Opinion ID: 2622770
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Does the requirement of affirmative authorization render RCW 42.17.760 unconstitutional?

Text: ¶ 25 A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of establishing its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. State ex rel. Heavey v. Murphy, 138 Wash.2d 800, 808, 982 P.2d 611 (1999). A statute is presumed constitutional, and all doubts are resolved in favor of constitutionality. Dixon, 78 Wash.2d at 804, 479 P.2d 931. ¶ 26 The first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution protect the freedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355-57, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). The practice of persons banding together to make their political voices heard is deeply embedded in the American political process. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294, 102 S.Ct. 434, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981). Its value is that by collective effort individuals can make their views known, when, individually, their voices would be faint or lost. Id. ¶ 27 The freedom to associate encompasses the freedom to contribute financially to an organization for the purpose of spreading a political message. Id. at 296, 102 S.Ct. 434. Making a contribution ... enables like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). Restrictions on expenditures in political campaigning implicate fundamental First Amendment interests. Id. at 23, 96 S.Ct. 612; see also Wash. State Republican Party, 141 Wash.2d at 256, 4 P.3d 808. ¶ 28 On the other hand, equally protected is a person's right not to be compelled to support political and ideological causes with which he or she disagrees. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995). The freedom of association includes the converse right not to be compelled to associate. Good v. Associated Students of Univ. of Wash., 86 Wash.2d 94, 100, 542 P.2d 762 (1975). Freedom of speech includes the freedom not to speak or to have one's money used to advocate ideas one opposes. Keller v. State Bar of Calif., 496 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2228, 110 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). [A]t the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State. Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-35, 97 S.Ct. 1782. ¶ 29 In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has addressed these competing rightsthe right to freely associate for the purpose of political speech and the right to be free from forced association in the context of the political speech of labor organizations. The result is an approach which strikes a balance between those who disagree with the labor organization's political activities and those who support the political activities. The approach accommodates the dissenting nonmember by providing an easy and prompt method of registering his or her objection and recouping any portion of fees which might otherwise be used by the union for political purposes. At the same time, the approach crafted by the Court makes it simple for one who supports the political causes of the union, whether member or nonmember, to assert his or her right of association. ¶ 30 In International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961), the Court considered whether a union receiving an employee's money should be free, despite that employee's objection, to spend his money for political causes which he opposes. The Court recognized the government's interest in supporting the important role unions play in preserving workplace harmony. Compulsory dues or fees to the union were justified by the union's obligation to represent all employees, whether members or not, as well as the union's desire to avoid free-riders. Therefore, the Court affirmed the union's right to collect fees from all employees who benefit from the union's collective bargaining activities. ¶ 31 The Court held, however, that compulsory union dues may not be used to support political causes if the member disagrees with those causes. On the other hand, the majority also has an interest in stating its views without being silenced by the dissenters. Id. at 773, 81 S.Ct. 1784. ¶ 32 The Court stated that the appropriate remedy must reconcile the majority and dissenting interests in the area of political expression, protecting both interests to the maximum extent possible without undue impingement of one on the other, and taking into account the administrative difficulty of accommodating each group. Id. Any remedies, however, would properly be granted only to those employees who had made known to the union that they did not desire their funds to be used for political causes to which they object. [D]issent is not to be presumedit must affirmatively be made known to the union by the dissenting employee. Id. at 774, 81 S.Ct. 1784. ¶ 33 In Abood, the Court affirmed that the principles of Street applied to public employees represented by a collective bargaining agency. The Court held that the union was allowed to use members' dues for purposes other than collective bargaining, provided the money did not come from employees who objected to the causes supported. Abood, 431 U.S. at 222, 97 S.Ct. 1782. [T]he Constitution requires only that such expenditures be financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing so against their will by the threat of loss of governmental employment. Id. at 235-36, 97 S.Ct. 1782. The Court affirmed that the burden is on the employee to make his objection known. ¶ 34 Then in Hudson and Ellis, [3] while once again affirming that the burden is on the employee to register his dissent to the union's political activities, the Court outlined the procedures that are constitutionally required to safeguard the First Amendment rights of that dissenting employee. An employee who is given a simple and convenient method of registering dissent has not been compelled to support a political cause and has not suffered a violation of his or her First Amendment rights. [4] ¶ 35 With these principles in mind, we consider the constitutionality of the restriction imposed by § 760 on the political speech of the union, its members, and its nonmembers. Regulation of First Amendment rights is always subject to exacting judicial scrutiny. Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 294, 102 S.Ct. 434. The State bears the burden of demonstrating that the restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 135 Wash.2d 618, 624, 957 P.2d 691 (1998). Such burdens are rarely met. Id. ¶ 36 Under § 760, the union is prevented from spending any portion of a nonmember's agency fees for political causes without the affirmative authorization of the nonmember. The WEA contends, and a majority at the Court of Appeals agreed, that the statute is unconstitutional because its requirement of affirmative authorization amounts to an impermissible presumption that each nonmember objects to the union's use of his or her fees for political activities. The State argues that although the Supreme Court has placed the burden on the dissenting nonmember to assert his or her First Amendment rights, it is nevertheless constitutionally permissible for § 760 to shift the burden to the union to protect the First Amendment rights of dissenting nonmembers. The Court of Appeals held that by presuming the dissent of nonmembers, § 760 upsets the balance of members' and nonmembers' constitutional rights in the context of a union's expenditures for political activities. Section 760 impermissibly shifts to the union the burden of the nonmembers' rights. This has the practical effect of inhibiting one group's political speech (the union and supporting nonmembers) for the improper purpose of increasing the speech of another group (the dissenting nonmembers). ¶ 37 A presumption of dissent violates the First Amendment rights of both members and nonmembers. The State argues that § 760 has no impact on the First Amendment rights of members because § 760 only requires the affirmative authorization of nonmembers. However, this argument denies the obvious, significant expense involved in complying with § 760. It is disingenuous to argue that § 760 has no impact on members' ability to assert their collective political voice. Campaign finance legislation can create insurmountable organizational and financial hurdles for organizations attempting to engage in political speech, rendering the legislation unconstitutional. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 254-55, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986). The weight of the administrative burden on the union is an important consideration in resolving the balance of member and nonmember First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671, 114 S.Ct. 1878, 128 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994) (court should consider the cost of procedural safeguards on First Amendment rights); Grunwald v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir.1993) (requirements of accommodating dissenting nonmembers must be practical). Dissenters may not silence the majority by the creation of too heavy an administrative burden. ¶ 38 In this case, WEA presented evidence that the procedures required by the State's interpretation of § 760 would be extremely costly and would have a significant impact on the union's political activities. See Report of Proceedings (RP) at 175-76, 187, 203, 208. The State concedes that written permission is not required. But even without a written permission requirement, the State's position would require individual contact with each nonmember who did not respond to the Hudson packet. Therefore, we reject the State's argument that transferring the burden from the dissenting nonmember to the union would have no impact on the union's ability to assert its political voice. ¶ 39 A presumption of dissent violates the First Amendment rights of nonmembers as well. A presumption of dissent fails to respect the nonmember's First Amendment rights as running both ways. Wagner v. Prof'l Eng'rs in Calif. Gov't, 354 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir.2004). It assumes that because an employee has not joined the union, he or she disagrees with the union's political expenditures. However, there are numerous and varied reasons why employees choose not to join a union. Leer v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 172 F.R.D. 439, 446-47 (W.D.Wash. 1997) (nonmembers do not have unanimity of purpose). Employees may choose to remain nonmembers for many reasons unrelated to political expression. For those nonmembers who agree with the union's political expenditures, § 760's presumption of dissent presents an unconstitutional burden on their right to associate themselves with the union on political issues. We are bound to provide at least as much protection to the union's members and nonmembers as that provided by the First Amendment: `[S]tates have no greater power to restrain the individual freedoms protected by the First Amendment than does the Congress.' Wash. State Republican Party, 141 Wash.2d at 264, 4 P.3d 808 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48-49, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985)). ¶ 40 Nevertheless, the State argues that we need not adhere to the balance of First Amendment rights as articulated in Street, Abood, and their progeny. [5] The State argues that those cases are different because they do not involve a state statute that expressly calls for affirmative authorization of nonmembers. The State also places great emphasis on the fact that § 760 was enacted by the citizens of Washington. However, the voters cannot do through initiative what is constitutionally prohibited. