Opinion ID: 4523917
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Majority Misreads the Plain Language of

Text: DoDI 1320.08 ¶ 6.3 “We construe a regulation in the same manner as we construe a statute[.]” Tesoro Haw. Corp. v. United States, 405 F.3d 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005). We first consider “its plain language” and “terms in accordance with their common meaning.” Lockheed Corp. v. Widnall, 113 F.3d 1225, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 1997). “In doing so, the court considers the Case: 18-2038 Document: 39 Page: 35 Filed: 04/09/2020 8 BAUDE v. UNITED STATES text of the regulation as a whole, reconciling the section in question with sections related to it.” Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 782 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the regulation contains “clear and unambiguous” terms, “then no further inquiry is usually required.” Id. We begin with the language of the regulation itself. DoDI 1320.08 provides that a twice-deferred major “shall normally be selected for continuation” if the officer is “within [six] years” of retirement on “the date of continuation.” DoDI 1320.08 ¶ 6.3. The Majority concludes that the phrase “shall normally” creates a “presumption,” Maj. Op. 15, under which the SecAF must “continue [an] officer [within six years of retirement] unless there is a reason not to do so,” id. at 20. The Majority says that “applying this presumption is mandatory, even if continuation is not.” Id. at 15. This erroneously reads “normally” out of the regulation. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (explaining a “cardinal principal of statutory construction that a statute” or regulation is read so that “no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (“Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition.” (quoting NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941) (L. Hand, J.))). While use of the word “shall,” by itself, is generally mandatory, Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (explaining that “shall” generally creates “an obligation impervious to judicial discretion” (citation omitted)), “shall normally” is permissive, see, e.g., SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 630 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that statutory language providing that an agency “shall normally” use a specified methodology “does not mandate” use of that methodology); Am. Silicon Techs. v. United States, 261 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (interpreting the phrase “shall normally” as providing “a general,” not mandatory, “rule,” leaving Case: 18-2038 Document: 39 Page: 36 Filed: 04/09/2020 BAUDE v. UNITED STATES 9 choice of methodology within the reasonable discretion of the agency). Accordingly, “shall normally” conveys the SecAF’s discretion to set the criteria for continuation—it creates a norm and provides the discretion to deviate from that norm. See Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1977 (2016) (explaining that permissive language “implies discretion”); see also 10 U.S.C. § 637(c) (providing that continuation is “subject to the approval of the [SecAF]”); Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d 973, 984 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The Air Force is entitled to discharge an officer on grounds rationally related to the standards of fitness for retention in that branch of the service.” (citation omitted)). 4 Next, DoDI 1320.08 provides that, even if an officer otherwise meets the criteria for continuation, the SecAF “may, in unusual circumstances such as when an officer’s official personnel record contains derogatory information, discharge an officer involuntarily in accordance with 4 This discretion is confirmed in other parts of DoDI 1320.08. Specifically, the SecAF has discretion to set the length of the period of continuation. 10 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5) (providing guaranteed continuation only for officers “within two years of qualifying for retirement”); DoDI 1320.08 ¶¶ 6.3.1–2 (setting express limits, “Minimum” and “Maximum Continuation Period[s],” thereby acknowledging the SecAF’s discretion to act within those limits); Air Force Instruction (“AFI”) 36-2501, Officer Promotion and Selective Continuation (July 16, 2004), https://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a1/publication/afi36-2501/afi36-2501.pdf at ¶¶ 7.9 (providing that “[b]ased on the needs of the Air Force, [the] SecAF determines [continuation] eligibility criteria”), 7.11.1 (“The SecAF determines the actual length of the continuation period.”), 7.18 (“The period of continuation on active duty may be reduced by the SecAF due to subsequent changes in the ‘critical skill needs’ of the Air Force.”). Case: 18-2038 Document: 39 Page: 37 Filed: 04/09/2020 10 BAUDE v. UNITED STATES [§] 632.” DoDI 1320.08 ¶ 6.3. From this, the Majority concludes that the SecAF must find “unusual circumstances” to not continue an officer and that the “unusual circumstances” must “relate to the individual officer’s circumstances.” Maj. Op. 18. This reading, however, fails to consider regulatory and statutory context. