Opinion ID: 4530342
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Defendant’s Mental State Regarding Entry

Text: Against the Will of the Owner Mr. Wicks argues that the evidence against him was insufficient for an additional reason: even if he entered private property owned by the Washington Nationals when he walked onto the sidewalk on the south side of N Street SE, the government did not show that he did so with the requisite state of mind with respect to the circumstance that his entry was against the will of the Washington Nationals.8 In Ortberg, this court described this mens rea element as requiring the government https://perma.cc/TBQ4-NFDE (describing Atlas Plus); Atlas Plus, District of Columbia, http://atlasplus.dcgis.dc.gov/ http://perma.cc/6CXK-XDXH (link to tool). 8 See Carrell v. United States, 165 A.3d 314, 320 n.13 (D.C. 2017) (en banc) (adopting the Model Penal Code’s classification of “conduct, circumstance[], and result[]” elements of a crime (internal quotation marks omitted)). 14 to “establish that the defendant knew or should have known that his entry [on private property] was unwanted.” 81 A.3d at 308. Subsequent to Ortberg, this court sitting en banc in Carrell v. United States, 165 A.3d 314 (D.C. 2017), announced a new approach for categorizing mens rea terminology and endorsed the “more particularized and standardized categorizations of mens rea” set out in the Model Penal Code. Id. at 324. As we noted in Carrell, when defining the elements of a crime without a specified mens rea, courts should “generally . . . infer that the government must prove at least that a defendant knows the facts that make his conduct fit the definition of the offense.”9 Id. at 321 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). We further acknowledged “that merely inferring a negligence, i.e., should-have-known, standard is disfavored.”10 Id. at 322 (footnote omitted). It is unclear whether Ortberg meant to endorse a negligence standard within the meaning 9 Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(b) (Am. Law Inst. 1985) (“A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.”). 10 Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (“A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.”). 15 of the Model Penal Code,11 or, if it did, whether such a standard would survive our analysis in Carrell, but we need not resolve this issue here. Even assuming that the Model Penal Code negligence standard applies, we cannot say on this record that the government established that Mr. Wicks “should [have] be[en] aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that” he was on private property owned by the Washington Nationals. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (Am. Law Inst. 1985). First, the lack of evidence that the sidewalk belongs to the Washington Nationals, see supra Part II.A., itself raises doubt that Mr. Wicks should have been aware that it did. Second, there is no evidence that the Washington Nationals publicly held itself out as the owner of property beyond the stadium structure: there is no evidence in the record about signage, barriers, or other announcements outside the stadium that would have informed a reasonable person that stepping on to the sidewalk would put them on private property.12 Third, the barring notice is not 11 Ortberg did not cite to the Model Penal Code. Instead, it catalogued this jurisdiction’s prior unlawful entry cases. Although Ortberg understood these cases to collectively reflect that proof of “actual knowledge” was unnecessary, 81 A.3d at 308, in all of the cases cited and indeed, in Ortberg itself, actual knowledge (which is rarely established by direct evidence, see Owens v. United States, 90 A.3d 1118, 1122 (D.C. 2014)), could be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. See Ortberg, 81 A.3d at 308 nn.6–8, 310. 12 See, e.g., Ortberg, 81 A.3d at 305–06, 309 (event space in hotel that was restricted where registration desk was set up at entrance for guests to pick up 16 specific as to what property is barred: it gives only a street address for a different street, South Capitol Street SE, and it did not append a map showing what property outside of the stadium structure, if any, was covered.13 Fourth, Mr. Wicks’s receipt of the barring notice on June 14, 2016, after being confronted by Officer Clarke and Detective Bemiller in one location—on the street, outside the center-field gate—did not put him on notice the location of his arrest on July 1, 2016—on the sidewalk outside the will call office—was Washington Nationals property.14 Indeed, the barring notice given to Mr. Wicks in the security office on June 14, 2016, specified that it was issued because Mr. Wicks was “scalping”—not because he was badges); Kozlovska v. United States, 30 A.3d 799, 800 & n.1 (D.C. 2011) (stairwell of apartment building that was restricted where access was controlled by security key); Artisst v. United States, 554 A.2d 327, 329 (D.C. 1989) (university residence facility that was restricted where university identification card was required for access); Culp v. United States, 486 A.2d 1174, 1175 (D.C. 1985) (vacant building that was restricted where windows and doors were boarded up and a “no trespassing sign” was posted); Bowman v. United States, 212 A.2d 610, 610–11 (D.C. 1965) (train platform that was restricted where passengers had to enter through gate bearing a “sign stating that only persons holding transportation (having tickets) were permitted through” and after “public announcement to the same effect”). 13 Cf. Vaas v. United States, 852 A.2d 44, 48 (D.C. 2004) (reversing contempt conviction based on violation of ambiguous stay-away order and “strongly suggest[ing] that in future orders trial courts endeavor to set more defined parameters, using maps, if practicable, that can be attached to the stay-away orders to provide defendants with clear guidance about this important aspect of a release order”). 14 Accordingly, it is not particularly probative that the notice stated that Mr. Wicks “was found on the premises” on June 14, 2016. 17 trespassing.15 Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient to establish that Mr. Wicks had the requisite mens rea regarding the circumstance element that his entry onto the sidewalk on the south side of N Street SE adjacent to the Washington Nationals’ stadium was “against the will” of the Washington Nationals. Ortberg, 81 A.3d at 308.