Opinion ID: 727854
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Agent Smith's Testimony6

Text: 28 IRS Agent Smith testified that Cha's activities were consistent with money laundering of drug proceeds. An expert cannot state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged.... Fed.R.Evid. 704. Smith testified that Cha's transactions were consistent with money laundering, but he never stated any opinion as to Cha's mental state. Admission of this testimony was proper. See United States v. Lockett, 919 F.2d 585, 590 (9th Cir.1990). 29 Smith also testified about IRS reporting requirements, and that Cha had not met those requirements. Cha argues that Smith's testimony improperly described the law to the jury. The law Smith summarized was on background matters collateral to the jury verdict. Smith's testimony did not usurp the role of the judge or jury. 30 Cha argues that Smith's testimony about why drug dealers launder their proceeds was improper, as it was a matter of ordinary experience, citing United States v. Montas, 41 F.3d 775, 782 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1886 (1995). 7 31 Like Montas, there was little probative value in having Smith testify that the reason drug dealers launder money is so they can spend it without being detected. Unlike Montas, however, there also was little prejudicial effect by admission of Smith's testimony. Because the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony. Cf. United States v. VonWillie, 59 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir.1995) (finding no abuse of discretion in admission of officer's lay testimony that: drug traffickers often use and possess firearms to intimidate buyers and protect drugs; the MK-11 is a particularly intimidating firearm; drug traffickers commonly kept weapons near their drugs). 32 Finally, Cha contends that Smith improperly bolstered the credibility of government witnesses because he repeated their testimony and based his conclusions on their testimony. An expert may base his opinion on evidence produced at trial, including testimony of other witnesses. United States v. Marchini, 797 F.2d 759, 765 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987).