Opinion ID: 798076
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Interference with Religious Practices

Text: 111 Hasty also argues that Judge Gleeson should have dismissed the Plaintiff's First Amendment claim against him on qualified immunity grounds because (1) BOP regulations conclusively establish a lack of personal involvement and (2) the Plaintiff did not allege a violation of his First Amendment rights. 112 Both arguments lack merit. Hasty contends that the only policy on religion at the MDC was the official BOP policy, codified at 28 C.F.R. part 548, and that the Plaintiff has not indicated that these policies were suspended or that he availed himself of available complaint procedures, see 28 C.F.R. part 542. Hasty contends that he was under no clearly established constitutional obligation to take affirmative steps to inquire whether Plaintiff observed particular religious practices, but as the BOP regulations instruct, Plaintiff had the responsibility to make his religious preferences known. Br. for Hasty at 47. But neither the complaint procedures nor the official policy governing religion allowed Hasty to ignore violations of detainees' First Amendment rights. If Hasty is arguing that the Plaintiff has forfeited his right to recover damages because he did not follow administrative complaint procedures, this may be relevant to the merits of the case, but it is not relevant to a qualified immunity defense. 113 Similarly without merit, Hasty argues that he could not be personally involved in any deprivations of religious freedom because BOP regulations establish that prison chaplains are responsible for managing religious activities within the institution. 28 C.F.R. § 548.12. As the Plaintiff points out, however, Hasty ignores other regulations stating that the warden determines, among other things, what religious items may be used by prisoners, see id. § 548.16, and whether attendance at religious functions is open to all prisoners, id. § 548.15. 114 Hasty's second argument is that Plaintiff has not alleged a violation of his First Amendment rights. He relies on O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987), which applied Turner 's legitimate penological interests test to First Amendment claims, see id. at 348-49, 107 S.Ct. 2400. Though recognizing that a prison regulation precluded some Muslim prisoners from attending Friday prayers, see id. at 345, 107 S.Ct. 2400, the Supreme Court found the regulation justified under Turner, focusing on the officials' legitimate security objectives and the availability of other channels by which prisoners could exercise their religious rights, see id. at 350-53, 107 S.Ct. 2400. In the pending case, however, the Plaintiff alleges that he was not allowed to attend Friday prayers, that prison guards banged on his door when he tried to pray, and that his Koran was routinely confiscated. 11 These allegations suffice to preclude a qualified immunity defense at this stage of the litigation. In particular, consideration of Hasty's arguments—that restrictions on movement and possessions ... were a necessary part of the legitimate and proper functioning of the maximum security procedures in the ADMAX SHU and that such restrictions were justified by security concerns and other institutional needs, Br. for Hasty at 49-50—must await factual discovery so that the Government's asserted security interests can be assessed against a factual record of what restrictions actually existed and what purpose they served.