Opinion ID: 368331
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Do Substantial Issues of Fact make Summary Judgment Inappropriate?

Text: 42 Based on the pleadings, affidavits, deposition testimony of the County's personnel, the contract between the parties and other documents and correspondence relating thereto, the district court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material facts and that Northrop was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, under Rule 56(c) and (e). On appeal the County argues that summary judgment was improper because substantial issues of fact remain, i. e., whether the County was a merchant, whether the Purchasing Administrator had power to contract for a one-year period of limitations, and whether the one-year period of limitations was waived. 43 It is true, as the County argues and as this court has often recognized, that summary judgment is a drastic remedy. It is equally clear, however, that it is a wholesome remedy where applicable to the circumstances and that the purpose of Rule 56 is to eliminate a trial where it is unnecessary and results in delay and expense. While appellate courts should not look the other way to ignore the existence of the genuine issues of material facts . . . neither should they strain to find the existence of such genuine issues where none exist. Mintz v. Mathers Fund, Inc., 463 F.2d 495, 498 (7th Cir. 1972), and cases there cited. 44 The County's argument is conclusory and does not specify what facts are in dispute. From our review of the record, we conclude that the district court properly found that there were no genuine issues of material facts. The merchant question involves the application of a legal definition to undisputed facts. Likewise, the agency and waiver issues presented questions of law and not of facts and were properly resolved by the court in granting summary judgment. 45 AFFIRMED.