Opinion ID: 845765
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: proof of actual visual intoxication

Text: The second issue is whether the Legislature intended to restrict the type of circumstantial evidence that qualifies as proof that the drunk was visibly intoxicated when served by the dramshop. The statute refers to the tortfeasor repeatedly as a visibly intoxicated person. MCL 436.1801(3), (6), (7), (8), and (9). As explained later in this opinion, a retail licensee may be liable under the statute when it serves an alcoholic beverage to a visibly intoxicated person. The act does not define visibly intoxicated. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction in this state that, unless otherwise defined by law, statutory words or phrases are given their plain and ordinary meaning. MCL 8.3a. When appropriate, this Court often refers to dictionary definitions to interpret statutory language. Visibly is the adverbial form of visible. The principal definition of visible is capable of being seen. Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997). This definition indicates that the Legislature did not intend that a plaintiff is limited to producing a witness who actually saw signs that the intoxicated person exhibited intoxication. The statute does not require actually manifested signs of intoxication. Rather, a plaintiff may show that indicators of the intoxication in the person were capable of being seen, that someone viewing the intoxicated person could have seen the indicators. [4] Had the Legislature intended to require at least some evidence that a witness actually saw signs that the person was intoxicated, it could have written: There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a retail licensee, other than the retail licensee who last sold, gave, or furnished alcoholic liquor to the minor or person seen by an eyewitness to be visibly intoxicated, has not committed any act giving rise to a cause of action under subsection (3). My rationale is supported not only by the actual language of the statute, but by case law as well. In Dines v. Henning, [5] this Court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment and adopted Judge Michael J. Kelly's dissenting opinion that stated, Eyewitness testimony of visible intoxication is not required to establish a dramshop claim; visible intoxication may be proven by circumstantial evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom. [6] Dines v. Henning, 184 Mich.App. 534, 540-541, 459 N.W.2d 305 (1990) (Kelly, J., dissenting ). Judge Kelly based his decision on Heyler v. Dixon, 160 Mich.App. 130, 408 N.W.2d 121 (1987). In that case, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the dramshop act was amended in 1972 to substitute visibly intoxicated for intoxicated. Id. at 145, 408 N.W.2d 121. The Court noted that case law existing at the time required that the allegedly intoxicated person must be visibly intoxicated at the time of the sale. Id., citing Archer v. Burton, 91 Mich.App. 57, 282 N.W.2d 833 (1979); McKnight v. Carter, 144 Mich.App. 623, 376 N.W.2d 170 (1985). The Heyler Court then noted that the existing standard jury instructions defined a person as visibly intoxicated when his or her intoxication would be apparent to an ordinary observer. S.J.I.2d 75.02. The Court noted that the Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that claims brought under the dramshop act may be proven by circumstantial evidence and that, if the combination of the circumstantial evidence and the permissible inferences drawn therefrom are sufficient to establish a prima facie case, a directed verdict is improper. Heyler, supra at 146, 408 N.W.2d 121. See Villa v. Golich, 42 Mich.App. 86, 88, 201 N.W.2d 349 (1972); Durbin v. K-K-M Corp., 54 Mich.App. 38, 56-57, 220 N.W.2d 110 (1974). The Court concluded by finding in that case that sufficient circumstantial evidence existed to render summary disposition improper. No limitations were read into the type of circumstantial evidence that is permissible. In making its determination in Heyler, the Court of Appeals stated that a jury could conclude that someone was a visibly intoxicated person from evidence showing that (1) the person admitted that he drank one or two beers an hour, (2) he stayed at the bar either 14 hours or nine hours, (3) he consumed somewhere between nine and 28 beers during his stay at the bar, (4) the accident occurred within minutes after the person left the bar, and (5) there was testimony from officers arriving at the scene of the accident that the person `smelled highly' of alcohol. Heyler, supra at 147, 408 N.W.2d 121. In this case, there was similar testimony about how long and approximately how much Breton drank. There was similar evidence that Breton caused the accident and that he was highly intoxicated at the time. The majority misreads Dines to conclude that expert testimony predicated on circumstantial evidence is insufficient to establish that a person was visibly intoxicated. Dines specifically adopted the long line of Court of Appeals cases holding that circumstantial evidence, standing alone, is sufficient to establish and support a dramshop claim. The majority opinion does not rely on Dines as it asserts; in fact, it limits the holding by restricting the circumstantial evidence that is admissible to that which was actually seen by a witness. In these cases, the circumstantial evidence on which the expert opinions were based sufficed by itself to rebut the statutory presumption and establish plaintiffs' prima facie case. In Heyler, circumstantial evidence was found to be sufficient even though, unlike in these cases, it was not supported by strong expert testimony. Here, plaintiffs had evidence that Breton's consumption of 24 to 25 beers in a nine-hour period had to have affected his central nervous system and resulted in visible signs of intoxication. While it is true that all of defendant's witnesses testified that Breton was not visibly intoxicated, that does not prevent the cases from going to the jury. It is not uncommon for a jury to disbelieve multiple eyewitnesses. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Taft Estate, 434 Mich. 858, 450 N.W.2d 266 (1990)(dissenting statement of Levin, J.). The majority has erroneously changed the meaning this Court has given for the past 15 years to visibly intoxicated person in MCL 436.1801. Plaintiffs presented compelling circumstantial evidence and strong expert testimony that Breton was visibly intoxicated when defendant served him beer before the accident.