Opinion ID: 212993
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Werra's Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in 63 Menlo Street

Text: Whether a defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular place is a two-pronged inquiry. We consider first, whether the movant has exhibited an actual, subjective, expectation of privacy; and second, whether such subjective expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable. Rheault, 561 F.3d at 59. The inquiry is necessarily fact-dependent, taking into consideration the nature of the searched location, and using our prior decisions for guidance. Id.; see also United States v. Beaudoin, 362 F.3d 60, 70 (1st Cir.2004) (Fourth Amendment analysis is renownedly fact specific....), vacated on other grounds by Champagne v. United States, 543 U.S. 1102, 125 S.Ct. 1025, 160 L.Ed.2d 1009 (2005) (mem.). As the district court recognized, Werra's privacy interest in the foyer of 63 Menlo Street is linked to the proper characterization of the building itself. Werra, 2008 WL 4280035, at . As the resident of a dwelling that is akin to a traditional home, id. at , he would possess a reasonable expectation of privacy throughout the interior of the premises. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371 ([T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.); United States v. Weidul, 325 F.3d 50, 52 n. 1 (1st Cir.2003) (noting that a defendant who was staying or living with a friend had an expectation of privacy in the friend's home). If the residence were comparable to a multi-unit apartment building, however, with [d]istinct, complete living spaces, Werra, 2008 WL 4280035, at , Werra's privacy interest would not extend to common areas such as the foyer. See, e.g., Rheault, 561 F.3d at 59 (noting well settled precedent that `a tenant lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building' (quoting United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir.1998))); United States v. Brown, 169 F.3d 89, 92 (1st Cir.1999) (rejecting Fourth Amendment claim based on officer's entry into the lobby of apartment building). The district court aptly observed that 63 Menlo Street does not fit squarely into the paradigm for either a traditional family home or a multi-unit apartment building. Werra, 2008 WL 4280035, at . Although it is a single-family structure, the residents were not a traditional single family occupying the house together. As other courts have held with respect to rooming houses and fraternities, however, an unconventional household does not necessarily diminish the protection afforded the residents of the house. See, e.g., Reardon v. Wroan, 811 F.2d 1025, 1027 n. 2 (7th Cir.1987) (noting that fraternity members could best be characterized as `roommates in the same house,' not simply co-tenants sharing certain common areas); State v. Titus, 707 So.2d 706, 708 (Fla.1998) (The mere fact that certain rooms traditionally associated with a home are shared by rooming house residents does not render the structure any less a home to those residents.); People v. Garriga, 189 A.D.2d 236, 596 N.Y.S.2d 25, 28 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) ([E]xisting precedent, although sparse, supports the conclusion that the internal hallway area of this rooming house was part of the defendant's home for Fourth Amendment purposes.). But see, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 533 F.2d 1210, 1214 (D.C.Cir.1976) (holding that appellant's constitutionally protected privacy interest began at the door to [his] room ... rather than at the door to the entire rooming house). [8] Thus, we agree with the district court that, unlike the typical expectation-of-privacy inquiry, which focuses solely on the particular location in which the evidence the defendant seeks to suppress was found, see, e.g., United States v. Bucci, 582 F.3d 108, 116 (1st Cir.2009) (front of home, as viewed by video camera); Rheault, 561 F.3d at 59 (third-floor landing of the front stairway); United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, 22 (1st Cir.2005) (gun case), we must conduct a broader examination of Werra's and the other tenants' living arrangements throughout 63 Menlo Street. If they lived separately like apartment dwellersthey could not claim the common areas of the house, including the foyer, as their private space vis-a-vis outsiders. However, if they did not live in individualized residences within the houseand were thus more like the occupants of a single-family hometheir right to privacy vis-a-vis outsiders would begin at 63 Menlo Street's front door. Under the latter scenario, the officers would have violated Werra's reasonable expectation of privacy by forcibly entering the house. We thus also agree with the district court that the relevant considerations for our inquiry include whether the building contains recognizably separate living units, the residents' right to exclude others from parts of the building, the number of residents, and the formal legal relationship among them. Werra, 2008 WL 4280035, at -5. Other facts that shed light on how the tenants viewed the dwelling, including the tenants' customary use of various spaces within the premises, also are pertinent in evaluating their subjective expectation of privacy. We think it of particular note that, unlike an apartment building in