Opinion ID: 186118
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: butler's residual functional capacity

Text: 22 Butler asserts that in assessing her RFC the ALJ failed to properly consider her inability to meet certain physical demands of work activity — namely, her inability to lift, which is an exertional limitation, as well as her inability to reach and stoop, which are both postural limitations. We agree. The ALJ's RFC assessment bears on Butler's ability to perform past relevant work (step four) and her ability to do other work (step five). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f), 416.920(e)-(f); id. §§ 404.1545(a)(5)(i)-(ii), 416.945(a)(5)(i)-(ii). It is designed to determine the claimant's uppermost ability to perform regular and continuous work-related physical and mental activities in a work environment. Id. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1); see also Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p, Assessing Residual Functional Capacity in Initial Claims, 1996 WL 374184, at - (SSA July 2, 1996). In effect, it is a function-by-function inquiry based on all of the relevant evidence of a claimant's ability to do work and must contain a narrative discussion identifying the evidence that supports each conclusion. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at , ; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). In performing the RFC assessment, the ALJ must explain how he considered and resolved any material inconsistencies or ambiguities evident in the record, as well as the reasons for rejecting medical opinions in conflict with the ultimate RFC determination. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at . 23 Here the ALJ found that Butler's physical impairments prevented her from performing her past relevant work but did not preclude her from engaging in a limited range of sedentary work. He concluded that Butler retains the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work so long as she can sit or stand at her own option, where the work does not involve lifting more than four pounds or involve more than minimal stress. 3 JA 32. In so concluding, the ALJ was required to consider the nature and extent of any limit on her ability to perform certain physical demands of work activity, such as lifting, reaching or stooping, that affect her ability to perform past relevant or other work. Id. §§ 404.1545(b), 416.945(b). Social Security Ruling 96-9p gives the ALJ additional guidance regarding the erosive effect any physical limitations may have on the unskilled sedentary occupational base — the occupational base to which the ALJ concluded Butler's impairments limited her. See SSR 96-9p, Determining Capability to Do Other Work — Implications of a Residual Functional Capacity for Less Than a Full Range of Sedentary Work, 1996 WL 374185, at  (SSA July 2, 1996). The Ruling explains that [a]n accurate accounting of [a claimant's] abilities, limitations, and restrictions is necessary to determine the extent of erosion of the occupational base, the types of sedentary occupations an individual might still be able to do, and whether it will be necessary to make use of a vocational resource. Id. at . With respect to an exertional limitation on lifting, the Ruling notes that [t]he extent of erosion will depend on the extent of the limitations and that an inability to lift ... more than 1 or 2 pounds would erode the unskilled sedentary occupational base significantly. Id. The Ruling also addresses postural limitations, explaining that [a] complete inability to stoop would significantly erode the unskilled sedentary occupational base and a finding that the individual is disabled would usually apply, but restriction to occasional stooping should, by itself, only minimally erode the unskilled occupational base of sedentary work. Id. at . Additionally, a Social Security Program Policy Statement observes that a [s]ignificant limitation[] of reaching, which is required in almost all jobs, may eliminate a large number of occupations a person could otherwise do and a vocational specialist may be needed to determine the effects of the limitation. SSR 85-15, Capability to Do Other Work — The Medical-Vocational Rules as a Framework for Evaluating Solely Nonexertional Impairments, 1985 WL 56857, at  (SSA 1985). 24 In light of this Ruling and Statement, it is clear that to arrive at his RFC assessment for Butler, the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Lightfoote, who repeatedly opined that she could not lift, reach or stoop. 