Opinion ID: 1766123
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: supplemental jury instruction after jury retired

Text: The jury retired to consider its verdict at 10:53 a.m. At 12:25 p.m. the court received some questions from the jury. One of the questions requested the court to further define malice aforethought, and beyond a reasonable doubt. Another question asked the court to define without malice. The circuit judge from Black's Law Dictionary, and over defense objection, gave the jury a definition of malice aforethought, and declined to further elaborate upon reasonable doubt. The record reveals the following instructions by the court: COURT: You asked for a definition of malice aforethought, a further definition of malice aforethought, without malice and reasonable doubt. I think I have done the best I can with those and you will be allowed to take those with you. But, I will read it to you as the law provides. In the definition of Murder, malice aforethought exists where the person doing the act which causes death has an intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm to any person, (whether the person is actually killed or not) or to commit any felony whatever has the knowledge that the act will probably cause the death or grievous bodily harm to some person, although he does not desire it or even wishes that it may not be caused  it means evil design in general, the dictate of a wicked, depraved and malignant heart; not premeditated personal hatred or revenge toward the person killed but that kind of unlawful purpose which, if persevered in, must produce mischief. Now, without malice, of course, means the absence of the above. That almost goes without saying, as to that. Now, with reference to your question concerning reasonable doubt, I am not permitted, under Mississippi Law to define for you reasonable doubt. Each of you must determine what is reasonable; it is a lay term and not a legal term. All of you know what reasonable is, as well as I do, all of you. The jury again retired to consider its verdict at 1:10 p.m., and reached a verdict at 3:01 p.m. that day. Nicolaou complains of the circuit judge's granting this additional instruction to the jury. On this contention we must agree that the court erred in granting this additional instruction. As the court observed, the jury was asking for a definition, not an application. (R. 714) Instructions, however, should be tailored to the facts of a case. Lancaster v. State, 472 So.2d 363 (Miss. 1985); Fairchild v. State, 459 So.2d 793 (Miss. 1984); Pittman v. State, 297 So.2d 888 (Miss. 1974); McBroom v. State, 217 Miss. 338, 64 So.2d 144 (1953). Moreover, in Smith v. State, 237 Miss. 626, 114 So.2d 676 (1959), we observed that it was unnecessary and unwise for the circuit court to attempt to define malice in jury instructions. This definition first states that malice aforethought exists where the person doing the act which causes the death has an intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm to any person. An essential element of the crime of murder is the felonious and premeditated intent to kill, not simply to do grievous bodily harm. Pitts v. State, 241 So.2d 668 (Miss. 1970). The definition additionally defines malice aforethought as existing when the defendant has an intention to commit any felony whatever, has the knowledge that the act will probably cause the death or grievous bodily harm to some person, although he does not desire it or even wishes that it may not be caused ... The definition as given could only have confused the jury. Since we cannot find that it was harmless, we must reverse. Harris v. State, 244 Miss. 552, 144 So.2d 790 (1962); Hawthorne v. State, 58 Miss. 778 (1881); Josephine v. State, 39 Miss. 613, 2 Mor.St.Cas. 1439 (1860). In Girton v. State, 446 So.2d 570 (Miss. 1984), we made some observations in regard to a circuit judge giving supplemental instructions to the jury after it retires to consider its verdict. We stated: The second recommendation requires the trial judge to constantly bear in mind that justice in every trial requires communication and understanding. Unless words are clearly understood, there is only a communication of sound, or worse, a distinct possibility of the receiver of the information placing a different meaning on what is spoken or written than the author meant. This is critical in any communication from the circuit judge to the jury, or between the judge and jury. 446 So.2d at 573. We found it critically important that the judge understand precisely what the jury meant by its inquiry. Just as important is that the jury understand precisely what the court meant by its instruction. REVERSED AND REMANDED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and ZUCCARO, JJ., concur. GRIFFIN, J., not participating.