Opinion ID: 3012034
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the New Jersey Supreme Court Properly

Text: Conclude that the Error was of the Type Condemned in Macon? Oakleigh DeCarlo, Marshall’s sister, was questioned on cross-examination about the visit police investigators made to the Marshall home on September 21, 1984, to inquire about the then newly discovered Louisiana contacts. Ms. _________________________________________________________________ barred from examining lower federal court decisions in deciding whether the state decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law). We have concluded, however, that decisions of federal courts below the level of the United States Supreme Court may be helpful to us in ascertaining the reasonableness of state courts’ application of clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent, as well as helpful amplifications of that precedent. Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 105 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F. 3d 877, 890 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 824 (1999)). We view our reliance on Thame and Macon as such a helpful amplification. And we think that other United States Supreme Court precedent implicitly recognized the principle we iterated in those cases. In Donnelly, for example, the United States Supreme Court contrasted the alleged error before it with the denial of thebenefit of a specific provision of the Bill of Rights, such as the right to counsel or the constructive denial of such a right, citing to Griffin. Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643. Thus, while the United States Supreme Court has not had the opportunity specifically to extend Griffin’s holding, it has recognized the basis for our holding in Macon. Further, the New Jersey Supreme Court itself stated that we are fully in accord with the decisions of the federal Courts of Appeals holding that a prosecutor’s statement suggesting that retention of counsel is inconsistent with innocence impermissibly infringes on a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel. Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 148. 47 DeCarlo was present. At trial, there was conflicting testimony as to whether Marshall was asked whether he knew certain names or was also shown photographs of the Louisiana contacts. Defense counsel had sought -- and received -- a ruling that the prosecutor could inquire as to Marshall’s reaction to the photographs shown to him, but not as to Marshall’s refusal to answer based on counsel’s advice. App. Br. at 123-24. The prosecutor inquired of Ms. DeCarlo whether the interview ended after Marshall was shown the photographs. PROSECUTOR: You didn’t hear him answer any questions, did you, when they said -- DECARLO: Yes, I did. PROSECUTOR: You did? DECARLO: Yes. PROSECUTOR: Answer their questions? DECARLO: He answered a question. PROSECUTOR: A question? DECARLO: A question. PROSECUTOR: One question? DECARLO: One question. PROSECUTOR: Then the conversation ended: is that correct? DECARLO: No. They said they had other questions and he said, I think I should have my lawyer here if you’re going to ask any more questions. PROSECUTOR: Did you say to him, Hey, Rob. Why get your lawyer. Your wife was murdered. Maybe these people -- Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 147. The above were characterized by the New Jersey Supreme Court as verging on infringement of the right to counsel, but brief andnot dwell[ed] on. Id. at 148. After the prosecutor completed his cross-examination, Thompson’s counsel, Mr. Hartman, cross-examined DeCarlo: 48 HARTMAN: You wouldn’t think it unreasonable that if a person retained an attorney and was possibly under suspicion that they should have their attorney present? DECARLO: Not at all. That’s why you hire them for his advice. Id. at 148. Hartman then asked Ms. DeCarlo if she thought it unreasonable that a person under suspicion would want their attorney present during questioning, and she responded that that is why attorneys were hired. Then the prosecutor resumed his cross-examination: PROSECUTOR: Especially when your wife has been killed and you haven’t -- you didn’t have anything to do with it, you still run out and hire an attorney? Id. Marshall’s counsel objected to the question, and the objection was sustained, but no curative instruction was sought or given. The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that what could be characterized as a question only by a most indulgent reading required a clear and forceful curative instruction by the court. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court characterized the prosecutor’s cross-examination of DeCarlo as a highly improper and inexcusable attempt . . . to suggest that defendant’s retention of counsel was inconsistent with his claim that he was innocent. Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 147. 49 [This page intentionally left blank] 50 Volume 2 of 3 51