Opinion ID: 184530
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Griffin claims that the magistrate judge committed revers- ible error when he excluded as irrelevant testimony aboutDoyle's sexist remarks. The WCC responds that the judgedid not err at all in excluding the testimony because Doylewas not responsible for Griffin's dismissal and Evans, whowas responsible, based her decision upon an objective test ofGriffin's skills--a test developed and supervised in part byGriffin's union representative. In the alternative, the WCCargues that the exclusion of the disputed testimony washarmless error in light of all the evidence indicating thatGriffin was fired for incompetence.
The magistrate judge initially regarded Griffin's effort tointroduce testimony about Doyle's comments as an attempt tosmuggle into the record evidence relevant only to theories ofrecovery that Griffin had failed to raise in her complaint tothe Department of Human Rights. In his order granting theWCC's motion in limine the judge explained: Evidence of a course of conduct as well as statements designed to show intent to sexually harass relevant to a claim of maintaining a sexually hostile work environment is not relevant to a claim of sexual discrimination in job training. During Griffin's opening statement, the WCC objected toGriffin's reference to expected testimony on the issue ofDoyle's bias. The magistrate judge sustained the objection,apparently because he still regarded the testimony as rele- vant only to a sexual harassment claim that had not beenpreserved for trial. Later in the course of the trial themagistrate judge shifted his ground somewhat: [T]his witness [Doyle] did not have any authority to hire or fire individuals. He made a recommendation and, on a number of occasions, his recommendation was overruled. So, he was not the one who had the ultimate authority on it. Griffin has argued from the outset that the excluded testimony is probative of Doyle's motive and intent and relevantto the case because Doyle was responsible for Griffin's training and participated in the decisionmaking process that led toher discharge. The WCC, on the other hand, argues thatDoyle's motive and intent are not relevant because Evans, notDoyle, made the decision to fire Griffin. The WCC relies upon the reasoning of a recent case in theSeventh Circuit: [W]hen the causal relationship between the subordinate's illicit motive and the employer's ultimate decision is broken, and the ultimate decision is clearly made on an independent and a legally permissive [sic] basis, the bias of the subordinate is not relevant. Willis v. Marion County Auditor's Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547(1997). So much is uncontroversial; even Griffin agrees withthe principle. Hence, if it is true, as the WCC argues, thatEvans's decision [to terminate Griffin was] independent of,or insulated from Doyle, then the evidence of Doyle's biaswas properly excluded as irrelevant. Griffin maintains, however, that Doyle was in fact anintegral part of the decision-making process that led to herdischarge, so that Doyle's discriminatory motive would haveinfected any deliberations over whether to terminate Plaintiff's employment. We agree. Unlike the court in Willis,we cannot say that [t]he record affirmatively demonstratesthat [the decisionmaker's] estimation of the quality of [plaintiff's] work was not jaded by anyone else's subjective andpossibly [sexually] biased evaluation. 118 F.3d at 547. On the contrary, Doyle was Evans's chief source of information regarding Griffin's job performance, repeatedly urgedEvans to terminate Griffin, was then made responsible fortraining Griffin, helped develop the tests used to assessGriffin, was responsible for evaluating Griffin's success on those tests, and was in contact with Evans at every significantstep in the decisionmaking process. Under these circumstances, in which Evans's dependence upon Doyle's opinionwas heightened by her inability independently to assess Griffin's technical proficiency, a jury exposed to the excludedevidence of Doyle's sexism might well conclude that Doyleused Evans, in Judge Posner's phrase, as the conduit of [his]prejudice--his cat's-paw. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). That Randolph Scott, a representative of Griffin's union,and others participated in the decisionmaking process together with Doyle was not sufficient to insulate Evans fromDoyle's influence. By his own estimate, Scott personallyobserved only some five percent of Griffin's training. LikeEvans, Scott depended upon Doyle's observations and evaluation for most of his knowledge about Griffin's performance. Evidence of Doyle's intent is therefore relevant in evaluatingGriffin's termination, and the magistrate judge erred byexcluding it. Thus do we join at least four other circuits in holding thatevidence of a subordinate's bias is relevant where the ultimatedecision maker is not insulated from the subordinate's influence. See Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27F.3d 1316, 1323 (8th Cir. 1994) (an employer cannot escaperesponsibility for [ ] discrimination ... when the facts onwhich the reviewers rely have been filtered by a managerdetermined to purge the labor force of [a protected class of]workers); see also, e.g., Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d1204, 1214 (3d Cir. 1995); Simpson v. Diversitech General,Inc., 945 F.2d 156, 160 (6th Cir. 1991); Shager v. Upjohn Co.,913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990); cf. Steverson v. Goldstein,24 F.3d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1994).
The magistrate judge's exclusion of testimony aboutDoyle's alleged bias is particularly surprising in light of theadmission in evidence of Doyle's self-serving statementsabout his lack of discriminatory intent. When Doyle testifiedon direct examination that he had recommended to Evans that three employees, including Griffin, be terminated, thefollowing exchange ensued: Q.Did you make those recommendations because they were women? A.No.... It has nothing to do with women. It has to do with someone who has an electricians' [sic] license who did not know basic fundamentals. By eliciting that testimony, the WCC opened the door tomatters excluded by its own motion in limine. Testimonyimpugning Doyle's intent should have been admitted on rebuttal at least for purposes of impeachment and in order toprevent the jury from forming the erroneous impression thatthe proper characterization of Doyle's intent was undisputed. See United States v. Baird, 29 F.3d 647, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1994)(Once the door is opened, the other party can get through itotherwise irrelevant evidence 'to the extent necessary toremove any unfair prejudice which might otherwise haveensued' ). Yet when Griffin's counsel tried to bring theexcluded evidence in through the door opened during thedefendant's case-in-chief, the magistrate judge denied themotion, thus compounding his error.
The WCC maintains that any error in the exclusion ofevidence concerning Doyle's views on women as electricians isharmless because of the overwhelming evidence that Griffin isan incompetent electrician. That evidence does not, however,render harmless the exclusion of the testimony regardingDoyle's intent. Most of the evidence of Griffin's incompetence comes from the selfsame Doyle, and a jury mightweigh that evidence differently if it had reason to believe thatDoyle did not want women electricians in his shop. Moreover, the gravamen of Griffin's complaint is that her apparentincompetence was the product of Doyle's animus againstwomen, which led him to neglect her training and then to testher for skills that she did not need in order to do her job. For these reasons we think that a reasonable jury thatheard the excluded evidence might have decided that the plaintiff was fired because of her sex notwithstanding theevidence that she was terminated for incompetence. Accordingly, we must remand the case for a new trial.