Opinion ID: 3036581
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The “Protective Principle” and “Universal

Text: Jurisdiction” Our circuit has recognized the “protective principle”15 as part of its consideration of whether nexus exists, not as a substitute for it. We first discussed the “protective principle” in Peterson, where we stated that drug trafficking may be prevented under the protective principle of jurisdiction, without any showing of 15 As recognized by the Second Circuit, under the “protective principle,” a state “has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct outside its territory that threatens its security as a state or the operation of its governmental functions, provided the conduct is generally recognized as a crime under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems.” United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1968) (quoting Restatement (Second), Foreign Relations § 33 (1965)). 2584 UNITED STATES v. PERLAZA an actual effect on the United States. Protective jurisdiction is proper if the activity threatens the security or governmental functions of the United States. Drug trafficking presents the sort of threat to our nation’s ability to function that merits application of the protective principle of jurisdiction. 812 F.2d at 493 (citations omitted). There are limitations, however, to Peterson’s discussion of the “protective principle.” First, the language in Peterson, quoted above, concerning the “protective principle” is dicta. It was “unnecessary to the decision of the case and . . . therefore not precedential,” Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1173, because, in that case, “there was more than a sufficient nexus with the United States to allow exercise of jurisdiction,” Peterson, 812 F.2d at 493. Second, the notion that Peterson’s “protective principle” can be applied to “prohibiting foreigners on foreign ships 500 miles offshore from possessing drugs that . . . might be bound for Canada, South America, or Zanzibar” — as suggested by the Government here — has been repeatedly called into question by our Court and others. United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988) (Breyer, J.) (questioning the reasonableness of a broad reading of the “protective principle” because such a broad reading would allow the United States to police any international conduct “against [any] important state interests”); see also, e.g., Davis, 905 F.2d at 248-49 & n.2; United States v. Suerte, No. CRIM. 00-0069, 2001 WL 1877264,  (S.D. Tex. June 6, 2001), vacated on other grounds, 291 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Juda, 797 F. Supp. 774, 777 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (“Juda I”), aff’d, 46 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Juda II”). For example, in Davis, we noted that “[i]nternational law principles,” such as the “protective principle,” may be useful as a rough guide of whether a suffi- cient nexus exists between the defendant and the UNITED STATES v. PERLAZA 2585 United States so that application of the statute in question would not violate due process. However, danger exists that emphasis on international law principles will cause us to lose sight of the ultimate question: would application of the statute to the defendant be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair? 902 F.2d at 249 n.2 (emphasis added) (citing Peterson, 812 F.2d at 493). Third, application of Peterson’s “protective principle” without a showing of nexus or statelessness would nullify 46 App. U.S.C. § 1903(c) and a wealth of our MDLEA opinions requiring nexus or statelessness for the United States to have jurisdiction over drug smugglers captured on the high seas. See, e.g., Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d at 827-28; Juda II, 46 F.3d at 965-66; Aikens, 923 F.2d at 655; Davis, 905 F.2d at 249.16 The Government also argues that the district court properly found that it had jurisdiction over the Go-Fast defendants under the “universal jurisdiction” to prevent piracy, slave trade, and universally condemned activity. This argument is simply a weaker version of the Government’s “protective principle” argument that differs only inasmuch as it rests exclusively on two Eleventh Circuit cases: United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1382 n.16 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting “a growing consensus among nations to include drug trafficking as a universally prohibited crime”), and Gonzalez, 776 F.2d at 939-40 (citing Marino-Garcia for the proposition that “conduct may be forbidden if it has a potentially adverse 16 Indeed, as Northern District of California Judge Charles Legge con- cluded, “Based upon the Davis court’s discussion on pp. 248-49, and particularly footnote 2 . . . the circuit has rejected the protective principle discussed in Peterson . . . as being an independent ground for jurisdiction, and instead requires a constitutionally sufficient nexus.” Juda I, 797 F. Supp. at 777. 2586 UNITED STATES v. PERLAZA effect and is generally recognized as a crime by nations that have reasonably developed legal systems”). [5] For these reasons, we reject the Government’s contention that either the “protective principle” or “universal jurisdiction” vitiated its obligation to establish statutory and constitutional jurisdiction over Defendants. Thus, we now consider whether the district court properly concluded that it had statutory jurisdiction over Defendants.