Opinion ID: 1296847
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Factor 6 National Versus State or Local Concerns

Text: Russell contends that Washington has historically applied the exclusionary rule broadly. As support he cites State v. Bonds, 98 Wn.2d 1, 10, 653 P.2d 1024 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983), where this court summarized the ways in which Washington law has generally extended the exclusionary rule beyond the original Fourth Amendment context. For example, this court adopted an exclusionary rule decades before the requirement was extended to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 84 A.L.R.2d 933 (1961), and Washington has extended the rule (sometimes judicially and sometimes legislatively) to statutory violations as well. Bonds, at 9-10. Moreover, as the Earls dissent argues, criminal law in general involves local, not national, concerns. See Earls, at 396-97 (Utter, J., dissenting). As with the fourth Gunwall factor, Russell's position does not tell the entire story. First, Russell gives no indication that the exclusionary rule at issue, suppression of the fruits of an un-Mirandized confession, has historically been applied more broadly under state law than under federal law. As discussed above, the specific exclusionary rule here at issue is peculiarly federal in nature. It is based on a federal case ( Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966)) interpreting the federal constitution. Moreover, this court has not held that Miranda (or similar) warnings are required independently under the state constitution. Thus, this case involves a national issue to a greater extent than do many other issues of criminal law. [8] On balance, we conclude that the Gunwall factors do not support extending greater protection through Const. art. 1, § 9 than that provided by the federal constitution in the present context. What Russell argues is essentially policy. He maintains that the State should not be allowed to use evidence derived from un-Mirandized statements, regardless of the surrounding circumstances. Policy considerations alone are insufficient, however, to trigger an expansive reading of Const. art. 1, § 9.
The third issue raised is whether the trial court erred in denying Russell's motion to sever count 1 from counts 2 and 3. The defense made a pretrial motion to sever these counts and renewed the motion at the close of the State's case. The court denied both motions and all three counts were joined. Russell now contends that these denials were error because the prejudice of joinder far outweighed any considerations of judicial economy. [9, 10] CrR 4.3(a) authorizes joinder of counts where the offenses are of the same or similar character. Joinder of counts should never be used in such a way as to unduly embarrass or prejudice a defendant or deny him or her a substantial right. State v. Smith, 74 Wn.2d 744, 754-55, 446 P.2d 571 (1968), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 934 (1972), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gosby, 85 Wn.2d 758, 539 P.2d 680 (1975). Prejudice may result from joinder if the defendant is embarrassed in the presentation of separate defenses, or if use of a single trial invites the jury to cumulate evidence to find guilt or infer a criminal disposition. State v. Watkins, 53 Wn. App. 264, 268, 766 P.2d 484 (1989) (citing Smith, 74 Wn.2d at 754-55). In determining whether the potential for prejudice requires severance, a trial court must consider (1) the strength of the State's evidence on each count; (2) the clarity of defenses as to each count; (3) court instructions to the jury to consider each count separately; and (4) the admissibility of evidence of the other charges even if not joined for trial. Smith, 74 Wn.2d at 755-56; State v. York, 50 Wn. App. 446, 451, 749 P.2d 683 (1987), review denied, 110 Wn.2d 1009 (1988). In addition, any residual prejudice must be weighed against the need for judicial economy. State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wn.2d 525, 539, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993); State v. Bythrow, 114 Wn.2d 713, 723, 790 P.2d 154 (1990); State v. Markle, 118 Wn.2d 424, 439, 823 P.2d 1101 (1992). On review, a trial court's refusal to sever charges is reversible only where it constitutes a manifest abuse of discretion. Markle, at 439; York, at 450. The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating such abuse. Bythrow, at 720; York, at 450. In considering the strength of the State's evidence on each count, the trial court found that the strength of counts 1 and 3 was similar and that count 2 was a weaker case. The defense disputes this conclusion. In assessing this contention, we need only address the evidence presented on counts 1 and 3 since the defense never moved to sever count 2 from count 3. With regard to count 3, the State's evidence indicated that Russell knew Levine and knew where she lived. On the morning of Levine's murder, Russell was staying in a motel that was less than a 15-minute walk from Levine's residence. Early in the morning, Russell left the motel. At approximately 5 a.m., an intruder was seen leaving Levine's residence. The intruder, like Russell, was wearing dark clothing. An eyewitness saw something white, about two-thirds as wide as the person, superimposed against the chest or abdomen of the intruder. Russell was wearing a dark blue sweatshirt with a white logo on the front. After Levine's murder, Russell told some of his friends that she was a whore who had been sleeping with a friend of his and who used men. Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 5463-64, 5360-61. A hair found on Levine's body after her murder was similar to Russell's. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it was discovered that a distinctive ring which Levine wore regularly was missing from her apartment. Less than 1 week after Levine's murder, Russell gave a similar ring to an acquaintance. Witnesses identified the ring as belonging to Levine. In count 1, the evidence showed that Russell borrowed a truck the evening before the Pohlreich murder and returned it the next day with the explanation that he had vomited in it. The truck's upholstery and carpeting later revealed blood and semen that PCR testing showed could be connected to Pohlreich and to Russell. Fibers found on Pohlreich's body matched fibers from the carpet and upholstery in Smith McLain's truck. Blood testing revealed that the blood in the upholstery could not have been Russell's. The evidence also showed that Russell knew Pohlreich and left Papagayo's with someone who matched her general description. The trial court concluded that the relative strengths of counts 1 and 3 were not sufficiently dissimilar to merit severance, especially given the relatively low power of discrimination inherent in PCR testing. The trial court specifically indicated that had the DNA testing been with RFLP, severance would have been warranted because of its high power of discrimination. We see no abuse of discretion in the court's conclusion. We agree the strengths of counts 1 and 3 were not dissimilar, with evidence of the ring in count 3 perhaps equal in strength to the PCR evidence in count 1. Neither piece of evidence pointed with certainty to the Defendant, but each was significant. [11] The second factor to consider is whether the clarity of defenses to each count was prejudiced by joinder. The likelihood that joinder will cause a jury to be confused as to the accused's defenses is very small where the defense is identical on each charge. State v. Hernandez, 58 Wn. App. 793, 799, 794 P.2d 1327 (1990), review denied, 117 Wn.2d 1011 (1991). Russell's defense on each count in this case was denial. The trial court recognized that the defense would attempt to portray count 2 as a domestic homicide, with Beethe's boyfriend Mike Suell as the perpetrator, but did not see this as significant. It isn't as though there will be a self-defense argument on one and a different type of defense on another one, or that there will be an admission of one or denial of another. Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 2067. The defense argues that joinder made it impossible to defend in count 2 by portraying that murder as a domestic homicide because the argument did not apply to the Pohlreich count. We note, however, that this defense would not have worked well even if count 1 were severed from counts 2 and 3 because Suell could not have been the source of the Negroid hairs found on Beethe's bed in count 3. Russell also claims joinder prejudiced his ability to present separate defenses because, had the counts been severed, he probably would have testified on counts 2 and 3 but not on count 1. Joinder, Russell claims, dissuaded him from testifying. [12] A defendant's desire to testify only on one count requires severance only if a defendant makes a convincing showing that she has important testimony to give concerning one count and a strong need to refrain from testifying about another. Watkins, at 270; State v. Weddel, 29 Wn. App. 461, 467, 629 P.2d 912, review denied, 96 Wn.2d 1009 (1981). In the instant case, Russell made no offer of proof as to the content of the anticipated testimony. In denying the motion to sever, the trial court made the following finding: Although there has been some recent suggestion that the defendant might elect to testify on one count and not on the others, there has been no offer of proof as to which count the defendant might elect to testify about, no offer of proof as to what he might say, and no showing that he would be prejudiced by any decision he might make regarding his decision to testify on any count or counts and not on another. Clerk's Papers, at 407. Absent an offer of