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins., 782 F.3d at 1365. DoDI 1320.08 ¶ 6.3’s “unusual circumstances” clause does not divest the SecAF of his discretion to set continuation eligibility criteria according to the needs of the service. See 10 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1) (providing that continuation is “subject to the needs of the service”); DoDI 1320.08 ¶ 6.3 (providing that the SecAF “shall normally” continue officers within six years of retirement). Rather, it establishes that an officer who otherwise meets the continuation eligibility criteria, as set by the SecAF, may be involuntarily discharged, rather than retired or continued, in “unusual circumstances.” DoDI 1320.08 ¶ 6.3; see 10 U.S.C. § 632(a)(1), (2) (providing that an officer not selected for continuation may be “discharged” or, if eligible, “retired”); SAppx 1001 (Air Force Selective Continuation Fact Sheet) (explaining that “those individuals meeting the continuation eligibility criteria will be considered” by the selective continuation board” and “[r]ecords which contain . . . derogatory information may warrant a ‘not fully qualified’ determination”). Further, even if this language did require the SecAF to find “unusual circumstances” before changing continuation eligibility criteria, nothing in the language of DoDI 1320.08 or relevant statutes limits those “unusual circumstances” to individual “derogatory information.” DoDI 1320.08 ¶ 6.3. The Majority provides that “[t]he law is clear that, when interpreting statutes or regulations, the provided example, while not always deemed exclusive, indicates the character of the circumstances to be considered.” Maj. Op. 18. “The law,” however, is not so absolute—ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis cannot “be resorted to” in order “to obscure and defeat the intent and purpose of Congress.” Case: 18-2038 Document: 39 Page: 38 Filed: 04/09/2020 BAUDE v. UNITED STATES 11 United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 682 (1950) (citation omitted); see Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (providing that we rely on “the doctrine of noscitur a sociis . . . to avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giving unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress”). Here, when enacting 10 U.S.C. § 637, Congress expressly “intended” for selective continuation “to be used sparingly and . . . primarily [as] a means of reducing the numbers in senior [officer] grades when necessary, such as during a reduction in force.” H.R. REP. No. 96–1462, at 27 (1980); see S. REP. No. 96–375, at 81 (1979) (similar). Congress’s express purpose was to create a force management tool responsive to congressionally mandated end-strength numbers. See H.R. REP. No. 96–1462 at 27 (“With the elimination of the temporary promotion system, some provision for forced separation is required. Otherwise there would be no method of thinning the force at senior grades during a reduction in force.”). Reading “unusual circumstances” so narrowly as to defeat this intent and purpose, based on a single, non-exclusive example, is an error. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 163 (2012) (declining to apply “the rule of ejusdem generis” to “defeat Congress’ intent”); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 225 (2008) (explaining that “[t]he absence of a list of specific items undercuts the inference embodied in ejusdem generis [and noscitur a sociis] that [the drafter] remained focused on the common attribute when it used the catchall phrase”). Last, DoDI 1320.08 provides that when the SecAF “intends not to continue larger pools of officers . . . who would qualify for retirement within [six] years of the date of a continuation, the [SecAF] shall notify the USD(P&R) of the proposed course of action.” DoDI 1320.08 ¶ 6.3. By its plain and ordinary language, the SecAF has the authority and discretion to not continue “larger pools of officers” even if they would otherwise “qualify for retirement within [six] Case: 18-2038 Document: 39 Page: 39 Filed: 04/09/2020 12 BAUDE v. UNITED STATES years.” Id. The Majority’s “individualized decision” requirement presumes that there are “larger pools” of senior officers with derogatory or similar information on their record waiting to be non-continued. The simpler, more realistic, explanation is that the SecAF may, when the needs of the service require, not continue larger pools of officers, in keeping with his discretion and authority. See 10 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5) (providing guaranteed continuation only for officers “within two years of qualifying for retirement”); Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 372 (1994) (“The plain meaning that we seek to discern is the plain meaning of the whole [regulation or] statute, not of isolated sentences.”). 