Opinion ID: 2349741
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Anti-SLAPP Defense

Text: The anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to prevent vexatious lawsuits against citizens who exercise their First Amendment rights of free speech and legitimate petitioning by granting those activities conditional immunity from punitive civil claims. See Hometown Properties, Inc., 680 A.2d at 61. The anti-SLAPP statute, § 9-33-1, contains an explicit findings section that elucidates this purpose: Findings.  The legislature finds and declares that full participation by persons and organizations and robust discussion of issues of public concern before the legislative, judicial, and administrative bodies and in other public fora are essential to the democratic process, that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances; that such litigation is disfavored and should be resolved quickly with minimum cost to citizens who have participated in matters of public concern. The next section of the statute, § 9-33-2, explains that the grant of conditional immunity will bar any civil claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim directed at the protected activities unless the petition or speech constitutes a sham: Conditional Immunity.  (a) A party's exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech under the United States or Rhode Island constitutions in connection with a matter of public concern shall be conditionally immune from civil claims, counter-claims, or cross-claims. Such immunity will apply as a bar to any civil claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim directed at petition or free speech as defined in subsection (e) of this section, except if the petition or free speech constitutes a sham. The petition or free speech constitutes a sham only if it is not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome, regardless of ultimate motive or purpose. When an exercise of free speech or right of petition in connection with a matter of public concern is implicated, a plaintiff must prove that such conduct is a sham to defeat an anti-SLAPP defense. Section 9-33-2(a) continues: The petition or free speech will be deemed to constitute a sham    only if it is both: (1) Objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable person exercising the right of speech or petition could realistically expect success in procuring the government action, result, or outcome, and (2) Subjectively baseless in the sense that it is actually an attempt to use the governmental process itself for its own direct effects. Use of outcome or result of the governmental process shall not constitute use of the governmental process itself for its own direct effects. Section 9-33-2(e) defines the kinds of free speech and petitioning activity that will receive conditional immunity. The definition is as follows: As used in this section, `a party's exercise of its right of petition or of free speech' shall mean any written or oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any written or oral statement made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; or any written or oral statement made in connection with an issue of public concern. Id. The motion justice produced an extensive written analysis of Alves's complaint for libel and false light as those allegations pertained to Palazzo's affirmative defense under the anti-SLAPP statute. She found that [w]ith respect to A. Palazzo's letters to the editor of the Daily Times, it is clear that the activity was of a type envisioned by the Legislature in enacting [the anti-SLAPP statute]. Citing our decision in Global Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Mallette, 762 A.2d 1208, 1211-12 (R.I.2000) (hereafter Global Waste Recycling ), she noted that speaking to a newspaper reporter is a frequently used method for members of the general public to communicate concerns to governmental authorities who are considering or reviewing a matter of public concern. She further cited the California case of Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 85 Cal.App.4th 468, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 205 (2000), for the proposition that writing a letter to the editor provides a vehicle for communicating a message about public matters to a large and interested community. In Damon, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d at 207, 210, the subject letters were published in a homeowners' newsletter, the circulation of which was to approximately 3,000 area residents and local businesses. We previously have upheld the constitutionality of the anti-SLAPP statute. Hometown Properties, Inc., 680 A.2d at 60. We also have adopted the Noerr-Pennington test, and applied its protection to common-law tort claims. Cove Road Development v. Western Cranston Industrial Park Associates, 674 A.2d 1234, 1237 (R.I.1996) (reiterating Noerr-Pennington test for anti-SLAPP analysis). The Noerr-Pennington test is a creation of antitrust law designed to protect the legitimate exercise of the First Amendment right to petition the government without the petitioner's being vulnerable to retributive civil claims by the targets of the petitioning activity. Hometown Properties, Inc., 680 A.2d at 60 (citing Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56, 113 S.Ct. 1920, 123 L.Ed.2d 611 (1993)). Moreover, we have held that making public complaints to newspapers on matters of public concern is protected activity within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute. See Global Waste Recycling, 762 A.2d at 1213 . In Global Waste Recycling, 762 A.2d at 1209-10, a construction and demolition debris recycling facility brought a defamation action against neighboring residents after the residents made comments to a local newspaper when a fire broke out on the recycling facility's grounds. We affirmed a Superior Court grant of summary judgment in favor of the local residents under the anti-SLAPP statute. Id. at 