Opinion ID: 2718900
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Extender Statute’s language

Text: The Extender Statute extends “the applicable statute of limitations” for “any action brought by” NCUA on behalf of a failed credit union. 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14)(A) (emphasis added). Application of the Extender Statute is mandatory. Id. (“the applicable statute of limitations . . . shall be . . .” (emphasis added)). See Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 302 (1989) (use of “shall” indicates a statutory instruction is “compulsory” and “mandatory”). “By using these words, Congress precluded the possibility that some other limitations period might apply to claims brought by [NCUA] as conservator [or receiver].” UBS Am. Inc., 712 F.3d at 142 (discussing the FHFA extender statute, which is identical to the NCUA Extender Statute). Thus, the plain meaning of the statute indicates that it applies to NCUA’s Securities Act claim and that it supplants all other time limits, including Section 13’s repose period. We therefore agree with the Second Circuit that this is the natural and correct reading of this language. Id. at 141-42. Defendants argue that the term “statute of limitations” in the Extender Statute does not include statutes of repose. It follows, they say, that the Extender Statute replaces only Section 13’s one-year period and not its three-year period. But Defendants misread the Extender Statute. - 21 - The term “statute of limitations” is phrased in the singular—it follows the word “the” and uses the word “statute,” not “statutes.” 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14)(A) (emphasis added). This term refers to the time limits in the Extender Statute itself—subparagraphs (A) and (B)—not the time periods in other statutes that the Extender Statute replaces, such as those in Section 13. And it applies to “any action brought by [NCUA].” Id. Although Defendants contend that their reading of the Extender Statute is plain and unambiguous, it is the opposite—at best a strained reading that may be plausible only if the term “statute of limitations” in the Extender Statute can be (1) understood narrowly and (2) somehow refers to time restrictions contained in statutes other than the Extender Statute. Rather than stop here and conclude, as the Second Circuit did in UBS, that the Extender Statute is plain and unambiguous in NCUA’s favor, we assume for the sake of discussion that the Defendants’ reading based on the text alone is at least plausible. We therefore examine the term “statute of limitations” more closely. The following contextual analysis further demonstrates the weakness of the Defendants’ interpretation of the Extender Statute—and the correctness of the district court’s conclusion that the Extender Statute governs NCUA’s Securities Act claims and supplants other limitations frameworks. (ii) Ordinary meaning of “statute of limitations” When interpreting a statute, we must “giv[e] all undefined terms their ordinary meaning.” UBS Am., 712 F.3d at 141; Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. - 22 - Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2011). We first assess the way the term is used. Because words do not have “intrinsic meanings. . . . [i]t is only through custom, usage, and convention that language acquires established meanings.” Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45:2, at 14-15 (7th ed. 2007). “Importantly, the proper inquiry focuses on the ordinary meaning of the [term] at the time Congress enacted it.” BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 184 (2004). “[T]he terms ‘statute of limitations’ and ‘statute of repose’ have seen considerable development in their usage and meaning.” Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 2013 WL 3455775, at , -- F.3d -- (4th Cir. 2013). “[A] historical analysis reveals that both scholars and courts have often used the terms interchangeably.” Id. (citing McDonald v. Sun Oil. Co., 548 F.3d 774, 781 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A]lthough some cases recognized the differences between statutes of limitation and repose [in 1986], a number of cases confused the terms or used them interchangeably . . . [and] considerable uncertainty about the distinction existed.”); id. at 781 nn.3-4 (collecting historical examples of inconsistent and overlapping use of the two terms)). A review of sources published before and shortly after Congress enacted the Extender Statute indicates that “statute of limitations” did not have a consistent, clearly distinct meaning in 1989. See UBS Am., 712 F.3d at 142-43 & n.3; Waldburger, 2013 WL 3455775, at , -- F.3d at --. Courts often begin an ordinary meaning analysis by consulting contemporary dictionary definitions. See, e.g., Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 127 S. Ct. 2352, 2356 (2007) (consulting the - 23 - fourth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary to interpret a federal statute adopted in 1976); Limtiaco v. Comacho, 127 S. Ct. 1413, 1418 (2007) (consulting the fourth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary published in 1951 to interpret a Guam statute enacted in 1950); Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 125-26 (2003) (consulting law dictionaries published in 1856 and 1859 to interpret a statute adopted in 1863). The fifth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary was published in 1979 and was current when FIRREA was enacted. It did not provide a definition for statutes of repose. Instead, the entry for “Repose statutes” redirected the reader to the entry for “Limitation (Statute of limitation).” Black’s Law Dictionary 1169 (5th ed. 1979). The entry for “Statute of limitations” in the same edition referred twice to statutes of repose. First, it stated that “[s]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose, and are such legislative enactments as prescribe the periods within which actions may be brought upon certain claims or within which certain rights may be enforced.” Id. at 835. Second, the final sentence of the entry stated: “Also sometimes referred to as ‘statutes of repose.’” Id.13 13 The next edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, published in 1994, provided a separate entry for “Statute of repose” that addressed the distinctions between repose and limitations periods. Black’s Law Dictionary 1411 (6th ed. 1994). Nevertheless, the entry for “Statute of limitations” begins with a broad definition: “Statutes . . . setting maximum time periods during which certain actions can be brought or rights enforced.” Id. at 927. Later in the same entry is a note with the subheading “Statute of repose compared.” That note begins with the sentence, “While statutes of limitation are sometimes called ‘statutes of repose’ . . . ” and proceeds to explain the distinctions we already have discussed. Id. at 927. - 24 - Beyond dictionary definitions, the Supreme Court used the terms “statute of limitations” and “statute of repose” synonymously in cases published before the Extender Statute’s enactment. E.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (referring to statutes of limitations generally as “statutes of repose”); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938) (referring to a statute of limitations: “The statute of limitations is a statute of repose . . . .”). A 1991 treatise on limitations of actions described five definitions for statute of repose: (1) in the most general sense, statute of repose is synonymous with statute of limitations; (2) [it] is a general term that encompasses various statutes, including statutes of limitations . . . ; (3) it is merely one type of statute of limitations . . . ; (4) [it] is considered distinct from a statute of limitations because it begins to run at a time unrelated to the traditional cause of action, that is, from the date of the act of injury regardless when discovered; and (5) it is synonymous with the “useful safe life” provisions of products liability statutes. Calvin W. Corman, 1 Limitation of Actions § 1.3.2.1, at 30-31 (1991). Applying these definitions to the term “statute of limitations” in the Extender Statute, only the fourth definition supports Defendants’ narrow reading, while the first, second, and third definitions support a broader reading and the fifth definition is irrelevant. - 25 - The foregoing discussion supports the broader meaning of “statute of limitations.” But it also shows that, standing alone, the words “statute of limitations” may be ambiguous.14 (iii) Specific context: surrounding language The Extender Statute set a new limitations framework that displaced pre-existing limitations frameworks for “any action” brought by NCUA. 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14) (“[T]he applicable statute of limitations with regard to any action . . . shall be . . . ”). In defining the new limitations framework, the Extender Statute provides this instruction: (B) Determination of the date on which a claim accrues [T]he date on which the statute of limitation begins to run . . . shall be the later of— (i) the date of the appointment of [NCUA] as conservator or liquidating agent; or