Opinion ID: 505933
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Creekmore's Judgment of Acquittal

Text: 54 The next issue on appeal concerns the Government's claim that the district court erred in granting Creekmore a judgment of acquittal after the jury found him guilty of conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 245(b)(2)(B). 26 The district judge held that the Government had failed to prove an essential element of the criminal violation; that is, the Government did not demonstrate that the parade was provided or administered by the city of Decatur within the meaning of Section 245(b)(2)(B). Creekmore, 648 F.Supp. at 1371. 55 The only case discussed by the parties and the district court which interprets this provision of the statute is United States v. Griffin, 585 F.Supp. 1439 (M.D.N.C.1983). Griffin involved a prosecution of KKK members for violating the civil rights of demonstrators engaged in a parade in Greensboro, N.C. The Griffin court held that the parade was administered by Greensboro because city ordinances contained requirements and regulations which were applicable to parades and which defined the responsibilities and functions of both parade participants and the city. The Griffin court reasoned that [t]he thorough involvement of the city in the details of the parade, and the city's close supervision and control of the march, qualifies this parade as having been 'administered' by the city. Id. at 1442. 56 At Creekmore's trial, the Government introduced evidence that the city of Decatur had enacted three ordinances in 1978 and 1979 to respond to continuing civil rights demonstrations. One ordinance granted the Chief of Police authority to regulate unlawful public assemblies to prevent breaches of the peace. Creekmore, 648 F.Supp. at 1370 n. 1. A second regulation prohibited groups from loitering so as to obstruct a public street. Id. A third law restricted the possession of firearms by persons at a public demonstration. Id. at 1371. The Government argues that these ordinances, combined with Chief Self's close involvement with the details of the parade and his provision of security for the demonstrators, indicates that the march was administered by the city within the meaning of the statute. 57 The witness Turner of the SCLC testified that he met with Chief Self during the week preceding the demonstration to discuss the time and route of the parade, and the number of participants and vehicles that might accompany the march. Chief Self agreed to provide protection for the marchers, and extra officers were called in for this purpose. On the day of the demonstration, the police closely observed the Klan gathering and kept the streets open for the parade. Some officers were assigned to travel along the parade route to prevent interference with the protest. Ultimately, when the Klan intervened in the march, the police attempted to clear the KKK out of the street. 58 Despite these official acts, the district court stated that the Decatur police had not provided any special service because the police are always bound to protect the public. Creekmore, 648 F.Supp. at 1374. The district court declined to adopt the reasoning of the court in Griffin because the Griffin protestors had obtained a parade permit whereas the SCLC did not. The court held that the ordinances cited by the Government were not sufficient to establish the functional equivalent of a parade permit, id. at 1375, which the district court deemed to be an essential prerequisite to a determination that the parade was provided or administered by the city. Id. at 1371. The court reached this conclusion even though it recognized that Decatur did not have an ordinance requiring a parade permit. 59 While the existence of a parade permit was considered important by the Griffin court, we do not believe that protestors who lack such a permit are outside the coverage of the statute, especially when the town, city, or county involved does not require that protestors obtain a parade permit. Furthermore, the district court's holding that the Decatur parade was not administered by the city because the dictionary definition of administer is to direct or to have charge of, and the Decatur police were not in charge of the demonstration, id. at 1372, is too simplistic. 27 Under this rationale, no demonstration would be covered by the statute because police and city officials will rarely, if ever, direct a protest. 28 60 More importantly, this holding ignores the legislative history of Section 245. Racially motivated violence during parades, marches, and demonstrations was precisely what this act was designed to redress. Griffin, 585 F.Supp. at 1446. The statute must be construed to achieve its broad remedial purpose. United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1527 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 173, 98 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987). As the Senate Report on this act stated, The purpose of the legislation is to strengthen the capability of the Federal Government to meet the problem of violent interference, for racial or other discriminatory reasons, with a person's free exercise of civil rights. S.Rep. No. 721, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1837, 1838. Sponsors and opponents of the bill agreed that the protection of the act was very broad. See 114 Cong.Rec. 319 (1968) (statement of Sen. Hart). The sponsors of the bill intended to address a wide range of racially motivated violence and intimidation. See 114 Cong.Rec. 533-36 (1968) (statement of Sen. Javits). This was recognized by opponents of the bill. As Senator Holland stated, It is very clear to me that when people demonstrate under [Section 245(b)(2)(B) ] ... they are certainly brought under this law. 114 Cong.Rec. 333 (1968) (statement of Sen. Holland). 61 Although many similar statements appear in the legislative history of the act, the district judge in this case ignored Congressional intent. In refusing to examine the legislative history, the district court stated that [e]ither Webster['s Dictionary] controls and the statutory language leaves no doubt as to its meaning, or there is sufficient ambiguity to trigger the presumption of a construction in favor of the accused. Creekmore, 648 F.Supp. at 1373. Because the district court's approach to this question was flawed and because its holding conflicts with Congressional intent, the granting of the judgment of acquittal constitutes reversible error. F. Reassignment to Different Judge 62 As its final contention, the Government argues that these cases should be remanded with instructions that they be assigned to a different district court judge. This is appropriate, the Government claims, because District Judge Acker has demonstrated an inability to disregard his original findings which were reversed by this Court in 1985. 63 This Court has stated that, where a reasonable person would question the trial judge's impartiality, reassignment is appropriate. United States v. Holland, 655 F.2d 44, 47 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). In addition, cases that have maintained a stalemated posture because of the district judge's intransigence require reassignment to another judge. Brooks v. Central Bank of Birmingham, 717 F.2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir.1983) (per curiam). 64 In cases where there is no proof of personal bias, the Second Circuit has persuasively enumerated factors which should be considered by an appellate court in deciding whether to exercise its supervisory authority to reassign a case. These criteria include: 65 (1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected, (2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. 66 United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.1977) (en banc ). Although this Court has not explicitly adopted these criteria, we have cited Robin with approval. See United States v. Long, 656 F.2d 1162, 1166 n. 7 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981). Moreover, other circuits have applied these principles. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 694 F.2d 294 (1st Cir.1982); United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 785 F.2d 777 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 580, 93 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986). 67 The record in the present cases indicates that Judge Acker has tremendous difficulty putting his 1984 findings out of his mind. Without finding substantially different evidence, Judge Acker held that the SPLC's conduct should be imputed to the Government even though this Court had previously reversed his original finding to that effect. Reassignment will preserve the appearance of justice and, hopefully, it will promote a speedier resolution of these cases. In remanding this case to the Chief Judge for the Northern District of Alabama, we act with the sensitivity that it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. Rex v. Sussex Justices (1924) 1 K.B. 256, 259 (emphasis added). In addition, an unnecessary waste of resources, out of proportion to the benefits involved in preserving the appearance of fairness, will not result. 29 In a similar situation, in which a district court entered a holding that had been explicitly reversed by this Court previously, we held that reassignment was necessary. Brooks, 717 F.2d at 1343. The stalemated posture of these cases mandates a similar conclusion here. 68 During the course of this litigation, Judge Acker's position has become hardened against the Government, and he has evidenced a commitment that clearly reflects that he is no longer able to view these cases impartially. We direct that these cases be reassigned.