Opinion ID: 2275645
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Assumed Duty Exception

Text: A traveler may avail himself of this exception when the railroad customarily signals at the particular private crossing, thereby inducing the traveler to rely on that signal. We stated that [w]here it had been customary to do that and the traveler relied upon receiving such warning, the failure to give it is negligence. Illinois Central R. Co. v. Maxwell, 292 Ky. 660, 167 S.W.2d 841, 843 (1943) (citing Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Young's Adm'r, 146 Ky. 317, 142 S.W. 709 (1912); Kentucky Traction & Terminal Company v. Brawner, 208 Ky. 310, 270 S.W. 825 (1925); Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Applegate's Adm'x, 268 Ky. 458, 105 S.W.2d 153 (1937)). Thus, in order to utilize this exception, Appellants must prove that (1) that CSX customarily signaled at this crossing; and (2) that Mary Calhoun relied on CSX always signaling at that crossing. The Court of Appeals in its reasoning, quoted from Mary Calhoun's deposition where she thrice reiterated that she had never heard a whistle. And in their briefs, Appellants concede that they cannot satisfy the above two-part standard, admitting that Mary Calhoun had never encountered a train at the actual crossing. Thus, she could never have relied on a signal to detect an oncoming train. [15] Instead, Appellants again urge this Court to change the law and end the reliance requirement stated in Maxwell. [16] We again decline. Removing the reliance prong eviscerates the assumed duty exception. By relying on a customary signal, travelers can reasonably presume that the absence of a signal is an assurance of safety and the equivalent of an invitation to a traveler to proceed. Maxwell, 167 S.W.2d at 843. We see no reason to depart from Maxwell. Unable to satisfy either prong of the assumed duty exception, Appellants contend that Roberson altered the assumed duty exception. In Roberson, we recognized the undertaker's doctrine, which imposes liability for the negligent performance of a service undertaken for the protection of a third person. Louisville Gas and Elec. Co. v. Roberson, 212 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Ky.2006). In Roberson, LG & E contracted with Jefferson County to install and maintain street lamps. Id. At issue there was whether LG & E could be held liable for the death of a minor, who was struck by a car after dusk, when one of the street lamps was not illuminated. Id. We refuse Appellants' request to extract a duty from another area of tort law and attempt to remold it into the one-hundred-and-fifty year-old railroad crossing framework. Furthermore, we note that a federal court likewise declined to apply the undertaker's doctrine to a different railroad accident at this very crossing. Gaw, 2008 WL 793655, at n. 4 (finding Roberson easily distinguishable, since the instant case pertained to a railroad crossing and lacked a contractual relationship between the parties). The parameters of tort law at private crossings are clearly delineated, and we thus decline to create a new exception. Based on Appellants' concession, that Mary Calhoun never relied on a train's signal, we affirm the Court of Appeals' holding that Appellants, as a matter of law, cannot avail themselves of this exception.