Opinion ID: 2498646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Limitation of Saroff's Testimony

Text: Landowner also argues on appeal that the trial judge placed too many restrictions on the testimony of Saroff. It is apparent from the trial transcript that landowner's strategy at trial was to admit evidence of various components or aspects of calculation of replacement cost without any expert testimony on how that calculation should be performed, leaving that task to the jury. Statements of landowner's counsel, in particular, demonstrate that he did not think his case required an independent expert appraisal witness. Rather, Saroff, as representative of the landowner, could be the only valuation witness, and he could testify like an expert and rely upon the hearsay opinions of Heavey and Larva. See, e.g., City of Wichita v. Eisenring, 269 Kan. at 782, 7 P.3d 1248 (`Information acquired from others, though generally not admissible as an independent fact, may be sufficient to qualify an expert and to supply a partial basis for his opinion.'); Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs v. Kiser Living Trust, 250 Kan. 84, 96, 825 P.2d 130 (1992) ([O]nce a witness has qualified as an expert, a court cannot regulate the factors used or the mental process by which the witness arrives at the conclusion. These matters can only be challenged by cross-examination testing the witness' credibility.). The trial judge stated that Saroff could not qualify himself as an expert and could not discuss opinions from Heavey and Larva as the basis for formation of his lay opinion; he could state the basis for his opinion, and if it happened to be reading some of [an appraisal textbook], I'm going to allow it. It is well settled a landowner is a competent witness to testify as to the value of his property. City of Wichita v. Chapman, 214 Kan. 575, 580, 521 P.2d 589 (1974) (citing City of Wichita v. May's Company, Inc., 212 Kan. 153, 155, 510 P.2d 184 [1973]; Urban Renewal Agency v. Tate, 196 Kan. 654, 414 P.2d 28 [1966]; Taylor v. State Highway Commission, 182 Kan. 397, Syl. ¶ 6, 320 P.2d 832 [1958]; Randle v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 181 Kan. 416, 420, 312 P.2d 235 [1957]; and). But [t]he qualification of a landowner to testify as to the value of his land is not dependent on a showing of a knowledgeable background. It is based on the presumption the landowner has acquired knowledge by virtue of his ownership. Lack of knowledge is subject to exposure by the condemning authority. 212 Kan. at 155, 510 P.2d 184. Landowner contends that this court held in Mooney that, [w]hen a landowner gives opinion testimony on the value of his own land, he does so in the capacity of an expert in the value of that particular property, even though he is not an expert on property values generally. As support, it states: Right after this Court mentioned the rule that a landowner is a competent witness on the value of his own land, this court went on to say: `Once a witness is qualified as an expert, the court cannot regulate the factors used by the expert or the mental process employed to reach a conclusion; those matters should be tested by cross-examination.' 283 Kan. at 619, 153 P.3d 1252. Landowner misreads this passage in Mooney. The language upon which it relies is merely a restatement of the landowners' arguments in that case, not the opinion's holding. See 283 Kan. at 619-24, 153 P.3d 1252. Mooney does not stand for the proposition that a landowner is equivalent to an appraisal expert or that he or she may parrot the opinions of experts as support for his or her fair market value. This is, in essence, what landowner sought to do here, and it was not error for the trial judge to disallow it. A landowner cannot do indirectly what he or she is unqualified to do directly. Saroff could testify, as he did, to his own opinion of fair market value and, thus, just compensation: $15 million, with $10 million for improvements on the tracts and $5 million for the land. We also note that the trial judge's restrictions did not prevent Saroff from testifying about his business relationship with Heavey and Heavey's assistance in valuing the property and about his interaction with Larva and Larva's inspection of the property. This testimony surely accomplished at least some of what landowner hoped to accomplish, burnishing Saroff's nonexpert testimony about value with an expert cloth. But Saroff was not qualified, as a lay landowner, to assemble the components of and calculate replacement cost, i.e., the cost to replace existing improvements on the land minus depreciation plus the value of the land evidenced through comparable sales. See Mooney, 283 Kan. at 622, 153 P.3d 1252. Nor was the jury, unguided by expert testimony or similarly established or recognized authority. It was landowner's burden to ensure that such expert testimony or other authority was presented, and it failed to carry it. This failure is not attributable to the trial judge's ruling limiting Saroff's testimony.