Opinion ID: 2639471
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior Representation of Prosecution Witnesses by Defense Counsel

Text: Defendant contends that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel due to conflicts of interest arising from his attorneys' prior representation of four prosecution witnesses. We disagree.
Prior to the preliminary hearing, Defense Counsel Patrick Forester, an assistant public defender, informed the court that a year earlier his office had represented Darlene's mother, Shirley W., who was then a prospective witness in a separate case in which the state sought to have Darlene declared a ward of the court on the basis of alleged sexual molestation by Gerald W., her stepfather. John Sudman, a deputy public defender in the same office as Forester, appeared as Shirley W.'s counsel at the detention, jurisdictional, dispositional, and review hearings. The petition was found true on January 27, 1984, and Darlene was made a ward of the court. On October 2, 1984, the public defender's office ceased its representation of Shirley W. In light of this information, the trial court appointed John Olson as counsel for Shirley W. in order to advise her of her attorney-client privileges arising from that earlier representation. After consulting with Olson, Shirley W. agreed in open court to waive any privileges she may have had, and agreed that she could be cross-examined as to any discussions she had with Sudman. On March 1, 1985, Forester declared a conflict of interest in a case involving James Carter, a potential prosecution witness. Forester never represented Carter. Attorney Stephen Tapson was appointed to represent Carter. On March 6, Tapson was replaced by another attorney, in anticipation of his appointment in the Cox case as second attorney. On March 7, Tapson was appointed as second attorney in the Cox case. Tapson represented that at no time had he talked to Carter. Forester informed the court that he explained the situation to defendant. Defendant then indicated to the court that despite this possible conflict of interest, he still wanted Tapson appointed. Defendant specifically agreed to waive any possible conflict of interest. Another potential witness, Darin McArthur, had previously been represented by Tapson's firm. Tapson informed all parties that he had had no contact with McArthur. Defendant again agreed to waive any possible conflict of interest arising from that case. Forester indicated for the record that he fully discussed this situation with defendant, including the nature of the cases in which witnesses Carter and McArthur were involved, and defendant still wanted Tapson appointed. Defendant confirmed this statement to the court. During trial, Lisa D. was called as a prosecution witness. Tapson indicated that the witness had previously been represented in juvenile court by another member of his firm. Tapson also indicated that his firm did not currently represent Lisa D. Tapson told the court that he was unsure if these facts constituted a conflict of interest. Forester indicated the defense would seek to impeach Lisa D. with her juvenile grand theft conviction. The prosecutor thereafter agreed to raise this issue on direct examination. The court ruled there was no conflict of interest. Defendant never objected to his continued representation by counsel in light of any of these alleged conflicts of interest.
The right to effective assistance of counsel, secured by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution, and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, includes the right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest. ( People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 833, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460 ( Bonin ).) To establish a federal constitutional violation, a defendant who fails to object at trial must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. ( Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980) 446 U.S. 335, 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333.) The Sullivan court made clear that the possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction. ( Ibid. ) To show a violation of the corresponding right under our state Constitution, a defendant need only demonstrate a potential conflict, so long as the record supports an `informed speculation' that the asserted conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. [Citations]. ( People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 998, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) But `[p]ermissible speculation giving rise to a conflict of interest may be deemed an informed speculation ... only when such is grounded on a factual basis that can be found in the record.' ( People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 776, 248 Cal.Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310 ( Belmontes ), quoting People v. Cook (1975) 13 Cal.3d 663, 670-671, 119 Cal.Rptr. 500, 532 P.2d 148.) To determine whether counsel's performance was adversely affected, we have suggested that Sullivan requires an inquiry into whether counsel pulled his punches, i.e., whether counsel failed to represent defendant as vigorously as he might have, had there been no conflict. ( People v. Easley (1988) 46 Cal.3d 712, 725, 250 Cal.Rptr. 855, 759 P.2d 490.) In undertaking such an inquiry, we are, as stated, bound by the record. But where a conflict of interest causes an attorney not to do something, the record may not reflect such an omission. We must therefore examine the record to determine (i) whether arguments or actions omitted would likely have been made by counsel who did not have a conflict of interest, and (ii) whether there may have been a tactical reason (other than the asserted conflict of interest) that might have caused any such omission. ( Id, at p. 727, 250 Cal.Rptr. 855, 759 P.2d 490.) In any event, a defendant may properly waive his right to the assistance of an attorney unhindered by a conflict of interest. ( Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 483, fn. 5, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426; Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 837, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460.)
