Opinion ID: 1506773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Ms. Tekle contends that the trial court committed error in dismissing her complaint because her injuries were not compensable under the WCA since she is not claiming a disabling injury affecting her wage earning capacity. She also argues that she was not an employee within the meaning of the WCA at the time of the assault by Foot Traffic's agent. Foot Traffic argues that the trial court properly dismissed Ms. Tekle's complaint because she was an employee under WCA whose injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. Foot Traffic also maintains that D.C.Code § 36-304 bars her lawsuit against the company, and that her allegations raise a substantial question of coverage under the WCA even though she claims no disabling injury. Thus, Foot Traffic asserts, primary jurisdiction rests with the DOES. The WCA contains an exclusivity provision which specifies in pertinent part: (a) The liability of an employer prescribed in § 36-303 shall be exclusive and in place of all liability of such employer to the employee ... and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law on account of such injury or death. D.C.Code § 36-304. If the exclusivity provision is deemed applicable in her case, Ms. Tekle's only remedy would be workers' compensation. As Professor Larson explains: [o]nce a workmen's compensation act has become applicable either through compulsion or election, it affords the exclusive remedy for the injury by the employee or his dependents against the employer.... 6 LARSON'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 65.11 (1997 ed.). In Tredway v. District of Columbia, 403 A.2d 732 (D.C.1979), we said that the exclusivity provision of [the Federal Employees' Compensation Act] FECA will not bar [a] tort claim unless the injury was sustained in the performance of appellant's duties. Id. at 735. We also concluded that [a] substantial question will exist `unless [the] injuries were clearly not compensable under the F.E.C.A.' Id. (quoting Daniels-Lumley v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 162, 163, 306 F.2d 769 (1962)). See also Mason v. District of Columbia, 395 A.2d 399, 402 (D.C. 1978). Similarly, we stated in Estate of Underwood v. National Credit Union Admin., 665 A.2d 621 (D.C.1995): when there is a substantial question whether the WCA applies, the administrative agency charged with implementing the statute, given its special expertise, has primary jurisdiction to make the initial determination concerning coverage before the courts can exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 631 (quoting Harrington v. Moss, 407 A.2d 658, 661 (D.C.1979)). In Tredway, we held that there was a substantial question of coverage and thus, the Secretary of Labor should make the initial determination of coverage. 403 A.2d at 735, 736-37. However, in Estate of Underwood, we concluded that injuries allegedly resulting from an employee's emotional distress attributable to sexual harassment were not compensable under the WCA and therefore, the employee could maintain an action at law in the trial court. 665 A.2d at 633. In light of our precedents, and based upon the factual record presented to us on appeal, where an employee had just been terminated by her coemployee/supervisor and manager of the employment site who allegedly also committed an assault and battery, falsely imprisoned, and inflicted intentional emotional distress on her following notice of her discharge, there are at least two related questions raised regarding the applicability of the WCA's exclusivity provision: (1) whether the employee is claiming the kind of injury that is compensated by the WCA; and (2) whether the alleged injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. Because we conclude that there is a substantial question concerning the applicability of the WCA, we remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to stay the proceeding until Ms. Tekle has had reasonable time to present her claims to the DOES. We provide the following discussion as a guide to the DOES' determination.