Opinion ID: 1858107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Challenges for Cause/Assignment of Error 12 and Supplemental Assignment of Error 4

Text: Defendant alleges the trial court erred by utilizing an inappropriate standard for challenges for cause made under La.C.Cr.P. art. 798(2). Although the title of defendant's assignment of error actually refers to La. C.Cr.P. art. 798(2)(a), his arguments in brief can be read only as referring to subsection (b) of that article. However, we note defendant continually objected to the constitutionality of subsection (a) during the trial. As such, we will address both arguments. With respect to subsection (b), defendant asserts Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) provides the constitutional standard governing when jurors can be excused for cause with respect to their views on capital punishment, and that excusing a juror for cause under the standard set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 798(2)(b) violates Witt. In Witt, the Supreme Court held the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment ... is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852. Louisiana. C.Cr.P. art. 798(2)(b) provides it is good cause for challenge on the part of the State where: (2) The juror tendered in a capital case [] has conscientious scruples against the infliction of capital punishment and makes it known: ... (b) That his attitude toward the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair him from making an impartial decision as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.... Thus, while Witt allows for the excusal for cause of a juror whose views prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror, La.C.Cr.P. art 798(2)(b) allows a juror to be excused for cause whose views prevent or substantially impair him from making an impartial decision as a juror. Defendant's position is that the scope of Article 798(2)(b) is broader than that constitutionally allowed under Witt and would result in allowing jurors whose bias against the death penalty is short of a substantial impairment to be excused for cause in violation of defendant's constitutional rights. As a result, defendant alleges it is a possibility thirteen jurors excluded for cause by the trial court in response to State requests were improperly dismissed. In State v. Tart, 93-0772, p. 14, n. 3 (La.2/9/96), 672 So.2d 116, 123, n. 3, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 310, 136 L.Ed.2d 227 (1996), this court noted Witt's standard for state cause challenges was embodied in La.C.Cr.P. art. 798(2). Certainly, making an impartial decision as a juror is one of the duties of a juror described in Witt, and the variation in the semantics employed under the two standards is insignificant. Regarding subsection (a), because the issue is not briefed, it is difficult to understand the defendant's argument on why excusing a juror for cause under subsection (a) somehow impermissibly broadens the scope of jurors excusable under Witt. Under La.C.Cr.P. art. 798(2)(a), a juror may be excused for cause if he has conscientious scruples against the infliction of capital punishment, and would automatically vote against the death penalty because of his capital punishment beliefs. This standard falls within Witt, which limits excusals for cause to those jurors whose views on capital punishment would substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors. It is the duty of a juror to make an impartial decision only after hearing all of the evidence and not as a result of any preconceived beliefs. Furthermore, defendant does not allege in this assignment any of the jurors excused for cause by the State and trial court were, in fact, improperly excused under either the Witt standard or his appreciation of the Article 798(2) standard. Nor does defendant discuss any individual juror's voir dire responses or the specific basis the State had for urging disqualification for each. For these reasons, this assignment lacks merit as does the assignment wherein defendant specifically alleged application of an improper standard resulted in the improper excusal for cause of prospective jurors John Fielding and Rosalind Johnson.