Opinion ID: 686729
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Enhancement for Role as an Organizer

Text: 17 Protesting his adjustment under Sec. 3B1.1(c)--which provides for a two-level increase if the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity that involved less than five participants and was not otherwise extensive, U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1(c)--Greenfield first asserts that his enhancement cannot be based on his relationship to Pace because he and Pace had equal roles in the offense. They planned and executed the ATM and American Express schemes together--as full and equal partners. Greenfield then claims his enhancement cannot be based on Lyons's involvement because he did not directly recruit or control Lyons. Lyons, he asserts, was recruited and supervised only by Pace. 18 Because the Government has conceded that Greenfield did not directly control or supervise Lyons and the record demonstrates that Greenfield and Pace were indeed equal partners, Greenfield's contentions with respect to his two-level enhancement under Sec. 3B1.1(c) have a measure of merit. The adjustment would have been inapplicable were Greenfield and Pace, as equal partners, the only participants in their schemes. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.4, comment. (explaining that no role adjustment is to be given when the offense is committed by individuals of roughly equal culpability); see also United States v. Katora, 981 F.2d 1398, 1402-03 (3d Cir.1992) (finding Sec. 3B1.1 enhancement inapplicable when two participants bear equal responsibility for 'organizing' their own commission of a crime). 19 Moreover, an increase under Sec. 3B1.1(c) could not be based solely upon Greenfield's extensive planning and preparations in connection with the schemes. To do so would involve impermissible double-counting in light of the fact that Greenfield had already been assessed an enhancement under Sec. 2F1.1(b)(2), which applies to criminal conduct involving more than minimal planning. 3 Nor could a Sec. 3B1.1(c) enhancement be premised upon Greenfield's management of property, assets, and activities in the schemes. The current version of Application Note 2 of Sec. 3B1.1 explains that [t]o qualify for an adjustment under this section, the defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1, comment. (n.2). It also indicates that an upward departure may be warranted ... in the case of a defendant who did not organize, lead, manage, or supervise another participant, but who nevertheless exercised management responsibility over the property, assets, or activities of a criminal organization. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, by negative implication, the Application Note seems clearly to preclude management responsibility over property, assets, or activities as the basis for an enhancement under Sec. 3B1.1(c). 20 It is only through the involvement of a further participant--in this instance Lyons--that the District Court's application of Sec. 3B1.1(c) to Greenfield can be justified. Indeed, as we recently explained in United States v. Leonard, 37 F.3d 32 (2d Cir.1994): 21 To qualify for an adjustment under Sec. 3B1.1, the defendant must have exercised some control over others involved in the commission of the offense or he must have been responsible for organizing others for the purpose of carrying out the crime. 22 Id. at 38 (citations and quotations omitted). As noted before, the Government conceded to the District Court that Greenfield did not exercise control over or supervise either defendants Pace or Lyons, Sentencing Transcript at 28, United States v. Greenfield, No. 3-93-cr-146 (D.Conn. Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter Greenfield's Sentencing Transcript]. It follows that an adjustment for Greenfield can stand only if he was responsible for organizing [Lyons] for the purpose of carrying out the crime. Leonard, 37 F.3d at 38 (emphasis added). 23 Evidence of a defendant's direct and immediate control over other participants obviously provides the strongest support for any aggravating role enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Liebman, 40 F.3d 544, 548 (2d Cir.1994). Yet, as the Leonard case suggests, direct and immediate control over other participants, though a crucial and perhaps even the most important factor, is neither a strict prerequisite for an enhancement under Sec. 3B1.1(c) nor the only factor a court should consider. See United States v. Vargas, 16 F.3d 155, 160 (7th Cir.1994); cf. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1, comment. (n.4) (specifying seven factors, of which only one concerns the degree of control and authority exercised over others, that a court is to consider when assessing whether a defendant occupies a position of leader/organizer or manager/supervisor). To hold that direct and immediate control over other participants is a strict prerequisite to a Sec. 3B1.1 enhancement would improperly permit exceedingly culpable defendants--i.e., persons placed high in a criminal organization's chain of command--to insulate themselves from enhancements under Sec. 3B1.1 by entrusting the recruitment and supervision of subordinates to their partners/co-conspirators. 24 But to be found responsible for organizing others, and thereby subject to a Sec. 3B1.1 enhancement, a defendant must have at least played a significant role in the decision to recruit or to supervise lower-level participants. See Katora, 981 F.2d at 1403 (noting that enhancement under Sec. 3B1.1 would be appropriate if [equal partners] had organized a third person). In this case, if Greenfield was substantially involved in Pace's decisions concerning the recruitment and supervision of Lyons, an enhancement under Sec. 3B1.1 would clearly be proper. If not, such an enhancement would not be appropriate--for example, if Greenfield had expressed little interest in having others participate and passively acquiesced in Pace's enlistment and management of Lyons. 25 Unfortunately, the evidence developed below is quite vague about the role Greenfield played in Lyons's recruitment and supervision. It seems clear that it was Pace who directly enlisted, controlled, and managed Lyons. However, Lyons's participation in the ATM scheme--i.e., helping Greenfield install and remove the phony ATM from the Buckland Mall and placing a glue-covered card in the legitimate ATM--does indicate that Greenfield was fully aware of Lyons's involvement and directly profited from Lyons's activities. Is there, then, an adequate foundation for an enhancement? Without more we cannot say. Because the District Court failed to make specific factual findings (based on the record before it or after additional evidentiary hearings) when it applied Sec. 3B1.1, we cannot assess Greenfield's responsibility for Lyons's involvement. 4 We simply cannot tell whether, for example, Greenfield talked to Pace about the involvement and supervision of an additional participant and thus was aware of (or could have readily foreseen) Pace's enlistment and management of Lyons. For it is also possible that Pace recruited and controlled Lyons on his own and without consulting or involving Greenfield. 26 Without more developed factual findings by the District Court, we cannot determine whether the enhancement for Greenfield's offense role was proper. Consequently, we must remand this portion of Greenfield's sentence for additional findings as to whether Greenfield was responsible for organizing [Lyons] for the purpose of carrying out the crime.