Opinion ID: 2995448
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Qualified Individual with a

Text: Disability Nawrot’s reasonable accommodation and disability-based discrimination claims under the ADA require that he demonstrate that he is a qualified individual with a disability. See 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112; see also Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568, 571-72 (7th Cir. 2001). A qualified individual with a disability is defined as an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12111(8). Bestfoods concedes that Nawrot can perform the essential functions of his employment position, and therefore we need only consider whether he is disabled. An individual has a disability within the meaning of the ADA if she (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12102(2). But not all plaintiffs with health conditions have a disability within the meaning of the ADA. See, e.g., Christian v. St. Anthony Med. Ctr., Inc., 117 F.3d 1051, 1053 (7th Cir. 1997) (The Act is not a general protection of medically afflicted persons.). To claim the protection of the ADA, plaintiffs must come within the coverage of the statutory definition of disability. See Moore v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 221 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 2000). Nawrot argues that he is disabled because he meets the first and third statutory definition of disability. We address only his argument under the first definition./1 Nawrot argues that his diabetes is a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits the major life activities of working, thinking, and caring for himself. Although all these major life activities were not explicitly identified to the district court, we believe that these issues were adequately raised below, and that the reasons behind the waiver rule do not require its application in this circumstance. Cf. Bailey v. Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 175 F.3d 526, 529-30 (7th Cir. 1999). We agree with Nawrot that he has demonstrated that his impairment substantially limits his ability to think and care for himself, and so we focus our discussion on these two major life activities./2 In Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), the Supreme Court set forth a three-part analysis to determine whether a plaintiff has shown that she is substantially limited in a major life activity, which asks: (1) whether the condition alleged constitutes a physical or mental impairment, (2) whether that impairment affects a major life activity, and (3) whether the impairment operates as a substantial limit on the major life activity asserted. Id. at 632-42. Moreover, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), the Supreme Court stated, in answering the third question, that individuals whose impairment ’might,’ ’could,’ or ’would’ be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken, but is corrected by medication or other measures cannot be considered disabled under the statute. 527 U.S. at 482-83. In other words, in applying the statute to specific impairments, courts may consider only the limitations of an individual that persist after taking into account mitigation measures (e.g., medication) and the negative side effects of the measures used to mitigate the impairment. See id.; see also Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999). This is not, however, license for courts to meander in would, could, or should- have land. We consider only the measures actually taken and consequences that actually follow. Cf. Sutton, 427 U.S. at 482-84 (reasoning that an approach [that] would often require courts and employers to speculate about a person’s condition and would, in many cases, force them to make a disability determination based on general information about how an uncorrected impairment usually affects individuals, rather than on the individual’s actual condition is contrary to the letter and the spirit of the ADA). Those who discriminate take their victims as they find them. Nawrot is a diabetic./3 But his diabetic status, per se, is not sufficient to qualify as a disability under the ADA. See id. at 483; Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2001). In Moore v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., supra, we reiterated that [s]ome impairments may be disabling for particular individuals but not others, depending upon the stage of the disease or disorder, the presence of other impairments that combine to make the impairment disabling or any number of other factors. Id. at 952 (quotingHomeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assocs., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 962 (7th Cir. 1996)). To be substantially limiting, the impairment must make the individual [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform or [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 29 CFR sec. 1630.2(j); see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480. However, Nawrot’s claim does not rest solely on his diabetic status. He also points out that as a consequence of his diabetes, he must inject himself with insulin approximately three times a day and must test his blood sugar level at least ten times a day. In addition, although he is able to manage his diabetes with constant monitoring and insulin injections (itself a substantial burden), this hardly remedies all the other adverse effects of his diabetes. Despite the most diligent care, Nawrot cannot completely control his blood sugar level. He suffers from unpredictable hypoglycemic episodes, of such extreme consequence that death is a very real and significant risk. On the occasions he suffers from such an episode, his ability to think coherently is significantly impaired, as well as his ability to function. He has lost consciousness and fallen several times. In addition, his ability to express coherent thoughts is impaired, causing him to make nonsensical statements. He suffered three diabetic episodes at work in the two years before his termination. And aside from full- blown diabetic episodes, Nawrot has had close calls, where he felt the onset of an episode but was able to avert a serious, debilitating attack. Moreover, Nawrot’s diabetes has progressively worsened. His difficulties became so overwhelming that in February 1997, he took medical leave to care for his physical health and attend to his diabetes management. By April 1997, his doctor described his diabetes as brittle and therefore very likely that he [will develop] hypoglycemic attacks. Physically, Nawrot has already suffered early stages of kidney damage and nerve damage in his feet as a consequence of his diabetes. His nerve damage is so extensive that it has affected his ability to sense feeling in his feet. Furthermore, Nawrot is on a restrictive diet, and depression and mood changes accompany his swings in blood sugar level. Bestfoods argues, however, that this is not enough. They argue that these facts fail to demonstrate a substantial limitation on any major life activity. We simply cannot agree. Instead, we are convinced that Nawrot has sufficiently demonstrated that his diabetes substantially limits his ability to think and care for himself, which are both major life activities. See, e.g., Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 307-11 (3d Cir. 1999).