Opinion ID: 4538476
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Acts Evidence of Child Sexual Assault

Text: ¶28 Gutierrez argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting evidence that he sexually assaulted A.R. when she was approximately six years old. We agree with the court of appeals that the circuit court properly admitted this other acts evidence of child sexual assault in light of the greater latitude rule. ¶29 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted if: (1) offered for an acceptable purpose under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2); (2) relevant under Wis. Stat. § 904.01; and (3) its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or delay under Wis. Stat. § 904.03. See State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 772-73, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998). Alongside this general framework, courts accept a greater latitude of proof as to other like occurrences of sexual assault, particularly against children. State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶36, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606; see also § 904.04(2)(b)1. (codifying the common law greater latitude rule). The greater latitude rule liberalizes each of Sullivan's three prongs in favor of admitting similar acts of child sexual assault. See Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶51. The greater latitude rule, however, does not relieve a court of the duty to ensure that the other acts evidence is offered for a proper purpose, is relevant, and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. Id., ¶52. 14 No. 2017AP2364-CR
¶30 Under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible unless offered for an acceptable purpose such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Here, the circuit court instructed the jury to consider the other acts evidence only for the purposes of motive, context, and background. ¶31 The other acts evidence of sexual assault was offered for the admissible purpose of proving that Gutierrez's motive was to intentionally touch A.R. for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. See Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5)(a) (defining the element of sexual contact). When a defendant's motive for an alleged sexual assault is an element of the charged crime, we have held that other crimes evidence may be offered for the purpose of establishing . . . motive. State v. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, ¶72, 361 Wis. 2d 529, 861 N.W.2d 174 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, ¶60, 263 Wis. 2d 1, 666 N.W.2d 771); see also Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶¶57-59. The evidence further provided context for A.R.'s delayed disclosure and a more complete story for the jury. Context and background, while not expressly listed in Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a), can also be acceptable purposes. See State v. Marinez, 2011 WI 12, ¶27, 331 Wis. 2d 568, 797 N.W.2d 399 (We have previously recognized that context, . . . and providing a more complete background are permissible purposes under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2)(a).) (citing Hunt, 263 Wis. 2d 1, ¶58). The circuit court did not erroneously 15 No. 2017AP2364-CR exercise its discretion by concluding motive, context, and background were acceptable purposes for the admission of other acts evidence.
¶32 Other acts evidence is relevant under Wis. Stat. § 904.01 if it: (1) relates to a fact or proposition that is of consequence to the determination of the action; and (2) is probative because it has a tendency to make a consequential fact more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 785–86. We consider relevancy in the context of the greater latitude rule. See Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶51. ¶33 Several of the counts——sexual assault of a child under the age of thirteen, incest with a child by stepparent, and child enticement——required the State to prove sexual contact, defined under Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5)(a) as intentional touching for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. See Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02(1)(e), 948.06(1m), 948.07(1). This motive, as an element of the charges, is a fact of consequence. See Hurley, 361 Wis. 2d 529, ¶83 (citing Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶65). The other acts evidence was also relevant to A.R.'s credibility, a consequential fact in this case. Id., ¶81 (A witness's credibility is always 'consequential' within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 904.01.) (quoting Marinez, 331 Wis. 2d 568, ¶34). ¶34 The probative value of the other acts evidence is measured by the factual similarities it shares with the charged conduct. See Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶67; see also Sullivan, 16 No. 2017AP2364-CR 216 Wis. 2d at 787. Here, the charged conduct and the other acts evidence share many factual similarities: the same victim and assailant; similar alleged acts of sexual contact; and the secluded location of all of the assaults. These strong similarities are highly probative as to Gutierrez's motive in the charged assaults and as to A.R.'s credibility.
¶35 Lastly, Wis. Stat. § 904.03 requires the circuit court to determine whether the probative value of the other acts evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Unfair prejudice occurs when the evidence influence[s] the outcome by improper means or if it appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case. Davidson, 236 Wis. 2d 537, ¶73 (quoting State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 39, 64, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999)). ¶36 The other acts evidence was highly probative as to motive, context, and background because of the marked similarities with the charged conduct. See id., ¶¶75-76; supra, ¶34. The danger of unfair prejudice based on the jury hearing evidence of other, similar conduct did not substantially outweigh its high probative value, especially in light of the greater latitude rule. See, e.g, State v. Veach, 2002 WI 110, ¶91, 255 Wis. 2d 390, 648 N.W.2d 447 (holding that even graphic, disturbing, and extremely 17 No. 2017AP2364-CR prejudicial testimony detailing a similar other act of child sexual assault is admissible under the greater latitude rule). Additionally, the cautionary instruction mitigated the possibility of unfair prejudice. See Hurley, 361 Wis. 2d 529, ¶89 (Limiting instructions substantially mitigate any unfair prejudicial effect.). ¶37 Because the other acts evidence of child sexual assault was probative as to motive, context, and background and was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, we affirm the court of appeals in upholding the circuit court's admission of that evidence.