Opinion ID: 75961
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: AEDPA's Limitations on Our Review

Text: 161 Before reaching the merits of Isaacs' claim, we must again consider the extent to which AEDPA circumscribes our review. As discussed above, § 2254(d)(1) prevents us from upsetting a state court adjudication of federal claims unless that adjudication is contrary to, or amounts to an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court precedent. With respect to Isaacs' Edwards claim, however, we are confronted with the situation in which Isaacs' brief to the state court argued the Edwards decision, but the state court's opinion did not mention it. Therefore, the question becomes whether we should defer to such an adjudication, as long as it is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the relevant Supreme Court decisions. 162 We have previously brushed up against this issue in two recent cases. First, in Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349, 1365 (11th Cir.2001), we discussed the effect of § 2254(d)(1) where it was unclear whether a state court had adjudicated a federal claim. In the earlier state supreme court opinion, [the] entire three-sentence discussion of the issue simply [found] `no reversible error' based upon the bare conclusion that `nowhere did the prosecutor seriously overstep his bounds,' and this conclusion was supported only by a string citation to five state court decisions. Id. at 1365 (citation omitted). Therefore, we noted that: To begin with, it is far from clear what, if any, rule of federal law the Georgia Supreme Court applied. Id. Moreover, the State conceded to this Court that the state supreme court had not applied federal law to Romine's claim. Id. Therefore, we concluded: 163 Given all these factors, especially the State's concession, we have grave doubt that the Georgia Supreme Court applied federal law at all, let alone the governing law set down in Supreme Court decisions. Failure to apply that governing law (or the same rule in state law) is tantamount to applying a rule that contradicts governing law, for these purposes. And under Williams that means the federal habeas court will be unconstrained by § 2254(d)(1) because the state-court decision falls within that provision's contrary to clause. In other words, when there is grave doubt about whether the state court applied the correct rule of governing federal law, § 2254(d)(1) does not apply. That is what we have here, so we proceed to decide the issue de novo, as the district court did. 164 Romine, 253 F.3d at 1365 (citations, quotations and footnote omitted). 165 After Romine, we more recently addressed the issue of the application of § 2254(d)(1) in the much more common context of a state court's rejection without discussion of a federal claim presented to it by a defendant. See Wright v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 278 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir.2002). In Wright, we acknowledged that Romine had brushed up against the same issue, but recognized that Romine was a narrow decision, characterizing it as follows: 166 In that case, it was unclear whether the federal constitutional issue had been raised and decided in state court — we expressed grave doubt that it had been — and the attorneys representing the State insisted that the state court had not addressed the federal issue. In those circumstances, we held that no deference was due the state court's decision of the federal constitutional issue for the simple reason that the state court probably had not decided it. We would not defer to that which did not exist. 167 Id. at 1254 (citation omitted). In contrast, we stated in Wright that it was not disputed that the issue before us had been presented to and decided by the state court, though without discussion, and we did not gravely doubt that it was. Id. 168 Finding Romine distinguishable, we continued in Wright by stating that the issue was whether the state court's summary, which is to say unexplicated, rejection of the federal constitutional issue qualifies as an adjudication under § 2254(d) so that it is entitled to deference. Id. Siding with six other circuits that had squarely addressed that question, we concluded that the summary nature of a state court's decision does not lessen the deference that it is due. Id. 169 In reaching this conclusion, we first focused on the fact that [t]he plain language of § 2254(d)(1) requires only that the federal claim have been `adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings' and have `resulted in a decision' that is neither contrary to nor involves an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Id. In light of these requirements, and noting that [a] judicial decision and a judicial opinion are not the same thing, we concluded that [t]he statutory language focuses on the result, not on the reasoning that led to the result, and nothing in that language requires the state court adjudication that has resulted in a decision to be accompanied by an opinion that explains the state court's rationale. Id. at 1255. Therefore, we held that in order for the § 2254(d)(1) bar to apply, all that is required is a rejection of the claim on the merits, not an explanation. Id. 170 We also noted that, [t]o conclude otherwise on this issue would be writing into § 2254(d)(1) an additional requirement that Congress did not put there — a requirement that the state courts explain the rationale of their decisions, and stated that Congress, and not federal courts, would have to impose such a requirement. Id. The Court observed that telling state courts how they must handle cases would run contrary to notions of federalism and comity. Id. Therefore, we concluded: In § 2254(d) Congress meant to, and did, mandate deference to state court adjudications on the merits of federal constitutional issues, and a decision that does not rest on procedural grounds alone is an adjudication on the merits regardless of the form in which it is expressed. Id. at 1255-56. 171 The instant case is analogous to Wright, and not to Romine. Here, it is apparent to us that the Georgia Supreme Court considered Edwards inapplicable in the context of an interrogation of an inmate in the penitentiary, conducted after a waiver of his Miranda rights, and conducted six to eleven years after his conviction and sentence (and even longer after his pre-trial invocation of the right to counsel during interrogation). As did the panel in Wright, we believe Romine is inapposite. Here, there was no concession by the State that the Georgia Supreme Court failed to address the federal claim. Here, we have no doubt but that the Georgia Supreme Court fairly considered Isaacs' argument that the Edwards elaboration on Miranda should apply, and decided that it did not. Thus, the Georgia Supreme Court cited only Miranda and not Edwards. 172 Accordingly, Section 2254(d)(1) applies to the Georgia Supreme Court's adjudication, and Isaacs is only entitled to relief if that court's rejection of his claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Supreme Court's decisions in Edwards and Roberson. As we will explain, we cannot conclude that it was. 173