Opinion ID: 540108
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prejudicial/Probative Balance

Text: 50 Federal Rule of Evidence 609 requires the trial court to determine before admitting such a conviction for impeachment that it is more probative than prejudicial. And Fed.R.Evid. 403 states that all relevant evidence--including, of course, evidence admitted under Rule 404--may be excluded if the trial court finds it to be more prejudicial than probative. 51 Simtob argues that even if relevant, the prior convictions should not have been admitted under these rules. Because the conduct underlying them was so old, and because they were used to prove intent, Simtob contends that the convictions were more prejudicial than probative. We review the trial court's determination of admissibility for abuse of discretion. Lopez-Martinez, 725 F.2d at 477. 52 Where predisposition is directly in issue, courts should be extremely cautious about admitting old convictions because their prejudicial impact may frequently outweigh their probative value. For example, appellant relies upon the Supreme Court's decision in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958), in which the court held, in language peculiarly apropos of our case, that 53 [A] nine year old sales conviction and a five year old possession conviction are insufficient to prove petitioner had a readiness to sell narcotics at the time [the informant] approached him, particularly when we must assume from the record that he was trying to overcome a narcotics habit at the time. 54 356 U.S. at 375-76, 78 S.Ct. at 822-23. 55 In United States v. Tom, 640 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir.1981), we considered the propriety of admitting evidence of a five-year old conviction in an entrapment case. The trial court ruled that the prior conviction was too old to be probative on the question of predisposition, but strongly bore on the issue of the defendant's credibility as a witness. While we noted the inherent prejudice in the admission of such conviction, we found no fault with the trial court's exercise of its discretion in balancing the probative and prejudicial value of the conviction: 56 [t]he testimony was, as the trial judge recognized, highly prejudicial. This is especially true given defendant's reliance on the defense of entrapment. He needed to show doubt as to whether he was predisposed to drug dealing. The jury may well have improperly inferred predisposition from the past conviction [footnote omitted]. The trial court went through the Rule 403 balancing analysis and decided that the impeaching testimony was too pertinent to credibility to be excluded [footnote omitted]. This balancing ... is committed to the trial court [citation omitted] (emphasis supplied). 57 640 F.2d at 1039-40. 58 It is not clear that any abuse of discretion has been shown in our case in the light of Tom. Predisposition was a major, if not central issue in the case and the convictions were old, but there was some probative value in their presentation. We do not have a situation in which the jury has improperly inferred predisposition based upon convictions which were not at all probative, and it seems clear that the trial judge considered both the age and remoteness, 6 of the convictions in response to counsel's suppression motion. The question is close, but we are inclined under these circumstances to defer to the trial judge's consideration and conclusion that the evidence was admissible. 59