Opinion ID: 1237882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: At oral argument DHSS first argued the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to assess costs pursuant to sec. 814.245, Stats. Section 814.245(6) states that a party seeking an award under this section shall, within 30 days after final judgment in the action, submit to the clerk an itemized application for fees and other expenses. DHSS asserts Sheely failed to apply for costs within thirty days after the circuit court's remand became final and therefore the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. We disagree. Section 814.245, Stats., contains substantially similar language as that in 5 USC sec. 405(c)(2) (1985). [8] Under the Federal Equal Access to Justice act [EAJA] the thirty-day time limit is a jurisdictional question. MacDonald Miller Co. v. N.L.R.B., 856 F.2d 1423, 1424 (9th Cir. 1988). See also J-I-J Const. Co. v. U.S., 829 F.2d 26, 29 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Sonicraft, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 814 F.2d 385, 386 (7th Cir. 1987); Clifton v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 1138, 1144 (5th Cir. 1985). This jurisdictional question cannot be waived and may be first raised on appeal. See Cassata v. Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp., 445 F.2d 122, 126 (7th Cir. 1971) (The bar of a judgment for costs against the United States under the doctrine of sovereign immunity presents a jurisdictional question which cannot be waived and may be first raised on appeal.). [3] There appear to be different approaches in the federal courts as to which moment is significant when measuring the thirty day jurisdictional requirement. Some courts permit the taxation of costs if a party successfully obtains a remand from a federal district court. See Bohn v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 232 (E.D. Ill. 1985); Sizemore v. Heckler, 608 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. Ill. 1985). The majority of federal courts, however, hold a party is eligible to receive fees and costs pursuant to the EAJA only after the matter is disposed of in favor of them on remand. When a court vacates an administrative decision and remands the matter for reconsideration, the successful party generally should not recover attorney's fees at that particular time since the claimant's rights and liabilities and those of the government have not yet been determined. Brown v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 747 F.2d 878, 883 (3rd Cir. 1984). Fees may be awarded `only to a party who has established his entitlement to some relief on the merits of his claims.' Id. at 883 quoting Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757 (1980) (per curiam) (a civil rights case). See also McGill v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 712 F.2d 28, 32 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1068 (1984) ([plaintiff) will not become a prevailing party unless and until she is awarded benefits, at which time her application for appropriate attorney's fees may again be considered.). This position has been adopted by the United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Singleton v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 710, 711 (7th Cir. 1986); a Wisconsin federal district court, Hutchinson v. Heckler, 612 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wis. 1985); and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in Kitsemble, 143 Wis. 2d at 863. We conclude the later position followed by the majority of courts to be the soundest and so we adopt it. [4] Here, Sheely concurrently petitioned the circuit court for both a final judgment and an award of fees and costs. In Auke Bay Concerned Citizen's v. Marsh, 779 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1986), the court held an application of fees is timely if the applicant files no more than thirty days after the final judgment and the applicant is able to show they are a prevailing party; eligible to receive an award under the EAJA. In Auke, a motion pursuant to the EAJA was submitted eight months prior to the formal-final judgment in the case. Other circuits have also held applications filed prior to the entry of final judgment are timely. See Miller v. United States, 753 F.2d 270, (3rd Cir. 1985), Matter of Esmond, 752 F.2d 1106, 1109 (5th Cir. 1985); But see Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 106 (4th Cir. 1983) (when no final judgment is filed by the district court on remand, claimant's attorney may refile for costs and fees when a final judgment is entered). We conclude the application for costs and fees with a request for the circuit court to enter final judgment is timely here. This approach of concurrent motions for final judgment and an award of costs under the EAJA has been approved and adopted by a federal district court in Wisconsin. Andino v. Heckler, 609 F. Supp. 293, 295 (E.D. Wis. 1985). Thus Sheely's application for costs and fees pursuant to sec. 814.245, Stats., was timely and the circuit court retained jurisdiction to award such fees and costs. DHSS also argues that the determination of whether Sheely is a prevailing party presents a jurisdictional question. We disagree. Whether a party is a prevailing party is a question on the merits of the case as to whether that party received the benefits or relief requested. Here Sheely is a prevailing party. She asked the circuit court to review DHSS's determination that she was not disabled and not qualified for medical assistance. The circuit court held DHSS had incorrectly determined her status and ordered a remand. Subsequently a federal administrative judge concluded Sheely was disabled and she received medical assistance pursuant to sec. 49.46(1)(a), Stats. DHSS did not refute this disability determination and closed its file. Sheely ultimately received the result and relief she initially requested and therefore she is a prevailing party. DHSS urges this court to adopt the position that the circuit court must explicitly state it is retaining jurisdiction to assess costs and fees when it remands a matter back to it for further proceedings on the merits of the case. We find no reason for such a requirement.