Opinion ID: 1846588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the state unreasonably delayed swinney's initial appearance for the purpose of investigation where the delay resulted in a confession and swinney had requested counsel.

Text: ¶ 17. Swinney argues that URCCC 6.03 requires that defendants to be brought for an initial appearance within forty-eight hours and without unnecessary delay. Swinney was brought before a judge approximately forty-three hours after her arrest. She argues that law enforcement was prepared to go forward with her arraignment on November 18, but delayed until 2:00 p.m. November 19 at the request of the District Attorney's office for the improper reason of investigation. ¶ 18. Swinney further argues that this delay resulted in a violation of her constitutional right to counsel under U.S. Const. amend. VI and Miss. Const. art. 3, § 26. The statements that were used to convict her were obtained during the aforementioned delay and after she had requested counsel. Therefore, she argues, they should have been suppressed. ¶ 19. The court admitted the statements at the suppression hearing of July 22, 1998, holding that the delay was necessary in order to determine what charges to bring against Swinney. I see nothing unreasonable under the facts and circumstances of this case in not bringing this defendant before a judicial officer at an earlier time. There might very well have been two capital murder cases to result from this ... certainly the State has the right and the responsibility to investigate [what charges to bring]. ¶ 20. The watershed case on this issue is County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991). In McLaughlin, the United States Supreme Court held that while an initial appearance within forty-eight hours will generally suffice, it nonetheless may not pass constitutional muster if the arrested individual can prove that his or her probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably. Examples of unreasonable delays are delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay's sake. Id. The Court gave examples of reasonable delays, such as transporting defendants, late-night bookings, securing the premises of arrest, and other practical realities. Id. Furthermore, after forty-eight hours have passed, the burden shifts to the [State] to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. Id. at 57, 111 S.Ct. 1661. ¶ 21. In Mississippi, an initial appearance under URCCC 6.03 includes a probable cause determination, and at that time the judge will inform the defendant of her right not to incriminate herself, her right to an attorney, her right to communicate with her attorney, family or friends, her right to a preliminary hearing, and the conditions under which she may obtain release, if any. As noted above, the Rule requires that every person in custody shall be taken for an initial appearance without unnecessary delay and within 48 hours of arrest. ¶ 22. Though McLaughlin speaks to unreasonable delays and Rule 6.03 addresses unnecessary delays, the two terms are used interchangeably here. The predecessor to Rule 6.03, UCRCCP 1.04, predated McLaughlin and required an appearance without unnecessary delay, but did not contain the within 48 hours of arrest requirement. Rule 6.03 became effective May 1, 1995, approximately four years after McLaughlin, and reflects the ruling in that case. Thus, it is an adoption of the Supreme Court's rule, despite the use of the term unnecessary rather than unreasonable. ¶ 23. To satisfy the dictates of Rule 6.03 and prevailing case law, arrested persons must be afforded an initial appearance both (1) within 48 hours, and (2) without unnecessary delay. We have defined without unnecessary delay to mean as soon as custody, booking, administrative and security needs have been met. Evans v. State, 725 So.2d 613, 644 (Miss. 1997) (citing Abram v. State, 606 So.2d 1015 (Miss.1992)). Once these needs have been met, there is but one possible excuse for delay: lack of access to a judge. Abram, 606 So.2d at 1029. In Abram, the defendant was not brought for an initial appearance until approximately 72 hours after his arrest, immediately after he confessed. Id. We held that Abram would not have confessed had he been given an initial appearance and, consequently, access to counsel. This was deemed reversible error because Abram's conviction for capital murder was based entirely on his confession. Id. ¶ 24. Even if it occurs within forty-eight hours, an initial appearance is unconstitutional if the defendant can show that the hearing was delayed for an impermissible purpose, such as gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay's sake. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 66, 111 S.Ct. 1661. In Mississippi, an initial appearance within 48 hours may also be unconstitutional if the defendant can show that the delay was not necessary for custody, booking, administration, or security, and was not caused by lack of access to a judge. Evans, 725 So.2d at 644. ¶ 25. In the case at bar, Corinth Chief of Police Fred Johnson told local media that the arraignment was set for today [Tuesday] but at the request of the District Attorney, the arraignment will be held at 2 p.m. on Wednesday. Swinney argues that this statement proves that custody, booking, administration, and security needs were met on Tuesday, November 18. In addition, a circuit court judge was present in Alcorn County for the civil term of court during the week beginning November 17, 1997. Therefore, Swinney