Opinion ID: 852493
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Summary Denial of Request for Standby Counsel

Text: As recounted above, when Henley requested that his standby counsel deliver closing argument, the trial court denied the request without elaboration. Appellate counsel did not raise this issue on direct appeal. And Henley claims counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to do so. To show that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an issue on appeal thus resulting in waiver for collateral review, the defendant must overcome the strongest presumption of adequate assistance, and judicial scrutiny is highly deferential. Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 260-61 (Ind.2000). To evaluate the performance prong when counsel waived issues upon appeal, we apply the following test: (1) whether the unraised issues are significant and obvious from the face of the record and (2) whether the unraised issues are clearly stronger than the raised issues. Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 605-06 (Ind.2001). If the analysis under this test demonstrates deficient performance, then we evaluate the prejudice prong which requires an examination of whether the issues which appellate counsel failed to raise, would have been clearly more likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial. Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at 194 (citation omitted). Although the performance prong and the prejudice prong are separate inquiries, failure to satisfy either prong will cause the claim to fail. French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind.2002). If we can easily dismiss an ineffective assistance claim based upon the prejudice prong, we may do so without addressing whether counsel's performance was deficient. Wentz v. State, 766 N.E.2d 351, 360 (Ind.2002). Most ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be resolved by a prejudice inquiry alone. French, 778 N.E.2d at 824. Our opinion in Koehler v. State, 499 N.E.2d 196 (Ind.1986), is important to this discussion. The defendant in that case proceeded pro se before a jury on a charge of battery. After the jury found him guilty as charged but before the habitual offender phase of trial began, the defendant requested that his standby counsel take over his defense. The trial court refused the request, and the defendant was found to be a habitual offender. On appeal the defendant contended that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by refusing to appoint counsel for the habitual offender hearing. Addressing this claim the Court cited with approval authority from various jurisdictions that had determined that it was within the trial court's discretion to appoint counsel after a defendant had begun the trial pro se. The Court continued: Relevant factors must be considered by the trial court in order for it to exercise a meaningful discretion in ruling on defendant's request to change from self-representation to counsel-representation. . . . Relevant factors should include, among others, the following: (1) defendant's prior history in the substitution of counsel and in the desire to change from self-representation to counsel-representation; (2) the reasons set forth for the request; (3) the length and stage of the trial proceedings; (4) disruption or delay which reasonably might be expected to ensue from the granting of such motion; and (5) the likelihood of defendant's effectiveness in defending against the charges if required to continue to act as his own attorney. Id. at 199 (quotation omitted). Examining the record and applying the foregoing factors, [5] the Court concluded, [I]t was an abuse of discretion to refuse Koehler's request for counsel. Id. The habitual offender adjudication was thus reversed and the cause was remanded for a new habitual offender phase of trial. In Dowell v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1063 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), the Court of Appeals addressed a claim that the trial court erred when it refused to allow defendant's standby counsel to conduct closing argument. After he appeared in court without counselhaving advised the court that he would hire his own attorney and did not need a court appointed attorneythe trial court issued an order appointing counsel for Dowell. Dowell refused the appointed counsel's services, and upon the court's order, counsel continued to serve in an advisory capacity only. Prior to voir dire, the court asked Dowell on two occasions if he wanted to represent himself, and Dowell responded affirmatively. The court informed Dowell he would be held to the same standards as an attorney. Dowell represented himself at voir dire and at the trial. Prior to his closing argument, Dowell requested that his advisory counsel be permitted to conduct the final summation. The court denied the request stating, for reasons that I am not at liberty to go into, that would be inappropriate at this point. Id. at 1068 (quoting record). Dowell conducted his own closing argument and was convicted as charged of theft and forgery. On appeal Dowell raised three issues: (1) whether he made a clear and unequivocal assertion of his right to self-representation, (2) whether he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, and (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Dowell's request for standby counsel to deliver the final argument. Concerning Dowell's first claim the Court of Appeals concluded that Dowell made a clear and unequivocal request to proceed pro se. As for Dowell's second claim, the Court of Appeals concluded that Dowell's waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Thus the court reversed Dowell's conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial. Acknowledging that [a]lthough not necessary to our decision the Court of Appeals nonetheless addressed Dowell's third claim. Dowell, 557 N.E.2d at 1067. Citing Koehler, the court noted the five factors the trial, court should have considered and, as in Koehler, the court recited facts of record applicable to those factors. It then determined [t]he trial court abused its discretion in summarily denying Dowell's request for standby counsel to conduct the closing argument. Id. at 1068. At the time of Henley's direct appeal Koehler and Dowell were the only reported Indiana decisions addressing a claim of trial court error in summarily denying a pro, se defendant's request for counsel after trial had begun. Assuming, for the sake of discussion that appellate counsel rendered deficient performance in not challenging the trial court's summary denial, the question remains whether this unraised issue would have been clearly more likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial. Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at 194. The Court of Appeals answered the question affirmatively, apparently reasoning that a trial court's failure to consider the Koehler factors when ruling on a pro se defendant's request for counsel is per se reversible error. [6] For reasons discussed in more detail below, we disagree with our colleagues on this point. But we pause here to discuss a related issue. Essentially, it is not at all clear that Henley was actually seeking to abandon his pro se defense and reassert his right to counsel. Thus there is a substantial question as to whether Koehler is even applicable in this case. The record shows that in the middle of the second day of the two-way trial Henley requested of the court, I'd like [standby counsel] to cross examine the witnesses, for me. Tr. at 722. The court inquired, You would like for him to take over your case? Id. Henley responded, Not take over it, but to co-counsel with me. Id. After the trial court explained that hybrid representation was not permitted, Henley responded, I still want to remain in charge of the case. Id. at 723. The trial court then denied Henley's request. Id. Minutes before Henley rested his case and before the State presented rebuttal testimony, the following colloquy occurred: [Trial Court]: Are we ready for the jury? [State]: Yes sir. [Standby Counsel]: Yes sir. You're going to have to tell the Judge before he brings the jury in. You will have to understand I decide the content, not you. [Trial Court]: Mr. Henley. [Defendant]: You decide the content? [Standby Counsel]: I decide the content, not you. If you want me to do it, I'll be happy to do it, but you need to tell the Judge what you want. [Defendant]: Go ahead, Your Honor. Go ahead and proceed. Tr. at 816. Although the details are not altogether clear, it is apparent in this exchange that Henley wanted standby counsel to handle some portion of the defense while at the same time remaining in control of his case. As indicated, the trial judge had previously advised Henley that hybrid representation was not permitted. Further, just before presenting his closing argument, Henley informed the jury [standby counsel] asked to share some of my time, I just want to make [a] brief statement. Id. at 854. The trial court interjected, No, you're representing yourself, sir. Id. Again Henley was attempting hybrid representation. Sandwiched between these events was Henley's request that standby counsel deliver closing argument. Viewed in isolation, this request appears to be a clear effort by Henley to abandon his pro se defense and rely instead on trained counsel. However, considering the context, the trial court very reasonably could have assumed that Henley was making yet another attempt at hybrid representation. The law is settled that [t]he Sixth Amendment does not require a trial judge to permit hybrid representation. . . . Sherwood v. State, 717 N.E.2d 131, 135 (Ind.1999). See also Myers v. State, 510 N.E.2d 1360, 1363 (Ind.1987) (This Court has refused to recognize a constitutional right to hybrid representation and a trial court may, in its discretion, deny a motion requesting creation of such a scheme.). Indeed Henley acknowledges as much. See Br. of Appellant at 10. Because hybrid representation was not allowed, there would have been no need for the trial court to consider the  Koehler  factors in denying Henley's request. Appellate counsel could not be deemed as rendering deficient performance for failing to advance such a claim. In any event assuming that Henley's request could be interpreted as an effort to abandon his pro se defense after trial had begun and to reassert his right to counsel, his argument still fails. First we do not read Koehler as standing for the proposition that the trial court's failure to consider certain factors before denying a pro se defendant's request for counsel