Opinion ID: 3019333
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counsel should conduct

Text: independent investigations relating to the guilt/innocence phase and to the penalty phase of a capital trial. Both investigations should begin immediately upon counsel’s entry into the case and should be pursued expeditiously. ... C. The investigation for preparation of the sentencing phase should be conducted regardless of any initial assertion by the client that mitigation is not to be offered. This investigation should comprise 39 efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor. ABA Guideline 11.4.1 (1989) (emphasis added). Counsel should explore, inter alia, “medical history,” “family and social history,” “educational history,” “special educational needs,” “employment and training history,” “prior adult and juvenile records,” and “prior correctional experience.” ABA Guideline 11.4.1(D)(2)(C). The ABA Guidelines go on to explain that [t]he need for a standard mandating investigation for the sentencing phase is underscored by cases in which counsel failed to recognize the importance of this aspect of death penalty litigation. Inexperienced counsel — and even counsel experienced in non-capital cases — “may underestimate the importance of developing meaningful sources of mitigating evidence . . .” See Guideline 11.8 and commentary. Counsel’s duty to investigate is not negated by the expressed desires of a client. Nor may counsel “sit idly by, thinking that the investigation would be futile.” The attorney must first evaluate the potential avenues of action and then advise the 40 client on the merits of each. Without investigation, counsel’s evaluation and advice amount to little more than a guess. ABA Guideline 11.4.1, commentary (1989) (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4–4.1, commentary (2d ed. 1982) (stating “[t]he lawyer . . . has a substantial and important role to perform in raising mitigating factors both to the prosecutor initially and to the court at sentencing . . . . Investigation is essential to fulfillment of these functions.”). “Despite these well-defined norms, however, counsel [here] abandoned their investigation of [Outten’s] background after having acquired only rudimentary knowledge of his history from a narrow set of sources.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524. It was standard practice at the time of Outten’s trial for a death-eligible defendant’s penalty-phase investigation to include his medical history, educational history, family and social history, employment history, and adult and juvenile correctional records. Counsel’s investigation, however, was limited solely to conversations with Outten and his mother—a woman who, as demonstrated by the unreviewed-by-counsel records, had not “shown great[] continued interest in [her son].” See Report of James-Monroe, App. at 180. We conclude that this effort fell well short of the national prevailing professional standards articulated by the American Bar Association and was, therefore, unreasonable. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (holding that 41 counsel’s decision not to expand their investigation to petitioner’s life history, beyond review of a presentence report and social service records, failed to meet the prevailing standards of attorney conduct). Counsel’s cursory investigation was also unreasonable in light of what they presumably discovered from the conversations with Outten and his mother prior to sentencing: Outten’s father was an abusive alcoholic; Outten had struggled in school and ultimately failed to graduate; he had run away from home; and he had a history of substance abuse.6 Id. at 527 (explaining that courts must consider whether the evidence known to counsel “would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further”). 6 The record does not reflect the content of counsel’s conversations in this regard. We presume that counsel discovered information concerning Outten’s abusive father, struggles in school, and substance abuse during their conversations with Outten and his mother because they testified as to those facts on direct examination during the sentencing proceedings. Moreover, in their affidavit, trial counsel noted that, prior to sentencing, they “determined that all negatives, abusive childhood, truancy and school problems would be counterproductive.” Trial Counsel Aff., App. at 158. Because counsel limited their sentencing investigation exclusively to Outten and his mother, either Outten or his mother—or both—must have been the source of counsel’s information on those “negatives.” In any event, counsel acknowledge that they were aware of the abuse and school problems. 42 “[A]ny reasonably competent attorney would have realized that pursuing those leads was necessary to make an informed choice among possible [sentencing strategies].” Id. at 525. “Indeed, counsel uncovered no evidence in their investigation to suggest that a mitigation case, in its own right, would have been counterproductive, or that further investigation would have been fruitless . . . .” Id. Moreover, as in Wiggins, “[h]ad counsel investigated further [here], they might well have discovered the sexual abuse [Outten suffered at the hands of his foster mother] revealed during . . . postconviction proceedings.” Id. As noted above, the prevailing professional norms for capital cases at the time of Outten’s trial instructed defense counsel “to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor.” ABA Guideline 11.4.1 (emphasis added). Given the minimal investigation conducted here, trial counsel’s evaluation of which defense strategy to pursue “amounted to little more than a[n] [uninformed] guess.” Id.; see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527. Simply stated, failing to present possibly mitigating evidence cannot be justified when counsel have not “fulfill[ed] their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 396 (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4–4.1, commentary). Accordingly, we hold the Delaware Supreme Court’s 1998 ruling in Outten III—that the limited scope of trial counsel’s investigation was adequate under the prevailing norms of professional conduct at the time of 43 Outten’s trial—was an objectively unreasonable application of the first prong of the Strickland inquiry. 