Opinion ID: 1233910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: FACTOR (b) INSTRUCTION

Text: (16) With respect to factor (b), the trial court instructed the jury (1) that evidence had been introduced for the purpose of showing that defendant had been convicted of forcible rape, possession of a deadly weapon and receiving stolen property, (2) that before it could consider any of the crimes as an aggravating factor it must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was, in fact convicted of such crimes, and (3) that it could not consider any evidence of any other crime as an aggravating circumstance. [22] Defendant now contends that this instruction was inadequate because it did not inform the jury that it could only consider the testimonial evidence of the circumstances underlying the prior convictions if it found that that evidence  as distinguished from the convictions themselves  had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Cf. People v. Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d 21, 53-55.) Because the instruction specifically advised the jury that it could not consider evidence of any crime other than the crimes of which defendant had been convicted as an aggravating circumstance, however, the instruction did not leave the jury free to consider other actions by the defendant that were disclosed by the testimony of the rape victim as distinct aggravating circumstances under factor (b). Accordingly, we find no error. (See, e.g., People v. Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d 991, 1040.)