Opinion ID: 3158526
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Re-arraign

Text: Next, Daves claims the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to re-arraign him after the state amended the sexual assault charges prior to trial. 5 According to Daves, the court’s failure to re-arraign him deprived the court of personal jurisdiction.3 Citing Rios v. State, 733 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1987), the state district court rejected this argument. Under Rios, “[a] state obtains personal jurisdiction over an accused by his physical presence before the court without regard to the manner in which that presence was obtained.” Id. at 244. The federal district court agreed. Because Daves fails to demonstrate reasonable jurists would find this conclusion debatable or wrong, we deny a COA on this claim. IV. Use of the Word “Force” in the Jury Instructions The trial court’s instructions on the sexual assault charges asked the jury to decide, in part, whether Daves (1) “[i]nflicted sexual intrusion” on the victim “by forcing her to” perform oral sex and engage in sexual intercourse, and (2) “[c]aused submission of [the victim] by threatening to inflict death or serious bodily injury on anyone.” Attachment to Br., Doc. 2-3, at 142, 149, 151, 153. Daves argues these instructions improperly combined the elements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(i) (which applies when a defendant “causes submission of the victim through the actual application . . . of physical force”) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(ii) (which applies when a defendant “causes submission of the victim by threat of death, serious bodily injury, extreme physical pain or kidnapping to be inflicted on anyone”). 3 In his application for COA, Daves suggests trial counsel was ineffective in neglecting to object to the trial court’s failure to re-arraign him. Because Daves didn’t advance that argument before the federal district court, we decline to address it. See Viera, 674 F.3d at 1220. 6 According to Daves, this alleged hybridization violated his rights under the Due Process Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. The state district court4 rejected this argument, reasoning that both subsections of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a) require a defendant to cause the victim to submit, whether by physical force as contemplated by § 6-2-302(a)(i), or by constructive force as contemplated by § 6-2-302(a)(ii). Thus, the state district court concluded, the instructions’ reference to force accurately described the elements of § 6-2-302(a)(ii). We agree with the federal district court that Daves has not demonstrated this instruction “was so fundamentally unfair as to deny [him] due process.” Tiger, 445 F.3d at 1267. Thus, we deny a COA on this claim.