Opinion ID: 77840
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Availability of Monetary Damages Under RLUIPA

Text: RLUIPA creates a private cause of action for a prison inmate if section 3 is violated, and further provides that the complaining party, if successful, may obtain appropriate relief against a government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). While the parties do not dispute that the phrase appropriate relief would presumably entitle a complaining inmate to injunctive and declaratory reliefsuch as, for example, an order granting the inmate the right to a particular object for use in religious worshipthe question is whether that phrase also encompasses a right to monetary relief. To put it mildly, there is a division of authority on this question. Madison v. Va., 474 F.3d 118, 130 n. 3 (4th Cir.2006). Some district courts have concluded that the phrase appropriate relief as used in RLUIPA does not encompass monetary damages. See, e.g., Boles v. Neet, 402 F.Supp.2d 1237, 1241 (D.Co.2005) (It would appear, therefore, that the `appropriate relief' permitted under the statute must be limited to injunctive or declaratory relief. . . .); see also Daker v. Ferrero, 475 F.Supp.2d 1325, 1337 (N.D.Ga.2007) (finding RLUIPA to be ambiguous on the question of whether it authorizes a private right of action seeking monetary damages, but rejecting a recovery of monetary damages, inasmuch as they are sought in an individual capacity lawsuit). A number of district courts have concluded otherwise, and have found that RLUIPA's phrase, appropriate relief, is sufficiently broad to include some forms of monetary relief. See Shidler v. Moore, 409 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1067 (N.D.Ind.2006); Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 326 F.Supp.2d 1140, 1161-62 (E.D.Cal.2003); see also Chase v. City of Portsmouth, No. 2:05CV446, 2005 WL 3079065, at  (E.D.Va. Nov. 16, 2005) (Appropriate relief may include injunctive and declaratory relief as well as nominal damages.) (citation omitted). Still other courts have assumed that money damages are available, without actually deciding the question. See Presley v. Edwards, No. 2:04-CV-729-WKW, 2007 WL 174153, at  (M.D.Al. Jan.19, 2007); Gooden v. Crain, 405 F.Supp.2d 714, 723-24 (E.D.Tex.2005); Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F.Supp.2d 937, 938-39 (W.D.Wis.2002). This was the approach taken by the district court in this case in disposing of Smith's action. See Smith, 401 F.Supp.2d at 1246. The Supreme Court has instructed that, where Congress had not given any guidance or clear indication of its purpose with respect to remedies, federal courts should presume the availability of all appropriate remedies. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 68-69, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 1034, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992) (citations omitted). In Franklin, the issue before the Court was what types of remedies were available in a private right of action for sex discrimination under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Title IX). Although the statute was silent as to what remedies were available, the court stated that it was appropriate for a court to presume the availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise. 503 U.S. at 66, 112 S.Ct. at 1032. Thus, absent any intent to the contrary reflected in the statute, the Court instructed that the presumption should be in favor of all available reliefboth injunctive and monetary. Id. at 73, 112 S.Ct. at 1036. After Franklin, courtswhen faced with a statute lacking express guidance on the question of remedieshave generally adhered to this presumption. In Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Systems, Inc., for example, the First Circuit concluded that the general phrase all appropriate relief, as used in section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c), embrace[d] monetary damages as well as other relevant forms of relief normally available. 26 F.3d 1187, 1191 (1st Cir. 1994). In light of Franklin and its progeny, we agree that the use of the phrase appropriate relief in section 3 of RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a), is broad enough to encompass the right to monetary damages in the event a plaintiff establishes a violation of the statute. Congress expressed no intent to the contrary within RLUIPA, even though it could have, by, for example, explicitly limiting the remedies set forth in § 2000cc(a) to injunctive relief only. Instead, Congress used broad, general language in crafting the remedies section of RLUIPA, stating that a prevailing party could obtain appropriate relief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). We assume that, when Congress acted, it was aware of Franklin 's presumption in favor of making all appropriate remedies available to the prevailing party. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73, 112 S.Ct. at 1036. In light of that presumption, we conclude that, absent an intent to the contrary, the phrase appropriate relief in RLUIPA encompasses monetary as well as injunctive relief. Having reached that general conclusion, however, it bears pointing out that a prisoner plaintiff's right to monetary relief is severely circumscribed by the terms of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e). The PLRA provides that a prisoner may not bring a federal civil action for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e); see also Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 532 (11th Cir. 2002) (construing § 1997(e) as barring a prisoner from obtaining compensatory damages for solely mental or emotional harm while he is in custody). Despite this limitation, nominal damages may sometimes be appropriate under § 1997(e). See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (stating that nominal damages may be appropriate if a plaintiff establishes a violation of a constitutional right, even if he cannot prove actual physical injury sufficient to entitle him to compensatory damages). Indeed, in earlier cases, we have suggested that § 1997(e) does not preclude a prisoner from seeking nominal damages if he can establish that he has suffered a constitutional injury. See Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir.2003); see also Boxer X v. Donald, 169 Fed.Appx. 555, 558 (11th Cir.2006) (stating that the PLRA's limitation on compensatory relief does not necessarily limit other forms of monetary relief, namely, nominal damages). Here, Smith has alleged violations of RLUIPA due to the burden placed upon his religious exercise, but no physical harm. He seeks nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages. It is clear from our case law, however, that the latter two types of damages are precluded under the PLRA, Napier, 314 F.3d at 532, but that nominal damages may still be recoverable. Hughes, 350 F.3d at 1162. Thus, although we conclude, as a general matter, that RLUIPA's phrase appropriate relief contemplates monetary as well as injunctive relief, in this case it is clear that Smith's monetary award, if any, will be limited to a grant of nominal damages, in light of the limiting language of § 1997(e). Having concluded that Smith may seek nominal damages in his section 3 RLUIPA action against the ADOC, we now must address whether Smith is entitled to bring either an individual capacity action, or an official capacity action, or both, against these defendant-appellees.