Opinion ID: 1034078
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State-Election Records

Text: Defendants challenge the district court’s admission of statements that defendants argue constitute testimonial hearsay. The statements came from state-election records that were introduced in two government exhibits: PR83 and PR84. PR83 contains “913 pages of documents documenting statewide complaints of election violations between 2002 and 2006, which included a number of complaints regarding Clay County that individually named Thompson’s alleged co-conspirators and co-defendants.”33 Thompson Br. at 44. The district court explained that PR83 was relevant for a non-hearsay purpose: 32 Maricle contends that “the excluded portions of the recordings were consistent with Maricle’s testimony, which would have rebut[t]ed the government’s express and implied charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.” Maricle Br. at 37. Although this is a valid exception to hearsay, Maricle has not pointed to anything in the record that shows that his prior statement was offered for that purpose. In fact, the record shows that the statements were offered prior to Maricle’s crossexamination by the government, undermining the possibility of admitting the statements to rebut the government’s charge of fabrication. R. 883 (03/12/2010 Trial Tr. at 30) (Page ID #9980); see United States v. Wells, 623 F.3d 332, 344 (6th Cir. 2010). 33 For example: Anonymous complaint dated 05/28/2002: “Jennings White/Stanley Bowling/Kennon White $75.00 a vote—payed by Bart Morris behind Super America.” A.A. at 509. Anonymous complaint dated 11/04/2002: “Rumor that votes will be bought with marijuana and oxycotin [sic]. Reports that William Stivers is behind the wrongdoing. Id. at 518. Jennings White reported on 05/11/2004: “The Clay County School Superintendent will control the vote buying by offering jobs in the school system.” Id. at 519. Anonymous complaint dated 05/15/2006: “Doug Adams, Superintendent of Clay Co Schools, man[ipu]lates the county and tells people who to vote for, especially those who work for him.” Id. at 524. Anonymous complaint dated 11/07/2006: “Doug White is running for mayor and he is buying votes. Precinct officers, his daughter-in-law and her brother, are handing out pieces of paper and telling voters to go to Bart Morris’ house. Caller doesn’t know if this is in exchange for money or drugs.” Id. at 530. Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 49 5336/ 5337/ 5366 [T]here has already been testimony that when the Attorney General’s office received complaints that those complaints would be relayed back to the [Clay County] clerk for investigation or for action to be taken. So knowledge of at least the clerk would certainly be relevant as to what was going on and then actions that were taken as a result of that, especially if, as has been offered here, there has been evidence that the clerk was intimately involved in the election irregularities that were taking place; and they would be taking some action to avoid detection. R. 934 (03/04/2010 Trial Tr. at 109–10) (Page ID #12311–12); see R. 853 (03/08/2010 Trial Tr. at 7–8) (Page ID #6846–47); see also R. 876 (03/02/2010 Trial Tr. at 81–83) (Page ID #9157–59). The district court also ruled that the records “were not unduly prejudicial,” rejecting defendants’ objections based on Federal Rule of Evidence 403 (“Rule 403”). R. 853 (03/08/2010 Trial Tr. at 8) (Page ID #6847). Finally, the district court instructed the jury: [T]o the extent that these documents contain complaints that are raised by third parties, parties calling to make complaints, those are not being admitted for the truthfulness of the statements that are being made in those materials. They are admitted to show the complaints were received from the office and that the office recorded those complaints, and you are so instructed. R. 934 (3/04/2010 Trial Tr. at 123) (Page ID #12325). Defendants did not object to this instruction. PR84 contains thirty-five pages of summaries of election-day complaints made to the State Board of Elections during the 2004 primary and 2006 primary and general elections in Clay County. Thompson Br. at 49. In a sidebar, the district court stated that it was admitting PR84 for the non-hearsay purpose of showing defendants’ awareness of election irregularities. R. 853 (03/08/2010 Trial Tr. at 93–95) (Page ID #6932–34). The district court ruled that the admission of PR84 did not violate Rule 403: With respect to 403, these are separate complaints other than those that were received by the Attorney General’s Office, but the complaints that were being received by both entities[, the State Board of Elections and Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 50 5336/ 5337/ 5366 the Attorney General’s Office,] is clearly relevant in the case. It’s not unduly prejudicial. The Court will give a limiting instruction, but, again, this goes to a very central issue that the United States is litigating in the case . . . . Id. at 95 (Page ID #6934). The district court’s limiting instruction was similar to that provided for PR83: I want to again advise the jury that with respect