Opinion ID: 344984
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the statutory program.

Text: 13 Our inquiry opens with an examination of the provisions under which Graves was charged and the overarching statutory program within which they operate. 9 The enactments alleged to have been violated fall within two separate titles of the Gun Control Act: 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a) is found in Title VII, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) and 924(a) comprise part of Title IV. 10 Coverage of these titles overlaps; each one limits the right of convicted felons and certain other persons to receive or transport guns. 11 Nevertheless, the two titles are not wholly congruent. With minor exceptions, only Title VII directly regulates the possession of firearms by the named individuals. Title IV, unlike Title VII, bars false statements by participants in weapons transactions.
14 Section 1202 proscribes the possession, receipt or transportation, in interstate commerce, of firearms by classes of persons that Congress deemed likely to misuse them. Those covered include convicted felons, mental incompetents, dishonorable dischargees from the armed forces, individuals who renounce their citizenship, and illegal aliens. 12 And there are only limited exemptions to the coverage of the Act. A convicted felon, for example, may become immunized from statutory liability if he secures a pardon expressly authorizing him to carry weapons. 13 15 On its face, § 1202 affords insight into Congressional intent with respect to the problems raised by this case. The provision speaks to the person who has been convicted by a court . . . of a felony. It contains no requirement that the conviction be obtained in any particular manner. Thus, textually, it is the fact of conviction which calls into play the disability imposed by Title VII. 16 We note also that § 1202, despite its location within the federal criminal code, is essentially regulatory in nature. It is unlike most other criminal laws which proscribe acts that are in themselves pernicious, e. g., kidnapping, theft or embezzlement. By contrast, the receipt or possession of firearms does not constitute conduct that is inherently harmful. As a result, Congress has not interdicted such behavior altogether. Rather, what the legislative authors have done is to impose controls on activities involving weapons. 17 The Congressional declaration set forth in § 1201 voices concern regarding the deleterious effects of firearms use by persons with possibly dangerous inclinations. 14 Not surprisingly, the prohibitions established by Title VII are somewhat sweeping, indicating that the draftsmen desired to regulate individuals having even the slightest potential for threatening community safety. We cannot say certainly on the record before us that it was unreasonable for Congress to have believed that a person with an outstanding felony conviction, even one that has been attacked as unconstitutional, may be somewhat more likely than the average citizen to utilize a gun improperly. And the statutory terms suggest that an outstanding conviction may contribute to liability under Title VII and its central provision, § 1202. 18
19 Section 922(a)(6) declares that it is unlawful for any person knowingly to make any false or fictitious oral or written statement . . . in connection with the acquisition of firearms. 15 While this provision in itself does not oblige a prospective gun purchaser to divulge any criminal infractions on his record, the Treasury Department requires, as a precondition to acquisition of a weapon, completion of an application form on which the purchaser must state whether he ever has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. 16 To deny an outstanding felony conviction on such form would appear to subject the purchaser of firearms to liability under § 922(a)(6). Section 924(a) delineates the penalties for making the false representations in the acquisition or transfer of weapons. 20 Under the legislation, comprehensive records are to be kept with respect to all firearms transactions. No person is exempt from the regulatory coverage of the Act. Importers, manufacturers, dealers, collectors and purchasers alike must submit the information mandated by federal authorities. Indeed, the disclosure sections of Title IV do not differentiate in their treatment of felons and non-felons. Facially, §§ 922 and 924 are designed to punish any material misrepresentation concerning a weapons transaction, whether or not the misrepresentation relates to a conviction. They do not penalize an individual for being a convicted felon, but only for failing to answer truthfully questions about his criminal record. Even more so than § 1202, then, these provisions are essentially regulatory as contrasted with being strictly criminal in nature. 21 A question which immediately arises is whether Congress envisaged the prosecution of an individual with an outstanding conviction, though one asserted to be unconstitutional, when he denies ever having been a felon. Inspection of § 922(a)(6), and Title IV as a whole, suggests that a person who is a convicted felon must divulge the fact of his conviction, regardless of whether or not he believes it to be unconstitutional. And the registration form hardly intimates that a prospective purchaser of a firearm is entitled to conceal a conviction that has not been vitiated, any more than he could suppress any other fact material to the transaction. 