Opinion ID: 667906
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendants Smith, Campbell, and Roberson

Text: 11 St. Amand initially contends that the district court erred in refusing to enter a default judgment against Roberson. The district court has discretion to enter a default judgment if the requirements of Rule 55 are met. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55. We review findings of fact made with respect to the propriety of default for clear error, and the district court's determination not to enter default for abuse of discretion. Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987). 12 The district court made a factual finding that Roberson was not properly served with process because there was no return to St. Amand of the acknowledgment required by Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). St. Amand made no effort to have service effected under other provisions of Rule 4. The district court's finding was not clearly erroneous. Because Roberson was not properly served, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to enter default. See Mason v. Genisco Technology Corp., 960 F.2d 849, 852-53 (9th Cir.1992) (if service by mail under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) fails, further attempts at service under Rule 4 are required before default may be entered). 13 St. Amand next contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Smith, Campbell, and Roberson. The court granted summary judgment because there was no evidence that any of them proximately caused St. Amand to be denied his right of access to the courts. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Nishimoto, 903 F.2d at 712. 14 St. Amand correctly contends that if his right of access to the courts was denied, then the officers are subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Vigliotto v. Terry, 873 F.2d 1201, 1202-03 (9th Cir.1989). However, [t]he temporary deprivation of an inmate's legal materials does not, in all cases, rise to a constitutional deprivation. Id. 15 The evidence presented by St. Amand does not show that Smith, Campbell, or Roberson participated in the eventual destruction of the documents. The defendants only refused to allow St. Amand to carry his legal files with him while he was extradited to Los Angeles. St. Amand received a receipt for his legal materials and could have obtained them had he paid for the postage. The defendants had nothing to do with the postage requirement or the destruction of the documents. Thus, even if the destruction of the records or the postage requirement could be considered constitutional violations, neither Smith, Campbell, nor Roberson proximately caused either occurrence. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1980); Vigliotto, 873 F.2d at 1203 (plaintiff's failure to recover materials taken from his cell was not the fault of the defendants). 16 The defendants were not responsible for the postage fee requirement nor for the ultimate destruction of the documents. Nor was it foreseeable to the defendants that the files would be destroyed. At most, these defendants were responsible for a temporary removal of St. Amand's box of legal materials from his possession and for putting them into storage. This does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation of St. Amand's right of access to the courts by these defendants. The district court properly granted summary judgment. 17 AFFIRMED.