Opinion ID: 1722380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admissibility of Testimony Relating to Defendant's Driving:

Text: 1. Defendant's Driving on the Day the Accident Occurred. Defendant claims error in the admission of testimony by Nelson, Jaeger and Hoffman regarding defendant's conduct in driving from his place of work in Waukesha to the scene of the accident. He claims that this evidence was irrelevant, and in the alternative, that it should have been excluded by the court because its probative value was outweighed by the danger of prejudice and misleading the jury. Sec. 904.03, Wisconsin Rules of Evidence. [5] The state argues that even if this evidence was not admissible to prove specific acts of negligence causing the accident, it was admissible to show that those acts reflected the high degree of negligence required by sec. 940.08, Stats., as an application of sec. 904.04(2), Wisconsin Rules of Evidence. [6] This latter view seems to have been taken by the circuit court in its decision on appeal: On a timely offer of proof the trial court concluded that the eyewitness observation of how the defendant operated his vehicle from the time he left work in Waukesha several miles away to the moment of the accident was admissible. On the offer of proof the determination of the court was that it be so limited to that trip. That ruling had precious little to do with habit and character but rather whether evidence of attitude, modus operandi and appearance of due care or lack of it five, ten and fifteen minutes before the accident was relevant to show negligence to a high degree in that it would cast some light on the question and be helpful to the jury in weighing and assessing other evidence. Out of this came evidence by the defendant as to how he and others were behaving on the highway: `I don't drive any faster than what they do.' `Well, do they drive too fast?' `Oh yeah, Mr. Hoffman he drives quite fast down the highway.' Also, `Did you give him a finger' `Yes' `Why?' `Because that was common. If they weren't giving me the finger I was giving it to them.' The court did not err in determining this evidence to be relevant. [6] The approach taken by the state and the circuit court must be rejected. The defendant's attitude was not an issue in this case. The evidence in question was not admissible under any of the exceptions to the character evidence rule stated in sec. 904.04 (2), Wis. Rules of Evidence. [7] The question before us is whether the testimony as to the defendant's driving before reaching the scene of the accident was properly admissible to prove defendant's high degree of negligence or whether it should have been excluded as irrelevant or too remote. [7] In Shapiro v. Klinker, 257 Wis. 622, 626, 627, 44 N.W.2d 622 (1950), this court adopted the following from 1 Jones, Evidence (4th ed.), sec. 137: `In determining a dispute concerning the relevancy of proffered evidence, the question to be resolved is as to whether there is a logical or rational connection between the fact which is sought to be proved and a matter of fact which has been made an issue in the case . . . . `While remoteness in point of time does not necessarily render evidence irrelevant, it may do so where the elapsed time is so great as to negative all rational or logical connection between the fact sought to be proved and the remote evidence offered in proof thereof.' To the same effect is Rausch v. Buisse, 33 Wis.2d 154, 166, 146 N.W.2d 801 (1966). Rejection of evidence because of remoteness rests in the trial court's discretion. Id.; Krause v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 44 Wis.2d 590, 598, 599, 172 N.W.2d 181 (1969). [8, 9] A review of the cases indicates that the most important factor in determining admissibility of conduct evidence prior to the accident is the degree of probability that the conduct continued until the accident occurred. Thus the condition or conduct sought to be proven will strongly affect the degree of remoteness which may be acceptable. Speed may be quickly changed, as may position on the highway. However, intoxication or drowsiness are likely to persist much longer, and evidence of such conditions many miles or minutes before the accident may be proper. Where speed is concerned, some courts have stated the general principle to be that the earlier point should be close enough to permit the inference that the speed continued, or probably continued, up to the scene of the accident. In Hefele v. Rotter, 197 Wis. 300, 222 N.W. 220 (1928), it was held proper to admit testimony that four to five miles before the accident the