Opinion ID: 781963
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Warrantless Entry (Count 1)7

Text: 12 It is well-established that a warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and therefore invalid unless it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement. United States v. Zubia-Melendez, 263 F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir.2001). In this case, it is undisputed that defendants failed to obtain a warrant before entering and searching the Roskas' residence. Thus, defendants' actions were presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. Id. Defendants point to two possible exceptions to the warrant requirement. We consider each in turn. 13
14 First, the defendants point to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Exigent circumstances exist when: 15 (1) the law enforcement officers ... have reasonable grounds to believe that there is immediate need to protect their lives or others or their property or that of others, (2) the search [is not] motivated by an intent to arrest and seize evidence, and (3) there [is] some reasonable basis, approaching probable cause, to associate an emergency with the area or place to be searched. 16 United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1567 (10th Cir.1992) (alterations in original). The government bears the burden of proving exigency. United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 970 (10th Cir.1993). The government's burden is particularly heavy where the police seek to enter a suspect's home. Anderson, 981 F.2d at 1567 (quoting United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1452 (10th Cir.1989)). In evaluating whether exigent circumstances existed, we examine the circumstances as they would have appeared to prudent, cautious, and trained officers. United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1233 (10th Cir. 1998). This exception is narrow, and must be jealously and carefully drawn. Id. 17 After examining the record, we conclude that it contains no evidence that could lead a reasonable state actor to conclude that there were exigent circumstances. Although defendants at times assert that a delay to obtain a warrant might have cost Rusty his life, the evidence shows otherwise. Defendants were aware that various doctors had suspected that Rusty was a victim of MSBP for quite some time, and the record indicates that there was nothing particularly unusual about Rusty's condition at the time he was removed. Rusty's attending physician stated on the phone that it would be a mistake to remove him from the home. Because no evidence indicates that Rusty was in immediate threat of death or severe physical harm — indeed, the evidence points to the opposite conclusion — we do not find sufficient exigent circumstances to relieve the state actors here of the burden of obtaining a warrant. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470-71, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (But where the discovery is anticipated, where the police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it ... [t]he requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience whatever, or at least none which is constitutionally cognizable in a legal system that regards warrantless searches as `per se unreasonable' in the absence of `exigent circumstances.').
18 Within the last thirty years, courts have increasingly recognized certain narrow circumstances that justify searches and seizures without reference to the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause or probable cause requirement. These are situations in which the requirement of a warrant based upon probable cause is ill-suited to achieving certain special needs of government, such as enforcing school discipline, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333-40, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985), allowing administrative searches of the business premises of closely-regulated industries, New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987), and taking inventory of seized items for caretaking purposes, Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447-48, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). 19 In all special needs cases, the nature of the need addressed makes particularized suspicion impossible or otherwise renders the warrant requirement impractical. For example, in Griffin v. Wisconsin, the Court noted that requiring a warrant before a search of a probationer's home would interfere to an appreciable degree with the probation system, and would reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create. 483 U.S. 868, 876, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (citation omitted). Similarly, the Burger Court noted that surprise is crucial if the regulatory scheme aimed at remedying this major social problem is to function at all. 482 U.S. at 710, 107 S.Ct. 2636; see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (recognizing that the special need articulated must `make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable' before waiving those requirements). If a special need renders the warrant requirement impracticable, we then balance the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search intrudes and the degree of intrusion occasioned by the search against the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue... and the efficacy of this means for meeting it. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995). 20 We find no special need that renders the warrant requirement impracticable when social workers enter a home to remove a child, absent exigent circumstances. First, we note that individualized suspicion is at the heart of a removal of a child from a home, distinguishing the instant case from the various drug testing cases that have been addressed by the Court. Second, unlike the situation in Burger (and assuming that exigent circumstances are not present), there is no need for surprise or sudden action that renders obtaining a warrant counterproductive. Nor is this situation similar to the position of the probationer in Griffin —the Roskas were not in the criminal justice system, there was no deterrent function being served by the threat of a sudden, warrantless search, and there was no immediate need for a quick response. 9 Simply put, unless the child is in imminent danger, there is no reason that it is impracticable to obtain a warrant before social workers remove a child from the home. Defendants took the time to seek the advice of an Assistant Utah Attorney General before proceeding with the removal; surely they could have taken the time to incur the minimal inconvenience involved in obtaining a warrant. Burger, 482 U.S. at 727, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 21 It is true that the state has a strong interest in protecting children, and that this interest should be taken into account in evaluating the reasonableness of the search and seizure challenged by plaintiffs. However, what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment depends on the context within which a search takes place. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337, 105 S.Ct. 733. The action challenged in this case involved not only a warrantless search, but also the removal of a child from his parents. In such a case, the interest of the government in protecting the child must be balanced against the interest of the parents in keeping the family together. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). Measured against this parental interest, the state's interest in protecting children does not excuse social workers from the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 22