Opinion ID: 379222
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Facts Surrounding The Confessions

Text: 143 The panel opinion (hereafter sometimes referred to as Panel Op.) and Judge Garza's opinion (hereafter referred to as Judge Garza's Op.) discuss the formulae for determining whether a confession is voluntary. See Judge Garza's Op., p. 937 n.6; Panel Op., 593 F.2d at 676. In a nutshell: 144 If an individual's will was overborne or if his confession was not the product of a rational intellect and a free will, his confession is inadmissible because (it is) coerced. 145 Townsend v. Sain, supra, 372 U.S. at 307, 83 S.Ct. at 754, 9 L.Ed.2d at 782 (quoting authority). As Judge Garza correctly points out, in a habeas proceeding the burden of establishing facts which demonstrate involuntariness is on the petitioner. See, e. g., Lokos v. Capps, 528 F.2d 576, 578 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1976). Cf. LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 690, 695, 93 S.Ct. 1203, 1205, 35 L.Ed.2d 637, 641 (1973). 146 We believe that both of Jurek's confessions are voluntary. However, because the en banc Court holds that the first is voluntary but the second is not, we consider each confession separately. Since several factors were, in the view of the panel, indicative of involuntariness with respect to both confessions, we first consider those factors before focusing on the precise circumstances of each of the two confessions. Our factual discussion is rather detailed, but since this case depends so heavily on the precise facts, we believe that such a detailed discussion is essential. 147
148 The panel opinion emphasized two considerations common to both confessions which suggest involuntariness: (1) the pre-confession conduct of the police and prosecuting attorneys, and (2) Jurek's limited mental capacity. We discuss each consideration separately. 149
150 The panel opinion suggested that the two written confessions were suspect because they were the fruits of an extraordinary series of actions by the police and prosecutors. 593 F.2d at 677. Specifically, the panel pointed out that Jurek was arrested, taken from his home without shirt or shoes, kept from his family, was not given an attorney for 42 hours, and was moved from Cuero to Austin and then back to Cuero, then to Victoria and back to Cuero. Id. at 678. The panel then cited a Supreme Court case, Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967), for the proposition that compelled travel during interrogation is a factor suggesting involuntariness. 593 F.2d at 678. The panel also pointed out that Jurek was arrested without a warrant. Id. Earlier in the opinion the panel had indicated that Jurek was logged into jail at 2:30 a. m. on August 17 and was questioned for at least the next ten hours (although) there were some respites, during which Jurek apparently was allowed to sleep. Id. at 674 (emphasis added). 151 The statements of the panel are in marked contrast to the findings and inferences by the Courts below. The Federal District Court explicitly found: 152 There is no evidence that Jurek's incarceration in the Victoria Jail was an effort to or resulted in lack of communication with his family. Nor is there any evidence that Jurek's confessions were a result of or were tained (sic) by a delay in taking Jurek before a magistrate. The circumstances of Petitioner's arrest after midnight and the fact that he was barefoot until he got to the jail do not amount to overbearing of will. 153 R. 445-46. Similarly, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated: 154 (T)he record reflects that the authorities had ample evidence to detain, question and arrest appellant. On the afternoon of the homicide, witnesses saw appellant, in his patchwork and haphazardly painted pickup, talking with the deceased in the Cuero City Park, where she had gone swimming. Shortly thereafter witnesses saw her riding in the back of this unusually colored pickup, screaming for help, as it sped through town. A relative soon reported her missing, and the search for her ensued. That evening, one of the witnesses who had seen this particular pickup at the park, identified it as the truck parked at appellant's residence. Appellant was therefore a logical person to question about the missing child's whereabouts. . . . There is no showing that the detention contributed to the making of appellant's two confessions. . . . 155 Appellant was arrested at 1:15 a. m. on August 17, approximately six hours after the child's disappearance. At police headquarters, the two arresting officers read appellant his Miranda warnings, and questioned him for approximately 45 minutes. He denied any knowledge concerning the child's whereabouts. At 2:30 a. m., he was placed in a jail cell, which contained a bed, and was left alone until the next morning, when the county attorney, who also read appellant his Miranda warnings, questioned him for approximately 15 minutes. He continued to deny any knowledge about the child's whereabouts. Two or three other officers spoke with him briefly during the morning. 156 Later in the day, two officers took appellant to Austin for a polygraph test. During the examination, he admitted murdering the girl. Her body was later recovered on the basis of information supplied by appellant at this time. The officers arrived back at Cuero with appellant at approximately 9:30 a. m. (should read p. m.). He was immediately taken before Magistrate Albert Ley, who read appellant his rights from a magistrate's certificate. Approximately four hours later, after being questioned by the district attorney and the county attorney, appellant gave his first confession. The confession stated that he killed the child because she made derogatory comments about his family. He was taken to the County Jail at Victoria at about 1:15 a. m. He was returned to Cuero at 2:00 p. m. and gave his second confession at 7:30 that evening after again speaking with the district attorney and the county attorney and several others. In the confession he stated that he had not told the complete truth in his earlier statement and that he killed the girl because she refused his sexual advances. 