Opinion ID: 11655
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Shipowners' Duties

Text: 14 The Shipowners' argument hinges on Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 68 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). The Scindia court articulated the scope of a vessel's duty under section 5(b). The basic principle which emerges from Scindia is that the primary responsibility for the safety of the longshoremen rests upon the stevedore. Randolph v. Laeisz, 896 F.2d 964, 970 (5th Cir.1990). However, vessel liability may still arise in three instances: 15 1) if the vessel owner fails to warn on turning over the ship of hidden defects of which he should have known. 16 2) for injury caused by hazards under the control of the ship. 17 3) if the vessel owner fails to intervene in the stevedore's operations when he has actual knowledge both of the hazard and that the stevedore, in the exercise of 'obviously improvident' judgment, means to work on in the face of it and therefore cannot be relied on to remedy it. Pimental v. LTD Canadian Pacific Bul, 965 F.2d 13, 15 (5th Cir.1992) (citing Masinter v. Tenneco Oil Co., 867 F.2d 892, 897 (5th Cir.1989)) (emphasis added). 18 The Shipowners contend that the magistrate judge erred in denying their motions for directed verdict and JNOV because Greenwood did not present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the Shipowners liable under Scindia. 19 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all of the evidence--not just that evidence which supports the nonmovant's case--but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 665 F.2d 1367, 1371 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc). The jury's verdict must be upheld unless the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the movant for directed verdict that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a verdict against the movant. Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir.1969) (en banc). A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury. Id. However, If there is substantial evidence ... of such quality and weight that reasonable and fairminded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions then a directed verdict is not proper. Maxey, 665 F.2d at 1371. 20 The Shipowners argue, among other things, that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that the defect in the crane's slewing brake was hidden, thus negating their first duty under Scindia. The Supreme Court held that the first duty extends to: 21 [E]xercising ordinary care under the circumstances to have the ship and its equipment in such condition that an expert and experienced stevedore will be able by the exercise of reasonable care to carry on its cargo operations with reasonable safety to persons and property, and to warning the stevedore of any hazards on the ship or with respect to its equipment that are known to the vessel or should be known to it in the exercise of reasonable care, that would likely be encountered by the stevedore in the course of his cargo operations and that are not known by the stevedore and would not be obvious to or anticipated by him if reasonably competent in the performance of his work. The shipowner thus has a duty with respect to the condition of the ship's gear, equipment, tools, and work space to be used in the stevedoring operations; and if he fails at least to warn the stevedore of hidden dangers which would have been known to him in the exercise of reasonable care, he has breached his duty and is liable if his negligence causes injury to a longshoreman. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167, 101 S.Ct. at 1622 (emphasis added). 22 Under this duty, a plaintiff must first show that the vessel owner had actual knowledge of the defect. However, If the condition existed from the outset, the shipowner is charged with actual knowledge of the dangerous condition. Hernandez v. M/V Rajaan, 841 F.2d 582, 586 (5th Cir.1988) (citing Harris v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 730 F.2d 296, 299 (5th Cir.1984)); see also Pimental, 965 F.2d at 17 n. 4. Logue testified that he noticed the defect in the slewing brake as soon as he began operating the crane, and this, arguably enhanced slightly by the ship's log's listing of the slewing brake as being in slight doubt, constituted substantial evidence that the defect in the slewing brake existed before the stevedore received custody of the ship. On this basis, it could be found that the Shipowners were charged with knowledge of the defect. However, the mere fact that the Shipowners may be chargeable with knowledge of the defect does not end our inquiry under the first duty. 23 [T]he defendant has not breached its duty to turn over a safe vessel if the defect causing the injury is open and obvious and one that the longshoreman should have seen. Pimental, 965 F.2d at 16; see also Polizzi v. M/V Zephyros II Monrovia, 