Opinion ID: 407646
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Present Mitigating Character Evidence

Text: 13 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), established a constitutional requirement in capital cases that the sentencing authority consider all mitigating evidence proffered by the defendant relating to his character and record and to the circumstances of the particular offense. Appellant's trial took place in 1974, some four years prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lockett. At that time, the rule had not yet been established that the Constitution compels consideration of all relevant mitigating character evidence. Moreover, although the Supreme Court subsequently interpreted the Florida statute as not limiting sentencer consideration of mitigating evidence, 18 the ambiguous wording of the statute left open the question whether that act allowed consideration of mitigating character evidence other than that falling within the statutorily enumerated factors. 19 14 At the sentencing phase of appellant's trial his counsel presented no evidence of his character or personal history. 20 The attorney's testimony at the magistrate's evidentiary hearing indicates that, at the time of appellant's trial, he understood the Florida statute as limiting the mitigating evidence that could be introduced to that falling within the statutory mitigating circumstances. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing 190-91, 218-20. In a pre-trial motion to dismiss the indictment the defense attorney asserted inter alia that the Florida death-penalty statute unconstitutionally limited presentation of mitigating evidence. 21 The trial judge denied the motion, however, and defense counsel made no further attempt to introduce nonstatutory evidence. Although the attorney testified that his interpretation of the statute influenced his decision as to what evidence to present at the sentencing hearing, he suggested that other reasons were important as well. In particular, he stated that he believed that he could fit any mitigating evidence within the statutory mitigating factors, id. at 191-92, and that, in any event, the defendant had instructed him not to introduce any mitigating evidence. Id. at 220-21.
15 In assessing whether defense counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence constituted ineffective assistance, the magistrate recognized that Proffitt was one of the first capital cases tried under the then newly-enacted Florida death penalty statute and that Proffitt's trial preceded the Lockett decision by several years. The magistrate did not believe the attorney's misperception of the law was excused, however, by the indefiniteness of that constitutional rule at that time. The magistrate accepted defense counsel's testimony that he went into the trial assuming that he could not put on any evidence in mitigation except as set forth in the statute. Nonetheless, the magistrate concluded that the subsequent Supreme Court holding against limiting mitigation evidence was reasonably foreseeable and that the attorney had in fact anticipated it. The magistrate rejected defense counsel's statement that he introduced no mitigating evidence pursuant to an instruction from appellant based on his not wanting to spend twenty-five years in jail. 22 The magistrate also rejected respondent's assertion that defense counsel failed to present mitigating evidence because no such evidence was available. The magistrate relied on a written proffer of evidence submitted by appellant in finding that the attorney could have procured favorable character evidence to present at the penalty phase. In addition to the proffer, defense counsel's testimony that he did not call appellant's mother because he could not think of any reason to do so except for the possible sympathy that it might have evoked from the jury, instead of supporting counsel's decision, in the magistrate's view bolstered appellant's claim that she should have been called as a witness to testify concerning appellant's character and personal history. The magistrate attributed defense counsel's failure to present mitigation evidence to a lack of preparation as well as to a mistake of law. 23 16 In summary, the evidence considered by the magistrate on the issue of defense counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence included (1) the trial record (including pre-trial motions filed by defense counsel), (2) defense counsel's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and (3) a written proffer of evidence submitted by appellant. The testimonial evidence he referred to in his memorandum included the defense attorney's statements concerning his understanding of the law respecting the Florida death penalty statute, his description of his preparation for the penalty stage of trial, and his statement that his failure to introduce mitigating evidence was in response to appellant's instructions. The magistrate accepted the attorney's testimony as to his interpretation of the statute and his preparation for the penalty stage of trial; indeed, the magistrate relied on this testimony in finding counsel's assistance inadequate. The magistrate disbelieved defense counsel's statement that he was following Proffitt's instructions in not introducing mitigating evidence, however, and the rejection of this testimony was critical to the magistrate's decision.
