Opinion ID: 755030
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Lacy Killed White Statement

Text: The proper standard in assessing whether jury exposure to extrinsic evidence requires a new trial is well-established: A defendant is entitled to a new trial when the jury obtains or uses evidence that has not been introduced during trial if there is 'a reasonable possibility that the extrinsic material could have affected the verdict.'  Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 405 (9th Cir.1988) (quoting Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir.1987)). The government has the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that extrinsic evidence did not contribute to the verdict. See United States v. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818, 821 (9th Cir.1991). This rule derives from one of the most fundamental tenets of our justice system: that a defendant's conviction may be based only on the evidence presented during the trial. United States v. Noushfar, 78 F.3d 1442, 1445 (9th Cir.1996). 1 We have identified several factors that are relevant to determining whether the government has met its burden: 2 (1) whether the material was actually received, and if so, how; 3 (2) the length of time it was available to the jury; 4 (3) the extent to which the juror discussed and considered it; 5 (4) whether the material was introduced before a verdict was reached, and if so at what point in the deliberations; and 6 (5) any other matters which may bear on the issue of the reasonable possibility of whether the extrinsic material affected the verdict. 7 United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1580 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting Dickson, 849 F.2d at 406); see also Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir.1995). 8 We have consistently emphasized the importance of the nature of the extrinsic evidence in juror misconduct cases. Prejudice is usually found only when the extrinsic evidence relates to a material issue in the case. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Marshall, 125 F.3d 739, 744 (9th Cir.1997) (recognizing in the habeas context that [j]uror misconduct which warrants relief generally relates directly to a material aspect of the case), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Apr. 6, 1998) (No. 97-8822); Lawson, 60 F.3d at 612-13 (emphasizing that extrinsic evidence of defendant's reputation for violence related directly to material issue in the case, defendant's intent to rob); Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d at 1580 (noting that reversible error has been found where the material considered by the jury relates to a material aspect of the case); Dickson, 849 F.2d at 406-07 (stressing the importance of the nature of the extraneous information). 9 We think that the nature of the Lacy killed White statement is determinative in this case. 1 The statement does not relate to a material issue in the case and therefore should not be the basis for granting a new trial. See United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 888 (9th Cir.1981) (reversal not required where no rational connection existed between the extrinsic material and a prejudicial jury conclusion). There is not a direct connection between the statement and the defendants or the charged offenses. First, Emanuel Lacy was not one of the defendants; neither was Apondo White. As a result, the Lacy killed White statement does not directly involve any of the defendants in this case. It is true that a connection to murder is potentially prejudicial, but in this case none of the defendants was implicated. Second, the defendants were not charged with crimes of violence--they faced drug charges. Thus, the Lacy killed White information is unlikely to have affected the jury's determination that the defendants were involved in unrelated, nonviolent drug transactions. See id. (refusing to find a material connection between the case and extrinsic evidence when it would require an assumption that the jury members reached an irrational conclusion). In short, the statement is immaterial to the issues involved in the case. 10 We are not persuaded that the statement was unduly prejudicial as a result of the government's allegation at trial that the Lacy and Flowers organizations were closely connected. We think it quite improbable that the jurors found it more likely that the defendants committed various drug offenses because the leader of an affiliated organization killed one of his own men. Moreover, we have previously recognized that extrinsic evidence connecting a defendant in a drug case to murder is not always unduly prejudicial, particularly because it is not relevant to any issue in the case before the jury. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d at 1580. In the case at hand, the extrinsic evidence is even less relevant because it only implicated associates of the defendants. 11 We conclude that the Lacy killed White statement is not relevant to a material issue in the case. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 125 F.3d at 744; Dickson, 849 F.2d at 407. The government satisfied its burden of showing harmlessness. Thus, remaining mindful that we accord substantial weight to the district court's conclusion as to the effect of the misconduct, see United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200, 206 (9th Cir.1991), we find that there is not a reasonable possibility that the Lacy killed White statement could have affected the verdict.