Opinion ID: 2590211
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of rabbi's testimony regarding position of Jewish religion on capital punishment

Text: The defense called Rabbi Leonard Beerman as a character witness during the penalty phase. Rabbi Beerman testified he had met and spoken with defendant and his family and that he was struck by defendant's intelligence and sensitivity and the gentleness of his personality. He believed defendant was innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted and should not suffer the death penalty. The rabbi explained further that he believed no one, including Hitler and Eichmann, should be executed. When defense counsel asked how the rabbi reconciled his testimony that defendant should not be executed with existing or perceived existing tenets of Judaism, the trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection on grounds of relevancy. Rabbi Beerman went on to testify, nonetheless, that he believed the death penalty is a violation of God's law and my Jewish faith is something that confirms me in this conviction. Defendant contends the trial court's ruling deprived him of his statutory and constitutional rights to present mitigating evidence. He observes that the federal Constitution precludes a state from imposing procedural barriers to the sentencing jury's consideration of mitigating evidence (e.g., Mills v. Maryland (1988) 486 U.S. 367, 375, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384; Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973) and notes California's catchall mitigating factor broadly permits a defendant to present evidence of any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime (ї 190.3, factor (k)). Defendant primarily asserts the evidence he sought to present was relevant to Rabbi Beerman's credibility because his views were made by some unspecified means to appear out of the mainstream of Jewish thinking. (Cf. People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 196, 284 Cal.Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290 [questions seeking to elicit a partisan expert's philosophical views on capital punishment might disclose some bias bearing on the expert's credibility as a witness in the penalty phase].) Assuming the trial court erred in sustaining the prosecutor's relevancy objection, however, defendant suffered no prejudice. After testifying to his belief defendant should not be executed, the rabbi stated his Jewish faith confirmed him in the conviction that capital punishment is a violation of God's law. The jury therefore could infer that Judaism disapproves of the death penalty, and to have explored the question further would not particularly have assisted the jury. We see no reasonable possibility the jury would have returned a more favorable verdict had the rabbi been permitted to testify more fully concerning Judaism's attitude toward the death penalty. ( People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 446-448, 250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135.)