Opinion ID: 2237187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Edison

Text: As a preliminary matter, we note that the construction and operation of a nuclear-generating facility proceeds along two distinct but concurrent schedules of events: (1) the construction schedule for the physical plant, and (2) the licensing schedule involving the utility's application for an operating license from the NRC. On appeal, Edison does not challenge the Commission's findings of unreasonable delay in Byron I's construction schedule. Edison does, however, contest the Commission's determinations regarding the licensing schedule. Edison takes issue with the Commission finding of a total of 15.9 months of unreasonable delay and the Commission's July 7, 1983, mitigated fuel-load date. Edison asserts that the Commission found that its conduct during the licensing litigation before the NRC was reasonable. Edison reasons that, therefore, any delay which resulted during the licensing litigation was reasonable. Edison argues that the reasonable delay in the licensing schedule masks any simultaneous, unreasonable delay in Byron I's construction schedule. Therefore, Edison argues that due to the reasonable delay resulting from the licensing litigation, the earliest date on which it could have loaded fuel at Byron I would have been April 1984 rather than the mitigated fuel-load date of July 7, 1983. The Commission contends that its determination concerning Edison's conduct before the Licensing Board was based on the facts as they existed when Edison was already embroiled in the contested proceedings. It argues, however, that, had Edison originally responded to NRC notices of deficiency differently, the subsequent licensing events would have occurred differently or may not have occurred at all. In January 1984, for the first time in its history, the Licensing Board denied Edison an operating license for Byron I. This license denial resulted in 9.6 months of litigation before the Licensing and Appeal Boards of the NRC's licensing branch. The Commission found that the entire 9.6 months of licensing delay which ensued after January 1984 was unreasonable. Implicit in the Commission's mitigated fuelload date, however, is the agency's determination that Edison should have received an NRC operating license for Byron I before July 7, 1983. Under Federal law, a utility must provide reasonable assurances of safety before it may receive an operating license. In order to provide reasonable assurances of safety, NRC regulations require the owner of a nuclear power facility to establish and carry out an effective quality assurance and quality control (QA/QC) program. (10 C.F.R. § 50, appendix B, criterion I (1991).) Although the owner may delegate the QA/QC function to others, compliance with each NRC requirement remains the owner's responsibility. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1984), 19 NRC 1163, 1170. The litigation surrounding the licensing for Byron I began before 1980 and concerned unresolved safety problems and quality assurance and control issues thought pertinent to the Byron facility. ( Commonwealth Edison Co. (1982), 15 NRC 1400, 1419.) Quality assurance and control problems plagued Edison throughout the construction of Byron I. The Licensing Board found that Edison had: freely availed itself of its prerogative to delegate, but failed in its responsibility to assure that its contractors carried out their delegated quality assurance tasks. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1984), 19 NRC 36, 43. As early as 1977, NRC Region III inspectors issued a notice of violation to Edison and informed Edison of deficiencies in its QA/QC program. ( Commonwealth Edison Co. (1984), 19 NRC 1163, 1171.) In a March 1980 Region III inspection, NRC inspectors found: [I]n spite of the three-year history of deficiencies in the SCC [Systems Control Corporation] QA Program and in equipment fabricated by SCC, Byron Station Construction Department personnel waived, without QA concurrence, final inspection of twenty safety-related local instrument panels at the SCC plant   . The    panels were then receipt inspected at the Byron Site by [Edison's] Station Construction Department, with no significant deficiencies noted, placed in the Unit I containment, and were later found, on reinspection in place, to require extensive repairs. (Emphasis added.) Commonwealth Edison Co., 19 NRC at 133. In the spring of 1982, Region III conducted a construction assessment team inspection to assess the QA/QC program at Byron I. It found, inter alia: Based on a review of training qualification and certification records of a minimum of ten percent of the QA/QC personnel working for contractors performing safety-related work it is apparent that an effective program does not exist to ensure that a suitable evaluation of initial capabilities is performed, that written certification is provided in an appropriate form, and that qualification criteria is [ sic ] established. Certain contractor QA/QC supervisors and inspectors were not adequately qualified and/or trained to perform safety-related inspection functions. ( Commonwealth Edison Co., 19 NRC at 1171.) The special team found that the QA/QC problems involved several Byron I contractors performing safety-related work, including Hatfield, Reliable