Opinion ID: 1975262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: New Hampshire Counsel

Text: Defendant stresses that, because the New Hampshire fugitive warrant served as a vehicle for his arrest and custodial questioning, his prior representation by counsel on the sexual assault charge underlying the warrant made invalid any possible subsequent waiver of his right to counsel. This argument was not made to the trial court and will not be considered here unless it reveals plain error. State v. Olson, 153 Vt. 226, 235, 571 A.2d 619, 624 (1989). The record does not disclose whether, at the time of the New Hampshire sexual assault charge, defendant invoked his right to counsel pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, so we need not consider the issue with respect to that provision. See Morse v. Morse, 126 Vt. 290, 292, 229 A.2d 228, 230 (1967) (facts outside the record cannot be considered by this Court). At most, it may be presumed that counsel was appointed pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. To the extent that defendant relies on this Sixth Amendment right to counsel, his argument is foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court's decision in McNeil v. Wisconsin, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). McNeil held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific, id. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 2207, and defendant himself emphasizes that the October 21, 1986 questioning was not related to the New Hampshire charge. Thus, defendant has failed to demonstrate that questioning without counsel constituted any error, certainly not plain error. [2]