Opinion ID: 6103576
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpretation Of Foreign Law

Text: ¶19 For centuries, the common law established that, unlike the laws of the domestic jurisdiction, a foreign country's laws must be pleaded and proven as facts. See Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co. Ltd., 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1872-73 (2018); Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 4 The Hennessys admit that they did not challenge the standard of review for questions of foreign law in the courts below. Generally, issues will not be considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997). But the rule is not absolute. Apex Elecs. Corp. v. Gee, 217 Wis. 2d 378, 384, 577 N.W.2d 23 (1998). When an issue involves a question of law rather than of fact, when the question of law has been briefed by both parties and when the question of law is of sufficient public interest to merit a decision, this court may exercise its discretion to address the issue. Id. The issue presented is a question of law, which has been thoroughly briefed by the parties and is of statewide significance. Thus, we will consider the issue, despite the Hennessys forfeiting the argument in courts below. 5 For an analysis on the merits of the Hennessys' claims, see infra, section III. 9 No. 2019AP1206 236 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.) (Foreign laws are well understood to be facts which must, like other facts, be proved to exist before they can be received in a court of justice.); 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 38 (2021) (Unless authorized by statute . . . the law of other nations must be pleaded and proved.).6 ¶20 Over 150 years of jurisprudence, we have recognized this basic principle in Wisconsin. Hull v. Augustine, 23 Wis. 383, 386 (1868) (noting that a party may establish a defense under foreign law by alleg[ing] the defense in its pleadings and sustain[ing] this averment by proof on the trial); Hite v. Keene, 149 Wis. 207, 215, 134 N.W. 383 (1912) (The question of what a foreign law is, is always a question of fact.); Milwaukee Cheese Co. v. Olafsson, 40 Wis. 2d 575, 580, 162 N.W.2d 609 (1968) ([T]he laws of foreign countries must be pleaded and proved as any other fact.). Questions of a foreign country's law are an issue for the court. Wis. Stat. § 902.02(5) (2017-18).7 As questions of fact assigned to circuit courts in the first instance, appellate courts review questions of a foreign country's law under the clearly erroneous In the United States, the laws of other states were 6 treated the same as the laws of foreign countries. Both were considered questions of fact. See Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328, 341 (1859) (When a question depends on the laws of a sister state, in our courts, such laws are a part of the evidence in the case, and like another fact must be proved by him who holds the affirmative. (quotations omitted)). As discussed below, we now consider other states' laws as questions of law. All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 7 the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 10 No. 2019AP1206 standard, not de novo. Royster-Clark, Inc. v. Olsen's Mill, Inc., 2006 WI 46, ¶¶11-12, 290 Wis. 2d 264, 714 N.W.2d 530 ([T]his court defers to the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are unsupported by the record and are, therefore, clearly erroneous.); Griffin v. Mark Travel Corp., 2006 WI App 213, ¶4, 296 Wis. 2d 642, 724 N.W.2d 900 (A trial court's findings of fact [as to the content of a foreign country's laws] may not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. (quotations omitted)). ¶21 The requirement that foreign laws be proven as facts has close ties to the doctrine of judicial notice. As explained by McCormick on Evidence: In the ordinary process of finding the applicable law, the normal method then is by informal investigation of any sources satisfactory to the judge. Thus, this process has been traditionally described in terms of the judge taking judicial notice of the law applicable to the case at hand. Indeed, when the source-material was not easily accessible to the judge, as in the case of foreign law or city ordinances, law has been treated as a peculiar species of fact, requiring formal proof. 2 McCormick on Evid. The Judge's Task as Law-Finder: Judicial Notice of Law § 335 (8th ed. 2020). ¶22 Thus, in Wisconsin, our courts by statute take judicial notice of the common law and statutes of every state, territory and other jurisdiction of the United States. Wis. Stat. § 902.02(1). Because courts may inform [themselves] of such laws in such manner as [they] may deem proper, § 902.02(2), and do not rely purely on allegations and evidence 11 No. 2019AP1206 offered by the parties, courts review questions of other states' laws independently. See, e.g., Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 2018 WI 81, ¶¶20-34, 383 Wis. 2d 63, 914 N.W.2d 76 (reviewing and applying the law of Ohio de novo). ¶23 Notably, Wis. Stat. § 902.02 explicitly excludes the law