Opinion ID: 2584893
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Asserted Error in Death-qualifying Voir Dire

Text: (4) Defendant contends the trial court violated his constitutional rights by excusing for cause two jurors and failing to excuse for cause another juror based on the jurors' statements concerning their ability to fairly and impartially impose the death penalty. We recently stated the law applicable to such claims: Qualification to serve on a capital jury is not limited to determining whether the person zealously opposes or supports the death penalty in every case. Under federal and state law, a prospective juror may be excluded for cause where his views on capital punishment would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ([ Wainwright v. Witt (1985)] 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844], clarifying Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770] [framing issue as whether it is `unmistakably clear' the prospective juror would `automatically'... vote for life or death].) The Witt standard applies to both prosecution and defense challenges. [Citations.] At bottom, capital jurors must be willing and able to follow the law, weigh the sentencing factors, and choose the appropriate penalty in the particular case. [Citations.] The trial court's findings as to the nature and effect of a prospective juror's views on capital punishment and related topics (e.g., law enforcement) receive substantial deference on appeal. [Citations.] Indeed, where answers given on voir dire are equivocal or conflicting, the trial court's assessment of the person's state of mind is generally binding on appeal. [Citation.] The trial court is in the unique position of assessing demeanor, tone, and credibility firsthandfactors of `critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.' ( Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, ___ [167 L.Ed.2d 1014, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 2224].) Hence, the trial judge may be left with the `definite impression' that the person cannot impartially apply the law even though, as is often true, he has not expressed his views with absolute clarity. ([ Wainwright v.], Witt, supra, 469 U.S. [at pp.] 425-426.) ( People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 20-21 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 896, 163 P.3d 896] ( DePriest ).) We decline defendant's invitation to revisit our past decisions establishing this standard. ( People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 262-263 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 118 P.3d 451].) Affording the trial court's decisions the deference which they are owed, we conclude the trial court did not err.
Defendant contends the trial court improperly excused for cause two prospective jurors, F.G. and J.F., who expressed some reservations about their ability to impose the death penalty, because, he argues, these prospective jurors indicated they could follow the trial court's instructions and impose the death penalty in an appropriate case. We are not persuaded. F.G. stated in her juror questionnaire that she was strongly against the death penalty because GOD would do the punishing and I'm in agreement. Although she believed her church opposed the death penalty due to the commandment Thou shalt not kill, she did not feel obligated to accept the church's view. She stated, however, that she preferred not to serve as a juror in this case because she did not want anyone's blood on my hands when I die and have to answer to GOD, and would not be a fair and impartial juror because I'd not be good if it came to the penalty phase and death was the appropriate penalty. F.G. did not answer the question if you believe under the evidence presented and the legal standard you will be advised of that death is the appropriate penalty, you could return such a verdict, and wrote not sure when asked whether she could vote to impose the death penalty in a case involving a robbery special circumstance. She had earlier given conflicting answers to similar questions. Two of her answers indicated she would not always vote for or against the death penalty regardless of the evidence, and two others indicated she disagree[d] somewhat with the statements that someone who intentionally kills another person always or never should receive the death penalty. She answered yes when asked if in an appropriate case she could reject the death penalty and choose a life without parole sentence. Seemingly contradicting these answers, however, F.G. answered no when asked in the next question if she could reject a life without parole sentence and choose the death penalty in an appropriate case. During voir dire, F.G. told the trial court that her views about the death penalty had changed somewhat due to a discussion at her church Sunday school class in which the minister stated that one must follow the law of the land in situations where a person might be called upon to kill another person. She at first stated that she now was more confident that she could vote to impose the death penalty in an appropriate case and was only moderately opposed to the death penalty in general. F.G. said she now believed that by consulting with God through her prayers during the trial, she would not be going against Him if she voted for the death penalty. F.G. also said that she would pray for guidance because this is something that I don't want to be the only one making the decision. I want some kind of answer from Him. F.G., however, also stated she did not feel she should be the one to decide whether the death penalty should be imposed, and wouldn't want to be in the position to have to do it. After the trial court explained that the questions F.G. was being asked pertained to whether she could vote for the death penalty in a general sensenot whether she would actually vote for or against the death penalty in this casethe trial court finally asked her, if you go in and you say, well, considering all of the evidence in mitigation, all of the evidence in aggravation, we [the jury] believe that the appropriate penalty is death, then could you ... vote for that alternative. F.G. responded, I'll