Opinion ID: 1145512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Transmitting or Receiving Wagering Information Through the Use of a Communication Device

Text: Reed asserts that he was charged with permitting one or all of the types of conduct proscribed by certain statutes and KRC regulations and that the evidence failed to prove even this conduct. He emphasizes that at most, he could be charged with after-the-fact knowledge that a fax message containing gambling information for Williams was received on the Park's telefax machine. According to Reed, it is not disputed that the first opportunity he had to know the contents of the fax message developed after the fax had been received on the Park's machine. Reed argues that even if he knew the fax contained gambling information he is not guilty of receiving gambling information. Reed states that, as a matter of law, there is no evidence that he permitted the telefax machine to be used to receive gambling information. Reed asserts that foreknowledge and consent are necessary ingredients to permitting someone to do something. He argues that after-the-fact knowledge does not satisfy the definition of the term permit. He relies on Reeb v. Liquor Control Board, 24 Wash. App. 349, 353, 600 P.2d 578 (1979) (To permit a regulatory violation to occur requires actual or constructive knowledge of the circumstances which would foreseeably lead to the prohibited activity.). Reed further believes that the KRC's true complaint was that he did not prevent Williams from taking the fax sheets and using the information to make bets. He observes that the KRC should adopt a regulation commanding employees to prevent the use of gambling information received on a telefax machine if it wishes to ban such conduct. He reasons that the KCR is torturing the term permit to include knowledge acquired after the fact. The KRC maintains that it assessed the credibility of the witnesses and, in the case of the conflicting testimony of Reed and Williams, found Williams to be credible. The KRC emphasizes that credible witnesses testified Reed not only was aware gambling information was received on the telefax machine, but that he also helped search for the fax and facilitated its delivery to Williams. The KRC maintains that Reed failed to take action to prevent the delivery of faxed information to a known gambler. It asserts that given Reed's experience and knowledge of the laws which prohibit the use of Park telefax machines in connection with gambling information, he should have made an inquiry as to the content of the fax before it was delivered to Williams. The KRC does not directly respond to Reed's arguments on the issues concerning the distinction between actually transmitting or receiving information and permitting the information to be communicated. Reed raises valid questions concerning his conduct and the language of the regulations under which he was charged. In the context of the federal statute and KRC regulations (18 U.S.C. § 1084[a] and K.A.R. XXX-XX-XX[a], [j], and [k] [1991 Supp.]), the general nature of the regulations in question must be considered. Such an analysis leads to the conclusion that Congress and the KRC arguably intended to prohibit the use of fax technology in connection with the transmission of gambling information. The question before us in reviewing the fax incident is whether the record in the case at bar supports the KRC's conclusion that Reed violated K.A.R. XXX-XX-XX(a) (1991 Supp. as effected by a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (knowingly uses a wire communication facility) and K.A.R. XXX-XX-XX(j) and (k) (1991 Supp.). We think not. We do not evaluate credibility. We accept the KRC's version of the facts. The KRC does not allege that Reed himself used a transmitting device or received wagering information through the use of a communication device. Rather, the charge was that Reed permitted the Park's telefax machine to be used to receive the two-page fax message sent to Williams. The regulations in question are not ambiguous. K.A.R. XXX-XX-XX(j) (1991 Supp.) states: When on the grounds of a racetrack facility, no person shall ... (j) unless authorized by the stewards or racing judges, use any radio transmitter of other transmitting device at a racetrack facility during a race meet. K.A.R. XXX-XX-XX(k) (1991 Supp.) states: When on the grounds of a racetrack facility, no person shall: ... (k) unless authorized by the commission, transmit or receive or attempt to transmit or receive wagering information through the use of a communication device. The enforceable scope of the regulations should be limited to the plain language. Permitting the use of the Park's telefax machine is not within the scope of the proscribed activities. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) provides: Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. As a matter of law, the KRC and the trial court incorrectly applied the regulations in question to the factual scenario in the case at bar. Reed's conduct was not a violation of either K.A.R. XXX-XX-XX(a) (1991 Supp.) as effected by 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) or K.A.R. XXX-XX-XX(j) and (k) (1991 Supp.).