Opinion ID: 6986505
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Consumer-Expectation Jury Instruction

Text: Plaintiff claims error in the trial court’s holding that, because “an ordinary consumer ... would not know the technical considerations that influences the design of the airbag system in [plaintiffs] Volvo,” the court need not give a consumer-expectation test instruction. In addition, in a post-trial order, the court stated that it “determined that airbags in passenger vehicles are not a subject to which consumers could have reasonable expectations.” Ohio law provides product-liability plaintiffs with two theories of proving product-liability: 1) the consumer-expectation standard and 2) the risk-benefit standard. See Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 83 Ohio St.3d 507, 700 N.E.2d 1247, 1248 (Ohio 1998) (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 37 Ohio St.3d 1, 523 N.E.2d 489, 495 (Ohio 1988)). The Ohio legislature codified these approaches in Ohio Rev Code § 2307.75(A), which provides in pertinent part: (A) ... a product is defective in design or formulation if either of the following applies: (1) When it left the control of its manufacturer, the foreseeable risks associated with its design or formulation as determined pursuant to division (B) of this section exceeded the benefits associated with that design or formulation as determined pursuant to division (C) of this section; (2) It is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. With respect to products subject to the two tests, the Ohio Supreme Court has stressed that these standards are not mutually exclusive, but instead constitute a single, two-pronged test for determining whether a product is defectively designed.... [A] product may be found defective in design even if it satisfies ordinary consumer expectations if the jury determines that the product’s design embodies excessive preventable danger. In other words, if the jury concludes that one standard is not met, the jury may consider the other standard. Perkins, 700 N.E.2d at 1248 (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Although there is discretion in applying these standards, the court noted that the legislature codified an approach that allows the jury to consider both standards based upon the plaintiffs theory of the case. Cf. Perkins, 700 N.E.2d at 1248. Plaintiffs choice to proceed under the two distinct tests can be viewed as broadening the scope of product defects actionable under Ohio’s products liability laws. Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that “‘[t]he very existence of a risk/benefit analysis in the Ohio cause of action for design defect helps those plaintiffs who would otherwise lose in a consumer expectation case.’ ” Perkins, 700 N.E.2d at 1248 (alterations in original) (quoting O’Reilly & Cody, Ohio PRODUCTS Liability Manual Section 6.08, 70-71 (1992)). In addition, we have previously found that the risk-benefit and consumer-expectation tests are not fungible; thus, a finding under one test does not imply a similar finding under the other test. See Jordan v. Paccar, Inc., 37 F.3d 1181, 1184 n. 2 (6th Cir.1994) (applying Ohio law and rejecting contention that a jury finding for defendant under the risk-benefit test implies that jury would have also found for defendant under consumer-benefit test). Regarding the substance of the consumer-expectation test, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that the test examines “what would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.” 5 Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St.2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568, 570-71 (Ohio 1981). Under the consumer-expectation test, a product may be proven to be in a defective condition if: (1) it is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, (2) the claimed defect was present when the product left the manufacturer; and (3) the claimed defect proximately caused the claimed injuries. Id. at 494. In sum, as applied to manufacturing defect cases, “evidence of unsafe, unexpected product performance is sufficient to infer the existence of a product defect” under the first prong of the consumer-expectation standard. State Farm Fire & Cas., 523 N.E.2d at 494-95 (Ohio 1988); see also Clay v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663, 671 (6th Cir.2000) (citing same and applying consumer-expectation test to plaintiffs claim of product defect in sport-utility vehicle roll-over accident). The court, however, has also stated that “[a]nother way of phrasing [the consumer-expectation test] is that a product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.” Leichtamer, 424 N.E.2d at 576 (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, “the determination of whether a product is more dangerous than an ordinary person would expect is generally a question of fact which does not require expert testimony.” See Fisher v. Ford Motor Co., 13 F.Supp.2d 631, 638 n. 10 (N.D.Ohio 1998) (citing Porter v. Gibson Greetings, Inc., No. 16575, 1997 WL 761851, at  (Ohio Ct.App.1997); Welch Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. O & K Trojan, Inc., 107 Ohio App.3d 218, 668 N.E.2d 529, 533-34 (Ohio Ct.App. 1995)). The trial court erred in holding that “an ordinary consumer ... would not know the technical considerations that influence the design of the airbag system in [plaintiffs] Volvo.” The consumer-expectation test focuses on the expectation of performance, not the technical considerations of the product. This court, following Ohio law, has found that the consumer need not be able to contemplate the technical