Opinion ID: 320666
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the proper scope of the mine safety act

Text: 21
22 The resolution of the issue here depends on the coverage of and the procedure under the Mine Safety Act. Obviously the Board and the Administrative Law Judge differed in their interpretations. Specifically, we must determine whether a miner brings himself under the coverage of the Act by reporting safety violations to his foreman and Mine Safety Committee, or whether he must formally notify the Secretary of Interior or his authorized representative before he is protected. We believe that the answer is clear: given the mine's procedures regarding safety complaints, the coverage of the Act begins when the miner notifies his foreman and/or safety committeeman of possible safety violations. 23 It is important to recognize at the outset that this case arises out of the enforcement of the Mine Safety Act, not an ordinary labor dispute. While a simple employee discharge may be merely a labor dispute, when allegations of safety violations are not frivolous the court must carefully review the case to determine whether the Mine Safety Act has been obeyed. Our review indicates that the Act is involved here, and indeed we conclude that Phillips has presented a valid cause of action. 24 Safety costs money. The temptation to minimize compliance with safety regulations and thus shave costs is always present. 24 The miners are both the most interested in health and safety protection, and in the best position to observe the compliance or noncompliance with safety laws. Sporadic federal inspections can never be frequent or thorough enough to insure compliance. Miners who insist on health and safety rules being followed, even at the cost of slowing down production, are not likely to be popular with mine foreman or mine top management. Only if the miners are given a realistically effective channel of communication re health and safety, and protection from reprisal after making complaints, can the Mine Safety Act be effectively enforced. 25 There is no question but that Phillips felt there was a danger due to excessive coal dust on 28 April 1971. The previous actions of the federal inspectors and the Mine Safety Committee confirm that Phillips was not overly or unreasonably worried about the dangerous conditions in the mine. 25 When Phillips felt that the dust conditions were harmful, he did what he could to reduce the risk-- he began to clean the water sprays. It was at this point that the foreman told him to start work, as opposed to continuing to fix the safety equipment. After rejecting Phillips' contention that it was necessary to reduce the dust, the foreman told him either to start work or be fired. Thus Phillips was given the choice of either working in what he felt was an unhealthy, unsafe area, or being discharged for not accepting the foreman's evaluation of the danger. His discharge on 28 April was the direct result of his disagreement with the foreman on the safety of the coal dust level. 26 We digress here to point out that the 'substantial evidence' question is no question at all. Our dissenting colleague adequately describes the Administrative Law Judge's and Board's conclusions on this: 'First, the Board found there was no substantial evidence to support the finding of the Trial Examiner that Phillips was discharged because of his safety complaints and safety activities. After reviewing the evidence the Board found, contrary to the Examiner's conclusion, that the reason for the discharge was the refusal of Phillips to obey the direct order of his foreman to haul coal.' (P. 787) Of course, both the Administrative Law Judge and the Board were right: Phillips was discharged because of his refusal to obey a direct order to haul coal because in his judgment the working conditions were unsafe and unhealthy and Phillips and his co-worker were engaged in an effort to repair the safety equipment (spray) before resuming hauling coal. The Board never considered any evidence 27 different from the Administrative Law Judge's evidence; the Board simply summed up the evidence in a conclusory way designed to characterize the issue as an ordinary labor dispute-- to which ordinary labor dispute remedies would attach. To the court it seems inescapable that the whole dispute arises under the Mine Safety Act and is governed by it; it there had been no Mine Safety Act, it seems likely that Phillips would never have registered this-- and previous-- safety complaints. 28 The Mine Safety Act protects miners who are discharged as a result of their complaints concerning safety violations in mines. Section 110(b)(1) prohibits discharge of or discrimination against a miner by reason of the fact that the miner 29 ( A) has notified the Secretary or his authorized representative of any alleged violation or danger, (B) has filed, instituted, or caused to be filed or instituted any proceeding under this chapter, or (C) has testified or is about to testify in any proceeding resulting from the administration or enforcement of the provisions of this chapter. 26 30 We believe that Phillips' notification to the foreman of possible dangers is an essential preliminary stage in both the notification to the Secretary (A) and the institution of proceedings (B), and consequently brings the protection of the Safety Act into play.
