Opinion ID: 1205096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Admission of Prior Inconsistent Statement by Angela Womble

Text: (6a) On July 22, 1986, Angela Womble selected defendant's photograph out of a photo lineup, stating she was positive it depicted the person who killed her mother. At trial, defense counsel asked Angela on cross-examination whether she had identified the July 22 photograph by name. She replied, I might have, I don't remember. I remember saying this is him, and it wasn't by name, it was by his face. On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Angela, When you identified that photograph on the 22nd of July, who were you identifying? She responded, Willie Johnson. Based on these responses, the prosecutor moved to admit the following preliminary hearing testimony into evidence as an inconsistent statement: [6] [DEFENSE COUNSEL.] When you looked at the second set of photographs, did you feel that the person you identified was the proper person because he looked like a person in the photographs you saw in the first set of photographs? [ถ] [ANGELA WOMBLE.] No. I remembered him as the one standing over me with the 12 gauge shotgun, that's what I remembered. Over a defense objection, the trial court allowed the preliminary hearing testimony to be read to the jury. This, defendant contends, was error. (7) A statement by a witness that is inconsistent with his or her trial testimony is admissible to establish the truth of the matter asserted in the statement under the conditions set forth in Evidence Code sections 1235 and 770. [7] The fundamental requirement of section 1235 is that the statement in fact be inconsistent with the witness's trial testimony. ( People v. Sam (1969) 71 Cal.2d 194, 210 [77 Cal. Rptr. 804, 454 P.2d 700].) Normally, the testimony of a witness that he or she does not remember an event is not inconsistent with that witness's prior statement describing the event. ( People v. Green (1971) 3 Cal.3d 981, 988 [92 Cal. Rptr. 494, 479 P.2d 998].) However, courts do not apply this rule mechanically. Inconsistency in effect, rather than contradiction in express terms, is the test for admitting a witness' prior statement [citation], and the same principle governs the case of the forgetful witness. ( Ibid. ) When a witness's claim of lack of memory amounts to deliberate evasion, inconsistency is implied. ( Id. at pp. 988-989.) As long as there is a reasonable basis in the record for concluding that the witness's I don't remember statements are evasive and untruthful, admission of his or her prior statements is proper. ( People v. O'Quinn (1980) 109 Cal. App.3d 219, 225 [167 Cal.Rptr 141].) (6b) Our examination of the record discloses no reasonable basis for a belief that the testimony Angela gave at trial was inconsistent with that which she gave at the preliminary hearing. The statement she made on cross-examination (I might have, I don't remember. I remember saying this is him, and it wasn't by name, it was by his face.) is, despite her momentary expression of uncertainty, essentially to the same effect as her prior testimony: that she identified defendant based on her memory of his appearance as he was committing his crimes. The most one can say about the response she gave on redirect examination (that she identified Willie Johnson in the photo lineup) is that it was somewhat ambiguous, not that it was necessarily inconsistent with her prior statement or evasive in any way. Admission of Angela Womble's preliminary hearing testimony was, therefore, erroneous. The error was, however, harmless despite the prosecutor's reference to the testimony in his closing argument. Angela identified defendant as the second gunman at trial based on her independent recollection. She also testified that when she identified defendant's photographs on July 2 and July 22, she had an independent recollection of what the man who shot her mother looked like. She testified that she never saw any photographs of Willie Johnson apart from the ones shown her by Detective Shipp, she did not see any names on the lineup photographs, and no one described Willie Johnson to her. Thus, it is not reasonably probable that admission of the preliminary hearing testimony affected the verdict. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]; see People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 211 [260 Cal. Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285].) Because Angela Womble was subject to cross-examination both at the preliminary hearing and at trial, defendant was at no time denied his constitutional right of confrontation. (See California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149, 155-156 [26 L.Ed.2d 489, 495, 90 S.Ct. 1930].) His other claims of state and federal constitutional error likewise fail.

On July 17, 1986, Detective Shipp advised defendant, who was in custody, of his Miranda rights, [8] and informed him he had been arrested on suspicion of murder. Defendant said he understood his rights and declined to talk to Shipp. The next day, Shipp attempted to arrange a live lineup at the Contra Costa County jail in Martinez, where defendant was being held. Deputy Sheriff Padilla spoke to defendant through the intercom system in defendant's cell, stating defendant would have to go downstairs. Padilla then went to defendant's cell, telling him he was going downstairs for a lineup. Defendant refused, declaring Padilla could not make him go. Meanwhile, Attorney Nancy Kramer, who had been appointed to represent defendant at the lineup, had arrived at the jail on the morning of July 18 and sought to speak with him. She was told there was a problem in locating him and was asked to wait while officials determined where he was being housed. Kramer left the jail at noon without having seen defendant. She returned between 1 and 1:30 p.m. and waited in a holding room. She was informed that defendant had been placed in a different module in protective custody, which was why he had not been located earlier. About 30 minutes later, she was told that defendant would not speak with her and was refusing to participate in the lineup. Detective Shipp and Angela Womble arrived at the county jail about 2:56 p.m. In the jail lobby, Shipp spoke with Kramer and Padilla regarding defendant's refusal to participate in the lineup. Shipp and an investigator went to defendant's cell. Shipp advised defendant that he had no right to refuse to stand in a lineup and that if he refused, the district attorney could comment about the refusal at trial. Defendant asked, Well, who do I have standing there with me? Shipp explained that an attorney had been appointed for him and would be present when the persons for the lineup were selected. Shipp asked defendant if he still refused. Defendant said he did. Kramer left the jail without having communicated with defendant. Defendant objected to introduction of evidence of his refusal to stand in a lineup. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court overruled the objection. Defendant contends the trial court erred.
