Opinion ID: 2599854
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Asserted federal claim

Text: Defendant also contends denial of his Marsden motion violated his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Of course, the denial of a defendant's motion to substitute counsel implicates the Sixth Amendment. ( People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 603, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683.) Although it is unclear whether defendant preserved this federal constitutional claim at trial, we assume for purposes of argument that he did. (Cf. People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 43-436, 35 Cal. Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765.) On direct review of the refusal to substitute counsel, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considers `the following three factors: (1) timeliness of the motion; (2) adequacy of the court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint; and (3) whether the conflict between the defendant and his attorney was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.' [Citations.] It found, and we agree, that these elements are consistent with California law under People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44, and its progeny. ( People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 606-607, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) Defendant's Marsden motion was timely made, and as we explained, ante, the trial court's inquiry into the grounds of defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel was more than adequate. More importantly, the alleged conflict between defendant and his defense counsel was not so serious that we must conclude communication between them had become so poisoned defendant was effectively denied his right to counsel. These facts distinguish defendant's cited legal authority. For example, in U.S. v. Walker (9th Cir.1990) 915 F.2d 480, [2] the district court made virtually no attempt to discover the causes underlying [the defendant's] dissatisfaction with his attorney ( Walker, at p. 483), although the defendant `made a prima facie showing of an irreconcilable conflict between himself and his appointed attorney' ( id. at p. 484). Similarly, in U.S. v. Adelzo-Gonzalez (9th Cir. 2001) 268 F.3d 772, there were striking signs of a serious conflict ( id. at p. 778), yet the district court did not ascertain the extent of a breakdown in communication by asking specific and targeted questions ( id. at p. 777). Finally, in Brown v. Craven (9th Cir.1970) 424 F.2d 1166, the federal appellate court concluded the state court that entertained the defendant's Marsden motion made no adequate inquiry into the cause of [the defendant's] dissatisfaction with his counsel ( id. at p. 1169). Because the trial court here undertook a sufficiently searching inquiry into the bases of defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel, and defendant's relationship with counsel was not so irreparably damaged that he was denied the right to counsel, we reject defendant's claim the trial court's denial of his Marsden motion violated his federal constitutional right to counsel.