Opinion ID: 1073
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: We consider below both the proper standard/scope of review to employ in this matter, as well as Charlton's specific Batson challenge.
Charlton contends that we should review his Batson challenge to the striking of Juror No. 23 for clear error. The government suggests, rather, that we should review Charlton's challenge for plain error. The government supports its argument by observing that Charlton did not renew his challenge when the purported purposeful discrimination became apparent: after the government withdrew its strike of Juror No. 37, [6] and then exercised a peremptory challenge against Juror No. 43. We need not take a position on this matter, as we find that the district court committed no errorclear or plainin denying Charlton's Batson challenge.
Charlton focuses his Batson claim on the government's exercise of a peremptory challenge against Juror No. 23. At trial, Charlton objected to the striking of Juror No. 23 on Batson grounds. As discussed below, Charlton has relied entirely on the number of prosecution strikes against African-Americans. As we have previously held, [i]t is at least questionable whether this evidence is adequate to surpass the prima facie hurdle. Aspen, 480 F.3d at 577 (citing United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1467 (10th Cir. 1991) (By itself, the number of challenges used against members of a particular [group] is not sufficient to establish ... a prima facie case.)) (alteration in original). But even assuming that Charlton could establish a prima facie case, it is clear that he cannot ultimately establish a Batson violation. Charlton concedes in his appellate brief that the reason the government offered at trialthat Juror No. 23 is an attorney, and I do not want an attorney on the juryis a sufficient race-neutral explanation for the challenge and, standing alone, would vitiate his argument. Charlton contends, however, that the totality of the circumstances indicates that a purpose to eliminate or minimize an African-American presence on the jury can be gleaned, and accordingly Charlton's rights were violated. To support his totality-of-the-circumstances argument, Charlton points to several developments throughout the process of voir dire. First, Charlton emphasizes that the government exercised only one peremptory challenge in the second round in which the district court called prospective jurors when it struck Juror No. 37, the sole newly called African-American. Second, Charlton points to the fact that the jury that was ultimately empaneled included two African-Americans, one of whom[, Juror No. 37,] was seated only because the prosecutor withdrew his peremptory challenge in the face of a Batson challenge. Finally, Charlton notes that the government attempted to exercise three, or fifty percent, of its six peremptory challenges on African-Americans: Juror No. 23, Juror No. 37, and Juror No. 43. Charlton contends that, although the government withdrew its peremptory challenge against Juror No. 37, the government's use of half of its challenges to rid, or attempt to rid[,] the jury of three (3) of the four (4) African-Americans who were seated casts a pall over the selection process that amounts to discrimination and undercuts the prosecutor's stated reason for challenging Juror No. 23.
Charlton's argument is unavailing given our consultation of all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity. Although on appeal Charlton focuses his Batson claim on the government's exercise of a peremptory challenge against Juror No. 23, our totality-of-the-circumstances analysis will also evaluate the government's treatment of other prospective jurors. We begin by considering the relevant numeric evidence. First, Charlton correctly notes that fifty percent of the government's strikes were directed against members of a particular group, African-Americans. Second, if we take the most conservative estimate of African-Americans in the jury pool, seven, these strikes resulted in three out of seven, or forty-three percent, of a particular group, African-Americans, being removed from the venire. Since only one of these strikesagainst Juror No. 23is directly challenged on appeal, the percentage of a particular group, African-Americans, being removed from the venire by the challenged strike is one out of seven, or fourteen percent. Third, if we compare the percentage of a group's representation in the venire to its representation on the jury, we find the two percentages to be similar. Again adopting the conservative estimate of African-Americans in the jury pool, we find that African-Americans comprised seven out of fifty-five, or thirteen percent, of the venire, and they comprised two out of twelve, or seventeen percent, of the jury that was ultimately empaneled. The proportion of African-Americans on the empaneled jury was thus actually slightly higher than in the venire. In submitting this Batson claim concerning Juror No. 23, Charlton appeals to just numbers alone, precisely what we have cautioned against. See Girouard, 521 F.3d at 116 (citation omitted). The government's use of half of its statutorily permitted peremptory challenges to rid, or attempt to rid, the jury of three of the four African-Americans who were seated does not necessarily amount to racial discrimination and does not necessarily undercut the government's stated reason for challenging Juror No. 23.
