Opinion ID: 24837
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standing and Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Text: 75 On appeal, Saitas puts forth various jurisdictional issues and argues that, even if the merits were to be reached, he did not violate the RCRA. We examine each of the threshold issues in turn. Not finding them to be viable in the instant case, we then examine the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, concluding that the district court did not err in finding in favor of Saitas. 76 Saitas asserts that Plaintiffs lack standing and also that he is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. 40 Standing is a jurisdictional doctrine that the Supreme Court has held must be decided before the merits of a case. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 93-102 (1998) (rejecting the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction); see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974) (stating that the concept of justiciability, which expresses the jurisdictional limitations imposed upon federal courts by the 'case or controversy' requirement of Art. III, embodies . . . [among other doctrines] the standing doctrine[]). While the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in the sense that it is a limitation on the federal court's judicial power, . . . [the Supreme Court has] recognized that it is not coextensive with the limitations on judicial power in Article III. Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 745 n.2 (1998); Laje v. R. E. Thomason Gen. Hosp., 665 F.2d 724, 726 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that Eleventh Amendment claims are jurisdictional in nature (emphasis added)). The Supreme Court has also stated that standing must be examined before the Eleventh Amendment. See Calderon, 523 U.S. at 745 (stating that the Court must first address whether [the action] is the sort of 'Article III' 'case or controversy' to which federal courts are limited).
77 Article III, § 2 of the Constitution extends the 'judicial Power' of the United States only to 'Cases' and 'Controversies.' Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102. That a suit may be a class action . . . adds nothing to the question of standing, for even named plaintiffs who represent a class must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40, n. 20 (1976)). A plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she satisfies the three constitutional requirements of standing: (1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 78 A plaintiff suffers injury in fact when there has been an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The causation requirement is met when the injury is such that it is 'fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.' Id. at 560-61 (alterations in original) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). As for redressability, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 561 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 79 On appeal, 41 Saitas does not appear to argue that Plaintiffs have not suffered an injury in fact or that they fail to demonstrate causation. 42 Rather, Saitas focuses his challenge on the redressability requirement. Saitas argues that an injunctive order requiring him to classify the Deepwood and South Loop 12 sites as open dumps, and to formally submit the names of those sites to the EPA for inclusion on the ODI, will not remedy the problem posed by the illegal dumps because there is no correlation between classification and enforcement. 43 Saitas analogizes the instant case to Steel Co. 80 Plaintiffs acknowledge that if they were seeking only to have the dumps classified as open dumps and listed on the ODI, then standing could be problematic, as in Steel Co. However, they interpret the RCRA not only to require Saitas to classify Deepwood and South Loop 12 as open dumps and submit them for the ODI, but also to require Saitas either to upgrade or to close the dumps. Thus, Plaintiffs assert that their requested relief goes beyond merely listing the Deepwood and South Loop 12 dumps on the ODI, noting that they strove to obtain an injunction that would also require Saitas to take steps to close the dumps or upgrade them to federal standards and to take the steps necessary to eliminate the existing health hazards and to minimize potential health hazards. We agree with Plaintiffs that they have standing. 81 First, Plaintiffs have amply demonstrated an injury in fact. At least two-million cubic yards of waste, approximately forty-feet deep, are present at the Deepwood dump, which is adjacent to Plaintiffs' residential neighborhoods. Residents close to the dumps report the appearance of snakes and rats in their backyards since the beginning of the illegal dumping. Asbestos and benzo(a)athracene have been detected at the Deepwood dump, and benzene has been discovered in excess of state limits. The Deepwood dump has caught fire and burned several times, and a significant fire hazard still exists at the dump. Solid waste continues to be dumped on the South Loop 12 site, with the State discovering during a 1991 inspection that the area of the waste along the alley behind the homes has been expanding. The City and State themselves have acknowledged that both dumps constitute a hazard to the public health. These facts, among others, demonstrate a concrete, actual injury and thus satisfy the first standing requirement. 