Opinion ID: 901120
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in conducting the trial in the defendant's absence.

Text: [¶ 10.] We review the trial court's decision to proceed with the trial in absence of the defendant de novo. Because the application of a statute to particular facts involves a question of law, we review the circuit court's conclusions de novo. State v. Guthrie, 2001 SD 61, ¶ 61, 627 N.W.2d 401, 424; Lucero v. VanWie, 1999 SD 109, ¶ 6, 598 N.W.2d 893, 895. [¶ 11.] Talarico claims that SDCL 23A-39-1 (Rule 43(a)) prohibits the State from trying him in absentia because he was not present at the beginning of his trial. This is an issue of first impression for this Court. Rule 43(a) requires the presence of a defendant at every stage of his trial with two exceptions. A defendant shall be present at his arraignment, at the time of his plea, at every stage of his trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as provided by § § 23A-39-2 and 23A-39-3. 23A-39-1 (Rule 43(a)). [¶ 12.] The first exception is when the defendant is initially present, but voluntarily absents himself after the trial has commenced, the second exception is when the defendant's own conduct justifies his exclusion. SDCL 23A-39-2 (Rule 43(b)) provides: The further progress of a trial to and including the return of a verdict shall not be prevented whenever a defendant who was initially present: (1) In noncapital cases, voluntarily absents himself after the trial has commenced; or (2) Engages in conduct which justifies his being excluded from the courtroom. [¶ 13.] Prior to codification of the Federal Rule 43 [which is equivalent to SDCL 23A-39-2 (Rule 43(a) and (b))], the United States Supreme Court in Diaz v. United States, determined that a defendant can waive his right to be present during certain portions of a trial. 223 U.S. 442, 454, 32 S.Ct. 250, 253, 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912). In Diaz, the defendant, out on bail, absented himself twice during the later stages of his trial in the Philippines. He had sent a note to the court that the trial should proceed without him. Id. at 453, 32 S.Ct. 250. He appealed his conviction, in part, on the premise that he could not waive his presence and the court did not have the power to proceed in his absence because the law expressly stated he was entitled to appear at every stage of the proceedings. [2] Id. The Court found no infringement of the law and that the defendant could waive his presence during portions of the trial. Id. at 459, 32 S.Ct. 250. [¶ 14.] Talarico relies on a later U.S. Supreme Court case of Crosby v. United States, wherein, the Court held that the Federal Rule 43 [3] did not permit the trial in absentia of a defendant who absconds prior to trial and is absent at its beginning. 506 U.S. 255, 256, 113 S.Ct. 748, 750, 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993). In Crosby, the defendant did not appear the day of the scheduled trial and could not be found. Id. The district court postponed the trial several days in an effort to find the defendant and, upon determining that he had absconded, tried him in absentia. Id at 257, 113 S.Ct. 748. Approximately six months later the defendant was apprehended in Florida and brought back for sentencing. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court based upon its interpretation of Federal Rule 43. [¶ 15.] The Court determined that Rule 43 does not allow full trials in absentia. The Rule declares explicitly: `The defendant shall be present ... at every stage of the trial ... except as otherwise provided by this rule' (emphasis added). Id. at 258-59, 113 S.Ct. 748. Crosby was not present prior to trial and the Court clearly distinguished between the pretrial flight of Crosby and the midtrial absence of Diaz. The Court based the distinction partly on the premise that midtrial flight or absence exhibits a knowing and voluntary waiver of a defendant's right to be present. The Court stated, Whether or not the right constitutionally may be waived in other circumstancesand we express no opinion here on that subjectthe defendant's initial presence serves to assure that any waiver is indeed knowing. Id. at 261, 113 S.Ct. 748. [¶ 16.] Talarico maintains he was escorted from the courtroom before the trial began and was, therefore, not present at the commencement of trial which is required for a valid waiver under the statute. The Rule states that the trial can proceed whenever a defendant who was initially present ... voluntarily absents himself after the trial has commenced.... Consequently, the threshold question is whether the trial had commenced for purposes of SDCL 23A-39-2 (Rule 43(b)). [¶ 17.] Prior to and during the trial, Talarico was in custody. He was brought into the courtroom for all scheduled proceedings. On the day of trial Talarico was physically present in the courtroom where the trial was to be held, all parties were present, the jurors had reported and were waiting to be brought into the courtroom. Talarico understood that the proceedings against him were underway. The trial judge announced as he started the proceeding, We're on the record outside the presence of the jury, it's February 26th, this is the time and place set for a trial in the matter of State of South Dakota versus Ronald Louis Talarico. Talarico immediately began to protest and requested a different attorney. To which the court again replied, The time and place for the trial is today, we have gone through this before.... Talarico tells the court: You know, you can either give me a week's continuance and subpoena my witnesses and I'll represent myself or send me on back to my cell, Judge, because I really don't want to act like an asshole here. What good is it going to do any of you people if I spit in his face in front of the jury? Because that's what I'm going to do, man. So send me back to my cell, have your little kangaroo court and convict me. You know, I mean that's the bottom line here. After