Opinion ID: 2967751
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the conviction issues

Text: As explained above, the Boldens, in their separate appeals, challenge their money laundering and related conspiracy convictions. In addition, Ms. Bolden asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict her on the eighteen separate false claims counts. We begin our analysis of their contentions on the Conviction Issues by examining the applicable standards of review.
First, in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, a verdict must be upheld if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); see also United States v. Bennafield, 287 F.3d 320, 324 (4th Cir. 2002). Second, we review de novo a challenge to the validity of an indictment. United States v. Loayza, 107 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 1997). Finally, we review for abuse of discretion a district court’s rulings on jury instructions. United States v. Bostian, 59 F.3d 474, 480 (4th Cir. 1995). In reviewing the adequacy of instructions, we accord the district court much discretion and will not reverse provided that the instructions, taken as a whole, adequately state the controlling law. Teague v. Baker, 35 F.3d 978, 985 (4th Cir. 1994).
The Boldens first challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions for money laundering. Each of their six money laundering convictions, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), arose out of the Related Party Transactions.17 Three of those convic17 Pursuant to § 1956(a)(1) of Title 18, criminal penalties are provided for: Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity— (A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or 16 UNITED STATES v. BOLDEN tions resulted from checks written by Emerald Health to Industrial, and the other three involved checks written by Industrial to Carolina Supply (collectively, the Industrial Check Transactions).18 As explained below, sufficient evidence supports the money laundering convictions.
In the common understanding, money laundering occurs when money derived from criminal activity is placed into a legitimate business in an effort to cleanse the money of criminal taint. The money laundering statute, however, as codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), proscribes a much broader range of conduct, specifically prohibiting four distinct types of money laundering activity. In order to contravene § 1956(a)(1), a defendant must, first of all, know that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of (ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or (B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part— (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). 18 Each of the six money laundering counts (Counts Thirty-Eight through Forty-Three), after describing the financial transaction, further alleged, in its penultimate paragraph, the following: The defendants engaged in the financial transaction with the intent to promote the carrying on of the specified unlawful activity, that is with the intent to further the mail and wire fraud scheme and artifices, . . . and knowingly [sic] that the financial transaction was designed, in whole or in part, to conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, and control of the proceeds of said specified unlawful activity. UNITED STATES v. BOLDEN 17 some specified unlawful activity. If this proceeds element is satisfied, a money laundering violation occurs when a defendant conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction: (1) intending to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity (promotion money laundering); or (2) intending to engage in conduct contravening §§ 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code; or (3) knowing that the financial transaction is designed to conceal the nature of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity (concealment money laundering); or (4) knowing that the transaction is designed to avoid a state or federal transaction reporting requirement. The money laundering counts charged the Boldens with involvement in both promotion money laundering and concealment money laundering.19 The instructions advised the jury that, in order to convict on those charges, it was obliged to find the Boldens involved in both promotion money laundering and concealment money laundering.20 Accordingly, by its guilty verdict on the six money laundering counts, 19 A single count of an indictment may permissibly allege either one or more of the types of money laundering contained in § 1956(a)(1). See e.g., United States v. Booth, 309 F.3d 566, 572 (9th Cir. 2002) (When a statute specifies two or more ways in which an offense may be committed, all may be alleged in the conjunctive in one count.). 20 Although the instructions required the jury to find, in order to convict, that the Boldens had engaged in both promotion money laundering and concealment money laundering, such instructions were unnecessarily favorable to them. When an indictment alleges both promotion and concealment money laundering, a conviction can be premised on proof of either. See United States v. LeDonne, 21 F.3d 1418, 1427 (7th Cir. 1994) ([W]here a statute defines two or more ways in which an offense may be committed, all may be alleged in the conjunctive in one count in order to adequately apprise the defendant of the government’s intention to charge him under either prong of the statute.); United States v. Street, 66 F.3d 969, 974 (8th Cir. 1995) (same). 18 UNITED STATES v. BOLDEN the jury found that they had each engaged in both types of money laundering. The Boldens maintain that their money laundering convictions must be vacated for two reasons. First, they contend that the financial transactions on which their money laundering convictions are based, i.e., the Industrial Check Transactions, did not involve the proceeds of the mail and wire fraud that constituted the specified unlawful activity alleged in the indictment. Second, they assert that the Industrial Check Transactions failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of either promotion money laundering or concealment money laundering. For the reasons explained below, we reject each of these contentions.
