Opinion ID: 468856
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: George Metz's intentional infliction of emotional distress and intrusion into seclusion claims.

Text: 29 Mr. Metz claims that the seizure of his person renders the government liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress and intrusion into his private seclusion, a type of invasion of privacy. 7 Amended and Recast Complaint, Count II p 3 in Record on Appeal at 207. Applying the Block v. Neal analysis, it is clear that any injury Metz has suffered as a result of these alleged torts stems from Metz's false arrest, a tort expressly exempted from the coverage of the FTCA. 8 In other words, the government's actions that constitute a claim for false arrest are essential to Mr. Metz's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and intrusion into seclusion. There is no other government conduct upon which such claims can rest. Thus, even though the claims may be distinct from a false arrest claim, any such difference is merely theoretical and not actual under the facts of this case. We conclude that these claims arise out of false arrest and are barred by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(h). 30 2. George Metz's false light claim and Ingrid Metz's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. 31 Mr. Metz claims that statements made by FLETC and USDT officials placed him in a false light in the public eye. This tort is another branch of invasion of privacy. Mrs. Metz's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is based upon the allegedly false statements made to her by FLETC and USDT officials on the night of August 3, 1982. Assuming that the allegations forming the basis of these claims are true, we find that both claims are barred under the terms of the FTCA. The wrong about which the Metzes complain in both of these claims are the statements themselves, just as the wrong about which the plaintiff in Shearer complained was the battery that resulted in the death of her son. See Shearer, --- U.S. at ----, 105 S.Ct. at 3042 (plurality opinion). In this case the governmental statements complained of constitute slander, which is of course enumerated in Sec. 2680(h). Applying the Supreme Court's analysis in Neal, the government officials' allegedly slanderous statements are essential to Mr. Metz's action for false light privacy and Ingrid Metz's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 9 See Block v. Neal, 460 U.S. at 297-99, 103 S.Ct. at 1094. There is no other governmental action upon which these claims could rest. These claims, therefore, arise out of slander for the purposes of Sec. 2680(h) and are not actionable under the FTCA. 32 3. Ingrid Metz's claim for intrusion into seclusion. 33 Ingrid Metz alleges that FLETC administrators McKinley and Graves violated her private solitude when they visited her residence on the night of August 3, 1982. The district court disposed of this issue on summary judgment by holding that there was no invasion of Mrs. Metz's privacy because, among other reasons, 10 she willingly agreed to talk to the officials and freely admitted them into her house along with Father Carr. Record on Appeal at 392. On appeal, the Metzes contend that the FLETC officials would not have been admitted to the Metz home had they not grossly misrepresented the facts and their intentions to Father Carr. Because Mrs. Metz was in turn misinformed by Carr, the Metzes claim that her consent to the intrusion was not a valid waiver of her right to privacy, or at least there is a genuine issue of fact in this regard. 11 Brief of Appellants at 48. 34 Assuming, but expressly not deciding, that Ingrid Metz's consent was invalid, it is invalid solely because it was given in response to false statements made by FLETC officials. Those allegedly false statements constitute the basis for a slander claim. Because the alleged slander is essential to Ingrid Metz's assertion that her consent was invalid, and because that assertion is in turn essential to her claim for intrusion, we conclude that her claim for intrusion arises out of slander. See Block v. Neal, 103 S.Ct. at 1094. 12 Ingrid Metz's claim for intrusion into her private seclusion, therefore, is not actionable under the FTCA. 35 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court is 36 AFFIRMED.