Opinion ID: 2604689
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: RCW 69.50.435(a) Is Constitutional As Applied

Text: RCW 69.50.435(a) enhances the sentence for delivering controlled substances by 24 months when delivery occurs within certain proscribed areas including in a school or within 1,000 feet of school grounds. By enacting the school zone enhancement statute, the Legislature sought to discourage the violent and destructive drug culture in areas like schools and school grounds where children are customarily present. State v. Silva-Baltazar, 125 Wash.2d 472, 483, 886 P.2d 138 (1994); State v. Coria, 120 Wash.2d 156, 172-73, 839 P.2d 890 (1992); State v. Shannon, 77 Wash.App. 379, 383, 892 P.2d 757 (1995); State v. Vasquez, 80 Wash.App. 5, 10, 906 P.2d 351 (1995). For alternative school programs like YEP, which serve many students who have been drug involved, the need for a drug free zone is even more pressing. The majority's analysis ignores the legislative purpose in enacting RCW 69.50.435. The majority finds RCW 69.50.435(a) to violate due process as applied because drug dealers like Becker and Gantt would not have notice of their proximity to YEP and would not be apprised of YEP's presence had they contacted the SPI's records custodian. The majority adopts a conscientious drug dealer standard for the application of due process principles that is incorrect in light of our cases analyzing RCW 69.50.435(a). The majority assumes a conscientious drug dealer will carefully ascertain the locale of his or her dealing to scrupulously avoid sales in drug free zones. We have held drug dealers unreservedly assume the risk of sentence enhancement when dealing drugs in proscribed areas. RCW 69.50.435 is a strict liability statute and specifically indicates it is irrelevant whether a person is aware that he or she is carrying on the prohibited drug activity in a drug free zone: It is not a defense to a prosecution for a violation of this section that the person was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while in a school or school bus or within one thousand feet of the school or school bus route stop, in a public park, on a public transit vehicle, or in a public transit stop shelter, ... RCW 69.50.435(b). In Silva-Baltazar, we stated: [D]ue process does not require drug dealers know they are within a drug free zone for purposes of ... RCW 69.50.435. State v. Coria, 120 Wash.2d 156, 166, 839 P.2d 890 (1992).... RCW 69.50.435 is a strict liability statute.... Not only does the Legislature have an interest in imposing strict liability for certain drug activity in specific locations, it has explicitly done so.... [W]e have identified the purpose of RCW 69.50.435 as discouraging the development of the violent and destructive drug culture in areas where there are children. Coria, at 172-73 [839 P.2d 890]. All participants who are in areas in which the Legislature has determined that children are likely to be present pose an equal threat to the children in terms of exposure to drug activity. Silva-Baltazar, 125 Wash.2d at 482-83, 886 P.2d 138. See State v. Coria, 120 Wash.2d 156, 165, 839 P.2d 890 (1992) (due process requirement of fair notice does not require drug dealers to know they were dealing drugs inside a drug free zone). State v. Carter, 64 Wash.App. 90, 823 P.2d 523 (1992) (public parks); see also United States v. Falu, 776 F.2d 46, 49-50 (2d Cir.1985) (mens rea not required in federal statute similar to RCW 69.50.435). In Coria, we rejected the contention RCW 69.50.435 is unconstitutionally vague because the convicted dealer did not know he was dealing drugs within 1,000 feet of a school bus route stop. Coria, 120 Wash.2d at 167, 839 P.2d 890. We also rejected the contention that fair notice was lacking because the bus stops were not marked or signed or only intermittently used by school children. [1] It is true that the school bus route stops involved here, like most others, are not marked. Therefore, the defendants could not have immediately determined, simply by looking around during a drug sale, that they were nearby a school bus route stop. Nevertheless, information regarding the locations of the stops was available through such means as observing the gathering of schoolchildren waiting for their school buses, or contacting local schools or the director of transportation for the school district. It may be unrealistic, of course, to expect drug dealers to take these steps, but that is irrelevant to the question whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague. The defendants' failure to have been aware of the law and to have taken action to protect themselves against the enhanced penalty for their criminal conduct is no basis for declaring the statute unconstitutionally vague. Coria, 120 Wash.2d at 167, 839 P.2d 890 (emphasis added). There is no substantive difference between the unmarked school bus stops in Coria and the lack of YEP signage outside the Alaska Building. Under Silva-Baltazar, when Becker and Gantt engaged in drug dealing activity, they assumed the risk those activities might be within proscribed areas triggering sentence enhancement. The majority attempts to distinguish Coria, in which bus stop locations were discoverable through the school district transportation director's office, by asserting the YEP location is not on record with certain SPI personnel. Majority op. at 