Opinion ID: 6985046
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Contribution Act

Text: As stated, the probate court entered an order finding that the settlement between Babb and the City of Champaign was made in good faith” within the meaning of the Contribution Act (740 ILCS 100/0.01 et seq. (West 1992)). That statute provides that, where two or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury to person or property, or the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them.” (740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West 1992).) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than its pro rata share of damages to the injured party. (740 ILCS 100/2(b) (West 1992).) The Contribution Act provides, however, that a tortfeasor who settles in good faith with the injured party is discharged from contribution liability. Specifically, sections 2(c) and 2(d) of the Contribution Act provide: (c) When a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one or more persons liable in tort arising out of the same injury or the same wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide but it reduces the recovery on any claim against the others to the extent of any amount stated in the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration actually paid for it, whichever is greater. (d) The tortfeasor who settles with a claimant pursuant to paragraph (c) is discharged from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor.” 740 ILCS 100/2(c), (d) (West 1992). The only limitation that the Contribution Act places upon the parties’ right to settle and. thereby extinguish contribution liability is that the settlement must be accomplished in good faith. (740 ILCS 100/2(c) (West 1992).) The Contribution Act does not define the term good faith.” Although our courts have struggled to define that concept, no uniform definition has emerged. One appellate court panel determined that a settlement will be considered in good faith when no tortious or wrongful conduct on the part of the settling tortfeasor has been shown. (Lowe v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1984) , 124 Ill. App. 3d 80, 94.) This definition is consistent with the commissioners’ comments to the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, which parallels our statute in many respects. (Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 12 U.L.A. 63, 100, Commissioners’ Comments (1955) (clause requiring that a good-faith settlement was intended to give courts occasion to determine whether the transaction was collusive,” and if so, there was no discharge from contribution liability).) Other panels of the appellate court, however, preferred a broader definition, which considered not only whether the settlement was collusive, but also whether the amount paid by the settling tortfeasor was  'within a reasonable range of the settlor’s fair share.’ ” See Wasmund v. Metropolitan Sanitary District (1985) , 135 Ill. App. 3d 926, 930, quoting River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court (1972), 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 997-98, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 506-07; Mallaney v. Dunaway (1988), 178 Ill. App. 3d 827, 833. In Ballweg v. City of Springfield (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 107, this court declined to place emphasis on any single factor as determinative of good faith. Instead, the court stated that in determining whether a settlement agreement was made in good faith, the trial court must consider the entire circumstances surrounding the settlement. (Ballweg, 114 Ill. 2d at 122-23.) This totality-of-the-circumstances analysis allows trial courts to give effect to the strong public policy favoring the peaceful settlement of claims. At the same time, the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis allows trial courts to be on guard for any type of evidence of collusion, unfair dealing or wrongful conduct by the settling parties. (See, e.g., Blagg v. Illinois F.W.D. Truck & Equipment Co. (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 188 (settling parties manipulated the settlement allocation to deprive the nonsettling employer of his workers’ compensation lien); Higginbottom v. Pillsbury Co. (1992), 232 Ill. App. 3d 240 (settlement agreement between plaintiff employee and third-party defendant employer was not supported by consideration); but see Wasmund v. Metropolitan Sanitary District (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 926 (settlement found to be in good faith, even though settling parties were friends” before settlement and husband and wife thereafter).) With this background in mind, we now address the issue of whether the trial court properly found that the instant settlement was made in good faith.