Opinion ID: 2276605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: background and factual summary

Text: On June 7, 1994, a woman accused Bobb of rape. Bobb maintained that he and the woman had consensual sex. Bobb was arrested and tried for the offense of rape. Prior to trial, Bobb filed a motion, pursuant to § 22-4122, informing the court that: At the trial in this matter the defense intends to put on evidence, through cross and direct examination, of the complainant's past sexual behavior with the accused for the purpose of establishing consent. [1] D.C.Code § 22-4122 is part of the District's Anti-Sexual Abuse Act which, among other things, was enacted to make changes to certain evidentiary and procedural aspects of sexual abuse cases. COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON BILL 10-87, ANTI-SEXUAL ABUSE ACT OF 1994, at 1 (September 28, 1994). Section 22-4122 codi[fies] [a] . . . federal rule of evidence [2] which prevents the unnecessary introduction, at trial, of evidence of a sexual abuse victim's prior sexual conduct. This provision is commonly referred to as the `rape shield law.' Id. at 15. Under § 22-4122, [i]f the . . . accused . . . intends to offer. . . evidence of specific instances of an alleged victim's past sexual behavior, the defendant must make a motion to this effect. § 22-4122(b)(1). A written offer of proof must be filed with the motion. § 22-4122(b)(2). Upon consideration of the motion, the trial court is required to schedule a hearing if, among other factors, the evidence is constitutionally required to be admitted; or shows past sexual behavior under circumstances where consent is an issue in the case before the court. § 22-4122(a) [3] , (b)(2). In filing the § 22-4122 motion, counsel for Bobb attached a short written offer of proof, stating in full: 1. The defendant is charged with the forcible rape of [the complainant] on or about June 7, 1994. 2. The defendant and the complainant are known to each other. 3. Based upon information and belief counsel would state that beginning approximately February, 1994, the defendant and the complainant engaged in consensual vaginal and oral intercourse and that the complainant received some compensation in return. At the § 22-4122 pre-trial hearing, which was closed to the public, see § 22-4122(b)(2) (a hearing in chambers), counsel for the defense called the complainant as the first witness. She denied having consensual sex with Bobb on June 7, 1994, or any other occasion. After her testimony, the trial court asked counsel for Bobb whether he had any other witnesses. He replied: We call the defendant. I note my objection though. Okay. I don't think we need to have the interpreter present. Bobb asserted that he had had consensual sex with the complainant approximately four or five times between October 1993 and June 1994. The government conducted fairly extensive cross-examination of Bobb. Defense counsel objected, variously, on the grounds that: the cross-examination was beyond the scope of the direct; there was no need for further cross-examination; and certain questions were irrelevant. At the end of the § 22-4122 hearing, counsel for Bobb moved to seal the entire proceeding. The trial court agreed to seal the proceeding but stated that it could be unsealed for the purpose of the parties getting a transcript so they can have it available to test the defendant's testimonial credibility if he chooses to testify. Just before trial commenced, defense counsel stated an objection to the unsealing of the hearing transcript, based on the statutory language in § 22-4122(b)(2) requiring the hearing to be held in chambers. The trial court noted that the judge who presided over the hearing had already denied defense counsel's request. At trial, the government's evidence revealed that on June 7, 1994, Bobb went to the rooming house on Fuller Street, N.W., in the District of Columbia, where he previously lived, to retrieve a blender. The complainant shared a room with her boyfriend in the same rooming house. Her boyfriend collected rent at the rooming house, and Bobb had alerted the complainant's boyfriend on the morning of June 7, 1994, that he needed to get his blender. Later that day, according to the testimony of the complainant, Bobb knocked on the door to the complainant's room and asked for the blender. After the complainant gave him the blender, she closed the door. Bobb knocked on her door again to turn in his keys to the rooming house. When the complainant opened the door and extended her arm to take the keys, Bobb grabbed her wrist and forced her into a bathroom. He choked the complainant and threatened to kill her if she shouted. Eventually he raped her. After the rape, the complainant immediately called her boyfriend who was at work. He went at once to the Fuller Street rooming house and found the complainant screaming and crying. He summoned a uniformed Secret Service agent who was nearby. The agent accompanied the boyfriend to his room at the Fuller Street address. There, the agent observed the complainant screaming and crying. She was crouched in a fetal position. The agent heard the complainant say: He raped me. Dr. Lynde Knowles  Jonas, a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology and at that time a senior resident at Georgetown University, testified at trial as an expert for the government. Dr. Knowles-Jonas performed a pelvic examination of the complainant after the rape. She described the redness and tenderness that she found which, in her view, indicated that injury or trauma had occurred. The doctor stated that [i]t would be unusual to find such injury or trauma in a woman who had had consensual sex, and agreed that the injury to the complainant could not have resulted from consensual sex. Bobb took the stand at trial in his own defense, after presenting three other witnesses, and stated that the following events took place. He and the complainant had consensual sex on June 7, 1994. During the period from October 1993 to June 1994, she came to his room on her own approximately ten times while they were living in the same rooming house. He had sex with the complainant on June 2, 1994, and approximately four times after that. He would give the complainant money, from $20 to $80 after sex. He gave her $80 on June 7. During cross-examination, the government attacked Bobb's credibility with the transcript of the § 22-4122 pre-trial testimony. Initially, counsel for Bobb objected on the ground of improper impeachment, essentially because government counsel did not provide a page number or a verbatim quote from the § 22-4122 transcript. The court agreed with defense counsel that the impeachment was improper and admonished the prosecutor to use the proper procedure for impeachment while using a transcript of prior testimony. Counsel for the government continued to use the § 22-4122 pre-trial testimony in the cross-examination of Bobb relating to his past contacts with the complainant. When the government's questions began to focus on June 7, 1994, and Bobb's assertion that the complainant initiated sex with him [f]or old time's sake, defense counsel objected, stating to the court: I'm not objecting to impeachment; I am objecting because the foundation is incorrect. After discussion, and when the prosecutor indicated that she would move on, the trial judge told defense counsel that he could try to rectify it on redirect. Later, defense counsel posed another objection to a question based on Bobb's pre-trial testimony, stating: I try not to object on my client's cross-examination, but this isn't impeachment. After a bench conference, the trial judge ordered government counsel to move on before Bobb responded to the question posed.