1213-14. We also therein adopted the analysis of the motion justice, who reasoned that the allegedly defamatory remarks were protected speech under the anti-SLAPP statute: `The [defendants'] remarks were typical of those frequently made by citizens, taxpayers, neighbors or other residents of the community who wish to spark or spur governmental action or to otherwise obtain a satisfactory resolution of their concerns. Making loud and public complaints to newspaper reporters is a frequently used method for members of a community to affect local matters of interest or concern.' Id. at 1211. We specifically rejected the recycling facility's argument that the statements for which immunity is claimed `must be made before some type of legislative, judicial or administrative body' and `not to the public via the print media.' Id. at 1213. As in Global Waste Recycling, 762 A.2d at 1213, Palazzo's letters to the editor of a newspaper voicing his opinion on a public school construction project are prototypical examples of a protected exercise of free speech in a public forum on an issue of public concern. The motion justice based her ruling on plaintiff's failure to satisfy the first part of the test to prove that Palazzo had engaged in sham petitioning. She explained her decision as follows: In his letters, A. Palazzo addressed a matter that was under review and consideration by a local governmental body. The statements addressed an issue of public concern in his community. He sent letters to the editor of a local newspaper. A. Palazzo expressed concern over the potential increased cost of the Natick school project. His statements concerning Plaintiff related to his position as a School Building Committee member and his alleged role with respect to the project. The Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the letters were objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable person making those statements could have realistically expected success in procuring the government action, result or outcome. Having found that Palazzo's statements in the letters to the editor were not objectively baseless, the motion justice did not address the subjective part of the test, and granted summary judgment on the libel and false-light counts. In the course of our de novo review, we have reviewed the pleadings, memoranda, exhibits, and affidavits that the parties submitted in the light most favorable to plaintiff. See, e.g., Global Waste Recycling, 762 A.2d at 1212. After that review, we conclude that the hearing justice did not err and that summary judgment in favor of Palazzo was appropriate. Alves contends that Palazzo's two letters, when read together, constitute actionable defamation. Specifically, he contends that Palazzo's statement, I've noticed what I'd call a `close' relationship between Sen. Alves and Mr. Eric Ahlborg, insinuates that the close relationship is the reason why Ahlborg's company was awarded the contract to build the Natick School. There is no doubt that one may infer an allegation of quid pro quo between Alves and Ahlborg based on that comment. However, considering this comment in the larger context of the letter, it is clear that Palazzo made it for the larger purpose of calling the taxpayers' attention to the costs of the building project. Other inflammatory comments in the letter reveal this overall purpose. For instance, further in that same letter, Palazzo says Mr. Rousselle and Sen. Alves believe that you really don't care how your money is spent. These comments clearly constitute a general, albeit hyperbolic, appeal to the affected taxpayers to examine the expense of the project. Furthermore, the statement serves as a challenge to the members of the school committee to examine and justify the expenditures the project entailed, especially with regard to potentially changing sites for the school. In the same letter, Palazzo issued the following challenge: I challenge anyone involved with this project to date, especially Mr. Rousselle, Sen. Alves and Ms. DiMasi, to deny the facts as I have presented them. Hopefully, you have noticed that they have not responded to the specific issues I have raised. Why not? Because all the information relative to this Council, the SBC and the warnings about the school site, are a matter of public record. All of the characterizations that Palazzo drew in the letter of October 9, 2001, were based on known or disclosed facts, and are clearly his interpretation of such facts. Saying that two people involved in a public project appear to have a close relationship only hints that there is an improper relationship; it does not elucidate the nature of the relationship. Palazzo invited everyone who was present at the school committee meetings to observe what he had observed and inquire whether there was something improper going on between Alves and Mr. Ahlborg. Palazzo drew his opinion from their appearances at public meetings. Anyone present at those meetings could have drawn the same or a different conclusion about their relationship. Furthermore, Palazzo enclosed his description of what he called a close relationship between Alves and Ahlborg in quotes, signaling that he was merely characterizing their relationship and not stating it as fact. Palazzo's opinion was just that  an opinion, and it does not rise to the level necessary to constitute actionable defamation. See Cullen, 809 A.2d at 1111 (The defendant's alleged defamatory statements were his opinion, and therefore, need not be adjudged true or false.). In addition, characterizing a relationship as close, for the purposes of implying to the public that the close relationship is improper, does not rise to the level necessary to support a false-light claim when the characterization is mere opinion. See Cullen, 809 A.2d at 1112 (When the statement giving rise to a false-light claim is one of opinion, this Court    holds that the same protections afforded opinions in a defamation claim also apply in the