Opinion ID: 2624305
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Randy Johnson's Prior Testimony Due to Unavailability

Text: Randy Johnson, who corroborated the testimony of Earlin Popham by testifying that defendant had solicited him several times to kill Elaine Bunyard, was determined by the trial court to be unavailable to testify at the second penalty phase trial, and therefore his testimony from the first trial was read to the jury. Defendant claims the trial court erred in determining that Johnson was unavailable and in admitting his earlier testimony, thereby violating state statutory law and his right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This claim has two parts: (1) the trial court with the prosecution's support erred in releasing Johnson on his own recognizance and, but for the error, Johnson would have been available to testify; (2) the prosecution was insufficiently diligent in trying to locate Johnson when he failed to appear. We disagree there was error or lack of diligence. The facts are these: As explained, Johnson testified during the first trial that defendant asked him on several occasions to kill Elaine Bunyard but Johnson refused. The prosecution intended to call Johnson as a witness at the penalty phase retrial, ostensibly for two reasons: (1) to corroborate Popham's testimony that defendant desired his wife's murder and would pay others to carry that out, thereby negating any lingering doubt about defendant's guilt that the second penalty phase jury might have; and (2) to establish that defendant committed an unadjudicated crime involving force or violence pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b), i.e., the attempted solicitation of Johnson to commit murder. On October 15, 1990, approximately one month before the retrial was to commence, a bench warrant issued for Johnson's arrest after he had failed to appear in response to the People's subpoena. On October 22, 1990, the prosecutor filed a declaration in support of a motion to require Johnson to enter into a written undertaking to appear in court pursuant to section 1332. He stated in the declaration that the written undertaking was necessary because of Johnson's failure to respond to the subpoena or contact the prosecution. On that same day, the trial court signed a warrant for Johnson's arrest, allowing him to be released only if he posted a $10,000 bond. Jury selection proceedings began on November 15, 1990. On December 13, Johnson was arrested on the October 22 warrant. On December 17, 1990, Johnson appeared for a hearing. During the hearing, the prosecutor reminded the court of its October 22 arrest warrant and the setting of bail at $10,000. Before the hearing, the trial court asked defendant's counsel to leave the courtroom, and counsel left after objecting to not being allowed to be present. The trial court also ordered the prosecution to provide counsel with Johnson's current rap sheet, which showed an extensive criminal history. [3] Johnson told the court that he had not looked at the subpoena and had not contacted the prosecutor. The prosecutor informed the court that Johnson was in custody on the bench warrant in defendant's case but that otherwise there was no reason to hold him in custody. The court asked a sheriff's officer, Sergeant Johnsen, if he was satisfied that he would be able to contact Johnson on a moment's notice or as needed and Sergeant Johnsen said that he was. The court released Johnson on his own recognizance, requiring him to call Sergeant Johnsen every Wednesday, and making clear that if he failed to do so, Johnson would violate the conditions of his release and be subject to immediate arrest, whereupon he would be kept in custody until defendant's trial was completed. Johnson was ordered to return to court on January 23, 1991, at 10:00 a.m. Johnson orally agreed to these conditions and signed a written agreement that he would return on the date specified. The next day, defense counsel informed the court that the State of Washington had issued a warrant for Johnson's arrest. The prosecutor stated that he had not been aware of that bench warrant until after the previous day's hearing. He explained that he had contacted Washington authorities and discovered that Johnson had served time in Washington on a misdemeanor offense but had not yet made restitution, and that the warrant was not for an extraditable offense. The prosecutor acknowledged that at the time Johnson was served a subpoena to appear as a material witness in the present case, he was in county jail, and that his rap sheet indicated that he had a number of previous arrests. Notwithstanding this new information, the trial court reaffirmed its order releasing Johnson on his own recognizance subject to the conditions described above. Defendant objected to the order. [4] Johnson returned to court on January 23, 1991, and was ordered to return again on February 6. He returned on February 6 and was ordered to return on February 19. Johnson did not return on February 19. The prosecutor stated that Johnson had shown up late for a February 11 interview and had not shown up for an interview scheduled for February 18. The prosecutor also stated that Sergeant Johnsen's attempts to locate Johnson had been unsuccessful. On March 1, 1991, the trial court held a hearing on whether Johnson was unavailable for testimony. Sergeant Johnsen and another sheriff's officer testified about various efforts to locate Johnson, which will be