Opinion ID: 782573
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Availability of Mandamus Relief

Text: 39
40 Mandamus is not to be used as a subterfuge to obtain appellate review that is otherwise foreclosed by law. See Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260, 67 S.Ct. 1558, 1559, 91 L.Ed. 2041 (1947) (mandamus and other extraordinary writs directed at judicial officers should be resorted to only where appeal is a clearly inadequate remedy. We are unwilling to utilize them as substitutes for appeals.). Consequently, courts have been hesitant to entertain petitions for mandamus to review the disqualification of counsel in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 105 S.Ct. 2757, 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985), that a party may not take an interlocutory appeal of a disqualification order, and must ordinarily wait to appeal from a final judgment. 41 Koller was the last of three successive decisions in the 1980s in which the Supreme Court set the standard for when the disqualification of an attorney can be appealed. The first was Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 101 S.Ct. 669, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981). In Firestone, the tire company appealed the denial of its motion to disqualify plaintiffs' counsel on the grounds that the firm had represented Firestone's insurance company in earlier, unrelated litigation. The Court held that an order denying a motion to disqualify counsel was not a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and thus could not be appealed except on appeal from a final judgment in the case. Moreover, the Court held that the order did not fall within the narrow finality exception recognized in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949) for collateral orders that are separate from the merits of the underlying case. An order denying disqualification, the Court held, was not effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment — as required to invoke the collateral order doctrine — because complete relief could be had on appeal from a final judgment. See Firestone at 378, 101 S.Ct. at 675 ([S]hould the Court of Appeals conclude after the trial has ended that permitting continuing representation was prejudicial error, it would retain its usual authority to vacate the judgment appealed from and order a new trial. That remedy seems plainly adequate(.)). 42 In Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 79 L.Ed.2d 288 (1984), the Court expanded upon Firestone and held that an order granting a motion to disqualify in a criminal case was also neither a final order nor a collateral order subject to immediate appeal under Cohen. In that case, the trial court had granted the Government's motion to disqualify a defense firm from representing multiple defendants in the same conspiracy scheme because one defendant had interests clearly divergent from the rest. The Court recognized that it had allowed for immediate appeal in certain unique circumstances where a defendant asserted a constitutional right not to stand trial at all, such as where a court refused to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds. In this instance, however, the defendant was merely asserting a right not to be convicted in certain circumstances, and that right could be fully vindicated by a successful appeal after conviction. Id. at 267, 104 S.Ct. at 1055-56. 43 The Court considered, but did not decide, whether successfully appealing the disqualification of counsel required a showing that the party suffered prejudice as a result of the denial. If no prejudice was required, the Court said, then the decision could be effectively reviewed on appeal regardless of whether the defendant was convicted or acquitted, since conviction would not be a prerequisite for relief. Thus, the Cohen prerequisites would not be satisfied. On the other hand, if conviction were required, the order would fall outside the Cohen exception for a different reason, because resolution was dependent on the outcome of the underlying case. 44 Finally, in Koller, the Court synthesized the Firestone and Flanagan rules and held that a district court's order granting a motion to disqualify counsel in a civil case was no more subject to immediate appeal than an order denying the motion. In Koller, the district court granted the defendant's motion to revoke the pro hac vice admission of one of the plaintiff's law firms after finding that its attorneys had improperly leaked information to the media on the eve of trial, forcing a postponement, and had tampered with a witness in a judicial inquiry related to the case. The D.C. Circuit invalidated the disqualification, and the Supreme Court reversed, finding no jurisdiction. 45 After observing that the disqualification order was not a final order because it did not dispose of the underlying case, the Court examined the Cohen factors. It concluded that the disqualification was not a collateral order because it was subject to effective review on appeal from a final judgment. The Court rejected the policy arguments on which the D.C. Circuit relied to find jurisdiction — in particular, the arguments that the law firm would suffer irreparable harm if the disqualification order were left to stand, and that insulating disqualification orders from review would only encourage the strategic use of motions to disqualify in future cases. See id. at 433-34, 105 S.Ct. at 2762-63. 46 Observing that it was rare for such a discretionary order to be successfully appealed, the Court said any benefit realized by the occasional reversal of an erroneous disqualification would be outweighed by the delay accompanying piecemeal review. Further, it observed that an attorney aggrieved by an unwarranted disqualification had alternative means of redress: he could seek certification for discretionary appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292, petition for a writ of mandamus, or — if all else failed — take the matter to the Circuit's Judicial Council. Id. at 435, 105 S.Ct. at 2763; see also id. at 436, 105 S.Ct. at 2764 (A mistaken ruling disqualifying counsel imposes financial hardship on both the disqualified lawyer and the client. But the possibility that a ruling may be erroneous and may impose additional litigation expense is not sufficient to set aside the finality requirement imposed by Congress.).
