Opinion ID: 705110
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Limited Remand

Text: 14 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2106, we may issue general or limited remands to the district courts. 3 In the context of sentencing decisions, the statute authorizes us to limit a remand to specific issues or to order complete resentencing. United States v. Polland, 56 F.3d 776, 777 (7th Cir.1995) (Polland II ). As Judge Flaum noted in Polland II, the mandate rule requires the district court to adhere to our commands on remand. Id.; see also United States v. Stanley, 54 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 238, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (1995). 15 Mr. Young submits that, in this case, the mandate rule required the district court to limit the scope of the resentencing hearing to calculating the quantity of marijuana he reasonably could have foreseen was at issue in the conspiracy. Although the quantity issue was the focus of our sentencing discussions in Young I and Young II, Mr. Young's interpretation of the remand order in Young II misconstrues the language of that decision and, in turn, the scope of our remand. As the district court recognized, our remand order in Young II was broad: We therefore vacate the district court's sentence and remand the case for resentencing consistent with this opinion. Young II, 34 F.3d at 506. Our order in no way constrained the scope of the issues the district court could consider on resentencing; rather, it simply directed the district court to adhere to our command that its quantity calculation reflect the amount of marijuana, by weight, for which Mr. Young was accountable. Similarly, although we noted that it was unlikely that the district court would revisit the aggravating role issue, id. at 507, we recognized the possibility that, upon resentencing, the court again might impose the enhancement and that, subsequently, Mr. Young again might appeal it. We therefore addressed the issue in the interests of judicial economy. Our efforts to avoid yet another appeal on the aggravating role enhancement issue would have been unnecessary had we intended to limit the scope of our remand, as Mr. Young contends, solely to the quantity calculation issue. 16 Our order in Young II thus differs from the limited remand order in Polland I, which, as we emphasized in Polland II, explicitly stated that the defendant's sentence was vacated and the case ... remanded for resentencing on the issue of obstruction of justice. Polland II, 56 F.3d at 777 (quoting United States v. Polland, 994 F.2d 1262, 1271 (7th Cir.1993) (Polland I ), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1115, 127 L.Ed.2d 425 (1994)). Likewise, the remand order in Young II was unlike the order in United States v. Gutierrez, 978 F.2d 1463, 1471 (7th Cir.1992), in which we noted in closing that the case was remanded for resentencing in accordance with this opinion. However, in Gutierrez, we made clear that we were vacating the opinion and remanding the case to the district court for its consideration whether [defendant Soto] is eligible for a two-level reduction as a minor participant. Id. On the successive appeal, we recognized the limited scope of our original remand order: 17 Soto's contention that he is entitled to a three point reduction of his offense level because his conduct falls between minimal and minor participation is clearly outside the scope of these proceedings. We affirmed Soto's conviction and the determination of his base-level offense and remanded his case to the district court solely for its consideration whether [the defendant] is eligible for a two-level reduction as a minor participant, which it declined to grant. See Gutierrez, 978 F.2d at 1471. 18 United States v. Soto, 48 F.3d 1415, 1419 n. 10 (7th Cir.1995). In contrast to the situation in Gutierrez, our discussion in Young II did not limit the scope of the district court's inquiry on remand. We indicated that the district court on remand will be writing 'on a clean slate'  and also cited the principle that the effect of a vacation is to nullify the previously imposed sentence. Young II, 34 F.3d at 506-07 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 979 F.2d 1219, 1223 (7th Cir.1992)). This language comports with several of our cases recognizing our power to order de novo resentencing. 4 Although Polland II states that we possess the concomitant power to wipe clean only part of the slate by issuing a limited remand order, our order in Young II was not so limited. 5