Opinion ID: 2342716
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Possession of a Firearm During a Crime of Violence (PFCV)

Text: Nixon's argument that his three convictions for PFCV merge into one has merit. Only one gun was used during the crimes committed by Nixon and thus, he asserts, there can be only one conviction for PFCV. The government argues, however, that the Congress of the United States intended for the number of violations to turn, not on the number or type of weapons in one's possession, but rather, the number of violent or dangerous crimes committed. Therefore, the government maintains, Congress intended for multiple predicate offenses to trigger multiple violations of § 22-3204(b). As indicated previously, the government concedes that Nixon's convictions for mayhem while armed and aggravated assault while armed merge. The government also concede[s] that one of [Nixon's] PFCV convictions  whether that based upon Mayhem While Armed or that based upon AAWA  must be vacated. The government do[es] not agree[, however,] that the two remaining PFCV convictions merge. [8] To support its argument that the PFCV convictions do not merge, the government relies on United States v. Anderson, 313 U.S.App. D.C. 335, 59 F.3d 1323 (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 999, 116 S.Ct. 542, 133 L.Ed.2d 445 (1995), a case involving the federal counterpart of § 22-3204(b)  18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Anderson held that only one § 924(c)(1) violation may be charged in relation to one predicate crime. 313 U.S.App. D.C. at 346, 59 F.3d at 1334. However, the court in Anderson reversed three of appellant's § 924(c)(1) convictions. 313 U.S.App. D.C. at 336, 59 F.3d at 1324. The District of Columbia circuit had occasion to discuss Anderson in a later case in which appellant was convicted of two counts of PFCV based upon separate predicate offenses, even though there was only one use of a gun. In commenting on Anderson, the court said in United States v. Wilson, 333 U.S.App. D.C. 103, 160 F.3d 732, 749 (1998): While the holding in Anderson does not compel that one of [appellant's] § 924(c) convictions be vacated, because there are two predicate offenses that purportedly give rise to two § 924(c) violations, the reasoning underlying the [e]n banc court's decision is no less applicable where a single use of a gun results in more than one offense. . . . [O]ur reasoning in Anderson and its application of the rule of lenity lead us to vacate one of [appellant's] § 924(c) convictions. 333 U.S.App. D.C. at ___, 160 F.3d at 749. This case differs from Wilson, supra, in that, during Nixon's single possession of a firearm, he shot into a car containing several individuals and was subsequently convicted of predicate counts against each of those four individuals. The crimes which serve as a basis for the two remaining PFCV counts involved separate victims. [9] See, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 75 F.3d 552, 557-58 (9th Cir.1996) (holding, somewhat reluctantly, that under circumstances similar to those here presented, convictions of possessory weapons offenses did not merge). Nevertheless, the District's legislature (the Council of the District of Columbia) has not clearly or unequivocally stated that a single possession of a single weapon during a single violent act may give rise to multiple PFCV prosecutions, and under the circumstances presented in this case, the rule of lenity should be applied. [10] Anderson, supra, 313 U.S.App. D.C. at 345, 59 F.3d at 1333. The rule of lenity should be applied in this case, first, because the government's view that the two remaining PFCV convictions do not merge into one would raise [a] serious constitutional question[ ] [under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution] on which precedent is not dispositive. Jones, supra, 119 S.Ct. at 1228. Any doubt on the issue is to be resolved in favor of avoiding those questions. Id. Thus, to avoid constitutional doubt in Nixon's case, we apply the rule of lenity. Second, especially in identifying legislative intent with respect to the proper unit of prosecution, [i]t may fairly be said to be a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against the imposition of harsher punishment. Id. (quoting Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955)). Indeed, the government does not claim in this case that firing simultaneously at several victims gives rise to multiple PFCV's, and the grand jury did not return indictments based on any such theory. Accordingly, based on the application of the doctrine of lenity, Nixon's PFCV convictions merge into one PFCV conviction.