Opinion ID: 2976633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing Objections

Text: On appeal, Wise objects to the Sentencing Guidelines calculation that the district court employed to impose his sentence. We review a district court’s findings of fact for purposes of its Sentencing Guidelines calculation for clear error, and interpretations of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. See United States v. Galloway, 439 F.3d 320, 322 (6th Cir. 2006).
Wise first objects to a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4 for using a minor to facilitate a crime. This enhancement was applied to two counts of conviction, including (1) count - 13 - three - travel in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in sexually explicit conduct with a minor and (2) count four - transporting of a minor with the intent that the minor engage in sexual activity. In short, Wise argues that the enhancement was improper here because he did not actively involve his children in committing or covering up the offenses in counts three and four, rather he simply blamed his children for the offenses. His argument fails. While Wise is correct that the enhancement should only apply when a defendant takes affirmative acts to involve a minor, he is wrong to suggest that his acts were not sufficient. See United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 846-49 (6th Cir. 2000). Here, the government presented evidence that Wise actively involved his minor children in attempting to avoid detection of and apprehension for the offenses in counts three and four and the district court properly relied on that evidence in applying the enhancement. First, when the victim was missing, the FBI interviewed Wise’s 9-year-old daughter about the victim’s whereabouts. His daughter proceeded to tell the FBI agents an elaborate story about meeting the victim in an internet chatroom, using her father’s screen name, and sending pictures of her father and cellular telephones to the victim. Indeed, that Wise’s young daughter told the FBI agents a story that so closely paralleled the untruthful story Wise himself provided to authorities is strong evidence that he used her to avoid detection of or apprehension for the offenses. The same can be said with respect to the use of Wise’s 12-year-old son. Wise’s son accompanied him on more than one occasion when Wise engaged in sexual activity with the victim. Because his son was close in age to the victim, he may have used him as a means to avoid detection by suggesting (if needed) that he was bringing his son to meet the victim, and his - 14 - son’s presence might have been a way to make the victim feel less threatened. Moreover, while the victim was missing, the FBI also interviewed Wise’s son and his story mirrored that of his sister’s and father’s untruthful story. Contrary to Wise’s suggestion, that his children might not have had knowledge of what he was doing is of no consequence to whether the enhancement should be imposed. See United States v. Jenkins, 229 F. App’x 362, 369 (6th Cir. 2005) (“USSG § 3B1.4 . . . does not impose a knowledge requirement on the minor who is used in the commission of the offense.”) (internal quotation and citations omitted). Accordingly, the district court did not err with respect to this enhancement.
Next, Wise objects to a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) for unduly influencing a minor. This enhancement was applied to two counts of conviction, including (1) count three - travel in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in sexually explicit conduct with a minor and (2) count four - transporting of a minor with the intent that the minor engage in sexual activity. Wise argues that the enhancement does not apply because “the alleged sexual contact was not forceable.” See Appellant’s Br. 29. His argument fails. The plain language of the enhancement does not require forceable contact. Moreover, a minor cannot legally consent to sexual intercourse. See Wilcox, 150 F. App’x at 461. The enhancement requires that “the court should closely consider the facts of the case to determine whether a participant’s influence over the minor compromised the voluntariness of the minor’s behavior.” U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B), cmt. 3(B). Wise misconstrues this note’s reference to - 15 - voluntariness of the minor’s behavior when he argues that forced contact is required. That is flatly not the intent of the enhancement or the application notes. Here, Wise was approximately 23 years older than the victim at the time of their illegal interactions and therefore a rebuttable presumption existed that he unduly influenced the victim. See U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B), cmt. 3(B). Wise fails to cite any evidence to rebut the presumption. Moreover, there was ample evidence to support undue influence apart from the presumption. Wise gave the victim expensive gifts, including cellular telephones, an iPod, a promise ring, and money to entice her. He paid for the victim’s stay in hotels, as well as provided her clothes and meals to facilitate their sexual encounters. He also drove to her house to pick her up on more than one occasion, including driving her to both a nearby and out of state hotel to engage in sexual contact with her. The victim testified that Wise requested she send him sexually explicit pictures of herself and that he told her that engaging in anal sex was not “real sex” such that she would not get pregnant or contract any sexually transmitted diseases. J.A. 199. He also emphasized to the victim that he was a former police officer. Moreover, the vast majority of these inducements, if not all, occurred after Wise knew the victim was 14-years-old. Defense counsel’s suggestion at oral argument to the contrary is not well taken. Wise also argues that application of the enhancement amounts to impermissible doublecounting. This argument similarly fails. “[W]e adhere in this case to our well-established rule that impermissible ‘double counting’ occurs when precisely the same aspect of a defendant’s conduct factors into his sentence in two separate ways.” United States v. Farrow, 198 F.3d 179, 193 (6th Cir. 1999). Wise’s conduct of unduly influencing the victim is not an element of the offenses in counts - 16 - three or four to which it was applied. Nor is it factored into his sentence in those offenses in two separate ways. Indeed, one can be found guilty of both offenses without a showing of undue influence. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the district court erred in applying this enhancement.
