Opinion ID: 159762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: refusal to grant severance

Text: Petitioner argues she was denied a fair trial when the trial court refused to sever her trial from co-defendant Bryson’s. Petitioner maintains their defenses were mutually antagonistic and inconsistent, she was unable to cross-examine Bryson about his hearsay statements, and Bryson presented improper second stage evidence.
Petitioner argues she and Bryson had mutually antagonistic and inconsistent defenses because Bryson’s defense was that she lured him into committing the crime and her defense was that she was uninvolved. On direct criminal appeal, -11- the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals determined the co-defendants did not present mutually antagonistic defenses, such that each attempted to exculpate himself or herself by inculpating the other. See Plantz, 876 P.2d at 273. The federal district court found that, although the co-defendants attempted to shift blame, neither offered evidence which would have required the jury to disbelieve the defense presented by the other. Accordingly, the court concluded petitioner and Bryson did not offer mutually antagonistic defenses requiring separate trials. Generally, severance is a question of state law not cognizable on habeas. See Fox, 200 F.3d at 1292 (citing Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 619 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1360 (1999)). There is no constitutional right to severance without a strong showing of prejudice caused by the joint trial. See id. Severance is not necessary merely because theories conflict or because one defendant is attempting to cast blame on another. Cf. United States v. Dirden , 38 F.3d 1131, 1141 (10th Cir. 1994) (direct criminal appeal). Rather, a petitioner must show “real prejudice.” See Fox , 200 F.3d at 1293. “Such . . . prejudice is shown if the defenses are truly mutually exclusive, such that ‘the jury could not believe the core of one defense without discounting entirely the core of the other.’” Id. (quoting Dirden , 38 F.3d at 1141). “Mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se .” Zafiro v. United States , 506 U.S. 534, 538 (1993). -12- Here, the defenses of noninvolvement and of lesser culpability due to intoxication and influence were not mutually antagonistic. 2 See Ochoa v. State, 963 P.2d 583, 596 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (casting blame on another defendant is not enough for separate trials), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1023 (1999); Spunaugle v. State, 946 P.2d 246, 251 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997) (deciding defenses are antagonistic only if each defense is complete defense to guilt and involuntary intoxication and influence are not complete defenses to guilt). Thus, petitioner failed to show the joint trial was prejudicial. 3 We conclude the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision was not unreasonable. 2 Petitioner argues Bryson’s voir dire and guilt stage opening statement show antagonistic defenses. During voir dire, Bryson’s attorney’s asked “Doesn’t make you wonder what she’s doing with an 18-year old black kid?” Tr. vol. II at 516. We agree with the district court that this question did not inculpate petitioner. She also complains about remarks Bryson’s attorney made in opening statements regarding petitioner’s relationships with other black men and her attempting to solicit them to kill her husband. Again, we agree with the district court that petitioner failed to show how these remarks were so prejudicial that she was entitled to a separate trial. 3 Even assuming a risk of prejudice, the instructions, which the jury presumably followed, see Richardson v. Marsh , 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987), sufficed to cure any possibility of prejudice. See Zafiro , 506 U.S. at 539, 540-41. The trial court instructed the jury that petitioner and Bryson were innocent unless the State proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury could return different verdicts for the two, and the jury must give separate consideration to each defendant. See Tr. vol. V at 1459-60, 1474. -13-
Petitioner argues that joinder permitted introduction of much incriminating hearsay evidence admissible only against Bryson and that she was denied her right to confront Bryson about his incriminating statements. The Supreme Court held in Bruton v. United States , 391 U.S. 123 (1968), that “a defendant is deprived of [her] rights under the Confrontation Clause when [her] codefendant’s incriminating confession is introduced at their joint trial,” regardless of any limiting instructions given the jury. Cruz v. New York , 481 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1987). Statements that are probative of the existence of a conspiracy and of both defendants’ participation in the conspiracy, however, are properly admitted. Cf. Bourjaily v. United States , 483 U.S. 171, 181-82 (1987). Even if statements implicate the defendant directly, their admission, under the facts of the case, may be harmless error. See Brown v. United States , 411 U.S. 223, 231 (1973) ( Bruton errors are harmless if erroneously admitted testimony was cumulative to other overwhelming uncontroverted evidence properly before jury); United States v. Glass , 128 F.3d 1398, 1403 (10th Cir. 1997) ( Bruton violation is harmless if, considering totality of evidence and context of challenged testimony, properly admitted evidence of defendant’s