Opinion ID: 2520807
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Martin's Parental Rights Were Properly Terminated Under AS 47.10.088.

Text: When the state petitions to terminate the rights of a parent under AS 47.10.088, the superior court must make several findings before termination may occur. First, it must find by clear and convincing evidence that the child has been subjected to conduct or conditions making the child a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011. [9] Second, it must find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has not remedied the conditions or conduct placing the child at risk, or has failed to make sufficient progress in a reasonable period of time such that the child remains at substantial risk of physical or mental injury. [10] Third, it must find by a preponderance of the evidence that DFYS made reasonable efforts to help the parent remedy the problematic behavior or conditions. [11] Finally, it must find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. [12] Martin challenges the superior court's findings on each of these issues. [13]
The superior court found that Amanda had been subjected to conditions causing her to be a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011. Martin contests the superior court's findings. [14]
The trial court found that Amanda was a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011(6), which provides in part that a child may be found to be in need of aid if the child has suffered substantial physical harm, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer substantial physical harm, as a result of conduct by or conditions created by the child's parent. Martin first argues that the trial court's holding was erroneous because he has never caused physical harm to Amanda in the past. But the trial court's ruling was specifically directed to the likelihood of future harm under AS 47.10.011(6); the state is not required to wait to intervene until a child has suffered actual harm. [15] Martin responds that the finding that he poses a risk of future harm is erroneous because his violent tendencies are not a condition created by him. We disagree. We analyze the totality of the State's evidence in assessing the risk of future physical harm to a child. [16] Looking at all of the evidence, it is clear that Martin has violent tendencies that pose a risk of future harm to Amanda. Martin kneed Hannah in the abdomen and shot her in the buttock while she was pregnant, and repeatedly threatened Hannah, her possessions, and her pets with guns. While in jail, he continued his threatening and controlling behavior toward Hannah, and also threatened the social worker. Martin himself admitted that he entered into confrontations with other prisoners while in jail, and that his attitude and disciplinary history in jail was poor, but he argues that he never directed violence at Amanda. We considered a similar argument in In re J.A., [17] where a parent argued that the previous violence between the parents had never placed the child in danger. We rejected that argument, noting that [t]he violent behavior of [the parents] need not have been directed at [the child] to place him in physical danger. As another court has acknowledged, [m]any violent acts could be committed in the child's presence, but not directed toward the child, in such a manner as to actually endanger the child's physical well-being. [18] Martin's reckless use of firearms, including shooting Hannah when she was pregnant with Amanda, shows that he would pose a significant risk of harm to Amanda in the future. Finally, and contrary to Martin's argument, it is irrelevant that much of the testimony comes solely from Hannah, because the trial court found her to be a credible witness, and we generally defer to the trial court on the issue of witness credibility. [19] We affirm the finding of the superior court.
Alaska Statute 47.10.011(8) provides in part that a child may be found in need of aid if conduct by or conditions created by the parent ... have ... (B) placed the child at substantial risk of mental injury as a result of (i) a pattern of rejecting, terrorizing, ignoring, isolating, or corrupting behavior that would, if continued, result in mental injury. The superior court found that the pattern of domestic violence described above constituted such terrorizing behavior that would, if continued, result in mental injury to [Amanda]. Martin's arguments regarding this subsection are essentially the same ones that he raises above: that Hannah is not a reliable witness, that his acts have never injured Amanda herself, and that his prior acts have not yet placed Amanda at risk. The statute itself directs the court to the question of whether the child would be mentally injured if the behavior is continued, thereby contemplating an analysis of future harm similar to that in subsection .011(6). As discussed above, the trial court's factual findings were amply supported by the record, and we agree that Martin's acts constitute terrorizing behavior. We have previously held that witnessing domestic violence is mentally harmful to children. [20] There was clear and convincing evidence that Martin's acts toward Hannah create a significant risk of mental injury to Amanda if continued.
