Opinion ID: 2974049
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rayfield’s Conviction

Text: Rayfield, like Perez, argues that he was simply a customer and not a dealer. He states that the evidence in this case only demonstrates that he purchased drugs to support his habit. He cites Hyde’s testimony where Hyde admitted that he and Rayfield on numerous occasions smoked marijuana together as proof that he was only a customer. Appellant Rayfield’s Br. at 14. Based on this evidence, Rayfield argues that “there is not a scintilla of evidence in the record that [he] ever distributed methamphetamine to anyone, or conspired with anyone else to distribute methamphetamine.” Id. at 15. The evidence on the record shows that Rayfield made weekly visits from Cleveland, Tennessee to Hyde’s residence to purchase a half pound of methamphetamine. Police surveillance revealed that Rayfield’s visits coincided with the arrival of Fonseca’s courier delivery. In addition, there was evidence that Rayfield attempted to sell his car in exchange for a large quantity of methamphetamine. There was evidence that, on one occasion, when Fonseca’s courier delivered methamphetamine to Hyde’s home, Rayfield attempted to conceal the contents of the package, Page 10 of 22 demonstrating his knowledge of what was inside the package. This evidence supports the finding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Rayfield guilty of conspiring to distribute methamphetamine. Layne, 192 F.3d at 568 (“additional evidence beyond the mere purchase or sale of drugs, such as evidence of repeat purchases or some enduring arrangement that implies knowledge of the scope of the conspiracy may support a conspiracy conviction.”) (citations omitted). Rayfield also argues that the Government’s evidence was based on the testimony of a partial witness, Amanda Hyde, regarding the nature of the drug transactions. He asserts that Amanda Hyde testified to help her husband and ensure herself immunity. This Court has repeatedly held that it will not substitute its own judgment for that of the jury when weighing the credibility of a witness. See, e.g., United States v. Hilliard, 11 F.3d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that this Court does not weigh evidence, make credibility determinations or substitute its judgment for that of the jury); United States v. Evans, 883 F.2d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 1989) (“Issues of witness credibility . . . are strictly for the jury to determine.”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Rayfield’s argument regarding Amanda Hyde’s credibility does not provide sufficient evidence to overturn the jury’s verdict. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to sustain Rayfield’s conviction. B. Nexus to Interstate Commerce Perez argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction because of his insufficient contacts in the Eastern District of Tennessee. Appellant Perez’s Br. at 14. This Court has unequivocally held that “drug trafficking is an ‘economic enterprise’ that substantially affects interstate commerce in numerous clear ways” and is an “activity that the federal government clearly may regulate.” United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1140-41 (6th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 911 (1991) (stating that Congress has already Page 11 of 22 determined, and the courts have accepted as rational, that drug trafficking affects interstate commerce). The district court properly maintained jurisdiction over this case. C. Improper Venue Rayfield argues that venue is improper in the Eastern District of Tennessee where the Government could not prove that a substantial act or acts in furtherance of the conspiracy took place in the Eastern District of Tennessee. This Court reviews de novo the district court’s interpretation of the venue statutes, and reviews for abuse of discretion the court’s decision whether to dismiss for lack of venue. United States v. Brika, 416 F.3d 514, 527 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Kerobo v. SW Clean Fuels, Corp., 285 F.3d 531, 533 (6th Cir. 2002)). “Venue is proper in the district where the crime was committed. See U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, Cl. 3 (‘Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed’); Fed. R. Crim. P. 18 (‘[T]he prosecution shall be had in a district in which the offense was committed.’).” Id. Since venue is often appropriate in more than one district, this Circuit applies the substantial contacts test to determine the appropriate venue. United States v. Williams, 788 F.2d 1213, 1215 (6th Cir.1986). This test “takes into account a number of factors [including] the site of the defendant’s acts, the elements and nature of the crime, the locus of the effect of the criminal conduct, and the suitability of each district for accurate fact finding.” Id. at 1215 (quoting United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 481 (2d Cir. 1985)). In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) instructs that “any offense against the United States begun in one district and completed in another . . . may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed.” Rayfield contends that venue is improper in Tennessee because all of the overt acts took place in Northern Georgia. Rayfield’s argument is without merit. The district court properly found Page 12 of 22 that Rayfield is a Tennessee resident and one of several co-conspirators who transported methamphetamine to Tennessee after purchasing it from Fonseca in Georgia. Fonseca testified