Opinion ID: 415604
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Alford Plea

Text: 105 Lipscomb argues that he was never convicted of robbery within the meaning of Rule 609 because he pled nolo contendere while maintaining his innocence pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). 74 We reject this argument. 106 First, Lipscomb did not plead nolo; rather, like the defendant in Alford, he pled guilty while maintaining his innocence. Moreover, even if an Alford plea is somehow analogous to a nolo plea, the legislative history makes it clear that a nolo plea results in a conviction. An early Advisory Committee draft of Rule 609 permitted the district court to admit evidence that [a witness] has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo contendere. 75 The exception for nolo pleas was deleted from the Advisory Committee's final draft and did not reappear. We must presume that Congress knew about and approved the deletion. 107 Second, we concluded in part III that the district court has discretion whether or not to inquire into background facts and circumstances such as the exact nature of a plea. It is implausible that Congress intended to make determinative a fact that the court may never learn about. Third, we see no policy reason why the government can impeach a defendant who does not admit guilt, goes to trial, and is convicted, but cannot impeach a defendant who does not admit guilt but concedes that he will be convicted if he goes to trial and therefore makes an Alford plea. 108 We hold therefore that an Alford plea, like a nolo plea, does not preclude subsequent use of a conviction under Rule 609. Accord United States v. Williams, 642 F.2d 136 (5th Cir.1981) (nolo plea).