Opinion ID: 2157405
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Villa Case.

Text: The primary facts were found by the Committee and appear to be undisputed. The following statement for the most part is based on these findings, supplemented by the Court's examination of the record. On May 23, 1953, Lieutenant Charles Villa, an Air Force Pilot stationed at the Dover Air Force Base, bought a Mercury automobile from Biter's Auto Service, Inc., automobile dealers in Dover. The total consideration was $3,123.04, made up as follows: Trade-in allowance for Ford car ........................... $1,745.60 Note to finance company secured by conditional sales contract.. 1,000.00 Personal Note .................. 357.44 Cash ........................... 20.00. Villa believed he was buying a new 1953 Mercury. The price was that fixed for a new car. The purchase order signed by him and accepted by Edward P. Biter, President of the corporation, specified a new car. In fact, the car was not new. As Biter and the salesman knew, it was a used car. It had been driven about 800 miles, had been involved in an accident, and had been traded in to Biter's by the prior owner. The speedometer had been turned back (by whom, does not appear) to show only eight miles of driving. By chance Villa learned the facts a few days later. Incensed, he consulted Lieutenant H. M. Finkelstein, then Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, at the Air Base, who told him to see Ridgely, the Deputy Attorney General. Finkelstein then called Ridgely on the telephone, stated the facts, and expressed his opinion that a violation of the criminal law was involved. Ridgely told Finkelstein to have Villa come to his (Ridgely's) office. Although Finkelstein cautioned Villa not to let his anger against Biter lead him to overlook his own financial interests, it is quite clear from the evidence that Villa was referred to Ridgely in the latter's official capacity. On Thursday, May 28th, Villa went to Ridgely's office on the Green in Dover. He told Ridgely the facts, and demanded prosecution  he wanted to hang Biter. Ridgely believed that the facts justified criminal proceedings, but sought to dissuade Villa from immediate prosecution because he thought such a course would delay a civil settlement. While Villa was there Ridgely telephoned the Biter office and talked to Mr. Murphy, the salesman. Ridgely told Murphy that Lieutenant Villa was with him, complaining that he (Villa) had been gypped in his purchase of the car, and that Villa was pretty well burned up about it. Ridgely asked Murphy to have Biter call him. Biter did not call him back, and on the following day (Friday, May 29th), Ridgely called Biter. Ridgely told Biter of Villa's complaint, and Biter admitted that his company had sold a used car as a new one. Ridgely questioned him about returning the Ford that Villa had traded in. Biter said it had been sold. Ridgely said Lieutenant Villa wanted to call off the transaction and would not take a new Mercury under any circumstances. Ridgely suggested, in effect, that Biter settle the matter. Ridgely testified: I stated to him, that in the interests of his corporation, that a matter like this, if it got spread all around the community, that it would damage his reputation, and that he should seriously consider putting everything back the way it was before it happened. Shortly after this conversation Villa returned to Ridgely's office. He renewed his request for criminal action. Ridgely again advised against immediate criminal prosecution, but Villa wanted it. Ridgely sent him to the Attorney General's office, where his statement of facts was reduced to writing. He then swore out warrants before the Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas for the arrest of Biter and Murphy on charges of obtaining money by false pretences. However, Ridgely directed his secretary to instruct the Clerk of the Court to hold the warrants and not to serve them. Asked why he held up the warrants, Ridgely testified: Well, if Mr. Biter had been arrested I felt reasonably certain that, as a defendant in a criminal action, he wouldn't pay off the money, or pay back to Lieutenant Villa what he had involved in the transaction or call it off. He might eventually, but not in the foreseeable future. After swearing out warrants Villa returned to Ridgely's office. The matter of recovering his car was discussed. Apparently Villa asked whether a civil settlement would interfere with prosecution, and Ridgely said it would not. Ridgely called Biter, and the possible recovery of Villa's car, or alternatively, a payment to Villa of the trade-in price, was discussed, but nothing was agreed upon. Ridgely advised Villa to go to Biter's, taking some one with him, and obtain, if possible, some sort of statements or admissions. Nothing seems to have occurred with respect to the case during the following three days (Saturday, Sunday and Monday), except that on Monday, June 1st, Ridgely again told his secretary that the warrants should not be served. On Tuesday, June 2nd, Villa came again to Ridgely's office. As a result of Ridgely's recommendations, he had decided to accept restitution, and told Ridgely he would take his money back  that is, an amount representing the value of the Ford car that he had traded in. Ridgely telephoned Biter to this effect, and told Biter that Villa would come to discuss the matter. Before Villa left his office, Ridgely