Opinion ID: 1522692
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effective Date of the Term Limitation Act of 1993

Text: Also presented to us is the question of the effective date of 21-A M.R.S.A. §§ 551-554 (Supp.1995). Entitled Limitation on Terms, section 553 lists the number of terms that each officeholder may serve before being subjected to the provisions of the Act. [9] The last sentence of section 553 provides as follows: This section applies to terms of office that begin on or after December 3, 1996. Read in isolation, this sentence could be construed in two possible ways. First, it could apply to persons already holding office, so the terms already served by that date are to be counted towards the limit outlined for each office. A second possible explanation is that the sentence means that terms beginning after December 3, 1996, are to be the first terms subjected to the limitations of section 553. It is this latter explanation that is urged upon us by the plaintiffs. We reject their interpretation. It is fundamental that we look to the purpose for which a law is enacted, and that we avoid a construction which leads to a result clearly not within the contemplation of the lawmaking body. Greaves v. Houlton Water Co., 143 Me. 207, 212, 59 A.2d 217, 219 (1948). The Transition Statement included in the Historical and Statutory Notes attached to 21-A M.R.S.A. § 553 states that the provisions of the Act prevent any legislator who has served the requisite number of terms by December 3, 1996, from serving in the 118th Legislature: A person elected or appointed to an office subject to the provisions of this Act who is disqualified from service by this Act may complete that person's term of office if the term commences on or before December 2, 1996. The limitations imposed by this Act apply to the terms of office served by persons elected to serve in or persons elected to serve by the First Regular Session of the 118th Legislature and to all terms of office served by persons elected to serve thereafter. This Transition Statement was included in the referendum sent to the electors on November 2, 1993, after the Legislature declined to enact the initiated petition. 1993 I.B. 1, § 2. The Transition Statement serves to grandfather any office holder who is in the middle of a term when the Act takes effect on December 3, 1996. Such a provision would be unnecessary and illogical if, as the plaintiffs contend, the first state legislators would not be disqualified pursuant to terms of the Act until the year 2004. Additional evidence in support of our interpretation is found in the Attorney General's explanatory statement that was attached to the referendum question pursuant to 1 M.R.S.A. § 353 (1989). [10] That explanation, which was put before the electors who enacted the Term Limitation Act, stated: These limitations would apply to the general election of 1996; meaning that any person who has served the requisite number of terms by that time would be disqualified from seeking reelection or reappointment in that year. The Attorney General's referendum explanation is a useful guide for interpreting voter enactments. In the absence of a challenge to the Attorney General's official explanation of the amendment, we assume that the voters intended to adopt the constitutional amendment on the terms in which it was presented to them.... State v. Brown, 571 A.2d 816, 818 (Me.1990). The electors of the state of Maine, exercising the legislative power granted to them by the Constitution, had before them in the referendum of November 2, 1993, the proposed statute in the exact language that was codified as 21-A M.R.S.A. §§ 551-554. They also had the explanation of the Attorney General and the Transition Statement, all of which when read in unison provide ample evidence in support of our conclusion. We answer Question 2 in the affirmative. All concurring.