defendant was proceeding down the road in a zigzag path and appeared to be sleeping or nodding. The court observed that such drowsiness would be much more apt to continue to the point of accident than is the speed at which the car was driven four or five miles, or even half a mile, from the point of collision. Similarly, in Shapiro v. Klinker, 257 Wis. 622, 626, 627, 44 N.W.2d 622 (1950), it was held error not to admit evidence indicative of intoxication five or six miles before the scene. In Krause v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 44 Wis.2d 590, 598-600, 172 N.W.2d 181 (1969), it was held within the trial court's discretion to admit evidence of who was driving a car some four hours before the accident, on the question of who was driving when the accident occurred. In Rausch v. Buisse, 33 Wis.2d 154, 166, 167, 146 N.W.2d 801 (1966), it was held a permissible exercise of discretion to refuse testimony as to skidmarks observed some six hours after the accident. [10] With respect to the issue of speed, the leading Wisconsin case appears to be Ronning v. State, 184 Wis. 651, 200 N.W. 394 (1924), in which this court reversed a conviction for fourth-degree manslaughter in the use of an automobile (a predecessor to the offense created by sec. 940.08, Stats.). The evidence under attack included the following: (1) testimony that the defendant had been driving 40 miles per hour about a mile from the accident (the speed limit then was 30 mph); (2) testimony that the defendant had been driving real fast somewhat farther than one mile from the accident; and (3) testimony that the defendant had been going about 70 mph about three-eighths of a mile from the accident. All the evidence was rejected save (3), and even that was held insufficient to make out a prima facie case. 184 Wis. at 656-658. The Ronning case seems to indicate that at least where a factor tending to reduce speed, such as a stretch of uneven and rough roads, intervenes, observations made at distances of a mile or so are not probative. It is a well-known fact that an automobile in good condition can very readily and quickly be regulated as to speed. Id. at 656. Other speed cases decided by this court include Neumann v. Evans, 272 Wis. 579, 585, 586, 76 N.W.2d 322 (1956) (Within judge's discretion to exclude estimate of speed about ¼ mile from the accident.); Tofte v. Crolius, 196 Wis. 608, 610, 612, 220 N.W. 225 (1928) (Error to allow testimony as to speed at which defendant passed witnesses' car over five miles before the point of collision, at least where witnesses did not keep vehicle in sight up to point of collision; however, in light of other evidence and admissions on the issue, not prejudicial.); Fox v. Kaminsky, 239 Wis. 559, 563, 564, 2 N.W.2d 199 (1942) (Prejudicial error to exclude testimony as to plaintiff's speed at a point 2,000 feet from accident where witness observed car up to point of accident and could testify that speed decreased, if anything, as accident site was approached.); State v. Resler, 262 Wis. 285, 288-289, 55 N.W.2d 35 (1952) (Witness estimated defendant's speed as he was passed about 1½ miles before the accident. The court said that if this were all, the evidence might have been inadmissible. But the witness continued down the road, at a speed of 40-50 mph, and arrived at the scene after defendant had gone off the road, gotten out of his car and flagged down the witness, permitting reasonable inference that speed when witness was passed was approximately continuous thereafter.) [11] Here, Randy Nelson testified that he was going between 50 and 55, and the defendant passed him quite easily right before the church, which was about onequarter mile from the accident. Nelson further testified that the defendant was going faster than Nelson was when the defendant passed Joe Sandvig in the curve, which is even closer to the accident. Sandvig estimated the defendant's speed when passing Sandvig at about 65 miles an hour and testified that defendant's speed continued after the pass. Thus Nelson's testimony relates entirely to conduct occurring within one-quarter of a mile or so from the scene, and between Nelson and Sandvig the defendant was under constant observation from the time he passed Nelson until the accident; and there is evidence that defendant's speed was continuous throughout that period. Under the cases cited above, it was clearly within the trial court's discretion to admit the testimony of Nelson, as well as Sandvig, regarding the defendant's speed. [12] The testimony of Jaeger and Hoffman is another matter. Jaeger (a passenger in the Hoffman car) said the