described at greater length below. Defendant asked the court to exclude Johnson's prior testimony on the ground that the People had failed to exercise due diligence in locating him. At defendant's request, the court allowed Johnson's FBI and CII (Criminal Investigation and Identification) rap sheets to become part of the record. The FBI rap sheet showed that Johnson had substantial contacts with Oregon and Washington and defendant noted that the police had made no efforts to look for him there. Notwithstanding that fact, the trial court found Johnson unavailable and on March 5, 1991, Johnson's testimony from the first trial was read to the jury. (3) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting Johnson's testimony. To evaluate this claim we review basic principles: The confrontation clauses of both the federal and state Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const. art. I, § 15.) That right is not absolute, however. An exception exists when a witness is unavailable and, at a previous court proceeding against the same defendant, has given testimony that was subject to cross-examination. Under federal constitutional law, such testimony is admissible if the prosecution shows it made `a good-faith effort' to obtain the presence of the witness at trial. ( People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 892 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243] ( Cromer ); see also Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 [158 L.Ed.2d 177, 124 S.Ct. 1354].) In California, the exception to the confrontation right for prior recorded testimony is codified in [Evidence Code] section 1291, subdivision (a), which provides: `Evidence of former testimony is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and: [¶] . . . . [¶] (2) The party against whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing.' A witness is unavailable if `[a]bsent from the hearing and the proponent of his or her statement has exercised reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his or her attendance by the court's process.' ([Evid. Code,] § 240, subd. (a)(5).) Although section 240 refers to `reasonable diligence,' this court has often described the evaluation as one involving `due diligence.' ( Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 898.) As noted, defendant contends the trial court erred in releasing Johnson on his own recognizance, a release that was supported by the People, and consequently erred in concluding he was unavailable to testify. As we have recognized, when the trial court errs in releasing a material witness from custody, which results in the witness becoming unavailable for testimony, and the prosecution supports that release, the prosecution may be held to have not exercised reasonable diligence. ( People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 993 [232 Cal.Rptr. 110, 728 P.2d 180] ( Louis ).) [5] (4) The decision to detain in custody a material witness involves weighing important competing rights. Article I, section 10 of the California Constitution guarantees `[w]itnesses may not be unreasonably detained.' This constitutional protection is balanced against `[t]he duty [of all citizens] to disclose knowledge of [a] crime....' [Citation.] This duty is considered to be `so vital that one known to be an innocent may be detained, in the absence of bail, as a material witness. [Citations.]' [Citation.] [¶] To enforce this duty, section 1332 allows for the incarceration of a person determined to be a material witness to secure his or her presence at trial. Section 1332 states, `(a) [W]hen the court is satisfied, by proof on oath, that there is good cause to believe that any material witness for the prosecution or defense, whether the witness is an adult or a minor, will not appear and testify unless security is required, at any proceeding in connection with any criminal prosecution . . . the court may order the witness to enter into a written undertaking to the effect that he or she will appear and testify at the time and place ordered by the court or that he or she will forfeit an amount the court deems proper. [¶] (b) If the witness required to enter into an undertaking to appear and testify, either with or without sureties, refuses compliance with the order for that purpose, the court may commit the witness, if an adult, to the custody of the sheriff . . . until the witness complies or is legally discharged.' ( In re D. W. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 491, 497-498 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 274].) `The unique posture of the material witness' requires special attention to ensure that the procedures leading to the incarceration of a witness are fair and comply with `procedural safeguards allowing the interests of the witness to be heard in conjunction with the interests of the state.' ( In re D. W., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 498.) The unjustified deprivation of a material witness's liberty is a violation of the due process clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. ( Ibid. ; see also In re Francisco M. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1071-1072 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 794] ( Francisco M. ).) The threshold question is the standard of review that should be employed to determine whether there has been reasonable diligence when a material witness has been released on his or her own recognizance and then becomes unavailable. We have held that appellate courts should independently review a trial court's determination that the prosecution's failed efforts to locate an absent witness are sufficient to justify an exception to the defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right of confrontation at trial. ( Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 901.) The question is whether we should employ the same independent review standard to determine whether releasing a material witness on his or her own recognizance constitutes a failure of reasonable diligence. In Cromer, in deciding that independent review rather than abuse of discretion was the proper standard, we relied on (1) the importance of the right at stake, i.e., the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses ( Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 896-897); (2) the fact that the determination of reasonable diligence requires application of an objective, constitutionally based legal test to certain facts ( id. at p. 900); and (3) the fact that the trial court does not have a first-person vantage point with respect to the prosecutor's efforts to find the witness, but is in essentially the same position as an appellate court in applying the objective test ( id. at p. 901). Thus, although the reviewing court will defer to the trial court's determination of the historical facts of what the prosecution did to locate an absent witness, it will independently review whether those efforts amount to reasonable diligence sufficient to sustain a finding of unavailability. ( Id. at pp. 900-901.) (5) In the present situation, in which we are reviewing essentially the trial court's own decision to release a witness on his own recognizance, albeit with the prosecution's consent and even urging, the circumstances are markedly different. First, whereas in the case of the prosecution's efforts to obtain the testimony of an absent witness, the defendant's constitutional right of confrontation is the sole constitutional right at stake, the decision to keep a material witness in custody involves balancing that right against the substantial due process right of the witness, who has not been charged with a crime, to not be unreasonably incarcerated. Second, whereas an appellate court is more or less in the same position as a trial court in judging whether the prosecution's efforts to obtain an absent witness are sufficient, the trial court is in a better position than an appellate court to ascertain whether and to what extent a witness is a flight risk, and the appropriate measures to reduce that risk. This determination involves in part an observation of the witness's credibility and demeanor that the trial court is uniquely in a position to make. Therefore, although we conduct independent review in the sense that we independently apply an objective, constitutionally based legal test to certain facts ( Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 900), we also give due deference to the trial court's determination of a witness's flight risk, and will second-guess that determination only when it is clear from the record that it was objectively unreasonable. (6) In the present case, we conclude the trial court made a reasonable determination that Randy Johnson would appear to testify, and the prosecution's support for the trial court's decision did not constitute a lack of reasonable diligence. After he was arrested for ignoring the subpoena, the court had Johnson agree orally and in writing to return on a specified date, and to keep in weekly contact with Sergeant Johnsen until that date, with the understanding that he would be rearrested and placed in custody if he failed to maintain that weekly contact. The court made a credibility determination that Johnson would return to testify, and Johnson did in fact comply within the reporting requirements for almost two months. In arguing in support of his position, defendant cites Louis, supra, 42 Cal.3d 969. We agree that a comparison of this case to Louis is useful  although we draw a different conclusion  and will therefore render a somewhat detailed account of that case. In Louis, the court considered the validity of a guilty verdict in a capital trial. The defendant and four codefendants were tried for several robberies and the murder of a gas station attendant. During the defendant's preliminary hearing, Gregory Tolbert, who was living in an apartment with the sister of one of the codefendants, testified to overhearing a conversation in the apartment among the defendant and the codefendants that the gas station attendant, who had witnessed one of their previous crimes, would have to be killed. ( Id. at p. 976.) After the murder, according to Tolbert's testimony, the defendant told a codefendant that he took out the attendant. ( Id. at p. 977.) At the preliminary hearing, some substantial questions about Tolbert's credibility emerged, including inconsistent and incriminating statements, as well as an extensive criminal record and the use of a number of aliases. ( Ibid. ) Tolbert also testified in a separate trial of the codefendants, and they were convicted of the robbery charges, but the jury found one of the codefendants not guilty of the murder charges and was unable to reach a verdict about the other codefendants. ( Louis, supra, 42 Cal.3d. at pp. 977-978.) Tolbert was in custody on felony charges, and in order to induce him to testify at the first trial of the codefendants, the prosecution