(8) Defendant urges that in the circumstances of this case, admission of his refusal to stand in a lineup denied him due process and violated his privilege against self-incrimination and his rights to counsel and to protection against cruel and unusual punishment. (Cal. Const., art. I, งง 7(a), 15, 17; U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th, & 14th Amends.) We reject his contentions. The privilege against self-incrimination extends to compelled testimonial or communicative disclosures by an accused, but not to real or physical evidence derived from him. ( Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 760-765 [16 L.Ed.2d 908, 913-916, 86 S.Ct. 1826]; People v. Ellis (1966) 65 Cal.2d 529, 533-537 [55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 421 P.2d 393] [voice identification testimony not protected by self-incrimination privilege].) A defendant's appearance, as manifested in a lineup, is one such type of nontestimonial, physical evidence. Accordingly, it is not protected by the privilege ( United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 221-223 [18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1153-1155, 87 S.Ct. 1926]), and evidence of a defendant's refusal to participate in a lineup is admissible at his trial. ( People v. Huston (1989) 210 Cal. App.3d 192, 216-217 [258 Cal. Rptr. 393]; People v. Smith (1970) 13 Cal. App.3d 897, 910 [91 Cal. Rptr. 786, 52 A.L.R.3d 875] [defendant's refusal, during show-up at police station, to don jacket and cap allegedly worn by robber not protected by self-incrimination privilege]; see also Quintana v. Municipal Court (1987) 192 Cal. App.3d 361, 365-366 [237 Cal. Rptr. 397] [defendant's refusal to submit to blood-alcohol test not protected by self-incrimination privilege], citing South Dakota v. Neville (1983) 459 U.S. 553, 562-564 [74 L.Ed.2d 748, 757-759, 103 S.Ct. 916].) (9a) Defendant argues that evidence of his refusal to participate in the lineup nonetheless should have been suppressed because he was denied his right to counsel during a critical stage of the prosecution against him. He bases this argument on the fact that jail authorities failed to afford him an opportunity to meet with Attorney Nancy Kramer when she arrived at the jail asking to see him. He relies on People v. Bustamante (1981) 30 Cal.3d 88 [177 Cal. Rptr. 576, 634 P.2d 927] ( Bustamante ), in which we held that the California Constitution affords a suspect a right to counsel at a preindictment lineup ( id. at p. 102), and People v. Houston (1986) 42 Cal.3d 595 [230 Cal. Rptr. 141, 724 P.2d 1166] ( Houston ), in which we held that, under the right to counsel afforded by the California Constitution, a suspect in custody must be informed promptly of his attorney's arrival at the detention facility, and must then be allowed to see the attorney if he so chooses before questioning begins or resumes ( id. at p. 610). Bustamante, supra, 30 Cal.3d 88, does not assist defendant, inasmuch as counsel was appointed for him in advance of the lineup. Nor does Houston, supra, 42 Cal.3d 595, benefit defendant, since defendant was not subjected to questioning. (See People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 868-869 [268 Cal. Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983] [ Houston rule is limited to the facts of that case.].) In any event, the exclusionary rules in both Bustamante and Houston were abrogated by the passage of Proposition 8, an initiative adopted by the voters of this state on June 8, 1982. Among other provisions, Proposition 8 added section 28 to article I of the state Constitution. That section abrogated judicial decisions requiring exclusion of relevant evidence from criminal proceedings, except as compelled by the federal Constitution or other statutes not implicated here. ( People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 315-319 [243 Cal. Rptr. 369, 748 P.2d 307].) (10)(See fn. 9.), (9b) As defendant's crime occurred after the adoption of Proposition 8, the exclusionary rules of Bustamante and Houston have no application to this case. [9] Defendant asserts a violation of his federal constitutional right to counsel, chiefly by way of attempting to distinguish Kirby v. Illinois (1972) 406 U.S. 682 [32 L.Ed.2d 411, 92 S.Ct. 1877] and Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412 [89 L.Ed.2d 410, 106 S.Ct. 1135]. Kirby held that the federal constitutional right to counsel does not attach until the initiation of judicial criminal proceedings. ( United States v. Gouveia (1984) 467 U.S. 180, 187-188 [81 L.Ed.2d 146, 153-154, 104 S.Ct. 2292]; Kirby v. Illinois, supra, 406 U.S. at pp. 689, 691 [32 L.Ed.2d at pp. 417, 418] (plur. opn. of Stewart, J.) (conc. opn. of Burger, C.J.).) Burbine reaffirmed that the right to counsel attaches with the commencement of judicial proceedings against an accused. In Burbine, the court concluded that police officers' failure to notify the accused โ who was in custody but had not been formally charged โ of his attorney's attempts to telephone him neither invalidated his waiver of Miranda rights nor impaired his right to counsel. ( Moran v. Burbine, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 421-428 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 420-425].) Defendant attempts to distinguish these cases by noting that (unlike Kirby) he had counsel and (unlike Burbine) he did not waive the right to counsel or his self-incrimination privilege. These distinctions do not make a difference because appearance in a lineup does not implicate the privilege against self-incrimination. (11) Defendant characterizes his conversation with Detective Shipp, during which he refused to stand in the lineup, as custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436. It was not. Interrogation consists of express questioning or of words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. ( Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 300-301 [64 L.Ed.2d 297, 307-308, 100 S.Ct. 1682].) Detective Shipp's statements to defendant were limited to conveying information about the proposed procedure and ascertaining whether or not defendant would participate. This neither required readvisement of rights nor amounted to interrogation in violation of Miranda. The fact that defendant's responses may have inculpated him was merely incidental to his unprivileged refusal to cooperate in a nontestimonial procedure. Defendant has failed to establish that admission of the fact of his refusal to stand in the lineup, and the statements by which he did so, violated any of his rights under the state and federal constitutions.

