Opinion ID: 853303
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Internet and Misappropriation

Text: The Internet offers its subscribers access to a myriad of functions. These functions include the opportunity to communicate, share and even exploit intellectual property. As a prelude to our examination of business law provisions applicable to misappropriation on the Internet, we discuss the nature of the Internet and the deceptive activities that it confronts. Internet 101. The Internet is an international aggregation of networks that connects numerous individual computer networks and computers. [11] This system of networks, also called the World Wide Web (WWW), has been described as a highly diffuse and complex system over which no entity has authority or control. [12] Most North American websites on the Internet register with an organization called InterNIC and receive a unique identifying number called an Internet Protocol (IP) address. For convenience, most of these numeric addresses are also assigned corresponding textual addresses. For example, Microsoft's IP address is 131.107.1.7, which can also be accessed by its textual address, microsoft.com. This textual address is referred to as the domain name. WWW registrants frequently select domain names that identify the registrant's name or interest, for the same reasons businesses and individuals have historically sought telephone numbers that were easy to remember. As visitors to websites delve further and further into a website beyond its home page, each web page is stored and accessed as a separate file located by a unique address called a Uniform Resource Locator (URL). The last three letters of most domain names are the highest level domain reference and serve as the primary information Internet computers use to locate and identify the website sought. Current highest level domains include .com for businesses, .net for Internet services, .edu for educational institutions, .gov for government agencies, .mil for military connections, and .org for non-profit organizations. Therefore, an Internet user can connect to the White House's website by typing in the address field the following: http://www.whitehouse.gov. [13] In addition to supporting the Web, the Internet also facilitates personalized communication through electronic mail (e-mail). The portion of e-mail addresses to the left of the @ symbol is the user identification and typically identifies the account owner, while that portion of the address to the right of the @ symbol is the domain name of the mail server. For example, a person can e-mail the President by addressing the message to president@whitehouse.gov. [14] Nearly anyone can create a website or an e-mail address. Using readily available software, the task requires little skill or investment. An individual can currently acquire and register a unique domain name (web address), a customizable website and a corresponding e-mail address for about $70 a year. [15] Such ease and affordability have stimulated commercial businesses, educational institutions, organizations and individuals to participate in Internet communication. People purchase websites, register domain names, and establish e-mail addresses to efficiently and effectively market and promote products, services and ideas to the literal world of the WWW. The ease of initiating these transactions also tempts the interests of wrongdoers, particularly in the context of domain name registrations. [16] As alluded to earlier, the organization in charge of maintaining the registration of North American domain names is InterNIC. Initially, registration of domain names occurred on a first-come, first-served basis. This policy was discontinued after more businesses began registering names and conflicts in requested names multiplied. [17] The original policy permitted many enterprising individuals to attain domain names that were identical or significantly similar to trademarked names that had not yet been registered on the Internet. [18] These individuals, sometimes referred to as cyberpredators, may be further sub-categorized according to their purpose for registering a popular name. Cybersquatters are individuals who register domain names that are well known, not to use the addresses, but to re-sell them at a profit. For example, the domain name wallstreet.com was sold for $1 million. Cybersquatters who register previously trademarked names rarely prevail in litigation between the squatter and the holder of the trademark. [19] Unlike cybersquatters, copycats register a domain name and use the address to operate a website that intentionally misleads users into believing they are doing business with someone else. Copycats either beat the legitimate organization to a domain name or register a close variation of an organization's domain name. The latter most frequently occurs when a unique spelling of an organization's name and/or domain name makes a close, but different spelling believable to a web user. Copycat domain name use is intentionally inimical to the trademark owner. For example, in Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629(KMW) 1997 WL 133313, at ,  (S.D.N.Y. Mar.24, 1997), aff'd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 834, 119 S.Ct. 90, 142 L.Ed.2d 71 (1998), the defendant was enjoined from using the domain name plannedparenthood.com, which he had previously registered and used to display anti-abortion material. Similarly, in Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F.Supp. 282, 290-91, 313 (D.N.J.1998), the defendant was enjoined from using the registered domain name jewsforjesus.org, where he had previously created a website for the purpose of contradicting the teachings of the actual Jews for Jesus organization. Our previous example, whitehouse.gov, has also fallen prey to a notorious, though unlitigated, example of copycat use. Felsher's Folios. Felsher's actions seem to fall in this second category of cyberpredators. He created the imposter websites and e-mail addresses for the sole purpose of harming the reputation of the University and its officials. Thus, it might seem appropriate to grant the University the relief gained by the plaintiffs in Planned Parenthood and Jews for Jesus. These plaintiff organizations, however, based their claims on provisions of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a), (c) (trademark infringement, trademark dilution, unfair competition and false designation of origin). Planned Parenthood, 1997 WL 133313, at ; Jews for Jesus, 993 F.Supp. at 294. These trademark actions require commercial use of the domain name. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (1999) (noncommercial use of a mark is not actionable under this section). Courts have held, The mere registration of a domain name, without more, is not a `commercial use' of a trademark. Jews for Jesus, 993 F.Supp. at 307 (citations omitted). The Lanham Act does not include claims for non-commercial use of a trademark in order to prevent courts from enjoining constitutionally protected speech. Id. (citing Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F.Supp. 1296, 1303 [C.D.Cal. 1996]). In any event, the plaintiffs here do not assert a right to relief under the Lanham Act, so we need not debate whether the commercial use requirement for trademark actions is satisfied by domain name registration and corresponding presentation of information on a website. Applicable Law. Amici curiae argue that an appropriate remedy for the misappropriation of a corporation name or likeness is found under the state unfair competition law and trademark statutes, as well as common law torts unrelated to notions of privacy, such as tortious interference with business relations. [20] (Amici Curiae Br. at 5.) We agree. Indiana Unfair Competition. Indiana courts have created a cause of action for unfair competition, defined as the attempt to create confusion concerning the source of the unfair competitor's goods. Westward Coach Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 388 F.2d 627, 633 (7th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 927, 88 S.Ct. 2286, 20 L.Ed.2d 1386 (1968) (citations omitted). See Rader v. Derby, 120 Ind.App. 202, 89 N.E.2d 724 (1950); Hartzler v. Goshen Churn & Ladder Co., 55 Ind.App. 455, 104 N.E. 34 (1914). This common law tort was historically considered a subspecies of the class of torts known as tortious interference with business or contractual relations. William L. Prosser, Prosser, Law of Torts 956 (4th ed. 1971). [21] In Hartzler, our appellate court described unfair competition as any conduct, the natural and probable tendency and effect of which is to deceive the public so as to pass off the goods or business of one person as and for that of another.... 55 Ind.App. at 464, 104 N.E. at 37 (citation omitted). The court further explained: Unfair competition is always a question of fact. The question to be determined in every case is whether or not, as a matter of fact, the name or mark used by defendant has previously come to indicate and designate plaintiff's goods, or to state it another way, whether defendant, as a matter of fact, is by his conduct passing off his goods as plaintiff's goods, or his business as plaintiff's business. 55 Ind.App. at 465-66, 104 N.E. at 38 (citation omitted). Professor Prosser's successor has characterized such causes of action in the following manner: Unfair competition ... does not describe a single course of conduct or a tort with a specific number of elements; it instead describes a general category into which a number of new torts may be placed when recognized by the courts. The category is open-ended, and nameless forms of unfair competition may be recognized at any time for the protection of commercial values. W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 1015 (5th ed. 1984). Professor Prosser himself illustrated unfair competition this way: Though trade warfare may be waged ruthlessly to the bitter end, there are certain rules of combat which must be observed. The trader has not a free lance. Fight he may, but as a soldier, not as a guerilla. William L. Prosser, Prosser, Law of Torts 956 (4th ed. 1971). Indiana Trademark Act. The Indiana Trademark Act, contained in Indiana Code chapter 24-2-1, adopts a similar test for the infringement of trademarks registered in the state. The act does not adversely affect the rights or the enforcement of rights in trademarks acquired in good faith at any time at common law. Ind.Code Ann. § 24-2-1-15 (West 1995). The act provides: [A]ny person who shall: (a) use, without the consent of the registrant, any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a trademark registered under this chapter in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive as to the source or origin of such goods or services ... shall be liable to a civil action by the owner of such registered trademark for any or all of the remedies provided in ... this chapter.... Id. at § 24-2-1-13. The act defines a trademark as any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a person to identify goods or services made, sold, or rendered by him and to distinguish them from goods or services made, sold, or rendered by others. Id. at § 24-2-1-2(a). Registration of the trademark with the office of the Secretary of State provides the registrant a remedy against the infringement of the registered trademark. Id. at §§ 24-2-1-4, 13, 14. [22] It is frequently feasible to pour new wine into old legal bottles. A number of these statutes and common law rules might well suffice as a foundation for the relief sought by the University. They have not been pled, however, and we find it difficult to use them here as a basis to sustain the trial court's judgment, as we sometimes do, on any grounds apparent in the record. [23]