82 Next, we find that Plaintiffs have demonstrated causation. The district court found that because most dumps do not apply for a state permit, the State's strategy of listing only previously permitted sites on the ODI greatly reduced the number of existing open dumps in Texas that could potentially find their way onto the ODI. The court also found that all of the dumps that the State did list on the ODI were subsequently upgraded to meet the EPA's sanitary landfill criteria. From our review of the record, we find that the district court did not err in making these findings. Therefore, it can be said that Plaintiffs' injury is fairly traceable to the actions of Saitas as it is likely that conditions at the Deepwood and South Loop 12 dumps would have been ameliorated if Saitas had acted to set the process in motion. Had the Deepwood and South Loop 12 dumps been placed on the ODI (which, Plaintiffs contend, is required by the RCRA 44 ), Saitas would have been obligated to plan for and implement the closing or upgrading of the dumps under 40 C.F.R. § 256.23. 83 We also agree with Plaintiffs that Steel Co. is inapposite to the instant case and find that they have satisfied the redressability requirement as well. In Steel Co., a citizens group sought declaratory judgment that the defendant violated the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (the EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1), by failing to file timely annual emergency and hazardous chemical inventory forms. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 86-88. Unlike the instant case, the Steel Co. defendant filed all of the overdue reports with the relevant agencies after receiving notice from the plaintiff that it was in violation of the EPCRA (even before the civil suit was filed). See id. at 88. The Supreme Court itself subsequently noted this very distinction in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000). The Court stated: 84 We specifically noted in [Steel Co.] that there was no allegation in the complaint of any continuing or imminent violation, and that no basis for such an allegation appeared to exist. In short, Steel Co. held that private plaintiffs, unlike the Federal Government, may not sue to assess penalties for wholly past violations, but our decision in that case did not reach the issue of standing to seek penalties for violations that are ongoing at the time of the complaint and that could continue into the future if undeterred. 85 Id. at 187-88 (internal citations omitted); see also 13 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.10, at 868 (Supp. 2000) (Many aspects of the [ruling in Steel Co.] rested on the conclusion that the plaintiff could not achieve standing by seeking remedies that would advance the public interest in deterring future violations or punishing past violations.). 86 In this case, Saitas did not act to classify properly the Deepwood and South Loop 12 sites as open dumps and then execute the resulting upgrade/closure process after being informed by Plaintiffs of alleged violations of federal law (as the Steel Co. defendant had done). Plaintiffs have alleged longstanding and uncorrected violations of Saitas's obligations to plan for and accomplish the elimination of the hazards caused by the dumps. Thus, an injunction requiring Saitas to upgrade or close the dumps would redress the hazards created by those dumps. 45 See Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (stating that a private citizen suing under § 6972(a)(1)(B) could seek a mandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible party to 'take action' by attending to the cleanup and proper disposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one that 'restrains' a responsible party from further violating [the] RCRA); Sealy Conn., Inc. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Conn. 1997) (stating that mandatory injunctions are authorized by § 6972(a)(1)(B) for attending to the cleanup and proper disposal of toxic waste); cf. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 214 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating that § 6973, see supra note 22, authorizes the cleanup of a site, even a dormant one, if that action is necessary to abate a present threat to the public health or the environment); United States v. Valentine, 856 F. Supp. 627, 633 (D. Wyo. 1994) (stating that [i]t is plain . . . that [§ 6973, see supra note 22,] empowers [a court] to grant the full range of equitable remedies and also all remedies traditionally provided under the common law of nuisance, at least so long as such relief serves to protect the public health and environment).
