Opinion ID: 215369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Miller's Due Process Rights

Text: We now turn to whether the Board violated Miller's due process rights when it found he was not likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time and denied him early parole eligibility. Miller argued before the district court that the Board's determination violated his constitutional rights because it was not supported by some evidence in the record. The district court also relied on the some evidence standard in independently scouring the record of Miller's murder review hearing before concluding that the Board did not violate Miller's rights. Miller v. Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 2007 WL 4245912,  (D.Or. 2007). In undertaking de novo review of the Board's decision, the district court acted in conformity with Ninth Circuit case law at the time, which commanded independent examination of the reasonableness of parole eligibility determinations on federal habeas review. See, e.g., Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir.2007); Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir.2006). See also Pearson v. Muntz, 625 F.3d 539, 548 (9th Cir.2010) ( Hayward specifically commands federal courts to examine the reasonableness of [the application of state law], as well as the reasonableness of the ... determination of the facts in light of the evidence.). Ninth Circuit case law on the scope of habeas review of parole eligibility decisions has since been superseded. The Supreme Court held in Cooke that in the context of parole eligibility decisions the due process right is procedural, and entitles a prisoner to nothing more than a fair hearing and a statement of reasons for a parole board's decision: When, however, a State creates a liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires fair procedures for its vindicationand federal courts will review the application of those constitutionally required procedures. In the context of parole, we have held that the procedures required are minimal. In Greenholtz, we found that a prisoner subject to a parole statute similar to California's received adequate process when he was allowed an opportunity to be heard and was provided a statement of the reasons why parole was denied. 442 U.S. at 16, 99 S.Ct. 2100. The Constitution, we held, does not require more. Ibid. Cooke, 131 S.Ct. at 862. In other words, the question before the district court, and the one we face on review of the district court's decision, is not whether the Board's decision to deny Miller early eligibility for parole was substantively reasonable, nor whether the Board correctly applied Oregon's parole standards. Instead, it is simply whether the state provided Miller with the minimum procedural due process outlined in Cooke. The Supreme Court found that the habeas petitioners in Cooke were allowed to speak at their parole hearings and to contest the evidence against them, were afforded access to their records in advance, and were notified as to the reasons why parole was denied. 131 S.Ct. at 862. That was sufficient, the Court held, to satisfy the Due Process Clause. Here, as in Cooke, Miller was afforded access to his records in advance of the hearings, and he was given the opportunity to submit information to the Board and to make a statement during the hearing. And, although the Board's initial decision was not explained, Miller was eventually provided with a written statement of the reasons why he was denied early eligibility for parole. After Cooke, that is the beginning and the end of the inquiry into whether he received due process, so we need look no further to affirm the district court's denial of Miller's petition. AFFIRMED.