Opinion ID: 2559012
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to object to prosecutor's motive argument

Text: Appellant next claims that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to challenge the Commonwealth's alleged misrepresentation of the evidence when characterizing appellant's motive for committing the murder. Appellant argues that the Commonwealth's portrayal of him as having been put out of the house by the victim and then rejected by another woman, Joan Walker, and the insinuation that these circumstances led him to murder the victim, was speculation without any basis in the record. Appellant points to the cross-examinations of Joan Walker and Frank Casper, in which both testified that appellant never threatened them or anyone else, to their knowledge. The Commonwealth responds that ample record evidence supported the trial prosecutor's characterization of appellant's motive, including other aspects of Ms. Walker's and Mr. Casper's testimony. The PCRA court did not address this issue in its opinion. [16] The standards governing challenges to statements by the prosecutor are well-settled: A prosecutor has reasonable latitude during his closing argument to advocate his case, respond to arguments of opposing counsel, and fairly present the Commonwealth's version of the evidence to the jury. A challenged statement by a prosecutor must be evaluated in the context in which it was made. Not every intemperate or improper remark mandates the granting of a new trial. Reversible error occurs only when the unavoidable effect of the challenged comments would prejudice the jurors and form in their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant such that the jurors could not weigh the evidence and render a true verdict. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 596 Pa. 119, 941 A.2d 655, 668 (2007) (citations omitted). Prosecutor remarks are not objectionable if the remarks were based on the evidence or proper inferences therefrom.... Commonwealth v. [Aaron] Jones, 571 Pa. 112, 811 A.2d 994, 1006 (2002). On the other hand, of course, the prosecutor should not misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inference it may draw. Commonwealth v. Shain, 493 Pa. 360, 426 A.2d 589, 591-92 (1981) (disapproving prosecution commentary suggesting that defendant intended to molest decedent-victim; setting of crime did not exclude that possibility, but evidence did not support inference of motive); see also Commonwealth v. Adkins, 468 Pa. 465, 364 A.2d 287, 290 (1976) (prosecution's motive argument based solely upon witness's speculative statement found to be insufficiently supported by evidence). Here, the prosecutor stated during his opening remarks that the victim had allowed appellant to stay at her apartment when he had nowhere else to go, but that shortly thereafter, she wanted him to leave and told this fact to her neighbor Frank Casper, who helped the victim put [appellant] out by allowing appellant to stay with him in his apartment with Joan Walker for a few days. The prosecutor continued by noting that appellant did stay at least one night with Casper and Walker, but that very soon thereafter, Ms. Walker didn't want [appellant] around anymore, either. He was starting to give her a bad feeling. See N.T., 11/6/91, at 24-27. In closing, the prosecutor reiterated that the victim had taken in appellant but that he had become so threatening to her that she had to put him out. The prosecutor stated next that while the Commonwealth is not obligated to prove motive, if one exists, the jury should consider it, and that along those lines, appellant had been put out by a woman, scorned by a woman who wouldn't even speak to him and that malice, that hostility, that anger was in him. N.T., 11/12/91, at 39. Appellant's claim that there was no evidence to support the prosecutor's comments regarding motive is belied by the record. Frank Casper testified that he allowed appellant to stay with him for a few nights because the victim had told him that she did not want appellant staying with her. N.T., 11/6/91, at 55. Although Ms. Walker testified on cross-examination that appellant never actually threatened her, her testimony on direct examination indicated clearly that appellant scared her and that she sought to avoid him, going so far one time as to punch him and push a friend's apartment door closed on him in an effort to stay away from him after he had followed her. N.T., 11/6/91, at 39, 41, 42, 45, 49. This testimony supported the prosecutor's statements suggesting appellant's possible motive for killing the victim. The prosecutor's remarks were a fair inference from the evidence and were not excessive or incendiary. The jury was also instructed both at the beginning and at the end of trial that the arguments of counsel were not to be taken as evidence. N.T., 11/6/91, at 20; 11/12/91, at 54. In light of the foregoing, trial counsel cannot be faulted for failing to object to the prosecutor's remarks, and thus, appellant's claim lacks arguable merit. Moreover, appellant has not shown that had trial counsel objected, the trial outcome would have been different, such that appellant was prejudiced by the prosecutor's opening and closing comments suggesting motive. Because appellant has not established ineffective assistance of trial counsel, his derivative claim of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel necessarily fails.