Opinion ID: 718186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The EPA's Interpretation of Section 302

Text: 14 Since Congress has entrusted implementation of EPCRA to the EPA, Chevron 's two-step analysis governs our review of the question of whether the EPA's delisting approach violates the law. Under Chevron, we first determine whether Congress' intent is clear regarding the precise question of statutory interpretation decided by the agency. If it is not, we then ask only whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). 6 15 The language of section 302 does not speak clearly to whether toxicity can be used as the sole criterion for determining revisions to the EHS list. The relevant provision is section 302(a)(4), which states that [a]ny revisions to the list shall take into account the toxicity, reactivity, volatility, dispersability, combustibility, or flammability of a substance. 42 U.S.C. § 11002(a)(4). This language does not unambiguously answer the question of whether revisions can be based on toxicity alone. The fact that Congress used the disjunctive connective or suggests strongly that it did not intend to require the EPA to consider all of the factors when making revision decisions. On the other hand, the use of the phrase shall take into account to introduce the list of factors might be read to imply that the EPA's discretion to consider only those factors it deems relevant is limited. 16 We turn, therefore, to whether the EPA's toxicity-only approach represents a permissible interpretation of section 302. The use of the disjunctive or instead of the conjunctive and certainly leaves section 302 open to the interpretation that it authorizes the EPA to make revisions based on any, some, or all of the section 302 factors. See Northwest Airlines v. FAA, 14 F.3d 64, 69 (D.C.Cir.1994) (where statute lists criteria for approval linked by or, agency's interpretation of statute as authorizing approval on the basis of any one of the factors listed is eminently reasonable). The controlling weight in the disjunctive or is reduced somewhat when used with a list of factors which the agency shall take into account, but even so the agency's interpretation is not precluded by section 302's language. Given its use here alongside a disjunctive list, the phrase can be reasonably interpreted as limiting the EPA's authority to consider additional factors in making EHS list revisions rather than as mandating that the EPA consider every factor listed. 17 Nor is the EPA's interpretation impermissible because the agency considers only one factor, toxicity, in all cases. While the fact that Congress included a list of factors in section 302(a)(4) suggests that Congress considered all these factors to be relevant in revising the EHS list, nothing in the language of the provision prohibits the EPA's across-the-board approach based on one factor. See, e.g., Clinton Memorial Hosp. v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 854, 857 (D.C.Cir.1993) (regulation precluding certain hospitals from ever qualifying as sole community hospitals on the basis of location alone was permissible construction of statute, even though statute listed other factors in addition to location by which sole community hospitals could be identified). 18 Huls argues that section 302 represents one of those occasions where an or should be construed conjunctively to avoid defeating the plain purpose of the statute or producing an unreasonable result. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586-87, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2025-26, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983); Schuler v. United States, 628 F.2d 199, 201 (D.C.Cir.1980) (en banc). We think that reading or in accordance with its normal disjunctive meaning--as the EPA has done--comports with the structure and purpose of EPCRA as a whole. EPCRA establishes a two-level scheme of regulation, with the EHS list constituting the first and the TPQ the second level. The only required result of a substance being included on the EHS list is that a TPQ will be promulgated for the substance. 7 Facilities need not notify emergency response commissions or cooperate with emergency planning unless they possess a listed substance in an amount exceeding its TPQ. Thus, while inclusion on the EHS list is not totally devoid of regulatory impact, only the TPQ triggers any significant regulatory burden. The EPA's toxicity-only approach accommodates this statutory scheme by requiring that a substance's TPQ be based on the actual risk that a release of the substance will result in off-site exposure. 8 If this risk is low, the substance receives a high TPQ, up to a maximum of 10,000 pounds. As a result there is no significant regulatory overreaching, even though the EHS list contains some substances that in practice represent a low risk of off-site exposure. 19 Moreover, the EPA's toxicity-only approach serves EPCRA's purpose of encouraging the development of emergency plans to control the off-site exposure of hazardous substances. There is no dispute that acutely toxic substances can pose a significant health hazard if exposure occurs. Excluding a substance from the EHS list removes the substance from the purview of EPCRA's emergency planning requirements altogether and makes it unlikely that a community will assess the potential risk posed by that substance at particular facilities. 9 Therefore, the net effect of the EPA's toxicity-only approach is to ensure that certain clearly hazardous substances are at least potentially within the scope of local emergency planning. In addition, the EPA's toxicity-only approach does not expand EPCRA's emergency planning requirements beyond the statutory design by forcing communities to develop emergency response plans even where the risk of off-site exposure is nonexistent. The emergency planning requirements are triggered only if an EHS list substance is present at a facility in an amount beyond its TPQ, and the EPA correlates each substance's TPQ to the possibility that an accidental release of the substance will result in off-site exposure. 20 We conclude that the EPA's toxicity-only approach represents a permissible construction under Chevron, since it accords with the language, structure, and purpose of section 302. We turn next to the question of whether the application of this approach in the case of IPDI was nonetheless unlawful because it violated the rule that agency action cannot be arbitrary and capricious. 21