Opinion ID: 6970658
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State Laiv Claims

Text: The Singh plaintiffs’ common law claims for rescission, negligence, wrongful death, conspiracy to defraud, breach of contract, and fraud are all preempted by the Warsaw ■ Convention. It is now well-established that “[a]ll state law claims that fall within the scope of the Convention are preempted.” Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir.1998) (citing Lockerbie I, 928 F.2d at 1273); see Coker v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (In re Pan American Corp.), 950 F.2d 839, 847 (2d Cir.1991) (transferee court in Second Circuit must apply preemption law as construed by the Second Circuit). This is because the Convention had two primary goals: first, to establish uniformity in the aviation industry with regard to the procedure for dealing with claims arising out of international transportation and the substantive law applicable to such claims ... [and] second— clearly the overriding purpose — to limit air carriers’ potential liability in the event of accidents. Lockerbie I, 928 F.2d at 1270 (quotation marks omitted).. Moreover, “[t]he existence of the state causes of action would not only result in the inconsistent application of law to the same accident, but also would cause enormous confusion for airlines in predicting the law upon which they would be called to respond.” Id. at 1276. All of the Singh plaintiffs’ common law claims are “within the scope” of Article 17 of the Convention, in that they all seek damages for “the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger” caused by an “accident ... on board [an] aircraft” in international transportation. Convention, arts. 1, 17; see Fishman, 132 F.3d at 141. Because all of the Singh plaintiffs’ common law claims are preempted by the Warsaw Convention, we have no need to address the second arrow in defendants’ preemption quiver: the questionable contention that somehow all of plaintiffs’ state claims implicate state laws or regulations “having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier,” and are therefore preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1993), reconstituted in 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). See generally American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 115 S.Ct. 817, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992). IV. Challenge to the Trial Judge’s Conduct All of the plaintiffs ai'gue that the trial judge committed reversible error by improperly questioning witnesses before the jury. In reviewing a challenge to a trial judge’s conduct, we determine not “whether the trial judge’s conduct left something to be desired, or even whether some comments would have been better left unsaid[, but] ... whether the judge’s behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [a party] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.” United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 343 (2d Cir.1993) (quotation marks omitted). Our statement of this legal standard in no sense should be taken to detract from our counsel that, of course, “a court must strive for ‘that atmosphere of perfect impartiality which is so much to be desired in a judicial proceeding,’ ” Santa Maria v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 81 F.3d 265, 273 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 82, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942)), and “must be especially cautious and circumspect in language and conduct during a jury trial.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Although “asking numerous and probing questions of witnesses” is “unquestionably proper,” a “trial judge should limit questioning to inquiries necessary to clarify ambiguities, correct misstatements, or obtain information necessary to make rulings,” United States v. Manko, 979 F.2d 900, 905 (2d Cir.1992), and “[w]e will reverse on the basis of a judge’s improper remarks if the judge expresses [his] opinion on an ultimate issue of fact in front of the jury or [argues] for one of the parties.” Causey v. Zinke (In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia), 871 F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir.1989) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). “[I]t is only after an examination of the entire record,” however, “that we can come to a conclusion about the conduct of the district court.” Manko, 979 F.2d at 905-06 (quotation marks omitted). Of the many examples cited by plaintiffs, the trial judge’s conduct in the jury’s presence was troublesome only in the judge’s questioning of plaintiffs’ principal airport security expert, Isaac Yeffet, a former head of El A1 security, as follows: THE COURT: Do you have an opinion as to what the state of security was at Karachi Airport on September 5,1986? THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: What is that opinion? THE WITNESS: That if terrorists— THE COURT: No, no, what is that opinion — not if, not hypothetically what could happen — as to the state of security at that airport? THE WITNESS: That they cannot near the aircraft stop terrorists who is [sic] coming to attack or to hijack the aircraft. THE COURT: That is not an .opinion, That is just your statement that they couldn’t prevent what happened. THE WITNESS: That’s right. THE COURT: I take it you have very good security on the West Bank, isn’t that correct, in Israel? THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: Troops all over the place? THE WITNESS: Yes. THE COURT: Somebody went into a mosque and shot 60 people. So what I am saying to you is, I ask you for your opinion of the nature of security. Was it good, bad, or indifferent? That is what I want to know. That is what they need to know. THE WITNESS: Your Honor, very bad. Trial Tr. at 1057-58. The trial judge’s reference to the Hebron massacre, 4 while arguably a legitimate effort to draw a proper expert opinion from Yeffet, could also have improperly suggested to the jury that, if “very good security on the West Bank” could not prevent the Hebron massacre, then the Pan Am hijacking would have occurred even had Pan Am fulfilled its promises of improved security. The trial judge compounded this error when, in response to Yeffet’s contention that Pan Am should have had more armed guards surrounding the plane on the tarmac, the district court stated: THE COURT: [Y]ou are an expert in this field, but I have flown and Lam sure other people have flown. I don’t have any recollection of having seen armed guards in most of the airplanes I have flown in that are flown