Opinion ID: 169642
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Some Degree of Success on the Merits

Text: Under the American rule, parties to a lawsuit ordinarily pay their own attorney fees. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). There are several exceptions to this principle. Most notably, there are certain statutory fee-shifting provisions that permit a court to order one party to pay the fees and costs of another. Bennett v. Coors Brewing Co., 189 F.3d 1221, 1238 (10th Cir. 1999). Typically, these statutes allow courts to award fees to the prevailing party. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000) ([T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. . . .). Less commonly, the CAA, and other federal statutes, allow courts to award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d); see also Loggerhead Turtle v. The County Council of Volusia County, 307 F.3d 1318, 1322 n. 5 (11th Cir.2002) (collecting statutes). While this court has not had occasion to address when an award is appropriate under the CAA, the Supreme Court has held that absent some degree of success on the merits by the claimant, it is not `appropriate' for a federal court to award attorneys' fees. . . . [8] Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694, 103 S.Ct. 3274, 77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983); id. at 682, 103 S.Ct. 3274 (We conclude that the language of the section, read in the light of the historic principles of fee-shifting in this and other countries, requires the conclusion that some success on the merits be obtained before a party becomes eligible for a fee award under § 307(f).). The Supreme Court has also interpreted the attorney fee provision of the CAA as a less stringent standard than that of other civil rights statutes that award attorney fees to prevailing parties, stating that the attorney fee provision of the CAA was meant to expand the class of parties eligible for fee awards from prevailing parties to partially prevailing parties  parties achieving some success, even if not major success. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 688, 103 S.Ct. 3274 (emphasis in original). Thus, one does not have to succeed completely on a CAA claim to achieve some success which would, in turn, merit the award of fees and costs. Here, Pro Products instituted its CAA action to enforce the provisions of the Act which ban certain aerosols. As noted, the district court entered an order concluding that, as a matter of law, Airosol's manufacture, sale, and distribution of Black Knight violated the Clean Air Act. Appx. at 73. Subsequently, the district court declined to penalize Airosol for its violations of the Act. Under the less exacting standard of the CAA attorney fee provision, we conclude that a plaintiff achieving a judicial holding that a party violated the Act is some degree of success on the merits. To the extent the district court concluded otherwise, it erred.