Opinion ID: 613271
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tarrant's Supplemental Complaint and Ensuing Litigation

Text: In 2009, the Oklahoma legislature passed H.B. 1483, which substantially overhauled the water permit application process. H.B. 1483, 52nd Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla.2009). Tarrant supplemented its complaint to challenge five more statutory provisions, including four from H.B. 1483, on both dormant Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause grounds. First, Tarrant challenged one of the new criteria that the OWRB must use when ruling on applications: If the application is for use of water out of state, the Board shall ... evaluate whether the water that is the subject of the application could feasibly be transported to alleviate water shortages in the State of Oklahoma. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.12(A)(5). Second, Tarrant challenged a new restriction on the OWRB's discretion: No permit issued by the Oklahoma Water Resources Board to use water outside the boundaries of the State of Oklahoma shall... [i]mpair the ability of the State of Oklahoma to meet its obligations under any interstate stream compact. Id. § 105.12A(B). Third, Tarrant challenged a post-approval application review process that applies only to out-of-state uses of water: Permits and amendments that authorize the use of water outside the state shall be subject to review by the Board at least every ten (10) years after the date of issuance to determine whether there has been a substantial or material change ... The Board may impose additional conditions as described by Board rules to address any such substantial or material change. Id. § 105.12F. Fourth, Tarrant challenged a new version of the longstanding legislative approval requirement: No permit for the use of water out of state shall authorize use of water apportioned to the State of Oklahoma under an interstate compact unless specifically authorized by an act of the Oklahoma Legislature and thereafter as approved by it. Id. § 105.12A(D). Fifth and finally, Tarrant challenged Oklahoma's statutorily enshrined state water plan, which declares: Water use within Oklahoma should be developed to the maximum extent feasible for the benefit of Oklahoma so that out-of-state downstream users will not acquire vested rights therein to the detriment of the citizens of this state. Id. § 1086.1(A)(3). OWRB filed a motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, for summary judgment. OWRB argued for dismissal on two grounds: that the court should defer to the Red River Compact Commission under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and that H.B. 1483 had impliedly repealed all of the originally challenged statutes. In the alternative, OWRB asked for summary judgment on the dormant Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause claims. On November 18, 2009, the district court denied OWRB's motion to dismiss on primary jurisdiction and implied repeal, but granted summary judgment for OWRB on the Supremacy Clause and dormant Commerce Clause claims. See Tarrant I, 2009 WL 3922803. In rejecting the implied repeal arguments, the court noted that the Supreme Court disfavors such arguments. Id. at . H.B. 1483 included no explicit repealer, and the legislative history of H.B. 1483 demonstrated that the Oklahoma legislature had consciously chosen not to adopt an explicit repealer that had been included in previous drafts of the bill. Id. On primary jurisdiction, the court explained that the dormant Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause arguments involved issues of law instead of issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges  the type of issues the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was meant to include. Id. at -3. Therefore, the court found no reason to defer to the Red River Compact Commission. The court next analyzed the dormant Commerce Clause challenge and based its decision on the nature of an interstate compact, the language Congress used ... and the logical import of that language. Id. at . It found no controlling precedent: So far as the court can determine, no case has squarely addressed the question of whether Congress' approval of compact language like that involved here is sufficient to insulate state statutes from Commerce Clause scrutiny. Id. at . The court found Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 73 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1982), the precedent that Tarrant primarily relied upon, distinguishable because that case involved non-compacted water. Here, the circumstances are at least one step removed from those existing in Sporhase. The particular compact involved here (the RRC) is directly applicable to the water in issue and it specifically contemplates dividing the water  allocating it  between the states involved. Tarrant I, 2009 WL 3922803 at . The court proceeded to the text of the Compact. The language of the RRC does not explicitly say `states can limit or stop the out-of-state shipment of water' nor does it make any explicit reference to the Commerce Clause, dormant or otherwise. But the court does not read the various cases to require that level of specificity. Id. at . The court instead looked to [t]he principal purpose and effect of the [Red River Compact], which, the court determined, was to protect state water resources: [N]one of the many cases concluding Congress' intent to supplant the Commerce Clause was insufficiently clear or insufficiently expressed involved circumstances where the essence of what Congress did do was to allocate resources between states. Id. at 6. [I]n light of the right of Oklahoma to control compact waters within its borders not inconsistent with the compact and in the absence of a showing that a particular statute is necessarily inconsistent with the compact, the court concluded that the superseding effect (over otherwise applicable Commerce Clause standards) extends to all water covered by the compact. Id. The district court then turned to Tarrant's Supremacy Clause claim. Tarrant focused its preemption argument on an alleged conflict between § 5.05(b)(1) of the Red River Compact and Oklahoma water statutes governing appropriation and use of water located within Oklahoma. See § 5.05(b)(1), 94 Stat. 3305. In particular, Tarrant argued that § 5.05(b)(1) allocates to Texas a share of Reach II, Subbasin 5 water that Tarrant can divert from the Oklahoma side of Subbasin 5 and use in Texas unrestrained by the Oklahoma statutes that place burdens on out-of-state water use. The district court addressed the preemption issue in one paragraph and held that the Compact does not preempt Oklahoma water statutes: The compact itself explicitly states it is not intended to supplant any state legislation if it is otherwise consistent with the compact. Tarrant I, 2009 WL 3922803 at . Tarrant also argued that the Oklahoma statutes it challenged should be invalidated under the dormant Commerce Clause insofar as they apply to water not governed by the Compact because Congress has not consented to any state burdens on interstate commerce in non-compacted water. In its order, the district court stated that because Tarrant had yet to execute a contract to export water that was not subject to the Compact, Tarrant's claims were too speculative. Id. The court granted Tarrant leave to amend the complaint should a contract be reached. Id. at .