Opinion ID: 1855335
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statutory Right to Contact Counsel

Text: Bromeland claims he was not afforded his statutory right to contact counsel of his choice prior to deciding whether to consent or refuse chemical testing. If we accept Bromeland's contention, then the revocation of his driver's license was improper. See Fuller v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 275 N.W.2d 410, 411 (Iowa 1979). Section 804.20 provides in relevant part: Any peace officer or other person having custody of any person arrested ... shall permit that person, without unnecessary delay after arrival at the place of detention, to call, consult, and see a member of the person's family or an attorney of the person's choice, or both. Such person shall be permitted to make a reasonable number of telephone calls as may be required to secure an attorney. In State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Iowa 1978), we held a person arrested for OWI has a limited right to contact an attorney under section 804.20. This limited statutory right also extends to license revocation proceedings under the implied consent law. Fuller, 275 N.W.2d at 411. Generally this right to counsel is satisfied by allowing the arrestee to make a telephone call. Ferguson v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 424 N.W.2d 464, 466 (Iowa 1988); Short v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 447 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Iowa App. 1989). Additionally, any request for counsel must be made in good faith. Ferguson, 424 N.W.2d at 466. Whether the request is made in good faith is determined by an objective consideration of the statements and conduct of the arrestee and peace officer, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Id. Section 804.20 does not provide an absolute right to counsel, but requires a peace officer to provide the arrestee with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney. Notwithstanding the unsuccessful attempt to contact Potter, officer Conroy afforded Bromeland a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel. He explained to Bromeland that Potter could not be reached and offered to call another attorney. Bromeland refused to select alternative counsel. Bromeland cannot now claim he was denied his statutory right to counsel. We have never interpreted section 804.20 as providing an absolute right to talk to one particular attorney if that person is unavailable or unable to be reached. We decline to do so now. When Potter could not be reached, it was incumbent upon Bromeland to select another attorney. Because Bromeland was afforded the opportunity to contact an attorney, but declined to do so, the officer reasonably invoked implied consent. The district court was correct in so ruling. We therefore affirm the district court's judgment upholding the revocation of Bromeland's driver's license. AFFIRMED.