Opinion ID: 2241300
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lazan v County of Suffolk

Text: After plaintiff pulled his car over to the shoulder of the Long Island Expressway, a Suffolk County highway patrol officer came up behind him with flashing lights. Plaintiff left his car and walked back to the police cruiser to speak with the officer. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he told the officer he had chest pains and was not feeling well. He did not, however, allege that he told the officer he was too ill or dizzy to drive. [5] After explaining that it was not safe to park on the side of the road, the officer told plaintiff to move his car to the nearest service station. Plaintiff drove off, but soon lost control of his car and suffered serious injuries after driving it into a guardrail and a telephone pole. Plaintiff sued Suffolk County, asserting that the police officer  with whom he alleged a special relationship  was to blame for his injuries. Supreme Court denied the County's motion for summary judgment and the Appellate Division affirmed, certifying to us the question whether its order was proper. We answer in the negative. The second prong of the Pelaez/Cuffy test for special relationship liability requires knowledge on the part of a municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm ( Pelaez, 2 NY3d at 202). Here, plaintiff never expressly told the police officer he was too sick to drive, and the record shows it was not manifestly clear to the officer that plaintiff was so disabled that he could not drive a short distance to a safer location. Therefore, as a matter of law, neither plaintiff's explanation to the police officer nor his appearance put the officer on notice that instructing plaintiff to remove his car from the shoulder of the expressway could lead to harm. Under these circumstances, we cannot expect the police to make a refined, expert medical diagnosis of a motorist's latent condition. Requiring them to do so would improperly burden police in carrying out their duties. For there to be special relationship-based liability, a municipality's agent must be clearly on notice of palpable danger, as where it is so obvious that a layman would ascertain it without inquiry, or where a person unambiguously communicated his incapacity to the officer. At that point, the officer would have to weigh the danger of leaving the car in a dangerous situation (at least until help arrived) against the danger posed by having the driver move the car. This calls for discretion and could result in liability only when it is clear that the danger in having the driver move the car outweighs the danger inherent in leaving the car in place for some time. In this case, however, the highway patrol officer was not adequately on notice to satisfy this test. Accordingly, in Kovit, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the complaint against the City dismissed. In Lazan, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint granted and the certified question answered in the negative. In Kovit v Estate of Hallums: Order reversed, etc. In Lazan v County of Suffolk: Order reversed, etc.