Opinion ID: 2156289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiffs' Acceptance of the Arbitration Agreement

Text: [¶ 9] Stenzel and Gerber argue that the trial court erred in dismissing the case in favor of arbitration because Dell failed to prove that they accepted the arbitration agreement. Specifically, they reason that because Dell did not advise them of the right to reject the terms of the agreement  including the arbitration clause  or of the method by which to communicate their rejection, their acceptance of the agreement cannot be inferred from their failure to do so. [¶ 10] [I]n order to be legally binding, a contract must be sufficiently definite in its terms so that a court can understand what the promisor undertook [and its] material terms ... must be agreed upon before a court can enforce [it]. Lynx Exploration & Prod. Co. v. 4-Sight Operating Co., 891 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tex.App.1995) (citations omitted). A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.204(a) (Vernon 2004). We have noted that a seller is the master of his offer, and is entitled to establish such standards of acceptance, notice, and the like as he sees fit. Motel Servs., Inc. v. Cent. Me. Power Co., 394 A.2d 786, 789 (Me.1978). [¶ 11] The agreement contains the following provision regarding the means by which a purchaser accepts its terms and conditions: By accepting delivery of the computer systems, related products, and/or services and support, and/or other products described on that invoice[, the customer] agrees to be bound by and accepts these terms and conditions. If for any reason Customer is not satisfied with a Dell-branded hardware system, Customer may return the system under the terms and conditions of Dell's Total Satisfaction Return Policy.... Stenzel and Gerber contend that the agreement, including its arbitration clause, is unenforceable because, although the agreement provides expressly the method to reject a hardware system, it fails to provide expressly the method to reject the terms of the agreement. [¶ 12] The trial court found that Stenzel and Gerber had at least three opportunities to review the terms of the agreement, including the arbitration clause, before deciding to accept or reject it. Their failure to refuse delivery of the computers or to exercise their right to return the computers once they were delivered was conduct by which both parties recognized the existence of a contract. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.204(a). By accepting delivery of the computers, and then failing to exercise their right to return the computers as provided by the agreement, Stenzel and Gerber expressly manifested their assent to be bound by the agreement, including its arbitration clause. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-49 (7th Cir.1997); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir.1996). [¶ 13] Stenzel and Gerber also assert that the trial court failed to expressly find that they accepted the arbitration clause. Although the court did not make a specific finding, it is apparent from the court's detailed and thoughtful analysis of the unconscionability claim, that it viewed Stenzel and Gerber as having manifested their assent to the arbitration provision. The record supports such a conclusion. [¶ 14] Accordingly, the court did not err in concluding that Stenzel and Gerber manifested their acceptance of the arbitration clause in the agreement.