Opinion ID: 1850677
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statement I.

Text: ¶ 10. As a prefatory matter, it is critical to focus on the fact that the initial comments which Wright finds objectionable concerned a jury instruction given by the trial court. Instruction C7, which was given without objection, stated: The court instructs the Jury that you must not consider the fact that the defendant did not testify as evidence against him and no inference of any kind may be drawn from the fact that the defendant did not testify in this case. In fact, defense counsel had pre-filed Instruction No. D-5, which stated: At no time under [sic] laws of the United States must a person charged with a crime prove his innocence or testify. If a person chooses not to testify, you the Jury, are not permitted to draw any inference of guilt and this fact should not influence your verdict in any matter what so ever [sic]. During the jury instruction conference, in considering the proposed defense instructions, defense counsel stated that he was withdrawing defendant's Instruction No. D-5 because it is essentially the same as the trial court's Jury Instruction No. C-7, which was by that time already given. ¶ 11. As the prosecutor stood to address the jury in closing arguments, significant critical evidence was before the jury. During cross-examination of Detective Hall, it was obvious that defense counsel was attempting to set up (at least inferentially) the defense of consensual sex between the victim and Wright. Likewise, the victim testified that she knew Wright because he had been at her apartment at parties. The victim testified that whenever she had maintenance problems her landlord would send Wright to perform the maintenance. On the day of the rape (which occurred later that night), Wright had been at the victim's apartment to put in an air conditioner. During this time, as he had done in the past, he made sexual comments and innuendos to the victim, which she rebuffed. During the cross-examination of the victim, defense counsel asked the victim about parties at her apartment, attended by Wright and others, where drugs were used. Defense counsel also questioned the victim about a third person (a man) being at her apartment earlier in the day when Wright came to perform his maintenance work, referring to this other man as your boyfriend. Defense counsel asked the victim if a fight ensued between her and her boyfriend because of Wright's presence. The victim denied that this other man was her boyfriend, or that there was any argument for any reason between them on that day. ¶ 12. With this backdrop, when the prosecutor was addressing the jury during the opening phase of the State's closing arguments, she stated, inter alia: I don't know if all of you ever rented before, but you deal with your landlord or you deal with someone that they employ. You don't really get your choice of maintenance people to come over and do the work. But she had a working relationship with [Wright], as she knew him, because he had done things in there before. And in fact, she even called, I think, his nephew or something, to get in touch with him to come and do that. He came that day to help her. And she told you that as he had done in the past, he made some flirty advances, whatever you want to call it. Some kind of feeling her out to see if she might be interested in a way. And she dealt with it the same way she dealt with it in the past. Maybe it was the right way; maybe it was the wrong way. But she kind of laughed it off saying: You know, we don't have anything to do with each other. You know, ha, ha, ha. You know, I am not interested in you. But a nice way but [sic] to let him know that she was not interested in him in that way. Now, there has been talk about [defense counsel] asking questions about her having a boyfriend there. She said that wasn't her boyfriend; she didn't have a boyfriend. And him being jealous of the defendant in some way. Ladies and gentlemen, again, that is not evidence. He could ask a question whether Santa Claus was at her house that day. That doesn't mean that Santa Claus was there that day. It's important that you know that the defendant has the right to testify or not testify. That's one of the jury instructions you will have. And he has the right not to testify. But he also has the right to call any witnesses that he wants to call in his case. Now there was no At this point, defense counsel objected, but not on the basis of the prosecutor's comment on the defendant's failure to testify. Instead, defense counsel objected and stated that the jury instructions says [sic] he does not have to prove anything. The following then occurred between the trial court and counsel: BY THE COURT: That's correct, he doesn't have to prove anything. BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor BY [PROSECUTOR]: But he has the right to call witnesses is my statement, if he so chooses. BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, we would move for a mistrial. BY THE COURT: All right. I will deny the motion for a mistrial. The defendant doesn't have to do anything. The burden of proof is on the State. BY [PROSECUTOR]: The burden of proof BY THE COURT: That's what all the instructions say. BY [PROSECUTOR]: That's correct. The burden of proof is on the State. There are witnesses that are equally available. Anybody with subpoena power are [sic] available to all. The prosecutor then continued her closing argument, stating: Now the only testimony about a boyfriend, the only testimony about some kind of jealousy came from [defense counsel]. That's the only place you heard it, ladies and gentlemen. ¶ 13. As noted above, defense counsel did not object on the basis of the prosecutor's alleged improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify, but on the basis that the prosecutor's comment was contrary to the trial court's instructions stating that the defendant was not required to prove anything. Other jury instructions had been given by the trial judge, read by the trial judge to the jury prior to the commencement of closing arguments, and taken by the jury to the jury room for use during the jury's deliberations. Instruction No. C-1 stated, inter alia, that the jury was not to single out one instruction alone as stating the law, but you must consider these instructions as a whole. Instruction No. C-1 also stated that [a]rguments, statements and remarks of counsel are intended to help you understand the evidence and apply the law, but are not evidence. If any argument, statement or remark has no basis in the evidence, then you should disregard that argument, statement or remark. ¶ 14. This Court has repeatedly held that attorneys on both sides are allowed wide latitude in their closing arguments and that there is an obvious difference between a comment on the defendant's failure to testify and a comment on defendant's failure to put on a credible defense. Underwood v. State, 919 So.2d 931, 939-40 (Miss.2005) (citing Howell v. State, 860 So.2d 704, 751-52 (Miss.2003)). The comment by the prosecutor in the present case was not error, but instead was appropriate, based on the status of the record at the time the comments were made in closing arguments. ¶ 15. Wright argues that the prosecutor's comment bears a strong resemblance to that in Livingston v. State, 525 So.2d 1300 (Miss.1988), in which the prosecution said: Now, the Court tells youyou are not to take into consideration the fact that the defendant did not testify. That's in an instruction right here. And we don't want you