Opinion ID: 1906701
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: dominic gibson

Text: The prosecution attempted to show that Dominic Gibson first retrieved a gun from Yappy and gave it to Mercer, and then told Yappy to go outside to speak with Mercer and Terrell. Once on the stand, the witness did not cooperate. Gibson first testified that he stayed in the apartment of Robin Motley, having his hair done, during the entire incident. The prosecution proceeded to interrogate Gibson by use of his grand jury testimony. At the end of Gibson's direct examination, the prosecution asked Gibson about spectators attending the trial: Q: And do you know these people seated in the back row of the room today? A: Yeah, I know them. Q: Are they friends of yours? A: They all right. Q: Are they friends of Melvin's and Wayne-Wayne's? A: I don't know. That's them. I don't know who friends with them or not. I don't know. I can't vouch for both of them. Q: Are they friends of yours from Lincoln Heights? A: Who? Q: The people seated in the back of the courtroom? A: Yeah, they are. They from Lincoln Heights. Q: They're from Lincoln Heights? Why are you here testifying today? A: Why am I here testifying? Q: Yeah. Why are you here testifying? Are you here voluntarily? A: Yeah. Y'all keep coming locking me up, picking me up, that's why I'm here. Q: You were subpoenaed, weren't you? A: Right. Q: And you didn't show up the first time, did you? A: Yeah, I was here. You saw me. You looked at me. Q: Do you want to be here today? A: Yeah, I want to be here today. I'm right here. Q: Do you want to be testifying against Melvin and Wayne-Wayne? A: I ain't  you asking me questions. I'm giving you answers. It is clear that Mr. Gibson contradicted his grand jury testimony. As Gibson was confronted with this grand jury testimony, it would be proper to inquire into the reasons why Mr. Gibson was changing his testimony. As in the case of Cunningham, moreover, it was not improper to elicit that Gibson was an unwilling witness. The manner in which the prosecution proceeded, however, was improper. In this instance, the prosecution attempted to link the people in the back of the courtroom to the defendants, Mercer and Terrell. By highlighting that the spectators were from Lincoln Heights, and intimating that they were friends with Mercer and Terrell, the prosecution created an impression that the spectators were there to influence the testimony of the witnesses. Such tactics are fraught with the potential for unfair prejudice for two reasons. First, they suggest to the jury a decision based on guilt by association. That is, the evidence suggests that because these imposing figures in the back of the courtroom were somehow connected to Mercer and Terrell, Mercer and Terrell must need their presence to intimidate witnesses because they are guilty. See United States v. Irvin, 87 F.3d 860, 866 (7th Cir.1996) (stating evidence of gang membership could have a prejudicial effect by increasing the chance of a conviction based on guilt by association). Second, the evidence plays on the passions and fear of the jury, by suggesting that a threat exists against the witnesses. See McClellan, supra, 706 A.2d at 551. That the prosecution did not mention the words intimidation or threat is immaterial in this context. The impression that the spectators from Lincoln Heights were present to influence witnesses was still created. By linking the fact that Gibson had testified at trial in contradiction to his grand jury testimony with the presence of spectators from Lincoln Heights, the prosecution inescapably implied that the spectators were there to intimidate witnesses. Further, the purpose for which the reference to the spectators from Lincoln Heights was made could have been accomplished by an alternative method, less prejudicial to Mercer and Terrell. The prosecution claims that this evidence was relevant to give the jury a glimpse into the state of mind of Gibson. This could have been accomplished without reference to the spectators from Lincoln Heights. The prosecution could have established that Gibson was only testifying due to a subpoena, and that Gibson did not want to be in the courtroom. Given the potential for unfair prejudice, and the availability of an alternative, less prejudicial method to accomplish the same goal, the suggestion that Gibson's recantation of his grand jury testimony was the product of fear was improper. Carter v. United States, 614 A.2d 913 (D.C. 1992), is not to the contrary. There, the prosecution asked whether the witness realized that he could face consequences on the street for his testimony. The court found the questions referred to a general threat, and did not directly implicate the defendant. Id. at 918. Thus, we held that the questions did not require reversal. Id. at 919. The reference to the people from Lincoln Heights in the back of the courtroom in this case, however, was not a reference to a general, abstract threat. By highlighting their presence, the prosecution created the impression of a very real and immediate threat. Additionally, it gave the jury a face with which to associate that threat. Further, by attempting to link the spectators from Lincoln Heights to Mercer and Terrell, the prosecution implied that there was a threat coming from the defendants. Thus, unlike the reference in Carter, the line of questioning in this case did have the potential to create direct, unfair prejudice against Mercer and Terrell.