Opinion ID: 1433925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: part iii. analysis and discussion.

Text: ¶ 12 Initially, we note that on this record it is undisputed Jason received no notice of, or representation in, the probate case of Dorothy's estate (District Court of Custer County, Case No. P-87-38). Thus, if he is an heir entitled to share in her estate, the final probate decree would be subject to collateral attack by him and would not be binding on a minor heir in his position. See e.g. Oberlander v. Eddington, 1964 OK 98, 391 P.2d 889, 891 Fourth Syllabus; Matter of Thurber's Estate, 1979 OK CIV APP 68, 604 P.2d 873, 874. ¶ 13 Prior to passage of § 231 this Court ruled a murderer was entitled to inherit from his victim. Holloway v. McCormick, 41 Okla. 1, 136 P. 1111 (1913). [6] In 1915, probably in response to Holloway, the Legislature passed the predecessor to § 231, which barred or disqualified a slayer from taking any part of his victim's estate whether by will or intestate succession. 1915 Okla. Sess. Laws, Ch. 136, § 1. The dispute here does not concern whether Egon is disqualified from taking any part of Dorothy's estate  all agree he is so disqualified  but who should take the share of her estate that Egon would have been entitled to had he not murdered his mother. ¶ 14 Laura relies on certain language of § 231 to assert Egon's share is subject to disposition as intestate property and that under § 213(B)(2)(a), a subsection of our descent and distribution statute, she was properly awarded the share because she is Dorothy's only other heir-at-law. [7] Laura argues she is the only remaining heir-at-law of Dorothy entitled to take and that Jason is not an heir-at-law because it is only when a child predeceases his parent that a grandchild becomes an heir-at-law of the grandparent. Thus, Laura's argument is that, although Egon is disqualified from taking, because he is still alive Jason cannot be considered Dorothy's intestate heir under § 213(B)(2)(a). Jason counters by arguing our intestate succession laws are irrelevant to this particular situation and § 231 does not mandate an intestate disposition, but Dorothy's intent as expressed in her will should prevail  an intent Jason asserts shows Egon's issue should take if he could not so take. ¶ 15 Laura's position is based on the following clause of § 231: [I]n every instance mentioned in this section all benefits that would accrue to any such person upon the death . . . of the person whose life is thus taken . . . shall become subject to distribution among the other heirs of such deceased person according to the laws of descent and distribution . . . . Laura misconstrues the import of § 231. Neither Egon's conditional testamentary trust share or the personal property specifically bequeathed to him by Dorothy's will were required to be disposed of as intestate property. We deal with the testamentary trust share first. ¶ 16 Of course, the fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. Ledbetter v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Commission, 1988 OK 117, 764 P.2d 172, 179. As we read the dispositional clause of § 231 quoted above, it provides only that any benefit that would accrue to the slayer upon the death of his victim shall be distributed to the other heirs of the victim by the laws of descent and distribution. It does not apply where nothing would accrue to the slayer at the death of his victim, a situation unmistakably evident here in regard to the testamentary trust. ¶ 17 By the plain, unambiguous terms of the trust Egon was not entitled to any trust share upon Dorothy's death. A trust's terms may postpone vesting of a beneficiary's interest to the happening of some future event, including the contingency or condition the beneficiary must survive to a designated future distribution date. Sivia v. Snyder, 1973 OK CIV APP 8, 517 P.2d 812 (approved for publication by Oklahoma Supreme Court). When a trust's terms show the intention of the trustor is to so postpone vesting, the beneficiary obtains no vested interest in the trust unless the contingency occurs and vesting is said to rest on a condition precedent. See Atchison v. Dietrich, 1957 OK 186, 315 P.2d 265. Under the testamentary trust set up by Dorothy's will, Egon would have obtained no vested interest in the trust upon Dorothy's death because even at her death, his interest was merely a contingent one. ¶ 18 By virtue of the residuary clause of Dorothy's will she bequeathed and devised all her remaining property to trustee First National Bank and Trust Company in Clinton, to serve per the terms of the testamentary trust. The trust's plain terms provide that no benefits  either principal or income  accrued to Egon upon her death. Instead, as to Egon, vesting is contingent on his survival to the trust's designated distribution date, which all parties appear to agree is not to occur until March 1999, i.e. when Laura turns 35 years old. Thus, no part of the testamentary trust accrued to Egon upon Dorothy's death and, in fact, neither principle or income from it would inure to his benefit until a period of approximately twelve (12) years after he murdered his mother. [8] ¶ 19 Accordingly, contrary to Laura's argument, § 231 does not control who should take Egon's conditional trust share because no part of it accrued to him upon Dorothy's death. Simply, § 231 provides no specific legislative guidance as to whether Jason or Laura should take Egon's conditional trust share and we, therefore, must decide its disposition outside the confines of that legislative provision. ¶ 20 The Kansas Supreme Court faced a similar dilemma in Estate of Van Der Veen, 262 Kan. 211, 935 P.2d 1042 (1997). There, the parents of two children (a son and daughter), were murdered by the son, who himself had a child. The parents were never aware of the existence of the son's child, their grandchild. In a joint will, the parents provided their estate residue was to go to the son and daughter, equally and per stirpes. Id. at 1043. The Kansas slayer statute [K.S.A.1996 Supp., § 59-513], although disqualifying the son from taking any part of his parents' estate either by will or intestate succession, was silent as to the disposition of the slayer's share. The Kansas Supreme Court, recognizing the per stirpes language meant the testators had taken into account the possibility one or both of their children would predecease them and, in such case, the grandchild would take the son's estate share, had to decide whether the grandchild