Opinion ID: 173187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: brady challenge

Text: The Brady doctrine protects a defendant's due-process right to a fair trial by ensuring that the prosecution does not conceal evidence that could warrant an acquittal. To establish a Brady violation, the defendant must prove that the prosecution suppressed evidence, the evidence was favorable to the defense, and the evidence was material. United States v. Erickson, 561 F.3d 1150, 1163 (10th Cir. 2009). Impeachment evidence, ... as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Burke, 571 F.3d 1048, 1053 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). [E]vidence significantly enhancing the quality of the impeachment evidence usually will [be material]. Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1174 (10th Cir.2009). Although Brady claims typically arise from nondisclosure of facts that occurred before trial, they can be based on nondisclosure of favorable evidence (such as impeachment evidence) that is unavailable to the government until trial is underway. See id. at 1173 (the government's disclosure duty continues throughout the judicial process.); Smith v. Roberts, 115 F.3d 818, 819, 820 (10th Cir.1997) (applying Brady to a claim that the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence received after trial but while the case was on direct appeal). Defendant claims that the government violated his rights under Brady by not disclosing that Williams and Watts had shared a cell during trial. He contends that this is material impeachment evidence with which he could have undermine[d] the witnesses' credibility based on their opportunity for collusion or fabrication. Aplt. Br. at 30. In district court, however, Defendant did not raise a Brady claim, only a claim of a violation of Rule 615 and the court's order under that rule. Our review is therefore for plain error. See United States v. Redcorn, 528 F.3d 727, 744 (10th Cir.2008). To prevail, Defendant must show that (1) there was error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Fields, 516 F.3d 923, 943 (10th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). He cannot surmount even the first requirement. Because there was no Brady violation, we reject his claim. Defendant's Brady claim fails because he has not shown that the undisclosed information is material. As the district court found, there was no evidence (1) that Williams and Watts had discussed the case or (2) that their testimony had been affected by any impermissible conversations between them. Absent such evidence, there is no reasonable probability that disclosure to Defendant of the cell-sharing arrangement would have changed the trial's outcome. Although Defendant has suggested that it is inconceivable that Williams and Watts did not discuss their testimony while confined together, their affidavits state that they had been instructed by the prosecutor not to discuss their testimony with each other, and both denied having done so. Moreover, Watts's testimony is consistent with her pretrial statements to investigators, and Defendant does not allege that the cell-sharing had tainted the testimony of Williams, who testified first. At oral argument in this court, defense counsel suggested that the two witnesses could have discussed Williams's testimony and realized that it had some gaps, so that Watts would have to engage in cleanup when she testified. But the record reveals no such cleanup in which Watts expanded upon her pretrial statements. In support of her suggestion, counsel contended that Watts, despite having told law-enforcement officers that it was Taylor who said that Greany must be killed, testified at trial that the statement had been made by Defendant. The transcript of proceedings, however, does not support this contention. At trial Watts testified that while the group was driving Greany to the murder site, [Taylor] had a knife and she talked to [Defendant] and saidshe said, I am going to have to kill him. R. Vol. 3, Part 3 at 536. On cross-examination Watts again attributed the remark to Taylor. It would have been better if Defendant had been informed during trial of the cell-sharing by the two eyewitnesses testifying against him. But this lapse did not deny him due process.