Opinion ID: 2547256
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Rebuttal evidence specifically contradicting a defendant's proffered character evidence

Text: Jezdik argues that the testimony of Detective Olewinski and Karl Kothera constitutes improper character evidence under NRS 48.045 and improper impeachment under NRS 50.085. The State argues that neither of these provisions applies because the State introduced the testimony to rebut Jezdik's own testimony on direct examination. This court reviews a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. [8] NRS 48.045(1) states the general rule regarding the admissibility of character evidence in a criminal trial: 1. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: (a) Evidence of his character or a trait of his character offered by an accused, and similar evidence offered by the prosecution to rebut such evidence .... (Emphasis added.) Thus, NRS 48.045(1)(a) gives the defendant the sole election to place his character in issue. NRS 48.055 provides the general mechanism for proving character under NRS 48.045: 1. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry may be made into specific instances of conduct. (Emphasis added.) As a general matter, when a defendant chooses to introduce character evidence in the form of reputation or opinion evidence, the prosecution is similarly limited in its rebuttal evidence and can only inquire into specific acts of conduct on cross-examination. Here, however, Jezdik did not place his character in issue as specified by one of the exclusive means provided in NRS 48.055: reputation or opinion evidence. Rather, he placed his character in issue through testimony that he had never been accused of anything prior to these current charges. As such, we reject Jezdik's assertion that counsel's question was an over-vague non-specific question [which] had no real impact on the State's case. Quite to the contrary, this statement in effect denies any prior specific instances of criminal misconduct. We also reject Jezdik's contention that Detective Olewinski's testimony improperly exposed the jury to testimony about other alleged uncharged crimes. [9] First, under these discrete circumstances, we conclude that NRS 48.045(1)(a) permits rebuttal of Jezdik's testimony of good character with similar evidence offered by the prosecution. Second, as discussed below, we conclude that such evidence is also admissible to impeach Jezdik's credibility. At common law, a party could attack an opposing witness's credibility by offering contradictory testimony. [10] Over time, courts developed restrictions to specific contradiction evidence, the foremost of which is the collateral fact rule. [11] Under this doctrine, [i]t is error to allow the State to impeach a defendant's credibility with extrinsic evidence relating to a collateral matter. [12] Facts are collateral if they are `outside the controversy, or are not directly connected with the principal matter or issue in dispute.' [13] Yet, under NRS 50.085(3), a party can impeach a witness on collateral matters during cross-examination with questions about specific acts as long as the impeachment pertains to truthfulness or untruthfulness and no extrinsic evidence is used. [14] As this court recently noted in Lobato v. State , the collateral-fact rule has limited application. [15] The rule does not limit the scope of cross-examination; an examiner can question a witness on practically any aspect of the witness's direct testimony. [16] Thus, the core prohibition [of the collateral-fact rule] applies when the witness to be impeached has already left the stand and the former cross-examiner later calls a second witness or proffers an exhibit to impeach the earlier witness's credibility. [17] The policy behind this rule is to prevent the cross-examiner from injecting collateral matters into the trial by setting the witness up and then allowing the very party that injected the matter into the trial to impeach the witness's credibility with extrinsic evidence relating to those collateral matters. [18] Even so, most methods of impeachment are exempt from the collateral-fact rule. [19] For example, the rule does not apply to attacks on a witness's ulterior motive for testifying, attacks on a witness's capacity or personal knowledge, or impeachment using criminal convictions. [20] As noted in Lobato, the collateral-fact rule only truly applies when a specific contradiction is coupled with impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement or impeachment using extrinsic prior bad acts not resulting in a conviction. [21] A specific contradiction involving extrinsic evidence of a prior bad act generally implicates the collateral-fact rule embodied in NRS 50.085(3). [22] However, authorities have noted an exception to the collateral-fact rule when the State seeks to introduce evidence on rebuttal to contradict specific factual assertions raised during the accused's direct examination. [23] Under this exception, the defendant's false statements on direct examination trigger or open the door to the curative admissibility of specific contradiction evidence. [24] The example in McCormick is illustrative: Suppose, for example, that on direct examination, an accused witness made a sweeping, superlative assertion that he had never committed a deceitful act. That assertion is such a serious violation of the rules limiting bolstering evidence that on a curative admissibility theory, many courts allow the opposing counsel to both cross-examine about the assertion and later introduce extrinsic evidence rebutting the assertion. [25] We have never explicitly embraced the modern doctrine of specific contradiction. [26] However, a review of our case law reveals implicit acceptance on previous occasions. For example, in Allen v. State, we affirmed the State's use of collateral act testimony to impeach the defendant's own testimony on direct examination. [27] We reasoned that the impeachment provided a `valuable aid to the jury in assessing [appellant's] credibility.' [28] Thus, we held the evidence properly admissible as being more probative than prejudicial. [29] Of particular note, we quoted Chief Justice Burger's rationale in Harris v. New York : Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. Having voluntarily taken the stand, [appellant] was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. [30] Similarly, in Bostic v. State, we held the admission of specific contradiction evidence proper when the defendant testified in his own defense. [31] We stated in Bostic that testimony for the purpose of contradicting [the defendant's] testimony is clearly distinguishable from the use of specific acts of misconduct to impeach the accused's character or credibility. [32] We cannot pervert the shield provided by NRS 50.085(3) into a license for a defendant to purposefully, or even inadvertently, introduce evidence giving the jury a false impression through an absolute denial of misconduct and then frustrate the State's attempt to contradict this evidence through proof of specific acts. [33] As a result, we adopt a limited exception to the collateral-fact rule and hold that our statutory rules of evidence do not prohibit a party from introducing extrinsic evidence specifically rebutting the adversary's proffered evidence of good character. [34] However, when a party resorts to extrinsic evidence to show a specific contradiction with the adversary's proffered testimony, the evidence should squarely contradict the adverse testimony. [35] In this respect, Jezdik asserts that Kothera's vague and unclear testimony did not directly contradict Jezdik's denial of prior accusations. We disagree. Kothera explicitly testified that Jezdik admitted to wrongfully obtaining a credit card in Kothera's name, and that Jezdik attempted to persuade Kothera to conceal the fraud after the authorities discovered the card in Jezdik's home. Further, while neither Kothera's nor Olewinksi's testimony explicitly established that Jezdik was aware that accusations had been lodged against him, we conclude that the State's rebuttal testimony squarely contradicted the potentially false impression that Jezdik's testimony left in the eyes of the jurors. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the State to rebut Jezdik's misleading testimony.