Opinion ID: 776136
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Anthony Gibbs's Juvenile Conduct

Text: 62 We review the legal application of the Guidelines de novo. United States v. Gilbert, 173 F.3d 974 (6th Cir. 1999). 63 In this court's remand, we held that the district court could use drugs attributable to Anthony Gibbs before February 15, 1994, when he was still a juvenile, to calculate his sentence. This court held that because count 55 for possession with intent to sell appear[ed] to be valid, the district court could consider the drug amounts. 6 Gibbs, 182 F.3d at 442. However, prior to resentencing, the government voluntarily dropped count 55. Appellee's Brief at 49. Nevertheless, Judge Smith included Defendant's drug activities, including those constituting count 55, as relevant conduct for purposes of calculating his base level under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). A.J.A. 1431-g. 64 Anthony Gibbs now argues that because count 55 was dismissed, the district court was divested of subject matter jurisdiction to consider this activity in sentencing because it occurred prior to his eighteenth birthday. 7 He argues that the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA) precludes the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over juvenile behavior that is not certified over to the district court by the Attorney General. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-32. In support of this interpretation of the FJDA, Defendant cites our decision in United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1991), in which we stated that If juveniles generally commit no 'crimes' when performing [acts that would have been crimes had they been an adult], the district court and government cannot rely upon the criminal statutes as a basis for the court's assumption of jurisdiction over the prosecution of juveniles. Id. at 1258. 65 The argument is creative, but not particularly compelling. 66 The FJDA prohibits the federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over a juvenile alleged to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency 8 (subject to special exceptions) unless the Attorney General certifies the offense (subject to certain requirements) to the appropriate district court of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 5032. If the Attorney General fails to certify to the offense, the juvenile must be surrendered to state authorities. Id. 67 Gibbs is quite right that the FJDA and the Chambers decision divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction over uncertified behavior committed by juveniles. However, as the district court noted, Anthony Gibbs was prosecuted as an adult for his adult behavior, and the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear any conduct that may be relevant to sentence Gibbs appropriately for that behavior. 68 Section 1B1.3(a)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines allows the court to consider all acts that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. The court is given wide discretion in what it may consider as relevant in implementing § 1B1.3. As Congress has stated, No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3661. See also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 150 (1997) (holding that a court may consider any conduct, even that which does not result in a conviction, in determining a sentence under § 1B1.3). Furthermore, as the Second Circuit has held, the relevant criminal conduct need not be conduct with which the defendant was charged, nor conduct over which the federal court has jurisdiction. United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 831 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). This principle has been broadened by later decisions in that circuit. In United States v. Martin, 157 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1998) the court held that a federal district court may consider any relevant conduct when sentencing a defendant, whether or not the conduct is a federal crime. In the context of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a), jurisdictional considerations are not relevant to a defendant's criminal responsibility. Id. at 51. 69 We agree with the Second Circuit, and find that the principle applies to quasi-criminal juvenile conduct such as the conduct in this case. Even if the district court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Anthony Gibbs for his juvenile conduct as a separate crime, it did not lack jurisdiction to consider his juvenile behavior in calculating his sentence under § 1B1.3(a)(2) for a crime he committed as an adult. We explicitly stated in our remand: 70 Although we vacate Gibbs's conspiracy conviction, we hold that the district court on remand may take into account quantities of crack cocaine Gibbs sold before he reached age eighteen as relevant conduct to Gibbs's independent drug trafficking convictions. 71 . . . . 72 As long as the government successfully prosecutes a defendant for a crime that occurred after the defendant reached the age of majority, the district court may consider relevant conduct that occurred before the defendant reached the requisite age as long as such conduct falls within the limitations set forth in § 1B1.3(a)(2). 73 Gibbs, 182 F.3d at 442. 74 The Sentencing Guidelines allows the grouping of counts that are part of the same course of conduct. The district court had jurisdiction to hear the adult crimes of Anthony Gibbs, and is authorized by the Guidelines and by the remand to take into account the pre-1994 behavior of Defendant. The record is replete with testimony that Anthony Gibbs sold crack and carried weapons nearly continuously from 1991 to 1995. 75 We therefore hold that the district court did not err in considering Anthony Gibbs's juvenile conduct.