Opinion ID: 765959
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Race-neutral Reasons

Text: 33 At the second step in the Batson analysis, the burden shifts to the prosecution to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the exercise of the peremptory challenge in question. We review de novo a district court's holding that a prosecutor's proffered reason for a peremptory challenge is race-neutral. United States v. McCoy, 23 F.3d 216, 217 (9th Cir. 1994). 34 In evaluating the race-neutrality of an attorney's explanation, a court must determine whether, assuming the proffered reasons for the peremptory challenges are true, the challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359. Noting that official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact and that [p]roof of racially discriminatory intent is required, the Supreme Court has defined a race-neutral reason: 35 A neutral explanation in the context of our analysis here means an explanation based on something other than the race of the juror. At this step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral. 36 Id. at 360; see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) ([A] `legitimate reason' is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection.). 37 Both of the reasons provided by the prosecutor for striking Ms. Mitchell are, or are similar to, reasons that have been recognized as race-neutral. The prosecutor explained that the primary reason he struck Ms. Mitchell was that she did not reveal in her questionnaire that she had been a victim of a violent crime, and he thought she was lying about it. See McCain v. Gramley, 96 F.3d 288, 293 (7th Cir. 1996) (prosecutor's reason for striking juror--he thought a juror who lived in high-crime neighborhood was lying about never being the victim of a crime--was race-neutral); Kelly v. Withrow, 25 F.3d 363, 366-67 (6th Cir. 1994) (no racial discrimination in prosecutor's striking of a juror that the prosecutor did not believe answered questions truthfully). The prosecutor's secondary reason was a concern that Ms. Mitchell's desire to attend her daughter's graduation might compromise her duties as a juror. Cf. United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448, 1454-55 (9th Cir. 1993) (concern that a juror might hold his loss of pay against the prosecution is race-neutral). 38 The prosecutor also asserted two reasons for striking Chaquita Goodloe that are similar to reasons previously held to be race-neutral. First, he stated that Ms. Goodloe's demeanor and lack of eye contact showed a disinterest in being a juror. See United States v. Changco, 1 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 1993) ([P]assivity, inattentiveness, or inability to relate to other jurors [are] valid, race-neutral explanations for excluding jurors.); United States v. Power, 881 F.2d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 1989) (deeming race-neutral the government's explanation that a juror's fidgeting and looking around as he sat in the jury box... made the prosecutor believe that the individual would not be an attentive juror.).Second, the prosecutor asserted that he did not want Ms. Goodloe as a juror because she lacked employment experience and experience outside of the home. See United States v. Hunter, 86 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 1996) (employment status and personal history are race neutral reasons for striking a juror). 39 Although the prosecutor's explanations for striking Ms. Mitchell and Ms. Goodloe appear, on their face, to be race neutral, Stubbs contends they are not. Citing United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 822-26 (9th Cir. 1992), he argues that the prosecutor's explanations are transparent proxies for racism. He contends that the prosecutor's asserted suspicion that Ms. Mitchell lied, based in part on her working and living in East Oakland (a predominately African-American neighborhood), is racial stereotyping. He also contends that the prosecutor's concerns about Ms. Goodloe are stereotypes about African-American single mothers. Relying on Bishop, Stubbs contends the prosecutor's explanations are not race-neutral. We reject this argument. 40 In Bishop, we recognized that under some circumstances a criterion that is closely tied to race... cease[to be] race-neutral and become[s] a surrogate for impermissible racial biases. 959 F.2d at 823. We held that a reason is not race-neutral if there is no nexus between the jurors' characteristic... and their possible approach to a specific trial. Id. at 825. In other words, a generic reason[ ] [or] group-based presupposition[ ] applicable in all criminal trials to members of a minority is not race-neutral. Id. Such a reason is unacceptable because, if true, it would violate the equal protection clause. See id. at 826. 41 Thus, in Bishop, we rejected a prosecutor's explanation that he struck an African-American juror who lived in Compton, a poor and predominately African-American community, because he believed Compton's residents were likely to be anesthetized to violence: 42 The prosecutor's justification in this case, unlike in Hernandez, referred to collective experiences and feelings that he just as easily could have ascribed to vast portions of the African-American community. Implicitly equating low-income, black neighborhoods with violence, and the experience of violence with its acceptance, it referred to assumptions that African-Americans face, and from which they suffer, on a daily basis. Ultimately, the invocation of residence both reflected and conveyed deeply ingrained and pernicious stereotypes. Id. at 825. We recognized, however, that residence could be a race-neutral factor when applied to a specific juror's suitability to sit in a particular case. See id. at 826. 43 The prosecutor's reasons in the present case are not corrupted by the defect described in Bishop. The prosecutor's reasons for excusing Ms. Mitchell and Ms. Goodloe were not generalized but had particular race-neutral relevance to each of them. The prosecutor's concerns about Ms. Mitchell were prompted by her failure to disclose that she had witnessed a violent crime, and by her concern that the trial might interfere with her attending her daughter's graduation. His concerns about Ms. Goodloe were prompted by her demeanor and her answers on the jury questionnaire. The prosecutor did not strike either juror because of some group-based presumption generally applicable to African-American jurors. We hold, therefore, that the prosecutor's reasons were facially race neutral. We next consider the third step in the Batson analysis. 44