Opinion ID: 2120964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: other batson hearing issues

Text: Defendant contends that, at the 1987 Batson hearing, the trial judge openly held a strong and fixed predisposition, manifested at the 1982 proceedings, that legitimate reasons underlay the disputed challenges of black venire members. Accordingly, defendant contends that his 1987 motion for substitution of judge was erroneously denied and that the ensuing hearing did not comport with due process of law. ( People ex rel. Przyblinski v. Scott (1959), 23 Ill.App.2d 167, 170, 161 N.E.2d 705 aff'd (1960), 19 Ill.2d 500, 167 N.E.2d 194; United States v. Sciuto (7th Cir.1976), 531 F.2d 842, 845.) As examples of cases in which judicial predisposition was held to have warranted substitution of judges, defendant cites People v. Chatman (1967), 36 Ill.2d 305, 223 N.E.2d 110, and People v. Robinson (1974), 18 Ill.App.3d 804, 310 N.E.2d 652. As evidence of the trial judge's alleged predisposition, defendant also points to the judge's inquiry of defense counsel at the Batson hearing as to whether a challenge could be based on the differing races of defendant and victim and to the judge's response that he was not too sure that counsel's negative reply was correct. However, when defendant made his motion for substitution of judge, he failed to adduce any of the reasons he now sets forth. (Granted, when defendant made his motion, he could not yet have referred to the trial judge's later comments regarding differing races of defendants and victims, but neither did defendant make any attempt to renew the motion thereafter.) The entire exchange between counsel and judge pertaining to the motion was as follows: MR. [ISAACSON, assistant public defender]: We're going to file this motion with the clerk. It's an SOJ. I'll tender a copy to the State. MR. ARTHUR [assistant State's Attorney]: Acknowledge receipt, Judge. THE COURT: I don't know under what section you are filing this. MR. [ISAACSON]: The reason we don't say the section is that there is no law on it. As Your Honor knows what this really is is an SOJ for cause. Obviously it's a matter of right because it's not here for trial. THE COURT: It's going to be denied. What else? Section 114-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 114-5) requires that a motion for substitution of judge be in writing ( People v. Agnew (1983), 97 Ill.2d 354, 358, 73 Ill.Dec. 544, 454 N.E.2d 641) and that, if more than a statutorily limited time has elapsed after a cause has been placed on a judge's trial call, the motion be supported by affidavit showing cause for the substitution (see People v. Marshall (1988), 165 Ill.App.3d 968, 974-75, 118 Ill.Dec. 256, 521 N.E.2d 538). Defendant has not pointed out where, if at all, his motion is to be found in the record on appeal, and we have not discovered it. Assuming that the written motion was supported by any requisite affidavit and that the trial judge's statement that the motion was going to be denied amounted to denial, it is true, as defendant contends, that the trial judge summarily denied the motion: Defense counsel was not invited to proceed except for answering the judge's query regarding the statutory section under which the motion was brought. In turn, this at least calls into question whether the statutory mandate to conduct a hearing and determine the merits of the motion was complied with. (See Ill.Rev. Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 114-5(c); cf. People v. Myles (1980), 83 Ill.App.3d 843, 852-53, 39 Ill.Dec. 1, 404 N.E.2d 385, rev'd on other grounds (1981), 86 Ill.2d 260, 55 Ill. Dec. 939, 427 N.E.2d 59 (oral argument was sufficient without evidentiary hearing when judge knew defendant's reasons for motion and had conducted proceeding that prompted it); People v. Spurlark (1978), 67 Ill.App.3d 186, 201, 23 Ill.Dec. 860, 384 N.E.2d 767 (explicitly extending opportunity for oral argument constituted sufficient hearing); People v. Pinchott (1977), 55 Ill. App.3d 601, 602-03, 13 Ill.Dec. 267, 370 N.E.2d 1294 (oral argument opportunity constituted hearing).) We note parenthetically that, at the time of the Batson hearing, the hearing on a motion for substitution of judge did not have to be before a different judge if the motion was made under section 114-5(c) after more than a limited time had elapsed since a cause was placed on a judge's trial call. Since the time of the Batson hearing, an amendment to the section has become effective, requiring that a judge not named in the motion conduct the hearing. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 114-5(c). Nevertheless, precisely because the written motion is absent from the record, and because the report of proceedings fails to show that defendant made any attempt to present to the trial judge the grounds on which defendant now relies in support of his motion, defendant through procedural default has waived such grounds for appeal purposes. (See People v. Curtiss (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 568, 572-73, 81 Ill.Dec. 753, 467 N.E.2d 624; People v. Bach (1979), 74 Ill.App.3d 893, 896, 30 Ill.Dec. 527, 393 N.E.2d 563.) Moreover, lack of specificity in a motion for substitution of judge has been held to be a valid reason for denying it even when no hearing is held on the motion. People v. Marshall (1988), 165 Ill.App.3d 968, 975, 118 Ill.Dec. 256, 521 N.E.2d 538. Nor would our plain error doctrine (see 107 Ill.2d R. 615(a)) apply even if defendant sought to invoke it (which he has not done). That doctrine permits us to take notice of plain errors and defects affecting substantial rights in instances where the evidence is closely balanced or where the error affected the fundamental fairness of the proceeding. ( People v. Fields (1990), 135 Ill.2d 18, 56, 142 Ill.Dec. 200, 552 N.E.2d 791.) Here, the evidence of defendant's guilt is overwhelming. If it is evidence pertinent to the substitution motion itself on which we are to focus, such evidence would have concerned whether cause existed for allowing the motion. We have already observed that defendant has failed to show that any such evidence at all was presented by affidavit or, even informally, in open court when his motion was made. Thus, there is no question of a close balance, regardless of which body of evidence is to be considered. Neither can we say that the fundamental fairness of the proceedings was impaired by denying the substitution motion. Finally, we note the strong presumption that judges rely only on proper evidence in reaching determinations on the merits. The fact that a judge has ruled adversely to a defendant on a previous occasion does not necessarily disqualify the judge from later sitting in judgment of the same defendant's claims. See People v. Vance (1979), 76 Ill.2d 171, 178, 28 Ill.Dec. 508, 390 N.E.2d 867; People v. Berland (1978), 74 Ill.2d 286, 310, 24 Ill.Dec. 508, 385 N.E.2d 649; People v. Beasley (1982), 108 Ill.App.3d 301, 309, 63 Ill.Dec. 942, 438 N.E.2d 1305; People v. Massarella (1979), 80 Ill.App.3d 552, 565, 36 Ill.Dec. 16, 400 N.E.2d 436. Thus, the fact that the trial judge had rejected defendant's claim of discrimination in jury selection on the basis of 1982 law does not by itself imply that the judge would hold a strong predisposition and would not fairly decide defendant's renewed claim on the basis of 1987 law. The trial judge did consider defendant's claims and rejected them, stating that he had heard nothing in 1987 that would alter the conclusion he had enunciated in 1982. This had the same effect as setting forth in full again his 1982 conclusions. However, the State does stray when it argues that we did not direct the trial judge to make his reasoning of record. As we have already observed, our remand order did specifically direct the circuit court to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law and to file them with our court's clerk. The fact that the circuit court failed to comply diligently with this order, though regrettable, does not undermine our conclusion that the trial judge's 1987 reaffirmance of his 1982 findings represented substantial compliance with his Batson obligations.
