Opinion ID: 75633
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prejudice to Rosell

Text: 112 We now turn to whether the district court erred by not granting a continuance or a mistrial in light of Rosell's involuntary absence. The right of a criminal defendant to be present at trial has three bases: the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and Fed. R. Crim. P. 43. See United States v. Brantley, 68 F.3d 1283, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 1995) (The right to be present during one's trial arises from the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and is codified at Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.). 113 The right to be present pursuant to the Confrontation Clause has been referred to as a trial right, and is less broad than the right afforded by the Due Process Clause or Rule 43. United States v. Boyd, 131 F.3d 951, 954 (11th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court has emphasized that a primary interest secured by the Confrontation Clause is the right of cross-examination. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2662 (1987) (citation, quotation, and brackets omitted). Thus, this clause has the functional purpose [of] ensuring a defendant an opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 739, 107 S. Ct. at 2664. 114 The Due Process Clause, on the other hand, offers a criminal defendant a somewhat broader right to be present. See Boyd, 131 F.3d at 954. The Supreme Court described this right as follows: 115 The Court has assumed that, even in situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him, he has a due process right to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge. . . . Although the Court has emphasized that this privilege of presence is not guaranteed when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow, . . . due process clearly requires that a defendant be allowed to be present to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence . . . . Thus, a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure. 116 Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745, 107 S. Ct. at 2667 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-08, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332-33 (1934)). Similarly, this Court has stated that [t]he right of a criminal defendant to be present at all critical stages of his trial is a fundamental constitutional right. Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1260 n.49 (11th Cir. 1982). 117 On its face, Rule 43 seems to provide a right to be present at trial that is broader still. Subject to certain inapplicable exceptions (including voluntary absence), the rule mandates that [t]he defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a). Although we have noted that Congress' intent in enacting Rule 43 was to codify then-existing case law regarding a criminal defendant's right to be present, we have declined to determine the extent to which the rule and the constitutional sources of the right to be present overlap. Boyd, 131 F.3d at 953 n.3. 118 It is clear under the facts of this case that the full force of each of the three sources of the right to be present - the Confrontation Clause, the Due Process Clause, and Rule 43 - bears down on the district court's decision to continue the trial in Rosell's absence. The trial right aimed at ensuring effective examination of witnesses provided by the Confrontation Clause is implicated given that Rosell was absent during several days of trial while witnesses gave testimony against him. The Due Process Clause's guarantee of presence during all critical stages of a trial applies because Rosell was absent during both the government's case-in-chief relating to him as well as the presentation of his own defense case. Stages of a trial could hardly be more critical for a defendant. Finally, the portions of the trial Rosell missed were unquestionably stages subject to Rule 43's directive. Consequently, Rosell had a clear right to be present during the portions of the trial which were conducted over his protest in his absence, and the district court committed a constitutional and statutory error by denying him that right. 119 The existence of error does not end our inquiry, however, because courts have repeatedly held that the continuation of trial in absence of a defendant may be harmless. See, e.g., Finney v. Zant, 709 F.2d 643, 646 (11th Cir. 1983) (Any error by reason of Finney's absence during trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.), overruled on other grounds, Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir. 1986); Hall v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 945, 947-48 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); Proffitt, 685 F.2d at 1260 n.49 ([O]nce the defendant has established a violation of that right [to be present] his conviction is unconstitutionally tainted and reversal is required unless the State proves the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.). 5 120 Under the circumstances of this case, the government has not carried its burden of proving that the unconstitutional continuation of trial in Rosell's absence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In reaching the conclusion that the error was not harmless, we find important the particular parts of his trial that Rosell missed. Obviously, the more crucial the stage of trial, the less likely that a defendant's involuntary absence was harmless. On several occasions, this Court has found that a defendant's absence was harmless. See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 131 F.3d 951, 953-54 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding harmless the defendant's absence during evidentiary hearing on motion for new trial); United States v. Brantley, 68 F.3d 1283, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding harmless defendant's unobjected-to absence during time when jury challenges were exercised); United States v. Harris, 908 F.2d 728, 739 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding harmless a defendant's short absence during closing argument where defendant had attorney present and did not object to proceeding); Hall v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 945, 947-48 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding harmless defendant's absence during non-substantive portion of jury qualification and during brief colloquy between judge and jury during deliberations); United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 652-54 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding harmless defendant's absence during portion of James hearing on admissibility of co-conspirator hearsay evidence); Finney v. Zant, 709 F.2d 643, 645-46 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding harmless defendant's brief, voluntary absence during the examination of witnesses when the defendant went to the restroom). 