further discussion with Talarico and his attorney concerning Talarico's request for a continuance, the following dialogue transpired: THE COURT: Well, Mr. Talarico, the what you're asking right now, because I'll tell you I'm going to deny your request for substitute counsel, I'm going to deny your request for a continuance, and what you're asking is at this point before the jury is even selected, before they have even come in to have any kind ofyou have been through it, I mean, you know THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I know exactly what's going on. THE COURT: Okay. So before that even starts you're just saying, Judge, please let me go? THE DEFENDANT: Absolutely, if he's representing me, yeah. THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'llI mean, Iagain, I think the law provides that you can voluntarily absent yourself. THE DEFENDANT: Okay. THE COURT: ... But, I'm going to do this: every time we have a break I'm going to send word back through the jail to tell you that we're on a break and re-invite you. THE DEFENDANT: Okay, well, you might as well save your breath because I'm not going back as long as he's here. We find that under this set of facts for the purposes of SDCL 23A-39-2 that Talarico was initially present, and that the trial had commenced. [¶ 18.] The second question is whether Talarico voluntarily waived his presence. Although we have not addressed the issue of waiver as it relates to presence at trial, we have done so as it relates to other procedural and constitutional rights. In State v. Tuttle, we held that in order to prove a valid waiver of one's Miranda rights the state must show that (1) the relinquishment of the defendant's rights was totally voluntary and (2) the defendant was fully aware that those rights were being waived and of the consequences of waiving them. 2002 SD 94, ¶ 9, 650 N.W.2d 20, 26. In State v. Martin, we stated that, There are no formal requirements for a valid waiver [of the 180-day rule] ...; `[s]o long as there is an indication, on the record, that the waiver is the informed and voluntary decision of the defendant, it will be accorded prima facie validity.' 493 N.W.2d 223, 226. The Court further remarked that although there were no formal requirements the state still must show that any waiver was the product of an informed and voluntary decision. Id. The New Mexico Supreme Court in a recent case applied its version of Rule 43 and found that a defendant can waive his right to be present during jury selection. State v. Padilla, 132 N.M. 247, 46 P.3d 1247 (2002). In determining the validity of the waiver, the court said a valid waiver not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Id. at 1254 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)). Although no particular litany of questions may be required, there must be a sufficient colloquy to satisfy the trial court's responsibilities; a knowing and voluntary waiver cannot be inferred from a silent record. Id.; see Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962). [¶ 19.] It is clear from the record that Talarico was well versed in the nature of the proceedings and his rights. The record is replete with lengthy discourse from the defendant about his concern with his lawyer, the system, and his right to a fair trial. He was clearly able to articulate his concerns to the trial court and understand his rights. Before Talarico was escorted from the courtroom, the trial court asks again: THE COURT: [Y]ou have a right to participate in this trial, we want you here, you have a constitutional right to be here, and I said it several times, probably when you have been in here, you have a right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, that means you have a right to be here, you have a right to have a trial, in fact our statutes and our constitution is all designed so that you are here. THE DEFENDANT: Gees. It's not going to work. THE COURT: Well. THE DEFENDANT: It's not going to work. THE COURT: Okay. ... THE COURT: ... If you choose not to participate in this trial I want to make absolutely certain that you understand that you have a right to be here. THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. THE COURT: And that if you choose to go back that you're doing it voluntarily THE DEFENDANT: Yes. [¶ 20.] The trial court determined that the defendant had voluntarily waived his right and returned Talarico to his cell. Despite this determination, the trial court sent the deputy to Talarico's jail cell on three separate occasions to ask if he would like to return to trial to which the defendant responded, he did not. Talarico was not present for any portion of his trial except sentencing. [¶ 21.] Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not err in determining that Talarico had voluntarily waived his right to be present. Talarico had appeared before the trial court numerous times prior to this trial. The trial judge took great care in explaining Talarico's rights including his right to be present at trial. He allowed Talarico to express his dissatisfactions and listened to his complaints. He explained Talarico's options including remaining in the courtroom shackled and restrained. In fact, at the first trial the court had contemplated allowing law enforcement to use a stun belt in the event they needed to subdue him. The court had sufficient interaction with Talarico to know his behavior, his intellect and his demeanor. Talarico was no stranger to court proceedings or his right to be present. He had just completed a jury trial in which he participated a few weeks before. Additionally, the court did a sufficient job of canvassing Talarico the morning of trial to ensure his request to absent himself was knowing and voluntary. Based upon the foregoing facts, we find that the defendant was present at the commencement of trial and that the trial court's determination that Talarico had voluntarily waived his right to be present at trial was not error. We affirm.