Opinion ID: 552246
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 112 All of the defendants except Jim Wright and Eugene Fisher claim that the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions for one or more of the counts charged in the indictment. We address these claims because if they have merit, a retrial would be prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).
113 Tammy Fisher argues that the evidence presented at trial failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she knowingly participated in either of the two charged conspiracies. Indeed, as to the 1988 conspiracy charged in Count 2, she argues that the evidence failed to establish any participation in the conspiracy at all, much less that she knowingly and voluntarily became a part of it. 114
115 The evidence of Tammy Fisher's participation in the amphetamine cooks in 1985-86 may be briefly stated. The government's informant Melvin Rogers testified that at one of the first cooks, Tammy prepared and served food and washed clothes for the four men who were manufacturing drugs in an outbuilding on her property and was present when they discussed the lab's progress. IX R. at 111. 39 Government informant Evelyn Rogers also testified that at one of the cooks Tammy allowed the men to go to her trailer, take a shower, [and] eat. X R. at 307. She also testified that on one occasion Tammy, together with Evelyn, Melvin and Eugene, walked to the lab site to shut [it] off for some reason. I don't know what. Id. at 308. 40 Evelyn also placed Tammy at the second cook, id. at 311, but did not elaborate. Later, however, she testified that [a]bout January Tammy helped Eugene Fisher and Steve Howell weigh phenylacetic acid. Id. at 377-78. Government informant Steve Howell likewise testified that on one occasion, in January or February of 1986, Tammy helped weigh chemicals. XI R. at 492-93. Finally, Melvin Rogers testified that on the same occasion Tammy helped pack the groceries, the bedding, and stuff like that into a truck when the lab site had to be moved from behind Eugene Fisher's house to the Sullivan's house. IX R. at 121-23. Significantly, he also testified that they moved the lab during early morning while it was still dark. Id. at 123. 116 While the evidence against Tammy Fisher on Count 1 is not extensive, we believe it is sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The most damaging evidence against Tammy is, of course, the testimony that she helped weigh chemicals and helped pack groceries and bedding into a truck used to move lab equipment to another location. A rational jury could reasonably infer from those acts that Tammy Fisher knew the essential objectives of the conspiracy and knowingly became a part of it. That is sufficient. See, e.g., United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280, 1296 (10th Cir.1988). 117
118 The evidence against Tammy Fisher with respect to Count 2, the 1988 conspiracy, is insufficient. There is no evidence in the record that Tammy ever participated in the 1988 conspiracy to manufacture amphetamines. The government points only to Evelyn Rogers' testimony that after she had delivered the glassware at the Sullivan's, Tammy alerted her father to the presence of an unfamiliar, slowly moving car outside the Sullivan home. 41 The government argues that this evidence of Tammy's counter-surveillance activity is sufficient to connect her to the conspiracy. Government's Brief at 34-35. 119 We do not agree. It cannot be reasonably inferred from proof of Tammy's equivocal act that she knew the existence and scope of the 1988 conspiratorial objective, or believed that her actions played any role in achieving that objective. Such gossamer evidence is not proof sufficient to support a criminal conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Tammy's conviction on Count 2 is reversed and a judgment of acquittal must be entered on that count. Burks, 437 U.S. at 18, 98 S.Ct. at 2151.
120 Mary Sullivan challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her conviction on Count 3 of the indictment for attempted manufacture of amphetamine. 42 She contends that there is no evidence that she either participated in the attempt to manufacture amphetamine, or that she aided and abetted the attempted manufacture of amphetamine. We disagree. 121 The crime of attempt requires proof of (1) the requisite criminal intent, and (2) an act or omission constituting a substantial step toward commission of the substantive offense. United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d at 1296; see also United States v. Remigio, 767 F.2d 730, 733 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1009, 106 S.Ct. 535, 88 L.Ed.2d 465 (1985). Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, there was evidence that Mary Sullivan spoke with Evelyn Rogers on the phone concerning the proposed amphetamine cook; that she met with Evelyn Rogers in a motel room to arrange for the glassware delivery; that she participated in the glassware delivery to the Sullivan home, and the concealment of the glassware behind the house; that she traveled to Irving, Texas, with her husband to arrange for the delivery of phenylacetic acid by Steve Howell; that she participated in the recorded conversation of July 3, 1988, in which she discussed the planned amphetamine cook; and that on the day before the lab was set up, she told Steve Howell that she had been to the library studying up ... on cooking procedures. See X R. at 330-36, 343-44, 367, 375; XI R. at 522-25, 557. 122 We are convinced there is sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find Mary Sullivan guilty of attempted manufacture of amphetamine beyond a reasonable doubt.
