Opinion ID: 1996929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 1995 Paternity Contempt Warrant

Text: DHR posits next that, even if service of the show cause order in 1995 was deficient, the court issued properly a paternity contempt warrant for Flanagan in 1995, and that the service of such warrant in 2007 provides an alternative basis for personal jurisdiction under § 5-1041 of the Family Law Article [6] of the Maryland Code. We conclude, however, that the 1995 paternity contempt warrant was issued improperly and the service of that improperly issued warrant cannot supply the basis for the Circuit Court's personal jurisdiction to find Flanagan in contempt. Title 5 of the Family Law Article, entitled Children, § 5-1041, [7] entitled Enforcement of order, provides: (a) In general.A court order under this subtitle is enforceable in the same manner and to the same extent as any other order of an equity court in this State. (b) Support orders.If an individual fails to make a support payment ordered under this subtitle, the individual shall be served with an order that directs the individual to show cause why that individual should not be held in contempt. (c) Warrants.(1) The court shall issue a warrant for the arrest of any individual who: (i) fails to appear in response to a show cause order served on the individual under this section; or (ii) cannot be served with the show cause order. (2) A warrant issued under this subsection shall be issued as provided in § 5-1014 of this subtitle. (d) Sanctions for support orders.If the court finds that an individual has failed to make a support payment ordered under this subtitle while having the means to pay, the court: (1) shall find the individual guilty of civil contempt; and (2) may order the individual imprisoned until the individual complies with the support order or otherwise purges the contempt. Md.Code, Fam. Law § 5-1041 (1999, 2006 Repl.Vol.). Under this section, a warrant shall issue only if the defendant (1) fails to appear after proper service of the show cause order or (2) cannot be served with the show cause order. As discussed supra, service of the show cause order by leaving a copy of it under the door at 1925 Pennsylvania Avenue was insufficient. Thus, issuance of the 1995 paternity contempt warrant cannot be considered proper under § 5-1041(c)(1)(i) because it may not be said that Flanagan failed to appear in response to a show cause order served on him. In addition, there is no suggestion that service upon Flanagan was impossible; rather, it appears that no efforts were made to serve Flanagan at one of the alternative addresses listed for him or to seek leave from the court for alternative service or a declaration that Flanagan was evading service. As such, issuance of the paternity contempt warrant cannot be justified by resort to § 5-1041(c)(1)(ii), as there is no proof that Flanagan could not be served. The 1995 paternity contempt warrant was issued improperly, and its issuance and service cannot form the basis for the Circuit Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction in 2007. [8] We observe, in passing, that Flanagan asserts additionally that service of the paternity contempt warrant in 2007 occurred too late to establish personal jurisdiction in the Circuit Court, in violation of Rule 2-507(b). That Rule states that [a]n action against any defendant who has not been served or over whom the court has not otherwise acquired jurisdiction is subject to dismissal as to that defendant at the expiration of 120 days from the issuance of original process directed to that defendant. Rule 2-507(b). Flanagan contends that the original process in the case was the issuance of the show cause order on 21 August 1995, and points to the fact that service of the arrest warrant was not effected until January 2007, well beyond the 120-day limit. Flanagan's argument is flawed. Rule 2-507(b) provides that failure to serve the defendant within 120 days from the issuance of original process merely makes the action subject to dismissal. Whether to dismiss rests in the sound discretion of a trial judge in the first instance, based on his or her weighing of the balance of the rights, interests, and reasons of the parties for the delay and the public demand for prompt resolution of litigation. Langrall, Muir & Noppinger v. Gladding, 282 Md. 397, 400-01, 384 A.2d 737, 739 (1978). Dismissal is not an automatic remedy for delayed service. As such, it is not proper, in the first instance, for an appellate court to decide whether the 12 year interval between issuance of the paternity contempt warrant and service of the warrant on Flanagan merits inherently dismissal of the contempt proceedings.