Opinion ID: 2453721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Is the KRTA Preempted Because It Violates the Commerce Clause?

Text: As previously noted, Kanza also asserts a Commerce Clause argument and blends it with the preemption argument. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. It argues that a state can only exercise its police powers in a nondiscriminatory manner and in a manner that does not offend the Commerce Clause. In making this argument it relies on the following passage from an STB decision: Nothing in our Trails Act rules or procedures is intended to usurp the right of state or local entities to impose appropriate safety, land use, and zoning regulation on trails so long as they are not applied in a discriminatory manner or in such a manner as to preclude the interim trail use or the ability to reactivate rail service in the future.  (Emphasis added.) Central Kansas Railway, L.L.C.Abandonment ExemptionIn Marion and McPherson Counties, KS, STB Docket No. AB-406 (Sub-No. 6X), at 5 n. 9 (STB served May 8, 2001). It is not clear whether the STB was addressing the federal Supremacy Clause or the Commerce Clause when discussing the prohibition against discriminatory application of state regulations. For our purposes we need not sort out the doctrinal basis of the STB's reasoning because Kanza merely uses the passage to launch a Commerce Clause argument, which it supports by citing In re Tax Appeals of CIG Field Services Co., 279 Kan. 857, 112 P.3d 138 (2005). CIG did not discuss the Supremacy Clause or preemption; rather, its analysis focused solely on the dormant Commerce Clause.