Opinion ID: 1704512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in denying Sprik's Motions to Dismiss and for Judgment of Acquittal with respect to Counts III through VI of the Information.

Text: The six-part Information set forth three separate crimes of Second Degree Rape in violation of SDCL 22-22-1(2) (Counts I, III, and V), or, in the alternative, three separate crimes of Third Degree Rape in violation of SDCL 22-22-1(5) (Counts II, IV, and VI). [1] The jury convicted Sprik only of Count II  Third Degree Rape in violation of SDCL 22-22-1(5). Sprik argues that an accused cannot be charged with more than one count of sexual assault for the same offense against the same victim on the basis of the same continuous act. According to Sprik, the duplicitous charging practice violates his rights secured to him under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution[] and Article VI, Sections 2 and 9 of the S.D. Constitution. To accept Sprik's argument would be to hold that a defendant can perform as many acts of penetration as possible during a sexual encounter or transaction and be subject to punishment for only one act of penetration. See Michigan v. Wilson, 196 Mich. App. 604, 493 N.W.2d 471, 474 n. 2 (1992). These facts indicate, however, that there were five separate acts of sexual penetration over the course of approximately two hours. (Sexual intercourse, fellatio, sexual intercourse, fellatio, and sexual intercourse.) Therefore, we conclude that under SDCL 22-22-1 and SDCL 22-22-2, the Legislature intended to punish separately each criminal sexual penetration, Wilson, 493 N.W.2d at 474 (citations omitted), and it was not inappropriate to charge Sprik with more than one count of sexual penetration. See generally Johnson v. Alaska, 762 P.2d 493, 495 (Alaska Ct.App.1988) (Separate convictions for multiple acts of penetration involving different openings of the victim's or the defendant's body are permissible.); Rodriquez v. Alaska, 741 P.2d 1200, 1208 (Alaska Ct.App.1987) (although a continuous transaction, there was a completed sexual act followed by another separate sexual act). Sprik also argues that the counts were not specifically set out as specific incidents of specific conduct in which to bar multiple or subsequent prosecution of each count upon conviction or acquittal thereof. To be sufficient, an information must state all of the elements of the offense charged, fairly inform the defendant of the charge against him, and enable the defendant to plead an acquittal of conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense. State v. Oster, 495 N.W.2d 305, 307 (S.D.1993) (citations omitted); State v. Floody, 481 N.W.2d 242, 246 (S.D.1992) (citations omitted). This court has consistently held that an indictment is generally sufficient if it employs the language of the statute or its equivalent. Oster, 495 N.W.2d at 307 (citations omitted). This court addressed similar arguments in State v. Wurtz, 436 N.W.2d 839 (S.D.1989) and Floody, 481 N.W.2d 242. In both instances, this court held against the defendant, noting that [a] party may proceed with proof, outside of the information itself, to determine the charge which the conviction was based upon in order to raise it as a bar to a subsequent prosecution. Floody, 481 N.W.2d at 247 (quoting Wurtz, 436 N.W.2d at 843). During the preliminary hearing, and at trial, N.G. testified that she was penetrated vaginally three times and orally twice. The State moved, at the close of the preliminary hearing, to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence to five separate acts rather than three because I believe the victim's testimony here substantiates more acts of sexual penetration than what was originally charged out in the complaint. The State's motion was denied. Finally, a separate decision was required by the jury on all counts. See Floody, 481 N.W.2d at 247. Inasmuch as the language of the indictment properly incorporate[d] the statutory law of South Dakota, we find the indictment to be sufficient. Oster, 495 N.W.2d at 307-08. Sprik argues that neither the Information nor the jury instructions described Counts I through VI as divisible incidents of sexual penetration. Therefore, according to Sprik, the jurors did not know which act of sexual penetration was attributable to which specific count and this led to a compromise verdict. In support, Sprik cites to a question from the jury during deliberations asking whether the sequence was vaginal, oral, vaginal. While it may be true that Sprik has no way of knowing which alleged act of penetration qualified as Third Degree Rape nor does he know which alleged act he was acquitted of, we find this harmless, if error. Whether the jury rejected the State's theory of the case, finding instead that the entire attack against N.G. constituted one count of Third Degree Rape, or simply found Sprik guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of only one of the three charged incidents of penetration, Sprik's conviction on Count II will prevent retrial based upon any alleged incidents of rape against N.G. occurring on September 14, 1992 at Memorial Park in Rapid City, South Dakota. Floody, 481 N.W.2d at 247 n. 7 (citing Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990)). This clearly protects Sprik against Double Jeopardy.