Opinion ID: 527148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discrimination Because of Sex

Text: 11 The EPA prohibits wage discrimination on the basis of sex in section 206(d)(1), which provides in pertinent part: 12 No employer ... shall discriminate ... between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees ... at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex ... for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.... 13 29 U.S.C. Sec. 206(d)(1). 14 Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). 3 If the jurisdictional prerequisites of both the EPA and Title VII are satisfied, a violation of the EPA is also a violation of Title VII. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1620.27(a). 15 In order to establish a prima facie case under the EPA, the plaintiff must show that an employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes 'for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.'  Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 2228, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974) (quoting 29 U.S.C. Sec. 206(a)(1)). Plaintiff need only show discrimination in pay against an employee vis-a-vis one employee of the opposite sex. Brock v. Georgia Southwestern College, 765 F.2d 1026, 1033 n. 10 (11th Cir.1985). If, however, other appropriate comparators, i.e., employees doing substantially equal work, were wrongly excluded from the comparison by plaintiff, defendant must call them to the attention of the court. Id. 16 The EEOC alleged that the two women who operated the truss saw were paid less than men performing the identical job. In addition, plaintiff claimed that the charging parties working in the Craftwood operation were paid at a lower rate than men working full-time in Craftwood, performing similar jobs. Appellant contends, however, that appellee failed to establish a case of discrimination on the basis of sex. Appellant argues that wages were set according to an employee's experience in construction work, i.e., a factor other than sex, and productivity. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 206(d)(1). Thus, appellant essentially raises on appeal the affirmative defenses the district court rejected in appellant's belated motion to amend its answer just before the trial commenced. The district court gave sufficient reasons for the denial from the bench, after hearing argument on the motion. The court stated, addressing appellant's counsel: 17 [T]he hornbook law is that affirmative defenses must be specifically pled. If this is an affirmative defense, you had a duty to plead it at least by the time of pre-trial. 18