Opinion ID: 777743
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Drake's Remaining Claims

Text: 38 The District Court invoked sovereign immunity to support its dismissal of the remainder of Drake's action. Drake contends that this was error, arguing that the court instead should have viewed his pro se allegations as three separate claims each of which survives the Government's 12(b)(6) motion. We address each of these claims in turn.
39 Drake claims that the FAA's decision not to find Delta in violation of the agency's Part 40 rules violated the APA. In other words, according to Drake, Delta so manifestly disobeyed the FAA's regulations in processing Drake's urine sample that the FAA abused its discretion in concluding otherwise. 40 The agency's actions in this context were governed by 49 U.S.C. § 46101. Under this provision, any person may file a complaint with the FAA asserting a violation of one of the agency's regulations. The agency is directed to look into the matter if a reasonable ground appears to the Secretary [of Transportation] or Administrator [of the FAA] for the investigation. § 46101(a)(1). Here, Drake filed such a complaint against Delta, and the FAA conducted an investigation. What happened next falls within the ambit of § 46101(a)(3), which provides that: 41 The Secretary of Transportation or Administrator may dismiss a complaint without a hearing when the Secretary or Administrator is of the opinion that the complaint does not state facts that warrant an investigation or action. 42 (Emphasis added.) It is this dismissal that Drake now seeks to challenge. We reject this challenge, because we find that the FAA's decision to dismiss Drake's complaint without a hearing is committed to agency discretion by law, and thus excluded from review under the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 43 While the APA embodies a basic presumption of judicial review, Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1510, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), § 701(a)(2) bars judicial review of agency action when the matter in dispute has been committed to agency discretion by law. The Supreme Court's first significant discussion of § 701(a)(2) came in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). There, the Court indicated that this is a very narrow exception, which applies only in those rare instances where `statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.' Id. at 410, 91 S.Ct. at 820 (quoting S.REP. No. 79-752 (1945)). 44 Since the Court's decision in Overton Park, the no law to apply formula has come to refer to the search for substantive legal criteria against which an agency's conduct can be seriously evaluated. If no such judicially manageable standards are discernable, meaningful judicial review is impossible, and agency action is shielded from the scrutiny of the courts. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 1654, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-600, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 2051-2052, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988). In such circumstances, the courts have no legal norms pursuant to which to evaluate the challenged action, and thus no concrete limitations to impose on the agency's exercise of discretion. In other words, § 701(a)(2) encodes the principle that an agency cannot abuse its discretion, and thus violate § 706(2)(A), where its governing statute confers such broad discretion as to essentially rule out the possibility of abuse. 45 In determining whether a matter has been committed solely to agency discretion, we consider both the nature of the administrative action at issue and the language and structure of the statute that supplies the applicable legal standards for reviewing that action. See, e.g., Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep't of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, 104 F.3d 1349, 1353 (D.C.Cir.1997). The Supreme Court has recognized that certain categories of administrative decisions, including refusals to take enforcement actions, are presumptively outside the bounds of judicial review. See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831-34, 105 S.Ct. at 1655-57; see also Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191, 113 S.Ct. 2024, 2030, 124 L.Ed.2d 101 (1993). 46 In the present case, the FAA's decision to dismiss Drake's complaint without a hearing was equivalent to a decision not to commence an enforcement action. Such a hearing is a prerequisite to an FAA finding that a carrier has committed a statutory or regulatory violation. See 49 U.S.C. § 46101(a)(4). Here, the agency determined that no hearing was necessary because the facts stated in Drake's complaint were insufficient to warrant further action. The FAA's action in this case was thus analogous to an exercise of prosecutorial discretion of the sort discussed in Chaney. And, as Chaney makes clear, when prosecutorial discretion is at issue, the matter is presumptively committed to agency discretion by law. See Block v. SEC, 50 F.3d 1078, 1082 (D.C.Cir.1995) (concluding that an agency's refusal to hold a hearing for the purpose of establishing the factual basis for subsequent enforcement action is subject to Chaney 's presumption against judicial review). 47 In an effort to avoid Chaney 's presumption against judicial review, Drake argues that he is merely challenging the specific findings of the FAA that led the agency not to commence an enforcement action. In other words, Drake contends that there is law to apply in the sense indicated by the Supreme Court in Overton Park, because the agency made specific findings to support its judgment and these findings are subject to review under § 706(2)(A) of the APA. This is a superficially appealing argument, but it ultimately fails for two related reasons. 48 First, it is clear that the FAA's factual findings were inextricably intertwined with its decision not to issue a compliance order against Delta. In other words, the FAA's decision that the facts did not show a violation of Part 40 was inseparable from its decision to take no further prosecutorial action against the carrier. This is not to suggest that such agency findings are never subject to judicial review. Instead, our point is that when, as here, such determinations are a prerequisite to an enforcement action, we would read Chaney far too narrowly to conclude that a challenge to the adequacy of agency findings is not in substance a challenge to the agency's refusal to enforce. See Block, 50 F.3d at 1081 (suggesting that Chaney applies not merely to an agency's decision not to commence enforcement action in the case of a recognized violation, but also to its antecedent judgment upon the question of whether a violation has occurred) (internal quotation marks omitted). 