Opinion ID: 2551571
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Is the K.S.A. 21-4638 Hard 40 Sentencing Scheme Unconstitutional?

Text: We next review Conley's contention that the K.S.A. 21-4638 hard 40 sentencing scheme is unconstitutional. Conley's constitutional claim was not presented to the district court. The State objects to consideration of the constitutional issue on appeal. Generally, [w]hen constitutional grounds are asserted for the first time on appeal, they are not properly before [this court] for review. State v. Shears, 260 Kan. 823, 837, 925 P.2d 1136 (1996). However, in Pierce v. Board of County Commissioners, 200 Kan. 74, 80-81, 434 P.2d 858 (1967), a constitutional issue case, we recognized three exceptions to the general rule: (1) The newly asserted claim involves only a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and is determinative of the case; (2) consideration of the claim is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent the denial of fundamental rights; and (3) the district court is right for the wrong reason. We hold that (1) and (2) above apply here and elect to address Conley's constitutional argument. We are influenced in this decision by the June 26, 2000, filing of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed.2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). Conley argues that Apprendi applies, resulting in an unconstitutional hard 40 sentencing procedure. We disagree. The significance of Apprendi on sentencing issues is a subject of current discussion in both state and federal courts. We begin our constitutional analysis by considering the relevant authorities predating Apprendi. Conley correctly asserts that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970). Conley claims that during his sentencing, the district court considered facts that were not elements of the crime. According to Conley, when such facts operate to enhance his sentence, the facts must be presented to the jury in order to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We have held that the standard of proof applicable to findings under K.S.A. 21-4635(c) (aggravating and mitigating circumstances) is the preponderance of the evidence. Facts `established for use in sentencing require less evidentiary weight than facts asserted for conviction.' [Citation omitted]. Spain, 263 Kan. at 713-14. Here, the district court sentenced Conley to life imprisonment. Under K.S.A. 22-3717(b)(1), a defendant guilty of first-degree premeditated murder is generally eligible for parole after serving 25 years. However, aggravating circumstances may warrant the imposition of a sentence of mandatory imprisonment of 40 years before a defendant is eligible for parole. K.S.A. 21-4635 and K.S.A. 21-4638. Conley contends that changing the possibility of parole from 25 years to 40 years impermissibly altered the length of his sentence. His contention is based on the fact that the question of whether certain aggravating factors existed was not presented to a jury and, thus, was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Conley recognizes that facts that do not increase a defendant's punishment beyond that authorized by the underlying statute need not be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88-89, 91 L. Ed.2d 67, 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986). What he fails to recognize is that McMillan resolves the hard 40 constitutional issue here in favor of the State. McMillan was sentenced under Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9712 (1982) (Act). The Act provided that a person convicted of certain enumerated felonies was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years' incarceration if the sentencing judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person `visibly possessed a firearm' during the commission of the offense. 477 U.S. at 81. The Act instructed the sentencing court to consider evidence introduced at trial, as well as additional evidence offered at sentencing. The sentencing court had the discretion to impose any sentence of less than 5 years for the underlying felony; however, it could not impose a sentence in excess of the length otherwise allowed for that offense. 477 U.S. at 81-82. The McMillan Court reasoned that visible possession was not an element of the crime. McMillan also noted that the Act, which comes into play only after the defendant has been convicted of an enumerated felony, neither provides for an increase in the maximum sentence for such felony nor authorizes a separate sentence; it merely requires a minimum sentence of five years, which may be more or less than the minimum sentence that might otherwise have been imposed. (Emphasis added.) 477 U.S. at 83. The McMillan Court concluded that the Act was constitutional; thus, McMillan's due process argument failed. 477 U.S. at 91. McMillan's 6th Amendment right to jury trial sentencing argument also failed. 477 U.S. at 93. Conley vaults over McMillan, arguing that Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 143 L. Ed.2d 311, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999), and Apprendi require that in a hard 40 case, aggravating facts leading to the sentence must be charged in the information, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. However, neither the reasoning in Jones nor in Apprendi leads to such a conclusion. We turn now to a review of these two cases. In Jones, Jones was charged with carjacking, under 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988 ed., Supp. V), which provided in pertinent part: Whoever, possessing a firearm ... takes a motor vehicle ... from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation ... shall (1) be ... imprisoned not more than 15 years ..., (2) if serious bodily injury ... results, be ... imprisoned not more than 25 years ..., and (3) if death results, be ... imprisoned for any number of years up to life.... Jones, 526 U.S. at 230. Jones' indictment did not reference the subsections and did not charge the facts mentioned in (2) or (3). At trial, the jury instructions defined the car jacking offense under subsection (1) of the statute. After Jones was found guilty, the court sentenced him to 25 years' (not 15 years) incarceration because one of the victims suffered serious bodily injury. The federal district court rejected Jones' objection that serious bodily injury was an element of the offense. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that subsection (2) merely set out a sentencing factor. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court found that subsections (2) and (3) provided for steeply higher penalties and were conditioned on further facts that seemed as important as the elements listed in the principal paragraph of the statute. 526 U.S. at 233. A review of other statutes led to the Supreme Court's conclusion that Congress had separate and aggravated offenses in mind when it employed the scheme of numbered subsections in § 2119. 526 U.S. at 235. Thus, the Court held, a judicial fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence raised serious constitutional questions. 526 U.S. at 251. Unlike the facts in Jones, the imposition of a hard 40 sentence here does not increase Conley's life sentence. Conley was convicted of murder in the first degree, an off-grid person felony. K.S.A. 21-3401. Conley's maximum sentence is imprisonment for life. K.S.A. 21-4706(c). Applying the hard 40 based on a fact not found by the jury does not increase the maximum penalty. Instead, it simply limits the lower end of the sentence, which is consistent with McMillan. As the Court found in McMillan, the judicial finding of aggravating factors of course `ups the ante' for a defendant,... but it does so only ... by raising the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court. 477 U.S. at 89. We next consider and distinguish Apprendi. Apprendi's reach does not extend to Conley's hard 40 sentence. Apprendi was convicted under a New Jersey statutory scheme that allowed a jury to convict a defendant of a second-degree offense based on a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully possessed a prohibited weapon. The statute then, after a later and separate proceeding, allowed a judge to impose punishment identical to that which New Jersey provides for crimes of the first degree. The judge's finding was based on a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's purpose for unlawfully possessing the weapon was to intimidate his victim on the basis of a particular characteristic, such as race. New Jersey argued that the required finding of purpose to intimidate was not an element of a distinct hate crime offense, but merely a traditional sentencing factor. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. 159 N.J. 7, 731 A.2d 1265 (1999). The United States Supreme Court, in Apprendi, a 5 to 4 decision, disagreed. Apprendi rejected the argument that the purpose to intimidate was merely a sentencing factor, which could be found by the judge; the Court held this was a proper subject for jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt under the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution. The majority, speaking through Justice Stevens, observed that the New Jersey statute mandated an examination of the defendant's state of mind. The statute, therefore, imposed, of its own force, an intent requirement necessary for the imposition of sentence. 147 L. Ed.2d at 456. Apprendi said: [T]he defendant's intent in committing a crime is perhaps as close as one might hope to come to a core criminal offense `element.' 147 L. Ed.2d at 457. We read Apprendi to hold that other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (Emphasis added.) 147 L. Ed.2d at 455. Apprendi's enhanced sentence was reversed because enhancement increased the penalty for the crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum. Apprendi noted, however, that it was permissible for a state to limit the sentencing court's discretion within the statutorily prescribed range, consistent with McMillan. 147 L. Ed.2d at 452-53. See also, two recent cases refusing to apply Apprendi to sentencing factors: U.S. v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir. 2000) (although drug quantity affected a sentence, the quantity was not required to have been charged in the indictment and proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt); U.S. v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 565 (7th Cir. 2000) (persons convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise set forth a sentencing factor, not an offense element, indictment did not have to charge fulfillment of criteria that would support enhancement). We find the following language of Apprendi instructive: The principal dissent accuses us of today `overruling McMillan.' [Citation omitted.] We do not overrule McMillan. We limit its holding to cases that do not involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury's verdicta limitation identified in the McMillan opinion itself. Conscious of the likelihood that legislative decisions may have been made in reliance on McMillan, we reserve for another day the question whether stare decisis considerations preclude reconsideration of its narrower holding. 147 L. Ed.2d 453, fn. 13. Conley invites us to follow the result reached by the Alaska Court of Appeals in Malloy v. State, 1 P.3d 1266 (Alaska App. 2000). We decline the invitation. Malloy was decided May 19, 2000. A motion for rehearing was granted June 16, 2000. Malloy's status awaits further clarification from Alaska's appellate courts.