Opinion ID: 2636189
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the Trans' motion and the circuit court's ruling

Text: In substance, the Trans argued in their motion to dismiss that the property was not subject to forfeiture because the offenses charged against Dang were not `covered offenses [that] specifically authorize[d] forfeiture' as required by [HRS] § 712A-4. The State opposed the Trans' motion, contending that the only reasonable interpretation of [HRS c]hapter 712A [(dealing with forfeiture)] and Title 12[ [6] ] . . . will lead [the circuit court] to conclude that violations of [HAR §§ ]13-95-70 and [13-95]-71 . . . constitute covered offenses under HRS [c]hapter 712A. (Bold emphasis omitted.) In support of its position, the State pointed to HRS § 199-7 (Supp.2000), which is included in the enforcement section of Title 12 and stated in relevant part: Search and seizure; forfeiture of property. (a) Any police officer or agent of [DLNR] upon whom the board of land and natural resources has conferred powers of police officers, shall have the authority to conduct searches on probable cause as provided by law and to seize any equipment, article, instrument, aircraft, vehicle, vessel, business records, or natural resource used or taken in violation of the provisions contained in . . . title 12, or any rules adopted thereunder. . . . (b) Any equipment, article, instrument, aircraft, vehicle, vessel, business records, or natural resource seized is subject to forfeiture pursuant to chapter 712A. Unless otherwise directed by the court pursuant to chapter 712A, any item, other than a natural resource, seized shall be ordered forfeited to the State for disposition as determined by the department, or may be destroyed, or may be kept and retained and utilized by the department or any other state agency. If not needed or required by the department or other state agency, the forfeited items shall be disposed of as provided by chapter 712A. (Emphases added.) Based on HRS § 199-7, the State asserted that the Trans' arguments that alleged violations of HAR §§ 13-95-70 and 13-95-71 were not covered offenses within the meaning of HRS 712A-4 would render the statutory schemes of both Chapter 712A and Title 12 superfluous and result in absurdity. Additionally, the State argued that the legislative history behind the enactment of, and amendments to, HRS § 199-7 indicated that it was [the] legislature's clear intent to authorize DLNR's use of asset forfeiture as an additional remedy for Title 12 violations. In response to the State's arguments, the Trans asserted that HRS § 199-7 was not on its face a statute setting forth an `offense,' nor even an offense contemplated by HRS § 712A-4(a) but, instead, only `empowers' officers of [DOCARE] to conduct searches on probable cause and to `seize' property taken in violation of [T]itle 12, or any rules adopted thereunder. As such, the Trans argued that HRS § 199-7 [was] insufficient to meet [HRS § ]712A-4(a)'s specific requirement that a covered offense, for purposes of forfeiture, must specifically authorize forfeiture, before any property seized pursuant to [HRS] § 199-7(a) can be forfeited. In other words, if HAR §§ 13-95-70 and 13-95-71 are the alleged offenses in this case, then those administrative rules and/or their penalty provisions must specifically authorize forfeiture in order for [the State] to institute a forfeiture proceeding. On December 19, 2001, a hearing was held on the Trans' motion to dismiss, wherein the parties presented their above positions, focusingat the request of the circuit court on the parties' differing interpretations of HRS § 199-7. Thereafter, the circuit court orally granted the Trans' motion to dismiss. On February 1, 2002, the circuit court filed an order consistent with its oral ruling, which also contained the following conclusions of law (COL): 1. An [i]n [r]em forfeiture proceeding under [HRS c]hapter 712A . . . is a civil proceeding governed by the Hawai`i Rules of Civil Procedure [(HRCP)]; therefore, the defenses of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to [HRCP] [R]ules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), . . . are appropriate defenses to assert in a Chapter 712A [i]n [r]em civil forfeiture proceeding; 2. Generally, forfeitures are not favored by the law and should be enforced only when within both the letter and spirit of the law. See Klinger v. Kepano, 64 Haw. 4, 9, 635 P.2d 938, 942 (1981); 3. [The State] alleged in [its p]etition that seizure for forfeiture and forfeiture in this case were proper because the [Trans'] property relates to alleged covered offenses under [HRS] § 712A-4; 4. HRS § 712A-4(a)-(d) list the specific offenses for which property is subject to forfeiture under HRS [c]hapter 712A; 5. HRS § 712A-4(a) permits forfeiture for all offenses which specifically authorize forfeiture, therefore, offenses on which a forfeiture action is based under HRS § 712A-4(a) of the [HRS] must be offenses which specifically authorize forfeiture. HRS § 712A-4(b)-(d) are not applicable to the present action; 6. The [p]etition asserts an intentional taking under HAR §§ 13-95-70 and 13-95-71 as the two covered offenses upon which this forfeiture action is based; 7. HAR §§ 13-95-70 and 13-95-71 do not specifically authorize forfeiture for a violation of these administrative rules; 8. HAR § 13-95-2, the penalty provision for violations of HAR [t]itle 13, [s]ubtitle 4, [p]art V, [c]hapter 95, does not specifically authorize forfeiture for a violation of HAR §§ 13-95-70 and 13-95-71; 9. HRS §§ 187A-5, 187A-12.5, 187A-13, 188-53, 188-70 and 189-4 [(all of which relate to aquatic resources and fishing rights)] do not specifically authorize forfeiture for a violation of the provisions of, or rules adopted under HRS [c]hapters 187A, 188 or 189; 10. [The State] argued that, based upon statutory interpretation and construction of HRS [c]hapter 712A, HRS [t]itle 12 and HRS § 199-7, that [sic] HAR §§ 13-95-70 and 13-95-71 are covered offenses which specifically authorize the forfeiture proceedings in the [p]etition; 11. The [circuit c]ourt disagrees with [the State], and finds that a covered offense under HRS § 712A-4(a) is an offense which specifically authorizes forfeiture; and in this case, neither HAR §§ 13-95-70 or 13-95-71, or any of the penalty provisions for a violation of these two administrative rules, specifically authorize forfeiture as required by HRS § 712A-4(a); and unless an offense or penalty provision for the offense specifically authorizes forfeiture, the offense is not a covered offense under HRS § 712A-4(a); and therefore HAR §§ 13-95-70 and 13-95-71 are not covered offenses because the alleged offenses, or their penalty provisions, do not specifically authorize forfeiture as required by HRS § 712A-4(a); 12. Since HAR §§ 13-95-70 and 13-95-71 are not covered offenses for purposes of forfeiture proceedings under HRS § 712A, the [p]etition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the [circuit c]ourt lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the forfeiture claims in the [p]etition. (Emphasis added.) (Footnote omitted.)