proof, it is difficult to conclude that joinder affected Russell's decision not to testify. We do not find the clarity of the Defendant's defenses prejudiced by joinder under the facts presented. [13] The third factor to consider is whether the court properly instructed the jury to consider each count separately. The defense now claims that the trial court should have instructed the jury to decide separately what the evidence in the case shows about the crime. See United States v. Johnson, 820 F.2d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir.1987). Since the defense never proposed such an instruction, however, and since the instruction it did propose is both the one that the trial court gave and a correct statement of the law, we find no error. See Harris v. Groth, 99 Wn.2d 438, 447, 663 P.2d 113 (1983); Hoglund v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 50 Wn. App. 360, 368, 749 P.2d 164 (1987), review denied, 110 Wn.2d 1008 (1988). The final factor is whether evidence of each count would be cross admissible under ER 404(b) if severance were granted. ER 404(b) permits evidence of other crimes to show identity, motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, absence of mistake or accident, opportunity, or an alternative means by which a crime could have been committed. State v. Lord, 117 Wn.2d 829, 872 n. 11, 822 P.2d 177 (1991), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 164 (1992). Such evidence is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. ER 404(b); State v. Smith, 106 Wn.2d 772, 775, 725 P.2d 951 (1986). Of relevance here is identity. In determining the admissibility of other crimes to prove identity, a trial court must determine that the evidence is relevant to identity and that any prejudicial effect is outweighed by the probative value. It must then properly limit the purpose for which the jury may consider the evidence. Smith, 106 Wn.2d at 772; Watkins, at 270. [13] [14] Evidence of other crimes is relevant on the issue of identity only if the method employed in the commission of both crimes is so unique that proof that an accused committed one of the crimes creates a high probability that he also committed the other crimes with which he is charged. Hernandez, at 799 (citing Smith, 106 Wn.2d at 777). In other words, the device used must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature. State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 772, 777, 684 P.2d 668 (1984) (citing McCormick's Evidence § 190, at 449 (Edward W. Cleary gen. ed., 2d ed. 1972)); see also State v. Lynch, 58 Wn. App. 83, 88, 792 P.2d 167, review denied, 115 Wn.2d 1020 (1990). The trial court found cross admissibility on the basis of signature and entered the following written findings: 6. Each crime bears the perpetrator's unique signature, comprised of the manner in which these women were killed, the elaborate manner in which they were posed after their deaths, and the proximity in time and place of the three murders. 7. Evidence of each crime is highly probative of the identity of the murderer in each of the other crimes; the probative value of this evidence greatly outweighs its prejudice to the defendant. Clerk's Papers, at 407. The trial court also cited the opinions of two criminal investigators who testified during the severance hearing that the three homicides bore the same signature and were committed by the same person. Russell now contends that the factors identified in finding of fact 6 do not meet the test for signature crimes, and that no unique signature was identified by the trial court. The State counters by citing other signature cases in which the criminal methods were less distinctive than those employed here. See State v. Laureano, 101 Wn.2d 745, 682 P.2d 889 (1984) (evidence of prior robbery admissible under ER 404(b) where crimes committed 3 weeks apart where both involved forcible entry into family residences by three persons dressed in army fatigues (though not the same three) and where both involved firearms and similar use of a shotgun); see also Lynch (two prior robberies admissible where all crimes involved wearing a brown wig, similar time of day, a red 10-speed bicycle, display of a gun tucked in a waistband, and theft of car keys from victims); but see Hernandez, at 799 (no showing of unusual or unique manner sufficient to show identity where robber entered the store, pulled a knife, asked for money and fled upon receiving it). We find that the factors cited by the trial court support the finding that certain evidence in this case was quite unique. Each count involved a victim killed by violent means who was then sexually assaulted and posed, naked, with the aid of props. The murders occurred within a few weeks of one another in a small geographic area. We agree with the trial court and with the expert witnesses that these similarities were not due simply to coincidence. Accordingly, we do not regard the trial court's conclusion as to cross admissibility as an abuse of discretion. Finally, the court must weigh any prejudice to the defendant resulting from joinder against the need for judicial economy. The trial court found that apart from the evidence of signature, a great deal of evidence, particularly from those witnesses who were acquainted with the defendant during the period of time in which these crimes were committed, would be repeated in each trial if the defendant's motion to sever Count I from the others is granted. Clerk's Papers, at 407-08. The court thus concluded that judicial economy was served by a single trial on all counts. Excluding pretrial motions, this case took 33 days to try. Considering our evaluation of the other severance factors we cannot find that the prejudice resulting from joinder in this case outweighed considerations of judicial economy. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Russell's motion for severance.
The fourth issue the Defendant raises is whether the trial court erred in admitting expert and lay testimony regarding the rarity of posed murder victims. Russell here raises several arguments regarding this testimony. We will first address Russell's contention that the expert testimony was inadmissible because the State's experts improperly relied on unproved scientific methodologies in determining that the same person committed all three murders. At issue here are references made by John Douglas and Robert Keppel to the HITS and VICAP computer programs during their testimony regarding the rarity of posing. [14] These programs use forms, filled out by local law enforcement officers, listing the various characteristics of homicides in Washington and the nation, respectively. The trial court found that the expert testimony referring to HITS and VICAP did not involve novel scientific evidence and was, therefore, subject only to the requirements of ER 702. [15, 16] As stated earlier, expert testimony is admissible under ER 702 if the witness qualifies as an expert and if the expert testimony would be helpful to the trier of fact. Kalakosky, at 541; State v. Cauthron, 120 Wn.2d 879, 890, 846 P.2d 502 (1993). Testimony which does not involve new methods of proof or new scientific principles from which conclusions are drawn need not be subjected to the Frye test. State v. Ortiz, 119 Wn.2d 294, 311, 831 P.2d 1060 (1992); State v. Young, 62 Wn. App. 895, 906, 802 P.2d 829, 817 P.2d 412 (1991). Decisions based on ER 702 are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Kalakosky, at 541. In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that both Keppel and Douglas were widely recognized as authorities in crime scene analysis. Both men have extensive experience in serial crime analysis and investigation. The court then found that their testimony would not involve the application of a new scientific technique and that a Frye hearing was unnecessary. Finally, the court ruled that the testimony concerning the rarity of posing would be helpful to the jury under ER 702: The jury does not have the specialized knowledge of how common the problem is or how often there is sexual penetration, open display of bodies, or the posing of the body after death. So I think it is within the scope of an opinion of somebody's experience to indicate whether these are common or not common or unique. I would find that the relevance of the testimony, as it goes to the identity of the perpetrator, and the inference to be drawn, is that the same person committed all three homicides. Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 2331. We agree with the trial court that the Frye test clearly was inapplicable to the expert testimony regarding the HITS and VICAP programs. These programs are nothing more than sophisticated record-keeping systems. The court correctly analyzed the admissibility of this testimony under ER 702 and we find no abuse of discretion in the admission of the experts' testimony. Russell also objects to this testimony on the ground that it was statistical. Neither expert expressed his opinion about the rarity of posing in precisely quantified terms, though Douglas testified as to the number of cases on VICAP and Keppel testified as to the number of cases on HITS. Russell maintains, however, that by specifying the extent of these databases, Keppel and Douglas implicitly testified that Russell was guilty as a matter of mathematical probability. [17] We first note that there is no prohibition against using well-founded statistics to establish some fact that will be useful to the trier of fact. State v. Briggs, 55 Wn. App. 44, 62-63, 776 P.2d 1347 (1989) (citing People v. Collins, 68 Cal.2d 319, 332, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968)). Second, both experts relied on the databases primarily as support for the conclusion that posing is a rare occurrence and not for the conclusion that there was a statistical probability that Russell committed the murders. Finally, both experts relied more on case materials and personal expertise than on the databases in forming their opinions and both expressed their opinions in nonquantifiable terms. Russell next contends that the trial court erred in allowing three lay witnesses to testify about the rarity of posing and thus to reinforce the expert testimony. In addition to Keppel and Douglas, three detectives testified that each of the bodies seemed posed and only one said he had ever seen another murder scene involving posing. [18] This court recently explained the appropriate conditions for admissibility of lay testimony as follows: Under Rule 701 and Rule 602, the witness must have personal knowledge of matter that forms the basis of testimony of opinion; the testimony must be based rationally upon the perception of the witness; and of course, the opinion must be helpful to the jury (the principal test). Ortiz, at 308-09 (citing McCormick's Evidence 29 (Edward W. Cleary gen. ed., 3d ed. 1984)). We have already concluded that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding testimony regarding the rarity of posing helpful to the trier of fact. The detectives testified regarding their personal knowledge of crime scenes, and their perceptions of the three murders at issue. While the testimony may have been cumulative, we do not see that its admission rises to the level of an abuse of discretion. The defense argues further that the State's expert testimony amounted to expert opinion on the ultimate question of guilt. The State points out, however, that if the testimony was improper, the defense opened the issue when it presented testimony that the murders were not related. These arguments bring us once again to Russell's challenge that this expert testimony was improperly admitted under ER 404(b) to show identity and thus to prove that the same person committed all three murders. In her pretrial ruling the judge limited the experts by allowing them to testify only that the criminal methods employed in each case were unique and rose to the level of signature evidence. The experts were precluded from testifying that they thought that the same person committed all three crimes. During the course of trial, the court modified this ruling when defense counsel, during cross examination of State's expert Keppel, asked whether he knew of any other cases related to these three murders. The State objected because the line of questioning went beyond the scope permitted by the court. The court told the defense: You may do that. Then they have the right to come back on redirect and ask if these three cases are related, which they have not done. They have not gone into the relationship among the three cases. If you want to relate ... the Pohlreich case to other cases, then I think in all fairness they can come back and relate the three cases to each other. Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 5770. When the defense pursued the issue of the similarities and differences among these three murders and others, the court allowed Keppel to testify on redirect that in his opinion all of the murders were committed by the same person. Keppel based his opinion on the posing and on the facts that all the victims were nude, all were female, and all were killed within a short period of time of their contact with the offender. He also observed that each crime involved the sexual insertion of a foreign object and that the offender needed to display these victims and ensure their discovery. Russell did not raise an ER 404(b) objection to this line of testimony. Later, the State's other expert, John Douglas, also testified that all of the victims were posed and that all of the murder scenes exhibited the same signature. Douglas based his opinion regarding signature on the facts that all of the victims had been posed in degrading and humiliating positions and on the fact that the murders occurred within a 67-day period within a small geographical area. Again, Russell raised no ER 404(b) objection but instead, in cross examination, sought to emphasize the differences between Pohlreich's murder and the other two murders. Douglas agreed that there were differences among the crimes, but explained on redirect that the differences were insignificant compared to the similarities. The significant part is the posing of the victims, the posing in this degrading type of position, that is critical. Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 6042. The defense then called Robert Gebo as an expert witness who testified that, at one point, he had believed that the Pohlreich and Beethe murders were not connected. On cross examination, the prosecution elicited Gebo's current opinion that all of the murders were committed by the same person. The court overruled defense counsel's objection and motion to strike, and again ruled that Gebo's testimony on direct brought the issue of whether the homicides were related onto the field of play. [19] In considering Russell's contention that these experts improperly gave opinions on the ultimate question of guilt, we observe that the purpose of showing identity under ER 404(b) is to demonstrate the probability that the same person committed the crime. Coe, at 777-78; Smith, 106 Wn.2d at 778. Having found the expert testimony admissible to show identity, we will not rule inadmissible the inference to be drawn from such evidence. Moreover, the express assertions that the same person committed the three murders were invited by defense counsel. Once the defense brought up the issue of whether these crimes were related to other crimes, the court properly ruled that the State could, in turn, ask the experts whether the crimes were related to one another and had been committed by one person. See State v. Gefeller, 76 Wn.2d 449, 455, 458 P.2d 17 (1969); State v. Crenshaw, 27 Wn. App. 326, 333, 617 P.2d 1941 (1980), aff'd, 98 Wn.2d 789 (1983). We find no error in the court's ruling. In a related argument, the defense complains that Gebo improperly based his change of opinion on the totality of the evidence against Russell, and that his testimony thus doubly invaded the province of the jury. The trial court cured any error in this regard by allowing the State to call Gebo as a rebuttal witness so that he could explain that his change of opinion was based not on information relating to Russell but on the views of his colleagues, Robert Keppel and John Douglas. The defense now claims that Gebo was lying. We have no way to assess this claim and will not consider it further. Russell next contends that the trial court's denial of discovery of police reports from which the HITS data is drawn violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The Sixth Amendment and Const. art. 1, § 22 (amend. 10) grant criminal defendants the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. State v. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d 1, 15, 659 P.2d 514 (1983); State v. Boast, 87 Wn.2d 447, 453, 553 P.2d 1322 (1976). ER 703 governs the bases of opinion testimony given by experts: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. ER 705, in turn, governs the disclosure of the facts underlying an expert's opinion and provides as follows: The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the judge requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross examination. ER 703 thus permits expert opinion testimony based on hearsay data that would be otherwise inadmissible in evidence, while ER 705, which is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 705, authorizes the admission of expert opinion testimony without the prior disclosure of the facts or data which underlie the opinion. See 11 James W. Moore & Helen I. Bendix, Federal Practice § 705.10, at VII-70 (2d ed. 1976); see also Robert H. Aronson, Evidence in Washington 705-3 (2d ed. 1993) (under ER 705, trial court has discretion to require an expert to disclose the basis for opinion). Initially, the defense requested access to the HITS system and specifically disavowed any request for police reports of cases included in that system. The State offered to allow a reputable defense expert to review the data with Keppel, and Keppel reviewed the database with defense counsel for several hours. The trial court granted the defense's discovery request for forms in the relevant categories, e.g., posing/unusual position, sexual insertion, ritual. After access to the HITS system was provided, the defense requested a variety of police reports referenced in HITS. The defense argues that the trial court's denial violated the confrontation clause. Keppel himself did not have access to the actual police reports in the HITS system. The trial court reasoned that meaningful cross examination was possible without access to the police reports by pointing out that Keppel was basing his conclusions on data interpreted by another person. [20, 21] Other Washington cases have allowed the admission of expert opinion based on data interpreted by another. See State v. Ecklund, 30 Wn. App. 313, 318, 633 P.2d 933 (1981); Tennant v. Roys, 44 Wn. App. 305, 311, 722 P.2d 848 (1986). We see no abuse of discretion or violation of the confrontation clause resulting from a similar admission here. The State allowed the defense to review the same data on which Keppel relied. Keppel himself did not have access to the actual police reports that make up the databases; moreover, he did not base his opinions exclusively on the databases. We hold that Russell was not denied due process and find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of discovery of the police reports underlying the HITS system.
