Opinion ID: 1057335
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The right to amend

Text: ¶ 37. Defendants argue that, even if the notice of appeal is deemed to have been filed after—or at the same time as—the motion to amend, the right to amend the complaint had terminated because the action was already final. We agree. ¶ 38. Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend the complaint “shall be freely given when justice so requires,” and we have repeatedly held that trial courts are to be liberal in permitting amendments to the pleadings. See, e.g., Lillicrap , 156 Vt. at 170, 591 A.2d at 44; Desrochers v. Perrault , 148 Vt. 491, 493, 535 A.2d 334, 336 (1987). This policy of liberality rests on three principal goals: (1) to ensure maximum opportunities for claims to be decided on their merits rather than on procedural niceties; (2) to provide notice of claims and defenses; and (3) to enable parties to raise claims that were overlooked or unknown earlier in the proceedings. Bevins v. King , 143 Vt. 252, 255, 465 A.2d 282, 283 (1983). ¶ 39. Defendants argue that NSIC’s right to amend the complaint under Rule 15 terminated when judgment was entered. As the record makes clear, judgment was entered on June 1, 2004. At that time, the action was final under our rules. See V.R.C.P. 58 and 79. We therefore agree with defendants that the right to amend under Rule 15 no longer attached when the motion was filed on June 14. It remains to decide whether the trial court properly concluded that Rule 59(e) provided a procedural avenue for NSIC’s recoupment claim.