Opinion ID: 1897045
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the common interest community required approval as a subdivision

Text: The defendants also contend that the trial court improperly concluded that the planned community did not constitute a division of the Cytec property that required the plaintiffs to seek subdivision approval from the planning commission. They argue, in essence, that the unit lines drawn by the declaration actually are divisions of the land for building purposes, so that approval by the city planning commission was a prerequisite to the issuance of a zoning permit. The plaintiffs contend that the defendants again misconstrue the act, this time by failing to recognize that the Cytec property has not been dividedthe land is still owned as one parcel. We agree with the plaintiffs, and conclude that the trial court properly determined that there was no division of the land that would require subdivision approval. We first set forth the applicable standard of review. Generally, it is the function of a zoning board . . . to decide within prescribed limits and consistent with the exercise of [its] legal discretion, whether a particular section of the zoning regulations applies to a given situation and the manner in which it does apply. The trial court had to decide whether the board correctly interpreted the section [of the regulations] and applied it with reasonable discretion to the facts. . . . In applying the law to the facts of a particular case, the board is endowed with . . . liberal discretion, and its action is subject to review . . . only to determine whether it was unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal. . . . Moreover, the plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that the board acted improperly. . . . Ordinarily, this court affords deference to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statute's purposes. . . . [A]n agency's factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight. . . . Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. . . . Furthermore, when [an] agency's determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny . . . the agency is not entitled to special deference. . . . [I]t is for the courts, and not administrative agencies, to expound and apply governing principles of law. . . . These principles apply equally to regulations as well as to statutes. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wood v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 258 Conn. 691, 697-98, 784 A.2d 354 (2001). The defendants' claim involves questions of law that we have not considered previously. Our review is, therefore, plenary. See id., at 699, 784 A.2d 354. The city exercises its zoning power pursuant to its charter, which was authorized by a special act of the legislature. [12] 26 Spec. Acts 1228, No. 619 (1953). The charter serves as an enabling act, both creating power and prescribing the form in which it must be exercised. . . . The charter is the source of authority governing subdivisions, except if there is a clear legislative intent that the General Statutes control. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 227 Conn. 71, 82, 629 A.2d 1089 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1164, 114 S.Ct. 1190, 127 L.Ed.2d 540 (1994); see also Sheridan v. Planning Board, 159 Conn. 1, 4, 266 A.2d 396 (1969) ([w]ith the exception of certain provisions contained in chapters 124 and 126 of the General Statutes . . . planning and zoning in Stamford are governed by . . . the Stamford charter (1953), rather than by the General Statutes). We, therefore, look to the Stamford charter and to the zoning and subdivision regulations adopted by the zoning and planning boards pursuant to the charter in order to determine whether the plaintiffs' proposed development constitutes a subdivision, which would require approval by the city planning board. [13] Section C6-30-19 of the Stamford charter provides that `subdivision' shall mean the division of a tract or parcel of land into two or more lots for the purpose, whether immediate or future, of sale or building development, expressly excluding development for agricultural purposes, and shall include resubdivision. [14] Stamford subdivision regulation § 2.14 similarly defines subdivision in relevant part as the division of a lot, parcel or tract of land into two or more lots or other division of land for the purpose, whether immediate or future, of building development. . . . The subdivision regulations define lot as a parcel or portion of land separated from other parcels or portions by description as a subdivision or record survey map, by metes and bounds for purpose of sale, lease, or transfer. Stamford Subdivision Regs., § 2.5. The city's zoning regulations define [l]ot as [a] parcel of land occupied or to be occupied by a building or a group of buildings and their accessory uses, or for storage space, including such open spaces as are required by these regulations and such other open spaces as are arranged, designed and/ or used in connection with such buildings. Stamford Zoning Regs., art. II, § 3A.55. These regulatory definitions make it clear that a division of the land must take place in order to trigger subdivision review; accordingly, the question before us is whether the creation of a common interest community consisting of airspace units divides the underlying property. The defendants claim that the unit lines drawn by the plaintiffs divided the Cytec property into three separate lots for the purposes of building development. The plaintiffs argue in response that the declaration divides only the ownership of the airspace above the Cytec property, not the land itself, which remains one lot and an undivided common element in the common interest community. We agree with the plaintiffs. We already have concluded that the act provides for the creation of airspace units. See part I of this opinion. Section 4.03(b) of the West