Opinion ID: 4936
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Existence of Factual Questions

Text: Repsa is correct that we have authority to decide only legal issues when we review an appeal from a collateral order. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527–28, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2816–17, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (court hearing appeal from collateral order denying qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reviews only legal issues). This rule carries even more weight here because the district court resolved FSIA immunity, an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, Stena, 923 F.2d at 386, on the basis of the complaint. Cf. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897, 102 S.Ct. 396, 70 L.Ed.2d 212 (1981) (appellate court reviews only application of law where district court dismisses for lack o f subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of the complaint alone). Whether Pemex is immune depends on the applicability of the commercial activity exception of the FSIA: (a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case— (2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). Not only would Pemex have to satisfy one of these jurisdictional connections with the United States to lose its immunity, there also would have to be a connection between its commercial activity and the cause of action asserted by Repsa. Stena, 923 F.2d at 386–87; Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion v. Compagnie Nationale Algerieene de Navigation, 730 F.2d 195, 200 (5th Cir.1984) (per curiam). As is apparent from a reading of § 1605(a)(2), application of the commercial activity exception to a particular defendant (a legal question) depends on certain jurisdictional facts: principally, it must be determined what commercial activity the defendant engaged in and where it took place. Repsa's argument fails because there is no real dispute over the facts relevant to the existence of immunity. At no point in the litigation, including on appeal, has Pemex disputed the facts Repsa has alleged in its (Repsa's) effort to establish that Pemex falls within the co mmercial activity exception. Pemex has never filed an answer to Repsa's third-party complaint and it never disputed the contents of any of Repsa's submissions to the district court, including the Moats and Contreras affidavits. Repsa seems to be asserting that the lack of any district court findings concerning the jurisdictional facts it alleged precludes our review. But this logic would prevent us from reviewing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissals for failure to state a cause of action simply because no findings as to the truth of the plaintiff's facts had yet been made. Clearly, if Pemex does not dispute Repsa's allegations, but believes that it is entitled to immunity under the facts as alleged, the issue we must resolve is the purely legal application of the FSIA. There is nothing unusual in a case arriving at an appellate court in this posture; indeed, the parties frequently do not dispute the facts relevant to jurisdiction and the courts often resolve FSIA immunity by reference to the pleadings. E.g., Rush–Presbyterian–St. Luke's, 877 F.2d at 576; Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 859 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir.1988) (per curiam).4