Opinion ID: 1465010
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: financial discovery.

Text: In support of its argument that the trial court should not have ordered the discovery of Dr. Primm's financial records, MetLife relies almost entirely on the comment of our predecessor court in Current v. Columbia Gas of Kentucky, Ky., 383 S.W.2d 139 (1964), that while evidence of the expert witness's compensation is admissible at trial, the better rule is to limit the showing to the fact that payment is being made. To permit details of the compensation injects collateral matter into the trial. Id. at 144. However, we overruled that passage in our recent decision in Tuttle v. Perry, Ky., 82 S.W.3d 920 (2002). [9] Tuttle held that an expert witness may be questioned as to the amount of his or her compensation because it is widely believed that [expert witnesses] may be expected to express opinions that favor the party who engaged them and who pays their fees. Id. at 923. Thus, we held that juries are entitled, before relying on an expert's opinion, to know how much that expert is being paid for the opinion. Id. at 924. We now hold that an expert physician's annual Rule 35.01 income, and the percentage such examinations constitute of his general practice, is discoverable, subject, of course, to the relevant provisions of CR 26.03. Tuttle relied extensively on a decision by Maryland's highest court in Wrobleski v. Nora de Lara, 353 Md. 509, 727 A.2d 930 (1999), which addressed almost this very issue in the context of cross-examination. Id. at 517, 727 A.2d 930. As we noted in Tuttle , Wrobleski confronted the question of whether a Maryland trial court had erred by allowing inquiry as to the amount of income earned by the expert witness and the approximate portion of the witness's total income derived from serving as an expert witness. 82 S.W.2d at 923. Finding that it is generally appropriate for a party to inquire whether a witness offered as an expert in a particular field earns a significant portion or amount of income from applying that expertise in a forensic setting, Wrobleski held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Id. at 938. It is undeniable that an expert's tendency to slant his testimony may be affected not just by how much he is being compensated on one particular occasion, but also by how much of his annual income is derived from similar testimony. Tuttle, supra, at 923 (agreeing that certain expert witnesses derive a significant portion of their total income from testifying in litigation.); Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 784 (5th Cir.1980) ([a] showing of a pattern of compensation in past cases raises an inference of the possibility that the witness has slanted his testimony in those cases so he would be hired to testify in future cases.). A jury could reasonably believe that a physician who derives a substantial percentage of his annual income from CR 35.01 examinations, potentially earning hundreds of thousands of dollars every year from such examinations alone, might be tempted to slant his testimony to suit his employer. [10] As the Supreme Court of Illinois has noted, [T]he financial advantage which accrues to an expert witness in a particular case can extend beyond the remuneration he receives for testifying in that case. A favorable verdict may well help him establish a track record which, to a professional witness, can be all-important in determining not only the frequency with which he is asked to testify but also the price which he can demand for such testimony.... We thus find that it was proper to inquire how much Dr. Martins was earning annually from services relating to rendering expert testimony. Trower v. Jones, 121 Ill.2d 211, 117 Ill.Dec. 136, 520 N.E.2d 297, 300 (1988). In contrast, a physician conducting his first and only CR 35.01 examination, but earning the same fee, might face a lesser temptation. Yet, the jury would be unable to distinguish that physician from the professional witness if we were to flatly prohibit the discovery ordered in this case. We hold that such evidence is generally discoverable and that the extent to which it may be used for impeachment purposes at trial is within the sound discretion of the trial judge exercised pursuant to KRE 403 and KRE 611. Another issue here, however, is whether the evidence is discoverable by a court order directed to the party who employed the expert witness. We note at the outset that CR 26.01 permits discovery by one or more of the following methods: depositions upon oral examination [CR 30] or written questions [CR 31]; written interrogatories [CR 33]; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes [CR 34]; physical and mental examinations [CR 35]; and requests for admission [CR 36]. If discovery is sought by deposition, CR 