to. Id. at 1305. ¶ 16. Although Wright is correct about the resemblance, his reliance on Livingston is misplaced. ¶ 17. A careful reading of Livingston leads this Court to conclude that it was decided in large part on a statute which no longer exists. The Livingston Court was deeply divided (5-4) concerning this issue, with the majority reasoning: It is the duty of the presiding judge, as well as trial attorneys on both sides, in the conduct of a criminal case to see that the constitutional rights of an accused are not violated. A defendant has a constitutional right not to take the witness stand. See: Mississippi Constitution, Article XXVI; U.S. Constitution, Amendment V; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). This right becomes meaningless if comment upon insinuation can be made reflecting upon his failure to testify. Indeed, for over a century, there has been a statute in effect in this state which provides: § 13-1-9. Competency of an accused. The accused shall be a competent witness for himself in any prosecution for crime against him. The failure of the accused, in any case, to testify shall not however operate to his prejudice or be commented on by counsel. (Emphasis added). ¶ 18. The Livingston court went on to state that [f]or nearly a century we have recognized [the defendant's right not to take the witness stand] and have held that any comment by a prosecutor regarding the defendant's failure to testify was incurable, reversible error. Id. at 1308. At this point, it cited twenty-one cases, ranging in dates from 1893 to 1986. A careful reading of each of them reveals that all but three of them directly relied upon § 13-1-9 or its predecessors. The three which did not simply made general reference to the repeated decisions of this Court so holding. ¶ 19. In 1991, some three years after the decision in Livingston, the Legislature repealed Miss.Code Ann. § 13-1-9. By this time, legislative action in repealing numerous procedural and evidentiary statutes had become commonplace in response to this Court's judicial enactment of, inter alia, the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure (eff. January 1, 1982), and the Mississippi Rules of Evidence (eff. January 1, 1986), thus representing the Legislature's recognition of the inherent power and authority of this Court to enact rules governing our state judiciary. See Newell v. State, 308 So.2d 71 (Miss.1975). ¶ 20. In addition, Livingston also cited the United States Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965); however, this Court failed to acknowledge the United States Supreme Court's freshly-decided case of United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 108 S.Ct. 864, 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988), which clarified its decision in Griffin. Robinson was decided a little more than two months before this Court decided Livingston. In Robinson, the Supreme Court was confronted with a situation where the defense counsel, in closing arguments, constantly referred to the government's persistent failure to allow the defendant (who did not testify) to explain his actions and his side of the story. Not surprisingly, the government requested the opportunity to rebut the defense counsel's comments, which request the trial judge granted, whereupon, the government prosecutor, in the final phase of closing arguments, informed the jury that the defendant could have taken the stand and explained it to you, anything he wanted to. Robinson, 485 U.S. at 27-28, 108 S.Ct. 864. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in pertinent part as follows: We hold that the prosecutor's statement that respondent could have explained to the jury his story did not in the light of the comments by defense counsel infringe upon respondent's Fifth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals and respondent apparently take the view that any direct reference by the prosecutor to the failure of the defendant to testify violates the Fifth Amendment as construed in Griffin. We decline to give Griffin such a broad reading, because we think such a reading would be quite inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment, which protects against compulsory self-incrimination. The Griffin court addressed prosecutorial comment which baldly stated to the jury that the defendant must have known what the disputed facts were, but that he had refused to take the stand to deny or explain them. We think there is considerable difference for purposes of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination between the sort of comments involved in Griffin and the comments involved in this case. . . . . Under Griffin . . . it is improper for either the court or the prosecutor to ask the jury to draw an adverse inference from a defendant's silence. But I do not believe the protective shield of the Fifth Amendment should be converted into a sword that cuts back on the area of legitimate comment by the prosecutor on the weaknesses in the defense case. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 515[, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96] (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring) (citation omitted). . . . . [The] central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225[, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141] (1975). . . . Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681[, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674] (1986). To this end it is important that both the defendant and the prosecutor have the opportunity to meet fairly the evidence and arguments of one another. The broad dicta in Griffin to the effect that the Fifth Amendment forbids . . . comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence, 380 U.S., at 615[, 85 S.Ct. 1229], must be taken in the light of the facts of that case. It is one thing to hold, as we did in Griffin, that the prosecutor may not treat a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent at trial as substantive evidence of guilt; it is quite another to urge, as defendant does here, that the same reasoning would forbid the prosecutor from fairly responding to an argument of the defendant by adverting to that silence. There may be some cost to the defendant in having remained silent in each situation, but we decline to expand Griffin to preclude a fair response by the prosecutor in situations such as the present one. Robinson, 485 U.S. at 31-34, 108 S.Ct. 864. ¶ 21. Thus, Livingston and its progeny are overruled to the extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion because: (1) the reversal of Livingston's conviction was based in large part on an evidentiary statute which has since been repealed; and, (2) this Court in Livingston erroneously interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Griffin, as clarified by Robinson, which this Court failed to acknowledge in Livingston. ¶ 22. In the present case, defense counsel did not object on the basis of the prosecutor's alleged improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify, but rather objected on the basis that the prosecutor's comment was contrary to the trial court's instructions stating that the defendant was not required to prove anything. The prosecutor in the present case in no way, either directly or inferentially, put a negative spin on the fact that the defendant exercised his constitutional right not to testify. Thus, consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Robinson, no error was committed by the prosecutor in her closing arguments to the jury.