Opinion ID: 2585351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Generality of Benefits

Text: Even when the government relief accorded religious institutions cannot be characterized as an accommodation of free exercise, the proper governmental stance of neutrality toward religion may manifest itself in an evenhanded provision of benefits to religious and secular institutions alike. This is true not only when the scope of benefits approaches universality (see Everson v. Board of Education, supra, 330 U.S. at pp. 17-18, 67 S.Ct. 504 [citing such general government services as police and fire protection and sewage disposal] ), but also, as seen below, when religious institutions are included in a limited set of recipients rationally defined by a secular governmental purpose. In Walz v. Tax Commission of New York City, supra, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 ( Walz ), the high court considered a New York law exempting from property taxation corporations and associations `organized exclusively for the moral or mental improvement of men and women, or for religious, bible, tract, charitable, benevolent, missionary, hospital, infirmary, educational, public playground, scientific, literary, bar association, medical society, library, patriotic, historical or cemetery purposes.' ( Id. at p. 667, fn. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1409.) In rejecting an establishment clause challenge to the exemption, the court relied prominently on the generality with which it had been offered: The legislative purpose of the property tax exemption is neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion; it is neither sponsorship nor hostility. New York, in common with the other States, has determined that certain entities that exist in a harmonious relationship to the community at large, and that foster its `moral or mental improvement,' should not be inhibited in their activities by property taxation or the hazard of loss of those properties for nonpayment of taxes. It has not singled out one particular church or religious group or even churches as such; rather, it has granted exemption to all houses of religious worship within a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations which include hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic groups. The State has an affirmative policy that considers these groups as beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life and finds this classification useful, desirable, and in the public interest. ( Id. at pp. 672-673, 90 S.Ct. 1409.) In Texas Monthly, supra, 489 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 890, 103 L.Ed.2d 1, again facing the question whether a tax exemption benefiting religious organizations violated the establishment clause, the court distinguished the evenhanded exemption of Walz from the narrow religious benefit provided by the Texas statute: In [Walz and other cases], . . . we emphasized that the benefits derived by religious organizations flowed to a large number of nonreligious groups as well. Indeed, were those benefits confined to religious organizations, they could not have appeared other than as state sponsorship of religion. . . . ( Texas Monthly, supra, at p. 11, 109 S.Ct. 890 (plur. opn. of Brennan, J.).) In contrast, Texas' sales tax exemption for periodicals published or distributed by a religious faith and consisting wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of the faith lacks sufficient breadth to pass scrutiny under the Establishment Clause. Every tax exemption constitutes a subsidy that affects nonqualifying taxpayers, forcing them to become `indirect and vicarious donors.' [Citations.] Insofar as that subsidy is conferred upon a wide array of nonsectarian groups as well as religious organizations in pursuit of some legitimate secular end, the fact that religious groups benefit incidentally does not deprive the subsidy of the secular purpose and primary effect mandated by the Establishment Clause. However, when government directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organizations that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause and that either burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly or cannot reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion, as Texas has done . . ., it `provide[s] unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious organizations' and cannot but `conve[y] a message of endorsement' to slighted members of the community. ( Id. at pp. 14-15, 109 S.Ct. 890, fn. omitted.) The main concurring opinion agreed that by confining the tax exemption exclusively to the sale of religious publications, Texas engaged in preferential support for the communication of religious messages. ( Id. at p. 28, 109 S.Ct. 890 (cone. opn. of Blackmun, J.).) In a variety of other factual contexts, as well, the high court has considered the evenhandedness, or generality, of benefits an important factor in its establishment clause analysis. Besides Walz and Texas Monthly, one may look to such cases as Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va. (1995) 515 U.S. 819, 839-840, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (holding that use of a student activity fund to pay costs of a Christian student publication would not violate the establishment clause, because the fund was used to create an open forum for speech and publication, evenhandedly supporting a wide variety of student publications); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. (1985) 472 U.S. 703, 710, footnote 9, 105 S.Ct. 