Opinion ID: 423927
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: activities requiring a permit.

Text: 95 We note at the outset of our discussion of the landclearing activities in this case that the litigation over this issue has not proceeded in the most desirable fashion. At oral argument, we asked the federal defendants why they were not claiming that their determination of which activities would require a permit should be subject to the same standard of review as the wetlands determination. Their counsel responded that the same standard probably should have applied, but he suspected that the issue had not been raised below. 96 Our own review of the record indicates that the federal defendants did suggest that the entire wetlands determination should have been reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard, 2 Record at 548, but they admitted that the EPA's activities determination had not been as carefully considered as the wetlands determination: 97 While the determination heretofore made is ample to support a finding by the court that most of the area in question is a wetland, and to support a conclusion that some of the nonfederal defendants' actions will involve the discharges of dredged or fill material, the activities determination was not based upon a full development of all relevant facts that would normally take place in a permit procedure. 98 2 Record at 551 (emphasis in original). The federal defendants then asked the court to allow the Corps to exercise its primary jurisdiction over which activities should be permitted on the wetlands by directing the private defendants to apply for a permit rather than proceeding to trial: 99 In light of the complex situation in this case, federal defendants suggest that the initial determination in this case of the essentially factual issues of whether or not there will be discharges of dredged or fill material and what the effects thereof will be on the reach and flow and circulation of navigable waters, be made through the permit process instituted by Congress for that purpose, and thereafter the case would be ripe for judicial review. 100 Id. (emphasis in original). 101 The judge-made doctrine of primary jurisdiction is concerned with promoting proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties. United States v. Western Pacific Railroad, 352 U.S. 59, 63, 77 S.Ct. 161, 165, 1 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956). It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, but where enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views. Id. at 64, 77 S.Ct. at 165. Application of the doctrine is particularly appropriate where uniformity of certain types of administrative decisions is desirable, or where there is a need for the expert and specialized knowledge of the agencies. Id.; see also Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U.S. 411, 420, 79 S.Ct. 1210, 1216, 3 L.Ed.2d 1334 (1959); Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75, 72 S.Ct. 492, 494-95, 96 L.Ed. 576 (1952). 102 The district court might have been well advised to agree to the federal defendants' request that the Corps be allowed to make the initial determination about which activities should be permitted on the Lake Long Tract. Compare Deltona Corp. v. Alexander, 682 F.2d 888, 893-94 (11th Cir.1982) (upholding summary judgment in Corps' favor where Corps had not yet had opportunity to make initial determination of extent of wetlands); Montgomery Environmental Coalition Citizens Coordinating Committee v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, 607 F.2d 378, 381 (D.C.Cir.1979) (upholding dismissal of action seeking to enjoin defendants from exceeding sewage treatment guidelines where EPA proceeding was pending, since EPA had primary jurisdiction over issuance of section 402 permits); and Alton Box Board Co. v. EPA, 592 F.2d 395, 399 n. 7 (7th Cir.1979) (court may order EPA to afford plaintiff a hearing but not to issue a permit because doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires initial agency determination), with Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island, 619 F.2d 231, 244-45 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096, 101 S.Ct. 893, 66 L.Ed.2d 824 (1981) (primary jurisdiction requires exhaustion of administrative remedies under Atomic Energy Act but not under CWA); Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 321 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1978) (dismissal of intervenor's claim for failure to exhaust not required where the agency failed to insist upon exhaustion, statutory interpretation issues were within court's competence, and plaintiff and intervenor raised essentially same question); and O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 523 F.Supp. 642, 646-47 (E.D.Pa.1981) (primary jurisdiction does not require sending case to state environmental agency where complaint is that agency has been ineffective and issues are within court's competence). As the federal defendants predicted, the district court took extensive evidence about the nature and effects of the landowners' activities, only to conclude that a dredge-and-fill permit was indeed required. Should the landowners now wish to proceed with their activities, they must apply to the Corps for a permit, at which point the Corps will be forced to consider the same evidence in order to determine whether a permit should issue. An initial determination by the Corps might have obviated the need for addressing some of the issues discussed in the district court's opinion and presently urged on appeal. 37 Further, if the Corps ultimately issues the permit, we will be faced with yet another round of appeals challenging the agency's determination. 