Opinion ID: 2802966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Overview of Issue Presented.

Text: A. Collateral Consequences. There has recently been an increase in what is typically referred to as “collateral consequences” that flow from a criminal conviction. Id. As we recently explained, Federal law now imposes dozens of sanctions for persons with felony drug convictions. States have also imposed an increasing number of sanctions as a result of criminal convictions. In Iowa, for example, a person who is convicted of sexual offenses will be subject to registration laws and other restrictions that apply to sex offenders, and a deferred judgment for eluding a law enforcement vehicle may have an impact on one’s driver’s license. Id. (citations omitted). Further, recent developments in the law regarding a defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel recognize that lawyers representing criminal defendants must advise their clients whether their pleas carry a risk of deportation. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374–75, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284, 298–99 (2010). In Padilla, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a criminal defendant who pled guilty to drug charges received constitutionally 7 deficient assistance of counsel when his lawyer failed to advise him of a serious consequence—deportation—that would automatically occur because of his conviction. Id. at 359, 373–75, 130 S. Ct. at 1478, 1486– 87, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 290, 298–99. This case presents a clear example of the impact collateral consequences may have on criminal proceedings. Hernandez-Galarza pled guilty to the charge of fraudulent practice in the fourth degree believing he would receive a deferred judgment, and that upon satisfying his one-year term of probation and other conditions, the court would expunge any record of his conviction. Hernandez-Galarza now alleges that after receiving a deferred judgment he became ineligible for cancellation of removal proceedings under federal immigration law because he no longer qualifies for the petty-offense exception. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). As such, he asserts he is subject to removal from the United States. See id. § 1182(a)(2). He seeks to attack his state criminal proceedings to avoid these claimed consequences. B. Avenues for Relief. In Iowa, there are three avenues for challenging a criminal conviction: direct appeal, see Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a); postconviction relief, see id. ch. 822; and habeas corpus, see id. ch. 663. Because he received a deferred judgment, HernandezGalarza could not challenge his conviction on direct appeal. See State v. Stessman, 460 N.W.2d 461, 462 (Iowa 1990) (holding a deferred judgment is interlocutory and cannot meet the final judgment requirement for appeals). Neither could he bring a postconviction relief action under Iowa Code chapter 822. See Daughenbaugh, 805 N.W.2d at 598 (holding a deferred judgment is not a “conviction” under Iowa’s postconviction relief statute). Thus, we must determine whether habeas corpus relief under Iowa Code chapter 663 is a cognizable avenue for 8 Hernandez-Galarza to challenge his deferred judgment based on ineffective assistance of counsel. IV. Whether Hernandez-Galarza Is Entitled to Relief Under Iowa Code Chapter 663. As noted by the court of appeals, Hernandez-Galarza seizes on a footnote in our Daughenbaugh opinion to support his use of habeas corpus to attack his deferred judgment. See id. at 599 n.1. There, we stated: “We express no opinion upon whether or under what circumstances a guilty plea followed by a deferred judgment might be subject to collateral attack under Iowa Code chapter 663.” Id. We must now address one possible circumstance. We begin our analysis by setting forth a brief history of the writ of habeas corpus. Next, we will discuss federal precedent and other state law decisions that have dealt with comparable issues in this context. Finally, we consider whether Hernandez-Galarza is entitled to relief under Iowa Code chapter 663. A. History of the Writ of Habeas Corpus. Commonly referred to as the “Great Writ,” Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243, 83 S. Ct. 373, 377, 9 L. Ed. 2d 285, 291, (1963), the remedy of habeas corpus is derived from the common law of England, see Ex parte Holman, 28 Iowa 88, 125 (1869) (Beck, J., in chambers). It was originally “a writ of right, to which every person [was] entitled, . . . inherent in the English people.” Holman, 28 Iowa at 125. Its chief purpose was to “seek the release of persons [unlawfully] held in actual, physical custody in prison or jail.” Jones, 371 U.S. at 238, 83 S. Ct. at 375, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 288. The remedy was subsequently transferred to the United States as part of the common law. See Holman, 28 Iowa at 125–26. It is now recognized by both the United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 9 suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”); Iowa Const. art. I, § 13 (“The writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, or refused when application is made as required by law, unless in case of rebellion, or invasion the public safety may require it.”). Although the writ originally provided an avenue of relief for prisoners to challenge their actual, physical confinement, it has since been extended to include challenges during the time a person is released on bail or parole. See Hensley v. Mun. Ct., 411 U.S. 345, 351–53, 93 S. Ct. 1571, 1575–76, 36 L. Ed. 2d 294, 300–01 (1973) (bail); Jones, 371 U.S. at 242–43, 83 S. Ct. at 377, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 290–91 (parole). It also “include[s] an inquiry into the proper custody of minor children.” Lamar v. Zimmerman, 169 N.W.2d 819, 821 (Iowa 1969). Historically, the writ provided a postconviction remedy after the time for appeal had passed, allowing an individual to obtain an evidentiary hearing and a determination of any alleged denial of constitutional rights. Birk v. Bennett, 258 Iowa 1016, 1023, 141 N.W.2d 576, 580 (1966). However, habeas corpus is not an avenue to determine the guilt or innocence of an individual, pass upon errors at trial, or challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Scalf v. Bennett, 260 Iowa 393, 398, 147 N.W.2d 860, 863 (1967). Rather, the question is whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment. Id. Constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes a jurisdictional defect and is reviewable by habeas corpus. Id. at 398, 147 N.W.2d at 864. However, in 1970 the Iowa legislature, by statute, limited the circumstances in which an individual may use habeas corpus to challenge a conviction. See 1970 Iowa Acts ch. 1276, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 663A.1 (1971) and now found at Iowa Code § 822.1 (2011)). 10 Today, Iowa Code section 822.1 provides: “The provisions of sections 663.1 through 663.44, inclusive, shall not apply to persons convicted of, or sentenced for, a public offense.” Thus, pursuant to Iowa Code section 822.1, the legislature foreclosed habeas corpus as a postconviction remedy for persons “convicted of, or sentenced for, a public offense.” See Allen v. State, 217 N.W.2d 528, 531 (Iowa 1974) (noting that Iowa Code section 663A.1, now section 822.1, “seems to abrogate habeas corpus for persons convicted of, or sentenced for, a public offense”), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. State, 345 N.W.2d 97, 99 (Iowa 1984). The postconviction procedure contained in Iowa Code chapter 822 now provides the proper remedial vehicle for persons “convicted of, or sentenced for, a public offense” to challenge their convictions. Iowa Code § 822.2. Here, however, because Hernandez-Galarza received a deferred judgment, he has not been “convicted of, or sentenced for, a public offense.” Id.; see Daughenbaugh, 805 N.W.2d at 598. Thus, insofar as Iowa Code section 822.1 is concerned, Iowa Code section 663 might be available to Hernandez-Galarza. B. Federal Precedent. The federal habeas statute gives the United States district courts jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions from persons who are “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (emphasis added); see also id. §§ 2255(a), 2254(a). Under federal law, actual physical detention is not required. See Jones, 371 U.S. at 240, 83 S. Ct. at 376, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 289. Rather, a person is deemed to be in “constructive custody” even when he or she is released on parole, id. at 242–43, 83 S. Ct. at 377, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 290–91; released on bail or on his or her own recognizance, Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351–53, 93 S. Ct. at 1575–76, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 300–01; or unconditionally released before 11 completion of proceedings on his or her habeas petition, Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237–38, 88 S. Ct. 1556, 1559–60, 20 L. Ed. 2d 554, 558–59 (1968). This constructive custody concept is predicated on the notion that such restrictions, although falling short of immediate physical imprisonment, significantly restrain an individual’s liberty in ways not shared by the public generally so as to fall within the historical ambit of the writ’s availability. See Jones, 371 U.S. at 240, 83 S. Ct. at 376, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 289 (“History, usage, and precedent can leave no doubt that, besides physical imprisonment, there are other restraints on a man’s liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally, which have been thought sufficient in the English-speaking world to support the issuance of habeas corpus.”). Notwithstanding, a habeas petitioner is not in custody for purposes of filing a federal habeas petition once the sentence imposed for a conviction has fully expired. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492, 109