Opinion ID: 1122968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: admissibility of evidence concerning defendant's beliefs under the first amendment to the united states constitution

Text: Defendant next asserts that the trial court's admission of the evidence concerning his belief in white supremacy violated his right to free speech and free association under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. [15] In so contending, defendant refers to all the evidence described in section II-A of this opinion, with the exception of the evidence concerning his violent, criminal conduct related to his beliefs. See 324 Or. at 417, 927 P.2d at 1087 (discussing the evidence at issue). Defendant relies upon Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992), to support his contention that his First Amendment rights were violated. As we shall explain, we disagree with defendant's reading of Dawson and conclude that no First Amendment violation occurred in this case. In Dawson, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. Both the defendant and his victim were white. Before the penalty phase began, the prosecution gave notice that it intended to call an expert witness to testify about the origin and nature of an organization called the Aryan Brotherhood. The prosecution also intended to introduce evidence that the defendant had the words Aryan Brotherhood tattooed on his hand and had a number of swastikas tattooed on his back, and also that the defendant had painted a swastika on the wall of his prison cell. 503 U.S. at 161-62, 166, 112 S.Ct. at 1095-96, 1098. In order to preclude the testimony of the state's expert, the defendant agreed that, in lieu of that testimony, the prosecution could submit the following stipulation to the jury: `The Aryan Brotherhood refers to a white racist prison gang that began in the 1960's in California in response to other gangs of racial minorities. Separate gangs calling themselves the Aryan Brotherhood now exist in many state prisons including Delaware.' Id. at 162, 112 S.Ct. at 1095-96. [16] During the penalty phase, the prosecution read the stipulation to the jury and also introduced evidence of the defendant's Aryan Brotherhood tattoo. However, the trial court excluded all the prosecution's swastika evidence. The prosecution introduced no other evidence that linked the defendant's Aryan Brotherhood membership to any conduct on the defendant's part or that demonstrated the specific beliefs of the Delaware prison branch of the Aryan Brotherhood. Id. at 162, 165-67, 112 S.Ct. at 1095-96, 1097-99. At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury recommended the death penalty and the trial court imposed it. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 163, 112 S.Ct. at 1096. The United States Supreme Court vacated and reversed the ruling of the Delaware Supreme Court, holding that [the defendant]'s First Amendment rights were violated by the admission of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence in this case, because the evidence proved nothing more than [the defendant]'s abstract beliefs. Id. at 167, 112 S.Ct. at 1098. Defendant claims that this case is indistinguishable from the Supreme Court's holding in Dawson, requiring a reversal of his death sentence. We disagree. In Dawson, the Supreme Court specifically framed the issue before it as whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the introduction in a capital sentencing proceeding of the fact that the defendant was a member of an organization called the Aryan Brotherhood, where the evidence has no relevance to the issues being decided in the proceeding. Id. at 160, 112 S.Ct. at 1095 (emphasis added). Throughout its opinion, the Court emphasized that the Aryan Brotherhood evidence, standing alone, was not relevant to any other issue before the jury. The Court stated: Even if the Delaware group to which [the defendant] allegedly belongs is racist, those beliefs, so far as we can determine, had no relevance to the sentencing proceeding in this case. For example, the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was not tied in any way to the murder of Dawson's victim.    Because the prosecution did not prove that the Aryan Brotherhood had committed any unlawful or violent acts, or had even endorsed such acts, the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was also not relevant to help prove any aggravating circumstance. In many cases, for example, associational evidence might serve a legitimate purpose in showing that a defendant represents a future danger to society. A defendant's membership in an organization that endorses the killing of any identifiable group, for example, might be relevant to a jury's inquiry into whether the defendant will be dangerous in the future.    But the inference which the jury was invited to draw in this case tended to prove nothing more than the abstract beliefs of the Delaware chapter [of the Aryan Brotherhood]. Id. at 166, 112 S.Ct. at 1098 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that, because the prosecution introduced no evidence that made the defendant's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood relevant, the First Amendment prevent[ed] Delaware    from employing evidence of a defendant's abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs ha[d] no bearing on the issue being tried. Id. at 168, 112 S.Ct. at 1099 (emphasis added). As is clear from the above-quoted passages from Dawson, the admission in a death-penalty proceeding of evidence that concerns a defendant's belief in white supremacy does not violate the First Amendment if such evidence is relevant to the determination of an issue before the jury. Defendant argues that, because his beliefs had nothing to do with the murders of his in-laws, who were white, evidence concerning those beliefs was not relevant during the penalty phase of his trial. That argument is incorrect because, under Dawson, the admissibility of the type of evidence at issue here is not limited merely to its relevance to a defendant's guilt. Rather, the evidence also may be admissible if it is relevant to help prove any aggravating circumstance. Id. at 166, 112 S.Ct. at 1098. As this court has stated before, [a] penalty phase jury is not required to `convict' a defendant of prior crimes. Rather, the jury must decide by answering the questions required by ORS 163.150 whether a particular defendant should or should not receive a death sentence. State v. Montez, 309 Or. 564, 611, 789 P.2d 1352 (1990) ( Montez I ), on remand 324 Or. 343, 927 P.2d 64 (1996). Under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B), one aggravating circumstance that the jury must consider is whether a defendant will be dangerous in the future. As we already have determined, the evidence in this case concerning defendant's specific, hostile beliefs, together with the evidence of specific instances of conduct related to those beliefs, was relevant to the jury's determination under the second question. See 324 Or. at 419-20, 927 P.2d at 1088-89 (reaching that conclusion). The situation before us here is different, therefore, than that before the Supreme Court in Dawson. In that case, the prosecution introduced abstract evidence concerning the Aryan Brotherhood that was not relevant to any issue before the jury. In contrast, in this case, the state presented evidence of defendant's specific beliefs and related conduct that was probative of his future dangerousness. Consequently, under Dawson, the trial court's admission of the evidence at issue here did not violate defendant's First Amendment rights.