Opinion ID: 1731024
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr Hughston

Text: Q Doctor, in your opinion, was the left hand at or above the wrist of Robert C. Huff on March 1, 1965, for all practical purposes entirely traumatically amputated or severed? A I would say that the arm wasthere wasn't anymuch of a chance of saving it. For practical purposes you could consider it as being amputated. At the same time, the one factor that allows you to have a chance to save it was still present, that was the blood supply. So that is the reason for trying to fight for it. Q But for all practical purposes it was severed? A For practical purposes, it was, yes, sir. Q Was there a permanent and irrecoverable loss as of that date? A Oh, yes, sure. We anticipated at the most,that the most we could gain from saving it, if we were able to save it at all, would be that he would have a hook there that would have some sensation to it, which is better than a steel hook that has no sensation to it. There wasn't any anticipation of being able to recover any real function to the hand, because he had lost all the muscles, front and back, all the muscles that move all the fingers and everything. Q Based upon the history given and your examination, Doctor, in your opinion, did this traumatic amputation or severance of Robert's entire hand and portion of his arm as you have described on March 1, 1965, result from the accident described to you? A Yes, sir. Q He suffered a complete loss of the usefulness of his arm at the time of the accident? A Yes, sir. We hold that under the cases we have cited and the testimony that the question of whether appellant suffered the loss of his hand by severance on March 1, 1965 was, at least, a question for the jury. But appellee argues that the court ruled correctly because the hand was not actually amputated within ninety days from March 1, the date of the injury. There is a split of authority on this question but we discuss only two cases, one from Louisiana and one from Mississippi. Other cases are mentioned in Annotation 87 A.L.R.2d 511, § 7(b). In Westenhover v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., La.App., 27 So.2d 391, the plaintiff's leg was crushed on August 24, 1945, and the leg was amputated between the knee and thigh on November 2, 1945. The policy provided that no sum would be payable for the loss of any member except for total and permanent severance at or above the ankle or wrist joints, and that no payment would be made unless the loss of the member occurs within thirty days from the date of the accident. The insurer denied liability because the amputation took place more than sixty days after the accident. The Louisiana Court of Appeals said: The provision of the policy at issue does not restrict the meaning of the loss of a member to amputation. It simply restricts liability for payment for the loss of a member to those cases in which such loss has been evidenced by amputation. Nor does the policy require that amputation, total and permanent severance, take place within thirty days, but simply that the loss of the member shall occur within thirty days from the date of the accident.