Opinion ID: 1967435
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Either under the Restatement Third or traditional negligence theory, the Phillips' claims should survive the present summary judgment effort.

Text: Appellants' arguments in support of the trial court's grant of summary judgment are constructed primarily on the intended user, simple tools, and open and obvious doctrines. As the lead correctly notes, a reasonably foreseeable use, as opposed to intended user framework, applies in the negligence setting. Nevertheless, in child-play fire cases, some courts have accepted arguments akin to Appellants' as controlling, although the various theories advanced by plaintiffs and reasons adopted by the courts make it difficult to generalize. [16] Other courts have concluded that the matter should be determined by risk-utility balancing, and thus, may be properly submitted to a jury. [17] See generally Annotation, Products Liability: Lighters and Lighter Fluid, 14 A.L.R.5th 47 (Lawyers Cooperative Publishing 1993 & West Group Supp.2002). The tension in these cases is obvious. On the one hand, concepts of parental responsibility and known and open childhood risks disfavor reallocation of loss. [18] Nevertheless, some of the policies underlying tort law loss reallocation are implicated in the disposable lighter cases, which involve a specific type of household, simple tool that may be particularly destructive and may be reasonably capable of safer design. See generally Jerry J. Phillips, Products Liability for Personal Injury to Minors, 56 VA. L.REV. 1223, 1240-41 (1970) ([E]ven the best of educational efforts cannot be expected to change the essential nature of children, and, unless we are prepared to ignore this fact, in many instances better product design presents the only realistic means available for protecting children against injury.). On balance, I agree that the above considerations are best assessed by a factfinder in a risk-utility equation. Thus, on the arguments presented in Appellants' summary judgment motion and properly before this Court, [19] I join the majority in its decision to refrain from precluding child resistance as a design obligation in terms of this particular type of household product known to be diverted to child play. I also believe that this view squares with the approach advanced in the Restatement Third.