Opinion ID: 795659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extent of Terry Stop

Text: 7 Martinez first argues that his statements to the officers in the park, the money seized from his person, and his participation in the show-up identification should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree because once he was handcuffed and placed in the police car, the Terry stop turned into an arrest, for which officers had no probable cause. The parties both focus on whether the cuffing of Martinez constituted an arrest. We conclude that the cuffing did not convert the Terry stop into an arrest, and even if it did, the officers had probable cause to effectuate the arrest, based on the wad of cash discovered during the Terry frisk. 8 An investigative detention may turn into an arrest if it `lasts for an unreasonably long time or if officers use unreasonable force.' United States v. Maltais, 403 F.3d 550, 556 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999)). During an investigative stop, officers should use the least intrusive means of detention and investigation reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose of the detention. Id. During a Terry stop, officers are authorized to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the stop. Id. This court has previously held that use of handcuffs can be a reasonable precaution during a Terry stop to protect their safety and maintain the status quo. See. e.g. United States v. Summe, No. 05-4179, 2006 WL 1458293 (8th Cir. May 30, 2006) (unpublished) (holding that use of cuffs to detain suspected accomplice did not constitute arrest); United States v. Saffeels, 982 F.2d 1199, 1206 (8th Cir.1992) (overruled on other grounds) (holding that using cuffs on robbery suspect did not convert Terry stop into arrest); United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957 (8th Cir.1992) (concluding that cuffing of suspects during Terry stop where suspects outnumbered officers and where officers were concerned for safety was reasonably necessary to achieve purposes of Terry stop). 9 Here, the officers knew that the robbery had been accomplished by brandishing a gun. Martinez was a close match to the description of the robber, and Atkinson found him near the scene of the crime, acting suspiciously. The discovery of what Atkinson immediately recognized as a wad of cash on Martinez's person reasonably led Atkinson and Missell to believe that Martinez might be the robber, and that he might still have the gun used to commit the crime. Placing Martinez in handcuffs was a reasonable response to the situation in order to protect the officers' personal safety and to maintain the status quo. As such, the use of handcuffs did not convert this Terry stop into an arrest. 10 Martinez also argues that placing him in a patrol car and transporting him back to the bank made the stop an arrest. We do not agree. In United States v. Lego, 855 F.2d 542 (8th Cir.1988), this court held that confining a potentially dangerous suspect to a patrol car while checking his identification was not tantamount to an arrest. There, the obvious exigencies of the situation authorized the officer to continue the Terry stop by confining the suspect to the patrol car until the situation stabilized and she could determine if full custodial arrest and detention were warranted. Id. at 545. Here, the exigencies were such that the officers could not dispel their suspicions that had prompted the Terry stop until they transported Martinez back to the bank for the show-up identification. In United States v. Montano-Gudino, 309 F.3d 501, 504 (8th Cir. 2002), this court held that, given the circumstances, moving a suspect from one location to another did not exceed the bounds of Terry because it was reasonable to relocate the suspect for questioning. 11 In Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 105 S.Ct. 1643, 84 L.Ed.2d 705 (1985), the Supreme Court held that transporting a suspect from his home to a police station for questioning goes beyond the scope of a Terry stop and effects an arrest for which there must be probable cause. Here, the officers did not take Martinez to the police station during the Terry stop, but moved him only to the scene of the crime to help dispel or confirm their suspicions. Similarly, in United States v. Charley, 396 F.3d 1074, 1080 n. 4, 1081 (9th Cir.2005), the court, relying on Montano-Gudino and cases from seven other circuits, held that moving a suspect from the place officers found her to her own home in order to check on her children whom she may have harmed there did not effect an arrest. Thus, neither placing Martinez in the police car nor transporting him to the bank converted this Terry stop into an arrest for which probable cause was required. 12 Even if the stop could be considered an arrest following the cuffing of Martinez, the discovery of the wad of cash on his person provided probable cause to arrest him. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 706 F.2d 263, 265 (8th Cir.1983) (finding that information officers obtained during investigatory stop escalated the factual basis from one permitting an investigatory stop to one warranting an arrest). Probable cause exists when, at the time of the arrest, the available facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense was being or had been committed by the person to be arrested. United States v. Kelly, 329 F.3d 624, 628 (8th Cir.2003). Given the facts and circumstances known to Atkinson and Missell at the time they discovered the wad of cash, a reasonably cautious officer would believe that Martinez might well have committed the bank robbery, and thus probable cause existed to arrest him then. 13