Opinion ID: 3066031
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Consider Substance Abuse

Text: At sentencing, Poyson presented evidence of a history of drug and alcohol abuse, but the state trial court and the state supreme court declined to treat the evidence as a nonstatutory mitigating factor. The trial court found that Poyson had presented only “very vague allegations that he has used alcohol . . . or . . . drugs in the past,” and found “very little to support the allegation that the defendant has a significant alcohol and/or drug abuse” history. The supreme court agreed that Poyson’s claims to have “used drugs or alcohol in the past” were “little more than ‘vague allegations.’” Poyson, 7 P.3d at 90. Poyson contends the state courts’ conclusions that he provided only “vague allegations” of substance abuse were unreasonable determinations of the facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) and violated his constitutional rights under Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605, Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112, and Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321 (1991). We disagree. Poyson’s claim – that “[b]ecause his death sentence is based upon [an] unreasonable determination of facts, [he] is entitled to habeas relief” – misunderstands the law. Even assuming that the state courts’ determination that Poyson provided only “vague allegations” of substance abuse was an unreasonable determination of the facts under § 2254(d)(2), an issue we need not reach, Poyson’s claim fails because he cannot demonstrate that his constitutional rights were violated. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2010) (per curiam) (holding that while § 2254(d)(2) relieves a federal court of AEDPA deference when the state court makes an unreasonable determination of facts, it “does not repeal the command of § 2254(a) that habeas relief may be POYSON V . RYAN 29 afforded to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground’ that his custody violates federal law”); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 737 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (holding that AEDPA does not “require any particular methodology for ordering the § 2254(d) and § 2254(a) determination[s]”). An unreasonable determination of the facts would not, standing alone, amount to a constitutional violation under Lockett, Eddings or Parker. Lockett invalidated an Ohio death penalty statute that precluded the sentencer from considering aspects of the defendant’s character or record as a mitigating factor. See 438 U.S. at 604. Eddings held that a sentencer may not refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence. See 455 U.S. at 113–15. Here, the state courts considered Poyson’s evidence of substance abuse, but found it wanting as a matter of fact and that Poyson failed to prove a history of substance abuse. Thus, there was no constitutional violation under Lockett and Eddings. Nor has Poyson shown a constitutional violation under Parker. There, the state supreme court reweighed aggravating and mitigating circumstances before affirming a death sentence. See Parker, 498 U.S. at 321–22. The court’s reweighing, however, was premised on its erroneous assumption that the state trial court had found that there were no mitigating circumstances. See id. The Supreme Court held that the state supreme court’s action deprived the defendant of “meaningful appellate review,” and thus that the sentencing violated the defendant’s right against “the arbitrary or irrational imposition of the death penalty.” Id. at 321. In Poyson’s view, Parker stands for the broad proposition that, “[w]hen a state court’s imposition of the death penalty is based not on the characteristics of the 30 POYSON V . RYAN accused and the offense but instead on a misperception of the record, the defendant is not being afforded the consideration that the Constitution requires.” In Parker, however, the state supreme court had misconstrued the state trial court’s findings, something that did not occur here. Parker does not hold that a state court’s erroneous factual finding in assessing mitigation evidence necessarily amounts to a constitutional violation. Rather, it suggests the opposite: This is not simply an error in assessing the mitigating evidence. Had the Florida Supreme Court conducted its own examination of the trial and sentencing hearing records and concluded that there were no mitigating circumstances, a different question would be presented. Similarly, if the trial judge had found no mitigating circumstances and the Florida Supreme Court had relied on that finding, our review would be very different. Id. at 322. In sum, we hold that Poyson is not entitled to habeas relief because he has not shown a constitutional violation under Lockett, Eddings or Parker. Because Poyson has raised arguments under only Lockett, Eddings and Parker, we need not decide whether, or under what circumstances, a state court’s erroneous factfinding in assessing mitigating evidence can itself rise to the level of a constitutional violation. POYSON V . RYAN 31 C. Penalty Phase Ineffective Assistance of Counsel In his federal habeas petition, Poyson argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial because his trial counsel failed to investigate the possibility that he suffered from fetal alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD). The district court ruled that Poyson failed to present this claim to the state courts, and hence that the claim was procedurally defaulted. Poyson challenges that ruling on appeal. We review de novo. See Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1099. A state prisoner must normally exhaust available state judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 363–64 (9th Cir. 1999); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This rule “reflects a policy of federal-state comity, an accommodation of our federal system designed to give the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Picard, 404 U.S. at 275 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a fair opportunity to consider each issue before presenting it to the federal court.” Weaver, 197 F.3d at 364. “[A] petitioner may provide further facts to support a claim in federal district court, so long as those facts do not ‘fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts.’” Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 32 POYSON V . RYAN (1986)).7 “[T]his rule allows a petitioner who presented a particular [ineffective assistance of counsel] claim, for example that counsel was ineffective in presenting humanizing testimony at sentencing, to develop additional facts supporting that particular claim.” Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Weaver, 197 F.3d at 364). “This does not mean, however, that a petitioner who presented any ineffective assistance of counsel claim below can later add unrelated alleged instances of counsel’s ineffectiveness to his claim.” Id. (citing Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc)).
