Opinion ID: 3012581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Background -- Contentions of the Parties

Text: Although neither party challenges the District Court's subject matter jurisdiction (or raised the issue in the District Court), we are obligated to address questions of 7 jurisdiction sua sponte. See Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 1999). We have detailed the jurisdictional history of the District Court of the Virgin Islands in Callwood v. Enos , 230 F.3d 627 (3d Cir. 2000), and Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1993), so we will provide only a summary version here. The Revised Organic Act, 48 U.S.C. SS 1541-1645 (West 1987 & Supp. 2001), which Congress enacted pursuant to its power under Article IV, S 3 of the U.S. Constitution, establishes the jurisdiction of the District Court of the Virgin Islands.5 Before 1984, the Revised Organic Act vested broad jurisdiction in the District Court of the Virgin Islands, including jurisdiction over all causes arising under the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States, Act of July 22, 1954, ch. 558 S 22, 68 Stat. 497, as well as general original jurisdiction over all other matters in the Virgin Islands, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the local courts over civil actions in which the amount in controversy was less than $500 and over criminal actions for local offenses in which the maximum punishment did not exceed six months in prison or a $100 fine. Callwood, 230 F.3d at 630. The result of this broad grant of jurisdiction was that the District Court of the Virgin Islands was more like a state court of general jurisdiction than a United States district court. Carty v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 679 F.2d 1051, 1057 (3d Cir. 1982). In 1984, Congress rewrote the section of the Revised Organic Act that defines the jurisdiction of the District Court of the Virgin Islands. The new jurisdictional provision effected two changes. First, the Act provided that,[t]he District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have the jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States, including, but not limited to, the diversity jurisdiction provided for in section 1332 of Title 28, and that of a _________________________________________________________________ 5. Article IV, S 3 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States. U.S. Const. art. IV, S 3, cl. 2. Pursuant to this power, Congress enacted the Revised Organic Act, which serves as the Virgin Islands constitution. See Parrott v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands, 230 F.3d 615, 623 (3d Cir. 2000). 8 bankruptcy court of the United States. 48 U.S.C.S 1612(a). As we noted in Walker v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 230 F.3d 82 (3d Cir. 2000), this provision affirmatively bestows on the District Court of the Virgin Islands the entire jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States . . . . Id. at 86. Second, the Act provided that the District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have general original jurisdiction in all causes in the Virgin Islands the jurisdiction over which is not then vested by local law in the local courts of the Virgin Islands . . . . 48 U.S.C. S 1612(b). Most importantly, however, in this section, Congress gave the Virgin Islands legislature the power to vest jurisdiction over local actions exclusively in the local courts. Callwood, 230 F.3d at 631; see also Estate Thomas Mall, Inc. v. Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands, 923 F.2d 258, 261 (3d Cir. 1991). The Virgin Islands legislature exercised this power in 1990, by enacting the following statutory section, which provides in relevant part: Subject to the original jurisdiction conferred on the District Court by section 22 of the Revised Organic Act of 1954, as amended, effective October 1, 1991, the Territorial Court shall have original jurisdiction in all civil actions regardless of the amount in controversy . . . . 4 V.I.C. S 76(a) (1997). In Brow we explained that this section divests the District Court of the Virgin Islands of jurisdiction of all local civil actions, but does not divest the District Court of its federal question and diversity jurisdiction in civil actions, as evidenced by the provisional language at the beginning of the statute. 994 F.2d at 1034; see also 4 V.I.C. S 76(b) (1997) (vesting original jurisdiction over all local criminal actions in the Territorial Court). Therefore, the question in this case is whether the District Court had jurisdiction to hear this dispute under 48 U.S.C. S 1612(a), which gives the District of the Virgin Islands jurisdiction that is equivalent, at least in the civil context, to that of a United States District Court. 6 Because _________________________________________________________________ 6. Cf. Callwood, 230 F.3d at 631 (noting that under S 22 of the Revised Organic Act, [48 U.S.C. S 1612(c),] the District Court of the Virgin Islands retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Territorial Court over criminal actions in which the local crimes charged are related to federal crimes). 9 the parties are not diverse, the only possible source of jurisdiction is federal question jurisdiction, which the District Court of the Virgin Islands has pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and 48 U.S.C. S 1612(a). We asked for supplemental briefs on the source of federal question jurisdiction in this case. Both parties agreed that this case is an action to quiet title. Club Comanche concedes that normally, such quiet title actions belong in the Territorial Court, and not the District Court. However, both parties contend that there are federal elements to the claim that are sufficient to support federal question jurisdiction. They point primarily to the Convention Between the United States and Denmark, 39 Stat. 1706 (signed Aug. 4, 1916; ratified Jan. 16, 1917) (reprinted in Title 1 V.I. Code Ann. at 27), by which the United States purchased from Denmark all of the state-owned lands in the islands of St. Croix, St. Thomas, and St. John. They argue that the resolution of this quiet title action requires the court to interpret this treaty, thus providing the basis for federal question jurisdiction. The GVI also points to three other purported sources of federal question jurisdiction. First, the GVI cites the two federal statutes by which the United States turned over submerged and public lands to the GVI: 48 U.S.C.SS 170508 (conveying to the GVI all submerged and formerly submerged lands), and 48 U.S.C. SS 1545(b)(1) and (2) (turning over to the GVI all public lands held by the United States except those expressly reserved by the U.S. Department of the Interior). The GVI also cites the federal common law as a source of federal jurisdiction, which it correctly contends is the law that governs questions of shoreline filling and accretion that occurred prior to 1974, when the United States conveyed submerged lands in the U.S. Virgin Islands to the GVI. See Alexander Hamilton Life Ins., 757 F.2d at 538 n.6.7 _________________________________________________________________ 7. The federal common law of submerged lands is arguably relevant to this case because one of the alternative arguments that the GVI presents is that the coastal lot that it now designates lot 40A was originally submerged land that the owners of lot 40 have reclaimed from the sea through a process of artificial filling, primarily during the eighteenth and 10