103 Regardless of whether it might have been advisable to allow the Corps to make the initial determination in this case, the federal defendants have abandoned their primary-jurisdiction claim on appeal, perhaps because they are satisfied with most of the district court's conclusions. The District of Columbia Circuit faced the converse of this situation in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C.Cir.1975). While rejecting the EPA's argument that the notice provision of section 505(b)(2) was a jurisdictional prerequisite to a citizen's suit under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(2), the Natural Resources court suggested that courts might properly give effect to the salutary purposes underlying the notice provision by resort to familiar doctrines such as those underpinning the requirements of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 510 F.2d at 703. The court explained: 104 The notice provision was designed to obviate the need for judicial recourse by affording the agency the opportunity to act on the alleged violation. Sound discretion bids a court stay its hand upon petition by the Administrator where it has reason to believe that further agency consideration may resolve the dispute and obviate the need for further judicial action. 105 Id. (footnote omitted). It was unwilling, however, to require exhaustion when the issue had been raised for the first time on appeal, there was no evidence that the agency desired to reassess its plans, and the course of the present action clearly indicate[d] that the agency's position with regard to its discretion under [section 304(b)(1)(A) was] firmly rooted. Id. 106 Here, the primary jurisdiction question has been abandoned, instead of being raised for the first time, on appeal. While the agencies' position has been anything but firmly rooted during the course of this action, they appear to have finally determined which of the private defendants' land-clearing activities should not be conducted without a section 404 permit. We note further that the agencies participated fully in the trial below, and thus the district court had the benefit of their views on the activities issue. See United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 500 F.2d 167, 175 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962, 95 S.Ct. 1352, 43 L.Ed.2d 439 (1975) (primary jurisdiction not necessary where agency had participated extensively in litigation). Under these circumstances, we believe that no purpose would be served by vacating the district court's decision and remanding to the agency for the initial determination. 107 We turn then to our consideration of whether the district court's conclusion that the private defendants' landclearing activities required a section 404 permit was correct. In reviewing the trial court's decision, we are bound by the traditional standard requiring us to uphold a trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Of course, we are free to make our own independent assessment of the court's legal conclusions. Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 967-68 (5th Cir.1983). 108
109 The district court found that the landowners had engaged in the following activities: 110 Initially, bulldozers outfitted with shearing blades cut the timber and vegetation at or just above ground level. The shearing blades were v-shaped, had a serrated edge and flat bottom and were approximately 18-20 feet in length. The blades were adjusted to be free floating so that they would ride along the top surface of the ground. Occasionally, however, the blades would gouge the surface of the ground. Although the blades were adjusted to ride on the ground's surface, they did scrape the leaf litter and humus that overlaid the soil as they moved from tree to tree. 111 After the shearing was completed in a section, bulldozers outfitted with rake blades pushed the felled trees into windrows. The upper portion of the raking blade was solid whereas the lower portion had tines that permitted soil to pass through the openings. The raking blades were also outfitted so that they generally operated on top of the soil. However, in the process of windrowing the trees and debris, soil and leaf litter was also scraped into the windrows. It is not clear whether the blades themselves or the broom-like action of the trees and brush that they were pushing actually scraped the soil and the overlying leaf litter. In any event the photographic evidence clearly demonstrated that soil and leaf litter was piled up during the windrowing process--this movement filled in low areas and along with the discing which followed, had a levelling effect on the surface of the land. 112 The trees and other vegetation that had been windrowed were then burned. The remaining ashes were later disced into and across the tract. Some of the felled trees and other debris would not burn. This material was buried in four or five pits, each approximately 50 feet long and 6 feet deep that had been dug with backhoes by the private defendants. 113 Tractors pulling chunk rakes would go over the areas that had been sheared and windrowed and rake together any remaining debris. Basically, the chunk rakes were sets of tines that were outfitted on cultivators that had had their blades removed. The chunk rakes gathered the small debris into piles where it was presumably burned. These ashes were also disced into the soil. 114 After the shearing, windrowing and chunk raking the land was disced to prepare it for soybean cultivation. A disc is a bowl-shaped blade that cuts into the ground and fluffs the soil up. The disc's [sic] used on this tract were 24 inches in diameter and would cut into the ground approximately 9 inches. During discing, some soil would ride in front of the disc and would be redeposited in other areas of the tract, resulting in substantial displacement and redepositing of the soil itself. 115 Defendants also dug a drainage ditch that was approximately three-quarters of a mile long. The earth excavated from the ditch was piled alongside the ditch and was to be spread over the adjacent area. Construction of at least four or five miles of additional ditches were contemplated for soybean cultivation. 116 Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Alexander (Avoyelles I), 473 F.Supp. 525, 528-29 (W.D.La.1979) (footnote omitted). 117 The private defendants are the only parties who challenge the district court's factual findings. While they have indicated portions of the record that support their contention that the landclearing activities did not result in any significant digging up of the earth or leveling of the land, 38 the plaintiffs presented their own eyewitness testimony to the effect that large chunks of earth had been torn up, holes dug, and sloughs filled in. 39 Resolution of this conflict in the evidence is properly left to the district court, who has had an opportunity to hear and observe the witnesses. We cannot say on the basis of this record that the trial court's factual findings were clearly erroneous. 118
