Opinion ID: 867478
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improvement of the State's Case on Retrial

Text: ¶ 24 In addition to filing a pretrial motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds, the defense also sought to preclude the State from offering any evidence on retrial that it had not offered at the first trial, claiming that double jeopardy principles prevented the State from improving its case on retrial. At Moody's second trial, the State presented testimonial and physical evidence that it did not offer at the first trial. Additionally, after relying solely on premeditation at the first trial, the State added felony murder theories as to both murders on retrial. Moody now argues that the admission of this new evidence and the addition of the felony murder theories in the second trial violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. ¶ 25 Moody relies on the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), for the proposition that the use of new evidence in a retrial violates both federal and state double jeopardy protections. His reading of Burks is flawed. Burks states that [t]he Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding. Id. Giving full effect to the phrase for the purpose of makes clear that Burks applies only to cases reversed for insufficiency of the evidence. See id. In such cases, the state cannot be allowed a second opportunity to prove a defendant guilty. Id. ¶ 26 In contrast, the Supreme Court has held that in all cases but those reversed on grounds of insufficient evidence, the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes no limitations whatever upon the power to retry a defendant who has succeeded in getting his first conviction set aside. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719-20, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989). When a case is reversed for any reason but insufficient evidence, the original conviction has been nullified and `the slate wiped clean.' Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 442, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981) (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721, 89 S.Ct. 2072). While neither case specifically addresses the presentation of additional evidence, it follows that if the slate is wiped clean, the state is not limited to using evidence presented at the first trial. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 442, 101 S.Ct. 1852; Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721, 89 S.Ct. 2072; see also Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 43 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982) (recognizing that [a] second chance for the defendant ... inevitably affords the prosecutor a second try as well, and that new evidence or advance understanding of the defendant's trial strategy will make the State's case even stronger during a second trial than it was at the first). ¶ 27 Moody's case, on the other hand, was reversed for deprivation of counsel. The sufficiency of the evidence of guilt was not at issue. Moody, 192 Ariz. at 509, ¶ 23, 968 P.2d at 582. Consequently, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's refusal to restrict the State to evidence it offered in the first trial. ¶ 28 Finally, Moody contends that the State violated double jeopardy principles by adding a felony murder theory in the second trial after relying solely on a premeditated murder theory in the first trial. Moody relies on Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1055-59 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 523 U.S. 538, 118 S.Ct. 1489, 140 L.Ed.2d 728 (1998), in claiming that the use of fundamentally inconsistent theories at the two trials violates a defendant's right to due process. Moody's reliance is misplaced, however, because Thompson involved a prosecutor who proceeded on conflicting theories in separate trials of co-defendants. See id. at 1055-57. That case turned on the prosecutor's actions of manipulat[ing] evidence and witnesses, argu[ing] inconsistent motives, and at [the second defendant's trial], essentially ridicul[ing] the theory he had used to obtain a conviction and death sentence at Thompson's trial. Id. at 1057. Moody is only one person, and the theories offered are not necessarily inconsistent. Thus Thompson is inapposite. ¶ 29 Moody offers no other support for his argument that the State could not lawfully proceed on a felony murder theory in the second trial. Consequently, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Moody's motions to preclude the State from proceeding on felony murder theories at the second trial. [2]