Opinion ID: 2587254
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffective assistance of counselโ admission of prior murder conviction

Text: Defendant contends the special circumstance finding that defendant previously had been convicted of second degree murder must be reversed due to the ineffective assistance of defense counsel in failing to review the earlier case for the purpose of collaterally attacking the conviction and moving to strike the special circumstance. Defendant asserts that defense counsel's failure was prejudicial for two reasons. First, the evidence of the prior murder conviction should not have been submitted to the jury as a special circumstance. Second, during the penalty phase, a police officer who investigated the prior murder testified on behalf of the prosecution concerning the officer's custodial interview with defendant, as well as the officer's discovery, in a search of defendant's apartment, of a magazine depicting a graphic wound to a woman's breast similar to that inflicted on the victim in the prior murder. According to defendant, that testimony was admitted without objection by defense counsel at the penalty phase of the present trial, despite the circumstance that the evidence had been ruled inadmissible at the prior trial. [12] The record reflects that in October 1987, eight months prior to trial, defense counsel subpoenaed certain records from defendant's prior murder conviction proceedings, but as of August 1, 1988, the records still had not been received. At that time, defense counsel noted that both the prosecution and the defense had been unable to obtain the transcript either of the preliminary hearing or the trial in the prior murder case. The court and the clerk advised counsel that a search would be commenced. The following day, the clerk of the court announced that a search had not uncovered the file in the courthouse and that she would contact the archives department. On August 9, 1988, defense counsel, explaining that they needed the records to determine the validity of the prior waivers, informed the court that they had not obtained transcripts of the prior murder trial from the clerk and that the district attorney did not have a copy. The clerk advised that she had not yet heard from the archives department. On August 10, the clerk announced that the file had been located in the archives and would be sent rush. On August 17, 1988, defense counsel indicated that the previous week he had reviewed the superior court file, but that the jury waiver and trial transcripts remained unavailable. Defense counsel explained that they had contacted the Court of Appeal but that court could not locate a transcript, and that they could not ascertain the identity of appellate counsel in the prior proceeding, had not yet contacted trial counsel, and were not prepared to begin the special circumstances phase. The trial court indicated the proceedings would go forward. On August 22, 1988, trial on the special circumstances commenced. We have recognized a defendant's right in a capital case to collaterally attack the constitutional validity of a prior conviction used to enhance a defendant's punishment for the current offenses. ( People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1129-1134, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478; see Curl v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1292, 1296, 276 Cal.Rptr. 49, 801 P.2d 292.) In the interests of efficiency, defendants are advised to proceed by means of a pretrial motion to strike the prior conviction. ( People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 1130-1131, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478.) [W]hen a defendant challenges the validity of a prior conviction, he or she bears the burden of establishing its constitutional invalidity. To meet this burden, it is not enough for a defendant simply to make some showing that a constitutional error occurred in the prior criminal proceedings. A prior conviction carries a ` strong presumption of constitutional regularity, ' and the defendant must establish a violation of his or her rights that `so departed from constitutional requirements' as to justify striking the prior conviction. [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 1136, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478.) On the basis of the present record, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that trial counsel in the present case unreasonably failed to obtain the required oral transcripts of the prior conviction, or necessarily should have moved to strike the prior conviction. Factual matters underlying such issues, including counsel's explanation for their actions, properly may be explored through a petition for writ of habeas corpus. ( People v. Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th 495, 557-558, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171.)