Opinion ID: 178775
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wright's Fair Trial Claims

Text: Next, Wright argues that the district court erred in precluding evidence that Wright's roommate, Shawn Dittfurth, had motive, opportunity, knowledge, and the ability to obtain, view, and possess child pornography. Wright wanted to introduce evidence showing that Dittfurth had a sexual attraction to minor boys and was proficient with computers. Wright claims that the district court precluded this prior act evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) because Dittfurth did not testify. The government raises two arguments in response. First, the government claims that Wright never actually offered any such evidence and therefore the district court did not preclude it. Second, the government argues that, assuming the district court did exclude the evidence, it was proper to do so, though on alternative grounds. On January 27, 2006, Wright filed a Notice of Intent To Present Other Act Evidence under Rule 404(b). Wright sought to introduce four different pieces of evidence with respect to prior acts of his roommate, Dittfurth. First, Wright intended to introduce records from Mount Saint Mary College in Newburgh, New York, showing Dittfurth received a computer competency waiver from Saint Mary's, as well as an A in Computer Literacy. Wright's theory for admission was that Dittfurth's computer competency would show Dittfurth had the knowledge necessary to commit the charges. He intended to call a custodian of records from Saint Mary's to testify. Second, Wright intended to introduce, through Wright's testimony at trial, that Dittfurth lived with Wright during the relevant time period and that Dittfurth was often alone in the apartment, where he had access to Wright's desktop computer. According to Wright, such testimony would show that Dittfurth had the opportunity to commit the alleged offenses. Third, also through Wright's testimony, Wright intended to introduce evidence that after Wright's apartment was searched on February 13, 2003, Dittfurth encouraged Wright to sign over to Dittfurth power of attorney to Wright's property and businesses, and suggested that Wright flee the country before charges were filed against him. Wright theorized that this evidence would show Dittfurth had the motive, intent, plan, and preparation to commit the offenses. Finally, Wright would testify that Dittfurth visited the site gay.com, where his online identity was Presumed Innocent. Wright argued that this evidence would show Dittfurth's identity and knowledge and that Dittfurth's on-line identity is ironic in light of this case. Argument on Wright's motion took place nearly a year later, on January 22, 2007. Wright's counsel indicated that the government agreed to allow Wright to testify that Dittfurth lived with Wright during the relevant time period. However, the government contested the other three pieces of evidence, which defense counsel proceeded to address in her argument to the district court. As to each piece of evidence Wright sought to introduce, the district court asked defense counsel how the evidence was relevant should Dittfurth not testify at trial. See District Ct. Docket No. 374: Transcript of Motion Hearing dated Jan. 22, 2007 at 14 (concerning Dittfurth's computer literacy); id. at 17 (power of attorney); id. at 19 (Presumed Innocent screen name). Likewise, the government assumed that the only way in which any of the evidence could be introduced was if Dittfurth testified. At the close of argument, the district court indicated that it agreed that evidence about Dittfurth's computer knowledge and the statements Dittfurth allegedly made requesting Wright give Dittfurth power of attorney were both relevant; not so with respect to the Presumed Innocent screen name. The minute entry from the January 22 hearing contains the following entry: Further 404B on Shawn Dittfurth; if he testifies, the Court finds evidence regarding testing out of computer class, and his statement to have defendant Wright turn over power of attorney to property in Mexico relevant; his use of on-line screen name of `presumed innocent' is not relevant. Appellant's Excerpts of Record (ER) at 35 (emphasis added). In later hearings with the court, defense counsel also discussed the possibility of calling Dittfurth's co-worker, Holly White, to testify to his credibility (since law enforcement interviewed him when they searched Wright's apartment) and to establish Dittfurth's interest in teenage boys. White would testify that when she worked at a skate shop with Dittfurth, he made passes at boys around the ages of 12-15. Defense counsel also discussed calling Nick Shorb, a 12-13 year old boy who worked with Dittfurth at the skate shop who would testify that Dittfurth made passes at him and showed him pornography. Both White and Shorb later appeared on Wright's list of witnesses for trial. There was no further discussion of whether the 404(b) evidence would be coming in until the first day of trial on January 17, 2008. During her opening statement, defense counsel discussed Dittfurth at some length, including references to his knowledge of computers from his days at Saint Mary's College, and that he encouraged Wright to go to Mexico following execution of the search warrant. After the court recessed the jury for the day, the government objected to defense counsel referring to individuals who would be testifying about Dittfurth, arguing that none of that evidence should come in unless Dittfurth testified. The government pointed out that neither it nor the defense would be calling Dittfurth to testify. The district court initially expressed its skepticism as to whether the evidence could be admitted absent Dittfurth testifying. However, the court never explicitly precluded such evidence. Rather, the district court left it to defense counsel to provide the court with a legal basis for introducing the evidence. Indeed, the district court judge stated numerous times that he was not sure if the evidence could come in without