Opinion ID: 2650588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Parties' Supplemental Briefing

Text: Pitts argues, Appointment of counsel for an indigent is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected. In support of his argument, he cites D'Ambrosio v. State, 112 Hawai#i 446, 146 P.3d 606 (App. 2006). He continues, without citation, The circuit court ignored the 'critical' stage of the post-verdict to sentencing part of the criminal proceedings against Pitts. He continues, without citation, The postverdict and sentencing time is still a critical part of the 7  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  proceedings and hence Pitts was entitled to have counsel appointed. The State argues that the circuit court did not err by not appointing substitute counsel post-verdict. The State cites to a federal habeas corpus case that ostensibly favors Pitts' position: Rodgers v. Marshall, 678 F.3d 1149, 1163 (9th Cir. 2012)(It is 'clearly established federal law' that the posttrial motion for new trial is a 'critical stage' that implicates the right to counsel, as is a defendant's right to re-assert the right to counsel during post-trial proceedings.)4 The State cited to Rodgers for the requirement that a defendant must make a timely request for representation. See Rodgers, 678 F.3d at 1163 ([T]rial courts cannot deny a defendant's timely request for representation without a sufficient reason.) (emphasis added). The State goes on to argue that Pitts' request for counsel for his post-verdict motions was untimely, having been made on the day those motions were heard, on May 12, 2010. Further, the State argues that Pitts made abundantly clear that no attorney 4 The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit on the clearly established federal law holding only. See Marshall v. Rodgers, 133