Opinion ID: 2304668
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State v. Medina

Text: On the night of June 14, 1990, Jose Torres and Michael Babilonia drove to a Camden apartment building where their friend Jimmy Rivera lived. When Babilonia beeped the car horn, Rivera's girlfriend, Melissa, came to the window and said that Rivera was sleeping. Babilonia continued to beep the car horn and cursed at Melissa. Defendant, Domingo Medina, who had been in the building, confronted Babilonia and Torres. Medina accused Torres of being with Medina's girlfriend, Anna, and of calling Medina a pussy. Torres denied Medina's allegations. Medina then pulled a handgun from the front pocket of his sweatshirt and pulled back the slide. Nervous, Torres began retreating. Medina threatened to shoot Torres if he continued walking. Torres continued. Medina followed him for half a block. Medina repeated his threat, but Torres continued to retreat. Medina fired five shots at Torres. Three of the bullets struck Torres, one in the lower back and two in the right buttock. The gunshots caused severe injury to Torres' diaphragm, liver, bladder, and sigmoid colon. At the hospital, Torres told a hospital worker that Medina had shot him. Police questioned Medina about the shooting. After they advised him of his Miranda rights, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966), Medina admitted that he had pointed a gun at Torres, that the gun was loaded, that he had cocked the gun, and that he had followed Torres up the street. He stated, however, that he had not intended to shoot Torres but that the handgun had discharged accidentally five times. A Camden County grand jury returned a six-count indictment against Medina, charging him with: second-degree aggravated assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1) (count one); fourth-degree aggravated assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(4) (count two); third-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (count three); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (count four); third-degree terroristic threats, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3b (count five); and attempted murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3 (count six). During the charge to the jury, the trial court explained the State's burden of proof: This defendant, as I've said on more than one occasion previously, is presumed innocent. He is presumed innocent when he is indicted, he is presumed innocent throughout trial, he is presumed innocent at this moment and will be presumed innocent when you begin your deliberations. And that presumption does not fade or extinguish until 12 of you agree that he is guilty of something. And in order for you to be persuaded to that the State must meet its burden of proof. And it's the State's burden of proof to prove to you every element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. And when we talk about a reasonable doubt we mean doubt from which a reason can be given, a doubt which arises from a fair and rational consideration of the evidence or perhaps the lack of evidence, it means a doubt as would cause a man of ordinary prudence to pause or hesitate when called upon to act in the most important aspects of life. A reasonable doubt is not a doubt that is merely fanciful or speculative such as a skeptical mind might suggest. A doubt which ignores a reasonable interpretation of the evidence or which arises merely from sympathy or perhaps from fear to return a verdict of guilt is not a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is not merely a doubt such as may be conjured up in the mind of someone desiring to escape the responsibility of making a decision. While it is your duty to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt, you do not search for doubt, you search for truth. And you give the defendant the benefit of a reasonable doubt if it arises in your minds after you have carefully considered all the evidence in the case. Reasonable doubt is not a mere possibility or imaginary doubt because as we all know, everything relating to human affairs or indeed depending upon oral evidence is open to some imaginary uncertainty as to the guilt of the defendant existing in your minds after you have given full and impartial consideration to all the evidence. It may arise from the evidence or it may arise from an absence of evidence. [emphasis added]. Medina did not object to the instruction. The jury convicted him of second-degree aggravated assault, fourth-degree aggravated assault, second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, and third-degree terroristic threats. It found him not guilty of the charges of second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, and attempted murder. The court sentenced Medina to an aggregate term of ten years with a five-year parole disqualifier. Before the Appellate Division, Medina claimed that the charge violated his right to due process and a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitutions and Article I, Paragraphs 1, 9 and 10 of the New Jersey Constitution. The Appellate Division affirmed. We granted certification, 140 N.J. 275, 658 A. 2d 299 (1995).