of foreign countries from judicial notice: (5) Foreign country. The law of a jurisdiction other than [the states, territories and other jurisdictions of the United States] shall be an issue for the court, but shall not be subject to the foregoing provisions concerning judicial notice. § 902.02(5); see also Milwaukee Cheese, 40 Wis. 2d at 580 (stating that the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, now codified under § 902.02, chang[ed] . . . the established law for proving the law of other states but left in place the requirement that the laws of foreign countries . . . be pleaded and proved as any other fact). ¶24 Other states have altered the common law, and have allowed courts to decide questions of a foreign country's law independently, by permitting courts, whether through rule or statute, to take judicial notice of the foreign country's law. See, e.g., Mich. R. Evid. 202(a) (2018) (A court may take judicial notice without request by a party of . . . the laws of foreign countries.); Harkness v. Harkness, 577 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) ([A trial court's] interpretation of and conclusions about American, foreign, and international law are reviewed de novo.); In re Estate of Crane, No. 288654, 2010 WL 935651, at  (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2010) (explaining the 12 No. 2019AP1206 background and history of Michigan's change in treatment of a foreign country's laws after allowing courts to take judicial notice of the law). ¶25 The federal courts have followed a similar path. In 1966, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to permit judicial notice of a foreign country's law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (In determining foreign law, the court may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.). The federal rule states explicitly that issues of a foreign country's law are question[s] of law. Id.; see Animal Sci. Prods., 138 S. Ct. at 1873 (Appellate review, as is true of domestic law determinations, is de novo.). ¶26 Even though Wisconsin's standard of review has been long established, the standard has been reaffirmed by this court on numerous occasions, and Wisconsin's statutory notice provisions on foreign law have not been changed, the Hennessys ask that the court resolve issues of foreign countries' laws as questions of law. Whether we treat this issue solely as a matter of stare decisis, statutory interpretation, or both, we decline to do so. ¶27 Any time this court is asked to overturn a prior case, we must thoroughly consider the doctrine of stare decisis. Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶41, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417. Fidelity to precedent ensures that existing law will not be abandoned lightly. When existing law is open to revision in every case, deciding cases 13 No. 2019AP1206 becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results. Hinrichs v. DOW Chem. Co., 2020 WI 2, ¶67, 389 Wis. 2d 669, 937 N.W.2d 37 (quoting Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶37, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 N.W.2d 266). Thus, any departure from stare decisis requires special justification. Id. (quotations omitted). ¶28 When asked to overturn precedent, we consider whether several factors are present: (1) Changes or developments in the law have undermined the rationale behind a decision; (2) there is a need to make a decision correspond to newly ascertained facts; (3) there is a showing that the precedent has become detrimental to coherence and consistency in the law; (4) the prior decision is unsound in principle; or (5) the prior decision is unworkable in practice. State v. Robinson, 2019 WI 102, ¶50, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813 (quotations omitted). In addition, we frequently review whether reliance interests are implicated and whether [the decision] has produced a settled body of law. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶99, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257. ¶29 There has been no [c]hange[] or development in the law that has undermined the rationale behind Wisconsin's current standard of review for questions of a foreign country's law. Robinson, 389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶50. The justifications underlying the question of fact standard remain valid today. Countries use different languages, and have distinct legal systems, cultural values, and societal expectations, all of which influence legal interpretation and analysis. As was true 14 No. 2019AP1206 in centuries past, applying a wholly independent standard of review to a foreign country's jurisprudence can create substantial difficulties for courts, and having a question of fact standard can relieve the pressure placed on the judicial system.8 The standard places the burden on the parties to present what evidence and expert testimony they believe are relevant on the issue of foreign law, and limits appellate review to clearly erroneous interpretations. The process may serve to facilitate efficient and