Opinion ID: 202016
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Booker Sentencing Issue

Text: 15 Hansen's first and main line of attack is the fact that the district court sentenced him under the prior mandatory guideline regime. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Despite his claim to the contrary, however, Hansen did not argue to the district court that the guidelines were unconstitutional or that his sentence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); therefore, his Booker claim is not preserved and thus we review for plain error. See United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir.2005). Under plain error review, Hansen must show (1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected the defendant's substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir.2001). 16 Hansen is able to meet the first two elements because he was sentenced under a mandatory guideline regime. See Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 77. The question is whether he is able to show a reasonable probability that the sentencing court, freed of the shackles forged by mandatory guidelines, would have fashioned a more favorable sentence. United States v. Guzman, 419 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir.2005). While we have said that we are not overly demanding as to proof of probability, United States v. Heldeman, 402 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir.2005), the defendant must point to specific indicia that reasonable probability exists. United States v. Sanchez-Berrios, 424 F.3d 65, 80 (1st Cir.2005). 17 To support his claim that it is reasonably probable that sentencing under a non-mandatory system would have yielded a different result, Hansen points to the following statement in the district judge's February 14, 2003 sentencing memorandum: 18 The defendant was 19. The people who enlisted him in stealing the van were at least ten years older, with a brutal reputation in Charlestown. While the law holds Hansen responsible for the foreseeable consequence of his acts, it is clear that his relationship to the armored car robbery that resulted in the tragic murder of Edward Kubera was tenuous. He had, at most, only the most general idea of the plans of Fidler and Bird. He did not know when the robbery would take place, where, or of whom. While Brennan suggests that Hansen knew that guns would be involved — semi-automatic guns at that — Hansen had no control over how they would be brandished, or indeed, whether they would be used at all. 19 United States v. Hansen, 256 F.Supp.2d 65, 72 (D.Mass.2003). These comments do suggest that the district judge was sympathetic to Hansen's situation in light of the jury's guilty verdict on Count 3, which held Hansen accountable for the shooting as a foreseeable consequence of the use of a firearm in the course of the conspiracy. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 648, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). Scrutinized in the context of the entire memorandum, however, the court's statements do little more than explain why it chose to depart downward to the second degree murder guideline (U.S.S.G. § 2A1.2 (base offense level of 33)) instead of using the first degree murder guideline (U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 (base offense level of 43)). Nothing in the judge's comments imply that she would have imposed a different sentence had she been operating under an advisory guideline regime. In fact, a review of the entire record indicates just the opposite. The district court explained: 20 In this area, the guidelines permit me to make a more nuanced judgment as to what kind of sentence Hansen deserves than the jury did. The jury may have found the killing foreseeable but I cannot conclude that it was intentional. If there ever were a case in which the downward departure to a second degree murder guideline was appropriate, it is this one. 21 Hansen, 256 F.Supp.2d at 72. Other comments by the court at the October 9, 2002 sentencing hearing indicate that to the extent the judge felt constrained, it was as a result of the jury's guilty verdict on the conspiracy counts, not the mandatory guidelines. 6 Indeed, the judge's comments indicate that she felt the mandatory guidelines allowed her room to craft an appropriate sentence based upon Hansen's actual role and his state of mind. This is critical because here, in contrast to the vast majority of cases, the applicable guidelines encourage the sentencing judge to choose the most appropriate point along a spectrum, from first degree murder (level 43) to second degree murder (level 33) 7 based upon an evaluation of state of mind. The judge exercised this authority by placing the crime at the level she found appropriate (level 33). 22 But having exercised the authority to depart, the court also made it clear that it would go no lower: [t]here's no way I'm going to go below a Level 33. It is also clear that the court believed Hansen played a greater role than Brennan in the offenses, and deserved a longer sentence than Brennan's 320 months. As the judge explained: 23 Based on the relationship, though, between Mr. Brennan and Mr. Hansen, I agree with the government that I will not give a role adjustment to Mr. Hansen, one that Mr. Brennan got. I do think that, whatever Mr. Brennan might have been involved in in any other situation certainly, he was a lesser participant in this offense than in others. 24 While there is certainly some evidence that the court felt sympathetic for Hansen's situation in light of Pinkerton, based upon this record, there can be little doubt but that Hansen falls short of meeting the burden of showing a reasonable probability that the district court would have imposed a more lenient sentence under an advisory guideline regime.