Opinion ID: 65379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the district court failed to apply AEDPA's standard of review and improperly disregarded the state court's factual findings.

Text: The State argues that the district court did not follow the proper standard of review when it granted Richards an evidentiary hearing and dismissed the trial court's findings as meaningless, and that under this Court's precedent, Richards was never entitled to a hearing. The State maintains that the state habeas court's findings, which were adopted by the Court of Criminal Appeals, are entitled to a presumption of correctness even though it did not conduct a live evidentiary hearing, pointing to cases holding that a full and fair hearing need not involve live testimony, particularly where, as here, the trial court was also the state habeas court. See, e.g., Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 766 (5th Cir.2000); Buxton v. Lynaugh, 879 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir.1989). Further, according to the State, by adopting Davis's affidavit in its findings, the trial court which was familiar with Davis and with her performance in Richards's trialmade an implicit credibility determination in favor of Davis and against Richards which is also entitled to a presumption of correctness. Moreover, the State argues, there was no need to develop the record in this case, and the evidentiary hearing was of questionable value because neither Davis nor Burks could remember the five-year-old murder trial well enough for the district court to make credibility determinations overriding those made by the state habeas court. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to hold an evidentiary hearing. Under § 2254(e)(2), if a habeas applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, a federal habeas court may not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless certain conditions are met. Morris v. Dretke, 413 F.3d 484, 499 (5th Cir.2005). Here, the State does not argue in its opening brief that the § 2254(e)(2) bar applies, [2] but rather maintains that the hearing was unnecessary and did not elucidate the issues. In cases where an applicant for federal habeas relief is not barred from obtaining an evidentiary hearing by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), the decision to grant such a hearing rests in the discretion of the district court. Schriro, 550 U.S.at 468, 127 S.Ct. 1933. In determining whether to grant a hearing, under Rule 8(a) of the habeas Court Rules `the judge must review the answer [and] any transcripts and records of state-court proceedings . . . to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted.' Hall v. Quarterman, 534 F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Schriro, 550 U.S. at 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933). In making this determination, courts must consider whether an evidentiary hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief. Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474, 127 S.Ct. 1933. Because the deferential standards prescribed by § 2254 control whether to grant habeas relief, a federal court must take into account those standards in deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is appropriate. Id. [I]f the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing. Id. In this case, Richards's petition alleged serious failures by Davis which are not refuted by the record, and Davis's explanations of her trial conduct, as adopted by the state habeas court, are conclusory and in varying degrees of tension with the trial record. [3] Thus, the district court was within its discretion to conclude that the evidentiary hearing could enable Richards to prove the petition's factual allegations, and that those, if proven, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief. Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474, 127 S.Ct. 1933. Moreover, even if the witnesses's memories were not ultimately complete, this cannot, ex ante, preclude a district court from holding an evidentiary hearing, which included documentary evidence as well as live testimony, about a five-year-old case. Nonetheless, as the State correctly observes, the state habeas court's factual determinations, including its credibility findings, are entitled to a presumption of correctness under § 2254(e)(1), regardless of whether the state court held a full and fair hearing. See Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 951 (5th Cir.2001) ([A] full and fair hearing is not a precondition to according § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness to state habeas court findings of fact nor to applying § 2254(d)'s standards of review.). However, after reviewing the record on appeal and the district court's thorough and considered opinion, we conclude that the district court afforded proper deference to the state court's decisions and rulings: although critical of the state court proceedings, the district court specifically found that [a]ny presumption of correctness of determinations made by the state court relevant to Richards's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel ground has been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Richards, 578 F.Supp.2d at 854; see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (A federal court can disagree with a state court's credibility determination and, when guided by AEDPA, conclude the decision was unreasonable or that the factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence.).