Opinion ID: 1972567
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relevance to Self-Defense

Text: A person may justifiably use deadly force when that person reasonably believes it necessary and reasonably believes the other person is about to use unlawful, deadly force against him or another person. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 108(2)(A)(1) (Supp.1994). Evidence of a person's character or of a person's bad acts is not admissible to prove that that person acted in conformity therewith. M.R.Evid. 404. Thus, evidence of a victim's violent nature is clearly inadmissible. State v. Mitchell, 390 A.2d 495, 501 (Me. 1978). This rule, however, does not keep out the victim's reputation for violence, proved to have been known to the accused before the event, for the purpose of showing his reasonable apprehension of immediate danger. M.R.Evid. 404 advisor's note (emphasis added). Unless the accused is aware of the victim's reputation or past acts, the exclusion of such evidence is not erroneous. State v. Leone, 581 A.2d at 394, 400. Even if the accused is aware of a victim's reputation, evidence of that reputation may still be excluded pursuant to M.R.Evid. 403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing and misleading the jury. State v. Tanguay, 574 A.2d 1359, 1362 (Me.1990). The court determined that the statement by Toler should not be admitted in evidence pursuant to the exception to M.R.Evid. 404 because there was no evidence that the defendants were aware of the statement prior to engaging in the charged conduct. Indeed, the defendants did not argue then and do not argue now that they were aware of Toler's statement. They argue only that the statement is probative of mind set and mood changes capable in Randal Toler. The court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to admit this evidence in support of the defendants' claims of self-defense.