Opinion ID: 585824
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Greig's Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel

Text: 6 The Critical Sequence of Events Behind It All 7 On February 19, 1991, before Greig's and Hanley's trial began, the court held Ernest Vasquez' rearraignment proceeding. There Vasquez' lawyer brought to the court's attention the following improper communications by Greig's counsel. He told the trial judge that after he informed Greig's lawyer of Vasquez' plea negotiations with the Government, Greig approached him and Vasquez stating, [t]hey [the Government] cannot convict me without your testimony. 4 Vasquez' lawyer then stated that he advised Vasquez to have no further contact with Greig. Vasquez' lawyer next explained to the court that after a plea agreement had been signed, Vasquez was asked by Greig to meet with Greig and Greig's lawyer. Vasquez met with them and was advised to plead not guilty based upon a valid entrapment defense. Vasquez' lawyer then reported to the court a second meeting. He stated that Greig and his counsel visited Vasquez' job site and again suggested that Vasquez not plead guilty on the basis that he had a valid entrapment defense. He reported that Greig's lawyer in this meeting also told Vasquez that he should seek other counsel. Finally, Vasquez' lawyer complained to the trial judge that Greig's lawyer never asked for his permission to consult with Vasquez; never informed him of the fact that he twice met with Vasquez; and never attempted to discuss with him the entrapment defense. 8 On the same day, prior to jury selection at the start of the trial, the district court informed Greig's counsel that, in his absence, the Court heard evidence today of that on two different occasions you personally visited with Mr. Vasquez, advised him that he should not plead guilty, that he had a defense, and that his lawyer was not doing for him what another lawyer should do or be able to do, that he should get another lawyer. The court then stated that a disciplinary proceeding would be held during jury deliberations at the end of Greig's trial. 9 On February 21, outside the presence of the jury and while they were deliberating in Greig's trial, the trial judge conducted the disciplinary proceeding, hearing testimony from Vasquez, Greig and their respective lawyers. The trial court did not make a ruling at the hearing, and took the matter under advisement until after the completion of Greig's sentencing. 10 At Greig's sentencing hearing on April 15, 1991, Greig was sentenced under § 3C1.1 to an extra 27 months for obstruction of justice as a result of his participation in the illicit meetings with Vasquez. 5 Not until the completion of Greig's sentencing did the trial court then announce its order permanently barring Greig's lawyer from appearing as counsel before the Western District Court of Texas. 6 11 Greig now asserts that his lawyer's misconduct created a conflict of interest, violating his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. We agree. The trial court, being aware of critical facts, erred in not holding a Garcia 7 hearing to insure that Greig was fully informed of his counsel's ethical violation and whether Greig nevertheless wanted counsel to continue in his defense. 12 (1) No Questions Asked 13 A defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel includes the right to representation free from a conflict of interest. Mitchell v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 77, 78-79 (5th Cir.1982). Nevertheless, we have long held that, like the right to counsel of any kind, the right to conflict-free counsel can be waived. United States v. Howton, 688 F.2d 272, 274 (5th Cir.1982). For a waiver to be effective, the record must show that the trial court determined that it was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily done: 14 As in Rule 11 procedures, the district court should address each defendant personally and forthrightly advise him of the potential dangers of representation by counsel with a conflict of interest. The defendant must be at liberty to question the district court as to the nature and consequences of his legal representation. Most significantly, the court should seek to elicit a narrative response from each defendant that he has been advised of his right to effective representation, that he understands the details of his attorney's possible conflict of interest and potential perils of such a conflict, that he has discussed the matter with his attorney or if he wishes with outside counsel, and that he voluntarily waives his Sixth Amendment protections. 15 Garcia, 517 F.2d at 277-78. Plainly stated, under Garcia, we instructed trial courts in the Fifth Circuit to conduct a hearing, now commonly known as a Garcia hearing, to ensure that the defendant (1) is aware that a conflict of interest exists; (2) realizes the potential hazards to his defense by continuing with such counsel under the onus of a conflict; and (3) is aware of his right to obtain other counsel. United States v. Casiano, 929 F.2d 1046, 1052 (5th Cir.1991). 