Opinion ID: 3185948
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The FDIC Website

Text: Agent Smith’s testimony regarding JPMorgan’s insurance status was based solely on his review of the FDIC website. He testified that he looked up JPMorgan on the website, “found their information and their certificate number,” and determined that it “[is] federally insured,” R., Vol. 3 at 85. What the website reports amounts to an assertion that JPMorgan has an FDIC certificate with a particular certificate number and that the insurance remains active. The government was attempting to prove the truth of that assertion. There is no argument that the website itself affects an institution’s legal rights (as perhaps may be true of a certificate), so we agree with Defendant that Agent Smith’s testimony offered the website content for its truth and was hearsay. Again, however, the public-records exception applies. The website information is “a record or statement of [the FDIC].” Fed. R. Evid. 803(8). And the website reports which banks are insured by the FDIC, thereby “set[ting] out . . . the office’s activities” related to deposit insurance. Id. Several courts have ruled that government websites fall 10 within the exception for public records. See, e.g., Williams v. Long, 585 F. Supp. 2d 679, 689–91 (D. Md. 2008) (judicial record of pending lawsuits against defendant); Chapman v. S.F. Newspaper Agency, No. C 01-02305 CRB, 2002 WL 31119944, at  (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2002) (printout of delivery confirmation from United States Postal Service “Track & Confirm” webpage); EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. CIV.A. 031605, 2004 WL 2347559, at  (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2004) (“table of information compiled by the United States Census Bureau” printed from Census Bureau website). Government records, statements, and reports are continually being placed on the internet to allow easy access to the general public. Their electronic format does not, by itself, prevent them from qualifying as public records. See Fed. R. Evid. 101(b)(6) (“a reference to any kind of written material or any other medium includes electronically stored information”); Fed. R. Evid. 101(d) (the term original includes electronically stored information in any form “readable by sight”). And courts have considered the FDIC website so reliable that they have taken judicial notice of information on it. See, e.g., Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Blackmore Sewer Const., Inc., 298 F.3d 600, 607 (7th Cir. 2002) (bank is branch office of another bank); FAS Capital, LLC v. Carr, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1259, 1267 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (FDIC was receiver of closed bank); Curcio v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., No. 09-CV-1498IEG (NLS), 2009 WL 3320499, at  (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009) (bank was regulated by Office of Thrift Supervision on date of transaction). We hold that because Agent Smith’s testimony about the FDIC certificates was either not hearsay or fell within the publicrecords exception and because his testimony about the FDIC website fell within the 11 public-records exception, the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Defendant’s hearsay objections. We recognize that the government did not argue that Agent Smith’s testimony about FDIC insurance coverage was admissible under the Rule 803(8) exception to the hearsay rule. But we see no unfairness to Defendant in affirming the district court’s decision to overrule Defendant’s hearsay objection on that ground. The legal issue is clear. And it is not dependent on any disputable factual foundation. (The dissent objects that Agent Smith did not bring to court the documents he reported about—the Big Horn FDIC certificate and, apparently, a printout from the FDIC website content on JPMorgan. But Defendant did not object to Smith’s testimony on that ground. And the trial court could properly credit his testimony about what he saw. Further, we can take judicial notice of the facts necessary to establish the foundation for the admission of the testimony. See Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) (preliminary questions of admissibility of evidence are decided by court).) Therefore, our rejection of the hearsay argument comes within our general rule that we may affirm on an unpreserved ground if doing so is fair to appellant. See United States v. Harrison, 296 F.3d 994, 1001 (10th Cir. 2002). We cannot express the point better than Judge Brorby did in Hernandez v. Starbuck, 69 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (10th Cir. 1995): [The Appellant’s] argument misconceives the roles played by the appellant, the appellee, and the court of appeals when a district court judgment is appealed. While the appellant challenges the district court’s ruling, the appellee is only interested in maintaining the status quo, i.e., an affirmance. Because the appellant 12 comes to the court of appeals as the challenger, he bears the burden of demonstrating the alleged error and the precise relief sought. A court of appeals is not required to manufacture an appellant’s argument on appeal when it has failed in its burden to draw our attention to the error below. In the event of such a failure, the court will ordinarily consider the appellant’s point waived. Appellees bear no such burden. Though Fed.R.App.P. 28(b) requires the appellee’s brief to contain arguments addressing the issues raised by the appellant, we have never characterized the appellee’s obligation in terms of a categorical imperative. The distinction between appellant’s and appellees’ obligations under Rule 28 grows out of the court of appeals’ freedom to affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the district court. This broad power to affirm extends beyond the counter-arguments raised by the appellee; it includes any ground for which there is record to support conclusions of law. Once the appellant alleges the district court erred, we have a duty to assess the validity of the appellant’s allegations. This duty arises in part out of our relationship with the district court, and we may not neglect it simply because an appellee fails to defend adequately the district court's decision. To do so would open the door to a perverse jurisprudence by which properly decided district court decisions could be reversed. (brackets, citations, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). We also repeat his caution to appellees: “We admonish appellees not to take our language as a license not to address appellant’s arguments. The appellee’s brief plays a vital function in informing the court of the weaknesses in the appellant’s arguments. By failing to address a ground for relief raised by the appellant, the appellee greatly increases the chances the court of appeals will be persuaded by the appellant’s position.” Id. at 1094 n.3.