Opinion ID: 2775233
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Improper-Purpose Doctrine Provides

Text: Too Little Guidance for Courts and Juries ¶46 Anger and even malice are commonplace human emotions, and it would be neither possible nor desirable to treat every angry or malicious action as a tort. Even a tort allowing liability whenever a defendant maliciously interfered with a plaintiff’s economic relations would be unwise. As Leigh Furniture recognized, such a tort would interfere with “much competitive commercial activity, such as a businessman’s efforts to forestall a competitor in order to further his own long-range economic interests.” Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 307 (Utah 1982). ¶47 Leigh Furniture sought to foreclose this possibility by requiring plaintiffs to show not merely that an improper purpose was present, but that it predominated over legitimate motivations. Id. (“[The improper-purpose doctrine] takes the long view of the defendant’s conduct, allowing objectionable short-run purposes to be eclipsed by legitimate long-range economic motivation.”). Yet even so, it recognized that there were “[p]roblems inherent in proving motivation or purpose” and cautioned against overuse of the improper-purpose prong. Id. ¶48 In Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., Chief Justice Zimmerman argued that Leigh Furniture’s efforts to limit the improper-purpose prong were inadequate. 885 P.2d 786, 789 n.3 (Utah 1994) (opinion of Zimmerman, C.J.). Under Leigh Furniture’s predominant-purpose standard, “all relevant considerations are issues of fact,” and “improper-purpose findings” are therefore “insulate[d] . . . from meaningful appellate review.” Id. Consequently, once a plaintiff presents evidence of an improper purpose, no legal standard exists to guide fact-finders’ determination of whether that purpose or the 13 ELDRIDGE v. JOHNDROW Opinion of the Court defendant’s legitimate purposes predominated. Juries are required to look into the defendant’s soul and discern which of her mixed motives was the real cause of her action—a question she herself, at the time she acted, may not have been able to answer with any certainty. ¶49 The three Utah cases that have allowed improper-purpose claims demonstrate the perceptiveness of Chief Justice Zimmerman’s critique.10 In each case, the question of improper purpose reached the court in a procedural posture that permitted only minimal scrutiny.11 In each case, there was clearly evidence to support a finding of a legitimate purpose.12 And yet in each case, the court concluded that weighing the evidence of a proper purpose against 10 These cases are Pratt, 885 P.2d 786; ProMax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); and Peterson v. Luna Bronze, L.C., No. 2:07CV00054DS, 2008 WL 4130021, at  (D. Utah Aug. 14, 2008). 11 Pratt and ProMax both involved challenges to a factual finding of improper purpose, and therefore reviewed only the sufficiency of the evidence. Pratt, 885 P.2d at 789 (“There is substantial credible evidence in the record to support the jury’s determination that defendants interfered with Pratt’s economic relations for an improper purpose . . . .”); ProMax, 943 P.2d at 252 (“[D]oes the evidence support the trial court’s factual findings and legal conclusions . . . ?”). In Luna Bronze, the federal district court denied summary judgment against an improper-purpose claim, concluding there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find an improper purpose. 2008 WL 4130021, at – (“The Court is of the view that a reasonable jury could conclude from the evidence cited by Luna Bronze that Peterson’s purpose was improper.”). 12 In all three cases, a jury could have concluded that the defendants’ action was intended to protect their legal rights and economic interests. Pratt arose out of an employer’s efforts to enforce a non-compete agreement, though the means the employer used to enforce the agreement were unconventional and possibly unethical. 885 P.2d at 789 (“Rather than suing Pratt for breach of the Noncompete Covenant as it was legally entitled to do, Prodata utilized its contacts at [Pratt’s employer] to have Pratt fired.”). In ProMax, the defendant claimed he had a contractual right “to act as [the] selling agent” for a home and took steps to prevent the home’s sale without his involvement. 943 P.2d at 251. And in Luna Bronze, the defendant’s allegedly tortious action was to send out cease-anddesist letters during a copyright dispute. 2008 WL 4130021, at . 14 Cite as: 2015 UT 21 Opinion of the Court the evidence of an improper purpose was a task for the finder of fact.13 ¶50 Were the approach of these cases followed in large numbers of cases, Leigh Furniture’s efforts to limit the scope of the improper-purpose doctrine would be futile; any significant evidence of improper purpose would allow juries to find even the most commonplace commercial conduct tortious, no matter how much evidence could be presented of legitimate motivations.14 The outcome of improper-purpose claims would thus depend more on jurors’ personal sympathies for one party or the other than on any generally applied legal rule.