Opinion ID: 2314184
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Plaintiffs' Fee Application

Text: In this case, the plaintiffs' fee application is not supported by contemporaneous time records. Paragraph 10 of Ms. Schiff's Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Petition for Costs, Expenses, and Attorneys' Fees represents that the summary submitted present[s] an accurate statement of services performed in connection with this litigation and was prepared from contemporaneous time records and, with respect to sums for costs and expenses, from accounting records. (Schiff Aff. 2/17/89 ¶ 10). However, that representation is flatly contradicted by the evidence. On cross-examination, Ms. Schiff acknowledged that the time records submitted by the plaintiffs included estimates of the hours she spent on this case and how much time was attributable to other services she performed for the Lodge in her capacity as its general counsel. She further acknowledged that those estimates were made long after the work had been performed. (Tr. 8/18/89 at 62-65). She also conceded that records regarding many of the hours claimed were reconstructed from slips of paper on which she made entries as long as three years after the services were performed. (Tr. 8/18/89 at 90-93). Moreover, she acknowledged that there were lags of six months in recording time that was entered directly into her permanent time records. (Tr. 8/18/89 at 97-98). This abject failure to satisfy the contemporaneousness requirement cannot be dismissed as a mere technicality because it appears to have contributed to patent inaccuracies in the documentation purportedly supporting the plaintiffs fee petition. For example, according to the records submitted, Ms. Schiff worked on this case for 25.7 hours on October 9, 1988, and 26.6 hours on October 10, 1988. While it may be possible to work around the clock for two consecutive days without respite, it clearly is impossible to do so for more than 24 hours in any one day. The summary also indicates that on April 14, 1988, Ms. Schiff spent 8.9 hours travelling to New York for a meeting. That was only two days after she wrote to the Court advising that she was unable to meet a filing deadline because of a totally incapacitating illness that would prevent her from engaging in normal activities for 7-10 days. Her incapacity was confirmed by another letter she sent to the Court on April 20 indicating that she had been hospitalized until April 19. Discrepancies of that nature cast serious doubt on the reliability of the plaintiffs' records and aptly illustrate why contemporaneous records are required. In this case, the plaintiffs have failed to satisfy that requirement.
Besides not being contemporaneous or accurate, the records submitted fail to exclude hours spent on claims asserted by plaintiffs who did not prevail or on claims unsuccessfully asserted by Nunes. That failure is especially egregious because the Court specifically instructed the parties to submit records in a form that would permit such allocations. The plaintiffs' cavalier disregard of those instructions is apparent from the following exchange during the cross-examination of Ms. Schiff: Q. Do you recall my asking you ... why didn't you allocate? Isn't it because you thought the Court was wrong in asking you to do that? Or did you forget to allocate, or what? And you answered I don't know if I like the `or what'. . . . . Question: Could it be that you forgot the Court told you to do it? Answer: It could be. It could also be I didn't have time. It could also be a number of reasons. (Tr. 8/18/89 at 49-50). Plaintiffs now seek to justify that failure by asserting that there is no need to allocate because their claims arise out of a common core of facts and are based on related legal theories. Therefore, they contend that they are entitled to compensation for time expended on both successful and unsuccessful claims. This Court finds no merit in that contention. It is true that where successful and unsuccessful claims share a common nucleus of operative facts or are based on alternative legal theories seeking the same relief, the claims may be deemed so interrelated that it is impractical or unjust to exclude time spent on the unsuccessful ones in making an award of attorneys' fees. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435-37, 103 S.Ct. at 1940-41. However, if the claims are separate and distinct, it is equally unjust to require the adverse party to pay for time expended on the meritless claims. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-35, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-40. Whether multiple claims are so intertwined that allocation is not required or sufficiently distinct that allocation is required depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In this case, the claims successfully and unsuccessfully asserted by the plaintiffs are separate and distinct in several respects. First, the successful and unsuccessful claims were asserted by different parties. As already noted, Nunes is the only plaintiff who prevailed on any claims. The claims of all other plaintiffs were either dismissed or resulted in judgments for the defendants. Accordingly, those plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees for time spent on their claims. Perkins, 728 F.2d at 1100. In addition, Nunes' claims are temporally and qualitatively distinct from the claims asserted by the other plaintiffs. Nunes' claims were based on allegations of discrimination against her during and after the 1985-1986 Training Academy and sought damages for physical and emotional injuries to her. Most of the evidence she presented concerned incidents involving her personally and the injuries or damages she allegedly sustained. On the other hand, the claims of the other plaintiffs arose from unspecified events occurring before the 1985-1986 Training Academy (i.e., before Nunes had any connection with the State Police) or alleged efforts to suppress the Lodge's union activities. Finally, there are significant distinctions among the claims asserted by Nunes herself. The claim on which she succeeded (i.e., Count V) was based on allegations of harassment after the Training Academy. The claims on which she was unsuccessful (i.e., Counts III and VIII) involved alleged harassment during the Training Academy. The difference in the proof underlying the two sets of claims is illustrated by the fact that the jury found Reynolds liable under Count III but not liable under V. It is further underscored by the fact that the jury found Stone and Benjamin liable under Count V but not liable under Count III. Therefore, while Nunes' claims may be loosely related, they are separate from each other. In short, it is clear that the various claims asserted by the plaintiffs do not share a common core of law and facts. Consequently, they are separate and distinct, and the failure to exclude time spent on the unsuccessful claims or to submit records permitting such an allocation renders the plaintiffs' fee petition deficient. See Jackson v. Illinois Prisoner Review Bd., 856 F.2d 890, 894 (7th Cir.1988) (unsuccessful ex post facto claim based upon different facts than was unrelated successful due process claim); Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Construction Co., 733 F.2d 55, 58-59 (8th Cir.1984) (successful retaliation claim unrelated to unsuccessful affirmative-action discrimination claim).
Besides ignoring the contemporaneousness and allocation requirements, the plaintiffs have failed to make a good faith effort to exclude hours spent on unrelated matters or hours that were duplicative or otherwise unproductive. For example, the time for which they seek compensation includes hours spent prosecuting a different suit by Linda Bailey in the State court. (Tr. 8/18/89 at 55-56). It also includes hours spent in lobbying the Rhode Island General Assembly for legislation desired by the Lodge. (Tr. 8/18/89 at 59-60). Furthermore, as already noted, it includes an indeterminate number of hours devoted to other Lodge business having nothing to do with this case. (Tr. 8/18/89 at 62). The amount requested by the plaintiffs also encompasses hours spent on the numerous requests for continuances and extensions of time that they made during the course of this litigation and on a mandamus petition that they filed with the Court of Appeals in August of 1988 unsuccessfully challenging this Court's denial of the last in a series of requests to postpone the trial. In addition, the plaintiffs' have made no attempt to eliminate duplicative hours logged in those instances where two or more attorneys attended the same conferences, sat in on the same depositions or other proceedings and reviewed the same documents. The net result is that the fee claimed has been grossly inflated. One measure of the extent of that inflation is the disproportion between the total time the plaintiffs' attorneys say they spent on this case and what one would expect was reasonably required. Thus, compensation is sought for more than 4,000 billable hours which represent more than two full years of a lawyer's billable time. However, despite the sweeping allegations contained in the complaint, the plaintiffs' claims were based on a relatively simple sequence of events occurring over a limited period of time. It is inconceivable that even the most vigorous advocacy of those claims required anywhere near the number of hours for which the plaintiffs seek recovery.
