Opinion ID: 1833305
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consideration and Rejection of Defenses

Text: Harpster argues that underlying the right to prepare a defense and the right to a written statement of the reasons for the discipline imposed, there is an implied right to have the defense actually considered by the disciplinary committee ... [and] as part of the right to present a defense, inmates are entitled to present arguments for mitigation of punishment. Harpster alleges that the ALJ did not consider the mitigating circumstances of his defense; namely, his intoxication and lack of intent or plan to escape. The State counters that Harpster's intoxication was not a mitigating circumstance, but instead was another violation of institutional rules. Furthermore, the State alleges testimony by the ALJ indicates she allowed Harpster to present his defense of intoxication and that she considered the defense and found it insufficient. Iowa courts have noted that while inmates are afforded some procedural due process protections, they are not as extensive as the rights afforded citizens charged with a crime. See Bruns, 503 N.W.2d at 611 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556, 94 S.Ct. at 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d at 951). While the due process requirements set forth in Wolff require a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the sanction imposed, the statement need not provide justification for the precise punishment imposed. Mahan, 541 N.W.2d at 920 (citing Bucklin v. State, 342 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Iowa App.1983)). Nor is it necessary for the written statement to expressly indicate what statements were relied on in the reports considered by the ALJ or committee. Speller v. State, 534 N.W.2d 445, 451 (Iowa 1995) (citing Brown v. Frey, 807 F.2d 1407, 1412 (8th Cir.1986)). All that is necessary is a statement of why the punishment is being imposed, which is satisfied by findings of fact indicating petitioner's guilt which in turn points to the need for discipline of some kind. Bucklin, 342 N.W.2d at 898. Furthermore, a separate statement of reasons is not necessary if the factual finding on the alleged violation clearly constitutes the reason for the discipline imposed. Davis v. State, 345 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 1984). We hold that the findings of fact made by ALJ Rankin and indicated in her written decision satisfy the standard enunciated by the cases cited above. The findings of fact state: Mr. Harpster did leave his off-grounds work site.... He was picked up that evening ... approximately 10 miles from the park. This is a violation of (CRC) rule 5 as Mr. Harpster did escape supervision. This statement indicates Harpster's guilt and points to the need for disciplinary action. See Mahan, 541 N.W.2d at 920 (citing Bucklin, 342 N.W.2d at 898). This factual finding clearly constitutes the reason for the discipline imposed. See Davis, 345 N.W.2d at 100. The findings of fact written by ALJ Rankin are quite similar in format and content to those approved in Thomas v. State , which simply stated the factual findings that constituted the elements of the charged offenses. Thomas v. State, 339 N.W.2d 166, 167-68 (Iowa 1983). Requiring a more detailed statement of the reasons for the punishment would be unduly technical. Thomas, 339 N.W.2d at 168. [2] We also find that ALJ Rankin considered and dismissed Harpster's defense of intoxication. Her written decision makes note of the facts alleged by Harpster which precipitated his absence from his assigned work site. In the evidence relied on section, Rankin stated that she relied on Harpster's statement. Such notations demonstrate that Rankin took the defense under consideration. Even though the decision does not make an explicit finding as to that defense, we hold specific written rejection of Harpster's defense to be unnecessary. Such a holding is supported by two of our prior opinions. In Rushing v. State , we rejected a contention that the written decision must contain a statement that the ALJ or discipline committee considered the inmate's proffered defense in reaching its decision. Rushing v. State, 382 N.W.2d 141, 144 (Iowa 1986). The Rushing court analogized the situation to that of a civil law nonjury case when a court has found in favor of the plaintiff. On review, the appellate court assumes that the district court considered and rejected each defense argued by the defendants even though not explicitly discussed in the ruling. Id. at 145. Furthermore, in Speller v. State , we found it unnecessary for the ALJ to specifically state that she was rejecting an inmate's defenses, as long as the decision showed that the defenses were considered. Speller, 534 N.W.2d at 450. Our finding today comports with this standard.