Opinion ID: 284440
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence obtained in the search of Thomas' apartment

Text: 18 Farris Thomas' principal points concern the extent of a search of his apartment incident to his concededly lawful arrest on March 1, 1967, and the admissibility of a letter from Egan found during the search. 19 While the record does not disclose the size of Thomas' apartment, nothing indicates that the search went beyond the bedroom where he was found in pajamas along with his girl friend Joyce Hoffman, 7 and the adjoining bathroom and closet. A loaded .38 caliber revolver was discovered in a night table by the bed and a quantity of marihuana was found in the bathroom adjoining the bedroom and underneath the mattress of the bed. Also found in the night table, a dresser drawer and a pocket of Thomas' coat, which was lying on a chair in the bedroom, were two address books containing Jessup's telephone numbers and the business card of an Austin Burke of Miami, Florida. Finally a letter from Egan to Farris or Joyce was discovered in a woman's pocketbook in the bedroom closet. The address books, card and letter were received in evidence at the trial. 20 We are unable to perceive how the extent of the search exceeded what was sanctioned in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947), and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950). The search in Harris, also conducted without a search warrant, for the purpose of finding two stolen checks, burglar tools and pens, lasted for five hours, included each room of a four room apartment, and ultimately led to a bedroom bureau drawer where the agents found and opened a sealed envelope marked personal papers; the envelope contained forged draft cards which were seized as contraband and admitted into evidence on the same ground. Here the search was for the instrumentalities used in a ramified narcotics conspiracy and for evidence thereof. The agents were entitled to search for narcotics, easily concealed in pockets, pocketbooks, and furniture drawers, for weapons, and also under Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed.2d 782 (1967), for evidence showing the identity of other conspirators and Thomas' connection with them. 21 In overruling the holding of Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309, 41 S. Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647 (1921), that a search may not include mere evidence, 8 the Supreme Court in Hayden, supra, entered the following caveat, 387 U.S. at 302-303, 87 S.Ct. 1642, at 1648. 22 The items of clothing involved in this case are not testimonial or communicative in nature, and their introduction therefore did not compel respondent to become a witness against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908. This case thus does not require that we consider whether there are items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a reasonable search and seizure. 23 Since all the fruits of the search received in evidence except the letter from Egan would have qualified as instrumentalities under pre- Hayden law, the caveat requires consideration only with respect to that. 24 The letter, dated January 29, 1967, was addressed to Farris or Joyce. It introduced Egan's attorney and stated that the recipients could be assured of its genuineness by its mention of the name of Jodie Brown, an alias Harris had used on his ill-starred trip to buy the last installment of heroin from Reid, and also of a ride in their new Eldorado. Egan said he needed help in getting a bondsman and some bread for legal fees and hospital expenses since he had been busted and hospitalized for three weeks. He continued, The problems that have arisen can be solved but I need to be on the outside. If Thomas couldn't help, perhaps two friends, the big fellow and the golfer can. Egan felt that the recipients owed him a small favor and was sure that performing it would be to their advantage in the long run. 25 We find no distinction of constitutional dimensions between the seizure of Hayden's clothing and of Egan's letter. While the demise of the mere evidence rule may well require the development of some new restriction on allowable search and seizure in its place, we suggest with deference that an approach geared to the objective of the Fourth Amendment to secure privacy would seem more promising than one based on the testimonial character of what is seized. The latter criterion marks the boundaries of the protection accorded by the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, as the Court noted in the passage in the Hayden opinion that we have quoted, as well as by the hearsay rule. The considerations relevant to such issues are different from those applicable to determining the scope of the Constitution's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Despite Mr. Justice Bradley's dicta in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 633, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), now largely repudiated by Hayden, 387 U.S. at 302-307, 87 S.Ct. 1642, the Fourth Amendment does not protect broadly against the seizure of things whose compulsory production would be forbidden by the Fifth. See State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 509, 213 A.2d 185 (1965) (Weintraub, C. J.). The Fifth Amendment would have prohibited a subpoena requiring Thomas to produce the address books and Egan's business card, on the basis that by responding he would be giving testimony that the articles produced are the ones demanded, 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2264 at 379-380 (McNaughton rev. 1961); yet no one could have seriously asserted, even before Hayden, that the Fourth Amendment protected such papers against seizure pursuant to a search warrant or a reasonable search incident to a lawful arrest. 