45.04 provides the additional tool of a subpoena duces tecum. A court order is generally appropriate only upon the failure of a party or witness to comply with a proper discovery request. CR 37.01(b)(i). Afterkirk has never sought discovery through the methods described in CR 26.01. He simply requested an order requiring Dr. Primm, a nonparty, to produce his business and financial records or information contained therein pertaining to the number of CR 35.01 examinations performed by him and the income he derived therefrom. Such an order equates to a CR 37.01 order to comply with a CR 33 interrogatory or a CR 34 request for production of documents. However, both CR 33.01 and CR 34.01 apply only to interrogatories and requests for production directed to a party. It has long been the law that, while a nonparty witness can be required by subpoena duces tecum to produce in conjunction with the witness's deposition or trial testimony relevant and unprivileged documents in his or her possession, the witness cannot be ordered to produce those documents for purposes of discovery in advance of the testimony. Marion Nat. Bank v. Abell's Adm'x, 88 Ky. 428, 11 S.W. 300, 301 (1889). Adoption of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure effected no change in that respect. See Kurt A. Philipps, Jr., 6 Kentucky Practice, Rules of Civil Procedure Annotated, CR 34.01, Comment 5, at 642 (5th ed. West 1995) (Rule 34 relates only to parties to an action). See also Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 416 (9th Cir.1985) (Rule 34 may not be used to discover matters from a nonparty.); Fisher v. Marubeni Cotton Corp., 526 F.2d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir.1975) (production of documents from a nonparty can be compelled only by a subpoena duces tecum issued under CR 45.01's federal counterpart, FRCP 45(d)(1)); Wright, Miller & Marcus, 8A Federal Practice & Procedure: § 2108, supra, at 60. The order as actually entered requires MetLife to produce Dr. Primm's business and financial records or information contained therein. However, CR 34.01, as enforced through CR 37.01, permits production and inspection only of documents and other records which are in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served. See Phillips, supra, CR 34.01, Comment 3, at 641 (The only limitations upon the pursuit of this discovery method are that the materials or property be in the possession, custody or control of the party from whom discovery is sought and the discoverable matter must fall within the scope of Rule 26.02.). `Control' with respect to the production of documents is defined `not only as possession but as the legal right to obtain the documents requested upon demand.' Cochran Consulting, Inc. v. Uwatec USA, Inc., 102 F.3d 1224, 1229-30 (Fed.Cir.1996) ( quoting Searock v. Stripling, 736 F.2d 650, 653 (11th Cir.1984)). The fact that MetLife employed Dr. Primm to examine Afterkirk does not give MetLife the legal right to obtain upon demand Dr. Primm's business and financial records or information contained therein. Searock, supra, at 653-54 (purchaser of sunken vessel counterclaiming against seller for negligent design could not be compelled to produce documents in possession of persons and corporations hired by him to perform repair work on the vessel); Lewis v. Cotton Belt RouteSt. Louis S.W. Ry. Co., 217 Ill.App.3d 94, 159 Ill.Dec. 995, 576 N.E.2d 918, 928 (1991) (plaintiff could not be compelled to produce handwritten notes taken by nurse who accompanied plaintiff to Rule 35-equivalent examination because nurse was not an employee of plaintiff or counsel but an independent contractor). This is not to say that MetLife cannot be compelled to produce, pursuant to CR 33 and CR 34, records and information in its possession, custody or control, e.g., the number of examinations performed by Dr. Primm on its behalf and the amounts paid by it to Dr. Primm for examinations, reports, depositions and trial testimony; or that Dr. Primm cannot be compelled by subpoena duces tecum issued pursuant to CR 45.04 to produce at a properly noticed deposition or at trial the requested documents and information in his possession. We hold only that MetLife cannot be compelled to produce documents and information pertaining to Dr. Primm that are not in its possession, custody or control. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals with respect to that portion of the trial court's order that permits the CR 35.01 examination to be videotaped, reverse the Court of Appeals with respect to that portion of the order that requires MetLife to furnish documents and information solely within the possession, custody and control of Dr. Primm, and direct that the writ be issued with respect to that latter aspect of the trial court's order. All concur.