Opinion ID: 2533183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Unavailable mitigation expert

Text: ¶ 55. Pitchford's second argument is that, even though no continuance was requested, the trial court committed plain error by failing to continue the beginning of the penalty phase. Prior to the start of the penalty phase of the trial, Pitchford retained the services of a mental-health expert, Dr. Rahn Bailey. However, Dr. Bailey, who was under subpoena for a trial in Texas, was not available to testify at the start of the penalty phase on February 8, 2006. Counsel for Pitchford contacted the trial judge and advised him of the scheduling conflict. The trial judge called the court in Texas and confirmed that Dr. Bailey was under subpoena there. The following morning, Pitchford's counsel advised the court that Dr. Bailey was available but that he would not be called to testify. ¶ 56. Pitchford now argues that although there was no express request for a continuance made ... the trial court was made fully aware that the Defendant desired to present the testimony of Dr. Rahn Bailey, and the failure of the trial court to continue the trial amounted to plain error because of the prejudice that Pitchford's defense suffered from the lack Dr. Bailey's testimony. ¶ 57. This argument is frivolous and without merit. The trial court cannot be held to err on an issue not presented to it for decision. [33] Counsel not only failed to ask for a continuance, he advised the trial court that the witness was available, but would not be called to testify. A trial court has no duty to sua sponte second-guess decisions by defense counsel. This issue has no merit.
¶ 58. Pitchford next claims the prosecutor engaged in misconduct that deprived him of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 3, Sections 14, 26, and 28 of the Mississippi Constitution. This Court has stated that, Where prosecutorial misconduct endangers the fairness of a trial and the impartial administration of justice, reversal must follow. [34] ¶ 59. Pitchford argues the prosecutor intentionally violated the Rules of Evidence in order to present misleading or inflammatory evidence to the jury, and made improper appeals to the jury at both the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial. Pitchford also claims the prosecutor used near-leading or misleading questions on its own witnesses, coached witnesses, interjected information into the responses from witnesses, and rested its arguments on facts not in evidence or inferences too attenuated from the facts which were in evidence. ¶ 60. The State argues that Pitchford did not object to these alleged improprieties at trial or in his motion for a new trial. Thus, the State argues, the claims are procedurally barred on direct appeal. While Pitchford admits no contemporaneous objections were made, he points out that his motion for a new trial included the following assignment of error: The Court allowed the district attorney to improperly argue during the penalty phase closing that their job was to go back there and vote for the death over defendant's objection. ¶ 61. Even had he not included this item in his motion for a new trial, Pitchford clearly objected to the prosecutor's in the box comments at trial. Pitchford also objected at trial to the prosecutor's comments that Walter Davis and his son may have been killed if they had arrived at the store any earlier; the prosecutor's questioning of Dominique Hogan as to the nature of her relationship with Pitchford; and the prosecutor's questioning of Pitchford's sister about the problems he got in at school and the time frame of his father's illness. So Pitchford properly preserved these allegations of misconduct for appeal. ¶ 62. Pitchford argues the prosecutor misrepresented the facts in closing argument by suggesting that Bullins voluntarily turned himself in and confessed, and that Pitchford was the man who fired the shots which killed the decedent. Specifically, the prosecutor stated to the jury: [Bullins] went to the sheriff's department the same morning of the murder and he admitted it. According to the record, however, Investigator Conley testified only that he talked to Bullins. While arguably inconsistent with the facts, the prosecutor's statement did not rise to the level necessary to [endanger] the fairness of [the] trial and the impartial administration of justice, as required by Goodin. [35] Thus, this assignment of error has no merit. ¶ 63. Pitchford also complains that the prosecutor improperly stated during closing arguments that [Pitchford and Bullins] both shot [Britt]. It doesn't matter which one shot with which gun. That hasn't got anything to do with this case. I think because it was his .22, he probably had it but that doesn't matter. All we have got to prove is that they went in that store together to rob it and they killed him. ¶ 64. Pitchford claims because the statementhe probably had the.22has no evidentiary basis in the record, this constitutes improper vouching for snitch witnesses. But the trial judge properly instructed the jury as to accomplice liability, and we find the prosecutor's statement was not outside his theory of accomplice liability. So this allegation of misconduct has no merit. ¶ 65. Pitchford next points out that the prosecutor stepped outside the bounds of evidence when he argued that the gun found in Pitchford's car was Britt's gun. But Marvin Fullwood testified that he had given Britt that exact gun approximately two years before the trial. Also, Investigator Conley testified that he had recovered the same gun from Pitchford's car, so the prosecutor's statement was not outside the bounds of evidence, and this allegation of misconduct has no merit. ¶ 66. Pitchford argues he is entitled to a reversal of his conviction because the prosecutor proclaimed to the jury during closing argument that Pitchford was a habitual liar. Pitchford argues the statement impermissibly spoke to his general character and was an indirect comment on his failure to testify, violating his Fifth-Amendment rights. In its brief, the State responds: During his closing argument, Pitchford... attacked the prosecution witnesses extensively as