2914, 86 L.Ed.2d 557 (law requiring employers to give religious employees their Sabbath days off was held unconstitutional, in part because it gives Sabbath observers a valuable right not provided to employees with legitimate, but nonreligious, reasons for wanting a particular day off); Mueller v. Allen (1983) 463 U.S. 388, 397, 103 S.Ct. 3062, 77 L.Ed.2d 721 (state tax deduction for educational expenses was upheld, in part because its benefits extend to families with children in public schools and nonsectarian private schools); and Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist (1973) 413 U.S. 756, 794, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 37 L.Ed.2d 948 (tax benefits were held unconstitutional, in part because they would go primarily to parents of children in sectarian private schools). Just last term, in Mitchell v. Helms, supra, 530 U.S. 793, 120 S.Ct. 2530, the plurality, concurring, and dissenting justices all recognized the important role of evenhandedness in assessing an establishment clause challenge. Though the justices disagreed sharply as to whether evenhandedness in the distribution of benefits is, by itself, a sufficient condition of constitutionality under the establishment clause, all agreed it is an important, in some cases necessary, condition of constitutionality. [11] More specifically, the evenhandedness aspect of the neutrality principle bars government from engaging in religious gerrymanders. ( Walz, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 696, 90 S.Ct. 1409 (cone. opn. of Harlan, J.).) With the exception of relief reasonably needed to alleviate substantial government burdens on free exercise, religious adherents and institutions must neither be denied nor granted government benefits on the basis of religion itself. In the absence of a demonstrable need for special accommodation of religion, religious institutions must not be singled out for special treatment, though they may, of course, be included in rationally drawn regulatory groups. In any particular case the critical question is whether the circumference of legislation encircles a class so broad that it can be fairly concluded that religious institutions could be thought to fall within the natural perimeter. ( Ibid. ) Two recent cases from the same federal district court, Renzi v. Connelly School of Holy Child, supra, 61 F.Supp.2d 440 ( Renzi ), and Concerned Citizens of Carderock v. Hubbard (D.Md.2000) 84 F.Supp.2d 668 ( Concerned Citizens ), illustrate the role of generality in establishment clause challenges to land use law exemptions. In Renzi, a county zoning ordinance that required property owners to obtain a special exception for nonconforming uses in residential zones exempted any private school located on the grounds of a church or religious organization. ( Renzi, supra, 61 F.Supp.2d at p. 442.) In finding an establishment clause violation, the court relied both on the lack of a substantial burden needing accommodation ( id. at pp. 446-447) and on the ordinance's unnecessary limitation to schools on religious property, a lack of evenhandedness the court concluded violated the principle of government neutrality. In the final analysis, it is on this principle that [the exemption] founders because it fails to be neutral in a context where neutrality is possible. By favoring sectarian schools over most other non-profit private educational institutions, it belies any secular purpose and has a principal effect of advancing religion. ( Id. at p. 444, fn. omitted.) Concerned Citizens involved a different part of the same county zoning ordinance, setting out a lengthy list of nonresidential uses permitted in the county's RE 2 zones. These included churches . . . and other places of worship, but also included such diverse institutions as embassies, small bed and breakfasts, group homes, child and adult daycare facilities, adult foster care homes, libraries and museums. Non-permitted uses could be located in the zone only if they obtained a special exception. ( Concerned Citizens, supra, 84 F.Supp.2d at p. 670 & fn. 2.) In finding the ordinance passed establishment clause muster, the court again relied on generality as a measure of neutrality, concluding in this case that the ordinance grants a benefit . . . to a wide array of `nonsectarian [uses] as well as religious [uses] . . .,' [ Texas Monthly, supra, ] 489 U.S. at 14, 109 S.Ct. 890, 103 L.Ed.2d 1, consistent with its purpose of preserving single family residential neighborhoods. The Ordinance envelops a broad circle of beneficiaries designating some 41 categories of permitted uses in the RE-2 zone, into which `churches . . . and other places of religious worship' naturally fit. ( Id. at p. 674, first ellipsis added.) Renzi was distinguished as involving a law the operative characteristic [of which] was religion. ( Concerned Citizens, supra, at p. 675, italics omitted.) Both cases seem to me correctly decided, and, as discussed below, I find the present case more like Renzi than Concerned Citizens. [12] Here, too, the law's operative characteristic is religion, for sections 25373(d) and 37361(c) provide the valuable privilege of self-exemption from landmark laws solely to religiously affiliated corporations and associations. Here, too, the blanket grant of this self-exemption power was unnecessary to prevent government interference with, or to alleviate a significant burden on, the free exercise of religion. Like the ordinance in Renzi, supra, 61 F.Supp.2d at page 444, our law fails to be neutral in a context where neutrality is possible.
