Opinion ID: 2542673
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Complainant as an Imprisoned Person

Text: Next, Hicks maintains that there was insufficient evidence to establish that a minor  in this case, Complainant  committed to the HYCF, is an imprisoned person because, in juvenile proceedings and juvenile facilities, the focus is on rehabilitation. Hicks again states that [p]risons and [y]outh [c]orrectional [f]acilities are operated by separate department[s] of the [e]xecutive branch of government. He argues that a juvenile ward of the court is not a prisoner: Wards in the HYCF are a separate class of individuals, as evidenced by the insistence of the Department of Human Services on referral to them as such, rather than as inmates or prisoners. In response, the prosecution asserts that the plain reading of the phrase an imprisoned person as used in HRS § 707-732(1)(e) encompasses juveniles confined to a youth correctional facility because: It would be absurd to believe that the legislature intended to punish guards for sexual [contact] with adults in an adult correctional facility, but not to punish guards for sexual [contact] with juveniles confined in a youth correctional facility like [the] HYCF, simply because they fall under the supervision of a different State department. This absurd result would be inconsistent with the overall statutory scheme for sexual offenses, which evidences a strong legislative intent to provide more, not less, protection for minors against sexual offenders. Further, the prosecution contends that, [v]iewing all of the evidence in the strongest light for the prosecution and in full recognition of the province of the trier of fact, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable mind might fairly conclude that Complainant was an imprisoned person. Like the phrase state correctional facility, the word imprisoned is not defined anywhere in the Hawai`i Penal Code. Thus, the undefined word must be read to bear its common, ordinary or usual meaning. Saranillio, 78 Hawai`i at 10, 889 P.2d at 694; see also HRS § 1-14. The Webster Third New International Dictionary (1993) defines imprison as to put in prison: confine in a jail. Id. at 1137 (emphasis added). Consequently, the issue before this court is whether there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Complainant was confined to the HYCF. In the present case, the testimony of Marciel and Haina clearly support the conclusion that Complainant was confined to the HYCF. For example, Marciel testified that her YCO job duties involved security[,] custody and control of wards and further explained that the wards are troubled youths that have been sentenced to prison. . . . They're in jail, and I'm a correctional officer for the youth. Thus, the circuit court did not err in concluding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Complainant was confined and, therefore, an imprisoned person. [5] Accordingly, the circuit court properly denied Hicks' oral motion for judgment of acquittal and motion for new trial.