Opinion ID: 2764051
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Appellate review of sufficiency of the evidence is limited to whether the State has introduced sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 508-09 (Mo. banc 2011). This Court does not reweigh the evidence but, rather, considers it in the light most favorable to the verdict and grants the State all reasonable inferences. Id. at 509. Contrary evidence and inferences are disregarded. Id. The Court may not supply missing evidence or give the State the benefit of unreasonable, speculative, or forced inferences. State v. Langdon, 110 S.W.3d 807, 811-12 (Mo. banc 2003). 6 Other claims of error are not addressed as they are resolved by the disposition in this opinion. 6
Section 569.160(3) provides, in relevant part: 1. A person commits the crime of burglary in the first degree if he knowingly enters unlawfully or knowingly remains unlawfully in a building or inhabitable structure for the purpose of committing a crime therein, and when in effecting entry or while in the building or inhabitable structure or in immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime: … (3) There is present in the structure another person who is not a participant in the crime. Section 569.160. There are two distinct burglary elements that are relevant here: (1) knowingly enters unlawfully, and (2) an intent to commit a crime therein, i.e., the alleged assault. 7 See State v. Cooper, 215 S.W.3d 123, 127 (Mo. banc 2007). To satisfy the first element, a person enters unlawfully when he is not licensed or privileged to do so. Section 569.010(8). If a person is privileged to enter, he is not guilty of burglary, regardless of any crimes he may commit therein. State v. Chandler, 635 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Mo. banc 1982). The mens rea “knowingly” modifies the phrase “enters unlawfully.” Section 569.160. A person acts “knowingly” with respect to his conduct or attendant circumstances when he is “aware of the nature of his conduct or that those circumstances exist.” Section 562.016.3(1). Accordingly, a person “enters unlawfully” when he is aware he has no privilege to enter. Chandler, 635 S.W.2d at 342. Knowledge is typically inferred from circumstantial evidence because direct evidence is rarely available. State v. Letica, 356 S.W.3d 157, 166 (Mo. banc 2011). 7 The parties agree that subdivision (3) of section 569.160 was satisfied because the informant was present inside the trailer when Deputy Hunt entered. 7 To convict, the State had to present sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, that Deputy Hunt knew he had no authority to enter the trailer. The analysis must focus on Deputy Hunt’s subjective belief. 8 In other words, the State had to present sufficient evidence that Deputy Hunt actually knew he had no authority—not just that he merely had a mistaken belief or that he guessed wrong under the circumstances. The lawfulness of the entry centers on whether Deputy Hunt had a reasonable belief that the suspect was inside the residence when he entered. The other officers generally agreed that if they had seen the suspect inside, the arrest warrant would have provided authority to enter, even though the residence did not belong to the suspect and the officers did not have a search warrant for the residence. A reasonable belief that the suspect was inside was, therefore, legally relevant to the question of Deputy Hunt’s authority to enter. 9 If Deputy Hunt did not actually believe the suspect was inside at the time he entered, as the State argues he did not, then he knew he had no authority to enter. Yet, even if the jury accepted the State’s position on the unlawful entry, the charge was still not submissible. This is because in addition to the knowingly unlawful entry 8 This is in contrast to the objective standard of reasonableness that governs Fourth Amendment law. State v. Lovelady, 432 S.W.3d 187, 191 (Mo. banc 2014). The parties discuss at length in their briefs whether Deputy Hunt’s conduct actually violated the Fourth Amendment. That is not an issue in this case. In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, it is important to keep the constitutional and criminal standards separate. Evidence that might be relevant to objective reasonableness in a suppression hearing or a civil damages action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not necessarily probative of Deputy Hunt’s mental state. If there was insufficient evidence of Deputy Hunt’s mens rea, the convictions cannot stand even if he committed a constitutional violation. 9 The parties cite to precedent of the United States Supreme Court in an effort to answer the question of whether an arrest warrant combined with a reasonable belief that the subject of that warrant is inside a third-party residence gives officers the limited authority to enter and make an arrest. This discussion largely misses the mark because the question in this case is not whether Deputy Hunt’s entry actually was unlawful but, rather, whether he knew it was unlawful. 8 element, the State also had to present sufficient evidence that, at the time of entry, he had the intent to assault the suspect as opposed to arresting him. It is here that submissibility fails because the evidence in this case cannot establish both a knowingly unlawful entry and an intent to commit assault. If Deputy Hunt had a reasonable belief that the suspect was inside the residence, then his entry was not knowingly unlawful under section 569.160. This is why the State argues that Deputy Hunt did not have such belief. But therein lies the “catch-22,” because if he did not actually believe the suspect was inside the residence, then he could not form the intent to commit assault. In other words, the burglary elements are mutually exclusive here because the predicate crime is assault. In light of the record and viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the trial court erred in submitting first-degree burglary to the jury and in failing to sustain Deputy Hunt’s motion for acquittal. There was insufficient evidence from which reasonable jurors could find each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction is reversed.
