Opinion ID: 1983886
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: burden of proof to show statutory violation

Text: Having determined that Section 2825 requires the use of a reasonable person standard, we next consider whether, on this record, the Council has adduced proof under Court of Chancery Rule 56 sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact whether a reasonable person would be misled by ESD's use of the word engineered into believing that ESD is entitled to practice engineering. See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Clark, Del.Supr., 88 A.2d 436, 442 (1952) (Tunnell, J., dissenting); see also Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Business and Professional Regulation, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S.Ct. 2084, 2089, 129 L.Ed.2d 118 (1994) (agency must demonstrate that harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, ___, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 1800, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993)). In an appeal from the entry of summary judgment, the standard of appellate review is de novo. Hoechst Celanese v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, Del.Supr., 656 A.2d 1094, 1099 (1995). From an appellate perspective, a decision granting summary judgment over the objection of the non-movant, does not, strictly speaking, present for review factual findings but rather presents the legal conclusion that there is no factual bar to the determination of the legal merit of the movant's position. Since that determination is made on a paper record we are free to draw our own inferences as to the legal significance of such evidence. Given the same record, the Court is as institutionally competent to discern the existence of factual disputes as is the trial court. Id. (quoting Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., Del.Supr., 606 A.2d 96, 100 (1992)). Cf. Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Del. Supr., 650 A.2d 1270, 1276 (1994). We find that the Council has not satisfied its burden. The Council's evidence was limited to: (1) anecdotal evidence of approximately four persons who called ESD in a given year to inquire whether ESD offered engineering services; and (2) a 1992 Gallup Organization poll (the Gallup Poll), [11] in which 85 percent of a random sample of Missouri residents stated that, for a company to use the word engineering in its name, its work should be supervised by a licensed engineer. Although the Council submitted that, on average, four people per year called ESD and asked if it provides engineering services, this evidence does not create an issue of material fact whether a reasonable person would be misled by ESD's use of the word engineered. In order to prove that a reasonable person would have been misled, specific evidence in the nature of a survey [12] or actual proof of the state of mind of a reasonable number of callers might suffice. Those questions are not before us, but on the record before us, proof is missing that a reasonable person would be misled. Further, there are two reasons why the impact of the 1992 Missouri Gallup Poll is not probative of the question whether a reasonable person would be misled in this case, notwithstanding the fact that relevant survey information is generally helpful in cases such as these, see, e.g., Moore v. California State Bd. of Accountancy, 2 Cal.4th 999, 9 Cal. Rptr.2d 358, 831 P.2d 798 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 951, 113 S.Ct. 1364, 122 L.Ed.2d 742 (1993). First, it is well accepted that current surveys are persuasive when they canvas the geographic area in which the challenged use occurs, or a geographic area reasonably close to that site. See Ernst Hardware Co. v. Ernst Home Ctr., Inc., 134 Or.App. 560, 895 P.2d 1363, 1366-67 (1995). Here, the Gallup Organization conducted the survey among a random sample of Missouri residents for another purpose nearly three years ago. Missouri can hardly be said to be a geographic area reasonably close to Delaware. Second, the survey polled Missouri residents concerning the use of the word engineering, not engineered. As noted above, [13] the noun engineering is materially different from the adjective engineered in usage which is relevant here. See 24 Del.C. § 2803; Random House Unabridged Dictionary, at 645 (2d ed. 1993). Thus, the Missouri poll of December 19, 1992 cannot be found to constitute proof probative of ESD's use of the adjective engineered as misleading in this context. The Council relies on McWhorter v. State of Ala. Bd. of Registration for Professional Eng'rs & Land Surveyors, Ala.Supr., 359 So.2d 769 (1978), in further support of its claim. In McWhorter, the Alabama Supreme Court reviewed an Alabama statutory scheme similar to the Act. The Alabama statute contained a nearly identical definition of engineer and a ban on its use by non-licensed persons. Id. at 772-73. The court enjoined McWhorter Engineering Company, a company that did not offer any engineering services but merely operated a machinery repair business, from using the word engineering in its title as the [u]se of the term `engineering' in McWhorter Engineering Company at least implies that McWhorter or an employee, is a professional engineer. Id. at 773 (citations omitted). The Council's reliance on this case is as problematic as its reliance on the 1992 Missouri Gallup Poll. The Alabama Supreme Court barred McWhorter from using the word engineering, not engineered, in its company name. Since the two words are materially different, the McWhorter analysis does not apply. Based on the fact that the Council has failed to satisfy its burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that ESD's use of engineered in its title would mislead a reasonable person, we hold that Section 2825 on this record does not cover ESD's use of the term engineered. [14]