Opinion ID: 201058
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Additional Claims Advanced in Donahue's Second Amended Complaint

Text: 30 Donahue argues that the district court erred by refusing to consider various claims advanced in his Second Amended Complaint, including claims for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986; Mass. Gen. Law ch. 151B, and ch. 31; Title VII; the United States and Massachusetts Constitutions, and the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The defendants respond that the court appropriately declined to address these claims because they appeared for the first time in Donahue's Second Amended Complaint without the permission of the court. 31 Donahue claims that our holding in Donahue I made clear that Donahue was entitled to amend his complaint to include a broad range of additional counts. This argument mischaracterizes the scope of our remand order. In Donahue I, we remanded the case to the district court to consider whether § 58A obviated Donahue's standing to seek prospective relief in the form of an injunction against the federal consent decree. We also directed the district court to reconsider Donahue's Motion to Amend the First Amended Complaint, noting that the decision to allow or disallow such an amendment was well within the district court's discretion. Donahue I, 304 F.3d at 121; see also O'Connell v. Hyatt Hotels of P.R., 357 F.3d 152, 154 (1st Cir.2004) (We review the denial of a motion to amend the pleadings for an abuse of discretion and will affirm if any adequate reason for the denial is apparent from the record.). Although we observed that Donahue might have advanced a claim under Title VII, we certainly did not require the district court sua sponte to consider, let alone to allow, the addition of that or other new claims that were not raised in a motion to amend. Rather, we simply noted that, in light of our remand, the district court could no longer deny Donahue's motion to amend on mootness grounds. Therefore, we directed the district court to determine — in its discretion — whether Donahue's proposed amendments were appropriate. Notably, Donahue's proposed amendments did not include the new claims that Donahue now seeks to advance. 32 After the service of responsive pleadings, a party may amend his or her complaint only by leave of the court or by written consent of the adverse party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Yet, on remand, Donahue never moved the district court to add new claims beyond those raised in his earlier motion to amend. Moreover, at the status conference held by the district court to address the scope of this case on remand, Donahue's counsel never mentioned Title VII, ch. 151B, or the other counts that later appeared in Donahue's Second Amended Complaint. Nor did he object when the attorney for the defendants framed the issues on remand as: 1) whether § 58A is still in force in the City of Boston; 2) whether it applies to Donahue; and 3) whether it is constitutional. Rather, he agreed to file an amended complaint that would provide the basis for addressing those specific issues. The district court's order issued at the conclusion of the status conference allowed Donahue's Motion to Amend the First Amended Complaint so described; it did not invite the addition of any other claims that might occur to the plaintiff. Finally, in its opinion granting summary judgment for the defendants, the district court expressly declined to consider the new claims purportedly advanced in the Second Amended Complaint, noting that [a]lthough the parties make a number of arguments in their briefs, this court believes that § 58A's effect on Donahue's candidacy is the only remaining issue in the case. 33 In short, the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in declining to expand the scope of this case beyond the issues presented on remand and raised in Donahue's previous motion to amend, particularly as Donahue never sought the district court's leave to add those new claims prior to the filing of his Second Amended Complaint. 8 See, e.g., Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir.2002) (A district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court.).