Opinion ID: 2318875
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Civil-Criminal Analysis.

Text: [¶ 8] In Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997), the Supreme Court promulgated the so-called intent-effects test for distinguishing between civil and criminal penalties, stating: Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a matter of statutory construction. A court must first ask whether the legislature, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. Even in those cases where the legislature has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. In making this latter determination, the factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169, 83 S.Ct. 554, 567-568, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), provide useful guideposts, including: (1) [w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter ; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. It is important to note, however, that these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its face, id. at 169, 83 S.Ct. at 568, and only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99-100, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (additional citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501, (1997) (applying similar principles to determine whether sex offender commitment statute violated Ex Post Facto Clause). [6] [¶ 9] The Mendoza-Martinez list of considerations, however, is neither exhaustive nor dispositive. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980). In fact, the Supreme Court has intimated, in other cases, that the most significant question under the effects stage of the analysis is whether the law, while perhaps having certain punitive aspects, serve[s] important nonpunitive goals. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996). [7] See also Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1091 (9th Cir.1997) (stating, Mendoza-Martinez 's list of considerations is helpful but is not exhaustive or dispositive), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1007, 118 S.Ct. 1191, 140 L.Ed.2d 321 (1998); Moore v. Avoyelles Corr. Ctr., 253 F.3d 870, 873 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that `[t]he most significant question under [the effects] stage of the [`intent-effects'] analysis' is whether the law `while perhaps having certain punitive aspects, serve[s] important nonpunitive goals.'). [¶ 10] Thus, our first task is to discern whether the intent of the Legislature in enacting the sex-offender notification program was to create a civil or criminal penalty. If we determine that the legislature intended to establish a civil penalty, we must then inquire whether there exists the clearest proof that the measure is so punitive in purpose or effect as to override the Legislature's intent.
[¶ 11] An analysis of the legislative history of SORNA and its sister Acts reveals that the Maine legislature intended SORNA to be a civil remedy. First, the legislative intent to establish a nonpunitive measure is ascertainable from the simple fact that the Legislature placed the statute in the civil code as opposed to the criminal code. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (stating that the Kansas Legislature's objective to create a civil proceeding is evidenced by its placement of the Sexually Violent Predator Act within the Kansas probate code, instead of the criminal code). Second, the civil nature of the Acts is evident in the Legislature's description of the 1991 Act as An Act to Ensure Continuing Knowledge of the Identity and Whereabouts of Convicted Sex Offenders, P.L. 1991, ch. 809, and its unambiguous expression in the 1995 Act that the legislation's purpose was to protect the public safety by enhancing access to information concerning sex offenders. 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11101 (Supp.2000). The description and purpose suggest that the Acts were enacted to protect the public, not to punish the sex offender. [¶ 12] Although SORNA carries none of these legislative expressions, the expressions of the prior Acts are attributable to it because SORNA is merely an expansion of those Acts, primarily enacted to conform the existing Maine Acts to federal law on the same issue. See L.D. 1721, Summary (119th Legis.1999). Specifically, the Legislature, in enacting SORNA, stated: This bill [creating SORNA] provides for the registration of sex offenders in conformance with federal law. The bill does the following. 1. It expands the scope of the definition of sex offender for the purposes of registration. 2. It adds sexually violent predator as a new category. 3. It increases the type of identifying information for sex offenders and sexually violent predators that must be kept by the State Bureau of Identification and directs the bureau to forward registration information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for inclusion in the national sex offender database. . . . . Id. Nothing in any of the Acts suggests that the Legislature sought to create anything other than a civil registration and notification procedure designed to protect the public from harm. The legislative intent in enacting SORNA, therefore, is remedial, not criminal.