5 Therefore, DoDI 1320.08 ¶ 6.3 accords the SecAF the discretion to set continuation eligibility criteria, to not continue an officer even if he or she meets that criteria in unusual circumstances, and to not continue large numbers of officers within six years of retirement. See Lengerich v. Dep’t of Interior, 454 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[W]e examine the text of the regulation as a whole, reconciling the section in question with sections related to it.”). B. The Majority’s Reading of DoDI 1320.08 ¶ 6.3 Is Contrary to Statute and Congressional Intent The Majority’s conclusion that the SecAF does not have the discretion to set continuation eligibility criteria is in substantial tension with DoDI 1320.08’s enabling statute and congressional intent. Congress provided that selective continuation is “subject to the needs of the service,” 10 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1), and “subject to the approval of the [SecAF],” id. § 637(c), with guaranteed continuation only for officers “within two years of qualifying for retirement,” id. § 637(a)(5). In enacting such legislation, Congress sought to “[s]tandardize officer-promotion procedures among the 5 Mr. Engle does not contest that “the SecAF had the authority to not continue large pools of majors within six years of retirement[.]” Appellant’s Supp. Br. 1 n.1. Case: 18-2038 Document: 39 Page: 40 Filed: 04/09/2020 BAUDE v. UNITED STATES 13 service” and to “tighten[] up the allowances on the number of officers in the higher grades.” 126 CONG. REC. H29,886 (Nov. 17, 1980) (statement of Rep. Mitchell). Congress expressly “intended” for the SecAF’s selective continuation authority “to be used sparingly and . . . primarily [as] a means of reducing the numbers in senior [officer] grades when necessary, such as during a reduction in force.” H.R. REP. No. 96–1462, at 27 (1980); see S. REP. No. 96–375, at 81 (1979) (similar); see also 126 CONG. REC. H29,886 (Nov. 17, 1980) (statement of Rep. Mitchell) (“It is the committee’s strong desire that [majors] be continued to [a standardized] 20 years of service as a matter of course; only in unusual circumstances would this authority not be fully utilized.”). This demonstrates that the SecAF has the authority to use selective continuation, as necessary, for reductions in force—not just for the removal of senior officers with derogatory information on their record. 6 It further shows that the SecAF has the discretion to determine who, outside the congressionally mandated two-year protective window, may be continued, according to the needs of the service. 7 The Secretary of Defense is charged with 6 Department of Defense regulation and policy re- flects this understanding. See DoDI 1320.08 ¶¶ 4 (“It is [Department of Defense] policy to retain competent and effective commissioned officers through the selective continuation process as a cost-effective means of satisfying skill needs in the Military Services.”), 5.2.1 (providing that the “Secretaries of the Military Departments shall” “[a]dminister the policy and procedures prescribe [in DoDI 1320.08]”), 5.2.3 (providing that the “Secretaries of the Military Departments shall” “[c]onvene continuation selection boards based on the needs of the Military Service concerned for continuation of officers on the Active Duty List”). 7 Air Force regulation and policy reflects this understanding. AFI 36-2501 at ¶¶ 7.9 (providing that “[b]ased on the needs of the Air Force, [the SecAF] determines Case: 18-2038 Document: 39 Page: 41 Filed: 04/09/2020 14 BAUDE v. UNITED STATES “prescribing regulations for the administration of [10 U.S.C. § 637],” 10 U.S.C. § 637(e), however, those regulations cannot be contrary to the express intent of Congress, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”); see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016) (explaining that, to the extent Congress grants authority to promulgate regulations, those regulations must be “reasonable in light of the text, nature, and purpose of the statute”). C. The Majority’s Reading of DoDI 1320.08 ¶ 6.3 Undermines the Separation of Powers and Civilian Control of the Military Preserving the SecAF’s authority and discretion to use selective continuation within statutory and regulatory bounds is important because the SecAF must be able to meet congressionally mandated end-strength numbers. Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to “raise and support Armies,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, and “provide and maintain a Navy,” id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13. [continuation] eligibility criteria”), 7.10 (“All officers recommended for continuation must meet a selective continuation board that will ultimately be forwarded to [the] SecAF for final approval”); Appx 1001 (Air Force Selective Continuation Fact Sheet) (explaining that “[s]elective continuation allows the Air Force, as determined by the [SecAF], to retain twice-deferred officers in critical skills for a length of time determined by the [SecAF]”); Appx 1001 (providing that the “SecAF determines the selective continuation eligibility criteria” and that it may “change from board to board based on current and projected needs of the Air Force”); Appx 1001 (providing that the “worst case scenario” is that “continuation is not offered to anyone”). Case: 18-2038 Document: 39 Page: 42 Filed: 04/09/2020 BAUDE v. UNITED STATES 15 Each fiscal year, Congress “authorizes appropriations . . . for military activities of the Department of Defense,” to, inter alia, “prescribe military personnel strengths for [that] fiscal year.” NDAA FY11, 124 Stat. at 4137. Neither the Secretary of Defense nor the SecAF has the authority to “make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation.” 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A); see Appx 1006–07 (Air Force Policy Directive 36-32, Military Retirements and Separations (July 14, 1993)) (“[T]he Air Force must be able to meet personnel strength levels established in law.”). Congress’s power to mandate end-strength numbers is central to civilian control of the military. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 225 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (“A standing force . . . is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary, provision. . . . A wise nation will combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties.”). “[J]udicial deference to . . . congressional exercise of authority is at its apogee when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged.” Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981). Further, the “composition of [military] forces” is “within the purview of the Congress and the military.” Maier, 754 F.2d at 980. “Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense,” the SecAF “is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of the Department of the Air Force, including,” “organizing,” “supplying,” “equipping,” “administering,” and “maintaining” that force. 10 U.S.C. § 8013(b). “The complex subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, Case: 18-2038 Document: 39 Page: 43 Filed: 04/09/2020 16 BAUDE v. UNITED STATES subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.” Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (emphasis in original)). It is well “settled that responsibility for determining who is fit or unfit to serve in the armed services is not a judicial province.” Heisig v. United States, 719 F.2d 1153, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Majority “fail[s] to give appropriate weight to this separation of powers,” Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 11, and the “wide discretion [of the SecAF] to manage [the Air Force’s] workforce,” Allphin v. United States, 758 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Instead, the Majority’s reading of DoDI 1320.08 ¶ 6.3 effectively gives the Secretary of Defense the means to make an end run around Congressionally mandated end-strength numbers, by giving the Secretary of Defense the authority to create an entitlement to continued employment in the military. See Maj. Op. 5 (explaining that the SecAF “must continue” an officer within the Secretary of Defense’s prescribed protective window absent “reason not to,” such as “derogatory information in [his or her] personnel file”). This is contrary to the “power of oversight and control of military force by elected representatives and officials” that “underlies our entire constitutional system[.]” Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 11. This is unquestionably in derogation of the good order and discipline of the armed services. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (“In the civilian life of a democracy many command few; in the military, however, this is reversed, for military necessity makes demands on its personnel without counterpart in civilian life.