Opinion ID: 307845
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the extortion defense

Text: 13 As noted above, while admitting the $15,000 payments, Kahn and Teleprompter claimed that the money had been extorted from them. The factual outlines of the defense, presented chiefly through Kahn's grand jury testimony, were as follows. The January 24 meeting at the Holiday Inn was a wholly innocent one, devoted wholly to legitimate lobbying against the proposed bidding. Realizing the apparent futility of its lobbying efforts, Teleprompter decided to make an offer the Council couldn't refuse, and the $474,000 bid followed. The size of the bid caught the mayor and Council off guard, and they were forced to accept it. But this angered the corrupt officials, who had planned to award the franchise to another bidder. Thus, the officials took advantage of the time period after February 1, ostensibly devoted to detailed negotiations, to threaten withdrawal of Council approval unless Teleprompter agreed to a payoff. These threats, which went to the very economic survival of Teleprompter in the cable TV line, finally overwhelmed Kahn on February 10, and he reluctantly succumbed to the nefarious scheme. 14 Since appellants fully presented this defense to the jury below, which through its verdict of guilty rejected it, our obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), would ordinarily require us to do the same. But Kahn and Teleprompter claim that Judge Motley's instructions on the extortion defense prevented the jury from fairly considering the issue. It is to those contentions we now turn. 15 The Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1952, makes it a crime to use an interstate facility with intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity, including bribery in violation of state law. Just as the initial inquiry in a Travel Act case is whether the underlying activity violates a state law, see United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 89 S.Ct. 534, 21 L.Ed.2d 487 (1969), the assertion of a particular state law defense in such a case requires a determination of whether the relevant state recognizes the defense. United States v. D'Amato, 436 F.2d 52, 53 (3rd Cir. 1970). 16 In the case at hand, appellants claim that Judge Motley erred by not instructing the jury that the defendants should be acquitted if it were found that they paid the money in response to extortion, or put briefly, that proof of extortion was a complete defense to bribery. Instead, the trial court told the jury that extortionate conduct by the public officials, if proved, could be considered by them in connection with the issue of whether the defendants had the requisite criminal intent and willfulness to violate the law. Since the Travel Act counts here were premised on a violation of several Pennsylvania bribery statutes, 4 the relevant question is whether Pennsylvania law recognizes extortion as a complete defense to bribery, or whether such a defense is relevant only on the issues of intent and willfulness. 17 Unfortunately, there are no Pennsylvania cases on point, and such dicta as exist are inconclusive. 5 Appellants admit this absence of state law, but rely heavily on United States v. Corallo, 413 F.2d 1306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958, 90 S.Ct. 431, 24 L.Ed.2d 422 (1969), where this Court held wholly unexceptionable jury instructions which characterized extortion as a complete defense to bribery. Id. at 1323. However, the Corallo Travel Act prosecution was premised on an underlying violation of New York law, and New York Penal Law Sec. 200.05 (McKinney 1967) explicitly makes proof of extortion a complete defense to bribery. The Pennsylvania bribery statutes contain no such provision, and we think it would be anomalous to read into the Pennsylvania code a provision that the New York legislature thought required a separate and explicit section in its state law. 18 At least two other considerations support this conclusion. In federal prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201, this court has refused to follow the New York rule of calling extortion a complete defense to bribery, but has instead held that such proof is relevant as bearing on the issue of intent. United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1966) (Barash I). There appears no reason to reach a different result with respect to Pennsylvania law, which, like Sec. 201, is conspicuously silent on the subject. 19 Finally, as a policy matter, we think that the Barash I rule is the preferable one. Almost every bribery case involves at least some coercion by the public official; the instances of honest men being corrupted by dirty money, if not nonexistent, are at least exceedingly rare. The proper response to coercion by corrupt public officials should be to go to the authorities, not to make the payoff. Thus, unless the extortion is so overpowering as to negate criminal intent or willfulness, we would be loath to allow those who give in to the illegal coercion to claim it as a total defense to bribery charges. 20 For all these reasons, we agree with Judge Motley that the Pennsylvania courts would not recognize proof of extortion as a complete defense to bribery charges, but would find the defense relevant only on the issues of intent and willfulness. Perhaps foreseeing this result, appellants claim that, even recognizing the validity of the general Barash I principle, Judge Motley's instructions on the extortion defense were erroneous. 21 At the outset, it is clear that Judge Motley's instructions virtually mirrored those approved by this court in United States v. Barash, 412 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832, 90 S.Ct. 86, 24 L.Ed.2d 82 (1969) (Barash II). Kahn and Teleprompter, however, point to two instances where the charge deviated, albeit slightly, from Barash II and claim prejudicial error. 22 First, appellants object to that portion of the charge where Judge Motley told the jury that bribery is committed where the paying party intended that the official be influenced in some way. They claim that the correct instruction would be that the defendant must have intended to influence the official in public actions, and since a bribe by definition is designed to influence in some way, this charge amounted to a directed verdict of conviction. 23 Whatever the technical merits of appellants' reasoning, it is inapplicable here. The objected language here occurred but two sentences after the point where the jury was told that bribery required the intent to influence a public officer with respect to any official act. (Emphasis added). Following so closely on such an instruction, the objected language hardly constituted prejudicial error. Indeed, on the facts of this case, it is difficult to see how the jury could have been affected at all by the challenged instruction. It was undisputed that the money was paid to secure the franchise, and awarding of the franchise was surely an official act. 24 Appellants' second objection to the charge is similarly meritless. In explaining the extortion defense, Judge Motley told the jury that economic coercion was relevant to the issue of whether the defendants had the requisite intent to influence action of a public official. Again, the claim is that the correct charge should have been official action. But in the factual context of this case, where nothing but official action was at issue, and given the earlier instruction about bribery requiring the intent to influence an officer with respect to any official act, there was clearly no error. Looking at the charge as a whole, Barash II, supra, 412 F.2d at 30, we find that Judge Motley fairly and completely presented the extortion defense to the jury, which clearly rejected it.