Opinion ID: 2609360
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to disclose the CI file.

Text: Although we have previously addressed the State's duty to provide the defendant with all potentially exculpatory evidence in its control or possession, we have yet to consider the novel situation where an independent federal agency refuses to disclose what it regards as confidential information contained in an internal CI file. See Roberts v. State, 110 Nev. 1121, 881 P.2d 1 (1994) (discussing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (requiring prosecutor to disclose to an accused favorable evidence material to either guilt or punishment)); see also U.S. v. Spires, 3 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir.1993). In Roberts, the defendant made a specific Brady request for a CI file on the informant well in advance of trial. Roberts, 110 Nev. at 1131, 881 P.2d at 7. The district court held three hearings to determine what information, if any, should be disclosed. Id. The district court ultimately ordered disclosure of the CI file on a Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department's informant, to which the State had access. Id. at 1132, 881 P.2d at 3. The prosecution failed to produce the file or to submit it to the court for in camera review following the defendant's specific materiality claim. Id. at 1132, 881 P.2d at 9. In reversing Roberts' conviction, this court stated: [I]t cannot be said that the district court judge ruled Roberts' entrapment claim without merit, for the judge instructed the jury on entrapment, indicating that Roberts presented evidence at trial sufficient to require an instruction on this theory. Accordingly, relevant impeachment evidence in Noel's [the informant's] CI file, as it relates to the alleged offense and Roberts' claim of entrapment, would have been admissible at trial. Id. at 1133, 881 P.2d at 8. In this case, the DEA refused to disclose the CI file on Hodges to the State. Given the prosecution's disclosure of the entirety of the DEA materials disclosed to it, and the testimony of DEA agents assigned to the case that certain confidential information was nondiscoverable, the record strongly suggests that not even the State was privy to the information contained in the CI file. We conclude that the case at bar is readily distinguishable from Roberts. In Roberts, the working relationship between the state and local police compelled the conclusion that they were a single entity for the purposes of providing discovery in criminal prosecutions. Further, the prosecution actively possessed the CI file in Roberts. We emphasize that the State may not circumvent the discovery process by claiming that a local police department, an agent of the State, refuses to disclose such documents. Therefore, when this situation presents itself, the Brady rule applies. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). At oral argument, Wade's counsel conceded that he did not believe that the State had any knowledge of the DEA's CI file on DEA's CI file on Hodges. Wade's counsel further represented that the only reason he knew that a CI file on Hodges must exist was due to his own experience. Relying on Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995), Wade maintains that the failures to disclose made it impossible for him to establish an entrapment defense without the CI file on Hodges. Claiming that he had no alternative method to obtain the file, Wade urges reversal of his conviction. We disagree. In Kyles, the United States Supreme Court held that 1) in determining whether evidence not disclosed by the State was material, and, therefore, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the cumulative effect of all suppressed evidence favorable to the defendant is considered, rather than considering each item of evidence individually; and 2) favorable evidence that the State failed to disclose to the defendant would have made a different result reasonably probable, and thus, nondisclosure of such evidence amounted to a Brady violation. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555. While we recognize that Wade intended to present an entrapment defense, we do not agree with his contention that he had no alternative way of obtaining the CI file. We hasten to point out that the record does not reflect that Wade, despite suspecting that a CI file on Hodges existed but had not been disclosed, at any time requested an in camera hearing per Roberts. Further, contrary to Wade's counsel's representation to this court, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 16.26 (1997), [8] Wade could have attempted to subpoena the CI file directly from the DEA, given that the State was not in a position of authority to order the DEA to disclose the evidence. Further, we are persuaded by Ferguson v. State, 226 Ga.App. 681, 487 S.E.2d 467, 468 (Ga.1997), in which a defendant on trial for trafficking claimed that the state violated Brady by failing to disclose that its witness had a prior criminal history and by failing to reveal an arrangement between a witness and the FBI. The court held that: In order to show that the State violated Brady by failing to reveal a deal with one of its witnesses, a defendant must show that the State possessed evidence of the deal; that the defendant did not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; that the State suppressed evidence of the deal; and that, had the evidence of the deal been disclosed to the defendant, there existed a reasonable probability that the result at trial would have been different. Id. (citing Burgeson v. State, 267 Ga. 102, 475 S.E.2d 580, 583 (Ga.1996)). After applying these standards, the court in Ferguson held that the defendant failed to carry his burden of showing a Brady violation. Id. The court stated that the state prosecutor disclosed all the information to the defense that it possessed regarding the federal arrangement. The court further relied on an earlier Georgia case in which the court stated, ` Brady requires information to be revealed only when it is possessed by the prosecutor or any one over whom the prosecutor has authority.' Id. at 469 (quoting Zant v. Moon, 264 Ga. 93, 440 S.E.2d 657 (Ga.1994)). We conclude that the instant case presents a similar situation, in that the State did not possess the CI file. Further, the State was not in a position of authority to order the federal DEA, an entity that did not act as an agent of the State prosecution, to cooperate. We agree with the court's rationale in Ferguson and, therefore, conclude that Wade also fails to carry his burden of showing a Brady violation. Further, because Wade could have employed alternative methods to obtain the information contained in the CI file on Hodges, we conclude that no Brady violation occurred. Having concluded that Wade's remaining allegations lack merit and do not warrant discussion, we hereby affirm Wade's judgment of conviction.