Opinion ID: 1402745
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Recreational Use Statute, KRS 411.190(8)

Text: KRS 411.190(8) provides that, [n]o action for the recovery of real property, including establishment of prescriptive easement, right-of-way, or adverse possession, may be brought by any person whose claim is based on use solely for recreational purposes. KRS 411.190(2) establishes that [t]he purpose of this section is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes. Recreational purposes is defined to include, but not limited to any of the following, or any combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, bicycling, horseback riding, pleasure driving, nature study, water-skiing, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, or scientific sites[.] KRS § 411.190(l)(c). Quite clearly, no evidence was introduced by Appellants tending to establish, in any way, that the disputed area was ever set aside for any period of time to the public for recreational purposes. KRS 411.190(1). Moreover, the act of going upon and marking a boundary with brightly-colored engineering flags and No Trespassing signs, as well as the act of evicting trespassers therefrom, is not recreational activity, nor is timbering. See KRS 411.190(l)(c). That aside, the majority asserts that KRS 411.190(8), effective July 15, 2002  five years after the adverse possession statute ran in this case  may apply retroactively to Appellees' November 1, 2002 complaint for reasons that statutory amendments that do not affect substantive rights, amendments often referred to as `remedial,' `do not come within the rule prohibiting retroactive application.' Op. at 80-81 ( citing Commonwealth Department of Agriculture v. Vinson, 30 S.W.3d 162, 169 (Ky.2000)). To this assertion, I must disagree. Such a holding is simply hard to understand in view of this Court's recent holding in Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740, 751 (Ky.2009), where this Court reiterated: Substantive amendments are those which change and redefine the out-of-court rights, obligations and duties of persons in their transactions with others. Commonwealth of Kentucky Department of Agriculture v. Vinson, 30 S.W.3d 162, 168 (Ky.2000). By contrast, procedural amendments  [t]hose amendments which apply to the in-court procedures and remedies which are used in handling pending litigation id. at 168-69  are to be retroactively applied (assuming no separation-of-powers concerns) so that the proceedings shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such proceedings.... This is consistent with our approach to substantive, procedural, and remedial civil statutes under KRS 446.080. That statute provides in part that [t]here shall be no difference in the construction of civil, penal and criminal statutes and that [n]o statute shall be construed to be retroactive, unless expressly so declared. Pursuant to these provisions, we have held, substantive civil statutes are not to be applied retroactively unless the General Assembly expressly declares otherwise, while procedural and remedial statutes are to be so applied. Commonwealth of Kentucky Department of Agriculture [v. Vinson], supra ; Peabody Coal Co. v. Gossett, 819 S.W.2d 33 (Ky.1991). Moreover, in Rodgers , we also cited to University of Louisville v. O'Bannon, 770 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Ky.1989) for the proposition that, [w]hether a particular circumstance constitutes a cause of action [or conversely a defense] ... is a matter of substantive law. Rodgers, 285 S.W.3d at 751. Thus, given this Court's recent position on these matters, I cannot accept that the taking away of a right of action to quiet one's title is procedural or remedial and thus I must also dissent as to this issue.