Wise next objects to a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(1)(B) based on the victim’s age. This enhancement was applied to count five - possessing one or more matters containing a visual depiction, involving the use of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. He argues that because the offense necessarily involves the use of a minor such an enhancement is double-counting. While Wise is correct that the offense in count five requires a minor (which is defined as any person under 18-years-old), the enhancement only applies if the minor is at least 12-years-old but under 16-years-old. See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(1)(B). Therefore, the victim’s specific age is not factored into the sentence in two separate ways and therefore it is not impermissible double-counting to apply the enhancement here. Cf. United States v. First, 226 F. App’x 576, 579-80 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that a four-level enhancement for the victim having not attained age 12 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(2)(A) did not constitute impermissible double-counting because the “base offense level applies to a range of crimes where the victim is not necessarily under the age of 12”). Accordingly, the district court did not err in applying this enhancement.
Wise also objects to the application of a two-level enhancement pursuant U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) for the commission of a sex act or sexual contact because he argues it amounts to - 17 - impermissible double-counting. This enhancement was applied to two counts of conviction, including (1) count three - traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in sexually explicit conduct with a minor and (2) count four - transporting of a minor with the intent that the minor engage in sexual activity. The offenses in counts three and four are complete once the defendant travels across state lines or transports the victim across state lines with the requisite purpose or intent, while the enhancement applies when the defendant not only intends but does engage in sexual conduct with the minor. To be found guilty of the offenses in counts three or four, it is not a necessary element that sexual contact with the minor actually occur. Therefore, the fact that Wise did engage in sexual conduct with the victim here is not factored into his sentence in two separate ways. Accordingly, the district court did not err in applying this enhancement.
Wise next objects to a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)(i) for the use of a computer. This enhancement was applied to count five - possessing one or more matters containing a visual depiction, involving the use of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Wise argues that it amounts to impermissible double-counting because the use of a computer is required as part of both the substantive offense in count five and the enhancement. To the contrary, the offense at issue in count five does not require the presence of a computer, rather a media storage device of any kind. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). In addition, the district court appropriately explained that Wise not only stored images on his computer as the offense conduct addresses but he also used his computer to “persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of, a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct, or to otherwise solicit participation by - 18 - a minor in such conduct” as addressed in the enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)(i); J.A. 23738. Therefore, Wise’s use of a computer in such a capacity is not factored into his sentence in two separate ways and is not impermissible double-counting. Accordingly, the district court did not err in applying this enhancement.
Wise also argues that the application of a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 was impermissible double-counting inasmuch as he separately was convicted of making false statements to an agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. This enhancement was not applied to count six that involved making false statements, rather it was applied to the other three counts of conviction. We have rejected a double-counting argument in a factually similar case. See United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 542 (6th Cir. 2008). We explained that “[w]hile Defendant correctly notes that impermissible double counting occurs where a defendant’s conduct factors into her sentence in two separate ways, the rule applies with respect [to] our evaluation of a single count.” Id. Moreover, the district court here appropriately explained that: It is clear from the testimony at trial and the presentence report that the defendant’s obstruction went beyond just making false statements to the authorities. For example, Mr. Wise repeatedly lied to the victim’s mother when she contacted him, he hid the victim in a motel room and enlisted others to assist him, had his children lie to the authorities for him, and committed perjury on the stand when he lied about his relationship with the victim. J.A. 236. Accordingly, the district court did not engage in impermissible double-counting when it applied this enhancement.
