Opinion ID: 666583
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A Conspiracy to Purchase Stolen Goods

Text: 19 The centerpiece of defendants' appeal is their vigorous contention that they cannot conspire to purchase stolen property if none of the property they purchased was actually stolen. In effect, they argue that the rule of Monasterski, which prevented their conviction for the substantive offense, should be extended to block their conviction for conspiracy. They base this entire line of argument on the premise that they did not purchase stolen auto parts during the pendency of the conspiracy. That is simply not true. The Warshawskys may not have purchased stolen auto parts from Agent Watson on the dates charged in the substantive counts of the indictment, but Steven LaFay testified that he sold stolen parts to them twice in 1990. LaFay's sales were not charged as substantive crimes because LaFay had not agreed to implicate the Warshawskys at the time of indictment. LaFay later pleaded guilty and testified as a witness for the prosecution. 20 Even if they never purchased stolen parts, we question whether Monasterski necessarily precludes a conviction for conspiring to purchase stolen parts. It is well-established that a conspirator need not successfully complete all of the elements of the underlying offense to be guilty of conspiracy. Rather, as Justice Jackson explained, the agreement or confederation to commit a crime ... is what is punishable as a conspiracy, if any overt act is taken in pursuit of it, ... whether or not the contemplated crime is consummated. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 542, 67 S.Ct. 1394, 1399, 91 L.Ed. 1654 (1947). See TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW Sec. 729 (14th ed. 1981 & Supp.1993) (Criminal liability for a conspiracy is not affected by the fact that the purpose of the conspiracy was not accomplished, or that it was impossible for it to be accomplished.). 21 Two other circuits have upheld convictions for conspiring to receive stolen property even though the goods were part of a sting and therefore were not stolen. For example, the court in United States v. Petit, 841 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1237, 108 S.Ct. 2906, 101 L.Ed.2d 938 (1988), concluded that a conspiracy to receive stolen property was possible even if the property was not stolen, because the crime of conspiracy is completed once the conspirators agree to commit an offense, and some overt act furthers their agreement. Id. at 1550. See also United States v. Rose, 590 F.2d 232, 235 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 99 S.Ct. 2859, 61 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) (although [18 U.S.C.] Sec. 2314 cannot be violated unless there are in fact stolen goods, a conspiracy to violate that section occurs when two or more persons agree to attempt to commit acts which include all the elements of a crime under that section and any overt act is done). Cf. United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 126-27 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855, 108 S.Ct. 162, 98 L.Ed.2d 116 (1987) (applying the logic of Rose  to uphold a drug importation conspiracy conviction even though no drugs were ever imported into the United States). 22 The facts before us do not require resolution of this thorny issue, for there is ample evidence in the record that the Warshawskys did in fact purchase stolen auto parts during the pendency of the conspiracy. Even were we inclined to hold that a conspiracy conviction requires proof that the parts were stolen, the Warshawskys' convictions would still stand, since the proofs fully support a finding that they purchased stolen parts at least twice. That Agent Watson did not ship stolen parts on the dates charged in the indictment may, as the trial judge properly held, relieve them of criminal liability for the substantive offenses, but it has no impact on the validity of their conspiracy convictions.