Opinion ID: 1498538
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged errors in refusing requests to charge.

Text: The judge marked `allowed on plaintiff's requests to charge Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5. We see no error in his refusal of the other requests, as they either had already been covered by the charge or contained defects which were slight and unimportant. (a) As the judge offered to give plaintiff's requested charges Nos. 1 and 2, should plaintiff's counsel so desire, we must treat the case as if they had been given. They cover everything contained in denied requested charge No. 3 except for the statement in No. 3 that defendant's intent to assume responsibility was immaterial. That statement was clearly implied in requested charges Nos. 1 and 2 and in the judge's charge. (b) Plaintiff's requested charge No. 6 would have had the judge tell the jury specifically to consider Allen's testimony concerning his conversation with Gibbins just after Allen had received defendant's March 18 letter and the enclosed acknowledgment. [18] In this segment of Allen's testimony, he did not (as plaintiff suggests in its brief) [19] state that he rejected defendant's counter-offer. He testified that he had then said to Gibbins that he could not understand defendant's acknowledgment of plaintiff's 100,000,000 order, as both he and Gibbins knew that that order was not bona fide but a collusive sham device, in obtaining priorities for aluminum, to deceive the national government. The judge in his charge had already sufficiently discussed that testimony and Gibbins' emphatically contrary testimony. [20] (c) Plaintiff's requested charge No. 7 would have told the jury the following: The jury must find that defendant, as a matter of law, was obligated to furnish boxes fit for plaintiff's use, if the jury were to find that plaintiff accepted the boxes after plaintiff received the April 18 letter and the accompanying reports, if the jury further found that defendant knew the purpose for which the boxes were to be used, and that plaintiff was relying upon defendant to supply boxes suitable for that purpose. Had the judge so charged, he would have committed error; for this suggested charge would have omitted to tell the jury that they must ignore the April 18 papers, if they found as a fact that plaintiff's April 7 letter was an acceptance by conduct of defendant's March 18 counter-offer. (d) The first five sentences of requested charge No. 9 were covered by the judge's charge. The last sentence presented a hypothetical situation at variance with the evidence. (e) Plaintiff's requested charges 8 and 10 [21] were sufficiently covered by the judge's charge and by plaintiff's requested charges Nos. 1 and 2, which the judge allowed and said he was willing to state to the jury. As nothing in the refused requests gave the judge a sufficiently clear indication of the error in his charge, cases like Sweeney v. United Feature Syndicate, 2 Cir., 129 F. 2d 904, 905 and Alcaro v. Jean Jordeau, 3 Cir., 138 F.2d 767, 771, are not in point.