Opinion ID: 3063420
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Summary Judgment: Challenges to Assessment

Text: We review “a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Kelley v. Hicks, 400 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2005). A party is entitled to summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). There is a genuine issue of material fact if the nonmoving party has produced evidence that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in its favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001). The Commissioner's determination of a deficiency is presumed correct, and the taxpayer has the burden of proving it incorrect. Webb v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 872 F.2d 380, 381 (11th Cir. 1989). Unsworn statements, even from pro se parties, should not be consider[ed] in determining the propriety of summary judgment. Gordon v. Watson, 622 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1980). Federal law does provide an alternative to making a 6 sworn statement, but requires that the statement include a hand-written statement, signed and dated, that the statement is true under the penalties of perjury. 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Goldston contends the IRS’s assessment was inaccurate with respect to income from a non-compete agreement. There is no evidence in the record to support Goldston’s contention that the IRS applied income from the non-compete agreement in 1991. Rather, the record shows all the income received from this agreement was applied to his 1990 income. Goldston also contends the IRS’s assessment was inaccurate with respect to income received from pension distributions. The IRS determined, and the Government maintained, Goldston received $480,540 as pension distributions in 1991. As evidence he received less than that amount, Goldston offered his own unsworn statement, his own unsworn “Explanation,” and multiple unsigned and unfiled 1991 tax forms. Goldston also offered testimony from Sondra McPhail, an IRS agent who handled Goldston’s account, and Michele Mangan, a CPA. McPhail and Mangan testified the originally recorded $480,540 distribution was later reduced, and Mangan stated in her affidavit that she determined Goldston received only $118,370. Finally, the record includes Goldston’s deposition 7 testimony that the plan never included $480,000 and that he received “about $65,000” in distributions. We will not consider Goldston’s unsworn statements or the multiple unsigned tax forms. See Gordon, 622 F.2d at 123. However, the district court did not mention the transcripts, Mangan’s affidavit, or Goldston’s deposition in its order granting summary judgment. These documents contradict the Government’s assertion that Goldston received $480,540 in pension distributions. This evidence created a genuine dispute of material fact and rendered summary judgment improper. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order granting summary judgment, as well as its judgment against Goldston, and remand this case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. VACATED AND REMANDED. 8