Opinion ID: 1226450
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Calculation of Gross Profit

Text: The employees also alleged that the dealership violated the Act in the way that it calculated the gross profit on the sale of each vehicle. This gross-profit amount was the key figure that determined the employees' compensation. The dealership agreed to pay its salespeople either 25 percent or 30 percent of the gross profit on the sale of each vehicle. Plaintiffs testified that they understood gross profit to be the sales price of the car, minus the dealership's cost of purchasing the car and preparing it for sale. This latter figure may be referred to as the cost basis of the car, or in the vernacular, what the dealership had in the car. The jury heard evidence, complicated by a blizzard of car-industry jargon, that the dealership made arbitrary increases to this cost basis that had nothing to do with any actual costs incurred by the dealership, or had no direct relationship to a car sold by one of the salespeople. These arbitrary increases had the effect of reducing the profit in a given vehicle, thereby reducing the commission paid to the employees, and increasing the money retained by the dealership. [8] Essentially, the plaintiffs argued that the dealership constantly changed their rate of pay without notice. Though the Act does not establish a particular rate of pay, it does require an employer to notify an employee of the rate of pay, and of any changes to that rate, to spare workers from trying to hit an ever-moving target. Every person, firm and corporation shall: (1) Notify his employees in writing, at the time of hiring of the rate of pay, and of the day, hour, and place of payment. (2) Notify his employees in writing, or through a posted notice maintained in a place accessible to his employees of any changes in the arrangements specified above prior to the time of such changes. W. Va.Code ß 21-5-9 (1975). [9] Both sides presented evidence to the jury describing the way the dealership calculated commissions, and the jury found that the above-mentioned practices violated the Act. As this Court recently affirmed, we may not discard casually the finding of a jury. ` An appellate court will not set aside the verdict of a jury, founded on conflicting testimony and approved by the trial court, unless the verdict is against the plain preponderance of the evidence. Point 2, Syllabus, Stephens v. Bartlett, 118 W.Va. 421, [191 S.E. 550 (1937)].' Syl. pt. 1, Walker v. Monongahela Power Co., 147 W.Va. 825, 131 S.E.2d 736 (1963). Syl. Pt. 1, Kessel v. Leavitt, 204 W.Va. 95, 511 S.E.2d 720 (1998). Again, because we fail to see how the evidence could lead a reasonable person to only one conclusion favorable to the movant, Barefoot, supra, we find that the circuit court was correct in denying appellants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on this count.