Opinion ID: 2603737
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State v. Howe

Text: In August 1986, John Howe III [1] moved to Shelton to live with his father. Prior to that, John lived with his mother in Alaska. Shortly after arriving in Shelton, John and his father began having difficulties. These difficulties eventually led John to move out of his father's house and into the house of his aunt and uncle, the Ackermans. Police subsequently arrested John for taking the Ackermans' car without their permission. John was placed in juvenile detention, and while in detention, John's father told John he was no longer welcome in his father's home. After his release from detention, John moved into a foster home. His father again told John that he could not return home until such time as he could exhibit law-abiding behavior. While in foster care, John entered his father's home through an unlocked door and took his father's car, boat, canteen and some gas. John was subsequently arrested and found guilty of burglary and several other crimes not relevant to this appeal. Division Two of the Court of Appeals reversed the burglary conviction. State v. Howe, 57 Wn. App. 63, 786 P.2d 824 (1990). Judge Alexander, writing for the majority, interpreted State v. Steinbach, supra , as recognizing that a child has a right to enter the parental home. The majority then concluded that a parent cannot unilaterally terminate that right, and that John's entry into his father's home was, therefore, lawful. We disagree. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the privilege the child has to enter the parental home derives from a parent's duty to provide for the care of minor children. 57 Wn. App. at 69. As noted above, the parent's statutory duty is set out in RCW 26.20.035(1)(a). John's father met that statutory duty. He informed the State that John could not return home, and he took John to a state-appointed shelter. By doing so, John's father fulfilled his statutory duty. John was placed in foster care, and he was at no time without the necessities the statute requires. John's father also explicitly told John that he could not return to his house. The trial court found that John's father clearly indicated to John that he was no longer welcome in his father's home, and that John knew and understood his father's communications. [2] That fact distinguishes this case from Steinbach. Since John's father fulfilled his obligations under RCW 26.20.035(1), he had the power to revoke John's privilege to enter the house. This revocation is not a unilateral termination of the child's rights. The revocation can only be done after the parent insures that the child's rights are protected. John's father made the revocation effective by expressly and unequivocally telling John that he could not return to the house. Since his father revoked that privilege, John's entry into the house was unlawful. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the juvenile court's finding of guilt.