Opinion ID: 1237936
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Characterizing Banks Killing as Murder

Text: During cross-examination of Rodney Perryman, the correctional officer who testified to his observation of the fatal prison stabbing of African-American inmate Leroy Banks, defense counsel asked about racial tensions in the prison that day. Well, there was tension just because a murder in that housing unit, Perryman answered. Defense counsel asked the court to strike the word murder. One of the prosecutors interjected, I don't know what else it could be characterized as. Defense counsel suggested it might be self-defense. The trial court struck the word murder, admonished the jurors that they were to determine what had happened, and suggested that the incident be referred to as an assault. Later, on redirect, the prosecutor in a question referred to this assault as the judge called it. (113) Defendant contends that the prosecutors should have known it was improper for them to characterize a homicide as murder and that the reference to this assault as the judge called it was an improper use of sarcasm to remind the jury of their personal belief that the Banks killing was in fact murder. Although it would be improper for a prosecutor to use the term murder in questioning a witness about an unadjudicated killing, a prosecutor is of course free to argue to the jury, after all the evidence had been presented, that it should find that a killing was murder. Here, the prosecutors never used the term murder in questioning Perryman about the Banks homicide. Although the prosecutor's suggestion that the killing could only be murder was premature, and should have been reserved for argument, defendant was not prejudiced. The testimony of Perryman and Carpenter plainly supported a finding of murder, and the defense, while attacking the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses, did not present any affirmative evidence to support a finding that the killing was self-defense or manslaughter.