Opinion ID: 2467100
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: claims as to southland corporation

Text: Appellants contend that Section 311.310, which makes it a misdemeanor to sell, vend, give away or otherwise supply any intoxicating liquor in any quantity whatsoever to ... any person intoxicated or appearing to be intoxicated...., infers a civil cause of action against Southland, a package liquor store. See Sampson v. W.F. Enterprises, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 333, 337 (Mo.App.1980) (A violation of Section 311.310 gives rise to a cause of action [against tavern owners] for civil damages.), and Nesbitt v. Westport Square, Ltd., 624 S.W.2d 519 (Mo.App.1981). Even assuming that Section 311.310 gives rise to a civil cause of action, our courts to date have limited the applicability of that cause of action to suits against tavern owners, who dispense alcoholic beverages by the drink. The parties have not cited, nor do we find, any case in which liability has been extended to package liquor store proprietors in Missouri, [2] either under Section 311.310 or general common law tort principles. Section 537.053 expresses a legislative intent to shield purveyors of intoxicants from liability for the injuries caused by their drunken patrons. Section 311.310 can no longer be read to give rise to a cause of action except under the limited circumstances provided in Section 537.053. Even were we inclined to extend common law liability to package store proprietors who knowingly sell alcohol to intoxicated customers, the passage of, and policy expressed in, Section 537.053 counsels against such a holding. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Southland. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed as to the Southland Corporation. The judgment of the trial court is reversed as to B-J's Family Bar and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. BILLINGS, C.J., and DONNELLY, RENDLEN and HIGGINS, JJ., concur. BLACKMAR, J., concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion filed. WELLIVER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and concurs in separate concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion of BLACKMAR, J. BLACKMAR, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree that the judgment against the plaintiff and in favor of Southland Corporation should be affirmed. I am not willing to accept Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 570 (Mo.App.1983), as the common law of Missouri. As the principal opinion points out, there was no application for transfer in that case. I would reject the suggestion that there is a common law in the Eastern District, which may differ from the common law of the state. The point ruled in Carver is an open one, so far as we are concerned. It is significant that, in the many years of our history, the courts have not imposed liability on the purveyors of liquor by the drink for the subsequent behavior of their patrons. I give no weight to the arcane case of Skinner v. Hughes, 13 Mo. 440 (1850), as establishing a rule of current application. The legislature has no proper office in defining the common law rules for application to existing claims, but the signals from the repeal of the dram shop law, Section 4487, RSMo 1929, by L. 1933-1934, p. 77, provide very clear indications, first, that the legislature considered that a statute was necessary to impose civil liability on the seller of liquor by the drink, and, second, that a later legislature determined that there should be no such liability. This statutory history demonstrates quite clearly, moreover, that Section 311.310, RSMo 1986, was not intended to afford a civil action. I see no compelling need to recognize a common law cause of action which has never been recognized by a decision of this Court, and which has been barred from future application by the express terms of Section 537.053, RSMo 1986. I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.