Opinion ID: 2183753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: harris' identifications from lineup photographs

Text: The defendants argue that the pretrial identifications made by Harris from photographs of the lineups are direct fruits of the allegedly unconstitutional lineups and that her testimony as to those identifications was therefore not admissible. As the defendants see it, by using the lineup photographs in this way the State can circumvent the exclusionary rule laid down in Gilbert and make the trier of fact aware that an accused was picked out of a lineup. The State responds that these pictures of the lineups, like other photos shown by the police to witnesses, may be utilized without the the presence of counsel for the accused. A per se rule excluding testimony that the accused was identified at an uncounseled lineup may be the only effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will respect the accused's constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the critical lineup. ( Gilbert v. California (1967), 388 U.S. 263, 273, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 1186, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1957.) By contrast, when the testimony concerns only an identification from a picture of the lineup, exclusion is not critical to effectuating the sixth amendment right. Since in-person lineup identifications are more accurate ( Simmons v. United States (1968), 390 U.S. 377, 386 n. 6, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1254 n. 6, 88 S.Ct. 967, 972 n. 6) and therefore more probative than photographic identifications, the police and the prosecution are unlikely to attempt to undercut the right to counsel by routinely foregoing the witness' actual presence in favor of merely showing the witness a picture of a simulated lineup. Although the photographs here were taken at lineups, Harris' testimony was not `come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality' ( Gilbert v. California (1967), 388 U.S. 263, 273, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 1186, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1957, quoting Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 488, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 455, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417). The primary illegality was allowing Buckle to make lineup identifications in the absence of counsel for the defendants. That illegality was irrelevant to Harris' later identification of the defendants from the photographs. From the viewpoint of Harris' identifications, the lineup photographs were no different than any other pictures or arrays of multiple suspects which the police could have constructed. The State can clearly obtain and use pictures of suspects without their lawyers being present, and we see no difference of constitutional magnitude between a single picture of several persons standing together and individual pictures of each. See People v. Lawrence (1971), 4 Cal.3d 273, 481 P.2d 212, 93 Cal. Rptr. 204. Moreover, defendants offer no suggestion as to how their lawyers' presence at the lineups could have aided them at trial with regard to Harris' identifications from the photographs; the attorneys' ability to cross-examine the witness would not have been any greater if they had been present when the lineup pictures were taken. ( Cf. United States v. Ash (1973), 413 U.S. 300, 312-13, 37 L.Ed.2d 619, 628, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 2575.) It should also be noted that defendant Ryder's concern that the trier of fact was indirectly apprised of the suppressed lineup through Harris' testimony is somewhat disingenuous where, as here, the case was tried by the judge who also presided at the suppression hearing. We conclude that the trial judge did not err in permitting Harris to testify to her identifications from the lineup photographs.