Opinion ID: 1999861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The question thus posed is whether, absent statutory preclusion, life insurance proceeds payable to a decedent's estate are subject to costs of administration thereof.

Text: The guardian-conservator claims this question must be resolved adverse to administrator-attorney by reason of these pronouncements in the case of In re Estate of Galloway, 222 Iowa 159, 161, 269 N.W. 7, 8 (1936): `   Life insurance payable to personal representatives or to the estate, while, from legal logic or necessity, a part of the estate, is by force of the statute, held by the personal representatives in trust for distribution to the statutory beneficiaries. The personal representatives collect it, not for administration generally, but for the purpose of distribution to particular beneficiaries, in obedience to statutory command. Testator knew that his life insurance was exempt from use in payment of debts, and knew that, under the law, in the absence of a will or agreement or assignment to the contrary, it would inure to the benefit of his widow. It is not to be lightly inferred that testator regarded his life insurance as part of his estate in the sense that it should be distributed to his creditors, in preference to his widow, or that he intended that his widow should forego the right or expectation which, under the law and its policy, and in pursuance of ordinary family prudence and foresight, she would have in it.' Thus we find this court has said that life insurance passes to the estate for the purpose of distribution to the beneficiaries. It is exempt under the statute from the payment of decedent's debts. The personal representative, or the estate, holds the money received from life insurance policies, in trust for the benefit of those designated to receive it under the statute. It does not come to the estate for the purpose of paying the debts of the personal representative, or the costs of administration, but purely as a trust fund, to be distributed to the beneficiary specified in the statute. See also In re Estate of Clemens, 226 Iowa 31, 36, 282 N.W. 730 (1938). Inceptionally we find no basis upon which to fault the foregoing statement regarding debts or rights of creditors. But as to both last cited cases reference to costs of administration is first dictum and next overlooks the clear-cut distinction noted in Cory, supra. Furthermore, a duly appointed executor is a fiduciary, thus frequently referred to as a trustee for all parties interested in an estate. See In re Estate of Swanson, 239 Iowa 294, 302, 31 N.W.2d 385 (1948); 31 Am.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 2; 33 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 142. See also Restatement, Second, Trusts § 6. This court has also held, in the field of statutory construction, legislative intent is expressed by omission as well as by inclusion. Stated otherwise, the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others. See Richardson v. City of Jefferson, 257 Iowa 709, 715, 134 N.W.2d 528 (1965). And as heretofore indicated, no statute has been cited and we find none foreclosing payment of reasonable costs, fees and expenses out of insurance proceeds paid to a decedent's estate. Moreover, decedent's surviving children do benefit by the collection, processing, accounting for and general administration of any such insurance derived funds. We therefore now hold trial court, sitting in probate, correctly ordered payment of costs, fees and expenses attendant upon administration of this decedent's estate, to the extent reasonably necessary, out of funds received by the estate from any carrier of insurance on decedent's life. All prior holdings by this court to the contrary are, to that extent, hereby overruled. Affirmed.