Sheet Metal, Hunter Corporation, Blount Brothers and others. It found that there was wide variation in QA/QC inspector certification and training by Byron's contractors and that many inspectors failed to meet Federal qualification criteria. The construction assessment team attributed the variations to Edison's failure to establish a formalized program for contractors to follow. Commonwealth Edison Co., 19 NRC at 196. In addition, the construction assessment team found that serious problems existed with respect to nonconforming documentation control and the tracking of nonconforming conditions discovered during inspections. The failure of some of Edison's contractors to maintain a reliable system of nonconforming documentation control was first observed by Region III as early as 1978. Commonwealth Edison Co., 19 NRC at 200. Following the construction assessment team inspection, Region III determined that, in order to provide reasonable assurance of the safety of Byron I, Edison had to conduct a reinspection of safety-related work and an inspector recertification program. The reinspection program was a very extensive and comprehensive program that look[ed] at almost all of the work that ha[d] been completed at [the] plant that is safety-related. (Emphasis added.) ( Commonwealth Edison Co., 19 NRC at 206.) Although the construction assessment team report was issued in June 1982, Edison did not propose an acceptable reinspection program until February 1983. In August 1983, Region III staff met with Edison over its concern that Edison was not maintaining a rigorous and dedicated control over the reinspection effort. Commonwealth Edison Co., 19 NRC at 201. Simultaneous to the inspection and reinspection activity at the Byron I facility, ongoing licensing litigation before the NRC Licensing Board transpired. In 1978, Edison applied for an operating license. Several parties intervened, raising, inter alia, the QA/QC issues. In June 1982, due to discovery sanctions, the Appeal Board limited the issues the intervenors could raise to those that the Licensing Board concludes it can comfortably decide on the merits without unjustifiably delaying operation of the Byron facility. (Emphasis added.) ( Commonwealth Edison Co. (1982), 15 NRC 1400, 1420.) The Appeal Board stated: It is our understanding that [Edison] expects the facility to be ready for fuel loading towards the end of 1983. To the extent that the [intervenors have] serious contentions to raise that cannot be litigated within this anticipated time frame, we repeat    [citation]: `As to those aspects of reactor operation not considered in an adjudicatory proceeding (if one is conducted), it is the staff's duty to insure the existence of an adequate basis for each of the requisite Section 50.57 determinations.'  (Emphasis added.) ( Commonwealth Edison Co., 15 NRC at 1420 n. 36.) The Appeal Board further stated: The choice of which contentions the [intervenors] may still litigate is for the [intervenors] to decide in the first instance, subject to the time constraint we have identified. In other words, the [intervenors are] to rank [their] contentions individually for the Licensing Board and the Board will then limit them based upon its understanding of the time needed to litigate those issues. (We would not be surprised if fewer than ten contentions can be timely heard   ). (Emphasis added.) Commonwealth Edison Co., 15 NRC at 1420 n. 37. The Appeal Board noted that its decision was in conformity with the NRC's policy statement, which provides, in part: If [licensing] proceedings are not concluded prior to the completion of construction, the cost of such delay could reach billions of dollars. The Commission will seek to avoid or reduce such delays whenever measures are available that do not compromise the Commission's fundamental commitment to a fair and thorough hearing process. ( Statement on Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings (1981), 13 NRC 452, 452-53.) The Appeal Board released its decision in June 1982, the same month as the construction assessment team inspection report and Region Ill's determination that Edison would be required to conduct reinspection and recertification programs before a license would issue for Byron I. During December 1982 and January 1983, pursuant to the Appeal Board's decision, the Licensing Board determined that the intervenors could litigate, inter alia, the QA/QC issues. In February 1983, Edison submitted an acceptable reinspection program. From March to May 1983, the Licensing Board conducted hearings and the QA/QC issues were litigated. In May 1983, the hearings ended and the record was closed. Since Edison had submitted its reinspection proposal to NRC staff only one month before the hearings began, no preliminary results were available to the Licensing Board when it was deciding what issues could be litigated or when it conducted the initial hearing. Moreover, it appears from the record that, at this time, the Licensing Board was not even aware of the reinspection program. Commonwealth Edison Co., 19 NRC at 208. In June 1983, the Licensing Board granted the intervenors' motion to reopen the record to take additional evidence with regard to certain aspects of the quality assurance issue and directed the parties `to present a full evidentiary showing and