Opinion ID: 3002637
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: On appeal, LeBon concedes that the initial traffic stop was lawful because Fratzke had probable cause to believe LeBon had violated a traffic law, and he agrees that the stop up to the point of returning his papers was reasonable. He argues, however, that when Fratzke returned to LeBon’s vehicle, he was not free to leave and was therefore “seized” because Fratzke physically stuck his head inside LeBon’s car and the emergency lights were still activated on the police car. Although he agreed to the search of his trunk, LeBon argues that his consent was coerced because a reasonable person would not have believed that he was free to leave at that point. When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we assess legal questions de novo and factual findings for clear error. United States v. Groves, 530 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 2008). The Fourth Amendment allows consensual, warrantless searches and seizures, but the government bears the burden of showing that the consent was freely and voluntarily given. United States v. Johnson, 495 F.3d 536, 541 (7th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court has held that an individual’s encounter with a police officer is consensual when an officer merely approaches to ask a few questions. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). “Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968); Acevedo v. Canterbury, 457 F.3d 721, 724 (7th Cir. 2006). Whether liberty is restrained is based on the totality of the circumstances: Determining whether a seizure has occurred is a highly fact‐bound inquiry, but the following are relevant factors: whether the encounter took place in a public place or whether police removed the person to another location; whether the police told the person he was not under arrest and was free to leave; whether the police informed the person that he was suspected of a crime or the target of an investigation; whether the person was deprived of No. 08‐2881 Page 4 identification or other documents without which he could not leave (such as a driver’s license or train or airline ticket); and whether there was any limitation of the person’s movement such as physical touching, display of a weapon, or other coercive conduct on the part of the police that indicates cooperation is required. United States v. Tyler, 512 F.3d 405, 409‐10 (7th Cir. 2008). In light of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the second phase of the stop and the trunk search were consensual. First, the encounter took place publicly after the concededly lawful stop concluded, and LeBon was never removed to another location. Also, Fratzke had already returned LeBon’s driver’s license and rental agreement and added, “We’ll get you out of here. Have a safe trip.” This means, as LeBon concedes, that he was free to leave rather than forced to submit to questions. Fratzke’s further questioning following LeBon’s consent took only a few minutes, a reasonable length of time. United States v. Figueroa‐Espana, 511 F.3d 696, 703 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Carpenter, 406 F.3d 915, 916‐17 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 953‐54 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc). Finally, Fratzke never touched LeBon or brandished a weapon to show force during the second encounter. Thus, all factors point against a seizure and toward voluntary consent for the continued detention and the trunk search. See Figueroa‐Espana, 511 F.3d at 702 (validating a motorist’s consent to further questioning after the officer has finished writing a citation and returned a motorist’s papers); United States v. Rivera, 906 F.2d 319, 323 (7th Cir. 1990) (same). LeBon resists this conclusion by contending that Fratzke’s head was inside LeBon’s vehicle when he asked if LeBon would answer more questions, thereby vitiating the consent. But even if this occurred, such minor intrusions are not coercive. See United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1177 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that leaning on car door did not make encounter nonconsensual); United States v. Lopez‐Guzman, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1162 (D. Kan. 2003) (same); see also United States v. McGill, 125 F.3d 642, 644 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding consent freely given even after officer leaned into vehicle). LeBon also contends that the ongoing flashing lights created a coercive atmosphere, but conceded that he was free to go after his papers were returned (and the lights were still on). In any case, the continuing illumination of emergency lights after a traffic stop does not prevent consent. See, e.g., Figueroa‐Espana, 511 F.3d at 702 (holding that whoop of siren does not prevent consent). Finally, LeBon argues that unlike in Figueroa‐Espana and Rivera, Fratzke did not explicitly tell LeBon that he was free to go when Fratzke returned LeBon’s papers. But Fratzke implied the same thing by wishing LeBon a “safe trip.” Regardless, the Fourth Amendment does not require express advice to leave. Childs, 277 F.3d at 954 (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39‐40 (1996)). No. 08‐2881 Page 5 Since the consensual questioning and search of the trunk did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.