Opinion ID: 2831320
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Unlawful Conduct in Wrongful Death Cases

Text: The wrongful death statute provides that “[a] person is liable for damages arising from an injury that causes an individual’s death if the injury was caused by the person’s or his agent’s or servant’s wrongful act, neglect, carelessness, unskillfulness, or default.” Id. § 71.002(b). Parents may bring a wrongful death action on behalf of their deceased children. See id. § 71.004. It is clear from the statute and our precedent that Chapter 33 applies to wrongful death claims. See, e.g., Russell, 841 S.W.2d at 347. By its terms, Chapter 33 expressly applies to “any cause of action based on tort.” TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE § 33.002. In addition, we have held that, under the wrongful death statute, a defendant may assert any defense against the claimant that he might have asserted against the decedent, if the decedent were alive. Russell, 841 S.W.2d at 347. This formerly included the defense of contributory negligence. See id. (citing Vassallo v. Nederl-Amerik Stoomv Maats Holland, 344 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Tex. 1961)). Further, we have 9 recognized federal case law that holds that Texas comparative negligence precluded recovery in a wrongful death case because the decedent’s negligence was greater than the tortfeasor’s. See id. at 347 n.7 (citing Mayo v. Tri-Bell Indus., Inc., 787 F.2d 1007, 1009 (5th Cir. 1986)). Finally, courts throughout the state generally accept that proportionate responsibility applies to wrongful death cases. See, e.g., Pastor v. Champs Rest., Inc., 750 S.W.2d 335, 358 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ) (remanding the case to the trial court to compare the decedent’s negligence and bar’s negligence in wrongful death case); Velasquez v. Levingston, 598 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (holding that recovery was precluded by then operative Texas comparative negligence statute because the decedent’s negligence was greater than the tortfeasor’s). Because Chapter 33’s proportionate responsibility scheme applies to wrongful death cases, and therefore applies to Arredondo’s case, we must determine whether the common law unlawful acts doctrine is available as an affirmative defense under the proportionate responsibility framework. We conclude that it is not. The plain language of section 33.003 clearly indicates that the common law unlawful acts doctrine is no longer a viable defense. Section 33.003 provides, in pertinent part: The trier of fact . . . shall determine the percentage of responsibility . . . with respect to each person’s causing or contributing to cause in any way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought, whether by negligent act or omission, by any defective or unreasonably dangerous product, by other conduct or activity that violates an applicable legal standard . . . . See TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE § 33.003(a) (emphasis added). The language of the statute indicates the Legislature’s desire to compare responsibility for injuries rather than bar recovery, even if the claimant was partly at fault or violated some legal standard. See Parker, 565 S.W.2d at 518 10 (discussing article 2212a, which is now Chapter 33). Therefore, we hold that Chapter 33 controls over the unlawful acts doctrine in the wrongful death context. The dissent contends that the unlawful acts doctrine and Chapter 33 may coexist as separate legal concepts. See ___ S.W.3d at ___. Nothing in Chapter 33 or in our case law suggests that the unlawful acts doctrine acts as an exception to the proportionate responsibility scheme, however. See Parker, 565 S.W.2d at 518 (holding that Chapter 33 replaces common law doctrines that lead to a “system of absolute victory or total defeat”). Proportionate responsibility abrogated former common law doctrines that barred a plaintiff’s recovery because of the plaintiff’s conduct—like assumption of the risk, imminent peril, and last clear chance—in favor of submission of a question on proportionate responsibility. See Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W. 3d 762, 772 (Tex. 2010). When the Legislature intends an exception to Chapter 33’s broad scheme, it creates specific exceptions for matters that are outside the scope of proportionate responsibility. See F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680, 690–91 (Tex. 2007). In the context of criminal actions, for example, the Legislature did just that, removing certain criminal acts performed in concert with another person from the proportionate responsibility scheme and instead imposing joint and several liability. See Act of May 18, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 136, § 1, sec. 33.002, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 971, 972, repealed by Act of June 11, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 4.10, sec. 33.002, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 859, 859. We find no such indication that the Legislature intended a plaintiff’s unlawful conduct to be treated differently from the other common law defenses under the former contributory negligence scheme, or that the Legislature intended it to be an exception to proportionate responsibility. We hold that the unlawful acts doctrine fits within the categories of 11 former common law defenses that are now exclusively controlled by Chapter 33’s proportionate responsibility scheme. Further, we have accepted the concept that those who voluntarily put themselves in dangerous situations are not necessarily barred from recovering from other negligent