Opinion ID: 3053844
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ongoing State Proceeding

Text: [2] The state-initiated proceeding in this case—the Elections Commission’s investigation of Plaintiffs’ activities—is SJSVCCPAC v. CITY OF SAN JOSE 14477 ongoing. After concluding that Plaintiffs had violated San Jose Municipal Code section 12.06.310, the Commission decided to impose two sanctions: a public reprimand and a fine. A month later, it issued the public reprimand. But, apparently because Plaintiffs have failed to provide the necessary financial information, the Commission has not yet assessed any fine. Plaintiffs argue that, because the Commission has decided that a violation occurred, the proceeding is no longer ongoing. We disagree. The transcript of the Commission’s hearing makes clear that the proceeding has not concluded: MR. MERTENS: . . . So my understanding is that we’ve covered the finding of a violation, and we’ve also covered the action we’re going to take, which is going to be imposing a penalty, as well as issuing a public reprimand. And the — we will determine at a future date the number of violations and the pen- alty that will be imposed by the Commission. MR. SATO: Mr. Chair, clarification. Are you also directing the Commission’s evaluator to proceed with an investigation as to the number of potential violations? MR. MERTENS: If that is the recommended course of action. [Commission then moves for a vote, and votes in favor of that course of action.] (Emphases added.) [3] The status of the Commission’s proceeding is analogous to the status of a civil case in which the district court has resolved liability but has not finalized relief. See Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970, 1981 (2008) (“We have long held that 14478 SJSVCCPAC v. CITY OF SAN JOSE an order resolving liability without addressing a plaintiff’s requests for relief is not final.”). The procedure here is also analogous to a criminal case in which the trier of fact has determined guilt, but the court has not imposed a sentence. In that circumstance, no final judgment has been entered, and the proceeding is plainly ongoing.3 See Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169, 174 (1963) (“Final judgment in a criminal case . . . means sentence. The sentence is the judgment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). There is no principled distinction between finality of judgments for purposes of appellate review and finality of state-initiated proceedings for purposes of Younger abstention. We therefore hold that the administrative proceeding is “ongoing” for purposes of Younger abstention. At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ lawyer observed that a state administrative agency could intentionally delay completion of a proceeding so as to thwart state-court and federal-court review. As we have noted, an exception to Younger abstention applies upon a “showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance.” Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435. Plaintiffs’ hypothetical example would fall under that exception but, here, Plaintiffs have not argued that Defendants have acted in bad faith and the record does not support such a finding. Indeed, it appears that any delay has been caused by Plaintiffs, first by refusing to provide the necessary financial information and then by filing this federal action, only six weeks after the Elections Commission’s decision to impose a fine. We pause to note an important legal issue that we need not and do not reach. Under California law, an aggrieved party may challenge a final administrative action in state court by petitioning for a writ of mandate. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1094.5. If a state administrative proceeding is final, and 3 This analogy is particularly apt where, as in many criminal cases (typically misdemeanors), the only sentence imposed is a fine. SJSVCCPAC v. CITY OF SAN JOSE 14479 state-court judicial review is available but has not been invoked, is the state proceeding nevertheless “ongoing” for purposes of Younger abstention? In other words, must federal courts view the administrative proceeding and the possibility for state-court review as one unitary proceeding? The Supreme Court has stated that this is an open question. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans (“NOPSI”), 491 U.S. 350, 370 n.4 (1989); see also id. at 374 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that he would hold that the proceedings are unitary); id. at 374-75 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that he is “not entirely persuaded” that the question is open). Seven circuits have addressed this question. Four have held that the administrative proceeding and the possibility for state court review are to be viewed as one unitary proceeding, and three have held the opposite. Compare Maymo-Melendez v. Alvarez-Ramirez, 364 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Younger now has to be read as treating the state process [the administrative proceeding and the possibility for state-court review] . . . as a continuum from start to finish.”), Majors v. Engelbrecht, 149 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the state proceeding is ongoing, even assuming that the administrative proceeding is final and state-court review had not begun), O’Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, 790-91 (3d Cir. 1994) (joining the majority rule and observing that “[w]e have been given no reason why a litigant in a state administrative proceeding should be permitted to forego statecourt judicial review of the agency’s decision in order to apply for relief in federal court”), and Alleghany Corp. v. Pomeroy, 898 F.2d 1314, 1316-17 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court left the question open and deciding that the proceedings are unitary), with Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 926 F.2d 567, 572 (6th Cir. 1991) (agreeing that “a state administrative enforcement proceeding is no longer pending when the agency proceeding has been completed, notwithstanding the availability of state appellate review”), CECOS Int’l, Inc. v. Jorling, 895 F.2d 66, 72 (2d 14480 SJSVCCPAC v. CITY OF SAN JOSE Cir. 1990) (holding that an aggrieved party may choose between petitioning the state court for review and filing a federal § 1983 claim), and Thomas v. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 807 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The mere availability of state judicial review of state administrative proceedings does not amount to the pendency of state judicial proceedings within the meaning of Huffman[ v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975)].”). Although we briefly joined the majority rule in 1993, that opinion was withdrawn, and we have not addressed the question since then. See Nev. Entm’t Indus., Inc. v. City of Henderson, 8 F.3d 1348 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (joining majority rule), withdrawn by 21 F.3d 895 (9th Cir.), on reh’g 26 F.3d 131 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished disposition) (holding that the Younger abstention question was moot); see also Kleenwell Biohazard Waste & Gen. Ecology Consultants, Inc. v. Nelson, 48 F.3d 391, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that the question is open in this circuit, but declining to reach it). Because, here, the administrative proceeding itself is ongoing, we do not reach the issue.