Opinion ID: 4514949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: admission of reply testimony

Text: The State argues the court of appeals erred in holding LaRosa's testimony was not limited to refuting Prather's testimony but was instead used to complete the State's case-in-chief. The State also contends the court of appeals erroneously held Prather could not have anticipated LaRosa's testimony. Prather argues the court of appeals properly reversed the trial court because LaRosa's testimony extended beyond rebutting Prather's testimony and introduced an entirely new forensic science the defense could not have anticipated. Prather contends the State should have offered LaRosa's testimony during its case-in-chief. As an additional sustaining ground, Prather argues the trial court abused its discretion in qualifying LaRosa as an expert in crime scene analysis and finding LaRosa's testimony reliable. Prather urges this Court to find this area of 'forensic science' is not scientifically valid because this kind of testimony has not been scientifically validated and is extremely controversial. In addition, Prather argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting LaRosa's testimony because the testimony improperly invaded the province of the jury because it related to Prather's intent. We will first address whether LaRosa's testimony satisfied the requirements of Rule 702 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence, and we will then address whether LaRosa's testimony was proper reply testimony.
We have previously referred to crime scene analysis testimony as nonscientific expert testimony. See State v. Tapp, 398 S.C. 376, 389, 728 S.E.2d 468, 475 (2012) (holding that although the law at the time of the trial instructed that the reliability of nonscientific expert testimony was a determination to be made by the jury, under later case law, the trial court was required to evaluate the reliability of the State's proposed expert's testimony in crime scene analysis and victimology). Courts in other jurisdictions have concluded crime scene analysis is a body of specialized knowledge. See State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 832 (Tenn. 2002) (The [crime scene analysis] testimony at issue in this case . . . is not based on scientific theory and methodology, but rather, is based on nonscientific 'specialized knowledge,' that is, the expert's experience.); Simmons v. State, 797 So. 2d 1134, 1151 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (internal citations omitted) (Crime-scene analysis, which involves the gathering and analysis of physical evidence, is generally recognized as a body of specialized knowledge. Therefore, because crime-scene analysis is not scientific evidence, we conclude that we are not bound by the test enunciated in Frye.). Thus, before admitting non-scientific expert witness testimony, a trial court must determine whether: (1) the qualifications of the expert are sufficient and (2) the subject matter of the expert's testimony is reliable. See State v. White, 382 S.C. 265, 273-74, 676 S.E.2d 684, 688-89 (2009) (citing Rule 702, SCRE). The qualification of an expert witness and the admissibility of the expert's testimony are matters within the trial court's sound discretion. State v. Chavis, 412 S.C. 101, 106, 771 S.E.2d 336, 338 (2015). A trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony will not be reversed absent a prejudicial abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the [trial] court are either controlled by an error of law or are based on unsupported factual conclusions. Id.
The test for qualification of an expert is a relative one that is dependent on the particular witness's reference to the subject. Wilson v. Rivers, 357 S.C. 447, 452, 593 S.E.2d 603, 605 (2004). To be competent to testify as an expert, 'a witness must have acquired by reason of study or experience or both such knowledge and skill in a profession or science that he is better qualified than the jury to form an opinion on the particular subject of his testimony.' Gooding v. St. Francis Xavier Hosp., 326 S.C. 248, 252-53, 487 S.E.2d 596, 598 (1997) (quoting O'Tuel v. Villani, 318 S.C. 24, 28, 455 S.E.2d 698, 701 (Ct. App. 1995), overruled on other grounds by I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 526 S.E.2d 716 (2000)). As noted above, LaRosa testified of his eighteen-year employment history with SLED and his extensive experience in crime scene analysis. His qualifications include two years of training with the FBI in its criminal profiler study program, his internship with a SCDMH forensic psychiatrist and psychologist (and his continuing relationship with SCDMH), as well as another internship with the FBI, during which he worked on active cases under peer-review by FBI supervisors. LaRosa testified he had been qualified as an expert in crime scene reconstruction and assessment in federal court and in general sessions court. He testified that in this case, he would combine forensics and crime scene reconstruction with the psychology and behavior exhibited at the instant crime scene to give an opinion only as to the number of people present after the crime had been committed. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding LaRosa was qualified as an expert in crime scene analysis.
