Opinion ID: 185967
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The RFRA Claim

Text: 26 Similar reasoning supports a grant of summary judgment for the government on HLF's claim that the designation and blocking order substantially burden its exercise of religion in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. RFRA bars the government from placing a substantial[] burden on a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates a compelling governmental interest, and uses the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), (b). Congress enacted RFRA in 1993 in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). The Smith decision had held that neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling government interest. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2161, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). In passing RFRA, Congress expressed its purpose as being to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972), and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. 27 Although the City of Boerne case held the RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state government action, we have held that without doubt the portion [of RFRA] applicable to the federal government... survived the Supreme Court's decision striking down the statute as applied to the States. Henderson v. Kennedy, 265 F.3d 1072, 1073 (D.C.Cir.2001). That the statute constitutionally applies against the federal government, however, only raises the question: does the present designation with its consequences substantially burden the exercise of religion on the facts before the district court and now before this court? Like the district court, we conclude that it does not. 28 The district court held that the Foundation could not state a viable RFRA claim on its own behalf because it had define[d] itself as a `non-profit charitable corporation' without any reference to its religious character or purpose. Holy Land, 219 F.Supp.2d at 83. Effectively then, the court held that such a corporation is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c), which provides judicial relief to a person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of RFRA. That may be, but we do not so decide today. We decide only that even if it is such a person, its religious exercise has not been burdened in violation of the statute. Congress in enacting RFRA only sought to provide process and standards for the protection of religious exercise. It did not purport to extend the definition of that term, and indeed defined the term exercise of religion only as meaning the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4). Even accepting the dubious proposition that a charitable corporation not otherwise defined can exercise religion as protected in the First Amendment, preventing such a corporation from aiding terrorists does not violate any right contemplated in the Constitution or the RFRA. No one on behalf of Holy Land Foundation has forwarded the proposition that the fomenting and spread of terrorism is mandated by the religion of Islam. At most they argue a right to charitable giving as a pillar of that religion. Cf. Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 17 (D.C.Cir.2001) (holding that a general religious mandate to spread the gospel by `all available means' does not provide RFRA protection to the sale of T-shirts). Acting against the funding of terrorism does not violate the free exercise rights protected by RFRA and the First Amendment. There is no free exercise right to fund terrorists. The record clearly supports a conclusion that HLF did. There is no evidence that Congress intended to create such a right within the RFRA. Therefore, HLF's activities do not fall within the RFRA's protection, and based on the evidence already in the record, summary judgment for the government is warranted.