Opinion ID: 659070
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Carter's Motion to Suppress his Confession

Text: 22 Carter next complains that the admission of his confession at trial violated his constitutional rights. Specifically, he claims that his confession was coerced because questioning persisted after he refused to make statements and requested counsel. In addition, Carter asserts that his confession was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, for he made statements to police officers after his indictment outside the presence of counsel. In response, the state argues that review of these issues is barred by Carter's procedural default, but the state also contends that Carter's substantive arguments are meritless. 23 We need not engage in what we have previously described as the complicated analysis of the state's procedural bar claim for two reasons. Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir.1986). First, as we explained previously, substantial evidence existed to prove Carter's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without admission of his post-indictment confession. Thus, any constitutional error that occurred at trial did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1721-22 (1993) (rejecting application of the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt harmless error standard enunciated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1966), to habeas corpus cases). Second, we agree with the government that the trial court did not err in allowing admission of Carter's post-indictment confession. 24 Carter claimed that he confessed to the murders after spending a night alone in his jail cell thinking about Agent Moore's statement to get this straightened out. That morning, Carter told Moore that he would answer questions. Moore then read him his rights, asked Carter a few questions, and Carter began a narrative that Moore transcribed. Carter then read the statement, made additions, and signed it. Viewing all the circumstances, we believe Carter voluntarily gave his confession. Agent Moore made his statement to Carter while ushering Carter into his jail cell for the evening. While Carter was certainly in custody at the time, Moore's statements cannot be considered interrogation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda warnings apply during custodial interrogation). Interrogation exists only when a person in custody is subjected either to express questioning or its functional equivalent. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301 (1980). The functional equivalent of interrogation includes any words or action on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Id. at 301. Clearly, Moore was not questioning Carter. Nor do we think that Carter was subjected to the functional equivalent of questioning when Moore made his statement while escorting Carter to his jail cell for the evening. Moore did not invite a response from Carter, but instead made a remark knowing that Carter had repeatedly indicated that he was thinking of making a statement. 25 Carter also claimed that he had a Sixth Amendment right to have counsel present during interrogation, because judicial proceedings had been initiated against him. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972). It is not clear from the record that this argument has ever been raised previously, but we need not rely on Carter's waiver of the issue below in rejecting his claim. As we have indicated above, no interrogation of Carter occurred until he awoke on July 15 and told officers that he wanted to straighten things out. Thus, it was Carter that instigated the discussion, and only then did Agent Moore read him his rights and begin the conversation that resulted in Carter's confession. By initiating the conversation that morning and by receiving his Miranda warnings, Carter waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-93 (1988) (defendant can waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, particularly when defendant admonished with Miranda warnings). 26