Opinion ID: 196248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was Gray's guilty plea voluntary

Text: B. Was Gray's guilty plea voluntary and intelligent? and intelligent? Gray claims that because of certain deficiencies in his Rule 11 hearing, his guilty plea was not given voluntarily and intelligently. Although Gray offers several grounds to support his claim, we find that only one of them merits discussion. In his motion to withdraw his plea, Gray stated essentially that he did not understand that he was pleading to a crime with a minimum ten-year sentence. He claims now that this misunderstanding of the consequences of his plea tainted his decision to plead -7- guilty, and constitutes a violation of one of Rule 11's core concerns. Although it is a close question, we agree. When asked by the court at his Rule 11 hearing whether he understood what the maximum punishment could be, Gray responded, Not exactly, thus alerting the court to his uncertainty about the consequences of his plea. In its attempt to explain these consequences, however, the court mistakenly stated, The maximum punishment is ten years to life. (Emphasis added). This statement was incorrect; in fact, the mandatory minimum sentence for the crime to which Gray pled guilty was ten years, and the court had no discretion over this minimum sentence. Moreover, this incorrect explanation was exacerbated by the court's subsequent statement to Gray that the matter of your sentence is up to me, implying that the length of the sentence was discretionary rather than mandatory. We think that based on these statements, a defendant could have reasonably concluded that ten years was the maximum sentence, at the discretion of the court, and that by pleading guilty it was possible that he could receive a sentence of less than ten years. The government concedes that the district court's incorrect explanation of Gray's sentence was short of ideal. The government nevertheless argues that, when considered in light of the fact that Gray had that morning signed the plea agreement, which specifically sets forth the applicable minimum mandatory sentence of ten years, the court's mistake should be deemed harmless. This argument ignores the plain language of Rule 11, -8- stating that the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the matters enumerated in Rule 11. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c) (emphasis added). We have held that reliance on a written document is not a sufficient substitute for personal examination by the court in ascertaining that Rule 11's core concerns are addressed. United States v. Medina-Silverio, 30 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1994) (internal quotations omitted). When asked at the hearing, Gray clearly stated under oath that he did not fully understand his potential sentence, despite the fact that he had signed the plea agreement that morning. Gray's signature on the plea agreement is therefore insufficient indication of his actual understanding of the consequences of his plea, and thus cannot cure or obviate the court's mistaken explanation of the applicable sentence. We think that the substance of what was communicated to Gray, specifically the district court's incorrect and misleading explanation of the mandatory minimum sentence, could have led a reasonable person to misunderstand the consequences of his guilty plea in this context, thus implicating one of Rule 11's core concerns. Although the court's error is not a total failure to address one of Rule 11's core concerns, see Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d at 5, we cannot say with any certainty that Gray's reasonable misunderstanding of his sentence did not affect his substantial rights within the meaning of Rule 11. In fact, the -9- record indicates, and the government even suggests, that Gray decided to withdraw his guilty plea only after learning the true consequences of his decision through discussions with his counsel. It seems likely, at the very least, that if Gray had clearly and accurately understood the consequences of a guilty plea, he would have decided differently. The court's error leading to Gray's misunderstanding therefore affected Gray's substantial rights, and Gray's guilty plea cannot be said to have been given voluntarily and intelligently.2 Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in denying Gray's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.3 The judgment of conviction and sentence is vacated. The guilty plea is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 2 We recently rejected a somewhat similar challenge as harmless error. In United States v. L pez-Pineda, 55 F.3d 693 (1st Cir. 1995), the appellant contended that the Rule 11 plea colloquy had been deficient due to the failure of the district court to identify the applicable minimum mandatory sentence. Id. at 696. The four-part test for assessing such Rule 11 claims (plausibility of grounds for requesting plea change, timing of request, assertion of innocence, and legal sufficiency of original Rule 11 hearing), requires a different result in this case. First, Gray advances a plausible basis for requesting vacation of his guilty plea and for failing to understand the sentencing consequences of his guilty plea, see supra at 8-9, whereas L pez-Pineda tendered a highly implausible explanation. Second, L pez-Pineda complained only after his sentence had been imposed. Id. at 697. Third, unlike Gray, L pez-Pineda asserted no claim of innocence. Id. 3 Because we find that Gray misunderstood the consequences of his guilty plea and reverse on this basis, we do not address his other arguments on appeal. -10-