Opinion ID: 1501117
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Right to Counsel and Confession

Text: Brown contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made about the murder of Synetta Ford in the guilt phase and the murder of Janet Perkins in the penalty phase. He alleges that the statements were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights in that the state questioned him without contacting his attorney and that his confession was not voluntary, intelligent and knowing because he was high on drugs. Brown made the same argument in State v. Brown, 902 S.W.2d 278, 291 (Mo. banc 1995), where he contended, among other things, that the trial court erred in admitting his confession to the murder of Synetta Ford because the police illegally obtained the confession about Ford's killing by interrogating him without the presence of his attorney. Id. The Court rejected his claim. Id. However, Brown respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its holding in that case with respect to this issue. Brown has previously litigated the validity and admissibility of his confession, and we see no need to re-visit the issue. Because the confession to the killing of Synetta Ford is the basis for this conviction and death penalty, we will, however, consider whether his confessions and waivers of his rights were involuntary, unintelligent or unknowing because he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Brown alleges that his defense attorney, who interviewed him on October 29, 1986, had difficulty interviewing him because of his drug intoxication. However, the record indicates that Brown was repeatedly informed of his Miranda right before his confessions. He repeatedly asserted that he understood his rights and signed written waivers of his rights. Toward the end of his confession, he said that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The defendant's physical and mental condition is not the critical question in determining if defendant's statements were voluntary. State v. Schnick, 819 S.W.2d 330, 337 (Mo. banc 1991). The deficient mental condition of a defendant, whether manifested by delusional behavior or a positive drug test, State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Mo. banc 1998), does not by itself render a confession involuntary, as there is no constitutional right to confess, only when totally rational and properly motivated. State v. Lyons, 951 S.W.2d 584, 590 (Mo. banc 1997). If one is informed of his right to remain silent under Miranda, and understands his right to remain silent under Miranda, and thereafter makes voluntary statements, it is absurd to say that such person has not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent. State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Mo. banc 1998). The record sufficiently supports the trial court ruling.