Opinion ID: 2307555
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Preparation of Motion

Text: In State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 549 A. 2d 792 (1988), we held that a murder committed with the intent to cause serious bodily injury, as opposed to the intent to kill, is not death-eligible. But see Amendment to N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 12 (overruling Gerald holding). Defendant's guilt-phase trial was conducted before our holding in Gerald. On direct appeal, defendant argued that he should receive a new guilt phase trial because the facts provided a rational basis to believe that he intended merely to cause serious bodily harm. We rejected the argument. Bey III, supra, 129 N.J. at 580, 610 A. 2d 814. Capital murder convictions rendered before Gerald are reversible only if the jury rationally could have convicted the defendant of causing serious bodily injury resulting in death. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 92, 549 A. 2d 792. In Bey III, we concluded that the evidence led to the conclusion that defendant's intent was to kill, not merely cause serious bodily injury, to his victim. When a defendant employs various means of violence against the same victim, we need not focus on which method actually succeeded in causing death. Rather, we find that defendant's actions, taken as a whole, were so wantonly brutal that he could have intended only to cause death, or knew that death was practically certain to occur. Overall, we find that defendant's strangulation of the victim and the degree of force applied to the victim's head and chest make it simply inconceivable that defendant was not `practically certain' that his action would kill the [victim]. [ Bey III, supra, 129 N.J. at 580, 610 A. 2d 814.] Defendant now contends that, in light of the Gerald holding, McCauley, his co-counsel, was ineffective in preparing a motion for a new guilt-phase trial. When drafting the motion, McCauley relied on the medical examiner's testimony and the autopsy report introduced during the guilt-phase of the original trial. He did not review the autopsy report or crime-scene photographs. Nor did he retain an independent pathologist to examine the photographs. At the PCR hearing, the defense introduced testimony from a pathologist, Dr. Karl Schwarz. Dr. Schwarz testified that blunt trauma to the heart and the head were as capable as ligature strangulation of having caused Peniston's death. Defendant reasons that Dr. Schwarz's testimony supports defendant's theory that he did not strangle the victim for the time necessary to kill her. Instead, defendant asserts that Peniston died suddenly and unexpectedly from the head and chest trauma. According to defendant, this theory provides a rational basis for convicting him of serious-bodily-injury murder. The PCR court, relying on our decision in Bey III that defendant's strangulation and other violent acts demonstrated that defendant purposefully or knowingly murdered Ms. Peniston, rejected defendant's claim. We likewise reject the claim. Even if McCauley should have sought a second opinion from a pathologist, such testimony would not have affected the outcome of the Gerald motion for a new trial. On direct appeal, we held, regardless of the actual cause of death, that defendant's actions demonstrated that he had formed the intent to kill. As we stated, defendant not only strangled the victim from behind, he also smashed her face hard enough to break her dental plate and cause cerebral hemorrhaging, and he stomped on her chest with enough force to crush her ribs, damage her heart and inscribe his sneaker sole on her chest. Bey III, supra, 129 N.J. at 580, 610 A. 2d 814. The degree of force defendant exerted was central to our finding that defendant acted with the intent to kill. Traumatic injuries to the victim's heart and head, as opposed to strangulation, may have been the actual cause of death. That fact, however, does not negate our conclusion that the evidence that defendant intended to cause death or knew that death was practically certain to occur is so compelling as to exclude the possibility that he possessed a less culpable state of mind. Id. at 581, 610 A. 2d 814. Defendant's motion for a new trial would have been denied even if McCauley had consulted a pathologist or taken other action in preparation of the motion. Thus, we find no prejudice to defendant.