Opinion ID: 1382539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Protected Status under Federal Law

Text: The Hospital cites us to several cases ( see note 22, infra) arising under the federal laws against disability discrimination [15] as authority for the proposition that Mr. Stone did not provide sufficient evidence upon which a jury could conclude that he was a person with a disability within the meaning of the law; and that therefore as a matter of law Mr. Stone did not make the threshold standing showing of being a person who could assert, invoke, or be covered by the protections of our Human Rights Act. Initially, we recognize that this Court, because of the similarity of the language in our Human Rights Act and related regulations and the federal laws and regulations that prohibit disability discrimination, has on occasion looked to decisions made under those federal laws to assist us in interpreting and applying our own law. See, e.g., Haynes v. Rhone-Poulenc, 206 W.Va. 18, 29 n. 14, 32, 521 S.E.2d 331, 342 n. 14 (1999) (stating that the 1989 expansion of the definition of disability was done to bring the law into line with the federal authorities.) However, in recent years a number of commentators on disability discrimination jurisprudence in the federal court arena have noted the development of a startlingly diverse body of federal case law, particularly in the protected person or standing area. [16] Because the Hospital cites us to several federal disability discrimination cases in support of its argument that Mr. Stone did not as a matter of law submit sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find that he had standing or protected status as a person with a disability within the meaning of the law so as to claim the protection of our Human Rights Act  and because our cases to date have looked at federal case law in the disability discrimination area in only a brief fashion  we direct our attention at this juncture to the question of who can make a claim of disability discrimination as that question has been addressed under federal law  in light of the Hospital's argument. The Hospital argues that under the holdings of several federal cases, many of which have their origin in Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir.1986), Mr. Stone does not have protected status to make a claim of disability discrimination because, says the Hospital, Mr. Stone merely showed that he was excluded from only one job, and not from a broad class of jobs. In other words, the Hospital argues that Mr. Stone did not as a matter of law present enough evidence for a jury to find that he was perceived or treated by the Hospital as having an impairment that would, as perceived, substantially limit his life activity of working. In Forrisi, the plaintiff, a utility repairman, had told his employer that he was afraid of heights, and so he was discharged  because he could not do utility repairs at a certain altitude due to that fear of heights. The court held that Mr. Forrisi could not invoke the disability discrimination laws  not even the regarded as disabled protection  because he was seen by his employer as being unsuited for one position in one plant  and nothing more. 794 F.2d at 935. The court noted that his employer never doubted Forrisi's ability to work in his chosen occupation[.] [17] Id. The exclusion-from-only-one-job rationale that the Forrisi court relied upon to say that the plaintiff in that case could not as a matter of law establish threshold protected status under federal disability discrimination law has been relied upon in some federal cases to deny threshold protected status as a matter of law to a range of persons with fairly substantial impairments. [18] In this regard, it should be remembered that if a person is prohibited from establishing threshold protected status as a person with a disability within the meaning of the law, an employer may inflict any sort of (otherwise legal) discriminatory conditions or acts on the person  no matter how unfair, arbitrary, stereotyped, bigoted, or unrelated to business necessity that those acts or conditions may be  and the person will have no standing to complain of or remedy the discrimination. And it should also be remembered that establishing the protected person status of being a person with a disability within the meaning of the law, who has standing to make a claim, in no way guarantees that a claim of disability discrimination will succeed. All other elements of a claim, such as a discriminatory adverse employment action, qualification to do the job, lack of reasonable accommodation, etc., must be shown before a person is entitled to any relief. An example of how this only-one-job approach has been relied upon in some federal cases to deny persons as a matter of law the right to present a disability discrimination claim to a court is Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir.1993). In Chandler, city policy excluded insulin-dependent diabetics and a large class of persons with various vision impairments (that were corrected with glasses), per se, from city driving jobs. The 5th Circuit held that as a matter of law the plaintiffs were unable to challenge these blanket policies as unfairly discriminatory  because the court held that driving was a single job function. The court held that no finder of fact could permissibly conclude that the plaintiffs were regarded as being substantially limited in their major life activity of working, by being treated as being unable to drive safely. In another example of this restrictive approach, Bridges v. City of Bossier, 92 F.3d 329 (5th Cir.1996), a fire department applicant with a mild form of hemophilia (also an EMT in the National Guard) was denied employment. The appeals court held that he did not have standing to bring a disability discrimination claim  because the court believed that as a matter of law, exclusion from firefighting, EMT, and paramedic jobs was not a substantial limitation of the major life activity of working. [19] As we have noted, the commentators on federal jurisprudence in the disability discrimination area have noted a state of turmoil and diversity. See note 17, supra. In contrast to the approach taken in the foregoing federal cases  the approach that the Hospital argues that we should take  in a number of other federal cases, a person was able to go before a finder of fact to show that by being excluded from a particular job they had been regarded, perceived or treated as a person with a substantially limiting impairment  so as to be able to go before a jury with their claim of disability discrimination. For example, in Cook v. State of Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir.1993), the appellate court considered a claim by an employer that the plaintiff, who had prevailed in a jury verdict, had not shown that employer had treated her as if her condition substantially limited her major life activity of working. The Cook court stated: [W]e think the degree of limitation fell squarely to the jury and that the evidence warrants its finding that appellant regarded plaintiff as substantially impaired.       The Rehabilitation Act seeks not only to aid the disabled, but also to eliminate discrimination on the basis of handicap. [citation omitted]       [D]enying an applicant even a single job that requires no unique skills, due solely to the perception that the applicant suffers from a physical limitation that would keep her from qualifying for a broad spectrum of jobs, can constitute treating an applicant as if her condition substantially limited a major life activity, viz, working.       There is a significant legal distinction between rejection based on a job-specific perception that the applicant is unable to excel at a narrow trade and a rejection based on more generalized perception that the applicant is impaired in such a way as would bar her from a large class of jobs. [citation omitted] Id. at 25-26. In another case, Deane v. Pocono Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir.1998), the district court granted summary judgment against a woman who claimed disability discrimination based on a perceived disability. The plaintiff in Deane, echoing Mr. Stone's claims in the instant case, claimed that her employer had acted on the basis of misperceptions as to her limitations, misperceptions that were the result of a `snap judgment' arrived at without making a good faith analysis, investigation, or assessment of the nature of her injury. 142 F.3d at 142. In Deane, the district court had held that the plaintiff could not invoke the ADA because, inter alia, her employer regarded her impairment as limiting only her ability to work as a nurse on the surgical/medical floor, not her ability to work as a nurse in general.... 142 F.3d at 144. The Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court's rationale, holding that there was sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [her employer] regarded her as substantially limited in the major life activity of working.... [including] deposition testimony ... documenting confusion as to the extent of Deane's physical capacity, with regard to pushing, pulling, and lifting. 142 F.3d at 144-145. [20] Summing up the foregoing discussion, it seems clear that the commentators are correct in identifying a diverse body of federal disability discrimination law  with some cases taking a highly restrictive approach to the question of who may go before a jury to seek to prove that they are a person with a disability within the meaning of the law  and other cases taking a less restrictive approach. [21] Based on the foregoing discussion, we recognize that the West Virginia Human Rights Act, as created by our Legislature and as applied by our courts and administrative agencies, represents an independent approach to the law of disability discrimination that is not mechanically tied to federal disability discrimination jurisprudence. [22] 3.