Opinion ID: 3037388
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: In the case of a payment adjustment, the

Text: adjustment reflects a change in the loan balance or is made pursuant to a formula, or to a schedule specifying the percentage or dollar change in the pay- ment as set forth in the loan contract; or (3) In the case of an open-end line-of-credit loan, the adjustment reflects an advance taken by the borrower under the line-of-credit and is permitted by the loan contract. 12 C.F.R. § 560.35(c). Quicken contends that the per diem statutes’ prohibition on collecting interest more than one day prior to recording conflicts with § 560.35. The conflict, it argues, arises because when recording occurs more than one day after disbursement, the per diem statutes “require adjustments in the payment amount based upon a factor not permitted by the regulation: QUICKEN LOANS, INC. v. WOOD 5603 the arbitrary date of late recording.” This amounts to a conflict argument invoking physical impossibility. The Commissioner contends that the regulation “does not appear in any way intended to address (or preempt) state statutes governing commencement of interest.” Likewise, the district court held that had Quicken complied with the per diem statutes in the first place, no adjustments would be necessary. [4] Despite Quicken’s argument, there is no actual conflict between the California per diem statutes and the OTS regulation on adjustments. It is not physically impossible to charge no interest for more than one day before recording and to adjust payments only in accordance with the OTS regulation’s requirements. Because commencement of interest is not a form of interest adjustment, summary judgment for the Commissioner was appropriate. Although Quicken also contends that the Commissioner failed to meet his burden to show that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the Parity Act, this argument is again based on Quicken’s conflation of a payment adjustment with commencement of interest. This is a legal rather than factual argument. The Commissioner satisfied his burden to show there was no genuine issue of material fact.