liars and [offered] testimony they could not be trusted or relied upon. The defense attack on the honesty of the prosecution witnesses invited the response tendered by the prosecution and was not error. The State's if Pitchford did it, we can do it argument has no merit. ¶ 67. First, regardless of whether either party opened the door, Pitchford's counsel had every right to attack and question the credibility of witnesses who had testified for the prosecution. Pitchford did not testify at trial, and had he not given statements to police on November 7 and 8, 2004, Pitchford's argument might indeed have merit. However, because his statements to police were before the jury, the prosecutor's attack on Pitchford's credibility was not inappropriate. ¶ 68. Pitchford argues the prosecutor should not have alluded to the possibility that Pitchford might have killed Walter Davis and his son, had they arrived on the scene right after the murder while Pitchford was still in the store. Pitchford characterizes this speculation as an attempt to incite prejudice and fear in the jury. ¶ 69. According to the record, the following exchange took place during closing argument: Mr. Evans: The Davis's walked in there at 7:27. We would of had two more dead people Mr. Carter: Your Honor, I object to that. Mr. Evans: if he had walked in there earlier. Mr. Carter: Your Honor, how canhe cannot say that. Mr. Evans: Your Honor, that is something that the jury can clearly see from the facts. The Court: He can make things that are reasonable inferences and has a right to comment on the evidence as he sees a reasonable inference to be. And it's up to the jury to determine the facts. So I'll overrule the objection. ¶ 70. This Court has held that the closing arguments may include inferences drawn from the evidence presented. [36] However, the fact that a particular inference may be drawn from the evidence does not per se suggest that the inferences properly may be presented to the jury. Rubenstein does not stand for the proposition that a prosecutor may present inappropriate inferences, even those that fairly may be drawn from the evidence. ¶ 71. While one fairly might infer from the evidence in this case that had they arrived earlierWalter Davis and his son might have been killed, that inference certainly is not admissible in the prosecution of Pitchford for the murder of Reuben Britt. After-the-fact speculation as to whether Pitchford might or might not have committed additional murders is no evidence whatsoever in the prosecution of this case. The trial judge should have sustained the objection to the prosecutor's inappropriate statement. However, in the context of this case, with the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented to the jury, we find this inappropriate statement, and the trial judge's incorrect ruling, to be harmless error. This Court will deem harmless an error where the same result would have been reached had [it] not existed. [37] ¶ 72. Pitchford complains that, during the penalty phase, the prosecutor asked Dominique Hogan, the mother of Pitchford's child: Isn't it a fact that y'all were doing a lot of fighting? Hogan answered in the negative. The prosecutor then asked, Were y'all going with other people at the time? Again, Hogan answered in the negative. Pitchford's counsel objected, stating the prosecution had no basis for asking such questions. The trial judge required the prosecutor to demonstrate a good-faith basis for asking the questions. The prosecutor produced Pitchford's psychological evaluation, which provided the good-faith basis for the question. Because the prosecutor demonstrated a good-faith basis for the questions, and further, because Pitchford shows no endangerment of the trial's fairness as required by Goodin, [38] this allegation of misconduct has no merit. ¶ 73. The prosecutor cross-examined Pitchford's sister and mother about Pitchford's behavior as a child and youth. Pitchford complains that, during the cross-examination they testified to prior bad acts. However, his sister testified on direct that she would receive phone calls from teachers when he got in trouble at school. Furthermore, his mother testified that, after his father's death, Pitchford started having problems at school. Both witnesses opened the door as to the nature of the problems Pitchford had at school, so this allegation of misconduct has no merit. ¶ 74. Pitchford claims that the prosecutorwhen questioning his sister about their father's deathmade inappropriate, inflammatory remarks, as follows: Q: Now, you said it was hard on him because his daddy only had about a month before he died. A: Yeah. Yes. Yes. Q: Okay. At least he did have a month, didn't he? A: Yes, he did. Q: That is better than somebody just being murdered and their family not  Mr. Carter: Your Honor, that is an absolutely improper question and he knows it. The Court: I'll overrule the objection.... Q: Him having about a month before his daddy died is a lot better than a family that doesn't have any time, that family member is just shot down and murdered, isn't it? A: I agree. ¶ 75. Pitchford cites numerous cases in support of his argument that these statements had an inflammatory effect. The crux of their holdings can be summed up as follows: There can be no graver proceeding than when a human being is put on trial for his or her life. The right to a fair trial includes the right to a verdict based on the evidence and not extraneous prejudicial happenings in and around the courtroom. [39] ¶ 76. The State responds to this issue minimally, arguing only that Pitchford's objection at trial was too general. We find the prosecutor's question was an improper attempt to incite the jurors' emotions and anger. It had no proper basis, and the objection to the question should have been sustained. However, we find the answer to the question was both obvious and already known to the jurors. Thus, we find the error was harmless. ¶ 77. Pitchford next claims the prosecutor instructed the jury to consider the heinous atrocious, and cruel aggravator during the sentencing phase without the proper limiting instruction or evidentiary support. Mississippi Code Section 99-19-101(5)(h) allows