Opinion ID: 4540558
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Retaliation Award

Text: Mr. Sivaraman next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded him no damages for his retaliation claim. He acknowledges that the trial court has broad discretion to fashion “appropriate relief” for the illegal retaliation, see D.C. Code § 32-1311(c), but maintains that it abused that discretion by revisiting and openly doubting the merits of this claim before issuing this non-award. He has a point. After the trial court entered a default in Mr. Sivaraman’s favor, it had no occasion to revisit the merits of his retaliation claim and instead should have fashioned appropriate relief while treating the claim as meritorious. See Lockhart v. Cade, 728 A.2d 65, 68–69 (D.C. 1999) (explaining that the only issue remaining personal loan that an employer borrowed from her employee? We have no ready answers for these policy questions, except to say that they are policy questions for the legislature. As for the current incarnation of the WPCL, we do not think the legislature has evinced any intention to capture debts like these that fall far outside the bounds of the standard definition of wages. 24 before the trial court after it entered default was the extent of plaintiff’s damages). If the trial court’s non-award was in fact based on such a reassessment of the merits, that would be an abuse of discretion. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (“A [trial] court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”); In re J.D.C., 594 A.2d 70, 75 (D.C. 1991) (“[A] trial court abuses its discretion when it rests its conclusions on incorrect legal standards.”). Because the record is unclear as to whether that was in fact the basis for the trial court’s nonaward, we instruct the trial court to reassess its damages award on the retaliation claim upon remand and, if the award remains nil, state its reasons uninfected by any doubts as to the claim’s merits. The WPCL makes it unlawful for “any employer to discharge, threaten, penalize, or in any other manner discriminate or retaliate against any employee or person because that employee or person has” engaged in certain activities protected under the law. D.C. Code § 32-1311(a). Upon the trial court’s entry of the default, both G&A and Mr. Guizzetti were deemed to have admitted to such retaliation, as alleged in Mr. Sivaraman’s complaint.18 See Lockhart, 728 A.2d at 68 (“[T]he entry 18 Given the trial court’s skepticism about whether Mr. Sivaraman even alleged a prima facie case of retaliation, we note separately that he did. One of the activities protected under the WPCL includes making a complaint to one’s employer that the employer violated a provision of the law. D.C. Code § 32-1311(a)(1). Mr. 25 of a default ‘operates as an admission by the defaulting party that there are no issues of liability . . . .’”); Rest. Equip. & Supply Depot, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 852 A.2d 951, 956 n.6 (D.C. 2004) (“[T]he entry of a default ‘simply precludes the defaulting party from offering any further defense on the issue of liability.’” (quoting Lockhart, 728 A.2d at 68)). All that was left for the trial court to do was determine the extent of the damages sustained by Mr. Sivaraman as the result of his termination and then craft an appropriate award. See Lockhart, 728 A.2d at 68, 70. Instead of confining itself to that task, the trial court repeatedly expressed skepticism about the merits of Mr. Sivaraman’s retaliation claim as animating its non-award. It reasoned, “I do not think that it is appropriate to award back pay under these circumstances because . . . although [we are] in a default situation I don’t give a lot of credence to the retaliation claim. . . . I am going to exercise my discretion not to award back pay . . . .”19 In Lockhart, we reversed a trial court’s denial of Sivaraman’s June 2016 email complaining he had not been paid, requesting to be paid, and inquiring when he could expect payment constitutes such a complaint. It is of no consequence that Mr. Sivaraman did not mention the WPCL in his email. See id. at § 1311(b). 19 The trial court made several comments on the merits of Mr. Sivaraman’s retaliation claim: “I don’t really know that there was retaliation, liability as to the retaliation claim to be honest . . . .”; “[Mr. Guizzetti] had some defenses here I am not at all certain that that retaliation claim would have been resolved in Mr. Sivaraman’s favor.”; “Mr. Guizzetti has defenses he would have raised as to why 26 damages under similar circumstances, where a default was entered in the plaintiff’s favor yet the trial court issued no award because of the plaintiff’s failure to “produce[] sufficient evidence” to “prove the substance of the complaint.” 728 A.2d at 67–68. Finding reversible error, we held that the judge “should have been confined to proof of damages only” and remanded the case for reconsideration of the damages award. Id. at 69. We reach the same result here. This is not to foreclose the possibility that the trial court, upon remand and without reconsideration of the merits, will remain of the view that no award is appropriate for this retaliation claim. There could be proper bases for coming to that conclusion; for instance, it may be that the court believes that Mr. Sivaraman’s posttermination consultancy work, for which he has already received a monetary award (plus treble damages), obviates any need for a separate award on the retaliation claim. But that is a discretionary call for the trial court in the first instance, and because it appears that this non-award was based on an inappropriate reconsideration of the merits of the retaliation claim, the trial court should revisit it on remand. Mr. Sivaraman was terminated . . . .”; “I am not really sure that on the merits Mr. Sivaraman would have prevailed on the retaliation claim.”; “[I]t really isn’t clear to me that he did not necessarily have meritorious defenses . . . .” 27