Opinion ID: 1658129
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: any other reason justifying vacation

Text: Although neither the motion nor the order vacating the default judgment recited which clause the requested and granted relief was predicated upon, they appear to be directed to the (2) accident or mistake and (4) the judgment is void provisions. While the circuit judge declined to set the judgment aside under the first cited reason, he did on the latter. It would further appear that the circuit judge was of a view that a judgment did not have to be a nullity to be vacated under (4), but only had to be erroneous. In order to touch all possible bases, however, we will briefly address clause (6) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment. Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 1, § 60.27 gives a general analysis of the federal cases which have considered clause (6). We need probe no deeper than the broad statements made in this treatise: the relief is reserved for exceptional and compelling circumstances. It must be based on some other reason than the first five clauses, and it must be some ground which will justify relief from the final judgment. Moore terms it a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case when relief is not warranted by the preceding clauses, or when it is uncertain that one or more of the preceding clauses afford relief. (P. 60-295) See also, Klaprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-615, 69 S.Ct. 384, 390, 93 L.Ed. 266 (1949); Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950); Alvestad v. Monsanto, 671 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 5th 1982); Turner v. Salvatierra, 580 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 5th 1978); Menier v. United States, 405 F.2d 245 (C.A. 5th 1968). The relief under this clause is of the nature which chancery courts might heretofore have given in exceptional cases from final judgments. It would serve no purpose, and indeed be beyond our function as an appellate court in this case to further delineate the grounds upon which relief may be granted to clause (6), since it is clear Walters never reached the edge of this grand reservoir. [5] REVERSED AND RENDERED, DEFAULT JUDGMENT REINSTATED. WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.