Opinion ID: 2455113
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Whether the District's proposed general obligation bond issue for the purpose of improving and expanding the District's existing water system is in violation of law?

Text: [¶ 25] The District planned to fund its improvement project by issuing general obligation bonds in the amount of $660,000.00, which bonds would accrue interest at 7 percent per annum, maturing in 30 years. On February 7, 2008, the District passed a resolution to levy an 8-mill tax on property within the District for the purpose of repaying the bonds. As noted above, two of Mountain Cement's claims survived dismissal: Claim IV, which challenged the District's tax resolution, and Claim V, which sought a declaration that the bond issue was invalid. See supra ¶ 8. Those claims were later determined against Mountain Cement via summary judgment. The present issue, arising out of Claim V, was determined by the district court in a decision letter dated April 20, 2010. The determination of that issue is primarily a question of statutory interpretation, requiring a journey through numerous statutes. [7] We will begin that process by setting forth Mountain Cement's position. [¶ 26] Chapter 10 of Title 41 of the Wyoming Statutes is entitled Water and Sewer District Law. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-10-103(a) (LexisNexis 2009) authorizes a board of county commissioners to establish water and sewer districts. Once a district has been established, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-10-113(a)(xii) (LexisNexis 2009) grants it the following authority: To borrow money and incur indebtedness and other obligations and evidence the same by certificates, notes or debentures, and to issue bonds, in accordance with the provisions of this act[.] In turn, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-10-124(a) (LexisNexis 2009) delineates the types of securities available to a district to evidence the borrowing of money: (a) A district may borrow money and issue the following securities to evidence such borrowing: (i) Short-term notes; (ii) General obligation bonds and other like securities; (iii) Revenue bonds and other like securities; and (iv) Special assessment bonds and other like securities. [¶ 27] The focal point of the present issue is the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-10-128 (LexisNexis 2009), which reads in its entirety as follows: § 41-10-128. Borrowing money and issuing bonds for purpose of acquiring or improving water or sewer system or other income-producing project. A district in pursuance of a resolution may borrow money, issue bonds, or otherwise extend its credit for the purpose of acquiring or improving a water or sewer system, or other income-producing project; provided that the bonds or other obligations shall be made payable solely out of the net revenues derived from the operation of the system or other such project; and the systems and projects may be combined, operated and maintained as joint systems or projects, in which case the bonds or other obligations shall be made payable solely out of the net revenues derived from the operation of the joint systems or projects. No revenue bonds or other like securities shall be issued unless the issuance thereof has been submitted to a vote of the electors and approved by a majority of the qualified taxpaying electors voting on the question and by a majority of other qualified electors voting thereon, or, if no ballots are cast in one (1) of the ballot boxes and a majority of the ballots in the other ballot box favor the issuance of such bonds or other like securities, approved either by a majority of the qualified taxpaying electors voting thereon or by a majority of the other qualified electors voting thereon, as the case may be, at an election held as provided for bond elections by the Political Subdivision Bond Election Law, W.S. XX-XX-XXX through XX-XX-XXX. (Emphasis added.) It is Mountain Cement's position that the above-emphasized language specifically limits the District to the issuance of revenue bonds, rather than general obligation bonds, under these circumstances. [¶ 28] The district court employed the following logic in disagreeing with Mountain Cement and in granting summary judgment to the District. First, citing §§ 41-10-113 and 41-10-124, the district court noted the general authority of districts to incur debt and to issue bonds. Next, the district court concluded as follows in regard to the first sentence of § 41-10-128: As used in the first sentence of Section 128, one could (but is not necessarily required to) conclude that the word bonds could apply to revenue bonds and general obligation bonds. However, this conclusion defies logic given the fact that the remainder of that same sentence mandates that the bonds be repaid out of net revenues, a requirement generally applicable only to revenue bonds. It would seem, then, that the term bonds does not include general obligation bonds which, by definition, are repaid from ad valorem property taxes. (Emphasis is original.) To these comments, the district court appended a footnote in which it surmised that [t]he conclusion that Wyoming Statute § 41-10-128 is intended to be limited to revenue bonds is bolstered by the sentence within that statute that refers specifically to revenue bonds. [¶ 29] The reader might conclude at this point that the district court had found the statute to be unambiguous, and that the statute limits districts to the use of revenue bonds when acquiring or improving a water system. But the above-quoted language from the decision letter directly precedes the following: Further, to read the statute as Mountain Cement would ask would leave a district with virtually no ability to create its water supply system in the first place, as the construction of the initial system surely would meet the definition of acquiring or improving a water or sewer system, thus meaning that any foundling district would be required to pay for the new construction or purchase of its water system solely from revenues collected from that system. Practically speaking, this limitation would nullify a district's ability to acquire or build an initial water supply system. Taken as a whole, Wyoming Statute § 41-10-128 is ambiguous and requires this Court to delve further in its quest for a proper statutory interpretation. In other words, the district court found the language of the statute, in and of itself, to be unambiguous, but then found the statute to be ambiguous based upon its possible application. [8] [¶ 30] Having found § 41-10-128 ambiguous, the district court sought to determine legislative intent first by looking to the statute's origin in 1959 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 188, §§ 24-28, at 277-78, where the following related sections are found: Forms of BorrowingExemption From Taxation Section 24. A district may borrow money and issue the following securities to evidence such borrowing: Short-term notes; General obligation bonds and other like securities; Revenue bonds and other like securities; and Special assessment bonds and other like securities. . . . . Short-Term Notes Section 25. A district, upon the affirmative vote of four directors, is hereby authorized to borrow money without an election in anticipation of the collection of taxes or other revenues and to issue short-term notes to evidence the amount so borrowed. Such short-term notes shall be payable from the fund for which the money was borrowed; shall mature before the close of the fiscal year in which the money is borrowed; and shall not be extended or funded except in compliance with Section 26, General Obligation Bonds of this Act. General Obligation Bonds. Section 26. No bonds or other evidences of indebtedness payable in whole or in part from the proceeds of general (ad valorem) property taxes or to which the full faith and credit of a district are pledged, shall be issued, except in pursuance of a resolution, nor until the question of their issuance shall at a special or biennial election be sumbitted [sic] to a vote of the electors and approved by a majority of the qualified taxpaying electors voting on the question and by a majority of other qualified electors voting thereon, in the maner [sic] provided by Article 6, Chapter 31, Wyoming Compiled Statutes, 1945, as from time to time amended. Limitation on Indebtedness Section 27. The aggregate amount of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness shall not exceed six per centum of the assessed value of the taxable property within the district as shown by the last preceding general assessment; provided, however, that in determining the amount of indebtedness, there shall not be included within the computation, bonds or other evidences of indebtedness outstanding or authorized to be issued for supplying water to the district, short-term notes, special assessment securities, or securities payable solely from the net revenues of an income-producing system or other project. Revenue Bonds. Section 28. A district in pursuance of a resolution may borrow money, issue bonds, or otherwise extend its credit for the purpose of acquiring or improving a water or sewer system, or other income producing project; provided that the bonds or other obligations shall be made payable solely out of the net revenues derived from the operation of such system or other such project; and such systems and projects may be combined, operated and maintained as joint systems or projects, in which case such bonds or other obligations shall be made payable solely out of the net revenues derived from the operation of such joint systems or projects. No revenue bonds or other like securities shall be issued unless the issuance thereof has been submitted to a vote of the electors and approved by a majority of the qualified taxpaying electors voting on the question and by a majority of other qualified electors voting thereon, in the manner provided by Article 6, Chapter 31, Wyoming Compiled Statutes, 1945, as from time to time amended. [¶ 31] From the format and organization of these sections, the district court reached the following conclusions: In large part, the statute stood then as it does today. And, as it originated, the Act followed a logical sequence of specifying the various methods by which a