As already noted, an application for attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 may be denied in its entirety if manifestly filed in bad faith. Jordan, 691 F.2d at 518. In this case, the plaintiffs' failure to make any effort to exclude unrelated and/or unnecessary hours constitutes the kind of bad faith that warrants such a denial. Lewis, 944 F.2d at 958. However, that failure tells only a small part of the story. What is far more disturbing is the misrepresentation made regarding the character of the records submitted in support of the fee application. Thus, it is difficult to reconcile the statement in Ms. Schiff's affidavit that the request was prepared from contemporaneous time records with her later admissions that a significant portion of those records was not contemporaneous. (Schiff Aff. 2/17/89 ¶ 10). It is even more difficult to explain that inconsistency in a charitable way because it appears that Ms. Schiff did not acknowledge that the records were not contemporaneous until after defense counsel become suspicious and expressed a desire to have them examined by handwriting experts. (Tr. 8/18/89 at 66-68). The implications become even more ominous when one considers the affidavit of Gilles R. Robert, one of Ms. Schiff's former clients. The affidavit, notarized by Ms. Schiff, was submitted for the purpose of establishing Ms. Schiff's customary hourly billing rate. It states that Mr. Robert's company paid legal fees of more than $50,000.00 to Ms. Schiff at the rate of $150.00 per hour. (Robert Aff. 8/4/89 ¶ 5). However, Mr. Robert testified that the fees totalled less than $10,000.00 and that he was induced by Ms. Schiff to sign the affidavit without reading it. (Tr. 7/15/91 at 14-15). The Court finds Mr. Roberts' testimony credible particularly since Ms. Schiff declined to cross-examine him or testify in rebuttal apparently out of concern for her Fifth Amendment rights. (Tr. 7/15/91 at 6-8). Although fear of self-incrimination may be a valid reason for not testifying, it is difficult to see how an attorney's Fifth Amendment rights are implicated by cross-examining a witness. In any event, in a civil case, the Court may and does draw an adverse inference from Ms. Schiff's decision not to testify. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318-19, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 1558, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976). The plaintiffs' good faith becomes even more suspect when one considers the evidence suggesting that some of the hours for which fees are being claimed may have been devoted to accomplished objectives unrelated to redressing the alleged sex discrimination and, therefore, are not compensable under § 1988. Thus, in a letter to the Lodge's president enumerating the benefits to be gained by initiating litigation, Ms. Schiff described the purposes of bringing suit to include supporting the Lodge's efforts to improve the working conditions and economic status of its members and providing valuable discovery activity, gathering information useful in other areas in order to counter what was perceived as the union-busting tactics of the State and its counsel .... [4]
Under § 1988, a prevailing party is entitled to recover not only reasonable attorneys' fees but also the reasonable costs and expenses necessarily incurred in litigating its claims. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988); see also Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 707 F.2d 636, 637 (1st Cir.1983) (per curiam). However, like requests for attorneys' fees, requests for costs and expenses must be properly documented. More specifically, a prevailing party must establish that they were both necessary and reasonable. Zabkowicz, 789 F.2d at 553. In this case, no such showing has been made. Instead, the plaintiffs' claim for expenses is characterized by the same utter disregard for applicable requirements as their claim for attorneys' fees. Thus, they assert that they have paid $22,510.17 for the services of three private investigators and approximately $40,000.00 in expert witness fees and expenses. However, they are unable to produce any bills or other documentation showing what services were performed, when they were rendered, how much time was involved, what rates were charged or what expenses are included in those sums. Those omissions are especially significant because none of the investigators or witnesses testified at trial, and therefore, the Court has no way to determine whether the services were necessary or whether the fees charged were reasonable. There is a similar lack of explanation or documentation with respect to more than $16,000.00 claimed for paralegal fees. In addition, some of the expenses claimed clearly appear to be extravagant. Thus, a total of nearly $15,000.00 is claimed for lodging expenses. Of that amount, $4,800.00 is identified as apartment rental for the two out-of-state attorneys who participated in the trial. That sum, itself, seems excessive inasmuch as the trial lasted for only 17 days. The remaining $10,200.00 consists of hotel bills for unidentified expert witnesses who never testified and other individuals who were identified but whose roles in the case, if any, are unknown. By the same token, more than $12,000.00 is claimed for unitemized transportation costs (air) for many of the same individuals. No bills, receipts or other documentation were provided to substantiate those amounts. Nor was there any indication as to when most of these individuals came to Rhode Island, the purposes of their visits, where they stayed or how long they stayed. Superimposed on this complete absence of documentation is the same kind of misrepresentation that permeates the plaintiffs' requests for attorneys' fees. Thus, the plaintiffs seek reimbursement for very precise amounts allegedly expended for items such as office supplies ($479.50 and $877.75), postage ($548.40), and photocopying ($10,320.00, $550.00, $3,689.23). Those figures clearly convey, and presumably were intended to convey, the impression that they were derived from detailed records or exact measurement of the quantities of each item involved. However, on cross-examination, Ms. Schiff admitted that they were only estimates and that there is no documentation to support them. (Tr. 8/18/89 at 125). Moreover, evidence was presented that Ms. Schiff and the Lodge are defendants in a state court suit seeking payment for the charter jet fees being claimed as air travel expenses in this case. In that suit the Lodge, itself, has asserted that such expenses are unrelated to this case. (Tr. 7/15/89 at 19-20; Exhibit B). In short, like their claim for attorneys' fees, the plaintiffs' claim for costs and expenses is so undocumented and riddled with misrepresentations that complete denial is warranted. See Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 789 F.2d 540, 549-50 (7th Cir.1986), rev'g in part 601 F.Supp. 139 (E.D.Wis.1985).