Opinion ID: 868116
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Statute’s Constitutionality

Text: Ballot access laws “place burdens on . . . the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.” Lee v. Keith, 463 F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968)). While these rights “rank among our most precious freedoms,” id., they are not absolute, Libertarian Party v. Rednour, 108 F.3d 768, 773 (7th Cir. 1997). To assess the constitutionality of ballot access laws, we engage in a two-step inquiry. 8 No. 12-3572 First, we determine whether the law imposes severe or reasonable and nondiscriminatory restrictions on candidates’ and voters’ constitutional rights so that we can ensure application of the appropriate level of scrutiny. See id. Second, we must determine whether the state interest offered in support of the law is sufficiently weighty under the appropriate level of scrutiny. See id. For severe restrictions on voters’ rights, the challenged statute must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). For statutes that impose only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions,” the state’s “important regulatory interests are generally sufficient.” Id. At the first stage, the district court determined that 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/7-61 imposes a reasonable and nondiscriminatory burden on candidates’ and voters’ rights. The plaintiffs do not dispute this determination. Ballot access laws that require “the would-be candidate [to] demonstrate significant support for his candidacy by submitting thousands (or depending on the size of the electorate, tens or even hundreds of thousands) of petitions” place a reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction on candidates’ and voters’ rights. Protect Marriage Ill. v. Orr, 463 F.3d 604, 607-08 (7th Cir. 2006). The statute at issue here requires nothing more of members of parties that do not hold primaries (here, the Republicans) than it does of members of parties that do (here, their Democratic counterparts); candidates from both types of parties typically must obtain the same number of signatures in most circumstances. OrdiNo. 12-3572 9 narily, the only differences between the two groups are that the former group of candidates must collect signatures and submit nominating petitions before the general election, not the primary, and that this group has 15 fewer days to do so. (Although it is true that, where the primary winner withdraws or dies before the general election, the party-appointed replacement candidate does not have to collect signatures, the fact remains that this individual takes the place of someone who had to do so.) Thus, we agree with the district court’s analysis on this point. A reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction on ballot access will pass muster if it serves an important regulatory interest. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. The Supreme Court has recognized that a state’s desire that elections be “run fairly and effectively” is among these important interests. Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193 (1986); see also Am. Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 (1974) (“[T]he State’s admittedly vital interests are sufficiently implicated to insist that political parties appearing on the general ballot demonstrate a significant, measureable quantum of community support.” (footnote omitted)). In the instant case, the plaintiffs concede that the prevention of voter confusion is an important regulatory interest, but they dispute that the challenged statute actually serves this interest. There is ample caselaw supporting the proposition that ballot access laws serve the important, interrelated goals of preventing voter confusion, blocking frivolous 10 No. 12-3572 candidates from the ballot, and otherwise protecting the integrity of elections. See, e.g., Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (accepting that a prohibition on write-in voting is connected to this objective); Munro, 479 U.S. 193-94 (finding that a requirement that parties receive greater than 1% of the vote in the previous election to appear on the ballot in the next election is connected to this objective); Am. Party of Texas, 415 U.S. at 782 n.14 (same); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972) (accepting that filing fees for ballot access are connected to this objective, although holding these fees to be unconstitutional on other grounds); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) (stating that a requirement that parties seeking placement on the ballot have received greater than 5% of the vote in the previous election is connected to this objective). Some of this caselaw deals directly with the connection between signature requirements for ballot access, as in this case, and the state’s important interest in the integrity of its elections. See, e.g., Lee, 463 F.3d at 769 (finding that a petition-submission requirement for ballot access is connected to this objective, but holding the law to be unconstitutional on other grounds); Protect Marriage, 463 F.3d at 607-08 (finding that a petition-submission requirement is connected to this objective); Libertarian Party, 108 F.3d at 775 (same). The rationale behind this connection is not complicated. Light regulation of ballot access could lead to an unmanageable number of frivolous candi- dates qualifying for the ballot, thereby confusing voters. See Nader v. Keith, 385 F.3d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing how Florida’s need to design a ballot that could No. 12-3572 11 accommodate ten presidential candidates led to voter confusion during the 2000 presidential election); Elizabeth Garrett, Democracy in the Wake of the California Recall, 153 Penn. L. Rev. 239, 254-55 (2004) (attributing the listing of 135 candidates on the ballot in California’s 2003 gubernatorial recall election to a “badly drafted statutory scheme,” in which candidates could qualify for the ballot simply by producing 65 signatures and paying $3,500). The plaintiffs point to the fact that, since only the Democratic candidate met the statutory scheme’s criteria for ballot placement in some 2012 state legislative races, ballots in the relevant districts listed only the Democratic candidate’s name for these offices. The plaintiffs claim that the inclusion of only one candidate on the ballot in some races belies the proffered rationale that the challenged statute prevents voter confusion. How, the plaintiffs ask, can voters be confused if only one name is printed on the ballots? The plaintiffs’ question overlooks the possibility that relaxing or abolishing these signature requirements could attract a significant number of frivolous candidates, leading to phone book-sized ballots and widespread voter confusion.1 Since the existing requirements that 1 Modern readers may wonder what a phone book is (or was). In short, it is a compilation of information about telephone subscribers including their names, addresses, and telephone numbers. See “Telephone directory,” Wikipedia, (continued...) 12 No. 12-3572 candidates for State Representative collect 500 signatures and candidates for State Senator collect 1,000 do not strike us as particularly onerous, 2 it seems plausible that lowering this bar even further could open the floodgates to an unmanageable number of frivolous candidates gaining ballot access. The state need not wait for such a situation to occur in order to act. See Munro, 479 U.S. at 194-95 (“[The Supreme Court has] never required a State to make a particularized showing of the existence of voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidates prior to the imposition of reasonable restrictions on ballot access.”). If courts were to require that government defendants marshal evidence to prove actual voter confusion, such a requirement would “necessitate that a State’s 1 (...continued) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telephone_directory (last visited May 14, 2013). In a large urban area like Chicago, such a directory could consist of millions of subscribers. 2 Although the record does not include information concerning the pool of qualified voters in each district from which candidates must obtain signatures, we take notice of the facts that 2,781,182 Cook County residents were eligible to vote in the 2012 general election, and that 57 Illinois House districts and 32 Illinois Senate districts include at least a portion of Cook County. Illinois State Board of Elections, Official Vote: November 6, 2012 General Election i, 38-113 (2012). These facts provide a rough sense of the pools of qualified voters from which candidates for these two bodies must obtain 500 or 1,000 signatures, respectively. No. 12-3572 13 political system sustain some level of damage before the legislature could take corrective action.” Id. at 195. Instead, the speculative concern that altering the challenged signature requirement would lead to a large number of frivolous candidates qualifying for the ballot and, consequently, voter confusion is sufficient. To prevent such harms from occurring in the first place, the state may enact reasonable and nondiscriminatory ballot access laws that serve the important regulatory interests of preventing voter confusion and protecting the integrity of elections. We hold that 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/7-61 is such a law.