17 The district court disagreed with the magistrate's conclusions concerning defense counsel's failure to introduce mitigating evidence at the penalty stage. The judge's disagreement stemmed primarily from a difference in his interpretation of the standard for judging ineffective assistance of counsel claims rather than from differences in his view of the evidence. 18 The judge agreed with the magistrate that defense counsel had labored under the impression that evidence in mitigation was limited to the specific mitigating circumstances enumerated in the statute. He disagreed, however, with the magistrate's conclusion that defense counsel had erroneously interpreted the law as it existed at the time of trial. The attorney's misapprehension of the law, the judge found, could only be characterized as a misapprehension through hindsight which has the advantage of Lockett v. Ohio decided four years later. The attorney's belief that evidence in mitigation was limited to the statutory circumstances was, in the judge's view, understandable, and his inclusion in a comprehensive pre-trial motion of the contention that, as such, the statute was unconstitutional did not undermine that conclusion. 19 The judge disagreed with the magistrate's assessment of the evidence insofar as the magistrate attributed counsel's omission to insufficient preparation rather than unavailability of mitigating evidence. The judge cited the defense attorney's testimony concerning his general preparation for trial-testimony not referred to in the magistrate's memorandum. The judge relied on the attorney's statements that he had met with appellant weekly to discuss the case, that he had engaged the assistance of an investigator, that he had talked to witnesses in Tampa who knew and worked with appellant, and that he had personally traveled to Connecticut to interview members of appellant's family. Moreover, the judge found convincing the attorney's testimony that he had not called appellant's sister as a mitigating witness because she had a criminal record; that he had not called appellant's half-brother because he and appellant had not had a relationship for some time; that he had not called appellant's mother because she was ill and therefore unable to travel from Connecticut to Florida for the trial, because appellant did not want to get his family involved, and because the attorney felt appellant's mother had nothing of substance to contribute in any event; and that he had not called appellant's wife because he did not feel she would make a good witness since she was unhappy with appellant's lifestyle and because he was concerned that calling her to testify might constitute waiver of the marital privilege, which appellant had asserted to prevent her from testifying at the guilt phase of trial. 20 In accepting the above-described testimony, the judge did not reject any credibility determinations implicitly made by the magistrate in violation of Louis v. Blackburn, supra. Although the magistrate ultimately concluded that the attorney's failure was the product of his misperception of the law and not the result of tactical considerations, nothing in the magistrate's findings indicates he did not credit the above testimony. First, the magistrate's acceptance of appellant's proffer describing mitigating evidence that could have been introduced does not indicate that he rejected the defense attorney's testimony concerning why he did not present certain witnesses. In addition to appellant's relatives, whom the defense attorney declined to call, the proffer lists as possible witnesses several other persons, including one of appellant's supervisors and a psychiatrist who examined appellant after trial. The magistrate, without accepting all the details in the proffer as true, simply found that the information it contained generally indicated that the defense attorney could have called character witnesses on appellant's behalf. Since the magistrate did not expressly reject the defense attorney's testimony as to why he did not call certain of the enumerated witnesses, the only conclusion one can draw from his partial reliance on the proffer is that he felt it probable the attorney could have called some of the witnesses listed by appellant in the proffer and not that the reasons the attorney gave for rejecting particular witnesses were not believable. The district court judge, on the other hand, rejected appellant's written proffer of evidence, correctly concluding that the magistrate's reliance on the proffer was improper. Even if the proffer had constituted competent evidence, however, rejection by the judge of such nontestimonial evidence would not require a second evidentiary hearing under Louis v. Blackburn. Second, the magistrate's memorandum does not evince disbelief of the defense attorney's description of his general preparatory efforts. Rather, the magistrate thought the attorney's failure to plan a separate strategy for the sentencing phase rendered his assistance inadequate irrespective of whatever other preparatory efforts the attorney undertook before and during trial. Nor does the district court's contrary conclusion indicate that the judge disbelieved the defense attorney's testimony, which the magistrate accepted, to the effect that the attorney engaged in no special preparation for the penalty phase; the judge simply disagreed that such separate preparation was required to meet the legal standard of reasonably effective counsel. We conclude that the judge's rejection of the magistrate's recommended ruling that defense counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence rendered his representation inadequate did not depend on differences in credibility choices requiring a rehearing under Louis v. Blackburn.