Opinion ID: 2385862
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Editorializing by a State Witness

Text: Before the state called Maine State Police Detective Peter Herring as a witness, Hilton's counsel informed the trial justice that Herring had a reputation for editorializing on the witness stand. The court cautioned counsel for the state to ensure that Herring was responsive to any questions put to him. During his testimony Herring related the following statement which he said Hilton had made to him: He said that Mr. Boston had committed suicide, that he had been holding an axe over his head, had been trying to hit himself with an axe and that he had tried to take the axe away. Apparently, Herring also made gestures intended to simulate a person chopping at his own head with an axe. Immediately after Herring testified with the gestures just described, Hilton's counsel objected and moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the state had not informed defense counsel of the behavior that Herring attributed to Hilton and that Herring's testimony seriously undermined Hilton's credibility. Because the state had given defense counsel a report by Herring which contained a closely similar admission by Hilton, and because he did not want to draw undue attention to Herring's testimony, the trial justice sustained defense counsel's objection at sidebar but denied the motion for mistrial. Although the judge declined to give an immediate curative instruction, during his final charge to the jury he stated, Any evidence as to which an objection was sustained by the court must be entirely disregarded. And in this regard I instruct you to ignore the demonstration by Trooper Herring. On appeal, Hilton contends that the Superior Court's refusal to grant a mistrial or an immediate curative instruction constituted reversible error. While acknowledging that defense counsel had received a copy of Herring's police report, Hilton contends that the testimony objected to represented a violation of the state's duty of disclosure under M.R.Crim.P. 16. Although Hilton is vague on the point of how Herring's testimony prejudiced him, he seems to suggest that before Herring testified, Hilton's credibility was intact; that after the detective testified, Hilton's credibility was destroyed. A motion for mistrial is addressed to the sound discretion of the presiding justice. A justice's refusal to grant a mistrial represents an abuse of discretion only where there is a reasonable possibility that the objectionable evidence might have been a contributing factor productive of a guilty verdict. State v. Saulle, Me., 414 A.2d 897 (1980). Even if prejudicial testimony reaches the jury, the justice's election to grant a curative instruction instead of a mistrial is final, absent an abuse of discretion. The presiding justice is in a better position than the reviewing court to gauge the impact of the objectionable testimony. Only where there are exceptionally prejudicial circumstances or prosecutorial bad faith will a curative instruction be deemed inadequate to eliminate the prejudice. State v. Butts, Me., 372 A.2d 1041 (1977); State v. Heald, Me., 292 A.2d 200 (1972). On the face of the record in this case we are unable to conclude that Herring's demonstration was exceptionally prejudicial to Hiltonif it was prejudicial at all. Before Herring was called as a witness several other witnesses had already testified to Hilton's assertions that Boston had committed suicide; indeed, one witness recalled Hilton's saying specifically that Boston had committed suicide with an axe. Hence, to the extent that Hilton's credibility would be undermined by his explanation of Boston's death as being the result of suicide with an axe, it had already been undermined by the time Herring testified. Defense counsel had been given a police report by Herring containing essentially the same statements. Although Herring's physical demonstrations may have accentuated the effect on the jury of his oral testimony, the record does not indicate what motions Detective Herring made or for how long he made them; hence, we have no meaningful way to review the impression Herring's demonstrations made upon the jury. The trial justice is in a peculiarly advantageous position to gauge the impact of objectionable actions by a witness, and has the benefit of sensory reactions which cannot be transmitted through printed pages to the reviewing court. See St. Pierre v. Houde, Me., 269 A.2d 538, 540 (1970). We have no basis to conclude that Herring's statements or actions were so exceptionally prejudicial as to require a mistrial. Nor do we find any evidence of misconduct by the prosecutor. There is no suggestion in the record that the state encouraged Herring's demonstration. There was nothing in Herring's testimony itself that was not implicit in his police report, which the state had earlier supplied to the defense. In the circumstances, we find no error in the justice's refusal to give an immediate curative instruction when Herring testified. The justice clearly expressed his concern that because there had been no curative instructions during the prior six days of trial, an immediate instruction might have accentuated the effect of Herring's testimony; if that testimony was prejudicial to Hilton, the instruction might have increased, rather than diminished, the prejudice. Accordingly, the trial justice was within his discretion in delaying his curative instruction until his final charge to the jury, when the impact of Herring's testimony may have diminished. Since there were neither exceptionally prejudicial circumstances nor bad faith on the part of the state in regard to Herring's testimony, the presiding justice was within his discretion in declining to grant a mistrial. The entry is: Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed. McKUSICK, C.J., and WERNICK, ROBERTS, JJ., concurring. CARTER, J., concurring in separate opinion.