Opinion ID: 4525688
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: De Leon’s Criminal History Score

Text: In calculating De Leon’s criminal history score, the district court assessed one point for a 2013 Kentucky controlled substance conviction that Kentucky later voided. De Leon posits that the court abused its discretion by counting that voided point in sentencing him. Case No. 19-5279, United States v. De Leon The Sentencing Guidelines assign at least one criminal history point to “each prior sentence.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1. “The term ‘prior sentence’ means any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1). But “[s]entences for expunged convictions are not counted.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j). Did Kentucky expunge De Leon’s 2013 conviction (and sentence)? If so, the district court abused its discretion by including it. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v. Shor, 549 F.3d 1075, 1077 (6th Cir. 2008). We review a district court’s criminal history score calculations for abuse of discretion, accepting factual findings unless clearly erroneous and scrutinizing anew its legal conclusions. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51–52; United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 440 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 264 (2018); United States v. Talley, 470 F. App’x 495, 496 (6th Cir. 2012). De Leon contends that Kentucky effectively expunged his conviction when it “void[ed]” and “seal[ed]” it, arguing that a void conviction “is tantamount to” and “equivalent to an expunged” one. The Government disagrees, maintaining that Kentucky’s voiding here did not equate to “expunging” under the Guidelines. Because the answer to the question is not self-evident from the text of the Guideline, we consult the Guidelines Commentary that addresses the differing import accorded to various procedures by which states may “set aside” prior convictions. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n.10. The Commentary confirms the distinction the drafters accorded to post-conviction indulgences “for reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law.” Id. That is, if the convicting jurisdiction later grants a pardon, the Commentary explains that those convictions are to be counted in the defendant’s criminal history score, but expunged convictions (innocence or legal error established) are not counted. Id. -2- Case No. 19-5279, United States v. De Leon Our cases concerning which type of prior convictions merit criminal history points scoring adhere to this Commentary by distinguishing between those post-conviction developments driven by guilt concerns, and those that stem from some form of indulgence. In Shor, Michigan sentenced the juvenile defendant under a diversion program featuring no “civil disability or loss of right or privilege.” 549 F.3d at 1076–78. We upheld the district court’s counting that conviction in the criminal history score as within its discretion, referencing the “quite clear” Guidelines Commentary “distinguish[ing] between” convictions that a jurisdiction expunged and those retaining an “adjudication of guilt.” Id. at 1078 (citing U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n.10). Because Steven Shor’s “adjudication of guilt” persisted under his diversion program, “the district court properly counted” the conviction. Id. at 1077–78. We made a similar distinction in United States v. Sturgill, 761 F. App’x 578 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Owens v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2704 (2019). Though Kentucky “expunged” three of Melissa Owens’s convictions, we upheld their inclusion in her criminal history score because “Kentucky’s expungement procedure does not demand a showing of innocence or legal error, and [the defendant] offered nothing at sentencing to show that such considerations led to the expungements in her case.” Id. at 582–83. For the same reasons, the district court sentenced within its discretion here. Yes, Kentucky voided De Leon’s conviction. But the sentencing court found that he failed to establish that Kentucky did so due to circumstances affecting validity or guilt. See United States v. French, 974 F.2d 687, 701 (6th Cir. 1992) (“The burden is upon the defendant to prove the invalidity and/or unconstitutionality of the prior conviction.”). Indeed, according to the Commonwealth’s order, Kentucky voided the conviction because De Leon “ha[d] successfully completed the terms of treatment, probation or sentence[.]” -3- Case No. 19-5279, United States v. De Leon Well what about this court’s recent Havis decision, argues De Leon in response? He points to the en banc opinion as instructing courts to avoid reliance on the Commentary to understand the meaning of the Guidelines. But De Leon misreads the court’s decision in United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (per curiam). True, the court recognized that “the application notes are interpretations of, not additions to, the Guidelines themselves.” Id. at 386 (quoting United States v. Rollins, 836 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 2016)) (emphasis deleted). But the court also explained that Commentary is binding when “the guideline which the commentary interprets will bear the construction.” Id. (quoting Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 46 (1993)). Because § 4A1.2, cmt n.10 explains the un-defined term “expunged,” and so conforms to the permissible Commentary interpretation of the Guideline, we are bound to follow it. Id.; United States v. Thomas, 933 F.3d 605, 610 (6th Cir. 2019) (noting that Commentary “helps interpret” obstruction-of-justice Guideline by defining the term “obstructed”); United States v. Buchanan, 933 F.3d 501, 514 n.2 (6th Cir. 2019) (finding Guidelines Commentary that “explains the meaning of” an un-defined term “binding on federal courts under . . . Havis”). Havis, by contrast, asked the Circuit to review Commentary that modified a Guideline by expanding an existing definition. Havis, 927 F.3d at 386–87. De Leon also attempts to distinguish Shor and Sturgill. He faults Shor for “[f]ocusing on the prior adjudication of guilt” rather than the permissible “future use[s]” of the defendant’s conviction under Michigan law. Federal courts, however, need not concern themselves with state courts’ use of state convictions. Indeed, the Guidelines Commentary directs our attention away from such considerations and toward a simple question: has the defendant proffered evidence of a post-conviction determination of innocence or legal error? U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n.10. Here, as in Shor, no. -4- Case No. 19-5279, United States v. De Leon His quarrel with Sturgill fares no better. De Leon points out that Kentucky voided his conviction under different Kentucky statutes than used in Sturgill. If anything, this distinction hurts De Leon’s case. The statute in Sturgill permits the “expungement” of certain convictions, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.078, while the statutes here “void” convictions, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 218A.275(8), 218A.276(8). These labels alone suggest that Kentucky never expunged De Leon’s conviction. Plus, under Sturgill’s statute, a conviction “shall be deemed never to have occurred,” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.078(6), while the provisions at bar here merely seal records and make the void conviction “not be deemed a first offense” under Kentucky’s penal code, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 218A.275(8)–(10), 218A.276(8)–(10). The district court thus proceeded within its discretion in concluding that, even after Kentucky voided his conviction, De Leon’s adjudication of guilt stands.