Opinion ID: 4105365
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: risks of error

Text: ¶ 29 Third, we consider whether the risks of error were at their peak. Specifically, we consider “the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel.” Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981). Similarly to North Carolina law as set out in Lassiter, Utah law 12 Cite as: 2016 UT 55 Opinion of the Court provides a number of procedures to help ensure accurate decisions in parental-rights termination proceedings.9 By way of example, the petition must include “the grounds on which termination of parental rights is sought.” UTAH CODE § 78A-6-505(1)(f). Additionally, a hearing must be held on the question of termination of parental rights, and the petitioner must “establish the facts by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 78A-6-506(2)–(3). ¶ 30 Despite such protections, there can still be considerable risk of error in parental-rights termination proceedings, which can be complicated for the parent seeking to defend his or her parental rights without the aid of counsel. The Court in Lassiter recognized the argument that parents are “uniquely well informed” about the subject of the parental-rights termination hearing (the parent’s relationship with the child) but indicated that the ultimate issues in such cases are not always simple. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 29–30. The Court pointed out that most parents would have difficulty understanding and confuting expert medical and psychiatric testimony, which is sometimes presented. Id. at 30. Additionally, it recognized that many parents facing termination proceedings may “be people with little education, who have had uncommon difficulty in dealing with life, and who are, at the hearing, thrust into a distressing and disorienting situation.” Id. Consequently, “courts have generally held that the State must appoint counsel for indigent parents at termination proceedings.” Id. ¶ 31 In the case at hand, the risks of error were significant. Because this case involves privately initiated termination proceedings, L.E.S. has not enjoyed the additional protections provided in state-initiated termination cases. See, e.g., UTAH CODE § 62A-4a-203(1)(a) (“[T]he division shall . . . make reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of a child from the child’s home . . . .”); id. § 62A-4a202(1)(a) (“[T]he division shall provide in-home services for the purpose of family preservation to any family with a child whose health and safety is not immediately endangered, when . . . the family is in 9 The procedures outlined in this paragraph are some of those applicable to the particular circumstances of this case as opposed to an exhaustive listing of procedures for ensuring accurate decisions in parental-rights termination proceedings generally under Utah law. And although they appear in the Juvenile Court Act, we assume here that these procedures apply to parental-rights termination proceedings that take place in district court. 13 Cite as: 2016 UT 55 Opinion of the Court crisis . . . .”); id. § 62A-4a-201(4) (indicating that after a temporary outof-home placement, “the division may . . . (a) when safe and appropriate, return the child to the child’s parent; or (b) as a last resort, pursue another permanency plan”); id. § 78A-6-503(3) (“If the party moving to terminate parental rights is a governmental entity, the court shall find that any actions or allegations made in opposition to the rights and desires of a parent regarding the parent’s child are supported by sufficient evidence to satisfy a parent’s constitutional entitlement to heightened protection against government interference with the parent’s fundamental rights and liberty interests.”); see also infra ¶ 35 n.10. Also, this case appears particularly disorienting because the court initially appointed counsel for L.E.S. upon a finding of indigence and later reversed the appointment of counsel based on an unopposed motion asserting that Utah law did not provide a right to counsel for termination proceedings in the district court. This left L.E.S. with the need to subsequently make a sophisticated constitutional argument for the right to counsel that he was unable to make without the assistance of counsel. ¶ 32 Furthermore, L.E.S. was incarcerated throughout the duration of the proceedings, and it is clear from the record that this led to significant communication difficulties and at times even his inability to attend proceedings, either in person or telephonically. The district court recognized early on that L.E.S. “had difficulty contacting family or counsel due to the prison telephone policies to make arrangement[s] to retain counsel.” L.E.S.’s sisters attended several of the proceedings and attempted to help L.E.S. with his defense, but their efforts appear to have been hampered by communication issues with L.E.S. in prison. Supra ¶¶ 7–10. L.E.S. was unable to telephonically attend the status conference during which the final parental-rights termination hearing was scheduled “due to changes in probation officers at the prison” that resulted in him not being available by telephone. Supra ¶ 10. He also was not present at the September 8, 2014 status conference, where his motion to continue was denied. Supra ¶ 15. ¶ 33 Additionally, although the district court held a number of status conferences in order to help L.E.S. obtain counsel, the district court mentions only one attorney that L.E.S. actually talked with, and L.E.S. reported to the district court that that attorney “was reluctant to take on the case in fear that because of the . . . prison policy she would not be able to provide adequate counsel.” ¶ 34 While no expert medical or psychiatric testimony or other similarly complicated evidence was brought before the court, it is 14 Cite as: 2016 UT 55 Opinion of the Court possible that had L.E.S. been represented by counsel, such testimony may have been brought. At this stage, it is difficult to conclude that the case below was simple and uncomplicated, dealing exclusively with issues about which L.E.S., as K.A.S.’s parent, was “uniquely well informed,” when the apparent simplicity of the record may be due to the fact that L.E.S. represented himself pro se and had no opportunity to present more complicated evidence and argument with the aid of counsel. Thus, we conclude that the risks of error in this case were significant, even if not quite at their peak.