Opinion ID: 1606929
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Employer's Response.

Text: This employer's justification for the discrimination was a self-condemning one: the chosen supervisor was simply not a people person. The point seems to be that Mueller did not confine his outrageous conduct to Vaughn, that he was inclined to treat everyone outrageously. The point also carries an innuendo of knowledge by the employer. Tom Ray, the plant manager, responded to Vaughn's early complaints by saying he would take care of it, that the company would send Mueller to a school where he can learn to talk to people. It is most significant that this was not done. Although Vaughn complained of Mueller's treatment several times, the majority seems to conclude he should have done even more to inform management. Other factors, however, support the trial court's finding. In the first place Vaughn's position as subordinate of Mueller placed him in a Catch 22 situation. The plant superintendent warned him not to be complaining to management about Mueller, stating If you ever go behind Al's [Mueller's] back, you'll be in a hell of a lot of trouble. The trial court findings on Mueller's conduct and the company's awareness were quite specific. The trial court held: Sometime prior to the time that Mueller's harassment of plaintiff was accentuated by virtue of his reference to his religion, [Vaughn] had talked to Tom Ray and Ray assured him that he would take care of it. Ray at that time admitted that Mueller was not a people person and that they were going to send him to a school where he can learn to talk to people. This was not done. Plaintiff talked to Tom Ray on at least two occasions prior to June 14 concerning the treatment he had received from Mueller. On these occasions as well as on the occasion subsequent to June 14 when Mueller met plaintiff in Ray's office, Tom Ray took notes on the meetings. These notes have never been produced. It was defendant's policy to have plant managers report to the Omaha office whenever a labor relations incident arose. Yet the Omaha office failed to disclose any correspondence from Tom Ray involving Mueller's conduct prior to May 30, 1986. Many of the instances set out occurred out of the hearing of other employees. All of the instances with reference to religion were out of the hearing of other employees. This type of approach is the most insidious of harassment, particularly when inflicted by a supervisor upon an employee. The trial court at another point held: [D]efendant employer is liable for the imposition of punitive damages by virtue of the fact that Mueller was employed in a managerial capacity in charge of the maintenance department. But, in any event, even though it could be contended that he was not acting in such capacity, the managerial agents, namely McKeighan and Tom Ray, both knew of the outrageous conduct imposed by Mueller upon the plaintiff and by standing placidly by ratified or approved the same. This finding was supported by substantial evidence. For example Vaughn himself testified: Q. And Pat McKeighan was the next person in chain of command? A. Yes. Q. You say nobody ever apologized. Did Mr. Ray ever tell you, we're sorry, or we'll try to work this out with you, or make amends? A. No. He just told me to go out and shake hands with him and that was it. I wish you'd forget it, he said. Q. Did Mr. Mueller ever apologize to you? A. No. Q. Did anybody on behalf of the company ever write a letter or anything indicating remorse or regrets that these incidents happened? A. No. Vaughn testified that, rather than remedy the conduct, management told Mueller and Vaughn to shake hands and forget it. This is far from an adequate employer's response to outrageous conduct. Under the civil rights Act, Vaughn should not have to forget it. Once outrageous discriminatory conduct has been established an employer is required to do even more than disavow or apologize for it. Escape from liability at such a stage can only result from prompt and reasonable steps to remedy the discriminating working environment. Unless we are to undertake a de novo review, and reject testimony accepted by the trial court, we are bound to conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court finding that the employer here did not take those reasonable steps. When, as here, an experienced trial court finds the employer did not act with reasonable dispatch to stamp out outrageous discrimination we should be especially alert to apply the proper scope of review. The temptation is great, when reaching the crucial issue of employer's response, to slip toward a de novo review. We should undertake a de novo review in this case only to the extent we are willing to do so in all discrimination cases.