Opinion ID: 533813
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the claim of the shipmaster

Text: 39 In the cross-appeal, defendant argues that we should affirm the summary judgment on the alternative ground that plaintiff's Jones Act claim must be denied because her decedent Daughenbaugh was not acting in the course of his employment at the time of his death. We disagree. 40 In Braen v. Pfeifer Oil Transportation Co., 361 U.S. 129, 80 S.Ct. 247, 4 L.Ed.2d 191 (1959), the Supreme Court explained that maintenance and cure cases supply relevant guides to the meaning of the term 'course of employment' under the [Jones] Act since it is the equivalent of the 'service of the ship' formula used in the maintenance and cure cases. Id. at 132-33, 80 S.Ct. at 249-50. The Court had previously held, in Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 71 S.Ct. 432, 95 L.Ed. 503 (1951), that a seamen injured in a dance hall while on shore leave was in the service of the ship and entitled to maintenance and cure. Id. at 530, 71 S.Ct. at 436. Moreover, in Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 63 S.Ct. 930, 87 L.Ed. 1107 (1943), the Court held that a sailor departing or returning from shore leave enjoys the broad protection of his right to maintenance and cure. Id. at 736, 63 S.Ct. at 936-37. To justify the extension of shipboard protections to the seaman ashore, the Aguilar Court explained: 41 Men cannot live for long cooped up aboard ship without substantial impairment of their efficiency, if not also serious danger to discipline. Relaxation beyond the confines of the ship is necessary if the work is to go on, more so that it may move smoothly. 42 No master would take a crew to sea if he could not grant shore leave, and no crew would be taken if it could never obtain it.... [S]hore leave is an elemental necessity in the sailing of ships, a part of the business as old as the art, not merely a personal diversion.... In sum, it is the ship's business which subjects the seaman to the risks attending hours of relaxation in strange surroundings. Accordingly, it is but reasonable that the business extend the same protections against injury from them as it gives for other risks of the employment. 43 Id. at 733-34, 63 S.Ct. at 935-36 (emphasis added). 44 Following the teachings of the Supreme Court, numerous lower courts have held that when a seaman is traveling along a standard route to leave the ship and go ashore or to return to the ship from shore leave, the seaman is acting within the course of his employment under the Jones Act. See, e.g., Marceau v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 146 F.2d 416, 418 (2d Cir.1945), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 872, 65 S.Ct. 1018, 89 L.Ed. 1426 (1945); Williamson v. Western Pacific Dredging Corp., 304 F.Supp. 509, 515-16 (D.Or.1969), aff'd, 441 F.2d 65 (9th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851, 92 S.Ct. 90, 30 L.Ed.2d 91 (1971); Nowery v. Smith, 69 F.Supp. 755, 757 (E.D.Pa.1946), aff'd, 161 F.2d 732 (3d Cir.1947). Moreover, in McDonough v. Buckeye S.S. Co., 103 F.Supp. 473 (N.D.Ohio 1951), aff'd, 200 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 926, 73 S.Ct. 785, 97 L.Ed. 1357 (1953), this court affirmed the district court's finding that an intoxicated seaman, returning from shore leave, was acting in the course of his employment for purposes of the Jones Act. McDonough, 200 F.2d 558. 45 Given the weight of the authority provided by Braen, Warren and Aguilar, and the holding of the Sixth Circuit's controlling case, McDonough, 2 we have concluded that the district court did not err in finding that Daughenbaugh was in the scope of his employment when last seen by the ship's officers. Opinion at 3. First, we are persuaded that Daughenbaugh, like the seaman in Aguilar, was properly deemed on defendant's business while returning from shore leave, because shore leave for the crew is beneficial and necessary to defendant's continued operation of the M/V Foy. See Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 733-34, 63 S.Ct. at 935. Second, the record reveals that even though Daughenbaugh, at the time of his death, was not performing routine tasks at the request of defendant, Daughenbaugh was generally answerable to [the shipmaster's] call to duty. Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 516, 69 S.Ct. 707, 709, 93 L.Ed. 850 (1949). Gintz, Daughenbaugh's superior officer, testified that if an M/V Foy crew member failed to return to the vessel at the sailing time posted by the First Mate, then the crew member was subject to discipline and discharge. Thus, because Daughenbaugh was required to return to the ship before the appointed sailing time, he was acting in the course of his employment when, en route to the M/V Foy, he disappeared on the dock. 46 Defendant argues that the district court's opinion, concluding that Daughenbaugh was acting in the scope of his employment when last seen, constitutes a blanket endorsement of seamen's claims under the Jones Act. However, defendant's liability under the Jones Act remains substantially limited to injuries negligently inflicted on its employees by its officers or agents. Hopson v. Texaco, Inc., 383 U.S. 262, 263, 86 S.Ct. 765, 766, 15 L.Ed.2d 740 (1966). See also 46 U.S.C.App. § 688; 45 U.S.C. § 51. In sum, the district court correctly found that on the night of his disappearance, Daughenbaugh, while returning from shore leave by the route customarily taken by the M/V Foy crew, was acting in the course of his employment.