Opinion ID: 3003137
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Alleged Retaliatory Actions

Text: In addition to being denied promotions, Stephens alleges that his supervisors retaliated against him when they assigned him menial job duties, occasionally required him to perform his job in dangerous neighborhoods, physically isolated him from other accident adjusters, and intimidated him by staring and yelling at him. The district court addressed these claims in a footnote and determined that they were not materially adverse actions. We agree that the adverse actions of which Stephens complains are not actionable. Federal law protects an employee only from retaliation that produces an injury, and, therefore, an employer’s retaliatory conduct is actionable only if it would be materially adverse to a reasonable employee. Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68-69. Title VII “does not set forth ‘a general civility code for the American workplace,’ ” id. at 68 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)), and it does not protect an employee from trivial harms, petty slights, nor minor annoyances, 22 No. 08-1416 id.; see also Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[N]ot everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.”). In the retaliation context, conduct is “materially adverse” if it would have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68 (quotations omitted); Nagle, 554 F.3d at 1119; see also Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005). We apply an objective test, but whether a particular action is materially adverse will depend on the context and circumstances of the particular case. Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68-69. We can dismiss two bases for Stephens’s retaliation claim relatively easily. First, the intimidation that Stephens allegedly suffered, which he summarily describes as being stared and yelled at, is not adequately supported by the record and is not an actionable harm. Second, although segregating an employee can be actionable retaliation, Stephens’s alleged “physical isolation” does not rise to such a level. Stephens testified that the three accident adjusters in the department were each assigned to a different office, meaning that each one was equally isolated from the others. None were entirely isolated from other City employees. This is not the type of harm that Title VII contemplates, nor would it dissuade a reasonable employee from complaining of discrimination. Cf. Herrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that a “classic case” of a retaliatory change in working conditions is “the employee whose desk is moved into a closet”). No. 08-1416 23 Last, although a closer question, the alleged alterations of Stephens’s job responsibilities are not actionable retaliation under Title VII and § 1981. Certainly, a significant or substantial change to an employee’s responsibilities may be materially adverse, but every reassignment is not automatically actionable. See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 71. Whether a change in job responsibilities is materially adverse “all depends on how much of a change, and how disadvantageous a change, took place.” Sitar v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 344 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir. 2003). Our decisions involving a transfer or reassignment of job responsibilities indicate that such an action is not materially adverse unless it represents a significant alteration to the employee’s duties, which is often reflected by a corresponding change in work hours, compensation, or career prospects. See, e.g., Nagle, 554 F.3d at 1119-20; Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 986 (7th Cir. 2008); Grube v. Lau Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 723, 728 (7th Cir. 2001); cf. Nichols, 510 F.3d at 780-81 (finding reassignment similar to Stephens’s not materially adverse for race discrimination claim); Washington, 420 F.3d at 662 (noting that “[b]y and large a reassignment that does not affect pay or promotion opportunities lacks th[e] potential to dissuade and thus is not actionable”). Stephens relies on Burlington Northern, in which the Supreme Court clarified that a retaliatory action is materially adverse when it would dissuade a reasonable employee from filing a charge. 548 U.S. at 68 (citing 24 No. 08-1416 Washington, 420 F.3d at 662).9 In that case, the employer reassigned the plaintiff, a female, from operating a forklift to performing standard railroad track laborer tasks. Id. at 70. The Court noted that “the forklift operator position required more qualifications, which is an indication of prestige; . . . was objectively considered a better job and the male employees resented [plaintiff] for occupying it.” Id. at 71 (quotations omitted). The track laborer tasks, however, “were by all accounts more arduous and dirtier.” Id. (quotations omitted). Because of the significant differences between the two jobs, the Court 9 Stephens asserts that Burlington Northern broadened the scope of “materially adverse” retaliatory conduct. He is correct in one sense: the Court held that “[t]he scope of the antiretaliation provision extends beyond workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm.” 548 U.S. at 67. But we took this approach prior to Burlington Northern. See Washington, 420 F.3d at 661 (“Although the anti-retaliation rule in § 2000e-3(a) is broader than the anti-discrimination rule in § 2000e-2(a) in the sense that it extends beyond pay and other tangible employment actions, nothing in § 2000e-3(a) says or even hints that the significance or materiality requirement has been dispensed with.”). Further, the retaliatory acts that Stephens allegedly suffered are employment-related, making this component of the Court’s decision inapplicable. To the extent that the Court clarified the test for measuring the requisite materiality of an adverse retaliatory act, it adopted the test that we previously applied in Washington. See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 67-68. Therefore, we consider our decisions under Washington and its predecessors to be consistent with Burlington Northern. No. 08-1416 25 held that a jury could conclude the reassignment was materially adverse. Id. We find the change in job responsibilities in Burlington Northern to be distinguishable from Stephens’s reassignment to photographing vehicles, sending vehicles to repair shops for estimates and repair, and occasionally being sent to purportedly dangerous neighborhoods. Simply put, even accepting Stephens’s assertions as true, the City altered his job duties only minimally. His new tasks are not dirtier, more arduous, less prestigious, or objectively inferior, nor do they possess any analogous attribute. Stephens alleges that his tasks were “less desirable,” but he does not allege that he was the only accident adjuster required to perform these duties, that other employees resented him for his prior responsibilities, or that the change in duties affected his compensation, work hours, or chances for a promotion. Although these impacts on an employee’s job may not be essential to an actionable retaliation claim, they reflect the sort of harm that would typically dissuade a reasonable employee from making a discrimination charge. Stephens’s new duties are well within his job description, differ minimally from his old duties, and do not prevent him from using his “skill and expertise” to such an extent that the reassignment is materially adverse. Cf. Tart v. Ill. Power Co., 366 F.3d 461, 473 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that reassignment was actionable for a discrimination claim where new duties “were objectively inferior; they involved far less skill and significantly harsher working conditions than the plaintiffs’ prior positions” (emphases added)). 26 No. 08-1416 Our post-Burlington Northern cases support our holding. See, e.g., Nagle, 554 F.3d at 1119; Lapka, 517 F.3d at 986. For example, in Nagle, the defendant reassigned a police officer from patrol duty to “strip mall detail” and a newly created “senior liaison” position, both assignments the officer claimed were undesirable and objectively inferior. 554 F.3d at 1119. We held that the reassignments were not actionable, noting that they did not change the officer’s pay, hours, or prospects of advancement, and “the senior liaison position had to be filled by someone and an employer is entitled to fill the position.” Id. at 1120. Similarly, in Lapka, an adjudication officer complained that her employer assigned her to handle cases that she alleged were more difficult and time-consuming, while stripping her of more interesting duties. 517 F.3d at 986. We noted that handling such cases was already part of her job, and the reallocation of her work did not significantly alter her responsibilities. Id. Specifically, the plaintiff “was not required to work extra hours, did not suffer any loss of pay and was not disciplined for failing to complete her work.” Id. We even rejected her argument that the increased case load caused her to fall behind in her work and receive a lower performance rating, noting that performance ratings are not actionable unless they are accompanied by tangible job consequences. Id. (citing Whittaker v. N. Ill. Univ., 424 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2005)). We do not mean to suggest that altering one’s job duties within the scope of one’s job description can never be materially adverse; the Supreme Court has decided that issue. See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 71. But here, No. 08-1416 27 the alterations to Stephens’s job were insufficient to dissuade a reasonable employee from filing a discrimination charge. Therefore, we agree that sum- mary judgment is appropriate.