Opinion ID: 4529239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim of Incompetence

Text: “The Eighth Amendment . . . prohibits the execution of a prisoner whose mental illness prevents him from rationally understanding why the State seeks to impose that punishment.” Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 722 (2019) (internal quotations omitted). The prisoner must prove he suffers from a psychotic disorder that makes him either unaware of the reasons for his punishment or such that he has no “rational understanding” of it. Id. at 723 (citing Panetti, 551 U.S. at 957-60). If the prisoner has a psychological dysfunction that “may have resulted in petitioner’s fundamental failure to appreciate the connection between the petitioner’s crime and his execution” then he may be incompetent to be executed. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 960 (internal quotations omitted.) In Panetti, the prisoner alleged he met this standard because he experienced “gross delusions preventing him from comprehending the meaning and purpose of the punishment to which he ha[d] been sentenced.” Id. Barton similarly must allege and demonstrate a “substantial threshold showing of insanity.” Id. at 949; Ford, 477 U.S. at 426. In support of his claim he is incompetent to be executed, Barton relies almost exclusively on the “Forensic Evaluation Report” authored by Dr. Patricia Zapf. Dr. Zapf 6 was hired by Barton’s counsel after November 19, 2019, when the State filed its motion to set Barton’s execution date. Dr. Zapf reviewed Barton’s records and conducted a two-day evaluation of him. Dr. Zapf ultimately concluded: “As a result of his Major Neurocognitive Disorder, Mr. Barton has significant impairments in executive function, problem solving, attention, concentration, working memory, and abstract reasoning, which result in the inability to provide rational assistance to counsel and to engage in consistent, logical, and rational decision making.” For these reasons, Dr. Zapf opined that Barton was incompetent under the standard set forth in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), and Justice Marshall’s plurality opinion in Ford, but noted he was competent under Justice Powell’s