Opinion ID: 1348729
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Temporary partial disability benefitstemporary second job and wage collective bargaining agreement

Text: Employee was totally incapacitated until May 1, 1989, at which time he returned to work at Morrell's, doing his present light duty work. It was not until January 24, 1990, that he received a disability rating from Dr. Cass. Department awarded him temporary partial disability benefits for this period of time per the provisions of SDCL 62-4-5. This benefit was based on the difference between his combined average weekly pre-injury earnings from both jobs and the amount he was actually earning at Morrell's upon his return. Circuit court reversed Department's award concluding that, although Employee did experience an actual reduction in earnings after he returned to work, this reduction was not the result of the injury Employee sustained. Employee appeals this conclusion. SDCL 62-4-5 provides for temporary partial disability benefits. It provides: If, after an injury has been sustained, the employee as a result thereof becomes partially incapacitated from pursuing his usual and customary line of employment, or if he has been released by his physician from temporary total disability and has not been given a rating to which § 62-4-6 would apply, he shall receive compensation, subject to the limitations as to maximum amounts fixed in § 62-4-3, equal to one-half of the difference between the average amount which he earned before the accident, and the average amount which he is earning or is able to earn in some suitable employment or business after the accident. Under this statute the employee can receive temporary partial benefits by establishing: 1. That he is partially incapacitated from pursuing his usual and customary line of employment due to his work related injury; or 2. That he has been released by his physician from temporary total disability and has not yet been given a permanent partial disability; and 3. That his present average earned income or that amount he is capable of earning at some suitable employment or business is less than what his average earned income was prior to his disability. If the employee makes his requisite showing, then he will receive the difference between his pre- and post-injury average earning amounts, subject to the limitations set forth in SDCL 62-4-3. In this case circuit court reversed the Department's award of temporary partial benefits for two reasons. First, that Employee's pre-injury earnings were artificially high because of an unusual situation where, for six weeks prior to the injury, Employee was temporarily performing two full-time jobs only to accommodate Safety Kleen. Circuit court reasoned that Employee's earnings from both jobs were not his true average earnings because, when the strike ended and he returned work at Morrell, he never intended to remain at Safety Kleen; rather, he was only going to remain until a replacement worker could be found. Second, circuit court found that Employee's post-injury wages at Morrell were reduced for economic reasons unrelated to Employee's injury. Employee's pre-injury wage rate of $9.75 an hour was reduced to $8.00 an hour due to an implemented contract offer Morrell made to its Union. Since Employee's post-injury wages at Morrell were the same that he would have received if he had not been injured, circuit court concluded that there was no nexus between Employee's reduced wages at Morrell and his injury. Circuit court went on to say that an award of temporary partial disability benefits to Employee, without any causal connection between Employee's injury and the difference between the pre- and post-injury wages, would bestow upon him a benefit which was not intended by SDCL 62-4-5. SDCL 62-1-1(7) defines the time periods covered by temporary partial and total disabilities as the time beginning on the date of injury, subject to the limitations set forth in § 62-4-2, and continuing until the employee attains complete recovery or until a specific loss becomes ascertainable, whichever comes first. SDCL 62-4-3 is the statute which provides for temporary total disability compensation. This statute sets forth a rate by which the employee's disability payments are to be determined. This rate, subject to the limitations set forth in the statute, is based on the average weekly wage the employee was earning at the time of his injury. See SDCL 62-1-1(1) for a definition of average weekly wage and SDCL 62-1-1(3) for a definition of earnings. Once the rate is established by SDCL 62-4-3 and its implementing statutes, that rate is used for computing benefit payments made during a period of rehabilitation under SDCL 62-4-5.1, permanent partial disability benefit payments under SDCL 62-4-6, permanent total disability benefit payments under SDCL 62-4-7, and death benefits payable to the employee's heirs under SDCL 62-4-12 et seq. It is interesting to note that the Department used Employee's average weekly earnings from both of his pre-injury jobs for the purpose of establishing Employee's compensation rate. Department then used this rate in setting Employee's temporary total disability benefits and his permanent partial disability benefits. Employers have not appealed this rate-basis computation. We fail to see why temporary partial disability payments should be considered any differently. Our statutory scheme does not differentiate between injuries an employee experiences the first day on his job or the last day on his job; nor does it differentiate between injuries incurred by full-time employees versus temporarily-employed employees. In our opinion circuit court created a temporary second job exception to SDCL 62-4-5 for computing pre-injury earnings. We do not see where this exception is either expressed or implied in our statute. When we are called upon to interpret the meaning of our worker's compensation statutes, we must keep in mind the following principles. One, [p]roceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Law ... are purely statutory, and the rights of the parties and the manner of procedure under the law must be determined by its provisions. Chittenden v. Jarvis, 68 S.D. 5, 8, 297 N.W. 787, 788 (1941). Two, if the language of a statute is clear, we must assume that the legislature meant what the statute says and we must, therefore, give its words and phrases a plain meaning and effect. Dubbelde v. John Morrell & Co., 473 N.W.2d 500 (S.D. 1991). And three, if the statute has an ambiguity, it should then be liberally construed in favor of injured employees. Mills v. Spink Elec. Co-op., 442 N.W.2d 243 (S.D.1989). While the facts of this case are unique since Employee's injury is attributable to both of his full-time jobs, it is up to the legislature to create any exception and not for this Court. In addition, Department found in finding of fact XIII that: Since his injury, [Employee] has been and will continue to be unable to perform work at Safety Kleen because there is no light-duty work available, and his disability and care regimen preclude a second job. Employee met his burden of proof on this issue and Employers did not offer any evidence to controvert this finding. Circuit court should not have considered Employee's future plan to leave his employment with Safety Kleen. We reverse the circuit court on this issue. The final issue is the question of whether a wage concession agreement should be taken into consideration in computing Employee's post-injury average earnings. Again, SDCL 62-4-5 does not make any provision for this exception. The statute simply requires an employee to establish that his post-injury earnings, or that average amount he is capable of earning, are less than what his pre-injury average earnings were. As mentioned earlier, Employee has met his burden of proof on this element by showing what his actual average wages were and that he is physically incapable of earning more. Circuit court erred in ordering that the wage concession agreement be considered. We reverse.