which tenants contract individually with the landlord, 63 Menlo Street was rented as a whole by Cicerano. He described it as my house at the suppression hearing and, indeed, Cicerano reported that he paid most of the $3,000 rentthough everybody pitched in. The district court listed about a half-dozen individuals who were living in the residence at the time of the police entry. They were not related Cicerano, in fact, did not know the last name of a tenant named Paulbut they were also not thrown together randomly. Cicerano explained that the residents were basically just friends trying to make it through ... [n]ot living on the street. The operation of 63 Menlo Street was thus in some respects a collective undertaking, with both the financial arrangements and the informal relationship among the residents suggestive of a single household. The residents' use of the house points in the same direction. Werra paid rent specifically for the third floor, which contained a bathroom and a kitchenette, and it apparently could have been used as a self-contained unit. At the time of the police entry, however, Werra was not the only person to regularly make use of the third floor, and he did not live solely within it. Werra testified that he had spent [m]any nights sleeping on a couch in the living room on the first floor because when I was up on the third floor, everybody wanted to come up on the third floor. Other testimony from Werra and Cicerano, although not fully consistent, also indicated that neither Werra nor the other tenants viewed the third floor as an independent living unit at the time the officers entered the house. Werra acknowledged that the third floor was his own personal space, but said that he had been paying rent for that space only until his girlfriend moved out at the end of October. [9] He testified that, more recently, he had been sleeping in the living room. He explained that he did not have a bed on the third flooronly a pull out couchand said he and his brother moved furniture into the living room so he could stay there. Cicerano confirmed that Werra relocated to the living room because the third floor was at times taken over by others, although he described Werra's relocation as intermittent rather than ongoing. He testified that Werra once in a while slept in the living room because there was a lot of partying basically, and a lot of people went to the third floor, so when he wanted to sleep, sometimes he'd go in there. Cicerano reported that the third floor had a door and that Werra had the ability to keep people out, but he also indicated that it would have been difficult for Werra to exclude others on the night before the November 10 incident because the first floor was shut down in the aftermath of Cicerano's mother's funeral. [10] Taken as a whole, the evidence regarding Werra's use of the living room showed that he slept there at least intermittently, with Cicerano's consent but at Werra's own discretion. Although the record contains no direct evidence about Werra's use of the downstairs kitchen and the other bathrooms in the house, Cicerano stated that people would sometimes congregate in the kitchen that adjoined Cicerano's bedroom on the first floor. Given his proximity to the downstairs kitchen when he was sleeping in the living room, it is a fair inference that Werra was at times part of such a group. In addition, when Werra was asked at the suppression hearing to confirm that there was a bathroom on the third floor, he noted that bathrooms also were located on the first and second floorsindicating that he had used them instead of bothering to climb up the stairs. [11] Not all rooms, however, were open to all tenants. Cicerano had a lock on his bedroom door, and he rarely allowed others to use the adjacent living room because he did not want to be disturbed when he was sleeping. Like Werra, other tenants were assigned specific rooms; Cicerano testified, for example, that Paul rented a room on the second floor. Yet, on balance, Cicerano's and Werra's testimony indicates that the tenants shared the house in much the same way as would a traditional family. Offspring in a single-family home may at times lock bedroom doors or post do not enter signs aimed at excluding their siblings and parents from their assigned rooms. And, just as occurs in the traditional family context, the supposed exclusivity of personal space at 63 Menlo Streetat least with respect to Werra's third-floor quarterswas not always respected. Werra's co-tenants were undeterred by the door to the third floor when that space was needed for their comfort and enjoyment. Werra behaved similarly, claiming alternative space in the house when the third floor was targeted by others. Though Cicerano limited access to the living room to suit his needs, the record shows that the tenants shared use of the first-floor kitchen and the second- and third-floor bathrooms. These circumstances are a far cry from a typical apartment building setting, where tenants live within discrete units and use common spaces, such as hallways and basements, primarily for storage or access to the outside. In analyzing whether Werra had demonstrated that 63 Menlo Street was sufficiently like a traditional home to give him an expectation of privacy in relation to outsiders throughout the premises, the district court began by noting that