Opinion ID: 3053274
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: We must decide whether the EPA had discretion to determine whether to promulgate ELGs and NSPSs for storm water runoff from the construction industry once it listed the construction industry as a point source category in a plan published pursuant to § 304(m). We hold that once the EPA listed the construction industry as a point-source category, it was required to promulgate ELGs and NSPSs. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment and the permanent injunction. When reviewing the EPA’s construction of a statute that it administers, we follow the two-step approach set forth in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). At step one, if Congress has “unambiguously NRDC v. USEPA 13171 expressed its intent on the issue before the court . . . ‘the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’ ” Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 526 F.3d 591, 602 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 & n.9). But if the statute is “silent or ambiguous” with respect to the issue before the court, we will proceed to step two and decide if the agency’s interpretation “ ‘is based on a permissible construction of the statute.’ ” Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843). We defer to the agency’s interpretation as long as it is “based on a permissible construction.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. [14] We conclude that the language of the CWA, when viewed in its entirety, is clear that the EPA must promulgate ELGs and NSPSs for the point-source categories it lists in any plan it publishes under § 304(m). Our analysis begins with § 304(m)(1), which requires the EPA, every two years after February 4, 1987, to “publish in the Federal Register a plan that shall” (A) establish a schedule for the annual review and revision of promulgated effluent guidelines . . . ; (B) identify categories of sources discharging toxic or nonconventional pollutants for which guidelines under subsection (b)(2) . . . and section 1316 . . . have not previously been published; and (C) establish a schedule for promulgation of effluent guidelines for categories identified in subparagraph (B), under which promulgation of such guidelines shall be no later than . . . 3 years after the publication of the plan for categories identified in later published plans [i.e. plans not published within 12 months after February 4, 1987]. By requiring the EPA to “establish a schedule” under which the guidelines—the ELGs and NSPSs— are promulgated “no later than . . . 3 years after the publication of the plan,” Congress’ intent to require the EPA to promulgate guidelines is 13172 NRDC v. USEPA clear.9 Indeed, Congress used unequivocal language, stating, in relevant part: “[the] promulgation of such guidelines shall be no later than . . . 3 years after the publication of the plan.” CWA § 304(m) (emphasis added.); see Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153 (2001) (“The word ‘shall’ is ordinarily the language of command.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [15] Other provisions in the CWA likewise support that Congress intended the promulgation of ELGs and NSPSs to be mandatory once a point-source category was listed in a plan under § 304(m). See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2007) (stating that the court should not examine statutory provisions in isolation but “with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Section 304(b), which is referenced by § 304(m)(1), states: “For the purpose of adopting or revising effluent limitations . . . the Administrator shall . . . publish within one year of October 18, 1972, regulations, providing guidelines for effluent limitations.” (Emphasis added). Thus, Congress has con- 9 Defendants contend that our analysis of whether the EPA has a nondiscretionary duty to promulgate NSPSs is controlled by § 306, the provision specifically addressing NSPSs. We disagree. First, because § 304(m)(1) expressly references § 306 and applies to both ELGs and NSPSs, our interpretation of that provision and the duty it creates applies equally to ELGs and NSPSs identified in a plan under § 304(m)(1). Second, the district court, based on information provided by the EPA, found that “since [§ 304(m)] was enacted, the EPA has promulgated NSPSs for categories included in [§ 304(m)] plans, but has added no new categories to [the list of categories in § 306]. Hence [§ 304(m)] seems currently to be the only vehicle by which the EPA identifies new source categories for the purpose of developing NSPSs.” The Defendants have not disputed this finding. We therefore conclude that because § 304(m)—in its text and in the EPA’s application—grants the EPA the authority to promulgate both ELGs and NSPSs, our analysis here applies equally to both. In light of the above, we need not address industry-intervenors’ suggestion that the Plaintiffs failed to plead a claim for breach of a non-discretionary duty under § 306. NRDC v. USEPA 13173 sistently used mandatory language with respect to the promulgation of ELGs. [16] Section 402(a)(1) also supports our interpretation. That section governs the NPDES and states the EPA may issue NPDES permits if the discharge will meet: (A) “all applicable requirements under [various other sections] of this title,” including the section governing effluent limitations, which are designed according to ELGs and NSPSs; or (B) if “prior to the taking of necessary implementing actions relating to all such requirements, such conditions as the Administrator determines necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.” CWA § 402(a)(1). Subsection (B) is explicit that it applies only “prior to the taking of necessary implementing actions” relating to the requirements in subsection (A). (Emphasis added). Thus, § 402(a)(1)(B) sets forth a system for assessing NPDES permits only until the EPA