Opinion ID: 3009129
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim Against Agusta

Text: Aircraft pilots must comply with the duties set forth in the FARs, which have “the force and effect of law.” Rodriquez, 823 F.2d at 739. Plaintiffs primarily assert that the Agusta pilots breached their duties under two FAR provisions: 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.13(a) and 91.111(a). Section 91.13(a) provides generally that “[n]o person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.” 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a); accord Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 365 (describing this provision as creating “an overarching general standard of care”). Section 91.111(a) provides that “[n]o person may operate an aircraft so close to another aircraft as to create a collision hazard.” 14 C.F.R. § 91.111(a). Plaintiffs also assert that the Agusta pilots violated parts of the Aeronautical Information Manual (“AIM”) and other FAA publications. The FARs require pilots to know and use relevant portions of the AIM and FAA advisory circulars. 14 C.F.R. § 61.105(b)(3); see Rodriquez, 823 F.2d at 739. In arguing that the Agusta pilots breached their safety duties, plaintiffs point to three categories of conduct: (1) the Agusta pilots’ request for a “westerly” departure, in the direction of two active runways; (2) their failure to clarify that they planned to go further to the northwest; and (3) their failure to hear Richburg’s direction to the Grumman to “make right traffic.” We address each of these acts or omissions below and conclude that, whether considered individually or collectively, they cannot support a finding that Agusta breached its duties. First, plaintiffs contend that the Agusta pilots should have requested a departure to the east or south, which would have directed them away from the active runways and the flow of fixed-wing traffic. Although the LOA had not yet been implemented at the time of the crash, plaintiffs emphasize that Agusta helicopters already could seek departures to the east and south. Plaintiffs, however, have not provided adequate evidence to show that the Agusta pilots breached their duties by not requesting such a departure. The undisputed evidence establishes that the Agusta pilots acted properly in seeking to take off to the west. At the time of takeoff, the wind was blowing from the northwest at a speed of eight knots, and the record demonstrates that helicopters should take off into the wind. Section 9-5 of the FAA Rotorcraft Flying Handbook directs pilots on takeoff to “head the helicopter into the wind, if possible.” J.A. 1750. Several witnesses echoed this sentiment. Indeed, plaintiffs’ expert Albert testified that “aircraft are supposed to take off and land into the wind,” J.A. 1685, and that “as far as wind direction, [the Agusta pilots’ requested takeoff] was probably appropriate.” J.A. at 1687. Plaintiffs concede the foregoing but argue that after taking off to the west, the Agusta pilots should have turned the helicopter in a different direction. Although plaintiffs presented evidence that the Agusta pilots could have executed such a maneuver, they have not shown that the pilots were required to do so in the circumstances here. Plaintiffs point to language in AIM § 4-3-17.a.2. that “[i]nsofar as possible, helicopter operations will be instructed to avoid the flow of fixed-wing aircraft.” J.A. 1484. But the remainder of that sentence clarifies that the provision’s purpose is “to minimize overall delays” and that “there will be many situations where faster/larger helicopters may be integrated with fixed-wing aircraft for the benefit of all concerned.” AIM § 4-3-17. a.2., J.A. 1484. Thus, section 9-18 of the FAA Rotorcraft Flying Handbook informs pilots that “[w]hen a control tower is in operation, you can request the type of departure you desire. In most cases, helicopter departures are made into the wind unless obstacles or traffic dictate otherwise.” J.A. 1751. The Agusta pilots desired to depart to the west in the direction of both the wind and their destination, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and traffic did not “dictate” against such a departure because it was “light to moderate” at the time. J.A. 798. Indeed, even after the LOA took effect, helicopters could depart in directions besides east and south if, as here, the pilot and ATC so coordinated. Furthermore, according to plaintiffs’ expert Sommer’s reconstruction of the accident, the Agusta pilots had not reached Runway 24, let alone Runway 33, by the time the Grumman lost control and crashed. The mere showing that the Agusta pilots could have sought a departure away from these runways does not create a genuine issue of fact as to whether they breached their duties by requesting a different departure; if it did, such an issue as to breach would arise in each of the “many situations” where helicopters integrate in the flow of fixed-wing traffic. AIM § 4-3- 17.a.2., J.A. 1484. Second, plaintiffs argue that the Agusta pilots should have clarified that they planned to go northwest rather than due west after ATC cleared them for a “westerly” departure. In support of this argument, plaintiffs emphasize that “[t]he single, most important thought in pilot-controller communications is understanding.” AIM § 4-2-1.b., J.A. 1481. They further note that pilots should “[r]equest[] clarification or amendment, as appropriate, any time clearance is not fully understood.” AIM § 5-5-2.a.3., J.A. 1486. In addition, plaintiffs suggest that the Agusta pilots’ unexpressed intention to turn right and fly further north to parallel Runway 33 violated the AIM provision dealing with “Unexpected Maneuvers in the Airport Traffic Pattern”: “Should a pilot decide to make maneuvering turns to maintain spacing behind a preceding aircraft, the pilot should always advise the controller if at all possible.” AIM § 4-3-5., J.A. 1483. We realize that according to Sommer’s report, the Grumman pilots “would have been aware that a westerly departure from the location of the Agusta could well have included an initial turn to the north around the departure end of runway 33,” consistent with normal