Opinion ID: 1960546
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Double Jeopardy Principles Generally

Text: Double jeopardy protections have long existed in Maryland common law, [11] see Gianiny v. State, 320 Md. 337, 347, 577 A.2d 795, 799-800 (1990); Pugh v. State, 271 Md. 701, 705, 319 A.2d 542, 544 (1974); State v. Barger, 242 Md. 616, 619, 220 A.2d 304, 306 (1966), and, since the Supreme Court's decision in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), as a matter of federal constitutional law by application to the States of the Fifth Amendment through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. [12] The purposes underlying double jeopardy include protect[ing] the integrity of a final judgment, United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2198, 57 L.Ed.2d 65, 74 (1978), and assuring that the State with all its resources and power is not allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223, 2 L.Ed.2d 199, 204 (1957). The basic premise of the double jeopardy prohibition is that when a criminal defendant has been put in jeopardy once, he or she may not be so placed again regarding the same offense. He or she is protected from successive prosecutions as well as cumulative punishments. The principle of double jeopardy encompasses three interrelated pleas at common law: autrefois acquit, autrefois convict, and pardon. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 340, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 1020, 43 L.Ed.2d 232, 239 (1975); Parks v. State, 287 Md. 11, 14, 410 A.2d 597 (1980). The pleas of autrefois convict and pardon provide that a criminal defendant may not be prosecuted twice for the same offense after conviction and may not be punished multiple times for the same offense. Therefore, the analytical challenges in cases involving autrefois convict and pardon are determining the point in the proceedings at which jeopardy attaches such that retrial would violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. The result of this inquiry is that jeopardy attaches at a jury trial when the jury is empaneled, and at a bench trial when the judge begins to hear or receive evidence. Blondes v. State, 273 Md. 435, 444-45, 330 A.2d 169 (1975). This Court recognized in Blondes that the judge begins to hear evidence when the first witness begins to testify or when documentary evidence, such as a stipulation or record of prior proceedings, is submitted. Blondes, 273 Md. at 445, 330 A.2d at 174. Maryland courts also have recognized, without adopting, the minority view that in a bench trial jeopardy attaches when the first witness is sworn. See id. Even when a final determination of guilt or innocence is not made in a prior proceeding, a criminal defendant may have a protected interest in avoiding multiple prosecutions. Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have recognized two situations in which such an interest may arise: when a mistrial is declared, and when the trial judge otherwise terminates the proceedings favorably to the defendant on a basis not related to factual guilt or innocence. See Scott, 437 U.S. at 92, 98 S.Ct. at 2194, 57 L.Ed.2d at 75-76. See also Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650, 707, 759 A.2d 764, 795 (2000) (noting that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution operates to limit the power of the government to retry a defendant who has succeeded in persuading a court to set his conviction aside when the conviction has been reversed because of the insufficiency of the evidence (citing the Supreme Court in Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 677, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2090, 72 L.Ed.2d 416, 426 (1982))); Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 576, 589, 625 A.2d 932, 938 (1993) noting that a criminal defendant does not waive his double jeopardy protections upon moving for a mistrial where the State intentionally coaxes the defendant into moving for a mistrial. In the case of a mistrial granted on the initiative of a party or the court's own initiative, although the record may support that the trial judge contemplated that there would be a new proceeding, the trial judge's intent is not determinative as to whether jeopardy attached. Rather, double jeopardy principles may protect against governmental actions that intend to provoke mistrial requests and subject a defendant to multiple prosecutions with their attendant burdens. When a defendant successfully terminates his or her trial prior to its conclusion by a motion for mistrial, double jeopardy principles do not prohibit a second prosecution, however, if the mistrial is requested by the defendant and is not the result of judicial overreaching or deliberate prosecutorial misconduct. Scott, 437 U.S. at 93-94, 98 S.Ct. at 2195, 57 L.Ed.2d at 76; Ware, 360 Md. at 709, 759 A.2d at 795; Booth v. State, 301 Md. 1, 3, 481 A.2d 505, 506 (1984); Tichnell v. State, 297 Md. 432, 440-41, 468 A.2d 1, 5 (1983); Bell v. State, 286 Md. 193, 205-06, 406 A.2d 909, 915-16 (1979). The Supreme Court noted in Scott that such a motion by the defendant is deemed to be a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact. The important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error. 437 U.S. at 94, 98 S.Ct. at 2195, 57 L.Ed.2d at 76 (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1079, 47 L.Ed.2d 267, 275 (1976)). In the case of a criminal defendant who otherwise successfully obtains a termination of the trial in his or her favor before a determination of guilt or innocence, a different analysis is applied and a different result may obtain. The trial judge who grants a motion such as this clearly contemplates that the instant proceeding will terminate then and there in favor of the defendant. Scott, 437 U.S. at 94, 98 S.Ct. at 2195, 57 L.Ed.2d at 76. The prosecution in such a matter will be forced to seek reversal on appeal. Id. The Supreme Court has held, however, that when a criminal defendant deliberately seeks such a termination on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, double jeopardy principles do not prevent the State from appealing that termination. Scott, 437 U.S. at 101, 98 S.Ct. at 2199, 57 L.Ed.2d at 80. This Court likewise stated in Parks, a case where the criminal defendant moved successfully to dismiss the case due to the State's failure to comply with statutory time strictures, that the defendant cannot by his own act avoid the jeopardy in which he stands and then assert it as a bar to a subsequent jeopardy. 