Opinion ID: 877465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: count i: the deliberate homicide charge, jury instructions and verdict

Text: The prosecutor used the following language in the formal charge of deliberate homicide (count I): That the defendant purposely and knowingly caused the death of another human being, to-wit: Peggy Lee Harstad, while engaged in the commission of the following felonies: Kidnapping and Sexual Intercourse Without Consent, involving the use of physical force and violence against the said Peggy Lee Harstad. This charge, unequivocally in the conjunctive, required that the prosecutor prove each of the following facts: 1. That Coleman deliberately and knowingly caused the death of Peggy Lee Harstad; and 2. That he did so while he was engaged in the commission of both kidnapping and sexual intercourse without consent; and 3. That while engaged in the commission of these crimes Coleman used physical force to accomplish them. As it turns out, however, the jury was not instructed in the conjunctive language of the charge itself, but rather was instructed that the jury could convict if it determined either that Coleman knowingly or purposely killed the woman, or that he did so while engaged in the commission of several alternative applications of the felony-murder rule. The jury was instructed in the exact language of count I, but was also instructed on the essential facts to be proved to sustain the charge of deliberate homicide. This instruction (instruction 27) unequivocally told the jury that it had a choice of several statutory theories of criminal responsibility on which to base its conviction: To sustain the charge of deliberate homicide, the State must prove the following propositions: First, that the defendant performed the acts causing the death of Peggy Harstad; Second, that when the defendant did so, (1) He acted purposely or knowingly or (2) that he was engaged in the commission of kidnapping or any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty. (Emphasis added.) Under the second proposition to be proved, the jury had several choices in determining how the woman's death came about. First, the jury could determine that Coleman purposely or knowingly caused the woman's death. If so, the jury could convict Coleman of deliberate homicide. Second, the jury could convict Coleman of deliberate homicide if it found that he was engaged in the commission of kidnapping. Third, the jury could convict Coleman of deliberate homicide if it found that he was engaged in the commission of ... any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual. (Emphasis added.) Therefore, the jury could base a guilty verdict for the charge of deliberate homicide by concluding that Coleman purposely or knowingly caused the death of the woman, or by applying the felony-murder rule that Coleman caused the woman's death while he was kidnapping her or while he was committing any other felony that involved using physical force or threatening to use physical force against the woman or any other person. The language any other felony provides a much wider range of possible felonies that the jury may have considered beyond that of kidnapping. The verdict returned by the jury, however, provides no basis from which one can determine which statutory theory or theories were used by the jury to convict. The verdict form signed by the jury foreman states only that: We, the jury, in the above-entitled cause find the defendant guilty of Deliberate Homicide as charged. Did the jury decide without reference to the felony-murder rule that Coleman had purposely or knowingly killed the woman? Or did the jury decide that Coleman caused the woman's death while kidnapping her? Or did the jury decide that Coleman caused the woman's death while he was engaged in the commission of some other unspecified felony that involved the use of force or a threat to use force? Or did the jury base its verdict on more than one of these statutory theories of criminal responsibility? Finally, and most important, was the jury unanimous on at least one of these statutory theories of criminal responsibility when it returned its guilty verdict? The trial court failed to instruct the jury that in order to convict Coleman for deliberate homicide, it must agree unanimously upon at least one of the alternative theories of criminal responsibility relied upon by the State. Gipson, supra and Green, supra, require that a jury be so instructed. The verdict does not establish whether the jury found that the defendant purposely or knowingly caused the woman's death or whether it found the defendant guilty by application of the felony-murder rule. And the verdict does not indicate that the jury was in unanimous agreement that the defendant was criminally responsible under any one, specific theory. Based on my previous discussion of the unanimity requirement, the deliberate homicide conviction should not be permitted to stand. It must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Chapman v. California, (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705; and see United States v. Gipson, supra.