Opinion ID: 76568
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Two Principles Underlying the Doctrine

Text: 28 Both the Marcus and Evanns courts relied on the two principles underlying the filed rate doctrine: (1) nondiscrimination — preventing carriers from engaging in price discrimination as between ratepayers and (2) nonjusticiability — preserving the exclusive role of federal agencies in approving rates for telecommunications services that are `reasonable' by keeping courts out of the rate-making process ..., a function that the federal regulatory agencies are more competent to perform. Marcus, 138 F.3d at 58. Based on these two principles, the doctrine is applied strictly to prevent a plaintiff from bringing a cause of action even in the face of apparent inequities whenever either the nondiscrimination strand or the nonjusticiability strand underlying the doctrine is implicated by the cause of action the plaintiff seeks to pursue. Id. at 59. We address each principle and its effect on Hill's claims in turn. 1. Nondiscrimination 29 The purpose of the nondiscrimination principle underlying the filed rate doctrine is to ensure that all telecommunications customers are charged the same rate for their service — the rate filed with and approved by the FCC. The filed rate doctrine prevents carriers from negotiating a lower rate with some customers and then charging others the rate filed with the FCC. AT&T Co. v. Central Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 223, 118 S.Ct. 1956, 1963, 141 L.Ed.2d 222 (1998). The nondiscrimination principle explains why the filed rate doctrine bars any challenge that, if successful, would have the effect of changing the filed tariff. Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs., Inc., 277 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir.2002). Even if such a challenge does not, in theory, attack the filed rate, an award of damages to the customer-plaintiff would, effectively, change the rate paid by the customer to one below the filed rate paid by other customers. See, e.g., Marcus, 138 F.3d at 60 (Plaintiffs who were able to prove their claims and recover damages would effectively receive a discounted rate for phone service over other AT&T customers.). 30 In this case, Hill's two remaining state-law causes of action implicate the nondiscrimination principle because, in effect, she seeks recovery of BellSouth's undisclosed charges in excess of its contributions to the [USF]. Hill, 244 F.Supp.2d at 1325. Such compensatory damages would have the effect of retroactively reducing Hill's rate for telecommunications service, and BellSouth would, in essence, be forced to refund to [Hill] the amount allegedly overcharged. Taffet v. Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1491 (11th Cir.1992) (en banc). Like all other BellSouth customers, Hill is presumed to have notice, via BellSouth's filed tariffs, of the basis for BellSouth's FUSC. Evanns, 229 F.3d at 841. And to permit her to recover on her claims that BellSouth had an obligation to disclose to its customers — beyond the disclosures already made in its filed tariffs — that the FUSC BellSouth levied recouped an amount in excess of its required contribution to the USF would be to allow her to receive a discounted rate for phone service over other [BellSouth] customers. See, e.g., Marcus, 138 F.3d at 60; Evanns, 229 F.3d at 841. 2. Nonjusticiability 31 The purpose of the nonjusticiability principle underlying the filed rate doctrine is to preserve the FCC's primary jurisdiction over determinations regarding the reasonableness of rates charged by regulated carriers. Arkansas Louisiana Gas, 453 U.S. at 577-78, 101 S.Ct. at 2930. This principle prevents more than judicial rate-setting; it precludes any judicial action which undermines agency rate-making authority. Marcus, 138 F.3d at 61. Thus, even if a claim does not directly attack the filed rate, an award of damages to the customer that would, in effect, result in a judicial determination of the reasonableness of that rate is prohibited under the filed rate doctrine. 32 In this case, Hill's two remaining state-law causes of action implicate the nonjusticiability principle because she seeks only monetary damages as relief. Hill, 244 F.Supp.2d at 1325. Were we to award Hill the relief she seeks, we would be retroactively determining that the FUSC originally levied by BellSouth, that was filed with and approved by the FCC, was unreasonable. The fact that Hill challenges BellSouth's representation of the FUSC — rather than the FUSC itself — does not alter our analysis: [a] regulated entity's alleged fraud does not create a right to a reasonable rate that exists independently of agency action. Taffet, 967 F.2d at 1494-95. Thus, Hill's remaining two claims are also barred by the nonjusticiability principle underlying the filed rate doctrine. 33 We therefore hold that Hill's two remaining claims implicate the filed rate doctrine because she seeks purely monetary damages as relief. Thus, these two claims raise substantial questions of federal law, and federal question jurisdiction should have attached. For that reason, the district court erred when it denied BellSouth's motion to dismiss these claims and instead remanded them to their state court of origin.