Opinion ID: 2060074
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Statutory Challenges to the Imposition of PRS at Resentencing

Text: In these appeals, defendants [1] who have completed serving their sentences of imprisonment and have been released from prisonassert several statutory challenges to the imposition of PRS in a resentencing proceeding. Although they recognize that courts have the inherent power to correct illegal sentences, defendants contend that this authority cannot be exercised more than one year after the declaration of the original sentence under CPL 440.40. Defendants claim that such resentencings are further subject to the prohibition in CPL 380.30 against unreasonable delays. They also argue, in the alternative, that Correction Law § 601-d allows a resentencing court the option to decline to resentence a defendant, even if the People do not so consent, and that the failure of a sentencing court to consider this option constitutes an abuse of discretion requiring the nullification of PRS. As a general principle, a sentence cannot be changed once a defendant begins to serve it; however, this applies only if the sentence is in accordance with law (CPL 430.10). Our precedent has long recognized that courts have the inherent authority to correct illegal sentences ( see e.g. People v Richardson, 100 NY2d 847, 852-853 [2003]; People v Minaya, 54 NY2d 360, 364 [1981], cert denied 455 US 1024 [1982], citing Bohlen v Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 121 NY 546, 550-551 [1890]). Because PRS is a mandatory component of a sentence for a crime punishable by a determinate prison term ( see Penal Law § 70.45 [1]), there is no dispute that defendants' original sentences that omitted the imposition of terms of PRS were illegal. Contrary to defendants' assertions, CPL 440.40which allows the People to move to set aside an invalid sentence within one year of its impositiondoes not impose a one-year limitation on a court's authority to rectify an illegal sentence. As we stated in People v Wright (56 NY2d 613, 615 [1982]), CPL 440.40 is designed to restrict the People's ability to move to set aside an illegal sentence and the text of this statute does not place a similar restriction on the court's inherent ability to correct its own errors. Defendants object to this precedent but the cases on which they rely Carlisle v United States (517 US 416 [1996]) and United States v Smith (331 US 469 [1947])address specific time limits contained in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that do not pertain to the inherent ability of New York courts to modify illegal sentences. In any event, we recently reaffirmed Wright in People v Sparber (10 NY3d at 471 n 6). Consequently, these resentencing proceedings were not barred by virtue of the fact that they occurred more than one year after defendants were initially sentenced. We also reject the claim that resentencing courts have the option of declining to impose PRS regardless of whether the People consent to that disposition. Penal Law § 70.85 specifies that in cases where PRS was required but not explicitly pronounced at sentencing, the matter may be returned for resentencing pursuant to Correction Law § 601-d, and the court may decide to reimpose the original determinate sentence without PRS only on consent of the district attorney (Penal Law § 70.85). Hence, a court may decline to impose PRS during resentencing only when the People issue the statutorily required consent under Penal Law § 70.85. Finally, defendants submit that the sentencing courts in these cases lost jurisdiction to resentence them under CPL 380.30 due to the length of the delays between the original sentencings and the resentencing proceedings. Certainly, the statute requires that sentences must be imposed without unreasonable delay (CPL 380.30 [1]), and in furtherance of that statutory directive, we have held that an unexplained delay of several years between conviction and sentencing results in the loss of jurisdiction over a defendant ( see People v Drake, 61 NY2d 359, 366 [1984]; People ex rel. Harty v Fay, 10 NY2d 374, 379 [1961]). Here, even assuming that CPL 380.30 applies, there was no violation of the statute because defendants were resentenced within a reasonable time after DOCS notified the courts that these defendants were designated persons under Correction Law § 601-d. Accordingly, defendants have identified no statutory barriers to the correction of the illegal sentences that were originally imposed.