Opinion ID: 1788225
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Fairness, Integrity, and Public Reputation of Jones' Trial

Text: Having concluded that Jones' substantial rights were affected when the Beard and Christy alternative perpetrator evidence was improperly excluded, we must next address the final consideration of the plain error analysiswas the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding (Jones' trial) seriously affected? The answer to this question is a close call. Here, we are particularly concerned with the generality of Jones' proffer of proof. Defense counsel are well-advised to make the most specific offer possible, even to the point of stating that witness X will testify as follows and witness Y will testify as follows. Further, defense counsel must be prepared to demonstrate that the proffered testimony is actually available and not offer more than can actually be proven. Here, the district court did not base its decisions to exclude the evidence on deficiencies in the form of Jones' offer of the proof, but instead used an erroneous legal standard. The error was plain and substantially affected Jones' rights to a fair trial. For us to speculate that the evidence would have been excluded had the correct standard been used would deny Jones the ability to argue against its exclusion using the correct standard. An even greater problem here is that we are forced to speculate on the ability of a defendant to present exculpatory evidence, which goes to the core of our constitutional protections for a defendant. Therefore, we conclude that the inability of Jones to address the exclusion of the Beard and Christy evidence in the context of the correct legal standard seriously affected the fairness and integrity of his trial. Accordingly, under our plain error analysis, we must hold that Jones' conviction be reversed and that he is entitled to a new trial.
Jones also argues that the district court erred in ordering that he wear a leg restraint during his trial. It is not necessary to address this issue in light of our holding that Jones' conviction should be reversed on other grounds. Further, Jones admits that even if we determine that it was error to order that he wear a leg restraint, the error was harmless because the jury never saw the restraint. Nevertheless, Jones asks that we address this issue to prevent further discretionary abuse by district courts [10] and we choose to do so for that reason. The decision to require a defendant to wear restraints during trial is within the discretion of the district court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 466, 475 (Minn.1999). But we have previously recognized that because of the prejudice involved in having the defendant restrained, to be constitutionally permissible the restraint must be justified by an essential state interest specific to each trial. State v. Shoen, 578 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Minn. 1998) (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986)). Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure 26.03, subd 2(c), dictates that restraints will not be used unless the trial judge has found such restraint reasonably necessary to maintain order or security. A trial judge who orders such restraint shall state the reasons on the record outside the presence of the jury. The nonexclusive list of factors to be considered in making the decision of whether to restrain the defendant include the following: (1) the seriousness of the charge; (2) the defendant's temperament and character; (3) the defendant's age and physical attributes; (4) the defendant's past record; (5) the defendant's prior escapes or attempted escapes; (6) threats made by the defendant to cause a disturbance; (7) the size and mood of the audience; (8) the nature and security of the courtroom; and (9) any less restrictive available alternatives. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d at 475. Here, the district court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury and made findings on the record as to why it ordered the restraint. The findings for why the restraint was ordered, however, are reminiscent of the findings we deemed insufficient in Shoen: the serious nature of the charges, the presumptive sentence of life in prison, and that this was the least restrictive means available. In Shoen, we stated that restraining the defendant was not objectively reasonable where the reasons offered for the restraint were that [the defendant] had been charged with first-degree murder,    that the restraint itself was the most innocuous type of restraint available, and that the jury would not know about it. Shoen, 578 N.W.2d at 715. Relying only on the seriousness of the charged crime and the inconspicuous nature of the restraint is no more objectively reasonable today than it was when we articulated the rule in Shoen. To hold otherwise would be to encourage courts to order restraints for all defendants charged with serious crimes. While the severity of the offense is an acceptable factor to be considered, it cannot be the only factor. Id. Accordingly, we hold that the court erred in ordering that Jones be restrained during his trial.
We next address the last error that Jones raised through his counsel. Jones alleges that there was prosecutorial misconduct during his trial, an allegation he makes for the first time on appeal. A defendant usually waives his right to raise the issue of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal when he fails to object or to seek a curative instruction at trial. State v. Torres, 632 N.W.2d, 609, 617-18 (Minn.2001). Relief will be granted in the absence of a timely objection only in cases involving unduly prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 450 (Minn.1997). Having already concluded that Jones is entitled to a new trial because the district court erred in failing to admit alternative perpetrator evidence, it is not necessary to address Jones' prosecutorial misconduct allegations in detail. We do note, however, that Jones' allegations of prosecutorial misconduct either lack merit or do not constitute the type of unduly prejudicial conduct that warrants relief in the absence of a timely objection. See id.
