Opinion ID: 2629208
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: As Compared to State v. Roberts

Text: Thomas contends that the to convict and accomplice liability instructions and the aggravating factors special verdict form given in his case allowed the jury to sentence him to death without requiring the State to prove that he personally caused Geist's death and that the aggravating factors specifically applied to him. He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on these instructional errors and that the court's factual findings supporting its conclusion that Thomas was a major participant in the crime of first degree murder with aggravating factors were not supported by the evidence in the record for the guilt phase of his trial. Thomas's ultimate argument is that, according to State v. Roberts, 142 Wash.2d 471, 14 P.3d 713 (2000), (1) his conviction for first degree murder must be reversed due to the errors in his to convict and accomplice liability instructions, because they failed to require proof of an element of the crime of first degree murder, premeditated intent; (2) he may not be found guilty of first degree murder under an accomplice liability theory because the State did not prove that he personally had knowledge he was facilitating the crime charged, i.e., first degree murder and; (3) his death sentence must be reversed due to the error in the aggravating factors special verdict form, in conjunction with the to convict instruction because they did not require the jury to find he was a major participant in the murder or the events leading up to it and that the aggravating factors applied specifically to him, rather than to just his accomplice, Rembert. The State contends that any error in those instructions and the special verdict form is subject to harmless error analysis and was, in fact, harmless in this case.
Both the to convict instruction and the aggravating factors special verdict form in Thomas's case were substantially the same as those found to be erroneous in Roberts. In Roberts, we reversed that defendant's death sentence given under the same to convict and aggravating factors instructions as were given in Thomas's trial. Roberts held, in part, that where a defendant is being tried for first degree aggravated murder solely as an accomplice, that defendant's major participation in the murder or events leading up to the murder must be proved before the death penalty can be imposed. Roberts, 142 Wash.2d at 503, 14 P.3d 713 (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987)). In Roberts, the to convict instruction was erroneous because it informed the jury that the elements of the crime could be committed by Roberts `or someone to whom he was an accomplice....' Therefore, the `to convict' instruction did not require the jury to find that Roberts acted with premeditated intent.... Id. at 504, 14 P.3d 713 (quoting clerk's papers). This was true despite a special interrogatory where the jury had found Roberts acted with premeditated intent. Id. The instruction also did not require a showing that Roberts had personally caused the death or that he actively participated in the events leading up to the death, i.e., his major participation. Id. The aggravating factors instruction in Roberts read: (1) The defendant and his accomplice committed the murder to conceal the commission of a crime or to protect or conceal the identity of the person committing a crime; or (2) The murder was committed in the course of, in furtherance of, or in immediate flight from a robbery in the first or second degree or a kidnapping in the first degree. Roberts, 142 Wash.2d at 504, 14 P.3d 713 (quoting clerk's papers). This court noted that while the first question required some form of actus reus by virtue of the word and, how much was not specified. The second question was worded in the passive voice such that no finding of actus reus on the part of the defendant was required. Id. This instruction was problematic because a jury that answered affirmatively to both questions could impose the death penalty even if Roberts did not personally cause the death or if he were only a minor participant in the events leading up to the death. Id. The to convict and aggravating factors instructions were erroneous in conjunction with one another because they allow a defendant to be sentenced to death without a showing that he or she personally caused the victim's death or was a major participant in the homicidal acts. Id. at 506, 14 P.3d 713. Thus, [w]hen jury instructions as used in [Roberts's] case allow for the possibility that the defendant was convicted solely as an accomplice to premeditated first degree murder, the defendant may not be executed unless the jury expressly finds (1) the defendant was a major participant in the acts that caused the death of the victim, and (2) the aggravating factors under the statute specifically apply to the defendant. Id. at 508-09, 14 P.3d 713. These findings by the jury should be done through special interrogatories when the State is trying its case based on accomplice liability. Id. at n. 12. Thus, contrary to Thomas's assertion, a jury is not required to find the defendant personally killed the victim in order to support a death sentence, only that he was a major participant in the events leading up to the victim's death. While Thomas did not object at trial to the aggravating factors and to convict instructions, as noted in Roberts, [e]xtensive authority supports the proposition that instructional error of the nature alleged here is of sufficient constitutional magnitude to be raised for the first time on appeal. Roberts, 142 Wash.2d at 500, 14 P.3d 713. Thomas is correct in his insistence that the error in his aggravating factors instruction is more egregious than that in Roberts because the first question in Thomas's instruction reads: [t]he defendant or an accomplice committed the murder to conceal the commission of a crime or to protect or conceal the identity of any person committing a crime.... CP at 1461 (emphasis added). [2] The or removes a requirement that the jury find any form of actus reus at all on Thomas's part and relieves the State of its burden to prove the aggravating circumstances as they pertain to the defendant. See Roberts, 142 Wash.2d at 504, 14 P.3d 713. That is to say, this instruction permits the jury to impose a death sentence on Thomas even if it finds that the aggravating factors apply only to Rembert, his accomplice. Thomas's to convict instruction, as in Roberts, does not require the jury to find he acted with premeditated intent.
Thomas contends that the accomplice liability instruction was erroneous because it relieved the State of its burden to prove he acted with knowledge that his actions would promote or facilitate the murder. Relying again on Roberts, Thomas points out that his instruction suffers from the same deficiencies as the accomplice liability instruction in that case. Namely, the instruction here specified that [a] person is an accomplice in the commission of a crime if, with knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, he or she either: (1) solicits, commands, encourages, or requests another person to commit the crime; or (2) aids or agrees to aid another person in planning or committing a crime. CP at 1450 (emphasis added). The shortcoming of this instruction is that it does not require that the defendant had knowledge he was facilitating the crime for which he was charged. See Roberts, 142 Wash.2d at 510-11, 14 P.3d 713; State v. Brown, 147 Wash.2d 330, 338, 58 P.3d 889 (2002). In contrast, the accomplice liability statute does require a mens rea of knowledge of the crime meaning, the charged offense. RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a); see also Roberts, 142 Wash.2d at 510, 14 P.3d 713.
The parties debate whether Thomas invited the error in the accomplice liability instruction. The State claims that although the defendant originally submitted a proposed accomplice liability instruction which differed from the court's, it was affirmatively withdrawn. Br. of Resp't at 120. The defense does not deny the facts alleged by the state but claims that its withdrawal was based on the failure of authority after the Court of Appeals withdrew its opinion in State v. Nguyen 94 Wash.App. 496, 972 P.2d 573 (1999). The prosecution proposed the instruction. The defense claims that in the absence of authority to the contrary it had no basis to challenge the pattern instruction. The State bears the burden of proof on invited error. Under the circumstances we characterize defense counsel's action as a failure to object rather than inviting error. As noted above, an error may be raised for the first time on appeal if it is a manifest error involving a constitutional right. RAP 2.5(a)(3), Roberts, 142 Wash.2d at 500-01, 14 P.3d 713.