Opinion ID: 1133633
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the statute in this case, section 43-47-19, miss. code 1972, amend., is unconstitutional on the grounds of vagueness and ambiguity, and as such, a conviction under same is void.

Text: ¶ 7. The statute in question reads as follows: Miss.Code Ann. § 43-47-19. Abuse, neglect and exploitation forbidden (1) It shall be unlawful for any person to abuse, neglect or exploit any vulnerable adult. (2) Any person who willfully commits an act or omits the performance of any duty, which act or omission contributes to, tends to contribute to or results in the abuse, neglect or exploitation of any vulnerable adult shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not to exceed One Thousand Dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment not to exceed one (1) year in the county jail, or by both such fine and imprisonment. (3) Any person who wilfully inflicts physical pain or injury upon a vulnerable adult shall be guilty of felonious abuse and/or battery of a vulnerable adult and, upon conviction thereof, may be punished by imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years. Explanations of the statutory terms appear in the definition section of the statute, as follows: Miss.Code Ann. § 43-47-5 Definitions For the purposes of this chapter, the following words shall have the meanings ascribed herein unless the context otherwise requires: (a) Abuse shall mean the willful infliction of physical pain, injury or mental anguish on a vulnerable adult, the unreasonable confinement of a vulnerable adult, or the willful deprivation by a caretaker of services which are necessary to maintain the mental and physical health of a vulnerable adult. Abuse shall not mean conduct which is part of the treatment and care of, and in furtherance of the health and safety of a patient or resident of a care facility. . . . (i) Exploitation shall mean ... the illegal or improper use of a vulnerable adult or his resources for another's profit or advantage. . . . (k) Neglect shall mean ... the failure of a caretaker to supply the vulnerable adult with food, clothing, shelter, health care, supervision or other services which are necessary to maintain his mental and physical health. ¶ 8. Boatner argues that the statute gives no guidance as to the meaning of abuse, neglect or exploitation and that, therefore, the criminal act is left up to a jury, or in this case, a judge to define. Clearly, subsections (a),(i), and (k) of section 43-47-5, as outlined, supra, not only offer guidance, but lay out plain definitions of the terms abuse, neglect and exploitation, so that the judge in this case had no need to, nor did he, provide his own definitions. ¶ 9. Boatner offers the cases of Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 86 S.Ct. 518, 15 L.Ed.2d 447 (1966) and Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 82 S.Ct. 275, 7 L.Ed.2d 285 (1961) as standing for the proposition that an unconstitutionally vague statute which carries the risk of prosecution constitutes a denial of due process of law. ¶ 10. In Giaccio, the defendant was acquitted and sentenced to pay the costs of prosecution. 382 U.S. 399, 86 S.Ct. 518, 15 L.Ed.2d 447. The 1860 Act simply stated that the jurors shall determine, by their verdict, whether ... the defendant shall pay the costs and that the judge shall pass sentence to that effect, and order [defendant] to be committed to the jail [until he pays]. Id., 86 S.Ct. at 521. The court, in holding the Act constitutionally invalid, noted that the statute did not impose any condition, limitation or contingency on the jury. Id. ¶ 11. The statutory language in Giaccio stands in stark contrast to the clear language of Miss.Code Ann. § 43-47-19 and its subsections which list the specific offensive acts proscribed, (1) abuse, neglect or exploit any vulnerable adult, (2) willfully commits an act or omits the performance of a duty, which.. contributes to, tends to contribute to or results in the abuse, neglect or exploitation of any vulnerable adult.... Miss.Code Ann. § 43-47-19. ¶ 12. In Giaccio, the Court stated that, ... a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case. Id., 86 S.Ct. at 520, 521. The Giaccio Court also stated that [i]mplicit in this constitutional safeguard is the premise that the law must be one that carries an understandable meaning with legal standards that courts must enforce. This state Act does not even begin to meet this constitutional requirement. Id., 86 S.Ct. at 521. In further contrast to the sparse language addressed by the Giaccio Court, the language of Miss.Code Ann. § 43-47-5 provides definitions with understandable meaning for the punishable acts of abuse, exploitation and neglect. Miss.Code Ann. § 43-47-5(a),(i),(k). These