157 The record reflects that appellant was repeatedly warned of his constitutional rights under Miranda. There is no evidence in the record that appellant was deprived of food or sleep, or that he was not in complete control of his faculties when he gave the confessions. He was left alone in his cells between interrogations and was offered food and beverages at various times during this two day period. There is evidence that he was alert enough to make minor corrections in the confessions before signing them. 158 Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 942-43 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (footnote omitted). 159 Most of the facts discussed by the Federal District Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals are undisputed. Moreover, we agree with the inferences drawn by these Courts from the undisputed facts with respect to the ultimate issue of voluntariness. Indeed, after making our own examination of the record, we are puzzled because of the large quantity of evidence contradicting the factual assertions made by the panel and the lack of any evidence in the record to support some of the panel's statements, despite the panel's claim to be relying only on undisputed facts. 593 F.2d at 674 n.2. 160 For example, the panel's suggestion that Jurek was questioned throughout the night after his arrest is not only unsupported by but is flatly contradicted by the record. See, e. g., Tr., Vol. I, 111-12; Tr., Vol. VI, 1333 (testimony of County Attorney Post); Tr., Vol. VIII, 1668-69 (testimony of Cuero Police Chief Wright). 12 Jurek's own attorney conceded in closing argument that after being put in jail, Jurek was left alone the rest of the night. Tr., Vol. VIII, 1815. And those who saw Jurek the next day testified that he appeared rested. See, e. g., Tr., Vol. VI, 1336 (testimony of County Attorney Post). 161 It is true that Jurek was taken to Austin for a polygraph test and was then moved to the Victoria Jail. However, the panel opinion is grossly misleading because it fails to consider adequately if at all the undisputed facts surrounding these events. To begin with, it is undisputed that the polygraph test was given at Jurek's own request. Tr., Vol. VI, 1311 (testimony of County Attorney Post). Jurek has at no time brought forth any evidence to rebut the undisputed evidence that he requested the polygraph test. Moreover, it is undisputed that Jurek was taken before a magistrate as soon as he returned from Austin (about 9:30 p. m.). Tr., Vol. VI, 1315-16 (testimony of County Attorney Post). And Jurek was offered meals and cigarettes before, during, and after his trip to Austin. Tr., Vol. VI, 1339-41 (testimony of County Attorney Post). 13 We find it incredible that Jurek can claim in this Court that the conduct of the police was coercive when the police were merely abiding by Jurek's own wishes. 162 Regarding Jurek's transfer to the Victoria Jail, the undisputed evidence establishes that this move was for Jurek's own safety. As the record makes clear, the victim's father was a county patrolman in Cuero and had access to the DeWitt County Jail in Cuero. All of the witnesses who testified on the matter agreed that Jurek's safety was the sole consideration in the decision that he stay at the Victoria Jail, not at the county jail in Cuero. E. g., Tr., Vol. I, 136, 141 (testimony of Sheriff Dietze); Cheatham Dep., 35-37 (testimony of District Attorney Cheatham). Indeed, there was evidence that Jurek himself expressed a desire to stay at the Victoria Jail. Tr., Vol. VI, 1324 (testimony of County Attorney Post); Tr., Vol. VI, 1440-41 (testimony of Robert Pickens). There is no evidence that Jurek suffered from this good faith transfer. Indeed, Victoria is less than 30 miles from Cuero. 163 It is also undisputed that on numerous occasions before the two confessions were given, Jurek was given his Miranda warnings. 14 For example, Judge Albert Ley, the Magistrate before whom Jurek appeared on the evening of the 17th, testified at length that he gave Jurek his warnings. 15 164 Like the District Court, we conclude that little, if any, significance can be attached to the fact that Jurek was not wearing shoes or a shirt at the time of arrest. 16 Both of Jurek's parents (who testified that Jurek was arrested without shirt and shoes) conceded that the police returned to the Jureks' residence the next day and picked up shoes and a shirt. Tr., Vol. VIII, 1734-35 (testimony of Mrs. Jurek); Tr., Vol. VIII, 1752 (testimony of Mr. Jurek). And Deputy Sheriff McMahan recalls that during the next day, Jurek was wearing shoes. Tr., Vol. VII, 1641. At most, Jurek went for one night without shoes and shirt, hardly a basis, either alone or in conjunction with the other factors, for declaring his confessions involuntarily. 17 165 The facts discussed above do not in any way suggest an attempt to break Jurek down. Panel Op., 593 F.2d at 678. Nor can we say that their effect could only have been to disorient Jurek, to weaken his resistance and heighten his suggestibility. Id. There are present here none of the egregious facts upon which Supreme Court holdings of involuntariness have been based. 18 The interval between arrest and the confessions was devoid of any coercive or unfair tactics by the police and prosecution. In the words of the Supreme Court: No threats were made, no promises offered, (and) no force used . . . . Thomas v. Arizona, supra, 356 U.S. at 401, 78 S.Ct. at 891, 2 L.Ed.2d at 871. (W)e find ample support in this record for a finding that the officers did not intend to take advantage of petitioner and that nothing they did had the effect of overbearing (petitioner's) will. Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426, 431, 78 S.Ct. 1354, 1357, 2 L.Ed.2d 1443, 1447 (1958). 166
