Opinion ID: 2971582
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Upshaw

Text: In a special verdict, the jury found that Upshaw committed Racketeering Act 14, an armed robbery of Blackshear in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.529. In a motion filed with the district court for a judgment of acquittal as to his substantive RICO conviction pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c), Upshaw argued that the jury’s determination that he committed Racketeering Act 14 was not supported by sufficient evidence. The district court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the determination and therefore denied Upshaw’s motion, which Upshaw appeals.4 This court reviews the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c) de novo. United States v. Al-Zubaidy, 283 F.3d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 2002). The district court’s denial must be affirmed if we determine, “after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 4 Even if there is not sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Upshaw committed Racketeering Act 14, this error would not warrant reversal of Upshaw’s substantive RICO conviction since the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Upshaw committed two other predicate acts, specifically Racketeering Acts 18A and 18B. However, since Upshaw’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the robbery of Blackshear relates to a sentencing claim presented by Upshaw, we address the substance of Upshaw’s argument. - 10 - Nos. 02-1409/1428 United States v. Upshaw & Rice beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Turner, 272 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in support of Upshaw’s conviction for Racketeering Act 14, we are mindful that a jury’s determination may be supported by sufficient evidence “even though the circumstantial evidence does not remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” United States v. Jones, 102 F.3d 804, 807 (6th Cir. 1996) (quotations omitted). Findings of fact made in conjunction with the denial of a Rule 29(c) motion are reviewed only for clear error. Al-Zubaidy, 283 F.3d at 808. The elements of armed robbery under Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.529 are: “(1) an assault, (2) a felonious taking of property from the victim’s presence or person, and (3) a perpetrator armed with a weapon.” People v. Harding, 506 N.W.2d 482, 500 (Mich. 1993). An assault “is made out from either an attempt to commit a battery or an unlawful act which places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.” People v. Reeves, 580 N.W.2d 433, 435 (Mich. 1998) (quotation omitted). Additionally, the “assault or putting in fear underlying the robbery must occur before or contemporaneously with the felonious taking.” People v. Randolph, 648 N.W.2d 164, 174 (Mich. 2002). As for the requirement that the property be taken in the victim’s presence, “[a] thing is in the presence of a person, in respect to robbery, which is within his reach, inspection, observation or control, that he could, if not overcome by violence or prevented by fear, retain his possession of it.” People v. Raper, 563 N.W.2d 709, 712 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (quotation omitted). Upshaw first argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to demonstrate that he committed assault in conjunction with the taking of the gun. The issue, then, is whether the evidence supports a finding that Officer Upshaw attempted to commit a battery or committed an - 11 - Nos. 02-1409/1428 United States v. Upshaw & Rice unlawful act that placed Blackshear in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery prior to taking the gun. A reasonable juror could have concluded that Upshaw committed an unlawful act by stopping Blackshear. A temporary stop and detention of a vehicle and its passengers can constitute an unlawful act in violation of the Fourth Amendment if the stop is unreasonable under the circumstances. See United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 592 (6th Cir. 2003). Generally, a stop is unreasonable if the police do not have probable cause for believing that a traffic violation has occurred. See id. Whether an officer had probable cause to stop a vehicle depends on what the officer knew at the time of the stop, not what he discovers after the stop. See United States v. Bradshaw, 102 F.3d 204, 210 (6th Cir. 1996). In an activity log, Officer Upshaw stated that he stopped Blackshear for a seatbelt violation but only warned him of the violation. However, Terry testified that he never heard Officer Upshaw or Officer Cook mention seat belts during the stop and confirmed that no citation was issued. A reasonable juror could conclude from this evidence that Officer Upshaw did not have probable cause to believe Blackshear or his passengers were not wearing seatbelts at the time of the stop and that Upshaw developed this justification after the stop. In other words, a reasonable juror could have concluded that the stop was unlawful because it was not supported by probable cause at the time it was made. A reasonable juror also could have concluded that this act created in Blackshear an apprehension of an immediate battery. Terry testified at trial that Blackshear “was in sort of a panic” upon seeing the police car. He also testified that Blackshear exclaimed at that point, “[L]ook - 12 - Nos. 02-1409/1428 United States v. Upshaw & Rice straight ahead because that’s Upshaw and Rice and I ain’t paid them,” which suggests that Blackshear feared some form of retribution from Upshaw. Finally, a reasonable juror could have concluded that this apprehension was reasonable in light of Upshaw’s prior threats. In June of 1997, Upshaw told Johnson to issue the following threat to Blackshear: “[W]hen you see [Blackshear] . . . tell him we’re going to fuck him up.” The district court determined that Johnson informed Blackshear of this comment, a finding which is not clearly erroneous, particularly