Opinion ID: 1688786
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Was the verdict inconsistent and so against the preponderance of the evidence as to be plainly erroneous and manifestly unjust?

Text: We think not. Defendants correctly cite the applicable rule in their brief: [A] post-judgment motion for a new trial, grounded on a claim that `the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, should be granted only in extreme cases, when to let the verdict stand, though supported by some evidence, would be palpably wrong and manifestly unjust.' Casey v. Jones, 410 So.2d 5, 7-8 (Ala.1981). They claim that this is the kind of case referred to in Casey, contending that the undisputed evidence is that at the time of the accident, Cordes was the agent of Melvin Hutson. They contend that Melvin was the principal in this case and should have been added as a party defendant, and that plaintiff himself recognized this fact and attempted to add Melvin Hutson on August 1, 1983, but the statute of limitations had run at that time, and that the trial court properly denied the addition. They argue: The only evidence of negligence in this case is the fact, disputed, but believed by the jury, that the ten foot hay rake protruded over the center of an eighteen foot wide road. The tractor was on the right side of the road going less than fifteen miles per hour and was properly allowed by statute to pull a ten foot wide hay rake. Plaintiff's testimony that the tractor was on its side of the road but that the hay rake was sticking out four or five feet into his lane leaving only four feet to get by is clearly a physical impossibility. The road in question is undisputedly eighteen feet wide; the hay rake in question protrudes only three feet from the left side of the tractor. The least possible space open for plaintiff would have been six feet. Any reasonably prudent motorcycle driver can maneuver through a six foot opening. Furthermore, plaintiff admitted he knew the motorcycle was a dangerous instrumentality, that he might meet farm vehicles on this road, and that he had room to get by the hay rake. He admitted at the scene that it was his fault and he admitted on the witness stand that he could have missed the hay rake had he been going slower. As we have pointed out, defendants presented each of these claims to the jury and the jury refused to respond in defendants' favor. The law, however, is well settled in this area. A jury verdict is presumed to be correct, and that presumption is strengthened where the trial court denies a motion for new trial. Merrill v. Badgett, 385 So.2d 1316 (Ala.Civ.App.), cert. denied, 385 So.2d 1319 (Ala.1980). Granting or refusing a motion for new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court; the exercise of that discretion carries with it a presumption of correctness which will not be disturbed by this court unless some legal right was abused and the record plainly and palpably shows the trial court was in error. Hill v. Cherry, 379 So.2d 590 (Ala.1980). We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying a new trial or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The judgment of the trial court is due to be, and is hereby, affirmed. AFFIRMED. TORBERT, C.J., and JONES, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.