Opinion ID: 2982938
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unreasonable Determinations of Fact

Text: First, Sutton contends that the state court misconstrued lead trial counsel’s postconviction testimony that he interviewed dozens of witnesses, overlooking the admission that he limited his investigation to positive character witnesses. But the portion of counsel’s testimony cited by Sutton admits no such thing. Rather, it states: [F]or the family review, we were able to secure the free services of a . . . College senior . . . . And she worked under the tutelage of Dr. Engum and myself to interview prospective character witnesses and things of that nature, the family profile. Counsel then provided examples of witnesses who spoke of Sutton’s good deeds—hardly an admission that the defense team never investigated Sutton’s background. Dr. Engum’s sentencing testimony about Sutton’s broken home and abuse—limited though it was—proves otherwise.1 And so does Dr. Auble’s testimony; as the TCCA noted, Dr. Auble “acknowledged that Dr. Engum had interviewed various family members” and that Dr. Engum’s notes 1 At sentencing, Dr. Engum characterized Sutton’s childhood as being: [e]ssentially, a fairly deplorable family background. I guess the most significant aspect of his family background is a father who was basically a chronic alcoholic. This kind of set the stage for Gary himself to become an alcohol abuser by age twelve. Mother and father were divorced fairly early. There were indications, from interviewing both Mr. Sutton as well as other family members, that there was a lot of—I don’t want to use the word competition, but a lot of attempts to bribe Gary by one parent or the other to try to cause Gary to live with either the father or the mother. Gary was subjected to a lot of mind games, a lot of head games. There’s also indications in the record of quite a bit of physical and mental abuse, and a certain sense that—it was at least felt by some family members that Gary was one of the least favored of all the children. - 16 - Case No. 11-6180, Sutton v. Carpenter “indicated that he was aware that family members, including Dellinger, had exposed [Sutton] to alcohol and prostitutes and that the petitioner’s father had once locked him out of the house and made him stay in a dog house.” Sutton, 2006 WL 1472542, at . This evidence sustains the TCCA’s finding that “counsel relied on information provided by their expert psychologist together with the information counsel gained from personally interviewing dozens of witnesses in deciding which information to present to the jury.” See Sutton, 2006 WL 1472542, at . Resisting this conclusion, Sutton argues that we can infer counsel’s ignorance of Sutton’s abusive childhood from his failure to request a jury instruction concerning abuse and a stray remark about Sutton’s parents “vying” for his attention during counsel’s argument to the jury. Such speculation, however, does not overcome the state court’s presumptively correct (and substantiated) factual conclusion that the defense team knew of and presented evidence of Sutton’s deplorable childhood. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Next, Sutton takes issue with the TCCA’s statement summarizing witness testimony that he “lived in a filthy house where he was verbally and physically mistreated by an unstable stepmother for one to two years,” Sutton, 2006 WL 1472542, at , when, in fact, he lived with the woman from the age of six into his teenage years. The TCCA attributed this fact to the testimony of Sutton’s brother, id. at , but we cannot confirm it in the record on appeal. Regardless, this slight misstatement of fact did not affect the state court’s decision; the court detailed his stepmother’s abuse and Dellinger’s corrupting influence, reflecting its understanding of the evidence Sutton claimed counsel should have presented. See id. - 17 - Case No. 11-6180, Sutton v. Carpenter In sum, Sutton has not shown that the TCCA’s decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).