Opinion ID: 167957
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Suppression of Defendant's statement, fingerprints, and A-file

Text: 43 Having concluded that Lopez-Mendoza refers only to jurisdictional challenges, and not to challenges to the admissibility of identity-related evidence, we must now determine whether the general exclusionary rule requires suppression of Defendant's statements, his fingerprints, and his A-file under the circumstances present here, see Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at 754-55; however, we must do so only if the Government preserved for appeal its argument against suppression under the general exclusionary rule.
44 According to the record, Defendant made statements concerning his identity and nationality directly after his illegal arrest and again at the border patrol station. The district court concluded, after applying the factors in Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, that the taint from Defendant's illegal arrest had not become sufficiently attenuated so as to permit admission of Defendant's incriminating statements. On appeal, the Government does not re-assert its attenuation-of-the-taint argument with regard to these statements. The Government's opening brief does not even mention the Brown factors or contend that the district court misapplied them. Rather, the Government rests its challenge to the suppression of Defendant's statements solely on the broader proposition that Lopez-Mendoza prevents a defendant from ever seeking suppression of evidence of his identity. That proposition having been rejected for the reasons stated above, we decline to disturb the conclusion of the district court that the taint from the illegal arrest was not sufficiently attenuated by the time Defendant spoke to law enforcement officers so as to permit admission of the statements concerning identity and nationality.
45 On the issue of the exclusion of fingerprints, the Government does expand its argument beyond its interpretation of Lopez-Mendoza. It also argues that if Lopez-Mendoza does not place identity evidence off limits from suppression, then under the ordinary application of the exclusionary rule Defendant's fingerprints should not be suppressed because this case is distinguishable from Davis and Hayes. We therefore review whether Defendant's fingerprints constitute fruit of the poisonous tree that must be excluded under the facts of this case. 46 Based on Defendant's now-suppressed statement of identity, Agent Armendariz took Defendant to the border patrol station where he was fingerprinted. Thus, there is a factual nexus between the illegal conduct and the evidence in question (fingerprints). Nevertheless, we distinguish between fingerprints that are obtained as a result of an unconstitutional governmental investigation and fingerprint evidence that is instead obtained merely as part of a routine booking procedure. In doing so, we hold that fingerprints administratively taken in conjunction with an arrest for the purpose of simply ascertaining or confirming the identity of the person arrested and routinely determining the criminal history and outstanding warrants of the person arrested are sufficiently unrelated to the unlawful arrest that they are not suppressible. Ultimately, however, we reverse and remand on this issue because the factual record in this case is insufficient to determine whether Defendant's unconstitutional arrest was purposefully exploited in order to develop critical evidence of criminal conduct to be used against Defendant. 47
48 Certain routine administrative procedures, such as fingerprinting, photographing, and getting a proper name and address from the defendant, are incidental events accompanying an arrest that are necessary for orderly law enforcement and protection of individual rights. See 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4(g), at 362 (4th ed. 2004) ([F]ingerprinting, like photographing, is a rather standard booking procedure.). Fingerprinting ensures that the person who has been arrested is in fact the person law enforcement agents believe they have in custody. See Notes and Comments, Excluding From Evidence Fingerprints Taken After an Unlawful Arrest, 69 Yale L.J. 432, 438 n. 30 (1959-60) (In addition to establishing identity at the time of arrest, fingerprints are useful in aiding the apprehension of escaped prisoners, and in ascertaining whether the defendant has been previously convicted ....) (citing United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1932)); 3 LaFave, supra, § 5.3(c), at 168 (Fingerprinting, as a routine part of the booking process, is justified by the legitimate interest of the government in knowing for an absolute certainty the identity of the person arrested, in knowing whether he is wanted elsewhere, and in ensuring his identification in the event he flees prosecution....). It is therefore considered elementary that a person in lawful custody may be required to submit to ... fingerprinting as part of routine identification processes. Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C.Cir.1963) (citations omitted). The government always has the right, and indeed the obligation, to know who it is that they hold in custody regardless of whether the arrest is later determined to be illegal. 