Opinion ID: 1938566
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the indictment charge a crime?

Text: In his contention that the indictment does not charge an offense, appellant relies upon three cases: Mosley v. State, 358 So.2d 1318 (Miss. 1978); Joyce v. State, 327 So.2d 255 (Miss. 1975); and Schloder v. State, 310 So.2d 721 (Miss. 1975). These cases dealt with our prior statute which did not proscribe as an offense the possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. However, Mississippi Code Annotated § 41-29-139 (Supp. 1984), in effect at the time of the crime, states in part: (a) Except as authorized by this article, it is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (1) To ... possess with intent to sell, barter, transfer, manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled substance; ... ... . (b) Any person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced as follows: (1) In the case of controlled substances classified in schedule I or II, as set out in sections 41-29-113 and 41-29-115, ... such person may, upon conviction, be imprisoned for not more than thirty (30) years or fined not more than one million dollars ($1,000,000.00) or both; Conceding that the statute does not use the word deliver, in Gandy v. State, 438 So.2d 279, 284-85 (Miss. 1983), we stated that the word deliver in an indictment is equivalent to transfer. Therefore, the indictment did charge Evans with a crime and there is no merit to this assignment of error. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and BOWLING, HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur.