Opinion ID: 1121458
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Admission of Defense Psychiatrist's Pretrial Testimony

Text: Defendant next challenges the trial court's ruling permitting the prosecutor to impeach the testimony of his trial experts with the testimony, given at a pretrial hearing to suppress defendant's incriminating statements, of Dr. Peter Mayland, a defense psychiatrist. Defendant claims that this decision violated his federal and state constitutional rights to counsel and against self-incrimination, as well as state laws governing the attorney-client privilege. We find no error in the court's ruling.
Dr. Peter Mayland (Mayland) was appointed to assist the defendant and his counsel in investigating a defense based upon the defendant's mental state at the time of the crimes. (Evid. Code, งง 730, 1017.) Mayland assisted defense counsel throughout the course of preparation for and during the trial. As previously noted, the defense called Mayland as a witness during the pretrial hearing on the motion to suppress defendant's confessions. Mayland testified that he harbored significant doubt that appellant could have voluntarily waived his constitutional rights prior to making his incriminating statements to the police. He testified that he first met defendant approximately two days after the murder at the request of defendant's counsel. He continued to see the defendant on a weekly basis for approximately one or two hours a visit. He testified about his impressions of the defendant during their meetings. On at least two separate occasions, the defendant had provided detailed accounts of the crimes. Under cross-examination, Mayland recreated defendant's accounts of the crimes, using his notes to refresh his recollection. These notes were produced to the prosecutor. At trial, the defense was that defendant was suffering from a rage reaction at the time of the crimes that prevented him from formulating the requisite intent to kill. Defendant called several experts to testify in support of his defense. Mayland was not called to testify at trial. The prosecution sought to impeach the reliability of the defense experts' conclusions by referring to various aspects of defendant's statements to Mayland. After extensive briefing and argument on this subject, the trial court concluded that the prosecutor could use defendant's statements to Mayland to impeach the defendant's experts. Specifically, the trial court ruled that the tendering of the psychiatric defense waived any Fifth and Sixth Amendment privileges. The trial court also ruled that defendant had waived the statutory attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient privileges.
(25) Since Mayland was appointed to assist defendant's counsel under section 1017, all communications between defendant and Mayland were protected by two distinct privileges: the psychotherapist-patient privilege and the attorney-client privilege. (Evid. Code, งง 952, 954, 1010-1027; People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 619-623 [268 Cal. Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127]; People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1060, fn. 11 [251 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 P.2d 680].) Defendant correctly concedes that at the time he tendered his mental defense at trial, he waived the applicable psychotherapist-patient privilege. Defendant argues, however, that the protection of the attorney-client privilege was never waived. The Attorney General asserts that defendant waived the attorney-client privilege protecting his statements to Mayland when he called Mayland to testify during the suppression hearing. The Attorney General is correct. By calling Mayland to the stand during the suppression hearing, defendant manifested an intent that his communications with Mayland be revealed to third parties and that the attorney-client privilege be waived. (See, e.g., People v. Haskett (1990) 52 Cal.3d 210, 243 [276 Cal. Rptr. 80, 801 P.2d 323].) Defendant counters that, under the circumstances of this case, the testimony in question was impermissibly compelled in violation of the federal and state Constitutions. Defendant first urges that the statute governing the waiver of the attorney-client privilege specifically excepts compelled statements from its scope. Evidence Code section 912, subdivision (a) states in relevant part that the attorney-client privilege is waived with respect to a communication protected by such privilege if any holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to such disclosure made by anyone. [28] Relying primarily upon Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377, 393-394 [19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1258-1259, 88 S.Ct. 967] (hereafter Simmons ), defendant argues that Mayland's testimony was coerced or compelled when defendant proffered it in order to protect his Fifth Amendment rights. In Simmons the United States Supreme Court established a rule of use immunity for a defendant's testimony in a suppression hearing. In that case, the defendant was charged with armed robbery. A critical piece of evidence against defendant was a suitcase containing implements and fruits of the robbery. The suitcase was seized by the police without a warrant during a search of the home of defendant's mother. At a suppression hearing, the defendant testified that he owned the suitcase in order to establish his standing to assert his Fourth Amendment right to exclude this evidence. The suppression motion was denied and defendant's testimony regarding ownership of the suitcase was admitted at trial to prove his guilt. ( Simmons, supra, 390 U.S. at pp. 379-381 [19 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1251-1252].) The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that defendant's testimony at the suppression hearing was compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment and could not be used at trial to prove his guilt. (390 U.S. at pp. 393-394 [19 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1258-1259].) The high court reasoned defendant should not be placed in the position of being forced to sacrifice one constitutional right (the protections of the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause) in order to attempt to vindicate another constitutional right (the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures). (390 U.S. at pp. 393-394 [19 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1258-1259].) This court has also sought to ameliorate the difficult choices facing defendants who wish to testify in pretrial proceedings. We have extended use immunity to defendants' pretrial testimony in probation revocation hearings and juvenile status hearings that occur before trial. ( People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 889 [120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024]; Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 809, 811 [210 Cal. Rptr. 204, 693 P.2d 789].) Neither defendant nor the Attorney