Opinion ID: 844172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Burglary Special Circumstance

Text: Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the burglary special-circumstance finding because the evidence showed the burglary was merely incidental to the murder rather than committed with an independent 103 37 purpose. Defendant also contends the trial court did not properly instruct the jury concerning this special circumstance, and instead gave an erroneous instruction to the jury concerning a nonexistent special circumstance of theft. We agree that the trial court did not properly instruct the jury and that the burglary special-circumstance finding must be reversed. Accordingly, we need not reach defendant‘s claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence for this special circumstance.
Pursuant to our decision in People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, a felonymurder special circumstance is inapplicable if the underlying felony is merely ―incidental‖ or ―ancillary‖ to the murder; instead, the evidence must demonstrate an independent or concurrent felonious purpose distinct from any intent to kill. (Id. at p. 61; accord, People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 511; People v. Davis 37 The prosecutor‘s theory for first degree murder was not premised on felony murder, and he argued only that the homicides were premeditated and deliberated first degree murder. The instructions given to the jury reflect these circumstances. This case, therefore, presents no issue concerning merger of the burglary and the homicide for purposes of setting the offense as a murder in the first degree. (People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431, 440 [merger rule prohibits setting murder as first degree when defendant committed burglary solely with the intent to assault the victim inside]; but see People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1121 [overruling Wilson‘s first degree felony-murder merger rule but making clear the overruling of Wilson does not apply retroactively].) The Attorney General, however, urges us to ascertain the relevance of the Wilson rule here because, in prior cases, we have suggested that the merger rule is either similar or identical to the ―merely incidental‖ rule for special circumstances. (People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 646; People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 509-510, 517; People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 778-779, 788-789.) We need not address this issue here because we reverse the burglary special-circumstance finding for instructional error. 104 (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 609.) Therefore, if defendant entered the condominium for the sole purpose of killing Connie, the burglary would be merely incidental to her murder, and the evidence would be insufficient to support a burglary special circumstance. The standard jury instruction explaining this rule is CALJIC No. 8.81.17, which states, in relevant part: ―To find that the special circumstance referred to in these instructions as murder in the commission of [the special-circumstanceeligible felony] is true, it must be proved: . . . [t]he murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of [the special-circumstance-eligible felony] and [¶] . . . [¶] [t]he murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the crime of [the specialcircumstance-eligible felony]. . . . In other words, the special circumstance referred to in these instructions is not established if the [attempted] [specialcircumstance-eligible felony] was merely incidental to the commission of the murder.‖ (CALJIC No. 8.81.17.) The trial court has no duty, on its own motion, to instruct the jury with quoted portion of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 ―unless the evidence supports an inference that the defendant might have intended to murder the victim without having an independent intent to commit the specified felony.‖ (People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 767; People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1,18.)
The prosecution theorized that defendant broke into Connie‘s home with the intent to assault her, thereby committing a burglary, but their interaction escalated into a double homicide. In response, the trial court proposed modified versions of CALJIC No. 8.81.17, which specifically identified the special- 105 circumstance-eligible felony as burglary — and CALJIC No. 14.50, which defined burglary. The trial court, however, instructed the jury pursuant to an erroneous modified version of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 that did not mention burglary. Instead, the modified instruction repeatedly identified the special-circumstance-eligible felony as ―a theft or other felony, to wit, assault with intent to commit great bodily 38 injury or with a deadly weapon, a handgun.‖ In defining burglary, the court instructed the jury that at the time of entry defendant must have had ―the specific intent to commit the crime of a theft or other felony to wit, assault with intent to commit great bodily injury or with a deadly weapon, a handgun.‖ The court gave the jury identical instructions in written form.
There was evidence from which the jury could infer that defendant entered Connie‘s residence for the sole purpose of killing her, thereby requiring an instruction pursuant to People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1. Defendant admitted 38 In its entirety, the court instructed the jury in this respect as follows: ―To find the special circumstance referred to in these instructions as murder in the commission of a theft or other felony, to wit, an assault with intent to commit great bodily injury or with a deadly weapon, a handgun, is true, it must be proved: One, the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a theft or other felony, to wit, assault with intent to commit great bodily injury or with a deadly weapon, a handgun. Two, the murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the crime of theft or other felony, to wit, assault with intent to commit great bodily injury or with a deadly weapon, a handgun, or to facilitate an escape therefrom or to avoid detection. In other words, the special circumstance referred to in these instructions is not established if the theft or other felony, to wit, assault with intent to commit great bodily injury or with a deadly weapon, a handgun, was merely incidental to the commission of the murder.‖ 106 to his burglary partner that he was contemplating killing Connie. Some three weeks before the killings, he feigned the shooting of a gun at her. Two weeks before the killings, defendant armed himself, broke into Connie‘s home, attempted to conceal his break-in, hid a firearm, discovered David Navarro was present, and handcuffed him, but may have been deterred from killing Connie due to David‘s presence. Just before the killings, defendant successfully lured Connie back to her condominium, promising her and Marilyn Young that he would leave Connie alone. On the night of the homicides, defendant had a gun, was agitated and nervous, referred to Connie as ―that fucking bitch,‖ and tried to ascertain whether David was home before he left his companions. Shortly thereafter, the victims were shot. Accordingly, because there was evidence that could have led the jury to infer that defendant entered Connie‘s residence for the sole purpose of killing her, the trial court had a duty to instruct the jury, on its own motion pursuant to People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, that the burglary special circumstance was not established if the burglary was merely incidental to the murder. (People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 505.) As noted above, the trial court gave a variant of this instruction, but it did not mention burglary and, instead, mistakenly referred to theft and assault with a deadly weapon — crimes that do not constitute 39 special circumstances. (§ 190.2.) Because of the confusing nature of these instructions, the jury may not have considered whether the burglary of Connie‘s home was merely incidental to her murder. 39 Although the instruction given referred to ―other felony,‖ in addition to theft and assault, nothing in the remaining instructions or verdict forms specifically referred to burglary as a felony. 107 Instructional error under People v. Green is reversible unless it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 256-257; People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1299; People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 929.) Given the inferences that reasonably may be drawn from the circumstances described above, the evidence failed to establish ―so overwhelmingly‖ that defendant had a felonious intent, independent of or concurrent to murder, in burglarizing Connie‘s home such that ―the jury could not have had a reasonable doubt on the matter.‖ (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 44.) Consequently, as we cannot conclude that the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse the burglary specialcircumstance finding.40 Because we reverse the burglary special circumstance on this ground and at least one valid special circumstance remains, we need not decide defendant‘s related contention that the burglary-murder specialcircumstance finding was supported by insufficient evidence. 40 The Attorney General alternatively argues that, even if defendant intended to kill Connie at the time he entered her residence, he may have been surprised by the presence of Sue Jory. According to the Attorney General, Sue‘s homicide, therefore, would have supported a burglary special circumstance because she was killed in the course of a burglary with the intent to murder Connie. The prosecutor, however, did not charge defendant with a burglary special circumstance as to Sue’s murder, nor do the instructions or verdict forms indicate that the jury deliberated this issue. Instead, the instructions and verdict forms show that the jury answered only the question of whether defendant was engaged in the commission of burglary during the course of Connie’s murder as charged in count 1. The separate verdict form for Sue‘s murder, count 2, lists no special circumstance for burglary; rather, it lists only the special circumstance of multiple murder. 108