considering that Blackshear returned to 5976 soon after Officer Upshaw left. A reasonable juror could have concluded that Blackshear regarded this threat as credible considering that, according to Johnson, upon returning to 5976, Blackshear found that Johnson had been assaulted by Officer Upshaw. A few weeks later, Officer Upshaw pulled over a car being driven by Blackshear. Blackshear may reasonably have apprehended that the stop was the first step in effectuating the prior threat. As the district court noted, “[a]lthough a common traffic stop, taken alone, would not seem to a reasonable person as dangerous or threatening, when it is preceded by specifically intimidating threats, as here, the court finds that what appears to the world as an ordinary police-citizen encounter may be in reality, and here was, something more sinister.” Upshaw contends that the threat issued to Blackshear via Johnson cannot constitute assault because that threat did not create in Blackshear a fear of immediate battery. Upshaw’s argument is misplaced. The unlawful act giving rise to the fear of immediate battery was not the threat but Upshaw’s stop of Blackshear’s car. This act reasonably gave rise to this fear because Blackshear was cognizant that Upshaw intended to “fuck him up” upon finding him. - 13 - Nos. 02-1409/1428 United States v. Upshaw & Rice In sum, construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the government and aware of the fact that circumstantial evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except guilt, we find a reasonable trier of fact could have found that Officer Upshaw committed an unlawful act that placed Blackshear in reasonable apprehension of immediate battery prior to taking the gun from his car, which constitutes assault. Reeves, 580 N.W.2d at 435. With respect to whether Upshaw took the gun in Blackshear’s presence, Upshaw argues that Blackshear was in the police car with Officer Cook when he actually took the gun from the glove box and that, consequently, he did not take the gun in Blackshear’s presence. Upshaw interprets the presence requirement of Michigan’s robbery statute too literally. Whether a taking occurs in the presence of a person for robbery purposes “depends on the effect of violence or fear on that person’s ability to control his possession of the [object in question] at the time of its taking.” People v. Green, 580 N.W.2d 444, 450 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).5 If a person loses his control over an object as an effect of the fear of an immediate battery instilled in him by an assailant, that object has been taken from his presence. See id.; accord Raper, 563 N.W.2d at 712-13; see also People v. Colton, No. 203518, 1999 WL 33454004, at  (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 1999) (upholding armed robbery conviction where evidence supported finding that “violence or the threat of violence was necessary to sever” the victim’s control over the stolen object); People v. Wiley, 315 N.W.2d 540, 541 (Mich. 5 Although Green technically describes the presence requirement with respect to Michigan’s carjacking statute, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.529a, its discussion of the issue controls here because Michigan courts expressly construe the presence requirement for carjacking and robbery, both armed and unarmed, identically. See Green, 580 N.W.2d at 450; Raper, 563 N.W.2d at 712. - 14 - Nos. 02-1409/1428 United States v. Upshaw & Rice Ct. App. 1981) (“There is no requirement that the [object] taken be within a victim’s presence if it is within his control and he lost control because of the violence of, or his fear of, the defendant.”). The case of People v. Spry, 254 N.W.2d 782 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977), is particularly instructive for our purposes. In Spry, a woman was forcibly removed from her car by three assailants. Id. at 783. Two of the assailants took the victim to their own car and attempted to rape her. Id. In the meantime, the third assailant – Robert Spry – entered the victim’s car and took money from her purse. Id. For this act, Spry was charged with unarmed robbery, to which he pled guilty. Id. at 784. Spry, however, appealed the sufficiency of the factual basis for this plea. Id. He argued that, since the victim was in another car with the two other assailants at the time he took money from the purse in the victim’s car, the evidence was insufficient to show that he took the money in the victim’s presence. See id. at 786-87. The Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed. It found that the evidence did support such a finding because, had the victim not been forcibly removed from her car and placed in the assailants’ car, she would have retained control over the money. Id. at 787. The logic of Spry applies here. The only real distinction between Spry and the case sub judice is that the assailants in Spry removed the victim from her car by force, whereas Upshaw was able to extract Blackshear from his car by instilling in him a fear of an immediate battery. However, such a distinction is of no consequence since it is clear that, under Michigan law, the assault element of robbery can be accomplished either by force or by putting the victim in fear of an immediate battery. Reeves, 580 N.W.2d at 435. Although the gun may not have been within Blackshear’s reach, inspection, or observation at the time it was taken, it was within his control until Officers - 15 - Nos. 02-1409/1428 United States v. Upshaw & Rice Upshaw and Cook put him in fear of an immediate battery by unlawfully stopping him and removing him from his car. In other words, construed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence supports a finding that Officer Upshaw took the gun in Blackshear’s presence because a reasonable juror could have concluded that Blackshear lost control of the gun as a result of the fear instilled in him by Officers Upshaw and Cook and that he could have maintained possession of the gun but for this fear.