Opinion ID: 766175
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Benjamin Logan

Text: 40 Logan presents four individual grounds for reversal. Logan asserts that the district court erred in failing to dismiss his indictment for pre-accusatory delay or on double jeopardy grounds. Logan also contends that the district court abused its discretion in failing to give a missing witness instruction. Finally, Logan argues that the life sentence he received for a robbery conviction violates due process. 41 Logan first contends that the district court erred in failing to dismiss the indictment for preaccusatory delay. While statutes of limitations provide 'the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges,' United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971) (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966)), constitutional due process has a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay, United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977). Dismissal of an indictment due to preindictment delay is warranted only where a defendant can establish 'that the delay was unreasonable and that it actually and substantially prejudiced the presentation of [the] defense.' Bennett v. Lockhart, 39 F.3d 848, 851 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Miller, 20 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir. 1994)). Only if actual prejudice is established will the court inquire into the reasons for the delay and balance them against the demonstrated prejudice. See Miller, 20 F.3d at 931. To prove actual prejudice, Logan must specifically identify witnesses or documents lost during the delay properly attributable to the government, relate the substance of the testimony which would be offered by the missing witnesses or the information contained in lost documents in sufficient detail to permit a court to assess accurately whether the information was material to his defense, and show that the missing testimony or other evidence is not available from alternate sources. See United States v. Bartlett, 794 F.2d 1285, 1289-90 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 934 (1986). We review a district court's determination of actual prejudice on a clearly erroneous standard. See id. at 1291 n.7. 42 The evidence presented by Logan falls far short of that necessary to establish actual prejudice. The only prejudice alleged by Logan was diminishment of witness memory due to the loss of witnesses or passage of time. However, even if such diminishment could be shown to be material, there were ample alternate sources for this evidence given that Logan had access to the records from three earlier state court trials concerning the events of the robbery. Because these records remained available to Logan, he cannot hope to establish actual prejudice. See Bartlett, 794 F.2d at 1290-91; United States v. Mmahat, 106 F.3d 89, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Logan's motion to dismiss the indictment for preaccusatory delay. 43 Logan next claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his indictment on double jeopardy grounds. Specifically, Logan claims that the federal gun-trafficking charges were a sham designed to vindicate Minnesota's interest in obtaining a conviction. As a general matter, of course, prosecution by multiple sovereigns poses no constitutional difficulty. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (When a defendant in a single act violates the 'peace and dignity' of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct 'offences.' (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)). However, where the federal prosecution was merely a sham for state prosecution because it either vindicates interests that the state could not itself advance or is suggestive of collusion on the part of state and federal prosecutors, the dual sovereignty doctrine does not apply. See United States v. Williams, 104 F.3d 213, 216 (8th Cir. 1997). 44 Logan asserts that his federal prosecution is merely a sham intended to rectify the state's failure to obtain a conviction, because despite an ATF investigation and inventory in connection with the robbery, the United States did not indict Logan until after he was acquitted of felony murder in Minnesota state court. This argument ignores that the obvious interest of the federal government in prosecuting interstate trafficking of firearms exists entirely independently of Minnesota's interest in obtaining a conviction for felony murder. As to the alleged collusion between federal and state officials, it is well established that cooperation between state and federal authorities does not amount to unlawful collusion. Williams, 104 F.3d at 216. Although we have recognized that at some point coordination between independent sovereigns may support an allegation of sham prosecution, this case presents no occasion to demarcate that line. 45 Logan's third individual claim concerns his contention that the district court abused its discretion in failing to give a missing witness instruction concerning a retired police officer whose testimony Logan asserts would have elucidate[d] events. Upon carefully reviewing the facts presented by Logan in light of the law of this circuit, we find no merit to Logan's third individual claim. 46 Logan's fourth and final individual claim asserts that his sentence of 540 months violates due process. Logan was convicted of robbery, conspiracy, gun-trafficking, and use of a firearm in a crime of violence. Following applicable sentencing guidelines provisions, the district court correctly established Logan's total offense level at 43. The recommended guidelines sentence of life imprisonment was adjusted to comply with the statutory maximum sentences set for each of Logan's offenses, yielding a total sentence of 540 months. Logan does not object to the district court's calculation of his sentence, but rather argues that this case falls into the category the Supreme Court had in mind when it observed that the preponderance standard th[is] Court approved for garden variety sentencing determinations may fail to comport with due process where . . . a sentencing enhancement factor becomes 'a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.' United States v. Townley, 929 F.2d 365, 369 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)). We disagree. 47 In United States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 170 (1st Cir. 1995), the First Circuit addressed the situation referred to in McMillan. The defendant in Lombard had been convicted in federal court of possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 924(e), but had earlier been acquitted in state court of a murder charge stemming from the same underlying events. The district court in that case applied the murder guideline, resulting in a life sentence. 5 In calling into question the constitutional propriety of adherence to the sentencing guidelines in such a circumstance, the First Circuit panel emphasized that Lombard received a life sentence based on the federal court's finding that it was more likely than not that Lombard had committed the murders of which he had been acquitted. Id. at 171. That is not the case here. Logan was convicted by a federal jury of armed robbery. United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2B3.1(c)(1) (1998) provides that if a victim was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. 1111 had such a killing taken place within the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the United States, apply 2A1.1 (First Degree Murder). In turn, 18 U.S.C. 1111(a) defines murder to include felony murder. In this case, there is no question but that Logan could have been convicted of felony murder. Thus, the decision in Lombard is easily distinguishable. Logan's other arguments concerning the constitutionality of his sentence are without merit. Accordingly, each of Logan's individual claims is rejected.