Opinion ID: 2100366
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Coomer's Alleged Incapacity

Text: Coomer also alleges that the release was ineffective due to her mental incapacity at the time of its execution. She claims this incapacity resulted from a combination of the severe pain of her injury and the medication she was prescribed for treatment of that pain. Our cases have allowed that incapacity, when properly proven, may provide sufficient grounds to invalidate a release. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Lee, 154 Ky. 226, 157 S.W. 60, 62 (1913). This position was acknowledged in Trevathan v. Tesseneer, 519 S.W.2d 614 (Ky.1975), where the Court noted that [s]ince the record is devoid of any indication of fraud, overreaching, or physical impairment at the time of execution, the simple question becomes whether. . . it may be invalidated on the ground of mutual mistake. Id. at 615 (emphasis added). As the Court of Appeals correctly noted in its opinion, the prerequisite for capacity to execute a personal release is the same as that required for any contract. Coomer's bald allegation of incapacity, however, is insufficient to overcome the motion for summary judgment. Coomer claims she was incompetent to execute the release because she was experiencing a great deal of pain from the accident, was prescribed and took more than the recommended dose of Tylenol-3, [5] and does not remember reading or executing the release. As noted by the Court of Appeals, even though Coomer claims no recollection of reading or executing the release, she could remember calling the adjuster's associate and offering to settle her claim for $500.00, she could remember the adjuster returning to her home with the check, and she acknowledges that her signature appears on the release. Furthermore, when describing in her deposition the face-to-face encounter with the adjuster, she stated: He come in and I signed the release. He wished me good luck.  (Emphasis added.) Although she maintained that she did not remember reading the release, when asked if she thought she would have read it, she responded: I'm quite sure I would have. Coomer's own testimony shows that she telephoned Progressive on her own initiative, that she was lucid enough to negotiate a settlement twice that originally offered by the company, that she recalls the negotiations, that she recalls the adjuster coming to her house, and that she signed and likely would have read the release. Though she claims not to remember actually reading or signing the release, her recollection of other events surrounding her execution of the release are detailed, to say the least. We also note that Coomer cashed the settlement check a day or two after executing the release. Additionally, the insurance adjuster's sworn affidavit states that he found no reason to doubt Coomer's capacity or suspect that she was intoxicated. Furthermore, Coomer has admitted that the $500.00 settlement was fair given what she believed at the time was a minor injury. Even having reviewed the record in a light most favorable to Coomer, it is clear to this Court that she has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to her competence to execute the release. This is insufficient to overcome summary judgment under Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991). Summary judgment on this issue was proper.