Opinion ID: 1169298
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issues

Text: CONCLUSION. Under ER 803(a)(3), the decedent's statements to his girl friend were admissible in evidence because they evinced his then state of mind. A statement made out of court that is offered in court to prove the truth of the matter stated is inadmissible hearsay evidence unless it falls within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. [1] One exception to the hearsay rule allows evidence of a declarant's state of mind. This is ER 803(a)(3) which reads: Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. This rule is in accord with previous Washington law providing that statements of a declarant's then existing state of mind are admissible in evidence if there is need for their use and if there is substantial probability of their trustworthiness. [2] Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) is the same as ER 803(a)(3). Under both rules, hearsay evidence is admissible if it bears on the declarant's state of mind and if that state of mind is an issue in the case. [3] Under the federal rule, the state of mind exception has also been held to authorize admission of evidence of a party's intentions as circumstantial evidence that he acted according to those intentions. This extension of the state of mind exception is known as the  Hillmon doctrine. [4] Long before the present evidentiary rules were adopted, the United States Supreme Court examined the state of mind rule in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 36 L.Ed. 706, 12 S.Ct. 909 (1892). The issue in Hillmon was the identity of a body found at a campsite. The plaintiffs in that case contended that the body was that of a Mr. Hillmon. The defendants contended the body was that of a Mr. Walters and sought to introduce letters Walters had written stating that he intended to go to the area of the campsite with Hillmon. The Supreme Court found the letters admissible for two purposes: The letters in question were competent, ... as evidence that, ... [Walters] had the intention of going, and of going with Hillmon, which made it more probable both that he did go and that he went with Hillmon, than if there had been no proof of such intention. Hillmon, at 295-96. Although Hillmon was a civil case, the Court cited with approval a number of criminal cases in support of its decision. One such case was Hunter v. State, 40 N.J.L. 495 (1878). In that case, Hunter was indicted for the murder of Armstrong. At issue was the admissibility of Armstrong's letters and statements, conveyed to his wife and son on the date of his death, to the effect that he was going on a business trip with Hunter. The Court quoted as follows from Hunter, at 538: In the ordinary course of things, it was the usual information that a man about leaving home would communicate, for the convenience of his family, ... At the time it was given, such declarations could . .. mean harm to no one; ... If it is legitimate to show by a man's own declarations that he left his home to be gone a week, or for a certain destination, which seems incontestable, why may it not be proved in the same way that a designated person was to bear him company?... If it was in the ordinary train of events for this man to leave word or to state where he was going, it seems to me it was equally so for him to say with whom he was going. Hillmon, at 299. A similar fact pattern, and much the same analysis, is found in State v. Vestal, 278 N.C. 561, 180 S.E.2d 755 (1971). Under Hillmon, therefore, a declarant's statement of future intent is admissible to prove: (1) that the declarant went to the place indicated by his or her statement of intention, and (2) that the declarant went there with the other named party. [5] Most courts have expanded the  Hillmon doctrine to admit hearsay statements of intent that implicate a third party's conduct. [6] This expansion is commonly used in murder trials, where courts admit a decedent's hearsay statements that implicate the defendant in the murder. [7] Courts use such evidence despite conflicting guidance in the comments to Fed. R. Evid. 803(3). That rule itself makes no reference to Hillmon, but the comments contain this statement by the Advisory Committee: `The rule of Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon ..., allowing evidence of intention as tending to prove the doing of the act intended, is, of course, left undisturbed'. [8] Following this observation is one from the House Judiciary Committee: `the Committee intends that the Rule be construed to limit the doctrine of [ Hillmon ], so as to render statements of intent by a declarant admissible only to prove his future conduct, not the future conduct of another person.' [9] Neither the text of ER 803(a)(3) nor the comments thereto mention Hillmon. One commentator in this state concludes that the history of rule 803(a)(3) indicates an intent to follow the House Committee's view. [10] No Washington cases are cited as direct support for this observation, and the commentator acknowledges that some courts have extended the rule to