Opinion ID: 1550932
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: instructions in regard to manslaughter

Text: The defendant argues that the trial justice committed reversible error in failing to give instructions that would allow the jury to find the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter committed in the heat of passion on adequate provocation, or voluntary manslaughter based upon diminished capacity. It is true that counsel for the defense requested an instruction in respect to diminished capacity (request No. 11). This request did not mention the crime of manslaughter. The trial justice did, in his instructions, speak of diminished capacity in accordance with this request. The trial justice did not relate the element of diminished capacity to the crime of manslaughter. Nevertheless, upon completion of the trial justice's instructions, the sole objection raised by counsel for the defense was to the failure of the trial justice to give his requested instruction on voluntary manslaughter committed in a sudden heat of passion    caused by adequate legal provocation (request No. 10). Defense counsel did not object to the failure to give an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based upon diminished capacity owing to intoxication or any other cause. It has long been the rule in this state that a party may not assign as error any portion of a charge or omission therefrom unless he specifically directs the trial justice's attention to the matter to which he objects, and gives the ground for his objection. He not only must, in accordance with Rule 30 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, object to the charge as given, but must also articulate the challenge in such a fashion that the court is made aware of the exact nature of the alleged error, be it of commission or omission. See, e.g., State v. Farlett, 490 A.2d 52, 56 (R.I. 1985); State v. Rodriquez, 465 A.2d 164, 170 (R.I. 1983); State v. Dionne, 442 A.2d 876, 885 (R.I. 1982). In the case at bar, defense counsel made no specific objection to the failure of the trial justice to instruct the jurors that they might find defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter based upon diminished capacity. Consequently, defendant cannot now claim error on the part of the trial justice for having failed to give such an instruction. Trial counsel, as indicated, did request an instruction on voluntary manslaughter committed in a sudden heat of passion    caused by adequate legal provocation. The defendant now argues that this instruction should have been given with specific reference to the Carlucci murder since there was evidence from defendant's statement that he had been provoked by his inability to achieve sexual consummation with the decedent, and his passion was therefore aroused. This argument is more astonishing than persuasive. In State v. Winston, 105 R.I. 447, 452-53, 252 A.2d 354, 357 (1969), we outlined the historical development of the distinction between murder and manslaughter. We pointed out that in England voluntary manslaughter had evolved so as to require two elements:

To suggest that one who is attempting to commit a sexual assault upon a victim may be given the benefit of the defense of adequate provocation by reason of failure to consummate his illicit design is to propose a contradiction in terms. There was not one shred of evidence in this case that the victim had taken any action that constituted adequate provocation. In attempting to fight off defendant, she was exercising, albeit unsuccessfully, her basic right of self-preservation. The defendant could not take advantage of her action to convert his savagery into a lesser degree of homicide. Winston, 105 R.I. at 453, 252 A.2d at 358. The trial justice did not err in declining defendant's proposed instruction in respect to voluntary manslaughter in the heat of passion and was not requested to instruct on the crime of manslaughter based on diminished capacity. We find no error in his instructing the jury as he did.