to any call-in complaints reflected in PR84, the exhibit that’s just been introduced, I’ve admitted that document as an exhibit, but you should not accept the complaints that are contained in that document for the truth of those matters that are asserted or that are reflected in the document. Id. at 106 (Page ID #6945). Defendants did not object to this instruction at trial; on appeal, defendants point out that the district court failed to instruct the jury as to the purpose for which it could consider PR84. Defendants argue that the admission of these exhibits violated their rights under the Confrontation Clause, that the district court abused its discretion in weighing the harm of unfair prejudice under Rule 403, and that the district court’s limiting instructions were insufficient under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
Defendants contend that the complaints contained with the state-election reports were testimonial hearsay that were admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The government responds that defendants’ awareness of election irregularities was relevant for two non-hearsay purposes and, therefore, does not implicate the Confrontation Clause. First, the government contends that the evidence supports its theory that after complaints were received, defendants adjusted their scheme to avoid detection. Second, the government explains that the evidence shows that Thompson’s grand jury testimony was false because he was aware of vote-stealing complaints in the 2006 election (Count 9 - obstruction of justice). We agree with the Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 51 5336/ 5337/ 5366 government that the Confrontation Clause is not implicated because the records were admitted for valid non-hearsay purposes. “The applicable standard of review for an evidentiary ruling of the district court where the evidentiary issues relate to a claimed violation of the Sixth Amendment is the de novo standard.” United States v. Robinson, 389 F.3d 582, 592 (6th Cir. 2004). “Where testimonial evidence is at issue . . . , the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). The Confrontation Clause does not, however, bar the admission of testimonial statements that are offered for non-hearsay purposes (i.e., not for the truth of the matter asserted). Id. at 59 n.9; United States v. Davis, 577 F.3d 660, 670 (6th Cir. 2009). Defendants assert that PR83 and PR84 were not admitted for a non-hearsay purpose but were, instead, admitted for the substance of the complaints contained in the records; that is, evidence showing that defendants bought votes. With regard to PR84, defendants argue that the government’s closing argument acknowledges this improper purpose: Now, folks, evidence in this case, the attorney general’s office had over 100 complaints in 2002, over 60 complaints in the 2006 election. You’ve got those complaints that are numbered. You’ve got those complaints that are in evidence. We have evidence that Wanda White was literally seen—and reported to Freddy Thompson himself in 2006—looking over changing people’s vote, and reported to him, and he didn’t even tell the grand jury that. R. 889 (03/22/2010 Trial Tr. at 13) (Page ID #10590). Contrary to defendants’ assertion, this statement shows that the government was using the election records for its stated non-hearsay purpose: Freddy Thompson lied to the grand jury when discussing complaints about the 2006 election because he had, in fact, received reports of outright Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 52 5336/ 5337/ 5366 vote buying.34 This was, of course, highly relevant to Count 9 of the indictment, which charged Thompson with obstruction of justice. Defendants also argue that PR83 could not have been admissible for showing defendants’ knowledge of vote buying because Jennings White, not Freddy Thompson, was the Clay County Clerk in 2002. This argument overlooks one of the stated nonhearsay purposes for which the government admitted the evidence. As discussed by the district court, the 2002 election records were relevant to corroborate testimony that explained that defendants adjusted their scheme based on the complaints received by the County Clerk’s office from the State Board of Elections. R. 853 (03/08/2010 Trial Tr. at 8) (Page ID #6847). In particular, testimony showed that defendants moved their vote-buying operation after being warned by Jennings White that investigators from the Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) were present in Clay County. R. 840 (02/11/2010 Trial Tr. at 47) (Page ID #5613). The fact that Jennings, as Clay County Clerk, had contact with the State Board of Elections regarding complaints of vote buying—which were forwarded to the OAG by the State Board of Elections—has the tendency to make it more probable that Jennings was able to warn conspirators about the OAG’s investigation. Evidence of such contact from later elections, when Thompson served as County Clerk, served a similar purpose. For these reasons, we hold that the state-election records were admitted for a non-hearsay purpose; therefore, defendants’ Confrontation Clause challenge fails.
