Opinion ID: 2582487
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Commission of Murders to conceal the commission of a crime (RCW 10.95.020(9))

Text: ¶ 47 Yates contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the third alleged aggravating factor  that he committed the murders of Mercer and Ellis to conceal the commission of the crime of patronizing a prostitute. RCW 10.95.020(9); RCW 9A.88.110(1)(c), (3). The State presented the testimony of Jennifer Robinson to establish that Yates was anxious to avoid being identified by the police as a person who hired prostitutes. According to Robinson, Yates picked her up on November 9, 1998, and asked for oral sex. When a police car pulled up behind them, Yates told Robinson to tell the police officer that Yates knew her father and was giving her a ride home. After the officer allowed them to move on, Yates seemed really nervous and really scared; he dropped Robinson off some blocks away and steadfastly declined any interest in the sex act previously requested. 53 VRP at 5007. Additionally, the State presented evidence that Yates had applied for a full-time position with the National Guard and that a prosecution for patronizing prostitutes would have adversely affected his potential for advancing in the military. 58 VRP at 5830-31, 5826-27. ¶ 48 Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, this circumstantial evidence is insufficient to prove that Yates murdered Mercer and Ellis to conceal the misdemeanor crime of patronizing prostitutes. If Yates had killed every prostitute he patronized, one could rationally infer that he intended to eliminate any evidence that he had committed the misdemeanor of patronizing prostitutes, but as the defense showed, Yates patronized other prostitutes without killing them. ¶ 49 In sum, the evidence was sufficient to prove to a rational trier of fact that Yates committed the murders of Mercer and Ellis as part of a common scheme or plan and in furtherance of . . . [r]obbery. RCW 10.95.020(10), (11)(a). ¶ 50 5. Sufficiency of Second Amended Information. Under Washington's capital punishment statutes, the jury must make three factual determinations before the death penalty can be imposed. First, the jury must conclude that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the substantive crime of first degree murder: A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when . . . [w]ith a premeditated intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of such person or of a third person. RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a). [17] Second, likewise in the guilt phase, the jury must conclude that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the aggravating circumstances set forth in RCW 10.95.020: A person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder, a class A felony, if he or she commits first degree murder as defined by RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a) . . . and one or more of the following aggravating circumstances exist. [18] Third, at the close of the special sentencing proceeding, the jury must unanimously answer the following question affirmatively: `Having in mind the crime of which the defendant has been found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency?' RCW 10.95.060(4). [19] ¶ 51 The second amended information charged Yates with two counts of the crime of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE WITH AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES. CP at 1003-04. As to count I, the information specified that Yates with premeditated intent to cause the death of another person, did shoot Melinda L. Mercer, thereby causing the death of Melinda L. Mercer, and it asserted that aggravated circumstances exist, to-wit: the murder was committed in the course of, in furtherance of, or in immediate flight from the crime of robbery in the first or second Degree and/or defendant committed the murder to conceal the commission of a crime; and/or defendant killed more than one victim and the murders were part of a common scheme or plan during the period of May 1996 through October 1998. Id. at 1003. The information cited RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a) and RCW 10.95.020(9), (10), (11). Id. at 1004. Count II substituted the name of the second victim, Connie L. Ellis, but otherwise mirrors count I. Id. ¶ 52 Seeking reversal of his convictions, Yates asserts for the first time on appeal that the State's second amended information violated the well-settled constitutional requirement that all essential elements of the crime must be included in the charging documents. State v. Tandecki, 153 Wash.2d 842, 846, 109 P.3d 398 (2005). An element is essential if its specification is necessary to establish the very illegality of the behavior. State v. Johnson, 119 Wash.2d 143, 147, 829 P.2d 1078 (1992) (citing United States v. Cina, 699 F.2d 853, 859 (7th Cir.1983)). The purpose of the `essential elements rule' is to apprise the accused of the charges against him or her and to allow the defendant to prepare a defense. State v. Vangerpen, 125 Wash.2d 782, 787, 888 P.2d 1177 (1995); see U.S. CONST. amend. 6 (providing that, [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 (stating that [i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him). Specifically, Yates contends that the information failed to state all essential elements of the crime of aggravated first degree murder when it failed to (1) set forth the elements of first or second degree robbery, (2) define the term common scheme or plan, or (3) allege the absence of mitigating factors. ¶ 53 Yates's first two claimed defects concern the adequacy of the information's description of two of the three alleged aggravators. Yates argues that the aggravators themselves are elements of the charged crime and that, consequently, the information should have specified the elements of the underlying aggravating crime of first or second degree robbery and should have defined the term common scheme or plan. [20] In recent decisions, however, this court has clearly held that under the statutory scheme in Washington the aggravating factors for first degree murder are not elements of that crime but are sentence enhancers that increase the statutory maximum sentence from life with the possibility of parole to life without the possibility of parole or the death penalty. State v. Thomas, 150 Wash.2d 821, 848, 83 P.3d 970 (2004); see also Brett, 126 Wash.2d at 154, 892 P.2d 29 (holding that [a]ggravating circumstances . . . are not elements of the crime, but `aggravation of penalty' factors (quoting State v. Kincaid, 103 Wash.2d 304, 307, 692 P.2d 823 (1985))). Yates claims that a different result is required under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). But as the State points out, the adequacy of the charging document was not at issue in either case; rather, those decisions concerned a defendant's right to have a jury determine any facts that could increase the sentence beyond the statutory maximum for the charged crime. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n. 3, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348; Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n. 4, 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428; see 51 VRP at 4726. As explained above, at every step in the Washington death penalty scheme, the jury makes the factual determinations. Moreover, contrary to Yates's suggestion, this court's decision in State v. Goodman, 150 Wash.2d 774, 83 P.3d 410 (2004), does not undermine our holdings in Thomas or Brett. In Goodman, we held that the charging document was defective because it accused the defendant of possessing meth but did not adequately define the word; given that meth could have meant various substances for which possession carried different sentences, the information did not on its face provide the defendant with clear notice of the charged crime. The information filed against Yates, however, plainly charged him with two counts of aggravated first degree murder, for which the sentence is life without parole or, in the absence of sufficient mitigating circumstances, death. RCW 10.95.030. ¶ 54 As to Yates's third claimed defect (the information's failure to allege the absence of mitigating circumstances), we have previously held that the absence of mitigating circumstances is not an essential element of the crime of aggravated first degree murder: The statutory death notice here is not an element of the crime of aggravated murder. Instead, the notice simply informs the accused of the penalty that may be imposed upon conviction of the crime. While we require formal notice to the accused by information of the criminal charges to satisfy the Sixth Amendment and art. I § 22, we do not extend such constitutional notice to the penalty exacted for conviction of the crime. State v. Clark, 129 Wash.2d 805, 811, 920 P.2d 187 (1996) (citation omitted). The purpose of the charging document  to enable the defendant to prepare a defense  is distinct from the statutory notice requirements regarding the State's decision to seek the death penalty. [21] ¶ 55 We reject Yates's claim that the second amended information was constitutionally inadequate. Adhering to our prior holdings in Thomas, Brett, and Clark, we conclude that the information apprised Yates of the charges against him by defining the base crime of first degree murder and setting forth the three alleged aggravators. ¶ 56 6. Jury Instruction on First Degree Murder. The court's instructions included a to convict instruction for each of the two counts of first degree murder. The instructions provided that, [t]o convict the defendant of the crime of murder in the first degree, the State must prove five elements beyond a reasonable doubt: that Yates killed Mercer and Ellis; that he acted with intent to cause the deaths; that the intent was premeditated; that Mercer and Ellis died as a result of Yates's acts; and that the acts occurred in this state. See CP at 4099, 4108, Jury Instructions 13, 22. As to each count, the jury returned a verdict form stating that it found Yates guilty of the crime of first degree murder. See id. at 4163, Verdict Form A Count I (Melinda Mercer); id. at 4167, Verdict Form B Count II (Connie Ellis). Immediately following each of the to convict instructions on first degree murder were instructions on the State's burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any or all of the three alleged aggravating circumstances. See id. at 4100, 4109, Jury Instructions 14, 23. Those instructions made it clear that the jury's determination regarding aggravators was necessary only [i]f you find the defendant guilty of premeditated murder in the first degree. Id. Just as the jury had to return a verdict form regarding each of the to convict instructions, the jury was required to return special verdict forms setting forth its unanimous determinations regarding each of the three aggravating circumstances on the two counts. See id. at 4164-65, 4168-69. For both the to convict instruction on first degree murder and the instruction on the alleged aggravators, the court relied on the Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal (WPIC). See WPIC 26.02, 30.03. ¶ 57 Yates contends that the trial court erred in declining to give his proposed jury instruction explicitly labeling first degree murder a lesser crime included in the charged crime of aggravated first degree murder. CP at 4030. Yates's proposed instruction stated that [t]he crime of premeditated first degree murder with aggravating circumstances necessarily includes the lesser crime of premeditated first degree murder, and the instruction went on to explain that, [w]hen a crime has been proven against a person and there exists a reasonable doubt as to which of two or more crimes that person is guilty, he or she shall be convicted only of the lowest crime. Id. Yates argues that by failing to adopt this instruction the trial court violated the Eighth Amendment under Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). There, the Court invalidated a state statute that left the jury with an either-or option: to convict the defendant of a crime requiring the death penalty or to acquit him. Id. at 635-38, 100 S.Ct. 2382. In the present case, however, the jury was not presented with the constitutionally flawed all-or-nothing option in Beck. Rather, the court's instructions, along with the verdict forms, made it clear that the jury's task with respect to each of the two counts was to determine at the outset whether the State had proved the elements of first degree murder; only if the base crime was proved would the jury deliberate whether the alleged aggravators had been proved. Here, the jury had three options on each count: it could have found Yates not guilty of first degree murder, guilty of first degree murder without any aggravating circumstances, or guilty of first degree murder with one or more aggravating circumstances. We reject Yates's claim that the jury was denied an opportunity to convict him of the lesser crime of first degree murder. The trial court's rejection of Yates's proposed lesser crime instruction was not a violation of the Eighth Amendment. ¶ 58 7. Expert Witnesses. Yates argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the expert testimony of FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) Agent Mark Safarik regarding crime scene analysis, and by permitting Lynn Everson to testify as an expert regarding the subculture and practices of women who work in prostitution. Yates also contends that the trial court erred by withholding funding for his proposed defense expert on prostitution.