Opinion ID: 2511836
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Third Factor Under KRPC 3.8(e)

Text: McKinnon's brief also does not argue the third factor under KRPC 3.8(e) whether the prosecution has another feasible alternative to obtain the information it seeks from her. At oral argument, however, McKinnon's counsel suggested that the State failed to establish this factor, because its investigator could have determined the former client's identity by checking the court files of the seven newly endorsed witnesses to determine the one from whose case the Public Defender's Office withdrew during the first half of 2007. Counsel for the State acknowledged at oral argument that such a review of the witnesses' court files was possible and that he did not know whether it had occurred. The detective's testimony, the only evidence in the record on the extent and results of the State's investigation after McKinnon's motion to withdraw, makes no mention of such an effort being undertaken. As with the first factor under KRPC 3.8(e), the issue before us is factual rather than legal. Is there substantial competent evidence in the record as it exists to support the district judge's determination on this factor? The answer is no. Again, the only evidence as to the third factor was the testimony of Moore, the detective who conducted the fruitless interviews of the seven newly endorsed witnesses. Although Moore said he believed that there were no other possible avenues of investigation, as oral argument to this court demonstrated, it would have taken little time and less imagination to discern other directions and strategies more likely to lead to helpful information. Unless these directions and strategies were attempted and failed, the State did not demonstrate that there were no feasible alternatives other than to coerce McKinnon's testimony. Even if the crime-fraud exception arose to defeat the attorney-client privilege under the first factor of KRPC 3.8(e), the third factor should have prevented issuance of the McKinnon subpoena in the first place or prevented its enforcement on her motion to quash. The judgment of the district court is reversed and vacated, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. DAVIS, C.J., not participating. LARRY T. SOLOMON, District Judge, assigned. [1]