Opinion ID: 1147344
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Heading: SEATTLE v. MAUREEN ELVERSTON

Text: Maureen Elverston was charged in Seattle Municipal Court with the offense of driving while intoxicated and the infraction of driving in excess of reasonable speed on September 23, 1987. Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 11.56.020(A); SMC 11.52.020. The charging document was issued on a uniform abstract of court record form (traffic citation form) and contained a reference to the Seattle Municipal Code section under which Ms. Elverston was charged  11560201c. [7] The acronym DWI was the only writing in the space provided for description of the offense. The citation was signed by the arresting officer and by Myron Cornelius, Assistant Seattle City Attorney. The words Booked Direct were written in place of the defendant's signature. [8] Petitioner Elverston's first trial on December 15, 1987, resulted in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict. On March 8, 1988, a second jury trial proceeded on the driving while intoxicated charge before Judge Ron A. Mamiya in Seattle Municipal Court. The excessive speed infraction was tried before Judge Mamiya without a jury. On March 9, 1988, the jury convicted Petitioner Elverston of driving while intoxicated. The court dismissed the excessive speed infraction, finding it had merged with the primary charge of driving while intoxicated. On March 22, 1988, petitioner was sentenced to 365 days in jail with 364 days suspended and a $1,000 fine with $500 suspended. On November 21, 1988, Judge R. Joseph Wesley, King County Superior Court, issued an order affirming Ms. Elverston's conviction. In her notice of discretionary review to Division One of the Court of Appeals, petitioner for the first time challenged the adequacy of the charging document. She also challenged an evidentiary ruling made by the trial court. On April 26, 1989, Court of Appeals Commissioner William H. Ellis granted review of petitioner's challenge to the adequacy of the charging document, but declined to review the evidentiary ruling. Petitioner Elverston requests this court to strike a portion of the City's brief as not being supported by evidence in the record. The challenged material provides: Since Division I of the Court of Appeals decided State v. Leach, 53 Wn. App. 322, [766] P.2d [1116] (1989), defense attorneys in Seattle Municipal Court have stopped requesting clarification of complaints that may be incomplete or unclear. Instead, the practice is now to raise it for the first time after a conviction, asking for a dismissal and citing as authority State v. Leach. It is considered malpractice to object to the sufficiency of a complaint prior to trial. Since this request for dismissal occurs immediately after the verdict, it is obvious that the alleged defect was known to the defendant at a time when it could have been remedied. Brief of Respondent, at 10-11. [3] Petitioner Elverston is correct. Cases on appeal are decided only on evidence in the record. State v. Wilson, 75 Wn.2d 329, 332, 450 P.2d 971 (1969). See also Grobe v. Valley Garbage Serv., Inc., 87 Wn.2d 217, 228-29, 551 P.2d 748 (1976). In addition, RAP 10.3(a)(5) and 10.3(b), applicable to opening and responding briefs in appellate cases, require that legal arguments be supported by appropriate references to the record. Further, under RAP 10.7, this court may, on its own initiative or on the motion of a party, strike an improper brief. We agree with Ms. Elverston and strike the quoted portion of the City's brief. Petitioner Elverston asks this court to vacate her conviction for driving while intoxicated, and to dismiss the charge against her because the charging document was not constitutionally sufficient and thus did not vest the trial court with subject matter jurisdiction under the Holt rule. She claims that the charging document, a uniform traffic citation signed by the arresting officer and the city attorney, contained neither the correct name of the charged offense nor an accurate reference to the statutory section. She further contends that the differing content requirements for complaints and for citations under CrRLJ 2.1(a)(2) and (b)(3)(iii) violate equal protection guaranties of the state and federal constitutions. This challenge was raised for the first time on appeal to Division One of the Court of Appeals. The matter was transferred to this court without a ruling. Petitioner Elverston further contends that even though CrRLJ 2.4(b) relieves the prosecutor from the obligation to state a factual basis for the charged offense in the citation charging document, neither that rule nor any other express provision relieves the City of Seattle from its duty to specify the statutory elements of the offense charged. She contends that her conclusion is compelled by the constitutional due process requirement that accused persons be fully informed of the nature of charges against them. See Const. art. 1, § 3; Const. art. 1, § 22 (amend. 10); U.S. Const. amends. 5, 6, 14. This court under the Criminal Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction adopted efficient procedures for initiating misdemeanor charges. CrRLJ 2.1. Those rules replaced the Justice Court Criminal Rules on September 1, 1987. Under the new rules, charges are initiated in district court by complaint or by citation and notice. CrRLJ 2.1. A law enforcement officer may initiate charges by citation and notice without prior approval of the prosecutor. CrRLJ 2.1(b)(6). The rules provide that either a complaint or a citation and notice may be amended at any time before verdict if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. CrRLJ 2.4(f). The rules also specify that after a complaint or a citation and notice have been filed, the defendant shall be arraigned thereon. CrRLJ 4.1(a). Under the rules, both a complaint and a citation and notice are final charging documents. Under CrRLJ 2.1(a)(2), if a criminal proceeding is