Opinion ID: 1711020
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Degree of Necessity Required to Establish Implied Easement From Former Use

Text: U.S. Cold argues that the degree of necessity required to be proved in order to establish an implied easement from former use is strict or absolute necessity. In support of this position, it cites Chalen v. Cialino, 206 Neb. 106, 291 N.W.2d 256 (1980); Meier v. Maguire, 172 Neb. 52, 108 N.W.2d 397 (1961); and Badura v. Lyons, supra . U.S. Cold correctly asserts that the court in Badura and Chalen required proof of strict necessity. However, U.S. Cold overlooks the fact that the issue in those two cases was not whether an implied easement from former use was created. The issue in Badura was whether an easement by necessity was created. As discussed previously, easements by necessity arise when land is otherwise landlocked, and thus are distinguishable from easements that arise from former use. In Badura, the court stated that ways of necessity are ways of strict necessity as distinguished from ways of mere convenience [citations omitted]; and that the degree of necessity requisite to support such a way is an absolute necessity, for which inconvenience without more does not suffice. 147 Neb. at 450, 23 N.W.2d at 684. The issue in Chalen was whether an implied easement by reservation was created. In Bennett v. Evans, 161 Neb. 807, 74 N.W.2d 728 (1956), this court made it clear that there is a well-recognized distinction between implied grants and implied reservations in that the rule of strict necessity is applied to implied reservations, but not to implied grants. (Citing Lampman v. Milks, 21 N.Y. 505 (1860)). As a result, we determine that Badura and Chalen are distinguishable from the instant case in that those cases did not arise in the context of an implied easement from former use. As in the instant case, the issue in Meier v. Maguire, supra , was whether an implied easement from former use was created. Headnote 3 of that opinion supports U.S. Cold's position that strict necessity must be proved in order to establish an implied easement from former use. However, a close reading of the opinion exposes headnote 3 as being inconsistent with what the court actually stated in the body of the opinion. In the opinion, the court discusses Bennett v. Evans, supra , and then declares, As we stated in that case, implied grants [easements arising from former use] are not favored, although they are more favored than implied reservations. The factor of necessity is involved in both. 172 Neb. at 56-57, 108 N.W.2d at 400. While the Meier court did state that necessity is a factor to be considered in both implied reservations and implied grants, it did not state, or even imply, that the requisite degree of necessity is the same in both. Furthermore, the fact that the court declared that implied grants are more favored than implied reservations indicates that a lesser degree of necessity is required to be proved for implied grants than is required for implied reservations. Moreover, the opinion cites numerous times with approval to Bennett v. Evans, supra , in which the court stated that `the rule of strict necessity is applied to implied reservations but not to implied grants....' 161 Neb. at 820, 74 N.W.2d at 736. As a result, we find that headnote 3 cannot be reconciled with the opinion. A court's opinion controls its syllabus, the syllabus being merely explanatory of the opinion and having no more force and effect than the statements made in the opinion on which the syllabus is based. Maxwell v. Hamel, 138 Neb. 49, 292 N.W. 38 (1940). Black's Law Dictionary 1449 (6th ed. 1990) includes headnote in its definition of syllabus and goes on to state that [o]rdinarily, where a headnote, even though prepared by the court, is given no special force by statute or rule of court, the opinion is to be looked to for the original and authentic statement of the grounds of decision (citing Burbank v. Ernst, 232 U.S. 162, 34 S.Ct. 299, 58 L.Ed. 551 (1914)). As a result, we find that Meier does not support U.S. Cold's position that strict necessity must be proved in order to establish an implied easement from former use. In Christensen v. Luehrs, 133 Neb. 50, 54, 273 N.W. 839, 841 (1937), this court stated: Some authorities hold ... that an easement will not pass by implication except in cases of strict necessity, while others hold that an easement by implied grant can only arise in case of necessity. The weight of authority and better view sustain the rule that the degree of necessity is such merely as renders the easement necessary for the convenient and comfortable enjoyment of the property as it existed when the severance was made, and that it should not be absolutely necessary for the enjoyment of the estate granted. (Emphasis supplied.) Likewise, in Hengen v. Hengen, 211 Neb. 276, 284, 318 N.W.2d 269, 274 (1982), this court stated that to prove the existence of an implied easement from former use, the easement is necessary for the proper and reasonable enjoyment of the dominant tract. (Emphasis supplied.) As a result, we conclude the degree of necessity required to prove the existence of an implied easement from former use is reasonable necessity. (e) Whether Alleged Easement Was Reasonably Necessary for Use and Enjoyment of Property U.S. Cold argues that use of the tracks across parcel B was not reasonably necessary for Stewart Seed's use and enjoyment of its land (parcel C) because evidence was adduced at trial that demonstrated that parcel C was accessible via use of trucks on public streets. This court has never reviewed a case involving an alleged easement for rail access. See Burke Warehouse, Inc. v. Thanos, 358 Mass. 823, 267 N.E.2d 917 (1971). However, in Hengen v. Hengen, supra , this court addressed whether the owners of the southwest quarter of a section of land had an implied easement, arising from use before severance of the section, to obtain irrigation water from a canal in the northwest quarter. The court found an implied easement existed, stating that [t]he necessity involved ... is to transport the irrigation water from the canal in the northwest quarter to the southwest quarter.... 211 Neb. at 284, 318 N.W.2d at 275. Thus, the Hengen court found the easement was necessary for the proper and reasonable enjoyment of the dominant tract without discussing possible alternative methods of transporting the irrigation water. U.S. Cold's argument, that the necessity element was not met because of the existence of possible alternative methods of transportation, is an argument grounded in strict necessity instead of the reasonable necessity standard applicable in the instant case. The testimony adduced at trial showed that the tracks across parcel B were part of the main rail line created by Union Stockyards and were the only available access to the tracks across parcel C. Obviously, this easement was reasonably necessary for Stewart Seed's convenient and comfortable use and enjoyment of parcel C at the time parcels B and C were subdivided. See, Hengen v. Hengen, supra ; Christensen v. Luehrs, supra . As a result, we find that Stewart Seed acquired an implied easement from former use, for use of the rail tracks across parcel B, upon its acquisition of parcel C on April 21, 1976.