Opinion ID: 1788066
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: judicial obligations

Text: The remaining violations relate to respondent's personal conduct as judge of the probate court. We examine (1) two examples of respondent's undue delay in deciding cases taken under advisement, (2) allegations relating to ex parte communications, (3) improprieties in the appointment of an appraiser and (4) respondent's inaccessibility to attorneys. Former Supreme Court Rule 2.07 required that A judge should be prompt in the performance of his judicial duties. . . . Former Rule 2.02 complemented that requirement by stating, Courts exist to promote justice . . . their administration should be speedy and careful.. . . Against the framework of these rules we discuss two flagrant cases of delay; the first involved the Cole estates. Margaret Cole died in 1953 (approximately nineteen years before the hearing in these matters), survived by her daughter Cheryl and her sister, Adeline Wilke, who was appointed executrix of Margaret's estate and guardian of Cheryl. Attaining her majority, Cheryl employed the firm of Campbell and Campbell to file exceptions to a number of settlements previously made by Adeline, both as executrix and guardian. The exceptions in these consolidated cases were tried in April of 1971. During the hearing of those cases Cheryl experienced mental distress and thereafter was adjudged incompetent. The Public Administrator, Patrick Fiandaca, was appointed her guardian and attorney Campbell continued to represent Cheryl as well as the guardian. Though Cheryl apparently experienced a mental breakdown during the trial, the hearing was completed in April, final briefs were filed and the case taken under advisement on May 28, 1971. Attorney Paul Kopsky, who represented one of the two bonding companies defending the case, was authorized after trial to represent both companies in settlement negotiations. Sometime during the next six months, Mr. Campbell informed the court that settlement negotiations had failed. However, on October 7, 1971, Mr. Kopsky met alone with respondent and asked the matter be held up and that no ruling be entered because he, Kopsky, thought the case would be settled. Later that day respondent saw Mr. Fiandaca in the hallway of the courthouse and Fiandaca also suggested that the case could be settled. [8] On May 17, 1972, one year after the case was taken under advisement, Campbell's firm forwarded to respondent a copy of a letter received from a Dr. Sandall, a staff psychiatrist of the St. Louis State Hospital, advising that he had been treating Cheryl Cole and that it would be beneficial to the progress of her state if some decision is reached in the court case. Respondent apparently did not reply to this letter. Thereafter respondent received two letters from attorney Campbell requesting that the case be decided. The first, in December, 1973, pointed out that a full stenographic transcript of the hearing had been made, referred to the Sandall letter Campbell forwarded in May, 1972, and advised respondent that the losing party would certainly appeal to the circuit court. Respondent well knew that neither party could appeal until a ruling was made. The second letter requesting action was sent to respondent by Mr. Campbell on July 15, 1974, stating: My records indicate the above cases were taken under submission on May 26, 1971. As you are no doubt aware, a full transcript of the proceedings were made, and has been filed with the Court together with extensive memorandums of law. The cases now have been under submission for over three years. In the meantime, the movant-exceptor, Cheryl Ann Cole, has been adjudicated an incompetent. On a previous occasion, approximately one and a half years ago, our office advised you that the physician for Miss Cole was of the opinion that the continued pendency of this action was a factor aggravating her mental health. Asking then that the matter be concluded, the letter ends, In the event that you feel for some reason that you should not make a decision in the cases, I would request that you disqualify yourself and certify the matters to the Circuit Court. Again we find no record of an oral or written response having been made to these letters. In April of 1973, respondent had been interviewed by Donald Wolff, representing the Commission, concerning a complaint by Campbell regarding respondent's failure to decide the case. Respondent finally rendered his decision in the case in May, 1975, and an appeal was taken. By way of explanation for this delay, respondent asserted that because he wished to avoid disrupting the relationship between Cheryl Cole and her aunt, he delayed his ruling in the hope that the case would be settled. While this may in part explain the delay in the early months the case was under submission, the delay of four years simply cannot be justified and must be characterized as misconduct under former Rules 2.02 and 2.07. The second example of delay in deciding