Opinion ID: 36501
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Environmental Effects of the RBTI

Text: Petitioners raise several challenges to the EIS’s analysis of the RBTI’s environmental effects. First, petitioners claim that the Air Force, and the FAA in adopting the EIS, did not adequately consider the effects of the proposal on the livestock on ranches underlying the RBTI route. Presumably relying on the principle that agencies must follow their own rules13, petitioners argue that the Air Force failed to take the requisite “hard look”14 at livestock impacts because it did not follow its 1993 handbook, “The Impact of Low Altitude Flights on Livestock and Poultry” (Handbook).15 Petitioners argue that, because the Air 12 Id. at 174-75. 13 Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 934 (1986). 14 Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989). 15 In its “Findings” section, the Handbook states: Any establishment of new low altitude airspace will seek to minimize potential impacts on livestock and poultry. An initial consideration is the regional distribution of sensitive livestock and poultry operations in the geographical region being considered for low altitude flight. This regional distribution will be determined by identifying those counties that are among the leading counties for livestock and poultry commodities in their respective 8 Force did not undertake the county- and individual-level inquiry outlined in the Handbook, but instead relied on several studies of the effects of low-level overflights on livestock and a general overview of the underlying region, its analysis was inadequate under NEPA. Petitioners rely on Idaho Sporting Congress, Inc. v. Rittenhouse, in which the Ninth Circuit invalidated a Forest Service EIS, because it analyzed impact on certain species on a “home range” scale, contrary to a Forest Service report stating, “the habitat needs of these species must be addressed at a landscape scale.”16 Contrary to Rittenhouse, however, cases have generally required that an agency pronouncement have the force and effect of law in order to bind the agency.17 To have the force and effect of law, an agency pronouncement state. ... In addition to consideration of counties, individual livestock and poultry operations within an area proposed for an MTR will also be considered. 16 305 F.3d 957, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 1165 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[a]gencies are under an obligation to follow their own regulations, procedures, and precedents, or provide a rational explanation for their departure” and invalidating EIS because agency did not follow its own regulation). 17 See, e.g., Lyng, 476 U.S. at 937 (stating that “not all agency publications are of binding force”); Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789-90 (1981) (holding that Social Security Administration Claims Manual was not binding agency rule); Fano v. O’Neill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1264 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that INS Operations Instructions did not bind agency “because they are not an exercise of delegated legislative power and do not 9 normally “must have been promulgated pursuant to a specific statutory grant of authority and in conformance with the procedural requirements imposed by Congress.”18 Petitioners do not argue, nor does the record show, that the Air Force’s Handbook was promulgated according to the APA’s procedural requirements. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. Thus the Air Force retained discretion to analyze impacts on livestock by methods other than those contained in the Handbook, and we must address the adequacy of the Air Force’s chosen method according to the arbitrary and capricious standard and the relevant criteria announced in Westphal. Because determining whether the RBTI overflights will have a significant adverse effect on livestock requires resolution of issues of fact, we defer purport to be anything other than internal house-keeping measures.”); Western Radio Servs. Co. v. Espy, 79 F.3d 896, 900-01 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e will review an agency’s alleged noncompliance with an agency pronouncement only if that pronouncement actually has the force and effect of law.”); Gatter v. Nimmo, 672 F.2d 343, 347 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that Veteran’s Administration publications did not bind agency, because they were not promulgated using APA procedural requirements for rulemaking); Fed. Land Bank in Receivership v. Fed. Intermediate Credit Bank, 727 F. Supp. 1055, 1058 (D. Miss. 1989) (holding that agency directive not promulgated according to APA procedure did not have force and effect of law). 18 U.S. v. Fifty-Three Eclectus Parrots, 685 F.2d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Gatter, 672 F.2d at 347; McGrail & Rowley v. Babbit, 986 F. Supp. 1386, 1393-94 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Fed. Land Bank, 727 F. Supp. at 1058. 10 substantially to the Air Force’s expert analysis of the relevant data.19 The EIS and administrative record reveal that the Air Force considered several studies and comments regarding potential impacts on livestock, including those indicating adverse effects. “[I]n making the factual inquiry whether an agency decision was ‘arbitrary or capricious,’ the reviewing court ‘must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.’”20 After reviewing the administrative record, we conclude that the Air Force’s determination that no conclusive evidence showed adverse effects, based on its consideration of relevant studies, was not a clear error of judgment. In addition, the Air Force included a discussion of these studies in the main body of the EIS and its appendices, providing “detail sufficient to allow those who did not participate in its preparation to understand and consider the pertinent environmental influences involved.”21 We therefore find the EIS’s analysis of livestock impacts adequate. 19 Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989) (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976)). 20 Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)). 21 Westphal, 230 F.3d at 174. 11 Because the Air Force’s analysis complied with NEPA, the FAA’s adoption of this portion of the EIS did not violate its obligations under that statute.22
