Opinion ID: 1413175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged misconduct of the prosecutor

Text: Defendant asserts that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during his opening argument to the jury by making three separate references to the deterrent effect of the death penalty. We take up the three specifications in the order presented. First: By way of illustration, the prosecutor referred to a different type of homicide, namely a domestic situational killing. We set forth the pertinent portion of the argument in the footnote. [fn. 3] Second: After referring to two car thefts by defendant in 1959 and 1960 for which he was respectively committed to the Youth Authority and sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail, the prosecutor argued as to whether incarceration is going to do him any good. ... [fn. 4] Defendant did not make any assignment of misconduct or object in any way to either of the above arguments. Third: At the conclusion of his opening argument, the prosecutor then said: Now, if you vote life, ladies and gentlemen, we will never be able to change that verdict. Just as a former verdict was life without possibility of parole as to the kidnaping charge, we can't change that verdict. That verdict stands. Before you decide what is a proper verdict, think of the consequences of that verdict. Think of the fact that if the verdict of this jury is the death penalty, that you may be preventing Mr. Varnum from ever killing again. Defendant's objection to the remarks was sustained and the jury admonished to disregard them. [4a] Defendant contends that in all three instances the prosecutor's remarks constituted an argument to the jury as to the deterrent effect of the death penalty and require a reversal under our holding in People v. Love (1961) 56 Cal.2d 720, 731 [16 Cal.Rptr. 777, 17 Cal.Rptr. 481, 366 P.2d 33, 809]. (See also People v. Bickley (1962) 57 Cal.2d 788, 798-799 [22 Cal.Rptr. 340, 372 P.2d 100]; People v. Imbler (1962) 57 Cal.2d 711, 717 [21 Cal.Rptr. 568, 381 P.2d 304] (not prejudicial error); People v. Garner (1961) 57 Cal.2d 135, 156 [18 Cal.Rptr. 40, 367 P.2d 680] (not prejudicial error); People v. Lane (1961) 56 Cal.2d 773, 787 [16 Cal.Rptr. 801, 366 P.2d 57].) We disagree. The argument was not that the death penalty was a more effective deterrent than imprisonment to the commission of crimes by others (italics added; People v. Bickley, supra, 57 Cal.2d 788, 798), but that if defendant were given the death penalty, he would be deterred and indeed prevented from continuing his course of criminal conduct. We find nothing in the remarks expressly or by fair implication advancing the proposition that the imposition of the death penalty upon Varnum would serve to deter others from committing similar crimes. The tenor of the argument is entirely different from that in Love and even assuming arguendo some implication in it of a deterrent effect upon others, it still would not embody any of the aggravated features of the argument which we found prejudicial in that [Love] case. (People v. Lane, supra, 56 Cal.2d 773, 787.) Further, as we have already indicated, defendant interposed no objection to the first two instances of alleged misconduct and the court sustained his objection to the third, properly admonishing the jury to disregard the remarks. [5] Misconduct of the prosecuting attorney may not be assigned as error on appeal if it has not been assigned at the trial unless, the case being closely balanced and presenting grave doubt of the defendant's guilt, the misconduct contributed materially to the verdict or unless the harmful results of the misconduct could not have been obviated by a timely admonition to the jury. (People v. Golston (1962) 58 Cal.2d 535, 541 [25 Cal.Rptr. 83, 375 P.2d 51], cert. den. 372 U.S. 955 [9 L.Ed.2d 979, 83 S.Ct. 954]; People v. Rosoto (1962) 58 Cal.2d 304, 357 [23 Cal.Rptr. 779, 373 P.2d 867], cert. den. 372 U.S. 955 [9 L.Ed.2d 978, 83 S.Ct. 953], remittitur recalled on other grounds, id., 62 Cal.2d 684 [43 Cal.Rptr. 828, 401 P.2d 220]; People v. Perez (1962) 58 Cal.2d 229, 247 [23 Cal.Rptr. 569, 373 P.2d 617, 3 A.L.R.3d 946]; People v. Wein (1958) 50 Cal.2d 383, 396 [326 P.2d 457]; People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245, 262 [324 P.2d 556]; People v. Kirkes (1952) 39 Cal.2d 719, 726-727 [249 P.2d 1]; People v. Berryman (1936) 6 Cal.2d 331, 337 [57 P.2d 136]; People v. Basler (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 389, 399 [31 Cal.Rptr. 884].) [4b] As to the first two remarks of the prosecutor it is clear that they fall within the above general rule and not within either of the above two exceptions, and that defendant cannot now raise an objection to the misconduct for the first time on appeal. As to the third remarks, the jury was promptly and fully admonished so as to effectively cure any harmful results of the argument. (People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.2d 331, 337; People v. Lyons, supra, 50 Cal.2d 245, 262.)