Opinion ID: 1104732
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Merits of the double-jeopardy claim

Text: The next issue is whether Heard's protection from twice being put in jeopardy for the same crime has been violated. [T]he Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997). Here, we are concerned with the third abuse protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause  prohibiting the State from `punishing twice or attempting a second time to punish criminally for the same offense.' United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 273, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996)(quoting Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 396, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 132 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995) (quoting in turn Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938) (emphasis omitted))). The test for determining whether two offenses are the same for double-jeopardy purposes was established in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). The applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. 180. This Court applied Blockburger in Ex parte Haney, 603 So.2d 412 (Ala.1992), in holding that the two convictions against Haney did not violate her protection against double jeopardy. Haney was convicted of two counts of capital murder: murder for hire, § 13A-5-40(a)(7), Ala. Code 1975, and murder committed during the course of a robbery, § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975. Both counts were based on the killing of one victim  her husband. This Court held that, because each crime contains an element not contained in the other, there was no violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy. Haney, 603 So.2d at 419 (citing Blockburger ). Likewise, in Ex parte Peraita, 897 So.2d 1227 (Ala.2004), this Court decided an issue concerning two capital-murder convictions. In that case, the defendant argued that his two capital-murder convictions for the death of one victim violated the Blockburger test. In Count I the defendant was charged with murder made capital because the murder was committed while he was under a sentence of life imprisonment, § 13A-5-40(a)(6), and in Count II he was charged with murder made capital because the murder was committed by a defendant who had been convicted of another murder in the 20 years preceding the crime, § 13A-5-40(a)(13). He was convicted on both counts. On appeal, this Court held that the two capital-murder convictions were for separate offenses and did not violate Blockburger. In numerous cases, the Court of Criminal Appeals has also held that two capital-murder convictions resulting from the death of one victim do not violate the Blockburger test because of the requirement of different elements in the two crimes. See Powell v. State, 631 So.2d 289 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (two convictions for capital murder of one victim because murder occurred during the course of a robbery and during the course of a burglary did not violate double-jeopardy principles because each offense contained an element not present in the other); Flowers v. State, 922 So.2d 938 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (two convictions for capital murder of one victim because murder occurred during a robbery and during a kidnapping did not violate double-jeopardy principles); Jackson v. State, 516 So.2d 726 (Ala.Crim.App.1985)(convictions for murder made capital because it was committed during the course of a robbery and during one or a series of acts, when the crimes were based on the death of one of the same victims, did not violate double-jeopardy principles); Stewart v. State, 601 So.2d 491 (Ala.Crim.App.1992), overruled on other grounds, Ex parte Gentry, 689 So.2d 916 (Ala.1996)(two convictions for capital murder, based on one murder, because murder was committed during the course of a robbery and during the course of a kidnapping passed the Blockburger test). The Court of Criminal Appeals also applied the Blockburger test in Borden v. State, 711 So.2d 498 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), affirmed, 711 So.2d 506 (Ala.1998). In Borden, the defendant was charged with two counts of murder: Count I, capital murder wherein two or more persons are murdered by one act or pursuant to one course of conduct, § 13A-5-40(a)(10), and Count II, capital murder committed by using a deadly weapon fired from outside a dwelling while the victim was inside the dwelling, § 13A-5-40(a)(16). The jury returned verdicts finding the defendant guilty of capital murder as charged in Count I and guilty of the lesser-included offense of intentional murder as to Count II. In a footnote, the Court of Criminal Appeals discussed the application of Blockburger to the facts in Borden: Here, Count I and Count II of the indictment were based partly on the same act: the intentional killing of Roland Harris. However, each count charged a crime containing a statutory element not contained in the other. In this case, each capital offense charged required proof of an element that the other did not. Proof of the double murder charge in Count I required proof of more than one murder and proof that the multiple murders were committed by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, which the firing-a-deadly-weapon-into-a-dwelling murder charge in Count II did not require. Proof of the firing-a-deadly-weapon-into-a-dwelling murder charge required proof that the defendant murdered the victim by firing a deadly weapon from outside a dwelling while the victim was inside a dwelling, which the double murder charge did not require. Under the Blockburger test, the appellant could properly be indicted and convicted for two separate and distinct capital offenses 'notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes.' The indictment was not multiplicitous and the separate counts, as alleged in the indictment, did not facially violate the Double Jeopardy clause. Borden, 711 So.2d at 501-02 n. 2 (citations omitted). The Court of Criminal Appeals held, though, that `[a]lthough the indictment returned against the appellant was facially valid, we find that the trial court was without jurisdiction to adjudge the appellant guilty of both capital murder for the double murder [of