(12a) Defendant contends that several remarks by the prosecutor during his guilt phase closing argument amounted to unsworn testimony or had the effect of vouching for prosecution witnesses, and so constituted misconduct. (See People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 212 [152 Cal. Rptr. 141, 589 P.2d 396]; People v. Perez (1962) 58 Cal.2d 229, 245-246 [23 Cal. Rptr. 569, 373 P.2d 617, 3 A.L.R.3d 946].) He has waived each claim of misconduct by failing to object and request an admonition to the jury. ( People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1235 [283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163]; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) His failure to object is not excused: in each instance any harm could have been cured by prompt admonition. Moreover, as will appear, even if defendant had preserved his claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we would find no reversible error. (13) Defendant first argues that the prosecutor argued improperly regarding the change in Angela's testimony about the perpetrator's earring. Angela initially stated that she noticed a shiny stud in the second gunman's right ear. (Defendant's left ear, not his right, is pierced.) In a conversation with Detective Shipp and the prosecutor shortly before the preliminary hearing, however, Angela determined the stud was, in fact, in the perpetrator's left ear. Both Angela and Detective Shipp testified regarding that conversation. In essence, Detective Shipp testified that Angela reached toward her own right ear, but then paused and spontaneously pointed at the prosecutor's left ear. Shipp testified that he told her she was pointing to her right ear, and that Angela agreed, and indicated the stud was in defendant's left ear. Shipp testified that neither he nor the prosecutor suggested to Angela which ear was the correct one. On cross-examination, Detective Shipp acknowledged that the conversation had not been tape-recorded. Referring to the change in her testimony regarding the gunman's earring, Angela testified she did it all on [her] own. Based on this testimony, the prosecutor argued, [A]ll I could do is submit to you that no suggestion was made in any way to Angela as to which hole or which pierced ear the defendant, Mr. Johnson, had. Defense counsel, in turn, stated in closing argument that [t]his movement of the earring really upsets me. People can be wrong, sure, but the earring never gets moved until two days before preliminary hearing, the 16th of December in an unrecorded conversation between the district attorney and Detective Shipp after Willie Johnson has been arrested for murder and after he has had his left ear photographed. In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued, The second time that same question [the location of the earring], it was not a leading question, it was not a suggestive question, ladies and gentlemen, I more than anybody else wish there was a tape of that interview, because I submit to you if you heard a tape of that, if you heard the spontaneity following the pregnant pause, if you will, and that ear, and Detective Shipp saying that's your right, the clear reliability and spontaneity of that pointing would be manifest. But, we don't have that taped. All I can do is submit it on the testimony of Angela Womble and Detective Shipp that that is in fact what happened. The prosecutor also told the jury that [A]ll I could do is submit to you that no suggestion was made in any way to Angela as to which hole or which pierced ear the defendant ... had. Defendant contends that the prosecutor injected into closing argument his own unsworn testimony regarding the conversation among himself, Angela, and Detective Shipp. Although defendant's contention is not without some force, we conclude the prosecutor's line of argument was sufficiently supported by the testimony of Angela Womble and Detective Shipp to avoid characterization as misconduct. The prosecutor's use of the term spontaneity echoed Detective Shipp's testimony as well as Angela's testimony that she did it all on [her] own. The prosecutor was entitled to express his personal wish that the conversation had been recorded, since defense counsel had implicitly accused the prosecutor of suggesting that Angela change her description of the second gunman; the jury would have appreciated the context of the remark. (See United States v. Young (1985) 470 U.S. 1, 17-18 [84 L.Ed.2d 1, 14, 1055 S.Ct. 1038].) Even if we could agree with defendant that the remarks strayed beyond the evidence, we would find them harmless. The jury had the oportunity to hear Detective Shipp and Angela Womble testify to the circumstances of the interview, and thus could judge their credibility independently of the prosecutor's argument. Defendant also contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by calling Angela Womble's identification of defendant as reliable an identification as may be found in a courtroom. We disagree; the statement cannot reasonably be interpreted as vouching, but would have been understood as an invitation to draw the desired inference. (14) Defendant further argues that the prosecutor gave unsworn testimony in suggesting to the jury a way to interpret Angela's reference to the second gunman as tall: that defendant, although only five feet, nine and