Opinion ID: 2351686
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sentencing Benchmarks

Text: In his first issue presented on appeal, defendant argues that the trial justice applied the wrong sentencing benchmark and imposed too severe a sentence by sentencing him to fifteen years, with three years to serve and twelve years suspended, with probation. The defendant did not pursue a motion to reduce his sentence under Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure before filing this appeal. [4] We have stated previously that: It is well settled that, in the absence of `extraordinary circumstances,' this Court will not consider the validity or the legality of a sentence on direct appeal.    Rather, we have repeatedly held that the proper procedure for a review of a sentence begins in the Superior Court under Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.    In the event that a defendant continues to be aggrieved by the ruling of the Superior Court, this Court then will review the decision on appeal. State v. Bettencourt, 723 A.2d 1101, 1114 (R.I.1999) (quoting State v. Collins, 679 A.2d 862, 867 (R.I.1996)); see also State v. Martinez, 824 A.2d 443, 451 (R.I.2003). In State v. Brigham, 638 A.2d 1043, 1046-47 (R.I.1994), we held that allegations that a sentence was unlawful because the trial justice considered improper criteria in imposing the sentence did not amount to extraordinary circumstances. In Bettencourt, we reached the same result on an identical issue. See Bettencourt, 723 A.2d at 1114. Moreover, we held that no extraordinary circumstances arose when the hearing justice extended the defendant's sentence by imposing an additional probationary period. State v. Vashey, 823 A.2d 1151, 1156-57 (R.I.2003). In the present case, the statutory penalty for second-degree child molestation sexual assault pursuant to § 11-37-8.4 is not less than six (6) years nor more than thirty (30) years. Before sentencing defendant, the trial justice had an extensive discussion with the attorneys for the prosecution and the defense about which sentencing benchmark to apply in this case. The two benchmarks of the Superior Court Sentencing Benchmarks at issue are Benchmark 36A: No relationship to victim  over clothing  one count. Less than jail to three years; and Benchmark 36B: No relationship to victim  under clothing or more than one count. 3-8 years. The trial justice recognized that the defense had presented a strong argument for applying Benchmark 36A, while the state had made an equally convincing argument for applying Benchmark 36B. The trial justice further indicated that the court would follow the prosecution's position, but that the sentence would be stayed pending further legal proceedings because there was disagreement whether the touching in this case had occurred over or under the clothing. The defendant subsequently was sentenced to fifteen years, with three years to serve. We note that the time ranges given in the sentencing benchmarks represent time to be served in jail. Thus the sentence that defendant received, fifteen years imprisonment with three years to serve, is not only within the statutory parameters, it also is consistent with both benchmarks at issue in this case, albeit at the maximum term of one and the minimum of the other. We conclude, therefore, that defendant has not shown extraordinary circumstances such as would warrant our review of the sentence on direct appeal. Consequently, we are precluded from considering defendant's challenge to this sentence in the absence of a determination made pursuant to a Rule 35 motion. Bettencourt, 723 A.2d at 1114. The statutory 120-day period in which to seek Superior Court review of the sentence commences on the date of this opinion should the defendant choose to file such a motion. Id.