Opinion ID: 2402245
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Improvements and Partial Payment

Text: Norman next challenges the trial justice's findings regarding improvements made to the Tiverton property. Under the part performance doctrine, improvements to land purportedly made in reliance upon an oral contract must indicate the existence of the contract in such a way that the improvements would have been improvident to make in the absence of some such contract, so that they are strong circumstantial evidence of its existence. 4 Corbin on Contracts § 18.15 at 541. Improvements in reliance on an alleged oral contract ordinarily must be permanent. R.W.P. Concessions, Inc., 487 A.2d at 132. Norman first argues that the trial justice committed reversible error in deeming the improvements made to the Tiverton property to be substantial enough to trigger the part performance exception. He contends that the total cost of the improvements made after the agreement  which he values between $2,075 and $2,375  constituted slightly more than 1 percent of the stipulated value of the property, and thus could not be substantial. Without even reaching whether Norman's assessment of the value of the improvements is factually accurate, we cannot agree with his argument. First, we note that this Court has never held that the question of whether improvements suffice to constitute part performance turns upon their cost in relation to the total value of the improved property. In R.W.P. Concessions, Inc., 487 A.2d at 131, 132, this Court did recognize that even a substantial expenditure of time and money was insufficient to constitute part performance when improvements to ready a concession stand were easily removable at the termination of the operating relationship. Yet this is certainly not the case in the present matter, where Jennifer and Gregory imbued the Tiverton property with significant sweat equity. Specifically, the addition of new doors and a banister, the replacement of floors, and the renovation of bedrooms  all of which Norman concedes took place after the agreement  are improvements not easily removable from the premises, and therefore would have been improvident absent an enforceable contract for the sale of the Tiverton property. Norman also argues that the trial justice erred by considering certain improvements to the Tiverton property made prior to the alleged oral agreement. We disagree. The trial justice enumerated the following as improvements supporting the application of the part performance doctrine: French doors were installed, a sun room was appended, the front entry was tiled, a new front door was added, the kitchen was completely overhauled, the bedrooms were refurbished, and the landscaping was improved. When cross-examined, however, Jennifer offered a different, but still substantial, list of improvements rendered after the actual purchase of the home: The tile in the front entry was laid, the front door was replaced, the new oak banister was installed, the last door in the sun room was hung, and both the master and another bedroom were renovated. We are of the opinion that even this second, albeit less comprehensive, list is sufficient evidence to indicate the existence of an oral agreement. Finally, even if the improvements by themselves were insufficient to constitute part performance, some combination of improvements, substantial payment of the purchase price, or possession can be enough. Najarian, 48 R.I. at 215, 136 A. at 768. An independent review of the evidence presented in this case leads us to conclude that the oral contract should be honored. Jennifer and Gregory paid Norman $140 per week from June 1, 2001, until April 12, 2002, when the couple reduced the weekly payments to $100; all these payments were deducted from a $70,000 figure, as evidenced by a ledger kept by Norman. Both Jennifer and Gregory testified that this $70,000 was the negotiated purchase price of the property. The purchase price was later reduced by $22,000 to account for a $30,000 home equity loan taken out by Norman, less an $8,000 private loan from Norman to Gregory and Jennifer. We hold that these payments toward the purchase price of the Tiverton property and the several permanent improvements made thereon, together with the continued possession, sufficiently constitute part performance of the oral contract. We did not easily or quickly conclude that there was sufficient part performance in this case. This was a close and difficult case for this Court. We would advise bench and bar that we consider the statute of frauds to be as important as it is venerable. We shall continue to look with some degree of skepticism upon the claims of any party who seeks to escape from the statutory mandate by invoking an exception.