Dittfurth's testifying, but that it was up to defense counsel to convince him otherwise. See ER at 52 (responding to the prosecutor's statement that the evidence was not relevant without Dittfurth testifying, saying: I haven't crossed that road yet, either, so I'm sure Ms. Williams is going to provide some sort of legal basis to allow that to come in without Mr. Dittfurth.); id. (I'm having trouble seeing that, I don't see how they're relevant without [Dittfurth], but I'm sure Ms. Williams will show me some book if it says they are.); id. at 53 (I'll still [sic] having trouble seeing how they come in without having Mr. Dittfurth called as a witness in some fashion. Not in some fashion, being called as a witness. I don't know see how I can cross that bridge, Ms. Williams, but we'll see.). The court then recessed for the day. The trial continued the following day. At the conclusion of the day's proceedings, after the court recessed the jury, defense counsel apologize[d] to the Court. She told the court that she went back and checked the minute entry from the earlier January 22 hearing and realized that [t]he Court had permitted me to get into the St. Mary's records as well as the power of attorney and going to Mexico if Mr. Dittfurth testified, and, as I explained yesterday, I was under the impression until yesterday morning that Mr. Dittfurth was going to testify. [11] Defense counsel also told the court that she realized that she would also be precluded from calling Holly White and requested that White be released from her subpoena. The district court then asked defense counsel to clarify whether she intended to call White, to which she responded, Absolutely not, Judge. The issue lies in our review of the record. On one hand, it seems as though the district court never actually precluded 404(b) evidence related to Dittfurth. Rather, the district court expressed some skepticism as to whether the evidence could come in, but left it to defense counsel to provide the court with legal authority to do so. At the end of the first day of trial, the parties informed the court that Dittfurth was not being called to testify, and the court invited defense counsel to provide a basis for introducing the evidence. However, defense counsel never accepted the district court's offer. Instead, rather than realizing that the district court was open to the possibility of allowing the evidence as long as it had some legal basis to do so, counsel withdrew her motion. Defense counsel therefore neglected to argue to the district court that Dittfurth's presence at trial was not a prerequisite to introducing the evidencethe argument Wright advances to us on appeal. Thus, the evidence was not introduced solely because defense counsel failed to provide the court with a reason for allowing it, not because the district court excluded it. Alternatively, it may be said that the district court ruled that the evidence was not admissible unless Dittfurth testified. One interpretation of the record is that the district court told defense counsel that it was not going to allow the evidence to come in since Dittfurth was not testifyingunless defense counsel could prove to the district court that such a ruling was erroneous. The best support for this view is the district court's January 22 minute entry, which again provided: Further 404B on Shawn Dittfurth; if he testifies, the Court finds evidence regarding testing out of computer class, and his statement to have defendant Wright turn over power of attorney to property in Mexico relevant. Thus, the district court conditioned the evidence's admissibility on Dittfurth testifying. Although it had been decided by that point that Dittfurth was not going to testify, defense counsel indicated in her opening statement that she intended to introduce the evidence. The government then objected to its introduction at the conclusion of the first day of trial, and the district court agreed that defense counsel would not be permitted to introduce the evidence absent Dittfurth testifying. The issue is confounded by the fact that some of our prior cases suggest that a lawyer's failure to state the grounds for the admissibility of evidence, and the district court's subsequent failure to rule based on those grounds, precludes us from considering the issue. See United States v. Tafollo-Cardenas, 897 F.2d 976, 980 (9th Cir.1990) (declining to consider whether defendant's statements were admissible under the general hearsay exception where the prosecutor did not raise the exception until introducing its amended jury instructions and the district court made no finding on its applicability). Other case law suggests that [a]bsent a ... definitive ruling by the district court that the evidence is admissible, a party does not preserve the issue of admissibility for appeal absent a contemporaneous objection, such that this court's review is only to prevent a manifest injustice. United States v. Archdale, 229 F.3d 861, 864-65 (9th Cir. 2000). We need not resolve whether the district court actually precluded the 404(b) evidence. Under any reading of the record, Wright never argued that the testimony should come in regardless of whether Dittfurth testifiedthe issue now presented on appeal. Thus, our review is for plain error. See United States v. Chang, 207 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir.2000) (reviewing for plain error where the theory of admissibility was not apparent from the context of [the defendant's] testimony); United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir.1980) (The presentation of additional evidentiary theories on appeal is inconsistent `with the salutary purpose of the timeliness requirement to allow the trial judge to make an informed ruling based on the issues as framed by the parties before the evidence is ... excluded.' (ellipsis in original) (quoting United States v. Lara-Hernandez, 588 F.2d 272, 274 (9th Cir.1978))). The exclusion of the Dittfurth-related 404(b) evidence in this case did not amount to plain error. For there to be plain error, Wright must