Opinion ID: 2252932
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: How Was This Instruction Defective?

Text: The trial court judge read the following instruction to the jury during preliminary and final instructions: There was in effect at the time of the alleged offense an Indiana Law, I.C. XX-XX-X-X, which reads, in part, as follows: A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being commits murder. There was also in effect at the time of the alleged offense an Indiana Law, I.C. XX-XX-X-X, which reads in part as follows: A person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with the culpability required for commission of the crime, he engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime. Attempted Murder is a Class A Felony. To convict a defendant of Attempted Murder, as alleged in Count I, the State must prove each of the following elements: The defendant: 1. Knowingly or intentionally 2. Engaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step to accomplish 3. The knowing or intentional killing of another human being, to-wit: Charles Williams. R. at 115,141. Although he failed to object at trial, Greer argues that giving this instruction constituted fundamental error because it did not inform the jury that he must have intended to kill the deputy in order to be convicted of attempted murder. Greer draws a parallel between the instruction given in his trial and the one used in Taylor v. State (1993), Ind., 616 N.E.2d 748. In Taylor, we held that giving an instruction which does not include specific intent to kill the victim as an element of attempted murder constitutes fundamental error. Id. at 748; see also, Spradlin v. State (1991), Ind., 569 N.E.2d 948. The State acknowledges that this Court has held that instructions purporting to set forth the elements of attempted murder must include specific intent. The State contends, however, that appellant waived this issue because he did not object to the instruction at trial. Alternatively, the State argues that the instructions as a whole sufficiently informed the jury about the requirement of specific intent. We believed the rule to be well-settled after our decisions in Taylor and Spradlin: Any instruction that purports to set forth the elements of attempted murder must include specific intent. Taylor, 616 N.E.2d at 749; Spradlin, 569 N.E.2d at 950. Absent inclusion of specific intent as an element of attempted murder, individuals who act without the necessary mens rea could be found guilty of attempted murder. Taylor, 616 N.E.2d at 749. Such an instruction strikes squarely against the principles of fairness and due process. Jackson v. State (1991), Ind., 575 N.E.2d 617. The instruction given in the instant case did not inform the jury of the vital specific intent requirement. Rather, this instruction allowed the jury to conclude that because appellant knowingly fired a gun at another, he attempted murder. This is directly contrary to a number of prior decisions by this Court. See, e.g., Zickefoose v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 618, 388 N.E.2d 507. The State must prove that appellant possessed an intent to kill when taking a substantial step toward the crime of murder. Id. at 622, 388 N.E.2d at 510. That is, appellant must have intended to kill the deputy when he fired his gun to be convicted of attempted murder. Under the language of the instruction given in this action, the jury could have found appellant guilty of attempted murder by finding the lesser mens rea of knowingly. [1] Accordingly, we hold in this case as we have previously held in analogous cases: Error occurred in this trial because the jury was able to convict on the lesser intent of knowingly. See Hill v. State (1993), Ind., 615 N.E.2d 97.