Opinion ID: 217547
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Contemporaneous Objection

Text: The state court may have denied Haney's Batson claim because he failed to object to the use of peremptory challenges during voir dire or at any point during the trial. [4] This presents an issue of first impression in this circuit: Whether the state court's decision to deny a Batson claim when a defendant made no contemporaneous objection to the use of peremptory challenges in the trial court is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. [5] The Supreme Court has never allowed a Batson challenge to be raised on appeal or on collateral attack, if no objection was made during jury selection. Indeed, as explained below, Batson itself presupposes a timely objection. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991) held that states may adopt rules for determining whether a Batson objection is timely, but did not address whether failure to timely object barred a habeas claim. Therefore, the state court's habeas decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law. Furthermore, we join other circuits which have considered this issue in holding that an objection at trial is a prerequisite to a Batson challenge for purposes of habeas review. [6] Accordingly, we hold that the state court's habeas decision was not an unreasonable application of the law clearly established in Batson. Under Batson, a defendant who alleges the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges must first make out a prima facie case. He must show: (1) that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, (2) that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race, and (3) that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference of intentional discrimination. 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The burden then shifts to the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral explanation for the challenges. Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. This process presupposes that the defendant made a timely objection to the challenges during voir dire, as Batson had done, id. at 83, 100, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The Court did not expressly require, however, that the defendant make such an objection in order to preserve the claim. The Supreme Court's established three-step Batson procedure supports reading Batson to require a contemporaneous objection at trial. At step one, the Court emphasized that the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances in determining whether defendant had made out a prima facie case. Id. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712. At step two, race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges often invoke a juror's demeanor ( e.g., nervousness, inattention), making the trial court's first-hand observations of even greater importance. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008). Because challenges are often based on such subtle, intangible impressions, the reasons for exercising the challenges may be quite difficult to remember if an objection is not raised promptly. McCrory, 82 F.3d at 1248. Finally, when determining whether the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations are credible, `the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.' Abu-Jamal, 520 F.3d at 282 n. 6 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003)); see also Thomas, 866 F.2d at 805 (Determining whether a prosecutor has acted discriminatorily in his use of a peremptory challenge depends greatly upon the observations of the presiding judge.). These determinations not only lie peculiarly within a trial judge's province, Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (citation omitted), they would also be difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate for the first time in post-conviction proceedings when no record is preserved. See Jones v. Butler, 864 F.2d 348, 370 (5th Cir.1988) (Years after trial, the prosecutor cannot adequately reconstruct his reasons for striking a venireman. Nor can the judge recall whether he believed a potential juror's statement that any alleged biases would not prevent him from being a fair and impartial juror.); see also McCrory, [7] 82 F.3d at 1250 (reversing the district court's grant of habeas relief where the State was unable to meet its burden under Batson simply because the prosecutor was understandably unable at the hearing, 10 years after trial, to explain his challenges. Accordingly, the conviction was vacated for a violation that may never have occurred.). In this case, for example, it is impossible to even ascertain which members of the venire were African American. See United States v. Dobynes, 905 F.2d 1192, 1197 & n. 4 (8th Cir.1990) (noting that even though the court reviewed the untimely Batson claim for plain error on direct appeal, the lack of a record made it impossible to even ascertain how many African Americans were on the venire). Although this problem exists even on direct appeal, it is exacerbated by the often lengthy delays between trial and a federal habeas petition. See, e.g., Galarza v. Keane, 252 F.3d 630, 641 (2d Cir. 2001) (11 years); McCrory, 82 F.3d at 1250 (10 years). Similarly, the Supreme Court's proposed remedies for Batson violations presuppose a contemporaneous objection. The Supreme Court declined to formulate particular procedures to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection to a prosecutor's challenges. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (emphasis added). However, the Court theorized that, after a finding of intentional discrimination, trial courts could choose to discharge the venire and select a new jury from a panel not previously associated with the case or disallow the discriminatory challenges and resume selection with the improperly challenged jurors reinstated on the venire. Id. at 99 n. 24, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Neither option would be viable if struck members of the panel had been dismissed, or the case had already gone to a jury. See Abu-Jamal, 520 F.3d at 282 & n. 8; McCrory, 82 F.3d at 1247; Jones, 864 F.2d at 370 ([A]ny prosecutorial misconduct is easily remedied before trial simply by seating the wrongfully struck venireman. After trial, the only remedy is setting aside the conviction.). Aside from these procedural issues, it would also be unwise to allow defendants to manipulate the[trial] system to the extreme prejudice of the prosecution by allowing post-conviction Batson claims. McCrory, 82 F.3d at 1247. A defendant would have a strong incentive to allow the trial to proceed with the selected jury, thenin the event of a convictionraise the Batson claim on appeal, long after the prosecutor may have forgotten the reasons for his challenges. Id.; see also Galarza, 252 F.3d at 641 (Walker, J., dissenting) (In addition to allowing the trial court to act in the first instance, potentially correcting the error and obviating the need for an expensive, time-consuming, and disruptive appeal, timely objection provides a record from which appellate courts can better assess the trial court's reasoning, discourages sandbagging and strategic behavior by trial counsel, and provides the prevailing party with notice of the objector's claims of error.). For these reasons, we join our sister circuits in concluding that a timely objection to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges is a prerequisite to a Batson challenge. Therefore, the California Supreme Court's decision denying Haney's Batson claim was not contrary to federal law. The district court's judgment denying habeas is AFFIRMED.