Russell next argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of other suspects and other crimes which he contends would connect another person with the three murders at issue. [22, 23] Washington law on this point is clear: While evidence tending to show that another party may have committed the crime may be admissible, before such testimony can be received there must be such proof of connection ... or circumstances as tend clearly to point out someone besides the one charged as the guilty party. State v. Kwan, 174 Wash. 528, 532-33, 25 P.2d 104 (1933) (citing State v. Downs, 168 Wash. 664, 667, 13 P.2d 1 (1932)); see also State v. Mak, 105 Wn.2d 692, 716, 718 P.2d 407, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986). The trial court's decision on admissibility of this type of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Mak, at 717. Russell asserts initially that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of two other assaults that occurred in September 1990. The defense states that the incidents were similar to the Beethe and Levine counts because the female victims lived on the ground floor of Bellevue apartment buildings and both received head injuries inflicted by a heavy object. A review of the facts, however, indicates substantial differences among the incidents. The first assault occurred early in the morning on September 9, 1990. The victim had locked herself out of her apartment building and was banging on her door when a man approached, offering his help. The two walked around to the back of the building to see if she could climb in a window. The man struck the victim on the head with what appeared to be a rock; she screamed and he fled. The trial court found no obvious similarities between injuries inflicted upon this victim and upon Beethe. Furthermore, the court noted that Russell had no alibi for the time of the assault, and could have been the assailant. The second assault occurred on September 15, 1990, when the victim surprised a burglar in her home. The burglar struck her once in the eye and then fled with money. Although Russell had an alibi in this case because he was in custody, the court found no similarity between either this assault and the one described above or between this assault and the murders at issue. Russell also assigns error to the trial court's refusal to admit evidence that two men, George Grumbs and Brent Carlson, may have murdered Pohlreich and Levine, respectively. George Grumbs was considered a suspect in a rape/murder case where the body was left in a parking lot. The victim in that case was an African-American with a history of prostitution and a heroin habit. She had been seen driving with Grumbs, and although her body was left in a parking lot, it was fully clothed and not posed. The trial court found that the Grumbs case bore little resemblance to the Pohlreich case. Brent Carlson had had a previous romantic relationship with Levine, and the two were friends up to her death. Carlson initially offered little in the way of an alibi for the night of Levine's death. Later he admitted that he had been with another woman the night of the murder, but he could not produce the woman. The trial court concluded that neither the relationship between Carlson and Levine nor the lack of an alibi was sufficient to bring this evidence into the case. The case law seems to focus on having more than motive and opportunity. Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 2261. We agree. As this court stated shortly after Downs was decided, [m]ere evidence of motive in another party, or motive coupled with threats of such other person, is inadmissible, unless coupled with other evidence tending to connect such other person with the actual commission of the crime charged. Kwan, 174 Wash. at 533. We see no evidence connecting either George Grumbs or Brent Carlson to the present case. Nor do we see any connection between the three murders and the two assaults described earlier. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of other crimes and suspects.
Russell also challenges the trial court's rulings admitting into evidence unused condoms, a police scanner, and a crime scene handbook. Russell argues that the admission of each item violated Evidence Rules 401, 403, and 404.
Prior to trial Russell moved to exclude unused condoms found in his belongings. The State asserted that the condoms were relevant to rebut an argument that Carol Beethe and Andrea Levine had been killed by someone other than Mary Pohlreich's killer, because semen was found at the scene of Pohlreich's murder but not at Beethe's and Levine's. (The State intended to argue that the absence of semen in the bodies of Levine and Beethe could be attributed to the use of condoms.) The trial court concluded the condoms had little probative value, as they are easily obtained, and determined this value was outweighed by the condoms' prejudicial effect. The court indicated, however, that it might reconsider its decision if the defense presented this theory at trial. The State objected that jurors might make the inference regarding different killers even if the defense did not directly present it to them. The next day, the trial court reversed its decision and admitted the condoms. The trial court noted that during the voir dire of potential jurors, none had found the possession of condoms unusual or offensive, and none believed it showed any intent to commit a sexual offense. The trial court concluded the condoms would not prejudice these jurors against the Defendant and found the condoms relevant in rebutting the potential inference of separate killers. Russell contends that the condoms were not relevant to any issue in the case. He points out that the State did not have to prove intercourse, that the condoms obviously had not been used in the murders, and that condoms are widely available. He argues further the condoms raised two impermissible inferences: that Russell was not celibate, and that Russell kept condoms in order to rape and murder women without leaving evidence. [24-26] A trial court's evaluation of relevance under ER 401 and its balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect under ER 403 will be overturned only for manifest abuse of discretion. See State v. Rice, 110 Wn.2d 577, 598-600, 757 P.2d 889 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989); State v. Harris, 106 Wn.2d 784, 791, 725 P.2d 975 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987). Discretion is abused only when no reasonable person would have decided the issue as the trial court did. Rice, at 600. We find no basis for overturning the court's ruling here. Although the balancing of the probative and prejudicial aspects of the condoms is close, the trial court's decision was within the bounds of appropriate discretion. While the evidence was not highly relevant, neither was it highly prejudicial in light of the jurors' responses to voir dire. Since a reasonable person could conclude under these circumstances that the prejudicial nature of this evidence did not outweigh its probative value, we find no abuse of discretion under ER 401 and ER 403. Moreover, because the condoms related to the identity of the killer or killers, we find no violation of ER 404(b).
Russell possessed a police scanner until the police took it away from him a few months prior to the killings. The scanner issue arose during presentation of the defense case. One of the defense theories was that Russell was working undercover for the police. The defense sought to introduce the following testimony from one of Russell's roommates: The roommate had called the police after noticing a man lurking outside; shortly thereafter, Russell returned to the residence saying he was angry she had called the police; and Russell said he had been in a police car when the call came in. Defense counsel said she wanted to introduce this evidence to show Russell was working with the police. The State countered that if this evidence were admitted, it would seek to introduce Russell's previous ownership of the scanner to show that Russell could have learned of the police call even if he were not employed by the police. The court stated, Either I am going to admit [Defendant's proposed testimony] and let the state go ahead with access to the police scanner, or I'm going to exclude it. Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 5385. Defense counsel responded by indicating that our position would be to let the evidence in and to let the state adduce evidence that he was in possession of a scanner in May. Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 5385. The trial court then allowed each party to present its evidence. Russell now contends admission of the scanner was improper. He argues that the evidence was not related to the elements of any of the charged crimes, that the scanner does not make any more probable his guilt in these charges, and that the evidence prejudicially implied that he had a criminal disposition. The scanner was relevant in rebutting the testimony proposed by defense counsel. Moreover, while this evidence has the potential for creating unfair prejudice, the prejudicial effect was markedly reduced in this case since the Defendant claimed to be working for the police. Also, the prosecutor elicited testimony informing the jury that possession of a scanner is not illegal. The trial court's decision was well within the range of discretion and we conclude that the evidence was properly admitted under ER 401 and 403. As to ER 404(b), the scanner was admitted for the purpose of explaining Russell's opportunity to learn of the police call other than through employment with the police. Because the evidence was not admitted to prove character, ER 404(b) was not violated.