In addition to the arguments presented through counsel, Jones made eleven allegations of error in a pro se brief. Jones alleged the following: (1) he was harassed by police; (2) the state was delinquent in turning over discovery items; (3) Anderson lied about having had a deal with the state in exchange for his testimony; (4) Anderson was coached while on the witness stand; (5) there were inconsistencies in the medical examiner's testimony; (6) there was insufficient forensic evidence to support his conviction; (7) the district court erred in denying his requests for a change of venue; (8) the court erred in allowing two witnesses to violate a court order mandating that witnesses not refer to the victim by her first name; (9) the court erred in not admitting a letter Jones wrote about Anderson; (10) a prior conviction of a state witness was not revealed to the defense; and (11) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We have considered each of Jones' pro se arguments and, after a thorough review of the record and case law relevant to these arguments, we conclude that none of these claims has merit.
Finally, we address the district court's denial of Sandra Halverson's, the victim's sister, request for restitution. We address this issue because it is possible that it will recur as the result of a retrial. This appeal can be classified as a state appeal from a sentence in a first-degree murder case, over which we have inherent jurisdiction. See State v. Warren, 592 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Minn.1999). The district court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to award restitution because Minn. Stat. § 611A.01 does not include a murder victim's sister in the class of eligible victims. See Minn.Stat. § 611A.01 (2002). Issues involving the authority and jurisdiction of the district court are legal issues, which we review de novo. State v. Pflepsen, 590 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Minn.1999). Statutory construction is also a matter of law that we review de novo. Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 190 (Minn.1990). The restitution statute defines the victim, or the party eligible to receive restitution, as a natural person who incurs loss or harm as a result of a crime   . If the victim is a natural person and is deceased, `victim' means the deceased's surviving spouse or next of kin. Minn.Stat. § 611A.01(b) (2002). Here, the district court first determined that, in a homicide case, the victim is deceased; therefore, the restitution can be requested only by the surviving spouse or next of kin of the deceased victim. The state argues that a more general definition of victim, i.e., someone who incurs a loss or harm, applies here and the district court erred in applying the deceased provision to limit the number of victims. The state asserts that the if the victim    is deceased provision is not meant to limit the number of victims eligible to receive restitution; rather, its purpose is to preserve restitution claims for crime victims who, for some reason unrelated to the crime, die before they are able to collect restitution. While the state is correct that the plain meaning of the statute permits a victim's claim to be preserved even if she dies for reasons unrelated to the crime, this result does not explain how to define the victim[s] whose claims are preserved. Moreover, we conclude that the state's general definition is problematic. One problem with the state's expansive definition of victim is illustrated when we substitute the state's definition into the other uses of the word victim in the restitution statutory scheme. For example, Minn.Stat. § 611A.03, subd. 1 (2002), requires that the state make a reasonable and good faith effort to inform the victim of any plea agreements. The state's definition of victim would render this provision unduly burdensome because the victim would include not just the direct victim of the crime but also all those who have incur[red] a loss, including, apparently, that victim's family members and perhaps friends. Every crime resonates within its community and may create innumerable victims, from the person against whom the crime was perpetrated to the unknown neighbor whose feelings of security are undermined. These persons may have incurred some identifiable loss, but certainly the legislature cannot have intended the absurd result of forcing the state to make all such victims aware of every plea agreement it enters into. The legislature must instead have envisioned that victim in Minn.Stat. § 611A.01(b) be defined as a natural person who incurs loss or harm as a [direct] result of a crime. Accordingly, the court of appeals has adopted a similarly narrow interpretation of victim in the restitution context. This court has explained that the definition of victim in the restitution statute is narrower than other statutory definitions of victim. `[W]hile restitution covers a broader range of damages, it is limited to a narrower range of crime victims.' In re Welfare of J.A.D., 603 N.W.2d 844, 846 (Minn.App.1999) (quoting State v. Dendy, 520 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn.App.1994)). A narrow interpretation of the term victim is also consistent with other sections of the crime victims' rights statutory scheme to which the Minn.Stat. § 611A.01 definition for victim is to be applied. Minnesota Statutes § 611A.038 (2002) gives victims the right to submit impact statements at sentencing. It also provides that [a] representative of the community affected by the crime may submit an impact statement in the same manner that a victim may[,]    [which] shall describe the adverse social or economic effects the offense has had on persons residing and businesses operating in the community. Minn.Stat. § 611A.038(b). If the term victim encompassed all those