Opinion ID: 1498170
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Improperly excused jurors

Text: Coulter contends two jurors were improperly excused for cause, on the prosecution's motion, because of their reservations about capital punishment. Juror John H. Johnson responded equivocally to the prosecutor's initial questions whether he would be capable of voting for the death penalty, and then said, Well, to be honest and tell the truth, I don't believe I could do it. He then said again, I don't know. Defense counsel asked Johnson to imagine a murder involving one of [his] loved ones: your wife, your mother. Is there a case in which you would consider imposing the death penalty? A. Well, since you put it like that, I believe I could. You know, yes sir. Q. And that's all the law requires. A. Yeah. All that is required. Q. In an appropriate case A. Right. Q. that you'd at least consider the death penalty. A. Right. The prosecutor then asked if Johnson could go so far as to actually vote for the death penalty, and Johnson said, I just couldn't say I could. I don't know. He gave the same response to an inquiry by the judge who then excused him for cause. Prospective juror Victor Mason began his voir dire responses by saying he did not believe in capital punishment. Like Johnson, he gave some equivocal responses but ultimately said he could vote for capital punishment in a case involving close kin. Coulter argues these jurors should not have been excused for cause because neither of them made it unmistakably clear he would automatically vote against the death penalty, citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). In Wainright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), the United States Supreme Court acknowledged confusion resulting both from lower court application of the Witherspoon standard and its own variance from the Witherspoon standard in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980). In Wainright v. Witt, supra , the Supreme Court declared the test stated in Adams v. Texas , to be correct. That standard is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. We note that, in addition to dispensing with Witherspoon's reference to automatic decisionmaking, this standard likewise does not require that a juror's bias be proved with unmistakable clarity. This is because determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism. What common sense should have realized experience has proved: many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made unmistakeably clear; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings. Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record, however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. [469 U.S. at 424-426, 105 S.Ct. at 852-853, footnotes omitted]. The Supreme Court then notes the deference which must be paid to the trial judge in making such decisions which will be informed by the judge's observance of the prospective juror's demeanor and credibility. We have no hesitancy in holding the trial court did not err in excluding Johnson and Mason from the jury. Each of them expressed a definite negative attitude toward the death penalty. We defer to the trial judge's finding that their equivocation did not sufficiently ameliorate those expressions to assure they could follow the law if instructed on the death penalty.