Opinion ID: 2827614
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the district court properly denied

Text: MR. MEZA’S PCRA CLAIM ¶7 Mr. Meza argues that the district court erred in dismissing his PCRA claim because it was properly brought under the PCRA.2 Specifically, Mr. Meza asserts that the PCRA provides a remedy for any person who challenges either a conviction or a sentence and that his plea in abeyance constitutes a conviction falling within the scope of the PCRA. The State challenges both of these points, arguing that entitlement to relief under the PCRA requires both a conviction and a sentence and that Mr. Meza was neither convicted nor sentenced because the charges against him were dismissed once he successfully complied with the terms of his plea-in-abeyance agreement. 2 In his opening brief, Mr. Meza also argues that the PCRA violates the equal protection provisions of the United States and Utah constitutions. Because this issue was not raised in the district court, we decline to address it on preservation grounds. In his reply brief, Mr. Meza suggests for the first time that the PCRA does not provide him due process. However, “issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that were not presented in the opening brief are considered waived.” Spencer v. Utah State Bar (In re Application of Spencer), 2012 UT 92, ¶ 25 n.36, 293 P.3d 360 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Mr. Meza first challenged the constitutionality of the PCRA on due process grounds in his reply brief, we also decline to address that issue. 3 MEZA v. STATE Opinion of the Court in part ¶8 We agree with the State. The PCRA provides a postconviction remedy to persons who have been both convicted and sentenced for a crime. But under the plea-in-abeyance statute, no judgment of conviction is entered pending completion of a plea-inabeyance agreement. Accordingly, Mr. Meza is not entitled to relief under the PCRA. A. Both a Conviction and a Sentence Are Prerequisites to Relief Under the PCRA ¶9 Mr. Meza argues that a petitioner may be entitled to relief under the PCRA if he has either a conviction or a sentence. In so arguing, Mr. Meza relies on several provisions in the PCRA that reference a conviction or sentence and points to federal court decisions treating a plea in abeyance as a sentence or a conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Gorman, 312 F.3d 1159, 1165–67 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Mr. Gorman’s plea in abeyance was both an adjudication of guilt and a conviction.”). In response, the State acknowledges that the PCRA allows a petitioner to obtain relief from either a conviction or a sentence, but argues that the petitioner must be both convicted and sentenced before he is entitled to relief. We agree with the State and hold that the PCRA requires a petitioner to be both convicted and sentenced before he is entitled to relief under the act. ¶10 When faced with a question of statutory interpretation, “our primary goal is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” LeBeau v. State, 2014 UT 39, ¶ 20, 337 P.3d 254. “The best evidence of the Legislature’s intent is the statute’s plain language.” Id. “[W]e read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶11 The PCRA provides that “a person who has been convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action . . . for postconviction relief.” UTAH CODE § 78B-9-104(1) (emphasis added). The meaning of “and” in this context is clear—both a conviction and a sentence are required before a petitioner may obtain PCRA relief. In arguing to the contrary, Mr. Meza relies on sections 78B-9-102(1) and 78B-9-104(1), which reference conviction and sentence in the disjunctive. But these sections speak not to the prerequisites for PCRA relief, but to the types of relief available. For example, section 102(1) explains that the PCRA is “the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence.” And section 104(1) enumerates the grounds “to vacate or modify the conviction or 4 Cite as: 2015 UT 70 Opinion of the Court in part sentence.” While these provisions specify a petitioner’s remedy for a challenged conviction or sentence, they do not dictate the conditions that a petitioner must satisfy before he is entitled to relief. ¶12 We are bound by the statute’s plain meaning and must give effect to its requirements. Accordingly, we hold that the PCRA requires that a petitioner be both convicted and sentenced before he is entitled to relief, even though the petitioner may choose to challenge only the conviction or the sentence. ¶13 Having concluded that both a conviction and a sentence are required