Opinion ID: 2351766
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Contempt Powers at Common Law

Text: It is well settled that Rhode Island and the other original colonies adhered to English common law [1] after gaining their independence, Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038, 1042 (R.I.1995), and that this state recognizes all common law offenses that have not been specifically abrogated or superseded by statute. In re Marlene B., 540 A.2d 1028, 1029 (R.I.1988). Under the common law of England courts had inherent power to punish for contempt. Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Law 531 (2nd ed. 1969) (citing Douglas v. Adel, 269 N.Y. 144, 146, 199 N.E. 35, 36 (1935)). Moreover, contempts against the King's Courts, which included the Court of King's Bench, Chancery, Common Pleas or Exchequer, were regarded as serious offenses highly punishable by Fine and Imprisonment. William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, ch. XXI,  Of Contempts against the King's Courts  at 57-58 (1739). The exercise of contempt powers by English courts and the imposition of punishments were well documented in the eighteenth century. Hawkins reported, for example, that a person who drew his sword on any judge, whether he strike or not, in the presence of the King's courts, could lose his Hand and his Goods, and the Profits of his Lands during Life, and suffer perpetual Imprisonment; whereas those who disturbed such Courts by threatening or reproachful Words to any Judge sitting in them were guilty of a High Misprision, and those who made an Affray in the Palace-Yard near the said Courts, but out of their View were subject to a severe fine and imprisonment during the King's Pleasure. Id. at 57. The inherent power to punish for contempt has long been recognized as part of our country's common law. Perkins, Criminal Law, at 531 (citing Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31, 36, 10 S.Ct. 424, 426, 33 L.Ed. 801, 804 (1890); In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 34 P. 227 (1893); Austin v. City and County of Denver, 156 Colo. 180, 397 P.2d 743 (1964); In re Hayes, 72 Fla. 558, 73 So. 362 (1916); State ex rel. Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Coleman, 347 Mo. 1238, 152 S.W.2d 640 (1941)). The moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of [the] power [to punish for contempt]. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510, 22 L.Ed. 205, 207-08 (1873). In Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227, 5 L.Ed. 242, 248 (1821), the United States Supreme Court stated that Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates. The source of judicial authority in respect to contempt was cogently identified in In re Cooper, 32 Vt. 253, 257 (1859): The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the nature and constitution of a court. It is a power not derived from any statute, but arising from necessity; implied, because it is necessary to the exercise all other powers. (Emphasis added.)