Opinion ID: 2709123
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court’s Procedural Approach

Text: After denying summary judgment, the district court granted the defendants’ motion to bifurcate the trial. In his opening brief, Volkman suggested that to do so was a proce‐ dural mistake. Volkman may have abandoned this argument in his reply brief (it is not mentioned at all), but we address it nonetheless in order to confirm that Volkman’s right to a jury trial was not impaired. The district court bifurcated Volkman’s trial pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the rule, “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third‐ party claims.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). In doing so, “the court must preserve any federal right to a jury trial.” Id. A district court’s decision to bifurcate or to hold separate trials is reviewable for an abuse of discretion. Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 495 (7th Cir. 2008). The district court did not abuse its discretion in this case. When a plaintiff brings a Section 1983 claim for retaliation in No. 12‐1778 7 violation of First Amendment rights in the employment context, our analysis has traditionally involved three steps. First, the court must decide whether the employee’s speech was constitutionally protected. Hutchins v. Clarke, 661 F.3d 947, 955 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 790 (7th Cir. 2006)). Second, the plaintiff must establish that the speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory action. Hutchins, 661 F.3d at 955–56. Finally, if the plaintiff satisfies the first two steps, the defendant has an opportunity to establish that the same action would have been taken in the absence of the employee’s protected speech. Id. Not all of these questions fall within the province of the jury. The latter two do; they concern causation as a factual matter, and are best answered by the traditional finder of fact. See Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health, 632 F.3d 1091, 1106 (9th Cir. 2011); Thomas v. City of Blanchard, 548 F.3d 1317, 1327 (10th Cir. 2008); Morris v. City of Chillicothe, 512 F.3d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 2008). But the first question—whether the employee’s speech was constitutionally protected—is a question of law to be decided by the court. Messman v. Helmke, 133 F.3d 1042, 1046 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983). The same goes for the subsidiary considerations which supply the answer to that question, such as whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen on a matter of public concern, and whether the governmental interests served by suppression of the speech outweigh the interests of the employee in engaging in that speech. Messman, 133 F.3d at 1046. The district court in this case simply separated the bench trial on issues of law—particularly, whether Volkman engaged 8 No. 12‐1778 in protected speech—from the jury trial on issues of fact. Not only was this not an abuse of discretion, it was the most efficient way to proceed. If a plaintiff’s speech is not constitu‐ tionally protected as a matter of law, his claim fails. In such instances, it is unnecessary to waste judicial resources on a jury trial to determine whether said unprotected speech was the reason for any adverse action taken against the plaintiff, because it makes no difference to the outcome of the case. We conclude that the district court’s procedure was constitution‐ ally adequate and was appropriately explained. B. Qualified Immunity and “Clearly Established” Rights In addition to ruling against Volkman outright on the issue of constitutional protection, the district court found that the defendants were shielded by the doctrine of qualified immunity, and that Volkman’s case must therefore be dis‐ missed. Volkman challenges that conclusion. We review the validity of a qualified immunity defense de novo. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994). Governmental actors performing discretionary functions enjoy “qualified immunity,” meaning that they are “shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Estate of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 778 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Sallenger v. Oakes, 473 F.3d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 2007)); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The qualified immunity analysis therefore traditionally involves a two‐part inquiry. The first question is whether the defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) No. 12‐1778 9 (overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)). The second question is whether that particular constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. Id. We may consider the two questions in either order. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236–242. In this case, we begin by asking whether the right alleged to be violated is “clearly established.” Volkman bears the burden of establishing that the constitu‐ tional right at issue was clearly established. Estate of Escobedo, 600 F.3d at 779 (citing Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 802 (7th Cir. 2008)). Typically, “[t]he difficult part of this inquiry is identify‐ ing the level of generality at which the constitutional right must be clearly established.” Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts … not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality,” Ashcroft v. al‐Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011), and the Seventh Circuit has long held that “the test for immunity should be whether the law was clear in relation to the specific facts confronting the public official when he acted.” Colaizzi v. Walker, 812 F.2d 304, 308 (7th Cir. 1987). At minimum, Volkman must show that the contours of the right he alleges was violated are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Estate of Escobedo, 600 F.3d at 779 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). And, although we are mindful that “an official action is not protected by qualified immunity only when the very action in question has previously been held unlawful,” id., we have also said that “[f]or qualified immunity to be surrendered, preexisting law must dictate, that is, truly compel … the conclusion for every like‐situated, reasonable 10 No. 12‐1778 government agent that what [he] is doing violates federal law in the circumstances.” Khuans v. Sch. Dist. 110, 123 F.3d 1010, 1019–20 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lassiter v. Ala. A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir. 1994)). The cases Volkman has put forward demonstrate little more than that the First Amendment right against retaliation, writ large, is clearly established. But this is not so easy a case that citing to a general proposition of law is enough to show that any reasonable official would have known that to restrict or punish Volkman’s speech was unconstitutional. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (suggesting that general propositions of law give “fair warning” only in the most obvious cases). There are fact‐intensive considerations at play, including whether Volkman spoke as a private citizen or in his capacity as a public employee, whether he spoke on a matter of public concern, and whether IDOC had an adequate justification for treating Volkman differently from any other member of the general public. See Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The defendants highlighted the weakness of Volkman’s effort to show that his rights were clearly established in their response brief, but he did nothing to buttress his position in his reply. As a result, we need not say at exactly what level of specificity Volkman was required to show that his rights were clearly established on these facts; it is enough to note that what he has done is plainly not enough. C. Volkman’s Rights Were Not Violated Finally, Volkman argues that even if the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, his requests for injunctive and No. 12‐1778 11 declaratory relief still remain, thus keeping the case alive. Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 959 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity does not apply to claims for equitable relief.”). There are serious questions about the continued justiciability of Volkman’s non‐monetary demands.1 Putting those aside, however, there is a simpler reason why the district court’s resolution of the case was correct: Volkman failed to prove his case. As we have mentioned, our analysis of a First Amend‐ ment retaliation claim involves three steps. First, the court must decide whether the employee’s speech was constitution‐ ally protected. Hutchins, 661 F.3d at 955–956. Second, the plaintiff must establish that the speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory action. Id. Third, if the plaintiff satisfies the first two steps, the defendant has an opportunity to establish that the same action would have been taken in the absence of the employee’s protected speech. Id. Answering the first question—whether the speech was constitutionally protected—requires answering the subsidiary questions laid out in the Connick‐Pickering test: whether 1 The injunctive relief he seeks is an order directing IDOC to vacate his written reprimand, but they may have done so internally already. If the injunctive relief is moot, we doubt whether, on these facts, the declaratory judgment request can stand alone. See Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (a declaratory judgment request cannot sustain a live case or controversy where granting the declaratory judgment would not “affect[ ] the behavior of defendant toward the plaintiff”); Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172 (1977) (holding that a claim for declaratory relief is moot where the “primary claim of a present interest in the controversy is that [the plaintiff] will obtain emotional satisfaction from [the] ruling”). 12 No. 12‐1778 Volkman spoke as a private citizen or in his capacity as a public employee; whether he spoke on a matter of public concern; and whether the IDOC defendants had an adequate justification for treating Volkman differently than any other member of the general public. See Hutchins, 661 F.3d at 955; Phelan, 463 F.3d at 790. Throughout the pendency of this litigation, the district court maintained that Volkman did speak as a private citizen and that he spoke on a matter of public concern. With that, we summarily agree. The district court ruled against Volkman after the bench trial, however, because IDOC showed that its interests in suppressing the speech outweighed Volkman’s interests in making it. The balancing of interests presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Messman, 133 F.3d at 1046. We have derived seven factors from Pickering which we consider when conducting the balancing of interests: (1) whether the speech would create problems in maintaining discipline or harmony among co‐workers; (2) whether the employment relationship is one in which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary; (3) whether the speech impeded the employee’s ability to perform her responsibilities; (4) the time, place, and manner of the speech; (5) the context within which the underlying dispute arose; (6) whether the matter was one on which debate was vital to informed decision‐making; and (7) whether the speaker should be regarded as a member of the general public. Gustafson v. Jones, 290 F.3d 895, 909 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d 358, 371 (7th Cir. 2000)). When reviewing No. 12‐1778 13 these factors, we have observed that “[t]he initial, and often determinative, question is whether the speech interferes with the employee’s work or with the efficient and successful operation of the office.” Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827, 842 (7th Cir. 1985). Moreover, because Pickering is a balancing test—requiring us to weigh factors against each other, rather than to merely count how many factors line up on each side—one factor of great weight may offset several which lean slightly in the other direction. The primary consideration here is the nature of the employer‐employee relationship in the paramilitary context of a correctional center, a concern which goes to the first, second, third and fifth factors, in particular. We have acknowledged that, “[b]ecause police departments function as paramilitary organizations charged with maintaining public safety and order, they are given more latitude in their decisions regarding discipline and personnel regulations than an ordinary government employer.” Kokkinis v. Ivkovich, 185 F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 971 (8th Cir. 1995)). The same logic applies to the law enforcement bodies tasked with protecting and maintaining our correctional centers, where safety and order are paramount concerns. In such settings, we afford considerable deference to the government employer’s assessment of the risks that employee speech creates. Id. at 845–46; see also Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 2006). Viewing the case against this backdrop, we agree with the district court that IDOC’s interests in restricting Volkman’s speech weigh more heavily in the balance. Volkman was employed in a supervisory capacity. Supervisors are tasked 14 No. 12‐1778 with enforcing rules and regulations. When a supervisor, like Volkman, criticizes a disciplinary decision (such as the decision to move the Burkhardt matter “out of house” to the prosecutor), it undermines other employees’ respect for the chain‐of‐command, and for the rules which were violated in the first place. There is value in maintaining order and respect for their own sake in a paramilitary context like this one, and we will not second‐guess prison officials’ conclusion that the example Volkman set through his conduct was a detrimental one. To be sure, none of this is meant to suggest that Volkman’s right to express his opinion on a matter of public concern is not also an important one. But in the paramilitary context of a correctional center, we agree with the district court that the LCC officials’ interests in maintaining order and security in the workplace outweighed Volkman’s interests in expressing his opinion on a work‐related prosecution.