Opinion ID: 2384358
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Does the potential for prejudice from the use of other crimes evidence substantially outweigh its probative value?

Text: Even if other crimes evidence is determined to be relevant for a proper purpose and is sufficiently probative of the defendant's guilt, it may still be excluded on this third ground. Therefore, balancing is a separate inquiry that is required to be undertaken by the trial judge. Lawson, supra, at Sec. 2.25(II)(D) (citing United States v. Bridwell, 583 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir.1978); United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1980)). A ruling based on a proper balancing of prejudice against probative value will not be disturbed unless it is determined that a trial court has abused its discretion. Rake v. Commonwealth, Ky., 450 S.W.2d 527 (1970). As for the prejudice side, there exists universal agreement that evidence of this sort is inherently and highly prejudicial to a defendant. It is very difficult for jurors to sift and separate such damaging information to avoid the natural inclination to view it as evidence of a defendant's criminal disposition, especially in child sexual abuse cases. For this reason, a trial judge must consider whether a clear instruction limiting the jury's use to its proper purpose is likely to be effective. In the present case, the outcome of this balancing inquiry should be clear. A majority of this Court agrees that there does not exist enough common fact of detail to establish the striking similarity between the uncharged acts and the sexual abuse for which appellant is being tried to justify admission of T.C.'s testimony as relevant to a pattern of conduct. Since there was no proper purpose this evidence could serve, the conclusion that its potential for prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value is inescapable. Walker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 476 S.W.2d 630 (1972). In this case the transcript of the trial reveals no evidence of the trial court having engaged in the analysis necessary to a proper determination of the admissibility of T.C.'s testimony under the law established by our cases. When the rulings of a trial judge are contrary to what the law requires, by way of analysis and result, and the record is lacking as to the factual and legal basis upon which the trial court exercised its discretion, this Court has an obligation not to defer to that discretion. Accordingly, we reverse on the issue of the admissibility of T.C.'s testimony at trial. For the foregoing reasons, this Court reverses appellant's conviction and remands this case for a new trial not inconsistent with the law as stated in this opinion. LAMBERT, LEIBSON, REYNOLDS and STUMBO, JJ., concur. STEPHENS, C.J., dissents in a separate dissenting opinion. WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents in a separate dissenting opinion in which SPAIN, J., joins.