Opinion ID: 1954091
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Patrol Vehicle Was Furnished for Regular Use

Text: [¶ 8] The threshold issue in this case is whether the patrol vehicle was furnished for the regular use of you, your spouse or any relative. If we conclude that the policy exclusion does not apply to the patrol vehicle, then we need not evaluate whether the regular use exclusion is valid under Maine's UM statute, 24-A M.R.S. § 2902(1). [¶ 9] In interpreting this policy provision, both parties fail to address what meaning, if any, to ascribe to the fact that Montagna stole the patrol vehicle from Pease before injuring him with it. We find this fact to be dispositive. At the moment Montagna stole the vehicle, it stopped being a vehicle furnished for the deputy's use, and was simply a stolen vehicle. [¶ 10] We find that a construction of the policy that excludes vehicles stolen from the insured from the regular use exclusion is consistent with the legislative intent . . . to benefit all insured motorists by throwing the burden of compensating for injuries which would otherwise go without redress from the individual victim to the insurance industry for a premium. Wescott, 397 A.2d at 166. [¶ 11] Our decision is also in accordance with other jurisdictions that have confronted the UM coverage issue of the insured being injured by an uninsured stealing the insured's own car. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nissen, 851 P.2d 165, 167-68 (Colo.1993) (concluding that where insured was severely injured while attempting to stop thief from stealing car, and insurer denied coverage on ground that thief was nonpermissive user of car, insured's car became uninsured motor vehicle eligible for coverage); see Comet Cas. Co. v. Jackson, 125 Ill.App.3d 921, 81 Ill.Dec. 569, 467 N.E.2d 269 (1984) (concluding that insured's automobile was uninsured for purposes of UM coverage claim for injuries resulting from being struck by unknown thief while trying to prevent theft of automobile); Am. Prot. Ins. Co. v. Parker, 150 Ga.App. 732, 258 S.E.2d 540, 544 (1979) (permitting UM coverage for insured who granted and subsequently withdrew permission to drive automobile to uninsured, and was subsequently attacked and run over by uninsured after withdrawal of permission); Longo v. Market Transition Facility of N.J., 326 N.J.Super. 316, 741 A.2d 149, 152-53 (App.Div.1999) (concluding that an intoxicated passenger's car driven by a thief or joy rider was an uninsured motor vehicle and not a vehicle furnished for regular use because a literal application would produce absurd result of denying UM coverage for a passenger who is a victim of a car-jacking); see also Guiberson v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 217 Mont. 279, 704 P.2d 68, 74 (1985) (concluding that UM coverage was available for employee injured while attempting to stop thief from stealing delivery truck because exclusion of innocent insured from coverage violated public policy); Fontanez v. Texas Farm Bureau Ins. Cos., 840 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tx.App.1992) (concluding that UM coverage available for insured struck and killed by uninsured thief attempting to steal vehicle because contrary interpretation would violate purpose and intent behind UM statute). Accordingly, the UM regular use policy exclusion is inapplicable in this case, and we do not address whether the exclusion is valid under Maine's UM statute. The entry is: Summary judgment vacated and remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. SILVER, J., concurring. [¶ 12] I concur in the result but not in the reasoning of the Court. The Court very narrowly interprets the State Farm policy in order to avoid a conflict with the uninsured motorist statute. I would find that the regular use exclusion violates the uninsured motorist statute. I also write to point out that Lincoln County did not provide UM coverage to Officer Pease. [¶ 13] The purpose of section 2902 is to permit an insured injured person the same recovery which would have been available to [him or] her had the tortfeasor been insured to the same extent as the injured party. Skidgell v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 1997 ME 149, ¶ 8, 697 A.2d 831, 833. The statute does not refer to exclusions at all, and we have said that we will not sanction reductions in coverage for which the Legislature has not provided. See id. ¶ 9, 697 A.2d at 834. Thus, even if the exclusionary language in State Farm's policy is explicit and unambiguous, it cannot prevail if it is contrary to the UM statute or public policy. See id. ¶ 7, 697 A.2d at 833. [¶ 14] In accordance with these principles, we have never upheld any other exclusion to UM coverage outside some variation on the owned-uninsured exception, despite State Farm's suggestions to the contrary. Quite the opposite, Maine courts have repeatedly held that insurers may not limit UM coverage by adding restrictive language to their UM policies. Policy exclusions have thus been invalidated if they restrict the right of an insured to recover damages under the UM statute. See, e.g., Butterfield v. Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2004 ME 124, ¶ 2, 860 A.2d 861, 862 (holding that an insurer may not restrict UM coverage to claims brought by named insureds for only those injuries sustained by named insureds, as opposed to any individual for whom a named insured is legally entitled to bring a claim); Skidgell, 1997 ME 149, ¶ 6, 697 A.2d at 833 (providing that an insurance company cannot limit UM coverage to passengers in a car, as opposed to a motorcycle); Young v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 535 A.2d 417, 420 (Me.1987) (invalidating the governmental vehicle exclusion because the statute mandates coverage for all uninsured motorists, without differentiating between financially responsible and financially irresponsible drivers); Dufour v. Metro. Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 438 A.2d 1290, 1291 (Me.1982) (recognizing that a pedestrian may recover damages under her UM coverage for injuries caused by the negligence of an uninsured motorist); Wescott v. Allstate Ins., 397 A.2d 156, 167-70 (Me.1979) (finding that the no-consent-to-settlement and excess-escape exclusionary clauses were void as against public policy and in contravention of the uninsured motorist statute); Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2003 WL 1618565, 2003 Me.Super. Lexis 18 (Jan. 27, 2003) (holding that the UM statute permits recovery for injuries sustained while riding a bicycle). [¶ 15] Judicial decisions in several states hold that a regular use exclusion in UM coverage is invalid because UM coverage is portable under all circumstances. Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee, 234 Wis.2d 587, 610 N.W.2d 467, 471 (2000) (quotation marks omitted); see also Niemann v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 143 Wis.2d 73, 420 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Ct.App.1988). Viewing UM coverage as limited personal accident insurance, these courts emphasize that UM coverage is available at all times and under all circumstances when a named insured sustains injury caused by accident as a result of an uninsured automobile. Bilbrey v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., 495 S.W.2d 375, 376 (Tex.Civ.App.1973). Unlike liability coverage, UM coverage inures to the person, not the vehicle. Gibbs v. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co., 938 S.W.2d 600, 606 (Mo.Ct.App.1997). [¶ 16] Such reasoning comports with the policy and purpose of Maine's UM statute. Maine precedent has ensured that UM coverage extends to pedestrians, bicyclists, and other insured who are injured while not in their owned-insured vehicle. Construing the UM statute broadly to prohibit such exclusions follows the legislative intent to close coverage gaps rather than endorse patchwork policies that leave responsible, insured consumers without the protection they have paid for. As the majority notes, [t]he legislative intent is to benefit all insured motorists by throwing the burden of compensating for injuries which would otherwise go without redress from the individual victim to the insurance industry for a premium. Wescott, 397 A.2d at 166. [¶ 17] If Lincoln County were able to provide UM coverage to on-duty officers, it is unlikely that Pease's claim would ever have reached this Court. It is important to note that many law enforcement officers do not have UM coverage on their patrol vehicles. Therefore, they are denied traditional personal injury protections when involved in an automobile accident with an underinsured driver.