Opinion ID: 2552300
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: validity of the miranda waiver

Text: ¶ 15 Bybee alleges he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights before confessing to Deputy Johnson. He primarily bases his claim on the fact that his father was not present during the interview and the fact that he was being treated for severe depression at the time. ¶ 16 We review for correctness a trial court's ultimate ruling regarding the validity of a Miranda waiver, while granting some degree of discretion to the trial court because of the wide variety of factual settings possible. State v. Dutchie, 969 P.2d 422, 427 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted); see also State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 & n. 3 (Utah 1991). Of course, We review for clear error the trial court's findings of fact underlying the waiver. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36, 939 n. 4 (Utah 1994). ¶ 17 In order to determine whether Miranda rights were validly waived, we examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the waiver. See Dutchie, 969 P.2d at 427. In the case of a juvenile, we have stated some of the relevant circumstances as follows: [A] minor has the capacity to make a voluntary confession, even of capital offenses, without the presence or consent of counsel or other responsible adult, and the admissibility of such a confession depends not on his age alone but on a combination of that factor with such other circumstances as his intelligence, education, experience, and ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of his statement. State v. Hunt, 607 P.2d 297, 300 (Utah 1980) (quoting People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202, 215 (1967)); see also Dutchie, 969 P.2d at 427. In addition, we consider whether the police used any coercive tactics in obtaining the waiver, and whether a parent, adult friend, or attorney was present. See Dutchie, 969 P.2d at 427, 429; Hunt, 607 P.2d at 300-01. ¶ 18 The trial court determined that some of the above factors weighed against finding the waiver to be valid and others weighed in favor of such a finding. Specifically, the trial court determined that the following facts weighed against finding the waiver to be valid: Bybee's depressed mental state, his level of education, his degree of experience with police, and the absence of his father from the interview. On the other hand, the trial court determined that the following facts weighed in favor of finding the waiver to be valid: Bybee's age, the consent of CBS personnel to the interview, the relatively short length of the interview, Bybee's continuing with the interview after being read his Miranda rights, the lack of police coercion, Bybee's prior confession to his father, and his apparent desire to cleanse a guilty conscience. The trial court ultimately ruled that Bybee was aware of his rights at the time [of the interview] and did not in any way resist the interview with the officer. ¶ 19 We affirm the trial court's holding that Bybee knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. In doing so, we accept all the trial court's factual findings regarding the relevant circumstances surrounding the waiver. However, as discussed below, we disagree with the legal import the trial court gave to a few of its factual findings (i.e., whether a particular fact weighed for or against a finding of valid waiver). ¶ 20 First, as the trial court noted, Bybee was nearly seventeen and one-half years old at the time of the interviewless than seven months short of reaching his majority. Though not dispositive, a minor's age is an important factor. Indeed, based solely on his age, Bybee would be presumed capable of validly waiving his right to counsel under the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure. See Utah R. Juv. P. 26(e) (A minor 14 years of age and older is presumed capable of intelligently comprehending and waiving the minor's right to counsel. . . .). On many occasions, this court has found older juveniles' waivers of Miranda rights to be valid. See Dutchie, 969 P.2d at 427-28, 430 (fifteen-year-old); State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 863, 866 (Utah 1998) (sixteen-year-old); State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348, 1349-50 (Utah 1986) (seventeen years and nine and one-half months old); State ex rel. T.S.V., 607 P.2d 827, 827-28 (Utah 1980) (seventeen-year-old); Hunt, 607 P.2d at 298 (sixteen years and eleven months old). Accordingly, Bybee's age supports the trial court's conclusion that the waiver was valid. ¶ 21 Second, although the trial court made no specific finding, the record indicates Bybee possessed sufficient intelligence to knowingly waive his rights. For example, Dr. Robert Behrens, Bybee's treating psychologist at CBS, testified at the suppression hearing that he thought Bybee was of average intelligence. This supports the trial court's ruling that the waiver was valid. ¶ 22 Third, Bybee's education level does not indicate his waiver was invalid. The trial court found that Bybee dropped out of school in the tenth grade and made the legal conclusion that this fact weighed against finding a valid waiver. We disagree with that legal conclusion. Dropping out of school in the tenth grade does not suggest the type of substantially deficient education that would be of concern in the assessment of the validity of a waiver. Most seventeen-year-olds would not have significantly more education than did Bybee at the time of the interview. Indeed, other seventeen-year-olds would only be in the eleventh or twelfth grade. Furthermore, we have found valid waivers by juveniles with far less education than Bybee possessed. See, e.g., Dutchie, 969 P.2d at 428-30 (finding valid waiver of Miranda rights by a fifteen-year-old who read at a second-or third-grade level). The trial court's findings regarding Bybee's education support its conclusion that Bybee validly waived his rights. ¶ 23 Fourth, Bybee's prior experience with the police supports finding a valid waiver. The trial court found no indication that [Bybee] . . . had any prior substantial exposure to law enforcement and made the legal conclusion that this fact weighed against finding a valid waiver. We disagree with that legal conclusion. Though perhaps lacking substantial exposure to law enforcement, as the trial court found, the record indicates Bybee had at least some prior experience with police and exhibited a noteworthy degree of sophistication with respect to law enforcement officers. For instance, during the early investigation of the murder, Bybee twice refused to talk to police and once told them to leave him alone unless they had a warrant. Also, at the start of the CBS interview, Bybee refused to allow Deputy Johnson to take notes of, or tape record, the discussion. These incidents demonstrate that Bybee was familiar with police methods and the limitations on those methods and was capable of asserting his will in the presence of law enforcement officers. In sum, we disagree with the trial court's legal conclusion that Bybee's previous experience with police weighs against finding a valid waiver. While Bybee's experience may not have been substantial, it is sufficient to lend support to the trial court's conclusion that Bybee validly waived his rights. ¶ 24 Fifth, we consider Bybee's ability to comprehend the meaning of the Miranda rights and the effect of their waiver. The Miranda rights include the suspect's right to remain silent, to know any statement he makes can be used against him in a court of law (i.e., the effect of waiving the rights), to have an attorney, and to have an attorney appointed if he cannot afford one. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). ¶ 25 The trial court found that Bybee understood his rights. The court appears to have based this conclusion primarily on the fact that there was no evidence of adolescent fright or fantasy on Bybee's part. The court did determine that Bybee showed some signs of despair but found that he did not confess for that reason. [2] ¶ 26 Beyond the trial court's express findings, the record contains facts illustrating Bybee's ability to comprehend his Miranda rights. Most significantly, Bybee himself testified at the suppression hearing that he knew nothing adverse would result if he refused to talk to Deputy Johnson. This is clear evidence that Bybee comprehended his right to remain silent. In addition, Bybee's refusal to let Deputy Johnson take notes of, or tape record, the interview is strong evidence that Bybee was coherent and capable of understanding and asserting his rights. ¶ 27 To be sure, Bybee was not completely mentally healthy at the time of the interview. He had attempted suicide one month before, was being treated for depression, and, according to Dr. Behrens' testimony, was not thinking as clearly as he could have been. [3] However, we emphasize that our inquiry is not whether Bybee was in an optimal mental state, but whether he was able to understand his important, yet relatively simple Miranda rights. Such an understanding did not require that Bybee be completely mentally healthy. For example, in Dutchie we found that a fifteen-year-old with significant mental problems competently waived his Miranda rights. See Dutchie, 969 P.2d at 428 (minor had been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder, a developmental expressive language disorder, an oppositional defiant disorder, and four different psychotic disorders, one of which produced auditory hallucinations). In light of all the facts pertinent to this issue, the trial court did not err in finding that Bybee had the ability to understand the meaning of his Miranda rights and the effect of their waiver. ¶ 28 Sixth, the lack of coercion in the interview supports the trial court's conclusion that the waiver was valid. The trial court found that Deputy Johnson made no threats or promises to induce Bybee's waiver. Deputy Johnson held the interview in an unlocked room that provided a more comfortable setting than Bybee's residence at CBS. In addition, Deputy Johnson interviewed Bybee alone and for only one hour. In short, Bybee has not expressly alleged Deputy Johnson coerced him and we can find nothing in the record that would support such an allegation. Moreover, the trial court found that Bybee wanted to confess in order to relieve himself of the great weight of what he had done, not because of any coercion. [4] The record supports this finding. Deputy Johnson testified that while confessing to the murder, Bybee sobbed and appeared as though a great weight was being lifted from him. That observation is supported by Dr. Behrens' testimony that Bybee was not a conscienceless psychopath unlikely to benefit from confessing, but, rather, possessed empathy and understanding and feeling for other folks. Dr. Behrens also opined that Bybee's crime may have contributed to his depression and that his confession could have contributed to his eventual recovery. In sum, no evidence indicates that Deputy Johnson coerced Bybee's waiver, but substantial evidence exists demonstrating that Bybee confessed to relieve feelings of guilt. This supports the trial court's ruling that Bybee validly waived his Miranda rights. ¶ 29 Finally, we consider the fact that Bybee did not have a parent, adult friend, or attorney present during the interview. The trial court found that Bybee asked for his father early in the interview, prior to confessing, but Deputy Johnson refused the request. It is impossible to know what effect on Bybee, if any, his father would have had if present. Given that it was he who had originally informed CBS that his son had killed a young boy, it is arguable whether Bybee's father would have altered the interview's course. Bybee's father did not appear to object to the interview or its results when he spoke with Deputy Johnson immediately thereafter. In fact, Bybee's father was helpful in arranging for Bybee's temporary release from CBS in order to locate the child's burial site and even accompanied the search party from Las Vegas to Page, Arizona. Regardless of such speculation, the fact remains that Bybee's father was not present. That fact does not render Bybee's waiver invalid, however. As we stated in Dutchie, while the presence of a parent or an attorney is a factor that should be considered by the court, it is not determinative, and the lack thereof does not make the waiver invalid per se. Dutchie, 969 P.2d at 429; see also Hunt, 607 P.2d at 300 (We are not persuaded . . . that a child is necessarily incompetent to waive his rights because of his infancy; nor do we agree that such a choice should lie with a child's parent, adult friend or attorney. (footnote omitted)); cf. Utah R. Juv. P. 26(e) (A minor 14 years of age and older is presumed capable of intelligently comprehending and waiving the minor's right to counsel . . . and may do so where the court finds such waiver to be knowing and voluntary, whether the minor's parent, guardian or custodian is present.). ¶ 30 We conclude that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not err in holding that Bybee knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. At the time of his confession he was almost seventeen and one-half years old, of average intelligence, possessed of a ninth grade education, sufficiently experienced with the police, capable of understanding his Miranda rights, and he was not coerced into waiving those rights. We therefore affirm the trial court's ruling.