Petitioners’ second challenge to the EIS’s adequacy concerns its analysis of the RBTI’s economic impacts. Specifically, petitioners fault the Air Force and FAA for failing to analyze in depth the effect that the RBTI will have on the values of underlying land for ranching, eco-tourism, and hunting lease income.23 As studies regarding the effects of low level overflights on rural land values were unavailable, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 governed the Air Force’s duty to obtain this information. That section provides: “[w]hen an agency is evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects on the human environment in an environmental impact statement and there is incomplete or unavailable information, the agency shall always make clear that such information is lacking.” Id. It also mandates certain procedures, but only where adverse effects are “reasonably foreseeable.” Id. 22 40 C.F.R. § 1506.3(a) (stating that cooperating agency may adopt lead agency’s EIS if it concludes that its NEPA requirements have been satisfied). 23 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(ii) (stating that EIS must discuss environmental effects of proposed action); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (defining “effects” to include economic impacts). 12 In response to facts similar to the present case, two courts have held that impacts of overflights on land values are not reasonably foreseeable and thus do not require detailed analysis.24 We find the reasoning of these courts persuasive. As in Lee v. U.S. Air Force, the flights in the present case will take place along a corridor miles wide, and primarily over areas that have been overflown for years, and potential noise increases experienced by owners of land underlying the RBTI are not significant.25 In addition, the Air Force examined available studies indicating that aircraft overflights near air bases and airports did not cause significant economic impacts. We find the Air Force’s consideration of economic impacts adequate. Accordingly, neither the Air Force’s nor the FAA’s determination that economic impacts were unlikely was arbitrary or capricious.
Petitioners also allege that the Air Force and FAA failed to take a “hard look” at the effects of wake vortices (trails of disturbed air) that would be 24 Lee v. U.S. Air Force, 354 F.3d 1229, 1241-42 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding Air Force’s conclusion that decreased land values were not reasonably foreseeable and would be minimal based on prior airspace use and dispersion of flight paths reasonable); Citizens Concerned About Jet Noise, Inc. v. Dalton, 48 F. Supp. 2d 582, 598 (E.D. Va. 1999), aff’d without opinion, 217 F.3d 838 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Norfolk v. U.S. EPA, 761 F. Supp. 867, 887-88 (D. Mass. 1991) (upholding EIS that did not quantify property value decline due to proposed action where EIS stated that such decline was unquantifiable), aff’d without opinion, 960 F.2d 143 (1st Cir. 1992). 25 See 354 F.3d at 1241-42. 13 generated by aircraft training in the RBTI. Petitioners argue that wake vortices damage ground structures like the windmills used by ranchers to provide water to livestock and wildlife. The Air Force responds that the EIS’s discussion of wake vortex effects is adequate, because it “provides a narrative description of what causes vortices and points out that actual, not modeled, B-52 aircraft flying as low as 300 feet [above ground level] ... would generate a surface wind speed of less than 4 mph.” Although CEQ regulations require agencies to “make explicit reference by footnote to the scientific and other sources relied upon for conclusions in the statement,”26 the EIS does not reveal the source of this data. Petitioners point out that the information came from an e-mail from the Boeing Company, stating that tests conducted between 1970 and 1986 “at flight level 300” resulted in “[n]o effect on the ground from the B-52 vortexes.” The Air Force presumably contends that “flight level 300 refers to 300 feet above ground level. In fact, it refers to 30,000 feet above ground level.27 It is not clear whether the Boeing e-mail was a miscommunication, because the Air 26 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24. 27 Petitioners note that “flight level” is defined at 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 as “three digits that represents hundreds of feet. For example, flight level 250 represents a barometric altimeter indication of 25,000 feet ...” This court also found the term’s definition through a simple internet search. See http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Flight%20level. 14 Force did not include the actual Boeing study in the administrative record. Therefore, the e-mail alone cannot provide an adequate basis for the Air Force’s conclusion that flights at 300 feet above ground level would generate low surface winds. To uphold that conclusion, we must find a more satisfactory basis than the Boeing e-mail. The Air Force also relied on a graph providing a “rough estimate” of B1-B wake vortex effects at low altitudes. The administrative record shows that the equation used to generate the chart came from a 1949 aerodynamics text by James Dwinnell, but the Air Force did not include the equation or its inputs in the EIS or administrative record.28 Petitioners urge this court to consider two extrarecord documents - excerpts from the Dwinnell text and its expert’s declaration - to determine whether the Air Force’s chart was reliable and thus constituted a hard look at wake vortex effects. Generally, the “record rule” limits judicial review of agency action to the administrative record before the agency at the time of its decision.29 This court 28 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24 states: “Agencies shall insure the professional integrity, including scientific integrity, of the discussions and analyses in environmental impact statements. They shall identify any methodologies used ... for conclusions in the statement.” 