Opinion ID: 2047586
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: foundation for videotapes

Text: Anglemyer's primary argument on appeal is that the State did not present adequate foundation for the admission of exhibits 15 and 16. Anglemyer argues that the videotapes should not have been admitted without the testimony of a witness who actually saw the events depicted and could testify that the videotapes accurately represented what the witness saw. Since Roeder had no personal knowledge of the events shown on the videotapes, Anglemyer argues that Roeder was unable to provide the necessary foundational testimony. Anglemyer's argument implicates the requirements of rule 901, which rule provides, in relevant part: (1) The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. (2) By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule: (a) Testimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be; .... (d) Appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances; .... (i) Evidence describing a process or system used to produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.... The plain language of rule 901 is directory rather than mandatory. State v. Ferris, 212 Neb. 835, 326 N.W.2d 185 (1982). We are also guided in our application of rule 901 by federal court decisions explaining Fed.R.Evid. 901, which is effectively identical to Nebraska's rule 901 and upon which it was based. Where a Nebraska Evidence Rule is substantially similar to a corresponding federal rule of evidence, Nebraska courts will look to federal decisions interpreting the corresponding federal rule for guidance in construing the Nebraska rule. Breeden v. Anesthesia West, 265 Neb. 356, 656 N.W.2d 913 (2003). It has been said that federal rule 901 does not erect a particularly high hurdle. U.S. v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 716 (1st Cir.1992). [T]he proponent of the evidence is not required `to rule out all possibilities inconsistent with authenticity, or to prove beyond any doubt that the evidence is what it purports to be.' U.S. v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 658 (2d Cir.2001). The authentication requirement does not demand that the proponent of a piece of evidence conclusively demonstrate the genuineness of his or her article, but only that he or she make a showing `sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.' Los Angeles News Service v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 935 (9th Cir.2002), amended on other grounds on denial of rehearing 313 F.3d 1093. See, also, State v. Ferris, supra . Cf. State v. Merrill, 252 Neb. 736, 566 N.W.2d 742 (1997). Rule 901 incorporates two traditional models of authenticating photographic evidence: the illustrative or pictorial testimony model and the silent witness model. See, generally, 2 McCormick on Evidence § 214 (John W. Strong et al., 5th ed. 1999 & Supp.2003). Under the illustrative model, a photograph, motion picture, videotape, or other recording is viewed merely as a graphic portrayal of oral testimony and is admissible only when a witness testifies that it is a correct and accurate representation of facts that the witness personally observed. Id. See, e.g., State v. Stephenson, 199 Neb. 362, 258 N.W.2d 824 (1977). It is this type of foundation that Anglemyer claims is lacking in this case. But under the silent witness theory of admission, photographic evidence may draw its verification not from any witness who has actually viewed the scene portrayed, but from other evidence which supports the reliability of the photographic product. 2 McCormick on Evidence, supra. Most commonly, such evidence has been directed at establishing the validity of the photographic process; however, other types of foundation may properly support the admission of silent witness evidence. See id. See, e.g., U.S. v. Rembert, 863 F.2d 1023 (D.C.Cir.1988); United States v. Stearns, 550 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir.1977); Ex parte Weddington, 843 So.2d 750 (Ala.2002); Dept. of Safety v. Cole, 342 Md. 12, 672 A.2d 1115 (1996); Midland Steel v. U.A.W. Local 486, 61 Ohio St.3d 121, 573 N.E.2d 98 (1991); Kindred v. State, 524 N.E.2d 279 (Ind.1988); State v. Pulphus, 465 A.2d 153 (R.I.1983); State v. Holderness, 293 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1980); People v. Bowley, 59 Cal.2d 855, 382 P.2d 591, 31 Cal.Rptr. 471 (1963); Brooks v. Com., 15 Va.App. 407, 424 S.E.2d 566 (1992). Even if direct, eyewitness testimony is absent, the contents of photographic evidence itself, together with such circumstantial or indirect evidence as bears upon the issue, may serve to explain and authenticate the evidence sufficiently to justify its admission. See United States v. Stearns, supra . As the advisory committee notes to federal rule 901 explain, [t]he characteristics of the offered item itself, considered in the light of circumstances, afford authentication techniques in great variety. See 28 U.S.C. app. rule 901 (2000). Based on those principles, courts have found sufficient foundation for the admission of still photographs under circumstances presenting foundation comparable to that in the instant case. For example, in Torres v. State, 442 N.E.2d 1021 (Ind.1982), the defendant was convicted of child molestation based upon several Polaroid photographs that were anonymously sent to police. No witness corroborated the events depicted in the photographs. However, the victim's mother identified her daughter, the defendant, and the defendant's girl friend in the photographs, and based on her knowledge of the defendant's apartment, the victim's mother identified the background of the photographs as the defendant's residence. Based on this foundation, the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the photographs accurately depicted what they were purported to depict. See id. In State v. Holderness, supra , the victim of a burglary had left a camera containing 12-exposure film in a briefcase left in his car parked in his garage. The garage was burglarized, and the briefcase stolen. Later that day, a neighborhood child brought the victim a roll of film of the kind that had been in the camera. The victim had the film developed, and the first eight pictures were ones which the victim had taken. Another picture, however, showed an unknown man on his knees looking sideways toward the camera, holding a partially open black briefcase. The victim was unable to identify the man, but the victim was able to testify that the briefcase looked exactly like his, and he identified the objects in the background of the picture as being in his backyard. The photograph was then used to identify the defendant and convict him of the burglary. The Iowa Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that the photograph was not distorted or inaccurate and was a picture of the burglar. See id. Similarly, in People v. Doggett, 83 Cal.App.2d 405, 188 P.2d 792 (1948), the defendants were charged with sex perversion based upon photographs seized from the defendants' apartment. The landlord of the apartment building identified the persons in the photographs as the defendants and testified that the photographs accurately represented the interior of the apartment, but that he had not witnessed the defendants' conduct as depicted in the photographs. Other photographic evidence demonstrated the similarity between the furnishings in the apartment and those in the photographs of the defendants. An expert witness testified that in his opinion, the photographs were genuine and had not been faked. The California Court of Appeals held that the photographs were properly admitted. The general rule, gleaned from the above cases, is that photographic evidence is admissible when it is shown that it is a correct reproduction of what it purports to depict. This is often proved by the testimony of the one who took the photograph. However, this is not necessary, and it is well settled that the showing may be made by any evidence that bears on whether the photographic evidence correctly depicts what it purports to represent. The essential element is that the photographic evidence be verified or authenticated as a genuine representation of what it purports to depict. See People v. Doggett, supra . This being the purpose, it is not required that an eyewitness be produced where other evidence is available to accomplish the same end. The effect and probative value of such other evidence is the important consideration, and not that the manner of making the requisite showing should be exactly the same in all cases. See id. Here, it was conclusively shown by testimony that exhibit 15, with an embedded date stamp, correctly represented and depicted the parties who occupied a certain motel room. The surroundings, furniture, and a particular imperfection on the wall of the room and other identifying features of the motel were shown to have been in part of that motel room at the time in question. There is an absence of anything which might tend to raise doubt about the matter. Under those circumstances, the verification or authentication was as satisfactory and reliable as that in the ordinary case where it depends upon the memory and integrity of a third party who may be directly interested in the result. In such a case, it can be said neither that other evidence is entirely lacking nor that proof of the requisite element was not sufficient to support the trial court's action in receiving such a videotape in evidence. Compare People v. Doggett, supra . Although we did not specifically discuss rule 901, this court applied similar reasoning in State v. Merrill, 252 Neb. 736, 566 N.W.2d 742 (1997). In that case, police saw marijuana plants growing on the defendant's property and obtained and executed a search warrant. Police seized a photograph album from the defendant's residence, containing several Polaroid photographs of the defendant and her husband with marijuana plants, and the photographs were admitted at trial over the defendant's objection. On appeal, we concluded that the photographs were properly admitted. We explained: The fact that the officers obtained possession of the album prior to [the defendant's] arrest establishes that the photographs were developed at a time pertinent to the inquiry, that is, at a time prior to when [the defendant] was charged with knowingly and intentionally possessing marijuana. The fact that [the defendant] and the marijuana could be identified establishes that the photographs accurately portrayed those subjects. Thus, the record establishes an adequate foundation for those five photographs. Id. at 741-42, 566 N.W.2d at 747. While each of these cases involved still photographs, it is well established that the same evidentiary principles apply to videotapes. See, Dept. of Safety v. Cole, 342 Md. 12, 672 A.2d 1115 (1996); Midland Steel v. U.A.W. Local 486, 61 Ohio St.3d 121, 573 N.E.2d 98 (1991); Kindred v. State, 524 N.E.2d 279 (Ind.1988); Straughn v. State, 876 So.2d 492 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); Brooks v. Com., 15 Va.App. 407, 424 S.E.2d 566 (1992). In the instant case, the State presented sufficient foundation to support the finding that the videotapes depicted what they were purported to depict. Roeder's testimony, summarized above, connects the people on the videotapes with the likely time and location of the creation of the videotapes. There is no evidence to suggest that exhibit 15 or 16 was tampered with or altered, particularly given that the videotapes were in possession of Mataya's Babydolls until they were seized by police. There is no evidence from which to infer that the State deliberately tampered with the videotapes, particularly given the presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officials. See United States v. Stearns, 550 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir.1977) (finding photographs accurate when they were in possession of persons in privity with defendant until seized by police). The county court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the videotapes at issue in this case. The contents of the videotapes, together with the information obtained from the police investigation, provided evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. See rule 901. Anglemyer's first assignment of error is without merit.