that he had drug customers in the Eastern District of Tennessee as well as numerous customers in Dalton, Georgia. The record is replete with evidence that the overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy took place in the Eastern District of Tennessee. Edwards bought methamphetamine from Fonseca every week for two years and one of Edwards’ customers lived in Bradley, Tennessee. The customer, McDonald, like Rayfield, made weekly trips to Georgia to pick up his methamphetamine from Fonseca’s couriers. Stewart also traveled from Cleveland, Tennessee to pick up methamphetamine from Fonseca. On at least one occasion, Roach and her father drove from Georgia through Tennessee to Kentucky to deliver methamphetamine to a relative. Numerous facts indicate that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that venue in the Eastern District of Tennessee was proper. D. Rayfield’s Challenge to the Jury Instructions 1. Lesser Included Offense Rayfield argues that the district court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the lesserincluded offense of conspiracy to possess methamphetamine and/or the lesser-included offense of simple possession of methamphetamine. This Court reviews the district court’s propriety of the jury instructions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ursery, 109 F.3d 1129, 1135 (6th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, this Court will not overturn jury instructions unless the district court’s error was so objectionable that it should have been apparent to the trial judge. Fed. R. Crim. P. 18. Page 13 of 22 A lesser-included offense instruction is appropriate where: (1) the request is properly made; (2) the elements of the lesser offense are identical to parts of the elements of the greater offense; (3) there is evidence that would support conviction on the lesser offense; and (4) the proof on the element or elements differentiating the two crimes is sufficiently disputed such that the jury could consistently acquit on the greater offense and convict on the lesser. United States v. Colon, 268 F.3d 367, 373 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Monger, 185 F.3d 574, 576 (6th Cir. 1999)). Rayfield properly asked the district court to instruct the jury that the object of the conspiracy was “misdemeanor simple possession,” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) as opposed to “felony distribution” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Rayfield, however, cannot establish the other requirements that would entitle him to the lesser included offense. The elements of distribution of methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana are not identical to possession of methamphetamine. See Colon, 268 F.3d at 377 (holding that “the elements of simple possession are not identical to the elements of distribution of cocaine or of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute or to distribute cocaine”). The Government correctly asserted that the jury would have to acquit Rayfield if it found him guilty of conspiracy to possess methamphetamine or simple possession because the elements required for distribution are different from possession. It would have been plain error for the district court to alter the grand jury’s charge and instruct the jury with the conspiracy to possess or simple possession offense. The district court did not abuse its discretion. 2. Jury Instruction on Quantity of Drugs Over a Period of Time Rayfield alleges that the district court committed plain error in instructing the jury that it could consider evidence showing that a person trafficked a large amount of drugs and engaged in Page 14 of 22 a series of drug transactions over a period of time as proof of a conspiracy. At trial, Rayfield did not object to the Court’s instruction on the quantity of drugs being proof of conspiracy to distribute. Accordingly, the standard of review is plain error. United States v. King, 169 F.3d 1035, 1040 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Wilkinson, 26 F.3d 623, 625 (6th Cir.1994)). “‘An instruction is not plainly erroneous unless there was an egregious error, one that directly leads to a miscarriage of justice.’” Id. (quoting Wilkinson, 26 F.3d at 625) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court instructed the jury that evidence showing that a person trafficked a large amount of drugs and engaged in a series of drug transactions may establish more than a buyer-seller relationship and may be considered proof of a conspiracy to distribute. This Court has repeatedly held that persons trafficking large amounts of drugs and engaged in a series of drug transactions over a long period of time may establish more than a buyer-seller relationship. See United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 330-31 (6th Cir. 2005) (inference of agreement to participate in drug conspiracy may be based upon evidence of repeat purchases and large quantity of drugs); United States v. Anderson, 89 F.3d 1306, 1310 (6th Cir. 1996). In this case, Rayfield bought three out of the four ounces that Fonseca sold to Hyde every week. Hyde paid Fonseca $1,500 for four ounces and would sell three ounces to Rayfield for $2,000. Further, Rayfield would drive from his residence in Cleveland, Tennessee to Hyde’s residence to give Hyde the money. Often, Rayfield was present when the courier delivered the methamphetamine to Hyde which permitted Rayfield to receive his three ounces immediately. Given the evidence in the case, the district court did not commit a plain error when it instructed the jury on the