Opinion ID: 591480
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Combined Effect of Impairments, Effect of Medications, Specific Reference to Available Jobs

Text: 21 A. In light of our conclusion that the Secretary did not reopen the 1982 final decision, we need only consider Passopulos's remaining claims as they challenge the second ALJ's consideration of Passopulos's case. The district court did not err in approving this decision denying Passopulos's second claim for disability benefits. The ALJ specifically found that Passopulos did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in or medically equal to one listed in the new regulations on mental impairment. In making this determination, the ALJ also expressly considered the combined effect of Passopulos's alleged mental illness on his physical impairments as already established in the 1982 final decision. The ALJ was not required to go back and consider Passopulos's claims of physical impairment individually because, as previously noted, the ALJ had determined that Passopulos had not shown good cause for reopening the 1982 final decision. Thus, the ALJ made a proper determination on the combination issue before concluding that Passopulos did not have an impairment or combination of impairments which rendered Passopulos disabled. See Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1006 (11th Cir.1986); Wheeler v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 1073, 1076 (11th Cir.1986); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523 (1992). 22 B. Passopulos's claim that the ALJ failed to elicit testimony and make findings regarding the effect of Passopulos's prescribed medications on his ability to work relates solely to his prior application. The ALJ did not have any evidence that Passopulos was taking medication for a mental impairment which caused side effects for his consideration. See generally Swindle v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 222, 226 (11th Cir.1990) (holding that an ALJ's determination on side effects was proper where the claimant did not complain about side effects nor did the record disclose any concerns about side effects by the doctors examining the claimant). Hence, Passopulos's arguments on the ALJ's failure to elicit testimony and make findings on the effect of prescribed medications and their side effects are completely without merit. We affirm the district court on this issue. 11th Cir.R. 36-1; United States v. Perchitti, 955 F.2d 674, 675 (11th Cir.1992). 23 C. Finally, the ALJ properly used the Medical Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, appendix II (the grids) to determine the existence of jobs in the national economy which Passopulos was capable of performing. This court has recognized that the grids may be used in lieu of vocational testimony on specific jobs if none of the claimant's nonexertional impairments are so severe as to prevent a full range of employment at the designated level. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 1002-03 (11th Cir.1987); Reeves v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 519, 524 (11th Cir.1984); compare Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir.1985) (recognizing that an administrative law judge should make specific findings on job availability when the claimant's nonexertional impairment is severe enough to preclude a wide range of employment at the designated level). The ALJ specifically found that Passopulos's nonexertional limitations did not significantly affect his residual functional capacity in any manner that would erode Passopulos's ability to perform a full range of light work. Hence, the district court did not err in approving the ALJ's utilization of the grids in lieu of specific vocational testimony.