Opinion ID: 2135135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Compensation for Drainage Easement.

Text: Once a drainage district has been established, the district is deemed to have acquired by permanent easement all right-of-way for drainage district ditches, tile lines, settling basins and other improvements.... Iowa Code § 468.27. We have held that the owner retains the right to use the property in any way not inconsistent with the carrying out of the plans of the drainage district, yet this should not be construed to mean that the owner may, in all cases, enter upon the right of way and level the waste banks so as to reclaim the land for cultivation. Johnston v. Drainage Dist. No. 80, 184 Iowa 346, 350, 168 N.W. 886, 888 (1918); see also Iowa Code § 468.149. Several plaintiffs claim a right to damages not only for the expansion of the drainage easement, but also for the taking of all of the land for the drainage right-of-way. They raise arguments under theories of adverse possession, equitable estoppel, and laches and urge the court to order condemnation proceedings. See Hammer v. County of Ida, 231 N.W.2d 896, 902 (Iowa 1975) (mandamus may be used to compel condemnation proceedings). As discussed earlier, plaintiffs argue that the waterway easement had been filled in and farmed for approximately fifty years. They claim this use of the land establishes an easement by prescription. See Iowa Code § 564.1. A party claiming an easement by prescription must prove, independent of use, that an easement was claimed as a matter of right, and that the other party had express notice thereof. Mensch v. Netty, 408 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Iowa 1987). Adverse possession must be established by evidence distinct from and independent of its use.... Iowa Code § 564.1. According to the plaintiffs, the county lost the permanent drainage easement because they had actual notice of the landowners' claims. To support this argument they point to Oleson's testimony about filling in the ditch on one tract of land at the direction of the county engineer and to the 1937 meeting where the board decided to return certain farmable lands to the tax rolls. We fail to see how this is evidence independent of their use of the land. In a related argument, plaintiffs claim a right to compensation for the entire easement under the doctrines of equitable estoppel or laches. The crux of their complaint is that the county should be stopped from reclaiming the right-of-way because they took no action to repair or restore the surface waterway for almost fifty years. We have previously applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to interests in real property. Henderson v. Millis, 373 N.W.2d 497, 504-05 (Iowa 1985); Johnson v. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d 750, 753-55 (Iowa 1981). To establish estoppel a plaintiff must, by clear and convincing evidence, prove a false representation or concealment of material facts by the actor, lack of knowledge on the part of the other person, intention by the actor that the representation or concealment be acted on, and reliance by the other person to his prejudice. Henderson, 373 N.W.2d at 505. Laches must also be proven by clear and convincing evidence and may apply when an unreasonable delay in asserting rights causes another undue prejudice. Id. We agree with the court that the plaintiffs' evidence falls far short of proving the elements of these defenses with respect to the original easement. Additionally, plaintiffs assert that because the 1990 project expanded the easement beyond its original boundaries they are entitled to compensation for the taking. It is clear the change in the side slopes expanded the right-of-way. The district court concluded the plaintiffs should be compensated for any damages resulting from the expansion of the easement and directed an appraisal of the affected lands. See Iowa Code §§ 468.24.26. We agree. See 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements & Licenses § 76, at 482; § 87, at 493 (1966).