31 In so holding, we do not adopt either extreme urged upon us. We do not think that merely because a discharge originates in a disagreement between a foreman and a miner that the Mine Safety Act is automatically brought into play. Nor do we adopt the other extreme, take the bare words of the statute with their most limited interpretation, and hold that before a miner's safety complaint is accorded the protection of the Safety Act the coal miner must have instituted a formal proceeding with the Secretary of Interior or his representative. Rather, we look to: the overall remedial purpose of the statute (discussed under C. infra); the practicalities of the situation in which government, management, and miner operate; and particularly to the procedure implementing the statute actually in effect at the Kencar mine. The existence of this procedure in itself was a practical recognition that the bare words of the Safety Act, unless implemented by some procedure at the mine to bridge the gap between 32 'the Secretary or his representative' (presumably the Federal Bureau of Mines) and the coal miner himself (the object of the Act), would be completely ineffective in achieving mine safety. 33 In summary, the procedure at the Kencar mine for the processing of safety complaints was the following: 34 (1) miner notifies his foreman of the problem and tries to obtain corrective action; 35 (2) if the foreman disagrees, the miner has the right to call in the Mine Safety Committeeman to evaluate the complaint;(3) (a) if the Mine Safety Committeeman agrees with the miner and the foreman fails to correct the problem the Committeeman can bring the case to the entire Committee and they may order the mine section closed; 36 (3) (b) if the Mine Safety Committeeman disagrees with the miner, the latter can request a Federal Mine Inspector be called in. Pending that determination, the miner is to be temporarily reassigned to another area. 27 37 This finding of the Administrative Law Judge is not disputed, and could hardly be disputed, as it rests on testimony at the hearing of Kencar management that this procedure was in effect before and on the day Phillips was discharged. 38 The Administrative Law Judge further found: 39 It is conceded by Respondent that, pending a resolution of a safety or health complaint, a miner at the Kencar Mine had the right to refuse to work under conditions which he believed in good faith to be hazardous to his safety or health. 28 40 Nothing in the Mine Safety Act or mine procedure suggests that the company has a right to fire a miner for refusing to work in a particular area of a mine when he fears a chronic, long-term threat to his health or safety there due to safety violations. 29 41 The Administrative Law Judge further specifically found: 42 Pending a determination by the Federal Inspector, the miner was to be reassigned to other, temporary duties. No case experienced in this mine actually reached the stage of temporary reassignment pending a Federal inspection, but management acknowledged at the hearing that under its practices and the implementation of its bargaining agreement, such would be the rights of the miners regarding safety or health complaints. 43 7. It is evident that, although the above safety complaint rights were acknowledged by management at the hearing, they were not entirely understood by the miners themselves. 30 44 It is clear beyond peradventure that Phillips was not required to accept the foreman's evaluation of danger; it is equally clear that he was discharged for not accepting the foreman's safety determination. We reject the Board's suggestion that Phillips was discharged only for a simple refusal to work. Rather, we conclude that the effective cause of Phillips' discharge was his complaint about hazardous working conditions in the mine. 45 When the foreman told him he was fired, Phillips left the mine. He was undoubtedly unfamiliar with the elaborate appeal and review procedure; he assumed that the firing was final. In view of the discharge on improper grounds, 31 we cannot hold Phillips to the standard of requiring him to file a petition with the Mine Safety Committee, or to notify formally the Secretary or other authorized person. Phillips 'instituted (a) proceeding' with the closest representative of any authority, i.e., his foreman, by making an effective complaint of a violation of the Mine Safety Act, i.e., refusing to work in unsafe conditions, for which he was promptly fired. While there is a possibility that the foreman also was unaware of the proper safety complaint procedures, nevertheless the mine management should have known of these procedures and rights, and with a greater time for reflection and investigation should have notified the miner of his rights of appeal and quashed the discharge. In fact 46 the management did neither, but sent a formal discharge notice asserting additional grounds, the validity of which the foreman later denied. This ratification by Kencar management of the improper discharge, especially in view of previous safety complaints, violated the Mine Safety Act. 47 The above discussion of the procedures necessary to implement the Mine Safety Act makes clear our most fundamental disagreement with the decision rationale of the Board, espoused by our dissenting colleague here. The method of 'institut(ing) any proceeding' or 'notif(ying) the Secretary or his authorized