Opinion ID: 65335
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of the Fourth Amendment

Text: We must at all times remain mindful that it is the Fifth Amendment, not the Fourth, that protects an individual's right to own property while acknowledging the State's concomitant right to acquire private property, albeit under carefully curtailed conditions: (1) The intended use must be public, and (2) the owner must be justly compensated. [24] The Takings Clause largely `operates as a conditional limitation, permitting the government to do what it wants so long as it pays the charge.' [25] In contrast, the Fourth Amendment protects, inter alia, an individual's right to possess property that he continues to own. [26] The State may not interfere with possession of private property unless its manner of doing so is reasonable. Even though some aspects of the Fourth and Fifth amendments might overlap, they provide distinct protections and impose distinct requirements on the government. The seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable interference with possession, requiring neither compensation nor public use, while the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects against physical occupation, transfer of title, and the elimination of all economically beneficial use but does not contain the language of reasonableness. Rather, the Takings Clause implies that if just compensation is paid and the purpose of the taking is public use, then it follows that the taking is reasonable per se. [27] Conversely, the Fourth Amendment requires only reasonableness when the State interferes with possession. The State may justify a seizure as reasonable in a number of ways, [28] nearly all of which have been identified within the criminal justice context public safety, [29] contraband, [30] border security, [31] public health [32] but none requires that the State put the property to a particular use or pay the owner! In essence, the Fourth Amendment provides no compensatory protection to the property owner like Severance, for once the State has satisfied the reasonableness requirement, its obligation is fulfilled. It is the Fifth Amendment, then, construed here through the lens of the Fourteenth Amendment, that ensures that the State must respect private property by curtailing the purpose for which the State may take (be it title, physical possession, or some crucial stick from the bundle of property rights), and requiring that when the State does take, it pay for the privilege. For the majority to say that the Fourth Amendment affords protection when the State takes a stick from the property-rights bundle is tantamount to permitting the State to take without public purpose or without providing just compensation, or both. Severance's argument thus leads her to a result that is diametrically opposed to the one she seeks: Less protection of property rights rather than more. In a case like this, in which Severance alleges nothing more than that the reason or purpose of the taking was erroneous, the Fourth Amendment does no work for her. [33] As I shall demonstrate in detail below, the State's action was unquestionably reasonable, leaving Severance uncompensated under the Fourth Amendment for the chimeric loss she now claims. In my judgment, this deftly illustrates why the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply to a takings claim masquerading as a seizure. It offers no quarter, and clearly explains why the Framers added the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, to define  that is, to confine what is permissible when the State takes private property. [34] Yet, in countenancing Severance's Fourth Amendment claim, the majority impermissibly opens the door to judicial cognizance of run-of-the-mill Fifth Amendment takings claims gussied up as seizure claims. Further, in a case like this that will now be heard sequentially to her Fifth Amendment claim (to say nothing of unnecessarily dragging the Texas Supreme Court into the fray), the majority opinion squanders judicial resources. The panel majority permits this takings claimant to don the trappings of a seizure claimant for a second bite at the constitutional apple. I foresee additional problems, including that this permits Severance and future similar claimants to head off what might otherwise be deemed a valid taking by bringing a seizure claim before the takings claim ripens. Indeed, the State need not act pursuant to an easement to effect a taking. The taking would be valid so long as the intended use was public and the landowner justly compensated. The majority's holding turns the Fifth Amendment on its head, enabling what might be a valid taking to be an impermissible seizure (the takings claimant has not yet sought compensation so none has been paid), an impossible outcome.