Deputy Hunt also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to submit the property damage count to the jury. Section 569.120 provides, in relevant part, that a person commits property damage if he “knowingly damages property of another.” The required mental state under the statute is “knowingly.” Although there is little doubt that Deputy Hunt acted knowingly when he kicked in the porch door to enter the residence, law 9 enforcement officers are afforded a privilege to damage another’s property under certain circumstances: To make an arrest in criminal actions, the officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a dwelling house or other building, or any other enclosure, if, after notice of his office and purpose, he be refused admittance. Section 544.200. The privilege applies to criminal arrests when the officer is first refused admittance after announcing his office and purpose, commonly referred to as a “knock and announce.” Here the record reflects that the section 544.200 privilege existed because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to believe that both conditions for its availability were met. First, in order for the privilege to apply, Deputy Hunt must have been making an arrest in a criminal action. This condition was satisfied. Deputy Hunt was a member of a multidistrict enforcement group and had power of arrest. He kicked in the door with the purpose of arresting the suspect on two felony arrest warrants, and that arrest occurred. The State argues that the privilege was unavailable because Deputy Hunt intended to assault the suspect, not arrest him. However, the fact that a physical altercation took place that was later alleged to be an assault does not negate Deputy Hunt’s purpose to effect an arrest. Property damage does not require any predicate crime. In other words, unlike burglary, property damage was not dependent on an intent to commit assault. Second, section 544.200 requires a knock and announce. Officers testified that, as they approached the trailer, they banged on the door and announced 10 “sheriff’s department, answer the door.” The informant testified that she saw police lights and heard the officers announce their presence, but she did not intend to open the door. The State responds that this did not satisfy the statute because Deputy Hunt did not himself perform the knock and announce. However, there is no requirement in section 544.200 that the officer who knocks and announces be the same one who enters. 10 The State counters that, even if Deputy Hunt could rely on the other officers’ knock and announce, their “announce” was defective because they declared their presence but not their purpose to arrest the suspect. In United States v. Boyer, 574 F.2d 951, 952 (8th Cir. 1978), police and FBI agents approached a third-party residence based on a confidential informant’s tip that a robbery suspect was hiding inside. An agent knocked on the door, identified himself, and demanded entry. Id. After 10 to 15 seconds with no response, the agent kicked in the door and entered. Id. The Eighth Circuit, applying Missouri law, found that the agent complied with section 544.200 and noted that the particular circumstances of a case “could relax the need to state a purpose on the part of officers who identified themselves, knocked and were denied entry.” Id. at 10 Section 544.200 refers to “the officer” in the singular. However, Missouri statutory construction dictates that when a statute refers to a party or person in the singular, the plural is included. Section 1.030.2. 11 953-54 (citing State v. Novak, 428 S.W.2d 585, 592-93 (Mo. 1968) and State v. Bryson, 506 S.W.2d 358 (Mo. 1974)). 11 Here the evidence showed that the informant not only heard the officers announce their presence but also clearly understood their purpose to arrest the suspect because she was the one who directed law enforcement to the residence for that exact purpose. Under these circumstances, the officers complied with section 544.200 because they knocked, announced their presence, demanded entry, and were refused. Although there was sufficient evidence that Deputy Hunt knowingly damaged the residence, as a matter of law this charge was not submissible because he was acting lawfully under the privilege of section 544.200. The conviction for second-degree property damage is reversed.