287 Md. at 19, 410 A.2d at 602. The third common law double jeopardy principle is the plea of autrefois acquit. It has always been a settled rule of the common law that after an acquittal of a party upon a regular trial on an indictment for either a felony or a misdemeanor, the verdict of acquittal can never afterward, in any form of proceeding, be set aside and a new trial granted, and it matters not whether such verdict be the result of a misdirection of the judge on a question of law, or of a misconception of fact on the part of the jury. State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301, 303 (1878) (emphasis added). This plea has been interpreted broadly. A verdict of not guilty invokes the protection against double jeopardy such that procedural errors or acquittals entered on a fatally defective indictment bar subsequent prosecution. Farrell v. State, 364 Md. 499, 509, 774 A.2d 387, 393 (2001) (holding that procedural errors do not affect the efficacy of an acquittal for jeopardy purposes and that the not guilty verdict need not be followed by entry of the judgment on the docket to bar subsequent prosecution); Brooks v. State, 299 Md. 146, 155, 472 A.2d 981, 986 (1984) (holding that the common law prohibition against double jeopardy barred the trial judge from granting a motion of acquittal and subsequently reversing himself to allow the charge to go to the jury even if the grant of the motion was error); Block v. State, 286 Md. 266, 272, 407 A.2d 320, 324 (1979) (finding that the improper or defective exercise of jurisdiction does not deprive an acquittal of its finality for double jeopardy purposes). Two cases particularly illuminate Maryland's common law double jeopardy jurisprudence: Pugh v. State and Farrell v. State . These cases demonstrate the finality accorded acquittals pursuant to our common law tradition. The trial judge in Pugh delivered an oral resume of the evidence before him in a bench trial involving narcotics possession violations [charges 2110 and 2111] and thereafter pronounced the defendant not guilty of the indictment. Pugh, 271 Md. at 704, 319 A.2d at 543. Immediately afterward, the judge had the following conversation with the prosecutor: PROSECUTOR: 2111 would be the distribution charge. That's what the State is pressing in this case. THE COURT: I would be glad to hear from you. PROSECUTOR: I believe that we have evidence, ample evidence of sale. That's exactly what the State is going after. This man is a distributor of cocaine, and on the night of the 18th of FebruaryÔÇö THE COURT: I see what you mean. PROSECUTOR:ÔÇöhe made a sale. THE COURT: I was thinking of it in a different way. So, the verdict is guilty of 2111, because it was an actual sale. What I was thinking of was the possession in quantity to indicate distribution.... Id., 319 A.2d at 543-44. The trial judge then reversed his earlier ruling and sentenced the defendant to twelve years imprisonment. The defendant argued on appeal that he had been put twice in jeopardy and therefore the subsequent sentence could not stand. Id., 319 A.2d at 544. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment, but this Court reversed. Noting that one particular aspect of the prohibition against double jeopardy has not engendered any difficulties in application or diverse opinions, we stated that it has always been clear that once a verdict of not guilty has been rendered at the conclusion of a criminal trial, that verdict is final and cannot be set aside. Pugh, 271 Md. at 705, 319 A.2d at 544. We acknowledged in Pugh that where a judge obviously inadvertently says one thing when he means another, and immediately thereafter corrects himself, the mis-spoken verdict may not stand. 271 Md. at 706, 319 A.2d at 545. Stating that it ma[kes] no difference whether the acquittal [is] based on a mistake of law or a mistake of fact, we held that when a trial judge intentionally renders a verdict of `not guilty' on a criminal charge, the prohibition against double jeopardy does not permit him to change his mind. Pugh, 271 Md. at 707, 319 A.2d at 544-45. Farrell v. State involved a defendant who was charged with speeding and negligent driving citations. He appeared for trial and entered a plea of not guilty. The State failed to produce any witnesses and the trial judge found defendant not guilty, and entered judgment to that effect. Farrell, 364 Md. at 501, 774 A.2d at 388. After twenty-eight days had passed, the State filed an identical set of charges against defendant by criminal information. Farrell moved to dismiss the new charges arguing that his right against double jeopardy was being violated. Farrell, 364 Md. at 502, 774 A.2d at 388. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss the State argued that, although the earlier verdict of not guilty had been rendered on identical charges, the failure to produce witnesses was justified, and therefore jeopardy should not have attached. The District Court held that the new set of charges must be dismissed on double jeopardy grounds. Farrell, 364 Md. at 502-03, 774 A.2d at 389. After the Circuit Court reversed the District Court's judgment, this Court considered the case. We held, following Maryland common law precedent, that the District Court in the first instance had jurisdiction over the offenses and over the defendant, and the verdicts were rendered intentionally by the trial judge. Therefore, the acquittals were final and the State was precluded by double jeopardy principles from bringing a new prosecution charging the same offenses. Farrell, 364 Md. at 510, 774 A.2d at 393. In so holding, we pointed out that whether jeopardy has attached, in the sense of the presentation of evidence or the swearing of witnesses, has no relevance to the finality of an acquittal under common law principles. Farrell, 364 Md. at 509, 774 A.2d at 393; Daff v. State, 317 Md. 678, 687-88, 566 A.2d 120,125 (1989).