Opinion ID: 2966464
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: defraying reasonable expenses of admin-

Text: istering the plan . . . . 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A). 12 Section 404(a)(1)(A) is included in the fiduciary responsibility provisions of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-14. The fiduciary responsibility provisions invoke the common law of trusts. See Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985); S. Rep. No. 127, 93d Cong. (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4865 (The fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.). At common law, trustees have a duty to give beneficiaries upon request complete and accurate information as to the nature and amount of the trust property. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 173 (1959). And beneficiaries are always entitled to such information as is reasonably necessary to enable [them] to enforce [their] rights under the trust or to prevent or redress a breach of trust. Id. cmt. c. The Appellants and the Amici assert that the information requested by the Appellants will help the Appellants to enforce their rights and to prevent a breach of trust. They argue that the Appellants are therefore entitled to the information under § 404(a)(1)(A), because that statute incorporates the common-law principle that beneficiaries are entitled to information that is reasonably necessary to enable them to enforce their rights or to prevent a breach of trust. The Appellants and the Amici thus argue that even if § 104(b)(4) does not require the administrator of the ESOP to furnish the requested documents, § 404(a)(1)(A) requires the fiduciaries of the ESOP to furnish the requested documents. To accept the argument of the Appellants and the Amici we would have to hold that ERISA's general fiduciary duty provision, § 404(a)(1)(A), requires plan fiduciaries to furnish documents to participants and beneficiaries in addition to the documents that ERISA's specific disclosure provision, § 104(b)(4), requires the plan administrator to furnish. Such a holding would conflict with the principle that specific statutes govern general statutes. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992); Farmer v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 4 F.3d 1274, 1284 (4th Cir. 1993). However inclusive may be the general language of a statute, it `will not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment.' Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102, 107 (1944) (quoting Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 13 (1932)). This principle applies with special force with regard to a reticulated statute such as ERISA. Bigger v. American Commercial Lines, 862 F.2d 1341, 1344 (8th Cir. 1988); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Alloytek, Inc., 924 F.2d 620, 626 (6th Cir. 1991). In Bigger, the court rejected an attempt to use the general fiduciary duty standard of § 404(a)(1)(A) to expand the duties imposed under another ERISA section that specifically governed the situation at issue. 862 F.2d at 1344. We likewise decline to use§ 404(a)(1)(A) to expand the duties imposed under § 104(b)(4), the ERISA section that specifically governs the situation at issue here--a request for documents related to the ESOP. As the Supreme Court has noted, ERISA's reporting and disclosure scheme, which includes§ 104(b)(4), may not be a foolproof informational scheme, although it is quite thorough. Either way, it is the scheme that Congress devised. And we do not think Congress intended it to be supplemented by a far-away provision in another part of [ERISA.] Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 115 S. Ct. 1223, 1231 (1995). The Appellants and the Amici maintain that the case law construing § 404(a)(1)(A) supports their position that § 404(a)(1)(A) requires plan fiduciaries to furnish information to participants and beneficiaries in addition to the documents that § 104(b)(4) requires plan administrators to furnish. Our review of the case law, however, reveals no support for their position. The Appellants and the Amici rely mainly on the panel opinion in Hughes, 39 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1995). The panel stated that § 404(a)(1)(A) may, under some circumstances, require the furnishing of information in addition to the information required to be furnished by § 104(b)(4). Id. at 1006 (citing Acosta v. Pacific Enters., 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir. 1991)). As noted above, however, during the pendency of this appeal, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the panel opinion in Hughes. The en banc court expressly declined to decide [w]hether § 404(a)(1)(A), a general ERISA provision, may be interpreted to require the disclosure of documents that relate to the provision of benefits or the defrayment of expenses but are not documents required to be disclosed under § 104(b)(4), ERISA's specific disclosure provision. Hughes, 72 F.3d at 694. 14 The other cases cited by the Appellants and the Amici in support of their argument merely hold that ERISA fiduciaries may not mislead participants or beneficiaries; the cases do not recognize a general fiduciary obligation under ERISA to provide information related to the plan on request. See Howe v. Varity Corp. , 36 F.3d 746, 753 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that an employer who used misrepresentations to induce employees to transfer to a newly created, undercapitalized sister company, with the intention of ridding itself of obligations under an employee benefit plan, violated § 404(a)(1)(A)), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996); Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 669 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that plan administrators may not make affirmative material misrepresentations to plan participants regarding changes to employee benefit plans); Bixler v. Central Pennsylvania Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that trustees have a duty not to misinform beneficiaries and to disclose information to beneficiaries when the trustee knows that failure to disclose might be harmful to beneficiaries); Anweiler v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 991-92 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that defendants breached their fiduciary duties by persuading a plan participant to designate one of the defendants the beneficiary of his life insurance policy, where the participant was led to believe that he was required to make the designation in order to receive his benefits); Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d Cir.) (holding that [a] plan administrator may not make affirmative material misrepresentations to plan participants about changes to an employee pension benefit plan), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 622 (1993); Drennan v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that an employer violated its fiduciary duties by misleading employees regarding the availability of participation in a plan), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 940 (1993); Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. , 919 F.2d 747, 75051 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that an ERISA fiduciary violated its fiduciary duties when a participant whose insurance coverage was being terminated inquired about the possibility of maintaining coverage and the fiduciary failed to disclose sufficient information regarding his options for maintaining coverage); Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that a fiduciary may not materially mislead those to whom the duties of loyalty and prudence described in [§ 404] are owed). Here, the Appellants do not allege that they have been misled; they allege that they need 15 the requested information to exercise an oversight role regarding the ESOP. Therefore, the cases discussed above are inapposite.