Opinion ID: 886539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Prejudice v. Probative value

Text: ¶ 95 Finally, Ayers argues that the prejudicial effect of the details from his prior offense outweighed the probative value. Ayers argues that those excruciating details painted Ayers as evil and dangerous and were inflammatory and prejudicial, and that the evidence tended to show Ayers acted in conformity with his bad character when Phyllis was killed. The State responds by pointing out that Ayers did not object to any of Richard's testimony and argues that in any event, the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial, but rather established the Wyoming victim's frailty, infirmity and inability to defend herself. In reply, Ayers contends his original objection to the introduction of evidence prior to trial preserved this issue for appeal. ¶ 96 We agree with the State that Ayers failed to properly preserve his contention that the details described by Richard were prejudicial and outweighed any probative value of his prior conviction. At no time during Richard's recitation of the facts surrounding Ayers' first degree sexual assault did Ayers object to the allegedly excruciating details. Nor did Ayers ever seek to limit the scope of Richard's testimony. We previously declined to address an alleged error when a defendant, who had generally objected to the admission of his prior conviction and to the State's first witness testifying that he was the defendant's probation and parole officer, failed to raise a specific objection to the State introducing the other crimes evidence through its first witness or in its case in chief. Anderson, 275 Mont. at 350, 912 P.2d at 804-805 (This Court will not address an alleged error that is deemed waived by lack of timely objection at trial.). See also Weeks, 270 Mont. at 85, 891 P.2d at 490 (although motion in limine may preserve a specification of error for appeal, that does not negate the appellant's obligation to make the basis and grounds for his objection clear to the court). Moreover, we will not put a district court in error for an action in which the appealing party acquiesced or actively participated. State v. Harris, 1999 MT 115, ¶ 32, 294 Mont. 397, ¶ 32, 983 P.2d 881, ¶ 32 (citing State v. Clay, 1998 MT 244, ¶ 24, 291 Mont. 147, ¶ 24, 967 P.2d 370, ¶ 24). ¶ 97 In State v. Ingraham , we noted that [w]e have repeatedly `approved the use of a motion in limine to preserve an objection for appeal, provided the objecting party makes the basis for his objection clear to the district court.'  Ingraham, 1998 MT 156, ¶ 36, 290 Mont. 18, ¶ 36, 966 P.2d 103, ¶ 36 (citing State v. Fuhrmann (1996), 278 Mont. 396, 403, 925 P.2d 1162, 1166) (emphasis added). Here, while Ayers did file a motion in opposition to the State's intent to present evidence of his prior conviction, he presented only a generic argument as to the prejudicial impact of the conviction; he did not argue that any specific details from the incident would be exceptionally prejudicial. See Fuhrmann, 278 Mont. at 403, 925 P.2d at 1167 (where defendant's argument before [this Court was] grounded in the same theory as was his argument below, defendant's motion in limine properly preserved his objection). ¶ 98 Ayers' argument on appealthat the evidence was prejudicial because of certain details originating from statements by the Wyoming victim and repeated by Richardis not grounded in the same theory as his motion in opposition presented to the District Court below. Ayers was well aware of the State's intent to introduce his prior Wyoming conviction through Richard. Nonetheless, Ayers did not object to the extent or scope of Richard's testimony at trial. Thus, the District Court was not given the opportunity to limit the evidence that Ayers now argues was prejudicial. ¶ 99 When considering the fourth prong of the Modified Just Rule, we have repeatedly noted that probative evidence will frequently and inevitably be prejudicial to a party. Henderson, 278 Mont. at 382, 925 P.2d at 479 (citations omitted). However, we have also concluded that although evidence of other acts may be prejudicial, when it satisfies the other three Modified Just Rule requirements, such prejudice alone is not a sufficient reason to refuse admission. Henderson, 278 Mont. at 382, 925 P.2d at 479 (citation omitted). Moreover, when the prior crime evidence meets the first three elements of the modified Just rule, the prior crime evidence necessarily carries great probative weight. Hagberg, 277 Mont. at 45, 920 P.2d at 93 (citations omitted). See also Brooks, 260 Mont. at 84, 857 P.2d at 737 and Anderson, 275 Mont. at 349, 912 P.2d at 804. ¶ 100 Ayers' prior conviction clearly had probative value. Moreover, Ayers failed to properly preserve the prejudice objection he now urges us to consider. ¶ 101 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that all four of the Modified Just criteria were met, and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of Ayers' prior conviction in Wyoming for first degree sexual assault. ¶ 102 Accordingly, Ayers' conviction is affirmed.