Opinion ID: 6340547
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: [4,5] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the appeal. 7 For an appellate court to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, there must be a final judgment or final order entered by the tribunal from which the appeal is taken. 8 Feik contends that the order appealed from is not a final order. [6,7] In probate proceedings, an appellate court applies the rubric of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Cum. Supp. 2020) to determine whether an order is final. The relevant questions are whether the order was made during a special proceeding and affected a substantial right. 9 A proceeding under the Nebraska Probate Code is a special proceeding. 10 [8-10] We turn our attention to whether the order affected a substantial right. A substantial right is an essential legal right, not a mere technical right. 11 A substantial right is affected if an order affects the subject matter of the litigation, such as by diminishing a claim or defense that was available to an appellant before the order from which an appeal is taken. 12 Substantial rights under § 25-1902 include those legal rights that a party is entitled to enforce or defend. 13 [11] In the context of multifaceted special proceedings that are designed to administer the affairs of a person, an order that ends a discrete phase of the proceedings affects a substantial right because it finally resolves the issues raised in that 7 In re Estate of Larson, 308 Neb. 240, 953 N.W.2d 535 (2021). 8 In re Estate of Beltran, supra note 3. 9 Id. 10 See id. 11 Id. 12 Id. 13 In re Estate of Larson, supra note 7. - 988 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports IN RE ESTATE OF SEVERSON Cite as 310 Neb. 982 phase. 14 Thus, a consideration regarding the finality of orders in probate cases is whether the order ended a discrete—that is, separate and distinct—phase of the proceedings. 15 A statute provides that “a proceeding for appointment of a personal representative is concluded by an order making or declining the appointment.” 16 Here, the probate court’s order appointing Kelly as personal representative ended a discrete phase of the probate proceeding. Moreover, the appointment order coupled with the issuance of letters of personal representative imposed fiduciary duties upon Kelly. 17 Because the order was made in a special proceeding and affected a substantial right, it was a final order. Appointment of Kelly as Personal Representative We next consider Kelly’s assignment of error alleging that the probate court “erred in appointing [her] as personal representative of the Estate because it lacked jurisdiction to make the appointment, [Kelly] objected to the appointment, and [she] did not accept the appointment as required by Nebraska Revised Statute § 30-2420.” During oral arguments, Kelly’s counsel argued in connection with this assignment that the letters were not effective. We understand Kelly’s assignment of error to encompass a challenge to the issuance of letters of personal representative to an appointee who refuses to qualify. Several probate statutes speak to qualification of a personal representative. One provides that “to acquire the powers and undertake the duties and liabilities of a personal representative of a decedent, a person must be appointed by order of the court 14 Id., citing John P. Lenich, What’s So Special About Special Proceedings? Making Sense of Nebraska’s Final Order Statute, 80 Neb. L. Rev. 239 (2001). 15 In re Estate of Beltran, supra note 3. 16 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2407(4) (Reissue 2016). 17 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2464 (Reissue 2016). - 989 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports IN RE ESTATE OF SEVERSON Cite as 310 Neb. 982 or registrar, qualify and be issued letters.” 18 Another specifies that “the registrar . . . shall appoint the applicant subject to qualification and acceptance.” 19 Yet another states that “[p]rior to receiving letters, a personal representative shall qualify by filing with the appointing court any required bond and a statement of acceptance of the duties of the office.” 20 The latter two statutes touch on another important component: acceptance. Acceptance of an appointment denotes consent to the appointment. 21 “Consent is the preliminary essential requirement for an appointment as an executor or administrator.” 22 The Utah Supreme Court addressed the necessity of consent in considering whether a court had the authority to compel an individual to serve as an administratrix against her will. 23 It found support for the requirement in its constitutional and statutory provisions: The Constitution of Utah prohibited “‘involuntary servitude,’” while a statute required that prior to issuance of letters testamentary or of administration “‘the executor, administrator or guardian must take and subscribe an oath that he will perform according to law the duties of executor, administrator or guardian, which oath must be attached to the letters.’” 24 The court explained the importance of appointing an individual willing to serve: A highly personal trust arises from an appointment as administrator and to compel one to serve against his will for the benefit of those to whom he has no obligation 18 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2403 (Reissue 2016). 19 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2420 (Reissue 2016). 20 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2444 (Reissue 2016). 21 See “Accept,” Oxford English Dictionary Online, http://www.oed.com/ view/Entry/1006 (last visited Feb. 14, 2022) (“[t]o consent to”). 22 33 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 88 at 793 (2009). See Matter of Estate of Cluff, 587 P.2d 128 (Utah 1978). 23 See Matter of Estate of Cluff, supra note 22. 24 Id. at 129. - 990 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports IN RE ESTATE OF SEVERSON Cite as 310 Neb. 982 would constitute a violation of public policy as well. It is necessary for the protection of estate heirs, creditors, and the general public that an administrator serve free from compulsion and that he only be allowed to serve when so willing. Generally speaking, only a willingness to serve is consistent with proper estate administration and the interest of the Court. 