Opinion ID: 1941856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the lineup identifications

Text: Both appellants contend that the government violated their Sixth Amendment rights to counsel by conducting lineups at which they were unrepresented by counsel. Consequently, appellants argue, the trial court committed reversible error in admitting identification testimony based on these lineups, including not only identifications made at the actual lineups but also identifications made by witnesses viewing photographs of the lineups.
Poole was arraigned on August 9, 1990. At that time, according to Poole's suppression motion filed below, the court issued a lineup order for August 29, 1990. Poole's counsel objected to the date because of a conflict. On August 27 and 28, Poole's counsel contacted police detectives to inform them of the conflict. According to Poole's counsel, the detectives said that they would attempt either to schedule a different lineup for the same time or to obtain substitute counsel. When Poole's counsel called again on August 29, he was unable to reach the detectives, but he did ascertain that Poole's lineup was to go forward. At the last minute, Poole's counsel managed to obtain substitute counsel, but only in time for this substitute to be present as the last two witnesses (out of a total of fifteen) viewed the lineup. According to the government's brief, Showell was arraigned on February 5, 1990, in connection with another hair salon robbery that had taken place on January 19, 1990not the robbery for which she was convicted. At that time, the magistrate signed an order compelling Showell and her counsel to appear for a lineup on February 15, 1990, as a condition of her release. For whatever reason, however, Showell's counsel did not appear on February 15. Appellants moved to suppress all identification testimony based upon these lineups, arguing that the lineups were (1) improperly suggestive, thereby violating their Fifth Amendment rights to due process, and (2) conducted in the absence of counsel, thereby violating their Sixth Amendment rights. [21] The trial court denied appellants' motions, finding that the lineups were not improperly suggestive, that the government had given counsel adequate notice of the lineups, that consequently it was not the government's fault that appellants were not represented by counsel, and that appellants had in any case failed to show prejudice. [22] At trial, the government played for the jury a videotape of Poole's lineup, in which one witness, Michelle Coats, identified Poole as the armed robber. Two other witnesses attended Poole's lineup: Ron Oliphant, who had earlier identified Poole in the street at Ridge Road, and Michele Mitchell. Oliphant testified that he had identified Poole at the lineup. Mitchell testified that she had told the police that she could not identify anyone at the lineup but that later she had picked out Poole from a photo of the lineup, although she was not one hundred percent sure of her identification. Six other witnesses testified that they had identified Poole from the lineup photo. As for Showell, one witness, Marjorie McCoy, testified that she had identified Showell as the robber's accomplice at a lineup, while four others testified that they had identified Showell from a photograph of this lineup.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to any lineup that occurs at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedingswhether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937-38, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (accused has right to counsel at post-indictment lineup); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1956, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967) (same). Identifications made at such a lineup in the absence of counsel are subject to a per se exclusionary rule, [23] but the erroneous admission of a lineup identification is not reversible per se. See Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 273, 87 S.Ct. at 1957. Rather, we review the case to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 274, 87 S.Ct. at 1957 (remanding case for state court to determine whether erroneous admission of testimony concerning lineup identifications made in absence of counsel was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)); (David) Washington v. United States, 377 A.2d 1348, 1350 (D.C.1977) (applying harmless constitutional error test to alleged violation of appellant's right to counsel at lineup).
In this case, appellants challenge the identification testimony given, not only by persons who attended the lineup of the person they identified, but also by persons who never attended the actual lineup and merely viewed a photograph of that lineup. Appellants contend that the trial court should have suppressed these photo identifications as fruits of an illegal lineup. As appellants appear to concede, they cannot base this claim upon the absence of counsel when witnesses viewed the lineup photos. The Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel does not apply when a witness is merely viewing a photograph of the accused. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 2579, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973). Following Ash, we have concluded that it makes no difference if the photo portrays a lineup; the right to counsel still does not apply to the viewing of the photo. See ( Clyde) Thomas v. United States, 382 A.2d 24, 27 (D.C.1978); (Daniel) Williams v. United States, 379 A.2d 698, 699 (D.C.1977). Appellants argue, however, that the absence of counsel at the lineup itself necessarily tainted any identification based upon the later viewing of a photo of that lineup, even if the person making the identification never attended the original lineup. We reject this argument. The Supreme Court has deemed counsel's presence at a lineup indispensable in large part due to the accused's inability effectively to reconstruct at trial any unfairness that occurred. Wade, 388 U.S. at 231-32, 87 S.Ct. at 1934; see also Ash, 413 U.S. at 312-13, 93 S.Ct. at 2575. The same difficulty does not inhere in a photographic identification. As Justice Stewart noted in his concurring opinion in Ash, there is a fundamental difference between a photographic