Opinion ID: 3025030
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: New Jersey Law Against Discrimination

Text: In applying the LAD, the New Jersey anti-discrimination law, courts use the same burden-shifting framework that the Supreme Court adopted in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Andersen v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 446 A.2d 486, 490 (N.J. 1982). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that, inter alia, he is a member of a protected class. Id. at 491. The LAD extends protection against discrimination to an individual who suffers from a disability. See N.J.S.A. 10:5-4.1. The District Court held that Sarnowski could not demonstrate that he was disabled under the LAD because he did not present expert medical evidence, 11 indicating that a handicap existed. Sarnowski, 2005 WL 3479685, at .2 This holding by the District Court misstates the standard adopted in New Jersey in interpreting the LAD. The District Court relied on Clowes v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 538 A.2d 794 (N.J. 1988), in requiring expert testimony of a disability. In Clowes, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court called for “competent and legal evidence” to support the diagnosis of a disability. Id. at 806. In Clowes, the court gave expert testimony as an example of such evidence. In subsequent cases, testimony by the plaintiff’s own treating physician has been held to satisfy this “competent and legal evidence” requirement. See Gaul v. AT & T, Inc., 955 F.Supp. 346, 349 (D.N.J. 1997) (“Clowes simply required that a plaintiff put forth competent medical evidence that he actually suffered from the ailment he claims is his disability.”) In Taylor v. Phoenixville School Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999), we have expressed our approval of this reading of Clowes. 2 Physical conditions that courts have accepted as meeting the LAD definition of disability include the aftermath of a heart attack, Panettieri v. C. V. Hill Refrigeration, 388 A.2d 630, 634 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978); varicose veins, Nieves v. Individualized Shirts, 961 F.Supp. 782, 796 (D.N.J. 1999); and obesity which contributed to arthritis, a heart condition, and obstructive lung disease, Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 800 A.2d 826, 835-36 (N.J. 2002). Under this standard, Sarnowski’s medical problems might well be found to satisfy the statutory definition. 12 Turning to the records that Sarnowski submitted to the District Court, we conclude that there was sufficient information on his medical condition – including records from his treating doctors that catalogued his diagnoses with Coronary Artery Disease and Wolff-Parkinson-White syndrome, his October 2002 bypass surgery, specific findings by his heart surgeons, and the installation of an intracardiac defibrillator in his chest at the end of April 2003 – to create an issue for the jury on Sarnowski’s disability under LAD.3 The District Court should not have granted summary judgment on this claim.