Opinion ID: 627222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Use of Acquitted Conduct in Sentencing

Text: Baranwal and Chebssi were both acquitted of Count 1, which charged them with conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846. On appeal, they argue that the District Court erred in taking into account the conduct for which they were acquitted in fashioning their sentences. As the government points out, however, our precedent authorizes a sentencing judge to consider relevant acquitted conduct that has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1305 (11th Cir.2005), and we have held that this does not violate a defendant's right to trial by jury or a defendant's due process right to have facts be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, see, e.g., United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 827 (11th Cir.2010); United States v. Faust, 456 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Cir.2006); United States v. Barakat, 130 F.3d 1448, 1452 (11th Cir.1997). Chebssi argues that allowing a judge to consider acquitted conduct deprives her of the due process right to fair notice. We have not squarely addressed this argument before, but find it to be without merit. In United States v. Irizarry, 458 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir.2006), we observed that [a]fter Booker, parties are inherently on notice that the sentencing guidelines range is advisory. Id. at 1212. Similarly, given that our precedents have consistently upheld district courts' use of [a defendant's] relevant conduct when determining an appropriate sentence, United States v. Campbell, 491 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir.2007), it is apparent to us that parties in this Circuit, such as Chebssi, are inherently on notice that a sentencing judge may take into account such conduct as well.