Opinion ID: 774026
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of Categorical Analysis to Crime of Violence

Text: 12 Under the language of the statute, a § 16(b) crime of violence is analyzed by its nature. We believe that this language compels an analysis that is focused on the intrinsic nature of the offense rather than on the factual circumstances surrounding any particular violation. See United States v. Velazquez-Overa, 100 F.3d 418, 420-21 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990)); United States v. Aragon, 983 F.2d 1306, 1312 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 138, 140-41 (8th Cir. 1992). Under this approach, commonly referred to as the categorical approach to criminal statutory interpretation, the singular circumstances of an individual petitioner's crimes should not be considered, and only the minimum criminal conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under a given statute is relevant[.] Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d at 270 (Calabresi, J., dissenting); see also Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 13 In this Circuit, we have long endorsed categorical analyses of criminal statutes in the context of deportation orders for crimes of moral turpitude. See United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399, 400 (2d Cir. 1939). Our decisions in this area stand for the proposition that the offense, judged from an abstracted perspective, must inherently involve moral turpitude; in other words, any conduct falling within the purview of the statute must by its nature entail moral turpitude. See id. (holding that because defendant could be convicted under relevant statute for crimes not involving moral turpitude, statute could not form basis for order of deportation based upon commission of crime of moral turpitude); see also United States ex rel. Zaffarano v. Corsi, 63 F.2d 757, 758 (2d Cir. 1933) (finding that conviction for second degree assault did not inherent[ly] involve moral turpitude because statute could encompass crimes that both did and did not involve moral turpitude); United States ex rel. Robinson v. Day, 51 F.2d 1022, 1022-23 (2d Cir. 1931) (When by its definition [a statute] does not necessarily involve moral turpitude, the alien cannot be deported because in the particular instance his conduct was immoral.). More recently, we have reaffirmed this approach in Michel v. INS, where we stated that [a]s a general rule, if a statute encompasses both acts that do and do not involve moral turpitude, the BIA cannot sustain a deportability finding [predicated on moral turpitude, based] on that statute. 206 F.3d at 263 (quoting Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 1996)). 14 Based upon the language of the statute requiring analysis of the nature of the crime, as well as by analogy to this Circuit's law regarding moral turpitude, we believe that the categorical approach is appropriate for determining whether an offense is a crime of violence under § 16(b) in the context of deportation proceedings. 6 Furthermore, the categorical approach is especially appropriate in the current context where the relevant facts may be up to ten years old and may never have been developed in a trial court. 7