Opinion ID: 1320521
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: evidentiary restrictions

Text: The victim testified that she had had no prior sexual relationships with defendant. Her testimony was that, at her request, defendant had agreed to drive her to an AmWay meeting in Lawrence. She denied knowing an individual by the name of Mark Herd. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to permit evidence of prior sexual activity between himself and the victim. This was sustained. Pursuant to this motion, evidence was admitted as follows: 1. Defendant testified that he had dated the victim on several occasions and had also propositioned her; 2. Defendant testified he and the victim had prior consensual sexual relations in the apartment of a Mr. Henry; 3. Henry testified the two had been in his apartment on the prior occasion; and 4. Another witness testified she had seen defendant and the victim together at a shopping center on a prior occasion. Defendant sought to establish a different purpose for the trip to Lawrence. He testified that he arranged a date for the victim and Mark Herd in Lawrence and he was taking her there for the date. Defendant testified he had on other occasions given the victim money, pills and marijuana. William Dixon testified he was supposed to arrange for the victim and Herd to meet in Lawrence to take care of the victim's business with Herd. Dixon testified he talked to the victim in Lawrence on the night in question and she told him she was there to meet Mark Herd. All testimony referred to in this paragraph was admitted without objection by the State. Two lines of testimony were excluded by the trial court. The first related to proffered testimony of defendant that he had on prior occasions arranged dates between the victim and other men. The claimed purpose of the testimony was for corroboration of his testimony as to the reason for the Lawrence trip. The trial court excluded the testimony on the basis that it was evidence of prior sexual activities contrary to K.S.A. 60-447a. The second line of proffered testimony was that of Clayton Northrup, who would testify that, pretending to be Mark Herd, he contacted the victim and they were to get together in Lawrence relative to a marijuana transaction. Although a specific ruling was not made, apparently this testimony was excluded on the ground of relevancy. There is some question as to whose testimony the Northrup testimony would be impeaching, as it was inconsistent with defendant's own version of the purpose of the Lawrence trip. As far as defendant's proffered testimony as to arranging dates with other men, there is a real question as to whether that came within the purview of K.S.A. 60-447a as to previous sexual conduct. However, in the case before us there was no claim by anyone that the Lawrence trip was not wholly consensual. The alleged crimes occurred after the trip had been concluded and nothing occurred during the trip that was related to the crimes. There are serious questions of relevancy as to what did or did not occur in Lawrence. The trial court granted considerable latitude to defendant in exploring the Lawrence events and the relationship of the parties. Obviously, the purpose of such testimony was to discredit the victim's testimony. In State v. Hall, 220 Kan. 712, 716, 556 P.2d 413 (1976), this court stated: K.S.A. 60-420 provides: `Subject to sections 60-421 and 60-422, for the purpose of impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party including the party calling him may examine him and introduce extrinsic evidence concerning any conduct by him and any other matter relevant upon the issues of credibility.' Contrary to the contention of the defense made during the trial, K.S.A. 60-422 does not authorize any particular type of evidence bearing on credibility, it imposes limitations on its admissibility. In our present case the credibility of Copeland was the focal point and the limitation on inquiry was as to specific facts of the incident. A trial judge must be given judicial discretion in determining the relevancy and extent of extrinsic evidence which is offered to test the credibility of a witness under K.S.A. 60-420. In the absence of court discretion to control the extent of credibility evidence the true issues in a criminal trial might well be obscured by trial of the witnesses. In discussing the limitation imposed by K.S.A. 60-422( d ) this court in State v. Humphrey, 217 Kan. 352, 537 P.2d 155, said: `It has been stated that the reason for the restriction is that where character is only incidentally involved it would not be expedient to let the trial go off on collateral tangents which would result from trying out the factual issues involved in the proof of specific instances of conduct....' (p. 364.) On the issue of credibility of a witness the trial court's determination as to the proper extent and limitation on extrinsic evidence will not be reversed on review except for an abuse of judicial discretion which affirmatively appears to have affected the substantial rights of the party complaining. (K.S.A. 60-2105; State v. Winston, 214 Kan. 525, 520 P.2d 1204.) We find no abuse of discretion. We do not find the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the proffered testimony herein.