Opinion ID: 2806532
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Res Judicata for As-Applied Challenges

Text: The State makes the same res judicata arguments as to these challenges as it does for the facial challenge. The res judicata analysis is different, however, when we address the as-applied challenges because, as we suggested in Abbott II, the actual factual development may be different than anticipated in a facial challenge setting. We now know with certainty that the non-ASC abortion facilities have actually closed and physicians have been unable to obtain admitting privileges after diligent effort. Thus, the actual impact of the combined effect of the admitting privileges and ASC requirements on abortion facilities, abortion physicians, and women in Texas can be more concretely understood and measured. See Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 699 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1983) (addressing whether the changes are “significant” and create “new legal conditions” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Our sister circuits have confronted the issue of how the ripeness analysis (a subsidiary consideration in the res judicata analysis discussed above) differs between a facial challenge and an as-applied challenge. The Eleventh Circuit has explained: 36Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Grossman, used the term “Lower Rio Grande Valley” to describe the area comprising the following four counties: Starr, Hidalgo, Willacy, and Cameron. See also Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 597 (“The Rio Grande Valley . . . has four counties.”). 44 Case: 14-50928 Document: 00513071917 Page: 45 Date Filed: 06/09/2015 No. 14-50928 Because the question of ripeness depends on the timing of the adjudication of a particular issue, it applies differently to facial and as-applied challenges. A facial challenge asserts that a law always operates unconstitutionally . . . . In the context of a facial challenge, a purely legal claim is presumptively ripe for judicial review because it does not require a developed factual record. An as-applied challenge, by contrast, addresses whether a statute is unconstitutional on the facts of a particular case or to a particular party. Because such a challenge asserts that a statute cannot be constitutionally applied in particular circumstances, it necessarily requires the development of a factual record for the court to consider. Harris v. Mexican Specialty Foods, Inc., 564 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The First Circuit has explained this approach as well: [A] challenge to a rule or statute may be ripe for adjudication on the question of facial constitutionality and yet not be ripe for adjudication on the question of constitutionality as applied. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 & n.50 (1972) (upholding noise control ordinance but reserving decision on constitutionality of possible applications); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) (upholding ordinance requiring licensing of films prior to public exhibition) and Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968) (invalidating same ordinance as applied); Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (upholding New York statutory scheme for identifying and removing subversive school teachers) and Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (invalidating portions of same statutory scheme as applied). Kines v. Day, 754 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1985). Other courts have concluded that an as-applied challenge was not ripe although a facial challenge was ripe. See 13B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3532.3 (3d ed. 1998) (“A number of other cases in more general settings reflect similar distinctions between the ripeness of broad attacks on the legitimacy of any regulation and the nonripeness of more particular attacks on more specific 45 Case: 14-50928 Document: 00513071917 Page: 46 Date Filed: 06/09/2015 No. 14-50928 applications.”); see, e.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (en banc); Sam & Ali, Inc. v. Ohio Dep’t of Liquor Control, 158 F.3d 397, 398–400 (6th Cir. 1998); Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l Union v. Nev. Gaming Comm’n, 984 F.2d 1507, 1512–13 (9th Cir. 1993). Although we agree with the State that some aspects of the as-applied challenge were extant at the time the Abbott II litigation was filed, some important facts occurred later, such as the actual closure of abortion facilities in Corpus Christi and El Paso and the physicians ultimately being denied admitting privileges after diligent effort. Cf. Orix, 212 F.3d at 895 (“[A] case is not ripe if further factual development is required.” (citation omitted)). We disclaimed reliance on such facts in Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 589 (“Later asapplied challenges can always deal with subsequent, concrete constitutional issues.”); id. at 599 n.14 (“To the extent that the State and Planned Parenthood rely on developments since the conclusion of the bench trial and during this appeal, we do not consider any arguments based on those facts . . . .”). Although Plaintiffs could have foreseen (and did foresee) some of these closures and admitting privilege rejections, the State suggested that we could not know these matters with certainty at the time, and we deferred consideration of these facts to a time when they were more concretely presented. That time arrived, and the district court correctly held it was not precluded from addressing the actual facts in the as-applied context. Thus, although it is a close question, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying relief to the State on this defense as to the McAllen and El Paso as-applied challenges.