individuals. For example, we have held that an individual who voluntarily became intoxicated and was injured while driving his car may recover against the establishment that served him the alcohol. See Smith v. Sewell, 858 S.W.2d 350, 355 (Tex. 1993). While “[h]istorically, an individual who voluntarily became intoxicated was precluded from suing a tavern owner for his own injuries,” id. at 352 (citing 1 JAMES H. MOSHER, LIQUOR LIABILITY LAW § 2.02[6][a](1990)), the Legislature in 1987 established a cause of action against providers of alcohol under certain circumstances by enacting Chapter 2 of the Alcoholic Beverage Code. See TEX . ALCO . BEV . CODE § 2.03; see also Act of June 11, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 303, § 3, sec. 202, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 1673, 1674. Therefore, in Smith v. Sewell, we held that, under Chapter 2, an individual who was voluntarily intoxicated was not barred from recovery, and that Chapter 33 was applicable to a cause of action under Chapter 2 against an alcoholic beverage provider. See 858 S.W.2d at 355–56. We noted that “when it is the intoxicated individual who is injured due to his own intoxication, it is particularly appropriate that his conduct in contributing to his injury should be considered in assessing the amount of recovery, if any, to which he is entitled.” Id. at 356. It follows that, like the rule prohibiting voluntarily intoxicated individuals from recovering from a tavern owner, the adoption of the proportionate responsibility framework abrogated use of the common law unlawful acts doctrine to bar recovery in the tort context. 12 Dugger cites several cases in which a plaintiff was precluded from recovering damages in the legal malpractice context due to the plaintiff’s underlying criminal conduct. See, e.g., Sharpe v. Turley, 191 S.W.3d 362, 365–69 (Tex. App—Dallas 2006, pet. denied); Saks v. Sawtelle, Goode, Davdison & Trolio, 880 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Tex. App—San Antonio 1994, writ denied); Dover v. Baker, Brown, Sharman & Parker, 859 S.W.2d 441, 450–51 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). While the public policy underlying the unlawful acts doctrine may be similar to the policy behind those cases, the context makes those cases unique. In Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1995), we held that a client’s criminal conduct, as a matter of law, was the sole proximate or producing cause of the client’s conviction, and that the client could not bring a legal malpractice claim unless she had been exonerated from the criminal conviction. Id. at 496–98. Because the client’s conduct, and not the attorney’s, is the sole cause of any injury resulting from conviction, the plaintiff cannot satisfy the causation element of a legal malpractice claim absent exoneration. See id. While some courts of appeals have extended that reasoning to civil defendants bringing legal malpractice actions, we have not directly addressed that issue. See, e.g., Sharpe, 191 S.W.3d at 369 (precluding a plaintiff from recovering from an attorney after a finding that summary judgment evidence established that the plaintiff’s conduct forming the basis of the underlying civil fraud claim was unlawful). As it is not before us, we do not do so now, and we limit the holding in this case to personal injury and wrongful death cases. We next consider section 93.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code and how it interacts with Chapter 33. 13 III. Section 93.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code In 1987, the Legislature enacted section 93.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, providing an affirmative defense to civil actions brought by convicted criminals seeking to recover damages for injuries arising out of their felonious acts.5 See TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE § 93.001; see also Act of June 19, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 824, § 1, sec. 93.001, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2856, 2856. The statute provides: (a) It is an affirmative defense to a civil action for damages for personal injury or death that the plaintiff, at the time the cause of action arose, was: (1) committing a felony, for which the plaintiff has been finally convicted, that was the sole cause of the damages sustained by the plaintiff; or (2) committing or attempting to commit suicide, and the plaintiff’s conduct in committing or attempting to commit suicide was the sole cause of the damages sustained; provided, however, if the suicide or attempted suicide was caused in whole or in part by a failure of the party or any defendant to comply with an applicable legal standard, then which suicide or attempted suicide shall not be a defense. (b) This section does not apply in any action brought by an employee, or the surviving beneficiaries of an employee, under the Workers’ Compensation Law of Texas, or in any action against an insurer based on a contract of insurance, a statute, or common law. (c) In an action to which this section applies, this section shall prevail over any other law. 5 Section 86.002 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code is a similar expression of the legislative policy that convicted criminals may not recover for injuries sustained while committing a crime. See T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C O DE § 86.002. Arredondo does not rely on section 86.002 to support her argument that the unlawful acts doctrine has been superseded. Thus, we do not address it. 14 TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE § 93.001. It is undisputed that