Opinion ID: 1043883
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: FMVSS 208 and Passenger Seatbelts

Text: FMVSS 208 “specifies performance requirements for the protection of vehicle occupants in crashes.” 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, S1. The purpose of FMVSS 208, according to 8 The Safety Act contains an express preemption clause, which prohibits states from enacting any standard that differs from a federal motor vehicle safety standard that is “applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment.” Id. § 30103(b)(1). The Safety Act also contains a saving clause, however, which provides that “[c]ompliance with a motor vehicle safety standard . . . does not exempt a person from liability at common law.” Id. § 30103(e). Reading these provisions together, the United States Supreme Court has clarified that the saving clause exempts state law tort suits from express preemption but does not preclude application of ordinary preemption principles. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 868-69, 874. -11- its own text, “is to reduce the number of deaths of vehicle occupants, and the severity of injuries, by . . . specifying equipment requirements for active and passive restraint systems.” Id. § 571.208, S2. Throughout its history, the standard has remained silent on the issue of passenger seatbelts with regard to the category of the vehicle at issue here—buses with a GVWR greater than 10,000 pounds.9 The original version of FMVSS 208 contained provisions applicable to all buses manufactured on or after January 1, 1972, requiring either a “complete . . . protection system” or a “belt system,” but this requirement applied only to the driver, not passengers. See id. § 571.208, S4.4.1. In 1973, NHTSA issued a notice “propos[ing] a new motor vehicle safety standard to require buses to have passenger seats that are stronger, higher, and less hostile on impact than present seats.” Bus Passenger Seating and Crash Protection, 38 Fed. Reg. 4776, 4776 (Feb. 22, 1973). The proposed standard mandated seatbelts and other seating specifications for all seating positions in all buses. Id. at 4776-77. After studying the issue for over a year, NHTSA withdrew the proposed new standard, citing cost concerns and statistics indicating that seating improvement would not substantially reduce injuries in intercity and transit buses, largely because, according to surveys, few passengers in those types of buses would use seatbelts if provided. School Bus Passenger Crash Protection, 39 Fed. Reg. 27,585, 27,585 (July 30, 1974). In light of these considerations, NHTSA concluded that the passenger seatbelt requirement and the other proposed seating requirements were not necessary “because of the adequacy of th[e] seating as presently designed.” Id. NHTSA opted instead to propose a different set of seating requirements to apply exclusively to school buses, which were eventually adopted. See id.; see also 49 C.F.R. § 571.222 (2012). In 1988, NHTSA proposed a rule that would require “manufacturers to install lap/shoulder belts in all forward-facing rear outboard seating positions in passenger cars, light trucks, multipurpose passenger vehicles (e.g., passenger vans and utility vehicles), and small buses.” Occupant Crash Protection, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,982, 47,982 (Nov. 29, 1988). In its notice of the proposed rule, NHTSA emphasized the extensive research “show[ing] that lap belts in the rear seat are effective in preventing deaths and reducing injuries,” and it further concluded that lap-and-shoulder belts in rear seating positions, including the passenger seats of small buses, would bring about increased safety benefits. Id. at 47,984. The proposed rule was adopted in 1989. Occupant Crash Protection, 54 Fed. Reg. 46,257, 46,257 (Nov. 2, 1989) (codified at 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, S4.4.3 (2012)). In considering whether to adopt this rule, however, the agency specifically exempted large buses from consideration. Id. at 46,261; Occupant Crash Protection, 53 Fed. Reg. at 47,987. As a result, 9 For ease of reference, we will hereinafter refer to buses with a GVWR greater than 10,000 pounds as “large buses” and buses with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less as “small buses.” -12- the version of FMVSS 208 in effect at the time the bus at issue was manufactured—like the current version—requires either a complete protection system or a seatbelt for the driver but does not require passenger seatbelts for large buses. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, S4.4.2.1–.2, S4.4.3.1. Not surprisingly, the Plaintiffs and the Defendants advance differing interpretations of the history of FMVSS 208 as well as NHTSA’s explanations for not imposing a passenger seatbelt requirement for large buses.10 The Defendants assert that the requirement of a seatbelt only for the driver position in large buses is tantamount to “an explicit statement that passenger seatbelts are not required,” reflecting a “conscious decision” by NHTSA “not to require seatbelts in passenger seats” based upon the determination that large buses are safe without passenger seatbelts. The Defendants also draw our attention to a letter dated August 19, 1992, in which NHTSA’s Chief Counsel, Paul Jackson Rice, opined that FMVSS 208 would preempt proposed legislation under consideration in New York that would have imposed a passenger seatbelt requirement for large buses. This opinion was based on Rice’s assessment that “NHTSA [had] expressly determined that there is not a safety need for safety belts or another type of occupant crash protection [in passenger] seating positions.” The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, dispute the notion that NHTSA has interpreted FMVSS 208 to preempt state tort suits and argue that prohibiting passenger seatbelts is not a significant regulatory objective of FMVSS 208. In support of their respective contentions, the parties rely upon a series of United States Supreme Court decisions addressing the preemption of state tort claims by federal regulations. The Defendants, like our Court of Appeals, rely heavily upon Geier, a 2000 decision in which the Supreme Court concluded that the 1984 version of FMVSS 208 preempted a state law tort claim premised on the failure of an auto-manufacturer to equip the plaintiff’s vehicle with an airbag. 