Opinion ID: 2621092
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Relating to the Testimony of Eyewitness Paul Pridgon

Text: Before Pridgon testified, defendant requested that a psychiatrist be present in court during Pridgon's testimony to determine whether he had the capacity to perceive and recollect. Defendant later withdrew his request and agreed with the court that the issue whether Pridgon's capacity to perceive and recollect was impaired was a matter of impeachment pursuant to Evidence Code section 780. Neither party requested a hearing outside the jury to determine whether Pridgon was qualified to testify. On cross-examination, Pridgon testified that when Simms was lying on the ground after defendant had struck her, Pridgon saw and heard blood flow from her head, which sounded [l]ike somebody pouring water in a cup. He also said that he knows how money sounds. Defendant impeached Pridgon with his preliminary hearing testimony, including the fact that Pridgon failed to mention previously that defendant strangled Simms. When Pridgon testified at trial that he told the investigator about the strangling, he told defense counsel to confirm the strangling with the pathologist. Defendant contends that Pridgon simply overheard the pathologist's testimony and did not actually see defendant strangle Simms. Indeed, defendant points out that Pridgon failed to mention this fact to Lorene Allen, whom he told that defendant killed Simms. Defendant also maintains that Pridgon embellished his testimony with his statement that he purposely fell on his bad knee to allow Simms to run away, which Pridgon failed to mention at the preliminary hearing. Pridgon also purportedly described an S, which he saw scrawled on the two-by-four used to kill Simms. Pridgon later clarified that the scrawled S was actually ants crawling over the two-by-four. In response to the defense question whether Pridgon's fingerprints were on the knife that defendant discarded, Pridgon testified: No way my fingerprints. They took my clothes and my prints and my necklace. It was negative to me, is nothing. If it comes out positive me, yes, fingerprints on it. Because I could barely positive negative. Negative means no. There was no fingerprints. At one point, Pridgon refused to answer a defense question regarding Simms's strangulation. Based on the foregoing testimony, defendant stated, I think I'm going to ask the Court to consider striking all of Mr. Pridgon's testimony . . . [¶] . . . [b]ased on . . . the wholesale impeachment that's been going on of him since he took the stand. . . . The trial court impliedly denied the request. After Pridgon testified, defendant called several expert witnesses who testified regarding Pridgon's mental disorders, including his psychosis, paranoia, and, schizophreniform disorder. Psychiatrist Dr. Kinsey testified that in June 1987, he triple-diagnosed then 15-year-old Pridgon with schizophreniform disorder, low IQ, and substance abuse. For Pridgon's psychotic symptoms of anxiety and auditory hallucinations, Dr. Kinsey prescribed an antipsychotic major tranquilizer, which he recommended that Pridgon take for at least a year. His colleague, Dr. Moulder, a psychologist, made a similar diagnosis and added that Pridgon's substance and alcohol use would exacerbate his psychotic symptoms. Psychologist Dr. Pickering testified that in September 1990, he diagnosed Pridgon with polysubstance abuse and borderline personality, involving characteristics of confusion, uncertainty, inadequacy, fear, and paranoia. He disagreed, however, with other defense experts' diagnoses of schizophreniform disorder. Dr. Pickering believed that Pridgon suffered from confabulation, [3] which he explained is a process where a person goes from a detail which may or may not be relevant to anything, to almost a giant imaginative leap . . . [which] takes on credibility. In addition, Dr. Pickering opined that Pridgon's drug use impaired his ability to perceive and recollect. Dr. Deutsch, an addiction specialist, opined that smoking large quantities of cocaine over a long period could affect a person's mental processes, which could eventually progress to a psychosis where the person has hallucinations, paranoia, delusions, and increased feelings of hostility. He further testified that an individual suffering from borderline personality, atypical psychosis, or schizophreniform disorder, and who uses cocaine or PCP, is in a much worse position than one who does not. In rebuttal, the prosecution offered the expert testimony of Dr. Terrell, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Thackrey, a clinical