Opinion ID: 2160038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Probate Court's Jurisdiction

Text: Ms. Pollack contends that the probate court did not have the requisite personal jurisdiction over Ms. Orshansky to appoint a guardian or conservator for her. Although the question of personal jurisdiction is one which neither Ms. Orshansky's appointed counsel nor Mr. Jordan raised on her behalf, we assume that Ms. Pollack, as a putative alternative guardian and conservator, has standing to challenge it. To sustain the probate court's jurisdiction, appellees rely on D.C.Code § 21-2021(1) and (4). Subsection (1), on which the probate court specifically relied, provides that the Guardianship Act applies to [a]ffairs and estates of a disappeared individual who is domiciled in the District and an individual to be protected who is domiciled in the District. Contrary to a suggestion by Ms. Pollack, this provision authorizes an intervention proceeding where the subject is either a disappeared individual who is domiciled in the District or an individual to be protected who is domiciled in the District. Appellees argue that Ms. Orshansky was in the latter category. In addition, subsection (4) provides that the Act also applies to [a]n incapacitated individual in the District, which appellees argue Ms. Orshansky was before Ms. Pollack removed her to New York. Ms. Orshansky was unquestionably a domiciliary of the District of Columbia and, of course, was physically in the District  at the time she was hospitalized and the petition in this case filed and served on her. She had resided in the District for some forty years without interruption, she owned her apartment here, and while she also owned an apartment in New York City, she had not moved there. Residence in fact is an essential element of domicile, District of Columbia v. Woods, 465 A.2d 385, 387 (D.C.1983) (citations omitted), and the place where a [person] lives is properly taken to be [her] domicile until facts adduced establish the contrary. In re Estate of Derricotte, 744 A.2d 535, 538 (D.C.2000) (quoting District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 455, 62 S.Ct. 303, 86 L.Ed. 329 (1941)). Thus, when the petition was filed, the probate court had jurisdiction pursuant to both subsections (1) and (4) of D.C.Code § 21-2021. The probate court did not lose jurisdiction under these subsections merely because Ms. Pollack moved her aunt to New York before the hearing. In the first place, the court readily could find as it did that Ms. Orshansky's domicile remained in the District. Domicile, once established, is presumed to continue until it is shown to have been changed. Derricotte, 744 A.2d at 538 (citation omitted). Physical presence in a new location does not defeat the presumption of continuing domicile unless an intent `to abandon a former domicile' in favor of a new one is also proven. Id. (quoting Woods, 465 A.2d at 387). It is plain that Ms. Pollack did not carry her burden of proving that Ms. Orshansky intended to forsake the District of Columbia and resettle in New York. Ms. Pollack presented some evidence that her aunt had made contingency plans for moving to New York to reside near her family if she became unable to take care of herself in Washington, but none that her aunt made the decision to act on those plans and stay in New York. To the contrary, the judge credited Mr. Jordan's testimony that Ms. Orshansky believed herself still to be in Washington, D.C. We are not persuaded by Ms. Pollack's argument that she was authorized as Ms. Orshansky's designated health care agent to change her domicile when she became incapacitated. Assuming that the health care proxy was valid and had taken effect, it merely authorized Ms. Pollack to make health care decisions for her aunt. It did not purport to make Ms. Pollack her aunt's guardian for other purposes or empower her to change her aunt's domicile. Cf. D.C.Code § 21-2047(b)(2) (stating that a court-appointed guardian may [t]ake custody of the person of the ward and establish the ward's place of abode within or without the District, if consistent with the terms of any order by a court of competent jurisdiction relating to detention or commitment of the ward); Lehmer v. Hardy, 54 App. D.C. 51, 54, 294 F. 407, 410 (1923) (stating that the guardian of a minor child has the right to change or fix her residence and domicile). In personam jurisdiction generally is determined as of the commencement of an action, and we see no reason to make an exception to that general rule for proceedings under the Guardianship Act, which states that general principles of law and equity are applicable unless displaced by ... particular provisions in the statute. D.C.Code § 21-2002(a). The Act is to be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies, which, broadly speaking, are to meet the needs of incapacitated persons for guardianship and other protection. D.C.Code § 21-2001(a). It would not help meet those needs to construe the Act so narrowly as to deprive the court of its power to intervene on an incapacitated person's behalf if that person happens to leave the District after a proceeding has been commenced. Still less would it promote the purposes and policies of the Act to construe it to permit a third party to terminate the court's jurisdiction over an incapacitated person unilaterally, by the simple expedient of removing that person from the District before the hearing on the petition can be held. We reject such a construction. As Ms. Orshansky was in the District and domiciled here when the Hospital filed its petition and served it on her, we conclude that the Superior Court had jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing on the petition notwithstanding her subsequent departure for New York.