Opinion ID: 3060228
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: christ is a clarification of the law

Text: As discussed above, the decision in Christ was not a substantive change in the law, i.e., one which changed the rights, obligations, or objectives of the law. Instead, the decision clarified what remedies were available to private litigants under TILA. The Christ decision simply determined that the language of the statute, while not expressly prohibiting an injunction, did not permit injunctive 20 relief. Christ does not state that injunctive relief had once been available and now is not. The issue of injunctive relief had never been addressed expressly by the statute or this Court. Christ simply “made clear what the Court had not before announced[.]” Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388. Consequently, Christ clarified the law. See id. at 388-90 (citing Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 437-38 (1976)). Rufo cautions that not every clarification in the law justifies a modification to a consent decree: To hold that a clarification in the law automatically opens the door for relitigation of the merits of every affected consent decree would undermine the finality of such agreements and could serve as a disincentive to negotiation of settlements in institutional reform litigation. . . . While a decision that clarifies the law will not, in and of itself, provide a basis for modifying a decree, it could constitute a change in circumstances that would support modification if the parties had based their agreement on a misunderstanding of the governing law. 502 U.S. at 389-90 (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court recognized that certain circumstances might justify a modification to a consent decree after a clarification in the law. Before determining if such circumstances justify modification, a court must first determine if the parties based their agreement on a misunderstanding of the law. Id. 21 Here, the district court found that Security Finance, as the party seeking modification, failed to meet its burden of showing that the parties had based their agreement on a misunderstanding of the law. The only evidence Security Finance submitted to support a claim that the parties misunderstood the law was the cursory, self-serving Supplemental Biggs Affidavit, which contained no facts to support the affiant’s conclusions and was only submitted in support of Security Finance’s Rule 59 motion. Furthermore, the Supplemental Biggs Affidavit only addressed Security Finance’s misunderstanding of the law; it was silent as to Plaintiffs’ understanding of the law. Thus, Security Finance’s unilateral approach fell short of its burden to show that the parties misunderstood the law at the time the consent decree was entered. Security Finance had the burden to point to record evidence to establish that the parties misunderstood the law at the time of their settlement and that such misunderstanding was a factor in the settlement. Because Security Finance failed to meet its burden, the district court was entitled to conclude that there was no mutual misunderstanding of the governing law that could support a modification.