defendant went really roaring past us, and Hoffman put defendant's speed during the pass at around 80. However, these two witnesses lost sight of the defendant some 12½ miles from the point of the accident, and did not see him again until reaching the scene. There was at least a 12-mile stretch before either Jaeger or Hoffman again saw the defendant. We think it was error to admit the testimony of Jaeger and Hoffman. There is no basis here for an inference that the defendant's speed, as estimated by Hoffman and Jaeger, continued to the point where the accident occurred. [13] Hoffman and Jaeger also testified that the defendant ran two stop signs and tailgated a truck, again at points in excess of 12½ miles from the place where the accident occurred. This evidence is too remote to be relevant to the defendant's conduct at the scene for the same reasons as the evidence with respect to speed, but more fundamentally, there is no indication in this case that tailgating or failing to obey a stop sign were in any way involved with the accident. The evident purpose and probable effect of the testimony were to establish in the minds of the jury that the defendant was a careless driver on his way to the scene of the accident and was therefore likely to have driven negligently where the accident occurred. [14] We see no basis upon which Hoffman's and Jaeger's testimony as to defendant's conduct 12½ miles from the place where the accident occurred can be viewed as relevant or probative on the issue of his speed at the accident, and its admission cannot be sustained. [8] 2. Defendant's Driving Over a Three-Month Period Prior to the Accident. Defendant contends that it was error to allow the witness Hoffman to testify as to the defendant's driving practices over the three-month period preceding the accident. The trial court had earlier ruled that no evidence going to such matters would be admitted, but in the case of Hoffman, the state was allowed to go into the matter on redirect examination upon the theory that the defense had opened up the matter on cross-examination. The circuit court agreed, feeling that the defense had opened the door on the avenue of bias, prejudice and credibility . . . . On cross-examination defense counsel was attempting to get Hoffman to admit that he did not like the defendant. The relevant cross-examination relating to defendant's driving went as follows:  Q. You don't like him [the defendant]; do you.  A. I didn'tnever said that.  Q. No, but I'm saying that: Isn't that true, you don't like him?  A. Well, not the way he drives. I don't have nothin' to do with that. . . .  Q. You never discussed him with other men prior to that date?  A. No. . . .  Q. Discussed him and his habits and why you didn't like him.  A. Oh, his habits.  Q. Yes.  A. What kind of habits?  Q. Any kind of habits you didn't like.  A. Driving habits, yeah. . . .  Q. Sir, I'm not trying to put words in your mouth. I just want the truth. Why don't you admit it, you never did like the guy  A. I never knew him that much.  Q. Then why would you talk about him with your friends, if you didn't know him?  A. When I see him go by me every day  Q. Did it irritate you because he grinned when he drove by you. Are you that thin-skinned, sir?  A. And the speed he goes by me, and how he goes by me.  Q. Did the grin get to you?  A. No.  Q. Kind of simmered to give you the finger; wasn't it.  A. He gave me that lots of times.  Q. Oh, he did?  A. Yes.  Q. So then you knew him; didn't you.  A. Just when I seen him go by me.  Q. And give you the finger.  A. Oh, yeah.  Q. Right. So you really didn't like him; did you. . . . How can you like a guy that gives you the finger?  A. A lot of guys do it.  Q. You didn't like him; did you. And you didn't like him giving you the finger; did you.  A. No. On redirect examination Hoffman testified that within three months of the accident he observed the following incidents on more than a half a dozen occasions: The defendant passed him on a hill, passed two cars, sometimes three at a time, and passed on curves in a nopassing zone. On recross-examination defense counsel again attempted to show that Hoffman had, over a long period, spent a lot of time keeping track of the defendant and watching the defendant and his driving activities. The last question was Is your testimony colored somewhat by your ill-feeling for Mr. Hart? The defendant claims that evidence as to defendant's driving which came out on cross-examination was volunteered unresponsively by the witness, so as not to constitute an opening of the door, and that admission of the evidence was precluded by sec. 