Opinion ID: 2632308
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of defendant's claim to be a contract killer

Text: Most of defendant's taped confession was admitted at the guilt phase, but the court excluded that portion in which defendant claimed that he was a contract killer and had committed 10 to 15 contract killings. The prosecution asked to play the entire recording at the penalty trial. Over defense objection, the judge granted this request. Before the tape was played to the jury, the judge gave a limiting instruction: Defendant's statements as to possible other homicides were being offered on the issue of his mental state and motive on the nature and circumstances of the present offense, and not for the truth of whether there were other homicides. The jury was not to consider such evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for which it is admitted. The prosecutor did not argue that defendant had committed other homicides. Instead, he argued that the confession showed one of defendant's motives in killing JoAnn was to enhance his reputation as a ruthless and dangerous person: [Defendant] needs to have it on the streets that he was a killer. And that's one of the reasons why he cut JoAnn Clemons's throat. So he could feel good about himself, so he could scare people.... So [defendant] sat on a lady's chest and cut her throat so he could pump up his reputation. Defendant contends that this court's decision in People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423, compels the conclusion that defendant's statements about his commission of contract killings were not admissible. In Phillips, the prosecution presented evidence of four instances in which Phillips had discussed committing other crimes. The evidence was offered under factor (b) of section 190.3, which permits the penalty jury to consider [t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. We examined the evidence of each of the four incidents and concluded that one showed solicitation of murder in violation of section 653f. (Phillips, at pp. 75-77, 222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423.) The evidence of the other three instances, however, failed to show the commission of a crime. (Id. at pp. 73-75, 222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423.) They were therefore inadmissible under factor (b), and the trial court's error in admitting that evidence, in connection with other errors, led to a reversal of the penalty judgment in Phillips. We agree with the Attorney General that Phillips is distinguishable. The evidence there was offered as proof of a criminal act involving force or violence under factor (b) of section 190.3, without any limiting instruction. The prosecution had argued that Phillips was planning or at least proposing to commit the murders he discussed, and that the evidence showed Phillips's casual attitude toward killing and his readiness to commit murder. ( People v. Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 83, 222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423.) The evidence in the case before us was offered under section 190.3, factor (a), as part of the circumstances of the charged murder, not under factor (b). The trial court here told the jury it could not consider defendant's confession as proof that he had committed other homicides. The prosecution did not claim defendant had committed any contract killings or planned to do so. The evidence was admitted solely to show defendant's attitude and motive in connection with the charged murder and, so limited, was properly admitted. Defendant also objects to the admission of a paper that said hit list, followed by a list of names, that he was carrying when he was arrested. Murder victim JoAnn Clemons's name was not on the list. Possession of the list was not a crime, and there was no evidence defendant actually intended to kill anyone on the list, so it was not admissible under section 190.3, factor (b). The trial court, however, admitted the list under section 190.3, factor (a) as an overall background piece of information, which would help the jury evaluate the nature and circumstances of the murder. The prosecution does not claim defendant had the list when he killed JoAnn Clemons. Its theory is that the list, like defendant's confession to being a professional hit man and enforcer, shows defendant's motive to establish a reputation as a contract killer. It was admissible for that purpose. Defendant argues, however, that both the list and the statement in his confession that he was a contract killer should have been excluded as more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352, which authorizes a trial court in its discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. In reply, the Attorney General argues that section 352 is inapplicable to penalty phase evidence offered under Penal Code section 190.3, factor (a). In People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130, however, we concluded that the trial court retains a limited discretion to exclude unduly inflammatory evidence. [T]he trial court, we said, lacks discretion to exclude all factor (a) evidence on the ground that it is inflammatory or lacking in probative value. (Id. at pp. 1200-1201, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) It retains, however, its traditional discretion to exclude `particular items of evidence' by which the prosecution seeks to demonstrate either the circumstances of the crime (factor (a)), or violent criminal activity (factor (b)), in a `manner' that is misleading, cumulative, or unduly inflammatory. (Id. at p. 1201, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) The trial court here did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence. The prejudicial effect of the evidence was that it might lead the jury to believe that defendant had committed other murders or planned to do so. But in view of the prosecutor's avoidance of any such claim, the absence of any evidence to support it, and the trial court's limiting instruction, it is far more likely that the jurors would recognize the defendant's actions as mere braggadocio. Thus the trial court could reasonably conclude that, as long as it gave limiting instructions, the probative value of the evidence at issue would outweigh its prejudicial effect.