Opinion ID: 2632493
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the District Court Err in Dismissing McKinney's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief?

Text: The district court dismissed McKinney's third petition for post-conviction relief on the ground that the prosecutor's handwritten memo was not material, was impeachment evidence, and would not result in a different outcome at trial. For three reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. First, there is no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. The State had the firearms expert examine McKinney's revolver about six months prior to trial in order to determine whether bullet fragments found in the victim's body were fired from McKinney's revolver. In connection with that examination, the expert worked the action twenty to thirty times and noticed that the double-action trigger pull was excessive. After McKinney had testified, the expert again examined the revolver using a trigger-pull gauge to measure the weight of its trigger pull. That is when he determined that the double-action trigger pull was twenty-one pounds. When asked whether the revolver had been tampered with or altered in any way since his first examination of it about six months earlier, he responded, There are no indications of tampering whatsoever. The trigger, to the best of my recollection, appeared to be the same in its action. Thus, even if the note indicated an intent by the prosecuting attorney to alter the revolver, there is absolutely no evidence that the prosecuting attorney acted upon that intent or that the trigger pull was altered. In fact, the uncontradicted evidence is to the contrary. McKinney accuses the expert of lying to cover up the alteration of the revolver, but he offers absolutely no evidence to support that accusation. He simply speculates that the prosecuting attorney and the expert conspired to provide false testimony. A mere accusation supported solely by speculation is not a sufficient basis for granting post-conviction relief. Second, McKinney's petition raising this issue is untimely. In a capital case, the petitioner filing a successive petition for post-conviction relief must make a prima facie showing that the issues raised were not known and could not reasonably have been known within forty-two days after entry of the judgment imposing the death sentence. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 992 P.2d 144 (1999). Even when the required prima facie showing is made, the issues must still be asserted `within a reasonable time' after they are known or reasonably could have been known. Id. at 701, 992 P.2d at 150. If we assume, even in the absence of any evidence supporting the assumption, that the trigger pull of the revolver had been altered to make it heavier, McKinney would have known of that at his trial in November 1981. He admittedly fired the first shot that hit the victim, claiming he did it accidentally. If the revolver's double-action trigger pull was so light that he could have accidentally fired the gun in the manner he claimed, he should reasonably have known something was wrong when he heard the State's firearms expert testify that the trigger pull was one of the heaviest he had ever encountered. Yet, McKinney did nothing to investigate whether the trigger pull had been altered. Under the circumstances, the lapse of almost twenty years is not a reasonable time to wait before raising the possibility that the trigger pull may have been altered. Third, there is no basis for concluding that the note would likely have had any impact on the outcome of McKinney's trial. McKinney argues that the prosecutors were required to disclose the note pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). In McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 706, 992 P.2d 144, 155 (1999) (citations omitted), we set forth the analysis under Brady as follows: The due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution mandate that the prosecution disclose exculpatory evidence in the government's possession to an accused person. The duty to disclose is irrespective of good or bad faith on the prosecution's part. The defendant's right to due process is violated where the prosecution fails to disclose exculpatory evidence that is material either to guilt or punishment. Evidence is material for purposes of due process analysis if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The prosecution does not violate the constitutional duty of disclosure unless the nondisclosure is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial. [T]he question is whether `the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.' Whether evidence is material for purposes of due process analysis is a question of law, over which this Court exercises free review. McKinney correctly argues that Brady requires the disclosure of impeachment evidence. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 106 P.3d 376 (2004). He claims, Arguably the credibility of [the firearms expert's] testimony directly related to Petitioner's guilt or innocence in light of Petitioner's claim of an accidental shooting as a defense. The note could not have been used to impeach the firearms expert called by the State. That expert did not author the note. McKinney did not seek to depose the expert in this proceeding, and there is no evidence that the expert was aware of or knew anything about the note, that he had ever been asked to tighten the gun's cylinder, or that he had ever done so. McKinney also argues that the alleged alteration of the revolver's trigger pull was not merely impeachment evidence, but it undermined his defense of accidental discharge. At most, the note would have created a suspicion that the prosecutor may have done something to the revolver that he described as Tighten gun cylinder. Absent evidence that the revolver was actually altered in some way, disclosure of the note would not likely have had any impact upon the outcome of the trial, nor would it have put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Even if we were to speculate that the prosecuting attorney did in some way alter the revolver to increase the weight of its trigger pull, such assumed fact would not likely have had any impact upon the outcome of the trial, nor would it have put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. McKinney's handgun was a double action revolver. It could be fired double action or single action. When a revolver is fired double action, the trigger finger must apply enough force to the trigger to cock the hammer, thereby compressing the hammer spring. When a revolver is fired single action, the hammer is manually cocked first, which compresses the hammer spring so that it need not be compressed by pulling on the trigger. As a result, the weight of the single action trigger pull is about half that of the double action trigger pull. In addition, when the hammer is manually cocked, it also causes the trigger to move to the rear, shortening the distance that the trigger must be pulled in order to fire the revolver. It is in single action mode that a revolver may have a hair trigger. The double action trigger pull is longer and heavier. McKinney testified that, when he was distracted by the Pomeranian dog playfully tugging at his pant leg, he accidentally fired the revolver in double action mode (without first cocking the hammer), hitting the victim. That scenario is simply not credible. The State's firearms expert testified that most revolvers when new have a fifteen pound or less double action trigger pull and that the trigger pull will lessen with time and use or if altered by a gunsmith. He also testified that a gunsmith would set the double action trigger pull of a target revolver at five to seven pounds and the double action pull of a police revolver at seven to nine pounds. There is no evidence that the double action trigger pull of McKinney's revolver had been reduced, or that it had previously been used as a target or police revolver. Thus, had the prosecutor altered the double action trigger pull of McKinney's revolver, such alteration would have increased the double action trigger pull by approximately six pounds-from about fifteen to twenty-one pounds. McKinney's version of what happened would not have been more believable had the double action trigger pull been around fifteen pounds rather than twenty-one. The shot McKinney admits firing did not kill the victim. It was the four shots to the back of the victim's head that were fatal. McKinney claimed that his female companion fired those shots without him knowing she would do so. There was ample evidence supporting the jury's finding that McKinney fired the fatal shots. See State v. McKinney, 107 Idaho 180, 182-83, 687 P.2d 570, 572-73 (1984), wherein we recited that evidence. There is no reasonable likelihood that the prosecutor's note, or even evidence that the prosecutor had altered the revolver to increase its trigger pull, would have altered the jury's decision regarding who fired the four fatal bullets into the back of the victim's head. Finally, McKinney asks us to speculate that the prosecuting attorney altered the revolver's trigger pull without any evidence supporting that speculation after having admitted that he murdered the victim. He testified in his first post-conviction proceeding: Q. Randy, do you deny killing Robert Bishop? A. No. I'm not proud of it, but I don't deny it either. It's something that shouldn't have happened. Just because I don't break down and cry in front of everybody doesn't mean I don't feel remorse for what I've done. ButI've cried several times in private. You know? I'm completely ashamed of what happened. If giving my life would bring Robert back, I'd readily do it with no hesitation or reservation. But it's not going to bring him back. He also admitted that he lied at his trial when testifying as to his version of what occurred. At his first post-conviction proceeding, McKinney contended that he had become very angry when the victim allegedly made homosexual advances towards him and asked to have sex with his female companion. Certainly, McKinney's actual guilt would not excuse wrongful conduct by the prosecuting attorney. Justice would certainly not be served, however, by setting aside McKinney's conviction for a crime he admits committing based solely upon unsubstantiated speculation of prosecutorial misconduct.