Opinion ID: 842329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: united states v. booker

Text: The Supreme Court next discussed statutory maximums and sentencing factors in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). In that case, the Court addressed the applicability of the preceding line of cases to the federal sentencing guidelines. The prosecution charged Booker [12] with possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base. The federal statute for this crime provided a maximum sentence of life in prison. But because of Booker's criminal history and the quantity of cocaine base that the jury found was involved, the guidelines required a maximum sentence of 21 years and 10 months' imprisonment. Instead of imposing that sentence, the trial court held a hearing during which it made additional findings of fact. It concluded that Booker had possessed another 566 grams of cocaine base and that he had obstructed justice. Accordingly, using a preponderance of the evidence standard, the court increased his maximum sentence to 30 years in prison. Id. at 227, 125 S.Ct. 738. After a discussion of Jones, Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely, the Supreme Court found the federal guidelines indistinguishable from the Washington guidelines that were at issue in Blakely: Booker's actual sentence, however, was 360 months, almost 10 years longer than the Guidelines range supported by the jury verdict alone. To reach this sentence, the judge found facts beyond those found by the jury: namely, that Booker possessed 566 grams of crack in addition to the 92.5 grams in his duffel bag. The jury never heard any evidence of the additional drug quantity, and the judge found it true by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, just as in Blakely, the jury's verdict alone does not authorize the sentence. The judge acquires that authority only upon finding some additional fact. There is no relevant distinction between the sentence imposed pursuant to the Washington statutes in Blakely and the sentences imposed pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in these cases. [ Id. at 235, 125 S.Ct. 738 quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (citation omitted).] Again, the Supreme Court found it irrelevant that a statute existed setting an absolute maximum sentence. The sentencing court could not impose the absolute maximum sentence in every case. Instead, in cases like Booker's, the jury's verdict supported only a lower maximum sentence. Booker, 543 U.S. at 234-235, 125 S.Ct. 738. The Supreme Court concluded: Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Apprendi: Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. [ Id. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738.] On this basis, the Supreme Court invalidated the statutory provisions that made the federal sentencing guidelines mandatory. Id. at 226-227, 125 S.Ct. 738.