Opinion ID: 1839639
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Heading: A General Overview of the Law of Building Restrictions

Text: In 1977, the Louisiana Legislature repealed Title V of Book II of the Louisiana Civil Code governing the surveying of lands and the fixing of limits and enacted a new Title V regulating building restrictions. Thus, building restrictions are now defined and governed by Articles 775-783 of the Louisiana Civil Code. These articles generally codified the existing jurisprudence, because prior to 1977 the Code did not specifically deal with building restrictions. Building restrictions are defined as charges imposed by the owner of an immovable in pursuance of a general plan governing building standards, specified uses, and improvements. The plan must be feasible and capable of being preserved. La. C.C. art. 775. The comments to Article 775 describe building restrictions as the most important category of restraints on the use or disposition of immovables from the viewpoints of urban and suburban developments in Louisiana. La. C.C. art. 775, comment (d). The requirements of an ancestor in title and of a general development plan are essential features of building restrictions as sui generis real rights. Id. Article 777 describes the nature and regulation of building restrictions as follows: Building restrictions are incorporeal immovables and real rights likened to predial servitudes. They are regulated by application of the rules governing predial servitudes to the extent that their application is compatible with the nature of building restrictions. La. C.C. art. 777. Although the comments to this article state that the article codified existing jurisprudence, the jurisprudence prior to 1977 had inconsistently treated building restrictions as predial servitudes, [2] real obligations accompanying the land into the hands of the vendee, [3] or covenants or equitable restrictions running with the land. [4] Building restrictions may impose on owners of immovables affirmative duties that are reasonable for the maintenance of the general plan. La. C.C. art. 778. One such affirmative duty is the duty to pay assessments. Comment, Some Observations on Building Restrictions, 41 La. L.Rev. 1201, 1208 (1984); Yiannopolis, Predial Servitudes, § 196 at pp. 519-520 (2nd Ed.1997) (Provisions that each purchaser of a lot in a subdivision shall automatically become a member of a corporation formed to provide maintenance of the common grounds, and that each member shall be subject to an annual assessment, have been enforced as reasonable and necessary.) Building restrictions may be enforced by mandatory and prohibitory injunctions without regard to the limitations of Article 3601 of the Code of Civil Procedure. La. C.C. art. 779. An injunctive action may be brought by the original subdivider or by landowners in the subdivision without the necessity of showing the ordinary prerequisites to injunctive relief, i.e., proof of irreparable injury, loss, or damage to the landowner. See Yiannopolis, Predial Servitudes, § 194 at 516-517 (2nd Ed.1997). This Court has since consistently held that building restrictions constitute real rights, not personal to the vendor, and inure to the benefit of all other grantees under a general plan of development, and are real rights running with the land; and that the remedy of the other grantees to prevent a violation of the restrictions by another is by injunction. Diefenthal v. Longue Vue Management Corp., 561 So.2d 44, 51 (La.1990); Cashio v. Shoriak, 481 So.2d 1013, 1015 (La. 1986); Oakbrook Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Sonnier, 481 So.2d 1008, 1010 (1986). The core issue in this case is the validity of the method by which Brier Lake Estates attempted to amend the Original Restrictions. The Amended Restrictions were adopted by a majority vote of the landowners in accordance with the amendment provisions of the Original Restrictions. While the Amended Restrictions restated many of the restrictions in the Original Restrictions, it increased some restrictions that already existed and added others. Defendant claims that although he had notice of the Amended Restrictions, the Amended Restrictions are invalid because they were not adopted by the unanimous consent of the landowners. This is an issue of first impression in this Court. Article 776 provides the method by which building restrictions may be established as follows: [b]uilding restrictions may be established only by juridical act executed by the owner of an immovable or by all the owners of the affected immovables. La. C.C. art. 776. There is no dispute that the building restrictions in the Original Restrictions were properly established by the developer of Brier Lake Estates as he was then the sole owner of all the property. Plaintiffs claim that Article 776 only applies to the original establishment of building restrictions and that under Article 780, the act establishing the original restrictions can provide a method for amendment of the restrictions that requires less than unanimous consent, even if the amended restrictions are more burdensome. Article 780 entitled Termination according to title; agreement of owners, provides as follows: Building restrictions terminate as provided in the act that establishes them. In the absence of such provision, building restrictions may be amended or terminated for the whole or a part of the restricted area by agreement of owners representing more than one-half of the land area affected by the restrictions, excluding streets and street rights-of-way, if the restrictions have been in effect for at least fifteen years, or by agreement of both owners representing two-thirds of the land area affected and two-thirds of the owners of the land affected by the restrictions, excluding streets and street rights-of-way, if the restrictions have been in effect for more than ten years. La. C.C. art. 780 (emphasis added). [5] The comments to Article 780 state that this provision reproduces the substance of R.S. 9:5622, repealed by Acts 1977, No. 170, § 8, effective January 1, 1978. It does not change the law. La. C.C. art. 780, comment (a). La. R.S. 9:5622 contained no provisions for amending building restrictions. Accordingly, when initially enacted in 1977, the second sentence of Article 780 read [i]n the absence of such provision, owners representing more than one-half of the land area affected by the restriction may terminate by agreement ... The 1980 amendment added amend or before terminate. Thus, before 1980, Article 780 and its predecessor, La. R.S. 9:5622, provided solely a method for terminating building restrictions by majority vote. In addition, the comments describe the article purely as a method of terminating existing building restrictions. No mention is made in the