Opinion ID: 2737415
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A system for use in a vehicle comprising:

Text: AMERICAN CALCAR, INC. v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO. 7 a memory for storing a plurality of displays having predetermined contents, the plurality of displays being associated with a plurality of as- pects of the vehicle; an interface for entering a query to conduct a search concerning an aspect of the vehicle; an input device for selecting a result of the search; a processor responsive to the selected result for identifying at least one of the plurality of displays which is associated with the aspect of the vehicle; and a display element for showing thereon the at least one display. The highlighted text shows the only difference between the prior art and the claim—as even Calcar concedes. As the district court noted, Calcar does not dispute that the 96RL navigation system “includes an interface for entering a query to conduct a search, an input device for selecting a result of the search, a processor that identifies a display associated with the selection, and an element that allows that display to be shown to the user.” Calcar III, at . Therefore, the only limitation that Calcar claims as novel is that the object of the user’s search has to be “an aspect of the vehicle.” Claim 1 of the ’765 patent similarly includes only the limitation of searching for and displaying information about an “aspect of the vehicle.” Calcar’s principal argument is that the district court improperly failed to account for the inventive differences between the prior art 96RL navigation system and the claims of the ’465 and ’795 patents. Calcar points to examples listed in the patent’s specification, such as the ability to retrieve such features as climate control functions, “the radio, the engine, and other aspects of the vehicle.” Appellant’s Br. 52. Calcar argues that the search for information regarding such aspects of the 8 AMERICAN CALCAR, INC. v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO. vehicle is a non-obvious invention that was merely based on the 96RL system. The district court did address the differences between the 96RL system and what Calcar actually claimed. It found that the only difference was “the nature of the information contained in the systems”: navigational details (destinations, addresses, directions) in the 96RL system and information about the vehicle itself in the ’465 and ’795 patents. Calcar III, at . The district court found that the PTO would have not allowed the patents as “it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to include different information in the 96RL navigation system.” Id. As the district court stated, the 96RL and Calcar’s patented system “perform the same function, i.e., delivery of information, in the same way, i.e., through an interactive display screen, to achieve the same result, namely providing information to the vehicle user.” Id. Calcar argues that by using the language “same function” “same way” “same result,” the district court improperly applied a doctrine of equivalents analysis to the question of obviousness. We find this argument unavailing. That sentence just summarizes why the mere substitution of one kind of information as the object of the search—which, under a broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim, could be anything about the car—would be an obvious, and thus unpatentable, invention. Because the district court did not commit clear error in its finding of materiality, we affirm the district court’s determination that the undisclosed operational details of the 96RL navigation system are material to the patentability of the ’465 and ’795 patents. We note that this court previously affirmed the finding of materiality as to the ’497 patent. Calcar II, 651 F.3d at 1334. AMERICAN CALCAR, INC. v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO. 9