three-quarters inches in height, was tall compared with Willie Womble. Unfortunately for the prosecutor, no witness had testified to Willie Womble's height. To overcome the difficulty, the prosecutor argued the jury could calculate, from the dimensions of the room and the distance of the body from the east wall, that Willie Womble was five feet three inches tall. [10] Defendant complains that the method by which the prosecutor derived Willie Womble's height was fallacious, and that in effect the prosecutor simply urged the jury to take his word for it that she was five feet three inches tall. We find no misconduct. The prosecutor avoided the error of stating that the pathologist would have testified that Willie Womble was indeed five feet three inches (see People v. Johnson (1981) 121 Cal. App.3d 94, 102 [175 Cal. Rptr. 8]); instead, he conceded he had not asked the proper questions and made a rather strained argument from other evidence that the jury should so find. If the prosecutor's reasoning was faulty, the jury was free to reject it. (15) Defendant next contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by referring to autopsy photographs not in evidence and by specifically noting with respect to one item, [Y]ou're not going to see a picture of it. No misconduct appears. The pathologist described Willie Womble's injuries as depicted in eight autopsy photographs. The trial court later ruled it would admit three of the photographs in evidence and exclude the remaining five. It would have been apparent to the jury, on retiring to deliberate, that the number of exhibits before them did not correspond to the number of photographs about which the pathologist had testified. We are unpersuaded the prosecutor's remark could have led the jury to speculate what else might be shown in the photographs not admitted. (16) Finally, defendant urges the prosecutor used his closing argument to testify to the reasons why criminalist Fukayama undertook a reexamination of the shotgun shells taken from the Womble residence. Defense counsel, in argument, suggested that reexamination was done to fit a case around Willie. In rebuttal, the prosecutor described the initial tests performed by Fukayama and certain omissions from his analysis, stating, The point is not what Mr. Fukayama's conclusions were, that wasn't the problem. The problem was with his method. It was unprofessional. The prosecutor elaborated: The problem was the incomplete examination and for that reason, and only that reason, that evidence went back to Mr. Fukayama in January after the preliminary hearing. I can only submit that to you but I submit to you that is in fact the case. Defendant contends that because there was no testimony either specifically labelling Fukayama's analysis unprofessional or directly stating that the reason for the reexamination was the incompleteness of the initial examination, the quoted argument constituted misconduct. We believe the prosecutor's comments that Fukayama's method was unprofessional and incomplete were fair inferences from the evidence, inasmuch as Fukayama described the deficiencies in his initial analysis and admitted his initial conclusion was wrong. However, the prosecutor went beyond the evidence when he argued that the only reason Fukayama reexamined the evidence was the incompleteness of the initial analysis. Fukayama did not so testify, and the prosecutor, as the person in charge of the proceedings against defendant, was in the best position to know why Fukayama was asked to reexamine the evidence. In effect, the prosecutor submitted the point on his own representation. We see no possibility that defendant was prejudiced, however, in light of the admitted deficiencies in Fukayama's initial analysis and his testimony that the prosecutor did not apply any undue influence or pressure on him. None of the claimed instances of misconduct, therefore, rendered defendant's trial unfair or unreliable. Because we find no prejudice, defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must likewise fail. ( People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839].) [11]
(12b) Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly drew the jury's attention to the fact that he had not testified at trial, violating his privilege against self-incrimination and other constitutional rights. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, งง 1, 7, subd. (a), 15, 16; Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 110, 85 S.Ct. 1229].) Defendant failed to object to the statements he now challenges, and so has waived his claim of misconduct. ( People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 690-691 [224 Cal. Rptr. 705, 715 P.2d 665]; People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 27.) (17) Even if he had preserved the claim, we would find it meritless, as we perceive no reasonable likelihood that the jury could have understood any of the statements in the manner defendant urges. ( People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705].) In closing argument, the prosecutor discussed defendant's liability for aiding and abetting Duchine in the robbery, noting that the jury did not receive an aiding and abetting instruction with respect to the murder and attempted murder counts because defendant personally killed Willie Womble and shot Angela Womble. The prosecutor argued that defendant committed those crimes to avoid being identified. Why did he do that? What was the point in doing something like that? ... I'm going to talk about it in some detail a little while later when I talk about specific items of evidence, when I talk about the earring, when I talk about the lighting conditions, but you know you have Angela Womble who told you and she certainly should know what the lighting conditions, what the ability to see inside that house was, and I'll talk about that and show you a little demonstration and you have a number of other witnesses.... [T]here was somebody else in that house who