Opinion ID: 1033521
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due Process Principles

Text: Both the federal and state Constitutions compel the government to afford persons due process before depriving them of any property interest. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend. [“nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”]; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a) [“A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . .”].) In 11 light of the virtually identical language of the federal and state guarantees, we have looked to the United States Supreme Court‟s precedents for guidance in interpreting the contours of our own due process clause and have treated the state clause‟s prescriptions as substantially overlapping those of the federal Constitution. (See, e.g., Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 731, 736-737.) “The essence of due process is the requirement that „a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.‟ ” (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 348; see Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532, 546.) The opportunity to be heard must be afforded “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” (Armstrong v. Manzo, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 552; accord, People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 869.) To ensure that the opportunity is meaningful, the United States Supreme Court and this court have identified some aspects of due process as irreducible minimums. For example, whenever “due process requires a hearing, the adjudicator must be impartial.” (Haas v. County of San Bernardino (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1017, 1025; see Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. (2009) 556 U.S. 868, 876; Withrow v. Larkin (1975) 421 U.S. 35, 47.) Beyond these broad outlines, however, the precise dictates of due process are flexible and vary according to context. (Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 334 [“ „ “[d]ue process,” unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances‟ ”]; Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1999) 20 Cal.4th 371, 391 & fn. 16.) “ „The function of legal process, as that concept is embodied in the Constitution, and in the realm of factfinding, is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions. Because of the broad spectrum of concerns to which the term must apply, flexibility is necessary to gear the process to the particular need; the quantum and 12 quality of the process due in a particular situation depend upon the need to serve the purpose of minimizing the risk of error.‟ ” (Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 332.) Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has rejected absolute rules in favor of balancing three considerations: “First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government‟s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” (Mathews, at p. 335; see Turner v. Rogers (2011) 564 U.S. ___, ___ [131 S.Ct. 2507, 25172518]; Wilkinson v. Austin (2005) 545 U.S. 209, 224-225.) With a minor modification, we have adopted the Mathews balancing test as the default framework for analyzing challenges to the sufficiency of proceedings under our own due process clause. The first three factors—the private interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the government‟s interest—are the same. (See, e.g., California Teachers Assn. v. State of California (1999) 20 Cal.4th 327, 347; In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 986-987.) In addition, we may also consider a fourth factor, “ „the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible government official.‟ ” (People v. Allen, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 862-863; accord, Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 390-391.) As the case in which we announced the additional state factor makes clear, however, dignitary interests play a role only when the rights of natural persons are at stake: “The federal approach also undervalues the important due process interest in recognizing the dignity and worth of the individual by treating him as an equal, fully participating and responsible member of society. [Citations.] „For 13 government to dispose of a person‟s significant interests without offering him a chance to be heard is to risk treating him as a nonperson, an object, rather than a respected, participating citizen.‟ [Citation.] Thus, even in cases in which the decision-making procedure will not alter the outcome of governmental action, due process may nevertheless require that certain procedural protections be granted the individual in order to protect important dignitary values, or, in other words, „to ensure that the method of interaction itself is fair in terms of what are perceived as minimum standards of political accountability—of modes of interaction which express a collective judgment that human beings are important in their own right, and that they must be treated with understanding, respect, and even compassion.‟ [Citation.]” (People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 267-268, italics added.) Accordingly, the fourth factor plays no role where, as here, due process rights are asserted by an entity rather than an individual. Consequently, in this case the starting point for our analysis under the state and federal Constitutions is the same. The requirements of due process extend to administrative adjudications. (Withrow v. Larkin, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 46; Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Resources Control Bd., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 737.) Relevant here, the bar against financially interested adjudicators applies with as much force to administrative adjudicators as to judicial officers. (Haas v. County of San Bernardino, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1027.) In many other respects, however, administrative hearings need not be conducted with the same rigor demanded of judicial proceedings: “[D]ue process allows more flexibility in administrative process than judicial process . . . .” (Ibid.; see Gai v. City of Selma (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 213, 219 [“The standard of impartiality required at an administrative hearing is less exacting than that required in a judicial proceeding.”].) With these principles in mind, we turn to Today‟s Fresh Start‟s due process claims. 14