Opinion ID: 2612495
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Isitt at 23-38.

Text: A point made by Judge Magnuson at the end of the section on the history of preliminary examinations and hearings in Idaho should perhaps be clarified. Judge Magnuson discussed Idaho's Constitutional Convention in order to point out that the pre-Convention closure of preliminary examinations was succeeded by the post-Convention closure of the newly instituted preliminary hearings. Isitt at 35-37. The tradition of closure of preliminary examinations and hearings at the defendant's request has thus continued uninterrupted from 1864 all the way up to the present. Judge Magnuson's review of the preliminary examination and hearing refutes the conclusory statements of the majority, at 758, 800 P.2d at 645 and the United States Supreme Court, Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 11, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 2742, n. 4., that there has been a tradition of presumed openness of the preliminary hearing in Idaho. Isitt at 30-38. Those statements were based on a single case, State v. McKenna, 78 Idaho 647, 309 P.2d 206 (1957). McKenna, however, proves the opposite  a tradition of closure. McKenna stated that magistrates should enforce I.C. § 19-811 upon the request of the defendant. McKenna at 653, 309 P.2d at 209 (Committing magistrates should abide by and enforce the provisions of this section.) Judge Magnuson also refutes the majority's conclusory statement that the Idaho preliminary hearing is sufficiently like a trial to generally justify public access. At 759, 800 P.2d at 646. The majority does not bother to discuss at all how a preliminary hearing is sufficiently like a trial. In Isitt, set out above, Judge Magnuson catalogued the differences between a preliminary hearing and a trial, and effectively explained why these differences could not but lead to the conclusion that public access does not play a positive role in preliminary hearings, but rather a negative role. Isitt at 23-30. The majority erred in applying the Press-Enterprise II considerations for determining whether a right of public access attaches to an Idaho preliminary hearing. After wrongly deciding that a right of access does attach, the majority goes on to alter the United States Supreme Court's test for when a magistrate can close a preliminary hearing, and thereby further erodes the defendant's right to a fair trial. Press-Enterprise II held that when criminal defendants seek closure of a preliminary hearing to protect their right to a fair trial the hearing shall be closed only if specific findings are made demonstrating that, first, there is substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent and, second, reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights. 478 U.S. at 14, 106 S.Ct. at 2743 (citations omitted). The majority opinion ventures out and interprets the federal Constitution on its own by adding the requirement that only under [un]usually compelling circumstances should preliminary hearings be closed. At 761, 800 P.2d at 648. The unusually compelling circumstances test goes beyond the Press-Enterprise II substantial probability of prejudice test and erodes the defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial. The United States Supreme Court endeavored to achieve a delicate balance between the first and sixth amendments with its substantial probability test; the majority opinion destroys that balance by requiring unusually compelling circumstances for a preliminary hearing to be closed to the public. A defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial may be seriously jeopardized by adverse publicity from a preliminary hearing. Publicity concerning the proceedings at a pretrial hearing ... could influence public opinion against a defendant and inform potential jurors of inculpatory information wholly inadmissable at the actual trial. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14, 106 S.Ct. at 2743 (quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 2905, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979)). On the other side of the ledger, the public's first amendment right of access to a preliminary hearing is questionable. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent in Press-Enterprise II, a first amendment claim to a right of access to a preliminary hearing is no stronger than a claim to a right of access to a grand jury proceeding. Press-Enterprise II at 26, 106 S.Ct. at 2749. The argument that the first amendment requires access to a preliminary hearing because the hearing is likely to be the final step in a criminal proceeding and the sole occasion for public scrutiny (since it often results in a guilty plea) applies with as much force to grand jury proceedings. Closure of grand juries denies an outlet for community rage just as much as closure of a preliminary hearing does. Id. Yet under Press-Enterprise II the first amendment requires public access to preliminary hearings but not to grand jury proceedings, even though they are functional equivalents. Id. at 26, 106 S.Ct. at 2749-50; but cf. State v. Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230, 241, 743 P.2d 459, 470 (1987) (Bistline, J., dissenting) (discusses equal protection problem created by difference in prosecution by indictment and prosecution by information). Press-Enterprise II found that a state's preliminary hearings, provided they met the threshold consideration discussed above, should be open to the public barring a showing of a substantial probability of prejudice to the defendant because one of the important means of assuring a fair trial is that the process be open to neutral observers. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 7, 106 S.Ct. at 2739. However, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, closure of a preliminary hearing could not possibly violate the defendant's right to a fair trial when it is the defendant who seeks closure. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 17, 106 S.Ct. at 2745. Because a defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial is at stake when a preliminary hearing is opened to the public, a magistrate must consider carefully whether there is a substantial probability that that right will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent. The United States Supreme Court did not find that the first amendment requires unusually compelling circumstances for closure. In fact, such a standard may very well run afoul of the sixth amendment.