who suffered a loss or harm as a result of the crime instead of just the direct victim of the crime, this section would be redundant. Similarly, under Minn.Stat. § 611A.039 (2002), which establishes the right to notice of a final disposition of a criminal case, the state is required to give such notice in cases in which there is an identifiable crime victim. It is not clear how such a victim would be identifiable unless it is because he or she was the direct victim of the crime. Finally, under Minn.Stat. § 611A.0395(a) (2002), the state is required to give the victim certain information in a notice of the defendant's appeal, including a statement that the victim and the victim's family may attend the argument or hearing. If the term victim was intended to encompass the direct victim's family in its definition, the phrase the victim and the victim's family would be redundant. Support for our interpretation of victim under Minn.Stat. § 611A.01 can also be found in the way the legislature used the term victim in describing a defendant's potential obligations when ordered to pay restitution. The statute includes the clause payment of compensation to the victim or the victim's family. Minn.Stat. §§ 609.10, subd. 2(a)(1) (2002); 609.125, subd. 2(a)(1) (2002). Thus, in looking at both the statutory provisions addressing victims' rights and those defining restitution obligations, we conclude the better interpretation of the term victim is that of the direct victim of the crime. In this case, however, the victim died as a result of the crime, as is always the case in a murder, and the district court then correctly looked at the If the victim    is deceased provision and noted that victim now means the deceased's surviving spouse or next of kin. Minn.Stat. § 611A.01(b). The state also argues that even if we adopt the district court's narrower interpretation of victim to mean surviving spouse or next of kin, a sister qualifies as next of kin and should be able to request restitution. Here, the district court appears to have determined that when the decedent has both a surviving spouse and next of kin, the or means that the next of kin can only claim restitution if there is no surviving spouse. The court offered no explanation for how it reached its determination, but it presumably read the disjunctive or to mean surviving spouse or [if there is none] next of kin. Apparently relying on the fact that Linda Jensen had a surviving spouse, the court determined that her sister could not recover, even though her surviving spouse never sought restitution. We conclude that the district court's interpretation of the disjunctive or contradicts the plain language of the statute. We construe the language to mean that the surviving spouse and next of kin cannot both recover, but it does not mean that the next of kin should be precluded from recovering when the surviving spouse does not seek restitution. Accordingly, if Halverson qualifies as a next of kin, she may be permitted to seek restitution because Jensen's surviving spouse apparently chose not to do so. To determine whether Halverson qualifies as next of kin under the statute requires that we define this term in the context of restitution. In support of its position that a victim's sister is entitled to restitution, the state cites to the wrongful death context, where `next of kin' means blood relatives who are members of the class from which beneficiaries are chosen under the intestacy statute. Wynkoop v. Carpenter, 574 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Minn. 1998). The state argues this definition is appropriate for restitution as well because one of the claims that can support a wrongful death action is an intentional murder, the act for which Halverson is seeking compensation. It is not clear, however, that the class of persons who qualify as restitution victims and those persons who are potential plaintiffs in a wrongful death action are sufficiently similar to borrow the definition of next of kin from the wrongful death context. More specifically, the next of kin who are restitution victim[s] under the statute appear to be only the persons who step into the shoes of the deceased direct victim of the crime, while the next of kin who are potential plaintiffs in a wrongful death action are the indirect victims of the crime. As the district court noted, the wrongful death statute differs from the restitution statute because it allows recovery for an unlimited number of persons as long as they are members of the group of spouse and next of kin. We conclude that the disjunctive use of the word or in the restitution statute suggests that only one person or class of persons is meant to be able to apply for restitution, so the term next of kin should be so defined. Thus, the next of kin who can recover under the restitution statute are more narrowly defined than those next of kin who are potential plaintiffs in a wrongful death action. Using the common law definition of next of kinthe nearest living blood relation accomplishes this result. See Watson v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 70 Minn. 514, 517, 73 N.W. 400, 401 (1897). Hence, we conclude that the common law definition of next of kin is the appropriate definition to use in the restitution context. Therefore, we hold that in a murder case the victim[s] eligible to receive restitution include either the murder victim's surviving spouse or her nearest living blood relation. As Linda Jensen's sister, Halverson cannot take under this definition because the record indicates that Linda Jensen's children are still living and they are in the class of persons who are her nearest living blood relatives who would qualify for restitution as her next of kin. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in denying Halverson's request for restitution. Reversed.