Opinion ID: 3059101
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: reasonable doubt jury instruction

Text: As to his convictions, Defendant Sweet contends that the district court erred when it gave the Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction defining reasonable doubt.1 Specifically, Sweet argues that the following language is unnecessarily confusing and lowered the government’s burden of proof: “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs.” This Court has repeatedly upheld the reasonable doubt instruction Sweet challenges. See, e.g., United States v. James, 642 F.3d 1333, 1337-38 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 2011 WL 4049497 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2011) (No. 11-6276) (“[W]e have repeatedly approved of the definition of reasonable doubt provided in the Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions.”); United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217, 1249-50 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Daniels, 986 F.2d 451, 457-58, 1 We review jury instructions de novo to determine whether they misstate the law or mislead the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party. United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217, 1248 (11th Cir. 2001). 3 readopted in relevant part on reh’g, 5 F.3d 495, 496 (11th Cir. 1993). Although Sweet cites opinions in other circuits questioning the utility of similar reasonable doubt instructions, he does not explain how the Eleventh Circuit’s Pattern Jury Instruction misstated the law or misled the jury in his case. As Sweet acknowledges, we are bound by our precedent upholding the Eleventh Circuit’s Pattern Jury Instruction on reasonable doubt “unless and until it is overruled by this court en banc or by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Brown, 342 F.3d 1245, 1246 (11th Cir. 2003). Therefore, Sweet has not shown error in the district court’s reasonable doubt jury instruction.