Opinion ID: 2763472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pension Fund

Text: The district court did not abuse its discretion in assessing attorneys’ fees against the trustees. 3 3 The trustees and the union do not challenge the amount of fees awarded; the challenge involves only the decision to grant attorneys’ fees. 5
The district court has discretion to award attorneys’ fees under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Gordon v. U.S. Steel Corp., 724 F.2d 106, 108 (10th Cir. 1983). Therefore, we review the district court’s order for abuse of discretion. Id. Under this standard of review, we will reverse only if the district court clearly erred in its judgment. Id. To determine if a party should be awarded attorneys’ fees for a withdrawal liability claim, the district court must weigh five factors: 1. the degree of the opposing parties’ culpability or bad faith, 2. the opposing parties’ ability to satisfy an award of attorneys’ fees, 3. the deterrence of a fee award on other parties considering similar claims in the future, 4. whether the parties requesting fees sought either to resolve a significant legal question regarding the Employee Retirement Income Security Act or to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan, and 5. the relative merits of the parties’ positions. Cardoza v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 708 F.3d 1196, 1207 (10th Cir. 2013). 4 No single factor is dispositive. Id. 4 The parties disagree on which statute governs the award of attorneys’ fees. The trustees believe the proper statute is 29 U.S.C. § 1451(e), while the electric companies and Mr. Larsen argue that both 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(g)(1) and 1451(e) apply. But, we believe the five-factor test would apply under both statutes. See Anita Founds., Inc. v. ILGWU Nat’l Ret. 6 The trustees confine their challenge to the district court’s application of the first and fifth factors. We conclude that the court did not clearly err in applying these factors. 2. First Factor: The Degree of the Opposing Parties’ Culpability or Bad Faith The trustees argue that the district court erroneously applied the first factor because ● the defendants concede that the trustees had not acted in bad faith, and ● the union’s alleged fault should not be attributed to the trustees. We reject both arguments. Despite the defendants’ concession, the district court had to decide how to apply the first factor. Doing so, the court focused on “the degree of blameworthiness” between the parties. Appellant’s App., vol. II at 853. This focus was reasonable, and the district court did not err by balancing the parties’ blameworthiness rather than narrowly considering whether the trustees had acted in bad faith. The court also acted in its discretion by attributing fault to the trustees, as well as the union. See Appellant’s App., vol. II at 853-54 Fund, 902 F.2d 185, 199 (2d Cir. 1990) (explaining the Gordon factors’ application to § 1132(g)(1) claims and listing other circuit courts that have adopted the Gordon factors for a § 1451(e) claim). Thus, we need not decide which statute governs the award of attorneys’ fees. 7 (explaining that the union and the trustees were at fault). The court regarded the trustees as blameworthy, reasoning that they had taken their chances in the prior suit by relying on the union and then filing a new action only after the union had lost. Id. In balancing the relative fault of the parties, the court acted in its discretion by determining that the trustees were more blameworthy than the electric companies or Mr. Larsen. 3. Fifth Factor: The Relative Merits of the Parties’ Positions The trustees argue that the district court failed to properly assess the relative merits of the parties’ positions. We reject this argument. In doing so, we give at least some weight to the defendants’ status as prevailing parties. Graham v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 1153, 1162 (10th Cir. 2007). The district court not only awarded judgment to the defendants, but also commented on the weakness of the trustees’ alter ego theory. In the course of denying the electric companies and Mr. Larsen’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district court commented: “I’ve reached the conclusion that although the evidence is, in my judgment, at this point very weak, there is sufficient evidence before the court to allow the case to proceed, and so I’m going to deny the motion . . . .” Appellant’s App., vol. II at 739. The district court ultimately rejected the claims based on res judicata. Though the trustees appeal that ruling, we lack jurisdiction over 8 that part of the appeal. Without jurisdiction to consider any of the trustees’ appeal points on the summary judgment ruling, we cannot disturb the district court’s discretionary assessment of the parties’ relative strengths and weaknesses. 4. Summary The district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the first and fifth factors against the trustees. The trustees do not question the district court’s consideration of the other three factors. In these circumstances, the court did not err in assessing attorneys’ fees against the trustees. III. Conclusion We lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal on the district court’s award of summary judgment. Thus, we dismiss this part of the appeal. 5 We reverse the award of attorneys’ fees against the union and affirm the fee award against the trustees. Entered for the Court Robert E. Bacharach