Opinion ID: 2599941
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenges to Juror Peter W.

Text: Defendant makes a number of contentions related to the trial court's refusal to excuse Juror Peter W. or to grant defendant an additional peremptory challenge in order to excuse him. At the time Peter W. underwent general voir dire, defendant had used 19 of his 20 peremptory challenges. Peter W. worked for the county department of corrections. During voir dire, the prosecutor asked him whether he knew defendant. Peter W. replied that he was employed in the main jail, and that he believed defendant stayed in the old building. The prosecutor then questioned him further concerning whether he had seen defendant at the jail. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor improperly had informed the jurors that defendant was in custody. The court denied the motion for mistrial but, upon defendant's request, the court ordered the prosecutor not to delve any further into the juror's occupation as it relates to the defendant. Defense counsel asked for one additional peremptory challenge, because there is contamination prejudice. The trial court denied that request as well. Defense counsel then challenged Peter W. for cause on the ground that the juror knew that defendant was in custody. Defense counsel questioned the juror further concerning whether the nature of his job might affect his ability to serve, and the juror indicated that it would not. During this questioning, Peter W. reconfirmed his earlier statements that he would be very cautious in making a decision that could result in a severe punishment. Defense counsel then explained to the judge that counsel faced a dilemma: he could either employ his last peremptory challenge to remove a juror who had a leaning against the death penalty, or retain him even though he was contaminated as a result of his knowledge that defendant was currently in custody. Defense counsel offered to stipulate to excuse the juror for cause. The prosecutor agreed to the stipulation for tactical reasons, but stated he did not believe the trial court had erred in its rulings. The trial court refused to accept the stipulation, stating that the juror was qualified and that there was no impediment to his service. Defense counsel employed his final peremptory challenge to excuse another juror, and Peter W. served on defendant's jury. Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to accept the stipulation. Defendant asserts that the parties are entitled to stipulate to the excusal of a juror absent extraordinary circumstances. Instead, [a]ssessing the qualifications of jurors challenged for cause is a matter falling within the broad discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 910, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103; see Code Civ. Proc. §§ 225, subd. (b)(1) [specifying grounds for challenge for cause], 230 [challenges for cause shall be determined by the court].) Defendant has cited no authority suggesting a court is required to accept the parties' stipulation that a juror be excused for cause. (See People v. Singh (1932) 121 Cal.App. 107, 111, 8 P.2d 898 [court is not required to accept the parties' stipulation on issues of law].) Defendant relies on the test established to determine whether parties who have settled a case while the appeal is pending are entitled to a stipulated reversal. (See Neary v. Regents of University of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 273, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 834 P.2d 119.) The standard established in Neary was based, in large part, on policies relevant to the settlement of civil actions  policies that are inapplicable in the present context. (See Neary, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 277-280, 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 859, 834 P.2d 119.) On appeal, we will uphold the trial court's decision if it is fairly supported by the record, and accept as binding the trial court's determination as to the prospective juror's true state of mind when the prospective juror has given conflicting or ambiguous statements. ( People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 132, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988.) The court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Peter W. was qualified to serve on defendant's jury. The juror did not have actual contact with defendant through his employment at the jail and expressed no opinion suggesting he could not be fair and impartial. [3] Defendant contends that no deference is due the trial court's ruling, because juror Peter W.'s employment as a corrections officer in the county jail system where defendant was housed constituted implied bias  a presumption of bias that could not be overcome by a finding that he could be fair and impartial. Under California law, a juror may be excused for implied bias only for one of the reasons listed in Code of Civil Procedure section 229, and for no other. (Code Civ. Proc. § 229.) If the facts do not establish one of the grounds for implied bias listed in that statute, the juror may be excused for [a]ctual bias if the court finds that the juror's state of mind would prevent him or her from being impartial. (Code Civ. Proc. § 225, subd. (b)(1)(C).) None of the statutory grounds for a finding of implied bias is present in this case, and the trial court concluded that Peter W. was not actually biased. Defendant argues nevertheless that Peter W.'s position as a corrections officer and his knowledge that defendant was incarcerated rendered him unable to decide the case impartially, and that the failure to excuse him violated the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a trial by an impartial jury. Defendant relies upon federal cases concluding that bias may be implied or presumed from the potential for substantial emotional involvement inherent in certain relationships. ( United States v. Allsup (9th Cir.1977) 566 F.2d 68, 71 [jurors should have been excused for cause from serving on case in which the defendant was charged with robbing a bank that employed them, even though they claimed they could be impartial]; see also Fields v. Woodford (9th.Cir.2002) 309 F.3d 1095 [evidentiary hearing required to determine whether juror whose wife had been the victim of a crime quite similar to the ones charged was biased]; United States v. Eubanks (9th.Cir.1979) 591 F.2d 513 [juror who had two sons who were serving long prison terms for murder and robbery committed in an attempt to obtain heroin should have been excused from serving in case in which the defendant was charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute heroin].) Even assuming these federal decisions are otherwise persuasive, we discern on the present record no potential for the type of emotional involvement that these cases found to be grounds for disqualification. Peter W. did not work in the part of the jail in which defendant was housed. The circumstance that he knew defendant was incarcerated did not render him unable to be impartial. (See, e.g., People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 121, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1336, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) [4] Defendant also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant defendant's request for an additional peremptory challenge. To support a claim that he is constitutionally entitled to more peremptory challenges than are provided by statute, a defendant must establish at the very least that in the absence of such additional challenges he is reasonably likely to receive an unfair trial before a partial jury. ( People v. Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d 659, 679, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217; see People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 231, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643 [additional peremptory challenge not required when the defendant did not demonstrate that the trial court erroneously denied challenges for cause and none of the allegedly biased prospective jurors actually served on the jury].) Other than the meritless contention that Peter W.'s employment at the jail was ground for disqualification, defendant suggests no reason that an additional peremptory challenge was necessary in order to avoid an unfair trial. Defense counsel argued that he needed the additional challenge because the jury panel was tainted by the information that defendant was in custody, but any such bias could have been addressed through an appropriate admonition, had one been requested.