Opinion ID: 853636
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Deemed Denied Problem

Text: Indiana Trial Rule 53.3(A) states in relevant part: In the event a court fails for forty-five (45) days to set a Motion to Correct Error for hearing, or fails to rule on a Motion to Correct Error within thirty (30) days after it was heard or forty-five (45) days after it was filed, if no hearing is required, the pending Motion to Correct Error shall be deemed denied. [1] Various issues may arise when a trial court grants a motion to correct error after the expiration of the prescribed time limits and after the party filing the motion has commenced an appeal from the deemed denial. The defendant argues that its appeal is authorized under Trial Rule 59(F), which makes appealable any order modif[ying] or setting aside a final judgment. Furthermore, Indiana Appellate Rule 4(A) provides that a ruling or order by the trial court granting or denying relief on a motion to correct error is an appealable final order. We observe that if a trial court belatedly grants a motion to correct error and thereby purports to vacate a prior grant of summary judgment, the trial court will presumably proceed with the case to conclusion. To construe our rules to preclude the party opposing the motion to correct error from the opportunity to immediately appeal a belatedly granted, but deemed denied, motion to correct error would disserve the efficient administration of justice. We reject the notion that the deemed denied language in Trial Rule 53.3(A) precludes a timely appeal under Trial Rule 59(F) and Appellate Rule 4(A). [2] Accordingly, we hold that the belated grant of the motion to correct error in this case is not necessarily a nullity but rather is voidable and subject to enforcement of the deemed denied provision of Trial Rule 53.3(A) in the event the party opposing the motion to correct error promptly appeals. Had the defendant failed to promptly appeal this belated grant, such failure would constitute waiver and would have precluded a subsequent appellate claim that the motion to correct error was deemed denied under Trial Rule 53.3(A). In addition to recognizing that the party opposing the motion to correct error may promptly appeal to assert that the motion was deemed denied under the rule, we further hold that the party filing the motion to correct error may seek appellate review of the merits of the deemed denied motion. When a party, like the plaintiff in this case, properly files a well-founded motion to correct error and timely files a praecipe when no action is taken within the Rule 53.3(A) period, but thereafter receives an order from the court granting the relief requested, such party should not be found to have abandoned the appeal. In his brief as appellee, the plaintiff reasserted the issues raised in the deemed denied motion to correct error. While concluding that the trial court had no power to grant the plaintiff's motion after the thirty-day period expired, the Court of Appeals found that Trial Rule 59(G) allowed the plaintiff to raise any cross-error in his appellate brief, including the denial of his motion to correct error by operation of law. Cavinder Elevators, 670 N.E.2d at 63. We agree. Having won the relief sought when the trial court ultimately, but belatedly, granted the motion to correct error, it is reasonable that the party filing the motion to correct error would assume that the case will proceed to trial and thus would have no reason to continue the appeal. But if the party opposing the motion to correct error promptly appeals from the belated grant of the motion to correct errors, arguing that the trial court had no power to grant the motion after the period specified under the rule, the time period for the party who filed the motion to correct error to perfect his timely-commenced appeal may have expired. This party should not be required to perfect and pursue an apparently unnecessary appeal of a claim already determined to be meritorious by the trial court. When a trial court considers and grants a motion to correct error, even if done belatedly, we perceive that such a decision will typically be correct on the merits and will result in expeditious further proceedings, without an intervening appeal. Sound judicial administration thus counsels against requiring a party whose motion to correct error is belatedly granted nevertheless to perfect an appeal from the superseded but deemed denied motion. These same concerns also counsel against permitting a belated grant of a motion to correct error long after its deemed denial has concluded the case as a final judgment from which an appeal was taken. Although we conclude that the plaintiff's abandonment of his timely-commenced appeal should not preclude him from asserting by cross-error under Trial Rule 59(G) the issues presented in his motion to correct error, we hold that the rule does not authorize resort to cross-error as a device to raise claims abandoned by the failure to initiate a timely appeal upon the deemed denial of a motion pursuant to Rule 53.3(A). Contrary to concerns expressed in the dissenting opinion, this application of Rule 53.3(A) does not create an open-ended time in which the trial court may rule. It applies only if, within thirty days after the motion is deemed denied, [3] the party filing the motion timely initiates an appeal, [4] and if the trial court belatedly grants the motion to correct error before the record of proceedings is filed, transferring jurisdiction to the appellate tribunal. [5] If a belated grant occurs, the opposing party may accept the ruling or may appeal to invalidate it as deemed denied pursuant to Rule 53.3(A). [6] The party filing the motion may not thereafter assert as cross-error the issues presented in the deemed denied motion to correct error if the time for filing a praecipe has expired and the party failed to commence an appeal. Summarizing our conclusions regarding the deemed denied problem, we reiterate that the belated grant of the plaintiff's motion to correct error in this case was not a nullity but rather was voidable subject to the defendant's timely appeal under Trial Rule 59(F) and Appellate Rule 4(A). If the defendant had failed to promptly appeal the belated grant of such a motion, however, this failure would have waived and thus precluded subsequent appellate review of whether the trial court's ruling violated Trial Rule 53.3(A). Because the defendant promptly appealed from the belated grant of the motion to correct error, and because the plaintiff timely commenced his appeal from the Rule 53.3(A) deemed denial of his motion to correct error, the defendant's appeal should be considered, as should the plaintiff's issues raised as cross-errors under Trial Rule 59(G). However, if the plaintiff, as the party filing the motion to correct error, had failed to commence a timely appeal following the deemed denial pursuant to Trial Rule 53.3(A), such failure would have waived the claims and precluded the plaintiff from raising them as cross-errors on appeal. We believe that our interpretation and application of the rule in this case will substantially enhance both judicial efficiency and fairness to litigants by eliminating unnecessary, impractical, harsh, and unfair consequences.