Opinion ID: 2294895
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Responsibility for Abuse of a Child

Text: In Fabritz we went no farther than to determine that the Legislature intended that the cause of an injury may include an act of omission so as to constitute cruel or inhumane treatment, in that case the failure of the mother to seek or obtain medical assistance for her child who had been abused by another. Fabritz did not go to the class of persons to whom the statutory proscription applies, as the accused there was a parent, the victim's mother, expressly designated in the statute. We have seen that the statute as originally enacted concerned [a]ny parent, adoptive parent or other person, who has the permanent or temporary care or custody of a minor child.... Acts 1963, ch. 743. This has been once amended to bring within the ambit of the statute any person who has responsibility for the supervision of a minor child. Acts 1966, ch. 221. Thus, since 1 June 1966, [a]ny parent, adoptive parent or other person who has the permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of a minor child under the age of eighteen years[ [11] ] who causes abuse to such minor child shall be guilty of a felony.... ง 35A(a). Persons subject to the statute are designated in those terms also in subsection (b) 7 (A) defining abuse and in subsection (b)8 defining sexual abuse. In Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 389 A.2d 341 (1978), we discussed the class of persons to whom ง 35A applies, in rejecting the contention that the statute was vague and therefore constitutionally defective for the reason that it failed to define adequately that class. Bowers urged that the statute was too indefinite to inform a person who is not a parent or adoptive parent of a child whether he comes within the ambit of the statute. He argued that no one in such position is capable of ascertaining whether the statute is aimed only at persons who have been awarded custody by judicial decree or includes also those who may simply be caring for a child in place of the parent. We were of the view that the General Assembly intended that the statute apply to persons who stand in loco parentis to a child. We said: Had the Legislature wished to narrow application of the child abuse law to those who had been awarded custody or control by court order, it could readily have done so in explicit language to that end. Id. at 130. We observed that Bowers' own testimony amply established that he had assumed `the care or custody or responsibility for the supervision' of his step-daughter, and thus stood in loco parentis with respect to her. Id. Bowers' challenge centered on the temporary care or custody provision of the statute. It does not follow from our holding that permanent or temporary care or custody is synonymous with responsibility for the supervision of. Such was clearly not the legislative intent, because, as we have seen, the latter provision was added by amendment three years after the former had been written into the law. There would have been no need to do so had the Legislature deemed the two provisions to have the same meaning. The child abuse statute speaks in terms of a person who has responsibility for the supervision of a minor child. It does not prescribe how such responsibility attaches or what responsibility and supervision encompass. A doubt or ambiguity exists as to the exact reach of the statute's provision with respect to has responsibility for the supervision of, justifying application of the principle that permits courts in such circumstances to ascertain and give effect to the real intention of the Legislature. See Fabritz at 423; Clerk v. Chesapeake Beach Park, 251 Md. 657, 663-664, 248 A.2d 479 (1968); Domain v. Bosley, 242 Md. 1, 7, 217 A.2d 555 (1966). Bowers equates permanent or temporary care or custody with in loco parentis, but responsibility for the supervision of is not bound by certain of the strictures required for one to stand in place of or instead of the parent. A person in loco parentis is charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities. Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951). A person in loco parentis to a child is one who means to put himself in the situation of the lawful father [or mother] of the child with reference to the father's [or mother's] office and duty of making provision for the child. Or, as defined by Sir Wm. Grant, Master of the Rolls, a person in loco parentis is one, `assuming the parental character and discharging parental duties.' Weatherby v. Dixon, 19 Ves. 412.... There must be some indication, in some form, of an intention to establish it. It is a question of intention. Von der Horst v. Von der Horst, 88 Md. 127, 130-131, 41 A. 124 (1898). The term `in loco parentis,' according to its generally accepted common law meaning, refers to a person who has put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relation without going through the formalities necessary to legal adoption. It embodies the two ideas of assuming the parental status and discharging the parental duties. Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F.2d 683, 686 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 850 (1947). This relationship involves more than a duty to aid and assist, more than a feeling of kindness, affection or generosity. It arises only when one is willing to assume all the obligations and to receive all the benefits associated with one standing as a natural parent to a child. Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767 (D.C. 1968), appeal denied, 418 F.2d 1189 (1969). A person may have the responsibility for the supervision of a minor child in the contemplation of ง 35A although not standing in loco parentis to that child. Responsibility in its common and generally accepted meaning denotes accountability, and supervision emphasizes broad authority to oversee with the powers of direction and decision. See American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1969); Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1968). As in the case of care or custody of a minor child under the child abuse law, a judicial decree is not necessary to obtain responsibility for the supervision of a minor child under that statute. Had the Legislature wished to narrow application of that law to those who had been charged with responsibility for the supervision of a child by court order, it could readily have done so in explicit language to that end. See Bowers, 283 Md. at 130. Absent a court order or award by some appropriate proceeding pursuant to statutory authority, we think it to be self-evident that responsibility for supervision of a minor child may be obtained only upon the mutual consent, expressed or implied, by the one legally charged with the care of the child and by the one assuming the responsibility. In other words, a parent may not impose responsibility for the supervision of his or her minor child on a third person unless that person accepts the responsibility, and a third person may not assume such responsibility unless the parent grants it. So it is that a baby sitter temporarily has responsibility for the supervision of a child; the parents grant the responsibility for the period they are not at home, and the sitter accepts it. And it is by mutual consent that a school teacher has responsibility for the supervision of children in connection with his academic duties. On the other hand, once responsibility for the supervision of a minor child has been placed in a third person, it may be terminated unilaterally by a parent by resuming responsibility, expressly or by conduct. The consent of the third party in such circumstances is not required; he may not prevent return of responsibility to the parent. But, of course, the third person in whom responsibility has been placed is not free to relinquish that responsibility without the knowledge of the parent. For example, a sitter may not simply walk away in the absence of the parents and leave the children to their own devices. Under the present state of our law, a person has no legal obligation to care for or look after the welfare of a stranger, adult or child. Generally one has no legal duty to aid another person in peril, even when that aid can be rendered without danger or inconvenience to himself.... A moral duty to take affirmative action is not enough to impose a legal duty to do so. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 183 (1972). See Clark & Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Crimes ง 10.02 (7th ed. 1967). The legal position is that the need of one and the opportunity of another to be of assistance are not alone sufficient to give rise to a legal duty to take positive action. R. Perkins, Criminal Law 594-595 (2d ed. 1969). Ordinarily, a person may stand by with impunity and watch another being murdered, raped, robbed, assaulted or otherwise unlawfully harmed. He need not shout a warning to a blind man headed for a precipice or to an absentminded one walking into a gunpowder room with a lighted candle in hand. He need not pull a neighbor's baby out of a pool of water or rescue an unconscious person stretched across the railroad tracks, though the baby is drowning, or the whistle of an approaching train is heard in the distance. LaFave & Scott at 183. The General Assembly has enacted two Good Samaritan statutes which afford protection to one who assists another in certain circumstances. Those statutes, however, impose no requirement that assistance be rendered. [12] In the face of this status of the law we cannot reasonably conclude that the Legislature, in bringing a person responsible for the supervision of a child within the ambit of the child abuse law, intended that such responsibility attach without the consent criteria we have set out. Were it otherwise, the consequences would go far beyond the legislative intent. For example, a person taking a lost child into his home to attempt to find its parents could be said to be responsible for that child's supervision. Or a person who allows his neighbor's children to play in his yard, keeping a watchful eye on their activities to prevent them from falling into harm, could be held responsible for the children's supervision. Or a person performing functions of a maternal nature from concern for the welfare, comfort or health of a child, or protecting it from danger because of a sense of moral obligation, may come within the reach of the act. In none of these situations would there be an intent to grant or assume the responsibility contemplated by the child abuse statute, and it would be incongruous indeed to subject such persons to possible criminal prosecution.