before a petitioner is entitled to any relief under the PCRA, we next address whether Mr. Meza was convicted under the PCRA. B. Mr. Meza’s Plea in Abeyance Was Not a Conviction ¶14 The State argues that pleas in abeyance do not qualify as convictions for purposes of the PCRA. Mr. Meza relies on federal cases construing pleas in abeyance as convictions in arguing that a plea of guilty or no contest is considered a conviction. He also points to other Utah statutes that construe a plea of guilty or no contest as a conviction. Considering the plain language of the pleain-abeyance statute, we do not find these sources persuasive. Except in those cases where a statute specifically provides otherwise, a successfully completed plea in abeyance is not a conviction and cannot be treated as such. ¶15 The plea-in-abeyance statute defines a plea in abeyance as “an order by a court, . . . accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant.” Id. § 77-2a-1(1). A court may hold a plea in abeyance “[a]t any time after acceptance of a plea of guilty or no contest but prior to entry of judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence.” Id. § 77-2a-2(1). While the plea is held in abeyance, the court will “not enter judgment of conviction against the defendant nor impose sentence upon the defendant.” Id. And if a defendant successfully completes the conditions of the plea-in-abeyance agreement, the court may either “reduce the degree of the offense and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence for a lower degree of offense[] or . . . allow withdrawal of a defendant’s plea and order the dismissal of the case.” Id. § 77-2a-3(2). ¶16 In Mr. Meza’s case, the justice court withdrew his plea and dismissed the case against him. Mr. Meza’s plea in abeyance was held “prior to entry of judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence.” Id. § 77-2a-2(1). And upon completion of Mr. Meza’s plea-in-abeyance agreement, the court “allow[ed] withdrawal of 5 MEZA v. STATE Opinion of the Court in part [his] plea and order[ed] the dismissal of the case.” Id. § 77-2a-3(2)(b). Thus, no judgment of conviction was ever entered against Mr. Meza. ¶17 In light of the plain language of the plea-in-abeyance statute, we are not persuaded by Mr. Meza’s references to other Utah statutes in which a plea in abeyance is considered a conviction. The plea-in-abeyance statute states the general rule that a successfully completed plea in abeyance is not a conviction. The statutes on which Mr. Meza relies are explicit exceptions to the general rule that simply have no application to the circumstances presented here. For example, the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act provides that “a plea of guilty or no contest to any domestic violence offense in Utah, which plea is held in abeyance[,] . . . is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the charge has been subsequently reduced or dismissed.” Id. § 77-36-1.2(2). And in the Crime Victims Restitution Act, a conviction includes “(a) judgment of guilt; (b) a plea of guilty; or (c) a plea of no contest.” Id. § 77-38a-102(1). And a plea in abeyance is either a “plea of guilty or of no contest.” Id. § 77-38a-102(9). But neither of these exceptions is applicable here.3 ¶18 We presume the Legislature uses each word advisedly. Had the Legislature intended a plea in abeyance to constitute a conviction in all circumstances, it would have so provided in the statute authorizing such pleas. But it did not. Rather, the statute provides to the contrary. And those statutes that do treat a plea in abeyance as a conviction do so only in explicitly defined contexts. For us to consider a plea in abeyance as a conviction in all cases would render the varying definitions created by the Legislature superfluous, which we will not do. We therefore hold that a successfully completed plea in abeyance resulting in dismissal of the original charges is not a conviction. Because Mr. Meza was never convicted, he does not qualify for relief under the PCRA.4 We 3 Other statutes also construe a plea in abeyance as a conviction. E.g., UTAH CODE § 17-16-10.5(2)(c) (malfeasance in office); id. § 76-9-301.7(1) (cruelty to animals). 4 The PCRA does provide a mechanism for a petitioner seeking to withdraw a guilty plea under certain circumstances. See id. § 7713-6(2). The PCRA provides a forum for relief from a plea in abeyance when the plea in abeyance is revoked and a judgment of conviction is entered, or when the court, in accordance with a (continued...) 6 Cite as: 2015 UT 70 Opinion of the Court in part therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of his PCRA action.