Opinion ID: 578658
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Upward Departure in Term of Imprisonment

Text: 14 The district court computed defendant's offense level as eight and his criminal history category as VI, thus resulting in a guideline sentence range of eighteen to twenty-four months imprisonment and two to three years of supervised release. The district court then departed upward, sentencing defendant to thirty-six months imprisonment and five years of supervised release. 15 Defendant argues that the district court improperly departed upward in sentencing him. The district court may depart from the applicable guideline range if it finds an aggravating or mitigating circumstance not adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b) (West Supp.1991). The district court's decision to depart upward is viewed under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Snover, 900 F.2d 1207, 1209 (8th Cir.1990) (Snover ); United States v. Carey, 898 F.2d 642, 645 (8th Cir.1990) (Carey ). A departure from the applicable guideline range is affirmed unless it is unreasonable. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e) (West Supp.1991). We must accept the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and must give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. Id. 16 In applying these standards, our court has adopted the three step analysis of the First Circuit in United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir.) (Diaz-Villafane ), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862, 110 S.Ct. 177, 107 L.Ed.2d 133 (1989). United States v. Smith, 909 F.2d 1164, 1169 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 691, 112 L.Ed.2d 682 (1991); United States v. Lang, 898 F.2d 1378, 1379-80 (8th Cir.1990) (Lang). We first review the circumstances relied on by the district court to determine if the case is sufficiently unusual to warrant departure. Second, we examine the district court's findings of fact to determine if the circumstances exist in the present case. The district court's findings of fact may be set aside for clear error only. Lastly, we determine whether the overall sentence is reasonable. 17 In order to review the circumstances relied on by the district court, the district court must provide the specific reasons for its departure. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(c) (West Supp.1991). Here, the district court set forth six reasons for its departure. In its judgment, the district court set forth the following reasons for its departure: 18
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22 5. Defendant has received in the past only minimal sentences in spite of the repetitive nature of his criminal conduct. 23 6. Court finds that the trial testimony established that the dollar loss as computed, does not truly reflect the extent of the fraudulent activity, or the harm associated with defendant's conduct. 24 We agree with the district court that these circumstances take this case outside of the heartland of sentencing and justify an upward departure. The district court first relied on the fact that defendant continually, even while on probation for prior fraudulent actions, used the same fraudulent scheme. This court has previously found that repeated commission of the same type of offense was not adequately considered by the guidelines and can justify an upward departure. See United States v. Perkins, 929 F.2d 436, 438 (8th Cir.1991). Here, defendant used various false names and social security numbers in various jurisdictions, but the criminal acts are remarkably similar. 25 The district court's second, third and fourth reasons for upward departure illustrate why defendant's criminal history score does not adequately reflect the seriousness of his prior criminal acts. Once again these circumstances can support an upward departure. Carey, 898 F.2d at 645-46. Additionally, the guidelines themselves mention that criminal conduct outside of the time period counted by the guidelines can be used to justify upward departure. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, note 8 (1990). Defendant argues that in his case, his criminal history score of thirteen or fourteen points puts him in the low end of Category VI and thus upward departure is unwarranted. Yet the district court set forth a considerable number of offenses which are not counted in defendant's criminal history score and these additional offenses, combined with the other circumstances described, justified the upward departure. 26 Fifth, the district court pointed to the past leniency received by defendant. Because defendant committed his various offenses in many different jurisdictions and under many different names, the sentencing courts were unaware of his prior criminal behavior. Following one conviction, defendant simply created a new identity and continued his fraudulent activity elsewhere. Once again, this court has accepted past leniency as a circumstance which justifies departure. Lang, 898 F.2d at 1380. 27 Finally, the district court pointed to the harm caused by defendant's conduct which was not adequately reflected in his base offense level. At the sentencing hearing, the district court pointed to falsehoods committed by defendant which were not counted in arriving at the mathematical computation of the dollar loss associated with his conduct, including falsehoods to obtain a driver's license, misuse of a law school student's record, use of false social security numbers, and use of other false information on military discharge papers. Uncharged conduct can be the basis for departure. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4 (1990); Snover, 900 F.2d at 1210. 28 We now move to the second step in the analysis, that is, whether the district court's findings of fact are supported by the evidence. We will only reverse the district court's findings of fact for clear error. The government had the burden of proving the conduct to be considered at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458, 464 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2907, 115 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1991). Defendant disputes a number of the factual findings of the district court. We find defendant's arguments unpersuasive. 29 Defendant's arguments concern three of the district court's reasons for departure: the prior offenses not counted because of their age, the outstanding fraud charges, and the outstanding warrant. Defendant does admit to some of the charges, for example, defendant admits to passing a bad check in Ohio in 1977. He disputes others. For example, he claims that he was not convicted in 1970 of defrauding an innkeeper in Boston, but instead received a suspended sentence and six months probation. The district court recognized defendant's objection. The district court stated that because this offense was not considered in calculating defendant's criminal history points, it could properly be considered for purposes of upward departure. 30 Defendant also objected to the district court's consideration of one of the outstanding fraud charges, a charge pending in Philadelphia. Defendant claims that he is not the Nicholas Faison who committed the offense and that the government has no fingerprint evidence to prove that he is Faison. The district court relied on a photograph taken in Philadelphia as well as the fact that defendant used the same Chicago address used by another alias, Zachary Stearns, his own date of birth, a similar fake social security number, and employed a similar fraudulent scheme. The district court properly relied on this pending charge as a reason for its upward departure. We have similarly reviewed defendant's other factual objections and find them all without merit. 31 Finally, we must determine the overall reasonableness of the district court's sentence. This step is quintessentially a judgment call, and we should give deference to the district court and respect its superior 'feel' for the case. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 49-50. The district court conducted three sentencing hearings following trial, and thus certainly was thoroughly acquainted with the facts of the case. We believe that the district court's decision to depart upward was reasonable. Based upon defendant's record, his continued use of the same fraudulent scheme, his past lenient sentences, and the non-quantifiable harm caused by defendant's conduct in Minnesota, we believe his sentence of thirty-six months imprisonment was reasonable. The sentence was well within the statutory maximum of six years. 18 U.S.C. § 3581(b)(4). 32