promulgates the requirements referenced in § 402(a)(1)(A) and does not contemplate that the EPA might never promulgate the requirements referenced in § 402(a)(1)(A). Rather, § 402(a)(1) supports that Congress assumed that “requirements,” including effluent limitations, which are guided by ELGs and NSPSs, would be in place after an interim period. While we conclude that the CWA is unambiguous that the EPA must promulgate ELGs and NSPSs for point-source categories listed in a plan pursuant to § 304(m), were we to find the statute ambiguous and consider whether the EPA’s interpretation was based on a “permissible construction,” we would reach the same conclusion. The addition of § 304(m) to the CWA stemmed from Congress’ frustration with “the slow pace in which these regulations [were] promulgated.” S. Rep. No. 99-50, at 3 (1985) (“Although the EPA continues to move forward with developing guidelines for the installation of cleanup technology for . . . dischargers, the slow pace in which these regulations are promulgated continues to be frustrating. Of the 29 industrial 13174 NRDC v. USEPA categories established in 1977 for which guidelines were required to be promulgated 5 still remain to be completed.”). Congress’s desire to speed up the promulgation of ELGs and NSPSs would be completely frustrated if § 304 were viewed merely as a planning mechanism and did not require the actual promulgation of ELGs and NSPSs. The Senate Report quoted confirms that Congress did not view § 304 as a planning mechanism. It states that “[g]uidelines are required for any category of sources discharging significant amounts of toxic pollutants. In this use, ‘significant amounts’ does not require the [EPA] to make any determination of environmental harm; any non-trivial discharges from sources in a category must lead to effluent guidelines.” Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added). Our recent opinion in OCEF does not contradict our interpretation. In OCEF, we held that the EPA’s decisions on “whether to revise the effluent guidelines and whether to incorporate technology-based criteria in its periodic review of the guidelines” were discretionary duties. 527 F.3d at 845. The duty that the OCEF court found to be discretionary was entirely distinct from the duty at issue in this case. This case addresses whether there is a mandatory duty to promulgate ELGs and NSPSs once a point-source category has been identified in a plan under § 304(m). In contrast, the OCEF court considered the EPA’s duty to consider technology-based criteria when it was performing its mandatory duty to review effluent limitations and ELGs. Id. at 849. Though the OCEF court found the statute to be ambiguous on that point and did not conclude that the duty to consider technology-based criteria was mandatory, the court acknowledged that “when Congress specifies an obligation and uses the word ‘shall,’ this denomination usually connotes a mandatory command.” Id. at 847 (citing Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. at 153). And later, in discussing the EPA’s duties in connection with the identification of new polluting sources, the OCEF court acknowledged that if a source has any non-trivial discharge of toxic pollutants, the EPA does not make a determination of NRDC v. USEPA 13175 environmental harm but “must” promulgate effluent guidelines. Id. at 852 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Despite our conclusion that the EPA had a non- discretionary duty to promulgate ELGs and NSPSs in this case, we also must consider whether the EPA properly avoided this duty when it removed the construction industry from its plans published pursuant to § 304(m). Nothing in the CWA expressly grants the EPA the authority to remove a point-source category from a § 304(m) plan. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(9) (Clean Air Act provision expressly granting the EPA the authority to delist source categories). Moreover, we do not find the EPA’s view, that it is allowed under the statute to unilaterally delist a point-source category already identified in a § 304(m) plan with no process, to be a permissible construction of the statute. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.10 First, § 304(m)(1)(c) is clear that once a category is identified under subsection B, the promulgation of guidelines “shall be no later than . . . 3 years after the publication of the plan.” This timeline effectuates Congress’ stated desire to force the EPA to more rapidly promulgate ELGs and NSPSs. If the EPA had the authority to delist point-source categories at its whim, however, this deadline would be rendered meaningless as the EPA could delist any point-source category to avoid the deadline set forth in § 304(m)(1)(c). [17] Second, § 304(m)(2) provides that “[t]he Administrator shall provide for public review and comment on the plan 10 We need not reach the question of whether the EPA could avoid promulgating ELGs and NSPSs for a point-source category that had, at one time, been included in a § 304(m) plan if the EPA formally amended the § 304(m) plan that triggered the duty to promulgate or undertook some other formal process to delist the point-source category. Here, the EPA has not established that it engaged in any such process but has submitted its statements in its 2004 and 2006 § 304(m) plans that it was “not identifying” the construction industry, which had previously been identified in earlier plans, as a point-source category. 13176 NRDC v. USEPA prior to final publication.” Thus, Congress determined that by the time a point-source category is listed in a § 304(m) plan, the EPA must have already engaged in a review process to consider whether the category should be listed. It follows logically that the three-year delay provided for in § 304(m)(1)(c) is not to decide whether to list a point-source category, but to allow the EPA to consider what the substance of the ELGs and NSPSs should be.