The Boldens first contend that the evidence failed to prove that the money laundering offenses involved the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity spelled out in the indictment. In particular, it charged their involvement in a mail and wire fraud scheme — an offense which qualifies as a specified unlawful activity under the relevant money laundering statute. The Boldens assert, however, that the mail and wire fraud activity consisted only of the submission of the 1993 and 1994 Cost Reports, and that it was not until the submission of those Reports that their fraud scheme generated proceeds. According to the Boldens, the Industrial Check Transactions — the financial transactions underlying the money laundering convictions — could not have involved the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity because they occurred prior to the submission of the 1993 and 1994 Cost Reports. Contrary to the Boldens’ contention, the money laundering statute does not require the underlying criminal activity be completed prior to the money laundering transactions. See United States v. Butler, 211 F.3d 826, 829 (4th Cir. 2000) (Funds are criminally derived if they are derived from an already completed offense, or a completed phase of an ongoing offense. (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added)). Thus, the key inquiry is not whether the specified unlawful activity was completed prior to the alleged money laundering transaction. Instead, we must determine whether the specified unlawful UNITED STATES v. BOLDEN 19 activity generated proceeds prior to the money laundering, and whether the money laundering actually involved those criminallyderived proceeds. We begin our analysis by noting that certain criminal activities can produce proceeds long before their completion. A mail fraud scheme, such as the Medicaid fraud scheme of the Boldens, is the prototype of an activity that can generate proceeds before the mailings take place. See United States v. Mankarious, 151 F.3d 694, 705 (7th Cir. 1998) (A mail fraud scheme . . . can create proceeds long before the mailing ever takes place.). Indeed, as the Tenth Circuit recognized in United States v. Massey, 48 F.3d 1560, 1566 (10th Cir. 1995), a ‘scheme to defraud’ has a wider meaning than an individual act of fraud. A mail or wire fraud scheme often encompasses a range of activities that occur prior to, and culminate in, mail and wire submissions. Accordingly, in order to sustain the Boldens’ money laundering convictions, there must simply have been sufficient evidence for the jury to have inferred that the [proceeds] came from a fraudulent scheme and that the use of the mails furthered that scheme. Mankarious, 151 F.3d at 703. The Boldens’ scheme to defraud Medicaid cast a wide net, and it was not limited to the submission of the Cost Reports. The scheme included, inter alia, the False Patient Billing; the Lease Transactions; the creation and use of a sham company, Industrial; the submission of the Industrial invoices to Emerald Health; the receipt of the prospective payments; and the inclusion of the Related Party Transactions as direct costs on the 1993 and 1994 Cost Reports. The Cost Reports were simply used to justify the prospective payments that Emerald Health had already received. Accordingly, the mail and wire submissions were merely the culminating acts in a scheme that had begun long before. And although their fraud scheme may not have been consummated until the submission of the Cost Reports, the Boldens had completed a substantial part of the scheme prior to the Industrial Check Transactions. For our purposes, the relevant fact is that the fraud scheme produced proceeds through the prospective payments prior to the financial transactions — the Industrial Check Transactions — on which the money laundering convictions were based. The 1993 and 1994 Cost 20 UNITED STATES v. BOLDEN Reports merely justified Emerald Health’s receipt of those prospective payments. See United States v. Allen, 76 F.3d 1348, 1361 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding that fraud scheme produces proceeds at the latest when the scheme succeeds in disgorging the funds from the victim and placing them into the control of the perpetrators); United States v. Morelli, 169 F.3d 798, 800 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding for purposes of money laundering statute that the money became the proceeds of fraud as soon as it entered the hands of members of the scheme). The prospective payments constituted the proceeds used by the Boldens in the Industrial Check Transactions. Accordingly, the contention that the money laundering offenses were not conducted with the proceeds of the fraud scheme must fail.
