Opinion ID: 668532
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Relevance of the Book Review Context

Text: In contrast to the situation in Milkovich, the instant case involves a context, a book review, in which the allegedly libelous statements were evaluations quintessentially of a type readers expect to find in that genre. The challenged statements in the Times review consist solely of the reviewer's comments on a literary work, and therefore must be judged with an eye toward readers' expectations and understandings of book reviews. This would not be the case if, for example, the review stated or implied that Interference was a badly written book because its author was a drug dealer. In that situation, this case would parallel Milkovich: the reviewer would simply be employing the medium of a book review as a vehicle for what would be a garden-variety libel, and the review would thus potentially be actionable. There is a long and rich history in our cultural and legal traditions of affording reviewers latitude to comment on literary and other works. The statements at issue in the instant case are assessments of a book, rather than direct assaults on Moldea's character, reputation, or competence as a journalist. While a bad review necessarily has the effect of injuring an author's reputation to some extent--sometimes to a devastating extent, as Moldea alleges is true here--criticism's long and impressive pedigree persuades us that, while a critic's latitude is not unlimited, he or she must be given the constitutional breathing space appropriate to the genre. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272, 84 S.Ct. 710, 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). We believe that the Times has suggested the appropriate standard for evaluating critical reviews: The proper analysis would make commentary actionable only when the interpretations are unsupportable by reference to the written work. Petition for Rehearing at 8 (emphasis added). This supportable interpretation standard provides that a critic's interpretation must be rationally supportable by reference to the actual text he or she is evaluating, and thus would not immunize situations analogous to that presented in Milkovich, in which a writer launches a personal attack, rather than interpreting a book. This standard also establishes boundaries even for textual interpretation. A critic's statement must be a rational assessment or account of something the reviewer can point to in the text, or omitted from the text, being critiqued. For instance, if the Times review stated that Interference was a terrible book because it asserted that African-Americans make poor football coaches, that reading would be unsupportable by reference to the written work, because nothing in Moldea's book even hints at this notion. In such a case, the usual inquiries as to libel would apply: a jury could determine that the review falsely characterized Interference, thereby libeling its author by portraying him as a racist (assuming the other elements of the case could be proved). Our decision to apply the supportable interpretation standard to book reviews finds strong support in analogous decisions of the Supreme Court, all decided or reaffirmed after Milkovich. These cases establish that when a writer is evaluating or giving an account of inherently ambiguous materials or subject matter, the First Amendment requires that the courts allow latitude for interpretation. For example, in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984), a decision the Court discussed and reaffirmed in Masson, a reviewer writing for Consumer Reports magazine described the experience of listening to music through a pair of stereo speakers: [I]ndividual instruments heard through the Bose system seemed to grow to gigantic proportions and tended to wander about the room. Bose, 466 U.S. at 488, 104 S.Ct. at 1953. Bose Corporation sued for defamation, alleging that the reviewer's unflattering portrayal was factually inaccurate. The Court held that the statements were not actionable, because they were not so obviously false as to sustain a finding of actual malice. As the Court interpreted Bose in Masson: [T]he result was not an assessment of events that speak for themselves, but one of a number of possible rational interpretations of an event that bristled with ambiguities and descriptive challenges for the writer. We refused to permit recovery for choice of language which, though perhaps reflecting a misconception, represented the sort of inaccuracy that is commonplace in the forum of robust debate to which the New York Times rule applies. Masson, 501 U.S. at 518, 111 S.Ct. at 2434 (quoting Bose, 466 U.S. at 512, 513, 104 S.Ct. at 1966) (internal citation omitted). The Court's opinion in Bose relied heavily on its earlier decision in Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 91 S.Ct. 633, 28 L.Ed.2d 45 (1971). Pape reversed a libel judgment against a reporter who had summarized a report by the United States Commission on Civil Rights discussing civil rights abuses by police officers. The article quoted the Commission's summary of the facts of an alleged incident of police brutality, but failed to state that the Commission had qualified its remarks by noting that they were taken from a civil complaint. As in Bose, the Court held that the claim was not actionable because the publication was not sufficiently false to sustain a finding of actual malice. See Masson, 501 U.S. at 518, 111 S.Ct. at 2434. Masson explained that Pape distinguished between a 'direct account of events that speak for themselves' and an article descriptive of what the Commission had reported. Time, Inc. v. Pape took into account the difficult choices that confront an author who departs from direct quotation and offers his own interpretation of an ambiguous source. Masson, 501 U.S. at 518, 111 S.Ct. at 2434 (quoting Pape, 401 U.S. at 285, 91 S.Ct. at 637) (internal citation omitted). Finally, Masson itself noted that: The protection for rational interpretation serves First Amendment principles by allowing an author the interpretive license that is necessary when relying upon ambiguous sources. 501 U.S. at 518, 111 S.Ct. at 2434. Masson concluded that in order to state a claim for defamation based upon the alteration of direct quotations, a plaintiff must show that the alterations resulted in a material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement. Id. at 517, 111 S.Ct. at 2433. 3 Although Masson, Bose and Pape all concerned the evidence necessary to establish actual malice, those decisions are rooted in the question of a plaintiff's ability to prove falsity so as to show that a defendant presented information he or she knew to be false. 4 Because of their focus on falsity, the reasoning of these decisions is fully applicable to the instant case. Masson, Bose and Pape recognized that some materials by their very nature require interpretation, and that the First Amendment affords latitude to those engaged in that task. Reasonable minds can and do differ as to how to interpret a literary work. Accordingly, as Masson counsels, we must allow a degree of interpretive license. 501 U.S. at 518, 111 S.Ct. at 2434.