Opinion ID: 4514756
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Spica’s Report

Text: ¶30. Dickerson argues that the trial court erred by failing to rule on the admissibility of Dr. Spica’s report and further claims that the report should have been admitted because its conclusion that Dickerson was incompetent to stand trial was reliable. Dickerson further asserts that the report should have been admitted because it was competent and relevant 13 evidence. The State argues that Dickerson’s failure to obtain a ruling on his motion to admit the evidence constitutes a waiver. The State claims that despite the waiver, the trial court committed no error because it did not exclude the report and did consider it in determining Dickerson’s competency to proceed in post-conviction relief proceedings. ¶31. “[I]t is the responsibility of the movant to obtain a ruling from the court on motions . . . and failure to do so constitutes a waiver.” Smith v. State, 986 So. 2d 290, 296 (Miss. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d 613, 708 (Miss. 1997)). “[I]t is the duty of the objecting party to obtain a ruling from the trial court on objections, and . . . if the record includes no ruling by the trial court, the objections are waived for purpose of appeal.” Rials v. Duckworth, 822 So. 2d 283, 288 (Miss. 2002) (citing Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110, 120 (Miss. 1999)). ¶32. The facts of Franklin v. Lovitt Equip. Co., Inc., 420 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Miss. 1982), are similar to what occurred here. In Franklin, the appellant claimed that the trial court failed to consider parol evidence that the appellant offered to the court even though the record “clearly indicate[d] that the testimony in question was permitted to be introduced into evidence . . . .” Id. The appellant argued that the trial court failed to consider the evidence based on the fact that the trial court reserved ruling on the admissibility of the evidence when it was presented and then failed to enter a definitive ruling on its admissibility before rendering a final decision. Id. This Court concluded, “Although the chancellor never ruled on this issue, it must be assumed that he considered the parol evidence in rendering his final 14 decision.” Id. ¶33. At Dickerson’s competency hearing, Dickerson moved to have Dr. Spica’s report admitted into evidence, and the State objected based on relevancy. The trial court allowed Dr. Spica’s report to be marked for identification, noted the objection and reserved ruling on the admission of the report into evidence. After the conclusion of Dr. Spica’s testimony, the State renewed its objection to Dickerson’s motion to admit Dr. Spica’s report, and, again, the trial court reserved ruling on the matter. It was not until after both parties filed post-hearing briefs and the trial court had issued its Memorandum Decision and Order that Dickerson renewed his motion to admit Dr. Spica’s report into evidence. ¶34. Dickerson argues that Dr. Spica’s report should have been admitted as relevant evidence by citing Mississippi Rule of Evidence 401, which states that evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and if “the fact is of consequence in determining the case.” Miss. R. Evid. 401. Although the trial court failed to rule on the admissibility of Dr. Spica’s written report, it is clear that the trial court considered it from the language the court used in its Memorandum Decision and Order. In that order, the trial court wrote that it reviewed the written reports of both Dr. Storer and Dr. Spica in its determination of Dickerson’s competency to proceed in post-conviction proceedings. ¶35. We find that any error the trial court may have committed by failing to rule on the admissibility of Dr. Spica’s report would be a harmless error because the trial court did 15 consider Dr. Spica’s written report in its determination of Dickerson’s competency. ¶36. The trial court found Dickerson competent to proceed in post-conviction collateral relief proceedings after considering the conflicting evidence produced by each party and the conflicting reports and testimonies of the experts. When conflicting evidence capable of more than one reasonable interpretation is presented to the court, the trial judge, as with any finder of fact, is entitled to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to afford their testimony. Trim v. Trim, 33 So. 3d 471, 479 (Miss. 2010). Therefore, we find that it was within the discretion of the trial court to weigh the credibility of the doctors’ conflicting testimony and to choose between their competing interpretations. The trial court’s determination that Dickerson is competent to proceed was not manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. II. Whether the trial court erred by failing to apply the Dusky/Gammage Standard to determine competency to proceed in post-conviction relief proceedings. ¶37. Dickerson argues that the Dusky/Gammage standard is the only standard that exists for determining competency in a Mississippi courtroom. At the competency hearing, the State proffered that the standard for competency in post-conviction proceedings should be that the “[p]etitioner is competent to proceed in post-conviction review proceedings if he has sufficient present ability to consult with his attorneys with a rational understanding as to facts relevant to his case.” ¶38. The trial court noted that neither party cited any controlling authority setting forth the 16 standard that either asserted was applicable to competency determinations for post-conviction relief proceedings. The trial court even addressed standards for competency used by other states for competency determinations in post-conviction. The trial court explained that in Florida, a petitioner must identify specific factual matters that require competent consultation with counsel, and in Illinois, a petitioner must show why personal communication would be required between petitioner and counsel. ¶39. The trial court found that Dickerson has the sufficient present ability to consult his attorneys with a reasonable degree of rational understanding in investigating, preparing and presenting claims for post-conviction relief, as well as a rational and factual understanding of the nature and object of post-conviction proceedings. According to these findings of fact, the trial court determined that Dickerson was competent to proceed in post-conviction relief proceedings under any of the standards proffered by the parties or under the standards used by other states that acknowledge a right to competency during the post-conviction collateral relief stage.