district could finance its projects. . . . . In reviewing the original form of the Act, it becomes apparent that Sections 24-28 were intended to address the various means by which a district could incur indebtedness and/or otherwise finance its projects. Revenue bonds were only one such option. And, while revenue bonds are limited to being issued for the purpose of acquiring or improving a water or sewer system, or other income producing project, the contrary is not true under the Act: Revenue bonds are not the only means a district has of financing such projects. (Emphasis in original.) To make it more clear, we will re-state what we believe to be the district court's interpretation of the relevant portions of the above sections. First, Section 26 does not prohibit the use of general obligation bonds to finance the acquisition or improvement of a water or sewer system. Second, the phrase provided that the bonds or other obligations shall be made payable solely out of the net revenues in Section 28 applies only to revenue bonds. In other words, under the district court's reading of these sections, a district may fund a water system acquisition or improvement project either through general obligation bonds, or through revenue bonds, but if done by the latter, the bonds must clearly state that they are payable solely out of revenue from the project. [¶ 32] To bolster this interpretation of § 41-10-128, the district court cited other sections of the Water and Sewer District Law. For instance, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-10-115 (LexisNexis 2009) provides in pertinent part as follows: To levy and collect taxes, the board shall determine, in each year, the amount of money necessary to be raised by taxation, taking into consideration other sources of revenue of the district, and shall fix a rate of levy, which, when levied upon every dollar of assessed valuation of taxable property within the district, and together with other revenues, will raise the amount required by the district annually to supply funds for paying expenses of organization and the costs of acquiring, operating and maintaining the works and equipment of the district .... (Emphasis added.) In this section, the district court found legislative intent that districts may fund water and sewer systems through taxation and the concomitant issuance of general obligation bonds. Similarly, the district court reached the following conclusion from its reading of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-10-127 (LexisNexis 2009), the substance of which is identical to the language of Section 27 set forth above: The intent to allow a variety of financing options also is reflected in Wyoming Statute § 41-10-127, [] which limits the amount of indebtedness a board may incur but specifically excludes from that calculation bonds or other evidences of indebtedness... for supplying water to the district[.] Id. Accordingly, The District has the power to incur general obligation bonds issued to supply water to The District. Section 127 provides that maximum aggregate amount of indebtedness a district can incur but exempts indebtedness outstanding for supplying water to the district from those calculations. [¶ 33] Next, the district court concluded that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-10-130 (LexisNexis 2009) arguably allows a district to incur indebtedness to pay for the acquisition or improvement of any project by general obligation bonds or revenue bonds because the section apparently applies to all extensions of credit, including general obligation bonds. (Emphasis in original.) Section 41-10-130 provides in pertinent part as follows: Whenever any board shall determine, by resolution, that the interest of said district and the public interest or necessity demand the acquisition or improvement of any project ... to carry out the objects or purposes of said district, requiring the creation of an indebtedness or the issuance of securities herein required to be authorized by the electors of the district, said board shall order the submission of the proposition of creating such indebtedness or securities to the qualified electors of the district at an election. (Emphasis added.) [¶ 34] The district court found additional support for the proposition that revenue bonds are not intended to be the sole method for financing the acquisition or improvement of a water system in the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-10-131 (LexisNexis 2009). That statute provides in part as follows: The principal of and interest on revenue bonds herein authorized to be issued ... shall be payable solely from the net revenues derived from the operation of the project for the acquisition or improvement of which the bonds are issued ...; and the principal of and interest on special assessment bonds herein authorized to be issued ... shall be payable solely out of moneys collected on account of the assessments, principal, interest and any penalties, levied for the project for the acquisition or improvement of which the bonds are issued [.] (Emphasis added.) The district court concluded that the emphasized language of this section would be rendered