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). There is no right to remain in the military, see Maier, 754 F.2d at 980 (“No one has an individual right, constitutional or otherwise, to enlist in the armed forces[.]”), and no “liberty or property interest” attached to an honorable discharge “sufficient to invoke due process rights to notice and a hearing,” Allphin, 758 F.3d at 1343. To the extent that an individual has any property interest, it is only a “reasonable expectation” in Case: 18-2038 Document: 39 Page: 44 Filed: 04/09/2020 BAUDE v. UNITED STATES 17 continued employment—there is no reasonable expectation that an officer who does not meet the basic requirements and standards set by the SecAF for continued employment will be selected for continuation. See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”). 8 8 The Majority faults this Dissent for considering relevant legislative history and pointing out the constitutional implications of the Majority’s opinion. See Maj. Op. 19 (characterizing this Dissent’s consideration of legislative history in regulatory and statutory interpretation as “[a]dvancing new arguments on behalf of the [G]overnment”), 23 (rejecting this Dissent’s consideration of the constitutional implications of the Majority’s opinion as “attempts to bolster its reasoning with arguments that the [G]overnment has not advanced”). The Majority misapprehends the nature of our judicial process. Our role is to “decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret constitutional and statutory provisions” not just “when” or as “presented,” but “[t]o the extent necessary to [the] decision[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 706. Whatever the Government may argue, it cannot obviate our “province and duty . . . to say what the law is.” Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177–78; see Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414 (2019) (explaining that a court must “resort[] to all the standard tools of interpretation” when determining whether a regulation is “genuinely ambiguous”). Judges are not advocates. We do not “advance” arguments on behalf of the parties. Our duty is to follow the law as we comprehend it. Case: 18-2038 Document: 39 Page: 45 Filed: 04/09/2020 18 BAUDE v. UNITED STATES II. The Majority Overreaches Our Standard of Review to Find Facts Not on the Record Having misread DoDI 1320.08, the Majority then finds that “even if the SecAF had the authority to declare any circumstance to be sufficiently unusual to justify rewriting other aspects of the regulation . . . there simply were no ‘unusual circumstances’ identified here.” Maj. Op. 20. Specifically, the Majority finds, first, that “there were no ‘unusual circumstances’ akin to derogatory information in [Mr.] Engle’s file that would have justified his non-continuation,” id., and second, that the SecAF found no broader unusual circumstances because neither “[t]he SecAF’s notice to the USD(P&R),” nor his “memorandum of instructions” to the selective continuation board “mention[s] . . . unusual circumstances of any kind,” id. (citing Appx 1005; Appx 33). In so doing, the Majority overreaches our standard of review. “We review a decision of the Court of Federal Claims granting or denying a motion for judgment on the administrative record without deference.” Barnick v. United States, 591 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). As such, “we apply the same standard of review” as the Court of Federal Claims, and “will not disturb the decision of the AFBCMR unless it is arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). First, the Majority finds, based on what it says is a Government concession, that “there were no ‘unusual circumstances’ akin to derogatory information in [Mr.] Engle’s file that would have justified his non-continuation.” Maj. Op. 20 (citing Oral Arg. at 20:42–51, http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2018-2038.mp3 (“We are unaware of any derogatory information or any decision regarding [Mr.] Engle that was personal in nature, that is not what the record here shows.”)); see id. 8 (stating that, if the SecAF had not changed the continuation Case: 18-2038 Document: 39 Page: 46 Filed: 04/09/2020 BAUDE v. UNITED STATES 19 criteria Mr. Engle “almost certainly would have been continued”). This may be true; however, such a finding is improper and outside our role on appeal. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (“[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.”). There is simply no record evidence to support this finding. This is unsurprising: “The proceedings of a selection board convened under [10 U.S.C. § 611] may not be disclosed to any person not a member of the board, except as authorized to process the report of the board.” 