Opinion ID: 1267352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Murder of Jose White and Discharge of a Firearm During the Offense (Counts Two and Three)

Text: Farmer argues that the government failed to adduce sufficient evidence to satisfy the VICAR statute's position-related motivation element as to the murder of Jose White. However, the government introduced substantial evidence that the Bloods deemed an attack against one Blood to be an attack against all, and that Bloods could rise within the gang by defending their peers and committing acts of violence against rival gangs. By shooting Whitewhom Farmer believed to be one of the Crips who had attacked Roach and ShokeFarmer conformed to the expectations of the Bloods enterprise. An exultant Farmer boasted about the crime to his fellow Bloods in the days and months that followed. A reasonable jury could infer from these facts that [Farmer] committed his violent crime because he knew it was expected of him by reason of his membership in the enterprise or that he committed it in furtherance of that membership. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 671 (quoting Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 381). Farmer argues that the government's theorythat he and two friends set off on their own to avenge the attack on Roach and Shokewas inconsistent with the depiction of the Bloods as a well-organized hierarchy, in which authorization to retaliate would come from superiors. But Farmer cites no evidence that such authorization was required. To the contrary, the evidence showed that Bloods were expected to aid one another without prompting. Moreover, the VGL members jointly agreed to seek revenge at the meeting in Centennial Park on the night of the murder; from that, the jury could infer that the attacks were authorized. [5] Farmer also argues that killing an innocent fourteen-year-old could not serve the interest of the Bloods, and that his move to Pennsylvania after the crime was evidence that the gang did not condone his actions. In support, Farmer cites United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 82-86 (2d Cir.2004), and United States v. D'Angelo, No. 02-cr-399(JG), 2004 WL 315237, at -14 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004), decisions vacating VICAR convictions because of evidence that the killings were against the interests of the defendants' enterprises. However, the question is not whether Farmer's position in the Bloods was advanced in fact by the murder he committed, but whether his purpose in committing the murder was to benefit his position. We held in Concepcion that a defendant's intent to increase his position in an enterprise can be transferred to an accidental killing. 983 F.2d at 381-82. In this case, there was ample evidence that Farmer intended to kill a Crip (and initially believed he had), and that at least part of his purpose in doing so was to raise his status in the Bloods. Farmer contended at oral argument that notwithstanding Concepcion, the position-related motivation element was not satisfied because the killing was so obviously a mistake that it would be irrational to attribute it to his membership in the Bloods. But the evidence showed that Farmer shot a teenager wearing a Crip color, where Crips might be found. The blunder does not alter the intent. As to Bruno and D'Angelo, neither decision controls this case because the shootings in those cases did not involve mistaken identity. The defendants in Bruno and D'Angelo intended to shoot (and did shoot) people whose killing could not have enhanced the defendants' status. See Bruno, 383 F.3d at 82-86; D'Angelo, 2004 WL 315237, at -14. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the government's evidence satisfied the requirement of the VICAR statute that, in killing White, Farmer acted for the purpose of maintaining or increasing his position in a racketeering enterprise.