Opinion ID: 1192491
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Convictions on Multiple Counts of Possession Violate Double Jeopardy Clause

Text: Polizzi argues for the first time on appeal that his multiple convictions for possession constitute a Double Jeopardy violation. Nonetheless, [a] plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the [district] court's attention. Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b); see United States v. Irving, 554 F.3d 64, 78 (2d Cir.2009) (reviewing for plain error a double jeopardy challenge not raised before the district court); United States v. Savarese, 404 F.3d 651, 656 (2d Cir.2005) (same); United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir.2002) (same), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.2003) (en banc); United States v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 41-43 (2d Cir.1998) (same). To demonstrate plain error, Polizzi must show: (1) `error,' (2) that is `plain,' and (3) that `affect[s] substantial rights.' Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770). If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error `seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Id. at 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770) (brackets and other internal quotation marks omitted). The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, inter alia, protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229, 114 S.Ct. 783, 127 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). When, as here, the same statutory violation is charged twice, the question is whether the facts underlying each count were intended by Congress to constitute separate `units' of prosecution. United States v. Ansaldi, 372 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir.2004) (citing Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955)); see also United States v. Kerley, 544 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir.2008). As charged in the indictment, each of the eleven possession convictions was for, [o]n or about November 16, 2005, within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere, ... knowingly and intentionally possess[ing] one computer file containing a visual depiction of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, the production of which involved such conduct. Collectively, therefore, the eleven counts were for possession of eleven computer files. Title 18, section 2252(a) of the United States Code, in relevant part, makes it a crime to knowingly possess[ ] ... 1 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter which contain any visual depiction ... ifโ(i) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct. 18 U.S.C. ง 2252(a)(4)(B). [3] The statute provides also for an affirmative defense to a charge of possession under that section if, inter alia, the defendant possessed less than three matters containing [prohibited images]. Id. ง 2252(c). Prior to an amendment in 1998, ง 2252(a) made it a crime to `knowingly possess[ ] 3 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter' containing child pornography and did not provide an affirmative defense. United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 259-60, 263 (2d Cir.2000) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. ง 2252(a)(4)(B) (1994)). The government maintains that each matter which contain[s] a prohibited image is a separate unit of prosecution such that the possession of each such matter is a separate violation of ง 2252(a)(4)(B). [4] We disagree. Based on the clear language of the statute, we conclude that Congress intended to subject a person who simultaneously possesses multiple books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter containing a visual depiction of child pornography to only one conviction under 18 U.S.C. ง 2252(a)(4)(B). [5] The language 1 or more, 18 U.S.C. ง 2252(a)(4)(B), indicates that a person commits one violation of the statute by possessing more than one matter containing a visual depiction of child pornography. Thus, unlike the word any, which has `typically been found ambiguous in connection with the allowable unit of prosecution,' for it contemplates the plural, rather than specifying the singular, United States v. Coiro, 922 F.2d 1008, 1014 (2d Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Kinsley, 518 F.2d 665, 668 (8th Cir.1975)), the phrase 1 or more specifies the plural. Thus, the plain language of the statute provides that a person who possesses 1 or more matters containing a prohibited image has violated the statute only once. See United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 730 (5th Cir.1995) (considering the prior version of ง 2252(a)(4)(B) and holding that the plain language of the statute's requirement that a defendant possess `three or more' items indicates that the legislature did not intend for this statute to be used to charge multiple offenses.). Further, the statute provides an affirmative defense to  a charge of violating [ง 2254(a)(4)] if the defendant, inter alia, possessed less than three matters containing [prohibited images]. 18 U.S.C. ง 2252(c)(1) (emphasis added). Such a defense necessarily contemplates that a person who possessed two matters containing prohibited images would face a single charge of violating ง 2252(a)(4)(B). Finally, the government has pointed to no legislative history suggesting a different view of congressional intent. Without engaging the legislative history directly, the government relies on two unpublished district court decisions from outside this Circuit for the assertion that `in light of the plain language and legislative history regarding the 1998 amendment, it appears that Congress intended to punish any possession of child pornography and that there was no intent to limit any and all possession of child pornography to a maximum of one count under ง 2252(a)(4)(B).' Gov't Br. at 58-59 (quoting United States v. Flyer, No. CR 05-1049, 2006 WL 2590459, at , 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64453, at  (D.Ariz. Sept.7, 2006), and citing United States v. Hamilton, Civ. No. 07-50054, 2007 WL 2903018, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73384 (W.D.Ark. Oct.1, 2007)). We respectfully do not think that Flyer and Hamilton are persuasive. That Congress, by its 1998 amendment, intended to prohibit possession of even one item or image containing child pornography, 144 Cong. Rec. 25239 (1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch), does not indicate that Congress intended to permit separate prosecution and punishment for each such item or image possessed. See Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 419-20, 79 S.Ct. 451, 3 L.Ed.2d 407 (1959) (But in view of the legislative history of [18 U.S.C. ง 2113](c) we think Congress was trying to reach a new group of wrongdoers, not to multiply the offense of the bank robbers themselves.); Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 327, 77 S.Ct. 403, 1 L.Ed.2d 370 (1957) (providing similar analysis). Having concluded that it was error to enter multiple convictions under ง 2252(a)(4)(B), we must assess whether the error is plain and affects substantial rights, and whether we should notice the forfeited error. We find these elements to be met and, therefore, will remedy the error. An error is `plain' if the ruling was contrary to law that was clearly established by the time of the appeal. Irving, 554 F.3d at 78 (citing Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544). Although our Circuit has not previously held, as we now do, that simultaneous possession of multiple matters containing images of child pornography constitutes a single violation of 18 U.S.C. ง 2252(a)(4)(B), that conclusion is demanded by the plain language of the statute and is entirely consistent with Supreme Court and Circuit precedent addressing similar statutes. Therefore, the error in this case is plain. Indeed, we have often found multiple convictions for a single statutory violation to constitute plain error although we had not previously addressed specifically whether the conduct at issue was intended by Congress to be a single statutory violation. See, e.g., Handakas, 286 F.3d at 99 (Because we find no precedential or statutory support for the multiple structuring charges, conviction on two separate counts constituted an `error' that is `plain.'); Gore, 154 F.3d at 43; Coiro, 922 F.2d at 1014-15; see also United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 73 (3rd Cir.2008) (Though we reach this conclusion as a matter of first impression, we do so on the basis of the Supreme Court's holding in Ball[ v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985)], which is well entrenched in our law and clear in its implications with respect to the double jeopardy question in this case.). The multiple convictions for possession affect Polizzi's substantial rights because [t]he separate conviction[s], apart from the concurrent sentence, ha[ve] potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored, Ball, 470 U.S. at 865, 105 S.Ct. 1668, and each conviction carried with it a special assessment that would not have been imposed absent the erroneously entered convictions. Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 301-03, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996). Finally, the government has identified no interest of the prosecution or the public, and we can think of none, that would be served by subjecting Polizzi to eleven convictions for possession rather than the single count of conviction authorized by law. Moreover, as discussed below, we are remanding the case on other grounds, which will require resentencing. In these circumstances, we conclude that maintaining these convictions would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Having concluded that Congress did not intend Polizzi's possession on November 25, 2005, to be punishable with multiple convictions under ง 2252(a)(4)(B), we remand this case to the district court to vacate all but one of the ง 2252(a)(4)(B) convictions. The district court shall exercise its discretion when determining which conviction should remain. See Ball, 470 U.S. at 864, 105 S.Ct. 1668.