Opinion ID: 1091131
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the city of jackson can be held liable for the actions of the officers since the trial court found they acted with malice.

Text: ¶ 49. The city next argues that the trial court erred by holding it liable under the MTCA for the actions of Officers Baker and McCluskey despite the fact that the trial court found the officers' actions malicious. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-5(2) states: For the purposes of this chapter an employee shall not be considered as acting within the course and scope of his employment and a governmental entity shall not be liable or be considered to have waived immunity for any conduct of its employee if the employee's conduct constituted fraud, malice, libel, slander, defamation or any criminal offense other than traffic violations. (Emphasis added.) In addition, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-7(2) states: An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee shall be held personally liable for acts or omissions occurring within the course and scope of the employee's duties. For the purposes of this chapter an employee shall not be considered as acting within the course and scope of his employment and a governmental entity shall not be liable or be considered to have waived immunity for any conduct of its employee if the employee's conduct constituted fraud, malice, libel, slander, defamation or any criminal offense. (Emphasis added). These statutes unambiguously state that an employee can be found to be acting outside the course and scope of employment if acting with malice. Bridges, 793 So.2d at 590. ¶ 50. It is undisputed by the parties that the officers were acting within the course and scope of their employment when they arrested Powell. However, the trial court found the officers' later actions to be malicious. According to §§ 11-46-5(2) and 11-46-7(2), the State of Mississippi and its political subdivisions have not waived sovereign immunity for employees that act beyond the course and scope of their employment, and employees act beyond that scope when they act with malice. Bridges, 793 So.2d at 590. Because Officers Baker and McCluskey acted with malice the City of Jackson is immune from liability for their actions under the MTCA. ¶ 51. It appears from the record that the trial court acknowledged that the officers acted with malice but still held the city liable because it negligently supervised the officers. The trial court found that the City of Jackson was aware of Officer McCluskey's history of using excessive force and being abusive toward minorities. Therefore, the trial court surmised that the city's liability was not premised on the actions of the officers but on its own actions. This is an incorrect statement of the law. A State may not be sued except by its consent. Hall v. State, 79 Miss. 38, 29 So. 994 (1901). This State has abrogated parts of its sovereign immunity pursuant to the MTCA, but still retains immunity for various claims. Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11-46-1, et seq. For its own actions the State and its political subdivisions have retained immunity for discretionary functions. See Jones v. Miss. Dep't of Transp., 744 So.2d 256, 260 (Miss.1999). Section 11-46-9(1)(d) applies to this situation and reads: (1) A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim: (d) Based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused; Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(d) (emphasis added). This Court has used a two-part test to determine if a function is discretionary: (1) whether the activity involved an element of choice or judgment, and if so; (2) whether the choice or judgment in supervision involves social, economic or political policy alternatives. Bridges, 793 So.2d at 588 (citing Jones, 744 So.2d at 260). Conversely, conduct will be considered ministerial; and therefore, immunity will not apply, if the obligation is imposed by law leaving no room for judgment. Doe v. State ex rel. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 859 So.2d 350, 356 (Miss.2003) (citing Leflore County v. Givens, 754 So.2d 1223, 1226 (Miss.2000)). ¶ 52. As applied to this case the decision requires a determination of whether (1) the manner in which the City of Jackson chooses to supervise its officers involves an element of choice and; (2) whether the choice involves social, economic or political policy. See Bridges, 793 So.2d at 588. Miss.Code Ann. § 21-31-21, which deals with a police officer's tenure and grounds for discipline, contains a series of reasons for discipline but offers no automatic situations requiring discipline. Therefore, this statute requires the City of Jackson to exercise its judgment in the manner in which it chooses to supervise its officers. City of Jackson v. McLeod, 199 Miss. 676, 686-88, 24 So.2d 319, 321 (1946). There is no doubt that the choice to employ and the manner of supervision of police officers does affects public policy, and the make-up of the police force inherently affects the social policy of a city. The manner in which a police department supervises, disciplines and regulates its police officers is a discretionary function of the government and thus the city is immune to suit under § 11-46-9(1)(d). Therefore, the judgment of the trial court regarding the city's liability to Powell pursuant to the MTCA is hereby reversed and rendered. ¶ 53. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a), (b) & (c), Judge Kidd awarded Powell attorney's fees and cost of litigation, totaling $34,650. While not implicitly stated in the judgment we must find that this award was based upon Powell's status as a prevailing party against the city in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. There is no evidence in the record or proceedings below presented to this Court which indicates that § 1983 was a basis for the complaint or actually litigated at trial. Without a doubt the courts of this State have the authority to hear and adjudge a claim under § 1983. Barrett v. Miller, 599 So.2d 559, 564 (Miss.1992). This authority is present even though the statute is not specifically cited by name in the complaint. Hood v. Miss. Dep't of Wildlife Conservation, 571 So.2d 263, 267 (Miss.1990). This authority is strengthened by the duty and obligation our courts have to enforce federally created rights. Burrell v. Miss. State Tax Comm'n, 536 So.2d 848, 863 (Miss.1988). However, in order for a trial court to have authority to decide a case under § 1983, it must be adequately pled in the complaint. Garg v. Albany Indus. Dev. Agency, 899 F.Supp. 961, 967 (N.D.N.Y.1995)(citing Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir.1987)), aff'd mem. 104 F.3d 351 (2d Cir.1996). ¶ 54. There are two essential elements of a § 1983 claim: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under the color of state law; and (2) this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Barrett, 599 So.2d at 563. Powell's complaint does not specifically cite § 1983, and nowhere in the pleadings is it mentioned. However, Powell's complaint does allege that the officers acted under the color of law and that Powell suffered a violation of his constitutional rights. We find that such conclusory language, unsupported by specific factual allegations is insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for inadequate supervision by the City of Jackson. See Garg, 899 F.Supp. at 968. The mere use of magic words in a complaint is not enough to put the city on notice that Powell claimed a § 1983 violation of his constitutional rights. Further, the absence of factual support or evidence in the complaint makes this pleading insufficient on its face. Litigants before the courts of this State cannot rely on ambiguous and conclusory assertions of error, but must provide clear and concise allegations of error in their complaints in order for the fair adjudication of claims. See Dowdell v. Fairman, 21 F.Supp.2d 828, 829 (N.D.Ill.1998) (the complaint must at least set out facts sufficient to outline or adumbrate the basis of the claim). We hold that Powell did not adequately plead § 1983 in his complaint; and therefore, the trial court's award of attorney's fees and litigation costs pursuant to § 1988(a), (b) and (c) was inappropriate. Therefore, as to the award of attorney's fees and litigation costs we reverse and render. ¶ 55. Assuming arguendo, which we do not, that Powell adequately pled § 1983, we would also reverse the award of the trial court because there was not a scintilla of evidence presented that the city was deliberately indifferent to the plight of African-Americans or that the city encouraged the type of actions which we find in the present case. A municipality will be responsible under § 1983 for failure to supervise and train its officers if that failure results in a violation of an individual's constitutional rights. Callis v. Sellars, 931 F.Supp. 504, 515 (S.D.Tex. 1996). The city must however be found to be deliberately indifferent to the rights of persons with whom the police officers come in contact. Id. There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); East Miss. State Hosp. v. Callens, 892 So.2d 800, 817 (Miss.2004). Therefore, the fact that the officers acted in a manner that would be deliberately indifferent to a person's rights does not necessitate the city's liability. Love v. King, 784 F.2d 708, 710 (5th Cir.1986). The officers must have acted at the direction of the municipality or pursuant to a municipal policy or custom. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018; Love, 784 F.2d at 710. ¶ 56. There was not a scintilla of evidence presented to indicate that the city had either an on-the-books or off-the-books policy which encouraged the type of activity that the officers engaged in. Powell cited to the fact that Officer McCluskey was part of seven different Internal Affairs investigation for evidence that the city was on notice that one of its officers acted maliciously toward African-Americans and therefore the city, by not disciplining him or compelling him to engage in sensitivity training, was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of African-Americans. We find this unsupported by the facts presented at trial. Powell failed to call any witnesses or present any evidence which supported his allegations. The only witnesses that Powell did call were those present at the scene or the medical personnel who treated Powell afterwards. ¶ 57. The only evidence that was adequately presented at trial involved the night the incident took place. Other than the words of Officer McCluskey, testifying as to the substance of the seven occasions that he was called by Internal Affairs, there was no evidence presented to indicate the nature of his previous police activities. The fact that Officer McCluskey was called seven times by Internal Affairs does not provide a conclusion that the city encouraged the use of excessive force against African-Americans. Rather, the fact that Officer McCluskey was called by Internal Affairs seven times and never disciplined for his actions is suggestive of the conclusion that there was no wrongdoing on his part and that the city was actively involved in the supervision of its police officers. Therefore, we hold that the trial court's finding that the City of Jackson was deliberately indifferent to the rights of African-Americans was without factual support and therefore was clearly erroneous.