Opinion ID: 1348933
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Black and Terry: Conspiracy Variance

Text: Black and Terry first complain that there was a fatal variance between the conspiracy charged in the indictment and the conspiracy proved at trial. [4] A fatal variance exists when the facts proved at trial differ from those alleged in the indictment. United States v. Dean, 574 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Longstreet, 567 F.3d 911, 918 (7th Cir.2009)). To prove a conspiracy variance claim, a defendant must establish that the evidence at trial did not support the jury's finding that he joined the charged conspiracy and that this caused him prejudice. Id. A conspiracy variance claim is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, see United States v. Avila, 557 F.3d 809, 815 (7th Cir.2009), which is reviewed under a highly deferential standard, United States v. Womack, 496 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2007). Viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the government, we consider whether the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's verdict. See Dean, 574 F.3d 836, 842. We will `overturn a conviction only if the record contains no evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found the defendant guilty.' Id. (quoting Longstreet, 567 F.3d at 918). As we have often observed, a defendant faces a nearly insurmountable hurdle when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 574 F.3d 384, 390 (7th Cir.2009) (quotation omitted). Neither Black nor Terry raised a conspiracy variance claim in the district court, so their burden is even heavier; we review for plain error only. [5] See Womack, 496 F.3d at 794. We find plain error if an error occurred, the error was plain, and the error affected the defendant's substantial rights. Id. Thus, our task is to determine whether the record contains evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found Black and Terry guilty of the conspiracies charged in the indictment. To prove a drug or Hobbs Act conspiracy, the government must establish that two or more persons agreed to commit an unlawful act, and that the defendant knowingly and intentionally joined in the agreement. Avila, 557 F.3d at 814. Two or more persons conspired together if they embraced a common criminal objective, even if they did not know each other or participate in every aspect of the crime. Id. (quotation omitted); see also Longstreet, 567 F.3d at 919. The government may prove an agreement among coconspirators by circumstantial evidence. Avila, 557 F.3d at 816. However, two persons have not conspired together when each of the conspirators' agreements has its own end, and each constitutes an end in itself. Id. at 814 (quotation omitted). This often comes up in a hub-and-spoke conspiracy, where the core conspirator is connected to each of the coconspirators by a spoke. Id. To prove a single conspiracy in the hub-and-spoke context, the government must establish that a rim connects the spokes together; otherwise the conspiracy is not one but many. United States v. Bustamante, 493 F.3d 879, 885 (7th Cir. 2007). This `rim' is an agreement to further a single design or purpose. Avila, 557 F.3d at 814. For a single conspiracy to exist, the conspirators who form the wheel's spokes must have been aware of each other and must do something in furtherance of some single, illegal enterprise. Bustamante, 493 F.3d at 885 (quotation omitted). Black and Terry contend that the government's evidence established a rimless hub-and-spoke conspiracy. Black claims that he was involved in only four ripoffs or attempted ripoffs. Terry asserts that the evidence proved that he was involved in just the Townsend ripoff. They claim that the government presented no evidence that they were aware of any other criminal activities involving the other alleged coconspirators or that they intended to further the wide conspiracy charged in the indictment. We, however, find no variance with respect to the proof against either Black or Terry. As for Black, the evidence established that he was aware that others were assisting him and Jones in the ripoffs and attempted ripoffs. The evidence was that Black agreed with Jones and Erik Johnson to participate in three ripoffs of drug dealers. Jones would relay information to Black and Johnson about the drug courierwhat type and color vehicle he would be driving, his gender and ethnicity, and where he would be driving. Jones's information usually panned out. It would be reasonable for a jury to infer that Black must have known that Jones was getting what proved to be very accurate inside information from someone who was also involved in the ripoff. And once Black and Johnson agreed to participate in the first attempted ripoff, Jones called someone in their presence. This evidence supports a reasonable inference that the person Jones called was involved in the ripoff and that Black was aware of that person's involvement. Furthermore, after the first successful ripoff, Jones didn't pay Black and Johnson immediately, but instead told them that he'd be in touch regarding payment. This reasonably suggests that Jones had to have another conspirator sell the drugs to get the cash to pay Black and Johnson. The wiretap evidence also supports the finding that Black was aware that Jones was working with other conspirators in setting up the ripoffs. In a November 13 call, after Black had agreed to participate in yet another ripoff, Jones instructed him to stay around for a minute, I got to make a call real quick, and then called Black back and advised, we waiting for him to call back. These statements made directly to Black convey that Jones wasn't working alone in setting up the ripoff. The recorded conversations also support a finding that Terry was aware that Jones was working with other bad cops. Take, for example, the recorded conversations shortly after Jerry Montgomery's arrest on September 8, 2004. That night, Jones called Terry and told him that one of my homies just called me... [who] [u]sed to work with me on my team and reported that your [Terry's] buddy, Jerry just got popped off [arrested] and he [Jerry] flew my name. Jones explained to Terry that Jerry had called Jones, and Jones advised Jerry, you got some ... green cause he can ... he will go away with some of that for sure, meaning that Jerry could bribe Jones's associate to release him. Terry's