Opinion ID: 789280
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedural Default: Independent and Adequate State Law Grounds

Text: 17 We will not consider a petitioner's claim under federal law if we determine that the state court decision rests on a state procedural ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment. Page v. Frank, 343 F.3d 901, 905 (7th Cir.2003). The Indiana appellate court analyzed Sanders's claim under the fundamental error standard, which permits a reviewing court to consider the merits of an improperly raised error if the reviewing court finds that the error was so prejudicial to the rights of the appellant that he could not have had a fair trial. However, under Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263-65, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989), only an explicit invocation of a state procedural bar blocks federal consideration of an issue. 18 Here, the language in the state court's opinion is not explicit. The Court of Appeals of Indiana recited that [i]f an issue was available on direct appeal but not litigated, it is waived. But instead of following that observation with a conclusion such as and Sanders' claims are waived under that standard, the court immediately proceeded to address and decide the merits. See, e.g., Moore v. Bryant, 295 F.3d 771, 774-75 (7th Cir.2002). Notably, the appellate court applied waiver to Sanders's claim that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury that the State had to prove that Sanders had the specific intent to kill to convict him of attempted murder, but failed to apply the procedural bar to the rest of Sanders's claims. 19 We have held that if the decision of the state court fairly appears to rest primarily on the resolution of those claims, or to be interwoven with those claims, and does not clearly and expressly rely on the procedural default, we may conclude that there is no independent and adequate state ground and proceed to hear the federal claims. Page, 343 F.3d at 907. Here, the Indiana appellate court never applied the doctrine of waiver to the claims Sanders raised in his habeas corpus petition and the court concluded that Sanders's claims failed on the merits. Because the appellate court's discussion of waiver is intertwined with its merits analysis of Sanders's claims, the state court's decision does not rest on an independent and adequate state law ground. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 266, 109 S.Ct. 1038; Moore, 295 F.3d at 774-75. 20 In any event, a procedural default can be overcome if a petitioner can show cause and prejudice for the default, Lee v. Davis, 328 F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir.2003), and attorney error that constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel is cause to set aside a procedural default, Franklin v. Gilmore, 188 F.3d 877, 883 (7th Cir.1999). Any default of Sanders's due process claim was caused by his appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue on direct appeal, and, as we discuss in Section II-B of this order, Sanders's counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not challenging the trial court's refusal to properly instruct the jury that the State bears the burden to prove the absence of sudden heat to obtain a murder or attempted murder conviction.