context of a false-light claim.). Alves also alleges that Palazzo's suggestion that the taxpayers of this town are being used to bankroll and advance the personal and financial agendas of a `chosen few' supports his libel claim because it suggests that Alves rigged the bidding for the school project. The allegation falls apart when the above quote is read in context. The offending remark was introduced by the following opinion: What I cannot support nor condone is what appears to be the Council's intention to go ahead with the current plan based upon phone calls and pressure exerted by political allies to the detriment of all other West Warwick taxpayers. Think about it  could it be possible that the taxpayers of this town are being used to bankroll   . Examining the greater context of Palazzo's statement reveals that his suggestion that the taxpayers are being used to bankroll personal and financial agendas was leveled at the town council, and not at Alves. By implication, Alves may be a beneficiary of this cabal, one of the chosen few, but the charge is clearly leveled against the town council. Moreover, all of Palazzo's cautionary language of what appears to be the Council's intention     and could it be possible that the taxpayers     makes clear that these are impressions of events concerning the funding of the project, as he saw them. They are his mere opinions, and not the stuff of which defamation and false light are made. We also conclude that plaintiff's allegations based on Palazzo's statement that Alves was exerting a lot of pressure to keep this project moving along   , must fail because the statement was mere hyperbole. Public officials are accused of and, often, do exert pressure to keep projects that they support moving along. Such action would be commendable if the project is in the public interest. With respect to this particular project, Palazzo obviously believed it to be contrary to the public interest. The statement, however, is hardly defamatory. The plaintiff further argues that because the trial justice failed to address whether Palazzo's statements were made with actual malice, he should be given an opportunity to prove whether Palazzo's statements were made with the requisite malice or recklessness to support his defamation claim. The plaintiff's argument misstates the order of proof under the anti-SLAPP statute. The motion justice was correct when she wrote: Having failed to prove that the published statements were objectively baseless, plaintiff cannot pursue a defamation action or an action based on false light against A. Palazzo based upon his letters to the editor. Because Palazzo's statements were not objectively baseless, they were entitled to immunity under the anti-SLAPP statute, precluding any finding of malice to support plaintiff's defamation claim. Once the motion justice determined that the statements were protected, Alves's defamation claim could not proceed. Furthermore, Alves had an opportunity to demonstrate whether Palazzo's statements were made with malice in Superior Court. Section 9-33-2(b) provides as follows: The court shall stay all discovery proceedings in the action upon the filing of a motion asserting the immunity established by this section; provided, however, that the court, on motion and after a hearing and for good cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted. Alves never filed a motion seeking permission to conduct special discovery on the issue of Palazzo's alleged malice. The statute provides that the court shall stay all discovery proceedings when a motion asserting immunity under the anti-SLAPP statute is asserted; however, that stay can be lifted on motion and after a hearing for good cause shown. Alves did not even attempt to show that he had good cause to pursue an inquiry into Palazzo's alleged malice. We do not intend any of the foregoing analysis to dismiss defamation and false-light claims out of hand when a defendant claims conditional immunity under the anti-SLAPP statute. We merely wish to highlight the deliberately high hurdle that a public official must clear to proceed under these common-law claims when citizens criticize public officials on issues of public concern. In addition, plaintiff argues that the award of costs and attorneys' fees was improper. Although he did not address this issue in his written submissions, plaintiff's counsel attacked the award at oral argument as too great because he thought that many of the hours billed represented duplicate time in preparing defenses on behalf of Alan and William Palazzo. We also infer that plaintiff challenges any award for costs and attorneys' fees as error because he contends that his defamation claim should proceed. Both arguments fail. Section 9-33-2(d) explicitly provides in part that the court shall award the prevailing party costs and reasonable attorney's fees, including those incurred for the motion and any related discovery matters. (Emphasis added.) The motion justice wrote an erudite decision supporting her judgment that Palazzo prevailed under the anti-SLAPP statute. Having done so, an award of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees was mandatory. Next, the plaintiff's challenge to the amount of the award fails for two reasons. First, the plaintiff has waived this argument by failing to include it in his brief as required by Article I, Rule 16(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Superior Group Ventures, Inc., 712 A.2d at 360. Second, even if the plaintiff had properly briefed this issue on appeal, the defendant's attorneys submitted affidavits and exhibits chronicling the hours they spent to prepare Palazzo's defense. The motion justice examined these affidavits and exhibits and made adjustments for a total award that she found reasonable. Palazzo received all the fees he requested for defending the slander count and half for defending the other counts he shared with William Palazzo. We will not disturb the award on appeal.