Opinion ID: 6330739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Suppress CSLI

Text: Before 2014, courts generally did not even discuss whether the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for digital information generated by or stored on a cell phone. See generally United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 428-29, 428-29 n.6, 429 n.7 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (explaining the scant authority whether the Fourth Amendment protects CSLI, and citing federal and state cases nationwide); Eric Lode, Annotation, Validity of Use of Cellular Telephone or Tower to Track Prospective, Real Time, or Historical Position of Possessor of Phone Under State Law, 94 A.L.R. 6th 579 (2014). The Supreme Court's 2014 decision in Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014), made clear the Fourth Amendment does protect digital information stored on a cell phone. See State v. Brown, 423 S.C. 519, 523-24, 815 S.E.2d 761, 763-64 (2018) (discussing Riley). When Warner murdered Patel in 2015, however, no South Carolina court—nor any federal court whose precedent binds our courts—had addressed whether the Fourth Amendment protects digital information derived from a cell phone but not stored on it, such as CSLI. In 2016, the Fourth Circuit found that it does not. Graham, 824 F.3d at 427.3 According to the Fourth Circuit, This holding accords with that of every other federal appellate court that has considered the Fourth Amendment question before us. Not one has adopted the Defendants' theory. 824 F.3d at 428. 3 This opinion was issued by the Fourth Circuit sitting en banc. 824 F.3d at 424. In the panel decision—issued August 5, 2015—the Fourth Circuit held the government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it obtains and inspects a cell phone user's historical CSLI for an extended period of time. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 344-45 (4th Cir. 2015). The court granted the government's petition for rehearing en banc on October 28, 2015, United States v. Graham, 624 F. App'x 75 (4th Cir. 2015), which vacated the panel decision, Graham, 824 F.3d at 424; see also 4th Cir. R. 35(c) (en banc proceedings) (Granting of rehearing en banc vacates the previous panel judgment and opinion.). In 2017, therefore, at the time of Warner's trial, it appeared that a person had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their CSLI held by a cell phone service provider and the Fourth Amendment did not require a warrant for the seizure of CSLI. The trial court in this case relied on Graham in finding the Fourth Amendment did not apply, stating the search warrant under the Graham case was not needed. Based on Graham, the trial court found Warner's voluntary use of his cell phone and the consequent provision of CSLI to the cell phone service provider resulted in the loss of any expectation of privacy Warner may have otherwise had in the information. In 2018, however—after Warner's trial and while his appeal was pending at the court of appeals—the Supreme Court held CSLI is subject to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Carpenter, 585 U.S. at ____, 138 S. Ct. at 2217, 201 L. Ed. 2d at 525. The State had not challenged the trial court's ruling that the warrant was invalid, Warner, 430 S.C. at 92, 842 S.E.2d at 369, which left for the court of appeals only the question of whether the exclusionary rule should be applied. The court of appeals found the exclusionary rule should not apply and affirmed. 430 S.C. at 94, 842 S.E.2d at 370. At oral argument before this Court, Justices raised difficult questions as to how—if South Carolina courts do not have authority to issue warrants for the seizure of records kept in another state—law enforcement may reasonably carry out its investigative responsibilities in this modern digital age. The answers, though sincere and realistic, were unsatisfactory. Therefore, and in light of our concerns that the trial court mistakenly found the warrant invalid, we find it necessary to analyze the validity of the May 4, 2015 warrant. As our Rules acknowledge, and as this Court has held many times, we may affirm on any ground appearing in the record. See Rule 220(c), SCACR (The appellate court may affirm any ruling . . . upon any ground[] appearing in the Record on Appeal.); State v. King, 422 S.C. 47, 64 n.5, 810 S.E.2d 18, 27 n.5 (2017) (same); State v. Johnson, 278 S.C. 668, 669-70, 301 S.E.2d 138, 139 (1983) (same). 4 4 Technically, we are not affirming the denial of the motion to suppress. However, we are deciding the trial court's ruling will not be reversed on the basis that the warrant sought information stored in another state. If no other basis for reversing the denial of the motion to suppress arises on remand, then the result of our analysis of the validity of the warrant in this respect will be that we affirm. The primary focus of the dispute before the trial court over the validity of this warrant was whether an Anderson County magistrate had the authority to issue the warrant to an out-of-state entity for records that are not physically located in this State. The applicable statute, section 17-13-140 of the South Carolina Code (2014), provides, Any magistrate . . .[5] may issue a search warrant to search for and seize . . . property constituting evidence of crime or tending to show that a particular person committed a criminal offense . . . . The property described in this section, or any part thereof, may be seized from any place where such property may be located, or from the person, possession or control of any person who shall be found to have such property in his possession or under his control. This warrant was issued to T-Mobile. While we assume for purposes of our analysis T-Mobile stores the applicable records in New Jersey, 6 the important fact is T- 5 The omitted text contains as many as three additional items in a series, followed by the limiting language . . . having jurisdiction over the area where the property sought is located. § 17-13-140. We find the limiting language applies only to the last item in the series, not to Any magistrate, which is the first item in the series. See Comm'rs of Pub. Works of the City of Laurens v. City of Fountain Inn, 428 S.C. 209, 219-20, 833 S.E.2d 834, 839 (2019) (Few, J., concurring) (explaining that under the last antecedent doctrine, the absence of a comma after the last item in a series indicates the modifying clause following the series applies only to the last item in the series). In addition, to read the limiting language as applying to all items in the series would contradict—and render superfluous—the language enabling the seizure of property within the control of any person, because if all seizures are limited to property inside the jurisdiction of the individual judge, it would not have been necessary to alternately authorize the seizure of property was under a person's control. 