Opinion ID: 864646
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Agent Grogan's Testimony

Text: ¶17. Easter argues that the trial court erred in allowing Agent Grogan to testify as to whether it was standard operating procedure for people involved in a drug transaction to disguise what they were discussing. Easter claims that the trial court allowed Agent Grogan to supply an expert opinion without being qualified as an expert. The record reflects the following exchange: Mr. Davis [State]: Agent Grogan, were you present when the confidential informant placed a phone call to the defendant on this date? Agent Grogan: Yes, sir. State: Were you able to listen to the conversation that ensued between them? Agent Grogan: Yes, sir. 7 State: Now, when these, how many of these types of conversations have you witnessed in law enforcement would you say? Agent Grogan: Probably hundreds I imagine. State: All right. Is it normal or is it kind of standard operating procedure for people involved in that to kind of disguise what they're talking about, or do they come out and say, I will sell you two ounces of cocaine? Mr. Parrish [Defense]: Your, Honor, at this time, we're going to object. This is calling for an expert opinion, and he hasn't been tendered as an expert at all. State: Judge, he can give his personal opinion based on his experience as a law enforcement officer. The Court: All right. Well, I'll let you voir dire him on his qualifications if you'd like to do that now. Defense: Your, Honor, we'd object. He has not been disclosed to the defendants as an expert witness. He's been disclosed to us as a fact witness. If he's going to start testifying as to his opinion about how drug deals -- based upon his training and experience, then he's getting into the expert range, and that's what we're objecting on because we're not able to prepare to rebut that. State: Your Honor, if I may, a lay witness can -- a fact witness can give their opinion. The Court: I think this officer can give an opinion based upon his experience. He's worked for -- been an agent for MBN for over four years. Defense: It's two and a half, Judge, but -- The Court: Two and a half years. Defense: We would object to him being able to give opinion testimony other than to -- observations that he -- as he observed whatever facts he's going to testify about. The Court: All right. Well, your objection's noted. It will be overruled. He'll be subject to cross-examination. State: Thank you, Judge. State: During these types of conversations between somebody wanted to purchase and somebody wanting to see narcotics, it is standard -- the normal course of business, I guess, code words or synonyms to be used rather than people to say, I 8 want one ounce of cocaine, and the seller to say, I will sell you one ounce of cocaine? Agent Grogan: Yes, sir. (emphasis added). ¶18. In overruling the defense's objection, the trial court determined that Agent Grogan was able to render his opinion based on his experience as a MBN agent. The Mississippi Court of Appeals was faced with a factually similar situation. In Jones v. State, 754 So.2d 476, 484 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999), the defense asserted that Detective Steve Renfroe presented expert testimony without being qualified as an expert. Detective Renfroe's testimony explained how he determined what evidence was relevant and what should be recovered from a crime scene. Id. Detective Renfroe also provided testimony explaining why the scales, the walkie-talkies and the metal detector all had evidentiary value in a narcotics arrest. Id. The court found that Detective Renfroe did not give an opinion as contemplated in Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702. Instead, he answered questions based on his experiences as a narcotics officer. Id. ¶19. This Court finds that the trial court did not commit reversible error in allowing Agent Grogan to testify, based on his experience as a narcotics agent for the MBN transactions, that it was not uncommon for there to be use of code to disguise the drug transaction. This issue is without merit.