Opinion ID: 891596
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Immunity Baths

Text: {56} Grants of immunity, whether made by prosecutors or by the courts, are inherently subject to abuse by witnesses. A witness may lie, or alter his testimony, in order to receive immunity. In the case of defense witness immunity, the risk is in some senses two-fold. For example, a friend of the accused may testify falsely under an immunity grant, stating that he, and not the accused, is guilty of the crime. Confused thereby, the jury may be unable to decide to convict beyond a reasonable doubt. With the grant of immunity, the prosecution may be left without a case, and the real perpetrator, either one in this hypothetical scenario, is never held accountable. Some courts have described this so-called immunity bath technique as a basis for not permitting judicially granted immunity. See, e.g., In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1222 (4th Cir.1973). {57} We recognize the concern is legitimate. However, where the issue is use immunity alone, and not transactional immunity, the concern largely, though not entirely, diminishes. The incentive for a witness to lie in exchange for mere use immunity is small. In the case of transactional immunity, the lying witness can secure for himself freedom from prosecution for a series of events in which he may have been involved. With use immunity, such a witness receives virtually nothing in return for his lie. The prosecution does not promise to refrain from prosecuting for the events described, but only for the testimony itself. Furthermore, use immunity does not protect against prosecution for perjury. See Rule 11-412 (stating that evidence or testimony obtained after a grant of use immunity may not be used against a person compelled to testify, except a prosecution for perjury committed in the course of the testimony). {58} And yet the incentive for prosecutors to grant defense witness immunity is small. Given the certainty that such testimony cannot help a prosecutor's case, it is not surprising that prosecutors grant immunity to defense witnesses only sparingly, if at all. The United States Department of Justice as a matter of policy mandates that prosecutors will not grant immunity to defense witnesses except in extraordinary circumstances where the defendant plainly would be deprived of a fair trial. U.S. Attorneys' Manual, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/ 23mcrm.htm# 9-23.214. We found no cases mentioning such a grant, while immunity grants to State witnesses are legion. See, e.g., Vallejos, 118 N.M. at 574, 883 P.2d at 1271; Brown, 1998-NMSC-037, ¶¶ 5-10, 126 N.M. 338, 969 P.2d 313, State v. Lunn, 82 N.M. 526, 529, 484 P.2d 368, 371 (Ct.App. 1971) (discussing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970)). {59} While the justifications for vesting immunity power solely in the prosecution are strong, particularly in the federal system, they are weaker under New Mexico law. As we have discussed, the policy grounds for sole prosecutorial authority on this issue are persuasive for transactional immunity, but much less so for use immunitya distinction which our case law in the past has failed to fully make. In asking our district courts to balance the various needs and rights with respect to use immunity, we are merely asking them to do what they do with many issues in nearly every phase of a criminal trial: mediate between the defendant and the State. This is the kind of decision district courts are well-suited to make. The constitutional stakes are high enough in the instance of use immunity that the court should have some role. In short, we conclude that while the reasons for unfettered prosecutorial control over use immunity are in some instances strong, they do not overcome the need for judicial intervention in every case.