Opinion ID: 1428788
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standing to maintain declaratory judgment action

Text: Standing questions are limited to whether the litigant is a `proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue... .' Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 24 n. 25 (Alaska 1976) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952-53, 20 L.Ed.2d 947, 961 (1968)). Standing in our state courts is not a constitutional doctrine; rather, it is a rule of judicial self-restraint based on the principle that courts should not resolve abstract questions or issue advisory opinions. Id. The basic requirement for standing in Alaska is adversity. Id. The concept of standing has been interpreted broadly in Alaska. We have departed from a restrictive interpretation of the standing requirement, Coghill v. Boucher, 511 P.2d 1297, 1303 (Alaska 1973), adopting instead an approach favoring increased accessibility to judicial forums. Moore v. State, 553 P.2d at 23; see also State v. Lewis, 559 P.2d 630, 634 n. 7 (Alaska) (and cases cited therein), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 901, 97 S.Ct. 2943, 53 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1977). Our cases have discussed two different kinds of standing. One is interest-injury standing; the other is citizen-taxpayer standing. Under the interest-injury approach, a plaintiff must have an interest adversely affected by the conduct complained of. Such an interest may be economic, Moore, 553 P.2d at 24; Wagstaff v. Superior Court, Family Court Division, 535 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska 1975), or it may be intangible, such as an aesthetic or environmental interest. Lewis, 559 P.2d at 635. The degree of injury to the interest need not be great; `[t]he basic idea ... is that an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of principle; the trifle is the basis for standing and the principle supplies the motivation.' Wagstaff, 535 P.2d at 1225 & n. 7 (quoting Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U.Chi.L.Rev. 601, 613 (1968)). In the instant case, the appellants assert that they have standing as citizens or taxpayers, rather than because their interests are injured. In prior cases, we have often permitted taxpayers or citizens to challenge governmental action based on their status as taxpayers or citizens. In many such cases, standing has been assumed and not discussed. [2] We have, however, explicitly addressed taxpayer-citizen standing on other occasions. For example, in Coghill v. Boucher, 511 P.2d 1297 (Alaska 1973), registered voters (one of whom was also a poll watcher) were allowed to challenge certain proposed vote-counting procedures. In finding standing, we stated: In the case at bar, we conclude that a retreat to restrictive notions of standing, as urged by appellee, would not advance the public's vital interest in maintenance of the integrity of vote-tallying procedures during statewide elections. Denial of standing to appellants in the instant case would have the effect of unduly limiting the possibility of a popular check upon executive control of the election process. If registered voters and poll watchers are foreclosed from seeking judicial review of administrative regulation of this sensitive aspect of our governmental system, then it may well be that any review of executive activity in this area would be completely foreclosed, particularly in the event that candidates or political parties were unwilling to challenge such administrative actions. We decline to restrict the public's access to Alaska's courts in such a manner. Id. at 1304. We also discussed the question of taxpayer standing in Lewis, 559 P.2d 630. At issue was the legality of a three-way land trade between the state, the federal government, and a native regional corporation. Our characterization of the plaintiffs' interest in Lewis applies in this case. Here, plaintiffs are seeking to protect mineral resources in land originally selected from the federal government under the Statehood Act. Their interest in the state's retention of mineral rights in state lands is no less significant than the aesthetic and environmental values sought to be vindicated in Sierra Club [ v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972)] and [ United States v. ] SCRAP [,412 U.S. 669, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973)]. 559 P.2d at 635. We declined to decide whether standing should be allowed in all taxpayer or citizen actions, but we allowed taxpayer standing in Lewis. Several factors influenced our conclusion: the land transfer allegedly violated specific constitutional limitations, the transfer was significant in size and in its potential economic impact on the state, and no one seemed to be in a better position than the plaintiffs to complain of the illegality of the transaction. Id. In Carpenter v. Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204 (Alaska), appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 801, 104 S.Ct. 45, 78 L.Ed.2d 67 (1983), we affirmed, in an alternative holding, the standing of a citizen to challenge the reapportionment of a House District in which she did not reside or vote. We stated: In the instant case, Carpenter alleges that District 2 violates a specific constitutional limitation and that the disputed transaction (the drawing of election district lines) arguably will have a significant impact on the state. Here the dispute over District 2 has been fully briefed, argued at trial and on appeal, and there is no one in a better position than Carpenter to litigate these issues. In our view, Carpenter also meets the standing criteria of Lewis. Id. at 1210 (footnote omitted). Gilman v. Martin, 662 P.2d 120 (Alaska 1983), involved a challenge to a municipal sale of land. We upheld taxpayer standing, stating that [a]ny resident or taxpayer of a municipality has a sufficient interest in the disposition of a significant number of acres of the municipality's land to seek a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the disposition. Id. at 123. In Hoblit v. Commissioner of Natural Resources, 678 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1984), we held that plaintiff did not have standing as a taxpayer to challenge the sale of some twenty acres of state land. We distinguished Gilman on the grounds that the amount of acreage involved in Hoblit was not significant. 