Opinion ID: 2638642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Stump

Text: This Court has not addressed previously the issue of whether an expert must consult a local physician who practiced in the community during the exact date of the alleged negligence, to survive a motion for summary judgment. At a glance, the case of Gubler v. Boe, 120 Idaho 294, 815 P.2d 1034 (1991), appears to address this issue. In that case, this Court examined an appeal from a medical malpractice case invoking the provisions of I.C. § 6-1012. Id. at 296, 815 P.2d at 1036. During trial, the district court considered the testimony of Dr. Tune, an expert witness who claimed that he had familiarized himself with the local standard of care in existence in Pocatello, Idaho, at the time of the alleged negligence of the defendant. Id. at 295, 815 P.2d at 1035. The district court found that the expert failed to meet the time and place requirements of I.C. § 6-1012. Id. The court pointed to the fact that the expert consulted an Idaho Falls physician, as opposed to a Pocatello physician, and that the standard discussed was that in existence in 1988, as opposed to that in 1983, the time of the alleged negligence. Id. In reaching its decision, the district court indicated that a local physician who consults with an out-of-state expert must establish that the information provided about the local standard pertains specifically to the time period in which the alleged negligence occurred. Id. However, an in-depth examination of Gubler reveals that this Court did not reach the time specificity issue on appeal. Rather, in Gubler, the relevant issues on appeal concerned whether the district court erred in denying the Gubler's motion for a continuance and whether the combined testimony of Dr. Tune and Dr. Boe, the defendant physician, sufficed to familiarize the expert with the local standard of care. Id. at 296, 815 P.2d at 1036. The language discussing the time specificity requirement found in Gubler pertains only to the district court's interpretation of the requirements of I.C. § 6-1012. Id. Consequently, the time specificity issue remains unaddressed by this Court. In this case, Dr. Stump, a board-certified neurologist, testified in his deposition that he consulted with Dr. Adornato about the medical standards of health care in Boise, Idaho. Dr. Adornato, also a neurologist, practiced in Boise in the late '80's, early '90's. Dr. Adornato, who has since moved to California, told Dr. Stump that based on the broad spread of medical knowledge and the availability of, basically, national meetings, that he felt it would be unlikely that there would be any variations in the medical care standards. Dr. Stump testified that he and Dr. Adornato specifically discussed the similarities in the standards of care pertaining to the time period in which Dr. Adornato practiced in Boise. Dr. Stump also indicated that he had read the depositions provided by Dr. Holland and Dr. Waters. The district court found that Dr. Stump failed to adequately familiarize himself with the local standard of care. The court noted: With respect to Dr. Stump's opinion regarding Dr. Holland's care, Dr. Stump failed to adequately familiarize himself with the standard of care applicable towell both to [an] emergency room doctor, certainly to an emergency room doctor in Boise in August of 1994, where all he did was speak to a fellow neurologist, Dr. Adornato. Dr. Adornato himself was not an emergency room doctor nor was he practicing in Boise in August ofin fact, in any medicine in Boise in August of 1994. With respect to Dr. Waters, I find the same fatal flaw, essentially Dr. Stump did not adequately familiarize himself with the standard of care applicable to an orthopedic surgeon in Boise in August of 1994, where the only consultation he had was with Dr. Adornato, again a neurologist who is not practicing orthopedic surgery or any other type of medicine in Boise at the relevant time. I would find that Dr. Stump's testimony and affidavit should have been considered. While it is true that Dr. Adornato was not practicing in Boise in 1994, there is no evidence or suggestion in the record that the standard of care changed in the two-year time period ranging from 1992-1994. For purposes of summary judgment, an inference exists that the standard of care did not change during the relatively brief time period. In addition, it is relevant that the record is void of evidence to suggest that a neurologist has different training and experience than an emergency room physician or an Internal Medicine doctor. This becomes particularly relevant when the testimony of the neurologist pertains to neurological tests performed by an orthopedist. This Court has noted that an expert does not need to share the same specialty as the defendant doctor; rather this is one factor to consider when determining if the expert's testimony satisfies I.C. §§ 6-1012, -1013. Further, in Hoene v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 752, 828 P.2d 315 (1992), this Court noted that I.C. §§ 6-1012, -1013 should not be utilized to shield physicians from suit in malpractice cases. Id. at 756, 828 P.2d at 319. This Court observed, [t]here is no indication in I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 that the legislature intended to grant this immunity from suit.... Id. The record indicates that Dr. Stump contacted numerous physicians to familiarize himself with the local standard of care. According to the affidavit of Lawrence Duff, letters were sent to twenty-two orthopedic physicians licensed in Idaho. Telephone calls were made to other out-of-state orthopedic physicians licensed in Idaho, however none of the physicians contacted were practicing in Idaho in 1994. Physicians are reluctant to testify against their fellow local physicians. Consequently, too rigidly enforcing the requirements set forth in the code provisions could serve to make it impossible for out-of-state experts to familiarize themselves with the local standard of care. This could ultimately preclude plaintiffs, such as Anna Dulaney, from bringing medical malpractice claims against Boise physicians under any set of facts. For the above-stated reasons, I would hold that the district court erred in finding that Dr. Stump's affidavit was inadmissible.