Opinion ID: 2561985
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dismissal is proper remedy

Text: ¶ 74 The Court of Appeals stated the remedy for insufficient evidence was remand not dismissal because double jeopardy does not preclude retrial in the civil context.... Anderson, 134 Wash.App. at 324, 139 P.3d 396. This is partly correct. ¶ 75 The Court of Appeals correctly noted under our existing precedent double jeopardy does not apply to sexually violent predator petitions because those petitions are civil rather than criminal. Young, 122 Wash.2d at 59, 857 P.2d 989. However, as properly observed by Judge Armstrong, if we hold that the State failed to prove a recent overt act, res judicata or law of the case would prevent the State from again litigating the issue on the same evidence.  Anderson 134 Wash.App. at 328, 139 P.3d 396 (Armstrong, J., dissenting); see also Hayes v. City of Seattle, 131 Wash.2d 706, 712-13, 934 P.2d 1179, 943 P.2d 265 (1997) (providing a multipart analysis to determine if a subsequent suit would be permitted). Since the State failed to prove a recent overt act, the State should be precluded from again seeking to prove so using the same evidence. The appropriate remedy is dismissal. ¶ 76 Therefore, I dissent. ¶ FAIRHURST, J. (concurring in dissent). ¶ 77 I find I cannot join either the majority or the dissent. I cannot join the majority's holding that John Charles Anderson's consensual relationships with four adult men constitute recent overt acts. [1] The majority misstates the record, and the conduct at issue is not sufficiently related to Anderson's diagnosis and pattern of nonconsensual, abusive relationships with children, and inappropriate behavior toward women. I cannot join the dissent because it unnecessarily posits a new definition of a recent overt act [2] and implies the statutory definition is unconstitutional. [3] Because of the flaws in both opinions, I write separately to explain why application of our statutes and case law demonstrates the State failed to prove Anderson committed a recent overt act. ¶ 78 Former RCW 71.09.020(10) establishes that a `[r]ecent overt act' is any act or threat that has either caused harm of a sexually violent nature or creates a reasonable apprehension of such harm in the mind of an objective person who knows of the history and mental condition of the person. The State's expert, Dr. Amy Phenix, testified that Anderson's relationships with four adult male patients at Western State Hospital (WSH) qualified as recent overt acts. Based on her assessment, the trial court found that Anderson's conduct with respect to these patients constituted a recent overt act. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 188. Although Anderson's partners are characterized as vulnerable, CP at 187, neither the State nor Anderson's partners claimed that any actual harm of a sexually violent nature resulted from these relationships. Dr. Larry Arnholt, who described Anderson's WSH partners at trial, testified that he was unaware of any coercive or forceful aspects to any of these sexual relationships. CP at 181. Contrary to the majority's assertion, there is no testimony that any of the partners had developmental or psychiatric disabilities that rendered them legally incapable of consenting. Majority at 995-96. [4] We must determine whether there is sufficient evidence that Anderson committed a recent overt act under former RCW 71.09.020(10), which in this case means whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Anderson's consensual sexual relationships with these four vulnerable adults created a reasonable apprehension of sexually violent harm in the mind of an objective person who knows Anderson's history and mental condition. [5] ¶ 79 Whether an individual's actions constitute a recent overt act is a mixed question of law and fact. In re Det. of Marshall, 156 Wash.2d 150, 158, 125 P.3d 111 (2005). I disagree with the majority's application of the law to the facts. In Marshall, this court adopted a two-step analysis for determining whether an act qualifies as a recent overt act for the purposes of a sexually violent predator petition. [F]irst, an inquiry must be made into the factual circumstances of the individual's history and mental condition; second, a legal inquiry must be made as to whether an objective person knowing the factual circumstances of the individual's history and mental condition would have a reasonable apprehension that the individual's act would cause harm of a sexually violent nature. Id. ¶ 80 Under Marshall, we first look to the factual circumstances of Anderson's history and mental condition. Dr. Phenix diagnosed Anderson with sexual sadism, pedophilia, and a personality disorder with antisocial, borderline, and narcissistic traits. His past offenses include anally raping a two-and-a-half-year-old boy (1988), assaulting his roommate (1988), and exposing himself to a female adult staff member (1989). During therapy sessions at WSH, Anderson admitted to sexual fantasies involving women, fantasies about sexual molestation of young boys and girls, and two other rapes of children. [6] The State also submitted evidence about Anderson's breaking WSH rules regarding alcohol consumption and leaving the hospital grounds without permission. For purposes of the factual inquiry, Anderson has a pattern of nonconsensual, abusive sexual relations with children and inappropriate sexual behavior toward women. ¶ 81 The second part of the Marshall test is the legal inquiry. The test requires a reasonable connection between the claimed recent overt act and the individual's history and mental condition in the view of an objective person. [7] Former RCW 71.09.020(10). The alleged recent overt acts include Anderson's sexual relationships with four adult male patients at WSH: Darryl, who is mildly to moderately retarded; Bobby, who is mildly retarded; Curtis, who is mildly retarded; and Rory, who has low average intelligence and borderline personality disorder. Although the majority chooses to analyze Anderson's fantasies as alleged overt acts, they are more appropriately addressed as evidence of his mental condition and history. Because no evidence was presented to show that Anderson's rule breaking behavior correlates to his diagnosis, these actions bear no reasonable relation to an apprehension of sexually violent harm. [8] ¶ 82 Thus, the alleged recent overt acts at issue are Anderson's consensual sexual relationships with fellow adult male patients. None of Anderson's partners filed any complaints against him, although WSH staff urged all parties to end the relationships. Dr. Phenix characterized the relationships as exploitive but did not describe them as abusive. Again, no witness testified that the relationships were nonconsensual. The question is whether these relationships create a reasonable apprehension of sexually violent harm, given Anderson's diagnosis and pattern of nonconsensual, abusive sexual relations with children and inappropriate behavior toward women. ¶ 83 Anderson's consensual relationships with the four adult male patients at WSH do not produce a reasonable apprehension of sexual violence given his history and diagnosis. [9] Although Dr. Phenix said that Anderson's relationships were akin to his past assaults on children, neither she nor Dr. Arnholt characterized Anderson's partners as having the developmental ages of children. [10] Nor did anyone claim the relationships were nonconsensual or abusive. The relationships were with men and do not have any reasonable relation to Anderson's history of inappropriate behavior toward women. Because Anderson's consensual relationships with adults did not cause sexually violent harm and do not create a reasonable apprehension of sexually violent harm in light of his history and mental condition, the Court of Appeals' finding that he is a sexually violent predator should be reversed. I dissent. WE CONCUR: CHAMBERS and STEPHENS, JJ.