Opinion ID: 1868000
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of Seizure Under Article I, Section 7

Text: Because this Court is the final arbiter of the Tennessee Constitution, and because this case presents an issue of first impression before this Court, we also choose to address the validity of the instant entry identification checkpoint under article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. This Court has twice previously analyzed the validity of roadblocks under our constitution. In State v. Downey, 945 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tenn.1997), the defendant was arrested after being stopped at a sobriety roadblock. In determining whether the stop was constitutional under article I, section 7, this Court adopted the balancing approach set forth in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), and utilized by the United States Supreme Court in Sitz for analyzing whether a sobriety checkpoint passed muster under the federal constitution. Downey, 945 S.W.2d at 110. That approach involves the weighing of three significant factors: the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51, 99 S.Ct. 2637. This balancing approach is to be applied with the understanding that the overriding question is whether the roadblock was established and operated in a constitutionally reasonable manner that minimized the intrusion on individuals and limited the discretion afforded to officers at the scene. Downey, 945 S.W.2d at 110. Applying the Brown/Sitz balancing approach to the roadblock at issue in Downey , we first recognized the State's compelling interest in detecting and deterring motorists who drive while under the influence of alcohol. Id. We further recognized that roadblocks are effective tools in advancing the State's interest in solving a serious public danger. Id. The particular sobriety roadblock at issue failed to pass muster under Tennessee's constitution, however, because it was not carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers, id., and did not sufficiently limit the discretion of the officers at the scene. Id. at 111. We revisited the issue of roadblocks in State v. Hicks, 55 S.W.3d 515, 519 (Tenn. 2001) (plurality opinion), which involved a roadblock ostensibly established to discover unlicensed drivers. In Hicks we reaffirm[ed] that the test adopted in Downey is to be applied in all cases involving constitutional challenges to roadblocks or checkpoints under the Tennessee Constitution. Id. at 524. Accordingly, we turn now to whether the instant checkpoint passes that test.
The first prong of the test examines the gravity of the public concerns served by the checkpoint. In Downey , we recognized the State's compelling interest in detecting and deterring inebriated drivers on the basis of overwhelming statistics indicating that more deaths and injuries have resulted from such motor vehicle accidents on our nation's highways than from all the wars this country has fought. 945 S.W.2d at 110 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 456, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (Blackmun, J., concurring)). Additionally, we noted the carnage and tragedy ... recorded daily in our newspapers and on our television screens, and the repeated efforts of our legislature to strengthen our laws against driving under the influence. Id. at 104. In the subsequent Hicks case, the State argued that the roadblock had been established to ensure highway safety by detecting and deterring unlicensed drivers. Id. at 525. Unlike the situation with drunk drivers, however, we did not have in Hicks the benefit of overwhelming statistics, daily media reports, and repeated legislative action establishing the connection between unlicensed motorists and highway safety. Nor did the record contain any evidence proving that drivers not possessing a license were a threat to highway safety. Id. at 527. Two members of this Court opined in Hicks that a driver's license roadblock would withstand scrutiny under the first prong of the Downey test only if the State showed that drivers not possessing a license are unable to safely operate motor vehicles on the roads and highways of this state; that an unlicensed driver invariably presents an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury to other drivers that is not typically present with licensed drivers; and that the safety threat from unlicensed drivers is of such a magnitude that the problem, coupled with its risk of harm, commands heightened attention. Id. at 527. In a concurring opinion, two other members of this Court concluded that the roadblock was unconstitutional per se because there is no basis upon which to reasonably conclude that a motorist who is not in possession of a valid drivers' license necessarily poses an immediate danger of death or serious bodily injury great enough to warrant the suspicionless stop of all drivers at a checkpoint. Id. at 540 (Anderson, C.J., concurring). Under both analyses, the Hicks roadblock failed to satisfy the first prong of the Downey test. Id. at 538-39, 541. Clearly, the State faces a significant challenge in demonstrating that its reason(s) for establishing a checkpoint are sufficiently compelling so as to justify suspicionless stops of our citizens. Id. at 525. In the instant case, the entry identification checkpoint was established, according to the State, to ensure residential safety by detecting and deterring unauthorized visitors. Although the trial court assumed arguendo the State's interest to be compelling, this Court will not presume the presence of a compelling state interest to justify further expanding the scope of permissive suspicionless seizures. Id. at 527. Rather, [b]ecause the exceptions to the warrant requirement `are jealously and carefully drawn,' the State must show that `the exigencies of the situation made the search [or seizure] imperative. ' Id. (quoting State v. Bartram, 925 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tenn.1996)) (initial emphasis added). As in Hicks , we have in this case no overwhelming statistics, daily media reports, or repeated legislative actions before us which establish a causal connection between unauthorized visitors to the Poss Homes community and risk or harm to its residents. Moreover, the State has offered us no proof that unauthorized visitors to Poss Homes necessarily threaten its residents' safety. As in Hicks , then, the State has failed in this case to demonstrate that its interest in establishing the instant checkpoint was sufficiently compelling to pass muster under the Tennessee Constitution. The instant checkpoint therefore necessarily fail[s] constitutional examination under article I, section 7. Id.
