Opinion ID: 6494575
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Political Pressure and Due Process

Text: Apart from ex parte communications, a distinct due process basis for the invalidation of an agency’s decision is external political pressure. In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiāhole I), 94 Hawai'i 97, 123, 9 P.3d 409, 435 (2000). In assessing whether external political pressure runs afoul of due process, the focus is “on the nexus between the pressure and the actual decision maker”; that is, “the relation between the communications and the adjudicator’s decisionmaking process.” Id. at 123-24, 9 P.3d at 435-36 (quoting ATX, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 41 F.3d 1522, 1527 (1994)). The majority concludes that no improper political pressure was effectuated in this case because, while there was direct contact between Aila and the respective chiefs of staff of the Governor and Senator Inouye at the March 21, 2012 meeting, there is no indication “that they discussed anything other than the timing of BLNR’s final decision following the contested case hearing.” Majority at 401-02, 382 P.3d at 213-14. However, the record does not enable this court to determine the exact role played by the chiefs of staff of the Governor and Senator Inouye at the March 21, 2012 meeting, what was said by the participants during that meeting, or the potential effect on Aila of what the chiefs of staff said. In short, because it cannot be gleaned from the record whether Aila was politically influenced by the participants in the March 21, 2012 meeting, there is insufficient information that would allow this court to conclude that due process was not affronted by external political pressure. The concurrence underscores the status of Aila as a member of the Governor’s Cabinet and posits that Aila should be free to respond to the Governor and the community regarding the procedural status of BLNR proceedings. Concurrence at 409-10, 382 P.3d at 221-22. Although this is accurate, even procedural inquiries by the Governor’s office about pending contested case proceedings before BLNR carnes the potential to subtly influence the substantive decisionmaking of the recipient of the inquiry. Prof'l Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth. (PATCO v. FLRA II), 685 F.2d 547, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Further, while the Governor, as the head of the executive branch, should have some leeway in overseeing the business of the various state administrative agencies, there is no gubernatorial “prerogative to influence quasi-judicial administrative agency proceedings through behind-the-scenes lobbying.” Portland Audubon Soc. v. Endangered Species Comm’n, 984 F.2d 1534, 1546 (9th Cir. 1993). As the Supreme Court has pronounced, “there may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on executive officers and members of executive tribunals whose decisions after healing affect interests of individuals, the discharge of which the President can not in a particular case properly influence or control.” Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135, 47 S.Ct. 21, 71 L.Ed. 160 (1926). The same limitation circumscribes the manner in which the Governor must manage state agencies. This court reaffirmed this legal principle in Waiāhole I: “We do not take lightly the governor’s legitimate supervisory interest and role with respect to [administrative agencies]. At the same time, we cannot emphasize strongly enough that all adjudicative proceedings conducted by [administrative agencies] must conform to the same exacting standards of fairness, impartiality, and independence of judgment applicable in any court of law.” Waiāhole I, 94 Hawai'i at 124, 9 P.3d at 436. The concurrence notes that Kilakila did not request that Aila be disqualified in light of the March 21, 2012 meeting. However, disqualification is a remedy for bias and impartiality, and ex parte communications to an administrative decisionmaker, without more, do not provide sufficient grounds for disqualification. See Sussel v. City & Cty. of Honolulu Civil Serv. Comm’n, 71 Haw. 101, 107, 784 P.2d 867, 870 (1989) (“[N]o one would argue seriously that the disqualification of [decision-makers] on grounds of actual bias ... prevents unfairness in all cases. So ‘our system of [justice] has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.’ ” (first quoting State v. Brown, 70 Haw. 459, 467, 776 P.2d 1182, 1187 (1989), and then quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955))). Thus, the remedy for improper ex parte communications is distinct from that demanded in cases involving a biased or impartial decisionmaker. The mere existence of improper ex parte communications does not automatically result in disqualification of an adjudicating agency decisionmaker; “due process requires disqualification where ‘circumstances fairly give rise to an appearance of impropriety and reasonably cast suspicion on [the adjudicator’s] impartiality.’ ” Liberty Dialysis-Haw., LLC v. Rainbow Dialysis, LLC, 130 Hawai'i 95, 110-11, 306 P.3d 140, 155-56 (2013) (quoting State v. Ross, 89 Hawai'i 371, 377, 974 P.2d 11, 17 (1998)). Indeed, if a party to an administrative proceeding could disqualify a decisionmaker for receiving improper ex parte communications, there is nothing to inhibit parties from employing such communications as a tool to “eliminate unfavorable decisionmakers.” 32 Charles Alan Wright & Charles H. Koch, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure Judicial Review § 8260 (1st ed. 2006). In addition, Kilakila could not have requested that Aila be disqualified because BLNR never disclosed sufficient information in response to Kilakila’s multiple requests regarding ex parte communications involving Aila. Without any additional information as to what was said during the March 21, 2012 meeting, what roles the attendees played, and the possible effect on Aila of what was discussed, Kilakila was never in a position to reasonably assess whether there were adequate grounds to seek Aila’s disqualification. Further, Kilakila’s motion for reconsideration of BLNR’s repeated refusals to disclose information that could support a disqualification request was denied the same day that the ATST permit was issued, effectively preventing any attempt at disqualifying Aila or other Board members.