Similarly unavailing is the contention that the Industrial Check Transactions failed to constitute either promotion money laundering or concealment money laundering. According to the Boldens, the Industrial Check Transactions were only used to carry on the legitimate business of Carolina Supply, and they thus did not qualify as promotion or concealment money laundering. Indeed, several courts have vacated money laundering convictions where the financial transactions were utilized for legitimate purposes. See e.g., United States v. Olaniyi-Oke, 199 F.3d 767, 770 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding there was no evidence that computers purchased in financial transaction charged as money laundering were to be used for anything other than fully legal personal use); United States v. Calderon, 169 F.3d 718, 721-22 (11th Cir. 1999) (determining there was no evidence that Appellant’s conduct furthered the alleged underlying narcotics trafficking). For the reasons explained below, we reject this contention.
Under the evidence, the Industrial Check Transactions were designed to avoid disclosing the Related Party Transactions to Medicaid, allowing the Boldens to evade Medicaid’s regulatory requirements and charge Medicaid inflated costs. Further, Emerald Health’s payments to Industrial compensated Nelson for his part in the scheme, encouraging his continued participation therein. Finally, Carolina Supply used the money it received from Industrial to purchase and UNITED STATES v. BOLDEN 21 deliver part of the supplies Industrial billed to Emerald Health. These partial deliveries provided an aura of legitimacy to Emerald Health’s payments to Industrial, allowing the Boldens to further conceal their scheme. Thus, the circumstances underlying the Industrial Check Transactions are sufficient to justify the finding that the Boldens committed promotion money laundering. In other decisions, we have ruled similarly. For example, in United States v. Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 1998), we found the evidence sufficient to sustain convictions for promotion money laundering. There, the defendants had obtained loans from an insurance company by misrepresenting that the funds would be used to finance accounts receivable for physicians. The funds were instead employed to promote risky non-medical businesses. In their scheme, the defendants created a sham business for the purpose of handling the loans. The insurance company wired loan proceeds to the sham business, which transferred those proceeds to the non-medical businesses. We found the transactions to constitute promotion money laundering, in contravention of § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), because, as Judge Hamilton explained, the transfer of money from [the sham business] to the non-medical businesses was integral to the success of the overall scheme. Id. at 221. In this case, Industrial was a sham business, used solely to deceive Medicaid on the Related Party Transactions, and it was thus integral to the success of the scheme.
The evidence also established that the Industrial Check Transactions constituted concealment money laundering, pursuant to § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). On this point, the Boldens maintain that, while the Industrial Check Transactions were designed to avoid the requirements of the Medicaid regulations, they were not designed to conceal the fact that Emerald Health had obtained prospective payments from Medicaid. On this basis, they assert that their convictions for concealment money laundering are invalid. Viewed in the proper light, however, the Industrial Check Transactions concealed the fact that the payments Medicaid made to Emerald Health were being used in the Related Party Transactions. As related above, supra Part II.B.2, the Boldens and Nelson created Industrial to 22 UNITED STATES v. BOLDEN hide the fact that Emerald Health was ordering supplies from Carolina Supply, a related party. The Industrial Check Transactions concealed this arrangement and enabled Medicaid to be billed at inflated prices for the supplies ordered from Carolina Supply. Those transactions also concealed the fact that the money flowing into Carolina Supply, and ultimately to the Boldens, was derived from Medicaid funds. The creation and use of sham businesses is highly relevant to the proof of concealment money laundering. The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 1374, 1385 (5th Cir. 1995), observed that the use of a third party, for example, a business entity or a relative, to purchase goods on one’s behalf or from which one will benefit usually constitutes sufficient proof of a design to conceal. And in United States v. Ladum, 141 F.3d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit, in an analogous situation, concluded that a defendant who concealed his ownership in a business from a bankruptcy trustee, through the use of nominees who held themselves out as owners of the stores, had committed concealment money laundering. The court reasoned that the use of nominees prevented the bankruptcy trustee from knowing that [the defendant] was the legitimate owner of the stores. Id. at 1340. Likewise, the Boldens’ use of Industrial concealed the fact that Emerald Health was billing Medicaid (at inflated prices) for the Related Party Transactions. In sum, the evidence sufficiently proves the allegations of concealment money laundering.
