Opinion ID: 852849
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Wallace's Claims

Text: Claim No. 1. Wallace claims his death sentence is unconstitutional because it is based on invalid aggravating circumstances. Specifically, Wallace asserts the trial court should not have considered his criminal history, which included two convictions that were vacated after Wallace had been sentenced. He cites Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988); Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 532, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 119 L.Ed.2d 326(1992); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 751-52, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725(1990); and Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928(Ind.1994). As the State notes, and even Wallace admits, he raised this claim in earlier appeals and lost. We previously concluded the trial court based its sentencing decision on the aggravating circumstances  the factors that made Wallace eligible for the death penalty  listed in Indiana's death penalty statute, see Wallace v. State, 486 N.E.2d at 463 (direct appeal), and we concluded the trial court did not commit error by considering Wallace's criminal history, see Wallace v. State, 553 N.E.2d at 471 (post-conviction appeal). Similarly, the federal courts previously concluded Wallace was not entitled to relief on account of having had two convictions vacated. See Wallace v. Davis, 2002 WL 31572002 at  (S.D.Ind.2002) aff'd, 362 F.3d at 917-18(7th Cir.2004). The doctrine of res judicata prevents the repetitious litigation of claims that, like Wallace's, have already been decided. See, e.g., Daniels v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1177, 1184 (Ind.2001); Wrinkles v. State, 776 N.E.2d 905, 908(Ind.2002). Wallace correctly notes that the bar of res judicata may sometimes not be enforced if the initial decision was clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice. See, e.g., Arthur v. State, 663 N.E.2d 529, 531 (Ind.1996) (internal quotation omitted). But Wallace has not shown that the prior decisions were erroneous or unjust, much less clearly or manifestly so. Claim No. 2. Wallace contends the trial court did not fully consider Wallace's mental health status as a mitigating circumstance. We addressed the issue of mitigating circumstances in the direct appeal and the first post-conviction appeal. See Wallace v. State, 486 N.E.2d at 463 (Although the court did not list each possible mitigating factor and dispose of it, he found that there were absolutely no mitigating factors to be weighed against the aggravating ones. The trial court's findings are amply supported by the record.); Wallace v. State, 553 N.E.2d at 470-71(the jury was accurately instructed with respect to mitigating circumstances and the trial court made findings regarding the lack of any mitigating circumstances and discussed all of these issues at length). Wallace asks us to reconsider the matter in light of Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 400, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2004). Smith turned on an improper jury instruction. In Wallace's case, both the jury and the trial court were properly informed about mitigating evidence. Wallace has not established a reasonable possibility that he is entitled to relief on the basis of Smith. Therefore, to the extent this claim is the same claim made and rejected in prior proceedings, the claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See, e.g., Daniels, 741 N.E.2d at 1184; Wrinkles, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1187 n. 3 (Ind.2001). To the extent Wallace's claim is raised for the first time, as the State contends, the claim is procedurally defaulted for not having been presented timely, and we decline to address it. See, e.g., Sanders v. State, 765 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind.2002); Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d at 1187 n. 3. This was the District Court's conclusion. See Wallace v. Davis, 2002 WL 31572002 at  (S.D.Ind.2002).