knew what the lighting conditions were. There was somebody else in that house who knew Willie and Angela Womble could see and not see [ sic ]. Somebody else in that house who was concerned about being identified and, therefore, perpetrated this murder and this attempted murder to prevent those persons from coming forward and identifying them for the killing or for the robbery, and based on that, they killed. [ถ] There's somebody else, ladies and gentlemen, who knows what Angela knows and who killed because of it, and that man is Willie Darnell Johnson. That's why there's another part of this special circumstance instruction that is important. [ถ] The Court instructed you a special circumstance is not established if it was merely incidental to the commission of the murder.... [ถ] You don't have that in this case. [ถ] The primary intent, ladies and gentlemen, was robbery. The motive for the murder was to use the language of the law, to avoid detection. To kill witnesses who Angela's last words in the tape could identify. Defendant contends a reasonable juror would have understood the quoted passage as commenting on his failure to testify. We disagree. The prosecutor was referring neither directly nor indirectly to defendant's failure to testify. Rather, his argument addressed the issues of whether the lighting in the Womble residence was sufficient to enable Angela and her mother to identify the perpetrator of the crime, and whether the murder was done in order to facilitate the robbery, as required to establish the special circumstance allegations. The rule in Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609, does not extend to comments on the state of the evidence ( People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453, 472-473 [276 Cal. Rptr. 356, 801 P.2d 1107]), and was not implicated in the instance defendant cites. (18) Defendant also complains the prosecutor committed Griffin error in arguing that [t]he uncontradicted evidence is that the defendant was there, that the defendant did kill Willie Womble, that the defendant did shoot Angela Womble. That is uncontradicted. It is true, as defendant asserts, that a prosecutor errs by referring to evidence as uncontradicted when the defendant, who elects not to testify, is the only person who could have refuted it. ( People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 758, fn. 20 [175 Cal. Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446].) If, however, the evidence could have been contradicted by witnesses other than the defendant, the prosecutor may without violating defendant's privilege against self-incrimination describe the evidence as unrefuted or uncontradicted. ( Ibid. ; see also People v. Miller (1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 996 [269 Cal. Rptr. 492, 790 P.2d 1289]; People v. Gray (1979) 91 Cal. App.3d 545, 552 [154 Cal. Rptr. 555].) Here, the defense challenged Angela's identification testimony, implicitly contending that defendant was elsewhere than at the Womble residence on the night of the crime. However, the defense presented no alibi evidence to support the contention. ( People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 34 [171 Cal. Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213].) Thus, the prosecutor's comment merely reflected the state of the evidence. ( People v. Murtishaw, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 758, fn. 20.)
(19) After discussing the special circumstance allegations, the prosecutor discussed the elements of the robbery and burglary charges. He argued, [D]on't think that because I may have already discussed the crimes of robbery and burglary in the context of special circumstances that they are not important โ somehow that they are mere surplusages of Counts 3 and 4. For reasons I'm not permitted to go into right now, they are not surplusages, they are important. (Italics added.) Defendant now argues that the prosecutor improperly told the jury that its verdicts should be influenced by unstated law and insinuated that legal technicalities might undo the jury's verdicts on some charges unless convictions were returned on all charges. This, he contends, violated his rights to personal presence, confrontation, jury trial, assistance of counsel, and due process. His failure to object to the comment at trial bars our review. ( People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 27.) If we were to reach the point, we would find it meritless. We do not interpret the prosecutor's statement as an invitation to let considerations other than the evidence affect the jury's verdict. We see no error in an argument that impresses upon the jury the necessity of fulfilling its duty to decide each of the charges and allegations before it.

Defendant contends that the jury was incorrectly instructed on eyewitness identification factors. (20) Defendant is entitled to an instruction that focuses the jury's attention on facts relevant to its determination of the existence of reasonable doubt regarding identification, by listing, in a neutral manner, the relevant factors supported by the evidence. ( People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1141 [248 Cal. Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049].) The instruction should not take a position as to the impact of each of the psychological factors listed; it should also list only factors applicable to the evidence at trial, and should refrain from being unduly long or argumentative. ( Id. at p. 1143.) The trial court read the jury a modified version of CALJIC No. 2.92, set forth in the margin. [12] We have noted that CALJIC No. 2.92 normally provides sufficient guidance on the subject of eyewitness identification factors. ( People v. Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1141.) Defendant challenges certain aspects of the instruction as given and the rejection of the instruction he proffered on the subject of eyewitness identification. We consider each of his contentions.
