Opinion ID: 792179
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conditions of Supervised Release and Fundamental Liberty Interests

Text: 17 We review the propriety of conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Brown, 402 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir.2005). A sentencing court may impose special conditions of supervised release that are reasonably related to certain statutory factors governing sentencing, involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to implement the statutory purposes of sentencing, and are consistent with pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir.2002). Section 5D1.3(b) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) 6 authorizes sentencing judges to impose special conditions of supervised release 18 to the extent that such conditions (1) are reasonably related to (A) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (B) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; and (2) involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth above and are consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. 19 U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b); accord 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); Brown, 402 F.3d at 136-37; United States v. Germosen, 139 F.3d 120, 131 (2d Cir.1998). 20 [S]entencing courts have `broad discretion to tailor conditions of supervised release to the goals and purposes outlined in § 5D1.3(b).' United States v. Amer, 110 F.3d 873, 883 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Abrar, 58 F.3d 43, 46-47 (2d Cir.1995)). Our Circuit has held that a sentencing court may impose a condition of supervised release if it is reasonably related to any one or more of the specified factors. United States v. Abrar, 58 F.3d at 46. The district court's broad discretion is not untrammelled, however, id. at 47, and our Court will `carefully scrutinize unusual and severe conditions.' Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126 (quoting United States v. Doe, 79 F.3d 1309, 1319 (2d Cir.1996) (further internal quotation marks omitted)). 7 21 Because conditions of supervised release must involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes of sentencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2), we must ask first whether the condition at issue here deprived Myers of any cognizable liberty interest. Myers claims the condition interfered with his constitutionally protected liberty interest in his relationship with his child. 22 It is well-established that a parent's interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her child is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 103-04 (2d Cir.1999). See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) (describing the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children as perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). The constitutional privileges attached to the parent-child relationship, however, are hardly absolute. Although parents enjoy a constitutionally protected interest in their family integrity, this interest is counterbalanced by the compelling governmental interest in the protection of minor children, particularly in circumstances where the protection is considered necessary as against the parents themselves. Wilkinson, 182 F.3d at 104 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In particular, the right of unmarried fathers to participate in their children's upbringing receives less protection where the biological father has not demonstrate[d] a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (internal quotations omitted). [T]he mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection. Id. 23 While this Circuit has examined special conditions of supervised release implicating constitutionally protected interests, cf. United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 188-93 (2d Cir.2004) (analyzing special condition of probation permitting computer monitoring under Fourth Amendment's special needs doctrine), we have not squarely addressed a special condition of probation or supervised release implicating a fundamental liberty interest protected by due process. 8 The statutory architecture for evaluating conditions of supervised release, however, is the same in both contexts. If a special condition implicates a fundamental liberty interest, we must carefully examine it to determine whether it is reasonably related to the pertinent factors, and involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), and our application of these criteria must reflect the heightened constitutional concerns. If the liberty interest at stake is fundamental, a deprivation of that liberty is reasonably necessary only if the deprivation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993)). 9 24 In short, when a fundamental liberty interest is implicated by a sentencing condition, we must first consider the sentencing goal to which the condition relates, and whether the record establishes its reasonableness. We must then consider whether it represents a greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary to achieve that goal. Here, however, the record was inadequate on both prongs of the inquiry, allowing us neither to identify the goal to which the condition related nor to determine whether an undue deprivation of liberty occurred. 10 25