Opinion ID: 670647
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Availability of Declaratory Relief: Problems of Mootness and Ripeness

Text: 24 Finally, Houston argues that even if its claim for specific monetary relief is moot (as we hold that it is), it nevertheless is entitled to a declaratory judgment that HUD is required to provide notice and an opportunity for a hearing before reducing a grantee's CDBG. 25 It is well-established that if a plaintiff challenges both a specific agency action and the policy that underlies that action, the challenge to the policy is not necessarily mooted merely because the challenge to the particular agency action is moot. See, e.g., Payne Enters. v. United States, 837 F.2d 486 (D.C.Cir.1988); Better Gov't Ass'n v. Department of State, 780 F.2d 86 (D.C.Cir.1986). This line of cases grows out of decisions such as Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 94 S.Ct. 1694, 40 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974), in which an employer sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent New Jersey from granting state welfare benefits to striking workers, on the ground that the state's actions violated federal labor law. In Super Tire, the Supreme Court held that because the strike that prompted that suit ended before the case could be resolved, the employer's request for an injunction preventing payment of welfare benefits during the strike was moot. See id. at 121, 94 S.Ct. at 1697. However, the Court observed that the employer's request for declaratory relief was not moot, because its subsequent relations with the union would be affected by the ongoing state policy of providing public assistance to strikers, and because the challenged law was in no way contingent or subject to the discretion of an enforcing body, but was fixed and definite. Id. at 122, 124, 94 S.Ct. at 1698, 1699. 26 In line with Super Tire, this circuit's case law provides that if a plaintiff's specific claim has been mooted, it may nevertheless seek declaratory relief forbidding an agency from imposing a disputed policy in the future, so long as the plaintiff has standing to bring such a forward-looking challenge 6 and the request for declaratory relief is ripe. For example, in Better Government, two public interest organizations challenged guidelines used to determine when a person or organization requesting information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) would be entitled to a waiver of search and copying fees. The appellants in that case filed suit after they were denied a fee waiver, challenging both the specific denials of waivers and the facial validity of the regulations. See Better Gov't, 780 F.2d at 89. After the suit commenced, the agencies that had denied appellants' fee requests reversed their denials, mooting appellants' specific claims. We held, however, that it was evident that the Government intended to continue to apply the challenged standards, and that the appellants' facial challenge to the guidelines alleged a continuing injury due to this practice. See id. at 91. Appellants' request for a declaratory judgment that the guidelines were invalid therefore was not moot. We observed that the appellants in that case had standing to challenge the future application of the fee waiver policy, id. at 96 n. 53, and noted that the critical question was whether, under traditional ripeness principles, the guidelines were sufficiently ripe to permit informed judicial review. Id. at 92. 27 When a plaintiff's specific claim is moot or otherwise fully resolved, there are three potential outcomes to a request for declaratory relief. First, if a plaintiff has made no challenge to some ongoing underlying policy, but merely attacks an isolated agency action, then the mooting of the specific claim moots any claim for a declaratory judgment that the specific action was unlawful, unless the specific claim fits the exception for cases that are capable of repetition, yet evading review, see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124-25, 93 S.Ct. 705, 707, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), 7 or falls within the voluntary cessation doctrine, see, e.g., United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632, 73 S.Ct. 894, 897, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953); Payne, 837 F.2d at 491. Second, if a plaintiff challenges an ongoing agency policy by seeking declaratory relief, but lacks standing to attack future applications of that policy, then the mooting of the plaintiff's specific claim obviously leaves the court unable to award relief. Third, as is illustrated by our decisions in Payne and Better Government, if a plaintiff's allegations go not only to a specific agency action, but to an ongoing policy as well, and the plaintiff has standing to challenge the future implementation of that policy, then declaratory relief may be granted if the claim is ripe for review. 28 The application of the above principles to the instant case is fairly straightforward. Houston's Complaint did nominally seek declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting HUD from reducing the city's CDBG in the future without notice and a hearing. This litigation, however, has focused almost exclusively on one specific agency action--the $2.6 million reduction in Houston's fiscal 1986 grant. Appellant does not allege that HUD imposed any subsequent penalties without adhering to section 111 of the CDBG Act, or that the agency threatened or even contemplated doing so. Houston did note in its brief to this court that some time after HUD imposed the penalty complained of here, the agency promulgated regulations requiring entitlement cities to make timely disbursements of CDBG funds, as measured by the cities' year-end credit balance ratio, see Brief for Appellant at 6 (citing 24 C.F.R. Sec. 570.902 (1993)); but appellant did not directly challenge these regulations either in the trial court or on appeal. Houston also made no attempt to show that the regulations or other HUD policies were affecting its ongoing administration of the city's CDBG program, other than noting in its Reply Brief to this court that HUD's claim to be able to reduce grants without a hearing continues to affect the temper and tenor of day to day relations between HUD and Houston.... Reply Brief at 4. Appellant has focused almost exclusively on its attempt to recover the 1986 penalty; thus, there is a serious question whether Houston's passing references to HUD's alleged policy of acting without a hearing suffice to prevent the mooting of its entire case. We need not decide this question however, as even assuming that the city's request for declaratory relief is not moot, it is plain that such a challenge is not ripe for review. 