Opinion ID: 3009936
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Deisler's Failure to Disclose His Prior Injury

Text: McCormack contends that Deisler's failure to disclose his prior back injury is the kind of misbehavior which relieves it of the duty it would otherwise have to provide maintenance and cure. However, nondisclosure of a pre-existing injury, without more, will not result in a seaman's loss of maintenance and cure. Such a forfeiture will not occur unless Deisler intentionally misrepresented or concealed medical facts that were material to 10 The duty to provide maintenance and cure is independent of any fault of the employer, and the seaman's contributory negligence does not affect his right to maintenance and cure. The Osceola, supra; Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 731. the decision to hire Deisler. In addition, there must be a nexus between the improperly concealed material information and the disputed injury. See McCorpen v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp., 396 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 894 (1968) (where a seaman is required to provide pre-employment medical information and the seaman intentionally misrepresents or conceals material medical facts, the disclosure of which is plainly desired, then he is not entitled to an award of maintenance and cure, if the injury is causally related to the concealed medical condition); Wactor v. Spartan Transportation Corp., 27 F.3d 347, 352 (8th Cir. 1994) (adopting the McCorpen standard); Siders v. Ohio River Co., 469 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (citing McCorpen).11 Given the historical importance of a seaman's claim for maintenance and cure, it 11 In Sammon v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp., 442 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 881 (1971), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that the rule in McCorpen that any concealment of material medical data, prevents an award for maintenance and cure is not the rule of this Circuit. Id. at 1029. The Sammon court held that the concealment of a preexisting condition by the seaman during a pre-hiring interview is fraudulent only if the seaman knows or reasonably should know that the concealed condition is relevant. Id. Under that rule, a seaman may claim maintenance and cure for a related injury or illness if, at the time he was asked, he held a good faith belief that the pre-existing condition was not relevant to his fitness for work. Id. Even if there is some tension between the rule of McCorpen and the rule of Sammon, see Wactor, 27 F.3d at 352 n.4, it is not relevant to this case, because, as discussed in the text, McCormack has not proven that Deisler's omission was material to its decision to hire him. should not be lost unless the employee's purportedly wrongful conduct was material to an employer's hiring decision. The district court concluded that Deisler should have disclosed his prior injury in response to the inquiry on the employment application. The court ruled that McCormack's inquiry into prior injuries created an inference that the information was material to McCormack. The court went on to conclude, however, that this inference of materiality was destroyed by the fact that McCormack's decision to deny maintenance and cure was not predicated on the concealment but rather on McCormack's contention that an accident never happened. Suppl. App. at 10708. In Deisler's view, the district court found that the concealment was not material to McCormack's decision to hire Deisler. But that clearly is not what the district court found. We thus view Deisler's materiality argument as an alternative argument for affirming the judgment. Cf. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, No. 94-1722, slip op. at 3 n.1 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 1995) (we can affirm on a ground which the district court did not rely but which was raised before it.). Assuming arguendo that the question on McCormack's application created a duty to disclose,12 the record is 12 McCormack argues that Deisler's failure to cross-appeal means that we must accept the district court's finding that Deisler should have disclosed that he could not perform the work as readily as others because of his prior back injury. The argument is frivolous. Of course, an appellee is entitled to rely on alternative arguments which had been raised in the district court supporting the judgment without filing a cross-appeal, so long as he or she is not seeking to expand his or her rights under the absolutely clear that Deisler's omission was not material to McCormack's hiring decision. Deisler was never questioned about his failure to answer although McCormack had eleven months to review his job application before he was told to report for work. This is evidenced by the fact that the sections on the bottom portion of the application labelled Reviewed By and Approved By were left blank. One of the investigators working for Lamorte stated: I met with McCormack Aggregates, Mr. Brad Simek, to discuss the hiring of Mr. Deisler and specifically to find out if there was a policy or practice of questioning prospective employees about medical conditions, or if anyone could testify as to any conversations with Deisler that the back condition predated his employment with McCormack. Unfortunately, McCormack is unable to provide me with any such supporting testimony. Suppl. App. at 182. McCormack argues that its failure to investigate Deisler's omission is irrelevant. Reply Brief of Appellant at 4. However, McCormack