Opinion ID: 1323972
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appropriateness of the Preliminary Injunction

Text: The Developer asserts that the Master erred in granting the preliminary injunction because Scratch Golf did not present sufficient evidence to establish that injunctive relief was appropriate. We agree. An injunction is a drastic remedy issued by the court in its discretion to prevent irreparable harm suffered by the plaintiff. Flanagan, S.C. Civil Procedure, 507 (2d ed.1996). For a preliminary injunction to be granted, the plaintiff must establish that (1) it would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted: (2) it will likely succeed on the merits of the litigation; and (3) there is an inadequate remedy at law. County of Richland v. Simpkins, 348 S.C. 664, 669, 560 S.E.2d 902, 904 (Ct.App.2002). Although Scratch Golf may be able to satisfy elements 1 and 2, it cannot satisfy element 3 because there was an alternative remedy at law available for Scratch Golf: the statutory remedy of attachment. Therefore, an injunction was not the appropriate remedy. At the preliminary injunction hearings, Scratch Golf argued that if an injunction were not granted, it would suffer irreparable harm having no adequate legal remedy to recover the proceeds from the sale of Dunes West in order to satisfy the potential judgment it would have against the Developer. Scratch Golf feared that the Developer's $1 million umbrella insurance policy, the Property Owner's Association $1 million umbrella insurance policy, or any leftover proceeds from the sale of the development would not be available to satisfy a judgment. Scratch Golf further argued that even if there were leftover proceeds from the sale, the Developer would take the proceeds out of the state to invest elsewhere, making it difficult for Scratch Golf to recover its judgment interest from those proceeds. This argument that Scratch Golf asserted  that once it receives a money judgment from its contract and tort action, it may have difficulty collecting from the Developer because the Developer may take its assets and run out of the state  is not proper justification for why a preliminary injunction should be issued but rather is justification for the statutory remedy of attachment. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-19-10 (2003), the attachment statute, provides: In any action: (8) When any person or corporation is about to remove any of his or its property from this State, or has assigned, disposed of or secreted or is about to assign, dispose of or secrete any of his or its property with intent to defraud creditors as mentioned in this chapter; The plaintiff at the time of issuing the summons or any time afterwards may have the property of such defendant or corporation attached, in the manner prescribed in this chapter, as a security for the satisfaction of such judgment as the plaintiff may recover. As this Court has stated, [t]he purpose of attachment generally is to take a defendants property into legal custody so that it may be applied to the plaintiffs debt, when established. John Deere Plow Co. of St. Louis v. L.D. Jennings, Inc., 203 S.C. 426, 27 S.E.2d 571, 572 (1943). [A]n attachment is merely a provisional remedy in aid of an action, and hence, to make it available, an action must be commenced in regular form. Williamson v. Eastern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 54 S.C. 582, 32 S.E. 765, 770 (1899) (citation omitted). We find Scratch Golf's argument that a preliminary injunction was necessary to protect its pre-judgment interest in the Developer's property should have been an argument justifying the necessity of an attachment. Due to the confusing and unusual posture of this case, we remand this matter to the Master so that the parties may argue the merits of whether an attachment  not an injunction  may be litigated pursuant to the attachment statute.