Opinion ID: 2333130
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Offer to prove Violation of Agreement

Text: At the trial in the court below the defendants attempted to show that the plaintiffs had themselves violated the Agreement and, therefore, under the provisions of Pennsylvania's Labor Anti-Injunction Act of 1939 (43 PS Sec. 206d(a)), they were barred from obtaining an injunction. The record reveals the following: MR. FREEDMAN: I offer to prove that the Philadelphia Marine Trade Association violated the agreement in locking out local 1291 of the ILA on several occasions during the period this contract has been in existence. THE COURT: But they have been working there ever since haven't they? MR. FREEDMAN: That is my offer of proof, sir. THE COURT: Up to the present inquiry they have been working. They have not been locked out now. They want them to go to work and they don't do it. MR. FREEDMAN: I am offering to prove that on several occasions during this past year  MR. RHOADS: I object. THE COURT: The objection is sustained. MR. FREEDMAN: Exception. THE COURT: I give you an exception, yes. It will be noted here that when the attorney for the defendants sought to prove that the plaintiffs had violated the Agreement the Court interposed with a factual observation which was not warranted because, firstly, the hearing had not terminated and, secondly, the observation was not germane to counsel's offer. Mr. Freedman's offer came strictly within Section 206(d) of the Anti-Injunction Act which, in stating situations where injunctions may be entertained, specifically excepts: Provided, however, That the complaining person has not, during the term of the said agreement, committed an act as defined in both of the aforesaid acts as an unfair labor practice or violated any of the terms of said agreement. The Majority treats this serious matter almost as lightly as did the court below. The Majority says: Defendants complain that the court refused to admit evidence designed to show that plaintiffs had violated the agreement on former occasions, but such evidence would clearly have been irrelevant in view of the fact that the agreement admittedly had continued in full force and effect down to the time of the occurrences giving rise to the present litigation. The fact that the Agreement was in full force and effect had no bearing on the question whether the plaintiffs had violated its provisions. The Act specifically states that the plaintiffs are not entitled to an injunction if they themselves violate the agreement. Did the plaintiffs violate the agreement, or did they not? That was a question which the Chancellor was required to decide under the specific wording of the statute. If the plaintiffs could not show clean hands, they were not entitled to an injunction. The defendants claimed unclean hands. The lower court asserted and this Court affirmed irrelevancy. I believe the offer was most relevant, and, in view of the defendants' charges, it was imperative that the plaintiffs display their hands for inspection.