Opinion ID: 6986353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bradbury in his official and individual capacity

Text: The district court also granted the motion to dismiss District Attorney Michael Bradbury in his official and individual capacity without leave to amend because Bradbury was entitled to qualified immunity “because no clearly established law proscribed his actions, and he could have reasonably believed his conduct was lawful.” The district court was correct in its finding. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the Supreme Court observed that “government officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” The test for qualified immunity is: (1) identification of the specific right being violated; (2) determination of whether the right was so clearly established as to alert a reasonable officer to its constitutional parameters; and (3) a determination of whether a reasonable officer would have believed that the policy or decision in question was lawful. See Kelley v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 666 (9th Cir.1995). It is unclear what policy or decision McDade objects to on Mr. Bradbury’s part. See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1998)(stating that “[Bia-bility under § 1983 must be based on the personal involvement of the defendant”). Indeed, the only action which can be attributed to Bradbury involves the provision of access to MEDS to Ms. West. Here, the district court correctly observed that no clearly established law prohibited the District Attorney’s provision of access to MEDS to Ms. West. Moreover, McDade has failed to demonstrate that Bradbury should have known that Ms. West’s access should have been restricted by virtue of her personal interest. “A reasonable belief that the conduct was lawful is sufficient to secure qualified immunity.” Kulas v. Valdez, 159 F.3d 453, 456 (9th Cir.1998). Given that there was no evidence to suggest that provision of the access code to Ms. West was unlawful, qualified immunity was justified in this instance.