Opinion ID: 2487581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Holding of Lee v. State

Text: In reversing Williams's conviction and sentence, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied heavily on Lee v. State, 246 Ala. 69, 18 So.2d 706 (1944). In that 1944 case, Virgil Lee was indicted, tried, and convicted of the charge that he  `did carnally know, or abuse in the attempt to carnally know [his daughter] Elese Lee, a girl under the age of twelve years,'  in violation of Title 14, § 398, Ala.Code 1940. 246 Ala. at 71, 18 So.2d at 707. The prosecution introduced testimony evidence indicating that Lee had previously made sexual advances on two of his other daughters, Mary Ruth and Jewel, and that he had placed his hands on their breasts and genitals. Id. In addition, the prosecution presented evidence indicating that Virgil Lee had raped Ruby, another of his daughters, who testified that she had become pregnant by her father. 246 Ala. at 71-72, 18 So.2d at 707-08. Ruby also testified that she had been married and that her father first raped her shortly after she had left her husband and returned home. 246 Ala. at 72, 18 So.2d at 708. This Court noted that Ruby's testimony was not at all clear or satisfactory as to whether she became pregnant at a time which necessarily would exclude the possibility that she conceived the child by her husband, not her father. 246 Ala. at 72, 18 So.2d at 708. With little discussion, the Court held that the trial court properly admitted testimony of Virgil Lee's sexual abuse of Mary Ruth, Jewel, and Ruby. 246 Ala. at 71, 18 So.2d at 707. However, the Court went on to consider whether the trial court properly admitted evidence of the fact of Ruby's pregnancy. 246 Ala. at 71-72, 18 So.2d at 707-08. In analyzing the admissibility of evidence pertaining to Ruby's pregnancy, the Court stated the following general rule:  `In inquiries of fact, dependent on circumstantial evidence for their solution, no certain rule can be laid down, which will define, with unerring accuracy, what collateral facts and circumstances are sufficiently proximate to justify their admission in evidence. Human transactions are too varied to admit of such clear declaration of the rule. Whatever tends to shed light on the main inquiry, and does not withdraw attention from such main inquiry, by obtruding upon the minds of the jury matters which are foreign, or of questionable pertinency, is, as a general rule, admissible evidence. On the other hand, undue multiplication of the issues is to be steadily guarded against, as tending to divert the minds of jurors from the main issue.'  246 Ala. at 72, 18 So.2d at 708 (quoting Mattison v. State, 55 Ala. 224, 232 (1876) (emphasis added)). Cf. Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid. (Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.). After considering the facts of the case in light of the general rule against the admission of evidence that unduly confuses and multiplies the issues before the jury, the Court in Lee held that the evidence pertaining to Ruby's pregnancy was not admissible. Specifically, the Court held: The fact of Ruby's pregnancy, through the agency of her father, does tend to shed light on the main inquiry, but unlike the fact of sexual intercourse with her father, it also tends to unduly multiply the issues and to divert the minds of the jury from the main issue. 246 Ala. at 72,18 So.2d at 708. As this Court noted in Lee, the paternity of Ruby's unborn child was not satisfactorily established by her testimony. Thus, evidence of Ruby's pregnancy introduced a side issuethe question of the child's paternity. See 246 Ala. at 72,18 So.2d at 708 ([Ruby's] testimony is not at all clear or satisfactory as to whether she became pregnant at a time which would necessarily exclude the possibility of her husband's agency.). [3] Any potential relevance of Ruby's pregnancy to the rape of Elese was far outweighed by the potential for the question of the child's paternity to multiply and confuse the issues before the jury. See Lee, 246 Ala. at 72, 18 So.2d at 708 ( `[U]ndue multiplication of the issues is to be steadily guarded against, as tending to divert the minds of jurors from the main issue.'  (quoting Mattison, 55 Ala. at 232)); cf. Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid. Thus, contrary to the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals in this case, Lee did not lay down a blanket rule that evidence showing the defendant impregnated the sister of the victim is inadmissible in Alabama. Williams v. State, 73 So.3d at 736. Rather, this Court in Lee held that, under the facts and circumstances of that case, the potential for prejudice and confusion outweighed any probative value that evidence of Ruby's pregnancy might have had. In fact, this Court's opinion in Lee strongly cautions that no certain rule can be laid down, which will define, with unerring accuracy, what collateral facts and circumstances are sufficiently proximate to justify their admission in evidence. Human transactions are too varied to admit of such clear declaration of the rule. Lee, 246 Ala. at 72,18 So.2d at 708.