Opinion ID: 6342637
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Publication of Crime Scene Photographs

Text: ¶ 36. Defendant next claims that the jury’s verdict must be reversed because the State published three unadmitted photographs of the victim’s body to the jury. He argues that the photographs were so inflammatory that they likely prejudiced the jury against him. We disagree. ¶ 37. Early in the trial, the State moved to admit approximately 100 photos of the crime scene. A discussion ensued during which the court asked whether every photograph was necessary, noting that some were quite graphic. The State eventually moved to admit all the photographs except for three labeled as State’s exhibits 57, 58, and 59. These were never admitted into evidence. They were taken after crime scene investigators turned the victim’s body over. 14 They depicted the victim’s bloody face and body. His arms, hands, and fingers were bent into unnatural positions, showing that rigor mortis had set in. ¶ 38. Later in the trial, during the VSP lieutenant’s testimony about the location and condition of the victim’s body and the actions of the crime scene investigators, the prosecutor showed him exhibits 57, 58, and 59 and asked questions about them. The photographs were also shown to the jury. Defendant did not object or argue that the photographs should be excluded pursuant to Vermont Rule of Evidence 403. ¶ 39. On appeal, defendant argues that the jury’s verdict must be reversed because the photographs were so gruesome that they likely prejudiced the jury against him. “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if its primary purpose or effect is to appeal to the jury’s sympathies, arouse its sense of horror, provoke its instinct to punish, or cause other reactions that would result in the jury basing its decision on something other than the established propositions of the case.” State v. Little, 167 Vt. 577, 579, 705 A.2d 177, 180 (1997). “Only when this danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value should the evidence be excluded.” Id. (citing V.R.E. 403). Because defendant did not object when the photographs were displayed to the jury, we review for plain error. State v. Muhammad, 2007 VT 36, ¶ 10, 182 Vt. 556, 927 A.2d 769 (mem.). “When the admission of prejudicial evidence is claimed to be plain error, the appellant must show that the judgment below was substantially affected by its admission.” State v. Laprade, 2008 VT 83, ¶ 23, 184 Vt. 251, 958 A.2d 1179. ¶ 40. We conclude that defendant has failed to meet this burden. First, the photographs were relevant to a disputed issue, namely, where the victim was located when defendant fired the shot. See Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 644 N.E.2d 978, 981 (Mass. 1995) (explaining that, in context of murder trial, “if the photographs possess evidential value on a material matter, they are not rendered inadmissible solely because they are gruesome or may have an inflammatory effect on the jury” (quotation omitted)). When the State showed the VSP lieutenant exhibit 57, the 15 lieutenant testified that he appeared to see glass on the victim’s jacket. Defense counsel interjected, “[c]ould the witness identify the location of that glass?” The lieutenant zoomed in on the image to indicate where he had seen the glass. The State then showed exhibit 58. The lieutenant noted that he could see air bubbles in the blood near the victim’s head as well as a dirt line on his pants, which he opined was consistent with “the back of his leg hitting the rocker panel of his car,” tying that opinion to previous testimony and images regarding the rocker panel. He also explained his opinion that the blood around the victim showed that he was coughing up blood after he came out of the car. He testified that exhibit 59 was a close-up of exhibit 58. On crossexamination, defense counsel questioned the lieutenant about the sufficiency of the crime scene response and challenged the lieutenant’s testimony that he observed some glass on victim. In his closing arguments, defense counsel argued that the lieutenant could have seen gravel, sand, or other debris on the victim’s jacket and questioned his ability to identify glass: “If anyone tells you they can do that from a photograph, you shouldn’t believe them.” As discussed above, the victim’s position at the time of the shooting was hotly contested. The three photographs were relevant to the State’s theory that the victim was seated in the vehicle. ¶ 41. Further, defendant has failed to show that the photographs were unduly prejudicial. The photographs at issue here were not significantly more gruesome or offensive than other photographs that were admitted without objection. For example, State’s exhibits 55 and 56 both show blood on the victim’s face as well as rigor mortis in his hands. Other admitted photographs showed close-ups of the bullet wound in the victim’s chest in which the victim’s skin is visibly discolored. Defendant did not object to any of these other photographs. Given that this was a homicide case, we do not conclude that exhibits 57, 58, and 59 were needlessly or unduly inflammatory. See Little, 167 Vt. at 579, 705 A.2d at 180 (affirming trial court’s denial of motion to exclude photographs of victim’s body, facial wounds, and showing gun held next to victim’s face in trial for second-degree murder because photographs were relevant to disputed issues and 16 did not rise to level of unfair prejudice). Defendant has therefore failed to show that their publication to the jury substantially affected the verdict.