2. Was Counsel’s Unreasonable Investigation Prejudicial? Because trial counsel’s failure to investigate Outten’s background was unreasonable, we proceed to whether that error was prejudicial—that is, whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “In assessing prejudice, we reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534. The James-Monroe report shows substantial evidence in mitigation that counsel failed to investigate and present at sentencing. In particular, Outten experienced severe mistreatment as a child from his “abusive and scary” alcoholic father. James-Monroe Report, App. at 176. Outten’s father physically assaulted and emotionally tormented his wife and children routinely, even “threaten[ing] on many occasions to kill [them].” Id. When Mrs. Outten returned home from work, she often found the children huddled in a corner, afraid to move. Id. at 177. “[M]any times the children would have been there all day and gone without food or completing their homework.” Id. 44 Frequently, Mrs. Outten and her children were forced to “walk the streets or seek shelter in an abandoned home or apartment lobby” in order to avoid Mr. Outten’s “rages or abusive actions.” Id. Outten’s brother John related an incident where, because he had left the dog tied up, his father choked him to the point of unconsciousness so that he would know “how it feels to choke to death.” Id. As Mr. Outten physically deteriorated, he became suicidal and often the children would find him passed out, having overdosed on medication and/or slit his wrists. Id. “Each of the Outten children has stories concerning the rage of their father and their mother’s inability to protect them.” Id. Neither Outten nor any of his siblings completed high school. Id. at 178. Moreover, they all suffered from alcoholism and/or drug addiction. Id. at 177–78. In addition to the considerable evidence of child abuse, James-Monroe discovered “easily accessible” documented evidence of neurological damage, poor school performance, low IQ, learning disabilities, placement in foster homes, sexual abuse, and substance abuse. Id. at 176–81. Even a superficial investigation into Outten’s school records reveals that he functioned during his developmental years at a below-average level of intelligence and, specifically, at a retarded level in the area of concentration. Id. at 180. Outten “thus has the kind of troubled history we have declared relevant to assessing a defendant’s moral culpability.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535; see 45 also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (stating that “evidence about the defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background . . . may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse”). The Delaware Supreme Court held that Outten’s allegations concerning the limited scope of counsel’s investigation of his background failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. Outten III, 720 A.2d at 553. We disagree. The Court’s conclusion was premised on evidence that “counsel made some effort to discover whether there was any useful information in Outten’s school records,” and that “information regarding [Outten’s] substance abuse problem, truancy trouble in school, appearances in Family Court, criminal activity, and abusive and alcoholic father came out in the testimony during the penalty phase hearing.” Id. In another context, we have rejected expressly the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s conclusion that the failure to present additional mitigating evidence was not prejudicial simply because the jury had some awareness of a petitioner’s childhood and mental illness: [T]he Commonwealth fails to appreciate the fact that the only evidence specifically pertaining to Jermyn’s childhood abuse came from Reverend 46 Falk, whose testimony, to which we have already alluded, was limited, equivocal, and misleading. While the jury was clearly aware that Jermyn claimed that he suffered a mental illness, the lack of directed and specific testimony about Jermyn’s childhood and its impact on Jermyn’s mental illness left the jury’s awareness incomplete. We therefore do not agree with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s characterization that the evidence that could have been presented would simply “have provided the jury with more detailed incidents of his childhood trauma and mental illness.” Rather, the testimony would have provided the jury with an entirely different view of Jermyn’s life and childhood which would have both aided in understanding the seriousness and origin of his mental illness and provided an understanding of Jermyn’s relationship with the deceased. Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 310–11 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal footnote and citations omitted). The same logic applies here. Simply because some mitigating evidence regarding Outten’s abusive childhood was introduced to the jury—despite defense counsel’s contrary intentions, see Trial Counsel Aff., App. at 158 (stating that the defense strategy was not to introduce any evidence of Outten’s 47 “abusive childhood” or “school problems”)—it does not follow that the jury was provided a comprehensive understanding of Outten’s abusive relationship with his father or other aspects of his troubled childhood. For example, while Outten’s mother portrayed her husband as a “very, very strict parent,” she did not relate to the jury the disturbing abuse she later described to James-Monroe in detail. In any event, the jury heard nothing regarding Outten’s sexual abuse in foster care, possible neurological damage, learning disabilities, or low IQ. Here, “counsel chose to abandon their investigation at an unreasonable juncture, making a fully informed decision with respect to sentencing strategy impossible.