Opinion ID: 782913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Horphag's Claims of Trademark Infringement and Dilution

Text: 8 Federal trademark law addresses the dual purposes of infringement law: ensuring that owners of trademarks can benefit from the goodwill associated with their marks and that consumers can distinguish among competing producers. Thane Int'l v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 900-01 (9th Cir.2002). To establish a trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1999), a plaintiff must establish that the defendant is using a mark confusingly similar to the protectable trademark of the plaintiff. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir.1999). Because Garcia admits to using Horphag's Pycnogenol trademark and specifically admits to using the Pycnogenol mark in the meta-tags for his websites, his use satisfies the terms of trademark infringement in the first instance. Thus, we must determine whether he adequately presents a defense to infringement under the Lanham Act. 9 There are two fair use defenses to trademark infringement. Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1150. In Cairns, this court described the difference between the nominative fair use and classic fair use defenses: 10 The nominative fair use analysis is appropriate where a defendant has used the plaintiff's mark to describe the plaintiff's product, even if the defendant's ultimate goal is to describe his own product. Conversely, the classic fair use analysis is appropriate where a defendant has used the plaintiff's mark only to describe his own product, and not at all to describe the plaintiff's product. 11 Id. at 1152 (emphasis and footnotes omitted). 12 The classic fair use defense applies only to marks that possess both a primary meaning and a secondary meaning — and only when the mark is used in its primary descriptive sense rather than its secondary trademark sense. Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 905-06 (9th Cir.2003) (citations and footnote omitted). The Pycnogenol mark does not possess any meaning other than its use as a registered trademark. Therefore, Garcia's use of the trademark plainly does not qualify for the classic fair use analysis. 13 The nominative fair use analysis acknowledges that `it is often virtually impossible to refer to a particular product for purposes of comparison, criticism, point of reference or any other such purpose without using the mark.' Brother Records, 318 F.3d at 908 (quoting New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir.1992)). Still, the `core element' of trademark infringement law is `whether an alleged trademark infringer's use of a mark creates a likelihood that the consuming public will be confused as to who makes the product.' Id. at 908 (quoting Thane Int'l, 305 F.3d at 901). Accordingly, this court has held that the nominative fair use defense is available only if `the use of the trademark does not attempt to capitalize on consumer confusion or to appropriate the cachet of one product for a different one.' Id. (quoting New Kids, 971 F.2d at 307-08). 14 This court looks to three factors in determining whether a defendant is entitled to the nominative fair use defense: (1) the product must not be readily identifiable without use of the mark; (2) only so much of the mark may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product; and (3) the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308. However, even if Garcia could meet the first two criteria, he cannot meet the third requirement because, as evidenced by the record at trial, Garcia's references to Pycnogenol spawn confusion as to sponsorship and attempt to appropriate the cachet of the trademark Pycnogenol to his product. 15 However, we vacate the district court's judgment on the trademark dilution claim and remand for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Moseley, 123 S.Ct. at 1115. The Supreme Court in Moseley expanded on the requirements for a trademark dilution claim under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act and emphasized the requirement of proof of actual dilution to succeed on such a claim. Because the district court did not have the opportunity to consider the facts of this case in light of the standard the Supreme Court articulated in Moseley, we vacate the district court's judgment on the trademark dilution claim and remand for reconsideration in light of Moseley. See generally Moseley, 537 U.S. 418, 123 S.Ct. 1115, 155 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003); see also Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903-07 (2002) (describing differences between trademark infringement and trademark dilution and discussing the three statutory exemptions from liability under the FTDA); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 873-77 (9th Cir.1999) (setting forth the fourfold test to evaluate whether a mark has been diluted). 16