Opinion ID: 2584121
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of KRPC 8.4(c)

Text: First, Trester argues that clear and convincing evidence does not support the hearing panel's finding that he violated KRPC 8.4(c). KRPC 8.4(c) provides that [i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 2006 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 511. Trester urges this court to reject the hearing panel's conclusion that he engaged in dishonest conduct when he held himself out as an attorney in California. Rather than motivated by dishonesty, fraud, or deceit, Trester contends that his misconduct was motivated by the mistaken belief that he could hold himself out as an attorney because he was admitted to practice law in Kansas and had been admitted to practice law before the United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. According to Trester, he has a plausible explanation justifying this mistaken belief. Regarding this alleged plausible explanation, Trester claims that before opening his California office, he solicited input from Los Angeles Attorney Ira Sherman, then head of the ethics division of the California Bar. In his testimony at the hearing, he indicated that the services he provided in California were consistent with the advice given to him by Sherman. Before the hearing panel, Trester denied ever making any appearances as an attorney before the California Superior Court, Appellate Court, or Supreme Court, instead claiming that he only appeared in those courts as a mediator. Instead of appearing in a legal capacity in California state courts, Trester testified that he made regular appearances in federal immigration courts and before administrative agencies. When asked, however, what percentage of his practice in the last 10 years has related to immigration law, Trester answered: It's varied from 15 to 20 percent to 50 and sometimes 60 percent. To add credence to his argument that he, in good faith, held himself out as an attorney, Trester notes in his brief that two previous ethics complaints filed against him were dismissed. First, Trester testified at the hearing that around 1980 an ethics complaint was filed in California based on Trester's holding himself out as an attorney. According to him, the claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Second, in 1996, a California attorney filed an ethics complaint against Trester, and the matter was referred to the office of the Kansas Disciplinary Administrator. The subject of the complaint involved Trester's negotiation of collective bargaining agreements and informal labor arbitration under the National Labor Relations Act. Because these particular acts did not consist of engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in California, the complaint was dismissed. Neither of these previous incidents appear to be relevant to the case at hand. Trester contends that he never told anyone he was a member of the California Bar. But, as the petitioner points out, Trester admitted he never told Friedman that he was not licensed to practice law in California, nor did he place his state of licensure on his business cards or stationery. Trester, instead, advertised that he was an attorney at law in the Law Offices of Irwin Trester, which gave the impression that he was authorized to practice law generally in that state. The petitioner argues that Trester's admission and actions show the intent to deceive. We agree. Trester contends his situation is comparable to the one in In re Kershner, 250 Kan. 383, 827 P.2d 1189 (1992). Kershner was convicted of four felony violations of the Kansas Securities Act (2 counts of violating K.S.A. 17-1254 by offering for sale shares of stock of a corporation when he was not registered as a broker-dealer or agent and 2 counts of violating K.S.A. 17-1255 by offering for sale or selling shares of stock in a corporation when such security was not registered). 250 Kan. at 383-84, 827 P.2d 1189. Kershner also failed to file his attorney registration fees for the years 1985-90 when he was not practicing law. In addition, Kershner failed to appear before the hearing panel, later claiming he never received notice of the hearing. 250 Kan. at 386, 827 P.2d 1189. The Kershner hearing panel recommended disbarment, finding that respondent violated the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 8.4(b), (c), and (g). 250 Kan. at 387, 827 P.2d 1189. This court found the fact that Kershner was convicted of four felony violations of the Kansas Securities Act was sufficient to show a violation of MRPC 8.4(b). We concluded: [U]nder the facts present, Kershner's felony convictions cannot also be `other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law' and a violation of MRPC 8.4(g). There does not appear to be a violation of MRPC 8.4(c). 250 Kan. at 388, 827 P.2d 1189. Kershner is distinguishable from the present case. Unlike this case, there is no indication Kershner held himself out as a broker or dealer and the criminal offenses did not include theft or the unauthorized practice of law. Additionally, Kershner had no victims to compensate. Here, Trester was ordered to pay restitution in the California theft cases. And the hearing panel found Trester caused actual injury to Friedman. Trester contends that he wants to provide evidence by way of explaining his conduct, but it appears that he merely attempts to attack the California criminal theft convictions and unauthorized practice of law conviction. This attack is inappropriate on two fronts: (1) Trester admits he violated KRPC 8.4(b) which was based on his California conviction of the crime of unauthorized practice of law, and (2) Supreme Court Rule 202 and Kansas precedent do not permit us to look behind Trester's convictions. See State v. Russo, 230 Kan. 5, 8, 630 P.2d 711 (1981) (once conviction becomes final, it is conclusive upon this court; we will not look behind the conviction or attempt to weigh the evidence leading to the conviction). Further, [a] final adjudication in another jurisdiction that a lawyer has been guilty of misconduct shall establish conclusively the misconduct for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this state. Supreme Court Rule 202 (2006 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 240). Recently, in In re Pyle, 283 Kan. 807, 825, 156 P.3d 1231 (2007), this court acknowledged the fact that, in fewer than 50 cases, we have found attorneys guilty of violating KRPC 8.4(c) in its current form. See, e.g., In re Singleton, 279 Kan. 515, 111 P.3d 630 (2005) (attorney misrepresented documents to judge; indefinite suspension); In re Rock, 279 Kan. 257, 105 P.3d 1290 (2005) (attorney converted client funds, abandoned clients, and committed other misconduct; disbarment). We have no qualms, however, saying that holding oneself out as an attorney in a state in which he or she has no license to practice law and giving the impression the attorney is authorized to practice law generally in that state engages in conduct that violates KRPC 8.4(c). Clear and convincing evidence supports the panel's finding that Trester violated KRPC 8.4(c).