Opinion ID: 2575903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Batson-Wheeler Claim

Text: As we have observed, a different jury from the one that tried the guilt phase heard the second penalty phase trial. Defendant claims that the prosecution, in participating in the selection of the second penalty phase jury, exercised peremptory challenges against African-American prospective jurors in violation of Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748. Federal law following Batson holds that exercising peremptory challenges solely on the basis of race offends the Fourteenth Amendment's guaranty of the equal protection of the laws ( Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. ___, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2324, 162 L.Ed.2d 196; U.S. v. Martinez-Salazar (2000) 528 U.S. 304, 315, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792), and Wheeler holds that such conduct violates defendants' right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the state Constitution ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748). Procedurally, the three Batson steps should by now be familiar. First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case `by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.' [Citations.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the `burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion' by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, `[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide ... whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.' ( Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. ___, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 2416, 162 L.Ed.2d 129.) Excluding even a single prospective juror for reasons impermissible under Batson and Wheeler requires reversal. ( People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 386, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769.) And although a party may exercise a peremptory challenge for any permissible reason or no reason at all ( Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834; People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 294, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890), implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination ( Purkett, supra, at p. 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769). In evaluating a trial court's Batson-Wheeler ruling that a party has offered a race-neutral basis for subjecting particular prospective jurors to peremptory challenge, we are mindful that `[i]f the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal.' ( People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1319-1320, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270, overruled on another point as explained post, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 638, 131 P.3d at p. 1033, fn. 13; accord, People v. Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th 345, 385-386, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769.) In a case in which deference is due, [t]he trial court's ruling on this issue is reviewed for substantial evidence. ( People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 971, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874.) The trial court here made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the prosecution's explanations for its excusal of the prospective jurors and, as we now explain, its ruling that the explanations were satisfactory is supported by substantial evidence. We find no basis for reversal. The parties and the trial court conferred in chambers to discuss defense and prosecution Batson-Wheeler motions. Of course, only defendant's motion is at issue here. Defendant objected that the prosecution had excluded eight African-American prospective jurors in the course of exercising 15 peremptory challenges. After struggling, along with the parties, over the question whether one of the seated jurors, a Puerto Rican woman, was more properly categorized as Hispanic or African-American, the trial court returned to defendant's motion. Before the court ruled on whether defendant had made out a prima facie case of impermissible discrimination, the prosecutor said, none of my reasons for excusing any of the [prospective] jurors related to race. [They] [r]elated to what I perceived their attitudes are and their ability to be able to impose the death penalty. The trial court found a prima facie case of impermissible discrimination, and asked the prosecutor to explain the peremptory challenges. [13] With regard to the first prospective juror, Mark T., the prosecutor observed that (1) he equivocated about his ability to impose the death penalty; (2) he had witnessed the effects of drug abuse and might be a wild card on that issue, if the defense presented any drug-related mitigating evidence, as the prosecutor believed it did in the first penalty trial; (3) his mother was a psychiatric social worker and his sister a psychologist; (4) he went to several colleges but graduated from none of them, which [j]ust kind of gives me the impression that he doesn't follow through with things; (5) he also had law-related classes with the law school format. I don't want [him] playing lawyer on the jury; (6) he expressed surprise that the electorate voted not to retain former Chief Justice Rose Bird on this court in 1986, and I don't want anybody [with that view of the 1986 election] on my jury in a death penalty case; (7) another employee in the Alameda County District Attorney's Office knew Mark T. and told the prosecutor he did not think he would be able to vote for death; and (8) the defense asked no questions of him, and I have a real problem with that, because it's obvious to me that they like him. With regard to the second prospective juror, Gloria W., the prosecutor