Opinion ID: 1113311
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State court limitations.

Text: The problem of ensuring the availability of habeas corpus and equivalent postconviction remedies to correct fundamental error which has resulted in imprisonment of a criminal defendant, while controlling abuse of the writ, is not new. (See Robson & Mello, Ariadne's Provisions: A Clue of Thread to the Intricacies of the Procedural Default, Adequate and Independent State Grounds, and Florida's Death Penalty (1988) 76 Cal.L.Rev. 87; Goldstein, Application of Res Judicata Principles to Successive Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions in Capital Cases: The Search for an Equitable Approach (1987) 21 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 45; Catz, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty; Need for a Preclusion Doctrine Exception (1985) 18 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 1177; Comment, Repetitive Post-Conviction Petitions Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Can the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Tame the Monster? (1982) 20 Duq. L.Rev. 237.) Like California, most states have statutory and/or judicially created limitations on successive petitions. [26] Some of these states have also attempted to articulate rules, and to achieve consistent application of rules, governing exceptions to the limitations imposed on successive petitions. [27] Others have no express standards. The Pennsylvania experience is instructive. In 1980, the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA), 42 Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes section 9541 et seq. (now the Post Conviction Relief Act), included an exception to its rules which deemed an issue finally litigated or waived on bases similar to those applied by this court. That exception permitted the court to consider the merits of a PCHA petition notwithstanding those bars if the petitioner was able to prove the existence of extraordinary circumstances to justify his failure to raise the issue. (Act of Jan. 25, 1966, Pa. Laws 1580 (1965) ง 4, 19 Pa. Stats. ง 1180-4 (Supp. 1979-1980).) Construing the extraordinary circumstances exception in Com. v. Watlington (1980) 491 Pa. 241 [420 A.2d 431], the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that serial ineffectiveness of appellate and succeeding counsel in failing to allege the ineffectiveness of prior counsel and trial counsel constituted an extraordinary circumstance. By 1988 the Watlington rule had proved itself inadequate to stem the tide of successive petitions and was abandoned. In Com. v. Lawson (1988) 519 Pa. 504 [549 A.2d 107], the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the vexing problem of repetitive petitions. ( Id., at p. 108.) This appeal evidences the problems that can arise if we permit post-conviction relief to destroy any concept of finality in our decisional process in the area of criminal law.... [I]ts importance to the integrity of our system of jurisprudence requires our attention, ... ( Id., at p. 110.) The court concluded that the intent of the Legislature, as reflected in the PCHA, to curtail continuing assaults on judgments, had been undermined by overly generous judicial decisions [which] have in fact permitted the magic words `ineffective assistance of prior counsel,' regardless of the number of prior counsel, to be equated with the concept of `extraordinary circumstances....' ( Id., at p. 111.) The solution was to dismiss without hearing a second or subsequent application for postconviction relief unless a strong prima facie showing is offered to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. [ถ] ... [ถ] We hold today that the mere assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel is not sufficient to override the waiver and `finally litigated' provisions in the P.C.H.A., as to permit the filing of repetitive or serial petitions under the banner of that statute. A repetitive or serial petition may be entertained only for the purpose of avoiding a demonstrated miscarriage of justice, which no civilized society can tolerate. (549 A.2d at p. 112, fn. omitted.) The new Lawson standard is satisfied if the petitioner can demonstrate either: (a) that the proceedings resulting in his conviction were so unfair that a miscarriage of justice occurred which no civilized society can tolerate or (b) that he is innocent of the criminal charges. ( Com. v. Laskaris (1991) 407 Pa.Super. 440 [595 A.2d 1229, 1231]; Com. v. Ryan (1990) 394 Pa.Super. 373 [575 A.2d 949, 950].) Other states require cause in all instances and require a showing of a miscarriage of justice before the merits of a successive petition will be considered. Alabama's Appellate Rules of Criminal Procedure establish that state's standard. Rule 20.2(b) of the Alabama Appellate Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: The court shall not grant relief on a second or successive petition on the same or similar grounds on behalf of the same petitioner. A second or successive petition on different grounds shall be denied unless the petitioner shows both that good cause exists why the new ground or grounds were not known or could not have been ascertained through reasonable diligence when the first petition was heard, and that failure to entertain the petition will result in a miscarriage of justice. The Florida rule does not reflect any exception, permitting summary denial of successive postconviction motions for relief unless the movant alleges that the asserted grounds were not known and could not have been known to the movant at the time the initial motion was filed. ( Christopher v. State (Fla. 1986) 489 So.2d 22, 24.) In Illinois, [a]ny claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived. (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, par. 122-3 (1965).) `The prior denials of the post-conviction petitions are res judicata of all claims raised therein and of all constitutional claims which could have been raised.' ( People v. Polansky, supra, 233 N.E.2d 374, 375. See also, People v. Holland (1965) 33 Ill.2d 246 [211 N.E.2d 265].) Ohio law permits the court in its discretion and for good cause shown to consider second or successive petitions whether based on the same facts or on newly discovered evidence. (Ohio Rev. Code Ann., ง 2953.23(A) (Anderson 1993).) Accordingly, ... a trial court is not required to file findings of fact and conclusions of law when declining to entertain a second or successive petition for post-conviction relief which alleges the same grounds as earlier petitions. ( State ex rel. Workman v. McGrath (Ohio 1988) 532 N.E.2d 105, 106.) New York recognizes that res judicata principles do not bar successive petitions on the same grounds, but notes that orderly administration requires at least a showing of changed circumstances. ( People ex rel. Woodard v. Berry (1990) 163 A.D.2d 119 [559 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47.) A successive petition with no new ground may not be entertained. ( People ex rel. Sassower v. Cunningham (1985) 112 A.D.2d 119 [492 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609].) In Oregon a petitioner who was represented by counsel in a prior post-conviction proceeding is foreclosed from reasserting a claim that was denied in the prior proceeding, and from asserting new claims that could reasonably have been asserted in the prior proceeding. ( Jensen v. Gladden (1963) 233 Or. 439 [378 P.2d 950].) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 65B(7) provides that a claim will be dismissed as frivolous on its face if it is apparent that the issues presented in the petition have already been adjudicated.... The Utah Supreme Court has observed that the law is not powerless to prevent abuse by prisoners who burden the courts and frustrate the ends of justice by trying to keep a case alive indefinitely. The law can and does protect itself against vexatious and abusive successive petitions for writs. ( Hurst v. Cook (Utah 1989) 777 P.2d 1029, 1036.) The court then held that a prior adjudication of the same ground for relief is sufficient to bar relitigation on that ground absent unusual circumstances. A showing of good cause that justifies the filing of a successive claim may be established by showing (1) the denial of a constitutional right pursuant to a new law that is, or might be, retroactive ..., (2) new facts not previously known which would show the denial of a constitutional right or might change the outcome of the trial ..., (3) the existence of fundamental unfairness in a conviction, (4) the illegality of a sentence ..., or (5) a claim overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or abuse the writ.... The burden in a second petition is on the petitioner `to show that the ends of justice would be served by permitting the redetermination on that ground.' ( Id., 777 P.2d at p. 1037, fn. omitted.) In Washington [n]o more than one petition for similar relief on behalf of the same petitioner will be entertained without good cause shown. Wn. Rules App. Proc., rule 16.4(d); Matter of Jeffries, supra, 789 P.2d 731.) [28]