Opinion ID: 1673978
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issue: Whether Mississippi's System for Awarding Punitive Damages Is Constitutional?

Text: Through this issue, GMAC contends that Mississippi's system or procedure for awarding punitive damages is unconstitutional. GMAC relies primarily on the United States Supreme Court's recent opinion in which the justices repeatedly expressed their concern over the constitutionality of Mississippi's system. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991). In Haslip, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of Alabama's system for awarding punitive damages. The Court concluded that Alabama's system met minimum due process requirements because a judge or jury's discretion in determining a punitive-damages award is limited. In other words, the discretion is limited or confined to deterrence and retribution. Id. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1044, 113 L.Ed.2d at 21. Thus, the judge and jury in Alabama are enlightened ... as to the punitive damages' nature and purpose. Id. Knowing the nature and purpose of a punitive-damages award, the Court added, reasonably accommodate[s a defendant's] interest in rational decision making and Alabama's interest in meaningful individualized assessment of appropriate deterrence and retribution. The Court then applauded the Alabama Supreme Court for providing an additional check on the jury's or trial court's discretion: It [the Alabama Supreme Court] undertakes a comparative analysis. It then applies the detailed substantive standard it has developed for evaluating punitive awards. In particular, it makes its review to ensure that the award does not exceed an amount that will accomplish society's goals of punishment and deterrence. ... This appellate review makes certain that the punitive damages are reasonable in their amount and rational in light of their purpose to punish what has occurred and to deter its repetition. Id. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1045, 113 L.Ed.2d at 21-22 (citations and footnote omitted). In short, [a]s long as the discretion is exercised within reasonable constraints, due process is satisfied. Id. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1035, 113 L.Ed.2d at 10 (citing cases). Upon concluding its analysis of the constitutionality of Alabama's system for awarding punitive damages, the Supreme Court footnoted its belief that Mississippi's system is  more likely than not  unconstitutional. More specifically, the Court seems to believe that a judge or jury's discretion is not limited or confined under Mississippi law; that the nature and purpose of a punitive-damages award is not defined; and that a substantive and comparative check is not conducted by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The Court explained, an amount awarded would be set aside or modified only if it was `manifestly and grossly excessive' or would be considered excessive when `it evinces passion, bias and prejudice on the part of the jury so as to shock the conscience.' Id. at ___ n. 10, 111 S.Ct. at 1045 n. 10, 113 L.Ed.2d at 22 n. 10 (citing Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 108 S.Ct. 1645, 100 L.Ed.2d 62 (1988)). However, in Andrew Jackson v. Williams, 566 So.2d 1172, 1182-92 (Miss. 1990), this Court meticulously explained that a judge or jury's discretion is limited or confined. This Court defined the nature and purpose of a punitive-damages award. And this Court provided a substantive and comparative check on the amount which the jury awarded the plaintiff. In sum, this Court rejects GMAC's contention that Mississippi's system for awarding punitive damages is unconstitutional. A related issue assigned by Ivy and concerning the jury's award of punitive damages will be discussed in § G, infra. However, the issue assigned by Ivy concerning the jury's award of punitive damages will be discussed in Subdivision G herein.