904.04, Wis. Rules of Evidence. [15, 16] The testimony speaks for itself. It is true that the witness's initial comment on defendant's driving habits was gratuitous. [9] However, defense counsel persisted, and we believe that by the time the witness mentioned the defendant's driving again it can fairly be said that he was responding to the question asked. On hindsight, the response which was forthcoming was predictable. No motion to strike the initial unresponsive answer or the responses relating to driving was made, although the defendant had previously objected to testimony concerning the defendant's driving prior to the day of the accident, which objection had been sustained. The state on redirect could attempt correction of any adverse implications flowing from cross-examination. The defense was obviously trying to discredit Hoffman by showing that he was biased against the defendant; and the state arguably had a right to explain further the witness's feelings along this line. The trial court possessed considerable discretion in defining the scope of redirect examination. State v. Cydzik, 60 Wis.2d 683, 690, 211 N.W.2d 421 (1973). [17] It appears as if the defendant took a calculated gamblethe defendant decided that it would be better to discredit the witness even at the risk of introducing his own driving conduct. The defense having drawn the witness out on the subject, under these circumstances, we think the trial court's exercise of discretion in allowing the additional inquiry by the state should be sustained. However, Hoffman should not have been permitted to testify. As we stated above, all of Hoffman's direct testimony should have been excluded on grounds of remoteness. Though we have concluded that Hoffman's testimony on redirect concerning the defendant's driving habits in general was properly received, this testimony was admissible only on a door-opening theory, and it is obvious that had Hoffman's initial testimony been excluded, the events leading to his testimony on redirect could not have transpired. 3. Admissibility of Testimony Constitutes Reversible Error. If the testimony of Hoffman and Jaeger regarding defendant's driving prior to the accident was improperly admitted, the logical next question is whether this error was harmless or requires reversal. [18] Errors committed at trial should not overturn the conviction unless it appears the result might probably have been more favorable to the party complaining had the error not occurred. Woodhull v. State, 43 Wis.2d 202, 168 N.W.2d 281 (1969). In Wold v. State, 57 Wis.2d 344, 356, 357, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973), a case involving improperly admitted evidence, the court said: . . . The test of harmless error is not whether some harm has resulted, but, rather, whether the appellate court in its independent determination can conclude there is sufficient evidence, other than and uninfluenced by the inadmissible evidence, which would convict the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. This test is based on reasonable probabilities. . . . A possibility test is the next thing to automatic reversal. In determining guilt `beyond a reasonable doubt,' the human mind should not work on possibilities, but on reasonable probabilities. (Citations omitted.) See also State v. Dean, 67 Wis.2d 513, 533, 227 N.W.2d 712 (1975). After careful reading of the record, we believe that the testimony of Hoffman and Jaeger, taken as a whole, changed the basic tenor of the trial and raised a definite risk that the jury might convict to punish a person they perceived to be a generally bad actor where automobiles are concerned. Hoffman's and Jaeger's testimony constituted a substantial part of the total testimony heard by the jury. The killing of an innocent, albeit careless, young boy is in itself likely to put a jury in a mood quite susceptible of prejudice, and we think it highly likely that the testimony of Hoffman and Jaeger was influential on the jury. [19, 20] In Fischer v. State, 226 Wis. 390, 399, 276 N.W. 640 (1937), we said that as a general rule (subject of course to exceptions), receipt of evidence of the defendant's bad character or commission of specific disconnected acts is prejudicial error. We concluded in that case that upon a review of the record the defendant did not have a fair trial. We conclude similarly here. [10] It may well be that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged against him, but he is entitled to a fair trial according to the established rules of procedure and principles of law. Boldt v. State, 72 Wis. 7, 17, 38 N.W. 177 (1888). [11]