After Russell was questioned by the police, he telephoned one of his roommates and asked her to give the police his copy of Crime Scene Search and Physical Evidence Handbook. The handbook outlines police procedures in gathering evidence from the scene of a crime and contains chapters on fingerprints and body fluids. The book does not contain a chapter on DNA testing. In a pretrial hearing, the State argued the handbook was relevant because it showed knowledge of techniques that were apparently used by the killer of Beethe and Levine. The trial court initially ruled the handbook inadmissible, but noted it would reconsider its decision if circumstances changed. The issue was raised again during trial. The State pointed out that the Beethe murderer had worn gloves; that Levine's bedroom had been wiped down to remove clues; that no semen was left at the Beethe and Levine crime scenes; and that the jury had already heard testimony that Russell had said he worked for the police. The trial court reversed its prior decision, noting that the handbook was relevant given the steps taken to minimize evidence left at the crime scene, and noting reduced prejudice due to Russell's contention he was working for the police. The trial court allowed the State to have a witness summarize and read from the handbook, but did not allow it to go to the jury. Russell contends admission of the handbook evidence was unfairly prejudicial. He cites Coe, 101 Wn.2d at 780, where the court reversed convictions for rape because, among other reasons, the State had cross-examined the defendant about his sexually oriented fiction. He relies additionally on State v. Hanson, 46 Wn. App. 656, 663-64, 731 P.2d 1140, review denied, 108 Wn.2d 1003 (1987), where the court held the defendant was improperly cross-examined about his own fictional writing and cited with approval the statement that [n]o inference of any kind can be drawn about a person's character from the kinds of books that he reads. Hanson, at 663 (citing United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1207 (9th Cir.) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979)); see also United States v. McCrea, 583 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.1978) (harmless error when defendant charged with possession of unregistered firearm was cross-examined about possession of books entitled Improvised Munitions Handbook and OSS Sabotage and Demolition Manual ). Although the issue is close, this case concerns evidence of greater relevance and less prejudice than was involved in the cases cited by Russell. Unlike the evidence at issue in Coe and Hanson, the handbook related directly to the facts of the crimes themselves. The crime scenes revealed that steps had been taken to ensure certain evidence was not left behind, and relevant topics on these points were covered in the handbook. Moreover, the prejudicial effect of the evidence was moderated in this case because possession of the handbook would have been consistent with Russell's claim to be working for the police. For these reasons, we uphold the trial court's ruling on ER 401 and 403 as being within the range of discretion. As to ER 404(b), the handbook evidence was admitted not to prove Russell's character, but for the purpose of demonstrating Russell's knowledge on a point relevant to the case. In conclusion, we affirm the trial court's rulings admitting the condoms, the scanner, and the handbook. We pause to emphasize, however, that we are not broadly authorizing trial courts to admit evidence of this nature in all criminal trials. Here the trial judge admitted the evidence after carefully evaluating each item's relationship to the issues in the case and after fully considering the restrictions of ER 401, 403 and 404. We commend the trial judge for her detailed examination.
The next issue is whether the trial court erred in denying a mistrial based on the State's cross examination of Matt McCaulley. Matt McCaulley was a 16-year-old neighbor of Carol Beethe. Soon after the murder McCaulley told police investigators that he saw a blue Corvette with a black top driving near Beethe's house around the time of her murder. He also said he heard a cat scream around that same time. Prosecutors interviewed McCaulley on March 26, 1991. McCaulley described using alcohol and drugs and having related hallucinations during the summer of 1990. He admitted drinking some bourbon the night of Beethe's murder. At trial, McCaulley was called as a defense witness to support the theory that Beethe was killed by a boyfriend, Mike Suell. McCaulley identified a photograph of Mike Suell's white-topped Corvette as possibly being the car he saw. On cross examination, McCaulley denied drinking any bourbon on the night of the murder. The State reminded him of his March 26 statement in which he admitted consuming bourbon that night. McCaulley then admitted drinking some bourbon that night, but denied it was enough to affect [his] system. Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 6602. The State also asked McCaulley on cross examination if he had any problems on the night in question with drugrelated hallucinations. McCaulley denied having any such problems that night. The State repeatedly questioned McCaulley about the discrepancies between his earlier statement that the top of the Corvette was black and his in-court testimony regarding Suell's white-topped Corvette. Russell first argues that a mistrial should have been granted on the basis of undue surprise. He contends the State used interview notes for impeachment that had not been disclosed in violation of the court's discovery order. [15] That order required each party to divulge in advance certain impeaching material gathered from witness interviews. [16] At trial the judge ruled that the discovery order did not require the State to divulge the interview notes. Rather, the order had been limited to a witness' prior inconsistent statements and did not include general impeachment evidence. Because McCaulley's statements to the prosecutors did not involve any inconsistent statements, the court allowed the cross examination based on the interview. [27] We accord discretion to trial court decisions on the scope of discovery in criminal cases where not inconsistent with CrR 4.7. See State v. Blackwell, 120 Wn.2d 822, 826, 845 P.2d 1017 (1993); State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d 51, 80, 804 P.2d 577 (1991). The trial judge did not abuse her discretion in ruling that the State had complied with her discovery order. Russell argues that due process is violated when the defendant is required to provide discovery that the State is not likewise required to provide, citing Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 37 L.Ed.2d 82, 93 S.Ct. 2208 (1973). In this case, however, both parties were required to comply with the same standard. Russell also argues due process is violated when the State seeks tactical advantage through surprise, citing Coe, at 783. This argument too misses the mark, for the State acquired no tactical advantage when both parties were operating under the same rule. Russell next argues that the State improperly inquired into McCaulley's drug and alcohol use. He contends that the prosecution's questions should have been limited to McCaulley's use of alcohol or drugs on the night of Beethe's murder. [28] It is well settled in Washington that evidence of drug use is admissible to impeach the credibility of a witness if there is a showing that the witness was using or was influenced by the drugs at the time of the occurrence which is the subject of the testimony. State v. Dault, 19 Wn. App. 709, 719, 578 P.2d 43 (1978); State v. Hall, 46 Wn. App. 689, 692, 732 P.2d 524, review denied, 108 Wn.2d 1004 (1987); State v. Smith, 103 Wash. 267, 269, 174 P. 9 (1918); see also David J. Oliveiri, Annotation, Use of Drugs as Affecting Competency or Credibility of Witness, 65 A.L.R.3d 705 § 6[b] (1975) (generally accepted in other jurisdictions that drug use may be admissible to show impairment of a witness' faculties). Here, the State's interview of McCaulley indicated that he drank bourbon on the night of Carol Beethe's murder and that he had drug- and alcohol-related hallucinations in the summer of 1990. Considering this evidence, the State properly questioned McCaulley about drugs or alcohol that may have influenced him on the night of Beethe's murder and whether he had problems with drug-induced hallucinations on the same night. We see no error in this cross examination. Russell also sought a mistrial based on a prosecution question relating to cats. After reminding McCaulley he had told police that he heard a cat scream at the time of Beethe's murder, the prosecutor asked how McCaulley knew the sound was made by a cat. McCaulley replied he had previously heard mating cats scream. The prosecutor then asked: Q: Do you recall you also could identify a cat scream sound from an occasion on which you killed a cat and was dangling it over a bridge? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, move to strike. THE COURT: Sustained. That will be stricken, the jury is directed to disregard it. Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 6608. At no point since, despite adequate opportunity, has the prosecution presented any valid basis for asking this question. The question insinuates that McCaulley had killed a cat and dangled it over a bridge, yet the prosecution has not demonstrated that McCaulley ever said such a thing, that he ever did such a thing, or that the prosecution had good reason to think this had happened. All the State can point to is McCaulley's statement that he heard a cat scream on the night of the murder. The question was undeniably improper, inflammatory, and unprofessional. The State argues that the trial court's actions sufficiently cured the error, and that any remaining prejudice did not require a mistrial. While we are unhappy with the State's tactics we do not find that a mistrial is warranted for the reasons below. [29-31] Courts generally presume jurors follow instructions to disregard improper evidence. See State v. Swan, 114 Wn.2d 613, 661-62, 790 P.2d 610 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991). Trial courts are accorded discretion in denying a motion for mistrial; such denials will be overturned only when there is a substantial likelihood the prejudice affected the jury's verdict. State v. Crane, 116 Wn.2d 315, 332-33, 804 P.2d 10, cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2867 (1991). Trial courts should grant a mistrial only when the defendant has been so prejudiced that nothing short of a new trial can insure that the defendant will be tried fairly. Mak, 105 Wn.2d at 701, quoted in State v. Hopson, 113 Wn.2d 273, 284, 778 P.2d 1014 (1989). The question's prejudicial effect was mitigated under the circumstances of this case. The single, isolated question occurred in the context of a lengthy trial. The trial court immediately struck the question from the record, even before McCaulley had a chance to answer it, and instructed the jury to disregard it. Under these circumstances, the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying Russell's request for a mistrial.