argues, the appearance was delayed from Tuesday until Wednesday for an impermissible purpose. The circuit court disagreed, holding that the delay was necessary to determine whether double murder charges should be brought against Swinney. Prior to May 1, 1995, the predecessor Rule 6.03 U.C.C.C.R. did not combine the probable cause determination with the initial appearance. Our present initial appearance requires the judicial officer to determine whether there was probable cause for the arrest and note the probable cause determination for the record. Thus, there are now additional functions under the new rule at an initial appearance. Under the Abram decision, a probable cause finding was not required. Also, it is noteworthy that Abram was not brought for an initial appearance until 72 hours after his arrest. Swinney was given an initial appearance within forty-three hours, thus, within the forty-eight hour limit. This was an extremely difficult and problematic case that officers were still investigating and attempting to determine if Swinney could be charged for the second count of murder. We agree with the circuit judge that the minor delay was reasonable under the facts of this case so the officers could determine whether Swinney could be charged with double murder. ¶ 26. It was during the delay from Tuesday to Wednesday that Swinney made the statement that she accidentally shot the victim in the back. The investigator from the District Attorney's office, Ralph Dance, took two statements on Wednesday morning, November 19, 1997. Swinney was given an initial appearance at 2:00 p.m. that same date. The second statement Swinney gave Dance where she signed the waiver constituted the only direct proof that she pulled the trigger and shot the Harville in the back. ¶ 27. An accused's right to counsel attaches after arrest and at the point when the initial appearance ought to have been held. Jimpson v. State, 532 So.2d 985, 988 (Miss.1988) (quoting May v. State, 524 So.2d 957, 967 (Miss.1988)). Swinney was clearly entitled to counsel as of 2:00 p.m. on that date, which was the time of her initial appearance. ¶ 28. The next questions are whether she specifically invoked her right to have an attorney present prior to the time of her initial appearance and specifically during the second interview that morning or whether she properly waived the confession. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until his attorney is present. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). ¶ 29. First, we must determine whether Swinney raised the specific issue of right to counsel, presented and argued it before the trial court. We find that Swinney's motion to suppress never presented this specific issue to the trial court for consideration and a ruling thereon. Therefore, Swinney's argument is procedurally barred. See, e.g., Evans v. State, 725 So.2d at 631; Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 845 (Miss.1994); Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1270 (Miss.1994); Cole v. State 525 So.2d 365, 369 (Miss.1987); Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305 (Miss.1986); Johnson v. State, 477 So.2d 196 (Miss.1985); In re Hill, 460 So.2d 792 (Miss.1984); Hill v. State, 432 So.2d 427 (Miss.1983). ¶ 30. Alternatively, Swinney's argument is without merit. Swinney's motion to suppress before the trial court is totally lacking of the argument that request for counsel barred further questioning by the officers. Defense counsel's arguments for suppression instead focused on the delay in the initial appearance. Swinney failed to directly argue to the judge that she invoked her Miranda right to an attorney during the interview process and that the officer ignored her request and questioned her further. Because she did not raise the specific issue, the trial judge did not address this ground for suppression in his bench ruling on the motion. The trial judge instead focused on this issue by Swinney's counsel and ruled that the motion of the defendant to suppress the statement given to the investigator, Mr. Dance, at or about nine o'clock and following that time on the 19th day of November, 1997, is overruled. ¶ 31. Although she mentioned asking for an attorney during testimony, neither her counsel, the district attorney, nor the trial judge ever focused upon that issue nor commented or asked further questions thereafter. It is as though the comment was an afterthought by Swinney while she was testifying. The timing of the statement and the initial appearance does not support Swinney's argument. Dance's questioning of Swinney commenced at 9:00 a.m. and her initial appearance was at 2:00 p.m. After the first statement was given, Dance stated that he confronted Swinney concerning the contradictory facts she had given, whereupon, Swinney admitted in the second statement that she had indeed shot Don Harville. Swinney thus claimed during her testimony at the suppression hearing that she asked for a lawyer and fifteen minutes later she was in court, a fact which is virtually an impossibility. Dance testified that he took the second contradictory statement from Swinney immediately after the first statement. More importantly, Swinney confirmed subsequently that her two statements were given within one hour of each other. Swinney, in fact, never claimed that Dance continued to ask her questions after she claims that she asked for a lawyer. Swinney testified that Dance stated simply, that I didn't need one because he wasn't doing nothing but talking at that