Opinion ID: 793602
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct Legal Standard

Text: 144 On habeas review, the relevant question is whether the prosecutor's comments `so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.' Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)). Even if the prosecutor's conduct was improper or even universally condemned, we can provide relief only if the statements were so flagrant as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair. Bowling v. Parker, 344 F.3d 487, 512 (6th Cir.2003). Reversal is required only if the prosecutor's misconduct is so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial or so gross as probably to prejudice the defendant. Pritchett v. Pitcher, 117 F.3d 959, 964 (6th Cir.1997); see also Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 311 (6th Cir.2000), overruled on other grounds sub nom Bowling, 344 F.3d at 501 n. 3. If a court does find a constitutional error in the sentencing phase, the court must then ask whether the constitutional error influenced the jury's decision between life and death. 145 The Supreme Court has advised that isolated statements of a prosecutor's argument, 146 like all closing arguments of counsel, are seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event; improvisation frequently results in syntax left imperfect and meaning less than crystal clear. While these general observations in no way justify prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest that a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations. 147 Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 646-47, 94 S.Ct. 1868. This Court has further instructed courts to consider: 148 the degree to which the remarks complained of have a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused; whether they are isolated or extensive; whether they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury and the strength of the competent proof to establish the guilt of the accused. 149 Angel v. Overberg, 682 F.2d 605, 608 (6th Cir.1982) ( en banc ). This Court has refused to find a prosecutor's prejudicial comments to constitute misconduct when the behavior was not so fundamentally unfair as to deny [the defendant] due process based on the totality of the circumstances. Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 495 (6th Cir.2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 8 150 Under AEDPA, this bar is heightened by the deference this Court must grant to the Ohio Supreme Court's rulings on Petitioner's nondefaulted prosecutorial-misconduct claims. See Bowling, 344 F.3d at 513; see also Macias v. Makowski, 291 F.3d 447, 453-54 (6th Cir.2002) (If this court were hearing the case on direct appeal, we might have concluded that the prosecutor's comments violated Macias's due process rights. But this case is before us on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. So the relevant question is not whether the state court's decision was wrong, but whether it was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.). 151