Opinion ID: 2979912
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Malcolm’s Initial Interrogation

Text: The Fifth Amendment states that a defendant cannot be “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda, the Supreme Court determined that a suspect under custodial interrogation must be given notice of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 478-79. To ensure compliance with this rule, incriminating statements elicited during custodial interrogation prior to Miranda warnings cannot be admitted at trial. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam). However, this rule only applies “where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). The Supreme Court has defined “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. “[T]he proper inquiry . . . [involves] two essential questions: ‘[F]irst, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’” Coomer v. Yukins, 533 F.3d 477, 485 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)). “The question of whether a defendant was ‘in custody’ is a mixed question of fact and law, and is thus reviewed de novo.” United States v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 2003). In 6 determining whether a suspect is subjected to a custodial interrogation, “the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). The “ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495). This Court has previously outlined several factors to consider to determine whether someone is in custody. The first factor considered is whether a reasonable person in defendant’s situation “would have believed that [he] was free to terminate the interrogation and leave.” United States v. Crossley, 224 F.3d 847, 861 (6th Cir. 2000). Additionally, we have considered “(1) the location of the interview; (2) the length and manner of the questioning; (3) whether there was any restraint on the individual’s freedom of movement; and (4) whether the individual was told that he or she did not need to answer the questions.” United States v. Hinojosa, 606 F.3d 875, 883 (6th Cir. 2010). Applying these factors, we conclude that the magistrate judge and district court were correct; the initial portion of the April 4, 2007 interview was not a custodial interrogation. During the interview, Malcolm was not handcuffed or physically restrained, facts which weigh against a custodial interrogation.1 See United States v. Panak, 552 F.3d 462, 467 (6th Cir. 2009). Malcolm 1 We are unpersuaded that general security protocols within the ATF office, which required staff escort for non-ATF visitors, restricted Malcolm’s movements in any noteworthy fashion. Similarly, the fact that Malcolm was told that he could not smoke in the interview room did not render the interview custodial, even though the second time that Malcolm asked “can I go smoke” he was told “give us five minutes here, tell us what happened, and then we’ll go smoke.” Given the commonality of these restrictions on activity and movement within modern office buildings, they would not make a reasonable person feel as though he or she could not leave and terminate an interview. 7 was told repeatedly that he could leave and was not under arrest.2 See Coomer, 533 F.3d at 487 (stating that under United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943, 951 (6th Cir. 1998), “one of the most important factors in the custody inquiry is whether an officer explicitly informs a suspect that he or she is not under arrest”). Additionally, Malcolm voluntarily appeared for the interview. See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 (noting that the defendant voluntarily came to the police station for questioning). Though Malcolm’s interview did occur at the ATF office at Special Agent Young’s request, a non-custodial interview is not transformed into a custodial one simply because “the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.” Id. Moreover, the fact that Special Agent Young lied to Malcolm regarding the purpose of the interview does not create the level of compulsion or coercion that turns non-custody into a custodial situation. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442 (holding that an agent’s “unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was ‘in custody’ at a particular time”). For these reasons, the first hour of the April 4, 2007 interview was a non-custodial interview. Because the Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination do not attach to non-custodial interviews, see United States v. Adams, 583 F.3d 457, 467 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The application of the Miranda rule is limited to ‘custodial interrogations.’”), Malcolm did not need to be informed of his Miranda rights before the interview began. The incriminating statements Malcolm made before being placed under arrest were admissible. 2 Malcolm’s argument that the questioning continued late into the day, making him concerned about returning a borrowed car has no bearing on this inquiry. Malcolm was formally arrested and provided with his Miranda rights approximately one hour into the interview, long before he could have difficulty returning a borrowed car. 8