Opinion ID: 2384481
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: TERRY v. COMMONWEALTH

Text: Richard Wayne Terry, age 31, was convicted of wanton murder in the slaying of his brother-in-law, Abraham King, and was sentenced to 45 years imprisonment. King was married to Terry's sister, Elvinia. Terry and others in the family believed Elvinia had died under circumstances suggesting that King was responsible. The shooting occurred in the home of Elvinia's mother. She was in her back bedroom pondering Elvinia's funeral arrangements when her son-in-law, King, arrived with some of his own relatives. King proceeded to the back bedroom, presumably to console his mother-in-law. Into this situation, loaded with the potential for violence, Terry arrived and proceeded immediately to the back bedroom. Within seconds, the shooting occurred. King was shot at close range through the back of the head and through the neck. Terry then hastily departed, taking his own relatives with him, and, after having proceeded some distance from the scene, threw the weapon that fired the fatal shots out of his car window and proceeded straight away back to his home in Tennessee. Terry testified in his own defense. He denied that the weapon involved was his own gun, claiming that as soon as he entered his mother-in-law's bedroom King was ripe to quarrel, and pulled out the gun. According to Terry, he grabbed King's hands and the gun went off, firing through the window; King let the gun go into Terry's hands and Terry then shot King, and then shot him again. There was no struggle. He shot King because King pulled a gun on him. Terry testified he didn't know what his intent was when he shot King, other than he was scared. He testified he waited around awhile after the shooting, rather than making a hasty exit as others described, and that his reason for leaving was because he did not want to have to shoot any of King's brothers. In the Terry case, as in the McGinnis case previously discussed, the principal issues on appeal were denying a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of wanton murder and refusing to include the defense of self-protection in the wanton murder instruction. As in McGinnis, the wanton murder instruction was given as a separate instruction for the jury to consider if they did not convict King of intentional murder under Instruction No. 1, thus seemingly relegating it to the erroneous status of a lesser included offense. Terry's two remaining claims of error, which we will discuss first, are (1) a Doyle violation ( Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976)), which is a claim the prosecutor commented in a constitutionally impermissible manner on the accused's pretrial exercise of his right to remain silent; and (2) permitting the prosecutor to prove conviction of a felony for purposes of impeachment when the felony conviction was eleven years old. We turn first to the claim of a Doyle violation. Doyle pertains to evidence and comment on post-arrest silence, not to evidence that may fairly be classified as proof of a guilty state of mind tending to disprove the appellant's claim of innocence by reason of self-defense. As stated in Fugate v. Commonwealth, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 675, 681 (1969): [F]light and attempts at concealment are circumstantial evidence of guilt, because they suggest a guilty state of mind. . . . (Citations omitted.) The premise underlying Doyle does not disclaim flight or silence as admissible evidence in circumstances where the trier of fact could reasonably infer an innocent person would stay to provide an explanation. Doyle holds only that, because  Miranda warnings are now part of due process ( Miranda requires informing a person under arrest that he may remain silent, [and] that anything he says may be used against him), notwithstanding the inference that might otherwise be drawn from his silence, to comment on silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violate[s] the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 426 U.S. at 619, 96 S.Ct. at 2245. The holding in Doyle does not apply here. The questions and answers underlying the present claim that prejudicial error occurred on Terry's cross-examination were as follows: Q. You didn't wait for the police to arrive to tell them the supposed story that Abraham had a gun, correct. A. No, mam. Q. In fact, today is the first time you're telling this story, correct? A. No, mam. Q. You have never reported to the authorities, to the police authorities that Abraham had a gun. Defense Counsel: Objection. Judge: (At bench) State your basis. Defense Counsel: It's an indirect reference on his 5th Amendment privilege not to incriminate himself. It's compulsory testimony. It's not only indirect, it's direct because he hasn't made a statement to the police. He has no, in fact he has a constitutional right not to make a statement. Judge: He's on the witness stand at the present time, Mr. McCall. Prosecutor: Thank you. Defense Counsel: Judge, as I understand it . . . Judge: Believe me, he can be asked that question, if he ever made a statement to the police. Q. You never, ever, told the authorities that Abraham King came at you with a gun, correct? Defense Counsel: Judge, same objection. Prosecutor: Your honor, in fact, I'll just strike the question. Only the first two questions were answered, and they relate to establishing an inference that the appellant had a guilty state of mind because he fled rather than choosing to remain to tell his story. The first question related solely