Opinion ID: 2175548
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contribution and indemnity.

Text: The law recognizes that there may not be a single proximate cause for every injury; several causes may combine to produce the harm. Hill v. McDonald, 442 A.2d 133, 137 (D.C.1982). Where the negligence of two defendants contributes to a single injury, both are jointly and severally liable, regardless of the degree of negligence on the part of each. Id. at 137-38. In such circumstances, however, a tortfeasor who has compensated the injured party may be entitled to recover from the second wrongdoer all or part of what he or she has expended. Recovery may be based on two principal theories, contribution and indemnity, or on various permutations of each doctrine. [18] Contribution is the more common and more modest of these remedies. It is based on the quintessentially equitable notion that as each tortfeasor was at fault in bringing about the injury to the innocent party, then in justice each tortfeasor should share [sic] his part in the burden of making the injured party whole again. Martello v. Hawley, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 129, 131, 300 F.2d 721, 723 (1962). Generally, one tortfeasor is entitled to contribution from a second in the amount of one half of the award, and the fact that the negligence of one may be greater than that of another does not give rise to a right of indemnity and does not change the method of equally apportioning contribution. Early Settlers Ins. Co. v. Schweid, 221 A.2d 920, 923 (D.C.1966). The District is not a comparative negligence jurisdiction, and the rule that each tortfeasor ordinarily pays half is consistent with this approach. Id. In Martello, as in this case, the plaintiff had settled with one of the tortfeasors and received judgment against the second. The court held that the non-settling defendant was entitled to contribution in the amount of one half of the verdict. 112 U.S.App. D.C. at 132, 300 F.2d at 724. In the present case, the trial judge, citing and following Martello, likewise held that R. & G. was entitled to a credit in one half of the amount of the verdict. R. & G. contends, however, that contribution is an inadequate remedy on this record, and that it is entitled to indemnity. It claims that Howard was an actively negligent successor tortfeasor who was primarily responsible for the loss of Ms. Brown's foot, while R. & G.'s own negligence actively caused, at most, only the ulcerations and not the amputation. This court recently had occasion to discuss in some depth the contours of the doctrine of indemnity. See East Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113 (D.C.1990). Noting that the duty to indemnify often arises from a contract that provides for it, id. at 1126, we explained that such a duty may also exist in the absence of a contract where indemnification is required to prevent injustice. Id. We recognized that an obligation to indemnify may be implied in fact (on an implied contract theory) or implied in law in order to achieve an equitable result. Id. at 1127 n. 20. After discussing various traditional formulations ( e.g., active as against passive negligence, or primary as against secondary liability) and commenting upon the difficulties which courts have encountered in applying them, we quoted with approval the articulation of the concept by Prosser and Keeton: Indemnity is a shifting of responsibility from the shoulders of one person to another; and the duty to indemnify has been recognized in cases where the equities have supported it. A court's view of the equities may have been based on the relation of the parties to one another, and the consequent duty owed; or it may be because of a significant difference in the kind or quality of their conduct. Id. at 1128 n. 20 (quoting W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 51, at 344 (1984)). The fundamental question before us, as Prosser and Keeton have explained, is whether in the present case the equities support a requirement that Howard indemnify R. & G.. The correct answer to that question depends, in our view, on whether the findings in the text or the findings in the footnote rule the day.