Opinion ID: 320437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Pre-Lineup Photographic Identifications

Text: 17 Appellant contends that the pre-lineup photographic identifications of appellant by Myrick, McGriff, and Baylor fatally tainted the in-court identifications by those witnesses. Appellant does not directly challenge the procedures employed by the police when the photographic identifications were procured, but argues that: (A) the identifications must be presumed suggestive since the Government was unable to produce the photographic array at trial; (B) although the Government did not use the photographic identifications as evidence at trial, its failure to preserve the photographs deprived appellant of a fair trial by denying him the opportunity to use the possibly suggestive photographs in cross-examining McGriff, Myrick, and Baylor; and (C) the Government's failure to produce the photographs should have resulted in the imposition of sanctions under this court's decision in United States v. Bryant. 30 We reject these contentions.
18 Appellant's first two contentions are almost directly controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Simmons v. United States. 31 The procedures and circumstances of the photographic identifications in Simmons were virtually identical to those in the case at bar. As in this case, the photographs were displayed to the witnesses prior to the defendant's arrest, so the photographic identification was a phase of the authorities' search for suspects and not simply a device for procuring evidence against existing suspects. The bank robbery in Simmons took place in the afternoon, and the lighting in the bank was good. The same circumstances existed during the robbery committed by appellant and his cohorts. The robbers in Simmons, as in this case, wore no masks. Five bank employees viewed Simmons for periods ranging up to five minutes. In this case, five employees had good opportunities to view appellant during his five to seven minutes in the bank. All five employees were shown photographs of Simmons the day after the robbery 'while their memories were still fresh.' 32 Here, three of the eyewitnesses viewed photographs just eleven days after the robbery occurred. 33 In Simmons, six photographs were displayed to each witness outside the presence of the others. Here, each witness individually inspected at least six photographs. 34 In both Simmons and this case, there was no indication that the authorities who conducted the photographic identifications made any suggestive comments to the identifying witnesses. The only significant difference between Simmons and the case at bar is in the nature of the photographs displayed: in Simmons, group photos in which Simmons appeared several times; in this case, individual photos among which was a single picture of appellant. It is difficult, however, to perceive why this difference should compel any different outcome in the present case. 19 In Simmons, the Court applied the following test to the facts described above: 20 Convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. This standard accords with our resolution of a similar issue in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-302 (, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199) . . .. 35 21 Under this test, the Court held that 'in the factual surroundings of this case the identification procedure used was not such as to deny Simmons due process of law . . ..' 36 The same conclusion is unavoidable on the facts of this case.
22 It is significant that in Simmons, as in this case, the Government was unable to make the photographic array displayed to identifying witnesses available at trial. The Court assessed this circumstance as follows: 23 Although the pictures might have been of some assistance to the defense, and although it doubtless would have been preferable for the Government to have labeled the pictures shown to each witness and kept them available for trial, we hold that in the circumstances the refusal of the District Court to order their production did not amount to an abuse of discretion . . .. The defense surely knew that photographs had played a role in the identification process. Yet there was no attempt to have the pictures produced prior to trial pursuant to Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16. When production of the pictures was sought at trial, the defense did not explain why they were needed, but simply argued that production was required under 3500. Moreover, the strength of the eyewitness identifications of Simmons renders it highly unlikely that nonproduction of the photographs caused him any prejudice. 37 24 This analysis applies with even greater force to the present case, in which defense counsel failed to make a motion for discovery of the photographs at any stage of the prosecution.
25 Finally, we must reject appellant's contention that the trial court erred by not enforcing the rule of United States v. Bryant 38 against the Government for its failure to preserve the photographic array. We emphasize that appellant did not move for production of the photographs in the proceedings below or request that Bryant sanctions be imposed on the Government for its loss of the evidence. We can reverse the judgment on a ground not asserted below only upon a finding of plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights. 39 We cannot make such a finding on the record of this case. Indeed, there is some evidence that the District of Columbia Police Department, heeding Bryant and this court's further admonition in United States v. Hamilton, 40 has made 'earnest efforts' to preserve photographic arrays that have been displayed to potential identifying witnesses. Detective Sergeant Noone testified at the pretrial suppression hearing that he 'usually keep(s) all these photographs in a court-work jacket in the Robbery Squad Office.' 41 Moreover, in United States v. Clemons we took note of 'recent commendable police regulations' 42 that provide for 'rigorous and systematic procedures designed to preserve' 43 photographic identification evidence for trial. 44 We need not decide, however, whether this evidence is sufficient to sustain the Government's burden of proof under Bryant and United States v. Perry, 45 since the appellant failed to activate the Government's burden by moving for discovery or Bryant sanctions. 26 The lost court-work jacket also contained Detective Sergeant Noone's notes recording the eyewitnesses' descriptions of the robbers on the day of the crime. Appellant asserts that these notes might have been helpful to him in cross-examining the identification witnesses at trial. Therefore, he contends, the Government's loss of the notes should have resulted in the imposition of sanctions under Bryant or the Jencks Act. 46 First, it has been held that rough, investigative notes taken by police officers at the scene of a crime are not 'substantially verbatim' statements within the coverage of the Jencks Act. 47 Moreover, we note again that the appellant failed properly to raise any Bryant or Jencks Act issues by moving for discovery or sanctions in the trial court. In the absence of plain error in the record, we decline to tamper with the judgment below. IV. Conclusion 27 For the reasons stated herein, we affirm appellant's conviction for armed robbery. However, we vacate appellant's conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon, which we have held a lesser-included offense of the crime of armed robbery. 48 28 Affirmed as modified.