Opinion ID: 790046
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Divided Loyalties

Text: 41 Next, PSC contends that the conclusion that the revenue-protection workers are not supervisors frustrates one of the NLRA's goals, that of protecting against divided loyalties. The Supreme Court has stated that both the supervisor and manager exceptions to the NLRA grow out of the concern [t]hat an employer is entitled to the undivided loyalty of its representatives. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 682, 100 S.Ct. 856, 63 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980). 42 Whether or not the statutory definition of supervisor permits consideration of the potential for divided loyalties, NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 580, 114 S.Ct. 1778, 128 L.Ed.2d 586 (1994), the record does not indicate a substantial risk of divided loyalties here. Of particular importance is that the structure of the bonus program unites the interests of PSC and its workers. A worker receives a bonus only when the worker reports an income loss to PSC that requires correction. The bonus is tied to the extent of the loss. The larger the amount of the loss calculated by the revenue-protection worker, the larger the bonus to a fellow worker and the larger the amount PSC will bill the customer. The only way in which a revenue-protection worker's efforts to increase the bonuses of fellow workers might injure PSC is if those efforts result in overcharges to customers that lead to customer-relations problems. Such abuse by a revenue-protection worker would, however, be transparent, because the offended customer would complain to the billing department, and corrective measures (both to reduce the charge and to discipline the worker) could readily be taken. This risk may not be nonexistent, but the Board could properly decide that the risk is too small to require that revenue-protection workers be treated as supervisors. 43 We note that PSC contends that the Union constitution creates a conflict of loyalty because a member can be disciplined for [w]ronging a member of the [Union] by any act ... causing him ... economic harm. R. Vol. I at 300. PSC suggests that a revenue-protection worker could therefore be required by the Union to comply with every request for an increased bonus or face Union sanctions. At the hearing, however, PSC took no steps to inquire into the meaning of the constitutional provision. We are unwilling to reverse the Board on speculation that the Union constitution requires workers to breach their work responsibilities. 44 Likewise, we reject PSC's contention that a conflict of loyalty arises from the alleged authority of revenue-protection investigators to compromise a customer's bill to accommodate the customer's financial condition. Both investigators denied that they had this authority, and the contrary evidence was ambiguous at best. The Regional Director's findings include no mention of such authority. And even PSC's witness estimated that investigators adjust bills (on some basis or other) only half a dozen times a year. Any potential conflict of loyalty here is too slim a reed to support reversal of the Board's decision.