Opinion ID: 177197
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpretation of State Law

Text: To address Appellants' second argument, we must determine whether section 13-21-403(4) had a substantive effect on the nature of the presumption of section 13-21-403(3). See 1 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 302.04[1] at 302-9 (Joseph M. Laughlin ed., 2d ed. 2010) ([O]nce it is determined that a state presumption must be applied under Rule 302, the court must give the presumption the same effect it would be given under state law.). Appellants essentially contend that it had no substantive impact on section 13-21-403(3)'s presumption and, more specifically, that section 13-21-403(4) does not undermine Mile Hi 's holding that the only effect of section 13-21-403(3)'s presumption is to impose the burden of going forward on the party against whom it is directed and that the presumption is intended to disappear once a plaintiff meets that burden. Mile Hi, 842 P.2d at 207. To support their argument, Appellants point out that the Colorado General Assembly did not remove from section 13-21-403(3) the language providing that the presumption is rebuttable. Aplt. Reply Br. at 17. They also argue that the Colorado Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Krueger v. Ary, 205 P.3d 1150 (Colo.2009), confirms that [the Tenth Circuit's] interpretation of Colorado's rebuttable presumptions in Wagner and Perlmutter was correct. Id. at 18. Teleflex counters that there can be no doubt that the statutory amendment was intended by the legislature to change how the presumption operated at trial. Aplee. Br. at 15. As a result, Teleflex reasons, Perlmutter and Wagner are no longer good law in Colorado, id. at 17, and the Tenth Circuit must reassess Colorado law. As we noted above, in diversity cases our task is simply to ascertain and apply the state law. Wankier, 353 F.3d at 866 (quoting Huddleston, 322 U.S. at 236, 64 S.Ct. 1015) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is axiomatic that state courts are the final arbiters of state law. United States v. DeGasso, 369 F.3d 1139, 1145 (10th Cir.2004). But here there are no relevant Colorado decisions interpreting section 13-21-403(4), so we must attempt to predict what the state's highest court would do. Wankier, 353 F.3d at 866. As we are sitting in diversity and construing a Colorado statute, we must give it the meaning it would have in the Colorado courts. To accomplish this objective, this court must begin with the plain language of the statute. If the statute is unambiguous and does not conflict with other statutory provisions, we need look no further. Parish Oil Co., Inc. v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 523 F.3d 1244, 1248 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting People v. Luther, 58 P.3d 1013, 1015 (Colo.2002)) (brackets and citations omitted). In construing statutes, our primary duty is to give full effect to the intent of the General Assembly... [T]he statute should be construed as written since it may be presumed that the General Assembly meant what it clearly said. Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 109 P.3d 585, 593 (Colo.2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). [W]e may consider the textual context; the statute's legislative history; the state of the law prior to the legislative enactment; the problem addressed by the legislation; and the relationship between the particular legislation and other relevant legislative provisions in an effort to discern the legislative intent. Colby v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 928 P.2d 1298, 1302 (Colo.1996) (citations omitted); see also Mile Hi, 842 P.2d at 207-08 (Rovira, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (collecting cases on statutory interpretation). Section 13-21-403(4) states that [i]n a product liability action in which the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the necessary facts giving rise to a presumption have been established, the court shall instruct the jury concerning the presumption. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-403(4) (emphasis added). This plain text indicates that the Colorado General Assembly sought to make clear that, once a showing by a preponderance has been made concerning the facts giving rise to section 13-21-403(3)'s presumption, an instruction regarding the presumption must be given. In the face of this plain language, Appellants would have us believe that [t]he General Assembly's decision to statutorily require a jury instruction reflects nothing more than a legislative determination that, procedurally, a jury instruction on the presumption will not be confusing to the jury. Aplt. Reply Br. at 16. Setting to one side the observation that this statement seems to concede that the district court here was permittedthough not obligedto instruct the jury on section 13-21-403(3)'s presumption, such a reading of section 13-21-403(4) would require us to assume that the Colorado General Assembly passed a superfluous statute one with a mandatory directive that the General Assembly did not intend to be mandatorily implemented. That would be an absurd interpretation. For us to indulge it, we would have to abandon our primary duty ... to give full effect to the intent of the General Assembly, Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 109 P.3d at 593, ignore our obligation to consider the state of the law prior to the legislative enactment, Charnes v. Boom, 766 P.2d 665, 667 (Colo.1988), and forget that we should consider a statute's textual context, Krieg v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 686 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Colo.1984). Furthermore, Appellants' suggestion that section 13-21-403(4) merely had a procedural effect on the nature of section 