Opinion ID: 799396
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction over Veterans Benefits

Text: Article III confers [t]he judicial Power of the United States on a supreme court and such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. The judicial Power vested in such courts extend[s] to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Article III is not self-executing, however, so the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts depends on an affirmative statutory grant. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812) ([Only] the Supreme Court[] possesses jurisdiction derived immediately from the constitution, and of which the legislative power cannot deprive it. All other Courts created by the general Government possess no jurisdiction but what is given them by the power that creates them, and can be vested with none but what the power ceded to the general Government will authorize them to confer.). Article III's federal question jurisdiction is statutorily conferred on federal district courts in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which VCS cites as the source of the district court's jurisdictional authority. That section provides: The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. But the fact that federal courts are vested with such jurisdiction over all civil actions does not mean that all federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over all such civil actions. The Constitution also grants to Congress the power to control federal court jurisdiction through such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; see Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-01, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973) (holding that Congress is not required to vest inferior federal courts with all the jurisdiction it was authorized to bestow under Art. III). And Congress is under no obligation to confer jurisdiction upon inferior federal courts equally; indeed, no court can assert a just claim to jurisdiction exclusively conferred on another, or withheld from all. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449, 12 L.Ed. 1147 (1850) (Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.). In cases involving benefits owed to veterans, Congress has created a scheme conferring exclusive jurisdiction over claims affecting veterans' benefits to some federal courts, while denying all other federal courts any jurisdiction over such claims. The source of that statutory scheme is the Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988. To understand the import of the VJRA, and how it affects our jurisdiction to consider VCS's claims here, it is helpful to examine the history of judicial review of VA decisions.
Our discussion will be brief because the history of judicial review of VA decisionmaking is a short one. Congress established the VA in 1930. Act of July 3, 1930, ch. 863, § 1, 46 Stat. 1016, 1016. Three years later, Congress prohibited judicial review of the VA's benefits decisions. Act of Mar. 20, 1933, ch. 3, § 5, 48 Stat. 8, 9 (All decisions rendered by the Administrator under ... this title, or the regulations issued pursuant thereto, shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law and fact, and no other official or court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to review ... any such decision.); see also Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 587, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934) (construing the statute to remove the possibility of judicial relief). Congress has consistently precluded judicial review of veterans' benefits determinations thereafter. Larrabee ex rel. Jones v. Derwinski, 968 F.2d 1497, 1499 (2d Cir.1992). Over time, however, exceptions to the preclusion provision began to appear. This development occurred most notably in the D.C. Circuit, see, e.g., Tracy v. Gleason, 379 F.2d 469, 472-73 (D.C.Cir.1967), where a procession of decisions ... `significantly narrow[ed] the preclusion statute' and limited its application to bar review of challenges related to initial filing of claims. Larrabee ex rel. Jones, 968 F.2d at 1500 (quoting Note, Judicial Review of Allegedly Ultra Vires Actions of the Veterans' Administration: Does 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) Preclude Review?, 55 Fordham L.Rev. 579, 596 (1987) (alteration in original)). In response to the D.C. Circuit's fairly tortured construction of the jurisdictional limitation, in 1970 Congress reemphasized its clear intent that the exemption from judicial review ... be all inclusive, and it amended the statute to provide that except for certain contractual benefits, the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration shall be unreviewable. H.R.Rep. No. 91-1166 at 10 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3723, 3730-31. The result was 38 U.S.C. § 211, [9] the precursor to § 511, which we construe here. Four years later, the Supreme Court interpreted § 211 in the context of an equal protection challenge to statutes related to veterans' benefits. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974). The Supreme Court held that § 211 precluded only review of decisions that arise in the administration by the Veterans' Administration of a statute providing benefits for veterans. Id. at 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160 (emphasis added). Declaring that construing § 211 to eliminate all federal court review of constitutional challenges to veterans' benefits legislation would raise serious questions concerning the constitutionality of § 211, and invoking the constitutional avoidance doctrine, the Court construed § 211 to allow federal court review of a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute itself. Id. at 366-67, 94 S.Ct. 1160. The Robison Court therefore concluded that district courts had jurisdiction to consider a direct facial challenge to statutes affecting veterans' benefits. Id. at 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160. Fourteen years after deciding Robison, the Supreme Court revisited the jurisdictional limitations of § 211 in Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 108 S.Ct. 1372, 99 L.Ed.2d 618 (1988). There, the Court held that § 211 did not bar federal courts from reviewing whether the VA's regulations conflicted with § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, which requires that federal programs not discriminate against handicapped individuals solely because of their handicap. Traynor, 485 U.S. at 545, 108 S.Ct. 1372. Section 211(a), the Court said, insulates from review decisions of law and fact ... made in interpreting or applying a particular provision of that statute to a particular set of facts. Id. at 543, 108 S.Ct. 1372. The Court noted that the VA had no special expertise in assessing the validity of its regulations against a later passed statute of general application. Id. at 544, 108 S.Ct. 1372. The Court doubted that permitting federal court review would interfere with the VA or burden the agency with expensive and time-consuming litigation. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court invited the VA to seek[ ] appropriate relief from Congress if experience proves otherwise. Id. at 544-45, 108 S.Ct. 1372.
