Opinion ID: 200913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Crowley's petition for fees was untimely

Text: 13 Crowley contends that the district court misinterpreted Local Rule 54.2, and that her petition for attorneys' fees in fact was timely filed. We begin with the text of the rule. 14 As the parties now seem to agree, the first paragraph of Local Rule 54.2 does not apply to Crowley's fee application, as this is not a case in which fees were contracted for or in which no notice of appeal was filed. 4 Rather, the timeliness is governed by the second paragraph, which states, An application for fees in all other cases shall be filed within 30 days of the filing of the appellate mandate providing for final disposition of any appeal. L.R. 54.2. 15 The crux of the dispute lies in the words final disposition of any appeal. L.L. Bean contends, consistent with the district court's opinion, that this phrase refers to an appeal to this court. Crowley filed her petition for fees ten weeks after this court issued its appellate mandate and eight weeks after the mandate had been filed in district court. Under this interpretation of Rule 54.2, her petition was indisputably untimely. 16 Crowley, however, reads the phrase any appeal more broadly to include certiorari petitions to the Supreme Court. Specifically, she contends that a prevailing plaintiff is required to file her petition for attorneys' fees within thirty days after the expiration date of the opposing party's right to appeal. The thirty-day period should not begin, she says, until there has been (1) express waiver of further review on certiorari; (2) denial of certiorari; (3) passage of the deadline to seek certiorari; or (4) the Supreme Court's decision, whichever is latest. Here, L.L. Bean had ninety days from the filing of the Court of Appeals mandate to file for certiorari with the Supreme Court. After that time passed with no certiorari filing, Crowley argues, she had an additional thirty days in which to submit her petition. 17 A plain reading of L.R. 54.2, however, indicates that the district court reasonably interpreted any appeal to refer solely to an appeal to this court. First, the rule makes no explicit reference to certiorari, only to appeals. 5 The Supreme Court no longer adjudicates appeals in cases such as this. See Pub.L. 100-352, § 1, 102 Stat. 662 (June 22, 1988) (repealing 28 U.S.C. § 1252, thereby eliminating nearly all of the Supreme Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction). 18 Second, the Rule's reference to appellate mandate providing for final disposition of any appeal reasonably refers to action by this court, not the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court generally does not issue appellate mandates. If it denies a petition for certiorari, it does not issue a mandate; rather, the clerk prepares, signs, and enters an order to that effect. See Sup.Ct. R. 45(3). If the Court instead grants plenary review, a formal mandate does not issue unless specifically directed; instead, the Clerk of [the Supreme] Court will send the clerk of the lower court a copy of the opinion or order of [the Supreme] Court and a certified copy of the judgment. Sup.Ct. R. 45(3). 6 Accordingly, the local rule's reference to filing of the appellate mandate can reasonably be construed as pertaining only to action of this court. 19 It is true that in other contexts, the term final disposition has been interpreted to refer to action taken by the Supreme Court or to additional appeals. See, e.g., Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 1075, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003) (holding that for the purpose of starting the clock on § 2255's one-year limitation period, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court's affirmation of the conviction); Adams v. Sec. and Exchange Comm'n, 287 F.3d 183, 187 (D.C.Cir.2002)(holding that thirty-day period for filing for fees pursuant to Equal Access to Justice Act does not run until the period in which an appeal can be brought has expired). These decisions are specific to legal contexts unrelated to those in the case at bar, however. See, e.g., Clay, 123 S.Ct. at 1075 (the relevant context is postconviction relief, a context in which finality has a long-recognized, clear meaning). There is no uniformity of interpretation as to the term final disposition and similar phrases; other cases use these terms to refer to judgments of the district court, a reading that plainly is inapplicable here. See, e.g., Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 123 S.Ct. 1696, 1698, 155 L.Ed.2d 775 (2003); Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 202-03, 119 S.Ct. 1915, 144 L.Ed.2d 184 (1999); Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 51, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995). Reading the Rule 54.2 as a whole, we conclude that the district court's interpretation was not erroneous, and that Crowley's application for attorneys' fees was untimely. 20 Crowley points to the detailed information contained in her fee petition and maintains that it is improper for the opposing party to have access to it before the litigation is complete. The likelihood of the Supreme Court granting certiorari on any given case is exceedingly slim, however. The risk of confidential information being shared with an opposing party who might somehow use it to its advantage in litigation before the Supreme Court is minimal, and does not change the result in this case. Further, if such a threat arose in a particular case, it could be addressed by seeking an extension on that ground or requesting to submit sensitive information under seal. 21