[¶ 13] The next phase of the examination requires us to determine whether the party challenging the statute demonstrates by the clearest proof that the notification scheme is to punitive in purpose or effect as to overcome the Legislature's civil intent. [8] People v. Malchow, 193 Ill.2d. 413, 250 Ill.Dec. 670, 739 N.E.2d 433, 439 (2000). Applying the Ursery and Mendoza-Martinez factors to the present legislation demonstrates that SORNA's effect is not so punitive that it defeats the Legislature's civil intent. [¶ 14] For the purposes of the Ursery factor, SORNA serves important nonpunitive goals because it is aimed at protecting the public from sex offenders. Gregoire, 124 F.3d at 1091. It is well-established that [a] law serving nonpunitive goals `is not punishment, even though it may bear harshly on one affected.' Moore, 253 F.3d at 873 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 614, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960)). [¶ 15] Applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors further supports a finding that SORNA requirements do not have a punitive effect. [9] First, SORNA does not place an affirmative disability or restraint on sex offenders. Their movements and activities are not restricted in any way. See Malchow, 250 Ill.Dec. 670, 739 N.E.2d at 439; see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (stating, [a]lthough the civil commitment scheme at issue here does involve an affirmative restraint, `the mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment.'). [¶ 16] Second, SORNA cannot be historically regarded as a punishment. Although the [d]issemination of information about criminal activity has always held the potential for substantial negative consequences for those involved in that activity, it cannot be compared with the public shaming, humiliation, and banishment of the colonial times, which all involve more then the dissemination of information. E.B. v. Veniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1099 (3rd Cir.1997) (rejecting appellant's analogy comparing notification laws to historical acts of public ridicule), cert, denied, 522 U.S. 1109, 118 S.Ct. 1039, 140 L.Ed.2d 105 (1998). The sting of laws like SORNA results not from [a person] being publicly displayed for ridicule and shaming but rather from the dissemination of accurate public record information about [that person's] past criminal activities and risk assessment by responsible public agencies based on that information. Id. The [d]issemination of [accurate information about past criminal activity] in and of itself... has never been regarded as punishment when done in furtherance of a legitimate governmental purpose, such as that which SORNA presents. [10] Id. at 1099-1100. [¶ 17] Third, the provisions at issue do not come into play based on a finding of scienter. The only requirement for the [registration and] notification provisions to become effective is that the offender is released into the community. Accordingly, this factor does not indicate a punitive intent. Malchow, 250 Ill.Dec. 670, 739 N.E.2d at 440. [¶ 18] Fourth, the SORNA's operation does not promote the two primary objectives of criminal punishment: retribution and deterrence. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-62, 117 S.Ct. 2072. As noted above, the intention of the Legislature in passing SORNA was to protect the public from sex offenders. The limited release of information to those likely to encounter sex offenders could hardly be characterized as `retribution.' Malchow, 250 Ill.Dec. 670, 739 N.E.2d at 440. See also Russell, 124 F.3d at 1089 (stating the Washington sex offender registration requirements do not have a retributive purpose but do have legitimate nonpunitive purposes). Further, SORNA is not retributive because it does not affix culpability for prior criminal conduct. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (stating Kansas Sex Offender Commitment Act not retributive for same reason). Instead, such conduct is solely used for evidentiary purposes, either to demonstrate that a `mental abnormality' exists or to support a finding of future dangerousness. Id. 521 U.S. at 363, 117 S.Ct. 2072. [¶ 19] As to the deterrence factor, the Malchow court noted: [I]t is possible that the Notification Law would have a deterrent effect. However, it is unlikely that those not already deterred from committing sex offenses by the possibility of a lengthy prison term will be deterred by the additional possibility of community notification. Moreover, even an obvious deterrent purpose does not necessarily make a law punitive. Malchow, 250 Ill.Dec. 670, 739 N.E.2d at 440 (citation omitted); accord Russell, 124 F.3d at 1089 (stating, [a]lthough registration arguably has a deterrent effect, [ United States v. ] Ursery [, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996)] declared that deterrence can serve both civil and