Opinion ID: 223052
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Use of Suppressed Wiretap Evidence to Impeach

Text: In response to the Government's mid-trial motion to admit portions of the previously suppressed MCC tapes, the District Court ruled that evidence obtained in violation of Title III could be admitted to impeach Simels's testimony. See Simels II, 2009 WL 4730232, at -. Simels contends that this decision disregarded the language, structure, and purpose of Title III. Appellant's Brief at 56. As this Court recently acknowledged, Simels's Title III claim is one of first impression in this Circuit. See SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 172 n. 9 (2d Cir. 2010). Although 18 U.S.C. § 2515 states that illegally obtained wire or oral communications may not be received in evidence in any trial, the Government contends that we should nonetheless approve use of such communications for impeachment purposes, following the Supreme Court's use for impeachment purposes of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, see Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954). As noted by the District Court in its written decision, see Simels II, 2009 WL 4730232, at , the Senate Judiciary Committee report on the bill that became Title III states that Congress did not intend to press the scope of the suppression [rule] beyond present search and seizure law. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 68 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2184-85. The report explicitly cites Walder. All of the circuits that have considered the issue have held that unlawfully obtained wiretap evidence may be used by the prosecution for impeachment in a criminal case. See United States v. Baftiri, 263 F.3d 856, 857-58 (8th Cir.2001); United States v. Echavarria-Olarte, 904 F.2d 1391, 1397 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 484 (1st Cir.1987); United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506, 508-09 (5th Cir.1973); see also Culbertson v. Culbertson, 143 F.3d 825, 827-28 (4th Cir. 1998) (approving use of evidence obtained by unauthorized wiretapping for impeachment of party's affidavit in civil case); Jacks v. Duckworth, 651 F.2d 480, 483-85 (7th Cir.1981) (permitting prosecution's use of evidence obtained by unauthorized wiretapping for impeachment as rebuttal evidence in criminal case). The Tenth Circuit has prohibited discovery of illegally obtained wiretap evidence in a civil case, distinguishing the cases permitting prosecution use for impeachment purposes in a criminal case on the ground that the exclusionary rule, which Walder declined to apply to Fourth Amendment violations, did not apply to private individuals. See Anthony v. United States, 667 F.2d 870, 879 (10th Cir.1982). We agree with the courts applying the Walder rationale to evidence obtained in violation of Title III. As the First Circuit has pointed out, section 2515 cannot always be applied literally because doing so would preclude the use of illegally obtained wiretap evidence in a prosecution for violating Title III itself. See Vest, 813 F.2d at 480. And, as the Eighth Circuit has stated, It makes no sense for evidence obtained in violation of a mere statute to be more severely restricted than evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution. At the time the statute was enacted, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment could be used for impeachment purposes. It is reasonable to assume that Congress had this background in mind when the statute was passed, and that, in the absence of an express statement, it did not intend to draw the line of exclusion in a different place. Baftiri, 263 F.3d at 857.