Opinion ID: 525091
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Authority for the Temporary Suspension

Text: 17 The Gun Control Act gives the Secretary of the Treasury the power to enforce its provisions. 1 The Act generally forbids the Secretary from authorizing the importation of firearms into the United States. 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 922(1) (West 1976). The Act, however, creates four narrow categories of firearms which the Secretary must authorize for importation. 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 925(d) (West 1976 and Supp.1989). Under the only exception relevant to this controversy, the Secretary of the Treasury must authorize the importation of firearms 18 of a type that does not fall within the definition of a firearm as defined in section 5845(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and is generally recognized as particularly suitable for or readily adaptable to sporting purposes, excluding surplus military firearms, except in any case where the Secretary has not authorized the importation of the firearm pursuant to this paragraph, it shall be unlawful to import any frame, receiver, or barrel of such firearm which would be prohibited if assembled. 19 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 925(d)(3) (West 1976 and Supp.1989) (emphasis added). 20 We must first determine whether the Act or its regulations authorize or prohibit the suspension. Contrary to the district court's conclusion, we believe that no provision precludes the suspension but rather, the Act impliedly authorizes such action. 21 GSI correctly notes that neither the Act nor its regulations explicitly authorizes the suspension. Despite this absence of express authority, we conclude that the Bureau must necessarily retain the power to correct the erroneous approval of firearms import applications. As discussed above, the Act strictly limits the importation of firearms to those which satisfy one of the four exceptions. 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 922(1) (West 1977). To accomplish this task, the Bureau inherently must possess the corollary power to temporarily suspend the importation of firearms under permits which the Bureau may have erroneously granted. Otherwise, gun companies could legally inundate the country with rifles which Congress intended to forbid from entering our borders. We decline to interpret the Act in a way which produces such a nonsensical result. 22 Beyond this common sense rationale, we find support for this implied authority in the legislative history. Several portions of the legislative history emphasize Congress's intent to ban the importation of firearms, and the Secretary's discretion in complying with this mandate. The Senate report to the Gun Control Act of 1968 provides that [t]he existing Federal controls over interstate and foreign commerce in firearms are not sufficient to enable the states to effectively cope with firearms traffic within their own borders.... Sen.R. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d. Sess. 80, reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2112, 2167. In addition, the Senate report explains that Congress intended section 925(d)(3) to curb the flow of surplus military weapons and other firearms being brought into the United States which are not particularly suitable for target shooting or hunting to prevent such weapons being used for criminal means. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 80, reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2112, 2167. Furthermore, the sponsor of the legislation, Senator Dodd, stated: 23 Title IV prohibits importation of arms which the Secretary determines are not suitable for research, sport, or as museum pieces.... The entire intent of the importation section is to get those kinds of weapons that are used by criminals and that have no sporting purpose. 24 114 Cong.Rec. S 5556 column 3, S 5582 column 1, S 5585, column 2 (May 14, 1968). These remarks illustrate Congress's intent absolutely to bar the importation of firearms outside of the narrow statutory exceptions. Given this purpose, we believe that Congress intended the Secretary to retain the necessary authority to comply with this mandate, including the power to temporarily suspend imports under potentially erroneous permits. 25 As further support for our conclusion, we note that the Supreme Court and other courts have recognized an implied authority in other agencies to reconsider and rectify errors even though the applicable statute and regulations do not expressly provide for such reconsideration. For example, in concluding that the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) could order a refund to correct a prior error, the Supreme Court stated that [a]n agency, like a court, can undo what is wrongfully done by virtue of its order. United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, 382 U.S. 223, 229, 86 S.Ct. 360, 364, 15 L.Ed.2d 284, 289 (1965); see also American Trucking Assoc. v. Frisco Trans. Co., 358 U.S. 133, 145, 79 S.Ct. 170, 177, 3 L.Ed.2d 172, 180-81 (1958) (the presence of authority in administrative offices and tribunals to correct [inadvertent ministerial] errors has long been recognized--probably so well that little discussion has ensued in the reported cases.). Other courts have similarly recognized this implied authority. See Iowa Power and Light Co. v. United States, 712 F.2d 1292, 1294-97 (8th Cir.1983) (ICC could retroactively impose higher tariff to correct legal error), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 949, 104 S.Ct. 2150, 80 L.Ed.2d 536 (1984); Bookman v. United States, 453 F.2d 1263, 1265, 197 Ct.Cl. 108 (1972) (allowing agency to reconsider decisions in absence of statutory or regulatory authorization after noting general rule that [e]very tribunal, judicial or administrative, has some power to correct its own errors or otherwise appropriate to modify its judgment, decree, or order.) (quoting 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Sec. 18.09 (1958)). Finally, some courts have specifically relied on this implied authority to allow an agency to revoke a license. Kudla v. Modde, 537 F.Supp. 87, 89 (E.D.Mich.1982), ( [t]he power of the state to require a license implies the power to revoke a license which has been improperly issued.), aff'd without opinion, 711 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir.1983); Century Arms, Inc. v. Kennedy, 323 F.Supp. 1002, 1016-17 (D.Vt.1971), (We are aware of no licenses which once granted, can never be taken away.) aff'd, 449 F.2d 1306 (2d Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065, 92 S.Ct. 1494, 31 L.Ed.2d 794 (1972). 26 The district court and GSI, however, refuse to imply such authority because they interpret section 925(d)(3) as expressly prohibiting the suspension. We do not interpret section 925(a)(3) so broadly. 27 Section 925(d)(3) requires the Secretary to authorize the importation of a firearm which is generally recognized as particularly suitable for sporting purposes. We agree with the district court that this section unambiguously requires the Secretary to authorize the importation of sporting firearms. But we decline to adopt the district court's broader interpretation of this section as precluding a temporary suspension until the Bureau proves that the rifles are not sporting firearms. First, we believe that such an interpretation places the cart before the horse; the Bureau must decide whether a firearm is generally suitable for a sporting purpose before the Act requires the Secretary to authorize such a rifle's importation. 