Opinion ID: 435958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: A. Post-Miranda Silence 12 The appellants assert that it was reversible error for evidence to be presented at trial concerning Wagers' post-arrest, post-Miranda silence. We find this assertion to be unpersuasive. 13 During direct examination of Agent Best by Prosecutor Zerhusen, the following transpired: 14 Q. At the time that you arrested Mr. Harrison on the late hours of December 7, 1983, did you advise him of his so-called Miranda rights? 15 A. Yes, I did. 16 Q. Would you tell the jury exactly what you advised Mr. Harrison?A. He knew that I was a Federal agent, and I told him that I had to explain his rights against self-incrimination to him. The first thing I told him, and Wagers together, was that they had the right to remain silent. And I explained to them that they didn't have to say anything to us if they didn't want to. And I asked them if they understood that, and they said that they did, each one of them. And I told them that anything they said could be used against them in court. I explained to them that if they told me A, B, C, that I could go to court and repeat A, B, C, to a judge or jury. I asked them if they understood that, and they said they did. 17 I told them they had the right to an attorney, which meant a lawyer, and if they couldn't afford an attorney, that one would be appointed for them at no expense. And I asked them if they understood that, and both of them said that they did. 18 And I asked--I told them that as part of their rights that if we wanted to question them about anything, they had the right to stop questioning or stop answering the questions and request an attorney be present, and once again, each of them said that they understood that. 19 Q. And again, who were you present with? 20 A. It was with Wagers and Harrison and FBI Agent Keller. 21 Q. And did you speak with Mr. Harrison during this time? 22 A. Well, we had--he asked--I asked him a couple of questions about his personal history, such as his name and where he was from, and he asked me a couple of questions. 23 Q. What did he tell you about his name and where he was from? 24 At this point, objections and motions by various defense counsels were made, including those by counsel for defendant Wagers as follows: 25 Mr. Smith: If we could just have one more minute of the Court's time. 26 The Court: Okay. 27 Mr. Smith: Your honor, since Mr. Zirhusen has had the witness testify that Mr. Wagers was read his rights, it is my recollection from what I have been furnished, I was given no statements, post-arrest statements. Is he going to testify about what Mr. Wagers said? 28 (Counselor Zirhusen nods in the negative.) 29 Mr. Smith: I believe that this is a comment on Mr. Wagers' silence after he was read his rights, and I think that this is error in this matter. 30 Mr. Zirhusen: There was no comment regarding anything he said or did not say anything. 31 Mr. Smith: It is a direct comment on his silence because the jury is expecting to hear what Mr. Wagers said. And, if they put nothing on that he said, that is a direct comment on his silence after he was read his rights. 32 The Court: Well, it probably shouldn't have been brought up since the two were there together. If you want me to tell the jury that Mr. Wagers was not required to make a statement, I will, but if you don't want me to, I won't say anything. 33 Wagers contends that the testimony of Agent Best, on direct examination by the government, constituted an impermissible reference to his right to remain silent. He bases this assertion on the fact that after he and co-defendant Harrison were arrested and given their rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), Harrison inquired as to the type and length of sentence he would receive. Wagers remained silent after his Miranda rights were given. In making this assertion, Wagers relies on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). In Doyle, the Supreme Court established that it is a violation of a defendant's due process rights to allow his silence at the time of arrest and after he has received his Miranda warning to be used to impeach an exculpatory story given for the first time at trial. Id. at 617-18, 96 S.Ct. at 2244-45. In cases decided pursuant to Doyle, the courts have uniformly condemned even indirect reference to a defendant's post-arrest silence. United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 381 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1419, 79 L.Ed.2d 744 (1984); United States v. Johnson, 558 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Wycoff, 545 F.2d 679 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1105, 97 S.Ct. 1135, 51 L.Ed.2d 556 (1977). 