Opinion ID: 2519810
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pitchess Disclosure

Text: In 1974, we held in Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305, that a defendant charged with battery on four Los Angeles County Sheriffs deputies could, in support of his claim of self-defense, discover any complaints of excessive force contained in the deputies' personnel files. The accused, we said, is entitled to that information upon a showing that it will facilitate the ascertainment of the facts and a fair trial. ( Id. at p. 536, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305.) This showing requires no more than general allegations establishing some cause for discovery other than `a mere desire for the benefit of all information which has been obtained by the People in their investigation of the crime.' ( Id. at p. 537, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305.) Four years after we articulated this judicially created doctrine ( Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 535, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305), the California Legislature codified the privileges and procedures surrounding what had come to be known as 'Pitchess motions' ... through the enactment of Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045. ( City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 81, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222 ( City of Santa Cruz ).) In City of Santa Cruz, we described the statutory scheme as follows: The Penal Code provisions define `personnel records' (Pen.Code, § 832.8) and provide that such records are `confidential' and subject to discovery only pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Evidence Code. (Pen.Code, § 832.7.) Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 set out the procedures for discovery in detail.... [S]ection 1043, subdivision (a) requires a written motion and notice to the governmental agency which has custody of the records sought, and subdivision (b) provides that such motion shall include, inter alia, `(2) A description of the type of records or information sought; and [11] (3) Affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that such governmental agency identified has such records or information from such records.' ( City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 81-83, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222.) We went on to say: A finding of `good cause' under section 1043, subdivision (b) is only the first hurdle in the discovery process. Once good cause for discovery has been established, section 1045 provides that the court shall then examine the information `in chambers' in conformity with section 915 (i.e., out of the presence of all persons except the person authorized to claim the privilege and such other persons as he or she is willing to have present), and shall exclude from disclosure several enumerated categories of information, including: (1) complaints more than five years old, (2) the `conclusions of any officer investigating a complaint ...' and (3) facts which are `so remote as to make disclosure of little or no practical benefit.' (§ 1045, subd. (b).) ( City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 83, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222, italics omitted.) We then observed that subdivision (b) of section 1043 requires a defendant to show good cause for discovery in these two general categories: (1) the materiality of the requested information to the pending litigation, and (2) a reasonable belief that the governmental agency has the information the defendant seeks to discover. ( City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 83, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222.) We further noted: The relatively low threshold for discovery embodied in section 1043 is offset, in turn, by section 1045's protective provisions which: (1) explicitly 'exclude from disclosure' certain enumerated categories of information (§ 1045, subd. (b)); (2) establish a procedure for in camera inspection by the court prior to any disclosure (§ 1045, subd. (b)); and (3) issue a forceful directive to the courts to consider the privacy interests of the officers whose records are sought and take whatever steps `justice requires' to protect the officers from `unnecessary annoyance, embarrassment or oppression.' (§ 1045, subds.(c), (d) & (e).) ( City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 83-84, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222.) Unlike the high court's constitutional materiality standard in Brady, which tests whether evidence is material to the fairness of trial, a defendant seeking Pitchess disclosure must, under statutory law, make a threshold showing of materiality. (§ 1043, subd. (b).) Under Pitchess, a defendant need only show that the information sought is material to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation. (§ 1043, subd. (b)(3).) Because Brady's constitutional materiality standard is narrower than the Pitchess requirements, any citizen complaint that meets Brady's test of materiality necessarily meets the relevance standard for disclosure under Pitchess. (§ 1045, subd. (b).)