Opinion ID: 1236539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Letter to Ishmael

Text: Smith next argues that the district court should not have allowed the government to impeach him with a letter that he wrote to his friend Robert Ishmael, because, Smith contends, this letter is privileged under the work-product doctrine. The government argues that we cannot consider this argument on appeal because Smith waived his right to raise it by knowingly failing to object in the district court. When a defendant fails to object to a district court's ruling, we generally say that he has forfeited the argument, and we will review the ruling for plain error. See United States v. Williams, 258 F.3d 669, 672 (7th Cir.2001). However, when a defendant or his attorney makes a purposeful decision not to object, rather than carelessly or negligently failing to object, the defendant has waived his right to contest the issue on appeal, and we are precluded from reviewing the district court's decision. See United States v. Murry, 395 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir.2005); United States v. Cooper, 243 F.3d 411, 416 (7th Cir.2001). And an attorney who affirmatively states that he has no objection to admission of evidence waives the right to argue to the contrary. See United States v. Redditt, 381 F.3d 597, 602 (7th Cir.2004). Before trial, Smith's counsel described to the court in general terms the content of the letters Smith wrote to Ishmael and explained, I've thought a lot about it, and I'm not sure that privilege attaches here. He then concluded, I suppose that if Mr. Smith were to testify that we'd need to revisit this. But I don't plan on any kind of formal objection at this point. After opening statements, outside the hearing of the jury, Smith's counsel agreed with the government's attorney that I don't see that there is a privilege either. When the letter was used to impeach Smith, defense counsel raised no objection. From defense counsel's comments, it appears that he considered whether to argue that the letter was privileged and made an affirmative decision not to do so. He did not carelessly or accidentally fail to raise an objection, rather, he intentionally chose to forego the argument. Thus, it has been waived, and we cannot revisit the district court's decision to allow the government to use the letter to impeach Smith. However, even absent the waiver, allowing the use of the letter for impeachment purposes was proper because the letter is not privileged work product. The work-product privilege protects documents prepared by an attorney or the attorney's agent to analyze and prepare the client's case. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); Hobley v. Burge, 433 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir.2006). It is not up to the client to determine whom to make an agent for the purposes of asserting the work-product privilege; the privilege extends to the work of the attorney's agents, not the client's agents. See Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238-39, 95 S.Ct. 2160. Though Ishmael is a private investigator and Smith wrote several letters to him detailing Smith's thoughts about his case and possible defense theories, Smith's counsel admitted to the district court that Ishmael was not involved in any investigation related to Smith's defense and had not been retained to do any work for the defense. The letters had nothing to do with Smith's legal representation and are not entitled to protection under the work-product doctrine.