criminal goals.... Ursery also noted that the fact that a sanction may be tied to criminal activity alone is insufficient to render the sanction punitive.). We agree with the Malchow court and conclude that SORNA's purpose is to protect the public. It does not significantly promote either retribution or deterrence. [¶ 20] Fifth, the behavior to which SORNA applies is, in fact, already a crime; the registration and notification requirements only relate to those people who have committed criminal actions. Nevertheless, the fact that SORNA's requirements are triggered by a criminal conviction is common to all regulatory disabilities that result from a prior conviction, i.e., the loss of the right to vote in some jurisdictions. Doe v. Pataki. 120 F.3d 1263, 1281 (2nd Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1122, 118 S.Ct. 1066, 140 L.Ed.2d 126 (1998). The Second Circuit noted that The disabilities mandated by the laws challenged and upheld in several Supreme Court decisions have also been triggered solely by the existence of a prior conviction. See e.g., Hawker [ v. New York ], 170 U.S. [189,] 196-97, 18 S.Ct. [573,] 576-77[, 42 L.Ed. 1002 (1898)] (prior felony conviction conclusive evidence of lack of fitness to practice medicine). As with the laws upheld in Hawker ..., the offender's prior conviction is used by the SORA solely for evidentiary purposes, i.e., as a presumption that the offender is likely to re-offend in the future. Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1281 (additional citations omitted). The Supreme Court stated in Hendricks We have previously concluded that an Illinois statute was nonpunitive even though it was triggered by the commission of a sexual assault, explaining that evidence of the prior criminal conduct was `received not to punish past misdeeds, but primarily to show the accused's mental condition and to predict future behavior.' Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362, 117 S.Ct. 2072. In addition, registration and notification helps locate sex offenders who commit new crimes; the law, therefore, is no more onerous than necessary to protect the public from harm, which is a permissible regulatory goal. See People v. Ansell, 25 Cal.4th 868, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 24 P.3d 1174, 1186 (2001); cf. Malchow, 250 Ill. Dec. 670, 739 N.E.2d at 440 (stating that, because the notification requirements only relate to those people who have committed criminal actions, the fifth factor of the Mendoza-Martinez test weighs in favor of the defendant; however, the notification requirements were deemed constitutional when considering the Mendoza-Martinez factors in whole). [¶ 21] Sixth, SORNA has a purpose, other than punishment, that can rationally be associated with the law. As set forth above, SORNA's purpose is to protect the public; the law was not intended as punishment. Seventh, the law does not appear excessive in relation to the goal of protecting the public from sex offenders by enhancing access to information concerning sex offenders. 34-A M.R.S.A. § 11101 (Supp.2000). The information is not widely disseminated. It is only disseminated to certain State agencies and to members of the public who the department determines appropriate to ensure public safety. 34-A M.R.S.A. §§ 11142 & 11143 (Supp.2000); [11] see also Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1281-82 (rejecting plaintiff's contentions that, inter alia, the punitive character of New York's sex-offender laws is indicated by its broad coverage of offenses, the wide extent of notification it authorizes, and the permission it grant to entities with vulnerable populations to disseminate information to the public with unfettered discretion (i.e., daycare centers)). [¶ 22] Finally, sex offender registration and notification laws have been the subject of much litigation and have been overwhelmingly sustained as constitutional by the majority of courts, [12] including the United States District Court for the District of Maine, see Corbin v. Chitwood, 145 F.Supp.2d 92, 99 (D.Me.2001). In Corbin, the court held that the Portland community notification law did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it did not constitute punishment. [13] Id. (citations omitted). The court also found that the defendant had not shown that the notification program is punitive (the record indicates that it was used in the interests of public safety), or that the punitive purpose or effect of the notification was so great as to negate the remedial intent of the policy. Id. (citations omitted). Similarly, Haskell has not met his burden of showing, nor has our analysis of the above factors revealed, that SORNA is punitive or that its punitive purpose or effect is so great as to negate the remedial intent of the registration and notification policies. The trial court, therefore, did not err in applying SORNA to Haskell.