Opinion ID: 1734460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sentencing statute only allows for two alternatives

Text: ¶ 28. The majority concludes that Gulley has not fully completed either of the two alternatives of the sentencing statute. It relies on the or either language found at the end of § 97-23-19. The majority interprets this language as the statute offering only two sentencing alternatives. The portion of the statute relevant to this finding is as follows:  upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten years, or fined not more than one thousand dollars and imprisoned in the county jail not more than one year, or either . The majority finds that the subject statute allows for only two sentencing options: (1) ten years imprisonment; or (2) a year in the county jail and a fine of one thousand dollars. ¶ 29. The sentencing statute contains not two, but four sentencing alternatives: (1) ten years' imprisonment; (2) a fine of not more than one thousand dollars and imprisonment in the county jail not more than one year; (3) imprisonment in the county jail not more than one year; and (4) a fine of not more than one thousand dollars. The majority's interpretation of the statute is inaccurate because it disregards the or either at the end of the statute. It is clear that the or either at the end of the statute is merely a grammatical shortcut to reference the additional sentences of only county jail imprisonment and only a fine. B. Return of the fine ¶ 30. The majority finds that the return of the fine cured any defect in the sentence. This finding is misplaced. The issues of a sentencing statute being in the disjunctive and of an attempt to return a fine by the clerk of the court have been reviewed and rendered by the United States Supreme Court, In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 63 S.Ct. 470, 87 L.Ed. 608 (1943), and more thoroughly addressed by the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Holmes, 822 F.2d 481 (5th Cir.1987). Those decisions reached results consistent with this Court's decision in Lightsey. ¶ 31. Writing for the Court in Bradley, Justice Roberts stated: The court sentenced the petitioner to six months' imprisonment, to pay a fine of $500, and to stand committed until he complied with the sentence. The sentence was erroneous; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 176, 21 L.Ed. 872. Under §268 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §385, 28 U.S.C.A. §385, the sentence could only be a fine or imprisonment. Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 512, 22 L.Ed. 205; Clark v. United States, 8 Cir., 61 F.2d 695, 709, affirmed 289 U.S. 1, 53 S.Ct. 465, 77 L.Ed. 993. ... On September 28, 1942, the petitioner was taken into custody and committed to prison. On October 1 his attorney paid the fine in cash to the clerk of the court. Later on that day the court, realizing that the sentence was erroneous, delivered to the clerk an order amending it by omitting any fine and retaining only the six months' imprisonment. The court instructed the clerk, who still held the money, to return it to the petitioner's attorney. The latter refused to receive it, and the clerk has it. . . . . ... [W]e are of opinion that the errors involved in the sentence require that he shall be freed from further imprisonment. When, on October 1, the fine was paid to the clerk and receipted for by him, the petitioner had complied with a portion of the sentence which could lawfully have been imposed. As the judgement of the court was thus executed so as to be a full satisfaction of one of the alternative penalties of the law, the power of the court was at an end. It is unimportant that the fine had not been covered into the treasury; it had been paid to the clerk, the officer of the United States authorized to receive it, and petitioner's rights did not depend upon what the officer subsequently did with the money. It follows that the subsequent amendment of the sentence could not avoid the satisfaction of the judgement, and the attempt to accomplish that end was a nullity. Since one valid alternative provision of the original sentence has been satisfied, the petitioner is entitled to be freed of further restraint. Bradley, 318 U.S. at 51-52, 63 S.Ct. 470 (emphasis added). ¶ 32. The Fifth Circuit reviewed the same issue in United States v. Holmes, 822 F.2d 481, 484-86 (5th Cir.1987), and reached a decision that is consistent with this Court's decision in Lightsey. Holmes was charged with multiple offenses. He pled guilty under a federal statute involving contempt. The court sentenced him to pay a $10,000.00 fine and to a one year prison term. However, before his confinement was to begin, Holmes paid the fine and filed a motion to vacate that part of the sentence ordering his imprisonment. ¶ 33. The Fifth Circuit found that the language of the contempt statute included disjunctive language as to sentencing, and that only a fine or imprisonment may be imposed. [T]he imposition of both is forbidden as to any one offense. Id. See also United States v. Hilburn, 625 F.2d 1177, 1181 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. DiGirlomo, 548 F.2d 252, 254 (8th Cir. 1977); United States ex rel. Kanawha Coal Operators Ass'n v. Miller, 540 F.2d 1213, 1214 (4th Cir.1976); United States v. Sampogne, 533 F.2d 766, 767 (2d Cir.1976), [T]he Supreme Court [in] ... In Re Bradley [citation omitted] squarely noted that the statutory language was in the disjunctive, that only one of two punishments was permissible and since the fine there, as here, has been paid, the petitioner had to be discharged from custody. This holding has been followed in United States v. De Simone, 267 F.2d 741 (2d Cir.) vacated as moot, 361 U.S. 827, 80 S.Ct.74, 4 L.Ed.2d 70 (1959). Accord, Intern'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 275 F.2d 610 (4th Cir.1960). ¶ 34. In its order, the Jackson County Circuit Court attempted to effect a resentencing of Gulley by labeling its actions a correcting of the sentence and relying on Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 67 S.Ct. 645, 91 L.Ed. 818 (1947). The circuit court found that [a]n excessive sentence can be corrected, and the entire sentence does not have to be discharged. However, the case at bar is not one of an excessive sentence, under Bozza, but two punishments, as in Bradley. ¶ 35. In Bozza the trial judge, during his morning session, sentenced the petitioner to imprisonment only. Later in the day, it was pointed out to the judge that the statute under which the petitioner was sentenced required a mandatory sentence of fine of $100 and imprisonment. Id. at 165, 67 S.Ct. 645. The judge then called the petitioner back into the courtroom during the afternoon session and imposed upon him the additional $100 fine, as required by the statute. ¶ 36. Here, the sentencing statute under which Gulley was sentenced required imprisonment in the penitentiary or a fine of not more than $1,000 and imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or either. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-23-19. In Bozza, the trial judge simply imposed the required sentence at two different times of the day. In the case at bar, the trial judge's imposition of two separate and distinct sentences for the same crimes constituted double jeopardy. ¶ 37. The Fifth Circuit found that Bozza does not purport to depart from Lange or Bradley and referred to Bozza's finding that Lange and Bradley are examples of cases in which the trial court could not correct the sentence without causing him to suffer double punishment. Holmes, 822 F.2d at 498, citing Bozza, 67 S.Ct. at 649 n. 2. The court in Holmes recognized that the full payment of a fine satisfies one lawful alternative sentence and the return of the fine would be wholly ineffective to change the fact that the contemnor has already fully satisfied the fine portion of his sentence. Holmes, 822 F.2d at 498-500 (emphasis in original). ¶ 38. Here, as was the case in Holmes, the majority finds that the circuit court should be allowed to return the fine to Gulley and impose only the prison sentence. However, the Fifth Circuit, when addressing this argument by the government in Holmes, stated: As an original proposition, the government's position might be arguable, but we find once again that Bradley has addressed the situation and compels us to reject this argument.... [T]he district court in Bradley did offer to return the fine to the contemnor, and the Supreme Court nonetheless held that Bradley's entire prison sentence must be set aside and, impliedly, that he was not obligated to accept the money. Id. at 499-500. ¶ 39. In Holmes, the government was unable to provide any citation of authority for the proposition that the courts can compel a contemnor to take back a fine and to accept, instead, a term in prison. Id. at 500. In the case at bar, the circuit court also failed to cite authority in support of its order to the circuit clerk to return the fine payment to Gulley. The Fifth Circuit held in Holmes that  Bradley alone, even without those additional problems, requires us to hold that attempts to return the fine paid by the appellant will not justify the execution of appellant's prison sentence. Id. C. General fine statute ¶ 40. The majority relies on the State's argument that there is a general fine statute that would apply when there is no statutory provision for fine under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-32, and this may have been the judge's initial thinking on the imposition of the fine in addition to the serving of time in the penitentiary. (emphasis added). The trial judge stated, in the Order Dismissing Post-Conviction Proceedings, [s]ection 99-19-32 of the Mississippi Code ... allows a fine in felony cases of $10,000 per case where no fine is allowed by the felony sentencing statute. Nevertheless, the Court will proceed arguendo with the proposition that the fine in [this case] was excessive and not a sentencing alternative . (emphasis added). ¶ 41. There was absolutely no mention of § 99-19-32 during the sentencing phase of this case. In fact, said section was not mentioned until the sentencing error was pointed out to the lower court. The first, and only, mention of this section by the lower court may be found in the Order Dismissing Post-Conviction Proceedings. It is clear that the trial judge did not sentence Gulley under § 99-19-32, but under § 97-23-19. The trial judge stated that Gulley was convicted of very serious charges and that the court thought the punishment should fit the crime. If the trial judge had intended Gulley to be sentenced under § 99-19-32, it is clear that he would have sentenced him to pay $70,000 ($10,000 per count) the maximum allowed by § 99-19-32. However, Gulley was not sentenced to pay $70,000, he was sentenced to pay $7,000 ($1,000 per count). If the trial judge had intended to sentence Gulley sentenced under § 99-19-32, he would certainly have sentenced him to the maximum allowed under said statute. Instead, he clearly sentenced Gulley under the misdemeanor portion of § 97-23-19, ordering him to pay $1,000 per count, for a total of $7,000. ¶ 42. Moreover, § 99-19-32 states that [o]ffenses punishable by imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for more than one (1) year and for which no fine is provided elsewhere by statute may be punishable by a fine not in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00). Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-32 (emphasis added). In the case at bar, Gulley was sentenced under § 97-23-19 which does provide a fine as an alternative sentence, making § 99-19-32 inapplicable here. D. Fine is excess ¶ 43. The majority further relies on the State's next argument that the fine is excess to the sentencing. This reliance is improper because the majority fails to recognize state, federal district court and United States Supreme Court authority that the felony sentence and misdemeanor sentence are alternate sentencing due to the disjunctive nature of the sentencing statute. ¶ 44. Significantly, the argument that the fine is in excess of and ancillary to imprisonment and could be deleted by modified sentence of the trial judge after the fine was paid, disregards the disjunctive nature of the four sentences allowed by said statute. One sentence (the fine) was completed by Gulley. Therefore, Gulley can not be subjected to a double sentence for the same offense. ¶ 45. The majority relies on Salter v. State, 387 So.2d 81 (Miss.1980), which held that removing the fine and ordering its return removes the excessiveness of the sentence. This reliance is also misplaced. In Salter, the petitioner was sentenced to a term in prison and a fine for embezzlement. This Court held that the petitioner could only be sentenced to a prison term or a fine and thus removed the fine portion of the sentence. However, the majority here fails to recognize what differentiates Salter from the case at bar, the modification of Salter's alternate sentencing occurred before either was completed. Therefore, Salter could not be subject to double jeopardy. ¶ 46. The majority next relies on Bass v. State, 328 So.2d 665 (Miss.1976). In Bass, the defendant was convicted of embezzlement and sentenced to both a fine and imprisonment with time suspended. In Bass this Court viewed the imposition of the fine as a term of post-release supervision and finding that it was excessive, removed that portion of the sentence. Again, the majority fails to acknowledge the most obvious difference between Bass and the case at bar, in Bass the sentence was reformed before either was completed. Therefore, Bass, unlike Gulley, could not be subject to double jeopardy. ¶ 47. The majority further relies on Bass in the decision, stating that this Court affirmed the conviction [of Bass] and the sentence of five years imprisonment which was suspended, but this Court reversed the $1,000 fine. While it is true that this Court affirmed the prison sentence and reversed the fine portion of Bass's sentence as excess, this argument must fail because of one distinct difference between Bass and Gulley-Bass never paid the fine portion of his sentence. Thus, he never completed any portion of his sentence and therefore could not be subject to double jeopardy. Gulley, on the other hand, did complete one lawful portion of his sentence. To enforce the prison term of his sentence violates his constitutional right against double jeopardy. E. Jurisdiction ¶ 48. The majority further relies on the State's jurisdictional assertion that Gulley has presented no claim which is procedurally alive showing denial of a state or federal right. The majority finds that Gulley has not shown that he is due relief under the specific provisions of § 99-39-5 because he has not demonstrated that his sentence was illegal or in violation of the Constitutions of the United States or the State of Mississippi. ¶ 49. In Gulley v. State No.2001-M-00256-SCT (Miss. March 18, 2002), this Court, upon the standards set by statute, reviewed Gulley's application to file his sworn Motion for Post-Conviction Relief in the Jackson County Circuit Court. The standard of review is two-fold: (1) based upon the face of the application, motion, exhibits and the prior record ... the claims presented by such are not procedurally barred under § 99-39-21 and (2) [the claims] further present a substantial showing of the denial of a state or federal right.... Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27(4)(5). Jordan v. State, 577 So.2d 368, 369 (Miss.1990). ¶ 50. By granting the application, this Court reviewed the record to determine whether the claims raised had been waived by failing to raise them at trial or on direct appeal. Necessarily, if this Court had found that the claims had been waived then it would not have allowed Gulley to bring the instant proceedings. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1). Compare Jordan, where this Court denied the application because the above standards were not met. Thus, the findings of this Court that Gulley had not waived these claims and that they are not procedurally barred serve as res judicata on those issues. This issue is procedurally barred and without merit. ¶ 51. The argument that Gulley has not demonstrated that his sentence was illegal or in violation of the Constitutions of the United States or the State of Mississippi is likewise without merit. This argument is based upon the failure to interpret the plain meaning that or either is a reference to either county jail imprisonment or a $1,000 fine. By receiving both sentences, Gulley has necessarily been given two separate and distinct sentences for the same crimes in violation of his right against double jeopardy. ¶ 52. The Fifth Circuit spoke frankly in Holmes stating that: [I]n many respects this case represents a miscarriage of justice. Undoubtedly Holmes deserves to serve some confinement, as the district court plainly intended.... [A] mistake was made by the district judge and the government which is now beyond recall. We imply no criticism of either; when the governing rules are somewhat unusual and technical, their application will inevitably involve some mistakes. That is part of the price. We should not pretend otherwise.... In cases of this sort, where the legal issues are arguable and the equities heavily on one side, the temptation is strong to bend the law itself. Such judicial bending of fixed legal rules, however, tends ultimately to be destructive of the rule of law. Of course, the judicial function requires us not only to conscientiously, even-handedly, and fairly interpret the law, but also similarly apply it to the facts of each case. The latter duty, however, does not permit us to disregard the law in order to achieve a desired result in a particular instance. Holmes, 822 F.2d at 500. ¶ 53. A similar mistake was made in the sentencing of Gulley who had two separate sentences for the same offense. He completed one. The other is not enforceable under double jeopardy constitutional protections. Though the circuit court may have intended harsher punishment and though Gulley surely deserves harsher punishment, he completed one punishment, though of a lesser degree, and is entitled to be released on the conviction of these seven counts. This case should be reversed and remanded with instructions that the petitioner be released from custody. Accordingly, I dissent.