26 Judge Learned Hand wrote in United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2 Cir. 1930): 27    the real evil aimed at by the Fourth Amendment is the search itself, that invasion of a man's privacy which consists in rummaging about among his effects to secure evidence against him. If the search is permitted at all, perhaps it does not make so much difference what is taken away, since the officers will not be interested in what does not incriminate, and there can be no sound policy in protecting what does. Nevertheless limitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to limit the quest itself   . 28 Characterizing the last remark as the rationale most frequently suggested for the rule preventing the seizure of evidence, Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, supra, 387 U.S. at 309-310, 87 S.Ct. 1642, Mr. Justice Brennan concluded that the limitations had not served the purpose for which they were intended. But Judge Hand's preceding statements afford the best clue to the formulation of any new limitation that we have been able to conceive. As he observed, the vice lies in the unlimited search. The reason why we shrink from allowing a personal diary to be the object of a search is that the entire diary must be read to discover whether there are incriminating entries; most of us would feel rather differently with respect to a diary whose cover page bore the title Robberies I Have Performed. Similarly the abhorrence generally felt with respect to rummaging through the contents of a desk to find an incriminating letter would not exist in the same measure if the letter were lying in plain view. The Hayden opinion stated that in the case of `mere evidence,' probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction. 387 U.S. at 307, 87 S.Ct. 1642 at 1650. Elaboration by the Court of that pregnant remark may afford whatever new boundary the death of Gouled may demand. 29 The facts of this case do not require us to essay, even in the tentative way to which we are limited, the task the Supreme Court left for the future in Hayden. Here there was no rummaging through private papers; the letter was discovered in a lawful search of Joyce Hoffman's pocketbook for narcotics. Having found the letter in the course of a lawful search, the agents would have been entitled, even under pre- Hayden law, to read it to see whether it was an instrumentality for effecting the conspiracy — as it would have been if Egan had outlined ways by which Thomas and his girl friend could have continued the enterprise while Egan's troubles persisted. The clear import of Hayden is to abolish any distinction because the letter turned out to be mere evidence of a conspiracy rather than a proposal to continue it. To hold that seizure of Egan's letter was impermissible would elevate the caveat in Hayden above the holding. 9 30 The final question is whether admission of the letter offended the hearsay rule. Thomas' counsel first objected to its receipt solely on the ground that, having been found in Joyce's pocketbook, it had no probative value, no materiality with respect to Mr. Thomas. This was overruled. Later, after the letter had been read to the jury, a colloquy took place at side-bar. Thomas' counsel there objected on the ground that since the letter was written from jail, it was not in furtherance of a conspiracy at large. The judge said he would receive the letter only against Thomas for the purpose of showing his prior relationship with Egan, and proceeded to give a limiting instruction with respect to the person but not the purpose. No further exception was taken. 31 If sufficiently specific objection had been registered, a question of some difficulty would have been presented. The letter seems plainly enough to be an assertion by Egan of past criminal association with Farris Thomas and Joyce Hoffman. For reasons indicated in fn. 6, we are not at all sure that the hearsay nature of such an assertion can be overcome simply by characterizing the evidence as circumstantial. On the other hand, if Thomas had given help to Egan as requested, the letter would have been admissible against him on the ground, among others, that his performance of the acts requested was an admission of the letter's contents. Arguably the retention of the letter for a month and the subsequent discovery of it in Miss Hoffman's handbag go far enough down the same road, see 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1073 at 90-91 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick, Evidence § 247 at 531-532; cf. United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2 Cir. 1933). Certainly these circumstances dispel what would otherwise be legitimate fears with respect to the danger of a plant. 32 We find it unnecessary to decide this. The original objection was without basis, and a specific objection overruled will be effective to the extent of the grounds specified, and no further. 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 18 at 339 (3d ed. 1940). While the later objection at side-bar came close to presenting the real point, the judge was warranted in believing that counsel was satisfied with the limiting instruction he proposed; if counsel objected to that or to the short-fall of the instruction as given, he should have said so. Our discussion of admissibility at least suffices to show there was not plain error in receiving the letter, F.R. Cr.P. 52(b), which, indeed, was largely cumulative, see fns. 3 and 7.