Opinion ID: 2222285
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: admission of evidence of the felony arrest warrant

Text: The general rule in Illinois is that the fact that warrants have been issued for the defendant for previous crimes is admissible where relevant to show the defendant's motive for committing the crime charged but only if the defendant knew about the warrant or knew that the officers were attempting to arrest him. ( People v. Wilson (1987), 116 Ill.2d 29, 52.) Even if the fact that the warrants were issued is admitted for this purpose, proof of the details of such crimes is improper. People v. Durkin (1928), 330 Ill. 394, 404. There is no showing in the record that the defendant knew about this warrant or knew that the officers were attempting to arrest him for the prior crime charged. The defendant himself testified that he fled from the police car because he had possession of an illegal gun. Without a showing that the defendant was aware of the warrant, the warrant itself does not prove anything about the defendant's state of mind. Moreover, the warrant itself was only an accusation; it was not relevant to prove that the defendant had committed the prior crime. The State did not attempt to prove, other than by the admission of the warrant, that the defendant actually had committed the prior crime, and that the prior crime, rather than the warrant, was his motive for fleeing the officers and killing one of them. Thus cases which the majority cites, such as People v. Stewart (1984), 105 Ill.2d 22, are not pertinent  these cases all deal with proof of prior crimes, not proof that the defendant was aware that he was being sought in connection with these crimes. Even assuming the warrant was admissible, it was also error to read the entire warrant to the jury, including the statement in the warrant that the defendant committed aggravated battery, a felony, by shooting    Frederick Ferguson in the leg while using a deadly weapon, to-wit, a shotgun. These were details of the crime that were highly prejudicial to the defendant since they tended to suggest a propensity to engage in violence. The majority opinion argues that these details were relevant because they showed the depth of the defendant's motive to escape and rebutted his contention that he was not the initial aggressor. Again, however, the majority opinion confuses the relevance of an accusation of a prior crime with relevance of a prior crime. Had the State introduced competent evidence to prove that the defendant had shot Frederick Ferguson, such evidence would have tended to prove that the defendant, having committed the crime, had a strong motive to resist arrest. However, in the absence of such evidence, the details included in the warrant itself could not provide evidence of motive without a showing that the defendant was aware of what the warrant contained.