121 None of those decisions, however, involved the absence of a defendant for the length of time involved in this case or during stages of a trial as critical as those missed by Rosell. 6 Unlike the previous cases in which we found a defendant's absence to be harmless, Rosell was denied the opportunity to assist his attorney in the cross-examination of several witnesses put on by the government and by some co-defendants. Rosell was unable to confront those witnesses in the courtroom and unable to observe the witnesses put on in his own defense or to suggest additional areas of inquiry his attorney might pursue with any of the witnesses who testified during his involuntary absence. He was also not present to discuss with his attorney whether additional witnesses should have been called. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the government has carried its burden of proving that proceeding with the trial during Rosell's involuntary absence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 122 Two arguments put forward by the government on this issue do merit some discussion. One is its argument that Rosell suffered no prejudice from his absence because his attorney was present at trial and represented his interests. As a panel of our predecessor court previously noted, in many cases finding a defendant's involuntary absence at trial to have been harmless error, the court emphasizes the fact that while the defendant may have been absent, his attorney was present to protect his rights. United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066, 1080 (5th Cir. 1981). Although the presence of counsel is certainly a relevant factor to be considered in determining whether a defendant's absence was harmless, the right to be present at trial - grounded in the Confrontation Clause and the Due Process Clause - is not a gossamer right inevitably swept away simply because a defendant is represented, in his absence, by counsel. The right to be present is distinct from the right to be represented by counsel. The right to be present would be hollow indeed if it was dependent upon the lack of representation by counsel. Furthermore, such a rule would ignore the fact that a client's active assistance at trial may be key to an attorney's effective representation of his interests. 123 Second, the government argues that Rosell has made an insufficient showing of prejudice, because he does not point to any issue that his counsel did not raise relevant to his defense. This argument, like the one we have just discussed, devalues the constitutional right to be present, and ignores the assistance that a defendant can provide to his counsel during trial. If we were to require that a defendant show with specificity how his presence might have changed the course or outcome of a trial, then the right to be present would cease to exist in many cases in which the evidence of guilt is strong. The right to be present at one's own trial is not that weak. And, of course, the government's argument would transfer the burden on the prejudice issue from it to the defendant. For these reasons, Rosell's rights under the Confrontation Clause, the Due Process Clause, and Rule 43 were violated by continuation of the trial over his protests while he was involuntarily absent during critical stages of the trial, and the government has not proven that the violations were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we remand for a new trial. E. THE BATSON CHALLENGE 124 Mercedes Novaton, Rosell, Jorge Lopez, Matamoros, Cuni, Reynaldo Rodriguez, and Leopoldo Rodriguez argue that the government violated the Equal Protection Clause by using its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). During jury selection, the government used six of its eight peremptory challenges to strike Hispanic jurors (the government did not exercise its other two challenges). 7 At the time that the government exercised its peremptory challenges, most or all of the appellants objected on Batson grounds. They argued to the district court that the government was striking Hispanic jurors because the appellants were of Hispanic descent. The district court rejected the appellants' Batson challenges, concluding that the appellants had not made a prima facie showing given that several Hispanic jurors were accepted by the government and that the appellants themselves had exercised peremptory challenges against Hispanic jurors. Nonetheless, the court permitted the government to offer a race-neutral explanation for each of its peremptory strikes if it chose to do so, and the government took the court up on its offer. 125 The government proffered race-neutral explanations for each of the six peremptory challenges it exercised. With respect to the first juror that the government struck, Ms. Jarp, the government had attempted to have her removed for cause because of her difficulty understanding English. When asked by the court whether she understood what was being said, Ms. Jarp had responded: Like I said, for me it is a little hard because I don't speak the language very well as everybody else, although she stated that she did not think that she had problems understanding the proceedings. The court declined to strike her for cause, and the government exercised its peremptory challenge. To explain its peremptory challenge of a second juror, Ms. Mason, the government stated that the juror had indicated that her son had been wrongfully arrested for possession of cocaine. 126 Next, the government struck Ms. Orsatelliz. The stated reason was that she was a social worker employed by Health and Rehabilitative Services. The government's fourth peremptory challenge was used against Ms. Michelsen. There was confusion among the attorneys as to whether Ms. Michelsen was Hispanic. The government stated that it had no knowledge of her being Hispanic, but certain defense attorneys stated that she was. The government said that although it did not know whether Ms. Michelsen was Hispanic, it would provide its race-neutral explanation, which is that Ms. Michelsen had previously accompanied a criminal defendant to his sentencing in order to hold his hand and give moral support. 