Opinion ID: 1186195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: First Issue: Are courts-martial counted under the SRA?

Text: This first issue addresses the general, statutory question of whether a court-martial may constitute part of an offender's criminal history for sentencing purposes. This statutory analysis has three aspects. First we must look at the definitions of conviction and criminal history in the SRA to see if those definitions include courts-martial. Then we will question whether a court-martial may count toward a defendant's offender score under RCW 9.94A.360. Finally, we will look at I-593 to determine if a court-martial may qualify as a prior strike. RCW 9.94A.030 defines many terms used throughout the SRA. Defendants claim their courts-martial do not meet the statutory definition of conviction. RCW 9.94A.030(9). That subsection provides: Conviction means an adjudication of guilt pursuant to Titles 10 or 13 RCW and includes a verdict of guilty, a finding of guilty, and acceptance of a plea of guilty. RCW 9.94A.030(9). Our discussion will focus on Title 10, since Title 13 involves juvenile proceedings, which are not at issue in these consolidated cases. Morley was court-martialed and found guilty by a military judge. James pleaded guilty to the crimes for which he was court-martialed. Neither Defendant challenges the guilty aspect of his proceeding; rather, Defendants claim their courts-martial are not convictions pursuant to Title 10. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986) defines pursuant to as in the course of carrying out: in conformance to or agreement with: according to.... Webster's at 1848. Defendants claim a foreign judgment does not qualify as a conviction under the SRA unless the judgment conforms with the criminal procedures set out in Title 10. Under Defendants' interpretation, before a sentencing court can consider an out-of-state criminal judgment, it has to sift through all of the foreign jurisdiction's procedural statutes and compare them to Title 10. The out-of-state judgment counts as a conviction only if the procedures in the out-of-state jurisdiction conform with Washington's criminal procedures. Otherwise, the foreign judgment cannot be used against the defendant in sentencing. We agree the definition of RCW 9.94A.030(9) appears plain and unambiguous on its face. It states a conviction is an adjudication of guilty pursuant to Titles 10 and 13 RCW. While it makes sense to apply this definition to convictions from this state, it would be absolutely unworkable to require out-of-state convictions to comply with Washington criminal procedure before allowing the out-of-state convictions to be included in a defendant's criminal history. Nothing in the SRA states or implies that a sentencing court must conduct the tedious task of comparing out-of-state criminal procedures to in-state procedures. When we look to some of the leading authorities on the SRA, David Boerner, Sentencing in Washington (1985); State of Wash. Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, Adult Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1996); and State of Wash. Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, Report to the Legislature (1983), we find no mention of a sentencing court having to conduct such a ridiculous inquiry. Title 10 RCW contains over three dozen chapters concerning a wide range of matters, including the following list of chapters which would probably be implicated in every criminal proceeding: RCW 10.16 Preliminary hearings. RCW 10.19 Bail and appearance bonds. RCW 10.25 Jurisdiction and venue. RCW 10.31 Warrants and arrests. RCW 10.40 Arraignment. RCW 10.46 Superior court trial. RCW 10.52 WitnessesGenerally. RCW 10.58 Evidence. RCW 10.61 Verdicts. RCW 10.64 Judgments and sentences. Additionally, RCW 10.58 arguably incorporates our Rules of Evidence, and our Criminal Rules of Procedure may also be implicated by these chapters, thereby requiring a sentencing court to review those court rules from other jurisdictions as well. We cannot believe any state's procedures and court rules would fully comply with all of Washington's rules and statutes of criminal procedure. If we required prior out-of-state convictions to conform to Washington procedures before allowing those convictions to be counted under the SRA, every single out-of-state conviction would be excluded from consideration. Such a result is clearly contrary to the purposes of the SRA. The Legislature intended sentencing courts to include out-of-state convictions when making sentencing calculations under the SRA. Numerous SRA definitions expressly include out-of-state crimes that are comparable to in-state crimes. See, e.g., RCW 9.94A.030(12)(a) ([c]riminal history includes out-of-state convictions); RCW 9.94A.030(18)(c) ([d]rug offense includes comparable out-of-state or federal convictions); RCW 9.94A.030(19)(b) ([e]scape includes comparable out-of-state or federal convictions); RCW 9.94A.030(20)(b) ([f]elony traffic offense includes comparable out-of-state or federal convictions); RCW 9.94A.030(23)(u) ([m]ost serious offenses include comparable out-of-state or federal convictions). The offender score statute, RCW 9.94A.360, uses out-of-state and