Opinion ID: 184437
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Litigation-Related Auditing Expenses

Text: The district court declined to grant the Trustees' requestfor reimbursement for 24 hours of litigation-related auditing __________ 3 The Trustees argue that JPR's unusual recordkeeping practicesincreased the costs of the routine audit. But there is no indicationthat JPR adopted its recordkeeping practices in order to concealunderpayments, or that there is any other link between thosepractices and JPR's underpayment. 4 The Default and Payment Clause also states that any person indefault may be required at the discretion of the Trustees to pay asliquidated damages such amounts as the Trustees may determine.... The Trustees have not argued that this language entitles them to recover routine audit fees, and we therefore have notconsidered that question. Nor have the Trustees claimed that theyshould have received audit fees under ERISA's provision permittingthe court to award such other legal or equitable relief as the courtdeems appropriate. 29 U.S.C. s 1132(g)(2)(E); see also OperatingEngineers Pension Trust v. A-C Co., 859 F.2d 1336, 1342-43 (9thCir. 1988) (finding that audit fees may be awarded under thisprovision). expenses, finding that the hours spent were more in thenature of litigation support than audit services, ... and inany event are inadequately supported. We find that thedistrict court was within its discretion in concluding that thisrequest for reimbursement was inadequately supported. Wetherefore do not consider whether litigation support servicesare compensable under section 1132(g)(2). But cf. Missouriv. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 (1989) (finding that an award ofa reasonable attorney's fee under 42 U.S.C. s 1988 mayinclude the services of paralegals). A plaintiff seeking attorney's fees under section 1983 mustdemonstrate that the hours billed were reasonably expendedin pursuit of the litigation. Counsel for the prevailing partyshould make a good-faith effort to exclude from a fee requesthours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligatedto exclude such hours from his fee submission. Hensley, 461U.S. at 434. [I]f the district court finds that the attorneyfailed to exercise billing discretion with respect to any of thehours [claimed], the court may reject those hours as notreasonably expended. Goos v. National Association of Realtors, 68 F.3d 1380, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The weaker theapparent need for a particular activity, the higher the evidentiary hurdle a claimant must cross in order to demonstratethat it was in fact performed in a reasonable effort to pursuethe litigation. The Trustees have failed to meet this standard of reasonableness. Sixteen hours of the twenty-four were consumed inpreparing for the Trustees' summary judgment motion, mostly on two declarations. The Trustees have not attempted toprovide us with any explanation of the need for these declarations, and their purpose is not obvious, given that the resultsof the audit appear not to have been in controversy. Theremaining eight hours were used to compile two tables, onecalculating the interest due on JPR's underpayments, and theother listing the hours of work performed by particularauditors and their hourly rates. Although the purpose ofthese tables is more clear, it is incomprehensible that theirpreparation could have consumed anywhere near eight hours. The appropriate course in such circumstances is often toallow a part of the requested time. Here, however, theallowable amount of time--perhaps two hours--would be deminimus, especially when considered in relation to the Trustees' fee request as a whole. Accordingly, we see no need todisturb the district court's decision to disallow this claimaltogether.