Opinion ID: 1913318
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: did the trial court err in allowing the prosecutor to exercise his peremptory challenges on two potential jurors based on their views of the death penalty?

Text: ¶ 124. Holland's failure to object waived the issue. Jones v. State, 517 So.2d 1295 (Miss. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 487 U.S. 1230, 108 S.Ct. 2891, 101 L.Ed.2d 925 (1988), overruled on other grounds by Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660 (Miss. 1991). Procedural bar notwithstanding, alternatively, on the merits, we find none. Had the issue been raised at the proper time and in the proper manner, it would be without merit. In Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held: The group of Witherspoon-excludables involved in the case at bar differs significantly from the groups we have previously recognized as distinctive. Death qualification, unlike the wholesale exclusion of blacks, women, or Mexican-American fro[m] jury services, is carefully designed to serve the State's concededly legitimate interest in obtaining a single jury that can properly and impartially apply the law to the facts of the case both at the guilt and sentencing phases of the capital trial. There is very little danger, therefore, and McCree does not even argue, that death qualification was instituted as a means for the State to arbitrarily skew the composition of capital-case juries. Furthermore, unlike blacks, women and Mexican-Americans, Witherspoon-excludables are singled out for exclusion in capital cases on the basis of an attribute that is with the individual's control. It is important to remember that not all who oppose the death penalty are subject to removal for cause in capital cases; those who firmly believe that the death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as juror in capital cases so long as they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law. Because the group of Witherspoon -excludables includes only those who cannot and will not conscientiously obey the law with respect to one of the issues in a capital case, death qualification hardly can be said to create an appearance of unfairness. Finally, the removal [for] cause of Witherspoon-excludables in capital cases does not prevent them from serving as jurors in other criminal cases, and thus leads to no substantial deprivation of their basic rights of citizenship. They are treated no differently than any juror who expresses the view that he would be unable to follow the law in a particular case. Id. at 175-76, 106 S.Ct. at 1766 (emphasis added.) ¶ 125. The United States Supreme Court clearly held that it is permissible to strike a juror for cause on the grounds of his moral or religious opposition to the death penalty. Views regarding the death penalty do not make one a member of a distinctive class that is protected under Batson or its progeny. Holland failed to object to the peremptory strike of these two jurors at trial, based upon their views of the death penalty being in conflict with their morals. Therefore, he is procedurally barred from asserting this issue now. Irving, 498 So.2d at 318; Chase, supra ; Foster, supra ; Cole, supra .