Opinion ID: 2774634
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Specific Intent to Defraud

Text: Turning to the specific-intent requirement, Plato first asserts that his efforts to repay the noteholders and refusal to seek bankruptcy protection indicate that he did not intend to defraud investors; the jury, however, was free to discredit this evidence in light of the other evidence of knowing misrepresentations. Insofar as the specific-intent requirement involves misrepresentations, Plato broadly challenges the evidentiary sufficiency of those misrepresentations based on the acquittal of Walker, the co-conspirator alleged in the indictment. Favorably construed, the crux of Plato’s argument is that Walker, as the primary point of contact with investors, was responsible for any misrepresentations and that, after Walker’s acquittal, the Government did not show that Plato “knew the scheme involved false representations.” 15 In support, Plato points to his testimony that he never advised Walker on marketing materials, and only had direct contact with one investor, which did not involve discussion of the Notes. However, this argument is fatally undermined by the record evidence and this court’s precedent. As noted above, the evidence supported numerous misrepresentations in the Notes themselves, misrepresentations for which Plato was directly responsible as the drafter of the Notes and President of MPC. On this basis alone, there is ample evidence for a reasonable jury to find that these misrepresentations evidenced Plato’s specific intent to defraud the investors, allowing a rational trier of fact to make the specific-intent finding that Plato “knowingly acted with the specific intent to deceive.” 15 United States v. Phipps, 595 F.3d 243, 246 (5th Cir. 2010). 10 Case: 13-20222 Document: 00512919459 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/29/2015 No. 13-20222