Opinion ID: 2444412
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Voluntariness of custodial statement

Text: Coleman next contends that the police coerced him into making his taped confession and, therefore, the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his custodial statement. Custodial statements are presumed involuntary, and the State has the burden of proving otherwise. Johnson v. State, 307 Ark. 525, 823 S.W.2d 440 (1992). In considering a motion to suppress a custodial statement, we make an independent determination of the voluntariness of the confession but do not set aside the trial judge's finding unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Henderson v. State, 311 Ark. 398, 844 S.W.2d 360 (1993). Typically, the question of whether the trial court erred in admitting a confession into evidence is two pronged: (1) whether the trial court erred in holding that the proof showed that the waiver and confession were voluntarily given; and (2) whether the trial court erred in holding that the proof showed that the waiver and confession were knowingly and intelligently given. See Weger v. State, 315 Ark. 555, 869 S.W.2d 688 (1994). In his brief, Coleman addresses both the issue of voluntariness and whether or not the proof showed his waiver and confession were knowingly and intelligently given. However, in Coleman's motion to suppress, as abstracted, he questions only the voluntariness of his confession and notes that the court's ruling on suppression of involuntary statement was denied. For this reason, we limit our discussion to this single issue. The testimony is in conflict on the issue of voluntariness. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Blytheville Police Detectives Hill and Gann submitted that they did not coerce or threaten Coleman in any way. Coleman was arrested for the murder of Woodard, was read his rights, and signed a rights-waiver form. He was questioned that day by Detective Hill, but this interview was not recorded. Coleman was then sent to Jonesboro for a polygraph test but was returned to the Blytheville jail that same evening. At about 8:30 a.m. the following day, Detective Gann advised Coleman of his rights and had him sign a second rights waiver form. From about 8:30 a.m. until his talk with Coleman at 10:30 a.m. Gann was fingerprinting and photographing prisoners, including Coleman. At 10:30 a.m. Gann resumed his contact with Coleman and at 11:30 a.m., Gann, along with Hill, recorded the statement at issue. Coleman contends that on the morning of the recording he repeatedly told Hill that he didn't have no knowledge of this situation, to which Hill allegedly responded, When you sit here and you pretend you can't remember nothin' you say your mind is so gone where you can't remember being here, this taking place. We got a different version from Shawn Jefferson. As long as you sit here and play this little game ... I give you my word ... that you're going to get death row. Hill added, You know Jerome as well as I do. He ain't worth dying over because you know as well as I do he was a known drug dealer. Coleman contends that he finally agreed to make a statement after Hill told him again that if he did not make some statement regarding what he had done, he would see to it that you get death row or lethal injection. Coleman also claims it scared him when Hill advised, If I wanted to help myselflife or maybe forty or fifty years but at least you got some chance. The way you're playing it I'm going to see to it that you will never get to see the streets no more if you get lethal injection or the electric chair. When Coleman asked Hill if he could have a lawyer present when he made his statement, Hill responded, You know yourself there ain't no way you can have a lawyer present now. We read you your rights and everything but you know yourself you can't get no lawyer until after you get your bond set and get in Circuit Court. Coleman now claims, as he did in his testimony at the Denno hearing and before the jury, that the police basically scripted his tape-recorded statement for him and that he gave the statement due to threats of death row or lethal injection. However, the facts as to these claims are disputed. Both Hill and Gann testified that they did not threaten, promise or coerce Coleman in any way, although Hill did admit that he confronted Coleman with elements of Jefferson's statement to the police that implicated him in the murder of Woodard. Further, Coleman's allegation that he asked for a lawyer is denied by the officers and is not reflected in his tape-recorded statement. The conflicting testimony during the Denno hearing presented issues of credibility to be resolved by the trial court. See Fleming v. State, 284 Ark. 307, 681 S.W.2d 390 (1984). Clearly, the recorded statements given by Coleman, together with the record of the proceedings on the motion to suppress, supported the trial court's refusal to grant the motion to suppress his recorded statement. See Morris v. State, 302 Ark. 532, 792 S.W.2d 288 (1990). Coleman renewed his objections to the voluntariness of the confession at trial when his taped confession was admitted to the jury. When he testified in his own defense, he again denied his participation in the murder, claiming that the officers had scared him into making his confession. His credibility then became a question for the jury to decide. See Moore v. State, 315 Ark. 131, 864 S.W.2d 863 (1993); Jones v. State, 314 Ark. 289, 862 S.W.2d 242 (1993).