Opinion ID: 2355508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stop and Detention

Text: ¶ 15 Tribal police officers are often first responders when problems arise on reservations, but it is not always apparent during the investigation stage whether the tribe possesses jurisdiction over the offender. [6] In recognition of this problem, the United States Supreme Court has consistently affirmed that tribal police have authority to stop and detain non-Indian offenders until they can be turned over to authorities with jurisdiction. See, e.g., Duro, 495 U.S. at 697, 110 S.Ct. 2053 (Where jurisdiction to try and punish an offender rests outside the tribe, tribal officers may exercise their power to detain the offender and transport him to the proper authorities.); Strate, 520 U.S. at 456 n. 11, 117 S.Ct. 1404 (We do not here question the authority of tribal police ... to detain and turn over to state officers nonmembers stopped on the highway for conduct violating state law. (quoting Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d at 390, 850 P.2d 1332)); see also Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208, 98 S.Ct. 1011. ¶ 16 This court, along with the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, has also held tribal police have inherent authority to stop non-Indians who violate the law on public roads within the reservation and detain them until they can be turned over to state authorities. See, e.g., Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d at 396, 850 P.2d 1332; Ortiz-Barraza, 512 F.2d at 1180 (holding that a tribal officer was authorized to stop and search non-Indian driver on the reservation); United States v. Terry, 400 F.3d 575, 579-80 (8th Cir.2005) (upholding overnight detention of a non-Indian in a tribal jail when state law enforcement officials could not take custody until the next morning). [7] The superior court therefore correctly looked to this court's analysis in Schmuck as a starting point. ¶ 17 In Schmuck we held: Indian tribes are limited sovereigns which retain the power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal and civil laws. This power necessarily includes the authority to stop a driver on the reservation to investigate a possible violation of tribal law and determine if the driver is an Indian, subject to the jurisdiction of that law. Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d at 380, 850 P.2d 1332. As in Schmuck, the Lummi Nation does not assert authority to arrest and prosecute Eriksen for DUI but merely claims the power to stop and detain her until she could be turned over to Whatcom County officials. Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d at 379, 850 P.2d 1332. [8] ¶ 18 Absent controlling federal law, tribes retain jurisdiction over events in Indian country: Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, supported by a host of decisions, is that those powers lawfully vested in an Indian nation are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather `inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.' COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.01[1][a] at 206 (2005) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978)). Therefore, Congress may constitutionally execute provisions of a treaty even if doing so affects state interests. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 203-05, 95 S.Ct. 944, 43 L.Ed.2d 129 (1975) (absence of state as party to hunting and fishing agreements did not detract from validity). Congress's authority over Indian affairs is plenary and exclusive, which refers to supremacy of federal over state law. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-71, 99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979). In Schmuck, we recognized that tribes retain their existing sovereign powers until Congress acts, 121 Wash.2d at 380, 850 P.2d 1332, even though the nature of tribes' sovereign powers is necessarily reduced by virtue of their dependent status. ¶ 19 As sovereigns, tribes exercise at least concurrent jurisdiction over all crimes committed by Indians in Indian country. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 328-29, 98 S.Ct. 1079. Tribes have an inherent power of self-governance, which includes the power to prescribe and enforce internal laws, including a traffic code. Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d at 381-82, 850 P.2d 1332 (citing Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326, 98 S.Ct. 1079). Fundamental to enforcing any traffic code is the authority by tribal officers to stop vehicles violating that code on roads within a reservation. Id. at 382, 98 S.Ct. 1079. In Schmuck we stated: Only by stopping the vehicle could [the officer] determine whether the driver was a tribal member, subject to the jurisdiction of the Tribe's traffic code. The alternative would put tribal officers in the impossible position of being unable to stop any driver for fear they would make an unlawful stop of a non-Indian. Such a result would seriously undercut the Tribe's ability to enforce tribal law and would render the traffic code virtually meaningless. Id. at 383, 850 P.2d 1332. ¶ 20 Schmuck therefore recognized that stops are essential components of the tribe's sovereign power to make and enforce its own traffic laws against its own members. While Strate later narrowed Montana 's second exception to those cases where the tribe's actions are `necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations,' here the Lummi Nation seeks to do exactly that. Strate, 520 U.S. at 459, 117 S.Ct. 1404 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564, 101 S.Ct. 1245). To stop offending motorists, the tribe calls upon `the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.' Id. (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959)). For the tribe to make and enforce its own laws, it must necessarily be able to stop drivers who offend the tribe's traffic code to see if they fall under the tribe's jurisdiction. This requirement fits squarely into Montana 's second exception. ¶ 21 Regarding the authority to detain, after a stop is made an express treaty provision requires tribal officers to detain non-Indian offenders until state authorities are able to assume custody. In 1855, the Lummi Nation and the United States entered into the Treaty of Point Elliott, which established the Lummi Reservation. Treaty between the United States and the Dwámish, Suguámish, and other allied and subordinate Tribes of Indians in Washington Territory, Jan. 22, 1855, art. 9, 12 Stat. 927 (hereinafter Treaty of Point Elliott). [9] Article 9 of the treaty expressly provides that the tribes shall turn over to government authorities anyone who violates United States law: [T]he said tribes agree not to shelter or conceal offenders against the laws of the United States, but to deliver them up to the authorities for trial. Thus the Lummi Nation is obliged by treaty to turn over lawbreakers rather than create safe havens for them to act with impunity. See Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d at 384-85, 850 P.2d 1332 (noting article 9 reflected concern that non-Indians would attempt to avoid prosecution by hiding out on reservations (citing H.R.Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., at 98 (1834))). Accordingly, the Lummi Nation is empowered by the terms of the Treaty of Point Elliott to detain offenders until state officials can take custody. See Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d at 383-86, 850 P.2d 1332. [10] The Lummi Nation therefore has authority to stop, under its sovereign authority, and detain, pursuant to the Treaty of Point Elliott, non-Indian offenders who violate traffic laws until state authorities can assume custody.