Opinion ID: 774843
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Metabolife's Right to Discovery

Text: 56 Metabolife contends that, even if it did not establish a prima facie case of falsity through its submissions to the district court, the district court erred in not allowing it discovery because the discovery-limiting aspects of the anti-SLAPP statute conflict with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 57 Procedural state laws are not used in federal court if to do so would result in a direct collision with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. , 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980). In the absence of a direct collision, the court must make the typical, relatively unguided Erie Choice. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). This choice should be made by balancing the state interest in its procedural rule with the twin purposes of the Erie doctrine, discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws. Id. at 468. 58 In United States v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 190 F.3d 963, 970-73 (9th Cir. 1999), we considered whether two subsections of the anti-SLAPP statute may properly be invoked in federal court. The subsections in question were the special motion to strike, §§ 425.16(b), and the availability of fees and costs, §§ 425.16(c). Id. We held that there is no direct conflict between these two subsections and the Federal Rules, and that the purposes of Erie are advanced by adopting the California procedural rules. Id. However, the court did not address other subsections of the anti-SLAPP statute, such as §§§§ 425.16(f) and (g). 59 Subsection 425.16(f) provides that the anti-SLAPP motion may be filed within sixty days of the filing of the complaint or, at the court's discretion, at any later date. Subsection 425.16(g) provides that the filing of an anti-SLAPP motion automatically stays all further discovery until the court rules on the motion. However, [t]he court, on noticed motion and for good cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted notwithstanding this subdivision.§§ 425.16(g). Together, these two subsections create a default rule that allows the defendant served with a complaint to immediately put the plaintiff to his or her proof before the plaintiff can conduct discovery. Rogers v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 973, 980 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 60 We have not previously considered whether subsections 425.16(f) and (g) directly collide with the Federal Rules or are contrary to Erie's purposes. However, a district court in our circuit addressed exactly this issue in Rogers, holding that [i]f this expedited procedure were used in federal court to test the plaintiff's evidence before the plaintiff has completed discovery, it would collide with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 57 F. Supp. 2d at 980. 61 Although Rule 56(f) facially gives judges the discretion to disallow discovery when the non-moving party cannot yet submit evidence supporting its opposition, the Supreme Court has restated the rule as requiring, rather than merely permitting, discovery where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to its opposition. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n.5 (1986). Taking note of this, the district court in Rogers held: 62 Section 425.16 limits discovery and makes further discovery an exception, rather than the rule. Rule 56 does not limit discovery. On the contrary, it ensures that adequate discovery will occur before summary judgment is considered. 63 Because the discovery-limiting aspects of §§ 425.16(f) and (g) collide with the discoveryallowing aspects of Rule 56, these aspects of subsections (f) and (g) cannot apply in federal court. 57 F. Supp. 2d at 982. We agree. 64 In this case, the district court also adopted the Rogers analysis, but failed to implement it properly. Recognizing that it should not scrutinize Plaintiff's evidence of facts uniquely within the Defendants' control before ordering discovery to enable Plaintiff to meet its burden of opposing Defendants' anti-SLAPP motions, the district court decided not to rule on the prima facie case of actual malice. 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1166. However, the district court reached the issue of falsity regarding the statement that Every expert we asked said Metabolife [356] is not safe because of its main ingredient, ma huang. Id. at 1172-73. 65 The district court found against Metabolife on this issue because it felt that Metabolife had not established that its product is safe when used as directed. Id. Since we are remanding for further Daubert II analysis of the proffered scientific evidence, for reasons discussed infra we also order the district court to allow discovery as to which experts Wornick consulted as the basis for this statement. 16 This information is in the defendants' exclusive control, and may be highly probative to Metabolife's burden of showing falsity.