had arranged for Tolbert to be released on his own recognizance over the weekend with an unnamed friend at an undisclosed location before appearing for sentencing. ( Ibid. ) Tolbert promptly disappeared. The retrial of the codefendants for noncapital murder and the trial of the defendant for capital murder were consolidated and conducted before two separate juries. ( Louis, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 978.) Tolbert was deemed unavailable and his preliminary hearing testimony was admitted in the defendant's trial over his objection, and the prior trial testimony was admitted against the defendant and codefendants. ( Id. at pp. 978, 981.) Tolbert's testimony at the previous trial did not include the statement made at the defendant's preliminary hearing that the defendant had said he `took . . . out' the attendant. ( Id. at p. 977.) Other than Tolbert's testimony on that point, the case against the defendant and the codefendants was the same, and was quite weak. ( Id. at pp. 981-982.) The defendant was convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances and was sentenced to death. Two of the codefendants were acquitted on the murder charge and the jury was unable to reach a verdict as to the third, whereupon the trial court declared a mistrial and dismissed the information against that codefendant with prejudice. ( Ibid. ) The Louis court held that the People had been insufficiently diligent in compelling Tolbert to testify at trial. ( Louis, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 991-993.) Characterizing Tolbert's testimony as the most important testimony in the defendant's case, this court concluded that the diligence required of the prosecutor was particularly high. Defendant was to go on trial for his life; Tolbert was a critical prosecution witness, and was known to be both unreliable and of suspect credibility  the very type of witness that requires, but is likely not to appear to submit to, cross-examination before a jury. ( Id. at p. 991.) In coming to the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to exercise reasonable diligence, the Louis court emphasized that at the time the prosecutor arranged to have Tolbert released on his own recognizance, he was in custody on felony charges, and was released as part of a deal in exchange for Tolbert's testimony in the codefendants' first trial. ( Id. at pp. 991-992.) Indeed, the People conceded that allowing Tolbert to be released prior to his sentencing was risky, but that the risk was worth taking in exchange for his testimony at the earlier trial. As we concluded, the argument that Tolbert's release was needed to secure this testimony at the first codefendants' trial is immaterial. The purpose of the due diligence requirement is to ensure that the prosecution has made all reasonable efforts to procure the presence of the witness before the defendant is denied the opportunity to confront him. [Citation.] Whether reasonable or not in view of some other purpose, the agreement neither was intended, nor did it operate, to prevent Tolbert's absence from defendant's trial. ( Id. at p. 992, italics omitted.) The present case is distinguishable from Louis in several respects. Although Johnson, like Tolbert, had an extensive criminal history, Johnson, unlike Tolbert, had no current charges pending against him, other than a nonextraditable failure to pay restitution in Washington, and therefore did not represent an imminent flight risk. In Louis, the court made clear that by releasing Tolbert for the weekend despite his known flight risk and the upcoming sentencing, the prosecution had subordinated the goal of producing him at the defendant's trial to the goal of having him testify at the codefendants' trial, and that the fulfillment of this latter goal could not justify the lack of reasonable diligence in meeting the former. In the present case, Johnson's release on his own recognizance was not undertaken in subordination to some other prosecutorial objective, but was an attempt to balance Johnson's liberty interests with defendant's right to confrontation. Moreover, in Louis, Tolbert was being held on another charge, and because he was being released for a weekend before being sentenced, his liberty interest in being released was relatively minor. Johnson's liberty interest was considerably greater. He was being held on no other charge, and the trial court was aware that Johnson's required testimony was at least five weeks (and what proved to be two months) in the future. In light of the fact that Johnson did not represent an imminent flight risk, we cannot say the trial court acted unreasonably under the circumstances in having Johnson sign a written undertaking to appear, and to take steps to ensure that Johnson remained in contact with the court and available, nor that the prosecution's support for these measures constituted a lack of reasonable diligence. Those measures worked for at least seven weeks  Johnson twice reported as he was supposed to and maintained weekly contact with Sergeant Johnsen. This case is also in contrast to Francisco M., supra, 86 Cal.App.4th 1061, cited by defendant, in which two juvenile material witnesses were detained and in which the Court of Appeal remanded the case to determine whether continuing detention was proper. [6] Even assuming that the detention in that case ultimately was deemed lawful, it was based in large part on the witnesses' avowed noncooperation  statements that they