Opinion ID: 2041394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Voluntariness of written statement.

Text: The remaining issue relates to the validity of Lybarger's written inculpatory statement made the following day. When faced with the question of the validity of a confession given subsequent to an illegally obtained confession the United States Supreme Court has adopted the test there must be a `break in the stream of events'    sufficient to insulate' the final events `from the effect of all that went before.' Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 349, 88 S.Ct. 1488, 1490, 20 L.Ed.2d 630, 634 (1968); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 88 S.Ct. 189, 19 L.Ed.2d 35 (1967); Clewis v. State of Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967). These cases indicate time alone is not a sufficient intervening factor. Here time and drug-induced sleep intervened. But we hold even these factors coupled with perfunctorily-given Miranda rights are not sufficient to validate the written statement. Several counter-balancing circumstances influence our conclusion. First, Dr. Loeffelholz's testimony went directly to this point. He opined Lybarger did not have the ability to volitionally make this written statement. He testified in effect Lybarger was emotionally broken by the first oral inculpatory statements. Second, when this statement was obtained from Lybarger he had been in custody for ten days without an opportunity to communicate with anyone but police and hospital personnel. Denial of access to the outside world continued throughout. See Darwin v. Connecticut, supra, 391 U.S. at 349, 88 S.Ct. at 1490, 20 L.Ed.2d at 633. A third major circumstance is the fact Lybarger was hospitalized. He was confined to a bed, never permitted to leave it, and continually clamped in four locked restraints around his ankles, body, and left wrist, until after he made the statement. Dr. Loeffelholz testified, In the local hospital he was put in restraints, and any individual who is placed in a psychiatric hospital or any hospital for that matter, has a tendency to comply with expectations. There is a greater tendency to comply if you have restraints on you. Lastly, we note the written statement itself carries some indication of state of Lybarger's mind when it was taken. A portion states,    As far as anybody else being with me, I can'tI don't think we did. I just don't know whether I did or didn't. From there was night, I guess. I don't know if I had my car or my bike but probably a car, I don't know, my car was screwed up after Rhonda left. It might have been a bike. I remember being out there. We were goofing around, I think it was my car.   . Dr. Loeffelholz testified,    this is not his usual way of speaking, if these are his words; they are words said in a rather highly stressful state   . The language of the statement does not persuade one it is the product of a rational intellect and a free will. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208, 80 S.Ct. 274, 280, 4 L.Ed.2d 242, 249 (1960). It is apparent to us the events surrounding this written statement were not sufficiently insulated from the prior events which occasioned the oral inculpatory statements. The coercion of the first oral statements infects it. We hold it too was properly suppressed. The writ of certiorari is annulled. This case is remanded to district court for further proceedings. Writ annulled.