The instant checkpoint also fails to satisfy the second prong of the Downey test, which is met when one can fairly say that [it] contribute[s] in a meaningful way to achieving the sufficiently compelling state interest. Hicks, 55 S.W.3d at 531. Here, the State's asserted interest was to ensure the safety of the Poss Homes residents. The method employed to advance this interest was an entry identification checkpoint, ostensibly operated to keep out unauthorized visitors. There is no proof in the record, however, which establishes that checking the identification of those who sought entrance somehow decreased the level of crime being committed within Poss Homes. Moreover, there is no proof in the record that it was unauthorized visitors who were threatening the residents' safety. While Officer Brown testified that the Poss Homes community was plagued with criminal activity, neither he nor anyone else testified as to who, precisely, was responsible for this misconduct. We cannot simply assume that it was only unauthorized visitors who were just loitering around, littering, dropping off trash and so forth and committing other kind of crimes. It is possible that it was the residents of Poss Homes who were themselves engaging in illegal conduct. In short, there is no proof in the record that links the checkpoint to its purported aim. The checkpoint even fails insofar as it was established simply to deflect would-be trespassers. The State asserts in its brief to this Court that nothing stops trespassers or dissuades them from entering more effectively than approaching them and asking for identification. There is no proof in the record to support this assertion, however. The intermediate appellate court found that [t]he identification checkpoint is an efficient means of determining that persons entering the housing development are residents or visitors with a legitimate business or social reason for being there. We disagree. Certainly, if someone trying to enter the development produced either a Poss Homes identification badge or a driver's license indicating a Poss Homes residence, the checkpoint would be effective at establishing that the person had, at least at some point in time, been a resident there. [9] A driver's license with a non-Poss Homes address would be useless, however, at indicating whether the would-be visitoror brand new resident had a legitimate reason for being there. Furthermore, unless Officer Brown had either a list of current residents or had memorized their names, he would not be able to verify a visitor's assertedly legitimate connection with a resident simply upon being given a name and address. Officer Brown offered no proof that he either had such a list or knew all of the residents by name. The checkpoint also fails in practical effect because the location at which it was established was not the only point of ingress into the community. Consequently, a person refused admittance at the Washington Street entrance could simply leave and gain entry into the development via another route. This aspect of the checkpoint completely undercuts Officer Brown's ostensible function as a gatekeeper of the community. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the instant checkpoint did not contribute in a meaningful way to achieving the State's asserted interest and is therefore not constitutionally reasonable.
