Opinion ID: 2767629
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Historical Background of Section 99-19-107

Text: ¶6. The Legislature enacted Section 99-19-107 in 1977 in the wake of several United States Supreme Court opinions pertaining to the constitutionality of the death penalty as applied in particular circumstances. A brief review of that jurisprudence provides helpful context for today’s analysis. ¶7. In 1972, the United States Supreme Court struck down Georgia’s death penalty statute as violative of the Eighth Amendment because of the arbitrary and capricious way in which it was administered. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). After Furman, the death penalty stood abolished in many states, including Mississippi. See Peterson v. State, 268 So. 2d 335 (Miss. 1972). In response, the Mississippi Legislature amended the state’s death penalty law to mandate the death penalty for certain crimes, including capital murder. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-21 (1975). Then, in 1976, the United States Supreme Court invalidated mandatory death statutes. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). The same day Woodson handed down, the Supreme Court also decided Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), which explained that Furman did not abolish the death penalty or hold it unconstitutional, but sought to guard against arbitrariness and capriciousness in the imposition of the death penalty. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-89. 4 ¶8. In the wake of the above-described cases, the Mississippi Supreme Court decided Jackson v. State, 337 So. 2d 1242 (Miss. 1976), in which the appellant had challenged the constitutionality of Mississippi Code Section 97-3-21. The Jackson Court held that the intent of the Legislature was to enact a death penalty statute that would satisfy Furman’s constitutional requirements. Jackson, 337 So. 2d at 1251. The Jackson Court construed Section 97-3-21 to mean that individuals convicted of capital murder would be sentenced to death only if the jury imposed a death sentence “after the defendant has been accorded a trial governed by procedures and guidelines designed to prevent the risk that the death penalty would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious or freakish manner.” Id. The Court held that Mississippi’s death penalty was permissive, rather than mandatory, and that the alternative to the death penalty was life imprisonment. Id. at 1251, 1256. ¶9. In 1977, the Mississippi Legislature again amended Section 97-3-21 to provide for a sentence of either death or life imprisonment as the penalty for capital murder, consistent with Jackson’s constitutional reading of that section. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-21 (1977). The Legislature also enacted Section 99-19-107, which provided: In the event the death penalty is held to be unconstitutional by the Mississippi Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, the court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death shall cause such person to be brought before the court and the court shall sentence such person to imprisonment for life, and such person shall not be eligible for work release or parole. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-107 (1977).2 2 The words “work release or” were removed in the 1982 version. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-107 (1982). 5 B. Interpretation and Application of Section 99-19-107 ¶10. The Court first considered Section 99-19-107 in Abram v. State, 606 So. 2d 1015 (Miss. 1992). Abram was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death by a jury in 1984. Id. at 1018. Afterward, Abram moved for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id. The trial court granted the motion, finding Abram’s death sentence unconstitutional under Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).3 The trial court stayed the jury’s death sentence indefinitely and sentenced Abram to life without parole pursuant to Section 99-19-107. Abram, 606 So. 2d at 1038. On appeal, the Court held that the trial court had misapplied the Enmund factors and, thus, had erred in setting aside Abram’s death sentence. Id. at 1039-44. The Abram Court also held that the trial court had misapplied Section 99-19-107, writing: Although there are no cases addressing the precise application of § 99-19-107, we think it fairly obvious that it is reserved for that event when either this Court or the United States Supreme Court makes a wholesale declaration that the death penalty in general, and/or our own statutory death penalty scheme in particular, is unconstitutional. This section is not reasonably or logically intended for use on a case by case basis by trial courts or this Court in conjunction with Enmund analysis. The only logical alternative once the jury verdict was disregarded would have been to impose a sentence of life imprisonment. . . . Id. at 1039 (emphasis added). Abram remained the law, and Section 99-19-107 was not mentioned again until 2007. 3 In Enmund, the Supreme Court had held that, in order for the death penalty to be imposed for felony murder, there must be a finding that the defendant in fact killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a killing take place or that lethal force be used. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797. The Mississippi Legislature codified the Enmund factors in 1983. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(7) (1983). 6 ¶11. In 2007, the Court had a second opportunity to examine Section 99-19-107 in Foster v. State, 961 So. 2d 670 (Miss. 2007), and the Court overruled Abram. Foster had been convicted for capital murder and sentenced to death for a murder that occurred when he was seventeen years old. Id. at 671 (¶ 2). Foster had raised the issue of his diminished mental capacity in a petition for post conviction relief, which had been denied. See Foster v. State, 687 So. 2d 1124 (Miss. 1996). However, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins, former Governor Ronnie Musgrove granted Foster a reprieve from execution and directed the Court to address the constitutionality of Foster’s sentence under Atkins. Foster v. State, 848 So. 2d 172, 173 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2003). Foster argued that his diminished mental capacity made him ineligible for the death penalty pursuant to Atkins, and the Court remanded for the trial court to conduct an Atkins hearing. Id. at 176 (¶ 15). ¶12. While Foster’s remand for an Atkins hearing was pending, the United States Supreme Court handed down Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), which held that the death penalty was unconstitutional as applied to individuals under eighteen years of age at the time of their capital crimes. Thereafter, the Court granted the State’s motion to withdraw the mandate for an Atkins hearing, vacated Foster’s death sentence, and directed the trial court to sentence him to life without parole pursuant to Section 99-19-107. Foster, 961 So. 2d at 670 (¶ 1). The circuit court complied, and Foster appealed the judgment, arguing that the application of Section 99-19-107 constituted an ex post facto punishment. Id. at 671 (¶¶ 3-4). We rejected Foster’s claim and found that, at the time Foster committed his crime, he was equally subject to Section 99-19-107. Id. at 672 (¶ 7). Regarding the application of Section 99-19-107 and the Abram Court’s interpretation of it, the Foster Court wrote: 7 The language of the statute is clear; it intends to provide for an alternative sentence for a person whose death sentence has been deemed unconstitutional. This Court has previously addressed the scope of section 99-19-107 in Abram v. State, 606 So. 2d 1015 (Miss. 1992). In Abram, this Court held that the statute was applicable “for that event when either this Court or the United States Supreme Court makes a wholesale declaration that the death penalty in general, and/or our own statutory death penalty scheme in particular, is unconstitutional.” Abram, 606 So. 2d at 1039. The “wholesale declaration” requirement set out in Abram is extraneous language that is unnecessary to the application of the statute. The statute provides that no one whose death penalty is ruled unconstitutional may receive parole. To the extent that Abram is inconsistent with the plain meaning of section 99-19-107, it is hereby overruled. Foster, 961 So. 2d at 672 (¶ 8) (emphasis added). The Foster Court showed certainty equal to that of the Abram Court when it reached an entirely different conclusion and overruled Abram. The Foster Court overruled Abram without once mentioning stare decisis or questioning whether that doctrine should operate to preserve Abram. ¶13. A unanimous Court issued Abram in 1992, fifteen years after the Legislature had passed Section 99-19-107; Foster emerged from a divided Court thirty years after the Legislature had enacted Section 99-19-107.4 The Abram Court held it “fairly obvious” that Section 99-19-107 would apply only if the death penalty in general or Mississippi’s statutory iteration of the death penalty was to be struck down as unconstitutional. Abram, 606 So. 2d at 1039. The Foster Court held that Section 99-19-107 was “clear,” and that it applies when an individual convict’s sentence of death is declared unconstitutional as to that person alone. Foster, 961 So. 2d at 672 (¶ 8). 4 The vote in Abram was 6-0, with three justices not participating. Abram, 606 So.