Opinion ID: 1909122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Construction-Plain Meaning

Text: This Court has previously stated that [l]ocal ordinances and charters are interpreted under the same canons of construction that apply to the interpretation of statutes. O'Connor v. Balt. County, 382 Md. 102, 113, 854 A.2d 1191, 1198 (2004). It is also a well settled principle of law that `[t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature,' in this case the County Council. Rockwood Cas. Ins. Co. v. Uninsured Employers' Fund, 385 Md. 99, 108, 867 A.2d 1026, 1031 (2005) (quoting Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995)). For that purpose, we begin our inquiry with the words of the statute, and, when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their commonly understood meaning, we ordinarily end our inquiry there also. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Kolzig, 375 Md. 562, 567, 826 A.2d 467, 469 (2003). Finally, this Court must construe a statute as a whole so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory. Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 453, 879 A.2d 1111, 1115 (2005). Prince George's County Code § 11-162 provides in pertinent part: [A]ny order or notice issued pursuant to this Subtitle shall be served upon the owner, operator, occupant, agent or other person responsible [ [12] ] for the condition or violation ... (emphasis added). Petitioners contend that the plain language of the statute requires the fire department to cite only the other person responsible for the condition or violation, i.e., the tenant. The County, on the other hand, argues that the qualifier responsible for the condition or violation only modifies the term other person and, as a result, the fire department may cite the owner and/or agent even if they did not cause the condition or violation. The Circuit Court and later the Court of Special Appeals agreed with the County's interpretation. The analysis of this statute in respect to plain meaning involves a three step process. First, we analyze the effect of the qualifying clause. We continue with an analysis of the punctuation used within the section. Finally, we address the use of the term other within that section.
We commence our analysis by utilizing the generally recognized rule of statutory construction that a qualifying clause ordinarily is confined to the immediately preceding words or phraseparticularly in the absence of a comma before the qualifying clause.... Sullivan v. Dixon, 280 Md. 444, 451, 373 A.2d 1245, 1249 (1977); Annapolis Market Place, 369 Md. at 707, 802 A.2d at 1040; Md. Dep't. of Env't. v. Underwood, 368 Md. 160, 175, 792 A.2d 1130, 1139 (2002); Schmerling v. Injured Workers' Ins. Fund, 368 Md. 434, 452 n. 9, 795 A.2d 715, 725 n. 9 (2002); but see Employment Sec. Admin. v. Weimer, 285 Md. 96, 102, 400 A.2d 1101, 1104-05 (1979) (noting that this is not an absolute rule, but an aid to determine the intent of the legislative body enacting the rule). In Underwood, the Court analyzed Md.Code (1982, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.), § 9-276(a) of the Environment Article, which provided that all expenditures ... by the Department ... shall be reimbursed to the Department ... by the owner or operator of the site or any other person who caused the ... violation of this subtitle. [13] Underwood, 368 Md. at 174, 792 A.2d at 1138. Interpreting the language of the statute, Judge Harrell, writing for the Court, stated: Respondents' interpretation of this section would have the clause `who caused the ... violation of this subtitle' modify all three categories of potential responsible parties described in the statute, i.e. the `owner,' the `operator,' and `any other person.' That interpretation, however, ignores the clear meaning of the structure and relationship of the words as they appear in the statute.... Id. at 175, 792 A.2d at 1139. More specifically, the Court determined that such interpretation would disregard the rule described in Sullivan and require that, in order to be found liable under the statute, the owner or operator must also have caused the violation. The Court then explained: The language of § 9-276 does not contain commas setting apart the three categories of potential responsible parties and the modifying clause (e.g. `the owner or operator of the site, or any other person, who caused the [violation]...'), nor does it explicitly apply the modifying clause to all three parties. In the absence of such context, it is clear that the modifying clause `who caused the [violation] ...' was intended to apply only to `any other person.' Consequently, the language of § 9-276(a) mandates that liability for reimbursement to the [Department] may be placed on any of 3 categories of persons who violate the subtitle: (1) an owner of a site [where the violation occurred]; (2) an operator of a site [where the violation occurred]; or (3) any other person who caused the [violation]. Id. at 176, 792 A.2d at 1139.
