Opinion ID: 2582281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Appropriate Inquiries to be Made

Text: As the foregoing discussion suggests, resolution of the issue presented in this case involves two related inquiries: (1) the breadth or scope of the so-called Almendarez-Torres exception applicable to an increase in sentence based upon a defendant's recidivism, and (2) the specific nature of the inquiry that is required to be made under California law in this matter. We address each of these inquiries in turn.
With regard to the first inquiry  the scope of the Almendarez-Torres exception  we note that, as the Thomas decision recognized, numerous out-of-state decisions have interpreted the Almendarez-Torres exception more broadly than did the Court of Appeal in the present case. In State v. Dixon (2001) 346 N.J.Super. 126, 787 A.2d 211, for example, the court held there is no right to a jury trial where [t]he required fact-finding does not relate to the present offense or its elements. ( Id. at p. 221, italics added.) In that case, after a jury convicted the defendant of various charges, the trial court sentenced him under a repeat offender statute. The court rejected the defendant's argument that he had a right to have a jury determine the existence of the factors that increased his sentence. In short, we read Apprendi as leaving to the judge, consistent with due process, the task of finding not only the mere fact of previous convictions but other related issues as well. Judges frequently must make factual determinations for sentencing, so it is hardly anomalous to require that they also determine the `who, what, when and where' of a prior conviction. [Citation.] ( Ibid., italics added.) In Wright v. State (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2001) 780 So.2d 216, the defendant asserted that a statute permitting the trial court to determine the fact of his prior conviction and whether the conviction was for a qualified offense committed within five years was unconstitutional. The court disagreed and held that even in the wake of Apprendi, the defendant had no right to have a jury decide these issues. In People v. Hill (2003) 345 Ill.App.3d 620, 280 Ill.Dec. 908, 803 N.E.2d 138, the court considered whether the state's mandatory recidivist sentencing provision was unconstitutional under Apprendi. The court held that there is no right to a jury trial on facts relating to recidivism, including the fact of the timing, degree, number and sequence of defendant's prior convictions, or on his age for purpose of enhancement under the recidivist sentencing statute. ( Id. at p. 150.) The court also relied upon its previous decision in People v. Lathon (2000) 317 Ill.App.3d 573, 251 Ill.Dec. 296, 740 N.E.2d 377, noting that decision's extensive review of Apprendi and Almendarez-Torres: Lathon looked at Apprendi's review of Almendarez-Torres and determined that the Apprendi Court not only endorsed the recidivism exception, but articulated reasons for such an exception, including the fact that procedural safeguards enhance the validity of any prior conviction, recidivism is not an essential element of the underlying criminal offense[,] and recidivism does not relate to the commission of the underlying offense. ( Hill, at p. 150.) In State v. Stewart (2002) 368 Md. 26, 791 A.2d 143, the defendant was convicted of possession and distribution of crack cocaine and was sentenced to 10 years in prison after the trial court determined that he had served a prior prison term. ( Id. at p. 144.) The defendant argued that he had a right to a jury trial on the prior-prison-term issue and to have the prosecution prove that matter beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Ibid. ) The Maryland Court of Appeals disagreed: [I]n light of the language in Apprendi suggesting that sentencing courts traditionally consider matters related to recidivism [citation], courts have found that the Almendarez-Torres exception to the right to a jury trial is not limited solely to prior convictions. ( Id. at p. 151.) The court further observed in Stewart: [T]he Almendarez-Torres exception covers questions related to recidivism, not merely the fact of prior conviction. Appellee's previous term of incarceration, like prior convictions arising from crimes committed on separate occasions [citation], or the aggravated nature of a prior conviction [citation], is a fact related to recidivism, and, as stated above, recidivism is a question that traditionally has been reserved for the sentencing court. ( Id. at p. 152, italics added.) Thus, the defendant in the Stewart case had no right to a jury trial on the issue of the length of his confinement upon a prior conviction, for the purpose of sentence enhancement under the subsequent offender statute. Finally, in People v. Rosen (2001) 96 N.Y.2d 329, 335, 728 N.Y.S.2d 407, 752 N.E.2d 844, the New York Court of Appeals held the [d]efendant had no constitutional right to a jury trial to establish the facts of his prior felony convictions (citing Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S., at p. 488, 120 S.Ct. 2348), including matters `pertaining to the defendant's history and character and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct.' ( Rosen, at p. 335, 728 N.Y.S.2d 407, 752 N.E.2d 844.) Similarly, a number of federal lower court decisions have reaffirmed the vitality of judicial fact finding with regard to a defendant's prior