Opinion ID: 1969802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 44

Heading: 1-9, i.1-19)

Text: Five of the claims asserted in this subcategory allege a number of violations of defendant's constitutional right to counsel and to reliable and effective appellate and post-conviction relief review of his conviction and death sentence. All such claims are based on trial counsel's failure to prevent significant legal matters and issues from being resolved off the record at trial. During the PCR proceedings, PCR counsel moved to compel both prosecution and defense trial counsel to review their trial notes and attempt to collaborate in reconstructing a record concerning certain subjects allegedly omitted from the trial record. In support of the motion, PCR counsel referred specifically to the omission from the trial transcript of any reference to the race of the members of the jury panel, to defendant's fainting spell between the return of the guilt-phase verdict and the commencement of the penalty phase, and to the State's decision at the commencement of the penalty phase to dismiss two of the alleged aggravating factors. The PCR court denied the motion, noting that seven years had elapsed since the trial, but permitted PCR counsel to conduct an independent inquiry with leave to renew the application to supplement the record based on a specific assertion about the manner in which the supplementation should occur. Because we are unable to discern that defendant has sustained any prejudice from the alleged omissions in the record either during appellate, proportionality, or PCR review, we conclude that those claims should be dismissed on their merits without a hearing. Concerning the specific contentions that the record's omission of any reference to defendant's fainting spell after the guilty verdict deprived defendant of a reliable penalty trial and precluded effective appellate review thereof, we already have determined that the fainting spell did not affect the fairness and reliability of defendant's penalty trial, supra at 244, 690 A. 2d at 78, and our review of that issue in this opinion is substantially equivalent to the review defendant might have sought on direct appeal. With respect to the record's omission of any reference to the race of the members of the jury panel, we rejected on the direct appeal the contention that the Atlantic County procedures for selecting the petit jury pool deprived defendant of the representative jury pool to which he was constitutionally entitled. Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 98, 586 A. 2d 85. Defendant fails to allege or demonstrate any other prejudice resulting from that omission from the record. Defendant also contends that page restrictions imposed by this Court on his direct appeal brief deprived him of effective assistance of counsel and adequate appellate review. In addition, defendant alleges that this Court's use of a less stringent standard of review in capital cases as compared with non-capital cases deprived him of due process and effective appellate review. We consider both contentions to be frivolous and dismiss them on their merits. Notwithstanding any page restrictions imposed on briefs as part of the process of managing capital case appeals, defendant has been and continues to be afforded careful and comprehensive appellate review by this Court. Concerning our standard for review of capital cases, we consistently have recognized our obligation to subject capital case records to heightened scrutiny and to exercise independent review of trial court rulings and determinations, a meticulous and searching standard that we have applied to all capital cases. See Bey I, supra, 112 N.J. at 92-93, 548 A. 2d 846. Defendant also asserts claims challenging the fairness and adequacy of his proportionality review, and claims challenging his proportionality review on the basis of evidence acquired after its conclusion. In addition, defendant asserts a number of claims that collectively allege that continuing evidence of race discrimination in the administration of the death penalty renders the death-penalty statute and defendant's death sentence constitutionally invalid. We reject all those claims on their merits without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant was accorded searching and comprehensive proportionality review of his death sentence, conducted on the basis of all information and data then available. See Marshall II, supra. We have no reservations about the fairness and adequacy of that review. Concerning defendant's assertions that evidence acquired subsequent to his proportionality review challenges the conclusion that defendant's death sentence was not disproportionate, we acknowledged in Marshall II, supra, that proportionality review was a finite process: And, finally, we cannot await a more certain state of proof before we render judgment. We must confront in this case the problem of the small sample of comparison cases. We do not know what will happen in the next ten similar cases, but we must nevertheless make our judgment now.... Proportionality review recognizes in that sense that society's standards may change and that which is proportionate in one era may be disproportionate in another. There are no absolutes. Ours is a finite role defined by our obligation to see that justice is done at a given time. [130 N.J. at 219, 613 A. 2d 1059.] Defendant also asserts that continuing evidence of race discrimination in the administration of the death penalty requires that this sentence be invalidated. We first addressed that issue in Marshall II, supra, and concluded that we do not yet confront a record in which `the statistical evidence ... relentlessly documents the risk that [Marshall's] sentence was influenced by racial considerations.' Id. at 213, 613 A. 2d 1059 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 328, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1786, 95 L.Ed. 2d 262, 301 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). We reached the same conclusion in State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 396, 645 A. 2d 685 (1994) ( Bey IV ), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1131, 130 L.Ed. 2d 1093 (1995), although reaffirming our commitment to continue to monitor any correlation between race and the imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 389, 645 A. 2d 685. We rejected similar claims of race discrimination in State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 210, 662 A. 2d 442 (1995) ( DiFrisco III ) and State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 80, 651 A. 2d 949 (1994) ( Martini II ). We shall continue to request and receive additional data and to entertain argument concerning enhanced evidence of race discrimination in the administration of our capital-punishment statute.