Opinion ID: 4026322
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Removal without Jurisdiction

Text: It is axiomatic that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). We are limited, by Congress and 6 POLO V. INNOVENTIONS INT’L by the Constitution, in the subject matter of cases we may adjudicate. Id. State courts, by contrast, are not so limited. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458–60 (1990). As a result, federal and state courts frequently have concurrent jurisdiction over a given case. See, e.g., id. (concerning federal claims); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 809 (1976) (concerning statelaw claims with diverse parties). When this is so, a plaintiff may choose the court system in which she files suit—she is, as the old maxim declares, “master of [her] case.” See, e.g., Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 1988). The availability of removal is an important check on the plaintiff’s mastery. Removal permits a defendant to bring to federal court a suit initially filed in state court—if the federal court could have exercised original jurisdiction in the first instance. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b).1 Removal is a powerful tool: It operates largely automatically in that once a defendant has filed the appropriate notice of removal in the federal district court removal is a fait accompli. §§ 1446(a), 1447(a), (b). If the removal suffers from procedural defects, the plaintiff is responsible for bringing those defects to the attention of the district court in a timely motion to remand. § 1447(c); Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003). Generally, procedural defects not so raised are waived. See Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 942 (9th Cir. 2006). Defects of subject-matter jurisdiction, however, are another matter. In an ordinary removal case, “[i]f at any time 1 But see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). POLO V. INNOVENTIONS INT’L 7 before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” § 1447(c) (emphasis added). No motion, timely or otherwise, is necessary: ultimate responsibility to ensure jurisdiction lies with the district court. Kelton Arms, 346 F.3d at 1192. Moreover, the district court generally must remand the case to state court, rather than dismiss it. Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997). Remand is the correct remedy because a failure of federal subjectmatter jurisdiction means only that the federal courts have no power to adjudicate the matter. State courts are not bound by the constraints of Article III. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989). The rule that a removed case in which the plaintiff lacks Article III standing must be remanded to state court under § 1447(c) applies as well to a case removed pursuant to CAFA as to any other type of removed case. § 1453(c)(1) (“Section 1447 shall apply to any removal of a case under [CAFA], except . . . section 1447(d) . . . .”); see also Me. Ass’n of Interdependent Neighborhoods v. Comm’r, Me. Dep’t of Human Servs., 876 F.2d 1051, 1053–54 (1st Cir. 1989). Despite this straightforward proposition, Innoventions argues that § 1447(c) should not apply to this case for three reasons. First, Innoventions relies on general maxims in our precedents, such as “a putative class action, once properly removed, stays removed.” See United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union v. Shell Oil Co., 602 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010). Taken at face value, the stated maxim proves too much: It squarely contradicts the statutory language, which provides for remand of CAFA actions on (mostly) the 8 POLO V. INNOVENTIONS INT’L same terms as any other case removed to federal court. See § 1453(c)(1). In context, the quoted statement in United Steel applies only to “post-filing developments,” such as a failure of Rule 23 class certification that might defeat CAFA eligibility. See 602 F.3d at 1091–92 & n.3. Our primary concern in that case was thwarting “jurisdictional ping-pong game[s]” in which parties lob a case back and forth between federal and state courts as post-filing developments occur. See id. at 1090. But when federal jurisdiction is absent from the commencement of a case, a putative class action is not “properly removed”—and therefore need not “stay[] removed.” See id. at 1091, 1092 n.3. This case lacked a named plaintiff with Article III standing, and therefore was not properly removed. Moreover, after remand of this appeal, Polo’s lack of Article III standing will be law of the case.2 Thus, there is no danger of a jurisdictional ping-pong game in this case: this rally has concluded. Second, Innoventions argues that the failure of a claim on the merits does not divest a court of jurisdiction. While this is generally true, see Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946), the point is irrelevant here. The district court expressly determined that Polo’s claims failed for lack of standing. The district court’s factual determinations—that Polo did not have diabetes and that Innoventions did not cause her to stop taking her diabetes medication—could have served as a basis for judgment on the merits of some of her other claims, such as her claim for personal injury. However, as we shall presently explain, Polo’s CLRA claim is independent of those facts. See infra Part II. According to the district court, that 2 See Morris v. Am. Nat’l Can Corp., 988 F.2d 50, 52 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the law-of-the-case doctrine applies just as readily to an issue that was waived as to an issue that was formally presented to the court). POLO V. INNOVENTIONS INT’L 9 claim was rendered “moot” when Innoventions refunded Polo the money she spent on DiabeStevia. It rendered no judgment on the merits of that claim. Finally, Innoventions argues that because Polo’s lack of injury was established as part of the summary-judgment process, it was established at final judgment, rather than “before final judgment” as required by § 1447(c). What the statute requires is remand “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction”—and the district court necessarily must have determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction before entering judgment to that effect.3 Therefore, this case falls within the purview of § 1447(c).