Opinion ID: 1122767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Promise, the Scope of the Promise, and The Issue of Reliance

Text: We must initially resolve whether Bailey in fact made a promise to the defendant. If he did, we must then determine the scope of the promise and address whether Manning reasonably and detrimentally relied upon the promise.
The People argue that Bailey's comments on April 9 did not constitute a promise. They present this argument in summary fashion, however, relying on assertions that Manning could not reasonably have interpreted Bailey's words as a promise or that the trial court was unreasonable in its conclusion that a promise was made. The defendant, on the other hand, adopts the same approach but positions herself at the opposite end of the spectrum. She simply assumes that a promise was made by Bailey and that the promise was evidenced by his statements of April 8 and 9. In order to determine if a promise was made, we must analyze the form and content of Bailey's words and the circumstances under which they were spoken. In our view, Bailey's statements to Manning on April 9 do not represent an express promise. On that occasion, Bailey stated to the defendant: I am going to interview you as a witness in this thing. Because I am not going to advise you of your rights, they cannot prosecute you for this. These statements were not structured in promissory terms and, at least when considered on their face and independently of the circumstances, might possibly be interpreted as an expression of Bailey's opinion as to the effect of his interview of Manning as a witness. Nevertheless, even though Bailey used no promissory language in speaking to Manning on April 9, his words spoken, when viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances, did constitute an implied promise. Previously, in January, Bailey had expressly offered Manning custody of both children and immunity from all criminal prosecution upon the safe return of Michael. Later, on April 8, Bailey ended his interview with Manning by saying: Betsy, you can either be a witness in a murder case or be a suspect in a murder case, it's up to you. On April 9, after Manning initiated the conversation and bargained unsuccessfully for her friends, Bailey then made the statement in issue here. Considering the initial custody and immunity offer in January, plus Bailey's continuing efforts to bargain with Manning over the return of the child, we are satisfied that the only reasonable construction to be placed upon his April 9 statements is that he was obligating himself to take certain actions in exchange for any statements from Manning regarding the reason for the child's disappearance and his present whereabouts. [9]
The exact scope of Bailey's implied promise is a separate matter. The prosecution contends that if Bailey's words constitute a promise, the scope of the promise was limited. It argues that the phrase cannot prosecute you for this, when coupled with the obvious reference to Miranda, meant that Manning would not be prosecuted for the statement she was about to give. [10] In its view, the trial court unreasonably interpreted for this as referring to any crime Manning may have committed, and by granting her de facto enforcement of a promise not to prosecute, the trial court read a broader meaning into Bailey's words than either he or Manning realized. In response, the defendant argues that the combined effect of Bailey's statements on April 8 and 9 was a promise that Manning would be treated as a witness and not as a suspect in any crime involving Michael. She claims that the comment on April 8 was an offer of witness-status, that this offer was never withdrawn, and that she accepted the offer, which remained vividly in [her] mind, on April 9. She criticizes the prosecution's discussion of the phrase cannot prosecute you for this as overly technical and divorced from the actual context in which the statements were presented. We believe there are at least three possible interpretations of Bailey's statements to the defendant on April 9: (1) an implied promise of full transactional immunity of the type offered the defendant in January; (2) an implied promise of limited immunity not to prosecute the defendant for any crime that she might admit during her ensuing statement; and (3) an implied promise not to use the defendant's statements in any prosecution against her. We are satisfied that under the particular circumstances of this case, the April 9 statements of Bailey can most reasonably and plausibly be interpreted as a promise not to prosecute Manning for any crimes that she might admit in the course of her interview. A review of the circumstances immediately preceding Bailey's statements on April 9 supports this interpretation. Bailey's statement to Manning on April 8 disclosed that the police considered her either a potential witness against Arevalo or a potential suspect in the as-yet-undetermined crime. Manning understood what Bailey meant and apparently discussed her next move with other persons in the jail. She told them on April 9 that [s]omething heavy is going to be coming down and that she would probably remain in jail even though the court of appeals had authorized her release. There is nothing in the record to indicate the nature of Manning's intentions on April 9. Since she initiated the crucial conversation with Bailey, we can only speculate that she intended to talk to someone before posting bond. When Bailey arrived unannounced at the jail, Manning asked to talk to him and then attempted to bargain for her friends. Presumably, if Bailey had agreed to the release of her friends, Manning would have provided incriminating information about Arevalo. The deal did not materialize, however, and Manning withdrew into the familiar fetal position. At this point, Bailey realized that Manning was not going to talk after all. After surveying his options, he then decided to interview Manning as a witness and thus dispense with any Miranda warning. Having made this decision, Bailey attempted to communicate to Manning the effect of his decision with these words: Because I am not going to advise you of your rights, they cannot prosecute you for this. The pronoun they in Bailey's last statement refers to the government, and the pronoun this refers to the information in the statement Manning was about to give. What Bailey was doing was obtaining a statement from the defendant in exchange for his implicit promise not to prosecute her for what she told him.
Having determined the scope of the promise, we turn to the question of whether Manning reasonably and detrimentally relied upon the promise. The trial court found and we agree that Manning clearly relied to her detriment on the promise by making a statement which could possibly implicate her in the child's death. What Manning told Bailey was not that she had abused or killed Michael, but that Arevalo had beaten the child for several hours with a belt on December 17, 1982, that she had unsuccessfully tried to intervene, and that she later assisted Arevalo in disposing of the child's body. In view of Bailey's apparent authority to act for the government, which we discussed above, Manning's reliance on Bailey's statements to her was reasonable.