Opinion ID: 1213851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Misrepresentations to the Bar and Committee

Text: Both the committee and the commission found that respondent intentionally lied during these proceedings in an attempt to conceal his failure to communicate the offer. They further determined that he knowingly encouraged at least one member of his secretarial staff to make false statements. Each concluded, therefore, that respondent engaged in dishonest conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter, in violation of ER 8.1 and ER 8.4. Neither the committee nor the commission offered any explanation for such findings other than that respondent and his witnesses were not believable. Although this court is the final arbiter of law and fact in disciplinary cases, In re Loftus, 171 Ariz. 672, 674, 832 P.2d 689, 691 (1992), we normally defer to the findings of the committee, especially in matters of witness credibility, In re Kersting, 151 Ariz. 171, 172, 726 P.2d 587, 588 (1986). We must, however, be satisfied that they are supported by clear and convincing evidence. Rule 54(c), Ariz.R.Sup.Ct.; In re Jones, 169 Ariz. 19, 21, 816 P.2d 916, 918 (1991). We accept the committee's finding that respondent's explanations were unpersuasive. However, lack of credibility is not always the equivalent of intentional dishonesty. Judges and juries often disbelieve witnesses, but that does not necessarily give rise to findings of perjury. [3] Humans are forgetful, make mistakes, and get confused. As one committee member observed in answer to respondent's suggestion that Mr. and Mrs. R were lying, based on inconsistencies in their stories, [I]t is impossible to categorize people as intentional prevaricators or people that simply have bad recollections. Hearing on Motion to Reopen, October 19, 1992, at 20. The fact that a witness is not believed does not, standing alone, constitute clear and convincing evidence of intentional fabrication. We believe the record is insufficient to support the conclusion that respondent intentionally lied. The explanations he offered were at least plausible, if not convincing. Moreover, we note that respondent refused to change his story even after members of both the committee and the commission essentially told him it was his only hope of avoiding serious discipline. Finally, respondent made no attempt to destroy or hide from his clients the letter referencing the offer he supposedly knew that he never told them about. He not only mailed it to them but had a copy placed in their file. He made no effort to remove it, even after Mrs. R told him she intended to pick up all her papers. He also left the original written settlement offer in the file. [4] It is therefore understandable that two members of the commission were unwilling to accept the finding that respondent intentionally deceived the committee, even though one of them agreed that he was not credible. We distinguish In re Fresquez, 162 Ariz. 328, 783 P.2d 774 (1989), and In re Fioramonti, 176 Ariz. 182, 859 P.2d 1315 (1993), where the evidence was uncontroverted that the attorneys had lied to the committee and commission. In Fresquez, the attorney was accused of 1) preparing and having his client sign a back-dated letter recanting the bar complaint and 2) having his secretary sign a false affidavit stating that she had mishandled that complaint. Fresquez, 162 Ariz. at 329-31, 783 P.2d at 775-77. He initially denied any involvement with the client's letter, later stated that perhaps someone on his staff had helped prepare it, and finally admitted doing it himself. Id. at 330, 783 P.2d at 776. He also admitted that he had drafted the affidavit without consulting his secretary and thereafter requested that she sign it. Finally, he conceded that she had never even seen the bar complaint. Fresquez Hearing Comm.Trans., Jan. 30, 1988, at 165-66. In Fioramonti, the attorney admitted creating and back-dating file notes and soliciting false affidavits. Fioramonti, 176 Ariz. at 185, 859 P.2d at 1318. In contrast, this respondent has never changed his story, has offered explanations for apparent inconsistencies in the evidence, [5] and has not admitted any wrongdoing. We expect and demand candor in disciplinary proceedings, particularly because attorneys are officers of this court. See id. at 187-88, 859 P.2d at 1320-21. Lying during such proceedings is one of the most serious ethical violations an attorney can commit and, absent mitigating circumstances, warrants the ultimate sanction of disbarment. See Fresquez, 162 Ariz. at 335, 783 P.2d at 781. However, despite (or perhaps because of) its seriousness, we cannot permit such an offense to be established on a lesser showing of proof than other ethical violations. Respondent's explanations are difficult to accept. After a careful review of the record, however, we cannot reach the conclusion that they are total fabrications. In other words, although we are concerned that respondent may have lied to the committee, we are not convinced that he did. Furthermore, we do not wish to deter attorneys from truthfully challenging charges against them for fear that they will not be believed and will then be disbarred for lying. See In re Shannon, 179 Ariz. 52, 81-82, 876 P.2d 548, 577-78 (1994) (Zlaket, J., dissenting). Our decision today is consistent with an opinion issued just last year by a panel of this court that included the present dissenter. In that matter, the committee found the lawyer's multiple explanations not credible in light of later developments in the case and the testimony elicited during the proceedings. In re Giles, 178 Ariz. 146, 150, 871 P.2d 693, 697 (1994). The court determined that the foregoing conclusion was clearly supported by the record, treated it as an aggravating circumstance, and suspended the attorney for 90 days. Id. at 150, 151, 871 P.2d at 697, 698. The difference is that the hearing committee in this case chose not to stop after its statement that respondent was not credible, but instead added, with no additional evidence or explanation, an assertion that he wilfully lied. We find no support in the record for this distinction.