119 The district court held that the private defendants' landclearing activities constituted a discharge of a pollutant into the waters of the United States, and that engaging in those activities without a section 404 dredge-and-fill permit was a violation of Section 301(a) of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). As the district court did, we must look beyond section 301(a) itself, to the statutory and regulatory definitions, in order to determine whether the district court's holding was correct. 120 Section 502(12) defines the term discharge of a pollutant as (a) any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source .... 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). A point source is defined in section 502(14) as any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any ... container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel ... from which pollutants are or may be discharged.... 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). Section 502(6) defines the term pollutant to mean dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal and agricultural waste discharged into water. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). The question in this case is whether the landclearing activities were (1) a discharge (2) of a pollutant (3) from a point source (4) into navigable waters. Further, we must determine whether the activities were normal agricultural activities exempted from the permit requirements by 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f). 121 As discussed in Part II, these activities did occur in navigable waters, as that term is defined in the statute. Further, we agree with the district court that the bulldozers and backhoes were point sources, since they collected into windrows and piles material that may ultimately have found its way back into the waters. See Sierra Club v. Abston Construction Co., 620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir.1980) (mining scrap piles may be point sources even though material may not be carried directly to waters from the piles); United States v. Holland, 373 F.Supp. 665, 668 (M.D.Fla.1974) (bulldozers are point sources). The question then is whether these activities constituted a discharge of a pollutant. 122 Emphasizing that the removal of all of the vegetation would destroy the vital ecological function of the wetlands, the district court concluded that the landclearing activities constituted a discharge within the meaning of the CWA. Both the federal and private defendants argue that the mere removal of wetlands vegetation was not a discharge because the term discharge is defined as the addition of pollutants, not the removal of materials. The district court rejected this argument as untenable because it believed that the federal defendants' interpretation would frustrate the ecological purposes of the CWA. 473 F.Supp. at 536. In the court's view, the federal defendants' argument implied that the excavation of [a] ditch 6 feet deep and 100 feet long requires a § 404 permit (is destructive of wetlands) but that the clearing of 20,000 acres of forest wetlands by methods involving only de minimis movement of earth does not (is not destructive of wetlands). Id. 123 The District of Columbia Circuit recently reversed a district court's decision where the lower court had rejected the EPA's view that section 402 of the CWA only covered the addition of pollutants. National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C.Cir.1982). Like the district court here, the trial court in National Wildlife found that the EPA's  'overly literal and technical' construction was the 'more tortured' and ... less consonant with Congress' zero-discharge goal. 693 F.2d at 166. As an initial matter, the court of appeals held that the district court had failed to give enough deference to the EPA's construction of the Act. 693 F.2d at 166-67 (citing EPA v. National Crushed Stone Association, 449 U.S. 64, 83, 101 S.Ct. 295, 307, 66 L.Ed.2d 268 (1980)). Besides the fact that Congress had given the EPA substantial discretion in administering the CWA, the court of appeals noted that the agency's construction had been made contemporaneously with the passage of the Act, and ha[d] been consistently adhered to since. 693 F.2d at 107. The court of appeals then went on to note that the district court had paid too much attention to the broad stated purposes of the Act, and too little attention to the legislative history that must inform its view of those purposes. Id. at 171. Finally, noting that regulation by the states of dam-induced pollution was provided for in section 208, 33 U.S.C. § 1218, the National Wildlife court concluded that the EPA's interpretation of the statute was reasonable and therefore it must be respected. See also Missouri ex rel. Ashcroft v. Department of the Army, 672 F.2d 1297, 1304 (8th Cir.1982) (district court did not err in holding that operation of dam did not result in discharge of pollutant as discharge requires addition of pollutant from point source and neither term applied to soil erosion or oxygen content of water). 