the heinous, atrocious, or cruel nature of the crime to be considered as an aggravating circumstance. [40] The complained-of language during the prosecution's closing is as follows: Y'all saw the autopsy photographs. There is not much of a place that you could touch on his body that didn't have some gunshot wound on it. Brutal. This is the ultimate crime. This is the type of crime that the death penalty is for. This is the type of person that the death penalty is for, somebody that could commit a crime like that. The prosecutor made this statement in the course of describing the events surrounding the crime, as they happened. Immediately prior to these statements, the prosecutor described Pitchford's previously-thwarted attempt to rob the store, and immediately following these statements, he discussed testimony which had revealed that the decedent had pleaded for mercy before being killed. We find the prosecutor's statement was not a call for the jury to consider the heinous, atrocious, and cruel nature of the crime as an aggravating factor, but rather was part of the story of the crime as the State perceived it. So this allegation of misconduct has no merit. ¶ 78. Pitchford claims the prosecutor instructed the jury that they were in the box to give Pitchford the death penalty. Pitchford mischaracterizes the prosecutor's statements during closing argument. The complained-of exchange is as follows: I am not going to mince words with you up here. I am going to tell you just like I told you on voir dire. I am asking for the death penalty because the ultimate crime deserves the ultimate punishment. That is what we have got here. I am not going to sit up here and quote the Bible.... I think it is absurd to sit up here and try to confuse y'all with that. Y'all know what you are here for. The law is clear in this state. The death penalty is an appropriate punishment. If you'll remember, when y'all were sitting out here, I asked everybody in the panel Mr. Carter: Your Honor, I object. They are not here to give death. They are here to deliberate and go back there and make a decision on life without possibility of parole or death. They are not here for death.... To say that is improper. The Court: Mr. Evans did not make that comment. So I'll allow him to proceed with his argument. Overrule the objection. .... As I told y'all when y'all were sitting out here, the important question that I asked y'all about that was this. And if any of y'all had answered this differently, you would not be here because this is a case where the death penalty is an appropriate punishment. If the law authorizes imposition of the death penalty and the facts justify it, could you give the death penalty? And the only ones that answered that they couldn't are gone. They are not here today. The law authorizes it because the judge has instructed you that the law authorizes it. The facts justify it because you have heard the facts. You have heard the testimony. You've seen the evidence.... The facts justify the death penalty in this case. These closing remarks, read in context, clearly demonstrate that the prosecutor did not instruct the jury that they were there only to give the death penalty. Instead, he used his closing argument to persuade the jurors thatfrom the prospective of the Statethe facts and the law together justified imposition of the death penalty, and each of the jurors had indicated that, in an appropriate case, they could impose the death penalty. So this allegation of prosecutorial misconduct has no merit. ¶ 79. Pitchford next claims the prosecutors skirted their ethical obligations to see that the defendant [was] accorded procedural justice, and he claims such prosecutorial misconduct is incurably prejudicial and requires reversal of his sentence. However, as previously stated, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, the statements we find inappropriate were harmless. Thus, this issue has no merit.
¶ 80. Pitchford's next assignment of error is that the jury was improperly influenced by displays of emotion from the victim's family. He claims two incidents served to prejudice his defense. ¶ 81. The first incident occurred following the State's direct examination of James Hathcock. Pitchford's counsel approached the bench and objected, claiming family members are in the back of the courtroom crying out loud, loud enough for everybody in the courtroom to hear. The trial judge stated, There have been no outbursts of any kind.... I have heard some sniffling going on ..., which he compared to sniffling as if one had a cold. Pitchford's counsel concluded the discussion with: Well, Your Honor, we would just ask if it becomes any worse than it is that the Court excuse the jury temporarily and just tell the family that they should control it to the extent they can. ¶ 82. The second incident occurred during the penalty phase of the trial. Defense counsel approached the bench and informed the trial judge that some members of the audience were talking during questioning. Specifically, defense counsel claimed thatafter he objected to a question as impropersomeone in the audience said no, it is not. The trial judge said he did not hear anything but nevertheless admonished members of the audience to refrain from commenting or making any noise. ¶ 83. Pitchford also makes a vague argument, citing no specifics, that the State made inflammatory appeals to the passion of the jury. We find the incidentsto the extent they are documented in the recordwere minor. Furthermore, Pitchford failed to request a curative instruction to the jury. [41] Accordingly, we find no error with this issue.
¶ 84. Pitchford's next argues the trial court improperly allowed the testimony of James Hathcock and Dantron Mitchell, both of whom had been incarcerated with Pitchford. Alternatively, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to give a requested cautionary instruction concerning informant testimony. ¶ 85. Hathcock and Mitchell both testified that Pitchford had confessed his role in the murder. They also denied receiving any promises or hope of reward in exchange for their testimony, although charges against Hathcock eventually were dropped. [42]