In a contention closely related to the preceding one, defendant argues that in 1987 the trial judge did not evaluate the legitimacy of the State's explanations for striking black venire members but heard them only to supplement the record. Defendant also argues that the presumption of the judge's fairness and impartiality is rebutted by the judge's 1982 characterization of some black venire members as bums, by his 1982 reference to Gay's race in explaining why he as a prosecutor might have wished to challenge her, and by his 1987 statement of uncertainty about whether Batson precludes a race-based challenge of a black venire member when the crime victim is white and the defendant black. Finally, defendant argues that the trial judge held race alone to be a proper basis for peremptory challenges and that this supposed holding failed to reflect an informed exercise of discretion or an application of the correct legal standard. We find no fault with the trial judge simply for characterizing the State's 1987 explanations as a supplementation of the record. In complying with our remand order and deciding defendant's claim of impermissible discrimination in jury selection, the judge was entitled to consider the 1982 record as well as the record of the 1987 hearing. Indeed, defendant himself tendered the 1982 transcript of proceedings (along with jury cards) to the judge as his entire 1987 evidentiary submission on the Batson issue. In that light, the State's explanations at the 1987 hearing can be said to have supplemented the 1982 record. Such a characterization does not imply that the judge was unwilling to evaluate the State's explanations anew. We are more concerned with those remarks by the judge that, according to defendant, rebut the presumption of impartiality. The bums comment alone, though coarse, provides little support for defendant's contention. At that point in the proceedings, only black venire members were at issue. Thus, the comment necessarily referred to certain unspecified black persons. We find nothing inherently race-specific in a reference to bums, nor any reason to believe that, if a group of white venire members had been at issue and had included individuals of a socioeconomic status or background similar to that of any black members to whom the judge was referring, the judge would not similarly have labeled them. The judge's 1982 reference to Gay's race and his 1987 expression of uncertainty about the scope of Batson are troubling, however. It is true that Batson forbids acceptance of prosecutorial explanations for challenges to black venire members if the explanations rely on assumptions that arise solely from the venire members' race, or on assumptions that the venire members would be biased in favor of a black defendant simply because of their common race. ( Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88.) Here, not only were defendant and the challenged venire members black, but also principal victims were white; and not only were Gay and defendant black, but also they were of similar ages. In other words, the defendant's and challenged venire members' common race in combination with certain other facts arguably supported the challenges at issue. Thus, through a naked parsing of Batson, it might be contended that such race-plus peremptory challenges are generally permissible, and were permissible in the present cause. Though to its credit the State makes no such Batson -based argument in support of the trial court's actual 1987 ruling on defendant's motion for a new trial, the State implicitly advances a similar theory to support validating the trial judge's 1982 comment on Gay's race. The State points out that Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759, had not yet been modified by Batson and that Swain had relieved prosecutors of any duty to explain their reasons for particular peremptory challenges. The State therefore suggests that Swain may, at the time when the judge's 1982 comment was uttered, have legitimized the judge's race-plus reference to Gay's combined race, sex, and age. The State's suggestion is without merit. First, even if prosecutors did not have to explain peremptory challenges, it would not logically follow that admittedly race-based challenges were permissible or that a trial judge's implicit endorsement thereof was proper. Second, Swain specifically disapproved challenges that were overtly race-based (see Swain, 380 U.S. at 203-04, 85 S.Ct. at 826-27, 13 L.Ed.2d at 763-64), despite tolerating, for the sake of honoring the peremptory-challenge system, challenges that had an unspoken racial basis (see Swain, 380 U.S. at 220-21, 85 S.Ct. at 836, 13 L.Ed.2d at 772-73). (See also Batson, 476 U.S. at 101 n. , 106 S.Ct. at 1725 n. , 90 L.Ed.2d at 90 n.  (White, J., concurring) ( Swain would allow invalidation of challenge if prosecutorially volunteered explanation is race-based); Garrett v. Morris (8th Cir.1987), 815 F.2d 509, 511-13 (same); Weathersby v. Morris (9th Cir.1983), 708 F.2d 1493, 1496 (same); cf. Teague v. Lane (1989), 489 U.S. 288, 295-98, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1067-68, 103 L.Ed.2d 334, 347 (declining, because of perceived Illinois procedural default and failure to show cause therefor and prejudice therefrom, to address merits of claim that Swain allowed examination of prosecutorially volunteered explanations for challenges); Teague, 489 U.S. at 323-26, 109 S.Ct. at 1082-83, 103 L.Ed.2d at 364-66 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (expressing view that Illinois courts might consider petitioner's Swain claim as within fundamental-fairness exception to waiver rule on collateral review). But see Teague v. Lane (7th Cir.1987), 820 F.2d 832, 834 n. 6 ( en banc), aff'd on other grounds (1989), 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (stating that Swain barred equal protection challenge to strikes