Opinion ID: 677079
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Habit or Practice of Using Excessive Force

Text: 21 Thompson contends that the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence (the affidavits from the other alleged victims and witnesses) that Boggs used excessive force on occasions other than July 29, 1989 (date of Thompson arrest). He submits that under Fed.R.Evid. 406 the affidavits are admissible as evidence establishing a habit or routine practice on Boggs' part. Thompson has failed to develop his argument or cite any legal authority, thus, under our Circuit's precedent, the argument is waived. First Indiana Bank v. Baker, 957 F.2d 506, 508 (7th Cir.1992) ([the appellant] has waived this issue, for he has failed to cite any pertinent authority for his argument ...); United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir.1991) ([w]e repeatedly have made clear that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1058, 122 L.Ed.2d 364 (1993). Even if Thompson had not waived the issue, he would not be entitled to relief for the following reasons. 22 In Wheeler v. Sims, 951 F.2d 796 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 320, 121 L.Ed.2d 241 (1992), we noted that the appellant carries a heavy burden in challenging a trial court's evidentiary rulings on appeal because 'a reviewing court gives special deference to the evidentiary rulings of the trial court.' Thus, we will reverse such rulings only upon a showing that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion. Id. at 801-02 (quoting United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1489-90 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 863, 111 S.Ct. 173, 112 L.Ed.2d 137 (1990)) (internal quotations omitted). [T]he abuse of discretion standard is met only when the trial judge's 'decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law or where the record contains no evidence on which he rationally could have based that decision, or where the supposed facts found are clearly erroneous.'  Id. (quoting Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 563-64 (7th Cir.1984)). 23 Federal Rule of Evidence 406 provides that: 24 Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice. 25 As the Advisory Committee noted in its Comment to Rule 406, habit describes one's regular response to a repeated specific situation. [B]efore a court may admit evidence of habit, the offering party must establish the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures more than a mere 'tendency' to act in a given manner, but rather, conduct that is 'semi-automatic' in nature. Simplex, Inc. v. Diversified Energy Systems, Inc., 847 F.2d 1290, 1293 (7th Cir.1988). 26 The party offering the evidence must establish the habitual nature of the alleged practice.    Although there are no precise standards for determining whether a behavior pattern has matured into a habit, two factors are considered controlling as a rule: adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response.    The factors focus on whether the behavior at issue occurred with sufficient regularity making it more probable than not that it would be carried out in every instance or in most instances.    The requisite regularity is tested by the ratio of reaction to situations.    It is essential, therefore, that the regularity of the conduct alleged to be habitual rest on an analysis of instances numerous enough to [support] an inference of systematic conduct and to establish one's regular response to a repeated specific situation. 27 United States v. Newman, 982 F.2d 665, 668 (1st Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 59, 126 L.Ed.2d 28 (1993) (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). 28 In the present case, the trial judge ruled that [a]s stated by the Advisory Committee Comment to Rule 406, habit describes one's regular response to a repeated specific situation. The prior and post-event incidents in question do not establish that Officer Boggs uses excessive force as a regular response to making arrests. Therefore, the court concludes that Rule 404 is applicable. Accordingly, such evidence is inadmissible. A careful review of the affidavits Thompson submitted makes clear the fact that Thompson has failed to establish that Boggs regularly responded with excessive force in a semi-automatic way to the situations he encountered. For example, Harvey Riggins' affidavit states that Officer Boggs struck him in the leg with a nightstick during a traffic stop. However, the same affidavit also recounts that prior to the contact, Riggins had stepped out of the car and got into it 4 with Boggs' colleague, Officer Seward, and that when Boggs attempted to place Riggins under arrest, Riggins stated that he didn't do nothing [sic] but admits he pulled his arm away from Boggs in an attempt to resist arrest. 29 Another alleged victim of Officer Boggs' excessive force, Jay Haas, averred that at the Havana Police Department following his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol, Troy Barnett, a police dispatcher, held his (Haas') arms while Boggs struck him. However, in his affidavit Haas admitted that prior to the alleged use of force he was upset because it was his birthday and his girlfriend was having difficulty obtaining bond for his release. After speaking with his girlfriend on the phone, he slammed [a] phone down ... knock[ing] the dial tone out. Haas stated that when he broke the phone, Boggs called him a name, and that as a result he got a little rowdy and said a few things [to Boggs] I didn't mean. It was at this point that Boggs allegedly struck Haas while Barnett held Haas' arms. 30 Finally, the affidavits of Roy Peters and Dan Flaherty, two more alleged victims of Boggs' excessive force, assert in conclusory fashion that Boggs used excessive force. They fail to set forth any details or specifics concerning how or under what conditions Boggs was supposed to have used excessive force, thus making it impossible to infer that Boggs' behavior was semi-automatic in nature. See Simplex, Inc., 847 F.2d at 1293. 