The Boldens also challenge, on three separate bases, their convictions for money laundering conspiracy, as charged in Count ThirtySeven of the indictment. They contend, first, that Count Thirty-Seven was fatally defective; second, that the jury instructions on money laundering conspiracy amended the indictment; and third, that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions of money laundering conspiracy.
In analyzing the sufficiency of Count Thirty-Seven, we look first to the requirements of an indictment. A valid indictment must: (1) allege the essential facts constituting the offense; (2) allege each eleUNITED STATES v. BOLDEN 23 ment of the offense, so that fair notice is provided; and (3) be sufficiently distinctive that a verdict will bar a second prosecution for the same offense. United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259, 1263 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1) (The indictment . . . shall be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.). As a basic proposition, an indictment is sufficient ‘if it alleges an offense in the words of the statute.’ United States v. Brandon, 298 F.3d 307, 310 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Wicks, 187 F.3d 426, 427 (4th Cir. 1999)). The Boldens contend that Count Thirty-Seven, which alleged a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h),21 was defective in three respects: (1) it failed to allege any overt acts; (2) it failed to identify the specified unlawful activity that produced the proceeds they conspired to launder; and (3) it failed to specify the offense defined in § 1956(a)(1) or § 1957 that the Boldens conspired to commit.22 We examine each of these three contentions in turn. 21 Section 1956(h), the money laundering conspiracy statute, provides that [a]ny person who conspires to commit any offense defined in this section or section 1957 shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). 22 Count Thirty-Seven of the indictment alleged the money laundering conspiracy as follows: The Grand Jury incorporates and realleges by reference all allegations set forth in the foregoing Introductory Paragraphs above and all overt acts alleged in Count One. From in or about January, 1989 through in or about December, 1995, within the Western District of North Carolina, and elsewhere, GLENNIS L. BOLDEN and CLIFFORD E. BOLDEN did knowingly, willfully, and unlawful [sic] . . . conspire . . . with one another, to commit money laundering offenses . . . in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1956(a)(1) and 1957. All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(h). 24 UNITED STATES v. BOLDEN
The first of these specifications, that Count Thirty-Seven is defective for failing to allege overt acts, is baseless. The Boldens were charged with and convicted of money laundering conspiracy, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and § 1956(h) does not require an overt act to be either alleged or proven. As we observed in United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 669 (4th Cir. 2001), a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), as opposed to a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, does not explicitly require proof of an overt act. In addressing a similar challenge to the drug conspiracy statute, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 15 (1994), held that an overt act is not an element of 21 U.S.C. § 846. As the Court observed, Congress explicitly required the commission of an overt act as an element of the conspiracy defined in 18 U.S.C. § 371, and the Court concluded that Congress must be presumed to have acted deliberately in failing to include similar language in § 846. Id. at 14. The drug and money laundering conspiracy statutes — § 846 and § 1956(h) — are drawn in similar terms, and neither requires an overt act. See United States v. Tam, 240 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2001) (The language of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) is nearly identical to the language of 21 U.S.C. § 846, which the Supreme Court held . . . does not require proof of an overt act.); see also United States v. Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 164 (5th Cir. 1998) (Section 846 has language virtually identical to the language of § 1956(h).). Thus, because an overt act is not an element of a § 1956(h) offense, there was no need for the grand jury to make such an allegation in Count Thirty-Seven.
