Opinion ID: 3134725
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Venireperson Sandra Hersil

Text: Defendant contends, however, that, even if we uphold the death-qualification procedure used in this case, his sentence must be vacated and his cause remanded for a new sentencing hearing because the circuit court erred in excluding prospective juror Sandra Hersil for cause based on her opposition to the death penalty. During voir dire , when venireperson Sandra Hersil was asked about her views on the death penalty, she stated: “Well, I believe what the Lord has told us that an eye is for an eye and a tooth is for a tooth, but I don’t think in reality I could judge and put a person to death. And live myself without–I don’t know if I would have psychological, emotional or what kind of trauma. I would have trauma.” The circuit court then asked Hersil whether she would refuse to vote for the death penalty, regardless of the facts of the case. Hersil replied: “I think I could probably say in reality, if my child was involved or my grandchild I would definitely say I would believe I would vote for death. But I don’t know if I could do it for other people. I guess that’s a maternal instinct in me.” The circuit court asked Hersil if she meant that, in this case, she would not be able to vote for the death penalty, no matter what the facts were. Hersil stated: “Probably the only time I could do it [is] if it involved a small child.” At the request of counsel for both sides, the circuit court informed Hersil that, under Illinois law, a person could be eligible for the death penalty in certain circumstances and asked Hersil whether she could follow the law and vote for the death penalty if that were appropriate. Hersil responded: “I think I probably would. I don’t know that I could vote for it.” According to defendant, it was error to exclude Hersil for cause because, although she indicated that imposing the death penalty might cause her psychological or emotional trauma, she indicated a “clear willingness to set aside her personal feelings and follow the law.” A prospective juror may not be removed for cause merely because he or she expresses general objections or conscientious or religious scruples against the imposition of the death penalty. Witherspoon v. Illinois , 391 U.S. 510, 522, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 784-85, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 1776-77 (1968); People v. Shaw , 186 Ill. 2d 301, 316 (1998). For a venireperson’s views on the death penalty to justify excusing that person for cause, they must “ ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” Wainwright , 469 U.S. at 424, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 851-52, 105 S. Ct. at 852, quoting Adams v. Texas , 448 U.S. 38, 45, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581, 589, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2526 (1980); People v. Seuffer , 144 Ill. 2d 482, 505 (1991). Removal of a venireperson for cause is appropriate unless it is clear that the venireperson is willing to set aside his or her own beliefs in favor of the rule of law. Lockhart , 476 U.S. at 176, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 149-50, 106 S. Ct. at 1766; People v. Taylor , 166 Ill. 2d 414, 423-24 (1995); People v. Pitsonbarger , 142 Ill. 2d 353, 386 (1990). In determining whether a venireperson should be excused for cause, the venireperson’s remarks must be considered as a whole. People v. Gilliam , 172 Ill. 2d 484, 511 (1996). “A trial judge need not follow a set formula in posing questions on voir dire , and it may be appropriate to exclude a prospective juror even though the person has not expressed his or her views with meticulous precision.” People v. Cole , 172 Ill. 2d 85, 99 (1996). The circuit court’s determination as to whether a prospective juror should be excused for cause will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Terrell , 185 Ill. 2d 467, 489 (1998). We find that, viewed in their entirety, Hersil’s voir dire responses support the circuit court’s determination that her views on the death penalty would have “ ‘prevent[ed] or substantially impair[ed] the performance of [her] duties as a juror in accordance with [her] instructions and [her] oath’ ” (see Wainwright , 469 U.S. at 424, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 851-52, 105 S. Ct. at 852, quoting Adams v. Texas , 448 U.S. 38, 45, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581, 589, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2526 (1980)). While Hersil indicated that she believed she could vote in favor of imposing the death penalty if a relative or small child were the victim, she stated that, in other cases, she did not think she could impose the death penalty or did not know if she could. Her responses do not, as defendant claims, indicate a “clear willingness” to follow the law despite her personal feelings about the imposition of the death penalty. When specifically asked whether she could follow the law by imposing the death penalty in an appropriate case, Hersil initially responded that she “probably” would, but then stated that she did not know whether she could. It was not clear from these responses that Hersil would have been able to set aside her personal beliefs and follow the law. See Lockhart , 476 U.S. at 176, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 149-50, 106 S. Ct. at 1766; Taylor , 166 Ill. 2d at 423 . In other cases involving voir dire responses similar to Hersil’s, this court has held that the circuit court properly excused the prospective jurors for cause. For example, in People v. Cole , 172 Ill. 2d 85, 100 (1996), the prospective juror initially stated that she did not really believe in the death penalty and did not know whether she could vote to impose it. The prospective juror then asserted that she would be able to follow the law and vote to impose the death penalty in an appropriate case but subsequently stated that she did not think she would be able to sign a verdict in favor of the death penalty. This court concluded that, when the prospective juror’s remarks were viewed as a whole, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excusing her for cause. Cole , 172 Ill. 2d at 100; see also Taylor , 166 Ill. 2d at 424. As in Cole , Hersil’s responses to questioning about her ability to follow the law were equivocal and indicated that she would not be able to vote in favor of the death penalty. The circuit court was in a superior position to evaluate the meaning of Hersil’s responses (see People v. Hickey , 178 Ill. 2d 256, 295-96 (1997)), and we cannot conclude based on the record that it abused its discretion in excusing her for cause. We find no error in the voir dire of prospective jurors for defendant’s sentencing hearing.