Opinion ID: 2830302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Request to Hold the Appeal in Abeyance

Text: In his reply brief and a letter submitted to this Court on April 10, 2015, Taylor urged this Court to hold his appeal in abeyance in light of the Supreme Court’s February 18, 2015 request in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 939 (2015) for parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the following question: “Whether the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(2)(B)(ii),3 is unconstitutionally vague.” On June 26, 2015, after the completion of oral arguments in this case, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Johnson, holding that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, and, thus, that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause violates the Constitution’s guarantee of due process. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). The Supreme Court’s decision, however, did “not call into question application of the [ACCA] to the four enumerated offenses [preceding the residual clause], or the remainder of the Act’s definition of a violent felony.” Id. at 2563. Taylor submits that his two prior convictions for simple robbery in Tennessee, and his conviction for pre-1989 third degree burglary in Tennessee, have been found by this Court to be 3 “Under the ACCA, a defendant who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and has three prior convictions for serious drug offenses or violent felonies must receive a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence.” United States v. Johnson, 707 F.3d 655, 658 (6th Cir.2013) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)). The ACCA defines “violent felony” as: any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult, that— (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another[.] 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). We refer to § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) as the “use of physical force” clause and the italicized portion of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) following the enumerated offenses as the “residual clause.” See United States v. Mitchell, 743 F.3d 1054, 1058 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 158, 190 L. Ed. 2d 115 (2014). No. 14-6048 United States v. Taylor Page 20 ACCA predicate offenses under the residual clause.4 Thus, he argued that the then-pending Supreme Court decision in Johnson v. United States gave this Court good reason to hold his appeal in abeyance. Now that the Supreme Court has indeed found the residual clause to be unconstitutionally vague, we must consider what effect, if any, that change in the law has on Taylor’s upward enhancement pursuant to the ACCA. Taylor did not raise on direct appeal any objections to his classification as an armed career criminal under the ACCA. He did, however, raise some objections to his classification as an armed career criminal in its Position Paper in response to the PSR. Specifically, Taylor objected to the application of his two Tennessee simple robbery convictions as qualifying convictions for ACCA purposes, arguing that the Tennessee statute was non-generic, overly broad, and indivisible, in that it could be violated simply by placing a person in fear, which might not necessarily entail violence.5 As Taylor acknowledged, this argument has been foreclosed by this Court in United States v. Mitchell, which is why he did not raise it on appeal. 743 F.3d 1054 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 158, 190 L. Ed. 2d 115 (2014). Further, Taylor states that he never raised the argument that the ACCA’s residual clause was void for vagueness, and thus could not form the basis for a finding that Tennessee simple robbery is a violent felony under the ACCA, because that argument was foreclosed in United States v. Taylor, 696 F.3d 628, 633 (6th Cir. 2012). He argues, now, that a holding in Johnson finding the residual clause unconstitutionally vague might entail that Tennessee simple robbery no longer qualifies as a predicate offense under the ACCA. We conclude that even though the Supreme Court struck down the residual clause, our holding in Mitchell stands. 4 The PSR includes the following four, prior convictions for violent felonies which warrant Taylor’s status as an Armed Career Criminal: The PSR includes the following four, prior convictions for violent felonies which qualify Taylor for his status as an armed career criminal under the ACCA: 1987 conviction for armed third degree burglary in Tennessee, 1992 conviction for robbery in Tennessee, 1996 conviction for robbery in Tennessee, and 2002 conviction for burglary in the first degree in Kentucky. In Taylor’s reply brief, he argues that his two prior convictions for simply robbery in Tennessee are not crimes of violence. In his objections to the PSR, he argues that one conviction for simple robbery in Tennessee, and one conviction for first degree burglary in Kentucky, are not crimes of violence. Then, in a letter submitted pursuant to FRAP 28(j), he states that his sentence should not have been enhanced under the ACCA based upon convictions for simply robbery under Tennessee law and Tennessee’s third degree robbery statute in 1982. This Court will address all four convictions. 5 “In 1988, Tennessee law defined robbery as ‘the felonious and forcible taking from the person of another, goods or money of any value, by violence or putting the person in fear.’ Tenn. Code Ann. § 39–2–501(a) (1982) (repealed). The version in effect in 2003 differed only slightly, defining robbery as the ‘intentional or knowing theft of property from the person of another by violence or putting the person in fear.’ Tenn. Code Ann. § 39–13–401.” Mitchell, 743 F.3d at 1058. No. 14-6048 United States v. Taylor Page 21 In Mitchell, this Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the Tennessee robbery statute is indivisible and overly broad, finding, instead, that it was divisible and not overly broad, because the language “ ‘by violence . . . or putting in fear,’ enunciate two alternative elements.” Id. at 1063-66. Thus, Taylor’s argument that the Tennessee robbery statute is non-generic, overly broad, and indivisible, has been entirely foreclosed by Mitchell. Further, this inquiry is not reopened by the unrelated holding under Johnson that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, as the two holdings have nothing to do with one another. The Mitchell Court concluded, further, that: [a]lthough the Tennessee robbery statutes are divisible, we need not defer to the modified categorical approach to determine which alternative formed the basis of Mitchell’s prior conviction. As already discussed, neither alternative element departs from the definitions provided in the ‘use of physical force’ clause or the residual clause. Id. at 1066. Indeed, earlier in the decision, the Mitchell Court had concluded that under the categorical approach, simple robbery in Tennessee was a violent felony under the “use of physical force clause” and the residual clause. In terms of the “use of physical force clause,” the Court found that “the commission of a robbery through fear, which in Tennessee reduces to the fear of bodily injury from physical force offered or impending, directly corresponds to § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)’s ‘use ... or threatened use of physical force.’” Id. at 1059. In terms of the residual clause, under the categorical approach, the Court found that robbery in Tennessee presented a risk of physical injury, as it was a lesser included offense than larceny, which this Court had already concluded posed a serious risk of injury to others. Id. at 1060. Further, the Court found that robbery required intentional conduct, and compared favorably with the offense of generic burglary in the enumerated clause, or first clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Id. at 1062. Thus, the Mitchell Court found that Tennessee simple robbery is a violent crime under both the “use of physical force clause” and the residual clause. The crime need only qualify as a violent felony under one of the clauses. Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson leaves unaffected this Court’s determination that simple robbery in Tennessee is a predicate offense under “the use of physical force” clause. No. 14-6048 United States v. Taylor Page 22 Next, this Court will determine whether the holding in Johnson affects whether Taylor’s 2002 conviction for first degree burglary in Kentucky qualifies as a predicate violent felony under the ACCA. It does not. In U.S. v. Jenkins, this Court found that second degree burglary in Kentucky6 is a violent felony under the enumerated offenses clause in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), and, thus, found it did not need to rely on the residual clause to determine if second degree burglary was a predicate offense. 528 F. App’x 483, 484-85 (6th Cir.) cert. denied sub nom. Jahns v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 455, 187 L. Ed. 2d 304 (2013) and cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 488, 187 L. Ed. 2d 330 (2013). Thus, first degree burglary7, which encompasses the same definition as second degree burglary, but is enhanced because the offender is armed, injures another, or threatens to use a dangerous instrument against another, is a predicate offense under the ACCA. In sum, the holding in Johnson does not disrupt the conclusion, pursuant to Jenkins, that first degree burglary in Kentucky is a predicate offense under the “enumerated offenses” clause of the ACCA. Finally, this Court will determine whether Johnson affects whether Taylor’s 1987 conviction for third degree burglary in Tennessee qualifies as a predicate violent felony under the ACCA. We are not required to do so, however, since it has already been determined, supra, that Taylor has three predicate offenses for ACCA purposes which Johnson does not affect. Taylor argues that in United States v. Bureau, 52 F.3d 584, 591 (6th Cir. 1995), this Court determined that pre-1989 third degree burglary in Tennessee8 is a violent felony under the residual clause. That case is inapposite, however, because it determined that attempted pre-1989 third degree burglary in Tennessee was a violent felony under the residual clause. 6 “A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when, with the intent to commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 511.030. 7 “(1) A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when, with the intent to commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building, and when in effecting entry or while in the building or in the immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime: (a) Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or (b) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or (c) Uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument against any person who is not a participant in the crime.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 511.020. 8 Pre-1989, burglary in the third-degree in Tennessee was defined as: “the breaking and entering into a business house, outhouse, or any other house of another, other than a dwelling house, with the intent to commit a felony.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-904. No. 14-6048 United States v. Taylor Page 23 In United States v. Caruthers, this Court found that third degree burglary under the pre1989 Tennessee statute was “generic” burglary under the ACCA’s enumerated clause because: (1) the case law showed that the statute did in fact require unlawful entry; and, (2) so long as the indictment shows that the defendant broke and entered into an actual building, the crime committed is a generic burglary under the ACCA. 458 F.3d 459, 474-76 (6th Cir. 2006). In the case sub judice, the PSR indicates that Taylor’s 1982 conviction for burglary in the third degree resulted from him breaking into a store. Under Caruthers, therefore, Taylor’s 1987 conviction qualifies as a generic burglary under the “enumerated offenses” clause. Accordingly, Johnson leaves unaffected Taylor’s ACCA enhancement based on his 1987 conviction for burglary in the third degree under Tennessee law.