Opinion ID: 1956574
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Regulating the Time, Place or Manner of Speech

Text: The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that all time, place and manner regulations  that is, regulations addressed not to the content of speech, but to some condition of its occurrence  burden the flow of speech. But it has always been necessary to show more than the existence of such an increased burden. To strike a time, place or manner regulation as violative of the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution, it is necessary to establish that, given the nature of the governmental interests, the regulation unduly burdens protected speech. Mr. Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, has recently reaffirmed this view: Our cases make equally clear, however, that reasonable `time, place and manner' regulations may be necessary to further significant governmental interests, and are permitted.. . . The nature of a place, `the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place and manner that are reasonable.' . . . [I]n assessing the reasonableness of a regulation, we must weigh heavily the fact that communication is involved; the regulation must be narrowly tailored to further the State's legitimate interest. (footnotes omitted) Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2303-04, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (upholding city antinoise ordinance regulating speech on land adjacent to school while school is in session). More recently, Chief Justice Burger, for the Court, reiterated: [a] narrowly drawn ordinance, that does not vest in municipal officials the undefined power to determine what messages residents will hear may serve these important [municipal] interests without running afoul of the First Amendment. Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 617, 96 S.Ct. 1755, 1759, 48 L.Ed.2d 243 (1976) (overturning, as unconstitutionally vague, ordinance conditioning right to solicit door-to-door on giving advance written notice to police). Thus, to pass constitutional muster as a regulation of time, place and manner, Ordinance No. 662 must be narrowly drawn, leav[ing] open ample alternative channels for communications, Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977) citing Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1830, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976), and protecting a significant government or public interest. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 581-582 (1978). It need not be shown that the chosen means is the least restrictive alternative. [2]