Opinion ID: 1238139
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Adversarial Process

Text: (3a) Both attorneys commented on the nature of the adversarial process during voir dire. Defense counsel analogized the upcoming trial to a game and observed that each side was seeking essentially the same goal, each of us is trying to win for our team.... The prosecutor, in response, emphasized that his role was not strict[ly] adversarial, that his client was the people of the state and that he was thereby obligated to ensure that people receive fair trials and not simply convict those charged with crimes and throw justice and equity out the door. To illustrate the point, the prosecutor noted that he had an obligation ethically in seeking justice to make sure [defense counsel] knows about all the witnesses I intend to call, what they are going to say, what they saw, all of those things. [ถ] This isn't just a game.... By way of contrast, the prosecutor observed that defense counsel has no obligation under our system of justice to reciprocate, to tell me where they're going or what they may do or who they may call. He is an adversary, the prosecutor explained, pure and simple. He must represent his client and his sole obligation within certain ethical grounds is to obtain an acquittal for his client. Defendant now contends that the prosecutor's remarks grossly distorted the adversarial process, impugned the ethics of defense counsel and improperly used the prestige of his office to bolster the state's case. As the People correctly observe, however, defendant failed to object to any of the prosecutor's remarks, thereby waiving his present objections. (4) It is, of course, the general rule that a defendant cannot complain on appeal of misconduct by a prosecutor at trial unless in a timely fashion he made an assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety. ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 794 [276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330]; see also People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 690-691 [224 Cal. Rptr. 705, 715 P.2d 665]; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) (5), (3b) Furthermore, the prosecutor's statements were not objectionable on the grounds asserted by defendant. It is not a distortion but a simple fact that the prosecutor `is the representative not of any ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.' ( People v. Superior Court ( Greer ) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 266 [137 Cal. Rptr. 476, 561 P.2d 1164], quoting Berger v. United States (1935) 295 U.S. 78, 88 [79 L.Ed. 1314, 1321, 55 S.Ct. 629]; accord People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 740, 746 [218 Cal. Rptr. 24, 705 P.2d 347].) The prosecutor was also factually correct in noting that discovery in the criminal context was not a two-way street; the prosecution's disclosure obligations were not reciprocated by the defense. ( In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543 [213 Cal. Rptr. 569, 698 P.2d 637]; but see Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356 [285 Cal. Rptr. 231, 815 P.2d 304].) Nor do we believe the jury could reasonably have interpreted the remarks as impugning the ethics of defense counsel, or as an improper attempt to bolster the state's case.