Opinion ID: 1477292
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Interpretations Given Equal Rights Amendments By Other Jurisdictions In Similar Situations.

Text: Perhaps most persuasive here is the growing body of case law from foreign jurisdictions flatly rejecting the argument that statutes that limit marriage to unions between a man and woman discriminate impermissibly on the basis of sex. Rand, 280 Md. at 512, 374 A.2d at 903 (Cases from other state jurisdictions interpreting the breadth and meaning of their equal rights amendments are instructive in ascertaining the reach of Maryland's [ERA].). The Court of Appeals of Washington, in Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash.App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974), was one of the first appellate courts to weigh-in on same-sex marriage in light of the then-newly promulgated ERA. There, the court held that [p]rior to adoption of the ERA, the proposition that women were to be accorded a position in the law inferior to that of men had a long history. Thus, in that context, the purpose of the ERA is to provide the legal protection, as between men and women, that apparently is missing from the state and federal Bills of Rights, and it is in light of that purpose that the language of the ERA must be construed. To accept the [same-sex couples'] contention that the ERA must be interpreted to prohibit statutes which refuse to permit same-sex marriages would be to subvert the purpose for which the ERA was enacted by expanding its scope beyond that which was undoubtedly intended by the majority of the citizens of this state who voted for the amendment. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1194. The majority of federal and state courts called on to consider analogous legal challenges since then have disposed of equal rights challenges in a similar manner. See, e.g., In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr.W.D.Wash.2004) (upholding the constitutionality of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and stating, [t]here is no evidence, from the voluminous legislative history or otherwise, that DOMA's purpose is to discriminate against men or women as a class. Accordingly, the marriage definition contained in DOMA does not classify according to gender. . . .); Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d 1, 6 (2006) (By limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, [the State] is not engaging in sex discrimination. The limitation does not put men and women in different classes, and give one class a benefit not given to the other. Women and Men are treated alike-they are permitted to marry people of the opposite sex, but not people of their own sex.); Andersen v. King Co., 158 Wash.2d 1, 138 P.3d 963, 987-89 (2006) (holding that the state DOMA does not discriminate on the basis of sex and cataloging the various cases from other jurisdictions interpreting their own equal rights amendments); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186-87 (1971); but see Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at  (Alaska Super.Ct. 27 February 1998), superceded by ALASKA. CONST. art. I, § 25 (amended 1999); Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44, 64 (1993) (plurality opinion) (determining that same-sex marriage statute drew a sex-based classification), abrogated by 1997 HAW. SESS. LAW H.B. 117 § 2, at 1247 (The Legislature shall have power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.). The Supreme Court of Vermont, in Baker v. Vermont, 170 Vt. 194, 744 A.2d 864 (1999), despite holding unconstitutional the exclusion of same-sex couples from the various benefits and protections that accompany marriage, rejected the argument that a statute limiting marriages to those between a man and woman constitutes sex-based discrimination. As the Vermont court stated, [t]he difficulty here is that the marriage laws are facially neutral; they do not single out men or women as a class for disparate treatment, but rather prohibit men and women equally from marrying a person of the same sex. Baker, 744 A.2d at 881 n. 13. Because there is no discrete class subject to differential treatment, according to the court's analysis, the prohibition on same-sex marriage did not draw a sex-based classification.