Opinion ID: 390520
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: At Bragg

Text: MR. REEVES: To which we Go ahead. THE COURT: Just a second. MR. REEVES: That's all right. Go ahead. THE WITNESS: At Bragg City, Missouri. MR. HAZEL: Q. And who do you live with, if anybody? A. I live by myself. Q. Did you tell Wanda McAllister that you were laying your life on the line for her? MR. REEVES: To which we object, Your Honor, on the same grounds. THE COURT: Overruled. THE WITNESS: I don't remember telling her that. I, I don't remember it. MR. HAZEL: Q. Did you tell Wanda McAllister that if you had enough money you would go off to Argentina with her? MR. REEVES: To which we object, Your Honor, on the grounds previously stated. THE COURT: Overruled. THE WITNESS: I don't remember ever telling her we were gonna go to Argentina, no, I don't remember it. MR. HAZEL: Q. Didn't you tell Wanda McAllister that if Roger Jackson testified about you showing him your house you would deny it? MR. REEVES: To which we object, Your Honor, on the grounds previously stated. THE COURT: Overruled. THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, you'll have to repeat the question, sir. MR. HAZEL: Q. Didn't you tell Wanda McAllister that if Roger Jackson testified about you showing him your house you would deny it? A. I don't remember telling her that. Q. Didn't you tell Wanda McAllister that if she was prosecuted you'd find her a lawyer that would stop it? MR. REEVES: To which we object, Your Honor, on the grounds previously stated. THE COURT: Overruled. THE WITNESS: I don't remember ever telling her that either. 8 Because we deem any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we need not reach the question whether the tapes seized in violation of the sixth amendment may be admissible for impeachment purposes. Compare United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980) (evidence suppressed as fruit of unlawful search may be used to impeach a defendant's false trial testimony) 9 The record reveals the following scenario: THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, the Bailiff tells me that you wish to come back into the Court Room. Mr. Schuerenberg, are you the Foreman of this Jury? MR. SCHUERENBERG: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Are you back in here with a Verdict or back in here for some other reason? MR. SCHUERENBERG: We have a hung Jury. THE COURT: Without telling me how the vote is, give me the numerical division, if you will, please. MR. SCHUERENBERG: Nine guilty THE COURT: No, don't tell me which way you stand, just tell me the numerical division, six and six or MR. SCHUERENBERG: Nine and three. THE COURT: Nine and three? MR. SCHUERENBERG: Yes, sir. THE COURT: How long has your Jury been at nine and three? MR. SCHUERENBERG: Oh, the last hour and a half. THE COURT: Well, you have been out there an hour and thirty-five minutes. Have you been that way MR. SCHUERENBERG: We gained one in the last little bit. Gained one and lost one, whichever way you want to put it. THE COURT: Do you feel like there is any possibility of reaching a verdict? MR. SCHUERENBERG: No, sir, I sure don't. I don't think there is any chance. (The polling of the jury followed this exchange.) 10 If the defendant requests or consents to a mistrial, the manifest necessity test does not apply. Unless the underlying error is attributable to prosecutorial misconduct or judicial overreaching, the defendant's consent to a mistrial ordinarily removes any barrier to reprosecution. Lee v. United States, 432 U.S 23, 97 S.Ct. 2141, 53 L.Ed.2d 80 (1977); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1081, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976); United States v. Martin, 561 F.2d 135, 138-39 (8th Cir. 1977). The state argues that the defendant impliedly consented to a mistrial when his counsel failed to object to the sua sponte mistrial ruling of the first court. In light of our decision, we need not address the state's claim that his failure to object constituted a waiver of the former jeopardy plea