Opinion ID: 773974
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Riley's Liberty Interest Claim

Text: 21 Mr. Riley claims that the defendants deprived him of a liberty interest in his occupation when they dismissed him from his position at Julian and then made statements to the Chicago Sun-Times, in the interview given by Ms. Johnson, to the effect that Mr. Riley should not be rehired by the Board due to his failure to perform duties in the events surrounding Wilson's death. R.37 at 9. To set forth a violation of Section 1983, Mr. Riley must show that 'the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law' and 'this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.' Strasburger v. Board of Educ., Hardin County Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1, 143 F.3d 351, 355 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)). In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the state may infringe a plaintiff's liberty interest when, in declining to rehire an employee, it makes a charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community that places his good name, reputation, honor, or integrity . . . at stake or when, in failing to rehire, it imposes on the plaintiff a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. Id. at 573. The Court has emphasized that, to implicate a liberty interest, such charges of defamation must be coupled with the alteration of a legal status, such as the loss of an employment position. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-10 (1976); see also Ratliff v. City of Milwaukee, 795 F.2d 612, 625 (7th Cir. 1986). We have interpreted Roth to indicate that a liberty interest may be threatened in two types of situations when the government removes someone from an employment position: (1) the individual's good name, reputation, honor or integrity are at stake by such charges as immorality, dishonesty, alcoholism, disloyalty, Communism or subversive acts; or (2) the state imposes a stigma or other disability on the individual which forecloses other opportunities. Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 693 (7th Cir. 1985). Mr. Riley claims that, in conjunction with his termination, Ms. Johnson's statements 7 deprived him of a liberty interest in pursuing the occupation of his choice; he maintains that the statements both seriously damaged his good name, reputation, honor and integrity and imposed a stigma upon him that foreclosed future employment opportunities. 8 He charges that the Board's failure to provide him with a name-clearing hearing after these statements were made violated his due process rights. 22 We have explained that, when an employee claims that a government employer has infringed his liberty to pursue the occupation of his choice, the employee must show that (1) he was stigmatized by the defendant's conduct, (2) the stigmatizing information was publically disclosed and (3) he suffered a tangible loss of other employment opportunities as a result of public disclosure. See Head v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 794, 801 (7th Cir. 2000); Strasburger, 143 F.3d at 356; Johnson v. Martin, 943 F.2d 15, 16 (7th Cir. 1991). We also have noted that, at the heart of every claim that an employer has infringed an employee's liberty of occupation, is a charge that the circumstances of the discharge, at least if they were publically stated, had the effect of blacklisting the employee from employment in comparable jobs. Colaizzi v. Walker, 812 F.2d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 1987). 9 In such cases, the employee's good name, reputation, honor or integrity must be called into question in a manner that makes it virtually impossible for the employee to find new employment in his chosen field. See Head, 225 F.3d at 801; Olivieri v. Rodriguez, 122 F.3d 406, 408 (7th Cir. 1997); Lashbrook v. Oerkfitz, 65 F.3d 1339, 1348-49 (7th Cir. 1995); Ratliff, 795 F.2d at 625. 23 The district court held that Mr. Riley could not satisfy the third part of the three-part test set forth above because he did not make a showing that prospective employment opportunities have been foreclosed to him due to Ms. Johnson's allegedly defamatory statements. We agree. Mr. Riley admits that, after being dismissed from Julian, he sought no additional employment opportunities and therefore was not turned down by any potential employer due to Ms. Johnson's statements. 10 Moreover, although he claims that those statements have made him virtually unemployable in his chosen profession, Mr. Riley was not discharged from his position as a swimming instructor with the City Colleges of Chicago after the statements were made, and, as far as the record shows, he continues to work in that position today. 