Opinion ID: 2124940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Right to Exclude Evidence of Refusal to Take Blood Test

Text: Appellant's counsel on appeal suggests that Oswald has a right under both the United States Constitution and the South Dakota Constitution to refuse to submit to a blood test and a right not to have testimony concerning such a refusal admitted at trial. He also contends that such rights are assured Defendant by our statute, SDCL 32-23-10. Article Five of the Amendments to the United States Constitution provides in part that: No person . . . shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself . . . Article VI,  9 of the South Dakota Constitution states: No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence against himself or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. SDCL 32-23-10 is our implied consent law: Any person who operates any vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical analysis of his blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance for the purpose of determining the amount of alcohol in his blood, as provided in  32-23-7, provided that such test is administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer having lawfully arrested such person for a violation of  32-23-1. Such person shall be requested by said officer to submit to such analysis and shall be advised by said officer of his right to refuse to submit to such analysis and the provisions of  32-23-11 and 32-23-12 in the event of such refusal with respect to the revocation of such person's driving license. [] Because we feel that this matter is adequately disposed of on statutory grounds we find no need to reach the constitutional questions. Quite recently in State v. Buckingham, 1976, S.D., 240 N.W.2d 84, Mr. Justice Wollman for this Court observed: Implicit in our implied consent statute, however, is the right to refuse to submit to a test and, a fortiori, the requirement that a choice be made between submitting to the test or suffering the consequences of such refusal. (citations omitted) Also implicit in the implied consent law is the assumption that the choice to be made is of considerable importance to the arrested driver. Although it may be true that to some drivers the loss of their license for a period of one year would be a penalty more severe than being convicted of the offense of driving while intoxicated, (citation omitted), there no doubt are some who would rather suffer the loss of their license for one year than to suffer the ignominy of a conviction for driving while intoxicated, together with the adverse economic consequences such a conviction entails. If the offense of driving while intoxicated is considered serious enough to warrant the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial, (citation omitted), then surely it is serious enough to require law enforcement officers to comply with the statutorily mandated procedural steps as a prerequisite to the admissibility of the results of a chemical test conducted pursuant to the implied consent law. In the case before us the Defendant was informed of his statutorily guaranteed right and, for whatever reason we do not know, he elected not to submit to the test. Certainly it is unfair to create by statute a right not to submit to a chemical test and to allow the accused to exercise that right and then in open court before a jury to permit testimony concerning that refusal which can all too easily work in the minds of the jury members to the prejudice of the defendant. Some twenty years ago the Supreme Court of our sister state to the north had before it a case similar to the one we now deal with. The reasoning of that court, though their statute may differ from ours, is appropriate here: Whether the statute implies that evidence of a refusal to take a test may be not received in evidence against a defendant is a question that is not without difficulty. We are of the opinion, however, that when the legislature granted an accused person a choice of whether he would submit to such a test, it intended that the choice should be absolutely free and not encumbered by a liability. If the fact that an accused person chooses not to take a test can be put in evidence and argued to the jury as evidence of guilt, then the statute places the defendant in a position where willy-nilly, he must risk providing evidence for the prosecution by submitting to a test or certainly provide it by refusing to take one, although his reason for refusal may have no relation to the question of guilt or innocence.    Thus the policy of our law appears to be that a defendant may claim a privilege granted by statute or the constitution, without being subjected to the liability that his exercise of the right may be used against him. State v. Severson, 1956, N.D., 75 N.W.2d 316. In an Oklahoma case a witness testified that he thought the defendant was drunk because he was red faced and he refused to take the test. A police officer also testified that the defendant refused to take the (intoximeter) test. There the Oklahoma Court noted:    the defendant's refusal to take the test was used by the state in its case in chief for purely prejudicial purposes. The accused's refusal should have ended the inquiry on the subject. It ill behooves the courts to say you have a right to refuse to do something, which may prove either beneficial or detrimental to you, and yet, notwithstanding your right so to do, we will permit your refusal to be shown and enable the state to destroy your right and achieve indirectly by innuendo what it was prevented by law from accomplishing directly. We can conceive of no greater inconsistency. Duckworth v. State, 1957, Okl.Cr., 309 P.2d 1103 at 1105. In a New York case testimony was given at trial that the defendant refused permission to a physician to take a blood sample for the determination of alcoholic content. Mr. Justice Coon for the Appellate Division of that Supreme Court said, after setting out pertinent testimony: That this was damning evidence against the defendant, when practically the sole issue was his intoxication, cannot be denied. The question is whether it was competent for any purpose. We think not. The Legislature has provided that evidence of the alcoholic content of the blood may be received in evidence. (citation omitted). It has also recognized a person's right to refuse the test. Vehicle and Traffic Law,  71-a.    The courts of this State have long and consistently held that under our self-incrimination laws the receipt of evidence in a criminal trial of a defendant's complete silence or refusal to answer is reversible error. (citations omitted). This has been on the theory that the fact that a defendant did what he had an absolute right to do cannot be used to create any unfavorable inference against him. People v. Stratton, 1955, 286 App.Div. 323, 143 N.Y. S.2d 362. We are also aware that our neighboring state of Minnesota has refused to allow admission of testimony on an accused's refusal to submit to chemical testing for purposes of determining alcoholic content, at least partially, on constitutional grounds. See State v. McCarthy, 1960, 259 Minn. 24, 104 N.W.2d 673 and State v. Andrews, 1973, 297 Minn. 260, 212 N.W.2d 863. While we are not necessarily in disagreement with these opinions we do not think it required in the instant case to go that far. We have a South Dakota statute which grants an absolute right to an arrested person to refuse to submit to testing to determine the alcoholic content of his or her blood, albeit not without certain consequences. But the consequences of such refusal are provided by statute and they nowhere include the admissibility of evidence of such refusal in court on a DWI charge. Defendant Oswald made timely objection to the introduction of testimony concerning his refusal to submit to the blood test and the testimony in question ought not to have been let in. Admission of evidence of Defendant's refusal was reversible error.