Opinion ID: 786971
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Present Applicability of Statutory Exemption

Text: 30 Under our preceding statutory interpretation of exception (A)(iii), we conclude that exception (A)(iii) has four requirements. We address Bean's satisfaction of each requirement in turn. 31 First, the non-hopper dredge must be documented under 46 U.S.C. ch. 121. There is no dispute that the MERIDIAN is a non-hopper dredging vessel documented under 46 U.S.C. ch. 121. See Norfolk II, 58 Fed.Cl. at 743. 32 Second, the non-hopper dredge must be chartered to SDC or to an entity in which it has an ownership interest. There is no dispute that SDC has a 50% ownership interest in Bean. Id. at 743-44. The MERIDIAN, in turn, is chartered to Bean. Id. at 743. Thus, there is no dispute that the non-hopper dredge MERIDIAN is chartered to Bean, an entity in which SDC has an ownership interest. 33 Third, the non-hopper dredge must be chartered to fulfill dredging obligations under a specific contract, including any extension periods, or as temporary replacement capacity for a vessel which has become disabled, but only for so long as the disability shall last and until the vessel is in a position to fully resume dredging operations. Bean proposed that the MERIDIAN would be chartered to perform dredging contracts under the Corps' contract bidding solicitation no. DACW54-03-B-0011. See id. at 743. Bean was the lowest bidder on the contract, and the Corps awarded the contract to Bean. Id. Thus, Bean satisfies this requirement because it chartered the MERIDIAN to fulfill dredging obligations under a specific contract. 34 Fourth, the exemption expires on the earlier of December 8, 2022 or when STUYVESANT ceases to be documented under chapter 121 of Title 46, United States Code. Because the vessel STUYVESANT is currently documented under 46 U.S.C. ch. 121, the statutory exception has not yet expired. 35 Accordingly, there are no genuine issues of material fact that Bean's chartering of the vessel MERIDIAN pursuant to the contract falls within the correct statutory construction of exception (A)(iii). Thus, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Norfolk and remand to the Court of Federal Claims with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Appellants.