Opinion ID: 2304074
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Facts & Process

Text: On the night of 17 February 1979, Kathy P. [1] and her sister, Teresa B., were walking to their car in the parking lot of the Prince George's Motor Lodge, after leaving the Cuckoo's Nest, a nearby bar. The Motor Lodge and the bar are in Prince George's County. A van approached and cornered the women between several parked cars. Three men got out of the van. One of them, later identified as Raymond Leon Adams, was carrying a gun. Adams, threatening to shoot the women, ordered them to get into the van. Adams grabbed Kathy P., struck her over her head, and, together with other men, pushed her into the van. The vehicle, with Kathy P. inside, sped off on Branch Avenue in the direction of the District of Columbia. Adams drove the van. It was stipulated at trial that it is between a mile and a mile and a half from the Prince George's Motor Lodge to the District of Columbia border. Shortly after being forced into the van, Kathy P. was ordered to remove her jewelry and forcibly stripped of her clothing. One of the other male occupants in the van, later identified as William Raleigh Knight, raped her at gunpoint within minutes of the abduction. [2] Shortly after the first rape, the van turned right off of Branch Avenue and went the wrong way on a one-way street. The van was involved in a minor accident with another vehicle. Kathy P. then endured a series of sexual attacks and rapes by several men. She estimated that approximately fifteen minutes elapsed between the kidnapping and this series of sexual attacks. [3] Kathy P. said she asked her abductors whether they were still in Maryland. They responded that they were in Maryland, however, she testified that she did not believe them because they laughed while responding. Just over two hours after the abduction, Kathy P. was pushed out of the van in Prince George's County, Maryland. She knocked on the door of a nearby apartment and was able to contact the Prince George's County Police for assistance. Teresa B. identified the driver of the van as Adams and also identified the passenger in the van as William Raleigh Knight. Kathy P. identified Adams in a photo array shortly after the attack, as well as again several days later and yet again at trial. Adams also was identified by a District of Columbia police officer who stopped Adams while he was driving a van matching the description of the van used in the abduction and attacks. A search of the van revealed three used prophylactics, and a scarf and comb belonging to Kathy P. It was stipulated at trial that Kathy P. suffered physical injuries consistent with a sexual assault. Adams was charged with kidnapping, robbery with a deadly weapon, six counts of first degree rape, and three counts of first degree sex offense. At his 1979 trial in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Adams contended that the rapes occurred outside the State of Maryland, and thus Maryland did not have jurisdiction to try him for the crimes. The State presented two counter-arguments. First, the State contended that the evidence showed that the rapes, in fact, did occur in Maryland. Second, the State argued that, even assuming that the rapes occurred in the District of Columbia, the State could assert jurisdiction under Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 465. Section 465 stated: If a person is transported by any means, with the intent to violate this subheading [sexual offenses] and the intent is followed by actual violation of this subheading, the defendant may be tried in the appropriate court within whose jurisdiction the county lies where the transportation was offered, solicited, begun, continued or ended. Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl.Vol.) Article 27, § 465. Adams retorted that § 465 addressed the matter of venue, not the territorial jurisdiction, of a particular court. [4] Adams further contended that Maryland had no authority to legislate itself into having jurisdiction over acts that do not occur within the State. After several lengthy discussions of jurisdiction at different stages of the trial, the trial court denied Adams's motions and ruled that the question would be submitted to the jury. At that point, the following discussion took place: Court: ... I think I am going to solve this problem very easily. I am going to instruct on the statute, and also add the question to be decided by the jury where all these acts took place. At this time I may agree with [the State's Attorney]. Maybe at a later time I may disagree with you. If the jury can make a finding it might solve a lot of problems, if this case went to the Court of Appeals or the Court of Special Appeals and there was a specific finding in that regard by the jury. Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I hate to interrupt the Court, but I think this is the very issue we addressed earlier. Court: Yes. Defense Counsel: The State has not shown anything upon which the jury can make that determination. And that is why I submit to the Court that this should not be passed to the jury. Court: ... [A]ll that I know is that the intent started out in a Prince George's County motel. All I have in front of me at this time is that is where it started. I have testimony from [Kathy P.] that sexual assaults were inflicted on her while the van was in motion, and that subsequent sexual assaults were inflicted on her at various places, and she was told they were in Maryland. Whether she believed what they told her or she didn't believe that makes no difference. Nobody has told me that this incident didn't occur in the State of Maryland. There is no evidence in this case at all that this didn't occur in Maryland, at this juncture. And if