Opinion ID: 2569354
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 43

Heading: Whether the subsection (5)(g) aggravating factor is invalid because it exists in virtually every first degree murder case.

Text: The defendant contends that subsection (5)(g) fails to present a principled basis for distinguishing a case in which a death sentence may be imposed from those in which a death sentence is unwarranted. According to the defendant, because every first degree murder after deliberation is intentional and a class 1 felony, subsection (5)(g) automatically makes all cases of first degree murder after deliberation death-eligible offenses. We disagree. The plain meaning of subsection (5)(g) indicates that the predicate felonies underlying the aggravator must be distinct from the murder itself. Subsection (5)(g) requires the commission of a class 1, 2, or 3 felony in addition to the intentional killing of the murder victim. Therefore, subsection (5)(g) facially limits the sentencing body's discretion and rationally distinguishes between those individuals for whom death is an appropriate sanction and those for whom it is not. See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 306-07, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990); White, 870 P.2d at 446. Moreover, the prosecution in this case did not allege that the murder of Maloney itself formed the factual predicate of subsection (5)(g). The prosecution's theory was that the killing occurred in connection with any of three class 2 felonies  the attempted murders of Creazzo and Maloney and the second degree kidnapping of Maloney. The jury was required to find that at least one of these class 2 felonies formed the factual predicate of subsection (5)(g) before it could conclude that the prosecution had proved the aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. We can detect no reasonable basis in the record for concluding that the jury may have relied on the murder of Maloney as the basis for its finding of subsection (5)(g).