Opinion ID: 1684614
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: reliability of the remark

Text: I next address the problem of exposing the jury to the remark before it was presented to the trial judge for a determination of its reliability; i.e., whether these prior crimes occurred. In a Williams -rule analysis, the burden of proof that the defendant committed the collateral crimes would be by clear and convincing evidence. See State v. Norris, 168 So.2d 541, 543 (Fla.1964); Acevedo v. State, 787 So.2d 127, 129 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). The majority does not reach this question because it does not construe the remark as collateral-crime evidence. However, I believe that whenever a statement implicates the defendant in uncharged crimes, it should be analyzed under precedent regarding collateral crimes. In this case, there is a real danger that the statement either was never made or was untrue. This danger illustrates why remarks that involve collateral crimes uttered without prior screening by the trial judge should be closely monitored by both the trial court and the reviewing court. In deposition, Butterfield denied that anyone said anything after Smith got back in the car. Brittingham testified in deposition that Smith made a similar statement not immediately after the shooting but later, after returning to the residence of Smith and Pearce. Brittingham did not repeat the statement from his deposition at trial. As to the substance of the statement attributed to Smith by Brittingham at trial, no other evidence in the record even suggests that Smith previously shot anyone. Most telling is the fact that that the State did not offer one iota of evidence during the penalty phase, when it would have been admissible, that Smith committed the other crimes.