is per se reversible error. It is true that in Koehler the Court reversed the defendant's habitual offender adjudication. But it did so only after examining the record, Which showed that the five factors the trial court neglected to consider all weighed in favor of granting the defendant relief. The Court thus concluded, [I]t was an abuse of discretion to refuse Koehler's request for counsel. Koehler, 499 N.E.2d at 199. As for Dowell, we make two observations. One, the opinion did not say that the trial court's failure to consider the Koehler factors automatically resulted in reversible error. Rather, expanding on the language of Koehler the opinion declared, The trial court abused its discretion in summarily denying Dowell's request for stand-by counsel to conduct the closing argument. Dowell, 557 N.E.2d at 1068 (emphasis added). Two, and more importantly, the portion of the opinion discussing this issue was, in the words of the court itself, not necessary to our decision. Id. at 1067. In appellate opinions, statements not necessary in the determination of the issues presented are obiter dictum. They are not binding and do not become the law. Koske v. Townsend Eng'g Co., 551 N.E.2d 437, 443 (Ind.1990) (citation omitted). In sum, at the time of Henley's direct appeal Koehler was the prevailing Indiana case authority in this area of the law. And Koehler teaches that where, without considering certain factors, the trial court denies a pro se defendant's request that counsel take over the defense after trial has begun, the appellate court will examine the record to determine whether the trial court has abused its discretion in refusing the request. We now examine the record and apply the factors as outlined in Koehler. (1) Defendant's prior history in the substitution of counsel and in the desire to change from self-representation to counsel-representation: Henley made the decision to proceed pro se before trial. But as discussed in more detail above, in the middle of trial he appeared to change his mind and requested that standby counsel serve as co-counsel. This factor weighs against the appointment of counsel. (2) The reasons set forth for the request: Henley gave no reason for requesting that standby counsel deliver closing argument. However in an earlier request that counsel cross-examine witnesses, Henley advised the trial court that he was up for two days [with] no sleep. Tr. at 721. [7] This is not a sufficient reason at this late stage in the proceeding. This factor also weighs against the appointment of counsel. (3) The length and state of the trial proceedings: It is true that Henley's request came at an opportune moment, after trial had concluded but before final summation had begun. This factor weighs in favor of the appointment of counsel. (4) Disruption or delay which reasonably might be expected to ensue from the granting of such motion: It is also true that the record does not indicate that allowing counsel to deliver closing argument would have created any delay. No continuance would have been necessary because standby counsel was familiar with the case. This factor also weighs in favor of the appointment of counsel. (5) The likelihood of defendant's effectiveness in defending against the charges if required to continue to act as his own attorney: Although obviously not exhibiting the skills of a trained and experienced lawyer, Henley had not failed miserably as defense counsel during his trial. Koehler, 499 N.E.2d at 199. In an attempt to show discrepancies in the testimony of the State's police witnesses, Henley cross-examined them through the use of various police reports the officers had compiled, as well as through the use of their pre-trial depositions that had been taken by standby counsel. See, e.g., Tr. at 264, 383. Henley's apparent trial strategy was to show police brutality in removing him from the van, that his firing at the police dog was a matter of self-defense, and that he did not fire at the officers. [8] The record shows that to advance his strategy Henley for the most part asked relevant questions of the State's witnesses as well as the witness he called on his own behalf. Final summation is not evidence but an opportunity to advance one's theory of the case. 16B Ind. Practice § 22.8(e) (2007) (Within [certain] evidentiary limitations, a party may argue his or her theory of the case in closing arguments.). There was no reason to believe that Henley would have been any less able in pressing his claim in closing argument than he was during trial. This factor weighs against the appointment of counsel. Considering the Koehler factors and weighing them against each other, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Henley's request for counsel. Consequently had appellate counsel raised this issue on appeal, his likelihood of success would have been virtually nonexistent. Stated somewhat differently, this unraised issue would not have been clearly more likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial. Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at 194 (quotation omitted). In this post-conviction proceeding, Henley has failed to show that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance on this issue. Because the Court of Appeals found this issue dispositive, it did not address Henley's remaining claims. We do so now.