Opinion ID: 1195082
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper criteria allegedly used to impose death

Text: Defendant argues that the court applied its own nonstatutory factors such as moral outrage, and improperly used him as a vehicle to promote social control. For a capital sentencing scheme to pass constitutional scrutiny, discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 323, 916 P.2d 1035, 1039 (1996)(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)). The trial court can give weight only to evidence that tends to establish an aggravating circumstance enumerated in A.R.S. § 13-703(F). See State v. Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. 46, 66, 906 P.2d 579, 599 (1995). There is nothing here to indicate that the sentencing judge overstepped these boundaries. After discussing at length the aggravating circumstances as well as the defense's proffered mitigation, the judge characterized capital punishment as an expression of the moral outrage of our society at a particular horrible and offensive conduct. He also mentioned deterrence as a goal of our criminal justice system in general and of capital punishment in particular. Absent evidence to the contrary, we assume the judge was capable of focusing on relevant factors and of setting aside irrelevant and emotional ones. See State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 316, 896 P.2d 830, 856 (1995). The above remarks do not demonstrate that the court abandoned constitutional mandates and sentenced defendant under its own beliefs.