Opinion ID: 1351145
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motions for a second change of venue or to sequester the jury

Text: a. Change of venue. As noted above, the Sacramento Superior Court granted defendant's change of venue motion. Both defendant's counsel and the prosecutor agreed the trial should be held in neighboring Contra Costa County, approximately 50 miles from Sacramento, but defendant wanted the trial moved to Southern California. (9a) After the case was transferred to Contra Costa County, and after his successful Faretta motion, defendant moved for a second change of venue. He asserts the trial court erroneously denied his motion. (10) When faced with a colorable claim that a trial court's denial of a change of venue motion may have denied the defendant a fair trial, the reviewing court must independently examine the record to determine whether, in light of the failure to change venue, it is reasonably likely that the defendant in fact received a fair trial. ( People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1125-1126 [259 Cal. Rptr. 473, 774 P.2d 146].) In making this assessment we are guided by the following factors and principles. First, we consider the nature and gravity of the offense, the nature and extent of the news coverage, the size of the community, the status of the defendant in the community, and the popularity and prominence of the victim. ( Id., at p. 1125, and cases cited.) Second, we have also frequently recognized that review of such matters on appeal  as opposed to pretrial review by writ  affords the reviewing court the opportunity to analyze and consider the voir dire of the jurors actually selected. `[V]oir dire may demonstrate that pretrial publicity had no prejudicial effect,' or conversely may corroborate the allegations of potential prejudice. ( Williams, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1125, and cases cited.) (9b) We proceed to determine, based on these factors and guidelines, whether it is reasonably likely defendant did not have a fair trial. ( Williams, supra, at p. 1126.) The charged offenses were obviously grave, and of a nature likely to attract much press attention. There was in fact substantial coverage, both print and electronic, but the coverage occurred mostly in late 1980  two years before the trial  and in Sacramento, about fifty miles from Contra Costa County, which was at the time the ninth-largest county in the state. Defendant, although painted as a sex molester and an ex-convict in the Sacramento community by the Sacramento press, had no particular status in the Contra Costa community. Likewise, the victims, although presented as likable all-American college students in the Sacramento press, were not prominent in the Contra Costa community. These factors, considered as a whole, do not lead us to doubt that defendant received a fair trial. Moreover, the voir dire of the actual jurors does not establish a reasonable likelihood that defendant did not have a fair trial. Of the 12 jurors who decided defendant's case, 10 had not been exposed to any pretrial publicity. Of the two who had (Appel and Youngman), both stated their impartiality and ability to reach decisions based on courtroom evidence. Appel vaguely recalled reading an article about college students in the Sacramento area who disappeared after going to a party. She remembered nothing more. She did not read any Sacramento newspapers, nor did she watch any television news. Youngman remembered reading one recent article in a San Francisco newspaper about the charges involved in the case, the fact that defendant's wife would testify against him, and defendant's prior record. At first she said she remembered nothing specific from the article, but then stated she may have remembered something about a prior robbery. She then stated that if it was true defendant had suffered a prior robbery conviction, she would not hold it against him, because he would already have paid his debt to society for that offense. Both jurors were subjected to individual voir dire on the impact of pretrial publicity, but defendant challenged neither for cause. (See People v. Jurado (1981) 115 Cal. App.3d 470, 491 [171 Cal. Rptr. 509].) Although we have noted that a juror's declaration of impartiality is not conclusive (e.g., Williams, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1129), here we have no basis to doubt the two jurors' assertions that they would not be persuaded by the brief news accounts they had seen. (11) We also observe, as we held in People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 949-950 [171 Cal. Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240], that `juror exposure to information about a ... defendant's prior convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he is charged' does not `presumptively deprive[] the defendant of due process.' [Citation.] `It is not required ... that jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion of the merits of the case. This is particularly true in criminal cases. To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.' Having reviewed the record independently, we are convinced there is no reasonable likelihood that defendant did not receive a fair trial. b. Sequestration of the jury. (12) Defendant asserts the court erred in denying his alternative request to sequester the jury during deliberations. He raises a similar point concerning the penalty phase, post, in part IV.9. Whether to sequester the jury is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. (§ 1121.) The record shows that after selection of the jury, and after the court denied defendant's second change-of-venue motion, defendant asked the court to consider sequestering the jury during deliberations. The court responded that it might consider sequestering the jury during deliberations, and defendant responded he would request that of the court. The court replied, Let's wait till we get to that point. We are a couple of months away from that. Because defendant offers no showing that he raised the matter when the trial approached the time for deliberations, we could justifiably consider the point waived. In any event, on these facts, no abuse of discretion appears. The court frequently admonished the jury not to discuss or read or listen to reports about the case. Defendant contends that although no juror reported he or she disobeyed the court's orders, it stretches the imagination to believe the jury could have been successfully insulated from the extensive media coverage, and hence the court abused its discretion in failing to sequester. We decline to find an abuse of discretion based on defendant's speculation. For similar reasons we also reject defendant's apparently separate claim that publicity during the trial so contaminated the jury that a fair trial was not had. Defendant offers no credible support for his theory.