Opinion ID: 2630898
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proposition 209 and Hi-Voltage

Text: Before explaining why section 31 violates the political structure doctrine, it is necessary to first briefly revisit Proposition 209, the ballot measure that enacted section 31, and Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th 537, in which this court construed section 31's scope.
After Proposition 209 qualified as an initiative constitutional amendment, it was placed on the November 5, 1996, General Election ballot. Prior to the election, voters received an official ballot pamphlet prepared by the nonpartisan Legislative Analyst's Office. ( Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson (N.D.Cal. 1996) 946 F.Supp. 1480, 1493 ( Coalition I ).) [17] The ballot pamphlet, which included an official description and analysis of each statewide initiative, described Proposition 209 as a measure that would eliminate race-and sex-conscious affirmative action programs in the areas of public employment, contracting, and education. (946 F.Supp. at p. 1493.) The Legislative Analyst's brief summary explained A YES vote on [Proposition 209] means: The elimination of those affirmative action programs for women and minorities run by the state or local governments in the areas of public employment, contracting, and education that give `preferential treatment' on the basis of sex, race, color, ethnicity, or national origin. A NO vote on [Proposition 209] means: State and local government affirmative action programs would remain in effect to the extent they are permitted under the United States Constitution. (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996) Legis. Analyst's brief summary of Prop. 209, p. 6 (Ballot Pamphlet).) In addition to its summary of the measure, the Legislative Analyst provided a more indepth analysis, emphasizing that passage of the initiative would effectively abolish all race- and sex-conscious affirmative action programs. The federal, state, and local governments run many programs intended to increase opportunities for various groupsincluding women and racial and ethnic minority groups. These programs are commonly called `affirmative action' programs. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [Proposition 209] would eliminate state and local government affirmative action programs in the areas of public employment, public education, and public contracting to the extent these programs involve `preferential treatment' based on race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin. (Ballot Pamp., supra, Legis. Analyst's analysis of Prop. 209, p. 30.) The Legislative Analyst then discussed various race- and sex-conscious affirmative action programs in the areas of public employment, contracting, and education that would be banned with the passage of the initiative. ( Id. at p. 31.) In addition to the nonpartisan analysis by the Legislative Analyst, the Ballot Pamphlet contained partisan arguments submitted by proponents and opponents of the measure. These arguments further underscored that the central issue at stake in Proposition 209 was race- and sex-conscious affirmative action (and race-conscious measures in particular). The argument in favor of the measure stated, `REVERSE DISCRIMINATION' BASED ON RACE OR GENDER IS PLAIN WRONG! [¶] . . . [S]tudents are being rejected from public universities because of their RACE. Job applicants are turned away because their RACE does not meet some `goal' or `timetable.' Contracts are awarded to high bidders because they are of the preferred RACE. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Proposition 209 will stop the terrible programs . . . . (Ballot Pamp., supra, argument in favor of Prop. 209, p. 32.) The argument against the initiative warned that California law currently allows tutoring, mentoring, outreach, recruitment, and counseling to help ensure equal opportunity for women and minorities. Proposition 209 will eliminate affirmative action programs like these that help achieve equal opportunity for women and minorities in public employment, education and contracting. ( Id., argument against Prop. 209, p. 33.) In explaining that Proposition 209 would eliminate race- and sex-conscious affirmative action programs, the Legislative Analyst, proponents, and opponents implicitly acknowledged preferential treatment on all other bases would be unaffected by the ballot measure. (See Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 566; id. at pp. 586-587 (conc. & dis. opn. of George, C. J.).) Indeed, this was explicitly recognized in the rebuttal to the argument against Proposition 209. Affirmative action programs that don't discriminate or grant preferential treatment [on the basis of race or sex] will be UNCHANGED. . . . [¶] Note that Proposition 209 doesn't prohibit consideration of economic disadvantage... . The state must remain free to help the economically disadvantaged, but not on the basis of race or sex. (Ballot Pamp., supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 209, p. 33.) On November 5, 1996, Proposition 209 passed, with 54 percent voting in favor of the measure and 46 percent voting against. ( Coalition I, supra, 946 F.Supp. at p. 1495.) White voters were the only racial group that, as a majority, voted in favor of Proposition 209, with 63 percent voting for passage. (946 F.Supp. at p. 1495, fn. 12.) Seventy-four percent of Black voters, 76 percent of Latino voters, and 61 percent of Asian-American voters opposed the measure. ( Ibid. ) Sixty-one percent of men voted in favor, while 52 percent of women voted against. ( Ibid. )
