Opinion ID: 1894790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: (b) delegation of authority

Text: Smith asserts that the Authority's subdelegation of its power to issue certificates of approval to the chief executive officer was unlawful. [3] In addition, Smith contends that even if the aforementioned delegation was proper, the certificate of approval is invalid because the chief executive officer impermissibly delegated his responsibilities to a hearing officer. We disagree. Where the statutory provisions enacted by the Legislature so provide, an administrative agency is free to delegate its powers to a subordinate officer. The statute in question at the time that Brewer's application was before the Authority provided that the Authority could [e]stablish rules ... as it deems necessary or convenient to carry out the purpose of this chapter. 10 M.R.S.A. § 969(26). The statute also provided that the authority may employ a chief executive officer and other staff [and]... may establish standards pursuant to which it may delegate its powers and duties to its staff. Id. § 969(5). Finally, the chief executive officer, in addition to certain duties specified by the statute, shall [p]erform other duties directed by the authority in carrying out the purposes of this chapter. Id. § 972(8). We find that these provisions, when read together expressly establish that the authority had the power to delegate its responsibility to issue certificates of approval to the chief executive officer. Next, Smith contends that the chief executive officer violated regulations promulgated by the Authority when he delegated his responsibility to hold a public hearing to a hearing officer. [4] We have previously recognized that in the context of administrative law, the officer who has the ultimate authority to render a decision need not hear or read all the evidence prior to reaching his decision. As long as the officer both familiarizes himself with the evidence sufficient to assure himself that all statutory criteria have been satisfied and retains the ultimate authority to render the decision, he can properly utilize subordinate officers to gather evidence and make preliminary reports. See New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util., 448 A.2d 272, 279 (Me.1982); Frank v. Assessors of Skowhegan, 329 A.2d 167, 176 (Me. 1974). In this case, Smith has failed to establish that the chief executive officer's decision to issue the certificate of approval was not based on his own independent evaluation of the evidence.