Opinion ID: 1123022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: reckless second-degree murder

Text: The defendant was charged with and convicted of premeditated murder in the first degree, K.S.A. 21-3401. The trial court instructed the jury on first-degree murder, K.S.A. 21-3401; intentional second-degree murder, K.S.A. 21-3402(a); voluntary manslaughter, K.S.A. 21-3403; and involuntary manslaughter, K.S.A. 21-3404. No objection to these instructions was made at trial. The defendant argues that the district court failed in its duty to instruct the jury on the lesser included crime of reckless second-degree murder, K.S.A. 21-3402(b). The defendant correctly asserts that the court has a statutory duty to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses. K.S.A. 21-3107(3) states: In cases where the crime charged may include some lesser crime, it is the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury, not only as to the crime charged but as to all lesser crimes of which the accused might be found guilty under the information or indictment and upon the evidence adduced. The duty arises whether or not the defendant requests the instruction at trial. State v. Sanders, 258 Kan. 409, 413, 904 P.2d 951 (1995); State v. Bowman, 252 Kan. 883, 892, 850 P.2d 236 (1993). A. Reckless second-degree murder as a lesser included offense of premeditated first-degree murder. Reckless second-degree murder, or depraved heart murder at common law, is defined in K.S.A. 21-3402, which states in full: Murder in the second degree is the killing of a human being committed: (a) Intentionally; or (b) unintentionally but recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Murder in the second degree as described in subsection (a) is a severity level 1, person felony. Murder in the second degree as described in subsection (b) is a severity level 2, person felony. (Emphasis added.) Subsection (b) was added to the definition of second-degree murder and became effective July 1, 1993. L. 1992, ch. 298, § 4. Reckless second-degree murder is distinguished from first-degree murder (intentionally and with premeditation, K.S.A. 21-3401[a]) and intentional second-degree murder by the level of intent required. In his treatise, Professor LaFave explains: Extremely negligent conduct, which creates what a reasonable [person] would realize to be not only an unjustifiable but also a very high degree of risk of death or serious bodily injury to another or to othersthough unaccompanied by any intent to kill or do serious bodily injuryand which actually causes the death of another, may constitute [depraved heart] murder. 2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 7.4 (1986). Reckless second-degree murder is similar in nature to involuntary manslaughter, K.S.A. 21-3404(a), which requires a level of recklessness resulting in death. In determining whether a crime is a lesser included offense of another crime, there is some statutory guidance. K.S.A. 21-3107(2) states in part: (2) ... An included crime may be any of the following: (a) A lesser degree of the same crime; (b) an attempt to commit the crime charged; (c) an attempt to commit a lesser degree of the crime charged; or (d) a crime necessarily proved if the crime charged were proved. Under the plain language of subsection (2)(a), the legislature can determine whether a crime is a lesser included crime by defining it as a lesser degree. This subsection is applicable in the present case. Under K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(a), second-degree murder is a lesser degree of first-degree murder and, therefore, an included crime. It is presumed that the legislature intended depraved heart murder to be a lesser included crime of first-degree murder when the legislature expanded the definition of second-degree murder. The legislature is presumed to understand the meaning of the words it uses and the procedures it establishes. State Bank Commissioner v. Emery, 19 Kan. App.2d 1063, 1071, 880 P.2d 783 (1994). This result is consistent with precedent explaining the theory of lesser included crimes of homicide under K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(a). In State v. Gregory, 218 Kan. 180, 542 P.2d 1051 (1975), the court examined whether manslaughter was a lesser included crime of murder. The Gregory court turned to the common law and noted: `Homicide, of which murder is the highest and most criminal species, is of various degrees, according to circumstances. The term, in its largest sense, is generic, embracing every mode by which the life of one man is taken by the act of another.' 