Opinion ID: 2978517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: At the outset, I address the majority’s outright dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The collateral order doctrine allows a defendant to appeal immediately a district court’s order denying summary judgment where “(1) the defendant was a public official asserting a defense of 2 Mrs. Cooney’s deposition indicates that she did not see Hanson until he came “around the corner of the house.” Therefore, her testimony does not speak to the items in Hanson’s hand while he was in the garage and advancing toward Brewer between the garage and the corner of the house. 15 No. 08-4238 Hanson v. City of Fairview Park, et al. qualified immunity; and (2) the issue appealed concerned, not which facts the parties might be able to prove, but, rather, whether or not certain given facts showed a violation of clearly established law.” Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The majority correctly notes that where the parties ask us to resolve factual disputes, we lack jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319 (1995). However, where the defendant raises a purely legal question—as is the case here—then this court does have jurisdiction to decide the issue. Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 2005). Here, Brewer raises a purely legal issue on appeal. Specifically, Brewer contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he reasonably believed that Hanson posed a serious and imminent threat to Brewer’s safety. While Brewer’s argument confuses some of the legal issues in his appeal,3 this does not change the fact that “the court—not the jury—must consider the ‘threshold question’ of whether the ‘facts alleged show the officer’s conduct’” was reasonable under the circumstances. Phillips v. Roane County, 534 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Brewer’s appeal does not fail simply because he contests Mrs. Cooney’s statement that Hanson did not have golf clubs in his hands when she first witnessed the event; he also presents the discrete legal issue of the reasonableness of his conduct. As the Supreme Court has held, and as our precedent dictates, the reasonableness of an officer’s actions is a pure 3 Defendant argues that the district court erred by implicitly imposing a duty to retreat. Nothing in the district court’s ruling appears to impose such a duty. However, the defendant goes on to argue that he was entitled to qualified immunity because his actions were reasonable. He therefore presents a legal issue for this Court to resolve. 16 No. 08-4238 Hanson v. City of Fairview Park, et al. question of law for the court to decide at the summary judgment stage. Marvin, 509 F.3d at 244 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007)). In some of our previous cases, we have required the defendant to concede the plaintiff’s version of the facts before we evaluated the legal issue. See, e.g., Harrison, 539 F.3d at 517(“[T]he defendant must be prepared to . . . concede an interpretation of the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff’s case”); Phillips, 534 F.3d at 538 (stating that the defendant “must essentially concede the most favorable view of the facts to the plaintiff”). However, the Supreme Court has not required such a mechanical concession before evaluating whether a police officer acted reasonably. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (reversing the lower court finding that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity because facts were in dispute). The Supreme Court has placed emphasis on whether the facts in dispute are genuine or material to the outcome of the case, rather than simply whether any factual dispute exists. Id. at 380 (emphasis added). The Court in Scott noted that when a factual dispute exists, courts are required to evaluate the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 378. In this case, we have a full record available and nothing prevents this court from evaluating the facts as Mrs. Hanson presents them, in a light most favorable to her. The issue then becomes whether Brewer is entitled to qualified immunity under Mrs. Hanson’s set of facts, or whether the facts in dispute are material to deciding the outcome. In dismissing Brewer’s appeal, the majority errs by focusing exclusively on the district court’s stated reason for denying summary judgment. The majority spends much of its effort quoting the district court’s analysis on the facts in dispute. However, an appeal is not fatal simply because the district court’s holding is based on what the district court describes as a genuine issue of material 17 No. 08-4238 Hanson v. City of Fairview Park, et al. fact. Estate of Carter, 408 F.3d at 309. “Despite the label used by the district court, this court can consider whether ‘the undisputed facts or the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff fail to establish a prima facie violation of clear constitutional law.’” Id. By relying solely on the district court’s findings, the majority ignores the second part of our job: to determine whether the defendant presents a legal issue over which we may properly exercise jurisdiction. Notwithstanding some factual disputes, qualified immunity may still be appropriate if the plaintiff’s version of the disputed facts “demonstrate that a hypothetical reasonable officer would not have known that his actions . . . were objectively unreasonable.” Scott v. Clay County, 205 F.3d 867, 877 (6th Cir. 2000). Thus, in cases where a factual dispute exists, our job is to evaluate the plaintiff’s version of the facts to determine whether the defendant acted reasonably, and not simply to accept the district court’s stated reason for denying summary judgment. The majority claims that this analysis implicates “fairness concerns” as to Mrs. Hanson because this “issue” was not presented to the court, and “qualified immunity . . . should first be decided by the district court.” If the issue of qualified immunity was not presented to the court, what then did the district court rule on when it denied Brewer’s motion for summary judgment? Mrs. Hanson was confronted with Brewer’s qualified immunity argument and was given both time and opportunity to present her version of the facts both in the district court below and in this court. Thus, “fairness” is in no way implicated here. The majority also argues that exercising jurisdiction runs afoul to Johnson and claims that “parsing through the record” is the job of trial—not appellate—judges. By citing Johnson to support its holding, the majority ignores the Supreme Court’s ruling in Scott, which clarified the analysis to be applied at the summary judgment stage. See 18 No. 08-4238 Hanson v. City of Fairview Park, et al. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (“The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute . . . will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” (internal quotations omitted)). Moreover, in claiming that “parsing through the record” is not our job, the majority disregards our precedent in qualified immunity cases which does exactly that—reviews the record. See, e.g., Davenport v. Causey, 521 F.3d 544, 547 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Because the district court did not identify what facts it found in dispute . . ., we have to engage in a cumbersome review of the record.” (internal quotations omitted)); Floyd v. City of Detroit, 518 F.3d 398, 404 (6th Cir. 2008) (“A review of the record, however, demonstrates that the officers’ qualified-immunity claims do not require us to consider whether there are genuine issues of fact for trial.” (emphasis added)); Gaddis v. Redford Township, 364 F.3d 763, 766 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he record on appeal includes a videotape . . . . We have carefully examined the tape along with the witnesses’ testimony.”). By failing to evaluate the pure legal issue, the majority undermines the purpose of qualified immunity and weakens its availability for future defendants. Qualified immunity recognizes that the public interest is best served when officials can act “with independence and without fear of consequences” so long as their actions do not violate clearly established rights. Moldowan v. City of Warren, --- F.3d --- , No. 07-2115, 2009 WL 2497969 at  (6th Cir. Aug 18, 2009) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 554 (1967)). It also protects officers from “undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.” Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 695 (6th Cir. 2005). Qualified immunity is more than a mere defense against the claim, but rather serves the more important role of providing immunity from suit. Phillips, 534 F.3d at 539 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)). Once the 19 No. 08-4238 Hanson v. City of Fairview Park, et al. immunity is lost, it cannot be recaptured if the case goes to trial. Id. Thus, denying summary judgment any time a factual dispute arises could thwart the important public interest that qualified immunity serves. Id. To dismiss this case outright under the auspices of some factual dispute, without further inquiry regarding the materiality of the factual dispute, runs directly against the well established purposes behind qualified immunity. Because I find that Brewer has presented a purely legal issue on appeal, I would hold that this court does have jurisdiction over the appeal. In resolving Brewer’s legal issue, I accept as true Mrs. Hanson’s version of the facts. That is, I assume that Scott Hanson was not holding any golf clubs at the time Brewer shot him. I now turn to the legal issue of whether Brewer is entitled to qualified immunity.