Opinion ID: 1734678
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Proceedings to Terminate Parental Rights

Text: We recently discussed the unique concerns present in all cases of involuntary termination of parental rights in State in the Interest of J.A., 99-2905 (La.1/12/00), 752 So.2d 806: In any case to involuntarily terminate parental rights, there are two private interests involved: those of the parents and those of the child. The parents have a natural, fundamental liberty interest to the continuing companionship, care, custody and management of their children warranting great deference and vigilant protection under the law, and due process requires that a fundamentally fair procedure be followed when the state seeks to terminate the parent-child legal relationship. However, the child has a profound interest, often at odds with those of his parents, in terminating parental rights that prevent adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable, long-term, and continuous relationships found in a home with proper parental care. In balancing these interests, the courts of this state have consistently found the interest of the child to be paramount over that of the parent. The State's parens patriae power allows intervention in the parent-child relationship only under serious circumstances, such as where the State seeks the permanent severance of that relationship in an involuntary termination proceeding. The fundamental purpose of involuntary termination proceedings is to provide the greatest possible protection to a child whose parents are unwilling or unable to provide adequate care for his physical, emotional, and mental health needs and adequate rearing by providing an expeditious judicial process for the termination of all parental rights and responsibilities and to achieve permanency and stability for the child. The focus of an involuntary termination proceeding is not whether the parent should be deprived of custody, but whether it would be in the best interest of the child for all legal relations with the parents to be terminated. As such, the primary concern of the courts and the State remains to secure the best interest for the child, including termination of parental rights if justifiable grounds exist and are proven. State in the Interest of J.A., 752 So.2d at 810-811 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). Title X of the Children's Code governs the involuntary termination of parental rights. To assist the court in determining whether a parent is unwilling or unable to adequately care for a child's physical, emotional, and mental health needs, La. Ch. Code art. 1015 provides the specific grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights. The State must only establish one ground under La. Ch.Code art. 1015, but the judge must also find that the termination is in the best interest of the child. La. Ch.Code art. 1039. Additionally, the State must prove the elements of one of the enumerated grounds by clear and convincing evidence to sever the parental bond. La. Ch.Code art. 1035(A); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (holding that the minimum standard of proof in termination of parental rights cases is clear and convincing evidence). In this case, OCS sought termination of R.K.'s parental rights under La. Ch.Code art. 1015(5). [5] OCS was authorized to file the petition by La. Ch.Code art. 1004(D), which provided at the time the petition was filed, when as a result of a prior child in need of care disposition, termination is authorized by Article 1015(5). However, the trial court terminated the parental rights of R.K. and J.K. based on La. Ch.Code art. 1015(3)(i) which provides as a ground for termination: (3) Misconduct of the parent toward this child or any other child of the parent or any other child in his household which constitutes extreme abuse, cruel and inhuman treatment, or grossly negligent behavior below a reasonable standard of human decency, including but not limited to the conviction, commission, aiding or abetting, attempting, conspiring, or soliciting to commit any of the following: . . . . i) Abuse [6] or neglect [7] which is chronic, life threatening, or results in gravely disabling physical or psychological injury or disfigurement. The court of appeal concluded that the only assertion of physical abuse in this case is that committed by R.K., finding no evidence of physical abuse, or knowledge of physical abuse, by J.K until after the incident by R.K. that set in motion the proceedings with OCS. [8] Thus, the court of appeal concluded that only the only alleged abuse by J.K. could be the infliction, attempted infliction, allowance, or toleration of the infliction of mental injury upon children by a parent as a result of inadequate supervision. The court of appeal appeared to focus on Dr. Williams' and J.K.'s testimony that she loves her children and sought to protect them when she perceived that they were in danger. However, we must continue to stress that the Legislature has expressed its intent that courts shall construe the procedural provisions of Title X of the Children's Code relative to the involuntary termination of parental rights liberally. La. Ch.Code art. 1001. We conclude that the lower court erred in failing to recognize that passive abuse or neglect by a parent can inflict just as, if not more so, gravely disabling injury as physical abuse. The trial court found that J.K.'s apparent inability to protect her children from witnessing the abuse resulted in severe psychological trauma, and based on her inability to reform that behavior, both pre- and post-custody with OCS, the trial court properly concluded that the best interests of the children would be served in terminating both R.K. and J.K's parental rights. As we recognized in State in the Interest of J.A., the Legislature defined a neglected child in broad terms precisely because foreseeing all the possible factual situations that may arise is impossible. 