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash.2d 183, 204, 11 P.3d 762 (2000). In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, it is irrelevant that a statute is enacted by the voters rather than a legislative body. Id. ¶ 41 Moreover, while our state may provide greater protection to its citizens, such as dissenting nonmembers, than is provided by the federal constitution, it cannot do so at the expense of the rights of other citizens, such as members and supporting nonmembers. The State's argument transfers the burden of asserting First Amendment rights from the dissenting nonmembers and places it on the supporting nonmembers and the union. Increased protection for nonmembers, as asserted by the State, tips the scales of First Amendment rights in favor of the dissenting nonmember, while increasing the burden on the nonmember who supports the union's political causes and also on the union, which must bear the administrative costs. [T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49, 96 S.Ct. 612. ¶ 42 In addition, there is no indication that in voting for I-134, the voters intended to provide more protection for nonmembers than that offered under federal constitutional principles. Rather, as we have previously stated, the principal thrust of I-134 was to protect the integrity of the election process from the perception that elected officials are improperly influenced by monetary contributions and the perception that individuals have an insignificant role to play. Wash. State Republican Party, 141 Wash.2d at 293, 4 P.3d 808. The intent of the statute was to protect the public, not individual employees. Crisman, 115 Wash.App. at 23, 60 P.3d 652 (the wording and history of chapter 42.17 RCW indicate that its goal is to protect the public); see also Nelson, 131 Wash.2d at 532, 936 P.2d 1123 (Initiative 134 ... was aimed at repairing the political process.). ¶ 43 The Ninth Circuit engaged in a similar analysis in Mitchell v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 963 F.2d 258 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 940, 113 S.Ct. 375, 121 L.Ed.2d 287 (1992). In Mitchell, plaintiffs were nonmembers who, like the nonmembers here, failed to object to the union's use of a portion of agency shop fees for nonchargeable expenditures. The district court issued an injunction, requiring the union to obtain the affirmative consent of each individual nonmember before using that nonmember's fees for political purposes. ¶ 44 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that requiring an opt-in system would unduly impede the union in order to protect `the relatively rare species' of employee who is unwilling to respond to the union's notifications but nevertheless has serious disagreements with the union's support of its political and ideological causes. Id. at 263. The court held it would be an unconstitutional burden to require all those who agree with the union's political activities to affirmatively consent. Id. The Mitchell court quoted the United States Supreme Court's statement in Street, that the union should not be sanctioned in favor of an employee who makes no complaint regarding the use of his or her money. Id. at 260. In addition, the court quoted from a California Supreme Court decision that reached the same conclusion in a similar case: [E]ach nonmember has a right to prevent the use of his or her service fee for purposes beyond the union's representational obligations. Since ... that additional right is an aspect of the right of an employee to refuse to participate in a union's activities..., it must be affirmatively asserted or else it is waived. Id. at 262 (quoting Cumero v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 49 Cal.3d 575, 590, 262 Cal.Rptr. 46, 778 P.2d 174 (1989)). ¶ 45 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit held that the Supreme Court has set out a hierarchy of interests, which places the burden on the nonmember to make his objection known. Weaver v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 970 F.2d 1523, 1532 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 917, 113 S.Ct. 1274, 122 L.Ed.2d 668 (1993). The Weaver court stated that [a]n `opt-in' procedure would greatly burden unions while offering only a modicum of control to nonunion employees whose procedural rights have already been safeguarded by Hudson. Id. at 1533. An opt-in provision impermissibly shifts the balance of interests underlying all of the Supreme Court's pronouncements. Id. ¶ 46 The dissent incorrectly states that the Sixth Circuit has explicitly affirmed the constitutionality of an opt-in statute similar to § 760. Dissent at 368 (citing Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240 (6th Cir.1997)). However, the statute at issue in Miller is not similar to § 760. Washington's counterpart to the Michigan statute at issue in Miller is RCW 42.17.680(3), which we construed in one of Evergreen's previous suits against WEA. See State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Found. v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 140 Wash.2d 615, 999 P.2d 602 (2000). The provision at issue in Miller was the Michigan statute's prohibition of reverse checkoff, a collection system that automatically deducts contributions from a member's paycheck without his or her prior approval. Like the Michigan statute at issue in Miller, RCW 42.17.680(3) restricts the ability of various groups, including corporations and labor groups, from making direct deductions from an employee's wages. Miller did not involve a statute like § 760, and Miller is inapplicable to this case. [6] ¶ 47 The United States Supreme Court has held that a union has the right to use nondissenting nonmember fees for political purposes. Abood, 431 U.S. at 240, 97 S.Ct. 1782 (quoting Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122, 83 S.Ct. 1158, 10 L.Ed.2d 235 (1963)). The State has failed to even attempt to justify § 760, which it is required to do when regulating First Amendment rights. In fact, a restriction on the First Amendment rights of WEA must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. Here, the only