Opinion ID: 71871
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The ADA Retaliatory Discharge Claim

Text: 42 The ADA also provides that no person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or because such individual made a charge ... under [the ADA]. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). This provision creates a prohibition on retaliation under the ADA that is similar to Title VII's prohibition on retaliation. Accordingly, we assess ADA retaliation claims under the same framework we employ for retaliation claims arising under Title VII. McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1075-77 (11th Cir.1996) (relying on Title VII jurisprudence to interpret meaning of ADA provisions in a retaliation case), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1819, 137 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1997). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) statutorily protected expression; (2) adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the protected expression and the adverse action. See Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1163 (11th Cir.1993) (explaining requirements to show retaliation in the Title VII context). Once a prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts to the defendant employer to come forward with legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its actions that negate the inference of retaliation. See Goldsmith, 996 F.2d at 1163. The plaintiff must then demonstrate that it will be able to establish at trial that the employer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons are a pretextual ruse designed to mask retaliation. Cf. Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436, 440 (11th Cir.1996). 43 In this case, the district court found that Stewart established a prima facie case, but failed to rebut Happy Herman's assertion that it legitimately fired Stewart for insubordination. We agree that Stewart failed to rebut Happy Herman's non-discriminatory explanation for discharging her. 44 Stewart argues that the district court erred in two respects. First, she contends that an inference of retaliation arises in this case because of the timing of her discharge and because Happy Herman's provided varying reasons for her termination. This claim is meritless. It is undisputed that the numerous acts of alleged insubordination in this case occurred around the same time period as Stewart's request for accommodations. Indeed, Stewart admits doing most of the acts at issue. No inference of retaliation based on suspect timing arises under these particular circumstances. Cf. Severino v. North Fort Myers Fire Control Dist., 935 F.2d 1179, 1183( 11th Cir.1991) (finding that the Rehabilitation Act does not subject employers to liability for maintaining appropriate discipline in the workplace even when the discipline is directed at a handicapped individual). We are also unpersuaded that Stewart could prevail before a jury on her pretext claim based on the alleged varying explanations. The discharge notice in this case stated only that Stewart was discharged for insubordination. Happy Herman's later provided different examples of Stewart's alleged insubordination to the Georgia Unemployment Board and the National Labor Relations Board. The explanation that Happy Herman's proffered, though, remained unvarying: it discharged Stewart for insubordination. Under these circumstances no question of pretext arises. See Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1534-35 (11th Cir.1997) (employer entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the reasons for the employer's action remain unrebutted). 45 Stewart's second contention is that the district court overlooked other adverse acts which occurred prior to her discharge, such as Happy Herman's managers denying Stewart the right to take accrued vacation time to extend her breaks. We agree that the district court did not address these alleged acts, but find that Stewart cannot rely on the district court's oversight to defeat the grant of summary judgment in this case. In our view, the acts Stewart describes relate directly to her reasonable accommodation discrimination claim, not her retaliation claim, and accordingly provide no basis for denying summary judgment on this issue.