null and void if a district was limited to acquiring or improving a water or other income-producing project out of the net revenues of said project. Finally, the district court cited Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-10-134 (LexisNexis 2009), which provides that [g]eneral obligation bonds, revenue bonds or special assessment bonds herein authorized to be issued shall bear a date or dates, shall mature in a denomination or denominations at the time or times not exceeding the estimated life of the improvements acquired with the bond proceeds .... (Emphasis added.) [¶ 35] Mountain Cement's disagreement with the district court's conclusions is three-pronged. First, Mountain Cement is adamant that the very specific words used in § 41-10-128 are unambiguous, and those words unambiguously require that bonds issued for the purpose of acquiring or improving a water system shall be made payable solely out of the net revenues derived from the operation of the system.... In short, such bonds must be revenue bonds. [¶ 36] Second, while conceding that the title or heading of a statute is not part of the substantive law enacted, Mountain Cement notes that the title or heading may suggest the purpose of the statute. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-105(c) (LexisNexis 2009); Counts v. State, 2008 WY 156, ¶ 18, 197 P.3d 1280, 1285 (Wyo.2008); and 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 108 (2001). In that regard, Mountain Cement finds the legislative history of the headings to this statute instructive. We noted above that, as originally enacted in the 1959 Session Laws, Section 28 was entitled Revenue Bonds. [9] Mountain Cement considers that heading a clear indication that the bonds described therein were to be revenue bonds. In 1965, the legislature re-enacted Section 28 with the new heading Water, Sewer System Bonds; Conditions. 1965 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 144, § 2, at 397. In this change, Mountain Cement sees the legislature's intent to identify the specific conditions that must be placed upon bonds issued for water systems; i.e., such bonds must be payable solely out of revenues. Mountain Cement also points out a further re-enactment of the statute in 1996, with the heading changed to Borrowing money and issuing bonds for purpose of acquiring or improving water or sewer system or other income-producing project. 1996 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 97, § 2, at 327. This change, Mountain Cement contends, reinforced the legislature's intent to limit how bonds can be used to fund water systems. [¶ 37] Finally, Mountain Cement disagrees with the conclusions the district court reached when reading § 41-10-128 in pari materia with other sections of the Water and Sewer District Law. For instance, Mountain Cement reads § 41-10-115 as authorizing the District to pay for operations, and for acquisition and maintenance of works and equipment by tax levy, and to pay interest and principal on general obligation bonds, but not to pay obligations statutorily required to be paid by net revenues. Instead, Mountain Cement points to the District's authority under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-10-113(a)(xxi) (LexisNexis 2009) to increase usage rates and to pledge the additional income to pay any indebtedness of the District. Specifically, Mountain Cement argues that the general provisions of § 41-10-115 do not abrogate the requirements of §§ 41-10-128 and 41-10-131 that improvements to the water system must be funded by the net revenues derived from operation of the system. [¶ 38] Mountain Cement also takes issue with the district court's interpretation of § 41-10-127 as granting authority to the District to issue general obligation bonds for the purpose of supplying water to the District. Mountain Cement contends that the exemption of certain bonds from the total indebtedness computation is not equivalent to a grant of authority to issue general obligation bonds for any particular purpose, and does not negate the specific language of § 41-10-128. Similarly, according to Mountain Cement, the provisions of §§ 41-10-129 and 41-10-131 dealing with special assessment districts do not amend or abrogate the specific language of § 41-10-128. In fact, § 41-10-131 states that [a]ll bonds not issued payable solely from such revenues or special assessments (with or without additional security) shall be the general obligations of the district, and the full faith and credit of the district shall be pledged for the payment thereof[,] thus maintaining the distinction between the two. Finally, Mountain Cement characterizes § 41-10-130 as a statute setting forth the general requirements for any bond issue that requires an election, and § 41-10-134 as a statute setting forth the general requirements for any bond herein authorized to be issued in regard to maturity dates, rates of interest, and other procedural requirements. Neither statute, according to Mountain Cement, contains a specific grant of authority to issue general obligation bonds for any particular purpose. [¶ 39] Before we address the question of whether the bond issue violated § 