Opinion ID: 2626972
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Heading: Whether the Litigation Privilege Applies to an Action Based on the Constitutional Right to Privacy

Text: Plaintiff also argues that even if the February 21 letter was privileged, the privilege does not apply to a cause of action based on California's constitutional right to privacy, which the voters added to the Constitution by an initiative in 1972. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1; see Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 15, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633 ( Hill ).) We have repeatedly stated that the litigation privilege bars all tort causes of action except malicious prosecution. (E.g., Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1057, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 516, 128 P.3d 713; Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 360, 7 Cal. Rptr.3d 803, 81 P.3d 244.) We have specifically stated that the privilege bars causes of action for invasion of privacy. ( Kimmel v. Goland, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 209, 271 Cal.Rptr. 191, 793 P.2d 524; Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 215, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365; Ribas v. Clark, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 365, 212 Cal.Rptr. 143, 696 P.2d 637.) In Ribas v. Clark , we quoted Prosser's explanation of why the privilege extends even to civil actions based on perjury (see pt. II.A, ante ), then stated, This policy is equally compelling in the context of common law and statutory claims for invasion of privacy; there is no basis for distinguishing between the two. (38 Cal.3d at p. 365, 212 Cal.Rptr. 143, 696 P.2d 637.) The question here is whether we should distinguish between common law and statutory claims for invasion of privacy and a claim based on the state Constitution. Although we have stated in seemingly absolute terms that the only exception to application of section 47(2) [now 47(b)] to tort suits has been for malicious prosecution actions ( Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 216, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365), we have never specifically stated that the privilege bars an action based on the constitutional right to privacy. Indeed, in Heller v. Norcal Mutual Ins. Co. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 30, 44, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 876 P.2d 999, we recognized but did not decide plaintiffs claim that a constitutional invasion of privacy defeats application of the litigation privilege. Two Court of Appeal decisions have concluded that the litigation privilege must yield to the constitutional right of privacy. ( Jeffrey H. v. Imai, Tadlock & Keeney (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 345, 355-361, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 916; Cutter v. Brownbridge (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 836, 844-847, 228 Cal.Rptr. 545.) They held that which interest prevailsthe constitutional right to privacy or the litigation privilegemust be decided on a case-by-ease basis. As summarized in the more recent case, the application of the litigation privilege in this constitutional context calls for a balancing of interests, despite the unqualified application of the privilege in other legal contexts. ( Jeffrey H. v. Imai, Tadlock & Keeney, supra, at p. 355, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 916.) The main argument in favor of this conclusion is that the litigation privilege, being merely a statutory creation, must yield to the constitutional right to privacy. The Court of Appeal in Wise v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at pages XXXX-X-XXX and footnote 1, 100 Cal. Rptr.2d 437, disagreed with Cutter v. Brownbridge supra, 183 Cal.App.3d 836, 228 Cal.Rptr. 545, and the Court of Appeal in this case disagreed with both Cutter v. Brownbridge, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d 836, 228 Cal.Rptr, 545, and Jeffrey H. v. Imai Tadlock & Keeney, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th 345, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 916. The Wise court and the Court of Appeal here concluded that the litigation privilege bars a privacy cause of action based on the Constitution as well as one based on common law or statute. We conclude that the litigation privilege applies even to a constitutionally based privacy cause of action. Obviously, if section 47(b) conflicted with California Constitution, article I, section 1, the statute would have to yield to the Constitution. The absolute privilege of section 47(b) would be unconstitutional and hence invalid to the extent of the conflict. But the statutory and constitutional provisions are not in conflict; they can and do coexist. The litigation privilege has existed [f]or well over a century, and [a]t least since then-Justice Traynor's opinion in Albertson v. Raboff (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375[, 295 P.2d 405], California courts have given the privilege an expansive reach. ( Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1193-1194, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044.) The parties have not cited, and we are not aware of, anything in the ballot materials or history of the 1972 initiative that added the constitutional right to privacy that suggested any intent to limit the scope of this preexisting privilege or to create a right of privacy that would prevail over the privilege. Rather, as we explain, we believe the constitutional right contains within it a limitation previously based on statute. When the voters adopted California Constitution, article I, section 1, they did so mindful of the preexisting litigation privilege. The constitutional right to privacy has never been absolute; it is subject to a balancing of interests. In Hill, we considered the nature of the constitutional right to privacy. We explained, Privacy concerns are not absolute; they must be balanced against other important interests. [Citations.] ... [¶] The diverse and somewhat amorphous character of the privacy right necessarily requires that privacy interests be specifically identified and carefully compared with competing or countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a `balancing test.' The comparison and balancing of diverse interests is central to the privacy jurisprudence of both common and constitutional law. [¶] Invasion of a privacy interest is not a violation of the state constitutional right to privacy if the invasion is justified by a competing interest. ( Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 37-38, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633, italics added.) These other important interests need not be constitutionally based. Even nonconstitutional interests can outweigh constitutional privacy interests. ( Id at pp. 43-4, 57-58, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633 [interests in sporting integrity and health and safety of athletes permits invasion of privacy].) Among the competing interests against which the privacy right must be balanced is the longstanding litigation privilege. The courts in Jeffrey H. v. Imai, Tadlock & Keeney, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th 345, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 916, and Cutter v. Brownbridge, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d 836, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, interpreted our opinion in Hill as requiring a balancing of the litigation privilege and the constitutional right of privacy on a case-by-case basis. We disagree. In adopting the litigation privilege, the Legislature has already done the balancing. The litigation privilege' furthers the vital public policy of affording free access to the courts and facilitating the crucial functions of the finder of fact. ( Ribas v. Clark, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 364-365, 212 Cal.Rptr. 143, 696 P.2d 637; see also the cases cited in pt. II.A, ante. ) This policy exists even if a privacy cause of action invokes the Constitution, and not on a case-by-case basis but in all cases. Litigants and witnesses could never be free of fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions ( Rusheen v. Cohen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1063, 39 Cal. Rptr.3d 516, 128 P.3d 713) if the privilege applied only in some cases but not others. This policy caused us to conclude that the litigation privilege bars all common law and statutory causes of action for invasion of privacy. ( Ribas v. Clark, supra, at p. 365, 212 Cal.Rptr. 143, 696 P.2d 637.) It applies equally to a constitutionally based cause of action for invasion of privacy. The same compelling need to afford free access to the courts exists whatever label is given to a privacy cause of action. Indeed, as the Court of Appeal noted here, recognition of such a distinction would allow a plaintiff to easily overcome the privilege on any privacy claim by simply inserting the adjective `constitutional' into his or her pleadings and jury instructions. If the policies underlying section 47(b) are sufficiently strong to support an absolute privilege, the resulting immunity should not evaporate merely because the plaintiff discovers a conveniently different label for pleading what is in substance an identical grievance arising from identical conduct as that protected by section 47(b). ( Rubin v. Green, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1203, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044.) Section 47(b)'s litigation privilege bars a privacy cause of action whether labeled as based on common law, statute, or Constitution. We disapprove of Jeffrey H. v. Imai, Tadlock & Keeney, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th 345, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 916, and Cutter v. Brownbridge, supra, 183 Cal. App.3d 836, 228 Cal.Rptr. 545, to the extent they are inconsistent with this opinion.