psychologist. Dr. Terrell, who met with Pridgon on several occasions and reviewed prior medical reports and records on Pridgon, testified that Pridgon had the intellect of a seven year old with a similar ability to recollect and comprehend. He also diagnosed Pridgon with substance abuse consisting of cocaine, marijuana, and PCP (which abuse was in remission), and atypical psychosis due to substance abuse. However, because Pridgon's account of the murder was within the realms of human experience, Dr. Terrell testified that his account did not seem to consist of a psychotic fantasy. He further testified that notwithstanding Pridgon's diagnosed mental disorders and low intellect, [t]here is nothing that would lead me to believe that he would be incapable of reporting an account of an act of this nature, though Pridgon's degree of accuracy would be that of a seven year old. Dr. Thackrey's findings were consistent with Dr. Terrell's. He concluded that Pridgon did not meet the criteria to be considered schizophrenic, or that he suffered from delusional symptoms or auditory hallucinations, but noted that Pridgon did suffer from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder resulting in his lack of concentration and increased fidgetiness. Dr. Thackrey found nothing in his review of the record or his assessment of Pridgon that would necessarily preclude [Pridgon's] ability to remember something that he saw happen or to tell us, at least in general terms, what had happened. Given Pridgon's limited intellectual abilities, Dr. Thackrey opined that it could be . . . relatively easy to inadvertently confuse Mr. Pridgon or elicit contradictory kinds of statements about details, and the like. Based in part on defendant's assertion that Pridgon's testimony was inherently unreliable, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, claiming insufficient evidence of guilt. The trial court denied the motion. The trial court also denied defendant's subsequent motion for a new trial or to modify the jury's verdict under section 1181, subdivisions 6 and 7 arguing that Pridgon's unreliable testimony made the verdict contrary to . . . evidence. On appeal, defendant asserts a number of claims regarding Pridgon's testimony, which we discuss in turn.
Defendant argues that Pridgon did not have the necessary capacity to perceive and recollect in order to testify under Evidence Code section 702, subdivision (a). To testify, a witness must have personal knowledge of the subject of the testimony, i.e., a present recollection of an impression derived from the exercise of the witness' own senses. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 2 West's Ann. Evid.Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 702, p. 300; Evid.Code, § 702, subd. (a).) In order to have personal knowledge, a witness must have the capacity to perceive and recollect. (See People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 525, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035.) The capacity to perceive and recollect is a condition for the admissibility of a witness's testimony on a certain matter, rather than a prerequisite for the witness's competency. ( Ibid. ) [4] Upon a party's objection, a witness's personal knowledge must be shown before the witness may testify regarding the matter. (Evid.Code, § 702, subd. (a); see also id., § 403, subd. (c)(1) [upon a party's request, a court must instruct the jury as to whether a preliminary fact exists before it may consider the proffered evidence].) `[I]f there is evidence that the witness has those capacities, the determination whether [he] in fact perceived and does recollect is left to the trier of fact.' [Citations.] ( People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 526, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035; 2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Witnesses, § 46, p. 297 [the capacity to perceive and recollect is only preliminarily determined by the trial judge, and ultimately redetermined by the jury].) A trial court should allow a witness's testimony unless no jury could reasonably find that he has such [personal] knowledge. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 2 West's Ann. Evid.Code, supra, foil. § 701, p. 284.) The fact that a witness has made inconsistent and exaggerated statements does not indicate an inability to perceive [or] recollect. . . . ( People v. Willard (1983) 155 Cal.App.3d 237, 240, 202 Cal.Rptr. 100.) Nor does a witness's mental defect or insane delusions necessarily reflect that the witness lacks the capacity to perceive or recollect. ( People v. McCaughan (1957) 49 Cal.2d 409, 420, 317 P.2d 974; People v. La Rue (1923) 62 Cal.App. 276, 284, 216 P. 627 [`It is admissible . . . in order to affect the credibility of the witness, to prove that he was or is subject to insane delusions; that his mind and memory are impaired by disease' ].) A witness's uncertainty about his or her recollection of events does not preclude admitting his or her testimony. ( People v. Avery (1950) 35 Cal.2d 487, 492, 218 P.2d 527 [uncertainty of recollection goes to the weight and not admissibility of a witness's testimony].) Defendant did not timely object to Pridgon's incapacity to perceive and recollect to limit the admissibility of Pridgon's testimony before he testified. Thus, without an objection, the trial court was not required to determine whether Pridgon had personal knowledge before he testified. (Evid.Code, § 702, subd. (a).) Although a party may move to strike a witness's testimony when lack of personal knowledge is shown on cross-examination (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 2 West's Ann. Evid.Code, supra, foil. § 702, p. 300), defendant did not challenge Pridgon's testimony on this basis. Rather, defendant agreed that Pridgon's capacity to perceive and recollect was a matter of impeachment, and proceeded to impeach his capacity through cross-examination and expert testimony. (Evid.Code, § 780, subd. (c); see also People v. Cooks (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 224, 302, 190 Cal.Rptr. 211 [A witness may be cross-examined about his mental condition or emotional stability to the extent it may affect his powers of perception, memory (recollection), or communication].) Thus, defendant's failure to object timely on the basis of Evidence Code section 702, subdivision (a), constitutes a waiver of this claim on appeal. (See People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 622, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635 [party must object to witness's lack of testimonial competence to preserve this claim on appeal].) Even assuming, however, that defendant had timely and specifically objected on this ground (see Evid.Code, § 353), we find no substantial basis for the trial court to have excluded Pridgon's testimony. Although Pridgon's testimony may have consisted of inconsistencies, incoherent responses, and possible hallucinations, delusions and confabulations, Pridgon presented a plausible account of the circumstances of [Simms's] murder. ( People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 574, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347 [witness who suffered from delusions was not incompetent to testify].) Pridgon testified to many details of the crime, which were unlikely to be known by anyone not present, and which were independently corroborated by the evidence. He also led police to the place where the two-by-four was discarded. Moreover, despite instances of Pridgon's incomprehensible testimony (often on cross-examination), he also testified lucidly, albeit simply, throughout trial. For instance, after Pridgon testified he saw defendant get on top of Simms after striking her, the prosecution asked if defendant did anything to her. Pridgon replied, Yeah, he had his hand right here. (Indicating.) Q[:] All right. Now you said he had his hand `right here'? A[:] On her throat. Q[:] `On the throat,' okay. And you showed me something with your hand. Whatwhat was it that you saw him doing with his hand? A[:] He tore her blouse up, and stick his hand up there in her bosom. In short, there was no substantial basis for the court to exclude Pridgon's testimony; rather, it was up to the jury to determine whether Pridgon's recollections were true. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 574, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; see also People v. McCaughan, supra, 49 Cal.2d at p. 420, 317 P.2d 974; People v. Avery, supra, 35 Cal.2d at p. 492, 218 P.2d 527; People v. Willard, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at p. 240, 202 Cal.Rptr. 100.) Although defendant maintains that Pridgon's intimate knowledge of the crimes indicated that Pridgon and not defendant committed the crimes, this is a separate issue from whether Pridgon had the capacity to perceive and recollect. Moreover, contrary to defendant's contention, we cannot conclude that Pridgon's testimony about hearing blood flow was improbable as a matter of law. (See, e.g., People v. Crowell (1988) 198 Cal. App.3d 1053, 1057, 244 Cal.Rptr. 296 [stabbing victim `could hear the air and the blood bubbling out my back']; People v. Fernandez (1950) 301 N.Y. 302, 316, 93 N.E.2d 859 [defendant `could hear blood