Opinion ID: 1108486
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Entitlement to judgment as a matter of law

Text: Chevron and PPG seek to minimize the significance of the remaining genuine issue of material fact discussed above by arguing that, even if water bottoms existed in Unit Tract 1 at the time of the 1938 transfer, they are nevertheless entitled to judgment as a matter of law. According to Chevron and PPG, the question of the State's continued ownership of water bottoms after the 1938 transfer is immaterial because the BLD, as a political subdivision or agent of the State, granted the mineral lease to Chevron on the State's behalf and the State is therefore a party to the lease and thus prohibited from attacking the validity of the lease. This argument perhaps best reveals the fundamental flaw in the position held by Chevron and PPG throughout this case. Chevron and PPG have placed so much reliance on the validity of the lease from the BLD to Chevron that they have failed to properly address some of the valid arguments set forth by the State. As we have already stated, the State is not attacking the validity of Chevron's lease, at least not on the face of the documents in the record. Rather, the State appears to be conceding the validity of the lease (at least for purposes of this litigation), but is simply seeking any portion of the royalties derived from Unit Tract 1 that might be attributable to property on which it continues to own the mineral rights because it never conveyed some of the property (the land that was inundated by water in 1938) to BLD. Thus, the fact that the Chevron lease may be valid is not material to the issues in this case. Chevron, PPG, and aligned defendant, Robert L. Lobrano, support their argument that BLD granted the mineral lease on Unit Tract 1 to Chevron as an agent of the State by citing the following language from this court's decision in Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District v. Department of Natural Resources : The well settled principle that a levee district is a creature or agency of the state was confirmed by the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. 496 So.2d 281, 289 (La.10/20/86). However, we find the fact that a levee district is a creature or agency of the State does not control the issue presented in this case, as Chevron and PPG suggest, for the reasons set forth below. First, we note that Chevron and PPG fail to explain the significance of the fact that the BLD is a creature or agency of the State to the issues presented herein. Even if, as Chevron and PPG argue, BLD granted the lease to Chevron on behalf of the State, that fact does not necessarily mean that the State itself is not entitled to receive any part of the royalties from the mineral lease, if the State can prove that some portions of Unit Tract 1 were never conveyed to the BLD because they constituted water bottoms at the time of the 1938 conveyance. Simply arguing that BLD is or was the State, without any citations to law or policy that explain the significance of that fact, is not sufficient to prove that PPG should receive all the royalties derived from Unit Tract 1 and/or that Chevron and PPG are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Second, the argument that the BLD is the State ignores an important reality. The fact is that, even though this court has held that levee districts are political subdivisions, agencies, and/or creatures of the State, the BLD was consolidated and merged with PPG in 1975, and PPG is unquestionably not the State of Louisiana. Chevron's and PPG's argument that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law simply ignores the fact that they are, in reality, asserting that all the royalties being derived from Unit Tract 1 should go to PPG, despite the fact that a remaining genuine issue of material fact remains regarding the State's ownership of mineral rights on some portions of Unit Tract 1 that may have been water bottoms at the time of the 1938 conveyance. The parties have not cited any law or cases setting forth the significance of the consolidation and merger of levee boards with local governmental subdivisions, a consolidation and merger which is allowed by La. Const. Art. VI, § 16(A). Given the disputed facts relative to the condition of Unit Tract 1 in 1938 and the consequential issues of law, we find that Chevron and PPG have not proved that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law and thus have not carried their burden of proving their entitlement to summary judgment.