Opinion ID: 2498924
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Guillen II

Text: ¶ 26 The United States Supreme Court limited the scope of this protection in Guillen II. That case arose from Ignacio Guillen's request for accident reports and other materials and data under our state's PRA [6] at the location of an intersection where his wife was killed in an automobile accident. Guillen II, 537 U.S. at 136, 123 S.Ct. 720. When Pierce County refused to provide any responsive information, Guillen brought an action for violation of the PRA. Id. Like the WSP in this case, the county attempted to justify its refusal by claiming the accident reports were privileged under § 409 because another agency, the public works department, collected the records for a purpose related to § 152. Guillen II, 537 U.S. at 136, 123 S.Ct. 720. The Court disagreed. ¶ 27 Three different interpretations were argued. The county argued that a document initially prepared and held by an agency for purposes unrelated to § 152 became protected under § 409 when a copy of that document was collected by another agency for purposes of § 152. Guillen II, 537 U.S. at 143, 123 S.Ct. 720. Guillen countered that § 409 protected only materials actually created by the agency responsible for compliance with § 152. Guillen II, 537 U.S. at 144, 123 S.Ct. 720. ¶ 28 The United States, as intervenor, proposed a third interpretation that was adopted by the Court:  § 409 protects only information compiled or collected for § 152 purposes, and does not protect information compiled or collected for purposes unrelated to § 152, as held by the agencies that compiled or collected that information. Guillen II, 537 U.S. at 146, 123 S.Ct. 720. The Court explained that this was the proper scope of the rule because it was broad enough to encompass information collected from other agencies for § 152 purposes, while at the same time taking a narrower view of the privilege by making it inapplicable to information compiled or collected for purposes unrelated to § 152 and held by agencies that are not pursuing § 152 objectives. Guillen II, 537 U.S. at 145-46, 123 S.Ct. 720. The Court also held § 409 was an evidentiary privilege and, as such, must be construed narrowly because privileges impede the search for the truth. Guillen II, 537 U.S. at 144, 123 S.Ct. 720. ¶ 29 Under this rule, an accident report collected only for law enforcement purposes and held by the county sheriff would not be protected under § 409 even if the same report was held by another agency that obtained the report for § 152 purposes. Guillen II, 537 U.S. at 144, 123 S.Ct. 720. This approach is consistent with the purpose of § 409 because the statute is not intended to make tort victims worse off than they would have been had § 152 never existed. Guillen II, 537 U.S. at 146, 123 S.Ct. 720. In other words, there is no reason to interpret § 409 as prohibiting the disclosure of information compiled or collected for purposes unrelated to § 152, held by government agencies not involved in administering § 152, if, before § 152 was adopted, plaintiffs would have been free to obtain such information from those very agencies. Id.