Opinion ID: 2361087
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Gender-Based Use of Peremptory Challenge

Text: In addition, Gattis argues that the State used a peremptory challenge to strike Mr. Wilfred Moore because of his gender, contrary to the United States Supreme Court's holding in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. [32] This Court remanded the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings on this issue. On remand, the Superior Court reviewed the parties' submissions and concluded that the State did not violate either the spirit or the letter of the law during the selection of Gattis' jury. [33] During jury selection, Mr. Moore was questioned as follows: Q: Now, if the facts and circumstances so warrant, could you find a verdict of guilty? A: Yes, sir, I could. . . . Q: If the facts and circumstances so warrant, could you recommend a sentence of death? A: I don't know, sir. Q: Well, let's go back to that. If the facts and circumstances so warrant, could you recommend a sentence of life imprisonment? A: Yes, sir, I could. Q: All right. Now, you did indicate that you would follow the Court's instructions on the law whether you agreed with that law or not. A: Right. Q: Taking those instructions in mind, then, and taking into account all the facts and circumstances, now, if the facts and circumstances so warrant and if the Court's instructions so permit, could you recommend a sentence of death? A: It's like going to war. I don't know if I  you know, until the time comes, truly in my heart would know if I could bring a bullet up there. I don't know until the time comes. Q: Okay. Philosophically, generally, you're not opposed to the death penalty? A: I believe in the death penalty, but I don't know if I could be the one to say, yes, sentence this defendant to death until the time comes. The State then asked the court that Mr. Moore be struck for cause, stating, Your Honor, I would like to make a record for the reason for striking that juror if the Court believes it may be appropriate.... Number one, I believe that this juror is very, very conservative in his application of the ... death penalty. He answered very quickly `yes' to the possibility of imposing a life sentence under the appropriate facts and circumstances, yet, to our belief, had a very difficult time in answering whether or not he could impose the death penalty under the appropriate circumstances. He seemed to be very, very conservative in the application of the death penalty. Number two, he is an older gentleman and we have, I believe, four or five older gentlemen on the jury panel already. And I would suggest that it's the State's point of view that we would prefer to have some more women on the jury. The Superior Court did not excuse Mr. Moore for cause, finding that his ambivalence about the death penalty was not strong enough to prevent him from following the court's instructions or his oath as a juror. The State then used a peremptory challenge to exclude him. The Superior Court allowed the strike, upholding the State's use of a peremptory challenge after remand by this Court, concluding that the primary motivation behind the State's action was not Mr. Moore's gender. [34] The United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of gender-based peremptory challenges in J.E.B. v. Alabama, holding that litigants may not use peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors solely on the basis of the person's gender. [35] But a juror may be stricken if the explanation proffered by the striking party is based upon a juror characteristic other than gender, and the proffered explanation [is not] pretextual. [36] Additionally, in United States v. Darden, the Eighth Circuit stated, If a party exercises a peremptory challenge in part for a discriminatory purpose, a trial court must decide whether the party whose conduct is being challenged has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike would have nevertheless been exercised even if an improper factor had not motivated in part the decision to strike. If so, the peremptory challenge is not subject to constitutional attack. [37] The Superior Court concluded that, although the State considered the gender of Mr. Moore, gender was not the State's primary motivation for striking him. The court noted that, before the State struck Mr. Moore, four men and three women had been selected for the jury, and the State had used four challenges to exclude two men and two women. The final jury was composed of six men and six women. [38] Based upon the State's conduct throughout the entire jury selection process, the Superior Court was satisfied that the State neither harbored nor displayed any intent to discriminate against men, and that in the particular instance of Mr. Moore, the State carried its burden of showing that it would have challenged him even in the absence of any gender-related reason. [39] We find no abuse of discretion in the Superior Court's determination. [40]