Opinion ID: 2684138
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reliance on Subjective Interview Questions

Text: Hicks argues that the panel’s reliance on subjective interview questions -- clearly the tie-breaker in this case -- provided a ready mechanism for discrimination and is therefore evidence of pretext. This argument is misguided. It is true that the subjectivity necessarily introduced by the interview process can mask discrimination. Cf. Keyes v. Secretary of the Navy, 853 F.2d 1016, 1026 n.12 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that [e]valuating an applicant at an interview is a highly subjective exercise). We have nonetheless declined, for good reason, to invalidate reliance on interviews in hiring decisions. See, e.g., Velazquez-Ortiz v. Vilsack, 657 F.3d 64, 76 (1st Cir. 2011) (affirming an award of summary judgment to the employer when the promotion decision was based, in large part, on the assessment that one candidate did exceptionally well during the interview (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the Coast Guard took pains to standardize the interview process, as well as record and quantify the candidates' performance on a uniform scale. The same twenty questions were asked of both candidates, and, as the district court remarked, they -15- were so broadly worded as to provide an interviewee with ample running room to tout her qualifications and experience. In essence, the Coast Guard made the subjective part of the promotion process as objective as possible, taking much of the ultimate discretion away from the interviewers. We are not suggesting that such measures are required to immunize an interview process against charges of discrimination. However, on this record, these measures do preclude any reasonable inference that the interview process was evidence of pretext. 3. Lack of African Americans in Supervisory Positions Hicks attempts to show pretext by pointing to the lack of African-American workers and managers at Air Station Cape Cod. See Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that evidence of discriminatory animus may also serve to prove pretext). Such historical evidence may inform the jury's evaluation of the decisionmakers' actions. Here, however, the historical evidence is so limited that it does not permit a reasonable inference of discrimination. There is no evidence that any other African American ever applied for the position sought by Hicks. The housing office at the base did not employ a large staff -- seven total employees. The fact that Hicks was the only African American in the group, without more, does not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to discriminatory animus within the office. Furthermore, there is no evidence as to -16- the number of African Americans working on the base in general or their opportunities for advancement. This meager record simply does not permit any reasonable conclusion about a disparity between the opportunities for African Americans and whites at the Air Station Cape Cod, let alone the housing office. 4. Alleged Comments about Race In an attempt to show pretext with evidence of discriminatory animus, Hicks cites a statement attributed to her former supervisor, departing Housing Manager Norton, describing Hicks as an angry black woman. However, it is undisputed that Norton took no part in the promotion decision. Accordingly, this evidence does nothing to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the promotion decision was motivated by anything other than Krout's documented scoring edge in the interviews.