Opinion ID: 2427524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Identifying a Substantial Step by Reference to the Crime Being Attempted

Text: While the parameters of the substantial step requirement are simply stated, they do not always provide bright lines for application. This is not surprising; the identification of a substantial step, like the identification of attempt itself, is necessarily a matter `of degree,' United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 633 (2d Cir.1950) (L. Hand, J.) (quoting Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. at 272, 59 N.E. at 56), that can vary depending on `the particular facts of each case' viewed in light of the crime charged, United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 66 (quoting United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d at 988); accord United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d at 408. An act that may constitute a substantial step towards the commission of one crime may not constitute such a step with respect to a different crime. See generally United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 66 (observing that substantial step requirement serves to ensure that person is convicted for attempt only when actions manifest firm disposition to commit charged crime). Thus, substantial-step analysis necessarily begins with a proper understanding of the crime being attempted. For example, in United States v. Delvecchio, 816 F.2d 859 (2d Cir.1987), a case frequently cited as illustrative of actions insufficient to demonstrate attempt, the substantive crime at issue was possession of a large quantity of heroin. We held that a substantial step to commit that crime was not established by proof that defendants had met with suppliers, agreed on terms, and provided their beeper numbers. Such evidence, at most, established a verbal agreement, which, without more, is insufficient as a matter of law to support an attempt[ed possession] conviction. Id. at 862. In so concluding, we noted that what was missing was any act to effect possession, such as acquisition, or attempted acquisition, of the purchase money, or travel to the agreed-on purchase site. See id. The crime here at issue, however, is of a quite different sort. Sabir was charged with attempting to provide material support for terrorism. Whereas an attempt to possess focuses on a defendant's efforts to acquire, an attempt to provide focuses on his efforts to supply, a distinction that necessarily informs an assessment of what conduct will manifest a substantial step towards the charged objective. Thus, while an agreement to purchase drugs from a supplier is not a substantial step sufficient to convict for attempted possession, see id. at 862, such an agreement to acquire might constitute a substantial step when the crime at issue is attempted distribution, see United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 340 (2d Cir.1993) (holding evidence insufficient to prove attempted distribution where defendant did not produce any heroin for the proposed sale ..., and there was no evidence that [he] ever entered into an agreement with a supplier or made inquiry of a supplier to obtain heroin for the proposed sale). Further important to a substantial-step assessment is an understanding of the underlying conduct proscribed by the crime being attempted. The conduct here at issue, material support to a foreign terrorist organization, is different from drug trafficking and any number of activities ( e.g., murder, robbery, fraud) that are criminally proscribed because they are inherently harmful. The material support statute criminalizes a range of conduct that may not be harmful in itself but that may assist, even indirectly, organizations committed to pursuing acts of devastating harm. Thus, as the Supreme Court recently observed, the very focus of the material support statute is preventative in that it criminalizes not terrorist attacks themselves, but aid that makes the attacks more likely to occur. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. at 2728. Accordingly, while a substantial step to commit a robbery must be conduct planned clearly to culminate in that particular harm, a substantial step towards the provision of material support need not be planned to culminate in actual terrorist harm, but only in supporteven benign supportfor an organization committed to such harm. See generally id. at 2724 (discussing Congress's finding that designated foreign terrorist organizations `are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct' (quoting AEDPA § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. at 1247) (emphasis in Humanitarian Law Project ).)