Opinion ID: 1764168
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable statutes and previous Missouri case law

Text: The general public policy statement in Missouri's employment security law, chapter 288, must first be considered. Section 288.020, RSMo 2000, [4] provides: Public policy declaredconstruction of law: 1. As a guide to the interpretation and application of this law, the public policy of this state is declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to health, morals, and welfare of the people of this state resulting in a public calamity. The legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of this state require the enactment of this measure, under the police powers of the state, for compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own. 2. This law shall be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose to promote employment security both by increasing opportunities for jobs through the maintenance of a system of public employment offices and by providing for the payment of compensation to individuals in respect to their unemployment. (italicized emphasis added). The statute to be applied, section 288.050.1, states the conditions for when an otherwise eligible claimant for unemployment benefits may be disqualified. As pertinent here, it provides: 1. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this law, a claimant shall be disqualified for waiting week credit or benefits until after the claimant has earned wages for work insured pursuant to the unemployment compensation laws of any state equal to ten times the claimant's weekly benefit amount if the deputy finds: (1) That the claimant has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work or to the claimant's employer. Section 288.050.1 (emphasis added). No definition of voluntarily is stated. Missouri courts have interpreted section 288.050.1(1) in various factual circumstances. Many cases have addressed the situation where a personal illness is coupled with another element, such as lack of notice to the employer, and have concluded that the absence was voluntary. In Reutzel v. Missouri Division of Employment Security, 955 S.W.2d 239, 240-41 (Mo.App. 1997), a claimant was absent because of personal illness, and he failed to contact the employer to give notice of that absence. The court there found the absence to be voluntary. Id. at 242. See also Turner v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n of Mo., 793 S.W.2d 191 (Mo.App. 1990) (voluntary quit found when, after checking out of hospital, claimant did not then return to work and gave no notice of this when there was a policy requiring notice). Other cases, such as Duffy v. Labor & Industrial Relations Commission, 556 S.W.2d 195 (Mo.App.1977), addressed section 288.050.1(1) in the context of an employee's personal illness when the employee affirmatively resigned because of that illness. The Duffy court held that the claimant left work voluntarily. Id. at 198. In addressing its particular factual circumstances, the Duffy decision and its progeny include broad propositions that reach beyond the particular facts in those cases. For example, Duffy states that [p]ersonal illness of the employee unrelated to her employment will not render termination involuntary unless the illness was caused or aggravated by the work or the employer. Id. (concluding that the lack of a causal connection between work and the illness meant that the claimant must be held as a matter of law to have left her job voluntarily). Duffy also cites Bussmann Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 335 S.W.2d 456 (Mo.App. 1960), in support of its reasoning on this point. Duffy, 556 S.W.2d at 198. In Bussmann , a pregnant employee who was refused an official leave of absence was deemed to have left work voluntarily. [5] Bussmann, 335 S.W.2d at 461. The court applied section 288.050.1(1) under that distinct factual scenario and came to its conclusion by interpreting the language without good cause attributable to such work or to the claimant's employer as defining voluntarily, even though nothing in the syntax suggested a definitional relationship. See id. at 460. Notably, however, other Missouri cases have not followed the reasoning in Duffy , Bussmann , and their progeny. Trail v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, 540 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Mo.App.1976), construed section 288.050.1(1) as follows: three issues are generally presented: (1) Was there a voluntary quitting? (2) If so, was it with good cause? (3) If both of the foregoing are found, was the good cause attributable to claimant's work or his employer? [6] This approach has been applied in some Missouri cases when a claimant leaves work for non-work-related reasons, such as personal illness. See Miller v. NuCrown, Inc., 238 S.W.3d 233, 235 (Mo. App.2007) (finding that termination was not voluntary when claimant followed her company's policy for calling in sick but was fired for her absence nevertheless); see also Miller v. Help at Home, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Mo.App.2006) (stating that it is the employee's burden to show that either he did not leave employment voluntarily, or, that if he did, he did so with good cause).