Opinion ID: 2077498
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Availability of Mandamus or Prohibition

Text: Mandamus and prohibition are both extraordinary writs. (See generally Allen, Mandamus, Quo Warranto, Prohibition, and Ne Exeat, 1960 U. Ill. L.F. 102.) Mandamus is discretionary and is appropriate only where there is a clear right to the requested relief, a clear duty of the respondent to act, and clear authority in the respondent to comply with the writ. ( League of Women Voters v. County of Peoria (1987), 121 Ill.2d 236, 242-43.) Though mandamus is extraordinary, we may consider a petition for the writ when it presents an issue that is novel and of crucial importance to the administration of justice, even if all the normal requirements for the writ's award are not met initially. Knuepfer v. Fawell (1983), 96 Ill.2d 284, 291. For a writ of prohibition to be issued, the action to be prohibited must be judicial or quasi-judicial in nature; the jurisdiction of the tribunal against which the writ is sought must be inferior to that of the issuing court; the action to be prohibited must be either outside the tribunal's jurisdiction or, if within its jurisdiction, beyond its legitimate authority; and the petitioner must be without any other adequate remedy. ( People ex rel. No. 3 J. & E. Discount, Inc. v. Whitler (1980), 81 Ill.2d 473, 479-80.) Actions of an administrative official, such as a Director of Revenue and his departmental hearings referee, may be sufficiently judicial in nature to be subject to a writ of prohibition. Whitler, 81 Ill.2d at 480. The office of mandamus is to provide affirmative rather than prohibitory relief ( People ex rel. Scott v. Kerner (1965), 32 Ill.2d 539, 543), though mandamus may lie to compel the undoing of an act ( People ex rel. Bier v. Scholz (1979), 77 Ill.2d 12, 16). By contrast, a writ of prohibition is used to prevent judicial or quasi-judicial action that would be taken without jurisdiction or that would be beyond the scope of legitimate jurisdictional authority. ( People ex rel. Foreman v. Nash (1987), 118 Ill.2d 90, 97.) The relief sought by the four chief judges is prohibitory in nature, regardless of whether the Board has a duty or authority to act in accordance with any writ of mandamus that we might frame in an attempt to provide the relief sought. Hence, we conclude that a writ of prohibition rather than of mandamus is the appropriate vehicle for awarding relief.
Cook County argues that in reality the four chief judges are seeking a declaratory judgment and that this is one reason for us to refuse the requested writ. A similar argument was made in People ex rel. Scott v. Kerner (1965), 32 Ill.2d 539, but, as we noted then (32 Ill.2d at 544-46), frequently the declaration of a right to be enforced by mandamus will occur simultaneously with the writ's award, especially where public issues of serious concern require speedy resolution (32 Ill.2d at 546). In any event, we have concluded that prohibition rather than mandamus lies.
In addition, Cook County urges that because administrative review by the appellate court is now available in representation cases and unfair labor practice cases (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, pars. 1609(i), 1611(e)), the four chief judges have a remedy other than the writ they seek. However, the four chief judges point to appellate delay during any review as threatening the smooth operation of the court system and possibly causing irreparable harm to their employment relationship with their employees. We agree that such results are likely and that appellate proceedings would inadequately remedy them. The effects of improperly ordered certification or bargaining would not easily be undone, if at all. Positions taken, agreements reached, and appropriations made would be on public view and formalized on the public record in a way seldom if ever equaled in private-sector collective bargaining. Even if such consequences may be said to ensue from all public-sector certification or bargaining orders that are ultimately reversed on appeal, the vital public interest in an efficient, continually functioning, and independent court system furnishes additional reason for us to conclude that administrative review would be inadequate in this case. See People ex rel. No. 3 J. & E. Discount, Inc. v. Whitler (1980), 81 Ill.2d 473, 483-84; People ex rel. Swift v. Superior Court (1935), 359 Ill. 612, 618-19; People ex rel. Modern Woodmen of America v. Circuit Court (1931), 347 Ill. 34, 40, 44-45. Finally, according to the four chief judges' reply brief, the orders in Chief Judges Orenic's and McCarthy's cases were entered before the July 1, 1988, effective date of the statutory amendment granting them the right of administrative review (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 1609(i)), and those chief judges would therefore not be entitled to such review. And, because of what we are advised was IBEW's loss of its representation election, Chief Judge Pearman might be held to lack standing as an aggrieved party (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 1609(i)) to seek such review of the order entered in his case. In any event, at the time of filing their petition, three of the four chief judges could not have obtained such administrative review, because no final Board orders had been entered in their cases. Hence, if they had a right to the relief sought at the time of filing their petition, that right should not necessarily be defeated by any subsequent theoretical ripeness of their cases for administrative review; and if the fourth petitioner, Chief Judge Rapp, had an independent right to the relief he sought when he joined in the petition, any concurrent availability of administrative review is no bar, particularly in light of the inadequacy of such review to avert the claimed potential harm to the judicial system.
