Opinion ID: 195625
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion for Residence Qua Residence

Text: 28 As its prefatory clause makes clear, the FHA Sec. 3603(b)(1) exemption--assuming its four provisos are satisfied--applies to any single-family house sold or rented by the owner in a discriminatory manner. For section 3603(b)(1) purposes, therefore, the relevant SFHs in this case are Houses A and B, located on the Los Llanos Property Suarez refused to rent or sell to HAVED. Section 3603(b)(1) neither defines the term SFH, nor does its prefatory clause expressly limit the term SFH to structures in which the defendant does not reside. Conversely, as Suarez acknowledges, if the Suarezes had refused to rent or sell their Guarico Residence to HAVED, the prefatory clause would not have debarred the Suarezes from a section 3603(b)(1) exemption merely because the property being rented or sold was their residence. 29 The statutory context in which the prefatory clause appears undermines the Suarez contention as well. See Skidgel v. Maine Dep't of Human Servs., 994 F.2d 930, 937 (1st Cir.1993) (meaning of particular statutory language assessed in light of entire statute). The four FHA Sec. 3603(b)(1) provisos do not give rise to four independent exemptions, as Suarez suggests, but represent four cumulative preconditions to the single exemption set out in the prefatory clause. If any of the four provisos is not satisfied, no section 3603(b)(1) exemption is appropriate. 30 Proviso 2 refers specifically to a discrete subset of the discriminatory SFH sales focused upon in the section 3603(b)(1) prefatory clause, namely, sales of SFHs in which the defendant is not residing. If the unqualified term SFH in the prefatory clause were intended to embrace only SFHs in which the defendant is not residing, no such further qualification would be needed in Proviso 2. See Mosquera-Perez v. INS, 3 F.3d 553, 556 (1st Cir.1993) (court should avoid interpretations which render any part of statute meaningless). Thus, if the term SFH, as used in the prefatory clause, applies to residences and nonresidences, the pendent references to such [SFHs] in Provisos 1 and 3 also necessarily encompass the Suarezes's Guarico Residence qua residence. 31 Finally, the legislative history discloses no basis for second-guessing the plain language of section 3603(b)(1). See Laracuente v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 891 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir.1989) (Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, the plain language of the statute is conclusive.). As initially introduced in Congress, the FHA contained few significant exemptions from liability, see, e.g., supra note 7 (describing Mrs. Murphy exemption), and the breadth of the FHA's coverage caused vigorous Senate opposition. See generally Jean E. Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 Washburn L.J. 149 (1969). Senator Everett M. Dirksen proposed to assuage opposition by exempting sales and rentals of any single-family house sold or rented by an owner residing in such house at the time of such sale or rental, or who was the most recent resident of such house prior to such sale or rental. See 114 Cong.Rec. 4571 (1968). Yet even the Dirksen substitute, later modified and enacted as Proviso 2, failed to gain enough Senate support. To break the deadlock, Senator Robert C. Byrd proposed the expanded four-part exemption, later codified as present section 3603(b)(1). During floor debate, Senator Byrd offered two illuminating hypotheticals to demonstrate the coverage which would be provided under his proposal, but not under the Dirksen substitute: 32 A widow owns and lives in a single-family dwelling. She also owns a single-family dwelling across the street, the tenant therein being her daughter. The daughter moves to another State. The widow cannot qualify for exemption under the Dirksen substitute because she neither resides in the house across the street--of which she is the owner--nor is the most recent resident of such dwelling prior to a subsequent sale or rental. 33 An individual lives in his own single-family dwelling located on a three-quarter-acre lot. He decides to build a second house on the lot. Ten years later misfortune forces him to parcel the lot and sell the house thereon. He does not qualify under the Dirksen substitute exemption because he is neither residing in the adjacent dwelling nor was he the most recent resident thereof. 34 114 Cong.Rec. 5640 (1968) (emphasis added). 35 Asked why it was necessary to raise the number of houses owned by one party to three, Senator Byrd referred to these two hypotheticals, and noted that he had already discussed situations in which there would be at least two [single-family] houses involved. Id. (emphasis added). Significantly, both hypotheticals assumed that the houses in which the seller currently resided would be counted toward the four-SFH threshold in Provisos 1 and 3. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 728, 103 S.Ct. 3291, 3300, 77 L.Ed.2d 961 (1983) (noting that interpretation of statute by sponsor is  'authoritative guide to the statute's construction' ) (citation omitted); see also Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263, 106 S.Ct. 1834, 1840, 90 L.Ed.2d 248 (1986) (sponsor's statements credited if consistent with statutory language). Other senators likewise recognized that the more than three threshold would include houses in which the seller resided. See 114 Cong.Rec. 5641 (1968) (I know we have people who have a summer home or a winter home.... One could easily have three homes.) (statement of Senator Jordan). Since this legislative history, at the very least, precludes our finding a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, Laracuente, 891 F.2d at 23, we must conclude that a defendant's residence, qua residence, is not to be excluded under Provisos 1 and 3 of section 3603(b)(1). 8