convictions. As summarized below, the decisions of these courts have opined that the Almendarez-Torres exception is not limited simply to the bare fact of a defendant's prior conviction, but extends as well to the nature of that conviction, thereby permitting sentencing courts to determine whether the prior conviction is the type of conviction (for example, a conviction of a violent felony) that renders the defendant subject to an enhanced sentence. One such decision is Chamberlain v. Pliler (C.D.Cal.2004) 307 F.Supp.2d 1128. In that case, after the jury found that the defendant had suffered prior felony convictions for robbery and assault with a deadly weapon, the trial court in the underlying state court proceeding determined that those convictions were serious or violent felony convictions for purposes of California's Three Strikes law, based in part upon the court's determination that the record of the prior criminal proceedings underlying the conviction for assault with a deadly weapon established that this conviction rested upon the defendant's personal use of a deadly weapon. In subsequent federal proceedings challenging the increased sentence under Apprendi, the federal district court in Chamberlain rejected the defendant's challenge, reiterating: `As we understand [defendant's] position, he believes that because the fact that he personally used a dangerous weapon or caused great bodily harm was never specifically submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, it could not be used to increase the penalty for his crimes. We do not agree with his interpretation of Apprendi. . . . [¶] By carving out an exception for proof of a prior conviction, we believe the Court [in Apprendi ] left state courts free to undertake the analysis set forth in Kelii to ascertain the facts underlying a prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon which had been submitted to a jury and previously found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. In the case of a prior conviction which might or might not constitute a strike, such as conviction under section 245, subdivision (a)(1), the trial court searches the underlying record for clear evidence of the type of injury suffered by the victim or the identity of the person who wielded the dangerous or deadly weapon. If there was any dispute about these matters and the issue was not resolved by the jury, the prior offense must be deemed ambiguous and not counted as a strike. If, on the other hand, the record is clear that the offense involved personal use of a dangerous weapon or actual infliction of great bodily harm, the court is free to impose the greater sentence. As the court said in Kelii, this is the type of inquiry traditionally performed by judges as part of the sentencing function.... We do not believe the holding in Apprendi undercuts the foundation for the decision in Kelii. ' ( Id. at pp. 1141-1142, quoting the California Court of Appeal's decision, fns. omitted, italics added.) In United States v. Santiago (2d Cir. 2001) 268 F.3d 151, the defendant pleaded guilty to the offense of possession of a firearm by a felon. (18 U.S.C. 922(g), 924(e).) The federal district court found the defendant had three serious prior convictions that had occurred on separate occasions, and sentenced him pursuant to a prior conviction sentence enhancement. ( Santiago, supra, 268 F.3d at p. 153.) On appeal, the defendant argued that only the fact of a prior conviction is exempted from the rule of Apprendi and that the issue of whether his prior convictions were committed on the same occasion must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Id. at pp. 153-154.) In Santiago, the Second Circuit disagreed, observing that [t]he determination of `the fact of a prior conviction' implicitly entails many subsidiary findings.... [¶] ... [¶] ... [W]e read Apprendi as leaving to the judge, consistent with due process, the task of finding not only the mere fact of previous convictions but other related issues as well. Judges frequently must make factual determinations for sentencing, so it is hardly anomalous to require that they also determine the `who, what, when, and where' of a prior conviction. ( Id. at p. 156; accord, United States v. Morris (7th Cir.2002) 293 F.3d 1010, 1012-1013 [no right to a jury trial on the issue of whether prior convictions were committed on a single occasion, for purposes of the armed career-criminal enhancement].) In United States v. Kempis-Bonola (8th Cir.2002) 287 F.3d 699, the federal district court determined that the defendant was not entitled to have a jury determine whether a prior conviction was an aggravated felony for purposes of enhancement under 8 United States Code section 1326, subdivision (b)(2). On appeal, the defendant argued that because the inquiry regarding the prior conviction required fact finding beyond the fact of conviction, Apprendi necessitated reversal of the judgment rendered against him. In rejecting the defendant's position, the Eighth Circuit explained: The reason that there can be no reversal here based on Apprendi is because ... the issue involves a prior conviction, and the holding of Apprendi expressly excepts the issue of recidivism from the rule it announced.... [¶] ... [T]he sentencing-related circumstances of recidivism are facts that may be found by the sentencing judge and are not within the scope of Apprendi's holding. ( Id. at pp. 702-703, italics added.)
