Opinion ID: 2999976
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sixth Amendment Cross-Examination Claim

Text: On appeal, Ricardo Romero argues that the district court erred by refusing his attempt to cross-examine Almeida on her prior inconsistent statement from the state court proceeding. “The Sixth Amendment right of confrontation requires that a defendant be given an opportunity for effective cross-examination.” United States v. Smith, 454 F.3d 707, 714 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing PennsylNos. 05-3294 & 05-3681 17 vania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986)). “The right to crossexamine is not unlimited; the Confrontation Clause guarantees only effective cross-examination, not crossexamination of any type sought by the defendant.” United States v. Williamson, 202 F.3d 974, 977 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)). “[T]rial courts have wide latitude ‘to impose reasonable limits on . . . cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’s safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.’ ” United States v. McGee, 408 F.3d 966, 975 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679). Our standard of review is determined through our evaluation of whether the alleged error implicates “core values of the [Sixth Amendment] confrontation right” or instead merely implicates “peripheral concerns.” United States v. Degraffenried, 339 F.3d 576, 581 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1358 (7th Cir. 1992)). An alleged error implicates a core value when the defendant was unable to cross-examine a witness at all on an issue protected by the Sixth Amendment while a peripheral concern involves the extent of the defendant’s ability to cross-examine on an issue. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 39 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[O]nce this core function is satisfied by allowing cross-examination to expose a motive to lie, it is of peripheral concern to the Sixth Amendment how much opportunity defense counsel gets to hammer that point home to the jury.”). “When reviewing the adequacy of a crossexamination, the question is whether the jury had sufficient information to make a discriminating appraisal of the witness’s motives and bias.” United States v. McLee, 436 F.3d 751, 762 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nelson, 39 F.3d at 708; United States v. Robinson, 832 F.2d 366, 373 (7th 18 Nos. 05-3294 & 05-3681 Cir. 1987); United States v. DeGudino, 722 F.2d 1351, 1354 (7th Cir. 1983)). We review claimed errors implicating the core value of the Sixth Amendment de novo while we review peripheral concerns for abuse of discretion. Smith, 454 F.3d at 714 (citing Nelson, 39 F.3d at 708). Ricardo Romero’s theory both at trial and on appeal is that Almeida is a “ ‘Yes [Wo]man’ for the prosecution,” a person who is willing to testify in a manner to satisfy the government, even if that requires her to lie. Ricardo Romero Br. at 30. Ricardo Romero attempted to demonstrate Almeida’s alleged bias through extensive crossexamination of her at trial. He brought out the fact that she had a scholarship to the University of WisconsinMadison at the time of her arrest on April 30, 2004, and that she was worried about the potential impact of her arrest on her future college plans when she was interviewed by the police. Cross-examination also brought out that her relationship with Ricardo Romero ended after the arrest. He was able to examine her regarding her concerns about being prosecuted after the arrest but that she was not prosecuted after she agreed to cooperate with the government. Ricardo Romero also cross-examined Almeida about prior inconsistent statements that she had made to the police during the various interviews conducted after the April 30, 2004 arrest. He was able to draw out inconsistencies in her statements to the police about when Almeida saw him in possession of the cookie tin. This allowed Ricardo Romero to imply that Almeida had changed her story in favor of the government once she began cooperating with the government. However, the district court prevented Ricardo Romero from cross-examining Almeida on an alleged inconsistent statement that she made while testifying in a state court proceeding. The state court proceeding involved a battery charge against Ricardo Romero. The police questioned Almeida about both the battery and the cookie tin during her interviews. Ricardo Romero argues that he Nos. 05-3294 & 05-3681 19 should have been allowed to cross-examine Almeida on the inconsistent statement between Almeida’s trial testimony in the battery case and her original statements to the police on the battery issue. The government objected to this line of impeachment and the district court agreed with the government holding that the battery case was too attenuated from the present drug case to be discussed and would also unduly confuse the jury. We conclude that the district court’s exclusion of crossexamination on the Almeida’s prior statement in the state court battery case implicated a peripheral concern and therefore we review the district court’s decision under the abuse of discretion standard. In reviewing the record on this issue, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by preventing cross-examination on Almeida’s inconsistent statements in the state battery case. Ricardo Romero was given ample opportunity to cross-examine Almeida on her potential biases and reasons for potentially not telling the truth while testifying at trial. He was also able to show prior inconsistent statements between her police interviews and her incourt testimony at trial. The district court allowed Ricardo Romero a substantial opportunity to pursue his theory of “Almeida as the ‘Yes Woman’ ” for the prosecution through several areas of impeachment. The district court acted within the scope of her discretion by prohibiting cross-examination on the battery case as that cross-examination was only marginally relevant and would have confused the issues before the jury. United States v. McGee, 408 F.3d 966, 975 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)).