Opinion ID: 2166128
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: thurman was properly convicted of use of weapon to commit felony

Text: In his first assignment of error, Thurman argues that the district court erred in upholding his convictions on two counts of use of a weapon to commit a felony because the underlying felonies were general intent crimes which would not support the use charges. Thurman argues that the underlying felonies, first degree sexual assault and first degree false imprisonment, while general intent crimes, are not intentional under State v. Ring [2] and State v. Pruett. [3] The State argues that Thurman confuses specific intent, general intent, and unintentional crimes and that only an unintentional felony would not support a use of a weapon charge. In Ring, this court stated: The apparent purposes behind § 28-1205 [which criminalizes the use of a weapon to commit a felony] are to discourage individuals from employing deadly weapons in order to facilitate or effectuate the commission of felonies and to discourage persons from carrying deadly weapons while they commit felonies. The statute is designed to regulate the manner in which felonies are committed, i.e., with the use or possession of deadly weapons . . . . It cannot reasonably be said that § 28-1205 will dissuade a person from using a deadly weapon to commit an unintentional felony; the two concepts are logically inconsistent. Thus, in order to interpret § 28-1205 in a manner which is consistent with its objective, we hold that the language to commit any felony, as it is used in that section, is synonymous with for the purpose of committing any felony. [4] We thus concluded that motor vehicle homicide was an unintentional crime that would not support a conviction for use of a weapon to commit a felony. [5] We subsequently held in Pruett that manslaughter due to reckless assault was also an unintentional crime which could not support a use of a weapon charge. [6]