Opinion ID: 750665
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of Evidentiary Hearing

Text: 112 In a capital case, a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing where there has been no state court evidentiary hearing and the petitioner raises a colorable claim of ineffective assistance. Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1170 (9th Cir.1990). The scope of an evidentiary hearing on a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is committed to the discretion of the district court. United States v. Layton, 855 F.2d 1388, 1421 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1046, 109 S.Ct. 1178, 103 L.Ed.2d 244 (1989). 113 In the present case, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Karl's ineffective assistance of counsel claim for the limited purpose of determining whether Karl could establish the first prong of the Strickland test. Karl was therefore required to prove that his counsel's performance was deficient before the court would entertain evidence regarding prejudice. 114 Karl argues that the district court's limitation on the scope of the evidentiary hearing was erroneous for two reasons. First, Karl claims that the two prongs of the Strickland test are interconnected and that they must be considered together. 115 No court has ever held that both prongs of the Strickland test must be examined simultaneously. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has held that a court is not required to address both components of the Strickland test in deciding an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. Thus, a court need not determine whether defendant was prejudiced by counsel's alleged deficiencies if it determines that counsel's performance was not deficient. See id.; Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 508 (9th Cir.1994) (defendant failed to show lack of thorough investigation of law and facts and therefore failed to meet his burden on the first prong of the Strickland test), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1026, 115 S.Ct. 1378, 131 L.Ed.2d 232 (1995). 116 Second, Karl claims that the district court erred in not allowing him to present expert medical and legal testimony regarding his trial counsel's performance. Karl alleges that he needed to present expert testimony to show what evidence could and should have been presented by his trial counsel. This claim lacks merit. 117 The district court allowed Karl to present the testimony of five attorneys regarding the standard of care used by Karl's attorney. These attorneys were all familiar with the case. Karl has failed to cite any authority, and we have found none, that supports his contention that only outside expert testimony can provide a basis on which to measure counsel's performance. 118 Furthermore, the majority of the proffered expert testimony rejected by the court went to the second prong of the Strickland test, which was not the subject of the hearing. Thus, the district court's refusal to allow the expert testimony based on its finding that the testimony would not be relevant to the limited scope of the evidentiary hearing was reasonable. 8 See Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1326-27 (9th Cir.1994) (upholding district court's limitation of defendant's expert evidence where the limitation was reasonably designed to restrict the issue to competence of counsel, on the basis of what was reasonably known by counsel at the time of trial), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1120, 115 S.Ct. 923, 130 L.Ed.2d 802 (1995). 119 Because a defendant is required to prove both prongs of the Strickland test before relief can be granted, the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of the evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant met the first prong of the Strickland test. See Layton, 855 F.2d at 1421. Furthermore, the district court's limitation of Karl's expert evidence was reasonably designed to restrict the issue of the hearing to the first prong of the Strickland test. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the expert medical and legal testimony proffered by Karl. See Wade, 29 F.3d at 1326-27.