Opinion ID: 1322365
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Dissent's Objection to the Standard of Review

Text: The dissent contends that we have incorrectly applied a de novo standard of review to the voluntary-cessation exception to the mootness doctrine. Dissent at 1134. In particular, the dissent asserts that we should review the district court's determination as to the effect of the federal agencies' voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal activities under the more deferential abuse of discretion standard.  Id. at 1135 (emphasis added). This standard leads the dissent to conclude regarding the issue of recurrence (i.e., the first part of the County of Los Angeles test) that we must agree with the district court and assume that the federal agencies may sidestep their self-mandated practices. Id. at 1137. Likewise, the dissent is guided by this deferential standard in resolving the question of whether interim events have comprehensively and irrevocably eliminated the effects of the alleged violation (i.e., the second part of the County of Los Angeles test). Indicative of this deference, the dissent states that it conclude[s] that the district court acted quite reasonably when it determined that the federal agencies cannot show that the effects of the ESA violation have been completely and irrevocably eradicated. Id. at 1138 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, we must disagree with our thoughtful colleague in dissent. In particular, we respectfully submit that the dissent's objection to the standard of review is misguided. It apparently overlooks the critical distinction between constitutional mootness and prudential mootnessonly the former kind of mootness is at issue here. Courts recognize two kinds of mootness: constitutional mootness and prudential mootness. See, e.g., United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-34, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953); Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1321 (10th Cir.1997); S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 727-28; Bldg. & Constr. Dep't v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 7 F.3d 1487, 1491-92 (10th Cir.1993); New Mexico ex rel. N.M. State Highway Dep't v. Goldschmidt, 629 F.2d 665, 668-69 (10th Cir.1980); see also Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 627 F.2d 289, 291 (D.C.Cir.1980) (per curiam) (The doctrine of mootness has two distinct branches.); 13B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533. 1, at 725 (3d ed.2008). Under the constitutional-mootness doctrine, a federal court has jurisdiction over only cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. [A]n actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if a case is not constitutionally moot, a court may dismiss the case under the prudential-mootness doctrine if the case is so attenuated that considerations of prudence and comity for coordinate branches of government counsel the court to stay its hand, and to withhold relief it has the power to grant. Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 727 (stating that [p]rudential mootness addresses not the power to grant relief but the court's discretion in the exercise of that power (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). [P]rudential mootness arises out of the court's general discretion in formulating prospective equitable remedies. . . . Bldg. & Constr. Dep't, 7 F.3d at 1492; see Chamber of Commerce, 627 F.2d at 291 (The cousin of the mootness doctrine, in its strict Article III sense, is a melange of doctrines relating to the court's discretion in matters of remedy and judicial administration.). This doctrine generally applies only to requests for injunctive or declaratory relief. Bldg. & Constr. Dep't, 7 F.3d at 1492 (All the cases in which the prudential mootness concept has been applied have involved a request for prospective equitable relief by declaratory judgment or injunction.); see Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321; S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 727. A voluntary-cessation evaluation may be an important component of the overall analysis with respect to both constitutional and prudential mootness. Under both Article III and prudential mootness doctrines, the central inquiry is essentially the same: have circumstances changed since the beginning of litigation that forestall any occasion for meaningful relief. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 727. Under both mootness doctrines, courts must assess the likelihood that defendants will recommence the challenged, allegedly offensive conduct. Compare Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance, 545 F.3d at 892 (noting in the constitutional context that this [voluntary-cessation] exception exists to counteract the possibility of a defendant ceasing illegal action long enough to render a lawsuit moot and then resuming the illegal conduct), with Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321 (noting as to prudential mootness that [a] court may refuse to grant relief where it appears that a change of circumstances renders it highly unlikely that the actions in question will be repeated), and Bldg. & Constr. Dep't, 7 F.3d at 1492 (noting that, in cases involving prudential mootness, a court may decline to grant declaratory or injunctive relief where it appears that a defendant, usually the government, has already changed or is in the process of changing its policies or where it appears that any repeat of the actions in question is otherwise highly unlikely). Although we engage in similar factual inquiries to ascertain constitutional and prudential mootness, different standards of review apply to these doctrines. The constitutional mootness question is a threshold inquiry because a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal jurisdiction. Our review of this question is de novo.  Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321 (citation omitted); see also Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1985) (We apply a de novo standard for reviewing a district court's decision on subject matter jurisdiction, and, concomitantly apply that standard in reviewing questions of mootness. (citation omitted)). By contrast, we review the district court's determination of prudential mootness for an abuse of discretion  because this doctrine is concerned with the court's discretion to exercise its power to provide relief. Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321 (emphasis added). As a component of the mootness analysis, it naturally and ineluctably follows that the voluntary-cessation inquiry will be subject to the same standard of review as the overarching mootness question at issuewhether constitutional or prudential. Compare Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 491 F.3d at 1149-50 (tacitly applying de novo standard of review to contention of voluntary cessation in the constitutional-mootness context), with Comm. for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1524-25 (10th Cir.1992) (explicitly applying abuse-of-discretion standard of review to assertion of voluntary cessation in the prudential-mootness context). In this case, we apply a de novo standard of review because the case presents a question of constitutional mootness. If we had concluded that the Environmental Group's ESA claims survived this jurisdictional-mootness inquiry, it might well have been appropriate to conduct a prudential-mootness analysis, given that the Environmental Groups seek only injunctive and declaratory relief. E.g., Bldg. & Constr. Dep't, 7 F.3d at 1492. However, we need not reach this issue or definitively opine on it, because we have determined that the Environmental Groups' ESA claims are constitutionally moot. The dissent mistakenly applies the abuse-of-discretion standardthat ordinarily is associated with the prudential-mootness doctrineto the question of constitutional mootness in this case. To support the application of an abuse-of-discretion standard, the dissent primarily relies on (1) the Supreme Court's opinion in W.T. Grant Co.; (2) the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Committee for the First Amendment v. Campbell; and (3) opinions from other circuits. [18] Dissent at 1134-35. The dissent's reliance is misplaced. Despite its arguments, W.T. Grant Co. and Committee for the First Amendment actually are quite consistent with our opinion. The cases from the other circuits, moreover, are contrary to our precedent and otherwise unpersuasive. In W.T. Grant Co., the Supreme Court established the dual analysis of constitutional and prudential mootness. 345 U.S. at 632-34, 73 S.Ct. 894. Based upon our analysis below, we must respectfully conclude that the dissent has misguidedly relied upon W.T. Grant Co. 's analysis related to prudential mootness in arguing for use of an abuse-of-discretion standard in this casewhere only constitutional mootness is at issue. Under the constitutional-mootness doctrine, the Court held in W.T. Grant Co. that the defendants had not carried their heavy burden of showing that their voluntary cessation of illegal interlocking corporate directorates rendered the case moot. Id. at 633, 73 S.Ct. 894. Although the defendants indicated that the interlocking corporate directorates no longer existed and disclaimed any intention to revive them, the Court reviewed the issue de novo and determined that this averment was insufficient to render the case moot. Id. (Such a profession [as offered by defendants] does not suffice to make a case moot although it is one of the factors to be considered in determining the appropriateness of granting an injunction against the now-discontinued acts.); id. at 638, 73 S.Ct. 894 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the constitutional-mootness ruling of the district court was now conceded [by the majority] to be erroneous). Once the Court rejected the constitutional-mootness claim, it considered prudential mootness. Id. at 633-34, 73 S.Ct. 894. It was in this context that the Court in W.T. Grant Co. used the language relied upon by the dissent, which noted the obligation of the government, as plaintiff, to demonstrate that there was no reasonable basis for the District Judge's decision. Id. at 634, 73 S.Ct. 894; see Dissent at 1134 (quoting from W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633-34, 73 S.Ct. 894). More directly, under the prudential-mootness doctrine, the Court held that the government had not carried its burden of showing that the district court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case. See W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633-34, 73 S.Ct. 894; id. at 635-36, 73 S.Ct. 894 (We conclude that, although the actions were not moot, no abuse of discretion has been demonstrated in the trial court's refusal to award injunctive relief. (emphasis added)). To be sure, the Court in W.T. Grant Co. did not expressly label the different mootness doctrines. However, the opinion's language nonetheless clearly indicates that the Court applied two different mootness doctrineswith different standards of reviewin undertaking the voluntary-cessation inquiry. Commentators have explicitly noted the distinct constitutional and prudential components of W.T. Grant Co. 's mootness analysis. See 13B Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, § 3533.1, at 744 (discussing the Court's resolution of the constitutional-mootness question and noting that W.T. Grant Co. is [t]he most important single illustration of the remedial doctrines, i.e., principles of prudential mootness). And we have recognized expressly the prudential-mootness dimension of W.T. Grant Co. 's analysis. See Bldg. & Constr. Dep't, 7 F.3d at 1492 (noting the Supreme Court's original formulation of the test for prudential mootness in W.T. Grant Co.); see also Goldschmidt, 629 F.2d at 669 (citing W.T. Grant Co. in discussing approvingly the proposition that even if some remnant of the original controversy be still alive, this is an instance where the courts, as a matter of prudence and sound discretion, should stay their hand and withhold drastic injunctive relief). Thus, we need not quarrel with the dissent's contention that the Court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard of review in W.T. Grant Co. The problem for the dissent, however, is that the Court applied this standard with respect to a mootness doctrine that is not germane to the resolution of this casethat is, the prudential-mootness doctrine. Therefore, we respectfully submit that the dissent's reliance on W.T. Grant in objecting to the application here of the de novo standard of review is misplaced; at issue here is constitutional mootness and that standard of review is appropriate. See, e.g., Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance, 545 F.3d at 891-94; Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 491 F.3d at 1148-50. For similar reasons, the dissent hardly fares better with its standard-of-review objection by relying on our decision in Committee for the First Amendment. At bottom, that case involves application of the prudential-mootness doctrine; consequently, it was entirely appropriate for the court to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. In Committee for the First Amendment, Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive (and later monetary) relief against various defendants in response to a decision by the Board of Regents (Regents) of Oklahoma State University (OSU) suspending the showing of The Last Temptation of Christ.  