Opinion ID: 203303
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard of Review and Law on Withholding of Removal

Text: In evaluating the agency's denial of withholding of removal, our review is aimed at determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Halo v. Gonzáles, 419 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir.2005). Under this standard, we will reverse only if the evidence in the record would compel a reasonable factfinder to reach a conclusion contrary to that of the agency. Hernández-Barrera v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 9, 20 (1st Cir.2004). On the other hand, `we may not affirm the [agency]'s decision when we cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the [agency]'s view.' Mukamusoni, 390 F.3d at 119 (quoting Gailius v. I.N.S., 147 F.3d 34, 44 (1st Cir.1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a consequence, we must remand the case for further proceedings if the agency's decision fails to state `with sufficient particularity and clarity the reasons for denial of asylum' or otherwise to `offer legally sufficient reasons for [the] decision.' Mihaylov, 379 F.3d at 21 (quoting Gailius, 147 F.3d at 46-47); accord Halo, 419 F.3d at 18-19; Cordero-Trejo v. I.N.S., 40 F.3d 482, 487 (1st Cir.1994) ([D]eference is not due where findings and conclusions are based on inferences or presumptions that are not reasonably grounded in the record, viewed as a whole, or are merely personal views of the immigration judge.) (citations omitted). Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, with appropriate deference to the agency's interpretation of the governing statute in accordance with administrative law principles. Lin v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir.2008). In order to qualify for withholding of removal, Sok must show that, upon return to Cambodia, her life or freedom would be threatened based on a ground enumerated in the relevant statute; political opinion is one such ground. I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 419, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1)). Sok can make this showing by establishing that, if returned to Cambodia, she will more likely than not be subjected to persecution because of her political opinion. Mewengkang v. Gonzáles, 486 F.3d 737, 741 (1st Cir.2007). If Sok can demonstrate that she was persecuted in Cambodia in the past, moreover, the applicable regulation affords her a rebuttable presumption that she will likely be persecuted if sent back. Rotinsulu v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 68, 71-72 (1st Cir.2008) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)). The Government then bears the burden of rebutting the presumption through proof of either a fundamental change in circumstances eliminating the likelihood of persecution, or that Sok could avoid persecution by moving elsewhere in Cambodia. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)-(B); accord Rotinsulu, 515 F.3d at 72. There is no single definition of persecution. The term encompasses more than threats to life or freedom, but less than mere harassment or annoyance. Between these broad margins, courts have tended to consider the subject on an ad hoc basis. Aguilar-Solís v. I.N.S., 168 F.3d 565, 570 (1st Cir.1999) (citations omitted). [P]ersecution always implies some connection to government action or inaction, Harutyunyan v. Gonzáles, 421 F.3d 64, 68 (1st Cir.2005) (citation omitted), as when the harm suffered is the direct result of government action, government-supported action, or government's unwillingness or inability to control private conduct. Nikijuluw v. Gonzáles, 427 F.3d 115, 121 (1st Cir.2005) (citation omitted). With these principles in mind, we proceed to the merits of Sok's claim.