Opinion ID: 2972617
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Admission of Moskal’s Testimony

Text: Because the Supreme Court has not held that admission of testimony relating to a truth test renders a trial fundamentally unfair, the Ohio Court of Appeals’ decision to uphold Maldonado’s conviction, despite the arguably improper admission of Moskal’s statement about having tested Price, was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. The Due Process Clause provides a remedy when the admission of unduly prejudicial evidence renders a trial fundamentally unfair. Payne v. Tenn., 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179-183 (1986)). On the other hand, “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). The Ohio Court of Appeals indicated that the trial court misapplied Ohio law when it overruled defense counsel’s objection to Detective Moskal’s statement that he believed Price because Price “was tested.”4 Nonetheless, the state court held, the error did not prejudice the proceedings. The question before this court is whether, regardless of the propriety under Ohio law of admitting Moskal’s statement, the statement rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825; Moore v. Tate, 882 F.2d 1107, 1109 (6th Cir. 1989). The Ohio Court of Appeals’ decision was not unreasonable under the AEDPA standard. The Supreme Court has never held that statements implying the results of a polygraph or similar test render the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair, in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Further, we are aware of no federal court of appeals that has found a due process violation warranting a grant of habeas relief under these facts. Indeed, three circuits have rejected habeas petitioners’ claims that testimony about truth testing violated the petitioners’ due process rights. Notably, two reached this conclusion under pre-AEDPA de novo review. Weston v. Dormire, 272 F.3d 1109, 1113 (8th Cir. 2001) (AEDPA deference); Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 510 (9th Cir. 1994) (de novo review); Escobar v. O’Leary, 943 F.2d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 1991) (de novo review). While these cases are distinguishable from the present one in important respects,5 they do not imply that testimony regarding truth testing violates due 4 The district court noted, “No one disputes that it was error for the state court to admit the testimony that is at the heart of this claim.” The warden argues, however, that it did assert proper application of Ohio evidence law in its answer / return of writ, where it stated that Maldonado’s petition “is designed to create the specter of error where none occurred.” The prosecution asked Moskal about “what steps were taken to verify Price’s account” only as a way of rehabilitating Moskal, in response to defense counsel’s impeachment of Moskal’s credibility, the warden argues. Appellee’s Br. at 19. Further, the warden contends that Moskal’s reference to Price’s having been “tested,” because it was brief , not repeated, and did not disclose the results, was innocuous. Id. at 22. Ohio law appears to lend little support to these arguments. Ohio allows the results of a polygraph examination to be admitted if numerous conditions are satisfied, including the defendant’s stipulating to their admission. State v. Souel, 372 N.E.2d 1318, 1323 (Ohio 1978). The rule does not appear to distinguish between admitting results of the test to prove the guilt of the accused, and admitting them to accredit a witness. The same standard applies to the testing of defendants and to the testing of prosecution witnesses. State v. Rowe, 589 N.E.2d 394, 404 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990). The mere mention of a witness’s having taken a lie detector test—not just admission of test results—may be prejudicial error. State v. Smith, 178 N.E.2d 605, 607 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960). The Ohio Court of Appeals stated that Moskal’s citing the test as a reason he believed Price’s last story strongly implied that Price had passed the test. 2001 WL 1044078 at . While the reference was brief, it formed the centerpiece of the prosecution’s re-direct. 5 Two principal circumstances supported these courts’ holding the trial to have been fundamentally fair: (1) testimony about the test did not divulge the results and therefore did not play a key role in rehabilitating or discrediting a witness, see Weston, 272 F.3d at 1113; Cacoperdo, 37 F.3d at 510; Escobar, 943 F.2d at 720; and (2) the court struck the testimony or offered to give a corrective instruction to the jury, see Cacoperdo, 37 F.3d at 510. In contrast, Moskal’s comment not only disclosed that Price took a test, but also strongly implied that the test proved Price to be truthful in his final version of the facts behind the murder—the version that most strongly implicated Maldonado. Moskal stated that Price was credible because he was tested. With forewarning of the prosecution’s plan to question Moskal about the test, the trial court stated in a sidebar conference that it would “allow some latitude” for questioning about the test but would not permit the results to be admitted. Therefore, the prosecutor structured his questions (“Did No. 03-4528 Maldonado v. Wilson Page 8 process. Finding a due process violation here would necessarily imply that the Constitution requires all states to have rules of evidence precluding some testimony about truth tests. No Supreme Court precedent demands this result, and the state court’s decision therefore was not unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The district court therefore properly denied Maldonado’s due process claim.