explanation of the pertinent investigations of Hatfield Electric's quality assurance program and the subsequent reinspections.' ( Commonwealth Edison Co. (July 1,1983), Nos. STN 50-454 OL, STN 50-455 OL, at 1.) At the reopened hearings, the Licensing Board was troubled and puzzled at the very low information content in the testimony of Edison's witnesses ( Commonwealth Edison Co., 19 NRC at 204), and expressed its concern    that [Edison] has done nothing of any significance to address the issue and has imparted a general sense of disinterest to the Board. ( Commonwealth Edison Co., 19 NRC at 206.) The Licensing Board concluded that Edison's evidentiary response to the issue in the reopened hearing has been weak and borders default. Commonwealth Edison Co., 19 NRC at 206. It was not until October 1983 that Edison first submitted the preliminary results of its reinspection program. Of great significance, these results indicated that the reinspection program did not identify any nonconformance in Hatfield's work that had safety significance. On January 13, 1984, over nine months from the date the reinspection program began, Edison submitted the final results on the eve of the release of the Licensing Board's decision. On January 14, 1984, the Licensing Board denied Edison's application for Byron I, stating: The Board withholds authorization for an operating license for the Byron Nuclear Station because of inadequacies in [Edison's] quality assurance program. ( Commonwealth Edison Co., 19 NRC at 278.) The Licensing Board came to its decision to deny Edison's operating license for Byron I without the benefit of the final results of the reinspection program. In January 1984, Edison appealed the decision to the Appeal Board. In April 1984, the Appeal Board remanded the cause to the Licensing Board for further proceedings. From May 1984 to November 1984, the Licensing Board conducted further proceedings, including litigation of the reinspection program results. In November 1984, the Licensing Board granted Edison a Byron I operating license. With respect to the licensing issue, the Commission found that Edison unreasonably delayed the submission of an acceptable reinspection program by six months. The agency determined that the reinspection program should have been submitted by August 1982, that the preliminary results should have been submitted by January 1983, and the final results should have been submitted in July 1983. It therefore found Edison responsible for the entire 9.6 months of litigation and delay which followed the Licensing Board's initial denial of an operating license in January 1984. Additionally, based on the Commission's mitigated construction schedule, the Commission determined that Edison should have been licensed and ready to load fuel on the July 7, 1983, mitigated fuel-load date. Therefore, the Commission found, in essence, that Edison was responsible for 15.9 months of unreasonable delay. Edison counters that a July 7, 1983, fuelload date was impossible because, from June to August 1983, the Licensing Board was conducting the reopened hearings and because the final results of the reinspection program also would have been litigated before the Licensing Board. Edison asserts that, given these two periods of litigation, the soonest it could have loaded fuel is April 1984. To support its argument, Edison points to: (1) the Licensing and Appeal Boards' refusal to delegate the QA/QC issue to the Commission staff for informal resolution and (2) the Commission findings that, with the exception of the six-month unreasonable delay in submitting the reinspection program, Edison's conduct during the licensing proceedings and the reinspection was reasonable. Therefore, Edison argues, the licensing litigation was a reasonable cause of delay which would mask any unreasonable delay in the construction schedule. The intervenors and the Commission focus on Edison's unreasonable six-month delay in submitting the reinspection program and the consequences which flowed from this initial delay. They assert that, had Edison begun the reinspection program in August 1982, all the licensing events that followed would have been different. Essentially, these parties argue that Edison is responsible for the consequences which flowed from Edison's initial, unreasonably slow response in submitting the reinspection program to the NRC. Upon review, it must be borne in mind that the Commission's findings of fact, i.e., that the operation of Byron I was unreasonably delayed by 15.9 months, are prima facie correct and are entitled to great deference. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 1112/3, par. 10-201(d).) We rely on the Commission's technical expertise in this area. A reviewing court will affirm the Commission's findings of fact if these findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 1112/3, par. 10-201(e)(iv)(A).) The burden in this case is on Edison to: (1) put forth evidence and (2) persuade the trier of fact. The Commission, by law, must disallow costs that Edison fails to prove reasonable. (Ill. Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 1112/3, par. 9-213; Hartigan I, 117 Ill.2d at 134, 109 Ill.Dec. 797, 510 N.E.2d 865.) As the appellate court properly stated: The Commission is qualified through experience and special study to evaluate the workings of the nuclear regulatory process. We must rely on the Commission's expertise in this regard. The Commission has determined that the licensing procedure would have proceeded differently had Edison made a timely response to the NRC.    [T]he Commission has made a fair inference, based on the record, and supported with a reasoned analysis. (Emphasis added.) Hartigan II, 202 Ill.App.3d at 943, 149 Ill.Dec. 341, 561 N.E.2d 711. Having undertaken an exhaustive review of the record, we find substantial evidence therein to support the Commission's finding that Byron I should have been ready and licensed to load fuel by July 7, 1983. The record supports the reasonable inference that, had Edison submitted its reinspection program six months earlier than it did, the licensing litigation schedule would have been vastly different. In light of the Appeal Board's language in its June 1982 decision and the NRC's policy statement, it is a reasonable inference from the evidence that the Licensing Board would have delegated the QA/QC issue to the Commission staff had Edison submitted its reinspection program in August 1982 and the preliminary results in January 1983. The Licensing and Appeal Boards' refusal to delegate this issue came only after the issue was extensively litigated in both the initial and the reopened hearings. The Licensing Board included the QA/QC issue in the licensing litigation before Edison even formulated an acceptable reinspection proposal. Moreover, at the initial hearings conducted from March to May 1983, Edison had only begun reinspecting when it otherwise should have had the preliminary results available as evidence for the Licensing Board to consider. The record also substantially supports the Commission's inference that, had Edison begun the reinspection program earlier and submitted the preliminary results in January 1983, the Licensing Board would not have reopened the record in June 1983. In its reopening order, the Licensing Board expressly stated that it was reopening the record to gather evidence related to QA/QC problems with Hatfield and the reinspection program. It is obvious that, since the preliminary results showed no safety-related problems concerning Hatfield's work, there would have been no reason to reopen the record if these results had been available to the Licensing Board. Moreover, taking into account the 2.1 months of unreasonable delay in the second milestone, even the final reinspection results, which confirmed the preliminary results, should have been available at the time of the motion to reopen. In addition, there also is ample evidence in the record to support the Commission inference that, had the reinspection program begun earlier, it would have been completed in less time than the actual reinspection program because it would not have interfered with hot functional testing. Therefore, the Commission's inference that the Licensing Board would not have reopened the record is substantially supported. Furthermore, in light of the NRC's policy statement, it is apparent that, had the final results been submitted by May 1983 (rather than by July 1983, a delay of 2.1 months), any litigation or informal resolution concerning these results would have been expedited if Byron I was ready, constructionwise, to load fuel by July 7, 1983. Finally, we note that Edison was on notice from Region III that there were significant QA/QC problems with its Byron contractors as early as 1978. Edison is responsible for QA/QC and it knew it had to provide reasonable assurance of Byron I's safety. If Edison had dealt with the QA/QC issue in a responsible manner, we have no doubt that much of the licensing litigation that transpired could have been avoided. We conclude that the Commission's finding of a July 7, 1983, mitigated fuel-load date is supported by substantial evidence in the record and we affirm the appellate court on this issue. We find that the licensing litigation, to a large extent, resulted from Edison's unreasonable six-month delay in initiating the reinspection program. Absent Edison's tardy response to Region Ill's construction assessment team report, in the very least, the reopened hearings would not have been necessary and the Licensing Board's January 1984 license denial would not have occurred. Edison failed to meet its burden to persuade the Commission that, due to reasonable causes, it could not have loaded fuel in July 1983. In affirming the appellate court on this issue, we reject Edison's argument that the licensing litigation, which the Commission found to be reasonable, masked any unreasonable construction schedule delays. The finding that Edison's conduct during the licensing proceedings and the reinspection program was reasonable is a finding that the Commission made in light of the actual circumstances as the events unfolded. This finding is entirely different from the Commission's determination that Byron I should have been licensed and ready to load fuel by July 7, 1983 absent the unreasonable delays which occurred. Edison is responsible for consequences which flow from its unreasonable actions or inaction. In the instant case, as a result of its unreasonable delay in beginning its reinspection program, Edison is responsible for the delay in Byron I operation which occurred beyond July 7, 1983.