Opinion ID: 1196196
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Act of Harassment Is Unconstitutionally Overbroad

Text: We agree with the trial court that act of harassment as used in section 18-8-706 encompasses a substantial amount of constitutionally protected communications. Following the standard for overbreadth we outline in section II(B)(1), supra, we hold that section 18-8-706 substantially burdens protected communications and that the phrase cannot be sufficiently limited. Therefore, we strike this prohibition from the statute.
We turn to the definition of act of harassment under the statute. The trial court found that act of harassment was undefined by the statute, and that the phrase encompasses speech and conduct that are constitutionally protected. We agree. We look to the plain meaning of the terms in order to determine whether they encompass protected communications. The term harassment is synonymous with vex, trouble, or annoy. See Webster's, supra, at 1031; see also Black's Law Dictionary 721 (7th ed.1999) (defining harassment as conduct that is directed at a specific person that annoys, alarms, or causes substantial emotional distress and serves no legitimate purpose). This broad meaning of the term applies to a wide range of communications and conduct, many of which are protected by the First Amendment. For example, forecasting a change in weather, engaging in a political discussion, or discouraging a witness from lying on the stand might vex, trouble, or annoy a person protected by section 18-8-706, but such communications are protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 862 P.2d 939, 942 (Colo.1993) (finding that subsection of harassment statute was anything but narrowly drawn and concluding that statute covered protected speech); Bolles v. People, 189 Colo. 394, 398, 541 P.2d 80, 83 (1975) (finding that forecasting the weather or predicting political trends, for instance, could alarm a person, but are still protected speech). Thus, we conclude that act of harassment encompasses protected communications.
Having determined that act of harassment encompasses constitutionally protected communications, we turn to the question of whether this overbreadth is substantial. Because no limiting construction can narrow the statute to permissible applications, we conclude that the phrase act of harassment in section 18-8-706 is substantially overbroad, and we strike it from the statute. Our cases consistently invalidate as substantially overbroad statutes that prohibit speech made with the intent of harassing, annoying, or alarming others. In Smith, for example, we invalidated a subsection of the harassment statute that prohibited all repeated communications containing `offensively coarse language' if made with the intent to annoy, harass, or alarm because of the amount of protected speech covered by the statute. See 862 P.2d at 942. In Bolles, we invalidated a statute that prohibited certain communications made with the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, because a significant amount of the speech covered by the statute was protected speech. See 189 Colo. at 399, 541 P.2d at 84. Similarly, the phrase act of harassment in section 18-8-706 encompasses a substantial amount of protected communications. For example, if a defendant calls a witness a liar or proposes to turn the witness in for perjury as retribution for the witness's testimony, these communications may vex, trouble, or annoy the witness, and would thus be prosecutable under the statute. Alternatively, if a union leader tells a manager that workers will strike if the manager gives false testimony concerning the union's members in a labor dispute, this could certainly trouble or annoy the manager and be prosecuted under the statute. However, these communications are protected speech, even if they were intended to harass a person protected by the statute. [12] These and other forms of protected speech that could be prosecuted under the statute as acts of harassment amount to more than a tiny fraction of the communications prohibited under section 18-8-706. Even though the statute requires that an act of harassment be directed at a person protected by the statute and be made for retributive or retaliatory purposes, the statute's broad scope is not adequately limited by these requirements. A considerable amount of protected speech is encompassed by prohibiting acts of harassment directed towards persons protected by the statute for retributive or retaliatory purposes. As our examples above demonstrate, retaliatory communications designed to harass a person protected by the statute may nonetheless be protected speech. Thus, the requirements that the act of harassment be directed at a person protected by the statute for retributive or retaliatory purposes do not limit the statute to permissible applications. We conclude that the proscription of an act of harassment under section 18-8-706 includes a substantial amount of protected communications and that we cannot supply a limiting construction for the statute. We also conclude that the statute does not sufficiently limit the scope of protected communications to which it applies. Thus, we hold that the phrase act of harassment in the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and strike it from the statute. Although we find that the term act of harassment in section 18-8-706 is unconstitutionally overbroad, we need not invalidate the entire statute if only one part of a statute is objectionable. A court may sever one section of a statute from the whole if partial invalidation will rid the statute of the constitutional infirmity of overbreadth. Ryan, 806 P.2d at 940. The General Assembly has provided by statute that we engage in such partial invalidation when necessary to save a statute from complete invalidation. See § 2-4-204, 1 C.R.S. (1999). [13] Therefore, we hold that section 18-8-706 is invalid only insofar as it prohibits an act of harassment against persons protected by the statute, and we strike this phrase from the statute. This partial invalidation does not alter the basic prohibition against making a threat or committing an act of harm or injury against a person protected by the statute.