Opinion ID: 774674
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Board's Approach

Text: 13 Petitioners and amicus argue that the approach used by the Board places too much reliance on the reason why the position was initially created. In its prior cases, petitioners note, the Board and this court in Bingaman had undertaken a fact-specific inquiry into the daily or frequent duties actually performed by the officer seeking LEO coverage, even if those duties were not listed in the Position Description as primary duties. Petitioners argue that the new position-oriented approach relies excessively on broad and unclear OPM classification standards and the Position Description in order to determine why the position was originally created many years ago, without sufficient examination of the regular duties actually performed by the particular employee. This approach, petitioners contend, is contrary to the plain language of the statutes creating the LEO retirement program, and conflicts with our decision in Bingaman. 14 The government argues that the approach used by the Board is permissible, and is more faithful to the statutes and the regulations than its earlier approach. As noted by the Board in this case, the approach formerly used by the Board in cases such as Bremby permitted an employee to be deemed eligible for LEO retirement credit so long as he or she could show that to some unspecified degree his or her primary duties involve the investigation, apprehension, or detention of those suspected or convicted of federal offenses, even if the employee's primary duties consist of non-LEO duties, such as maintaining law and order or protecting life and property. The Bremby approach, the government argues, ignored the first criterion of 5 C.F.R. 831.902, 842.802, which defined the term primary duties to require an assessment of the basic reasons for the existence of the position. 5 C.F.R 831.902, 842.802. 15
16 We hold that the approach used by the Board in this case is indeed consistent with the statutory and regulatory criteria for LEO retirement credit. The express language of the regulations promulgated under the CSRS and FERS statutes provides support for considering the reason for the position's existence as part of the LEO-eligibility analysis. A LEO is defined in both the CSRS and the FERS statutes as one the duties of whose position are primarily the investigation, apprehension, or detention of those suspected or convicted of federal offenses. 5 U.S.C. 8331(20), 8401(17) (emphasis added). Thus, under the statutes, an employee may only receive LEO retirement credit if the position he or she occupies primarily involves certain specified duties. 17 Moreover, the Board's approach is consistent with OPM regulations. The inclusion of the conjunctive and in sections 831.902 and 842.802 clearly indicates that all three criteria must be demonstrated in order for a position to be LEO-eligible. The 6-factor Bingaman test only considered prongs (ii) and (iii) to determine whether the officers' duties occupied a substantial portion of their working time (prong (ii)), and were assigned on a regular and recurring basis (prong (iii)). 3 The approach used by the Board here affirmatively involves consideration of prong (i) of sections 831.902 and 842.802 so as to ensure that in addition to consisting of duties that occupy a substantial portion, if not 50 percent or more, of the officer's working time and that occurred on a regular and recurring basis, the position exists currently as a LEO position. 18 Placing emphasis on why the position exists is also consistent with the legislative intent in providing for the LEO retirement program: to limit LEO-eligibility to rigorous positions that retirement at an unusually early age is appropriate. A Senate Report stated that LEO positions should be composed, insofar as possible of young men and women physically capable of meeting the vigorous demands of occupations which are far more taxing physically than most in the federal service. S. Rep. No. 93-948, at 2 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3698, 3699. Accordingly, Congress established maximum retirement ages for LEO employees such as FBI Special Agents and for employees serving in other positions which are statutorily entitled to LEO retirement coverage. See 5 U.S.C. 8335, 8425. LEO employees, for instance, are often required to retire no later than between 55 and 57 years of age, or when they have accrued twenty years of creditable service if they are beyond those ages when they completed the twenty years. See id. Congress further has authorized an agency head to determine and fix minimum and maximum limits of age within which an original appointment may be made to a LEO position. See 5 U.S.C. 3307(e) (1994). For instance, all Department of Justice LEO positions have a maximum entry age of 37, which may be waived for applicants up to 40 years of age. In assessing why the position exists, factors such as an early mandatory retirement age and a maximum entry age should be considered in determining whether the basic reasons for the existence of the position consists of duties that will make the employee LEO-eligible. Examination of such factors will be quite probative in determining whether the position really exists as a LEO position, that is, its job description and actual duties consist of tasks that only a young and physically fit individual could perform. 19 The dissent concludes that the Board improperly treated the purpose of the 'existence' of the position . . . as turning on the basic reasons for the position's 'creation.' 4 Although in several places, including the concluding paragraph, the Board's opinion misstates the law as requiring that the position be created primarily for the performance of LEO duties, the Board's examination of the duties actually performed by the officers demonstrates that it knew it had to determine the reasons why the position existed at the time of application for LEO credit, not merely when it was originally created. As noted by the dissent, early in its opinion, the Board stated that under its new, position-oriented approach, if the position was not created for the purpose of investigation, apprehension, or detention, then the incumbents of the position would not be entitled to LEO credit. Watson, 86 M.S.P.R. at 321. Significantly, however, the Board did not stop there. It went on to state in the very next sentence: 20 This is not to say that the Board will not consider evidence of what duties the appellants performed from day-to-day in the GS-083 Police Officer position. Rather, the Board will consider that evidence, along with all of the other evidence of record, to ascertain whether the appellant is entitled to LEO retirement coverage. 21 Id. This statement indicates that the Board knew that even if the official documentation of the position's creation did not support an applicant's LEO eligibility, the Board still needed to inquire into the applicant's actual duties as alleged. Moreover, in describing why it was departing from the Bremby approach, the Board specifically noted that its new approach would more affirmatively take into account the basic reasons for the existence of the position. Id. (emphases added). 