Opinion ID: 1506787
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Tort of Publication of Private Facts

Text: The depositors also allege an infringement of their rights under § 9-1-28.1(a)(3) to avoid having their private affairs publicized. This section guarantees [t]he right to be secure from unreasonable publicity given to one's private life. To state a cause of action a plaintiff must show (1) publication (2) of a private fact (3) that the fact which has been made public [is] one which would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities, §§ 9-1-28.1(a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii), and (4) damages, § 9-1-28.1(b). In interpreting the requirements of what we shall refer to as the tort of publication of private facts, we again find the relevant Restatement (Second) Torts provision, § 652D, to be informative. [16] Since the interests asserted to have been invaded by the Governor's action are within the category to which § 9-1-28.1(a)(3) offers protection, we proceed to address each of the elements of the tort to determine if the trial justice's grant of summary judgment was appropriate. We start our discussion with the first requirement, publication. Unlike the Restatement, which requires there be publicity given to the private information, Restatement (Second) Torts § 652D cmt. a, our statute requires that the information be published. Section 9-1-28.1(a)(3)(A)(i). The term publication, by analogy to the tort of slander, does not require that the information be disseminated in a newspaper but merely that it be repeated to a third party. See Gaudette v. Carter, 100 R.I. 259, 260-61, 214 A.2d 197, 199 (1965); Restatement (Second) Torts § 577. Next the tort requires that any actionable disclosure must involve private fact[s]. Section 9-1-28.1(a)(3)(A)(i). The Governor asserts that the depositors' banking records were not private as a matter of law and that therefore he cannot be held liable for their release. In this contention he relies, as did the trial justice, upon United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976), for the proposition that banking records are not private facts. [17] In Miller the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the issue of whether a depositor has a Fourth Amendment right to privacy in the contents of his or her banking records. Quoting the statement from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 582 (1967), that [w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public    is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection, Miller, 425 U.S. at 442, 96 S.Ct. at 1623, 48 L.Ed.2d at 78, the Court observed that information contained in the banking documents at issue had been voluntarily given to the bank, thereby risking its disclosure to the government. Id. at 442-43, 96 S.Ct. at 1624, 48 L.Ed.2d at 79. Since the information had been voluntarily disclosed, the Court found no protectable Fourth Amendment interest in the evidence obtained by the state from a third party bank's records. Id. at 443, 96 S.Ct. at 1624, 48 L.Ed.2d at 79. However, Miller 's conclusion that there is no Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of banking records does not necessarily apply in the circumstances presented by § 9-1-28.1(a)(3). That the Fourth Amendment does not prevent access to information contained in the records of financial institutions for legitimate law-enforcement purposes does not in any way suggest that the information becomes public for all purposes. Having determined that the depositors' disclosure of their financial matters to their bank for a limited purpose did not constitute a waiver of all expectations of privacy they may have had, we must next determine if such an expectation did exist. Doing so requires us to determine what are private facts protected under § 9-1-28.1(a)(3)(A)(i). The use of the term unreasonable, in defining the gravamen of the tort, draws us inevitably to Justice Harlan's oft-quoted definition of a reasonable expectation of privacy from the context of the Fourth Amendment: first that a person must have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as `reasonable.' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516, 19 L.Ed.2d at 588 (Harlan, J., concurring). We conclude that Justice Harlan's subjective/objective test provides an excellent definition of the interests the Legislature sought to protect in creating a right to privacy. It requires that a claim to privacy be bona fide and of a type that a reasonable person would expect to be observed. Therefore, in order for the action in tort to lie, we hold that plaintiffs must demonstrate that they actually expected a disclosed fact to remain private, and that society would recognize this expectation of privacy as reasonable and be willing to respect it. These issues in the first instance constitute mixed questions of law and fact to be determined by the trier of fact in a trial on the merits. Applying this standard to the facts of the case at bar we conclude that a trier of fact might well determine that the depositors had an expectation of privacy in their bank records and might also find that the depositors entertained a good faith belief that their bank records would not be publicized. Such expectations have been recognized in respect to the bank's obligation to maintain privacy in Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 44 Md.App. 335, 408 A.2d 758 (1979) (bank has obligation not to disclose financial information of depositors save by compulsion of law); see also Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of England, 1 K.B. 461 (1923) (opinion of Lord Justice Bankes); see generally Edward L. Raymond, Jr., Annotation, Bank's liability, under state law, for disclosing financial information concerning depositor or customer, 81 A.L.R.4th 377 (1990). In the case at bar, we regard these issues as they relate to the Governor as mixed questions of law and fact. Next, for liability to exist, [t]he fact which has been made public must be one which would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities. Section 9-1-28.1(a)(3)(A)(ii). This requirement ensures that any disclosure be of the sort that could be expected to inflict harm on the person whose private affairs are made points of public discussion. This issue, of course, involves a factual determination of what would be offensive or objectionable in the context of this case. The Governor has contended that since the depositors benefited from his release of their information by receiving compensation from the state, they have no grounds for complaint. We take this argument as suggesting that the disclosures would not have been offensive to a reasonable person, given the end result. Without question it appears that the Governor's intention in disclosure was benign. However, whether this benign purpose would overcome or supersede the element of offensiveness should be left to the trier of fact upon remand. Finally, we note that the depositors have alleged damages in their complaint. Since summary judgment was rendered, the issue of damages was not considered in the Superior Court. Thus the final element necessary to support this action must be left for determination upon remand. Having determined that by their allegations relating to the tort of publication of private facts plaintiffs have set forth a complaint that raises genuine issues of material fact, we next address the two defenses raised by the Governor. 3