Opinion ID: 78396
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Officer Ortiz

Text: Sarras claims two errors occurred as to Officer Ortiz's testimony. Sarras's first claim is that the district court erred in permitting Ortiz to testify that she believed E.M. when she initially reported the abuse. However, it was Sarras who asked Ortiz the question in this regard. Sarras asked, You assumed that what she said was true, and you had it made up in your mind when you went to his home. . . . Correct? Ortiz responded, What  I believed my victim when she told me what happened to her. Sarras concedes that he did not object to Ortiz's response. Normally, we would review such a claim for plain error. But because Sarras's claimed error is invited error, it is thus unreviewable. Sarras elicited Ortiz's testimony that she believed E.M. He wanted the jury to believe that Ortiz conducted an inadequate investigation based on her flawed belief that E.M. was telling the truth and Sarras was guilty. Because Sarras's question elicited the very testimony about which he now complains, he is entitled to no relief. See United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1215-16 (11th Cir.2005) ([A] defendant can `invite' non-responsive testimony when he insists on pursuing a line of questioning after it becomes apparent that further cross-examination will elicit potentially damaging testimony, and fails to object to the non-responsive answer when it is given.); United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1327-28 (11th Cir.2005) (Where invited error exists, it precludes a court from invoking the plain error rule and reversing.); United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1289-90 (11th Cir.2003) (where injection of allegedly inadmissible evidence is attributable to defense, defendant may not claim on appeal that its introduction constitutes reversible error); United States v. Parikh, 858 F.2d 688, 695 (11th Cir.1988) (holding that admission of improper testimony when [government witness was] responding to an inquiry by defense counsel, creates `invited error'). Sarras's second claim about Ortiz is that the district court erred in permitting her to testify, over Sarras's objection, that it is not unusual for a thirteen-year-old child to fail to remember the exact times and dates of the abuse. The government concedes that Officer Ortiz was not qualified as an expert but argues that her testimony about children's memories was lay, not expert, testimony. Rule 701 permits a lay witness to provide opinion testimony if the opinion (1) is rationally based on the perception of the witness, (2) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (3) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. Fed.R.Evid. 701; compare Fed.R.Evid. 702 (reserving for expert witnesses testimony based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge). The government argues that Officer Ortiz's testimony is lay opinion because it is not based on scientific or specialized knowledge within the realm of an expert but rather on particular knowledge gained by virtue of her position and repeated exposure to victims of sexual abuse. See United States v. LeCroy, 441 F.3d 914, 927 (11th Cir.2006) (concluding that a police officer's testimony that a blood stain on the back of [the victim's] shirt appeared to have been made by someone wiping a bloody knife off on the shirt was a layperson observation that was admissible under Rule 701); United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1119 (11th Cir.2002) (stating that an agent's characterization of defendant's boat as go-fast boat was proper lay opinion testimony because it was based on personal observation as well as past experience). In response, Sarras argues this type of memory evidence is usually provided by a mental health professional and is precisely the specialized knowledge contemplated by Rule 702. See Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260-61 ([E]xperience in a field may offer another path to expert status.). Sarras also points out that Officer Ortiz gave her victim-memory opinion without any evidence of how long she had been a sex crimes investigator, how many cases she had handled, how many involved minors, or what training she had as to sex crime victims. See id. at 1261 ([I]f the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts. (quotation marks and brackets omitted)). We agree with Sarras that the government did not seek to qualify Officer Ortiz as an expert but offered her opinion testimony on this issue as a lay witness. And her opinion testimony does seem more like that of an expert with specialized knowledge. [36] Nonetheless, we conclude that any potential error in admitting Officer Ortiz's brief testimony about victims' forgetfulness was harmless error. See United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1300 (11th Cir.2005) (when judge erroneously admits evidence in criminal prosecution, question is whether error had substantial influence on outcome of case or left grave doubt as to whether it affected outcome of case). In this case, the key issue involved identifying the abuser, not pinpointing precisely when the abuse occurred. Moreover, the forensic expert testified about the October dates on the camera. The red wristband E.M. wore in some pictures was consistent with those October dates. We recognize that Sarras contends that E.M.'s inability to remember the exact dates of the abuse is evidence that she fabricated the story as part of her mother's grand scheme to frame him. However, Sarras had ample opportunity to develop this theme at trial. Although the photos were deleted from his computer immediately after the recorded call, Sarras called an expert to testify that the date applet on his laptop had been accessed on May 6, within twenty-four hours of E.M. reporting the abuse to the police on May 7. He repeatedly questioned witnesses about the interconnectivity between his and E.M.'s and her mother's computers, his parental restrictions on E.M., and his financial dealings with E.M.'s mother. And the laptop photos showed the location of the abuse by depicting the furniture in them. Sarras developed his I've been framed theme extensively in both his opening and closing statements. We have no doubt that this isolated statement by Officer Ortizabout a victim's memory of dates and times had no impact on the outcome of the trial.