Opinion ID: 1218866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Penalty Phase Ineffective Assistance of Counsel[1]

Text: In addition to the deference granted to the state court's decision under AEDPA, we review ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the deferential light of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). We must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To succeed on his claim, Brown must establish that his counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 687, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Brown alleges his counsel was ineffective for failing adequately to prepare his mental health expert, Dr. Summerour, to testify. Brown contends that because Dr. Summerour had developed negative information about Brown that could be exposed during cross-examination, his counsel, Mr. Myers, should not have called Dr. Summerour to testify at all. The bulk of the information to which Brown objects came from a life history that Dr. Summerour asked Brown to prepare to aid in understanding his psychological makeup. In the life history, Brown described his thoughts during the prior rape of Kelly Porterfield. Brown related such thoughts as why should I let this grand opportunity go to waste when he encountered Kelly in the home and what the hell when deciding whether to ejaculate inside her. Brown's history also described the rape itself, indicating that [w]hen I got ready to ejaculate, her body motions changed and she was like giving in, and I asked her to put her leg around me and she did. The relevant question is therefore whether reasonable counsel, knowing the risk that this information would be brought to light, would still call Dr. Summerour to testify. Although Myers was clearly risking exposing this negative information to the jury, the jury already knew about the Porterfield rape from Kelly's testimony. Myers needed at least to attempt to offer some explanation to the jury for both the Susan Jordan rape/murder and the prior rape of Kelly Porterfield. In the penalty phase, the government pointed out that Brown had not murdered Kelly Porterfield and had wound up going to prison for that rape. The prosecutor suggested that Brown learned from this mistake and murdered Susan Jordan so there would be no witnesses to his crime. Dr. Summerour provided some potentially beneficial information to dispel this suggestion. Dr. Summerour concluded that Brown did not have a sense of what is normal in the way of sexual attraction and behavior, and that Brown's problems may be partially attributable to his mother, who had both physically and emotionally abused him. Dr. Summerour indicated Brown had complained his mother had spanked him so severely he could not wear shorts to gym class. Dr. Summerour also testified that Brown's mother had told Brown that sex was dirty and that he was not supposed to do dirty things with girls or his fingers would fall off and one of his legs would get shorter. Brown apparently had an uncle with some missing fingers and believed this was what had happened to him. Dr. Summerour explained that Brown suffered from severe sexual dysfunction and was not able to have normal sexual relations, being able to complete the act only if either he or the other person were completely in control. Dr. Summerour also testified that Brown was basically in a state of arrested development sexually, putting him roughly in an adolescent stage, and that this probably explained his interest in young girls. Dr. Summerour also opined that Brown was not antisocial or sociopathic, but actually could feel shame and remorse for his actions, and that Brown did hold to some of society's values, such as working and education. Dr. Summerour indicated that Brown's feelings of shame were the reason why Brown could not confront his victims. For example, in the Kelly Porterfield rape trial, Brown had initially pled not guilty, but when the time came for Kelly to testify, Brown could not face her and pled guilty. Similarly, in the penalty phase of this case, Brown refused to be present in the courtroom when Kelly testified, and when Brown himself was called to testify, he expressed regret that Kelly had suffered. Dr. Summerour opined that Brown had killed Susan Jordan out of shame for his actions and that Brown had left her face down in the dirt so that he did not have to face her. In addition, Dr. Summerour opined that Brown was suffering from a narcissistic personality disorder. Dr. Summerour explained that this was an exaggerated self-love, which was usually a compensation for feelings of inadequacy (in Brown's case, sexual impotency). He indicated that narcissistic people often have a rich fantasy life and, in Brown's case, Brown imagined that he could somehow make things right with Kelly Porterfield, make her fall in love with him, and even marry him. Dr. Summerour explained that this disorder may also have been why he made the phone calls on the evening of the murder i.e., to get noticed and to be caught. Dr. Summerour further testified that Brown had not received any treatment for his sexual disorders while in prison for the Porterfield rape. Although the picture painted by Dr. Summerour is not a pretty one, it is significantly more sympathetic than the one portrayed by the government. Faced with horrific crimes against teenage girls, it was not unreasonable for Myers to conclude that some explanation that presented Brown as a troubled individual, rather than a ruthless killer seeking to avoid capture and compound the victim's family's pain, might give Brown some hope for a life sentence. Myers himself testifies that he would do things differently if given a chance today but that, at the time, he believed Dr. Summerour was capable, had a beneficial opinion about Brown, and that perhaps his analysis would help the jury see Mr. Brown as human and might result in their showing some mercy. We do not judge counsel's actions through the twenty-twenty lens of hindsight, Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc), and recognize there are many different reasonable ways to try a case, id. at 1128. Although Myers's decision to put Dr. Summerour on the stand came with some risks, it came with benefits to Brown as well, in an attempt to explain the genesis of his behavior and portray him as more human and sympathetic to the jury. These benefits were available only if Dr. Summerour were called. We therefore agree with the district court that Myers's decision to have Dr. Summerour testify might be considered sound trial strategy, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, as a reasonable attorney could conclude that the positive out-weighed the negative: As the Court has previously ruled, counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to present Dr. Summerour's opinions to the jury despite the baggage involved. Summerour's testimony was a major part of the presentation in mitigation, portraying Petitioner as an inhibited, sad figure with a fear of women rather than as a vicious predator. The choice to depict him as an ill man, at the mercy of his complexes, was a reasonable strategic choice to try to earn him sympathy and mercy. As such, we cannot say that it was objectively unreasonable for the California Supreme Court to conclude Brown had not satisfied the requirements of Strickland. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Claim 20(A).