49 In light of the underlying purpose of the exclusionary rule, it would make little sense to suppress fingerprint evidence obtained merely as part of a routine booking procedure, even where a judge subsequently rules that the arrest was illegal. The exclusionary rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960); see also Excluding From Evidence, supra, 69 YALE L.J. at 436 n. 24 ([T]he threat of exclusion will operate as intended only if an excludable piece of evidence is the target of the police activity, and if the police are previously aware of the rule and its threat to the success of their venture.). 50 A blanket rule excluding fingerprint evidence obtained after an illegal arrest would have neither a practical deterrence effect on unlawful arrests that were not made for the purpose of obtaining fingerprint evidence nor would it outweigh the substantial social costs of suppressing such evidence. See Penn. Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998) (directing that the exclusionary rule applies only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, although Lopez-Mendoza does not automatically exempt all fingerprint evidence from application of the Wong Sun doctrine, application of that rule indicates that fingerprints taken as part of a routine booking procedure following an arrest later determined to be illegal ordinarily will not be poisoned fruit of an illegal arrest and should not be suppressed. 6 See United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d 864, 868-69 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that fingerprint evidence obtained as a result of an alien's illegal arrest need not be suppressed if the fingerprints were taken merely for purposes of identification such as during a routine booking procedure); Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at 756 (suppressing fingerprint evidence where the government offered no evidence that the fingerprints were obtained as a matter of course through routine booking procedures); see also Paulson v. State, 257 So.2d 303, 305 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1972) (holding that fingerprints routinely taken after illegal arrest could be used in a subsequent prosecution for another crime). 51 This is not to say that fingerprint evidence taken after an illegal arrest, even as part of a routine booking procedure, is never suppressible. By focusing upon the purpose for an illegal arrest and subsequent fingerprinting in determining whether fingerprint evidence is tainted fruit, courts properly focus on effectuating the underlying policy of the exclusionary rule. This is how we read the Supreme Court's decisions in Davis and Hayes. 52 In Davis and Hayes, the Supreme Court held that when an illegal arrest was used as an investigatory devise to obtain fingerprints, the fingerprints were regarded as inadmissible fruit of an illegal detention. Hayes, 470 U.S. at 817-18, 105 S.Ct. 1643; Davis, 394 U.S. at 727-28, 89 S.Ct. 1394. However, both cases arose from illegal arrests made for the purpose of obtaining fingerprints. 7 In suppressing the fingerprint evidence, the Court focused its attention squarely on the motive of the arresting officers to obtain fingerprints, and made it plain . . . that that motive rationalized its decision. United States v. Ortiz-Gonzalbo, 946 F.Supp. 287, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd on other grounds, No. 97-1210, 1997 WL 829306 (2d Cir. Dec.9, 1997) (unpublished). Specifically, in Davis, the majority held that [d]etentions for the sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints are ... subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. 394 U.S. at 727, 89 S.Ct. 1394 (emphasis added). Additionally, Justice Harlan in his concurring Davis opinion directed that the rule applied by the Davis majority must be limited to situations like the `dragnet' procedures employed in th[at] case. 394 U.S. at 728, 89 S.Ct. 1394 (Harlan, J., concurring). And Justice Brennan, the author of Davis, later stated in his concurring opinion in Hayes that Hayes and Davis were indistinguishable in that a suspect may not be apprehended, detained and forced to accompany the police to another location to be fingerprinted without a warrant or probable cause. 470 U.S. at 818-19, 105 S.Ct. 1643 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 53 We therefore do not interpret Davis or Hayes as directing that fingerprint evidence obtained as a result of any illegal arrest or detention is always fruit of a poisoned tree. Like a majority of other courts to interpret these cases, we read Davis and Hayes as requiring the suppression of fingerprint evidence only when the illegal arrest was for the purpose of obtaining fingerprints without a warrant or probable cause. See Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d at 867; Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at 755; United States v. Jennings, 468 F.2d 111, 115 (9th Cir.1972); see also Ortiz-Gonzalbo, 946 F.Supp. at 288-89; S.E.G. v. State, 645 So.2d 347, 348-49 (Ala. Crim.App.1994); Black v. State, 383 So.2d 295, 297 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980); Paulson, 257 So.2d at 304; Orum v. State, 46 Ala. App. 543, 245 So.2d 829, 830 (Ala.Crim. App.1970). 8 But see United States v. Lyles, 471 F.2d 1167, 1169 (5th Cir.1972) (If [an arrest is illegal], then the fingerprints taken from appellant pursuant to that arrest will be inadmissible....); People v. Hernandez, 11 Cal.App.3d 481, 492-94, 89 Cal.Rptr. 766 (Cal.Ct.App.1970) (Although the Davis case involved the indiscriminate roundup of numerous young men for the purpose of interrogation and fingerprinting, the high court gave no indication that its ruling was to be limited to those facts.). Without a similar motive, neither Davis nor Hayes require suppression of fingerprint evidence obtained at every illegal arrest or detention. 