Opinion ID: 200517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Existence of a Private Right of Action.

Text: 27 Hannaford's initial response is that a single incident of discrimination is insufficient to support a private right of action under Title III of the ADA. In mounting this argument, Hannaford does not challenge the district court's ruling that Dudley had standing to bring his Title III suit. See Dudley I, 146 F.Supp.2d at 85-86. 2 Rather, Hannaford attacks the court's closely related determination, id. at 85, that the language of section 12188(a)(1) is broad enough to provide a private right of action for an individual who suffered a single incident of discrimination. 28 To the extent that this argument rests on the proposition that Title III is not intended to provide redress for past discrimination that is unlikely to recur, it is well-founded. Section 12188(a)(1) of the ADA incorporates the remedies set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a). That compendium of remedies allows only injunctive relief (as opposed to money damages). See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968) (per curiam). It therefore requires some ongoing harm (or, at least, a colorable threat of future harm). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (permitting a civil action for injunctive relief whenever there are reasonable grounds to believe that any person is about to engage in any [prohibited] act or practice ) (emphasis supplied). Otherwise, an injunction would be pointless. 29 Dudley envisions the persistence of Hannaford's refusal to reconsider policy as an ongoing harm. But Dudley never attempted to purchase alcoholic beverages at the Gardiner Shop `n Save either before or after the night in question, and Hannaford asserts that Dudley, in order to establish an ongoing harm, must prove that a subsequent effort on his part to purchase alcoholic beverages at the Gardiner store would have been a futile gesture. Id. § 12188(a)(1). Without this embellishment, Hannaford says, Dudley is not being subjected to discrimination on a current basis, as Title III requires. 30 The proposition that Hannaford advances — that a disabled person must subject himself to repeated instances of discrimination in order to invoke the remedial framework of Title III of the ADA — turns the language of section 12188(a)(1) on its head. The futile gesture provision is designed to protect a disabled plaintiff from having to shoulder an undue evidentiary burden. Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.2002). Yet Hannaford's rendition of the provision converts it into one that creates just such a burden. We do not believe that establishing a private right of action under Title III requires a plaintiff to perform such heroic measures. 31 Under Title III of the ADA, courts typically have gauged the discriminatory effect of a policy or practice by the degree to which that policy or practice denies access to a disabled individual, not merely by the specific instances in which the policy or practice frustrates the individual. See, e.g., id. at 1136-37 (holding that a disabled individual suffers an injury once he has become aware of discriminatory conditions existing at a public accommodation... and is thereby deterred from visiting or patronizing that accommodation); Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that a disabled individual may invoke Title III to demand that a building be brought into compliance with the ADA even though he only entered the building once). In these cases, the existence of a private right of action under section 12188(a)(1) does not depend upon how many attempts a plaintiff has made to overcome a discriminatory barrier, but, rather, upon whether the barrier remains in place. 32 Our analysis, however, cannot stop there. This is not a physical barrier case and, as Hannaford correctly observes, the likelihood that Dudley would be denied a future right to purchase necessarily turns on an informed prophecy about a store clerk's subjective judgment. Moreover, Hannaford suggests that the evening in question may have been atypical both because it was a Saturday night and because it followed a grueling move that may have exacerbated Dudley's symptoms. Were Dudley to come into the Gardiner store at a more tranquil time or after a less harrowing day, this thesis runs, he might not encounter the same difficulties. 33 This idiosyncratic fact pattern distinguishes the case at hand from the mine-run of Title III cases (like the prototypical physical barrier cases). To the extent that those other cases enter into a discussion of probabilities, that discussion usually occurs in the context of determining whether a particular plaintiff enjoys standing to launch a Title III claim. Consequently, the court scrutinizes the likelihood that a plaintiff, absent the barrier, would have frequented the public accommodation in the future. See, e.g., Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1138; Schroedel v. NYU Med. Ctr., 885 F.Supp. 594, 598-99 (S.D.N.Y.1995). Although those cases do not involve a direct inquiry as to whether the practice that blocked access once would do so again, they nonetheless articulate a standard that can be tailored to fit the unusual dimensions of the instant case. 34 As a general matter, recent Title III cases have required plaintiffs to show a real and immediate threat that a particular (illegal) barrier will cause future harm. See, e.g., Steger, 228 F.3d at 