Before admitting expert testimony, a trial court must qualify the expert and determine whether the subject matter of the expert's proposed testimony is reliable, as required by Rule 702, SCRE. See Tapp, 398 S.C. at 388-89, 728 S.E.2d at 47475; see also White, 382 S.C. at 273, 676 S.E.2d at 688 (Nonscientific expert testimony must satisfy Rule 702, both in terms of expert qualifications and reliability of the subject matter.). In Tapp, the trial court determined a witness was qualified in the field of crime scene analysis, but we held the trial court erroneously allowed the jury to resolve the question of whether his testimony was reliable. 398 S.C. at 389, 728 S.E.2d at 475. As noted above, even though we concluded the trial court erred in admitting the testimony without first resolving the threshold reliability issue, we held this error was harmless because the witness's testimony could not have contributed to the verdict. Id. at 390, 728 S.E.2d at 476. We have not had the occasion to review a trial court's finding that a crime scene analysis expert's testimony was reliable. The trial court found LaRosa's testimony to be sufficiently reliable to be admitted, as required by Rule 702, SCRE, and Tapp. However, the court of appeals' majority found expert testimony that speculates on the motives and mindset of a perpetrator to be suspect, particularly when based on crime scene photographs, instead of viewing the crime scene in person, 'some' of a codefendant's prior statements, and none of the mental health histories of the parties. Prather, 422 S.C. at 110 n.5, 810 S.E.2d at 426 n.5. As noted, LaRosa testified as to the phases of staging and undoing and the purposes of those acts. This type of testimony has been admitted as reliable crime scene analysis testimony in other jurisdictions. See Stevens, 78 S.W.3d at 829, 831, 835 (upholding the trial court's decision to limit an FBI expert's testimony to his analysis of the evidence found at the crime scene, including testimony regarding the staging of the crime scene and the possibility that the homicides were committed by more than one offender); People v. Jackson, 165 Cal. Rptr. 3d 70, 75, 83-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (holding an FBI agent's testimony was an indisputably admissible class of evidence, where the agent performed a crime scene assessment that was irrespective of who committed the crime, and [t]he purpose of his analysis was to behaviorally and forensically assess the crime and crime scene dynamics through the interaction of the offender or offenders, [the victim], and the location, in order to determine whether the crime scene had been staged, to focus on why the homicide occurred, and if an opinion could be rendered as to the offender's motive). Prather argues LaRosa's testimony amounted to a criminal profile and that criminal profiling is useful only as an investigative tool and is not sufficiently reliable to be admitted as expert testimony. A criminal profile is a collection of conduct and characteristics commonly displayed by those who commit a certain crime. People v. Robbie, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479, 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). A profile is simply an investigative technique. It is nothing more than a listing of characteristics that in the opinion of law enforcement officers are typical of a person engaged in a specific illegal activity. United States v. McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991). [T]he syllogism underlying profile evidence [is that] criminals act in a certain way; the defendant acted that way; therefore, the defendant is a criminal. Robbie, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 485. An example of a criminal profile can be found in State v. Spann, 334 S.C. 618, 513 S.E.2d 98 (1999). In Spann, an expert in crime scene analysis and criminal personality profiling testified on behalf of the defendant and profiled the killer of [ ] three women as a white male in his mid-20's to mid-30's with a history of mental illness, who was either single or had a dysfunctional marriage, a person with bizarre fantasies, a history of child abuse, and knowledge of the area. Id. at 621, 513 S.E.2d at 100. We did not approve profiling testimony in Spann; we simply noted in Spann that the defendant did not fit the expert's criminal profile. LaRosa did not examine the mental health histories of either Prather or Phillips, nor did he create criminal profiles for them. He also did not offer an opinion as to what either man did or did not do at the scene. LaRosa's testimony cannot be construed as drawing conclusions regarding the type of person(s) who committed the murder or the type of persons who carved on Victim's back and covered his body. Such testimony has been excluded in other jurisdictions as unreliable. See Stevens, 78 S.W.3d at 835 (holding the portion of the crime scene analysis expert's conclusions as to the type of individual who committed the crime based on the physical evidence found at the scene was unreliable and therefore inadmissible). LaRosa testified in general terms regarding the number of persons in there after the crime and never mentioned Prather's, Phillips', or Rabon's names. His testimony demonstrated the conflicting personalities of someone who staged the crime scene (carving and placement of the dildo) and someone who undid the crime scene (covering Victim). Importantly, LaRosa acknowledged he could not tell who participated in the killing of Victim. We conclude LaRosa's testimony did not rise to the level of criminal profiling. Unlike the court of appeals, we do not consider vital the fact that LaRosa did not visit the crime scene, reviewed only a portion of Phillips' statements to law enforcement, and did not review anyone's mental health history. The photographs and other information the State provided to LaRosa evidenced the superficial carving, the murdered Victim, and the placement of the pillow, blanket, and dildo— the pertinent information LaRosa needed to render his opinions. As we have stated several times, LaRosa's opinions went only to the number of personalities in there after the crime. LaRosa did not offer an opinion as to whether either personality murdered Victim, and he did not offer an opinion as to whether Rabon, Prather, or Phillips were involved in the staging or undoing. The mental health histories of Rabon, Prather, and Phillips were of no consequence to LaRosa's testimony on this point. We hold the trial court did not err in finding LaRosa's crime scene analysis testimony reliable. We share the reluctance of many courts to admit expert testimony in a criminal trial that rises to the level of a criminal profile of the perpetrator. We are also mindful that '[p]rofile' testimony and permissible expert opinion overlap, which underscores the necessity of objecting to questionable testimony during trial so that the trial court can limit any objectionable 'profile' aspect and channel the testimony toward admissible expert opinion instead. State v. Avendano-Lopez, 904 P.2d 324, 327 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). Our holding shall in no way be considered as our approval of criminal profiling evidence in the courts of this State.
