Opinion ID: 2094969
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: There Was Sufficient Evidence to Support Hilding's Convictions for Sexual Assault and Stalking.

Text: Hilding asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for stalking and for sexual assault. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. With regard to the stalking charge, Hilding was convicted of a violation of § 28-311.03, which provides that a person is guilty of stalking if he or she willfully harasses another person or a family or household member of such person with the intent to injure, terrify, threaten, or intimidate. Hilding notes that many of the calls between himself and M.S. were initiated by M.S. and that some were made at the request of the police. He asserts that his statements were responses to allegations made by M.S. and were invited by the controlled calls initiated by the police. The evidence in this case included evidence of numerous telephone calls initiated by Hilding to M.S. and of numerous e-mails Hilding sent to M.S. Most of these communications were initiated by Hilding rather than by M.S., and at least some of the communications by M.S. were responding to messages from Hilding. Furthermore, the stalking charge was supported by numerous statements Hilding made to M.S. in the telephone calls and e-mails, and such statements could rationally support a conviction regardless of which party initiated the communications. Hilding made numerous statements to the effect that he would tell people, including M.S.' family, friends, and coworkers, that M.S. had a sexually transmitted disease. He also made numerous threats of physical harm to M.S., to her brother, and to the men that M.S. dated. The jury reasonably could have found that Hilding's harassing communications were intended to injure, terrify, threaten, or intimidate M.S. and amounted to stalking. See § 28-311.03. With regard to the sexual assault charges, Hilding was convicted of two violations of § 28-319, which provides that a person is guilty of first degree sexual assault if he or she subjects another person to sexual penetration . . . without the consent of the victim. In Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-318(8)(a) (Reissue 2008), [w]ithout consent is defined to mean, inter alia, that [t]he victim was compelled to submit due to the use of force or threat of force or coercion, or . . . the victim expressed a lack of consent through words. Hilding concedes that at trial, he admitted to sexual intercourse with M.S. on the days charged and states that the only issue at trial was whether M.S. consented. He also acknowledges that the issue is largely one of witness credibility, but he argues that M.S.' testimony was so conflicting and her conduct so implausible that her testimony stating she did not consent is unbelievable and could not as a matter of law constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Brief for appellant at 24-25. The testimony of M.S., if believed by the jury, could establish that the sexual penetration was without consent as defined in § 28-318(8)(a). She testified that Hilding used force, the threat of force, or coercion to compel her to submit to sexual penetration and, additionally, that she expressed her lack of consent through words by telling him she did not want to have sex. Hilding's sole argument is that M.S.' testimony was not credible; however, the jury, as the fact finder, found her testimony to be credible. When reviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, we, as an appellate court, do not pass on the credibility of witnesses, see State v. Branch, 277 Neb. 738, 764 N.W.2d 867 (2009), and because the jury as the trier of fact could have found the essential elements of first degree sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt based on M.S.' testimony, the evidence was sufficient to support Hilding's two convictions for first degree sexual assault. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Hilding's convictions for stalking and two counts of first degree sexual assault.