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527–28. As we have already explained, the state court’s ruling that the scope of counsel’s investigation was adequate was an unreasonable application of Strickland. Thus, its subsequent deference to counsel’s decision not to “pursue all lines of investigation,” Outten III, 720 A.2d at 553 (internal quotations omitted), “despite the fact that counsel based this alleged choice on what we have made clear was an unreasonable investigation, was also objectively unreasonable.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 528. This is because “strategic choices made after less than complete investigations are [only] reasonable . . . to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigations.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91. The State counters that trial counsel would have proceeded with their “reasonable” strategy of presenting Outten 48 as kind, caring, and ultimately innocent, notwithstanding the mitigating evidence they failed to discover. In Wiggins, the State of Maryland offered a similar contention, “maintaining that Wiggins’ counsel would not have altered their chosen strategy of focusing exclusively on Wiggins’ direct responsibility for the murder.” 539 U.S. at 536. The Supreme Court flatly rejected this logic, explaining that counsel were not in a position to make a reasonable strategic choice as to whether to focus on Wiggins’ direct responsibility, the sordid details of his life history, or both, because the investigation supporting their choice was unreasonable. Id. The same analysis applies here. Counsel for Outten were not in a position to make a reasonable decision whether to focus on his innocence or positive characteristics, the details of his traumatic background, or both, as their investigation in preparation for sentencing was itself unreasonably deficient. Moreover, as already discussed, counsel’s presentation at sentencing hardly reflected their stated strategy. The innocence argument was never presented to the jury because the trial judge disallowed it. To make matters worse, counsel then did an “about face” by proclaiming to the jury in closing that “it wasn’t too difficult to decide” that Outten had murdered Mannon. To hammer home the point, counsel explicitly stated, “He’s guilty.” 49 Trial counsel’s sentencing presentation also failed to focus on evidence indicating Outten’s good character traits. As stated above, counsel did argue that Outten had no convictions for violent crimes, but he did so by referring to Outten’s “long criminal record” and stated that “Jack Outten was on the street for a long time committing crimes, but there’s no history of violence.” In closing, counsel neglected to remind the jury that Outten was capable of holding down a job, had cared for his dying father, or had assisted his sister with child care. Worse yet, the contention that Outten was non-violent was considerably undermined by the cross-examination testimony of various family members describing Outten’s physical attacks on his sister and ex-girlfriend—damaging testimony that could have been factored into trial counsel’s strategic decision had counsel interviewed those witnesses prior to sentencing. The State asserts, and we acknowledge, that not all of the evidence in the records counsel failed to investigate is favorable to Outten. This is nearly always the case. Indeed, the same was true of the evidence not investigated by counsel in Williams. There, the Supreme Court observed that “the failure to introduce the comparatively voluminous amount of evidence that did speak in Williams’ favor was not justified by . . . [the] decision to focus on Williams’ voluntary confession.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 398. The same is true here; the failure to introduce considerable evidence that could have been helpful to Outten was not justified by counsel’s belief, without an adequate investigation, that the net result of any investigation would be 50 negative. In fact, much of the aggravating evidence in the records was either introduced or elicited on cross-examination by the State at sentencing. The more important point here, however, is while it is true that trial counsel may not have introduced into evidence all of Outten’s records at sentencing if they had procured them, the records most certainly would have informed counsel’s preparation. Moreover, given the jury’s close vote in favor of death for Outten—7 to 5—counsel would have had the ability to argue a much broader range of mitigating factors than the four that were presented to the jury.7 In this context, we conclude that the Delaware Supreme Court unreasonably applied the second prong of Strickland in reaching the determination that Outten could not establish prejudice because Outten’s records contained some harmful information. See Outten III, 720 A.2d at 552 (approving the Superior Court’s reasoning that Outten’s “ records contained both mitigating and aggravating information which, at best, cancel each other out . . . [; thus] trial counsel cannot be faulted for not investigating them [because,] in all likelihood, the 7 For example, notwithstanding the emotional and physical abuse Outten suffered at the hands of his father, the record reflects that Outten forgave him and remained by his side during his final months of life. In this context, it seems that revealing the severity of Mr. Outten’s abuse of his children would have bolstered and complemented—rather than detracted from—the defense’s portrait of Outten as caring and compassionate. 51 records would not have been used”) (internal quotations omitted)). In effect, despite the fact that there was a wealth of readily accessible mitigating evidence here, the jury heard little of it. In evaluating the totality of the evidence, both introduced at trial and in the habeas proceedings, we conclude that “[h]ad the jury been able to place [Outten’s] excruciating life history on the mitigating side of the scale, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror [or more] would have struck a different balance.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537. Because the jury recommended death by the narrow margin of 7 to 5, persuading even one juror to vote for life imprisonment could have made all the difference. This without doubt satisfies Strickland’s prejudice prong.