Opinion ID: 77316
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mandatory Nature of the Remedy

Text: 63 The Act instructs that, upon a finding of a pattern or practice of violations, a court shall order a permanent injunction barring the secondary transmission by the satellite carrier, for private home viewing, of the primary transmissions of any primary network station affiliated with the same network. 17 U.S.C. § 119(a)(7)(B)(i) (emphasis added). Despite the facially mandatory nature of the provision, EchoStar argues that the district court had discretion to issue the injunction, and properly exercised that discretion in not issuing the injunction in this case. In making this argument, EchoStar relies primarily on Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 64 S.Ct. 587, 88 L.Ed. 754 (1944), for the proposition that, if Congress is going to remove courts' traditional equitable discretion, an unequivocal statement of its purpose would have been made. 321 U.S. at 329, 64 S.Ct. at 591; see also id. at 330, 64 S.Ct. at 592 (We do not believe that such a major departure from that long tradition as is here proposed should be lightly implied.). We believe there are important differences between the statute in Hecht and the one before us that lead us to conclude that Congress removed courts' discretion upon a finding of a pattern or practice of violations. 64 The Hecht Court interpreted section 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., (repealed 1956), which provided that, upon finding of certain conditions, a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order shall be granted without bond. The Court found statutory language (or other order) and legislative history suggesting that Congress had not intended to remove courts' traditional equitable discretion. 321 U.S. at 328-29, 64 S.Ct. at 591. Unlike Hecht here there is no ambiguous statutory language in the SHVA and we are unaware of any legislative history that would indicate that the remedial measure chosen by Congress is anything but mandatory. Cf. H.R.Rep. No. 106-464, at 94 (1999) (Conf.Rep.) (The section 122 license contains remedial provisions parallel to those of Section 119, including a `pattern or practice' provision that requires termination of the Section 122 statutory license as to a particular satellite carrier if it engages in certain abuses of the license. (emphasis added)). Moreover, section 119(a)(7)(B)(i) itself contemplates both mandatory and discretionary remedies: Upon the same finding of a pattern or practice, the court shall order a permanent injunction whereas the court may order statutory damages. 17 U.S.C. § 119(a)(7)(B)(i) (emphasis added). Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that Congress understood what it was doing when it instructed courts to provide a specific remedy and permitted courts to provide another. Accordingly, we find that Congress unequivocally stated a purpose to restrict the courts' traditional equitable authority upon a finding of a pattern or practice. Accord ABC, Inc. 184 F.3d at 354-55. 32 Because, as discussed, we come to the unavoidable conclusion that EchoStar engaged in a pattern or practice of SHVA violations, we hold that the district court is required to issue a nationwide permanent injunction barring the provision of distant network programming pursuant to the Act's statutory license.