892; Deck v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 121 F.Supp.2d 1292, 1299 (D.Haw.2000); Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906 F.Supp. 317, 321 (E.D.Va.1995); Schroedel, 885 F.Supp. at 599; Aikins v. St. Helena Hosp., 843 F.Supp. 1329, 1333 (N.D.Cal.1994). This standard has been adapted from generic Supreme Court precedents discussing whether a plaintiff has standing to protest a particular injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing includes suffering an injury in fact that is actual or imminent) (citations omitted); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (requiring a plaintiff requesting injunctive relief to establish a real and immediate threat that illegal conduct will occur); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974) (Abstract injury is not enough.... The injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.) (citations omitted). Even though no court has yet employed this standard to determine whether a plaintiff has a private right of action under section 12188(a)(1), we deem it an appropriate way to answer that inquiry. 35 Applying that standard, we conclude that Dudley has shown a real and immediate threat of ongoing harm. After all, the offending policy remains firmly in place; there is no dispute that Dudley, having just moved to a small town, would have been likely to patronize the Gardiner Shop `n Save; and the symptoms of his disability continue to mimic the side effects of intoxication. Moreover, three Hannaford employees (Donnell, Cookson, and Fossett) all independently concluded that Dudley was inebriated. These facts suggest that Hannaford is overstating the degree of randomness involved in a store clerk's perceptions. Notably, even Hannaford does not venture to predict a different result if the contributing circumstances of February 27 — when a weary Dudley entered the store on a Saturday night — were to recur. 36 We hasten to add that Dudley's experience on that evening was not wholly unique. The record shows three other incidents that are informative (even though none of them involved a Hannaford store). The first two occurred prior to February 27, 1999. In each instance, a sales clerk mistook Dudley's disability for intoxication and, before receiving an explanation, refused to sell him alcohol. On the third occasion (after the events of February 27, 1999), a sales clerk again rebuffed Dudley in an attempt to purchase alcoholic beverages. On all three occasions, Dudley explained the situation and the store relented. If these establishments adhered to a strict refusal to reconsider policy, similar to Hannaford's, Dudley's efforts to purchase liquor would have been thwarted. Thus, while there is no absolute certainty that Dudley would be denied the right to purchase alcoholic beverages during a future visit to the Gardiner Shop `n Save, the likelihood of a denial seems substantial. No more is exigible to support a Title III right of action. 37 This conclusion rests, in part, on the background understanding that section 12188(a)(1) negates any requirement that a disabled person engage in a futile gesture to establish the existence of a discriminatory policy or practice. See Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1136-37 (explaining that when a disabled plaintiff has actual knowledge of an illegal barrier at a public accommodation and is thereby deterred, he need not engage in the futile gesture of attempting to gain access to show ongoing harm); Steger, 228 F.3d at 892 (similar). We have scant case law to guide us on how futile a gesture must be to satisfy this benchmark, 3 but Congress clearly meant not to overburden Title III claimants. This is evident from the fact that Title III's remedies mirror those contained in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In enacting the latter statute, Congress evinced its understanding that enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance. Newman, 390 U.S. at 401, 88 S.Ct. 964. It is fair to assume that Congress had the same understanding when it enacted Title III of the ADA. See generally H.R. Rep 101-485(II), at 126 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 409 (noting Congress's explicit intention to make [section 12188(a)(1)] consistent with title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Limiting Title III relief to instances in which a future violation appears certain to occur would create a standard far more demanding than that contemplated by the congressional objectives that influenced the ADA. 38 To sum up, the question before us is whether Dudley has proffered enough evidence to establish a real and immediate threat that Hannaford's policy will again result in a Title III violation. Given the remedial purpose underlying the ADA, courts should resolve doubts about such questions in favor of disabled individuals. See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 861 (1st Cir.1998); see also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336, 88 S.Ct. 548, 19 L.Ed.2d 564 (1967) (recognizing the familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes). So viewed, we think that the record shows a sufficient probability of a repeat occurrence, and, in any event, Hannaford points to nothing suggesting that Dudley would be treated differently if the circumstances of February 27 were replicated today. Although the issue is close, we therefore hold that section 12188 provides Dudley with a private right of action. 39