Opinion ID: 773161
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Opportunity To Present A Defense

Text: 26 Apart from the evidentiary challenges discussed above, Lea argues that the Constitution mandates that both the testimonies of Agent West and Heidi Werch should have been admitted. Specifically, Lea asserts that the district court's decisions to exclude that evidence constitutes a violation of Lea's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. 27 We begin by noting that the right of a defendant to present evidence is grounded in the Sixth Amendment, and stands on no lesser footing than the other Sixth Amendment rights. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988). Just as the accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, the accused also has a right to present his or her own witnesses to establish a defense. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). However, a defendant's right to present relevant evidence is not unbounded, but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308. Thus, a defendant's interest in presenting relevant evidence may 'bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.' Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)). The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence. The Compulsory Process Clause provides him with an effective weapon, but it is a weapon that cannot be used irresponsibly. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410. Under the Constitution, state and federal rulemakers have broad latitude to fashion rules which operate to exclude evidence from criminal trials. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308. Such rules will not be deemed to abridge an accused's right to present a defense so long as they are not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. Rock, 483 U.S. at 56. 28 The evidence that Lea argues should have been introduced in keeping with the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense is evidence which we have already determined is in one instance privileged and in the other inadmissible under standard rules of evidence. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410. In light of those findings, in order to be successful on his Sixth Amendment claim, Lea would have to put forth that the rules which guided those decisions violate the standards set forth in cases such as Rock. See id. In this instance, that would require Lea to argue that Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and the marital communications privilege were arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they were designed to serve. Lea does not undertake that endeavor, and we believe he is wise in not doing so. Therefore, we find that the district court's decisions, to the extent that they operated to limit Lea's ability to present evidence of Werch's supposed culpability, did not violate Lea's Sixth Amendment Right to Compulsory Process.