demonstrate that: (1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant's substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Marcus, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 2164, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). First, assuming without deciding that the district court actually precluded the introduction of the 404(b) evidence because Dittfurth did not testify, it was error to do so. The government concedes that Rule 404(b) applies to nonwitnesses, under our decision in United States v. McCourt, 925 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir.1991). See also United States v. Cruz-Garcia, 344 F.3d 951, 955 n. 3 (9th Cir.2003). However, it argues that the district court should be affirmed on other groundsnamely that the proffered evidence was forbidden propensity evidence. The only case the government cites for its propensity argument is a Nebraska Court of Appeals case agreeing with McCourt that 404(b) permits introduction by the accused of a third-party's prior acts, but holding that there the evidence was properly excluded based on propensity grounds. See State v. Gardner, 1 Neb.App. 450, 498 N.W.2d 605, 609-10 (1993). In Gardner, the defendant was convicted of sexual assault of a child and sought to introduce evidence that since the victim's father had molested a child once before, he was the guilty party. Id. at 610. This is classic propensity evidence. By contrast, Wright was not seeking to introduce evidence that Dittfurth had committed prior acts involving child pornography images. Rather, Wright wanted to establish that Dittfurth had the kind of computer knowledge necessary to obtain child pornography (through introduction of the Saint Mary's college records), that Dittfurth knew that Wright's computer contained illegal imagesan element of Counts 2 and 3(through testimony that following the FBI's search Dittfurth encouraged Wright to sign over power of attorney to Dittfurth and told Wright to flee the country), and that Dittfurth had the intent to commit the crimes alleged (through testimony that he was sexually interested in underage boys). Cf. United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1313 (11th Cir.2009) (Evidence that Defendant traveled abroad in order to engage in sexual trysts with underage boys in Prague was, thus, admissible under 404(b) as `proof of ... knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident' and intent with regard to his travel with his cousin and his former patient during which sexually explicit images of the boys were created and with regard to his collection of pornographic images of children. (ellipsis in original)); United States v. Sebolt, 460 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir.2006) (Prior instances of sexual misconduct with a child victim may establish a defendant's sexual interest in children and thereby serve as evidence of the defendant's motive to commit a charged offense involving the sexual exploitation of children.). Moreover, the standard of admissibility when a criminal defendant offers similar acts evidence as a shield need not be as restrictive as when a prosecutor uses such evidence as a sword. United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 911 (2d Cir.1984) (discussed with approval in McCourt, 925 F.2d at 1234, explaining that  Aboumoussallem is exemplary of a number of cases in which courts have admitted similar acts evidence for defense purposes). [12] However, though we find error, we are not convinced that any such error prejudiced Wright under the plain error standard. Wright's principal defense was that Dittfurth was responsible for possession of the child pornography images. Practically all of the defense's case was directed at explaining ways in which Dittfurth could have been the responsible party. For example, the defense argued that Wright's desktop computer and the laptop computer Wright purchased for Dittfurth to use were networked; that there was an icon on Wright's desktop for a program called pcAnywhere, which allows one computer to access another; that one of the files charged in Count 3 was modified while Wright was at a business trade show (inferring it had to be Dittfurth who viewed the image); that Dittfurth was often alone in the apartment; and that the seven CDs containing child pornography found in Wright's briefcase were placed there by Dittfurth. Wright's 404(b) evidence would have shown that Dittfurth was computer proficient, had a history of making passes at adolescent boys, and told Wright to flee to Mexico following the search (which Wright argued indicated that Dittfurth knew there was contraband on the computer). Thus, even without the 404(b) evidence, the defense presented the jury with a significant amount of evidence that Dittfurth was the culpable party. Indeed, it seems like the jury shifted at least some of the blame to Dittfurth because it acquitted Wright of the possession charges with respect to the CDs. Of the additional testimony Wright did not present, only the evidence concerning Dittfurth's penchant for adolescent boys had even the potential to affect the jury's verdict; the jury knew that Wright ran several online business, and therefore had significant computer knowledge himself, and that Dittfurth told Wright to flee to Mexico is weak evidence of Dittfurth's knowledge of contraband. Considering all the evidence the jury knew about Wright and Dittfurth, excluding this additional testimony did not amount to plain error. See United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1023-24 (9th Cir.2001) (finding exclusion of third-party culpability evidence not harmless where defendant was not permitted to provide an answer to the question of who committed the crime, if not the defendant); United States v. Crosby, 75 F.3d 1343, 1347 (9th Cir.1996) (same). Wright put on the Dittfurth did it defense. He presented the jury with myriad ways in which Dittfurth could have been responsible for the offense. Any additional evidence concerning Dittfurth would have been merely cumulative.
