Opinion ID: 743074
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limitation on Expert Testimony

Text: 36 Agard's second assertion of error relates to the trial court's limitation on the testimony of an expert witness for the defense. Winder testified that, when she was forced to engage in sodomy, her anus was sore and she twice had to pull away from Agard due to pain. On cross-examination, the defense elicited the following testimony from Winder: 37 Q. I believe you also testified that during this incident you say that [Agard] forced his penis into your anus; is that correct? 38 A. Yes. 39 Q. And that was against your will; correct? 40 A. Yes. 41 Q. And in fact that hurt, made it sore? 42 A. Yes. 43 Q. And that it's your testimony that at some subsequent time [he] again forced his penis into your anus? 44 A. Yes. Forced--yes. 45 Q. And that hurt very much; correct? 46 A. Yes. 47 Later in the trial, the prosecution established that Winder did not struggle with Agard because [she] knew it would be more painful if she resisted. 48 The prosecution asked its expert witness, Dr. Karimi, questions about the probability of discernible trauma to the rectum as a result of anal penetration. When asked whether if a woman during anal intercourse felt pain, does that mean you would see trauma, Karimi replied [n]o. Asked to explain, he said that for ... trauma you have to have moderate or severe force. If the force is less than moderate, there wouldn't be any trauma. 49 The defense countered with expert testimony from Dr. Jeffrey Gilbert, who had not examined Winder but had reviewed her medical records. Based on his experience of conducting thousands of pelvic examinations, he testified that there is very often visible evidence of injury to the rectum when individuals engage in voluntary anal intercourse. He further explained that at times with the presence of lubrication the injuries are still present. On cross-examination, he adopted the prosecutor's term sometimes in the place of very often, and also acknowledged that trauma is not necessarily the result of such activity. 50 Defense counsel also posed a number of hypothetical questions to Dr. Gilbert concerning the likelihood of trauma as a result of forcible anal intercourse against the will of the victim who felt pain and soreness. All were objected to and the objections sustained by the trial court. The defense argued that the questions were proper, because they comported with Winder's testimony on cross-examination that Agard forced his penis into her anus. The prosecution countered that the questions were not relevant to the case, because the victim alleged that threats--not physical force--were used by Agard to overcome her will. Or, in the prosecutor's own words, [y]ou didn't ask your expert if there was no struggle would there be trauma. The court continued to sustain prosecution objections to any question containing the words force or forcible on both direct and redirect examination. On summation, the prosecution paraphrased both experts' testimony, [Winder] told you she didn't struggle when he was inside of her.... Dr. Gilbert and Dr. Karimi told you that if there is no struggle, there is not always going to be trauma, and I ask you to rely on [their] testimony.... The defense moved for a mistrial based on improper curtailment of its examination, and continued to press its disagreement with the court's decision through the trial and to the Appellate Division, Second Department. 51 Our analysis of Agard's contention is aided by the express conclusion of the Appellate Division that curtailment of the defense's expert testimony was improper under New York law (though the court did hold the error to be harmless). Agard, 199 A.D.2d at 402-03, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 240-41 (the hypothetical question posed to the defendant's expert was based on facts which were 'fairly inferable from the evidence,' which included indications of physical force as well as threats) (citing, inter alia, Tarlowe v. Metropolitan Ski Slopes, Inc., 28 N.Y.2d 410, 414, 322 N.Y.S.2d 665, 667, 271 N.E.2d 515, 516 (1971)). We find that, while expert testimony is limited by the requirements of relevancy and by the trial court's traditional discretion to prevent prejudicial or confusing testimony, these considerations did not warrant keeping this important information from the jury. 52 The trial court's rulings demonstrate a concern over an ambiguity in the words force and forcible. Both terms may be used to mean either physical compulsion or doing something against the will of another. In the latter instance, physical coercion may not be present; for example, as the prosecution alleged in this case, threats can be used to overcome the will of another. The prosecution was rightly concerned that the defense's questions to its expert could have led the jury to misunderstand exactly which meaning of the word force was intended. Indeed, as the Appellate Division noted, the mixed roles of threats and physical force were at issue in the trial, as Winder alleged acts of physical force, including a kick, punches and slaps on her buttocks during the anal penetration. Agard, 199 A.D.2d at 402, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 240. 