Opinion ID: 2313088
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defense Counsel's Alleged Ineffectiveness

Text: Defense counsel knew or should have known that the complainant and the lead detective had been privy to appellant's immunized testimony, and that their exposure might taint their forthcoming testimony or other prosecution evidence at trial. If the government, put to the test, could not prove otherwise, appellant would have been entitled to substantial relief  e.g., exclusion of evidence at trial. The government might have been obliged to abort appellant's prosecution. Furthermore, as the record stands, it does not appear that counsel had a tactical reason to forego a Kastigar hearing. We have difficulty imagining such a reason. As the court said in Hylton, [p]utting the government to its burden ... was, so to speak, a freebie; it cost the defense nothing and the possible benefit ... was undoubtedly significant. [59] The Hylton court held trial counsel's unjustified failure to raise Kastigar in that case to be simply inexcusable. [60] Unlike in the present case, a post-trial evidentiary hearing on the ineffectiveness claim was held in Hylton. The hearing revealed that counsel's decision was not a tactical one but instead rested on a misunderstanding of Kastigar.  [61] At the present stage of this case, we need only say that appellant has made a more-than-colorable showing of deficient performance. We give short shrift to the government's argument that trial counsel can hardly be deemed deficient for failing to request a Kastigar hearing when there is no case law or settled practice to establish her obligation to have done so in this specific context, i.e., when a criminal defendant has testified at a CPO hearing. Appellee's Brief at 45. [62] That is looking at the question too narrowly. A competent criminal defense attorney must be able to apply fundamental principles to new fact situations. As Hylton illustrates, whatever the specific circumstances, any defense attorney should appreciate that the prosecution must not use a defendant's immunized testimony or derivative evidence against him. The attorney's ignorance of Section 16-1002(c) or Kastigar is no excuse for doing nothing to protect the defendant from such use. Appellant's allegations also show a sufficient likelihood of prejudice at trial  a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different [63]  to warrant a hearing on his claim of ineffectiveness. On this score, it is enough to point out that Parker and the lead detective were exposed to appellant's immunized testimony. The allocation of the burden of persuasion at a Kastigar hearing means appellant's entitlement to relief is presumed unless the government proves the absence of taint and the independent derivation of its evidence. The government's ability to surmount such a difficult obstacle [64] in this case is doubtful, and we may not infer findings favorable to it. [65] The prosecutor's affidavit does not dispose of the matter: [a] government agent's denials that he made use of the immunized testimony, standing alone, are generally insufficient to meet the government's burden. [66] The prosecutor's good faith, which appellant has not questioned, is beside the point if the prosecution nonetheless was tainted by the use of his immunized testimony. [67] That Parker's trial testimony may have been generally consistent with her testimony before she listened to appellant [68] does not prove her later testimony was not affected more subtly, but nonetheless materially, by her reaction to what he said. Parker was not examined in the grand jury or at trial about the influence on her of appellant's immunized testimony. [69] It appears the government took no steps to prevent, cabin, or discover such influence, for the prosecutor averred that she did not speak with Parker about the CPO hearing when she prepared appellant's case for indictment and trial. Similarly, the government has not proved that its investigation was unaffected by appellant's immunized testimony. Appellant suggests that David Brox may have become a prosecution witness because Detective Montague or Parker heard appellant at the CPO hearing attribute some of Parker's harassment to Brox's enemies. On the present record, it is not clear how the government identified Brox as a potential witness, or whether it did so prior to the CPO hearing. Finally, it cannot be said at this stage that any use of appellant's immunized testimony or derivative evidence at trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the strength of the government's case against appellant. We do not yet know what, if any, evidence in the government's case should have been excluded. To answer that critical question, an evidentiary hearing is required on appellant's Kastigar claim.