Brown's other ineffective assistance claims are so intertwined that they are best discussed together. Brown contends that Myers was ineffective in the penalty phase because he failed to conduct an adequate background investigation and because, if this additional information had been presented to a competently trained neuropsychologist (as opposed to a psychiatrist), such an expert could have presented a more compelling case to the jury.
It is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase. Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir.1999). In numerous cases, this court and the Supreme Court have explained and reiterated this high standard for investigation in capital cases. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533-34, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Stankewitz v. Woodford, 365 F.3d 706, 719 (9th Cir.2004); Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 1999). Brown contends that Myers fell below this standard because he failed to conduct an adequate background investigation for the penalty phase. Myers interviewed Brown and numerous family members about Brown's childhood, but did not specifically ask any of them about physical abuse. Myers also did not obtain any of Brown's military records, although Brown indicated (and testified at the penalty phase) that he had been disciplined for impersonating an officer. In addition, Myers did not obtain any of Brown's high school or college records, relying on his impression that Brown was of normal literacy based on his ability to communicate, as well as the life history Brown wrote for Dr. Summerour. Brown argues that a more complete investigation would have revealed that, while living with his great aunt for a year or so around third grade, he (and his siblings) were beaten with a broom handle. Brown's military records reveal that he was disciplined for being absent without leave (AWOL), but do not indicate he had impersonated an officer. Brown's school transcripts reveal that he was doing rather poorly in high school and that, although he had enrolled in a local community college, he had never completed a course. We consider each of Brown's allegations of deficiency in turn and in relation to their potential impact on the sentencing proceeding.
Even assuming Brown is correct that his counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate childhood abuse, Brown does not explain how the additional information about abuse by his aunt could have altered the outcome of his penalty phase hearing. To support his claim, he offers only his own declaration that his aunt used to beat me and all of the kids with a broom handle. She was vicious. Brown provides no specifics as to the severity, duration, or frequency of these beatings, nor does he offer the testimony of any family member to corroborate his allegation. Although childhood abuse can certainly constitute a mitigating factor, the jury in this case had already heard through Dr. Summerour that Brown claimed he had been severely spanked by his mother as a childto the point of not being able to expose his legs in gym classand how her comments to him about sex may have negatively impacted his sexual development and resulted in his sexual dysfunction. When asked about the alleged additional abuse by the aunt in a deposition, Dr. Summerour explained that this was something he would have probably told the jury about, to additionally explain the etiology of Brown's behaviors and problems, but that the information would not have altered his basic diagnosis. The state, on the other hand, had evidence that Brown had recently raped another young girl [Kelly Porterfield] and had also been involved in a voyeuristic sexual incident with a 12-year-old girl before that. The rape and murder of Susan Jordan was bad enough by itself, but it was also coupled with taunting phone calls to torment her family. The jury deliberated less than three hours before reaching a death verdict. At best, the additional information about childhood abuse would have probably bolstered Summerour's diagnosis, but in light of the other information before the jury, there is no reasonable probability that this informationparticularly in the vague manner presented by Browncould have resulted in a different outcome of the penalty phase of the trial.
