Opinion ID: 888906
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Montana Scaffolding Act

Text: ¶ 17 The Montana Scaffolding Act, set forth in Title 50, Chapter 77, MCA, defines scaffold or scaffolding as a temporarily elevated platform and its supporting structure that is used on a construction site to support a person, material, or both. The Scaffolding Act provides that [s]ubject to the comparative negligence principles provided in Title 27, chapter 1, part 7, a contractor, subcontractor, or builder who uses or constructs a scaffold on a construction site is liable for damages sustained by any person who uses the scaffold ... when the damages are caused by negligence of the contractor, subcontractor, or builder in the use or construction of the scaffold. Section 50-77-101, MCA. ¶ 18 A violation of the duties imposed by the Scaffolding Act imposes absolute liability. Slater v. Central Plumbing and Heating Co., 275 Mont. 266, 269, 912 P.2d 780, 782 (1996). This Court has held that the statutory duty of an employer to provide its employees with a safe workplace is extended to a general contractor when that general contractor controls job safety or has a nondelegable duty of safety, arising out of contract. Stepanek v. Kober Const., 191 Mont. 430, 434, 625 P.2d 51, 53 (1981). Furthermore, where a contract imposes a nondelegable duty to ensure a safe place to work, a general contractor cannot avoid liability by attempting to shift the responsibility to someone else. Nave v. Harlan Jones Drilling, 252 Mont. 199, 203, 827 P.2d 1239, 1241 (1992). ¶ 19 United National argues that the indemnity clause in the contract does not apply because the Scaffolding Act prohibits Swank from shifting its liability to Booth for breach of nondelegable duties. United National further argues that [t]he prime contract imposed on Swank the duty to control, manage, and supervise safety on the construction project... [a]nd Swank was responsible for the proper handling of all materialslike the scissor liftit brought to the work-site. St. Paul counters stating the entity controlling the use of the scissor lift at the time of the loss was Advanced Fireproofing, not Swank Enterprises. Furthermore, it is Advanced Fireproofing and [Booth] who were in complete control of the cleanliness and operation of the scaffold in question. St. Paul concludes stating [t]here was never any determination that Swank Enterprises violated any duties it owed to [Booth]. Many violations were alleged, but none [was] proved and the matter was resolved in a compromise settlement without disposition of the liability issues on the merits. ¶ 20 This Court has held that contractual provisions similar to those in the prime contract between Swank and KRMC have created a nondelegable duty to control workplace safety and to comply with the requirements of the Scaffolding Act. See Steiner v. Dept. of Highways, 269 Mont. 270, 276-77, 887 P.2d 1228, 1232-33; Slater, 275 Mont. at 272, 912 P.2d at 783; Stepanek, 191 Mont. at 439, 625 P.2d at 56. As in Stepanek, the prime contract between Swank and KRMC indicates Swank maintained the responsibility to control safety on the project. The prime contract gave Swank the overall responsibility for safety precautions and programs, the responsibility for protecting employees at the worksite, and the responsibility for the safety of materials brought to the worksite. According to our jurisprudence interpreting the Scaffolding Act, Swank cannot delegate its contractual duty to maintain safety, arising from the prime contract with KRMC. Thus, Swank had a nondelegable duty under the Scaffolding Act to ensure the safety of the scissor lift. ¶ 21 While the Scaffolding Act and the case law interpreting that act create a nondelegable duty to ensure workplace safety, the party with that duty can still insure itself from liability arising out of violations (alleged or proven) of that duty as long as the duty itself is not being delegated to another. In other words, carrying insurance for liability under the Scaffolding Act is not the same as delegating one's duty to comply with the Scaffolding Act. If Swank's insurance coverage is not sufficient to satisfy a judgment, then Swank remains liable for the excess. Swank is not attempting to delegate its duty under the Scaffolding Act. Rather, Swank seeks a determination that United National's policy, listing Swank as an additional insured, covers Swank for its liability to Booth. ¶ 22 The Dissent asserts this conclusion is a sea change in our nondelegable duty law and that our holding in fact allows a general contractor to delegate its nondelegable duty for workplace safety to a third party. The Dissent claims Advanced Fireproofing now bears the liability for Swank's breach of its nondelegable duty to provide workplace safety and Advanced Fireproofing must either provide workplace safety or, alternatively, incur the financial burden (through its insurer) of Swank's breach of its duty to provide a safe place to work. Dissent, ¶ 43. Swank was insured under United National's policy through an additional insured endorsement. This endorsement had the effect of making Swank an insured of United National. Following the Dissent's reasoning to its logical conclusion, if a general contractor carries insurance (either on its own or through a provision in a subcontract) to cover liability for failure to provide workplace safety, that insurance contract would constitute a delegation of the general contractor's nondelegable duty; it would, in the words of the Dissent, be foisting its own misconduct and neglect onto a third partythe insurance company. Despite the protestations of the Dissent, we have never held that a contractor cannot insure itself for the absolute liability that arises from a violation of the duty to provide workplace safety. Indeed, such a holding would be counterproductive in that insurance coverage provides a further resource to satisfy an injured worker's claim. ¶ 23 Swank has fulfilled its duty under the Scaffolding Act. Swank's liability was reflected by and accounted for in its settlement of Booth's claim. Swank's subcontract with Advanced Fireproofing required Advanced Fireproofing to obtain insurance covering Swank as an additional insured, on a primary non-contributing basis, in contemplation of the type of incident at issue here. Although our holding is not premised upon the assumption, we note as an aside that if Advanced Fireproofing accounted for the cost of the insurance in its bid for the work, Swank indirectly paid for that insurance. Thus, by requesting that Advanced Fireproofing indemnify Swank for Swank's own negligence, Swank is not delegating a nondelegable duty under the Montana Scaffolding Act. Rather, that duty has been satisfied. The issue is, thus, a question of insurance contract law.