Opinion ID: 2515997
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: was the appellant denied effective assistance of counsel in entering his guilty pleas?

Text: [¶ 19] Wyoming has a well-established and oft-repeated standard for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793, 796 (Wyo.1995); Starr v. State, 888 P.2d 1262, 1266-67 (Wyo.1995); Arner v. State, 872 P.2d 100, 104 (Wyo.1994); Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo.1986). The reviewing court should indulge a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Herdt, at 796; Starr, at 1266; Arner, at 104; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Under the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland and Frias, an appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance was deficient and that prejudice resulted. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; Starr, at 1266; King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 125 (Wyo.1991) (Cardine, J., dissenting); Campbell v. State, 728 P.2d 628, 629 (Wyo.1986); Frias, 722 P.2d at 145. In other words, to warrant reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that his counsel failed to `render such assistance as would have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney' and that `counsel's deficiency prejudiced the defense of [the] case.' Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo.1990). `The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.' Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, ¶ 6, 18 P.3d 1164, 1168-69 (Wyo.2001) (quoting Grainey v. State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Wyo.2000)). This test has been specialized for cases where entry of a guilty plea is challenged on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel: When an attorney has allegedly misadvised his client with respect to the entry of a guilty plea, a determination must be made of whether the decision to plead and forego the defense of his case resulted in prejudice to the client. That determination involves two interrelated questions: whether, in the absence of counsel's error, the recommendation of a reasonably competent attorney concerning the plea would differ from that given; and whether, absent the error, the outcome of a trial would have been more advantageous to the client than the result of his plea. Hill [v. Lockhart], 474 U.S. [52] at 59-60, 106 S.Ct. [366] at 370-71 [88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)]. The defendant may also establish the necessary prejudice by proof of circumstances indicating that, in deciding whether or not to plead guilty, he placed special emphasis on the challenged aspect of his attorney's advice. He must suggest to the reviewing court a plausible reason why, had his representation been as he claims it should have been, he would have chosen to forsake the benefits of his plea agreement for the risks of trial. Id.; see also Worthen [v. Meachum], 842 F.2d [1179] at 1184 [(10th Cir.1988)]. Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo.1990); see also Brock v. State, 981 P.2d 465, 469 (Wyo.1999). The burden of proving that counsel was ineffective rests on the appellant. Sorensen v. State, 6 P.3d 657, 660 (Wyo.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1093, 121 S.Ct. 818, 148 L.Ed.2d 702 (2001) (quoting Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo.1986)). [¶ 20] The appellant's brief contains the following paragraph generally damning trial counsel's performance: The right to assistance of counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6, and by Art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution. Both contemplate something more than a perfunctory defense or the appearance at counsel table of a warm body and nothing more. Effective assistance of counsel also requires that counsel act in the Defendant's best interests, and that counsel not become an advocate for the prosecution. Where a Defendant is threatened, coerced and intimidated into pleading guilty, and when his attorney will not explain and reveal evidence to which the Defendant is entitled, his attorney clearly is acting as an advocate for the prosecution rather than for the Defendant. At the hearing on his motion to withdraw guilty pleas, the appellant testified under oath as to the following specific allegations of ineffectiveness of counsel: 1. The appellant decided to plead guilty, then changed his mind, then pled guilty anyway because he felt intimidated by his court-appointed counsel. 2. Counsel did not review with him what would occur in the change of plea hearing and the questions that would be asked. 3. The appellant did not tell the district court of the intimidation by his attorney because he was tired of arguing with her. 4. Counsel did not do her job correctly in trying to get the appellant a deal with the district attorney's office. 5. Counsel either failed to find out what evidence the State had against the appellant or she refused to divulge it to him. 6. Counsel threatened to have the appellant sent to the State Hospital if he did not plead guilty. 7. The appellant told the district court he was satisfied with his attorney's representation because he was intimidated by the attorney. 8. Counsel did not explore the appellant's defenses to the conspiracy charge, specifically his alcohol and drug problems. 9. Counsel either failed to find out what other charges the State planned to bring against the appellant or refused to divulge that information to him. 10. Counsel never explained to the appellant what a conspiracy is. [¶ 21] The State's response to these allegations consists of three documents: an affidavit from the appellant's trial counsel, a letter from trial counsel to the appellant dated May 4, 2000, and a letter from the appellant to trial counsel on the same date. Pertinent information from those documents includes the following: 1. Trial counsel has over five years experience as a public defender. 