effective resolution of foreign law disputes. These disputes may otherwise consume court resources without consequent development of Wisconsin law. ¶30 Nonetheless, the Hennessys cite policy rationales in support of their position. They argue that recrafting issues of a foreign country's laws as questions of law would allow courts to exercise independent judgment, and it would give courts the opportunity to fully analyze the substance of foreign law. We explained over 50 years ago in Milwaukee Cheese that, while [i]t is relatively easy to gain access to the laws of the states, [a]ccess to the laws of foreign countries is far more difficult. Even if the laws were readily available, language barriers, problems of interpretation, and unfamiliar legal 8 For instance, the instant dispute concerns interrelated legal documents that repeatedly cross-reference each other. The loan agreement, the note, and the note's addendum are governed by Wisconsin law and are written in English, while the trust agreement is governed by Mexican law and is written in Spanish. Accurately interpreting the documents and the Mexican judgment at issue under a question of law standard could present significant linguistic and conceptual challenges. 15 No. 2019AP1206 systems compound the difficulties involved in a search of the law. 40 Wis. 2d at 581; see also Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 638-39 (7th Cir. 2010) (Wood, J., concurring) (Exercises in comparative law are notoriously difficult, because the U.S. reader is likely to miss nuances in the foreign law, to fail to appreciate the way in which one branch of the other country's law interacts with another, or to assume erroneously that the foreign law mirrors U.S. law when it does not.). The Hennessys fail to cite a single case where litigants, under the question of fact standard, were inhibited from presenting to the court a full and accurate body of a foreign country's law. Although the Hennessys disagree with the circuit court's findings in this case, there is no indication that the record was incomplete or somehow inadequate. ¶31 The Hennessys correctly identify jurisdictions that treat issues of foreign law as questions of law, but there are in fact other jurisdictions that, like Wisconsin, continue to follow the common law approach. See, e.g., Ramsey County v. Yee Lee, 770 N.W.2d 572, 577-78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (Foreign law is a matter of fact which the courts of this country cannot be presumed to be acquainted with or to take judicial notice of unless it is pleaded and proved. (quotations omitted)). Moreover, [i]t is not a sufficient reason for this court to overrule its precedent that a large majority of other jurisdictions, with no binding authority on this court, have reached opposing conclusions. Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶100. Similarly, a policy disagreement with a prior 16 No. 2019AP1206 decision does not, on its own, justify overturning precedent. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 281 Wis. 2d 300, ¶¶46, 50 ([E]ven if this court were now persuaded by . . . policy arguments [that opposed a prior decision], that is not a sufficient reason to overturn the decision.). ¶32 Further, subsequent review and development in the law have not undermined the validity of Wisconsin's standard of review. Cf. Robinson, 389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶¶51-57 (overturning a decision from this court when it did not conform to U.S. Supreme Court precedent upon which the decision was based); Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶105 (reasoning that a decision from this court could not be upheld under stare decisis principles where the decision could not be reconciled [with other Wisconsin precedent] without generating . . . arbitrary and illogical distinctions). On numerous occasions, this court has concluded that Wisconsin applies a question of fact standard for interpretation of foreign law. See, e.g., Milwaukee Cheese, 40 Wis. 2d at 580-81. There is no indication that the prior decisions were wrongly decided, unsound in principle, or subject to change due to newly ascertained facts. Robinson, 389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶50. The foundational common law principles that support Wisconsin's standard have not changed, and the challenges that underlie the interpretation of a foreign country's law remain. ¶33 Most significantly, the question of fact standard has produced a settled body of law that has, over the course of many decades, been workable in practice. Johnson Controls, 264 17 No. 2019AP1206 Wis. 2d 60, ¶99; Robinson, 389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶50. The court of appeals and this court have consistently relied on the question of fact standard for over 150 years. Hull, 23 Wis. at 386; Milwaukee Cheese, 40 Wis. 2d at 580-81; Griffin, 296 Wis. 2d 642, ¶4. This is not a case where a decision, propped up on infirm legal grounds, fails to provide suitable direction and consistency to [the] area of the law. Johnson Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶106. Quite the opposite. Wisconsin courts, under current law, have a clearly established standard, and they have regularly applied [it] . . . in a consistent manner. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 281 Wis. 2d 300, ¶51; see, e.g., Griffin, 296 Wis. 2d 642, ¶¶5-15 (applying the standard to interpretation of Mexican laws and treaties); Witt v. Realist, Inc., 18 Wis. 2d 282, 289-91, 118 N.W.2d 85 (1962) (using the question of fact standard to interpret the meaning of German law). ¶34 Additionally, the question of fact standard for the law of foreign countries is supported by Wisconsin statutes. Wisconsin Stat. § 902.02(5) states that courts may not take judicial notice of a foreign country's law, and judicial notice is intimately tied to questions of law and de novo review. ¶35 Wisconsin Stat. § 902.02(1) states explicitly that the laws of other states are subject to judicial notice. Courts do not need to rely on the allegations and proofs offered by the parties, and thus, courts review questions of other states' laws independently. See, 2 McCormick on Evid., supra ¶21, § 335 (explaining the connection between judicial notice and 18 No. 2019AP1206 independent judicial review). On appeal, the interpretation of other states' laws is a question of law reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 383 Wis. 2d 63, ¶¶20-34. Notably, other states have transitioned to a question of law standard for foreign countries' laws by allowing courts to take judicial notice of the law. See, e.g., Mich. R. Evid. 202(a) (2018). Wisconsin has not done so. ¶36 Unlike questions of other states' laws, Wis. Stat. § 902.02(5) explicitly excludes the law of foreign countries from judicial notice. See Milwaukee Cheese, 40 Wis. 2d at 580 (explaining changes made by the legislature in the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act to require judicial notice for other states' laws, while not altering the question of fact standard for foreign countries' laws).9 Nowhere in the statutory chapter on judicial notice does the legislature permit judicial 9 To the extent that this court, in prior cases, has cited the notice statute in support of the question of fact standard, this bolsters the argument against discarding our past decisions, as the Hennessys request. See Witt v. Realist, Inc., 18 Wis. 2d 282, 289, 118 N.W.2d 85 (1962) (citing the notice provisions in the context of explaining the question of fact standard); Milwaukee Cheese Co. v. Olafsson, 40 Wis. 2d 575, 580, 162 N.W.2d 609 (1968). Stare decisis has greater significance when our prior decisions involve the interpretation of statutes. See Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, ¶52, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417 (This court has long been committed to the principle that a construction given to a statute by the court becomes a part thereof, unless the legislature subsequently amends the statute to effect a change. (quotations omitted)); Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 456 (2015) (explaining that stare decisis carries enhanced force when a decision . . . interprets a statute because critics of [the] ruling can take their objections across the street, and [the legislature] can correct any mistake it sees). 19 No. 2019AP1206 notice of foreign countries' laws. In other states that, like Wisconsin, still prohibit judicial notice for foreign countries' laws, they too consider foreign countries' laws under a question of fact standard. See Yee Lee, 770 N.W.2d at 577-78; Minn. Stat. §§ 599.01, 599.08 (2021) (stating that foreign countries laws must be proved as facts and are not subject to judicial notice). Considering the statutory context of Wis. Stat. § 902.02, our treatment of other states' law as questions of law, and how judicial notice statutes have impacted standards of review in other jurisdictions, Wisconsin courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign countries' laws, and instead, the parties must prove them as facts. ¶37 In all, we do not accept the invitation to alter Wisconsin's standard for interpreting the law of foreign countries. The substance of foreign law remains a question of fact that must be pleaded and proved as any other fact. Milwaukee Cheese, 40 Wis. 2d at 580. The meaning of a foreign country's law is an issue reserved in the first instance for the circuit court. Wis. Stat. § 902.02(5). On appeal, we review the circuit court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. ¶38 When reviewing questions of fact, the standard is highly deferential. Royster-Clark, 290 Wis. 2d 264, ¶11. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when it is against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, although evidence may have presented competing factual inferences, the circuit court's findings are to be sustained if they do not go 20 No. 2019AP1206 against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Country Visions Coop. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 2021 WI 35, ¶19, 396 Wis. 2d 470, 958 N.W.2d 511 (cleaned up).