Opinion ID: 1992848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Limitations on defendant's right to allocution

Text: At the conclusion of the State's penalty-phase case-in-chief, the trial court explained to defendant the right of allocution. The court delineated specific boundaries that defendant would have to respect: Number one, you may ask the jury to spare your life. Number two, you may explain to the jury, if it's true, that you are a person who is capable of feeling and expressing remorse, and that you feel remorse, and that you have hope of rehabilitating yourself if your life is spared.... What you must not do, Mr. Loftin, is you must not deny your guilt. You must not deny the truth of any evidence, you must not argue about the evidence. You must not argue about aggravating and mitigating factors. You must not say anything about the witnesses, the prosecutor, your lawyers, this court, or the trial.... You must not say anything about the legality or morality of capital punishment. The court identified the remedies it might pursue if defendant exceeded the court-imposed boundaries. The court also informed defendant that he was permitted to submit a written version of his allocution statement to ensure that it was proper. Defendant and his counsel received a written copy of the court's instructions, which both signed, confirming that they understood and accepted the court's instructions. Defendant chose not to submit a written version of his allocution statement. In his allocution statement, defendant blamed his conduct on racial inequities, discussed the adverse impact his execution would have on his family, and commented on the evidence presented with respect to mitigating factors. As a result, the trial court held a sidebar conference to discuss how best to cure the problem. After rejecting the State's suggestion that it be permitted to cross-examine defendant, the trial court and counsel discussed potential curative instructions. Defense counsel agreed to an instruction in which the court would inform the jury that it should disregard what defendant said about the impact of the execution on his family, his comments on racism, and his discussion of the aggravating and mitigating factors presented in this case. Accordingly, the trial court instructed as follows: Ladies and Gentlemen, it is necessary for the Court at this juncture to instruct you with respect to Mr. Loftin's allocution and to instruct you that some of his remarks went outside the bounds of his right to exercise allocution. Number one, it is not an appropriate exercise of his right of allocution to raise the issue of racism, it falls outside of the bounds of his right to speak. Secondly, it falls outside the bounds of his right to speak to discuss the aggravating and/or mitigating factors that have been presented in this case by both sides. Finally, as I have instructed you repeatedly, the impact of his execution on his mother, his children, his wife and his family is not a proper mitigating factor for you to consider, and you are to disregard not only his comments about racism, his comments with respect to the evidence of mitigating and aggravating [factors], but also the impact that his execution would have upon his family. In its final instructions on allocution, the court permitted the jury to consider what Mr. Loftin stated insofar as it impacts one or more of the mitigating factors, and subject to the court's limiting instructions at the conclusion of his statement. Defense counsel did not raise any objection relating to the court's limitation on the right of allocution or to the court's remedy after defendant exceeded the court-imposed boundaries. Defendant contends that he did not exceed the scope of proper allocution and now objects to the trial court's restrictions on his right of allocution. During allocution, a defendant is permitted to make a brief statement in order to allow the jury to ascertain that he or she is an `individual capable of feeling and expressing remorse and of demonstrating some measure of hope for the future.' State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 430, 548 A. 2d 1022 (1988) (quoting J. Thomas Sullivan, The Capital Defendant's Right to Make a Personal Plea for Mercy: Common Law Allocution and Constitutional Mitigation, 15 N.M.L.Rev. 41, 41 (1985)), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S.Ct. 1146, 103 L.Ed. 2d 205 (1989). The right to make a statement in allocution is not commanded by the Constitution, id. at 429, 548 A. 2d 1022, but is rather a common-law right recognized in New Jersey. Id. at 428, 548 A. 2d 1022. In delivering an allocution statement, a defendant is not authorized to argue legal points, advance or dispute facts, or attempt to exculpate himself. Id. at 430, 548 A. 2d 1022. In Zola, supra, we made clear that in making an allocution statement, a defendant should limit himself to standing before the jury and, in his own voice, asking that his life be spared. Ibid. If the accused does not stray from that subject matter in his statement, he will not expose himself to cross-examination. However, should a defendant dispute facts in issue or offer other facts to exculpate himself, defendant will be subject to corrective action by the court including either comment by the court or prosecutor or in some cases possible reopening of the case for cross-examination. Id. at 432, 548 A. 2d 1022. In asserting that the substantive limitations imposed on his allocution were improper, defendant misconstrues the nature of that right. Defendant's statements exceeded the scope of the right of allocution envisioned in Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 429-32, 548 A. 2d 1022. In State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 478, 645 A. 2d 734 (1994) ( DiFrisco II ), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 949, 133 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1996), we explained that the purpose of allocution is twofold. First, it reflects our commonly-held belief that our civilization should afford every defendant an opportunity to ask for mercy. Second, it permits a defendant to impress a jury with his or her feelings of remorse. However, a defendant's allocution should not take on a testimonial color. To allow defendant to testify about mitigating or aggravating factors without permitting the State to cross-examine him would be unfair to the State and could have the effect of misleading the jury. Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 429-32, 548 A. 2d 1022. Because defendant's statements about racism, the mitigating evidence, and the impact that his execution would have on his family went beyond the permitted boundaries, it was proper for the trial court to issue a curative instruction. Defendant asserts that the trial court's decision to strike the portions of the allocution that went beyond the permitted boundaries was overly drastic and prejudicial. However, the appropriate form of corrective action for an abuse of the right of allocution is within the discretion of the trial court. In Zola, supra, we indicated that corrective action might include comment by the court or prosecutor, or, in some cases, reopening the case for cross-examination. Id. at 432, 548 A. 2d 1022. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking the improper portions of the allocution statement. Nor were the trial court's instructions regarding the allocution statement inconsistent or confusing.