Cook County also contends that the writ of prohibition may not issue unless a petitioner's arguments concern the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal ( People ex rel. No. 3 J. & E. Discount, Inc. v. Whitler (1980), 81 Ill.2d 473, 480) and that the Board has clear jurisdiction and authority to determine who is a public employer or joint employer. As we explained in Whitler (81 Ill.2d at 479-80), one of the four conditions for issuance of a writ of prohibition is that the action sought to be prohibited must be either outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal or, if within its jurisdiction, beyond its legitimate authority.  (Emphasis added.) Though their jurisdictional argument is somewhat confusingly stated, the four chief judges contend in essence that the Board exceeds at least its legitimate authority if not its very jurisdiction by certifying counties as joint employers with chief judges in regard to court employees and by disregarding constitutional questions surrounding the issue. Arguments such as the four chief judges' need not be wholly correct in order to concern jurisdiction; thus, for this reason alone, Cook County's contention is inadequate. More importantly, the condition for issuance of a writ is that the inferior tribunal's jurisdiction or authority would actually be exceeded by the action to be prohibited, not merely that the petitioner argue concerning that issue. Because we find that the Board does in fact exceed its legitimate authority when it classifies chief judges and counties as joint employers of court employees, the condition is satisfied. It is of no moment that the Board arguably lacks power to declare a statute such as the funding statutes unconstitutional and to refuse to follow it. While it may be that the Board had no choice other than to follow the statutes, this does not mean that achieving an unconstitutional result by so doing lies within the Board's legitimate authority. Even if the Board in a sense was statutorily left powerless to avoid straying outside its legitimate authority as ultimately defined by us, the fact remains that, by declaring the result of the Board's actions to be ultra vires, we can do for the Board what it could not do for itself, i.e., construe the constitution so as to limit its authority and then keep the Board within that authority. Once having made such a declaration, as we do in this opinion, we can and do view the writ of prohibition's jurisdiction-related condition for issuance to have been met.
We need not address Cook County's contention that the four chief judges rely on incompetent summaries of factual matters as evidence. Cook County argues that to support their petition the four chief judges are not entitled to cite offers of proof, or statements contained in amicus curiae briefs filed in other Board cases, as evidence of county co-employer interference with judicial administration. The four chief judges reply that they are compelled to cite offers of proof because the precedent of successful arguments by Cook County itself in County of Cook led to exclusion of the actual proof from the Board record in the present case. Even if Cook County is procedurally correct, the four chief judges' petition need not depend on such evidentiary submissions. If, as we decide, requiring a chief judge and a county to bargain as joint employers of court employees inevitably invades the administrative province of the courts, thereby contravening the separation of powers and tending to undermine the unity of the court system, we need not consider evidence that such a requirement already has impeded judicial administration. Therefore, whether or not the four chief judges would be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Cook County has failed to show that prohibition does not lie in this cause.