Defendants argue that even if their right to confrontation was not violated, the district court should have excluded PR83 and PR84 under Rule 403. As noted in part IV.A.1 of this opinion, the district court is afforded broad discretion in making its balancing determination under Rule 403; however, such discretion is not unfettered. E.g., United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 723 (6th Cir. 2002). Even maximizing 34 We acknowledge, however, that this relevance relies on other testimony that the complaints were in fact forwarded to Thompson. Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 53 5336/ 5337/ 5366 the probative value of the state-election records and minimizing their potential for unfair prejudice, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the stateelection records. The probative value of the state-election records is minimal at best. As discussed earlier, the records were admitted to: (1) corroborate testimony that explained how defendants adjusted their scheme based on the complaints received by the Clay County Clerk’s office from the State Board of Elections and (2) show that Thompson knew that there were reports of vote buying, contrary to his grand jury testimony. Defendants aptly point out that both of these purposes rest not on the records themselves but on testimony that the records were actually forwarded to the County Clerk from the State Board of Elections. The government responds that evidence of knowledge “is hard to come by” and therefore has a high probative value.35 Gov’t Br. at 98 (quoting United States v. Ross, 502 F.3d 521, 530 (6th Cir. 2007)). But the records were not evidence of knowledge—that came from linking the records from the State Board of Elections to the County Clerk. Thus, the evidence was valuable only to the extent that it corroborated testimony that defendants adjusted their scheme when the County Clerk (i.e., Thompson) received complaints of vote buying. Therefore, the contents of the records did not add anything to the government’s case, if considered solely for the stated non-hearsay purpose. The state-election records are unfairly prejudicial. “Regardless of the reason for which the court and the prosecutor thought the evidence was being offered, the prejudice inquiry asks whether ‘the jury [was] likely to consider the statement for the truth of what was stated with significant resultant prejudice.’” United States v. Evans, 216 F.3d 80, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Reyes, 18 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. Johnson, 27 F.3d 1186, 1193 (6th Cir. 1994) (“When prior acts evidence is introduced, regardless of the stated purpose, the likelihood is very great that the jurors will use the evidence precisely for the purpose it may not be considered.”); see also FED. 35 The government’s Rule 403 analysis more or less begins and ends there. Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 54 5336/ 5337/ 5366 R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note (“In reaching a decision whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction.”). In the present case, the answer is unequivocally yes, the jury was likely to consider the statements for their truth. The substance of the complaints contained within the state-election records do not simply paint defendants in a bad light. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 95 F.3d 449, 453 (6th Cir. 1996). In fact, the complaints go even further than propensity evidence, reaching one of the most important findings that the jury was required to make: whether defendants engaged in vote buying from 2002 to 2006. E.g., A.A. at 509 (Anonymous complaint dated 05/28/2002: “Jennings White/Stanley Bowling/Kennon White $75.00 a vote—payed by Bart Morris behind Super America.”). In the words of Justice Cardozo, “[t]he reverberating clang of those accusatory words would drown all weaker sounds.” Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933); see United States v. Stout, 509 F.3d 796, 801 (6th Cir. 2007). On balance, the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value. In making this determination, we note there was other evidence available with the same probative value but without the unfair prejudice. See United States v. Merriweather, 78 F.3d 1070, 1077 (6th Cir. 1996) (“One factor in balancing unfair prejudice against probative value under Rule 403 is the availability of other means of proof.”); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182–83 (1997) (“If an alternative were found to have substantially the same or greater probative value but a lower danger of unfair prejudice, sound judicial discretion would discount the value of the item first offered and exclude it if its discounted probative value were substantially outweighed by unfairly prejudicial risk.”). To corroborate testimony that the County Clerk had received complaints of vote buying, the government might have proffered redacted versions of the records—removing the unfairly prejudicial accusations that defendants were engaging in vote buying. The names of the accused were not relevant Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 55 5336/ 5337/ 5366 to the clerk’s knowledge of vote buying.36 Furthermore, “the admission of this prejudicial evidence was not remedied by the district court’s instruction to the jury that” the evidence should not be considered for the truth of the complaints contained within. Haywood, 280 F.3d at 724. Making matters worse, the district court failed to instruct the jury of the purpose for which it could consider PR84. Although this failure was likely because the district court presumed that the jury would understand that it was to consider PR84 for the same purpose as PR83, “a clear and concise instruction identifying for the jurors the specific purpose for which the evidence was admissible” was especially necessary here where the evidence is unfairly prejudicial. Merriweather, 78 F.3d at 1077. We hold that the district court abused its discretion in determining that the danger of unfair prejudice from admitting the state-election records did not substantially outweigh their probative value.37 Simply put, the state-election records should have been excluded under Rule 403.