Opinion ID: 1669462
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionality of the Guest Statute

Text: At a point in the proceedings, Darryl filed a Constitutional Challenge of the Guest Statute. [1] Section 32-1-2, Ala.Code 1975, commonly known as the guest statute, was enacted by the Legislature in 1935. It reads: The owner, operator or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest while being transported without payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, resulting from the operation thereof, unless such injuries or death are caused by the willful or wanton misconduct of such operator, owner or person responsible for the operation of said motor vehicle. Darryl contended that the guest statute violates §§ 13 and 22 of the Alabama Constitution and Amendment 14 of the United States Constitution. He acknowledged that this Court had rejected identical constitutional challenges to the guest statute in Pickett v. Matthews, 238 Ala. 542, 192 So. 261 (1939), and Beasley v. Bozeman, 294 Ala. 288, 315 So.2d 570 (1975). Darryl's argument then, and now, is that societal and legal changes occurring subsequent to Beasley justify revisiting and overruling that case and Pickett. In his brief to this Court, Darryl cites a California case and a Texas case as support for his position that we should overrule Pickett and Beasley: Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal.Rptr. 388 (1973), and Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1985). Merlo was decided two years before this Court decided Beasley and was specifically noted in that opinion, the Court concluding, nonetheless, that under the distribution of powers section of our State Constitution, it is within the province of the Legislature to ascertain and determine when the welfare of the people might require that the guest statute should be repealed. The Legislature's power should not be interfered with unless it is exercised in a manner which plainly conflicts with some higher law. Pickett v. Matthews, supra. 294 Ala. at 290, 315 So.2d at 571. Justice Jones wrote an opinion concurring specially in Beasley, which two other Justices joined, in which he questioned the wisdom of the guest statute, but in which he also expressed his strong belief in the wisdom of the separation of powers doctrine which is the foundation of our system of government.... Justice Jones continued: [T]he Court is powerless to strike down as invalid a legislative act unless such act is constitutionally prohibited or otherwise violative of constitutional proscriptions. The legislative process, through elective representatives, with all of its faults, and its tendency to be unduly influenced by pressure groups, is the best method yet derived by man for the enactment of laws expressive of the public policy of its people. (I would add parenthetically: My faith in this process further leads me to believe that a legislature sensitive to the will of the people it represents will now exercise its prerogative to repeal this inherently bad law.) 294 Ala. at 291, 315 So.2d at 571. Despite Justice Jones's express invitation, the Legislature has chosen not to repeal the guest statute. In Whitworth, the Texas Supreme Court noted, as had this Court in Beasley, that the United States Supreme Court had upheld the right of states to enact guest statutes, as against a claim that such statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 50 S.Ct. 57, 74 L.Ed. 221 (1929), the Supreme Court found a rational distinction between gratuitous passengers in automobiles and guests in other modes of transportation. In Whitworth, the Texas Supreme Court acknowledged the continued authority of Silver with regard to the equal-rights provision of the United States Constitution but concluded that it was at liberty to interpret differently the equal-protection clause appearing in the Texas Constitution, which provides: All free men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services. 699 S.W.2d at 196 n. 1. The Court declared that we are at liberty to interpret state statutes in light of our own constitution and to fashion our own tests to determine a statute's constitutionality. 699 S.W.2d at 196. The Texas guest statute, as revised in 1973, discriminated against only guest passengers who were `related within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity to the owner or operator of a motor vehicle.' 699 S.W.2d at 195. Pointing out that [e]ven when the purpose of a statute is legitimate, equal protection analysis still requires a determination that the classifications drawn by the statute or rationally related to the statute's purpose, the Court concluded that the classification system of the revised statute lacked such rationality: The Texas Guest Statute creates a presumption that all automobile passengers suing a driver who is within the second degree of affinity or consanguinity do so collusively. We refuse to indulge in the assumption that close relatives will prevaricate so as to promote a spurious lawsuit. 699 S.W.2d at 197. The question whether §§ 1, 6, and 22 of Article I, Constitution of Alabama 1901, combine to guarantee the citizens of Alabama equal protection under the laws remains in dispute. See Black v. Pike County Comm'n, 360 So.2d 303 (Ala.1978); Ex parte Jackson, 516 So.2d 768 (Ala.1986), and Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609 (Ala.1987) (implying that those provisions do provide for equal protection); but see Ex parte Melof, 735 So.2d 1172 (Ala.1999). Hutchins v. DCH Reg'l Med. Ctr., 770 So.2d 49, 59 (Ala.2000). Darryl does not argue that Art. I, §§ 1, 6, and 22, Alabama Constitution of 1901, combine to guarantee the citizens of Alabama equal protection under the laws. Rather, he argues that the guest statute is unconstitutional because it violates § 22 and § 13 of the Alabama Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, his argument consisting simply of the following: The Alabama Guest Statute is unconstitutional for the following reasons: 1. The Alabama Guest Statute is a derogation of the common law. 2. The Alabama State Constitution guarantees a remedy for any injury, which includes injuries to guests: ` Sec. 13. Courts to be open; remedies for all injuries; impartiality of justice. `That all courts shall be open; and that every person, for any injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a remedy by due process of law; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.' 3. The Alabama Constitution forbids any grant of privilege or immunity: ` Sec. 22. Ex post facto laws; impairment of obligations of contracts irrevocable or exclusive grants of special privileges or immunities. `That no ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligations of contracts, or making any irrevocable or exclusive grants of special privileges or immunities, shall be passed by the legislature; and every grant of franchise, privilege, or immunity shall forever remain subject to revocation, alteration, or amendment.' 4. The Guest Statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 5. There is no rational basis between `guest' and other passengers. All guests and passengers should receive the benefit of the driver's insurance when the driver is negligent. As applied to this case, the Alabama Guest Statute is unconstitutional because it only protects the insurance company and there is no rational basis between `guests' and passengers. Anna Key, the grandmother, is dead. The insurance company of Anna Key is the only beneficiary of the Guest Statute in this case. Anna Key has no estate and there will be no recovery against the estate unless her insurance company is held responsible. (Appellant's brief, pp. 30-32.) Merely quoting § 13 and § 22, Ala. Const.1901, without citing or discussing relevant caselaw, falls far short of argument adequate to demonstrate that Pickett and Beasley were wrongly decided with respect to the effect of §§ 13 and 22. Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So.2d 1, 20 (Ala.2003)(Furthermore, `it is not the function of this Court to do a party's legal research or to make and address legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient authority or argument.' Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.2d 248, 251 (Ala.1994)(citing Spradlin v. Spradlin, 601 So.2d 76 (Ala.1992)).). See also Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Larkin, 857 So.2d 97 (Ala.2003); Crutcher v. Wendy's of North Alabama, Inc., 857 So.2d 82 (Ala.2003). Likewise, the naked statement that [t]he Guest Statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, falls far short of demonstrating that we should presume Silver v. Silver to no longer be controlling authority.