Opinion ID: 1058852
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: refusal to permit examination of investigators under oath

Text: The trial court denied Juniper's discovery request in a Motion to Examine Investigators Under Oath in which he sought to ensure that law enforcement officials have not concealed exculpatory evidence ... and that any and all such evidence will be available prior to trial. Juniper assigns error to this ruling arguing that the trial court abused its discretion. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the motion sought material beyond the scope to which Juniper is entitled under Rule 3A:11 or any other provision of law. There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, even where a capital offense is charged. Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 490-91, 404 S.E.2d 227, 233, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944, 112 S.Ct. 386, 116 L.Ed.2d 337 (1991). While a defendant has the right to exculpatory evidence in the Commonwealth's possession upon request, Stover v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 789, 795, 180 S.E.2d 504, 509 (1971), Rule 3A:11 defines the other discovery available to the accused in a felony case. See Hackman v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 710, 713, 261 S.E.2d 555, 558 (1980) (decided under previous Rule 3A:14). Under Rule 3A:11, a felony defendant is entitled to his own written or recorded statements made to law enforcement personnel, certain written reports in the possession of the Commonwealth, and tangible objects ... within the possession, custody, or control of the Commonwealth which may be material to the preparation of [the] defense. Rule 3A:11(b). The Rule specifically does not authorize discovery of statements made by Commonwealth witnesses or prospective ... witnesses to agents of the Commonwealth ... in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case. Rule 3A:11(b)(2). Citing past instances in other cases when law enforcement failed to provide prosecutors with all exculpatory evidence in their possession, Juniper argues that he should be able to examine the Commonwealth's investigators at a pretrial hearing in order to determine independently if they have provided all Brady material to the Commonwealth's Attorney. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Juniper offers no authority to support this argument. It is the individual prosecutor [who] has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police. Burns v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 328, 541 S.E.2d 872, 886, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1043, 122 S.Ct. 621, 151 L.Ed.2d 542 (2001) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)). Juniper admitted that the Commonwealth's Attorney has apparently disclosed all exculpatory evidence, and he does not assert that any additional discoverable material actually exists or that he has any reason to believe that there is any which has not been disclosed. We agree with the Commonwealth that Juniper's motion is a speculative search for evidence. No statute or rule of court affords a defendant the right to use a pretrial hearing as a discovery vehicle in this manner. Davis v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 816, 821, 213 S.E.2d 785, 788-89 (1975); see also Williams v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 724, 729, 160 S.E.2d 781, 784-85 (1968). Because granting Juniper's motion to examine the Commonwealth's investigators under oath would have allowed Juniper discovery which is not authorized under Rule 3A:11 or otherwise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.