Opinion ID: 2584947
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arguments Concerning Defense Experts

Text: Three mental health experts were called to support defendant's case in mitigation: psychologist Larry Nicholas, neuropsychologist John Wicks, and psychiatrist Albert Globus. Defendant contends the prosecutor sought to prejudice his case by maligning the integrity of these experts. With respect to Dr. Nicholas, defendant asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing: Now, Dr. Nicholas is a doctor, he's not a Ph.D. [¶] He's a spin doctor. He's like these guys you see on TV who go down and talk to the political reporters, this is what we really want to say, and just kind of spin it around so it comes out the way they want it. (Italics added.) Defendant next complains the prosecutor made the following improper argument concerning Dr. Wicks: Let me talk just for a minute about Dr. Wicks. [¶] You know, in some respects he's probably our most helpful witness in this area of theany problems the defendant might have had. [¶] You know, he was just a little too glib, a little too self-assured, a little too cocky . . . . (Italics added.) Defendant also criticizes the prosecutor's description of Dr. Globus as kind of like a kid with a new toy and as being a little too grandiose, and the prosecutor's comments that the doctor was really a fish out of water and just kind of a glib fellow whose conclusions amounted to psychobabble. Additionally, he complains the prosecutor ridiculed Dr. Globus's integrity and his career choice as a defense expert. (12) Even assuming these claims were preserved for review, we would reject them as meritless. Prosecutors are allowed wide latitude in penalty phase argument, so long as the beliefs they express are based on the evidence presented. ( People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 613 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 22, 139 P.3d 492]; see People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 133 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296] [prosecutor's conclusions may not assume or state facts not in evidence [citation] or mischaracterize the evidence].) Although prosecutorial arguments may not denigrate opposing counsel's integrity, harsh and colorful attacks on the credibility of opposing witnesses are permissible. [Citations.] ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 162 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980] [claimed disparagement of defense expert was not misconduct].) Moreover, a prosecutor is free to remind the jurors that a paid witness may accordingly be biased and is also allowed to argue, from the evidence, that a witness's testimony is unbelievable, unsound, or even a patent `lie.' ( Ibid. [prosecutor properly implied that defense expert `stretch[ed] [a principle] for a buck']; see People v. Alfaro, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1328 [it is not misconduct to question a defense expert's veracity].) Although the prosecutor misstated the record when he said Dr. Nicholas was not a Ph.D, the rest of his argument concerning the doctor, viewed in context, properly sought to point out the weaknesses of his testimony and conclusions, based on the evidence presented. [15] Moreover, the prosecutor's inaccurate comment was brief and was not used in support of critical or key points. Under these circumstances, we find no basis to sustain defendant's claim of prejudicial misconduct. Likewise, the prosecutor's description of Dr. Wicks as being a little too glib, a little too self-assured, a little too cocky was not inappropriate or baseless name calling but was tied directly to the evidence indicating Dr. Wicks was misinformed about a test result: You know, he was just a little too glib, a little too self-assured, a little too cocky throwing out all the remarks about the school system. I wonder how competent he would have been in his opinion if he had been properly informed about the results of the MRI test. [¶] Remember, he was toldor made a big production of how Dr. Globus told him the MRI test showed frontal lobe deficit. Of course, that is what he was finding, so boy we really got it here. [¶] Maybe his testimony would have been a little different had he not been so misinformed on that basic premise. (Italics added.) Defendant concedes on appeal that Dr. Wicks incorrectly recalled what Dr. Globus told him about the MRI finding, but he asserts the prosecutor improperly implied that Dr. Wicks based his neuropsychological evaluation on what Dr. Globus told him. Defendant's interpretation of the prosecutor's argument, however, is refuted by the italicized language in the above-quoted passage, and it appears the prosecutor was simply commenting on Dr. Wicks's level of confidence in his own finding of frontal lobe damage after having incorrectly recalled an independent but similar finding by Dr. Globus. The prosecutor's arguments pertaining to Dr. Globus also were based on the evidence. In addressing the doctor's reliance on PET (positron emission tomography) and MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) scans in finding organic brain damage, the prosecutor argued: We turn to Dr. Globus, who is kind of like a kid with a new toy. Remember, it's only been in use in Sacramento and in the country maybe five or six years. It's a relatively new thing. [¶] We have to be wary that, perhaps, Dr. Globus is being a little too grandiose about the capability of this machine and his capability to interpret what that machine can reveal. The prosecutor also commented that Dr. Globus was really a fish out of water and just kind of a glib fellow whose conclusions amounted to psychobabble. Finally, in addressing the doctor's career choice after leaving a job at the University of California, Davis, the prosecutor remarked: That's a darn good job at UC Davis. What does he do, he resigns. [¶] Where does that private practice come from, what does that do? He has got thirty patients he hardly ever sees. Why is that? He had found he can make a living working in court. [¶] There are people who will hire him to come in here and give these offhanded, glib opinions to try and make Richard Parson, who are just basically criminals, into the sort of person who has a brain problem that we should all feel sorry about. [¶] And you can understand why because, you know, for seeing a guy for four hours, talking to Richard Parson for four hours and writing a report, Dr. Globus is going to get paid nine or ten-thousand dollars. That's not too bad. [¶] . . . [¶] There isreally, Dr. Globus is kind of, I would say, describing his medical career, he's a washed-up doctor who has now just become a professional witness. And that only works if you say things that your clients want to hear. We conclude that none of the identified comments relating to these three defense experts constituted misconduct. By and large, the prosecutor's comments merely cautioned the jury to carefully scrutinize their testimony and to examine the source and content of the information providing the bases of their opinions. Although many of the remarks were unflattering (e.g., a spin doctor, glib, cocky, grandiose, a fish out of water, psychobabble), the prosecutor was entitled to argue vigorously and use appropriate epithets based on inferences and deductions drawn from the evidence. ( People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673]; see People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 134.) We observe, however, that even though the prosecutor could and did properly argue to the jury that Dr. Globus may have been biased given his status as a paid witness ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 162), his one reference to Dr. Globus as a washed-up doctor was inappropriate because it did not appear tied to any evidence. Nonetheless, the comment was not misconduct, prejudicial or otherwise, because it was isolated in nature and did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. ( Darden v. Wainwright, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 181; see People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 733.) Moreover, the comment did not amount to the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods for purposes of persuasion ( People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 733; People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 969), and there is no reasonable possibility the comment influenced the penalty verdict ( People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1130 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 592, 88 P.3d 498]; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1019 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519]).