Opinion ID: 2452941
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: preaccusatorial delay

Text: ¶ 5 In United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held that a preaccusatorial delay can result in a due process violation even where the statute of limitations has not expired. Although the statute of limitations provides a definitive legislative limit, due process may also be implicated by preaccusatorial delay. Id. (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)). The court said its role was circumscribed: We are to determine only whether the action complained ofhere, compelling respondent to stand trial after the Government delayed indictment to investigate furtherviolates those fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions, and which define the community's sense of fair play and decency. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044 (citations omitted). Lovasco also stated that proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim, and [] the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused. Id. ¶ 6 This court first interpreted Lovasco 's preaccusatorial delay requirements in Calderon: The defendant must show that he was prejudiced by the delay, and, in making its due process inquiry, the court must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused. .... Simply establishing prejudice is not enough, however. To find a due process violation, the court must also consider the State's reasons for the delay. If the State is able to justify the delay, the court must undertake a further balancing of the State's interest and the prejudice to the accused. Ultimately, the test suggested by the U.S. Supreme Court is whether the action complained of violates those `fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions'. State v. Calderon, 102 Wash.2d 348, 352-53, 684 P.2d 1293 (1984) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044 (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112, 55 S.Ct. 340, 342, 79 L.Ed. 791 (1935))). Our next case to address preaccusatorial delay articulated an analytical framework in the form of a three-part test to assist a court in determining whether a delay violates fundamental conceptions of justice: [T]he Calderon court established a 3-prong test for determining when preaccusatorial delay violates due process. (1) The defendant must show he was prejudiced by the delay; (2) the court must consider the reasons for the delay; and (3) if the State is able to justify the delay, the court must undertake a further balancing of the State's interest and the prejudice to the accused. .... The ultimate test is whether the action complained of ... violates those `fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions'. State v. Alvin, 109 Wash.2d 602, 604-05, 746 P.2d 807 (1987) (alteration in original) (quoting Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 353, 684 P.2d 1293 (quoting Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044)). Most recently, in State v. Salavea, 151 Wash.2d 133, 86 P.3d 125 (2004), we articulated the test slightly differently: First, the defendant must show the charging delay caused prejudice. If the defendant shows prejudice, the court then examines the State's reasons for the delay. Finally, the court balances the delay against the defendant's prejudice to decide if the delay violates the fundamental conceptions of justice. Id. at 139, 86 P.3d 125 (citing Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044; Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 352-53, 684 P.2d 1293; State v. Dixon, 114 Wash.2d 857, 858-59, 792 P.2d 137 (1990)). ¶ 7 Whether due process rights are violated by a preaccusatorial delay is a question we review de novo. Id. at 138-39, 86 P.3d 125 (citing State v. Warner, 125 Wash.2d 876, 883, 889 P.2d 479 (1995)). Because our review is de novo, we examine the entire record to determine prejudice and to balance the delay against the prejudice. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 n. 31, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (court reviewing de novo makes original appraisal of all evidence).
¶ 8 The State argues, in accord with several jurisdictions outside Washington, that only intentional delay in bad faith can violate due process, while merely negligent delay can never result in a due process violation. [2] See United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1511-12 (5th Cir.1996). This court, however, has never made a definitive statement on the issue. See Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 353, 684 P.2d 1293 (It has been suggested that negligently failing to bring charges promptly may also establish a constitutional violation.); Salavea, 151 Wash.2d at 139, 86 P.3d 125 ([I]f the delay only is negligent, due process may or may not be violated.). ¶ 9 Circuits holding that negligent delay alone can never violate due process explicitly reject a balancing or weighing approach like the one adopted by this court. E.g., Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1514 (we reject the ... balancing test and hold that for preindictment delay to violate the due process clause it must not only cause the accused substantial, actual prejudice, but the delay must also have been intentionally undertaken by the government... for some ... bad faith purpose (citation omitted)). Instead, those circuits that have rejected balancing invariably require the defendant to show (1) actual prejudice and (2) intentional bad faith by the government. [3] Id. at 1511-12 (reviewing the various formulations of the test in the various circuits). ¶ 10 Circuits that apply a balancing test similar to ours, on the other hand, have held that negligence can result in a due process violation. [4] Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.1990) (adopting a balancing approach and finding a due process violation where the State's delay was negligent and defendant was seriously prejudiced); United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir.1985) (If mere negligent conduct by the prosecutors is asserted, then obviously the delay and/or prejudice suffered by the defendant will have to be greater than that in cases where recklessness or intentional governmental conduct is alleged.). ¶ 11 The jurisprudence of this court and the better reasoning of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits support adopting the approach that negligent delay can violate due process. See Howell, 904 F.2d at 895; Moran, 759 F.2d at 782. The core question is whether the action by the government violates fundamental conceptions of justice. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044; Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 353, 684 P.2d 1293. The answer to this question does not necessarily turn on the intent of the government actors. ¶ 12 As we said in Calderon, [u]ltimately, the test suggested by the United States Supreme Court is `whether the action complained of ... violates those fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.' Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 353, 684 P.2d 1293 (alteration in original) (quoting Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044 (quoting Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112, 55 S.Ct. 340)). We also stated that in making its due process inquiry, the court must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused. Id. at 352, 684 P.2d 1293. The formalistic and rigid two-part test used in the majority of circuits does not accurately reflect the more nuanced approach suggested by the United States Supreme Court and adopted by this court in Calderon. As one Court of Appeals opinion correctly observed, [I]f mere negligent conduct is asserted, the... prejudice suffered by the defendant will have to be greater than where intentional or deliberate government conduct is alleged. State v. Schifferl, 51 Wash.App. 268, 273, 753 P.2d 549 (1988) (citing Moran, 759 F.2d 777).