29 Fla. Power & Light v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44 (1985). 15 has recognized an exception to the general rule, however, where examination of extra-record materials is necessary to determine whether an agency has adequately considered environmental impacts under NEPA.30 In the present case we find it necessary to look at the Dwinnell text to determine whether the Air Force’s use of the equation therein was sound. Because we lack technical expertise in aerodynamics, we also consider extra-record materials to aid our understanding of the science involved.31 Our review of the Dwinnell text and the declarations of petitioners’ and the Air Force’s experts reveal that the Air Force failed to take a hard look at the possible effects of wake turbulence on ground structures. Although an illustration in the EIS shows that the wake turbulence of an airplane at 300 feet above ground would generate wind speed around two mph at thirty-five feet (the height of a windmill as depicted on the illustration), the Air Force’s own expert, Dr. Ojars Skujins, admits that a B1-B at this altitude could generate wind speeds 30 Sierra Club v. Peterson, 185 F.3d 349, 369-70 (5th Cir. 1999), vacated on other grounds on reh’g, 228 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2000); Sabine River Auth. v. Dep’t of Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 678 (5th Cir. 1992); accord Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1997). 31 Friends of Payette v. Horseshoe Bend Hydroelectric Co., 988 F.2d 989, 997 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that courts may consider extra-record evidence when “necessary to explain technical terms or complex subject matter.”). 16 as high as forty-seven mph just twenty-two feet above ground. Dr. Skujins also declares that the chart generated by the Air Force based on the Dwinnell equation is “oversimplified” and “does tend to underestimate the maximum vortex strength.” Dr. Skujins concludes, however, that the Air Force was correct in finding that vortices would not create a significant impact, because average wind speeds in the RBTI area are similar to wind speeds generated by wake vortices. The Air Force is entitled to rely on its own qualified experts’ reasonable opinions in determining the significance of impacts.32 The Air Force did not rely on Dr. Skujins’s opinion, however, in addressing the wake vortex issue in the EIS process, but rather relied on the Boeing e-mail and the chart generated from the Dwinnell equation. As discussed above, neither document presents a reliable picture of the impact of wake vortices on surface structures, misinforming both public participation and the Air Force’s conclusion.33 The Air Force’s reliance 32 Sabine River Auth., 951 F.2d at 678. 33 See Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 349. Although the Air Force now argues that wake vortex effects would be speculative and thus need not be discussed in the EIS, during the NEPA process they took the position that wake vortex effects would not be significant based on the two pieces of evidence discussed. Courts may only uphold agency action on the bases articulated by the agency at the time of the action, and may not consider appellate counsel’s “post hoc rationalizations.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 49-50. 17 on this data cannot satisfy the hard look requirement of NEPA and thus this portion of the EIS is inadequate.34 This determination applies equally to the FAA, which, as an adopting agency, was required to satisfy itself that the wake vortex discussion in the EIS complied with NEPA.35
Petitioners’ final challenge to the EIS’s analysis of environmental effects concerns potential conflicts between training flights in IR-178 and Lancer MOA and civil and commercial aviation in western Texas. Petitioners contend that the Air Force’s conclusion in the EIS that the RBTI would have little effect on airspace management is contradicted by an FAA study in the administrative record. In addition, petitioners claim that the Air Force violated its own regulations by failing to adequately address mitigation measures proposed by the FAA study in the EIS. The Air Force argues that effects on aviation are “aeronautical” rather than “environmental,” and thus do not require discussion in an EIS. Counsel for the Air Force acknowledged in oral argument, however, the difficulty involved in 34 See Westphal, 230 F.3d at 174-75 (stating that “the conclusions upon which an [EIS] is based must be supported by evidence in the administrative record.”) 35 40 C.F.R. § 1506.3(a); Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, question 30, 46 Fed. Reg. 18026 (Mar. 23, 1981). 18 drawing a bright line between effects that are purely “aeronautical” and those that are “environmental.” Because “‘[e]nvironment’ means something more than rocks, trees, and streams, or the amount of air pollution [- i]t encompasses all the factors that affect the quality of life,”36 we are reluctant to draw such a line. Civil and commercial aviation are part of the modern human environment broadly defined, and because the RBTI would impact aviation, NEPA required the Air Force to address that impact in the EIS.37 “It is a familiar rule of administrative law that an agency must abide by its own regulations.”38 The Air Force regulations implementing NEPA provide that an EIS must include “responses to comments on the Draft EIS by modifying the text and referring in the appendix to where the comment is addressed or providing a written explanation in the comments section, or both.”39 In the present case the Air Force responded to the FAA solely by modifying the text. It did not refer in the appendix to where the FAA’s comments were addressed or provide any written explanation, neglecting much of its responsibilities under the 36 Jones v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 390 F. Supp. 579, 591 (E.D. La. 1974). 37 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i). 38 Fort Stewart Sch. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S. 641, 654 (1990). 39 32 C.F.R. § 989.19(d). 19 regulation. We therefore conclude that this portion of the EIS is also inadequate.