123
124 Defendants Russell and Mary Sullivan challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain their convictions on Count 5 for possession of an unregistered firearm, an AR-15 rifle, in violation of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 5861(d). They claim the government failed to prove the essential element of possession. 43 Russell Sullivan challenges on the same basis his conviction on Count 7 for illegal possession of the same firearm after former conviction of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g). The government does not point to any evidence of actual possession, but argues that the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support an inference of joint constructive possession by Mary and Russell Sullivan. We agree. 125 It is well settled that the required possession for purposes of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 5861(d) includes both actual and constructive possession. United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1533 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 3197, 105 L.Ed.2d 705 (1989). Constructive possession exists when a person does not have actual possession, but knowingly holds the power to exercise dominion and control over an object. Cardenas, 864 F.2d at 1533 (quoting United States v. Medina-Ramos, 834 F.2d 874, 876 (10th Cir.1987)). Furthermore, possession need not be exclusive; it may be joint, and therefore does not require that exercise of dominion and control by others be disproved. United States v. Rivera, 844 F.2d 916, 926 (2d Cir.1988). 126 The government points to the following evidence in support of the jury's verdict. First, Evelyn Rogers testified that when she met with Mary and Russell Sullivan in Irving, Texas, Russell displayed a clip that he could drop into his AR-15 in just a matter of seconds that would make it rock and roll. X R. at 375-76. Second, Steve Brown (Mary Sullivan's son) testified that he purchased the AR-15 in question at a pawn shop and had given it to his younger brother, since deceased. XVII R. at 1914. He testified that he had taken the AR-15 and several other guns to his mother's house after some of his guns were stolen, and that after his brother's death, we moved the gun cabinet and stuff into his mother's bedroom. Id. at 1915. Mary Sullivan admitted that the AR-15 belonged to her deceased son and that she kept all of his property after his death, including the guns. Id. at 2073-74. Finally, the machine gun was found in the master bedroom of the Sullivans' home along with a nearby auto sear and 30-shot clips. XII R. at 868-69. The government argues, and we agree, that this is sufficient evidence to support an inference of joint constructive possession. See, e.g., United States v. McCoy, 781 F.2d 168 (10th Cir.1985) 127 The defendants argue that the evidence of dominion and control is too tenuous here to amount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In particular, Mary Sullivan argues that there was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that she slept in or otherwise had knowledge of the contents of the room in which the gun was found. She relies on United States v. Bonham, 477 F.2d 1137 (3d Cir.1973) (en banc), for the proposition that joint occupancy of a bedroom is insufficient evidence on which to base an inference of criminal possession. Finally, she correctly asserts that [t]here was no evidence concerning where in the bedroom the gun was found, whether it was in plain view or hidden, or anything else about the circumstances. Appellee's Brief at 30. Russell Sullivan argues that he was eight to ten miles away from his home when the AR-15 was seized; that none of his fingerprints were found on the AR-15; and that the government did not introduce any evidence that he exercised dominion and control over the room in which the firearm was found. 128 Although we agree that joint occupancy of a bedroom, without more, would be insufficient to support this conviction, the evidence in this case goes somewhat beyond that. The evidence presented at trial shows some connection between each defendant and the firearm, and supports the inference that each defendant was aware of the presence of the firearm in the master bedroom. The evidence in this case is stronger, for example, than the evidence we held sufficient in United States v. Miles, 772 F.2d 613 (10th Cir.1985). On balance, we think there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that each of the Sullivans constructively possessed the unregistered AR-15 rifle. 129
130 Russell and Mary Sullivan, Eugene Fisher, Steve Brown and Jimmy Wright also challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain their convictions on Count 4 for knowingly and unlawfully us[ing] or carrying firearms during the commission of a felony ..., to wit: conspiracy to manufacture amphetamine,.... in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1). In judging the sufficiency of the evidence, we are bound to view the proof presented in the light most favorable to the government to ascertain if there is sufficient substantial proof, direct and circumstantial, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, from which a jury might find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Wright, 826 F.2d 938, 946 (10th Cir.1987); United States v. Twilligear, 460 F.2d 79, 81-82 (10th Cir.1972). We conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions of the defendants other than Mary Sullivan, and hold that her conviction on this count must be set aside. 