Opinion ID: 1191239
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: contention: initiative measure 282 is unconstitutional because it purports to diminish the salaries of state elected officials and of the judiciary during the term for which they were elected

Text: To reach this conclusion, petitioners must start with the major premise that they first received an increase of compensation during their term of office by reason of Laws of 1973, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 137, § 110, which compensation was subsequently reduced by initiative measure 282. The major premise is faulty; the conclusion is fallacious. In 1968, article 30, section 1, of the state constitution was adopted. It provides: The compensation of all elective ... state ... officers who do not fix their own compensation, including judges of courts of record ... may be increased during their terms of office to the end that such officers and judges shall each severally receive compensation for their services in accordance with the law in effect at the time the services are being rendered. (Italics ours.) What was the law in effect January 1, 1974? [6] Prior to Laws of 1973, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 137, § 110, the officials and judges were receiving salaries prescribed by prior legislation that had been in effect for several years. The increase provided by section 110 did not become effective until January 1, 1974. This is not unique. Some other sections of Laws of 1973, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 137  an appropriation bill  do not apply immediately or become effective until future dates. For us to determine now that they become effective immediately might produce some fantastic results. The legislature, in the absence of constitutional restraint, may fix any time in the future as the time when a statute shall become effective. State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 148 P. 28 (1915). It is a cardinal rule that a statute passed to take effect at a later date speaks from the time it becomes operative and not from the time of its passage. In Walker v. Lanning, 74 Wash. 253, 256, 133 P. 462 (1913), the court quoted with approval as follows: Until the time arrives when it is to take effect and be in force, a statute which has been passed by both houses of the legislature and approved by the executive has no force whatever for any purpose, and all acts purporting to have been done under it prior to that time are void. 36 Cyc. 1192. (Italics ours.) Without more, the increased salaries would have become effective January 1, 1974. Meanwhile, however, the voters amended section 110 by initiative measure 282. Its adoption was certified by the Governor December 6, 1973. It became effective January 1, 1974, as the only valid salary-increase legislation for state elected officials and the judiciary which is now in effect. Both being validly enacted statutes, the one last in time  the initiative  controls. No state official or judge had acquired a vested interest in a salary increase until January 1, 1974. Accordingly, there was no reduction of salary of any state official or judge. On the contrary, there was a salary increase. Other subsidiary contentions have been made, but we do not consider them of moment, controlling, or necessary to our decision. To discuss them would unduly extend the length of this opinion. In summary, initiative measure 282 is an effective amendment of Laws of 1973, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 137, § 110, and the order restraining the State Treasurer from paying salaries pursuant to said section 110 is made permanent. The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Secretary of State is dismissed with prejudice. It is so ordered. DONWORTH, RYAN, STIGER, KALE, CRAMER, and STUNTZ, JJ. Pro Tem., concur. WICKS, J. [] (dissenting) In my opinion the issues in this case are res judicata. They have all been fully and completely settled, determined and disposed of in State ex rel. Helm v. Kramer, 82 Wn.2d 307, 510 P.2d 1110. The purpose and intent of petitioner in the Helm case was exactly the same as that of the proponents of initiative measure 282, to have the people approve or reject at the polls an item, section or part of a law passed by the legislature, section 110, chapter 137, Laws of 1973, first extraordinary session. In that case the petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to accept for filing documents tendered to him for referendum so the people might approve or reject at the polls section 110 which provided a substantial increase in the annual compensation to be paid the elected state officials therein mentioned. The action was founded on the referendum portion, article 2, section 1, amendment 7, of the state constitution, which provides: (b) Referendum. The second power reserved by the people is the referendum, and it may be ordered on any act, bill, law, or any part thereof passed by the legislature, except such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of the state government and its existing public institutions, ... (Italics mine.) The