Opinion ID: 2411780
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the kentucky education reform act of 1990

Text: Appellants challenge anti-nepotism provisions, KRS 160.180(2)(i) and KRS 160.380(2)(f), found within the Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990 (hereinafter referred to as KERA); embodied in Chapters 156 through 163. The General Assembly enacted KERA, which radically changed the system of public education in this Commonwealth, following our decision in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., Ky., 790 S.W.2d 186 (1989). In Rose, supra, at 215, we declared that education is a basic fundamental right in Kentucky, guaranteed by Section 183 of our Kentucky Constitution. Section 183 provides that: The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the State. We acknowledged in Rose, supra, at 212, that there is a strong presumption of the constitutionality of enactments of the General Assembly. Yet after reviewing the facts presented, we determined that application of the former legislative framework resulted in constitutionally deficient common schools. Therefore, our opinion directed the General Assembly to recreate and redesign a new system that will comply with standards we have set out. Id. The following were included as essential and minimal characteristics of a constitutionally efficient system of common schools, as required by Section 183: 1) The establishment, maintenance, and funding of common schools in Kentucky is the sole responsibility of the General Assembly, and 6) Common schools shall be monitored by the General Assembly to assure that they are operated with no waste, no duplication, no mismanagement, and with no political influence. Id., at 212-213. (Emphasis added.) Earlier in our opinion in Rose, supra, at 193, we noted that the trial court held that: An adequate school system must also include careful and comprehensive supervision at all levels to monitor personnel performance and minimize waste. If and where waste and mismanagement exist, including but not limited to improper nepotism, favoritism, and misallocation of school monies, they must be eliminated, through state intervention if necessary. (Emphasis added.) We summarized in Rose, supra, at 216, that: the sole responsibility for providing the system of common schools lies with the General Assembly. If they choose to delegate any of this duty to institutions such as the local boards of education, the General Assembly must provide a mechanism to assure that the ultimate control remains with the General Assembly, and assure that those local districts also exercise the delegated duties in an efficient manner. (Emphasis added.) The evils of waste, duplication, mismanagement and political influence were thus identified by our Court in Rose, supra , as barriers against an efficient school system. The General Assembly, in response to this opinion, enacted KERA in 1990. The new statutes, as we shall illustrate, removed many personnel decisions from the control of the local school boards. This was a policy decision by the General Assembly to restructure the state-wide educational system. All appointments, promotions, and transfers of school personnel, prior to KERA, were made upon the recommendation of the district superintendent,  subject to approval of the board,  under former KRS 160.380. (Emphasis added.) Thus, a majority vote of the district board members was required for any personnel actions. Likewise, reductions in pay and responsibilities, under former KRS 161.760; demotions, under former KRS 161.765; and terminations, under former KRS 161.790; required a majority vote of the school board members, the latter two actions also required a hearing before the Board voted. New provisions in KERA serve to legislatively eliminate areas which were once fertile ground for favoritism and/or neoptism to take root. KRS 160.370, removes direct responsibility for the hiring and dismissal of all personnel in the [school] district from the school board, giving such power to the superintendent. Similarly, KRS 160.380(2)(a) provides that [a]ll appointments, promotions and transfers of principals, supervisors, teachers, and other public school employees shall be made only by the superintendent of schools . . . (Emphasis added.) Reduction in a teacher's responsibility under KRS 161.760; demotion of administrative personnel under KRS 161.765; and suspensions and terminations of teachers under KRS 161.790; all are effected, under KERA, by the superintendent, the latter two actions pursuant to statute, provide for a hearing, upon request. The General Assembly, further attempting to expunge the deleterious effects of nepotism from the common schools, provides under KRS 160.170, that an elected member of the board, before assuming duties of office, must take an oath that he will not in any way influence the hiring or appointment of district employees. If this oath is broken, the violating board member will be removed from office, under KRS 415.050 and 415.060. See KRS 160.180(3). Appellants assert that the previously enumerated provisions illustrate that responsibilities for hiring, promotions, transfers, assignments, etc. are now outside the purview of the local school boards and that whatever problems remain, pertaining to nepotism in the hiring of school personnel, are more than amply covered by KRS 160.180(3), and by 161.164(3), (4). The latter statute