Opinion ID: 2294072
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: The Ex Post Facto Challenge

Text: While Mr. Germane concedes that the Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification Act is not sufficiently punitive in character so as to trigger the application of the ex post facto clause of the federal constitution, [51] he argues that the statute is in violation of the state constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.I. Const. art. 1, sec. 12. [52] We do not agree. Our test for evaluation of ex post facto challenges is well established. In Town of West Warwick v. Local 1104, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, CLC, 745 A.2d 786 (R.I.2000), we summarized that standard as follows: A violation of the ex post facto clause occurs only when there is retrospective application of law that disadvantages an offender by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.    It is black letter law that the ex post facto clause in both our state and federal constitutions only prohibit retroactive penal legislation. Id. at 788 (citing Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original)). Although it follows as a consequence of a criminal conviction, sexual offender registration and notification is a civil regulatory process. As we recently noted in the case of In re Richard A., 946 A.2d 204 (R.I. 2008): It is evident that the purpose of the Registration Act is not to punish the offending [individual], but rather to protect the safety and general welfare of the public. Supplying the names and addresses of sex offenders to law enforcement agencies enables the agencies to deal more successfully with the serious problem of recidivist sex offenders.    [T]he proceeding remains rehabilitative, rather than punitive   . Id. at 213. Although our opinion in In re Richard A. addressed the Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification Act as it applied to juveniles, we believe that our characterization of the act in that opinion is equally accurate when applied to adult sexual offenders. As we noted in that opinion: [T]he registration requirement does not constitute criminal punishment   . Id. We therefore hold that we are not confronted with a violation of the Rhode Island ex post facto clause because the registration requirement is simply part of a nonpunitive, civil regulatory scheme. [53]