somebody does testify that they occurred in the District of Columbia that then becomes in my judgment a factual issue that a jury then can make a determination on. At this juncture all that I know is it started out and it occurred in Maryland, and that is all I have in front of me. If someone gets up and says it occurred elsewhere I think that it is perfectly reasonable to let a jury make a  that is one of the issues a jury may have to determine. If this case is ever appealed, or he is convicted and I make a subsequent ruling the statute applies out of state, and the Court of Appeals says I am wrong, or the jury says that it did happen in the District and I am wrong, that ends it right then and there. Do you [to the State's Attorney] think that is a solution? State's Attorney: I don't really know. It is a good procedure to get the jury to come back with specific findings of fact in a case like this, obviously, if this case is appealed to the Court of Appeals. Court: How would the Court of Appeals know how the jury made a determination, based on what you told me? In other words, you want me to instruct them on the statute? State's Attorney: Yes, sir. Court: That if this defendant formed the intention to commit a sexual assault on this lady, and he formed that intention in the State of Maryland, and they so find, the fact that it happened in the District of Columbia makes no difference, that it could happen anywhere as long as he formed that intention, that is what you say the purpose of the statute is? State's Attorney: That is correct, your Honor. Court: All right. If they find it happened in the District. Now suppose I agree with you and say you are absolutely right in your interpretation, then this case goes to the Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals says this is not the law, didn't have any jurisdiction because it happened  they don't really know where it happened. How does the Court of Appeals know where it happened? State's Attorney: Well, I guess they don't. I really don't think there is any reason for the statute to exist  Court: You don't think there is any reason for the statute to exist other than this? You may be absolutely right. You don't want to submit it to the jury on special issue as to this, but you want them instructed that  States Attorney: Special Instruction as to the statute. Court: Well all right. But you think the statute is applicable. All right. State's Attorney: Yes, sir. Court: Do you [to Defense Counsel] agree with that, there should be a special issue before the jury as to where this sexual act occurred? Defense Counsel: Assuming that the Court is ruling that this issue goes to the jury  Court: Yes, that is a pretty good assumption at this time. Defense Counsel: I understand that your Honor. Court: All right. Defense Counsel: I would submit that the Court's proposed method is the better method, and I would ask the Court to do that, to get a specific finding as to whether or not the incidents involving the sexual acts and the rapes took place in the District of Columbia or Maryland. Court: All of them? Defense Counsel: Assuming all of them go to the jury, your Honor, I would assume those questions would have to be answered definitely. I think the jury does have to find  Court: Let's assume I do it that way, what is the burden of proof on that issue? Defense Counsel: It is the same as the burden for any other  Court: Anything else? You have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt? Defense Counsel: Yes, your Honor. Court: Do you agree with that [to State's Attorney]? State's Attorney: If the Court submits that special issue? Court: Yes. State's Attorney: Yes, sir. Court: All right. The trial court proposed a special verdict sheet which included asking the jury whether it found jurisdiction, proven beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the rapes occurring in Maryland or the application § 465. Adams objected, arguing that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that the rapes occurred in Maryland. The judge ruled that the evidence was sufficient to send the issue to the jury. Adams then agreed to the special verdict sheet proposed by the trial court. [5] Accordingly, the trial court gave the jury the following pertinent jury instructions regarding the special verdict sheet: [You] will make a determination as to each one of these 12 charges, and they are numbered for your benefit, and you will find the defendant either not guilty or guilty of each one. And below that finding, if you find the defendant is guilty, you will also make a finding that the offense either occurred in Maryland or that jurisdiction was obtained in this case under Article 17, 465, of our Annotated Code, which I will tell you about later. The judge later elaborated on the special verdict question available as to each of the individual counts. For example, he instructed the jury as follows: Now, when you make that determination or if you make a determination as to first degree rape you will also make a determination as to where this rape occurred, and you will see there is a place for you to check either that the rape occurred in our State or that jurisdiction was obtained under Article 27, Section 465 of our Annotated Code. And our Legislature has enacted a statute that says in regards to sexual offenses if a person is transported by any means with intent to violate this subheading, meaning sexual offenses, and the intent is followed by actual violation of this subheading, the defendant may be tried in the appropriate court within whose jurisdiction the county lies where the transportation was offered, solicited, begun, continued, or ended. If you find that the application of this statute is how this particular sex offense occurred you will check that, if