Opinion ID: 1958935
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Common law merger doctrine

Text: Our inquiry has not ended, however, for we have yet to delve into the common law doctrine of merger, which in this State can be traced at least as far back as Harman v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & Rawle 69 (Pa. 1824). We must recognize at the outset that the doctrine is to a large extent coterminous with the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments. Thus, it has been said that merger raises essentially the same question as the doctrine of lesser included offenses. Commonwealth v. Simpson, 316 Pa.Super. 115, 462 A.2d 821 (1983); Commonwealth v. Williams, 299 Pa.Super. 278, 445 A.2d 753 (1982); Commonwealth v. Olsen, 247 Pa.Super. 513, 520 n. 4, 372 A.2d 1207, 1211 n. 4 (1977); Commonwealth v. Ackerman, 239 Pa.Super. 187, 191 n. 4, 361 A.2d 746, 748 n. 4 (1976). See also Commonwealth v. Sparrow, supra, 471 Pa. at 521 n. 7, 370 A.2d at 728 n. 7 (Nix, J., dissenting); Commonwealth ex rel. Russo v. Ashe, 293 Pa. 322, 142 A. 317 (1928); Commonwealth v. Hill, 237 Pa.Super. 543, 353 A.2d 870 (1975) (allocatur denied). The test of merger is also said to be whether one crime necessarily involves another. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 452 Pa. 275, 305 A.2d 369 (1973); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, supra ; Commonwealth v. Hill, supra . Often merger is invoked side by side with double jeopardy principles as the grounds upon which duplicitous sentences may be vacated. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Moszczynski, supra ; Commonwealth v. Garnett, 336 Pa.Super. 313, 485 A.2d 821 (1984); Commonwealth v. Laing, 310 Pa.Super. 105, 456 A.2d 204 (1983); Commonwealth v. Maddox, supra ; Commonwealth v. Williams, 290 Pa.Super. 209, 434 A.2d 717 (1981). Indeed, one former member of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court offered the following explanation for the existence of Pennsylvania's merger doctrine: The doctrine of merger was adopted by this Court because the double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania constitution has traditionally been applied only to capital offenses. E.g., Commonwealth v. Baker, 413 Pa. 105, 196 A.2d 382 (1964). The double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution, of course, had not yet been applied to the states. Benton v. Maryland , 395 U.S. [784], 794, 89 S.Ct. 2056 [2062], 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). See generally Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 243-45, 304 A.2d 432, 436-67 (plurality opinion of Roberts, J.); id., 452 Pa. at 269, 304 A.2d at 446 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 808, 94 S.Ct. 73, 38 L.Ed.2d 44 (1973), on remand, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969, 94 S.Ct. 3172, 41 L.Ed.2d 1139 (1974). Commonwealth v. Carter, 482 Pa. 274, 280 n. 3, 393 A.2d 660, 663 n. 3 (1978) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting, joined by O'Brien, J.). See also Commonwealth v. Boerner, 281 Pa.Super. 505, 422 A.2d 583 (1980) (allocatur denied). As it has developed in this jurisdiction, however, the doctrine of sentencing merger is actually broader and more flexible than the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. See Commonwealth v. Sayko, 333 Pa.Super. 265, 482 A.2d 559 (1984); see also Commonwealth v. Simpson, supra . The doctrine acts to limit the multiplicity of sentences which may be meted out for what is, in practical effect, a single criminal act, even when a comparison of the elements of the various crimes charged does not reveal that any of those crimes is necessarily included in any other. Thus, in merger of sentences cases, we focus not only on the similarity of the elements of the crimes but also, and primarily, on the facts proved at trial, for the question is whether those facts show that in practical effect the defendant committed a single criminal act. . . . Commonwealth v. Crocker, 280 Pa.Super. 470, 475, 421 A.2d 818, 820-21 (1980) (emphasis added). In deciding whether merger is required, a court is obliged to interpret the verdict not in the light of theoretical possibilities, but rather in the light of common sense. Commonwealth v. Newman, 323 Pa.Super. 394, 470 A.2d 976 (1984). When courts decide under the merger doctrine that two crimes necessarily involve one another, it does not always mean that all the elements of one crime are included in the other. It means that on the facts of the case the two crimes were so intimately bound up in the same wrongful act that as a practical matter proof of one crime necessarily proves the other, so that they must be treated as the same offense. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jackson, 271 Pa.Super. 131, 412 A.2d 610 (1979); Commonwealth v. Richardson, 232 Pa.Super. 123, 334 A.2d 700 (1975). If the same facts show that practically speaking there was only one offense against the Commonwealth, then the defendant may be punished for only one offense despite the number of chargeable offenses arising out of the transaction. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ayala, 492 Pa. 418, 424 A.2d 1260 (1981); Commonwealth v. Artis, 294 Pa.Super. 276, 439 A.2d 1199 (1982); Commonwealth v. Eberts, 282 Pa.Super. 354, 422 A.2d 1154 (1980). The difficulty in applying this doctrine is how to determine, practically speaking, when the facts disclose but one offense. This inquiry demands special attention to the unique facts of each case. See Commonwealth v. Belgrave, 258 Pa.Super. 40, 391 A.2d 662 (1978) (Cercone, J., concurring and dissenting). However, the merger doctrine is not and cannot be so fluid that it permits absolute discretion in the judiciary to decide on the facts of each case whether or not two statutory crimes were essentially the same criminal act. Commonwealth v. Watson, 311 Pa.Super. 89, 92, 457 A.2d 127, 128 (1983). Especially when we consider that separate punishments for merged offenses are illegal, see Commonwealth v. Byron, 319 Pa.Super. 1, 465 A.2d 1023 (1983); Commonwealth v. Tolassi, 303 Pa. Super. 177, 449 A.2d 636 (1982), and that duplicitous sentences are beyond the power of the court to impose, see Commonwealth v. Franklin, 306 Pa.Super. 