The checkpoint in this case also fails the third prong of the Downey test: that to be constitutionally reasonable, a roadblock must be established and operated in accordance with predetermined operational guidelines and supervisory authority that minimize the risk of arbitrary intrusion on individuals and limit the discretion of law enforcement officers at the scene. 945 S.W.2d at 104. We clarified in Hicks : the most important attribute of a reasonable roadblock is the presence of genuine limitations upon the discretion of the officers in the field. Two facts are critical to finding that the officers' discretion on the scene was properly limited: (1) the decision to set up the roadblock in the first instance cannot have been made by the officer or officers actually establishing the checkpoint, and (2) the officers on the scene cannot decide for themselves the procedures to be used in operating the roadblock. In all cases, therefore, the State must show that some authority superior to the officers in the field decided to establish the roadblock, particularly as to its time and location, and that the officers adhered to neutral standards previously fixed by administrative decision or regulation. To be clear, these factors are so essential to a reasonable roadblock that the absence of either of them will necessarily result in the invalidation of the stops. 55 S.W.3d at 533 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Later in the Hicks decision we stressed that active and careful supervision is critical to the constitutional reasonableness of any roadblock.... Id. at 536. In this case, it is unclear whose decision it was to set up the checkpoint in the first instance. Officer Brown indicated that the checkpoint was operated pursuant to a special mandate from the CHA and that the checkpoint plan was formulated by Chief Hazelwood. However, Officer Brown also indicated that the checkpoints were operated at random times, usually in the late afternoons. The trial court found that there was no evidence regarding who was responsible for deciding the precise location(s), frequency, and times of checkpoints. Even without definitive proof that it was Officer Brown who both decided to establish this particular checkpoint and then established it, the checkpoint fails constitutional muster because of the utter lack of supervision over his methodology in conducting the checkpoint. In this case, the only predetermined operational guideline in place regarding this checkpoint was that it could be operated only on streets owned by the CHA. As to its actual operation, Officer Brown testified: What I do, I'd wait till they got on the housing property. The first thing I would do is what I call a greeting, How are you doing. Good afternoon. Then after that I'd say, I'm Ralph Brown, criminal investigator for Chattanooga Housing Authority. Then I would tell them the reason why I stopped them, I'm checking IDs, see if you live here in this residenceI mean this housing development. After that I'd ask for a form of identification, a driving license, and after that point sometimes I'd ask for registration and insurance, and after that I would make a final decision on what I was going to do. (emphasis added). Officer Brown's own testimony indicates that he determined, in his discretion, what documentation he would request and then determined, in his discretion, what he would do about the particular visitor to the development. [10] This discretion was, so far as the record indicates, unfettered. Where the officers actually conducting the checkpoint [have] virtually complete discretion to decide for themselves the procedures to be used in its operation, id. at 535, the checkpoint fails to pass muster under our Constitution. Id. at 536. Finally, there are elements of subterfuge evident in the operation of this entry identification checkpoint. First, Officer Brown testified that, upon stopping a person seeking entrance into Poss Homes, he would check and see if they had an ID to live in that residence. [11] Also we would check their driving license. (emphasis added). If the checkpoint was being operated solely to establish a legitimate connection between the would-be entrant and the community, however, Officer Brown had no reason to also demand the person's driver's license if he or she had already produced a Poss Homes identification badge. Second, Officer Brown testified that, in addition to seeking multiple forms of identification from people trying to enter Poss Homes, he sometimes sought vehicle registration and proof of insurance documents. Because persons may legitimately drive vehicles belonging to others, however, a vehicle registration document is of questionable value in determining the identity of the driver. Proof of insurance is relevant to nothing other than determining compliance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated chapter twelve. See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 55-12-101-140. Those provisions have no logical connection to deflecting would-be trespassers from public housing developments. We disagree, therefore, with the intermediate court's conclusion that the checkpoint stops were aimed solely at ascertaining the person's connection to the neighborhood. If that were the case, Officer Brown would not have requested these latter documents, even sometimes. Since checking vehicle registration and proof of insurance have nothing to do with the State's claimed interest in the instant entry identification checkpoint, we may infer that Officer Brown was pursuing investigatory agendas that were wholly distinct and apart from the State's claimed interest. Hicks, 55 S.W.3d at 537. As we stated in Hicks , and reiterate here, [w]hen police officers are permitted, either through administrative design or supervisory neglect, to actively engage in suspicionless investigation of criminal activity wholly unrelated to the purposes of the roadblock, the constitutional protections afforded by [a]rticle I, section 7 are rendered utterly without effect or meaning. Id. at 538. Accordingly, a checkpoint designed or operated to further illegitimate law enforcement practices under the pretext of a lawful purpose is unreasonable under [a]rticle I, section 7, irrespective of other indicia of reasonableness. Id. at 536. Therefore, we hold that the instant checkpoint fails to pass constitutional muster for this reason, as well.