Opinion ID: 2630270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Tape Recordings

Text: [¶ 5] At trial, Garza's girlfriend, KV, was called by the State in its case-in-chief to testify regarding her recollection of the events on June 17, 2007, the last day JM alleged Garza had assaulted her. Immediately before KV testified, the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the district court discussed the use of certain tape recorded conversations between Garza and KV which occurred while Garza was incarcerated in the Laramie County Detention Center awaiting trial in this case. The prosecutor indicated she would use the recordings for impeachment, pursuant to W.R.E. 613 and 801(d), only if KV denied making certain statements. [¶ 6] During KV's testimony, the prosecutor attempted to use the recordings, and defense counsel objected. Defense counsel argued that the prosecutor was impermissibly using the recordings in an attempt to introduce statements made by Garza to KV as substantive evidence in the State's case rather than for the stated purpose of impeaching KV with her prior statements. Defense counsel further maintained that Garza's statements to KV were inadmissible hearsay and irrelevant to the issues at trial. The district court ultimately determined that the tape recordings, which indicated an attempt by Garza to influence the testimony of prospective witnesses, were admissible under W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A) as admissions of a party opponent. [2] The district court specifically found Garza's statements to be relevant because they tended to show indicia of guilt. The district court also found that the recordings were relevant and admissible insofar as they could impeach KV's testimony. [¶ 7] Garza asserts reversible error in the admission of the tape recordings. He essentially argues, in a nonsensical and confusing manner, that the recordings were improper impeachment material and otherwise irrelevant, inadmissible evidence. In reviewing the propriety of the district court's evidentiary ruling, we are guided by the following principles: Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and include determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, materiality, and remoteness of the evidence. This Court will generally accede to the trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court clearly abused its discretion. We have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice. Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. In the absence of an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's determination. The burden is on the defendant to establish such an abuse. Brown v. State, 2005 WY 37, ¶ 12, 109 P.3d 52, 56 (Wyo.2005) (quotation marks and internal citations omitted); see also Farmer v. State, 2005 WY 162, ¶ 8, 124 P.3d 699, 703 (Wyo.2005); Holloman v. State, 2005 WY 25, ¶ 10, 106 P.3d 879, 883 (Wyo.2005). [¶ 8] We need not address the impeachment value of the tape recordings because we agree with the district court's ruling that they were admissible as statements by a party opponent under W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A). We also agree with the district court that the recordings were relevant because they showed indicia of guilt. See Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 543 (Wyo.2000); 2 McCormick on Evidence § 265 (6th ed.2006). We have followed the principle that evidence of an attempt to fabricate evidence is particularly harmful to a defendant since it is an incriminating circumstance inconsistent with innocence and tends to show consciousness of guilt. Miller v. State, 830 P.2d 419, 427 (Wyo.1992). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's admission of the challenged evidence.