53 We agree that the term force is ambiguous and potentially misleading. However, that ambiguity was not a reason to exclude the expert testimony entirely, at least when the degree of force exercised by the defendant was at issue in the trial. Rather, it was a proper subject for the prosecutor's cross-examination of Dr. Gilbert. The prosecution could have brought out the fact that Winder did not struggle with Agard, and asked what effect that fact would have on Gilbert's opinion. 54 Moreover, the defense was not permitted to ask certain questions which to some extent clarified the meaning of the term force and which further used specific language taken from Winder's testimony. For example, defense counsel asked: 55 Now, could you tell us within a reasonable degree of medical certainty what sort of findings you would expect if a woman claimed to have ... forcible anal intercourse against her will, the second time longer than the first, both times being sore and both times being painful? 56 These additional details gave the defense's interrogation further grounding in complainant's testimony, thereby making those questions even more clearly relevant. We therefore find error in the trial court's ruling. 57 Our question, however, is whether the ruling, viewed in light of the whole record, deprived Agard of a fundamentally fair trial. Rosario, 839 F.2d at 925. As we outlined in our discussion of the rape shield statute, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to our Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant a meaningful opportunity to present a defense. Crane, 476 U.S. at 690, 106 S.Ct. at 2146. Erroneous evidentiary rulings rarely rise to the level of harm to this fundamental constitutional right. To isolate those few situations where such mistakes injure constitutional rights, this court applies the standard of materiality as set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). See Rosario, 839 F.2d at 924; Taylor v. Curry, 708 F.2d 886, 891 (2d Cir.1983). Agurs stated: 58 The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt. Such a finding is permissible only if supported by evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It necessarily follows that if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed. This means that the omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. 59 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112-13, 96 S.Ct. at 2401-02 (footnotes omitted). 60 In order to evaluate the importance of the additional expert testimony in this case, therefore, we must look at the strength of the evidence supporting Agard's conviction. 61 On direct review, the Appellate Division characterized the evidence of his guilt as overwhelming. Having reviewed the entire record of the trial, we cannot agree with that characterization, nor are we required to accept it on habeas review. Annunziato v. Manson, 566 F.2d 410, 413 (2d Cir.1977). We believe that the lack of medical evidence on the one charge--forcible anal sodomy--for which the jury convicted Agard suggests that the jury decided the case primarily, if not solely, upon the credibility of Agard, Winder, and Keegan. We simply do not know the reasoning behind the verdict. 2 We do know, however, that, as the district court duly noted, Winder and Agard presented sharply conflicting stories making their credibility the central issue in the trial; 3 that there was very little evidence beyond the medical findings presented to the jury to support or undermine the testimony of the two most important witnesses; and that the jury's verdict does not demonstrate any clear resolution of the credibility question. In light of these observations, we think that the evidence of Agard's guilt cannot be characterized as overwhelming. We thus reject this basis for the conclusion of the Appellate Division that the error was harmless. 62 The Appellate Division also stated, however, that it found the erroneous evidentiary ruling to be harmless because the defendant's expert was permitted to testify that individuals who engaged in voluntary anal intercourse, even using lubricants, frequently suffered from conspicuous rectal trauma. Agard, 199 A.D.2d at 403, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 241. We agree that this opinion evidence allowed Agard to make an argument about the significance of the lack of medical evidence of sodomy, and thereby saved the erroneous ruling from rising to the level of constitutional harm because it did not deprive him of the opportunity to make an argument to the jury. Indeed, the facts of Agurs support this conclusion. The Court there concluded that the jury's ignorance of the victim's criminal record was not material to the defendant's self-defense defense, in part because evidence was already on record of the victim's propensity for violence, and thus the record was largely cumulative. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 114, 96 S.Ct. at 2402. Here, too, additional opinion testimony would only add further support for a defense argument clearly before the jury.