exceptions mentioned in this paragraph of the constitution are frequently referred to as emergency provisions. This has doubtless come about by reason of the word immediate. But the word immediate is not controlling. These are provisions that limit the use of the referendum. They restrict its use and were included for a very definite and specific reason. They must be read and given the same solemnity as the other provisions of the article. Chapter 137 contained these restrictive clauses and the court in the Helm case, by reason thereof, correctly held section 110 was not subject to referendum. The petitioner in the Helm case being thus prevented from presenting to the people the issue of the increase in compensation as provided in section 110, sought some other avenue to present the issue to the people, the use of the initiative. The first paragraph of article 2, section 1, amendment 7, provides: the people reserve to themselves the power to propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, ... (Italics mine.) Paragraph (a) that immediately follows reaffirms the initiative provision in the first paragraph and provides the mechanics for its use. The powers of initiative and referendum are separate and distinct. By the initiative the people propose bills, laws, and ... enact or reject the same at the polls. By the referendum the people may order it on any act, bill, law, or any part thereof passed by the legislature with certain enumerated exceptions. The purpose of the referendum is for the people to determine at the polls whether they approve or reject an act, bill, law, or any part thereof passed by the legislature. To determine the issue of whether initiative 282 is an unconstitutional use of the initiative process and is in fact, a referendum we must look to the substance, purpose and intent of the proponents. In State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, 107 Wash. 167, 181 P. 920, the court, in examining the provisions of article 2, section 1, having specific reference to the referendum provision, said: The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled by mere pretences. They are at liberty  indeed, are under a solemn duty to look to the substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661. (Italics mine.) Looking then at the substance of initiative 282 we find it nothing more than a pretense in an attempt to use the initiative as a referendum to avoid the emergency or rather restrictive provision of the referendum provisions of the constitution. It is argued that initiative 282 is a bill or law as those terms are used in the initiative provisions of the constitution; that it is something new or different from section 110. I don't find it so. The provisions for increases in initiative 282 are the same as in section 110 but in a lesser amount. Initiative 282 is a reenactment of section 110 but rejecting any increase over and above 5.5 percent. That this was the purpose and intent of the proponents of initiative 282 is demonstrated in section 1, wherein the proposed respective salaries are set forth: Schedule of Annual Salaries Executive Officials Governor ................................. $ ( (47,300)) 34,300 Lieutenant Governor ...................... $ ( (22,000)) 10,600 Attorney General ......................... $ ( (37,950)) 24,300 Superintendent of Public Instruction ..... $ ( (37,950)) 23,750 Commissioner of Public Lands ............. $ ( (33,000)) 21,100 Auditor .................................. $ ( (29,700)) 17,400 Insurance Commissioner ................... $ ( (29,700)) 17,400 Secretary of State ....................... $ ( (26,400)) 15,800 Treasurer ................................ $ ( (26,400)) 15,800 Judicial Officials Supreme Court ............................ $ ((38,000)) 34,825 Court of Appeals ......................... $ ((35,000)) 31,650 Superior Court ........................... $ ((32,000)) 28,500 Full Time District Court Judges: PROVIDED, That no funds shall be allocated from this appropriation to implement these salary increases ................................ $ ((26,000)) 23,250 Legislative Officials Legislators .............................. $ ((10,560)) 3,800 It will be noted the increases provided in section 110 are set forth and stricken and a lesser amount set opposite the name of each officer. Presumably, the lesser amount is 5.5 percent above the old schedule. This is clearly a proposal to present to the people an opportunity to determine at the polls a rejection or approval of a section of a law passed by the legislature; clearly a referendum function. Initiative 282 added nothing, it gave nothing that was not provided in section 110. To carry this thought a step further, suppose initiative 282 had provided section 110 be amended by striking the increases therein provided. It is obvious such a proposal would be a referendum and subject to the restrictive clauses of the referendum provision. Suppose it had provided section 110 be amended by providing the annual compensation of these officials should be increased by 1 cent. It would seem clear such a proposal would be an attempt by the proponents to use