Opinion ID: 784317
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Relevant Principles of Statutory Construction

Text: 75 The centerpiece of any preemption analysis is congressional purpose. The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963). After quoting this oft-repeated comment from Schermerhorn, the Supreme Court recently wrote, [a]s a result, any understanding of the scope of a pre-emption statute must rest primarily on `a fair understanding of congressional purpose.' Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485-86, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (citation omitted) (italics in original). To determine congressional purpose, we look to the statute's language, structure, subject matter, context, and history — factors that typically help courts determine a statute's objectives and thereby illuminate its text. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998); see also Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486, 116 S.Ct. 2240 (Congress' intent, of course, primarily is discerned from the language of the pre-emption statute and the `statutory framework' surrounding it. Also relevant, however, is the `structure and purpose of the statute as a whole[.]')(internal citations omitted). 76 Two presumptions assist us in determining congressional purpose in this case. The first is a general presumption, applicable in all preemption cases. The second is a presumption specific to cases decided under the Bankruptcy Code. 77 First, we presume that Congress does not undertake lightly to preempt state law, particularly in areas of traditional state regulation. 78 [B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action. In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has `legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,' we `start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superceded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' 79 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240 (internal citation omitted). As the Court stated in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992), in refusing to find state tort damage actions preempted by a federal cigarette labeling and advertising requirement, we must construe these provisions [of federal law] in light of the presumption against the pre-emption of state police power regulations. 80 Even though bankruptcy is one of only two federal legislative powers in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution in which the power to make uniform laws is made explicit, the presumption against displacing state law by federal bankruptcy law is just as strong in bankruptcy as in other areas of federal legislative power. In Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 106 S.Ct. 755, 88 L.Ed.2d 859 (1986), the question addressed was whether bankruptcy law displaced state environmental law. The Court emphasized that if Congress wished to grant an exemption from otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy state law, `the intention would be clearly expressed.' Id. at 501, 106 S.Ct. 755 (citation omitted). Similarly, in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 114 S.Ct. 1757, 128 L.Ed.2d 556 (1994), the Court refused to construe bankruptcy law so as to interfere with the operation of a foreclosure sale conducted under state law. To displace traditional state regulation in such a manner, the federal statutory purpose must be `clear and manifest.' Id. at 544, 114 S.Ct. 1757 (citation omitted). 81 Second, we presume, absent clear indications to the contrary, that Congress did not intend to change preexisting bankruptcy law or practice in adopting the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 or in amending it in 1984. The Supreme Court, in a remarkably consistent series of cases, has explicitly and repeatedly relied on this presumption. The first case is a bankruptcy preemption case; the others are straight bankruptcy cases. 82 In Midlantic, the question addressed was whether, under 11 U.S.C. § 554(a), a bankruptcy trustee could abandon burdensome real property and thereby entirely preempt state-law obligations — such as required environmental clean-up — attached to that property. Section 554(a) was enacted as part of the 1978 Code and was amended slightly in 1984. Prior to the adoption of § 554(a), a trustee could not entirely escape state-law obligations by abandoning property. However, § 554(a) explicitly authorized abandonment by the trustee and did not mention any state-law limitation on abandonment. The Court rejected an argument by the trustee that § 554(a) evidenced a congressional purpose to depart from prior bankruptcy practice and entirely to preempt state environmental law obligations: 83 If Congress wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from non-bankruptcy law, the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable considerations of convenience in administering the estate of the bankrupt. 84