Opinion ID: 3133297
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: There are two pertinent legal provisions in this case: Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2(a) and Idaho Code section 18-920(2). Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2(a) outlines the requirements of a no contact order. It states in part: (a) No contact orders issued pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-920 shall be in writing and served on or signed by the defendant. Each judicial district shall adopt by administrative order a form for no contact orders for that district. No contact orders must contain, at a minimum, the following information: (1) The case number, defendant’s name and victim’s name; (2) A distance restriction; (3) That the order will expire at 11:59 p.m. on a specific date, or upon dismissal of the case; (4) An advisory that: (a) A violation of the order may be prosecuted as a separate crime under I.C. § 18-920 for which no bail will be set until an appearance before a judge, and the possible penalties for this 3 crime, (b) The no contact order can only be modified by a judge, and (c) When more that one domestic violence protection order is in place, the most restrictive provision will control any conflicting terms of any other civil or criminal protection order. Whenever a no contact order is issued, modified or terminated by the court, or the criminal case is dismissed the clerk shall give written notification to the records department of the sheriff’s office in the county in which the order was originally issued, immediately. . . . I.C.R. 46.2(a). The relevant provision here is subsection (3): requiring that the no contact order must contain the information “[t]hat the order will expire at 11:59 p.m. on a specific date, or upon dismissal of the case.” I.C.R. 46.2(a)(3). Idaho Code section 18-920(2) makes it a criminal offense to violate a no contact order. A person commits a violation of a no contact order when: (a) A person has been charged or convicted under any offense defined in subsection (1) of this section; 1 and (b) A no contact order has been issued, either by a court or by an Idaho criminal rule; and (c) The person charged or convicted has had contact with the stated person in violation of an order. I.C. § 18-920(2). The relevant provision here is subsection (b): requiring that “[a] no contact order has been issued, either by a court or by an Idaho criminal rule.” I.C. § 18-920(2)(b). In this case, the magistrate judge did not provide a specific expiration date in the no contact order. By failing to do so, the magistrate judge did not comply with Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2(a)(3). We have outlined the requirements of Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2(a)(3) in plain terms, and we have stressed our expectation of compliance. State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 772 & n.1, 229 P.3d 374, 377 & n.1 (2010); State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 175–76, 177 P.3d 387, 389–90 (2008); see also Herren, 157 Idaho at 725, 339 P.3d at 1129 (“Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2 is a procedural rule that sets forth the minimum requirements for a valid no contact order.”) A no 1 Subsection (1) states: When a person is charged with or convicted of an offense under section 18-901, 18-903, 18-905, 18-907, 18-909, 18-911, 18-913, 18-915, 18-918, 18-919, 18-6710, 18-6711, 18-7905, 18-7906 or 39-6312, Idaho Code, or any other offense for which a court finds that a no contact order is appropriate, an order forbidding contact with another person may be issued. A no contact order may be imposed by the court or by Idaho criminal rule. I.C. § 18-920(1). There is no claim in this case that the magistrate court erred by issuing a no contact order for the offenses charged against Hillbroom. 4 contact order should state that it will expire: “at 11:59 p.m. on __________, or upon dismissal of this case, whichever first occurs.” Cobler, 148 Idaho at 772 n.1, 229 P.3d at 377 n.1. Moreover, we have described the important public interests served by the expiration date. Castro, 145 Idaho at 175–76, 177 P.3d at 389–90. The expiration date “alleviate[s] backlogging and confusion.” Id. at 175, 177 P.3d at 389. It also avoids the issuance of no contact orders of “eternal existence” or “enshrined perpetuity.” Id. We urge the lower courts, including the judge in this case, to follow the directive in Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2(a)(3) to provide for a specific expiration date in all no contact orders. Although the magistrate judge failed to comply with Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2(a)(3), the issue before us is not a direct appeal of the error in the issuance of the no contact order. Rather, the issue in this case is whether Hillbroom’s conviction for a violation of a no contact order must be vacated because the underlying no contact order failed to comply with the requirement in Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2(a)(3) for a specific expiration date. We conclude that the failure of the no contact order to comply with Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2(a)(3) does not require us to vacate Hillbroom’s conviction. Statutory interpretation begins with the statute’s plain language. This Court considers the statute as a whole, and gives words their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. When the statute’s language is unambiguous, the legislature’s clearly expressed intent must be given effect, and we do not need to go beyond the statute’s plain language to consider other rules of statutory construction. State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3, 343 P.3d 30, 32 (2015) (citations omitted). Here, the no contact order element in Idaho Code section 18-920(2)(b) is stated in the disjunctive: “[a] no contact order has been issued, either by a court or by an Idaho criminal rule.” I.C. § 18-920(2)(b) (emphasis added). This language is unambiguous. The use of “or” indicates two alternatives, distinct from one another. See Herren, 157 Idaho at 726, 339 P.3d at 1130. Thus, the statute contemplates two types of no contact orders subject to prosecution for a violation thereof: (1) no contact orders issued by the court and (2) no contact orders issued by operation of an Idaho Criminal Rule. However, we have not adopted an Idaho Criminal Rule that would automatically issue a no contact order. Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2(a) only instructs the court on the proper procedures to issue a no contact order. But, even though we do not have an Idaho Criminal Rule that automatically issues no contact orders, a no contact order “issued . . . by the court” is sufficient under the plain language of Idaho Code section 18-920(2)(b). In this case, the magistrate court clearly issued an order prohibiting Hillbroom from contacting the victim. This 5 action satisfies Idaho Code section 18-920(2)(b). We affirm Hillbroom’s conviction for violation of a no contact order. Finally, we acknowledge that Hillbroom, represented by counsel, had at least three opportunities to bring the blank expiration date to the attention of the magistrate court or the district court, but he never notified the lower courts of this error based on the record before us. Hillbroom’s remedy for this error was to seek modification of the no contact order and request a specific date of expiration.