22 The Board's approach included consideration of both the position documentation and actual duties. First, the Board determined the purpose for the creation of the officers' position in the GS-083 series. Id. This is an altogether logical and proper place to begin. In doing so, it considered the OPM Classification Standards, the OPM Guide, and the Position Description. Id. at 323-26. It found that, as created, the position was not LEO-eligible. Id. at 326. The Board next determined whether the purpose for the position changed, i.e., whether the purpose for the position's existence was different than the purpose for its creation. Id. at 321. In doing so, it considered -- in equivalent detail and at an equivalent length of its treatment of position documents -- the testimony regarding the officers' actual, day-to-day duties. Id. It found that the basic reasons for the position's existence were not different from those for its creation, and thus, that the officers were not LEO-eligible. Id. at 328. This second step was also proper and necessary, as the Board clearly understood. In concluding its analysis, the Board stated: While an incumbent's actual duties are relevant . . . the evidence of the actual duties performed in these cases does not persuade us that -- contrary to the official documentation of the position -- 'the basic reasons for the existence of the position' was [sic] actually investigation, apprehension, or detention. Id. If the Board believed that eligibility for LEO retirement credit is determined solely by the reasons for the position's creation, it would not need to consider, much less devote equivalent treatment to, the testimony regarding the officers' day-to-day duties. Nor did it consider actual duties only as an alternative ground for decision. Indeed, the Board specifically noted that its new position-oriented approach did not foreclose other officers in the GS-083 series from showing that the basic reasons for the existence of their positions had shifted from peace-keeping to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of criminals or suspects. Id. at 330 n.7. 23 We note that footnote 7 of the Board's opinion, like the concluding paragraph, incorrectly states the law as requiring that applicants must show that the position was created as an LEO-position. Id. However, the portion of the Board's opinion explaining its analysis reflects that it correctly understood that the reasons for the position's existence, not merely its creation, are determinative. Such reasons could be shown by proof that the duties an employee performs day-to-day differ from those of the OPM classification standards, the OPM Guide, or the Position Description. Id. at 321; see also Ellis v. United States, 610 F.2d 760 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (finding that the duties actually performed by the officer were not properly set forth in their position description, and thus granting a retirement annuity under 5 U.S.C. 8331(21)). By providing this alternative way to show entitlement to LEO credit, the Board necessarily concluded that the reasons for the existence of the position can be established not only by the position papers but also by actual duties performed. Thus, contrary to the dissent's suggestion, we conclude that the Board applied the correct legal standard. The Board's analysis properly included the reasons for the position's existence, and not merely its creation.
24 The Board's approach is also wholly consistent with the approach taken by this court in Bingaman. Petitioners seem to read Bingaman to require a rigid, bright-line test based on the six factors of the Board's decision. Petitioners also argue that other factors -- such as whether the officers' duties are commensurate with Norfolk City police officers -- should be considered as well. This court, however, has never adopted the Bingaman factors; nor has the court held that federal employees are always entitled to LEO coverage so long as they satisfy the Bingaman factors. Indeed, as noted in Bingaman and Hannon v. Department of Justice, 234 F.3d 674 (Fed. Cir. 2000), the Bingaman factors were developed by the Board, not by this court as captur[ing] the essence of what Congress intended. Bingaman, 127 F.3d at 1436; Hannon, 234 F.3d at 677-78 (noting that in Bingaman, this court merely recognized and applied the [Bingaman] factors, factors which had been developed by the Board, not this court). In examining the duties performed by these petitioners, the Bingaman court only addressed prongs (ii) and (iii) of 5 C.F.R. 831.902, 842.802. Bingaman, 127 F.3d at 1436 (Applying [the Bingaman factors], the [AJ] properly found that Bingaman failed to establish that he is eligible for LEO retirement credit.). The court did not need to consider prong (i) of the test -- examining the basic reasons for the existence of the position -- because the court found that the petitioners had failed to meet their burden of proof regarding the second and third prongs of 5 C.F.R. 831.902, 842.802. 25 Moreover, some of the most probative factors are not even a part of the six-factor Bingaman test. Hannon, 234 F.3d at 678. For instance, in Hannon, this court held that the Board should consider hazard as a probative factor in assessing LEO retirement coverage. Id. at 679 (The Board has recognized . . . that hazard is a significant element of law enforcement work.). Moreover, in light of evident legislative intent to grant LEO credit only to those who have jobs requiring physically demanding work, other factors, such as whether the officer must retire at an early age or whether there is an early maximum entry age, would also be highly probative in determining whether the officer is entitled to LEO retirement credit. Indeed, while all of the Bingaman factors may always be considered, some are more probative than others. For example, whether the job requires an annual physical fitness test may be probative in assessing whether the position is designed to be limited to young and physically fit individuals who would be forced to retire at an unusually early age, depending on the stringency of the test. Other Bingaman factors, however, are normally less probative because they do not always distinguish between officers who do LEO work and those who do not. For example, guards mainly protecting life and property and police officers whose jobs primarily involve pursuing or detaining criminals all might carry a firearm, be on call 24 hours a day, or have to work long periods without taking a break. The regulations, however, specifically exclude guards who mainly protect life and property from LEO retirement coverage. See 5 C.F.R. 831.902, 842.802. Other factors, proposed by petitioners, have little relevance. For instance, that petitioners' positions are equivalent to those of Norfolk City police officers has little probative value because not all Norfolk City police officers would be entitled to LEO credit if they were federal employees. 26