Opinion ID: 208706
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: obtainable by

Text: In this case, Abbott's plain language argument, that  obtainable by introduces an optional process, even if  obtained by would introduce limiting process steps, is also unavailing. The BASF case, an analogous situation to this case, controls. As noted above, the Supreme Court in BASF considered the following claim language: Artificial alizarine, produced from anthracine or its derivatives by either of the methods herein described, or by any other method which will produce a like result.  111 U.S. at 296, 4 S.Ct. 455 (emphasis added). The patentee argued that even though the defendant did not make artificial alizarine by either of the methods herein described, the claim should capture the product because of the or by another method language. Id. at 309, 4 S.Ct. 455. The Supreme Court refused to attach importance to those expansive words: No. 4,321 furnishes no test by which to identify the product it covers, except that such product is to be the result of the process it describes. Id. at 305, 4 S.Ct. 455. Abbott's claims 2-5, like those in BASF and like product-by-process claims in general, do not furnish any test by which to identify the cefdinir crystals except that they are the result of their respectively claimed processes. As per BASF, Abbott's claim cannot capture a product obtained by or obtainable by processes other than those explicitly recited in the claims. If this court were to strip the process elements from the claims, as Abbott would urge, for infringement purposes, there would then be nothing to differentiate independent claim 2 from independent claim 5. After all, if those claims are not bound by the process terms but only define the basic cefdinir compound, then each of the claims recite the same thing, over and over again. Though Abbott argues that it merely intends to give meaning to the word obtainable, it instead seeks to have this court render meaningless the explicit process limitations that the applicant chose to define its invention. The intrinsic evidence in this case further rebuts Abbott's contention that its claims are not limited to those products actually obtained by the processes recited. In column 2 of the '507 patent, under the title heading The Process for Preparing Crystal A of the Compound (I), the patentee used specific language to describe the very two processes that are mirrored in claims 2 and 5. '507 patent col.2 ll.13-51. This language is not open-ended, nor does it constitute a mere description of the product by reference to the manner in which it can be made, as Abbott argues. By drafting claims 2 and 5 to incorporate these specific processes, Abbott made a conscious choice to place process requirements on its claimed product. If Abbott had wanted to obtain broader coverage for crystalline cefdinir devoid of any process limitations, as it seeks to do here, it could have simply done so (if indeed, as it argues, it is really the product that is the heart of the invention, not the process). But it did not. The crystals of claims 2 and 5 are simply not identifiable other than by the processes disclosed in column 2. This court must enforce the ways and terms that a party chooses to define its invention. The prosecution history also does not support Abbott's contention that obtainable by offers merely an optional set of definitional process conditions. During prosecution, Abbott faced obviousness rejections based on application claims 6-9, which were process claims that mirrored the very process limitations of issued claims 2-5. The PTO refused to issue the claims until one set of duplicates was cancelled. Abbott's action in cancelling claims 6-9 demonstrates its acquiescence to the PTO's view that the process elements of claims 2-5 are critical parts of those claims. In addition, in a response to the PTO's office action, Abbott chose to differentiate a cited § 103 reference, Takaya, on the basis that Abbott's claimed processes are different. For these reasons, the applicant's statement in the file wrapper that the method of preparation ... is not considered the heart of the present invention should not be afforded undue gravitas. The process limitations cannot be haphazardly jettisoned for an infringement analysis when they were so important in the patentability analysis. In sum, a patentee's use of the word obtainable rather than obtained by cannot give it a free pass to escape the ambit of the product-by-process claiming doctrine. Claims that include such ambiguous language should be viewed extremely narrowly. If this court does not require, as a precondition for infringement, that an accused infringer actually use a recited process, simply because of the patentee's choice of the probabilistic suffix able, the very recitation of that process becomes redundant. This would widen the scope of the patentee's claims beyond that which is actually inventeda windfall to the inventor at the expense of future innovation and proper notice to the public of the scope of the claimed invention. For all the above reasons, the Eastern District of Virginia correctly construed the process limitations beginning with obtainable by in claims 2-5 as limiting the asserted claims to products made by those process steps.