- 19 - To the extent Wise’s argument can be construed as a reasonableness one, that argument similarly fails. “We review the reasonableness of a sentence using the abuse-of-discretion standard of review.” United States v. Phinazee, 515 F.3d 511, 514 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Gall v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007)). “[T]he fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Id. (citation omitted). Indeed, “our reasonableness review is two-fold, requiring that a sentence be both procedurally and substantively reasonable.” Id. (citation omitted). We have explained that: A sentence may be procedurally unreasonable if the district court “did not appreciate the non-mandatory nature of the guidelines, did not correctly calculate the sentencing range under the guidelines, or did not consider the § 3553(a) factors.” (citations omitted). Id. With respect to procedural unreasonableness, Wise does not allege that the district court failed to appreciate the non-mandatory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines and such an argument would fail in any event because the district court chose a sentence outside the Sentencing Guideline range. Wise also does not allege that the district court did not consider the § 3553(a) factors. Rather, his procedural attacks on the sentence relate to whether the district court correctly calculated the Sentencing Guidelines range and, as discussed supra, we reject all of those challenges. In the end, Wise’s remaining objection to his sentence amounts to an argument that it was substantively unreasonable because the upward departure was unwarranted. Here, Wise’s total offense level was a 38, and with a criminal history category of I, his total Sentencing Guidelines range was 235 to 293 months’ imprisonment. The district court departed upward and sentenced Wise to 360 months’ imprisonment. - 20 - “[A] sentence may be substantively unreasonable when the district court selects the sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” Id. (citing United States v. Borho, 485 F.3d 904, 908 (6th Cir. 2007)) (alterations in original) (citation and quotation marks omitted). To the contrary, here, there was plenty of evidence to support the district court’s upward departure.3 J.A. 261-65. The district court specifically noted several factors that influenced its decision, including that: (1) the victim suffered physical injury when she contracted herpes simplex virus II, a sexually transmitted disease that is incurable; (2) the victim suffered serious psychological injury, as evidenced by inpatient and ongoing mental health treatment and a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder; and (3) Wise’s actions were egregious, including that he kept the victim in a hotel room for four days repeatedly subjecting her to various sexual contacts, while taking overt steps to keep her location a secret. The district court explained that: 3 We previously have explained the difference between a departure and a variance. A district court may impose a sentence outside of the applicable Guidelines range through a Guidelines or non-Guidelines departure. “Our court has previously explained that departures based on Chapter 5 of the Guidelines should be referred to as ‘Guideline departures,’ and that ‘sentences lower than the Guidelines recommendation based on section 3553(a) factors’ can be referred to as ‘Non-Guideline departures.’ ” United States v. Jones, 445 F.3d 865, 872 n. 1 (6th Cir.2006) (Moore, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 477 n. 5 (6th Cir.2006)). We often refer to Non-Guideline departures as “variances.” See id.; United States v. Matheny, 450 F.3d 633, 640 n. 4 (6th Cir.2006). United States v. Cousins, 469 F.3d 572, 577 (6th Cir. 2006). While it would be helpful on appellate review if the district court would articulate whether it was departing or varying, it is of no consequence in this case because we review both actions for reasonableness. See J.A. 263 (“So the Court will depart upward or vary upward, depending on how you want to look at it.”). In any event, here, it would not alter our conclusion whether we characterize the district court’s actions as an upward departure or a variance because the sentence is not unreasonable. - 21 - So considering all of these facts, considering the fact that the behavior is so reprehensible that the Sentencing Commission, in my opinion, would never have considered the total factual situation that is involved in this case, an upward departure is appropriate. J.A. 263. All of these factors touched upon the provisions also listed in the presentence report (“PSR”) as support for an upward departure, including: (1) in the case of child crimes and sexual offenses there exists an aggravating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(a)(1)(B); (2) when the victim suffered significant physical or extreme psychological injury, as described by U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.2, 5K2.3; and (3) when defendant’s conduct is extreme, as provided by U.S.S.G. §5K2.8. The district court also explained its prudent weighing of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors: I have considered the advisory guidelines. I have considered the sentencing factors set out in 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a). I have considered the presentence report. I have considered, Mr. Stephens, your filings. And, I’m looking to impose a sentence which is sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes set out in 3553(a). And I look at, number one, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the characteristics of the defendant. I have nothing to say about the characteristics of the defendant prior to what happened here. When I look at the nature and circumstances of the offense, I find it to be reprehensible, I find the conduct of the defendant to be reprehensible. This is one of the most serious offenses I’ve seen since I’ve been on the bench. I think a long sentence is necessary to promote respect for the law, it is necessary to promote justice, and it is necessary to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. J.A. 264. To the extent Wise also argues the district court improperly considered evidence that the victim contracted a sexually transmitted disease from Wise because that evidence was not subjected to cross-examination or to a jury finding, that argument similarly fails. We have explained that “[s]ince Booker, we have reaffirmed the doctrine that district judges in determining defendants’ - 22 - sentences may consider facts that they find under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.” United States v. Klups, 514 F.3d 532, 537-38 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that “judge could have found the existence of ongoing abuse by a preponderance of the evidence and, accordingly, could have validly taken this conduct into account as a justification for the variance”); see also Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465-66 (2007) (“[E]ven if it increases the likelihood that the judge, not the jury, will find “sentencing facts,” [it] does not violate the Sixth Amendment. This Court’s Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence.”). Here, the district court appropriately found that the victim contracted a sexually transmitted disease from Wise by a preponderance of the evidence. In short, “[w]hile defendant [Wise’s] sentence was lengthy, he has not established that the sentence was unreasonable.” United States v. Ward, 506 F.3d 468, 478 (6th Cir. 2007).