Opinion ID: 2792892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Motion for Remand

Text: We review a magistrate’s decision regarding the necessity of a remand to the Commissioner based on new evidence de novo. Vega v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 265 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 2001). A claimant is generally permitted to present new evidence at each stage of the administrative process. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 7 Case: 14-12471 Date Filed: 04/10/2015 Page: 8 of 11 1261 (11th Cir. 2007). “The Appeals Council must consider new, material, and chronologically relevant evidence and must review the case if the [ALJ’s] action, findings, or conclusion is contrary to the weight of the evidence currently of record.” Id. (quotation omitted). The Appeals Council must “adequately evaluate” new evidence. Epps v. Harris, 624 F.2d 1267, 1273 (5th Cir. 1980) (remanding so that a determination of disability could be made on the record as a whole where the Appeals Council had “perfunctorily adhered to the decision of the hearing examiner” without sufficiently evaluating the new evidence). The Appeals Council is not required to provide a detailed explanation of the claimant’s new evidence when denying a request for review. Mitchell v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 784-85 (11th Cir. 2014). Where a claimant seeks review in a federal court of the Commissioner’s final decision, the district court may remand the case to the Commissioner using two methods under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g): “sentence four” remands and “sentence six” remands. Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1261. Sentence four and sentence six remands serve different purposes. Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1095 (11th Cir. 1996). “[A] sentence-four remand is based upon a determination that the Commissioner erred in some respect in reaching the decision to deny benefits,” whereas “[a] sentence-six remand does not result from any error by the Commissioner.” Id. 8 Case: 14-12471 Date Filed: 04/10/2015 Page: 9 of 11 Under the fourth sentence of § 405(g), the district court may affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner’s decision, with or without remanding for rehearing. Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1261. Sentence four is applicable when the evidence was properly before the Commissioner, but “the Appeals Council did not adequately consider the additional evidence.” Id. at 1268 (quotation omitted). A sentence four remand is warranted only where the Commissioner’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence or where the Commissioner or ALJ incorrectly applied the relevant law. Jackson, 99 F.3d at 1092. Under the sixth sentence of § 405(g), the district court may remand the case “to the Commissioner for the taking of additional evidence upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1261 (quotation omitted). The evidence must also be noncumulative. Caulder v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 872, 877 (11th Cir. 1986). A sentence six remand is “appropriate when the district court learns of evidence not in existence or available to the claimant at the time of the administrative proceeding that might have changed the outcome of that proceeding.” Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 626, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 2664, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990); Hyde v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 456, 459 (11th Cir. 1987). The district court is not authorized by sentence six “to 9 Case: 14-12471 Date Filed: 04/10/2015 Page: 10 of 11 remand for reconsideration of evidence previously considered by the Appeals Council.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1269. Here, Norton’s contention that remand was necessary because the Appeals Council did not adequately evaluate his newly submitted evidence is meritless. The Appeals Council stated that it had considered the additional evidence, listed what that specific evidence was, and concluded without elaboration that the evidence did not provide a basis for changing the ALJ’s decision. The Appeals Council was not required to provide a thorough explanation of its decision. Mitchell, 771 F.3d at 784-85. Additionally, although Norton submitted several pieces of new evidence, the Appeals Council was only required to consider those that related to the period on or before the August 2011 ALJ hearing decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1470(b). Accordingly, although the Appeals Council did not acknowledge this fact, the urology records from 2012 were not properly a part of the administrative record. See id. Next, the magistrate judge did not err in refusing to remand Norton’s case. There was no error under sentence six because, although the evidence was new and noncumulative, and Norton had good cause for failing to produce the records before the ALJ, because they did not yet exist, the records were not material because they would not have changed the outcome of the proceeding. See Sullivan, 496 U.S. at 626, 110 S.Ct. at 2664; Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1261. Although 10 Case: 14-12471 Date Filed: 04/10/2015 Page: 11 of 11 Norton complained of 6 to 12 months of urinary issues when he first sought treatment from Dr. Fusia, and he was given several prescriptions to resolve his frequent urination, there were no objective findings that supported his subjective complaints, and no indication that his frequent urination prevented him from performing the full range of medium work. Even assuming his complaint was true, the ALJ was already aware of his urinary issues through the records from Dr. Biggers and Norton’s hearing testimony, and thus it did not appear probable that the new evidence would have produced a different result. Hyde, 823 F.2d at 459. On the above, the magistrate judge did not err in refusing to remand Norton’s case for consideration of the additional medical records, and thus we affirm the district court’s denial of Norton’s motion for remand. AFFIRMED. 11