Opinion ID: 1708793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: General Contractor's Motion

Text: Witherspoon alleges the general contractor, Sides, was engaged by him to construct the house described in the plans and specifications and to erect it in a good and workmanlike manner. He further alleges Sides was negligent in permitting the installation of a cast iron rather than a ductile iron pipe, in not noting the discrepancy between the pipe installed and that specified, in not calling the discrepancy to the attention of the architect and engineer, and in all the respects in which the plumbing subcontractor was negligent. Witherspoon alleges the plumbing subcontractor was negligent by installing the wrong pipe, by improperly backfilling, and by failing to install adequate stress protection for the pipe. Although cast as a tort, the true nature of the action against Sides is for breach of contract. See, Bussell v. Western Diesel Power, 216 Neb. 822, 346 N.W.2d 394 (1984); Lincoln Grain v. Coopers & Lybrand, 216 Neb. 433, 345 N.W.2d 300 (1984). However, we dispose of the case on the theory on which it was presented to the district court. Lincoln Grain v. Coopers & Lybrand, supra . Whether pled in tort or contract, the applicable period of repose is found in Neb. Rev.Stat. § 25-223 (Reissue 1979). See Kearney Clinic Bldg. Corp. v. Weaver, 211 Neb. 499, 319 N.W.2d 95 (1982), applying the statute in the context of a contract action. The statute provides in relevant part: In no event may any action be commenced to recover damages for an alleged breach of warranty on improvements to real property or deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property more than ten years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action. A statute of repose is a type of a statute of limitations. Stock v. Meissner, 217 Neb. 56, 348 N.W.2d 426 (1984). It is clear beyond any doubt that a period of limitations begins to run in this state upon the violation of a legal right, that is, when the aggrieved party has the right to institute and maintain suit, even though the nature and extent of the damages may not be known. Rosnick v. Marks, 218 Neb. 499, 357 N.W.2d 186 (1984); Interholzinger v. Estate of Dent, 214 Neb. 264, 333 N.W.2d 895 (1983); Grand Island School Dist. # 2 v. Celotex Corp., 203 Neb. 559, 279 N.W.2d 603 (1979). The operative phrase in § 25-223 is the act giving rise to the cause of action. Sides argues that each act of negligence attributed to it, either directly or vicariously, occurred more than 10 years prior to the filing of suit. That argument overlooks, however, the allegation that Sides was engaged to erect the house in a good and workmanlike manner. Implicit in Witherspoon's cause of action against Sides is the claim that Sides erected the house in other than a workmanlike manner by allowing the use of an inadequately supported cast iron pipe. The failure to erect the structure in a workmanlike manner was the act giving rise to the cause of action, and it occurred when construction of the house was completed. See Cacace v. Morcaldi, 37 Conn.Supp. 735, 435 A.2d 1035 (1981), holding completion of construction to be the operative date under a statute barring suit after 3 years from act or omission complained of. See, also, Oja & Associates v. Park Towers, 89 Wash.2d 72, 569 P.2d 1141 (1977); Shockley v. Public Service Company of Colorado, 525 P.2d 1183 (Colo.App.1974). Since the suit was filed within 10 years from the completion of construction, it is not barred by the period of repose contained in § 25-223.