you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense occurred in our state. In a final reminder to the jury after closing arguments, the trial judge noted, And also that in regard to both the rape and sexual charges you must determine whether it occurred in Maryland or whether there was jurisdiction under the statute. All right. The trial court also gave advisory jury instructions, based on Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. [6] Throughout the twenty pages of instructions read to the jury, the trial judge made repeated references to the advisory nature of his instructions. For example, he stated: Those of you who have sat previously as jurors in a criminal case know, and for those of you who have not sat previously and who do not know, that in our State, unlike [forty-eight] other states in our country, in a criminal case you as the jury sit not only as what we call the triers of fact, you also sit as what we call the judge of the law. And what this means, in essence, is that the facts in this case as you have sat and listened to for the past five days will be as you find them to be, and the law in this case will be as you find it to be. And because you are both the judges of the fact and the judges of the law anything that I may now tell you about either the facts or the law is purely advisory. You may disregard anything that I tell you, and you may pay absolutely no attention to what I tell you concerning either the facts or the law, with this one admonition concerning the law. You are not to apply the law as you think it ought to be or what it should be, but what it in fact is in this particular case. And because you are the judges of the law [the State's Attorney] and [Adams's trial counsel] in their closing arguments to you may tell you what they think the law is in our State and how you should apply it in this particular case. I, therefore, instruct you in an advisory capacity that in this case that you will sit on, that is of a criminal nature, the law places the burden on the State of Maryland to prove that the defendant, and in this case [Adams] is guilty beyond what we call a reasonable doubt. No defendant in any criminal case has to prove he is innocent. Accordingly, you will assume that [Adams] is innocent unless you are convinced from all the evidence in this case that you have heard for the past five days that he is guilty. The trial court alluded to the advisory nature of the instructions at least ten times in the course of delivering the charge to the jury. Adams did not object to the references to the advisory nature of the jury instruction, despite their prominence in the charge to the jury. [7] On 7 December 1979, the jury found Adams guilty on all twelve counts. In addition, the jury made a special finding that all twelve counts occurred within the State of Maryland. Although the option was available on the verdict sheet, the jury did not check the option finding jurisdiction under Article 27, § 465. Adams was sentenced to one life term for one count of first degree rape, multiple concurrent life sentences for the remaining rapes and sexual assaults, thirty consecutive years of imprisonment for kidnapping, and twenty consecutive years for robbery. Adams appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. He raised eight issues. [8] In an unreported opinion filed in 1980, the intermediate appellate court affirmed Adams's conviction. We denied Adams's Petition for Writ of Certiorari from that judgment. Adams v. State, 289 Md. 733 (1980). On 1 April 2004, some twenty-four years after his convictions and affirmance thereof on direct appeal, Adams filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County an initial Petition for Post Conviction Relief. The Petition alleged four bases for relief: (1) the trial court improperly gave only advisory jury instructions; (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on jurisdiction; (3) the trial court gave an incomplete reasonable doubt instruction; and (4) Adams's trial counsel was ineffective. In support of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Adams alleged that his attorney failed to object to the improper jurisdiction and reasonable doubt instructions and failed to file a Motion for Modification of Sentence. The post-conviction court granted the Petition on the grounds that the advisory jury instructions and the jury instructions on jurisdiction were improper. [9] The Court also granted the Petition based on the ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically Adams's trial counsel's failure to object to the assertedly erroneous jurisdiction instructions. [10] The Court of Special Appeals, on the State's appeal, affirmed the post-conviction Court in a reported opinion. State v. Adams, 171 Md.App. 668, 912 A.2d 16 (2006). We granted the State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. State v. Adams, 399 Md. 595, 925 A.2d 634 (2007). The State presents three questions for our consideration: (1) Under the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, has Adams waived his post conviction complaint that the trial court's advisory jury instructions denied him his constitutional right to due process? (2) Under the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, has Adams waived his right to challenge an instruction advising the jury that it could find jurisdiction under § 465 of Article 27 and, if not waived, in light of the special verdict in this case, was the instruction harmless? (3) Did the post conviction court err in concluding that Adams's counsel's performance was deficient because counsel failed to object to the court's instructions on jurisdiction as counsel's failure to object to the instructions was not error and, in any event, was Adams prejudiced?