Opinion ID: 2289965
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Appellant's Confession Was Voluntary

Text: Appellant asserts that he was not orally given his Miranda warnings, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), that the warning he was given by the police officer was inadequate in that appellant was told that anything he said could be used for or against him, that he did not effectively waive his constitutional rights, and that his statement was involuntary in that he was emotionally under par at the time it was given. There were two pre-trial suppression hearings. The first was in June, 1967, following appellant's motion to suppress. After two days of hearings, Judge JAMIESON, the hearing judge, denied the motion. When the case was called for trial, in August, 1967, appellant again moved to suppress, alleging that all statements and physical evidence were the fruits of an illegal arrest. After further hearing, out of the presence of the jury, the motion was denied by Judge DOTY, the trial judge. Notwithstanding these rulings, appellant, as was his right, see Commonwealth v. Joyner, 441 Pa. 242, 272 A. 2d 454 (1971), again challenged the voluntariness of his confession at trial, and the issue was submitted to the jury. The record of the suppression hearing and the trial discloses that Detective Krimmel, testifying for the Commonwealth, stated that he gave appellant his Miranda warnings when first engaging him in conversation at the police station, and that appellant orally acknowledged that he knew the meaning of the warnings; that before appellant voluntarily submitted to a polygraph test, he was again orally given his warnings by Officer Kowalczyk; that appellant made an oral statement, at the beginning of which he was again made aware of his Miranda warnings and that appellant then read and signed a typewritten transcription of his statement containing the warnings and a waiver thereof. [2] The detective further testified that after the polygraph test had been taken, appellant was told by Officer Kowalczyk that he was in trouble and should retain a lawyer, and that appellant had replied that he didn't need a lawyer and would tell the detective all about it. The elapsed time from appellant's arrest at his home until the taking of his written statement at the police administration building was just over three hours. He was questioned for about an hour and a half of this period before he confessed, and was, so the policemen testified, calm and stable throughout this period, responsive to questions, and without any indication of intoxication. Appellant himself testified that after he was arrested and taken to the police administration building, Officer Kowalczyk immediately began to interrogate him. Camm said that he told the officer he had spent the previous evening drinking with John Bytoff. Appellant asserted he was told by Kowalczyk to sign a paper, which the officer only later informed him constituted a written agreement to take a polygraph examination. He further testified that after he took the test, the officer told appellant he was lying. At no time, Camm stated, had he been told of his right to counsel or his right to remain silent; the warnings contained in his written statement had not been read to him or by him. Dr. Kenneth Kool, a psychiatrist who testified on behalf of appellant, testified that it seemed improbable to me he [Camm] would be able to give that kind of sequential presentation, i.e., such as was contained in the written confession. He felt that the appellant, with his limited emotional resources, his premorbidity and schizoid tendency, had, in effect, been brainwashed by the isolation, the questioning, and the polygraph test, and that the interrogation would have a much more profound effect on him than it would on a so-called normal person. This testimony, by itself, was not sufficient to compel a finding of mental incompetence, and in any event did not have to be accepted. See 1 Henry, Pennsylvania Evidence, § 565 at 576-577. A careful examination of the record fails to demonstrate that the lower court erred at the suppression hearings in not holding as a matter of law that appellant's confession was involuntary, or that the jury erred in not so finding as a matter of fact. The question of appellant's physical or mental coercion was strictly factual, and it was fully within the jury's competence to reject appellant's version. Appellant argues that the confession was not knowingly or understandingly given because Officer Krimmel, in administering the constitutional warnings, stated that anything Camm might say could be used for or against him. Detective Krimmel, confronted on cross-examination at trial with an answer he had apparently given at the first suppression hearing using the for or against phraseology in a warning he had given appellant, denied having done so. I haven't said that at any proceeding. My only recollection is that anything he would say would be used against him at the trial. Officer Kowalczyk stated he had not heard Krimmel give the warning in for or against terms. The written statement, signed by appellant, used only the word against. Since the trial and decision below in the case at bar, we have held that a warning that a statement might be used for or against an accused is constitutionally inadequate. Commonwealth v. Davis, 440 Pa. 123, 270 A. 2d 199 (1970); Commonwealth v. Singleton, 439 Pa. 185, 266 A. 2d 753 (1970). In both of these cases there was no dispute that the only warning given the accused had been that whatever he said could be used for or against you. In the case before us, on the other hand, the record not only does not compel such a factual finding, but the clear weight of the evidence is to the contrary. The record indicates, moreover, that three subsequent warnings given to Camm, including the written one, were in proper form, saying only could be used against you, and that no incriminating statements were made by appellant until after the subsequent oral warnings. In this situation, we cannot say as a matter of law that the warnings were not adequate or that the confession which followed them was not understandingly made; nor can we say that the jury verdict which involved a factual determination of adequacy and understanding was not fully supportable.