Opinion ID: 2190684
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Questioning in a Custodial Setting: Miranda v. Arizona

Text: This case requires us to reemphasize a criminal defendant's fundamental constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination as explicated in the seminal Supreme Court case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In that case, the Supreme Court undertook an exhaustive examination of the tension between the government's interest in obtaining confessions of criminal behavior and the privilege against self-incriminationthe essential mainstay of our adversary system. Id. at 460, 86 S.Ct. 1602. That privilege is set forth in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution: [2] No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. [3] After observing that [w]e sometimes forget how long it has taken to establish the privilege against self-incrimination, the sources from which it came and the fervor with which it was defended, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458, 86 S.Ct. 1602, the Court set forth a long line of historical precedent for the Fifth Amendment, including the Bible, id. at 459 n. 27, 86 S.Ct. 1602, and the 1637 trial of John Lilburn, id. The Court then observed that we may view the historical development of the privilege as one which groped for the proper scope of governmental power over the citizen. As a `noble principle often transcends its origins,' the privilege has come rightfully to be recognized in part as an individual's substantive right, a `right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy.'... All these policies [underlying the right against self-incrimination] point to one overriding thought: the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a governmentstate or federalmust accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. To maintain a `fair state-individual balance,' to require the government `to shoulder the entire load,' to respect the inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth. In sum, the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right `to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.' Id. at 460, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (citations omitted). Upon recognizing that the Court had consistently ... accorded a liberal construction to the privilege against self-incrimination, id. at 461, 86 S.Ct. 1602, the Court famously held as follows: when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized.... [Accordingly,] [h]e must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. Id. at 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (emphasis added); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (observing that [a] Miranda violation does not constitute coercion but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwarned statements); Walton, 41 S.W.3d at 86. [4] By its own terms, Miranda applies to the questioning of an individual who has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way. 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Our first step toward responding to the certified question in this case is therefore a determination of whether the Defendant was in custody during his initial interrogation by Det. Roland and Sgt. Postiglione or whether his custody did not commence until the point at which Det. Roland delivered the Miranda warnings.