Opinion ID: 1824918
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Issues Raised by Schramek

Text: Schramek objects to the referee's findings and recommendations on the grounds that the referee and this Court are without jurisdiction to hear this matter, that this action violates federal and state antitrust laws and RICO acts, and that the Bar has failed to present evidence of any public harm caused by Schramek's actions. First, Schramek asserts that this Court is without jurisdiction to hear this cause because he is not a member of The Florida Bar and because this Court's jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law extends only to licensed attorneys. In support of this argument, Schramek quotes article V, section 15, of the Florida Constitution: The supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and discipline of persons admitted. This issue was resolved more than thirty years ago in State ex rel. The Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587 (Fla. 1962), vacated on other grounds, 373 U.S. 379, 83 S.Ct. 1322, 10 L.Ed.2d 428 (1963). In Sperry, we stated that Florida's constitution inherently vests the power in this Court to prevent the practice of law by those not admitted to that practice and that we may enforce that authority through either injunction or contempt proceedings because the unauthorized practice of law constitutes contempt of court. See also The Fla. Bar v. Flowers, 320 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1975) (constitutional authority of this Court to have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate admission to the practice of law necessarily includes the power to prevent the unlicensed practice of law); The Fla. Bar re Adv. Opinion  HRS Nonlawyer Counselor, 518 So.2d 1270 (Fla. 1988) (this Court has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and the attending power to prevent the unauthorized practice of law). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court recognized this authority in Sperry v. Florida ex rel. The Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 383, 83 S.Ct. 1322, 1325, 10 L.Ed.2d 428 (1963), when it stated that Florida has a substantial interest in regulating the practice of law within the State and ... [can] validly prohibit nonlawyers from engaging in [the unlicensed practice of law]. Second, Schramek contends that this Court is without jurisdiction because the initial judge assigned to act as referee in this cause signed an Order of Recusal in which he disqualified the Court from further proceedings in this cause. Schramek claims that, because the term the Court encompasses all courts of Florida and not just the initial judge assigned as referee, the referee, in effect, dismissed the Bar's petition against him. We find this argument to be without merit. As the referee who was finally assigned to hear this cause noted regarding this issue, the terms judge and court are often used interchangeably, and when the initial referee referred to the Court in the Order of Recusal, he was referring to himself and not to this Court. Schramek also contends that this Court is acting unconstitutionally and without jurisdiction in pursuing this matter because this Court has acted to deprive him of his constitutionally protected rights to engage in trade in violation of federal and state RICO and antitrust laws. Again, we find Schramek's contention to be without merit. In recognizing that the Supreme Court of Florida has the exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law in this state, we stated in The Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So.2d 1186, 1189 (Fla. 1978): Because of the natural tendency of all professions to act in their own self interest ... this Court must closely scrutinize all regulations tending to limit competition in the delivery of legal services to the public, and determine whether or not such regulations are truly in the public interest. However, this Court acts well within its constitutional authority to limit the practice of law by nonlawyers given the significant state interest in protecting the public. As we noted in Sperry, prohibiting the unlicensed practice of law is not done to aid or protect the members of the legal profession either in creating or maintaining a monopoly or closed shop. It is done to protect the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by unqualified persons... . 140 So.2d at 595. Indeed, given the factual circumstances presented at the hearing in this cause, the activities in which Schramek has been involved constitute exactly the type of incorrect and harmful legal advice that this Court strives to prevent in prohibiting the unlicensed practice of law. Schramek next states that the Bar has presented no evidence that he engaged in the unlicensed practice of law or that his actions have resulted in any public harm. Without question, this contention is erroneous  the record clearly reflects that Schramek has engaged in the unlicensed practice of law and that such actions have caused substantial public harm. By his own admission, Schramek modifies forms approved by this Court, uses forms not approved by this Court for use by nonlawyers, and provides legal advice regarding a number of areas, including, but not limited to, living trusts, the transfer of real property, bankruptcy, the formation of corporations, and the appellate process. This Court has specifically determined that each of those activities constitutes the unauthorized practice of law because they require a knowledge of the law greater than that possessed by the average citizen. See The Fla. Bar re Adv. Opinion  Nonlawyer Preparation of Living Trusts, 613 So.2d 426, 18 Fla. L. Weekly S23 (Fla. 1992) (the assembly, drafting, execution, and funding of a living trust document constitutes the practice of law  only a lawyer can make a determination as to a client's need for a living trust and identify the type of living trust most appropriate for the client); Rules Regulating The Fla. Bar  Approval of Forms, 581 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1991) (approved simplified forms are not intended to be used by nonlawyers as a means to practice law or to give legal advice and nonlawyers are prohibited and enjoined from performing functions other than those set forth in rule 10-1.1(b)); The Fla. Bar v. King, 468 So.2d 982 (Fla. 1985) (having direct contact with clients in the nature of consultation, explanation, recommendations, advice, and assistance in the provision, selection, and completion of forms is the unauthorized practice of law); The Fla. Bar v. Valdes, 464 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 1985) (preparation of deeds for individuals other than one's self constitutes the unauthorized practice of law); The Fla. Bar v. Mills, 410 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1982) (giving advice regarding procedures to follow for an appeal constitutes the unauthorized practice of law); The Fla. Bar v. Mills, 398 So.2d 1368 (Fla. 1981) (drafting articles of incorporation is the practice of law); The Fla. Bar v. Town, 174 So.2d 395 (Fla. 1965) (same). Schramek's assertion before the Unlicensed Practice of Law Committee that he has no way of determining what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law is totally without merit given that we have specifically determined that the activities in which he engages do constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Moreover, the record clearly establishes that the incorrect legal advice provided by Schramek resulted in significant public harm. As noted previously, in V.G.'s estate, Schramek prepared a deed in which he signed a signature for a dead man and then, in turn, notarized that same signature in an attempt to transfer the real property to a living trust. Notably, were Schramek a licensed attorney before this Court in a disciplinary proceeding, that type of conduct would result in his being substantially disciplined, if not disbarred. Equally as important, Schramek was recently found guilty by a jury and convicted of forgery, uttering, and notary fraud because he forged the signature of another individual on a document and notarized that same signature. [2] Further, the testimony of Richard Campbell reflects that Schramek gave incorrect advice and caused harm to those seeking his services in bankruptcy proceedings. We also take note that Schramek, in providing bankruptcy services, did not make audio records of the conversations between himself and the debtors as required by law. See In re Rishel, 149 B.R. 720 (Bankr. S.D.Fla. 1993). Although the evidence in Rishel was insufficient to prove that Schramek had given legal advice to the person using his services, the bankruptcy court noted that had the debtor obtained competent legal advice, the debtor could have saved himself hundreds, perhaps thousands, of dollars. Id. Finally, it is clear that Schramek has been giving incorrect legal advice in his lectures to the general public on living trusts. As previously indicated, he discusses in those lectures the consequences of estate planning and the tax advantages that exist under certain circumstances.