Opinion ID: 6112520
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing Challenge (Turner)

Text: Turner challenges his sentence on three grounds. First, he contends that using acquitted conduct to determine a sentence violates Turner’s Sixth Amendment rights and his Fifth -28- Nos. 19-6148/6186/6253/6352, United States v. Lewis, et al. Amendment right to due process. Second, he contends that the acquitted conduct used to enhance his offense level was not proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Finally, Turner asserts that the acquitted conduct used was not relevant conduct under § 131.3(a)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines. Turner was acquitted of the counts associated with the CVS robbery on June 18, 2015. On that day, three men—armed and wearing masks—entered a CVS drugstore around 11 p.m. and ordered everyone down on the floor. One of the men jumped over the counter and handed a piece of paper to the pharmacist containing a list of drugs demanded. The armed man held the pharmacist at gunpoint, ordering her to place the drugs on the list in his bag. Once the pharmacist had done so, and placed money in the bag from the cash register, the men fled. But the men left the paper that listed the drugs at the pharmacy. Police found another member of the Concrete Cartel, Arterrious Tate, driving in the vicinity. When asked why he was in the area, Tate averred that he was coming from a Taco Bell, but there was a “divided roadway” that blocked the Taco Bell from the area where Tate was stopped, but that explanation made little sense. Later, a forensic examiner recovered Turner’s fingerprints from the piece of paper demanding drugs. When police questioned Turner about his fingerprints on the note, Turner responded that he had written on a lot of “notebook paper” even though the police had not revealed that the note was written on notebook paper. At sentencing, the district judge found that these facts established by a preponderance of the evidence that Turner was involved in the June 18, 2015, robbery. The district judge thereafter found the conduct relevant under USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1) and used the acquitted conduct in determining Turner’s sentence to calculate the offense level for Turner’s RICO conspiracy pursuant to USSG § 2E1.1(a). The court’s ruling resulted in a -29- Nos. 19-6148/6186/6253/6352, United States v. Lewis, et al. combined offense level of 35 for Turner’s convictions on Counts 1, 32, and 33, and with a criminal history category of I, yielding an advisory range of 168 to 210 months of imprisonment. Turner’s § 924(c) conviction on Count 33 carried a mandatory sentence of 120 months of imprisonment. The court ultimately varied downward from the advisory range and sentenced Turner to 120 months of imprisonment on Counts 1, 32, and 34 (to run concurrently) and a consecutive sentence on Count 33 of 120-months, resulting in 240 months of imprisonment. The district court’s finding of fact at sentencing are reviewed for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Donadeo, 910 F.3d 886, 893 (6th Cir. 2018). We begin with Turner’s constitutional challenge to the use of acquitted conduct. Our binding precedent in United States v. White, which held that a district court’s consideration of acquitted conduct in sentencing under an advisory guidelines system does not violate the Sixth Amendment, constrains us to conclude that the use of acquitted conduct in sentencing is not a violation under the Constitution. 551 F.3d 381, 383–84 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). As to the substantive merits of the district court’s determination, the district court clearly set forth its reasoning for the findings of fact that led it to conclude that a preponderance of the evidence supported Turner’s involvement and also explained why that conduct was relevant under the Guidelines. The court relied on the findings that: Turner’s fingerprint was found on the note; Turner made a statement regarding notebook paper to the investigator without anyone ever telling him that his fingerprint was on notebook paper; Tate—a fellow Concrete Cartel member—was in the area and driving suspiciously; and Tate turned out to be Turner’s “right-hand man.” The court concluded that this evidence showed it was “more likely than not” that Turner was involved, or at least “aided, abetted, willfully caused, counseled, commanded [the robbery], or [the robbery was] jointly under[taken] activity that was reasonably foreseeable” to Turner. That Turner now raises -30- Nos. 19-6148/6186/6253/6352, United States v. Lewis, et al. an alternative, and arguably plausible, explanation of the events does not render erroneous the district court’s conclusion and weighing of evidence. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). Based on those facts, we perceive no error in the district court’s legal conclusion that a preponderance of the evidence supported Turner’s involvement. Finally, with respect to Turner’s challenge to the district court’s conclusion that these facts constitute relevant conduct under the Guidelines, USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1) provides two avenues for defining relevant conduct. First, under USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), “all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant” is relevant conduct that could be used to enhance a sentence. Second, under USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), relevant conduct is also defined as conduct “in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity . . . , all acts and omissions of others that were (i) within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity; (ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity; and (iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.” Critically, as to both subsections, the conduct must have “occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.” Id. The district court found that the conduct was relevant under both § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) and § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), but that either one would be sufficient to sustain the sentence determination. As to Section (A), which Turner does not address, the record evidence supported the district court’s conclusion that it was more likely than not that Turner himself was involved in the robbery and that the robbery was relevant conduct related to the RICO conspiracy, given the similarities between this robbery and the other robberies implicated in the RICO conspiracy. Based on this, we therefore find no error in the district court’s consideration of the robbery as relevant conduct -31- Nos. 19-6148/6186/6253/6352, United States v. Lewis, et al. under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). Because the district court’s findings under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) support the sentence, we need not address Turner’s argument that his conduct was not relevant under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).