cases under submission involved the estate of Sommerlath. We do not recite the details except to note that respondent took twenty-one months to render his decision and we find respondent's proffered justification insufficient to excuse the delay. In mitigation, we note that in the large volume of court business (though contested cases constitute a minor portion of the work of the court), only Cole and Sommerlath demonstrate unreasonable delay. Considering the circumstances of the cases discussed here and in light of the volume of court business, we censure respondent for his misconduct or willful neglect of duty in these matters but do not order the suspension urged by the Commission. The next act of misconduct found by the Commission concerns respondent's appointive powers. In this regard, former Rule 2.12 provided that appointees such as referees, guardians, etc., were to be selected with a view solely to their character and fitness. (Emphasis added.) The Rule further states that the power of making such appointments should not be exercised by him for personal or partisan advantage. Late in 1974, respondent directed that the name of an attorney be removed from the list of inheritance tax appraisers in the St. Louis County Probate Court, though he had served in that capacity from time to time for more than ten years, including periods before and after respondent assumed office. In March, 1975, the attorney inquired why his name was taken from the list. Respondent replied that he had learned the attorney had voted against him in a confidential poll conducted by the Missouri Bar. In the hearing, respondent testified he had been informed of the attorney's Bar poll vote in late 1974, but that he had removed the attorney mainly because his work was not good and he just wasn't doing the job. While the court should be given wide latitude in selecting such appointees, careful attention with the provisions of Rule 2.12 was required (after July, 1975, the Code of Judicial Conduct controls), but in this instance we do not believe that the Commission's finding of misconduct was sustained by the record. The final allegation of misconduct with which we deal centers on the personal conduct of respondent in his dealings with attorneys appearing before the court. Former Rule 2.10 stated in part, A judge should be courteous to counsel . . . and also to all others appearing . . . in the court. This theme is repeated in Canon 3 A(3) as follows: A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his official capacity. . . The Commission found Judge Kohn discourteous in that he was inaccessible and difficult to contact. Attorneys were required to work their way through an array of underlings, who insulated him from counsel, creating unnecessary delays in their work. The testimony of two witnesses support this finding. Numerous witnesses, including six presented by the Commission, testified they had no trouble arranging to see respondent, and seemed reconciled to the necessity for advance appointment. All witnesses testified that Judge Kohn's demeanor to them in personal contacts and in the courtroom was courteous. We find that the burden of showing violation of the Canons as to this charge was not met. The Commission has moved to strike respondent's brief for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 84.04. We overrule the motion. Finally, the Commission report reflects that a number of the Commissioners considered removal appropriate in this case because of what they considered an intransigent attitude respondent demonstrated throughout the hearing as to any change in his behavior or the operation of the probate court. Accordingly we emphasize for the benefit of respondent that attorneys coming to the bar are officers of the court entitled to the courteous treatment expressed in the Canons from respondent and those in his employ. The bench must uniformly protect the dignity to which our brethren at the bar are justly entitled and it is unbecoming when jurists lose sight of the fact they have been practitioners of the law and remain active participants in this noble profession. No member of the bench should long be permitted to conduct himself in a manner contrary to the Code. However, we trust respondent will reexamine the St. Louis County Probate Court Procedures and encourage the reasonable exercise of discretion of those in charge of their administration. We hardly need add that courteous and respectful treatment should henceforth be extended to all appearing in respondent's court, including those who testified on behalf of the Commission and cooperated in its investigation. Confident that conduct of the sort here censured will not recur, we direct that the disqualification imposed by Rule 12.07 during pendency of the Commission's recommendations to this Court be terminated. MORGAN, C. J., and BARDGETT, FINCH, DONNELLY, RENDLEN and SEILER, JJ., concur. SIMEONE, J., not participating because not a member of the Court when cause was submitted.