Opinion ID: 2087560
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cross-examination of Margaret Jenkins

Text: During his cross-examination of Ms. Jenkins, defense counsel brought out the fact that she had previously been convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute it. Counsel then asked whether she had been using cocaine on the night of the fire. The court sustained the government's objection to this question on the ground that it implied a relation between the prior conviction in 1987 and Jenkins' behavior in 1994. Now, on appeal, Grayton argues that this line of cross-examination would have demonstrated that Jenkins herself started the fire by smoking crack cocaine in her apartment that night. That, in turn, would show that her testimony against Grayton was biased  specifically, that it was motivated by a desire to cover up her own responsibility for the fire. Grayton contends that the trial court's refusal to allow this line of questioning violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. He also maintains that, even if there was no constitutional violation, the court abused its discretion, see ( James) Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 361-363 (D.C.1979), and thus he must be granted a new trial. A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses necessarily includes the right to cross-examine. Ray v. United States, 620 A.2d 860, 862 (D.C.1993) (citations omitted). Moreover, the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). Thus the bias or partiality of a witness is always a proper subject of cross-examination. Hyman v. United States, 342 A.2d 43, 44 (D.C.1975) (citing Davis ). The Confrontation Clause is violated, however, only when the trial court precludes a `meaningful' degree of cross-examination to establish bias. Flores v. United States, 698 A.2d 474, 479 (D.C. 1997) (citation omitted); see Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 854 (D.C. 1978) (Some meaningful degree of cross-examination must be allowed in the first instance to satisfy the Sixth Amendment). Thus we must determine whether defense counsel had a sufficient opportunity on cross-examination to bring out considerations relevant to motive or bias. ( Irving) Johnson v. United States, 418 A.2d 136, 140 (D.C.1980) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Elliott v. United States, 633 A.2d 27, 33 (D.C.1993). At the same time, of course, we must bear in mind that [t]here is no constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence. Gibson v. United States, 536 A.2d 78, 82 (D.C.1987). In order to cross-examine a witness about a prior bad act that has not resulted in a criminal conviction, the examiner (1) must have a factual predicate for asking the question and (2) must show that the act `bears directly upon the veracity of the witness in respect to the issues involved [in] the trial.' Sherer v. United States, 470 A.2d 732, 738 (D.C.1983) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931, 105 S.Ct. 325, 83 L.Ed.2d 262 (1984); accord, e.g., Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1, 4 (D.C.1996) (en banc); Murphy v. Bonanno, 663 A.2d 505, 508-509 (D.C. 1995); Kitchen v. United States, 95 U.S.App. D.C. 277, 279, 221 F.2d 832, 834 (1955). This two-part standard constitutes a minimum threshold for the admissibility of proposed cross-examination into alleged prior bad acts, and evidence which fails to satisfy the Sherer test may not be admitted. Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315, 323 (D.C.1990). To meet the first requirement under Sherer, the questioner must proffer `some facts which support a genuine belief' that the witness is biased in the manner asserted. Jones v. United States, 516 A.2d 513, 517 (D.C.1986) (citations omitted); see Ray, 620 A.2d at 862-863; ( Irving) Johnson, 418 A.2d at 140. [T]he questioner must support any proposal for cross-examination with a credible statement describing the suspected cause of bias in the witness, supported by plausible factual allegations or itself plausible within the framework of facts that neither party has contested. Scull v. United States, 564 A.2d 1161, 1164 n. 4 (D.C.1989). Grayton fails to satisfy the first prong of the Sherer test. The only basis for his theory that Ms. Jenkins might have started the fire by smoking crack in her apartment was the fact that she had smoked crack before. He could offer no evidence that she had done so on the night in question, and in fact all of the evidence at trial indicated otherwise. Defense counsel did make a proffer that Robin Anderson would testify that she and Jenkins had been smoking crack cocaine on the night of the fire, at about 1:30 a.m., and the court ruled that such testimony would be admissible. Later, however, when counsel began his examination of Anderson, he reverted to asking the question much more generally, without tying it to the time and place of the fire. At that point the court properly stopped the questioning. [8] The trial court nevertheless did err in one respect, but we conclude that the error was harmless. At the time the court sustained the government's objection to defense counsel's proposed cross-examination of Ms. Jenkins, Ms. Anderson had not yet testified, but counsel had made a proffer of her testimony. Specifically, counsel had proffered that Anderson would testify that she and Jenkins had smoked crack that same night, shortly before the fire began. Given this proffer, the court erred in precluding cross-examination of Jenkins about smoking crack cocaine on the night of the fire before it knew that Anderson's testimony would not live up to the proffer. However, the fact that Anderson did not testify as counsel had proffered renders any error harmless under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), especially in light of the strong evidence of guilt. We turn to Grayton's alternative argument that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the government's objection to his question. It is well settled that, despite the Sixth Amendment, the trial court has broad discretion to `impose reasonable limits' on cross-examination `based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.' Roundtree, 581 A.2d at 323 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)); accord, Elliott, 633 A.2d at 32 (citing Roundtree ); Scull, 564 A.2d at 1164. A proposed line of questioning may, and should, be disallowed if the trial court concludes that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Roundtree, 581 A.2d at 323. In this case, the probative value of the proposed cross-examination was minimal, and the risk of prejudice was considerable. There was a substantial danger that this line of inquiry would distract the jury from the issue of Grayton's guilt or innocence, causing it to focus instead on the collateral issue of Jenkins' alleged drug habit. Moreover, defense counsel was not totally prevented from cross-examining Jenkins in an effort to show possible bias, and indeed he did so. The trial court merely prevented counsel from introducing an irrelevant, collateral, and potentially prejudicial issue into the trial. On the record before us, we can find no abuse of discretion.