Opinion ID: 848767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: liberal construction of the wdca

Text: It is also important to note the danger of the majority's questioning and partial disavowal of the rule that the Worker's Disability Compensation Act should be construed liberally to grant rather than deny benefits. The pronouncement jeopardizes decisions that invoke the rule going back over seventy years. [3] Michigan courts have always considered the WDCA and its predecessors to be remedial in nature. Hagerman v. Gencorp Automotive, 457 Mich. 720, 739, 579 N.W.2d 347 (1998). Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines a remedial statute as [a] statute to be construed liberally as one intended to reform or extend existing rights.... Ballentine's Law Dictionary (3d ed.). Accord 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 8, pp. 234-235. Initially, I note that the majority misconstrues the dissents. It states that we would use liberal construction of the WDCA to award compensation for injuries that do not arise out of and in the course of employment. Ante at 207. This is incorrect. The liberal construction rule simply means that if an injury arises out of and in the course of employment, courts should favor inclusion. The rule guards against the rigid exclusion of claims that could go either way, and does not provide for inclusion of claims to which the WDCA is wholly inapplicable.
Next, I disagree with the majority that liberal construction should be applicable only at a secondary stage of the analysis. I believe that it is applicable also at the initial qualifying stage when a determination is made whether a claim is covered by the WDCA. The majority asserts that the work-related question is resolved at the initial stage, which it terms nearly jurisdictional. However, no mention of work-related appears in M.C.L. § 418.131, the nearly jurisdictional provision. M.C.L. § 418.131 delineates the ambit of the WDCA and provides that [t]he right to the recovery of benefits as provided in this act shall be the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer for a personal injury or occupational disease. Therefore, jurisdiction is based on personal injury or occupational disease, not on whether an injury or disease is work-related. [4] Whether an injury is work-related is resolved after the jurisdictional stage, when the analysis has proceeded to the point of determining whether the employee is entitled to benefits. M.C.L. § 418.301 then becomes relevant. It provides that [a]n employee, who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment by an employer who is subject to this act at the time of the injury, shall be paid compensation as provided in this act. Hence, the question whether an injury is work-related is not a jurisdictional question, but one directed at whether the injured employee is entitled to benefits from the employer in question. It is beyond dispute that our courts have consistently used the liberal construction rule to decide the question of entitlement to benefits. As the Bower Court stated: The Worker's Disability Compensation Act was designed to help relieve the social and economic difficulties faced by injured workers. As remedial legislation, it is liberally construed to grant rather than deny benefits. Niekro v. The Brick Tavern, 66 Mich.App. 53, 238 N.W.2d 537 (1975). See McAvoy v. H.B. Sherman Co., 401 Mich. 419, 258 N.W.2d 414 (1977). [ Bower v. Whitehall Leather Co., 412 Mich. 172, 191, 312 N.W.2d 640 (1981) (emphasis added).] Because the question whether an injury or disease is work-related is directly implicated in determining entitlement to benefits, it follows that the question is susceptible to liberal construction. [5]
The majority concludes that liberal construction is logically justifiable only after it has first been established that an injury is work-related. My disagreement with the conclusion is based in part on the fact that the application of liberal construction to whether an injury is work-related comports with the Legislature's remedial goals. Our courts have been relying on the liberal construction principle since at least 1933. [6] In 1994, Justice Brickley provided an example of its proper application in his lead opinion in Nederhood v. Cadillac Malleable Iron Co., 445 Mich. 234, 247, 518 N.W.2d 390 (1994): In formulating our decision ..., we must also be mindful of the policies underlying the Worker's Disability Compensation Act. M.C.L. § 418.101 et seq.; ... As a preliminary matter, it must be remembered that the act was designed to be remedial and must not be unnecessarily construed so as to favor a denial of benefits....