Opinion ID: 2570657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: An adequate administrative remedy is available

Text: Despite this strong indication to the contrary, appellants argue that the statutory scheme creates a readily apparent private enforcement right. Appellants' argument is based on the alleged lack of an explicit, nondiscretionary, administrative process by which they might personally obtain relief. In particular, appellants assert that the administrative remedy provided by the labor statutes is inadequate because the decision whether to hear a matter is within the Labor Commissioner's discretion, and thus, the Labor Commissioner may choose not to decide a complaint. NRS 607.205 provides that the Labor Commissioner may conduct a hearing to resolve labor complaints: In aid of his enforcement responsibilities under the labor laws of the State of Nevada, the Labor Commissioner or a person designated by him may conduct hearings and issue decisions thereon in the manner set forth in NRS 607.207. NRS 607.207(1) sets forth where the hearing may be held: When an enforcement question is presented under any labor law of the State of Nevada, the determination of which is not exclusively vested in another officer, board or commission, the Labor Commissioner or a person designated by him may conduct a hearing in any place convenient to the parties, if practicable, and otherwise in a place chosen by the Labor Commissioner. Within 30 days after the hearing, the Labor Commissioner must render a written decision setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law, which must be mailed to the parties. [22] The Labor Commissioner's decision may then be challenged by way of a district court petition for judicial review, and the district court may hold a trial de novo thereupon. [23] After the district court renders a decision, any aggrieved party may appeal to this court. [24] Appellants' argument is based on NRS 607.205's and NRS 607.207's use of the term may, which typically connotes discretion. [25] We addressed a similar argument in Rosequist v. International Ass'n of Firefighters. [26] In that case, we noted that a statute providing that `[t]he [Employee-Management Relations Board] may hear and determine any complaint' was ambiguous. [27] In resolving the ambiguity, we explained that the legislation's purposes to relieve burdens on the court and to develop and utilize the Board's expertise meant that the term may in that instance was not discretionarythe Board was required to hear labor disputes arising out of NRS Chapter 288. [28] Likewise, here, a similar ambiguity exists in NRS 607.205, since the statute could mean either that the Labor Commissioner has discretion in determining whether to hear and decide a complaint or merely that the Labor Commissioner has authority to hold hearings. [29] Also, the may in NRS 607.207 could grant discretion over whether a hearing is necessary, or only over where the hearing is held. For reasons similar to those set forth in Rosequist, we conclude that the labor statutes, including NRS 607.205 and NRS 607.207, require the Labor Commissioner to hear and decide complaints seeking enforcement of the labor laws. Specifically, the Labor Commissioner is charged with knowing and enforcing the labor laws; these responsibilities acknowledge a special expertise as to those laws. [30] Implicit in the Labor Commissioner's obligation to know and enforce the labor laws is the duty to hear and resolve labor law complaints. As noted, within 30 days from the hearing's conclusion, the Labor Commissioner must render a written decision resolving the complaint at issue, based on the facts and legal conclusion developed at the hearing. [31] Indeed, resolving labor law complaints is perhaps one of the Labor Commissioner's most significant enforcement mechanisms. In this manner, the Labor Commissioner's expertise is optimized, and the parties then have an opportunity to petition the district court for judicial review and, ultimately, appeal to this court. Accordingly, the Labor Commissioner's duty to hear and resolve enforcement complaints is not discretionary, and appellants had access to an adequate administrative enforcement mechanism, precluding a finding of legislative intent to create a parallel private remedy. [32] Thus, appellants have failed to overcome the presumption that no private cause of action was intended. [33] As no private remedy is implied under NRS 608.160, appellants had no right to obtain relief in the district court under that statute. As a result, summary judgment in favor of the Wynn was proper.