5 31 In addition, with respect to the Thompson incident, it must be kept in mind that Boggs' arrest of Thompson came after a high-speed pursuit in which Thompson ran several stop signs and endangered people's lives while reaching speeds in excess of sixty miles per hour through the city and into the hospital parking lot. Furthermore, we must point out that the plaintiff's complaint acknowledged that Thompson had been attempting to elude the police, and we are of the opinion that Thompson's reckless driving while under the influence of alcohol endangered the lives of the officers and the individuals who were leaving the hospital when Thompson sped by. After the plaintiff, Thompson, collided with Officer Noble's squad car and had fallen to the ground, he crouched into a position resembling a sprinter's starting position, as if ready to continue his flight on foot. Officer Boggs tackled Thompson in an attempt to forestall his flight. 32 The affidavits presented in the five additional incidents and the evidence before us fails to demonstrate a habit of using excessive force. We agree with the trial court that the five unsubstantiated incidents of Officer Boggs' alleged excessive force, without any evidence of the total number of contacts Officer Boggs had with citizens or the number of arrests he performed, fail to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of demonstrating that Boggs' regular response to a repeated specific situation was the systematic use of excessive force. Newman, 982 F.2d at 668. Thompson has failed to establish that the requisite regularity is tested by the ratio of reaction to situations. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Thus there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the behavior at issue occurred with sufficient regularity making it more probable than not that it would be carried out in every instance or in most instances. Id. (internal quotations omitted). We therefore conclude the trial court did not err in refusing to admit evidence that Boggs used excessive force on his arrestees as a matter of habit. 6 2. Evidence that Boggs Violated the City's Policy on High-Speed Pursuits 33 Thompson contends that the court abused its discretion when it prohibited him from mentioning during trial that Boggs' pursuit of him may have violated the City of Havana's general rule discouraging high-speed vehicular pursuits of traffic offenders. 7 Once again, Thompson's allegation fails to cite any legal authority in support of his argument that the court abused its discretion in precluding him from mentioning the City's general rule against such chases. Therefore, Thompson has waived the argument. First Indiana Bank, 957 F.2d at 508; Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1384 ([w]e repeatedly have made clear that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived). In any event, we agree with the district court's conclusion that a violation of Havana's policy against the pursuit of traffic offenders was irrelevant. Evidence that Boggs may have violated City policy by pursuing Thompson at a high speed was irrelevant to the issue of whether Boggs used excessive force when arresting Thompson in the hospital parking lot. 34 3. Characterizing Boggs' and Noble's Police Reports as 35 False 36 Thompson submits that the court erroneously prohibited him from characterizing Officers Boggs' and Noble's police reports as false and further alleges that the court ruled that the officers' reports were credible as a matter of law. Once again, he has waived the issue by failing to cite any authority in support of his argument. Id. Moreover, contrary to Thompson's contention, the trial court did not rule that the police reports were credible as a matter of law. Rather, the court observed that the police reports in question are not 'false' simply because they are not in agreement with reports of other witnesses. The court specifically ruled that the reports could be used to refresh the witnesses' recollection and Thompson was able to thoroughly cross-examine both Boggs and Noble about their involvement in apprehending Thompson. Thus, we conclude the court did not err in prohibiting Thompson from characterizing the police reports as false. 4. Jury Instruction 37 Thompson argues that the court committed reversible error when it refused to submit Thompson's proposed Jury Instruction No. 16, based on Illinois Pattern Instruction 12.04. 8 The record discloses that the court heard argument from the parties' attorneys on each proposed instruction, and that when the court stated we will not give No. 16, counsel for Thompson remained silent and did not object to the judge's decision. As we stated in Stachniak v. Hayes, 989 F.2d 914, 920 (7th Cir.1993), Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that '[n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection.'  [I]f a party fails to make a specific, timely jury instruction objection during trial, an argument regarding that jury instruction is deemed to be waived for purposes of appeal. Id. Thompson has waived the issue for appellate review. 38