observed that (1) she was late to court one day; (2) she had a son the same age as defendant at the time of the crimes; (3) she did not mix with the other [prospective] jurors and came across as unfriendly both to them and to him; (4) she equivocated in numerous respects about the death penalty and, ultimately, the prosecutor doubted she could impose it; (5) her youngest brother had died of a drug overdose and the prosecutor was unsure how she might react to any mitigating evidence of drug usage by defendant; (6) she might have religious scruples regarding capital punishment; (7) [s]he's training for foster care to take care of 12-year-old boys. And I know in the last [penalty] trial the defense relied heavily on the defendant's problems back in Mississippi ... [in] foster situations; and (8) the defense asked no questions of her. With regard to the third prospective juror, Ray F., the prosecutor observed that (1) he was born in Berkeley and might share anti-death-penalty views the prosecutor believed to be prevalent there; (2) court security reported that Ray F. had jousted verbally with them; (3) he was totally against the death penalty as a student; (4) he might have excessive religious scruples regarding capital punishment; (5) he opposed the electorate's decision not to retain former Chief Justice Rose Bird on this court in 1986; (6) he would find psychological or psychiatric testimony helpful, and I would prefer people that don't particularly like it if I could find them; and (7) he had equivocated over the years about the death penalty and, ultimately, the prosecutor doubted he could impose it. With regard to the fourth prospective juror, Charles S., the prosecutor observed that (1) potential affinities existed between him and defendant because the prospective juror's father was a minister in Mississippi, as the prosecutor believed a grandfather of defendant to be; (2) his children had drug-abuse problems; (3) he was not friendly to the prosecutor and the prosecutor did not believe he would get along with other jurors; (4) his son was a career criminal; (5) he had minimized the extent of his own criminal activity, describing an arrest for disturbing the peace when instead he was arrested on a felony charge of trying to draw a firearm on an Oakland police officer (the prosecutor regretted not knowing that information earlier or he would have challenged Charles S. for cause); (6) he equivocated in numerous respects about the death penalty and, ultimately, the prosecutor believed he would never impose it; and (7) the defense asked no questions of him. With regard to the fifth prospective juror, M.S., the prosecutor observed that (1) he dressed pretty grubbily in court and thereby showed no respect for the entire process; (2) potential affinities existed between him and defendant because they were both from Mississippi and the prospective juror's father was a farmer in that state, as the prosecutor believed a grandfather of defendant to be; (3) he equivocated in numerous respects about the death penalty and, ultimately, the prosecutor believed he would never impose it; (4) he was not friendly to the prosecutor and the prosecutor did not believe he would get along with other jurors; (5) he inaccurately answered a question concerning whether one of his two sons had been a crime victim; (6) a sister's boyfriend had been charged with murder in Arkansas; (7) he might think that mental illness could warrant a sentence less than death; (8) he believed death penalty appeals take too long; (9) he might have religious scruples regarding capital punishment; and (10) the prosecutor had driven by his house and saw a wrecked automobile in the driveway, which suggested a certain disorderliness in the prospective juror's life. Moreover, the prosecutor believed that the known attitudes of the remaining prospective jurors made the excusal of M.S. advantageous. With regard to the sixth prospective juror, George M., the prosecutor observed that (1) he continually wore sunglasses in court and thereby showed no respect to the system; (2) he flirted with female prospective jurors and I don't want ... a Don Juan on the jury; (3) he equivocated in numerous respects about the death penalty and, ultimately, the prosecutor believed he would never impose it; (4) he was not friendly to the prosecutor and the prosecutor did not believe he would get along with other male jurors; (5) he did not graduate from high school; and (6) his back problems made him unable to sit or stand for extended periods. Moreover, the prosecutor believed that the known attitudes of the remaining prospective jurors made the excusal of George M. advantageous. With regard to the seventh prospective juror, V.R., the prosecutor observed that (1) potential affinities existed between her and defendant because they both had children born out of wedlock; (2) she equivocated in numerous respects about the death penalty and, ultimately, the prosecutor believed she would never impose it; (3) she was aloof to other prospective jurors; (4) she inaccurately answered a question concerning whether she had been a crime victim; (5) she might have religious scruples regarding capital punishment; (6) the prosecutor had noticed that her automobile was in a sufficiently dilapidated condition to suggest a certain disorderliness in her life; (7) the prosecutor had watched the prospective juror interact with coworkers at Home Depot and observed that she did not appear to get along with them; and (8) the defense seemed too comfortable with her. I don't think I could take a chance on her. Moreover, the one that replaced her[,] who was next on the list when I excused her[,] was another black female ... who I thought was a much stronger juror and much better for the prosecution. And she is, in fact, on the jury and she's a black woman also. With regard to