Opinion ID: 169164
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: p robable c ause to a rrest

Text: M r. Brown next argues his consent to search at the sheriff’s office was tainted by an unlaw ful arrest during the roadside encounter. As noted above, w e assume for the sake of our analysis that the officers arrested M r. Brown during the roadside encounter. The validity of a warrantless arrest turns on whether the arresting officers had probable cause. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Karr v. Smith, 774 F.2d 1029, 1031 (10th Cir. 1985). “Probable cause to arrest exists if, under the totality of the circumstances, the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to justify a prudent officer in believing the defendant is engaged in an illegal activity.” United States v. Stephenson, 452 F.3d 1173, 1178 -15- (10th Cir. 2006). Once probable cause to arrest for a particular offense exists, an arrest is justified irrespective of whether the arrestee actually committed the offense. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) (“If the officer acts with probable cause, he is protected even though it turns out that the citizen is innocent.”). Accordingly, probable cause demands “only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983). In determining whether probable cause for arrest exists, our inquiry is objective. W e “evaluate[] . . . the circumstances as they would have appeared to prudent, cautious, and trained police officers.” United States v. Davis, 197 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). The officers’ own subjective opinions or beliefs about probable cause are not dispositive. Id. In addition, we are mindful that probable cause is a “commonsense, non-technical conception[ ] that deal[s] with ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 231). The government contends the officers had probable cause to arrest M r. Brown for vehicle theft under K.S.A. § 21-3701(a), which provides that a person commits theft if he obtains or exerts “unauthorized control over [another’s] property” and has the “intent to deprive the ow ner permanently of possession, use -16- or benefit of the . . . property.” K.S.A. § 21-3701(a)(1). Thus, under this statute, the officers had probable cause to arrest M r. Brown if the facts and circumstances within their knowledge were sufficient to justify a prudent officer in believing that M r. Brown was exerting unauthorized control over the rental vehicle and intended to permanently deprive Enterprise of it. W e think that sufficient facts existed to justify a prudent, cautious, and trained police officer in believing that M r. Brown had committed vehicle theft under K.S.A. § 21-3701(a), even though subsequent investigation revealed that M r. Brown lawfully possessed the car. As an initial matter, prior to encountering M r. Brown, police dispatch informed the officers that a man “ran” out of a motel and drove east on I-70 after refusing to disclose information about a dark-colored Dodge Intrepid because he was afraid the motel was going to “call the cops.” Aple’s Supp. App. at 112. As Deputy Dollison testified, this information indicated that the man at the motel wanted to avoid contact with the police because, among other things, “[t]he vehicle might be stolen.” Id. at 40. Importantly, the officers reasonably suspected that M r. Brown was the man from the motel because he w as driving east on I-70 in a car that matched the report’s description. See United States v. Lenoir, 318 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[P]olice observation of an individual fitting a police dispatch description of a person involved in a disturbance, near in time and geographic location to the disturbance establishes reasonable suspicion that the individual is the subject of -17- the dispatch.”). Similarly indicative of a crime was M r. Brown’s behavior during his initial conversation with Deputy Dollison. As the district court noted, M r. Brown was extremely nervous with shaky hands, overly talkative, and driving in a tie at 3:45 a.m. even though he was purportedly in the floor-cleaning business. In addition, when Deputy Dollison asked him where he was coming from, M r. Brown vaguely replied “out west.” Aple’s Supp. App. at 49. See O zbirn, 189 F.3d at 1200 (noting that “suspicious conduct . . . , including nervous, talkative, and overly-friendly behavior, and vague description of . . . travel plans” contributed in conjunction with other factors to the probable cause calculus). Standing alone, M r. Brow n’s activity at the hotel and Deputy Dollison’s initial observations would be insufficient to establish probable cause. However, the officers soon became aware of several additional facts that, combined with M r. Brown’s suspicious behavior, established “a probability or substantial chance,” Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 n.13, that M r. Brown had stolen the rental vehicle. See generally Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 (1968) (“[D]eliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in the decision to make an arrest.”). First, during his initial conversation with M r. Brown, Deputy Dollison -18- discovered that M r. Brown’s rental agreement with Enterprise had apparently expired ten days earlier. This fact was highly suggestive of a vehicle theft, for the agreement indicated on its face that M r. Brown may have been exerting unauthorized control over the vehicle for a substantial amount of time. See State v. Greene, 5 P.2d 933, 938 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (“[U]nauthorized control means control exercised over property of another without the consent of the owner.