Alaska Statute 47.10.088(a)(1)(B) requires the trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence either that the parent has not remedied his or her harmful conduct or conditions, or that the parent has failed to make enough progress within a reasonable time such that there is still a substantial risk of harm to the child. The superior court found by clear and convincing evidence that Martin had not remedied his violent conduct and anger management problems, because Martin compiled an impressive list of infractions while incarcerated based on his violent and confrontational behavior, to the point that he [was] in administrative segregation, and was thus unable even to obtain treatment for his poor anger management skills. Martin protests the trial court's finding that he committed infractions while in prison, arguing that the nature of his infractions was admitted over hearsay objections. But Martin himself admitted to disciplinary problems and confrontations while in prison. When this testimony is taken together with the testimony of Hannah and the social worker that Martin threatened them while he was in custody, the evidence is clear and convincing that Martin did not remedy his behavior and did not make sufficient progress under AS 47.10.088(a)(1)(B). In determining under AS 47.10.088(a)(1)(B) whether a parent has remedied his or her conduct, we also consider factors relating to the best interests of the child. [21] Martin argues that he was not given reasonable time to control his problems, did well until visitation with Amanda was cut off, and will be in jail for a sufficient length of time to be substantially improved when he is released. The guardian ad litem responds that a decade is not a reasonable period of time to remedy his behavior based on Amanda's age or needs. [22] We agree. Amanda was not yet two years old at the time of trial, and her need for permanency must reasonably limit the length of time accorded to Martin to remedy his behavior. The legislature has found that children under six years of age suffer tremendously when their bonding processes are interrupted, such that it is important to provide for an expedited placement procedure to ensure that all children, especially those under the age of six years, who have been removed from their homes are placed in permanent homes expeditiously. [23] By the time the trial ended in April 2002, Amanda had been in foster care for eighteen months, three months more than the upper limit set in AS 47.10.088(d)(1) [24] for the final disposition of a child's CINA placement. We affirm the trial court's finding that Martin had not remedied his conduct within a reasonable time.
Alaska Statute 47.10.088(a)(2) requires the court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that DFYS has made reasonable efforts to assist the parent in remedying harmful conduct or conditions, as required by AS 47.10.086. The superior court found that DFYS did all it could reasonably do until its efforts were excused by Martin's long sentence. Martin argues that DFYS's efforts were unreasonable because it delivered only the first case plan to him, a case worker met with him in person only once, and later case plans required further classes and good behavior even after he had been placed in maximum security. But we agree with the trial court that DFYS drew up a suitable case plan, including parenting classes and drug monitoring, and implemented it through telephonic contact until March 2001 when Martin's maximum security statuswhich resulted from Martin's own actions while in prisonprecluded him from taking further classes. DFYS also made reasonable efforts to provide Martin with visitation until it became clear that the visitation was harmful to Amanda. While Martin is in prison, the Department of Corrections rather than DFYS has primary responsibility for providing services to him; [25] after Martin was sentenced, the superior court was empowered to find that DFYS was not required to make efforts under AS 47.10.086(c)(10) because Martin was incarcerated and ... unavailable to care for the child during a significant period of the child's minority. The superior court made this finding. The superior court did not err in finding that DFYS complied with the reasonable efforts requirement.
The superior court found by a preponderance of the evidence under Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rule 18(c)(2)(C) that termination of parental rights was in Amanda's best interests. Martin disagrees and argues that it would be in the child's best interests instead to be gradually transitioned back into the care of her mother so that she could be raised by immediate family. But the question whether it would be in Amanda's best interests if Martin's rights were terminated is different from the question where Amanda's permanent placement should be. The court found that Martin is an untreated violent offender with little prospect at present of learning to control his behavior, Amanda does not know him, and at nearly two years old, she was of an age at which it was important not to disrupt the bonding that had occurred between her and her foster parents. These findings met AS 47.10.088(c)'s requirement that the court ... consider the best interests of the child.