Opinion ID: 738219
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Nieman's Price-Anderson Act Claim

Text: 26 Based on § 2014(hh), the parties in the instant case agree that under the Price-Anderson Act, Ohio law provides the limitations period. However, they disagree as to whether state law or federal law should be used to determine when the statute of limitations begins to run. 9 27 This court recently encountered a similar issue in Huffman v. United States, 82 F.3d 703 (6th Cir.1996), where we reversed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant in a case alleging a temporary nuisance under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA statute of limitations requires that a claim be presented against the government within two years 'after such claim accrues.'  Id. at 705 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)). Like the Price-Anderson Act, the FTCA incorporates state tort law so that the federal government is liable in tort in the same manner and to the same extent that state law would impose on a private individual in similar circumstances. Huffman, 82 F.3d at 705 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674). Therefore, the Huffman court held that state law both provides the cause of action and governs the application of the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations. Huffman, 82 F.3d at 705 (citing Arcade Water Dist. v. United States, 940 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir.1991) (discussing state law concepts of permanent and temporary nuisance in the context of the FTCA statute of limitations)). Because there existed genuine issues of material fact as to whether the alleged nuisance was temporary (and therefore not time-barred under Kentucky law) or permanent (and hence time-barred), the court reversed the grant of summary judgment. Huffman, 82 F.3d at 705-06. Following our precedent in Huffman, we must apply Ohio state law principles to determine when the Ohio limitations period begins to run.