Opinion ID: 751653
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence in First Carjacking Incident

Text: 25 Williams next claims that there is insufficient evidence to convict him of carjacking in the first incident. He contends that his statements to police that he jacked one victim for a car and another victim for a briefcase should have been suppressed because they were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966). Williams argues that because his initial statement to police, that he wanted to talk after being informed by an officer that he had been identified in a lineup, was coerced, his subsequent statements made after being advised of and waiving his Miranda rights are inadmissible. Williams further argues that the remaining evidence is insufficient to convict him of carjacking in the first incident because the government failed to prove he was the man who stole Cooper's car. We reject Williams' arguments because we hold that his statements were admissible under Miranda and that there is sufficient evidence to support his conviction for carjacking in the first incident. 26 We find that Williams' first statement, that he wanted to talk after being informed by the officer that he had been identified in a lineup, was voluntarily made without any coercion. This statement was also not obtained in violation of Miranda. 2 Assuming arguendo that the officer's statement to Williams that he had been identified was interrogation for purposes of Miranda, there was no violation. Williams was advised of his Miranda rights when he was arrested earlier in the day, he told police he understood his rights, and he did not assert any of his rights. Under such circumstances, Miranda did not prevent the officer from interrogating Williams by telling him he had been identified in the lineup. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. We therefore hold that Williams' subsequent statements, made after again being advised of his Miranda rights and waiving those rights, were admissible. 27 We next review the record to determine if a reasonable jury could have found Williams guilty of carjacking in the first incident. Uder, 98 F.3d at 1045. Williams told the police that he jacked a lady for her car. (Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 281.) Williams' fingerprints were found on Cooper's telescope in the trunk of Cooper's car. An eyewitness saw Williams driving Cooper's stolen car after the incident involving O'Har, the morning after Cooper's car was stolen. We conclude that this evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Williams was the man who carjacked Cooper's car. Williams' carjacking conviction for the first incident must therefore stand. 28