Opinion ID: 167150
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Verbickas's Sentence

Text: 156 Mr. Verbickas has failed to satisfy the third prong of establishing plain error. First, he has failed to show that a jury applying a reasonable doubt standard would not have found the same material facts. Indeed, Mr. Verbickas did not challenge the factual basis of any of the enhancements at the District Court (and does not do so here). Rather, with respect to the enhancements based on the condition of the victim (restrained and vulnerable), Mr. Verbickas's contentions were legal claims. 22 Cf. United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 876 (10th Cir.2005) (in harmless error analysis, stating that defendant's decision not to contest the facts supporting an enhancement indicates that constitutional Booker error did not affect substantial rights). Moreover, the record is replete with testimony that Mr. Lane was in fact restrained and that he was in fact vulnerable within the meaning of the Guideline provision. See U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1; United States v. Lambright, 320 F.3d 517, 518 (5th Cir.2003) (inmate who was completely dependent on correctional officers for care, was locked in cell, and was unable to protect himself from assault was vulnerable victim); United States v. Hershkowitz, 968 F.2d 1503, 1504-06 (2d Cir.1992) (inmate beaten while surrounded by correctional officers was vulnerable victim). With respect to the enhancement based on the offense involving two or more participants, the record shows that Ms. Gutierrez pleaded guilty to abusing Mr. Lane. Finally, it is clear from the jury's verdict that it found Mr. Verbickas was acting under color of law. Indeed, a finding that the defendant acted under color of law in depriving an inmate of a constitutional right was explicitly listed as an element of § 242 in the jury instructions. Accordingly, Mr. Verbickas has in no way demonstrated that a jury applying a reasonable doubt standard would not have found the same facts as the District Court which gave rise to the enhancements. 157 Second, Mr. Verbickas has failed to show that the District Court, applying the sentencing factors in § 3553(a), might have imposed a sentence outside the Guidelines range. The judge did not express any dissatisfaction with the length of the sentence or indicate that he felt that it was inappropriate in light of all the circumstances. See Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1175. Further, the District Court imposed a sentence in the middle of the applicable Guidelines range, even though it was within the court's power to impose a shorter sentence under the pre- Booker scheme. That it was not inclined to do so suggests that the judge would not exercise his now greater [post- Booker ] discretion to reduce the sentence. United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 876 (10th Cir.2005). 158 We are aware that this Court recently found that constitutional Booker error affected a defendant's substantial rights even though the district court had granted a five-level downward departure that took into consideration several of the sentencing factors recommended by § 3553(a)(1). See Serrata, 425 F.3d at 918. Though the District Court in this case took several of the § 3553(a)(1) sentencing factors into account in granting Mr. Verbickas a two-level downward departure, we think that Serrata is distinguishable for several reasons. First, in Serrata we found that the most telling evidence that the defendant's substantial rights were violated was that the district court repeatedly expressed its dissatisfaction with the guidelines and stated that it would sentence each defendant to probation if the Guidelines so permitted. Id. at 919. Second, the district court sentenced each defendant to the lowest possible sentence in the applicable Guidelines range. Id. Third, this Court found that the district court abused its discretion in departing downward — we acknowledged that although departure was not warranted under the Guidelines, post- Booker, the same factors may warrant departure pursuant to § 3553(a)(1). 23 Id.; cf. United States v. Ollson, 413 F.3d 1119, 1121 (10th Cir.2005) (finding that defendant's substantial rights not violated when district court properly exercised discretion to depart downward and could have departed further if it determined further departure was warranted). None of these circumstances are present in this case. We therefore conclude that Mr. Verbickas has failed to establish that but for the improper judicial fact-finding, the result of his proceeding would have been different. 159