Opinion ID: 1835766
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Valerie White

Text: In unargued assignment of error 12, the defendant alleges that potential juror Valerie White was also improperly excused for cause. [5] White stated on her jury questionnaire that she was against the death penalty. During questioning by the trial court, White stated that she was against the death penalty because her religion forbade her to judge another. When further questioned by the court, she stated: Q: ... In general, tell me what are your feelings about the death penalty. A: Me myself, I'm against the death penalty only because I'm notmy religionI'm notI can't judge a person.       Q: Do you feel that there is any circumstances in which you could put aside your church teachings and actually serve on a jury and consider the death penalty as an option? A: I guess I could. I would have to if I had to serve on a jury. Q: ....let me put it another way. Do you believe in the death penalty at all? A: No ma'am. Q: Do you believe that you could ever personally vote to impose the death penalty in a case? A: I would have to say no right now, but I'm not in that situation. I don't know the situation of a case to answer. Later, White responded to the court's questioning that she was not so opposed to the death penalty such that she would not consider it under any circumstance. White stated that the type of case in which she could consider the death penalty was the lady that killed her children, her two children, I could have given her the death penalty. When the prosecution explained to White that the instant case did not involve the death of a child, but rather the stabbing death of a forty year old woman for money by a twenty year old male, her testimony was as follows: Q: In that situation, could you have reservations in returning the death penalty, particularly in this case? A: Yes. Q: And would those be very-it could be a substantial impairment? A: Yes. In an attempt by defense counsel to rehabilitate White, the following testimony occurred: Q: Not in an abstract case, but in this case, could you put those reservations [about the death penalty] aside, or are they so strong that they would affect you to the point that you just couldn't apply the death penalty? A: I understand it better that you've explained it. And honestly, I could put my reservations aside. In determining a juror's competency, a trial judge is not expected to rely upon one isolated area of voir dire. State v. O'Conner, 320 So.2d 188, 191 (La.1975). Consequently, she is not bound by a juror's answer to a particular question when that answer is inconsistent with other answers and other facts and circumstances known to the judge as a result of the entire examination. Id.; See also State v. Oliphant, 220 La. 489, 56 So.2d 846, 847 (La.1952). We again note that unmistakable clarity is not required to establish that a juror's views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of her duties. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852. In explaining why unmistakable clarity is not required, the Supreme Court stated: This is because determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism. What common sense should have realized experience has proved: many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made unmistakably clear; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings. Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record, however, there will be situations where the trial judge will be left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. Id. at 425-26, 105 S.Ct. at 852. In Witt, the Court went on to say, `In doubtful cases, the exercise of [the trial judge's] power of observation often proves the most accurate method of ascertaining the truth.... To the sophistication and sagacity of the trial judge the law confides the duty of appraisal.' Id. at 434, 105 S.Ct. at 857(quoting Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434, 103 S.Ct. 843, 851, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983) (quoting Boyd v. Boyd, 252 N.Y. 422, 169 N.E. 632, 634 (N.Y.1930))). Appellate review of the entire voir dire is essential to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in excusing a juror. State v. Bates, 397 So.2d 1331, 1334 (La.1981). In granting the State's cause challenge, the trial court cited the inconsistency in White's responses to questions about her ability to consider the death penalty. White's testimony that she could indeed put her reservations about capital punishment aside conflicted with remarks to the contrary on her jury questionnaire and her responses to questions asked of her by the court and by the prosecution. Her equivocal yet conflicting responses exemplify the situation described by the Supreme Court in Witt, supra. State v. Burr, 341 N.C. 263, 461 S.E.2d 602, 613 (N.C.1995). White's varying and overall inconsistent testimony led to the trial judge's conclusion that she could not reasonably be expected to be fully impartial regarding the penalty to be imposed. Given the cold record before us, it is impossible for us to judge which one of White's inconsistent answers rang the most true; it is the trial court's duty to perform such an evaluation. People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 205 (Colo.1990); See alsoPeople v. Millwee, 18 Cal.4th 96, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990 (Cal.1998) (trial court did not err in dismissing juror for cause where inconsistent answers left trial court with impression that juror could not follow the law); Greene v. State, 268 Ga. 47, 485 S.E.2d 741 (Ga.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 568, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (1997)(deference afforded trial court's grant of State's challenge for cause where juror gave conflicting and equivocal answers regarding her views on the death penalty); Taylor v. State, 638 So.2d 30 (Fla.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1003, 115 S.Ct. 518, 130 L.Ed.2d 424 (1994). Thus, considering this juror's testimony as a whole, and not merely correct answers in isolation, the record supports the trial court's ultimate determination that White was unfit for service. Affording the trial court the deference due in this circumstance, we find that this assignment of error has no merit.