Opinion ID: 1285302
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: quo warranto action

Text: The State argues the circuit judge erred in ruling it did not have standing to bring a quo warranto action challenging a municipality's annexation of property the State does not own. We agree. When located within an annexed area, the State as a property owner, an individual property owner, or a registered qualified elector has sufficient standing to challenge an annexation. A party may ask the court to declare his or her statutory or proprietary rights affected by the annexation in a declaratory judgment action. State by State Budget and Control Board, supra; Dalton v. Town Council of Mt. Pleasant, 241 S.C. 546, 129 S.E.2d 523 (1963); cases cited in footnote 1; 1 Antieau on Local Government Law § 3 .10[4] (2d ed.1999); 2A McQuillin Municipal Corporations § 7.43 (3d. ed.1996). The issue before us today is whether the State, when acting in the public interest, may bring a quo warranto action challenging the annexation of property it does not own. A quo warranto action is rooted in the common law writ designed to test whether a person exercising power is legally entitled to do so. It is an ancient prerogative right through which the state acts to protect itself and the good of the public generally, and may be used to test the legality of exercise of powers by municipal corporations. 74 C.J.S. Quo Warranto §§ 1-2 (1951); Black's Law Dictionary 1256-57 (1990). The attorney general may bring quo warranto actions in the name of the State. See S.C.Code Ann. §§ 15-63-10 to-210 (1976). We hold that the State, provided it is acting in the public interest, has standing to bring a quo warranto action challenging the annexation of property it does not own. See Central Realty Corp. v. Allison, 218 S.C. 435, 449, 63 S.E.2d 153, 159 (1951) (under appropriate circumstances, validity of municipal ordinances may be tested by certiorari, declaratory judgment proceedings, habeas corpus, injunction, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto); State v. City Council of Charleston, 8 S.C.L. (1 Mill Const.) 36 (1817) (concluding attorney general may bring quo warranto action against City of Charleston on behalf of the State); 1 Antieau on Local Government Law § 3.10[2] (validity of municipal annexation may be attacked by state, which usually does so by quo warranto action, absent statute providing otherwise); 17 McQuillin Municipal Corporations § 50.10 (3d ed.1993) (same); 65 Am.Jur.2d Quo Warranto § 48 (1972) (same); 74 C.J.S. Quo Warranto §§ 26-27 (attorney general usually may bring quo warranto action on behalf of state). In fact, some courts have reasoned that a quo warranto action brought by the state is a desirable or required method of challenging an annexation in order to avoid numerous individual suits. State ex rel. Earhart v. City of Bristol, 970 S.W.2d 948, 952 (Tenn.1998); Alexander Oil Co. v. City of Seguin, 825 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex.1991). We assume, without deciding, that the State was acting in the public interest in bringing the 1996 action to determine the validity of the unusual strip annexation. It is not necessary to decide that issue because we find the matter discussed below dispositive. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit judge's ruling that the State lacks standing to bring a quo warranto action.