Opinion ID: 1277687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failing to Introduce Psychiatric Evidence at the Guilt Phase

Text: As discussed, trial counsel put on a guilt phase defense that consisted primarily of attempting to cast doubt on whether defendant had premeditated and deliberated prior to committing the murders, and was therefore guilty only of second degree murder. Specifically, counsel tried to show that defendant had been unable to form the requisite mental state because of the use of alcohol, cocaine, and heroin shortly before the murders. Counsel presented two medical doctors to testify in general about the mental impairments caused by these substances individually and in combination. The defense did not present any psychiatric testimony at the guilt phase, reserving such testimony for the penalty phase. Defendant now claims that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to introduce the psychiatric testimony during the guilt phase, in violation of his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that: (1) the representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) prejudice resulted, i.e., that absent counsel's failings a more favorable result would have been probable. ( People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1339, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) In evaluating whether defendant has demonstrated inadequate performance, we accord great deference to the tactical decisions of trial counsel in order to avoid `second-guessing counsel's tactics and chilling vigorous advocacy.' ( In re Fields (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1069, 275 Cal.Rptr. 384, 800 P.2d 862.) In the present case, we conclude defendant has not carried his burden of showing inadequate performance. Two psychiatrists, Drs.Benson and Pierce, both testified at the penalty phase regarding defendant's general mental disturbances, including his paranoia and poor impulse control. We disagree with defendant that it was inadequate performance not to introduce such testimony at the guilt phase of the trial. It was reasonable for counsel to conclude that such testimony would not be effective at that point. Given the fact of the six murders and all the evidence that defendant had indeed deliberated, counsel could have reasonably decided that generalized psychiatric testimony would have been unhelpful or counterproductive, and that it was proper to focus the psychiatric testimony at the guilt phase on defendant's intoxication at the time of the murders. Moreover, defendant cannot carry his burden of showing that such a strategy resulted in prejudice. Indeed, since the psychiatric testimony did not sway the jury to choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole at the penalty phase, it is unlikely that confronting the same jury with the same evidence at the guilt phase would have caused them to vote for second degree murder over first degree murder.