dripping' from victim who was lying flat on the floor]; State v. Oslund (1985) 71 Or.App. 701, 704, 693 P.2d 1354 [defendant heard [shooting victim's] blood dripping on the floor].) Nor can we conclude as a matter of law that Pridgon could not hear the sound of money. The rustling of paper money is an audible sound. (See, e.g., Rushing v. State (Ind.1983) 449 N.E.2d 597, 598 [witness to robbery did not see defendant take money from the cash register but heard the sound of money rustling and cash drawer clips flopping].) Indeed, in ruling on defendant's subsequent motion for a new trial, the trial court stated: The Court sat approximately four to six feet from Pridgon during his entire trial testimony. The Court had an ample opportunity to observe the demeanor and manner in which Mr. Pridgon testified. In addition, the Court had an opportunity to observe the attitude of Mr. Pridgon toward this action and toward the giving of testimony in general. It is clear that Mr. Pridgon suffers from some type of mental problem. At the very least it can be said that he is a slow learner, [¶] However, the Court believed [Pridgon's testimony regarding the murder]. The trial court rejected defendant's contention that Pridgon hallucinated the death and the manner of killing. Although the court noted that Pridgon's testimony included inconsistencies (and did not attempt to reconcile them), it stated that, The Court can only reiterate that at no time has the Court questioned the credibility of Mr. Pridgon on the fact that the Defendant killed Sandra Simms and took money from her person at the time of the killing. As noted, because defendant failed to object that Pridgon had the capacity to perceive and recollect in order to testify, the trial court had no occasion to consider this issue. However, based on the record before us, we conclude that the trial court's statements regarding Pridgon's credibility strongly suggest that the court would have overruled defendant's objection and rejected his argument on this claim. To that end, we reject defendant's contention that the trial court erroneously believed that Pridgon's capacity to perceive and recollect was an issue relating only to impeachment. The trial court's statements noted above reflect that it believed Pridgon had such capacity. Plainly, Pridgon fell well short of being an ideal witness. As the prosecution's psychologist testified, it would be easy to inadvertently confuse Pridgon, given his limited intellectual abilities. Inevitably, his confusion mounted when someone motivated to make him look incredibleas defense counsel wasasked the questions. As a reviewing court, we confront a cold record without the trial court's benefit of observing firsthand the appearance and demeanor of the witness. Here, both the jury and trial court found that Pridgon was a credible witness, and we must give proper deference to such findings. ( People v. Jones (1968) 268 Cal. App.2d 161, 165, 73 Cal.Rptr. 727.) Thus, we reject defendant's constitutional challenges based on his right of confrontation protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, his rights to due process, to present a defense, to a trial by jury, and to a reliable conviction afforded under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and his right to a reliable, individualized capital sentencing determination guaranteed under the Eighth Amendment. For similar reasons, we reject defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to timely object to Pridgon's capacity to perceive and recollect, or for otherwise conceding Pridgon's capacity was a matter of impeachment. Where there was no sound legal basis for objection, counsel's failure to object to the admission of the evidence cannot establish ineffective assistance. ( People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 616, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635.)
Defendant also contends that Pridgon was incompetent to testify under Evidence Code section 701, subdivision (a). A person is incompetent and disqualified to be a witness if he or she is [i]ncapable of expressing himself or herself concerning the matter so as to be understood, either directly or through interpretation by one who can understand him (Evid.Code, § 701, subd. (a)(1)), or is [i]ncapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth. (Evid.Code, § 701, subd. (a)(2).) [T]he burden of proof is on the party who objects to the proffered witness, and a trial court's determination will be upheld in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. [Citations.] ( People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 573, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; see also People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 444, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388.) The challenging party must establish a witness's incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. ( People v. Farley (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 851, 869, 153 Cal.Rptr. 695; see also Evid.Code, § 405; 1 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook, supra, § 25.6, p. 400.) Unlike a witness's personal knowledge, a witness's competency to testify is determined exclusively by the court. (3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, supra, Presentation at Trial, § 61, p. 93; see Evid.Code, § 405, subd. (a).) Defendant failed to object at trial to Pridgon's competency and in fact expressly stated that Pridgon was competent to testify. Accordingly, his claim is waived on appeal. ( People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 622, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635[[d]efendant may not circumvent this objection requirement by claiming that the trial court should have inquired into the witness's qualifications on its own].) Defendant argues, however, that he effectively retracted his waiver by later moving to strike Pridgon's entire testimony during trial. Assuming, however, that defendant timely and specifically objected to Pridgon's competence through his motion to strike (Evid.Code, § 353, subd. (a)), we find no substantial basis for the trial court to determine that Pridgon was incompetent to testify. Although Pridgon may have suffered from mental disorders and his testimony was difficult to comprehend at times, the record does not support the claim that he was incapable of communicating so as to be understood, pursuant to Evidence Code section 701, subdivision (a)(1). (See People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 574, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347 [no substantial evidence that witness, who delusionally believed imaginary son was present during murder, lacked capabilities under Evid.Code, § 701, subd. (a)(1) & (2) ]; People v. Jones, supra, 268 Cal.App.2d at pp. 165-166, 73 Cal.Rptr. 727 [prosecution witness characterized as a mental defective by trial judge was not incompetent despite his conflicting and inconsistent testimony]; People v. Scaggs (1957) 153 Cal-App.2d 354, 314 P.2d 793 [record did not disclose that witness who was described as senile and of unsound mind was incompetent as a matter of law].) Consistent with Pridgon's diagnosis of having the intellect of a seven year old, he expressed difficulty with complex questions and often responded in incomplete, sometimes nonsensical, sentences. Mere difficulty in understanding a witness, however, does not disqualify that witness under Evidence Code section 701, subdivision (a). To the extent defendant contends Pridgon's responses were unbelievable including his testimony that he heard blood and knew how money soundsthis was an issue of credibility for the jury and not relevant to the issue of Pridgon's competency. (See Adamson v. Department of Social Services (1988) 207 Cal.App.3d 14, 20, 254 Cal.Rptr. 667.) `Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citations.]' ( People v. Jones, supra, 268 Cal.App.2d at p. 165, 73 Cal.Rptr. 727.) Moreover, the fact that Pridgon initially refused to answer defendant's question regarding Simms's strangulation did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not understand the duty to tell the truth. (Evid.Code, § 701, subd. (a)(2).) After Pridgon's refusals to answer, defense counsel asserted that I think [Pridgon's] lying right now. This, however, is a question of credibility for the jury as trier of fact. (See Evid.Code, § 780, subd. (a) [witness's demeanor while testifying and the manner in which he testifies may be relevant to credibility].) In sum, even assuming that defendant properly objected to Pridgon's competency to testify, there was no substantial basis for the trial court to exclude Pridgon's testimony on this ground. (Evid.Code, § 701, subd. (a).) Moreover, the record supports that the trial court would have rejected defendant's challenges to Pridgon's competency. Thus, we also reject defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to object to Pridgon's lack of competency. Where there was no sound legal basis for objection, counsel's failure to object to the admission of the evidence cannot establish ineffective assistance. ( People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 616, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635.)