16 In United States v. White, 706 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.1983), after finding an actual conflict of interest, we held that the defendant's waiver of his counsel's conflict of interest was legally ineffective because of the trial court's clear failure to follow Garcia. Counsel in White was under investigation by a grand jury regarding his participation in his client's escape from jail. After finding an actual conflict of interest, we reversed based upon the defendant's invalid waiver of the conflict. Although the trial court's inquiry in White was more detailed than the inquiry made by the trial judge in the instant case, we nevertheless found failure with the procedure since neither the court, the defense attorney, nor the prosecutor informed the defendant of the precise manner in which he might be prejudiced. Instead, the court placed complete reliance upon counsel's statement that he had informed his client of the dangers of the conflict of interest. Id. at 509. 17 The record leaves no doubt that the trial court failed to make any inquiry whatsoever as to whether Greig was aware of the conflict and its potential hazardous effects upon his defense. While we recognize that a trial court does not always have an affirmative duty to inquire into the possibility of a conflict of interest, 8 it does have a duty to conduct a hearing once it has been alerted and certainly when it knows of the existence of an actual conflict of interest. 9 The record makes clear that Vasquez' attorney, on the same day that Greig's trial began, informed the court of unethical meetings between Greig, Greig's lawyer and Vasquez, which ultimately resulted in an enhancement to Greig's sentence for obstruction of justice. The court had a duty to inquire further into Greig's counsel's conflict of interest. Based on the trial court's failure to conduct even a barebones Garcia hearing, we hold that Greig could not have knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to conflict-free counsel. 18 (2) Ethical Violation Created Actual Conflict 19 The Government contends that the court's failure to hold a Garcia hearing is irrelevant because no actual conflict of interest existed. Although we agree with the Government that the necessity for such a hearing is triggered only by an actual conflict, 10 there is little doubt that an actual conflict existed here. 20 Here, counsel was in the position of simultaneously having to defend himself as well as his client regarding their potentially criminal activity. Like his client, counsel was open to an indictment for obstruction of justice based on their contacts with Vasquez. 11 At the very least, counsel faced severe disciplinary measures, including monetary sanctions, and indeed the very loss of the right to appear as counsel in the whole Western District of Texas. His alleged conduct was highly unethical and clearly violated the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 12 21 We find persuasive the Third Circuit's reasoning in Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125 (3d Cir.1984). There the defendant's lawyer did not withdraw despite the fact that he faced a potential indictment for destruction of evidence in his client's case. 13 In finding an actual conflict of interest, the court reasoned: 22 Even if not criminally charged for such events, trial counsel could have faced severe disciplinary consequences if it were ever known that he was involved in the destruction of evidence. Trial counsel neither avoided professional impropriety nor the appearance of impropriety.... In circumstances such as these, when defense counsel has independent personal information regarding the facts underlying his client's charges, and faces potential liability for those charges, he has an actual conflict of interest. 23 Id. at 136 (citations omitted). 24 In United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir.1987), the defendant's counsel was under investigation by the same United States attorney's office prosecuting the defendant. Further, certain assistant U.S. attorneys suggested to the defendant's counsel that his own indictment could be delayed until after the completion of his client's trial. Finding an actual conflict of interest, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that counsel was under an ethical obligation to inform his client of the investigation and the possibility that it would affect his judgment. Specifically, the court held that since it was in counsel's best interest to have a lengthy trial, he could not have adequately represented his client in exploring possible plea negotiations. See also United States v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867 (2d Cir.1984). 