¶ 13 Oppelt argues that, if the defendant shows prejudice from a preaccusatorial delay and the State cannot justify the delay, the case must be dismissed without balancing. Oppelt's argument relies on this court's formulation of the third prong of the preaccusatorial delay test before its most recent iteration: [5] if the State is able to justify the delay, the court must undertake a further balancing of the State's interest and the prejudice to the accused. Alvin, 109 Wash.2d at 604, 746 P.2d 807 (citing Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 352-53, 684 P.2d 1293). Oppelt asserts this allows the court to reach the third prong only if the State is able to justify the delay, but if the State cannot justify the delay, the court should stop, go no further, perform no balancing, and dismiss the case. ¶ 14 Here, the delay was caused by the State's negligence. See Clerk's Papers (CP) at 93. The defendant argues this means the State was not able to justify the delay, and therefore the court should not have gone on to the balancing test, but should have simply dismissed the case. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 9. Like the State, Oppelt wants a simple formalistic approach. [6] Both parties confuse the analytical framework this court has adopted to assist in answering the core question of whether the government action violates fundamental conceptions of justice with formal bright line rules. There are always reasons for a delay, and some are better than others, but Oppelt suggests every delay, no matter how brief, which causes some prejudice and for which there was not a good justification requires automatic dismissal. Such a bright line test would lead to absurd results, and we reject it.
¶ 15 There have been several different formulations of what courts must balance in conducting a preaccusatorial delay analysis. We take this opportunity to clarify exactly what it is that must be balanced because our courts have engaged in three different interpretations: (1) the reasons for the delay are balanced with the prejudice to the defendant, e.g., Schifferl, 51 Wash.App. at 272, 753 P.2d 549; (2) the State's interest is balanced with the prejudice to the defendant, e.g., State v. Frazier, 82 Wash.App. 576, 589, 918 P.2d 964 (1996); and (3) the delay is balanced with the prejudice. E.g., Salavea, 151 Wash.2d at 139, 86 P.3d 125. This court's cases confirm that what are meant to be balanced are the reasons for the delay and the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay. [7] See Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 354, 684 P.2d 1293 (While we could conceive of a case in which an offender could successfully argue that the prejudice resulting from the loss of juvenile court jurisdiction outweighed the State's reasons for the charging delay, this is not that case. (emphasis added)); Alvin, 109 Wash.2d at 605, 746 P.2d 807 (The final prong requires weighing the State's reasons for delay against the prejudice to Alvin in losing juvenile court jurisdiction. (emphasis added)); State v. Lidge, 111 Wash.2d 845, 852, 765 P.2d 1292 (1989) (The importance of these [investigative] delays outweighs any prejudice that Eskridge suffered. (emphases added)). The language the State's interest is simply imprecise. Compare Alvin, 109 Wash.2d at 604, 746 P.2d 807 with Alvin, 109 Wash.2d at 605, 746 P.2d 807. ¶ 16 Regardless of the precise label of the items to be balanced, the three-pronged test is best understood as an analytical tool to assist the court in answering the underlying question of whether a delay has resulted in a due process violation by violating fundamental conceptions of justice. The prongs should be approached with this principle in mind. The test, simply stated, is that (1) the defendant must show actual prejudice from the delay; (2) if the defendant shows prejudice, the court must determine the reasons for the delay; (3) the court must then weigh the reasons and the prejudice to determine whether fundamental conceptions of justice would be violated by allowing prosecution. [8] See State v. Warner, 125 Wash.2d 876, 890, 889 P.2d 479 (1995) (The ultimate issue in balancing the interests is `whether the action complained of ... violates those fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.' (alteration in original) (quoting Lidge, 111 Wash.2d at 852, 765 P.2d 1292)). ¶ 17 In this case, the judge's reasons for finding actual prejudice to the defendant were (1) [A.R.'s great grandmother's] inability to recall the type of lotion used and who applied it to the victim's genital area and (2) [A.R.'s great grandmother's] medical condition that affects her memory. [9] CP at 94. This precluded [Oppelt] from making a specific argument that we know it's this type of lotion and this type of lotion would definitely cause the redness [observed by the nurse who examined A.R.]. Report of Proceedings (RP) (June 5, 2008) at 34. Where the State's reason for delay is mere negligence, establishing a due process violation requires greater prejudice to the defendant than cases of intentional bad faith delay. Moran, 759 F.2d at 782. The loss of testimony about the exact lotion used is very slight prejudice. The defendant was not precluded from arguing that the lotion might have caused redness and swelling, and no other memory issues were identified as specifically problematic. In balancing, the court must determine if fundamental conceptions of justice would be violated by allowing the prosecution. The trial judge phrased this question as whether the defendant can show that he cannot receive a fair trial. CP at 95. She properly answered that he could receive a fair trial. Her refusal to dismiss for preaccusatorial delay is upheld.