Opinion ID: 2343096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Recusal of Commissioners

Text: As its third point on appeal, Ford argues that the Commission erred in denying its motion that commissioners with a pro-dealer bias recuse from the case. Specifically, Ford argues that several of the commissioners were themselves automotive dealers and that they would have an interest in broadly interpreting the provisions of section 23-112-403. Thus, according to Ford, the denial of its motion violated Ford's right to due process under both the United States Constitution and the Arkansas Constitution. Crain and the Commission both counter that Ford bears the burden of proving bias and failed to do so in this case. We find no error in the Commission's denial of Ford's motion to recuse. An adjudicator is presumed to be unbiased, and in order to overcome that presumption, a litigant must show a conflict of interest or some other specific reason for disqualification. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975). In order to establish bias, the party making the allegation must show that the decision maker has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against one of the parties to the dispute. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927)). In support of its argument that commissioners who were also automotive dealers were biased in this case, Ford relies in part on a decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Riney, 21 F.3d 793 (8th Cir. 1994). In that case, a dispute between Yamaha and one of its licensed dealers was submitted to the AMVC. At that time, one of the commissioners was a Harley Davidson dealer. That commissioner voted to impose sanctions on Yamaha, and a majority of the Commission agreed. Thereafter, Yamaha filed an action in federal district court, alleging that the Commission's vote violated its constitutional rights. In its prayer for relief, Yamaha sought an injunction to prevent imposition of the Commission's fine. The federal district court entered an order abstaining from, and dismissing without prejudice, the case based on the fact that there was an ongoing state proceeding, as well as the fact that there was no evidence of bias. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the matter to the district court, concluding that the district court's finding that there was no evidence of bias in the state proceeding was clearly erroneous. In reaching this conclusion, the court pointed to the fact that the commissioner that owned a Harley Davidson dealership had a pecuniary interest in eliminating Yamaha as competition in the state. In addition, the court found that the commissioner had abdicated his role as adjudicator by prejudging the issues in the case. The court ultimately concluded that this commissioner's bias resulted in Yamaha being unable to obtain a hearing before a competent tribunal. Yamaha is distinguishable, however, from the present case. Ford simply alleges that dealers who sit as commissioners have an interest in interpreting section 23-112-403 broadly. The record reflects that only one of the commissioners who participated and voted in this case was a dealer. [1] The remaining five commissioners were consumer members. Ford cites to comments made by the one dealer commissioner about his own experiences as a dealer, but fails to point to any actual examples of bias on the part of any particular commissioner. It simply argues that pro-dealer commissioners will vote a certain way to protect their own economic interests, specifically being able to sell a dealership to the highest bidder, regardless of the qualifications of that dealer. A similar argument was raised and rejected in Massengale v. Oklahoma Bd. of Exam'rs in Optometry, 30 F.3d 1325 (10th Cir.1994). In that case, the plaintiffs, who were optometrists and sub-leased office space from Pearle Vision and Lenscrafters, were brought before the Board of Examiners in Optometry for disciplinary action. The plaintiffs argued in part that the members of the board were biased against them and had an economic stake in the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding. In rejecting this argument, the court stated: Plaintiffs' argument assumes the Board members will decide on the basis of their personal economic interests. Particularly in view of the Board's appointment of an impartial hearing officer and the availability of state court review of any evidence of bias, there is nothing to suggest that the disciplinary hearings will be influenced by Board members' inappropriate economic motivation. Id. at 1330. Like the situation in Massengale , Arkansas's APA provides for state court review of any allegations of bias. See section 25-15-213. Ford is entitled to review of any such allegation from both the circuit court and an appellate court. Moreover, there was an impartial hearing officer appointed to oversee the Commission proceedings. Here, Ford failed to demonstrate that any particular commissioner was actually biased against it. Accordingly, we reject Ford's argument that it was prejudiced by the failure of certain commissioners to recuse from this case.