14 25 A few cases in our own circuit also help demonstrate the actual conflict present in this instance. In White, 706 F.2d at 506, counsel was under investigation by a grand jury regarding his participation in his client's escape from jail. We found, without question, that these circumstances created an actual conflict of interest, 15 and reversed based upon the defendant's invalid waiver of the conflict. See discussion supra. The same lawyer, in a related case, United States v. Snyder, 16 707 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.1983), was disqualified by the trial court from representing White's co-conspirator and accomplice, Snyder, in his trial. The trial court reasoned that since the lawyer was an indicted co-conspirator, a conflict existed meriting disqualification. Although we agreed with the court's determination that an actual conflict existed, we affirmed the trial court's disqualification based on our policy to preserve the integrity of the judicial system. 17 26 Likewise, we are convinced that the events in this case resulted in an actual conflict of interest, a conflict which Greig was given no opportunity to waive. This is not the end of the line for Greig, however. For Greig to prevail, we must also find that his counsel's conflict of interest adversely affected his performance. 27 (3) Conflict Adversely Affected Counsel's Performance 28 The existence of an actual conflict does not warrant setting aside the conviction in a criminal proceeding if the error had no adverse effect on the judgment. United States v. Abner, 825 F.2d 835, 843 (5th Cir.1987). Adverse effect is not the equivalent of prejudice, the reasonable probability of a different result, as the term 'prejudice' is defined in Strickland. 18 Injury sufficient to justify reversal is presumed from the showing of adverse effect. Id. (citing Nealy v. Cabana, 782 F.2d 1362, 1365 (5th Cir.1986). 29 Although adverse effects are not always readily apparent from the record, our examination of the record provides ample evidence that counsel's conflict had an adverse effect on both Greig's trial and sentence. 30 First, we find at the outset that Greig's counsel was preoccupied with his own disciplinary proceeding. Counsel was warned at the very start of the trial that he would soon be required to show cause why he should not be disciplined because of his contacts with Vasquez. Throughout Greig's trial, counsel must have been plagued by the fear of sanctions, which could, as they actually did, result in disbarment in the Western District. Added to that was the uncertainty of whether he would be indicted for obstruction of justice. 31 As evidenced by the following exchange at Greig's trial, counsel failed to defend Greig vigorously and single-mindedly completely free from his own necessity of avoiding incrimination, sanctions or even disbarment. The Government on direct examination asked Vasquez whether he had met with Greig and Greig's attorney without his lawyer being present. On redirect, the Government similarly questioned Vasquez about whether Greig and Greig's lawyer tried to convince him to abandon his guilty plea and not testify against Greig. Uninterrupted by objection from Greig's counsel, Vasquez responded yes. Moreover, Greig's counsel made no attempt on cross-examination to counter Vasquez' testimony. On recross, instead of attempting to in some way diminish the unfavorable testimony against his client, counsel immediately covered his own tracks: 32 Q [Greig's Counsel] And so I never went ahead and--and told you or intimidated you or harassed you in any way, did I, sir? 33 A [Vasquez] No, sir. 34 Q In fact, if anything, I told you, Perhaps your attorney doesn't know about this tape, go play it to him and discuss it with him, correct?A Correct. 35 Q And isn't it true that I also told you that I could not go ahead and represent you because I was representing Mr. Greig, correct? 36 A Correct. 37 Q And you asked me that if in fact you chose to switch to another lawyer, if I could recommend one, and I said, Well, I can recommend a friend of mine, Mr. Cantu, correct? 38 A Correct. 39 Regardless of the truthfulness or untruthfulness of Vasquez' answers, it is plainly obvious to this court that Greig's counsel was preoccupied with conducting his own defense. We cannot ignore the fact that all of this could have been easily avoided by the court conducting a Garcia hearing to ensure that Greig was fully informed of his counsel's conflict. 40 Though the disciplinary proceeding was held at the end of Greig's trial while the jury was deliberating, counsel's representation of Greig at the proceeding further demonstrates counsel's preoccupation. After first questioning Vasquez, counsel called his client Greig to the stand to testify about their meetings with Vasquez: 41 Q [Counsel] Did I ever tell him that his lawyer wasn't doing a good job? 42 A [Greig] I can't say I didn't say that. 43 Q Did you say that, Mr. Greig? 44 A I--yes. 45 Q You're under oath. 46 A More than once. 47 Q You're the gentleman that told him to go ahead and switch lawyers? 48 A Yes.... 49