Wright calls out a number of comments made by the prosecutor, either during cross-examination or in his closing argument, that he argues constitute prosecutorial misconduct and warrant reversal. To obtain a reversal based on prosecutorial misconduct, Wright must establish both misconduct and prejudice. See United States v. Sarkisian, 197 F.3d 966, 988 (9th Cir.1999). Where defense counsel objects at trial to acts of alleged prosecutorial misconduct, we review for harmless error on defendant's appeal; absent such an objection, we review under the more deferential plain error standard. United States v. Hinton, 31 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 1994). [13] First, Wright argues that the prosecutor improperly inserted his personal disbelief of the defense and submitted his own testimony to the jury. Wright contends that the prosecutor's statements constitute impermissible vouching. The rule that a prosecutor may not express his personal opinion of the defendant's guilt or his belief in the credibility of witnesses is firmly established. United States v. McKoy, 771 F.2d 1207, 1210-11 (9th Cir.1985); see also United States v. Kerr, 981 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir.1992) (A prosecutor has no business telling the jury his individual impressions of the evidence.). Improper vouching occurs when the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind the witness by providing personal assurances of the witness's veracity. Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Improper vouching also occurs where the prosecutor suggests that the testimony of government witnesses is supported by information outside that presented to the jury. United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1190 (9th Cir.2005). We also have identified improper vouching and related misconduct in a broader range of circumstances. A prosecutor may not, for instance, express an opinion of the defendant's guilt, denigrate the defense as a sham, implicitly vouch for a witness's credibility, or vouch for his or her own credibility. United States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076, 1098 (9th Cir.2002) (internal citations omitted). However, vouching typically involves the prosecution bolstering the testimony of its own witness. United States v. Nobari, 574 F.3d 1065, 1078 (9th Cir.2009). Of the statements Wright identifies, we find the most troubling to be the trifecta comment delivered during the prosecutor's closing argument: Now, I've been handling these cases for a number of years and I've seen where defensewhere the defense of it was my roommate has been advanced, and I've seen the defense advanced that it was some sort of hacker or trojan or virus, something along those lines, and then I've also seen, well, somebody did something inappropriately, the interview, this, that, something along those lines. But never have I seen the trifecta, all three in this same place. This is very this is unbelievably remarkable that you guys got to witness this. So we're betting on Shawn Dittfurth to win, the FBI to place, and I guess some computer hacker, trojan, virus mystery man to show, but the problem is none of those things ever showed. ER at 594. The prosecutor made several other references to his own impressions of the evidence throughout his closing argument. For example, on one such occasion the prosecutor remarked: Of course [Wright's] denying that he said he knew he should not have child pornography on his computer. I'm not sure why he's denying that because if somebody asked me should you have child pornography on your server, on your computer, I would say of course not, but here he is saying no, no, no, we weren'tthere was no child pornography and I never said anything about how I knew I shouldn't have child pornography on this computer. ER at 581 (emphases added). Though less egregious, there are several more examples in the record. See, e.g., ER at 582 (And there's a number of places along the way where I think what the defendant said, not only was not supported by the evidence, but was so completely illogical it was absolutely ridiculous.) (emphasis added); id. at 589 (The Dockmans said it was a sweater, but I think they'd remember a suede Tasmanian devil vest and distinguish that from a sweater.) (emphasis added); id. at 590 (But the last one, the betrayal, the three different prongs of this betrayal that were alluded to in the opening statement, I found that one most remarkable of all.) (emphasis added). [14] While the government responds to many of the statements Wright focuses on, it includes only a passing reference to the prosecutor's trifecta comment. While it is probably not correct to label this misconduct as vouching, see Nobari, 574 F.3d at 1078, [15] the prosecutor's comment not only gave the jury his impression of the evidence in the case, but it improperly introduced evidence outside the record i.e., the prosecutor's experience with similar casesas a means of commenting on the defense's case and Wright's credibility. Cf. United States v. Galloway, 316 F.3d 624, 632-33 (6th Cir.2003) (statement during closing argument held to be improper where prosecutor told the jury about