Opinion ID: 1355586
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Commissioner Fletcher's Testimony.

Text: As a juvenile, defendant was adjudicated a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 on four occasions. At the penalty phase of trial the prosecution called Juvenile Court Commissioner Fletcher to testify for the purpose of establish[ing] a foundation for defendant's juvenile court file, i.e., to describe the juvenile court process, including the rights afforded juveniles and the standards for adjudication, to read the charges against defendant, and to describe the dispositions in defendant's cases and the rehabilitative programs available at the institutions to which defendant was committed. Defense counsel objected on grounds defendant's juvenile adjudications were not felony convictions and any testimony by Commissioner Fletcher concerning rehabilitation efforts on defendant's behalf would be speculative. The court overruled the objection, stating the commissioner's testimony would not demonstrate rehabilitation efforts in defendant's case. The commissioner thereupon testified much as the prosecutor had proposed. (6) Defendant first argues that much of Commissioner Fletcher's testimony was irrelevant to any statutory factor in aggravation and so inadmissible under People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 773-776 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782]. In that case we examined the new language of section 190.3 enacted by the 1978 death penalty initiative and concluded: Evidence of defendant's background, character, or conduct which is not probative of any specific listed factor would have no tendency to prove or disprove a fact of consequence to the determination of the action, and is therefore irrelevant to aggravation. ( Id., at p. 774.) Pursuant to Boyd, defendant is correct that Commissioner Fletcher's testimony concerning the juvenile court system and rehabilitation programs was inadmissible as not bearing on any statutory factor in aggravation. Respondent argues, however, that even if Commissioner Fletcher's testimony concerning the juvenile court system and placement facilities was inadmissible in the case-in-chief, it was appropriate to rebut defendant's good character evidence, to wit, the testimony of defendant's mother that he was a good boy as far as she knew and was well-behaved at home, including the intervals between confinement in juvenile facilities, and that she had taught him right from wrong and had taken him to church. In Boyd, we held that the prosecution's case for aggravation is limited to evidence relevant to the listed factors exclusive of [section 190.3] factor (k)  since that factor encompasses only extenuating circumstances.... Once the defense has presented evidence of circumstances admissible under factor (k), however, prosecution rebuttal evidence would be admissible as evidence tending to `disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.' (Evid. Code, § 210.) ( People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762, 775-776 [248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253]; see also People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 709-710.) We explained in People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113] that a defendant who introduces good character evidence widens the scope of the bad character evidence that may be introduced in rebuttal. The theory for permitting such rebuttal evidence and argument is not that it proves a statutory aggravating factor, but that it undermines defendant's claim that his good character weighs in favor of mercy. Accordingly, the prosecutor, when making such a rebuttal effort, is not bound by the listed aggravating factors or by his statutory pretrial notice of aggravating evidence. (§ 190.3.) ( Id., at p. 791, italics in original.) Even if the challenged evidence might have been relevant and admissible in rebuttal, it was error to admit it in the case-in-chief. We cannot speculate on what evidence defendant would have presented if the prosecutor had not presented evidence of his juvenile adjudications and the rehabilitative facilities available to juvenile offenders. Once the prosecutor had introduced the juvenile record, defendant had nothing to lose by presenting evidence exploring his character as a youth. We should not permit the prosecutor to evade the limitations on aggravating evidence that section 190.3 imposes by forcing the defendant to present evidence which opens up issues for rebuttal. We conclude that the commissioner's testimony about the procedural protections and rehabilitative facilities available to juvenile offenders was inadmissible because it was irrelevant to any of the statutory factors in aggravation.