124 A brief analysis of the district court's factual findings indicates that the dispute about whether the CWA covers the mere removal of vegetation is a false issue in this case. The EPA has explained on appeal that it agrees with the district court that if vegetation or other materials are redeposited in the wetland, that activity is a discharge. [Their] point of disagreement with the district court was with its apparent conclusion that removal activities [were] covered by the Act even when nothing is redeposited on the land. Federal Defendants' Reply Brief at 2 n. 1. 40 The district court's factual findings demonstrate that this is not a mere removal case. The court found that during the clearing process small sloughs were filled in and larger ones partially filled thereby levelling the land. 473 F.Supp. at 536. The landowners' own witness admitted to burying logs in holes that he had dug, and the plaintiffs' witnesses testified that material that would not burn was buried. Since the landclearing activities involved the redeposit of materials, rather than their mere removal, we need not determine today whether mere removal may constitute a discharge under the CWA. 41 Any suggestion made by the district court that the term discharge does cover removal is pure dicta. 125 The word addition, as used in the definition of the term discharge, may reasonably be understood to include redeposit. As the district court recognized, this reading of the definition is consistent with both the purposes and legislative history of the statute. The CWA was designed to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a), and as discussed in Part II, the legislative history indicates that Congress recognized the importance of protecting wetlands as a means of reaching the statutory goals. See, e.g., 3 Legislative History, at 869 (remarks of Sen. Muskie) (quoted by the district court, 473 F.Supp. at 536). There is ample evidence in the record to support the district court's conclusion that the landowners' redepositing activities would significantly alter the character of the wetlands and limit the vital ecological functions served by the tract. 42 Since we have concluded that the term discharge covers the redepositing of materials taken from the wetlands, we hold that the district court correctly decided that the landclearing activities on the Lake Long Tract constituted a discharge within the meaning of the Act. 43 126 Similarly, we agree with the district court, the plaintiffs and the federal defendants that the material discharged in this case was fill, if not dredged, material and hence subject to the Corps' regulation under section 404, as long as the activities did not fall within the section 404(f) exemption. The term fill material is defined in the Corps' regulations as 127 any material used for the primary purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of a waterbody. The term does not include any pollutant discharged into the water primarily to dispose of waste, as that activity is regulated under Section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. 128 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(m). The regulations define the discharge of fill material as 129 the addition of fill material into waters of the United States. The term generally includes, without limitation, the following activities: Placement of fill that is necessary to the construction of any structure in a water of the United States; the building of any structure or impoundment requiring rock, sand, dirt, or other material for its construction; site-development fills for recreational, industrial, commercial, residential, and other uses; causeways or road fills; dams and dikes; artificial islands; property protection and/or reclamation devices such as riprap, groins, seawalls, breakwaters, and revetments; beach nourishment; levees; fill for structures such as sewage treatment facilities, intake and outfall pipes associated with power plants and subaqueous utility lines; and artificial reefs. The term does not include plowing, cultivating, seeding and harvesting for the production of food, fiber, and forest products. 130 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(n). 131 As discussed above, the burying of the unburned material, as well as the discing, had the effect of filling in the sloughs on the tract and leveling the land. The landowners insist that any leveling was incidental to their clearing activities and therefore the material was not deposited for the primary purpose of changing the character of the land. The district court found, however, that there had been significant leveling. The plaintiffs' witnesses testified that sloughs that had contained rainwater in the past had been filled in; thus, the activities were changing the bottom elevation of the waterbody. Certainly, the activities were designed to replace the aquatic area with dry land. Accordingly, we hold that the district court correctly concluded that the landowners were discharging fill material into the wetlands. 132 The district court also found that removal of the vegetation constituted dredging. The regulations define dredged material as material that is excavated or dredged from waters of the United States. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(k). The district court reasoned that since the vegetation was part of the wetlands, it was also part of the waters of the United States; therefore, removal of the vegetation constituted dredging. 133 The landowners emphasize that dredging is excavation. They argue that the vegetation is a wetland indicator, not a part of the wetland itself; therefore, the removal of the vegetation from the surface of the wetland is not dredging. The federal defendants agree with the landowners that the removal of vegetation from above ground is not dredging, but they do not view this as a crucial issue in this case because they agree with the district court that the landowners were discharging fill material. Federal Defendants' Brief at 19 n. 17. We note that there was testimony that the landowners' activities included the digging of ditches and holes, which would constitute dredging even under the landowners' interpretation of the regulation. Like the federal defendants, however, we do not believe that a decision whether there was a discharge of dredged material is necessary here, since we have concluded that there was a discharge of fill material. 134
