Opinion ID: 1215411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: admissibility of polygraph test

Text: The defendant Frazier submitted to a polygraph test prior to trial pursuant to a written stipulation signed by him, his counsel, and the prosecutor. Its material terms were as follows: [T]hat a member of the West Virginia Department of Public Safety [would] conduct a polograph [sic] test or tests on . . . Robert Frazier with a view to determining whether Robert Frazier did deliver a controlled substance to Kenneth Morgan as alleged . . . . The stipulation provided that the test results, together with the opinion of the polygraph operator, would be admissible in court either for or against the said Robert Frazier upon the trial of the said indictment. The stipulation also stated it would have no force and effect and the test results would be inadmissible for or against Robert Frazier . . . if in the opinion of the polygraph operator the test results are not valid for any reason whatsoever . . . . The State called the polygraph expert as a part of its case-in-chief. He stated the test showed the defendant lied when, during the course of the test, he denied delivering marijuana. After cross-examining the expert, Frazier's counsel moved to strike his evidence. The admissibility of the results of a polygraph test is a subject of continuing legal controversy. Without attempting an exhaustive analysis of all aspects of this controversy, we will trace its essential historical outlines. The general rule flowing from the case of Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013, 34 A.L.R. 145 (1923), is that such results are not admissible. The predicate for the rule is the questionable scientific accuracy of the test. See, e. g., United States v. Tremont, 351 F.2d 144, 146 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 944, 86 S.Ct. 1198, 16 L.Ed.2d 207 (1966); McCroskey v. United States, 339 F.2d 895, 897 (8th Cir. 1965); Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 377, 382 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 929, 79 S.Ct. 315, 3 L.Ed.2d 302 (1959); United States v. Bando, 244 F.2d 833, 841 (2nd Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 844, 78 S.Ct. 67, 2 L.Ed.2d 53 (1957); Tyler v. United States, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 2, 9, 193 F.2d 24, 31 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 908, 72 S.Ct. 639, 96 L.Ed. 1326 (1952); Sullivan v. State, 303 So.2d 632, 634-35 (Fla.1974), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 3226, 49 L.Ed.2d 1220 (1976); Smith v. State, 20 Md.App. 577, 593-96, 318 A.2d 568, 579-80 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909, 95 S.Ct. 828, 42 L.Ed.2d 839 (1975); People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 255 N.W.2d 171 (1977) (not admissible at trial; may be on motion for new trial); Harrison v. State, 307 So.2d 557, 562 (Miss.1975); Warden, Nevada State Prison v. Lischko, 90 Nev. 221, 224, 523 P.2d 6, 8 (1974); State v. Jackson, 287 N.C. 470, 480, 215 S.E.2d 123, 129-30 (1975); Fulton v. State, 541 P.2d 871 (Okl.Cr.1975); Commonwealth v. Brooks, 454 Pa. 75, 309 A.2d 732, 733-34 (1973); State v. Woo, 84 Wash.2d 472, 527 P.2d 271 (1974). The advocates of the admissibility of polygraph test results have spent the intervening years since Frye attempting to demonstrate reliability of polygraphic tests. [2] There is a considerable body of studies and statistics suggesting that in the hands of an experienced operator, substantially accurate test results can be obtained. [3] A major difficulty with these statistics, however, is that they lack any independent verification of the operator's judgment, and they contain the further statistical flaw that even where some verification is present, the verified cases are not separated from the unverified. [4] A polygraph test involves two main components. First, the machine itself, which registers various physiological changes in the subject, i. e., breathing, heartbeat, blood pressure and galvanic skin reflex, as he responds to questions. Second, the interpretation of these responses, as recorded by the machine, by its operator. Overlaid on this latter component may be the operator's method of structuring the test and his direct observations of the individual while taking the testimony. The operator's interpretation of the test result is a factor of some significance. [5] Perhaps as a result of the lack of any substantial study independently verifying the accuracy of the polygraph, along with the subjective influence of the operator and the legal problems discussed hereafter, no appellate court has sanctioned the introduction of the polygraph test under the same rules of evidence which govern scientific tests. Some courts have adopted the approach of State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962), which permitted the admission of the polygraph test by written stipulation of the parties under the following conditions: (1) That the county attorney, defendant and his counsel all sign a written stipulation providing for defendant's submission to the test and for the subsequent admission at trial of the graphs and the examiner's opinion thereon on behalf of either defendant or the state. (2) That notwithstanding the stipulation the admissibility of the test results is subject to the discretion of the trial judge, i. e. if the trial judge is not convinced that the examiner is qualified or that the test was conducted under proper conditions he may refuse to accept such evidence. (3) That if the graphs and examiner's opinion are offered in evidence the opposing party shall have the right to cross-examine the examiner respecting: a. the examiner's qualifications and training; b. the conditions under which the test was administered; c. the limitations of and possibilities for error in the technique of polygraphic interrogation; and d. at the discretion of the trial judge, any other matter deemed pertinent to the inquiry. (4) That if such evidence is admitted the trial judge should instruct the jury that the examiner's testimony does not tend to prove or disprove any element of the crime with which a defendant is charged but at most tends only to indicate that at the time of the examination defendant was not telling the truth. Further, the jury members should be instructed that it is for them to determine what corroborative weight and effect such testimony should be given. [91 Ariz, at 283-84, 371 P.2d at 900-901][ [6] There are several problems arising from the Valdez concept. Its central thesis of admissibility is the written stipulation. [7] Yet, it is clear that by written stipulation parties cannot make evidence admissible that otherwise would be inadmissible. In other words, a written stipulation agreeing to the introduction of certain evidence is not the legal basis for its admissibility. Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474, 479 (Alaska 1970) (polygraph test stipulation); 29 Am. Jur.2d Evidence § 13. It is true that Valdez and its progeny suggest that the examiner's testimony concerning the polygraph test bears upon the truthfulness of the subject's testimony, and therefore his credibility. Yet, if this were the real basis for its admissibility, there would be no need for the written stipulation, since it is generally held that any witness' credibility may be impeached. State v. Justice, 135 W.Va. 852, 65 S.E.2d 743 (1951); Moore v. Skyline Cab, Inc., 134 W.Va. 121, 59 S.E.2d 437 (1950); State v. Crummit, 123 W.Va. 36, 13 S.E.2d 757 (1941); 81 Am.Jur.2d Witnesses § 518; 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 458. However, if the test bore merely on the issue of credibility, it would ordinarily not be admissible unless the defendant took the witness stand. Most cases that follow the Valdez stipulation, and Valdez itself, do not discuss, much less differentiate between, whether the test can be introduced in the state's case-in-chief or only for the impeachment of the defendant. One court has held that it can be used in the state's case-in-chief. In State v. Baskerville, 139 N.J.Super. 389, 393-94, 354 A.2d 328, 330 (1976), the court seized on the language of the stipulation, which stated that the results could be used against the defendant, as being sufficiently broad to admit the results whether he testified or not. However, Baskerville does not discuss State v. McDavitt, 62 N.J. 36, 297 A.2d 849 (1972), where the New Jersey Supreme Court stated the polygraph test evidentiary role as follows: Where polygraph test results are admitted into evidence, the jury should be instructed as to the consideration to be given such testimony. It is not direct proof of a defendant's guilt or innocence of the crime charged. It is opinion evidence by an expert and tends only to indicate whether or not the subject was telling the truth when tested. . . . [62 N.J. at 47, 297 A.2d at 855] The court in State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76, 239 S.E.2d 324 (1977), after adopting the Valdez stipulation theory, not only approved the use of polygraph tests in the state's case-in-chief, but also held the test had corroborative evidentiary value, at least to the extent to uphold a rape conviction under the rule that the victim's accusation must have some independent corroboration. This despite its language that: In giving the charge the judge should state that the examiner's opinions may only be used to indicate whether at the time of the polygraph examination the person examined believed that he was telling the whole truth . . . . [240 Ga. at 80, 239 S.E.2d at 327] It is difficult to perceive how the written stipulation or the fact that the polygraph test can be admitted to impeach the credibility of the defendant can furnish any sound legal theory for the use of the polygraph in the state's case-in-chief. An even more difficult problem is encountered if we attempt to utilize these theories when the defendant seeks to admit a favorable polygraph test taken under a Valdez stipulation. If we follow the Valdez rationale that the polygraph test is not independent proof of any fact but merely bears on credibility, the defendant ordinarily cannot introduce his own extrajudicial exculpatory statements. They are generally thought to be too self-serving. Piassick v. United States, 253 F.2d 658, 661 (5th Cir. 1958); Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 345 Mass. 85, 185 N.E.2d 754 (1962); McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 145, at 312 n. 21 (2nd ed. 1972). We have not encountered a case which discusses this point. Obviously, the defendant gains little from a Valdez stipulation if he cannot introduce a favorable polygraph test. Massachusetts, perhaps sensing the weakness of Valdez, has moved a step beyond in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 313 N.E.2d 120 (1974), by holding that a defendant may move the trial court directly for the right to take a polygraph test. If the motion is granted, the test is admissible, although both the state and the defendant can cross-examine the expert. The basis for admitting it into evidence is not specifically articulated, although the court's view of the accuracy of the polygraph is somewhat restrained: In sum, despite very significant progress in recent years, the field of polygraphy is still challenged forcefully on theoretical grounds and has yet to achieve a predictable level of consistency among examiners. For these reasons we do not believe that at this time polygraph test results should be generally admissible in evidence in criminal trials. [365 Mass. at 429, 313 N.E.2d at 125] Curiously, it might be thought that once the Valdez written stipulation theory was abandoned, the door would be opened to permit the polygraph test to be accepted on its own merits. In the subsequent case of Commonwealth v. Stewart, 377 N.E.2d 693, 697 (Mass.1978), the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that