Opinion ID: 466532
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Hicks Matter

Text: 13 As stated, Shaw was first convicted by the jury of armed robbery in violation of Okla.Stat. tit. 21, Sec. 801. The penalty for that crime was imprisonment for no less than five years nor more than life. Shaw was also charged by the State of Oklahoma with four prior felony convictions. In this connection, the jury was instructed 3 that if the jury found that Shaw had previously suffered one felony conviction, the sentence must be no less than twenty years and no more than life, but that if the jury found that the State had failed to prove any prior felony conviction, then the sentence should be not less than five years nor more than life. No objection was made to this instruction. Defense counsel, in closing argument to the jury in the sentencing trial, argued that twenty years, under the circumstances, was too long, but necessarily argued, and vigorously so, that the jury should fix Shaw's punishment at twenty years, and no more. Conversely, the prosecutor urged the jury to fix Shaw's punishment at life imprisonment. By its verdict, the jury rejected the argument of Shaw's counsel for a twenty-year sentence and followed the urging of the prosecutor, fixing Shaw's punishment at life imprisonment. 14 It later developed that the trial court, as well as all of counsel, were laboring under a misapprehension as to the minimum sentence which could be imposed if the jury found that Shaw had suffered one prior felony conviction. Instead of being a twenty-year minimum, as the jury was instructed, the actual minimum then permitted by statute was ten years. Okla.Stat. tit. 21, Sec. 51(A) (1981) (amended in a manner immaterial to this case by 1985 Okla.Sess.Laws ch. 112, Sec. 3). On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that misstatement, and, acting under its discretionary power to reduce the sentence imposed in trial court, reduced the life sentence to forty-five years. Shaw v. Oklahoma, No. F-79-550, slip op. at 5 (Okla.Crim.App. July 21, 1981). 4 Shaw, in this federal habeas proceeding, asserts that this error in the sentencing jury instruction is constitutional error. He argues that under the circumstances, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals should have remanded the case to the trial court for a new resentencing trial where the jury would be properly instructed as to the correct minimum sentence which could be imposed, i.e., ten years and not twenty. In thus arguing, Shaw relies on Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 65 L.Ed.2d 175 (1980). We do not believe that Hicks mandates a reversal in the present case. 15 In Hicks, the jury was instructed that if they found the defendant guilty of unlawfully distributing heroin, he must be sentenced to forty years imprisonment (no more, no less) since he had been convicted of felony offenses twice within the preceding ten years. The jury found Hicks guilty and, in accord with the instruction, fixed his punishment at forty years. 16 Subsequent to Hicks' conviction, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, in another case, declared one provision of the habitual offender statute, under which Hicks' mandatory forty-year prison term had been imposed, unconstitutional. Thigpen v. State, 571 P.2d 467 (Okla.Crim.App.1977). However, when Hicks appealed his conviction, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his sentence, reasoning that Hicks was not prejudiced since his sentence was within the range of punishment that could have been imposed had the jury been instructed under the valid remaining provision of the habitual offender statute. 17 On certiorari, the Supreme Court in Hicks reversed, holding that the possibility ... is thus substantial that the jury would have fixed Hicks' sentence at less than forty years if they had not been instructed that the only sentence which could be imposed was the mandatory forty years. 447 U.S. at 346, 100 S.Ct. at 2229. 18 In our view, Hicks is different from the instant case. In Hicks, the jury was instructed that the only sentence they could impose was forty years. If they had not been so instructed, they might well have come in with a lesser sentence. In our case, it is unlikely that the sentencing error had any effect on Shaw's sentence. The jury was instructed that the range of punishment which could be imposed was from twenty years to life. The jury rejected the argument of defense counsel that they give Shaw a twenty-year sentence and, instead, imposed the maximum sentence allowable, i.e., life. It is pure speculation that the jury would have imposed something less than life imprisonment had it been properly instructed that the minimum possible sentence was ten years, and not twenty. The possibility that Shaw would have received a lesser sentence is certainly not, in our view, substantial. The jury flatly rejected the suggestion of Shaw's counsel that a twenty-year sentence be imposed. In such circumstance, it is difficult for us to perceive how a plea by counsel for a ten-year sentence would have been accepted by that jury or would have otherwise affected its ultimate verdict. See Hill v. Estelle, 653 F.2d 202, 205 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1036, 102 S.Ct. 577, 70 L.Ed.2d 481 (1981) (error in minimum possible sentence did not implicate Hicks when actual sentence given was large enough to show that error did not prejudice defendant). 5 19 As a variation of the Hicks argument, counsel argues that the Oklahoma Court of Appeals had no authority to reduce Shaw's sentence from life to forty-five years, and that such interfered with Shaw's statutory right to have a jury fix his sentence. It is true that under Oklahoma law a jury, in the first instance, fixes the sentence of one convicted of a felony. Okla.Stat. tit. 22, Sec. 926 (1981). At the same time, Oklahoma statutes also provide that an appellate court may, on appeal, modify a sentence which, in the first instance, has been fixed by a jury. Okla.Stat. tit. 22, Sec. 1066 (1981). 6 Applied to the instant case, a jury did fix Shaw's sentence, at the maximum allowed by statute, and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, acting under its discretionary statutory authority, reduced the sentence fixed by the jury. Such is permissible under Oklahoma law and does not, in our view, offend the federal constitution in any manner. 7