Opinion ID: 2598865
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Refusal to provide new counsel with trial transcript for motion for new trial and for sentencing and inadequacy of representation on sentencing.

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court's failure to provide his posttrial counsel, who did not represent him at trial, with a transcript of the trial rendered his counsel's posttrial representation inadequate. Gregory Coggs represented the defendant at trial, which began October 10, 2000, and ended October 20, 2000. On December 8, 2000, this court indefinitely suspended Coggs from the practice of law in Kansas. See In re Coggs, 270 Kan. 381, 14 P.3d 1123 (2000). On the same day, the trial court appointed Nancy Roe to replace Coggs  not based upon Coggs' suspension but based upon the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. There are two aspects to the defendant's argument. The first is the preservation for appeal of potential trial errors. The second is the denial of effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The defendant cites an Iowa case, State v. Brodene, 493 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1992), which involved similar facts. It was that court's remedy to excuse the new counsel from any preservation of error requirements in preparing and presenting the posttrial motions. 493 N.W.2d at 795. Such a remedy is appropriate in this case and eliminates the first aspect of the defendant's alleged error. The defendant's rights on appeal have not been prejudiced based on Roe not having preserved any issues for appeal. The defendant appears to concede as much in his brief on appeal. The second aspect of the defendant's argument is more troubling. The question is whether the defendant was adequately represented during sentencing. While the defendant does not argue that his new counsel was ineffective at sentencing, the defendant raises the issue of the fairness of his sentencing proceeding, and the State has had an opportunity to respond to that argument. Ordinarily, the appellate court will not consider an issue which has not been raised before the trial court and which has not been raised by the parties on appeal. However, we have the power to consider sua sponte an issue for the first time on appeal if to do so is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent the denial of fundamental rights. State v. Puckett, 230 Kan. 596, 600-01, 640 P.2d 1198 (1982). A remand is not necessary if the ineffective assistance of counsel is apparent from reading the cold record. See State v. Cheeks, 258 Kan. 581, 593-94, 908 P.2d 175 (1995). Given the defendant's overall argument that he was denied a fair hearing at sentencing, and given our reading of this record, we are now compelled to consider the effectiveness of the defendant's counsel at sentencing. The facts are not in dispute, and the cold record speaks for itself as to the issue we address. The question becomes a legal determination under the record before us. The defendant's new counsel Roe, because she did not represent the defendant during trial, requested a trial transcript to aid in her preparation for motion for new trial and sentencing. In response, the trial court suggested new counsel contact the defendant's trial counsel Coggs to discuss trial issues and sentencing. Coggs failed to attend a meeting Roe scheduled. Roe again requested a trial transcript. The court again suggested Roe contact Coggs, and again Coggs failed to attend a meeting Roe had scheduled. Roe was unable to reach Coggs a third time. We have already addressed the failure to provide counsel with a transcript for the defendant's motion for new trial. The trial court's failure to order a trial transcript for Roe in regards to the defendant's motion for new trial was not error. We do not believe it was error for the trial court to deny Roe a trial transcript for sentencing. Roe was appointed on December 8, 2000, and the sentencing was not held until April 11, 2001. Thus, the defendant's new attorney had over 4 months to prepare for sentencing. By reading the court file, she would have known that the defense of mental disease or defect was asserted. Although Roe found it impossible to meet with trial counsel Coggs, there were others she could have spoken with. She could have spoken with Dr. Parks and Dr. Hatcher about their testimony. She could have spoken with the defendant about his testimony and the underlying facts. She had ample time without a transcript to prepare for the defendant's sentencing hearing. We note that it was the court which pointed out on the record that the psychiatric testimony involving PTSD was a matter that could be considered by the court in sentencing the defendant. Although not considered weighty enough to deter the court from imposing a hard 50 sentence, we note that even absent a record, the defendant's trial witnesses were still available. In a more relaxed sentencing proceeding, these witnesses could have offered additional testimony on the defendant's behalf. K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-4635 (b) provides: In order to make such a determination [sentence for murder in the first degree based upon the finding of premeditated murder], the court may be presented evidence concerning any matter that the court deems relevant to the question of sentence and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in K.S.A. 21-4636 and amendments thereto and any mitigating circumstances. Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, provided that the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements. Moreover, various exhibits were in the record that may have been helpful to the defendant. We are struck by the record of the sentencing hearing. Counsel did little if anything to represent the defendant during the sentencing hearing. Essentially, counsel absolved herself of responsibility by stating to the court that she had no transcript and thus was not in a position to add anything during sentencing. The record discloses the following: Ms. Morehead [Prosecutor]: Additionally, judge, since this is a premeditated first-degree murder case, you are required under statute to first consider imposing a Hard 50 sentence. And under the provisions of that statute, you have to find that there are aggravating circumstances that apply. In this case, there are two that come to my mind that specifically apply and would warrant the giving of a Hard 50. Ms. Roe: Your Honor, I don't mean to interrupt, but was there notice of Hard 50 in this case? Ms. Morehead: There is no requirement of notice. THE COURT: No longer a requirement. There was at one time for the 40, was there not? Ms. Morehead: Yes, Judge. There is no requirement that notice be given for Hard 50. THE COURT: Yeah. Ms. Morehead: Judge, two of the factors that I think are evident in this case are, first of all, the fact that Mr. Washington has a prior conviction for an offense that involves either great bodily harm or death . . . . The second one is the cruel and heinous nature of this offense. . . . . . . . THE COURT: Ms. Roe. Ms. ROE: We would object to the Hard 50, your honor. Unfortunately, I'm not in a position to argue facts that I'm not aware of. The above exchange indicates to this court that defense counsel was not aware of the statutory provisions relating to a hard 50 sentence even though she appeared for the defendant who was facing a hard 50 sentence. This portion of the record and defense counsel's failure to present any response on behalf of the defendant raises a genuine concern as to whether the defendant's counsel had read the provisions of the statute before sentencing. The record also raises genuine concern about the amount of time counsel spent preparing for this sentencing hearing even though she had a full 4 months to prepare. The State in its brief on appeal argues that the defendant has failed to point to any evidence in the trial transcript that his new attorney could have used to rebut the State's argument. The State also assures this court that the trial court was on board throughout the process and therefore considered all the evidence, even evidence tending to show that the crime was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Such a response misses the mark. The defendant was entitled to adequate representation by counsel familiar with the statutory provisions relating to a hard 50 sentence. In this case, his counsel simply abdicated her position with the excuse that she had not been given a trial transcript. We have no hesitancy in concluding within the analytical framework of Strickland that the defendant's attorney at sentencing made errors so serious that she was not functioning as counsel as that word is used in the Sixth Amendment. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 678, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Furthermore, the record supports the conclusion that the performance of the defendant's attorney at sentencing prejudiced the defendant's rights at sentencing. Under these circumstances, we must vacate the defendant's sentences and remand for resentencing.