Opinion ID: 874061
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Shelton's Claim for Legal Malpractice Abated upon Her Death

Text: The abatement rule holds that in the absence of a legislative enactment addressing the survivability of a claim, the common law rules govern. See I.C. § 73-116 (The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all cases not provided for in these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all courts of this state.); see also Evans v. Twin Falls Cnty., 118 Idaho 210, 215, 796 P.2d 87, 92 (1990). Under the common law, claims arising out of contracts generally survive the death of the claimant, while those sounding in pure tort abate. See Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 674-79, 34 P.2d 957, 960-61 (1934); Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 417-18, 184 P. 477, 477 (1919). The Idaho Legislature addressed whether negligence claims abate in amending I.C. § 5-327(2) to provide that negligence claims, including legal malpractice claims, do not abate on the death of the injured person. Because the Idaho Legislature failed to provide express language of retroactivity, I.C. § 5-327(2) is inapplicable to the present action, which arose prior to the statute's effective date. [1] See I.C. § 73-101 (asserting that [n]o part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so declared); see also Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 448, 915 P.2d 6, 10 (1996). Thus, this Court's ruling is dependent on whether Patricia Shelton's legal malpractice claim sounds in pure tort or arises out of contract under the common law. See I.C. § 73-116; Helgeson, 54 Idaho at 674-79, 34 P.2d at 960-61; Kloepfer, 32 Idaho at 417-18, 184 P. at 477. This Court previously held that legal malpractice actions sound in tort in the context of attorney's fees claims under I.C. § 12-120(3). See Rice v. Litster, 132 Idaho 897, 980 P.2d 561 (1999); see also Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 807 P.2d 633 (1991). In restricting attorney's fees claims to commercial transactions under I.C. § 12-120(3), this Court held that an action for legal malpractice is a tort action ... even though the underlying transaction which resulted in the malpractice was a `commercial transaction....' See Rice, 132 Idaho at 901, 980 P.2d at 565 (quoting Fuller, 119 Idaho at 425, 807 P.2d at 643). Although Rice and Fuller have since been overruled regarding their prohibition of I.C. § 12-120(3) attorney's fees claims in the context of legal malpractice actions, this Court recognized that they were not overruled on the characterization of legal malpractice actions as sounding in tort. See City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 664-65, 201 P.3d 629, 637-38 (2009) (holding that commercial transactions under § 12-120(3) are not limited to contract actions and may include legal malpractice tort actions even in the absence of an attorney-client contract); see also Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 256 P.3d 730 (2011) (holding that legal malpractice actions sound in tort, but I.C. § 12-120(3) only requires that there be a commercial transaction, which may be satisfied with the establishment of an attorney-client relationship). As this Court previously recognized, [l]egal malpractice actions are an amalgam of tort and contract theories. See Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 706, 652 P.2d 650, 654 (1982). The tort basis of legal malpractice actions flows from the elements of legal malpractice: (a) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (b) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (c) failure to perform the duty; and (d) the negligence of the lawyer must have been a proximate cause of the damage to the client.... Id. (quoting Sherry v. Diercks, 29 Wash.App. 433, 437, 628 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1981)). The scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is defined by the purposes for which the attorney is retained. Johnson, 103 Idaho at 704, 652 P.2d at 652; Fuller, 119 Idaho at 425, 807 P.2d at 643 (holding that the tort of legal malpractice is also a breach of the attorney-client relationship). Breach of an attorney's duty in negligence is a tort. See Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 136, 90 P.3d 884, 886 (2004); Johnson, 103 Idaho at 704, 706-07, 652 P.2d at 652, 654-55. The contract basis of legal malpractice actions is the failure to perform obligations directly specified in the written contract. See Johnson, 103 Idaho at 704, 706-07, 652 P.2d at 652, 654-55 (holding that a breach of contract claim would arise if the attorney did not do what he promised to do in the contract, e.g., failing to draw up a contract of sale). Thus, under the abatement rule, breach of duty is an action in tort, not contract; that is, unless an attorney foolhardily contracts with his client guaranteeing a specific outcome in the litigation or provides for a higher standard of care in the contract, he is held to the standard of care expected of an attorney. Breach of that duty is a tort. As further elaborated by Justice Jim Jones in his special concurrence, the contours of the duties owed by an attorney to his or her client are defined by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. If an attorney and client want to provide for a higher standard of care, they may do so by express language in the contract. Here, the standard of care in the contract is essentially the same as in any attorney-client relationship. Because this claim sounds in tort, it abated upon Patricia Shelton's death. Owens also asserts that the personal nature of the attorney-client relationship suggests that legal malpractice claims are not assignable and, therefore, abate under MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 75, 249 P. 254, 257 (1926). This Court need not specifically address this issue because Shelton's legal malpractice claim abated.