Opinion ID: 3026413
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Individual Questioning

Text: All appellants argue vigorously that the District Court should not have questioned the jurors about Juror 11's alleged 68 misconduct. We review “a trial court’s response to allegations of juror misconduct for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Boone, 458 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 2006). Here, we conclude that the District Court acted within its discretion when it individually questioned the jurors. We have recently had occasion to set forth the applicable legal standard governing the district courts’ latitude to question jurors during deliberations about allegations of misconduct. In Boone, we recognized that “[i]t is beyond question that the secrecy of deliberations is critical to the success of the jury system.” Id. at 329. At the same time, we emphasized that “[i]t is also manifest, however, that a juror who refuses to deliberate or who commits jury nullification violates the sworn jury oath and prevents the jury from fulfilling its constitutional role.” Id. Attempting to reconcile these disparate values, we held that “where substantial evidence of jury misconduct – including credible allegations of jury nullification or of a refusal to deliberate – arises during deliberations, a district court may, within its sound discretion, investigate the allegations through juror questioning or other appropriate means.” Id. We stressed that a district court, “based on its unique perspective at the scene, is in a far superior position than this Court to appropriately consider allegations of juror misconduct, both during trial and during deliberations.” Id. Applying that legal principle in Boone, we affirmed the District Court’s decision to question a juror after the Court received a note stating: We have some serious concern about one of our fellow jurors. He has told . . . all of us several times that his best friend is a cop, and he has several guns, some unregistered and being stored at his friend’s house. This leads us to believe that he lied on his initial questionnaire for jury selection. Also, he refuses to discuss certain [counts] because he had his mind made up before we started deliberating. He has said he does not believe anything the police said and thinks everyone is lying. We feel this seriously affects our deliberations. Our votes are 11 to [ ] 1 on 69 four [counts] and we have agreed on four. The juror in question has stated they will not change their mind [sic] and does not want to work at any evidence or discuss any testimony. We seem to be at an impasse. Please help us. Thank you, [jury foreperson]. Id. at 324 (alterations in original). The appellant argued that this note presented insufficient justification for the District Court to question the juror. We rejected that argument, explaining that “[a]lthough this evidence was far from unambiguous, there was a sufficient indication that Juror X was violating his oath to provide discretion to the trial judge to investigate further.” Id. at 330. Accordingly, the legal standard is clear: a district court may investigate allegations of juror misconduct when presented with “substantial evidence” of that misconduct. All appellants protest that the District Court here was not presented with substantial evidence of misconduct. The first individualized investigation was precipitated by two notes: one accused a juror of being biased, while another accused a juror of refusing to consider evidence and deliberate. This evidence is at least as strong as that presented in Boone, and, recognizing that the District Court was in the best position to understand and respond to the exigencies of the situation, we conclude that those notes amounted to “substantial evidence of jury misconduct.” The District Court’s second voir dire was also an acceptable use of its discretion. It is true that the note that prompted this investigation was ambiguous: a court could have read the note either to state that further deliberations would be useless because the jurors simply could not agree or because one juror was violating her oath by failing to participate. While the note alone may have been insufficient to justify questioning the jurors a second time, the District Court was not operating from a blank slate. The District Court had previously fielded complaints from jurors – both by note and during the first questioning – that Juror 11 was failing to deliberate. Thus, the District Court certainly could have interpreted this note to allege 70 further misconduct, which, taken in tandem with previous allegations, was sufficient to permit the District Court to exercise its discretion to investigate further. See Boone, 458 F.3d at 330 (stating that “[t]he fact that a different judge may have chosen not to conduct a[n] investigation is irrelevant”). Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court acted within its discretion in choosing to conduct a second session of individual questioning. Finally, the third investigation was also appropriate. This series of questioning was prompted by the District Court’s receiving two notes: the first claimed that a juror was biased, and the second exhorted the judge to question the jurors. A specific allegation of bias, made after the District Court had exhaustively instructed the jurors on proper and improper bias, provided substantial evidence of juror misconduct. While it may be more intrusive to question each juror individually, as occurred here, than only the subject of the allegation of misconduct, as occurred in Boone, we nevertheless conclude that the District Court acted well within its discretion when it used the more-expansive mode of investigation. We have recognized that there are times in which individual questioning is the optimal way in which to root out misconduct, see United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 686 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that district court’s use of questionnaire, instead of, for instance, individualized voir dire, was “inadequate to enable the court to fulfill its responsibility of providing an appropriate cautionary instruction and of determining whether prejudice resulted from the jury misconduct”); United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 667 (3d Cir. 1993) (calling individual voir dire the “method of inquiry [that] we have preferred”), and that the District Court must utilize procedures that will “provide a reasonable assurance for the discovery of prejudice,” Martin v. Warden, Huntingdon State Corr. Inst., 653 F.2d 799, 807 (3d Cir. 1981). Crucially, the District Court took care to limit its questions to appropriate matters that did not touch on the merits of the jury’s deliberation, and expressly informed each juror on multiple occasions that he or she should not reveal the substance of the deliberations. See United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 634 n.16 (5th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the district court was very careful; it insisted that the jurors refrain from 71 describing the content and method of their deliberations”). As we have recognized, the District Court was in the best position to evaluate what kind of investigation the circumstances demanded, see Boone, 458 F.3d at 329; here, its decision was reasonable. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court acted within its discretion to question the jurors on all three occasions.