Opinion ID: 871078
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State presented sufficient evidence to the grand jury to maintain Taylor's indictment

Text: Taylor contends in his application that the State presented insufficient evidence to the grand jury regarding the property of another element of the offense. Specifically, Taylor argues that the State only presented evidence to the grand jury that the Bishop and Peabody Essex Museums previously owned the artifacts, and further argues that the museums do not own the artifacts after repatriation. [28] A grand jury indictment must be based on probable cause. Ganal, 81 Hawai`i at 367, 917 P.2d at 379 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Probable cause has been defined as a state of facts as would lead a person of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused. Id. (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Furthermore, in order to support an indictment, the prosecution must provide evidence of each essential element of the charged offense to the grand jury. Ontai, 84 Hawai`i at 63-64, 929 P.2d at 76-77. If no evidence is produced as to a material element of the offense, a person of ordinary caution and prudence could not have a `strong suspicion' that the defendant is guilty of the [charged] crime. Id. at 64, 929 P.2d at 77. Therefore, in order for the grand jury to have found probable cause to support Taylor's indictment for first degree theft, the State must have produced evidence of each essential element of the offense. See Ontai, 84 Hawai`i at 64, 929 P.2d at 77. This court has held that there are three material elements for theft in the first degree under HRS §§ 708-830(1) and 708-830.5(1)(a): that the defendant intended to: (1) obtain or exert control over the property of another; (2) deprive the other of his or her property; and (3) deprive another of property that exceeds $20,000 in value. State v. Duncan, 101 Hawai`i 269, 279, 67 P.3d 768, 778 (2003). HRS § 708-800 defines [p]roperty of another as property which any person, other than the defendant, has possession of or any other interest in[.] [29] Id. Because Taylor does not dispute that the State presented evidence satisfying the second and third elements for theft in the first degree, we focus on the first elementthat Taylor obtained or exerted control over the property of another. See id. at 279, 67 P.3d at 778. The following facts were presented to the grand jury through the testimony of Agent Kaikana: (1) in the 1800s, J.S. Emerson took artifacts out of [Kanupa Cave,] some of which he then sold to the Bishop Museum and the Peabody Museum Essex in Massachusetts; (2) those artifacts were repatriated from the museums and reburied at Kanupa Cave; [30] (3) Hui Malama, ... OHA, [the] State, and the Bishop Museum.... all got together, brought the thing [sic] back to Kanupa and it was repatriated; (4) Taylor, who owned a store in Captain Cook that sold antiquities, and an accomplice went to the cave with the direction of some third party; (5) Taylor and the accomplice removed the rock that was blocking the cave entrance and went inside; (6) there they found a lot of artifacts or items that were in woven lauhala basket [sic] and wrapped in black cloth; (7) they took about 157 artifacts from the cave and tried to sell them; (8) some of the artifacts bore Emerson tags or [] labels; (9) Taylor knew that the artifacts belonged to the J.S. Emerson Collection; (10) Taylor, [t]o hide or conceal the sale of these items, [took] the Emerson tags off of the items, the artifacts, to sell [them]; and (11) the estimated value of the artifacts was between $800,000 and $1.2 million. Based on the foregoing evidence, a person of ordinary caution or prudence could believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion that the artifacts were property of another. See Ganal, 81 Hawai`i at 367, 917 P.2d at 379. Most notably, the grand jury heard evidence that artifacts were worth at least $800,000. It further heard evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred that the artifacts had been purposely secreted in the cave and not simply discarded, including the fact that the cave entrance had been covered with a rock, the items were enclosed in lauhala and black cloth, and reburial had been undertaken in a joint effort involving the State of Hawai`i, as well as Hui Malama, ... OHA, ... and the Bishop Museum[.] Thus, the evidence before the grand jury did not suggest that the artifacts were abandoned. [31] If the artifacts were abandoned, they could not, by definition, be property of another, and an indictment for first degree theft could not be maintained. Indeed, in his application Taylor analogizes his case to an environmentalist picking up a discarded soda can to recycle it or a small boy picking up a penny by the side of the road, and suggests that their conduct would be criminalized by the ICA's holding. However, those hypothetical cases are clearly distinguishable, since they did not involve property worth at least $800,000 which the evidence reasonably suggested had been carefully wrapped and secreted in a cave as part of a multi-party repatriation effort. Nor did the evidence in the grand jury suggest that Taylor owned the items or that he had permission to take the artifacts. To the contrary, the evidence of Taylor's conduct after he took the items (removing the tags so that they would be more difficult to trace) supports the reasonable inference that he neither owned them nor had permission to take them. Rather, the value of the items and the manner and circumstances in which they were reburied were sufficient to create a strong suspicion that someone other than Taylor retained a right of possession in the artifacts and that the items were accordingly the property of another when Taylor took them. It is true, as Taylor points out, that the evidence presented to the grand jury was not sufficient to establish exactly which entity or entities had a possessory or other interest in the artifacts. [32] However, our caselaw does not require that level of specificity in order to sustain an indictment. See Ganal, 81 Hawai`i at 367, 917 P.2d at 379 ([T]he evidence to support an indictment need not be sufficient to support a conviction.). This point is illustrated by our holding in Nases, where the defendant was charged with and convicted of theft of a calculator pursuant to HRS § 708-830. 65 Haw. at 218, 649 P.2d at 1139. On appeal, the defendant argued that there was a fatal variance between the charge and the evidence presented against him at trial. Id. The charged offense alleged that the calculator was the property of Setsuko Yokoyama and Setsuko Yokoyama doing business as Kalakaua Kleaners, whereas it was actually the property of Kalakaua Kleaners, a corporation. Id. This court held that it was undisputed that the calculator did not belong to [the defendant] but was the property of another. The particular ownership of the property in question was not an essential element in proving the crime and there is no fatal variance between the charge and the proof. Id. at 218, 649 P.2d at 1139-40. Rather, [i]t has long been settled that where the offense is obtaining control over the property of another, proof that the property was the property of another is all that is necessary and the naming of the person owning the property in the indictment is surplusage. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Although the facts of Nases differ from the instant case in that Nases involved a variance between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial, Nases supports the proposition that the State need only prove that the property taken is that of another. Id. Therefore, because the State presented sufficient evidence that the artifacts were property of another, it was not required to present evidence to the grand jury establishing which entity or entities had a possessory interest in the artifacts. [33] However, the ICA erred when it stated that specification of the actual owner of the property for purposes of this theft charge is not required and only evidence that the property was not that of Taylor is required.  Taylor, 2011 WL 661793, at  (emphasis added). As discussed supra, HRS § 708-800 defines property of another in HRS § 708-830(1) as property which any person, other than the defendant, has possession of or any other interest in[.] Property is defined in HRS § 708-800 as any money, personal property, real property, thing in action, evidence of debt or contract, or article of value of any kind. Consequently, as Taylor correctly contends, something may well be `property' (because it is an article of value of some kind) but not yet `property of another' (because someone does not possess it or have any other interest in it). Therefore, the ICA erred when it stated that only evidence that the property was not that of Taylor is required. Id. In sum, because the State presented evidence that a person of ordinary caution or prudence could believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion that the artifacts were the property of another, there was sufficient evidence to support Taylor's indictment, and the circuit court did not err in denying his motion to dismiss on this ground.