Opinion ID: 795883
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Importance of Hawaii's Terrain and Conditions

Text: 82 The Army also argues that Hawaii's unique terrain and conditions mandate transformation in Hawaii. At oral argument and in subsequent supplemental briefing, Appellees focused our attention on their argument that Hawaii's terrain is unique in the United States and most closely approximates tropical terrain in the Pacific Rim and elsewhere in the world. The Army cites a 1997 study on Installation Training Capacity by Army Headquarters, which notes that [t]raining areas on Oahu, Hawaii are unique in the Army's training land inventory. They are the only mountainous jungle setting. HQDA, Training Directorate, Office of the Dep. Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Installation Training Capacity (ITC) Phase 1 Study Report (Dec. 31, 1997), at 11, AR 0002886. These documents refer to the Kawailoa Training Area (KLOA) on Oahu. 83 KLOA consists of 23,348 acres on the western slope of the Ko`olau Mountain Range, of which 5,310 acres are suitable for maneuver training activities. Final SEIS at 7-14, 7-15, AR 0051956-57. KLOA can support small infantry unit maneuvers and helicopter. The remaining land is considered unsuitable for maneuver training, but can support mountain and jungle warfare training. In these areas, troop deployment is limited to single file, small unit movement on ridgelines. Id. at 7-15, AR 00551957. Based on this statement in the SEIS, Appellee argues that the Army's assertion that Hawaii offers unique training areas for the 2nd Brigade once it has been transformed into a Stryker Brigade is fully consistent with the actual training terrain available. 84 While the Army may be correct that KLOA provides unique and important mountainous jungle terrain for a light infantry unit, the Army has failed to account for the fact that no Stryker training is proposed for KLOA. In fact, KLOA cannot support Stryker vehicles and is unsuitable for Stryker Brigade training. Stryker vehicles are eight-wheeled, 23-foot long, 9-foot wide, 20-ton combat vehicles. Final SEIS at 2-33, AR 0051318. While the actual vehicle employed by the SBCT may vary from the current Stryker vehicles as the system is developed, it overall will have the same characteristics as the current Stryker. Id. Because of the limitations of the Stryker, most mounted movement takes places on roads or unrestricted terrain. Id. at 2-40, AR 0051325. The SEIS indicates that not a single acre of KLOA is maneuver-acreage for mounted Stryker training. Stryker vehicles would only be appropriate in KLOA along Drum Road in transit to other locations. Id. at 2-37, AR 0051322. Stryker training focuses on [u]rban operations training and will employ new urban warfare facilities. Id. at 2-36, AR 0051321. 85 At the time that the Army noted the unique training that KLOA's mountainous jungle terrain would provide the Army, Stryker brigades did not yet exist. The SEIS indicates that, while that jungle terrain may be unique and important for light infantry brigades like the current 2nd Brigade, KLOA cannot support Stryker vehicles, and no mounted training is envisioned or possible there. The fact that Oahu has jungle terrain does not alone justify the elimination of alternatives involving transformation of the 2nd Brigade outside of Hawaii. 86 Ultimately, the question raised by the Army's own experts during the PEIS process and following the publication of the ROD based on the PEIS, and by the public in the scoping process for SEIS — Why Hawaii? — was never answered. Transformation of the 2nd Brigade outside of Hawaii was a reasonable alternative that the Army was obligated under NEPA to consider. Its failure to do so renders the Army's EISs inadequate. See Friends of Southeast's Future, 153 F.3d at 1065.