Opinion ID: 2224792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hearsay Regarding Thunder Hawk's Fear of Bradley

Text: Bradley's third assignment of error concerns the trial court's admission of hearsay testimony of six witnesses to the effect that Thunder Hawk was afraid of him. Bradley admits that the hearsay evidence fit within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule codified in SDCL 19-16-7 (Rule 803(3)), which provides, in pertinent part: A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition, such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health, is not excluded by § 19-16-4 [hearsay not admissible except as otherwise provided], even though the declarant is available as a witness.... The trial court found the statements regarding Thunder Hawk's fear of Bradley relevant as it related to both the prior bad acts on the part of Bradley, towards her, and to Thunder Hawk's behavior. Case authority weighs against Bradley, as United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758 (D.C.Cir. 1973), State v. Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 628 P.2d 580 (1981), State v. Lehman, 126 Ariz. 388, 616 P.2d 63 (1980), State v. Ramirez, 116 Ariz. 259, 569 P.2d 201 (1977), and State v. Blanchard, 315 N.W.2d 427 (Minn.1982), all make reference to relevance regarding accidental death or suicide, or other material issues as justifying admission of statements of fear. As no physical evidence of cause of death existed, an inference could be made that perhaps Thunder Hawk had not been killed. Bradley, before trial, made a motion for appointment of an expert witness, Dr. Michael Graham, M.D., to testify as to natural causes of death or other causes of death which do not constitute homicide. Indeed, on cross-examination of the coroner, one of Bradley's tactics was to ask whether he could rule out alcohol or drug overdose as a cause of death (to which the coroner responded that he could not). In the circumstances of this case, this was an alternate source of relevance. The evidence was relevant to a material issue in this case. The Brown decision, extensively quoted in the appellant's reply brief at pages 25-26, does not decry any admission of fear evidence; rather, it disapproved of such evidence where a court entirely ignored the relevance balancing process which seeks to avoid undue and unnecessary prejudice and confusion. Brown, 490 F.2d at 773 (footnote omitted). If the trial court erred, according to Brown, in using identity as the issue to which the evidence was relevant, it was admissible regarding the nature of Thunder Hawk's death. Any error in hinging relevance to identity was nonprejudicial as the evidence was material to issues other than identity. The nature of Thunder Hawk's death was put in issue by Bradley, distinguishing this case from State v. Cameron, 100 Wash.2d 520, 674 P.2d 650 (1983) (where self-defense was a non-issue raised solely by the State). Had the fear applied only to identity, reversal might be in order, per Brown, as the victim's state of mind has nothing to do with identityit's really putting the cart before the horse.