General provided as authority any case in which use immunity was granted for the testimony of a psychiatrist at a pretrial suppression hearing. After reviewing the policies underlying such use immunities, we decline to find the Simmons rule applicable to the situation at hand. (Cf. People v. Haskett, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 244 [rejecting request for use immunity during retrial to bar use of psychiatric testimony offered by defense in first trial on the basis of lack of authority to support the request].) Assuming without deciding that the waiver of the attorney-client privilege is of constitutional dimensions pursuant to the Sixth Amendment and its state counterpart, we are not faced in this case with an intolerable conflict between constitutional rights. Defendant was not compelled to waive the attorney-client privilege shielding his revelations to Mayland in order to support his suppression motion. As illustrated by the fact that mental health experts other than Mayland testified at trial, experts, who were not part of the defense team, could have been readied and called to testify during the pretrial hearing, thus obviating the asserted constitutional dilemma. The presentation of Mayland's testimony was a tactical choice that was not impermissibly coerced or compelled. Defendant also appears to contend that his Fifth Amendment rights, as well as his Sixth Amendment rights, were infringed by the use of Mayland's testimony. This argument is without merit. First, defendant's statements to Mayland in no way were coerced or compelled, nor did they involve any state action; they were voluntarily made. ( People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 620, fn. 30.) Second, defendant waived his Fifth Amendments rights with respect to statements made during psychiatric examinations requested by or agreed to by the defense when he placed his mental state in issue during trial. ( People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 961-962 [245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395]; Buchanan v. Kentucky (1987) 483 U.S. 402, 421-424 [97 L.Ed.2d 336, 354-357, 107 S.Ct. 2906].) [29] Third, the jury was admonished that the statements in question could not be considered for the truth of their content. ( In re Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400, 412 [46 Cal. Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33].) In summary, defendant waived the attorney-client privilege protecting his statements to Mayland when Mayland took the stand at the pretrial hearing and revealed them. The defendant waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when he raised his rage reaction defense at trial. At that point, Mayland's testimony was not protected by any applicable privilege or constitutional right and could be used by the prosecutor for impeachment or rebuttal. The result reached by the trial court was correct. For this reason, it is not necessary to address defendant's claims of prejudice resulting from the use of this testimony to impeach defense witnesses.
(26) Defendant claims prejudice resulting from references by the prosecutor during his summation at both the guilt and penalty phases to statements that defendant made to Mayland. Essentially, defendant contends that the prosecutor used the statements as substantive evidence relating to the manner in which the crimes were committed, rather than for the limited purpose for which they were admitted โ to illuminate the reliability of expert opinions. Our review of the arguments discloses three instances where the prosecutor's statements arguably tended to obscure the limited nature of the evidence in question. Any harm flowing from these remarks readily could have been cured by an appropriate admonition following an objection by the defendant. Defendant objected during trial to only the comment made during the prosecutor's rebuttal statement during the guilt phase; therefore, his objections to the other two comments were waived. ( People v. Haskett, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 244.) With respect to the comment during rebuttal, we find no prejudice occurred. [30] The trial court sustained defendant's objection. Although the trial court failed to give a specific admonition regarding the limited use for which defendant's statements to Mayland were admitted, the trial court provided a general admonition. [31] The jury was instructed, however, both prior to the argument and again later during deliberations in response to questions regarding whether any of defendant's statements to the experts were admissible evidence, that such testimony was not to be considered as evidence of the truth of the facts disclosed by the statements. Therefore, although a specific admonition was not immediately given by the trial court, any potential prejudice was dissipated by the trial court's instructions. ( People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 689, fn. 17.) There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled. (See People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663.) Further, we find that, given the repeated admonitions and instructions that the jury was not to consider defendant's statements to the defense experts for their content, no prejudice arose from any of the challenged comments by the prosecutor, whether these comments are viewed individually or cumulatively. (Cf. People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 689, fn. 17; People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 79 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118].)
(27) Defendant also claims that certain questions by the prosecutor to defense experts Drs. Ronald Roberts and Stephen Raffle constituted prohibited comment on the exercise of a privilege pursuant to Evidence Code, section 913, because these questions contained references to meetings between defendant and Mayland. We disagree. Mayland's meetings with defendant prior to the suppression hearing were within the scope of his testimony at that hearing. Therefore, at the time the prosecution asked the questions to which defendant now objects, there was no privilege to exercise with respect to facts relating to these interviews. The prosecutor's questions did not constitute impermissible comment on defendant's exercise of a privilege.
Defendant next argues that his proposed settled record establishes that the trial court erred by admitting Mayland's testimony for any purpose during the trial. Defendant asserts that the court and the prosecutor had assured defense counsel during an unreported conference that Mayland's testimony would not be used for any purpose during trial and that trial counsel relied upon these assurances in deciding to present Mayland's testimony. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to settle the record, which would have substantiated this claim. Defendant also contends that he was deprived of his right to be present during all stages of the trial since he was absent from the unreported conference.
