Opinion ID: 2221665
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: defendant was accorded due process of law.

Text: First, it is clear to this Court that the defendant in this case was not being held in this state's custody in violation of the United States Constitution. The district court concluded that defendant acquired a fundamental liberty interest once he was released on bond, pending the completion of his substantive appeal in the state courts. To support that conclusion, the district court relied on Atkins v. Michigan, 644 F.2d 543 (C.A.6, 1981), cert. den. 452 U.S. 964, 101 S.Ct. 3115, 69 L.Ed.2d 975 (1981), and Love v. Ficano, 19 F.Supp. 2d 754 (E.D.Mich., 1998), two cases dealing with an accused's right to bail pending trial. The district court extended the holdings of Atkins and Love to the postconviction setting, but ignored other Sixth Circuit precedent dealing with requests for an appeal bond in a postconviction setting. For example, we believe that Bloss, 421 F.2d 903, is clearly relevant to defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In that case, the defendant was convicted of violating Michigan law prohibiting the sale of obscene literature. Although the defendant had enjoyed pretrial bond, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for bond pending appeal of his conviction. The Court of Appeals and this Court likewise denied defendant's repeated requests for bond pending appeal. The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan nevertheless granted defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered the defendant's release from Michigan custody. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, concluding that the defendant had no fundamental liberty interest in obtaining a postconviction bond, and that his due process rights had not been violated. Bloss considered the application of habeas corpus principles to a defendant's application for appeal bond in a postconviction setting, whereas Atkins and Love considered pretrial detainees. [13] Further, in an unpublished opinion following Bloss, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a defendant simply has no federal constitutional right to bail pending appeal. Dennany v. Abramajtys, 37 F.3d 1498, 1994 WL 545323,  (C.A.6, 1994). In Dennany, the defendant had been duly convicted of a criminal offense by the Michigan courts. The state courts granted the defendant a new trial, but denied his motions for bond pending retrial. The Sixth Circuit held that the defendant had no federal constitutional right to bond pending appeal, and further held that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was properly dismissed because it did not raise a federal constitutional claim.... [14] Id. While neither Bloss nor Dennany involved a defendant whose motion for appeal bond had been granted by a state court, we believe these two cases are relevant to the district court's resolution of the issues presented in this case. The district court nevertheless recognized federal precedent for the principle that, once a state has made provision for bond pending appeal, the arbitrary denial of such bond violates the due process protections contained in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. United States ex rel. Walker v. Twomey, 484 F.2d 874 (C.A.7, 1973); King v. Zimmerman, 632 F.Supp. 271 (E.D.Pa., 1986); Abbott v. Laurie, 422 F.Supp. 976 (D.R.I., 1976). Assuming, without deciding, that defendant did acquire a fundamental liberty interest once he was released on appeal bond by the Court of Appeals, we believe that our March 3, 2000, order conveyed that this Court fully considered the merits of the appeal bond issue. Further, we believe that due process principles did not require this Court to provide the federal district court with a more extensive rationale supporting that decision, in order to facilitate the district court's desire to conduct a substantive review.