Opinion ID: 4679985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Governing Precedent

Text: A. The Right of Self-Governance and Expectation of NonIgnorance Florida citizens have the right “to formulate ‘their own organic law.’ ” Medical Marijuana I, 132 So. 3d 786, 794 (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Right to Treatment & Rehab. for Non-Violent Drug Offenses, 818 So. 2d 491, 494 (Fla. 2002)). To avoid undue interference with this right, we have “traditionally applied a deferential standard of review to the validity of a citizen initiative petition.” Id. Our restraint in this area is longstanding: There is no lawful reason why the electors of this State should not have the right to determine the manner in which the Constitution may be amended. . . . Sovereignty resides in the people and the electors have a right to approve or reject a proposed amendment to the organic law of th[e] State, limited only by those instances where there is an entire failure to comply with a plain and essential requirement of [the law]. Id. at 795 (second alteration in original) (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Right to Treatment & Rehab. for Non-Violent Drug Offenses, 818 So. 2d at 494 (quoting Pope v. Gray, 104 So. 2d 841, 842 (Fla. 1958))). - 23 - Consistent with these principles, we take a nonpaternalistic approach to our review, expecting voters to educate themselves regarding the details of a proposed amendment before voting and advising that the ballot summary need not educate voters on collateral implications of a proposed amendment’s effects: Under our system of free elections, the voter must acquaint himself with the details of a proposed ordinance on a referendum together with the pros and cons thereon before he enters the voting booth. If he does not, it is no function of the ballot question to provide him with that needed education. What the law very simply requires is that the ballot give the voter fair notice of the question he must decide so that he may intelligently cast his vote. Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Standards for Establishing Legislative Dist. Boundaries, 2 So. 3d 175, 185 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Right to Treatment & Rehab. for Non-Violent Drug Offenses, 818 So. 2d at 498). Our review similarly presumes that voters possess a rudimentary knowledge of their government’s structure and of the laws governing their conduct. Fla. Educ. Ass’n v. Fla. Dep’t of State, 48 So. 3d 694, 701 (Fla. 2010) (“This Court presumes that the average voter has a certain amount of common understanding and knowledge.”); Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So. - 24 - 2d 360, 375 (Fla. 2005) (Cantero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“All citizens are presumed to know the law.”) (quoting Hart v. Hart, 377 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)). Citizens are also presumed to know what constitutes a federal crime. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (“The rule that ‘ignorance of the law will not excuse’ is deep in our law . . . .” (quoting Shelvin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910))). Finally, it is one of the most fundamental and elementary principles of our constitutional republic that no state law—not even a state constitution—can override federal law. See U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. B. Ballot Summary Section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2019), requires that each ballot summary 5 be written in “clear and unambiguous language” 5. Although the title and summary “must be read together in determining whether the ballot information properly informs the voters,” Advisory Op. to the Att’y Gen. re All Voters Vote in Primary Elections for State Legislature, Governor, & Cabinet, 291 So. 3d 901, 906 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Voluntary Univ. Pre-Kindergarten Educ., 824 So. 2d 161, 166 (Fla. 2002)), I will focus on the summary because that is where the language is found that the majority judges to be misleading. - 25 - and provide “an explanatory statement, not exceeding 75 words in length, of the chief purpose of the measure.” Id. (emphasis added). In plain language, this statute imposes a straightforward legal requirement that the summary unambiguously and succinctly explain the primary legal change to the Florida Constitution that the amendment would bring about—and thereby “provide fair notice of the content of the proposed amendment.” All Voters Vote, 291 So. 3d at 906 (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So. 2d 563, 566 (Fla. 1998)). The point here is that the statute’s directive is solely to explain the Florida constitutional change—with no requirement that the summary provide an explanation of secondary ramifications of the proposed amendment. See id. (explaining that the statute does not require an explanation of “possible ramifications” of an amendment). Accordingly, we have “never required that a ballot summary inform voters as to the current state of federal law [or] the impact of a proposed state constitutional amendment on federal statutory law.” Medical Marijuana I, 132 So. 3d at 808. We also properly consider “whether the language of the title and summary, as written, misleads the public.” Fla. Educ. Ass’n v. - 26 - Fla. Dep’t of State, 48 So. 3d 694, 701 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Fla. Dep’t of State v. Slough, 992 So. 2d 142, 147 (Fla. 2008)). This aspect of our review necessarily flows from the language of section 101.161(1), requiring that the ballot summary in “clear and unambiguous” language explain the chief purpose of the proposal. We have properly read this language as including an “accuracy” requirement—stating that the substance of the proposal must be “accurately represented on the ballot.” Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7, 12 (Fla. 2000) (emphasis omitted). Therefore, the proponents of the measure cannot use the summary to disguise the measure “as something else.” Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151, 156 (Fla. 1982). Stated another way, “[a] ballot title and summary cannot either ‘fly under false colors’ or ‘hide the ball’ as to the amendment’s true effect.” Armstrong, 773 So. 2d at 16. In lay terms, the statute supports an inquiry into whether the summary would inadvertently trick the voter as to how Florida law would change if the amendment passes. Id. C. Stare Decisis The doctrine of stare decisis requires us to follow the precedent outlined above unless “we are convinced that [it] clearly - 27 - conflicts with the law we are sworn to uphold.” State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 507 (Fla. 2020). Even clearly erroneous precedent should be maintained and followed based upon citizens’ reliance on that precedent in conducting their affairs. Id. Here, reliance interests are at their zenith because citizens rely heavily (if not exclusively) on our precedent when seeking to amend their constitution. Citizens draft the proposal knowing that it will never make the ballot unless we judge their language to be compliant with section 101.161(1). They then expend significant resources to obtain the signatures necessary to trigger our review, with no opportunity to redraft the proposal if we find it deficient. Rather, if their original work product is deemed defective, the citizenry must start again with a new proposal for a later election cycle, at least two years in the future. They must then redraft a new summary and restart the expensive signature-gathering process. These practicalities, and the core right of self-governance they relate to, clearly militate in favor of following the doctrine of stare decisis in the citizen-initiative context, see Poole, 297 So. 3d at 507 (identifying reliance as a “critical consideration” in determining whether to adhere to precedent), and underscore why it - 28 - is of paramount importance that we faithfully, consistently, and impartially apply our precedent in this area, irrespective of our personal views as to “the merits or wisdom of the proposed amendment,” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Repeal of High Speed Rail Amendment, 880 So. 2d 624, 625 (Fla. 2004). Our precedent therefore appropriately dictates that we must “act with extreme care, caution, and restraint before [we] remove[ ] a constitutional amendment from the vote of the people,” Askew, 421 So. 2d at 156, and also appropriately instructs that “[t]his Court has no authority to inject itself in the process [by blocking a proposed amendment from appearing on the ballot], unless the laws governing the process have been clearly and conclusively violated,” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Right to Treatment & Rehab. for Non-Violent Drug Offenses, 818 So. 2d at 494, 498-99, thereby rendering the proposal “clearly and conclusively defective,” id at 494 (quoting Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let’s Help Florida, 363 So. 2d 337, 339 (Fla. 1978)).