Opinion ID: 1423997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gaddy's Prior Convictions

Text: The Government introduced three of Gaddy's prior convictions for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver: cocaine base in 1995, cocaine in 1996, and marijuana in 2002. We review the district court's decision to admit Gaddy's prior convictions for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Cook, 454 F.3d 938, 940 (8th Cir.2006). [We] will reverse only when such evidence clearly had no bearing on the case and was introduced solely to prove the defendant's propensity to commit criminal acts. United States v. Foster, 344 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir.2003) (internal quotation omitted). Evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible under [Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 404(b) solely to prove the defendant's criminal disposition, but is admissible to show proof of ... intent ... [or] knowledge.... Bad acts evidence is admissible if (1) it is relevant to a material issue; (2) it is similar in kind and not overly remote in time to the crime charged; (3) it is supported by sufficient evidence; and (4) its potential prejudice does not substantially outweigh its probative value. United States v. Jackson, 278 F.3d 769, 771 (8th Cir.2002) (internal quotations omitted). First, Gaddy contends that the convictions were too remote in time to the crime charged. At the time of his trial, Gaddy's prior convictions were four, ten and eleven years old, which are not so remote as to be inadmissible. See Ironi, 525 F.3d at 688 (finding that prior drug convictions that were eight and ten years old were not too remote); Cook, 454 F.3d at 942 (concluding that drug convictions that were eight and nine years old were not too remote); United States v. Green, 151 F.3d 1111, 1114 (8th Cir.1998) (listing cases in which convictions that were twelve, thirteen and seventeen years old were admissible). Gaddy's prior convictions are not overly remote under Rule 404(b). Second, Gaddy argues that the unfair prejudice of admitting these convictions substantially outweighed their probative value. Gaddy does not dispute the Government's characterization of his defense as a general denial. A general denial defense places the defendant's state of mind at issue. Jackson, 278 F.3d at 771. In light of a general denial, prior drug sale convictions are probative to show that Gaddy had the intent and knowledge necessary for a jury to convict him. See Foster, 344 F.3d at 801 (finding that a general denial defense plac[es] intent or state of mind into question and allow[s] the admission of prior criminal convictions to prove both knowledge and intent); Jackson, 278 F.3d at 771 (concluding that a general denial defense permits evidence of prior convictions to show knowledge and intent). In addition, any unfair prejudicial effect of these prior convictions was reduced by the district court's limiting instruction, which instructed the jury that it could only consider this evidence to decide the issues of intent and knowledge. See Ironi, 525 F.3d at 688. Therefore, the potential prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of these prior convictions, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Gaddy's prior convictions.