860 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir.1988); Morris v. Compagnie Maritime Des Chargeurs Reunis, S.A., 832 F.2d 67, 71 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1022, 108 S.Ct. 1576, 99 L.Ed.2d 891 (1988). If the longshoreman knew of the defect, then it is considered open and obvious. Pimental, 965 F.2d at 16 (finding that the defects were obvious based on the testimony of two crane operators who stated that the defects were immediately noticeable). See also, e.g., Burchett v. Cargill, Inc., 48 F.3d 173, 179 (5th Cir.1995). Here, Logue testified on direct examination, and reiterated on cross examination, that as soon as he began operating the crane, he became aware of the defective slewing brake. Furthermore, Polinard, another longshoreman experienced in crane operation, testified that he was able to visually observe this defect in the crane's functioning. Therefore, whatever latent characteristics the alleged defect may have had before the longshoremen began to operate the crane, they became open and obvious before the end of the first (7:00 to 8:00 a.m.) shift during which Logue operated the crane. See Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167, 101 S.Ct. at 1622 (a vessel's duty to warn extends only to defects that are not known by the stevedore and which would not be obvious to or anticipated by him if reasonably competent in the performance of his work). 9 24 The defense did indeed present evidence, in the form of testimony by O'Neal, Guilford, and others, to the effect that the crane in question did not malfunction as Logue had claimed and indicating that the accident was either due to Logue's improper operation of it or to the truck in which the tag-line was caught driving off, causing the line to break, or to some combination of these. If this defense evidence were credited, however, the Shipowners would be entitled to judgment. Conversely, Logue's testimony was essential to Greenwood's case, and without it there would be no substantial evidence that Greenwood's injury was caused by a defect in the crane existing when the vessel was turned over to the stevedore. Greenwood's counsel has consistently recognized this and based his case on Logue's testimony. 10 There is really nothing apart from this. Greenwood's only meaningful liability witnesses were Logue and Polinard, whose testimony merely tended to corroborate Logue's. 11 There was no expert testimony that the crane's slewing brake was defective--indeed, there was expert testimony that it was not--and there was no testimony as to any examination of the crane reflecting such a defect. There are only two versions of the condition of the slewing brake and its relation to the accident: Logue's version, that the crane's slewing brake from the very beginning never functioned properly, and the version of O'Neal and the defense witnesses that the slewing brake functioned acceptably and the accident was due to operator error and/or the truck's driving off with the hung up tag line. The record suggests no third version. Greenwood supported, and supports, Logue's version, as he must. 12 But under it, the first Scindia duty does not apply. 25 Greenwood argues that just because the danger is obvious does not necessarily offer a complete defense to a longshoreman's suit, and that the shipowner is still liable if the longshoreman's only alternatives when facing an open and obvious hazard are unduly impracticable or time-consuming. Pimental, 965 F.2d at 16 (citing Treadaway v. Societe Anonyme Louis-Dreyfus, 894 F.2d 161, 167 (5th Cir.1990); Teply v. Mobil Oil Corp., 859 F.2d 375, 378 (5th Cir.1988)). Greenwood contends that Logue had no alternative but to continue to use the crane because when machinery breaks down, as the longshoremen are normally told to milk it along. This observation concerning cargo operations in general cannot substitute for evidence that such was the case in this particular instance. Greenwood presented no evidence that Logue was instructed to continue to use the crane despite the defect or that he would face trouble for delaying the work. Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 535 (5th Cir.1986) (quoting Stass v. American Commercial Lines, Inc., 720 F.2d 879, 882 (5th Cir.1983)). In fact, when the boom brake on the crane later began to malfunction, the crane was immediately shut down for half an hour and the longshoremen were paid for that dead time. This tends to show that when the Shipowners learned of a problem with the crane, operations would cease until the crane was repaired. Certainly, that alternative was not impracticable, and even if the repairs required some time, the longshoremen would be paid for the resulting down time. See Teply, 859 F.2d at 378 (Ship owners are not liable for obvious dangers that injure contractors aboard their vessels unless the contractors, in order to avoid the danger, would be forced either to leave the job or to