Opinion ID: 852378
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Negligence Claim against Connecticut General

Text: The Estate contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in Connecticut General's favor because genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether Gruber was an agent of Connecticut General such that it is liable for Gruber's negligence. [2] The term insurance agent is often used loosely. But because the term invokes agency principles, we must identify the principal for whom the insurance intermediary is an agent. A party who negotiates an insurance contract to cover someone else's risk is acting as an agent for either the insured or the insurer. 3 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 45:1 (3d ed.2007). Depending on whose interests the insurance agent is representing, he or she may be a broker or an agent. A critical distinction exists. A representative of the insured is known as an insurance broker. As a general rule, a broker is the agent of the insured, and not the insurer. Plumlee v. Monroe Guar. Ins. Co., 655 N.E.2d 350, 357 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). As such the insurer is not liable for the broker's tortious conduct. Id. A broker represents the insured by acting as an intermediary between the insured and the insurer, soliciting insurance from the public under no employment from any special company, and, upon securing an order, places it with a company selected by the insured, or if the insured has no preference, with a company selected by the broker. 7 Eric Mills Holmes, Holmes' Appleman on Insurance § 47.5 (2d ed.1998). In contrast, an insurance agent represents an insurer under an employment agreement by the insurance company. Russ & Segalla, supra, at § 45:1. Unlike acts of a broker, acts of an [insurance] agent are imputable to the insurer. Id. Whether an insurance intermediary is an agent of the insured or the insurer is fact sensitive and includes consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, the relation of the parties, their actions, their usual course of dealing, any instructions given to the person by the company, the conduct of the parties generally, and the nature of the transaction. Benante v. United Pac. Life Ins. Co., 659 N.E.2d 545, 547-48 (Ind.1995) (quotation omitted). In this case the parties identify Gruber as a servicing agent. Although the record is not clear on precisely what this means, for our purposes the question is whether Gruber was an insurance agent such that his actions may be imputed to Connecticut General. In support of its motion for summary judgment on this point, Connecticut General submitted excerpts from Gruber's deposition. In relevant part his testimony reveals: Gruber sold individual life insurance policies for at least four companies (Gruber Dep. at 51); Gruber did not arrange for any insurance issued by Connecticut General other than conversion policies arising out of the Indiana University Group Policy (Gruber Dep. at 51); Gruber could not sell any Connecticut General policies (Gruber Dep. at 51-52); although Gruber did not receive commissions in connection with any Connecticut General conversion policies, he did receive commissions for selling the policies of other insurers (Gruber Dep. at 78); Gruber did not have a written agreement with Connecticut General and never had authority to issue policies for Connecticut General (Gruber Dep. at 59, 105); Gruber did not have Connecticut General policy forms, letterhead or business cards (Gruber Dep. at 103); and Connecticut General did not exercise control over Gruber's activities (Gruber Dep. at 103, 105). App. at 291-92. In opposition to Connecticut General's motion for summary judgment, the Estate designated a number of exhibits, none of which supported the contention that Gruber was an insurance agent for Connecticut General. [3] Interestingly, one of the exhibits puts the notion to rest: the excerpted trial testimony of Gail Kenyon, the manager of the life underwriting section of Connecticut General. Kenyon spoke with Mrs. Mintz on more than one occasion and ultimately made the decision to deny her request to allow an exception to convert the policy. Referring to Gruber, Kenyon testified, He was an agentjust not Connecticut General's agent. App. at 696. When asked about Gruber forwarding the conversion application, and whether that was typical Kenyon replied, I really don't know, because there is no agent ever involved ... an agent of any kind, usually... involved in conversions, because we don't pay them. So we don't know who is involved and who isn't. All we know is we really get an application signed by the employee. App. at 711. The following exchange is also instructive: Q. [Counsel] Did he [Gruber] receive any training from Connecticut General? A. [Kenyon] No. Q. [Counsel] Mrs. Kenyon, was Mr. Gruber authorized to enter into an oral insurance contract on behalf of Connecticut General? A. [Kenyon] No. Q. [Counsel] Was he authorized to issue policies on behalf of Connecticut General? A. [Kenyon] No. Q. [Counsel] Was he authorized to make any promises whatsoever to anybody on behalf of Connecticut General? A. [Kenyon] No, he wasn't. Q. [Counsel] Did Mr. Gruber have any input whatsoever with your department as to whether or not to issue a conversion policy? A. [Kenyon] No, he doesn't ... or didn't. App. at 712. It is certainly true, as the Estate insists, that whether an intermediary is an agent of the insured or the insurer is fact sensitive. See Benante, 659 N.E.2d at 547-48. But the undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that Gruber was not the agent of Connecticut General. There was simply nothing before the trial court showing that the relationship between Gruber and Connecticut General, their actions, or their usual course of dealing, made Gruber Connecticut General's insurance agent. See Id. Indeed even the Estate's own submissions show the contrary. Further, simply because Indiana University instructed Mintz to contact Gruber for any questions concerning the conversion and Gruber responded to those questions does not mean Gruber was thus an agent of Connecticut General. See Id. It is apparent that Gruber was acting as an intermediary between Mintz as an insured and Connecticut General as an insurer. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in Connecticut General's favor. We therefore affirm its judgment on this issue.