Opinion ID: 1207881
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: finding of abuse

Text: Sherry D. first contends there was no evidence in the record to support the circuit court's initial finding that her conduct constituted child abuse or neglect. This Court has held that parental rights may be terminated on account of abuse even if the parent did not personally inflict the injuries. Syllabus Point 2 of In re Jeffrey R.L., 190 W.Va. 24, 435 S.E.2d 162 (1993), sets forth the standard for when parental rights may be terminated for failure to prevent abuse: `W.Va.Code, 49-1-3(a) (1984), in part, defines an abused child to include one whose parent knowingly allows another person to commit the abuse. Under this standard, termination of parental rights is usually upheld only where the parent takes no action in the face of knowledge of the abuse or actually aids or protects the abusing parent.' Syl. pt. 3, In re Betty J.W., 179 W.Va. 605, 371 S.E.2d 326 (1988). The circuit court found that Jonathan Brett D. intentionally abused his son and that Sherry D. was aware of the abuse and did nothing to prevent it. As we previously stated, this Court accords deference to such findings of fact. [9] A review of the record does not reflect the circuit court's findings were clearly erroneous. The medical evidence shows the baby suffered three major injuries within the first five months of his life, not to mention the numerous bruises about his back, face, and bottom. Sherry D. may not have been present when the abuse occurred, as she claims, but it could reasonably be inferred she possessed knowledge the abuse was occurring. Other family members questioned how the baby sustained the bruises and reported their suspicions to the Department. Sherry D. was aware her husband had received counseling for impulse control problems after the birth of their son. [10] Standing alone this factor is not determinative. However, considering the other evidence in this case, we find the circuit court's determination that Sherry D. was aware the abuse was occurring was substantially supported by the record. Courts oftentimes must rely upon circumstantial evidence in finding a parent liable for failing to protect his or her child from abuse even though he or she never actively participated in the abuse. Should the parents choose to support each other's version of what transpired, there may be no direct evidence to the contrary. Particularly when the victim of the abuse is a baby, as in this case, he or she cannot testify. In State v. Adams, 89 N.M. 737, 557 P.2d 586 (1976), the Court of Appeals of New Mexico affirmed the defendant's criminal conviction of child abuse resulting in the death of his twenty-eight-month-old daughter. The Adamses had a rationalization for all the child's bruises and injuriesfrom her playing with her brother to being accidently hit on the head with a glider. The defendant supported his wife's explanation for how their child was injured and eventually died. The court found his claims to be unconvincing. The circumstances leading to the child's death supported the inference that the father knew the abuse was occurring and failed to take action to stop it. [11] See also State v. Williquette, 129 Wis.2d 239, 385 N.W.2d 145 (1986) (mother failed to protect seven- and eight-year-old children from their father's abuse after they reported the abuse to her); but see Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979) (defendant's child abuse conviction reversed because she was not within the class of persons specified by the statute, i.e., a parent or guardian, even though she witnessed a friend beat her baby to death and did nothing to stop it).