Opinion ID: 2539099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: May the imposition of an unauthorized sentence ever be harmless?

Text: ¶ 20 In Recuenco II, the United States Supreme Court held that the [f]ailure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element to the jury, is not structural error. 548 U.S. at 222, 126 S.Ct. 2546. Therefore, under a federal Sixth Amendment analysis, a Blakely error may, under certain circumstances, be subject to a harmless error analysis. Recuenco II, 548 U.S. at 219-20, 126 S.Ct. 2546. '[M]ost constitutional errors can be harmless.' State v. Frost, 160 Wash.2d 765, 781, 161 P.3d 361 (2007) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Recuenco II, 548 U.S. at 218, 126 S.Ct. 2546). ¶ 21 Here, however, the question is whether a sentencing enhancement that violated the defendant's right (under article I, sections 21 and 22) to have a jury determine all the factors that subject him to greater punishment can be harmless under our state constitution. In these cases, the error was made, not in the jury instruction, but in the trial court's imposition of a sentence. ¶ 22 On remand from Recuenco II, we determined that harmless error analysis does not apply where no error occurred in the jury's determination of guilt. Recuenco III, 163 Wash.2d at 441, 180 P.3d 1276. There, we did not decide whether a Blakely error may ever be harmless under a state constitutional analysis. Instead we held in part that harmless error analysis was not applicable because the error occurred when the trial court exceeded its authority in imposing a sentence neither charged nor authorized by the jury. 163 Wash.2d at 440, 442, 180 P.3d 1276. ¶ 23 Unlike in Recuenco III, it is undisputed here that the State charged the defendants with crimes and/or introduced evidence consistent with the use of a firearm. And, from an evidentiary view, no dispute exists that the deadly weapon was a firearm. But this distinction from Recuenco III makes no difference. In that case, we based our holding on the fact that the trial court exceeded its authority by imposing a firearm enhancement without a jury determination that the defendant was armed with a firearm. 163 Wash.2d at 440, 180 P.3d 1276 (noting  [f]urther, Recuenco lacked any notice that he could be sentenced under the firearm enhancement (emphasis added)). The trial court's error in Recuenco IIIimposing the firearm enhancement without a special verdict to support itoccurred in the sentencing phase; no error occurred during trial. As in Recuenco III, the errors in the cases before us occurred during sentencing, not in the jury's determination of guilt. Thus, as in that case, because the trial courts' errors occurred after the jury verdicts were reached, the harmless error doctrine does not apply. ¶ 24 The dissent mischaracterizes the error that occurred. No error exists in the charging document, and no error exists in the instructions or jury findings. The error occurred when the judge imposed a sentence not authorized by the jury's express findings. The problem arises from the statutory definition of deadly weapon as including a firearm. Former RCW 9.94A.602. Because of this definition, the only way to determine the applicable sentence enhancement is to look to the jury's findings. Quite simply, only three options exist: First, if the jury makes no finding, no sentence enhancement may be imposed. Second, where the jury finds the use of a deadly weapon (even if a firearm), then the deadly weapon enhancement is authorized. Finally, where the jury finds the use of a firearm, then the firearm enhancement applies. Critically, the sentencing judge can know which (if any) enhancement applies only by looking to the jury's special findings. Where the jury makes such a finding, the sentencing judge is bound by that finding. Where the judge exceeds that authority, error occurs that can never be harmless.