had the burden of proving that the omission was material to its decision to hire Deisler, see Wactor, 27 F.3d at 352; Ruiz v. Plimsoll Marine, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 315, 317 (M.D. La. 1992), and its failure to do so is fatal to its assertion (..continued) judgment or limit another's rights. See Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, No. 94-1722, slip op. at 3 n.1 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 1995). that Deisler is not now entitled to recover maintenance and cure.13 B. Wages, Compensatory Damages, Prejudgment Interest, Attorney's Fees and Costs McCormack argues that even if Deisler can recover maintenance and cure, the district court erred in awarding lost wages, damages for pain and suffering, prejudgment interest, costs, and attorney's fees, as those are not an incident of the seaman's contract of employment.14 McCormack asserts that these damages are an incident of negligence under the Jones Act and that since Deisler elected to dismiss his Jones Act claim after 13 We reject McCormack's contention that we should, here, presume reliance from the simple fact that it asked the question. But there may be situations where courts should presume such reliance. For instance, if a shipowner requires a prospective applicant to submit to a physical examination and/or to fill out a detailed medical history form, the extent to which the employer will be required to submit affirmative proof of reliance should be diminished. It is not that reliance is no longer required; rather, it is that the employer will there have demonstrated reliance by adopting a particular procedure or form. However, where, as here, a general question about past illnesses and injuries is but a single question in a standard form employment application, the situation is markedly different. The question is simply one of many questions on a variety of topics, and the rather vague inquiry into medical history may not ever be reviewed by anyone at all. The employer's interest in the information is significantly less than in the prior examples, and it therefore makes sense to require the shipowner to present evidence of reliance. 14 Although lost wages are qualitatively different from damages for pain and suffering as the former would certainly be deemed an incident of the seaman's contract of employment, for purposes of our discussion, we will accept McCormack's conflation of these damages. the trial, the nature of the two causes of action, and the law of the case precludes recovery for these damages under general maritime law. See Brief of Appellant at 13. In Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367 (1932), the Supreme Court discussed the impact of the then recently enacted Jones Act upon general maritime law. The Court stated: By the general maritime law, a seaman is without a remedy against the ship or her owners for injuries to his person, suffered in the line of service, with two exceptions only . . . . A remedy is his also if the injury has been suffered through breach of the duty to provide him with maintenance and cure. The duty to make such provision is imposed by the law itself as one annexed to the employment. The Osceola, supra. Contractual it is in the sense that it has its source in a relation which is contractual in origin, but, given the relation, no agreement is competent to abrogate the incident. If the failure to give maintenance or cure has caused or aggravated an illness, the seaman has his right of action for injury thus done to him; the recovery in such circumstances including not only necessary expenses, but also compensation for the hurt. The Iroquois, 194 U.S. 240 . . . . The question then is to what extent the ancient rule has been changed by modern statute . . . commonly known as the Jones Act . . . . We are to determine whether death resulting from the negligent omission to furnish care or cure is death from personal injury within the meaning of the statute. We think the origin of the duty is consistent with a remedy in tort, since the wrong, if a violation of a contract, is also something more. The duty, as already pointed out, is one annexed by the law to a relation and annexed as an inseparable incident without heed to any expression of the will of the contracting parties. For breach of a duty thus imposed, the remedy upon the contract does not exclude an alternative remedy built upon the tort. Id. at 370-72. Several courts have since cited Cortes for the proposition that an employee may recover damages resulting from an employer's failure to provide maintenance and cure. See e.g. Vaughn v. N.J. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530 (1962); Murphy v. Light, 257 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 1958); Sims v. United States of America War Shipping Admin., 186 F.2d 972, 974 (3d Cir. 1951). In Sims, the district court disallowed a claim for additional damages in an action for maintenance and cure that a seaman brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 741 et. seq.15 In reversing we stated: The new question in this case is whether the respondent is liable for the 15 The Suits in Admiralty Act waives the government's sovereign immunity: [i]n cases where if [a United States] vessel were privately owned or operated, or if [United States] cargo were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or property were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained, any appropriate nonjury proceeding in personam may be brought against the United States . . . . Gordon v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., 835 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988) (citing 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1982)). In effect, the Suits in Admiralty Act is a jurisdictional statute providing for maintenance of admiralty suits against the United States which encompasses all maritime torts alleged against the United States. See id. at 98; United States v. Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 176 n.14 (1976). consequential damages16 occasioned by the failure to provide for maintenance and cure after termination of the voyage when it was demanded . . . . We may regard it as settled law that if a man is injured or becomes ill while on a voyage, neglect to fulfill the duty to provide maintenance and cure may impose damages beyond mere cost of food and medicines. The Iroquois, 194 U.S. 240, 24 S.Ct. 640, 48 L.Ed. 955 . . . .17 16 While the district court correctly classified Deisler's lost wages and damages for his pain and suffering as compensatory damages, an award of consequential damages would clearly encompass these compensatory damages. Compensatory damages serve to compensate for harm sustained by a party. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 903 (1977). Consequential damages are merely compensatory damages for harm that does not flow directly and immediately from the act of a party, but only some of the consequences or results of such act. Black's Law Dictionary 390 (6th ed. 1990). 17 The Iroquois, 194 U.S. 240 (1904), first recognized the principle that the shipowner can be held liable for the damages resulting from neglect in the fulfillment of the duty to provide maintenance and cure. There, plaintiff seaman sued the vessel in rem to recover damages resulting from the master's failure to provide him surgical treatment and care. The seaman fractured two ribs and his right leg when he accidentally fell from the main yard to the deck of the vessel. The master, with the aid of the carpenter, set the leg in splints for five weeks, after which the master found the leg to be in good condition and permitted the seaman to walk about with the aid of a crutch. However, after arriving at port it was found the bones of his leg were not united and as a result his leg had to be amputated. Id. at 240241. In his suit, the seaman alleged that the master breached the duty owed to him in failing to put into an intermediate port and procure the proper surgical attention. The district court entered a $3,000 judgment for the seaman which the court of appeals subsequently affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court first noted that it had recently recognized the shipowner's duty to provide proper medical treatment for a seaman who becomes ill or injured in The Osceola. The Court ultimately held that the master had breached his duty to the seaman by failing to put into an intermediate port sooner. The Court further held that the fact that the seaman did not request to be taken to an intermediate port was of This Court has held that it is not enough to give a sick man a hospital ticket. If he is ill and penniless transportation to the place of treatment must be provided . . . . Sims, 186 F.2d at 973-74. This obligation is inherent in the seaman's employment, but it is not limited by traditional concepts of contract. This obligation for maintenance and cure is . . . imposed by the law itself as one annexed to the employment . . . . The duty . . . is one annexed by law to a relation, and annexed as an inseparable incident without heed to any expression of the will of the contracting parties. Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1932). It is no more a contract than the obligation of a husband to support his wife is one of contract. Each arises out of a relationship voluntarily entered into. But these duties are imposed by the law as an incident to the relationship, not a matter of contract. . . . [T]herefore, . . . the usual rules of damages for breach of contract to pay money are [not] applicable. (emphasis added).18 (..continued) no significance because the master was his legal guardian and had a duty to look out for the safety and care of his seamen, whether or not such a request was made. Id. at 247. 18 We have, however, limited the right to recover additional damages when one is not injured on the open sea. See Graham v. Alcoa S.S. Co., Inc., 201 F.2d 423, 425 (3d Cir, 1953) (This is not an action for failure to give proper medical care aboard ship, however, so that the Iroquois and Cortes cases are not precisely apposite. Plaintiff must sink or swim with the Sims case.). Graham reasoned that consequential damages would not be allowed where the injury did not occur at open sea unless the sailor first informed the employer of the injury and requested maintenance and cure. Here, as in Sims, Deisler did just that. In Sims, . . . we held the defendant liable for its failure to supply maintenance and cure, but we limited liability to damages for those consequences occurring after notice of defendant for libellant's need of care and of his inability to procure it Id. at 974. Although the court's analogy to the marital relationship can not withstand the social evolution that has occurred since the court spoke, the court's pronouncement of the permissible recovery for failure to promptly provide maintenance and cure remains valid. See also Neville v. American Barge Line Co., 276 F.2d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 1960). There, a prior suit had established that the plaintiff was entitled to maintenance and cure up until December 4, 1951, and that