Opinion ID: 2052707
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instructions at Aggravation-Mitigation

Text: Defendant claims that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing for the additional reason that the circuit court refused to give the jury nonpattern instructions he submitted. As a result, he argues that a new sentencing hearing is required. If the IPI instructions contain an applicable instruction on a subject about which the circuit court determines the jury should be instructed, the circuit court must use that instruction, unless the court determines that the instruction does not accurately state the law. 134 Ill.2d R. 451(a). It is within the circuit court's discretion to decide whether to give the jury a nonpattern instruction. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill.2d 484, 519, 218 Ill.Dec. 884, 670 N.E.2d 606 (1996). If the subject matter of the refused nonpattern instruction is covered by pattern instruction or other instructions given by the circuit court, no abuse of discretion will be found. Gilliam, 172 Ill.2d at 519, 218 Ill.Dec. 884, 670 N.E.2d 606.
According to defendant it was error for the circuit court to refuse his request to provide the jury with three nonpattern instructions concerning the jury's power to consider mercy in determining the appropriate sentence for him. In one of these instructions, defendant proposed the addition of the following paragraph to IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.01: There is nothing that prevents you from affording Timothy Buss mercy in these proceedings; and that such mercy, if based on the particular circumstances of the offense and the Defendant Timothy Buss, can constitute a mitigating factor sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence. The circuit court also refused defendant's requests to use two other nonpattern instructions concerning mercy. One informed the jury that In considering the death penalty, you may, if you wish to do so, consider whether or not you wish to extend mercy to the Defendant. The other provided: A mitigating circumstance is a fact about either the offense or about the defendant, which in fairness or in mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability or which justifies a sentence of less than death, although it does not justify or excuse the offense. The appropriateness of the exercise of mercy is itself a mitigating factor you may consider in determining whether the State has proved that the death penalty is warranted. You are also to consider as mitigating circumstances any other factors concerning the defendant that you find to be relevant. The circuit court refused these nonpattern instructions on the basis that the IPI instructions tendered by the State sufficiently instructed the jury on the subject. According to defendant, the circuit court failed to recognize its discretion to modify the IPI instructions or, to the extent Supreme Court Rule 451(a) prevented the circuit court from modifying the pattern instructions in this case, it is unconstitutional because, without the modification, defendant was denied a fair sentencing hearing. Alternatively, defendant asserts that the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing his instructions. He argues that the instructions he submitted should have been provided to the jury because the IPI instructions failed to inform the jury that it could consider mercy and how to do so. He contends that, without his instructions on mercy, the jury was left without adequate guidance as to the proper role of its mercy power. As a result, defendant argues, he was denied his right to due process and the protections against cruel and unusual punishment under the fourteenth and eighth amendments to the United States Constitution. In addition, defendant asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to renew defendant's request for a mercy instruction after this request was denied at the instruction conference. As a preliminary matter, we cannot agree with defendant's suggestion that the circuit court failed to recognize its discretion to modify the IPI instructions. At the instructions conference, defense counsel argued that it was within the court's discretion to accept the modifications proposed by defendant. The circuit court responded, I'm going to deny Defendant's one. I will stick with the IPI 7C.01. It's consistent with the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions that have been set forth by the Illinois Supreme Court. I will follow them. These statements indicate that the court recognized its power to modify the pattern instructions but chose not to do so because the subject matter of the refused instruction was covered by the IPI instructions. This was a proper exercise of discretion by the court. While a jury may properly consider mercy as a factor at a capital sentencing hearing, mercy must be considered in the context of all aggravating and mitigating factors. Hope, 168 Ill.2d at 46-47, 212 Ill.Dec. 909, 658 N.E.2d 391. Consequently, it is well established by the precedent of this court that no specific instruction concerning mercy is required when a jury is instructed that it should consider all circumstances that provide reasons for imposing a sentence other than death ( Hope, 168 Ill.2d at 46-47, 212 Ill.Dec. 909, 658 N.E.2d 391). See, e.g., People v. Miller, 173 Ill.2d 167, 198-99, 219 Ill.Dec. 43, 670 N.E.2d 721 (1996); People v. Sutherland, 155 Ill.2d 1, 29, 182 Ill.Dec. 577, 610 N.E.2d 1 (1992); People v. Simms, 143 Ill.2d 154, 182-83, 157 Ill.Dec. 483, 572 N.E.2d 947 (1991); People v. Lear, 143 Ill.2d 138, 151, 157 Ill.Dec. 412, 572 N.E.2d 876 (1991). In this case, the jury was instructed: In deciding whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, you should consider all the aggravating factors supported by the evidence and all the mitigating factors supported by the evidence   . Mitigating factors include: Any reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to death. Where there is evidence of a mitigating factor, the fact that such mitigating factor is not a factor specifically listed in these instructions does not preclude your consideration of the evidence. See IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06. This instruction permitted the jury to consider mercy, and, therefore, no additional specific instructions concerning this nonstatutory mitigating factor were required. See People v. Kidd, 175 Ill.2d 1, 50, 221 Ill.Dec. 486, 675 N.E.2d 910 (1996) (observing that this court has repeatedly rejected attempts by defendants to specify nonstatutory mitigating factors at the aggravation-mitigation stage). Defendant asks us to overrule the cases in which we have held that no separate mercy instruction is required. We continue to agree with the reasoning of those cases, however, and find that defendant's arguments do not support our rejection of that line of authority. Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing defendant's proposed instructions concerning mercy. In addition, given our holding that no specific instructions concerning mercy were required, we find no merit to defendant's arguments that Rule 451(a) unconstitutionally restricted the circuit court's ability to give such instructions and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to renew defendant's request for these instructions.
