Opinion ID: 2094747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: New York's Long-Arm Statute

Text: CPLR 302 (a) provides: As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary    who   : 3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act, if he    (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce (CPLR 302 [a] [3] [ii]). The conferral of jurisdiction under this provision rests on five elements: First, that defendant committed a tortious act outside the State; second, that the cause of action arises from that act; third, that the act caused injury to a person or property within the State; fourth, that defendant expected or should reasonably have expected the act to have consequences in the State; and fifth, that defendant derived substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce. No one disputes the first three elements. Plaintiff has alleged that his cause of action arises from defendant's tortious acts outside the State, which caused him injury in Niagara, New York. The fourth elementcontemplating in-State consequencesis met when [t]he nonresident tortfeasor    expect[s], or ha[s] reason to expect, that his or her tortious activity in another State will have direct consequences in New York ( Ingraham v Carroll, 90 NY2d 592, 598 [emphasis added]). The element is intended to ensure some link between a defendant and New York State to make it reasonable to require a defendant to come to New York to answer for tortious conduct committed elsewhere ( Ingraham v Carroll, 90 NY2d, at 598, supra ). Moreover, the defendant need not foresee the specific event that produced the alleged injury. The defendant need only reasonably foresee that any defect in its product would have direct consequences within the State ( see, 12th Ann Report of NY Jud Conf, at 343-344; see generally, Siegel, NY Prac § 88, at 151 [3d ed]). Pak-Mor's invoice, including its reference to a New York Light Bar, shows that it knew the rear-loader was destined for use in New York. Clearly, Pak-Mor had reason to expect that any defects would have direct consequences in this State. The fifth elementdefendant's deriving substantial revenue from interstate or international commerceis designed to narrow the long-arm reach to preclude the exercise of jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries who might cause direct, foreseeable injury within the State but `whose business operations are of a local character' ( Ingraham v Carroll, 90 NY2d, at 599, supra [quoting 12th Ann Report of NY Jud Conf, at 342-343]). Therefore, in Ingraham, we held that a physician who practiced only in Vermont and earned his entire revenue from his local medical services did not derive substantial interstate revenue as contemplated by CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii). By contrast, Pak-Mor's business can hardly be characterized as local. A Texas corporation with a manufacturing facility in Virginia is inherently engaged in interstate commerce. Moreover, the company had a New York distributor and a district representative. Its national advertising and New York sales figures alone show that the company derives substantial revenue from interstate commerce. [2] In short, we have no difficulty in concluding that CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii) was satisfied in this case. Pak-Mor derived substantial revenue from interstate commerce and the circumstances surrounding its sale of the subject rear-loader gave it reason to expect that its acts in connection with the manufacture of the rear-loader would have consequences in this State. Because CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii) did not authorize jurisdiction over the defendant in Ingraham ( supra ), we had no need to consider Federal due process. Here, we do.