41-10-128, we feel obliged to discuss some inter-related rules of statutory construction that must be clearly understood and applied in this case: (1) our first duty is to interpret a statute to determine whether it is ambiguous or unambiguous; (2) we have no right or authority to construe an unambiguous statute; (3) in interpreting statutes, we consider all related statutes in pari materia. [10] We have set forth these principles in seemingly innumerable opinions. See, e.g., BP America, 2005 WY 60, ¶ 15, 112 P.3d at 604; Fuller v. State, 2010 WY 55, ¶ 5, 230 P.3d 309, 310 (Wyo. 2010); Rawlinson v. Greer, 2003 WY 28, ¶ 14, 64 P.3d 120, 123 (Wyo.2003); Wyo. Cmty. Coll. Comm'n v. Casper Cmty. Coll. Dist., 2001 WY 86, ¶ 16, 31 P.3d 1242, 1249 (Wyo. 2001). In every case, we have defined the word ambiguous as meaning something like vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. See, e.g., Fuller, 2010 WY 55, ¶ 5, 230 P.3d at 310; Rawlinson, 2003 WY 28, ¶ 14, 64 P.3d at 123. By identifying the practice of construing statutes in pari materia as a rule of construction, we have suggested that the practice does not apply unless we first find a particular statute to be ambiguous. In fact, that appears to be the general rule: Sections and acts in pari materia, and all parts thereof, should be construed together and compared with each other. Because the object of the rule is to ascertain and carry into effect the legislative intent, it proceeds upon the supposition that the several statutes were governed by one spirit and policy, and were intended to be consistent and harmonious in their several parts and provisions. Under this rule, each statute or section is construed in the light of, with reference to, or in connection with, other statutes or sections. However, no mere collation of other statutes is decisive in determining what a particular statute means. Furthermore, as in the case of all other rules of statutory construction, the necessity of applying the rule as to the construction of statutes in pari materia exists only where the terms of the statute to be construed are ambiguous, or its significance doubtful. 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 103 (2001) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). [¶ 40] The problem with applying the practice of reading statutes in pari materia only in cases where an ambiguity has been identified within the confines of a single statute is that it does not account for the ambiguity created when two related statutes say two different things on the same subject. Some courts have taken care of this problem by broadening the definition of ambiguity to include situations where one statutory section irreconcilably conflicts with another statutory section. See, e.g., People v. Gardner, 482 Mich. 41, 753 N.W.2d 78, 85, n. 12 (2008); and Vill. of Holly v. Holly Twp., 267 Mich. App. 461, 705 N.W.2d 532, 539 (2005), appeal denied, 474 Mich. 1025, 708 N.W.2d 429 (2006); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 114 (2001). Our point now is to make it clear that statutes should be considered in pari materia as part of the process of determining whether they are ambiguous, and not just as part of the process of determining their meaning once they have been found to be ambiguous. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 843, 846, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (unambiguous if statutory scheme is coherent and consistent). In actuality, such is not inconsistent with our prior practice, even though we have not always been clear on the matter. See, e.g., Anderson v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 157, ¶ 9, 245 P.3d 263, 266-67 (Wyo. 2010); Ball v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 128, ¶ 29, 239 P.3d 621, 629 (Wyo.2010); Bd. of County Comm'rs of County of Campbell v. Rio Tinto Energy Am., Inc., 2008 WY 139, ¶ 5, 196 P.3d 791, 793 (Wyo.2008); BP America, 2005 WY 60, ¶ 15, 112 P.3d at 604; and Jones ex rel. Jones v. State, Dep't of Health, 2001 WY 28, ¶ 11, 18 P.3d 1189, 1194 (Wyo.2001). We take this opportunity to clarify that a statute is ambiguous not only if it is vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations, but also if it irreconcilably conflicts with another statute or section of the same statute in pari materia. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So.2d 1260, 1265-66 (Fla.2008) (If a part of a statute appears to have a clear meaning if considered alone but when given that meaning is inconsistent with other parts of the same statute or others in pari materia, the Court will examine the entire act and those in pari materia in order to ascertain the overall legislative intent.). [¶ 41] The second point we wish to make in regard to statutory construction arises out of the fact that the district court appears to have found § 41-10-128 unambiguous in its wording, but then found it ambiguous due to its effect. See supra ¶ 29. That runs contrary to the general rule: It is generally regarded as permissible to consider the consequences of a proposed interpretation of a statute, where the act is ambiguous in terms and fairly susceptible of two constructions. Under such circumstances, it is presumed that undesirable consequences were not intended; instead, it is presumed that the statute was intended to have the most beneficial operation that the language permits. A construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. On the other hand, where a statute is so plain and unambiguous that it is not susceptible of more than one construction, courts construing the same should not be concerned with the consequences resulting therefrom. The undesirable consequences do not justify a departure from the terms of the act as written. In such case, the consequences, if objectionable, can only be avoided by a change of the law itself, to be effected by the legislature, and not by judicial action in the guise of interpretation. 