167 The panel opinion, in holding both of Jurek's written confessions involuntary, relied heavily on Jurek's limited mental capacity. The evidence is undisputed that Jurek is of somewhat low intelligence. The various doctors who testified agreed that Jurek's overall IQ is about 80. See, e. g., Tr., Vol. VIII, 1709 (testimony of Dr. Kenneth Owens); R., 82 (testimony of Dr. Russell Adams). The District Court found that Jurek is an individual of below-average intelligence, mildly retarded, with possible organic brain damage. And the evidence established that Jurek had only a seventh grade writing ability. Tr., Vol. VIII, 1678 (testimony of Dr. William McKinney). However, the effect of Jurek's dull normal intelligence on his ability to give a voluntary confession is not established by the evidence and clearly the panel's statement, (T)here is a serious danger both that Jurek did not want to confess and that his susceptibility to the police officers' influence made him confess to things he did not do, 593 F.2d at 677, is flagrant appellate fact finding at its worst. The District Court found that the psychiatric testimony presented to it was inconclusive and not convincing. R., 434. After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the District Court concluded: Considering Jurek's intelligence, either alone or in conjunction with the other factors, does not indicate an involuntary confession. R., 445. 168 There is some support in the record for the panel's position, although the evidence is at best inconclusive. Dr. Lawrence Schoenfeld, a witness at the Federal habeas hearing, testified that Jurek might be coerced into confessing to escape from a tension-producing situation. But Dr. Schoenfeld emphasized that this was not positively the case. See also Tr., Vol. VIII, 1714 (testimony of Dr. Kenneth Owens). Other medical experts were even less conclusive. For example, Dr. William McKinney testified that when he interviewed Jurek, Jurek did not feel coerced into giving answers he did not want to give: 169 . . . I did not feel that that, you know that he was just going just answering the questions just to give me an answer, irregardless. I think this is what you (Defense Attorney) are implying, that he would be willing to say anything to get over the question. I felt that he was giving me what he what he felt, although, at times, his statements were contradictory. 170 Tr., Vol. VIII, 1682. Dr. McKinney conceded, however, that his interviews with Jurek may not have been as stress-producing as police-house interrogation. Tr., Vol. VIII, 1684. Dr. McKinney also conceded that it was possible that Jurek could be swayed into signing a confession against his interests. Tr., Vol. VIII, 1700. 171 Moreover, although there was evidence that Jurek was somewhat susceptible to pressure in a stress-producing environment, the evidence also established that Jurek was capable of understanding the contents of the confessions. For example, Dr. Owens testified that if the two written confessions were read to Jurek he could understand them. Tr., Vol. VIII, 1718. Similarly, Dr. McKinney testified that Jurek could understand the two confessions: 172 I believe that he does have adequate intellectual capacity to read and understand (the confessions). . . . There would only be a few words that I would question whether he would, perhaps, comprehend the meaning of (them). 173 Tr., Vol. VIII, 1678. 174 The panel also stated, based on the psychological testimony, that Jurek is less likely to be able to understand his right to remain silent. He may also be unable to insist effectively that that right be observed. 593 F.2d at 677. The evidence is again very inconclusive, however. While Dr. Schoenfeld testified at the Federal habeas hearing that Jurek might have difficulty understanding the Miranda warnings, R., 37, Dr. Russell Adams disagreed with the tenor of that testimony: 175 There is one particular area that I would take a slightly different view, although I don't know that it certainly is a divergent view with Dr. Schoenfeld's report, and that has to do with whether or not Mr. Jurek understood the Miranda warning. It is my contention that he probably did understand it if it were presented if it were explained to him, I think he would have ability to understand it. R., 75. Later Dr. Adams testified: 176 I felt the patient was able to understand information presented him orally in a no, wait. I felt that the patient's ability to understand information presented him orally and in writing was poor, but it was generally in line with his intellectual ability and in my opinion he did have the ability to understand in general terms the Miranda warning. 177 R., 87. Dr. Adams conceded, however, that the warnings would have to be clearly explained to Jurek, see R., 76, and that Jurek's ability to understand the Miranda warnings was not as high as that of most other people. See R., 88-89. 178 To summarize, while it is undisputed that Jurek's intelligence was somewhat below normal, the exact impact of this on his susceptibility to coercion is far from undisputed. Moreover, it is anything but clear that Jurek could not understand the confessions or Miranda warnings. As stated above, the District Court concluded that Jurek's somewhat limited mental capacity did not, either alone or in conjunction with other factors, render his confessions involuntary. And we must remember that the District Court, having heard testimony by three medical experts, found that testimony unpersuasive and did not find anything persuasive in the record, either. Unlike this Court, the District Court had the opportunity to judge the credibility of these medical witnesses. In our view, because the impact of Jurek's limited mental capacity is so unclear, we think this is one of those occasions when the inferences drawn by the District Court are entitled to significant weight even with respect to the ultimate determination of voluntariness. See Culombe v. Connecticut, supra, 367 U.S. at 605, 81 S.Ct. at 1880, 6 L.Ed.2d at 1059; Haynes v. Washington, supra, 373 U.S. at 515, 83 S.Ct. at 1344, 10 L.Ed.2d at 522. The District Court's conclusion is buttressed by the conclusions of the State Trial Court, jury, and Appellate Court, all of which found, after considering the testimony presented at trial regarding Jurek's limited mentality, that Jurek's confessions were voluntary. Thus, after giving appropriate weight to the inferences drawn below, and after carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that Jurek's limited mental capacity, considered alone, or in conjunction with the other factors discussed in this opinion, did not make Jurek's written confessions involuntary. 19
