Opinion ID: 774796
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Qualified Immunity as Final Decision

Text: 29 Before reaching the merits, we must settle the question of whether we have jurisdiction over the appeal, especially given the fact that Judge Sprizzo's denials of summary judgment were without prejudice. Ordinarily, an appeal lies only from a final judgment of a district court, since federal law limits appellate jurisdiction to review of final decisions of that court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). Under the collateral order doctrine, the Supreme Court has ruled that the term final decisions also encompasses that small class of orders which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). From that holding, it is clear that an interlocutory order is immediately appealable if it [1] conclusively determine[s] the disputed question, [2] resolve[s] an important issue completely separable from the merits of the action, and [3] [would] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). 30 A denial by a district court of a claim of qualified immunity -- to the extent that it turns on an issue of law -- is a collateral order subject to immediate appeal. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). Under the qualified immunity doctrine, government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Hence, the doctrine strikes a balance between the need, on one hand, to hold responsible public officials exercising their power in a wholly unjustified manner and, on the other hand, to shield officials responsibly attempting to perform their public duties in good faith from having to explain their actions to the satisfaction of a jury. Kaminsky v. Rosenblum, 929 F.2d 922, 924-25 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, Ch. J.)). 31 To the extent the denial of the defense rests on a legal determination of the state of the law at the time of the official's actions, a denial of immunity is conceptually separable from the merits of the plaintiff's claim that his rights have been violated. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527-28. Because qualified immunity is a shield not only from liability, but also from the burdens of discovery and trial, a denial of immunity is effectively unreviewable if appeal is delayed until after a final judgment has been entered. Id. at 526-27. Such a denial also satisfies the requirement of finality, since the district court's legal determination is conclusive with respect to the official's entitlement to avoid the burdens of discovery and trial. Id. at 527. Accordingly, a denial of qualified immunity, to the extent it turns on a question of law, satisfies the three-pronged test of the collateral order doctrine set forth in Coopers & Lybrand, and is immediately appealable. Id. at 530. 32 Applying this test, we have permitted an interlocutory appeal from an order denying qualified immunity where the facts as alleged by plaintiff are assumed to be true, and the only question for appellate review is the legal determination whether the defendant official's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right. X-Men Sec., Inc. v. Pataki, 196 F.3d 56, 66 (2d Cir. 1999). Equally clear is that a defendant may not appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial, since such an order is not truly separable from the merits of the action. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 314, 319-20 (1995); accord Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 475 (2d Cir. 1995). Thus, we have dismissed appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction where the only point challenged by the defendant was the district court's conclusion that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether the defendant actually committed the acts alleged by the plaintiff. Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 632-33 (2d Cir. 2000); Tolbert v. Queens Coll., 164 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999). But cf. McCullough v. Wyandanch Union Free Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 272, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (reviewing total absence of evidence as matter of law) (collecting cases).
33 In Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 307 (1996), the Supreme Court held that the collateral order doctrine permits successive interlocutory appeals of a district court's rulings denying qualified immunity. In Behrens, the district court had denied without prejudice the defendant's initial motion for dismissal or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, on the ground that summary judgment on qualified immunity was premature given the lack of discovery. Id. at 303. When the defendant renewed the motion following discovery, the district court again denied the motion, this time holding that material issues of fact precluded summary judgment. Id. at 304. The Ninth Circuit entertained the defendant's interlocutory appeal from the first ruling, but when defendant sought immediate appeal of the second ruling, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal in light of its precedent permitting only one interlocutory appeal. Id. at 303-05. 34 The Supreme Court reversed the decision to dismiss the second appeal. Id. at 314. It said that qualified immunity gives government officials the right not only to avoid trial, but also to avoid pre-trial burdens like discovery that can be disruptive of government effectiveness; [w]hether or not a later summary judgment motion is granted, denial of a motion to dismiss is conclusive as to this right. Id. at 308. As a result, the Ninth Circuit's one-appeal rule improperly forced government officials to choose between the right to avoid discovery and the right to avoid trial, when the qualified immunity doctrine set forth in Harlow and Mitchell encompassed both rights, thereby supporting a separate appeal to protect each right. See id. at 308-09. Behrens further noted that such successive pre-trial appeals typically will not be redundant, since motions for dismissal and for summary judgment follow different legal standards, and that the potential for abusive delays of proceedings was minimal. Id. at 309-10. The Court concluded, an order denying qualified immunity, to the extent it turns on an 'issue of law,' is immediately appealable. Id. at 311 (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530). 35 We think Behrens casts considerable doubt on the continued viability of our decision in Whalen v. County of Fulton, 19 F.3d 828 (2d Cir. 1994). In that case we dismissed an intermediate appeal in light of the district court's denial of the qualified immunity motion with the use of the phrase without prejudice, believing that such denial did not conclusively determine the issue of immunity and therefore did not impinge on the right to avoid the trial itself. Id. at 830-31. Behrens now teaches us that such appeals should be permitted because denials of immunity are conclusive with regard to a defendant's right to avoid pre- trial discovery, so long as the validity of the denial of the qualified immunity defense can be decided as a matter of law in light of the record on appeal. 516 U.S. at 308.
