Opinion ID: 1825277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Fundamental Error Question

Text: A facial challenge to a statute's constitutional validity may be raised for the first time on appeal only if the error is fundamental. Trushin v. State, 425 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 1982); Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1982); Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So.2d 134 (Fla. 1970). In Sanford, we reviewed an article III, section 6, constitutional attack on the validity of a chapter law similar to the issue before us here. In that case, we evaluated the question of whether the arguments raised regarding an award of attorney's fees constituted fundamental error so as to allow us to consider a constitutional challenge to the chapter law's title, a challenge that had been raised for the first time on appeal. Because the merits of the case involved an employment retention and compensation question, we determined that the issue of attorney's fees did not go to the merits or the foundation of the case. Consequently, we refused to consider the constitutionality of the chapter law because no fundamental error question was raised. Sanford, 237 So.2d at 138. Subsequently, in reviewing other cases where issues were first being raised on appeal, we concluded that, for an error to be so fundamental that it can be raised for the first time on appeal, the error must be basic to the judicial decision under review and equivalent to a denial of due process. D'Oleo-Valdez v. State, 531 So.2d 1347 (Fla. 1988); Ray v. State, 403 So.2d 956 (Fla. 1981). A review of the chapter law at issue reflects that it affects a quantifiable determinant of the length of sentence that may be imposed on a defendant. Section 775.084 allows a court to impose a substantially extended term of imprisonment on those defendants who qualify under the statute. Under the amendments to section 775.084 contained in chapter 89-280, Johnson was sentenced to a maximum sentence of twenty-five years, with a minimum mandatory sentence of ten years. Had he not qualified as a habitual offender under the new amendments, his maximum sentence under the guidelines would have been three and one-half years. Clearly, the habitual felony offender amendments contained in chapter 89-280 involve fundamental liberty due process interests. Contrary to the question raised in Sanford, we find the issue in this case to be a question of fundamental error. We reached a similar conclusion in Trushin by finding that the arguments concerning the constitutional facial validity of the statute under which Trushin was convicted raised a fundamental error. 425 So.2d at 1130. However, we specifically noted in Trushin that [t]he constitutional application of a statute to a particular set of facts is another matter and must be raised at the trial level. Id. at 1129-30. We conclude that the validity of chapter 89-280 falls within the definition of fundamental error as a matter of law and does not involve any factual application. Consequently, we hold that the challenge may be raised on appeal even though the claim was not raised before the trial court.