Opinion ID: 1109439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether The Terms Of The Trust Created By The Testator Are So Vague, Ambiguous and Uncertain As To Render The Trust Void

Text: Here Davis asserts that the term education is ambiguous, citing numerous examples of education which are non-traditional and claiming the trust gives no guidance as to which pursuits are or are not education. Next, the designation of beneficiaries makes the trust void for vagueness. So too does the fact that the phrase not allow any of the descendants of F.A. Anderson, Sr. to take advantage is uncertain, or so we are told. We find no merit in Davis' challenge that education is too broad and ambiguous. We begin with the general premise that If the trustee is to use trust funds to provide for the `education' of a beneficiary, the type of education to be furnished will depend on his express directions or the reasonable implications arising from all the circumstances of the case. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 811, p. 28 (2d ed. 1981). There is a wonderful, old case on point concerning Martha Washington's devise of stock in trust for the proper education of her three nephews and to fit them for some useful trade. Dandridge v. Washington's Executors, 2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 370, 7 L.Ed. 454 (1829). In part the dispute was whether the money should be limited to the pursuit of a mechanical trade or more broadly defined. Chief Justice Marshall wrote: But we do not think the bequest is confined to the expense of acquiring the trade so as to be enabled to exercise it in the common way. Such does not appear to have been the intent of the testatrix. Her bounty is extended to the proper education of three relatives so that they may be severally fitted and accomplished in some useful trade. Their education is a primary object, as well as their acquisition of the trade, and when we consider the situation and character of the parties and the language of the will, we cannot doubt that the testatrix intended such education as would fit her relatives to hold a distinguished place in that line of life in which she designed them to move. The sum allowed for the object ought to be liberal such as would accomplish it if the fund from which it was to be drawn would admit of it. Dandridge, 2 Pet. (27 U.S.) at 377, 7 L.Ed. at 457. We have spoken directly to this issue. In Simpson v. Watkins, 162 Miss. 242, 139 So. 400 (1932), this Court was called upon to interpret provisions in what it deemed an education will. One fourteen-year-old nephew then sued for expenses to attend a private boarding school as opposed to the fine system of public schools of Jackson, Mississippi. In affirming the trustee's allowance, the Court had this to say: Education in its true sense means much more than the acquisition of knowledge out of the pages of textbooks. A testator having such a breadth of vision as this testator has, evidenced by his will, could scarcely have failed to have in mind that a true education includes the inculcation of the precept of a respectable economy and a just regard for the rights and interests of others. Simpson, 162 Miss. at 250, 139 So. at 402. The Court concluded: Without further length of elaboration we will quote and adopt the resume of the question at issue as made by the chancellor in his decree which resume is in the following words: That the trustees are vested with sufficient discretion by necessary implication to administer the trust estate with such reasonable and prudent economy as may be required to accomplish the ultimate goal and real intent to the testator, and to this end may adopt reasonable plans, regulations and schedules for the submission and allowance of educational expenses of beneficiaries. Simpson, 162 Miss. at 251, 139 So. at 402. Other states have addressed the issue. In McGehee v. Smith, 248 Ala. 174, 26 So.2d 861 (1946), a trust in part for the reasonable education of testator's son was held to be broad: The word education is a broad and comprehensive term and has a variable and indefinite meaning, and the appellants contend that the testator, by the use of the word education did not intend for the said trust funds to be used for the maintenance and support of Howard while he is in high school. The answer to this question thus raised depends upon the ascertained intent of the testator and this intention may be gathered not only from within the instrument itself, but also from the circumstances which surrounded the testator when the will was made, including the situation and condition of his estate, his relations with his family and beneficiaries, and their situation and condition. McGehee, 248 Ala. at 178, 26 So.2d at 864. A trustee whose duty it was to apply the trust income and principal to the support and education of a minor, bought him an automobile and supplies for it in order that the boy could commute to school and live outside a large city. The trustee's action was held valid. Indianhead National Bank v. Theriault, 97 N.H. 212, 84 A.2d 828 (1952). Under a trust which permitted the trustee to spend up to $2,000.00 a year for the support and education of grandchildren, the trustee may expend $1800.00 a year to provide rearing and training for a mongoloid grandchild. In Re Besso's Estate, 220 N.Y.S.2d 475, 30 Misc.2d 766 (1961). The intent of Charles Maurice Anderson, as that intent may be gleaned from the words and expressions that appear in his will, is our touchstone. That intent signals a broad discretion vested in the trustee. While equity among beneficiaries is certainly a factor to be considered, the trustee has clear authority to consider as well the special needs, aptitude and diligence of each beneficiary  to be as liberal as possible without allowing unfair advantage. Nothing in the testator's plan mandates equality in distributions, nor are trust benefits restricted to college education, nor are they available only to the young. Should one of the descendants of F.A. Anderson, Sr., prove exceptionally talented in music, the trustee may well finance (a reasonable portion of) that child's education at Julliard. And the same of another's pursuit of an M.B.A. at Wharton, or a third's attendance at Andover, or a young child's enrollment in a Montessori School. The trustee may purchase an Encyclopaedia Britannica for one beneficiary, a personal computer for another, athletic equipment for a third. If perchance a problem of substance should arise regarding a particular expenditure, the Chancery Court, upon proper application, would have authority to afford such direction as may be needed. See Estate of Bunch v. Heirs of Bunch, 485 So.2d 284, 285-87 (Miss. 1986); In Re Estate of Hall, 193 So.2d 587, 591-92 (Miss. 1967). Davis' other points are too devoid of merit to warrant discussion.