Opinion ID: 612988
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The March 24, 2008 and May 1, 2008 orders

Text: Between 2006 and 2008, many of O'Connor's codefendants pleaded guilty, resulting in additional delays that O'Connor concedes were properly excluded under the Act. The last of her codefendants pleaded guilty on March 8, 2008, and O'Connor's trial was scheduled to begin on March 24, 2008. On that date a dispute arose over the authentication of mortgage records the government planned to submit as exhibits. Two weeks earlier, the government filed a motion to admit the records under Rule 902(11) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and tendered the required declarations from the records custodians attesting to their authenticity. Just before jury selection was set to begin, O'Connor's counsel objected, raising a challenge to the sufficiency of the declarations (though not the authenticity of the records). The parties jointly requested a continuance to May 19, 2008, to resolve the dispute so that the mortgage records could be admitted without calling records custodians from 22 lending institutions located all over the country. The court granted this request, continued the case to May 19, and entered another ends-of-justice exclusion for trial preparation. We find no error (much less plain error) in this order. The on-the-record discussion among counsel and the court, together with the court's docket entry, are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute. On May 1, 2008, the judge notified the parties of a conflict in her schedule that required the court to transfer the case to another judge or reset the May 19 trial. O'Connor's counsel chose the latter option and agreed that the delay could be excluded under the Act. The judge proposed July 1, 2008, as the new trial date. O'Connor's counsel instead suggested a date in September based on other commitments during the summer. The judge reluctantly acquiesced and rescheduled trial for September 22, 2008, entering another ends-of-justice exclusion citing the need for continuity of counsel. O'Connor's attorney waived objection to this delay. O'Connor now argues that the exclusion of time from May 19 to September 22 was improper because the Act does not permit the court to exclude delay resulting from general congestion of the court's calendar. § 3161(h)(7)(C). The government counters that only 42 days of this delay  from May 19 to July 1  were improperly excluded based on the court's calendar congestion. The court had proposed to start trial on July 1 but counsel was unavailable. Accordingly, the delay from July 1 to September 22 was solely attributable to calendar conflicts of counsel, not the court. Indeed, the judge specifically noted the need for continuity of counsel when she set the September 22 date. We agree with the government that only 42 days were improperly excluded from the speedy-trial clock. The rest of the delay was properly excluded and adequately supported by the court's conclusion that the additional time was necessary to maintain continuity of counsel.