Opinion ID: 1697840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court's grant of stewman's motion for a new trial is appealable

Text: ¶ 33. This Court accepted the Defendants' petition for interlocutory appeal on the issue of new trial. As stated in Issue I, sufficient evidence was introduced at trial to reasonably conclude that White was not negligent, and the jury verdict was based on substantial evidence. Therefore, we held that the trial court erred by setting aside the jury verdict and granting the peremptory instruction. Now, we examine the trial court's grant of a new trial, and this Court finds that the jury verdict shall be reinstated in favor of the Defendants. M.R.C.P. 50(c) provides that the court: [S]hall specify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for new trial . . . In the case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. (Emphasis added); see also Comments to Rule 50. Clearly, M.R.C.P. 50(c) gives this Court the authority to review the grant of a new trial. But see Maxwell v. Illinois Central Gulf R. R., 513 So.2d 901 (Miss.1987); McFarland v. Entergy Mississippi, Inc., 918 So.2d 697 (Miss.Ct.App. 2005); and Hearn v. Brown, 876 So.2d 380 (Miss.Ct.App.2003). This Court then can either affirm or reverse the trial court's grant of new trial, whichever is appropriate in each case. ¶ 34. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also offer guidance on the issue of whether an appellate court can rule on a motion for new trial. See Stubblefield v. Jesco, Inc., 464 So.2d 47, 59-60 (Miss.1984)(generally federal practice should be our guide when considering questions arising under the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure). The language unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered is the same in F.R.C.P. 50(c) and M.R.C.P. 50(c). Wright and Miller look to the Advisory Committee Note to F.R.C.P. 50(c)(1) and state that the appellate court, if it reverses the [J.N.O.V.], may in an appropriate case also reverse the conditional grant of the new trial and direct that judgment be entered on the verdict. Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2540, p. 376-77, n. 32. The guidance provided by the federal rules and Wright and Millers comments to the F.R.C.P. 50(c) are instructive in the interpretation of the language of M.R.C.P. 50(c). The federal guidance on the language unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered supports this Court's interpretation of the same language in M.R.C.P. 50(c) that the grant of a new trial can be reversed when the particular circumstances of a case warrant a reversal. ¶ 35. In Maxwell, 513 So.2d at 907-08, this Court held that the J.N.O.V. granted in favor of the Railroad was reversible error and sent the case back for a new trial. We find that this ruling was correct under the facts of that case. The issue on appeal was whether the Railroad breached its duty to sound the whistle once [the plaintiff] was spotted on the tracks. Id. at 906. Unlike the facts in the case before us today, the facts as to the whistle were in dispute in Maxwell. The issue of whether the whistle sounded concerned a weight of the evidence review as opposed to its legal sufficiency. The Court, in Maxwell, allowed the new trial because the trial court erred by granting the J.N.O.V., and the new trial was based on the verdict being contrary to the weight of the evidence. Id. at 907. However, the Court held that just because the J.N.O.V. should not have been granted [it] in no way compell[ed] the conclusion that the Circuit Court also erred in ordering a new trial. Id. at 908. A reverse of a trial judge's ruling on a request for new trial is proper only when it amounts to an abuse of discretion. Id.; see also Whitten v. Cox, 799 So.2d 1, 7 (Miss.2000); Thornhill v. Wilson, 504 So.2d 1205, 1209 (Miss. 1987). ¶ 36. Clearly, the Court in Maxwell did not limit its authority or jurisdiction in new trial matters. However, this Court did not specifically address M.R.C.P. 50(c) in Maxwell. In Hearn and McFarland, the Court of Appeals misinterpreted this Court's holding in Maxwell. The Court of Appeals in Hearn found that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to reach the issue of new trial. In Hearn, the Court of Appeals held: Once this Court determined that the circuit court erred in granting J.N.O.V., the conditional nature of the order for new trial on liability was removed, and it became the operative direction of the circuit court as to how the case would proceed at the trial level. Because of its interlocutory nature, that order is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to consider. Hearn, 876 So.2d at 384. McFarland followed the same reasoning as Hearn, that being a lack of jurisdiction to review the conditional order for a new trial. McFarland, 918 So.2d at 705. ¶ 37. M.R.C.P. 1 provides, in part [t]hese rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Obviously, the drafter's of the Rules and commentary responsible for Rule 50(c) recognize the absurdity of blind adherence to pre-rule practice regarding the conditional grant of a new trial by including the language unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. ¶ 38. Therefore, we find that M.R.C.P. 50(c) gives this Court the authority to review the grant of a new trial. We, therefore, expressly overrule any holding contrary to today's decision. We find that the trial court erred by granting the peremptory instruction, which was the legal equivalent of a grant of the motion for J.N.O.V., and the grant of a new trial to the Plaintiff and reverse and render judgment in favor of the Defendants.