During the appellate record correction process, appellate counsel moved for a settled statement detailing the contents of an unreported conference that occurred during the suppression hearing. The trial court accepted declarations and oral testimony from trial counsel regarding the circumstances of this alleged conference. Briefly, the defendant's trial attorneys contended that an in-chambers, unreported discussion occurred, during a recess in the Evidence Code section 402 hearing and prior to the time that Mayland was called as a witness, in which the judge, the prosecutor and both defense counsel participated. Both defense attorneys testified that the issue of whether Mayland's testimony, if he were to be called to the stand, would later be admissible at trial was discussed during this conference. Allen recalled that he announced his intent to call Mayland to testify only if we could be assured that his testimony could not later be introduced at Mr. Clark's trial. As a result of this conversation, both defense attorneys left the chambers with the impression that the defense could call Mayland as a witness at the suppression hearing without his testimony later being used at trial. Allen subsequently admitted, however, that the trial court did not rule on this issue. The prosecutor's recollection of the conversation differed. He testified that all counsel had been in chambers when the court inquired about the probable length of the remainder of the hearing. Defense counsel mentioned that a psychiatrist might be called as a witness. The court directed that it be informed by the end of the day as to whether the witness would be called. At that point, the prosecutor recalled counsel leaving chambers. In the courtroom, outside of the presence of the judge, Allen and the prosecutor discussed the evidentiary implications of Mayland's testimony and the possible relevance of Simmons, supra, 390 U.S. 377. The prosecutor recalled telling Allen that he believed that Simmons immunized the testimony, but that subsequent cases permitted its use as impeachment. The trial judge stated that he did not recall any such discussion occurring in his chambers. Furthermore, he expressed skepticism that any experienced defense counsel would have relied upon an implied decision such as the one Allen's testimony described or would have failed to bring this understanding to the attention of the court when the question of admissibility of Mayland's testimony was raised during trial. The trial court denied the motion. In the course of doing so, the court found that the  Simmons issue had not been discussed in the presence of the court and that the scheduling discussion was not material to any issue on appeal.
(28) This court has repeatedly recognized that settlement of the record is primarily a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court. (E.g., People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 183, fn. 30; People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 116 [279 Cal. Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311].) Once settlement is ordered, the trial court has broad discretion to accept or reject counsel's representations in accordance with its assessment of their credibility. ( People v. Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 116; People v. Gzikowski (1982) 32 Cal.3d 580, 584-585, fn. 2 [186 Cal. Rptr. 339, 651 P.2d 1145].) Defendant's contention that he was entitled to a hearing on this issue before a judge other than the trial judge in this case is meritless. (29) Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion. The recollection of the participants conflicted regarding the content of the in-chambers discussion. Both the court and the prosecutor recalled that the  Simmons issue was not raised in the court's presence. The prosecutor recalled discussing it with defense counsel outside of the presence of the court. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings. Further, given these findings, the trial court correctly determined that the proceeding in question was not the type that may be settled under the California Rules of Court. ( People v. Gzikowski, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 584-585, fn. 2.) (30) Appellant also contends that his absence from the in-chambers conference violated his statutory (งง 977, 1043) and constitutional (e.g., People v. Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1140) right to be present during all trial proceedings. This right is not implicated, however, unless the proceedings bear a reasonable, substantial relation to [defendant's] opportunity to defend the charges against him.... ( People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d Cal.3d 543, 573-574 [244 Cal. Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776]; accord, People v. Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1140.) A discussion regarding the length of time for a hearing and the possible defense witnesses to be called does not implicate defendant's opportunity to defend himself. (See People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 178; People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 602-603 [280 Cal. Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290].)
(31a) Defendant further argues that, by deciding to call Mayland as a witness without obtaining an order from the court or a binding commitment from the prosecutor not to use Mayland's testimony at trial, his trial attorneys rendered ineffective assistance to him. Defendant's argument is premised upon the fact that his trial attorneys testified that they never would have called Mayland to the stand if they had believed that his testimony could be used at trial. (32) In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate that (1) his attorneys' representation was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) his attorneys' deficient representation subjected him to prejudice, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for his attorneys' failings, the result would have been more favorable to him. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687[80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052]; In re Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 945, 950 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 269, 838 P.2d 1222].) In this context, [a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 697-698].) (31b) We need not decide whether defendant's trial attorneys were incompetent, because defendant is unable to demonstrate that the alleged deficiency resulted in prejudice โ that is, that a more favorable result would have been reached at either the guilt or penalty phase had Mayland's testimony been excluded from the trial. First, appellant's statements to Mayland were not admitted at trial for their truth. Their sole use was for impeachment of the defense experts' opinions. Second, the use of Mayland's testimony to impeach the testimony of Drs. Smith, Roberts, and Raffle represented a small portion of the prosecutor's cross-examination of these witnesses. The testimony of these witnesses contained many contradictions. In rebuttal, the prosecutor presented additional evidence, including credible expert testimony, that cast further doubt upon the reliability of the evaluations of the defense experts. Additionally, the testimony of numerous percipient witnesses, who observed the defendant within hours following the crime, and the low levels of drugs revealed by the blood test taken after defendant's arrest cast doubt upon defendant's rage reaction theory. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that a more favorable result in either the guilt or penalty phase would not have resulted even if Mayland's pretrial testimony had never been referred to during trial.