127 The government's fifth peremptory strike was used against Ms. De La Roca. When challenged, the government explained that it struck Ms. De La Roca because she was friends with one of the defense attorneys, knew another defense attorney, and had previously worked for a judge who was prosecuted by federal authorities. The defense attorney with whom Ms. De La Roca claimed to be friends stated that although he knew her, he did not consider her a friend. Finally, the government struck Mr. Saenz. The government explained that [t]he basis for the Government's striking of Mr. Saenz [was] his age, lack of life experience, and the fact that when asked . . . [about] the influence of narcotics indicated he had friends who 'smoked weed.' Satisfied with the government's race-neutral explanations for all of its peremptory challenges, the district court denied the appellants' Batson motion. 1. Standard of Review 128 A district court's findings regarding whether a peremptory strike was exercised for a discriminatory reason largely involve credibility determinations and are therefore entitled to great deference. Thus, we review a district court's findings in this respect only for clear error. United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520, 1530 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 2. The Batson Framework 129 In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), the Supreme Court recognized that a prosecutor violates a defendant's equal protection rights when he or she uses peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner in order to strike from the petit jury members of the defendant's race. Courts evaluate Batson objections under the following three-step procedure: 130 (1) the objector must make a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenge is exercised on the basis of race; (2) the burden then shifts to the challenger to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question; and (3) the trial court must determine whether the objector has carried its burden of proving purposeful discrimination. 131 United States v. Allen-Brown, 243 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2001). 132 Our cases hold that the establishment of a prima facie case is an absolute precondition to further inquiry into the motivation behind the challenged strike. Central Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Lowder Realty Co., Inc., 236 F.3d 629, 636 (11th Cir. 2000). [T]he party objecting to a peremptory strike bears the burden of establishing facts sufficient to support an inference of racial discrimination. Id. However, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances in determining whether a prima facie case of discrimination has been established. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. Such circumstances include whether there is a pattern of strikes against jurors of a certain race, and the questions asked by the prosecutor during voir dire. Id. at 97, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. 133 This Court has cautioned, however, that the mere fact of striking a juror or a set of jurors of a particular race does not necessarily create an inference of racial discrimination. Lowder Realty, 236 F.3d at 636. Instead, [t]he number of persons struck takes on meaning only when coupled with other information such as the racial composition of the venire, the race of others struck, or the voir dire answers of those who were struck compared to the answers of those who were not struck. Id. at 636-37. The existence of a substantial disparity between the percentage of jurors of one race struck and the percentage of their representation on the jury may create such an inference of discrimination, whereas the unchallenged presence of jurors of a particular race on a jury substantially weakens the basis for a prima facie case of discrimination in the peremptory striking of jurors of that race. Id. at 6338. Courts reviewing the resolution of a Batson challenge give great deference to a district court's finding as to the existence of a prima facie case. Allen-Brown, 243 F.3d at 1296 (citations and quotations omitted). 134 If a prima facie case of discrimination is established, then the prosecution must proffer a race-neutral explanation for its strikes. The Supreme Court has stated that [t]he second step does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995). In explaining the language in Batson, the Court noted that [w]hat [Batson] means by a 'legitimate reason' is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection. Id. at 769, 115 S. Ct. at 1771. See also United States v. Cobb, 185 F.3d 1193, 1196 n.2 (11th Cir. 1999) (Under Batson, the reason for a peremptory strike that is challenged on race grounds does not have to be 'valid' in any sense other than race-neutral, nor does it have to relate to the case being tried.). 135 After a race-neutral explanation is offered, a court must then determine whether an equal protection violation has occurred. It is during the third step [of the Batson framework] that the persuasiveness of the justification [proffered by the prosecutor] becomes relevant - the step in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S. Ct. at 1771. 3. Application to This Case 136 It is somewhat unclear on this record whether the district court rejected the appellants' Batson objections based on their failure to establish a prima facie case, or whether it did so because, in light of all relevant circumstances including the government's race-neutral explanations for its strikes, it found that the appellants had not carried their burden of proving that the challenged strikes were purposely discriminatory. When the appellants first raised the Batson issue, after the prosecution had exercised its first two strikes against Hispanic jurors, the court indicated that they had not established a prima facie case requiring a race-neutral explanation. Nonetheless, it allowed the government to proffer such an explanation, and the court indicated that it accepted the government's explanation. The court again indicated after the third strike that it did not believe that the government was obligated to offer an explanation. However, after the appellants made their later Batson objections, the court no longer voiced any opinions about whether or not a prima facie case of discrimination had been established or whether the government was obligated to proffer its race-neutral explanations. Instead, the court listened to those explanations, as well as the arguments made by the appellants' attorneys, and then overruled the objections. 