Opinion ID: 1573553
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Ordinance Title Satisfies the City Charter

Text: The Cape Girardeau City Charter, section 3.14(a), contains two provisions regarding the titles of ordinances introduced for passage in the City Council: Every such ordinance shall be by bill in written or printed form with the subject of the ordinance clearly expressed in its title; and No ordinance except those making appropriations of money and those codifying or revising existing ordinances shall contain more than one (1) subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title. This language is similar to Missouri Constitution article III, section 23, which says that No bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except [certain bills related to state indebtedness] and general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts for which moneys are appropriated. Although the trial court found that the title of Ordinance 2403 violated both charter section 3.14 and Article III, section 23 of the Constitution, respondent does not attempt to defend the latter proposition, since this Court has long held that the prohibition in section 23 applies only to bills passed by the General Assembly, not to municipal ordinances. [5] The question of whether the ordinance title violates the charter, however, requires more substantial consideration. While Missouri courts have frequently been called upon to invalidate both state and local legislation for violations of the single subject and clearly expressed, principles, they have been reluctant to do so. Challenges based on improper bill titles are disfavored. This reflects not just this Court's traditional respect for the legislative branch and the accompanying presumption that its enactments are constitutional, but also a reluctance to strictly apply procedural rules in a way that might interfere with the functioning of the legislature. [6] Though these concerns of comity are not necessarily present to the same extent in examining municipal enactments, this Court has nevertheless long been guided by the principle that [s]ound policy and legislative convenience dictate a liberal construction of the title and subject-matter of enactments to maintain their validity. [7] Bill title requirements such as the Cape Girardeau Charter provision here involve two distinct (albeit related) requirements: (1) a bill cannot contain more than one subject and (2) the subject of the bill must be clearly expressed in its title. [8] A bill satisfies the single subject requirement if all provisions of the bill fairly relate to the same subject, have a natural connection therewith or are incidents or means to accomplish its purpose. [9] The clearly expressed test serves a similar purpose, but focuses on different elements: The `clear title' provision, like the `single subject' restriction, was designed to prevent fraudulent, misleading, and improper legislation, by providing that the title should indicate in a general way the kind of legislation that was being enacted. If the title of a bill contains a particular limitation or restriction, a provision that goes beyond the limitation in the title is invalid because such title affirmatively misleads the reader. [10] Under these principles, Ordinance 2403 is not impermissible multi-subject legislation. Each of the provisions of the ordinance is closely allied, fit and appropriate, and of similar nature to the subject expressed in the title of the ordinancethe amendment of the city code relating to the hotel/motel/restaurant tax. [11] It is not fatal, under a single subject analysis, that the title mentions the tax increase, but not the purposes to which it will be put. As this Court has previously held, the imposition of a tax and the purposes to which the revenue will be devoted are sufficiently closely connected to withstand a single subject challenge. [12] The cases principally relied upon by Drury, Hammerschmidt v. Boone County [13] and ACI Plastics v. City of St. Louis, [14] are not to the contrary. In ACI Plastics , this Court struck down a St. Louis ordinance that put to the voters a question that included two unrelated revenue raising measures, a gross receipts tax of 3/8 of one percent on all sales in the City and a five dollar monthly fee per employee imposed on all employers in the City. [15] The title of the enactment (which essentially repeated the body of the proposal) did not suggest, any more than the bill itself did, any common subject to which each of these facially unrelated provisions might apply. Similarly, in Hammerschmidt , the legislature had joined two seemingly unrelated billsone changing various election procedures and one permitting Boone, Jefferson and Clay Counties to adopt county constitutions. [16] This Court concluded that permitting changes in the county form of government did not have a natural connection to the subject of elections and neither furthered that goal nor was a necessary incident to achieving it. [17] Here, the purpose of the tax increase, the tax increase itself and the procedural mechanisms for putting it into place all relate naturally and appropriately to a single subject in a way that the markedly unrelated provisions in ACI Plastics and Hammerschmidt did not. In evaluating the distinct question of whether the title here clearly expresses the single subject of this legislation, the trial court properly focused on the fact that the title mentions several provisions of the ordinance, but omits the specific uses to which the tax increase will be put. A title that is a list of specific provisions, but fails to be comprehensive, risks offending the core principle of clear title analysis: The touchstone of the clear title rule is that the bill's title cannot be underinclusive. [18] Recognizing that the prevention of underinclusiveness is the chief concern of clear title analysis, this Court has permitted legislative bodies substantial latitude to employ highly inclusive (that is, quite general) titles [19] and has determined that a title need not list every detail of the bill in order to be appropriately clear. [20] A general title is only impermissible if it is so broad or amorphous that it effectively renders the single subject requirement meaningless or obscures the actual subject of the legislation. [21] With a more specific title, such as that at issue here, however, closer scrutiny is required. The general principle is: The title may be expressed in a few words, but where it descends to particulars the particulars stated become the subject of the act, which must conform to the title as expressed by the particulars. Where the title goes into such detail as would reasonably lead to the belief that nothing was included except that which is specified then any matter not specified is not within the title. Any such matter beyond the title is void. [22] Although the title of Ordinance 2403 lists specific provisions of the enactment, it is not so specific that it would cause a reasonable reader to conclude that nothing is contained in the ordinance other than those matters explicitly set forth in the title. In particular, a reader informed in a general way that the provisions of the city code dealing with the hotel/motel/restaurant tax are to be amended (as this title does) would not assume from the few specific provisions included in the title that the ordinance contains no provisions regarding how the increased tax revenues are to be spent. Keeping in mind this Court's traditionally liberal construction of titles in the face of clear title challenges, the title is sufficiently general that it does not misleadingly exclude the spending portions of the ordinance from its subject matter. The provisions of Ordinance 2403 are sufficiently closely related to the single subject of the bill, which is sufficiently clearly expressed in its title, that the ordinance does not violate city charter section 3.14(a). The judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment to plaintiffs on Count V of the petition was therefore erroneous. [23]