allow the admission of a statement as proof of the joint conduct of the declarant and another. [11] The defendant argues that under State v. Parr, 93 Wn.2d 95, 606 P.2d 263 (1980), the decedent's statements as to the defendant's phone call to him are inadmissible to show that the defendant met the decedent on 116th Street. At issue in Parr was the admissibility of a decedent's statements that she feared Parr and that he once threatened her. This evidence was introduced to rebut a claim that the defendant accidentally shot the victim in self-defense. [12] We observed there that the inference to be drawn from such testimony was that the defendant wanted to and did kill the victim and was unduly prejudicial. Parr held that ER 803(a)(3) permits statements reporting the declarant's state of mind, but does not permit statements reporting the conduct of another which might have induced that state of mind. [13] Parr is distinguishable from the case before us. Here, the decedent's statements concerning his intention to take a certain action shortly before he was killed necessarily implicated the defendant's future conduct. The decedent said that because the defendant had called him, he (the decedent) was going to meet the defendant on 116th Street. Unlike Parr, the State is not relying on past incidents to prove the defendant's subsequent conduct. [14] The Ninth Circuit recognized that state of mind evidence used to prove subsequent conduct of the declarant and a third party is not foolproof, but concluded that any unreliability goes to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. Even where no actions by other parties are necessary in order for the intended act to be performed, a myriad of contingencies could intervene to frustrate the fulfillment of the intention. The fact that the cooperation of another party is necessary if the intended act is to be performed adds another important contingency, but the difference is one of degree rather than kind. The possible unreliability of the inference to be drawn from the present intention is a matter going to the weight of the evidence which might be argued to the trier of fact, but it should not be a ground for completely excluding the admittedly relevant evidence. United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 376 n. 14 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977). [15] We agree. One New York court has found a greater degree of reliability in using Hillmon evidence to prove the conduct of a third person. Everyday experience confirms that people frequently express an intent to see another under circumstances that make it extremely likely that such a meeting will occur. Indeed, it is not uncommon for such expressions of intent to be more trustworthy evidence that the meeting took place than many statements of intent with regard to the performance of acts not involving any inference with regard to another person. People v. Malizia, 92 A.D.2d 154, 160, 460 N.Y.S.2d 23, 27 (1983), aff'd, 62 N.Y.2d 755, 465 N.E.2d 364, 476 N.Y.S.2d 825, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932, 83 L.Ed.2d 264, 105 S.Ct. 327 (1984). [1] The decedent's statements, made before leaving his house, about the phone call from the defendant and his intention to go help him, constituted the State's strongest evidence of the defendant's guilt. Neither this defendant's nor the decedent's states of mind were at issue in the trial. Under the  Hillmon doctrine, however, the decedent's intentions were admissible to infer that he acted according to those intentions, and that he acted with the person he mentioned. The conduct of the decedent and the defendant after the phone call was definitely at issue in the trial. The decedent's statements under the circumstances here created a trustworthy inference that the defendant met him on 116th Street where he was killed within a half hour of receiving the phone call and leaving his home. Those statements were properly admitted into evidence, the weight of such evidence being for the jury. The defendant argues that even if admission of decedent's statements was proper, their use violated his constitutional right of confrontation. We disagree. [2] Both the state and federal constitutions guarantee a defendant in a criminal prosecution the right to confront those who testify against the defendant. U.S. Const. amend. 6; Const. art. 1, § 22 (amend. 10). The confrontation clause restricts the range of admissible hearsay in two ways. [16] The prosecution must demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant, and the proposed statement must bear adequate indicia of reliability. [17] Reliability is inferred where the evidence falls within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. [18] In the present case, the declarant was unavailable to testify because he had been killed. [19] The state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule is well established. Since the trial court did not err by concluding that the decedent's statements came within that exception, their use did not violate the defendant's right of confrontation.