25 The Utah Supreme Court’s reasoning is persuasive. We need not discuss our own constitution, because our statute, as set forth above, requires that “a personal representative shall qualify by filing with the appointing court any required bond and a statement of acceptance of the duties of the office.” 26 A consequence of acceptance is contained in a different statute: “By accepting appointment, a personal representative submits personally to the jurisdiction of the court in any proceeding relating to the estate that may be instituted by any interested person.” 27 With respect to acceptance, we find some parallels in our recent decision concerning a guardianship. 28 There, the county court directed that a ward’s parents be appointed as coguardians upon issuance of letters of guardianship and upon the parents’ filing, among other things, an acceptance of appointment. The parents never filed an acceptance. They appealed, assigning that the court erred in ordering them to serve as guardians over their objection. We agreed with the parents that “one who is not willing to serve as a private guardian cannot be compelled to accept such an appointment.” 29 And we 25 Id. at 129-30. 26 § 30-2444 (emphasis supplied). See, also, Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1446 (providing for appointment to be set aside where personal representative had been appointed but failed to qualify by filing required bond and acceptance within 60 days of appointment). 27 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2445 (Reissue 2016). 28 See In re Guardianship of Nicholas H., 309 Neb. 1, 958 N.W.2d 661 (2021). 29 Id. at 11, 958 N.W.2d at 668. - 991 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports IN RE ESTATE OF SEVERSON Cite as 310 Neb. 982 stated that “[o]nly after a written acceptance is filed and the guardian submits to the personal jurisdiction of the court will letters of guardianship be issued by the court.” 30 But in that case, because the parents never accepted the court’s appointment, no letters issued. In rejecting the assignment of error, we stated that “the appointment they assign as error was never completed and cannot be completed without their voluntary acceptance.” 31 The record is devoid of any statement of acceptance filed by Kelly. To the contrary, she filed an objection “as nominated personal representative” to the application for informal appointment of personal representative in intestacy and asked the court to dismiss the application. At oral argument, Feik conceded that no acceptance had been filed by Kelly. [12-14] As we stated with respect to a private guardian, it follows that one who is not willing to serve as a personal representative cannot be compelled to accept such an appointment. Without acceptance by one appointed personal representative, there can be no qualification. 32 And the Nebraska Probate Code requires qualification of a personal representative before the issuance of letters. 33 In other words, in the absence of qualification, the issuance of letters as part of the appointment proc­ ess is not authorized by statute. Here, the court issued letters to Kelly without her qualification. Because this action was not statutorily authorized, we reverse the order directing issuance of letters and the letters issued in accordance with that order, and remand the cause for further proceedings. [15] We express no opinion on the validity or effect of any actions taken in reliance upon the letters issued to Kelly. 30 Id. 31 Id. at 11-12, 958 N.W.2d at 669. 32 See § 30-2444. 33 See §§ 30-2403, 30-2420, and 30-2444. - 992 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports IN RE ESTATE OF SEVERSON Cite as 310 Neb. 982 Such questions may well exist, but they are beyond the scope of the present probate proceeding. In the absence of an actual case or controversy requiring judicial resolution, it is not the function of the courts to render a judgment that is merely advisory. 34 And to the extent that the reasoning of the county court conveyed in an order within the probate proceeding may seem to express an opinion on matters outside the scope of the appointment proceeding itself, we reverse those portions of the probate court’s order. Statute of Limitations Kelly also argues that § 30-2408 prohibited the commencement of the appointment proceeding. The parties agree that it was commenced more than 3 years after Severson’s death and that no prior appointment or probate proceeding had occurred. But Kelly contends that no exception under § 30-2408 applies while Feik relies upon the exception in subsection (4), which states that “an informal . . . appointment proceeding may be commenced thereafter if no formal or informal proceeding for probate or proceeding concerning the succession or administration has occurred within the three-year period, but claims other than expenses of administration may not be presented against the estate.” We agree with Feik. [16] The exception applies because no such proceeding had occurred within the 3-year period. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. 35 Over a decade ago, we declared that “[§] 30-2408 clearly permits an informal appointment proceeding to be commenced more than 3 years after the decedent’s death ‘if no formal or informal proceeding for probate or proceeding concerning the succession or administration has occurred 34 State ex rel. Peterson v. Ebke, 303 Neb. 637, 930 N.W.2d 551 (2019). 35 In re Estate of Nemetz, 273 Neb. 918, 735 N.W.2d 363 (2007). - 993 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports IN RE ESTATE OF SEVERSON Cite as 310 Neb. 982 within the three-year period.’” 36 Thus, a proceeding could be commenced here to appoint a personal representative. We read the clause regarding “claims other than expenses of administration” as limiting the scope of the proceeding rather than its commencement. 37 Remaining Assignments of Error [17] Because we reverse the order directing issuance of letters of personal representative and remand the cause for further proceedings, we need not consider Kelly’s other assigned errors. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before it. 38