Opinion ID: 1817858
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: compulsory examination/right against self-incrimination

Text: [14] ¶ 27. Having determined that Richard A.P. evidence may be admissible in some cases, the next issue is whether a defendant who intends to introduce Richard A.P. evidence may be compelled to undergo an examination from a state-selected expert without violating the defendant's right against self-incrimination. ¶ 28. The State argues that a defendant who intends to introduce Richard A.P. expert testimony waives his or her right against self-incrimination by placing his or her mental status at issue. The State argues that this waiver derives from the fact that the expert's testimony is based on statements that the defendant has made to the expert and that the expert's testimony essentially amounts to the defendant's introduction of his or her own statements of the crime chargedthereby waiving the right against self-incrimination. As a result, the State asserts that a reciprocal compelled examination by an expert selected by the State is appropriate and the only fair and effective way for it to counter the defendant's introduction of Richard A.P. evidence. The State acknowledges that its use of this evidence is limitedit may only use the evidence obtained from its own expert's psychological examination of the defendant to rebut the testimony of the defendant's psychological expert. It cannot introduce this evidence in its case-in-chief. ¶ 29. The State admits that there is no case law directly on point for the proposition that it advances that is, that a defendant waives his right against self-incrimination by introducing Richard A.P. profile evidence at trial, thereby allowing the court to order a compelled examination by the state. However, it argues that there is analogous support in cases where courts have found a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination based on the defendant's introduction of expert psychological testimony in support of an insanity defense, see State v. Hutchinson, 766 P.2d 447 (Wash. 1989); in support of a diminished capacity defense, Commonwealth v. Morley, 681 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 1996); during the penalty phase of a trial or at sentencing, Savino v. Commonwealth, 391 S.E.2d 276 (Va. 1990); and to show battered wife syndrome in support of self-defense claim, State v. Briand, 547 A.2d 235 (N.H. 1988). The State admits that, unlike these cases, Davis is not claiming that he lacked the requisite mental capacity to commit the crime. However, the State contends that the rationale from these cases supports its propositionthat is, that the defendant's introduction of expert psychiatric testimony on his or her mental status constitutes a waiver of the right against self-incrimination. ¶ 30. Davis argues that his introduction of Richard A.P. expert testimony does not constitute a waiver of his right against self-incrimination. He distinguishes the State's cases from his case. He argues that the cases cited by the State mostly involve defendants who admitted to committing the crime charged and who introduced expert psychological testimony to show that they lacked the mental capacity to form the requisite intent to commit the crime. In such cases, an examination can be compelled, Davis argues, because it is the defendant who injects this new issue into the case, on which the defendant bears the burden of proof. In contrast, in his case, he has not admitted to committing the crime and is not introducing his expert psychological testimony to show that he lacked the requisite intent. Instead, he is offering evidence to support his innocence on the elements of the crime, on which the State carries the burden of proof. A compelled examination, he contends, will now allow the State to gather incriminating testimony from him on an element of the crime. ¶ 31. The court of appeals rejected Davis's distinction, concluding that his introduction of Richard A.P. evidence was essentially the same as the introduction of expert testimony to show lack of mental capacity to form intent. The court stated: We are convinced that Davis's affirmative defense/burden of proof approach elevates form over substance. See United States v. Halbert, 712 F.2d 388, 390 (9th Cir. 1983). While Davis is not technically asserting an affirmative defense, he is certainly offering a theory of defense. We see no reason to distinguish the ability of the State to compel psychiatric testimony in response to an affirmative defense from the use of such testimony to rebut the defendant's theory of defense based on expert character evidence. Both instances place the defendant's mental status in issue and hinge on the workings of a defendant's mind at the time of the offense. United States v. White, 21 F. Supp.2d 1197, 1200 (E.D. Cal. 1998). Davis, 2001 WI App 210, ¶¶ 11, 13. [2] As a result, the court of appeals concluded that Davis's introduction of Richard A.P. expert testimony, like the introduction of expert psychiatric testimony to prove insanity or diminished capacity, constituted a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination. We do not reach this same conclusion. We disagree that the mere introduction of such Richard A.P. evidence necessarily constitutes a waiver of the right against self-incrimination in all instances. ¶ 32. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that [n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . . U.S. Const. amend. V. The Wisconsin Constitution provides for approximately the same protection. Wis. Const. art. I, § 8(1). [15, 16] ¶ 33. Whether a compulsory examination is constitutionally permissible is a question of constitutional law that we ultimately decide de novo. Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 353. The circuit court's factual findings underlying any such decision are to be upheld unless they are contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Id. ¶ 34. In cases where the defendant introduces expert testimony in support of a defense related to his or her mental capacity, not all courts have specifically required a waiver of the right against self-incrimination to occur before ordering a compulsory examination. See Briand, 547 A.2d 235 (N.H. 1988) (identifying two general approaches that courts have taken in such cases). Some courts conclude that a compulsory examination is constitutionally permissiblethat is, not in violation of the right against self-incriminationbased on the reasoning that the state must be afforded the same opportunity to obtain the same type and quality of psychological evaluation as the defendant when the defendant raises the issue of his or her mental capacity. Id. at 238; see also U.S. v. White, 21 F. Supp.2d 1197, 1200 (E.D. Cal. 1998); Hutchinson, 766 P.2d at 452-53. The overriding concern in such cases is that the finder of fact must be given a fair and full assessment of the defendant's culpability when the defendant raises this issue. Id. ¶ 35. In contrast, other courts have held that a compulsory examination by the state is constitutionally permissible because the defendant waives the privilege against self-incrimination by showing his or her intent to introduce expert psychiatric testimony in support of a defense related to his or her mental capacity. Briand, 547 A.2d at 238; see also, State v. Fair, 496 A.2d 461 (Conn. 1985); Morley, 681 A.2d 1254, Savino, 391 S.E.2d 276. In turn, based on this waiver and fairness considerations to the state, courts have justified ordering compulsory examinations. The Briand decision shows some courts' justification for finding that a waiver occurs in such cases. ¶ 36. In Briand, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder for shooting her husband. Briand, 547 A.2d at 236. Before trial, the defendant informed the state that she had undergone a psychological examination from her own expert and that she intended to present the psychologist's testimony to show either that she suffered from battered woman's syndrome (in support of a potential self-defense plea) or that she was provoked (in support of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter). Id. The court concluded that the defendant's mere notice of this expert testimony constituted a waiver of her privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 239. The court explained: Because the expert's testimony is thus predicated on the defendant's statements, the latter are explicitly or implicitly placed in evidence through the testimony of the expert during his direct and cross-examination. Since a defendant would waive his privilege against compelled self-incrimination if he took the stand and made those same statements himself, his decision to introduce his account of relevant facts indirectly through an expert witness should likewise be treated as a waiver obligating him to provide the same access to the State's expert that he has given to his own, and opening the door to the introduction of resulting State's evidence, as the State requests here, to the extent that he introduces comparable evidence on his own behalf. Id. We find this reasoning persuasive. We conclude that such waiver must occur in this case before the State is entitled to an examination of the defendant by its own expert. [17] ¶ 37. Based on the type of evidence presented in this case, however, we are not prepared to conclude that the defendant automatically waives his or her privilege simply by introducing Richard A.P. character profile evidence. As Davis contends, Richard A.P. evidence is distinguishable from expert testimony related to a defendant's mental capacity to form criminal intent. In particular, Richard A.P. evidence is introduced as character evidence, used as circumstantial evidence to show that the defendant did not commit the crime. The defendant has not introduced this evidence to support a particular defense related to his mental capacity. Therefore, we conclude that the mere introduction of Richard A.P. profile evidence does not constitute waiver of the right against self-incrimination. ¶ 38. We are also not convinced that the state needs a reciprocal psychological examination in order to adequately counter such Richard A.P. character evidence. When the expert testimony is introduced in support of a defense related to the defendant's mental capacity to form the requisite intent, the need for the state to counter this evidence with a reciprocal examination is greater because the defendant has clearly placed his mental capacity at issue to directly address an element of the crime. Richard A.P. evidence, however, is not introduced to support a defense based on his mental capacity. It is circumstantial evidence of his innocence. Further, allowing a compelled examination to counter character evidence presents a great danger to the defendant that this compelled examination will result in incriminating testimony that the state may use in its case-in-chief or in rebutting this character evidence. This danger outweighs any fairness considerations in favor of the state in such cases involving character evidence. ¶ 39. Nevertheless, the State is justifiably concerned in this case that the introduction of Richard A.P. expert testimony may amount to nothing more than the defendant's own denial of the crime through a surrogate. For this reason, we conclude that a waiver of the right against self-incrimination may result in some cases. [18, 19] ¶ 40. A defendant who seeks to introduce Richard A.P. evidence must notify the court and the state that he or she intends to introduce this evidence at trial and precisely identify the exact testimony that the expert will provide at trial and the bases for the expert's opinion. Upon this disclosure, the state may then bring a motion requesting the court to compel the defendant to undergo an examination by an expert from the