Opinion ID: 2625875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appearance of Judicial Bias

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court's hostile and disparaging comments during trial exhibited such a degree of bias against defense counsel, and so interfered with counsel's examination of witnesses, as to deprive defendant of a fair trial, the effective assistance of counsel, and a reliable penalty determination. We disagree. First, because counsel failed to object to, or seek a jury admonition regarding, any of the instances of alleged judicial intemperance, the issue is waived on appeal. ( People v. Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1108, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36; People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 411, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221.) Moreover, the claim is without merit; though the trial judge, the Honorable Jack Tso, was sometimes impatient with the attorneys for both parties, and though a few of his exchanges with defense counsel were especially contentious, neither separately nor together do these instances of harsh language amount to an unconstitutional display of judicial bias. Although the trial court has both the duty and the discretion to control the conduct of the trial ( People v. Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1108, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36), the court commits misconduct if it persistently makes discourteous and disparaging remarks to defense counsel so as to discredit the defense or create the impression it is allying itself with the prosecution ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 353, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708). Nevertheless, [i]t is well within [a trial court's] discretion to rebuke an attorney, sometimes harshly, when that attorney asks inappropriate questions, ignores the court's instructions, or otherwise engages in improper or delaying behavior. ( United States v. Donate (D.C.Cir.1996) 99 F.3d 426, 434.) Indeed, [o]ur role ... is not to determine whether the trial judge's conduct left something to be desired, or even whether some comments would have been better left unsaid. Rather, we must determine whether the judge's behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial. ( United States v. Pisani (2d Cir.1985) 773 F.2d 397, 402.) Defendant cites several minor instances assertedly showing the court's impatience with, or irritation toward, counsel. [6] But such manifestations of friction between court and counsel, while not desirable, are virtually inevitable in a long trial. The trial court frequently addressed the prosecutors in an equally brusque manner. [7] Defendant maintains the court frequently disparaged and upbraided defense counsel during counsel's examination of witnesses. Upon examination, we conclude that, whether or not the court's evidentiary ruling in each cited instance was correct, [8] in no case did the court display overt bias against the defense so as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. In asking defense counsel whether a line of questioning, on recross-examination of the prosecution fingerprint examiner, was within the scope of redirect, the court neither disparaged counsel's efforts nor prevented counsel from pursuing cross-examination. Similarly, when the court told counsel not to argue with a police investigator, defense counsel rephrased and reposed his question without objection or court interference. Again, when the court interrupted counsel's cross-examination of a prosecution witness who had heard the gunshots, urging counsel to get right to the issue, counsel complied but eventually returned to the interrupted line of questioning. Whether or not the court's rulings on cross-examination of Stephan Schliebe, the prosecution paint expert, were correct (see post, pt. VII.), the court, contrary to defendant's claim, did not berate counsel in making them. Counsel's cross-examination was extensive, technical, and at points confusing, and the court's occasional impatience with repetitious or vague foundational questions did not convey a judicial bias against the defense. On redirect examination of Adolfo Lara, defendant's attorney in the robbery trial, confusion arose over two aspects of the prosecutor's cross-examination: On cross, Lara had been confronted with prior testimony in which he described his reaction to the news of Koll's death as disbelief, and had also been denied an opportunity to explain why, once he was convinced Roll really had been killed, he was not shocked. On redirect, defense counsel attempted to read additional prior testimony going to the question of what Lara meant by disbelief. The court, apparently misrecalling the cross-examination, thought Lara had wanted to explain his disbelief but had been denied that opportunity; the court told defense counsel, instead of reading the testimony, simply to ask Lara what he meant by disbelief. Lara then eliminated the source of the confusion by testifying that he was using shock and disbelief in the same sense, i.e., to convey that when the robbery prosecutor, Haney, told him Roll had been killed, Lara at first thought Haney was either joking or testing his reaction. The court's repeated direction that counsel ask Lara what he meant rather than read his prior testimony betrayed judicial confusionwhich was soon dispelled by Lara's testimonyrather than bias. Defendant complains of the court's treatment of counsel during the direct examination of Ramesh Rar, the defense's paint comparison expert. Rar's testimony begins on page 4306 of the reporter's transcript. Not until page 4394 did defense counsel ask Rar to give his opinion as to whether the paints on the metal post and bubble shield matched each other. Part of the intervening testimony involved the effect of Bremstrahlung radiation on electron microscopy of materials. Rar testified that the examiner must adjust for the Bremstrahlung effect, which can mask the presence of certain elements and create spurious indications of other elements. When counsel further asked Rar to illustrate the Bremstrahlung effect using a projected graph, the court barred the illustration on its own motion, saying, I don't need it illustrated. The jury doesn't require it. Let's get the matters that are relevant. Kar then testified that the prosecution's paint comparison expert had apparently not adjusted for the Bremstrahlung effect. When counsel asked Rar if the prosecution examiner's unadjusted data would lead Rar to the same conclusion he had independently reached about the materials, the court objected that counsel was assuming facts not in evidence: no conclusion about the materials had yet been elicited from Rar. The court told counsel, Now, I don't know what his conclusion pertains to, so why don't we get to it, counsel, please. As defense counsel began to lay the foundation for Kar's opinion, however, the court periodically interposed, or solicited from the prosecutor, objections to the phrasing of certain questions. After the court again urged counsel to get to the bottom line, the following exchange occurred: Q. By Mr. Maple: Do you have an opinion, Dr. Kar, as to whether the paint taken from the The Court: By whom? Q. By Mr. Maple:snap ring of the bubble shield The Court: That he took, right? Not the one that Schliebe took; is that correct? Mr. Maple: That is right. Because nobody can test that, your Honor. He [Schliebe] threw it away. Mr. Holliman: I'll object to counsel editorializing. The Court: Disregard the statement of the attorney. Counsel, I cautioned you. Let's not have any of this. All I'm trying to do is to speed up the process because we have an expert here that can give us his opinion, and the standard way of doing it is to qualify the expert; ask him what his opinion is as to thewhatever he's going to compare. Then he'll give his opinion and then simply ask him what the basis of his opinion is, at which time he may then bring in focus all of his qualifications for all of us. But you're shot gunning, counsel. That- Mr. Maple: Well, your Honor and I differ, and I apologize to the court for the difference. The Court: Counsel, I told you how much this court costs to operate. Counsel then elicited Kar's opinion (that the paints differed) without further difficulty. While some of the court's comments during the examination of Kar would have been better left unsaid ( United States v. Pisani, supra, 773 F.2d at p. 402), we do not believe the court's behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial. ( Ibid ). That the court became impatient with counsel's examination of the expert was perhaps understandable, but its instructions on how to question the witness should have been given outside the jury's hearing. Nonetheless, we believe the effect of the court's remarks was not to discredit the defense or create the impression it is allying itself with the prosecution. ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 353, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) The jury may well have received the impression that the court disliked counsel's methods of examination, but not that the court disparaged or discredited Kar's favorable evidence itself. Finally, defendant claims that the court undermined the credibility of an expert witness the defense attempted to call to testify regarding eyewitness identification evidence. [9] However, as this expert's proposed testimony was excluded as irrelevant (see post, pt. X.), how defendant could have been prejudiced by any damage to her credibility is unclear. We conclude that imperfect as the trial court's behavior may occasionally have been, it did not deprive defendant of a fair trial, the effective assistance of counsel, or a reliable penalty determination.