Opinion ID: 179427
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Narrow Tailoring Argument

Text: Plaintiffs further argue that the school district's across-school ban is unconstitutional because speech restrictions must be narrowly tailored. Plaintiffs contend that because no principal or teacher can make exceptions to the ban based on the circumstances within individual schools and classrooms, the ban is unnecessarily broad and thus, violative of the Constitution. Because the dress code's distinction between the display of racially divisive symbols and racially inclusive symbols involves expressive conduct within the protection of the First Amendment, this provision of the dress code must be [narrowly] tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest. Police Dep't of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). In this case, the government's interest is the school district's objective of educat[ing] its students in a learning environment conducive to fostering both knowledge and democratic responsibility, which is undoubtedly a substantial interest. Barr, 538 F.3d at 576. In determining whether the dress code's ban on displays of racially divisive symbols is narrowly tailored we inquire as to whether this ban satisfies the Tinker standard. See id. Plaintiffs point to no authority for the proposition that the school district is required to apply district policy on a school-by-school or classroom-by-classroom basis. Not only would the piecemeal approach suggested by Plaintiffs be unworkable, but this Court appears to have implicitly rejected Plaintiffs' arguments that the narrow tailoring requirement prevents school districts from establishing and enforcing a district-wide dress code. See Barr, 538 F.3d at 556-57 (detailing the district-wide dress code); see also Brogdon, 217 Fed.Appx. 518, 526 (6th Cir.2007) (affirming the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in a case involving a district-wide dress code prohibiting attire that caused disruption to the educational process). Other circuits have similarly upheld district-wide bans on displays of the Confederate flag. See B.W.A., 554 F.3d at 741 (upholding a school district's ban on clothing depicting the Confederate flag); West, 206 F.3d at 1366-67 (same). Tinker does not require an individualized analysis of each student's clothing each day, but rather a reasonable forecast by school officials that displays of the Confederate flag would cause disruptions. See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 591-92 (holding that pursuant to Tinker school officials need not wait until a disruption actually occurs before regulating student speech). As we have previously stated, Anderson County school officials enforce the ban in a viewpoint-neutral manner and only banned those symbols they have reasonably forecasted will substantially disrupt or materially interfere with schoolwork and school discipline. Accordingly, we hold that the dress code's provision banning displays of racially divisive symbols, and its application to the Confederate flag, is narrowly tailored to the state and school district's substantial interest in educating students in the public school system. [8]
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants. [9]