federal convictions in the scoring of a defendant's offender score. RCW 9.94A.360(3). Since the Legislature obviously intended out-of-state convictions to be considered under the SRA, we cannot read RCW 9.94A.030(9) in a way which would exclude every out-of-state conviction from a defendant's criminal history. Our refusal to apply the definition of conviction to out-of-state cases does not ignore the Legislature's statutory directives. The Legislature declared the statutory definitions in RCW 9.94A.030 should not be blindly applied:  Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter. RCW 9.94A.030 (emphasis added). The Legislature's expressed desire for out-of-state convictions to be considered under the SRA requires us to ignore the reference in RCW 9.94A.030(9) to Title 10 RCW. The reference to Title 10 only makes sense within the context of in-state convictions. The application of Title 10 to out-of-state convictions would effectively result in all out-of-state convictions being excluded from consideration under the SRA. Since 1984, when the SRA became effective (RCW 9.94A.905), many defendants have had their offender scores increased because of prior out-of-state or federal convictions. We cannot find a single reported case wherein the sentencing court imposed the procedural requirements of Title 10 upon out-of-state convictions. If we adopted Defendants' reading of RCW 9.94A.030(9), our holding would apply retroactively to the date the SRA was enacted. In re Personal Restraint of Johnson, 131 Wash.2d 558, 568, 933 P.2d 1019 (1997) (Once the Court has determined the meaning of a statute, that is what the statute has meant since its enactment.). Under Defendants' argument, it would appear the court system has applied the SRA incorrectly for nearly 14 years when out-of-state convictions were included in a defendant's criminal history. If we adopted Defendants' position, every single prisoner with out-of-state prior convictions would potentially have a cause for post-conviction relief. We find Defendants' courts-martial qualify as convictions under the SRA. As mentioned above, Morley was found guilty by a military judge in a court-martial, and James pleaded guilty to the crimes for which he was court-martialed. These proceedings are convictions which should be considered by sentencing judges. See State v. Aronson, 82 Wash.App. 762, 919 P.2d 133 (1996) (holding courts-martial count toward defendant's offender score); State v. Duke, 77 Wash.App. 532, 536, 892 P.2d 120 (1995) (implying in dicta that courts-martial are a part of a defendant's criminal history); cf. State v. Martz, 8 Wash.App. 192, 196, 504 P.2d 1174 (1973) (court-martial is a criminal conviction which can be used to attack a defendant's credibility). We now turn to the SRA's general definition of the phrase, criminal history. Neither I-593 nor the offender score statute, RCW 9.94A.360, actually uses the phrase, but both use similar language in referring to past convictions. See RCW 9.94A.360(1); RCW 9.94A.030(27)(a)(ii); see also State v. Villegas, 72 Wash.App. 34, 36, 863 P.2d 560 (1993) (The offender score is based on prior criminal history, RCW 9.94A.030(12), and is calculated pursuant to RCW 9.94A.360.). Criminal history is defined as the list of a defendant's prior convictions, whether in this state, in federal court, or elsewhere. RCW 9.94A .030(12)(a) (1996). Defendants dispute whether their courts-martial qualify as convictions from federal court or elsewhere. James argues the term elsewhere is ambiguous, and the rule of leniency requires this court to hold the term fails to encompass courts-martial. Elsewhere is not defined in the SRA, but the term could hardly be considered ambiguous. Even Webster's Third International Dictionary (1986) contains just one definition for the term: in or to some or any other place. Webster's at 737. The term is all-encompassing and it contains no restrictions. Elsewhere reaches all foreign convictions, whether from other state courts, federal courts, military courts, and perhaps even courts in foreign countries. See, e.g., State v. Herzog, 48 Wash. App. 831, 740 P.2d 380 (1987) (holding a West German conviction by a two-person jury was unconstitutional on its face and could not be considered as criminal history, thereby implying the foreign conviction, but for its unconstitutionality, would have counted as criminal history). The term, out-of-state, is equally broad in its scope. Villegas, 72 Wash.App. at 37, 863 P.2d 560 ([T]he term `out-of-state' convictions, as used in RCW 9.94A.360(3), encompasses all non-Washington convictions, including federal convictions.). We hold courts-martial are included in the SRA's reference to out-of-state convictions and convictions elsewhere. Courts-martial, as convictions from elsewhere, are included in a defendant's criminal history. A court-martial unambiguously constitutes a conviction from elsewhere, but it is less clear whether a court-martial is a federal conviction. The definition of criminal history in RCW 9.94A.030(12)(a) (1991) lists both federal convictions and convictions from elsewhere. The definition of a persistent offender in RCW 9.94A.030(27)(a)(ii) only discusses in-state convictions and convictions from elsewhere. When