The Boldens next assert that Count Thirty-Seven failed to identify the specified unlawful activity that produced the proceeds they conspired to launder. We have observed that [t]he core of money laundering . . . is the laundering transaction itself, and that details about the nature of the unlawful activity underlying the character of the proceeds need not be alleged. Smith, 44 F.3d at 1265. In any event, Count Thirty-Seven spelled out the unlawful activity that produced the proceeds the Boldens conspired to launder. Count Thirty-Seven incorporated and realleged the overt acts alleged in Count One, which charged the Boldens with violating the UNITED STATES v. BOLDEN 25 general conspiracy statute (18 U.S.C. § 371). Those overt acts included allegations that the Boldens established Industrial to avoid the federal rules governing related party transactions, that Industrial’s invoices were included on the Cost Reports, and that, as a result, Carolina Supply and [Industrial] generated profits from Medicaid reimbursement to the facility. Count One also alleged that Ms. Bolden caused the submission of electronic billings to the Medicaid program which resulted in the interstate wiring of claims and payments between Raleigh, North Carolina and Dallas, Texas. In this context, the Boldens had ample notice of the details of the specified unlawful activity (mail and wire fraud) that generated the proceeds they conspired to launder, and any contention to the contrary must be rejected.
Finally, the Boldens contend that Count Thirty-Seven is fatally flawed because it failed to specify a specific statutory object of the conspiracy, that is, which one of five offenses — the four defined in § 1956(a)(1) or § 1957’s single offense — they conspired to commit.23 Count Thirty-Seven was not required to allege the specific type of money laundering the Boldens conspired to commit; it was simply alleging a multiple-object conspiracy. Courts have uniformly upheld multiple-object conspiracies, and they have consistently concluded that a guilty verdict must be sustained if the evidence shows that the conspiracy furthered any one of the objects alleged. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991); United States v. Hudgins, 120 F.3d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 1997). For example, the Third Circuit upheld a conviction where the indictment alleged a conspiracy with three statutory objects — including violations of § 1956(a)(1) and § 1956(a)(2). See United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1201-02 (3d Cir. 1994). The court observed that the convictions could be sustained if the defendants knowingly and intentionally committed acts furthering any of 23 The five statutory objects referred to in Count Thirty-Seven include the four types of money laundering offenses contained in § 1956(a)(1), see supra Part III.B.1, plus the money laundering offense contained in § 1957. Under § 1957, it is unlawful to engage in a monetary transaction of more than $10,000 with property derived from a specified unlawful activity. 26 UNITED STATES v. BOLDEN the three objects of the conspiracy. Id. at 1202. Pursuant to the foregoing, this contention must also be rejected.
