Opinion ID: 2211566
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voluntary Prong of the Miranda Waiver

Text: Determining whether a waiver of Miranda rights was voluntary involves the same inquiry as in the due process context. In Connelly, supra at 169-170, 107 S.Ct. 515, the Supreme Court explained that there is no reason to require more in the way of a `Voluntariness' inquiry in the Miranda waiver context than in the Fourteenth Amendment confession context. Thus, whether a waiver of Miranda rights is voluntary depends on the absence of police coercion. Id. at 170, 107 S.Ct. 515. The Connelly Court explained that `the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception....' Id., quoting Moran, supra at 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135. In the instant case, there is no question that defendant's decision to waive his Miranda rights, and, concomitantly, his decision to confess, was completely voluntary. Consequently, as in Cheatham, our task here is to determine whether defendant's waiver was also knowing and intelligent.