Opinion ID: 666019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Davis Case

Text: 23 In the Davis case, the government volunteered a racially-neutral explanation for using four peremptory challenges to strike black venirepersons. Where the government volunteers a race neutral explanation for exercising peremptory challenges and the trial court goes on to rule on the ultimate issue of whether the race neutral reason was really a pretext for discrimination, the issue of whether the challenging party has established a prima facie case is moot. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-60, 111 S.Ct. at 1866. 24 At step two of the Batson framework, the issue becomes the facial validity of the defending party's explanation. The Supreme Court defines a racially-neutral explanation as an explanation based on something other than the race of the juror. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. at 1866. The explanation needs only to be clear and reasonably specific, presenting legitimate reasons that are related to the particular case, United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 989, 117 L.Ed.2d 151 (1992), and need[s] not rise to the level of justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. Nichols, 937 F.2d at 1262, quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. A trial court may not find that the defending party violated the Equal Protection Clause at this stage and must accept the proffered explanation for the venireperson's exclusion as racially-neutral unless the explanation inherently exposes a discriminatory intent. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-60, 111 S.Ct. at 1866. The trial court must also assume that the proffered reasons for making the peremptory challenge are true. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-60, 111 S.Ct. at 1866. 25 At step three, the trial court must evaluate the racially-neutral explanation and determine whether the peremptory challenge violated the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law. In order to establish a violation, the trial court must find racially discriminatory intent or purpose as a matter of fact on the part of the offending party. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-60, 111 S.Ct. at 1866, 1868. The Supreme Court has stated that discriminatory purpose implies that the offending party acted, at least in part, because of the adverse effects his action would have upon an identified group. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-60, 111 S.Ct. at 1866. Discriminatory purpose may be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts and a finding that the government's stated racially-neutral reasons were a mere pretext for discrimination. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362-64, 111 S.Ct. at 1868. 26 On appeal, the trial court's decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact and will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 368-69, 111 S.Ct. at 1871; United States v. Hughes, 970 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir.1992); and United States v. Mojica, 984 F.2d 1426, 1449 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2433, 124 L.Ed.2d 653 (1993). The Four Peremptory Challenges 27 1. Michael Bolton. Michael Bolton was the first black member of the venire against whom the government exercised a peremptory challenge. The government proffered two reasons for excluding Bolton. First, the government stated that Bolton's answer to the district judge's initial Witherspoon question indicated that Bolton would have difficulty voting for the death penalty in any case. Bolton said, That's a sensitive question; something to think about. When pressed for a direct answer by the district judge, Bolton asked, You need a yes or a no answer? After being asked the question for a third time, Bolton responded, There are circumstances and if they're presented properly, I'd search the facts and everything else, I would say, yes. 28 Second, the government believed that Bolton would be an unreliable and inattentive juror. The government stated that throughout the entire jury selection process, [Bolton] appeared to be bored and disinterested. The government also noted that Bolton had arrived 40 minutes late for one court session without explanation or apology. 29 2. Pauline Simmons. The government's explanation for striking Pauline Simmons was that she appeared to be headstrong and could disrupt the jury's deliberative process. They based this reasoning on Simmons's volunteered statement to the court that she was pretty well read on a great deal of subjects. The government stated that this statement suggested that Simmons appeared to be a know-it-all. They also expressed the concern that Simmons might be sympathetic toward the Defendant because she had several children approximately the same age as the Defendant. 30 3. Elizabeth Reames. The government's explanation for excluding Elizabeth Reames was similar to the explanation used for excluding Bolton, that is, her response to the district judge's initial Witherspoon question. Reames had stated, I wouldn't say I would never. The district judge inquired further, asking if there could be circumstances under which she would vote to impose the death penalty, and Reames's inclusive response was, I could but--. One of the government prosecutors also noted that Reames sighed when addressing the issue, suggesting that she had great difficulty with the prospect of ever applying the death penalty. 31 4. Evangeline Fletcher. On appeal, neither party addresses the government's exclusion of Evangeline Fletcher. 32 Davis argues that the government's explanations for striking the above venirepersons were wholly subjective, and that without some objective verification, the Batson framework for establishing purposeful discrimination will effectively render such challenges meaningless and unenforceable. 33 The ultimate issue in a Batson challenge turns on a factual finding of discriminatory intent. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 368-69, 111 S.Ct. at 1871; Hughes, 970 F.2d at 230; and Mojica, 984 F.2d at 1449. The Batson framework properly positions the focus in making such an ultimate decision upon the trial court. The trial court must weigh the defending party's racially-neutral explanation and consider all other relevant facts to determine whether the explanation was a mere pretext or not. 34 In addressing the issue of deference given to a trial court's factual findings, the Supreme Court has indicated that the decisive question in the typical peremptory challenge inquiry ... will be whether counsel's race-neutral explanation ... should be believed. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364-65, 111 S.Ct. at 1869. At step three of the Batson framework, in determining the issue of state of mind, the trial judge sits as a neutral observer making credibility evaluations and assessing the demeanor of the challenged venireperson and the attorney/party who exercised the challenge. 35 This Court rejects Davis's argument that objective verification should be required to buttress subjective race-neutral explanations at step two of the Batson framework. The reasons given for the exercise of a peremptory challenge must simply be race-neutral. The burden remains with the challenging party to show purposeful discrimination. 36 Unlike the reviewing court, a trial judge sits in a position to witness the relevant evidence first hand. The trial judge can assess the tone of voice, the body language, the facial gestures, and the overall countenance of potential jurors and trial counsel in evaluating these matters. Judgments of credibility in cases like this depend on assessments which cannot be made by the reviewing court. 37 This Court is convinced that the district judge did a thorough and diligent job in this case. The record shows that he considered the justification for each venireperson's exclusion and defendant's response before determining that the government's proffered explanations were reasonable and credible. He also juxtaposed his own assessment of the excluded venireperson with the reasons proffered by the government. For example, he recalled that juror Reames was one of those persons who gave a sort of very reluctant qualifying answer to the first Witherspoon question and noted in his observance of juror Simmons's demeanor that the prosecutor's interpretation of her statement was reasonable. 38 The trial judge sits in the unique position to make credibility assessments of the actions of trial attorneys. In some cases, such as here, the judge has had the opportunity to observe patterns and practices of particular attorneys during prior jury selections. See United States v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847, 850 (7th Cir.1991). The district judge in this trial specifically addressed his prior experiences with the government prosecutors in assessing whether their proffered reasons were credible. He noted that his prior experience with these prosecutors buttressed his conclusion that race played no part in their selection of the Davis jury. 39 This was the first death penalty case brought under Sec. 848 in the Northern District of Illinois and that jury selection took several days. The transcript shows that Judge Shadur took every precaution during the entire jury selection process, beginning with the Witherspoon questioning, to see that the proper procedures were followed. 40 The district court's findings on the Batson issue are affirmed.