179 We concur with Judge Garza's analysis and conclusion with respect to the first confession. However, we think it useful to emphasize some additional evidence supporting the conclusion that the first confession was voluntary. 180 At the outset, it is important to emphasize that the undisputed evidence reveals that Jurek was given Miranda warnings immediately prior to making the first written confession and indicated at that time that he did not want an attorney: 181 Q (By the District Attorney) . . . And I will ask you whether or not you gave the defendant his warnings? 182 A (County Attorney Post) Yes, I did. And, in fact, I customarily read and, in this instance, I did, also. I read directly from the statement form, itself. 183 Q The statement, itself. All right. Did you read the complete printed warning that appears on State's Exhibit No. 2 184 A Yes, sir. 185 Q to this defendant, prior to his making any statement? 186 A Yes, sir, I did. 187 Q All right, sir. And, in other words, did you inform him that he was facing a murder charge of little Wendy Adams? 188 A Yes, sir, I did. 189 Q And that he had a right to retain counsel, and if he could not obtain counsel that one would be appointed for him? 190 A Yes, sir, I did. 191 Q Did he make any requests for counsel there at that time? 192 A No, sir. In fact, he stated that he did not want an attorney at that time. 193 Tr., Vol. I, 103-04 (testimony of County Attorney Post). 194 In addition, we agree with the District Court that Jurek made no clear request for an attorney earlier when he was given Miranda warnings by Judge Ley. 20 And we fully agree with Judge Garza's analysis of the waiver question and the applicability of Nash v. Estelle, supra. 195 As Judge Garza points out, Garza Op., p. 934, the first confession was given with both County Attorney Post and District Attorney Cheatham present. It is undisputed that Cheatham attempted to take down the confession in Jurek's own words. See Cheatham Dep., 61, quoted in Garza Op., p. 934 n. 4. 196 After the confession was typed, the State took enormous care to ensure that Jurek fully understood exactly what he was signing. The statement was read by and to Jurek in the presence of two witnesses selected from the community. As County Attorney Post testified: 197 Q (By the District Attorney) . . . And let me ask you this: Was he given an opportunity to read it or have it read to him? 198 A Yes, sir. He was given both opportunities. And, in fact, he declined, I believe well, in this instance, I believe he actually read the statement, himself, and then it was read. 199 Q Out loud? 200 A It was read out loud by him? 201 Q In the presence of the witnesses. 202 A Right. 203 Tr., Vol. I, 106. And according to Post, Jurek made corrections and initialed changes while reading through the confession: 204 Q (By the District Attorney) . . . And was he asked as he went along in other words, was it checked every sentence or so to see if this was correct? 205 A Yes, sir. 206 Q I believe there is one correction of the name there at the top, is this correct or not, sir? 207 A Yes, it is. 208 Q And who made that? Who requested that correction to be made, if you recall? 209 A The defendant, himself, did. 210 Tr., Vol. I, 106-07 (testimony of County Attorney Post). 211 One of the witnesses to the signing of the first confession was Robert Hesse, a probation officer. As his testimony reveals, Hesse was very careful to make sure that Jurek's confession was voluntary: 212 Q (By the District Attorney) Was he asked there if he freely and voluntarily made that statement? 213 A Yes, he did. And I was very cautious before I signed it, to make sure. And I asked Jerry, myself, in my own words, Are you sure this is what you want to sign, and this is your statement, as you want it? 214 Q Uh-huh. 215 A And are you telling me that all the things you read up here are true, and you have not been forced; you are doing this of your own free will and accord? 216 And he assured me that he was, before I signed that. 217 Q In other words, you did that in addition to what Mr. Post 218 A Yes, sir. 219 Q and I had already done, each one of us, is that correct, sir? 220 A Yes, sir. Because I was pretty sure it would come to this point right here, and I wanted to make sure before I signed it. 221 Q In other words, if I understand correctly, in addition to all the warnings and explanations that Mr. Post and I made in your presence, you, yourself 222 A That's correct. 223 Q did this with the defendant, and assured yourself that he was signing it freely and voluntarily, and of his own accord, is this correct? 224 A Yes, sir. 225 (Hesse testimony continued) . . . After it was over with, I made sure this was his statement and this is the way he wanted it. And I told him, You know you do not have to sign this, but this is what you freely want to do? 226 Again, I made the point of making sure. You are not coerced or nothing's happened, no threats have been made; this is your statement? 227 And I felt sure the time that I signed it that that was his statement. 228 Tr., Vol. VI, 1402-03, 1405. In addition, Hesse confirmed that Jurek initialed typographical errors in the confession: 229 Q (By the District Attorney) . . . (D)id you see the defendant place his initials on the 230 A Yes, sir. 231 Q typographical errors? 232 A Yes, sir. 233 Q All right, sir. 234 A The errors had not been corrected when I was there. And while I was there, the errors were corrected and with Jerry's permission, he initialed each each correction in the statement. 235 Tr., Vol. VI, 1401. 236 For the reasons stated in Judge Garza's opinion, supplemented by the reasons and facts stated by us, we conclude, after carefully examining the record, that Jurek's first confession was voluntary and hence, was properly admitted into evidence.
