Opinion ID: 1468342
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: merger of felony murder (rape) and rape

Text: Appellant next contends that his conviction for rape must be vacated because this offense should merge into the felony murder which was based on it and for which appellant was also convicted and sentenced. Because the purposes of the felony murder doctrine would in this way be violated, and for reasons we shall discuss, we find no justification for the application of the doctrine of merger to felony murder. We thus affirm. Merger of two offenses is ordinarily appropriate when the lesser offense consists entirely of some but not all of the elements of the greater offense. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932); Hall v. United States, D.C.App., 343 A.2d 35, 38-39 (1975). Thus, for example, assault merges into assault with a dangerous weapon, and assault with a dangerous weapon merges into armed robbery. See Bates v. United States, D.C.App., 327 A.2d 542 (1974); Taylor v. United States, D.C.App., 324 A.2d 683 (1974); Quick v. United States, D.C.App., 316 A.2d 875 (1974). In determining whether merger is appropriate, this court has refused to analyze solely by abstract consideration of the statutes involved or the wording of the indictment, and has looked instead to the societal interests protected by the statutes under consideration. Hall v. United States, D.C. App., 343 A.2d 35, 39 (1975); [3] cf. Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 79 S.Ct. 421, 3 L.Ed.2d 516 (1959). Shortly after our decision in Hall we upheld separate convictions for first-degree premeditated murder and felony murder (burglary), holding that the societal interests served by each statute are separate and distinct. Blango v. United States, D.C. App., 373 A.2d 885, 888 (1977). In further explaining this rationale, we later said, the societal interest served by the burglary statute, protection of occupied dwellings, is separate and distinct from that of the murder statute, security and value of the person. Harris v. United States, D.C.App., 377 A.2d 34, 38 (1977). For similar reasons we necessarily hold that the societal interests which Congress sought to protect by enactment of D.C.Code 1973, § 22-2401 (felony murder) and § 22-2801 (rape) are separate and distinct. [4] The rape statute is to protect women from sexual assault. The felony murder statute purports to protect human life  it dispenses with the need for the prosecution to establish that the accused killed with a particular state of mind, and instead permits the jury to infer the requisite intent from the fact that a felony was committed. [5] We find nothing in this legislation to suggest that Congress intended the underlying offense (rape) to be nonprosecutable under the merger rule when the defendant is charged with felony murder. Accordingly there can be no merger of these offenses. Appellant directs our attention to United States v. Greene, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 489 F.2d 1145 (1973), in which the United States Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that conviction for rescue of a federal prisoner, a federal felony, merged into conviction for felony murder. The court cited no precedent for its holding, and indeed as Chief Judge Bazelon observed in his statement as to why he would grant rehearing en banc, this court has affirmed both the underlying felony and the felony murder in countless cases. [6] Id. at 45, 489 F.2d at 1169. Greene is not binding on this court [7] and we decline to apply its reasoning to this case. We find highly persuasive, however, the views expressed by Chief Judge Bazelon: The government itself pointed out in its petition for rehearing that this merger was predicated on a wholly erroneous understanding of the felony murder doctrine. At common law, homicides were divided into two categories, murder and manslaughter, with murder requiring a showing of malice. Any homicide committed in the course of a felony was considered murder because malice could be implied from the commission of the felony. When homicides were further subdivided by statute into first degree murder, second degree murder and manslaughter, the doctrine of felony murder was preserved, and the underlying felony was viewed as providing the premeditation and deliberation otherwise required for first degree murder, as well as malice, where necessary. Given this rationale for the felony murder doctrine, it strains credulity to hold that the underlying felony merges into the felony murder. The statute proscribing the underlying felony  robbery, for example  is designed to protect a wholly different societal interest from the felony murder statute, which is intended to protect against homicide. The underlying felony is an essential element of felony murder only because without it the homicide might be second degree murder or manslaughter. Clearly, neither manslaughter nor second degree murder merges with any other felony like robbery or assisting a prisoner to escape. [ Id. at 44-45, 489 F.2d at 1168-69 (footnotes omitted).] We are impressed both with Chief Judge Bazelon's societal interest analysis and with his recognition that while the underlying felony is an element of felony murder it serves a more important function as an intent-divining mechanism. Consistent with this view it is clear that rape is not a lesser included offense of felony murder, and that merger is inappropriate even absent societal interest analysis. Appellant also directs our attention to state court decisions which have applied the merger doctrine to felony murder. [8] We find more persuasive the cases which have declined to apply merger in this situation. [9] We cannot accept a construction of law the effect of which would be to render the underlying felony a nullity any time death occurred during its perpetration. To do so would encourage rather than deter crime. [10] We find nothing to suggest that this was the congressional intent. Appellant's conviction for rape is affirmed.