Opinion ID: 693463
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equitable Tolling and the QTA

Text: 11 Under the [QTA], the United States, subject to certain exceptions, has waived its sovereign immunity [permitting] plaintiffs to name it as a party defendant in civil actions to adjudicate title disputes involving real property in which the United States claims an interest. Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 275-76, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 1813-14, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983) (footnote omitted). The QTA provides the exclusive procedure by which a claimant can judicially challenge the title of the United States to real property. Id. at 276-77, 103 S.Ct. at 1814. Claims brought pursuant to the QTA are subject to a twelve-year statute of limitations: 12 Any civil action under this section ... shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States. 13 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2409a(g). 14 In McIntyre v. United States, 789 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir.1986), we held that this statute of limitations was a jurisdictional prerequisite and that equitable estoppel or tolling [could not] be used to circumvent the Act's 12-year statute of limitations. Id. at 1411. However, we now hold that this rule in McIntyre was overruled by the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990). 15 In Irwin, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the plaintiff's claim was barred by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-16(c), requiring a civil suit under Title VII to be filed within 30 days of receipt of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's right-to-sue letter. Id. at 92, 111 S.Ct. at 455. It held that the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States. Congress, of course, may provide otherwise if it wishes to do so. Id. at 95-96, 111 S.Ct. at 457. Although the Court in Irwin was addressing a claim under Title VII, it intended to create a general rule that equitable tolling was a defense to all federal statutes of limitations, unless Congress provided otherwise. Id.; see also Goodhand v. United States, 40 F.3d 209, 213 (7th Cir.1994); Glarner v. United States, Dep't of Veterans Admin., 30 F.3d 697, 701 (6th Cir.1994); Long v. Frank, 22 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 938, 130 L.Ed.2d 883 (1995). 16 The Government offers several arguments challenging the applicability of equitable tolling to the QTA's statute of limitations. All of its arguments are premised on the assertion that the presumption of equitable tolling established by Irwin is rebutted because Congress provided that equitable tolling does not apply to the QTA's statute of limitations. We reject each of the Government's arguments. 17 First, the Government relies on Block, 461 U.S. at 273, 103 S.Ct. at 1813, to argue that the QTA's statute of limitations is jurisdictional. In Block, the Court held that if a suit under the QTA is time-barred by the statute of limitations, then federal courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits. Id. at 292, 103 S.Ct. at 1823. Similarly, the Court in United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 106 S.Ct. 2224, 90 L.Ed.2d 841 (1986), held that [w]hen the United States consents to be sued, the terms of its waiver of sovereign immunity define the extent of the court's jurisdiction. Id. at 841, 106 S.Ct. at 2229.  '[A] statute of limitations ... constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity,'  and thus, defines jurisdiction. Id. (quoting Block, 461 U.S. at 287, 103 S.Ct. at 1820). However, the Court in Irwin reasoned that making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way that it is applicable to private suits, amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver. 498 U.S. at 95, 111 S.Ct. at 457. Thus, as this court has previously noted, the Court in Irwin held that federal statutory time limitations on suits against the government are not jurisdictional in nature. Garrett, 10 F.3d at 1437 (emphasis added) (citing Irwin, 498 U.S. at 89, 111 S.Ct. at 454). Consequently, we hold that the statements in Block and Mottaz that the QTA's statute of limitations is jurisdictional in nature have no continuing validity after the Court's decision in Irwin. 18 Second, the Government argues the legislative history of the QTA discloses a congressional intent to impose a twelve-year statute of limitations without possibility of equitable tolling. Again, the Government relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Block. In Block, the Court rejected North Dakota's argument that it could maintain an officer's suit to challenge the United States' claim to portions of the bed of the Little Missouri River. Focusing on the legislative history, the Court held that the QTA was the exclusive means by which adverse claimants could challenge the United States' title to real property. Block, 461 U.S. at 286, 103 S.Ct. at 1819. The Court also stated that [t]he legislative history is clear that Congress intended to foreclose totally any suit on claims that accrued more than 12 years prior to the effective date of the QTA. Id. at n. 23. However, we construe this language as referring to the Court's conclusion that officer's suits could not be used to circumvent the exclusive remedy of the QTA, not as precluding the availability of equitable tolling. 19 The Government also relies directly on the legislative history of the QTA. It argues the original Senate Report referred to the proposed QTA as jurisdictional and stated that [i]n no way would it alter the substantive rules of law prevailing in actions against the Government. S.Rep. No. 92-575 (Dec. 10, 1971). However, a statement that the QTA was not intended to alter substantive rules of law says nothing about the effect of a statute of limitations, which is traditionally regarded as a procedural bar to an action and does not directly affect underlying rights. See Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 1142, 89 L.Ed. 1628 (1945) ([A]s a matter of constitutional law ... statutes of limitation go to matters of remedy, not to destruction of fundamental rights.). 20 The Government, relying on the House Report, also argues that legislative history indicates the twelve-year statute of limitations was intended to prevent stale claims. This report states that the period is fixed ... so that the government will not have to defend against [stale] claims, and that the statute of limitations will make a reasonable provision for the bulk of existing controversies. H.R.Rep. No. 1559, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4550-51. However, this language indicates nothing more than Congress imposed the QTA's statute of limitations for the usual purpose, namely, to limit stale claims. 21 In sum, neither the legislative history nor the Court's decision in Block precludes application of equitable tolling to suits brought pursuant to the QTA. Thus, we hold that the doctrine applies to the QTA's statute of limitations. Because the district court held otherwise, it never had the opportunity to consider whether equitable tolling should apply to the Fadem's QTA claim. On remand, it should make that determination.