Opinion ID: 852687
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Polygraph Examination and Testimony

Text: Grinstead raises two related contentions about the admission of the polygraph evidence in his trial. First, he contends that counsel should not have permitted him to take the exam when there was no strategic justification for doing so in light of the fact that the stipulation agreement did not provide that the State would dismiss the charges if the results of the exam demonstrated Grinstead was being truthful. (Br. Pet'r.-Appellant at 12-13.) We find this contention entirely baseless. It rests largely on the premise that the State would have been willing to drop all charges if Grinstead proved truthful. While such agreements may be reached when lesser offenses are at issue, it seems far from certain that a prosecutor would drop all charges against a defendant in a murder investigation solely on the basis of polygraph evidence (which Grinstead himself labels inherently unreliable.). (Br. Pet'r.-Appellant at 13.) As counsel testified at the post-conviction hearing, the stipulation he agreed to at the time was a standard stipulation, and his experience was that an agreement to drop charges was generally not put in a stipulation in Greene County. (P.C. Tr. at 13.) This certainly suggests that counsel's performance on this point was within professional norms. Moreover, the post-conviction testimony revealed that the decision to submit to a polygraph examination was Grinstead's, not his counsel's. (P.C. Tr. at 11.) In point of fact, counsel appeared to take numerous steps to safeguard Grinstead from an unfavorable result. In particular, counsel attempted to ensure that the examiner was one he had worked with before and whom he trusted enough as an examiner to allow any of [his] clients/defendants to be given the test by the State of Indiana. (P.C. Tr. at 14, 26.) Counsel also made clear to Grinstead the danger of submitting to the exam, stating that his general recommendation to clients considering doing so is that either you are 100% squeaky clean on this or you do not take it period, it can only hurt you. (P.C. Tr. at 11-12.) Counsel advised Grinstead that he could not use subterfuge to alter the results of the exam. (P.C. Tr. at 11-12.) These warnings were ultimately about all that counsel could have done. It was Grinstead's choice to submit to the exam and his choice to misrepresent his level of involvement in the crime to both his lawyer and the examiner. In fact, Grinstead admitted at trial that it was his not being truthful and not having told [that he had been the first to hit Cross] before [that] effected the polygraph outcome. [1] (R. at 1090.) As for whether the only reasonable strategy might have been for the lawyer to put his foot down and bar his client from participating, counsel acknowledged that he considered at least two justifications for allowing Grinstead to submit to the exam. First, although there was no formal agreement with the State to drop the charges, counsel believed a positive result could be used to bargain for a reduction in the charges. (P.C. Tr. at 12.) Counsel also thought a result showing Grinstead's truthfulness could be used at trial to bolster his client's credibility. (P.C. Tr. at 12.) Ultimately, we cannot conclude that the post-conviction court was wrong, based on the evidence before it, in deciding that allowing Grinstead to submit to a polygraph exam was within professional norms. Grinstead also faults his counsel's failure to object to certain testimony by the polygraph examiner. He says his counsel should have objected when examiner State Police Officer Mark James [2] said, I believe that Mr. Grinstead did in fact hit Mr. Cross and I believe that he did in fact help kill Mr. Cross. (R. at 1002.) The State concedes that these statements crossed the line of permissible testimony by interjecting the examiner's personal opinion (Pet. Transfer at 10), but argues that any error was of negligible prejudicial effect since the only difference between what Officer James actually said and what he could have testified to based on the results of the exam was semantic. (Pet. Transfer at 10.) The post-conviction court called James' statement mere recitation of other evidence which demonstrated the same evidence. (Appellant's App. at 154.) While at least part of the testimony at issue might well have been subject to objection (I believe that he did in fact help kill Mr. Cross), Grinstead's own acknowledgement of his level of participation in the crime was such that we cannot say a lawyer who passed on objecting was deficient, especially in light of the strong presumption of adequate performance. Because the evidence before the post-conviction court did not lead to the unerring and unmistaken conclusion that Grinstead was prejudiced by Officer James' statement, we do not believe that the failure to object to this statement constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.