Opinion ID: 2543851
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Common Law Scope of Municipal Duty

Text: Keller and the amicus curiae Washington State Trial Lawyers Association Foundation (WSTLA Foundation) argue that the language in instruction 13, by persons using them in a proper manner and exercising ordinary care for their own safety, improperly limits a municipality's duty to only fault-free plaintiffs. The City and the amicus curiae Washington Defense Trial Lawyers (WDTL) assert that the instruction is a correct statement of a municipality's duty under Washington law and that prior decisions make it clear that this duty is limited. Pet. for Review at 10-15; Br. of Amicus WDTL at 3-5. Keller and WSTLA Foundation respond that Washington's common law on municipal duty is confusing and erratic. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 5; Br. of Amicus Curiae WSTLA Foundation at 9. Therefore, as a threshold matter, we must first determine the proper scope of a municipality's duty in building and maintaining its roadways before reaching the ultimate question of whether instruction 13 was proper. The City relies on Hansen to support its position that instruction 13 provided a correct statement of a municipality's duty. Pet. for Review at 11. In Hansen, this court evaluated whether the trial court had erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant. Hansen, 95 Wash.2d at 775, 632 P.2d 504. The court examined whether a municipality had a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury where the plaintiff jaywalked across an area of the street that was under construction. Id. at 775, 632 P.2d 504. In doing so, the court stated that a `municipality ... [is] obligated to exercise ordinary care to keep its public ways in a reasonably safe condition for persons using such ways in a proper manner and exercising due care for their own safety.' Id. at 776, 632 P.2d 504 (alteration in original) (quoting Berglund, 4 Wash.2d at 313, 103 P.2d 355). The court also rejected the Court of Appeals assertion that the rule expressed in Berglund and in Nelson v. City of Tacoma, 19 Wash.App. 807, 577 P.2d 986 (1978) was no longer applicable because of the adoption of comparative fault. Hansen, 95 Wash.2d at 778, 632 P.2d 504. The court's holding however, did not turn on whether the jury had been given the proper instruction, but on whether there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. Id. at 777, 632 P.2d 504. The court concluded that under a municipality's general duty, there was no evidence that the defendant failed to `exercise ordinary care to keep the public ways in such a condition that they are reasonably safe for ordinary travel by persons using them in a manner that can be reasonably anticipated.' Id. (quoting jury instruction 10). Furthermore, although Hansen included the language challenged in this case, it is unclear whether that language was ever intended by this court to limit the class of plaintiffs covered by the municipality's duty or whether it was merely intended to establish the appropriate standard of care. Several Court of Appeals cases have interpreted Hansen to hold that a municipality owes only a limited duty to those using its roadways. See Wick, 86 Wash.App. at 380-82, 936 P.2d 1201 (upholding jury instruction that used 6 WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL 140.01(WPI) language regarding municipalities' duty); Gunshows v. Vancouver Tours & Transit, Ltd., 77 Wash. App. 430, 434-35, 891 P.2d 46 (1995) (finding state owed no duty to negligent plaintiff even if plaintiff's negligence was foreseeable); Walker v. State, 67 Wash.App. 611, 617, 837 P.2d 1023 (1992) (stating that language, `persons using such ways in a proper manner and exercising due care for their own safety', qualifies the duty of the municipality (quoting McKee v. City of Edmonds, 54 Wash.App. 265, 267, 773 P.2d 434 (1989))), rev'd, 121 Wash.2d 214, 217, 848 P.2d 721 (1993) (holding that Court of Appeals should not have reached jury instruction issue because plaintiff failed to preserve it); McKee, 54 Wash.App. at 267-68, 773 P.2d 434 (interpreting Hansen as qualifying municipalities' duty to only apply to those using roadways in proper manner). However, this court's precedent has been inconsistent in the language it uses to define a municipality's duty; thus, a more thorough review of our cases is needed to determine the appropriate scope of this duty. A number of cases defining a municipality's duty include language similar to that used in the challenged instruction here. See Ruff v. King County, 125 Wash.2d 697, 704, 887 P.2d 886 (1995) ([a] county has a duty to maintain its roadways in a reasonably safe condition for ordinary travel by persons using them in a proper manner); [10] McCluskey v. Handorff-Sherman, 125 Wash.2d 1, 6, 882 P.2d 157 (1994) (state has duty to exercise ordinary care in the repair and maintenance of its public highways, keeping them in such a condition that they are reasonably safe for ordinary travel by persons using them in a proper manner); Stewart v. State, 92 Wash.2d 285, 299, 597 P.2d 101 (1979) (stating that state has duty to maintain its roads in such a condition that they are reasonably safe for persons using them in