Opinion ID: 1669169
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Witness Records

Text: Prior to trial, Hankins served a subpoena duces tecum for the records created when Dawn Cook was hospitalized at her own request for psychological problems approximately 4 months before the killings and about 8 months prior to trial. He wished to determine whether the records reflected on this witness' credibility. The trial judge ordered the records produced for an in camera review. The records reflect that although Dawn Cook denied hallucinating, she reported recent poor memory. The records also reveal a physician's statement that Dawn Cook's memory for both recent and remote events appeared to show some blocking, however, not to a gross degree at this time. The trial judge concluded the records failed to show an impairment of Dawn Cook's ability to perceive, remember, and relate events to a degree that could not reasonably be revealed or tested by cross-examination, and denied Hankins access to the records. Hankins argues the trial judge's decision denied him the ability to effectively crossexamine a chief prosecution witness. He urges that her testimony that Danae Cook was nervous around Hankins, that his relationship with her had deteriorated, that he had taken some money, and that his moods were swinging toward depression and anger provided evidence that he had a motive for the crimes, and he thus was entitled to cross-examine Dawn Cook about her own mental condition in order to properly impeach her. A sharply divided U.S. Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53, 107 S.Ct. 989, 999, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987), concluded that the confrontation clause of U.S. Const. amend. VI does not empower a criminal defendant to require pretrial disclosure of any and all information which might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony. We, however, recently ruled that the sixth amendment right to confront witnesses requires that upon a showing of reasonable grounds to believe that the failure to produce privileged impeaching information is likely to impair a criminal defendant's ability to effectively cross-examine the witness claiming the privilege, the witness' testimony must be excluded. State v. Trammell, 231 Neb. 137, 435 N.W.2d 197 (1989). While the Ritchie Court found no such sixth amendment right, it did hold that due process principles require the government to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that in this context, evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Both Ritchie and Trammell provide for an in camera review of the information such as was held in the present case. Under the circumstances, we cannot agree with the trial judge's determination that the information Hankins sought did not have a substantial bearing on Dawn Cook's credibility. The nature of the information was such that it should have been made available to him for such use as might be appropriate during his cross-examination of Dawn Cook. However, Dawn Cook's testimony was not, contrary to Hankins' claim, crucial to the prosecution. Hankins' depression and shifts in his moods were established by his own confession, as well as by psychiatric evidence. The fact of his encounter with Barbara Cook over his failure to return the change from a $20 bill was also testified to by Haws. Dawn Cook's testimony was indeed, as the State claims, cumulative. Thus, it cannot be said there is a reasonable probability that had the information been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.