Opinion ID: 739906
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: False Statements in the Warrant Affidavit and Probable Cause

Text: 52 Trzaska also argues that the warrants were not supported by probable cause because the warrant affidavit falsely related Johnson's observations of Trzaska's movements while Trzaska was moving the guns from his apartment to his garage after the illegal plain view search. 53 Every statement in a warrant affidavit does not have to be true. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2681, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). However, if a defendant can make a sufficient showing that false statements were deliberately or recklessly included in a warrant affidavit, a court should disregard the allegedly false statements and determine whether the remaining portions of the affidavit would support probable cause to issue the warrant. Id. at 171-72, 98 S.Ct. at 2684-85. If the remaining portions of the affidavit would support probable cause, the warrant was properly issued and the court need go no further. Id. However, if the remaining portions of the affidavit would not create probable cause, the court should conduct a hearing to determine whether the statements were in fact false and whether they were made in a deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth. Id. 54 As discussed above, the district court conducted a Franks hearing. Based in part on probation officer O'Keefe's testimony at that hearing, the district court concluded that O'Keefe was not trained as a law enforcement officer and was therefore careless[ ] in how she took notes. Further, the district court stated: It was simply not good practice and good procedure to have someone swear to an affidavit who had absolutely no personal knowledge of the facts. The court decided that any false statements in the affidavit were a result of these mistakes and other misunderstandings, and that these mistakes and misunderstandings did not arise to a deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth. 55 Whether a person acted deliberately or recklessly is a factual question of intent, and we therefore review the court's decision for clear error. See United States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216, 220-21 (2d Cir.1992) (district court's factual determinations during Franks hearing are reviewed for clear error); cf. In re Bonnanzio, 91 F.3d 296, 301 (2d Cir.1996) (bankruptcy court's determination whether debtor acted intentionally or recklessly is a factual question of intent which is reviewed for clear error); Twin Peaks Productions v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1382 (2d Cir.1993) (a district court's determination of whether a person acted intentionally or recklessly is reviewed for clear error). 56 We agree that O'Keefe should have made notes about her conversations with Johnson at an earlier time. We also agree that the person preparing the affidavit should have had at least some personal knowledge of what had transpired. However, we do not conclude that the district court made a clear error when it held that the statements in the warrant affidavit were not made in a deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth. The district judge heard officer O'Keefe's explanation and found her credible. That finding is not clearly erroneous and we will not upset it. We conclude that the challenged statements were properly included in the warrant affidavit. 57 Trzaska also argues that the government deliberately or recklessly failed to disclose that it made two visits to his apartment before applying for the warrant. Trzaska argues that the warrant affidavit makes it clear that the probation officers made the routine home visit, but that the government failed to make it clear that the officers then left his apartment and returned later to conduct the plain view search. 2 Assuming that Trzaska is correct--that the government improperly failed to reveal that it left Trzaska's apartment and then returned to conduct the plain view search--Franks instructs that we should disregard the false statements and then determine whether the remaining portions of the warrant affidavit would create probable cause. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72, 98 S.Ct. at 2684-85. We have done just that. In the previous subsection we disregarded the evidence seized in the plain view search (because the search was illegal) and determined that the remaining portions of the warrant affidavit would create probable cause to search Trzaska's apartment and garage.