36 This conclusion is reinforced by our recent decision in X-Men Sec., Inc. v. Pataki, 196 F.3d 56. In X-Men, the district court denied in part an initial motion to dismiss the plaintiff's civil rights complaint on qualified immunity grounds, holding that in light of the lack of discovery the motion was premature and could be better decided on a motion for summary judgment. X-Men Sec., Inc. v. Pataki, 983 F. Supp. 101, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). We declined to dismiss the appeal from that ruling for lack of jurisdiction, giving reasons equally applicable to the instant appeal: 37 Where the district court bases its refusal to grant a qualified-immunity motion on the premise that the court is unable to, or prefers not to, determine the motion without discovery into the alleged facts, that refusal constitutes at least an implicit decision that the complaint alleges a constitutional claim on which relief can be granted. That purely legal decision does not turn on whether the plaintiff can in fact elicit any evidence to support his allegations; it thus possesses the requisite finality for immediate appealability under the collateral order doctrine. 38 X-Men Sec., Inc., 196 F.3d at 66. 39 From this it follows that even when a district court rejects a qualified immunity defense due to a perceived need for further discovery, an appellate court may exercise jurisdiction to review an interlocutory appeal that questions whether -- on the plaintiff's version of the facts -- defendant's actions violated the plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights as a matter of law. See id. at 66-67. 40 Several other circuits have similarly held. McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 275-76 (4th Cir. 1998) (relying on Behrens); Brown v. Nix, 33 F.3d 951, 953 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Behrens, 516 U.S. at 313 (even where district court denies summary judgment because of material issues of fact, appellate court may still review purely legal question whether, on plaintiff's version of facts, qualified immunity standard has been met as matter of law); Velasquez v. Senko, 813 F.2d 1509, 1510-11 (9th Cir. 1987) (appeal dismissed not because district court denied qualified immunity without prejudice but because only point raised by defendants turned on fact issue); cf. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 893 F.2d 498, 503-04 (2d Cir. 1990) (denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity not immediately appealable because of need for factual development, but court noted that complaint stated allegations that, if proven, would overcome immunity bar as matter of law); Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736, 741 (2d Cir. 1988) (denial of qualified immunity immediately appealable as to legal questions where district court failed to rule on the defense even though defendant's motion had raised it). 41 At first blush our conclusion that there is finality for jurisdictional purposes might appear to contradict other circuit decisions that have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction where the trial court wanted further discovery before ruling on qualified immunity. See 19 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 202.07[2][b][ii], at 202-36 & n.19.14 (3d ed. 2000) (collecting cases); 15A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3914.10, at n.29 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 2000) (collecting cases). Closer inspection reveals this not to be true, as these cases not only predated Behrens, but also are consistent with Behrens' treatment of unresolved fact questions. See Schrob v. Catterson, 967 F.2d 929, 939 (3d Cir. 1992) (denial of substitution motion that vitiated immunity implicitly rested on unresolved factual issues); Maxey ex rel. Maxey v. Fulton, 890 F.2d 279, 283 (10th Cir. 1989) (by choosing not to appeal denial of initial dispositive motion, defendant waived ability to object to discovery that was ordered following denial, without prejudice, of later summary judgment motion); Lawson v. Abrams, 863 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1988) (no interlocutory jurisdiction where discovery needed to determine whether absolute or qualified immunity applied based on defendants' conduct); Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 508-09 (5th Cir. 1987) (qualified immunity ruling turned on factual issue whether defendant had coerced plaintiff's consent to warrantless search). 42 As a consequence, we hold that where a district court denies an initial dispositive motion on qualified immunity grounds prior to discovery, the appealability of that ruling depends not on whether the motion was denied without prejudice to its renewal following discovery, but rather on whether the ruling turns on a question of law.