237 Judge Garza's opinion, after holding that the first confession was properly admitted into evidence, declared that (t)he circumstances are vastly different with regard to the second confession. Garza Op., p. 940 (emphasis added). We strongly disagree with Judge Garza's conclusion that the second confession was involuntary. 238 We first examine the factors relied upon by Judge Garza in distinguishing between the two confessions, concluding that most of them are not supported by the record. We then discuss other factors not alluded to by Judge Garza or the panel which reinforce the findings below that the second confession was voluntary. 239 i. Distinctions Between The Confessions Emphasized By Judge Garza 240
241 A distinction between the two confessions strongly emphasized by Judge Garza is based on the wording of the confessions themselves. As the opinion states: 242 The correct grammar and composition of (the second confession) (is) . . . vastly different from that of the first. It would be impossible to conclude that the same person gave each confession verbatim. 243 Garza Op., p. 935 (emphasis added). For convenience, we reproduce both the first 21 and second 22 confessions in their entirety. 244 For a number of reasons, we disagree with Judge Garza's statement. To begin with, there is no suggestion by any witness or any Court below that the two confessions may differ with respect to the amount of input by Jurek. Every witness who discussed the language of the confessions discussed both confessions together. 23 In addition, the panel opinion, although quoting language from the second confession, did not distinguish between the two confessions. See 593 F.2d at 677 & n. 5. Likewise, Jurek's own brief to the en banc Court did not attempt to separate the two confessions for purposes of analyzing their language. See Jurek's En Banc Brief, at 33. Judge Garza's argument concerning language and grammar distinctions between the two confessions comes not from any of the Courts or witnesses below, but from his own de novo language and composition analysis. Appellate Judges should not be in the business of independently analyzing the grammar and sentence structure of confessions, just as they should not and do not make de novo analyses of fingerprints, blood samples, voice recordings or other real evidence. 245 In any event, the testimony adduced at trial and the confessions themselves simply do not support Judge Garza's conclusion. To begin with, we have County Attorney Post's undisputed evidence that he took down the second confession as best he could from Jurek's own words: 246 Q (By the Defense Attorney) Now, Mr. Post, just prior to the recess, I asked you if you would deliver to me the notes which you made, which you used to produce the statement which is marked for identification purposes as Exhibit No. 2. . . . Mr. Post, in examining this, I find that it's, with very few exceptions, word for word like the statement. Now, my question originally was: 247 Do you have any working notes, any just notations which you used and made at the time you were interrogating Jerry Jurek, which you used to compose this statement that was signed? Now, this is a rough draft of the statement. 248 A This is exactly what he gave me. I took it down. I have nothing else. 249 Q And you will tell this Court and this jury, and me, that this boy, sitting right here, just without any prompting from you, particularly, and in this chronological order, without any breaks, gave you this statement? 250 A In effect, yes. I asked him we had I had asked him, as I said, Mr. Nelson (a Texas rancher) and myself and Mr. Cheatham and Mr. Jacob (a cattle ranger). He then said he did no longer wish to stand on his first statement; he wished to change it. 251 I said, Jerry, tell me about it. 252 And he did. And if he would pause, I presume I'd say, What happened then? Or, Next? Keep going. 253 Other than that, it's exactly as what is there. 254 Q And you are not are you telling the Court that this is the language that this boy used when he talked to you, or is this your way of putting down your interpretation of what he said? 255 A As best I could, I put down exactly what he told me. 256 Q In the words that he used? 257 A As near as possible as I could, yes, sir. 258 Tr., Vol. VI, 1353-54. Since Jurek was required to come forth in the Federal habeas proceeding with facts to rebut this undisputed testimony, and since Jurek did not do so, this testimony by Post remains undisputed. 259 More importantly, a reading of the two confessions demonstrates that Judge Garza has grossly exaggerated language differences between the two confessions. Reasonably sophisticated sentences can be found in the first confession. E. g., 260 In the first part of this statement I called Richard Broz by his wrong first name and called him Mike; but his name was Richard. I have made this statement freely and voluntarily and nobody has forced me, threatened me or done anything to make me give this statement against my will. 261 On the other hand, the second confession hardly bears the stamp of a college English professor. E. g., 262 (W)hen Richard and Rickey and myself were riding around drinking beer we talked about getting some pussy. I talked about Shirley Kay Range and how I wanted to get with her and get some pussy. . . . When I am with the guys I talk about beer and pussy. 