Opinion ID: 1439558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: implied cause of action under rcw 49.44.090

Text: RCW 49.44.090 makes it an unfair employment practice (1) For an employer ... because an individual is between the ages of forty and seventy, to refuse to hire or employ or license or to bar or to terminate from employment such individual, or to discriminate against such individual in promotion, compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.... RCW 49.44 is silent regarding remedies against an employer engaged in this unfair practice; the chapter also does not define employer. [5] It has long been recognized that a legislative enactment may be the foundation of a right of action. McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wn.2d 265, 274, 621 P.2d 1285 (1980) (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting). Further, we can assume that the legislature is aware of the doctrine of implied statutory causes of action and also assume that the legislature would not enact a remedial statute granting rights to an identifiable class without enabling members of that class to enforce those rights. Without an implicit creation of a remedy, the statute is meaningless. McNeal, at 277 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting). And as a majority of this court has stated, when a statute... [has] provided a right of recovery, it is incumbent upon the court to devise a remedy. See 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 55.03 (4th ed. 1973). State v. Manuel, 94 Wn.2d 695, 699, 619 P.2d 977 (1980); see also Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wn.2d 827, 846, 400 P.2d 72 (1965) (implying a right of action under the state's labor relations act for an employee who claimed that his employer, in violation of the statute, had interfered with the employee's labor activities); State ex rel. Phillips v. State Liquor Control Bd., 59 Wn.2d 565, 570, 369 P.2d 844 (1962) ([c]ourts have consistently held that when a statute gives a new right and no specific remedy, the common law will provide a remedy). The Restatement of Torts recognizes the implied right of action: When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A (1979). The federal courts also recognize an implied cause of action under a statute which provides protection to a specified class of persons but creates no remedy. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 45 L.Ed.2d 26, 95 S.Ct. 2080 (1975); In re WPPSS Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.1987). Borrowing from the test used by federal courts in determining whether to imply a cause of action, we must resolve the following issues: first, whether the plaintiff is within the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted; second, whether legislative intent, explicitly or implicitly, supports creating or denying a remedy; and third, whether implying a remedy is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislation. [3] WPPSS Securities Litigation, 823 F.2d at 1353. Plaintiffs, employees who were aged 60 and 61 at the time of their discharges, are clearly part of the class of persons entitled to the protection of RCW 49.44.090. The statute creates a right on the part of employees within the protected class to be free from age discrimination by their employers but does not indicate explicitly an intent to create a remedy. However, as noted above, we may rely on the assumption that the Legislature would not enact a statute granting rights to an identifiable class without enabling members of that class to enforce those rights. Moreover, the purpose of this legislation is obviously to confront the problem of age discrimination by employers, and according a private right of action to persons within the protected class is consistent with this underlying legislative purpose. [6] Therefore, we hold that because RCW 49.44.090 makes it an unfair employment practice to discriminate against an employee who is between the ages of 40 and 70 based upon her age, but provides no express method of redress against an employer who has engaged in such an unfair practice, there is an implied right of action for plaintiffs alleging violations of that statute. [7] For the elements of this cause of action, we look to our recent opinion in Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, Inc., supra , in which we identified the necessary criteria for establishing an age discrimination claim under RCW 49.60. There, because RCW 49.60 did not provide any specific criteria for age discrimination claims, we looked to criteria developed by federal courts under a similar federal statute. Grimwood, at 361. We reviewed the four elements sufficient to make out a prima facie age discrimination case: (1) that the employee was within the statutorily protected age group; (2) was discharged; (3) was doing satisfactory work; and (4) was replaced by a younger person. Grimwood, at 362 (citing Roberts v. ARCO, 88 Wn.2d 887, 892, 568 P.2d 764 (1977); Brady v. Daily World, 105 Wn.2d 770, 777, 718 P.2d 785 (1986); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973)). We noted that these four elements are not absolutes. Grimwood, at 362. We looked to Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir.1979) and agreed with that court that the burden of persuasion remains at all times upon the plaintiff. Once a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination. The employer's burden at this stage is not one of persuasion, but rather a burden of production. To go forward, the employer need only articulate reasons sufficient to meet the prima facie case.... Once the employer fulfills his burden of production, to create a genuine issue of material fact the plaintiff must satisfy his ultimate burden of persuasion and show that the employer's articulated reasons are a mere pretext for what, in fact, is a discriminatory purpose. (Citation omitted.) Grimwood, at 363-64. Because the subject matter of the two statutes is similar, we adopt the elements and burdens as explained in the Grimwood opinion for establishing a cause of action under RCW 49.44.090.