Opinion ID: 2831455
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consent in Trespass Causes of Action

Text: We first consider whether lack of consent is an element of the trespass cause of action (on which the plaintiff bears the burden) or whether consent is an affirmative defense (on which the defendant bears the burden). If lack of consent is an element of a trespass cause of action as the jury charge instructed here, then we need not address whether Texas law recognizes a trespass cause of action for deep subsurface wastewater migration because the jury found in EPS’s favor on all of FPL Farming’s claims and any error would be harmless. See TEX . R. APP . P. 61.1(a); see also Gilbert Wheeler, Inc. v. Enbridge Pipelines (E. Tex.), L.P., ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (Tex. 2014) (declining to address a question related to a trespass allegation because “even if the submission of the trespass cause of action was error, it was harmless”). We have not squarely addressed the question of which party bears the burden of proving consent in a trespass action, nor have the courts of appeals answered it uniformly.2 We recently observed that “we have rarely addressed trespass damages in detail,” Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood 2 Compare Stukes v. Bachmeyer, 249 S.W .3d 461, 465 n.1 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.) (referencing consent as an affirmative defense without analyzing the question directly), Gen. Mills Rests., Inc. v. Tex. Wings, Inc., 12 S.W .3d 827, 835 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2000, no pet.) (same), Cain v. Rust Indus. Cleaning Servs., Inc., 969 S.W .2d 464, 470 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 1998, pet. denied) (same), Ward v. Ne. Tex. Farmers Co-op. Elevator, 909 S.W .2d 143, 150 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 1995, writ denied) (same), Carr v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 893 S.W .2d 613, 623 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) (same), and Stone Res., Inc. v. Barnett, 661 S.W .2d 148, 151 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ) (performing some analysis on the consent question and holding that consent is an affirmative defense), with Watson v. Brazos Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 918 S.W .2d 639, 645–46 (Tex. App.— W aco 1996, writ denied) (approving a jury charge that defined trespass as entering another’s property without consent). 5 Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909, 920 (Tex. 2013), so it is unsurprising that we have also not addressed which party bears the burden to prove consent in a trespass lawsuit.3 Although important trespass issues have not frequently drawn this Court’s attention, our historical precedent guides the present inquiry. Examining our historical treatment of trespass is important because we adhere to prior decisions that have established rules relating to property rights unless, or until, the Legislature modifies those rules. See Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Sw. Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 29 (Tex. 1978) (stating that “[t]he doctrine of stare decisis has been and should be strictly followed by this Court in cases involving established rules of property rights,” but giving effect to subsequent changes in legislative policy); see also Southland Royalty Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 249 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tex. 1952) (stating that when this Court reviews property rights, previously established rules “should not be changed in the absence of other controlling circumstances, even though good reasons might be given for a different holding”) (quoting Tanton v. State Nat’l Bank of El Paso, 79 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Tex. 1935)); cf. Marcus Cable Assocs., L.P. v. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex. 2002) (acknowledging “[t]he emphasis our law places upon . . . important public policies by promoting certainty in land transactions”). A review of this Court’s trespass-related jurisprudence reveals that 3 In a recent case involving a civil battery claim, however, we recognized that “[c]onsent to contact ‘negatives the wrongful element of the defendant’s act, and prevents the existence of a tort.’” City of Watauga v. Gordon, 434 S.W .3d 586, 591 (Tex. 2014) (quoting W . P AGE K EETON ET AL., P RO SSER & K EETON O N THE L AW O F T O RTS , § 18, at 112 (5th ed.1984)). W e concluded that the plaintiff pleaded the existence of an intentional tort because his pleadings demonstrated he did not consent to the defendant’s conduct, and “battery is defined to require an intentional touching without consent.” Id. at 594 (citation omitted). 6 a common definition of trespass has emerged over time that is consistent with the trespass definition submitted to the jury in this case. This Court has consistently defined a trespass as encompassing three elements: (1) entry (2) onto the property of another (3) without the property owner’s consent or authorization. Our review of this Court’s trespass cases begins with our first recorded opinions.4 In 1841, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Texas reviewed a case in which: A jury found that the defendant entered on the premises of the plaintiff without any title in law or warrant of authority from the plaintiff; that the plaintiff, with a view to be restored to possession, gave up one portion of his land to get possession of the other portion, and that the title of the plaintiff was genuine. Hall v. Phelps, Dallam 435, 436 (Tex. 1841). The Court noted that the trial court refused the defendant’s proposed instructions, which sought to depict the parties’ transaction as consensual and not coerced. Id. at 436–37 (noting, for example, one proposed instruction: “If [the jury] believed the parties compromised their difficulties and settled the same, they should find for the defendant.”). Instead, the Court approved the trial court’s instructions, id. at 439–40, 441, which the Court summarized as stating: [If the jury] believed the defendant entered on the premises without any title in law or warrant of authority from the plaintiff, and that [the plaintiff], with a view to be restored to possession, gave up one portion of his land to get back the other, they might declare the title so made as void; that they should determine from the evidence, if this had been such a case; that if they believed the defendant had a doubtful claim to the league granted to plaintiff, they might find for the defendant; but to come to that conclusion they should be satisfied the defendant had more than a shadow of 4 W e recognize that this historical examination involves cases decided before formal pleading rules went into effect. W e cite them not as conclusive authority on their allocation of the burden of proof, but as examples of how this Court has defined trespass or approved the definition of trespass over time. 7 title; and that if they believed the defendant’s entry on the land