With regard to the second issue noted above  the nature of the inquiry required (and permitted) in this context under California law  we observe that the matter presented is not, as the Court of Appeal appears to have assumed, a determination or finding about the [defendant's earlier] conduct itself, such as the intent with which a defendant acted. Instead, it is a determination regarding the nature or basis of the defendant's prior conviction  specifically, whether that conviction qualified as a conviction of a serious felony. California law specifies that in making this determination, the inquiry is a limited one and must be based upon the record of the prior criminal proceeding, with a focus on the elements of the offense of which the defendant was convicted. If the enumeration of the elements of the offense does not resolve the issue, an examination of the record of the earlier criminal proceeding is required in order to ascertain whether that record reveals whether the conviction realistically may have been based on conduct that would not constitute a serious felony under California law. (See, e.g., People v. Woodell, supra, 17 Cal.4th 448, 452-461, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 950 P.2d 85.) The need for such an inquiry does not contemplate that the court will make an independent determination regarding a disputed issue of fact relating to the defendant's prior conduct (see id. at p. 460, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 950 P.2d 85), but instead that the court simply will examine the record of the prior proceeding to determine whether that record is sufficient to demonstrate that the conviction is of the type that subjects the defendant to increased punishment under California law. This is an inquiry that is quite different from the resolution of the issues submitted to a jury, and is one more typically and appropriately undertaken by a court. As the foregoing discussion makes clear, numerous state and federal court decisions have interpreted the Almendarez-Torres exception more broadly than defendant urges here, and have concluded that Apprendi does not preclude a court from making sentencing determinations related to a defendant's recidivism. In the present case, the trial court had before it the colloquies from the relevant Nevada proceedings, in which defendant pleaded guilty to the Nevada robbery charges. From this factual inquiry, limited to examining court documents ( Kelii, supra, 21 Cal.4th 452, 457, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 674, 981 P.2d 518), the trial court fairly could determine whether each of the prior convictions constituted a serious prior felony conviction for purposes of the California sentencing statute. As we previously have observed, but wish to reiterate, `This is the type of inquiry traditionally performed by judges as part of the sentencing function.' ( Ibid. ) In his supplemental briefing filed in this court, defendant contends that even if Apprendi and its constitutional progeny leave the scope of the Almendarez-Torres exception unclear, the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Shepard v. United States (2005) 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 ( Shepard ) indicates that a jury trial is required in the present context. In Shepard, the high court addressed whether, under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) (18 U.S.C., § 924(e)), a sentencing court may look to police reports or complaint applications in determining whether a guilty plea in an earlier criminal proceeding formed the basis for a conviction of generic burglary, qualifying the defendant for a minimum 15-year prison sentence under the ACCA. In Shepard, a majority of the high court held that a later court determining the character of an admitted burglary is generally limited to examining the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented. ( Id. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 1257].) In reaching this conclusion  and rejecting the assertion that the sentencing court properly could consider all the documents contained within the record of the prior criminal proceeding  the majority opinion in Shepard stated, in the course of its analysis, that [w]hile the disputed fact here can be described as a fact about a prior conviction, it is too far removed from the conclusive significance of a prior judicial record, and too much like the findings subject to Jones [ v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215] and Apprendi, to say that Almendarez-Torres clearly authorizes a judge to resolve the dispute. The rule of reading statutes to avoid serious risks of unconstitutionality, see Jones, supra, at 239, [119 S.Ct. 1215], ... therefore counsels us to limit the scope of judicial factfinding on the disputed generic character of a prior plea.... ( Shepard, supra, 544 U.S. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at pp. 1262-1263, italics added; [9] see also id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 1257 [[A] later court determining the character of an admitted burglary is generally limited to examining the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.].) Although the Shepard decision may suggest that a majority of the high court would view the legal issue presented in the case before us as presenting a serious constitutional issue, the high court's decision did not purport to resolve that issue. The issue before the high court in Shepard was resolved as a matter of statutory interpretation, and the court did not purport to decide whether a state is constitutionally precluded from permitting a court to conduct the kind of examination of the record of a prior criminal proceeding that occurred in the case before us in determining whether a conviction constitutes a qualifying prior conviction for purposes of enhancement under a state sentencing statute. [10] Accordingly, we believe that Shepard fails to establish the validity of the Court of Appeal's application of Apprendi. In this regard, it is worth noting that in the several months following the Shepard decision, a number of federal lower courts have reaffirmed the viability of the Almendarez-Torres exception. (See, e.g., United States v. Reeves (8th Cir.2005) 410 F.3d 1031, 1035, quoting United States v. Marcussen (8th Cir.2005) 403 F.3d 982, 984 [We previously have rejected the argument that the nature of a prior conviction is to be treated differently from the fact of a prior conviction; Shepard supports the rule that the sentencing court, not a jury, must determine whether prior convictions qualify as violent felonies]; United States v. Williams (7th Cir.2005) 410 F.3d 397, 402 [trial court can make findings of fact respecting criminal history, be they findings as to the fact of [a defendant's] prior convictions or as to the nature of those convictions, because Shepard acknowledges the continuing validity of Almendarez-Torres ].) In view of the foregoing circumstances, we conclude that Shepard does not provide the type of clear resolution of the issue that would justify overturning the relevant California precedents.