Opinion ID: 152652
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Excessive Force Issue

Text: In his first claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Brooks asserted Deputies Gaenzle and Smith violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure when they used excessive and deadly force in shooting him as he fled. In ruling on the deputies' motion for summary judgment, the district court held no excessive force occurred based on its determination Mr. Brooks's shooting did not constitute a seizure and its alternative determination the force used was objectively reasonable under the circumstances presented. In addressing the seizure issue, the district court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 595-96, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989), for the proposition a seizure only occurs if the government's actions restrain the movement of the suspect. It further observed: For a seizure to occur, the government does not have to literally stop the suspect in his tracks or freeze him in place. But, the plain meaning of the word seizure and various Supreme Court interpretations indicate that the government must do something that gives it the opportunity to control the suspect's ability to evade capture or control. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 595-96 [109 S.Ct. 1378] (Violation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control.).... In other words, the government must have substantially precluded the suspect's ability to loose himself from the government's control. Apt.App. at 19. It also observed that in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628-29, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), the Supreme Court determined no seizure occurred during the course of a foot chase because the government's `show of authority' did not produce his stop. Apt.App. at 20. Similarly, it noted in Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251, 1255 (10th Cir.1994), this court held shooting and striking a helicopter operated by an innocent hostage, but failing to seriously encumber his ability to flee or evade restraint, did not amount to a Fourth Amendment seizure. Applying the holdings of these cases to the instant case, the district court determined no seizure occurred when Deputy Gaenzle shot and struck Mr. Brooks because he managed to continue climbing the fence without the shot even temporarily halt[ing] his escape; eluded arrest for three days; and still had enough spring in his step to evade police in the mall parking lot before being chased and apprehended at a nearby home. Apt.App. at 21-23. In making its determination, the district court also considered the cases relied on by Mr. Brooks. It pointed out Mr. Brooks relied on mere dicta in Bella to assert the shooting of a fleeing suspect automatically or per se constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure. See 24 F.3d at 1255. In addressing the other cases on which Mr. Brooks relied, including Brower, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir.1993); and Lemery v. Beckner, 323 Fed.Appx. 644 (10th Cir.) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 416, 175 L.Ed.2d 271 (2009), it pointed out the officers' use of deadly force in those cases actually terminated the fleeing suspects' movement, either by killing them or immediately or momentarily subduing them. It reasoned the holding in those cases would likely have been different if the fleeing suspects had, like Mr. Brooks, survived their respective encounters with the police and eluded arrest by escaping from the scene. In contrast, it pointed out the outcome of Mr. Brooks's case would likely have been different if Deputy Gaenzle's shot had hobbled or injured him, thereby preventing him from climbing over the fence and escaping with Mr. Acevedo. While it stated the gunshot presumably pain[ed] Mr. Brooks or slowed the pace of his escape, it did not bring him within the government's control. Apt.App. at 23. In holding no seizure occurred, the district court concluded Deputy Gaenzle's gunshot may have injured Mr. Brooks, but it clearly did not produce a stop or terminate his movement. Alternatively, the district court determined that, even if Mr. Brooks could prove a seizure occurred, the deputies used an objectively reasonable degree of force under the circumstances presented. In making this determination, it pointed out law enforcement officers may reasonably use deadly force when they have probable cause to believe a suspect has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, and, at the time Deputy Gaenzle shot him, Mr. Brooks was involved in the commission of an inherently violent crime where, during the course of a burglary, someone shot at the deputies at close range before fleeing. The district court held Deputy Gaenzle acted reasonably because a reasonable officer in his position would have, under the circumstances presented, feared for his safety and the safety of others. In making this determination, the district court rejected Mr. Brooks's claim Deputies Gaenzle and Smith failed to use objectively reasonable force: (1) because the jury acquitted him of the charge of being a felon in possession of a weapon; and (2) based on his allegation he did not possess a weapon or participate in the violent acts for which he was convicted, but merely acted in complicity with Mr. Acevedo. In rejecting these arguments, the district court noted that, regardless of whether Mr. Brooks actually possessed a gun or the fact a jury acquitted him of possession of a weapon, he was undisputably involved in a crime where someone involved in the burglary nearly shot the two deputies in the face and that the law does not require he actually carry the gun or commit the shooting. In addition, the district court determined Mr. Brooks's