The Boldens next contend that the trial court constructively amended Count Thirty-Seven by impermissibly broadening the identity of the members of the conspiracy. That charge alleged that the Boldens did knowingly [conspire] with one another, to commit money laundering offenses. As such, it omitted an allegation commonly made in such charges, that the defendants conspired with others known and unknown to the Grand Jury.24 The Boldens contend that, because such an allegation was not made in Count Thirty-Seven, the jury was obliged to find that the Boldens had conspired with each other, and the court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury on this point.25 A defendant may only be tried on charges alleged in an indictment, and only the grand jury may broaden or alter the charges in the indictment. United States v. Randall, 171 F.3d 195, 203 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation and citation omitted). An indictment is constructively amended when the essential elements of the offense . . . 24 At oral argument, the Assistant United States Attorney acknowledged that the failure to allege others known and unknown in the indictment was a drafting error. 25 The instruction which the Boldens challenge stated in pertinent part: In order for you to find either Defendant — either of the Defendants or both guilty of the charge [of money laundering conspiracy], the Government must prove each of the following essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt as to the Defendant under consideration: one, two or more persons in some way or manner, positively or tacitly, came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan. (emphasis added). In contrast, the Boldens’ proposed instruction provided that, in order to convict, the jury had to find that defendants Glennis Bolden and [Clifford] Bolden made an agreement to commit money laundering offenses. Although the available record does not show whether the Boldens objected to the instruction given, we assume that a proper objection was made and that this contention has not been waived. UNITED STATES v. BOLDEN 27 are altered to broaden the possible bases for conviction beyond what is contained in the indictment. United States v. Keller, 916 F.2d 628, 634 (11th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706, 710 (4th Cir. 1994) (A constructive amendment to an indictment occurs when either the government, [the court], or both, broadens the possible bases for conviction beyond those presented by the grand jury.). Where an indictment has been constructively amended, we have found reversible error, and we conclusively presume that the defendant has been prejudiced by the constructive amendment. Floresca, 38 F.3d at 711. In support of their constructive amendment claim, the Boldens rely almost exclusively on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Keller, 916 F.2d 628, where two defendants were indicted for conspiracy, and the indictment failed to allege that there were unnamed coconspirators. An initial instruction permitted the jury to convict Keller if the jury found he had conspired with anyone, while the indictment, like our Count Thirty-Seven, alleged that he had conspired only with his codefendant. The court gave a supplemental instruction, using a hypothetical conspiracy example, emphasizing that Keller could be convicted if the jury found he entered into an unlawful agreement with anyone. The jury then convicted Keller and acquitted his codefendant. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that, where an indictment alleges that only two individuals conspired, . . . an essential element of the offense is the identity of the individuals who agreed. Id. at 634. The court observed that, [w]hile the initial instruction standing alone may not have been enough to constitute an amendment, the trial court exacerbated the problem with its supplemental instructions in response to the jury’s question. Id. at 636. Contrary to the Boldens’ contention, the instruction did not fatally amend Count Thirty-Seven. Even if a coconspirator’s identity is an essential element of the conspiracy charge (but see United States v. Am. Waste Fibers Co., Inc., 809 F.2d 1044, 1046 (4th Cir. 1987)), the jury, by convicting the Boldens of the money laundering conspiracy alleged, necessarily found that they had conspired with each other, as Count Thirty-Seven alleged, and as the instruction permitted.26 26 Even if the jury found that there were additional coconspirators, such as Nelson and Lane, it also found, as the instruction permitted, that the Boldens conspired with each other. 28 UNITED STATES v. BOLDEN
Finally, the Boldens contend that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for money laundering conspiracy. On this issue, they first assert that the Industrial Check Transactions cannot be part of a money laundering conspiracy because they did not involve the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity. Independently, the Boldens contend that, even if the Industrial Check Transactions involved those proceeds, the transactions were not for the purpose of promoting or concealing the specified unlawful activity. As explained in Part III.B, supra, these contentions are without merit. The Boldens also maintain that the overt acts in Count One, incorporated and realleged in Count Thirty-Seven, do not involve money laundering conduct and that the evidence was therefore insufficient to convict. On the contrary, as we explained in Part III.C.1.a, supra, an indictment for money laundering conspiracy need not allege an overt act. In these circumstances, this contention must also be rejected.
