Opinion ID: 1134803
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Issue 9: Was There Defective Legal Representation During Pirtle's Appeal?

Text: Pirtle claims his appellate counsel's failure to ask this court to consider any issue regarding the testimony of Deputy Cal Walker violated [his] due process rights. Pirtle Brief at 197-98. As noted previously, Deputy Walker testified at trial that when Pirtle was asked during his arrest if he knew why he was being arrested, Pirtle replied Of course I do, you might as well shoot me now. RP at 2607. To avoid having this court conclude the failure of Pirtle's former appellate counsel to address Deputy Walker's testimony was merely a tactical decision to concentrate on more meritorious claims, Pirtle submits a declaration from his appellant counsel, Joan M. Fisher. In Fisher's declaration, she stated it was a product of oversight and not a strategic decision not to raise a claim pertaining to Deputy Walker's testimony. Pirtle Brief at 199 (citing Fisher Decl. at ¶ 9-10). Pirtle contends that, but for his former appellant counsel's oversight, there is a reasonable probability this court would have reversed his convictions and sentence, and remanded the case for a new guilt and penalty trial. Pirtle Brief at 201. We disagree, for the reasons discussed in detail above. Pirtle offers no other evidence to show how Deputy Walker's statement meets his burden of proving prejudice. [11] Moreover, Pirtle argues that, due to his former appellate counsel's oversight, this court should review the prejudicial effect of Deputy Walker's statement under the same standard used on appeal. Thus, Pirtle contends the State should be required to show that any prejudicial effect of Deputy Walker's statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Powell, 126 Wash.2d 244, 893 P.2d 615 (1995). Since we find no error in Deputy Walker's testimony, under any approach, Pirtle's argument fails.