Opinion ID: 654620
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Examination of Section 844(h)(1).

Text: 13 Our reading of section 844(h)(1) leads us to conclude that the intent of Congress is clearly expressed in the language of the statute. Section 844(h)(1) states in simple, clear terms that [w]hoever ... uses fire or an explosive to commit any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States ... shall ... be sentenced to imprisonment for five years.... 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(h)(1) (emphasis added). The language of the statute does not limit itself to the prosecution of arson cases, as the defendants urge us to conclude. Had Congress wanted to so limit the statute, it could have easily inserted the word arson into the statute. SeeSmith v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2054, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993). For example, Congress could have drafted the statute to read: Whoever uses fire or an explosive to commit any arson which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States shall be sentenced to imprisonment for five years. Congress chose not to do so. Instead, Congress chose to punish those who use fire to commit any felony. That dictate applies to the facts of this case. The defendants used fire to burn two crosses in order to commit the felony of violating the civil rights of the inhabitants of the house. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 241. Accordingly, we find the language of section 844(h)(1) to be clear and unambiguous and the statute applicable to the facts of this case. Cf.United States v. Worthy, 915 F.2d 1514, 1516-17 (11th Cir.1990) (holding that pre-1990 Sentencing Guidelines section 2K1.4(b)(4)--use of fire or explosives to commit a federal felony--is not restricted to arson crimes and applies to cross burnings designed to interfere with another's civil rights); accordUnited States v. Gresser, 935 F.2d 96, 102-03 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 239, 116 L.Ed.2d 195 (1991). 14 The defendants insist, however, that the application of section 844(h)(1) to this case causes an absurd result. 5 For that characterization to apply, the application here would have to be so outlandish that Congress could not have intended it. This statute does not reach that difficult standard. Put another way, [a] straightforward reading of [section 844(h)(1) ] does not produce a result so absurd or glaringly unjust as to raise a reasonable doubt about Congress's intent. Chapman v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1926-27, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The language Congress used in section 844(h)(1) shows that Congress intended to punish those who use fire to commit any felony. That is exactly what the defendants did in this case. Hence, the application of the statute here does not cause an absurd result. 6 15 To underscore their point that to avoid an absurd result section 844(h)(1) must apply only to arson cases, the defendants provide us with the example of a person who commits the theft of an interstate shipment. They posit that if the thief uses a Bic lighter as a light source to help him insert the key into the lock of the truck he wants to steal, section 844(h)(1) could be applied, thus causing an absurd result. But there is a significant difference between using fire simply to commit a felony and using fire to facilitate or assist in the commission of a felony. Fire from the Bic lighter facilitates or assists in the commission of the crime of interstate theft. That is not the same as using fire to commit a felony, in this case conspiracy against rights through threat or intimidation. Using the lighter to illuminate a keyhole is no different from illuminating the keyhole with a flashlight. Illuminating a wooden cross, however, with a flashlight or a floodlight is completely different from illuminating the cross by setting it on fire. The fire is an integral part of the threat or intimidation. One cannot reasonably argue that merely erecting a wooden cross, whether illuminated by a floodlight or not, on someone's driveway has the same effect as setting the cross on fire. The intimidation or threat does not stem from the fact that a wooden cross--by itself--is placed outside one's home. The intimidation stems from the flames emanating from the cross. By burning two crosses, the defendants used fire to commit the felony of conspiracy to violate the civil rights of those in the Jones household. The fire did not simply facilitate or assist them in the commission of their crime. 7 16 Moreover, an examination of the language and design of section 844 supports our conclusion that section 844(h)(1) is not restricted solely to arson cases. SeeK Mart Corp., 486 U.S. at 291, 108 S.Ct. at 1817. Section 844 is a penalties statute fashioned to punish the illegal use of fire or explosives. In drafting the statute, Congress placed section 844(i), the federal arson statute, immediately after section 844(h). Section 844(i) provides in part: 17 Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for not more than ten years or fined not more than $10,000, or both.... 18 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(i). If Congress had intended section 844(h)(1) to apply only to arson cases, as the defendants maintain, then no need would exist for section 844(i) and vice versa. Surely Congress did not intend to duplicate section 844(h)(1) with section 844(i). Instead, section 844(h)(1) applies to anyone who uses fire to commit any felony and is not limited just to arson cases. SeeFreytag v. C.I.R., --- U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (noting that courts should have  'a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment' ); see alsoUnited States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir.1987) (stating that in construing a legislative enactment, we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988). CompareUnited States v. Fiore, 821 F.2d 127, 130-32 (2d Cir.1987) (holding that sections 844(h)(1) and 844(i) are not multiplicitous) withUnited States v. Chaney, 559 F.2d 1094, 1096 (7th Cir.1977) (holding that the pre-1982 amended version of section 844(h)(1) and section 844(i) cannot be charged in the same indictment when identical evidence is used to prove both); see alsoUnited States v. Karlic, 997 F.2d 564, 571 (9th Cir.1993) (discussing Fiore and Chaney). As such, we conclude that the language and design of section 844 as a whole is consistent with the charge and conviction under the facts of this case. 19