To state the obvious, sections 25373(d) and 37361(c) do not distribute government benefits evenhandedly to the religious and nonreligious alike; the self-exemption power they provide is given only to religiously affiliated associations and corporations. Since, as we have seen in part I, ante, the unrestricted grant of self-exemption cannot be justified as needed to alleviate a significant burden on, or prevent government interference in, the free exercise of religion, no reason appears for restricting relief to religious property owners. [13] Without such reason or justification, such a law granting valuable privileges only to religious organizations advances those organizations' missions relative to nonreligious counterparts and thus conveys a message of comparative government endorsement of religious viewpoints. While evenhandedness may not itself guarantee constitutional neutrality, a lack of evenhandedness, without a need for the discrimination, is a departure from the neutral stance required of government. The majority appears to argue that the restriction of benefits to religious organizations under sections 25373(d) and 37361(c) is constitutionally insignificant. It quotes a single sentence from Corporation of Presiding Bishop: Where, as here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities. ( Corporation of Presiding Bishop, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 338, 107 S.Ct. 2862.) In context, however, that remark says little about the role of a lack of evenhandedness in a case like this one. One must note, first, that the high court did not say that an exemption's singling out of religious organizations was always permissible, only that it was not per se invalid. ( Corporation of Presiding Bishop, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 338, 107 S.Ct. 2862, italics omitted.) The court, indeed, observed that on at least two prior occasions it had given weight to the breadth or narrowness of an exemption. ( Ibid., citing id. at p. 333, fn. 11, 107 S.Ct. 2862, citing Mueller v. Allen, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 397, 103 S.Ct. 3062, and Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, supra, 413 U.S. at p. 794, 93 S.Ct. 2955.) Second, as the quoted sentence makes explicit, Corporation of Presiding Bishop was a case in which the general law at issue, title VII's bar on religious discrimination in the workplace, in fact placed a significant burden on religious organizations' religious freedom. Indeed, the prohibition against religious discrimination in employment, by its nature, uniquely burdened the exercise of religion, because only religious employers were likely to suffer significant impairment of their legitimate activities if bound by this prohibition of title VII. Congress's decision to exempt only religious employers from the prohibition can, therefore, readily be characterized as a neutral measure to prevent interference with religion. Where, as here, however, the costs of a regulation fall more generally on secular and religious institutions, the lack of evenhandedness in granting relief by exemption becomes much more significant. Second, the majority attempts to distinguish Texas Monthly, a sales tax exemption case, as involving a forced subsidy from nonexempt taxpayers to sexempt religious publishers, relying on the Texas Monthly plurality's observation that [e]very tax exemption constitutes a subsidy that affects nonqualifying taxpayers, forcing them to become `indirect and vicarious donors.' ( Texas Monthly, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 14, 109 S.Ct. 890.) In contrast, the majority asserts, an exemption from landmark status does not create a subsidy for religious activity by forcing other property owners to be vicarious donors. (Maj. opn., ante, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 295, 13 P.3d at p. 1136.) In my view, no salient distinction appears between the manner in which sections 25373(d) and 37361(c) favor religious property owners over their nonreligious counterparts and the manner in which the Texas sales tax exemption favored religious publishers over their nonreligious counterparts. None of the Texas Monthly opinions suggest that, under Texas law, a specified dollar amount had to be raised each year from taxes on sales of books and magazines, so that the cost of the religious exemption would have to be borne exclusively by other publishers. Rather, the involuntary donation effect was described as indirect; to the extent the exemption for religious publications deprived Texas of tax revenue, the state would have to raise it from other sources or reduce the cost or amount of public services funded by the tax. The subsidy to religious taxpayers would be borne by other, nonreligious taxpayers, by the general population of state service recipients, or by both. Similarly, California has required that localities subsidize religious property owners with a valuable privilegethe power to exempt themselves from costly land use regulations. If a city, prevented by the exemption from preserving the historical and cultural value of a structure, wishes to make up as well as possible the historical and cultural deficit thereby created, it will have to designate additional landmarks and/or apply its