Opinion ID: 1962463
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legislative veto as excessive intrusion into law enforcement.

Text: The veto provision in the Legislative Oversight Act, L. 1981, c. 27, violates the constitutional separation of powers. By allowing the Legislature to control agency rulemaking, the legislative veto can gravely impair the functions of agencies charged with enforcing statutes. The extremely broad legislative veto in the Oversight Act thereby frustrates the Executive's constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the law. [T]he function of promulgating administrative rules and regulations lies at the very heart of the administrative process. Cammarata v. Essex Cty. Park Comm'n, 26 N.J. 404, 410 (1958). See also Abelson's Inc. v. N.J. State Board of Optometrists, 5 N.J. 412, 423 (1950). Rulemaking allows the agency to further the policy goals of legislation by developing coherent and rational codes of conduct so those concerned may know in advance all the rules of the game, so to speak, and may act with reasonable assurance, Boller Beverages Inc. v. Davis, 38 N.J. 138, 152 (1962). We have recognized that administrative agencies are the arms of the executive branch of government through which it executes the laws passed by the Legislature. Agencies regulate through their delegated power to promulgate rules and regulations. See In re Administrative Rules, 90 N.J. 85 (1982). In their effects on private conduct, the types of commands embodied in executive rules may not differ greatly from those in many statutes. For example, the Casino Control Act, N.J.S.A. 5:12-1 to -152, embodies legislative commands far more detailed than the administrative regulation of most industries. However, apart from whether power is inherently executive or legislative, once [the Legislature] has delegated by law a task to the executive, it cannot interfere ... in the performance of that task. Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 467, 488 (1962). Even where the Legislature is not using its veto power to effectively change the law, the veto can illegitimately interfere with executive attempts to enforce the law. The chief function of executive agencies is to implement statutes through the adoption of coherent regulatory schemes. The legislative veto undermines performance of that duty by allowing the Legislature to nullify virtually every existing and future scheme of regulation or any portion of it. The veto of selected parts of a coherent regulatory scheme not only negates what is overridden; it can also render the remainder of the statute irrational or contrary to the goals it seeks to accomplish. [L]egislative interference, constant in its potentiality, can be exercised in any given case without a change in the general standards the legislature has initially decreed. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 F. 2d 408, 432 (9th Cir.1980), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 812, 102 S.Ct. 87, 70 L.Ed. 2d 81 (1981). Moreover, the Legislature need not explain its reasons for any veto decision. Its action therefore leaves the agency with no guidance on how to enforce the law. Broad legislative veto power deters executive agencies in the performance of their constitutional duty to enforce existing laws. Its vice lies not only in its exercise but in its very existence. Faced with potential paralysis from repeated uses of the veto that disrupt coherent regulatory schemes, officials may retreat from the execution of their responsibilities. They will resort to compromises with legislative committees aimed at drafting rules that the current Legislature will find acceptable. In federal agencies an increased reliance on low visibility negotiations with congressional oversight committees apparently has occurred. [3] This process violates two fundamental standards for informal rulemaking: reasoned decision making based on a record and the opportunity for public participants to contest opposing presentations. Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 1369, 1413-14 (1977). In effect, Congress is able to expand its role from one of oversight ... to one of shared administration.... Congress gains the ability to direct unilaterally ... the exercise of agency discretion in a specific manner considered undesirable or unachievable when the enabling statute was first passed. [ Consumer Energy, 673 F. 2d at 474] We are not called upon to determine whether every form of legislative veto or oversight intrudes excessively into the executive sphere of law enforcement. We deal only with the all-inclusive veto presented in this case. In other contexts legislative cooperation or sharing of powers may be essential to further a statute's purpose. Under appropriate circumstances, the Legislature can cooperate with the Executive without violating the separation of powers. See Enourato v. N.J. Building Authority, 90 N.J. 396 (1982). Inevitably some osmosis occurs when the branches of government touch one another; the powers of one branch sometimes take on the hue and characteristics of the powers of the others. [ Knight v. Margate, 86 N.J. at 388] However, legislative veto power cannot stand where it allows an assumption by one branch of powers that are central or essential to the operation of a coordinate branch. Chadha, 634 F. 2d at 425. Moreover, [i]f an exercise of functions which lie at the center of another branch is attempted on a long-term and routine basis, a violation of the constitutional rule requiring separation of powers is more easily established. Id. The legislative veto provision in L. 1981, c. 27, applies to virtually every rule proposed by any executive agency in the State. Because this particular veto provision sweeps so broadly, it allows the Legislature to interfere with essential executive branch rule-making functions on a long-term and routine basis, Chadha, 634 F. 2d at 425, thereby violating the separation of powers.