response demonstrated that he understood what Jones meant: Terry asked him: [Y]ou guys ... they can't cut him loose or nothing can they? The next day, Jones and Terry were discussing Jerry's situation when Jones told Terry that Jerry once had taunted him with a bag of money and that Jones responded by telling Jerry that he was lucky Jones knew him because he can call some cars right now ... [b]e like, whoop, whoop ... [a]nd grab your ass and follow you. This statement reflected Jones's ability to have other officers pull someone over. In addition, on October 27, 2004, shortly after Jerry got out of jail, he was pulled over. Jones called Terry to inform him that one of Jones's buddies called Jones to report that they had pulled Jerry over and Jerry was talking again. Jones assured Terry that his buddies were just going to fwith [Jerry] for a minute. The next day, Jones told Terry that [y]our man [Jerry] was talking a little bit and brought up Jones's name and also mentioned BTerry's nicknamein the sense that Jerry was pointing a finger at B. Jones assured Terry that he was going to meet his buddy and he'd find out what Jerry had said. Thus, the wiretap evidence permitted a reasonable jury to find that Terry knew that other bad cops were assisting Jones in his criminal activities. Moreover, the evidence clearly established that Terry was aware of coconspirator Flagg. Both Terry and Flagg participated with Jones in the Townsend ripoff. Once Flagg arrived on the scene with Jones and ripped off Townsend, Terry knew that Flagg was in on Jones's criminal activities. And a few days after the ripoff, Terry asked Jones about the split between him and his buddy, meaning Flagg. The evidence also supported a finding that Terry participated in the conspiracy both before and after the Townsend ripoff. For one, telephone records for July 21, the day Jones, Black, and others attempted to rip off drug couriers near Ashland and 85th Street, show six calls between Jones and Terry. A few of these were made within two minutes of calls between Jones's cell phone and a cell phone registered to or used by other members of the conspiracy: Corey Flagg and Erik Johnson. In addition, on September 14, Jones told James Walker in a recorded conversation that B was coming over to his house that night and he was supposed to have something. Jones added that when he come ... it's serious business. Given the evidence, a reasonable jury could infer that the something that Terry would have would be another opportunity to rip off a drug dealer. Moreover, in an October 7, 2004, conversation, Jones was praising Terry's performance and said, yeah, you good.... I'm thinking like damn, that man got a demo. (Jones testified that demo meant criminal activity.) And Terry asked him, Which, which one you talking about? Terry's question implies there were several demos and thus supports the inference that Terry participated in more than one ripoff. Then, on November 13, 2004, Jones called Terry and Terry said, I thought you wanted to link up.... [Y]ou had said you wanted to holler at me this week for something. Jones responded, Oh, yeah ... I just tried to do something but it didn't go through. The jury could reasonably find that this referred to the plan to rip off the Mexican drug dealer. Jones added that he hoped it would go through tomorrow when he got to work. Terry responded, you let me know, which a jury could reasonably infer indicated his continued interest in participating in Jones's schemes. And even later, on November 23, 2004, Jones and Terry were recorded discussing plans for another ripoff. In arguing that the wiretap evidence does not prove that he participated in a conspiracy larger than the single ripoff of Townsend, Terry selectively identifies a September 22 phone call between Jones and Joel Montgomery in which Joel tells Jones how to contact the old girl. Jones says that he will tell B to contact her and then Jones and Joel agree not to tell B that Joel was the source for the old girl's phone number. Terry also points to a call between himself and Jones in which Terry asks Jones if he told Joel about Terry. Jones says he said Terry wanted Townsend's phone numbers, but claimed not to know why Terry wanted them. While Terry submits that these calls show that Jones was keeping him in the dark about the extent of his criminal activities, the jury was in the best position to weigh this evidence against the other evidence that reasonably suggests that Terry's involvement ran deeper than he claims. The government's evidence supports the finding that Terry, Black, Jones, Flagg, and other coconspirators were acting in furtherance of a single, illegal purpose. Terry set up drug dealers and couriers to be ripped off, and Jones, Black, and other corrupt cops performed the stops, invasions, and seizures of the drugs and money. This was not a rimless hub-and-spoke conspiracy. Terry asserts that there was no evidence that he had any direct communication with any coconspirator other than Jones. However, [c]oconspirators do not have to have contact with, or even know, all of the other conspirators. United States v. Frazier, 213 F.3d 409, 415 (7th Cir.2000). And coconspirators need not participate in every aspect of the scheme. Avila, 557 F.3d at 814. The evidence supported the finding that Terry was aware that others were assisting Jones in planning and conducting the ripoffs; Terry did not have to talk with them to gain that knowledge. To find for Black and Terry on their conspiracy variance claims, we would have to reweigh the evidence and second-guess the jury's credibility determinations. In the absence of truly exceptional circumstances, and they have not pointed to any, we cannot do so. See Dean, 574 F.3d 836, 842-43. Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found Black and Terry guilty of the conspiracies with which they were charged in the indictment. [6] Black and Terry also suggest that the district court erred in failing to give a multiple conspiracies instruction. Because neither of them requested a multiple conspiracies instruction they forfeited this challenge on appeal and our review is for plain error only. See Longstreet, 567 F.3d at 921. We find no errorplain or otherwisein the failure to give a multiple conspiracies instruction in this case. As discussed, the evidence was sufficient to establish Black's and Terry's participation in the overall conspiracy charged in the indictment.