Opinion ID: 1710572
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: alleged improper argument at guilt phase

Text: Appellant raises numerous claims of improper closing argument by the prosecutor during the guilt phase of trial, believing his counsel ineffective in failing to object. The motion court found no ineffective assistance; we will reverse the motion court's findings only if they are clearly erroneous. State v. Copeland, 928 S.W.2d 828, 844 (Mo. 1996). Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make non-meritorious objections. State v. Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d 854, 876 (Mo. banc 1996). Thus, appellant must show that counsel's objection would have been upheld if made and that the failure to object resulted in a substantial deprivation of his right to a fair trial. Ruff v. State, 815 S.W.2d 460, 465 (Mo.App.1991). Generally, failure to object during closing argument is not error, but rather a function of trial strategy. State v. Wood, 719 S.W.2d 756, 759-60 (Mo.1986).
Appellant first claims ineffective assistance because defense counsel failed to object when the prosecutor said: Now, here's the point. The evidence here is absolutely positive, without a doubt, overwhelming, overwhelming at this point. You know, that you have seen it all. So that presumption, I submit to you is dispelled. Appellant claims this argument tells the jury to ignore the presumption of innocence. Read in context, the prosecutor's statement merely argues that the State has met its burden of proof and has overcome the presumption of innocence. The prosecutor did not tell the jury to ignore that presumption. The state's argument was not improper. The point is denied.
Appellant faults counsel for failing to object to the prosecutor's allegedly impermissible references to appellant's failure to testify. The prosecutor did comment several times that the evidence against appellant was undisputed or uncontradicted. Merely stating that the evidence is uncontradicted is not a direct reference to a defendant's failure to testify. State v. Lee, 841 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. banc 1992). Appellant contends that there was an indirect reference to his failure to testify in that the evidence the prosecutor labeled as undisputed could only have been contradicted by appellant. When the accused is the only witness that can deny the evidence on a vital portion of the case, a general statement that such proof was undisputed has been held to be an indirect reference to the defendant's failure to testify. State v. Arnold, 628 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Mo.1982). An indirect reference to a defendant's failure to testify is improper only where the prosecutor proceeds from a calculated intent to magnify the defendant's decision not to testify so as to call it to the jury's attention to that silence. State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820, 826 (Mo.banc 1988). On review of the record, we believe that the motion court did not err on this point. This case does not present a situation where only the defendant could dispute the state's evidence. The point is denied.
Appellant next contends that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object when the prosecutor said: And you must understand we can only the law says we use Mr. Clemons' statement here. What anybody else said involved in this thing is not relevant and we can't bring it in. Appellant contends this statement suggests that the prosecutor had additional incriminating evidence that he was simply unable to present to the jury. The prosecutor may make statements drawing legitimate inferences from the evidence, but he may not make statements that imply a knowledge of facts not before the jury. State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Mo. banc 1992). Contrary to appellant's assertion, the prosecutor is directing the jury not to speculate as to evidence outside of the record. The appellant is not prejudiced when the prosecutor explicitly states that any statements not in the record are not relevant to the case. The motion court did not err when it held that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to this statement.
Next in appellant's litany is his contention that his counsel failed to object when the prosecutor injected his own opinion as to appellant's guilt into his closing argument. The prosecutor referred to some of the defense's theories as preposterous and in my opinion, probably ... pretty stupid. Appellant also claims counsel should have objected to such statements as: If you listened to the evidence correctly, you saw what was going on here and to find Mr. Clemons not guilty is to leave every last ounce of common sense and reason you were ever born with on the doorstep of the courtroom. Prosecutors may make reasonable inferences from the evidence. State v. Weaver, 912 S.W.2d 499, 512 (Mo. banc 1995). Prosecutors may make statements that indicate their opinion of the defendant's guilt, where it is apparent that the opinion is based on evidence in the case. Id. Prosecutors may also comment on the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, even to the point of belittling and or discussing the improbability of specific testimony. Id. at 513. The prosecutor's statements here, read in context, do not impermissibly express the prosecutor's opinion. They are permissible arguments as to the strength of the case based on evidence in the record. The motion court did not err in failing to find counsel ineffective for failing to object to these statements.
Appellant claims he suffered unconstitutional prejudice because his counsel did not object when the prosecutor told the jury that there are people willing to do things to put that kind of evidence on that's obviously a lie. Appellant characterizes this statement as a personal attack on his defense counsel. As we have said, a prosecutor may comment on the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, even to the point of belittling or highlighting the improbability of specific testimony. State v. Weaver, 912 S.W.2d at 513. Moreover, immediately prior to characterizing certain evidence as obviously a lie, the prosecutor also said [U]nderstand, I'm not blaming these lawyers for that kind of witness or information. The prosecutor's statements were not a personal attack. They were not prejudicial. The motion court did not err in failing to find counsel ineffective for failing to object to these statements.
Finally, appellant submits that the prosecutor made various improper inflammatory arguments to which his counsel should have objected.
Appellant claims the prosecutor appealed to the jury's fears by saying, [I]f it were not for you, the people of the city would have no one to come to when they have been victimized. Defense counsel did not object. Permissible prosecutorial arguments include references to the prevalence of crime in the community, the personal safety of its inhabitants, and that conviction of the defendant is part of the jury's duty to prevent crime. State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. banc 1993). The prosecution may point out the possible societal effects of the general failure of juries to perform their duties. State v. Danback, 886 S.W.2d 204, 209 (Mo. App.1994). The prosecutor's statement in this case fell within these perimeters.
