Opinion ID: 537575
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Little Tucker Act Claim

Text: 3 Appellant has stated a claim under the Tucker Act sufficient to avoid dismissal only if he has demonstrated a substantive right, independent of the Tucker Act, to payment of money by the United States because the Tucker Act itself does not establish a right to payment but merely waives sovereign immunity (and grants jurisdiction to the district courts and the Claims Court). See United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). 4 Appellant claims he is due back pay under 37 U.S.C. Secs. 206(a) and 204(a)(2) (1982). Neither section, however, establishes his right to payment. Section 206(a) merely mandates payment to reservists for each regular period of instruction, or period of appropriate duty, at which he is engaged.... Appellant performed no reserve unit drills for pay after his transfer to a non-paying position and thus was not entitled to payment following his transfer, the only period at issue in this appeal. Section 204(a)(2) provides for payment to a reservist who is participating in training or other full-time duty. Appellant did not so participate and therefore is not entitled to payment under this section either. Cf. Ayala v. United States, 16 Cl.Ct. 1, 4 (1988) ([A] reservist is not entitled to compensation ... unless he is ordered to perform and actually performs the work. Compensation is not based on status as a reservist. (citing United States v. Wickersham, 201 U.S. 390 (1906))). 5 Because Appellant has not demonstrated a substantive right to payment by the United States separate from 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(a)(2), the district court properly dismissed his Little Tucker Act claim as he failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). 6