47 [T]he remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations.... Only exceptional circumstances, amounting to a judicial usurpation of power, will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34-35, 101 S.Ct. 188, 190, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980); see also In re Temple, 851 F.2d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir.1988) (mandamus is to be exercised only in drastic situations, when no other adequate means are available to remedy a clear usurpation of power or abuse of discretion); In re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir.1975) ([M]andamus lies only to confine a lower court to its jurisdiction or to compel it to perform ministerial functions over which it has no discretion.). 48 The party seeking mandamus has the burden of demonstrating that its right to issuance of the writ is `clear and indisputable.' Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96, 88 S.Ct. 269, 274, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967) ( quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384, 74 S.Ct. 145, 148, 98 L.Ed. 106 (1953)); In re American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir.1992) ( quoting Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 309, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 1822, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989)). Significantly, a party is not entitled to mandamus merely because it shows evidence that, on appeal, would warrant reversal of the district court. In re Bushkin Assoc., Inc., 864 F.2d 241, 245 (1st Cir. 1989). 49 As noted above, the trilogy of Supreme Court cases — Firestone, Flanagan and Koller — held that disqualification orders are not immediately appealable, but left open the possible availability of mandamus. Following these Supreme Court cases, divergent authority has evolved. As the Seventh Circuit noted in In re Sandahl, 980 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir.1992), some circuits have seemed to permit mandamus to slide into mere right to relief, id. at 1121 (emphasis in original), rather than insisting upon a clear right to relief (`clear and indisputable,' as the cases sometimes say). Id. Sandahl cited as examples of this line of cases the Fifth Circuit's decision in American Airlines, supra, and Christensen v. United States Dist. Court, 844 F.2d 694 (9th Cir.1988). The Seventh Circuit noted that other circuits had resisted this temptation, citing Bushkin, supra; In re Mechem, 880 F.2d 872 (6th Cir.1989); and In re American Cable Publications, Inc., 768 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir.1985). The Seventh Circuit joined the resisters in avoiding the collapse of mandamus into an ordinary appeal. It held that mandamus in a disqualification case would lie only upon a showing that the district court order was patently erroneous and a showing of a clear right to relief, or a demonstrable injustice. 980 F.2d at 1121. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 614 F.2d 958, 962 (5th Cir.1980) (holding that mandamus will not issue to correct a duty that is to any degree debatable)( citing United States v. Denson, 603 F.2d 1143, 1147 n. 2 (5th Cir.1979) (en banc)). 50 We agree with the Seventh Circuit. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy requiring demonstrable injustice or irreparable injury. Consequently, following the lead of Sandahl, mandamus should ordinarily lie to remedy an attorney disqualification order only if the district court order is patently erroneous and the petitioners have shown a clear and undisputable right to relief.
51 In view of these persuasive cases, we cannot conclude that Petitioners have satisfied the high standard required for issuance of the writ of mandamus. Neither BellSouth nor Price has demonstrated a clear and indisputable right to relief. 52 In addition, BellSouth has not shown that it will suffer irreparable harm or demonstrable injustice if resolution is delayed until the end of the case. If it wins at trial or settles, then no harm was done. If it loses, it can appeal and raise denial of its chosen counsel as an enumeration of error. The mere possibility that a litigant might have to re-litigate a case is not a sufficiently compelling interest to warrant immediate review. See Firestone, 449 U.S. at 378, 101 S.Ct. at 675 (interlocutory orders are not appealable `on the mere ground that they may be erroneous') ( quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98 n. 6, 88 S.Ct. 269, 275 n. 6, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967)); Mechem, 880 F.2d at 874 (applying Koller, [t]hat an erroneous ruling may impose additional cost does not... satisfy the high standard required for mandamus.); Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152, 154-55 (7th Cir.1988) ([O]rdinarily the inconvenience, lost time, and sunk costs of such further proceedings as could have been avoided by correcting the trial judge's error are not considered the kind of irremediable harm that will satisfy the stringent requirements for issuing a writ of mandamus.). Moreover, BellSouth has not presented any facts to indicate that Price's counsel is indispensable to its case. To the contrary, the district court found that the company is ably represented by a large, national firm, to which Price was merely local co-counsel. 53 Price and his firm have a stronger argument with respect to injury, but as our discussion below concludes, they have failed to demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to relief. They have not shown that the district court's ultimate decision to disqualify was patently erroneous. While our discussion reveals the possibility of dire consequences or irreparable harm, there are no findings of fact to support same, and the record does not compel such a finding. 6 54 The analysis leading to our conclusion must examine each of Petitioners' arguments to ascertain whether they have made the strong showing required for the issuance of a writ of mandamus.