678 P.2d at 1341. Similarly, we distinguished Lewis because the `magnitude of the transaction and its potential economic impact on the State' which were determinative in Lewis are simply lacking here. Id. We remanded for a determination as to whether or not the plaintiff had standing because of his status as an adjoining land owner. Id. at 1341-42. This review of taxpayer-citizen standing in Alaska clearly demonstrates that taxpayer-citizen status is a sufficient basis on which to challenge allegedly illegal government conduct on matters of significant public concern. Taxpayer-citizen standing has never been denied in any decision of this court, except on the basis that the controversy was not of public significance, [3] or on the basis that the plaintiff was not a taxpayer. [4] However, Lewis and Carpenter suggested, without deciding, that taxpayer-citizen standing may be denied even in cases of public significance under certain circumstances. [5] In our view, taxpayer-citizen standing cannot be claimed in all cases as a matter of right. Rather, each case must be examined to determine if several criteria have been met. First, the case in question must be one of public significance. [6] On measure of significance may be that specific constitutional limitations are at issue, as in Carpenter and Lewis. That is not an exclusive measure of significance, however, as statutory and common law questions may also be very important. [7] Second, the plaintiff must be appropriate in several respects. For example, standing may be denied if there is a plaintiff more directly affected by the challenged conduct in question who has or is likely to bring suit. The same is true if there is no true adversity of interest, such as a sham plaintiff whose intent is to lose the lawsuit and thus create judicial precedent upholding the challenged action. [8] Further, standing may be denied if the plaintiff appears to be incapable, for economic or other reasons, of competently advocating the position it has asserted. [9] The instant case is undoubtedly one of public significance. If appellants prevail, the state must change its method of making state land available for mining. Some 50,000 existing mining claims may be affected. Under the current system, according to the appellants, the state is illegally giving up more than $100,000 annually in royalties. Further, the state is at risk of forfeiting to the United States extensive areas of state lands. The state has correctly acknowledged the significance of this case. We turn now to consider whether appellants are appropriate parties to bring this suit. They are well represented by competent counsel who have forcefully presented their position. They are not sham plaintiffs; their sincerity in opposing the state's mineral disposition system is unquestioned. On the other hand, the state argues that there is a potential plaintiff with a more direct interest in the validity of the state's system. The state contends that the Attorney General of the United States may bring a forfeiture proceeding under section 6(i) and that this possibility means that appellants lack standing. In our view, the mere possibility that the Attorney General may sue does not mean that appellants are inappropriate plaintiffs. In Carpenter, a resident and voter of the House District in question would theoretically have been more interested in litigating the question whether the district was malapportioned than was the non-resident plaintiff in that case. However, no such person had filed suit. We noted that the issues had been fully presented at trial and on appeal by the plaintiff, and held that she had standing. 667 P.2d at 1210. Similarly, in Coghill v. Boucher , we suggested that candidates or political parties might be more interested than registered voters and poll watchers in challenging the vote-counting procedures at issue. However, they had not done so. We noted that if the plaintiffs were not afforded standing, it may well be that any review of executive activity in this area would be completely foreclosed. 511 P.2d at 1034. Thus, the crucial inquiry is whether the more directly concerned potential plaintiff has sued or seems likely to sue in the foreseeable future. The Attorney General has not sued nor are there any indications that he plans to do so. Moreover, the appellants' interest in this suit is different than the Attorney General's would be if suit were brought in the United States District Court pursuant to section 6(i). Appellants are interested in preserving to the state the economic value of these lands. The Attorney General, however, would be bringing an action for forfeiture of these lands, contrary to appellants' interest. For these reasons we conclude that appellants have standing as taxpayer-citizens to maintain this action.
There has been much litigation concerning the meaning and scope of various statehood act land grants and their restrictions. [10] There have been frequent questions of ownership of the granted lands as between private or governmental contestants. [11] Much of this litigation has occurred in the state courts. The question presented in this case is whether Congress intended to preclude all litigation concerning the meaning of section 6(i) by enacting the proviso which reads: That any lands or minerals hereafter disposed of contrary to the provisions of this section shall be forfeited to the United States by appropriate proceedings instituted by the Attorney General for that purpose in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. In our view, this question must be answered in the negative. It is clear that Congress intended that only the U.S. Attorney General could bring forfeiture proceedings and that such proceedings could only be brought in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. No inference can be drawn, however, from either the context or the history of the Statehood Act that forfeiture proceedings were meant to be the only means by which a judicial interpretation of the meaning of section 6(i) could be obtained. The sole reference to the land grant forfeiture provision which we have found in the legislative history appears in the Senate Report accompanying a 1954 bill providing for the admission of Alaska into the Union, S. 50, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954): The Attorney General is authorized to take appropriate proceedings for forfeiture of any of the lands granted to the State which are disposed of contrary to these restrictions. In making the above provision, the committee has followed the practice prevalent in a number of mining States  a practice that has stood the test of time and experience. S.Rep. No. 1028, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1954). This reference is to the forfeiture clause of the Act of January 25, 1927 (commonly called the School Lands Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1026, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 870(b) (1982)), which extended to public land states grants of certain numbered school sections which were mineral in character. [12] This clause has not prevented judicial interpretation of the School Lands Act in nonforfeiture proceedings. [13] We hold that the identical language in section 6(i) has a similar, non-preclusive effect. It would be unusual in the extreme if a state court could not construe the meaning of its state's Statehood Act. In the absence of any indication that Congress intended to bar our state courts from interpreting section 6(i), we conclude that appellants' declaratory judgment action seeking an interpretation of section 6(i) may be maintained.