Opinion ID: 1808962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: We briefly turn to Tomash's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The elements of this tort are:

Text: (1) Outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) The defendant's intentional causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) Plaintiff has suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) Actual proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. Northrup v. Farmland Industries, 372 N.W.2d 193, 197 (Iowa 1985) (quoting Vinson v. Linn-Mar Community School District, 360 N.W.2d 108, 118 (Iowa 1984)). No outrageous conduct on the part of these defendants has been shown. For conduct to be outrageous it must be `so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' Reihmann v. Foerstner, 375 N.W.2d 677, 681 (Iowa 1985) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment d (1965)); see also M.H. by and through Callahan v. State, 385 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Iowa 1986); Northrup, 372 N.W.2d at 198. Here, the only conduct potentially actionable involves PEC's or Deere's alleged part in the bringing of criminal charges. We have noted the record discloses no activity by Deere in that proceeding. PEC's conduct in this regard was a regular step in the criminal process in Linn County and was reasonably appropriate under the circumstances of this case. That conduct can in no way be viewed as outrageous under the stringent standard adopted by our prior cases. See Reihmann, 375 N.W.2d at 681. Trial court in this case properly granted defendants' motions for directed verdict. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED AND JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.