87 Saitas argues on appeal 46 that he is protected from suit by the Eleventh Amendment and that the suit cannot be maintained under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Eleventh Amendment states: The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. U.S. Const. amend. XI. Although by its terms the Amendment applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State, . . . the Amendment's applicability [has been extended] to suits by citizens against their own States. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 962 (2001). 88 Because Plaintiffs have sued a state official in his official capacity, we address whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young operates in this case. As will be explained below, we find that Plaintiffs' suit for prospective injunctive relief under the RCRA may proceed against the individual state official sued in his official capacity, Jeffrey A. Saitas, Executive Director of the TNRCC. 47 Ex parte Young 89 Ex parte Young held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit against a state official who is alleged to be acting in violation of federal law. See 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908); see also Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 968 n.9; Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102-03 (1984); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667-69 (1974); AT&T Communications v. Bellsouth Telecomms. Inc., 238 F.3d 636, 647 (5th Cir. 2001); Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 139 F.3d 1033, 1039 (5th Cir. 1998). The Ex parte Young doctrine is premised on the concept that a state cannot authorize its officials to violate the Constitution and laws of the United States. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 160 (The State has no power to impart to [the state officer] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.). The Supreme Court's decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the [Ex parte] Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 105. 90 In this case, we find that Plaintiffs' claims against Saitas are within the ambit of Ex parte Young. First, having sued Saitas in his official capacity, Plaintiffs are seeking prospective injunctive relief, 48 as opposed to retrospective relief. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667-69 (rejecting an injunction ordering retroactive payment of previously owed monetary benefits). The distinction between that relief permissible under the doctrine of Ex parte Young and that found barred in Edelman was the difference between prospective relief on one hand and retrospective relief on the other. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979). 91 Second, Plaintiffs are also alleging violations of federal law, specifically the RCRA, and not state law. The regulations, requirements, and standards that Plaintiffs seek to enforce pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A) are federal statutory and regulatory provisions: 42 U.S.C. §§ 6943(a)(2) & (3), 6944; 40 C.F.R. § 256.23(a), (c), & (d). Although the state plan provides that the State will comply with these federal provisions, Plaintiffs are not seeking to enforce the plan itself and therefore do not run afoul of Pennhurst's admonition regarding state law claims. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106 (concluding that [Ex parte] Young and Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law); Earles, 139 F.3d at 1039-40. 92 Saitas does not appear to contest that Plaintiffs are seeking prospective injunctive relief for violations of federal law. Rather, Saitas argues that state officers cannot be sued to enforce federal statutes that contain comprehensive enforcement mechanisms. Saitas focuses on Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), in which the Supreme Court held: [W]here Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte Young. Id. at 74. 93 In Seminole Tribe, the Court found that Congress intended to limit the availability of an Ex parte Young suit against state officers for violations of federal statutory law when it enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (the IGRA). See id. at 75-76. However, the statute that gives rise to Plaintiffs' claims in this case is distinguishable from the IGRA. In Seminole Tribe itself, the Court differentiated between the IGRA and statutes such as the Clean Water Act (the CWA). See 517 U.S. at 75 n.17 (noting that the IGRA provision at issue stands in contrast to provisions such as those under the CWA, in which Congress is clear that it intends to authorize federal jurisdiction over government entities and focusing on the any person language in the CWA citizen suit provision). We are persuaded that the similarity of the citizen suit provisions of the CWA and the RCRA requires like interpretation. See U.S. Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615-16 (1992). The CWA authorizes citizen suitsagainst any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation. 94 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (2000). Similarly, Plaintiffs are suing pursuant to the RCRA provision that authorizes citizens suits 95 against any person (including (a) the United States, and (b) any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order. 96 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A). That the RCRA authorizes suits against any person to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment clearly indicates that Congress specifically intended to permit suits against states within the bounds of the Amendment. See, e.g., Prisco v. New York, No. 91 Civ. 3990 (RLC), 1996 WL 596546, at  (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1996) (determining that Seminole Tribe did not bar plaintiff's RCRA claim under Ex parte Young); cf. S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 64 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3730 (stating that if the Federal, State, and local agencies fail to exercise their enforcement responsibility, the public is provided the right to seek vigorous enforcement action under the citizen suit provisions); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that Congress implicitly intended to authorize citizens to bring Ex parte Young suits against state officials with the responsibility to comply with [the CWA]). 97 We thus find the RCRA, with its explicit reference to the Eleventh Amendment and its similarity to the CWA, to be precisely the sort of statute envisioned by the Seminole Tribe Court to authorize an Ex parte Young action. See 517 U.S. at 75 n.17. Far from demonstrating Congress's intention to bar access to Ex parte Young, the RCRA embraces the Ex parte Young doctrine as a feature of its remedial scheme. Therefore, Plaintiffs' RCRA claim against Saitas is not barred by Seminole Tribe's exception to the doctrine of Ex parte Young.