Opinion ID: 483358
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: contract and fraud

Text: 68 Curtis' implied contract and fraud claims merit little consideration. Curtis contends that putting up for competitive bid the county ambulance services contract constituted an offer to all interested ambulance providers to submit their bids with the understanding, expressed in Home Rule Resolution 80-139 (and reinforced throughout the bid term), that the ambulance services contract would be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder. Reply Brief of Appellant at 22. Curtis then argues that it accepted that offer by preparing the bid in conformance with the specifications, thereby giving rise to a contract which the Board allegedly breached by considering the bids and awarding the contract in an unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory and illegal manner. Id. at 23. It finally argues that, if no express contract exists, then at least an implied contract exists between itself and the County. The existence or nonexistence of a contract is a question of fact, Curtis argues, thereby precluding dismissal here. 69 Curtis' contract claims, by its own admission, depend upon its argument that Resolution 80-139 required that the ambulance contract go to the lowest responsible bidder. Having found that the Resolution imposes no such requirement, we similarly reject Curtis' contract arguments. 70 In the district court, and only briefly on appeal, Curtis appears to make a third-party beneficiary argument, largely in reliance on Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir.1972), claiming that the request for a bid ... and specifications, created a contractual obligation on the part of the defendant Board ... and plaintiff is in the protective realm of the obligation created by such resolution. The plaintiff as the lowest responsible bidder under the bid specifications and procedures is a proper third party beneficiary of the contractual obligations set forth under the bid specifications, requirements, and procedures ... R.Vol. I at 17-18; Complaint, p 28. 71 We reject Curtis' argument that it was the intended beneficiary of any contractual relationship between the County and Medevac. The contract itself contains nothing suggesting that Curtis is such a beneficiary. Furthermore, Euresti is inapposite to Curtis' argument that it is within the protective realm of legislation or regulations in the public interest, 458 F.2d at 1118, so as to give rise to an implied right of action to enforce Resolution 80-139. In Euresti, indigent county residents brought a class action against hospital administrators, trustees, and county commissioners seeking a declaratory judgment to compel the hospital to provide free or below cost services to them. The action was based on the Hill-Burton Act, Title VI of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 291-291o-1., which requires that hospitals which receive federal funds provide free or below cost services to indigents. This court determined that, even in the absence of a contractual relationship between the hospital and the federal government, indigents, those clearly within the protective realm of the Hill-Burton Act, had an implied right of action to require the hospital to provide such services. 72 Curtis is not an intended beneficiary of Resolution 80-139. The competitive bidding procedures are designed to protect taxpayers from the wasteful or fraudulent expenditure of public funds.... ARA Services, 590 F.Supp. at 628 (quoting Regional Scaffolding & Hoisting Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 593 F.Supp. 529 (E.D.Pa.1984)). Bidding statutes are for the benefit of the taxpayers and are construed as nearly as possible with sole reference to the public good. Autotote, 427 A.2d at 58 (quoting Terminal Constr. Corp. v. Atlantic City Sewerage Auth., 67 N.J. 403, 341 A.2d 327 (1975)). As we have already determined, Resolution 80-139 imposed no requirement that contracts of the type involved here go to the lowest responsible bidder. We do not believe that Resolution includes disappointed bidders within its protective realm. 73 Curtis did not argue its fraud theory to the district court and will not be allowed to argue that theory on appeal. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323 n. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 2724 n. 1, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977); United States v. Immordino, 534 F.2d 1378, 1381 (10th Cir.1976); Harman v. Diversified Medical Invs. Corp., 524 F.2d 361, 365 (10th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 1727, 48 L.Ed.2d 195 (1976); International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 953 v. Central Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 501 F.2d 902, 907 (10th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 926, 95 S.Ct. 1123, 43 L.Ed.2d 397 (1975). In any event, we have reviewed the allegations of the complaint and find that they fail to meet the specificity requirements for allegations of fraud. 15