Opinion ID: 2081910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Requested Instruction on Promises, Rewards, or Inducements

Text: Oliveira argues that the trial justice erred by refusing to instruct the jurors specifically that in assessing Green's credibility, they were entitled to take into account any promises, rewards, or inducements that Green may have received in exchange for his testimony. After closing arguments, the trial justice delivered a credibility instruction to the jury. In relevant part, the trial justice instructed the jury to: Take into account any bias or prejudice the witness may have shown one way or the other and the witness' interest in the outcome of the case, if you believe any witness had any such interest.   Occasionally, unfortunately, witnesses do not tell the truth under oath. Witnesses take sides. They tend to exaggerate the evidence which they believe will assist the side they favor and minimize or try to hide the evidence which they believe will harm the side that they favor. It happens that    a witness has an interest in the outcome of the case and his or her evidence consciously or subconsciously is influenced or slanted by that interest. Oliveira objected to the trial justice's failure to include an instruction specifically focused on the promises and rewards Green had received in exchange for his testimony, to which the trial justice responded, Nobody asked me to. What, am I supposed to think of everything? Oliveira acknowledged that he had not submitted a written request for such an instruction, but argued that it was the law of the case as it had been given at the first trial. Unpersuaded, the trial justice refused to give the instruction, stating that it wasn't necessary. We agree. [12] It is well settled that a trial justice is not required to give specific instructions requested by a party so long as the charge of the trial justice adequately covers the subject matter relating to the request. State v. Fenner, 503 A.2d 518, 525 (R.I.1986). In this instance, the trial justice's credibility instruction adequately covered the issue of bias and prejudice. Although the jurors certainly were entitled to take such promises and motivations into account, their acceptance or rejection of Green's testimony ultimately was their decision to make, free of any peremptory instructions from the trial justice. See id. Moreover, in this case, counsel had adequate opportunity to argue matters of credibility, including bias, motivation, anticipated benefits, or rewards during their closing arguments. In this jurisdiction, trial justices are inhibited from commenting upon the evidence unless they do so in a completely impartial manner. Fenner, 503 A.2d at 525. Furthermore, in Fenner, we said that it is probably better practice for a trial justice to avoid giving such instructions in respect either to alibi testimony or to accomplice testimony and to rely instead upon general instructions concerning credibility, motivation, bias, and the like. Counsel rather than the court are the appropriate agents to argue to the jury concerning the specific credibility or lack thereof of a particular witness. Id. In State v. DeMasi, 413 A.2d 99 (R.I. 1980), we specifically expressed the opinion that it was not necessary for a trial justice to make, in effect, an impeaching comment upon the testimony of an erstwhile accomplice who had been granted immunity by the Attorney General. Id. at 100. In this case, the trial justice gave a credibility instruction that pointed out that a witness's interest in the outcome of the case might bias or shade his testimony and in turn effect his credibility. The trial justice's instructions on the issue of credibility were adequate and impartial and in no way constituted prejudicial error. Once a defendant's requested instructions have been adequately covered by the instructions given to the jury, the refusal to give the instructions requested by the defendant is not error.