Opinion ID: 201959
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intervention by the Secretary

Text: 25 Finally, Taylor and Migliore claim that the Secretary's decision not to intervene in their cases violated the SWDA, because under that statute the Secretary has no discretion whether to enforce if a violation is found. Appellees, however, state that this is a non-issue, arguing that the Secretary's decision on whether to intervene is unreviewable by this Court under the Supreme Court's decision in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). In that case, the Supreme Court held that an agency's decision not to take requested action where the action is committed to agency discretion by law is presumptively unreviewable (quoting the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)). The Court stated that review is not to be had in such instances because a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830, 105 S.Ct. 1649. 26 The appellants, in response, argue that the Court in Heckler also stated that the presumption of unreviewability may be rebutted where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers. Id. at 832-33, 105 S.Ct. 1649. In other words, where there is a sufficient or meaningful standard provided in the governing statute, courts have something against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion, and judicial review is allowed. Massachusetts Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 852 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830, 105 S.Ct. 1649). The appellants point to 42 U.S.C. § 6971(b) as providing a standard sufficient to guide judicial review in this case. 27 The key question, then, is whether a meaningful standard exists here against which we can judge the Secretary's decision not to intervene in the appellants' cases. Id. We need not resolve such a question, however, for even assuming that the appellants are correct and that 42 U.S.C. § 6971(b) provides such a standard, we find, after undertaking the requisite judicial review, that the Secretary's refusal to intervene in this instance was proper. 28 As we have already mentioned, appellants argue that where violations of the SWDA's employee protection provision have been found, the Secretary is required to act. In support of their argument, they cite to the text of 42 U.S.C. § 6971(b): 29 [Upon receipt of a complaint, the Secretary of Labor shall cause such investigation to be made as he deems appropriate.]. . . Upon receiving the report of such investigation, the Secretary of Labor shall make findings of fact. If he finds that such violation did occur, he shall issue a decision, incorporating an order therein and his findings, requiring the party committing such violation to take such affirmative action to abate the violation as the Secretary of Labor deems appropriate.... 30 42 U.S.C. § 6971(b). Appellants are arguing, in other words, that once a violation is found, the Secretary has no discretion—he has mandatory duties that he must perform. To emphasize the mandatory nature of the Secretary's duties, appellants point to how in the section cited, Congress used the word shall to describe the Secretary's obligations no less than seven times (with the appellants citing instances not quoted in the above paragraph). They also note that the word `shall' is ordinarily the `language of command' (quoting Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153, 121 S.Ct. 2079, 150 L.Ed.2d 188 (2001)). 31 Appellants are correct that there is a procedure that the Secretary is required to follow in dealing with whistleblower complaints. Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations, pt. 24 implements the employee protection provision provided for in the SWDA, 42 U.S.C. § 6971, and provides procedures for Labor Department officials to follow when they receive a whistleblower complaint. The regulations appoint the Assistant Secretary to act for the Secretary and to undertake and complete an investigation within thirty days of the receipt of a complaint. 29 C.F.R. 24.4(d)(1). If the Assistant Secretary finds a violation, he is to issue a notice of determination that includes, among other things, an order requiring the party at fault to abate the violation. Any order, however, is only preliminary at the time the notice of determination is released. According to the regulations, any party desiring review of the determination or any part thereof is required to file a request for a hearing with the Chief Administrative Law Judge within five business days. If a request for a hearing is timely filed, the notice of determination of the Assistant Secretary shall be inoperative, and shall become operative only if the case is later dismissed. See 29 C.F.R. § 24.4(d)(1) & (2). When the notice of determination becomes inoperative, so does any order contained within it. 32 In the instant case, the Assistant Secretary, as per the regulations, made his determinations that there had been violations of the SWDA with regard to Taylor and Migliore and included orders requiring RIDEM to abate those violations. RIDEM, however, disagreed with the Assistant Secretary and therefore decided to appeal the determinations before an ALJ. When RIDEM filed these appeals, the determinations of the Assistant Secretary (including the orders accompanying them) automatically became inoperative. See 29 C.F.R. § 24.4(d)(1) & (2). Thus, the appellants are correct—that if the Assistant Secretary finds that a violation [of the SWDA] did occur, he shall issue a decision incorporating [his] findings and either order relief or dismiss the complaint. Appellant Br. 14 (citing to 42 U.S.C. § 6971(b)). We find that the Assistant Secretary performed his mandatory duty here. 33 However, the Assistant Secretary [or his boss, the Secretary] was not required to do more than this. As we have stated, once the Assistant Secretary issues his determinations and any orders, his mandatory duties are at an end. It then becomes the responsibility of the parties, if they disagree with either those determinations or the accompanying orders, to appeal to the Chief Administrative Law Judge for a hearing. If such a hearing takes place, the Assistant Secretary is permitted to intervene at [his] discretion, but nothing requires him to do so. See 29 C.F.R. 24.6(f)(1). We find, therefore, that the Assistant Secretary was not required to intervene in the ALJ proceedings in this case. 34 In the alternative, appellants concede that the Secretary [or through her, the Assistant Secretary] had broad discretion to determine whether or not to intervene. They contend, however, that when the Secretary exercised that discretion, she was required to provide an explanation for her decision. Here, appellants claim, such an explanation was absent. We find, however, nothing in either the controlling statute or the regulations that requires the Secretary or the Assistant Secretary to explain his or her reasons, and we decline to read such a requirement into these authorities. 9 Although the Assistant Secretary must provide a statement of reasons when he issues his initial determination, he is not required to issue such a statement when he refuses to intervene before an ALJ.