Opinion ID: 1699080
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: We will consider plaintiffs in two categories. 1st. The Bailiffs, plaintiffs Smith, Egkild, and McKinney. 2nd. Plaintiff, Deputy Sheriff Allgood, in charge of criminal affairs.

Text: IV. Section 337.7, supra, pertains to bailiffs only. It provides for their appointment by the sheriff, and contains no provision for approval by the board of supervisors. The appointment of such three plaintiffs as bailiffs, when made by the Sheriff was final and complete. He carefully followed the provisions of Section 97B.46 as to the matter of their ages. The Board's refusal to approve, and the County Auditor's refusal to certify payment of their salaries, had no legal effect. Section 337.7 is a specific statute. Section 341.1 is a general statute pertaining to all county officers and their deputies. Where there is conflict or ambiguity between a specific Statute and a general Statute, the provisions of the specific section control. Great Western Accident Insurance Co. v. Martin, Co. Treas., 183 Iowa 1009, 166 N.W. 705; McKinney v. McClure, 206 Iowa 285, 220 N.W. 354; Workman v. District Court, 222 Iowa 364, 269 N.W. 27; State v. Iowa Southern Utilities, 231 Iowa 784, 2 N.W.2d 372, 4 N.W.2d 869; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Sec. 367, Page 371; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 347b, P. 720. Three Judges of the District Court of Polk County wrote strong and laudatory letters to the Sheriff as to the services of the three bailiffs, and recommended their retention. These letters are part of the record. In Workman v. District Court, supra, this court said:    it is a fundamental rule that where the general statute, if standing alone, would include the same matter as the special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to the general statute, whether it was passed before or after such general enactment. In 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, supra, as a composite statement from many jurisdictions, appears the following statement: It is an old and familiar principle    that where there is in the same statute, a specific provision, and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include matters embraced in the former, the particular provision must control, and the general provision must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular provision. After discussing a general and specific statute in Great Western Accident Insurance Co. v. Martin, supra, this court said: The specific controls the general. V. We will consider the status of plaintiff Deputy Sheriff Allgood. Taking all pertinent statutory sections into consideration, we arrive at the intention of the legislature as to the respective authority of the sheriff and the board. We have assistance from this court's opinion, written by Judge Weaver in State v. Rhein, supra. In the Rhein case the County Treasurer selected a bank for deposit of county funds. The Board selected another Bank. The Court held the Bank selected by the Treasurer was entitled to the funds. The opinion stated the Board had no power of selection under the Statute. Preservation of the money of the county was primarily the responsibility of the Treasurer. In the case at bar it is the responsibility of the Sheriff to keep the peace in the County, and to employ deputies who will properly assist him. This responsibility does not rest in the Board, nor any member thereof. In granting to the Sheriff and other County Officers the power to appoint deputies, bailiffs, and other employees it was the intention of the legislature that the elected Sheriff could secure as deputies, able and loyal people for public service. In stating that such appointments were subject to approval of Board of Supervisors, it was also the legislative intent that common sense would be used by the Board. In approving or failing to approve the Board could not reject an appointee on frivolous, trivial, minimal, arbitrary or capricious grounds. For example they could not reject the Sheriff's appointments because they did not like the color of the hair of the appointee, nor because of his politics, religious affiliation, nor age, unless the matter of age was contrary to statute. In the instant case they withheld approval on the one ground of age. This reason, as far as the Board was concerned, had no basis in the Statute. The Board used only Section 97B.45, and refused to give attention to Section 97B.46. Section 97B.46 is as much a part of Legislative enactment as the previous Section. When some employer, and head of a department, has an employee who is past seventy years of age, and still healthy and fully capable of performing his duties, the legislature, in its wisdom, provided a method to retain the usually very valuable services of such employee. As to Deputy Sheriff Allgood, a specialist in the criminal division, the Sheriff outlined the importance of his work. On this basis the Sheriff recommended his retention, as he had a right to do under Section 97B.46. The Board's reason for rejection was trivial and arbitrary, and not effective. See: A.G.O. August 16, 1961; A.G.O. March 2, 1962. They pertain directly to matters involved in case at bar, and sustain the position taken by the trial court. The decree of the trial court for issuance of Writ of Mandamus as to the Board of Supervisors and the members thereof, and as to the County Auditor was correct, and is affirmed. Affirmed. GARFIELD, C. J., HAYS, LARSON, and THORNTON, JJ., concur. THOMPSON and SNELL, JJ., concur specially. MOORE and STUART, JJ., take no part.