Appellant claims that the prosecutor discussed a hypothetical crime in order to inflame the jury, and that defense counsel should have taken steps to prevent this highly prejudicial hypothetical from reaching the jury's ears. The prosecutor said: The man (Clemons) was co-equal with Mr. Antonio Richardson who pushed them off and Mr. Gray who organized it ... If you look at the evidence, that's what it is. Let me give you an example. What would you do if you had these ... two girls and the fellow outside of a room, and he raped them, both of them, he robbed the guy, and the other guys raped them, and it's at night, and so they send the girls into the dark. MR. MOSS: Save my time. MR. CONSTANTINOU: Just a minute, Your Honor, he's mischaracterizing the evidence, it's not something that's been introduced. THE COURT: Proceed. Overruled, proceed. MR. MOSS: The rape is outside this room and then you send them into a dark room. Okay? All of these threeof these people in a dark room. And Mr. Antonio Richardson goes into that dark room with a knife. And Mr. Clemons goes in there with a knife, and Mr. Gray and Mr. Winfrey stand outside; and the door is closed; and it's dark, nobody can see anything And when all is said and done, you open the door, and Tom Cummins is not dead, but he's laying there knifed. And Julie Kerry is laying there dead, with ten stab wounds in her; Robin Kerry is laying there dead with ten stab wounds in her. Okay? What do you know? Tom Cummins can't say, because it was dark, who put the ten stab wounds in Julie, who put the ten stab wounds in Robin, or who put the stab wounds in him. But you know darn good and well the only two people who walked into that dark room with a weapon and the knives, you know, in fact, were him and the other guy. So what are you going to say? Okay? You got a bonus if you had a light bulb on, it would have made a difference. But we're going to distinguish now because we really don't know. It don't piecemeal out like that, when these fellows work together like that. Appellant argues that this argument rendered his trial unfair because it misstated the basic tenets of accomplice liability; it was not remotely based on the evidence at trial; and was irrelevant to any issue presented at trial. While appellant correctly observes that his counsel did object early on in the particular argument at issue and was overruled, appellant contends that this objection was constitutionally insufficient, and that counsel should have continued to object as the prosecutor's hypothetical grew more egregious. The prosecutor apparently used this hypothetical to illustrate the concept of accomplice liability. Appellant is correct to observe that the state's metaphor here failed to mention the necessity of the jury finding that both actors had the necessary mental state deliberation. The fact that an argument may be improper does not necessarily mean that counsel was ineffective for not objecting. In determining ineffective assistance, courts will weigh several factors, including counsel's reason for not objecting, whether the jury was properly instructed on the law, and whether, in the total context of the trial, it was reasonably probable that the outcome would have been different absent the improper argument. State v. Copeland, 928 S.W.2d 828, 843 (Mo.1996). Applying these factors, we are aware that defense counsel testified at the Rule 29.15 hearing that he did not continue to object to the state's hypothetical because he was getting tired of objecting and being overruled. Counsel's statement does not show a strategic reason for his failure to object. Thus, we must consider whether his failure to object resulted in prejudice. In reviewing the context of the entire trial, neither the motion court nor we believe it reasonably probable that the outcome would have been different had the state's argument not been made. Ultimately, the jury received correct instructions on the law of accomplice liability. Any deficiencies in the prosecutor's argument were corrected by the trial court's instructions to the jury. See, e.g. State v. Neal, 849 S.W.2d 250, 255 (Mo.App. 1993). In the presence of overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt and the propriety of the trial court's instructions to the jury on this issue, the motion court did not err in failing to find counsel ineffective on this point.
Appellant claims that the prosecutor appealed to the jurors' religious sentiments when he said, I trust you will pray about [your decision]. He also observed that life has value, God created it, and God will take it away. Defense counsel objected to this latter statement, noting that there had been no evidence of God in the case. The Court overruled this objection. As to the first statement, it does not even begin to rise to the level of excessive Biblical ... references against which this Court advised in State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641, 656 (Mo. banc 1993). Appellant offers no explanation of how he suffered prejudice from these statements. The motion court did not err in finding no ineffective assistance on issues relating to these statements.
Appellant asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the prosecutor injected his personal opinion into the penalty phase argument by stating [a]nd at this point, the truth being known, you know as well as I that the decision is death. A prosecutor may state his personal opinions on whether the death penalty should be imposed so long as that argument is fairly based on the evidence. State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753, 769 (Mo. banc 1996). The prosecutor's statements here is based on the evidence in the case. The motion court did not err in holding that defense counsel's failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance
Appellant points to other prosecutorial arguments he considers improper in that they were inflammatory and not based on the evidence. The record reflects that defense counsel objected to these remaining arguments, and that the trial court sustained the objections. Appellant faults his counsel for not also requesting a mistrial. Where a defendant alleges ineffective assistance in his counsel's failure to ask for a mistrial, appellant must show a reasonable probability that he was deprived of the right to a fair trial. State v. Light, 871 S.W.2d 59, 63 (Mo.App. 1994). Such prejudice is demonstrated when it can be shown that a mistrial would have been granted by the court had it been requested. Id. Appellant has made no such showing in this case.