his experience trying drug cases); McKoy, 771 F.2d at 1211 (jury could have construed the testimony of former prosecutor, who testified as a witness at trial, as `expert testimony' based on his personal knowledge and his prior experience with other cases). Though the prosecutor's statement might not technically be viewed as improper vouching, it was certainly improper, since it denigrat[ed] the defense as a sham. United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1225 (9th Cir.1999); see also Hermanek, 289 F.3d at 1101 (Although appellants attempt to characterize the prosecutor's argument as improper vouching, their contention is viewed more aptly as an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct for referring to facts not in evidence.). Accordingly, the prosecutor's trifecta comment was improper. Similarly, the prosecutor's repeated references to how he viewed the evidence were also improper. See id. at 1100 ([P]rosecutors' arguments not only must be based on facts in evidence, but should be phrased in such a manner that it is clear to the jury that the prosecutor is summarizing evidence rather than inserting personal knowledge and opinion into the case.). Wright next contends that the prosecutor manipulated or misstated the evidence and forced Wright to imply that Agent Andrews lied on the stand. He first argues that the prosecutor forced Wright to call Andrews a rogue agentin reference to the tactics she employed during Wright's interview. It is true that the prosecutor used the term rogue agent to refer to Agent Andrews, and Wright wound up adopting that term in response. See ER at 544-45. Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's statement, and her objection was sustained. There is no indication that the prosecutor was misstating evidence. Rather, he was engaging Wright in a fairly argumentative cross-examination in order to poke holes in Wright's version of the facts. There was nothing improper about the prosecutor's conduct in that instance. [16] Wright also takes issue with the way in which the prosecutor pitted Wright's credibility against the government's witnesses. He relies on United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 573 (9th Cir.2004), where we held it was improper to ask the defendant point blank whether the testifying agent lied, noting that the prosecutor referred several times in closing argument to the defendant calling the agent a liar. Id. at 567-68. In Combs, the prosecutor also impermissibly referenced the fact that if the jury believed the testifying agent had lied, the agent would have committed perjury, flush[ing] his ten-year career down the toilet. Id. at 568. Combs is distinguishable. The prosecutor did not force Wright to impugn Agent Andrews's testimony the same way the prosecutor did in Combs. Rather, in his closing argument, the prosecutor contrasted Wright's testimony with that of Agent Andrews and Detective Englander. Unlike in Combs, where the prosecutor explicitly forced the defendant to impugn the veracity of the agent's testimony, the prosecutor's argument here was not improper. See Molina, 934 F.2d at 1445 (In a case that essentially reduces to which of two conflicting stories is true, it may be reasonable to infer, and hence to argue, that one of the two sides is lying.); see also United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d 511, 520 (9th Cir.1998) (distinguishing Molina on the grounds that in Garcia-Guizar, the prosecutor interjected his own personal opinions about the defendant's and government witness's credibility); United States v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir.1997) (Criticism of defense theories and tactics is a proper subject of closing argument.). Finally, Wright argues that the prosecutor improperly insulted him several times throughout cross-examination and in the prosecutor's closing argument. Wright points to the following examples: (1) referring to Wright's statement that he used pornography to avoid being promiscuous, the prosecutor stated Like are those the only two options? I mean couldn't you be in a committed relationship?; (2) the prosecutor asked Wright during cross-examination, You're proud of your collection of child pornography, aren't you? (Wright responded: No, it actually disgusts me that people would trade such things.); (3) the prosecutor referred to T-shirt slogans Wright came up with for his business OffensiveTs.com; (4) the prosecutor told the jury that Wright's practice of burning blockbuster movies was illegal; and (5) the prosecutor responded to the defense's theory that law enforcement was out to get him by telling the jury that Wright was not Pablo Escobar or the Larry Flynt of child pornography. Not one of these statements was improper. Prosecutors have considerable leeway to strike `hard blows' based on the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence. United States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 652 (9th Cir.2000) (holding prosecutor's statements that the defendant had an excuse for everything and was trying to skirt the lawjust like he tries to skirt everything else were not improper) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Rude, 