Opinion ID: 1685334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The State's Statutory Defenses.

Text: AFSCME urges that, once arbitrability under the collective-bargaining agreement is established, the question for the court is a narrow one, i.e., whether the award drew its essence from the collective-bargaining agreement. This contention is based on our pronouncements in American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. State, 526 N.W.2d 282, 283 (Iowa 1995), and Sergeant Bluff-Luton Education Ass'n v. Sergeant Bluff-Luton Community School District, 282 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 1979). While this is the standard for resolving most arbitration disputes, there is another consideration in arbitrations arising from the collective-bargaining agreements of public employees. In those cases, we must also consult the applicable statutory law governing public-employee arbitration. Public employee contracts are creatures of statute. Lee v. Halford, 540 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Iowa 1995); Hammer v. Branstad, 463 N.W.2d 86, 91-92 (Iowa 1990). The right of public employees to organize and collectively bargain is governed by statute, and in creating this process, the legislature is free to limit the bargaining process, what may be contained in a collective-bargaining agreement, and the authority of arbitrators to order specific types of relief. In the present cases, the State urges that both the arbitration of the dispute and the award are precluded by statute. It bases this argument on the following statutory directives: If the department determines that a person, who is employed by an institution... has been convicted of a crime or has a record of founded child or dependent adult abuse, the department shall perform an evaluation to determine whether prohibition of the person's employment... is warranted. Iowa Code § 218.13(3). In an evaluation, the department shall consider the nature and seriousness of the crime or founded child or dependent adult abuse in relation to the position sought or held, the time elapsed since the commission of the crime or founded abuse, the circumstances under which the crime or founded abuse was committed, the degree of rehabilitation, the likelihood that the person will commit the crime or founded abuse again, and the number of crimes or founded abuses committed by the person involved. The department may permit a person who is evaluated to be employed or reside or to continue employment or residence if the person complies with the department's conditions relating to employment or residence which may include completion of additional training. Iowa Code § 218.13(4). If the department determines that the person has committed a crime or has a record of founded child or dependent adult abuse which warrants prohibition of employment ... the person shall not be employed by an institution. Iowa Code § 218.13(5) (emphasis added). No collective bargaining agreement or arbitrator's decision shall be valid or enforceable if its implementation would... substantially impair or limit the performance of any statutory duty by the public employer. Iowa Code § 20.17(6). A provision of the Code which is inconsistent with any term or condition of a collective bargaining agreement ... shall supersede the term or condition... unless otherwise provided by the general assembly. Iowa Code § 20.28. The State urges that under Iowa Code section 20.28 the so-called record check termination procedures contained in section 218.13 are inconsistent with the collective-bargaining agreement. It also urges that Iowa Code section 20.17(6) renders the arbitrator's decision unenforceable because its implementation would impair the obligation of the DHS to terminate Nordyke and DeHoet under the provisions of Iowa Code section 218.13(5). We disagree with the State's first argument and conclude that, for purposes of applying section 20.28, the collective-bargaining agreement is not in conflict with any of the statutory provisions upon which the State relies. However, unlike section 20.28, which only governs the collective-bargaining agreement, section 20.17(6) also governs the arbitrator's decision. In applying that statute, we agree that the award of the arbitrator does impair a statutory duty of the public employer. In reaching this conclusion, we are aware that the statutory scheme presented in section 218.13 and particularly the last sentence of subsection 4 thereof does not mandate termination in all cases in which a record check reveals a criminal conviction. Nevertheless, in determining whether the department was under a duty to discharge the employees, we must consider what the department's evaluation of the facts was and not what it might have been. In the present case, it was the duty of the public employer to move sequentially through the record check steps for investigation and evaluation as provided in section 218.13. When, at the evaluation step called for in subsection 5, the department concluded that the criminal activity of Nordyke and DeHoet warranted prohibition of employment, it then became the department's duty to discharge these employees. Viewed in this light, we are convinced that the arbitrators' awards reinstating these employees impaired the department's statutory duty to discharge them. AFSCME urges that we took a different view of section 20.17(6) in Postville Community School District, 548 N.W.2d at 562. In that case, a school district sought to preclude enforcement of an arbitrator's award reinstating a discharged employee by urging that forcing it to reinstate that employee would impair its general duty to furnish its students a safe environment. We held that the arbitrator's award did not violate section 20.17(6). We are satisfied that the Postville Community School District case may be distinguished on the basis that, unlike the present dispute, it did not involve a specific statutory directive with respect to the termination of employees. The district court did not err in vacating the arbitrator's decision reinstating Nordyke and DeHoet.