would not testify and would seek to evade a subpoena. (86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1067-1069.) In the present case, Johnson promised to cooperate, credibly in the view of the trial court. Although a trial court's credibility determination that a material witness will appear will not be accorded unlimited deference by an appellate court, and a prosecutor's support for a decision to release a witness who poses a substantial flight risk is a significant factor to be considered in evaluating whether the prosecutor has exercised due diligence, in this case the trial court's determination was reasonable. Defendant also argues that the court was not required to keep Johnson in custody but could have imposed (and the prosecution should have urged the court to impose) on Johnson a written undertaking with security, pursuant to section 1332, subdivision (a), in other words to release the witness on bail, in order to ensure his appearance at trial. Defendant did not raise this argument at trial and it is therefore forfeited on appeal. (See People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 414 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 721, 165 P.3d 512].) Although defendant's trial counsel objected to Johnson's OR release, he never raised the alternative of requiring a written undertaking with security. Without raising the issue at trial, we have no way of knowing whether imposing such conditions on Johnson was a feasible alternative to detention on the one hand and OR (own recognizance) release on the other. Defendant also contends that once Johnson failed to appear, the prosecution was insufficiently diligent in finding him. As noted, we independently review the trial court's determination that the prosecution has been reasonably diligent in finding an absent witness. ( Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 901.) The record reveals that two sheriff's officers testified that they made numerous attempts to locate Johnson, including: repeatedly checking Johnson's last known address, and areas he was known to frequent; putting out a BOLO (be-on-the-lookout-for) bulletin for Johnson; attempting to contact Johnson's brother and sister, who also lived in the county; checking the jails and hospitals of San Joaquin County and the jails of six neighboring counties; repeatedly over a week's time checking the east end of Stockton and other locations where they had information he was likely to be; and checking with Johnson's known associates. Officers also testified that they learned on the evening of February 19, 1991, that several days earlier Johnson had taken, perhaps stolen, a car and had used it to flee from the minimart where he had stolen a beer, and was now attempting to avoid the police. Defendant made at trial and makes again on appeal the argument that the police did not attempt to look for Johnson out of state, in Oregon or Washington, where according to his rap sheets he had been convicted of various crimes. But there was nothing to indicate he had fled to those states; indeed, given that there was a warrant for his arrest in Washington, his flight to that state was not particularly likely. Our review of the case law shows that in those cases in which courts have not found adequate diligence, the efforts of the prosecutor or defense counsel have been perfunctory or obviously negligent. (See, e.g., People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 524 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420] [belated effort to find witness consisted of a single phone call to her former work number and several visits to her former address]; People v. Avila (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 163, 169-170 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 441] [waiting until the first day of trial to locate a witness at her last known residence without efforts to keep track of her, despite knowing she was a flight risk]; People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1547, 1556-1557 [273 Cal.Rptr. 389] [despite witness's criminal record and drug use, investigator confined search for witness in the criminal justice system to a single county and did not search by witness's known aliases].) On the other hand, diligence has been found when the prosecution's efforts are timely, reasonably extensive and carried out over a reasonable period. (See, e.g., People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1297 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1] [frequent stops at witness's last known residence over a one-week period, contacting neighbors, employer, and relatives]; People v. Diaz (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 695, 706-707 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 799] [numerous attempts to find witness defeated by witness's determined effort to avoid testifying]; People v. Wise (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 339, 344 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 413] [checking several addresses where witness might be found, as well as local jail, hospital, and coroner].) The People's efforts in the present case decidedly resemble the extensive efforts made in the latter group of cases. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the prosecution had been reasonably diligent in attempting to locate Johnson, that the trial court properly deemed him to be unavailable, and that his testimony from the first trial was properly admitted.