Opinion ID: 2600675
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's confession during his return from Mexico

Text: Defendant contends that the advisements given defendant by Detective Edmonds pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602] ( Miranda ), during the flight returning defendant to the United States were inadequate. [6] According to defendant, he neither intelligently nor knowingly waived his Miranda rights. The transcribed record of the interview establishes, to the contrary, that Detective Edmonds carefully advised defendant of his Miranda rights and inquired in followup questions whether defendant had been beaten or mistreated in any way or felt he was being coerced in any way. Defendant repeatedly responded that he had not been mistreated or coerced and had volunteered to talk with Edmonds about the crimes. Defendant also claims that his asserted inability to communicate effectively in English contributed to a perception that the lawyer [provided for him by the government] would be in the Sheriff's employ and not necessarily aligned with defendant's best interests, and evidently the impression that there would be no benefit in requesting or receiving the assistance of an attorney. Defendant relies upon U.S. v. Garibay (9th Cir. 1998) 143 F.3d 534, a decision that assertedly bears a compelling similarity to his own case. In that matter, the court held the defendant had not knowingly or intelligently waived his Miranda rights, because he did not understand the recitation of his rights in English, was not given an opportunity to hear his rights in Spanish, did not have ability in the English language, and had a low verbal IQ. ( Id. at pp. 537-538.) In the present case, in contrast, the transcript of advisements, followup questions, and defendant's responses establishes that Detective Edmonds inquired whether defendant wished to receive the advisements in English or in Spanish and whether he was more comfortable conversing in English or in Spanish. Spanish-speaking agents were present on the flight, with whom defendant could consult if there was something he did not understand. In addition, as explained in expert testimony, defendant had an above-average IQ. Unlike the defendant in Garibay, defendant was provided an ample opportunity to be advised in Spanish and to communicate in that language, and had the innate intelligence to decide whether to avail himself of that opportunity. (6) Finally, defendant contends his waiver of Miranda rights was invalid because, in obtaining the waiver, Detective Edmonds failed to advise defendant that he might face the death penalty if found guilty. In rejecting such a claim in People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984], we explained that Miranda does not require the authorities to apprise a suspect of the crimes with which he or she may be charged. We explained that [i]f a suspect need not be informed of the possible charges against him, there is no basis for concluding that he must be advised of the possible punishment for those charges if proven. ( Id. at p. 982.)
Defendant contends that both his Miranda waiver and his ensuing statement are attributable to his will being overborne and thus are involuntary. As mentioned earlier, defendant believes we should infer involuntariness from the likelihood that defendant was physically and psychologically coerced while in the custody of Mexican law enforcement officers and, in addition, [a]fter this ordeal, he was physically, mentally and emotionally exhausted. Defendant also points to the circumstances surrounding his seizure by American officials, his recent ingestion of drugs and alcohol, the circumstances of the flight, including lengthy confinement in a small aircraft, lack of sleep, water, and access to a telephone, his inability to communicate effectively in English, and Detective Edmonds's assertedly coercive questioning tactics. As an initial matter, defendant requests that the court overlook defense counsel's failure to object to the admission of the confession at trial or, alternatively, determine that defense counsel violated defendant's Sixth Amendment rights by providing ineffective assistance. We shall discuss the latter claim with the other claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On the merits, we conclude that the circumstances of defendant's arrest and transfer did not contribute to or result in his will being overborne. Defendant's spontaneous initial admission of guilt (in itself consistent with the self-accusatory note found in his vehicle), the absence of physical signs or other evidence that defendant had been mistreated prior to or during his transfer to American officials, together with the recording of the Miranda advisements, defendant's explicit waiver of his rights, and his subsequent lengthy and detailed narrative of the circumstances of the crimes, are simply inconsistent with involuntary conduct on his part. The record evidence amply reflects defendant's personal willingness, if not desire, to discuss his crimes.