54 The exclusionary rule applies whenever evidence has been obtained `by exploitation' of the primary illegality instead of `by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' Evidence can be obtained `by exploitation' of an unlawful detention even when the detention is not for the sole purpose of gathering evidence. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at 755 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S.Ct. 407). Accordingly, we hold that if an illegal arrest was purposefully exploited for the objective of obtaining fingerprints, then the fingerprint evidence must be suppressed. 9 See United States v. Flores-Sandoval, 422 F.3d 711, 715 (8th Cir.2005) (affirming exclusion of fingerprint evidence where the defendant's fingerprints were taken for the purpose of assisting the [United States Immigrations and Customs Enforcement] investigation) (quotations, alteration omitted); Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d at 868-69 (distinguishing between fingerprints taken for investigative purposes and those taken for identification purposes); Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at 756 (distinguishing between fingerprints taken as part of a routine booking procedure and fingerprints taken for an INS-related purpose). Conversely, in the absence of evidence that the illegal arrest was purposefully exploited for investigatory objectives, fingerprints taken as part of a routine, booking procedure are not fruit of a poisonous tree. 55
56 Accordingly, in determining whether the fingerprint evidence in this case should be suppressed, we must determine the original purpose for arresting and later fingerprinting Defendant; that is, was Defendant fingerprinted merely as part of a routine booking or processing procedure or was the illegal arrest in part for the purpose of obtaining unauthorized fingerprints so Defendant could be connected to additional alleged illegal activity. The precise circumstances under which Defendant was arrested and his fingerprints taken are not clear from the record. 57 The Government asserts on appeal that Defendant's fingerprints were taken while he was being processed for having illegally reentered the country; however, Agent Armendariz testified, and the district court found, only that [Defendant]'s fingerprints were obtained at the Border Patrol Station and were used to connect [him] to his immigration record and prior criminal record. Although it is clear how the fingerprints evidence was ultimately used, there is no evidence in the record before us to support the Government's assertion that the illegal arrest was not in part for the purpose of obtaining Defendant's fingerprints to link him to criminal activity. Because, on the record before us, we do not know whether the illegal arrest was purposefully exploited for the objective of obtaining Defendant's fingerprints, we remand for an evidentiary hearing on this issue. See Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d at 865 (remanding to the district court for factfinding in a similar case challenging the admissibility of fingerprint evidence where the factual record regarding the fingerprinting of the defendant was incomplete). 10
58 In its order below, the district court found that Defendant's fingerprints were used to connect him to his immigration record and prior criminal record, otherwise known as his A-file. The Government argues, in addition to its Lopez-Mendoza argument, that (1) Defendant lacked standing to challenge the introduction of the A-file; and (2) it is inappropriate to suppress this file because its contents were not developed as the result of any illegal activity, but rather the file was compiled prior to, and independently of, the illegal seizure of Defendant. The Government's challenge thus requires us to determine whether independent government records must be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree if the illegal arrest brings to the attention of authorities the fact that an individual is present in the United States and a subsequent check of independently created and maintained records reveals the individual's immigration and/or prior criminal record. 59
60 While the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies only when the defendant has standing regarding the Fourth Amendment violation which constitutes the poisonous tree, see United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980), the law imposes no separate standing requirement regarding the evidence which constitutes the fruit of that poisonous tree. In Wong Sun, the seminal case defining the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the defendant, James Wah Toy, moved to suppress, inter alia, drugs found at the house of his co-defendant, Johnny Yee. 371 U.S. at 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407. Toy had standing to object to admission of the drugs at his trial because of the alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; in that case, the unlawful arrest of Toy. See id. at 484, 83 S.Ct. 407. The Supreme Court suppressed Toy's statements to the officers, including the statement that he had no drugs but that Yee did, as fruit of the illegal arrest. Id. at 486-87, 83 S.Ct. 407. The Supreme Court ultimately held that Toy was also entitled to suppression of the drugs found at Yee's house because it [was] clear that the narcotics were `come at by the exploitation of [Toy's statement]' and hence that [the drugs] may not be used against Toy. Id. at 488, 83 S.Ct. 407. Thus, regardless of the fact that Toy maintained no reasonable expectation of privacy in the drugs at Yee's house, the Supreme Court determined that he could object to them as poisonous fruits. See id. at 488, 83 S.Ct. 407. 