Opinion ID: 160960
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Factors Justifying Departure

Text: With regard to the first three characteristics cited by Gauvin , Ms. McGowan contends that the factors relied upon for departure were insufficient to remove her case “from the heartland of mail theft cases under [USSG] § 2B1.1.” Aplt’s Br. at 15. The factors cited by the district court were (1) the number of -3- victims; (2) the number of checks; (3) the possession of false identification cards and the equipment to make them; (4) the theft of personal items having no monetary value; and (5) the harms suffered by victims who were forced to correct their credit and financial records. 3d Amended Judgment, filed Feb. 10, 2000 [hereinafter referred to as “Judgment”], at 13. Ms. McGowan states that the number of victims did not require an additional enhancement because it was been “implicitly considered” through a 9- level enhancement for the loss amount under USSG §2B1.1(b)(1), and a two-level enhancement for more than minimal planning under §2B1.1(b)(4)(a). Aplt’s Br. at 16. In support, she cites United States v. Corrigan , 128 F.3d 330, 335 (6th Cir. 1997), which held that “[t]he number of victims is adequately considered in the Sentencing Guidelines dealing with fraud,” and United States v. Stein , 127 F.3d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1997), which held that “it is the rare case that the existence of both” multiple victims and more than minimal planning “will take the case outside the heartland of the Guidelines and justify a departure.” The government does not directly respond to this argument. Instead, it cites Koon , 518 U.S. at 98, for the proposition that the district court’s departure methodology was permissible. See Aple’s Br. at 3-4. We find the cases cited by Ms. McGowan inapposite. Both cases deal with fraud offenses under §2F1.1, not property offenses under §2B1.1. The Guidelines -4- for property offenses contain no provision akin to the multiple victim enhancement of §2F1.1(b)(2)(B). Furthermore, §2F1.1(b)(2)(B) lists more than minimal planning and multiple victims as alternative, not cumulative, reasons to apply a two-level enhancement. See USSG §2F1.1(b)(2)(B) (“If the offense involved (A) more than minimal planning, or (B) a scheme to defraud more than one victim, increase by 2 levels.”) (emphasis added). As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Stein , this suggests the Sentencing Commission realized that in most fraud schemes, “where one of these factors applies the other will apply as well.” Stein , 127 F.3d at 780. We take the absence of a similar alternative provision for multiple victims in §2B1.1(b)(4)(A) as an indication that the Commission did not take the same view of multiple victim property offenses, and that a large number of victims may constitute an adequate justification for an additional departure. Here, the number of victims was around 300, which seemed to the district court “substantially in excess” of a number typical for property offenses, even those involving mail. Aplt’s Br. at 65 (Tr. of Sentencing Hearing). It was thus a permissible basis for a departure. Ms. McGowan then proposes that the number of checks, the possession of equipment to make false IDs, and the theft of items having no monetary value all fell within the heartland of mail theft cases. She argues that because §2B1.1(b)(3) requires a minimum enhancement to level 6 for the theft of -5- “undelivered United States mail,” the Commission “has considered and addressed the enhancements appropriate for theft of mail cases,” and “mail cases have their own ‘heartland’ of conduct.” Aplt’s Br. at 17-18. Again, the government does not specifically respond to these arguments, but generally contends that the guidelines “do not adequately consider the harm to the individual victims.” Aple’s Br. at 4. Based on the Application Notes to §2B1.1, we agree with the government’s position. The Commission noted that [c]onsistent with statutory distinctions, an increased minimum offense level is provided for the theft of undelivered mail. Theft of undelivered mail interferes with a governmental function, and the scope of the theft may be difficult to ascertain. USSG §2B1.1, comment. (backg’d.). It appears that the intent of this enhancement was not to take into account the theft of over 300 boxes of checks, the possession of false identification, and the theft of items with no monetary value. The presence of these factors may therefore appropriately take a mail theft case outside the sentencing heartland. Finally, Ms. McGowan contends that the court’s use of the “extensive inconveniences and costs incurred, not only by financial institutions, but by the individuals whose checks were stolen,” was unjustified. See Judgment at 13. She proposes that like the use of false identification, the need for individuals to correct their credit histories is a normal result of mail theft and does not take a -6- case outside the mail theft “heartland.” See Aplt’s Br. at 19-23. We decline to reach the merits of this argument, as we find that the district court’s departure was already justified by the factors cited above.