Defendants were sentenced, the offender score statute only mentioned out-of-state convictions. Former RCW 9.94A.360(3) (since amended by Laws of 1995, ch. 316, § 1). Any possible distinction between federal and out-of-state convictions has no impact on our analysis of the issues in this case; therefore, we decline to rule on the question of whether a court-martial may properly be considered a federal conviction under the SRA. Having determined courts-martial are included in a defendant's criminal history, RCW 9.94A.360 must be examined. The first three subsections of RCW 9.94A.360 set out the general rules for when prior convictions must be included in a defendant's offender score. RCW 9.94A.360(1) states a prior conviction is one which existed before the date of sentencing for the offense for which the defendant's offender score is currently being computed. As we held above, a court-martial is a conviction. Defendants' court-martial convictions existed before the sentencing proceedings on their current offenses, so they are prior convictions under RCW 9.94A.360(1). RCW 9.94A.360(2) (1996) sets forth when various classes of crimes in a defendant's history must be included in the defendant's offender score. Prior convictions for class A felonies and sex offenses are always included in the offender score. Prior class B felony convictions, other than sex offenses, shall not be included in the offender score, if since the last date of release from confinement ... the offender had spent ten consecutive years in the community without being convicted of any felonies. Former RCW 9.94A.360(2) (since amended by Laws of 1995, ch. 316, § 1, and Laws of 1997, ch. 338, § 5). Class C prior felony convictions, other than sex offenses, wash out after five years. RCW 9.94A.360(2). This subsection contains no language which operates to exclude courts-martial from consideration; the only consideration under this subsection is whether the prior conviction is old enough to wash out. At the time both Defendants were sentenced, RCW 9.94A.360(3) provided: Out-of-state convictions for offenses shall be classified according to the comparable offense definitions and sentences provided by Washington law. Former RCW 9.94A.360(3). This subsection requires the sentencing court to make the factual determination of whether the out-of-state conviction is comparable to an in-state conviction. Once an out-of-state conviction is classified as the comparable Washington offense, the sentencing court must then determine if the conviction would wash out under RCW 9.94A.360(2) (1996). Nothing in RCW 9.94A.360(3) excludes courts-martial from being considered by the sentencing court. If the court-martial is comparable to a Washington crime, it may be considered. We find, as a statutory matter, courts-martial may be included in a defendant's offender score once the factual issues whether the particular conviction washes out, and whether it is comparable to a Washington offenseare resolved. See also State v. Aronson, 82 Wash.App. 762, 919 P.2d 133 (1996) (affirming use of defendant's prior court-martial for indecent liberties in calculating the offender score); cf. State v. Duke, 77 Wash.App. 532, 535-36, 892 P.2d 120 (1995) (deciding defendant's court-martial was not comparable to any Washington offense, thereby precluding its consideration under RCW 9.94A.360). Reading the SRA to include courts-martial in a defendant's offender score is consistent with the purposes of the Act. The Act was designed, in part, to [e]nsure that the punishment for a criminal offense is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the offender's criminal history. RCW 9.94A.010(1) (emphasis added). The purpose of the offender score statute is to ensure that defendants with equivalent prior convictions are treated `the same way, regardless of whether their prior convictions were incurred in Washington or elsewhere.' Villegas, 72 Wash.App. at 38-39, 863 P.2d 560 (quoting State v. Weiand, 66 Wash.App. 29, 34, 831 P.2d 749 (1992)). Under our reading of the offender score statute and the general SRA definitions, a defendant who was convicted of rape in a military court-martial is treated the same as one who was convicted of rape in any other jurisdiction. We now turn to the final statutory analysis of whether a court-martial may be considered under I-593, the Persistent Offender Accountability Act. I-593, also known as the three strikes and you're out law, was approved in 1993 by an overwhelming majority of voters in this state. State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 746, 921 P.2d 514 (1996). The operative portions of the law are codified at RCW 9.94A.030(23) (definition of [m]ost serious offense), RCW 9.94A.030(27) (definition of [p]ersistent offender), and RCW 9.94A.120(4). The operation of RCW 9.94A.120(4) is straightforward: If the sentencing court finds a defendant is a persistent offender, the court must sentence the defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole. At the time both Defendants pleaded guilty to their current offenses, a persistent offender was defined as an offender who is convicted of a most serious offense, and who has two prior convictions, in this state or elsewhere, for crimes