This is not a case in which defense counsel has undertaken multiple representation of defendants with competing interests. (See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426.) Nor is it a case in which a former client was called as a witness, and was alleged to have masterminded the crime in which the current client was presently on trial. ( Leversen v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 530, 194 Cal.Rptr. 448, 668 P.2d 755.) Instead, this is a case where three of four witnesses were previously represented by other attorneys in counsel's firm in matters that were unrelated to the current trial, and where counsel was appointed to represent the fourth witness, but never spoke to the witness before being replaced. (See, e.g., Belmontes, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 776, 248 Cal.Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310.) A conflict may arise if a former client is a witness in a new case because the attorney is forbidden to use against a former client any confidential information acquired during that attorney-client relationship. ( Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 835, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460; Leversen v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 538, 194 Cal.Rptr. 448, 668 P.2d 755.) But if the attorney possesses no such confidential information, courts have routinely held that no actual or potential conflict of interest exists. For example, in People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 145-146, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461, we upheld the trial court's ruling that no conflict existed, given that advisory counsel possessed no confidential information stemming from his prior representation of a prosecution witness in several factually unrelated cases. Similarly, in People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1001-1002, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099 ( Clark ), we held that no actual or potential conflict existed where the public defender possessed no confidential information stemming from his prior representation of three prosecution witnesses. In Belmontes, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pages 774-777, 248 Cal.Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310, we held that the record did not establish that counsel had an actual or potential conflict of interest stemming from his firm's prior representation of the codefendant, because the attorney possessed no confidential information stemming from that earlier representation. (See also Vangsness v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1089-1092, 206 Cal.Rptr. 45 [same].) In the present matter, defendant has made no showing that an actual or potential conflict existed that adversely affected counsel's performance. Instead, defendant makes only the conclusory assertion that defense counsel could not effectively cross-examine witnesses Lisa D., McArthur, and Carter as to the circumstances of the charges upon which counsel formerly represented them. Defendant makes no claim that defense counsel could not effectively cross-examine these witnesses as to their testimony in the current case, nor does he assert that defense counsel even possessed confidential information acquired during the former representation. Defendant's assertion falls far short of an informed speculation grounded in a factual basis that can be found in the record. ( Belmontes, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 776, 248 Cal.Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310.) For example, Lisa D. testified that while she was with Lynda and two other girls, defendant asked them: Hey sluts, does your mama know where you are? She also stated she saw defendant and Lynda together in the downtown parking lot. Forester, not Tapson, vigorously cross-examined Lisa D. This last fact is relevant because any alleged conflict as to Lisa D. arose from her relationship with Tapson, not Forester. We have held that it is appropriate for a cocounsel who has no conflict with a witness to conduct cross-examination. (See, e.g., Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1002, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099 [no conflict where cocounsel, who had not represented witness, conducted cross-examination].) We hold that no actual or potential conflict existed as to witness Lisa. D. James Carter testified that he saw Denise the night she disappeared and that the last person he saw her with was not defendant. Darin McArthur testified that he saw defendant and Lynda together the night she disappeared. Nothing in the record suggests, nor has defendant alleged, that Forester possessed confidential information stemming from the public defender's prior representation of Carter. Tapson stated he had never met Carter and represented to the court that he possessed no confidential information. Tapson also stated that he had no confidential information regarding McArthur stemming from his firm's prior representation of him. Based on this record, we hold that no actual or potential conflict of interest existed as to witnesses Carter and McArthur. Finally, as to Shirley W., after consultation with an independent lawyer, she waived, in open court, any attorney-client privilege she possessed and agreed she could be cross-examined as to any discussions she had with the public defender's office. As defendant's counsel were not forbidden from using any confidential communications against Shirley W., there was no actual or potential conflict of interest.