section 93.001 may not be used as an affirmative defense in this case. Martinez was never finally convicted, nor is there any indication that Martinez committed suicide as required by subsection 93.001(a)(2). See id. We must still consider the language of section 93.001, however, to determine whether it evinces legislative intent that the common law unlawful acts doctrine remain available as an affirmative defense when the statutory affirmative defense is not, as Dugger argues. Subsection 93.001(a) initially indicates broad applicability to personal injury and wrongful death cases, but then limits the availability of the affirmative defense to two circumstances. See id. § 93.001(a). First, subsection 93.001(a)(1) limits the affirmative defense to cases in which both (1) the plaintiff was finally convicted, and (2) the felony was the sole cause of the damages. See id. The phrase “for which the plaintiff has been finally convicted” is an expression of a narrow policy of the state that convicted wrongdoers who committed the most serious crimes should not be permitted to recover. Id. § 93.001(a)(1). The narrow focus of subsection 93.001(a)(1) might, in effect, preclude its utility, as the dissent notes, where the plaintiff dies before conviction. See ___S.W.3d at ___. Yet this anomaly is less evidence of absurdity than recognition of the Legislature’s policy choice that only criminals actually convicted of the most serious crimes will be barred from recovery. Although there is some overlap with the policy underlying the common law unlawful acts doctrine, the statute embodies this policy in a limited and narrow way. Second, subsection 93.001(a)(2) limits the affirmative defense to instances in which the plaintiff was committing or attempting suicide. This is entirely beyond the scope of the unlawful acts doctrine, although the policy underlying the common law doctrine certainly lends support for the suicide affirmative defense. But, again, 15 although Dugger argues that the broad unlawful acts doctrine survived Chapter 33 and section 93.001, nothing in the statute suggests such legislative intent. See generally TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE § 93.001. In fact, subsections 93.001(b) and (c) clearly contemplate that the affirmative defense is not available in all cases, and subsection 93.001(a) specifies the narrow circumstances in which a plaintiff’s recovery is barred by the plaintiff’s conduct. Arredondo argues that the language in subsection 93.001(c), stating “this section shall prevail over any other law,” expresses the Legislature’s intention for this statute to supersede the unlawful acts doctrine. Dugger contends that the phrase “an action in which this section applies,” limits the statutory affirmative defense to cases in which (1) there has been a final conviction, or (2) there has been a suicide or attempted suicide, but the common law unlawful acts doctrine is available in all other personal injury or wrongful death actions. In considering these competing interpretations, we presume the Legislature enacts a statute with knowledge of existing law. Acker v. Tex. Water Comm’n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990) (citing McBride v. Clayton, 166 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. 1942)). When section 93.001 was enacted in 1987, article 2212a’s comparative negligence already existed. Compare Act of June 19, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 824, § 1, sec. 93.001, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2856, 2856 (enactment of § 93.001 in 1987), with Act of April 9, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 28, §§ 1–2, 4–5, art. 2212a, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 41, 41–43 (repealed 1985) (art. 2212a in effect in 1987). Chapter 33, as amended in 1987—the same legislative session as the enactment of section 93.001—provided that “[i]n an action to recover damages for negligence resulting in personal injury, property damage, or death . . . a claimant may recover damages only if his percentage of responsibility is less than or equal to 50 percent.” Act of June 16, 1987, 70th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 2, 16 § 2.04, sec. 33.001(a), 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 37, 41 (amended 1993); compare id. (amendment of Chapter 33 in 1987 by 70th Legislature), with Act of June 19, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 824, § 1, sec. 93.001, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2856, 2856 (enactment of § 93.001 in 1987 by 70th Legislature). Although section 93.001 does not expressly state what “other law” it prevails over, the Legislature likely intended it to prevail over Chapter 33’s proportionate responsibility scheme, which had already abrogated the common law unlawful acts doctrine defense. See TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE § 93.001. The dissent suggests that section 93.001 is a mere reaffirmation by the Legislature of the continued vitality of the unlawful acts doctrine in the context in which a plaintiff was engaged in criminal conduct and subsequently convicted. ___ S.W.3d at ___. In light of Chapter 33’s abrogation of common law defenses that provide a complete bar to plaintiff’s recovery—including the unlawful acts doctrine—we interpret subsection 93.001(c) as an indication that the Legislature intended the statutory affirmative defense to resurrect only a small portion of the unlawful acts doctrine, providing a complete bar to recovery only in the certain limited circumstances articulated by subsections 93.001(a)(1) and (2). See TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE § 93.001(c).