Opinion ID: 2576442
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: application of merger doctrine to utah code section 76-10-504

Text: ¶ 7 We first consider whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that the legislature intended Utah Code section 76-10-504 as an enhancement statute to which the merger doctrine, set forth in Utah Code section 76-1-402, would not apply. As the court of appeals observed, in its origin, `[m]erger is a judicially-crafted doctrine available to protect criminal defendants from being twice punished for committing a single act that may violate more than one criminal statute.' State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, ¶ 19, 65 P.3d 648 (quoting State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, ¶ 17, 55 P.3d 1131). The motivating principle behind the merger doctrine is to prevent violations of constitutional double jeopardy protection. State v. Lopez, 2004 UT App 410, ¶ 8, 103 P.3d 153 (Courts apply the merger doctrine as one means of alleviating the concern of double jeopardy that a defendant should not be punished twice for the same crime.); see also Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977) ([T]he [Double Jeopardy Clause] forbids successive prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater and lesser included offense.). ¶ 8 This principle has been codified at Utah Code section 76-1-402(3). See State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 90 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that the test for determining whether a conviction for two separate offenses violates the Double Jeopardy Clause is essentially the same as that in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)); State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (recognizing that convictions for both a greater and a lesser included offense would violate both the Double Jeopardy Clause and section 76-1-402(3)); State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 241 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (The [statutory] prohibition on conviction for lesser-included offenses flows from the double jeopardy clauses of the Utah and the United States Constitutions.). Section 76-1-402(3) provides that [a] defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (2003). The subsection further states that lesser included offenses are established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged. Id. § 76-1-402(3)(a). Thus, where the two crimes are `such that the greater cannot be committed without necessarily having committed the lesser,' then as a matter of law they stand in the relationship of greater and lesser offenses, and the defendant cannot be convicted or punished for both. State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1983)). ¶ 9 In Hill, we set forth a two-part test for determining whether a conviction for a second offense arising out of the same set of facts violates section 76-1-402(3), requiring a comparison of the statutory elements of the two crimes [first] as a theoretical matter and [second], where necessary, by reference to the facts proved at trial. Id. It is uncontested here that aggravated assault would constitute a lesser included offense of felony use of a concealed weapon under the two-part Hill analysis because the latter offense is defined as using a concealed weapon during the commission of a crime of violence, which includes aggravated assault. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-501(2)(b), -504(3) (1995). [2] In McCovey, however, this court in effect added a third step to the analysis, holding that in cases where the legislature intended a statute to be an enhancement statute, the merger doctrine set forth in section 76-1-402(3) does not apply. 803 P.2d at 1237. Here, the court of appeals agreed with the State that section 76-10-504 is an enhancement statute, but Smith argues it is not. We therefore focus our analysis on that question. ¶ 10 In McCovey, this court reasoned that enhancement statutes are different in nature than other criminal statutes because they single out particular characteristics of criminal conduct as warranting harsher punishment. Id. The court proceeded to rest its determination that the felony murder statute was an enhancement statute on an examination of the nature and purpose of the statute. Id. at 1238. The court concluded that [i]n essence, [felony murder] is a strict liability offense that enhances an otherwise unintentional killing to second degree murder. Id. ¶ 11 Here, revisiting the issue of enhancement statutes and their relationship to section 76-1-402(3), we depart from McCovey's somewhat nebulous focus on a statute's nature and purpose and return to the core principle of statutory construction: `Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond to divine legislative intent. Instead, we are guided by the rule that a statute should be construed according to its plain language.' Id. at 1240 (Durham, J., dissenting) (quoting Allisen v. Am. Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988)). Section 76-1-402(3), by its plain language, requires the determination of a greater-lesser relationship between offenses to rest on a comparison of the facts required to establish the commission of the offense[s] charged. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)(a). The statute is devoid of any explicit indication that it should not apply whenever a court decides that the nature and purpose of a criminal provision warrants an exemption. We are therefore persuaded that, when considering whether the legislature intended to exempt an offense from operation of the merger doctrine, we must base our conclusion on an objective examination of the plain language and structure of the statute defining the offense. In other words, if the legislature intends to preclude section 76-1-402(3) from requiring merger in a specific instance, it must clearly indicate that the provision in question is intended to enhance the penalty for one type of offense when certain characteristics are present that independently constitute a different offense. [3] Only when such an explicit indication of legislative intent is present in the specific offense statute will we consider it appropriate to exempt that statute from operation of the general merger requirements in section 76-1-402(3). [4] Such a plain language analysis is also consistent with the constitutionally guaranteed double jeopardy interests that section 76-1-402(3) was designed to protect. ¶ 12 In accord with these principles, we consider whether section 76-10-504(3) operates as an enhancement provision or, alternatively, whether charges under that subsection must merge with charges for the underlying crime of violence. Section 76-10-504 provides, in relevant part: (1) Except as provided in Section 76-10-503 and in Subsections (2) and (3): (a) a person who carries a concealed dangerous weapon which is not a firearm on his person or one that is readily accessible for immediate use which is not securely encased, as defined in this part, in a place other than his residence, property, or business under his control is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. (b) a person without a valid concealed firearm permit who carries a concealed dangerous weapon which is a firearm and that contains no ammunition is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, but if the firearm contains ammunition the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. (2) A person who carries concealed a sawed-off shotgun or a sawed-off rifle is guilty of a second degree felony; (3) If the concealed firearm is used in the commission of a crime of violence as defined in Section 76-10-501, and the person is a party to the offense, the person is guilty of a second degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(1)-(3). ¶ 13 The plain language and structure of this statute demonstrate that subsection (3) is intended to operate as an enhancement provision, enhancing the penalty for the offense of carrying a concealed firearm when the offense is committed in conjunction with a crime of violence, a separate offense. The statute sets forth different levels of offenses depending on the circumstances in which carrying a concealed weapon occurs and on the type of weapon involved. As the court of appeals correctly observed, [t]he penalties imposed by section 76-10-504 increase proportionally to the increased risk to the public. Smith, 2003 UT App 52 at ¶ 22, 65 P.3d 648. We agree with the court of appeals that this structure, evidencing a graduated punishment scale[,] is indicative of an enhancement statute. Id. ¶ 14 We also note that applying the merger requirement of section 76-1-402(3) to the offenses of carrying a concealed weapon and committing a crime of violence would lead to an absurd result in cases where the crime of violence itself carries a higher penalty than an offense under section 76-10-504(3), which is a second degree felony. See Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980) ([S]tatutory enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and . . . interpretations are to be avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd.). Many of the crimes of violence listed in section 76-10-501(2)(b) are first degree felonies. Thus, if section 76-1-402 applied to section 76-10-504(3), cases might arise in which a first degree felony would be considered a lesser included offense that was required to merge into a second degree felony. Such a result is prevented by our recognition that section 76-10-504(3) is an enhancement provision. ¶ 15 We thus affirm the court of appeals's conclusion that the charges against Smith for aggravated assault should not merge with the charge for using a concealed firearm in the commission of a crime of violence.