Opinion ID: 4565159
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial by Consent

Text: ¶ 12. We conclude that even though VTRE failed to file any pleading asserting a right to ingress and egress over the area where MontChilly built a fence, the claims were tried by consent and the trial court properly reached them. ¶ 13. Although parties are generally required to identify their legal claims and specify their requests for judgment in their pleadings, courts may address issues tried by consent. See V.R.C.P. 15(b) (“When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.”). “In order to find consent for an unpleaded issue, it must appear that the injured party understood the evidence was introduced to prove the unpleaded issue.” In re Waitsfield-Fayston Tel. Co., 2007 VT 55, ¶ 19, 182 Vt. 79, 928 A.2d 1219 (quotation and alteration omitted). ¶ 14. We conclude that the question of whether MontChilly’s fence interfered with VTRE’s easement for ingress and egress was tried by consent for several reasons. First, there is no dispute that VTRE’s claim that MontChilly’s fence interfered with VTRE’s property rights was 5 an active issue throughout the case. Although VTRE’s legal theory as to the basis for its entitlement to use the contested property as a turnaround (and to park) shifted through the course of the proceedings, its request for a judgment ordering MontChilly to remove the fence so the occupants of the VTRE property and their guests could turn around (and park) in that space was a central issue in the case. VTRE filed a motion specifically seeking removal of the fence, and in the context of a hearing on the motion the trial court acknowledged that, though it had not been properly pled, the issue was “obviously in the case.” ¶ 15. Second, both parties presented evidence and argument concerning the scope of VTRE’s easement relative to the turnaround area in the contested hearing. See Kwon v. Edson, 2019 VT 59, ¶ 30, __ Vt. __, 217 A.3d 935 (identifying aggrieved party’s failure to object at trial to testimony about issue not expressly pled as factor supporting conclusion that matter was tried by consent). At the outset, VTRE’s counsel withdrew any claim to adverse possession and said, “[i]t’s really an easement case.” Lizotte likewise disavowed a prescriptive easement claim, testified that he had an easement for ingress and egress from the Mountain Road, and asserted that the placement of MontChilly’s fence was “effectively rewriting the easement.” MontChilly did not object to this testimony, but instead cross-examined Lizotte concerning the scope of his access rights. MontChilly’s principal, Seaberg, testified that the turnaround was unnecessary for reasonable use of the easement and suggested that the only reason Lizotte needed the turnaround was that he parked too many cars on his property. Although VTRE initially staked its claim to a right to use the contested turnaround on theories of adverse possession and prescriptive easement, by the time of the trial, its focus had shifted to the deeded easement for ingress and egress as the source of its legal rights. ¶ 16. Finally, both parties’ proposed findings addressed the question. See Kwon, 2019 VT 59, ¶ 31 (concluding that inclusion of issue in both parties’ proposed findings supports conclusion that it was tried by consent). VTRE’s post-trial brief expressly set forth its claim that 6 MontChilly’s fence unlawfully and unilaterally reduced the size and scope of VTRE’s historical easement. MontChilly did not object to VTRE’s inclusion of this issue either at the time or in its post-decision motion for reconsideration, which instead focused on the merits of the court’s analysis with respect to the easement. Moreover, MontChilly’s own post-trial memorandum acknowledged that “Mr. Lizotte claimed the installation of the fence changed the width of the access and now requires him to back up 200-300 feet to turn around,” and requested that the court declare that the driveway easement “be as it appears on the ground” and in surveys from 2016 and 2018. For these reasons, we conclude that MontChilly had fair notice of VTRE’s claim that its fence interfered with VTRE’s deeded easement for ingress and egress. B. Sufficiency of Evidence Concerning Turnaround ¶ 17. In its initial decision, the trial court found that a 1966 warranty deed grants VTRE a right to access the VTRE residence by traveling over MontChilly’s property. It found that, while the location of the right-of-way was not defined in the warranty deed, the record evidence shows that “access was traditionally gained through a driveway area near the neighboring . . . property that was wide enough for two cars to pass each other and included a gravel turnaround near the VTRE Residence property line.” The Court found that the fence encroaches, at least in part, on the driveway area “traditionally used as part of the [deeded] easement.” Citing the common-law rule that the owner of a servient estate may not change the location of a right-of-way without the consent of the easement owner, the court found that MontChilly’s fence effectively relocated VTRE’s easement into a smaller area without VTRE’s consent. See Sweezey v. Neel, 2006 VT 38, ¶ 10, 179 Vt. 507, 904 A.2d 1050 (recognizing general property law principle that “the owners of both the dominant and servient estates must consent to relocate an easement” (quotation omitted)). The court further concluded that VTRE’s easement did not include the right to park in the turnaround area on MontChilly’s property. 