Opinion ID: 2050572
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: Following a hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress statements made on August 18, August 20, and September 4, 1981, the trial court, without stating its reasons, granted the motion with respect to the first two statements, but denied it with respect to the September 4 statement. Defendant argues that the court's failure to suppress the September 4 statement constitutes reversible error. Specifically, she argues that the statement was the direct result of a specific promise of immunity or leniency and was not, therefore, voluntarily given. We note initially that it is incumbent upon a defendant to object to the introduction of the challenged evidence at trial and to specify the grounds upon which the objection is premised. Here, the Defendant objected to the admission of the statement for reasons that we previously argued in chambers. Such objection is insufficient to preserve error. Nonetheless, we find that Defendant's argument is without merit. In Hendricks v. State (1978), 267 Ind. 496, 371 N.E.2d 1312, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 961, 98 S.Ct. 3079, 57 L.Ed.2d 1127, we set forth the applicable standards for review: In order for a confession to be admitted, whenever a question arises as to its voluntariness, the issue is controlled by the constitutional standard of voluntariness alike in both state and federal prosecutions. Malloy v. Hogan, (1964) 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653. To be voluntary a confession `must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor be obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.' Shotwell Manufacturing Co. v. U.S., (1963) 371 U.S. 341, 83 S.Ct. 448, 9 L.Ed.2d 357 quoting Bram v. U.S., (1897) 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568; Ashby v. State, (1976) [265 Ind. 316], 354 N.E.2d 192. A prior involuntary statement may render a second or subsequent statement inadmissible: `Of course, after an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed.' U.S. v. Bayer, (1947) 331 U.S. 532 at 540, 67 S.Ct. 1394 at 1398, 91 L.Ed. 1654 at 1660. However, a prior involuntary confession does not render subsequent statements inadmissible per se. `But this Court has never gone so far as to hold that making a confession under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables the confessor from making a usable one after these conditions have been removed.' U.S. v. Bayer, supra, 331 U.S. at 541, 67 S.Ct. 1398, 91 L.Ed. at 1660. Neither does the mere advisement of Miranda rights necessarily purge the taint of circumstances surrounding the previous confession. Brown v. Illinois, (1975) 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416. In order for a subsequent confession to be admissible there must be a break in the chain of events sufficient to insulate the statement from that which went before. Clewis v. Texas, (1967) 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423; Leyra v. Denno, (1954) 347 U.S. 556, 74 S.Ct. 716, 98 L.Ed. 948. The totality of the circumstances should be reviewed in determining the admissibility of a subsequent statement, but the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested three primary factors for scrutiny: (1) the temporal proximity of the illegality and the confession; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the flagrancy of the official misconduct. Brown v. Illinois, supra . Id. 267 Ind. at 499-500, 371 N.E.2d at 1313-1314. Although conceding that the trial court's suppression of the statements of August 18 and August 20 does not necessarily render the statement of September 4 inadmissible, the Defendant argues that there was no break in the chain of events from the prior confessions sufficient to insulate the confession of September 4 from the prior statements. The facts surrounding the taking of the statements as disclosed in the hearing on the motion to suppress and at trial are these: On August 18, 1981, the Defendant signed an immunity agreement (see Issue III) and gave a statement to the police. On August 20, she and her sister Margaret gave an additional statement. Before giving this statement, the Defendant asked Officer Demlow if the immunity agreement was still in effect. He told her that he did not know and would have to check with Prosecutor Doboze. He stated that he told her that, without checking with Doboze, he would have to say it was not still in effect. He then offered to contact Doboze. The Defendant, however, said that that was not necessary, left with her sister for about fifteen to twenty minutes, and then returned to the police station where she gave her statement, after being advised of her rights and signing a waiver form. Both she and Margaret told police that Rick Shelton had killed Charles Abner. Rick was then arrested and on August 31 and September 1, he confessed to the murder of Charles Abner. Thereafter, the Defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit murder and was arrested at approximately 7:30 a.m. on September 4, 1981. She was transported to the Washington County Jail where police gave her the Miranda advisements and she signed a waiver of rights form. She gave the challenged incriminating statement at 9:42 a.m. The immunity agreement was never discussed on September 4, 1981. Applying the standards set forth in Hendricks, we find that there was a break in the chain of events sufficient to insulate the September 4 statement from the two prior statements. First, she had reason to know that the immunity agreement was not in effect on September 4. In addition, fifteen (15) days had transpired between the date of her prior statement, which was suppressed, and the challenged statement. Upon being arrested, she was advised of the charges against her and was fully advised of her rights. She also signed a waiver of rights form. In the interim between August 20 and September 4, several events occurred. Her mother, Martha Abner, was arrested in connection with the crime, and Rick Shelton was arrested and confessed. Moreover, we do not find any official misconduct. Under these circumstances we find that the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to conclude that the Defendant's statement of September 4, 1981 was voluntary. See Holleman v. Duckworth (7th Cir.1983), 700 F.2d 391, 396-397, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 116, 78 L.Ed.2d 116; Holleman v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 534, 538-539, 400 N.E.2d 123, 126; Gutierrez v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 639, 646-647, 395 N.E.2d 218, 223-224.