plaintiff had not yet reached the point of maximum cure. Id. at 118-19. Thereafter, plaintiff instituted a second suit because no money had been paid for maintenance and cure after December 4, 1951. In the second action, plaintiff sought maintenance and cure, along with lost wages and damages for pain and suffering. Id. at 119. The claim for consequential damages was based upon plaintiff's assertion that the failure to provide maintenance and cure prevented her from obtaining psychiatric treatment, and had thus caused additional suffering and loss of earnings. Id. at 120. A jury awarded plaintiff maintenance and cure and lost wages as well as damages for the pain and suffering that resulted from withholding maintenance and cure. We reversed the award of consequential damages because of insufficient proof of causation. However, we (..continued) because of indigence. Id. at 425. Here, the district court concluded that Deisler's pain and suffering resulted from his inability to afford necessary surgery. Findings of Fact, ¶ 31. expressly reaffirmed the principle that consequential damages are recoverable for the wrongful failure to provide maintenance and cure. Id. (citing Sims, 186 F.2d at 975). The claim in Neville was brought under general maritime law. Thus, consequential damages for failure to pay maintenance and cure are not limited to claims under the Jones Act. This is consistent with the Supreme Court's decisions in Cortes and Vaughn, supra. In Vaughn, plaintiff seaman had worked as a taxi driver after becoming ill while in defendant's employ. The employer refused to pay maintenance and cure because it doubted that plaintiff had really been ill. Ultimately [the employee] was required to hire an attorney and sue in the courts to recover maintenance and cure, agreeing to pay the lawyer a 50% contingent fee. Vaughn, 369 U.S. at 529. The district court granted maintenance and cure but ordered that the amount plaintiff had earned as a taxi driver be deducted from the recovery. The court further limited recovery to damages directly relating to the employer's obligation to provide medical treatment for the sailor. The court reasoned that plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees, and could only recover damages which resulted when the failure to furnish maintenance and cure caused or aggravated the illness or other physical or mental suffering. Id. The court of appeals also denied counsel fees reasoning that they are not recoverable in suits for breach of contract. The Supreme Court disagreed on both points. The Court reasoned that [w]hile failure to give maintenance and cure may give rise to a claim for damages for the suffering and for the physical handicap which follows (The Iroquois, 194 U.S. 240, 24 S.Ct. 640, 48 L.Ed. 955), the recovery may also include 'necessary expenses.' Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 371, 53 S.Ct. 173, 174, 77 L.Ed. 368. Id. at 530. The Court reasoned that the shipowner's duty to provide maintenance and cure was among 'the most pervasive' of all and . . . not to be defeated by restrictive distinctions nor 'narrowly confined.' When there are ambiguities or doubts, they are resolved in favor of the seaman. Id. at 532 (citations omitted). The Court also rejected the ruling that wages earned as a cab driver should be deducted from any recovery. It would be a sorry day for seamen if shipowners, knowing of the claim for maintenance and cure, could disregard it, force the disabled seaman to work, and then evade part or all of their legal obligation by having it reduced by the amount of the sick man's earnings . . . . This result is at war with the liberal attitude that heretofore has obtained and with admiralty's tender regard for seamen. Id. at 533 (citing Yates v. Dann, 223 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1955)) (if seaman is found to be still in need of maintenance and cure the fact that the seaman is forced by financial necessity to return to his regular employment will not serve as a bar to his recovery). We therefore disagree with McCormack's assertion that the additional damages that Deisler seeks are limited to the Jones Act. Brief of Appellant at 13-14. We believe that the district court properly awarded Deisler lost wages, damages for pain and suffering, and prejudgment interest arising from McCormack's failure to pay him maintenance and cure. McCormack further asserts that even where such additional damages and expenses are awarded on a maintenance and cure claim, they are allowed only where there is a willful and wrongful refusal to pay maintenance and cure and that the record here does not support the district court's conclusion that McCormack's refusal to pay maintenance and cure was arbitrary or capricious. As noted above, in Sims we held that consequential damages are allowed in a claim for maintenance and cure in order to make the injured seaman whole, and they are not dependent upon a showing of bad faith. See Sims, 186 F.2d at 974. That holding was based upon the analogous situation in tort law: One man hurts another in an accident. The actor fails to provide medical care or alleviate the harm suffered by the victim honestly thinking that he was not (1) himself negligent or (2) the victim was contributorily negligent. If the trier of fact disagrees with the actor on these conclusions, defendant is liable for full damages suffered, although some of them could have been mitigated by prompt action on his part. Id. at 974-75. In Morales v. Garijak, 829 F.2d 1355, 1358 (5th Cir. 1987), the court suggests that compensatory damages may not be