In his state habeas petition, Poyson raised two ineffective assistance of counsel claims relevant here. In the first claim, Poyson alleged that trial counsel “was ineffective because he failed to request the appointment of experts in the field of mental health early in the case.” He alleged that the investigation for both phases of the trial should have begun “immediately” upon counsel’s appointment, including “the immediate appointment of experts for both parts of the trial.” Counsel’s failure “to immediately secure the appointment of mental health experts . . . prejudiced” him in two ways. First, it precluded him from presenting a defense of “diminished capacity” with respect to the Delahunt murder during the guilt phase of the trial. Second, “the failure of counsel to immediately pursue mitigation caused the loss of mitigating information” that could have been presented at sentencing. 7 As the Supreme Court has recently clarified, these factual allegations must be based on the “record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). POYSON V . RYAN 33 Poyson presented a report by a neuropsychologist retained during the state habeas proceedings, Robert Briggs, Ph.D. According to Poyson, Briggs’ report showed that Poyson “was brain-damaged” at the time of the murders, but had since “recovered, due to his long stay first in jail, then on condemned row, without chemical or physical insult to his brain.” In Poyson’s view, “the report leaves no doubt that neurophyschological testing shows that he was impaired at the time of the crime.” This mitigating evidence had been “lost forever.” In the state petition’s second claim, Poyson alleged that trial counsel failed to properly present mitigation and psychological evidence because counsel “did nothing to show the trial court how [his] abusive childhood caused, or directly related to, [his] conduct during the murders.” He alleged that trial counsel were deficient because they were “required to make some attempt to correlate Mr. Poyson’s physically and psychologically abusive background with his behavior,” because “a connection between the two would be much more powerful in mitigation than the abuse standing alone.”
Poyson’s federal petition presented a substantially different claim – counsel’s failure to investigate Poyson’s possible fetal alcohol spectrum disorder. Poyson alleged that trial counsel were ineffective because they “failed to make any effort to investigate and develop” evidence that Poyson suffered from FASD. He alleged that defense counsel “failed to investigate the obvious possibility that [he] suffered from FASD,” made “no effort” to “pursue this fertile area of mitigation” and “ignored obvious evidence that [he] was exposed to drugs and alcohol in utero.” Poyson further 34 POYSON V . RYAN alleged that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance: Their failure to adequately investigate and substantiate [evidence that Petitioner was exposed to drugs and alcohol in utero] profoundly prejudiced Petitioner. Adequate explanation during the pre-sentence hearing of the effect of FASD on Petitioner’s brain would likely have convinced the trial court that Petitioner had a lesser degree of culpability.
The district court concluded that the claim raised in the federal petition had not been fairly presented to the Arizona courts: This Court concludes that the claim asserted in the instant amended petition is fundamentally different than that presented in state court. Petitioner’s argument in support of [this claim] is based entirely on trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate and develop mitigation evidence based on Petitioner’s in utero exposure to drugs and alcohol. This version of Petitioner’s sentencing [ineffective assistance of counsel] claim has never been presented to the Arizona courts. While it is true that new factual allegations do not ordinarily render a claim unexhausted, a petitioner may not “fundamentally alter the legal claim already POYSON V . RYAN 35 considered by the state courts.” Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 989–90 ([9th Cir.] 2002) (citing Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 260). To do so deprives the state court of “a meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal error without interference from the federal judiciary.” Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 257. Here, Petitioner is not simply proffering additional evidentiary support for a factual theory presented to the state court. Rather, he is alleging an entirely new theory of counsel ineffectiveness; one that has not previously been presented in state court. We agree. Poyson presented not only new facts in support of a claim presented to the state court, but also a fundamentally new theory of counsel’s ineffectiveness – one that the Arizona courts lacked “a meaningful opportunity to consider.” Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 257. The district court therefore properly dismissed Poyson’s penalty phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim as procedurally defaulted. AFFIRMED.