Opinion ID: 2168121
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the retailer's and manufacturer's duty

Text: The trial court certified two separate questions focusing on appellees' products liability approach to the retailer's and manufacturer's liability. Because the analysis is the same for both appellants, we consider both issues here. This court has indicated that strict products liability in Illinois follows the formulation set forth in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), which imposes strict liability upon one who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property. ( Rios v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works (1974), 59 Ill.2d 79, 319 N.E.2d 232; Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc. (7th Cir.1984), 743 F.2d 1200 (applying Illinois law).) A product is unreasonably dangerous when it is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. ( Palmer v. Avco Distributing Corp. (1980), 82 Ill.2d 211, 216, 45 Ill.Dec. 377, 412 N.E.2d 959, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment i (1965); Hunt v. Blasius (1978), 74 Ill.2d 203, 211-12, 23 Ill.Dec. 574, 384 N.E.2d 368.) A product may be unreasonably dangerous in one of two ways: because of (1) a design or manufacturing defect or (2) a failure to warn of a danger posed by the product of which the average consumer would not be aware. (See Martin, 743 F.2d at 1202.) A nondefective product that presents a danger that the average consumer would recognize does not give rise to strict liability. See Hunt, 74 Ill.2d 203, 23 Ill.Dec. 574, 384 N.E.2d 368. A plaintiff may demonstrate that a product is defective in design, so as to subject a retailer and a manufacturer to strict liability for resulting injuries, in one of two ways: (1) by introducing evidence that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner or (2) by introducing evidence that the product's design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to prove that on balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such designs. See generally Palmer v. Avco Distributing Corp. (1980), 82 Ill.2d 211, 219-20, 45 Ill.Dec. 377, 412 N.E.2d 959, citing Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978), 20 Cal.3d 413, 427-28, 573 P.2d 443, 452, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 234-35, 573 P.2d 443, 453. There has been no evidence presented in the form of affidavits, depositions, testimony or other evidentiary materials to support a finding on a motion for summary judgment that the window screens failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. Window screens are designed to allow air and light into an area while preventing insects from entering. ( Scheffler, 67 Ill.App.2d at 225, 214 N.E.2d 575 ([I]t is settled law that a landlord has no duty to furnish screens suitable for anything other than keeping out insects); Gasquoine, 10 Ill.App.2d at 425, 135 N.E.2d 121 (`[A] primary purpose    of screens [is] to keep out insects while letting in light and air').) They may, on occasion, serve to prevent an individual from falling from a window, but this purpose is incidental to their intended use. ( Crawford, 331 Ill.App. at 574, 73 N.E.2d 615 (`A screen in a window, obviously and of common knowledge, is not placed there for the purpose of keeping persons from falling out of a window'), quoting Egan, 103 N.J.L. at 476, 135 A. at 812.) Virtually any manufactured product can cause or be a proximate cause of injury if put to certain uses or misuses ( Hunt, 74 Ill.2d at 211, 23 Ill.Dec. 574, 384 N.E.2d 368), but strict liability applies only when the product is `dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary [person]   , with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics' ( Palmer, 82 Ill.2d at 216, 45 Ill.Dec. 377, 412 N.E.2d 959; quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment i (1965); see also Hunt, 74 Ill.2d at 211-12, 23 Ill.Dec. 574, 384 N.E.2d 368). The window screens were simply serving the purpose for which they were created when the accidents occurred. Even assuming that the ordinary [person] may recognize the potential for a screen to restrict a fall from a window, we cannot conclude that, in the event a window screen fails to prevent the fall of a minor leaning against it, the ordinary [person] would consider the screen dangerous beyond his original contemplation of the product. A consumer may rightfully expect a product to safely do the job for which it was built or for a foreseeable similar use, but neither a retailer nor a manufacturer can be held strictly liable for injuries resulting from the misuse of its product. Likewise, there has been no evidence presented in the form of affidavits, depositions, testimony or other evidentiary materials to support a finding on a motion for summary judgment that the window screens' design proximately caused appellees' injuries. Appellees allege in their complaints that: (a) The screens readily popped out from the frames; (b) The screens were not securely fastened within tracks on the windows; (c) There are no secure latches, locks or other devices to fix the window screens to the frames. Appellees fail to provide evidence of how the window screens' design could have been altered to create a safer screen, such as the one described by appellees, or any evidence of the form and feasibility of the alternative screen design. (See, e.g., Palmer, 82 Ill.2d at 218, 45 Ill.Dec. 377, 412 N.E.2d 959.) In light of appellees' failure to provide any evidence to support their allegations, we cannot conclude that, as a matter of law, the window screens are defective or unreasonably dangerous such as to serve as the basis for a products liability action against the retailer or manufacturer of such window frames and window screens.