24 263 In addition, a reading of the second confession demonstrates as a matter of common sense that the prosecutors did not put words into Jurek's mouth. At one point the second confession states: I asked (Wendy) if she had ever had sex before and she said yes. Wendy's body was discovered on the morning of August 18, Tr., Vol. VII, 1648 (testimony of Raymond Tate), and an autopsy was thereafter performed that same day. The autopsy made clear that Wendy had never had sexual intercourse with anyone. Tr., Vol. VIII, 1536-37 (testimony of Dr. Paul Obert). At about 7:30 p. m. on the evening of August 18, Jurek made the second confession. The record is unclear as to whether the results of the autopsy were at that time available to Post. If they were, then Post would of course have known that Wendy had never had sexual intercourse. But even if the autopsy was not in Post's hands, common sense would have suggested to him that it would be extremely unlikely that ten year old Wendy Adams would have told Jurek that she had had sex before. In our view, the insertion of the above-quoted statement justifies the implied conclusion of all the Courts below, State and Federal, that the State was putting into the second confession whatever Jurek said regardless of its plausibility or lack thereof and was not drafting the confession for Jurek. 264 Considering the testimony of Post, along with the language of the confessions, their substance, and the fact that not a single witness or Court below on trial or habeas had ever suggested a distinction between the two based on composition and grammar, we believe that Judge Garza was unwarranted in making his own independent comparative analysis of the two confessions. 265
Obtaining The Second Confession 266 In distinguishing between the two confessions, Judge Garza also emphasized that while the circumstances surrounding the first confession gave little to indicate that the prosecutors were striving for any result other than the solution of the crime and the recovery of Wendy Adams' remains, Garza Op. at p. 940, the second confession was undertaken with the purpose of amending (the first) confession to secure the death penalty. Id. at p. 941. 267 In Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959), the Supreme Court stated: 268 The police were not . . . merely trying to solve a crime, or even to absolve a suspect. . . . They were rather concerned primarily with securing a statement from the defendant on which they could convict him. The undeviating intent of the officers to extract a confession from petitioner is therefore patent. When such an intent is shown, this Court has held that the confession must be examined with the most careful scrutiny . . . . 269 Id. at 324, 79 S.Ct. at 1207, 3 L.Ed.2d at 1272. Relying on Spano, see Garza Op., p. 939, Judge Garza apparently reasons that the second confession is particularly suspect because the prosecuting attorneys were motivated solely to get the death penalty while, when eliciting the first confession from Jurek, they were carrying out legitimate law enforcement aims. 270 While the considerations expressed in Spano may in some circumstances be decisive, 25 we believe that Judge Garza has misapplied the reasoning of that case. To begin with, Judge Garza's extremely liberal interpretation of Spano, even if we were to accept it which we decline to do would seem to apply equally to the first written confession as well as to the second. In Austin, Jurek made an oral confession 26 that led to the finding of Wendy's body. 27 Thus, Judge Garza was incorrect in stating that the first written confession was essential for the solution of the crime and the recovery of Wendy Adams' remains. Garza Op., p. 940. Moreover, District Attorney Cheatham, who prosecuted the case, believed that the oral confession was admissible. 28 Thus, before obtaining the first confession, the prosecuting attorneys had what they thought they needed, not only to locate the victim but to help convict Jurek. Sure, a written confession would be less risky from the standpoint of admissibility and would also be more persuasive to the jury, but these are precisely the considerations which the Court in Spano arguably had in mind when writing the above-quoted language. 29 271 We emphasize that we are not trying to argue that the first confession was coercive under Spano, but simply that the circumstances surrounding the two confessions were not that different. Indeed, as we indicate below, we believe that Judge Garza's reading of Spano (which we are merely applying to the first confession as well as the second) is incorrect and is, as a practical matter, unworkable. 272 Perhaps Judge Garza intends to argue that while Spano considerations apply even with respect to the first confession, they apply more heavily with respect to the second, because the prosecutors were driven in obtaining the second confession by a desire to secure the death penalty, not merely to convict Jurek. Yet, in our view, Judge Garza's (and the panel's) suspicion that the prosecutors were motivated by death penalty considerations at the time of the second confession is based not on evidence in the record but on the surmise of these Judges. Indeed, the evidence rebuts a drive on the part of the State to ensure that the death penalty was obtained. Nowhere does any witness testify that Jurek's second statement was essential to get the death penalty. On the contrary, District Attorney Cheatham testified that, in his view, there was clearly enough evidence for the death penalty without the second confession because kidnapping, like rape, is an aggravating factor under Texas law: 30 273 To me there was, from my view, from a legal standpoint, and I might be wrong, but from my view there wasn't any question of whether he had admitted a capital case. You had kidnapping and you had murder and if there is one of those elements, if they have its murder committed in the course of either attempting or kidnapping so under the second statement I think you had another aspect of it but in my opinion this was it, this was capital murder in the first statement. In fact, it was capital murder before I ever took it from what he told them up in Austin. Cheatham Dep., 65. 