Opinion ID: 1202533
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: depraved indifference murder instruction

Text: Defendant's seventeenth point is that the trial court erred by refusing to give his depraved indifference murder instruction with respect to each killing. Defendant's sole theory of the case was that he intentionally killed the five victims but that he did so under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse. At the conclusion of trial, defendant requested a second degree murder instruction for each of the five killings that included the depraved indifference variation of that offense. [220] Over defendant's objection, the court limited the second degree murder instructions to the knowingly and intentionally variation of that offense. [221] In State v. Baker, [222] this Court enunciated the standards to be used for determining whether a jury should be instructed on lesser included offense(s). If a defendant requests a lesser included instruction, as was the case here, an evidence-based standard controls. [223] To determine whether an offense is included in a charged offense, the trial court must first determine whether the offense is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged. [224] If the same facts tend to prove elements of more than one statutory offense and the evidence is ambiguous and susceptible to alternative explanations, the trial court must give the lesser included offense instruction if any one of the alternative interpretations provides both a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. [225] We have previously determined that depraved indifference murder is a lesser included offense of first degree murder. [226] Therefore, the first prong of the Baker test was satisfied. By defense counsel's own concessions to the jury, the evidence plainly established that defendant intentionally killed his victims; had the jury believed defendant's experts concerning his extreme mental or emotional disturbance, it would have acquitted him of the capital offense and convicted him of manslaughter. The evidence simply was not ambiguous or susceptible to alternative interpretations with respect to defendant's intent. In other words, the mental state set forth in section 76-5-203(1)(c) as interpreted in State v. Fontana, [227] was not applicable to defendant's case under any reasonable interpretation of the evidence and was inconsistent with his theory of the case. Therefore, the trial court properly refused the instruction.