the initiative process as a means of evading the restrictive provisions of the referendum. An attempt by the initiative process to approve or reject a part of an act passed by the legislature. It still would have all the ear marks of a referendum. There is no magic in the 5.5 percent increase provided in initiative 282. It is still a proposal to present to the people for their determination at the polls the question of whether they approve or reject a section of an act passed by the legislature  an attempt by the initiative process to circumvent the restrictive clause of the referendum. To hold otherwise is to open an avenue whereby any act, bill [or] law passed by the legislature may be presented to the people as an initiative by adding the simplest phrase or clause calling it an amendment. This would make the restrictive clauses of the referendum meaningless. Such was not the intent and purpose of the people in the adoption of amendment 7 and subsequent amendments thereto. The order restraining the State Treasurer from paying salaries pursuant to section 110 should be vacated. The writ of prohibition against the Secretary of State should have been granted. KELLY, J. [] (dissenting) I concur generally in Judge Wicks' dissent, and would add the following: The primary question in this case is a constitutional one. Initiatives, including initiative 282, are subject to the same scrutiny and limitations as any other enactment, and have at times been declared unconstitutional. See State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Court, 92 Wash. 16, 159 P. 92 (1916); Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d 81 (1933); Gilman v. State Tax Comm'n, 32 Wn.2d 480, 202 P.2d 443 (1949); Ford v. Logan, 79 Wn.2d 147, 483 P.2d 1247 (1971). The appropriation bill, chapter 137, first extraordinary session, passed by the state Senate and House of Representatives, and signed by the Governor April 24, 1973, substantially embodied the recommendations of the duly and legally appointed state committee on salaries created by statute. RCW 43.03.027-.047. See State ex rel. Helm v. Kramer, 82 Wn.2d 307, 510 P.2d 1110 (1973), for personnel of the committee. This committee was created and acted before the convening of the legislature that passed chapter 137, including section 110, against which initiative 282 was directed. The measure contained the usual emergency clause found in budget bills, providing for the support and orderly functioning of state government. If there is a conflict between the constitutional power specifically vested in the duly elected state legislature, pursuant to amendment 20 of the state constitution, and the nebulous reservation of power claimed by the proponents of initiative 282, within the framework, background and history of this case (and there is: amendment 7, article 2, section 1(a) and (b) state constitution), the latter must give way to the former; the latter being an unconstitutional attempt, under the guise of an initiative, to deprive the constitutional legislature of its specific constitutional power, by a tortuous interpretation and application of parts of amendment 7. Kramer has held this cannot be done by referendum. Does greater constitutional power repose in the approach by initiative? My answer is no. It is an attempt to do the same thing. Where will it end? It should end here. We should hold that the specificity of the constitutional power vested in the duly elected legislature clearly outweighs, and is paramount, in this case, under any interpretation of the law, to the power claimed reserved under the initiative provisions of the state constitution. To vacillate and procrastinate at this stage is to invite chaos and confusion. The majority seems willing to take that chance. I do not think we should. That uncertainty exists in the minds of the court majority is reflected in a quotation from their opinion: We reject the contention ... that appropriate constitutional provisions do not apply to initiatives. To do otherwise would be a recognition that we have an initiative process governed by men and not by law. Nothing in this opinion is to be interpreted as opening a Pandora's box, releasing a runaway, uncontrolled initiative process. In my opinion that is just what the majority is doing, notwithstanding the disclaimer. The latent fear or possibility implied in the foregoing quotation has become a reality, and an invitation to do likewise in reference to any act of the legislature pertaining to the budget, even though the latter in many instances is predicated upon the recommendation, through the Governor, of a statutorily appointed state committee on salaries. It means that through an initiative, the whole or any part of a given budget dealing with salaries can be amended or nullified. This will result in the breakdown of the entire legislative system, an end surely not contemplated or intended by those who desire to maintain the orderly, albeit, sometimes slow, processes of the law. To use the power of the initiative process in that way, in my opinion, is unconstitutional, and should not be sanctioned by this court in this case. I dissent.