Opinion ID: 1723746
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court erroneously allowed the submission of a jury instruction requiring the plaintiffs to prove the cause of the ignition of the fire.

Text: ¶ 10. The Snapps base their claim that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence upon the facts that the fire started in the Harrison bay and that two fire fighters, three fire investigators and the Assistant Fire Chief all acknowledged that the [Varsol] burned and caused extreme smoke and fire damage to the plaintiffs goods. Further they base their claims upon the fact that Harrison was declared by the trial court to be negligent per se in that the paint thinner was (1) stored without a permit as required by § 402.11 of the city fire code; (2) stored without a two hour fire wall (a wall that would take an ordinary fire two hours to burn through) separating the Harrison storage bay from that of the Snapps, as required by § 904.6.4 of the city fire code; (3) stored in unregulated five gallon plastic containers as required by Table 904-A of the city fire code; and that (4) the 3/4 inch shelving above the Varsol was less than the one inch minimum shelving required by § 904.5.4 of the city fire code. ¶ 11. The Snapps claim that if the Defendant would not have been negligent per se in his storage of Varsol, we would not be here today. The Snapps further claim that the evidence was so overwhelming that it could support only one theory: that the Defendant was negligent and that his negligence was, as a matter of law, a proximate contributing cause of the plaintiffs extensive losses. (emphasis added). ¶ 12. Harrison argues that regardless of the violations of the fire code, there exists no proof of a causal connection between that negligence and the injuries claimed by the Snapps. Harrison also argues that because the origin of the fire is undetermined, no causal connection can be shown to exist between Harrison or any of his employees and the fire. ¶ 13. We find two cases instructive to the case sub judice. In Reid & Sibell, Inc. v. Gilmore & Edwards Co., 134 Cal. App.2d 60, 285 P.2d 364 (Cal. App. 1955) the California Appellate Court held that although the storage of paint thinner which caught ablaze was negligence in that case, no liability applies unless that negligence was a proximate cause of the destruction of the plaintiffs goods. Reid & Sibell, Inc. at 369. That case also makes clear that whether negligence is a proximate contributing cause of the resulting fire is a jury question. Reid & Sibell, Inc., at 371. In that case, the jury decided the question in favor of the plaintiffs, and that court did not disturb that jury's verdict. ¶ 14. In Munford, Inc. v. Peterson, 368 So.2d 213, 217 (Miss. 1979), this Court stated that when a statute is violated, the injured party is entitled to an instruction that the party violating the statute is guilty of negligence and, if that negligence proximately caused or contributed to the injury, then the injured party is entitled to recover. The plaintiffs in the case sub judice were granted this entitlement in Instruction P-6A, and admit as much in their brief at page 17. ¶ 15. These cases are enlightening because both make clear that the issue of proximate or contributing causation is one for the jury as long as there is adequate support in the record for the jury's finding. These holdings are in direct contravention of the Snapps' claims that the issue of proximate causation is one of law. Therefore, if there is credible evidence in the record to support the finding that there was no causal connection between Harrison's negligence per se and the fire which destroyed the Snapps' property, the trial judge was correct in denying the motion for a new trial. ¶ 16. The Snapps put on several witnesses who had investigated the fire. None of them could hazard a guess as to how the fire started, and all agreed that it is not unusual for a fire investigator to be unable to find the ignition source. However, all of them agreed that the mere presence of the Varsol was insufficient to start this fire. The Snapp's expert, Assistant Fire Chief Ronnie Smith, on cross examination, went so far as to agree that no fire code violations by Harrison had anything to do with the cause or origin of the fire in any form or fashion. This Court has always condemned the use of possible and could have evidence in negligence cases. Carpenter v. Nobile, 620 So.2d 961, 965 (Miss. 1993); Foster v. State, 508 So.2d 1111, 1118 (Miss. 1987). The jury correctly evaluated the testimony and did not resort to guesswork to find the missing piece of the puzzle  causation. ¶ 17. The Snapps also assign as error the fact that the trial court granted Harrison jury instruction D-18A. That instruction required the jury to find that Harrison or one of his employees put in motion the events through which the damage occurred. It further required that without such a finding, the verdict should be for the defense. ¶ 18. The Snapps argue that several witnesses testified that it is not unusual to be unable to find the ignition source. Therefore, a fire victim would never be able to recover for losses unless he could demonstrate exactly how the fire started. We find this argument unavailing for two reasons: (1) to adhere to such an argument would create a different standard of liability in fire or arson cases, whereby it would be sufficient to find that a fire started on property belonging to the defendant without having to prove that an act of the defendant, or a failure to act, was the proximate cause of the damages suffered by any plaintiff; (2) the Snapps' own witness, Assistant Fire Chief Smith, agreed unequivocally on cross-examination that the damages suffered by the Snapps had nothing to do with the storage of Varsol in the Harrison bay. After a consideration of the evidence, it is apparent that the jury took this testimony literally. As a result, we find that Instruction D-18A was given based upon evidence within the record, and the instruction was properly followed by the jury. Therefore, we find this assignment of error to be meritless.