Opinion ID: 2646701
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Filed-Rate Doctrine

Text: The filed-rate doctrine is also known as the filedtariff doctrine. Balthazar, 109 Hawai#i at 72, 123 P.3d at 198. Essentially, “it prohibits a regulated entity from charging rates for its services that differ from the rates filed with the appropriate federal regulatory agency.” Id. (citing Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981)). In Balthazar, this court provided a brief history of the doctrine, noting that the twin aims of the filed-rate doctrine were to “(1) prevent[] service or rate discrimination among consumers and (2) prevent[] courts from intruding upon the rate-making authority of federal agencies.” Id. at 73, 123 P.3d at 198 (citing Bryan v. BellSouth Communications, Inc., 377 F.3d 424, 429 (4th Cir. 2004)). Although originally a federal doctrine, this court has held that the principles of the filed-rate doctrine apply where rates are filed with a state regulatory agency. Id. (citing Molokoa Village Dev. Co. v. Kauai Elec. Co., 60 Haw. 582, 587, 593 P.2d 375, 379 (1979) (stating that the rule that prevents carriers from being bound under equitable doctrines to their undercharges “applies equally to other utilities”)). In the telecommunications sector, regulated entities have their rates and terms defined in tariffs filed with the state PUC and the FCC. See Balthazar, 109 Hawai#i at 74, 123 P.3d at 199. “Generally, tariffs are ‘public documents setting forth services being offered; rates and charges with respect to services; and governing rules, regulations, and practices 25 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER relating to those services.’” In re Waikoloa Sanitary Sewer Co., 109 Hawai#i 263, 271, 125 P.3d 484, 492 (2005) (brackets omitted) (quoting Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 808 N.E.2d 1248, 1263 (2004)). Pursuant to the filed-rate doctrine, “filed tariffs govern a utility’s relationship with its customers and have the force and effect of law until suspended or set aside.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 217 (2002)). Balthazar noted that “neither the tort of the carrier nor the existence of a contract will work to vary or enlarge the rights defined in a tariff.” 109 Hawai#i at 73, 123 P.3d at 198 (citation omitted). It is well-established that “‘the filed-rate doctrine. . . does not preclude courts from interpreting the provisions of a tariff and enforcing that tariff,’ Brown [v. MCI WorldCom Network Services, Inc.], 277 F.3d [1166,] 1171-72 [(9th Cir. 2002)], and that ‘if the filed-rate doctrine were to bar a court from interpreting and enforcing the provisions of a tariff, that doctrine would render meaningless the provisions of the [Federal Communications Act] allowing plaintiffs redress in federal court,’ id. at 1172.” Waikoloa, 109 Hawai#i at 272, 125 P.3d at 493 (original brackets omitted). The filed-rate or filed-tariff doctrine does preclude certain types of claims, however. This court has held that claims that “directly attack the validity or reasonableness of rates or terms defined in a tariff” are barred, see Balthazar, 26 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 109 Hawai#i at 74, 81, 123 P.3d at 199, 206, and claims that seek damages are barred “if an award of damages ‘would have the effect of imposing any rate other than that reflected in the filed tariff[,]’” id. at 81, 123 P.3d at 206 (quoting Dreamscape Design, Inc. v. Affinity Network, Inc., 414 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2005)). Despite these limitations, it appears that so long as a claim only “ask[s] the courts to interpret the filed rates, or to enforce the filed rates” the claim will not be barred by the filed-rate doctrine. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This court has applied the filed-rate doctrine in three prior cases, Molokoa Village, Balthazar, and Waikoloa, which are briefly summarized as follows for illustrative purposes. In Molokoa Village, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, the electric utility serving Kauai, was required to reimburse to the plaintiff the costs of installation of an underground electric system in a real estate development, as agreed upon by the parties. 60 Haw. at 583, 593 P.2d at 377. The defendant alleged that although the parties had agreed, it was unable to lawfully reimburse the full agreed-upon costs because of the limitations provided in its tariff. Id. at 584, 593 P.2d at 377. According to the terms of the tariff, the tariff barred payment of the agreed-upon claim, unless the additional expense of the underground installation was for “engineering and operating reasons.” Id. at 588, 593 P.2d at 380. This court construed the defendant’s position as asserting the defense of 27 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER “illegality,” and therefore concluded that the defendant carried the burden of proof to show that the reimbursement would violate the tariff limitation. Id. In addressing the merits, Molokoa Village held that “[t]he facts found by the trial court suggest that the [plaintiff] may have had engineering and operating reasons for some portion of [the] underground installation and thus do not negate the existence of such reasons for assuming the entire cost of the system.” Id. at 589, 593 P.2d at 380. Since the defendant did not affirmatively establish that there were no engineering and operating reasons for the additional cost, this court held that a reimbursement of the agreed-upon amount was required. Id. Thus, in Molokoa Village, the filed-rate doctrine was analyzed as a defense to a contract claim. In Balthazar, Verizon had represented to consumers that they must pay a fee in order to receive “Touch Calling” services. 109 Hawai#i at 71, 123 P.3d at 196. However, identical telephone services were provided to customers who did not pay the fee. Id. at 70, 123 P.3d at 195. The plaintiffs filed a complaint against Verizon, claiming that Verizon had engaged in false, unfair, and/or deceptive trade practices by misrepresenting to consumers that they had to pay an additional fee. Id. at 71, 123 P.3d at 195. The relevant tariff provisions provided that a charge was to be paid for the Touch Calling service, because the PUC had ordered that the existing rate structure be kept intact despite changes in the relevant technology, to enable the recovery of costs for other services. Id. 28 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Verizon filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that plaintiff’s complaint was barred by both the filedrate and primary jurisdiction doctrines. Id. The trial court denied Verizon’s motion to dismiss, but later granted a motion for summary judgment filed by Verizon on the ground that the claims were barred by the filed-rate doctrine. Id. at 70, 123 P.3d at 195. This court held that the claims were barred because (1) knowledge of the tariff terms, including the fees for Touch tone calling services was imputed to consumers under the filedrate doctrine, id. at 75, 123 P.3d at 200, (2) despite the alleged misrepresentations, the plaintiffs incurred no injury because they had paid the filed rate for the Touch Calling service under the terms of the tariff, id. at 80, 123 P.3d at 205, and (3) payment to the plaintiffs to reimburse the Touch Calling fee by Verizon or by the court in the form of damages would have the effect of imposing a lower rate for Touch Calling fees than the rate prescribed by the tariff, in violation of the filed-rate doctrine, id. at 80-81, 123 P.3d at 205-06. Thus, in Balthazar, this court interpreted and enforced the terms of the tariff in reaching its result. In Waikoloa, this court considered, inter alia, whether contributions made by real estate developers to a public utility to build new wastewater collection and treatment facilities fell within the purview of a filed tariff. 109 Hawai#i at 270, 125 P.3d at 491. The appellant had appealed from a final order of the PUC requiring that it refund certain contributions. Id. 29 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER This court concluded that the PUC had erred in requiring that the appellant provide a refund to the developers, because the appellant’s filed tariff stated that “[developers] shall be required to pay a non-refundable contribution in aid of construction of the Company.” Id. at 272, 125 P.3d at 493 (emphasis in original). Waikoloa interpreted the tariff under the principles of statutory interpretation, and held that because the tariff language explicitly prohibited refunds, the payments were not refundable, regardless of whether the limitations on refunds furthered the public policy behind the filed-rate doctrine. Id. at 272 n.10, 273, 125 P.3d at 493 n.10, 494.