137 We do not believe that the judge abused his discretion by finding that the first two or three strikes by the government did not require a response from the government. However, in light of the fact that the judge decided to hear the prosecution's explanations before ruling on the final Batson objections, and given that the court eventually stopped indicating that the government was not obligated to proffer those explanations, we will assume for purposes of this opinion that the district court found that the appellants had put forth a prima facie showing of discrimination when all of the government's peremptory strikes were considered together. It is only an assumption, because whether the court actually did so is far from clear. We will further assume that the assumed finding of a prima facie case was correct. 138 Even assuming all of this, the appellants are not entitled to relief because the district court did not commit clear error by denying the appellants' Batson objections in light of the government's proffered, race-neutral explanations for its peremptory strikes as well as the other relevant circumstances. The appellants' contention that the government's explanations were pretextual concern only two of the strikes - those against Ms. De La Roca and Ms. Orsatelliz. The appellants point out that although the government said that it struck Ms. De La Roca because she was friends with one of the defense attorneys and had worked for a judge who had been federally prosecuted, another non-Hispanic juror who was not dismissed had worked as a clerk in the state criminal courts and stated that he knew most of the people here. Furthermore, the appellants argue that even though Ms. Orsatelliz was dismissed because she was a social worker employed by the Health and Rehabilitative Services, and was therefore presumably liberal, three other jurors who worked for the Dade County Department of Education had not been struck even though their employment could also indicate that they were liberal. 139 These arguments do not persuade us that the district court committed clear error in finding that the prosecution's strikes were non-discriminatory. We have recognized that failing to strike a white juror who shares some traits with a struck [non-white juror] does not itself automatically prove the existence of discrimination. United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 926 (11th Cir. 1995). That is certainly true where there are relevant differences between the struck jurors and the comparator jurors. Here there are such differences. Although a white juror who worked for the courts and knew the attorneys was not struck, the Hispanic juror with those traits who was struck also had the added problem, from the government's perspective, of having worked for a judge who had been prosecuted by the federal government. That additional aspect of the Hispanic juror's background could certainly lead a prosecutor to decide to exercise a peremptory strike against her, but not the other juror. 140 Similarly, the fact that three Department of Education employees were allowed to remain on the jury certainly does not indicate that the government lied when it said that the reason it struck another juror was that she was a social worker for another agency. The appellants have not shown that all reasonable prosecutors would have considered those positions equally liberal. 141 Moreover, we note that the district court was free to consider all other relevant circumstances, such as the fact that the government left several Hispanic jurors unchallenged and that the appellants themselves exercised peremptory challenges to strike Hispanic jurors, in deciding whether the appellants had carried their burden of proving that the government had committed an equal protection violation. On this record, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in reaching the conclusion that the government had not exercised its strikes in a manner that discriminated against Hispanics. 142 F. THE FAILURE TO PERMIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF AGENTS CONCERNING UNRELATED INVESTIGATIONS 143 Appellants Reynaldo Rodriguez, Humberto Rodriguez, Mercedes Novaton, Leopoldo Rodriguez, Rosell, and Lopez contend that the district court committed reversible error by granting the government's motions in limine precluding them from cross-examining some of the agents about certain matters. Although the motions concerned four different agents, the appellants' arguments on appeal are limited to the preclusion of cross-examination of two of them - Detective Paez and Agent Lucas. First, the appellants maintain that they should have been permitted to cross-examine Paez about his involvement in the Miami River Cops Scandal. As a part of the investigation into that scandal, Paez had been suspended with pay from the police force for a four-month period in 1987. After the investigation, he was reinstated. No criminal charges were ever brought against Paez in connection with the scandal, although he was formally reprimanded for failing to document a conversation with an informant. 144 The appellants argued to the district court that cross-examination of Paez concerning this matter should be permitted because it could show bias or a motive to lie on his part. In particular, they argued that Paez had a cloud over his head at the Miami Police Department [as a result of the Miami River Cops Scandal] and was motivated to clear himself by testifying against another alleged dirty cop. Furthermore, the appellants represented to the district court that although Paez had been cleared six years before the trial in this case, they had information that there might be an ongoing investigation into the scandal, possibly implicating Paez. They believed that the government should have provided them with information concerning any such investigation, and that they should have been permitted to cross-examine Paez about it. 145 Second, the appellants argued to the district court that they should have been able to cross-examine Agent Lucas concerning an investigation that was pending against him at the time of trial. Lucas was investigated by the DEA in July 1993 after the agency received a letter alleging that he had stolen twenty-three kilograms of cocaine during a cocaine seizure. Lucas was cleared after the investigation. In June 1994, however, the same source that had written the letter made the same allegations about Lucas, and a second investigation was conducted. That investigation was pending when the trial in the trial of this case began. 