Opinion ID: 1975121
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Principal Theory

Text: Under its theory that appellant committed felony-murder as a principal, the government had to show that appellant killed the decedent while perpetrating the underlying felony of armed burglary: the entry with intent to assault Kirk Shephard with the bat. That is the causal link requirement. It is not sufficient for the government to prove only that the burglary was followed by an unlawful killing; it must prove that there was such actual legal relation between the killing and the crime committed ... that the killing can be said to have occurred as a part of the perpetration of the crime, or in furtherance of an attempt or purpose to commit it. Heinlein, 160 U.S.App.D.C. at 168, 490 F.2d at 736 (quoting State v. Schwensen, 392 P.2d at 334); see Bolden, 169 U.S.App.D.C. at 66, 514 F.2d at 1307; Head, 451 A.2d at 625. Unlike the majority, I believe the question whether the government presented sufficient evidence to sustain appellant's conviction as a principal is a close call. First, as already indicated, the government's evidence showing that appellant aided and abetted Theodore Taylor's entry with intent to assault was sufficient to establish appellant's participation in the underlying felony of armed burglary. Second, I agree with the majority that there was sufficient evidence to show that the decedent was killed by the second gunshot (this point was uncontested at trial) and that appellant had possession of the gun at the time of the first gunshot. Finally, although no one saw who fired the second, fatal shot, Percy Settles testified that he saw appellant and the decedent struggle over the gun just before it went off the second time, and several other witnesses heard appellant and the decedent arguing over the bat just before the second shot. Thus, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that appellant shot the decedent. The jury, however, did not convict appellant of murder. Because the jury hung on both first degree premeditated murder and the lesser included offense of second degree murder, at least one juror did not believe appellant fired the second shot with the required mental state. See D.C.Code § 22-2401 (requiring deliberate and premeditated malice for murder in the first degree, other than felony-murder); id. at -2403 (requiring malice aforethought for murder in the second degree). We can assume, however, that the jury believed that appellant shot the decedent, since all the government's evidence pointed to him, rather than to Theodore Taylor, as the triggerman. See supra Part II.A. Thus, because the jury did not find appellant had the necessary mens rea for murder, it convicted him of first degree murder solely because of the application of the felonymurder rule. For us to overturn his conviction for felony-murder, therefore, appellant must show that the government failed in its burden of sufficiently proving the causal link between the burglary and the killing. In other words, if there was legally insufficient evidence of the causal link, our one choice would be to overturn the conviction. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for felony-murder, the majority summarizes: The assault upon Shephard led almost immediately to the intervention of decedent, the momentary departure of Taylor and appellant, and the encounter between Kevin Marshall and decedent. Kevin Marshall's call for assistance led to the return of Taylor and appellant and their assistance to Kevin Marshall in his altercation with decedent. Either Taylor... or appellant ... inflicted the fatal wound. Ante at 557. [10] From that factual summary the majority concludes that the burglary `may be deemed a continuing offense for purposes of the felony-murder statute,' id. (quoting Blango, 373 A.2d at 888), and that [t]he jury was presented with an `unbroken chain of facts and circumstances which link' the burglary committed at the initial entry and the homicide, id. at 558 (quoting Coleman, 111 U.S.App.D.C. at 215, 295 F.2d at 560). Unfortunately, the majority does not explain how the government's evidence in this case proves that the burglary was a continuing offense, as in Blango, nor does it explain why the chain of facts and circumstances was unbroken, as in Coleman. See supra at 560-561 (discussing facts and holdings of Blango and Coleman ). According to the government's own evidence at trial, the flow of events between Theodore Taylor's entry and assault of Shephard (one swing of the bat which Shephard blocked) and appellant's shooting of the decedent was not as uninterrupted as the majority's synopsis suggests. Of the government's three key eyewitnesses (Janice Settles, Percy Settles, and Tawanna Matthews), Janice Settles provided the most complete and understandable testimony regarding what happened before the shots were fired, while Percy Settles provided the most complete and understandable testimony regarding what happened at the time the shots were fired. Both Percy Settles and Matthews testified that appellant told Theodore Taylor don't fight with the bat because Taylor and Shephard knew each other. That corroborated testimony was not challenged. Janice Settles testified that after Taylor nonetheless swung the bat at Shephard, she intervened and ordered everybody out. Percy Settles corroborated Janice Settles' testimony. At about this time, the decedent came out of the bathroom and told everyone to stop arguing because all of them grew up together. According to Janice Settles, appellant and Taylor complied with her order and left the apartment and went back into the hallway. Matthews corroborated Janice Settles' story that appellant was in the hallway and not in the apartment at that point. [11] Although Kevin Marshall attempted to follow them, the door jammed and he got stuck inside. Then Kevin Marshall and the decedent began to argue, Marshall hit the decedent with the bat, and the two began struggling over the bat. When Marshall called out for help, appellant reentered the apartment. According to Percy Settles' testimony, appellant then pulled a gun and fired it once into the floor. After everyone scattered, the decedent refused to give appellant the bat and the two of them began to struggle over the gun. That was the last thing Percy Settles saw, but shortly thereafter a second shot rang out, and appellant ran from the apartment. Surely a reasonable juror could have concluded that, by telling Theodore Taylor not to use the bat and by leaving the apartment when ordered to do so by Janice Settles, appellant had either disassociated himself from the original criminal enterprise or that the chain of circumstances between the burglary and the killing had been broken. See Coleman, 111 U.S.App. D.C. at 216, 295 F.2d at 561; cf. Harris, 377 A.2d at 38. On the other hand, the jury could have refused so to find. Coleman, 111 U.S.App.D.C. at 219, 295 F.2d at 564. First, even though appellant had momentarily left the apartment, both the batthe weapon on which the common purpose centered and one of appellant's co-felons, Kevin Marshall, remained in the apartment. Thus, the jury could reasonably find that Kevin Marshall had not yet accomplished his escape from the scene of the crime and that appellant returned in order to further his co-felon's escape. Second, events happened very quickly, so the jury could have inferred that appellant's momentary departure at about the same time the decedent entered the room to breakup the fighting and arguing precipitated by the assault on Shephardwas not enough to break the chain of circumstances between the burglary and the subsequent deadly struggle between appellant and decedent. I conclude, therefore, that the government's evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find the causal link between the felony and the killing in order to fairly infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Langley v. United States, 515 A.2d 729, 731 (D.C.1986).