say, no. I'mI just really don't know. I'd rather say no than now say yes and get to that point and not be able to follow the law. The trial court granted the prosecution's motion to excuse F.G. for cause, noting that it found that she had tried to answer the questions truthfully, and the challenge was a real close call ... or at least was until her absolute last answer. The court found that this last answer, i.e., that F.G. did not think she could vote to impose the death penalty, in combination with F.G.'s stated desire not to be placed in the position of having to make that choice, indicated that her ability to be impartial would be substantially impaired. We cannot conclude the trial court erred by excusing F.G. for cause. Her voir dire answers indicated a continued strong aversion to being placed in the position of having to choose to impose the death penalty if that was the appropriate sentence, and her belief that, at best, she might be able to do so because she was required to follow the law of the land and would have guidance from God to help make her decision. As we have said before in similar circumstances, [t]he prospective juror's answers were equivocal and conflicting. Those answers, in combination with the trial court's firsthand observations, could give rise to a definite impression that [F.G.]'s views on the death penalty would substantially impair the performance of [her] duties. We therefore defer to the court's ruling. ( People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1007 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775]; see also DePriest, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 22.) We reach a similar conclusion regarding the trial court's decision to excuse Prospective Juror J.F. His answers in the juror questionnaire also were conflicting: he answered that he was moderately in favor of the death penalty, that he would not automatically vote for or against the death penalty, and could return such a verdict in an appropriate case. He answered no, however, when asked whether he could vote to impose the death penalty in a case involving a robbery special circumstance, and no again when asked whether in an appropriate case he could reject a life without parole sentence and vote to impose the death penalty. [16] J.F. also stated that he believed a life sentence was a worse punishment than death because death was the fast way out. He explained that his view of the death penalty was based on his belief that God will do the punishing. When questioned during voir dire about his conflicting answers, J.F. stated that he did not believe in the death penalty because of his religious views, but he guess[ed] he might be able to bend to vote for the death penalty in a really terrible case or very extreme circumstances such as a serial murderer or the murder of a child. He also stated, however, that he would be uncomfortable having to make the penalty decision, and guessed he could not be a fair juror for the prosecution. The trial court ultimately asked J.F. whether, based upon the charges in this case of murder and a robbery-murder special circumstance, and realizing there might be aggravating and mitigating evidence presented at trial, he saw any possibility of your voting for the death penalty in this case. J.F. responded, No. The trial court noted for the record that J.F.'s answer was immediate and unequivocal, and J.F. concurred in that characterization. The court, citing our decision in People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1279-1281 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1], granted the prosecution's challenge for cause, finding that J.F.'s answers suggested that he would automatically vote against the death penalty regardless of the evidence in this case. To the extent that J.F.'s answers left any doubt about his inability to impartially determine the appropriate penalty in this case, [17] as with the decision to excuse F.G., we will defer to the trial court's resolution of that uncertainty, given that his answers were at the least conflicting and equivocal, and could be viewed as indicating he would be substantially impaired in discharging his duty as a juror. Accordingly, we find no violation of defendant's constitutional rights in the trial court's excusal of Prospective Jurors F.G. and J.F. for cause.
Defendant contends the trial court erred by refusing to excuse for cause Juror A.M., who served on the jury throughout the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. We are not persuaded. As an initial matter, although defendant exercised all of his peremptory challenges, he failed to express dissatisfaction with the final jury before it was sworn. Because defendant's trial occurred before our decision in People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887] ( Crittenden ), though, we will not apply the holding in that case that the failure to do so forfeits an appellate claim that the trial court erred by denying a challenge for cause. ( Id. at p. 121, fn. 4; see Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 742.) As to the merits of his claim, in determining whether Juror A.M. was biased and should have been excused for cause, we apply the same standard discussed above, i.e., whether the record establishes that the juror's views concerning the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties. We defer to the trial court's findings of the true state of mind of the juror when the juror's answers were conflicting or ambiguous. ( Blair, supra, at pp. 741, 743.) Juror A.M.'s circumstances were essentially the same as those of the jurors we discussed in Blair, with one notable exception, which we will discuss below: initially Juror A.M. expressed some variation of the view that ... she would vote for the death penalty in all cases of intentional, deliberate, or premeditated murder. Nonetheless, after the trial court and sometimes the prosecutor explained that the death penalty was not mandatory if the defendant was found guilty of murder with special circumstances, but instead that there would be a separate penalty phase at which the parties would have the opportunity to present aggravating and mitigating evidence relevant to