Opinion ID: 788611
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Child Contact and Custody Condition

Text: 17 At sentencing Wise objected to the condition that prohibits her from having contact with children and custody of her son without approval. We review a condition of supervised release for abuse of discretion. 1 Wise argues that the court abused its discretion because the condition is unrelated to her offense of conviction, she had no notice that it was contemplated, and the record did not support it. 18
19 A condition of supervised release does not have to be related to the offense of conviction. The applicable statute requires the judge, at sentencing, to consider the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. 2 That language does not limit the court to looking only at the offense already committed, but rather requires the court to look forward in time to crimes that may be committed in the future. Under the statute, the court may order conditions of supervised release, not only if they are related to the offense of conviction, but also if they are reasonably related to other factors, such as the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. 3 20 One value of a criminal prosecution and presentence report is that they expose to judicial intervention other problems (such as alcoholism and drug addiction) and other crimes that may need to be addressed in sentencing for the offense of conviction. This is not to say that the wide discretion of the district court is unfettered. [T]he conditions imposed are permissible only if they are reasonably related to the goal of deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation of the offender, and even if conditions meet the above requirements, they still can involve `no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes' of supervised release. 4 21 Here, although the district court did not say so, we can infer that the condition prohibiting residing with, maintaining custody of, or being in the presence of children was responsive to Wise's apparent mental problems and her history involving sexual abuse of children, and was related to the goal of protecting children, who constitute part of the public. That the condition was unrelated to Wise's offense of trying to defraud the Social Security Administration into helping her establish a fake identity is not of itself a sound reason to vacate the condition. Nevertheless, there must be a nexus between the past behavior and the public safety rationale sufficient to justify the specific conditions imposed. In United States v. T.M., for example, this court rejected a similar, but less extreme condition of release when the defendant had a history of inappropriate behavior with children, concluding that even considered cumulatively, [defendant's past] do[es] not establish a reasonable relationship between his sexually-related conditions of supervised release and either deterrence, public safety, or rehabilitation. 5
22 So far as we can tell from the record, until the judge pronounced sentence Wise and her attorney had no notice that the condition regarding contact with children was under consideration. The presentence report did not suggest it, the judge did not announce that he was contemplating it, and nothing else in the record suggested the condition as a possibility before it was imposed. 23 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(C) requires the district court at sentencing to allow the attorneys to comment on the probation officer's determinations and other matters relating to an appropriate sentence. Rule 32(i)(4) requires the court to allow both sides' attorneys and the defendant personally to speak [b]efore imposing sentence. In Burns v. United States, 6 the Supreme Court held that, by implication, Rule 32 requires the district court to give reasonable notice to the parties that it is contemplating an upward departure on a ground not previously identified in the presentence report or a prehearing submission by the government as a ground for upward departure. Wise's attorney and Wise could not argue about the custody and contact condition if they didn't even know that it was being considered. The Supreme Court in Burns reasoned that it makes no sense to impute to Congress an intent that the defendant have the right to comment on the appropriateness of a sua sponte departure but not the right to be notified that the court is contemplating such a ruling. 7 24 In United States v. Lopez, 8 we held that a defendant did not have the right to notice before the court sua sponte imposed a supervised release condition of participation in a program of mental health treatment. We distinguished Burns on the ground that the mental health condition was not a departure from the guidelines, but was contemplated by them, because participation in a mental health program is listed in the discretionary conditions of supervised release in the guidelines, of which all defendants have notice. 25 The condition here — basically no contact with children and no custody of her own child without approval — falls on the Burns rather than the Lopez side of the line. Though it is not a departure as in Burns, it is also not a listed condition as in Lopez. The sentencing guideline on conditions of supervised release lists a number of conditions that should always be included, 9 and several more conditions (including the one at issue in Lopez ) are recommended in certain circumstances. 10 The condition imposed in this case, prohibiting custody and contact with minors, is not on these lists. 26 Custody of one's own child is an important interest that `undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.' 11 Though it is not an upward departure, most parents would probably regard loss of the custody and society of their own children as more important and severe than an upward departure. So far as the record reveals, Wise and her attorney (and government counsel) had no notice of the possibility that she would lose her son when she went in for sentencing for lying to the Social Security office. 27 Where a condition of supervised release is not on the list of mandatory or discretionary conditions in the sentencing guidelines, notice is required before it is imposed, so that counsel and the defendant will have the opportunity to address personally its appropriateness. The form and timing of notice are left to the discretion of the district court. For a condition such as the one at issue here, advance written notice would work best, both to enable both sides to marshal their evidence and arguments, and (more importantly in many cases) to allow negotiation of a condition upon which the government and the defense could agree. It may be enough in many cases for the judge to mention orally at the sentencing hearing that he is contemplating a condition, in case either party wishes to comment or request a continuance. It is not enough notice, however, first to impose the sentence, and then to invite counsel to comment, at least where counsel objects as occurred here. That is no notice at all. Talking a judge out of a decision he has already made is a different and harder task than persuading him not to make it. Also, such an approach prevents negotiation of a condition more precisely tailored to the legitimate interests of both sides. Our conclusion that notice is required for conditions not in the sentencing guidelines list is consistent with the decisions of other circuits that have ruled on the question. 12
28 Wise also argues that the material in the presentence report, adopted as findings of fact without objection, did not furnish a sufficient basis for the custody and society condition. Because we must vacate and remand on account of the lack of notice, and the record may be further developed on remand, we have no occasion to decide that issue. 29