Opinion ID: 1365997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Defamation Complaint

Text: Although the First Amendment does not bar the defamation action, the plaintiffs are not entitled to prevail on the appeal because they have failed to plead a valid claim for defamation. To be defamatory under Utah law, a communication must impeach an individual's honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation or publish his or her natural defects or expose him or her to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-2(1) (1981). Whether the publication of an alleged defamatory statement, the photograph in this case, is capable of conveying a defamatory message is initially a question of law. Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 270-71 (3d Cir.1980); El Meson Espanol v. NYM Corp., 521 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.1975); McCabe v. Village Voice, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 525, 528 (E.D.Pa. 1982); Frinzi v. Hanson, 30 Wis.2d 271, 140 N.W.2d 259 (1966); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 614, comment b (1977); Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts, § 111, at 774 (5th ed. 1984). The tort of defamation protects only reputation. A publication is not defamatory simply because it is nettlesome or embarrassing to a plaintiff, or even because it makes a false statement about the plaintiff. Thus, an embarrassing, even though false, statement that does not damage one's reputation is not actionable as libel or slander. If no defamatory meaning can reasonably be inferred by reasonable persons from the communication, the action must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Only if a court first determines that a publication might be considered defamatory by a reasonable person is there a fact issue for the trier of fact. Steaks Unlimited, 623 F.2d at 270-71; El Meson, 521 F.2d at 739-40; Martin v. Municipal Publications, 510 F. Supp. 255, 257 (E.D.Pa. 1981); Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 442, 273 A.2d 899, 904 (1971); Restatement supra, § 614, comment b. Here, the photograph shows the plaintiffs with Senator Hatch in a work setting, and it appears in a political advertisement dealing with labor issues. At most, the photograph can be construed to imply that the plaintiffs are members of the Republican Party or that they supported Hatch's reelection. However, attribution of membership in a political party in the United States that is a mainstream party and not at odds with the fundamental social order is not defamatory, Prosser and Keeton, supra, § 111, nor is attribution of support for a candidate from one of those parties. [5] It is, of course, true that some persons find such lack of merit in any political party other than their own that they feel affronted if they are identified as being affiliated with another party. But such subjective perceptions and sensibilities have little to do with reputation, since reputation is based on a collective judgment of a large group of people. See Frinzi v. Hanson, 30 Wis.2d at 278, 140 N.W.2d at 262. Clearly both Republican and Democratic Parties are mainstream parties, and neither party can legitimately be said, for purposes of defamation law, to be at odds in any way with the fundamental social order. To what extent the general principle extends beyond those two parties need not now be decided. Frinzi illustrates the principle. A Democratic candidate for governor was accused by the state chairman of the Democratic Party of having been endorsed by certain Republicans and others who supported weakening anti-gambling laws. He was also attacked for considering running as an independent [and] throw[ing] away all pretense at being a Democrat. 30 Wis.2d at 274, 140 N.W.2d at 260. The court held that however offensive to the plaintiff those statements were, they were not defamatory. 30 Wis.2d at 278, 140 N.W.2d at 262. On similar grounds, Rawlins v. McKee, 327 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.Civ.App. 1959), held that a statement describing the plaintiff, a political candidate, as a radical who was backed and financed by the big shot labor bosses was not defamatory because it did not expose the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt or ridicule as required by the Texas libel statute. See also Haas v. Evening Democrat Co., 252 Iowa 517, 107 N.W.2d 444 (1961); Manasco v. Walley, 216 Miss. 614, 63 So.2d 91 (1953); Steinman v. Di Roberts, 23 A.D.2d 693, 257 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1965), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 512, 267 N.Y.S.2d 512, 214 N.E.2d 789 (1966); Annotation, Libel and Slander: Imputation of Subversive or Otherwise Objectionable Political or Social Principles, 33 A.L.R.2d 1196, 1203 (1954). However offensive the photograph in this case may have been to the plaintiffs, it could not, as a matter of law, have damaged their reputations or subjected them to public hatred, contempt or ridicule. In sum, the complaint failed to state a claim for relief based on defamation.