Opinion ID: 901439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Improper Final Argument and Admissibility of Evidence at Trial

Text: [¶25.] Carothers claims reversible error based on a comment made by the State's Attorney in his closing argument to the jury. Although no objection was made at trial, Carothers claims the comment constituted plain error. Plain error requires the defendant to show (1) error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. State v. Page, 2006 SD 2, ¶15, 709 NW2d 739, 750 (internal quotations omitted); see also SDCL 23A-44-15. The plain error rule is applied cautiously and we will only invoke our discretion in exceptional circumstances. State v. Nelson, 1998 SD 124, ¶8, 587 NW2d 439, 443. [¶26.] Carothers alleges that plain error occurred during the State's Attorney's closing argument. Carothers takes issue with the State's Attorney's reference to a statement Carothers made in his interview with law enforcement officers. The taped interview was introduced into evidence and shown to the jury. In a portion of the interview, Carothers discussed seeing the child lying on the floor of the dining room, rubbing a plastic shovel on her panties. Carothers stated this was abnormal conduct for a little girl. He also stated that the child's uncle had witnessed the incident and commented on her actions. Although Carothers could not remember the exact words the uncle had used, he stated that it was something like you little pervert. [¶27.] Based on this portion of the interview between Carothers and the officers, the State's Attorney made the following statements in his closing arguments: In that taped interview on the 3rd of October, and the Defendant was making mention of something about a shovel, and he said, was asked by Lieutenant Miller, What did he say, [what did] Allan say to [S.T.]? [Carothers responded] Well, I don't know what he said but [something about a] little pervert. Lieutenant Miller asked, Was that his words? [Carothers stated],No, those are mine. Ladies and gentlemen, in that house the 1st and 2nd of October, there may have been a pervert, but it was not [S.T.]. [¶28.] Viewed in context, the State's Attorney was merely referring to evidence already heard by the jury. Therefore, the context of the State's Attorney's comment in addition to its singular reference does not rise to the level of misconduct and needs no further analysis. Cf. State v. Smith, 1999 SD 83, 599 NW2d 344 (finding nonprejudicial misconduct where prosecutor repeatedly called defendant a monster, pervert, child molester, sexual predator, and a tyrant). [¶29.] The remaining issues raised by Carothers pertain to the habitual offender proceeding. Carothers argues that the court erred in admitting Exhibits 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10, which resulted in unfair prejudice and the presentation of cumulative evidence. We review a trial court's evidentiary ruling under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Jolley, 2003 SD 5, ¶5, 656 NW2d 305, 307. Under this standard, we do not determine whether we would have made a like decision, only whether a judicial mind, considering the law and the facts, could have reached a similar decision. Id. [¶30.] Exhibits 4, 5, and 7 consist of information relating to Carothers' three prior convictions alleged in the habitual offender information. These exhibits included a cover sheet attesting to the accuracy of the attached fingerprint card, the fingerprint card, and the penitentiary entrance record for each conviction, including two photographs of Carothers. [¶31.] The fingerprint card in Exhibit 4 showed the final disposition of Carothers' burglary conviction, which Carothers contends was irrelevant to the prosecution's burden of proof. Under the habitual offender statutes, the prosecution has the burden of providing sufficient evidence of identity. See State v. Loop, 422 NW2d 420, 424 (SD 1988); SDCL 22-7-11. In meeting this burden, certified fingerprint cards are deemed admissible without providing an evidentiary foundation. SDCL 22-7-11. Even though the information on the fingerprint card repeated the final disposition of Carothers' burglary conviction and may have been cumulative, the card was relevant to proving Carothers was an habitual criminal. Whether the probative value of relevant evidence has been substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice due to its cumulative nature is within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Devall, 489 NW2d 371, 375 (SD 1992). Consequently, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. [¶32.] Carothers also argues that providing two sets of photographs in Exhibits 5 and 7 was excessive. However, the photographs established identity, a question of fact for the jury which had to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Stuck v. Leapley, 473 NW2d 476, 479 n4 (SD 1991). Providing the jury with a photograph for each conviction established that the Derrick E. Carothers before the jury was the same Derrick E. Carothers who had been convicted of each crime. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Exhibits 4, 5, and 7. [¶33.] Exhibit 9 consisted of a Knox County, Illinois, information charging Carothers with aggravated battery and criminal damage to state property while incarcerated as well as the judgment relating to those charges. Exhibit 10 was an Illinois Verification of Incarceration listing Carothers' convictions in that state. Carothers asserts that including both Exhibit 9 and 10 was prejudicial and unnecessary. [¶34.] Under SDCL 22-7-9, only one prior conviction arising from the same transaction may be considered in determining the number of defendant's prior convictions. Exhibit 9 was provided to illustrate that the battery and criminal damage charges listed in Exhibit 10 arose from a separate transaction than the other charges listed in Exhibit 10. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Exhibits 9 and 10. [¶35.] Carothers next argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to exhibit his tattoos to the jury. We have previously held that when identity is at issue, a defendant may be required to show his tattoo without violating his right against self-incrimination. State v. Knoche, 515 NW2d 834, 839 (SD 1994). A description of Carothers' tattoos was provided in an Illinois prison document included in the State's exhibits. While Carothers contends that displaying his tattoos to the jury was prejudicial because fingerprints and photographs had already been submitted into evidence, the cumulative nature of the evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Devall, 489 NW2d at 375. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Carothers to display his tattoo to the jury. [¶36.] Carothers also claims that the trial court abused its discretion concerning the number of his prior convictions that were submitted to the jury in the habitual offender trial. He contends that providing the jury with all of his prior convictions resulted in unfair prejudice. He cites no authority for this argument, and we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the number of prior convictions it submitted to the jury. [¶37.] Finally, Carothers claims that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury to determine if his prior convictions were crimes of violence or felonies under South Dakota or United States law. His arguments have no merit since both issues involve questions of law that are decided by the court rather than questions of fact decided by the jury. See State v. Stuck, 434 NW2d 43, 47 (SD 1988) (finding that the determination of whether an offense is a felony is not a question of fact for the jury but a matter of law predetermined by the legislature and applied by the judiciary); SDCL 22-7-8 (enhancing sentences when there are three or more felony convictions in addition to the principal felony if one of the prior felonies was a crime of violence); SDCL 22-1-2(9) (defining crime of violence). [¶38.] Accordingly, we affirm on all issues. [¶39.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS, KONENKAMP, and ZINTER, Justices, concur.