Opinion ID: 711122
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Forfeiture as Punishment

Text: 19 On appeal, the government contends that the administrative forfeiture in this case did not implicate double jeopardy because it was not an overwhelmingly disproportionate sanction and therefore did not constitute punishment for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Idowu counters that our proportionality test, as set forth in United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Levin v. United States, 506 U.S. 815, 113 S.Ct. 55, 121 L.Ed.2d 24 (1992), is no longer the appropriate test for determining whether a civil forfeiture may be classified as punishment, and that under the Supreme Court's holding in Austin v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993), all civil forfeiture constitutes punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Both arguments overly simplify a complex and confused question. 20 In Halper, the Supreme Court held that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term. 490 U.S. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-02 (emphasis supplied). We considered Halper's impact on civil forfeiture in 38 Whalers Cove Drive, where we held that [civil forfeitures] that are overwhelmingly disproportionate to the value of the offense, must be classified as punishment unless the forfeitures are shown to serve articulated, legitimate civil purposes. 954 F.2d at 35. We went on to note that legitimate civil purposes for forfeiture include the removal of instrumentalities of crime from general circulation and the compensation of the government's investigation and enforcement expenditures, in addition to any damages the government may suffer directly as a result of criminal acts. Id. at 35-36. 21 In Austin, the Supreme Court held that civil forfeitures pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Secs. 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) constituted punishment for the purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 5 --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2812. In that case, the Court considered whether the forfeiture statutes at issue were remedial or punitive, rather than whether the forfeiture of the property involved in the case was remedial or punitive. In concluding that forfeitures pursuant to these particular statutes were not solely remedial--and therefore under Halper must be considered punitive--the Court considered three factors: (1) the historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment; (2) the focus of the statutes on the culpability of the owner; and (3) evidence, such as legislative history, that Congress understood these provisions as serving to deter and to punish. 6 Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2812. 22 Our court has not yet applied the Austin approach to double jeopardy cases. In United States v. United States Currency in the Amount of $145,139.00, 18 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Etim v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 72, 130 L.Ed.2d 27 (1994), a panel of this court applied Whalers Cove, without citing Austin, noting that the forfeiture of currency employed as an instrumentality of the crime was not punitive under Halper. In an even more recent opinion, another panel of our court considered, without deciding, whether the Supreme Court in Austin intended to supersede the case-by-case methodology of Halper and Whalers Cove for determining whether forfeiture constitutes punishment for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. United States v. All Assets of G.P.S. Automotive, 66 F.3d 483, 491 (2d Cir.1995). 23 Four other circuits that have considered this question have concluded that the only fair reading of the Court's decision in Austin is that it resolves the 'punishment' issue with respect to forfeiture cases for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause as well as the Excessive Fines Clause. United States v. $405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir.1994), amended in part on denial of rehearing, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir.1995), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 762, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (1996); see United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213, 1216 (3d Cir.1995) (quoting $405,089.23 United States Currency with approval), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3318 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1995) (No. 95-630); United States v. Perez, 70 F.3d 345, 348-49 (5th Cir.1995) (applying Austin approach to civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 881(a)(4) for purposes of double jeopardy analysis); United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir.1995) ([U]nder Halper and Austin, any civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 881(a)(7) constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes.), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 762, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (1996); cf. United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 574, 130 L.Ed.2d 490 (1994) (finding Austin approach inapplicable to forfeiture of drug proceeds under Sec. 881(a)(6), 7 because such proceeds can be said to be roughly proportion[ate] to the costs incurred by the government and society as a result of the crimes). Although it is not clear that the Supreme Court intended Austin to define punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis, we see no principled basis for distinguishing between punishment in the context of the Excessive Fines Clause and punishment in the context of the Double Jeopardy Clause. If Idowu's claim involved judicial forfeiture, the district court might have been required to apply the Austin analysis to the relevant forfeiture statutes to determine whether Iodwu had twice been placed in jeopardy. Because we conclude that administrative forfeiture of property does not constitute punishment, Idowu's claim fails in any event.