Opinion ID: 556752
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is the Indictment Multiplicitous?

Text: 8 Bonavia contends that it was improper for the district court to try, convict, and sentence him on all three counts of the indictment because they are multiplicitous. Therefore, he says that his convictions on counts three and four should be reversed. The government concedes that counts two and three are multiplicitous--and that the case should be remanded so that the district court can vacate the sentence on count three and merge that count with count two for purposes of resentencing--but contends that count four alleges a separate and distinct possession which supports a separate conviction and sentence. 9 Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, [a]n indictment is multiplicitous if it charges a single offense in more than one count. United States v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir.1990). [T]he simultaneous, undifferentiated possession of multiple firearms constitutes only one offense under 18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1202(a). United States v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 350, 351 (5th Cir.1980); 7 see also United States v. Grinkiewicz, 873 F.2d 253, 255 (11th Cir.1989) (the  'simultaneous possession of several weapons constitutes only one offense under Section [922(g) ]'  (brackets in original)). The general rule is that  '[o]nly one offense is charged under the terms of Sec. 1202(a)(1) regardless of the number of firearms involved, absent a showing that the firearms were stored or acquired at different times or places.'  United States v. Bullock, 615 F.2d 1082, 1084 (5th Cir.1980) (quoting United States v. Rosenbarger, 536 F.2d 715, 721 (6th Cir.1976)). 8 Thus, we have held that section 1202(a) allows the government to treat each of several firearms not simultaneously received or possessed as separate units of prosecution. Bullock, 615 F.2d at 1086. The government can prove separate receipts by establishing that the weapons were acquired at different times or places; separate possessions can be established by showing either that the weapons were stored in different places or that the weapons were acquired at different times or places. United States v. McCrary, 643 F.2d 323, 326 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). 9 10 The government presented no evidence that Bonavia received the three weapons charged in counts two, three, and four at different times or in different places. It also presented no evidence that the weapons charged in counts two and three were stored in different places. So, counts two and three are multiplicitous. 11 While all three weapons were seized at the same time in Bonavia's office, the government did present evidence, through the testimony of Paul Speese, that Bonavia had taken the weapon charged in count four (the Wesco rifle) to Bonavia's home in Miami Lakes and had used it there. Thus, we are faced with the issue whether evidence that shows defendant--at some point between the time that he is presumed to have simultaneously received several weapons and the time that those weapons were seized from the same location (that is, at some point during the period of time alleged in the indictment)--held one of the weapons at a different location from the others is sufficient to establish a separate possession and, thus, a separate violation of section 1202(a). 12 In considering this issue, we recognize that the seizure of the weapons from the same place does not automatically answer the question of whether the weapons were separately possessed. We agree with the statement of the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Mullins: 13 Although the two guns were seized together, logic and the scheme of Sec. 1202(a) strongly suggest that [the defendant's] acts of possession may not be viewed in a frozen, momentary state immediately prior to the seizure. The answer to the question whether there was one possession of two guns or two possessions is to be found in the course of his treatment of the firearms.... [T]he character of the possession is to be found in the possessor's course of conduct. 14 698 F.2d 686, 687 (4th Cir.1983) (two separate offenses chargeable because evidence sufficiently showed defendant's disparate course of dealing with two weapons). We hold that if evidence presented at trial establishes that defendant, at some point in the period covered by the indictment, separated one of the weapons charged in the indictment and possessed that weapon separately--that is, at a different location--the government may treat that weapon as a separate unit of prosecution, even though that gun was seized at the same time and in the same location as other weapons charged in the indictment and had been received by defendant at the same time as the other weapons. 15