provides that any board member who attempts to influence the hiring of any school employee shall be subject to removal from office pursuant to KRS 415.050 and 415.060. KRS 161.164(3), (4) prohibit board members from trading their influence in personnel matters for votes, and from basing personnel decisions on an employee's political or religious opinions or affiliations or ethnic origin or race or color or sex or age or handicapping condition. The new Act does place many personnel decisions that were previously under the district school board's control, now under the control of the superintendent, but local boards still retain numerous powers. Under KRS 160.350(1), boards are responsible for hiring and fixing the salary of superintendents. Boards also may discharge superintendents for cause, under KRS 160.350(3), subject only to the approval of the chief state school officer. KRS 160.370 provides that the superintendent shall have general supervision . . . of the general conduct of the schools, the course of instruction, the discipline of pupils, and the management of business affairs, but this is subject to the control of the board of education.  (Emphasis added.) The superintendent is responsible for the hiring and dismissal of all personnel in the district, pursuant to KRS 160.370, but this same provision designates that he shall be the executive agent of the board that appoints him. (Emphasis added.) The OEA, from a practical viewpoint, asserts that boards enjoy substantial and indirect control over superintendents, because superintendents are dependent on their board's continuing goodwill, since it is the board who appoints the superintendent for a term of no more than four (4) years. KRS 160.350(1). The General Assembly, in restructuring the system of common schools, through KERA, provides for further elimination of indirect political influence in personnel matters, in KRS 160.180(1), (2)(i) and 160.380(1)(a), (2)(f). KRS 160.180(2)(i) provides that: (2) No person shall be eligible to membership on a board of education:       (i) Who has a relative as defined in subsection (1) of this section employed by the school district and is elected after July 13, 1990. However, this shall not apply to a board member holding office on July 13, 1990 whose relative was not initially hired by the district during the tenure of the board member. Section (1) of KRS 160.180 defines relative as: father, mother, brother, sister, husband, wife, son, daughter, aunt, uncle, son-in-law, and daughter-in-law. KRS 160.380(1)(a), and (2)(f), read as follows: (1) As used in this section: (a) `Relative' shall mean father, mother, brother, sister, husband, wife, son, daughter, aunt, uncle, son-in-law, and daughter-in-law. (2)(f) No superintendent shall employ a relative of a school board member of the district, unless on July 13, 1990, the board member's relative is an employee of the district, the board member is holding office, and the relative was not initially hired by the district during the tenure of the board member. A relative employed in 1989-90 and initially hired during the tenure of a board member serving on July 13, 1990, may continue to be employed during the remainder of the board member's term. However, the superintendent shall not promote any relative of a school board member who continues employment under the exception of this subsection. Appellants challenge the constitutionality of a qualification for school board membership, as defined in KRS 160.180(2)(i), that prohibits anyone elected after July 13, 1990, from serving as a board member, who has a relative as defined within the statute, and that relative is employed by the district. KRS 160.180(2)(i) incorporates two exceptions in its disqualification restriction, a fact that the trial court noted: 1) The statute applies only to persons elected after July 13, 1990, and 2) The statute contains a grandfather clause, permitting persons holding office on July 13, 1990, whose relative was not initially hired during the board member's tenure, to serve additional terms. KRS 160.380(2)(f), also constitutionally challenged by appellants, prohibits a school district from employing relatives of its school board members. Similar to exceptions found in KRS 160.180(2)(i), this section, as the trial court notes, provides that: 1) An employee may continue during the term of a board member relative who is serving on July 13, 1990, and 2) An employee may continue to be employed during subsequent terms of a member relative, serving on the effective date of the statute, if the employee was not initially hired during the board member's tenure. Reading KRS 160.180(2)(i) and 160.380(2)(f) together allows both board members and their relatives who were employed during the board member's tenure, before July 13, 1990, to continue in their respective positions, until the end of the board member's current term, a fact noted by the trial court. Board members are barred from continuing to serve, when their term ends, though, if their relative remains employed by their school district. Appellants frame constitutional challenges to KRS 160.180(2)(i), and KRS 160.380(1)(a), (2)(f), on grounds that the statutes: (1) violate their First Amendment rights; (2) violate their rights expressed under the Equal Protection Clause; (3) are overbroad; and (4) deny procedural and substantive due process, and infringe familial rights of school employees.