Opinion ID: 1454621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Prosecution Examination of Defense Witnesses

Text: (49) Defendant charges the prosecutor with prejudicial misconduct in examining defense witnesses about what he maintains were inadmissible matters. As to the first of these matters  a question directed to defendant's expert, a former San Quentin warden, as to whether he had spoken to the victims of the inmates he referred to in his testimony  defendant waived any alleged error by failing to object. (Evid. Code, § 353; People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 547-548 [262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129]; People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 762.) The same is true of defendant's challenges to the prosecutor's questions to the same witness about the murder rate in prison and instances involving the murders of guards and inmates by prisoners. Defense counsel did object to the following question directed to Reverend Eshelman, a psychologist and former prison chaplain called as an expert by the defense: In your opinion, as Mr. Morris sits here today, is he a dangerous man? The objection was sustained and the prosecutor dropped the line of inquiry. In view of Eshelman's direct testimony, there was no misconduct. Eshelman offered his opinion, based on his training as a psychologist and his more than 20 years as a prison chaplain, that defendant was a sensitive and personable man who had a proven ability to get along and adapt in a prison environment. According to Eshelman, defendant had participated in prison chapel programs, was one of the highest producers in prison industries, and was cooperative and pleasant. He compared defendant favorably to life sentence prisoners he had known who had made a positive contribution to prison life. While the prosecution is prohibited from offering expert testimony predicting future dangerousness in its case-in-chief ( Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 257), it may explore the issue on cross-examination or in rebuttal if defendant offers expert testimony predicting good prison behavior in the future. ( People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1211; People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 150 [255 Cal. Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32].) As we said in Gates : If the defense chooses to raise the subject, it cannot expect immunity from cross-examination on it. (43 Cal.3d at p. 1211.) As in Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1168, the prosecutor's question was a permissible attempt to challenge defense expert evidence. [16] Moreover, we note that the question was an isolated one that does not support an inference of prejudice and that any conceivable prejudice could have been cured by a timely admonition, which was not requested by the defense. (E.g., People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1089-1090 [248 Cal. Rptr. 510, 755 P.2d 960]; People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 649-650 [244 Cal. Rptr. 181, 749 P.2d 836].) In sum, we find no misconduct in the prosecutor's examination of defense expert witnesses that would justify a reversal.