Opinion ID: 2315948
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: The Trial Court's Failure to Define Murder During Voir Dire

Text: For the first time on appeal defendant raised the issue that failure to define the crime of murder denied defendant a fair and impartial jury. The trial court did not define murder for prospective jurors because it was unnecessary. This jury did not have to determine whether Biegenwald had committed murder; that had already been determined. This jury's sole function was to determine the appropriate penalty. Failure to provide a legal definition on a tangential issue during voir dire is not clearly capable of producing an unjust result. State v. Hunt, supra, 115 N.J. at 363, 558 A. 2d 1259 (citing R. 1:7-2 and R. 2:10-2). Defendant's reliance on State v. Williams, supra, 113 N.J. at 412 n. 5, 550 A. 2d 1172, is misplaced for three reasons. First, Williams was a case in which the same jury would be called on to decide the guilt/non-guilt issue and the life-imprisonment/death-penalty issue. Of course, knowledge about what constitutes capital murder, ibid., would have a place in such a pre-guilt setting. This jury never had a pre-guilt stage. Second, this trial court in fact met the Williams command. It would be helpful if the trial court provided the jurors with an outline of the State's death penalty statute. Ibid. The trial court gave, in its words, a basic outline to them. It said that it was usually done in a two-stage procedure. The court then continued: This case is a murder case, but your task is somewhat unusual. It's a different kind of task that you'll be asked to perform.         The first stage before the jury is to determine whether or not the person who is accused of the crime is guilty of the crime of murder, the jury sits and decides whether the man is or woman is guilty or not guilty of murder. That's the first stage [in the typical case]. Then the legislature has said after that's finished, then there is a second proceeding, a second trial and the purpose of the second trial is to determine what the penalty is that should be imposed, the jury in New Jersey is the one that decides the penalty. And the options that the legislature has enacted in the law are two: The penalty, if somebody is convicted of murder the penalty is either death or the life imprisonment with no parole for at least 30 years. Those are the options. Ultimately when a case is tried, it's tried to the same jury for the first part and for the second part. So the jury that heard all the evidence on whether or not the person is guilty of the crime, if it decides the person is guilty, then that same jury sits and the case continues with the presentation of additional proofs which bear upon the jury's decision in the second part of the case, whether the man is to be penalized by death or penalized by life imprisonment with no parole for at least 30 years. Of course if the jury in the first part of the case decides the person is not guilty, that's the end of it. The proofs that are proffered in the second part of the case are proofs which bear upon what are called aggravating and mitigating factors. Common sense tells you the aggravating factors are those proofs which would cause you to kind of lean towards the death penalty. Mitigating factors are those factors which would cause you to lean towards life imprisonment with no parole for at least 30 years. Those are the proofs that are presented in the second part of the case. And after those proofs are presented, then the jury deliberates as to what the penalty should be and it weighs and carefully considers those aggravating and mitigating factors under principles of law which the trial Judge explains to the jurors. Now, the legislation, while it provides that usually the same jury takes care of both parts of the case also allows in specific cases for a different jury to be impaneled for the second part than that jury which heard the first part. And that's exactly what's happening here. Richard Biegenwald has been convicted of murder, no question about that, he's guilty of murder. The question the jurors in this case will be deciding is what is the appropriate penalty of the two options which the legislature has provided. The jury we're going to select then will have to decide whether from all of the proofs that are [proffered] on these aggravating and mitigating factors and after weighing them in accordance with the law, will have to decide whether death is the appropriate penalty or rather whether the other appropriate penalty is life imprisonment with no possibility of parole for at least 30 years. This jury then we're going to pick is not going to be concerned at all with deciding whether the man was, should have been, or is not guilty. He is guilty. No question about that. And you don't have any concern over that. The jury that's going to decide this case will decide punishment or penalty. Now, our purpose is to select from among you, jurors who will be able to fulfill that responsibility in a fair and impartial way. We will attempt to ascertain from each of you whether you think that you can do so by way of an inquiry which will involve, one, your preparation of answers to a written questionnaire that we'll distribute, that written questionnaire will ask questions about your background, things of that nature, and then we will, after you fill out the questionnaires, you'll come in individually and we will look at the answers to the questions and we'll ask you certain questions which will enable us, that means the Court and the lawyers involved, to get an idea of your background and your thinking, so that we can evaluate whether you ought to be able to be a fair and impartial juror on this case. Because trial counsel asked for no more-elaborate definition of the issues before the jury, we appraise this issue under the plain-error standard. An outline of this detail convinces me that the court's failure to adorn it further did not contribute to an unjust result. See State v. Hunt, supra, 115 N.J. at 350, 558 A. 2d 1259. These jurors certainly had some basic comprehension about what their legal duties as jurors would be. State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 446, 585 A. 2d 864. Finally, it is not at all clear that Williams itself would have held such a failure to be reversible error. Williams stated that it would be helpful for the trial court to provide such a definition. Ibid. Williams did not state or imply that failure to do so gave rise to a presumption or even an inference that jurors were confused or misinformed. I am not convinced that either the facts of this case or the holding of Williams made defining murder during voir dire an absolute imperative. I am also not convinced that even if they did, this Court's instructions did not meet that standard. I am convinced, however, that the failure to define murder was not plain error.