Opinion ID: 1229632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: farnworth failed to state a claim for breach of an implied contract of employment.

Text: Farnworth asserts that he pleaded a claim for breach of an implied contract of employment. We disagree. Farnworth alleged that he was a permanent employee as defined by the Manual and by the facts and circumstances surrounding his employment and that Femling and the county breached his express contract of employment as well as the implied covenant of fair dealing.... Farnworth argues that these allegations, read together, set out a breach of implied contract theory. The trial court ruled that an implied contract claim was not at issue by the pleadings. An implied in fact contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of the contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request of one party and the performance by the other often being inferred from the circumstances attending the performance. Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153, 408 P.2d 810, 815 (1965). Pleadings should be liberally construed. Stewart v. Arrington Construction Company, 92 Idaho 526, 530, 446 P.2d 895, 899 (1968) (doubts concerning the sufficiency of a complaint should be resolved in favor of the complainant). See also I.R.C.P. 8(f) (all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice). Cf. I.R.C.P 8(a)(1) (a pleading shall contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief). Even liberally construing Farnworth's pleadings, however, we conclude that Farnworth did not state a claim for breach of an implied contract of employment. Farnworth did not specifically allege that there was an implied contract of employment. The allegations concerning the facts and circumstances of his employment, upon which Farnworth relies, were part of his civil rights claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The allegations concerning the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing speak for themselves. ( See part IV, below.) These allegations cannot be construed to plead the breach of an implied contract. In addition, Farnworth never directly addressed the implied contract claim in his briefs opposing the various summary judgment motions, nor did he move to amend his pleadings to include such a claim.