Opinion ID: 2631205
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: monetary damages for the violation of a self-executing clause

Text: ¶ 19 This court addressed the availability of damages for constitutional violations in Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732 (Utah 1996). In Bott, we held that prisoners may collect damages from prison employees for violating the Unnecessary Rigor/Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. See id. at 739. We also stated more broadly that self-executing constitutional provisions allow for awards of money damages. Id. However, we did not clearly articulate the source of our authority to provide damages, nor did we clearly establish an analytical framework for determining when damages would be an appropriate remedy for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision. We do so now. ¶ 20 We begin by identifying the source of our authority to award damages for constitutional violations. Except for the Takings Clause, the Utah Constitution does not expressly provide damage remedies for constitutional violations. Thus, aside from the Takings Clause, there is no textual constitutional right to damages for one who suffers a constitutional tort. [5] Nor has the legislature enacted any laws authorizing damage claims for constitutional violations in general, or the violation of the Due Process Clause or the Open Education Clause in particular. [6] Thus, there is no express statutory right to damages for one who suffers a constitutional tort. [7] In the absence of applicable constitutional or statutory authority, Utah courts employ the common law. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1996). [8] Under the common law, individuals had access to remedies of money damages for violations of their individual rights, and these rights, enumerated in fundamental documents, were the forerunners of many of the provisions adopted in federal and state bills of rights. Bott, 922 P.2d at 739 (citations omitted). Hence, a Utah court's ability to award damages for violation of a self-executing constitutional provision rests on the common law. The Restatement (Second) of Torts supports this view. Restatement section 874A states that when no specific remedy is mentioned, a court may accord an appropriate remedy to one injured from the violation of a constitutional provision. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A & cmt. a (1979). [9] Comment (g) to section 874A suggests that a court's authority to do so arises from the common law. See id. cmt. g, at 306-07; see also Jennifer Friesen, State Constitutional Law § 7-5(c) (2d ed. 1996) (stating that section 874A espouses a common law doctrine). ¶ 21 This common law ability to award damages for constitutional violations requires policy decisions by the court, and it should be aware of them and face them candidly.... The court is not required to provide the civil remedy, and yet judicial tradition gives it the authority to do this under appropriate circumstances. The court has discretion and it must be careful to exercise that discretion cautiously and soundly. Restatement § 874A cmt. d, at 303. ¶ 22 To ensure that damage actions are permitted only under appropriate circumstances, we therefore hold that a plaintiff must establish the following three elements before he or she may proceed with a private suit for damages. ¶ 23 First, a plaintiff must establish that he or she suffered a flagrant violation of his or her constitutional rights. See Dick Fischer Dev. v. Department of Admin., 838 P.2d 263, 268 (Alaska 1992); see also Bott, 922 P.2d at 734-35, 739-40 (describing the level of defendants' culpability necessary to create damages liability). In essence, this means that a defendant must have violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). To be considered clearly established, [t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (citations omitted). The requirement that the unconstitutional conduct be flagrant ensures that a government employee is allowed the ordinary human frailties of forgetfulness, distractibility, or misjudgment without rendering [him or her]self liable for a constitutional violation. Bott, 922 P.2d at 739-40. ¶ 24 Second, a plaintiff must establish that existing remedies do not redress his or her injuries. [10] See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425, 108 S.Ct. 2460, 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988) (refusing to create a damages remedy for an alleged due process violation where Congress had provided meaningful safeguards or remedies); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) (same with respect to alleged First Amendment violation); Dick Fischer Dev., 838 P.2d at 268; Bonner v. City of Santa Ana, 45 Cal.App.4th 1465, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 671, 673, 676-78 (1996) (refusing to create damages remedy for alleged due process violation where alternative common law tort cause of action existed); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A cmt. h, at 309 (suggesting courts should consider the adequacy of existing remedies when deciding whether to provide a tort remedy). This second requirement is meant to ensure that courts use their common law remedial power cautiously and in favor of existing remedies. See Lynch v. Jacobsen, 55 Utah 129, 138-39, 184 P. 929, 933 (1919). We urge caution in light of the myriad policy considerations involved in a decision to award damages against a governmental agency and/or its employees for a constitutional violation. Moreover, we urge deference to existing remedies out of respect for separation of powers' principles. In general, the legislative branch has the authority, and in many cases is better suited, to establish appropriate remedies for individual injuries. By requiring courts to defer to relevant legislative determinations of appropriate remedies, we respect the legislature's important role in our constitutional system of government. ¶ 25 Third, a plaintiff must establish that equitable relief, such as an injunction, was and is wholly inadequate to protect the plaintiff's rights or redress his or her injuries. [11] See, e.g., Bott, 922 P.2d at 739 (stating that if prisoners' rights under article I, section 9 are violated, injunctive relief may not be adequate to remedy prisoners' injuries); see also, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979) (stating that damages are an appropriate remedy where plaintiff was unconstitutionally terminated from her job on a congressional staff because, in part, equitable relief in the form of reinstatement would be unavailing in light of the fact that her former employer was no longer a congressman); cf. Rockhouse Mountain Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Conway, 127 N.H. 593, 503 A.2d 1385, 1388 (1986) (stating that damages are an inappropriate remedy for a constitutional violation where the alleged injury can be undone by the judiciary). This final requirement is meant to take advantage of the meaningful role equitable relief can play in redressing constitutional injuries, [12] while not implicating so many of the difficult policy considerations raised by a decision to award damages. ¶ 26 If the Federal District Court concludes the foregoing requirements are satisfied, a trial on the merits should proceed as would any other tort claim.