22 From the statutory language, it is apparent that the legislative framers intended to elicit detailed and accurate information so as to be able to monitor the movement of guns. In this regard, it is equally evident that Congress wished to penalize a person with an outstanding, though assertedly unconstitutional, conviction for failing to disclose the fact of such criminal adjudication. 23 We recognize that such an interpretation of §§ 922 and 924 tangentially implicates a conviction which may at some future time be deemed constitutionally infirm. Nevertheless, two components of Title IV strongly indicate that Congress intended that such a conviction could conduce to liability under the statutes. These features will be reviewed not only for their relevance to our discussion of Title IV, but also as support for the analysis concerning Title VII. 17 24 Sections 922(g) and (h), like § 1202(a), provide that it is illegal for convicted felons and other specified persons to receive or transport firearms. 18 The classes of persons covered by § 922, however, vary somewhat from those regulated by § 1202. In addition to convicted felons and mental incompetents, Title IV places firearms restrictions on illicit drug users, drug addicts, fugitives from justice and persons under indictment for crimes punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year. 25 Of these categories of individuals, the most pertinent to our inquiry here is the group containing indicted persons. An indictment ordinarily has limited legal effect, reflecting the deliberations of grand jurors as to probable cause for believing that the indictee might be guilty. Unlike a conviction, the indicted offense remains unproved, at least through trial; the individual named in the indictment remains innocent until guilt is demonstrated. 19 Even so, Congress undoubtedly found that persons under indictment have a somewhat greater likelihood than other citizens to misuse firearms. And so indictees were included within the prohibitory classification of § 922. 26 Section 922 would appear to provide some evidence of Congressional intent concerning the issues in this case. This is so since there are a number of similarities between an indictment and a conviction claimed to be unconstitutional. Both may result in the eventual vindication of the defendant, thereby dissolving the disability with respect to firearms. The restriction in either case may be only a temporary one which will be removed when a court frees the defendant from the scrutiny of the criminal justice system or when the executive branch grants a dispensation. To argue, as does Graves, that Congress intended to impose no disability on persons with outstanding convictions that they assert are unconstitutional, but to impose a disability on persons under indictment, would be to charge the legislative framers with a manifest inconsistency. We cannot discern that Congress sought to design such an asymmetrical statutory arrangement. 27 The other relevant feature of Title IV, insofar as our current inquiry is concerned, consists of subsection (c) of § 925, which affords a procedure to secure relief from any firearms disability imposed on a convicted felon. 20 Basically, this provision stipulates that any person with a criminal record may apply to the Secretary of the Treasury for relief from the weapon restrictions dictated by federal law. The Secretary may grant such relief if he is satisfied that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to the public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest. It is clear that § 925(c) applies to more than Title IV because it refers to disabilities on possession an activity regulated by Title VII. 21 28 Section 925(c) is quite revealing in connection with the issues under review because that provision affords an individual with an outstanding conviction, that he contends was unconstitutionally rendered, an additional method with which to attack such conviction aside from the usual direct appeal, a petition for post-conviction relief or the pardon procedure. No reason appears why assertions as to unconstitutionality could not be considered in the course of the decision by the Secretary. 29 More importantly, the presence of the relief provision suggests that Congress expected felons, from time to time, to challenge their convictions and, in so doing, remove any prohibition before resuming their place among the ranks of users of firearms. Failure to overturn their disability, either judicially through an appeal or a post-conviction proceeding or administratively through the Secretary or pardoning authorities, would reinforce the viability of the statutory restriction. It follows that Congress did not plan that the constitutionality of an underlying conviction would be adjudicated during the very prosecution for the firearms violation, at least where the defendant has not even sought to void such conviction through other available channels. Also, it is questionable whether Congress intended to permit such an individual to attack, or require the government to demonstrate, the validity of a prior conviction during a trial for misrepresentation on the requisite registration form. 30 In sum, the Gun Control Act in itself contains evidence, somewhat sparse but nonetheless telling, regarding the intent of Congress as to the questions posed in this action. The language of the statute suggests that the legislative framers sanctioned the use of an outstanding criminal conviction as a predicate for a firearms violation, even where the defendant questions the constitutionality of the prior conviction during his trial on the gun charges. This is particularly so where, as here, the defendant, before resuming the use of firearms, has in no way challenged such conviction through any of the procedures contained in the Act. 31