Opinion ID: 1367800
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kaapu's Standing to Challenge the ATDC's Decision to Withhold Disclosure of Development Proposals

Text: Kaapu contends that the plain language of HRS § 92-12 (1985) of the Sunshine Law confers standing on him to challenge the validity of the confidentiality provisions of ATDC Rule 15-26-44 as a justification for the ATDC's nondisclosure of the development proposals at the public meeting. [11] We agree. HRS § 92-12 provides in relevant part: (a) The attorney general and the prosecuting attorney shall enforce this part. . . . . (c) Any person may commence a suit in the circuit court of the circuit in which a prohibited act occurs for the purpose of requiring compliance with or preventing violations of this part [ i.e., HRS §§ 92-1 through 92-13, relating to meetings] or to determine the applicability of this part to discussions or decisions of the public body. The court may order payment of reasonable attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party in a suit brought under this section. (Emphasis added.) Literally construed, HRS § 92-12(c) authorizes any person to file a lawsuit in circuit court to seek enforcement of the open meetings provisions of HRS § 92-3. Where the terms of a statute are plain, unambiguous and explicit, the courts are not at liberty to go outside of the language to search for a meaning which does not reasonably [accord with] the terms of the statute. City and County of Honolulu v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 53 Haw. 431, 433-34, 495 P.2d 1180, 1182 (1972) (citations omitted). In effect, HRS § 92-12 gives Kaapu standing to challenge the validity of the confidentiality provisions of ATDC Rule 15-26-44 as a private attorney general, inasmuch as he is a `person[] upon whom [the legislature] has conferred the right to seek judicial review of agency action.' See Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. Anderson, 70 Haw. 276, 285, 768 P.2d 1293, 1300 (1989) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737-38, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1367, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972) (emphasis deleted)). Ordinarily, statutes require economic injury rather than mere concern for the public interest as a predicate to standing to sue as a private attorney general. See id. But in the case of HRS § 92-12, any person is expressly authorized to initiate a lawsuit, upon the allegation that a prohibited act has occurred in violation of HRS §§ 92-1 through 92-13, in order to enforce compliance with or determine the applicability of the Sunshine Law to the proceedings of boards such as the ATDC. Noting Kaapu's lack of meaningful participation in the public meeting, the ATDC cites Mahuiki v. Planning Commission, 65 Haw. 506, 654 P.2d 874 (1982), Jordan v. Hamada, 62 Haw. 444, 616 P.2d 1368 (1980), and Munoz v. Commissioner of Public Lands, 40 Haw. 675 (1955), for the proposition that Hawaii law requires one who seeks judicial review of administrative action to show that one actually participated as an adversary in the proceeding involving the disputed decision in order to have standing to seek judicial review. All three cases, however, are inapposite to the question of standing under HRS § 92-12. Mahuiki and Jordan involved attempts by plaintiffs claiming to be persons aggrieved... in a contested case to obtain judicial review of an administrative agency's action under HRS § 91-14(a) (1985) of the HAPA; [12] in each instance, this court ruled that participation in a hearing as an adversary was a statutory prerequisite to standing. Mahuiki, 65 Haw. at 514-15, 654 P.2d at 879-80; Jordan, 62 Haw. at 449, 616 P.2d at 1372. In the present matter, however, Kaapu relies on HRS § 92-12, rather than HRS § 91-14(a), as the basis for standing to sue. Munoz, a pre-HAPA case, stands for the principle that a party who directly and actively participates in a judicial or other public sale or auction of property and accepts the benefits of the sale by bidding is equitably estopped from impugning the disposition of such property. 40 Haw. at 688-89. Standing to sue, rather than equitable estoppel, is at issue here. The feature distinguishing the standing requirement under HAPA from that underlying the Sunshine Law is succinctly set forth in City and County of Honolulu v. Public Utilities Commission, as follows: HRS § 91-14(a), which provides [a]ny person aggrieved by a final decision and order in a contested case ... is entitled to judicial review ..., is clear and unambiguous that the person aggrieved must have been involved in the contested case.... HRS § 91-14(a) does not provide simply that any person aggrieved by a final decision and order is entitled to judicial review. If the legislature intended to give any person aggrieved by a final decision and order, regardless of whether the person participated in a contested case, the right to judicial review, the legislature would have so stated. 53 Haw. at 433, 495 P.2d at 1182 (emphasis in original). Just as HRS § 91-14(a) clearly and unambiguously requires that a person aggrieved by a decision and order have participated in the contested case that produced it, so HRS § 92-12 clearly and unambiguously entitles any person to commence a suit in the circuit court of the circuit in which a prohibited act occurs, regardless of the person's participation in any proceeding. Such a construction of HRS § 92-12 is consistent with the legislature's [d]eclaration of policy and intent, set forth in HRS § 92-1 (1985), that the formation and conduct of public policy  the discussions, deliberations, decisions, and action of governmental agencies  shall be conducted as openly as possible in order to protect the people's right to know.... Accordingly, we hold as a matter of law that the circuit court erred in ruling that Kaapu lacked standing to challenge the validity of the confidentiality provisions of ATDC Rule 15-26-44 as a justification for the ATDC's nondisclosure of the development proposals at the public meeting. However, we further hold that the error was harmless, inasmuch as it does not alter the ultimate disposition of this matter.