the eighth prospective juror, Ethel F., the prosecutor observed that (1) she was elderly and might regard life as too precious; (2) she was not friendly toward him and appeared to be aloof toward the other prospective jurors, but kept smiling at defendant; (3) her career in nursing might make her too compassionate; (4) she might have religious scruples against imposing the death penalty; (5) she might have to leave the jury in midtrial to help an ailing son; (6) she equivocated about the death penalty and, ultimately, the prosecutor believed she would never impose it; and (7) the defense seemed too comfortable with her. Moreover, the prosecutor believed that the known attitudes of the remaining prospective jurors made the excusal of Ethel F. advantageous. The trial court denied defendant's Batson-Wheeler motion. It found the prosecutor's reasons to be genuine and candid and not pretextual, and recited in detail its reasons for so finding. It explained at length that many of the prosecutor's observations of the prospective jurors' demeanors and attitudes matched its own. And it commented that I do not find that [the prosecutor's] voir dire of the Black [prospective] jurors as opposed to other [prospective] jurors was perfunctory, unsavory, shallow or desultory. [І] I find it was thorough and lengthy. And his voir dire of Black [prospective] jurors was virtually the same as was his voir dire of other [prospective] jurors. Given the trial court's well-reasoned and sincere effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications the prosecutor offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1319-1320, 1 Cal. Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270, overruled on another point as discussed ante, 41 Cal. Rptr.3d at p. 638, 131 P.3d at p. 1033, fn. 13.) Substantial evidence, set forth in detail below in our discussion of defendant's Miller-El claim ( Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, 545 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2317), supports the trial court's ruling with regard to each prospective juror. Apart from an inconsequential misstatement of the content of Mark T.'s juror questionnaire, which we ascribe to an innocent misrecollection, we have found nothing in the record contradicting the prosecutor's explanations for his peremptory challenges. [14] To the extent that the record touches on the genuineness of the prosecutor's stated race-neutral reasons for challenging the prospective jurors, it confirms them. [15] Our discussion requires a further inquiry, but undertaking it does not alter our conclusion. In Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, 545 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2317, the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant had established purposeful discrimination under Batson. ( Id. at pp. ___, 125 S.Ct. at pp. 2322, 2341.) Prefatorily, we note that Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, 545 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2317 ( Miller-El ), is an extreme case, in which the evidence of the Dallas County, Texas, District Attorney's Office's practice of improperly challenging African-American prospective jurors on the basis simply of race was overwhelming. The Supreme Court referred to the state's incredible explanations ( id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2339), trickery ( id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2337), and ruse[s] ( id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2337, fn. 24, at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2338, fns. 25, 26). In sum, the state court's [contrary] conclusion was unreasonable as well as erroneous ( id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2340) under the very high standard imposed on federal courts reviewing state court death judgments. [16] In Miller-El the Court performed a comparative prospective juror analysis, apparently for the first time on appeal. ( Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. ___, ___-___, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2325-2332; see also id. at pp. ___, ___, 125 S.Ct. at pp. 2347, 2351 (dis. opn. of Thomas, J.).) On the basis in part of the transcript of voir dire  ( id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2326, fn. 1; accord, id. at pp. ___, ___, 125 S.Ct. at pp. 2332, 2333), the court in Miller-El engaged in side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists who were struck and white panelists allowed to serve ( id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2325) and examined the prosecution's treatment of challenged and accepted prospective jurors who were similarly situated ( id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2329). The court explained that prospective jurors may be similarly situated without an exact match between or among them with respect to the reasons that a party gave for challenging them. None of our cases announces a rule that no comparison is probative unless the situation of the individuals compared is identical in all respects, and there is no reason to accept one. ( Id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2329, fn. 6.) But the court did not articulate a minimum standard of similarity at which point the comparisons will begin to be probative. Assuming without deciding that comparative prospective juror analysis for the first time on appeal is constitutionally required in these circumstances, in which the trial court found a prima facie case of discrimination (see People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 71, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622; cf. id. at pp. 69, 71, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622 [undertaking that analysis even though no prima facie case established, when prosecutor permitted to comment