Opinion ID: 1800393
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kidnapping. Our kidnapping statute provides in section 710.1(2), The Code 1979:

Text: A person commits kidnapping when he or she either confines a person or removes a person from one place to another, knowing that he or she has neither the authority nor the consent of the other to do so; provided, that to constitute kidnapping the act must be accompanied by one or more of the following: .... 2. The intent to use such person as a shield or hostage. .... Under that section, a defendant must confine a person or remove a person from one place to another. The State claims that defendant confined Mrs. Zamora when he grabbed her around the neck. Defendant contends that confines in the statute contemplates a greater restraint than occurred here. A removal is not involved. The parties' dispute raises again the basic question of the scope of the crime of kidnapping. We have confronted this problem on several occasions, and our present task is to fit this case into the pattern of those decisions. State v. Holderness, 301 N.W.2d 733 (Iowa 1981); State v. Rich, 305 N.W.2d 739 (Iowa 1981); State v. Knupp, 310 N.W.2d 179 (Iowa 1981); State v. Marr, 316 N.W.2d 176 (Iowa 1982). The factual recitation in Holderness includes the following: On August 26, 1978, a ten-year-old girl was abducted while in a Davenport cemetery. After luring the girl from her bicycle to his car, the assailant choked her, partially removed her pants and did some things to her which she could not remember. The assailant also struck her on the head several times with both a club and his fist. Following this episode, he transported the victim out into the country, where she was subjected to various incidents of sexual abuse while still confined in the assailant's car. She was later released when he returned her to the cemetery. 301 N.W.2d at 736. We stated: We believe the facts and circumstances of this case are sufficient to support the conclusion that the confinement and movement involved were not merely incidental to the crime of sexual abuse, and that the offense of kidnapping was amply established. Id. at 740. In Rich a shopping center custodian in a mall told the female victim, after hours, that she would have to use another exit. The two walked toward that exit and the custodian grabbed the victim from behind, held a sharp object to her back and told her she would not get hurt if she did as told, led her to the men's restroom, forced her to lie on her stomach, tied her hands behind her back, and sexually abused her. He then led her around the shopping center, laid her on her back and tied her legs to a bannister with her brassiere and a rag, later untied her legs, put her in a three-wheeled trash container and covered her with trash, wheeled her to a utility shed, left, returned, tied her feet, subsequently wheeled her into the mall area again, and departed. The victim later escaped. After extensively reviewing the split of authority on the confinement-removal issue, contrast People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159, 204 N.E.2d 842, 256 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1965), to State v. Jacobs, 93 Ariz. 336, 380 P.2d 998, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 46, 84 S.Ct. 158, 11 L.Ed.2d 108 (1963), and considering the general rules of construction of criminal statutes, we held: Applying these principles of construction, we conclude that our legislature, in enacting section 710.1, intended the terms confines and removes to require more than the confinement or removal that is an inherent incident of commission of the crime of sexual abuse. Although no minimum period of confinement or distance of removal is required for conviction of kidnapping, the confinement or removal must definitely exceed that normally incidental to the commission of sexual abuse. Such confinement or removal may exist because it substantially increases the risk of harm to the victim, significantly lessens the risk of detection, or significantly facilitates escape following the consummation of the offense. 305 N.W.2d at 745. Knupp involved this factual situation: In her high heels she had trouble traversing the icy Mississippi River bridge and accepted a ride with defendant. She left his car at the tollbooth and resumed walking. Defendant returned, stopped his car about five feet from the curb, opened the passenger door, and again asked the victim if she wanted a ride. She stepped into the street to answer the defendant, put her right hand on the car roof, and told defendant he was a nice guy but she did not want a ride. Defendant seized the victim's arm, pulled her into the car, and drove away. Apparently no one heard the victim's scream. Defendant told her he just wanted to make sure she got home safely. When he asked where she lived she replied that he could let her out at the Benson Lumber Company. During this travel the victim told defendant she had quarreled with her husband and that she was pregnant. She later characterized her reaction as scared and babbling. Defendant drove six or seven blocks toward the lumber company, but turned in at the Yetter Oil Company parking lot and stopped under an overpass bridge. The victim got out of the car. In the ensuing ten-minute struggle, defendant punched her in the stomach several times and she was shoved back into the