Opinion ID: 1590563
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver in Other Jurisdictions

Text: As another basis for receding from Carter and Sherbill, Chames argues that there has been a shift in the position of Florida's sister states on this issue. If this were true, it would at least furnish a valid reason for reconsidering our precedent. We have been willing to recede from precedent when it conflicted with the law in a majority of states. See, e.g., Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65, 69 (Fla.1992) (We thus hold, as a majority of the other states have held in this context, that defamatory statements voluntarily made by private individuals to the police or the state's attorney prior to the institution of criminal charges are presumptively qualifiedly privileged. We therefore recede from Ange [ v. State, 98 Fla. 538, 123 So. 916 (1929)] and Robertson [ v. Industrial Insurance Co., 75 So.2d 198 (Fla.1954) ] to the extent they are inconsistent with our ruling today.); State v. Soto, 423 So.2d 362, 363 (Fla.1982) (answering in the negative a certified question as to the continued desirability of according to the Uniform Interstate Extradition Act . . . a more restrictive construction, as reflected by the decision of Ennist v. Baden, [158 Fla. 141, 28 So.2d 160 (1946)], than is accorded the Act by other courts of last resort, and receding from. Ennist ). As we explain; however, because of the differing constitutional and statutory provisions involved, any such trend on this issue is difficult to discern, and to the extent it can be discerned, the trend appears to go in the opposite direction. Given the variety of state homestead provisions, comparisons to other jurisdictions are difficult and generally of limited value. See Snyder, 699 So.2d at 1002 ([O]ur case law surrounding the homestead provision has its own contours and legal principles. As a result, it is not susceptible to comparisons with similar provisions in other jurisdictions.); see also Ryan P. Rivera, State Homestead Exemptions and Their Effect on Federal Bankruptcy Laws, 39 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 71, 97 (2004) (In the late nineteenth century no two state homestead exemptions were the same. Today, state homestead exemptions have become even more diverse, as states have afforded disparate treatment to issues such as waiver, abandonment, and noncontiguous property in determining the extent of the debtor's rights to the homestead exemption.) (footnote omitted). Nonetheless, our review fails to reveal a shift toward permitting a waiver of the homestead or personal property exemptions in an executory contractthat is, a contract . . . for which there remains something still to be done on both sides. Black's Law Dictionary 344 (8th ed.2004); see also 40 Am Jur.2d Homestead § 189 (2007) (In the absence of express constitutional or statutory provision for contractual waiver of the homestead exemption, such waivers have been generally held void for reasons of public policy.). We need not exhaustively analyze the plethora of disparate state constitutional and statutory homestead exemptions. Suffice it to say that the majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue (whether by constitution, statute, or judicial opinion) do not permit a general waiver of homestead or personal property exemptions in an executory contract. [3] Some states permit waiver in limited circumstances. [4] Relatively few clearly permit a general waiver of the homestead or personal property exemptions in an executory contract. [5] We recognize that several of the out-of-state cases cited in the Third District's concurring opinion contain broad statements that homestead exemptions are personal rights that may be waived. See DeMayo, 934 So.2d at 552-53 (Shepherd, J., concurring). However, many of these cases do not involve waiver in the manner attempted here. Instead, they address waiver in a mortgage or deed of trust; [6] waiver of the surviving spouse's homestead rights; [7] or waiver in some other context. [8] As we have noted, Florida, too, allows a waiver of the exemption in a mortgage and a waiver of the surviving spouse's homestead rights. Therefore, to that extent, Florida law is consistent with those cases. To the extent those cases discuss waiver in myriad other contexts, however, they do not inform our analysis. We also disagree that four of the six jurisdictions that prohibited this type of waiver when we decided Carter now permit it. In Carter, we surveyed the law in eight states, noting that two (Alabama and Pennsylvania) permitted waiver, but six (Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, New York, and North Carolina) did not. See Carter, 20 Fla. at 563-69. Of the six jurisdictions that prohibited a waiver back then, only Louisiana permits it now. See La. Const. art. XII, § 9. (The legislature shall provide by law for exemptions from seizure and sale, as well as waivers of and exclusions from such exemptions.); La. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 20:1(D) (Supp.2007) (Any person entitled to a homestead may waive same, in whole or in part, by signing a written waiver thereof. . . . The waiver may be either general or specific and shall have effect from the time of recording.). It appears that Illinois has limited its decision in Recht, 82 Ill. at 148 (holding that waivers in an executory contract are invalid) to waivers by heads of family, but has not overruled it. See Powell v. Daily, 163 Ill. 646, 45 N.E. 414, 415 (1896) (distinguishing a waiver by a head of family from a waiver by an unmarried man). The remaining four jurisdictions that prohibited a waiver thenIowa, Kentucky, New York, and North Carolinacontinue to do so. [9] Moreover, Pennsylvania, which at that time permitted a waiver, now prohibits it. See 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 8122 (West 2007); Mayhugh, 331 A.2d at 457 n. 7. For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the law in other jurisdictions has so substantially changed as to warrant receding from our longstanding precedent. Instead, Florida remains in line with the majority of jurisdictions in prohibiting a waiver of homestead and personal property exemptions in the manner attempted here.