Opinion ID: 2513166
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: When Defendants' Allegedly Unconstitutional Conduct Took Place

Text: On appeal, Scott advances two separate theories as to when the defendants' allegedly unconstitutional conduct took place, only one of which appears to have been asserted in her complaint. First, she argues that in 2002, four years before Earley, the DOC defendants violated her constitutional rights by taking part in the administrative imposition of her PRS, presumably through their role in the creation or ratification of DOC policies governing PRS. For the reasons we have already rehearsed, because any conduct on the defendants' part that led to the imposition of Scott's PRS occurred some four years before Earley, the law as to the unconstitutionality of such acts was not clearly established when they took place and the defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity. Scott argues further, however, that even after Earley, the DOC defendants violated her constitutional rights (1) by not seeking to remove her PRS or quash her warrant in light of Earley, (2) by revoking her PRS and sentencing her to ten months' incarceration, and (3) by not releasing her while she remained in custody or seeking to have her resentenced in light of Earley. The only allegation contained in the complaint that addresses the DOC defendants' purportedly unconstitutional actions with respect to Scott's PRS is that they adopted, approved, and/or ratified the imposition of mandatory [PRS] on individuals such as plaintiff sentenced to determinate terms of imprisonment in New York State courts but not sentenced to mandatory [PRS]. Compl. ¶ 16. This allegation does not appear to include Scott's second, tripartite argument advanced on appeal concerning actions taken after our decision in Earley. Reading the allegation in the complaint liberally, as we are required to do when reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, the challenge is directed at the administrative imposition of PRS, not the failure to take action to remove it after it was imposed. Nevertheless, because we recognize that [a] supervisory official may be liable [under section 1983 not only] because he or she created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, [but also because he or she] allowed such a policy or custom to continue, Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir.1986), we consider Scott's claims to the extent that she is arguing that the defendants unconstitutionally allowed her administrative PRS to continue after the practice was clearly established to be unconstitutional. We conclude that the facts pleaded are insufficient to make out such a claim. None of Scott's allegations with respect to the DOC defendants include assertions that affirmative actions taken by these defendants after Earley violated her rights; they refer only to the DOC defendants' failure to act. And Scott has not pleaded facts giving rise to a clearly established affirmative legal obligation on the part of the DOC defendants to take any of the actions that Scott alleges they failed to take. A claim for failure to act is cognizable only in the presence of a corresponding duty to have acted. See, e.g., Benzman v. Whitman, 523 F.3d 119, 132 (2d Cir.2008) (finding no violation of law where Environmental Protection Agency allegedly failed to consider certain factors pertaining to air quality after the 9/11 attacks because there is no allegation of any failure to carry out a mandatory duty to take a discrete action required by the [National Contingency Plan]); cf. Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736, 743 (2d Cir. 1988) (As a general rule, a government official is not liable for failing to prevent another from violating a person's constitutional rights, unless the official is charged with an affirmative duty to act.). In the absence of such an allegation, this claim must fail. 1. Failure to Seek to Remove Scott's PRS or Quash Her Warrant after Earley. Scott asserts in her brief that the DOC defendants violated her due process rights by failing to take action to remove her PRS and quash her warrant after Earley was decided. See, e.g., Appellant's Br. at 19 (noting that DOC[] did not seek to have any criminal defendants re-sentenced to PRS until July 2008). Thus the argument seems to be that after Earley was decided but before Scott was arrested by the New York State Division of Parole, DOC should have searched its records for people who had PRS imposed administratively and purged the PRS. But this argument fails because no facts are alleged in the complaint that would support a finding that DOC had the power, through its employees, unilaterally to revoke Scott's PRS despite the conceded fact that DOC had imposed it. Indeed, it was not until June 2008, some ten months after Scott's release from her parole violation sentence, that the New York State Legislature provided a statutory method by which government officials could seek to resentence or otherwise handle the cases of inmates who had received administrative imposition of PRS, also thereby imposing an affirmative duty on the part of such officials to do so. See N.Y. Corr. Law § 601-d (2008). And Scott herself concedes that New York law prohibits DOC[] from unilaterally correcting sentenceseven illegal ones. Appellant's Br. at 16 (citing Murray v. Goord, 298 A.D.2d 94, 97, 747 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1st Dep't.2002)). Even if there were a basis for a conclusion that DOC officials had the power unilaterally to revoke her PRS, moreover, there is no pleaded basis on which to conclude that DOC would have been obligated under Earley to do so. Scott provides no authority for the proposition asserted on appeal that DOC, as opposed to the District Attorney, the sentencing court, the Division of Parole, or any other state actor with responsibilities with respect to criminal sentencing, [6] had such an affirmative legal duty at the time, much less a clearly established one. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (Unless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal.); accord Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 815. 2. Revocation of Scott's PRS. Scott also asserts, in her brief if not in her complaint, that the DOC defendants violated her constitutional rights in connection with her parole violation hearing after her arrest for non-compliance with her PRS. But that hearing was conducted entirely by and before the New York State Division of Parole. See Appellant's Br. at 19 (arguing that DOC allowed perhaps thousands of criminal defendants, including appellant, to be arrested and re-incarcerated for violating their administratively-imposed PRS). Scott does not plead facts that, if proven, could establish that the DOC defendants were aware of, let alone participated in, the hearing. [7] To the contrary, Scott herself asserts that appellees may not have known of appellant's arrest or participated in appellant's parole revocation hearing. Appellant's Br. at 25. This lack of alleged personal involvement or knowledge bars any claim that the DOC defendants can be held liable for what occurred at the hearing. See McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir.1977) (In this Circuit personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under [section] 1983.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1282, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978); accord Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873-74 (2d Cir. 1995). To be sure, [t]he personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be shown by evidence that: ... the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, Colon, 58 F.3d at 873, but the practice of re-incarcerating persons who violated their administratively-imposed PRS was a practice of the Division of Parole, and not of DOC, and was not a practice over which Scott has alleged the DOC defendants had any knowledge or control. 3. Failure To Release Scott from Incarceration or To Move to Have Her Resentenced. Finally, Scott asserts that the DOC defendants violated her Due Process rights by not taking action to release her from custody after she was sentenced to eighteen months' incarceration for violating the terms of her PRS. See, e.g., Appellant's Br. at 26 (arguing that appellees could have rescinded appellant's administratively-imposed PRS and requested parole officials to issue any necessary release orders). But there is no allegation of a failure to release or failure to seek resentencing in her complaint, [8] nor indeed does the complaint assert that the DOC defendants themselves knew whether her PRS had been imposed administratively or judicially. There is nothing in the complaint, then, that would support a conclusion that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to known violations of Scott's rights. See Colon, 58 F.3d at 873-74. And again, Scott has failed to point to any clearly established affirmative duty on the part of the DOC defendants to make a motion to correct her sentence. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806; Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 815. Under New York law, DOC was not obligated affirmatively to seek resentencing for defendants with administratively-imposed PRS until 2008, when New York Correction Law § 601-d became effective, N.Y. Corr. Law § 601-d(1),(2) (2008), but after Scott's incarceration had ended. Scott would in any event have had doubtful standing to pursue this claim because of the absence of any pleaded injury-in-fact to her arising from the DOC defendants' failure to act in this regard. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (requiring, as an irreducible constitutional minimum of standing, that the plaintiff must have suffered an `injury in fact'). If, as Scott has conceded, DOC could not have unilaterally released her from custody after the Administrative Law Judge or the Division of Parole had issued an order revoking her parole, the only injury Scott could be alleging arises from the DOC defendants' failure to make a motion for her release. But Scott herself made that motionsuccessfullythrough her habeas petition and was thereupon released. Her complaint does not allege that she would have been released earlier had DOC made the motion, and, even had such an argument been made, we are skeptical of the viability of an argument that a DOC motion for release in light of Earley would result in an earlier release date than a defendant-initiated motion. Absent an allegation that the failure to make the motion for her release resulted in increased time spent incarcerated, we fail to understand how injury in fact has been pleaded in this regard.