Opinion ID: 76690
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Search and Seizure of Property

Text: 33 Marmer argues that the district court's ex parte order allowing AT&T to seize pieces of his property from his residence was improper for two primary reasons: 12 (1) the district court lacked statutory authority under § 553(c)(2)(A) of the CCPA to issue the order, and (2) the seizure order was unnecessary because AT&T presented no evidence that Marmer would violate the agreed injunction. We conclude that the district court had the legal authority to authorize the search and seizure, and that issuance of the order was not an abuse of discretion.
34 Identical to his argument regarding the asset freeze, Marmer argues that the district court lacked statutory authority under § 553(c)(2)(A) of the CCPA to issue its order allowing AT&T to search and seize property from his residence. Marmer argues that, when Congress wants to authorize this type of relief, they do so explicitly, as in the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1116, which directly states that district courts may issue ex parte seizures. We disagree. 35 Marmer's argument fails to account for the Supreme Court's decision in Porter regarding the broad inherent equitable powers possessed by district courts, discussed in section II.C.1., supra. Simply because Congress has explicitly authorized equitable relief other than preliminary and permanent injunctions in the Lanham Act does not dictate that broader equitable relief is precluded per se under the CCPA. We have previously held that language similar to that contained in the CCPA did not contain a clear limitation on the district courts' inherent equitable authority. U.S. Oil & Gas, 748 F.2d at 1434; Gem Merch., 87 F.3d at 469-70. Nor does the CCPA, by necessary and inescapable inference, limit the district courts' broad equitable powers. Id. Based on this reasoning, we conclude that an ex parte search and seizure order directed at a defendant's residence, while certainly more drastic than an ex parte asset freeze, is an appropriate equitable remedy to protect the Congressional intent of the CCPA. Accordingly, we hold that the district court had proper legal authority to issue the search and seizure order in this case. We now consider whether issuance of the order in this case was an abuse of discretion.
36 When the defendant's identity is known and notice could feasibly be given, ex parte seizures are proper only if providing notice to the defendant would render fruitless the further prosecution of the action. In re Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir.1979) (per curiam); see First Tech. Safety Sys., Inc. v. Depinet, 11 F.3d 641, 650 (6th Cir.1993); Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 322 (7th Cir.1984). To support an ex parte seizure motion, the plaintiff may not rely on bare assertions that the defendant, if given notice, would destroy relevant evidence. Depinet, 11 F.3d at 650-51. Rather, the plaintiff must show that [the] defendant[], or persons involved in similar activities, had... concealed evidence or disregarded court orders in the past. Id. at 651; see also Vuitton v. White, 945 F.2d 569, 575 (3rd Cir.1991) ( ex parte seizure order granted under Lanham Act based on the fact that at least four of the street vendor defendants apparently are selling counterfeits in violation of the permanent injunction issued in an earlier action); In re Vuitton, 606 F.2d at 2 (see below). 37 In In re Vuitton, the plaintiff requested an ex parte TRO to prevent the defendants from continuing to sell counterfeit merchandise. 606 F.2d at 1-2. The district court refused to grant the order and the Second Circuit reversed, noting that the plaintiff had presented evidence based on its past experience in 84 similar cases and hundreds of investigations revealing that once a counterfeiter learned of an action against him, he would immediately transfer his inventory to another counterfeit seller, whose identity would be unknown. Id. at 2 (quoting an affidavit submitted by the plaintiff's attorney). The Second Circuit ordered the district court to issue an ex parte TRO narrow enough ... to protect the interests of the defendants. Id. at 3. 38 As in In re Vuitton, AT&T presented evidence that other pirate descrambler sellers had secreted evidence once notice of a pending search was given. Specifically, AT&T submitted the affidavit of Daniel Lefkowitz, an attorney who represented another cable company in similar litigation, detailing numerous cases where defendants charged with violation of the CCPA destroyed or transferred records, evidence, and assets. R1-16, Ex. C at 3-6. 13 AT&T also submitted evidence that a search of Marmer's residence would uncover relevant evidence. Specifically, Marin's additional affidavit indicated that when Marin called Marmer to place an order, Marmer indicated he was working at home. R3-68 at ¶ 11. Marmer also indicated that he often forwarded his phone to his home and worked at home selling descramblers as late a[s] midnight. Id. In addition, Marin stated that, during his phone call with Marmer, Marmer retrieved records pertinent to [his] purchase from [the] Pagosa Ct. address. Id. 39 We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to support AT&T's request for an ex parte seizure order encompassing Marmer's residence. Accordingly, we hold that the district court's issuance of the order authorizing AT&T to search and seize property from Marmer's home—and its subsequent denial of Marmer's motion for return of the seized property—was not an abuse of discretion. 14