Opinion ID: 2621469
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: r.c.p. 12(b)(6) dismissal

Text: In pursuing review of an order dismissing a complaint, we accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Gillis v. F & A Enterprises, 934 P.2d 1253, 1254-55 (Wyo.1997). In Gillis, we reiterated that dismissal is a drastic remedy which should be granted sparingly. We sustain a dismissal pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) only when it is certain from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot allege any facts that would entitle him to relief. Garnett v. Brock, 2 P.3d 558, 562 (Wyo.2000). See also Duncan v. Afton, Inc., 991 P.2d 739, 741-42 (Wyo.1999) and Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 608 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wyo.1980). [¶ 7] The appellant begins his argument that the appellees owed him a duty in this case by turning to this Court's statement that [t]he Wyoming common law of negligence imposes a duty on the defendant to exercise the degree of care required of a reasonable person in light of all the circumstances. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 411 (Wyo.1983). He then cites the same case for a further explication of the same principle: `   One owes the duty to every person in our society to use reasonable care to avoid injury to the other person in any situation in which it could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care might result in such injury.' Kirby v. Sonville, 286 Or. 339, 594 P.2d 818, 821 (1979).    McClellan, 666 P.2d at 412 ( quoting Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980)). [¶ 8] The appellant bolsters his position by referring to various sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965), for example, describes several non-exclusive special relationships that may give rise to a duty to aid or protect a third person, including common carrier and passenger, innkeeper and guest, and possessor of land held open to the public and invited guest. More pertinent to the instant case is Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 315, which describes a duty to control the actions of a third person to prevent harm to another: There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection. [¶ 9] The sections that follow Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 315 describe situations where an actor has a duty to control the conduct of a third person. Two of those sections describe situations that bear some resemblance to the case at hand. Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 316 provides: A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his minor child as to prevent it from intentionally harming others or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control. Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 318 provides: If the actor permits a third person to use lands or chattels in his possession otherwise than as a servant, he is, if present, under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of the third person as to prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the actor (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the third person, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control. And finally, Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 324A provides: One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking. [¶ 10] One example of a case wherein a duty was based upon these Restatement principles is Gritzner v. Michael R., 228 Wis.2d 541, 598 N.W.2d 282 (1999). In Gritzner, a minor was sexually molested by another minor while playing at the latter's home. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals found it self-evident that an adult who voluntarily takes on the supervision, custody or control, even on a temporary basis, of a visiting child ..., stands in a special relationship to such child for purposes of the child's `protection' under § 314A of the Restatement. Gritzner, 598 N.W.2d at 287-88. In reversing the dismissal of the victim's negligence action against the parent of the perpetrator, the court also found that a duty of protection existed under Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 324A. Gritzner, 598 N.W.2d at 289. It is noteworthy that the potential liability of the homeowner in Gritzner did not arise from the concept of premises liability, but from the special relationship. Id. at 288. [4] [¶ 11] Under different facts, a similar result was reached in Morgan v. Perlowski, 508 N.W.2d 724 (Iowa 1993). While attending a beer party at Perlowski's mother's house, Morgan was assaulted by another guest. Id. at 725-26. In Morgan's negligence action against Perlowski, a question arose as to the proper source of any duty Perlowski owed Morgan. Rejecting a premises liability theory, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the duty arose out of the special relationship concepts of Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, §§ 315 and 318. Morgan, 508 N.W.2d at 726-28. In adopting the principles of Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 318, the court held that [a]s a matter of public policy, it is reasonable to impose a limited duty upon a possessor of land, who is present on the land, to control the conduct of social guests. Morgan, 508 N.W.2d at 728. The court then concluded that it was a jury question whether Perlowski knew or should have known he had the ability to control the assaulting guest and whether he knew or should have known of the necessity and opportunity to exercise such control. Id. [5] See also Chavez v. Torres, 128 N.M. 171, 991 P.2d 1, 5-6 (1999). For a duty to arise under Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 318, harm must have been reasonably foreseeable by the homeowner. Anthony H. v. John G., 415 Mass. 196, 612 N.E.2d 663, 666 (1993). [¶ 12] As an alternative theory of liability, the appellant also contends that the appellees stood in loco parentis and had assumed the parental duty to control the teenagers who were staying overnight on their property. [6] Without citation to any particular