Opinion ID: 2116540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: 4. Suggestion to Witness Morehead

Text: In a bar, prior to the commission of the murders, Nissen and Lotter had a discussion with witness Morehead, who later testified at trial. On direct examination, the prosecution asked Morehead whether Lotter made any statement regarding some trouble he was allegedly in. Morehead responded, No. He never said anything. Nissen said something about they were in trouble. At this point, defense counsel objected as to hearsay, and the objection was sustained. On redirect examination, the prosecution asked Morehead, The comment that you heard, was it during the approximate same time when there was talk about being in trouble? When they were talking about being in trouble? Morehead responded, Yeah. It all came. Once again, defense counsel objected, this time moving for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct, moving to strike, and moving that the jury be admonished. The objections were sustained, but defense counsel's motions were overruled. When the prosecutor has already been advised by the trial court that a particular question will not be permitted but continues to ask the question in an attempt to elicit incompetent testimony, the prosecutor commits misconduct. See State v. Gurule, 194 Neb. 618, 234 N.W.2d 603 (1975). See, also, State v. Palser, 238 Neb. 193, 469 N.W.2d 753 (1991). The question in the instant case is whether the prosecutor's misconduct was prejudicial. In Com. v. Wallace, 522 Pa. 297, 561 A.2d 719 (1989), the court addressed a similar situation. At trial the prosecution asked [a prosecution witness], `where did you meet the defendant Wallace' and [the witness] replied, `I met him in the West Virginia Penitentiary, 1973.' Id. at 307, 561 A.2d at 724. The defense objected and moved for mistrial. The trial court denied the motion and offered to admonish the jury, but the defense rejected the court's offer. On appeal, the defense argued that the testimony was highly prejudicial because it created an inference of past criminal acts. The prosecution argued that it was intended only to demonstrate the relationship between the defendant and the witness and did not relate to a specific past criminal act. References to prior criminal activities may be prejudicial even when the testimony conveys knowledge of those activities only by reasonable implication. The court noted there was no doubt that the the testimony created an inference to the jury that the [defendant] had been involved in prior criminal activity. Id. at 308, 561 A.2d at 724. However, the court also noted that there is no per se rule that requires a new trial for a defendant every time there is a reference to prior criminal activity. Id. at 308, 561 A.2d at 724-25. Considering that the testimony did not relate to specific acts and that the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, the court held that the improper reference was harmless at most. In the instant case, the prosecutor's question concerning the alleged trouble certainly created an inference to the jury that Lotter had been involved in prior criminal activity. However, prior to Morehead's testimony, defense counsel had elicited testimony from Nissen on cross-examination concerning the sexual assault of Brandon. Thus, the inference to be drawn by the jury would be that the trouble referred to by the prosecutor was the sexual assault. Because the jury had already been made aware of the sexual assault through defense counsel's cross-examination of Nissen, Lotter suffered no prejudice.