Opinion ID: 4374721
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Destruction of the Hat and Hair Evidence

Text: Appellant argues that the motions court erred in denying without a hearing his application for post-conviction DNA testing. Appellant claims he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on (1) whether the government conducted a reasonable search to substantiate its assertion that the hat and hair evidence had been lost or destroyed; and (2) whether the government should be sanctioned for failing to preserve the evidence. “For claims under the IPA, the question whether a hearing is required is confided to the sound discretion of the trial court.” 52 In lieu of holding an evidentiary hearing on the adequacy of the MPD’s search, the court accepted the government’s proffer. In our view the court exercised its discretion reasonably in doing so, because the proffer, though it was somewhat conclusory and not as detailed as it might have been, was substantial and appellant did not contest it or request a hearing on the issue. When the government opposes an application for post-conviction DNA testing on the ground that the sought-after biological material does not exist, “it must proffer evidence” showing that it conducted “a reasonable search” for the 52 (Wallace) Mitchell, 80 A.3d at 977 (quotation marks omitted). 38 material, “meaning an extensive search in any place the evidence could reasonably be found.”53 The government provided such a proffer in this case; according to the sworn affidavit of the ECB chief, it did not merely rely on the computerized property records and individuals’ memories, but conducted a physical search in the “evidence bins and shelves previously assigned to this evidence” and the boxes in which any handwritten records pertaining to the evidence might have been stored. 54 For the first time on appeal, appellant complains that the proffer did not include an affidavit from anyone on Lieutenant Manigault’s staff who actually performed the search at her direction and “thus had personal knowledge of exactly where and how thoroughly they looked.” 55 This objection comes too late; in the absence of any timely complaint about the lack of additional detail, appellant must be deemed to have accepted the supervisor’s summary of the search undertaken as accurate and adequate. Appellant also complains that the search was limited to locations that had been “assigned” to the missing evidence, whereas misplaced 53 Id. at 970. “The trial court’s inquiry is not whether the material does not exist or no longer exists, but whether the government has performed a ‘reasonable search.’” Id. at 970-71. 54 By way of contrast, in (Wallace) Mitchell this court deemed a search inadequate where “we d[id] not know where the government checked, what it checked for, or whom it checked with – if it checked at all.” Id. at 970. 55 Brief for Appellant at 40. 39 evidence could have been in “other areas of the [ECB] or facilities where the evidence … was previously stored or transported.”56 But appellant did not raise this objection below either, and even now he does not identify a single specific location that should have been searched because “the evidence could reasonably be found” there. The obligation to conduct a reasonable search does not require a topto-bottom search of every property warehouse, building, and police vehicle in which the evidence conceivably might have been at any time. 57 Finally, appellant complains – once again for the first time on appeal – that the government did not contact the FBI Crime Laboratory to determine whether it retained any of the hair samples examined by Agent Fram. There is no merit to this belated objection, however; the government submitted documentation and cited trial testimony confirming that the FBI returned the hat and hairs to the MPD for use at trial, and no reason appears why the FBI would have silently held any evidence back when it did so. Appellant’s suggestion that the FBI might have retained any of this evidence thus is contrary to the record and nothing but unmoored speculation. It 56 Id. 57 We have difficulty imagining that such an unfocused search would be at all feasible, given the huge volume of evidence contained in the MPD evidence warehouse alone – “approximately 300,000 items or more,” according to the affidavit of Lieutenant Manigault. 40 does not suggest any failure to “search in any place the evidence could reasonably be found.” 58 Once the government has proffered evidence of a reasonable search in support of its representation that the biological material in question does not exist, the applicant for DNA testing must be afforded “an opportunity to weigh in on the procedure the government employed in reaching that conclusion,” which entails an “opportunity to probe, challenge, or otherwise respond to the statements in the [proffer] before a decision can be rendered.” 59 “[I]f the court determines that there is a genuine factual dispute as to whether the evidence exists, ordinarily the court should hold a hearing.” 60 In this case, appellant was given the opportunity to probe and challenge the government’s proffer, but he did not take it. He raised no questions or objections as to the adequacy of the search, he did not present the court with a “genuine dispute” as to the existence of the hat and hair evidence, and he did not request an evidentiary hearing to explore those seemingly uncontested 58 (Wallace) Mitchell, 80 A.3d at 970. 59 Id. at 969 (internal quotation marks omitted). 60 Id. (quoting Arey v. State, 929 A.2d 501, 510 (Md. 2007)). 41 issues. Under the circumstances, the court therefore was not obliged to hold an evidentiary hearing on whether the government performed a reasonable search.61 Appellant did request an evidentiary hearing to determine appropriate sanctions that the court might have imposed on the government in deciding appellant’s then pending § 23-110 motion to vacate his convictions on account of the Napue violation. As we have noted, the court all but ignored that request and denied the § 23-110 motion without holding a hearing on the government’s degree of fault in destroying evidence or imposing any sanctions on the government. Nonetheless, we do not decide whether the court should have imposed sanctions for the government’s IPA violation or held a hearing to answer that question in deciding appellant’s Napue claim pursuant to § 23-110.62 The unresolved question 61 Given this conclusion, we find it unnecessary to reach the court’s alternative reason for denying an evidentiary hearing, its finding of no reasonable probability that DNA testing would produce non-cumulative evidence helpful in establishing appellant’s actual innocence. We refrain from expressing any view on that issue. 62 Although the extent of the government’s blameworthiness is a factual issue that one would expect to be resolved after taking evidence, the appropriateness of imposing sanctions on the government in the § 23-110 matter for its putatively wrongful failure to preserve the hair evidence is far from obvious. Even if the hair had not been lost and post-conviction DNA testing of it would have tended to exculpate appellant, the test results would have been new evidence that could not have been available to appellant at the time of trial. While the DNA test results might have supplied grounds for relief under the IPA, they therefore (continued…) 42 of sanctions need be addressed only if and when the government chooses to retry appellant and he then renews his request for sanctions based on the possibility that DNA testing might have generated favorable evidence for him in the future prosecution. The relevant circumstances may be unforeseeably different in that event; for under our case law, the court might need to determine and weigh not only the government’s blameworthiness (which, we agree, may necessitate an evidentiary hearing), but also the importance of the lost evidence; the prejudice to appellant and the overall impact of its loss in the context of the anticipated new trial; and the effect of any proposed sanction on the administration of justice.63 These matters are not ripe for decision now. (continued…) would not be a basis for challenging the constitutionality of appellant’s conviction pursuant to § 23-110. It thus is not clear why the government’s post-conviction loss of the hair evidence should affect the court’s resolution of appellant’s unrelated due process claim under Napue. Cf. Turner v. United States, 116 A.3d 894, 917-18 (D.C. 2015) (holding that newly discovered exculpatory evidence that did not exist and could not have been available at the time of trial is not relevant to whether the government violated its Brady obligations). 63 See Weems v. United States, 191 A.3d 296, 306 (D.C. 2018). 43