Opinion ID: 3027974
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: prohibition on sexually explicit materials

Text: Voelker is also prohibited from possessing any textual descriptions or visual descriptions of “sexually explicit conduct,” as defined by 18 U.S.C.§ 2256(2)(A). This means “actual or simulated (i) sexual intercourse, including genitalgenital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; (ii) bestiality; (iii) masturbation; (iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.” Id. Voelker argues that this condition violates the First Amendment and, like the ban on computer and internet access, it also involves a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to deter future criminal conduct and protect the public. Although the court did not provide us with an explanation for this condition either, the conduct the defendant admitted to offers some support for this restriction. When the District Court 27 does not articulate its reasons for imposing a given sentence, “‘we may . . . examine the record and perform the required balancing ourselves.’” United States v. Johnson, 388 F.3d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Becker v. ARCO Chemical Co., 207 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2000)).11 It is apparent from the charges Voelker pled guilty to, as well as the conduct he admitted, that the court thought this condition was consistent with the nature of Voelker’s offense. Although “the District Court could, perfectly consonant with the Constitution, restrict [an offender’s] access to sexually oriented materials,” such a restriction must have a nexus to the goals of supervised release. United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 267 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Loy II”). We are unable to find any such nexus here, and the District Court’s failure to explain its reasons makes our review all the more difficult.12 We assume the court believed 11 Although in Johnson we were addressing Federal Rule of Evidence 609(b), this statement is equally applicable here. 12 The government asserts, without explanation, that this condition “does reasonably relate to the nature and circumstances of the Appellant’s offense.” Appellee’s Br. 19. 28 a lifetime ban on possessing “sexually explicit materials” would further his rehabilitation and reduce the chances of recidivism. At first blush, this restriction appears to be sufficiently related to Voelker’s offense to survive his challenge. Although a ban on accessing sexually explicit material involving children would certainly be reasonable, there are First Amendment implications for a ban that extends to explicit material involving adults. We assume that the condition was specifically intended to include explicit material involving adults because such material cannot legally involve children, and the statutorily mandated conditions of supervised release require Voelker to comply with those laws. Those conditions prohibit future possession of child pornography. However, nothing on this The government points us, presumably for clarification, to United States v. Bee, where a similar condition was upheld. 162 F.3d 1232, 1235 (9th Cir. 1998). It is not entirely clear why the court in Bee felt that restricting sexually explicit materials “was necessary to address Bee’s problems with deviant sexual behavior triggered by his abuse of alcohol.” Id. In any event, that case involved physical abuse of a six year-old girl. Id. at 1234. The supervised release condition was limited to three years and narrower in scope than the restriction the court imposed here. Id. 29 record suggests that sexually explicit material involving only adults contributed in any way to Voelker’s offense, nor is there any reason to believe that viewing such material would cause Voelker to reoffend.13 Even assuming this restriction has some unexplained rehabilitative, deterrent or penological purpose, given our discussion in United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Loy I”),14 it should have been apparent that any such purpose 13 Compare United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2003), where Simmons was convicted of transporting a minor in foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in illegal sexual conduct and of producing sexually explicit videotapes. Id. at 74. Simmons’ sentence involved a three year term of supervised release, which included a condition prohibiting him from possessing or viewing “pornographic material.” Id. at 74-75. In upholding the condition, the court explained that since Simmons “often videotaped his sexual attacks upon his victims, it was reasonable for [the District Court] to conclude that there was a connection between Simmons’ viewing and possessing sexually explicit material and his criminal behavior.” Id. at 82. 14 We vacated a sentence in Loy I because of the conditions of supervised release and remanded for resentencing. In Loy II, we vacated the sentence that was imposed on remand and remanded the case once again. Since both Loy I, and Loy II are relevant to the issues here, we will collectively refer to them as “Loy,” where appropriate. 30 had to be balanced against the serious First Amendment concerns endemic in such a restriction.15 See Loy II. The conditions imposed here are particularly troublesome when viewed against the backdrop of our discussion in Loy. As we discuss below, these conditions of supervised release are almost identical to the conditions we vacated there. Moreover, these conditions were imposed by the same sentencing judge. Loy entered a guilty plea to knowingly receiving child pornography through the mails in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and also entered a conditional guilty plea to violating § 2252(a)(4)(B).16 Loy II, 237 F.3d. at 255. The sentence that was imposed included a three year term of supervised release with conditions that included testing and treatment for drugs and 15 Nonobscene, sexually explicit materials involving persons over the age of seventeen are protected by the Constitution, without regard to their social worth. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994), Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1969). 16 Loy reserved his right to challenge the legitimacy of an anticipatory search warrant that was used during the course of the investigation. See Loy I, 191 F.3d at 364. 31 alcohol, a prohibition on unsupervised contact with minors, and a prohibition against possessing any kind of pornography. Id. On appeal, Loy challenged each of those conditions. Id. at 253. He argued that there was nothing in the record to suggest that drug and alcohol treatment or counseling was appropriate. Loy I, 191 F.3d at 370. He also argued that prohibiting unsupervised contact with minors and the possession of any kind of pornography was “not reasonably related to any of the statutory goals and involve[d] a greater deprivation of liberty than required.” Id. at 371. We remanded the case to the District Court for resentencing because the court imposed the special conditions “without making any factual findings relating to them or providing any reasons in support of them.” Id. “Since we [could] not know why the district court imposed these conditions, we [could not] properly review Loy’s abuse of discretion claim.” Id. In remanding, we “remind[ed] the court that the conditions of supervised release must be reasonably 32 related to the goals of deterrence, protection of the public and rehabilitation of the defendant.” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(1), 3553(a)(2)). We added, “[m]oreover, we caution that any condition implicating the deprivation of liberty can be no greater than necessary to meet these goals.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2)). On remand, the District Court eliminated the requirement of drug and alcohol testing and treatment but reimposed the conditions “barring Loy from possessing pornography of any type, as well as from having any unsupervised contact with minors.” Loy II, 237 F.3d at 255. The court amended the latter condition to add the requirement that “any supervision must come from someone other than [Loy’s] wife” because information learned during the investigation suggested that she was also involved with child pornography. Id. In reimposing the conditions, the court explained that “‘it is sometimes impossible to differentiate between children and adults in pornographic materials,’ [and the prohibition of all 33 pornography] was necessary to protect children who are victimized in child pornography as well as to deter Loy from further criminal conduct or from attempting to obtain illegal child pornography.” Id. (quoting the District Court’s opinion). Loy again appealed. Id. at 253. He argued that the ban on “all forms” of pornography was overbroad and that the prohibition against unsupervised contact with minors was not reasonably related to statutory goals of sentencing and interfered with his right to procreate and raise a family. Id. In adjudicating the appeal, we described the ban on all forms of pornography as “an unusually broad condition.” Id. at 266. We concluded that a ban is not “‘narrowly tailored’ if it restricts First Amendment freedoms without any resulting benefit to public safety.” Id. We explained that the ban the court imposed was so broad that it extended “not only to Playboy magazine, but also to medical textbooks[,] . . . serious art [and] ubiquitous advertising.” Id. at 266-67. Since it included both legal and illegal pornography, it was overly broad and 34 could not stand. Id. at 267. We also concluded that it violated Loy’s due process rights by “failing to provide [him] with adequate notice of what he may and may not do, chilling First Amendment rights in the process.” Id. at 267. As we noted above, that sentence was imposed by the same judge who imposed the sentence here. However, unlike the undefined ban the judge imposed in Loy, the court here incorporated 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) into the prohibition into the definition of “pornographic material” in an apparent attempt to avoid the fatal flaw that afflicted the sentence in Loy. The definition of “sexually explicit conduct” contained in § 2256(2) is set forth below.17 However, even given this refinement, the 17 18 U.S.C.§ 2256(2) defines “sexually explicit conduct,” as follows: (2)(A) actual or simulated-- (I) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; (ii) bestiality; (iii) masturbation; (iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person[.] 35 prohibition on possessing sexually explicit material still sweeps within its reach some legal adult pornography as well as illegal child pornography. Thus, in attempting to avoid the problems the court encountered in Loy, it ignored our caution that “the deprivation of liberty can be no greater than necessary to meet [the] goals [of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(2)].” Loy I, 191 F.3d at 371. Furthermore, the court once again failed to provide an analysis or explanation to support this broad restriction. We realize that the court attempted to justify the prohibition of adult pornography on remand in Loy by relying upon the asserted difficulty of knowing whether persons depicted in pornography are minors. 237 F.3d at 255. However, that justification does not appear anywhere on this record. We will not scour the jurisprudence of a sentencing judge in an attempt to divine the justification for a sentence based upon similar sentences that the judge may have explained in a similar 36 case years before, especially since § 3583 requires sentencing courts to explain the sentences they impose. Moreover, even if we were to reach beyond this record and assume the court was relying upon the same justification it furnished in Loy, the instant condition would still be problematic because it includes legal pornography depicting individuals who are clearly not minors. Accordingly, we will also vacate this condition of special release.