Opinion ID: 2155856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the joyce decision

Text: In People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce (1988), 126 Ill.2d 209, 222, we held that section 115-1 was unconstitutional. Section 115-1 provided the State with the right to a jury in certain criminal trials. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 115-1 (including first degree murder, Class X felonies, criminal sexual assault, and felony violations of two statutes designed to prohibit the sale and use of illicit drugs). Joyce consolidated several cases which involved defendants situated similarly to defendant in the case at bar. Each Joyce defendant had been indicted for a drug-related offense and had submitted jury waivers. The State indicated that it would not waive a trial by jury. The trial judge, however, deviated from the express language of section 115-1 and denied the State's request for a jury trial. The State then petitioned this court to compel the judge to expunge the orders which allowed the defendants' jury waivers. Joyce, 126 Ill.2d at 211. In its analysis in Joyce, this court first noted that the right to a trial by jury is guaranteed by both the Federal and State Constitutions. However, this court also observed that Federal constitutional law permits a statute that requires consent by the government to a jury waiver. ( Joyce, 126 Ill.2d at 213, citing Singer v. United States (1965), 380 U.S. 24, 13 L.Ed.2d 630, 85 S.Ct. 783 (upholding Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a), which is similar to section 115-1).) The court therefore determined that section 115-1 would survive an attack based upon Federal constitutional principles. Despite this, the court did not limit its analysis of section 115-1 to Federal constitutional law. If the language of our State constitution, or the debates or committee reports from the constitutional convention, indicates that a provision of our constitution is intended to be construed differently from similar provisions of the Federal Constitution, then this court should not be limited by the construction placed on the Federal constitutional provisions. ( Joyce, 126 Ill.2d at 213.) The court carefully analyzed the provisions of our State constitution dealing with the right to a jury trial. It also examined the history of those provisions, along with all the information which might lead it to ascertain the intent of the drafters of the constitution, including the debates and committee reports as well as the common law interpretation of the right to a jury trial as embodied in decisions of this court which the debates reveal the drafters intended to adopt as constitutional principles. (See Joyce, 126 Ill.2d at 213-22.) Basing its decision solely on Illinois constitutional principles, the court held that section 115-1 was unconstitutional and that only a defendant has a right to a jury trial. Joyce, 126 Ill.2d at 222.