in a lone case even if they were shown to be based on race); United States v. Danzey (E.D.N.Y.1979), 476 F.Supp. 1065, aff'd without written opinion (2d Cir.1980), 620 F.2d 286 (stating that Swain barred review even of volunteered explanations).) Third, even assuming that Swain might have tolerated an explicitly race-based challenge (or a trial judge's approval of one), it is the trial judge's 1987 ruling, not any understanding of the law that he may have had in 1982, that is before us. Accordingly, whether he was legally right in 1982 does not settle the matter if his 1982 view had become incorrect under 1987 law and if we can say that in his 1987 ruling he relied on that wrong view of the law. At least by 1987, any view that consideration of a venire member's race could justify a prosecutor's peremptory challenge had become wrong. Some language in Batson does refer to peremptory challenges based simply or solely on race. But see Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87-88 (referring more broadly to exclusion on account of race). However, we reject any notion that Batson offers solace to prosecutors who explain challenges on race-plus grounds. Our chief reason is simple: The race-plus concept is largely illusory in the context of a Batson hearing. If black venire members' disparate treatment as compared to that of similarly situated white persons is alleged, then it is insufficient or even self-defeating for a prosecutor to explain that a black venire member's race plus another factor motivated the challenge. Such an explanation will not, of itself, justify the allegedly disparate treatment, since the reference to race will leave unanswered how it was proper to challenge the black but not a comparable white venire member. On the other hand, if a prosecutor adequately explains the challenge of a black venire member by distinguishing on nonracial grounds an allegedly comparable and unchallenged white venire memberor even if the prosecutor resorts to relying on the nonspecific possibility that in some other respect the white juror was desirable, and then secures a favorable trial-court ruling to which we generally show great deference (see People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d 1, 23-24, 131 Ill.Dec. 78, 538 N.E.2d 453)the prosecutor's explanation will not have depended on the illusory race-plus concept after all. Furthermore, if a prosecutor's explanation is really so limited as to make citation of the challenged venire member's race essential to the explanation's coherence, then the explanation can truly be said to rest solely or simply on the racial factor for otherwise, stripped of the racial underpinning, it would effectively not have been a sufficient explanation at all and would have failed to rebut a Batson prima facie case. Either way, therefore, Batson cannot be viewed as permitting the trial judge or the State to explain Gay's challenge by actually relying on her race, even as one of several factors. This conclusion is buttressed by characterizations of Batson in later cases. (See Holland v. Illinois (1990), 493 U.S. ___, ___, 110 S.Ct. 803, 811, 107 L.Ed.2d 905, 920 (systematic exclusion of blacks from jury system is obviously unlawful); Holland, 493 U.S. at ___, 110 S.Ct. at 811, 107 L.Ed.2d at 921 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (excluding juror on the basis of race is constitutional violation); People v. Harris (1989), 129 Ill.2d 123, 174, 135 Ill. Dec. 861, 544 N.E.2d 357 (assumption of sympathy because of shared race is impermissible); cf. Wilkerson v. Texas (1989), ___ U.S. ___, ___, 110 S.Ct. 292, 293-95, 107 L.Ed.2d 272, 273-75 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of cert. ) (race-plus explanations do not satisfy Batson requirement of neutral explanations).) Given the fact that other young, female, but white venire members went unchallenged by the State, the State does not persuade by now arguing that the trial judge's reference to Gay as a black lady might have been merely incidental to his consideration of her sex and age as components of some sexual attraction toward defendant. Accordingly, it would be improper for us to approve such a judicially volunteered 1982 explanation if, as the State seemingly would permit, we imputed it to the prosecutors as a basis for their 1987 explanations at the Batson hearing. But the prosecutors' own 1987 explanations, based on Gay's crime-victim experience and her arguably equivocal answers at voir dire, provided adequate independent grounds for the trial judge to find in 1987 that the challenge to Gay was based on nonracial factors. And we cannot say that the judge's expressed 1982 concern about Gay's and defendant's race, or his 1987 uncertainty about the role of race in justifying peremptory challenges, though legally erroneous, rebutted the presumption of his impartiality. A judge can be wrong without being partial. For these reasons, and given the deference we show to trial courts' Batson findings, defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by any race-based surplusage in the trial judge's volunteered 1982 explanation of Gay's challenge, however improper it was. Nor has defendant shown that the trial judge lacked impartiality or that he failed in 1987 to assess defendant's Batson claim. Defendant is also incorrect in arguing that the trial judge held that Batson allowed race alone to be the basis of peremptory challenges. Though the trial judge demonstrated an incomplete understanding of evolving and complex Batson law in not sufficiently recognizing racial motivations as discriminatory, his expression of uncertainty did not constitute the holding that defendant alleges. And the trial judge's discretion in finding no racial discrimination against Gay was sufficiently informed, because articulated reasons of crime victimization and equivocation adequately supported his finding.