a defendant could not first take a polygraph test and then move its admission. Following what might be termed a Russian roulette theory of admissibility of polygraph tests, the court held that the defendant must elect to agree in advance that the test would be admitted irrespective of the test results. While the proponents of the admissibility of the polygraph test assume its substantial accuracy, there is still confusion as to the exact function it plays. Some, analogizing it to other scientific tests, such as ballistic tests, blood samples and other chemical tests, urge its admissibility as a scientific test, but state it is not proof of any independent fact. [8] There can be little question that from a jury standpoint, the polygraph test as interpreted by the expert is independent proof of what often are the most critical facts in the case, that is, the guilt of the defendant. It must be kept in mind that the general interrogation approach on a polygraph examination is to ask the defendant a series of questions to which only yes or no responses are given. [9] Among the questions asked are those dealing directly with the crime involved: Did you murder Ralph Steinman?; Did you strike Ralph Steinman on the head with a blunt object?; [10] Did you intentionally cut Markle?; Did you intentionally swing a knife at Josephine Wait? [11] In this case, two of the questions were, Did you give Kenneth Morgan a cigarette of marijuana? and Did the cigarette you gave Kenneth Morgan contain marijuana? Obviously, when the jury hears testimony from the polygraph expert that the polygraph test showed the defendant lied when he responded No to the question, Did you murder Ralph Steinman?, the jury's conclusion will be that his true answer was Yes. This result inexorably follows from the basic theory of the polygraph that it measures the physiological responses of the subject which cannot be masked when he lies. It is this spontaneous physiological response as interpreted by the expert which forms an independent fact of a scientific nature. Thus, to close the illustration, the independent scientific fact proved by the polygraph test is not merely that the defendant lied when he answered No to the question, Did you murder Ralph Steinman?, but that the true answer is Yes, as established by his physiological reaction. [12] We cannot view the test from any other standpoint and none of the reasons advanced for its limited admissibility square with the underlying function of the test. We are persuaded that despite the assertions of the scientific nature of the test, much depends on the subjective analysis of the test results by its operator. We know of no scientific test conventionally admitted by the courts which carries such a high degree of interpretative subjectivity. The insanity defense is peripherally analogous, but no machine is represented as testing scientifically the presence of insanity. The issue of insanity is ultimately a jury question, based usually on the conflicting testimony of experts. Here, the polygraph machine resolves the issue, unless we recognize that its results are subject to differing interpretations by polygraph experts, which is a frank admission of the fallibility of the experts' interpretation. Additionally, it might be recognized that multiple polygraph tests on the same subject can produce opposite results. This, of course, would cast doubt upon the accuracy of the machine, as well as that of the operator. [13] Undoubtedly, the issue of admissibility of polygraph tests could be resolved (much like the insanity issue) by recognizing the independent testimonial quality of the test as interpreted by the expert, and by permitting each side to offer its own test results, no matter how divergent from the other party's, leaving the entire resolution to the good judgment of the jury. However, the advocates of admissibility are strangely silent on recommending this approach, possibly because this would be a tacit admission that the test is not really scientific. In the final analysis, we do not accept the current legal theories under which courts have permitted the limited introduction of polygraph tests. There is the silent premise that these courts do not really believe the polygraph to be a scientifically accurate test such that it can be admitted as can other scientific tests. Consequently, admissibility is restricted on rather artificial grounds. We do acknowledge that the basic concept of a polygraph test rests on the principle that it measures a person's physiological reactions. We do not, however, readily accept the further premise that the polygraph expert plays a neutral role in the interpretation of the test results. Nor do we find any court or commentator who acknowledges the reality that the polygraph is designed to establish by independent measurement the physiological response of the subject which, when interpreted by the operator on critical questions involving the commission of the crime, forms a separate testimonial basis of the facts relating to the crime. Perhaps the reason such reality is not openly acknowledged is that the polygraph test would have to be admitted. But if such tests are to be openly admitted on the foregoing basis, then each side must be free to develop and seek admission of contrary polygraph tests. The trial courts would then be subject to a plethora of collateral questions, which can only result in multiplying the possibility of reversible error. [14] Moreover, the only virtue of the polygraph test, that it produces the same scientifically accurate result each time it is administered notwithstanding different operators or machines, would be destroyed. Since we refuse to accept the artificial theory of admitting a polygraph on the basis of an agreed stipulation and on the basis the results relate only to credibility, and reject for the reasons stated the admission of the polygraph as a scientific test, we must conclude that the polygraph is not admissible in this State.