752 So.2d at 813. Further, the broad definition enables experienced juvenile courts to apply their training and experience to the unique facts and circumstances of each case. Id. Although J.K.'s testimony reveals efforts on her part to obtain help for herself through restraining orders and law enforcement, the record also demonstrates her inability to follow through with any attempt to stay away from her husband. In fact, the overwhelming evidence by mental health professionals and her own admissions supports the finding that she sabotaged her own efforts to rehabilitate, for example, by refusing to participate in further therapy to allow OCS to determine compliance with her case plan, and returning to her husband on numerous occasions, including contacts initiated by her, even after the petition to terminate her rights had been filed. Dr. Williams related that J.K.'s behavior is consistent with her mental diagnosis of chronic depression and self-defeating personality disorder. He diagnosed J.K. as having a self-defeating personality disorder, which he described as a habitual and entrenched pattern of behaving, thinking, [and] feeling in which the person chronically ... sabotages their [sic] own good fortunes. They continually shoot themselves in the foot ... and have a hard time maintaining a healthy, happy, harmonious type of life. ... Dr. Williams did not think that it would be reasonable for the children to return to J.K. until there was good reason to believe that she had changed. He opined that two or more years of intensive treatment with stability and avoiding the violence would be necessary before a consideration of returning the children to her, even with the offer of relative assistance. While a finding of mental illness, standing alone, is insufficient grounds to warrant termination of R.K..'s parental rights, La. Ch. Code art. 1015, a mental deficiency related to the parenting ability is relevant in determining the role of the mother in abuse or neglect of the children. State in the Interest of J.A, 752 So.2d at 814. J.K. engaged in a pattern of returning to R.K. both before and after the children were out of her custody. In fairness to J.K., she was under the impression initially that OCS was encouraging the reconciliations, but OCS clarified its position to her. Moreover, Dr. Williams testified that J.K. was very, very aware that ... there was a heavy contingency between her own assessment of her readiness to get them back ... and her relationship with [R.K.] and keeping him out of her life. Our review of the record supports the trial court's finding of clear and convincing evidence that J.K. participated in passive abuse, namely that she allowed or tolerated the infliction of mental injury on her children. Whether termed abuse or neglect, the evidence overwhelmingly indicates that the children suffered severe trauma from their repeated exposure to violence perpetrated by R.K. on J.K. We further conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the children suffered life-threatening and severely disabling psychological injury that in their best interests required termination of J.K.'s parental rights. Ms. Miles testified that K.K. needs stability and needs to feel safe. She also testified that it would be [v]ery, very important that K.K. not witness violence toward a caretaker at this point and that [i]t would be very detrimental to her to be placed in an environment where her caretaker was the subject of physical abuse. Dr. Post was of the opinion that the children need stability and permanency and stated that it would be crucial for the children to be free from violence. She testified that her only concern was that J.K. continued to go back to R.K., and she explained: [T]hey're already so traumatized that exposing them to more of that possibly seems to outweigh the fact that they might be able to be with her ... because they're so disturbed. ... Dr. Williams was also of the opinion that the children need security and stability. Dr. Menou testified that her main concern for the children would be that they not return to J.K. because J.K. may continue the relationship with R.K. and the children would be subject to the same abusive environment that they were in initially. We are cognizant that domestic violence and child abuse or neglect are often related problems within the same dysfunctional family. [9] While we recognize that the battered woman in the relationship is the victim, and a pattern of returning to the batterer is common, [10] we must also accept the legislature's mandate that the children are the paramount concern. [11] In the unique facts of this case, the trial court found that because the children had suffered such severe psychological trauma, J.K.'s repeated returns to R.K., and high risk of continuing to do so, constituted neglect that is chronic, life threatening, or results in gravely disabling physical or psychological injury or disfigurement. La. Ch.Code art. 1015(3)(i). We disagree with the court of appeal's conclusion that OCS did not adequately provide necessary services for the safe return of the children. OCS is a governmental agency with thousands of cases and finite resources. According to Ms. Becton, the twelve-session restriction was placed in advance of Dr. Menou's treatment. J.K.'s apparent need for long-term assistance and support to break the cycle of abuse in her life was not contingent upon OCS providing all the financial assistance and effort to ensure that this in fact occurred. J.K. presented no evidence of her efforts to pursue further therapy or obtain financial assistance, despite her awareness of the case plan's requirements to achieve reunification with her children. We believe the court of appeal was swayed by the moving letters provided by relatives and former relatives of J.K. The letters from relatives introduced into evidence demonstrated a desire and potential ability to care for the children. [12] While we too are concerned that the children be placed with relatives as opposed to strangers, we note that it is OCS's role, and not the courts, to determine placement of the children after the termination of parental rights. See La. Ch.Code art 1040; La. Ch.Code art. 672; State in the Interest of Sapia, 397 So.2d 469 (La.1981). The existence of relatives is generally irrelevant to the termination of a parental rights, as noted and objected to by the State and the children's attorney during trial. [13] Rather, the letters are relevant to the trial court's approving placement in accordance with the best interest of the children, upon submittal by OCS during placement proceedings.