In a criminal prosecution, the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of an offense. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072-73, 25 L.Ed. 2d 368, 375 (1970). The due process clauses of the Federal Constitution, Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2080-81, 124 L.Ed. 2d 182, 188 (1993); Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1072-73, 25 L.Ed. 2d at 375; United States v. Pine, 609 F. 2d 106, 107 (3d Cir.1979); and the New Jersey Constitution, State v. Anderson, 127 N.J. 191, 200-01, 603 A. 2d 928 (1992) compel this standard. Under the Sixth Amendment, the jury, not the court, determines guilt in a serious criminal case. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1447-48, 20 L.Ed. 2d 491 (1968); Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105-06, 15 S.Ct. 273, 294-95, 39 L.Ed. 343 (1895). Due process mandates that the jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Sullivan, supra, 508 U.S. at 278, 113 S.Ct. at 2081, 124 L.Ed. 2d at 188. A jury instruction that fails to communicate the State's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not amenable to harmless-error analysis and requires reversal. Id. at 278-81, 113 S.Ct. at 2081-83, 124 L.Ed. 2d at 189-90. The reasonable-doubt standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence, and reduces the risk of wrongful conviction. Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at 363, 90 S.Ct. at 1072, 25 L.Ed. 2d at 375. It assures that a defendant will not be convicted if reasonable doubt exists about his or her guilt. Id. at 363-64, 90 S.Ct. at 1072-73, 25 L.Ed. 2d at 375. Notwithstanding its venerated role, the standard is problematic. As the United States Supreme Court recently lamented, [a]lthough this standard is an ancient and honored aspect of our criminal justice system, it defies easy explication. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, ___, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1242, 127 L.Ed. 2d 583, 590 (1994). Neither the New Jersey Constitution nor the Federal Constitution explicitly demands that trial courts define reasonable doubt. Both constitutions require only that the trial court inform the jury of the State's burden to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Neither constitution defines reasonable doubt. Understandably, trial courts have struggled in explaining the State's burden. This Court has cautioned trial courts against using any charge that has a tendency to `understate[]' or `trivialize the awesome duty of the jury to determine whether the defendant's guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 41, 524 A. 2d 130 (1987) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 373 Mass. 116, 364 N.E. 2d 1264, 1272 (1977)); accord State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518, 544-45, 601 A. 2d 175 (1992). Some federal circuit courts of appeal have instructed district courts not to try to define the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard because the definitions are frequently either unhelpful or inaccurate. See, e.g., United States v. Adkins, 937 F. 2d 947, 950 (4th Cir.1991) (This circuit has repeatedly warned against giving the jury definitions of reasonable doubt, because definitions tend to impermissibly lessen the burden of proof.... The only exception to our categorical disdain for definition is when the jury specifically requests it.); United States v. Hall, 854 F. 2d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir.1988) (upholding district court's refusal to provide definition, despite jury's request, because, at best, definitions of reasonable doubt are unhelpful to a jury.... An attempt to define reasonable doubt presents a risk without any real benefit.). The United States Supreme Court has held that a jury instruction that partially defined reasonable doubt, as such a doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty, and as an actual substantial doubt, violated the Due Process Clause. Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 40, 111 S.Ct. 328, 329, 112 L.Ed. 2d 339 (1990). The Court explained that the words `substantial' and `grave,' as they are commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard. Id. at 41, 111 S.Ct. at 329, 112 L.Ed. 2d at 342. Although the Court disapproves of equating the reasonable-doubt standard with moral certainty, an instruction that makes the equation will not violate due process if the charge also emphasizes that the jurors must base their conclusion on the evidence. Victor, supra, 511 U.S. at ___-___, 114 S.Ct. at 1248-49, 127 L.Ed. 2d at 596-97. Because the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof, id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1243, 127 L.Ed. 2d at 590, reasonable-doubt instructions must be considered in their entirety. See State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 135, 586 A. 2d 85 (1991); State v. Wilbely, 63 N.J. 420, 422, 307 A. 2d 608 (1973); State v. Malia, 287 N.J. Super. 198, 206, 670 A. 2d 1075 (App.Div. 1996); State v. Hudson, 286 N.J. Super. 149, 153, 668 A. 2d 457 (App.Div. 1995). Only those instructions that overall lessen the State's burden of proof violate due process.
Medina contends that the instruction improperly diminished the State's burden of proof. When explaining reasonable doubt to the jury, the trial court stated:  when we talk about a reasonable doubt we mean doubt from which a reason can be given, a doubt which arises from a fair and rational consideration of the evidence or perhaps the lack of evidence, it means a doubt as would cause a man of ordinary prudence to pause or hesitate when called upon to act in the most important aspects of life. This portion of the charge was incorrect. It erroneously implies that the jury must find an articulable reason to support its doubts about the State's case. See State v. Vaszorich, 13 N.J. 99, 115, 98 A. 2d 299 (1953) (holding that the statement contained in a juror pamphlet that a reasonable doubt is one for which, should he be called upon, a juror can give a reason, was obviously erroneous under our law). Jurors may harbor a valid reasonable doubt even if they cannot explain the reason for the doubt. In State v. Hudson, supra , the Appellate Division disapproved of a similar definition of reasonable doubt as a doubt for which a reason can be given. The court wrote that a reasonable doubt may be one that defies the jury's ability to express or articulate the reasons for it. Id. at 153, 668 A. 2d 457. The court found, however, that the instruction by itself did not violate due process. Examining the charge as a whole, the Appellate Division concluded that the overwhelming tenor of the disputed instruction was to convey to the jury the State's responsibility to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Ibid. Similarly, in