Main & Alvord Commercial Park declaration describes the lower horizontal boundary of the units as the surface of the `land,' and further provides that [a]ll space below the surface of the `land' is undivided and is a Common Element. The space below each Unit is allocated as a Limited Common Element. . . . The declaration also describes one of the common elements of the planned community as the portion of the land which lies below the boundary described in Subsection 4.03(b). . . . The declaration, therefore, clearly states that the land underlying the commercial park, namely, the entire thirty-five acre Cytec property, remains one undivided lot. Consistent with the declaration, the documents on file in the city land records indicate that, in eighty-five years, upon the expiration of the leases that allowed for the creation of the commercial park, the entire lot again will become the property of Cytec, free of any leasehold interest. The Cytec property, therefore, has not been divided so as to require subdivision approval. The defendants argue that General Statutes § 47-204(b)(1) supports their contention that the units created by the declaration are in fact separate pieces of property, created through a division of land which required subdivision approval. Section 47-204(b)(1) concerns taxing and assessing a common interest community, and provides, inter alia, that, in a planned community: If there is any unit owner other than a declarant, each unit that has been created, together with its interest in the common elements, constitutes for all purposes a separate parcel of real property. In directing our attention to this statutory provision, however, the defendants overlook the definition of unit owner. Section 47-202(32) defines `unit owner' as a declarant or other person who owns a unit, or a lessee of a unit in a leasehold common interest community whose lease expires simultaneously with any lease the expiration or termination of which will remove the unit from the common interest community. . . . In a condominium or planned community, the declarant is the owner of any unit created by the declaration. . . . (Emphasis added.) Pursuant to this definition, the only unit owner in the West Main & Alvord Commercial Park is the declarant, Stamford Holdings. In order for the plaintiffs to be unit owners, the termination of their leases would have to coincide with the termination of the lease that created the planned community. No units will be removed from the common interest community until the expiration of the ground lease between Stamford Holdings and Cytec, which will occur on December 3, 2088. Stop & Shop's lease has a term of twenty-five years, [15] Alvord's lease expires on December 2, 2078, and Stamford Labs Realty-A, LLC's lease expires the following day. Therefore, the plaintiffs are not unit owners as defined by the act, and the only unit owner is the declarant, so that the language contained in § 47-204 provides no support for the defendants' argument. The defendants also argue that the plaintiffs chose to execute their development plan via a common interest community with the sole intention of evading subdivision review and the attendant public hearing. The transcript of the board's decision indicates that several board members were of the opinion that the plaintiffs' establishment of a planned common interest community would leave the city helpless to regulate the use of the Cytec property. Although it is true that the ownership arrangement established by the plaintiffs does not require subdivision approval, the city is not powerless to regulate the plaintiffs' development of the property. The city has always had control over the Cytec property through the enforcement of its zoning regulations. The regulations adopted by the board enabled it to divide the city into zoning districts of such number, shape and area as may be deemed best suited to carry out these regulations and provide for their enforcement. . . . Stamford Zoning Regs., art. I, § 1.A; see also Stamford Charter § C6-40-1. The Cytec property is designated as an M-L zone for light industrial uses under city regulations. Stamford Zoning Regs., Appendix A, Land Use Schedule. Permitted uses within an M-L zone include Food Shops, Retail, which, as we discuss more fully in part III of this opinion, encompasses grocery stores such as the one the plaintiffs plan to build. Therefore, the city exercised its regulatory powers and determined permissible uses for the Cytec property when it designated the lot as appropriate for multiple light industrial uses. Once it did so, Cytec, as the property owner, had the absolute right to put its land to any use that is consistent with its zoning classification. The city further exercised its powers through the zoning permit application process, during which the plaintiffs' plans were scrutinized and approved by several city departments, including the assessor's office, the tax collector, coastal management, environmental protection, flood plain, fire marshal, health, traffic, the building official and finally, the zoning enforcement officer. [16] In order to gain the approval of the zoning enforcement officer, the plaintiffs were required to comply with height, bulk, frontage, parking and square footage requirements. Moreover, the city will have the opportunity to enforce its regulations both during and after construction of the Super Stop & Shop, prior to issuance of the building's certificate of occupancy. In short, our conclusion that the plaintiffs have not divided the property and, therefore, need not submit to subdivision review, does not render the city powerless to monitor the plaintiffs' development of the Cytec property. Rather, the city has always had, and will always retain, the power to regulate the use of the Cytec property through its zoning regulations. It does not, however, have the power to regulate the ownership of the property, and a common interest community is a form of ownership.