Defendant did not request an instruction that Pridgon's capacity to perceive and recollect was a preliminary fact that the jury must find before it may consider Pridgon's testimony. (Evid.Code, § 403, subds.(a)(2), (c)(1).) However, defendant maintains that the trial court should have given this instruction sua sponte. In addition, defendant argues that the trial court should have subsequently determine[d] that Pridgon's personal knowledge was not proven as a preliminary fact, and therefore should have instructed the jury to disregard his testimony. (Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (c)(2).) We discuss each issue in turn. Under Evidence Code section 403, subdivision (c)(1), if the court admits evidence subject to the existence of a preliminary fact, the court [m]ay, and on request shall, instruct the jury to determine whether the preliminary fact exists and to disregard the proffered evidence unless the jury finds that the preliminary fact does exist. On its own terms, this provision makes it discretionary for the trial court to give an instruction regarding a preliminary fact unless the party makes a request. Because defendant failed to do so, the trial court was not required to instruct the jury that Pridgon's capacity to perceive and recollect was a preliminary fact before the jury could consider his testimony. (Evid.Code § 403, subd. (c)(1).) Nor was the trial court required to instruct the jury sua sponte. Contrary to defendant's contention, his challenge to Pridgon's capacity to perceive and recollect was not a defense per se or a theory of his case, but an evidentiary issue serving to limit Pridgon's testimony. Thus, the cases upon which defendant relies are inapposite. (See, e.g., People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 720, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913 [sua sponte duty to instruct on involuntary manslaughter upon evidence of diminished capacity]; People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 531, 83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390 [sua sponte duty to instruct on issue of provocation]; People v. Splawn (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 553, 559, 211 Cal.Rptr. 638 [sua sponte duty to instruct on lesser included offense of attempted disposal of insured property with intent to defraud].) Indeed, the foregoing distinction is underscored by the purpose for this Evidence Code section 403, subdivision (c)(1), instruction in this case. Defendant's proposed sua sponte instruction would merely have told the jury the obvious: that if it found Pridgon could not perceive or recollect, i.e., that he hallucinated the murder and robbery, then the jury should disregard his testimony. Our faith in the common sense of jurors weighs against requiring a trial court to give such instruction sua sponte. We also reject defendant's contention that the trial court should have subsequently instructed the jury to disregard Pridgon's testimony because the jury could not reasonably find that the preliminary fact [of Pridgon's capacity to perceive and recollect] exists. (Evid.Code, § 403, subd. (c)(2).) Contrary to defendant's suggestion, we cannot conclude that no reasonable person could find that [Pridgon] had personal knowledge of the circumstances, such that the trial court should have excluded his testimony as a matter of law. ( People v. Blagg (1970) 10 Cal. App.3d 1035, 1039, 89 Cal.Rptr. 446; Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (c)(2).) Based on testimony of both prosecution and defense expert witnesses, the record reflects that Pridgon did not suffer from severe mental defects which substantially affected his testimony, or that Pridgon's cocaine use substantially interfered with his ability to perceive and recollect. Further, there was no evidence as to exactly when Pridgon stopped taking the major tranquilizer Mellaril, or that he would otherwise experience hallucinations without taking the medication, from which to infer that Pridgon experienced hallucinations on the day of the murder, as defendant contends. Regarding defendant's claim that Pridgon confabulated Simms's strangulation after he overheard the pathologist testify, Pridgon made gestures at the preliminary hearing indicating that he saw defendant strangle Simms before the pathologist testified. Moreover, Pridgon's failure to mention the strangling to Detective Sanchez or Lorene Allen may have been based on the detective's failure to include this in his report, and on Allen's statement that she did not want to know anything about the murder, which would cause Pridgon not to give her further details. Indeed, when the prosecution read the excerpt from the detective's report, which did not contain details of the strangling, Pridgon interjected that he recalled that defendant bent over Simms, put both hands on her neck, and attempted to strangle her before taking her money. In addition, Pridgon's statement that he was tired of my people getting killed was not a delusional belief Pridgon had that he was a protector of an unidentifiable group. Rather, it was a statement reasonably interpreted that Pridgon, who was a Black man, was tired of fellow Black people, like Simms, getting killed. Moreover, Pridgon's statement that he was attempting to help Simms by falling on his bad knee was not inconsistent with his preliminary hearing testimony, and he eventually reaffirmed this statement during cross-examination. Finally, Pridgon's inability to tell time, including the exact time of the murder, would be consistent with his having the intellect of a seven year old. In short, we conclude that the trial court did not err by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury regarding Pridgon's capacity to perceive and recollect as a preliminary fact (see Evid.Code, § 403, subd. (c)(1)), or by failing to instruct the jury to disregard Pridgon's testimony. (Evid.Code, § 403, subd. (c)(2).) Thus, we reject defendant's constitutional claims in this regard. For similar reasons, we reject defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to request such instructions. Because there was no reasonable likelihood of prejudice in that the instructions would not have provided necessary guidance to the jurors, we need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient. ( People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 656, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351 [two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel claim].)