10 U.S.C. § 613a(a). Second, the Majority finds that the “SecAF fail[ed] to identify any [unusual circumstance]” in his notice to the USD(P&R) or instructions to the selective continuation board, rendering the AFBCMR’s affirmance unsupported by substantial evidence and the Government’s arguments post-hoc rationalizations. Maj. Op. 22; see SAppx 115 (AFBCMR concluding that Petitioners had submitted “insufficient relevant evidence” to “demonstrate . . . an error or injustice” and that “the explanation provided by [the Air Force] that the [SecAF] had a reasonable basis to pursue the course of action he determined necessary”). The Majority concludes that this “alone should end the inquiry.” Maj. Op. 21 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 81 (1943)). The Majority mistakes an incomplete record for definitive proof of a negative claim. Specifically, before the Court of Federal Claims, Mr. Engle and the other Petitioners sought to compel the Government to supplement the administrative record with the evidence the Majority now seeks. See SAppx 147 (summarizing Petitioners’ request that the Government “[p]rovide details . . . of the information [the] SecAF briefed to the [USD(P&R)] on January 24, 2011[,] regarding the SecAF’s intent to not selectively continue certain officers,” “of the information the Air Force briefed to [the] USD(P&R) and [c]ongressional subcommittee staff members on January 12, 13, and Case: 18-2038 Document: 39 Page: 47 Filed: 04/09/2020 20 BAUDE v. UNITED STATES 24, 2011[,] regarding [the] SecAF’s intent to not continue certain officers,” and “of the information the Air Force briefed to [c]ongressional subcommittee staff members on March 17, 2011[,] and May 11, 2011[,] regarding the SecAF’s intent to not selectively continue certain officers,” including “copies of the brief[s] provided, briefing materials, transcripts, and any and all correspondence”). The Court of Federal Claims, however, denied this request, because Mr. Engle and the other Petitioners had “waived [their] supplementation rights” by failing to “identify this evidence [as] missing during [administrative] review,” despite having been before the [AFBCMR] twice.” SAppx 149. Mr. Engle does not contest this determination, see generally Appellant’s Br; Appellant’s Supp. Br., nor does the Majority address it, see generally Maj. Op. It is, therefore, undisputed that the Court of Federal Claims acted within its discretion when it denied Mr. Engle and other Petitioners’ request. See Barnick, 591 F.3d at 1382 (“[We] review[] evidentiary rulings [of the Court of Federal Claims] under an abuse of discretion standard.” (citation omitted)); id. at 1382 (“[W]here evidence could have been submitted to a corrections board and was not, the evidence is properly excluded by the Court of Federal Claims.” (citation omitted)). 9 Before the Court of Federal Claims, the burden was on Mr. Engle to establish “prejudicial error.” 5 U.S.C. § 706; see 10 U.S.C. § 1558(f)(2). He did not. Rather, he conceded that the “SecAF was only required to notify [the] USD(P&R) of his intent to [not selectively continue larger 9 Even if such details of the SecAF’s decision were on the record, it is unclear what the Majority could do with them. See Adkins v. United States, 68 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The merits of a service secretary’s decision regarding military affairs are unquestionably beyond the competence of the judiciary to review.”). Case: 18-2038 Document: 39 Page: 48 Filed: 04/09/2020 BAUDE v. UNITED STATES 21 pools of officers].” SAppx 150. He nonetheless now argues this absence of evidence to his advantage. See Appellant’s Supp. Br. 7 (arguing that the “SecAF did not purport to identify any ‘unusual circumstances’ justifying the six-tofive-year change when making the determination not to selectively continue Mr. Engle,” and “[t]hat failure alone is error that requires reversal[.]”). His argument, in addition to being improper, is without merit. See Dodson v. U.S. Gov’t, Dep’t of Army, 988 F.2d 1199, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[M]ilitary administrators are presumed to act lawfully and in good faith like other public officers, and the military is entitled to substantial deference in the governance of its affairs.”); see also Biddle v. United States, 186 Ct. Cl. 87, 104 (1968) (providing for a “presumption in favor of the validity” of official military acts, such that “in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed that the [secretary] performed [his] official duties properly”).