Opinion ID: 2198330
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Jury Instruction on Aggravated Assault

Text: As an element of aggravated assault, serious bodily injury is specifically defined as: [B]odily injury that involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty. Nixon v. United States, 730 A.2d 145, 149 (D.C.1999). We have held that trial courts must instruct juries on the definition of serious bodily injury in aggravated assault cases. See Gathy v. United States, 754 A.2d 912, 916 (D.C.2000). Implicit in that requirement is that the jury may not be left to its own experience and common sense in defining an element such as serious bodily injury without the aid of a precise definition, in order to avoid the danger that jurors may set the standard of `aggravation' below what the legislature intended in fashioning a crime that increases twenty-fold the maximum prison term for a simple assault.' Zeledon v. United States, 770 A.2d 972, 977 (D.C. 2001). In this case, our review of the trial court's failure to further define serious bodily injury is for plain error, as there was no objection to the instruction given on the aggravated assault charge. See Guishard v. United States, 669 A.2d 1306, 1315 n. 16 (D.C.1995). Under that standard, not only must error be established, but also that the error was plain and clearly prejudicial to substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); Coates v. United States, 705 A.2d 1100, 1104 (D.C.1998). Once these hurdles are satisfied, appellant must also show that the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice, that is, actual innocence; or that the trial court's error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Wilson v. United States, 785 A.2d 321, 326 (D.C.2001) (internal citation and quotation omitted). In light of our decisions in Nixon and Gathy, the trial court's failure to define serious bodily injury constituted error. See id. It is unclear, however, whether that error can be assigned as plain. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) ([W]here the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appealit is enough that an error be `plain' at the time of appellate consideration.). As we have previously noted, whether the law regarding the necessity of proving the seriousness of the victim's injury was settled prior to Nixon and Gathy is arguable. See Wilson, 785 A.2d at 326. However, even if appellant could show that the error was plain in this instance and that it affected substantial rights, we are not persuaded that his conviction amounted to a miscarriage of justice, or that the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings will be undermined by the absence of the instruction in his case, in light of the trial court's complete enumeration of all the elements of the crime of aggravated assault, see id. at 327, and ample evidence of the seriousness of the assault inflicted on Davis, see id. at 329 (affirming conviction for aggravated assault despite the trial court's failure to define serious bodily injury because, based on the evidence presented, reasonable jurors would conclude that the victim had suffered serious bodily injury).