Opinion ID: 2975508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant’s Base Offense Level

Text: 6 No. 06-3988 “Guideline interpretation is a question of law to be reviewed by this Court de novo.” United States v. Beckner, 983 F.2d 1380, 1383 (6th Cir. 1993).
According to § 3D1.2(c), All counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into a single Group. Counts involve substantially the same harm within the meaning of this rule: . . . (c) When one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the guideline applicable to another of the counts. § 3D1.2(c). Thus, there are two options embedded in subsection C that a defendant may proceed under: if the conduct that gives rise to one offense can either be treated as a specific offense characteristic in, or is used to adjust the applicable Guideline of a second offense, those offenses must be grouped. Defendant argues that the court erred in failing to group his illegal reentry conviction (Count 5) with Counts 1-4. Defendant claims that Count 5 involved substantially the same harm as the first four Counts, and thus, that § 3D1.2(c) requires they be grouped together. Notably, we have held that “[w]here distinct societal interests are infringed by conduct in different counts they should not be grouped together, even if they are generally considered part of a common plan or scheme.” United States v. Sims-Robertson, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 1146 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Egson, 897 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1990)). Thus, we require more than merely a finding that the harms arise out of the same plan or scheme. In Beckner, we shed some light on what is considered “substantially the same harm.” 983 F.2d at 1383. In that case, the defendant was convicted of two mail fraud counts and two charges of resisting arrest. Id. The district court did not group the counts involving resisting arrest with the mail fraud counts. Id. We held that the 7 No. 06-3988 district court erred in failing to group these counts. In that case, we reasoned that the defendant’s mail fraud base offense level had been enhanced by two levels because of “reckless endangerment during flight,” which was formed by the same conduct as her attempt to escape arrest. Id. Because that was the same conduct that formed the basis of the resisting arrest count, we determined that the counts should have been grouped pursuant to § 3D1.2(c). Id. The Guideline for the mail fraud conviction was adjusted because of the conduct that gave rise to the resisting arrest conviction, which clearly falls within § 3D1.2(c) Id. “The very same conduct, defendant’s driving of the car in her futile attempt to escape arrest . . . is also embodied in defendant’s resisting arrest counts” and “[a]s a result, section 3D1.2(c) applies.” Id. at 1383-84. Simply put, “using conduct from one group of counts to adjust the offense level of another group of counts without thereafter grouping all the counts together is inconsistent” with § 3D1.2(c). United States v. Ross, 279 F.3d 600, 605 (8th Cir. 2002). Defendant argues that Counts 1-4 were enhanced because of Count 5, and thus, that this case is indistinguishable from Beckner. Defendant’s PSR clearly states that, with respect to Counts 1-4, “because the Defendant committed the instant offense after sustaining a conviction for a felony immigration and naturalization offense, the offense level is increased by two (2) levels, pursuant to § 2L2.1(b)(4)(A).” (J.A. at 86). Count 5, however, is based on the offense of illegal reentry following deportation on or about October 7, 2005. Importantly, Defendant had been convicted of Illegal Reentry two times prior to the occasion that formed the basis for Count 5. Defendant fails to address the fact that either of these earlier convictions could have formed the basis for this enhancement. Further, the PSR explicitly states that the enhancement is being imposed because 8 No. 06-3988 Defendant committed the instant offenses (Counts 1-4) after being convicted of a felony immigration and naturalization offense. When Defendant committed the conduct that gave rise to Counts 1-4 he had not been convicted of Count 5 yet. Thus, the only logical conclusion is that Defendant’s twolevel enhancement was imposed because of his previous convictions of Illegal Reentry. The conduct that gave rise to the enhancement was not the same conduct that gave rise to Count 5, and accordingly, the district court did not err in failing to group Counts 1-4 with Count 5 for the purpose of determining Defendant’s base offense level. Beckner, 983 F.2d at 1383-84.