recovered unless the shipowner's refusal is unreasonable. However, we do not need to address the specifics of this argument as this record clearly supports a finding that McCormack's refusal was not reasonable. From the outset, the only reason offered for McCormack's failure to pay maintenance and cure was the assertion that no accident had occurred. During the trial, the district court questioned Bernard Lillis, McCormack's Chief Financial Officer, about McCormack's reason for denying Deisler's claim: Lillis: If one person had come along and said that they saw Mr. Deisler fall over the wheelbarrow I would have changed my decision. . . . The Court: Mr. Lillis has made it very clear that the reason maintenance and cure was denied was because he didn't think the accident ever happened. Isn't that right, Mr. Lillis? Mr. Lillis: That's right, your honor. . . . The Court: Let me pursue this. Is it your position that the only reason that maintenance and cure was denied was because your company felt that an accident never happened? Mr. Lillis: That is true, your honor. The Court: An accident of Mr. Deisler falling over a wheelbarrow on June 15, 1989? Mr. Lillis: That's correct. The Court: That is it? Mr. Lillis: That is it. (emphasis added). Findings of Fact, ¶ 49 n.5, Suppl. App. at 4546. However, McCormack never interviewed Deisler, and although Melendez denied seeing Deisler fall he told Lamorte's investigator that he saw Deisler dusting himself off after the wheelbarrow incident. Suppl. App. at 169. In addition, Ellis told Lamorte's investigator that he saw the wheel barrow lying on its side, the bags on the ground, and Deisler standing there kicking his feet. Id. Rather than accept that testimony as corroboration that Deisler had been injured, McCormack tenaciously used it to support the rather dubious position that no accident could have occurred because no one saw it. Finally, McCormack disregarded their own investigators' recommendations that they pay Deisler maintenance and cure. Although McCormack was under no obligation to accept the recommendations of Lamorte or American Maritime, the district court did not have to ignore McCormack's rejection of its own expert's recommendation. Similarly, the district court properly noted that McCormack's reason for denying Deisler's claim shifted from pillar to post as the case progressed. Defendant's primary defense to the maintenance and cure claim was that plaintiff lied about an accident occurring. Second, defendant contended that no injury occurred even if the incident did. Third, defendant contended that if plaintiff was suffering from any condition, which it denied, it pre- existed the date of the incident. Next, defendant contended that even if an injury occurred, it was fully resolved, and no further medical care was necessary. Thus, the presentation of plaintiff and Steve Melendez as liability witnesses was necessary. Plaintiff was required to move for a new Jones Act trial because of defendant's misrepresentations of material facts. Findings of Fact, ¶ 59. That assessment is supported by the record. It is now for McCormack, not Deisler, to bear the extra cost occasioned by McCormack's intransigence. This includes the wages Deisler would have been earning had McCormack met its obligation to finance the corrective back surgery, and damages for the pain and suffering he has endured while awaiting that surgery. See Cortes, supra. 1. The Law of the Case Nor does the law of the case preclude Deisler from recovering consequential damages under general maritime law despite the jury's Jones Act verdict in favor of defendants. The doctrine of the law of the case dictates that 'when a court decides upon a rule of law, that rule should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the litigation.' In re Resyn Corp., 945 F.2d 1279, 1281 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Devex Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 857 F.2d 197, 199 (3d Cir. 1988)); see also Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)19; Schultz v. Onan Corp., 737 F.2d 339, 345 (3d Cir. 1984) (the law of the case doctrine applies to issues that were actually discussed by the court in the prior appeal [and] to issues decided by necessary implication.). While the doctrine most commonly serves to bar litigants from rearguing issues previously decided on appeal, see CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 1211, 1215 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 150 (1st Cir. 1991); Schultz, 737 F.2d at 345, we have held that the dismissal of an appeal terminates the cause of action and the judgment of the district court becomes the law of the case. See Hook v. Hook & Ackerman, 233 F.2d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 1956).20 19 Unlike the more precise requirements of res judicata, law of the case is an amorphous concept. 460 U.S. at 618. 20 The [l]aw of the case directs a court's discretion, it does not limit the tribunal's power. Schultz, 737 F.2d at 345 (citations omitted). McCormack argues that since Deisler elected to dismiss the Jones Act claim after trial the law of the case precludes recovery of consequential damages under general maritime law. That argument rests upon the mistaken belief that such lost wages and damages for pain and suffering are incidents of negligence under the Jones Act and not recoverable under the general maritime law. As we explained above, such damages may be recovered for the failure to provide maintenance and cure in the absence of a Jones Act claim. Thus, the law of the case is not a bar to plaintiff's recovery.