Opinion ID: 52528
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon

Text: To convict a defendant of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant was a felon; (2) the defendant knew he was in possession of the firearm; and (3) the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce. United States v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004). Viewing the evidence most favorably to the Government, a juror reasonably may have found beyond a reasonable doubt that King possessed a firearm that was discovered in the box spring of his bed.5 See Anderson, 326 F.3d at 1326; Grigsby, 111 F.3d at 833. The parties stipulated King was a convicted felon and the firearm was in or affected interstate commerce. Thus, the Government was required only to prove the third element at trial, that King knew he was in possession of the firearm. 5 This is true even if the jury’s acquittal on the count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime was inconsistent with this verdict. See Reynolds v. McInnes, 338 F.3d 1221, 1230-31 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Where a defendant logically is either guilty of both counts in an indictment or not guilty of either, but the judge or jury acquits on one and convicts on the other, the defendant is not entitled to have the conviction set aside simply because the verdict is inconsistent”). 10 As to that element, the Government presented evidence showing King rented his hotel room both under his real name and the false name of “Jason Smith” for 23 days in 2004, from November 16 through December 8, 2004. There was no evidence at trial to suggest that anyone other than the maids had a key, or access, to the hotel room during that period. Thus, King had, at the very least, shared constructive possession of the room in which the firearm was discovered. See United States v. Molina, 443 F.3d 824, 829 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[A] person who owns or exercises dominion and control over a . . . residence in which contraband is concealed may be deemed to be in constructive possession of the contraband . . . .”); United States v. Brunty, 701 F.2d 1375, 1382 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Constructive possession may be shared with others.”). Moreover, the Government presented testimony that Source 1 informed the police he or she observed a gun in King’s hotel room, and the search warrant was based, in part, on this information. Although the search warrant affidavit indicated Source 1 informed the police the gun was “gold,” and the firearm recovered during the search of King’s hotel room was black, this discrepancy was never mentioned to the jury. Accordingly, the jury only heard a gun was observed in the hotel room before the search, and a gun was recovered during the search of the hotel room. Thus, a reasonable juror may have believed the firearm belonged to King. 11 Also, given the time delay between King observing the police search the wrong room and the police securing a search warrant for his room, and the circumstances surrounding the bleach all over the floor of his hotel room, a juror may have reasonably believed King attempted to cover up his wrongdoings, including hiding the firearm in the box spring of the bed.