49 Second, whether this case is governed by Overton Park (no law to apply so the presumption of reviewability is lost) or Chaney (agency action involved an exercise of prosecutorial discretion and presumption of non-reviewability has not been overcome), Drake cannot prevail. This is so because, in the end analysis, the statute at issue gives virtually unfettered discretion to the FAA to act as it did in this case. 50 Chaney 's presumption against judicial review may be rebutted where the relevant statute supplies meaningful standards to cabin the agency's otherwise plenary discretion. See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832-33, 105 S.Ct. at 1656; see also Vigil, 508 U.S. at 193, 113 S.Ct. at 2031 (Congress may always circumscribe agency discretion to allocate resources by putting restrictions in the operative statutes....); Block, 50 F.3d at 1082 (noting that an enforcement decision that would otherwise be unreviewable is subject to judicial review if the Congress or the agency itself has provided a meaningful standard for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement power). Accordingly, we may review the FAA decisions challenged by Drake only if the operative statute provides clear guidelines by which to do so, or otherwise evinces an intent to constrain the FAA's discretion. 51 In this case, however, the statute does just the opposite. The language of § 46101(a)(3), which set the terms for the FAA's decision to dismiss Drake's complaint without a hearing, is highly discretionary. Indeed, a provision that allows the Administrator to act when she  is of the opinion that the complaint does not state facts that warrant an investigation, gives the FAA virtually unbridled discretion over such decisions. The only statutory reference point is the Administrator's own beliefs. Therefore, a court has no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion, at least so long as the agency's action does not otherwise infringe some constitutional right or protection. See Webster, 486 U.S. at 603-04, 108 S.Ct. at 2053-54. 52 The Supreme Court has relied on an analogous distinction between a subjective standard (whether the agency thinks that a condition has been met) and an objective one (whether the condition in fact has been met) in deciding that agency action was unreviewable. In Webster, the Court held that a provision allowing termination of a CIA employee whenever the agency's Director shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States precluded judicial review of that decision. Id. at 600, 108 S.Ct. at 2051 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 403(c)). What may be thought necessary may not in fact be necessary, but a court may pass judgment only on the latter, not the former. 53 Thus, whether this case involves a presumption of nonreviewability under Chaney or, instead, a presumption of reviewability under Overton Park, Drake's claim still fails because there is no law to apply. See, e.g., Claybrook v. Slater, 111 F.3d 904, 908-09 (D.C.Cir.1997) (decision of agency representative to adjourn a meeting whenever he determines it to be in the public interest was committed to agency discretion by law) (emphasis added). In sum, then, it is clear that the relevant statutory language fairly exudes deference to the FAA, and foreclose[s] the application of any meaningful judicial standard of review. Webster, 486 U.S. at 600, 108 S.Ct. at 2051. We therefore have no basis upon which to review the FAA's decision to dismiss Drake's complaint without a hearing. Appellant has therefore failed to state a claim under the APA.
54 We need not linger long over Drake's argument that his complaint states a colorable Bivens claim. The complaint names only the FAA itself as defendant. Drake neither named nor served any individual defendants. It is of course well-settled that Bivens liability cannot be imposed on an agency of the Federal Government. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994). Drake's constitutional claim against the FAA thus fails. 55 Aware of this problem, amicus asks us to allow Drake to correct this pleading deficiency on remand. Because we have rejected all of appellant's claims, however, there is nothing to remand. Insofar as we are being asked to send the case back merely so that Drake may amend his complaint, this request comes too late. See Gov't of Guam v. Am. President Lines, 28 F.3d 142, 149-51 (D.C.Cir.1994) (holding that plaintiffs whose complaints are dismissed waive their right to amend following appeal if they failed to seek leave to amend from the District Court); United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 286 F.3d 542, 552-53 (D.C.Cir.2002) (confirming that this rule applies so long as the Court of Appeals affirms the dismissal of the complaint).
56 Finally, we reject Drake's complaint resting on the Federal Tort Claims Act. By its own terms, the FTCA does not apply to any claim that is based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency ... whether or not the discretion involved be abused. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). As our discussion of appellant's APA claim has demonstrated, the FAA's decision to dismiss Drake's complaint without a hearing in light of its finding that Delta did not violate Part 40 plainly represents an exercise of the agency's discretion. Accordingly, the District Court's decision that Drake stated no claim under the FTCA was entirely correct. 57 Drake argues that the FAA's governing statute contains certain mandatory elements that, if disregarded, could serve as the basis for an FTCA action. Specifically, he points to the provision mandating that the Administrator shall issue an order to compel compliance with this part if the Secretary or Administrator finds in an investigation under this subsection that a person is violating this part. 49 U.S.C. § 46101(a)(4) (emphasis added). We have no occasion to address whether disobeying such a statutory command could give rise to FTCA liability, because there has been no such disobedience in this case. The whole basis for Drake's complaint is that the FAA did not find a violation. Accordingly, whatever obligations this statutory scheme may impose on the FAA simply have not been triggered.