Opinion ID: 891641
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Actual Physical Control Requires Proof of a General Intent to Drive

Text: {24} We agree with Harrison and reaffirm that the DWI provision proscribing driving while intoxicated is a strict liability crime and requires no mens rea for conviction when the accused, while intoxicated, is observed behind the steering wheel of a moving vehicle. However, the facts of this case persuade us that when a DWI charge is based on evidence of actual physical control, evidence of intent is also necessary to support a conviction. The threat, if any, that was posed by Defendant as he lay passed out or asleep in his vehicle was far short of that posed by an intoxicated individual who is driving. While Defendant arguably exercised some level of control over the vehicle, given his location in the driver's seat and the proximity of his keys, there was no indication that he posed any actual, as opposed to hypothetical, threat to the public. {25} In fact, an intoxicated individual may exercise a great deal of control over a vehicle, yet still pose little danger to himself, herself, or the public. For example, on a cold night, an intoxicated person may use his vehicle as a temporary shelteras a place to sleep it offeven going so far as to start the engine so that he can turn on the heater. Such an individual, while clearly in control of his vehicle, does not pose a threat to himself, herself, or the public precisely because he has decided not to drive. The individual's recognition that he is too intoxicated to drive embodies the aim of our DWI law and its enforcement. To subject this type of behavior to strict liability would be counterproductive. {26} It is not until an intoxicated individual in actual physical control of a vehicle forms the intent to drive that he becomes a danger. At that moment he ceases to be merely a passive occupant of the vehiclehe becomes a threat to public safety and is therefore culpable under the DWI law. We therefore hold that a DWI conviction that is based on actual physical control requires proof that the accused actually exercised control over the vehicle, as well as proof of a general intent to drive, so as to pose a real danger to the safety of the driver or the public. [3] It is no longer sufficient to introduce evidence that shows that the accused can directly commence operating a vehicle while ... intoxicated. Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, ¶ 19, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233. {27} We recognize that interpreting actual physical control to require proof of intent makes it analytically similar to an attempt crime. See NMSA 1978, § 30-28-1 (1963) (requiring an overt act in furtherance of and with intent to commit the crime); cf. Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, ¶ 19, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233 (equating actual physical control with being in a situation in which [drivers] can directly commence operating a vehicle while they are intoxicated); Atkinson v. State, 331 Md. 199, 627 A.2d 1019, 1025 (1993) (noting that the view among many states is that the purpose of the actual physical control language in DWI provisions is preventive, aimed to protect the public from what inebriated individuals might do (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We note that the Legislature has intended that [n]o person shall be sentenced for an attempt to commit a misdemeanor. Section 30-28-1. This is true in general, unless a specific statute provides otherwise. See City of Albuquerque v. Chavez, 91 N.M. 559, 560, 577 P.2d 457, 458 (Ct.App.1978) (holding that Section 30-28-1 is inapplicable if another statute authorizes the alleged attempted misdemeanor). Insofar as we believe that the Legislature equated proof of actual physical control with proof of driving, Section 66-8-102 authorizes prosecution for attempted DWI. Thus, when the prosecution relies on actual physical control to prove DWI, the prosecution must prove an overt act sufficient to establish actual physical control of the vehicle along with the general intent to drive. See § 30-28-1.