guilt is overwhelming and prejudicial effect of co-defendant’s statement was insignificant by comparison). -14- First, petitioner objects to the testimony of Detective Gibson, who interviewed Bryson. Detective Gibson testified that Bryson confessed to having a romantic relationship with petitioner, using illegal drugs during the relationship, and being involved in the murder. On direct criminal appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals determined Detective Gibson’s testimony did not deny petitioner her right to confrontation. See Plantz , 876 P.2d at 279-80. The federal district court agreed. Detective Gibson’s testimony did not incriminate petitioner. Even if it had, it was cumulative, and therefore harmless, because both McKimble and Michael Kendrick testified through personal knowledge about petitioner’s and Bryson’s relationship, McKimble testified from his personal knowledge that petitioner purchased alcohol and drugs on numerous occasions, and McKimble testified about petitioner’s involvement in the murder. Thus, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ determination--that petitioner was not denied her constitutional right of confrontation by the admission of Detective Gibson’s testimony--was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Petitioner next complains that first stage witnesses Terry Norman, Derrick Jones, Kendrick, and Ricky John Dunn all testified about incriminating hearsay statements Bryson made about petitioner’s and his involvement in the murder. On direct criminal appeal, the Oklahoma appellate court determined most of the -15- statements related to petitioner’s relationship with Bryson and his planning and commission of the crime. The court, however, found that certain testimony of Norman and of Kendrick was improperly admitted against petitioner in violation of Bruton . See Plantz , 876 P.2d at 280. The court declined to reverse, however, because petitioner did not object to the statements and because any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. (citing Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). The court concluded “[t]he improperly admitted statements were merely cumulative of other overwhelming and largely uncontroverted evidence of [petitioner’s] role in the conspiracy and murder properly before the jury.” Id. The federal district court agreed, and further concluded much of the other complained of testimony fell under the co-conspirator hearsay exception, did not incriminate petitioner, or was harmless in light of the cumulative testimony of McKimble. On appeal, petitioner specifically complains only of testimony by Norman that petitioner told him “we” had committed the murder and testimony by Kendrick that petitioner provided clothes to Bryson after the murder. 4 She maintains this testimony was not in furtherance of the conspiracy. We agree. 4 On appeal, petitioner does not make specific complaints regarding Jones’ and Dunn’s testimony. We have reviewed their testimony and the testimony of Norman and Kendrick in full and conclude none of the testimony violates petitioner’s right to confrontation. -16- Norman’s testimony, however, does not specifically incriminate petitioner. Evidence of guilt, established by McKimble’s testimony, showed the testimony of both Norman and Kendrick was harmless. We conclude the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ determinations were not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.
Petitioner argues that because she was required to present her mitigation evidence first she was not allowed an opportunity to defend herself against the attacks made by Bryson during the presentation of his mitigating evidence. Although asserted on direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not discuss this issue. Thus, we review the district court’s determination de novo . As the district court noted, petitioner did not ask for an opportunity to present additional mitigating evidence after Bryson presented evidence, and at no time has she indicated what evidence she would have offered to rebut Bryson’s second stage evidence. In any event, most of Bryson’s second stage evidence focused on his family background and his mental state and did not implicate petitioner in any way. Also, petitioner complains she had no notice she would have to defend against aggravating evidence presented by Bryson. She, however, cites no authority indicating entitlement to such notice. -17- For alleged attacks by Bryson, petitioner points to the testimony of Bryson’s father indicating that he had advised Bryson to break off his relationship with petitioner. Although asked by Bryson’s attorney whether Bryson came to him regarding the killing, the trial court would not allow Bryson’s father to answer. He was only allowed to testify that Bryson was troubled by a statement petitioner had made to Bryson and that he had advised Bryson to stay away from petitioner. Even if this testimony could be characterized as incriminating, it is harmless because it is less incriminating than the testimony presented during the first stage of trial. Petitioner was aware of the first stage evidence and made no attempt to rebut it at the second stage. Petitioner further complains that Bryson’s mental health expert testified that petitioner represented the “bad mother” to Bryson. After the witness was told to confine his testimony to Bryson, he clarified that he was only referring to Bryson’s perceptions. We agree with the district court that this testimony did not incriminate petitioner.