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 171 (2001) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). We have adhered, and will continue to adhere to that principle, and we look outside the statute to its purposes and effects only if it is ambiguous: When the language is not clear or is ambiguous, the court must look to the mischief the statute was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conclusions of law, and other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances, making use of the accepted rules of construction to ascertain a legislative intent that is reasonable and consistent. City of Torrington v. Cottier, 2006 WY 145, ¶ 5, 145 P.3d 1274, 1277 (Wyo.2006); see also Wyo. Cmty. Coll. Comm'n, 2001 WY 86, ¶ 18, 31 P.3d at 1249; and Richards v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Sweetwater County, 6 P.3d 1251, 1253 (Wyo.2000). When construing an ambiguous statute, we seek an intent that is reasonable and just, rather than one that is unreasonable or absurd. Taylor v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2003 WY 83, ¶ 9, 72 P.3d 799, 802 (Wyo.2003); Halliburton Co. v. McAdams, Roux & Assocs., 773 P.2d 153, 154-55 (Wyo. 1989); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 172 (2001). [11] [¶ 42] The issue upon which we must focus, re-stated somewhat simplistically, is whether § 41-10-128 provides that revenue bonds are a way or the only way in which the District may fund its proposed well water project. We conclude that, when read in pari materia with the other provisions of the Water and Sewer District Law, the unambiguous intent of § 41-10-128 is to allow, but not to require, the use of revenue bonds for such purpose. [¶ 43] Section 41-10-113(a)(xii) authorizes districts [t]o borrow money and incur indebtedness and other obligations and evidence the same by certificates, notes or debentures, and to issue bonds, in accordance with the provisions of this act[.] In turn, § 41-10-124(a) lists the particular methods available to districts for such borrowing: short-term notes, general obligation bonds and like securities, revenue bonds and like securities, and special assessment bonds and like securities. Section 41-10-124 is followed by separate statutes detailing how each of those borrowing methods can be implemented: § 41-10-125 covers short-term notes, § 41-10-126 covers general obligation bonds, § 41-10-128 covers revenue bonds, and § 41-10-129 covers special assessment bonds. We do not see in § 41-10-126 any limitation upon the use of general obligation bonds to fund a water or sewer or other income-producing system, and we read § 41-10-128, in pari materia, as simply authorizing the issuance of revenue bonds for projects that are revenue-producing. Given the sense of the entire Act, it is too restrictive and unreasonable to read the words provided that in § 41-10-128 as being a limitation on all bonds issued to fund such a project; rather, the words are meant to allow a district to fund such a project with bonds whose payment is restricted to revenue from the project. [¶ 44] The logic underlying this view of the Water and Sewer District Act is perhaps too obvious to require discussion, but we will identify it for the sake of emphasis: general obligation bonds may be issued to fund all types of projects, but revenue bonds only make sense if the project being funded is revenue-producing. Stated alternatively, logic does not prohibit the issuance of general obligation bonds to fund a revenue-producing project, but logic does prohibit the issuance of revenue bonds to fund a non-revenue-producing project. Logic therefore supports a reading of § 41-10-128 as describing what a district must do to issue revenue bonds to fund a revenue-producing project, but not a reading of § 41-10-128 as prohibiting the issuance of general obligation bonds for such a purpose. In that regard, Mountain Cement has presented no compelling argument for the proposition that the legislature would have intended to prohibit the use of general obligation bonds for the central function of a district, that being the acquisition or improvement of water and sewer systems. Finally, we will note that § 41-10-134, which requires bonds to mature at a time no later than the estimated life of the improvements acquired with the bond proceeds, applies not just to revenue bonds and special assessment bonds, but also to general obligation bonds.