Opinion ID: 2212618
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: statements made to police

Text: After cross examining the witness at some length, appellants made a motion to require the State to produce any and all written statements of the witness ... to aid the defense in cross examining the witness. The trial court denied this motion saying it was not up to trial judges to change the law in this area. On re-cross examination the following exchange took place between the witness and appellants' attorney: Q. Mr. Schoolcraft, when you talked to some detectives about this case, did you sign a statement for them? A. Sir, I talked to the F.B.I. before I ever did talk to any investigators, before I ever did clear myself up, my past. Q. Well, my question to you, Mr. Schoolcraft, is have you made a written statement about this case involving Codalata and Antrobus ... A. That's correct sir. Q.... and Marge Trivett. Who has the written statement? A. I made a written statement. Q. Who has the written statement? Who took the written Statements? A. Mr. Stout did, sir. Q. Mr. Stout. Was there one or more than one? A. Atwell was there too, sir, was present. Q. All right, was there one statement or more than one statement taken from you? A. Sir, I don't know. Q. How many did you sign? A. I signed statements on everything that I had did, sir. Q. Did you read them before you signed them? A. Yes, sir, I was advised of my constitutional rights. MR. ORR: All right, at this time the defendants Codalata and Antrobus for the record, Your Honor, renew their motions for copies of the written statements the witness has said has been given to Detectives Stout and Atwell. There was no response by the State to the appellants' motion to produce and the trial court denied the motion. The sole evidence connecting appellants with the crime charged was this testimony of the accomplice, Schoolcraft. The appellants were not arrested until after the police had received information concerning the crime from Schoolcraft. The witness testified that he had used dope in the past, had been arrested on a pre-mental charge, had been under observation for thirty days in the psychiatric ward of General Hospital, had attempted suicide while in the jail, had attacked a police officer with a knife, was being used as a prosecuting witness in nineteen pending cases, had two prior convictions for burglary and one for arson, and had still not been sentenced for the crime for which he was indicted jointly with appellants. The witness also admitted he had previously testified against appellant Codalata in another case where appellant was found not guilty. In this context it is obvious that appellants had a great interest in inspecting the witness' pre-trial statements for possible use in cross examination and impeachment. We hold that under the principles of the Bernard case it was error for the trial court, in the absence of the appellee showing a paramount interest in non-disclosure, to deny appellants' motion requesting production by appellee of the witness' pre-trial statements made to the police officers for the purpose of cross-examination and impeachment of the witness. This general rule has been adopted in many jurisdictions in the United States. Jencks v. U.S. (1957), 353 U.S. 657, 1 L.Ed.2d 1103, 77 S.Ct. 1007, adopted the rule for the entire federal judiciary. Later the Jencks rule was substantially incorporated in Title 18 U.S.C. § 3500, which now provides the federal rule for obtaining such statements. State v. Ashton (1963), 95 Ariz. 37, 386 P.2d 83; People v. Estrada (1960), 54 Cal.2d 713, 355 P.2d 641; State v. Hutchins (1957), 51 Del. 100, 138 A.2d 342; People v. Neiman (1964), 30 Ill.2d 393, 197 N.E.2d 8; People v. Salimone (1933), 265 Mich. 486, 251 N.W. 594; State v. Backman (1917), 41 Nev. 197, 168 P. 733; State v. Hunt (1958), 25 N.J. 514, 138 A.2d 1; People v. Rosario (1961), 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881; Commonwealth v. Smith (1965), 417 Pa. 321, 208 A.2d 219; Pruitt v. State (1962), 172 Tex. Cr. App. 187, 355 S.W.2d 528. With respect to a defendant's right to obtain such statements we hold the rule to be this: First, the defendant must lay the proper foundation for his motion or the trial court may properly deny it. An adequate foundation is laid when: (1) The witness whose statement is sought has testified on direct examination; (2) A substantially verbatim transcription of statements made by the witness prior to trial is shown to probably be within the control of the prosecution; and, (3) The statements relate to matters covered in the witness' testimony in the present case. After laying this foundation, the defendant may move the trial court to require the State to produce such statements for use by the defense in cross examination and impeachment of the witness. If the foundation is proper the trial court must grant the motion and order the statements turned directly over to the defendant unless the State alleges: (a) There are no such statements within the control of the State. The trial court must conduct a hearing on the conflicting claims of the parties to resolve this issue. (b) There is a necessity for keeping the contents of the statements confidential. (c) The statement also contains matter not related to the matters covered in witness' testimony and the State does not wish to reveal that portion. In the latter two cases the statements need not be given directly to the defendant but should be given to the trial court for his decision