This finding is further supported by the relevant non-numeric evidence. First, the government did not ask any questions or make any statements during voir dire that suggested it was operating with racial animosity towards African-Americans. Second, by the end of voir dire for the prospective jurors, the government had two unused peremptory challenges through which it could have eliminated more members of the allegedly targeted group of African-Americans. One African-American was seated in the first round of voir dire and the government did not strike or attempt to strike that person at any point during voir dire. As other circuits have found, this circumstance suggests that the government was not exercising its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. See, e.g., King v. Moore, 196 F.3d 1327, 1335 (11th Cir.1999) (rejecting a prospective African-American juror after accepting another black venireperson... [indicates] not only was there no pattern of discriminatory strikes, there was a sort of `antipattern'); United States v. Mixon, 977 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir.1992) (in a situation in which [t]he government used five out of its six challenges against blacks[, t]he one black accepted by the government weakens the argument that the government was accepting jurors solely on a racial basis). Third, the government offered apparent non-discriminatory reasons for striking potential jurors based on their voir dire answers. The defense concedes on appeal that the explanations the government provided were race-neutral. The district court accepted each explanation, either implicitly, by not soliciting an explanation and not rejecting the peremptory challenge, or explicitly, by soliciting an explanation and then not rejecting the peremptory challenge. See Girouard, 521 F.3d at 115 (where defense counsel objected on religious grounds to a peremptory challenge and the district court refused to ask the prosecutor for a race-neutral explanation, we interpreted the district court's action as an implicit rejection of [the defendant's] prima facie case of a Batson violation). The government stated it struck Juror No. 23 because the prospective juror was an attorney. Other courts have not only permitted such peremptory challenges, but have, sua sponte, declared their obviousness. For example, a district court in the District of Massachusetts, without asking the prosecution to justify a strike against a prospective juror who was an attorney, stated, [O]ne can think of many reasons why we wouldn't want an attorney on a criminal case. Id. at 114, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The government stated it attempted to strike Juror No. 37 because the prospective juror was a member of the clergy. Other courts have permitted such peremptory challenges. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found to be race-neutral the government's peremptory challenge of an African-American prospective juror who indicated that she and her husband were ordained ministers and the government inferred that she might have a higher threshold of reasonable doubt. Mixon, 977 F.2d at 923. The government stated it struck Juror No. 43 because the prospective juror had a son in prison for a crime similar to the one charged against Charlton: possession of a firearm. The defense did not object to the peremptory challenge against Juror No. 43 at the time but cites the strike on appeal as part of the totality of the circumstances that indicate that the government intended to eliminate or minimize an African-American presence on the jury. However, other circuits have upheld similar juror dismissals. See, e.g., United States v. Hendrix, 509 F.3d 362, 370 (7th Cir.2007) (finding a valid and race-neutral basis for the strikes where prosecution exercised peremptory challenges against three jurors, all of whom had relatives in prison); United States v. Crawford, 413 F.3d 873, 875 (8th Cir.2005) (There is no Batson violation when a juror is dismissed because the juror's relatives have been prosecuted or convicted of a crime....). Finally, there is no evidence in the record that similarly situated jurors (attorneys, members of clergy, or relatives of convicts) from outside the allegedly targeted group of African-Americans were permitted to serve. In fact, the government was consistent when, according to the trial transcript, the only other similarly situated prospective juror, Juror No. 47, who stated she had a relative in jail for possession of a firearm, was considered as an alternate juror. As with Juror No. 43, the government exercised a peremptory challenge against this prospective (alternate) juror, offering the same explanation in the process, notwithstanding that Juror No. 47 was not African-American. Having consulted all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity, we conclude that Charlton failed to establish that the government purposely discriminated against African-Americans in exercising its peremptory challenge against Juror No. 23 and thus the district court committed no errorclear or plain in permitting the government's peremptory challenge against that prospective juror. Furthermore, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court made a mistake in deciding that Charlton failed to prove that the strike constituted purposeful discrimination on the basis of race. We have not determined an inherent discriminatory intent in the government's explanation for striking Juror No. 23, and so deem the reason offeredthat she was an attorney and the government did not want an attorney on the juryto be race-neutral. Thus, contrary to Charlton's contention, we glean no purpose by the government to eliminate or minimize an African-American presence on the jury.