Opinion ID: 1133622
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Prosecutor's Comments Regarding Defendant's Escape From Prison and Potential Threat to Others in Prison

Text: Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument at the penalty phase by falsely characterizing defendant's 1973 escape from prison as violent, and by arguing that defendant could pose a threat of violence to others in prison if he were sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. According to defendant, the prosecutor's intentional presentation of false and misleading information to the jury introduced improper aggravating factors, depriving him of a fair trial and a reliable penalty determination. [19] A defense witness at the penalty phase testified that defendant escaped from prison when he and approximately 10 other inmates cut through the roof of the cellblock and went over the wall using a rope ladder. The witness stated that no one was harmed during the escape. No evidence suggested that defendant possessed a weapon at the time of the escape, or that the escape itself otherwise involved violence or the threat of violence. The prosecution did present evidence, however, that after defendant escaped and before he was apprehended, defendant committed an armed robbery. (See pt. H.B.2., ante. ) During closing argument, in the course of discussing defendant's prior criminal activity, the prosecutor observed that defendant was sentenced to prison in 1969 for armed robbery, and that in 1973 he escaped. The prosecutor then stated: Now, the fact that he's sentenced, or the fact that he escaped, are not factors in aggravation. They're just part of the history of the choices that he's made. [¶] Then while he was escaped, while he was out of prison, in April of 1973, he robbed Mr. Cavins, who came in and testified as to exactly what happened there. [¶] Again, he uses a firearm.... After referring to testimony regarding defendant's possession of a shank in prison, the prosecutor continued: One of the threads that runs through all these events is that [defendant] always manages to get his hands on a deadly weapon. He has a gun, and he threatens to kill his wife, and fires the shots in the car. [¶] He is convicted of an armed robbery. He's arrested. He has a gun, and he escapes from prison. While he's escaped from prison, he manages to get a gun, and commits another act of violence. (Italics added.) Later in his argument, the prosecutor made the following comments: Would [defendant] be a threat in prison? Possibly. He's escaped in the past, and when he's escaped, he's committed a violent act. [¶] The ... only times he hasn't been in prison since 1969, he's committed violent acts; escape in 1973; robbed Mr. Cavins. And he's out for just barely over a year, after all this time in prison, and he commits the murder that has brought us here today. Contrary to defendant's characterization of the prosecutor's remarks, we find the prosecutor did not suggest that defendant possessed a gun when he escaped from prison. In light of the evidence and previous argument, it is clear the statement, He's arrested. He has a gun, and he escapes from prison, was transcribed with punctuation conveying a meaning different from that intended by the prosecutor. Defendant did have a gun when he was arrested for robbery. On no other occasion did the prosecutor imply that defendant was armed when he escaped, or that the escape involved violence; indeed, the prosecutor explicitly conceded that the escape could not be considered as an aggravating factor  something he would not have done if he could have asserted an implied threat of violence because of defendant's possession of a firearm. (See People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1235-1236, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) In addition, if defendant had possessed a gun when he escaped from prison, it is unlikely the prosecutor would have said that while defendant was at large, he managed to obtain a gun. Similarly, by stating that when defendant was not in prison, he's committed violent acts; escape in 1973; robbed Mr. Cavins, the prosecutor was not suggesting that the escape was a violent act, but rather that defendant committed the violent act of robbery while he was at large after the escape. The prosecutor's argument did not mischaracterize the evidence. Nor did the prosecutor improperly suggest that defendant might pose a threat to others in prison. It is settled that a defendant's knowing possession of a potentially dangerous weapon in custody is admissible under [section 190.3,] factor (b). Such conduct is unlawful and involves an implied threat of violence even where there is no evidence defendant used or displayed it in a provocative or threatening manner. ( People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 589, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142.) Defendant offered an innocent explanation for his possession of a shank in prison (self-defense), as he was entitled to do, but the evidence remains admissible under section 190.3, factor (b). (4 Cal.4th at p. 589, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142.) As a result of his possession of the weapon, defendant was placed in involuntary segregation due to a threat to the population.... Therefore, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by suggesting that defendant might pose a threat of violence in prison. ( People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1172, 1174, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.)