Opinion ID: 2211822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: circuit court's determination of competency

Text: ¶ 46. Having examined the threshold issue, standard of review, we now turn to the second issue by examining the circuit court's determination that Byrge was competent to stand trial. Under the standard that applies to competency determinations, we will not reverse the circuit court's decision unless it was clearly erroneous. Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 223-24. ¶ 47. The only witness to testify at Byrge's hearing was Dr. Baker, the court-appointed psychiatrist who conducted the competency evaluation of Byrge. [19] Byrge, however, asks this court also to review the reports submitted by Drs. Lorenz and Fosdal. We decline to do so. Both Drs. Lorenz and Fosdal conducted their evaluations for the NGI pleas; they did not examine Byrge for the purposes of a competency determination. [20] An examination for purposes of NGI considers the ability of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct or to conform the defendant's conduct with the requirements of law at the time of the commission of the criminal offense. Wis. Stat. § 971.16(3). An evaluation for competency to stand trial assesses the defendant's present mental capacity to understand the proceedings and assist in his or her defense. Wis. Stat. § 971.14(3)(c). [15-17] ¶ 48. The aims of a competency hearing are modest, seeking to verify that the defendant can satisfy the understand-and-assist test. See Moran, 509 U.S. at 402. The hearing need not establish a psychiatric classification of the defendant's condition. Id. Section 971.13(1) contemplates a judicial, not a clinical, inquiry, [21] and our courts treat competency to stand trial as a legal standard, not a medical determination. See Haskins, 62 Wis. 2d at 265. Elaborate psychiatric evaluations sometimes introduce a clinical diagnosis that may not speak to competency to proceed. Id. at 264-65. A history of irrational behavior and prior medical opinions about a defendant's condition, like a defendant's demeanor, can serve as indicia in the competency determination. Drope, 420 U.S. at 180. But clinical reports occasionally state that a defendant is incompetent when what really was meant was merely that the defendant had some mental illness which required treatment. Haskins, 62 Wis. 2d at 265. [18] ¶ 49. Even if a defendant has suffered past psychiatric episodes, he or she nonetheless may evince sufficient present ability to proceed. See Haskins, 62 Wis. 2d at 263 (quoting Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402). Consequently, a court looks at the defendant's present mental capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel at the time of the proceedings. Wis. Stat. § 971.14(3)(c); McKnight, 65 Wis. 2d at 595; see also Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 222-23. ¶ 50. In this case Byrge essentially asks this court to inject a medical determination into the legal standard. He argues that the circuit court should have found him incompetent to proceed because he suffered from psychological, mental, and psychiatric problems. We decline to do so. Dr. Baker recognized the distinction between the medical classification and legal competency to proceed. He interviewed Byrge twice  once for the NGI evaluation and later for competency to stand trial. He differentiated between the two types of evaluations when he noted that his first examination measured mental responsibility, whereas the competency evaluation determined if Byrge could cooperate with counsel and assist with his own defense. ¶ 51. Baker concluded that Byrge was able to understand the proceedings and assist in the defense. He found Byrge was not mentally ill or malingering, he simply was distressed at the number of things that occurred in jail and the possibility of the trial. Baker testified that Byrge was aware of both the charges against him and the many factors involved in the legal process. Although Baker agreed Byrge might be suicidal or depressed, he testified that the condition did not affect legal competency because Byrge was not unable to cooperate with his attorney or in any way function at the trial. ¶ 52. The circuit court concluded that the State had proven that Byrge was competent because he had substantial capacity to understand the proceedings and assist in his own defense. The court addressed the credibility and demeanor of the witness and of the defendant. Emphasizing its confidence in Baker's abilities, his testimony in numerous past cases, and his credentials, the circuit court stated that it could listen to Baker's telephone testimony and make a determination without look[ing] in his eyes. Byrge was present at the hearing, shackled to a wheelchair. The court noted the constraints on Byrge's physical liberty and did not discount them in its competency determination. The record makes no indication that Byrge was agitated or disruptive during the proceeding. [19] ¶ 53. The findings of the circuit court are supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker and the circuit court's observation of Byrge's demeanor. Based on the record before us, we find that the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it found Byrge competent to stand trial. We therefore decline to second-guess the factual determination of the circuit court.