representative' is not spelled out in the Act, certainly not in terms cognizable by a coal miner. The Kencar Mine management and union representatives sensibly recognized this, and put into effect a procedure to bridge the gap between the miner in the pit and the Federal Bureau of Mines, the Secretary's representative. That procedure had as its first step the miner notifying his foreman of the problem and trying to obtain corrective action. Phillips did precisely this in accordance with Kencar Mine's approved procedure to meet the standards of the Mine Safety Act. Phillips was fired for doing so. 48 To hold that Phillips was not protected against discharge because he took the first prescribed step under the Kencar procedure to invoke the Mine Safety Act, to hold that only a miner's discharge after he reaches the Bureau of Mines with his complaint is protected by the Safety Act, would nullify not only the protection against discharge but also the fundamental purpose of the Act to compel safety in the mines. 32 49 We believe that the Mine Safety Act, to be effective, must be construed as we have here. If it is not, it will be easy for management to avoid the prohibitions of the Act. If every miner who complained of safety device failures could be placed in Phillips' situation, the Act would be a hollow promise of protection; a foreman's determination of safety would become final. 50
51 Our view of the Mine Safety Act is supported by the legislative history. Senator Kennedy, in introducing his amendment which became section 110(b) of the Safety Act, noted the broad purpose of the provision: 52 the rationale for this amendment is clear. For safety's sake, we want to encourage the reporting of suspected violations of health and safety regulations . . .. 53 But miners will not speak up if they fear retaliation. This amendment should deter such retaliation, and, therefore, encourage miners to bring dangers and suspected violations to public attention. 33 Senator Kennedy also remarked that 54 it is especially important that miners not feel inhibited to point out health and safety violations because there is such a high degree of danger in the mines. 34 55 Given this wide scope of protection intended, a liberal construction of the language of the Act is justified. 35 56 The House Committee on Education and Labor in reporting on the Act also suggested a liberal construction: 57 Subsection (b) prohibits discrimination against miners for having exercised their rights under this Act or for having participated, in any way, in the enforcement of the Act. The subsection provides procedures for obtaining reinstatement and back pay for miners discharged by operators and other remedies for miners discriminated against. 36 58 Furthermore, we note that the Third Circuit in considering a previous Mine Safety Act stressed a broad reading: 59 In construing safety or remedial legislation narrow or limited construction is to be eschewed. Rather, in this field liberal construction in light of the prime purpose of the legislation is to be employed. This statute is remedial, with a humane purpose in view and is therefore entitled to a liberal construction. 37 60 The parallels between the Mine Safety Act and other protective labor acts are significant. The Safety Act provision which we here construe was introduced with the announced intention of giving to miners 'the same protection against retaliation which we give employees under other Federal labor laws.' 38 Specifically, the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Landrum-Griffin Act were all noted as protecting employees against discrimination because of exercise of rights under the Acts. 61 The Supreme Court has construed the corresponding NLRA provision broadly: in NLRB v. Scrivener, dba AA Electric Company, 39 the Court held violative of the NLRA the discharge of an employee for his giving a sworn written statement to a NLRB field examiner who was investigating an unfair labor practice charge. Justice Blackmun, writing for the unanimous Court, was concerned that the employee should be protected in the investigative stages as well as after filing of formal charges or in giving formal testimony. Such protection is necessary to prevent the Board's channels of information from being dried up by employer intimidation of prospective complainants and witnesses. 40 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun stated that 62 the presence of the preceding words 'to discharge or otherwise discriminate' reveals, we think, particularly by the word 'otherwise,' an intent on the part of Congress to afford broad rather than narrow protection to the employee. 41 63 In the Mine Safety Act the words 'in any other way discriminate' may be similarly construed. 64 We believe our view of the scope of section 110(b)(1) of the Mine Safety Act is the only practical one to ensure the health and safety of miners, which is the central purpose of the Act. Holding that miners are not protected until they initiate formal procedure for review, of which they may be unaware, would violate the goal of protecting the miners' health and would thus violate the Congressional intent. 42 The result we reach in this case best comports with the remedial purpose of the legislation. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals and reinstate the decision and order of the Administrative Law Judge. 65 So ordered.