Opinion ID: 696232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Vicarious Liability Provision (Sec. 25-47(B))

Text: 32 Section 25-47(B) holds political candidates prima facie responsible for the placement, erection and removal of their political signs. In response to Whitton's request to alter or amend the court's previous judgment, the district court held that Sec. 25-47(B) is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. Whitton argues that this section is a content-based restriction because only political candidates whose political signs violate provisions of the sign code are subject to the burden-shifting mandated by this section. We agree. 33 Under the sign code, there are no other provisions which hold a party presumptively responsible for code infractions. Thus, a business that erects a sign advertising its products or services that is in excess of the square footage allowance is not held prima facie responsible for the violation. Similarly, a residential landowner who places a permanent ground sign too close to the curb line is not subject to the burden shifting provisions of Sec. 25-47(B). Only a political candidate whose political sign is in violation of the sign code is held vicariously prima facie liable for violations. Again, because the particular message on the sign dictates whether it is subject to the challenged restriction, it too is a content-based restriction. 34 Like the provisions examined above, this section cannot withstand the rigors of strict scrutiny. Gladstone has offered no interests which it seeks to serve or protect through the enactment of this provision. Section 25-50, which outlines the legislative purpose and intent regarding the restrictions peculiar to political signs, makes no reference to Sec. 25-47(B). Likewise, the restriction is not narrowly tailored. Gladstone could subject political candidates to prosecution in the same manner as other sign code violators and has not provided any rationale for the disparate treatment of political candidates whose signs violate the sign code. 16 35 We conclude that Sec. 25-47(B) is a content-based restriction that does not withstand strict scrutiny. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's holding that it is a constitutionally permissible time, place, and manner restriction.