Opinion ID: 396890
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Improper Comments

Text: 17 The first impropriety committed by the prosecutor was in vouching for Amato's veracity. In his summation, the prosecutor reviewed Amato's involvement in the case, and his testimony, at length. Recognizing that Amato's performance on the witness stand had been poor, the prosecutor argued for Amato's credibility. Initially, the prosecutor shied away from an outright endorsement, employing instead the rhetorical device I suggest that: 18 I suggest to you that Mr. Amato in part was a very truthful witness. There were parts that he wasn't truthful. I suggest to you he backed off things that he very clearly said to the grand jury about his conversation with Mr. Modica at Dyker Travel. 19 Transcript at 1056. A few moments later, the prosecutor conceded that it had been improper for Amato, as an airline employee, to moonlight as a travel agent. Then he continued: 20 But I'm not here telling you that Mr. Amato is your A-1, Class-1 citizen. I'm here to tell you that Mr. Amato's testimony when it relates to the evidence in this case is truthful. 21 Id. at 1061. Appellant objected, but the judge overruled the objection. 22 The I'm here to tell you comment was improper. The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice declare: It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or guilt of the defendant. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 3-5.8(b) (1980) (hereinafter cited as ABA Standard (number)). The policies underlying this proscription go to the heart of a fair trial. The prosecutor is cloaked with the authority of the United States Government; he stands before the jury as the community's representative. His remarks are those, not simply of an advocate, but rather of a federal official duty-bound to see that justice is done. The jury knows that he has prepared and presented the case and that he has complete access to the facts uncovered in the government's investigation. Thus, when the prosecutor conveys to the jurors his personal view that a witness spoke the truth, it may be difficult for them to ignore his views, however biased and baseless they may in fact be. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1934). Personal expressions of opinion are especially improper if phrased to leave the impression that the prosecutor's opinion is based on matters in the investigative file and not in the trial evidence. United States v. Lamerson, 457 F.2d 371, 372 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); McMillian v. United States, 363 F.2d 165, 169 (5th Cir. 1966). 23 This Court has repeatedly warned prosecutors not to vouch for their witnesses' truthfulness, see, e. g., United States v. Bivona, 487 F.2d 443, 444-47 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Santana, 485 F.2d 365, 370-71 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931, 94 S.Ct. 1444, 39 L.Ed.2d 490 (1974); United States v. Drummond, 481 F.2d 62, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1973); cf. United States v. Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1041-43 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 444 U.S. 1040, 100 S.Ct. 713, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980); United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396, 400-02 (5th Cir. 1978), and has even reversed a conviction when a prosecutor repeatedly told the jury that certain testimony was true, see United States v. Burse, 531 F.2d 1151, 1154-55 (2d Cir. 1976); cf. United States v. Lamerson, 457 F.2d 371, 372 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); United States v. Handman, 447 F.2d 853, 856 (7th Cir. 1971). Recently, this Court cited the ABA Standard quoted above and declared: All prosecutors in this circuit should be guided by this rule in the future. United States v. Sprayregen, 577 F.2d 173, 174 n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 979, 99 S.Ct. 563, 58 L.Ed.2d 649 (1978). 24 The trial court erred in overruling appellant's objection. The judge should have stricken the remark and immediately instructed the jurors to the effect that they could consider no evidence other than that presented to them; that the prosecutor was an advocate, not a sworn witness; and that they must treat the prosecutor's assertion as to the witness's veracity as non-evidentiary argument that they were free to reject. 25 A second improper statement by the prosecutor was closely related to his vouching for Amato's credibility. The prosecutor several times characterized witnesses, particularly Amato, as being scared, apparently in order to explain their reticence and inconsistency. Defense counsel promptly objected to this characterization, concerned that the comments would suggest to the jury that Amato had been threatened for testifying against appellant. The trial judge initially refused to permit defense counsel to approach the bench, simply overruling his objections. Transcript at 1052-55. Apparently concerned that the jury might miss his point, the prosecutor then expressly suggested that Amato's fear was related to a mysterious third person who had accompanied appellant when he arrived at the airport to claim the missing suitcase: 26 You heard Mr. Amato state that the defendant, Mr. Modica had someone else with him at the time. You heard Mr. Miradoli say that, too. You heard Mr. Costanzo, who testified today, say that, too. There is only one person who didn't say that-Mr. Modica. And when these witnesses-again, talking about Mr. Miradoli, Mr. Costanzo, Mr. Amato, when they were asked about this other person, did you see their reaction? Did they look like they were anxious, that they were trying to describe them? What did their faces look like? They were scared. I am telling you-. 