6 There is no evidence in the record to support this assumption other than the fact law enforcement officers were required to submit the warrant to the T-Mobile Law Enforcement Relations Group, which is located in New Jersey. In fact, the FBI Special Agent who testified as the State's expert on CSLI—when asked where the records were stored—did not testify where the records are stored. He stated only that the records are generated in New Jersey, [New Jersey is] where T-Mobile's compliance people are, where they generate -- where all the requests go to and they Mobile clearly does business in South Carolina, in particular, in Anderson County. T-Mobile, therefore, is subject to the jurisdiction of an Anderson County magistrate. The warrant sought records reflecting information generated in South Carolina through the interaction of Warner's cell phone and cell towers in Anderson County. While the T-Mobile office to which officers were told to send the warrant is located in New Jersey, section 17-13-140 specifically provides, The property described in this section . . . may be seized . . . from the person, possession or control of any person who shall be found to have such property in his possession or under his control. T-Mobile is in possession and control of property that section 17-13-140 permits to be seized. T-Mobile is a person doing business in Anderson County. Thus, T-Mobile is subject to the jurisdiction of our courts, and we find it was not beyond the power of the magistrate to issue the warrant. Our determination that the warrant was not invalid for the reason relied on by the trial court raises other questions. Warner argued in his suppression motion, for example, the affidavit supporting the warrant did not set forth probable cause. We agree. The affidavit states only, Information was received through crime stoppers indicating that Justin Warner is a possible suspect. The informant's information was corroborated and a record search revealed that Warner has this listed number to him. While we have recognized—recently—that [p]robable cause . . . is not a high bar, State v. Jones, 435 S.C. 138, 145, 866 S.E.2d 558, 562 (2021) (quoting Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1103, 188 L. Ed. 2d 46, 62 (2014)), it is by no means a toothless standard. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310-11, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1890 (1949) (stating probable cause has come to mean more than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within . . . [the officers'] knowledge, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed). The affidavit attached to this warrant provided the magistrate no facts or circumstances whatsoever; only the conclusory statement that some unnamed person considered Warner as a suspect based on unprovided information. 7 It is generate those [records]. The actual records are pulled from the different switches, but [New Jersey is] where the record is generated from . . . . 7 The Supreme Court's statement in Kaley, which we quoted in Jones, was made to support the Supreme Court's continued refusal to require the use of adversarial procedures to make probable cause determinations in grand jury proceedings. Kaley, 571 U.S. at 338, 134 S. Ct. at 1103, 188 L. Ed. 2d at 62. The Supreme Court's statement in Brinegar was made in explaining probable cause inconceivable to us that the magistrate did not require the experienced detective to supplement the affidavit with sworn testimony, or if the magistrate did not require it, that the detective did not provide it on his own. It is unclear, however, whether the information in the affidavit was supplemented before the magistrate issued the warrant. Because the record on this issue—and perhaps other issues—was never fully developed during the suppression hearing, we remand to the trial court for a ruling on any unresolved issues related to Warner's motion to suppress. See State v. Johnson, 302 S.C. 243, 249, 395 S.E.2d 167, 170 (1990) (finding the affidavit attached to the search warrant lacked probable cause, but remanding to develop the existed to support a search incident to a warrantless arrest. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 170-71, 69 S. Ct. at 1308, 93 L. Ed. at 1888. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983), even after abandoning the two-pronged test the Supreme Court previously applied, 62 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 548, the Court addressed a hypothetical basis for a search warrant much like the situation presented by the affidavit in this case: Our earlier cases illustrate the limits beyond which a magistrate may not venture in issuing a warrant. A sworn statement of an affiant that 'he has cause to suspect and does believe that' [a crime has been committed] will not do. An affidavit must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause, and [a] wholly conclusory statement . . . fail[s] to meet this requirement. An officer's statement that 'affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe' that heroin is stored in a home, is likewise inadequate. . . . [T]his is a mere conclusory statement that gives the magistrate virtually no basis at all for making a judgment regarding probable cause. Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the magistrate's duty does not occur, courts must continue to conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued. 62 U.S. at 239, 103 S. Ct. at 2332-33, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 548-49. record as to whether the affidavit was supplemented; explaining possible results on remand). If the trial court determines the affidavit was not supplemented, and thus the warrant lacked probable cause, the trial court should also consider whether the exclusionary rule should apply.