Opinion ID: 6800285
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: WPA Definition of “Protected Disclosure”

Text: The WPA defines “protected disclosure,” where relevant here, as “any disclosure of information . . . to any person by an employee . . . that the employee reasonably believes evidences,” 28 among other things, “[a] substantial and specific danger to public health and safety.” 29 “The employee must hold such a belief at the time the whistle is blown, and the belief must be both sincere and objectively reasonable.” 30 Our case law defines “reasonable” as whether “a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the employee [could] reasonably conclude that the actions of the government 26 National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. McDavitt, 804 A.2d 275, 280 (D.C. 2002). 27 Id. (quoting Corley v. BP Oil Corp., 402 A.2d 1258, 1263 (D.C. 1979)). 28 D.C. Code § 1-615.52(a)(6). 29 D.C. Code § 1-615.52(a)(6)(E). 30 Ukwuani, 241 A.3d at 551. 22 evidence [illegality].” 31 “This analysis does not hinge upon whether the action was ultimately determined to be illegal, but it does require that the employee’s belief be objectively reasonable and that the employee has not ignored essential facts, including those which detract from a reasonable belief.” 32 “In other words, the fact finder must consider whether the employee reasonably should have been aware of information that would have defeated his inference of official misconduct.” 33 In assessing reasonableness, the jury is required to consider whether a disinterested observer with appellant’s “background and expertise” could reasonably believe that the actions of the government evidence illegality. 34 “A mere policy disagreement with an agency or supervisor is not enough to show . . . a substantial and specific danger to public safety; an employee ‘must disclose such 31 Zirkle v. District of Columbia, 830 A.2d 1250, 1259-60 (D.C. 2003) (second alteration in original) (quoting Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Although Lachance is a federal case, it defines “reasonable” in the context of a “similarly worded federal WPA.” Id. at 1259 n.13. 32 Ukwuani, 241 A.3d at 552 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 33 Id. (emphasis in original). 34 Zirkle, 830 A.2d at 1258. 23 serious errors by the agency that a conclusion that the agency erred is not debatable among reasonable people.’” 35