Brown also argues that he was prejudiced by Myers's failure to obtain his military records because the jury was wrongly informed (by Brown) that he was disciplined for a more severe offense than a simple AWOL. Even assuming Myers was deficient in failing to verify Brown's account, Brown again cannot demonstrate prejudice. Brown's explanation at trial was that he impersonated an officer as a joke on new recruits and that others played along with it. Thus, the impersonation was not portrayed to be a severe offense to the jury. Moreover, in light of Brown's serious crimes that were the true focus of the penalty phase, there is no reasonable probability of a different outcome if the jury had known that Brown was only disciplined for being AWOL instead of for impersonating an officer. [2]
Brown's final claim is that his counsel should have obtained his school records, which would have revealed poor performance and, in turn, identified the need for psychological testing, which would have revealed that Brown suffered from dyslexia and attention deficit disorder (ADD). As explained by Brown's new expert, Dr. Stotland, in his declaration and at the evidentiary hearing, Brown's attention deficit affects his learning, behavior, and decision-making, making him impulsive. Dr. Stotland opines that Brown responds to stressful or complicated circumstances by repeating or escalating his behavioral pattern even when his actions are inappropriate or harmful, and that Brown has severe difficulty inhibiting inappropriate behavior. In his deposition, Dr. Summerour Brown's trial expertexplained that he did not pick up on Brown's condition based on his meetings with Brown or his review of Brown's life history, but that learning problems or other problems in the classroom might have alerted him to the possibility of ADD. He also agreed that ADD could have contributed to impulse control problems and heightened frustration. Dr. Summerour also testified that if he had known Brown suffered from learning disabilities or ADD, he would have disclosed this to the jury, even though it would not have altered his ultimate conclusions or diagnosis. Brown therefore has a good argument that his counsel's performance was deficient by failing adequately to investigate Brown's academic background and provide this relevant information to Dr. Summerour. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 370, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 928 (9th Cir.2001); Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir.2002). Once again, however, the question of prejudice looms: was there a reasonable probability of a different out-come if Brown's school records had been available at the time of the penalty phase? It is not clear whether, even if Myers had obtained the school records and provided them to Dr. Summerour (or any other mental health expert), Brown would have actually been diagnosed with ADD. Dr. Summerour testified that at the time of Brown's trial in the early 1980's, ADD was considered a childhood disorder that was outgrown by adulthood. Thus, although Dr. Summerour testified he could have probably identified ADD today using current tests, in the early 1980's, the diagnosis depended more upon observation of behavior problems in children. Dr. Stotland's diagnosis of Brown in 1996-97 may be correct, but this does not mean that counsel's failure to obtain the academic records in 1981-82 actually hindered the penalty phase mitigation presentation. Even if Brown's ADD could have been diagnosed in the early 1980's, there was little additional benefit to be gained from Dr. Stotland's testimony. In large part, both Dr. Summerour and Dr. Stotland agreed that Brown had severe sexual dysfunction that had stemmed from negative interactions with his own mother and other women, and this was probably the most explanatory or sympathetic evidence that could be put before the jury. Dr. Stotland described Brown as having obsessive-compulsive behavior, but also agreed that Dr. Summerour's diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder was not unreasonable and that Brown definitely had a problem with narcissistic personality traits. Dr. Summerour also testified during the penalty phase that Brown was immature and had impulse control problems, which was consistent with Dr. Stotland's later observations. [3] Even if Dr. Stotland could have, as Brown claims, presented a more cohesive explanation of Brown's problems to the jury, Brown had a mountain of aggravation to overcome, including the prior rape of a young girl, the rape and murder of the young victim in this case, and his tormenting phone calls to the family following the event. The jury was also aware from Brown's own testimony that Brown professed remorse over the prior rape of Kelly Porterfield, but remained strangely silent as to Susan Jordan's rape or murder. To be sure, horrific facts do not preclude a finding of prejudice. See, e.g., Smith v. Stewart, 189 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 1999); Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 620-21 (9th Cir.1992). But giving the state court decision the deference it is due under AEDPA, we cannot say that the California Supreme Court was objectively unreasonable in concluding that Brown had not satisfied both prongs of Strickland. Dyslexia and ADDassuming they could have even been diagnosed in adults in the early 1980'sare somewhat common disorders; although they add quantity to the mitigation case, they add little in terms of quality. It is doubtful that this information, even when explained by Dr. Stotland, would have generated significantly more sympathy than the explanation of Brown's neurosis that was already given by Dr. Summerour, [4] or, for that matter, that either of these explanations was going to overcome the substantial aggravating case. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of the writ on this claim.