Opinion ID: 6348792
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre-Plea Investigation of Suppressor

Text: Mr. Seamster contends counsel provided ineffective assistance by not adequately investigating whether the suppressor was a silencer that could be attached to a firearm and needed to be registered for purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Mr. Seamster further contends that had counsel investigated the matter and retained an expert, counsel would have learned the suppressor was a “toy barrel suppressor for toy guns” and had never been used on a firearm. Opening Br. at 14. This, Mr. Seamster argues, would have given counsel a basis for moving to dismiss the unregistered silencer charge. As part of his representation, “counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 6 Appellate Case: 22-4003 Document: 010110695289 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 Page: 7 unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. “[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Id. at 690–91. “In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Id. at 691. Mr. Seamster fails to demonstrate that the district court’s rejection of this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is debatable or wrong. Counsel for Mr. Seamster acknowledges he could have “dug deeper into whether the ‘toy barrel suppressor’ was a silencer.” ROA Vol. 2 at 74. But, after determining it was not obvious that the suppressor did not qualify as a silencer that needed to be registered, counsel made a strategic decision not to investigate the matter further because, in his professional judgment, pleading to the unregistered silencer charge in exchange for dismissal of the other charges would benefit Mr. Seamster at sentencing. Meanwhile, as counsel noted in his declaration, investigating the issue further might have (1) resulted in the elimination of a factual basis for a guilty plea to the unregistered silencer charge, leaving Mr. Seamster exposed to having to plead guilty to or being convicted on the methamphetamine charge and/or the firearms charge,4 and (2) jeopardized the prosecutor’s willingness to offer a 4 Neither in his § 2255 motion to the district court nor in his COA application to us does Mr. Seamster offer a plausible defense to the firearms charge or the methamphetamine charge. In fact, at sentencing, Mr. Seamster admitted the methamphetamine was his and that the firearms were on his property and he had access to them. Further, as counsel foresaw, the unregistered silencer charge was at least less 7 Appellate Case: 22-4003 Document: 010110695289 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 Page: 8 favorable plea agreement. Additionally, counsel was able to argue at sentencing that the potential “toy” nature of the suppressor mitigated the offense. And where the district court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 18 months, it appears counsel’s strategy proved effective. Thus, given the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for counsel to not further investigate whether the suppressor was a silencer that needed to be registered. Accordingly, Mr. Seamster has not presented an argument causing debate regarding the district court’s conclusion that counsel did not perform deficiently.5 Therefore, Mr. Seamster has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, and we deny a COA on this issue.