Opinion ID: 1703787
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Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Concerning Contributory Negligence

Text: Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in finding that decedent was contributorily negligent at the time of his fatal accident. He generally claims this finding was not supported by the record, and the State did not meet its burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence as required by section 619.17 of the Iowa Code. In its finding of fact the trial court generally stated that the decedent was contributorily negligent at the time of the accident causing his death. The court made no specific findings of contributory negligence; however, it did find that decedent was intoxicated and that his intoxication contributed to the accident. The court also discussed evidence that led to its conclusion that decedent did not attempt to avoid the barricade which should have been visible to him some 250-300 feet before he hit it. Plaintiff claims the fact that decedent had been drinking or even that he was intoxicated does not constitute contributory negligence. We do not disagree with this limited statement. Our previous decisions clearly point out that the act of driving while intoxicated in violation of Iowa Code section 321.281 is not negligent per se and thus not conclusive evidence of contributory negligence so as to bar recovery. Yost v. Miner, 163 N.W.2d 557, 561 (Iowa 1968); Chandler v. Harger, 253 Iowa 565, 571-72, 113 N.W.2d 250, 253 (1954); Nicholson v. City of Des Moines, 246 Iowa 318, 324, 67 N.W.2d 533, 537 (1954). A drunken driver may be found negligent and barred from recovery if his intoxicated condition is translated into outward conduct which is negligent and bears a causal relation to his injury. Yost, 163 N.W.2d at 561. The matter of intoxication and its causal relationship to the injury are questions that must be decided by the factfinder. Id. Although the trial court found intoxication and causation, it did not label the intoxication as per se negligent conduct. Instead it carefully quoted from Yost (quoting Nicholson ) that intoxication is not conclusive evidence of contributory negligence, but it is admissible as a circumstance showing a lack of due care. We conclude that the trial court did not misapply the law in this instance. Plaintiff also claims the trial court misplaced the burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence. Although the court did not specifically refer to the respective burdens of proof on the parties in its finding of fact, in paragraph 8 it stated the court now concludes that the defense of contributory negligence is available to the defendant. From this statement we conclude that the trial court treated contributory negligence as a defense available to the defendant rather than a matter the plaintiff must disprove. Likewise, the court's reference to the absence of skid marks does not indicate it shifted the burden of proof on contributory negligence to the plaintiff. While there was no direct testimony about skid marks, plaintiff placed into evidence numerous photographs taken at the scene shortly after the accident, an officer's report, and a detailed diagram of the accident scene. Testimony indicated that the motorcycle headlight was on high beam, visibility was clear and the roadway was dry. It further showed that prior to reaching the barricade in question, a westbound motorist would have to zigzag through two staggered partial barricades. On the night of the accident, the fatal barricade was visible from a distance of 250-300 feet away. There was room on either side of the barricade to drive around it. This had been the usual practice of other motorists. The evidence also indicates decedent's motorcycle hit and crashed through the barricade near the middle of the north half of the highway causing a concrete piece weighing about 4000 pounds to be pushed back 10 feet by the impact. The motorcycle was demolished and decedent was thrown 100 feet beyond the barricade. Plaintiff's own evidence indicated that if decedent had seen the barricade at 217 feet away he would have had 3.75 seconds of time for evasive action if his speed was 40 miles per hour, 2.9 seconds at 50 miles per hour and 2.46 seconds at 60 miles per hour. The trial court considering all these exhibits and the circumstances of the accident had substantial evidence to conclude there were no skid marks and decedent did not take evasive action to avoid the barricade. We do not agree that the trial court shifted the burden of proof of contributory negligence to the plaintiff. Neither do we agree with the contention that there is not substantial support in the record for the trial court's findings. Findings of fact by the trial court in an action at law are binding upon the appellate court if supported by substantial evidence. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(1). There is ample evidence to support the trial court's finding that the decedent failed to exercise ordinary care and, further, that this failure contributed to both the accident and his subsequent death. We have considered all of the arguments of the parties, even though we have not addressed each one specifically. We hold that the trial court did not commit reversible error. AFFIRMED.