Opinion ID: 752090
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: False Identification

Text: 45 On the issue of obstruction of justice through the use of a false identification, the district court concluded that Charles deliberately misled a judicial officer by giving false identification to the magistrate/judge and thereby concealed his prior criminal record. Charles claims that requiring him to reveal his true identity to the magistrate would have violated his Fifth Amendment rights. 46 Other courts have concluded that the use of a false identification during proceedings before a magistrate judge constitutes obstruction of justice. The First, Second, and Eighth Circuits have held that the defendant's use of a false identity in the hope of being released on bail is an obstruction of justice ... because the grant or denial of bail is part of the process. United States v. Thomas, 86 F.3d 263, 264 (1st Cir.1996); see United States v. Mafanya, 24 F.3d 412, 414 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Yerks, 918 F.2d 1371, 1375 (8th Cir.1990). Charles does not dispute that he used the name Charles Owen throughout the entire pre-trial release hearing. Charles further admits that he intentionally misled the magistrate judge in order to hide his true criminal record and thus secure pre-trial release. 47 Charles contends, however, that if he had revealed his true identity, the magistrate judge would not have granted pre-trial release. He concludes that, under these circumstances, his use of a false identification is protected by the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Charles overlooks well-settled constitutional law stating that the Fifth Amendment grants a privilege to remain silent without risking contempt, but it 'does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.'  United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 178, 97 S.Ct. 1823, 1825-26, 52 L.Ed.2d 231 (1977) (quoting Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142, 32 S.Ct. 71, 73, 56 L.Ed. 128 (1911)). Charles could have remained silent. Once he chose to speak and affirmatively deceive the court, however, the Fifth Amendment no longer shielded him from a charge of obstruction of justice. 48 We concur with the district judge's conclusion that Charles used a false identification in order to deceive the magistrate judge and receive pre-trial release, and that this behavior constitutes obstruction of justice as defined by the sentencing guidelines. Thus the district court's two-level sentence enhancement would have been justified on either one of the two obstruction of justice grounds.