Opinion ID: 2622141
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged Unconstitutionality of Lying-in-wait Special-circumstance Instruction

Text: Defendant contends the lying-in-wait special-circumstance instruction was confusing and constitutionally flawed in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and California Constitution article I, section 16. [12] In particular, he contends that [i]f the temporal element is ... equivalent to that of first-degree murder, then the statute loses all claim to performing a rational narrowing function. It is not clear whether he means first degree murder on a theory of premeditation and deliberation, or lying in wait, but in either case the claim fails. In distinction with premeditated first degree murder, the lying-in-wait special circumstance requires a physical concealment or concealment of purpose and a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage. (Section 190.2, former subd. (a)(15); Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 554-555, 557, 257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244.) Thus, any overlap between the premeditation element of first degree murder and the durational element of the lying in wait special circumstance does not undermine the narrowing function of the special circumstance. ( Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 434, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992.) Moreover, contrary to Justice Moreno's concurring and dissenting opinion, concealment of purpose inhibits detection, defeats self-defense, and may betray at least some level of trust, making it more blameworthy than premeditated murder that does not involve surprise. (See Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 159, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357 [poison murder]; cone. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J, post, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 231-232,158 P.3d at p. 793.) A similar narrowing distinction is discernible between the lying-in-wait special circumstance and lying-in-wait murder because the former requires an intent to kill, while the latter does not. ( Ceja, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1140, fn. 2, 17 Cal. Rptr.2d 375, 847 P.2d 55; Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 448, 285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273.) Thus, any overlap between the elements of lying in wait in both contexts does not undermine the narrowing function of the special circumstance. (See Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 434, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992; see also Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 158-159, 109 Cal. Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357.) Defendant further contends that [i]f the temporal element is ... equivalent to that of first degree murder, the requirement of a `substantial period of watching and waiting is a confusing, contradictory and unnecessary addition to the instruction, making the instruction incorrect on a material point, and results in the concept of lying in wait being defined in the instruction in materially different ways. We disagree with these assertions, and conclude the instruction is internally consistent. The instruction requires a period of time long enough to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation. (See ante, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 213, fn. 10, 158 P.3d at p. 777, fn. 10.) This formulation describes the durational requirement of the special circumstance, which is demonstrated by a substantial period of watching and waiting during which the defendant is physically concealed or conceals his purpose.