Opinion ID: 1868873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: La. R.S. 51:721(A) & (B)

Text: The state contends that the trial court erroneously held La. R.S. 51:721(A) and (B) unconstitutional. The state argues that defendants do not have standing to attack the constitutionality of La. R.S. 51:721(A) and (B) because this statute will not adversely impact their constitutional rights. The state maintains that it has not and never had any intention of invoking the statute. This court has held as a general rule, in criminal proceedings, the accused may challenge the validity of a statute, practice or policy that adversely affects or threatens to adversely affect his rights. State v. McMahon, 391 So.2d 1120 (La.1980); State v. Brown, 389 So.2d 48 (La.1980). Further-more, it is sufficient to show that there is a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the operation or enforcement of the law. See e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1664-65, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979); Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 91 S.Ct. 490, 27 L.Ed.2d 571 (1971); Morgan v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 66 S.Ct. 1050, 90 L.Ed. 1317 (1946). La. R.S. 51:721 provides in pertinent part: A. In any action, civil or criminal, where a defense is based upon any exemption provided for in this Part, the burden of proving the existence of the exemption shall be upon the party raising such defense. B. In any action, civil or criminal, a certificate signed and sealed by the commissioner, stating compliance or non-compliance with this Part, shall constitute prima facie evidence of such compliance or non-compliance with this Part and shall be admissible in any such action. As the trial court noted, La. R.S. 51:721 is an evidentiary statute. Section B concerns the admission into evidence of a certificate from the commissioner and its affect at trial. [9] The evidence reveals that the state admitted such a certificate into evidence in the grand jury proceedings. Such evidence could, and most likely would, be applicable in the prosecution of this matter. Therefore, the statute threatens to adversely affect the defendants' rights. In light of the pertinent jurisprudence, defendants have standing to attack the constitutionality of La. R.S. 51:721. Further, La. R.S. 51:721(A) allows a defendant to prove that his actions constitute an exemption to the securities law. [10] This subsection can be utilized if a defendant is charged under the provisions of La. R.S. 51:703, which deals with the registration of dealers, salesmen, and investment advisers, as well as surety bonds and records. This statute also threatens to adversely affect defendant's rights.
The state also contends that the trial court improperly found that R.S. 51:721(B) violates defendants' right of confrontation. In so holding, the trial court reasoned that by allowing the introduction into evidence of a certificate stating non-compliance, defendants would be denied their right of confronting (i.e., cross-examining) the commissioner about this finding. [11] This reasoning is flawed in several respects. Initially, it should be noted that this subsection can be equally utilized by either party (the state or defendant). Thus arguably, a defendant could offer a certificate from the commissioner as evidence of his compliance with the securities laws which would be prima facie proof of that compliance. Additionally, the statute does not preclude the defense from calling the commissioner as a witness and cross-examining him. Defendants are entitled to subpoena the commissioner and question him about the preparation of the certificate of non-compliance and the information on which it is based. La.C.Cr.P. art. 731 (The court shall issue subpoenas for the compulsory attendance of witnesses at ... trials when requested to do so by ... the defendant ....); see generally, U.S. Const. amend. VI, XIV; La. Const. art. 1 § 16 (right to compulsory process); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972) (per curiam). Furthermore, R.S. 51:721(B) acts as nothing more than a firmly rooted evidentiary exception to hearsay which does not violate a defendant's right of confrontation. La. C.E. art. 803(8), for example, would allow the admission of similar evidence. Art. 803 provides that certain types of public records and reports are not excluded by the hearsay rule. Arguably, a certificate stating compliance or non-compliance as described in R.S. 51:721(B), could also be admitted into evidence pursuant to several subsections of C.E. 803(8), for example, (a)(i) records regularly recorded by a public agency or (b)(ii) factual findings offered by the prosecution in a criminal case. In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3147, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule do not violate a defendant's right of confrontation. Admission under a firmly rooted hearsay exception satisfies the constitutional requirement of reliability because of the weight accorded longstanding judicial and legislative experience in assessing the trustworthiness of certain types of out-of-court statements. Id. The public records exception to hearsay is firmly rooted. Louisiana jurisprudence has long recognized the traditional `public documents' exception to the rule against hearsay. State v. Nicholas, 359 So.2d 965, 968 (La.1978). This exception is historically based upon the principles of necessity and the probability of trustworthiness. Id. (citing, 5 Wigmore on Evidence, Sections 1631, 1632 (Chadbourne Rev., 1974)); see also, McCormick, Evidence §§ 281-290 (Strong ed. 1992) (Most American jurisdictions have long recognized a public and business records exception to the hearsay rule.). Thus, although R.S. 51:721(B) is not contained in the Louisiana Code of Evidence, it nevertheless functions as a public records exception to the hearsay rule and can be characterized as a further articulation of C.E. art. 803(8). Consequently, R.S. 51:721(B) does not violate defendants' right to confrontation and therefore is constitutional.
The state further contends that the trial court erroneously found that R.S. 51:721(A) shifts the burden of proof to defendants. The trial court reasoned and defendants contend that 721(A) is unconstitutional because it places the burden of proof on defendants to show that their conduct did not fall within the purview of the securities law because a valid exemption applies. According to defendants, this subsection permits the state to obtain a conviction without having to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This, however, is a misreading of the applicable jurisprudence detailed supra. La. R.S. 51:701 et seq has codified what the state legislature has determined will be criminal conduct in the securities field. Within this chapter, the legislature has also codified certain exemptions/exceptions. See La. R.S. 51:708 (Exempt securities); 51:709 (Exempt transactions). By creating these exemptions, in effect the legislature has provided for a type of affirmative defense for defendants. The legislature has also mandated that the defendant carry the burden of proving the existence of the exemption.... La. R.S. 51:721(A). This type of burden shifting is found in many criminal statutes and is not unconstitutional because proof of the defense does not necessarily negate an essential element of the crime. Patterson v. New York, supra . Furthermore, the type of statutory construction which shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to prove he fits into a codified exemption/exception has been utilized in numerous other criminal statutes. La. R.S. 14:76, which criminalizes bigamy, is an example of such a statute which has codified specific defenses or exemptions to the statute and has placed the burden of their proof upon the defendant. Bigamy is defined as the marriage to another person by a person already married and having a husband or wife living.... La. R.S. 14:76. A defendant, however, will not be convicted, if he can show, that his previous spouse was absent at the time of the second marriage for five successive years without being known to such person, within that time, to be living.... La. R.S. 14:76(1); see State v. Cain, 106 La. 708, 31 So. 300 (1902) (Court held where a defendant, prosecuted for bigamy, undertook to show that he contracted the second marriage in the honest belief that the first had been dissolved by a decree of divorce, the burden was on him to show reasonable grounds for such belief and that he did so believe). In addition, it has generally been held by both federal and state courts that the burden of proof (or specifically the burden of persuasion) may properly be placed upon the defendant as to other affirmative defenses or exemptions such as insanity, intoxication, duress and self-defense. See LaFave and Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 1.8, p. 75. In the instant case, the burden shifting language of this section is constitutionally permissible because proof of the exemption does not necessarily negate an essential element of the crime. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.