Opinion ID: 2631065
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the commission correctly treated this proceeding as legislative in nature

Text: ¶ 10 The Commission ruled that SBC's application should be treated as a legislative matter. Appellants argue that this decision constitutes reversible error. Initially, we note that neither Cox nor AARP (appellants) objected below to treating this proceeding as legislative. This omission would ordinarily preclude our review of appellants' contention, [19] but the rule has an exception that permits review of an alleged deprivation of due process of law despite failure to preserve it below. [20] While appellants do not use the term due process to describe their attack, they claim that the Commission's decision to treat this proceeding as legislative rather than judicial resulted in a hearing that was fundamentally unfair. The flaws alleged to inhere in the hearing include lobbying, ex parte contacts, and a failure of the Commission to follow its own rules. The gist of these allegations is that the legislative designation of this proceeding led to a violation of appellants' right to receive the benefit of due process. We will therefore consider this proposition of error despite appellants' failure to object below. ¶ 11 Both appellants and appellees rely on the landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Company , [21] which defined a judicial inquiry as one which investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on present and past facts and under laws supposed already to exist and defined a legislative proceeding as one that looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter. [22] This court has adopted Prentis's classic definition of legislative and judicial proceedings and has held that the kind of process that is a litigant's due flows from the label attached by law to a proceeding. [23] ¶ 12 Appellants argue that SBC's application exhibits the essential characteristics of a judicial proceeding as defined by Prentis. They contend that the Commission examined present and past facts regarding the extent of competition in the Oklahoma telecommunications market, applied existing Commission rules to those facts, and decided, after vigorous contest, that SBC's services were subject to effective competition and entitled to be placed in Basket 4. ¶ 13 Appellees argue that SBC's application displays the typical qualities of a legislative proceeding as defined by Prentis. The question of competition among telecommunications service providers calls for a policy assessment that will determine how SBC's rates will be set in the future. It is hence similar, although not identical, to a rate hearing. Appellees also argue that in ruling on the competitiveness of the Oklahoma telecommunications market, the Commission is not exercising its dispute-settling function by declaring and enforcing liabilities as it would in judicature, but is instead establishing a rule for the future, equally applicable to all telecommunications service providers. ¶ 14 The line between what is legislative and what is judicial is not always a clear one, but we agree with the Commission that this proceeding is more akin to legislation than to adjudication. We see the Commission's role in this cause as similar to that of a legislative committee engaged in fact-finding for the purpose of legislation. The Commission was not charged with arriving at a strictly accurate reconstruction of past events in order to settle a private dispute between the parties, but rather with establishing a rule to guide it in making decisions about the telecommunications industry in the future. The Commission's inquiry required it to hear testimony and argument from contending factions and witnesses, but the fact that there was conflicting evidence and parties standing in opposition to the relief requested does not make the proceeding judicial. Proposed legislation often engenders heated contest between those who favor it and those who oppose it. ¶ 15 We also conclude that while this was not a ratemaking proceeding per se. it was closely related to ratemaking. [24] The rule it establishes will permit SBC to determine its own rates in the future with only minimal regulatory supervision. Ratemaking has been definitively labeled and treated as legislative. [25] ¶ 16 Despite the legislative characterization the Commission gave to this proceeding, we note that the parties were afforded many of the due process protections associated with a judicial proceeding, including notice and opportunity to be heard, the right to present their own witnesses, and the right to cross examine opposing witnesses. As for the allegations of improper communications, legislative proceedings are not governed by judicial standards of communication among decision-makers or between decision-makers and others. [26]