despite the lack of such a case]), we undertake that analysis. Doing so, we find nothing in the record that entitles defendant to relief. In Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2317, the Supreme Court said of peremptory challenges in state courts that choices [to exercise them are] subject to myriad legitimate influences, whatever the race of the individuals on the panel from which jurors are selected. ( Id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2324.) These influences include matters that are often the subjects of instinct. ( Id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2332.) The court cautioned, however, that [i]f a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson's third step. ( Id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2325; accord, id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2330.) It further stated that failure to engage in any meaningful voir dire examination on a subject a party asserts it is concerned about is evidence suggesting that the stated concern is pretextual. ( Id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2328; accord, id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2330, fn. 8.) In a similar vein, the court stated that the credibility of reasons given can be measured by `how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.' ( Id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2329.) In another component of its discussion, Miller-El instructs that if a stated reason does not hold up, its pretextual significance does not fade because a trial judge, or an appeals court, can imagine a reason that might not have been shown up as false. ( Id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2332.) Finally, the Miller-El court thought it fitting to consider, albeit as a less significant factor than the side-by-side comparisons it undertook, the statistic that the State had peremptorily challenged 12% of qualified nonblack panel members, but eliminated 91% of the black ones. ( Id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2340.) The fundamental inquiry remains the same after Miller-El as before: is there substantial evidence to support the trial court's ruling that the prosecutor's reasons for excusing prospective jurors were based on proper grounds, and not because of the prospective jurors' membership in a protected group? If so, then defendant is not entitled to relief. In undertaking this inquiry, we note that the question is not whether we as a reviewing court find the challenged prospective jurors similarly situated, or not, to those who were accepted, but whether the record shows that the party making the peremptory challenges honestly believed them not to be similarly situated in legitimate respects. As we have observed, Miller-El teaches that if a stated reason does not hold up, its pretextual significance does not fade because ... an appeals court, can imagine a reason that might not have been shown up as false. ( Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. ___, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2332.) Accordingly, we confine our inquiry to whether the prosecutor here honestly found pertinent and legitimate dissimilarities between members of the group he challenged and the group he accepted. Defendant compares 17 prospective jurors (including three African-Americans and two Latinos) whom the prosecution accepted at various stages against eight African-Americans whom it peremptorily challenged, and argues that the accepted prospective jurors shared characteristics with the excluded African-Americans. It is true that a number of the accepted jurors had isolated and discrete similarities with the rejected African-American prospective jurors. There are, in fact, dozens of such commonalities. For example, the prosecutor stated that because Mark T., a challenged prospective juror, had witnessed the effects of drug abuse, and the brother of another challenged prospective juror, Gloria W., had died of a drug overdose, they might be unduly swayed by defense evidence involving defendant's use of drugs. Several of the accepted jurors, however, including Lloyd B., Charleen H., Mary S., Holly A., and Richard R., had also witnessed the effects of drug abuse on family members, and one accepted juror, Beverly R., stated that drug usage might be mitigating. The prosecutor also stated that Mark T.'s mother was a psychiatric social worker and his sister a psychologist, and that he and another prospective juror he peremptorily challenged, Ray F., would find psychological or psychiatric testimony unduly helpful. In general, then, the prosecutor implied that people exposed to psychology or psychiatry might give too much deference to testimony regarding mental health issues. Several of the accepted jurors, however, including Beverly R., Willie G., Danielle M., Marion R., Sheila B., Charleen H., Brian H., and Mary S., had had similar exposure, or otherwise indicated they might be receptive to mitigating testimony on mental health issues. The prosecutor stated that Ray F.'s Berkeley background might make him too liberal, but an accepted juror, Dorothy B., apparently once lived in Berkeley. The prosecutor asked her no questions on the subject. As noted, Miller-El states that failure to engage in any meaningful voir dire examination on a subject a party asserts it is concerned about is evidence suggesting that the stated concern is pretextual. (545 U.S. ___, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2328; accord, id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2330, fn. 8.) [17] The prosecutor stated that he peremptorily challenged George M. in part because he did not graduate from high school. But that was also true of R.G., whom he accepted even though she had only a ninth-grade education. These are but a few examples of similarities found in prospective jurors the prosecutor accepted and African-Americans he challenged. Defendant, relying on Miller-El's teaching that failure to engage in any meaningful voir dire examination on a subject a party asserts it is concerned about is evidence suggesting that the stated concern is pretextual ( Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. ___, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2328; accord, id. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2330, fn. 8), notes that the prosecutor cited the damaged condition of the automobiles associated with M.S. and V.R., without asking them a single question about the circumstances of the accidents causing the damage or whether the cars even belonged to them. He is correct that the prosecutor did not question either prospective juror about the automobiles. Nevertheless, the trial court's ruling that the prosecutor's conduct was within constitutional bounds is supported by substantial evidence. In each case, the prosecutor justified the excusals by stating, either explicitly by giving the ultimate conclusion or implicitly by giving examples, that he believed the prospective jurors he challenged were dissimilar to those he accepted because members of the former group were at least unlikely Б─■ and in some cases would be unwilling Б─■ to impose the death penalty. The record supports the prosecutor's justifications and provides substantial evidence in support of the court's ruling. To provide a few examples, Mark T. testified, my feelings are mixed about [capital punishment], yes. He worried about [t]he idea of disproportionate penalties, inequities, ... distribution of the penalty.... Gloria W. had written on her jury questionnaire that the death penalty is justified if the crime has been established without any doubts, a higher standard than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard the guilt phase jury applied. Asked whether it was right for the state to kill, she initially testified, I don't know whether anyone should take anyone's life, except if it's a matter of self-defense, to defend yourself. She did later state that I think the state has a right to do that. Still, even on the written record before us, she seemed reluctant to impose the death penalty. Ray F. testified, I was a student in the 70's, and I think I was probably totally against the death penalty then. And now I'm an older person, and I'm not certain I'm actually for the death penalty or against it. He characterized his prior position as extreme. Charles S. equivocated about the death penalty, and testified in a manner from which the prosecutor could infer that he was lukewarm about it. It was undisputed that M.S. disported himself arrogantly (wearing a cap and sunglasses in court) and arrived late one day, and thus nothing contradicts the prosecutor's assertion that M.S. appeared to him not to respect the judicial process. Moreover, the prosecutor correctly noted that M.S. mentioned mental illness as a possible reason not to impose a death sentence. George M. testified, I don't want to be on no jury that's going to kill somebody or convict them for life, anyway. The record of V.R.'s testimony does not contradict any of the prosecutor's observations about her. The prosecutor stated that Ethel F. was not friendly toward him and appeared to be aloof toward the other prospective jurors, but kept smiling at defendant, and nothing in the record before us contradicts that concern. We also note that the prosecutor accepted three African-American jurors, which we find here to be an indication of the prosecution's good faith in exercising his peremptories. ( People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216, 225, 242 Cal.Rptr. 477, 746 P.2d 452.) If the prosecutor were filtering prospective jurors by race, presumably he would have challenged Charleen H., an African-American woman of Puerto Rican descent. Charleen H. stated that the justice system is biased against the poor; she opined that it depends how much money you have, I think, where you go to prison and how you're treated. But Charleen H. also stated that she strongly favored the death penalty. Sheila B., an African-American whom the prosecutor did not challenge peremptorily or for cause, opined that the criminal justice system is less than just, and amplified on this sentiment by explaining that our society's inherently racist, it's inherently prejudiced, it's inherently classist. So if you're from a certain class, race, whatever group, you may be unjustly either found guilty, not guilty[,] or things happen to you. But Sheila B. also had a law enforcement background, moderately favored the death penalty in principle, and, stating I believe it has a place in the judicial process, declared that she would vote for it if it appeared on the ballot. Overall her questionnaire showed her to be thoughtful, sober-minded, and analytical. Plainly the prosecutor was looking for prospective jurors bearing a favorable attitude toward his cause, not race or ethnicity, in assessing them. In sum, the prosecutor gave reasons showing that he honestly viewed the prospective jurors he challenged as not similarly situated, in legitimate respects, to those he accepted. The trial court accepted those reasons, and substantial evidence in the record supports the its ruling. On our own review of the record, we think it clear that the prosecutor was looking, without regard to race, for sober-minded jurors who led orderly lives and could impose the death penalty if the evidence warranted it. The prospective jurors, including Latinos and African-Americans, whom he accepted were of that type, and those he rejected were lacking in the essentially pro-death-penalty qualities he was seeking. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant's Batson-Wheeler claim is without merit.