Opinion ID: 219956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Was Mr. Orocio prejudiced by his plea counsel's ineffectiveness?

Text: Having determined that, assuming the truth of Mr. Orocio's affidavit, Mr. Orocio's counsel was ineffective under the standard laid out by Padilla and Strickland, and that Padilla is retroactively applicable, we turn to the question of whether Mr. Orocio has sufficiently alleged that counsel's failure properly to advise prejudiced him. That is, we must determine whether `there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). A reasonable probability is a standard of proof somewhat lower than a preponderance of the evidence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Although the Padilla decision clearly imposes a duty on counsel during the negotiation of a plea bargain, a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment Right to effective assistance of counsel[,] ... to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation, Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1486, it does not undertake to provide instruction on whether a client was prejudiced by the ineffectiveness, id. at 1483-84. Instead, we turn to longstanding Supreme Court precedent to guide the prejudice inquiry. In a challenge to a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the prejudice inquiry takes the form of whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366 (emphasis added). [I]n order to satisfy the `prejudice' requirement [of Strickland ], the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Id. This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part, but not exclusively, on a prediction whether the [errors] likely would have changed the outcome of a trial. Id. The District Court ultimately based its determination that there was no prejudice on its finding that Orocio had not shown that he would have been acquitted, had he gone to trial. In so doing, the District Court followed an older line of reasoning in this Circuit which originated in United States v. Nino, 878 F.2d 101, 105 (3d Cir.1989). The Supreme Court, however, requires only that a defendant have rationally gone to trial in the first place, and it has never required an affirmative demonstration of likely acquittal at such a trial as the sine qua non of prejudice. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366. To the extent that we have previously interpreted Hill to require such a showing, the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Padilla (of which the District Court did not have the benefit) has made it clear that that is not appropriate. Instead, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances, Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1485, and a rational decision not to plead guilty does not focus solely on whether a defendant would have been found guilty at trial Padilla reiterated that an alien defendant might rationally be more concerned with removal than with a term of imprisonment, see id. at 1483 (recognizing that `[p]reserving a client's right to remain in the United States may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence' (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323, 121 S.Ct. 2271)). Therefore, Nino 's requirement that a defendant affirmatively show that he would been acquitted in order to establish prejudice in this context is no longer good law. [13] See In re Krebs, 527 F.3d 82, 84 (3d Cir.2008) (A panel of this Court may reevaluate the holding of a prior panel which conflicts with intervening Supreme Court precedent.). Mr. Orocio argues two forms of prejudice from his attorney's failure to inform him of possible immigration consequences. First, he argues that prejudice should be presumed in his case because the failure to advise of immigration consequences is easy to identify and prevent. Second, he argues that he suffered actual prejudice because he would have chosen to go to trial instead of agreeing to a plea that subjected him to automatic deportation. We reject his first contention, but we agree with his second. With respect to presumed prejudice, Mr. Orocio takes the easy to identify and prevent standard from Strickland. When taken in context, however, the language does not support a finding of presumed prejudice in this case. The full passage from Strickland reads as follows: In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed. Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice. So are various kinds of state interference with counsel's assistance. Prejudice in these circumstances is so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost. Moreover, such circumstances involve impairments of the Sixth Amendment right that are easy to identify and, for that reason and because the prosecution is directly responsible, easy for the government to prevent. 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (citations omitted) (emphases added). The Court further held that actual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove prejudice [because] [t]he government is not responsible for, and hence not able to prevent, attorney errors that will result in a reversal of a conviction or sentence. Id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Mr. Orocio does not allege that he was denied the assistance of counsel altogether, and he does not allege that the government was responsible for his counsel's omission or interfered with his representation. Simply put, he has not alleged the type of scenario where government-caused prejudice is so likely that an examination into the facts of his particular case is not worth the cost. Accordingly, his argument of presumed prejudice is unpersuasive, and he must affirmatively prove prejudice. In order to prove prejudice affirmatively, Mr. Orocio must show that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366. Mr. Orocio's affidavit states that he would have taken his case to trial if he could not have secured a plea agreement that would avoid a removal consequence. App. 39. The District Court held that Mr. Orocio's prior concession of guilt during the plea colloquy was dispositive and necessarily foreclosed a credible, objectively reasonable claim that he would have nonetheless rolled the dice and gone to trial in the hope of avoiding removal: The Court rejects Mr. Orocio's argument because the second prong of Strickland requires him to show that, but for his counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have [pled] guilty and that he would not have been convicted at trial. Mr. Orocio has failed to show this. To the contrary, Mr. Orocio has not disputed the accuracy of the underlying facts giving rise to his guilty plea. Because Mr. Orocio has admitted in open court that he was guilty of the crime which he was convicted and does not now challenge his guilt (but merely asserts that a more favorable plea deal could have been negotiated on his behalf), the Strickland test is not satisfied and Mr. Orocio's motion cannot prevail. App. 22. We disagree with this assessment. Mr. Orocio's guilty plea does not end the Hill inquiry because, had he not pled guilty, there would not have been any acknowledgement of guilt in open court foreclosing a rational decision to go to trial. Instead, the inquiry must focus on whether Mr. Orocio, if made aware of the dire immigration consequences of the proposed guilty plea, could have reasonably chosen to go to trial even though he faced a drug distribution charge constituting an aggravated felony with a 10-year minimum sentence. We believe it would have been a reasonable decision. In Padilla, the Supreme Court reiterated that `[p]reserving the client's right to remain in the United States may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.' Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1483 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) [14] ) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). For the alien defendant most concerned with remaining in the United States, especially a legal permanent resident, it is not at all unreasonable to go to trial and risk a ten-year sentence and guaranteed removal, but with the chance of acquittal and the right to remain in the United States, instead of pleading guilty to an offense that, while not an aggravated felony, carries presumptively mandatory removal consequences. Just as the threat of [removal] may provide the defendant with a powerful incentive to plead guilty to an offense that does not mandate that penalty in exchange for a dismissal of a charge that does, id. at 1486, the threat of removal provides an equally powerful incentive to go to trial if a plea would result in removal anyway. Mr. Orocio was only 27 years old at the time he entered the plea agreement, and he rationally could have been more concerned about a near-certainty of multiple decades of banishment from the United States than the possibility of a single decade in prison. Accordingly, we hold that, on the facts as alleged in his coram nobis petition, a decision by Mr. Orocio to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances. Id. at 1485; accord State v. Sandoval, 171 Wash.2d 163, 249 P.3d 1015, 1021-22 (2011) (finding prejudice to lawful permanent resident defendant on similar facts). The government further contends that any prejudice to Mr. Orocio was mitigated by two statements made by the District Court during the change of plea hearing and the later sentencing hearing. First, at the change of plea hearing, in October of 2004, the court made a brief reference to immigration authorities: [The court]: Nor is [the plea agreement]and I should tell you tooit's not binding upon any civil authorities such as the Internal Revenue Service and it's not binding upon the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Do you understand that? [Mr. Orocio]: Yes. App. 66. At the sentencing hearing, in March of 2005, the court again alluded to immigration authorities: You also ... are to cooperate with Immigration and Customs Enforcement to resolve any problems with your status in this country. You are to provide truthful information and abide by the rules and regulations of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. If you are deported, Mr. Orocio, you cannot come back to this country without first getting the written permission of the Attorney General of this country. If you do come back, you are to report in person to the nearest United States Probation Office within 48 hours of your reentry. App. 52-53. The gist of the government's argument is that these two colloquies, in tandem, put Mr. Orocio on notice that he could be removed. With that notice, the government argues, Mr. Orocio should have prepared arguments on appeal or filed a § 2255 petition. The question under Strickland and Hill, however, is not whether Mr. Orocio had later access to remedies, but whether he would have pled guilty at all. The allusion to immigration authorities at the change of plea hearing was insufficient to mitigate the prejudice suffered by Mr. Orocio. The fact that a plea agreement is not binding on the Immigration and Naturalization Service did not alert Mr. Orocio to the fact that his removal was a near certainty as a consequence of pleading guilty to a controlled substance offense. Moreover, the single reference to the INS was in the context of a series of warnings that included a statement that the plea agreement was not even binding on the District Court. App. 65. In sum, the warning at the change of plea hearing was sufficient to alert Mr. Orocio that his plea was binding on only himself and the government, id., but was wholly insufficient to alert him of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. The allusion to immigration authorities at sentencing was likewise insufficient to mitigate any prejudice. As the Padilla Court noted, because the law was succinct and straightforward and truly clear with respect to removal for controlled substance offenses, the District Court's sensible advice to Mr. Orocio to cooperate with ICE was too generalizedand, also, far too late in the processto effectively alert Mr. Orocio to the severe removal consequences of his guilty plea of five months before. 130 S.Ct. at 1483. We conclude that, assuming Mr. Orocio can establish at an evidentiary hearing the facts that he has alleged in his affidavit, Mr. Orocio will have shown prejudice in the Strickland sense flowing from the failure of counsel to inform him, at the time the guilty plea agreement was proffered, of the grave immigration consequences that acceptance of the agreement would entail.