Opinion ID: 2996363
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rosario’s Apprendi Claim

Text: Rosario was convicted on Count 1 (conspiracy to violate the drug laws), Count 2 (use of minors to distribute narcotics), Count 3 (use of minors to avoid detection of drug law violations), and Count 20 (distribution of narcotics). Based on the court’s determination of the quantity of drugs for 32 Nos. 99-2299, 99-2505, 99-2514, 99-2570, 99-2598, 99-2763, 99-2983, 01-1690 which Rosario was responsible, the district court found that the applicable sentencing guideline range was 30 years (360 months) to life. Rosario was given a prison term of 30 years, which was arrived at by imposing 30-year sentences each for Counts 1, 2, and 3, and a 20-year sentence on Count 20—all sentences to run concurrently. As discussed above, since drug quantity was not determined by the jury, the applicable statutory maximum comes from 841(b)(1)(C), which for Rosario provides a maximum of 20 years. Facially this creates an Apprendi error, but ultimately we reject Rosario’s challenge for the following reasons. Rosario did not raise his Apprendi challenge below so we will overturn his sentence only if we find plain error. We have previously rejected arguments identical to Rosario’s. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 289 F.3d 1023, 1027 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Brough, 243 F.3d 1078, 1080-81 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Parolin, 239 F.3d 922, 929-30 (7th Cir. 2001). In each case our reasoning has been the same: while the sentence the defendant received exceeded the statutory maximum for one or more of the counts, it did not extend beyond the sentence that the trial court could have imposed if it had stacked the sentences of all the counts consecutively as it must in certain situations under the sentencing guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) (2002) (discussed below). Under such circumstances, when consecutive sentences provide an alternative means of achieving the same sentence without exceeding the maximum for any one count, Apprendi is not violated. Application of this principle to Rosario’s case will illustrate the point. As noted above, Rosario was convicted on four separate counts. The judge sentenced him to three 30-year sentences and one 20-year sentence, and Nos. 99-2299, 99-2505, 99-2514, 99-2570, 33 99-2598, 99-2763, 99-2983, 01-1690 the sentences were to run concurrently. Thus, the sentence fell within the guideline range of 30 years (360 months) to life, the applicable range based on the drug quantity involved as determined by the judge. The sen- tence of 30 years on some of the counts, however, violates Apprendi because the maximum penalty applicable to Rosario under the statute was 20 years. Our review for plain error, however, means we will reverse the sentence only if the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,” Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 (citation omitted)—that is, only if the error prejudiced Rosario by imposing on him a sentence greater than he would otherwise have received.13 See United States v. Angle, 254 F.3d 514, 518-19 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 13 The standard of review is at least one of the factors that makes this case distinguishable from language in Apprendi that arguably would require us to reach the opposite conclusion. In Apprendi, the State of New Jersey argued that Apprendi’s 12-year sentence, when there was a 10-year maximum, did not violate the due process clause because the State could have achieved the same result by stacking sentences from other counts. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, however, stating that “[t]he constitutional question . . . is whether the 12-year sentence imposed on count 18 was permissible, given that it was above the 10-year maximum . . . . The sentences on counts 3 and 22 have no . . . relevance to our disposition.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474. The important distinction to be made with our case, though, is that in Apprendi the State of New Jersey was arguing that there was no constitutional error in the sentence; whereas, we have already determined that there was error. In the case now before us, we are simply trying to determine if that error prejudiced Rosario, so as to require reversal under the plain error standard of review. See United States v. Angle, 254 F.3d 514, 519 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (distinguishing Apprendi on the same basis); United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 544-45 (6th Cir. 2000) (same). 34 Nos. 99-2299, 99-2505, 99-2514, 99-2570, 99-2598, 99-2763, 99-2983, 01-1690 Here there is no prejudice because Rosario could have received the same prison term through stacking the sentences in a way that avoided violation of Apprendi. In fact, sentencing guideline § 5G1.2(d) provides that where, as here, multiple counts of conviction are involved “the sentence imposed on one or more of the other counts shall run consecutively, but only to the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the total punishment.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) (emphasis added).14 The dis- 14 We noted in Knox that “the courts of appeals do not agree whether, in the wake of Apprendi, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) still compels a judge to use consecutive sentences when necessary to construct a term within the Guideline range . . . [but] every court of appeals believes that consecutive sentences are lawful if the district judge chooses to impose them.” 287 F.3d at 669 (citations omitted). The language of § 5G1.2(d) is cast in terms of the mandatory rather than the discretionary and the majority of circuits that have decided the issue have found that § 5G1.2(d) is mandatory. See United States v. Outen, 286 F.3d 622, 640 n.19 (2d Cir. 2002) (“We have held that the application of § 5G1.2 is largely mandatory.”); United States v. Diaz, 296 F.3d 680, 684 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“§ 5G1.2 mandates consecutive sentences in those cases in which the total punishment exceeds the statutory maximum for any one count.”); United States v. Buckland, 289 F.3d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“[I]f the Guidelines calculation exceeds the statutory maximum for any count in a case involving multiple counts, then the mandatory provisions of § 5G1.2(d) come into play regarding the question of consecutive sentences.”); United States v. Angle, 254 F.3d 514, 518 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“[T]he district court must impose consecutive terms of imprisonment to the extent necessary to achieve the total punishment.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Price, 265 F.3d 1097, 1109 (10th Cir. 2001) (“This court agrees with those circuits which have concluded that § 5G1.2(d) is a mandatory provision.”). But see United States v. (continued...) Nos. 99-2299, 99-2505, 99-2514, 99-2570, 35 99-2598, 99-2763, 99-2983, 01-1690 trict judge in this case found that the specified guideline range applicable to Rosario was 30 years to life. In order to comply with § 5G1.2(d), the district court would have to reach the same 30-year prison term by sentencing Rosario to 20 years on one or more of the counts with a consecutive 10-year sentence on one or more of the other counts. Therefore, we find that the district court’s error did not seriously affect the fairness of the proceeding. See Martinez, 289 F.3d at 1027. Several other circuits have considered the same argument that Rosario makes today and have held, as we have, that there is no prejudice, and therefore no need to remand, when the application of consecutive sentences under § 5G1.2(d) would result in the same sentence that the defendant already received.15 14 (...continued) Velasquez, 304 F.3d 237, 242-43 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 3584 gives district courts discretion to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences); United States v. Vasquez-Zamora, 253 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court had discretion under 5G1.2(d) to impose a consecutive or concurrent sentence). 15 See, e.g., Outen, 286 F.3d at 640 (“[W]here a defendant is convicted on multiple counts, any error in exceeding the statutory maximum on a single count is harmless if the application of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2 would require the sentence on one or more of the remaining counts to run consecutively so that defendant’s total term of imprisonment remains unchanged.”); Diaz, 296 F.3d at 684 (“Because § 5G1.2(d) mandates consecutive sentences in those cases in which the total punishment exceeds the statutory maximum for any one count and the district court’s calculation of total punishment is not affected by an Apprendi error, remand to allow the district court to consider whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences would be an idle act.”); Buckland, 289 F.3d at 572 (“[E]ven if [the defendant] had been (continued...) 36 Nos. 99-2299, 99-2505, 99-2514, 99-2570, 99-2598, 99-2763, 99-2983, 01-1690 Rosario’s Apprendi argument is rejected.