authority, the appellant simply argues that this theory supports a finding that the appellees had a duty to the minors. [¶ 13] This Court, and the Wyoming State Legislature, have both previously dealt with the tort of social host or vendor liability for harm caused by an intoxicated person. [7] In Parsons v. Jow, 480 P.2d 396, 397 (Wyo. 1971), this Court stated that there was no common law cause of action against a liquor vendor in favor of one injured by an intoxicated vendee because proximate cause was deemed to be the vendee's consumption, not the vendor's sale. We also said that any change in that rule was up to the legislature. Id. at 398. Twelve years later, in McClellan, 666 P.2d at 410-12, we reversed ourselves and acknowledged a cause of action based on common law negligence. [8] We further held that statutes forbidding the sale of alcohol to minors were meant not only to protect minors, but also to protect the general public, and that violation of such statutes is evidence of negligence. Id. at 413. [¶ 14] The primary holding of McClellan was legislatively abrogated in 1985 with passage of a statute specifically limiting the liability of alcohol providers. 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 205, § 1. The statute was modified in 1986. 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 6, § 1. In pertinent part, it provides that [n]o person who has legally provided alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to any other person is liable for damages caused by the intoxication of the other person. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301 (LexisNexis 2001). The clear intent of the act is to immunize both vendors and social hosts from liability for damages caused by persons to whom alcohol has legally been provided. In that regard, it is not legal for a person to provide alcohol to a minor who is not his legal ward, medical patient or member of his own immediate family.... Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-6-101(a) (Lexis 1999). [¶ 15] In the context of the present case, the effect of this statute is to allow the appellant to pursue a cause of action against the appellees if it can be shown that they provided alcohol to the teenaged boys. So, without the statute, there is certainly no legislative bar to such an action. The question remains, however, where there is no allegation that the appellees, themselves, provided the alcohol, what facts might sustain a cause of action against them? In other words, under what circumstances should the appellees be seen to have had a duty to protect the appellant? [¶ 16] Broadly speaking, [a] duty may arise by contract, statute, common law, or when the relationship of the parties is such that the law imposes an obligation on the defendant to act reasonably for the protection of the plaintiff. Hamilton v. Natrona County Educ. Ass'n, 901 P.2d 381, 384 (Wyo.1995). One such relationship is the parent/child relationship. In Sare v. Stetz, 67 Wyo. 55, 214 P.2d 486, 487 (1950), we rejected the family purpose doctrine, under which a parent, as owner of a car, may be held liable for the negligence of a child who drives the car. In doing so, we held that `[a] parent is not liable for the tort of his minor child merely from the relationship.' Id. at 488 ( quoting Arkin v. Page, 287 Ill. 420, 123 N.E. 30, 31 (1919)). We reached a similar conclusion in Kimble v. Muller, 417 P.2d 178, 180 (Wyo.1966), where we said: For us to hold the father in this instance liable for his son's negligence, because the father permitted the son to use the car, would be equivalent to holding that every parent is liable for every tort of a child. See also Hatch v. O'Neill, 133 Ga.App. 624, 212 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1974) ([a] mother is not negligent in simply failing to keep a constant and unremitting watch and restraint over her children) and Paige v. Bing Const. Co., 61 Mich.App. 480, 233 N.W.2d 46, 49 (1975) (impossibility of a parent knowing what a child is doing at all timesdespite utmost vigilance). [¶ 17] Clearly, the parental relationship, without more, is not sufficient to make a parent liable in tort for the conduct of his or her child. That is analogous to the principle that a social host, even when acting in loco parentis, is not necessarily liable in tort for the conduct of his or her minor social guests. The question that must be answered is thiswhat is the something more that must exist in circumstances such as those in the instant case before a duty arises on the part of a social host to protect third parties from harm caused by an intoxicated minor guest? Some courts have said the answer lies in the host's knowledge of the minor's propensity to engage in the specific dangerous activity: When a person has not furnished the instrumentality but through negligence allowed access thereto to a child, the standard for imposing liability upon the person is whether the person knew of the child's proclivity or propensity for the specific dangerous activity which caused the harm.... If such knowledge cannot be shown on the part of the parent, then liability cannot attach.... ... ... We hold that the [parents] were not negligent in simply failing to keep a constant and unremitting watch and restraint over their children, or over other children with whom their children were playing. Dennis by Evans v. Timmons, 313 S.C. 338, 437 S.E.2d 138, 141 (1993). Similarly, in Manuel v. Koonce, 206 Ga.App. 582, 425 S.E.2d 921, 923-24 (1992), parents who did not furnish alcohol to their son and his minor guests, who were absent from their home, and who had no reason to anticipate that their son and his minor guests would obtain alcohol, were not liable for personal injuries and deaths caused by a minor driver to whom their son had provided alcohol. Specifically, the Georgia Court of Appeals found no evidence that the parents knew or should have known that their son had a propensity to provide alcohol to underage guests at their home. Id. at 923. [9] See also Gritzner, 598 N.W.2d at 289 (duty arose under Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 