146 After listening to the arguments of counsel, the district court granted the government's motions in limine to preclude cross-examination concerning the investigation of Paez and Lucas. The court felt that those investigations were irrelevant, and even if [they were] relevant, [their] probative value is outweighed by [their] prejudice. The court also thought that the defendants had made an insufficient showing concerning the existence of an ongoing investigation into Paez's involvement in the Miami River Cops Scandal to permit cross-examination (or additional discovery) in that regard. 147 We review the district court's evidentiary decisions only for a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Lankford, 955 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir. 1992). The parties basically agree on the framework applicable to the questions presented by the government's motions in limine. To the extent that the appellants sought to attack Paez's and Lucas' credibility, Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence controlled. That rule permits a party, under certain circumstances, to challenge the credibility of a witness with questions concerning past acts reflecting on the witness' character for truthfulness. That rule provides: 148 Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility . . . may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . . . 149 Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). 150 Although Rule 608 provides a district court with discretion to admit such evidence, Rule 403 circumscribes the court's discretion by requiring the court to weigh the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice from it. Ad-Vantage Tel. Directory Consultants, Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp., 37 F.3d 1460, 1464 (11th Cir. 1994). Rule 403 provides that: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403. 151 In addition to the rules of evidence, courts have long recognized that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides a criminal defendant with a right to cross-examine witnesses. This Court has stated that: 152 The district court's discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination is subject . . . to the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. The right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment includes the right to cross-examination. Cross-examination has traditionally been allowed for the purpose of impeaching or discrediting the witness . In particular, the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying has been labeled by the Supreme Court as an important function of the Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination. 153 Lankford, 955 F.2d at 1548 (citations omitted). Furthermore, [c]ross-examination of a government 'star' witness is important, and a presumption favors free cross-examination on possible bias, motive, ability to perceive and remember, and general character for truthfulness. United States v. Phelps, 733 F.2d 1464, 1472 (11th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). However, the mere fact that [a defendant] sought to explore bias on the part of a prosecution witness does not automatically void the court's ability to limit cross-examination. United States v. Diaz, 26 F.3d 1533, 1540 (11th Cir. 1994). Instead, a defendant is only entitled to cross-examine a witness if the information sought to be elicited [is] relevant. Id. (citations and quotations omitted); see also Phelps, 733 F.2d at 1472 (noting that cross-examination regarding potential bias must be relevant). 154 In light of these standards, we believe that the district court acted well within its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of Paez and Lucas. First, with respect to Paez, the information which the appellants sought to elicit concerning the Miami River Cops Scandal was inadmissible under Rules 608 and 403. We find the Ad-Vantage case instructive in this regard. In that case, we held that cross-examination concerning two investigations by the Florida Bar Association and Florida Institute of Certified Public Accountants into the witness' possible ethical violations, which had not resulted in sanction, were inadmissible under Rules 608(b) and 403. In reaching that conclusion, we noted that the types of [a]cts probative of untruthfulness under Rule 608(b) include such acts as forgery, perjury, and fraud. Ad-Vantage, 37 F.3d at 1464. On the other hand, [t]o infer untruthfulness from any unethical act 'paves the way to the exception which will swallow the Rule.' Id. (citation omitted). We also reasoned that the fact no sanction had been imposed for the allegedly unethical conduct and the temporal remoteness of the investigations made the relevance of the information questionable. Id. Moreover, we held in Ad-Vantage that even if the cross-examination concerning the investigations of the ethical complaints was marginally relevant, it still should be excluded under Rule 403 because [i]n these circumstances, when the allegations of wrongdoing were grave but no sanctions resulted, the danger was great that the jury would infer more from the investigation than was fairly inferable. Id. 155 The same reasoning applies in this case. The Miami River Cops Scandal occurred more than six years prior to the trial of this case. Paez was thoroughly investigated in connection with that scandal, but was never charged with any crime and only received a reprimand for failing to document a conversation with an informant. The conduct for which he was reprimanded does not indicate a lack of truthfulness. Given that the investigation was temporally remote from Paez's testimony in this case and that Paez's only sanction in connection with the scandal was completely unrelated to his character for truthfulness, we conclude that the district court properly concluded that it was irrelevant. Moreover, as in Ad-Vantage, we agree with the district court that any potential relevance of the information was substantially outweighed by the possibility of unfair prejudice, and that it was due to be excluded under Rule 403. 