In 2000, this court considered the validity of a program adopted by the City of San Jose to encourage the participation of minority-owned business enterprises and women-owned business enterprises in public works projects. ( Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 542.) Contractors bidding for city projects were required to fulfill either an outreach or a participation component, and the plaintiffs argued that the program's requirements violated section 31. ( Hi-Voltage, at pp. 543-544.) We agreed, concluding the program's outreach option affords preferential treatment to [minority-/women-owned business enterprise] subcontractors on the basis of race or sex, and the participation option discriminates on the same bases against non-[minority-/women-owned business enterprise] subcontractors as well as general contractors that fail to fulfill either of the options when submitting their bids. ( Id. at p. 560, fn. omitted.) In reaching this conclusion, we reviewed the language of section 31 as well as the ballot materials accompanying Proposition 209. ( Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 559-562.) We noted the measure's language was not limited in any way and effectively prohibited all race- and sex-conscious affirmative action programs. ( Id. at pp. 559-560; id. at pp. 591-592 (conc. & dis. opn. of George, C. J.).) Turning to the ballot materials, we concluded the partisan statements and the Legislative Analyst's analysis provided further support for our construction. ( Id. at pp. 560-562.) In particular, we noted the proponents' statements focused on race- and sex-conscious affirmative action programs and evinced a clear desire to ban all such programs. ( Id. at pp. 560-561.) This court ultimately concluded the electorate intended to do something more than restate existing law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race or sex. ( Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 561 [citing Coalition I, supra, 946 F.Supp. at p. 1489].) [18] That something more, the majority reasoned, was a repudiation of case law permitting race- and sex-conscious measures formulated to remediate the lingering effects of past discrimination or conspicuous imbalance in public contracting, employment, and education. ( Hi-Voltage, supra, at p. 566.) We accordingly held that, following the adoption of section 31,  any action that discriminates or grants preferential treatment on the basis of race or sex would be forbidden, including race- and sex-conscious measures that would otherwise be permitted by the equal protection clause. ( Hi-Voltage, at pp. 566-567.) Thus, the practical effect of section 31's ban of race- and sex-conscious measures is limited to just one category of legislation. It has no independent effect on legislation that cannot survive heightened scrutiny because such legislation already violates the Constitution. (See Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 561.) It also has no effect on legislation required by the Constitution (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2), when, for example, a public entity seeks to remedy its own past intentional discrimination ( Hi-Voltage, at p. 568). Consequently, section 31's only nonredundant effect is on race- and sex-conscious measures that are permitted, but not required, by the Constitution, i.e., legislation that, despite classifying on the basis of race or sex, can survive heightened scrutiny. For race-conscious programs to do so, they must be narrowly tailored and justified by a compelling interest. ( McLaughlin v. Florida (1964) 379 U.S. 184, 191-192 [13 L.Ed.2d 222, 85 S.Ct. 283].) Under the high court's decisions, this category of legislation has become increasingly narrow. For example, in public contracting, a race-conscious program must be narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of past discrimination by the public entity itself or by private sector entities within its jurisdiction. ( Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co. (1989) 488 U.S. 469, 498-506 [102 L.Ed.2d 854, 109 S.Ct. 706] ( Croson ).) The Supreme Court has rejected as insufficiently compelling the remedying of societal discrimination ( id. at p. 505) or the attainment of racial balance in an industry ( id. at p. 507). Similarly, in public employment, remedying the effects of past discrimination by the public entity is a compelling interest, while remedying societal discrimination is not. ( Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education (1986) 476 U.S. 267, 274 [90 L.Ed.2d 260, 106 S.Ct. 1842] (plur. opn. of Powell, J.).) In the public education context, in addition to remedying the effects of past discrimination, the high court has found compelling the promotion of racial diversity in higher education. ( Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 (2007) 551 U.S. 701, 720 [168 L.Ed.2d 508, 127 S.Ct. 2738]; Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) 539 U.S. 306, 325 [156 L.Ed.2d 304, 123 S.Ct. 2325].) Thus, the only real change section 31 makes to existing law is to close an already narrow, albeit significant, window of constitutionally permissible remedial legislation. ( Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 568.)