135 Finally, the private defendants argue that their activities are normal farming activities exempt under section 404(f) of the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (Supp. V 1981). Section 404(f)(1) exempts from the permit requirements: 136 (f)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the discharge of dredged or fill material-- 137 (A) from normal farming, silviculture, and ranching activities such as plowing, seeding, cultivating, minor drainage, harvesting for the production of food, fiber, and forest products, or upland soil and water conservation practices. 138 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A). The Corps' regulations further implement this limitation by excluding plowing, cultivating, feeding and harvesting for the production of food, fiber and forest products from the definitions of a discharge of dredged or fill material. 33 C.F.R. §§ 323.2(1), (n). While the private defendants' landclearing activities are not those specified in the Act, the defendants insist that the activities are nonetheless normal farming practices that should fall within the exemption. 139 The district court believed that the section 404(f)(1) exemptions were limited to ongoing agricultural activities. It reasoned that the word  'normal' connote[d] an established and continuing activity, and that the activities set out as examples in section 404(f)(1)(A) were the kinds of activities that would only occur on a continuing basis as part of an ongoing farming or forestry operation. Avoyelles I, 473 F.Supp. at 535. 44 Because no farming operation was or could have been contemplated [on the Lake Long Tract] until after the acreage had been cleared, the district court concluded that the activities in this case were not normal farming activities. Id. It added that this conclusion was buttressed by the fact that section 404(f)(2) specifically takes away the exemption for activities that involve changing the use of the land. Id. Since we agree with the district court that section 404(f)(2) precludes applying the normal farming activities exemption in this case, we affirm the district court's decision on that basis. 45 140 Section 404(f)(2) takes away at least some of the exemptions arguably provided by section 404(f)(1): 141 (2) Any discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters incidental to any activity having as its purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a use to which it was not previously subject, where the flow or circulation of navigable waters may be impaired or the reach of such waters be reduced, shall be required to have a permit under this section. 142 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2). Read together, the two parts of section 404(f) provide a narrow exemption for agricultural and silvicultural activities that have little or no adverse effect on the nation's waters. This is precisely what Congress intended in enacting the amendment. During the Senate debates on the 1977 amendments, Senator Muskie, one of the primary sponsors of the CWA, explained: 143 New subsection 404(f) provides that Federal permits will not be required for those narrowly defined activities that cause little or no adverse effects either individually or cumulatively. While it is understood that some of these activities may necessarily result in incidental filling and minor harm to aquatic resources, the exemptions do not apply to discharges that convert extensive areas of water into dry land or impede circulation or reduce the reach or size of the water body. 144 3 Legislative History, at 474. As the district court opinion ably demonstrates, the purpose and effect of the landclearing activities on the Lake Long Tract was to bring an area of the navigable waters into a use to which it was not previously subject. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2). All of the vegetation was cut down, the land leveled, and at least one ditch dug to increase drainage so that the property could be changed from a forest to a soybean field. These changes can hardly be viewed as having a minimal adverse effect on the wetlands. 46 Accordingly, we hold that the district court was correct in concluding that the landclearing activities in this case were not exempt farming activities under section 404(f)(1). 145 Since, as we have observed, additional litigation could ensue from the Corps' section 404 permit determinations, however, a word of caution seems appropriate. Our partial affirmance of the district court's decisions on permanent injunction is based upon the same total activities approach used by the district court. That court did not make a tract-by-tract determination of what precise activities were observed in each area of the lands involved, nor does the district court's opinion disclose the precise location of the lands previously cleared, on which permits are required only for construction of dikes, levees or major drainage projects. If a section 404 permit application is filed on any part of the lands covered by the district court's injunction, the Corps should be free to apply its expertise to that permit determination without any constraint from the district court's injunctive determinations except those we have expressly affirmed, i.e., (1) that the bulldozers and backhoes are point sources within the meaning of the CWA; (2) that the filling in of the sloughs and leveling of the land resulted in the redepositing of fill material into the waters of the United States and was therefore a discharge of a pollutant; and (3) that the landclearing activities observed on the land thus far were not exempt from the Corps' section 404 permit requirements because those activities constituted a change in use of the wetlands. 146