amount of Rayfield’s drug quantity as evidence to establish the conspiracy. E. Sentencing Page 15 of 22 1. Rayfield’s Request for “Safety Valve” Provision Rayfield argues that the district court erred when it refused to consider sentencing him pursuant to the safety valve provision. This Court reviews the district court’s refusal to apply a safety value reduction for clear error. United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 459 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Adu, 82 F.3d 119, 124 (6th Cir. 1996). The safety valve provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and United States Sentencing Guideline (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”) § 5C1.2(5), provide in pertinent part, that the defendant may be sentenced without regard to the applicable mandatory minimum sentence and may receive a two-level reduction in his offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(6) if, not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, “the defendant has truthfully provided to the government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.” § 3553(f)(5); § 5C1.2(5). In this case, Rayfield did not truthfully provide the Government with information or evidence. Rayfield consistently disputed his involvement in the conspiracy. He continually alleged that he was not a dealer and only possessed methamphetamine. Under these circumstances, the district court properly denied his request for a reduction under the safety valve provision. See Adu, 82 F.3d at 125 (stating that “[w]here the government challenges a defendant’s claim of complete and timely disclosure and the defendant does not produce evidence that demonstrates such disclosure, a district court’s denial of a motion under § 3553(f) and § 5C1.2(5) is not clearly erroneous.”). The district court did not err in refusing to apply the safety valve reduction to Rayfield’s sentence. 2. Reasonableness of Perez’s and Rayfield’s Sentences Page 16 of 22 Rayfield and Perez challenge the reasonableness of the district court’s sentencing determinations. “When reviewing sentencing decisions, [this Court] review[s] the district court’s factual findings for clear error, while reviewing the district court’s conclusions of law de novo.” United States v. Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 795 (6th Cir. 2005). Where the district court applied advisory Guidelines, this Court reviews the selection of a sentence for reasonableness. United States v. Jackson, 408 F.3d 301, 305 (6th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 340, 346 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[i]n a case such as this one, where Defendant contests the manner in which the district court applied the consulted Guideline, we are instructed to review the sentence for reasonableness.”). Even if a sentencing error occurred, the Court will not remand if it decides the error was harmless. When the district court properly calculates the sentence under the Guidelines, a rebuttable presumption attaches that the sentence length is reasonable. United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006).
Rayfield argues that his sentence was excessive and that the district court failed to consider the mandate of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) by avoiding a sentencing disparity between him and his coDefendants. Specifically, Rayfield argues that other co-defendants received minimal sentences of thirty-three months (Marrero, Fernandez, and Izquierdo) and fourteen months (Alvaro Santoyo, another co-Defendant in this case). Rayfield’s argument lacks merit. Rayfield’s advisory Guideline range was 151 to 188 months. He was subject to a statutory minimum sentence of sixty months and a maximum of forty years. The other Defendants he compares himself to, Marrero, Fernandez, and Izquierdo, were sentenced after the Government filed § 5K1.1 downward departures based on their substantial assistance. As indicated above, Rayfield Page 17 of 22 has consistently disputed his involvement in the conspiracy and did not assist the Government. Based on the facts, he was not entitled to a similar departure. When the district court sentenced Rayfield, it adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors. In support of its sentence, the district court cited Rayfield’s lack of criminal history, the need to deter him from further crimes, the effect of dealing methamphetamine, and the need to be severe. The district court also required that Rayfield receive five hundred hours of drug treatment therapy. Since the district court’s sentence was reasonable, we affirm Rayfield’s sentence.
Perez’s sentence was also reasonable. Perez contends that 121 months was unreasonable because his sentence was greater than necessary and there was excessive disparity between his sentence and the other co-Defendants. Perez further argues that a sentence of 75 months would have sufficiently addressed his conduct. Perez’s mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) was 120 months. His advisory Guideline range was 121 to 151 months. The district court stated that it considered the advisory Guideline range as “one factor among others to determine Mr. Perez’s sentence.” The district court discussed the drug quantity found by the jury and the seriousness of his offense. The district court noted that it imposed the sentence to promote respect for the law and felt that Perez should receive treatment for substance abuse. Perez failed to present any evidence that the district court’s sentence was unreasonable. We therefore affirm Perez’s sentence.