restrictions that much more strictly to already designated buildings. Alternatively, the city may choose to forgo that amount of the public good created by historical preservation. Either way, nonadherents of the religioneither other historic property owners, the citizenry as a whole, or bothbecome involuntary donors to the religious organization's mission. To the extent, then, that land use regulation is understood to create a public good, or prevent a public harm, it stands for present purposes in a comparable position to the collection of tax revenue. Honoring religion's negative claims . . . also may produce forced subsidies. Tax exemption shifts burdens from some to others, and exemptions from regulatory schemes result in uncorrected harms of the sort with which the scheme is concerned. Exemption for religious entities from land-use regulation, for example, inescapably imposes social and economic costs upon others in the community. (Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, supra, 60 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. at pp. 750-751, fn. omitted.) Perhaps, then, the majority is relying on an unarticulated belief that historic preservation is not a sufficiently important public good, and the loss of landmarks not a significant civic threat, for Texas Monthly's subsidy rationale to be applicable. If so, I disagree. Particularly in California, with its relative paucity of historic buildings and its population perpetually rich in newcomers, preserving what landmarks we have is all the more vital to creating and continuing a sense of community. As Winston Churchill observed, We shape our buildings; thereafter they shape us. (Quoted in Simpson's Contemporary Quotations (Houghton Mifflin 1988).) Preservation of historic buildings and sites benefits the citizens in obvious ways by conserving aesthetically pleasing features of the urban landscape and by bolstering aspects of the local economy, such as tourism, that are dependent on the city's distinctive character. Beyond that, landmarks are crucial to the coherence of the community itself. In essence, `we strive to save our historic and architectural heritage simply because . . . it has become part of us.' It has become so on two levels, the individual and the communal. . . . [¶] . . . At the most basic level, a landmark can help physically orient a person in his environment; we oftentimes use landmarks to find our way about a city. A landmark, therefore, may be an important part of the `legible' cityscape. In addition, a landmark can serve to orient a person in her historical or cultural environment. . . . [¶] More importantly, a landmark can impact an individual psychologically. Buildings function as symbols, imparting meaning beyond their historical context or architectural characteristics. [¶] Preservation saves these meanings and associations. . . . [¶] On a greater scale, the cumulative effect of the icon-individual subjective experience becomes the basis for a shared communal identity with roots in the past, a present manifestation, and a foundation for the future. . . . [¶] Aside from transmitting knowledge of the past, landmark preservation functions to provide a basis for a separate, presently shared community experience. For example, an individual who has recently moved to Boston need not be specifically aware of Fenway Park's storied past, of the great baseball players who have competed there over the years, to appreciate its value as an icon in the community. By doing so, she has an immediate tie to individuals who are knowledgeable about the stadium's past, or who have resided in the community for many years. This is one, admittedly trivial, example, but taken as a whole, landmarks can serve to presently facilitate communal bonds, and thereby stability, among a spectrum of residents who might otherwise have little in common. (Nunez & Sidman, supra, 12 J.L. & Religion at pp. 311-313, fns. omitted.) Texas Monthly's rationale, therefore, appears fully applicable here. The Legislature's unjustifiably unequal treatment of religious and nonreligious property owners forces the latter, along with the citizenry as a whole, to subsidize the former's missions. The California law fails to be neutral in a context where neutrality is possible. ( Renzi supra, 61 F.Supp.2d at p. 444, fn. omitted.) Again, this is not to suggest that every exemption for a religious landmark would properly be regarded as an unconstitutional forced subsidy of religion. Where unyielding application of landmark restrictions would prevent a religious group from continuing to worship as it chooses in the landmarked building, for example, an exemption, even if targeted to a particular religious group, would be seen not as favoritism but as a reasonable accommodation of religious freedom. Nor would any establishment clause problem be presented by a hardship exemption designed and applied more generally to a rationally defined set of nonprofit religious, philosophical, charitable, educational, and civic organizations. (See Texas Monthly, supra, 489 U.S. at pp. 15-16,109 S.Ct. 890.) Unfortunately, the Legislature took neither of these approaches in sections 25373(d) and 37361(c), instead granting solely to religious organizations a unique and unjustified power of self-exemption.