Opinion ID: 2384456
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Grand Jury Power

Text: Moreover, the Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 69-3-115(d), also restricts the power and function of the grand jury which in Tennessee has inquisitorial powers over and shall have authority to return a presentment of all indictable or presentable offenses found to have been committed or to be triable within the county. [8] That power enables the grand jury to act independently of a court and the district attorney general by instituting a criminal action by virtue of a presentment. [9] The independent inquisitorial power and function of the grand jury is derived directly from Article I, Section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution, which provides [t]hat no person shall be put to answer any criminal charge but by presentment, indictment or impeachment. [10] Tenn. Code Ann. § 69-3-115(d) restricts the independent inquisitorial power of the grand jury by requiring that it obtain permission from the Commissioner or the Board before returning a presentment. Such a restriction violates Article I, § 14 of the Tennessee Constitution. Having decided that Tenn. Code Ann. § 69-3-115(d) is unconstitutional because it impermissibly interferes with the prosecutorial discretion and responsibility of the district attorney general and with the power and function of the grand jury, we must now consider whether the offending portion of the Act can be stricken and the remainder upheld. The doctrine of elision applies if it is made to appear from the face of the statute that the legislature would have enacted it with the objectionable features omitted, ... provided, of course, there is left enough of the act for a complete law capable of enforcement and fairly answering the object of its passage. [11] The General Assembly specifically included a severability clause in the Water Quality Control Act of 1977, which provides that [i]f any section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or words of this part is for any reason held to be invalid, such decree shall not affect the validity of any remaining portion of this part. [12] The severability clause indicates an intent on the part of the legislature to have the valid parts of the Act remain in force, unless the purpose of the Act would be frustrated. [13] Clearly, allowing the criminal sanctions of the Act to be enforced in accordance with the general principles of enforcement applicable to all criminal laws would not frustrate the purpose of the Water Quality Control Act of 1977. Accordingly, we apply the doctrine of elision to Tenn. Code Ann. § 69-3-115(d), the offending provision of the Act, and uphold the remainder of the Act as complete and capable of enforcement.