529 U.S. at 864-65. At issue in Geier was a portion of FMVSS 208 that required manufacturers to equip their vehicles with “passive restraint systems,” but at the same time permitted manufacturers “to choose among different passive restraint mechanisms, such as airbags, automatic belts, or other passive restraint technologies to satisfy that requirement.” Id. at 878. The key feature of the regulation requiring preemption was that the passive restraint standard “deliberately sought variety—a mix of 10 In support of their respective arguments about the history of the regulations and the agency’s explanation of the relevant objectives, the parties cite extensive material postdating the manufacture of the bus at issue. Consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent, we will limit our consideration of these issues to the version of the regulations in effect in October of 1995, when the bus was manufactured. See, e.g., Williamson, 131 S. Ct. at 1134, 1137-39 (limiting consideration of regulatory history and agency explanation of objectives to the version of the applicable regulation in effect at the time of manufacture); Geier, 529 U.S. at 864, 875-83 (same). Of course, more recent materials may be relevant in regard to the agency’s current views of the preemptive effect of its regulations. -13- several different passive restraint systems.” Id. The Court emphasized that NHTSA had rejected a strict airbag requirement in favor of preserving manufacturer choice as to passive restraints because of “safety concerns (perceived or real) associated with airbags,” high production costs, and negative public perception. Id. at 878-79. The Court in Geier applied the preemption bar, concluding that a rule of state tort law imposing a duty to install an airbag “would have required manufacturers of all similar cars to install airbags rather than other passive restraint systems, such as automatic belts or passive interiors. It thereby would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of devices that the federal regulation sought.” Id. at 881. The Plaintiffs rely primarily on two subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions that cautioned against an overly broad application of the ruling in Geier. In the first such case, Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, the Court concluded that a Coast Guard regulation, which did not require propeller guards on boat motors, did not implicitly preempt a state law tort claim alleging negligence on the part of a manufacturer for failing to install such a guard. 537 U.S. 51, 64-68 (2002). The regulatory history in Sprietsma indicated that the Coast Guard had considered adopting a rule requiring propeller guards but had ultimately decided “to take no regulatory action.” Id. at 65. The Coast Guard’s reasons for not requiring propeller guards included the high cost of retrofitting existing boats, the lack of a universally acceptable guard for “all boats and motors,” and data suggesting that “propeller guards might prevent penetrating injuries but increase the potential for blunt trauma caused by collision with the guard.” Id. at 61. The Court rejected the manufacturer’s attempt to equate the Coast Guard’s decision not to adopt a propeller-guard requirement with a policy against propeller guards, explaining that “[i]t is quite wrong to view th[e] decision [not to require propeller guards] as the functional equivalent of a regulation prohibiting all States . . . from adopting such a regulation.” Id. at 65. Distinguishing Geier, the Court further observed that the Coast Guard’s stated reasons for not adopting a propeller guard requirement reveal[] only a judgment that the available data did not meet the . . . “stringent” criteria for federal regulation. The Coast Guard did not take the further step of deciding that, as a matter of policy, the States and their political subdivisions should not impose some version of propeller guard regulation, and it most definitely did not reject propeller guards as unsafe. The Coast Guard’s apparent focus was on the lack of any “universally acceptable” propeller guard for “all modes of boat operation.” But nothing in its official explanation would be inconsistent with a tort verdict premised on a jury’s finding that some type of propeller guard should have been installed on this particular kind of boat equipped with respondent’s particular type of motor. Thus, although the Coast Guard’s decision not to require propeller guards was -14- undoubtedly intentional and carefully considered, it does not convey an “authoritative” message of a federal policy against propeller guards. Id. at 66-67 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Plaintiffs also rely upon the 2011 decision in Williamson, which involved a tort claim alleging that a minivan occupant died in an accident because her rear inner seat was equipped with only a lap belt instead of lap-and-shoulder belts. 131 S. Ct. at 1134. At issue was a different provision of the same version of FMVSS 208 applicable in this case, which permitted auto manufacturers to choose between lap belts and lap-and-shoulder belts for rear inner seats. Id. The Court recognized the similarity of the preemption question in Geier, noting that as in that case, FMVSS 208 left manufacturers with a choice that would be restricted by a verdict imposing liability; however, the Court ultimately distinguished Geier, concluding that “manufacturer choice was an important regulatory objective” in Geier, whereas the choice between lap belts and lap-and-shoulder belts at issue in Williamson was not “a significant regulatory objective.” Id. at 1137. The Court reasoned that, in contrast to the extensive regulatory history showing a deliberate preservation of manufacturer choice in Geier, the choice between seatbelts permitted under FMVSS 208 had nothing to do with consumer acceptance, safety concerns, or an interest in assuring a mix of various devices. Id. at 1137-38. Rather, the primary reasons for allowing manufacturers to choose between lap-only and lap-and-shoulder belts were the high cost associated with lap-and-shoulder belts and their potential interference with exit and entry due to “‘stretch[ing] the shoulder belt across the aisleway.’” Id. at 1138 (alteration in original) (quoting Occupant Crash