Opinion ID: 195655
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Court's Denial of Motion for Continuance

Text: Appellant Flynn challenges the court's denial of his motion for continuance of trial to enable him to seek retained counsel, filed on September 25, 1992, as well as the court's refusal of his motion to reconsider, filed on the first day of trial, October 5, 1992. This Court will review the denial of Flynn's motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945, 952 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 1094 (1990). The record indicates that Flynn first requested, and was granted, the right to seek retained counsel on May 28, 1992, after withdrawing his motion to represent himself pro se. Flynn failed to retain counsel in the time allotted and on June 18, appeared before a magistrate judge in a hearing on the Government's motion to have counsel appointed for him. Flynn told the magistrate that he still desired to seek retained counsel and mentioned the names of two possible lawyers. The magistrate granted the Government's motion and appointed as Flynn's counsel Attorney Lawrence Gillis, who entered his appearance on July 6, 1992. This action by the court in no way interfered with Flynn's continued efforts to retain outside counsel. On September 1, 1992, the district court granted -34- Flynn's motion for continuance of trial, giving him one deadline, which lapsed, and extending it again until September 18 to enable Flynn to retain private counsel.18 Five days after the deadline, on September 23, Attorney Barry Wilson filed a motion to enter his appearance as Flynn's counsel and, on September 25, filed a motion to continue the October trial date until January of 1993, to give him time to prepare for trial. The district court denied the September 25 motion as well as a motion, filed on the first day of trial, to reconsider its ruling, finding that: Flynn's maneuvers with respect to counsel are such as to equate with a waiver of his right to choose counsel. . . . The court fully understands the difficulties imposed on Attorney Gillis by Mr. Flynn's refusal to date to cooperate with him, but it behooves Mr. Flynn to now sit down with his appointed counsel and to assist him in the presentation of his defenses. September 28, 1992, Order (Docket No. 187) at 3-4. Trial continued as scheduled, beginning on October 5, 1992, except that Attorney Gillis withdrew and Attorney Wilson took over as Flynn's retained counsel. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to assistance of counsel, which includes the right to counsel of one's choice. United States v. Hallock, 941 F.2d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 1991). While the right to effective assistance is absolute, 18 Flynn's motion was based on an affidavit filed by Gillis alleging a total breakdown in communication with his client because Flynn refused to cooperate with him in preparing a defense. -35- this Court has long held that a defendant's right to choose a particular counsel must be weighed against administration-ofjustice concerns and cannot be insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct reasonable and orderly court procedure. United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 86 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977); see also Hallock, 941 F.2d at 44; Machor, 879 F.2d at 952; Tuitt v. Fair, 822 F.2d 166 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 945 (1987). In light of these factors, this Court does not find that the district court abused its discretion in denying Flynn's motion for continuance. In essence, Flynn had nearly four months to secure private counsel -- from May 28, 1992, until September 18, 1992. The trial date was continued for one month at his behest; yet he continually failed to meet deadlines set by the court. Given these circumstances, the Court affirms the denial of Flynn's belated September 25 motion for continuance and his later motion to reconsider.19