88 F.3d 1538, 1547-48 (9th Cir.1996) (not improper for prosecutor to refer to the defendants as crooks, or evil at least eleven times, or to use other derogatory remarks such as con man, or trolling around for victims over 90 times). Having established that at least some of the prosecutor's statements in this case were improper, Wright must also establish prejudice. The question is whether it is more probable than not that the prosecutor's conduct materially affected the fairness of the trial. Hermanek, 289 F.3d at 1102. Wright has not established prejudice. The improper statements were relatively isolated incidents over the course of a ten day trial. The trifecta comment was by far the most egregious statement made by the prosecutor, though it too was mitigated by defense counsel's excellent rebuttal, which focused extensively on the three defenses to which the prosecutor's trifecta comment referred. While Wright's credibility was certainly a key issue at trial, there is no indication that the jury discredited his testimony. Rather, the jury acquitted Wright of Counts 1 and 4-10, reinforc[ing the] conclusion that the prosecutor's remarks did not undermine the jury's ability to view the evidence independently and fairly. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18 n. 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (finding no plain error despite prosecutor's improper vouching based in part on the fact that the jury acquitted the defendant of the most serious charge he faced); United States v. de Cruz, 82 F.3d 856, 863-64 (9th Cir.1996) (finding allegedly improper prosecutorial comments to be harmless where the jury acquitted defendant of one of the charges, indicating its ability to weigh the evidence without prejudice). Other than the trifecta comment, the prosecutor's misconduct was fairly mild and was mitigated by the court's general jury instructions, given at the beginning of trial, as well as at the end of the prosecutor's closing argument and during the final jury instructions that [a]rguments and statements by lawyers are not evidence. See United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1280 (9th Cir. 1993) (general instruction sufficient to cure mild vouching). Accordingly, the prosecutor's improper statements amounted to harmless error.
On July 27, 2006, the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub.L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (the Adam Walsh Act), was signed into law. Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m), the Adam Walsh Act altered the balance of pre-trial criminal discovery under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under Rule 16, the government must turn over to the defense material evidence obtained from the defendant that the government intends to use in its case-in-chief. Before the Act, courts had held that such material includes mirror image copies of computer evidence in child pornography cases. See United States v. Hill, 322 F.Supp.2d 1081, 1091 (C.D.Cal.2004) (Kozinski, J., sitting by designation). However, now under the Adam Walsh Act, a court shall deny, in any criminal proceeding, any request by the defendant to copy, photograph, duplicate, or otherwise reproduce any property or material that constitutes child pornography..., so long as the Government makes the property or material reasonably available to the defendant.  18 U.S.C. § 3509(m)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The Act goes on to define reasonably available as providing the defendant ample opportunity for inspection, viewing, and examination at a Government facility of the property or material by the defendant, his or her attorney, and any individual the defendant may seek to qualify to furnish expert testimony at trial. Id. § 3509(m)(2)(B). Wright raises three arguments with respect to his access to a mirror-image copy of his computer hard drive in this case. First, he argues that the hard drive was not made reasonably available to him, thus violating a number of constitutional rights; [17] second, he claims that the district court erred in denying Wright a mid-trial continuance that would have allowed him an additional day to subject the hard drive to forensic testing; and third, he contends that the Federal Public Defender (FPD) and its expert are employees of the court under the meaning of the Act, and the FPD office is a government facility under the Act. As Wright claims the violation of a number of constitutional rights based on the evidence not being made reasonably available to him, our review of that issue is de novo. See United States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2007) (de novo review of Confrontation Clause claims based on exclusion of an area of inquiry); United States v. Bahamonde, 445 F.3d 1225, 1228 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2006) (de novo review of denial of due process and compulsory process claims). We review the district court's denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir.2005). We review de novo questions of the Adam Walsh Act's construction. United States v. Kaczynski, 551 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir.2009).