28 Second, the Bureau and the Secretary of Treasury do not interpret this section as prohibiting a temporary ban. Because we do not believe the language of section 925(a)(3) compels a different interpretation, we should defer to their interpretation. See Callaway v. Block, 763 F.2d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir.1985) (construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong). 29 Third, the legislative history supports our interpretation. The Senate Report notes that the Act gives the Secretary of the Treasury unusually broad discretion in applying section 925(d)(3): 30 The difficulty of defining weapons characteristics to meet this target [of eliminating the importation of weapons used in crime], without discriminating against sporting quality firearms, was a major reason why the Secretary of the Treasury has been given fairly broad discretion in defining and administering the import prohibition.... 31 S.Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1968). In fact, such broad discretion was a major concern of the opponents of the bill: 32 The proposed restrictions of Title IV would give the Secretary of the Treasury unusually broad discretion to decide whether a particular type of firearm is generally recognized as particularly suitable for, or readily adaptable to, sporting purposes.... 33 S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 255 (April 29, 1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 2306 (individual views of Messrs. Dirksen, Hruska, Thurmond and Burdick on Title IV). Because the Bureau has significant discretion in administering the Gun Control Act, we do not believe that Congress intended section 925(d)(3) to prevent the Bureau from temporarily suspending imports which may be unlawful under the Act. 34 The district court and GSI cite the 1986 amendment to the Gun Control Act as support for their interpretation of section 925(d)(3). We, however, agree with the Bureau that the 1986 amendment does not compel us to adopt the district court's interpretation. The 1986 amendment substituted the word shall for may in section 925(d), and therefore, mandated the Secretary to authorize the importation of firearms falling within one of the four excepted categories. Firearm Owners Protection Act, P.L. 99-308, 100 Stat. 459 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 925(d) (West 1988); H.Rep. No. 495, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 14 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1327, 1340 (the 1986 amendment [o]pens up the importation of firearms by mandating the Secretary to authorize importation of a firearm if there is a sporting purpose and eliminat[es] the requirement that the importer has the burden of satisfying the Secretary of the sporting purpose....). As discussed above, while we acknowledge this mandatory language, we do not believe that such language prohibits the Bureau from temporarily suspending the importation of certain firearms while reassessing whether such firearms have a sporting purpose. As the senate report notes, it is anticipated that in the vast majority of cases, [the substitution of 'shall' for 'may' in the authorization section] will not result in any change in current practices. S.Rep. No. 98-583, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1984). Thus, we conclude that section 925(d)(3) does not expressly preclude the temporary suspension. 35 Turning to the implementing regulations, GSI contends that the regulations also prohibit the Government's actions. We disagree. 36 The Secretary promulgated regulations which prescribe procedures for importing firearms. Under the regulations, gun companies must apply for a permit to import firearms. 27 C.F.R. Sec. 178.112 (1988). If the Bureau approves the permit, the licensed importer may import the quantity of firearms specified in the application for the period of time stated in the application. 27 C.F.R. Sec. 178.112 (1988). 37 According to GSI, the following regulation unambiguously prohibits the temporary import suspension: 38 If the Director [of the Bureau] approves the application, such approved application shall serve as the permit to import the firearm, firearm barrel, or ammunition described therein, and importation of such firearms, firearm barrels, or ammunition may continue to be made by the licensed importer under the approved application (permit) during the period specified thereon. [Emphasis added.] 39 27 C.F.R. Sec. 178.112. This regulation does not unambiguously proscribe the Bureau from temporarily suspending firearms imports. Rather than expressly precluding such action, the regulation merely explains the consequences of the Bureau's proper approval of a firearm import application. 40 Even if the regulation does not unambiguously preclude the suspension, GSI argues that the regulation's failure to explicitly authorize the Bureau to suspend a valid permit demonstrates that the Bureau does not have the authority to temporarily suspend GSI's permits. According to GSI, where the Bureau has retained authority to suspend or revoke such permits, it has implemented explicit regulations which recognize such authority. See 27 C.F.R. Sec. 47.44 (1988) (explicitly granting the Bureau the right to deny, revoke, suspend or revise permits found to be inconsistent with or violating the Arms Export Control Act of 1976); 27 C.F.R. Secs. 178.71-178.78 (1988) (regulations establishing a procedure for suspending or revoking a license in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Sec. 923). The Secretary's creation of express procedures for revoking or suspending permits under a different statute does not compellingly indicate that the Bureau did not intend to establish such a right to temporarily suspend permits under the Act. Similarly, the Secretary's imposition of procedures for revoking a license does not convince us that its failure to expressly authorize the Bureau to suspend a permit indicates its intent to preclude such action. 41 More importantly, the Secretary urges this court not to interpret this regulation as precluding the temporary suspension. We must defer to the Bureau's interpretation of the Gun Control Act and its regulations absent plain error in the Bureau's interpretation. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616, 625 (1965) (court should follow agency's interpretation unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong); Veterans Administration Medical Center v. FLRA, 675 F.2d 260 (11th Cir.1982); Bowles v. Seminole Rock and Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700, 1702 (1945) (administrative interpretation is the ultimate criterion for interpreting an administrative regulation and such interpretation becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation). Because we do not find the Secretary's interpretation plainly erroneous, but rather we find it more valid than GSI's interpretation, we reject GSI's contention that the Bureau's regulations preclude the temporary suspension. 42