considerations of the product’s design to find the product defective under the consumer-expectation test. In Sours v. General Motors Corp., we rejected the defendant’s argument that the Ohio consumer-expectation test was inapplicable to a vehicle because of a lack of consumer expectation with respect to a one-vehicle, roll-over accident in which plaintiff alleged a defect in the roof design. See 717 F.2d 1511, 1515-16 (6th Cir.1983). The Sours court found that the trial court properly instructed the jury on the consumer-expectation test and held that the risk-benefit test did not “eclipse the consumer-expectation standard; rather it was intended to serve as a refinement of that general principle in those situations where expectations were likely to be distorted.” Id. at 1515; see also Colboch v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 108 Ohio App.3d 448, 670 N.E.2d 1366, 1371 (Ohio Ct.App.1996) (applying consumer-expectation test to explosion of vehicle tire and stating that test focuses on “whether the hazard is unexpected”). In Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., the Ohio Supreme Court applied the consumer-expectation test to the plaintiffs claim that a roll bar of a jeep was defective when it failed during a pitch-over accident on off-road terrain. See 424 N.E.2d at 576. The court reasoned that a consumer, expecting to use the vehicle on off-road terrain as advertised by the defendant, could establish an expectation in the product’s performance. See id. The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that the consumer-expectation test may fail to reach product defects when the consumer “is ignorant of the product and has no expectation of its safety, or where a new product is involved and no expectation of safety has developed.” Knitz v. Minster Machine Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio 1982); see also Pruitt v. General Motors Corp., 74 Ohio App.3d 520, 599 N.E.2d 723, 726 (Ohio Ct.App.1991) (finding that the defect must be within the realm of the common consumer understanding in applying consumer-expectation test). The Knitz court, however, clarified this observation, noting that such instances arise when “the injured party is an innocent bystander who is ignorant of the product” or when new users have developed no expectation of product performance. See id. at 818. Neither situation is present in this case. Moreover, the Knitz court did not deem the consumer-expectation test inapplicable in cases where the injured is ignorant, but instead noted that the test would not produce a defect because the plaintiff would not have any performance expectation. See id.; see also Pruitt, 599 N.E.2d at 726 (applying consumer-expectation test but finding that consumer could not expect a product performance which contemplated plaintiffs specific use of the product). Following our reasoning in Sours and Jordan, and Ohio’s reasoning in Leichtamer and Colboch, a consumer need only have an expectation in the normal operation and safety with respect to their airbag system operation to satisfy the consumer-expectation test. Accordingly, Ohio’s consumer-expectation test has been applied to the roll-over stability of a sport utility vehicle, see Clay, 215 F.3d at 671, a vehicle’s roof design, see Sours, 717 F.2d at 1515-16, a vehicle’s roll-over bar, see Leichtamer, 424 N.E.2d at 576, and to a vehicle’s airbag system, see Fisher, 13 F.Supp.2d at 638-39. Under Ohio law, we find the trial court’s findings with respect to the consumer’s knowledge of the technical details of the airbag system are misplaced. Cf. Fisher, 13 F.Supp.2d at 638-39; State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 523 N.E.2d at 495. Finally, we are unpersuaded by defendants’ citation to other jurisdiction’s cases in which courts have rejected the consumer-expectation test as inapplicable to complicated non-consumer devices, such as vehicular airbags. 6 Under Ohio law, the issue is not whether the consumer can determine the reasonable expectations for the technical operation of the product, but the consumer’s reasonable ability to expect the performance of the product. See Sours, 717 F.2d at 1515-16; Leichtamer, 424 N.E.2d at 576; Colboch, 670 N.E.2d at 1371. In addition, this court’s opinion in Jordan v. Paccar, Inc. fails to support defendants’ position regarding the applicability of the consumer-expectation test. In Jordan, this court found that it was not error for the district court to refuse to instruct the jury on the consumer-expectation test because the claim was subsumed by the risk-benefit instruction. See 37 F.3d at 1184. The Jordan court found that, under the facts of that particular case, the plaintiff had no consumer expectation of surviving the tragic injury at issue. See id. In the present case, plaintiffs theory is that normal expectations for unbelted passenger safety in a low-speed collision was not met by defendants’ product; thus, the facts in the present case are distinguishable from those in Jordan. Following the applicable precedent and Ohio law of consumer-expectation, § 2307.75(A), the district court abused its discretion in refusing to instruct on the consumer-expectation test where evidence of unexpected performance was presented at trial. The consumer-expectation test is one of two distinct tests for product defect, in which evidence of unexpected performance is sufficient to infer product defect. Because the court abused its discretion in failing to give the requested jury instruction, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment denying the consumer-expectation instruction and REMAND for a new trial.