Opinion ID: 1317765
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the state make a legally binding promise to pay $75,468.04 to hpi?

Text: The resolve of this question depends on the question of whether the Board acted within its statutorily granted authority. HRS § 171-30 [1] gives the Board exclusive responsibility for the acquisition of all real property needed by the State for public purposes. The statute, however, does not expressly grant to the Board the power to settle legal disputes between itself and a private party and commit the State to an obligation to pay a sum of money out of State funds. Nor does the statute expressly empower the Board to resolve, with finality, legal disputes between itself and a private party and bind the State to the resolve. However, this court in Yuen v. Hawaiian Homes Commission, 37 Haw. 8 (1944) stated at page 11: ... General powers to accomplish purposes entrusted to public offices [by statute] include all incidental powers fairly deducible from the end to be accomplished. Thus, did the Board, in resolving its legal dispute with HPI, exercise an incidential power fairly deducible from the purposes the Board was entrusted to accomplish? We conclude the Board does not have such an incidental or implied power. In our opinion, the exclusive responsibility of acquiring real property interest granted to the Board under HRS § 171-30 necessary implies the authority to contract for the purchase of such interest. The implication is required lest the granting of the responsibility be substantially impaired. The same cannot be said for implying to the Board the power or authority to settle, with finality, legal disputes resulting from its breach of the land sale contract. This authority is not required by the Board to fulfill its duty to acquire real property interests for the State. The lack of authority to compromise, with finality, a legal dispute resulting from its breach of a land sale contract will not impair in any way the Board's ability to initially enter into a contract for the acquisition of land. We believe that the Attorney General, under the authority of HRS § 26-7 (Supp. 1975), [2] has exclusive authority to control and manage for the State all phases of civil litigation in which the State has an interest, unless authority to do so in specific matters has been expressly or impliedly granted to another department or agency. See Kennington-Saenger Theatres, Inc. v. State, 196 Miss. 841, 18 So.2d 483 (1944), and State v. Ehrlick, 65 W. Va. 700, 64 S.E. 935 (1909). The authority necessarily includes control of the settlement of imminent actions against the State. Under HRS § 26-7, the Attorney General has the further exclusive authority to approve as to the legality and form of all documents relating to the acquisition of any land or interest in land by the State. We are of the opinion that implicit in the express grants of authority to the Attorney General, the Attorney General has the sole power to approve or to refuse to approve as to the legality and form of any compromise settlement effectuated by the Board in regards to the Board's breach of a contract to purchase land for the State. The record is clear that no other department or agency has been expressly or impliedly granted the authority to approve or to disapprove as to the legality and form of the settlement in question. Since the Board had neither express nor implied or incidental authority to settle, with finality, the dispute in this case, and since HPI was required to take notice of the extent of authority conferred by law on the Board, Schull Construction Co. v. Board of Regents of Education, 79 S.D. 487, 113 N.W.2d 663 (1962); Lien v. Northwestern Engineering Co., 74 S.D. 476, 54 N.W.2d 472 (1952), we hold that the compromise agreement resolving the legal dispute between the Board and HPI, without the Attorney General's approval, was not binding upon the State. We are of the further opinion that the Governor's allotment advice in regard to the compromise settlement and his letter to HPI relative to the settlement were both conditionally premised upon the Attorney General's approval. The Governor's conduct was in accordance with the provisions of HRS § 26-7 (Supp. 1975), supra. [3] We, therefore, conclude that the State did not make a binding promise to pay $75,468.04 to HPI.