218 Kan. at 182-83 (quoting Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 303 [1850]). The court held that manslaughter is a lesser degree of homicide than murder, and for purposes of K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(a) is a `lesser degree of the same crime.' Gregory, 218 Kan. at 183. This holding included involuntary manslaughter, which like depraved heart murder, is predicated on recklessness. In summary, both statutory rules and case law support the conclusion that reckless second-degree murder, or depraved heart murder, is a lesser included crime of first-degree murder. B. Duty to instruct on lesser included offense The duty to instruct arises only where the record shows evidence upon which the accused might reasonably be convicted of the lesser offense. State v. Coleman, 253 Kan. 335, 352, 856 P.2d 121 (1993); State v. Dixon, 252 Kan. 39, 43, 843 P.2d 182 (1992). In State v. Harris, 259 Kan. 689, 702, 915 P.2d 758 (1996), we set forth the evidentiary standard to be followed in determining whether the trial court was required to instruct. We have held that a criminal defendant has a right to an instruction on all lesser included offenses supported by the evidence at trial so long as (1) the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant's theory, would justify a jury verdict in accord with the defendant's theory and (2) the evidence at trial does not exclude a theory of guilt on the lesser offense. The defendant did not testify at trial. However, the defendant's nine-page confession was admitted into evidence for the jury's consideration. Several other witnesses testified as to what the defendant did and what the defendant said. We must, therefore, review this evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant's theory and determine whether such evidence, and all evidence at trial, would justify a jury verdict in accord with the defendant's theory. Harris, 259 Kan. at 702. The defendant asserts that several points of evidence support a possible conviction of reckless second-degree murder. He states in his brief that [w]ielding a gun, flashing it at people, is certainly reckless conduct, and pointing and shooting a gun at another person, clearly manifests indifference towards that person's life. However, the defendant's statement clearly and consistently seeks to establish that he shot in self-defense. First, the defendant stated that the three boys addressed him with some derogatory comments and he responded in kind. He then pulled out the gun, two of the boys ran, and the third, the victim, was gonna pull a blade out on me, so you know I thought he was coming to hurt me so I popped him. Later in the same statement, the defendant stated that the victim pulled a blade out, and ... I pulled my gun out first and he pulled a blade out. After the two boys ran, the victim stood there like I'm a punk. He said man you a punk. So I said man you wouldn't think I wouldn't pull the trigger dude. And he said what's up man, I'm gonna cut youand popped him. Finally, in his statement the defendant says, Yeah, when he pulled his knife out that's when I said, man, what's up, you know clink, clink [the defendant showed how he put a bullet in the chamber of the gun]. You know he pulled his knife out, so I said what's up, I pulled myand then he stood up with the knife like oh, man you a punk niger [sic], you ain't gonna shoot nobody.... [H]e pulled his knife out first, then I pulled my gun out.... And then I feel that I was gonna get harmed, so I pulled my gun out, and he got shot. I wasn't trying to kill him though man. Finally, in the last part of his statement the defendant again mentions the knife and states, I wasn't trying to kill him. Valiant, in whose duplex defendant hid after the shooting, testified that the defendant told her that some dudes up by the church tried to rob him, that they got his money, and that he pulled a gun on them and got his money back and shot one person in the leg. Consistent with the defendant's testimony and all the evidence at trial, the court instructed on self-defense and involuntary manslaughter, a lawful act (self-defense) done in an unlawful manner. However, other than the two self-serving statements of the defendant that he did not intend to kill the victim, the record contains only tenuous evidence regarding a duty to instruct on reckless second-degree murder. There is no evidence of recklessness. The defendant's actions were intentional, according to the only evidence admitted, including his own statements. At best the evidence on behalf of the defendant suggested that he did not intend to kill the victim but only defended himself by shooting the victim in the leg. The instructions given by the court, including the involuntary manslaughter instruction, are consistent with the defendant's theory. Under these circumstances, since all evidence supports an intentional shooting, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant's theory of reckless second-degree murder, would not have justified a jury verdict on this offense. Accordingly, the trial court was under no duty to instruct on this lesser included offense.