Opinion ID: 556426
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence Reviewed in Paoli

Text: 32 The Paoli defendants based their motion for summary judgment on two arguments: Expert testimony should have been excluded under Fed.R.Evid. 702, 703, and 403; and defendants' own submitted studies and expert testimony on PCB exposure and causation did not confirm the evidence that was submitted by plaintiffs. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 841. We concluded that because Paoli was decided at the summary judgment stage, where credibility determinations are inappropriate, the evidence regarding exposure and causation is significant only insofar as it relates, within the contours of our Rule 703 jurisprudence, to whether certain of plaintiffs' expert opinions should have been excluded because they were not based on facts or data reasonably relied on by experts in the field. Id. at 841-42. 33 With regard to the issue of PCB exposure, defendants and their own experts challenged the reliability and validity of the testimony of all plaintiffs' experts. Id. at 842-44. Defendants made two claims against Shubin's testimony on causation: (1) his diagnosis conflicted with the diagnoses of other physicians who had previously examined patients, and (2) his diagnosis was based on a method that improperly assumed the injuries to be caused by PCBs. Id. at 844 (citations omitted). In order to support these claims, defendants questioned the validity of Shubin's testimony based upon the three plaintiffs he diagnosed. First, they contended that Shubin's conclusion that the first plaintiff's hypertension was caused by PCB exposure failed to consider other possible causal factors, such as the plaintiff's family history of hypertension. Moreover, Shubin could not cite any studies demonstrating a direct causal relationship between PCB exposure and hypertension. Shubin also attributed the plaintiff's death to PCB exposure even though previous doctors had determined that the death had been caused by the plaintiff's use of psychotropic drugs. Id. 34 Similarly, defendants argued that there was no support for Shubin's conclusion that the second plaintiff's four spontaneous abortions or the third plaintiff's various illnesses, were related to PCB exposure. For example, Shubin had found no PCBs in the third plaintiff's blood nor did he dismiss other possible causes of the plaintiff's illnesses, such as the plaintiff's cigarette smoking. Defendants also criticized Shubin's reference to animal studies and the Yusho and Yu Cheng incidents. Id. In general, defendants' experts characterized [Shubin's] opinions as 'conjectural guesses,' which 'fail adequately to consider multiple etiologic factors, as well as obvious differential diagnoses,' and 'would not withstand review by a qualified panel of his peers.'  Id. (citations omitted). 6 35 We concluded, however, that defendants' attempts to exclude plaintiffs' expert witness testimony were not warranted under the Japanese Electronics standard. We noted in Paoli that the Japanese Electronics standard does not require a district court to hold an in limine or other type of hearing in order to conduct a factual inquiry. However, we did make clear ... that the district court must have a proper and reviewable foundation for making its admissibility findings. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 853. With regard to the Paoli defendants' submissions, though, we concluded that we could identify no such foundation here. Id. 36 An example directly relevant to this case was our determination that the district did not identify the source of the consensus conclusion from the scientific literature that it relied upon in excluding opinions based upon the Yusho and Yu Cheng incidents (which Shubin referenced). Nor did the district court even specify which particular opinions it was excluding based upon its conclusions. For these reasons, we concluded that those rulings that did satisfy Fed.R.Evid. 703 were to be reconsidered in the remanded proceedings according to the Japanese Electronics standard. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 853-54.