Opinion ID: 763479
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Abuse Of Trust Departure

Text: 47 Akinkoye disputes the district court's decision to depart upward because he abused a position of trust. Akinkoye contends that real estate agents do not occupy a position of trust, or, in the alternative, that the only victims were the banks, with whom he held no position of trust. Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 (1998), a district court may depart upward if it determines that the defendant abused a position of trust and that abuse significantly contributed to the commission or concealment of the crime. See id. We review the district court's factual determination that Akinkoye abused a position of trust for clear error. See United States v. Mackey, 114 F.3d 470, 476 (4th Cir.1997). 48 Akinkoye's first argument is unpersuasive. He cites a series of cases in other circuits where defendants of various occupations were held not to have abused trust. 4 In our circuit, however, we have rejected a mechanistic approach to the abuse of trust departure that excludes defendants from consideration based on their job titles. See United States v. Gordon, 61 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir.1995) (The abuse of trust enhancement was not designed to turn on formalistic definitions of job type.). 5 Instead, we examine several factors in determining whether a particular defendant abused a position of trust. Those factors include: (1) whether the defendant had either special duties or  'special access to information not available to other employees' ; (2) the extent of discretion the defendant possesses; (3) whether the defendant's acts indicate that he is  'more culpable' than others'  who are in positions similar to his and who engage in criminal acts; and (4) viewing the entire question of abuse of trust from the victim's perspective. See id. (citations omitted). 49 In reviewing the factors mentioned above, we cannot conclude that the district court clearly erred in determining that Akinkoye held a position of trust and abused it. First, Akinkoye had special access to information as a real estate agent. Re/Max's clients not only gave Re/Max confidential information (such as Social Security Numbers), but also the keys to their respective homes. These items were given to Re/Max to facilitate Re/Max's representation of them in the sale of their homes. 50 Although the confidential information and the keys were located where any Re/Max employee theoretically could have accessed them, a real estate agent's use of them is far less likely to arouse suspicion than another staffer's. Akinkoye entered clients' homes and took files home with him without much concern on Re/Max's part because such activities are consistent with his duties as an agent. By contrast, a Re/Max secretary undoubtedly would have aroused suspicion much more quickly by engaging in those activities. Akinkoye's ability to set his own schedule and work odd hours with little supervision and little concern from Re/Max also facilitated the crimes. Those facts show that Akinkoye's position made his criminal activity difficult to detect, which is a basis for the enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3; United States v. Hill, 915 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir.1990) (stating that a person in a position of trust can be distinguished from others by the extent to which the position provides the freedom to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong). 51 The second and third factors also are met. Akinkoye had great discretion. The manager of the Re/Max office in which Akinkoye worked testified that the agents enjoy broad discretion in the hours they work, freedom of access to information and other matters. She also stated that the agents are subject to little supervision. Based on her uncontroverted testimony, the second factor is met. 52 In addition, the third factor is met because of the nature and extent of Akinkoye's crime. Over a nineteen-month span, Akinkoye acquired dozens of credit cards through his scheme and caused an actual loss of $214,245.28. He wrote more than $30,000 worth of fraudulent checks to the credit card companies in an effort to increase the limits of the cards. He also enlisted the help of a woman, Afolabi, to facilitate the use of the cards with women's names on them. In all, Akinkoye is more culpable than the real estate agent that may commit crimes. 53 Finally, we must view Akinkoye's position from the perspective of the victim. Akinkoye first asserts that the banks were the real victims and from their perspective, he had an ordinary commercial relationship (credit card applicant to credit card company relationship). See United States v. Moore, 29 F.3d 175, 178 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that an ordinary commercial relationship between the perpetrator and victim is insufficient to support the abuse of trust departure). However, it seems to us that although the banks ultimately have borne the financial burden, the Re/Max clients have been victimized as well. Their identities and credit histories were used to facilitate the crime, and several of the clients testified to the difficulties they experienced in clearing up matters with the various credit agencies. One client received constant harassment at home and work from creditors. Another victim's search for a new home was impeded because of the credit problems caused by Akinkoye's activity. Thus, Akinkoye's focus on the ultimate financial burden ignores the emotional, financial and other burdens borne by the clients until the extent of the fraud scheme was exposed and corrected. 54 Moreover, Akinkoye need not have personally known all of the Re/Max clients he defrauded to be subject to the departure. The clients trusted Re/Max to represent them. Their personal information was made available to all of Re/Max's agents in order to facilitate effective representation. Akinkoye would not have had access to the homes and information if not for his status as an agent. 55 Moreover, Akinkoye's reading of the Guidelines would lead to absurd results. If we were to adopt his interpretation of the Guidelines, then, for example, the managing partner of a law firm could not be held to have abused trust of clients of the firm whom he or she had not met. Yet, that partner is precisely the type of person to whom the enhancement was intended to apply, because the clients engaged the firm to represent them. Similarly, Re/Max's clients engaged Re/Max to represent them, and they placed their confidence in Re/Max's agents as their representatives. Akinkoye used that trust to obtain credit cards and execute a fraud scheme. Therefore, the district court's determination that Akinkoye abused a position of trust was not clearly erroneous.