61 In a number of cases, we have reinforced the principle that the relevant inquiry in determining whether a defendant has standing to challenge evidence as fruit of a poisonous tree is whether his or her Fourth Amendment rights were violated, not the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in the evidence alleged to be poisonous fruit. In United States v. DeLuca, 269 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir.2001), for example, the defendant, a passenger in a car, moved to suppress methamphetamine taken from the car. Id. at 1130-31. We held that, although the defendant did not have standing to directly challenge the search of the car because he had neither a possessory nor property interest in the car, he had standing to challenge the lawfulness of his detention and thus to seek to suppression of the methamphetamine as fruit of that detention. Id. at 1132. See also United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1500 (10th Cir.1996) (recognizing that, although a defendant may lack the requisite possessory or ownership interest in a vehicle to directly challenge a search of that vehicle, the defendant may nonetheless contest the lawfulness of his own detention and seek to suppress evidence found in that vehicle as the fruit of the illegal detention); United States v. Eylicio-Montoya, 70 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 1995) (same). 62 Contrary to our conclusion, the Third and Fifth Circuits have expressly concluded that, at least absent egregious circumstances, 11 it is erroneous for a district court to suppress the contents of a defendant's A-file because an alien charged with illegal reentry has no possessory or proprietary interest in his immigration file or the documentary evidence contained in that file and thus has no standing to challenge the file's introduction into evidence. See Bowley, 435 F.3d at 431 (citing the expectation of privacy language used in United States v. Pineda-Chinchilla, 712 F.2d 942, 943-44 (5th Cir.1983)); Pineda-Chinchilla, 712 F.2d at 943-44 (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)). Contrary to these decisions, we do not read Rawlings or Rakas, nor any other Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case, to support the proposition that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies only when the defendant has standing regarding both the violation which constitutes the poisonous tree and separate standing regarding the evidence which constitutes the fruit of that poisonous tree. 12 Instead, in both Rawlings and Rakas, the Supreme Court merely held that a defendant has standing to seek suppression of evidence only if he has had his own Fourth Amendment rights infringed by the search and seizure which he seeks to challenge. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 138, 99 S.Ct. 421; Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556; see also United States v. Allen, 235 F.3d 482, 489 (10th Cir.2000). 63 A defendant's standing to challenge the admissibility of evidence deemed fruit of an illegal search and seizure therefore arises from the alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment rights by virtue of the primary illegality; here, the unlawful arrest of Defendant. There is no independent requirement that a defendant also have standing or a proprietary interest in the items sought to be suppressed under the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine. See 6 LaFave, supra, § 11.4, at 257 ([I]t must be cautioned that a defendant ... can prevail on a `fruit of the poisonous tree' claim only if he has standing regarding the violation which constitutes the poisonous tree, without reference to any other standing requirements) (emphasis added, footnote omitted). In this case, the Government has conceded on appeal that Defendant himself was unlawfully detained and arrested; thus, Defendant has standing to object to any poisonous fruit obtained as a result of that primary illegality. 64
65 Where, as here, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated, the only relevant question in determining whether evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree and therefore subject to the exclusionary rule is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which the instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1563 (10th Cir.1993) (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S.Ct. 407). In this case, the answer to that question necessarily depends on whether Defendant's fingerprints, which the Government used to secure Defendant's A-file, should be suppressed. If the fingerprints are determined to be suppressible it will be because of a determination that the fingerprints were illegally obtained for the investigative purpose of obtaining Defendant's immigration record and potentially charging him with a more serious crime. Under such circumstances it seems to us that the A-file is inextricably linked to the fingerprints and if one is a fruit of the poisonous tree (the unconstitutional arrest), then the other is as well. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484, 83 S.Ct. 407 (The exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of [Fourth Amendment] invasions.); see also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939) ([T]he knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it simply because it is used derivatively.) (quotations omitted). 