Opinion ID: 196544
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Related Rulings

Text: 5 Gilberg first contends that the final jury instruction misdefined the mens rea element in 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which criminalizes knowingly mak[ing] any false statement or report ... for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of ... any [FDIC-insured bank] ... upon any application, advance, ... commitment, or loan. (Emphasis added.) Gilberg argues that section 1014 affords a good faith defense where the defendant knew the statement or report contained false information but acted without the bad purpose to influence the bank's actions. He proffered evidence that he knew and believed, at the time of the various loan applications, that the prevailing banking practice was to approve or disapprove applications based solely on the appraised value of the real property securing the loan, rather than on whether the real estate sale itself involved price discounts or secondary mortgage financing. Thus, Gilberg argues, the district court hobbled his defense by instructing the jury that a defendant does not act in good faith even if he honestly holds a particular opinion or belief and, yet, knowingly makes false and fraudulent statements or misrepresentations. 6 Gilberg concededly raised no objection to the jury instruction. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 51. Consequently, we review for plain error, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b), and may reverse only if (i) the final jury instruction constituted error (ii) which was or should have been obvious in the sense that the governing law was clearly settled to the contrary, and (iii) appellant proves that the error resulted in prejudice, or in other words, that it affected his substantial rights. See United States v. Hurley, 63 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). Even if these three criteria are met, however, we do not notice the error unless it caused 'a miscarriage of justice' or [seriously] undermined 'the integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'  Id. (citations omitted). 7 Though the statutory interpretation posited by Gilberg is dubious at best, cf., e.g., United States v. Wilcox, 919 F.2d 109, 112 (9th Cir.1990) (The requisite intent [under § 1014] is the intent to influence an action, and nothing more.), we do not reach the merits. Gilberg cites to no authority--let alone to a controlling United States Supreme Court or First Circuit decision--clearly holding that the good faith instruction given below contained an erroneous statement of the mens rea requirement under section 1014. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-34, 113 S.Ct. at 1777 (At a minimum, the Court of Appeals cannot correct an error pursuant to Rule 52(b) unless the error is clear under current law.) (emphasis added). 1 Hence, any error in the challenged instruction was neither obvious, nor cognizable under Criminal Rule 52(b).
8 Gilberg next assigns error in the district court order precluding evidence that the defrauded banks had relied exclusively on property appraisals in determining whether to approve loan applications, and not on the apparent absence of discounts and second mortgage financing. He claims that this ruling prejudiced him because the excluded evidence would have bolstered his good faith defense. See supra Section II.A.1. 2 9 Once again we review for plain error, since Gilberg first raised this claim on appeal. See Hurley, 63 F.3d at 9. As there was no plain error in rejecting the good faith defense instruction, a fortiori there can have been no plain error in excluding evidence offered in support. Furthermore, given Gilberg's concession that a representative sampling of this good faith evidence was admitted at trial, he has failed to demonstrate prejudice. Olano, 507 U.S. at 1778-79, 113 S.Ct. at 1778 (noting that, unlike Rule 52(a), Rule 52(b) provides that the defendant rather than the Government ... bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice) (emphasis added).