Opinion ID: 6345898
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Text and Context

Text: The statutory text and context favor a reading that interference with, or restraint of FMLA rights can violate § 2615(a)(1), without proof of an actual denial, for at least four reasons. First, the three verbs in § 2615(a)(1) are listed disjunctively. They are not coextensive, and there is no indication that all three were included in § 2615(a)(1) for the sake of redundant emphasis. Second, § 2615(a)(1) protects “the attempt to exercise” FMLA rights, which would make little sense if actual denial were required. Third, reading § 2615(a)(1) to permit the array of activities that prejudice but do not deny FMLA rights would undermine the FMLA’s guarantees of family and medical leave to eligible employees and their families. Finally, Department of Labor regulations implementing the FMLA provide additional persuasive evidence supporting the plain-language interpretation of these provisions. We discuss each point in turn. First, the use of the disjunctive “or” in § 2615(a)(1) signals that interference or restraint without denial is suﬃcient to violate the statute, and that requiring denial would turn “interfere with, restrain, or” into surplusage. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1141 (2018) (noting that “‘or’ is ‘almost always disjunctive’” (internal citation No. 19-3435 11 omitted)). By itself the point is not necessarily decisive. See, e.g., Reid Hospital and Health Care Services, Inc. v. Conifer Revenue Cycle Solutions, LLC, 8 F.4th 642, 652 (7th Cir. 2021) (discussing limit of anti-surplusage canon for contracts and statutes). It is well recognized that the anti-surplusage canon has limits and that statutory drafters often take a “belt-and-suspenders approach” to ensure that the statutory language captures the intended universe, sometimes producing texts that emphasize redundance over brevity. Id. (collecting authorities). The anti-surplusage canon alone does not resolve the question before us, but its application to § 2615(a)(1) points in the same direction as the other textual evidence. For example, the activities prohibited by § 2615(a)(1) are related but are not so similar that their appearance together indicates redundance. Each adds to the scope of the prohibition. When employers refuse to grant or accept proper FMLA requests, they deny access within the meaning of the Act. Such a denial also acts (i) as a form of interference (by checking or hampering FMLA access); and (ii) as a restraint (by limiting FMLA access). But the reverse is not necessarily true. An employer can interfere with or restrain rights under the FMLA without explicitly denying a leave request.4 4 The edition of Black’s Law Dictionary current when the FMLA was passed in 1993 defined these terms as follows: Deny. To traverse. To give negative answer or reply to. To refuse to grant or accept. To refuse to grant a petition or protest. Interfere. To check; hamper; hinder; infringe; encroach; trespass; disturb; intervene; intermeddle; interpose. To enter into, or take part in, the concerns of others. Restrain. To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to 12 No. 19-3435 For example, an employer that implements a burdensome approval process or discourages employees from requesting FMLA leave could interfere with and restrain access without denying many requests because few requests requiring a formal decision would ever be made. By including the trio of verbs in § 2615(a)(1) in a disjunctive clause, Congress enacted statutory language that strongly suggests that interfering, restraining, and denying are distinct ways of violating the FMLA. Second, § 2615(a)(1) also protects “the attempt to exercise” FMLA rights. Suppose that an electrician meets with her employer and seeks medical leave information, intending to exercise FMLA rights. This likely qualiﬁes as an attempt to exercise beneﬁts under the Act even if the electrician does not speciﬁcally invoke the FMLA. Preddie, 799 F.3d at 816 (“The notice requirements of the FMLA are not onerous. An employee need not expressly mention the FMLA in his leave request or otherwise invoke any of its provisions.”), quoting Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 2006). Are we to read § 2615(a)(1) so that no violation can take place until the employer refuses to grant an actual FMLA request from the electrician? If so, then the electrician might not be protected during the initial phase of preparing and formulating an FMLA request. put compulsion upon; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle; to repress or suppress; to curb. To restrict a person’s movements in such manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty. Deny, Interfere, Restrain, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (internal citations removed). No. 19-3435 13 Under this view, an employer that wanted to prevent FMLA use would have many options that would stop short of denying a claim, such as not providing basic FMLA information to an employee unaware of his rights, or orally discouraging FMLA use before the employee actually requested leave. This would be a strange result and would conﬂict with this court’s precedents under the Act. See, e.g., Lutes, 950 F.3d at 362–63, 369 (reversing summary judgment against metal worker on FMLA interference claim when he was ﬁred for staying home to recover from injury while unaware he may have qualiﬁed for FMLA); Preddie, 799 F.3d at 818, 821 (reversing summary judgment against teacher on FMLA interference claim when principal told him that missing additional time would have consequences). As applied to the issue of denial, the text of § 2615(a)(1) is not ambiguous. For the Act to protect “the exercise of or the attempt to exercise” FMLA rights, it must be read so that an interference or restraint without actual denial is still a violation. Third, reading the Act to permit employers to interfere with or restrain the use of FMLA rights as long as no unlawful denial occurs would conﬂict with and undermine the rights granted. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601(b)(1) & (b)(2); 2617. Rights under the Act would be signiﬁcantly diminished if it permitted employers to actively discourage employees from taking steps to access FMLA beneﬁts or otherwise to interfere with or restrain such access. The Act was designed to accommodate “the legitimate interests of employers,” § 2601(b)(3) (emphasis added), but we see no legitimate interest for employers in impeding access to FMLA beneﬁts by subterfuge, concealment, or intimidation. 14 No. 19-3435 Finally, Department of Labor regulations implementing the FMLA also support this interpretation:
ployee’s rights under the law, and with legal proceedings or inquiries relating to an em- ployee’s rights. …
tions constitute interfering with, restraining, or denying the exercise of rights provided by the Act. … Interfering with the exercise of an employee’s rights would include, for exam- ple, not only refusing to authorize FMLA leave, but discouraging an employee from using such leave. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(a)–(b) (emphasis added). Section 2615(a)(1) is not ambiguous about whether denial is required to show a violation, so Chevron deference does not apply here. See Planned Parenthood of Indiana, Inc. v. Commissioner of Indiana State Dept. of Health, 699 F.3d 962, 980 (7th Cir. 2012) (“In the absence of ambiguity, Chevron deference does not come into play.”), citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). But the FMLA vests the Secretary of Labor with broad authority to issue regulations implementing the FMLA, and his regulatory interpretation is further persuasive evidence that the best reading of § 2615(a)(1) is that actual denial is not required. 29 U.S.C § 2654. 5 5 At this court’s invitation, the Department of Labor submitted an amicus brief on the question whether “a plaintiff pursuing a claim of interference with rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. No. 19-3435 15