66 The Government has cited United States v. White, 326 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir.2003), for the statement that [t]he exclusionary rule enjoins the Government from benefitting from evidence it has unlawfully obtained; it does not reach backward to taint information that was in official hands prior to any illegality. Id. at 1140 (quoting Crews, 445 U.S. at 475, 100 S.Ct. 1244 (plurality opinion)). However, neither Crews nor White stand for the proposition that all preexisting Governmental records found as a result of an illegal arrest are exempt from suppression. 67 In Crews, the Supreme Court expressly noted that the Fourth Amendment violation ... yielded nothing of evidentiary value that the police did not already have in their grasp. 445 U.S. at 475, 100 S.Ct. 1244 (plurality opinion). The record in that case indicated that 68 prior to [the defendant's] illegal arrest, the police both knew respondent's identity and had some basis to suspect his involvement in the very crimes with which he was charged. Moreover, before they approached respondent, the police had already obtained access to the evidence that implicated him in the robberies, i.e., the mnemonic representations of the criminal retained by the victims and related to the police in the form of their agreement upon his description. In short, the Fourth Amendment violation in this case yielded nothing of evidentiary value that the police did not already have in their grasp. Rather, respondent's unlawful arrest served merely to link together two extant ingredients in his identification. 69 Id. (footnote omitted) (plurality opinion). It is in this context that the Supreme Court stated that [t]he exclusionary rule enjoins the Government from benefiting from evidence it has unlawfully obtained; it does not reach backward to taint information that was in official hands prior to any illegality. Id. (plurality opinion). In this case, by contrast, while Defendant's A-file was not developed as the result of any illegal activity, but rather was compiled prior to, and independently of, the illegal seizure of Defendant, the Border Patrol in this case did not effectively have Defendant's A-file in their grasp. Instead, the practicality of the situations is that they obtained Defendant's A-file only by first taking his fingerprints. 70 In White, we held that defendant's identity and the discovery of his status as a felon from criminal history records were not suppressible. However, we did so based on the doctrine of inevitable discovery, concluding that after the defendant voluntary gave the officers his name, an NCIC check using that name revealed an outstanding warrant that would have inevitably led to the defendant's arrest and the subsequent discovery of his prior felony conviction regardless of the illegal search. 326 F.3d at 1138. In refusing to suppress the defendant's status as a felon, we also noted that, at the time the illegal search was conducted, the officers neither knew of nor sought information about the defendant's status as a felon and consequently the illegal search was not exploited for the purpose of determining White's identity or his prior felony status. Id. at 1140. Accordingly, in White, we merely reiterated the general rule that evidence gained through exploitation of illegal police conduct must be suppressed unless that evidence would have been inevitably discovered. We did not announce a new rule prohibiting suppression of all previously compiled Government records regardless of whether exploitation of an illegal search and seizure produced the critical link between a defendant's identity and his immigration or prior criminal history record. 71 In this appeal, the Government does not argue inevitable discovery. Additionally, for the reasons explained earlier, it is possible that, in contrast to White, the police in this case exploited the illegal detention of Defendant by taking his fingerprints for the very purpose of investigating his immigration or prior criminal history status. Where, as may prove to be the case here, obtaining information regarding a defendant's immigration status and prior criminal history proves to be the objective of official illegality, the deterrence purpose of the exclusionary rule would effectively be served only by excluding the very evidence sought to be obtained by the primary illegal behavior, not just the means used to obtain that evidence. See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217, 80 S.Ct. 1437 ([The] purpose [of the exclusionary rule] is ... to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.); see also Excluding From Evidence, supra, 69 YALE L.J. at 436 n. 24 (noting that the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule depends on excluding the piece of evidence that is the target of police activity). 72 The answer to whether Defendant's A-file [was] come at by exploitation of illegal conduct necessarily depends on whether Defendant's fingerprints were obtained for an investigatory purpose exploiting the unconstitutional arrest or whether they were obtained as part of a routine booking procedure not linked to the purpose of the illegal arrest. Because the officers used Defendant's fingerprints to obtain his A-file, if those fingerprints are determined to be suppressible as fruits of the poisonous tree, then it follows that the A-file should also be suppressed. Accordingly, whether Defendant's A-file should be suppressed will need to be decided on remand in conjunction with the evidentiary hearing regarding Defendant's fingerprints.