Opinion ID: 2310530
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct at the Closing

Text: Appellant alleges prosecutorial misconduct in closing remarks to the jury. As best as can be gleaned from Appellant's brief, pp. 35-37, the statements and analyses forming the basis of the complaint include the following. First, the prosecutor said: Now, Mister Cannon [counsel for co-defendant Reese] told you that we just got an easy sell; that is, the police officers and the detectives from homicide and the Commonwealth when we took Jackson . . . Well, Jackson earned his deal with the Commonwealth the hard way. When you have any crimes, whether it's economic crime, whether it's a crime of violence such as this or a simple theft, if somebody cannot identify the witnesses [sic], if we have only one perpetrator that's caught, yes, we will make an arrangement, a negotiation, a deal with  to get what we consider are the more serious people.       [W]e have to enter into negotiations, no matter how distasteful it is for us, to arrive at the other perpetrators. Why? Because if it's within our knowledge, the police, that there were 2 more people on the street, there were 2 more killers on the street that we had to find. And that's why the deal was made. (T.T., April 23, 1984, pp. 198-200.) Appellant insists that it was improper to refer to any accused as a killer. Additionally, he argues that by referring to we as the prosecutor's office with experience in these matters in contrast to what we consider the more and fair assessment of the evidence. In particular, we have personal interpretations. Lacking any further explanation in this brief, the accusation is conclusory. Appellant appears to be suggesting that somehow such comparisons are morally invidious and lie beyond the pale of acceptable courtroom procedure. Labeling Appellant a killer somehow inferred that he was more culpable than co-defendant Reese. Second, Appellant quotes the prosecutor's remarks (T.T., April 23, 1984, p. 204): He /referring to Jackson/ didn't isolate himself from the facts in the case. And in every statement he always says Touche tells him that Lambert's the shooter. And in every statement he says that Touche lays it out that Touche went up to the bar to talk to the barmaid and the other person, Lambert, did the shooting. Appellant interprets such statements to mean that Jackson says that Reese says that Appellant is the shooter. (Brief, p. 37.) Under this characterization, Appellant argues that the implication would violate the Bruton rule, since Appellant was not permitted to cross-examine witness Jackson on his relationship with Reese while these closing remarks to the jury allowed the prosecutor to use Jackson's statement to the police concerning what Reese had told him about Lambert's role in the crime. Third, Appellant complains that the prosecutor totally misstated the testimony of a witness, Richard DeLoach. On numerous occasions we have held that a prosecuting attorney is forbidden to inject into evidence highly prejudicial personal opinions of a defendant's credibility on the grounds that it encroaches on the jury's exclusive function of weighing the evidence. The determination of guilt must be compelled intellectually from a disinterested and fair assessment of the evidence. In particular, we have struck hard at prosecutorial labelling of accused as cold blooded killers. Commonwealth v. Gilman, 470 Pa. 179, 188-192, 368 A.2d 253, 257-259 (1977) (collecting cases and incorporating both our Code of Professional Responsibility and ABA Standards). On this evidence, nevertheless, we cannot hold that the first statement violated these rules. Explanatory references to plea bargains are commonplace and acceptable. The reference to 2 more killers on the street was part of the explanation for the need to plea bargain with Jackson and, in any event, lacks the quality of directness towards the Appellant. Such remarks must be evaluated in the context in which they occurred, Commonwealth v. Smith, 490 Pa. 380, 388, 416 A.2d 986, 989 (1980), and must rise to the level of unfairness or undue prejudice. Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 511 Pa. 429, 515 A.2d 531 (1986). [10] Appellant's second argument that the prosecutor's closing remarks violated the Bruton rule is equally devoid of any merit. The interpretation of the meaning of this statement is pure speculation by the Appellant and an invitation to us to read the jury's collective mind in a factual vacuum. We decline to enter that sophist world. Finally, the prosecution did not misstate witness DeLoach's testimony. The prosecutor's closing statement regarding this evidence is as follows (at T.T., April 23, 1984, p. 211): Now, Mister Irwin in his closing told you that Mister DeLoach had testified that the person who got shot was towering over the shooter. Well, I submit to you ladies and gentlemen I don't recollect that evidence. It's up to you whether you remember that or not but  MR. IRWIN: That's objected to. THE COURT: Objection noted on the record. The evidence of towering over was part of the effort to establish the height of the true killer by contrasting the heights of Reese and Lambert. Appellant's present allegation is that by denying in front of the jury that witness DeLoach had given such a description, the prosecution engaged in misleading the fact-finder. A review of DeLoach's testimony, nevertheless, reveals no references to who towered over whom. DeLoach stated simply that he could not identify the shooter who was shorter than he (T.T., April 11, 1984, pp. 167, 171), but the phrase towering over him instead was used solely by defense counsel. (T.T., April 23, 1984, p. 112: He was standing straight and the victim fell on top of him and was towering over him. He referred to the shooter.) We determine that there was no misstatement of the trial testimony by the prosecutor because DeLoach never made such statement in the first instance.