Opinion ID: 1266339
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preemption in RLA Cases

Text: Although Garmon was decided in the context of the National Labor Relations Act, similar reasoning animated the Supreme Court's application of preemption to the Railway Labor Act in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 89 S.Ct. 1109, 22 L.Ed.2d 344 (1969); see, e.g., Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 387 F.3d at 321 (suggesting that Garmon was extended to the RLA in Jacksonville Terminal ). In Jacksonville Terminal, the Court considered whether, in the context of a major labor dispute governed by the RLA, a Florida court had the authority to enjoin the picketing of a freight rail terminal facility under state tort and labor laws. 394 U.S. at 372-77, 89 S.Ct. 1109. The Court concluded that it did not because the exercise of plenary state authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frustrate effective implementation of the [RLA's] processes. Id. at 380, 89 S.Ct. 1109. The Court reached this conclusion even while acknowledging that, unlike the situation presented in Garmon, in a major dispute under the RLA there is no administrative agency equivalent to the NLRB with jurisdiction over railway labor disputes. Id. at 384 n. 19, 89 S.Ct. 1109. In the years since Jacksonville Terminal and Garmon were decided, this and other circuits have applied their reasoning to major RLA disputes, see, e.g., Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 387 F.3d at 320-23 (applying Garmon and Jacksonville Terminal to RLA major dispute and affirming dismissal of, inter alia, tortious and malicious interference, fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of contract claims); to minor RLA disputes, see, e.g., Beers v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 703 F.2d 425, 428-29 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress claim brought in context of minor RLA dispute was preempted under Garmon ); and to RLA issues, like those presented here, not falling squarely within either category, see, e.g., Kaufman v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 274 F.3d 197, 202-03 (5th Cir.2001) (applying Garmon to hold third-party tortious interference claim preempted by RLA); Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 1064, 1076 (9th Cir.2001) (noting that [s]tate laws that frustrate the purpose of the RLA are preempted); Peterson v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 759 F.2d 1161, 1170-71 (4th Cir.1985) (holding that RLA preempts state law claim for wrongful discharge even where RLA arbitral mechanism not implicated because state claims seek to vindicate rights largely secured by federal law); cf. Delta Air Lines v. Kramarsky, 650 F.2d 1287, 1301-02 (2d Cir.1981) (applying Garmon analysis to claim that New York Disability Benefits Law (DBL) was preempted by RLA, and holding that because DBL governs matters outside the intended reach of the RLA ... the RLA therefore does not preempt the DBL), vacated in part on different grounds on rehearing by 666 F.2d 21, 26 (2d Cir.1981), affirmed in part and vacated in part on other grounds by Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 92 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983) (noting that Second Circuit resolved RLA preemption claim against Delta, but that claim was not before Supreme Court). Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, these cases demonstrate that the principles animating Garmon, Jacksonville Terminal, and their progeny are applicable to plaintiffs' state law claims. Underlying these principles is a concern with whether the particular state law at issue may stand[ ] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). Accordingly, courts have invoked Garmon to preempt certain state law causes of action even where the RLA claim at issue is not subject to the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB). See 45 U.S.C. § 153; Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548, 552, 79 S.Ct. 1322, 3 L.Ed.2d 1422 (1959) (discussing exclusive primary jurisdiction of NRAB over minor RLA disputes). Similarly, courts have applied Jacksonville Terminal to preempt more than just those state law claims that attempt to regulate economic warfare between disputants subject to the [RLA's] processes. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. at 380, 89 S.Ct. 1109. Although expansive views of the preemption doctrine have not escaped criticism, see Wyeth v. Levine, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1211, 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring), we need not here reach the outer boundaries of the doctrine to conclude that the maintenance of plaintiffs' state tort claims would frustrate effective implementation of the [RLA's] processes. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. at 380, 89 S.Ct. 1109.