Opinion ID: 4534282
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Rosillo-Puga

Text: Despite this, we still must address whether our decision in Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2009), overruled on other grounds by ContrerasBocanegra, 678 F.3d at 819, binds us to affirm. Though neither party argues that Rosillo-Puga binds us, Reyes-Vargas’s issue runs right through that case. Accordingly, we address Rosillo-Puga in some detail. In Rosillo-Puga, the government began removal proceedings against RosilloPuga by filing a notice to appear in the immigration court after he was convicted for domestic battery in Indiana. Id. at 1149. Under Seventh Circuit law, this domesticbattery conviction qualified as an aggravated felony and a crime of domestic violence, rendering him removable. 20 Id. After a hearing, the IJ ordered him removed from the United States. Id. He chose not to appeal. Id. Several months after his removal, the Seventh Circuit ruled, in a different case, that an Indiana domesticbattery conviction did not qualify as a crime of domestic violence or an aggravated felony. Id. So about three years after this decision, he moved to have the IJ reopen his 20 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (making aliens removable for being “convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed”); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (making aliens removable for committing a “crime of domestic violence,” which is a “crime of violence” against a spouse); 18 U.S.C. § 16 (defining a “crime of violence” under federal law). 20 immigration proceedings, relying both on the statutory “motion to reopen” (as mirrored in the regulations) and on the IJ’s sua sponte authority to reopen at any time. Id. The IJ rejected both of Rosillo-Puga’s requested avenues, ruling that the post-departure bar prevented its exercise of discretion in the case, and the Board affirmed. Id. at 1150–51. Rosillo-Puga appealed the Board’s decision to our court, and we also affirmed. Id. at 1160. On appeal, all agreed that Rosillo-Puga’s statutory “motion to reopen” was untimely—he had filed it more than ninety days after his order of removal. That provided a full basis to deny the statutory “motion to reopen.” Id. at 1158. But