the evidence lacked many details concerning the rights of the residents within the building and the relationships among those who lived there. Werra, 2008 WL 4280035, at . [12] The court observed that the third floor appear[ed] to have been an independent living unit from which Werra could exclude others, and it stated that Werra had no reasonable expectations of privacy in the foyer because others over whom he had no control could pass through it without his permission. Id. The court concluded its analysis by noting that Werra's expectation of privacy in the living room was limited to the permission for use granted by Cicerano. Id. The government urges us to adopt the district court's conclusion that the absence of ... key facts means that Werra failed to carry his burden of showing that 63 Menlo Street was equivalent to a traditional home. Id. We agree that the record was less than ideal. That the evidence could have been stronger, however, does not make it inadequate. As we have described, the facts found by the district court indicate that day-to-day living for the tenants at 63 Menlo Street, including Werra, occurred throughout the house. Although the record does not show that the unrelated individuals who resided at 63 Menlo Street behaved like a traditional family, it does show that they were not merely co-tenants who passed through the common spaces of the house on the way to and from their independent pursuits. Rather, like the fraternity members described in Reardon, the residents of 63 Menlo Street could best be characterized as `roommates in the same house,' not simply co-tenants sharing certain common areas. 811 F.2d at 1027 n. 2. Indeed, the residents at 63 Menlo Street were all living with Cicerano, in his house, as part of a nontraditional single-family household. As Cicerano put it, Werra stayed at my house, he lived at my house. The district court's analysis does not address the facts showing that 63 Menlo Street was operated as a single household, including Cicerano's notable testimony that he paid most of the rent. The court's finding that Werra could have lived independently and excluded others from the third floor is correct, but that theoretical arrangement did not reflect the evidence on how Werra and the other residents actually lived. Although the dissent focuses on the discrepancy between Werra's and Cicerano's testimony about how frequently Werra slept in the living room, the analysis is the same whether Werra did so intermittently or [m]any nights; the fact remains that it was an ordinary occurrence for others to use the third floor and for Werra to relocate to the living room. Moreover, Werra testified that his brother helped him move furniture into the living room, conduct that shows a belief that he had a personal claim to the spacealbeit a claim that was subject to the quiet use that was demanded by Cicerano. [13] The government cites no case in which a resident of a single-family structure was found to lack a reasonable expectation of privacy, relative to outsiders, in the common areas of his or her house. Instead, it points to inapposite cases involving duplexes or larger buildings in which tenants lived in separate, fully self-contained units. Similarly, the district court mistakenly adopted the frame of reference for multi-unit buildings in observing that Werra lacked a privacy interest in the foyer because others living in the house could pass through the entryway without his permission. The inability to exclude cohabitants from shared spaces within a traditional home does not on its own eliminate a resident's privacy interest in keeping outsiders from barging through the front door. Individuals routinely bring friends into their homes without the consent of every family member who resides there, and such unilateral decisions do not convert the hallway or entrance of a private home into a public space. There is no evidence that people who did not live at 63 Menlo Street routinely entered without the consent of a resident, which might have undermined the presumption of privacy that normally attends the interior of a residence. [14] In sum, based on the facts of record, we conclude that Werra has met his burden to show that he possessed a subjective expectation of privacy in the foyer of 63 Menlo Streetor, more specifically, that he believed the entire house, and not just the third floor, served as his home and, hence, that he could prevent the entry of anyone whom he and his housemates wished to keep out. We further conclude that, on this record, Werra's expectation of privacy was reasonable. A resident of a single-family structure who shares living arrangements as did the tenants of 63 Menlo Street could reasonably expect that his right to privacy begins at the front door. See Titus, 707 So.2d at 708 (holding that, just like private homeowners, rooming house residents have an actual expectation of privacy in the common areas of the rooming house and that given the sanctity of the home, society is prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable). [15] Because Werra had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the foyer, he is entitled to challenge the officers' forcible, warrantless entry into the house. The government claims that the officers lawfully entered to execute the arrest warrant for Daley. We now turn to that contention.