Opinion ID: 1604196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the state intentionally struck african-americans and women from the jury in this case in violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the united states constitution and state law.

Text: The jury selected to hear this case consisted of nine whites and three blacks. Seven of the jurors were females. Of the eight peremptory challenges used by the prosecution, seven were used to strike blacks, and six of the eight challenges were used to strike women from the jury (five of the six were black females). Chase used all twelve of his challenges against whites, eight of whom were also women. Chase is a black male and the victim in the case was a white male. Chase challenges the prosecution's peremptory challenges under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In each case where a black juror was peremptorily challenged, the prosecution was required by the court to provide a non-racial reason for exercising the challenge. The court accepted the reasons given and allowed the challenges. No objection was raised by Chase to the challenges based on gender and as a consequence that claim is procedurally barred. Batson sets forth a three-part test for a defendant to make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in jury selection. The defendant must show: 1) that he is a member of a cognizable racial group; 2) that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race; 3) that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. 476 U.S. at 96. This Court gives great deference to the trial court's findings of fact on this issue. Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 672 (Miss. 1991) (citing Bradley v. State, 562 So.2d 1276, 1283 (Miss. 1990)). As long as the trial court was within its authority when it determined that the State articulated a `neutral, non-race based explanation,' we will not reverse. Willie, 585 So.2d at 672 (quoting Chisolm v. State, 529 So.2d 635, 639 (Miss. 1988)). While Chase contends that all the challenges against blacks were improper, he focuses on two challenges, those of Linda Johnson and Larry Jones.
The reason given by the prosecutor for exercising a challenge: Well, she said she needed to go to the doctor today. She said she's in a brace  She said she had physical problems, asthma. She might could make it, but, obviously she said she needs to go to the doctor. [BY THE COURT: Yes, she said she needed to go to a bone and joint doctor today. She's got high blood. Well, all right... .] During the voir dire the prospective jurors were asked if they were on medication. Linda Johnson told the trial judge: Yes, I have asthma, sinus and congestion, and I have to take, I have to go to the hospital and have breathing tests ... I need to go to the doctor right now. When asked by the judge if she were required to be in court for several days if she thought that it would hurt her health, Linda Johnson said, No, unless you got a lot of cologne and perfume and stuff. That really hurts me. The judge noted that she had an appointment at the Jackson Bone & Joint Clinic and seemed very concerned about not being able to make that appointment. Chase contends that the prosecutor's reason for striking Linda Johnson is suspect because the prosecutor did not also peremptorily strike a prospective white juror, James Walters, with medical problems. Walters stated on voir dire: I'm James Walters, Your Honor, and I take medication twice a day... . I could send for it. My wife is home but she doesn't drive. James Walters was accepted as a juror by the prosecution and then struck peremptorily by Chase. Linda Johnson's health was of immediate concern to her and could have influenced her ability to function as a juror. She had an appointment with a bone and joint doctor the day of the voir dire and apparently was wearing a brace. Her medical problem had not been resolved to her satisfaction. The white juror, on the other hand, stated only that he was on medication and did not express the same concern or preoccupation that Ms. Johnson did.
The prosecutor explained the strike of Larry Jones as follows: On voir dire when asked were there any additional questions he stood up and asked would it be the first death sentence ever in the State of Mississippi. I'm not exactly sure what that means, and I would use a peremptory challenge. Larry Jones, on voir dire, asked the defense, If he was found guilty of capital murder, wouldn't that be the first death sentence in Mississippi? When told no, Larry Jones said, There's been another one? In each instance the trial judge accepted the explanation given by the prosecution in exercising its challenge. In neither case did the defense offer rebuttal. In Davis v. State, 551 So.2d 165, 172 (Miss. 1989), this Court held that the defense may rebut the neutral nonracial explanation for peremptory challenges. The Court went on to say: In the absence of an actual proffer of evidence concerning this issue, this Court may not reverse on this point. See Jones v. State, 306 So.2d 57, 58 (Miss. 1975); Pennington v. State, 437 So.2d 37, 39 (Miss. 1983). While this Court intends to be sensitive to the possibility that reasons may actually be for racially discriminatory purposes, it is incumbent upon Davis to come forward with proof when given the opportunity for rebuttal. Id. The statement of Mr. Jones might indicate that he was uninformed and probably would not make a good juror. The use of the peremptory challenge against him is difficult to comprehend based on only a reading of the transcript. This Court does not have the advantage of observing the prospective juror. The trial judge with the opportunity to observe the prospective juror accepted the explanation by the State, and this Court will give deference to his finding. In addition to finding each explanation adequate, the trial judge further stated: This district does not have a history, nor does the State's attorneys in this district, have a history of excluding blacks from the jury. I cannot remember a jury in the last ten years that was not represented by members of the black race as well as members of the white race. The trial court's findings were neither clearly erroneous nor against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The record does not support Chase's Batson claim of purposeful racial discrimination in jury selection. On the question of gender-based discrimination, Chase argues that no genderneutral explanations were offered for peremptory challenges against women. However, no objection was raised by the defense and no such explanation was requested. Chase concedes that the holding in Batson has not been applied to gender discrimination. The bigger problem is that Chase did not raise this issue at trial and allow the prosecutor an opportunity to respond or give the trial judge an opportunity to make a ruling or finding of fact. This failure alone insures that this issue cannot be the basis of reversal. Chase's claim of gender-based discrimination in jury selection is procedurally barred on appeal by our rule requiring contemporaneous objection as a prerequisite to preservation of the issue on appeal. Alternatively considering this assignment on its merits, Chase also does not make a case for purposeful exclusion of women. The reasons given by the prosecutor for exercising the peremptory challenges on five of the women were not only race neutral, they were also gender neutral. Chase also used seven of his peremptory challenges, more than the prosecution, to exclude women from the jury. Despite the exclusion of women by both sides, the jury panel ultimately consisted of a majority of women. Chase's assignment fails not only for failure to preserve the issue, but also for failure of any supporting proof. In addition to the other considerations, it should also be pointed out that the prosecutor only used a total of eight peremptory challenges. This considerably weakens any argument by Chase. If the prosecutor were intent on purposeful discrimination based on either race or gender, then the additional challenges could have been used to exclude blacks or women who ultimately served on the jury. This assignment of error is without merit and procedurally barred, in part.