Opinion ID: 2375654
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Concord General policy

Text: [3] The Beans and Jonathan Miller also claim that Concord General is obligated to provide coverage under a family automobile policy issued to Jonathan Miller. Concord General contends that it is not required to defend or provide coverage for this accident because of an exclusionary clause stating that the policy does not apply to a non-owned automobile while maintained or used by any person while such person is employed or otherwise engaged in the automobile business of the insured or of any other person or organization. The trial court found that Miller was operating an auto which he did not own while he was employed in the automobile business of another person or organization. It went on to rule that a reasonable person in the position of the insured would understand that exclusion to apply to this situation, and held that Concord General was therefore not required to defend or provide coverage. See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Indem. Co., 116 N.H. 12, 351 A.2d 891 (1976); Case v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 105 N.H. 422, 201 A.2d 897 (1964). The trial court's decision constitutes a fair reading of the facts presented and the law in this State. The Beans urge us to interpret the phrase any person to mean any person except the named insured, which would result in coverage for Jonathan Miller in this case. If the company intended to exclude only use by any person except the named insured, it could easily have used that phrase. We cannot distort the plain language of the policy to reach that result. See Hanover Ins. Co. v. Grondin, 119 N.H. 394, 402 A.2d 174 (May 23, 1979); Auclair v. Allstate Co., 118 N.H. 626, 392 A.2d 1197 (1978). [4] Nor is Concord General required to provide the requested coverage by the terms of the Financial Responsibility Act. Because Miller was operating a non-owned automobile, coverage would be required, if at all, by RSA 268:1 VII(b). The trial court correctly ruled that coverage under that subparagraph is required only if no other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured. RSA 268:1 VII(b). We held above that Mr. Miller is covered by the Merchants Mutual policy of his employer. This case is therefore distinguishable from Liberty Mutual supra, which involved operation of a vehicle owned by the insured and therefore fell within RSA 268:1 VII(a), which has no such limiting clause. The limiting clause at issue here is applicable even though the other valid and collectible insurance is available solely because of the Financial Responsibility Act. Merchants Mutual Cas. Co. v. Tuttle, 98 N.H. 349, 355, 101 A.2d 262, 266 (1953). [5] The Concord General policy does contain language stating that the insurance with respect to a . . . non-owned automobile shall be excess insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance. Although this provision is valid, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 109 N.H. 108, 244 A.2d 199 (1968), we hold that it does not apply when the excess coverage would be derived only from the statute rather than from the policy itself. We therefore affirm the trial court's ruling that Concord General has no obligation to defend or provide coverage for Jonathan Miller for the action arising out of this incident.