Opinion ID: 2274267
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Heading: Comparative fault applies to CWF's professional negligence claim

Text: Prior to Gustafson, Missouri followed the contributory negligence rule. Under the contributory negligence rule, a plaintiff could not recover damages if the plaintiff's own negligence directly contributed in any way to the injuries sustained. Gramex Corp. v. Green Supply, Inc., 89 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Mo. banc 2002), citing Moore v. Kansas City & I. Rapid-Transit Ry., 126 Mo. 265, 29 S.W. 9, 12 (1894). Therefore, even if the defendant's conduct was the primary cause of the plaintiff's injury, the defendant could escape all liability under the contributory negligence rule. The contributory negligence rule proved unsatisfactory as courts came to recognize that negligence actions are premised on the culpability of the parties. Id. In other words, negligence actions, which are based on the breach of a legal duty of care, fundamentally are premised on the concept of fault. See, e.g., Bell v. Poplar Bluff Physicians Group, Inc., 879 S.W.2d 618, 623 (Mo.App.1994) (malpractice, negligence, error, and mistake all connote some type of fault, whether or not intentional). The all-or-nothing allocation of fault under contributory negligence ignored the fact that the parties to a negligence action generally are held to some standard of care and that, in some cases, the injury at issue was caused by a breach of the standard of care by both parties. Therefore, the contributory negligence rule operated to irrationally impose total responsibility upon one party for the consequences of the conduct of both parties. Earll v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 714 S.W.2d 932, 936 (Mo.App.1986). To ameliorate the shortcomings of the contributory negligence rule, Gustafson adopted a comprehensive system of comparative fault in which the jury decides the relative fault of the parties and assesses damages accordingly. Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Mo. banc 1996). Gustafson held that [i]nsofar as possible this and future cases shall apply the doctrine of pure comparative fault in accordance with the Uniform Comparative Fault Act §§ 1-6, 12 U.L.A. Supp. 35-45 (1983). 661 S.W.2d at 15. Although Gustafson did not enact the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCFA) as substantive law, Lippard v. Houdaille Industries, 715 S.W.2d 491, 492-493 (Mo. banc 1986), Gustafson and subsequent cases have established that the UCFA informs the application of comparative fault in Missouri. The UCFA provides that [i]n an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or death to person or harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but does not bar recovery. UCFA Section 1(a), 12 U.L.A. Master Ed. 125 (2008). The UCFA further provides that comparative fault is not recommended to extend to: [M]atters like economic loss resulting from a tort such as negligent misrepresentation, or interference with contractual relations or egregious falsehood, or harm to reputation resulting from defamation. But failure to include these harms specifically in the Act is not intended to preclude application of the general principle to them if a Court determines that the common law of the state would make the application. UCFA Section 1 Cmt., 12 U.L.A. Master Ed. 125 (2008). This case involves a negligence action involving economic loss from professional malpractice. The UCFA comment does not provide a rationale for limiting comparative fault to cases involving personal injury and expressly leaves open the possibility that comparative fault can apply to economic loss cases if consistent with state common law. If the comparative fault rule set forth in the UCFA and adopted in Gustafson was theoretically incompatible with economic loss cases, the UCFA would not have left open the possibility of applying comparative fault in economic loss cases. A more plausible interpretation of the comment is that it accounts for the fact that many states, including Missouri, traditionally have restricted the availability of tort damages in cases alleging only economic loss. [2] The UCFA addresses the application of comparative fault, not the kind of damage or injury that may be pleaded in a tort action. A recommendation to extend comparative fault to economic loss cases would have exceeded the intended scope of the UCFA by effectively recommending that states not only adopt comparative fault but also enlarge the scope of damages recoverable in a tort action. The adoption of comparative fault in economic loss cases is not necessarily inconsistent with the UCFA. The Missouri cases subsequent to Gustafson, although inconsistent in the application of comparative fault in economic loss cases, largely have concluded that Gustafson's abrogation of contributory negligence does not extend to economic loss negligence cases. [3] Nonetheless, this Court has not addressed directly the issue and now holds that the comparative fault rule established in Gustafson applies to claims of economic loss caused by professional negligence. There is no compelling reason to limit the application of comparative fault based on the nature of the injury. The defining feature of negligence actions is not the nature of the damages but the negligent breach of a legal duty of care that results in injury or loss to the plaintiff. Negligence actions are fault-driven, whether the plaintiff suffers a broken leg in a car accident or the loss of money due to professional negligence. There is nothing inherent in the nature of the type of injury that warrants the application of comparative fault in the former case and contributory fault in the latter case. Consistency dictates that comparative fault apply in both cases. Mayer Hoffman and CBIZ assert that because this case involves a contractual relationship, it is inappropriate to apply comparative fault because the parties can allocate the risk of loss in the contract. This objection does not withstand scrutiny. First, the same objection could be made to the application of contributory fault. It is not necessarily the case that the application of contributory fault will be consistent with any agreement the parties may have had with respect to the allocation of risks and duties. Only in a very one-sided contract would the parties agree the client is barred from all recovery due to the slightest degree of negligence by the client. Second, and more importantly, CWF's cause of action is not premised on the contract. It is premised on the professional duty recognized by law that arises from the relationship created by the accountant-client relationship. See, e.g., Business Men's Assurance Co. of America v. Graham, 891 S.W.2d 438, 453 (Mo.App.1994) (tort recovery permitted when a client sues for breach of a duty recognized by law as arising from the relationship or status the parties have created by their agreement). Comparative fault should apply in this professional negligence case for the same reasons that it applies in a negligence action involving personal injury. Finally, the prevailing view is that comparative negligence applies in negligence actions involving only economic loss. Shields v. Cape Fox Corp., 42 P.3d 1083, 1090 (Alaska 2002). [4] Although the cases from other jurisdictions do not necessarily involve identical factual scenarios, the fact remains that each holds that the state's law of comparative fault generally should apply to negligence actions irrespective of the nature of the damages. Likewise, this Court concludes that principles of comparative fault that to date have been applied in negligence actions involving personal injury also should be applied in professional negligence actions that allege economic loss. Consequently, the trial court erred in submitting contributory negligence in Instruction No. 11.