Opinion ID: 76461
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Enhancement for Delay in Payment

Text: 60 The district court also erred in applying a multiplier of 1.15 to the attorney's fees awarded based on the delay in the Aisenbergs' receiving reimbursement for their attorney's fees. Specifically, the district court concluded that [t]he circumstances of the present action, which has persisted for over five years, justify the application of a multiplier of 1.15 to the lodestar of $2,330,958.45 to compensate the Aisenbergs for the delay in reimbursement. Aisenberg, 247 F.Supp.2d at 1321. This 1.15 multiplier added $349,643.77 to the fee award of $2,330,958.45, for a total of $2,680,602.22 in attorney's fees. 61 It is well established that interest cannot be recovered in a suit against the Government in the absence of an express waiver of sovereign immunity from an award of interest. Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 311, 106 S.Ct. 2957, 2960, 92 L.Ed.2d 250 (1986); Newton v. Capital Assur. Co., 245 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir.2001) (stating that `[i]n the absence of express congressional consent to the award of interest separate from a general waiver of immunity to suit, the United States is immune from an interest award') (alteration in original) (quoting Shaw, 478 U.S. at 314, 106 S.Ct. at 2961). Moreover, the Supreme Court has admonished that compensation for delay and interest share an identical function, that they both are designed to compensate for the belated receipt of money, and that the no-interest rule cannot be avoided simply by devising a new name for an old institution. Shaw, 478 U.S. at 321-22, 106 S.Ct. at 2965. Thus, an award of compensation for delay is equivalent to an award of interest. Id. at 321, 106 S.Ct. at 2965. 27 Accordingly, we must view the district court's compensation for delay as effectively an award of interest. 62 Further, the Supreme Court has declined to find the requisite waiver of immunity from interest in the statutory requirement of awarding `reasonable' attorney's fees, and has consistently ... refused to impute an intent to waive immunity from interest into the ambiguous use of a particular word or phrase in a statute. Shaw, 478 U.S. at 320, 106 S.Ct. at 2964. The Supreme Court has instructed that [a] statute allowing costs, and within that category, attorney's fees, does not provide the clear affirmative intent of Congress to waive the sovereign's immunity to interest payments. Id. at 321, 106 S.Ct. at 2965. 63 Nothing in the Hyde Amendment, nor the incorporated § 2412(d) of the EAJA, provides the required unequivocal waiver of immunity of the United States for the payment of interest or compensation for delay. 28 Instead, the Hyde Amendment provides for only reasonable attorney's fee[s] and other litigation expenses. Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, historical and statutory notes). Therefore, we conclude that the district court also erred in enhancing the attorney's fee award by fifteen percent, or $349,643.77, for the delay in payment of these fees.