Opinion ID: 360429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grievous Loss.

Text: 43 The second constitutional claim urged by the plaintiffs met its death knell under the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976), and Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 97 S.Ct. 274, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976). 44 Under the grievous loss theory, the deleterious impact of a particular deprivation upon a prisoner's residuum of liberty could be so significant as to trigger the procedural protections engrained in the Fourteenth Amendment. A prime example of the application of the grievous loss theory may be found in United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973), Cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146, 94 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed.2d 102 (1974), in which this Circuit held that prolonged segregatory confinement constituted a grievous loss necessitating the procedural protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. 45 In Meachum, the Supreme Court held that other than liberty interests which originate in the Constitution, a state prisoner must seek the source of a liberty interest in state law. 427 U.S. at 226, 96 S.Ct. 2532. Thus, Meachum means that a prisoner is not constitutionally entitled to procedural protections unless he establishes a constitutional right or he has some justifiable expectation rooted in state law that the challenged action will not be taken absent the occurrence of a specified factual predicate. Montanye, 427 U.S. at 242-43, 96 S.Ct. 2543. 46 The Meachum demise of the grievous loss theory as a source of liberty interests was noted and mourned in a dissent by Justice Stevens. Justice Stevens realized and deplored the fact that Meachum emasculated the view he expressed as a Circuit Judge in Miller, 427 U.S. at 235, 96 S.Ct. 2532. 47 The First Circuit has also implicitly realized that the grievous loss theory cannot support the finding of a liberty interest for prisoners placed in segregation. See Four Certain Unnamed Inmates of Mass., etc. v. Hall, 550 F.2d 1291 (1st Cir. 1977). See also Walker v. Hughes, 558 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 (6th Cir. 1977). The rationale underlying Meachum which dealt the death blow to the grievous loss theory has also been chronicled in numerous law review articles. See, e. g., Calhoun, The Supreme Court and The Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: A Reappraisal, 4 Hastings Con.L.Q. 219 (1977); Note, Two Views of a Prisoner's Right to Due Process: Meachum v. Fano, 12 Harv. Civil Rights Civil Liberties L.Rev. 405 (1977); Note, Involuntary Interprison Transfers of State Prisoners After Meachum v. Fano and Montanye v. Haymes, 37 Ohio State L.J. 845 (1976). 48 Plaintiffs argue that Meachum and Montanye merely establish a transfer rule and denounce the Department's broad construction of those cases as unwarranted. They rely on some language in Meachum and two of the Court's post-Meachum cases for the conclusion that procedural protections are triggered where the grievous loss flows from segregation. 49 It is true that in Meachum the Supreme Court noted that (n)one of the transfers ordered entailed . . . disciplinary confinement. 427 U.S. at 222, 96 S.Ct. at 2537. However, a reading of Meachum and Montanye establishes that the Court's rationale leaves no room in which to identify a principled basis for differentiating between a transfer from the general prison population to solitary confinement and a transfer involving equally disparate conditions between one physical facility and another. 427 U.S. at 235, 96 S.Ct. at 2543 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 50 The plaintiffs' reliance on two post-Meachum cases in which this Circuit continued to questionably embrace the grievous loss theory is misplaced. In Holmes v. United States Board of Parole, 541 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1976), this Court distinguished Meachum and held that the classification of a federal prisoner as a special offender constituted a grievous loss and triggered due process protections. The rationale of Holmes was overruled in Solomon v. Benson, 563 F.2d 339 (7th Cir. 1977). It is, however, significant to note that in Holmes the panel distinguished Meachum on the basis that established prison policy and guidelines created a justifiable expectation that special offender status would only be established following Wolff -type due process. 541 F.2d at 1252-53. 51 The plaintiffs' claim that Aikens v. Lash, 547 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1976), established the proposition that an interprison transfer resulting in segregation constitutes a grievous loss requiring procedural protections in spite of the Meachum decision is also misplaced. Aikens grew up during the advent of Meachum and its reach is not as broad as plaintiffs suggest because of crucial concessions made by the defendants in that case. Aikens was before this Court on two occasions after the District Court ruled that procedural protections had to accompany interprison transfers resulting in segregation and specified which protections were due. 371 F.Supp. 482 (N.D.Ind.1974). In reaching its conclusion, the District Court relied primarily upon Miller. On appeal, the state conceded that procedural protections were required and argued only that the District Court had gone too far. This Court affirmed. 514 F.2d 55, 57 n.5 (7th Cir. 1975). However, the Supreme Court, 425 U.S. 947, 96 S.Ct. 1721, 48 L.Ed.2d 191 (1976), vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976). By the time Aikens was reconsidered, Meachum and Montanye had been decided and the panel was aware that the rationale underlying those decisions could undercut the threshold conclusion in Aikens that there was a liberty interest requiring due process. However, the Court did not need to meet this question in view of the state's concession that Meachum and Montanye were distinguishable since neither involved segregation. 547 F.2d at 373 n.1. Thus, plaintiffs incorrectly interpret Aikens as post-Meachum authority for the proposition that segregation alone is sufficient to trigger due process requirements. 52