(21) Defendant urges that the portion of the instruction dealing with the influence of stress on identification was erroneous, in that it was confusing and undermined the testimony of Dr. Loftus, defendant's expert witness. The instruction directed the jury to consider [t]he stress, if any, to which the witness was subjected at the time of the observation (italics added). Defendant contends this portion of the instruction undermined the defense's ability to rely on the testimony of its expert witness, Dr. Loftus. We disagree. Dr. Loftus testified that the degree of stress or fright that a witness would experience during a crime such as occurred in this case would reduce his or her ability to acquire information accurately. That the situation was stressful was undisputed; the prosecutor acknowledged in closing argument that the stress level was high even before the first shot was fired. However, we do not view the instruction as casting doubt on Dr. Loftus's testimony in any significant way. Rather, it allowed the jury to determine the level of stress Angela experienced during the crime.
(22) Defendant further contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the extent to which the witness was either certain or uncertain of the identification was a factor to consider in assessing eyewitness testimony. Defendant asserts that there was no evidence to support this instruction because Dr. Loftus testified without contradiction that a witness's confidence in an identification does not positively correlate with its accuracy. As a corollary to this claim, he argues the instruction was improper because it contradicted Dr. Loftus's testimony, thereby implying the jury could not rely on her evidence. We cannot agree with defendant's contentions. First, as defendant concedes, the jury remained free to reject Dr. Loftus's testimony although it was uncontradicted. ( People v. Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1142-1143.) The trial court was not required โ indeed, was not permitted โ to instruct the jury to view the evidence through the lens of her theory. Second, the jury was instructed that it should consider [t]estimony of any expert regarding acquisition, retention, or retrieval of information presented to the senses of an eyewitness. Thus, if the jury was persuaded by Dr. Loftus's testimony, the instructions allowed it to infer that Angela's positive identification was not necessarily an accurate one. We cannot agree with defendant that the jury must have found these two portions of the eyewitness identification instruction confusing. His contention would be valid only if the jury were required to accept Dr. Loftus's testimony; as we have seen, it was not. The trial court did not err, therefore, in instructing the jury on the certainty factor.
(23) Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing his request that the jury be instructed as follows: Was the witness' memory affected by intervening time and events? Memory tends to fade over time, and studies show that a witness may subconsciously incorporate into her memory information from other sources. The trial court did not err. The requested instruction was argumentative, in that it invited the jury to draw inferences favorable to the defendant from specified items of evidence on a disputed question of fact. ( People v. Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1135.) As such, it was properly refused. In addition, the concept that post-event information could contaminate a witness's identification was adequately covered by other instructions. The jury was told to consider [w]hether the witness' identification is in fact the product of her own recollection and [w]hether the witness' memory was or was not affected by intervening time and events.
(24a, 25a) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as follows: Did the witness identify the defendant before trial from photographs? If so, were the photographs suggestive in any way? Instead, the court proposed to instruct the jury to consider [w]hether the witness was able to identify the perpetrator in a photographic lineup and the fairness of the photographic lineup. Defense counsel agreed to the use of the word fairness, observing, I've got no problems with that ... it's common everyday language. Defendant now contends the trial court erred in (1) striking the adjective alleged before perpetrator, and (2) substituting the concept of fairness for suggestiveness. (24b) Defendant's first contention is without merit. Deletion of the word alleged from the instruction did not lighten the prosecution's burden of proof. The jury was instructed that, for a guilty verdict, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the person who committed the crime. (CALJIC No. 2.91.) The jury was also instructed that defendant was not required to prove himself innocent or to prove that another person committed the crime. Moreover, defense counsel himself stated, I don't know why we need the word `alleged.' Perpetrator, I mean, somebody did something โ. (25b) Defendant's second contention is likewise meritless. He complains that by changing defendant's proposed instruction on suggestiveness into one on fairness, the court directed the jury's attention away from the issue of conscious or subconscious suggestive influences (including those exerted by unofficial sources such as Angela's family and friends) and instead focused the jury on intentional bias-inducing conduct by the police. It is unclear why defendant complains about this focus. Inasmuch as the instruction dealt with the fairness of lineups, it necessarily focused on official conduct. The jury's consideration of unofficial suggestive influences was sufficiently guided by the instructions to consider [w]hether the witness' memory was or was not affected by intervening time and events, and [w]hether the witness' identification is in fact the product of her own recollection.