Russell next contends that prosecutorial misconduct during cross examination and closing argument was so egregious that Russell was denied a fair trial. Before discussing the instances of alleged misconduct, we will briefly review the law applicable to prosecutorial misconduct. [32, 33] Where improper argument is charged, the defense bears the burden of establishing the impropriety of the prosecuting attorney's comments as well as their prejudicial effect. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d at 93; State v. Hughes, 106 Wn.2d 176, 195, 721 P.2d 902 (1986). Reversal is not required if the error could have been obviated by a curative instruction which the defense did not request. Hoffman, at 93; State v. York, 50 Wn. App. 446, 458, 749 P.2d 683 (1987), review denied, 110 Wn.2d 1009 (1988). [34, 35] Allegedly improper arguments should be reviewed in the context of the total argument, the issues in the case, the evidence addressed in the argument, and the instructions given. State v. Graham, 59 Wn. App. 418, 428, 798 P.2d 314 (1990); State v. Green, 46 Wn. App. 92, 96, 730 P.2d 1350 (1986). Remarks of the prosecutor, even if they are improper, are not grounds for reversal if they were invited or provoked by defense counsel and are in reply to his or her acts and statements, unless the remarks are not a pertinent reply or are so prejudicial that a curative instruction would be ineffective. State v. Dennison, 72 Wn.2d 842, 849, 435 P.2d 526 (1967); Graham, at 428-29. [36, 37] Lastly, failure to object to an improper remark constitutes a waiver of error unless the remark is so flagrant and ill intentioned that it causes an enduring and resulting prejudice that could not have been neutralized by an admonition to the jury. Hoffman, at 93; York, at 458-59. In other words, a conviction must be reversed only if there is a substantial likelihood that the alleged prosecutorial misconduct affected the verdict. State v. Lord, 117 Wn.2d 829, 887, 822 P.2d 177 (1991), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 164 (1992); State v. Wood, 44 Wn. App. 139, 145, 721 P.2d 541, review denied, 107 Wn.2d 1011 (1986). Most of the statements Russell complains of must be analyzed under the enduring and resulting prejudice standard since only one was objected to at trial. Furthermore, in moving for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct, Russell complained of only 3 of the 12 instances of alleged misconduct now at issue. The trial court denied the motion. The decision to deny a request for mistrial based upon alleged prosecutorial misconduct lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and it will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Ray, 116 Wn.2d 531, 549, 806 P.2d 1220 (1991); Hopson, 113 Wn.2d at 284. Russell first complains of three statements made during closing argument that he claims were based on facts not in evidence: the statement that McCaulley said his brother was a hit man; the statement that Russell owned a Seattle Police cap with a patch on it; and the statement that additional incriminating evidence could have been developed. The defense objected to none of these statements when made. The State responds accurately that the hit man and police cap statements were drawn directly from the testimony of two witnesses. The statement regarding additional incriminating evidence was made in response to Russell's theory that the police did an inadequate job of investigating the murders and that they did not test every conceivable item of evidence. The State framed this response as follows: But you want to listen very, very carefully to arguments made by the defense in this connection, when you know that six months ago in April they were told that if there was any work they wanted done on any item of evidence, any test, it would be done. It was said to them, folks, we really don't want to hear about this at trial. You may have reason to guess that there is incriminating evidence that has not been developed. You really think that there is evidence of innocence there? The police are only human. They made mistakes, they did the best they could. They developed a lot of incriminating evidence. There may be some that remained undeveloped. Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 7063. [38] A prosecutor may not suggest that evidence not presented at trial provides additional grounds for finding a defendant guilty. United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659, 663 (5th Cir.1979). It is not misconduct, however, for a prosecutor to argue that the evidence does not support the defense theory. Graham, at 429; State v. Contreras, 57 Wn. App. 471, 476, 788 P.2d 1114, review denied, 115 Wn.2d 1014 (1990). Moreover, the prosecutor, as an advocate, is entitled to make a fair response to the arguments of defense counsel. United States v. Hiett, 581 F.2d 1199, 1204 (5th Cir.1978). It appears that the cited statement was aimed more at responding to defense criticisms than at finding additional reasons to convict Russell. The inadequacy of the police investigation was a constant defense theme, and the prosecutor's statement constituted a fair response to that theory. Moreover, the trial court ameliorated the effect of the statement when it gave a curative instruction in response to defense counsel's subsequent statement that there is a lot of evidence which we haven't seen which has been held back from us.... Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 7133. The court instructed the jury to base your decision solely on the evidence presented in court. You are to disregard any remarks that there is additional evidence being withheld from you, the jury. You are to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in court and not on speculation. Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 7148. [39] Despite this admonition, the deputy prosecutor could not resist commenting further on the possibility of withheld evidence. During rebuttal, she referred to defense counsel's notions that evidence is being held back, and to the large amount of discovery information made available to the defense. The deputy prosecutor then added, You know they have had access to their own experts to look at ... this evidence, very few of whom you heard from. Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 7269. The defense objected, and the court reminded the jury that it was to consider the evidence before it, the exhibits and the instructions. While the prosecutor improperly referred to facts not in evidence, we find that defense counsel's objection and the court's prompt response arguably cured any resulting prejudice. In light of this we do not find the remark so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. Russell next objects to the deputy prosecutor's statement in closing argument that [t]he killing stopped with these three women and it should go no further. Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 7053. The defense made no objection to this statement when it was made. Russell now claims that this remark was improper because it was based on facts not in evidence. The State asserts, however, that it is a reasonable inference from the evidence that no additional posed victims were found after Russell's arrest. See Hoffman, at 94-95; State v. Ranicke, 3 Wn. App. 892, 897, 479 P.2d 135 (1970) (in closing argument, prosecuting attorney permitted reasonable latitude in drawing inferences from the evidence). The State also points out that defense counsel stated later that there weren't any other posed bodies. Even if the remark was error, the prejudicial effect of this isolated statement could have been cured had the defense objected. We find more serious a later comment made by the prosecutor: Mr. Russell was going to go to California, San Diego, I think he said. If you have a reasonable doubt that he killed these women, let him go. He'll find new friends. There is no shortage of naieve [ sic ], trusting, foolish young people in the cities of this country. He will settle in. He will begin looking for work. You could say he will be hunting for a job and he will find it. If you have a reasonable doubt that he's the killer, let him go. Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 7117-18. Russell made no objection to these comments, but he did refer to them in his motion for a mistrial. He argues that the comments were a deliberate appeal to the jury's fears and thus inappropriate. See State v. Belgarde, 110 Wn.2d 504, 507, 755 P.2d 174 (1988); State v. Claflin, 38 Wn. App. 847, 851, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984), review denied, 103 Wn.2d 1014 (1985). In Belgarde, the court found that the prosecutor's inflammatory comments were a deliberate appeal to the jury's passion and prejudice, encouraging it to render a verdict based on the defendant's associations rather than on the evidence. Since an objection and instruction to disregard could not have erased the fear and revulsion jurors would have felt, a new trial was the mandatory remedy for such misconduct. Belgarde, at 508. [40] While egregious, it is doubtful that the prosecutor's statements herein created a sense of revulsion. Moreover, defense counsel repeated the California remark in her closing argument: The state suggested Mr. Russell killed three people in Bellevue, he was on the way to California and he would kill again. Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 7163. This statement was made to illustrate how the State was trying to identify Russell as a serial killer. The incorporation of this statement into the defense argument weakens the contention that it denied Russell a fair trial. While we do not approve of the prosecutor's statement, we do not find it sufficiently flagrant under the facts presented to warrant a new trial. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179-82, 91 L.Ed.2d 144, 106 S.Ct. 2464 (1986) (remarks about a defendant's future dangerousness were criticized but not regarded as reversible error). Russell next contends that the State committed misconduct in commenting on his right to remain silent and in shifting the burden of proof by stating that the defense failed to bring in (1) anyone to testify he bought a ring in Canada; (2) any evidence to establish who he was working with on the morning Levine was killed; (3) some of his acquaintances to show where he went in Smith McLain's truck; and (4) someone to establish that he worked for the police. Defense counsel made no objections to any of these statements during closing argument. [41] The defense now claims error, arguing the statements were not justified by the missing witness doctrine outlined in State v. Blair, 117 Wn.2d 479, 485-86, 816 P.2d 718 (1991). Under this doctrine, where a party fails to produce otherwise proper evidence which is within his or her control, the jury may draw an inference unfavorable to that party. Blair, at 485-86 (citing State v. Davis, 73 Wn.2d 271, 276, 438 P.2d 185 (1968)). Most jurisdictions permit the missing witness inference in criminal cases where the defense fails to call logical witnesses. Blair, at 486. The inference may be drawn only where there is an unexplained failure to call a witness whom it would be natural for a party to call if that party knew that the testimony would be favorable. Blair, at 488 (citing Davis, at 279-80). The inference may not be drawn when to do so would infringe on the defendant's constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent. Blair, at 491. The Blair court did not agree, however, that any comment on a defendant's failure to produce witnesses is an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof. Here, nothing in the prosecutor's comments said that the defendant had to present any proof on the question of his innocence. The prosecutor was entitled to argue the reasonable inference from the evidence presented. Blair, at 491. The first comment of which Russell complains referred to an amethyst ring allegedly belonging to Andrea Levine. The State presented evidence that shortly after Levine was murdered, Russell gave the ring to Dacia Jubinville. On cross examination, Jubinville said that Russell told her he got the ring in Canada. During closing argument, the prosecutor posed some questions for the defense. If Mr. Russell bought that ring in Canada, who did he buy it from? ... why didn't they bring somebody down from Vancouver? They could have saved themselves a lot of trouble, just to find the man or woman that sold Mr. Russell the ring. Where is he? Doesn't that make you wonder a little bit? Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 7110. The comments at issue thus were based on testimony elicited by the defense, and pointed to logical support of the defense theory that was missing. These comments are justifiable under the missing witness doctrine. Russell next complains of the following remarks: Not one of Mr. Russell's acquaintances called by the state or by the defense has any idea where he went in Smitty's truck. Not one of them has any idea where he was on the mornings that Carol Beethe and Randy Levine were killed. Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 7111. The defense contends that these comments were the same as an outright statement that Russell did not take the stand and provide an alibi. While the remarks point to absence of alibi, they do not refer to Russell's failure to testify. These comments did not violate his right to remain silent or shift the burden of proof. Russell also complains of the prosecutor's reference to the absence of witnesses to corroborate that Russell worked as an undercover police informant. The prosecutor first acknowledged that Russell had no burden of proof and then said: But when they talk about people who are peculiarly within their knowledge, for instance ... these mysterious police that they want to claim Mr. Russell really was working for, those are people peculiarly within their knowledge. When those people are not brought forward you are entitled to ask why not? And the logical explanation is because they don't exist. Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 7273. These comments were made after the defense stated in closing argument that Russell could not introduce witnesses on this point because of the danger to which it would subject Russell in jail. Thus, the defense implied that it could have produced such witnesses, and the State's remarks seem well within the bounds of the missing witness doctrine. [42, 43] Russell also argues that the State disparaged his right to present a defense by its cross examination of defense investigator Debra Malcom. The law allows cross examination of a witness into matters that will affect credibility by showing bias, ill will, interest, or corruption. State v. Jones, 67 Wn.2d 506, 512, 408 P.2d 247 (1965); State v. Roberts, 25 Wn. App. 830, 834, 611 P.2d 1297 (1980). The scope of such cross examination is within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Robbins, 35 Wn.2d 389, 396, 213 P.2d 310 (1950); Roberts, at 834. While the State subjected Debra Malcom to rigorous cross examination, the questions were designed to emphasize her position as part of the defense team and to show that her investigative techniques were often suggestive and incomplete. The inquiry was within the proper bounds of cross examination. Finally, Russell contends that two personal attacks on his attorneys deprived him of his right to counsel. The first comments occurred during rebuttal, and followed statements by the defense that the State pursued Russell because of his race and that it changed and fabricated evidence to fit its theory of the case. The State responded as follows: I think defense counsel in this case has kind of stooped to new lows in the argument you just heard, essentially going from claiming people are lying and fabricating evidence, whenever there is a piece of evidence they can't explain away, to claiming that the police  going so far as to claim that the police planted the defendant's Negroid hairs in the ME exhibits, that they got from his bag. .... You've heard all the witnesses, you will judge their credibility. Thank God you, and not Ms. Schwartz, is the judge of the credibility of the witnesses.... Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 7267-68. The State further complained that the defense had attacked and vilified Dr. Blake. [N]o matter what we do, if it suits someone's interest to claim that that evidence is not reliable, or is fabricated, they will stoop to any level to do so. You have seen that here. Verbatim Report on Appeal, at 7289. The defense made no objection to any of the comments cited above. These remarks appear to have been provoked by defense counsel and arguably constitute a fair response to attacks made by the defense on the deputy prosecutor, her witnesses, and the work of government agents. See United States v. Nanez, 694 F.2d 405, 410 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909 (1983); Graham, at 428-29. The Ninth Circuit has stated that absent specific evidence in the record, no particular defense counsel can be maligned. Bruno v. Rushen, 721 F.2d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 (1984). It would appear that specific evidence supported the prosecutor's statements here. While inflammatory, the remarks were not so prejudicial that a curative instruction would have been ineffective. In summary, only one of the many instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct was objected to at trial. Thus, the admonition stated by this court in Jones v. Hogan, 56 Wn.2d 23, 27, 351 P.2d 153 (1960), may be applicable: Counsel may not remain silent, speculating upon a favorable verdict, and then, when it is adverse, use the claimed misconduct as a life preserver on a motion for new trial or on appeal. Moreover, only the statement regarding the likelihood of Russell continuing to kill in California appears to have been capable of lasting prejudicial effect. While it is not, by itself, sufficient to warrant a new trial, we reiterate here our unhappiness with this comment.