concerning the State's claim. If the trial court agrees with the State then on (b) and (c) the trial court may deny defendant's motion or turn over to the defendant only the relevant portion of the statement. The motion made on re-cross examination met the foundation requirements set out above because the witness testified that he gave a signed statement to the police. The excerpt quoted from the record shows that the witness, after testifying for the appellee on direct examination, stated that he had given a signed statement concerning the facts in this case to the police. This was an adequate foundation for appellants' motion to produce these pre-trial statements of the witness for the purpose of cross-examination and impeachment, and in the absence of a showing of the State's paramount interest in non-disclosure it was error for the trial court to deny it. We note that this rule is a departure from the rule in effect prior to the Bernard case. In Anderson v. State (1959), 239 Ind. 372, 156 N.E.2d 384, the Court in holding that it was not error to deny the defendant's motion to produce police reports containing statements of prosecuting witnesses said: We do not here decide that under no circumstances may the accused inspect statements made by witnesses which are a part of such file, as where it is first shown that such statements are in direct conflict with the testimony of the witnesses in open court and that such prior statements would prove the innocence of the accused. There was no attempt to prove such conflict in this case. 239 Ind. at 376. We believe the better rule does not require a defendant to prove an inconsistency between the statement and the testimony of the witness before he even knows what the witness said in the statement. As the Supreme Court said in adopting that rule in Jencks v. U.S., supra : Every experienced trial judge and trial lawyer knows the value for impeaching purposes of statements of the witness recording the events before time dulls treacherous memory. Flat contradiction between the witness' testimony and the version of the events given in his reports is not the only test of inconsistency. The omission from the reports of facts related at the trial, or a contract in emphasis upon the same facts, even a different order of treatment, are also relevant to the cross-examining process of testing the credibility of a witness' trial testimony. Requiring the accused first to show conflict between the reports and the testimony is actually to deny the accused evidence relevant and material to his defense. The occasion for determining a conflict cannot arise until after the witness has testified, and unless he admits conflict, as in Gordon, the accused is helpless to know or discover conflict without inspecting the reports. A requirement of a showing of conflict would be clearly incompatible with our standards for the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts and must therefore be rejected. For the interest of the United States in a criminal prosecution `... is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shal be done....' 353 U.S. 668, 669. In a leading New York case, People v. Rosario, supra , the court said: A pretrial statement of a witness for the prosecution is valuable not just as a source of contradictions with which to confront him and discredit his trial testimony. Even statements seemingly in harmony with such testimony may contain matter which will prove helpful on cross-examination. They may reflect a witness' bias, for instance, or otherwise supply the defendant with knowledge essential to the neutralization of the damaging testimony of the witness which might, perhaps, turn the scales in his favor. Shades of meaning, stress, additions or omissions may be found which will place the witness' answers upon direct examination in an entirely different light.... Furthermore, omissions, contrasts and even contradictions, vital perhaps, for discrediting a witness, are certainly not as apparent to the impartial presiding judge as to single-minded counsel for the accused; the latter is in a far better position to appraise the value of a witness' pretrial statements for impeachment purposes. Until his attorney has an opportunity to see the statement, it is asked, how can he effectively answer the trial judge's assertion that it contains nothing at variance with the testimony given or, at least, useful to him in his attempt to discredit such witness? See also People v. Estrada, supra ; People v. Chapman (1959), 52 Cal.2d 95, 338 P.2d 428; People v. Wolff (1960), 19 Ill.2d 318, 167 N.E.2d 197; Palermo v. U.S. (1959), 360 U.S. 343, 3 L.Ed.2d 1287, 79 S.Ct. 1217, interpreting Title 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Jencks Act). We explicitly refrain from discussing the legal requirements for the admissibility of such a statement into evidence. We deal here only with appellants' right to inspect the statement to determine its possible use in cross examination and impeachment of the witness. Neither does our rule require a defendant to show prior to his even seeing the statement that it would prove the innocence of the defendant. We do not see how a defendant could ever satisfy that requirement but in any case it is irrelevant because the issue here is under what conditions may a defendant inspect the statement to determine its possible use in cross examining and impeaching the credibility of the witness. Obviously it may have such a use without directly proving the innocence of the defendant.