which would be most serious offenses under Washington law, and which would be included in the offender score under RCW 9.94A.360. RCW 9.94A.030(27)(a). The definition of persistent offenders now includes a separate subsection qualifying certain sex offenders as persistent offenders after just two strikes, but the sex offender subsection was not enacted until after Defendants were sentenced. See Laws of 1996, ch. 289. Application of the persistent offender definition can be broken down into several steps. After a defendant has been convicted in this state of a most serious offense, RCW 9.94A.030(27)(a)(i), four more elements must be present for a defendant to be declared a persistent offender: (1) The defendant must have been previously convicted on at least two separate occasions, (2) in this state or elsewhere, (3) of felonies that, under the laws of this state, would be considered most serious offenses (defined in RCW 9.94A.030(23)), and (4) would be included in the offender score under RCW 9.94A.360. RCW 9.94A.030(27)(a)(ii). The first two elements require Defendants to have been previously convicted as offenders on at least two separate occasions in this state or elsewhere. As we held above, we find courts-martial are convictions from elsewhere. This holding stems from the general definitions in the SRA, and those definitions also apply within the context of I-593. These first two elements are present in these consolidated cases. Under the third element of the persistent offender definition, the prior convictions must involve felonies that under the laws of this state would be considered most serious offenses.... RCW 9.94A.030(27)(a)(ii). Determining whether a court-martial is comparable to a most serious offense requires a factual analysis of the particular court-martial involved in each case. We conduct this fact-specific inquiry under the second issue of this decision. As a statutory matter, if a court-martial is comparable to a most serious offense under Washington laws, the third element will be present. This analysis is supported by the definition of most serious offenses, which includes any federal or out-of-state conviction for an offense that under the laws of this state would be a felony classified as a most serious offense under this subsection. RCW 9.94A.030(23)(u); State v. Mutch, 87 Wash.App. 433, 436, 942 P.2d 1018 (1997). The last element of a persistent offender status states the prior convictions must be included in the offender score under RCW 9.94A.360. RCW 9.94A.030(27)(a)(ii). As we held above, a court-martial may be considered under RCW 9.94A.360 if the court-martial is comparable to a Washington offense and the conviction does not wash out. Once the factual requirements are met, then a court-martial counts under RCW 9.94A.360. If the court-martial is included in the offender score, then the fourth element of a persistent offender status is present. In conclusion, we find a court-martial can potentially qualify as a prior strike, thereby elevating a defendant to the status of a persistent offender. We find no statutory language which operates to exclude courts-martial from consideration under I-593. Just as a court-martial constitutes part of a defendant's criminal history, and may be included in the defendant's offender score, we find the court-martial also may be considered when determining whether the defendant qualifies as a persistent offender. Including courts-martial within the scope of the Persistent Offender Accountability Act is consistent with the intent of the voters who approved the law. The [f]indings and intent section of I-593 states in part: (1) The people of the state of Washington find and declare that: (a) Community protection from persistent offenders is a priority for any civilized society. (b) Nearly fifty percent of the criminals convicted in Washington state have active prior criminal histories. (c) Punishments for criminal offenses should be proportionate to both the seriousness of the crime and the prior criminal history. (d) The public has the right and the responsibility to determine when to impose a life sentence. (2) By sentencing three-time, most serious offenders to prison for life without the possibility of parole, the people intend to: (a) Improve public safety by placing the most dangerous criminals in prison. (b) Reduce the number of serious, repeat offenders by tougher sentencing. RCW 9.94A.392 (emphasis added). These findings do not support Defendants' efforts to distinguish between court-martial convictions and other criminal convictions. A defendant's repeat offender status does not depend on where the defendant's prior criminal acts occurred. The status of a repeat offender hinges on the substance of a defendant's prior criminal acts: Are the defendant's prior convictions, regardless of venue or jurisdiction, comparable to most serious offenses in this state? A defendant who commits a serious crime while under jurisdiction of a military court is no less a repeat offender than one who commits the same offense in another state. Allowing courts-martial to be considered under I-593 ensures the equal treatment of all defendants and satisfies the public's desire to protect society from repeat, most serious offenders.