27 Transcript at 1068. 28 Defense counsel objected. At the bench, he argued that the prosecutor was suggesting that the witnesses were scared and that (t)here isn't any hint of a threat in this case. Id. The trial judge responded: He (the prosecutor) is not suggesting that the threat comes from the defendant. Id. at 1068-69. Defense counsel said I think that's a pretty clear implication, but the judge disagreed. Id. at 1069. Yet the testimony described the third person as having accompanied appellant, and Amato's alleged fear related to his testifying against appellant. The statement seems to have been designed to explain Amato's testimonial inadequacies by associating appellant with an unknown and threatening individual. 29 The trial judge should have sustained the objection and taken corrective action. A prosecutor is free to comment upon the evidence, including demeanor. But he may not use the presence of an unknown individual, concerning whom no evidence was introduced, as a vehicle for suggesting that the defendant is associated with threatening people. See, e. g., United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1342-43 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Peak, 498 F.2d 1337, 1339 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hayward, 420 F.2d 142, 146-47 (D.C.Cir.1969); Hall v. United States, 419 F.2d 582, 585 (5th Cir. 1969). Such a suggestion has a special potential for prejudice, moreover, when it is made by a prosecutor, who the jury may well think knows something about the defendant's mysterious associate that cannot be revealed, and who at the same time vouches for the truthfulness of the frightened witness's testimony. 30 A third impropriety occurred in the prosecutor's rebuttal summation. He closed his argument by saying: 31 I submit to you that the Government has proven the proof. It has proven the charges in this case beyond every doubt. The proof is very clear. Don't let Mr. Modica walk out of this room laughing at you. 32 Transcript at 1164-65. Appellant's objection was overruled. Id. at 1165. 33 The apposite ABA Standard states a fundamental principle: The prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury. ABA Standard 3-5.8(c). Cf. United States v. Hayward, supra, 420 F.2d at 146 (It is fundamental to sound procedure in federal criminal prosecutions that counsel refrain from 'appeal wholly irrelevant to any facts or issues in the case, the purpose and effect of which could only (be) to arouse passion and prejudice.' ) (quoting Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 247, 63 S.Ct. 561, 566, 87 L.Ed. 734 (1943)). No trial-civil or criminal-should be decided upon the basis of the jurors' emotions. But the stricture against prejudicial appeals to the jury is most compelling with respect to the performance of a prosecutor, for the reasons given by the Supreme Court in Berger v. United States, supra: 34 The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a proper one. 35 295 U.S. at 88, 55 S.Ct. at 633. In this case, the only conceivable purpose of the prosecutor's parting shot was to prejudice the jury. The observations of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, with respect to a prosecutor's closing reference to a defendant as a hoodlum, are applicable to the prosecutor's remarks here: 36 This type of shorthand characterization of an accused, not based on evidence, is especially likely to stick in the minds of the jury and influence its deliberations. Out of the usual welter of grey facts it starkly rises-succinct, pithy, colorful, and expressed in a sharp break with the decorum which the citizen expects from the representative of his government. 37 Hall v. United States, supra, 419 F.2d at 587. The government does not deny in its brief that the comment was improper. 38 Here, again, defense counsel objected, but was overruled. The judge should immediately have charged the jurors that they were not to consider anyone's reaction-the prosecutor's or the defendant's-to their verdict, and that the only issue before them was whether the prosecution had proven its case. 39 In addition to the instances noted above, the summation was punctuated with excessive use of the personal pronoun I. More than 60 times in the summation the prosecutor introduced a sentence with I'm telling you or I suggest to you. Occasional use of such rhetorical devices is simply fair argument, United States v. Murphy, 374 F.2d 651, 655 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 836, 88 S.Ct. 47, 19 L.Ed.2d 98 (1967), but their constant use runs the risk that the jury may think the issue is whether the prosecutor is truthful, instead of whether his evidence is to be believed. A prosecutor should exercise restraint to avoid needless personal references, without sacrificing the vigor or effectiveness of his argument. 40 In sum, the prosecutor made a number of clearly improper remarks throughout his summation, and the district court should have sustained appellant's objections to those comments.