Opinion ID: 1237936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: Length of Defendant's Prior Incarceration

Text: Prosecution witness Pat Freese, a detective for the Eureka Police Department, testified that he asked defendant, shortly after his arrest, where he had been on the evening of the Triplex robbery. Defendant answered that he was not sure and that most of his days had run together because he had been in prison for the past eleven years. Defense counsel did not object or move to strike the answer, but counsel later moved for a mistrial. The trial court did not grant a mistrial, but it did instruct the jury that it was not to consider evidence that defendant had been in prison in determining his guilt in this particular trial or to determine that he's a bad person. (51) Defendant contends that the court erred in denying a mistrial and that the admonition was insufficient to cure the harm. As we have already mentioned, a trial court's ruling denying a motion for mistrial is reviewed under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. ( People v. McLain, supra, 46 Cal.3d 97, 113.) We find no abuse of discretion here. Because of the nature of the charges, evidence was properly admitted to prove that defendant had been in prison and was an AB member. Although additional details about defendant's prior prison term were not directly relevant on the issue of guilt, the jury was entitled to consider the plausibility of the explanation defendant offered for his claimed inability to remember where he had been at the time of a charged offense. Assuming the evidence should have been excluded as being more prejudicial than probative (Evid. Code, § 352), the prejudice to defendant was not incurable by admonition or instruction. (See People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 854 [180 Cal. Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776].) Defendant complains that the trial court's admonition was inadequate because it did not specifically advise the jury to disregard the length of his previous imprisonment. The criticism is unwarranted. The admonition not to consider the prior imprisonment at all to prove defendant's guilt or to prove he was a bad person necessarily included an admonition to disregard the length of that imprisonment. Defendant was not harmed by the admonition being more inclusive than it needed to be. 8. Conduct of Mary Markley Beverly Lloyd, defendant's mother, testified as a prosecution witness. During redirect examination, the prosecution asked her about the time when Barry Brown, an investigator for the Humboldt County District Attorney, served her with a subpoena. Specifically, the prosecutor asked whether a woman named Mary Markley was present and whether Brown was ordered off her property. The trial court overruled a defense objection, and the witness answered that she did not remember that Markley ordered Brown off the property. She added, I know she was protecting me because I was so dumb I didn't know that I didn't need to talk to him. (52) Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting the evidence. He argues that Markley's conduct was irrelevant because she was not a witness and her actions had no bearing on Lloyd's credibility. We disagree. The alleged incident occurred on Lloyd's property and in Lloyd's presence. Markley could not have ordered anyone to leave without Lloyd's approval or ratification. Thus, the inquiry was proper to explore Lloyd's bias against the prosecution. In any event, the witness testified she did not remember whether Markley had ordered Brown to leave, and the incident was not mentioned again. We find neither error nor prejudice. 9. AB Activities Outside California (53) Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred when it permitted prosecution witness Michael Thompson to testify, over defense objection, that the AB had members in prisons nationwide and that it was affiliated with certain organized crime groups. We reject the contention. Thompson testified that beginning in 1981 AB members held meetings at Palm Hall, the adjustment center of the Chino prison, to formulate plans to restructure the AB. Without objection, he testified that in 1982, as a result of these meetings, the AB held a vote to elect a governing body. The trial court overruled a defense objection on relevance grounds to a question asking where the vote had taken place, and the witness answered that it was taken at Palm Hall, Folsom, San Quentin, [and] federal institutions through [ sic ] the nation. Over another defense objection on relevance grounds, the witness testified that the AB was nationwide and that it existed in Arizona, New York, Nevada, Illinois, and Michigan. The court explained it was admitting the testimony only because Thompson had testified that a vote was taken. The ruling was correct. Defendant was charged with a conspiracy to murder under orders of a prison gang's leadership. Evidence of the size and nature of the gang and the manner in which the leadership derived its authority was relevant to prove the charge. The trial court recognized that the subject carried a risk of undue prejudice (see Evid. Code, § 352), and when defense counsel made timely and appropriate objections, it confined the prosecution within reasonable limits. For example, the court sustained a defense objection to a question concerning the AB's membership in 1979 and instructed the prosecutor to restrict his inquiry to the time of the charged conspiracy. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed brief testimony on the distribution of the AB membership, shortly before the formation of the charged conspiracy, to explain how the AB leaders had acquired their authority. Thompson later testified, without objection, that one of the aims of the AB reorganization was to become more involved within the community of organized crime as opposed to a prison gang whose primary motivations were racial violence and drug abuse. He said that the leadership group adopted policies to achieve this goal. Asked for examples of the policies, Thompson said, The Aryan Brotherhood is associated with the Mexican Mafia or the Hell's Angels or  for instance, in Federal penitentiary, we're with the Italian Mafia. Defense counsel objected belatedly and moved to strike, apparently on relevance grounds. The trial court responded: I don't know whether we need an example of the policies. It has nothing to do with the facts of this case. Let's get to the policies we're concerned about the facts of the case [ sic ]. Defendant complains that the trial court should have stricken as irrelevant the testimony about the AB's affiliation with organized crime groups. We agree that the evidence had little if any relevance to the charges against defendant and that it should have been stricken, but defendant has not demonstrated prejudice. The witness had already testified, without objection, that the AB was a prison gang, that prisoners were required to shed someone's blood to become AB members, and that the AB was seeking to expand its organized crime activities, including drug dealing, extortion, and murder. The jury was also well aware that the charge in this case involved a conspiracy to murder. Under these circumstances, the jury was unlikely to be shocked or influenced by testimony that the AB had affiliated with known organized crime groups. Moreover, the trial court, although it did not strike the testimony, advised the jury that the testimony had nothing to do with the facts of this case. Had the court stricken the challenged testimony, there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have returned a verdict more favorable to defendant. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)