Opinion ID: 799396
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disability Benefits Claims

Text: VCS next claims that the VA's system for adjudicating veterans' eligibility for disability benefits suffers from unconscionable delays and therefore violates the statutory and constitutional rights of veterans. The district court concluded that, because determination of whether the delay[in benefits adjudication] is unreasonable may depend on the facts of each particular claim, § 511 prevents this Court from undertaking such a review. Veterans, 563 F.Supp.2d at 1083-84 (citation omitted). [19] We agree with the district court for the same reason that we explained earlier with respect to delays in mental health carewe simply lack jurisdiction. Like VCS's challenge to delays in the VA's provision of mental health care, VCS's challenge to delays in the VA's adjudication of veterans' disability benefits plainly implicates questions of law and fact regarding the appropriate method of providing benefits to individual veterans. The district court cannot decide such claims without determining whether the VA acted properly in handling individual veterans' benefits requests at each point in the process. Section 511 deprives the district court of jurisdiction over such questions. In reaching this conclusion, we find ourselves in accord with the Sixth Circuit, which resolved a similar question in Beamon v. Brown . There, a group of veterans asked the district court to review the legality and constitutionality of the procedures that the VA uses to decide benefits claims. Beamon, 125 F.3d at 970. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs' claims raised questions of law and fact regarding the provision of benefits by the VA and that [d]etermining the proper procedures for claim adjudication is a necessary precursor to deciding veterans benefits claims. Under § 511(a), the VA Secretary shall decide this type of question. Id. Because the plaintiffs alleged that VA procedures cause unreasonable delays in the resolution of benefits claims, [t]o adjudicate this claim, the District Court would need to review individual claims for veterans' benefits, the manner in which they were processed, and the decisions rendered by the regional office of the VA and the BVA. Id. at 970-71. [20] VCS claims that no such review is required here because it challenges average delays in the adjudication of service-related disability benefits (as opposed to delay in the processing of any one individual claim). For reasons we previously discussed, that is a distinction without difference. Whether the average delays of which VCS complains are reasonable depends on the facts of individual veterans' claims, such as the complexity of the claim (PTSD claims being some of the most difficult to resolve), the severity of the disability, and the availability and quality of the evidence. As the district court noted, a veteran who raises seven or eight issues in his or her claim will likely face a more protracted delay than a veteran who raises only one or two issues. Veterans, 563 F.Supp.2d at 1083. Because the district court lacks jurisdiction to review the circumstances or decisions that created the delay in any one veteran's case, it cannot determine whether there has been a systemic denial of due process due to unreasonable delay. [21] VCS asserts that if the district court lacks jurisdiction to hear its claims, then it will be unable to secure adequate relief because compelling the VA to issue a decision on individual benefits is not the same as curing the deficiencies that cause widespread delay. To that end, VCS contends that the district court must retain jurisdiction over its challenge to the administrative gridlock plaguing the adjudication of benefits claims under the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160. VCS notes that the drafters of § 511 recognized that Robison was correct in asserting judicial authority to decide whether statutes meet constitutional muster. H.R.Rep. No. 100-963, at 22, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5803. Although we discussed Robison in the context of § 511's history, it requires further discussion here. In Robison, a conscientious objector who completed alternative service was denied veterans' educational benefits under a program granting such benefits to persons who served full-time duty in the Armed Forces. 415 U.S. at 362-64, 94 S.Ct. 1160. He claimed that this violated the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 364-65, 94 S.Ct. 1160. The government argued that § 211, the predecessor to § 511, deprived the district court of jurisdiction. Id. Indeed, under the government's view of § 211, no court had jurisdiction to review the plaintiff's equal protection claims. [22] Id. at 366, 94 S.Ct. 1160. The Supreme Court held that the district court had jurisdiction. Although § 211 provided that no court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review the VA's decisions concerning veterans' benefits, id. at 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160 (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court held that precluding federal court review of constitutional questions would raise serious questions concerning the constitutionality of § 211(a), id. at 366 & n. 8, 94 S.Ct. 1160. The Court construed § 211 to bar only federal review of challenges to the administration  of the benefits program. Id. at 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160. Because the conscientious objector had challenged Congress's design on constitutional grounds, § 211's preclusion of review of the Secretary's actions did not bar the exercise of jurisdiction. [23] Id. Following Robison, the Supreme Court confirmed that district courts have jurisdiction to entertain constitutional attacks on the operation of the claims systems under the precursor to § 511. Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 311 n. 3, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 87 L.Ed.2d 220 (1985). Robison 's warning of serious questions concerning statutes that preclude all judicial review is of limited application here. First, the fact that VCS drapes its claims in constitutional terms is not itself sufficient to confer jurisdiction on us. Numerous courts have recognized that § 511 broadly divests district courts of jurisdiction over constitutional claims related to benefits even where those claims concern agency procedures and do not challenge specific VA benefits determinations. See, e.g., Beamon, 125 F.3d at 971 ([T]he VJRA explicitly granted comprehensive and exclusive jurisdiction to the CVA and the Federal Circuit over claims seeking review of VA decisions that relate to benefits decisions under § 511(a). This jurisdiction includes constitutional issues....); Hall v. U.S. Dep't Veterans' Affairs, 85 F.3d 532, 535 (11th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (holding that a direct constitutional challenge to a VA regulation must be brought in the Federal Circuit); Hicks, 961 F.2d at 1370 (These provisions amply evince Congress's intent to include all issues, even constitutional ones, necessary to a decision which affects benefits in this exclusive appellate review scheme.); Addington v. United States, 94 Fed.Cl. 779, 783 (2010) (The exclusive remedy for claims of due process violations lies in the [Veterans Court].). More importantly, nothing in the VJRA forecloses judicial review of constitutional questions as VCS suggests. After Robison read § 211 broadly, Congress subsequently established the [Veterans Court], effectively stripping district courts of any such jurisdiction, Beamon, 125 F.3d at 973 n. 4; cf. Bates, 398 F.3d at 1364 (explaining that the VJRA's specialized review process exchanged court review for independent judicial review of the [VA]'s final decisions by a new Article I Court). But Congress did not leave veterans without a forum for their constitutional claims. When Congress created the Veterans Court, it expressly empowered that court to decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an action of the Secretary. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(1) (emphasis added). That same statute leaves no doubt that the Veterans Court has the authority to adjudicate veterans' constitutional claims that benefits have been unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. Id. § 7261(a)(2); Vietnam Veterans of Am., 599 F.3d at 659-60 & n. 6; see also Beamon, 125 F.3d at 968 (finding that the Veterans Court has the power to provide adequate relief for the plaintiffs seeking to challenge the VA's unreasonably delayed benefits decisions). The Veterans Court's power is such that its orders not only affect how a single veteran's claim is handled, but will dictate how similar claims are handled by the VA in the future. See Beamon, 125 F.3d at 970 (Plaintiffs may bring their claims individually, and the [Veterans Court]'s decisions of individual claims will have a binding effect on the manner in which the VA processes subsequent veterans' claims.). That power, together with the authority to issue extraordinary writs pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); see Vietnam Veterans of Am., 599 F.3d at 659-60 & n. 6; see also Erspamer, 1 Vet. App. at 7, makes the Veterans Court an adequate forum for this type of claim. Beyond the Veterans Court, Congress also ensured that an Article III court can review such claims. Congress granted the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit the exclusive jurisdiction to review and decide any challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof brought under this section, and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to the extent presented and necessary to a decision. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). To drive the point home, Congress affirmed that the Federal Circuit shall decide all relevant questions of law, including interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions. Id. § 7292(d)(1). In tandem, the availability of review by both the Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit evinces Congress's intent to protect the federal courts and the VA from time-consuming veterans' benefits litigation, while providing a specialized forum wherein complex decisions about such benefits can be made. Congress has fully answered the Supreme Court's serious question concerning the constitutionality of § 511's limitation on our jurisdiction. In sum, Congress may have foreclosed our review of the VA's decisions related to claims adjudication, but it has not foreclosed federal judicial review in toto. [24] Whatever serious questions, Robison, 415 U.S. at 366, 94 S.Ct. 1160, might arise if Congress were to preclude all review of constitutional challenges, there can be no question that Congress may eliminate our jurisdiction to review the VA's decisions, while preserving such review elsewhere. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. As the Supreme Court stated in Lockerty v. Phillips, [t]he Congressional power to ordain and establish inferior courts includes the power `of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.' 319 U.S. 182, 187, 63 S.Ct. 1019, 87 L.Ed. 1339 (1943) (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 Howe) 236, 245, 11 L.Ed. 576 (1845)). We lack jurisdiction over VCS's claims challenging delays in the VA's adjudication of service-related disability benefits.