Opinion ID: 859236
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Proficiency Standard

Text: ¶9 Arizona law has required English proficiency as a qualification for public office since before statehood. The Territorial Code provided that “[n]o person who cannot write and read in the English language shall be eligible to hold any territorial, county, precinct or district office in the Territory of Arizona.” See Ariz. Civ. Code 1901, tit. 1, ch. 14, § 199; see also Ariz. Civ. Code 1913, tit. 1, ch. 18, § 158 (“No person who cannot speak, write, and read the English language shall be eligible to hold any state, county, or precinct office in the state of Arizona.”). ¶10 This longstanding requirement is repeated in both our Enabling Act and Constitution. The Enabling Act states “that ability to read, write, speak, and understand the English language sufficiently well to conduct the duties of the office 5 without the aid of an interpreter shall be a necessary qualification for all state officers and members of the state legislature.” Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 20, 36 Stat. 557, 570 (“Enabling Act”). The Arizona Constitution contains this same requirement. Ariz. Const. art. 20, ¶ 8. ¶11 The proficiency requirement adopted in the Territorial Code was carried forward in the early versions of the Arizona Code and eventually reenacted with minor changes as § 38-201(C) in the 1956 Code. Section 38-201(C) provides that “[a] person who is unable to speak, write and read the English language is not eligible to hold a state, county, city, town or precinct office in the state, whether elective or appointive, and no certificate of election or commission shall issue to a person so disqualified.” The trial court found that this statute would be “rendered meaningless” if “it were interpreted as having no standard or only requiring minimal or bare proficiency at speaking, reading, and writing the English language.” The court narrowly construed the statute to require “sufficient proficiency in speaking, reading, and writing the English language” to understand and perform the duties of the office sought. ¶12 Cabrera argues that the trial court improperly expanded this statute by requiring some degree of English fluency in addition to the statutorily required ability to read, 6 write, and speak English. Because she read aloud council meeting minutes printed in English and was able during her testimony to engage in some basic conversation using English words, Cabrera contends she has met the statutory requirement. ¶13 We review a trial court’s interpretation of a statute de novo. Ballesteros v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 226 Ariz. 345, 347 ¶ 7, 248 P.3d 193, 195 (2011). “[D]isqualifications provided by the legislature are construed strictly and there is a presumption in favor of the eligibility of one who had been elected or appointed to public office.” Shirley v. Superior Court (Minyard), 109 Ariz. 510, 515, 513 P.2d 939, 944 (1973); see also McCarthy v. State ex rel. Harless, 55 Ariz. 328, 335, 101 P.2d 449, 451 (1940) (recognizing same standard). ¶14 We think that the same principles should apply to candidates’ eligibility to run for office. See, e.g., Bysiewicz v. Dinardo, 6 A.3d 726, 738 (Conn. 2010) (citing cases using above standard for candidate eligibility to run for office); Municipality of Anchorage v. Mjos, 179 P.3d 941, 943 (Alaska 2008) (noting that “there is a presumption in favor of candidate eligibility”). This approach respects “the right of the people to select officers of their own choosing.” McCarthy, 55 Ariz. at 334, 101 P.2d at 451. ¶15 Our reading of § 38-201(C) is informed by the 7 requirements in the Enabling Act and Arizona Constitution of sufficient English proficiency to conduct the duties of the office without the aid of an interpreter. See Gladden Farms, Inc. v. State, 129 Ariz. 516, 518, 633 P.2d 325, 327 (1981) (noting that the Enabling Act is one of Arizona’s fundamental laws and preempts conflicting state statutes). The statute’s eligibility requirements apply to a broad range of public officials, including state officers. The qualifications mandated by Arizona’s Enabling Act and Constitution, on the other hand, apply to all state officers and legislators. Those qualifications include an ability to “understand the English language sufficiently well to conduct the duties of the office without the aid of an interpreter.” Enabling Act § 20; Ariz. Const. art. 20, § 8. Although § 38-201(C) does not include the quoted language, when the legislature reenacted the Territorial Code’s proficiency requirement in the 1913 Arizona Code, the predecessor to § 38-201(C), it implicitly included the requirements of the Enabling Act and Constitution because it could not have statutorily imposed anything less with respect to state officers or legislators. See Gladden Farms, 129 Ariz. at 518, 633 P.2d at 327. ¶16 When read in conjunction with Arizona's Enabling Act and Constitution, § 38-201(C) means that to qualify for a public office, a candidate must possess sufficient proficiency in the 8 English language to conduct the duties of the office. To construe the statute as requiring that a candidate only be able to read, write, and speak English, without requiring comprehension of the language, would be incompatible with Arizona’s fundamental law. The most plausible and harmonious reading of the statute is that it requires a sufficient level of proficiency of the English language to conduct the duties of the office without the aid of an interpreter. ¶17 The testimony below supports the trial court’s conclusions that Cabrera failed to comprehend the questions posed to her. Her testimony showed minimal English language comprehension and displayed, as the expert observed, a “large gap” between her level of understanding and that required to serve as a city councilmember. Although she read aloud from various city council meeting documents, Cabrera could not answer elementary questions about what she had read or what had occurred at these meetings. ¶18 Section 38-201(C) does not require any specific level of proficiency other than that required to be able to conduct the duties of the office. In this case, the expert, Dr. Eggington, testified that Cabrera reads at a ninth or tenth grade reading level. If the statute required only proficiency in reading English, this testimony would support a finding of sufficient proficiency. But the statute also requires the 9 ability to speak English, and Dr. Eggington testified that “speaking proficiency is the strongest marker of overall proficiency” in considering whether a person can speak, read, and write a language. Based on his interview of Cabrera and objective testing, Dr. Eggington determined that she has “minimal survival proficiency” in spoken English. He explained that “she is able to perform certain courtesy requirements and maintain simple face-to-face conversation on familiar topics,” but otherwise cannot follow a conversation. His testimony about the “large gap between [her] ability in speaking English and what is needed to perform City Councilman duties,” as well as the trial court’s own observations of Cabrera’s difficulties in understanding and communicating in English, support the trial court’s findings. ¶19 We emphasize that § 38-201(C) requires only a functional ability to read, speak, and write English. The statute does not authorize a literacy test or an intelligence test and does not require anything other than functional comprehension of English in everyday usage. Here, Cabrera’s inability to comprehend English was clear and the trial court properly disqualified her under the statute.