Opinion ID: 2585419
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ex parte dismissal of a juror

Text: During the evidentiary stage of the trial, a juror telephoned the judge at night and informed the judge that she could not continue to serve as a juror because she was ill. The judge dismissed the juror. The following morning the trial proceeded with an alternate juror on the panel. Although there is no record of a hearing on the matter of the juror's incapacity or of the judge's replacement of the juror with an alternate, when the trial again commenced the judge stated: All jurors are present with the exception of Miss Douglas and she has been excused.... [Bailiff], if you'll take out the twelve jurors who will decide the case.... Miss Bair, you are the remaining alternate juror. The other juror became ill and so we've put in another alternate juror. No objections were made to the judge's substitution of the juror with an alternate. The issue was not raised by the defendant in a motion to dismiss or other post-trial motion. In his appeal, Calderon contends that the trial judge committed reversible error in dismissing the juror prior to consulting the parties. Calderon asserts that although no actual prejudice resulted from the judge's dismissal of the juror, prejudice is presumed; therefore, he is entitled to a new trial. The State argues that a showing of actual prejudice is necessary for the defendant to obtain relief because Calderon was not prejudiced by the substitution of jurors; therefore, Calderon has no issue to appeal. In State v. Fulton, 269 Kan. 835, 9 P.3d 18 (2000), the trial judge had an off-the-record private discussion with a juror who had committed juror misconduct during deliberations. The judge disqualified the misbehaving juror and replaced her with an alternate juror. Defense counsel objected and requested a mistrial. The motion was denied. The defendant was subsequently convicted. Defense counsel moved for a new trial based on the trial judge's dismissal of the misbehaving juror and the judge's substitution of the alternate juror. The motion for new trial was denied. On appeal, the defendant asserted that under the circumstances prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial is presumed. Fulton argued that the judge's sua sponte dismissal of the misbehaving juror denied the defendant the inquiry necessary to determine whether prejudice had occurred. The Fulton court noted that where a judge dismisses a misbehaving juror and replaces that juror with an alternate without giving the defendant an opportunity to question the juror as to the extent and character of his or her misbehavior, the defendant has the burden to show prejudice. 269 Kan. at 844. Fulton also asserted that the judge's ex parte conversation with the misbehaving juror denied him his constitutional and statutory right to be present at all critical stages of the trial. Under the constitutional standard of review, to determine the error harmless, an appellate court must be able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. 269 Kan. at 845. The Fulton court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's absence during the judge's conference and dismissal of the misbehaving juror had no likelihood of changing the result of the trial. Here, there was no juror misconduct. The excused juror was incapacitated and could not proceed. The judge's excusing the ill juror was not critical to the trial. Alternate jurors had been selected. One of the purposes for selecting an alternate juror is to replace a juror who becomes incapacitated after the trial has commenced. Under the circumstances, excusing from further service an ill juror, outside the presence of the defendant, was neither prejudicial nor deprived the defendant of the right to be present at all stages of the trial. We note that the better practice would have been for the trial judge, on the record and in the presence of the defendant, to notify the parties of the juror's illness and then substitute the alternate juror. Since there is no claim that Calderon was prejudiced by the judge's replacement of the incapacitated juror, the defendant is not entitled to a new trial on this issue.