Opinion ID: 2633632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: defendant has failed to establish the threshold requirements of collateral estoppel.

Text: As we recently explained, collateral estoppel applies `only if several threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, he party to the former proceeding. [Citations.]' ( Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921, 943, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 220, 126 P.3d 1040.) The party asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing these [threshold] requirements. [Citation.] ( Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 341, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223.) Because the law does not favor estoppels ( People v. Frank (1865) 28 Cal. 507, 517 ( Frank )), this burden is a heavy one. As we have explained, [c]ertainty is an essential element of every estoppel. . . . ( City of Oakland v. Oakland Water-Front Co. (1897) 118 Cal. 160, 221, 50 P. 277. Thus, where a party asserts a certain question in issue has been litigated and determined between the same parties in a previous action, it is not enough that the proposed evidence tends to show that the precise question may have been involved in such litigation. ( Emerson v. Yosemite Gold Min. & Mill. Co. (1906) 149 Cal. 50, 57, 85 P. 122.) In other words, `[e]very estoppel must be certain to every intent, and not to be taken by argument or inference.' [Citation.] `If upon the face of a record anything is left to conjecture as to what was necessarily involved and decided, there is no estoppel in it when pleaded, and nothing conclusive in it when offered in evidence.' [Citation.] ( Beronio v. Ventura County Lumber Co. (1900) 129 Cal. 232, 236, 61 P. 958.) These rules take on special significance where the decision asserted as an estoppel may have been based on several alternative grounds. `[I]f it appear[s] that several distinct matters may have been litigated' in the prior action, `upon one or more of which the judgment may have passed,' unless the record clearly indicates `which of them was thus litigated, and upon which the judgment was rendered,' collateral estoppel does not apply. ( Horton v. Goodenough (1920) 184 Cal. 451, 461, 194 P. 34.) Thus, collateral estoppel does not apply if it is impossible to determine from the evidence offered in support of the estoppel which of several potentially dispositive issues the prior decision was founded upon. ( Frank, supra, 28 Cal. at p. 516.) Under these principles, defendant's collateral estoppel claim fails. As the majority correctly explains, the ALJ's determination here that the overpayments were caused by administrative errors leaves open the possibility that defendant made misstatements that were a contributing cause to the overpayments. (Maj. opn., ante, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 89, 141 P.3d at p. 210.) Indeed, this is precisely what the trial court concluded in rejecting defendant's collateral estoppel claim. Based on the ALJ's decision, the trial court concluded that the ALJ's causation finding simply represents a qualitative comparison between the things the county did and the things the defendant did and does not carry with it an implicit finding that there was no error in reporting. Supporting this conclusion are the ALJ's findings that [t]he county welfare department was not fully apprised of the actual circumstances surrounding which parent had primary responsibility for the care and control of defendant's children and that the likelihood of overpayments would merely have been diminishedโnot eliminatedโhad the county welfare department properly reviewed the [children's] living arrangement in September 1998. In light of these findings, the trial court correctly concluded the ALJ made no finding that misstatements by defendant did not contribute to the overpayments. The majority also correctly explains that the absence in the record of the notices of action makes it difficult to determine precisely what issues were before and decided by the ALJ. (Maj. opn., ante, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 90, 141 P.3d at p. 210.) Notably, at oral argument, defendant's counsel conceded that it's a difficult record to read because all of the information and documents weren't entered into evidence at the criminal trial. Indeed, in her brief, defendant explains that the only evidence she produced below in support of her collateral estoppel claim was a copy of the ALJ's decision. Under the governing law as set forth above, because defendant bears the burden of proving the elements of collateral estoppel, the absence from the record of the notices is her responsibility and the failure of the incomplete record to clarify the scope of the ALJ's decision requires rejection of her collateral estoppel claim. (Cf. Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 258, 142 Cal.Rptr. 414, 572 P.2d 28 [rejecting res judicata claim where sparse record presented . . . fail[ed] to show either the precise nature of the factual issues litigated, or the depth of the court's inquiry].) I disagree with the majority's view that we should remand the case to the Court of Appeal to consider the effect, if any, of the absences of [the notices of action] from the record . . . . (Maj. opn., ante, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 90, 141 P.3d at p. 210.) As demonstrated above, by placing the burden on the party alleging collateral estoppel to prove with certainty that a particular issue was decided in the prior proceeding, and by rejecting the doctrine's application where the record fails to demonstrate which of several potentially dispositive issues the prior decision was based on, our decisions clearly specify the effect of the record's incompleteness ( ibid. ): defendant's collateral estoppel claim should be rejected. Because the majority correctly concludes that, on the record before us, the ALJ's determination leaves open the possibility that defendant made misstatements that were a contributing cause to the overpayments ( id., 48 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 89, 141 P.3d at pp. 209-210), under the governing cases, there is nothing left for the Court of Appeal to consider. Notably, although the majority directs the Court of Appeal on remand to consider the effect, if any, of the absences of [the notices of action] from the record ( id., 48 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 89-90, 141 P.3d at p. 210), the majority gives the Court of Appeal no guidance as to what it is supposed to do with this information. Rather than remand for further consideration of this issue, we should simply affirm the trial court's rejection of defendant's collateral estoppel claim and its denial of her dismissal motion. [1]