Opinion ID: 2977481
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legislative Immunity Under Federal Law

Text: Here, the Council Members contend that they have legislative immunity as a matter of law. They assert that in rejecting the plaintiffs’ development plan, they were engaging in acts that were legislative in nature, thereby entitling them to absolute immunity for those acts. In support of this argument, the Council Members maintain that they engaged in legislative functions when they debated the effects of the Jaggers’s proposed site plan development on the Alexandria community as a whole. If true, the Council Members’ actions may bar claims against them in their personal capacity inasmuch as those actions were legislative, rather than administrative. Bogan v. -7- No. 08-5213 Wayne Jaggers, et al. v. City of Alexandria, et al. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998); R.S.W.W., Inc. v. City of Keego Harbor, 397 F.3d 427, 437 (6th Cir. 2005). That is, individual members of local governmental bodies, like the Council Members, are absolutely immune from suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when conducting legitimate legislative activity. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 49. Not all governmental acts by local government bodies are necessarily legislative in nature, and “[t]he various activities of most local or municipal officials cannot be characterized as only administrative, legislative, or judicial.” Haskell v. Washington Twp., 864 F.2d 1266, 1277-78 (6th Cir. 1988). Here, the Council, whose members are elected, is a local governmental body that has a combination of both legislative and administrative powers. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 83A.130. It is only with respect to the legislative powers delegated to them that the members of local boards, like the City Council, are entitled to absolute immunity. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54. Therefore, the burden rests on the Council Members “to establish the existence of absolute legislative immunity.” Canary v. Osborn, 211 F.3d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 2000). And the existence of that immunity “ turns on the nature of the act,” not “the motive or intent of the official performing it.” Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54. The question before us, therefore, is whether the Council Members’ actions, when “stripped of all considerations of intent and motive,” were legislative rather than administrative or executive. Id. at 55. In Bogan, the Supreme Court set forth the necessary considerations to decide whether a defendant’s acts are legislative, and, therefore, protected by the doctrine of absolute immunity. According to the Bogan Court, two factors are relevant to determine whether a defendant’s acts fall within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. Id. at 54. First, we must consider whether a defendant’s actions were legislative in form., i.e., whether “they were integral steps in the legislative -8- No. 08-5213 Wayne Jaggers, et al. v. City of Alexandria, et al. process.” Id. at 55. Second, we must ask whether a defendant’s actions were “legislative in substance,” i.e., whether the actions “bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation,” including whether they “reflected discretionary, policymaking decisions implicating the budgetary priorities” of the government and the services the government provides to its constituents. Id. at 55-56. First, the Council Members cannot establish that, as a matter of law, their actions were legislative in form (“procedurally legislative”). Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55. Voting for an ordinance is “quintessentially legislative” in form. Id. Similarly, introducing a budget and signing into law an ordinance are legislative in form. Id. The Council Members do not maintain that their actions were “quintessentially legislative.” According to the plaintiffs’ allegations, the Council Members disapproved their development plan pursuant to Alexandria Zoning Ordinance § 14(1)(c), which provides: “[t]he Alexandria City Council shall, within forty-five (45) consecutive days after receiving the recommendations of the Planning Commission, review said recommendations and take action to approve or disapprove the proposed Development Plan.” (Joint Appendix (“JA”) 11-12.) While the Council Members’ actions to disapprove the plaintiffs’ development plan may have complied with § 14(1)(c), there is nothing in the record indicating that the Council Members’ authority to do so stems from their legislative authority. That is, there is no allegation or evidence in the record establishing that the procedures set forth in §14(1)(c) are the procedures Council Members use to invoke their legislative, rather than their managerial or administrative powers. Moreover, the Council Members do not contend that their decision was the result of legislative powers delegated to them by Kentucky law or that the actions undertaken to reach their decision were integral steps in the legislative process. Having no evidence before us establishing that the -9- No. 08-5213 Wayne Jaggers, et al. v. City of Alexandria, et al. Council Members’ actions were integral steps in the legislative process, we find that discovery is necessary to determine whether the Council Members’ acts were procedurally legislative under Bogan. In particular, the Council Members must put forth some evidence that they took their actions under the legislative powers delegated to them under Kentucky law. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55. Similarly, we conclude that further discovery is necessary before it can be determined whether the Council Members’ actions were legislative in substance. Id. at 55-56. The Council Members assert that they discussed the effects of the proposed map amendment and site plan on their community, taking into account several factors, including the size of the development and the fact that the development would require variances from the existing zoning code, and traffic safety implications, indicating that their decision was the result of policy considerations. We disagree. “Although zoning is ordinarily a legislative activity, it is not always legislative for the purposes of [legislative] immunity.” Haskell, 864 F.2d at 1278. “If the underlying purpose of zoning activity is to establish general policy, then it is legislative.” Id. If, however, the zoning action involves applying existing zoning rules to a specific property, the question of legislative immunity becomes more difficult because applying known rules and legislation to make a zoning decision in this way is more likely to be administrative rather than legislative. See 8A Eugene McQuillian, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 25.217 (3d ed. 2008) (“[A] zoning ordinance vesting in the municipal council the power to determine whether a building permit should be granted . . . ordinarily is regarded as administrative, rather than legislative in character.”). The question before us, then, is whether we can conclude from the allegations set forth in the complaint that the Council Members’ - 10 - No. 08-5213 Wayne Jaggers, et al. v. City of Alexandria, et al. actions in reaching their decision evidenced broad-based policy decisions. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54. We cannot. Instead, those allegations, construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, indicate that a question of fact exists as to whether the Council Members’ decision resulted from larger policy concerns or goals. In particular, the plaintiffs’ allegations—that Council Member Graus moved to disapprove their development plan because, among other things, the development would be oversized and would require variances, the entrance would be too close, there were safety and traffic concerns during peak times, and patrons leaving the property may attempt to make an unlawful righthand turn (JA 17.)—are not wholly legislative in character. Rather, the bulk of these concerns, construed in a light favorable to the plaintiffs, seem to center on the suitability of the Jaggers’s property for its proposed use. While such concerns may stem from underlying policy considerations, we see none on the face of the plaintiffs’ complaint. Given that further evidence is necessary to determine whether these considerations were legislative in substance, we lack appellate jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine to decide this interlocutory appeal. State Employees Bargaining Agent Coalition, 494 F.3d at 82.