131 In United States v. McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir.1989), we agreed with other courts that the uses element of Sec. 924(c)(1) is satisfied where a defendant has ready access to a firearm and it was an integral part of his criminal undertaking and its availability increased the likelihood that the criminal undertaking would succeed. United States v. Matra, 841 F.2d 837, 843 (8th Cir.1988). See also United States v. Meggett, 875 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir.1989) (five firearms secreted about a defendant's apartment). Here there was evidence that there was a substantial number of weapons at the Sullivan and Fisher residences, that it was a common practice for the male defendants to carry firearms, that three of the defendants possessed weapons at the laboratory site, and that two defendants took weapons to investigate possible trouble with the feds. 44 We feel the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions of Eugene Fisher, Steve Brown, Jimmy Wright and Russell Sullivan on Count 4. 132 However, we are unable to agree with the government that its evidence was sufficient with respect to the conviction of Mary Sullivan on Count 4. The government does not cite any specific evidence to indicate that she carried or used a firearm. We agree that there was sufficient proof that both Mary and Russell Sullivan had joint and constructive possession of the AR-15 rifle at their home, but that was in connection with a conviction for possession of an unregistered firearm. Count 4, however, is a different substantive charge under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c). As to that offense, we are required to determine whether the proof was sufficient to sustain the charge under that section. 45 We are persuaded to agree with the Ninth Circuit's construction of the statute in United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir.1985) (opinion of Kennedy, J.), that the evident purpose of [Sec. 924(c) ] was to impose more severe sanctions where firearms facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, the commission of a felony. This results from the inclusion within the statutory elements of the language that the using or carrying of the firearm must be during and in relation to a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime. With this in mind, we do not find sufficient evidence in this record that Mary Sullivan carried or used firearms during and in relation to the underlying drug conspiracy offense. The constructive possession proof sufficient with respect to the charge concerning possession of the unregistered AR-15 rifle is not sufficient to sustain the Count 4 conviction within the meaning of Sec. 924(c). A conviction must be supported by sufficient substantial evidence, and not mere suspicion of guilt. United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 1455 (10th Cir.1987). 133 In sum, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of defendants Eugene Fisher, Steve Brown, Jimmy Wright and Russell Sullivan on Count 4. Therefore, their argument that retrial of them on this Count 4 charge would be barred by Double Jeopardy principles, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), is without merit. However, the claim to this effect by Mary Sullivan is good, and a judgment of acquittal for her with respect to Count 4 will be entered by the district court on remand. Id. at 18, 98 S.Ct. at 2151.
134 Finally, defendants Russell and Mary Sullivan claim that the evidence does not support their convictions on Count 6 of the indictment for manufacturing (cultivating) marijuana. 46 The defendants contend that the evidence is insufficient to show that either defendant knowingly manufactured the marijuana. 47 135 The government devotes only two very short paragraphs in its brief to this issue. It does not cite record evidence except to rely exclusively on one short passage from the tape recorded conversation of July 3, 1988 in support of its conclusory assertion that [t]he evidence was sufficient to sustain the challenged convictions of appellants. Brief of the United States at 57. 136 When the search warrants were executed at the Sullivan residence on July 20, 1988, agent Higbee located 61 live marijuana plants growing in pots behind the pond and down a little ways. XIII R. at 1116. Higbee estimated that the location of the marijuana was approximately 100 yards from the Sullivan residence, id. at 1125, but admitted that he did not know who owned the property where the plants were located. Id. at 1124. (The government did not introduce any evidence of ownership of the land in question.) Higbee also testified that there was a path leading from the Sullivan residence in the general direction of the marijuana. Id. at 1118. He admitted, however, that the marijuana was on the opposite side of an approximately seven-acre pond, id. at 1127, and to get to the marijuana he had to walk up over a dam. Id. at 1123. The government points to the tape recorded conversation of July 3, 1988, involving Russell and Mary Sullivan, Steve Howell, and Evelyn Rogers, as evidence of Russell and Mary Sullivan's dominion and control of the marijuana. 48 137 We think the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, is insufficient to establish the required elements of possession or scienter. Higbee's testimony clearly is insufficient to support an inference of knowing cultivation as to either Russell or Mary Sullivan. There is no substantial evidence that either defendant participated in growing the marijuana plants, or that they knew the plants existed. The testimony that the plants were growing in the area near the Russell's home, without more, is insufficient. The sounds on the tape would support only a guess as to guilt. 138 Evidence that raises only a suspicion of guilt cannot sustain a criminal conviction. Accordingly, Russell and Mary Sullivan's convictions on Count 6 are REVERSED with instructions to enter judgments of acquittal as to each defendant on that count.