Opinion ID: 1792842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: aldridge, nickerson and miller

Text: In contrast, however, and left unexplained by the majority, venire persons Aldridge, Nickerson and Miller each indicated biases or prejudices as to Van Poyck's guilt or a predisposition in favor of the death penalty for him, which clearly cast reasonable doubt on their impartiality. For example, Miller responded during the selection process: THE COURT: ... If you were asked your opinion of the death penalty, sir, would you say you are strongly in favor, strongly opposed or in the middle? MR. MILLER: I am for capital punishment. THE COURT: Okay, would you agree, sir, that it is a fair statement that capital punishment or the death penalty is not an appropriate sentence in all first degree murder cases, that it depends on the case? MR. MILLER: Right. The thing, if a person is without a doubt proven guilty, you know, for a rape or murder, I believe, you know, death ought to be the sentence. THE COURT: In every case no matter what? MR. MILLER: Without a doubt, yes, if it's proved without a doubt. After additional questions by the prosecutor and defense counsel, the following colloquy occurred: MR. KLEIN [Defense Counsel]: Is there any particular type of case where you would have severe problems or substantial problems with giving a life recommendation? How about premeditated murder, would you have a problem giving a life recommendation for premeditated murder assuming, again, the facts show there is no question that he did it beyond a reasonable doubt? MR MILLER: Yes, premeditated I would say it was deliberate so long as it was without a doubt, I would probably, you know, go with the death penalty. .... MR. KLEIN: Would you feel the same way if you were to know that the alternative to the death penalty that a person should spend the rest of his life in prison, you as a taxpayer would have to house and feed him for the rest of his natural life, would you, would you hesitate to give a life recommendation under those circumstances? MR. MILLER: Yes. He further stated that he did not believe the public should be burdened with the cost of feeding and housing persons convicted of premeditated murder. Although the majority notes Mr. Miller's later statements in response to leading questions that he could set his personal feelings aside and follow the court's instructions, his initial statements strongly cast doubt on his ability to remain impartial and, under our established case law, it was error for the trial court to deny a challenge for cause. Similarly, Aldridge's statements indicated reasonable doubt as to his ability to accept Van Poyck as innocent until proven guilty: MR. KLEIN: Mr. Aldridge, as a result of what you have read [in the newspapers], have you formed any opinion, at all, about this case or about Mr. Van Poyck? ALDRIDGE: Based on the facts presented in the newspaper, my opinion is that the Defendant is guilty. MR. KLEIN: Okay. Based upon what you read, would you have, would you, before you could bring back a verdict of not guilty, would you ask for evidence, would you ask for us as Defense to present evidence to persuade you otherwise? MR. ALDRIDGE: Yes, certainly. MR. KLEIN: Would you have a difficult time finding Mr. Van Poyck not guilty unless you heard some evidence from the Defense to convince you that he was innocent in view of what you have heard? MR. ALDRIDGE: Yes, in view of what I have read, yes. THE COURT: Mr. Aldridge, let me ask you something. If I instructed you that under the law of our country, that under the constitution Mr. Van Poyck as he sits here right at this moment is presumed innocent and that presumption stays with him until the time the State presents evidence sufficient for you to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, would you be able to follow that instruction? MR. ALDRIDGE: I would hope that I could. THE COURT: If I told you right now the ball is in your court, is Mr. Van Poyck guilty or not guilty, what would you say in light of what I just told you? MR. ALDRIDGE: I would have to say not guilty. THE COURT: Okay. Would you be able to follow that if you were a juror and not form an opinion or fixed in your mind a verdict until you have heard all the evidence in the courtroom? MR. ALDRIDGE: I would hope that I could. .... THE COURT: Also, under our system the Defendant in any criminal case is not required to testify nor present evidence. The reason for that is that the burden of proof in a criminal case is on the State, not on the Defense. Would you agree with that? MR. ALDRIDGE: Yes. THE COURT: Would you be able to do that even if you read the papers? MR. ALDRIDGE: I would hope that I could. (Emphasis added.) Aldridge's statements that he hoped he could set aside his personal views and render a verdict based solely on evidence presented in the courtroom did not overcome his earlier statement that he believed Van Poyck was guilty. Rather, his responses, I hope that I could to each of the court's questions pertaining to the guilt phase of the trial further clouded Aldridge's ability to set aside his personal biases. Williams; Singer. Nickerson also declared strong support for the death penalty and expressed a predisposed belief that premeditated murder warrants the death penalty. Upon being advised by the court that, if selected as a juror, he would be given a set of instructions to follow in making a recommendation as to sentence, Nickerson claimed that he probably would follow the instructions regardless of his personal views, but d[id] not know for sure. When compared to the juror responses discussed in our prior cases and those discussed by Judge Pariente in Williams, it is clear that Nickerson, Miller and Aldridge should have been excused for cause because their responses raised reasonable doubts as to their ability to render an unbiased and impartial decision and recommendation. Despite their affirmations to the court, Nickerson's response that he probably would follow the law and Aldridge's statement that he hoped [he] could are, for example, far too uncertain and ambiguous to overcome their earlier statements indicating predisposed prejudices. Our case law supports appellant's challenges to these jurors. Because the trial court denied Van Poyck's challenges for cause, Van Poyck was forced to exhaust his peremptory strikes on them. As a result, two pro-death jurors actually sat on his jury.