Opinion ID: 2639488
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Primary caregiver preference

Text: The M.s contend that Judge Reese gave custody to the C.s simply because they have been her primary caregivers since the death of her parents and [she] might experience some emotional trauma if transitioned into the care of the [M.] Family. They point out that although the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity [19] is one of the statutory best-interest factors in determining child custody, nonetheless we have held that the trial court cannot simply assume that the current primary caregiver is automatically the best caregiver for the child. [20] However, the issue was not merely primary caregiving, but whether removing Lucy from the primary custody of the people with whom she had spent twenty-one of her twenty-four months would be unnecessarily traumatic for her, especially since she had already lost one set of parents. The record shows that the superior court carefully questioned in voir dire each expert who testified on child psychology about the possible effects on Lucy of being separated from the C.s, and overruled objections to such questions when asked. [21] There was evidence in the record to support a conclusion that the transfer of custody could be risky, and such trauma is properly considered during a custody determination under AS 25.24.150(c)(5). [22] We find no abuse of discretion on this point.