Opinion ID: 755629
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Binford Issue

Text: 49 Burke received two criminal history points because at the time of the offense of conviction, he was serving another sentence. On March 7, 1996, Burke pled guilty to driving without a license and driving with a suspended license in Illinois state court. He was sentenced to twelve months' court supervision, which he successfully completed on March 10, 1997. He was arrested on these federal drug charges on November 12, 1996, during the period of Illinois court supervision. 50 The district court added two criminal history points because Burke's federal offense occurred while he was under Illinois court supervision. The Guidelines instruct the district court to [a]dd 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d). The district court counted the offenses of driving without a license and driving with a suspended license because [s]entences for misdemeanor and petty offenses are counted, except as follows: (1) Sentences for the following prior offenses and offenses similar to them, by whatever name they are known, are counted only if (A) the sentence was a term of probation of at least one year or a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days.... U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c). Driving without a license or with a revoked or suspended license is one of the misdemeanor and petty offenses listed. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1). 51 Burke argues that court supervision is not a criminal justice sentence because in Illinois the successful completion of court supervision does not result in a conviction on the record. Instead, the case is dismissed entirely. We addressed this issue in United States v. Binford, 108 F.3d 723 (7th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2530, 138 L.Ed.2d 1029 (1997). In Binford, the defendant challenged the district court's decision to assign him two criminal history points for committing the instant offense while on court supervision in Illinois for illegal transportation of alcohol by a driver. See id. at 725. Binford first argued that illegal transportation of alcohol by a driver was similar to an offense listed in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c), but we rejected that argument as dubious. Id. at 726. Rather than analyzing his novel argument, we advanced to the next inquiry under § 4A1.2(c), whether Binford was sentenced to a term of probation of at least one year. See id. at 727. We held that he was. [S]upervision is the functional equivalent of conditional discharge, which we previously have held to be the functional equivalent of probation. The bottom line is that probation, conditional discharge and supervision all allow a convicted defendant to stay out of prison so long as he stays out of trouble. Id. We noted that the only difference between court supervision and unsupervised probation is that charges against a convicted defendant on supervision may ultimately be dismissed. This is of no consequence for purposes of § 4A1.2(c)(1). Id. at 727-28. Thus, we held that court supervision is a criminal justice sentence and the district court properly added two criminal history points. 52 Burke attacks Binford in two ways. First, he argues that our discussion of whether court supervision is the same as probation for purposes of § 4A1.1(d) is dicta and therefore not binding. According to Burke, the discussion is dicta because we decided in the previous paragraph that the defendant's offense was not similar to any listed in § 4A1.2(c)(1), thereby making his offense countable in criminal history regardless of whether court supervision is a kind of probation. We disagree. We did not decide that the defendant's sentence was dissimilar to any listed offense. We merely assumed it. We found it unnecessary to analyze the issue of similarity any further. Binford, 108 F.3d at 726. We went on to [a]ssum[e] arguendo that Binford's misdemeanor is 'similar to' one of the offenses listed. Id. We decided Binford on precisely the ground Burke faces now. 53 Burke also argues that we misconstrued the sentencing guidelines in Binford by regarding court supervision as a conviction under Illinois law. He cites numerous Illinois cases and statutes showing that upon the successful completion of court supervision, the charges are dropped and there is no longer a conviction on the defendant's record. This is of no moment to our analysis of the Guidelines. The Guidelines are federal law. They do not rely on state definitions or labels. We have previously analyzed the import of having a case dismissed after successful completion of court supervision. We found that when a defendant successfully completes court supervision, his conviction is not set aside because of his innocence. His conviction [i]s set aside under Illinois law for purposes of removing the stigma associated with a criminal conviction and to restore his civil rights. United States v. Stowe, 989 F.2d 261, 263 (7th Cir.1993). To rephrase, the defendant is no less guilty of the offense after completing his court supervision than he was when he was found guilty, whether or not Illinois still considers him a misdemeanant. 54 Furthermore, the Guidelines ask whether at the time of the instant offense the defendant was serving a criminal justice sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d). Whether that criminal case against the defendant may later be dismissed has no effect on the answer to that question. The Guidelines seek to enhance the punishment of defendants who commit crimes while they are specifically under court directive to keep their noses clean. Burke was under such a directive. The district court properly assigned him two criminal history points under § 4A1.1(d). 55 For the foregoing reasons we A FFIRM Burke's sentence.