was without any right to enter, they might find such damages as the evidence warranted. Id. at 437 (emphasis added). After the plaintiff proved that “the defendant’s entry on the land was without any right to enter,” the trial court ruled in the plaintiff’s favor and issued an injunction prohibiting the defendant from entering the plaintiff’s land.5 Id. The Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in all respects. Id. at 441. In 1878, the now-Supreme Court of Texas had an opportunity to review jury instructions that involved trespass issues. In Houston & Great Northern Railroad Co. v. Meador, 50 Tex. 77 (1878), a landowner’s heirs sued a railroad company and alleged it negligently constructed a railroad through the landowner’s property by damaging fences and failing to install cattle guards, which caused livestock to enter the property and damage crops. Id. at 81. The railroad requested a jury instruction on the defense that because it used independent contractors to construct the railroad, the contractors were solely liable for any damages caused by their own negligence. Id. at 81, 83–84. The trial court denied the railroad’s proposed instruction based on an exception to independent contractor liability rules that an employer can still be held liable if it authorized an independent contractor to commit a wrongful act. Id. at 82–84. Apart from the question of negligence, the case turned on whether the railroad caused the independent contractors to wrongfully trespass on the landowner’s property because causing such a wrongful act would have made the railroad responsible for the independent 5 W e specifically note this portion of the relief granted—an injunction against future entry— because it is wholly consistent with the relief available in a common law trespass action. See, e.g., Allen v. Keeling, 613 S.W .2d 253, 255 (Tex. 1981) (enjoining defendants from trespassing). 8 contractor’s negligence. Id. at 84. The Court approved of the trial court’s instruction that defined trespass: If, [the evidence] should show either that the defendants [or the independent contractors] entered upon the [landowner’s property] for the purpose of constructing said railroad, without first having obtained the consent of the [landowner], . . . then the defendants, if the evidence under the law of the charge would otherwise justify it, would be liable for damages to [the landowner’s crops based on the negligent construction of the railroad]. Id. at 83 (emphasis added). In approving this instruction, the Court noted that “[u]nder the evidence, it was for the jury to say whether [the landowner] had consented to the entry on his premises or not.” Id. at 84. In a trespass to try title case in 1881, this Court defined a trespasser as “one who, not having the title to land, without the consent of the true owner, makes entry thereon.” Pilcher v. Kirk, 55 Tex. 208, 216 (1881) (emphasis added). Similarly, in 1884, this Court recognized that “[t]he ordinary signification of the term ‘trespass’ is the wrongful interference with another’s personal or property rights.” Cahn Bros. & Co. v. Bonnett, 62 Tex. 674, 676 (1884). In determining the appropriate venue for a plaintiff to bring suit for a wrongful writ of attachment, the Court explained that “the pith of the action is the wrongful interference thereby with the property rights of the plaintiff.” Id. In 1889, in a case involving questions of trespass and the lawful recovery of personal property, a married couple alleged that a group of defendants entered their home, removed rented furniture, and threatened the wife. Loftus v. Maxey, 11 S.W. 272, 272 (Tex. 1889). The parties contested the issue of whether the couple consented to the defendants’ entry, and this Court approved 9 of a jury instruction that read: “If the proof satisfy you that the defendants . . . did take and remove the bed, as alleged in the plaintiffs’ petition, without the consent of [the plaintiffs], . . . then you will find for plaintiffs for such an amount as you may deem proper and adequate . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). Later, in 1926, this Court noted that construction and maintenance of a dam on another’s property for thirty-five years would constitute a continuing trespass if it occurred without the landowner’s consent. See Motl v. Boyd, 286 S.W. 458, 476 (Tex. 1926), disapproved of on other grounds by Valmont Plantations v. State, 355 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1962). Ten years later, in a premises liability case, this Court defined a trespasser, in part, as someone who “enters upon the property of another without any right, lawful authority, or express or implied invitation, permission, or license.” Tex.–La. Power Co. v. Webster, 91 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex. 1936) (citation omitted). Later still, in Shell Oil Co. v. Howth, 159 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. 1942), a case involving adverse claims to mineral land, this Court distinguished another case by explaining that “[t]he entry of the [defendant] on the land without the consent of [the landowner] constituted a trespass and ouster in denial of [the landowner’s] rights. That was the gravamen of the wrong, and a recovery was based upon that ground.” Id. at 491 (emphasis added) (citing Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. 190, 190–91 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1925, judgm’t adopted), judgm’t set aside on reh’g, 291 S.W. 538 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1927, holding approved)). In recent years, this Court’s definition of a common law trespasser has remained consistent with our historical precedent. In 1997, we cited a writ refused, court of appeals case for its holding that “every unauthorized entry upon land of another is a trespass.” Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. 10 Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 827 (Tex. 1997) (emphasis added) (quoting McDaniel Bros. v. Wilson, 70 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1934, writ ref’d)). In a 2006 premises liability case, we stated that “[a] trespasser at common law was one who entered upon property of another without any legal right or invitation, express or implied.” State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 285 (Tex. 2006) (emphasis added) (citing Tex.–La. Power Co., 91 S.W.2d at 306). Two years later, in a case involving a trespass allegation, we once again approvingly quoted the rule from McDaniel Brothers that “every unauthorized entry upon land of another is a trespass even if no damage is done or injury is slight, and gives a cause of action to the injured party.” Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 12 n.36 (Tex. 2008) (emphasis added) (quoting McDaniel Bros., 70 S.W.2d at 621). Further, we reiterated the now-familiar standard in a 2011 trespass case, stating that “[t]respass to real property is an unauthorized entry upon the land of another, and may occur when one enters—or causes something to enter—another’s property.” Barnes v. Mathis, 353 S.W.3d 760,