Opinion ID: 625291
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause

Text: Our Confrontation Clause, penned under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, guarantees that accusations against a criminal defendant can be admitted at trial only once the accusers take the stand and confront the defendant. U.S. Const. amend. VI. This rule stretches back to seventeenth century English law and even to the Roman empire. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988) ([The Confrontation Clause] comes to us on faded parchment, with a lineage that traces back to the beginnings of Western legal culture. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-45, 124 S.Ct. 1354; White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 361-62, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895). The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.  Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The right of a defendant to be confronted with his accuser is not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination, which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers. Id. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The Confrontation Clause was designed to root out the principal evil of using  ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. Michigan v. Bryant, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1152, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50, 124 S.Ct. 1354) (internal quotation marks omitted). The preference for live testimony ... is because of the importance of cross-examination, `the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.' White, 502 U.S. at 356, 112 S.Ct. 736 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)). Specifically, confrontation impress[es] [the witness] with the seriousness of the matter and guard[s] against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury as well as permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990) (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242, 15 S.Ct. 337, and Green, 399 U.S. at 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); see also Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (noting that cross examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested). In the landmark case of Bruton v. United States , the Supreme Court held that the credibility and truth-telling concerns of the Confrontation Clause are heightened when the evidence that the prosecution seeks to admit is a testimonial, hearsay accusation against the defendant, uttered by a co-conspirator in the course of a confession. 391 U.S. at 132, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (holding that [t]his prejudice cannot be dispelled by cross-examination if the codefendant does not take the stand (internal citation omitted)); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63-65, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (refining the scope of the Confrontation Clause but reiterating concerns in Bruton related to the admission of a co-conspirator's accusation); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 132, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) ([T]he truthfinding function of the Confrontation Clause is uniquely threatened when an accomplice's confession is sought to be introduced against a criminal defendant without the benefit of cross-examination. (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986))); Akins v. Warren, 362 Fed.Appx. 508, 512 (6th Cir.2010) (A defendant's admissions, implicating his or her co-defendants, cannot be introduced at a joint trial unless the confessing defendant takes the stand.). The rule of  Bruton makes clear that the protections of the Confrontation Clause are at their zenith whenever ... the prosecution offers into evidence a non-testifying hearsay declarant's confession that names the accused as his partner in crime. Jones v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030, 1049 (7th Cir.2011). This is so because when one person accuses another of a crime under circumstances in which the declarant stands to gain by inculpating another, the accusation is presumptively suspect and must be subjected to the scrutiny of cross-examination. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 132, 119 S.Ct. 1887 (quoting Lee, 476 U.S. at 541, 106 S.Ct. 2056).