Opinion ID: 203873
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The imprimatur problem

Text: The problem with overview testimony is obvious if the evidence promised by the overview witness never materializes; we repeat our condemnation of the use of overview witnesses in such circumstances. However, even if all of the overview testimony is corroborated during the course of the trial, there is still the problem with such testimony that was identified in Casas: [o]verview testimony by government agents is especially problematic because juries may place greater weight on evidence perceived to have the imprimatur of the government. 356 F.3d at 120; see also United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 214 (2d Cir.2005) (noting that even if the testimony of an overview witness does prove to be a summary of later-admitted evidence, it is generally viewed as `improper ... for a party to open its case with an overview witness who summarizes evidence that has not yet been presented to the jury' and that [t]he law already provides an adequate vehicle for the government to `help' the jury gain an overview of anticipated evidence as well as a preview of its theory of each defendant's culpability: the opening statement) (quoting 6 Jack B. Weinstein, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 1006.04[3]); Avilés-Colón, 536 F.3d at 21 n. 13 (expressing concern about the use of a government agent to endorse the testimony of other witnesses, who testify from personal knowledge about the involvement of the defendant in the conspiracy, and thereby add the imprimatur of the government to those witnesses' testimony). The overview testimony of a law enforcement official is not simply a repetition (at best) of other evidence. It is also, in effect, an endorsement of the veracity of the testimony that will follow. Garcia, 413 F.3d at 213 (noting that an overview witness did more than simply summarize the trial testimony; in addition, he told the jury that ... an experienced DEA agent[ ] had determined, based on the total investigation of the charged crimes, that [the defendant] was a culpable member of the conspiracy). We prohibit this endorsement when it takes the form of a prosecutor affirming a personal belief in the veracity of a government witness. That practice is called vouching, and it is prohibited because of its potential to shore up a witness's credibility by putting the prestige of the United States behind him and thereby inviting the jury to find guilt on some basis other than the evidence presented at trial. United States v. Vazquez-Botet, 532 F.3d 37, 53 (1st Cir.2008); see also United States v. Perez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2003) (A prosecutor improperly vouches for a witness when she places the prestige of her office behind the government's case by, say, imparting her personal belief in a witness's veracity or implying that the jury should credit the prosecution's evidence simply because the government can be trusted.). In our view, there is no meaningful difference between the endorsement of credibility offered by the government's overview witness and the endorsement offered by the vouching prosecutor. Indeed, Casas itself raised the comparison between overview testimony and vouching by citing to Perez-Ruiz after observing that overview testimony by government agents is especially problematic because of the effect on juries of evidence perceived to have the imprimatur of the government. Casas, 356 F.3d at 120. The problematic nature of overview testimony (even when the testimony accurately anticipates the testimony of subsequent witnesses) is further confirmed by the cautious approach that courts have taken to so-called summary witnesses, who testify at the end of the government's case instead of the beginning. The testimony of a summary witness must, by definition, be completely consistent with the other evidence introduced at trial. United States v. Stierhoff, 549 F.3d 19, 28 (1st Cir.2008). Still, courts have allowed such witnesses only in limited circumstances. For example, in United States v. Fullwood, 342 F.3d 409, 413 (5th Cir.2003), the Fifth Circuit endorsed the limited use of summary witnesses in complex cases, but also recognized the inherent dangers of such testimony where an agent had been allowed, without justification, to simply recap substantial portions of the Government's case-in-chief. Collecting cases, the court identified several of these potential dangers, including the fact that the practice unfairly allowed a prosecution witness merely to repeat the testimony of another, and the possibility that the credibility of the summary witness may be substituted for the credibility of the evidence summarized. Id. at 413-14. Other courts have admitted summary testimony only in the most complicated of cases, and only where the potential prejudice is minimized through the use of procedural safeguards such as limiting instructions and extensive cross-examination. See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 370 F.3d 1039, 1046-47 (10th Cir. 2004) [4] (twenty-three day drug conspiracy trial with over fifty witnesses); United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1161 (4th Cir.1995). The reluctance of courts to allow the government an additional opportunity to present its case in a tidy package at the end of its presentation of evidence, even when the summary evidence is, by definition, completely consistent with the rest of the trial record, confirms that the imprimatur problem with such repetitive testimony is inescapable whether that testimony comes at the beginning or end of the government's case. There is no justification for presenting an overview witness who simply anticipates the testimony of other government witnesses, even if he does so accurately. However, as we shall explain, there may still be value and legitimacy in government overview testimony that serves a different purpose.