the victims] ... and guilty of the intentional murder [with regard to one of the victims]. Borden, 711 So.2d at 502. The court based its reasoning on § 13A-1-8(b), Ala.Code 1975, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense. He may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if: (1) One offense is included in the other, as defined in section 13A-1-9.... Section 13A-1-9(a)(1), provides: A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged. An offense is an included one if: (1) It is established by proof of the same or fewer than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged.... In other words, § 13A-1-8(b) does not bar multiple convictions when a single criminal act results in multiple offenses, except, for example, under § 13A-1-9, where one offense is a lesser-included offense of the other. The Court of Criminal Appeals in Borden, therefore, held that because intentional murder, defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1), is an element that must be proven of the capital offense of which the defendant was convicted, § 13A-5-40(a)(10), intentional murder is a lesser-included offense of this capital-murder charge. Therefore, the two convictions violated double jeopardy, and the Court of Criminal Appeals ordered that the conviction for the lesser-included offense be vacated. This Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Ex parte Borden, 711 So.2d 506. The Court of Criminal Appeals has also applied § 13A-1-8 in other cases. In Cooper v. State, 912 So.2d 1150 (Ala.Crim.App. 2005), the Court of Criminal Appeals applied the statute to two convictions for the murder of one victim; the defendant was convicted under Count I for intentional murder (based on the capital charge of murder during the course of a robbery) and under Count II for capital murder committed during the course of a burglary. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the two convictions violated § 13A-1-8(b), because intentional murder, even though it was based under another count, was a lesser-included offense of the offense of capital murder committed during the course of a robbery. Therefore, the conviction for the lesser-included offense should be vacated because it violated the defendant's protection against double jeopardy. Likewise, in Simmons v. State, 797 So.2d 1134 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), two verdicts were held to violate double-jeopardy principles and § 13A-1-8(b) because one found the defendant guilty of a lesser-included offense of another. In Simmons, there was one victim and the defendant was convicted under Count III (capital murder committed during the course of sexual abuse) and under Count II (intentional murder committed during a robbery). [5] Again, because intentional murder was also a lesser-included offense under Count III, the defendant could not be convicted of both; the conviction of the lesser-included offense was ordered vacated. A defendant can be convicted of two or more capital murders for the death of one victim, so long as those convictions are in accordance with Blockburger, i.e., so long as each conviction required an element not required in the other convictions. However, when a jury returns a verdict finding a defendant guilty of capital murder on one count and guilty of a lesser-included offense of another count, if that lesser-included offense is also a lesser-included offense of the offense resulting in the capital-murder conviction, under § 13A-1-8(b) and § 13A-1-9, Ala.Code 1975, the conviction for the lesser-included cannot stand. In the present case, Heard was charged in Count I with murder made capital because it was committed during the course of a robbery, § 13A-5-40(a)(2), and in Count II with murder made capital because it was committed through the use of a deadly weapon fired from outside a dwelling while the victim was inside the dwelling, § 13A-5-40(a)(16). A conviction on Count I required proof that Heard intended to commit a robbery; this was not an element of the offense charged in Count II. To convict under Count II, the State had to prove that Heard fired into a dwelling; this is not an element of the offense charged in Count I. Therefore, the indictment does not facially violate the Blockburger test. If the jury had returned verdicts of guilty on both counts of capital murder, those two convictions would have been permissible. However, the jury returned verdicts convicting Heard of the lesser-included offense of felony murder under Count I and of capital murder under Count II. Therefore, we must determine whether the felony-murder conviction is considered a lesser-included offense of the offense resulting in the capital-murder conviction on Count II. Section 13A-1-9(a), Ala.Code 1975, states: An offense is an included one if: (1) It is established by proof of the same or fewer than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or (2) It consists of an attempt or solicitation to commit the offense charged or to commit a lesser included offense; or (3) It is specifically designated by statute as a lesser degree of the offense charged; or (4) If differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property or public interests, or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission. Based on this definition of a lesser-included offense, the only category under which this case could fall would be § 13A-1-9(a)(1). However, felony murder for a killing that occurs during the course of a robbery is not established by proof of the same or fewer than all the facts required to establish the commission of capital murder for firing a gun into an occupied dwelling. Felony murder requires the intent to commit the underlying felony (robbery), while the offense resulting in the capital-murder conviction requires the intent to discharge a firearm into a home. Therefore, felony murder based on the felony of robbery is not a lesser-included offense of the offense of capital murder based on firing a gun into an occupied dwelling. [6] Because the conviction under Count I is not for a lesser-included offense to the offense charged in Count II, § 13A-1-8-(b) does not apply to this case. Because the indictment passed the Blockburger test and § 13A-1-8(b) does not apply, these convictions do not violate Heard's protection from double jeopardy.