Opinion ID: 570364
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court's Exclusion of Character Testimony

Text: 7 A next-door neighbor of Wiggins testified at trial as to his good acts in the community and good character. However, the District Court, upon Government objection, refused to allow this witness to testify as to her general opinion of Wiggins. See Transcript (Tr.) at 263-66. Wiggins now contends that, in making this ruling, the trial court accepted the Government's erroneous argument that opinion evidence as to character is inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. In fact, as Wiggins correctly points out, the Federal Rules permit opinion evidence as to character. See FED.R.EVID. 405(a). Thus, Wiggins argues, the District Court's ruling improperly precluded him from receiving a favorable jury instruction on his good character that might have formed the basis for acquittal. 8 We reject this claim. First, it is far from clear that the District Court relied on the Government's misreading of the Federal Rules of Evidence in excluding the opinion testimony. The question at issue asked the witness: What is your opinion of Mr. Wiggins? Tr. at 263. After the Government objected, a brief colloquy was held; defense counsel proffered that, all ... [he] want[ed] to use this witness for was to testify that Wiggins had contributed to the community in the respect of helping elderly people and cleaning the streets and things of that nature. Id. at 264. Before the court ruled, the Government also argued that the defendant could not put on character evidence merely to show that he's a nice person. Id. at 265. The following exchange then took place: 9 The court: I think I'll have to sustain the objection with respect to what you're seeking to offer as to her opinion of him. 10 [Counsel]: So all I'll be able to ask is what is general opinion? 11 The court: I guess if he has a reputation for truthfulness, that's obviously at issue here, but that isn't what you asked, you just asked for her.... general opinion of him, as I recall the question. 12 Id. at 266 (emphasis added). 13 We are not at all convinced that the court improperly relied on the fact that the question called for opinion testimony; we think it at least equally plausible that the court excluded the evidence because the opinion solicited was general, rather than directed to a specific character trait relevant to Wiggins' criminal prosecution. We need not resolve this question, however, because we find the latter ground to be a legitimate basis for exclusion, and a trial court's evidentiary ruling may be upheld on grounds other than those relied on by the court itself. See, e.g., Lewy v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 799 F.2d 1281, 1297 (9th Cir.1986). The Federal Rules of Evidence provide: 14 Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: 15 (1) Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused.... 16 FED.R.EVID. 404(a) & (a)(1) (emphasis added). The Federal Rules therefore permit a defendant to introduce character evidence only to demonstrate a pertinent trait of character. As defense counsel stated in his proffer, the evidence excluded by the District Court would have concerned Wiggins' efforts to help out around his neighborhood. Such evidence simply has no relevance to the issue of whether or not he distributed PCP. Had defense counsel, on the other hand, proffered that the witness would have testified as to Wiggins' truthfulness, such evidence would have certainly met the pertinency requirement, because it would have been germane to the credibility of his testimony. Based upon trial counsel's actual proffer, however, we must conclude that the excluded evidence was inadmissible. 17