Opinion ID: 1057944
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony of Major Deidre Raver

Text: Prieto alleges that victim impact statements made by Rachael Raver's sister, Major Deidre Raver, herself an alleged victim of an unreported rape many years prior, were improper and highly prejudicial. In particular, he objected to the following testimony by Major Raver: [L]ook at me, I'm 50 years old, I never got married. I don't think I ever will, and I'm not — it's one of those things where I don't think I'm capable of having a relationship after that. I mean, I myself was a rape survivor when I was very young, and I watched that — that guy got away with it. So now I have my sister who dies. 16 Prieto moved for a mistrial, arguing that the testimony implied that this jury should give retribution for her personal victimization from crimes committed by another individual. The circuit court, after temporarily excusing the jury to hear argument, instructed Major Raver that she could not testify to the circumstances of her own rape but could discuss any psychological injury that she suffered as a result of what she described as survivor's guilt following her sister's attack. The jurors returned, and the circuit court instructed them to disregard Major Raver's statement that the person who raped her got away with it and give it no further consideration in this trial or in your deliberations. Major Raver then further explained her psychological injury: Basically, you know, as a rape survivor myself, I had a lot of feelings of just guilt that my sister got murdered because I wasn't there to save her. . . . [B]eing a survivor yourself and a victim, and then you have a family member who is a victim, and they're younger than you, and you're not there to protect them and save them, the amount of guilt, it just — it makes it impossible to grieve. Prieto argues that the circuit court erred in two ways: first, that the curative instruction was insufficient given the prejudicial nature of Major Raver's remarks and the time the jury had to ruminate over the remarks while they were dismissed from the courtroom; and second, that Major Raver's psychological 17 testimony related to fallout from another crime not alleged to have been committed by Prieto and should not have been admitted. Prieto does not contend that Raver's comments subsequent to the curative instruction exceeded the scope of the circuit court's ruling. Thus, the issues before us are (1) whether the scope of her testimony concerning the psychological harm that she suffered was proper, and (2) whether the curative instruction was sufficient so as not to require a mistrial. Generally, this Court has held and continues to hold that victim impact testimony regarding a capital offense is admissible because it is probative of the depravity of mind component of the vileness predicate. Andrews, 280 Va. at 29192, 699 S.E.2d at 272 (citing Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460, 476, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389-90 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 829 (1995)). Code § 19.2-264.4 provides that: A. Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of an offense which may be punishable by death, a proceeding shall be held which shall be limited to a determination as to whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. . . . A1. In any proceeding conducted pursuant to this section, the court shall permit the victim, as defined in § 19.2-11.01, . . . to testify in the presence of the accused regarding the impact of the offense upon the victim. The court shall limit the victim's testimony to the factors set forth in clauses (i) through (vi) of subsection A of § 19.2-299.1. Code § 19.2-11.01(B) defines a victim as a person who has suffered physical, psychological or economic harm as a direct 18 result of the commission of a felony and the spouse, parent, sibling, or legal guardian of such a person who . . . was the victim of a homicide, among others. Virginia law is in accord with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, holding that a  '[s]tate may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the . . . decision as to whether or not the death penalty shall be imposed.'  Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 381, 484 S.E.2d 898, 903 (1997) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1018 (1997). So long as [the] prejudicial effect does not outweigh its probative value, such evidence is beneficial to the determination of an individualized sentence as is required by the Eighth Amendment. Beck, 253 Va. at 382, 484 S.E.2d at 904 (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 825). Because of its relevance to the vileness aggravating factor only, this Court has held that victim impact testimony must be confined to the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced. Andrews, 280 Va. at 291-92, 699 S.E.2d at 272. As we explained in Andrews, [v]ictim impact testimony regarding unadjudicated criminal conduct . . . is not relevant to the vileness predicate because the testimony concerns an offense 19 unrelated to the capital offense upon which the defendant is being sentenced. Id. at 292, 699 S.E.2d at 272. Prieto argues that this Court should consider Major Raver's own rape to be an unadjudicated act under Andrews and, accordingly, should find it irrelevant to the vileness aggravating factor and therefore inadmissible. We disagree. Andrews pertains to instances in which there is some allegation that the defendant being sentenced also committed and should be held responsible for the unadjudicated act. No reasonable juror could conclude from Major Raver's testimony that she was attempting to implicate Prieto in her own rape in any way. Major Raver's victim impact testimony as a family member of the deceased is permitted under Code §§ 19.2-11.01(B) and 19.2- 264.4. The proper scope of Major Raver's testimony must therefore be evaluated as any other victim impact statement. The scope of testimony in the sentencing phase is wide, and the standard for exclusion of relevant evidence is whether the prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. Teleguz, 273 Va. at 482, 643 S.E.2d at 723. This is a matter of discretion for the circuit court and is properly reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. Here, the circuit court directed the witness to narrow the scope of her testimony to the impact that her sister's murder had on her own life. Her own previous experiences were raised 20 in the context of this discussion. This testimony, however, was not so far removed from the victims as to have nothing of value to impart about the impact of the murder, Beck, 253 Va. at 385, 484 S.E.2d at 906, and the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony. Additionally, we must consider whether Major Raver's original statement that her rapist got away with it was so prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial. In this evaluation, we review whether the jury was promptly, explicitly and carefully instructed to disregard the inappropriate testimony, Lewis v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 80, 84, 175 S.E.2d 236, 238 (1970), and consider the nature of the arguably inflammatory material in relation to the rest of the evidence in the case. Fowlkes v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 241, 252, 255, 663 S.E.2d 98, 103, 105 (2008). There is no question that the trial judge's instruction was explicit and careful. Prieto argues that it was not prompt in that it was not immediate because the jury was dismissed while the circuit court heard oral argument on the matter, leaving the jurors with time to ruminate on Major Raver's statement. Judges routinely abide by this practice, however, when considering issues of consequence. Indeed, judges must be given the opportunity, when necessary, to hear thorough argument on an evidentiary issue before ruling. We find that the circuit 21 court's proper and prompt curative instruction upon the jury's return immediately after hearing oral argument was appropriate and sufficient to meet the standard set forth in Lewis. As we have stated in the past, [a] jury is presumed to have followed the instructions of the trial court. Muhammad, 269 Va. at 524, 619 S.E.2d at 58. We therefore have no basis from which to conclude that a mistrial was necessary. Finally, when the nature of the challenged testimony is viewed in light of the context and other incidents of the case, it becomes clear that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant a second mistrial. No accusation was ever made that Prieto had any connection with Major Raver's rape. Despite having had time to ruminate over her statement, in the situation presented, no reasonable juror would assume that he or she was implicitly invited, as Prieto alleges, to levy additional retribution upon him arising from unrelated crimes committed long ago against Major Raver. We accordingly find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial or bar subsequent testimony from Major Raver.