Opinion ID: 621110
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: procedural reasonableness of sentence claim

Text: If the appellate waiver provision is invalid or inapplicable, Cadavid is entitled to appeal the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. Such claims are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-52 (2007). Any factual findings determined by the district court in applying the sentencing guidelines are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Galloway, 439 F.3d 320, 322 (6th Cir. 2006). Cadavid argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable for three reasons: (1) the district court failed to calculate properly the guidelines when it held him accountable for twenty-five kilograms of chemicals and not two grams; (2) the district court failed to resolve each disputed fact on the record as required under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32; and (3) the district court used clearly erroneous facts and unreliable testimony from Agent Gibson in imposing the sentence. Because the first and the third arguments relate to the same issue—what drug quantity should be used to calculate Cadavid’s sentence—we discuss them together.
The base offense level for a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 960(d)(1) is set by referencing the drug quantity table in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.11(d). Where the amount in the offense is three kilograms or more of either ephedrine or PPA, the base offense level is thirty-eight. Where the amount is at least two 11 No. 10-1803 United States v. Cadavid-Yepes grams but less than four, the base offense level is eighteen.6 The district court first must make a finding as to the amount of drugs for which the defendant is “accountable” based on his relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. United States v. Gill, 348 F.3d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 2003). Relevant conduct includes “all quantities of drugs with which [the defendant] was directly involved and, in the case of joint criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable quantities.” United States v. Ledezma, 26 F.3d 636, 646 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 942 (1994). A district court’s findings with respect to drug quantities must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Gill, 348 F.3d at 151. “When the amount of drugs is uncertain, the district court must ‘err on the side of caution’ and hold the defendant accountable only for that amount that is more likely than not attributable to the defendant.” Id. The district court may, however, consider quantities of drugs not specified in the count of conviction if they were part of the same course of conduct as the offense of conviction. Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2)). At sentencing, the government offered seven pieces of evidence to establish that Cadavid was accountable for the twenty-five-kilogram drum and not just the two one-gram samples that he had sent to the United States: (1) Agent Gibson’s testimony that the confidential informant played the role of a broker who wanted to buy drums of ephedrine; (2) Agent Gibson’s testimony that the confidential informant told Cadavid in meetings that he was interested in getting drums of ephedrine or PPA; (3) that Cadavid sent a sample of both chemicals to Detroit, which implied a larger quantity 6 Section 2D1.11(d) n.(B) instructs the court to aggregate quantities when both ephedrine and PPA are involved. Thus, the pens containing one gram of each substance would be treated as two grams total under the guidelines. 12 No. 10-1803 United States v. Cadavid-Yepes would follow, and Agent Gibson’s testimony that these sales were typically in the form of drums because that is how chemical companies package them; (4) the March 21, 2006, email from Cadavid to the confidential informant attaching a photograph of a twenty-five-kilogram drum in which he states “I am sending proof of what there is here” and attaches a sheet detailing the specifics for a drum of ephedrine at either twenty-five or fifty kilograms; (5) the May 17, 2006, email from Cadavid to the confidential informant in which he states “From don efra7 there are 4000 pesos available, but this has to be quickly, because there are several people behind that,” which Agent Gibson testified referenced either four kilograms of ephedrine or four twenty-five-kilogram drums; (6) the June 6, 2006, email from Cadavid to the confidential informant stating “two bottles and they belong to efrain,” which Agent Gibson testified meant two drums of ephedrine; (7) intercepted calls between Cadavid and other individuals discussing unspecified large quantities of ephedrine; and (8) that Cadavid obtained his samples from Edgar Bohorquez, Cadavid introduced the confidential informant to Bohorquez, and Bohorquez sold one twenty-five-kilogram drum to the confidential informant in September 2006, three months after Cadavid’s arrest. R. 61 (Sent. Hr’g. Tr. Part A at 7-10) (summarizing evidence); R. 68 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. Part 1 at 23-67) (testimony Agent Gibson). The district court, focusing on what conduct was reasonably foreseeable from the defendant’s actions, found that Cadavid was accountable for twenty-five kilograms based on the “testimony, exhibits, [and] the argument[s].” R. 61 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. Part A at 22). 7 Cadavid does not dispute that the subject of these emails was the sale of ephedrine, or that words like “Don efra” and “efrain” were code for ephedrine. R. 68 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. Part 1 at 30). 13 No. 10-1803 United States v. Cadavid-Yepes Cadavid argues primarily that any connection to twenty-five kilograms is speculative, based on unreliable hearsay, or based on Agent Gibson’s erroneous interpretation of the coded emails. He offers no alternative explanation of the coded phrases in the emails that Agent Gibson argued referenced drums, e.g. “two bottles.” Even were we to exclude the informant’s statements Cadavid claims were not supported by documentary evidence,8 there is ample evidence connecting Cadavid to the ultimate sale of a twenty-five-kilogram drum by Bohorquez, which Cadavid does not deny occurred three months after his arrest. Cadavid does not dispute that he put Bohorquez and the informant in touch, Cadavid admits he obtained the samples from Bohorquez, and Cadavid offers no alternative explanation for the contents of the emails that connect him to the sale of a drum. The evidence establishes Cadavid’s knowledge of and association with the ultimate sale of a twenty-fivekilogram drum such that he can be held responsible for it even if he was not present for the transaction. See Ledezma, 26 F.3d at 645-46. Cadavid’s other attacks on the evidence are equally unavailing. The revelation that the photo of a twenty-five-kilogram drum Cadavid sent as an e-mail attachment was merely an image downloaded from a website and not an actual drum shows at most that Cadavid did not have a drum in his possession when he sent the email. However, the district court placed greater emphasis on the specification sheet in the email detailing the quantities available as either a twenty-five-kilogram or 8 We need not and do not decide whether there were sufficient indicia of reliability under U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 for the court to consider the statements of the confidential informant offered by Agent Gibson at sentencing, because the defendant’s own statements and actions support the district court’s findings. 14 No. 10-1803 United States v. Cadavid-Yepes fifty-kilogram drum. R. 61 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. Part A at 22). Nor must Cadavid have ever possessed the drum to be responsible for the greater amount. See Ledezma, 26 F.3d at 646. Given this record, we cannot hold that the district court committed clear error in finding Cadavid accountable for the twenty-five-kilogram drum that Bohorquez sold and not just for the two one-gram samples.
Finally, we also reject Cadavid’s argument that the district court failed to resolve properly the dispute over drug quantity. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(B), formerly Rule 32(c)(3)(D), requires a district court to make findings with respect to any controverted matter or else rule that a finding is not necessary. United States v. Solorio, 337 F.3d 580, 598 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1063 (2003). At sentencing, Cadavid’s counsel was given an opportunity to present evidence regarding his position on the drug quantity and declined to do so, relying solely on argument and his sentencing memorandum and exhibits. R. 61 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. Part A at 4). The district court then issued its findings of fact resolving the issue of drug quantity. Id. at 21. Cadavid’s claim that his subsequent allocution created new disputes of fact that the district court failed to resolve lacks merit both because his allocution merely reargued the same dispute and because the district court heard all of Cadavid’s arguments and reached the same conclusions following the allocution, which the district court then again stated on record. R. 66 (Sent. Hr’g Tr. Part B at 7-8) (“I believe the offense was intended to be a large amount of improper substance being sent privately to individuals here [in the United States].”). We hold the district court did not violate Rule 32. 15 No. 10-1803 United States v. Cadavid-Yepes