Opinion ID: 2594239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Teague Test

Text: Having determined that Blakely announced a procedural rule, we apply the three-step test of Teague v. Lane to determine whether Blakely applies to Johnson's case. Beard, 542 U.S. at 411, 124 S.Ct. 2504; Edwards, 129 P.3d at 983. The first step of the Teague analysis is to determine when Johnson's conviction became final. Beard, 542 U.S. at 411, 124 S.Ct. 2504. Next, Teague requires us to assay the legal landscape as of the date Johnson's conviction became final and ask whether the Constitution, as interpreted by the precedent then existing, compelled the Blakely rule. Id. at 411, 413, 124 S.Ct. 2504. We must, in other words, decide whether the rule is actually `new.' Id. at 411, 124 S.Ct. 2504. Finally, we must determine if the rule falls under an exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity of procedural rules. Id.
State convictions are final `for purposes of retroactivity analysis when the availability of direct appeal to the state courts has been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has elapsed or a timely filed petition has been finally denied.' Beard, 542 U.S. at 411, 124 S.Ct. 2504 (quoting Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390, 114 S.Ct. 948, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994)); Edwards, 129 P.3d at 983. The parties here agree that Johnson's conviction was final before June 24, 2004, the date Blakely was announced. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to determine the precise date on which Johnson's conviction became final for purposes of this appeal. It suffices to note that Johnson was convicted in December 2000, her sentence was revoked in 2001, and the record shows no direct appeals on her part.
The next step of the Teague analysis is to assay the legal landscape as of the time Johnson's conviction became final and ask whether the rule later announced [in Blakely ] was dictated by then-existing precedent. Beard, 542 U.S. at 413, 124 S.Ct. 2504 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); Edwards, 129 P.3d at 984. We make this inquiry because no retroactivity analysis would be necessary if Blakely simply applied a well-established constitutional principle to govern a case which [was] closely analogous to those which ha[d] been previously considered in the prior case law. Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 216, 108 S.Ct. 534, 98 L.Ed.2d 546 (1988) (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263-64, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). To determine whether the Blakely rule was dictated by then-existing precedent, we inquire whether the rule ... was apparent to all reasonable jurists. Beard, 542 U.S. at 413, 124 S.Ct. 2504. Blakely was not apparent to all reasonable jurists. On the contrary, a great many reasonable jurists failed to foresee the Blakely rule. When the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether Blakely was apparent to all reasonable jurists, that court observed that [e]very circuit court of appeals that addressed the question presented in Blakely reached the opposite conclusion from the rule subsequently announced by the Supreme Court. Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1035 (9th Cir.2005) (compiling cases). Moreover, in her dissenting opinion in Blakely, Justice O'Connor surveyed the pre- Blakely case law and concluded that prior to Blakely, only one court had ever applied Apprendi to invalidate application of a guidelines scheme. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 320 n. 1, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Indeed, the fact that Justice O'Connor was one of four dissenters in Blakely is itself a powerful rejection of the argument that the rule in that case was apparent to all reasonable jurists. See Beard, 542 U.S. at 415-16, 124 S.Ct. 2504 (noting that there was no need to guess as to whether a rule announced in a case was apparent to all reasonable jurists where four justices dissented in the case). [4] Therefore, we conclude that Blakely announced a new rule for purposes of retroactivity analysis.
The final step in our analysis is to determine whether Blakely falls under the exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity of new rules of criminal procedure. This exception is reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Beard, 542 U.S. at 417, 124 S.Ct. 2504 (quotation marks omitted); Edwards, 129 P.3d at 986. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the limited scope of this exception, explaining that it is clearly meant to apply only to a small core of rules requiring observance of those procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Beard, 542 U.S. at 417, 124 S.Ct. 2504 (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the Blakely rule does not fall under the exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Summerlin guides our analysis of whether Blakely is a watershed rule. Summerlin addressed the retroactivity of the constitutional rule announced in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). As discussed in Part II.A., above, Ring applied Apprendi in holding that a jury, and not a judge, must find the facts that justify a death sentence. The Summerlin Court declined to accord retroactive effect to Ring, holding that Ring announced a new procedural rule that did not qualify for the watershed rule exception. Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 356, 124 S.Ct. 2519. In holding that Ring  which applied the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee to the proceedings that determine whether a convicted person will receive a term of imprisonment or the death penalty  is not to be applied retroactively, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that the procedural protections of Blakely are not to be applied retroactively. Indeed, this is exactly the conclusion reached by a number of courts. See Varela v. United States, 400 F.3d 864, 867 (11th Cir.2005) (While neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has addressed the retroactivity of Blakely ... the Supreme Court's recent decision in Schriro v. Summerlin is essentially dispositive.); McReynolds v. United States, 397 F.3d 479, 480 (7th Cir.2005) (concluding that Summerlin is all but conclusive on the point of whether United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), which applied Apprendi and Blakely to the federal Sentencing Guidelines, is to be applied retroactively). Johnson distinguishes Summerlin by noting that the sentencing scheme that the Court addressed in Ring and Summerlin required judges to find the factors that warrant the death penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, as the Summerlin Court itself noted, the retroactivity of Apprendi's beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement was not an issue in Summerlin. See Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 351 n. 1, 124 S.Ct. 2519. We agree that the Supreme Court has not expressly addressed the retroactivity of Blakely's holding that the jury must find the existence of sentencing facts beyond a reasonable doubt. However, we are persuaded that Blakely's beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement is no more watershed than its alteration of the finder of fact. First, the watershed exception applies to rules that are central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt. Beard, 542 U.S. at 417, 124 S.Ct. 2504. Because Blakely alters sentencing procedures, it is difficult to conclude that it is central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt. Second, several federal courts of appeals have held that Apprendi, which altered both the factfinder and the burden of proof, and which was the basis for Blakely, did not announce a watershed rule. See Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1036 (9th Cir.2005) (listing cases). Third, although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether Apprendi's burden-of-proof requirement is to be applied retroactively, the Court's post- Apprendi cases suggest that it is not. Since Apprendi, the Court has twice stated that it is unlikely that any . . . watershed rules ha[ve] yet to emerge. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 667 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (This class of rules is extremely narrow, and it is unlikely that any . . . ha[s] yet to emerge.) (internal quotation marks omitted). The fact that the Court made these statements after Apprendi held that facts that increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, see Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, strongly suggests that the Court does not consider Apprendi to be a watershed rule. If Apprendi does not qualify for the watershed exception, it is difficult to understand how Blakely, which applies Apprendi's Sixth Amendment holding, could qualify.