Opinion ID: 2184643
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hall v. Commonwealth, 2000-SC-0820-DG

Text: This appeal was heard at oral argument with the three other sex offender registration cases. It involves an appeal from an opinion of the Court of Appeals which affirmed an order of the circuit court which found Hall to be a high risk sex offender and required registration and notification. The questions presented are whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; whether the statutes violate the separation of powers doctrine; and whether it was error to allow the introduction of the testimony of an expert witness without determining that the evidence was reliable. The primary issue is whether the 1998 Sexual Offender Registration Statute as enacted and applied violates separation of powers principles. Hall, then 22 years old, was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and first-degree sodomy in 1992. He was sentenced to a total of seven years in prison. He was paroled in 1996, and as a condition of his parole, he was directed to attend a sex offender treatment program. A year later, his parole was revoked when he failed to continue the treatment program. Also in that year, he was charged with violating the Child Pornography Prevention Act by having in his possession visual depictions obtained from the Internet of minors appearing to engage in sexually explicit conduct prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 2252(A). Prior to his release from his state conviction, the circuit judge ordered Hall to undergo a sex offender risk assessment pursuant to KRS 17.570. He was taken to the Kentucky State Reformatory where the assessment was performed by a certified provider, a psychologist, who after interviewing Hall and conducting a series of tests, wrote a report that Hall exhibited a high risk to reoffend sexually. Subsequently, a hearing was conducted in circuit court pursuant to KRS 17.570(4) where Hall, represented by counsel, sought to have the trial judge dismiss the proceeding as a violation of his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. He also challenged the sex offender Risk Assessment Report as being inadmissible as evidence because the author of the report was not present for either direct or cross-examination. The circuit judge denied the motion to dismiss because he did not believe the rules of evidence prohibiting the admission of hearsay were applicable to the proceeding which was similar to a preliminary hearing or parole revocation hearing. Hall argues that the circuit judge erred in holding the hearing because he did not have jurisdiction and that KRS 17.500 et seq. violates the doctrine of separation of powers. He also claims that the circuit judge erred when he allowed the introduction of hearsay testimony of an expert witness without determining that the evidence was reliable. He further argues that the Court of Appeals committed error when it held that KRS 17.500 et seq. allowed the legislature to make determinations concerning evidence which are reserved for the judiciary. The Commonwealth responds that the sentencing court had proper jurisdiction to conduct the risk assessment hearing. It argues that the legislature had the express power to determine the original jurisdiction of circuit and district courts. It also asserts that the trial judge correctly used the recommendations of the certified provider during the risk assessment hearing. The Commonwealth states that classification hearings are similar to probation and parole hearings and may be conducted in accordance with minimum requirements of due process.
Although this issue is not properly preserved for appellate review, this Court will consider the arguments presented. We acknowledge that the legislature, pursuant to the constitution, has express power to determine the original jurisdiction of circuit and district courts. Ky. Const. §§ 112(5) and 113(6). See also KRS 23A.010. When the legislature does not specifically assign jurisdiction of a particular matter to the district court, jurisdiction rests in the circuit court. The General Assembly has enacted the declaratory judgment statute, KRS 418.040 et seq., which has been held constitutional by this Court in Black v. Elkhorn Coal Corp., 233 Ky. 588, 26 S.W.2d 481 (1930). It has also enacted the habeas corpus statutes encompassed in KRS 419.020 et seq. and the shock probation statutes in KRS 439.265 to 267. The latter statutes have been held to be constitutional in Commonwealth v. Williamson, Ky., 492 S.W.2d 874 (1973). See also Commonwealth v. Gross, Ky., 936 S.W.2d 85, 87 (1996). This Court has recognized the authority of the legislature to enact statutes regarding the jurisdiction of the court. See Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, Ky., 888 S.W.2d 679 (1994); McElroy v. Taylor, Ky., 977 S.W.2d 929 (1998). Here, the legislature assigned to the circuit courts the duty of conducting classification hearings in connection with a legislative act requiring assessment for the purpose of community notice.
The procedural due process rights of Hall were violated at the risk assessment hearing because the author of the report failed to attend. Consequently, this case is remanded to the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the pre-2000 amendments. Such a hearing would require the attendance of the author of the report as well as the right of Hall to call expert witnesses to rebut the same. The trial judge has the authority to accept the results of the risk assessment evaluation without qualifying the tests pursuant to Daubert or Kumho . The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing. The Act is constitutional as applied to Hall.