Opinion ID: 2375447
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retirement Board Claim

Text: In denying benefits, the board reasoned that because the plaintiff never had been a member of the retirement system, he was ineligible for disability retirement benefits. The parties are in agreement that the plaintiff was required to become a member of the retirement system and that he never joined prior to his leaving State service in June 1975. RSA 100-A:3 I provides as follows: Any person who becomes an employee, teacher, permanent policeman or permanent fireman ... shall become a member of the retirement system as a condition of employment: .... There is evidence in the record that sometime in 1973, the plaintiff became aware of the requirement that all State employees become members of the State retirement system as a condition of employment. RSA 100-A:3. He testified that he did not join the system because he had already asked to be replaced and because there is not much sense in me making efforts in the retirement system when I anyday, I could be leaving their services. The State was also aware that plaintiff had neglected to join the system, and there is evidence of efforts to enroll him and others similarly situated in the system. The plaintiff claims that not only was he entitled to membership, but also that the employer had an affirmative duty to enroll him. He argues that its failure to enroll him estops the State from denying him benefits. The board argues that estoppel does not lie against the State, see Institute for Trend Research v. Griffin, 101 N.H. 255, 139 A.2d 628 (1958), and that the duty to join the system is upon the plaintiff. The board contends, therefore, that the plaintiff should be estopped from claiming benefits because of the State's efforts to enroll him and his own voluntary relinquishment of a known right. The master found that the plaintiff is not entitled to a disability pension from the State retirement system since, by choice, he never became a member of the system and, further, that he was not `in service' at the time he applied. [7-10] RSA ch. 100-A contains no provision for judicial review. Nevertheless, certiorari will properly lie for this purpose when no other remedy is available to the petitioner. Kalloch v. Board of Trustees, 116 N.H. 443, 444, 362 A.2d 201, 202 (1976). The superior court has concurrent original jurisdiction with this court to grant writs of certiorari. George v. Credit Corp., 105 N.H. 269, 197 A.2d 212 (1964); cf. Carling Brewing Co. v. State Liquor Comm'n, 102 N.H. 284, 155 A.2d 808 (1959) (trial court asserted jurisdiction over writ of certiorari but transferred all questions to supreme court). The instant petition was not one seeking certiorari, but the trial court could properly hear it as one since there is no statutory appeal provision. See Melton v. Personnel Comm'n, 119 N.H. 272, 401 A.2d 1060 (1979). Courts are not limited by the technical accuracy or designation of legal forms of action. State v. Harkaway, 105 N.H. 42, 46, 192 A.2d 619, 622 (1963). On a sufficient petition the question is whether there is an error correctible by the [court]. Boody v. Watson, 64 N.H. 162, 173, 9 A. 794, 803 (1887). The issue of the correctness of the board's and master's ruling is now before us with a record and transcript. [11-14] The legislature established the board of trustees as the body responsible for the proper administration of this chapter. RSA 100-A:14 II. As with other boards, agencies, and commissions, [c]onsideration and due weight must be given its decisions and judgments. Melton v. Personnel Comm'n, 119 N.H. at 280, 401 A.2d 1065. On certiorari courts are not at liberty to substitute [their] judgment for that of the commission or make findings de novo. Wilson v. Personnel Comm'n, 118 N.H. 424, 426, 387 A.2d 1160, 1161 (1978). The test to determine whether to grant a writ of certiorari is whether the agency has acted illegally in respect to jurisdiction, authority or observance of the law . . . or has abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Id. at 425-26, 387 A.2d at 1161. Although the master did make a factual finding concerning the issue of whether the plaintiff was in service when he applied for membership in the retirement system, a finding beyond the purview of certiorari jurisdiction, see, e.g., Melton v. Personnel Comm'n, 119 N.H. at 280, 401 A.2d 1065, any error was harmless. The verdict is supported independently by the master's finding consistent with that of the board that the plaintiff had voluntarily refused to join the system. Cf. Legislative Utility Consumers' Council v. Public Service Co., 119 N.H. 332, 402 A.2d 626 (1979) (improper administrative notice of certain facts harmless when sufficient independent evidence supports decision). The record amply supports the findings and rulings of both the board and court. We hold that their judgments are not so lacking in reason as to suggest an abuse of discretion or action that is arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. Melton v. Personnel Comm'n, 119 N.H. 272, 401 A.2d 1060 (1979); Wilson v. Personnel Comm'n, 118 N.H. 424, 387 A.2d 1160 (1978). Plaintiff's and defendants' exceptions overruled.