Opinion ID: 6498779
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Suffer or Permit” Prong

Text: Huerta also argues that the time spent waiting for and undergoing the exit process was compensable as “hours worked” under the “suffer or permit” prong of Wage Order No. 16. Under California law, “an employee who is suffered or permitted to work does not have to be under the employer’s control to be compensated, provided the employer has or should have knowledge of the employee’s work.” Frlekin, 457 P.3d at 531 (first citing Morillion, 995 P.2d at 144–45; then citing Troester v. Starbucks Corp., 421 P.3d 1114 (Cal. 2018); and then citing Hernandez, 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 856). The “phrase ‘suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do so’ . . . encompasses a meaning distinct from merely ‘working.’ . . . [It] can be interpreted as time an employee is working but is not subject to an employer’s control.” Morillion, 995 P.2d at 145. And “a benefit is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for liability under the ‘suffer or permit’ standard. Instead . . . , the basis of liability is the defendant’s knowledge of and failure to prevent the work from occurring.” Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 282 (Cal. 2010). The California Supreme Court has never explicitly defined “work” in the phrase “suffer or permit to work” or issued an opinion that squarely addresses the question. Cf. id. at 273–74, 282 (discussing the history of the phrase and its interaction with employer control); Dynamex Ops. W. v. Super. Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 32 (Cal. 2018) (discussing how the phrase impacted the definition of independent contractor). 14 HUERTA V. CSI ELEC. CONTRACTORS The California Court of Appeal has held “the standard of ‘suffered or permitted to work’ is met when an employee is engaged in certain tasks or exertion that a manager would recognize as work. Mere transportation of tools, which does not add time or exertion to a commute, does not meet this standard.” Hernandez, 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 860 (quoting Taylor v. Cox Commc’ns Cal., LLC, 283 F. Supp. 3d 881, 890 (C.D. Cal. 2017)). Here, Huerta was a forklift operator, and there is no record evidence suggesting his manager would recognize driving his personal vehicle, rolling down his window, or scanning his identification badge as “work.” He does not contest these were the only required activities, but instead argues they met the legal standard because he had to literally exert himself to do so. However, the California Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted this definition and we are uncertain if it would. The answer would be dispositive here if decided in Huerta’s favor, so we respectfully certify this question.