Opinion ID: 1201357
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ten-Day Suspension

Text: There is no dispute that the ten-day suspension was an adverse employment action or that Ms. Atanus is a member of various protected classes. We thus shall discuss only the two remaining aspects of this suspension that are disputed.
Ms. Atanus, claiming that she was treated differently than other employees, submits that a material issue of fact exists regarding the alleged inappropriate conduct for which the GSA suspended her. According to Ms. Atanus, Smith was unreceptive to [her] concerns and rebuffed her attempt to discuss her suspension, and his treatment of her illustrates the discrimination she faced by the Agency's management. Appellant's Br. at 13. She further asserts that the GSA's rationale for suspending her was pretextual because it was false, self-serving and one-sided and because she was not loud, rude, or aggressive as Smith alleges. Id. Ms. Atanus maintains that she was singled out for worse treatment than other similarly situated employees in the GSA. On this fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test, a plaintiff must show that members of the comparative group are directly comparable to her in all material respects. Burks, 464 F.3d at 751 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (noting that relevant factors include whether the employees reported to the same supervisor, whether they were subject to the same standards and whether they had comparable education, experience and qualification). Keeping in mind that this prong ought not be applied in an unduly rigid or narrow[] manner, Ms. Atanus has not put forth any evidence of employees outside of her various protected classes who acted in a materially similar manner but were treated more favorably. Pantoja v. Am. NTN Bearing Mfg. Corp., 495 F.3d 840, 845-46 (7th Cir.2007) (noting that the plaintiff must show that members of the comparison group are sufficiently comparable to her to suggest that she was singled out for worse treatment). Indeed, Ms. Atanus has failed to point the court to any other GSA employee to serve as a basis for comparison. Rather, Ms. Atanus claims that the record is devoid of others in [her] division receiving similar treatment from Smith and the GSA. Appellant's Br. at 13. This contention, however, ignores that the burden of establishing a prima facie case is on her, McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, and, in any event, leaves us without any basis for comparing whether other employees in her division who were insubordinate, disorderly and rude to their supervisor's boss received similar treatment, Henry v. Jones, 507 F.3d 558, 566 (7th Cir.2007) (holding that an employee had not established a prima facie case because [h]is conduct was more egregious than that of the non-white officers he highlights).
Even if she had established a prima facie case of discrimination, Ms. Atanus has not shown that the GSA's reasons for her ten-day suspension are pretextual. A plaintiff may show pretext with evidence that the employer's explanation is not credible. Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1039 (7th Cir.1993). In this regard, an employee may show that the employer's reason had no[] basis in fact, that the explanation was not the real reason for its action or that the reason stated was insufficient to warrant the adverse job action. Bahl, 115 F.3d at 1291 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The main inquiry in determining pretext is whether the employer honestly acted on the stated reason rather than whether the reason for the [adverse employment action] was a correct business judgment. Id. (noting that this court will not take on the mantle of a super-personnel department reviewing the business decisions of [the] employer); Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 696 (7th Cir. 2006) (An employer's mistaken belief that the plaintiff's conduct merited termination is not unlawful, so long as the belief was honestly held.). The GSA's stated reason for suspending Ms. Atanus was her insubordinate, disorderly and rude conduct toward her supervisor's boss, her similar past conduct and her failure to explain herself. Ms. Atanus admits that she told Smith that she did not believe Christians would act in this manner, that he would not suspend her if he was a person of [G]od, that he was the one who should be suspended because he was doing his job improperly and that she would have his superior overturn his decision. R.37 ¶ 39, at 6 (responding to R.34 ¶ 39, at 6). Ms. Atanus does not contest that Brown's decision to suspend her was based upon Smith's report of Ms. Atanus' conduct. Ms. Atanus, in short, offers nothing more than her belief that her conduct toward Smith did not warrant a ten-day suspension to show that the GSA did not act honestly and in good faith. [6] Cowan v. Glenbrook Sec. Services, Inc., 123 F.3d 438, 444 (7th Cir.1997) (perpetually tardy employee could not defeat a motion for summary judgment with mere speculative inference that termination was due to racial animus rather than record of tardiness). Indeed, she flatly asserts that a trial is warranted because this issue hinges on credibility and intent. Given the facts that Ms. Atanus has admitted, however, and given that she has no evidence of pretext, no reasonable jury could find that the GSA's stated reasons have no basis in fact, are not the real reasons for her suspension or that her conduct was insufficient to warrant the suspension. Fane v. Locke Reynolds, 480 F.3d 534, 541 (7th Cir.2007) (affirming a grant of summary judgment where an employee was terminated for rude behavior, insubordination, and not recognizing her own inappropriate behavior and where the employer believed that such conduct warranted termination and honestly acted pursuant to that belief); Gadsby v. Norwalk Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324, 1337-38 (7th Cir.1995) (Flaum, J., concurring).