Opinion ID: 2830728
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unreasonableness of Custodial Sentence

Text: We turn now to Yingst’s second challenge, concerning the procedural and substantive unreasonableness of the custodial sentence imposed upon him. We review criminal sentences for “reasonableness” under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court “fails to calculate (or improperly calculates) the Sentencing Guidelines range, treats the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails adequately to explain the chosen sentence.” United States v. Chu, 714 F.3d 742, 746 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). A sentence is substantively unreasonable “only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted); see generally United States v. Park, 758 F.3d 193, 199-202 (2d Cir. 2014). Yingst argues that the District Court committed procedural error by failing to properly calculate his Guidelines range, failing to consider and weigh all of the § 3553(a) factors, failing to consider his non-frivolous arguments for a lighter sentence, failing to adequately explain his sentence, and treating the Guidelines as mandatory. Insofar as Yingst raises these objections for the first time on appeal, we review his challenges for plain error only. United States v. Kimber, 777 F.3d 553, 563 (2d Cir. 2015). Yingst has failed to demonstrate error, plain or otherwise, with respect to his procedural unreasonableness challenges as to his term of imprisonment. Concerning Yingst’s claims that the District Court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors or his own arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence, the District Court assertedly considered the submissions of defense counsel, the 3 statements of the defendant himself, and the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).1 App’x at 89, 99. Absent evidence to the contrary, we “presume that a sentencing judge has faithfully discharged her duty to consider the statutory factors and have steadfastly refused to require judges to explain or enumerate how such consideration was conducted.” Kimber, 777 F.3d at 565 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Yingst’s claim that the District Court failed to properly calculate his Guidelines sentence, and in particular the relevant enhancements, is also belied by the record. Defense counsel explicitly agreed, on the record, with the Guidelines range calculated by the Court. See App’x at 88. Further, Yingst himself attested to facts sufficient to support the enhancements he now challenges related to number of images and violent or sadistic conduct. Finally, Yingst has adduced no showing whatsoever that the District Court improperly treated the Guidelines as mandatory. Rather, the record explicitly reflects the District Court’s awareness that it could impose a “non-Guidelines” sentence and its conscious choice not to do so. See id. at 89. Yingst’s substantive unreasonableness challenge to his custodial sentence is similarly unavailing. The substantive reasonableness standard “provide[s] a backstop for those few cases that, although procedurally correct, would nonetheless damage the administration of justice because the sentence imposed was shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.” United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009). Yingst has failed to make the requisite showing that this bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence “shock[s] the conscience,” constitutes a “manifest injustice” or is otherwise substantively unreasonable. Id. at 124.