Opinion ID: 1855709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: Improper commutation evidence

Text: In this assignment of error, defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly elicited evidence that a death sentence should be imposed to save the victims' family [sic] and friends from having to attend commutation hearings for the rest of their lives. The testimony at issue in this assignment of error occurred during the cross-examination of Dean Burke Foster, the defendant's expert in executive clemency and correction, in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 905.2(B), which allows a defendant to provide evidence on the frequency and extent to which the governor has used his pardon and commutation power. [15] To this end, the defendant questioned Foster extensively. Foster gave statistical testimony about the number of convicted first-degree murderers in the prison system, how many of those people had their sentences commuted, and, of those commuted, the number who were released from prison. The expert was also questioned about the number of sentences commuted by Governor Mike Foster, and he testified that no one convicted of two counts of first degree murder had ever had his or her sentence commuted. All of Foster's statistical testimony, however, was based on events occurring after 1973, when Louisiana's first degree murder statute was enacted. Foster further testified: Q. And if the judgeif the jury would recommend a life sentence as opposed to a death sentence, would youwould it be fair to say that you think Todd Wessinger would be sent to Angola as a double murderer, a twice-convicted first degree murderer? A. He would surely go to Angola. Angola is a lifers' prisoner [sic]. Over half the inmates there are serving life sentences. That is where he would go if convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. There is no doubt about that. Q. Don't people get out of Angola? Aren't they commuted out of Angola? Aren't they paroled out of Angola? A. Some people get out of Angola, but lifers don't get out of Angola because lifers are not eligible to leave prison. A life sentence in Louisiana means a natural life sentence, so if he is given life imprisonment, he will spend the rest of his life in prison at Angola. (Emph.added.) On cross-examination, Foster doggedly refused to retreat from his assertion that defendant, if given a life sentence, would live out the rest of his years at Angola. Foster further asserted that, given the political climate of the state, defendant, if given a life sentence, would not get that sentence commuted. After being questioned about commutations prior to 1973, when a life sentence could be commuted to ten and a half years, Foster testified during cross-examination: Q. And you cannot tell this jury, you can tell statistics, but you cannot tell this jury Mike Foster will be the governor past another two and a half years, can you? A. No, sir, but you know the political climate that governors operate in now is much different from what it used to be. The pardon board simply doesn't do things it used to do and governors don't do things they used to. Q. That is what we are saying. We hope those times don't come back, but you cannot guarantee them, can you, professor? A. The trend has been very definitely in one direction, and you can pretty much guarantee it because no governor or pardon board is going back to the days when they turned lifers lose after ten and a half years. The prosecutor also questioned Foster about a murderer who had been paroled by Buddy Roemer and subsequently committed another murder, yet Foster still refused to let go of his assertion that defendant, if given a life sentence, could never get out of prison. Finally, the prosecutor questioned Foster about pardon board hearings: Q. I call it commutation hearings. I take the correction there. I have been there on commutations. But let me ask you this. They can apply how often? A. They can apply, if they are rejected, every two years. Q. How do they come up every six months? A. They can't come up every six months. Q. Can't? A. No, the law provides the rule Q. So every two years, the victims' families have to go down there and face a hearing and they have to testify and tell what happened to their loved ones, don't they? A. No, sir. The pardon boardyou are only entitled to one pardon board hearing. Anything after that is discretionary. They don't have to approve your application when you ask. Q. How many times has Billy Wayne Sinclair been up there? A. I couldn't tell you about that character. Q. How many times has Wilbert Rideauhow many times have those families had to go up there? You're the expert. Tell me. Those are the two most famous in Louisiana. You don't know how many times? A. I have not kept up with how many times they have been before the pardon board. Q. How many times have those families had to come from Lake Charles or Baton Rouge and go through what they go through? You don't know, do you? A. That's not something I have researched, so I can't answer that question. Q. It's hard on these families, isn't it? A. It's hard on them, but that's required by law. Q. Because they know what the uncertainty is to whether or not he's going to get commuted and get out, don't they? Don't they? (Emph.added.) Defendant contends the last quoted excerpt of the cross-examination erroneously invited the jury to sentence Mr. Wessinger to death to save his victims' families from having to oppose his commutation. We note initially that this testimony was in response to Foster's assertions about the certainty that defendant, if given a life sentence, would spend the rest of his life at Angola, which testimony went astray from that which shows the frequency and extent of the governor's commutation power. We further note that this excerpt, when viewed in isolation, does seem to come very close to being erroneous. [16] However, when the transcript of Foster's testimony is read as a whole, it becomes apparent that this testimony was part of the proper scope of cross-examination, as the prosecutor was trying to make Foster retreat from his position of virtually guaranteeing the jury that defendant would never be commuted out of a life sentence. We also reiterate that we must give credit to the good sense and fairmindedness of the jurors, which qualities would surely prevent them from giving a man the death penalty merely to prevent the victims' families from attending commutation hearings. It must also be noted that the prosecutor, in his closing argument, impressed upon the jury that they were not to use the pardon board hearings as a reason to give the defendant the death penalty: They called an expert on commutation who testified aboutI think he said there have been 21 commutations of first degree murder since 1973 and 11 have gotten out. And I guess with that witnessI guess I was a little facetious, but I won't apologize for that because I don't believe anybody is a psychic. I don't think anybody can predict. When you have a statute that says the governor can commute any sentence to a set term of years, and he says absolutely it can never, never happen, then I don't have much respect for his opinion. But I am not arguing that because it doesn't make any difference. I am not arguing viz-a-viz life versus death, whether he gets out of whatever. What I am arguing to you is that in a crime of this nature, almost unparalleled in Baton Rouge, that he deserves the death penalty as punishment. That, based on this evidence, what you have seen in this courtroom, that that is the only acceptable punishment based on evidence where a person starts days in advance deciding that he's going to rob a place and execute everybody in there, and when he carries that plan out, that you reach a point where you have just gone too far and the maximum penalty, whatever it is in Louisiana, the death penalty, is certainly the only acceptable penalty based on that evidence of premeditated massacre for money. There wasn't any particular emergency. Did you see a precipitating factor? What they introduced was here is a guy with a good home. Here's a guy who had a job. Here's a guy who had a job with Coca-Cola. He had a place to sleep. He wasn't starving. None of his kids were in the hospital. There was no emergency. He didn't rob and kill Stephanie Guzzardo and shoot Mike Armentor and shoot and kill David Breakwell because of some emergency where he had to have money. He made a lifestyle and business decision that he wanted the money and executed two fine people and almost executed a third and tried to do a fourth. I think all that evidence is plain to you. So this commutation issue, don't get off on that because what you should consider is that because of the pain, misery, and suffering that he has caused, that he richly deserves the death penalty, and each and every one of you told me in voir dire that you believe in the death penalty, that this is the type of case, if I proved it, where you could return one, and I think after listening to everything that has been in evidence that you should agree that the evidence in this case demands that the only acceptable penalty would be a death penalty. (Emph.added.) Finally, we note that there was no contemporaneous objection lodged to any of this testimony. While this does not preclude us from reviewing this assignment of error, defense counsel's lack of an objection does suggest that this testimony, contrary to its appearance in the cold record, was not as damaging as it may now seem. See State v. Taylor, 93-2201 (La.2/28/96), 669 So.2d 364, 375 n. 10 (Under either the scope of review established in Smith or the limited scope of review to which we return today, the lack of an objection is a factor to be considered in examining the impact of a prosecutor's closing argument. Particularly, the lack of an objection demonstrates the defense counsels' belief that the live argument, despite its appearance in the cold record, was not overly damaging.). We thus find that this testimony was not erroneous under these particular circumstances. Further, even assuming arguendo that this testimony was erroneous, it was harmless error. Given the volume of evidence that the jury viewed, which evidence established both the callous nature of the crime and the defendant's cold indifference to the value of human life, it seems that the penalty given to defendant was surely unattributable to the disputed testimony. The defendant further argues that the testimony about the length of Gov. Foster's term and the testimony about Gov. Roemer were also erroneous. Again, this testimony was also within the proper scope of cross-examination, as it went to disproving Foster's assertion that defendant would never be released from Angola if he were given a life sentence. These assignments of error thus lack merit.