Opinion ID: 1427055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: endorsement of client's check

Text: (5a) The hearing panel found, among other things, that petitioner had endorsed his client's signature to the estate distribution check without Torres' knowledge or consent. (6) An attorney who does so engages in serious misconduct. (E.g., Silver v. State Bar (1974) 13 Cal.3d 134, 144 [117 Cal. Rptr. 821, 528 P.2d 1157]; Himmel v. State Bar (1971) 4 Cal.3d 786, 798 [94 Cal. Rptr. 825, 484 P.2d 993].) (5b) Petitioner concedes he had no express authority from Torres, but he contends the broad power of attorney contained in the retainer agreement permitted him to endorse the check. We disagree. The form agreement declared that Torres retained petitioner to prosecute a claim against Client's Father's estate. It empowered petitioner to perform the said services for and on behalf of the client, and in his or her name, and to do all things which the attorney may deem necessary, appropriate, or advisable. (Italics added.) This general language was wholly ineffective to create the authority asserted. It simply confirmed that petitioner was to act as Torres' legal representative in the estate matter. Its words granted no specific power, express or implied, which would not exist in any event under the attorney-client relationship. (7) An attorney's general authority to pursue and collect a claim does not include the implied authority to endorse the client's signature on negotiable instruments payable to the client, since the agency can be fully performed without this power. Any such endorsement authority must be expressly granted. ( Navrides v. Zurich Ins. Co. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 698, 707, fn. 6 [97 Cal. Rptr. 309, 488 P.2d 637, 49 A.L.R.3d 828]; Helgeson v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1953) 116 Cal. App.2d Supp. 925, 927 [255 P.2d 484], disapproved on other grounds, Navrides, supra, at p. 712; see also Arcade Realty Co. v. Bank of Commerce (1919) 180 Cal. 318, 321 [181 P. 66, 12 A.L.R. 102]; Cignetti v. American Trust Co. (1956) 139 Cal. App.2d 744, 748 [294 P.2d 490], disapproved on other grounds, Navrides, supra, at p. 712.) [4] Our past disciplinary cases have assumed that representational authority alone does not constitute the client's consent to simulation of his signature on a draft payable in his name. ( Silver, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 144; Himmel, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 798.) [5] (5c) Since it is undisputed that Torres gave no actual consent to petitioner's endorsement, the finding of misconduct is valid. [6]