Ms. Bolden challenges eighteen of her twenty convictions for violating the false claims statute (Counts Three through Eleven, Thirteen through Nineteen, Twenty-One, and Twenty-Four).27 She contends that the evidence was insufficient on the essential element of her knowledge that the claims submitted to Medicaid were false. Her convictions resulted from eighteen separate Medicaid Bills, between December 1993 and April 1995, for Emerald Health’s supposed care of patients who had died, had been hospitalized, or had been discharged. The false claims statute, codified at § 287 of Title 18, criminalizes the submission of a false claim to the United States, or any department or agency thereof, if the defendant knows that such claim is 27 Ms. Bolden was convicted on 20 counts of filing false claims. Two of those counts related to her submission of false Cost Reports to Medicaid, while the other 18 counts were connected to her submission of Medicaid Bills for patient services not rendered. Ms. Bolden only appeals her convictions on the latter 18 counts. When we refer to her false claims convictions, we are referring to those on appeal. UNITED STATES v. BOLDEN 29 28 false, fictitious, or fraudulent. Thus, we must uphold such a conviction if the evidence shows the submission of a false claim and if the defendant acted with knowledge that the claim was false . . . and with a consciousness that he was either doing something which was wrong, or which violated the law. United States v. Maher, 582 F.2d 842, 847 (4th Cir. 1978) (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Blecker, 657 F.2d 629, 634 (4th Cir. 1981) (upholding false claim conviction even though there was evidence that the government got its money’s worth). Although the jury was required to find, in order to convict Ms. Bolden, that she had knowingly submitted the eighteen false claims to Medicaid, it was entitled to do so on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Indeed, [t]he question of one’s intent is not measured by a psychic reading of [the defendant’s] mind but by the surrounding facts and circumstances; i.e., circumstantial evidence. United States v. Larson, 581 F.2d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 1978). On the evidence presented, the jury could conclude that Ms. Bolden knowingly submitted the eighteen false claims to Medicaid. She controlled Emerald Health’s Medicaid Bills, and Emerald Health was strapped for funds. Ms. Bolden was aware that Emerald Health’s patient census was incorrect, and she nonetheless instructed Emerald Health’s employees to submit the Medicaid Bills.29 According to Ms. Cox, the accounts 28 The false claims statute, 18 U.S.C. § 287, provides in pertinent part that: Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States, or to any department or agency thereof, any claim upon or against the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be imprisoned not more than five years and shall be subject to a fine in the amount provided in this title. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (emphasis added). Importantly, the submission of a false claim to a state agency to obtain federal funds that were provided to the state falls within the parameters of § 287. See United States v. Littlefield, 840 F.2d 143, 151 (1st Cir. 1988) (submission of false claims to state agency violated § 287 because federal monies were used to fund state program). 29 In order to bill Medicaid, Emerald Health maintained a daily patient census, which identified patients residing in the nursing facility and specified the levels of care they were receiving. 30 UNITED STATES v. BOLDEN receivable clerk, many times [Emerald Health] would get behind on the census and most of the time [they] would go ahead and . . . submit a bill to Medicaid. Ms. Cox informed Ms. Bolden that Emerald Health’s patient census was inaccurate, yet Ms. Bolden instructed her to go ahead and bill Medicaid because it was necessary to get money into the facility, and Emerald Health could, in any event, send in a recoupment if [it] billed something in error. Even if Ms. Bolden had contemplated correcting these Medicaid Bills, such an effort would not have been a valid defense to the charges. Under § 287, the Government was obliged to establish only her knowing submission of the false claims. The jury was entitled to conclude, on the evidence of Ms. Cox and the related circumstances, that Ms. Bolden knowingly submitted false claims to Medicaid. See United States v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953, 962 (5th Cir. 1983) (Where sufficiency is at issue, a finding that an accused acted recklessly may be enough to sustain a jury verdict, because a jury may properly infer the requisite intent. (emphasis in original)); United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 242 (1st Cir. 1982) (concluding that evidence of defendant’s pervasive involvement in operations of corporation involved in transactions in question was sufficient for a reasonable juror to infer that [defendant] knew of . . . the conspiracy). Ms. Bolden also contends that her submission of false claims to Medicaid were simply mistakes, due to poor bookkeeping and accounting practices. She presented this explanation to the jury as a defense, however, and it was rejected. Viewed in the proper light, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Ms. Bolden on each of the false claim charges.