punishment, [she] expressed a willingness to consider all of the evidence and both available penalty options before deciding on the appropriate punishment. ( Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 743.) The only significant difference here, upon which defendant focuses our attention, is that Juror A.M. also stated in her questionnaire with regard to mitigating evidence that she did not see why someone's past has anything to do with what they are charged with today or when they committed the crime. Similarly, during voir dire, she initially stated that she did not think she would use [background information] as a factor in my decision since I don't think it's pertinent to, you know, what's on hand, the crime.... I wouldn't take it into consideration. She agreed that it was her view that she would give such evidence no weight at all. Juror A.M. ultimately stated, however, that she could reject the death penalty in an appropriate case based on the rest of the evidence, you know, ifI don't know how. Just depending on the evidence and stuff because we have our own opinion. We have to come to a consensus about it. We have to, just other than the good things and stuff, just all the evidence brought forth to support that he wouldn't deserve. (5) Defendant argues on appeal as he did in the trial court that Juror A.M.'s statements about her view of the merit of a defendant's personal background as evidence in mitigation show that her ability to be fair and impartial and to follow the law was substantially impaired. We disagree. Juror A.M.'s statements are properly understood as explaining her then existing view of the relative weight of one particular type of mitigating evidence. As the United States Supreme Court recognized in Patton v. Yount (1984) 467 U.S. 1025, 1039 [81 L.Ed.2d 847, 104 S.Ct. 2885], [i]t is well to remember that the lay persons on the panel may never have been subjected to the type of leading questions and cross-examination tactics that frequently are employed, and that were evident in this case. Prospective jurors represent a cross section of the community, and their education and experience vary widely. Also, unlike witnesses, prospective jurors have had no briefing by lawyers prior to taking the stand. Jurors thus cannot be expected invariably to express themselves carefully or even consistently. We therefore do not believe Juror A.M.'s statement that she would not take into consideration defendant's background should be read literally, but rather we interpret this comment in relation to her statement that she did not, at that time, see the relevance of such evidence. At bottom, Juror A.M. expressed strong skepticism at the abstract suggestion that the personal background of a defendant could mitigate the seriousness of having committed murder. The fact, however, that during voir dire a juror expresses a negative opinion about the persuasive valuein theoryof a certain class of mitigating evidence, does not establish that the juror's performance of his or her duty will be substantially impaired. Juror A.M. never said she would not weigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence in reaching her decision; in fact, she said she would do so. Her statements concerning personal background evidence meant only that Juror A.M.a layperson who had never before been involved in a capital trialdid not at that time see the relevance of such evidence in the determination of the appropriate sentence. The fact that this preexisting view might have made it more difficult for defendant to convince Juror A.M. of the relative strength of a mitigation case that included evidence of defendant's background does not prove that she would automatically vote for the death penalty, [18] or that her belief prevented or substantially impaired the performance of her duties as a juror to follow the trial court's instructions to weigh the evidence to be offered. (Cf. People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 447 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271] [A juror might find it very difficult to vote to impose the death penalty, and yet such a juror's performance still would not be substantially impaired under Witt, unless he or she were unwilling or unable to follow the trial court's instructions by weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the case and determining whether death is the appropriate penalty under the law.].) As the Supreme Court of Kentucky aptly stated in similar circumstances: Voir dire examination occurs when a prospective juror quite properly has little or no information about the facts of the case and only the most vague idea as to the applicable law. At such a time a juror is often presented with the facts in their harshest light and asked if he could consider imposition of a minimum punishment. Many jurors find it difficult to conceive of minimum punishment when the facts as given suggest only the most severe punishment. Similarly, many citizens are astounded to learn that being under the influence of drugs or alcohol [or, as here, the defendant's personal background] may be considered by them as factors mitigating the punishment which should be imposed. Predictably, when asked whether they believe being under the influence should mitigate punishment, the answer is often in the negative. A per se disqualification is not required merely because a juror does not instantly embrace every legal concept presented during voir dire examination. The test is not whether a juror agrees with the law when it is presented in the most extreme manner. The test is whether, after having heard all of the evidence, the prospective juror can conform his views to the requirements of the law and render a fair and impartial verdict. ( Mabe v. Com. (Ky. 1994) 884 S.W.2d 668, 671.) Affording the proper deference to the trial court's assessment of Juror A.M.'s ability to follow the law and to weigh the evidence for and against the death penaltyultimately assigning whatever weight she deemed appropriate to the evidence on each sidewe conclude the trial court did not err in denying the challenge for cause, and, accordingly, defendant was not denied his right to a fair and impartial jury.