Opinion ID: 1476693
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Witness Contact

Text: Williams next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to prohibit contact between the government and H.T. over the course of her testimony. As the Supreme Court has noted: It is a common practice for a judge to instruct a witness not to discuss his or her testimony with third parties until the trial is completed. Such nondiscussion orders are a corollary of the broader rule that witnesses may be sequestered to lessen the danger that their testimony will be influenced by hearing what other witnesses have to say, and to increase the likelihood that they will confine themselves to truthful statements based on their own recollections. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 281-82, 109 S.Ct. 594, 102 L.Ed.2d 624 (1989) (footnotes and citations omitted). Such matters are left to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Johnson v. District of Columbia, 655 A.2d 316, 317 (D.C.1995); Garmon v. United States, 684 A.2d 327, 328 (D.C.1996). Williams requested that the government be admonished from speaking to H.T. during the first recess of H.T.'s first day of testimony. The court responded that the warning was not necessary. At the end of that day, upon learning that H.T. would stay at the CAC overnight, Williams requested that the prosecutor should not have any contact with her during that time to prepare her for additional testimony. The prosecutor responded that she did not mean to talk to H.T. about the substance of her testimony, but rather to ensure that she would come on time, and that Ms. Staunch could talk to H.T. and try and determine whether or not she would in fact be able to testify. At the end of proceedings the following day, Williams again asked that the government be directed to tell anyone who would have contact with H.T. over the weekend not to discuss her testimony. The trial judge responded: I think it's obviously inappropriate to discuss the testimony directly.... I don't think I'm going to be more formal than that.... [The prosecutor] may want to make sure that others around don'tthat they're alert to the need to remain professional and not[] get frustrated and caught up in the frustration of the circumstances[] and step over any professional lines. We find ample evidence of the trial court's prudence in this statement, and the prosecutor responded that she was willing to comply with the court's terms. To the extent that Williams sought to separate H.T. from Ms. Staunch, we cannot say that the trial court was required to provide a more stringent prohibition than it did. The trial court was fully justified in not separating a five year old child from the CAC counselor who was treating her. In an attempt to show the prejudicial impact upon him resulting from the trial court's failure to make a more formal warning, Williams notes that Ms. Staunch subsequently testified that I asked her if it was difficult to talk about what had happened in front of him, and she said yes. Then I said `Would it be easier if he weren't there?' and she said yes. This interaction appears geared toward Ms. Staunch's counseling of H.T., and not designed to shape her testimony. Ms. Staunch's testimony was elicited while the court evaluated whether to proceed with the Hicks-Bey testimony and does not appear to have had an effect on H.T.'s testimony anywayparticularly in recognition of the fact that, despite continuing to work with Ms. Staunch, H.T. was not able to testify at any great detail even outside of Williams's presence until impeached with the CAC videotape.