Opinion ID: 73897
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 13 As an initial matter, we must determine whether the district court had jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims. The parties have briefed extensively numerous jurisdictional issues focusing particularly on whether IIRIRA's amendments to the INA's scheme for the judicial review of immigration matters altered the district court's jurisdiction over this case. We hold that this case is governed by IIRIRA's transitional rules, and therefore, the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims. Under the INA before IIRIRA's amendments, the Supreme Court and this Court recognized that not all challenges to INS actions were committed exclusively to the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir.1984), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846, 105 S.Ct. 2992, 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985); Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). Because Plaintiffs' claims are within the narrow category of claims that the pre-IIRIRA INA did not exclusively commit to the jurisdiction of the court of appeals, the district court did not err in resting its jurisdiction on McNary, Jean and Smith. Likewise, because IIRIRA's transitional provisions, rather than IIRIRA's complete amendments to the INA, govern jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims, IIRIRA did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction.9 In Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1033 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), this Court held that the exclusive judicial-review procedures under former INA § 106(a) did not apply to claims alleging a program, pattern or scheme by immigration officials to violate the constitutional rights of aliens. In reaching this conclusion, this Court first noted that INA § 106(a) vested exclusive jurisdiction in the court of appeals to review  'all final orders of deportation ... made against aliens within the United States pursuant to administrative proceedings under section 1252(b) [deportation hearings]....'  Id. at 1032 (quoting INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1982)). We reasoned that the INA's judicial-review procedures gave sole jurisdiction to the court of appeals over alleged procedural irregularities but only to the extent these 9 In concluding that the district court had jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims, this Court does not affirm or endorse the findings or reasoning of the district court in justifying its exercise of jurisdiction. Instead, we base our conclusion on the reasoning set out in this opinion. 14 irregularities may provide a basis for reversing an individual deportation order .... Id. at 1033 (emphasis in original). Thus, this Court in Smith recognized a distinction between (1) the court of appeals' jurisdiction over an individual alien's deportation proceedings and final deportation order and (2) a district court's jurisdiction over widespread allegations of constitutional violations by immigration officials: The distinction we draw is one between the authority of a court of appeals to pass upon the merits of an individual deportation order and any action in the deportation proceeding to the extent it may affect the merits determination, on the one hand, and on the other, the authority of a district court to wield its equitable powers when a wholesale, carefully orchestrated, program of constitutional violations is alleged. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1033 (finding cognizable in district-court claims challenging the constitutional adequacy of the INS' procedures for administering asylum applications). Similarly, in Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 980 (11th Cir.1984), this Court concluded that former INA § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b)(1984), did not preclude district-court jurisdiction over widespread abuses by immigration officials. We began by noting that INA § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b)(1984) provided that  'any alien against whom a final order of exclusion has been made heretofore or hereafter ... may obtain judicial review of such order by habeas corpus proceedings and not otherwise.'  Id. at 980 (emphasis in original) (quoting INA § 106(b)), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b)(1984). Essentially following the holding in Smith, this Court concluded that this limitation did not preclude the district court's jurisdiction over allegations that the INS wrongfully failed to give the plaintiffs notice of asylum. Id. To ensure that the exceptions from Smith and Jean did not swallow the general rule of the exclusivity of the INA's judicial-review procedures, in both cases, this Court carefully noted the limited nature of these exceptions to the exclusive-review provisions under the pre-IIRIRA INA. In Smith, we stated that [o]ur holding is not to be construed as permitting a constitutional challenge in the district court based on a procedural ruling in a deportation proceeding with which an alien is dissatisfied. 676 F.2d at 1033. We further noted that such an attempt to assert district-court jurisdiction would constitute an end-run around the administrative process and would be inconsistent with Congress' intent in enacting the INA's judicial-review 15 scheme. Id. Likewise, in Jean, we reiterated the limited nature of our holding. 