Finally, Russell maintains that he was denied a fair trial due to the cumulative effect of errors that include improper joinder, the improper admission of expert testimony and other physical character evidence, and the denial of the right to confront and present evidence in defense. [44] It is well accepted that reversal may be required due to the cumulative effects of trial court errors, even if each error examined on its own would otherwise be considered harmless. See State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 772, 789, 684 P.2d 668 (1984); State v. Badda, 63 Wn.2d 176, 183, 385 P.2d 859 (1963); State v. Alexander, 64 Wn. App. 147, 154, 822 P.2d 1250 (1992). Analysis of this issue depends on the nature of the error. Constitutional error is harmless when the conviction is supported by overwhelming evidence. State v. Whelchel, 115 Wn.2d 708, 728, 801 P.2d 948 (1990); State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 425, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1020 (1986). Under this test, constitutional error requires reversal unless the reviewing court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have reached the same result in absence of the error. Whelchel, at 728; Guloy, at 425. Nonconstitutional error requires reversal only if, within reasonable probabilities, it materially affected the outcome of the trial. State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 127, 857 P.2d 270 (1993); State v. Tharp, 96 Wn.2d 591, 599, 637 P.2d 961 (1981). We have identified no error, harmless or prejudicial, resulting from the trial court's rulings regarding joinder, the admission of expert testimony, or the admission of evidence of other assaults. More troublesome are the deputy prosecutor's references to a cat killing during Matt McCaulley's cross examination and to Russell's future dangerousness during closing argument. Given the scope of this trial, however, we do not find that the comments had a material effect on its outcome, nor do we believe that a different result would have been reached in their absence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and uphold the Defendant's convictions in this case. BRACHTENBACH, DOLLIVER, DURHAM, and GUY, JJ., concur. ANDERSEN, C.J. (dissenting) I dissent solely on the issue of the admissibility of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) polymerase chain reaction (PCR) evidence; such evidence should not have been admitted. My reasons follow. While I recognize that reasonable minds can differ on this very complex issue, I am convinced by the record before us and the available scientific literature on the subject that PCR evidence is not yet generally accepted for use in the forensic setting by the relevant sciences. The most important scientific publication on the subject of the forensic use of DNA evidence to date is an exhaustive 185-page report issued by the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences (hereinafter NRC). [17] As this court recently explained in State v. Cauthron, 120 Wn.2d 879, 885, 846 P.2d 502 (1993), a committee of eminent scientists and jurists exhaustively researched and analyzed the current status of forensic DNA typing in the preparation for the NRC report. Because some of the most prestigious scientists in the nation indicated in that report that there is still significant controversy among the relevant scientists, I am unable to conclude that PCR evidence is admissible in Washington. This court has recently discussed in detail the proper test and standard of review to be used when determining whether novel scientific evidence is admissible. In State v. Cauthron, 120 Wn.2d 879, 886, 846 P.2d 502 (1993), we renewed our longstanding adherence to the standard in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 34 A.L.R. 145 (D.C. Cir.1923): [E]vidence deriving from a scientific theory or principle is admissible only if that theory or principle has achieved general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. (Italics mine.) Cauthron, 120 Wn.2d at 886. We review the trial court's decision to admit novel scientific evidence de novo and if there is a significant dispute between qualified experts as to the validity of scientific evidence, it should not be admitted. [18] We look to the record before us, the legal and scientific literature and any relevant case law. [19] The testimony of the scientists in the Frye hearing in this case and the report from the scientists involved in the NRC study show that there is still a significant dispute among knowledgeable scientists about PCR testing of crime scene evidence. It is also relevant to note that no appellate court in a jurisdiction which uses the Frye rule has yet allowed the admission of PCR evidence in a criminal case. While I have little doubt that some form of DNA PCR testing will ultimately become admissible, and perhaps even some day replace the current RFLP [20] method, I do not believe we have yet reached that point in time. I recognize that total unanimity is not necessary to satisfy the Frye test, but while there is still significant debate, novel scientific evidence is not admissible in Washington. The majority opinion formally recognizes that Washington uses the Frye standard to determine the admissibility of evidence based on novel scientific procedures, but then the majority fails to adhere to that standard. I agree with the majority to the extent that the underlying scientific theory of DNA typing is accepted in the scientific community. [21] But in order to meet the Frye test, both an accepted theory and a valid technique to implement that theory must be shown to be generally accepted in the scientific community. Cauthron, 120 Wn.2d at 889. [22] The technique to implement the theory at issue here is the polymerase chain reaction test used in this case to detect variation at the HLA DQ alpha locus. I agree with the majority that PCR testing is accepted, and widely used, in medical research and diagnostic laboratories. However, I disagree that the fact that PCR is generally accepted by the scientists for use in the medical arena means that it also is generally accepted for use in the forensic setting. Because of problems of contaminated specimens, mixed samples, or crime scene samples so small as to prohibit corroborative testing, this is a very different inquiry in the medical and the forensic setting. The heart of the controversy surrounding PCR technology involves the transfer of the technology from the medical and the research applications to use on potentially degraded minute samples of crime scene evidence. [23] The NRC's report explains the difference as follows: To understand the challenges involved in such technology transfer, it is instructive to compare forensic DNA typing with DNA diagnostics. DNA diagnostics usually involves clean tissue samples from known sources. It can usually be repeated to resolve ambiguities. It involves comparison of discrete alternatives (e.g., which of two alleles did a child inherit from a parent?) and thus includes built-in consistency checks against artifacts. It requires no knowledge of the distribution of patterns in the general population. Forensic DNA typing often involves samples that are degraded, contaminated, or from multiple unknown sources. It sometimes cannot be repeated, because there is too little sample. It often involves matching of samples from a wide range of alternatives present in the population and thus lacks built-in consistency checks. DNA Technology, at 52. [24] As the majority notes, in a Frye analysis the opinions may come from all the scientists knowledgeable about DNA techniques. However, because of the nature of the amplification process in PCR testing, those opinions should be about the use of the technology on crime scene evidence. I wish to be clear that I am not saying that forensics is the relevant scientific community; I am simply saying that while PCR testing is generally accepted for use in the research and diagnostic setting, it is not generally accepted for use on contaminated and mixed specimens obtained from crime scenes. I, therefore, believe that the correct inquiry before us is whether the PCR method of determining identity when used in the forensic setting on crime scene evidence enjoys general acceptance in the relevant scientific communities of molecular biology and genetics. The scientific literature, the testimony of the scientists from the Frye hearing in this case and existing case law demonstrate that it does not. Rather, these sources point to the existence of a significant dispute on this issue.