Opinion ID: 2978715
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sentence Is Procedurally Reasonable

Text: Auston’s first challenge to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence is that the district court improperly calculated the Guidelines range. Specifically, Auston argues that the district court incorrectly calculated the drug quantity involved in his crime and that the proper amount was between 50 and 150 kilograms of cocaine, not an amount greater than 150 kilograms as the district court found. Under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2D1.1(c)(1), if Auston’s offense involved the lesser amount, the base offense level would have been 36, as opposed to 38, which would have resulted in a lower Guidelines range. We review a determination of drug quantity for clear error. Jeross, 521 F.3d at 570. The district court’s fact finding must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The district court is authorized to rely on both physical evidence and testimonial evidence to establish the appropriate quantity. Id. “Testimonial evidence from a coconspirator may be sufficient to determine the amount of drugs for which another coconspirator should be held accountable.” Id. (quotation and alteration omitted). In this case, a preponderance of the evidence supports the district court’s finding that Auston was responsible for a quantity of cocaine greater than 150 kilograms. Coconspirator testimony from Harris established that Auston made “about” three deliveries to Dayton, Ohio and “around” three deliveries to Washington, D.C. during his involvement in the conspiracy. Harris Test., Hr’g Tr. of 8 8/30/06, at 1561-62 (Doc. 219). Harris testified that the average shipment size for each trip to Washington, D.C. was not under 35 kilograms and that the average shipment size for Dayton, Ohio was “about 35” kilograms. Harris Test., Hr’g Tr. of 9/6/06, at 2085-86 (Doc. 211). At least one of those shipments to Dayton involved 63 kilograms of cocaine. Given these estimates, a preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that Auston was personally responsible for transporting over 150 kilograms of cocaine. Auston next challenges the district court’s Guidelines calculation by arguing that he deserved a reduction in his offense level for being a minor or minimal participant in the drug conspiracy under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. “Whether a defendant is entitled to a downward offense-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 depends heavily on factual determinations” by the district court, which this court reviews for clear error. United States v. Bailey, 488 F.3d 363, 369 (6th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). Auston “has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to the reduction.” Id. “Defendants may be minimal or minor participants in relation to the scope of the conspiracy as a whole, but they are not entitled to a mitigating role reduction if they are held accountable only for the quantities of drugs attributable to them.” Id. at 369-70 (quotation omitted). The district court did not err in denying Auston a minor-role adjustment. Although the evidence indicates that Auston, as a courier, was a relatively small player in a much larger criminal enterprise, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Auston was himself involved with over 150 kilograms of cocaine and personally delivered that quantity to at least two locations throughout the United States. Thus, despite the fact that Auston may have been a “minor participant[] in relation to the scope of the conspiracy as a whole,” he was not entitled to the reduction under § 3B1.2 9 because the district court held him accountable only for the quantity that he transported. Bailey, 488 F.3d at 369-70.3 Auston additionally claims that the district court erred in failing to consider his age and deteriorating health as a “legitimate basis for downward departure.” Def. Br. at 29. The record clearly contradicts this claim. During sentencing, the district court repeatedly discussed Auston’s age and health as part of its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and in determining whether a below-Guidelines sentence would be appropriate. Auston’s final claim of procedural error—made without citation to the record—is that the district court was constrained by this circuit’s pre-Gall proportionality test and that the district court believed that the Sixth Circuit would reverse on appeal a greater downward variance from the Guidelines range. Although Auston was sentenced on April 2, 2007, more than six months before the Supreme Court’s decision in Gall v. United States, a thorough review of the sentencing materials indicates that the district court was well aware that it was entitled to vary below the recommended Guidelines range and did not believe it was constrained. See Sent. Hr’g Tr. of 2/05/07, at 14 (Doc. 319). First, Auston’s 180-month sentence was 112 months below the bottom of the recommended Guidelines range. Moreover, at no time did the district court indicate that its 112-month variance (or any further variance) would need extraordinary justifications. The district court did not cite Sixth Circuit case law employing a proportionality test or indicate that it was unclear about the extent of its discretion. To the contrary, in fact, the record indicates that the district court went to great lengths 3 Auston also argues that he merited a “downward adjustment of up to 4 levels . . . through Section 2D1.1(a)(3) for defendants who receive a downward adjustment based upon a mitigating role.” Def. Br. at 27. The denial of a reduction under § 3B1.2, however, made him ineligible for a reduction under § 2D1.1(a)(3), which explicitly requires that the defendant have received an adjustment for a mitigating role under § 3B1.2. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3). 10 to ensure that Auston had the benefit of its sentencing discretion, which it considered ample, even informing Auston that he would be well-advised to allow the Probation Office to obtain more information about his background because the more information the district court had “about [Auston], the better job [it could] do in imposing . . . a fair sentence.” Id. at 24. The district court also postponed the final sentencing to allow Auston to sign the proper releases so that the Probation Office could file an amended Presentence Investigation Report with all the relevant information. In sum, the record contains nothing, whether it be a statement or an implication, upon which Auston can base his claim that the district court felt constrained by Sixth Circuit pre-Gall precedent. In conclusion, the district court did not commit procedural error by improperly calculating the recommended Guidelines range or in failing to consider Auston’s health or age. And, for the reasons discussed above, Auston’s sentence was procedurally reasonable.