Opinion ID: 1672000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admissibility of Walker's Statements

Text: Walker contends that his right to counsel under article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution was violated during his interrogation at Metro-Dade police headquarters when he equivocally indicated to the interrogating officers his desire to have a lawyer present. Walker maintains that because the officers failed to stop the interrogation and clarify his request, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession and allowing the interrogating officers to testify as to the substance of his statements at trial. In State v. Owen, 696 So.2d 715 (Fla. 1997), this Court recently followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), in holding that police in Florida need not ask clarifying questions if a defendant who has received proper Miranda warnings makes only an equivocal or ambiguous request to terminate an interrogation after having validly waived his or her Miranda rights. We receded from prior decisions which had held that an equivocal invocation of Miranda rights required the police to either terminate interrogation or clarify the suspect's wishes. In this case, Walker voluntarily drove himself to Metro-Dade headquarters to be questioned about the murders of Joanne and Quentin Jones. Walker was read his Miranda rights and signed a waiver form while talking with the officers in an interview room. Initially, Walker contends that the police should have ceased their interrogation of him when he stated, on two occasions, that if police brought in a stenographer to record his statement he wanted an attorney. These comments did not constitute a clear request for an attorney. His request for counsel was conditioned upon the possibility that the officers would not honor his wish and insist on recording his statement anyway. When the officers told Walker that his statement would not be recorded, Walker continued to talk and did not reassert a desire to have an attorney present. Moreover, Detective Everett explicitly testified at the suppression hearing that in response to Walker's request not to have his statement recorded, he asked Walker if he wanted to continue talking and Walker answered affirmatively. The trial court did not err in denying Walker's motion to suppress. Walker next contends that the coercive interrogation techniques employed by Detectives Everett and Watterson rendered his confession involuntary. Where a defendant alleges that his statement was the product of coercion, the voluntariness of the confession must be determined by an examination of the totality of the circumstances. Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 964 (Fla. 1992). In this case, Walker cites as improper the combination of the following techniques: (1) Walker was not advised prior to interrogation that he was the focus of the investigation; (2) police falsely told Walker that they had found a fingerprint or his fingerprint on the duct tape from one of the victims before they had learned of such results, and repeatedly insisted that they knew he was guilty; (3) police showed Walker a picture of the deceased infant's decomposing body and told him that whoever had done this had done a terrible thing; (4) knowing that Walker was a deacon in his church, police exploited his religious beliefs when they told him that God would not believe his abduction story; (5) police engaged in racially-charged role playing with Detective Watterson, a white officer, being the bad-cop while Detective Everett, a black officer, attempted to relate to Walker brother to brother. (6) police threatened Walker with the electric chair and Detective Everett then promised he could help Walker out. In orally denying Walker's motion on these grounds, the trial court noted: And these techniques that were used by the police, everyone knows about them. They have not been disapproved by the law in any way. They are used constantly. They practically are used in every murder case I've ever heard about. And I think there's no question that given the totality of circumstances, that this statement that the Defendant gave was freely and voluntarily given and the motion to suppress is denied. As noted previously, a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is accorded great deference. McNamara v. State, 357 So.2d 410 (Fla.1978). The testimony from the motion to suppress hearing reflects that the trial court's denial of Walker's motion on this ground also is supported by the record. Contrary to Walker's assertions, the police interrogation here simply cannot be characterized as so coercive as to render his confession involuntary. Although Walker was questioned for six hours, the interrogation occurred during the morning and early part of day. Walker was provided with drinks upon request and allowed to use the bathroom when he wished. Although Detective Everett reminded Walker that he could face the death penalty for the murders of the victims in this case, Walker was never threatened with the electric chair, or promised anything other than that Detective Everett would inform the prosecutor that Walker had cooperated in the investigation. Although Detective Watterson did not know that Walker's fingerprint was found on a piece of duct tape when he conveyed that information to Walker during questioning, Watterson honored appellant's wishes and refrained from taking fingerprints or photographs at that time because of Walker's shaken reaction to that news. [5] Consequently, we affirm the trial court's denial of Walker's motion on this ground also. Finally, Walker contends that his confession was improperly admitted against him because it was the product of an illegal arrest for which the officers lacked probable cause. Probable cause for arrest exists where an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect has committed a felony. The standard of conclusiveness and probability is less than that required to support a conviction. Blanco v. State, 452 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla.1984). The question of probable cause is viewed from the perspective of a police officer with specialized training and takes into account the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. Schmitt v. State, 563 So.2d 1095, 1098 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Specifically, Walker characterizes the totality of the officers' knowledge at the time of the arrest as follows: (1) Walker's inconsistent statements to police regarding his activities on the night of the murders; (2) his nervous reaction when police falsely reported that a fingerprint had been found on the duct tape; (3) his unique knowledge of the location of the duct tape on Ms. Jones' body; and (4) unverified information from the victims' family members that Walker was having some difficulties in his relationship with Ms. Jones. Walker argues that such knowledge was insufficient to establish probable cause for his arrest. However, in addition to the information cited by appellant, the record reflects that at the time of Walker's arrest, the officers also (1) knew that Walker had repeatedly lied to police, first maintaining that he had not been with the victims on the night they were murdered and later offering the abduction story in which he could not explain how he had gotten home after being abandoned near the Orange Bowl by the armed men or why he had not informed police that his son and former girlfriend had been bound and abducted; and (2) were aware that Walker had a motive for the murder in that he and Ms. Jones were having disagreements about child support payments and that Ms. Jones had filed a complaint accusing Walker of sexually assaulting her on a prior occasion. In light of the totality of these circumstances, we do not find that the trial court erred in rejecting Walker's claim that police lacked probable cause to arrest him during his interrogation and affirm the denial of Walker's motion to suppress.