Opinion ID: 794347
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: overview of the right of access to judicial records

Text: 19 Historically, courts have recognized a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents. Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 & n. 7, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978). This right is justified by the interest of citizens in keep[ing] a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies. Id. at 598, 98 S.Ct. 1306. Such vigilance is aided by the efforts of newspapers to publish information concerning the operation of government. Id. 20 Nonetheless, access to judicial records is not absolute. A narrow range of documents is not subject to the right of public access at all because the records have traditionally been kept secret for important policy reasons. Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir.1989). Our case law has identified two categories of documents that fall in this category: grand jury transcripts and warrant materials in the midst of a pre-indictment investigation. Id. 21 Unless a particular court record is one traditionally kept secret, a strong presumption in favor of access is the starting point. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135 (citing Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir.1995)). A party seeking to seal a judicial record then bears the burden of overcoming this strong presumption by meeting the compelling reasons standard. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. That is, the party must articulate[ ] compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings, id. (citing San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096, 1102-03 (9th Cir.1999)), that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the `public interest in understanding the judicial process.' Hagestad, 49 F.3d at 1434 (quoting EEOC v. Erection Co., 900 F.2d 168, 170 (9th Cir.1990)). In turn, the court must conscientiously balance[ ] the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. After considering these interests, if the court decides to seal certain judicial records, it must base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture. Hagestad, 49 F.3d at 1434 (citing Valley Broadcasting Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 798 F.2d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir.1986)). 22 In general, compelling reasons sufficient to outweigh the public's interest in disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes, such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598, 98 S.Ct. 1306; accord Valley Broadcasting Co., 798 F.2d at 1294. The mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant's embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136. 23 We acknowledged explicitly in San Jose Mercury News, 187 F.3d at 1102, and later confirmed in Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136, that the strong presumption of access to judicial records applies fully to dispositive pleadings, including motions for summary judgment and related attachments. We adopted this principle of disclosure because the resolution of a dispute on the merits, whether by trial or summary judgment, is at the heart of the interest in ensuring the public's understanding of the judicial process and of significant public events. Valley Broadcasting, 798 F.2d at 1294; accord Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135-36 (noting that `summary judgment adjudicates substantive rights and serves as a substitute for trial') (quoting Rushford v. The New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1988)). Thus, compelling reasons must be shown to seal judicial records attached to a dispositive motion. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136. The compelling reasons standard is invoked even if the dispositive motion, or its attachments, were previously filed under seal or protective order. Id. ([T]he presumption of access is not rebutted where . . . documents subject to a protective order are filed under seal as attachments to a dispositive motion. The . . . `compelling reasons' standard continues to apply.) (internal citations omitted). 24 We have, however, carved out an exception to the presumption of access to judicial records, Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135, for a  sealed discovery document [attached] to a non-dispositive motion, such that the usual presumption of the public's right of access is rebutted. Phillips v. General Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir.2002) (emphasis added). There are, as we explained in Foltz, good reasons to distinguish between dispositive and non-dispositive motions. 331 F.3d at 1135. Specifically, the public has less of a need for access to court records attached only to non-dispositive motions because those documents are often `unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action.' Id. (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984)). 25 The public policies that support the right of access to dispositive motions, and related materials, do not apply with equal force to non-dispositive materials. Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1213. We reasoned in Phillips that when a district court grants a protective order to seal documents during discovery, it already has determined that `good cause' exists to protect this information from being disclosed to the public by balancing the needs for discovery against the need for confidentiality. Id. The application of a strong presumption of access to sealed records, not directly relevant to the merits of the case, would eviscerate the broad power of the district court to fashion protective orders. Id. Thus a particularized showing, Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1138, under the good cause standard of Rule 26(c) will suffice[ ] to warrant preserving the secrecy of sealed discovery material attached to non-dispositive motions. Id. at 1135. 26 In sum, we treat judicial records attached to dispositive motions differently from records attached to non-dispositive motions. Those who seek to maintain the secrecy of documents attached to dispositive motions must meet the high threshold of showing that compelling reasons support secrecy. Id. at 1136. A good cause showing under Rule 26(c) will suffice to keep sealed records attached to non-dispositive motions. Id. at 1135. 27 It is important to emphasize the difference between the compelling reasons standard and the good cause standard, especially because the City suggests that they essentially collapse in this case. 4 A good cause showing will suffice to seal documents produced in discovery. Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(c) (stating that if good cause is shown in discovery, a district court may issue any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense). Rule 26(c) gives the district court much flexibility in balancing and protecting the interests of private parties. Id. 28 A good cause showing will not, without more, satisfy a compelling reasons test. See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135-36; Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1212 (observing that even if a court finds good cause under Rule 26(c) to seal a document, it must still determine whether the common law right of access compels production). Different interests are at stake with the right of access than with Rule 26(c); with the former, the private interests of the litigants are not the only weights on the scale. Unlike private materials unearthed during discovery, judicial records are public documents almost by definition, and the public is entitled to access by default. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597, 98 S.Ct. 1306. This fact sharply tips the balance in favor of production when a document, formerly sealed for good cause under Rule 26(c), becomes part of a judicial record. Thus a good cause showing alone will not suffice to fulfill the compelling reasons standard that a party must meet to rebut the presumption of access to dispositive pleadings and attachments. 5 29 Having in mind these differences in the nature of the sealed filings and the applicable standards, we bifurcate our analysis, first considering records to which the compelling reasons standard applies — the documents attached to dispositive motions that the City and United States seek to keep sealed. We then analyze records to which the good cause standard applies —the documents attached to non-dispositive motions that the City alone seeks to keep sealed. 30