29 We note that there is no doubt that Houston would have standing to challenge an alleged HUD policy of reducing CDBG funds without a hearing. As an entitlement city, appellant receives a yearly CDBG, and so presumably would be at sufficiently imminent risk of injury from such a policy to satisfy standing requirements. Cf. Payne, 837 F.2d at 493-94 (plaintiffs were frequent FOIA requesters whose primary conduct was affected by the practice at issue); Better Gov't, 780 F.2d at 93-94 (nonprofit organization plaintiffs routinely made FOIA requests, and alleged they had a statutory entitlement to FOIA fee waivers). However, even if Houston has standing, its claim for declaratory relief is unripe. 30 The framework for assessing ripeness was established in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), in which the Supreme Court provided a two-pronged test that requires a reviewing court to evaluate both the fitness of the issue for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. 8 This court has explained that the primary focus of the ripeness doctrine is to balance the petitioner's interest in prompt consideration of allegedly unlawful agency action against the agency's interest in crystallizing its policy before that policy is subject to review and the court's interest in avoiding unnecessary adjudication and in deciding issues in a concrete setting. Eagle-Picher Industries v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 915 (D.C.Cir.1985). 9 31 Under the fitness of the issues prong, the first question for a reviewing court is whether the disputed claims raise purely legal questions and would, therefore, be presumptively suitable for judicial review. Better Gov't, 780 F.2d at 92; see also Payne, 837 F.2d at 492; Eagle-Picher, 759 F.2d at 915. Next, we consider whether the court or the agency would benefit from postponing review until the policy in question has sufficiently crystallized by taking on a more definite form. Better Gov't, 780 F.2d at 92. The instant request for declaratory relief utterly fails to meet these standards. The dispute between Houston and HUD concerns the proper characterization of the specific action the agency took in this case--whether the 1986 penalty addressed the city's present or future disbursement of CDBG monies. There is simply no way for this court to consider whether HUD can act without a hearing in some amorphous category of cases such as this one, because the actual contours of the cases within the category are potentially determinative of their outcome. This case would be quite different if, for example, HUD announced a firm policy, applicable in all cases, under which it claimed the authority to reduce grantees' CDBGs without ever holding a hearing. Here, however, we are presented with a situation in which we require a concrete dispute in order even to know what HUD's policy is. 32 The agency's current regulations provide that CDBG grantees that have an end of year credit balance ratio of over 1.5 may be regarded as failing to carry out their activities in a timely manner. 24 C.F.R. Sec. 570.902(a) (1993). We have no means to evaluate in the abstract the myriad circumstances that might cause a grantee to exceed the target ratio so as to determine whether those circumstances would implicate section 111 of the CDBG Act. Indeed, were the court to rule on the issue now, it would be required to conduct a pseudo-rulemaking proceeding by examining and weighing all of the considerations that might lead the agency to hold or refuse to hold a hearing before reducing Houston's CDBG in the future. Webb v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 696 F.2d 101, 107 (D.C.Cir.1982). 33 Further, HUD's regulations also allow for agency discretion to impose penalties, providing that HUD may require the [grantee] to undertake appropriate corrective or remedial actions, and if that step fails, HUD may impose a sanction. 24 C.F.R. Sec. 570.900(6), (7) (emphasis added). Thus, the challenged proscription is discretionary so that it is unclear if, when or how the agency will employ it. Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931, 940 (D.C.Cir.1986), vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1001, 110 S.Ct. 1329, 108 L.Ed.2d 469 (1990). As the Supreme Court observed in assessing an analogous provision: The regulation serves notice only that the Commissioner may under certain circumstances order inspection of certain facilities and data.... At this juncture we have no idea whether or when such an inspection will be ordered and what reasons the Commissioner will give to justify his order. Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 163, 87 S.Ct. 1520, 1524, 18 L.Ed.2d 697 (1967). Judicial review of this issue is likely to stand on a much surer footing in the context of a specific application of this regulation than could be the case in the framework of the generalized challenge made here. Id. at 164, 87 S.Ct. at 1524. 34 Finally, under the hardship prong, we consider Houston's interest in immediate review. Better Gov't, 780 F.2d at 92. As stated above, appellant noted in passing in its Reply Brief that HUD's alleged policy of violating of CDBG Act section 111 affects the city's ongoing relationship with the agency. This vague grievance really amounts only to a complaint that this issue remains unresolved. The only hardship [Houston] will endure as a result of delaying consideration of this issue is the burden of having to file another suit. Webb, 696 F.2d at 107. Appellant has not alleged that HUD has reduced its CDBG in an illegal fashion since the disputed penalty in 1986, or that the agency has threatened to do so in the foreseeable future. Even if such a threat were imminent, Houston easily could file suit to challenge that action once it occurred. 10 In the event HUD were to impose another penalty, the only harm to Houston if its claim proved meritorious would be the temporary loss of the use of some portion of its CDBG. Given that the penalty at issue here was imposed because appellant had too much money in its account and was failing to disburse it rapidly enough, the city can scarcely argue that the temporary loss of some small percentage of its CDBG will cause it the type of hardship which warrants immediate consideration of an issue presented in abstract form. Id.