7 ¶ 18. Following the court’s ruling, MontChilly filed a motion for reconsideration arguing, among other things, that there was no evidence that the longstanding easement for ingress was wide enough for two cars or included the turnaround area. MontChilly pointed to testimony that the gravel turnaround was created in 2010 when the contractor who performed sewer connection work left the gravel behind, and asserted that there was no evidence of use of the area for turning around prior to 2010. The court reaffirmed its findings and noted, “It is immaterial whether the ‘turnaround area’ was always gravel or had been a grassy area prior to 2010. . . . There is no dispute that the open area had always existed on the property, and was not previously fenced in.” ¶ 19. On appeal, MontChilly reiterates its argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that the driveway traditionally included this turnaround area. Reviewing the record in light of the applicable substantive law, burden of proof, and standard of review, we conclude that the trial court’s conclusion that MontChilly’s fence encroaches on VTRE’s deeded easement is not supported by the evidence. ¶ 20. The evidence at trial concerning the easement for ingress and egress included the following. VTRE introduced the 1966 deed establishing the easement. The deed establishes a “right to pass and travel over other land of the grantor for the purpose of ingress and egress to and from the [VTRE property], with such right to be exercised through the use of motor vehicle and similar type conveyance and pedestrian type travel.” The deed does not further define the parameters of the easement. Lizotte testified that before MontChilly put up the fence, the driveway was wide enough so that two cars could pass one another without having to back up, and there was a parking area on the left side that was used to back up and turn around. He estimated the width of the driveway to be fifty feet. Because of the fence, two cars cannot pass one another on the 8 drive, and the parking area is no longer available to turn around.3 As a result, cars have to back up a hundred yards to turn around. VTRE introduced a 2016 survey Seaberg had given Lizotte, which depicts the turnaround area as part of the land covered with gravel. Lizotte acknowledged that he did not have firsthand knowledge as to whether the gravel turnaround had been used for a very short period of time. Lizotte offered no evidence about the use of the access easement prior to his occupancy of the VTRE property. ¶ 21. For MontChilly, Seaberg testified that since he came to the property in 2010, the driveway had never been wide enough for two cars to pass unless one was driving up on the lawn. He said the driveway was approximately sixteen, maybe up to eighteen feet wide. He testified that in 2010, there was no parking or anything else in the area of the turnaround; it was grass. After Seaberg gave VTRE’s predecessor a sewer easement, the driveway and the corner area now described as the turnaround area were torn up to facilitate the connection. Upon completing the project, the contractor filled the driveway back with gravel; instead of filling the area now called the turnround with grass seed, the contractor dumped gravel and created a parking area. At that point, Seaberg told Schmidt, VTRE’s predecessor, that he could leave the gravel in place for now, but if people parking in the area became a problem, he would tell people to stop. It became a problem at one point, and Seaberg told Schmidt to tell his tenants to stop parking there. ¶ 22. These events prompted Seaberg to get a survey showing the boundaries between the two properties. Seaberg testified that in response to a request—in late 2016 or early 2017, before Lizotte closed on the VTRE property—he gave Lizotte the survey. When Seaberg provided the survey, he noted the turnaround area and told Lizotte it had only been added a few years ago and was not to be used for parking. Almost immediately after Lizotte closed on the VTRE 3 In response to questions on cross-examination, Lizotte also raised questions about the boundary line, suggesting that the fence encroached on his property. However, his counsel clarified that VTRE was not making any claim concerning the boundary line. 9 property, Seaberg observed multiple cars associated with the VTRE property parked on his land. He sent Lizotte texts asking him to stop parking on his land, but got no response. Seaberg testified that Lizotte had adequate space to turn cars around on his own property, and that any problems in that regard were the result of bringing more cars onto the property. Seaberg further testified that he put up the fence to protect the space for installation of a playground, and to guard against construction vehicles and dumpsters being placed on his property during an upcoming construction project involving demolition of the VTRE house. He took measures to ensure that the fence was entirely on his property, and he testified that the fence did not narrow the driveway but instead was grounded in the pre-existing lawn. ¶ 23. To determine whether a unilateral act of one party modifies an established easement, the Court must make a determination as to the scope of the express easement. See Farrell v. Vt. Elec. Power Co., 2012 VT 96, ¶ 13, 193 Vt. 307, 68 A.3d 1111 (“Whether a particular use overburdens an easement . . . depends on the easement’s original purpose and the scope of its authorized use.”); see also J. Bruce & J. Ely, Law of Easements and Licenses in Land § 7.6 (2020) (“The initial point of inquiry is to determine whether the instrument creating the easement adequately locates the easement and describes its dimensions.”). The touchstone for interpreting the scope of an express easement is the intent of the original parties to the easement. Post and Beam Equities Grp., LLC v. Sunne Vill. Dev. Prop. Owners Ass’n, 2015 VT 60, ¶ 56, 199 Vt. 313, 124 A.3d 454. Where the intent is clearly to create a right of ingress and egress, but the language of the deed is general, “the owner of the easement is ‘entitled to a convenient, reasonable, and accessible way, having regard to the interest and convenience of the owner of the land as well as their own.’ ” Patch v. Baird, 140 Vt. 60, 66, 435 A.2d 690, 692 (1981) (quoting LaFleur v. Zelenko, 101 Vt. 64, 70, 141 A. 603, 605 (1928)). ¶ 24. While an easement is presumed to include reasonably convenient use, the easement “must be used ‘in a manner consistent with the use contemplated at the time of its creation,’ and 10 may not be used ‘in a way that materially increases the burden on’ the property subject to the easement.” Farrell, 2012 VT 96, ¶ 13 (quoting Rowe v. Lavanway, 2006 VT 47, ¶ 22, 180 Vt. 505, 904 A.2d 78 (mem.)); see also Sargent v. Gagne, 121 Vt. 1, 12, 147 A.2d 892, 900 (1958) (“It is the general rule that a way, once located, cannot be changed thereafter without the mutual consent of the owners of the dominant and servient estates.”). However, the scope of a deeded easement can be expanded to account for normal changes to preserve the intended use. See Post and Beam, 2015 VT 60, ¶ 57 (explaining that the “manner, frequency and intensity of the use of [an] easement may change over time to take advantage of developments in technology and to accommodate normal development . . . if doing so would reflect the expectations of the parties who create servitudes of indefinite duration” (quotation and alterations omitted)). ¶ 25. As the party alleging that MontChilly has encroached on its deeded easement, VTRE bears the burden of proving this claim. Cf. Patch, 140 Vt. at 66, 435 A.2d at 693 (stating that proponent of claimed easement had burden of proving where the easement was located). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view it in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and we do not set aside findings of fact unless “there is no credible evidence to support the findings.” Okemo Mountain, Inc. v. Lysobey, 2005 VT 55, ¶ 8, 178 Vt. 608, 883 A.2d 757. The court’s findings may be based on reasonable inference, but cannot rise to the level of speculation. Kwon, 2019 VT 59, ¶ 26. ¶ 26. Applying these standards, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings that the easement historically included a turnaround area to enable cars to turn around on the MontChilly property. Even assuming the court credits only those aspects of Seaberg’s testimony that are helpful to VTRE, at most the court received evidence that the driveway has included a gravel-covered turnaround area since 2010, and that, per Lizotte’s testimony, occupants and guests of the VTRE property have used the turnaround to turn around their cars since he began living at the property in July 2016. VTRE offered no evidence that 11 VTRE’s predecessors routinely turned their cars around on the contested area of MontChilly’s property, or that a turnaround existed, covered with gravel or not, prior to 2010.4 VTRE is not necessarily required to provide historical evidence dating back to the 1966 deed to establish the scope of the deed, but the limited evidence of very recent use of the driveway is insufficient to meet VTRE’s burden to establish that MontChilly has encroached on the deeded easement as historically understood. ¶ 27. Likewise, with respect to the width of the easement, neither party purported to offer precise evidence. Lizotte testified that before MontChilly put up the fence, the driveway was fifty feet wide, extending all the way to the pool. He offered no evidence that two cars could pass each other within the easement beyond his personal experience since living on the VTRE property for a little over two years. He offered no physical evidence on the ground, nor evidence of historical usage to support an inference as to the width of the easement as historically understood by the owners of the dominant and servient parcels. Although there may be some minimum width that is necessary to ensure a “convenient, reasonable, and accessible way,” see Patch, 140 Vt. at 66, 435 A.2d at 692, VTRE did not show, and the court did not find, a minimum width necessary to satisfy this requirement, Cf. 24 V.S.A. § 4412(3) (describing minimum width of permanent access easements for development subject to zoning regulation). For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that MontChilly’s fence encroached on VTRE’s access easement is not supported by the evidence, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment that “MontChilly’s fence, as presently constructed, encroaches on and limits VTRE’s driveway easement and must be moved or removed.” 4 MontChilly called as a witness the owner of the MontChilly property from 1998 to 2010. This witness testified that the occupants of the VTRE property did not park on the MontChilly property. Although this witness presumably could have provided historical perspective dating back more than another decade, neither party asked this witness about the width of the driveway or use of the MontChilly property for turning around. 12