(26) Defendant requested that the jury be instructed as follows: Did the witness give a description of the offender immediately after the alleged crime? If so how well does the defendant fit that description? The trial court declined to give the requested instruction, concluding that the subject of that request was adequately addressed by two factors listed in CALJIC No. 2.92, i.e., The witness' ability following the observation to provide a description of the perpetrator of the act and [t]he extent to which the defendant either fits or does not fit the description of the perpetrator previously given by the witness. Defendant now complains that the instruction the trial court gave is designed for the case in which the eyewitness gives only one description of the perpetrator, not multiple descriptions as did Angela. Defendant argues that by not acknowledging that the jury should consider whether a description given at the scene of the crime might deserve a different weight than a description given weeks or months later, the instructions indicated that Dr. Loftus's views were unrecognized by the law. Defendant's contention is incorrect. The instruction given does not limit the jury to consideration of any one description Angela might have provided. The jury was free to consider the extent to which defendant matched any of Angela's descriptions of the perpetrators. In fact, defendant's proposed instruction would have been susceptible to the criticism that it lay undue stress on Dr. Loftus's testimony that a description given nearer in time to an event is more reliable than one given at a later time. The trial court did not err in refusing it. In sum, the identification instruction given by the trial court met the requirements set forth in People v. Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pages 1141, 1143: it focused the jury's attention on facts relevant to its determination of the existence of reasonable doubt regarding identification, by listing, in a neutral manner, the relevant factors supported by the evidence, without improperly invading the domain of either jury or expert witness.
(27) Defendant contends that certain instructions given the jury in this case undermined the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court instructed the jury that defendant was presumed innocent until the contrary was proved and that the presumption placed on the state the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (CALJIC No. 2.90; งง 1096, 1096a.) In four separate instructions โ pertaining to the charged crimes, the required mental state, and the special circumstance allegations โ the trial court told the jury that if one interpretation of the evidence appears to you to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to accept the reasonable interpretation and to reject the unreasonable. Defendant contends that by telling the jurors that their duty is to accept a guilty interpretation of the evidence as long as it appears to be reasonable, the instructions (1) allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof less than that of the reasonable doubt standard (see In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375, 90 S.Ct. 1068]) and (2) operate as an unconstitutional mandatory, conclusive presumption of guilt (see Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263, 265-266 [105 L.Ed.2d 218, 221-222, 109 S.Ct. 2419]; Sandstrom v. Montana (1979) 442 U.S. 510, 515 [61 L.Ed.2d 39, 45, 99 S.Ct. 2450]). We rejected similar contentions in People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 386 [279 Cal. Rptr. 980, 807 P.2d 1009] ( Jennings ), and while defendant criticizes our reasoning, we are not persuaded to reconsider our holding. Finally, we note that despite their use of the term moral certainty, the instructions given in this case do not suffer from the flaws condemned in Cage v. Louisiana (1990) 498 U.S. 39 [112 L.Ed.2d 339, 111 S.Ct. 328]. As we held in Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d 334, CALJIC No. 2.90 does not transform true reasonable doubt, as it traditionally has been defined, into some other degree of doubt.
The trial court instructed the jury, based on CALJIC No. 2.06, that [i]f you find that a defendant attempted to suppress evidence against himself in any manner, such as by refusing to participate in the lineup, such attempt may be considered by you as a circumstance tending to show a consciousness of guilt. [ถ] However, such evidence is not sufficient in itself to prove guilt and its weight and significance, if any, are matters for your consideration. (28) Defendant contends the giving of this instruction was error for two reasons. First, he argues that it characterized his refusal to participate in the lineup as an attempt to suppress evidence even though his refusal did not demonstrate a consciousness of guilt and its admission into evidence violated the Constitution. This argument is without merit. We have already concluded that defendant's refusal to participate in the lineup was properly admitted and supported an inference of consciousness of guilt. ( Ante, at pp. 1221-1224].) The giving of the instruction, therefore, was proper (and beneficial to defendant, to the extent that it made clear the refusal did not, in itself, suffice to establish his guilt). (See People v. Sudduth (1966) 65 Cal.2d 543, 546-547 [55 Cal. Rptr. 393, 421 P.2d 401] [refusal to give breath sample]; People v. Huston, supra, 210 Cal. App.3d at p. 218; People v. Roach (1980) 108 Cal. App.3d 891, 894 [166 Cal. Rptr. 801] [refusal to give urine sample].) (29) Second, he argues that even if the jury could properly have been authorized to consider the lineup refusal as evidence of consciousness of guilt, the instruction was improper because it told the jury that the lineup refusal was only one example of evidence that could be considered as consciousness of guilt. Defendant argues the instruction encouraged the jury to examine all of the evidence โ without guidance from the trial court โ to determine whether any of it demonstrated an attempt to suppress evidence, regardless of whether such a finding was in fact supported by the law or evidence. This argument is equally meritless. The instruction simply allowed the jury to infer consciousness of guilt if it found that defendant attempted to suppress evidence against himself. Defendant reads too much into the phrase in any manner: it merely acknowledges that there are many methods by which evidence may be suppressed. The succeeding phrase โ such as by refusing to participate in the lineup โ pinpoints the evidence supporting the inference. Defendant contends the instruction violates the rule articulated in People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588 [138 Cal. Rptr. 885, 564 P.2d 1203]. There we held the giving of a modified version of CALJIC No. 2.06 to be erroneous because the trial judge failed to make the preliminary determination that there was evidence in the record which, if believed by the jury, would sufficiently support the desired inference of consciousness of guilt. Instead, the trial court improperly left that question of law up to the jury. ( Id. at pp. 597-598.) By contrast, in this case the trial court, in giving the instruction, implicitly determined as a matter of law that the evidence of defendant's refusal to stand in the lineup, if credited by the jury, could warrant an inference of consciousness of guilt if the jury found that the refusal was intended to suppress evidence. (See People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 870 [251 Cal. Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423].) Defendant does not suggest any way in which the jury might have been misled regarding the sort of evidence it could consider as indicating consciousness of guilt. If he believed the instruction required clarification, it was incumbent on him to request it. ( People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 870-871.) He did not do so. Reading the instructions as a whole, as the jury itself was directed to do (CALJIC No. 1.01; see People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1246), we conclude they correctly guided the jury's consideration of the evidence.
