Opinion ID: 2799819
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Video and Tattoo Evidence

Text: Colon contends that his First Amendment rights were violated when the district court permitted the government to present as evidence a rap video and images of his tattoos, some of which he had posted to his Facebook page. Though we ordinarily review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, because Colon failed to raise these objections at trial we review the admission of this evidence for plain error. See United States v. Fell, 531 F.3d 197, 209 (2d Cir. 2008). The district court admitted into evidence a video that was made in December 2011 in the Melrose‐Jackson Houses and depicted Colon, a cooperating witness Aubrey Pemberton, and a number of GFC members. In the video, Colon is seen rapping: ʺYG to OG / Somebody make somebody nose bleed ‐ 15 ‐ / Iʹm OG shoot the Ruger / Iʹm a shooter.ʺ Tr. 2134‐36. At trial, Pemberton served as a guide through the lyrics, testifying that the Young Gunnaz crew, or YG, was feuding with the OG (formerly the GFC). The video helped establish Colonʹs association with members of the enterprise and his motive to participate in the charged conduct against members of the Young Gunnaz. The district court also allowed the government to offer photographs of Colonʹs tattoos, some of which he had posted on his Facebook page. One of the photographs was a close‐up of Colonʹs hand, showing his ʺY.G.K.ʺ tattoo, which stands for ʺYoung Gunnaz Killer.ʺ In some of the photographs Colon is pointing a gun at his Y.G.K. tattoo, indicating, according to the government, his desire to harm members of the Young Gunnaz. Other tattoos depicted in the photographs introduced at trial included one on his right arm that read ʺCourtlandtʺ; tattoos on his left arm that referenced Meregildoʹs nicknames (ʺYoungʺ and ʺKillaʺ); and one stating ʺM.I.P. [Mac In Peace] T‐Money,ʺ referring to Harrison, the former leader of CAC. Colon argues that the admission of the rap video and tattoo images violated his First Amendment rights because courts should not ʺsustain a conviction that may have rested on a form of expression, however distasteful, ‐ 16 ‐ which the Constitution tolerates and protects.ʺ Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 594 (1969). This challenge is meritless, however, because here the speech is not ʺitself the proscribed conduct.ʺ United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2012). The speech was not the basis for the prosecution, but instead it was used to establish the existence of, and Colonʹs participation in, the alleged RICO enterprise. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993) (ʺThe First Amendment . . . does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.ʺ); United States v. Salameh, 152