initiated by a complaint, the document must contain a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. CrRLJ 2.1(a)(2). If the charging document is a citation and notice, it must state the date, time, place, numerical code section, description of the offense charged, the date on which the citation was issued, and the name of the citing officer. CrRLJ 2.1(b)(3)(iii). Absent prejudice to substantial rights of the defendant, a citation will not be considered insufficient if it does not contain a definite statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. CrRLJ 2.4(b). A defendant's due process right to notice of the offense charged does not depend upon whether the charging document is a complaint or a citation and notice. The requirement of CrRLJ 2.1(b)(3)(iii) that the citation contain a description of the offense charged does not circumvent the constitutional requirement that the citation must apprise defendants with reasonable certainty of the nature of the accusations against them. See Grant, 89 Wn.2d at 686 (citing Seattle v. Proctor, 183 Wash. 299, 304, 48 P.2d 241 (1935)). While the Criminal Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction present efficient procedures for initiating prosecution of misdemeanor crimes in courts of limited jurisdiction, application of the rules must not abridge a defendant's constitutional rights. [9] Misdemeanor defendants have a right to be fully informed of the nature of accusations against them so that they may prepare an adequate defense. State v. Grant, 89 Wn.2d 678, 575 P.2d 210 (1978). See also Const. art. 1, § 22 (amend. 10); U.S. Const. amend. 6. This right is satisfied when defendants are apprised with reasonable certainty of the accusations against them. Under the state and federal constitutions, the charging document must state a criminal offense. Under Holt, which cites misdemeanor cases as authority, a complaint does not sufficiently state an offense unless all statutory elements or essential facts constituting the offense are included. The citation issued to Petitioner Elverston described the offense charged as DWI and listed the code section as 11560201c. DWI is the acronym for Driving While Intoxicated, the language in the title of section A of SMC 11.56.020, the Seattle Municipal Code section under which petitioner was charged. The code section describes the prohibited conduct. Further, the letters DWI have come into common usage as referring to driving while intoxicated, a phrase which is a complete statement of the statutory elements constituting the offense charged under SMC 11.56.020(A)(1)(c). Petitioner Elverston contends that DWI is an inaccurate description of the offense and that the correct description under SMC 11.56.020(A)(1) is driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug. This contention is without merit. Driving while under the influence of or affected by intoxicating liquor or any drug refers to one of several methods of proving Driving While Intoxicated, as indicated in SMC 11.56.020(A)(1). See State v. Franco, 96 Wn.2d 816, 821, 639 P.2d 1320 (1982) (RCW 46.61.502, the driving while intoxicated statute which, in almost identical language to the Seattle code section, defines a single offense committed by alternate means). [4] Petitioner Elverston also contends that the citation is invalid because the code section number on the citation does not include the letter A. The citation indicates 11560201c, apparently referring to SMC 11.56.020(A)(1)(c). However, petitioner has not shown that the somewhat incomplete citation prejudiced or in any manner affected her substantial rights. The citation states an offense. Technical defects not affecting the substance of the charged offense do not prejudice the defendant and thus do not require dismissal. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 100 Wn.2d 607, 674 P.2d 145 (1983), overruled on other grounds in State v. Bergeron, 105 Wn.2d 1, 711 P.2d 1000 (1985); State v. Ryan, 34 Wash. 597, 76 P. 90 (1904). CrRLJ 2.4(b) states that: [n]o citation and notice ... shall be deemed insufficient ... by reason of defects or imperfections which do not tend to prejudice substantial rights of the defendant. See also Seattle v. Reel, 69 Wn.2d 227, 418 P.2d 237 (1966) (challenge to sufficiency of complaint on grounds that misdemeanor citation failed to state the day of month violation occurred, day of issuance of citation, amount of bail, or time, date or place to appear in court, rejected by court because the omissions did not mislead or prejudice defendant). Petitioner Elverston requested neither a clarification of the charge nor a bill of particulars. [5] The City contends that under court rules, by proceeding to trial without objecting to the charging document, a defendant waives objection to the sufficiency of a misdemeanor complaint or citation and notice. This is not correct. A challenge to the sufficiency of a charging document because it fails to allege the essential elements of the offense charged may be raised for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a); Holt, 104 Wn.2d at 320. See also CrRLJ 4.1(d)(3); CrRLJ 7.4(a). However, by failing to request a bill of particulars, Ms. Elverston waived her right to challenge the sufficiency of the citation upon a claim that the citation to the statute was incomplete. Holt, at 320. See also CrRLJ 2.4(b). Moreover, the citation and notice issued to Maureen Elverston complies with CrRLJ 2.1(b)(3)(iii) because it does contain the correct code citation and an adequate description of the offense. DWI adequately describes the offense of Driving While Intoxicated. The City further contends that constitutional guaranties do not mandate identical procedures for both courts of limited jurisdiction and superior courts, recognizing that punishment for misdemeanors is less severe than punishment for felonies. [10] This is correct. Any criminal charging document must sufficiently and completely state an offense. This is necessary to preserve an accused person's constitutional right to due process. This requirement is satisfied by a more simplified procedure in courts of limited jurisdiction. Further, a defendant's right to equal protection of the laws is not violated by the use of citations to initiate prosecutions. [6] Although the constitutional requirement for adequate notice is the same whether that notice is given by complaint or by citation and notice, there is a logical basis for reasonably distinguishing between misdemeanor defendants issued citations and those served with complaints. Complaints must be more detailed since they are issued by a prosecutor who was not present at the scene of the crime. Defining the crime with more specificity in a complaint assists a defendant in determining the particular incident to which the complaint refers. See State v. Carey, 4 Wash. 424, 433, 30 P. 729 (1892) (crime must be alleged with sufficient specificity to afford an accused person protection against double jeopardy). Citations, however, are generally issued by law enforcement officers who have personal contact with defendants at the scene. Defendants charged by citation are necessarily aware of the particular incidents for which officers are charging them. They presumably know the facts underlying their charges. Further, the citation charging procedure permits officers to initiate prosecutions without unjustifiable expense and delay. [11] In addition, the procedure under CrRLJ 2.1(b) facilitates an officer's ability to charge defendants at the scene and then to release those persons for whom jailing is unnecessary. Differing procedures and requirements for charging by complaint and by citation and notice do not violate due process and equal protection rights. [7] Petitioner Elverston contends that state and federal guaranties of due process are violated by procedures which permit criminal prosecutions to be initiated by persons other than prosecuting attorneys. [12] Petitioner further contends that defendants have a due process right to answer only to those charges which have been screened by prosecuting authorities. However, petitioner cites no applicable authority for her argument. We affirm Petitioner Elverston's conviction for driving while intoxicated. The citation issued to Ms. Elverston complies with CrRLJ 2.1(b)(3)(iii) which requires a citation to contain the date, time, place, numerical code section, description of the offense charged, the date on which the citation was issued, and the name of the citing officer. Misdemeanor citations are constitutionally sufficient if they apprise defendants with reasonable certainty of the nature of the accusations against them. CALLOW, C.J., UTTER, DOLLIVER, DORE, ANDERSEN, and DURHAM, JJ., and PEARSON, J. Pro Tem., concur. BRACHTENBACH, J. (concurring) I concur in the majority opinion. However, I write separately to emphasize that application of the essential elements rule to misdemeanors charged in courts of limited jurisdiction has long been a settled matter in this state's jurisprudence. Misdemeanor charges have been subject to the rule for over 60 years. See, e.g., Seattle v. Proctor, 183 Wash. 299, 48 P.2d 241 (1935); Seattle v. Jordan, 134 Wash. 30, 235 P. 6 (1925); State v. Moser, 41 Wn.2d 29, 246 P.2d 1101 (1952) (gross misdemeanor). See also State v. Ashker, 11 Wn. App. 423, 523 P.2d 949 (1974), overruled on other grounds in State v. Braithwaite, 92 Wn.2d 624, 600 P.2d 1260 (1979). The rule has been applied to charges tried in courts of limited jurisdiction for nearly 80 years. See, e.g., State v. Heath, 57 Wash. 246, 106 P. 756 (1910) (justice court); State v. Jordan, supra (police court); State v. Proctor, supra (police court); Seattle v. Morrow, 45 Wn.2d 27, 273 P.2d 238 (1954) (justice court). In fact, in Seattle v. Jordan, supra, at 34-35, this court specifically declined to apply a more liberal rule for pleadings filed in police court. Neither the State nor the City of Seattle has offered any sound legal basis for overruling this longstanding precedent. Instead, it appears, the underlying concern appears to be that because the law has not been followed, we should change it to protect those convictions subject to attack on the basis that the law was not followed. It goes without saying that this is insufficient reason to change existing law of constitutional magnitude. I also stress that it is not the defendant's obligation to ensure that the State's charges are sufficient to uphold his or her conviction. If the State initially fails to file sufficient charges, the court rules allow for amendment of the charging document. I am disturbed, however, by the possibility that a defendant may be well aware at the outset of the proceedings that the charging document fails to state a crime, and yet maintain silence until appeal. When faced with the question whether an indictment sufficiently charges an offense, federal courts have held that indictments which are tardily challenged are liberally construed in favor of validity. United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 361 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977); accord, e.g., United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 960 n. 19 (3d Cir.1979); United States v. Hooker, 841 F.2d 1225, 1230 (4th Cir.1988); United States v. Freeman, 813 F.2d 303, 304 (10th Cir.1987). I recognize that this state's and the federal applicable rules of appellate review are not congruent. However, I think that in the proper case, with full briefing and argument by the parties, this court should consider whether to apply a stricter standard for reviewing allegedly insufficient charging documents. I do not suggest that we abandon the essential elements rule; rather that in cases where the alleged defect in the charging document is as knowable to the defendant at the outset as on appeal, we consider adopting an appellate standard of liberally construing the document in favor of validity. Reconsideration denied March 6, 1990.