comments of amending building restrictions. Brier Lake Estates argues that comment (a) supports its position because prior to 1977, this Court upheld provisions in an act establishing a restrictive covenant setting forth a procedure for the modification of the terms of the covenant by majority vote of the landowners. In Bruce v. Simonson Investments, Inc., supra , the landowners voted, by majority vote as provided for in the act establishing the building restrictions, to amend the building restrictions to allow certain residential areas to be used as parking areas. We held as follows: The release of such a servitude is a real alienation. Normally, therefore, all owners of lots to which the servitude is due must give consent to achieve a full discharge of the servitude. The Act creating the servitude may, however, provide a different method of discharge or modification. The Act in the present case provided such a method. It required the affirmative vote in writing of the owners of a majority of the lots, after notice to all lot owners and a meeting. Such a provision is valid. (Emphasis added.) 207 So.2d at 363. However, since notice was not provided as required in the original act, we held that the modification was invalid. Id. The crucial distinction between the instant case and Bruce is that in Bruce, the landowners were voting to lessen a building restriction to allow for a parking area. In effect, this is a termination of the residential use requirement for that area. Bruce does not hold that an act establishing a building restriction may contain a provision allowing for an amendment by majority vote which increases a restriction. Thus, contrary to Brier Lake's argument, it was not the law prior to 1977 to allow restrictions to be increased or added by less than unanimous consent. In fact, while other courts have upheld amendments to building restrictions by majority vote, in each case the amendment lessened the restriction. See Perkins v. B & W Contractors, Inc., 439 So.2d 652 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 443 So.2d 593 (La.1983) (amendment by majority vote allowing multifamily residences valid); Roccaforte v. Lewis, 286 So.2d 490 (La.App. 1st Cir.1973) (amendment by majority vote allowing apartment buildings valid); Failla v. Meaux, 237 So.2d 688 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1970) (amendment by majority vote allowing commercial usage valid). Because the amendments in these cases lessened rather than increased the restrictions, the holdings of these cases do not conflict with Article 776 which requires unanimous consent for the imposition of new building restrictions. Civil Code articles 776 and 780 must be read in pari materia. La. C.C. art. 13. In addition, [d]oubt as to the existence, validity, or extent of building restrictions is resolved in favor of the unrestricted use of the immovable. La. C.C. art. 783. Thus, we agree with the consensus among the legal commentators that amendments by a mere majority vote can only lessen existing building restrictions, but an amendment that creates more burdensome restrictions requires unanimous consent of all owners of the affected immovable property. See also Mackey v. Armstrong, 30,054-CA (La.App. 2nd Cir. 12/30/97), 705 So.2d 1198. For example, Professor Lee Hargrave has written: To construe that reference to amendments as empowering the burdening of all lots in a subdivision with new restrictions upon approval of the owners of a only a simple majority of the land area affected would be to make a major change in the law on scant authority. There would seem to be little policy reason to move in that direction, policy being more generally toward free use of property and limiting private land use controls. It would be more consistent with that history and policy to construe Article 780 to refer only to amendments that lessen the restrictions on property. Hargrave further writes: If one were to allow new limitations by the amendment route, one would face further constitutional issues. Enforcement of private restrictions is considered state action that comes within the constitutional limitations. Louisiana constitution Article I, Section 4 would then come into play, with its provision that one's right to use and enjoy private property is subject to reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the police power.... That inquiry would then have to balance the extent of the deprivation of enjoyment with the reasons supporting the government interest in enforcing the limitation in favor of the neighbors. That latter inquiry would no doubt focus further on the reasonableness of the reasons the neighbors seek to impose the added restriction. The uncertainty and unpredictability of that approach would suggest that it ought not to be lightly undertaken. It would suggest that it is preferable to apply the statutory solution described above. If change is to be made, the legislature would be the more appropriate body to adopt the standards to apply.... Lee Hargrave, Property-Servitudes & Building Restrictions, 51 La. L.Rev. 371, 384-85 (1990). Professor Yiannopoulos expressed the same sentiment in his treatise on predial servitudes: These clumsy amendments to Article 780 of the Louisiana Civil Code have confused the distinct and distinguishable matters of termination and amendment of building restrictions. An amendment of building restrictions may actually involve termination of existing restrictions, an imposition of new restrictions, or both. However, the requirements for the termination of building restrictions and for the termination of existing restrictions are not the same. It has been correctly suggested that Article 780, as amended, contemplates amendments that lessen restrictions on property. When a purported amendment results in the imposition of new restrictions or in expansion of existing restrictions, all owners of the affected immovables must consent. Yiannopolis, Predial Servitudes, § 196 at 522-523 (2 nd Ed.1997); see also Comment, Some Observations on Building Restrictions, 41 La. L.Rev. 1201, 1205 (1984) (For modification of the plan which make it more restrictive, however, it arguably is necessary to obtain the consent of all owners, since the effect of tightening the existing restrictions is the same as creating new ones, and the creation of restrictions does require universal consent.) Further, we are not persuaded by the argument that because Jones purchased the lot after the recordation of the Amended Restrictions, he must take the property subject to those restrictions. Amended building restrictions which increase restrictions or add new restrictions and which were not consented to by all the affected landowners in the subdivision are invalid. The recordation of invalid building restrictions does not give them validity.