time. Neither her counsel, the district attorney or the trial judge followed up with any question regarding whether Dance actually asked her any additional questions. We are thus left to speculate at to this subject, and this Court cannot do so. ¶ 32. The trial court after hearing conflicting testimony, made a finding of fact. This Court should not overturn a trial court ruling unless it is clearly erroneous or contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. See, e.g., Dancer v. State, 721 So.2d 583, 587 (Miss.1998); McGowan v. State, 706 So.2d 231, 235 (Miss.1997); Morgan v. State, 681 So.2d 82, 87 (Miss.1996); Alexander v. State, 610 So.2d 320, 326 (Miss.1992); Stokes v. State, 548 So.2d 118, 122 (Miss.1989); Woodward v. State, 533 So.2d 418, 427 (Miss.1988); Hall v. State, 427 So.2d 957, 960 (Miss. 1983); Ratliff v. State, 317 So.2d 403, 405 (Miss.1975) ¶ 33. Once the right to counsel is invoked, an interrogation may only continue if the defendant initiates further discussions with police, and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives the right. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984). The holding in Smith had its origins in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). This is a two-fold requirement for a defendant as Swinney would have to have initiated the interrogation and waived the right to counsel once she invoked right to counsel. Whether there has been an intelligent, knowing, and voluntary waiver is essentially a factual inquiry to be determined by the trial judge from the totality of the circumstances. Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 753 (Miss.1984) (collecting authorities). If the trial judge applied the correct legal standard and if there is substantial evidence to support the finding, an affirmance is generally required. Id. ¶ 34. In ruling this statement admissible, the trial court did so without stating the legal standard it applied and without making findings of fact. At the suppression hearing, Dance testified that he and Swinney were alone during the questioning at issue, which took place in a small office in the back of the police department. He did not deny that Swinney requested counsel before signing the waiver, or that he told her to go ahead and sign it because she did not need a lawyer. ¶ 35. Dance testified to the contents of the waiver as follows: Swinney has an eleventh-grade education; she can read and write; she understands her right to remain silent and have a lawyer present during questioning, and she was willing to talk to him at that time. She signed the waiver underneath a note that says I understand my rights. ¶ 36. The transcript of the suppression hearing shows that Swinney had been informed of her rights at least four times and had signed a rights waiver with Dance and Billy Whitehead when she gave her first statement on November 17. After apparently refusing to sign two other rights waivers, Swinney signed the last one on November 19, just before her confession. ¶ 37. For a waiver of counsel to be valid, it must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case `upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713, 723 (Miss.1984) (citations omitted). Under this standard, there is substantial evidence to support a finding that Swinney was aware that she was entitled to refuse to sign the document and that she did so voluntarily, as she had refused to do so twice before. She therefore waived her right to counsel before making the inculpatory statement. ¶ 38. Swinney further alleges that her confession was not given voluntarily because Dance told her If you don't tell me you did it, you won't see your son anymore. ¶ 39. For a confession to be admissible, it must have been given voluntarily and not given because of promises, threats, or inducements. Dancer v. State, 721 So.2d at 587 (citations omitted). Where the voluntariness of a confession is put at issue, the State bears the burden of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. Neal v. State, 451 So.2d at 753. The admissibility of a confession is essentially a fact-finding function, and as long as the trial court applies the correct legal standards, we will not overturn a judge's finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence. Dancer, 721 So.2d at 587. Where the trial court admits a statement into evidence based on conflicting evidence, this Court must generally affirm. Id. ¶ 40. In overruling Swinney's motion to suppress the confession, the circuit court did not undertake a legal analysis; it did not identify a legal standard and apply it to the facts before the court. However, a trial judge's determination that a confession is admissible becomes a finding of fact and will not be disturbed unless manifestly incorrect or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Applewhite v. State, 753 So.2d 1039, 1041 (Miss.2000). ¶ 41. When this confession was given, there were only two people present in the room, Swinney and Dance. Dance testified that he made no such statements to Swinney. The only evidence in the record regarding the voluntariness of the confession is the testimony of Swinney and Dance. When the circuit court admitted the statements, it decided as fact-finder that Dance was the more credible witness. The trial court's decision was based on substantial evidence after hearing conflicting testimony from Dance and Swinney. The trial court's ruling is not clearly erroneous or contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Thus, we find no error here.