31 274 What the prosecuting attorneys were trying to do was not necessarily to secure the death penalty but to solve the crime by establishing just what the true circumstances were surrounding Wendy's death. The reasons given by Jurek in the first confession for killing Wendy that Wendy made nasty comments about Jurek's brother and told Jurek he should not be drinking, are incredulous on their face. As District Attorney Cheatham testified: 275 I can't conceive of somebody going out and snatching up a girl, a little girl in a bikini, racing all through town, hollering, screaming for help, to ask her how she liked his kinfolks. Just being perfectly blunt about it, I just can't conceive of a man doing that under those circumstances without some further ulterior motive. Cheatham Dep., 63. 32 276 Judge Garza's approach to Spano would mean that once the police have identified the person who committed the act that caused the death, they must cease all interrogation or risk that any confession obtained will be held inadmissible. Spano does not stand for any such unrealistic proposition. What if Jurek had stated that he was responsible for Wendy's death but that it was an accident? What if he stated that Wendy was dying of cancer and asked him to kill her as an act of mercy? In the interest of law enforcement, Spano must permit law enforcement officers to secure a plausible, and hopefully true, version of the events surrounding a crime before subsequent confessions are subject to the sort of rigid scrutiny to produce inadmissibility. Thus we would hold that at the time of the second confession, the prosecuting attorneys were still merely trying to solve a crime and were not concerned primarily with securing a statement from defendant on which they could convict him. Spano, supra, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. at 1207, 3 L.Ed.2d at 1272. 33 277
278 In addition to the two factors discussed above, Judge Garza's opinion emphasized the need for counsel at the second confession and the fact that none was appointed. The opinion also emphasized the fact that Jurek had been in custody for a much longer period of time when the second confession was obtained. We find these contentions unpersuasive. 279 With respect to the appointment of counsel, we think Judge Garza has exaggerated the greater need for counsel at the time of the second confession than at the time of the first. In our view, it is equally the case that no court-appointed attorney worth his salt, Garza Op., p. 941, would have consented to Jurek signing the first confession (as well as the second). Certainly Jurek had received no promises of leniency, let alone a clear-cut plea bargain proposal. Moreover, as we stated above, the prosecutor thought that the first confession, plus the independent evidence adduced at trial, would have supported the death penalty under a kidnapping theory. Thus Jurek may well have been signing his life away with the first confession. But, as we have pointed out, Jurek did not request counsel before either of the two confessions. And, as we show below, Jurek was repeatedly given Miranda warnings and several witnesses ensured that the second statement was voluntary. We think it wholly unacceptable that a confession should be thrown out because a lawyer was not forced upon Jurek against his repeated statement that he did not want a lawyer. Cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1974). 280 Thus we are left with the physical fact that at the time of the second confession Jurek had been in custody for about 18 hours after the time of the first one. As the undisputed evidence in the record makes clear, after making his first confession (at 1:15 a. m.), Jurek was immediately transferred at his own request to the Victoria Jail and did not return to Cuero until 2:00 p. m. that day. Tr., Vol. VI, 1324-25 (testimony of County Attorney Post). He presumably slept throughout the night at the Victoria Jail. Tr., Vol. VI, 1336 (testimony of County Attorney Post). He was questioned briefly that afternoon. See Tr., Vol. VI, 1326-27, 1329-30 (testimony of County Attorney Post). It is undisputed that at the time of the second confession (7:30 p. m.), Jurek was fresh and alert. See, e. g., Tr., Vol. VI, 1331, 1336-37 (testimony of County Attorney Post). There is not one whit of evidence of any violence, coercion or threatening police or prosecutor tactics during the 18th of August. Consequently, no importance can be attached to the fact that several hours separated the two confessions. 281 ii. Other Circumstances Demonstrating The Voluntariness Of The Second Confession 282 Neither the panel nor Judge Garza gave any weight to the fact that the signing of the second confession was observed by four witnesses selected from the community, and that two of these witnesses testified at length that they fully believed that Jurek's second confession was voluntary. 