422, 430 n. 4, 452 A.2d 797, 801 n. 4 (1982), we realize that the merger doctrine relies on more than an educated judicial guess as to how many crimes were committed in practical effect. The need to apply the merger doctrine usually arises only in situations where the legislature has outlawed the same conduct under more than one statute. We have just indicated that crimes may sometimes merge even when the Double Jeopardy Clause does not require it. Therefore, we should be very concerned with articulating the reasons why merger occurs. If anything is settled in sentencing law, it is that the legislature has the exclusive power to define criminal offenses and set the punishments to be imposed on them. See Whalen v. United States, supra ; Tarver, supra ; see also Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 339 Pa.Super. 32, 488 A.2d 293 (1985). A punishment, even if it constitutes a duplicitous punishment, is not illegal if the legislature has authorized it. The only principle that can therefore justify the merger doctrine is that, just like the Double Jeopardy Clause, it provides a rule of statutory construction for determining what the legislature intended. See Commonwealth v. Soudani, 398 Pa. 546, 159 A.2d 687, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 886, 81 S.Ct. 177, 5 L.Ed.2d 107 (1960); see also Bostic, supra, 500 Pa. at 354 n. 5, 456 A.2d at 1324 n. 5; Commonwealth v. White, 341 Pa.Super. 261, 491 A.2d 252 (1985). The difference is that the merger doctrine does not ask us to adhere rigidly to a same offense test in searching for legislative intent. Nor, on the other hand, is it concerned exclusively with the physical facts that must be proven to make out various crimes. Instead, it obliges us to take a broader view of the purposes of criminal legislation and the diverse evils which particular enactments were meant to protect against. Analysis of duplicitous sentence questions has traditionally revolved around the concept of injury to the sovereign, in this case the Commonwealth. . . . Therefore, in order to support the imposition of two sentences. . ., it must be found that [the defendant's] conduct constituted two injuries to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Walker, 468 Pa. 323, 331-32, 362 A.2d 227, 231 (1976). Accord, Commonwealth v. Sanders, 339 Pa.Super. 373, 489 A.2d 207 (1985); Commonwealth v. Padden, 335 Pa.Super. 51, 483 A.2d 950 (1984). See also Commonwealth v. Miller, 469 Pa. 24, 364 A.2d 886 (1976) (explaining separate harms done by conspiracy to commit offense and the completed offense). Cf. 18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(iii)(A) (former conviction or acquittal bars subsequent prosecution for same conduct under different statute unless each offense requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil. . . .) (Emphasis added). Cf. also United States v. Woodward, supra (separate evils analysis also relevant to double jeopardy inquiry into congressional intent to impose multiple punishments under different enactments); Albernaz v. United States, supra (same); Commonwealth v. Allen, 506 Pa. 500, 486 A.2d 363 (1984) (citing different interests vindicated by criminal contempt proceedings and prosecution for assault arising out of same conduct). In order to find that separate statutory offenses merge, we must therefore determine not only that the crimes arose out of the same criminal act, transaction, or episode, but also that the statutes defining the crimes charged were directed to substantially the same harm or evil. If we do not take both of these steps, we fail in our duty to effectuate the legislative mandate in carrying out statutory punishments. Obviously if a defendant has committed several discrete criminal acts, he may be punished separately for each of them despite their close relationship in a single criminal episode, as long as each act is a separate injury in itself. If there are separate criminal acts, the first condition for application of the merger doctrine does not exist. Once a defendant commits an original crime, he is not permitted to compound the injuries he inflicts and then escape liability for additional crimes under the guise that they all were done in the same criminal transaction. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gray, 339 Pa.Super. 385, 489 A.2d 213 (1985) (defendant could be sentenced for two robberies arising from the same transaction involving two victims); Commonwealth v. Hassine, 340 Pa.Super. 318, 490 A.2d 438 (1985) (defendant could receive separate sentences for inchoate offenses of attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder where lives of two different persons were at stake in the same transaction); Commonwealth v. Button, 332 Pa.Super. 239, 481 A.2d 342 (1984) (rationale applied to double murder); Commonwealth v. Miranda, 296 Pa.Super. 441, 442 A.2d 1133 (1982) (en banc) (defendant fired one shot that struck both a male and a female victim; he then pointed the gun at the male threateningly, and again fired the gun in the direction of the female; held, separate sentences were proper for attempted murder and reckless endangerment of the male, and aggravated assault and reckless endangerment of the female); Commonwealth v. Wojciechowski, 285 Pa.Super. 1, 9, 426 A.2d 674, 678 (1981) (allocatur denied) (separate sentences for rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, indecent assault, and unlawful restraint based on single sexual attack were warranted; [i]t is unthinkable that a woman, once having been raped, is in the position where her attacker can then abuse her in any other fashion sexually . . . without incurring further sanctions for these separate and distinct crimes); accord, Commonwealth v. Pifer, 284 Pa.Super. 170, 425 A.2d 757 (1981). Even if the defendant's criminal conduct consists of a single physical act, however, the merger doctrine does not bar separate punishments if there are substantially different interests of the Commonwealth at stake and the defendant's act has injured each interest. See White, supra (single act supported separate punishments for rape and incest); Miranda, supra ; Commonwealth v. Lawton, 272 Pa.Super. 40, 414 A.2d 658 (1979) (single act of swinging fist into crowd supported separate sentences for simple assault on one person and reckless endangerment of another).