Like the statute in Underwood, § 11-162 does not contain commas setting apart the clause from the different categories of individuals named in the list. When the qualifying clause is set apart by a comma, it is clear that it modifies every element within the list. For example, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. The comma following the word property clearly indicates that the qualifying clause without due process of law applies to all three terms: life, liberty, and property. The Court of Special Appeals recognized that the qualifying clause was not set apart by a comma and was therefore limited to modify only the term other person. Petitioners, in response, argue that the intermediate Court ignored the comma before `or,' which comma applies the entire subsequent phrase to `owner' or `agent.' There is no such comma in the statute. Interestingly, however, althoughas we indicatethere is no comma after agent in the text of the actual statute, it somehow made it's way into the petitioners' briefs. [14]
Petitioners argue that this reading of the County Code renders the word other superfluous. In support of their contention they point to Underwood as well. In addition to determining who was liable for the violation, the Underwood Court also determined thatunder the statutethe action to seek reimbursement was a legal action. Md.Code (1982, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.), § 9-276(b) of the Environment Article provided that [i]n addition to any other legal action authorized by this subtitle, the Attorney General may bring an action to recover costs and interest from any person who fails to make reimbursement as required under subsection (a) of this section. Underwood, 368 Md. at 174, 792 A.2d at 1138 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that the use of the word other, which is modified by the qualifying clause legal action, indicated that the action to recover costs under that section was a legal action. Underwood, 368 Md. at 184, 792 A.2d at 1144. As a result, petitioners contend that under this interpretation of § 11-162 of the County Code, use of the term other indicates that the other persons named in the list must also be responsible for the condition or violation in order to be cited. The use of the words other and legal action in that particular part of Underwood, however, related to a different context than that of the present case and offers little support for petitioners' position in the current context. Petitioners' argument, moreover, fails to reconcile the Court's interpretation, in the same opinion, of two adjacent sections of the same statute containing the term other. As described supra, the Court limited the effect of the qualifying clause in § 9-276(a) of the Environment Article to any other person, interpreting other to exclude the owner or operator of the site. Underwood, 368 Md. at 176, 792 A.2d at 1139. [15] Then, the Court interpreted the term other in § 9-276(b) of the Environment Article to mean that such action was also a legal action. Id. at 184, 792 A.2d at 1144. These apparent incongruent interpretations can be easily and reasonably explained. Section 9-276(a) of the Environment Article, like § 11-162 of the County Code (the section at issue here in the case at bar), involves a list of persons responsible for a violation of the code. Section 9-276(b) of the Environment Article, on the other hand, does not refer to a list of persons who have violated a statute, but to a type of action similar to that of different sections described in the Code. Furthermore, § 9-276(a) of the Environment Article and § 11-162 of the County Code could have easily been written to include all the persons of the list by the addition of a comma or an express provision in the statute to that effect. As petitioners suggest, an interpretation of the statute must not render any word within it superfluous or nugatory. See Moore, 388 Md. at 453, 879 A.2d at 1115. The use of the word other supports the conclusion that the County Council intended to limit the qualifying clause to those persons, other than the ones in the specific list, responsible for the condition or violation. If the Council had intended that only the persons responsible for the violation were to be cited, then the use of the terms owner, operator, occupant, agent would be rendered superfluous. Had that been the intention of the drafters, they could simply have stated: Notice shall be served upon the person responsible for the condition or violation. Such language, had it been used, might have restricted application of that section to only those persons who caused the condition or violation. But, the statute was not so drafted. Applying the Sullivan standard to the facts of the case sub judice, we findas did the Court of Special Appealsthat the qualifying clause responsible for the condition or violation only modifies the term other person. As a result, there are five separate persons or entities who can be cited under the County Code: (1) the owner, (2) the operator, (3) the occupant, (4) the agent, or (5) other person responsible for the condition or violation. As a result, the owner, operator, occupant, or agent may be cited even though they may not have caused the condition or violation. We, therefore, affirm the Court of Special Appeals finding that the plain language of § 11-162 allows the fire department to cite the owner and/or managing agent of the property.