Opinion ID: 2972268
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Faulkner’s Detention in the Police Car

Text: Faulkner claims that, even if the initial stop of his vehicle was justified, the officers’ decision to detain him in the back seat of the police cruiser during the stop was an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Because Faulkner’s brief detention in the back seat of the police cruiser was justified by his suspicious behavior after the traffic stop, and because the detention does not appear to have lasted longer than was necessary to run Faulkner’s license and issue a citation, his detention was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. A traffic stop is “analogous to a ‘Terry stop.’” United States v. Palomino, 100 F.3d 446, 449 (6th Cir. 1996). A valid traffic stop must be justified at its inception, and any detention must be related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Id. Accordingly, “[e]ven if the initial stop is lawful, any subsequent detention must not be excessively intrusive.” Id. Because the initial stop of Faulkner’s car was justified, the relevant question therefore becomes whether the detention exceeded the purpose and objective of the stop. United States v. Bradshaw, 102 F.3d 204, 212 (6th Cir. 1996). -7- No. 04-5589 United States v. Faulkner The detention of Faulkner was well within the purpose and objective of the initial search. Faulkner was initially stopped for violating a traffic ordinance. Faulkner was not detained longer than was necessary for the police to perform a records check of Faulkner’s vehicle and license. His detention was therefore well within the bounds of the initial traffic stop. See United States v. Wellman, 185 F.3d 651, 656 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Bradshaw, 102 F.3d at 212). Furthermore, the placement of Faulkner in the police cruiser was reasonable. Officer Schafer testified that he placed Faulkner in the police cruiser because, based on Faulkner’s behavior, Schafer had concerns that Faulkner would either flee the scene or attempt to fight an officer. A defendant’s “nervous” and “agitated” behavior, while not significant enough to warrant detention exceeding the scope of the original stop, see United States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159, 162-63 (6th Cir. 1995), can justify detention in a police cruiser for a duration not exceeding the bounds of the initial stop. See Bradshaw, 102 F.3d at 212 nn.16 & 18 (stating that a defendant’s behavior in exiting his vehicle and approaching the officer in a “nervous” and “jittery” manner provides a basis for detention based on safety concerns); United States v. Calderon-Valenzuela, Nos. 98-4353 & 98-4355, 2000 WL 571953, at  3 (6th Cir. May 3, 2000) (finding that “[a] suspect may be detained in a police cruiser until the purposes of an initial traffic stop are completed”). Accordingly, the placement of Faulkner in the police cruiser during the time period necessary to run a check of his license was reasonable. -8- No. 04-5589 United States v. Faulkner