Opinion ID: 2599107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Juror's Refusal to Consider Mitigating Evidence

Text: In an affidavit for the defense, juror Seawood stated: I felt cheated and angry when we were told about the old lady being killed for the first time at the penalty phase trial. Once I heard about the murder of the old lady, I did not want to hear any more. I did not even consider mitigation after I heard about the old lady's murder. I felt like it was my grandmother that had been killed. At second phase my thought went to the old lady even more than to [C.W.]. I did not hear what other jurors were saying because my thoughts about this were so strong. In her affidavit prepared for the State, she stated: Hearing about the murder of Bessie Lawrence did have a great effect on me. I still listened to all the evidence but the mitigators could not outweigh the aggravator of his killing the old lady. Kleypas suggests juror Seawood's initial affidavit shows that after she heard evidence of the prior homicide she had in essence decided the case prior to hearing all the evidence. He contends that therefore Seawood was not an impartial juror and a death sentence imposed by a jury where a member is not impartial denies him due process of law, citing State v. Cady, 248 Kan. 743, 811 P.2d 1130 (1991). In Cady, a juror was overheard during a recess saying, `[t]hat son-of-a-bitch [Cady] is guilty as hell.' 248 Kan. at 749-50. The remark was overheard by a detective who reported it to the prosecution; however, the prosecution never reported it to the defense counsel. While noting the right to a jury trial guarantees to the defendant a fair trial by an impartial, indifferent jury, the court also stated: [T]he Fourteenth Amendment's guaranty of due process does not require that a prospective juror be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved in the case, and the mere existence on his or her part of a preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused is, without more, insufficient to rebut the presumption of impartiality if he or she can lay aside an impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. 248 Kan. at 755. The court did not consider whether this juror's preconceived opinion violated due process because prosecutorial misconduct required a new trial. 248 Kan. at 757. Juror Seawood's statement is not of the type that occurred in Cady, and her second affidavit stated that she listened to all the evidence but the mitigators could not outweigh the aggravator of his killing the old lady. Instead of indicating a preconceived opinion, the affidavits, read together, demonstrate a proper weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. She was required to and did evaluate all the evidence. Her ultimate decision was adverse to Kleypas but provides no basis for his claims of a denial of due process.