Opinion ID: 772680
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Multiplicity of counts I and III

Text: 20 Finley also argues that the district court erred as a matter of law when it denied the defense motion to dismiss the drug possession charge in count III of the indictment as multiplicitous. Count I charged distribution and was based on Finley's sale of the two bags of cocaine to Officer Alvarado. Count III charged possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and, from the evidence in the record, was apparently based on the remaining 19 bags that were not sold and were found in Finley's possession. According to Finley, count III violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it was not based on separate and distinct elements from count I. 21 An indictment is multiplicitous when it charges a single offense... multiple times, in separate counts, when, in law and fact, only one crime has been committed. United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Multiplicity is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. at 146. To determine whether separate counts charge the same offense more than once, we apply the test set out by the Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Under Blockburger, we determine 'whether there are two offenses or only one [by] whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.' United States v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 44, quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. 22 In Gore, we faced the precise issue before us today, namely whether drug distribution and drug possession offenses under 841(a)(1) may be charged separately when they arise from the same transaction. We held there that possession with intent and distribution should not be regarded as the same offense... except under the narrow set of facts where the evidence shows only that the defendant handed over a packet of drugs. Gore, 154 F.3d at 46 (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Gore court reasoned that where a defendant sells the entire quantity of drugs he possesses, his possession merges into the completed distribution offense. Id at 45-47. That is not what happened here. The evidence at trial showed that Finley sold only two of the 21 bags of cocaine and continued to possess the other 19. Clearly, on this evidence and in light of our holding in Gore, the indictment here properly charged possession and distribution separately.