identification and a lineup identification, insofar as defense counsel can more readily reconstruct the identification procedure when it involves the viewing of photographs: A photographic identification is quite different from a lineup, for there are substantially fewer possibilities of impermissible suggestion when photographs are used, and those unfair influences can be readily reconstructed at trial. It is true that the defendant's photograph may be markedly different from the others displayed, but this unfairness can be demonstrated at trial from an actual comparison of the photographs used or from the witness' description of the display. Similarly, it is possible that the photographs could be arranged in a suggestive manner, or that by comment or gesture the prosecuting authorities might single out the defendant's picture. But these are the kinds of overt influence that a witness can easily recount and that would serve to impeach the identification testimony. In short, there are few possibilities for unfair suggestivenessand those rather blatant and easily reconstructed. Accordingly, an accused would not be foreclosed from an effective cross-examination of an identification witness simply because his counsel was not present at the photographic display. Ash, 413 U.S. at 324-25, 93 S.Ct. at 2581-82 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also id. at 319, 93 S.Ct. at 2578 (majority opinion) (Although we do not suggest that equality of access to photographs removes all potential for abuse, it does remove any inequality in the adversary process itself and thereby fully satisfies the historical spirit of the Sixth Amendment's counsel guarantee.) (footnote omitted). We believe that this distinction between lineups and photos similarly forecloses appellants' argument in this case. With the exception of Mitchell, who attended Poole's lineup, no witnesses who made identifications based on lineup photos had previously attended the original lineup of the same defendant they identified. [24] Thus, except in the case of Mitchell, the situation was entirely comparable to the viewing of a photo array. See People v. Curtis, 113 Ill.2d 136, 100 Ill.Dec. 735, 739, 497 N.E.2d 1004, 1008 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014, 107 S.Ct. 1890, 95 L.Ed.2d 497 (1987). Any impropriety that may have occurred in the absence of counsel at the original lineups could have tainted a later photographic identification only insofar as the photos themselves may have been suggestive. These photos, however, were readily available for counsel's inspection. Counsel's absence from the lineups did not, therefore, hinder appellants from reconstructing the identification process or from making a suggestivity argument to the court; the attorneys' ability to cross-examine the witness would not have been any greater if they had been present when the lineup pictures were taken. Id. Consequently, identifications based upon the lineup photos alone did not implicate appellants' right to counsel, notwithstanding counsel's absence at the actual lineups. See id.; cf. Edwards v. Butler, 882 F.2d 160, 164 (5th Cir.1989) (right to counsel does not apply when police photograph suspect). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting identifications, whether in-court or out-of-court, by witnesses who had only seen photographs of the lineups, rather than attending the lineups themselves. See Curtis, 100 Ill.Dec. at 739, 497 N.E.2d at 1008 (no error in admission of testimony concerning identification of accused from photo of lineup, notwithstanding fact that lineup was conducted without counsel).
We turn now to the identification testimony given by those witnesses who actually attended the lineup of the person they identified, i.e., Oliphant's, Coats's, and Mitchell's identifications of Poole and McCoy's identification of Showell. The government argues that this testimony should not be suppressed, notwithstanding the absence of counsel at the lineups, because defense counsel had adequate notice of the lineups [25] and because videotaping made it possible to reconstruct the lineups at trial. [26] Furthermore, the government contends that Showell's right to counsel with respect to this case had not yet attached because at the time of her lineup she had been arraigned only in connection with another robbery and had not yet been charged in the January 25, 1990, robbery. We need not consider these arguments, however, because we conclude that, assuming that the admission of these identifications was error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Even excluding the identification testimony given by the witnesses who attended the lineup of the person they identified, the evidence against both appellants was very strong. Six other witnesses identified Poole and four other witnesses identified Showell. Since the robbery had lasted for some ten to twenty minutes, these witnesses had had ample opportunity to view their assailants. Thus, the identification testimony given by witnesses who attended the lineup of the person they identified was at most cumulative, since it merely corroborated very substantial identification evidence that was otherwise available to the jury. We note further that, well before he attended Poole's lineup, Oliphant had identified Poole on Ridge Road. Thus, even assuming that Oliphant's identifications of Poole at the lineup and thereafter were suppressible due to the absence of counsel at the lineup, Oliphant's testimony concerning his initial sighting of Poole on Ridge Road remained admissible. Finally, the government presented other evidence linking Poole and Showell to the crime and to one another. Four witnesses identified the gun found at 510 Ridge Road as resembling the gun used in the robbery. Also, a photograph recovered from 510 Ridge Road showed Poole and Showell together. In light of such overwhelming evidence, we conclude that any prejudice to appellants' rights resulting from the absence of counsel at their lineups was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Miley v. United States, 477 A.2d 720, 724 (D.C. 1984) (even in cases of alleged constitutional error, reversal of the conviction is uncalled for where the evidence against the accused was overwhelming); (David) Washington, 377 A.2d at 1350-51.