Defendant contends that the prosecutors' jury selection notes contained notations or omissions inconsistent with their explanations for challenging black venire members and that the trial court erred in finding the notes irrelevant and in withholding them from disclosure to defendant. Besides arguing erroneously that defendant failed to make a prima facie case under Batson and thus had no right to any explanations for the State's challenges, the State responds that at a Batson hearing a defendant has no right to cross-examine a prosecutor about proffered explanations and that defendant therefore had no right to use the notes for cross-examination. The State also responds that the trial judge, as trier of fact, did view the notes and found that nothing in them would help defendant, so that defendant suffered no prejudice. In addition, the State responds that nothing in the notes shows inconsistency in explanations, or even shows the race of venire members (with the possible exception of one venire member who was excused for cause). Defendant replies that the trial judge's comments strongly indicated that he sympathized with the State and that defense counsel's assessment of the notes and resulting advocacy certainly would have differed from the trial judge's views. Much of defendant's argument depends on the assumption that such notes will necessarily reflect every factor that the State later cites in support of its decision to challenge and that, if a cited factor is recorded for a white person who goes unchallenged but is unrecorded for a black person who is challenged, this discrepancy will undercut the State's explanation. Yet such notes are made subjectively under the pressure of time and events during voir dire; they are not systematic, nor are they required to be. If, as the State points out, a venire member is challenged because of an answer given only moments before, the notetaker may fail to record the answer in the notes. Yet, that fact alone should not impugn the good faith of a proffered explanation or cast doubt on whether, at the time a venire member was challenged, the prosecutor could have recalled the answer that is later cited as an explanation for the challenge. Defendant also errs when he analyzes the issue of note disclosure in terms of such criminal evidentiary concepts as discovery of prior written statements of intended State witnesses (107 Ill.2d Rules 412(a)(i), (a)(ii), (a)(iii)) and proof of a defendant's guilty knowledge and absence of mistake. The prosecutors here were not defendants. Neither were they State witnesses in the sense of Rule 412, which applies to criminal trials on the merits, not to preliminary hearings. (See 107 Ill.2d R. 411.) Just as Rule 412 does not apply to preliminary hearings, it should not be applied mandatorily to post-conviction Batson hearings. Furthermore, as we decided while this appeal was pending, prosecutors are not subject to cross-examination on oath at Batson hearings. ( People v. Harris (1989), 129 Ill.2d 123, 174, 135 Ill.Dec. 861, 544 N.E.2d 357; People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d 1, 24-26, 131 Ill.Dec. 78, 538 N.E.2d 453.) We have expressly declined to adopt such a requirement. People v. Mack (1989), 128 Ill.2d 231, 251-52, 131 Ill.Dec. 551, 538 N.E.2d 1107 (citing cases); Young, 128 Ill.2d at 24-26, 131 Ill.Dec. 78, 538 N.E.2d 453. But see Note, Defense Presence and Participation: A Procedural Minimum for Batson v. Kentucky Hearings, 99 Yale L.J. 187, 205-06 (1989) (note by Brett M. Kavanaugh) (arguing that during typical Batson hearings trial courts should have discretion whether to permit full evidentiary format with sworn cross-examination of prosecutor but that Batson hearings held on remand should, because of time lapse and complexity of issues, be required to follow such format; citing cases). Defendant has cited no controlling authority for his contention that the trial judge erred in examining the jury selection notes in camera but refusing to disclose them to defendant. We believe that the question whether to disclose the notes was within the trial judge's discretion and that the procedure he employed and the entry of his resultant findings were not abuses of that discretion. And, for reasons to which we have already referred, we cannot see in the notes' contents or omissions any substantial support for defendant's contentions of prosecutorial discrimination in jury selection or bad faith in explaining challenges.