Opinion ID: 710073
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Missouri's Involuntary Manslaughter Statute

Text: 122 Although it may be possible that recklessness, properly defined, could define a crime involving moral turpitude, I find the BIA's conclusion that the Missouri recklessness statute provides such a definition is wrong as a matter of law. As I have postulated the standard of review for this issue, the BIA is entitled to no deference whatsoever in its interpretation of Missouri law. That is well, because I find that the BIA made two errors in its interpretation of Missouri law in this case. First, the language of the Missouri recklessness statute does not explicitly state the characteristic elements of a crime involving moral turpitude, nor is the language of the statute amenable to such an interpretation. Furthermore, the BIA looked only at the Missouri statutes defining Ms. Franklin's offense, and not at Missouri case law, which properly defines the nature of the statutory elements of the offense. Had the BIA done so, it would have found that Missouri courts have never interpreted Missouri's involuntary manslaughter statute as involving the essential elements of a crime involving moral turpitude. 23 123 Missouri's statutory definition of criminal recklessness at issue here is found in Mo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 562.016.4. That statute defines a person who has acted with criminal recklessness as one who consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, and [the] disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care [that] a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. Mo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 562.016.4. This statutory language does not define an evil intent element of a crime, because, as I observed above, it does not state any kind of intent at all, let alone an intent to do evil. The law distinguishes among culpable states of mind, separating intentional acts from the merely reckless, and meting out punishment accordingly. Neither conscious disregard of nor gross deviation from a standard of care is necessarily vile, base, or depraved, nor does either raise an inference of implicit evil intent. 124 Thus, although the language of the statute does not explicitly state the essential elements of a crime involving moral turpitude, the BIA reads into the explicit elements some inference or possibility of moral turpitude. Following Medina, 15 I. & N. Dec. 611, the BIA in this case apparently finds sufficient a willingness to commit the act in disregard of the perceived risk, which is its own interpretation of the meaning of conscious disregard. I do not find that interpretation supportable, nor, if it were proper, would I find such willingness sufficient. Like readiness to do evil, such a willingness to act in disregard of risks does not necessarily imply intent to do evil. Readiness and willingness to act in a certain way or in disregard of risks is a disposition, but intent is the formulation of a purpose. It is evil intent, not readiness or willingness to have such an intent, in which moral turpitude necessarily inheres. Nor is an inference or possibility of moral turpitude the proper standard. A crime is not a crime involving moral turpitude unless it is one in which moral turpitude necessarily inheres. Goldeshtein, 8 F.3d at 647; Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d at 1003; Wadman, 329 F.2d at 814; Tseung Chu, 247 F.2d at 935; Ablett, 240 F.2d at 625; Giglio, 208 F.2d at 337; Guarino, 107 F.2d at 399. 125 Thus, it is not necessary to subscribe to my position that review of the BIA's interpretation of Missouri law is de novo, according the BIA no deference, to come to the conclusion that the BIA's interpretation of this Missouri statute cannot stand. Even if I am wrong, and the BIA must be accorded deference in its interpretation of the Missouri statute, the BIA's interpretation simply is not reasonable. Neither conscious disregard nor the BIA's gloss on the meaning of that phrase as willingness to commit an act can be construed, as a matter of law or as a matter of reasonableness, to be the requisite evil intent element of moral turpitude. 126 It might be argued that Missouri courts nonetheless recognize elements of moral turpitude in the state's involuntary manslaughter statute. 24 In State v. Hamlett, 756 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Mo.Ct.App.1988), and State v. Harris, 825 S.W.2d 644, 647-48 (Mo.Ct.App.1992), the Missouri Court of Appeals held that persons convicted under Mo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 565.024.1(1) have committed an act with such reckless character as to indicate an utter disregard for human life, and [they have] knowledge, actual or imputed, that [their] conduct would endanger human life. I do not find these cases contrary to the conclusion that involuntary manslaughter under Missouri law is not a crime involving moral turpitude. 127 In Harris, the Missouri Court of Appeals distinguished between acting recklessly and knowingly under Missouri law on the ground that recklessness  'involves conscious risk creation. It resembles knowingly in that a state of awareness is involved, but the awareness is of risk, that is of a probability less than a substantial certainty....'  