state. On this motion, the circuit court must then carefully examine the defendant's disclosure regarding his or her expert's testimony and the expert's basis for his or her opinion. If this disclosure statement shows that the expert will either explicitly or implicitly provide testimony regarding relevant facts surrounding the alleged crime that amounts to the defendant's own denial of the crime, the court may then order the defendant to undergo a reciprocal examination from the state based on the fact that the defendant has waived his or her right against self-incrimination. In this way, the defendant is permitted to introduce expert opinion testimony pursuant to Richard A.P., but restricted from introducing statements that amount to nothing more than the defendant's own statements on the crime. [20] ¶ 41. In his reply brief, Davis asserted that he did not intend on using the opinions of Levin as a mechanism to present his version of the facts of the alleged offense before the jury. Levin, Davis contends, would only testify to the results of psychological tests and to his opinions based on the results of these tests; Levin would not be used as a conduit. To the extent that Levin will testify that he used only standardized tests that did not require Levin to inquire into the relevant facts surrounding the case, we conclude that no waiver of the right against self-incrimination would have occurred and the State is not entitled to a reciprocal examination of the defendant. However, as he concedes, Davis must disclose all results of Levin's tests to the State if he introduces testimony from Levin. The State may then have its own expert examine these tests and testify to rebut any testimony from Levin. The State, we conclude, is not unfairly prejudiced by this result. The State is afforded sufficient means to question this evidence through cross-examination and through rebuttal expert testimony. ¶ 42. The State contends that its need for a compulsory examination is based in part on the fact that the jury will give more weight to an expert from the defendant because his or her expert will have personally conducted the tests on the defendant and interviewed the defendant. We do not agree with this assertion as it pertains to Richard A.P. expert testimony. Cross-examination and rebuttal expert witnesses will provide the State with adequate tools to counter such evidence without subjecting the defendant to a potentially prejudicial compelled examination by the State's expert. With appropriate instructions from the court, we have confidence that the finder of fact will give fair weight to this evidence, even though the State has not conducted personal interviews with the defendant. [21] ¶ 43. At oral argument, Davis proposed a different solution to this case: a jury instruction. He argued that, instead of allowing the State to conduct its own examination of the defendant, we should instead implement a rule where, if the defendant's expert testifies to facts learned from the defendant, the circuit court should instruct the jury not to accept as true the facts that the expert testified to pertaining to the defendant, unless they were supported by the testimony of others with personal knowledge of those facts. An analogous solution was implemented in California; however, there the state's expert is allowed to examine the defendant and, when the state's expert testifies, the court instructs the jury not to regard as true any of the state's expert's statement of the facts on which the expert's opinion is based. See People v. Danis, 107 Cal. Rptr. 675, 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). We have given full consideration to all potential options and conclude that the solution adopted above best serves all interests in cases where Richard A.P. evidence is presented, without compromising fairness to the state and constitutional protections of the defendant, but still allowing a full inquiry into the facts by the jury. ¶ 44. Finally, we address State ex rel. LaFollette v. Raskin, 34 Wis. 2d 607, 150 N.W.2d 318 (1967), upon which Davis relies. Raskin established a bifurcated trial system for defendants pleading not guilty by reason of insanity. In that case, the defendant entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity to charges of armed robbery and burglary. Id. at 612. In light of his insanity plea, he was required to undergo a statutorily-mandated psychiatric examination from a court-appointed expert. Id. at 613, 618-19. The Raskin court concluded that the defendant's submission to the statutorily-mandated psychiatric examination did not constitute a waiver of privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 622. Accordingly, the state was prohibited from introducing the results from this examination during the guilt phase of the trial. [22] ¶ 45. Following Raskin, Davis argues that he cannot be forced to undergo a compulsory examination by the State simply by introducing expert testimony on his lack of any sexual disorder. He argues that, in such instances, following Raskin, he still retains his right against self-incrimination. Raskin, however, does not restrict the state's ability to obtain compulsory examinations. Instead, its holding restricts the prosecution, in light of a defendant's right against self-incrimination, from using incriminating statements obtained during a compulsory examination during the guilt phase of trial. Nothing in Raskin restricts the court from ordering a compulsory examination when the defendant effectively waives his right against self-incrimination by introducing his or her own statements through a surrogate at the guilt phase of trial. We therefore conclude that Raskin is distinguishable. We conclude, however, that the State is restricted to using any evidence obtained from a compulsory examination only in rebutting defendant's expert testimony. See Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 422-23 (1987).