Defendant claims that the instructions at the aggravation-mitigation stage were also defective because of the circuit court's refusal to give the jury two instructions he proposed concerning the unanimity requirement (see 720 ILCS 5/9-1(g) (West 1994)). He asked that the jury be instructed as follows: There is no requirement that you reach a unanimous decision at this stage of the proceedings. If one or more of you have decided the defendant should not receive death, you may sign the verdict form without debate. The second unanimity instruction defendant proposed provided: If the jury or any juror determines that there are mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence, then the Court shall not sentence the Defendant, Timothy Buss, to death. The circuit court refused to use these nonpattern instructions. Instead, it gave the jury the following IPI instruction: Under the law, the defendant shall be sentenced to death if you unanimously find that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence. If you are unable to find unanimously that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence, the court will impose a sentence of natural life imprisonment, and no person serving a sentence of natural life imprisonment can be paroled or released, except through an order by the Governor for executive clemency. See IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.05. The jury was also instructed: [Y]ou may not sign a verdict imposing a death sentence unless you unanimously vote for it (see IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.07), and If you do not unanimously find from your consideration of all the evidence that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence, then you should sign the verdict requiring the court to impose a sentence other than death (see IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06). According to defendant, the circuit court's refusal of the unanimity instructions he proposed denied him a fair sentencing hearing because the IPI instructions provided to the jury did not give the jury a clear understanding of the unanimity rule. Defendant asserts that, because the circuit court refused his instructions, the jury was left with the mistaken belief that any verdict against the imposition of the death penalty also had to be unanimous. Defendant's challenge to the court's refusal to give his unanimity instructions is without merit for several reasons. First, given that there were IPI instructions that addressed this subject, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse defendant's nonpattern instructions. See Gilliam, 172 Ill.2d at 519, 218 Ill.Dec. 884, 670 N.E.2d 606. Indeed, after comparing the IPI instructions provided to the jury with defendant's proposed instructions, we are unable to discern any clarification of the unanimity rule made by defendant's instructions. In addition, this court has rejected the argument that the existing IPI instructions concerning the unanimity rule mislead the jury by suggesting that a verdict against the death penalty must be unanimous. Macri, 185 Ill.2d at 70, 235 Ill.Dec. 589, 705 N.E.2d 772. The refusal of defendant's unanimity instructions did not deny defendant a fair sentencing hearing.
Defendant's third challenge to the instructions provided to the jury at the aggravation-mitigation stage is that these instructions failed to correctly state the standard under which the jury may choose not to impose the death penalty. Although defendant's argument is somewhat difficult to understand, it appears that his objection to the instructions provided in his case is that they overstate[d] the mitigation required under state law to acquit of death and failed to inform the jury that it had unfettered discretion in determining whether to impose the death penalty. He contends that the circuit court should have given the following instruction to the jury: You may spare the defendant's life for any reason you deem appropriate and satisfactory. The circuit court instead instructed the jury that, if it did not find that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence, the court would sentence the defendant to a sentence other than death. See IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.05. In addition, the circuit court instructed the jury that a mitigating factor was [a]ny reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to death and that [w]here there is evidence of a mitigating factor, the fact that such mitigating factor is not a factor specifically listed in these instructions does not preclude your consideration of the evidence. See IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06. As we have held in the past, these instructions accurately state the law with respect to the quantum of proof at the aggravation-mitigation hearing. See Gilliam, 172 Ill.2d at 520, 218 Ill.Dec. 884, 670 N.E.2d 606. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's refusal of defendant's instruction.