could be allowed to take under the will even though his slayer father was not actually deceased. ¶ 21 The Kansas Supreme Court concluded that where the grandchild was wholly innocent the better rule was to dispose of the disqualified slayer's share as if the slayer had predeceased his victim(s), which would allow the grandchild to take. 935 P.2d at 1049. It was also concluded such a determination was consistent with the intent of the parents as expressed in the will, which reflected the daughter was to take only one-half of the estate and no intention she was to receive the entirety of the estate in the event of the son's disqualification. Id. Likewise, we believe the better rule here is to dispose of Egon's potential trust share as if he predeceased Dorothy  or as more apt to the particular trust terms  that Egon be deemed to have died prior to the distribution date designated in the will/testamentary trust. ¶ 22 In construing a will the intent of the testator is paramount. Matter of Estate of Worsham, 1993 OK CIV APP 122, 859 P.2d 1134, 1136. It is also presumed a testator intends to dispose of his entire estate and avoid intestacy in whole or in part. Matter of Estate of Tayrien, 1980 OK 8, 609 P.2d 752, 755. Here, Dorothy plainly expressed an intent that her entire estate be disposed of under her will and that Laura was to receive only a one-half share of the testamentary trust. Nothing in the will's provisions expresses an intent that Laura is to receive the entirety of the trust in the event Egon, having a child, was disqualified from taking. On the contrary, the terms of the will specifically contemplated providing for her grandchildren out of the trust and express a preference that Egon's issue, not Laura, should take where Egon dies prior to the distribution date, a situation we deem analogous to his disqualification under § 231. This leaves only the personalty specifically bequeathed to Egon for our consideration. ¶ 23 Laura's position in this case is essentially one which seeks to apply what she contends is the plain language of the dispositional clause of § 231 to mandate a slayer's share of his victim's estate passes by intestate succession to a victim's other heirs-at-law. In essence, she seeks to read § 231 in isolation, divorced from any other potentially relevant statute or any principle concerning the interpretation of wills. We do not believe § 231 can be read in such isolation and Laura's position fails to take into consideration that when construing statutes, all relevant portions of the statute and related enactments must be considered together, where possible, so that force and effect is given to each. Clifton v. Clifton, 1990 OK 88, 801 P.2d 693, 696. ¶ 24 Under 84 O.S.1991, § 167, [a] bequest of the residue of the testator's personal property passes all the personal property which [s]he was entitled to bequeath at the time of [her] death not otherwise effectually bequeathed by [her] will. Further, as noted above, there is a well-recognized presumption against intestacy (of which § 167 is, itself, a part) and under this presumption a will's residuary clause must be construed to prevent intestacy as to any part of the testator's estate unless there is an apparent intention the property should be excluded from the will. In Re Estate of He-Ah-To-Me, 1958 OK 46, 325 P.2d 746, 750. Thus, it has been recognized a general residuary clause passes not only all the property the testator did not attempt to dispose of in other parts of her will, but also all the property attempted to be disposed of by the will outside of the residuary clause, the disposition of which has for some reason failed, unless a contrary intention appears in the will. 4 Bowe-Parker: PAGE ON WILLS § 33.54 (1961). ¶ 25 Here there is no hint of an intention expressed in Dorothy's will to exclude the personalty bequeathed to Egon from the reach of her will's residuary clause upon his disqualification. Therefore, application of § 167 and the presumption in favor of testacy would result in the personalty Egon is disqualified from taking becoming part of the residue of the estate to serve per the terms of the testamentary trust because such personalty was not subject to an effective disposition. It is, thus, clear to us the dispositional language of § 231 was never intended to apply to a situation like that here where § 167 and the presumption in favor of testacy allows the personalty specifically bequeathed to Egon to pass by virtue of the general residuary clause of Dorothy's will. To rule otherwise would ascribe to the Legislature an intent to defeat the ability of a testator to completely dispose of their property by will, without any direct expression in § 231 that the statute was to have such an effect. We decline to attribute such a legislative intent to § 231. [9] ¶ 26 In view of our analysis, it is plain the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Laura. Summary judgment to Jason, however, would also not be warranted on the present record. His summary judgment submission relied on the Acknowledgment of Paternity purportedly signed by Egon in the presence of a competent witness to support his claim he was Egon's natural child. Although under 84 O.S.1991, § 215 such an acknowledgment is a method by which an out-of-wedlock child may show he/she is entitled to inherit from his father and his father's kindred, no evidence was submitted this acknowledgment was actually signed by Egon in the presence of a competent witness. Jason merely alleged, in his February 27, 1996 trial court brief in response to Laura's motion for summary judgment and in support of his own motion for summary judgment, that Egon signed the acknowledgment in the presence of a competent witness. In the absence of proof such an acknowledgment was actually signed by Egon in the presence of a competent witness, the writing cannot currently be taken as sufficient to comply with the requirement(s) of § 215. See In Re Lewis' Estate, 200 Okla. 352, 194 P.2d 174, 176 (1948); Burns v. Lawson, 188 Okla. 181, 107 P.2d 555, 556 (1940). Therefore, Jason's paternity remains a material disputed factual issue and the matter must be remanded for further proceedings. [10] ¶ 27 For the reasons specified above, the Court of Civil Appeals' memorandum opinion is VACATED, the trial court judgment is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. ¶ 28 KAUGER, C.J., SUMMERS, V.C.J., HODGES, HARGRAVE and ALMA WILSON, JJ., concur. ¶ 29 SIMMS and OPALA, JJ., concur in part; dissent in part. ¶ 30 WATT, J., dissent.