Opinion ID: 1470157
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Asserted Improper Death Qualification

Text: Appellant claims that a juror was improperly excused for cause, since, when asked by the trial court whether he was so irrevocably opposed to the death penalty as to be unable to follow the law, he stated I guess not, no. Appellant relies upon Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), in which the United States Supreme Court held that a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. Id. at 522, 88 S.Ct. at 1777. According to Appellant, the fact that this venireperson was excused from jury service even though he indicated that he could put aside his personal feelings is an example of improper death-qualification. Further, he asserts that all prior counsel were ineffective for failing to raise this claim. The Commonwealth responds with assertions that this claim is waived and meritless. In terms of merit, the Commonwealth emphasizes the discretionary nature of a trial court's rulings on challenges for cause, see Commonwealth v. Stevens, 559 Pa. 171, 197, 739 A.2d 507, 521 (1999), and the standard by which such challenges are assessed. See Commonwealth v. Morales, 549 Pa. 400, 417-19, 701 A.2d 516, 524-25 (1997) (The proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be dismissed for cause is whether his views on capital punishment would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985))). The Commonwealth develops that, during voir dire, the referenced juror repeatedly and emphatically stated that he could not impose the death penalty, as follows: THE COURT: Do you have any religious, moral, ethical beliefs against the imposition of the death penalty in a case? PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I don't believe in it, no. THE COURT: When you say you don't believe in the death penalty, is that based on religious belief? PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I just don't believe it's right to take the life of anyone, no matter what. THE COURT: Counsel. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I have no questions. [PROSECUTOR]: . . . [J]ust so I understand exactly, I have to ask the question in a precise fashion. It is my understanding from your answer to the Judge's question that if you were forced to make a decision, no matter what the facts of a particular case were and no matter what the law is, you, because of your personal beliefs, would be unable to impose the death penalty on another individual, is that correct? PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No, it's not. I don't believe in it. [PROSECUTOR]: I'm saying, because of your beliefs, you would be unable to ever impose the death penalty, is that what you're saying? PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes. [PROSECUTOR]: Thank you. THE COURT: Is your opposition to the death penalty such that you would automatically vote against the death penalty for this defendant regardless of the facts of this case? PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I wouldn't change my opinion of what I think. N.T. September 27, 2001, at 55-57. According to the Commonwealth, this Court has determined that trial courts dismissed prospective jurors properly for cause due to their opposition to the death penalty in cases far less obvious that the present one. See Brief for Appellee at 83-84 (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Cox, 556 Pa. 368, 384, 728 A.2d 923, 930 (1999) (holding that a trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed potential jurors for cause after their answers to two or more questions regarding their ability to impose the death penalty in an appropriate case indicated an inability to do so)). The Commonwealth stresses that, prior to his final statement, the venireperson had steadfastly and repeatedly maintained that he was opposed to the death penalty in every case, and that he would not change his opinion. The prospective juror's ultimate equivocation, the Commonwealth asserts, merely represented a nearly desperate effort by a highly frustrated man to end this repeated and pointed questioning. Id. at 84. We agree with the Commonwealth to the degree that its argument suggests that it was within the trial court's discretion to resolve the credibility issue arising from the prospective juror's contradictory responses. Further, Appellant has not presented a proffer which might warrant an evidentiary hearing on this claim.