34 For example, Darrell Cooper, a real estate broker and a witness to the signing of the second confession, testified at length concerning the circumstances surrounding the signing of the second confession. Cooper testified that the second confession was read to Jurek word for word before he signed it. Tr., Vol. I, 54. He also testified that both the first confession and the second confession were explained to Jurek thoroughly in front of all four witnesses. Tr., Vol. VI, 1423. And he stated that Jurek confirmed in his own words that both the first and second confessions were voluntary. Tr., Vol. VI, 1423-24. 283 Cooper also testified that Jurek was asked whether he wanted an attorney and that Jurek said no: 284 Q (By Jurek's Attorney) Was an attorney present when this was signed? 285 A Not for the defendant, for Mr. Jurek. He said he didn't want one. 286 Q Mr. Jurek said he did not want one? Were you present when Mr. Cheatham asked him if he wanted one? 287 A Yes, sir. 288 Q Did Mr. Cheatham make any efforts to actually see that he had a lawyer? 289 A Well, now, this, I don't know. But the boy said he didn't need an attorney. 290 Q Were you there when Mr. Cheatham or anybody else gave him what we call the defendant's rights? 291 A Yes, sir, I sure was. 292 Q Did they make any effort to actually appoint one prior to his signing this thing? 293 A Well, Mr. Jurek said he didn't want one. In other words, at that point in the thing, when Mr. Post was reading his rights, they asked him did he want an attorney present. He said no. And then, I think Mr. Cheatham told him that he had the right to have an attorney present; if he couldn't afford one, that that well, I don't remember the details. But, anyway, to the effect that the county would appoint an attorney to represent him if he did not have the money to hire an attorney. 294 Q But they just told him this, now; they never actually urged him to tell them to go out and get him an attorney, did they? 295 A Well, I don't think they urged him to get an attorney, but they told him he could have one if he wanted one. 296 Q Did they impress upon him the fact that it wouldn't cost him a penny? 297 A Yes, sir. 298 Tr., Vol. I, 55-56, 59-60. See also Tr., Vol. VI, 1417 (I know several times Mr. Cheatham and Mr. Post both told (Jurek) that he had the right to have an attorney present, I know.). 299 Moreover, Cooper testified that Jurek was given no promises of better treatment by making the second confession and, on the other hand, was not threatened in any way about the consequences of not signing it. Tr., Vol. VI, 1425. And according to Cooper, Jurek told the four witnesses and the prosecuting attorneys that he was making the second confession because he did not tell the truth in the first one and wanted to set the record straight. Tr., Vol. I, 63-64, 75; Vol. VI, 1424. 35 Additionally, Jurek reconfirmed that the first confession was given voluntarily. Tr., Vol. I, 66-67. Cooper testified that he did not observe anything to indicate that Jurek was coerced. Tr., Vol. I, 70. And he believed that Jurek knew the consequences of what he was signing. Tr., Vol. VI, 1415 (I don't think there was any doubt in the boy's mind that evening but what he knew what he was signing and the consequences of signing.). 300 A second witness to the second confession was Robert J. Pickens, Vice-President of the Buchel Bank & Trust Co. in Cuero and a licensed attorney. Pickens recalled that Post read the second confession to Jurek out loud and that the statement was handed to Jurek for him to read. Tr., Vol. VI, 1432. Moreover, Pickens testified at length that Jurek was given his Miranda warnings before signing the confession. Tr., Vol. VI, 1432-35, 1440. Pickens also confirmed that Jurek was asked whether the statement was voluntary, Tr., Vol. VI, 1437, and that Jurek stated that he was not in any way coerced into making the second confession. Tr., Vol. VI, 1439-40. Pickens also testified that he observed nothing that in any way suggested that Jurek was coerced into confessing. Tr., Vol. VI, 1440. 301 Thus, both of these witnesses testified that Jurek stated that the second confession was voluntary, that Jurek was given his Miranda warnings, and that there was nothing to suggest any coercion. We must keep in mind that these witnesses had an opportunity to observe Jurek's demeanor and to listen to him state in his own words that he did not want an attorney and that the confession was voluntarily given. 302 The testimony of these witnesses is consistent with that of County Attorney Post. Post testified that he gave Jurek his Miranda warnings before the second confession was made by Jurek. Tr., Vol. VI, 1292-93, 1365. Moreover, according to Post, Jurek confirmed that both the first and second statements were freely and voluntarily given. Tr., Vol. VI, 1365. In addition, Post testified that he read the second confession to Jurek a few sentences at a time, and asked Jurek to confirm the correctness of each part and to indicate whether he wanted to make any changes. Tr., Vol. I, 127. 36 303 The testimony given by Post and the witnesses is, we emphasize, undisputed. Jurek brought forth no facts at the Federal habeas hearing to challenge the circumstances surrounding the signing of the second confession.