front seat. As a preliminary to a resulting sex act defendant produced a knife and used it to cut through her body suit. After the sex act the victim put on her blue jeans and walked the short distance to her home. 310 N.W.2d at 181. We reviewed Holderness and Rich and held: Applying the criteria we have identified in our opinions as aiding in the resolution of the removal issue, we hold this confinement and removal was kidnapping within section 710.1. Defendant's actions substantially exceeded that which could have been considered merely incidental to the sexual abuse, substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim, and significantly lessened the risk of detection. Id. at 183. In Marr the facts were these: The victim had left her apartment house around 10:00 p. m. to walk to a nearby drug store. Upon leaving the store, she noticed a manwhom she later identified as the defendantsitting in a car and staring at her. While walking back to her apartment she heard a car door slam and observed the defendant following her at a distance of fifty feet. She picked up her pace, and he began to run after her; when she began to run too, he yelled Hey wait a minute, and she stopped and turned around to face him. She screamed and he clamped his hand over her mouth, threatening her not to scream, or [she] would never scream again. At this point the two were on the sidewalk directly in front of the victim's apartment house, which abutted the sidewalk. The defendant slammed her against the corner of the building, and then shoved her down to the ground around to the side of the building, some ten to fifteen feet into a gangway separating it from a neighboring house. One of her arms was pinned under her back, allowing the defendant to lift her shirt, pull down her pants, and sexually abuse her. Although she believed he had a knife, the defendant apparently did not have any kind of weapon in his possession. She could not scream or breathe easily because he clutched her throat; in fact he applied so much pressure that she almost lost consciousness. Alerted by a noise outside the apartment, the victim's husband entered the gangway and interrupted the attack, which had lasted two or three minutes. 316 N.W.2d at 177. We held: We conclude the State failed to sustain its burden of proof under the kidnapping charge that the confinement or removal definitely exceeded that normally incidental to the commission of sexual abuse. Id. at 180. We now hold that unless we extend kidnapping to nearly any case involving a seizure by a defendant of another person during the commission of a crime, which we refuse to do, the instant case does not involve sufficient confinement to constitute kidnapping. As the United States Supreme Court stated regarding the federal kidnapping act in Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 464, 66 S.Ct. 233, 237, 90 L.Ed. 198, 203 (1946): Were we to sanction a careless view of the crime of kidnapping or were we to disregard the background and setting of the Act the boundaries of potential liability would be lost in infinity. The Michigan Court of Appeals concretely expressed the same thought in People v. Adams, 34 Mich. App. 546, 557, 192 N.W.2d 19, 24 (1971), aff'd, 389 Mich. 222, 205 N.W.2d 415 (1973): It will be observed that the statute makes no reference to the duration or circumstances of the confinement. Literally construed, the statute leads to absurd results. The trespasser who momentarily locks a caretaker in his cottage is placed on the same footing as the professional criminal who invades a home, seizes the occupants at gunpoint, transports them to a secret hideout, and holds them for ransom. The robber who orders his victim to stand motionless while his wallet is removed is guilty of the same crime as the robber who forces his victim to drive for miles to a deserted location, where he is terrorized and abandoned. A group of college students who invade a dean's office, wrongfully confining its occupants, commit the same offense as a gang of rapists who seize a woman and remove her from her family to a place of isolation. See also Aikerson v. State, 274 So.2d 124, 127 (Miss.1973) (This would mean that any person who seized and held another in a fist fight or seized, hugged and kissed a woman without her consent, would be guilty of kidnapping.); Mobley v. State, 409 So.2d 1031, 1034 (Fla.1982) (The prevalent view nationwide is that kidnapping statutes, regardless of their wording, do not apply to unlawful confinements or movements incidental to other felonies. Most courts have reasoned that the legislature did not intend for the statutes to be literally applied. Some reasoned that a narrow construction of the statutes was necessary to prevent the abuse of prosecutorial discretion. One court has suggested that a literal application of its kidnapping statute would be a violation of due process. Kidnapping conviction upheld where defendants held hostages in cell during prison riot.). We are impressed by the distinction between seizure and detention (which the court equated to confinement) drawn by the court in Hardie v. State, 140 Tex.Cr. 368, 377, 144 S.W.2d 571, 575 (1940). The present case involves a seizure of Mrs. Zamora by defendant, not a confinement of her. Under the statute, kidnapping cannot be predicated on merely seizing another person. The trial court should have dismissed the kidnapping count.