1325-26. [2] This argument is without merit. In Coria, we made clear the recording of bus stop routes with school officials provides one means of ascertaining the location of such stops, but it is not an absolute requirement. In Coria, the Court of Appeals expressed concerns regarding ascertaining the locations of the school bus route stops relating to the master map the school district submits to the SPI, including a perceived difficulty in gaining access to the master map. We dismissed these concerns, finding the master map reasonably accessible, but noted: In any case, the defendants did not need to gain access to the master map in order to have determined the locations of the school bus route stops involved here because that information was readily available through other means. Coria, 120 Wash.2d at 168, 839 P.2d 890. The Court of Appeals was also concerned with difficulties in interpreting the master map. These concerns we also dismissed stating, [a]gain, this is irrelevant because accessing the master map is not the only way of learning the locations of the school bus route stops. Id. Moreover, the statute in Coria defined school bus stops in terms of official maps. School bus route stops means a school bus stop as designated on maps submitted by school districts to the office of the superintendent of public instruction; ... RCW 69.50.435(f)(3). There is no such recorded location requirement contained in the statute's definition of school. RCW 69.50.435(f)(1). The record here shows that other means of readily ascertaining the location of YEP were available to Becker and Gantt. They could have called the Seattle School District regarding YEP. Had they looked at the Alaska Building's directory, they would have seen the entry Seattle Public Schools, Youth Education Program. Some 80 students participated in the program, whose hours ran from 7:45 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. The students could be seen leaving and entering the building via the Second Avenue entrance. The coming and going of students at normal school hours and the directory listing are readily ascertainable ways of discovering the presence of a drug free zone: [T]he type of conduct RCW 69.50.435 proscribes is clear. The absence of a requirement that the drug dealer knew he was in proximity to a school bus route stop does not offend the due process requirement of fair notice. Nor is due process offended by the fact that the statute places on drug dealers the burden of determining by readily understandable and available means the proximity of their illegal activities to school bus route stops. Coria, 120 Wash.2d at 169, 839 P.2d 890. The requirements of Coria are met in this case. Implicitly, the majority believes an alternative education program housed in a downtown office building without appurtenant property is not a school for purposes of the statute. The majority complains of a lack of a flag, surrounding sports fields, playgrounds, or other signs of a traditional school. Majority op. at 1325. The statute is not unconstitutional as applied to Becker and Gantt because YEP is a nontraditional school. Under RCW 69.50.435(a), YEP is an institution of learning with a curriculum below the college or university level which is maintained at public expense, thus meeting the definition of school under RCW 28A.150.010. YEP is funded and directed by the Seattle School District and provides instruction in high school level classes. It meets the RCW 28A.150.020 definition of common schools because it is maintained at public expense in [a] school district and carr[ies] on a program from kindergarten through twelfth grade or any part thereof. ... The language of the school zone enhancement statute is broad and unambiguous. A school includes all publicly funded instruction below 12th grade. Vasquez, 80 Wash.App. at 9, 906 P.2d 351. As the Court of Appeals noted in State v. Shannon, 77 Wash.App. 379, 892 P.2d 757 (1995): The penalty enhancement, for selling within 1,000 feet of the perimeter of school grounds, plainly extends the zone of protection outward from all real property comprising the school and supporting its activities. Appellant confuses school grounds with playground. School grounds is broader than shrubbery or playgrounds; it includes both the physical plant and appurtenant property, if any. Therefore, the absence of appurtenant property does not deprive a school of the drug free zone protection because the school's physical plant is part and parcel of school grounds. The 1,000 foot measurement of the prohibited zone is accomplished by extending radii outward around the property on which the school is located. Shannon, 77 Wash.App. at 382, 892 P.2d 757 (citations omitted). Coria, Silva-Baltazar, Vasquez, and Shannon are dispositive of appellants' due process claims. RCW 69.50.435 is a strict liability statute. As such, the absence of a requirement that the drug dealer must know he was in proximity to a sentence enhancement zone does not offend due process. Nor is due process offended by the fact the statute places on drug dealers the burden of determining by readily understandable and available means the proximity of their illegal activities to sentence enhancement zones. Vasquez and Shannon specifically and correctly applied RCW 69.50.435(a) to YEP. RCW 69.50.435 does not violate due process as applied to Becker and Gantt. [3]