Opinion ID: 2441971
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The cafeteria meeting

Text: Appellants claim that the exclusion of testimony regarding what was discussed during the cafeteria meeting severely impede[d their] ability to introduce the full extent of the admissions against interest, despite the introduction of Dr. Salter's one-on-one conversations with several doctors, because witnesses [found it difficult] to distinguish which statements were made in the cafeteria versus other parts of the hospital. Appellants assert that the informal meeting of doctors in a cafeteria cannot fit within [the] definition of professional peer review, and that the witnesses should have been allowed to testify about the content of that conversation. Appellee, however, contends that the meeting falls within the plain language of the peer review statute. In the alternative, he argues that even if the trial court erred by concluding that the cafeteria conversation was privileged, appellants suffered no prejudice because the jury was exposed to Dr. Salter's views on the matter through testimony regarding Dr. Salter's numerous other conversations on the subject, covering substantively the same ground as the cafeteria meeting. Appellants assert that the peer review privilege does not apply to informal discussions among colleagues in the cafeteria [which are not] part of the recognized peer review process at the hospital. Appellee, on the other hand, points out that the plain language of the statute does not require that a meeting conform to a formal hospital process in order to be privileged. [9] Therefore, he asserts, a meeting where multiple individual physicians were specifically summoned ... to discuss their opinions [of a colleague's performance] is precisely the nature of the meetings [protected by the privilege]. We need not reach the merits of these arguments because we hold that appellants suffered no prejudice even if the trial court erred by withholding the cafeteria conversation from the jury. Appellants' claim of error depends on their assertion that they were unable to present the jury with the full extent of Dr. Salter's pre-trial statements concerning his views of Dr. Alexander's performance because the trial judge prevented the witnesses from testifying about the cafeteria meeting. Therefore, they claim, they were unable to properly contrast his earlier views with the more attenuated testimony he provided at trial. This claim is without merit. The record indicates that the jury was presented with testimony from multiple witnesses who repeatedly described Dr. Salter's pre-trial view that Dr. Alexander had not placed the valve properly. Any evidence provided by admission of the cafeteria discussion, which also focused on Dr. Salter's dissatisfaction with the operation, would have been cumulative. Even appellants concede the point that the cafeteria conversation did not involve any novel admissions, stating that the ruling impaired the weight of the testimony by giving the false impression that the admissions were not made repeatedly. [10] We will not reverse a judgment upon a jury verdict for harmless error which has not been shown to have prejudiced substantial rights in the proceedings or the ultimate outcome of the trial. [11] Moreover, it is well-settled that exclusion of cumulative evidence does not require reversal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. [12] We do not discern from the record that the weight of testimony regarding Dr. Salter's admissions was materially impaired by the exclusion of the admissions made during the cafeteria meeting. Thus, we hold that the judge's ruling does not constitute a manifest abuse of discretion. [13]