156 Likewise, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it limited the cross-examination of Agent Lucas. The insertion into the trial of unproven allegations that Lucas had stolen cocaine had the obvious potential to cause serious and unfair prejudice to the government. In light of the fact that Lucas was cleared during the first investigation and that the second investigation concerned the same allegations from the same source, information concerning those investigations elicited during cross-examination would not have had much, if any, probative value. 157 Finally, the appellants have failed to show any basis for attributing bias to Lucas because of the investigations. They might have (but did not) suggest that he was trying to gain advantage in the investigation by pleasing the DEA and prosecutors. However, the jury knew that Lucas worked for the DEA and presumably factored in his allegiance to it when weighing his testimony. We do not believe that the existence of the investigation would have added anything (other than unfair prejudice) to the equation. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the cross-examination of Lucas as it did under Rules 608(b) and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 158 G. LAY OPINION TESTIMONY REGARDING THE USE OF CODE WORDS 159 Appellants Humberto Rodriguez, Cuni, Lopez, Mercedes Novaton, Rosell, Reynaldo Rodriguez, and Leopoldo Rodriguez challenge the district court's admission of testimony by some of the agents on the case concerning the use of code words by the defendants. At several points throughout the trial, the district court permitted law enforcement agents who had monitored the telephone wiretaps, as well as the supervisors of those agents, to testify concerning their understanding of the meaning of certain words used by the defendants in the taped conversations. For example, agents testified that when the defendants used the phrases fifteen year old girl or fifty year old grandmother, they were actually referring to fifteen and fifty kilogram quantities of cocaine. 160 Over the objection of the defendants, the district court found that such testimony was admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 701 as lay witness opinion testimony which was rationally based on the perceptions and experience of the agents. The defense maintained that the testimony was actually expert testimony governed by Fed. R. 702, which should not have been admitted because the prosecution had not laid the proper foundation to qualify the witnesses as experts and because, contrary to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E) and the court's pre-trial orders, the government had not identified those witnesses as experts or provided summaries of their testimony before trial. 161 Rule 701 provides the standards for determining when a lay witness may provide testimony in opinion form. That rule, at the time of this trial in 1994, 8 provided as follows: 162 If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. 163 Fed. R. Evid. 701. The appellants do not dispute that the testimony was rationally based on the perception of the witnesses, nor do they dispute that the testimony was helpful to the jury in understanding the witnesses' testimony or in determining a fact in issue in the case. Instead, the appellants argue that despite the satisfaction of each of the two prerequisites for admitting lay witness opinion testimony, the evidence should have been excluded because the testimony might also have been characterized as expert testimony subject to the requirements of Rule 702 because the agents' opinion testimony was based, in part, on their prior experiences. 164 The appellants' argument has superficial appeal because the agents' experiences in drug investigations could be viewed as the type of specialized knowledge falling under Rule 702. In fact, we have in the past affirmed the admission under Rule 702 of the expert testimony of a police officer interpreting drug codes and jargon. United States v. Brown, 872 F.2d 385, 392 (11th Cir. 1989) (affirming admission of opinion that references to paper, candy, dresses, related to the sale of cocaine). Also, at least one of our sister circuits has found that a district court committed error, albeit harmless, by admitting this type of testimony as lay witness opinion testimony rather than expert opinion testimony. See United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1244-46 (9th Cir. 1997). 165 However, we do not accept the appellants' position , because it is based on the erroneous assumption (at least with respect to the pre-amendment version of Rule 701) that because an expert could provide the type of testimony at issue, a lay witness cannot. Our case law is squarely to the contrary. In United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1992), this Court made clear that a witness does not fall outside of Rule 701 simply because his or her rational[] . . . perception is based in part on the witness' past experiences. In Myers, the defendant, a former police officer charged with depriving arrestees of their civil rights by using a stun gun, challenged a district court's admission of testimony that reddish burn marks on [a victim's] back were consistent with marks that would be left by a stun gun. Id. at 1577. Myers argued that testimony should not have been admitted under Rule 701 because it went beyond the everyday common knowledge of a lay person. Id. This Court rejected his argument concluding that the witness's conclusion was rationally based upon his personal perception of [the victim's] back and his nineteen years of experience on the police force. Id. We further noted that [t]o the extent that [the witness's] opinion lacked a technical/medical basis, [the defendant] had the opportunity to expose this on cross-examination, and the defendant's objection to the evidence goes to its weight and not its admissibility. Id.; see also Agro Air Assocs., Inc. v. Houston Casualty Co., 128 F.3d 1452, 1455 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming the admission of lay witness opinion testimony based on the witnesses' personal observations and knowledge of, and experience in, the aviation industry). Moreover, we have specifically held on a number of occasions that district courts did not abuse their discretion by permitting police officers to testify under Rule 701 about their understanding of the meaning of conversations by or with criminal defendants. For example, in United States v. Awan, we affirmed a district court's admission of testimony by an undercover agent concerning the meaning and import of statements that were part of tape-recorded conversations with the defendants. 