324A where parent had prior knowledge of son's propensity to sexually abuse other children) and Garrison Retirement Home Corp. v. Hancock, 484 So.2d 1257, 1262 (Fla.App.1985) (defendant, who had knowledge of resident's poor driving capabilities, had duty to protect others). [¶ 18] In Austin v. Kaness, 950 P.2d 561 (Wyo.1997), we considered the specific question of the liability of homeowner parents to a third party injured by an intoxicated social guest who had obtained alcohol in the parents' home, not from them, but from their adult son. Because the son was not a minor, and because he did not reside in his parents' home, the question of the parents' liability was presented under theories of agency and respondeat superior. Id. at 563-64. We found that the parents were not liable for their son's conduct because, even if he were considered an employee or agent, the act of throwing a beer party was clearly outside the scope of his duties. Id. at 564. [¶ 19] Several courts have recognized a limited cause of action where an intoxicated social guest harms a third party. For example, in Cravens v. Inman, 223 Ill.App.3d 1059, 166 Ill.Dec. 409, 586 N.E.2d 367, 377-78 (1991), the court stated: We agree with plaintiff's assertion that this court should, under the precise facts of the instant cause, adopt the view of other states that have recognized social host negligence liability for automobile accident injuries caused by an intoxicated minor driver. We emphasize that our holding is limited to the facts alleged in plaintiff's pleading, i.e., where (1) a social host has knowingly served alcohol, and permits the liquor to be served, to youths under 18 years of age at the social host's residence, (2) the social host permits the minors' consumption to continue to the point of intoxication, and (3) the social host allows the inebriated minors to depart from the residence in a motor vehicle. We express no opinion with respect to factual scenarios other than the one presented herein. [10] These same factors, described somewhat differently, were also adopted in Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716, 719 (1985): We therefore find that the defendant hostess and her daughter owed a duty to those using the highways not to subject them to an unreasonable risk of harm by furnishing alcohol to a person under 19 who was noticeably intoxicated and who these defendants knew would soon be driving his car. [11] [¶ 20] It should be recalled that, in Parsons, 480 P.2d at 397, this Court stated that there was no common law cause of action against a liquor vendor for negligence because the consumption, rather than the sale, of the alcohol was the proximate cause of any harm to third parties. [12] With the coming of comparative negligence, however, some courts see this as a question for the jury: We hold that, where there is sufficient proof at trial, a social host who negligently serves or furnishes intoxicating beverages to a minor guest, and the intoxicants so furnished cause the minor to be intoxicated or cause the minor's driving ability to be impaired, shall be liable to third persons in the proportion that the negligence in furnishing the beverage to the minor was a substantial factor in causing the accident or injuries, as may be determined under the rules of comparative negligence. Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis.2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857, 865 (1985). [13] The key element in this analysis of causation is foreseeability. We turn now to the question of proximate cause. Under many circumstances the act which is the proximate cause of the damage resulting from a breach of duty relating to alcohol is the act of the consumer of the alcohol. Under such circumstances, the consumer is solely liable because the act of furnishing the alcohol is too remote to be the proximate cause of the negligence of the consumer.... That is to say, the subsequent act of the consumer is not foreseeable to the provider, or the consumption of an excessive amount of alcohol is the intervening (unforeseeable) cause of the damage. However, where one provides alcohol to a noticeably intoxicated 17-year-old knowing that he will soon be driving his car, it is foreseeable to the provider that the consumer will drive while intoxicated and a jury would be authorized to find that it is foreseeable to the provider that the intoxicated driver may injure someone. That is to say, a jury would be authorized to find that providing alcohol to a noticeably intoxicated 17-year-old automobile driver was one of the proximate causes of the negligence of the driver and of the injuries to the deceased. Sutter, 327 S.E.2d at 719 (emphasis in original and footnote omitted). Furthermore, for such a duty to arise, the foreseeable harm need not be known with specificity: `... The duty of any person is the obligation of due care to refrain from any act which will cause foreseeable harm to others even though the nature of that harm and the identity of the harmed person or harmed interest is unknown at the time of the act.... `A defendant's duty is established when it can be said that it was foreseeable that his act or omission to act may cause harm to someone. A party is negligent when he commits an act when some harm to someone is foreseeable. Once negligence is established, the defendant is liable for unforeseeable consequences as well as foreseeable ones. In addition, he is liable to unforeseeable plaintiffs.' Koback, 366 N.W.2d at 863 ( quoting Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis.2d 483, 280 N.W.2d 178, 184 (1979) (Day, J., dissenting)). [¶ 21] The sampling of opinions cited herein reveals the extent to which courts have gone to establish liability on the part of social hosts for harm caused by their intoxicated guests. Premises liability, parental liability, respondeat superior, agency, special relationships, gratuitous undertaking, and common law negligencethese theories have all been advanced to provide the underpinnings for such a tort. In truth, the answer lies in a principle to which we have turned in the past in determining the existence of a duty in a negligence caseduty exists where society says it ought to exist. Essential to any negligence cause of action is proof of facts which impose a duty upon defendant. See, ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 931 (Wyo.1981). The question of the existence of a duty is a matter of law for the court to decide. Id., at 932. A duty exists where, `upon the facts in evidence, such a relation exists between the parties that the community will impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the otheror, more simply, whether the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered invasion was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the defendant.' Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 37 at 236 (5th ed.1984). Duncan, 991 P.2d at 742 ( quoting Goodrich v. Seamands, 870 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Wyo. 1994)). Deciding whether a legal obligation should be imposed involves a balancing of certain identified factors: When this Court has considered whether a duty should be imposed based on a particular relationship, we have balanced numerous factors to aid in that determination: (1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, (5) the policy of preventing future harm, (6) the extent of the burden upon the defendant, (7) the consequences to the community and the court system, and (8) the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. Duncan, 991 P.2d at 744 ( quoting Ortega v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199, 203, 206 (Wyo.1995)) (footnote omitted). This is a test for the imposition of a duty under the general theory of common law negligence and it does not require the existence of a relationship recognized under some specialized theory such as premises liability or agency. Instead, it is the same theory set forth in McClellan, 666 P.2d at 412 ( quoting Alegria, 619 P.2d at 137), whereby a duty of reasonable care exists to avoid injury to another person where it `could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care might result in such injury.' [¶ 22] People who legally provide alcoholic liquor or malt beverages to another person are immunized under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301(a) against liability for damages that may be caused by the intoxication of that other person. Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-6-101(a), it is illegal to provide alcoholic liquor or malt beverages to minors, except in certain limited circumstances not pertinent here. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-301(c) makes it clear that the immunity provision does not affect liability where the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage is provided in violation of Title 12. Taken together, these statutory sections reflect the legislature's recognition that, where alcohol is illegally provided to a minor, the person providing the alcohol may become liable for injuries resulting from that minor's resulting intoxication. Consequently, there is no statutory deterrent to a finding by this Court that a common law cause of action for social host liability exists under the appropriate circumstances. [¶ 23] This is not the case in which to make that determination. Neither party applied the Duncan factors to the facts of this case. We are not inclined to pursue that task on our own initiative. Furthermore, the appellant's complaint lacked several allegations that seem to be universally required where a tort duty has been recognized in such circumstances. First, there is no liability unless the defendant parents/homeowners provided the alcohol to the minor guests or, at least, they knew or should have known alcohol was being provided to the minor guest. Second, there is no liability unless the parents/homeowners knew or should have known that the minor guest was drinking to the point of intoxication. And third, there is no liability unless the parents/homeowners knew or should have known that the minor guest would soon be driving an automobile. In other words, the mere failure of parents/homeowners to supervise the minors does not, without more, create a duty to protect third parties from harm caused by an intoxicated minor driver under these circumstances. [14] See Sutter, 327 S.E.2d at 719; Charles v. Seigfried, 251 Ill.App.3d 1059, 191 Ill.Dec. 431, 623 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (1993), rev'd, 165 Ill.2d 482, 209 Ill.Dec. 226, 651 N.E.2d 154, 159 (1995) (reversed on ground that state's dramshop act had pre-empted the field); Cravens, 166 Ill.Dec. 409, 586 N.E.2d at 378; Bowling v. Popp, 536 N.E.2d 511, 514 (Ind.App.1989); Fullmer v. Tague, 500 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Iowa 1993); Spears v. Bradford, 652 So.2d 628, 632 (La.App.1995); O'Flynn v. Powers, 38 Mass.App.Ct. 936, 646 N.E.2d 1091, 1092 (1995); Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299, 420 S.E.2d 174, 178 (1992); Daniel v. Reeder, 16 S.W.3d 491, 495 (Tex.App.2000); and Edward L. Raymond, Jr., Annotation, Social Host's Liability for Injuries Incurred by Third Parties as a Result of Intoxicated Guest's Negligence, 62 A.L.R.4th 16, §§ 8-9, 13, 17-19 (1988). [¶ 24] It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to dismiss the appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The complaint failed to allege the minimal facts that would support a cause of action under these circumstances. Perhaps the most noticeable deficiency is any allegation that the appellees knew or should have known that Jefferson would soon be driving a car. Nowhere in the record is there even a suggestion, let alone any evidence, to contradict the complaint's own implication that the boys left the appellees' premises on foot. Consequently, there is likewise nothing in the record to support any inference that the appellees knew or should have known that Jefferson would later be driving a vehicle. Similarly, there is not a hint in the complaint as to the source of the alcohol that Jefferson drank that night. An allegation of failure to supervise minors, without more, is not sufficient.