Opinion ID: 182627
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged mootness based on Ashraf's removal from the country

Text: The government argues in its motion to dismiss this appeal that Ashraf's claims are moot because he has already been removed from the country and, even if his conviction for willfully failing to obtain travel documents were to be reversed, he would still not be permitted to reenter because of his earlier firearms conviction. Ashraf, on the other hand, argues that his current appeal is not moot because [h]is chances to obtain a waiver of inadmissibility with the Attorney General would certainly be enhanced if he is able to reverse the wrongful convictions reached in the instant matter. He also disputes his future inability to return based on his firearms conviction because he raises arguments that he believes should result in the reversal of that conviction. Ashraf correctly points out that a defendant is presumed to suffer collateral consequences from a conviction even after the sentence has expired. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 12-13, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998). Although the Supreme Court in Spencer declined to extend this presumption beyond challenges to convictions, such as to parole revocations, the Court left the presumption intact where a defendant seeks to overturn a conviction because of the obvious fact of life that most criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral legal consequences. Id. at 12, 118 S.Ct. 978 (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968)). This court has also noted that, in recent decades, the Supreme Court has allowed federal courts to presume the existence of collateral consequences. Gentry v. Deuth, 456 F.3d 687, 694-95 (6th Cir.2006) (holding, based on Spencer, 523 U.S. at 8, 118 S.Ct. 978, that the petitioner could bring a habeas corpus petition challenging her state-court conviction for driving under the influence and for manslaughter even though she had already been released from prison). The government responds by citing United States v. Rosenbaum-Alanis, 483 F.3d 381 (5th Cir.2007), for the proposition that where aliens are deported and legally prevented from reentering the country, their challenges to criminal proceedings that would not alter their inability to reenter are moot. Id. at 383 (Because the defendant has been deported to the Republic of Mexico and is legally unable, without permission of the Attorney General, to reenter the United States to be present for a resentencing proceeding as required by Rule 43, there is no relief we are able to grant him and his appeal is moot.). But the present case is distinguishable from Rosenbaum-Alanis because the defendant there challenged only the length of his sentence, not his conviction. See Gentry, 456 F.3d at 694 (pointing out that the Commonwealth mistakenly relies on a line of decisions that addresses habeas petitions attacking the sentence rather than the conviction  (emphasis in original)). The Supreme Court in Spencer explicitly distinguished between challenges to convictions and other types of challenges to criminal proceedings. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 12, 118 S.Ct. 978. We thus conclude that the decision in Rosenbaum-Alanis is not inconsistent with applying Spencer 's presumption of collateral consequences to Ashraf's appeal. Whether our court interprets Spencer 's presumption as absolute within the context of challenges to convictions is not entirely clear. But even if one presumes that the mere presence of the conviction is not, in and of itself, sufficient injury to give rise to a case or controversy, it is equally settled by Gentry that a petitioner need not show much more than the possibility of tangible collateral consequences for the burden to shift to the state to show that the consequences are not in fact possible. Gall v. Scroggy, 603 F.3d 346, 354 (6th Cir.2010) (citing Gentry, 456 F.3d at 694, and Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7, 118 S.Ct. 978). In Gall, this court rejected Kentucky's claim that because the petitioner's murder conviction would not affect his parole proceedings until the year 2021, such consequences were too remote to constitute an injury. Id. at 354. Ashraf's contention that his conviction might affect the Attorney General's discretionary decision to allow him back in the country similarly satisfies whatever minimal collateral consequence that Ashraf might be required to show in order for this court to retain jurisdiction over his claim. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II), (iii) (providing that the statute's prohibition on an alien who is forbidden from reentering the country at any time because of an aggravated felony does not apply if the Attorney General has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission). This court has relied on a case from one of our sister circuits that recognizes just such an injury as a legitimate collateral consequence. The petitioner in Chong v. District Director, I.N.S., 264 F.3d 378 (3d Cir.2001), challenged the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA's) determination that her aggravated felonies were particularly serious, even though Chong had already been deported. Id. at 382, cited favorably by Garcia-Flores v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 439, 441 n. 1 (6th Cir.2007) (noting that an alien may challenge his or her removal even after being deported because the alien continues to suffer an ongoing injury based on his or her being prevented from seeking reentry for five years after the removal). As in the present case, even if Chong were to prevail, she would still not have been able to return to the United States because her aggravated-felony convictions would have remained on her record. Chong, 264 F.3d at 385-86. But the Third Circuit held that Chong's claim was not moot because if the court were to reverse the Board's finding that Chong committed a particularly serious crime, the Attorney General could exercise his discretion and grant `withholding' of removal and allow Chong to reenter the United States. Id. We conclude that Ashraf's appeal is analogous and thus not moot. The government's motion to dismiss is therefore denied.