Opinion ID: 844251
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Orlando Hunt's Polygraph Test Results

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting polygraph evidence in violation of state law and his rights to a fair trial and a reliable verdict under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. We agree, as we must, that error occurred, but find no reversible prejudice.
On direct examination by the prosecutor, Orlando Hunt stated that during his initial police interviews he denied any knowledge of the Coder murder because he was afraid for his safety and that of his family. Hunt further testified that, after a subsequent interview in San Bernardino, he decided to tell investigators the truth about witnessing defendant shoot Coder. On cross-examination, counsel asked Hunt whether he changed his story and implicated defendant because the prosecutor pressed him and threatened to charge him with the murder. Hunt answered that he decided to tell the truth because his conscience bothered him. Thereafter, out of the presence of the jury, the prosecutor sought to introduce evidence that Hunt took and failed a polygraph test in order to establish his state of mind when he decided to tell police the truth about witnessing the murder. Defense counsel objected that the test results were inadmissible under Evidence Code section 351.1, and that their admission would improperly place a stamp of approval upon the version of events to which Hunt ultimately testified. The trial court overruled the objection, reasoning the proffered evidence was relevant to Hunt's credibility because he might have changed his story about his knowledge of the crime based on information he received that he had failed, or that led him to believe he had failed, the polygraph test. Subsequently, on redirect examination, the prosecutor elicited from Hunt that he initially told police both truth and lies about his knowledge of the murder. He stated he later took a polygraph test, after which the polygraph examiner informed him the results showed he had told the truth about someon certain things, and then lied on certain things. The examiner then told Hunt to just go ahead and tell the truth. Hunt said that, after he thought about what the examiner told him, he decided to tell the truth for the first time about being an eyewitness to the murder, and did so during his December 19, 1995, interview with the prosecutor and Buchanan.

Defendant contends the trial court should have excluded evidence that Hunt was given a polygraph examination about his knowledge of, and involvement in, the Coder murder, and that the examiner informed him he had answered certain unspecified questions falsely. We agree this evidence should have been excluded. (13) Evidence Code section 351.1 prohibits the admission of polygraph evidence in criminal cases absent a stipulation. [31] ( People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 842, 845-846 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 420, 94 P.3d 551]; accord, People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 128 [30 Cal.Rptr.3d 105, 113 P.3d 1125] ( Samuels ).) This section codifies a rule that this court adopted more than 30 years ago ... in which we said that polygraph test results `do not scientifically prove the truth or falsity of the answers given during such tests.' ( People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 817 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204] ( Espinoza ).) The statutory ban against admission of polygraph evidence `is a rational and proportional means of advancing the legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence.' ( People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 890 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 149, 126 P.3d 981] ( Hinton ), quoting People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 413 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1]; see also United States v. Scheffer (1998) 523 U.S. 303, 314 [140 L.Ed.2d 413, 118 S.Ct. 1261] [a per se rule excluding all polygraph evidence offends no constitutional principle].) The state's exclusion of polygraph evidence is adorned with no exceptions, and its stricture on admission of such evidence has been uniformly enforced by this court and the Court of Appeal. (See, e.g., Samuels, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 128 [evidence that defendant cooperated with police by offering to take, and passing, polygraph examination was not admissible to refute prosecution's evidence that she was uncooperative during investigation]; People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 870-872 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1] ( Burgener ) [on retrial of penalty phase, evidence that a third party's polygraph test results were inconclusive was not admissible for impeachment]; People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1122 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36] [no exception for favorable mitigating polygraph evidence at the penalty phase]; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 419 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610] [evidence that prosecution witness twice failed polygraph examination offered for impeachment was inadmissible]; People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 193-194 [279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949] [evidence that a prosecution witness had failed a polygraph examination was not admissible to support the defense theory that she was actual killer]; People v. Kegler (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 72, 84-90 [242 Cal.Rptr. 897] [same].) The People contend the evidence was properly admitted, not to endorse or attack the credibility of answers given during a polygraph examination, but to explain why Hunt, in his postpolygraph statement to police, changed his story about his involvement in the murder and implicated defendant as the killer. The People assert that because such evidence was relevant to Hunt's credibility, this court should recognize a state-of-mind exception to Evidence Code section 351.1 for this limited purpose. We find this argument unpersuasive. (See People v. Lee (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 772, 790-791 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 828] ( Lee ) [declining to recognize exception to ban on polygraph evidence offered to explain prosecution witness's state of mind in changing postpolygraph statement to police and as relevant to impeachment of witness's recantation of the statement at trial]; see also People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 763-764 [114 Cal.Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267] [evidence of a defendant's willingness to take a polygraph test is inadmissible as a badge of innocence to bolster his credibility]; accord, Espinoza, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 817-818; People v. Basuta (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 370, 389 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 285] ( Basuta ) [evidence that a prosecution witness agreed to take a polygraph examination after giving the police a statement was inadmissible to bolster her credibility].) Accordingly, the trial court's admission of the polygraph evidence was erroneous.
