Opinion ID: 405227
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of the Motion to Strike Testimony

Text: 138 Bunch contends that his motion to strike testimony or for alternative relief should have been granted as a sanction for a violation of Rule 26(e). Opening Brief for Appellant at 19. He argues that the testimony of Lingelbach and Turner at trial constituted a major change in previously disclosed information and a major change in the defendant's theory of defense. Id. at 21. The government thus had at least the minimal responsibility of notifying plaintiff of the change or supplementation of the information provided in discovery. Reply Brief for Appellant at 12. Rule 26(e) provides in pertinent part: 139 (e) Supplementation of Responses. A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no duty to supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired, except as follows: 140 (2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he obtains information upon the basis of which ... (B) he knows that the response though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing concealment. 141 The determination of a violation of Rule 26(e) and the imposition of sanctions is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Phil Crowley Steel Corp. v. Macomber, Inc., 601 F.2d 342, 344 (8th Cir. 1979). The ruling of the district court will be reversed when there has been a gross abuse of discretion. See Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Dile, 643 F.2d 670, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1981). We must thus determine first whether the deposition responses of Lingelbach and Turner were no longer true, and second, if no longer true, whether the government's failure to amend the responses was a knowing concealment. 142 First, the testimony of both Lingelbach and Turner throughout their depositions was that the decision to select Casson was not based on age but rather based on the whole-man concept; the decision to get the best person for the job taking into account all the factors that influence a person's performance. See, e.g., Lingelbach deposition at 27-29; see also Turner deposition at 26-27. This testimony was consistent with the letter sent to Bunch in which it was stated that since Bunch did not meet the 'whole man' qualification criteria that Casson had been selected. Plaintiff's Exhibit at 8. The testimony was also consistent with the government's theory in the case that age was not the determining factor in the decision not to select Bunch. The government's trial brief stated that: The evidence at trial will show that age was but one factor taken into consideration and that other factors played as significant a role in plaintiff's non-selection. Trial brief for government at 11. The government's opening statement, again mapped out the theory that Bunch would be unable to prove that age was the determining factor in his nonselection. RT at 8-11. The trial testimony of Lingelbach and Turner supported the government's theory as outlined in the opening statement. See id. 143 Bunch, however, focuses on specific trial testimony of Lingelbach and Turner. With regard to Lingelbach, for instance, he directs our attention to Lingelbach's statement that factors other than age and retainability were paramount to the extent in distinguishing the difference between the experience of this individual (Casson) to where while those things were looked at, they were not relevant to his (Bunch's) nonselection. RT at 151-52. Bunch invites us to compare this statement with Lingelbach's deposition testimony that he thought generally retainability would be one of the key factors. Lingelbach deposition at 27. Bunch also points to Lingelbach's testimony at trial that the OER's were the major factor in Casson's selection. See RT at 103-04. At his deposition Lingelbach indicated that there was no single factor that was primary to the decision to hire Casson. Lingelbach deposition at 26. Turner's testimony at trial and his testimony at his deposition were essentially the same as Lingelbach's. Bunch would have us believe that the same problem of untruthfulness exists as to Turner's testimony. 144 The deposition testimony of both Lingelbach and Turner was brought to the court's attention when counsel questioned each of them about the statements they had made during their depositions. See, e.g., RT at 139-41, 174-78. The trial judge did not, however, believe that the previous deposition testimony of Lingelbach and Turner was untruthful. He did not view their testimony as stating that age and retainability were never taken into account: 145 THE COURT: Well we have the testimony of Mr. Lingelbach that Casson was the best qualified person. 146 MR. MOEN: And his testimony is that age and retainability were never taken into account. 147 THE COURT: Well I didn't take his testimony that way, and I don't think the question is it didn't ever in this case, that age and retainability wasn't considered. 148 MR. MOEN: Well if I understood Mr. Lingelbach's testimony- 149 THE COURT: That isn't the burden now of the plaintiff. 150 MR. MOEN: Okay, I understood Mr. Lingelbach's testimony somewhat differently, your Honor, and that may be my own fault, but I thought he was saying for the first time ever in this case that age and retainability were not factors in deciding to hire Casson over Bunch. 151 THE COURT: Well in the letter, Plaintiff's (Exhibit) 5, they mention that, they have always said, from what I have read in their depositions that age, retainability were all the general factors considered; so we have testimony in this case that the determination was made on the best qualifications based primarily on the OER's, and the twice passing over of the plaintiff by the Air Force. That is what I have gotten out of this testimony so far, unless this witness is going to rebut that.MR. MOEN: Well I think he can to some extent rebut the emphasis on OER's, your Honor. 152 RT at 181-82. 153 Bunch called Turner to the stand as a rebuttal witness but Turner agreed with Lingelbach's testimony, e.g., RT at 160-61. Finally, we note that the trial judge found the testimony of Lingelbach and Turner, to be entirely credible and reasonable. Finding of Fact No. 21. 154 We agree with the trial judge. Bunch has not established that the responses given by Lingelbach and Turner at their deposition, were no longer true, as required by Rule 26(e). 155 Second, assuming Bunch had succeeded in demonstrating that the deposition testimony of Lingelbach and Turner was no longer true, Rule 26(e) only imposes a duty to amend a response when failure to disclose new facts is in substance a knowing concealment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e)(2)(B); see also, Havenfield Corp. v. H & R Block, Inc., 509 F.2d 1263, 1272 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999, 95 S.Ct. 2395, 44 L.Ed.2d 665 (1975). Bunch failed to present any evidence that there was a knowing concealment of new facts. To the contrary Bunch advised the trial court that the government must have been surprised by the testimony of Lingelbach and Turner: 156 (A)t trial, Lingelbach and Turner testified that age and retainability were not factors in selecting Casson over Bunch. Obviously up to that time counsel for both sides agreed that age and retainability were factors, and the issues were how significant were they and does their use constiture (sic) age discrimination. Any surprise claimed by plaintiffs must, if the truth were stated, have been shared by defendants' own attorney, based on the prior statements made by the attorney. 157 Bunch's Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Testimony or for Alternative Relief at 7. (Bunch's Memorandum of Authorities) (emphasis in original). 158 The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Bunch's motion based on Rule 26(e).