a proper manner and exercising ordinary care for their own safety); Owens v. City of Seattle, 49 Wash.2d 187, 191, 299 P.2d 560 (1956) (municipalities are obligated to exercise ordinary care to keep its public ways in a reasonably safe condition for persons using them in a proper manner and exercising due care for their own safety); Parker v. Skagit County, 49 Wash.2d 33, 38, 297 P.2d 620 (1956) (municipalities are `obligated to exercise ordinary care to keep its public ways in a reasonably safe condition for persons using such ways in a proper manner and exercising due care for their own safety' (quoting Berglund, 4 Wash.2d at 313, 103 P.2d 355)). There are also many cases that define a municipality's duty without including the challenged language and arguably expanding the class of persons to whom a duty is owed. See Provins v. Bevis, 70 Wash.2d 131, 138, 422 P.2d 505 (1967) (county is obligated to exercise ordinary care to keep its public ways in a safe condition for ordinary travel); Lucas v. Phillips, 34 Wash.2d 591, 597, 209 P.2d 279 (1949) (county has duty to use such care as would keep [the bridge] in a reasonably safe condition for those who might go upon it); Barton v. King County, 18 Wash.2d 573, 578, 139 P.2d 1019 (1943) (stating general rule that municipality must maintain the improved portion of the highway in a reasonably safe condition for ordinary travel); Fritch v. King County, 4 Wash.2d 87, 90, 102 P.2d 249 (1940) (county must exercise reasonable care to see that the highways are maintained in a safe condition for ordinary travel); Gray v. King County, 140 Wash. 169, 171, 248 P. 397 (1926) (county obligated to maintain wharf in such condition as to be reasonably safe for those who might go on it); Neel v. King County, 53 Wash. 490, 497, 102 P. 396 (1909) (upholding jury instruction, which stated that `[i]t is the duty of the county ... to maintain its public highways and roads in a reasonably safe condition for public travel'); Teater v. City of Seattle, 10 Wash. 327, 329, 38 P. 1006 (1894) (city is not an insurer of the safety of its streets, but is only required to keep them in a safe condition for ordinary travel). [11] Much of the current confusion as to a municipality's duty seems to stem from the language used in Berglund. In Berglund, the parents of a minor child sued Spokane County to recover damages for injuries the child sustained when she was struck by an automobile while crossing a bridge. Berglund, 4 Wash.2d at 310-11, 103 P.2d 355. Both the plaintiff and the car were traveling westbound, but on opposite sides of the bridge. Id. at 312, 103 P.2d 355. The plaintiff alleged that heavy traffic forced the car to the other side of the bridge where it struck the plaintiff. Id. The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer to the complaint. Id. at 311, 103 P.2d 355. In examining the case, this court stated that although a municipality is not an insurer against accident nor a guarantor of the safety of travelers, it is nevertheless obligated to exercise ordinary care to keep its public ways in a reasonably safe condition for persons using such ways in a proper manner and exercising due care for their own safety. Id. at 313, 103 P.2d 355. However, the Berglund court also stated a municipality's duty as requiring `ordinary care to provide against such dangers to the traveling public as may reasonably be anticipated,' and in terms of the care an ordinarily reasonable person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. Id. at 314-15, 103 P.2d 355 (quoting 8 AM.JUR. Bridges § 38, at 936 (1937)). In addition, the court incorporated the element of foreseeability into its formulation of a municipality's duty. Id. at 319-20, 103 P.2d 355. The court stated a municipality could be held liable if the general type of harm that occurred was foreseeable even if the specific act was not. Id. The court rejected the defendant's argument that a municipality has no duty to keep its streets and bridges safe for those who use them unlawfully. Id. at 320, 103 P.2d 355. The court held that the question was one of foreseeability and that [i]f, under the surrounding conditions, the negligence of drivers at the particular point was reasonably to be anticipated, it would be the county's duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the public against the resulting dangers. Id. at 321, 103 P.2d 355. [12] Thus, interpreting our cases as a whole, the language used in Berglund and other decisions by this court does not limit the scope of a municipality's duty to only those using the roads and highways in a nonnegligent manner. Our pattern instructions reflect this view. WPI 140.01, at 136 (Supp. 1994). Although including the challenged language in the instruction, the comment in WPI 140.01 clearly states that [d]uty, as defined in this instruction, is not determined by the negligence, if any, of a plaintiff. Id. It adds, to avoid juror confusion of the duty of a defendant with the issue of the negligence of a plaintiff, a separate clarifying instruction may be appropriate. Id. We therefore hold that a municipality owes a duty to all persons, whether negligent or fault-free, to build and maintain its roadways in a condition that is reasonably safe for ordinary travel.