Opinion ID: 516427
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Status of the Union as the Employees' Representative

Text: 24 A union chosen by an appropriate bargaining unit is presumed to have the continued support of the majority of its members. See Fall River Dyeing, 107 S.Ct. at 2233; NLRB v. Burns International Security Service, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 279 n. 3, 92 S.Ct. 1571, 1578 n. 3, 32 L.Ed.2d 61 (1972). The purpose behind this presumption is to promote stability in the collective-bargaining relationship and hence industrial peace. See Fall River Dyeing, 107 S.Ct. at 2233. Where an employer remains the same, a Board certification carries with it an almost conclusive presumption that the majority representative status of the union continues for a reasonable time, usually a year. After this period, there is a rebuttable presumption of majority representation. Burns, 406 U.S. at 279 n. 3, 92 S.Ct. at 1578 n. 3 (citations omitted). After the initial year, the question whether the presumption of continued majority support has been rebutted is recast in terms of whether the employer has reasonable, good faith grounds for believing that the union has lost its majority status after a collective bargaining agreement has expired. International Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770, 772 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 222, 102 L.Ed.2d 213 (1988). 25 In order to show good faith doubt, the employer must produce evidence probative of a change in employee sentiment. This is a difficult burden to meet. For example, the fact that an employee has crossed a picket line is not evidence that the employee has abandoned his union. NLRB v. Frick, Co., 423 F.2d 1327, 1333-34 (3d Cir.1970). Similarly, we have declined to accept testimony proffered by an employer's representative based on his subjective conclusions about change in sentiment. Toltec Metals, Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 1122, 1125 (3d Cir.1974). Even a petition circulated by employees may not lend credence to an employer's good faith doubt. Garrett R.R. Car & Equipment, Inc. v. NLRB, 683 F.2d 731, 737 (3d Cir.1982). In sum, for an employer [t]o meet this burden 'requires more than an employer's mere mention of [its good faith doubt] and more than proof of the employer's subjective frame of mind.' What is required is a 'rational basis in fact.'  Toltec, 490 F.2d at 1125 (bracketed statement in original) (quoting NLRB v. Rish Equipment Co., 407 F.2d 1098, 1101 (4th Cir.1969)); see also Frick, 423 F.2d at 1331. 26 The NLRB does not purport to apply the presumption of majority support in this case. In the absence of any explanation from the NLRB beyond its cryptic comment that the facts are specific and unique, we cannot tell why in this case the NLRB ignored the Burns presumption of majority rule at Morton's plant. Morton, after all, was the employer both at the facility for the mentally retarded and the nursing home. Although some of the facts enumerated in the first footnote of the NLRB's opinion--such as the amount of time which the plant was closed and the change in operations--could bear on the question of whether the Union was entitled to the presumption of continued majority support, the Board does not explain why these facts are relevant to the employees' attitudes toward the Union in this case. And other facts contained in the Board's footnote--such as Morton's good faith in closing and reopening the facility--appear to have nothing to do with the presumption. 27 If the NLRB is holding that a single employer is not bound by the presumption of majority support when it significantly changes it operations, or when it closes its plant without expectation of reopening and then reopens a significantly changed operation, or for some other reason, it must state the rule explicitly. And it must provide its reason for adopting that interpretation of the law. A reviewing court cannot properly judge the NLRB's action without knowing what the NLRB did and why.