Opinion ID: 1959192
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Facilitation Instruction

Text: Appellant argues that the jury should have received an instruction on facilitation. KRS 506.080 provides that a person is guilty of criminal facilitation when, acting with knowledge that another person is committing or intends to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which knowingly provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission of the crime and which in fact aids such person to commit the crime. The primary difference between facilitation and complicity is the state of mind; complicity requires the complicitor to intend that the crime take place. Webb v. Commonwealth, 904 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Ky.1995). Perhaps a clearer statement is that a complicitor must be an instigator, or otherwise invested in the crime, while a facilitator need only be a knowing, cooperative bystander with no stake in the crime. Prior to the giving of an instruction, however, there must be evidence to support it. Thompkins v. Commonwealth, 54 S.W.3d 147 (Ky.2001). In this case, facilitation would require Appellant providing money to Emerson, knowing that he would use it to commit the crime, but without intention to promote the crime itself. Appellant was not entitled to the facilitation instruction because no reasonable juror could conclude that Appellant was involved and had knowledge, but was indifferent to whether Emerson committed the murder. There is no evidence to support that contention and Appellant was not entitled to the instruction.