962 F.2d at 1519 (footnote omitted). The film was shown on the scheduled dates and, during the course of the litigation, the university adopted a new policy concerning use of university facilities for expressive purposes including the showing of movies, which we noted effected major changes from the expressive-activity policy that plaintiffs initially challenged. Id. at 1524-25. The district court concluded that plaintiffs' claim for prospective relief (i.e., declaratory and injunctive relief) was moot. Id. at 1520, 1524. In providing background on the subject of mootness, we did briefly cite to cases associated with the constitutional-mootness doctrine, such as County of Los Angeles, and we noted their holdings. See id. at 1524-25. However, when assessing the viability of plaintiffs' specific claim for prospective relief, we clearly were focused on the issue of prudential-mootness. This is evident in our heavy reliance from the outset to the end of our mootness analysis on [t]he most important single illustration, 13B Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, § 3533.1, at 744, of the prudential-mootness doctrinethat is, W.T. Grant Co. Compare Comm. for the First Amendment, 962 F.2d at 1519 (quoting in the first paragraph of the opinion from W.T. Grant Co. 's prudential-mootness analysis, which notes that the quantum of contrition that should be expected from an offender ceasing challenged activity is `a question better addressed to the discretion of the trial court' (quoting W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 634, 73 S.Ct. 894)), with id. at 1525 (in the final paragraphs of its mootness analysis, quoting from W.T. Grant Co. 's prudential-mootness discussion, noting that Plaintiffs . . . simply have not met their burden with respect to `some cognizable danger of recurrent violations.' (quoting W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 632, 73 S.Ct. 894)). More specifically, in Committee for the First Amendment, we set forth the prudential-mootness test from W.T. Grant Co. and indicated that we would review the district court's mootness ruling for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1524-25. Regarding whether the inquiry was one of prudential mootness, it is telling that we assessed whether the district court could have reasonably concluded in exercising its general discretion in formulating prospective equitable remedies, Bldg. & Constr. Dep't, 7 F.3d at 1492, that providing prospective relief here was not appropriate, by actually examining ourselves the contours of the specific relief sought by plaintiffs. See Comm. for the First Amendment, 962 F.2d at 1525-26 (What Plaintiffs seek is an injunction framed no more narrowly than requiring the Defendants to follow the First Amendment concerning future on-campus activities of every sort. No specific facts anchor such a command rendering enforcement problematic in a university environment where hundreds of decisions concerning extracurricular use of facilities are made every academic year.). In other words, our focus was on the district court's exercise of discretion in fashioning equitable remedies and not on whether there was [a]n actual controversy. Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 67, 117 S.Ct. 1055 (internal quotation marks omitted). We concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion insofar as it determined that plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief was moot. Comm. for the First Amendment, 962 F.2d at 1524; see id. at 1526. Thus, the flaw in the dissent's reliance on Committee for the First Amendment  a prudential-mootness case predicated on W.T. Grant Co. 's prudential-mootness analysisshould be readily apparent: this is not a prudential-mootness case. Accordingly, as with W.T. Grant Co., we have no basis to attack the dissent's contention that Committee for the First Amendment applied an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. But it did so with regard to a mootness doctrine that is not at issue hereprudential mootness. With respect to the mootness doctrine that is at issue, constitutional-mootness, our case law is clearthe standard of review is de novo. E.g., Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321. Finally, the dissent looks to cases from the Seventh and Second Circuits for support. Dissent at ___ (citing Kikumura v. Turner, 28 F.3d 592, 597 (7th Cir.1994); Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 F.2d 50, 59 (2d Cir.1992)). These cases, however, are unpersuasive and do not square with our own precedent (such as Fletcher ), which recognizes the distinction regarding the applicable standard of review between the doctrines of constitutional and prudential mootness and, more specifically, holds that only in the case of prudential mootness do we apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review, because in such a case we are concerned with the [district] court's discretion to exercise its power to provide relief. Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321; cf. id. (The constitutional mootness question is a threshold inquiry because a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal jurisdiction. Our review of this question is de novo.  (citation omitted)). In Kikumura, the Seventh Circuit appears to have fallen victim to the same mistake that we respectfully have attributed to the dissentmapping the prudential-mootness analysis of W.T. Grant Co. onto a case involving constitutional mootness. For example, in a mootness discussion that cites to W.T. Grant Co., the Seventh Circuit states that [d]etermining whether an official's voluntary cessation from engaging in conduct challenged as unconstitutional renders a case moot calls for an exercise of judicial discretion. Kikumura, 28 F.3d at 598. Kikumura may be at odds with other Seventh Circuit cases, which appear not to have made the same mistake, but instead have recognized that the constitutional-mootness questionincluding the subsidiary question of voluntary cessationimplicates the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts and is reviewed de novo. In Federation of Advertising Industry Representatives, Inc. v. City of Chicago, for example, the Seventh Circuit reviewed de novo the question of whether to apply the voluntary-cessation exception to a constitutional-mootness issue. 326 F.3d 924, 928-31 (7th Cir.1996). In that context, the Seventh Circuit stated: Whether a case has been rendered moot is a question of law that we review de novo. . . . A question of mootness arises when, as here, a challenged ordinance is repealed during the pendency of litigation, and a plaintiff seeks only prospective relief. Id. at 929 (citations omitted); see Walsh v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 400 F.3d 535, 536-37 (7th Cir.2005) (noting that [w]e review the district court's decision [entering summary judgment on mootness grounds] de novo,  and proceeding to address the specific question of voluntary cessation de novo); cf. Evers v. Astrue, 536 F.3d 651, 656 (7th Cir.2008) (This case begins and ends with our determination of subject-matter jurisdiction.. . . [W]e review a district court's dismissal on mootness grounds de novo.  (citations omitted)); St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir.2007) (We review de novo the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which includes a dismissal on mootness grounds.). Irrespective of whether Kikumura is inconsistent with Seventh Circuit precedent, however, insofar as Kikumura calls for the application of an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to the question of constitutional mootness it is inconsistent with our precedent, and we accordingly decline to follow it. For somewhat similar reasons, the Second Circuit's decision in Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors is contrary to our precedent and unpersuasive. There, like the Kikumura court, the Second Circuit mistakenly relied upon the language of W.T. Grant Co. concerning prudential mootness, in announcing the standard of review for a question of constitutional mootness. Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors, 981 F.2d at 59. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the state's minority business program. Id. at 58. The state's passage of an emergency regulation that suspended enforcement of the program's goals presented an issue of voluntary cessation to the district court. Id. at 58-59. The district court ruled that the state's action mooted the plaintiffs' claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 59. Citing W.T. Grant Co., the Second Circuit concluded that an abuse-of-discretion standard of review was appropriately applied to the district court's ruling, and it determined that [t]he district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing [plaintiffs'] complaints as moot because the emergency regulation suspends application of the minority enterprise goals on state-funded contracts. Id. Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors is contrary to our precedent because-in mistaken reliance on the prudential-mootness analysis of W.T. Grant Co. it applies an abuse-of-discretion standard, rather than a de novo standard, to a question of constitutional mootness. Moreover, even if its application here was not barred by our precedent, we would be wary of adopting the rule of Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors. At least one Second Circuit case has intimated that the abuse-of-discretion standard articulated in Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors is limited to the context of voluntary cessation. See Irish Lesbian & Gay Org. v. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 647 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1998) (The Defendants here have not voluntarily agreed to cease enforcing Section 10-110 against [plaintiff] or to grant [plaintiff's] permit requests in the future. Therefore, the abuse-of-discretion standard does not apply and we review the district court's determination of mootness under the customary de novo standard.). However, the Supreme Court has clearly held that voluntary cessation is part and parcel of the constitutional-mootness analysis and can result in a finding that an action or claim is moot. See County of Los Angeles, 440 U.S. at 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379. Accordingly, voluntary cessation implicates the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts, and our circuit and also the Second Circuit have recognized that subject-matter-jurisdiction questionsincluding those involving mootnessare reviewed de novo. Compare Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321 (The constitutional mootness question is a threshold inquiry because a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal jurisdiction. Our review of this question is de novo.  (citation omitted)), with Lamar Adver. of Penn, LLC v. Town of Orchard Park, 356 F.3d 365, 377 n. 16 (2d Cir.2004) ([T]he condition of mootness is not a defense that could be waived by [a defendant], but rather is a condition that deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. (alterations in original and internal quotation marks omitted)); and United States v. New York City Transit Auth., 97 F.3d 672, 676 (2d Cir.1996) (A ruling that a case is not moot is reviewed de novo. This case is not moot unless no reasonable expectation remains that the policy will be reinstituted.). In sum, we respectfully conclude that the dissent's reliance on Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors is misplaced. The case is contrary to our precedent and otherwise unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we must disagree with our thoughtful colleague in dissent concerning the standard of review that is applicable to the mootness question in this case. We thus proceed to the issue of vacatur.