34 However, testimony on direct examination by a government witness that a defendant had been given the Miranda rights, followed by neither questions as to what defendant said nor by testimony concerning that defendant's failure to make statements after the giving of said rights, does not constitute improper comment upon that defendant's right to remain silent. United States v. Jonas, 639 F.2d 200, 205 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1073 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956, 100 S.Ct. 2928, 64 L.Ed.2d 815 (1980). As in the present case, the issue in Jonas and Warren, was the question of improper comment on the right of silence. In Jonas and Warren, the government witness gave a narrative of the arrest process and described the giving or lack of responses by the defendants. The Fifth Circuit stated in Jonas that: 35 Appellant's contention regarding this issue was answered by this Court in United States v. Warren, supra, 578 F.2d at 1072-73. There, this Court held that admission of testimony that the defendants were advised at the time of their arrest of their right to remain silent did not constitute a comment on the exercise of the defendants' right to remain silent and thus reversal was not required. No reversal is required in this case. 36 639 F.2d at 205. 37 We find that the facts of this case do not evince a violation of appellant's due process rights pursuant to Doyle. Agent Best testified only to the questions that were directed to him by appellant Harrison. In this testimony, he made no reference, explicit or implicit, as to the silence of appellant Wagers. Furthermore, the government did not raise the fact of Wagers' post-arrest silence by questions, other testimony, or comment in the argument. In fact, Wagers makes no allegation that the government in any manner referred to, followed up on, or emphasized Best's testimony. Moreover, if this testimony was so egregious that it constituted major prejudice, counsel for appellant should have requested that a curative instruction be given to the jury. However, no such curative instruction was requested. The record clearly evinces that the trial court offered to make such an instruction. The failure of appellant's counsel to pursue such an instruction is anathema to the validity of this assertion. We, therefore, conclude that there was no improper reference to appellant's post-Miranda silence by the prosecutor or Agent Best's testimony. 38 Appellant Hucks also asserts that his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent was violated by Agent Best's comments regarding his post-arrest silence. This assertion cannot be substantiated. 39 During cross-examination of Agent Best by Warren Scoville, counsel for co-defendant Harrison, the following transpired: 40 Q. What kind of investigation did you conduct to find the person who got away that night, that you were told that got away, that delivered the cocaine? 41 A. I don't believe there is any other person, so there was no investigation. 42 Q. You didn't conduct any investigation? 43 A. I know of nothing to look into unless Mr. Hucks had wanted to tell me something that I could look into. 44 As a result of the preceding testimony, Hucks moved for a mistrial, which was denied by the court. The court then admonished the jury to disregard this portion of Agent Best's testimony. 45 Hucks contends that this testimony constituted an improper comment on his right to remain silent after his arrest. However, a curative instruction was made immediately by the trial judge. He sustained an objection by appellant's counsel, but denied the motion for a mistrial. He noted that: 46 The Court: I don't think we have a comment on the silence of a party, because what we have here is much different. The first thing that was brought up about Hucks even making a statement was brought up by his counsel, Mr. House. The second thing that was brought up about Mr. Huck's statement was by counsel for Mr. Harrison. Now it is different to say that Mr. Hucks wouldn't tell me anything. What we have here is Mr. Hucks tells the agent, and the first time it is brought out is when Mr. House and Mr. Scoville brought it out primarily, that there was another individual involved, but he couldn't give him a name. That is a whole lot different from saying Mr. Hucks wouldn't say anything. But Mr. Hucks did say something, and when he came forward to say that he had a--he knew there was a mysterious party there, to quote an old movie theme, it was the Third Man Theme, that there was some other mysterious person that was lurking in the woods, that is not a comment on his silence. 47 Mr. House: Your Honor, I believe-- 48 The Court: Because he never did say, I'm using Miranda rights or I don't want to give you the name, he just said he didn't have a name or something of that nature. 49 Mr. House: Your Honor, I believe what Agent Best said on the stand was he did not have any basis for investigation unless Hucks wanted to tell him something. That implies knowledge retained by silence, and that is a direct comment on Mr. Hucks' Miranda rights. And it tells the jury that he is holding something back. And that was not the import of Hucks' statement at all. 50 The Court: Well, when he, Hucks, said there was a central figure or a main cog or whatever it was, those were his words, but he was pointing at somebody besides him that did it, but he couldn't identify him, I think that was (sic) what the agent said, especially in that-- 51