Opinion ID: 2321016
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Testimony About Defendant's Drinking

Text: The defendant argues that the trial justice erred in failing to pass the case when Ms. DelValle testified that defendant had been drinking on the day of the incident. At issue is the following dialogue that occurred during redirect examination: [THE PROSECUTOR]: Do you remember what the defendant was wearing that day? [MS. DELVALLE]: He was wearing that same sweater with black pants and a hat and a backpack, and he was drinking. Defense counsel immediately requested a sidebar conference, during which he moved to pass the case. At sidebar, defense counsel also requested a significant instruction if the trial justice denied the motion to pass. The prosecutor expressed to the trial justice that she thought she previously had instructed Ms. DelValle not to talk about defendant's alcohol use. At sidebar, the prosecutor surmised that Ms. DelValle presumed that testifying about defendant's drinking was permissible because earlier cross-examination of Ms. DelValle elicited testimony that she and defendant had used crack cocaine together. The trial justice sustained defense counsel's objection to the testimony but ultimately declined to pass the case. After the sidebar conference the trial justice struck the offending testimony and instructed the jury to disregard Ms. DelValle's answer pertaining to defendant's drinking. [5] The defendant argues that this remark by Ms. DelValle may have induced the jurors to conclude that defendant's alcohol consumption caused him to act irrationally and violently in his encounter with Ms. DelValle. The defendant cites this Court's holding in Handy v. Geary, 105 R.I. 419, 252 A.2d 435 (1969) as support for this contention. In Handy, this Court instructed that whenever a party seeks to introduce evidence of alcohol consumption, the trial justice shall conduct a preliminary hearing outside the presence of the jury to resolve whether evidence of alcohol consumption rises to such a level that it should be admitted at trial. State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 583 (R.I.2009) (citing Handy, 105 R.I. at 431, 252 A.2d at 441-42). Only if the trial justice finds that the evidence is such that different minds can naturally and fairly come to different conclusions on the question of intoxication [6] may evidence of drinking be admitted with proper instruction given to the jury. Handy, 105 R.I. at 431, 252 A.2d at 442. We extended the application of this procedure to criminal cases in State v. Amaral, 109 R.I. 379, 386-88, 285 A.2d 783, 787-88 (1972). The defendant further argues that the cautionary instruction given by the trial justice did not dispel the taint of the challenged evidence, thus requiring the justice to declare a mistrial. We disagree. In considering a motion to pass occasioned by the accidental introduction of allegedly harmful information at trial, the trial justice must assess the prejudicial impact of the information. State v. Rosario, 14 A.3d 206, 215 (R.I.2011) (quoting State v. LaPlante, 962 A.2d 63, 70 (R.I.2009)). A statement may be held to be sufficiently prejudicial when it is extraneous to the issues before the jury and tend[s] to inflame the passions of the jury. Id. (quoting State v. Monteiro, 924 A.2d 784, 792 (R.I.2007)). Furthermore, rather than using some prescribed formula for determining prejudice, we have observed that potentially prejudicial evidence must be viewed in the context in which it appeared and in light of the attendant circumstances. Id. (quoting LaPlante, 962 A.2d at 70-71). Taking into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the statement by Ms. DelValle, we hold that the comment regarding defendant's drinking on the day of the incident was not sufficiently prejudicial as to prevent the jury from calmly and dispassionately considering the evidence. See Rosario, 14 A.3d at 216. Indeed, prior to Ms. DelValle's statement, the jury already had been made aware during Ms. DelValle's earlier testimony that both she and defendant had used crack cocaine all the time together. This testimony concerning defendant's drug use was admitted without objection. In the context of this other, possibly more, prejudicial testimonial evidence, the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying to pass the case. Moreover, the trial justice's cautionary instruction to the jury took place immediately after the sidebar conference. Unless some indication exists that the jury failed to obey the cautionary instruction given by the trial justice, we must assume that the jury followed the instruction as given. State v. Barbosa, 908 A.2d 1000, 1005 (R.I.2006); see also State v. Mendoza, 889 A.2d 153, 159 (R.I.2005). In this case, there is no indication that the jury failed to obey the cautionary instruction. Therefore, considering the full testimonial evidence and the trial justice's specific and timely cautionary instruction to the jury, we find no clear error committed by the trial justice in refusing to pass the case.