Opinion ID: 1742617
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claims of Penalty Phase Error.

Text: During the penalty phase of the March 2003 trial, the trial court made the same error it made in the guilt phase of the September 2002 trial when it permitted the clerk to read from the 1995 judgment of conviction that the offenses of which Appellant was convicted were amended from Sodomy I (3 counts), with Rape I (2 counts), and Persistent Felony Offender II being dismissed. See Perdue, 916 S.W.2d at 164-65 (holding that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to grant a mistrial after the jury was informed, during the penalty phase, that the defendant's prior manslaughter conviction had resulted from an amendment of murder charges). Although this issue was not preserved by contemporaneous objection, we have addressed it because it is likely to recur upon retrial. Appellant did object to the prior convictions on grounds that they were improperly authenticated because there was no acknowledgment, as required by KRE 902(8). However, each conviction contains a certificate, which purports to be signed by a deputy clerk of the Jefferson Circuit Court, that it is a certified copy of records of Jefferson Circuit Court, Tony Miller, Clerk. That suffices to satisfy the authentication requirements of KRE 902(2).
Joe Morris, a probation and parole officer employed by the Department of Corrections (D.O.C.), testified from D.O.C. records that Appellant was released from prison on August 1, 1997, less than five years prior to the commission of the present offense. See KRS 532.080(2)(c)1 (providing that PFO status can be imposed for a previous felony conviction for which the offender completed service of the sentence within five years prior to the commission of the present felony). Appellant objected to Morris's testimony on grounds that he was not the custodian of the records and could not authenticate their accuracy. However, D.O.C. records are public records, not business records; thus the Commonwealth was not required to introduce them through a custodian or other qualified witness. Compare KRE 803(8) (public records) with KRE 803(6) (business records). Morris, an employee of the agency entrusted with custody of the records, testified from his knowledge that they were D.O.C., i.e., public, records. The trial court obviously believed that the source[] of information, i.e., Morris, did not indicate lack of trustworthiness. KRE 803(8). The records were properly admitted. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction and sentences imposed by the Fulton Circuit Court are reversed and this case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with the content of this opinion. LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES, and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur. ROACH, J., concurs by separate opinion. SCOTT, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion. WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents without separate opinion.