reliance on Deputy Gaenzle's statementthat he believed Mr. Brooks possessed a handgun, which was critical to his decision to use deadly forcewas merely a subjective standard instead of the requisite objective reasonableness standard in viewing whether a reasonable officer would have used such force under the circumstances presented. Based on this assessment, the district court concluded sufficient undisputed facts existed in the record to support Deputy Gaenzle's use of deadly force, notwithstanding his own subjective impression of the situation. Having made a determination the shooting of Mr. Brooks did not constitute a seizure and, alternatively, the force used was objectively reasonable under the circumstances presented, the district court held Deputies Gaenzle and Smith did not use excessive force in violation of Mr. Brooks's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. On appeal, Mr. Brooks contends the district court erred in its analysis and resolution of his excessive force claim with regard to both its holding no seizure occurred and its alternative holding Deputy Gaenzle used objectively reasonable force under the circumstances presented. In support of his seizure argument, Mr. Brooks relies on the same or similar arguments he made in opposing the deputies' motion for summary judgment, including his reliance on Hodari, Bella, Cole, and Lemery, and another case, Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir.2003), for the proposition intentional physical deadly force to restrain a suspect's movement is sufficient per se to constitute a seizure, regardless of whether his movement was substantially precluded or seriously encumbered. In making this argument, Mr. Brooks asserts Hodari stands for the proposition the `application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful,' is a seizure. 499 U.S. at 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547. He contends this was accomplished when he was struck by the bullet. He concludes that because Deputy Gaenzle applied physical deadly force with the intent of restraining his movement, a seizure occurred, regardless of whether his attempted apprehension was `ultimately unsuccessful' or he still had spring in his step days later at the time of his arrest. He alternatively contends his `pain[ed] or slowed' movement, as referenced by the district court, sufficiently constitutes a seizure, as it restrained his movement. As to his argument concerning the objective reasonableness of the force applied, Mr. Brooks again relies on Deputy Gaenzle's subjective statement concerning his assessment of the risk he posed, claiming such a subjective assessment may be considered. He also reasserts his claim his mere involvement in the burglary, where a shot was discharged at the deputies, is insufficient to establish he posed a threat to either Deputy Gaenzle or the community at large. We begin our discussion with our standard of review, as set forth in Reeves v. Churchich, 484 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir.2007): We review a grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity de novo, applying the same legal standard used by the district court. Summary judgment should be granted if the pleadings... together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In conducting our review, we view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. In an action under section 1983, individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless it is demonstrated that their alleged conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person in their positions would have known. Once a defendant has raised qualified immunity as an affirmative defense, the plaintiff bears the heavy two-part burden of demonstrating that (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct. Id. at 1250 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In this case, Deputies Gaenzle and Smith raised the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Thus, the threshold question is whether the officer[s'] conduct violated a constitutional right, when they shot him as he fled. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). Turning to whether a constitutional right was violated, [t]he Fourth Amendment protects individuals against `unreasonable searches and seizures.' Bella, 24 F.3d at 1255. To state a claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must show both that a `seizure' occurred and that the seizure was `unreasonable.' Id. The issue of what constitutes a seizure has been repeatedly addressed by the Supreme Court, from which we take instruction. In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held [a] seizure triggering the Fourth Amendment's protections occurs only when the officer has, by means of physical force or show of authority, ... in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.... 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In United States v. Mendenhall, the Supreme Court further explained a person is `seized' only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.  446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (emphasis added). In Garner, the Court applied this principle to a suspect flight situation where a police officer's fatal shooting of a fleeing suspect was deemed to constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure on grounds that [w]henever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away, he has seized that person. 