told him there would be an attorney's fee, and suggested that Villa get Biter to pay it. The amount was not mentioned. Villa went to see Biter. There is no substantial dispute as to what occurred. Villa asked for $1800 (the trade-in value of his Ford plus $35 of expenses), the cancellation of his obligations, and an attorney's fee. Without any haggling Biter immediately agreed to these terms. The amount of the fee was not mentioned. On the following day (June 3d) the settlement was consummated on the agreed basis. Ridgely then stated that his fee would be $624, representing twenty per cent of $3,120, the approximate total of the amounts of Villa's obligations and the trade-in value of the car. Biter was amazed and surprised (according to Villa, he got kind of choked up), and said (in effect) that if he had thought it was going to be that much, he would have let the customer take legal proceedings. [1] Without further demur, however, he paid the bill. He subsequently wrote Ridgely, complaining about the amount of the fee, but Ridgely refused to reduce it. Ridgely never took any further steps to prosecute the criminal charges. In early December a resident of Dover sent a letter to the press purporting to state the facts of the Villa-Biter settlement. Informed of the contents of the letter, the Attorney General telephoned Ridgely for an explanation. In order to confirm his report to his superior officer, Ridgely sent for Biter and asked him to talk to the Attorney General. Biter refused to talk until he consulted his lawyer. Later he did talk. Ridgely, at the request of the Attorney General, wrote a letter for the newspapers in justification or explanation of his conduct. This letter contained four statements that Ridgely now admits to have been erroneous: (1) that the matter began as a civil one and had no connection with the Attorney General's office; (2) that he had been retained on the basis of the amount collected; (3) that Villa without any investigation or advice secured warrants of arrest; and (4) that after the issuance of the warrants, he (Ridgely) requested that no further action be taken until complete details were made available. Upon publication of these letters this Court directed the Censor Committee to proceed with an investigation of Ridgely's conduct. The findings of the Censor Committee upon the Villa matter are to the effect that Ridgely's conduct was unprofessional in that it was (1) a violation of certain of the canons of professional and judicial ethics, and (2) a violation of his duty as a public officer in that he had placed himself in a position where his personal interests were opposed to his duty to the public. We think it unnecessary to determine whether this case falls within the language of the canons cited by the Committee. [2] Their underlying intent is to apply to the conduct of the lawyer the injunction that no man can serve two masters. A lawyer cannot represent conflicting interests, because he owes to every client the duty of undivided loyalty. In civil cases he may ordinarily choose between two clients whose interests conflict, with full disclosure when required. But a public prosecutor permitted to engage in private practice has no such freedom of choice. His private interest must yield to the public one. The facts of the Villa matter show beyond doubt that Ridgely subordinated the public interest to his own. From the beginning he treated Villa as a possible client. According to his testimony, he felt that from the time of his first interview with Villa he was aiding and advising Villa as a private attorney. Speaking of his dealings with Villa, he testified: A. He [Villa] was just a difficult client to try to keep going along a path that would serve his own best interests. Q. As he saw it? A. As I saw it. From this point of view it was natural for him to discourage prosecution and advise a civil settlement. Before Villa was content to withhold prosecution, Ridgely undertook to negotiate such a settlement. Moreover, his suggestion to Biter that it was to the latter's interest to avoid public knowledge of the matter was necessarily inconsistent with any intention to prosecute. He believed that Villa's interests required civil action, and that criminal proceedings would prejudice civil recovery. After the warrants had been sworn out, he directed the Court Clerk not to serve them. He finally persuaded Villa to withhold prosecution and accept restitution. In all this he acted as an attorney would act for a private client  the client's interest came first. It necessarily follows that, as the Committee concluded, he violated the duty that he owed to the public. In explaining his actions before the Censor Committee, Ridgely sought to show that the case against Biter was weak because the car sold to Villa was probably worth what was paid for it. [3] That argument was also made before us. He also expressed to the Committee an opinion that the misrepresentation in respect of the mileage driven, effected by turning back the speedometer, was not a material misrepresentation. These suggestions have no merit. To sell a used automobile as a new one and turn back its speedometer to conceal its mileage is an extremely shoddy piece of business, to say the least, and reflects no credit upon those who participated in it. Certainly, as Ridgely conceded, a prosecution could be founded upon it. But this is not the point of the matter. What Ridgely undertook to do