Opinion ID: 161465
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructing the Jury on Presumptions

Text: 34 Because Plaintiff did not raise this objection below, we review the challenged instruction only to see whether it is patently plainly erroneous and prejudicial. Zimmerman v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 848 F.2d 1047, 1054 (10th Cir. 1988); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 (No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection. (emphasis added)). Only rarely will we reverse based on allegedly erroneous instructions to which there was no objection at trial; the party claiming plain error has the heavy burden of demonstrating fundamental injustice. Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 553 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted). 35 The full text of the challenged instruction is as follows: 36 Presumptions are rules based upon experience or public policy and are established in the law to assist a jury in discovering the truth. Presumptions take the place of evidence unless and until outweighed by evidence to the contrary. 37 In this case, the law presumes that Ronald Rice, the deceased, had the mental capacity to change the policy beneficiary to his mother. 38 The next instruction, to which no objection has been taken, stated: In this action, where plaintiff, Cindy Rice, alleges that Ronald Rice, the insured, lacked the mental capacity to change the beneficiary to his policy from his wife to his mother, plaintiff has the burden of establishing by the greater weight of the evidence that on the date Ronald Rice executed the change of beneficiary form, Ronald Rice lacked the requisite mental capacity. 39 Plaintiff argues that it was incorrect under Federal Rule of Evidence 301 for the court to give the first of these instructions to the jury in this case. Rule 301 states that a presumption imposes a burden of production, but does not shift the burden of proof. Plaintiff argues that Rule 301 incorporates the bursting bubble theory of presumptions. Under this approach, once she met her burden of production the presumption would drop out of the picture entirely, and therefore it would have been inappropriate to mention the presumption in the jury instructions. However, the advisory committee notes reject the notion that the presumptions authorized by Rule 301 would simply disappear when contrary evidence is introduced. See Fed. R. Evid. 301 advisory committee notes, 1972 Proposed Rules. While there is conflicting authority, see, e.g., Bratton v. Yoder Co. (In re Yoder Co.), 758 F.2d 1114, 1119-20 (6th Cir. 1985), we cannot say that the jury instruction amounted to plain error. 40 In any event, in this case Plaintiff bore the burden of proof on the issue of mental capacity even absent the presumption. Moreover, the instruction made it clear that the presumption could be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence. There is sufficient authority that a presumption instruction that tracks the burden of proof as in this case is not reversible error. See, e.g., Lewis v. Owen, 395 F.2d 537, 542 (10th Cir. 1968); Dostal v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 189 F.2d 352, 355-56 (3d Cir. 1951); cf. Brown v. Henderson, 189 N.E. 41, 43 (Mass. 1934) (Lummus, J., concurring in the result) (The statutory presumption . . . is wholly overshadowed by that burden of proof, and can have no practical effect. . . . [It] is like a handkerchief thrown over something also covered by a blanket. For this reason, if the burden of proof is correctly stated to the jury, there can be no reversible error in dealing with the presumption . . . .). Whether or not the district court was correct to instruct the jury on the presumption of mental capacity in this case, the instructions as a whole were not patently plainly erroneous and prejudicial. Zimmerman, 848 F.2d at 1054.