On November 14, 2006, the parties entered into a stipulation and protective order outlining Wright's access to a bit-by-bit image copy of Wright's hard drive. The stipulation provided for the evidence to remain in the care, custody and control of the United States Attorney's Office. Defense counsel and the defense expert, Rick Lavaty, were permitted to access the evidence; the stipulation provided that they would be buzzed in during regular office hours to the U.S. Attorney's Office and that when it was not being analyzed, the hard drive was to remain in a secure location. The U.S. Attorney's Office established a secure space for the defense expert to set up his own equipment and conduct the examination. If it was necessary, the expert was permitted to leave his computer and the hard drive running overnight. At the conclusion of each session, the hard drive was to be returned to an authorized employee at the office where it would be placed back in a secure location. The government agreed not to look at any material the defense team may leave in the secure space, including, but not limited to, exhibits and documents, nor ... perform any forensic analysis of the bit-by-bit hard drive provided to the defense team. If the computer was left running overnight, the government promised to make reasonable attempts to be sure no one uses the offered secure space in the defense expert's absence. After the parties entered into the stipulation, Lavaty assembled a computer forensics cart to take over to the U.S. Attorney's Office for his examinations. On November 27, 2006, defense counsel told the district court that Lavaty felt comfortable with the stipulation and protective order and planned on commencing his examination. Counsel estimated that Lavaty needed approximately 150 hours for the full forensics exam and to create all the exhibits necessary for trial. The defense was permitted to access the evidence for fourteen monthsthat is, from November 14, 2006 (the date of the stipulation), to the start of the trial on January 17, 2008. Over the course of that time, defense counsel raised various budget, timing, and staffing problems that counsel maintained were preventing the defense from adequately examining the hard drive. On January 4, 2008, less than two weeks before trial (which had been adjourned numerous times up to that point), Wright moved to continue trial based on Lavaty's inability to finish his examination, citing Lavaty's other obligations with the FPD office. Counsel also noted that her own schedule and work demands had prevented her from concentrating fully on the case. The district court denied the continuance. Wright renewed the motion one week later, on January 11, 2008, but it was denied again. Wright argues that the evidence was not made reasonably available to him because the district court failed to recognize the defense office's budget and staffing problems, Lavaty's other duties with the FPD office, and the court's earlier denial of Wright's request for an outside expert, which was denied because it was deemed too costly. Interpretation of the Adam Walsh Act is an issue of first impression in this circuit; indeed, the Seventh Circuit is the only Court of Appeals yet to consider the Act. See United States v. Shrake, 515 F.3d 743 (7th Cir.2008) (rejecting a facial challenge to the Act's constitutionality). There are a number of district court cases considering whether defendants were given ample opportunity for inspection, viewing, and examination at a Government facility of child pornography material, yet none of those cases is particularly helpful to Wright. Wright principally relies on United States v. Knellinger, 471 F.Supp.2d 640 (E.D.Va.2007). There, the district court concluded that the defendant had not been given an ample opportunity to conduct an examination of the evidence and thus ordered the government to turn over to the defendant a copy of the hard drive. Id. at 650. In Knellinger, the defendant intended to pursue the theory that the child pornography he was charged with possessing was not produced using real minors. Id. at 647; see Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002). The defendant's expert witnesses, who would have to be privately retained, testified that they would not agree to work on the case if they could only perform their examination at a government facility. Knellinger, 471 F.Supp.2d at 647-48. One expert testified that while he normally charged approximately $135,000 for his services in a child pornography case, he would charge approximately $540,000, excluding moving expenses, in a case in which he had to analyze the material away from his office. Id. at 647. He also testified that even if he were to perform his examination at a government facility, he wouldn't be able to service the client or the attorney effectively. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, he would not agree to work on a case like Knellinger's. Similarly, another expert testified that he would not work on the case because of the difficulty associated with moving equipment to, and adequately performing his analytical work in, a Government facility. Id. at 648. Therefore, the terms of the Adam Walsh Act effectively precluded the defendant from pursuing his only viable defense. Knellinger is easily distinguishable. Unlike in Knellinger, Wright's forensic expert, Lavaty, claimed he was comfortable with the parties' terms for providing Wright access to the hard drive. Wright was afforded fourteen months to conduct his examination and does not claim that the agreed upon terms entered into by the parties precluded Wright from pursuing a viable defense theory. Rather, Wright bases much of his argument on the fact that prior to the Adam Walsh Act being passed into law, the district court found that the government's proposed terms of access would hamper defendant's preparation of this case, and thus ordered the government to provide Wright a mirror copy of the hard drive. [18] However, that ruling bears little, if any, relevance to whether the government's proposed terms provided Wright with ample opportunity to examine the evidence. Wright's argument essentially boils down to the following contention: the Adam Walsh Act requires that the defendant and the government have equal access to the child pornography evidence. Yet this is not what the Act provides. It provides only that the defendant be given ample opportunity to examine the evidence. In any event, none of the cases that Wright cites is apposite. For example, in United States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453, 1469 (9th Cir.1984), we held that the government is required to identify witnesses to the crime whose testimony may be exculpatory. It was in that context that we observed that [b]oth sides have an equal right, and should have an equal opportunity, to interview [such witnesses]. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor does the Seventh Circuit's decision in Shrake help Wright. In Shrake, after rejecting the defendant's facial challenge to § 3509(m), the court expressed its concern over the fact that the prosecution provided its own private expert consultant an exact copy of the hard drive, but denied the defense the same. 515 F.3d at 746. The court stated that rather than asking the district court to foreclose testimony by the prosecution's expert, which the district court denied doing, [t]he appropriate reliefwhich defense counsel never soughtwould have been access on equal terms. Id. at 747. Shrake had no occasion to define what it meant by access on equal terms. However, by access, the court appears to have been referring to the types of forensic tools each side had available to it in performing its examination. Indeed, the court noted that Shrake's counsel did not seek access on equal terms, perhaps because the prosecution's expert did not use any forensic tool that was unavailable to the defense expert when he examined the hard drive. Id. Thus, any defense request for access on equal terms would have been pointless. In any event, Shrake clearly does not hold that the defendant and the government must be given an equal amount of time to examine the evidence, which is Wright's main contention. We need not define the exact parameters of what it means to give a defendant ample opportunity to examine child-pornography evidence. Wright was permitted to access the hard drive for a period of fourteen months in a secure location within the U.S. Attorney's Office. Wright makes no claim that the parties' arrangement threatened to disrupt the attorney-client relationship or that the defense team's work product was compromised in any way. In short, Wright was given ample opportunity for inspection, viewing, and examination under the Act. See United States v. Cordy, 560 F.3d 808, 816 (8th Cir.2009) (in a case governed by the Adam Walsh Act, defense counsel had adequate time for trial preparation based on having access to the computer data for three months).
