Opinion ID: 2633509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Defendant's Impeachment with Statements Taken in Violation of Miranda

Text: The trial court granted in part defendant's motion to exclude his statements to Detective Frogue made after his arrest (in which he denied he knew anything about the assaults on Miller and Wissel). Because the detective had continued his questioning after defendant was advised of and declined to waive his right not to talk to the detective ( Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694), the court held, postinvocation statements could not be used in the government's case-in-chief, but could be used for impeachment if defendant testified, which he later did. (See Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 225-226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 ( Harris ); People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1188, 73 Cal. Rptr.2d 865, 953 P.2d 1212 ( Peevy ).) Defendant contends use of his statements in impeachment should also have been prohibited because in questioning him Detective Frogue deliberately failed to honor his invocation of the right to remain silent. [6] As defendant recognizes, we rejected this argument for an exception to the Harris rule in Peevy, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pages 1196-1202, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865, 953 P.2d 1212. Defendant argues that Peevy's holding should be reevaluated in light of Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 ( Dickerson ), but we fail to see Dickerson's bearing on the question. The Dickerson court held that Miranda's protections are constitutionally required and therefore could not be altered by statute. ( Dickerson, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 438-441, 120 S.Ct. 2326.) The high court acknowledged that some of its decisions, including Harris, supra, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1, had limited Miranda's application, but explained those decisions were not inconsistent with Miranda's constitutional foundation: These decisions illustrate the principlenot that Miranda is not a constitutional rulebut that no constitutional rule is immutable. No court laying down a general rule can possibly foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it, and the sort of modifications represented by these cases are as much a normal part of constitutional law as the original decision. ( Dickerson, at p. 441, 120 S.Ct. 2326.) Dickerson, as the high court understood its decision, is clearly not inconsistent with Harris. Our decision in Peevy did not rest on the premise Miranda's rules are nonconstitutional. Indeed, in Peevy we expressly disagreed with the People's argument that Miranda impose[s] no affirmative duties upon police officers, but merely establish[es] rules of evidence or mere advice regarding preferred police conduct. ( Peevy, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1202, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865, 953 P.2d 1212.) We recognized in Peevy that Miranda states required rules of conduct for police officers, drawn from the United States Constitution, but held the deliberateness of a violation of those rules did not alter the balance struck in Harris and other cases between deterring police misconduct and exposing defendants who commit perjury at trial. ( Peevy, at pp. 1204-1205, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865, 953 P.2d 1212.) The high court's reiteration of Miranda's constitutional principles in Dickerson therefore does not affect our holding in Peevy. The trial court did not err in allowing defendant to be impeached with his statements to Detective Frogue.