Opinion ID: 2608840
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: part ii. a correct application of governing law

Text: The following appears to be the holding achieved in Idaho by today's majority, and as well it comprises the total extent of the ratio decendi which moves it to the holding: Defendants acknowledge the state of Idaho has authority to enforce the operation of motor vehicle laws of this state in Indian Country pursuant to the consent provided in Public Law 280 and as implemented by the Idaho legislature in I.C. § 67-5101. However, defendants argue that the state does not have jurisdiction to enforce the evidentiary test provisions of I.C. § 18-8002, because they are enrolled members of the Nez Perce Tribe and the incidents giving rise to their arrests and the resulting charges occurred within the boundaries of the Nez Perce Reservation. The state of Idaho, clearly having the jurisdiction and responsibility for enforcement and punishment of criminal offenses relating to the operation of motor vehicles upon the highways and roads maintained by the state and its political subdivisions within the boundaries of Indian reservations, State v. Michael, 111 Idaho 930, 729 P.2d 405 (1986), also has jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of I.C. § 18-8002 for the same reasons. 117 Idaho at 1014, 793 P.2d at 687 (1990) (emphasis added.) That the defendants so acknowledge lends no support to the majority's conclusion that the state's jurisdiction over enforcement and punishment of motor-vehicle-related criminal offenses committed upon the state highways ipso facto also extends to enforce the civil provisions of I.C. § 18-8002. Idaho Code § 18-8002 is declared a civil penalty, as the legislature wrote in the King's English. To presume that the state's properly assumed jurisdiction over the enforcement of criminal offenses also includes the enforcement of § 18-8002 is simply wrong. I remind the majority that this Court authored, and in 1982 the legislature accordingly enacted, legislation which made into infractions conduct which had theretofore constituted misdemeanor criminal offenses. Section 49-1502 and section 49-1505 of that act contain provisions identical in substance to § 18-8002, insofar as embodying the suspension of a driver's license is concerned, as may be readily noted: 49-1502. Procedure for processing infraction citations.  An infraction is a civil public offense, but... . [7] 49-1505. Suspension of operator's license for failure to pay underlying traffic infraction penalty  Appeal.  (1) The department shall immediately suspend the license, permit and operating privileges of any operator or chauffeur upon receiving notice from any court of the state that a person has failed to pay the penalty for a traffic infraction judgment. In the instance before us today, the legislature acting of its own volition, created yet another civil infraction to wit, refusing an officer's request to submit to a test for sobriety. By implicitly considering I.C. § 18-8002 as a criminal offense  because it is found in the Criminal Code (put there by the codifiers of the Idaho Code, and in the company of other offenses such as the Motion Picture Fair Bidding Act)  and citing to this Court's holding in State v. Michael, 111 Idaho 930, 729 P.2d 405 (1986), the majority incorrectly addresses the issue presented. Public Law 280 did not authorize the state of Idaho to assume jurisdiction over all cases involving civil and regulatory disputes. Up until now, this Court has admirably applied the limiting language of I.C. § 67-5101, in accordance with Public Law 280, including Section 4(a). Another statement by the majority that requires negative comment is the insistence that McCormack's and Cree's consent to the breath tests was voluntary: Having concluded that I.C. § 18-8002 is a valid exercise of Idaho's jurisdiction on an Indian reservation, we now address the underlying issue of defendant's argument that the results of the breath tests should be suppressed. In both cases before this Court, the defendants voluntarily submitted to the evidentiary breath test required by I.C. § 18-8002. Their voluntary submission to the test renders moot any challenge that otherwise may have been present related to the suppression issues... . By their voluntary acts in submitting to the § 18-8002 evidentiary test, defendants have waived any suppression issue that may have existed. 117 Idaho at 1014-1015, 793 P.2d at 687-688 (some emphasis added.) This italicized statement above is incorrect. A good share of the oral argument included the issue of voluntariness as against the contention that the defendant's submission to a test was coerced by the threats of the officers that the defendants would be deprived of their drivers' licenses if they did not take the tests. Also it was on that basis that the conditional pleas of guilty were entered. The majority points out that McCormack and Cree entered conditional plea agreements in order to appeal the trial court's admission of the breath test results. For the reasons stated herein, the arresting officers did not have authority to threaten McCormack and Cree with the implied consent law. The tribal council had never been asked to give its consent to being bound by, of all things, the state's implied consent statute, I.C. § 18-8002. My memory not failing me, I clearly recall one member of the Court posing this question to the deputy attorney general at oral argument: Supposing the officer had threatened to cut off one of McCormack's ears if he did not consent to taking the test? The consents were indeed coerced by threats of seizure and suspension of driving licenses. The defendants therefore are clearly entitled to withdraw their pleas of guilty. The state might do well to take the simple step heretofore not taken, i.e., request the consent of the tribal councils involved throughout the state. There is no reason whatever for indulging in the belief that the councils are unwilling to do their part in diminishing the carnage daily taking place on roads and highways of the state and its political subdivisions. That the state today gathers a majority of this court's membership willing to join Justice Boyle's opinion does not suggest that the state is serving its intended purpose of highway safety. The majority's error is failing to take heed that I.C. § 67-5101, as presently written, is not in accordance with the federal enabling legislation.