Opinion ID: 205321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Restoration

Text: Civil forfeiture actions such as that commenced by the government against Pescatore in 2003 and settled pursuant to the Plea Agreement are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 981. That section subject[s] to forfeiture to the United States property that was involved in, inter alia, various offenses under Title 18, including money laundering in violation of § 1956 and altering or removing motor vehicle identification numbers in violation of § 511. 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(A) and (F)(i). To the extent pertinent to the present appeal, § 981(e) provides that [n]otwithstanding any other provision of the law, . . . the Attorney General . . . is authorized to retain property forfeited pursuant to this section, or to transfer such property on such terms and conditions as he may determine . . . . (6) as restoration to any victim of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(6) (emphases added). Thus, the Attorney General is allowed to choose between restoration and retention. Pescatore has not called to our attention, and we are not aware of, any provision in this or any other section that requires the Attorney General to choose either option over the other. The authorization either to retain . . . or to transfer, with no accompanying statutory constraints, makes the decision between the two choices a matter of discretion. Nor does anything in the Plea Agreement, which we interpret in accordance with traditional principles of contract law, see generally United States v. Brumer, 528 F.3d 157, 158 (2d Cir.2008), purport to place any constraints on the Attorney General's exercise of that discretion. Paragraph 17 of the Agreement obligated the USAO to recommend that the DOJ grant Pescatore relief in the form of restoration, and Pescatore has provided no reason to discredit the government's representation to the district court that the Office made the promised recommendation. The Agreement further stated expressly that the USAO ha[d] authority only to recommend and that the final decision whether to grant such relief rest[ed] with the Department (Plea Agreement ¶ 17), and Pescatore concedes that this called on the DOJ to exercise its discretion (Pescatore brief on appeal at 12). The promise that the Department would make its decision in accordance with applicable law (Plea Agreement ¶ 17) is not, as Pescatore would have it ( see, e.g., Pescatore brief on appeal at 4, 9, 10, 12, 14,), the equivalent of a promise to grant restoration so long as it is not prohibited. The unambiguous statement that the Department, upon receiving the recommendation, would make its decision in accordance with applicable law plainly means that the Department would do anything the law requires and nothing the law prohibits. The Plea Agreement contains no promise that the DOJ would exercise its discretion to grant Pescatore relief that was not required. To the extent that the government suggests here, as it argued in the district court, that the decision of the DOJ to deny restoration is not reviewable in a court of law (Motion Tr. 18), we need not address that issue, given that the government has explained the basis for the DOJ's decision, and the record cannot support a conclusion that that basis evinced any abuse of discretion. Forfeiture and restitution are separate remedies with different purposes, and the DOJ Manual dealing with forfeitures and with compensation for crime victims indicates that discretion may be exercised to transfer forfeited assets to victims where . . . other property is not available to satisfy the order of restitution (Appendix to Government brief on appeal (United States Department of Justice, Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual 164 (2010))). At the hearing on Pescatore's restoration/restitution motion, the government explained that Pescatore's restoration request was denied because the defendant actually does have assets (Motion Tr. 18; see also Government brief on appeal at 16), and Pescatore in no way suggested that he lacked the wherewithal to satisfy his restitution obligations ( see Motion Tr. 16 (Mr. Froccaro: I have never said he doesn't have assets).) Accordingly, the criteria for restoration set out in the DOJ Manual were not met. In sum, we see nothing in the statutory provisions, DOJ's normal operating procedures, or the Plea Agreement that required the Department to use the forfeited assets to relieve Pescatore of his restitution obligations, and the record shows no failure on the part of the government to consider his request in good faith. The district court properly denied Pescatore's motion to compel the government to grant restoration.