face penalties for causing delay). Greenwood has failed to submit sufficient evidence to fit within the scope of this asserted exception to the general rule. 26 Finally, the Shipowners contend there is insufficient evidence that they had actual knowledge of the stevedore's improvident judgment to continue operating the crane, thereby negating the third Scindia duty. 13 The Scindia court held that this duty arises when the shipowner knows of the stevedore's obviously improvident judgment based on the fact that the shipowner knew of the defect and that [the stevedore] was continuing to use it, [and therefore] should have realized the [defect] presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the longshoremen, and that in such circumstances it had a duty to intervene and repair the [defect]. 451 U.S. at 175, 101 S.Ct. at 1626. We have interpreted this language as determining that a vessel has a duty to intervene when it has actual knowledge of a dangerous condition and actual knowledge that the stevedore, in the exercise of 'obviously improvident' judgment, has failed to remedy it. Pimental, 965 F.2d at 17 (citing Randolph, 896 F.2d at 970; Woods v. Sammisa Co., 873 F.2d 842, 854 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1050, 110 S.Ct. 853, 107 L.Ed.2d 847; Helaire v. Mobil Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1031, 1037 (5th Cir.1983)). Therefore, in order to prevail under this third duty, the longshoreman must show not only that the shipowner had actual knowledge of the defect and of the stevedore's continuing use of the defective item, but also: 1) it had actual knowledge that the [defect] posed an unreasonable risk of harm and 2) actual knowledge that it could not rely on the stevedore to protect its employees and that if unremedied the condition posed a substantial risk of injury. Randolph, 896 F.2d at 971. 27 A difficulty in the above formulation is discerning what must be shown to demonstrate that a shipowner had actual knowledge of a stevedore's obviously improvident judgment such that the shipowner could not rely on the stevedore to protect its employees. The shipowner's obligation to intervene under the third Scindia duty is narrow and requires 'something more' than mere shipowner knowledge of a dangerous condition. Singleton v. Guangzhou Ocean Shipping Co., 79 F.3d 26, 28 (5th Cir.1996). This is because,  'The shipowner defers to the qualification of the stevedoring contractor in the selection and use of equipment and relies on the competency of the stevedore company.'  Scindia, 451 U.S. at 172, 101 S.Ct. at 1624 (quoting with approval Italia Societa v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315, 322, 84 S.Ct. 748, 753, 11 L.Ed.2d 732 (1964)); see also Morris, 832 F.2d at 71. Therefore, It might well be 'reasonable' for the owner to rely on the stevedore's judgment that the condition, though dangerous, was safe enough. Helaire, 709 F.2d at 1039 n. 12. The question then is when should it become obvious to a shipowner that a stevedore's judgment--based on its specialized knowledge--is obviously improvident or dangerous. It seems to us that, consistent with Scindia 's basic thrust, in order for the expert stevedore's judgment to appear obviously improvident, that expert stevedore must use an object with a defective condition that is so hazardous that anyone can tell that its continued use creates an unreasonable risk of harm even when the stevedore's expertise is taken into account. Randolph, 896 F.2d at 971; Woods, 873 F.2d at 847. 28 In this case, there exists sufficient evidence that the Shipowners were charged with knowledge of the defect, and knew of the stevedore's continued use of the crane. However, there was insufficient evidence that the Shipowners had the actual knowledge that the operation of the crane with the doubtful slewing brake created an unreasonable risk of harm to the expert longshoremen. See Randolph, 896 F.2d at 971 (holding that although the defendants knew of the defect, there was no evidence that the defendants were actually aware that an unreasonable risk of harm was thereby created). Although one not operating the crane could see that it was jerky, its thus observable malfunction was not so severe that the Shipowners--without any specialized knowledge and who were not operating it--would necessarily have known that it posed an unreasonable risk of harm. 14 In fact, after the accident, no report by either the stevedore, Logue, or the other longshoremen was made to the ship, and the crane continued to be used, without any slewing brake incident, for the remaining three days of unloading operations. There was simply no evidence that the fault in this slewing brake was such a serious defect that the expert stevedore's continued knowing use of it would be seen as obviously improvident by the Shipowners. 29 The evidence does not suffice to establish that the Shipowners violated any of the Scindia duties. 15