Opinion ID: 2635589
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: conflict between the counterfeit act and the imitation act

Text: ¶10 The problem we encounter in this case is that taking section 58-37-2(1)(i)(ii) as written on its face would lead to absurd results and impermissible overlap between the Counterfeit Act and the Imitation Act. We note that the legislature enacted both the Imitation Act and the Counterfeit Act, and it necessarily follows that the legislature must have intended some meaningful distinction between the two. We therefore interpret the two Acts so that the statutes do not work an absurd result and so that the Acts are sufficiently independent from each other. In light of that objective, the only acceptable interpretation is to read section 58-37-2(1)(i)(ii) as applying only to substances masquerading as legitimate substances. Thus, for the reasons set out below, we read the Counterfeit Act to be applicable when a defendant tries to pass off a substance as something legitimate or lawful. ¶11 First, looking at the statute as a whole, our interpretation of section 58-37-2(1)(i)(ii) is consistent with the overall purpose of the Counterfeit Act. Because a literal interpretation of the any substance that is represented to be a controlled substance language in section 58-37-2(1)(i)(ii) would reach an exceptionally broad range of substances and circumstancesfar beyond those defined in section 58-37-2(1)(i)(i) we determine that such could not have been the legislature's intent, and we decline to read section 58-37-2(1)(i)(ii) as a catchall provision. We note that if section 583-7-2(1)(i)(ii) were to encompass any substance represented by words or conduct as a controlled substance, section 58-37-2(1)(i)(i) would be rendered superfluous because there would be virtually no circumstances where behavior covered by subsection (i) would not also be covered by subsection (ii). Thus, we read the statute to contain a more meaningful distinction, such that each provision is attributed a significant and operative purpose. Section 58-37-2(1)(i)(i) is essentially limited to the distribution of look alike pharmaceuticals, and section 58-37-2(1)(i)(ii) should therefore refer to something along the same lines. ¶12 Second, to avoid absurd results, we must assume that section 58-37-2(1)(i)(ii) contains a falsity element regarding the representation of a substance as a legitimate or lawful controlled substance. Notably, if any substance could qualify as a counterfeit based on either a true or a false representation, then even an accurate and otherwise lawful representation of a prescription drug could violate the statute. A broad interpretation of section 58-37-2(1)(i)(ii), taken to its logical conclusions, would therefore result in criminalizing legitimate behavior. Prior to 1987, only false representations were punishable under the Counterfeit Act. [2] In 1987, the legislature split the definition of counterfeit substance into two parts. While section 58-37-2(1)(i)(i) preserved the falsity language, the second part of the statute, section 58-37-2(1)(i)(ii), did not. We assume, however, that the legislature did not intend to criminalize the legitimate distribution of controlled substances. Therefore, to avoid absurd results, we assume that the falsity language unintentionally slipped out of section 58-37-2(1)(i)(ii) when the legislature amended the definition. ¶13 Third, we note that the classification of a substance as an imitation substance focuses on the substance's appearance. Thus, for there to be a distinction between the Imitation Act and the Counterfeit Act, counterfeit substances must be classified by attributes or characteristic beyond mere presentation or appearance. While it may be theoretically possible to see a distinction between the two acts based on the subtle difference between representation by description or presentation and representation by appearance alone, we decline to adopt that interpretation. Doing so would allow distribution of benign look alike substances to be punishable under the Imitation Act, while the same behavior would also be punishable under the Counterfeit Act if the distributer made an affirmative representation that the substance was a controlled substance. It seems implausible that distribution of a look alike substance would occur without some false representation as to its identity or contents. Thus, in many instances, the prosecutor could choose between charging a felony or a misdemeanor offense based on identical behavior. [3] ¶14 Thus, the distinction that we reason was intended by the legislature between the Imitation Act and the Counterfeit Act differentiates between the statutes based on the type of substance regulated and not on the type of representation used by the defendant. This conclusion illuminates a clear and necessary distinction between the statutes by delineating the definition of imitation drugs as those falsely represented to be illicit substances and counterfeit drugs as those falsely represented to be legitimate substances. Thus, substances falsely represented to be from a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser are exclusively regulated within the provisions of the Counterfeit Act (representation by appearance or packaging under section 58-37-2(1)(i)(i) and representation by oral or other means under section 58-37-2(1)(i)(ii)). In other words, if a substance appears to be legitimate due to any false verbal or written communication, then it is a counterfeit. In contrast, an imitation substance is one that appears to be an illicit substance of the variety which would probably never be identified by branding or manufacturer's marks.