Opinion ID: 2977151
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court’s sua sponte authority

Text: Defendants did not raise the issue of res judicata in district court. Under both federal and Tennessee law, res judicata is an affirmative defense that should be raised by the defending party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (“In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively . . . res judicata . . . and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.”; Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.03 (same). In fact, the failure to plead an affirmative defense in the first responsive pleading “generally results in a waiver of that defense.” Horton v. Potter, 369 F.3d 906, 911 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Haskell v. Washington. Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1273 (6th Cir. 1988)). While it is also true that courts generally lack the ability to raise an affirmative defense sua sponte, see Haskell, 864 F.2d at 1273, this Court has recognized “that it might be appropriate to raise the res judicata defense sua sponte in certain circumstances.” Hutcherson v. Lauderdale County, 326 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000) (“This result is fully consistent with the policies underlying res judicata: it is not based solely on the defendant’s interest in avoiding the burdens of twice defending a suit, but is also based on the avoidance of unnecessary judicial waste.”) and Holloway Constr. Co. v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 891 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. - 11 - No. 07-6329 Hanger Prosthetics & Orthotics East, Inc. v. Henson, et al. 1989) (noting that “a district court may invoke the doctrine of res judicata in the interests of, inter alia, the promotion of judicial economy”). Raising res judicata sua sponte in appropriate cases, “insures the finality of decisions, conserves judicial resources, and protects litigants from multiple lawsuits.” McClain v. Apodaca, 793 F.2d 1031, 1032 (9th Cir. 1986). This case fits precisely within those circumstances. Hanger previously filed an action against Kitchens and Choice in state court and was awarded damages on its claims. This second action is against Defendants Henson and Altshuler for their alleged role in the same matter. Hanger could have included Defendants in its state court action. However, in state court, Hanger chose to file its procurement of a breach of contract action against only Choice. As in other cases where courts have raised res judicata, the district court properly considered the doctrine sua sponte. See, e.g., McClain, 793 F.2d at 1032-33 (bankruptcy court sua sponte raised issue of res judicata; affirmed on appeal); Minneapolis Auto Parts Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 739 F.2d 408, 409, n.2 (8th Cir. 1984) (claim preclusion raised for first time on appeal; case certified back to district court to consider the effect of res judicata); Am. Furniture Co. v. Int’l Accommodations Supply, 721 F.2d 478, 482 (5th Cir. 1981) (res judicata raised sua sponte by court of appeals); Hicks v. Holland, 235 F.2d 183 (6th Cir. 1956) (per curiam) (district court sua sponte raised issues of res judicata; affirmed on appeal), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 855 (1956). Moreover, this second litigation wastes judicial resources, risks potentially conflicting judicial determinations, and burdens the parties with multiple lawsuits. For these reasons, the district court properly raised sua sponte res judicata. - 12 - No. 07-6329 Hanger Prosthetics & Orthotics East, Inc. v. Henson, et al.