Opinion ID: 1936097
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the circuit court erred in moving jackson's case from leflore to copiah county in violation of the equal protection clauses of the united states and mississippi constitutions

Text: After a jury was seated in Leflore County on August 26, 1991, Jackson's attorney sought a change of venue on grounds that pre-trial publicity surrounding the case might affect the fairness and impartiality of the jury. His motion, seeking transfer to a county with racial demographics similar to those in Leflore County, was granted and the proceedings were moved to Copiah County. He now complains that his equal protection rights were violated because Copiah County has a non-white population of fifty-one percent (51%), whereas the minority population in Leflore County is sixty-one percent (61%). The accused has a right to a change of venue when it is doubtful that an impartial jury can be obtained; such doubt is implicit when there is strong public sentiment against the defendant. Johnson v. State, 476 So.2d 1195, 1210-11 (Miss. 1985). In Simon v. State, 633 So.2d 407, 412 (Miss. 1993), however, we rejected an appellant's claim that he was entitled to a trial in a county with precisely the same racial demographics as that in which his trial was initially set, noting that he had failed to make a prima facie case that he was denied a trial by an impartial jury representing a fair cross-section of the community. Likewise, Jackson argues only that the demographics were not identical and has made no effort to establish a prima facie case that the jury did not represent a fair cross-section of the community from which it was selected. Lanier v. State, 533 So.2d 473, 477 (Miss. 1988) (to show prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, defendant must prove: exclusion of distinctive group; representation of this group neither fair nor reasonable in relation to community population; under-representation due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.). See also, Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130, 61 S.Ct. 164, 165, 85 L.Ed. 84, 86 (1940) ([a]lthough a defendant has no right to a jury of any particular racial composition, we have long held that the State cannot act so as to deprive a defendant of his right to a venire that is `truly representative of the community'). Jackson has not shown that he was deprived of a jury that was representative of the community. Indeed, the record does not even indicate the racial composition of the jury as seated. Accordingly, we find no merit to his argument.