Opinion ID: 2331585
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 44

Heading: Costs Associated with Appellee Valentine's Attempted Challenges to the Will

Text: The estate asserts that Valentine acted in bad faith by violating two orders barring a will contest. First, the estate maintains that the April 4, 1994, order admitting the July 31 will to probate acted as a bar to Valentine's attempted caveat in March of 1997 because by the time Valentine brought this challenge, the six-month statutory time period for bringing a caveat had expired. Second, the estate points to Valentine's pleading filed in early April 1997, which also challenged the July 31 will, and maintains that this filing was also in bad faith since it had been barred by the trial court's order of March 31, 1997, dismissing Valentine's challenges to the will as time-barred. Finally, the estate asserts that Valentine's attempt to intervene in Patton v. Elliott was a violation of the order admitting the will to probate, and the March 31, 1997 and June 27, 1997 orders dismissing Valentine's various challenges to the will. Even if Valentine's first challenge to the will could be construed as a violation of the order admitting the will to probate, it is not at all clear that any of Valentine's attempted challenges to the will were entirely without color and . . . asserted wantonly, for purposes of harassment or delay, or for other improper reasons. Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1088 (2d Cir.1977). This is because a claim is colorable for purposes of a bad faith analysis when it has  some legal and factual support. Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 348 (2d Cir.1980) (per curiam) (emphasis added). The question is whether a reasonable attorney could have concluded that facts supporting the claim might be established, not whether such facts actually had been established. Id. Sanctions should not be imposed unless it is patently clear that a claim ha[d] absolutely no chance of success prior to filing. Schwartz v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 718 A.2d 553, 555 (D.C.1998) (citation omitted); Green v. Louis Fireison & Assocs., 618 A.2d 185, 188-189 (D.C.1992). As shaky as they were, none of Valentine's challenges to the will sank to such a level as to compel a finding of bad faith and require a court to either award sanctions or risk abusing its discretion. Valentine's initial pleadings were based on some facts that tended to support her claim of a forged will. Her pleadings after the March 31, 1997, order argued for either application of the discovery rule to probate statutory time limitations or use of the fraud statute of limitations in this probate proceeding. Thus she either had some factual support for her pleadings or was arguing for a modification of existing law. The trial court did not commit error when it did not find bad faith on Valentine's part and did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award attorneys' fees for the various challenges to the will.