Opinion ID: 783410
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the Doctrine of Comparative Liability

Text: 20 Ammar contends that the district court, in reducing his damages award, mistakenly applied principles of assumption of risk rather than contributory negligence or comparative negligence. We see no indication that this is so. 21 Assumption of risk is the knowledgeable acceptance by an employee of a dangerous condition when and if such acceptance was necessary for the performance of his duties. Rivera v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 474 F.2d 255, 257 (2d Cir.1973) ( Rivera ). Assumption of risk has long been eliminated from maritime injury law by statute. See id. at 256-57 (citing 35 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1946) (railroad employees), as amended, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1946), made applicable to seamen by 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1946)). 22 Instead, the Jones Act incorporates the doctrine of comparative negligence, under which recovery is reduced if the plaintiff is found to have been negligent and his negligence contributed to his injury. See, e.g., Rivera, 474 F.2d at 257. Such contributory negligence in a Jones Act case connotes some careless act or omission on the part of the employee over and above [mere] knowledgeable acceptance of a risk. Id. The defendant must show more than that the seaman simply had knowledge of a hazard; it must show that the seaman fail[ed] to adopt safer alternative courses of action, and the inquiry at trial should thus center[] on what choices were available to [the Plaintiff] and how he exercised those choices. Akermanis v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 688 F.2d 898, 904 n. 2 (2d Cir.1982). 23 In the present case, the district court, citing Rivera, expressly discussed the differences between the concepts of assumption of risk and comparative or contributory negligence. Noting that [n]othing about [its] findings suggest[ed] that [the court thought] it was necessary for the performance of Mr. Ammar's duties that he accept the risk of climbing on board the crane, the court stated that its findings all relate to the theory of contributory or comparative negligence, which connotes some careless act or omission on the part of the employee, over and above that knowledgeable acceptance of risk. (Dec. 5 Tr. at 26.) 24 As discussed in Part II.B. below, the court's findings focused not simply on Ammar's knowledge of the danger in the approach he took but also on the existence of less dangerous approaches and Ammar's awareness of those alternatives. Thus, Ammar's contention that the court applied erroneous legal principles finds no support in the record. 25