Opinion ID: 2636808
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict

Text: {10} Our review of the denial of a directed verdict motion asks whether sufficient evidence was adduced to support the underlying charge. See State v. Robinson, 94 N.M. 693, 696, 616 P.2d 406, 409 (1980). The test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction. State v. Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, ¶ 5, 140 N.M. 94, 140 P.3d 515 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court does not evaluate the evidence to determine whether some hypothesis could be designed which is consistent with a finding of innocence. State v. Graham, 2005-NMSC-004, ¶ 13, 137 N.M. 197, 109 P.3d 285 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Instead, [w]e view the evidence as a whole and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury's verdict, id., while at the same time asking whether  any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, id. ¶ 7 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {11} Child's testimony in this case was ambiguous as to the number of times that Defendant touched her during the charging period. She told the jury about two separate instances of inappropriate touching, the first occurring while she was putting lotion on her rash and the second happening while she was falling asleep. However, that testimony came after Child had first stated that Defendant had touched her five times subsequent to the Colorado trip, only to then answer that the touching had occurred just once after Colorado. Thus, Child's testimony was inconsistent. When parts of a witness's testimony are conflicting and ambiguous[,]... [i]t is the exclusive province of the jury to resolve [the] factual inconsistencies in [that] testimony. State v. Morales, 2000-NMCA-046, ¶ 8, 129 N.M. 141, 2 P.3d 878 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In the instant case, the record supports the inference that Defendant touched Child multiple times during the charging period, as well as the inference that he touched her only once during that time. However, the applicable standard of review does not contemplate our pars[ing] the testimony and view[ing] the verdict only in light of the probative value of individual pieces of evidence. Graham, 2005-NMSC-004, ¶ 13, 137 N.M. 197, 109 P.3d 285. Instead, [a]ppellate courts faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume  even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record  that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the [prevailing party], and must defer to that resolution. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Given that presumption and the record before us, we conclude that the jury acted rationally in resolving the factual inconsistencies present in Child's testimony in favor of the conclusion that Defendant touched Child twice during the charging period. We defer to that resolution, and thus agree with Judge Fry's conclusion in dissent that the trial court properly denied Defendant's directed verdict motion. See Sena, 2007-NMCA-115, ¶ 35, 142 N.M. 677, 168 P.3d 1101 (Fry, J., dissenting).