471 U.S. at 7, 105 S.Ct. 1694. The Garner Court also stated there can be no question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. [5] Id. (emphasis added). Thus, from Terry, Mendenhall, and Garner, one can reasonably conclude a seizure requires restraint of one's freedom of movement and includes apprehension or capture by deadly force. However, they do not stand for the proposition, as Mr. Brooks contends, that use of deadly force alone constitutes a seizure. Instead, it is clear restraint of freedom of movement must occur. Subsequent Supreme Court cases determining what constitutes a seizure in flight situations also do not support Mr. Brooks's contention use of deadly force against him is enough alone to constitute a seizure. In Brower, a suspect was killed when the stolen car he was driving at high speeds to elude police crashed into a police roadblock intentionally put in place to stop him. 489 U.S. at 594-95, 598-99, 109 S.Ct. 1378. The Supreme Court determined this constituted a seizure, reasoning a seizure occurs if the person is stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place to achieve that result. Id. at 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378. In making this determination, the Supreme Court instructed: [A] Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur whenever there is a governmentally caused termination of an individual's freedom of movement (the innocent passerby), nor even where there is a governmentally caused and governmentally desired termination of an individual's freedom of movement (the fleeing felon), but only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied. Id. at 596-97, 109 S.Ct. 1378 (emphasis added). It further explained, a [v]iolation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control. Id. at 596, 109 S.Ct. 1378 (emphasis added). Applying these principles, the Court concluded the complaint sufficiently alleged the police sought to stop [Mr.] Brower by means of a roadblock and succeeded in doing so. Id. at 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378 (emphasis added). Applying these principles to the instant case, it is clear the gunfire which struck Mr. Brooks was intentional and intended to stop him, but he was not stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion for that purpose and, instead, he continued to flee and elude authorities for days. Under the circumstances, we cannot say authorities gained intentional acquisition of physical control over Mr. Brooks. Id. at 596, 109 S.Ct. 1378. Similarly, in Hodari, the Supreme Court determined a police officer's pursuit of a suspect constituted a show of authority enjoining him to halt, but no seizure occurred until the police officer tackled him because, until then, he did not yield or submit to the officer's show of authority. 499 U.S. at 622-24, 629, 111 S.Ct. 1547. In so concluding, the Court noted [t]he narrow question before us is whether, with respect to a show of authority as with respect to application of physical force, a seizure occurs even though the subject does not yield. Id. at 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (emphasis added). In determining a seizure did not occur until the physical act of tackling the suspect, it observed the common law connotation of the word seizure meant not merely to grasp or apply physical force, but to actually bring an object within physical control. See id. at 624, 111 S.Ct. 1547. It then discussed the common law definition of arrest, which it characterized as the quintessential `seizure of the person,' and pointed out common law defined arrest as the application of physical force with lawful authority, whether or not it succeeded in subduing the arrestee, including the laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful. Id. at 624, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547; see also Thomas v. Durastanti, 607 F.3d 655, 663 (10th Cir.2010) (pointing out the Supreme Court's discussion on this point constitutes dicta). This common law dicta is what Mr. Brooks relies on in stating Hodari stands for the proposition a seizure occurs per se when there is, as he asserts, an `application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful.' 499 U.S. at 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547. In support, he points out the Eleventh Circuit, in Vaughan, relied on Hodari for the same proposition. See 343 F.3d at 1329 n. 5. We further note the Eleventh Circuit applied the same dicta to conclude a bullet striking a suspect constituted a seizure, even though he was not stopped by the bullet but continued to flee by running to his house. See Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1265, 1268 (11th Cir.2003). But, in relying on the Hodari common law dicta, Mr. Brooks and these cases ignore the Hodari Court's further explanation: We have consulted the common-law to explain the meaning of seizure .... [and] neither usage nor common-law tradition makes an attempted seizure a seizure. The common law may have made an attempted seizure unlawful in certain circumstances; but it made many things unlawful, very few of which were elevated to constitutional proscriptions. 499 U.S. at 626 n. 2, 111 S.Ct. 1547. As the Supreme Court later clarified, the holding in Hodari centered on the proposition a police pursuit in attempting to seize a person does not amount to a `seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and its common law discussion merely illustrated the principle attempted seizures are beyond the Fourth Amendment's scope. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844-45 & n. 7, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). Moreover, when read in context and its entirety, Hodari clarifies that a seizure cannot occur unless a show of authority results in the suspect's submission. See 499 U.S. at 629, 111 S.Ct. 1547. In addition, as clearly indicated by Brower and other Supreme Court precedent reached prior to Hodari, some form of intentional acquisition of physical control, through termination of movement by physical force or submission to a show of authority, must occur in flight cases for a seizure to occur. Nothing in the Hodari discussion indicates an intent to overrule such precedent. Instead, we have expressly recognized Hodari must be reconciled or compared with the holding in Brower that a seizure requires `intentional acquisition of physical control' and occurs when `a person [is] stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve the result.' Thomas, 607 F.3d at 663 (citation omitted). Following Hodari and Lewis, the Supreme Court again considered what constitutes a seizure by summarizing, [a] person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government's action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains his freedom of movement, through means intentionally applied. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted and emphasis added). As to Hodari and Lewis, it further clarified, [a] police officer may make a seizure by a show of authority and without the use of physical force, but there is no seizure without actual submission; otherwise there is at most an attempted seizure, so far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned. Id. As to what constitutes actual submission, the Supreme Court explained it depends on the totality of the circumstancesthe whole picture, United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981), and, as the Brendlin Court offered, what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority; a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away. 551 U.S. at 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400. Not only have we applied these same principles in considering seizure situations, but none of our holdings suggest the mere use of physical force or show of authority alone, without termination of movement or submission, constitutes a seizure. For instance, in Reeves, we determined two individuals were not seized for the purpose of a Fourth Amendment violation when law enforcement officers pointed their guns at them and ordered them not to move, but they failed to submit to their assertions of authority. See 484 F.3d at 1248-50, 1253-54 & n. 17. In Latta v. Keryte, 118 F.3d 693 (10th Cir.1997), we held an officer did not seize a suspect during an interstate pursuit, even though he shot out two of the suspect's tires, given it did not cause [him] to submit to ... authority or succeed in stopping him. Id. at 700. Likewise, in Bella, we determined a seizure did not occur when a law enforcement officer shot at and struck a helicopter operated by an innocent hostage. 24 F.3d at 1254-56. We concluded that while the shots constituted an intentional assertion of authority, they did not cause the hostage to submit or otherwise succeed in stopping him, and therefore, it did not constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1255-56. Similarly, in this case, the intentional use of deadly force in shooting Mr. Brooks neither prevented his freedom of movement nor otherwise succeeded in stopping him. [6] While our holding in Bella supports the district court's decision Mr. Brooks was not seized by the gunshot, in that case we generally stated Hodari stood for the proposition a `seizure' occurs only when a fleeing person is physically touched by police or when he or she submits to a show of authority by police. 24 F.3d at 1255. We also relied on Hodari to generally suggest that when law enforcement officers shoot at a fleeing suspect, a `seizure' occurs only if the shot strikes the fleeing person or if the shot causes the fleeing person to submit to this show of authority. Id. It is apparent Mr. Brooks is relying on these general statements when citing to Bella and Cole to support the position a police officer effects a seizure the moment his bullet strikes a suspect who is his intended target. Apt. Br. at 11-12. But further explanation of Hodari, and our discussion of Hodari in Bella, is required here. As previously mentioned, in the portion of Hodari on which we relied in Bella, the Court was discussing common law seizures and arrests to explain the Fourth Amendment could not be stretched to cover attempted seizures by unsuccessful shows of authority, such as a pursuit. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 625-27, 111 S.Ct. 1547. In making this point, it stated: [Common law] arrest requires either physical force ... or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority. Mere words will not constitute an arrest, while, on the other hand, no actual, physical touching is essential. The apparent inconsistency in the two parts of this statement is explained by the fact that an assertion of authority and purpose to arrest followed by submission of the arrestee constitutes an arrest. There can be no arrest without either touching or submission. Id. at 626-27, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, as we explained in Bella, Hodari indicates no seizure can occur unless there is physical touch or a show of authority. But, as other Supreme Court precedent further instructs, such physical touch (or force) must terminate the suspect's movement, and, alternatively, any show of authority (without touch) must cause submission. Nothing in our reading of the statements in Hodari or Bella or their holdings causes us to believe that in flight situations mere intentional physical touch constitutes a seizure, absent termination of the suspect's movement. [7] As the district court in the instant case stated, the plain meaning of the word seizure and various Supreme Court interpretations indicate that the government must do something that gives it the opportunity to control the suspect's ability to evade capture or control. Apt. App. at 19. Unfortunately but understandably, Hodari and our general discussion in Bella have been incorrectly interpreted by Mr. Brooks to mean his shooting alone constitutes a seizure, without consideration of the fact he continued to flee without the deputies' acquisition of physical control, as demonstrated by the fact he remained at large for days. As to the other cases on which Mr. Brooks relies, the district court aptly noted his successful eluding of the police is different than what occurred in Brower, Garner, or Cole, where the officers' use of deadly force actually terminated the fleeing suspects' movement, either by killing them or immediately stopping them. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 594, 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378; Garner, 471 U.S. at 3-4, 7, 105 S.Ct. 1694; Cole, 993 F.2d at 1330, 1332-33. Similarly, in Hodari, no seizure occurred until the suspect was tackled and thereby stopped. See 499 U.S. at 629, 111 S.Ct. 1547. In Vaughan, on which Mr. Brooks also relies, a passenger was struck by a bullet fired by police in an attempt to stop him and the driver in a speeding vehicle. 343 F.3d at 1326-27. After the passenger was struck, the driver of the vehicle continued evasive action before losing control and crashing. Id. at 1327. The court determined the persons to be stopped in the vehicle were stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion ... to achieve that result, when an officer fired his weapon to stop the passenger and driver, and one of those bullets struck the passenger. Id. at 1329. But, unlike Vaughan, a significant difference exists here because the instrumentality meant to stop Mr. Brooksthe bullet from Deputy Gaenzle's gundid not stop him, and therefore, the intended result was not achieved. We are not alone in interpreting Supreme Court precedent as requiring intentional termination of movement or acquisition of physical control in flight situations, regardless of the force applied. See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 196 F.3d 762, 768 (7th Cir.1999) (holding there must be either a show of authority or a use of force which must have caused the fleeing individual to stop attempting escape); United States v. Hernandez, 27 F.3d 1403, 1405, 1406-07 (9th Cir.1994) (determining no seizure occurred when officer grabbed suspect, a struggle ensued, and suspect fled, as he was not seized because he never submitted to authority, nor was he physically subdued and further holding [a] seizure does not occur if an officer applies physical force in an attempt to detain a suspect but such force is ineffective); Cameron v. City of Pontiac, 813 F.2d 782, 785 (6th Cir.1987) (holding [t]he use of deadly force standing alone does not constitute a seizure, and absent an actual physical restraint or physical seizure, the alleged unreasonableness of the officers' conduct cannot serve as a basis for a § 1983 cause of action). Applying these legal principles concerning flight-type seizures to the instant case, we agree with the district court's assessment Deputy Gaenzle's gunshot may have intentionally struck Mr. Brooks but it clearly did not terminate his movement or otherwise cause the government to have physical control over him. This is evidenced by the fact he continued climbing the fence and eluding arrest for three days, after which, as the district court aptly noted, he still had enough spring in his step to evade police in the mall parking lot and cause them to chase him to a nearby house. Apt.App. at 23. As an alternative argument, Mr. Brooks relies on the district court's pronouncement the gunshot presumably pain[ed] him or slowed the pace of his escape to assert, seemingly for the first time on appeal, his `pain[ed] or slowed' movement sufficiently constitutes a seizure. [8] The only case he cites which can be construed to remotely support such a proposition is Lemery, an unpublished opinion where we relied on the aforementioned statements in Hodari and Bella to hold the momentary stopping of an individual, with a pepper ball shot to the eye before he walked away unpursued by police, constituted a `governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.' See Lemery, 323 Fed.Appx. at 649. But in that case, as well as in United States v. Morgan, [9] we dealt with momentary termination of the suspect's movement, and not pained or slowed movement, as argued here, and Mr. Brooks provides no other citation to authority which supports his contention pained or slowed movement is sufficient to constitute a seizure. We generally will not address issues not supported by citation to legal authority. See MacArthur v. San Juan County, 495 F.3d 1157, 1160-61 (10th Cir. 2007). In addition, [w]e have repeatedly declined to allow parties to assert for the first time on appeal legal theories not raised before the district court, even when they fall under the same general rubric as an argument presented to the district court. United States v. A.B., 529 F.3d 1275, 1279 n. 4 (10th Cir.2008). As a result, we need not further address Mr. Brooks's argument that pained or slowed movement is sufficient to constitute a seizure. As to his reliance on Lemery, even if we applied its non-precedential holding that a suspect's momentary termination of movement alone, caused by a pepper ball shot, constitutes a seizure, neither the record on appeal nor Mr. Brooks's arguments indicate Deputy Gaenzle's bullet momentarily stopped his escape and, instead, as the district court stated, it did not even temporarily halt[] it. Apt.App. at 21-22. For these reasons, we agree with the district court's assessment no genuine issue exists as to any material fact, and Deputies Gaenzle and Smith, as the moving parties, are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because Mr. Brooks has not demonstrated their alleged conduct violated a constitutional right by means of seizure, we need not consider the issue of whether the deputies' conduct was objectively reasonable, which is also required for a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.