13-21-403(3)'s presumption is misguided. Before the amendment, the presumption operated as a procedural tool for ordering proofthe presumption required a finding in favor of non-defectiveness until some credible evidence rebutted that presumption, at which time the presumption disappeared. In the absence of rebuttal, the plaintiff had not met the burden of going forward and a directed verdict was appropriate. See Mile Hi, 842 P.2d at 204-07; see also Beaver v. Fid. Life Ass'n, 313 F.2d 111, 113 (1963) (discussing the category of presumption that functions as a procedural tool for ordering proof); cf. Krueger, 205 P.3d at 1154-56 (discussing rebuttable presumptions as tools for burden shifting). See generally 2 Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 344 at 506-22 (6th ed. 2006) (discussing the procedural effect of presumptions in civil cases). As a consequence of the 2003 amendment, which introduced section 13-21-403(4), the presumption of section 13-21-403(3) is now accorded substantive effect in the case; it is to be considered by the jury along with traditional forms of evidence, so long as the trial court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the necessary facts giving rise to the presumption have been established. See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-403(4); see also Beaver, 313 F.2d at 113 (applying Kansas law and noting the judicial category of presumption that operates as a rule of affirmative evidence, which persists to sustain the burden of proving the presumed fact until outweighed by the preponderance of the evidence of the non-existence of that fact, i.e., it is to be considered as evidence against evidence  (emphasis added)); Broun, supra, § 344 at 513 (noting that [a]nother solution ... is to instruct the jury that the presumption is `evidence,' to be weighed and considered with the testimony in the case). Therefore, in enacting section 13-21-403(4), the Colorado General Assembly effectively overruled Mile Hi 's interpretation of the effect of section 13-21-403(3)'s presumption as being only to impose the burden of going forward on the party against whom it is directed. Mile Hi, 842 P.2d at 207. And, consequently, our cases that adopted Mile Hi 's interpretation viz. Perlmutter and Wagner no longer accurately reflect Colorado law. To be sure, as Appellants note, the Colorado General Assembly did not remove the word rebuttable from section 13-21-403(3). But the General Assembly's deliberate choiceand we must assume that its choice was deliberate, see, e.g., Stumpf v. Colo. Dep't of Revenue, 231 P.3d 1, 3 (Colo. App.2009)to leave the word in the statute does not mean that section 13-21-403(4) is window dressing. The continuing presence of the word rebuttable can be explained readily as an attempt to clarify that the jury is still permitted to conclude that a product is defective, even when the presumption is in force. In other words, it indicates that section 13-21-403(3) does not embody a conclusive presumption. See Colby, 928 P.2d at 1308-09 (Scott, J., dissenting) (noting conclusive presumptions in the Colorado code); see also Broun, supra, § 344 at 513 (noting the danger that the jury may infer that the presumption is conclusive). Further, Appellants offer no reason to think that our reading of the statute is erroneous. To the contrary, all indications from Colorado law suggest that we are on the right path. In Krueger the key case relied upon by Appellantsthe Colorado Supreme Court h[e]ld [that] the rebuttable presumptions of undue influence and unfairness do not continue in a case after they are sufficiently rebutted and, therefore, that plaintiff's requested instructionswhich inform the jury of the presumptions and require the jury to consider the presumptions in conjunction with all the other evidence to determine whether [the defendant] unduly influenced [the decedent]are improper. 205 P.3d at 1153, 1156. The court in Krueger, however, expressly noted that its discussion of presumptions only covered the general rule. Id. at 1154. Krueger does not foreclose the possibility that some rebuttable presumptions do not follow the general rule. 205 P.3d at 1154. And Krueger recognized, of course, that [a] trial court is obligated to correctly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case. Id. at 1157 (quoting Jordan v. Bogner, 844 P.2d 664, 667 (Colo.1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither Krueger nor any other case of which we are aware suggests that the Colorado General Assembly is somehow barred from creating a presumption with substantive effect. Cf. Ravin v. Gambrell, 788 P.2d 817, 822 (Colo.1990) (Our prior decisions have made clear that when a plaintiff introduces sufficient evidence to establish the presumption of negligence embodied in the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the trial court must instruct the jury as to the nature and effect of that doctrine. (emphasis added)); Tafoya, 884 F.2d at 1336 (noting that the status and strength of a rebuttable presumption vary according to the force of the policies which motivate a court or a legislature to create it). And we believe that the General Assembly has done just that by enacting section 13-21-403(4). In sum, we think it clear that, in adding section 13-21-403(4), the Colorado General Assembly said what it meant and meant what it said: [i]n a product liability action in which the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the necessary facts giving rise to a presumption have been established, the court shall instruct the jury concerning the presumption. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-403(4) (emphasis added). Properly instructed, the jury may consider this presumption along with traditional forms of evidence in the case. This is precisely the conclusion that the district court reached here.