Opinion ID: 1941856
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Merger and Sentencing

Text: Poole claims that his conviction for possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, D.C.Code § 22-3204(b), merges with his predicate convictions for armed robbery, burglary while armed, and assault with intent to commit robbery while armed. In ( Michael) Thomas v. United States, 602 A.2d 647 (D.C.1992), this court faced a similar claim that the crime of possessing a firearm while committing a dangerous crime should merge with distribution of a controlled substance while armed and possession with intent to distribute while armed. We held that the D.C. Council did not intend for the offense defined by 3204(b) to merge with an offense subject to the enhanced penalty provision of 3202 for armed offenses. Id. at 650. That holding clearly applies to this case and forecloses further consideration of Poole's merger claim. As for Poole's one-sentence assertion that his sentences are undue and oppressive, given the acts constituting the offenses for which he was convicted, it is well established that this court will not review on appeal sentences which are within statutory limits, upon the ground that such sentences are too severe. In re L.J., 546 A.2d 429, 434 (D.C.1988). Since Poole does not allege that his sentence conflicts with statutory guidelines, we need not consider his claim further.