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Ramirez v. Ashcroft, 361 F. Supp. 2d 650, 658 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“Unauthorized use of a motor vehicle can encompass acts such as using a vehicle in a manner that exceeds the scope of the owner’s consent.”). Although Enterprise had not taken any affirmative steps to repossess the vehicle or to suggest it might be stolen, the fact that the vehicle was apparently ten days overdue suggested that M r. Brown intended to permanently deprive Enterprise of possession. See United States v. Edwards, 576 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that “exceeding the scope of the rental agreement would support a jury finding that [the defendant] intended to steal the car.”). M oreover, the fact that the officers did not telephone “1-800-Enterprise,” as M r. Brown requested, does not vitiate probable cause. As noted above, the officers did attempt to contact the company by calling a number listed on the rental agreement. A lthough that attempt was unsuccessful and M r. Brown proposed another alternative, the officers w ere neither required to “investigate independently every claim of innocence,” nor compelled “by the Constitution to -19- perform an error-free investigation of such a claim.” Baker v. M cCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979). See also Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995) (“G iven the requirement[] that arrest be made only on probable cause, we do not think a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is required by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence, whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite intent.”); Thom pson v. City of Olson, 798 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1986) (“[H]aving once determined that there is probable cause to arrest, an officer should not be required to reassess his probable cause conclusion at every turn, whether faced with the discovery of some new evidence or a suspect’s self-exonerating explanation from the back of the squad car.”). Additionally, after Deputy Dollison returned to the vehicle and ran a check on M r. Brown’s license, dispatch informed the officers that M r. Brown had falsely identified himself as “Hector Burgos.” As a general matter, the use of an alias is suspicious because it suggests an individual’s desire to avoid police detection. United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 767 (10th Cir. 1999). Here, particularly in light of the report from dispatch and the expired rental agreement, M r. Brown’s use of an alias was probative of a vehicle theft because it suggested that he used it to rent the vehicle. See K.S.A. § 21-3702(a)(1) (stating the “[t]he giving of a false identification or fictitious name . . . at the time of obtaining control over [rented] property” constitutes “prima facie evidence of intent to -20- permanently deprive the owner . . . of property.”). A lthough the rental contract is not in the record, the only indication that the defendant’s identity was “Jason Brown” came from police dispatch, suggesting that the rental contract and driver’s license each identified M r. Brown as “Hector Burgos.” Finally, as Sergeant Schneider testified, the presence of multiple air fresheners and the gas can in the vehicle suggested that M r. Brown was transporting narcotics in either the gas can itself or a hidden compartment in the vehicle’s gas tank. See Aple’s Supp. App. at 133-34. W e think that the probability that M r. Brown had stolen the vehicle was further increased by the presence of these items because individuals who transport narcotics or who are involved in the drug-trade often employ stolen vehicles. See, e.g., United States v. Sutherland, 405 F.3d 263, 269 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that defendant drove a “stolen [rental] car containing controlled substances and illegal drugs”); United States v. M athis, 357 F.3d 1200, 1202-03 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[A] warrant was executed at defendant[’s] residence authorizing a search for records and other evidence of his purported illegal activities, including distribution of methamphetamine and possession of stolen vehicles.”). W e therefore conclude the combined weight of the report from dispatch, M r. Brown’s behavior during the initial stop, the expired rental agreement showing the vehicle was ten days overdue, M r. Brown’s use of an alias, and the evidence suggesting M r. Brown was transporting narcotics in the vehicle was -21- sufficient to establish probable cause that M r. Brown had committed vehicle theft under K.S.A. § 21-3701(a). Accordingly, M r. Brown’s arrest comported with the Fourth Amendment, and his subsequent consent at the sheriff’s office to search his vehicle was valid. IV . C ON CLU SIO N For the reasons stated above, we A FFIRM the district court’s denial of M r. Brown’s motion to suppress. -22-