Opinion ID: 62348
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Gulley argues that there was legally insufficient evidence to support his conviction for murder or for aiding and abetting murder. He emphasizes that there was no eye-witness testimony or video evidence proving that he caused Brown’s death. Nor was there any evidence that the weapon he possessed caused Brown’s fatal wounds. While Brown’s blood was found on his gloves, Gulley argues that evidence merely proves that he was in the same area as 8 No. 06-41528 Brown when Jackson murdered him. To be legally sufficient, Gulley contends, the prosecution was required to prove that he associated himself with the murder by helping to facilitate the crime in some manner—by restraining Brown or blocking Brown from exiting the cell, for example. He argues, however, that there was no such evidence in this case. Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is “highly deferential to the verdict.” United States v. Harris, 293 F.3d 863, 869 (5th Cir. 2002). The court asks “‘whether the evidence, when reviewed in the light most favorable to the government with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices made in support of a conviction, allows a rational fact finder to find every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Asibor, 109 F.3d 1023, 1030 (5th Cir. 1997)). Thus, our inquiry is “limited to whether the jury’s verdict was reasonable, not whether we believe it to be correct.” United States v. Williams, 264 F.3d 561, 576 (5th Cir. 2001). To establish a defendant’s guilt for first degree murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111, the Government must prove that a defendant: (1) unlawfully killed another person; (2) with malice aforethought; and (3) premeditation. United States v. Agofsky, 458 F.3d 369, 371 (5th Cir. 2006). Moreover, anyone who “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures [the murder], is punishable as a principal.” 18 U.S.C. § 2. “An aider and abettor is liable for criminal acts that are the ‘natural or probable consequence of the crime’ that he counseled, commanded or otherwise encouraged.” United States v. Vaden, 912 F.2d 780, 783 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). To sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting, the Government must prove that the underlying offense occurred, “that [the] defendant associated with [the] criminal venture, purposefully participated in the criminal activity, and sought by his or her actions to make the venture succeed.” United States v. Polk, 56 F.3d 613, 620 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). A defendant associates 9 No. 06-41528 himself with a criminal venture when he shares in the criminal intent of the principal. United States v. Jaramillo, 42 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 1995). “To participate in the criminal activity means that the defendant acted in some affirmative manner designed to aid the venture.” Id. (citation omitted). We find that there is sufficient evidence to uphold a conviction for aiding and abetting Brown’s murder under 18 U.S.C. § 2. A rational jury could have concluded that Brown intended to join in Jackson’s criminal venture because there was evidence he: (1) drew a deadly weapon against Brown in response to Jackson’s instructions to do so; and (2) joined in chasing Brown for approximately sixty yards into cell number 125. Indeed, the video evidence shows that Gulley, weapon in hand, was the first person to corner Jackson in the cell. It does not matter whether Gulley struck the mortal blow because he participated in the chase and encouraged the fight. See United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 725, 730-31 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding an aiding and abetting murder conviction where the defendant’s fight with a police officer ended when his co-defendant shot the officer). Moreover, a rational jury could conclude that Gulley intended for his actions to assist in the murder of Brown. Inmate Prince testified that upon running into cell number 125, Gulley told him and Richards “we’re going to kill this nigger, get out of here.” This is direct evidence of intent, and the jury was entitled to credit the testimony as they saw fit. See United States v. Cathey, 259 F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 2001). Gulley’s seeks to avoid this conclusion by analogizing his case to the Eighth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Grey Bear, 828 F.2d 1286 (8th Cir. 1987). In that case, eleven co-defendants were brought to trial and variously convicted of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and assault resulting in serious bodily injury. Id. at 1288. The evidence established that the defendants attacked the victim at a party, chased him to a highway, beat him, and left him lying on a road. Id. at 1293-97. One of the defendants then drove 10 No. 06-41528 over the victim. Id. at 1294. The court found that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction against co-defendant Maynard Dunn for assault resulting in serious bodily injury because the only evidence implicating him was a single witness’s testimony that Dunn “threw a punch” at the victim. Id. at 1295. There was no evidence to show when Dunn threw the punch, where on the victim’s body it landed, or what type of injury it caused. Id. Furthermore, while Dunn could have aided and abetted the crime of assault by implicitly encouraging others to engage in their more severe attack on the victim, the Government’s own witness testified that Dunn had stated he did not want to get involved in the fight. Id. Gulley’s reliance on Grey Bear is unavailing. Unlike in Grey Bear, here there is no ambiguity in the time line or any question that Gulley was involved in the ultimate events leading to the victim’s death. Also, in Grey Bear, the prosecution’s witness testified that the co-defendant expressly disavowed an intent to take part in the fight that caused the victim’s death. But here the evidence shows that Gulley fully participated in the events leading up to Brown’s death and expressed an intent to kill Brown. Thus, Gulley was not convicted based on his “mere presence at the scene of the crime.” See id. at 1292 (citation omitted). Gulley was convicted because he drew a weapon in response to Jackson’s exhortation to “get” Brown, chased Brown into cell number 125, where the fatal blow was struck, and told Prince he was going to kill Brown seconds before Brown was in fact killed.