2. Trial counsel met with the appellant very soon after being appointed. 3. At their first meeting, the appellant expressed a desire to plead guilty, but he wanted to have a preliminary hearing to see if Juan Martinez was going to be charged. 4. The appellant asked trial counsel to try to work out a plea bargain for a stipulated three to five year sentence, but the district attorney refused due to the appellant's lengthy criminal record. 5. Trial counsel attempted numerous times to work out a deal for a specified term of years, to no avail, and this information was relayed to the appellant. 6. The appellant still wished to plead guilty, even without a plea agreement. 7. Trial counsel learned of the following evidence against the appellant, and informed the appellant of its existence: a. The appellant worked for the victim. b. Juan Martinez confessed to the police that he had cashed several checks for the appellant. c. One of the checks was actually made payable to the appellant. d. The appellant had prior convictions for forgery and had been imprisoned in Nebraska for forgery and fraud type offenses. e. There was some evidence that the word hundred was misspelled on these checks and on other checks for which the appellant had been convicted. 8. Because the appellant wished to plead guilty, trial counsel advised him first to plead not guilty, so a different sentencing judge could be obtained, the present judge being the same judge who had sentenced him on his most recent prior conviction. 9. When the appellant voiced some concerns about pleading guilty, trial counsel advised him that he should plead guilty because, by taking responsibility, he would receive a lesser sentence. 10. Trial counsel believed the evidence against the appellant to be overwhelming. 11. The State agreed to waive the PSI at the appellant's request, and also agreed not to file additional forgery charges on new checks it had received. 12. The appellant could not understand why trial counsel would not take herself off his case because he had lots of attorneys take themselves off his cases. 13. In his letter, the appellant states, I will have to admit that you are a good attorney and I would like you to finish this case for me as I said. [¶ 22] In addition to considering the above information, the district court also reviewed the transcript of the change of plea hearing, which contained the following dialogue: THE COURT: Apart from that plea agreement, has anybody promised you anything or threatened you with anything in order to get you to plead guilty? THE DEFENDANT: No. THE COURT: Are you entering this plea of your own free will? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Have you discussed this matter fully and completely with [your court-appointed counsel]? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Are you satisfied with her representation of you in this matter? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Before I go any further, do you have any questions that you would like to ask her? I can arrange it so you can ask those separately or confidentially, if necessary. THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. [¶ 23] Based on everything in the record and everything presented at the hearing, the district court concluded that there was little or no doubt of the adequacy of trial counsel's representation of the appellant. We agree. The appellant has failed to meet his heavy burden of overcoming the strong presumption of effectiveness. To a large extent, this is simply a credibility issue, and we are not inclined to second-guess the district court in that regard. [¶ 24] Neither of the two prongs of the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) test has been met. While trial counsel could have been more patient, it is clear from the record that she was dealing with a client who was more than ordinarily demanding. What appears to have been a personality conflict did not rise to deficient representation. Further, the appellant has not proven what prejudice he suffered as a result of trial counsel's representation. Given his record, it certainly is not surprising that the district attorney would not agree to a light sentence, and it is not surprising that the district judge gave him substantial consecutive sentences. [¶ 25] One particular issue deserves additional mention. The appellant claims that trial counsel failed to investigate or present two possible defenses: lack of specific intent and intoxication. However, there is nothing in the record to indicate that either of these defenses was available to the appellant. A hearing was held in the district court on the appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The appellant presented no evidence at that hearing that he had no specific intent either to agree that a forgery would be committed or that the forgery was done with the intent to defraud. As to the defense of intoxication, the only evidence in the record is that the appellant answered yes to his attorney's question, Did you have any alcohol or drug problems at the time that you were charged with these crimes? There is nothing to show the extent of the appellant's alcohol or drug problems, if they existed, or that they contributed in any way to the commission of the crimes. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a defense for which there is no evidentiary support. Barron v. State, 819 P.2d 412, 416 (Wyo.1991); Munden v. State, 698 P.2d 621, 624 (Wyo.1985). [¶ 26] The idea that the appellant should plead guilty did not come from trial counsel, but from the appellant. He was not tricked or threatened into making that decision. The fact that trial counsel concurred with the appellant's assessment of the case does not mean she was ineffective. The appellant has not shown that a different attorney would have advised him any differently.