Opinion ID: 1853688
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The statute. Section 321.261, The Code 1979, provides in pertinent part:

Text: The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene ... and in every event shall remain at the scene ... until he has fulfilled the requirements of section 321.263.... The above statute provides a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty days nor more than one year, or by fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five thousand dollars, or both, and revocation of the offender's operator's or chauffeur's license. Section 321.263, referred to in section 321.261, requires the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident to provide identifying information and to give the injured person assistance. Iowa statutes preceding present section 321.261 expressly referred to the driver's knowledge of the accident. See § 1571-m23, The Code 1913 ([a]ny person operating a motor vehicle who, knowing that injury has been caused ...); § 5072, The Code 1927 ([t]he operator of a motor vehicle who knows that ... injury has been caused ...). In 1939 Iowa apparently joined many other states in adopting provisions of the Uniform Vehicle Code [1] that omitted language relating to the driver's knowledge of the injury- or death-causing accident. B. The case law. Nonetheless, despite this litigation-spawning omission from the Uniform Vehicle Code (and consequently from the Iowa Code) courts generally have held that the driver's knowledge of the accident or injury is a prerequisite to a conviction for the violation of such a statute. See, e. g., Kimoktoak v. State, 584 P.2d 25, 31 (Alaska 1978); People v. Nunn, 77 Ill.2d 243, 251-52, 32 Ill.Dec. 914, 917-18, 396 N.E.2d 27, 30-31 (1979); State v. Feintuch, 150 N.J.Super. 414, 420-21, 375 A.2d 1223, 1226-27 (1977); State v. Lemme, 104 R.I. 416, 423, 244 A.2d 585, 589 (1968); 7 Am.Jur.2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 247 (1963); Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 497 (1969). These decisions ordinarily start from the premise that the statute requires an affirmative course of action to be taken by the driver and it necessarily follows that one must be aware of facts giving rise to the duty in order to trigger the obligation to perform it. See Kimoktoak, 584 P.2d at 31; Nunn, 77 Ill.2d at 252, 396 N.E.2d at 31; Feintuch, 150 N.J.Super. at 421, 375 A.2d at 1226. Finally, although the issue has not been presented squarely in our prior decisions, our opinions interpreting companion section 321.264 (informational requirements after striking unattended vehicle) strongly indicate knowledge is an implied element of the offense. See State v. McDonald, 190 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Iowa 1971); State v. Christopher, 176 N.W.2d 777, 778-79 (Iowa 1970). The State's brief concedes these decisions are decisive on the requirement of the driver's knowledge, but seeks to support the court's instruction that if defendant lacked knowledge as a result of his own carelessness or negligence, he nonetheless could be convicted. C. The instruction. Trial court's instruction relating to the elements of the offense made no mention of defendant's knowledge, but the latter took no exception. However, instruction 7 told the jury: The defendant asserts that at the time of the alleged occurrence, he did not know an accident had taken place. In this regard, you are instructed that if you find the defendant did not know that an accident had taken place and that his lack of knowledge that an accident had taken place was not a result of his own carelessness or negligence, then you should find the defendant not guilty. Defendant, citing Christopher, took exception to the court's failure to give his requested instruction, which was essentially the same as that quoted above except that it omitted the clause relating to carelessness and negligence. He then took exception to the instruction submitted on the ground it placed upon the defendant the burden of proving ... that his acts and conduct at the time and place ... were free from both carelessness or negligence ... this ... grafts upon the holding of the Supreme Court ... additional elements ... which are not proper elements .... It was apparent from trial court's ruling on the motion for directed verdict, coupled with this instruction, that it did not consider defendant's knowledge to be an element to be proved by the State, but treated defendant's alleged lack of knowledge as an affirmative defense. Whether defendant agreed with this approach is not clear from the record, but it is plain that he contended his own subjective knowledge was required, not the knowledge of a reasonable person.