Opinion ID: 1868000
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Degree to Which the Checkpoint Achieves the State's Asserted Interest

Text: The instant checkpoint also fails to satisfy the second prong of the Downey test, which is met when one can fairly say that [it] contribute[s] in a meaningful way to achieving the sufficiently compelling state interest. Hicks, 55 S.W.3d at 531. Here, the State's asserted interest was to ensure the safety of the Poss Homes residents. The method employed to advance this interest was an entry identification checkpoint, ostensibly operated to keep out unauthorized visitors. There is no proof in the record, however, which establishes that checking the identification of those who sought entrance somehow decreased the level of crime being committed within Poss Homes. Moreover, there is no proof in the record that it was unauthorized visitors who were threatening the residents' safety. While Officer Brown testified that the Poss Homes community was plagued with criminal activity, neither he nor anyone else testified as to who, precisely, was responsible for this misconduct. We cannot simply assume that it was only unauthorized visitors who were just loitering around, littering, dropping off trash and so forth and committing other kind of crimes. It is possible that it was the residents of Poss Homes who were themselves engaging in illegal conduct. In short, there is no proof in the record that links the checkpoint to its purported aim. The checkpoint even fails insofar as it was established simply to deflect would-be trespassers. The State asserts in its brief to this Court that nothing stops trespassers or dissuades them from entering more effectively than approaching them and asking for identification. There is no proof in the record to support this assertion, however. The intermediate appellate court found that [t]he identification checkpoint is an efficient means of determining that persons entering the housing development are residents or visitors with a legitimate business or social reason for being there. We disagree. Certainly, if someone trying to enter the development produced either a Poss Homes identification badge or a driver's license indicating a Poss Homes residence, the checkpoint would be effective at establishing that the person had, at least at some point in time, been a resident there. [9] A driver's license with a non-Poss Homes address would be useless, however, at indicating whether the would-be visitoror brand new resident had a legitimate reason for being there. Furthermore, unless Officer Brown had either a list of current residents or had memorized their names, he would not be able to verify a visitor's assertedly legitimate connection with a resident simply upon being given a name and address. Officer Brown offered no proof that he either had such a list or knew all of the residents by name. The checkpoint also fails in practical effect because the location at which it was established was not the only point of ingress into the community. Consequently, a person refused admittance at the Washington Street entrance could simply leave and gain entry into the development via another route. This aspect of the checkpoint completely undercuts Officer Brown's ostensible function as a gatekeeper of the community. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the instant checkpoint did not contribute in a meaningful way to achieving the State's asserted interest and is therefore not constitutionally reasonable.