(30) Defendant contends that the giving of an expanded version of CALJIC No. 8.75 improperly skewed the jury's deliberative process by precluding deliberation on necessarily included offenses unless and until the jury acquitted defendant of the greater offense. The jury was instructed that [y]ou must unanimously agree that the defendant is not guilty of first degree murder before you may find the defendant guilty or not guilty of second degree murder and [y]ou must unanimously agree that the defendant is not guilty of second degree murder before you find him guilty or not guilty of voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assault, brandishing a firearm or simple assault. In People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322 [250 Cal. Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572], we held that Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503 [183 Cal. Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809] should be read to authorize an instruction that the jury may not return a verdict on the lesser offense unless it has unanimously agreed that defendant is not guilty of the greater crime charged, but should not be interpreted to prohibit a jury from considering or discussing the lesser offenses before returning a verdict on the greater offense. ( People v. Kurtzman, supra 46 Cal.3d at pp. 324-325.) There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction as defendant argues. ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663.) The instruction given in this case complies with Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d 322, in that it does not preclude the jury from considering or discussing lesser included offenses before returning a verdict on the greater offense; it merely requires the jury to acquit defendant of the greater charge before finding him guilty or not guilty of a lesser charge. ( People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 580 [286 Cal. Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893]; People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 976 [264 Cal. Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608].) Indeed, the instruction told the jury that if you unanimously agree that the defendant is not guilty of the offense of first degree murder and second degree murder charged in Count 1, you must have your foreman date and sign such verdict and return them into court regardless of what may happen in your deliberations on any lesser included offenses.... A reasonable inference from this instruction is that the jury may deliberate on lesser included offenses before it has returned its verdict on the first and second degree murder charges. Citing portions of the prosecutor's argument, defendant suggests that instruction must have misled the jury. He does not persuade us. Defendant notes that the prosecutor at one point said, I would submit to you essentially what that instruction tells you to do is you address the crime as charged first and if and only if you return a verdict of not guilty on the crimes charged do you even reach the question of the lesser and included offenses. [ถ] Your first job is to look at the crimes charged, and, ladies and gentlemen, for reasons I'm going to go into at some length, you are not going to reach those lesser and included offenses. This portion of the prosecutor's argument might support defendant's contention. Defendant acknowledges, however, that the prosecutor also argued as follows: The defendant is charged with murder in the Information in Count 1. I would submit to you your first decision is, did he do it? Was he there? Did he have a shotgun? I'll talk about those facts that show you that he did in a moment, but when you reach that conclusion, and I submit to you you will, you have got an unlawful killing of a human being. You have the intent to kill, that's malice aforethought. Before you go further because of a legislatively created mitigating circumstance called heat of passion, I submit to you the next place you have to go before you reach the question of premeditation and deliberation is manslaughter, sudden quarrel, heat of passion.  (Italics added.) It is clear that this portion of the prosecutor's argument contemplated that the jury would consider the lesser included offense of manslaughter at the same time it deliberated on the murder charge. On this record, we believe it unlikely the instruction affected the jury's deliberative process to defendant's detriment. (31) Defendant also contends that the giving of CALJIC No. 8.75 amounted to a violation of section 1097 and, consequently, a deprivation of due process. The contention is erroneous. Section 1097 provides that [w]hen it appears that the defendant has committed a public offense, or attempted to commit a public offense, and there is reasonable ground of doubt in which of two or more degrees of the crime or attempted crime he is guilty, he can be convicted of the lowest of such degrees only. In this case, the jury was instructed that [i]f you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder has been committed by the defendant but you have a reasonable doubt whether such murder was of the first or of the second degree, you must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and return a verdict fixing the murder as of the second degree. (CALJIC No. 8.71.) There is no conflict between CALJIC Nos. 8.75 and 8.71, and the instructions given in this case did not violate section 1097.
(32) Defendant contends that even if no single error in the guilt phase of his trial warrants reversal of his conviction, the cumulative effect of such errors does demand relief. We have identified as errors only the admission of an assertedly inconsistent prior statement by Angela Womble and one instance of impropriety by the prosecutor in closing argument. Neither individually nor cumulatively do these errors warrant reversal.