Opinion ID: 853516
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Was the Sentence Erroneous?

Text: A. No Violation of Article I, Section 16. Ellis first argues that his 165-year sentence violates Article I, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution, which states, Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense. [10] In a recent examination of the purpose and scope of Section 16, we stated, The constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments proscribes atrocious or obsolete punishments and is aimed at the kind and form of the punishment, rather than the duration or amount. Dunlop, 724 N.E.2d 592, 597 (Ind.2000) (citing Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 542 (Ind.1998)). In Douglas v. State, we indicated that cruel and unusual punishment is that which constitutes only purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.... 481 N.E.2d 107, 112 (Ind.1985) (emphasis added). The 165-year sentence imposed upon Ellis does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. As for the proportionality clause in Section 16, our Dunlop opinion observed, We will find a sentence not proportional `only when a criminal penalty is not graduated and proportioned to the nature of an offense.' 724 N.E.2d at 597 (quoting Conner v. State, 626 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ind. 1993) (citation omitted)). [11] The record clearly indicates that the trial judge considered the nature of the offense when he fashioned the sentence. [12] (R. at 1165.) The 165-year sentence is not disproportional to the nature of the offenses committed. B. Mitigating Factor Properly Omitted. Ellis next argues that the trial court erred when it failed to find his relatively young age a mitigating circumstance. [13] (Appellant's Br. at 19.) Ellis was twenty-one years old when he committed the offenses. The finding of mitigating factors is not mandatory; it rests within the discretion of the trial court. Wingett v. State, 640 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ind.1994). A court is not obligated to credit or weigh a possible mitigating circumstance as defendant suggests it should be credited or weighed. Archer v. State, 689 N.E.2d 678, 684 (Ind. 1997). Only when the trial court fails to find a significant mitigator that is clearly supported by the record is there a reasonable belief that it was improperly overlooked. Legue v. State, 688 N.E.2d 408, 411 (Ind.1997). Focusing on chronological age is a common shorthand for measuring culpability, but for people in their teens and early twenties it is frequently not the end of the inquiry. There are both relatively old offenders who seem clueless and relatively young ones who appear hardened and purposeful. Ellis has not persuaded us that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to give mitigating weight to the fact that he was twenty-one at the time of the crime. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 725 N.E.2d 864, 868 (Ind.2000)(age of twenty does not compel finding of mitigation). Compare Trowbridge v. State, 717 N.E.2d 138, 149-50 (Ind.1999)(trial court abused its discretion in rejecting fourteen-year-old defendant's age as a mitigating factor). C. Consecutive Sentence Exceeded Statutory Limitation. Ellis contends that the court erred in ordering consecutive maximum sentences for murder and two counts of attempted murder. He relies on Indiana Code § 35-50-1-2(c), which states in part: The court may order terms of imprisonment to be served consecutively even if the sentences are not imposed at the same time. However, except for crimes of violence, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment, ... to which the defendant is sentenced for felony convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct shall not exceed the presumptive sentence for a felony which is one (1) class of felony higher than the most serious of the felonies for which the person has been convicted. Crimes of violence is a defined term, a straightforward list, including such crimes as murder and aggravated battery. It does not include attempted murder. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-1-2(a)(West 1998). Ellis therefore argues that this statutory limit applies to his two attempted murder convictions, such that the total sentence for his two attempted murders should not exceed the presumptive sentence for murder, fifty-five years (one felony class higher than attempted murder). The State responds with two arguments. First, the State claims that the limitation of consecutive sentencing does not apply because a lesser included offense of attempted murder, i.e. aggravated battery, is specifically listed in the statute as a crime of violence. In support of this argument, the State relies on Jackson v. State, 698 N.E.2d 809 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), in which the court determined that even if the crime charged, (there, as here, attempted murder) is not specifically listed in the statute, it may nevertheless be excluded from the sentencing limitation. Id. at 813-14. Relying on Johnson v. State, 464 N.E.2d 1309, 1311 (Ind.1984), the Jackson court decided that aggravated battery was a lesser included offense of attempted murder because the charging information contain[ed] all the essential elements necessary to convict the defendant of battery. Jackson, 698 N.E.2d at 813. Consequently, the Jackson court held, in light of the information and the evidence presented at trial, the restrictions of the sentencing statute do not apply.... Id. at 814. Our Johnson opinion seems ill-suited for this purpose. The issue in Johnson was whether aggravated battery could be a lesser included offense of attempted murder as part of its determination that a jury instruction stating the claim was proper. Johnson, 464 N.E.2d at 1310-11. A better analysis of the consecutive sentencing statute appears in Ballard v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1276 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). In Ballard, the issue was whether battery as a class C felony was intended to be included as a crime of violence. Id. at 1279. In considering whether the statute was ambiguous and required interpretation, the court stated, [T]he statute is clear. The legislature delineated the exact crimes by name and citation that were to be considered violent crimes. Id. at 1280. The court observed that if the legislature had intended to include other crimes, then the offense would have appeared in [the] Indiana Code section. Id. We agree. Second, the State argues that Ind.Code § 35-50-1-2(c) does not apply at all as long as any of the convictions for which Ellis received consecutive sentences was a crime of violence. This argument relies on Payne v. State, 688 N.E.2d 164 (Ind.1997). In Payne, and in Greer v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1140 (Ind.1997), we examined a previous version of the statute in the course of determining whether various convictions fell within the sentencing limitation. The statute then in effect exempted murder and felony convictions for which a person receives an enhanced penalty because the felony resulted in serious bodily injury from the limitation. Payne, 688 N.E.2d at 165; Greer, 684 N.E.2d at 1141. [14] We applied a multiple step process to facilitate this determination. The second step of inquiry questioned whether any of the consecutively sentenced convictions satisfied the statutory exemption. Payne, 688 N.E.2d at 166. In Payne and Greer, the challenged consecutive sentences were either all covered by the limit or all not covered. Payne, 688 N.E.2d at 166; Greer, 684 N.E.2d at 1142-43. We therefore were not called upon to decide how the statute is applied when less than all of the crimes on which sentencing is being imputed are covered. Construction of the statute is necessary because it involves some ambiguity as to whether the existence of one crime of violence is sufficient to exempt each of the consecutively sentenced convictions from the statutory limitation. [T]he rule of lenity requires that criminal statutes be strictly construed against the State. Walker v. State, 668 N.E.2d 243, 246 (Ind.1996)(citing Bond v. State, 515 N.E.2d 856, 857 (Ind.1987)). Adherence to this rule requires that we interpret the statute to exempt from the sentencing limitation (1) consecutive sentencing among crimes of violence, and (2) consecutive sentencing between a crime of violence and those that are not crimes of violence. However, the limitation should apply for consecutive sentences between and among those crimes that are not crimes of violence. Therefore, the trial court erred when it ordered Ellis' sentences for the two counts of attempted murder to be served consecutively for a total term of 100 years. This portion of the sentence exceeded the statutory limitation. The limitation should have been fifty-five years for consecutive sentencing, i.e., the presumptive sentence for the felony one class higher than attempted murder. The trial court did not err, however, by ordering the murder sentence served consecutively to the two counts of attempted murder without limitation. Therefore, Ellis may properly be sentenced for sixty-five years for murder, to be served consecutively with a fifty-five year sentence for the attempted murders, resulting in a total sentence of one hundred and twenty years.