was, as Deputy Attorney General, to withhold prosecution because, as Villa's private attorney, he thought that prosecution conflicted with Villa's interests. It is quite true that there are cases of criminal fraud or injury to property in which the prosecuting officer may properly determine that the public interest will not be prejudiced by withholding prosecution if full restitution is made. But in other cases the violation of law may be so serious that he should listen to no suggestion that the prosecution be dropped. Now, the exercise of this power by the prosecuting officer  the decision to prosecute or not to prosecute fraud cases  involves the performance of one of the most difficult and delicate functions of his office. It requires the weighing and balancing of interests that may, and often do, conflict  those of the public and those of the victim of the fraud. One thing is certain. The prosecuting officer cannot perform this function  he cannot discharge his public obligation  if his personal interests are involved. And his representation of the defrauded person at once gives him a personal interest in the matter that disables him from the proper performance of his official duty. If Ridgely's view was correct that the matter was primarily a civil fraud, he should have referred Villa to independent counsel. If it was his view that the violation of law justified the institution of criminal proceedings, he should have instituted them; and if after full consideration he had then concluded on sufficient grounds to permit a civil settlement, at the urging of independent counsel, he could have done so. What he could not properly do was to act in two capacities  as Deputy Attorney General and as Villa's attorney. The result of Ridgely's course of conduct was in effect to deprive the State of the services of its prosecuting officer in a matter requiring the impartial exercise of official judgment. But this is not all. There is another feature of this case that has a most unpleasant aspect. That is the collection of the fee from Biter. We ask at once: Why did Biter pay this fee? Why should Ridgely have thought that he might pay it? As an experienced business man Biter must have known that attorneys' fees are not collectible from the defendant in a case of this kind. Certainly Ridgely knew it. Yet, without knowing the amount to be charged, Biter agreed at once to pay it. When the amount was told him, he protested but nevertheless paid. He testified that anyone would assume such an obligation in the course of a normal settlement with a customer; but admitted that he had not on any other occasion paid any customer's counsel fees. At one time in testifying he said that the thought of a criminal violation never entered his mind; but at another time he was asked about the meaning of the phrase press charges that he said he had used in his protest against the amount of Ridgely's fee, and he replied that the only charge that he could think of would be misrepresentation. He admitted that the car sold to Villa could not honestly have been represented as a new car. Misrepresentation he understood to have a criminal aspect. At the time of the settlement he knew that the speedometer had been turned back and that this was a violation of law. After the settlement he learned of the issuance of the warrant, but did not inquire about it, because he felt that there had been a mutual settlement. He felt that the settlement would cancel out any criminal prosecution because Villa had been made whole. And when asked by Ridgely to explain the matter to the Attorney General, he refused to talk until he had consulted counsel. We have no doubt that Biter's ready acceptance of the settlement terms, and his payment of the fee, were prompted by anxiety to hush up the matter, and by the belief that he would avert prosecution on a criminal charge. We should say at once that there is no evidence that Ridgely or Villa ever threatened Biter with criminal prosecution. But the result  the payment of a fee to Ridgely, a prosecuting officer as well as a private attorney  is deplorable. As the Censor Committee observed, such an act necessarily tends to destroy the confidence of the public in the prosecuting officer. It was grossly improper for Ridgely to suggest or receive the payment of any fee by Biter. And to some extent the matter is made worse by the large amount charged  an amount clearly exorbitant, as Ridgely's counsel candidly admits. As we have indicated, there is no evidence of Ridgely's intentional use of the powers of his office to obtain money. His serious final mistake in the matter of the fee is probably traceable to the initial one  the adoption of Villa as a private client. From this he was led on to a position where, we suspect, he had become blind to the possible implications of what he was doing. The line between public duty and private interest was blurred. The record suggests, however, a certain uneasiness in his mind about the matter. Thus he did not go with Villa to see Biter, because (he said) he was Deputy Attorney General, and it might not appear proper. And an adverse inference must be drawn from the erroneous statements in his letter to the press. They may have been made hastily, under pressure of time, but it is hard to believe that they do not evidence some consciousness of the impropriety of his conduct. The Committee's finding of unprofessional conduct in the Villa matter must be approved.