4 The district court found, and the Commissioner agrees, that the ALJ rejected Lightfoote's conclusion that Butler was unable to stoop by referring to the (apparently) contrary opinions of other medical experts. JA 31-32; see, e.g., id. 104, 106-07, 207. But the other medical opinions on which the ALJ purportedly relied do not address Butler's ability to stoop. (The ALJ cited the views of Drs. Asadi, Press and Yan; Hall's opinion, which did address Butler's ability to stoop, was not cited by the ALJ.) In his November 19, 1996 report Yan noted that Butler's examination was otherwise within normal limits, after having stated that Butler complained that she had disk disease over her lumbosacral area, had severe pain which prevented her from getting up easily, could not stand for too long and could not lift heavy objects. Id. 106-07. Yan, however, did opine that Butler's disks appeared to be within normal limits. Id. Asadi's report acknowledged that Butler had a history of lower back pain, but that there is no limitation of movement of [her] cervical spine. Id. 185. Butler was referred to Asadi, however, only for a second opinion on the diagnosis and treatment of her headaches. The ALJ also noted Press's lumbar spine examination that revealed mild scoliosis but was otherwise negative. Id. 104. It is not apparent to us how these three one-time, generalized medical reports conflict with Lightfoote's continuous, specific opinion that Butler cannot stoop on the job. The ALJ's conclusionary attempt to justify his RFC finding that Butler was capable of engaging in a limited range of sedentary work inexplicably cited Lightfoote's opinion that Butler could not perform work that required her to stoop. Id. 32, 176. 25 The same goes for Lightfoote's conclusions regarding Butler's inability to lift and reach. In concluding that Butler was capable of performing work that requires lifting of no more than four pounds, the ALJ apparently relied on Butler's testimony that she can lift a half-gallon of milk (which, according to the ALJ, weighs approximately four pounds) with reasonable comfort. Id. 60. In so finding, however, he failed to explain away, or even acknowledge, Lightfoote's three specific opinions that Butler could not perform work that required any lifting. Id. 125, 128, 188. The ALJ may have discounted these opinions in view of Lightfoote's earlier notations indicating that Butler was capable of lifting up to 10 pounds. The ALJ, however, did not cite these opinions at all; rather, he relied exclusively on Butler's own testimony at the hearing. Id. 32. But the ALJ does not tell us how Butler's occasional lifting a half-gallon of milk conflicts with Lightfoote's opinion that Butler could not lift as part of her regular and continuous work-activity. As to Butler's second alleged postural limitation, it appears that the ALJ ignored Lightfoote's opinion that Butler could not perform work that requires any reaching. Id. 125. Nowhere in the ALJ's opinion is reaching mentioned, and none of the other medical opinions he references touches on it in the least. 26 In sum, we cannot discern from the record the ALJ's basis for rejecting Lightfoote's opinions regarding these limitations nor from his mere references to the other physicians' reports. The ALJ's reasoning is not simply spare — as the district court described it — in crucial particulars it is missing. Nor did he note[] the contradictory evidence in the record, which record supplie[d] the reason for his decision. Williams v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 1494, 1499 (D.C.Cir.1993). This simply will not do. The judiciary can scarcely perform its assigned review function, limited though it is, without some indication not only of what evidence was credited, but also whether other evidence was rejected rather than simply ignored. Brown, 794 F.2d at 708. 27 The Commissioner contends that the ALJ must have interpreted Lightfoote's opinion that Butler should never stoop to mean that she should stoop very little or only occasionally. Appellee's Br. at 22. While this interpretation may have some intuitive appeal, the ALJ did not articulate this view in his decision 5 and Lightfoote's multiple opinions are not easily susceptible of such an interpretation. Despite his hopeful statements regarding Butler's capacity to perform some gainful activity, Lightfoote consistently opined that any job Butler performed had to accommodate her inability to stoop. JA 103, 125, 126, 176, 180, 204. The Commissioner also directs our attention to Hall's RFC assessment, which found Butler capable of lifting 10 pounds frequently and stooping occasionally. Although Hall's assessment conflicts with Lightfoote's opinions, the ALJ apparently did not rely on Hall's assessment as that assessment was not cited in the ALJ's order. Id. 31-32. And in view of Lightfoote's consistent opinions to the contrary, Hall's report, without more, does not constitute substantial evidence that Butler is capable of frequently lifting 10 pounds and stooping occasionally. 6 We are therefore at a loss to locate in the lengthy record substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's determination that Butler is capable of lifting four pounds, reaching and occasionally stooping on the job.