Opinion ID: 2686712
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: forest service jurisdiction over activities

Text: AFFECTING FOREST SERVICE LAND Parker’s principal argument is that his actions took place on Salmon la Sac road—a Kittitas County road authorized by an easement from Plum Creek Timber Company to the county—and that the Forest Service’s own regulations explicitly exempt such a road from the operation of 36 C.F.R. Part 261. The flaw in this reasoning is that Parker cites only part of the relevant regulation and overlooks the Forest Service’s broad authority to regulate activities “affecting” Forest Service land. 6 UNITED STATES V. PARKER Part 261 prohibits certain activities in and around Forest Service property, including, as relevant here, selling merchandise or conducting work activities or services not authorized by federal law, regulation, or special-use authorization. 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c). The prohibitions of Part 261 apply when an act or omission “occurs in the National Forest System or on a National Forest System road or trail,” id. § 261.1(a)(1), or when the act or omission “affects, threatens, or endangers property of the United States administered by the Forest Service.” Id. § 261.1(a)(2). Parker conveniently skips over the proviso in (a)(2). The regulation defines “National Forest System” to include “all national forest lands and waters reserved or withdrawn from the public domain of the United States [or] . . . acquired . . . .” Id. § 261.2. A “[f]orest road or trail” is defined as [a] road or trail wholly or partly within or adjacent to and serving the National Forest System that the Forest Service determines is necessary for the protection, administration, and utilization of the National Forest System and the use and development of its resources[,] and “National Forest System road” is defined as a subset of the above, namely [a] forest road other than a road which has been authorized by a legally documented UNITED STATES V. PARKER 7 right-of-way held by a State, county, or other local public road authority. Id. (emphasis added). It appears that the Highway at issue here was not a “National Forest System road,” because that term is reserved for forest roads not subject to easements held by public entities, id., and Kittitas County had been granted an easement over the Highway “for public road purposes.”1 Although the existence of a right-of-way or an easement may remove a road from the definition of “National Forest System road,” it does not deprive the Forest Service of authority over the road. To begin, exempting roads subject to an easement from the definition of “National Forest System road or trail” was expressly meant not to “in any way affect the Forest Service’s jurisdiction to enforce traffic laws, to protect NFS lands underlying routes, or to regulate use, including use on valid rights-of-way.” Travel Management; Designated Routes and Areas for Motor Vehicle Use, 70 Fed. Reg. 68,264, 68,275 (Nov. 9, 2005); see also id. at 68,283 (“Part 261– Prohibitions,” paragraph 2) (noting that the comments at 68,275 applied to both § 261 and § 212). Although Parker cites language, drafted for inclusion in the rule, that may have suggested that the Forest Service was ceding all authority 1 The magistrate judge found that the easement did not create exclusive rights in Kittitas County; that it permitted Kittitas County to “extend rights and privileges for use . . . to other governmental agencies”; and that it was “never intended to deprive any other governmental agency of the ability or jurisdiction to regulate conduct on the highway or within its described easement.” 8 UNITED STATES V. PARKER over roads with rights-of-way, the language Parker references was deleted from the final rule. Id. at 68,275. Because the Forest Service’s enforcement actions in Parker’s case related to the “protect[ion of] NFS lands underlying routes” or the “regula[tion of] use,” the Forest Service retained jurisdiction over those activities whether or not the road is not a National Forest System road. Recognizing the Forest Service’s broad authority to protect its lands, we turn to the specific authority granted under § 261.1(a)(2), which covers acts or omissions that “affect[], threaten[], or endanger[] property of the United States administered by the Forest Service.” “It is well established that [the Property Clause of the Constitution2] grants to the United States power to regulate conduct on nonfederal land when reasonably necessary to protect adjacent federal property. . . .” United States v. Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). Lindsey, like Parker’s case, involved regulations issued pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 551 and encompassing activities that “affect[], threaten[] or endanger[]” Forest Service property. Two people were charged with violating Department of Agriculture regulations prohibiting the use of campfires without a permit. Id. at 6, n.1. We held that the federal government had jurisdiction to regulate the building of campfires on land “legally on the river bed, title to which is held by the State,” in order to protect the surrounding National Forests, because the government retained jurisdiction under the Property Clause. Id. at 6–7. Accord United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 2 The Property Clause provides that “Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” U.S. Const. art. IV. UNITED STATES V. PARKER 9 (1927) (holding that Congress could “prohibit the doing of acts upon privately owned lands that imperil the publicly owned forests,” in a case involving the building of fires); United States v. Anglin, 438 F.3d 1229, 1230 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that it was “irrelevant” that defendants were presented while off public land with a notice that they had violated Part 261 while on public land); Free Enter. Canoe Renters Ass’n of Missouri v. Watt, 711 F.2d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting, in a case involving permit requirements for canoe outfitters whose commercial activities took place on public roads within a National Scenic Riverway, that Congress can regulate conduct not on federal land that would threaten federal land). The commercial activity here, like building a fire or launching a canoe, is one that has implications for National Forest land even if commenced on property adjacent to the forest. As the magistrate judge noted, “[r]enting snowmobiles to multiple individuals untrained or inexperienced in their operation might cause fire, safety or environmental hazards within the National Forest.” Indeed, the Forest Service regulations specifically provide for certain restrictions and prohibitions on use by over-snow vehicles. 36 C.F.R. § 212.81. But more importantly, Parker was running a commercial operation that was predicated on dispatching snowmobiles into the National Forest, and he did so without obtaining the required special use permit. That this activity “affect[ed], threaten[ed], or endanger[ed]” National Forest lands is beyond argument. Id. § 261.1(a)(2). The Forest Service also had jurisdiction over Parker’s activities because they took place “in the National Forest System” for the purposes of § 261.1(a)(1). Roberson encountered Parker on the Highway, but Parker led a group 10 UNITED STATES V. PARKER of his clients “further into the National Forest on snowmobiles.” The district court adopted the finding of the magistrate judge that Parker’s “commercial or work activity” was “done by the delivery of multiple customers and snowmobiles to National Forest land at the side of the Salmon la Sac highway.” Photographic evidence admitted at trial showed that the Highway itself had been cleared of snow on the dates of the encounters, and as such was unsuitable for snowmobiling, indicating that Parker’s clients were destined for the Forest. In other words, Parker’s activities both took place “in the National Forest System” and “affect[ed], threaten[ed], or endanger[ed] National Forest land.” For these reasons, we hold that the Forest Service had jurisdiction over Parker’s activities on the Highway under both § 261.1(a)(1) and (a)(2).