Opinion ID: 1799288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: whether the court erred by allowing the prosecution to argue the case could be decided by a lessened burden of proof.

Text: During the first trial the State argued, in effect, that this was a simple case for the jury to decide, turning on whether the jury believed the witnesses for the State or the witnesses for the defense. At the second trial before arguments began, Christmas made a motion in limine for the court to exclude a similar type argument from the State. Christmas contended that such an argument tends to demean the State's burden of proof and persuade the jury that the standard is something less than beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court overruled the defendant's motion in limine. During closing argument the State made the following statements. Gentlemen, this is not really a complicated case. What this case comes down to is if you believe what this defendant said when he took the witness stand, then the State has failed to prove its case and you should turn him loose. But on the other hand, if you believe what Nicole Christenberry and Diane Christenberry and Lee Haden have said from that witness stand, then the State has proved its case and your obligation is to find him guilty. Christmas contends that the above argument by the State urged a verdict upon a degree of persuasion as low as a mere preponderance of the evidence. He concedes that the term reasonable doubt did appear in some instructions, but asserts the prosecutor was able to demean it with the above argument. Although the statements by the State would have been prohibited as jury instructions, they were permissible in closing argument. Assuming, but not deciding, its use was tantamount to an attempt to define the term reasonable doubt, we have held ... that distinctions between reasonable doubt, all possible doubt, beyond a shadow of a doubt, and the like, while, not properly the subject of jury instructions, are permissible during trial counsel's closing argument. Heidelberg v. State, 584 So.2d 393, 396 (Miss. 1991). Christmas then complains that Instruction D-2 [7] was improperly refused. That instruction was taken from In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072-73, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), where the Supreme Court wrote, It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper fact finder of his guilt with utmost certainty. Christmas asserts the Supreme Court viewed reasonable doubt as meaning with utmost certainty. According to Christmas, Instruction D-2 was the correct statement of law. This Court does not review jury instructions in isolation; rather, they are read as a whole to determine if the jury was properly instructed. Peoples Bank and Trust Co. v. Cermack, 658 So.2d 1352, 1356 (Miss. 1995). [A]n instructional error will not warrant reversal if the jury was fully and fairly instructed by other instructions. Collins v. State, 594 So.2d 29, 35 (Miss. 1992); Laney v. State, 486 So.2d 1242, 1246 (Miss. 1986). This Court assumes that juries follow the instructions given to them by the trial court. Id; Payne v. State, 462 So.2d 902, 904 (Miss. 1984). The trial judge gave the appropriate instructions to the jury regarding reasonable doubt. In fact, the trial court withdrew one of its instructions and substituted the defendant's in its place. The trial judge reasoned that his C-13 [8] , which was a presumption instruction element, that he usually gives did not go as far as D-1 [9] that was given. The jury was further instructed as to reasonable doubt by S-1 [10] . By looking at the total instructions given, this Court finds the instructions given by the court were permissible. As stated earlier, jury instructions are not viewed in isolation, but as a whole. Peoples Bank and Trust Co., 658 So.2d at 1356. Also, this Court is to assume that juries follow instructions which are given to them by the trial court. Collins, 594 So.2d at 35. Christmas argues the trial judge committed reversible error during voir dire by commenting on reasonable doubt. THE COURT: ... In every state and under federal law, in order for a conviction to be had, the prosecutor in this state, the D.A., must prove to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did, in fact, commit the crime. That's the burden of proof every prosecutor in every county of this state and in every state and in the federal government. That's the burden they always have in every criminal case. Their duty is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is guilty. The person charged does not have the duty of affirmatively coming forward to prove himself or herself not guilty. They may present testimony and evidence to disprove the State's case, but it's not their duty to come forward first to show that they are not guilty. It's the State's duty to come forward first to prove that they are guilty. Now, obviously, from what I've just said there to those of you who have sat on civil cases, it was quite a different matter in civil lawsuits. Because in a civil lawsuit, one side is seeking from the other only money. And in those type cases, civil cases where somebody is suing somebody, the burden is much different and quite lower. In that case all they have to do is prove by what's called a preponderance of the evidence that the allegations made against the other party are true, fifty plus one so to speak. The standard, of course, as I've just said  noted to you is much higher in a criminal case. Now, I didn't say anything else beyond a reasonable doubt either, okay? There's only so far they have to go. They don't have to go to the end of the universe, because everybody and everything is to be reasonable here  are supposed to be reasonable here. Christmas claims such oral instructions have been denounced by this Court. This Court has said an instruction defining reasonable doubt is not proper. Gray v. State, 351 So.2d 1342, 1348 (Miss. 1977). Also, Christmas asserts that this Court has spoken directly to judges addressing reasonable doubt by saying, such matters should be limited to the remarks of counsel, not embodied in instructions emanating from the court. Gillum v. State, 468 So.2d 856, 863 (Miss. 1985). Christmas is procedurally barred from asserting this argument on appeal. Christmas did not make a contemporaneous objection at the time the court made the comments during voir dire. Therefore, he should not be able to raise this as an assignment of error for the first time on appeal. It is elementary that, for preservation of error for review, there must be contemporaneous objections. King v. State, 615 So.2d 1202, 1205 (Miss. 1993); Smith v. State, 530 So.2d 155, 161-62 (Miss. 1988). Alternatively, even if a contemporaneous objection had been made, Christmas does not show unto this Court how he has been prejudiced by the remarks of the trial judge in voir dire. In Gillum, this Court [c]onsidered in the context of the numerous instructions given touching the State's burden, and we concluded... substantial prejudice did not result to appellant from it. Id. Because the comments were made during voir dire, we find that any prejudice to Christmas was minimal and/or cured upon the instructions being given to the jury before deliberations. Therefore, this assignment of error lacks merit, and the decision by the lower court is affirmed.