727 F.2d at 980. We stress that our holding is a narrow one that should not be construed to permit judicial review of run-of-the-mill interlocutory procedural rulings by an immigration judge with which an alien happens to disagree. Id. After this Court decided Smith and Jean, the Supreme Court employed similar reasoning in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991). At issue in McNary were the judicial-review procedures governing INS decisions made regarding a special amnesty program for agricultural workers. These judicial-review provisions provided that [t]here shall be no administrative or judicial review of a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status under this section except in accordance with this subsection and that [t]here shall be judicial review of such denial only in the judicial review of an order of exclusion or deportation under section 1105a of this title [INA § 106 (providing for judicial review in the court of appeals) ]. McNary, 498 U.S. at 486 n. 6, 111 S.Ct. at 893 n. 6 (quoting INA §§ 210(e)(1) & (3)(A)). Relying heavily on the specific wording of these judicial-review provisions, the Court reasoned that the reference to a singular application for adjustment in INA § 210(e)(1) and a singular judicial review of such denial in INA § 210(e)(3)(A) indicated that these provisions governed jurisdiction over singular, individual amnesty applications and not general collateral challenges to unconstitutional practices and policies used by the agency in processing applications. Id.; see also Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 55, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993) (holding that provisions virtually identical to the provisions at issue in McNary did not preclude district-court jurisdiction over challenges to a regulation implementing an INS legalization program). In this appeal, Plaintiffs assert the type of class-wide challenges to INS practices that fall outside the pre-IIRIRA judicial-review scheme. Plaintiffs do not challenge the specific result in any single case and do not argue that any of the individual Plaintiffs would receive suspension of deportation if their applications received full consideration. Instead, Plaintiffs allege, and the district court found, that the application of the stop-time provision to the members of the Plaintiff class violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Thus, 16 Plaintiffs assert a program, pattern or scheme by immigration officials to violate the constitutional rights of aliens that is similar to the due-process claims in Smith and Jean. Accordingly, the district court did not err in its conclusion that the pre-IIRIRA INA did not require that Plaintiffs' claims be asserted through a petition for review in the court of appeals.10 The INS argues that INA § 242(g), which applies in transitional cases, precludes district-court jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims.11 The INS acknowledges the Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999), but nonetheless claims that INA § 242(g) precludes jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims. Despite the INS' arguments, INA § 242(g) does not apply to Plaintiffs' claims. The Supreme Court in American-Arab narrowly construed INA § 242(g) as applying only to the three discrete discretionary actions described in INA § 242(g)—the decision or action to (1) commence proceedings, (2) adjudicate cases, or (3) execute removal orders. 119 S.Ct. at 943. According to the Court, Congress had good reason to focus a particular statutory provision limiting judicial review of these types of claims. Id. at 943-44 (There was good reason for Congress to focus special attention upon, and make special provision for, judicial review of the Attorney General's discrete acts of 'commenc[ing] proceedings, adjudicat[ing] cases, [and] 10 At this point, we reemphasize that Plaintiffs and the INS agree that this case is governed by IIRIRA's transitional rules. Thus, most of IIRIRA's substantial revisions to the INA's judicial-review scheme do not apply to this case and do not govern jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims. Although contending the permanent rule in INA § 242(g) applies, the INS concedes that nothing in IIRIRA's transitional provisions altered the district court's jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. Moreover, as defined by the district court, the Plaintiff class also includes aliens who were subject to final deportation orders prior to IIRIRA. The deportation proceedings of these Plaintiffs are governed by INA § 106 without the transitional rule amendments. 11 INA § 242(g) provides that: Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (Supp.1998). 17 execut[ing] removal orders'—which represent the initiation or prosecution of various stages in the deportation process.) Plaintiffs' challenges to the application of the stop-time rule to pending applications for suspension involve constitutional challenges to legislation specifically mandating such an application of the stop-time rule. Plaintiffs' claims do not challenge the Attorney General's exercise of her discretion to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders. Thus, INA § 242(g) does not alter the jurisdiction, recognized by this Court in Smith and Jean, over class-wide allegations of constitutional violations by the INS. Having determined that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims, we now turn to whether the district court properly entered the preliminary injunction.