Opinion ID: 2611454
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: constructive wrongful discharge

Text: DOC argues initially that any claim by the officers is barred because the State's Civil Service statutes constitute the exclusive remedy for any and all claims an employee covered by civil service may have against the State or other employees covered by civil service. Other states have held civil service remedies to be exclusive. In Devine v. City of Des Moines, 366 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Iowa 1985) (quoting Iowa Code Ann. § 400.18 (West 19__)), the Iowa Supreme Court considered language similar to RCW 41.06.010 from the Iowa civil service law: `No person holding civil service rights as provided in this chapter shall be removed, demoted, or suspended arbitrarily, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.' The court held this language provided the sole means by which the propriety of a civil service employee's dismissal may be determined. Other states interpreting their civil service law as the exclusive remedy for civil service employees in the absence of a specific exclusivity provision include California ( Valenzuela v. State, 194 Cal.App.3d 916, 240 Cal.Rptr. 45, 48-49 (1987)); Kansas ( Gray v. Jenkins, 183 Kan. 251, 326 P.2d 319, 326 (1958)); Mississippi ( Scott v. Lowe, 223 Miss. 312, 78 So.2d 452 (1955)); Tennessee ( Wallace v. Neal, 191 Tenn. 240, 232 S.W.2d 49 (1950)); Vermont ( Smith v. Highway Bd., 117 Vt. 343, 91 A.2d 805 (1952)); and Wisconsin ( Castelaz v. City of Milwaukee, 94 Wis.2d 513, 289 N.W.2d 259, 267 (1980)). See also Micone v. Town of Steilacoom Civil Serv. Comm'n, 44 Wash.App. 636, 643 n. 2, 722 P.2d 1369, review denied, 107 Wash.2d 1010 (1986); accord Albright v. State, 65 Wash.App. 763, 768, 829 P.2d 1114 (1992); White v. State, 131 Wash.2d 1, 929 P.2d 396 (1997). While RCW 41.06 and WAC Title 356 provide comprehensive rules governing the selection, continued employment, discipline, and discharge of state employees and the remedies afforded state employees, we do not need to reach the exclusive remedy issue here because, in this case, Reninger and Cohen have failed to state claims for constructive wrongful discharge or tortious interference.
DOC argues the doctrines of wrongful discharge or constructive wrongful discharge do not apply to employees who are not terminable at-will. Reninger and Cohen, given their civil service status, were not terminable at-will employees. Indeed, our case law has questioned the viability of such a tort where other relief is available to an affected employee. See, e.g., Micone v. Town of Steilacoom Civil Serv. Comm'n, 44 Wash.App. 636, 643 n. 2, 722 P.2d 1369 (questioning whether the doctrine of constructive discharge even applies to employment governed by civil service rules), review denied, 107 Wash.2d 1010 (1986); Albright v. Department of Social and Health Servs., 65 Wash.App. 763, 768-69, 829 P.2d 1114 (1992) (same). We do not reach this issue because the officers fail to state a claim for wrongful constructive discharge under our cases.
Under the common law, an employer in Washington could discharge an employee with or without cause, absent an agreement to the contrary. Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash.2d 887, 891, 568 P.2d 764 (1977). In Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984), we first recognized an exception to this general terminable-at-will rule, holding that a cause of action for the tort of wrongful discharge will lie where the discharge of [an] employee contravenes a clear mandate of public policy. Thompson, 102 Wash.2d at 232, 685 P.2d 1081. We have interpreted the cause of action narrowly. White v. State, 131 Wash.2d 1, 19-20, 929 P.2d 396 (1997) (court declines to recognize cause of action for wrongful transfer of state employee). In determining whether a clear mandate of public policy has been violated, we consider whether the employer's conduct contravenes the letter or purpose of a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision or scheme. Thompson, 102 Wash.2d at 232, 685 P.2d 1081 (quoting Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625, 631 (1982)). What qualifies as a clear mandate of public policy is a question of law. Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wash.2d 931, 937, 913 P.2d 377 (1996). Reninger and Cohen have not alleged or proved they were terminated for a reason that contravenes public policy. In Gardner, 128 Wash.2d at 936-41, 913 P.2d 377, we reiterated the admonition of Thompson: the exception [to the at-will doctrine] should be narrowly construed in order to guard against frivolous lawsuits.... `[C]ourts should proceed cautiously if called upon to declare public policy absent some prior legislative or judicial expression on the subject.' Gardner, 128 Wash.2d at 936-37, 913 P.2d 377 (emphasis omitted) (quoting in part Thompson, 102 Wash.2d at 232, 685 P.2d 1081). In Gardner, we stated, consistent with this principle, that courts have generally found the contravention of a clear mandate of public policy in four limited situations: (1) where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) where employees are fired for performing a public duty or obligation ...; (3) where employees are fired for exercising a legal right or privilege...; and (4) where employees are fired in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., whistleblowing. Id. at 936, 913 P.2d 377. The touchstone of these exceptions is whether the employee's termination would contravene some public, as opposed to a purely private, interest. See Dicomes v. State, 113 Wash.2d 612, 618, 782 P.2d 1002 (1989) (public policy concerns ... what affects the citizens of the State collectively) (quoting Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124, 130, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981)); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 379, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 217 (1988) (court must inquire whether discharge affects duty which inures to the benefit of the public at large rather than to a particular employer or employee); see generally 2 CHARLES B. CRAVER ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.10, at 269-70 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1994). If Reninger and Cohen were set up, as they allege, then the State arguably violated a statutory or regulatory provision by terminating Reninger and Cohen without cause. See RCW 41.06.186 (authorizing the personnel resources board to adopt rules relating to the termination of state employees); WAC 356-34-010, WAC 356-34-040 (defining cause for dismissal and providing that public employees may be dismissed for cause). The alleged impetus for the plaintiffs' termination does not, however, fall within one of the categories we recognized in Dicomes. Nor does their firing contravene public policy. Reninger and Cohen claimed they did not leave any firearms unattended and their fellow employees concocted this scheme, based on a personal vendetta, in an effort to get them fired. Although this conduct is certainly unworthy of fellow officers, it does not affect the public collectively, and therefore does not constitute a wrongful discharge under Thompson and Dicomes. If we were to permit the officers to state a wrongful discharge claim simply by alleging that their employer violated a statute, even though the statute has nothing to do with the public as a whole, we would be extending the tort far beyond the parameters set by Thompson and Dicomes. Reninger and Cohen failed to state a claim for wrongful discharge as we defined that concept in Dicomes.