Opinion ID: 1261234
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Entry Into a Contract

Text: To find personal jurisdiction based on § 36-2-803 (1)(g), it is not necessary to demonstrate a binding contract existed; but rather, the White children need only make a prima facie showing that the trial court should exercise jurisdiction. Askins v. Firedoor Corp. of Florida , 281 S.C. 614, 316 S.E. (2d) 713 (Ct. App. 1984). Stephens argues that they failed to make this showing. We agree. The Complaint alleges that an agreement was made between the parties at the request of the defendant. It does not allege that the contract was formed in South Carolina or that it was to be performed in this state. Stephens argues that the only way such an agreement could have been made would have been over the phone when she was in Georgia. She also claims that the contract could not have been performed in South Carolina because the funds are in Georgia. She further argues that the White children fail to allege any consideration for the agreement or the legal right of Stephens and the White children to make such an agreement. We find that a prima facie showing of a contract to be performed in the state was not made. Therefore, we find that the White children failed to make the requisite showing to invoke jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. 2. Due Process Before personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a nonresident, due process requires that it be determined whether he purposefully established minimum contacts with this State such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed. (2d) 528 (1985); International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). [I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Hanson v. Denckla , 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed. (2d) 1283 (1958). Our courts have established four factors which may be considered in reaching this determination: (1) the duration of the activity of the nonresident in this state; (2) the character and circumstances of the commission of the non-resident's acts; (3) the inconvenience resulting to the parties by conferring or refusing to confer jurisdiction over the nonresident; and (4) the State's interest in exercising jurisdiction. Colite Industries v. G.W. Murphy Construction Co. , 297 S.C. 426, 377 S.E. (2d) 321 (1989); Atlantic Soft Drink Co. v. South Carolina National Bank , 287 S.C. 228, 336 S.E. (2d) 876 (1985). As noted above, the duration of Stephens' activities in this state was minimal. Although a single act may support jurisdiction, it must create a substantial connection with the forum. Burger King, supra . Stephens' activities do not indicate that she purposefully availed herself of jurisdiction nor do they create a substantial connection with South Carolina. In regard to the character and circumstances of her acts, it was not established that the alleged agreement was formed or that it was to be performed in South Carolina. In addition, the refusal to exercise jurisdiction will not result in extreme inconvenience. Two of the White children reside in South Carolina and one resides in North Carolina. Stephens and the funds involved in the controversy are located in Georgia. While South Carolina has an interest in providing redress for its citizens, that interest is diminished when no business was transacted in this state and any contract formed was not to be performed in this State. Therefore, we find that the facts do not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Stephens under the long-arm statute or under a minimum contacts analysis. For the reasons discussed above, the lower court is reversed. GREGORY, C.J., and HARWELL, CHANDLER and FINNEY, JJ., concur.