Opinion ID: 695159
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: An Agreement To the Contrary?

Text: 39 As noted above, once it is determined that a work is made for hire, the hiring party is presumed to be the author of the work, although this presumption can be overcome by evidence of an agreement to the contrary. The district court found evidence of such a contrary agreement. 831 F.Supp. at 312. 3 40 The court reasoned that if Playboy and Nagel had intended a work-for-hire relationship, Playboy would have confirmed that relationship in the check legends. Instead, it found, Playboy chose to ratify the relationship with the language of Legend A, which indicates a general transfer of rights to Playboy. Id. Such an assignment of rights to Playboy, the court reasoned, would not make sense if the parties presumed that Playboy would be the author of the work for statutory purposes, because if Playboy were the author, Nagel would hold no rights to the paintings and, thus, would have nothing to transfer to Playboy in Legend A. Id. 41 The court supported its conclusion with a reference to industry custom. See May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assocs., 618 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir.1980) (industry custom may be used to prove parties' intent that works not be made for hire). The court found that from 1974 until January 1, 1978, the effective date of the 1976 Act, the custom in the magazine industry was that absent explicit language to the contrary, a contributor transferred only one time reproduction rights in the work sold for publication. Playboy, 831 F.Supp. at 312. The court found that Legend A, which acknowledges an assignment to Playboy Enterprises, Inc. of all right, title and interest in and to the paintings, combined with the custom in the industry showed that the parties intended Nagel to remain the author of the works. Id. 42 Playboy challenges this finding. It argues that Legend A is not inconsistent with a work-for-hire agreement, which would make Playboy the author of the work for statutory purposes, because the 1909 Act only governed works after they were published. Before publication, all works were governed by common law copyright. The checks containing the Legend A transfer agreement were issued pre-publication, and Playboy argues that [t]o protect Playboy's rights in the illustrations during this period, an assignment of the common law rights was necessary, and Legend Agreement A accomplished just that. Appellants' Brief at 32. 43 As we discuss more fully in Section III, we find it impossible to discern the intent of the parties from the language of Legend A. The legend acknowledges an assignment of rights, but it does not specifically mention copyright--let alone common law copyright. It could intend the transfer of a one-time use right, as the district court found, or of common law copyright, as Playboy argues, or of all rights--including both copyright and possessory rights. As Legend A is not clear, and as Playboy's explanation for the agreement is at least plausible, we are not convinced that the legend either proves or disproves that the parties intended something other than a work-for-hire relationship. 44 Further, we are not convinced by the district court's recourse to industry custom. The district court used evidence of custom to conclude that the parties intended that Nagel transfer only one-time reproduction rights to Playboy, and that he retain authorship and copyright in the paintings. The court, however, did not consider the impact of the fact, stipulated by the parties, that it was the regular and consistent policy and practice of Playboy at all relevant times in this action to seek to acquire from all freelance writers, artists and photographers who contribute to Playboy magazine all rights, including copyrights, in and to their contributions. Joint Pre-Trial Order, Stipulated Facts, p 23. This practice is, of course, not conclusive of the intent of these particular parties because it sheds no light on Nagel's intent, but it clearly undercuts the import of the industry custom cited. 45 Given the controverted evidence of a contrary agreement between Playboy and Nagel, we conclude that it was clearly erroneous for the district court to find that Dumas met her burden of proving that the parties intended a relationship other than work for hire. Hence, by presumption, Playboy is the author of the works created before January 1, 1978 that were made for hire.