24 Mr. Riley argues that an employee should not be required to show that the defamation in question caused the tangible loss of employment opportunities; he maintains that such a requirement diminishes the rights of public employees and serves no real purpose. However, regarding such liberty interest claims, the Supreme Court noted in Roth that [i]t stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person is deprived of liberty when he simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before to seek another. Roth, 408 U.S. at 575. As a result, the Court indicated that a cognizable constitutional claim required proof that an employer's actions significantly foreclosed an employee's future employment prospects to a degree amounting to a deprivation of liberty. See id. at 574 n.13 (Mere proof, for example, that [the plaintiff's] record of non-retention in one job, taken alone, might make him somewhat less attractive to some other employers would hardly establish the kind of foreclosure of opportunities amounting to a deprivation of 'liberty.'). In line with the Supreme Court's direction, we have required that a plaintiff's claim establish that hisfuture employment opportunities have been curtailed so significantly that a liberty interest was implicated. See Zaky v. United States Veterans Admin., 793 F.2d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining that a court should not simply assume, based on a plaintiff's assertions, that a wide variety of opportunities have been foreclosed). Therefore, a requirement that the employee show that he suffered a tangible loss of other employment opportunities is consistent with the case authority insisting that a liberty interest claim not be unduly speculative. When a plaintiff cannot make such a showing, his liberty interest claim must fail. See Lashbrook, 65 F.3d at 1349; Fittshur v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 31 F.3d 1401, 1409-10 (7th Cir. 1994); Vukadinovich v. Board of Sch. Trustees of the Michigan City Area Schs., 978 F.2d 403, 413 n.7 (7th Cir. 1992); Oshe v. Hughes, 816 F.2d 1144, 1150 (7th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 485 U.S. 902 (1988); Munson, 754 F.2d at 694. 25 Mr. Riley also argues that he has put forward sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he is all but unemployable in his chosen profession due to the Board's actions. He asserts that, when he approached Julian's principal in August 1998 and requested his reinstatement at the school, the principal told Mr. Riley that the Board had forbidden her from employing him and had made it clear that Mr. Riley could not work for any Board facility. Mr. Riley maintains that precluding him from working in any school in the Chicago public school system should suffice to demonstrate that his liberty of occupation has been violated. In support of that claim he relies upon Larry v. Lawlor, 605 F.2d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 1978), a case in which a plaintiff applied to the Civil Service Commission (the Commission) and requested to be placed on a list of eligible applicants for employment consideration by various departments of the federal government. In Larry, we held that the plaintiff had demonstrated a tangible loss of employment opportunities sufficient to implicate a liberty interest. See id. at 958-59. The Commission's investigative report, which rated the plaintiff's application ineligible due to his unsatisfactory employment record and his habitual use of alcohol, barred him from all federal employment for up to three years. See id. at 956. Notably, the court relied upon Justice Jackson's comment in Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), that a bar from government employment is no small injury when government employment so dominates the field of opportunity. Id. at 958 (quoting McGrath, 341 U.S. at 185 (Jackson, J., concurring)); cf. Perry v. F.B.I., 781 F.2d 1294, 1299-1303 (7th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (distinguishing Larry as a case involving the absolute ban of all government employment for a significant time period). 26 In this case, Mr. Riley has not demonstrated a bar to his employment opportunities similar to the magnitude of that present in Larry. As the district court noted, Mr. Riley did not actually seek employment at any other Board facilities. See R.44 at 3 (ruling on motions for reconsideration). Even assuming that he was banned from employment with the Chicago public schools, the court noted that the Chicago school system is one of many school systems in the metropolitan area and state and is an entity distinct from the City of Chicago, the Chicago Park District, and numerous other municipal entities in the metropolitan area. Id. at 4 n.4. With many potential employment opportunities as a swimming instructor still available to him and with no demonstration that the Board's comments have prevented him from obtaining one of those jobs, Mr. Riley cannot demonstrate that his liberty has been infringed in the manner required by the case law. Indeed, the evidence demon strates that, contrary to Mr. Riley's assertions of unemployability, he continues to hold a job with the City Colleges of Chicago as a swimming instructor. Cf. Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 531 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that plaintiff's renewal as principal afteremployer's stigmatizing conduct meant he could not show that it was virtually impossible for him to find employment in chosen field); Oshe, 816 F.2d at 1150 (holding that evidence that plaintiff found employment after termination demonstrated that plaintiff could not show liberty deprivation); Munson, 754 F.2d at 694 (concluding that plaintiff's claim that he was virtually unemployable was undercut by evidence that he was able to secure part-time and then full-time employment after termination by employer). As a result, we agree with the district court that Mr. Riley's liberty interest claim must fail. 27