Opinion ID: 2229271
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: may an order of the court dismissing a criminal complaint be appealed by the state?

Text: Section 29-28-07, NDCC, lists the orders from which the State may appeal, and provides in relevant part: An appeal may be taken by the state from: 1. An order quashing an information or indictment or any count thereof; The defendant contends that the quoted statutory language allows an appeal only from an order quashing an information or indictment, not from an order dismissing a complaint. He cites State v. Bauer, 153 N.W.2d 895 (N.D.1967), in support of this contention, a case which held that an order dismissing a criminal complaint was not appealable because it was not expressly enumerated by § 29-28-07, NDCC. While State v. Bauer, supra , was not expressly overruled by State v. Hart, 162 N.W.2d 499, 500 (N.D.1968), that latter decision held that an order granting a motion to quash a criminal complaint is appealable by the State. In so holding, this Court stated: By statute, the rules of practice and procedure in criminal actions in district courts and in county courts of increased jurisdiction are similar. N.D.C.C. § 27-08-24. Because of this intended uniformity of practice and procedure and because, as previously pointed out, there is no real distinction between a criminal information and a criminal complaint under our law, a motion to quash, based upon the enumerated grounds of N.D. C.C. § 29-14-04 having reference to criminal informations, is available and may be employed in a county court of increased jurisdiction to test the jurisdictional and legal sufficiency of a criminal complaint. Accordingly, in the instant case the defendant was entitled to so test the vulnerability of the amended criminal complaint in the county court. It follows that the order granting the motion to quash the complaint is appealable, just as is an order granting a motion to quash an information. While this Court in State v. Hart, supra , found that there is no real distinction between a criminal information and a criminal complaint for purposes of determining appealability under § 29-28-07, NDCC, in the same manner, in State v. Howe, 247 N.W.2d 647 (N.D.1976), we held that an order dismissing an information under Rule 12, NDRCrimP, in effect quashes an information within the purview of appealable orders under § 29-28-07. In reaching this conclusion in State v. Howe, supra , we said, at 652: We do not think Rule 12, NDRCrimP, was intended to deny the substantive right to appeal granted under subsection (1) of the statute, and if so intended, it could not have that effect. A procedural rule cannot abrogate a substantive right. Rather, the rule abolished a creature known as the motion to quash, substituting therefor a motion to dismiss which has precisely the same effect. The order of dismissal here `quashed' the information, and brings the appeal within subsection (1) of § 29-28-07, NDCC. In reaching the foregoing conclusion in State v. Howe, supra , we said that, while the right to appeal is purely statutory, statutes conferring the right to appeal must be liberally construed, and that in determining appealability it is not the label which controls but, rather, the effect. We think these cases and Rule 12, NDRCrimP, which abolished motions to quash and replaced them with motions to dismiss, clearly permit the appealability of an order dismissing a criminal complaint under § 29-28-07(1), NDCC.