Congress responded almost immediately to the Court's invitation in Traynor. For Congress, Traynor threatened to increase the judiciary's involvement in technical VA decision-making. See H.R.Rep. No. 100-963, at 20-21, 27 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5802-03, 5809-10. In order to dissuade the judiciary from ignoring the explicit language that Congress used in isolating decisions of the Administrator from judicial scrutiny, id. at 21, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5802, Congress overhauled both the internal review mechanism and § 211 in the VJRA. Pub.L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105. The VJRA made three fundamental changes to the procedures and statutes affecting review of VA decisions. First, the VJRA placed responsibility for reviewing decisions made by VA Regional Offices and the Board of Veterans' Appeals in a new Article I court, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251, 7261. As Congress explained, the creation of the Veterans Court was intended to provide a more independent review by a body which is not bound by the Administrator's view of the law, and that will be more clearly perceived as one which has as its sole function deciding claims in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States. H.R.Rep. No. 100-963, at 26, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5808. The statute also provide[d] claimants with an avenue for the review of VA decisions that would otherwise have been unreviewable under prior veterans-related legislation. Beamon v. Brown, 125 F.3d 965, 972 (6th Cir.1997). Congress indicated that the Veterans Court's authority would extend to  all questions involving benefits under laws administered by the VA. This would include factual, legal, and constitutional questions. H.R.Rep. No. 100-963, at 5, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5786 (emphasis added). To that end, Congress conferred on the Veterans Court  exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the Board of Veterans' Appeals, 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (emphasis added), and its powers include the authority to decide any question of law relevant to benefits proceedings, id. § 7261(a)(1), and compel action of the Secretary unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed, id. § 7261(a)(2). The Veterans Court also has authority under the All Writs Act to issue writs necessary or appropriate in aid of [its] jurisdiction[ ]. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); see also Erspamer v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 3, 7 (1990) (holding that this court has jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs under the All Writs Act). Second, decisions of the Veterans Court are reviewed exclusively by the Federal Circuit, which shall decide all relevant questions of law, including interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), (c), (d)(1). [10] Although the Federal Circuit may not review factual determinations, it may review the application of law to facts if a constitutional issue is implicated. Id. § 7292(d)(2). The decisions of the Federal Circuit are final and only subject to review by the Supreme Court upon certiorari. Id. § 7292(c). As the Second Circuit observed, [b]y providing judicial review in the Federal Circuit, Congress intended to obviate the Supreme Court's reluctance to construe [§ 211] as barring judicial review of substantial statutory and constitutional claims, while maintaining uniformity by establishing an exclusive mechanism for appellate review of decisions of the Secretary. Larrabee ex rel. Jones, 968 F.2d at 1501 (citations omitted). Third and finally, Congress expanded the provision precluding judicial review, formerly § 211. Under the new provision, eventually codified at 38 U.S.C. § 511, [11] the VA shall decide all questions of law and fact necessary to a decision by the Secretary under a law that affects the provision of benefits by the Secretary to veterans. 38 U.S.C. § 511(a). [12] Whereas § 211(a) prohibited review of decisions... under any law ... providing benefits for veterans, 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970), § 511(a) prohibits review of all questions of law and fact necessary to a decision ... that affects the provision of benefits, 38 U.S.C. § 511(a) (2006). With this change, Congress intended to broaden the scope of section 211 and limit outside court intervention in the VA decisionmaking process. See H.R.Rep. No. 100-963, at 27, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5809; see also Larrabee ex rel. Jones, 968 F.2d at 1501 (The VJRA ... broadens section 211's preclusion of judicial review by other courts.). The nonreviewability provision in § 511(a) is subject to four exceptions, one of which is relevant here and we have previously discussed: The Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit may review the Secretary's decisions regarding veterans' benefits. 38 U.S.C. § 511(b)(4); see id. §§ 7252, 7292. In sum, the VJRA supplies two independent means by which we are disqualified from hearing veterans' suits concerning their benefits. First, Congress has expressly disqualified us from hearing cases related to VA benefits in § 511(a) (may not be reviewed by any ... court), and second, Congress has conferred exclusive jurisdiction over such claims to the Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit, id. §§ 511(b)(4), 7252(a), 7292(c). The provisions may not be co-extensive, so if a claim comes within either provision, the district court is divested of jurisdiction that it otherwise might have exercised under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we are divested of any power of appellate review. See H.R.Rep. No. 100-963, at 28, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5810 (By vesting jurisdiction of challenges brought under the APA solely in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the bill deprives United States District Courts of jurisdiction to hear such matters under 28 U.S.C. 1331.). Together, these provisions demonstrate that Congress was quite serious about limiting our jurisdiction over anything dealing with the provision of veterans' benefits.