by airlines. What I am asking you is this: As of September 5, 1986, was it common practice for airlines at that time to have armed guards, them own paid armed guards in the terminal, in the airport? THE WITNESS: They had armed guards— THE COURT: But were they employed by the airlines or were they soldiers? THE WITNESS: No, they were from the .local authorities, and some of them that had air marshals, they were on the spot until-their aircraft took off. THE COURT: But would it be fair to say that most airlines at September 5, 1986, did not employ armed guards to patrol the airline terminals? Is that true? THE ■ WITNESS: I cannot say most of them employed. But I can say that the local authorities, with the cooperation with the head of security of those airlines, they provide them armed guards to secure their flight. THE COURT: But normally the armed guhrds, the people who patrol the terminals, are supplied by the local military authorities or local civilian authorities? THE WITNESS: Correct. THE COURT: At least that is what I have seen, and tell me if I am right. THE WITNESS: You are correct. Id. at 1062-63. Apparently disbelieving Yef-fet’s expert opinion that Pan Am should have employed armed guards and that such armed guards may have prevented the hijacking, the trial judge continued to question Yeffet during plaintiffs’ direct examination: THE COURT: What I am saying to you is — and I have asked you the question five times and I have gotten the same answer all five times — the one thing you say Pan .Am should have had was more armed guards — at least five, as I heard your testimony. THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor, upwards of six. THE COURT: How long would it take a hijacker with a machine gun to dispatch five armed guards? THE WITNESS: What do you mean to dispatch? THE COURT: Shoot them. THE WITNESS: All this action is a question of seconds. THE COURT: I know. THE WITNESS: Now, if I have armed guard professionals, some of them with uniforms, some of them without uniforms, and they are aware why they are in the position, once the terrorists are coming with their car, they might kill one or two, but we still have professional armed guards to give the answer to kill the four terrorists. THE COURT: It depends how good they are. If they are as good as these highly trained, specialized commando types that El A1 employs, I guess you have one scenario. But if they are ordinary soldiers, you have another? THE WITNESS: They [the security persons at Karachi] are not even soldiers, your Honor. THE COURT: But these people testified that they are highly trained commando types, are they.not? THE WITNESS: When any other airlines decides [sic] already to have armed guards— THE COURT: I think I have your opinion. Id. at 1069-70. The trial judge’s own experiences with airlines and his opinion as to whether El A1 commandos or ordinary soldiers would have prevented the Pan Am hijacking are plainly of no relevance to the jury. We cannot say that the above colloquies reflected “questioning [limited] to inquiries necessary to clarify ambiguities, correct misstatements, or obtain' information necessary to make rulings,” Manko, 979 F.2d at 905, and indeed they approach the tone of a cross-examination on behalf of defendants. Moreover, the trial judge’s questioning went to the issue of causation, upon which the jury ultimately found in favor of defendants. During the six-week trial and many thousands of pages of testimony, however, the district court did not otherwise engage in improper questioning in front of the jury. Although a very close issue, upon “examination of the entire record” in this particular case, see Manko, 979 F.2d at 905-906, and given the trial judge’s otherwise proper conduct in front of the jury throughout the entire six-week trial, we decline to vacate the judgment of the district court based upon the trial judge’s questioning of Yeffet. Plaintiffs also point to a number of remarks made by the trial judge to counsel out of the jury’s presence as evidence of the district court’s bias against plaintiffs'. For example, after the trial judge forbade one of the plaintiffs lawyers from speaking and suggested that he go to “a- trial practice school,” the judge stated to another plaintiffs lawyer: THE COURT: If you want to improve his career, tell the firm to send him to a trial practice seminar so he learns something about the rudiments of asking a question, the rudiments of what arguments to make to a judge, what arguments not to make to a judge.... [COUNSEL]: I don’t want to focus on a narrow issue. I understand what you are saying. I understand. I have heard it. THE COURT: He doesn’t know how to ■ try a case, in my view. [COUNSEL]: I want you to know that, with my experience and my confidence in [plaintiffs’ counsel], nothing has been done to undermine that confidence in him. THE COURT: ■ That may be. That may only prove that you are more obdurate than you should be. Frankly, when I was a partner at a law firm, I took criticisms of federal judges more seriously than that and I paid more attention to it, which is probably why I learned more than you did. The fact of the matter is that if a federal judge with my trial experience and my judicial experience and my record as a practicing lawyer before I came here, if that opinion is so unimportant to you, maybe that explains why he is as bad as he is. Trial Tr. at 2780-82; ■ Other similar comments, also outside the-jury’s presence, are cited by the plaintiffs. To be sure, the foregoing remarks are tough medicine, not of the sort an attorney likes to hear, and perhaps their message — that the trial attorney’s- performance was below par and in serious need of improvement — could have been conveyed in a less acerbic manner. If the remarks had been made in the jury’s presence, we would be concerned that they might have been taken by the jury as reflecting an opinion by the judge on the merits of plaintiffs’ case. But the jury did not hear' them and we will not second-guess the trial judge’s belief that the attorney’s performance warranted the rebuke. In our view, the remarte are indicative not of judicial bias, but rather of the judge’s legitimate concern over the attorney’s performance at trial. Because the remarks were made outside of the jury’s presence and did not otherwise impede the fairness of the proceedings, they did not influence or prejudice the trial in any way, and we therefore decline to vacate the district court’s judgment on that basis. Cf. Santa Maria, 81 F.3d at 275 (ordering new trial because of trial judge’s prejudicial comments in jury’s presence).