Opinion ID: 14721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Cognizable Injuries

Text: 13 See Robert Belton, Remedies in Employment Discrimination Law § 3.9 (1992) (Although [Albemarle] and Franks [v.Bowman Transp. Co.] were decided in the context of Title VII, their substantive principles are, as a general rule, equally applicable as a useful starting points in resolving remedial issues in cases brought under section 1981, the ADEA, and the Equal Pay Act cases.) (footnotes omitted). 12 Under the make whole remedial theory, a court’s first task is to determine the injuries caused by discrimination that require judicial relief. In other words, the court must ascertain in what way the plaintiff is not “whole.” In the vast majority of employment discrimination cases, the asserted injury is an adverse employment decision (e.g., refusal to hire, denial of promotion, or wrongful discharge), allegedly caused by or because of discrimination on the basis of a prohibited characteristic or trait such as gender, race, religion, national origin, age, or disability. In this sense, the case sub judice, at least as presented on appeal, presents an atypical and uncommon suit. Although the original complaint did allege an adverse employment action——Turner’s refusal to hire Armstrong due to perceived disability——this claim was rejected by the court below and that ruling has not been challenged on appeal.14 The magistrate judge determined that there was no evidence indicating the employment action in question was tainted by disability discrimination, and consequently it does not constitute a compensable injury.15 14 The original complaint also alleged damages flowing from the allegedly discriminatory refusal to hire, including substantial loss of income, emotional distress, pain and suffering. Because Armstrong chose not to appeal the magistrate judge’s ruling that Turner’s refusal to hire him was not, in any part, because of unlawful discrimination, he has waived this claim and neither the adverse employment decision, nor the consequential injuries, alleged below can constitute a compensable injury unless they were proximately caused by the specific ADA violation asserted on appeal. 15 The court below concluded that the only belief [Turner] formed was that [Armstrong] did not truthfully answer the questions on the 13 Armstrong does not challenge this conclusion on appeal.16 [application] form. Armstrong, 950 F.Supp. at 165 (emphasis added). Turner did not perceive or regard Armstrong as disabled or substantially impaired in any way. Id. Further the court determined that the summary judgment evidence shows that [Turner] did not form any attitudes or beliefs about the plaintiff’s ability to function at work once the possible asbestos exposure was discovered. Id. In sum, the court below concluded that the information revealed by the unlawful medical inquiry did not lead Turner to deny Armstrong employment because of disability, but rather because of the perception that he did not truthfully answer the questions on the form. Id. at 165. Armstrong has not asserted that these conclusions are incorrect or that the record reflects a genuine dispute of material fact as to them. 16 It might be argued that because the medical inquiry revealed the discrepancy between the information provided by Armstrong and the information in the background check, the inquiry caused Armstrong not to be hired. In fact, amicus EEOC does make a related argument in their brief, asserting that Turner’s failure to hire Armstrong was caused by its adverse reaction to Armstrong’s medical information. This assertion is not consistent with the unchallenged determination of the court below regarding Turner’s motivation, but even if the EEOC’s contention were correct, it would not alter the outcome of this appeal. As we made clear in Buchanan v. City of San Antonio, 85 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996), a causal link must be established between the specific ADA violations [alleged] . . . and the injuries sustained, for which a plaintiff seeks damages. Id. at 200. Under Buchanan, if section 12112(d)(2)(A) were to give rise to a private right of action, any concomitant liability would be limited by familiar tort principles such as proximate cause. It is a well-established principle of tort law that violation of a statute will not give rise to liability for resulting injuries unless, inter alia, the plaintiff was a member of the class of individuals the statute was intended to protect, and the injury was of the type contemplated by the statute and resulted from the hazard against which the statute was intended to protect. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 286 and 874A (1965). See also Gavagan v. United States, 955 F.2d 1016 at 1020-21 (5th Cir. 1992). In the case at bar, the harm caused, i.e., an adverse employment decision, clearly falls within the class of harms covered by Title I of the ADA. However, this harm did not result from one of the particular hazards against which the ADA was intended to protect (i.e., employment discrimination on the basis of disability). The magistrate judge determined, and Armstrong does not assert otherwise, that Turner’s decision was not caused by an unlawful discriminatory motive. Thus, although the medical inquiry may be construed as having been, in a purely mechanistic 14 Although it is unclear, it appears that Armstrong implicitly argues (or assumes) that a violation of section 12112(d)(2)(A) constitutes a compensable injury in fact. We reject this reading of the provision. This Court has been unable to find any indication either in the text of the ADA or in its legislative history that a violation of the prohibition against preemployment medical examinations and inquiries, in and of itself, was intended to give rise to damages liability.17 This is consistent with the general analysis and reasoning of our decision in Buchanan, which dealt with an alleged violation of the same provision that is at sense, a cause of Turner’s refusal to employ Armstrong, it was not, in the general tort sense, a legal or proximate cause of Turner’s decision and thus does not constitute a compensable injury. The ADA simply cannot be reasonably construed as having been intended to protect a nondisabled job applicant from not being hired because a potential employer, incident to a prohibited section 12112(d)(2)(A) inquiry, either learns that the applicant has an embezzlement or murder conviction or believes, correctly or incorrectly, that the applicant has not been completely honest and forthcoming during the job application process. Moreover, in such cases, including this one, it is obviously irrelevant to the resulting failure to employ that the inquiry was not preceded by a conditional employment offer under section 12112(d)(3). As we stated in the context of a similar federal antidiscrimination statute, the ADA cannot protect . . . employees from erroneous or even arbitrary personnel decisions, but only from decisions which are unlawfully motivated. Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1508 (5th Cir.1988) (ADEA case). 17 The magistrate judge found nothing in the legislative history which supports the conclusion that Congress intended any job applicant to have a cause of action for violation of the ADA rules on preemployment examinations and inquiries. Armstrong, 950 F.Supp. at 167. Likewise, we are unable to find any support for the proposition that a violation of the section 12112(d), standing alone, was intended to give rise to damages liability. 15 issue here.18 We find this approach to be consonant with the structure of the ADA as well as the principles embodied in the 18 The general analysis in Buchanan seems to imply——or at least is susceptible to the reading——that a mere violation of section 12112(d)(2)(A) is insufficient to give rise to liability absent the existence of an actual injury of which the violation is a legal and proximate cause. In Buchanan, the plaintiff was a patrolman for the Bexar County Sheriff’s Department who repeatedly applied and was rejected for a position on the San Antonio police force. 85 F.3d at 197. Eventually Buchanan filed suit alleging that he had been discriminated against on the basis of disability. The case went to trial, and, at the end of plaintiff’s evidence, Buchanan moved for and was granted judgment as a matter of law based on two specific violations of section 12112(d). Id. at 198. The court submitted two special interrogatories to the jury on the issues of causation and amount of damages. Id. The jury answered yes to the first interrogatory, which asked whether Buchanan had sustained damages from [the defendant’s] violation of the [ADA], and granted $300,000 in compensatory damages. Id. In addition to the $300,000 in compensatory damages, the district court awarded back pay, attorneys’ fees, and post-judgment interest. Id. On appeal, this Court concluded that Armstrong had, as a matter of law, established a violation of section 12112(d)(2). Id. at 199. We then went on to briefly discuss the predicates of a damages claim based on a violation of that subsection. Id. at 199200. We began by stating that [a] further gap in support of [the] judgment is the absence of proof of damage, even if the other predicates had been established, caused by a premature medical examination. Id. at 199-200 (emphasis added). We observed that compensatory damages, like other damages, are not recoverable under Title VII (and derivatively under the ADA) unless the prohibited employment practice was the cause of the applicant’s rejection. Id. at 200 (footnote omitted). In discussing the possible injuries for which Buchanan might receive compensation, we mentioned only those associated with the adverse employment decision alleged. We made no mention of any possibility that Buchanan might receive relief in the form of damages absent proof of actual injury, and we plainly assumed precisely the opposite. In the case at bar, Armstrong has not alleged any actual injury flowing from the alleged section 12112(d)(2)(A) violation, nor has he directed this Court’s attention to any basis for any damages relief. In fact, at oral argument before this Court, Armstrong’s counsel seemed to admit that, for this very reason, Armstrong was not entitled to damages relief. 16 statute.19 Consequently, we hold that damages liability under section 12112(d)(2)(A) must be based on something more than a mere violation of that provision. There must be some cognizable injury in fact of which the violation is a legal and proximate cause for damages to arise from a single violation.20 This exhausts the various bases for a damages claim by Armstrong.21 Because Armstrong has not identified a cognizable and 19 We note that in what appears to be the only reported case construing the Rehabilitation Act regulations on which section 12112(d) is based the court came to a similar conclusion. See Doe v. Syracuse School Dist., 508 F.Supp. 333 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (violative preemployment inquiry held to be persuasive evidence of alleged employment discrimination, but medical inquiry did not, in and of itself, constitute discriminatory conduct so as to be compensable under the Rehabilitation Act). 20 This holding can also be explained as an application of the make whole purpose of Title VII remedies. Armstrong is entitled to no remedy because he has not been injured and has no need of being made whole. Suppose Armstrong had been hired and then brought a suit based on the premature medical examination. To what relief would he be entitled? A make whole remedial scheme would not provide him with a damages remedy because he already occupies (in the hypothetical) precisely the same position that he would have occupied absent the unlawful employment practice. Similarly, where a plaintiff cannot demonstrate actual injury, providing a damages remedy for a violation of section 12112(d)(2)(A) would appear to be inconsistent with the make whole theory of equitable relief espoused in Albemarle. Accordingly, we hold that a mere violation of section 12112(d)(2)(A) does not automatically, or per se, give rise to damages liability. We do not, however, foreclose the possibility of liability based on any injuries legally and proximately caused by such a violation. 21 He did not allege (or present summary judgment evidence of) any injury, other than discussed above, arising out of the alleged section 12112(d)(2)(A) violation, and he has not alleged (or presented summary judgment evidence of) actions exhibiting malice or reckless indifference even remotely sufficient to approach the type of conduct required to support punitive damages. 17 compensable injury arising out of the medical examination and inquiry, or alleged any corresponding damages, he has completely failed to demonstrate any entitlement to a damages remedy.