Opinion ID: 2779924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: prejudice and leniency

Text: In addition, the majority finds that the Board abused its discretion because it failed to address the extent of prejudice it would suffer should waiver be granted, and because the Board did not apply or articulate a more lenient good cause standard in this case on the basis that leniency is “a factor it has previously treated as significant” in other instances. In the cases cited by the majority, prejudice and leniency are considered only after good excuse of the delay was established. In addition, the cases cited involve circumstances beyond the missed deadline facts of this case. See Williamson v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 334 F.3d 1058, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“there are at least three documents that, taken together, are sufficient to constitute preponderant evidence that Williamson’s appeal was filed on [the deadline]”); Primbs v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 366, 370 (1984) (where there was a dereliction of duty by an attorney and dismissal under Rule 60(b)(6)). Such circumstances are not present in the instant appeal. As a HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 5 result, the majority appears to elevate both prejudice and leniency as factors that alone may establish good cause, a proposition I do not accept. This case is a simple matter of a law firm missing a filing deadline that has placed its client at risk of losing her retirement benefits. There are no excuses proffered, reasonable or otherwise, for missing the deadline. The Board fully reviewed the facts in its decision that good cause has not been shown. Because I find no reason to disturb that determination, I dissent.