Opinion ID: 2392062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inference and Deference

Text: The following cases further emphasize a trial judge's or a jury's ability to choose among differing inferences that might possibly be made from a factual situation and the deference we must give in that regard to the inferences a fact-finder may draw. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d at 573 (noting the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts); Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 460, 682 A.2d 248, 254 (1996) (Involving a probable cause issue the Court stated it is the trier of fact that must draw the inferences.... Consequently, absent clear error in its fact-finding, an appellate court is required, in deference to the trial court, to accept those findings of fact.); In re Timothy F., 343 Md. 371, 379-80, 681 A.2d 501, 504-05 (1996) (in criminal cases the appropriate inquiry is not whether the reviewing court believes that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but, rather, whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt); McMillian v. State, 325 Md. 272, 281-82, 600 A.2d 430, 434-35 (1992) (stating that The trial court's findings as to disputed facts are accepted by this Court unless found to be clearly erroneous); see also Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183, 571 A.2d 1239, 1241 (1990). In State v. Raines, 326 Md. 582, 590-93, 606 A.2d 265, 269-70 (1992), we stated: This analysis indicates that the Court of Special Appeals credited the Raines's version of the events, one that necessarily mitigated his culpability. Of course, the credibility of the witnesses was a matter for the trial court, as fact finder, not the appellate court, to resolve. Furthermore, the determination of an accused's intention is, in the first instance, for the trial judge, when sitting without a jury, and this determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. As noted, the trial court discounted Raines's version of the events. Instead, the court drew an inference based on other evidence offered at trial that the killing was intentional, deliberate and premeditated. This, the trial court, as fact finder, has the exclusive right to do. The Court of Special Appeals erred in conducting its own independent credibility analysis and in rejecting the trial court's finding of facts. ... This Court has noted that the trier of fact may infer the intent to kill from the surrounding circumstances: `[S]ince intent is subjective and, without the cooperation of the accused, cannot be directly and objectively proven, its presence must be shown by established facts which permit a proper inference of its existence.'