Opinion ID: 712057
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Personal jurisdiction over Unger

Text: 10 McFarlane claims that the court had personal jurisdiction over Unger by virtue of subsection (3) or (4) of the District's statute relating to personal jurisdiction based on conduct linked to the District: 11 (a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person's-- 12 (1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia; 13 . . . . . 14 (3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District of Columbia; 15 (4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia. 16 D.C.Code 1981 Sec. 13-423(a). Although the D.C. Court of Appeals reads subsection (1) to extend to the limits of due process, see Environmental Research Int'l v. Lockwood Greene Eng., 355 A.2d 808 (D.C.1976), McFarlane does not assert it. See also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984) (exploring limits of due process as applied to personal jurisdiction over out-of-state writer of an article defaming a resident of the forum state). And the subsections he does assert are unavailing. The first, Sec. 13-423(a)(3), requires that both tortious injury and an act predicate to it take place within the District. But Unger's acts were not in the District; it is undisputed that he wrote the article in New York and delivered it to Esquire in New York. The case is therefore like Moncrief v. Lexington Herald-Leader Co., 807 F.2d 217 (D.C.Cir.1986), where the defendant in Kentucky published and mailed a newspaper that allegedly defamed the plaintiff in the District, and we found no basis for jurisdiction under subsection (3). 17 McFarlane argues that in a libel action the injury is part of the tort, so that, in law, the defendant has committed an act within the District. We rejected that claim in Moncrief, on the ground that to accept it would obliterate subsection (3)'s careful distinction between injury and act. Id. at 220-21. McFarlane appears to concede that circuit precedent excludes Unger from the purview of Sec. 13-423(a)(3), and invites us to overrule Moncrief. But we have no power to do so, even if we thought it desirable. One panel of the court does not have authority to overrule another. See, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1369 n. 19 (D.C.Cir.1974). 18 Section 13-423(a)(4) is of no more help to McFarlane. It contemplates jurisdiction when there is tortious injury within the District accompanied by any of three specified kinds of additional contacts between the District and the defendant, not necessarily related to the contested act or injury. Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 763 (D.C.Cir.1987). McFarlane has not shown that Unger had any of the specified types of contacts. His appeal makes no claim at all on the third type--deriving substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District. Invoking the first and second types (regular business or persistent course of conduct), he points to the fact of Unger's having written for six national publications whose circulations include the District and, on two occasions, writing for District-based publications (the Washington Post and the New Republic). But writing an article for a publication that is circulated throughout the nation, including the District, hardly constitutes doing or soliciting business, or engaging in a persistent course of conduct, within the District. The writer is not the publisher; Unger's contacts must be assessed separately. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 781 n. 13, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 1482 n. 13, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984). 19 Thus we are left with two articles appearing in Washington-based publications, one in the Washington Post (which was written after McFarlane's complaint was filed and is therefore no basis for personal jurisdiction, see Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 52 (2d Cir.1991); Asarco, Inc. v. Glenara, Ltd., 912 F.2d 784, 787 n. 1 (5th Cir.1990)) and one in the New Republic. If regularly and persistent are to have any meaning, sale of two articles to District-based publications over a career in journalism cannot amount to regularly doing business or to a persistent course of conduct. Thus, without regard to the circuit's newsgathering exception to jurisdiction, see Moncrief, 807 F.2d at 222-25, we agree with the district court that McFarlane has failed to show contacts between Unger and the District satisfying Sec. 13-423(a)(4). We affirm its finding of a lack of personal jurisdiction over Unger. 20 We also affirm the district court's decision to dismiss instead of transfer the case against Unger. The plaintiff asked for a transfer under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1406(a), which permits transfer in the interest of justice of a case laying venue in the wrong division or district. Where personal jurisdiction is absent and venue is proper (or at least unchallenged, as here), courts have disagreed as to whether a request for transfer should be analyzed under Sec. 1406(a) or instead under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1404(a). See generally 15 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 3827, at 263-67 (1986). In this particular case it appears to make no difference. Our standard of review is the same--abuse of discretion--under both sections. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257, 102 S.Ct. 252, 266-67, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981) (adopting abuse of discretion standard, noting need to balance multiple factors, in transfer under Sec. 1404(a)); Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 789 (D.C.Cir.1983) (applying abuse of discretion, without discussion, in transfer under Sec. 1406(a)). And, although Sec. 1404(a) calls on the court to consider the convenience of parties and witnesses (in addition to the interest of justice, which both sections specify), neither party addresses arguments uniquely pertinent to convenience. Accordingly, we need not try to resolve the nearly hopeless muddle of conflicting reasoning and precedent as to which statute properly applies. Ellis v. Great Southwestern Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1106-07 (5th Cir.1981). 21 The district court's denial of a transfer matters because the statute of limitations for defamation has now apparently expired in New York, the place where McFarlane could most readily secure jurisdiction over Unger. The district judge explained that while denying such a transfer thus exacts a heavy penalty, the fault for the problem rests with McFarlane, who was put on notice, by Unger's answer to the complaint, of Unger's intention to rely on a defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, and nonetheless failed to file a protective suit in New York. The district court further reasoned that McFarlane would not be prejudiced by denial of transfer, as Esquire had adequate insurance. That strikes us as something of an oversimplification, as McFarlane's quest for vindication would more easily be satisfied (as we shall see) in a suit against Unger than against Esquire, because of Unger's far greater awareness of the reasons to doubt the truth of the article's claims. Nonetheless, because of McFarlane's notice of the defense and his counsel's inexplicable failure to file a protective suit, we think the district court was within its discretion in denying a transfer.