Opinion ID: 2069196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: De Facto Revocation Claim

Text: Appellants contend that where the court has granted an insanity acquittee conditional release, the Hospital has no authority to return the acquittee to inpatient status without judicial authorization, and the available statutory remedies, when it exercises such authority, are inadequate under these circumstances to meet the requirements of due process. Appellants' argument that a court order was required before they could be returned to inpatient care is premised on the claim that the temporary suspensions of their outpatient status constituted de facto revocations. We do not regard the suspensions that way. Marlowe's return to the Hospital was pursuant to an order of court, not by summary action of the Hospital. Brown's return to the Hospital for inpatient treatment was typically temporary. Although the Hospital returned Brown to inpatient status in October 1991, two months later, he was released conditionally for holidays. A few months later, he was released for work, and in September 1992, the Hospital approved his outplacement in the community with modifications of the conditions of release, to which Brown did not object. Similarly, shortly after his rehospitalization in November 1993, Brown was released by the Hospital for work, and by April 1994, the Hospital had agreed to Brown's resumption of outpatient status. Moreover, the court's orders releasing Brown expressly conferred upon the Hospital the authority to suspend temporarily his outpatient status when his mental health required it. We find nothing in the statute which precludes the court from authorizing the Hospital responsible for acquittee-patient's treatment to return the patient temporarily for inpatient care under circumstances which warrant it with the view toward assimilating the patient back into the community when consistent with the safety of the community and the patient. See Richardson, supra, 481 A.2d at 480. Such measures are consistent with the statutory goals of assuring the patient's recovery and protecting public safety. See Reese, supra, 614 A.2d at 511 (citation omitted). Therefore, we do not regard the Hospital's decision to return a patient to the Hospital temporarily for treatment pursuant to its authority under court order, when properly exercised, to be equivalent to a revocation of conditional release.