interest asserted is additional protection for nonmembers' First Amendment rights. However, there is no indication or argument that WEA is compelling nonmembers to support political activities or preventing nonmembers from asserting their First Amendment rights. ¶ 48 The Supreme Court has indicated that a nonmember has a right to be free from compelled support of a political cause the nonmember does not agree with. As the Supreme Court has held, there is no compelled support if the union utilizes the Hudson procedures. Given that there is no compelled support, it does not appear that there is any governmental interference with First Amendment rights of nonmembers for § 760 to protect against. Certainly the State has not provided any evidence of a compelling governmental interest that justifies the restriction on WEA from using the fees of the nondissenting nonmembers. ¶ 49 Judge Robin J. Hunt in her dissent at the Court of Appeals opines that while opt-in procedures have not been found to be constitutionally required, the procedure is not constitutionally infirm. State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 117 Wash.App. 625, 644, 71 P.3d 244 (2003) (Hunt, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). She argues that the cases we cite, Street, Abood, Mitchell, and others, create a constitutional floor, but not a ceiling. Even if this argument were accepted, when the State acts in a way that affects the associational and free-speech rights of individuals, in addition to having a compelling reason, its legislation must be narrowly tailored. RCW 42.17.760 is not narrowly tailored especially when examined in light of recent United State Supreme Court authority. ¶ 50 In Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L.Ed.2d 554 (2000), the United States Supreme Court set forth the test for determining whether a government regulation improperly violates a group's right of expressive association. Because § 760 regulates the relationship between the union and agency fee payers with regard to political activity, the Boy Scouts analysis should be applied here. Under the Boy Scouts test, we must evaluate whether § 760's opt-in provision would significantly burden the union's expressive activity. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 653, 120 S.Ct. 2446. If so, then we must analyze whether § 760's opt-in provision is narrowly tailored to support a compelling state interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free speech. Id. at 648, 120 S.Ct. 2446. We conclude that the union's expressive activity is significantly burdened by § 760's opt-in requirement. We also conclude that any compelling state interest in protecting dissenters' rights, could be met by less restrictive means other than the § 760 opt-in procedure. The union's Hudson procedures amount to a constitutionally permissible alternative that adequately protects both the union and dissenters. Because RCW 42.17.760 is not narrowly tailored, we hold that the statute is unconstitutional. ¶ 51 The dissent complains that the narrowly tailored issue was not argued or briefed and that we should not rely on Boy Scouts. However, this is specifically argued in Respondent WEA's brief to this court. Resp't Br. at 14. That the Boy Scouts v. Dale case was not cited does not preclude this court from considering this important case. [T]his court has the inherent discretionary authority to reach issues not briefed by the parties if those issues are necessary for decision. Blaney v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 151 Wash.2d 203, 213, 87 P.3d 757 (2004) (quoting City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash.2d 260, 269, 868 P.2d 134 (1994)). Moreover, [T]his court has frequently recognized it is not constrained by the issues as framed by the parties if the parties ignore a constitutional mandate, a statutory commandment, or an established precedent. City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash.2d 260, 269, 868 P.2d 134 (1994). ¶ 52 In 2000, the United States Supreme Court analyzed whether application of New Jersey's public accommodation law to require the Boy Scouts to admit James Dale, a homosexual gay rights activist, violated the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 643, 647, 120 S.Ct. 2446. The Court noted that government actions that unconstitutionally burden a group's right of expressive association may take many forms, one of which was forcing a group to accept certain unwanted members. Id. at 648, 120 S.Ct. 2446. The Court then applied a multistep analysis and concluded (1) that the Boy Scouts engaged in expressive activity, (2) that forced inclusion of Dale would significantly burden the Boy Scouts' expression, and (3) that application of New Jersey's public accommodations law in that case ran afoul of the Boy Scouts' constitutional freedom of expressive association. Id. at 656, 120 S.Ct. 2446. ¶ 53 While this case involves regulation of the use of agency shop fees, rather than regulation of the group's membership, the essence of RCW 42.17.760 is state regulation of the relationship between the union and agency fee payers with regard to political speech. ¶ 54 Under Boy Scouts, in order to determine whether § 760 violates the union's freedom of expressive association, we must first determine whether the union engages in expressive activity. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 656, 120 S.Ct. 2446. It is clear from the record that the WEA engages in political and ideological activities not related to collective bargaining or contract administration. Moreover, § 760 specifically regulates the expenditure of agency shop fees to influence an election or to operate a political committee. Thus, it seems indisputable that the union engages in expressive activity and § 760 regulates the union's expressive association with agency fee payers. See Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 650, 120 S.Ct. 2446. ¶ 55 We must next determine whether § 760 opt-in requirement, significantly burdens the union's ability to express its viewpoint. The Boy Scouts Court emphasized that courts must also give deference to an association's view of what would impair its expression. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 653, 120 S.Ct. 2446. ¶ 56 RCW 41.59.060(2) provides that if an agency shop agreement becomes effective, a fee that is equivalent to union dues will be deducted from the salary of employees in the bargaining unit. See also RCW 41.59.100 (providing for limited exceptions not at issue here). Thus, under the agency shop provisions, the union is entitled to collect a fee equivalent to 100 percent of union dues from nonmembers in the bargaining unit. RCW 41.59.100. ¶ 57 Section 760 then encumbers the use of such funds by prohibiting their expenditure for political speech absent affirmative authorization by the agency fee paying nonmember. Notably, the statute acknowledges that the fees are in the union's possession but places restrictions upon the use of the union's funds for political speech. RCW 42.17.760. ¶ 58 The union's Hudson procedures protect dissenters' rights not to participate in the union's political speech. Twice a year, the union mailed a Hudson packet to agency fee payers. The packet contained detailed information about the union's expenditures and the right to object to nonchargeable expenditures. The packet offered three options. A nonmember could: (1) pay agency shop fees equal to 100 percent of union dues, (2) pay agency shop fees, but object to WEA's political expenditures and receive a rebate of nonchargeable expenditures as calculated by the union, or (3) object to the WEA's political expenditures and challenge the WEA's calculation of nonchargeable expenditures before an impartial arbitrator. RCW 42.17.760 significantly changes this process by requiring the union to forgo the use of the portion of agency fees that would go toward political expenditures unless the nonmember affirmatively authorizes use for political purposes, rather than allowing the union to use that portion of the agency fee for political speech absent objection. ¶ 59 The union contends that § 760's affirmative authorization requirement significantly burdens its expressive association with nonobjecting agency fee payers. At trial, a union expert testified that it would double the complexity of the dues collection system if fee payers were to pay a different amount than members. The union's additional efforts to attain affirmative authorization would impose further administrative burden. Even if the union were to hold the amount allocated to political activity in escrow while seeking affirmative authorization, the lack of access to those funds could impact the timeliness of the union's political speech. Given the Boy Scouts requirement that we give deference to the union's view of what would impair its political expression and given the long recognized, highly protected nature of political speech, we conclude that RCW 42.17.760 significantly burdens the union's right of expressive association. See Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 653, 120 S.Ct. 2446; see also Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425, 108 S.Ct. 1886, 100 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988) (political speech is at the core of the First Amendment freedom). ¶ 60 Finally, we must consider whether RCW 42.17.760 is narrowly tailored to support a compelling government interest that is unrelated to suppression. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 648, 120 S.Ct. 2446. The protection of dissenters' First Amendment rights is a compelling interest and this interest is not rooted in a desire to suppress the union's political speech for suppression's sake. However, the federal case law previously extensively cited reveals that § 760's opt-in provision is not narrowly tailored to protect this interest. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 106 S.Ct. 1066; Abood, 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782; Street, 367 U.S. 740, 81 S.Ct. 1784; Weaver, 970 F.2d 1523; Mitchell, 963 F.2d 258. As noted previously, the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts have concluded that a constitutionally acceptable alternative is the opt-out system previously implemented by the union. See, e.g., Street, 367 U.S. at 774, 81 S.Ct. 1784; Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36, 97 S.Ct. 1782; Mitchell, 963 F.2d at 262-63. Even if these cases do not contain a constitutionally based prohibition against opt-in systems, they do reveal a less restrictive alternative means for protecting dissenters' rights. Under the Boy Scouts analysis, § 760 significantly burdens the union's expressive association, requiring the statute to survive strict scrutiny. See Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 648, 120 S.Ct. 2446. The constitutionally acceptable opt-out alternative is significant in that it reveals that protection of dissenters' rights can be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of the union's associational freedoms than RCW 42.17.760's opt-in requirement. See id. ¶ 61 In sum, RCW 42.17.760 regulates the relationship between the union and agency fee payers with regard to political expression. Therefore, we apply the framework set forth in Boy Scouts to determine whether § 760 violates the union's right of expressive association. The union engages in expressive activity and RCW 42.17.760's opt-in requirement significantly burdens the union's association with agency fee payers with regard to its political speech. Accepting the argument that protection of dissenters' rights is a compelling state interest, the opt-out procedure is a less restrictive constitutionally permissible alternative. RCW 42.17.760's opt-in procedure is not narrowly tailored to advance the State's interest in protecting dissenters' rights, and thus, the statute is unconstitutional.