Opinion ID: 2264131
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Evidentiary Standards Applied At Sentencing

Text: Former Maryland Code, Article 27, § 413(c) (currently codified as Criminal Law Article, § 2-303(e)) made admissible at a death penalty sentencing proceeding evidence relating to mitigating or aggravating circumstances, evidence of prior criminal convictions or the absence of such convictions, a pre-sentence investigation report (other than a recommendation as to sentence), and any other evidence the court finds to have probative value and relevance to sentencing, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any statements. [6] Evans acknowledges that we have, on several occasions, found no Constitutional problem with those somewhat relaxed statutory evidentiary rules. See Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 175, 729 A.2d 910, 933 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 910, 120 S.Ct. 258, 145 L.Ed.2d 216 (1999); Bruce v. State, 328 Md. 594, 630-31, 616 A.2d 392, 410 (1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 963, 113 S.Ct. 2936, 124 L.Ed.2d 686 (1993); Booth v. State, 327 Md. 142, 160-61, 608 A.2d 162, 170-71 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 988, 113 S.Ct. 500, 121 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992). See also Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 431-32, 583 A.2d 218, 239 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835, 112 S.Ct. 117, 116 L.Ed.2d 86 (1991) and State v. Colvin, 314 Md. 1, 17-18 n. 5, 548 A.2d 506, 514 n. 5 (1988). Nonetheless, he contends that, under Ring, that conclusion is no longer valid, and that, notwithstanding that a jury has found the elements of first degree murder, the defendant remains innocent of the greater crime of capital murder and that [t]he additional elements necessary to convict a defendant of that crime  i.e. principalship and aggravating circumstances  therefore must be proved under the rules of evidence established for, and subject to the requirements of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments (and the parallel state guarantees) applicable to, the determination of guilt or innocence in criminal cases. Evans never raised this issue at his sentencing proceeding. Indeed, he acknowledges that he failed to mount any defense to the State's claim of principalship or to the two aggravating factors posited by the State. He blames that, 13 years later, on the fact that lower evidentiary standards were applicable. He complains, in particular, about the admission of a pre-sentence investigation report, his prison records, and victim impact statements, all declared admissible by statute. This issue has been raised elsewhere, in both Federal and State courts, and it has been universally rejected. See United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135 (2nd Cir.2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 946, 125 S.Ct. 369, 160 L.Ed.2d 259 (2004); United States v. Lee, 374 F.3d 637 (8th Cir.2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2962, 162 L.Ed.2d 892 (2005); United States v. Rodriguez, 380 F.Supp.2d 1041, 1053-54 (D.N.D.2005); United States v. Johnson, 378 F.Supp.2d 1051, 1069 (N.D.Iowa 2005); United States v. Sampson, 332 F.Supp.2d 325 (D.Mass.2004); United States v. Taylor, 302 F.Supp.2d 901, 905 (N.D.Ind.2003); United States v. Battle, 264 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1105-07 (N.D.Ga.2003); United States v. Haynes, 269 F.Supp.2d 970, 985-87 (W.D.Tenn.2003); United States v. Matthews, 246 F.Supp.2d 137, 142 (N.D.N.Y.2002); United States v. Lentz, 225 F.Supp.2d 672, 682-83 (E.D.Va.2002); State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 319 (Tenn. 2005); Ploof v. State, 856 A.2d 539, 544 (Del.2004). The rationale, explained in Fell and Lee, is that the relaxed standard, allowed as well under the Federal Death Penalty Act, does not impair the reliability of the evidence admissible during the penalty phase ... Rather, the admission of more rather than less evidence during the penalty phase increases reliability by providing full and complete information about the defendant and allowing for an individualized inquiry into the appropriate sentence for the offense. United States v. Lee, supra, 374 F.3d at 648. We are in agreement with those decisions. The relaxed standards were designed largely for the defendant's benefit, both to allow the defendant to offer evidence in support of mitigating factors or to defend against or ameliorate aggravating factors that might otherwise be inadmissible and, as noted in Lee, to allow the jury to have a more complete picture of the defendant. The proper application of Rule 5-403 can serve as a brake on evidence that is unduly prejudicial.