The admission of reply testimony is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. Stewart, 283 S.C. 104, 106, 320 S.E.2d 447, 449 (1984). The admission of testimony which is arguably contradictory of and in reply to earlier testimony does not constitute an abuse of discretion. Id. Rather, [a]n abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support. State v. Jones, 416 S.C. 283, 290, 786 S.E.2d 132, 136 (2016). Reply testimony should be limited to rebuttal of matters raised by the defense. State v. Huckabee, 388 S.C. 232, 242, 694 S.E.2d 781, 786 (Ct. App. 2010). Any arguably contradictory testimony is proper on reply. State v. South, 285 S.C. 529, 535, 331 S.E.2d 775, 779 (1985). In State v. McDowell, we held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the examining pathologist to testify on reply that the murder victim's head was resting against a hard, flat object at the time the third shot was fired. 272 S.C. 203, 206-07, 249 S.E.2d 916, 917 (1978). The defendant argued the State was required to introduce the pathologist's testimony during its case-in-chief, and therefore, the testimony was improper. We held the pathologist's testimony was proper reply testimony to the defendant's testimony that the victim was standing when he fired the third shot, which was in direct opposition to his earlier statements. Id. We reasoned the pathologist's testimony was unnecessary until the defendant contradicted his statement to law enforcement that the victim was lying on the floor when he (the defendant) fired the last shot. Id. Here, the court of appeals' majority distinguished this case from McDowell and other cases, stating [u]nlike [those] cases, LaRosa's testimony was not proper reply testimony because the rebuttal should have been limited to refuting Prather's testimony, rather than to complete the State's case-in-chief. Prather, 422 S.C. at 106, 810 S.E.2d at 424. The majority cited Prather's testimony that he waited in his vehicle for Phillips for about ten minutes and that he denied carving anything into Victim's back or covering him with a blanket. The majority noted Prather did not testify to the number of perpetrators or as to anyone's motive for the carving, the placement of the dildo, or the covering of Victim. Id. at 107, 810 S.E.2d at 424. The majority also concluded LaRosa's broad expert testimony explain[ing] the crime scene could not reasonably be anticipated by Prather. Id. at 107, 810 S.E.2d at 424. We disagree. Prather testified that when he and Phillips left Victim's residence, Victim was alive, walking around, not mutilated, not covered, and not face-down in the couch. Prather further testified that Phillips went back inside the residence to find his shoes, leaving Prather in the car. The inferences arising from Prather's testimony are obvious—when Phillips went back inside the dwelling, he was alone with Victim, thus placing blame for the crimes solely upon Phillips. LaRosa's testimony provided another explanation for the number of people present immediately after Victim was murdered. Consequently, until Prather testified that Victim was alive, was not mutilated, and was not covered just before Phillips went back inside, LaRosa's testimony was unnecessary, much like the pathologist's testimony in McDowell. At the least, LaRosa's testimony was arguably contradictory to Prather's testimony. See South, 285 S.C. at 535, 331 S.E.2d at 779 (Any arguably contradictory testimony is proper on reply.). Although Prather did not testify about the motivation for someone to carve rapist into Victim's back or to cover Victim's body, LaRosa's testimony of the motives for staging and undoing was necessary to his conclusion that the two separate behaviors evidenced two conflicting personalities. This provided the foundation for LaRosa's testimony that two people were present after the crime and countered Prather's testimony that only one person was present at that time. See State v. Durden, 264 S.C. 86, 90, 212 S.E.2d 587, 589 (1975) (The reply testimony was made necessary by the evidence which the appellant had submitted. The reply testimony did not go beyond a refutation of that which the appellant's witness had asserted. It can hardly be argued that the appellant's counsel was taken by surprise.).
We also reject Prather's argument that LaRosa's testimony invaded the province of the jury by improperly injecting evidence of Prather's intent. Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. Rule 704, SCRE. Such testimony is admissible, so long as the expert does not opine on the criminal defendant's state of mind or guilt or testify on matters of law in such a way that the jury is not permitted to reach its own conclusion concerning the criminal defendant's guilt or innocence. State v. Commander, 396 S.C. 254, 269, 721 S.E.2d 413, 421 (2011). Again, LaRosa testified there were two personalities present after the crime. LaRosa did not directly or indirectly compare Prather's behavior to either of those personalities, and LaRosa did not offer an opinion as to who committed the murder. LaRosa's testimony allowed the jury to reach its own conclusion regarding Prather's state of mind. We hold the trial court did not err in admitting LaRosa's testimony.