Though admission of the polygraph references was error, we are persuaded, under the circumstances of this case, that no reversible prejudice arose. The instant matter is materially distinguishable from the two cases on which defendant primarily relies, Lee and Basuta. In Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 772, before the sole witness to the murder provided his initial statement to police, he was administered a police polygraph examination in which he denied having knowledge of the murder. ( Id. at pp. 776, 782.) The examiner informed the witness that he had failed the test and that there was a probability he was the shooter. Thereafter, during a tape-recorded interview, the witness provided the examiner a statement in which he identified the defendant as the shooter. ( Id. at pp. 783-785.) At trial, he denied he had witnessed the murder. ( Id. at p. 776.) The prosecutor was permitted to play the witness's tape-recorded polygraph examination and his interview under the theory this evidence was relevant impeachment material bearing on the witness's state of mind to explain why he subsequently changed his story and identified the defendant as the killer. ( Id. at pp. 790-791.) On appeal, the reviewing court rejected the prosecutor's theory of admissibility and concluded admission of the polygraph evidence was prejudicial error under Evidence Code section 351.1. ( Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 790-791.) The Lee court affirmed there is no state-of-mind exception to the statute's proscription against use of such evidence in criminal proceedings. ( Id. at p. 791.) The error was deemed prejudicial because [t]he polygraph evidence lent an unreasonable impression of credibility ... to the witness's identification of the defendant as the killer in an otherwise weak case. ( Id. at p. 792.) As the Court of Appeal noted, jurors heard no evidence of the lack of certainty of polygraph results. On the other hand, the prosecutor informed them that his [polygraph] machine [w]as a piece of space age technology, as reliable as a calculator, `state-of-the-art,' `high tech stuff,' and `copyrighted by [the] Johns Hopkins University applied physics laboratory ... the same people that monitor the spacecraft.' ( Ibid. ) Similarly, in Basuta, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th 370, the defendant, a home daycare operator, was convicted of assault charges stemming from the death of a 13-month-old toddler by shake-induced injuries. Other than the defendant, the sole percipient witness to the events leading to the death of the toddler was the defendant's housekeeper. She initially told police investigators that the toddler fell and hit his head when another child pushed him. ( Id. at pp. 376-379.) Thereafter, during a police interview, the witness accused the defendant of shaking the toddler. At the conclusion of the interview, the witness offered to take a polygraph examination. [32] ( Basuta, at pp. 388-389.) At trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony about the witness's offer from a detective who participated in the interview. ( Id. at p. 389.) The Court of Appeal concluded admission of the witness's offer to take a polygraph test was prejudicial and warranted reversal of the defendant's conviction. It reasoned the jury's decision on the witness's credibility was central to the prosecution's case, and the detective's testimony had a high potential to affect the jury's resolution of that issue. ( Basuta, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 390.) The jury could have found the sole percipient witness credible based on a belief that her willingness to take the polygraph examination reflected her confidence in its results, or could have inferred that the prosecution decided to bring the charges once persuaded that the witness was credible by her offer to take a polygraph test. ( Ibid. ) Here, by contrast, we agree with the People that erroneous admission of evidence of Hunt's polygraph examination was harmless under any standard. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) Unlike in Lee, defendant suffered no prejudice from any unreasonable impression of credibility the polygraph test results themselves might have bestowed on Hunt's identification of defendant as the killer. ( Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 792.) Kerry Scott unequivocally identified defendant as Coder's killer and corroborated Gina Lee's presence in or near the field in back of the motel. Also, Lee testified consistently with Scott that defendant was in the field when Coder was shot and that he left the area immediately thereafter. Lee also corroborated Hunt's testimony that Hunt was with defendant at the motel shortly before the murder occurred, and that he and defendant ran from the murder scene immediately after the shooting. Further, Scott's testimony substantially agreed with the pathologist's findings that Coder was shot in the head at close range and fell to the ground after taking a step or two, at most, after being shot. In addition, unlike in Basuta, jurors would not have concluded that Hunt agreed to take the polygraph because he had confidence in the test result; he admitted he initially told police a mixture of truth and lies about his involvement in the murder. (See Basuta, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 390.) Nor would they have concluded Hunt's testimony was believable merely because he took the test; among other things, Hunt testified against defendant despite threats by defendant and defendant's sister Robin to harm him if he did so. ( Ibid. ) Moreover, unlike the housekeeper in Basuta, Hunt was not the sole percipient witness to the crime at issue; hence, the jurors in this case would not have credited Hunt's testimony based on their belief the prosecutor would not have prosecuted defendant if he had doubts about Hunt's credibility. (See Basuta, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 390.) Indeed, the jury was aware that the prosecutor did have reservations about the credibility of this witness. During Hunt's postpolygraph interview (the audiotape recording of which was played for the jury), the prosecutor threatened to prosecute Hunt for Coder's murder, and told him, albeit falsely and presumably merely to add force to this threat, that four witnesses said he was standing next to defendant when the victim was shot. Also, jurors were informed that Hunt was a drug user with a felony record, a factor that weighed against finding Hunt credible merely because he willingly underwent a polygraph test. Reversal is not required.