Opinion ID: 3190739
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Analysis of Fourth Bryant Prong

Text: The parties agree that Brown has demonstrated that, in light of the timing of his conviction and § 2255 motion, and the retroactively-applicable circuit-busting precedent established in Begay, he can meet the first three prongs of the Bryant test. The parties also agree that Brown’s 188-month sentence on Count 3 exceeds the 120-month statutory maximum in § 924(a). The dispositive question here is whether, in order to satisfy the fourth prong of Bryant, Brown must show further that his illegal sentence on Count 3 is above what Congress has authorized on every one of his concurrent counts of conviction. In other words, we must decide whether Brown has to show that his aggregate 188month detention for Counts 1, 2, and 3 is illegal. Like the district court ruled and as the government argues, we conclude that Brown must show that his overall detention is illegal, which Brown has failed to do. Brown cannot “open a portal” to the § 2255(e) savings clause by attacking the legality of just one of his concurrent sentences. The § 2255(e) savings clause specifies that a prisoner may file a § 2241 petition when his § 2255 motion was “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (emphasis added). When a prisoner has only one conviction and sentence, his detention is legal as long as his sentence is legal. However, if a prisoner is serving multiple sentences, his detention may be 12 Case: 15-11335 Date Filed: 04/01/2016 Page: 13 of 15 legal even if one of his sentences is not. Therefore, a prisoner cannot show that his first § 2255 motion was inadequate or ineffective to test his “detention” unless his total sentence now exceeds the statutory maximum for each crime of conviction. This is the showing required for the fourth Bryant prong. Dictum in Bryant also supports this interpretation of “detention.” This Court explained in Bryant that a petitioner can access the savings clause when he “is being detained without authorization by any statute.” Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1283. In essence, the Bryant Court was stating what we just concluded: a detention is legal (authorized by statute) so long as its length is within the statutory maximum for one of the counts of conviction. So long as “any statute” supports the detention, it remains legal, and the petitioner cannot rely on the savings clause for relief. See id. Importantly, our conclusion today is in line with all of our current case law on the savings clause, which makes clear that § 2255(e), at best, “contains a very narrow exception to [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s] prohibition on successive collateral relief.” Id. (emphasis added). We have stated in the sentencing-error context that this exception applies only to “fundamental defect[s].” See id. at 1281; Williams, 713 F.3d at 1343; Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1319 n.20; Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1244-45 (11th Cir. 1999). Put 13 Case: 15-11335 Date Filed: 04/01/2016 Page: 14 of 15 simply, there is no fundamental defect when a prisoner is not serving more time, in total, than authorized by law. 4 Applying this principle to Brown, we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain his § 2241 petition. While Brown’s 188-month ACCA sentence was illegal, his 188-month detention was authorized by the statutory maxima for his drug crimes—life for possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute, and 20 years for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(C) (2003). As Brown’s erroneous ACCA sentence is not causing him to remain in prison longer than authorized by any of his statutes of conviction, he has failed to satisfy the fourth Bryant prong and “open a portal” to the savings clause.5