Opinion ID: 4457066
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Date of Take

Text: DOH contends the trial court wrongly held that the date of take was an issue of fact for the jury to decide. DOH asserts the trial court should have declared the date of take, as a matter of law, as the date the condemnation petition was filed. See Syl. Pt. 1, W.Va. Dep’t of Highways v. Roda, 177 W. Va. 383, 352 S.E.2d 134 (1986) (“In eminent domain proceedings, the date of take for the purpose of determining the fair market value of property for the fixing of compensation to be made to the condemnee is the date on which the property is lawfully taken by the commencement of appropriate legal proceedings pursuant to W.Va. Code, 54-2-14a, as amended.”). DOH maintains 12 there was nothing for the jury to decide because the date of take was conclusively determined to be March 9, 2010. We agree with DOH that under the facts presented here, “the date of take for the purpose of determining the fair market value of property . . . lawfully taken” was March 9, 2010. Roda, 177 W. Va. at 384, 352 S.E.2d at 135, syl. pt. 1. Nevertheless, we find no support in the record for DOH’s assertion that the trial court instructed the jury to decide the date of the take. In fact, this determination was simply not a point of contention between the parties by the time the case went to trial because DOH took so little of the property (116 square feet of Respondents’ 2.45 acres). The jury awarded $2,000 for the take and $1,800 for the TCE (424 square feet) when the entire property, plus improvements was worth $2.5 million. Significantly, Respondents did not argue at trial that a de facto taking occurred years earlier.6 Rather, Respondents argued they were entitled to condemnation 6 Respondents did advance a de facto taking argument earlier in the litigation. In August 2016, Respondents moved the trial court to take judicial notice of the take as January 1, 2003. This request was based on the jury verdict in DOH v. Rapp, et al., Civil Action No. 10-C-109, Circuit Court of Wood County (Oct. 28, 2014). The Rapp case involved the same condemnation project. Mr. Rapp also operated a gasoline service station and the Rapps and Pifers owned neighboring adjacent properties. Significantly, in Rapp, the jury concluded that a de facto taking of the property occurred years prior to the filing of the petition. In Rapp, the jury awarded $1,010,573 as just compensation; the elements included fair market value of the entirety of the property ($950,000), businesses loss damages for years 2003 through 2010 ($35,573), and annoyance and inconvenience damages ($25,000). (continued . . .) 13 blight damages prior to the take. See W.Va. Code § 54-2-9a (providing damages element of just compensation); see also Nichols, supra § G18.06[3] at G18-47 (recognizing landowner “may seek an earlier date of valuation in which to arrive at just compensation, or attempt to recover for loss of value of his or her property as an element of damages caused by the cloud of blight hovering over the property.”). We emphasize that the phrases “condemnation blight damages” and “de facto taking” are not interchangeable. The distinction between the two approaches is not merely theoretical; a de facto taking may entitle the owner to establish an earlier date for purposes of property valuation and recovery of interest. S. Cary Gaylord, Lorena Hart Ludovici, Condemnation Blight, ALI-ABA 189, 195 (May 7, 1992). In a case involving substantial sums of money, such a consideration becomes significant. In Pearsall v. Richmond Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 242 S.E.2d 228, 230 (Va. 1978), the Supreme Court of Virginia 7 discussed the practical effects of claiming damages for At the hearing on Respondents’ motion for the trial court to take judicial notice of the date as January 1, 2003, Respondents argued that the Rapps and the Pifers were in the same position for a number of years because DOH had publically announced its public project plans but delayed for years before filing the petitions. DOH disagreed and distinguished the cases. DOH argued the take that actually occurred to Respondents’ property was “miniscule compared to the Rapps.” The trial court denied Respondents’ motion and found the date of take was a question of fact because each piece of property was unique. After this ruling, Respondents abandoned their de facto taking argument. 7 Virginia is a “taking-damaging” state. Va. Const. art. I, § 11 (“No private property shall be damaged or taken for public use without just compensation to the owner thereof.”). 14 condemnation blight: “The date of taking is left unchanged but the condemnee is compensated for the loss in value traceable to grossly premature disclosure of the condemnation (or other serious value-depressing actions of the condemnor), prior to the actual taking of the property.” Id. at 230 (quotations and citations omitted). While the verdict form did not specifically state that March 9, 2010, was the date of take, the trial court did ask the jury if Respondents “suffered condemnation blight prior to March 9, 2010?” The jury answered this question in the affirmative and then listed $35,033 in condemnation blight damages for five years (2003 – 2007) for a total of $175,165. Condemnation blight damages, by their very definition, are damages suffered in anticipation of the take.8 We therefore find no merit to DOH’s argument. The date of take was not in dispute nor was that question left to the jury. March 9, 2010, was the appropriate date for determining the fair market value of the property taken and damage to the residue. DOH does not dispute those elements of just compensation. In this case, the date of take was significant only insofar as determining when interest began to accrue on the award.