Opinion ID: 441741
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Testimonial Evidence

Text: 38 Appellants Dr. Gold and Opti-Center challenge a number of decisions by the trial court relating to the admissibility of testimonial evidence about Medicare billing practices. Specifically, they contend that the district court abused its discretion by permitting HCFA official Lord and HHS Special Agent Cioffi to testify concerning the scope of Medicare's coverage for prosthetic eyewear; by permitting U.S. Vision President Schwartz to testify that he believed Opti-Center's Medicare billing practices were improper; and by allowing various Opti-Center employees to testify that they had informed their superiors in the company that its Medicare billing practices did not conform to those employed by other optometrists. We find no merit in any of these contentions. 39 With regard to the testimony of Cioffi and Lord, appellants raise a variety of complaints. They object that there was no showing that the subject matter of their testimony was one as to which the trier of fact might require assistance; that Lord and Cioffi could not properly qualify as expert witnesses under Fed.R.Evid. 702; and that their testimony improperly constituted opinions as to the legal implications of the defendants' conduct. The implausibility of the first of these contentions is best illustrated by the fact that Dr. Gold's entire defense turned on the argument that a trained optometrist who had been in the optical business for thirty-five years might not understand what types of eyewear were eligible for Medicare. Appellants' second objection is equally devoid of merit. A trial judge has broad discretion in deciding whether to qualify a witness as an expert, and his action must be sustained on appeal unless it is manifestly erroneous. See United States v. Costa, 691 F.2d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir.1982). Lord was chief of HCFA's Coverage and Eligibility Policy Section for the southeastern region and had been working in Medicare for nine years, and Cioffi had received special training concerning Medicare and was a three-year veteran of the Office of Investigations within the Inspector General's Office of HHS. We therefore conclude that the trial judge was within his discretion in finding that they could qualify as expert witnesses. 40 Nor do we believe that the trial court erred by permitting Lord and Cioffi to testify as to whether particular claims filed by Opti-Center were in their opinions eligible for reimbursement under Medicare. It is well established that Fed.R.Evid. 704 permits a witness to express an opinion as to an ultimate issue that must be decided by the trier of fact. United States v. Miller, 600 F.2d 498, 500 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 955, 100 S.Ct. 434, 62 L.Ed.2d 327 (1979). In addition, this court has expressly approved the use of expert legal testimony in a case where an IRS agent merely stated his opinion as an accountant [with regard to the tax consequences of a transaction], and did not attempt to assume the role of the court. United States v. Fogg, 652 F.2d 551, 556-57 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905, 102 S.Ct. 1751, 72 L.Ed.2d 162 (1982); see also United States v. Schafer, 580 F.2d 774, 778 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 970, 99 S.Ct. 463, 58 L.Ed.2d 430 (1978); United States v. Milton, 555 F.2d 1198, 1204 (5th Cir.1977). Because the trial judge here was careful to instruct the jury about the weight that should be given expert testimony such as that offered by Lord and Cioffi, we conclude that his decision to admit their opinions was proper. 10 41 Dr. Gold and Opti-Center also attack the trial court's decision to permit William Schwartz to testify that the volume of cataract eyewear sales at Opti-Center prior to its purchase by U.S. Vision was excessive, and that Medicare-related sales at the Tampa area stores disappeared after U.S. Vision revised the procedures for handling Medicare claims to conform with its own understanding of the statutory requirements. Appellants raise a barrage of objections to this testimony, contending that it was irrelevant, prejudicial, and constituted improper opinion evidence. We believe that it is self-evident that Schwartz' testimony was highly relevant to the issue of whether Opti-Center's practices were proper or improper. Fed.R.Evid. 701 permits opinion testimony by lay witnesses if the opinions offered are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Schwartz' statement that he considered the volume of cataract sales at Opti-Center excessive was based on his own examination of the store's records--he testified that between twenty-five and forty percent of all sales were cataract-related--and his personal experience in the optical business. Because his opinion was based on first-hand knowledge or observation and was helpful in resolving issues that were critical in this case, Fed.R.Evid. 701 advisory committee note, we conclude that the trial judge did not err in admitting his testimony. 42 Nor do we find merit in the objections raised by Dr. Gold and Opti-Center to the admission of testimony from three former Opti-Center employees--Nancy Shepard, Flossie Gousha, and Debbie Develle--who all testified that they had informed their superiors at the company that its Medicare billing practices did not accord with those used by their prior employers in the optical field. Appellants contend that their testimony constituted hearsay and improper opinion evidence, but these objections indicate that they misperceive the nature and relevance of this testimony. The testimony of these witnesses was important not because they were experts on Medicare, but because they had put their superiors on notice that there was reason to question whether Opti-Center's billing practices were in compliance with the law. Their testimony was therefore useful because it established that the conspirators had reason to know that their activities were illegal; it was not admitted to prove that the interpretation these witnesses had of the Medicare program was necessarily the correct one. 11
43 Appellant Warren objects to the government's presentation of rebuttal testimony against her by Mary Conway and Michael Covington. Covington testified on rebuttal that he had told Warren in June of 1981 about a newspaper article he had read concerning someone in the medical field [who] had come into some trouble for not collecting the twenty percent deductible a Medicare patient was supposed to pay. Opti-Center had generally not billed its Medicare customers for this amount. Mary Conway testified on rebuttal that in June or July of 1981, Warren instructed her to alter Opti-Center's internal records to indicate that the company had in fact been billing its customers for their required contribution. Appellant Warren asserts that this testimony was improperly admitted because it was new evidence that did not rebut anything she had presented in her defense. In fact, however, Warren had flatly denied on cross-examination that she ever discussed such a report with Covington. The purpose of rebuttal evidence is  'to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove the evidence of the adverse party,'  United States v. Delk, 586 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir.1978) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Luttrell v. United States, 320 F.2d 462, 464 (5th Cir.1963)), and the decision to permit rebuttal testimony is one that resides in the sound discretion of the trial judge. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 1334, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976); United States v. Sadler, 488 F.2d 434, 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931, 94 S.Ct. 2642, 41 L.Ed.2d 234 (1974). We find no error in the district court's decision to permit Covington and Conway to testify in response to Warren's earlier statements, and we believe that the trial judge's refusal to permit Warren to re-take the stand was also within the permissible scope of his discretion. 44