Opinion ID: 2639507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did Probable Cause Exist to Justify an Arrest of Defendant for DUI?

Text: We first consider whether the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI. Probable cause exists when the facts known to the arresting officer would persuade someone of `reasonable caution' that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. [Citation.] `[P]robable cause is a fluid conceptturning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts....' ( Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527.) It is incapable of precise definition. ( Maryland v. Pringle (2003) 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769.) `The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,' and that belief must be `particularized with respect to the person to be ... seized.' ( Ibid. ) ( People v. Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 673, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85, 93 P.3d 1027.) That standard was satisfied here. Although Madelene Orvos did not see defendant drinking, she did see him have difficulty walking, toss an empty vodka bottle out of the Bronco, and pass out again in the vehicle. When he woke up, he drove erratically and too fast. He also ran red lights and stop signs. As defendant concedes, the record fully supported Orvos's belief, which she communicated to the police, that the driver of the Bronco was intoxicated. Orvos's report thus established probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest of the Bronco's driver. (Veh. Code, § 40300.5; People v. Schofield (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 968, 972-975, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 429; see generally People v. Smith (1976) 17 Cal.3d 845, 852, 132 Cal. Rptr. 397, 553 P.2d 557 [citizen-informant who has personally observed the commission of a crime is presumptively reliable].) The officers also had ample justification for suspecting that defendant had been the driver of the Bronco. The registered owner of the vehicle lived at 3610 San Jose Lane. A Bronco was parked in front of that residence, and Orvos confirmed that this was the vehicle she had just been following. Officer Gutierrez touched the Bronco's hood and concluded that it had been driven very recently. The officers went to the door and inquired who had been driving the Bronco. Slavka Kovarick said that the Bronco belonged to Daniel and that she was going to call Daniel out to speak to them. Kovarick went into the bedroom immediately to the left of the front door and came out a short time later to say she could not wake Daniel up. Shortly thereafter, Officer Dejohn heard quiet voices coming from down the hall and then saw defendant, a tall White male, approximately 45 years old and shirtless, walk out the back door. At Dejohn's invitation, defendant walked back into the house and approached the entryway by exiting through the bedroom door immediately to the left of the front door. He was staggering and swaying, slurring his speech, and smelled of alcohol. His appearance and demeanor matched the description of the driver provided by Orvos. He also had walked into and out of the bedroom that belonged to Daniel. The officers, having reasonable grounds for believing that defendant was Daniel and that Daniel was the driver, thus had probable cause to arrest him for DUI. Defendant claims probable cause was nonetheless lacking because the description Orvos had provided was too general to justify suspicion of any individual person. He cites People v. Curtis (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33, in which a cursory description of the suspect's race, color of clothing, and presence in the neighborhood where a prowler has been reported was deemed sufficient to justify a detention but not an arrest ( id. at p. 350, 74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33), and on People v. Mickelson (1963) 59 Cal.2d 448, 30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658, in which the suspect's description as a fairly tall White man of large build with dark hair and a red sweater likewise failed to justify the arrest of a man matching that description who was merely in the neighborhood where a robbery had occurred more than 20 minutes earlier and was driving toward the scene of the crime, not away from it. ( Id. at pp. 450, 454, 30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658.) But we have in this case much more than a vague description of a suspect that happens to be matched by someone in the general neighborhood where a crime occurred. The Bronco was traced to a particular residence by its registration as well as by Orvos's visual identification and the fact the engine was still warm. Kovarick told the officers that Daniel, the owner of the Bronco, was indeed home and that she would tell him to come to the door. Only then did a man matching Orvos's description attempt to flee from the house, although he eventually came to the door after passing through Daniel's bedroom. When the man arrived at the front door, the officers immediately could tell that he was intoxicated. These additional facts soundly distinguish Curtis and Mickelson. ( People v. Schader (1965) 62 Cal.2d 716, 724, 44 Cal.Rptr. 193, 401 P.2d 665; In re Louis F. (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 611, 616, 149 Cal.Rptr. 642 [ Curtis and Mickelson should not be understood as standing for the proposition identification data furnished to a police officer can never alone be sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest unless there could not have been anyone other than the person arrested who could have fit the description. Rather, the question is one of degree. And when identification information of the kind here present is buttressed by additional probative evidence of complicity, it cannot be maintained probable cause was lacking].) Defendant also errs in supposing that the officers' lack of certainty defendant was the driver precludes a finding of probable cause. `[S]ufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.' ( Maryland v. Garrison (1987) 480 U.S. 79, 87, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72.)