Opinion ID: 2775178
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hicks v. State

Text: Mary Hicks was arrested for and convicted of driving under the influence.24 At her trial a village public safety officer testified that, while responding to a report that Hicks was driving under the influence, he located Hicks’s truck parked in a spot at her friend’s house that he knew had recently been vacant.25 He also testified to observing Hicks enter the truck and start the engine.26 He stated that Hicks then exited the truck and ran back inside the friend’s house.27 The officer spoke with Hicks at the friend’s house, determined that she was intoxicated, and arrested her.28 During closing arguments at Hicks’s trial, the prosecutor told the jury that it could find Hicks guilty of either of the 22 Id. at  (omissions in original) (quoting Borchgrevink v. State, 239 P.3d 410, 421 (Alaska App. 2010)). 23 Moreno v. State, Nos. S-15067/15070 (Alaska Supreme Court Order, June 10, 2013). 24 See Hicks v. State, Mem. Op. & J. No. 5911, 2013 WL 203264, at  (Alaska App. Jan. 16, 2013). 25 Id. 26 Id. 27 Id. 28 Id. at -2. -7- 6982 two distinct driving or operating incidents: driving to the friend’s house or starting the parked truck in front of the friend’s house.29 This was obvious error under the Alaska Constitution’s due process clause,30 which we have interpreted to bestow on a criminal defendant the “right to have jurors ‘all agree that the defendant committed a single offense.’ ”31 Hicks did not object to the prosecutor’s statement or ask the court to instruct the jury that it had to unanimously agree on one offense to return a guilty verdict.32 The jury convicted Hicks of driving under the influence.33 Hicks appealed, arguing plain error. Before the court of appeals, the State proffered two possible tactical reasons for Hicks’s failure to object.34 First, the State asserted that “had she raised the issue in the trial court, the State might have sought to amend the indictment to charge her with two separate felony offenses.”35 Second, the State argued that Hicks’s defense focused on attacking the strength of the evidence of the second incident when the officer observed Hicks start her engine.36 The court of appeals concluded that Hicks’s attorney made a tactical decision not to object because an 29 Id. at . 30 Alaska Const. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”). 31 Khan v. State, 278 P.3d 893, 899 (Alaska 2012) (quoting State v. James, 698 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Alaska 1985)). 32 Hicks, 2013 WL 203264, at . 33 Id. at . 34 Id. at . 35 Id. 36 Id. -8- 6982 objection would have emphasized that the jury could convict Hicks based solely on the evidence of her driving under the influence, which did not rely on the officer’s disputed testimony.37 Hicks filed a petition for hearing. We granted Hicks’s petition and consolidated it with Moreno’s petition.38