Opinion ID: 1935963
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: did the trial court judge err in refusing to recuse himself?

Text: Both through pre-trial motions, and the trial itself, Gollott asserted that the trial judge should have recused himself. He asserts that the trial judge had been friends with him and his family. In addition, Gollott asserts that members of his family have given the trial judge campaign contributions. Gollott argues that the trial judge became sensitive to his relationship with Gollott, when Diane's family allegedly criticized him. As a result, Gollott argues that the judge allegedly began hearing motions telephonically, scheduling motions at the end of the day, and during breaks in other cases. Gollott argues these actions indicate the case began to take special significance with the trial judge. In addition, the trial judge drafted instructions, later withdrawn by the judge, which would deny Gollott any defense in this case. The trial judge did deny Gollott the defense of accident. Gollott also argues that the trial judge had an ex parte discussion with the prosecutor concerning a peremptory instruction. Gollott's assertion fails to demonstrate that the trial judge talked to the prosecutor ex parte. The trial judge states he asked the prosecutor to check the law with the Attorney General's office during the course of the last time. Later, the trial judge states that Mrs. Nicholson, defense counsel, was present. Gollott argues the general standard for recusal, as given in Cantrell v. State, 507 So.2d 325, 328 (Miss. 1987). The standard is whether the judge has sufficient connections with parties or preconceived opinions regarding a case so that he could not fulfill the role of a judge in deciding it. Cantrell, 507 So.2d at 328. The problem in this case is that Gollott fails to develop the factual basis for a motion to recuse. He fails to state or present in the record which members of Gollott's family had connections with the judge, or the timing and amount of any campaign contributions between the judge and Gollott's family. He fails to develop the timing or content of any accusations leveled against the judge by Diane's family. Gollott fails to show how telephonic motions, or motions scheduled while a jury is meeting, are unusual. This Court has stated that parties must apprise itself of information which would require a judge's recusal, in a case concerning recusal of a justice of this Court. Ryals v. Pigott, 580 So.2d 1140, 1175 (Miss. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940, 112 S.Ct. 377, 116 L.Ed.2d 328 (1991). More to the point, other courts have stated that mere conclusory allegations do not warrant recusal. State v. Brown, 546 So.2d 1265, 1272 (La. Ct. App. 1989). Louisiana requires supporting factual assertions to show bias or prejudice, to support a motion for recusal. Brown, 546 So.2d at 1272. This Court cannot review a basis for recusal, in that no facts are present to develop the extent of the judge's interests in this case. This assignment of error lacks merit.