Harris, 825 S.W.2d at 647-48 (quoting Model Penal Code Sec. 202 at 236 (1985)). The court observed that where awareness rises to a practical certainty and is accompanied by conduct evidencing intent to harm another, the proper charge was second degree murder. Id. at 648. Thus, Harris actually stands for the lack of evil intent or guilty knowledge as an element of involuntary manslaughter under the Missouri statute, not for the presence of such an element. 128 Similarly, in Hamlett, the Missouri Court of Appeals points out that recklessness in Missouri's involuntary manslaughter statute has the same connotation as the term 'culpable negligence' which appeared in the old manslaughter statute. Hamlett, 756 S.W.2d at 199. It is this definition of culpable negligence that was then applied to involuntary manslaughter. Id. However, the Hamlett decision points out that conduct is not reckless, within the meaning of the new involuntary manslaughter statute, if it was intentional. Thus, Hamlett also stands for the proposition that involuntary manslaughter under the Missouri statute lacks rather than includes an evil intent or guilty knowledge element. 129 I have found no Missouri cases finding or suggesting that involuntary manslaughter under the Missouri statute involves the essential elements of a crime involving moral turpitude, but I have found many that suggest that involuntary manslaughter under the Missouri statute lacks precisely the necessary elements. See, e.g., State v. Isom, 906 S.W.2d 870, 872-74 (Mo.Ct.App.1995) (slip. op.) (quoting same distinction between recklessly and knowingly as in Harris, in the context of involuntary manslaughter conviction, and further finding distinction between involuntary manslaughter and voluntary manslaughter is whether there is evidence of recklessness as opposed to intentional conduct; [e]vidence that a defendant intended the act which caused the death, even if he did not intend the result, supports submission of voluntary, not involuntary, manslaughter; thus conduct that goes beyond recklessness and constitutes conduct which was likely to produce death constitutes voluntary manslaughter); State v. Smith, 891 S.W.2d 461, 467 (Mo.Ct.App.1994) (same distinction between involuntary manslaughter and voluntary manslaughter on the basis of intent); State v. Jennings, 887 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Mo.Ct.App.1994) (although involuntary manslaughter lacks any element of intent to cause harm, it may still support conviction for armed criminal action); State v. Schmidt, 865 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Mo.Ct.App.1993) (involuntary manslaughter does not involve elements of acting purposefully or knowingly, but involuntary manslaughter may still support a conviction for armed criminal action); State v. Burke, 809 S.W.2d 391, 397-98 (Mo.Ct.App.1990) (consciously disregards in definition of recklessness for the purposes of involuntary manslaughter has its meaning in common usage, and neither it nor recklessness define an intent element); State v. Morris, 784 S.W.2d 815, 820 (Mo.Ct.App.1990) (intending act, even if not intending result, makes crime voluntary manslaughter); State v. Smith, 747 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Mo.Ct.App.1988) (intent to do conduct which could lead to death of another goes beyond recklessness); State v. Arellano, 736 S.W.2d 432, 435-36 (Mo.Ct.App.1987) (one may be reckless if one's conduct is undirected and random, without intent to harm any particular person or persons); State v. Skinner, 734 S.W.2d 877, 882 (Mo.Ct.App.1987) (evidence of intent to do the act leading to death, even if death was not intended, negates a finding of recklessness, and makes it inappropriate for court or jury to consider involuntary manslaughter instead of murder). 130 The present Missouri manslaughter statute, which distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter on the basis of intent, became effective on October 10, 1984, State v. Galbraith, 723 S.W.2d 55, 60 (Mo.Ct.App.1986), but decisions of Missouri courts ante-dating this amendment of the state's criminal code are nevertheless still instructive on the lack of any intent necessary to support conviction of involuntary manslaughter under Missouri law. See, e.g., State v. Rideau, 650 S.W.2d 675, 676 (Mo.Ct.App.1983) (former Missouri manslaughter statute, Sec. 565.005, did not make common-law distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter based on presence or lack of intent); State v. Cox, 645 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Mo.Ct.App.1982) (manslaughter can be committed recklessly, that is, without any intent); State v. Elgin, 391 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Mo.Ct.App.1965) (even though statute made no distinction, voluntary manslaughter could be distinguished from involuntary manslaughter because the former embraces an intentional killing, while the latter extends to an unintentional killing while culpably negligent). 131 Thus, de novo review of the nature of the crime of involuntary manslaughter under Missouri law demonstrates that the essential elements of a crime involving moral turpitude are missing. Even a reasonableness review cannot countenance an interpretation of the crime as it is defined under Missouri law as involving such elements. I cannot hold that Myrisia Franklin has been convicted of a crime in which moral turpitude necessarily inheres, and must therefore dissent from the majority's opinion affirming the BIA's conclusion that deportation is appropriate pursuant to Sec. 241(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1251(a)(2)(A), in this case.