to pre-arrest silence to which Doyle does not apply. The second question was whether today is the first time you're telling this story, which may or may not refer to post-arrest silence, but Terry answered  No  to this question. The remaining two questions, which were the only ones to which objections were made, were never answered. When the objection was first made and overruled, the prosecutor then restated the question and, when defense counsel objected again, the prosecutor withdrew the question. It is meaningless to argue over whether Doyle v. Ohio should be stretched to cover evidence that Terry never, ever, told the authorities that Abraham King came at [him] with a gun when no such evidence was presented because the prosecutor withdrew the question. The prosecutor's first question to Terry on cross-examination was whether he had ever been convicted of a felony, and Terry replied that he had been so convicted at age 19. The court then admonished the jury, advising that such evidence goes only to considering the credibility of the witness. Defense counsel had objected to this evidence on grounds the prior conviction was too old to be relevant, citing the newly enacted KRE 609 which had been published with an effective date one week after this trial. KRE 609 specifies evidence of conviction of a crime shall be admissible for impeachment if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment for one (1) year or more under the law under which the witness was convicted. The rule further provides in subsection (b): Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten (10) years has elapsed since the date of the conviction unless the court determines that the probative value of the conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. Even before the time limit suggested by the new rule, whether to consider proof of a prior felony conviction too remote to be of probative value rested within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Richardson, Ky., 674 S.W.2d 515 (1984). Here the trial court was ruling in an area where he had discretion. A rule that would become effective at a later date hardly served to divest him of discretion. The Kentucky rule on the admissibility of evidence of a conviction of a crime for impeachment (KRE 609) differs in several respects from the federal rule (FRE 609). Without regard to how the federal rule may be interpreted, KRE 609 does not, by its terms, divest the trial court of a limited discretion to admit a conviction more than ten years old. It is precatory, rather than mandatory, and leaves room for a trial judge to rule such evidence admissible in circumstances where fairness so demands. In this case, the trial judge was within his discretion in admitting the evidence under the rule in effect at the time of trial. In the event of a new trial, if the evidence is offered again, the trial judge will be bound by the procedure specified in KRE 609. However, KRE 609 does not foreclose the evidence; it simply imposes on the Commonwealth the burden of persuading the court that, in the circumstances in which the evidence is being offered, the probative value of the conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. KRE 609, supra. We turn now to the wanton murder/self-defense problem, the Shannon issues. Here Terry, as did McGinnis, sufficiently preserved his right to a directed verdict on the charge of wanton murder and his objection to the instruction on wanton murder. Terry shot King through the back of the head and the neck, at close range. The act was intentional and the only possible consequence of this act was to cause death. Yet, possibly the jury could believe from Terry's testimony, despite the evidence to the contrary, Terry's claim of self-defense. Under the structure of the Penal Code, if Terry believed it was necessary to shoot in self-defense, however wanton or unreasonable his belief was in the circumstances, his degree of culpability was less than that required to convict him of murder. Such a belief, if truly held, diminished his culpability to Manslaughter II or Reckless Homicide. The instructions on Manslaughter II and Reckless Homicide should not be qualified by self-defense because self-defense is unavailable in a prosecution for an offense for which wantonness or recklessness . . . establish[es] culpability. KRS 503.120(1). By the same token, if the jury believes Terry's belief in the need for self-defense was objectively reasonable, he did not commit a wanton or reckless act. Manslaughter II and Reckless Homicide instructions will also suffice to cover the situation if the jury does not believe the claim of self-defense, but is persuaded Terry intended no injury, or slight injury, because it is, at the least, wanton or reckless to fire a deadly weapon at another person, regardless of the degree of harm intended. An instruction on Manslaughter I, qualified by a self-defense instruction, is also proper in present circumstances. This finding is possible because the jury might possibly conclude from Terry's testimony that, while he lacked the intent to cause death requisite to a finding of intentional murder, he intended serious physical injury. Should they so conclude, and further conclude that Terry was not acting in self-defense, Manslaughter I is the appropriate conviction. KRS 507.030(1). Likewise, Manslaughter I is the appropriate verdict should the jury conclude Terry shot to kill while acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. KRS 507.030(2). Wanton murder is not an available option under the evidence presented.