Opinion ID: 1120806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Direct and Vicarious Liability

Text: Defendants assert (1) that one of the jury instructions was flawed because it allowed the jury to award special damages in excess of the dollar amount pleaded in the complaint, (2) that the evidence did not support the damages awarded, and (3) that the issue of punitive damages should not have been submitted to the jury. The complaint alleged that plaintiff has been injured and suffered damages including, but not limited to, loss of wages, medical expenses, severe emotional distress, and mental anguish requiring professional therapy, and further pain and suffering at least in the amount of $75,000.00... . The complaint prayed for judgment as follows: 1. In the sum of $75,000.00 and such other sum as plaintiff shall establish by proof at time of trial; 2. Exemplary damages at least in the amount of $100,000.00; 3. For costs of suit incurred herein, including reasonable attorneys fees; and 4. For such other and further relief as the court deems just. The trial court instructed the jury in instruction No. 46: The plaintiff alleges that by reason of her claimed injuries, for which she claims the defendants are liable, she has sustained general damages in the sum of $200,000.00 for severe emotional distress, mental anguish and pain and suffering, and has lost an additional sum of $26,515.00, on account of the costs of the therapy that she has undergone as a result of the malicious prosecution, loss of wages, and cost of legal fees for defense of the criminal proceeding. These allegations are not evidence, but are merely the extent of the plaintiff's claims, and must not be considered by you as evidence in the case. The jury awarded a total of $80,000 in compensatory damages, $70,000 against Gibson and $10,000 against Crosgrove. It also awarded $8,000 in punitive damages, $7,000 against Gibson and $1,000 against Crosgrove. Instruction No. 46 was not erroneous because it permitted the jury to award more than the amount of general damages alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff was entitled to the general damages proved, even though more than the amount alleged by the complaint. See Utah R.Civ.P. 54(c). The amount of damages awarded was justified by the evidence. Special damages are a particular type of damages which are a natural consequence of the injury caused but are not the type of damages that necessarily flow from the harmful act. See Cohn v. J.C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d 306, 307 (Utah 1975). One claiming special damages must plead each type of damage specifically so that the opposing party has an adequate opportunity to defend against the plaintiff's claims. The complaint sought damages for lost wages, medical expenses, and severe emotional distress. Those allegations satisfied the requirement of Rule 9(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that special damages must be specifically pleaded. However, the law does not require that the exact dollar amount of special damages be specifically pleaded. See Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 383 F. Supp. 420, 423 n. 2 (E.D.Pa. 1974); United Ins. Co. of America v. B.W. Rudy, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 398, 405 (E.D.Pa. 1967); Cox v. Johnston, 484 P.2d 116, 120 (Colo.Ct.App. 1971); see also Cohn v. J.C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d 306 (Utah 1975); 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1311 (1990). Finally, defendants contend that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to award punitive damages. Their argument is that in initiating the prosecution against Hodges, defendants were prompted by a reasonable belief that Hodges had committed a theft and that a reasonable belief necessarily negates the required state of mind necessary to support a claim for punitive damages. See Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1988); Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 337 (Utah 1985); Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1112-13 (Utah 1985). If defendants were guilty only of simple negligence, inadvertence, mistake, or error of judgment, they would be correct. See Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983). Defendants argue that there is no evidence that Gibson's employees acted willfully or maliciously in presenting evidence to the prosecutor or in terminating Hodges' employment and that even if Crosgrove initiated the prosecution against Hodges to cover his own misdeeds, his malice cannot be imputed to Gibson for purposes of imposing punitive damages against Gibson. That, however, is not the law. [6] A master may be liable for punitive damages under certain conditions. See Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 776-78 (Utah 1988). In Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984), this Court held that, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer was liable for punitive damages based on a low-level employee's (i.e., security officer's) tortious and malicious acts of false arrest and false imprisonment. As discussed above, the jury was entitled to find that Crosgrove acted knowingly and maliciously toward Hodges. Because Crosgrove was a manager and acted in his managerial capacity, Gibson is also liable, through Crosgrove, for punitive damages. In Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 778 (Utah 1988), we relied in most part on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 909(b) and (e) to sustain the availability of punitive damages against an employer on the basis of vicarious liability. Section 909 states: Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal because of an act by an agent if, but only if, (a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or (b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reckless in employing or retaining him, or (c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment, or (d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the act. (Emphasis added.) Accord Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217C (1958). Section 909(c), Restatement (Second) of Torts, and § 217C(c), Restatement (Second) of Agency, state the accepted rule that a master or other principal can be liable for punitive damages based on the conduct of a managerial agent. The punitive damage award against Gibson must therefore be sustained, at least as to the malicious prosecution claim, because the jury could have found that Crosgrove acted with actual malice toward Hodges and did so in his managerial capacity and within the scope of his employment. Our ruling in this case on punitive damages is supported not only by our own prior cases, but also by a number of other courts in factual contexts similar to this case. See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 122 A.2d 457 (1956); Moore v. Target Stores, Inc., 571 P.2d 1236 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977). See generally Annotation, Principal's Liability for Punitive Damages Because of False Arrest or Imprisonment, or Malicious Prosecution, By Agent or Employee, 93 A.L.R.3d 826 (1979 & Supp. 1990).