Opinion ID: 168782
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tolling of Statute of Limitation

Text: M s. Griffiths-Rast argues in the alternative that even if she was aware of her legal injury prior to November 26, 1999, the limitation period should have been tolled for some of that time because (1) Dr. Prasad conducted business outside of Utah for periods of time between her surgery and September 2000, and (2) Dr. Prasad moved from Utah to California in September 2000. Under § 78-12-35: -6- W here a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state, the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter after his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he departs from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. M s. Griffiths-Rast argues that it is a disputed genuine issue of fact whether Dr. Prasad was absent for enough time so that tolling the statute of limitation for that period of time would result in the statue not being violated. She argues that the district court should have conducted a separate trial to decide this issue. The district court held that medical malpractice actions were excepted from the tolling provision of § 78-12-35 because under § 78-14-4(2) the two-year limitation period “shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the law.” (emphasis added). The court held that this provision was an “explicit exception to section 78-12-35” and that the limitation period was not tolled during Dr. Prasad’s absences. W e agree. M s. Griffiths-Rast argues on appeal that the tolling provision in § 78-12-35 is applicable despite the language in § 78-14-4(2). She first directs us to Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 333 n.3 (Utah 1997). In that footnote, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the family of a woman who allegedly died of malpractice argued that they should be able to file her suit outside the two-year statute of limitation because under § 78-12-37: -7- [I]f a person entitled to bring an action dies before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action survives, an action may be commenced by [her] representatives after the expiration of that time and within one year from [her] death. The Utah Supreme Court ruled against the family on the ground that the statute of limitation had run prior to the woman’s death. Jensen therefore does not support M s. Griffiths-Rast’s argument. A ruling that § 78-12-37 did not apply because the limitation period expired prior to the decedent’s death, is not the same as ruling that § 78-12-37 would have applied if the limitation period had not expired. There is no indication that the court even considered the effect of § 78-14-4(2) on § 78-12-37. M s. Griffiths-Rast also argues that the Utah Supreme Court found that § 78-14-4(2) was unconstitutional as applied to minors. In Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 580-81 (Utah 1993), the court found that § 78-14-4(2) created an exception to § 78-12-36, which generally tolls limitation periods as to claims of minors until the minor reaches the age of majority. Since M s. Griffiths-Rast’s brief does no more than note that Lee found § 78-14-4(2) unconstitutional in that it nullified § 78-12-36, we can only assume that she is asserting, without argument, that it is also unconstitutional when applied to nullify to § 78-12-35. W e disagree. The Utah Supreme Court’s holding in Lee was premised on the fact that, since minors had no legal capacity to sue in Utah, application of § 78-14-4(2) in -8- some cases would result in the statute of limitation running prior to the minor coming of age and being legally able to bring his or her action. Lee, 867 P.2d at 580. Consequently, application of § 78-14-4(2) would deprive some minors of access to the court system. Id. Here, there is no such problem. Considering the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e), Utah R. Civ. P. 4, and Utah’s long-arm statute, § 78-27-24, 2 it is clear that a potential defendant’s flight to another state will not 2 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e): Unless otherwise provided by federal law, service upon an individual from whom a waiver has not been obtained and filed . . . may be effected in any judicial district of the United States: (1) pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court is located, or in which service is effected, for the service of a summons upon the defendant in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of the State; or (2) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally or by leaving copies thereof at the individual’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. Under the pertinent parts of Utah R . Civ. P. 4(d)(1): (d)(1) Personal service. The summons and complaint may be served in any state or judicial district of the United States . . . . If the person to be served refuses to accept a copy of the process, service shall be sufficient if the person serving the same shall state the name of the process and offer to deliver a copy thereof. Personal service shall be made as follow s: (d)(1)(A) Upon any individual . . . by delivering a copy of the (continued...) -9- immunize him from suit. Dr. Prasad was himself served with process after he moved to California. 3 2 (...continued) summons and the complaint to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process[.] Under the pertinent parts of § 78-27-24: Any person . . . whether or not a citizen or resident of [Utah], who in person or through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of [Utah] as to any claim arising out of or related to: (1) the transaction of any business within this state; (2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state; (3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach of warranty; 3 M s. Griffiths-Rast also raises a brief argument that under § 78-14-8 she was entitled to a 120-day enlargement of the four-year limitation period imposed by the statute of repose found in § 78-14-4(1). This argument is meritless. First, the district court held that M s. Griffiths-Rast’s action was barred under the malpractice act’s two-year statute of limitation, not the four-year statute of repose. Second, under § 78-14-8, a malpractice action may not be commenced unless the prospective defendant is given notice of the plaintiff’s intent to comm ence an action at least ninety days prior to the filing of the suit. If the notice is served “less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable time period, the time for commencing the malpractice action against the health care provider shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service of the notice.” Id. M s. Griffiths-Rast served her notice of intent in November of 2001. (continued...) -10-