Opinion ID: 1962322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Indemnity and contribution

Text: The Bankses seek indemnification from Holcomb on the theory that Holcomb is liable for breach of implied warranty, while the Bankses are liable only for negligence. Holcomb seeks contribution from the Bankses because the jury apportioned their total negligence in the proportions of 60% to the Bankses and 40% to Holcomb. The trial court agreed with Holcomb and ordered judgment for Holcomb for contribution from the Bankses in the amount of 60% of the Dongos' judgment against it. Both the Dongos [5] and the Bankses cross-appeal on this issue. Like the analogous issue of comparative fault between a negligent plaintiff and a defendant liable for breach of implied warranty, the issue of contribution or indemnity between one defendant liable in negligence and a co-defendant liable for breach of implied warranty is one that has not heretofore been decided in Maine, although it has been addressed in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division, Package Machinery Co., 70 Ill.2d 1, 15 Ill. Dec. 829, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977); cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946, 98 S.Ct. 2849, 56 L.Ed.2d 787 (1978). As with the preceding issue, we find on examination of the record that the Bankses did not at trial preserve the issue for appellate review. As discussed in the preceding section, counsel for the Bankses [6] agreed that the comparative negligence act applied to the warranty claim against Holcomb, as well as to the negligence claim. The form special verdicts first submitted to the jury contained no question on the apportionment of fault between the co-defendants, Holcomb and the Bankses. Immediately after the jury returned its special verdicts, finding inter alia that Holcomb was guilty of breach of implied warranty, the justice, without any further conference of record with counsel, submitted an additional interrogatory asking the jury to apportion negligence between Holcomb and the Bankses according to a scale on which their combined negligence was represented by 100%. Counsel for the Bankses made no reservation against the application of the same principle of comparative fault as between the co-defendants as was by the special verdict form to be applied between the plaintiffs (including Douglas Banks) and defendant Holcomb. It would be anomalous if contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiffs was by agreement to reduce or defeat their implied warranty claims against Holcomb, but co-defendant Bankses' contributing fault was to be disregarded in deciding indemnification and contribution claims between the Bankses and Holcomb. [7] The defendant Bankses would be put in a better position than the plaintiff Dongos. This patent anomaly leads us to conclude, in the absence of any reservation made promptly to the contrary, that counsel understood, and at least acquiesced, that the comparative fault principle should in this case be applied also to the contribution-indemnification questions, whatever the basis of Holcomb's liability. In light of the discussions had earlier between the court and counsel in which all agreed that plaintiffs' contributing negligence was to be compared with Holcomb's fault in breach of implied warranty, the Bankses had a duty to speak up if they wished to assert a different controlling principle as between co-defendants. They did finally speak up in a memorandum filed in support of their motion for judgment long after trial, but that came too late for the submission of any further interrogatories to the jury. Cf. Reville v. Reville, Me., 289 A.2d 695 (1972) (appellant foreclosed from raising constitutional issue for first time on appeal because of absence of opportunity for trial court to make appropriate subsidiary findings of fact). The Bankses' failure to raise their present contention in timely fashion at trial forecloses our consideration of it on appeal. See Century Homes, Inc. v. Plaisted, supra .