966 F.2d 1415, 1430 (11th Cir. 1992). The defendants in that case argued that the jurors should have been permitted to reach their own conclusions about the meaning of the statements without the influence of the agent's interpretation. Id. We rejected that argument after finding that the agent's testimony was based on his perceptions of the conversations and that the testimony could have been helpful to the jury. Id. at 1430. See also United States v. Davis, 787 F.2d 1501, 1505 (11th Cir. 1986) (affirming admission of opinion under Rule 701 that when defendant stated that he wanted to make a trip, he was referring to an illegal act); United States v. Russell, 703 F.2d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 1983) (affirming admission of agents' testimony interpreting tape-recorded conversations with defendants). 166 In light of these decisions, we believe that the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting agents involved in this case to give opinion testimony based on their perceptions and on their experience as police officers about the meaning of code words employed by the defendants in their intercepted telephone conversations. Moreover, the district court instructed the jury that the agents were not expert witnesses and that the jurors should independently determine the meaning of the statements. Also, each of the witnesses was subject to cross-examination by the appellants during which they challenged the agents' interpretations of the taped conversations. Under these circumstances, the appellants' objections go to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the agents' testimony. See Myers, 972 F.2d at 1577. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion. 9 H. CONFLICT OF INTEREST OF CUNI'S ATTORNEY 167 Cuni contends that the district court erred by denying his motion for a new trial or to dismiss the indictment based on an alleged conflict of interest by one of his trial attorneys. Cuni maintains that his attorney labored under a conflict of interest by continuing his representation of Cuni despite the possibility that he was being investigated by the same United States Attorney's Office in connection with a different case. Cuni states that his attorney did not inform him of the possible conflict and did not seek his consent to continue his representation. Cuni also argues that the government engaged in misconduct when it failed to inform the district court or the defendants of the potential conflict resulting from the investigation of Cuni's attorney. The district court rejected Cuni's arguments, concluding that there was no showing of an actual conflict between the interests of Cuni and his attorney, and also that Cuni's representation had not been adversely affected by any potential conflict. 10 168 The factual basis for Cuni's claim relates to the possible connection between one of his attorneys, Michael Blacker, and a conspiracy charged in an unrelated case in which Blacker was counsel for a different defendant (named Martin). On October 18, 1994, approximately three and a half weeks after the trial in this case began, Blacker was served with a bill of particulars in that case, and in it the Assistant United States Attorney indicated that: 169 [I]n an abundance of caution and to the extent defendant MARTIN has not read the discovery, the government will restate those individuals, other than the charged co-conspirators, who may have furthered the objects of the conspiracy: . . . Michael Blacker. 170 The government maintains that despite this statement in the bill of particulars, Cuni's attorney did not have a conflict of interest because he was not under investigation by the United States Attorney's Office. In support of its position, the government provided a copy of notes taken by an attorney who represented Blacker during a June 1995 meeting with the Assistant United States Attorney. The notes indicate that Blacker's lawyer was advised during the meeting that Blacker was not a target of any investigation and that no indictment was contemplated against him. In light of these facts, and without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge recommended that Cuni's motion for a new trial or dismissal be denied, and the district court adopted that recommendation. 171 It is well-settled that [i]n order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1718 (1980). The Supreme Court noted in Cuyler that a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief. Id. at 349-50, 100 S. Ct. at 1719. However, the Court emphasized that the possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction, and that absent a showing of actual conflict and adverse effect, a defendant is not entitled to relief. Id. at 350, 100 S. Ct. at 1719. Therefore, the Supreme Court has noted that there is no per se rule of prejudice in all cases involving potential conflicts of interest, but instead only a rule of presumptive prejudice where an attorney 'actively represented conflicting interests' and . . . 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected [the] lawyer's performance.' Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2067 (1984) (citation omitted). 172 In Freund v. Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc), this Court discussed the two-part Cuyler test for reviewing claims involving conflicts of interest. First, we noted that [a]n 'actual conflict' of interest occurs when a lawyer has 'inconsistent interests.' Id. at 859 (citations omitted). The Court stated that: 173 In order to prove that an actual conflict hindered [the defendant's] lawyer's performance, [the defendant] must make a factual showing of inconsistent interests or point to specific instances in the record to suggest an actual impairment of his or her interests. Overall, the actual conflict inquiry is fact-specific, consistent with the [defendant's] ultimate burden to prove that his conviction was unconstitutional. 