Opinion ID: 2604134
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Multiple Use of Same Robbery.

Text: (10) Defendant contends that use of the same robbery as the basis for the felony-murder rule, as a special circumstance, and as an aggravating circumstance in the penalty phase, violates the double jeopardy clause and the Eighth Amendment's proscription against double punishment. [7] He relies primarily on State v. Cherry (1979) 298 N.C. 86 [257 S.E.2d. 551] and Collins v. Lockhart (8th Cir.1985) 754 F.2d 258]. Under the North Carolina statute at issue in Cherry, any finding of first degree murder leads to a sentencing proceeding for determination of whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. Only a first degree felony-murder conviction, however, automatically carried with it an aggravating circumstance. The North Carolina court found that this scheme made a felony-murder defendant's chance of receiving a death sentence disproportionately higher than that of other first degree murder defendants. Accordingly, it held that the felony-murder aggravating circumstance should not be submitted at the sentencing phase when a defendant has been convicted of first degree murder under the felony-murder rule. In Collins v. Lockhart, supra, 754 F.2d 258, the Eighth Circuit found a similar flaw in the Arkansas statute. There the defendant was found guilty of robbery-felony murder, one of six types of murder which could subject him to the possibility of the death penalty. However, under the Arkansas statutory scheme felony murder was not itself sufficient to justify the death penalty. In addition, the jury had to find the existence of at least one of six statutorily defined aggravating circumstances in order to impose the death penalty. One of the six defined aggravating circumstances was a capital felony ... committed for financial gain. The Eighth Circuit decided that the same robbery which made the murder a capital murder, could not also be used to satisfy the aggravating circumstance of capital felony committed for financial gain. The court said: [i]n effect, a robber-murderer enters the sentencing phase with a built-in aggravating circumstance. ( Id. at p. 264.) The court found this violative of the Eighth Amendment because the aggravating circumstance did not serve its intended function of narrowing the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty. However, our statutory scheme differs from the North Carolina and Arkansas statutes in that the finding of a felony-murder special circumstance makes the death penalty no more mandatory than the finding of any other special circumstance. Under our penalty scheme, the jury must weigh the factors in aggravation and mitigation to determine penalty. The circumstances of the crime is an aggravating factor as to all defendants who reach the penalty phase. Thus defendants with a felony-murder special circumstance are subject to no greater chance of receiving the death penalty than any other defendant against whom a special circumstance finding has been made. Defendant's double jeopardy argument was answered in People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 199-200 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480], where we rejected an argument that there is any double jeopardy or multiple punishment problem arising from use of the same felony for first degree felony murder and a felony-murder special circumstance.