operations at PNE. J.A. 1510. But the Agusta pilots never made the referenced right turn because the crash occurred before they were anywhere “near close enough to get going.” J.A. 1387. We do not see how the Agusta pilots could have violated any communication responsibilities by failing to warn of a maneuver that they did not make. Plaintiffs’ other accusations regarding the Agusta pilots’ alleged failure to clarify their intentions led to different witnesses expressing somewhat varying views on the meaning of the term “westerly.” But plaintiffs’ own experts opined that the Agusta pilots responded appropriately to their clearance. Burgess testified that from an ATC perspective, the Agusta pilots did nothing wrong based on “the clearance that they received and how they responded.” J.A. 1700. Gramlich testified that “[b]ased on an air traffic control perspective, no, I did not see anything wrong from the Agusta pilots.” J.A. 471. Stimson likewise testified that the Agusta pilots’ departure to the northwest was “within their ATC instructions.” J.A. 446. Finally, Richburg, the very individual to whom plaintiffs suggest that the Agusta pilots should have clarified their intentions, similarly did not express any problem with the Agusta pilots’ request for a westerly departure or their taking off to the northwest after receiving clearance. Given these views of both plaintiffs’ ATC experts and the controller involved, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that there was a defect in how the Agusta pilots communicated with ATC. Third, plaintiffs fault the Agusta pilots for not hearing Richburg’s direction, “55U make right traffic.” They contend that this missed communication by the Agusta pilots violated a portion of AIM § 4-2-1.b. which provides that “[p]ilots are to maintain vigilance in monitoring air traffic control radio communications frequencies for potential traffic conflicts with their aircraft especially when operating on an active runway.” J.A. 1481. But the evidence that plaintiffs produced belies the conclusion that this single missed transmission shows that the Agusta pilots lacked diligence. Cf. Transco Leasing Corp. v. United States, 896 F.2d 1435, 1447 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that duty “to exercise vigilance so as to see and avoid other aircraft” did not create “absolute duty to see and avoid”), amended on reh’g on other grounds, 905 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Greenwood Air Crash, 924 F. Supp. 1518, 1535 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (same). Albert testified that the mere fact that a pilot missed a single call generally does not reflect the pilot’s loss of situational awareness. J.A. 1689. Diaz added that a pilot reasonably might not hear a communication between ATC and another aircraft due to other factors requiring the pilot’s focus, including operation of the pilot’s own aircraft as well as the pilot’s own communications with ATC. J.A. 1146. Moreover, after referring to “that Grumman,” without registration numbers, in notifying the Agusta pilots of the Grumman’s initial left downwind departure plan, Richburg used the registration numbers alone in redirecting the Grumman to the right. J.A. 1444. As Burgess explained, such a discrepancy could justify other pilots in missing the transmission as in the absence of the prefix “Grumman,” “it’s questionable . . . whether the other pilots would know exactly what airplane [Richburg was] talking about.” J.A. 1029. Notwithstanding their missing of the single transmission, the Agusta pilots kept the Grumman in sight and stopped as soon as the Grumman began to turn right. In these circumstances, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the Agusta pilots lacked vigilance or situational awareness. Plaintiffs finally argue that the Agusta pilots’ collective conduct violated 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.13(a) and 91.111(a) by bringing them too close to the Grumman. Certainly pilots violate § 91.13(a) if they engage in careless or reckless conduct that causes potential, even if not actual, danger. See GoJet Airlines, LLC v. F.A.A., 743 F.3d 1168, 1172 (8th Cir. 2014); Cooper v. Hinson, 109 F.3d 997, 1001 (4th Cir. 1997); Roach v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 804 F.2d 1147, 1157 (10th Cir. 1986). Moreover, pilots violate § 91.111(a) if they fly so close to another aircraft as to create a collision hazard even if there is not a collision. See Bennett v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 66 F.3d 1130, 1135-36, 1138 n.11 (10th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, Sommer conceded that “there [was] no collision hazard with the Grumman” given that the Agusta pilots executed the quick stop. J.A. 1744. Based on Sommer’s reconstruction of the accident, the Agusta pilots were more than half a mile from the Grumman and flying slowly when the Grumman received the instruction to “make right traffic,” and the Agusta traveled only 50 feet closer to the Grumman before the Grumman pilots lost control. J.A. 1747. Even if we accepted Albert’s speculative estimate that the Agusta pilots were only about 1,000 feet from the Grumman when they turned, he acknowledged that even this distance was not so close as to create an emergency. J.A. 1100. The Agusta pilots’ precautionary decision to execute the quick stop no more demonstrates that they came so close as to breach their duties under the FARs than it demonstrates that the Grumman pilots breached these same duties by making the right turn that more immediately put the two aircraft on potentially conflicting paths. Cf. Transco, 896 F.2d at 1447 (“Without more, the fact that two airplanes collide in mid-air in visual meteorological conditions is not evidence of negligence on the part of both pilots or of negligence on the part of one, but not the other, pilot.”). Finally, plaintiffs’ own pilot expert, Suchocki, testified that the Agusta pilots complied with their duties under the FARs and did nothing wrong on the day of the accident. J.A. 455. Plaintiffs therefore have failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the Agusta pilots breached their duty of care.2