Opinion ID: 2614563
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Interests of Criminal Defendants

Text: Traditionally, the double jeopardy clause has been viewed as safeguarding three interests of defendants: (1) the interest in being free from successive prosecutions; (2) the interest in the finality of judgments; and (3) the interest in having the trial completed in front of the first tribunal. See Rick A. Bierschbach, Note, One Bite at the Apple: Reversals of Convictions Tainted by Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Ban of Double Jeopardy, 94 Mich. L.Rev. 1346, 1348-49 (1996). With regard to a defendant's interest in restricting the prosecution to a single attempt to prove his or her guilt at trial, the United States Supreme Court has offered two fundamental bases. First, multiple prosecutions seriously disrupt a defendant's personal life during trial and create a potential for governmental harassment of the defendant. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-04, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978) (noting that a second prosecution increases the financial and emotional burden on the accused and prolongs the period in which he or she is stigmatized by an unresolved accusation of wrongdoing). Second, repeated prosecutions enhance the likelihood that an innocent defendant may be convicted. See id.; see also United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980) (noting that reprosecution allows the government to gain advantage from what it learns at the first trial about the strengths of the defense and its own weaknesses); Lessary, 75 Haw. at 455-56, 865 P.2d at 155 (quoting Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 518-19, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990)). Similarly, the interest in the finality of judgments contemplates the importance to the defendant of being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971); see also Quitog, 85 Hawai`i at 148-49, 938 P.2d at 579-80 (noting the constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit (quoting United States v. Cavanaugh, 948 F.2d 405, 413-17 (8th Cir.1991))). Related to but separate from this interest is the defendant's interest in having the trial completed by the first tribunal. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 36, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978) (recognizing right to have trial completed by a particular tribunal). In doing so, the defendant is afforded the protection against manipulation designed to prevent the initial fact-finder from reaching a verdict in the defendant's case. Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 25.1(b) (2d ed.1992).