174 Id. (citations and quotations omitted). If a defendant is unable to show an actual conflict, then he is not entitled to relief from his conviction because a speculative or merely hypothetical conflict of interest does not yield a Sixth Amendment violation. Burden v. Zant, 24 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 1994). 175 If a defendant carries his burden of showing an actual conflict of interest, a court must then consider whether the conflict adversely affected his representation. In Freund, we summarized the adverse effect inquiry as follows: 176 To prove adverse effect, a [defendant] must satisfy three elements. First, he must point to some plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic [that] might have been pursued. Second, he must demonstrate that the alternative strategy or tactic was reasonable under the facts. Because prejudice is presumed, the [defendant] need not show that the defense would necessarily have been successful if [the alternative strategy or tactic] had been used, rather he only need prove that the alternative possessed sufficient substance to be a viable alternative. Finally, he must show some link between the actual conflict and the decision to forgo the alternative strategy of defense. In other words, he must establish that the alternative defense was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to the attorney's other loyalties or interests. 177 Freund, 165 F.3d at 860 (citations and quotations omitted). In the absence of a showing of an adverse effect, prejudice is not presumed to flow from a conflict of interest. Id. 178 Applications of these standards to the facts of this case reveal that Cuni is not entitled to relief based on the alleged conflict of interest. First we consider whether an actual conflict has been shown. As we noted in Freund, the inquiry into the existence of an actual conflict is fact-specific. 165 F.3d at 859. Based on the evidence in the record, we cannot determine whether or not an actual conflict existed. The only evidence that the district court had before it on the issue was the bill of particulars indicating that Blacker might be an unindicted co-conspirator, and the representation, based on Blacker's attorney's notes from a meeting that occurred over six months after the end of the trial in this case, that Blacker was not a target of any investigation and was not expected to be indicted. We believe that this information was insufficient to permit the court to find that no actual conflict existed. In particular we note that reliance on the notes from the June 1995 meeting between Blacker's attorney and the Assistant United States Attorney are not persuasive because they apparently reflect only information that was given to Blacker after the conclusion of Cuni's trial in this case. Those notes do not indicate that no conflict existed earlier that should have been disclosed to Cuni and the district court. 179 Nonetheless, even if we assume that an actual conflict of interest existed between Cuni and his attorney, we agree with the district court's alternative holding that Cuni has not, and cannot, show his attorney's performance was adversely affected by the conflict. Cuni has made absolutely no showing of any adverse effect resulting from his attorney's alleged conflict of interest, much less any plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic that was reasonable under the facts. See Freund, 165 F.3d at 860 (citations and quotations omitted). The closest Cuni comes to articulating any adverse effect is a statement that he would have dismissed his attorney if he had been informed of the possible conflict, and a conclusory allegation that his attorney absented himself from the trial in this case in order to defend his own interests in the case in which he was named as a possible, unindicted co-conspirator. While the latter allegation might be a cause for concern if there were any factual basis supporting it, there is none. 180 Moreover, our own review of the record convinces us that Cuni's representation was not adversely affected by the possible conflict of interest. As the magistrate judge pointed out, [t]his record is replete with examples of vigorous and relentless[] attacks by Blacker on the government's case and its agents. In particular, Blacker argued that Agent Lucas, the agent who filed affidavits in support of the various wiretaps, made intentional or reckless misrepresentations in support of the applications. Blacker also challenged the competence of the agents who monitored the wiretaps, and argued that those agents misunderstood the recorded statements. We agree with the magistrate judge that this aggressive approach could hardly be seen as an effective way for an attorney to curry favor with the government. 11 Therefore, we conclude that Cuni has failed to show any adverse effect from the alleged conflict of interest entitling him to relief from his conviction. 181 Our opinion in United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1987), on which Cuni heavily relies, does not require a different result. In McLain, we found that a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated when his attorney had a conflict of interest because the same prosecutor was investigating that attorney on an unrelated matter. 823 F.2d at 1463. After noting that an attorney has an ethical obligation to inform his or her client about any potential conflict of interest, we considered whether the attorney's performance in that case was adversely affected by the conflict of interest. Id. at 1464. We found that [t]here [was] substantial evidence that the United States attorney would not attempt to indict [the attorney] until [his client's] trial ended, and noted that this created an incentive for the attorney to forego plea bargain negotiations and to prolong the trial. Id. We also found that the attorney's conflict of interest affected his efforts to negotiate a plea bargain in several other specific respects. Id. These specific instances of adverse effects resulting from the conflict of interest distinguish McLain from this case. As we have already discussed, nothing in the record of this case suggests that Cuni's representation was affected in any way by the alleged conflict. Therefore, we reject this contention. 12 182