statutory directives and definitions were intended to, and successfully provide clear legal standards that the courts can and must enforce as the Circuit Court did in this case. ¶ 13. In Cramp, the statutory language in question involved an oath which required all employees of the State of Florida to swear that they, inter alia, had not and would not lend [their] aid, support, advise, counsel or influence to the Communist Party. Cramp, at 280 & 285, 82 S.Ct. 275. The issue to be decided was not only whether a state can constitutionally compel those in its service to swear to such terms, but what the terms meant. Id. at 286, 82 S.Ct. 275. The Court, focusing on the extraordinary ambiguity of the statutory language, discussed whether one who had ever cast a vote for a Communist candidate legally appearing on a ballot could safely subscribe to the oath, or whether one who had voted for a candidate nominated by another party, but endorsed by the Communist Party, could so subscribe. Id. The Court further questioned whether a lawyer who had represented the Communist Party or its members swear that he had never knowingly lent his counsel to the Party. ¶ 14. The Court in Cramp, in holding an oath to be unconstitutionally vague, stated: We think this case demonstrably falls within the compass of those decisions of the Court which hold that ... a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process law. Id., at 287, 82 S.Ct. 275, (citation omitted). The Court also commented, No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statute. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids. Id., citation omitted. In light of the plain language of Miss.Code Ann. §§ 43-47-19; 43-47-5(a), (i), (k), it is clear what the State forbids. Where the statute proscribes willful infliction of physical pain, injury or mental anguish on a vulnerable adult and commit[ting] an act ... which contributes to, tends to contribute to or results in [willful infliction of physical pain, injury or mental anguish (upon) a vulnerable adult] (§ 43-47-19 and § 43-47-5(a)), the statute is clearly informative. This Court has held that the test concerning statutory construction is whether a person of ordinary intelligence would, by reading the statute, receive fair notice of that which is required or forbidden. State v. Burnham, 546 So.2d 690, 692 (Miss. 1989). The language of the statute in question informs an adult of ordinary intelligence that striking an adult patient in a care facility with an open hand is punishable as abuse. As the State emphasizes, in its brief, [a]lthough a statute imposing criminal penalties must be strictly construed in favor of the accused, it should not be so strict as to override common sense or statutory purpose. United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25, 68 S.Ct. 376, 380, 92 L.Ed. 442, 448 (1948). ¶ 15. An unstrained reading of the statute would also put any person of ordinary intelligence on notice that a striking which left a red mark in the shape of a partial hand print long enough for a nurse to obtain a photograph of it, is abuse. At the very least, such a striking would be something which clearly tended to contribute... to the abuse ... of any vulnerable adult. Id. Likewise, a plain reading of the statute would put one on notice that a striking which caused an elderly patient to respond by yell[ing] out is abuse, or at the very least would be an act that tends to contribute to or result in abuse. Id. ¶ 16. Whereas the Court in Cramp stated, ... it appears upon a mere inspection that these general words and phrases are so vague and indefinite that any penalty prescribed for their violation constitutes a denial of due process of law, the court in the present case was not left with general words and phrases to decipher. Id. Because the vague statutory language found in Giaccio and Cramp is so distinguishable from the informative language of Miss. Code Ann. § 43-47-19 and § 43-47-5(a),(i), (k), neither case is controlling. Here, the Mississippi statute in question does not constitute a denial of due process. ¶ 17. In Meeks v. Tallahatchie County, 513 So.2d 563 (Miss.1987), this Court applied the test for determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague as set out in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). [A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process. Meeks, at 566 (quoting Connally, at 391, 46 S.Ct. 126). Boatner herself admitted under oath that you are never supposed to hit a resident and that to do so is abuse. The State rightfully asks how Boatner can, then, claim the statute was vague. Boatner was on notice as to what behavior was prohibited. Id. For the foregoing reasons, Boatner's argument that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous fails.