State v. Biegenwald, supra , we held as inadequate an equation of reasonable doubt with a doubt based on reason, reasoning processes, but did not find a violation of due process. The instruction provided an alternative definition of reasonable doubt as an honest and reasonable uncertainty as to the guilt of the defendant which exists in your minds after you have given full and impartial consideration to all of the evidence in the case. Id. at 42-43, 524 A. 2d 130. This alternative definition, when viewed in the charge as a whole, properly informed the jury of the prosecution's burden. Id. at 43, 524 A. 2d 130. Here, immediately following the offending clause, the trial court provided an alternative definition of reasonable doubt: a doubt which arises from a fair and rational consideration of the evidence or perhaps the lack of evidence, it means a doubt as would cause a man of ordinary prudence to pause or hesitate when called upon to act in the most important aspects of life. This clause more accurately describes the State's burden. It leads us to believe that the offending language was unlikely to have lessened the State's burden of proof in the eyes of the jury. See Victor, supra, 511 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1249-50, 127 L.Ed. 2d at 599 (holding potential prejudice caused by equating reasonable doubt with a substantial doubt mitigated by providing an alternate definition of reasonable doubt as a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act). Defendant next alleges error in the part of the charge that excludes from reasonable doubt a doubt that ignores a reasonable interpretation of the evidence. We disagree. Jurors need not convict just because the State presents a reasonable interpretation of the evidence. They may accept or reject such a proffer. Reasonable doubt can arise even when the State presents a reasonable interpretation of the evidence. In State v. Purnell, supra, 126 N.J. at 543-44, 601 A. 2d 175, we sustained a definition of reasonable doubt that cautioned jurors against viewing skeptically the State's evidence or ignoring an interpretation of the evidence that might favor the State. Viewing the charge as a whole, we held that it did not impermissibly lower the State's burden of proof. Ibid. ; see also State v. Bogus, 223 N.J. Super. 409, 430-31, 538 A. 2d 1278 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 567, 546 A. 2d 497 (1988) (upholding a jury charge that excluded from reasonable doubt a doubt which ignores a reasonable interpretation of the evidence). Likewise here, the trial court emphasized that Medina was presumed innocent, that the jury should give him the benefit of a reasonable doubt, that it should consider all of the evidence, and that the State's burden was to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Reviewing the charge as a whole, we conclude that the challenged comment did not impermissibly diminish the State's burden of proof. Medina's third allegation of error concerns the trial court's statement: While it is your duty to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt, you do not search for doubt, you search for truth. And you give the defendant the benefit of a reasonable doubt if it arises in your minds after you have carefully considered all the evidence in the case. The emphasized clause is wrong. Telling the jurors not to search for doubt improperly eases the State's burden. Indeed, in determining whether the State has met its burden, the jury's duty is to scrutinize the evidence and search for doubt. The charge, however, does not constitute plain error. In Purnell, supra, we examined a nearly identical clause and concluded: While telling jurors to search for truth, the court, in the same sentence, told them to give the defendant the benefit of a reasonable doubt, if it arises in your mind, after you have considered all of the evidence in the case. In addition, the court correctly charged the jury on the presumption of innocence and on the State's burden of proof. Furthermore, the State's burden of proving each element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt was restated without qualification in the context of the separate instructions concerning the various charges in the indictment, so that [t]he concept of the State's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt permeates the trial court's jury charge. [ Id. at 544, 601 A. 2d 175 (citation omitted)]. We are similarly unpersuaded here that the jury was confused about the nature of the State's burden of proof. Medina's final allegation of error concerns the trial court's statement that the presumption of innocence does not fade or extinguish until twelve of you agree that he is guilty of something.  The misleading nature of this comment is self-evident. The State's burden is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of an offense. A jury should find a defendant guilty not in the abstract, but only of specific offenses. In a multi-count indictment, moreover, a jury finding that the defendant is guilty of something does not strip the defendant of the presumption of innocence on the remaining charges. Again, however, we believe that this statement does not constitute plain error. Immediately after delivering the offending clause, the court provided a more accurate explanation of the State's burden of proof: And in order for you to be persuaded of that the State must meet its burden of proof. And it's the State's burden of proof to prove to you every element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the court restated in the context of separate instructions concerning the various charges, the State's burden of providing each element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Read as a whole, the instruction made clear that the jury was to hold the State to its burden of proof for each offense. The jury's verdict confirms this conclusion. Although finding Medina guilty on three counts, the jury acquitted him on two other counts. That finding indicates that the jury did not relieve the State of its burden of proof after first finding that Medina was at least guilty of something. Although some parts of the charge were incorrect, when read in its entirety, the charge does not violate due process. The court adequately explained that Medina was innocent until proven guilty and that the State must prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It told the jury that a reasonable doubt was that which arises from a fair and rational consideration of the evidence or perhaps from the lack of evidence. Despite the regrettable errors, the charge did not so infect the instruction as to lower the State's burden of proof. In so concluding, we admonish trial courts, however, not to repeat the offending clauses in the future.