Next, Wright argues that the district court improperly denied his request for a one-day mid-trial continuance so that Lavaty could conduct further forensic testing. Wright claims that the testing was necessary to rebut the government's argument that the mIRC file server was installed long before 2002 (when Dittfurth moved in with Wright). Practically, this weakened Wright's defensethat Dittfurth was the person responsible for the child pornography. According to the government, Wright installed the mIRC program on his computer in November 2000. On Day 7 of the trial, during voir dire, the prosecutor asked Lavaty his opinion about when Wright installed the mIRC program on his computer. The prosecutor tried to establish that the program was installed in 2000, not 2002 as Lavaty had testified. The prosecutor's theory was that the 2002 creation date for the mIRC fileswhich Lavaty testified showed that Wright installed the program in 2002was due to the installation of a newer version of the mIRC program, thus replacing the older 2000 version. Lavaty admitted that this was a possible explanation, but also offered reasons for discounting such a theory. After the prosecutor asked, Did you test that? Lavaty conceded that he had not. Wright argues that the government's theorythat the mIRC program had been installed in 2000was not disclosed to the defense until just five days before the start of trial. When Lavaty admitted on the stand that he had not tested for the reasons he gave for a 2002 installation date, Wright asked for a one-day continuance so that Lavaty could conduct the requisite tests. The court denied the request. Wright argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying Wright's request for a continuance. We disagree. First, on January 11, six days before the start of trial, Wright moved for a continuance because the government had apparently just disclosed (five days prior) an expert report alleging that the mIRC and file-server programs were installed in 2000. Wright told the district court that the continuance was necessary because the government's newly disclosed evidence relates specifically to Count 1 of the indictment which is the ten-year mandatory minimum count in the report of the forensic examination which was done just this last Tuesday by their file server expert who is the guy who wrote the program. The jury acquitted Wright of Count 1. Therefore, to the extent that the continuance would have allowed Wright to better prepare his defense as to Count 1, he has not established prejudice. See Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d at 1139 (holding that the defendant must establish prejudice from the denial of a continuance). However, it is not entirely clear that the government's theory about the 2000 installation date related only to Count 1. To the extent it related to the other alleged counts, Wright was given a total of eleven days (seven business days) prior to the start of trial to rebut the government's evidence. This was more than enough time. See United States v. Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir.1983) ([F]airness requires that adequate notice be given the defense to check the findings and conclusions of the government's experts. (quoting United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir.1969) (internal quotation marks omitted))). Moreover, despite Lavaty's concession that he did not test for the 2002 theory, he provided persuasive support during his testimony even in the absence of testing. When the prosecutor concluded his voir dire, defense counsel established on direct examination that Lavaty's 2002 theory was certainly possible. Indeed, Lavaty testified that it was his belief that the mIRC program was installed on Wright's computer in December 2002. Cf. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d at 1138 (denial of the continuance resulted in the defendant's inability to present any evidence that might rebut the government's medical assertions (emphasis added)). As we held above, Wright was given ample opportunity to prepare his defense. Yet even without considering the fourteen months the defense team had to conduct forensic testing, it had over a week to prepare expert testimony in response to the government's theory that Wright installed the file-server software in 2000. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wright's motion for a one-day mid-trial continuance.