Opinion ID: 537712
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Richardson Decision

Text: 9 The Richardson court concluded that there was not sufficient evidence in the record on which a jury could base a verdict for the plaintiff because all of the plaintiff's expert testimony--the only relevant evidence on the causation issue--was inadmissible. Relying on Federal Rule of Evidence 703, the court ruled, in essence, that the issue of scientific causation should not have been left to the jury because Dr. Alan Done's expert opinion that Bendectin caused the plaintiff's birth defects lacked an adequate scientific foundation. Dr. Done served as the lead expert for the plaintiffs in both Richardson and this case. The Richardson court's treatment of Dr. Done's testimony subsumed that of the other experts presented on the Richardsons' behalf. 857 F.2d at 829 n. 38. 10 Rule 703 governs the Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts, and requires that the grounds relied upon by an expert be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject. Fed.R.Evid. 703. The Richardson court noted that Dr. Done had predicated his opinion on four types of data. After canvassing the probative value of each type of data, the court concluded: 11 These three types of studies then--chemical, in vitro, and in vivo--cannot furnish a sufficient foundation for a conclusion that Bendectin caused the birth defects at issue in this case. Studies of this kind, singly or in combination, are not capable of proving causation in human beings in the face of the overwhelming body of contradictory epidemiological evidence. Perhaps mindful of this, the last type of evidence considered by Dr. Done consisted of the epidemiological studies. When such studies are available and relevant, and particularly when they are numerous and span a significant period of time, they assume a very important role in determinations of questions of causation. 12 857 F.2d at 830 (emphasis added). Every epidemiological study introduced in Richardson had concluded that there was not a statistically significant relationship between Bendectin and birth defects. The court proceeded to note Dr. Done's concession that he would not give an opinion as to causation without a statistically significant relationship. Id. Dr. Done overcame this hurdle 13 [o]nly by recalculating the [published epidemiological] data ... to obtain what he deems a statistically significant result. Moreover, the studies rejected by Dr. Done had been published in peer-reviewed scientific journals, while Dr. Done has neither published his recalculations nor offered them for peer review. 14 Id. at 831. 15 The Richardson court distinguished its case from our decision in Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062, 105 S.Ct. 545, 83 L.Ed.2d 432 (1984), which addressed the question whether paraquat exposure caused pulmonary fibrosis. Ferebee, the Richardson court concluded, was an example of  'a classic battle of the experts, a battle in which the jury must decide the victor.'  Richardson, 857 F.2d at 832 (quoting Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535). In Ferebee the defendant attempted to discredit the opinions of the plaintiff's experts on the ground that their views were sufficiently novel to be inadmissible. The Ferebee court stated: 16 [A] cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established by animal or epidemiological studies before a doctor can testify that, in his opinion, such a relationship exists. As long as the basic methodology employed to reach such a conclusion is sound, ... products liability law does not preclude recovery until a statistically significant number of people have been injured or until science has had the time and resources to complete sophisticated laboratory studies of the chemical. 17 736 F.2d at 1535-36. The Richardson court found Ferebee inapposite because it applied to cases where the causation theory is novel and  'stand[s] at the frontier of current medical and epidemiological inquiry.'  In Richardson, however, the case was a great distance from the frontier of epidemiological inquiry, because studies had been conducted and published for twenty-odd years. 857 F.2d at 832. 18 The Richardson court concluded, as a matter of law, that the wealth of published epidemiological data ... none of which has concluded that the drug is teratogenic ... must be given their just due. 857 F.2d at 832. Therefore, under Rule 703, an opinion refuting this scientific consensus is inadmissible for lack of an adequate foundation, in the absence of other substantial probative evidence on which to base this opinion. It is this uncontroversial rule of evidence that is the ratio decidendi of Richardson and this case. 19 Two other circuits have reached similar conclusions. See Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories, Inc., 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir.1987); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 884 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.1989) (en banc). The First Circuit opined that [a] new [epidemiological] study coming to a different conclusion and challenging the consensus would be admissible evidence. Without such a study there is nothing on which expert opinion on Bendectin as a cause may be based. Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1194; cf. In Re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F.Supp. 1223, 1242 (E.D.N.Y.1985) (When the expert's ... testimony lie[s] at the periphery of what the scientific community considers acceptable, special care should be exercised in evaluating the reliability and probative worth of the proffered testimony under Rules 703 and 20 403). Unlike the circumstances of Ferebee, the body of published epidemiological opinions on the subject at hand is extensive, indeed massive, and all such opinions point to the same conclusion. As Richardson teaches, this is our measuring rod for scientific adequacy. 21 Because Richardson provides a binding legal precedent governing the admissibility of expert opinion on the ability of Bendectin to cause human birth defects, the Ealys can only avoid that decision by showing that the record here is materially different from that in Richardson. We find no such difference.