Opinion ID: 624278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tortious Interference and Attorneys’ Fees

Text: An essential element of a tortious interference claim in Georgia is that the defendant must be a “‘third party,’ i.e., a ‘stranger’ to the contract with which the defendant allegedly interfered.” Atlanta Market Ctr. Mgmt. Co. v. McLane, 503 S.E.2d 278, 282 (Ga. 1998). Under this requirement, Georgia courts have said that there can be no tortious interference claim where the plaintiff and defendant were parties to “a comprehensive interwoven set of contracts.” Jefferson-Pilot Commc’ns Co. v. Phoenix City Broad., Ltd. of Atlanta, 421 S.E.2d 295, 299 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). In other words, “the defendant must be a stranger to both the contract and the business relationship giving rise to and underpinning the contract.” Atlanta Market Ctr., 503 S.E.2d at 283 (emphasis in original); see also Iraola & CIA, S.A. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 325 F.3d 1274, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2003). 4 In this case, the contract that WM allegedly interfered with was part of a set of interwoven contracts all relating to Integration World. WM contracted with TBA to run the convention; TBA contracted with AMI to provide scanners at the convention; AMI contracted with GT to provide a scanner; and GT contracted with WM to rent a booth at the convention. Given these interwoven contracts and facts, WM was not a stranger to the business relationship giving rise to and underpinning the contract between GT and AMI. Atlanta Market Ctr., 503 S.E.2d at 283. Under Georgia law, there could be no tortious interference claim. See id.; Iraola, 325 F.3d at 1284. However, WM never presented this argument to the district court during either trial, instead raising it for the first time on appeal.2 Accordingly, WM has waived its argument that it was not a stranger to the contract with which it allegedly interfered, and we cannot consider it for those issues with respect to which WM is the appellant. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that we have “repeatedly held that an issue not raised in the district court and raised for the first time in an appeal will not be considered”) (quotation omitted). Thus, WM cannot rely upon the “stranger” theory as support for its challenge to the existence of a tortious interference claim. 2 WM did argue to the district court that WM could not have intended to interfere with the contract because it had no knowledge of it. However, as indicated by Georgia courts, the intent to injure the plaintiff is a separate element from being a stranger to the contract. See Disaster Servs., Inc. v. ERC P’Ship, 492 S.E.2d 526, 528 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). 5 WM’s only other alleged error from the first trial with respect to the existence of a tortious interference claim is that no reasonable jury could have found that WM had intended to interfere with the contract between GT and AMI.3 Atlanta Market Ctr., 503 S.E.2d at 282. WM properly preserved this argument, but we discern no error in the district court’s conclusion. A reasonable jury could find that WM knew that a separate contract existed for the retrieval of sales leads, because WM knew that the sales leads were not provided by WM itself, and probably knew that TBI was not itself providing the sales leads. This meant that a third party must have been providing the service to GT, and there was sufficient evidence of interference by WM. We also find no error in the award of attorneys’ fees in the second trial. The Supreme Court of Georgia has stated that there is no proportionality requirement between attorneys’ fees and compensatory damages where a showing of bad faith has been made under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. Tyler v. Lincoln, 527 S.E.2d 180, 183 (Ga. 2000) (holding that § 13-6-11 “authorizes an attorney fee award even when nominal damages are recovered”); Spring Lake Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Peacock, 390 S.E.2d 31, 31-32 (Ga. 1990) (allowing an attorneys’ fees award of $7500 under § 13-6-11 when only $1 in damages had been awarded); see also 3 We review de novo a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50. Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1526 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if “the facts and inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of one party, such that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict”). 6 LaRoche Indus., Inc. v. AIG Risk Mgmt., Inc., 959 F.2d 189, 193 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e are governed by the law in Georgia which places the question of attorneys’ fees within the province of the jury and provides that the court should not vacate such an award unless there was absolutely no evidence to support it.”). Accordingly, we find no merit in WM’s argument that it was error for the district court to allow an award of $517,168.34 in attorneys’ fees with just $325 in compensatory damages.4