Opinion ID: 464632
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of Payment

Text: 5 Texas Employers' makes two arguments in support of its contention that payment was made timely. First, Texas Employers' argues that Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e) applies to this factual situation and that it gave Texas Employers' three extra days to pay the original compensation award. Second, Texas Employers' asserts that either because of the course of dealings between it and Lauzon, or by express agreement of Lauzon's wife, payment was made when the check became available to Lauzon at Texas Employers' place of business. This Court addresses these contentions in order. 6 (1) Application of Rule 6(e) 7 Texas Employers' argues that it actually had thirteen days in which to pay the award. This thirteen day period is calculated by taking the ten days permitted by the LHWCA and adding three days as provided by Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e). According to Texas Employers', Rule 6(e) extends by three days the ten day period that is otherwise allowed by section 14(f) to satisfy ... the award. Appellant's Brief at 30. Since it is undisputed that payment was made within thirteen days, payment would be timely under Texas Employers' theory, and the twenty percent assessment would then be improper. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e) provides: 8 Additional Time After Service by Mail. 9 Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period. 10 (emphasis added). Texas Employers' asserts that it was entitled to three extra days because the LHWCA provides that the employer is to be notified by mail of an award. See 33 U.S.C. Sec. 919(e). 11 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings for enforcement or review of compensation orders under ... U.S.C., Title 33, Secs. 918, 921, except to the extent that matters of procedure are provided for in that Act. Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(a)(6) (emphasis added). Although section 914 is not mentioned specifically in rule 81(a)(6), this Court has held that a 'Section 14(f) assessment,' ... [is] a 'supplementary order declaring the amount of the default' within the meaning of section 18(a) of the LHWCA. Tidelands Marine Service v. Patterson, 719 F.2d 126, 128 n. 3 (5th Cir.1983). Thus, Texas Employers' presents a strong argument that the Rules apply to the instant penalty assessment. Nevertheless, this Court need not decide that issue and we expressly reserve it. 12 The general applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to section 914(f) assessments need not be determined because even if the Rules of Civil Procedure apply in this context, Rule 6(e) does not afford Texas Employers' the relief it seeks. Rule 6(e) grants three additional days to a party required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him when service is by mail. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e). Because section 914 requires action within ten days of filing, as opposed to service, Rule 6(e) is inapplicable. First, this Court has stated: 13 Section [914(f) ] is self-executing; the 20 percent additional compensation automatically becomes due immediately upon the expiration of the ten-day period following the filing of the compensation order with the deputy commissioner. 14 Tidelands, 719 F.2d at 128 n. 2 (emphasis added). 15 Second, this approach is consistent with the rationale of Welsh v. Elevating Boats, Inc., 698 F.2d 230 (5th Cir.1983), and that rationale applies equally to the instant case. According to Welsh, the fact that notice is to be served by mail is not dispositive. The correct inquiry is whether the required actions must be performed within a prescribed period of filing or of service. If the act is to be taken after filing, the time for action begins to run from that date. If the act is to be taken after service, the three day extension of either Fed.R.App.P. 26(c) or Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e) applies. Welsh involved a notice of appeal issue, but it also cited for the stated proposition a case involving payment of costs. See Clements v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 473 F.2d 668 (5th Cir.1973). 16 The statute involved in this case is clear. According to section 914(f), an award must be paid within ten days after it becomes due, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 914(f) (emphasis added). An award becomes effective when filed in the office of the deputy commissioner.... 33 U.S.C. Sec. 921(a) (emphasis added). This Court has stated that [t]he term 'effective' in Sec. 921(a) is equivalent to the terms 'due' and 'due and payable' in Secs. 914(f) and 918(a), respectively. Tidelands, 719 F.2d at 127 n. 1. Consequently, in the instant case, the time for payment started running when the award was filed, and not when Texas Employers' was served. Rule 6(e) does not provide Texas Employers' with relief in this instance. 17 (2) Arrangement with Plaintiff 18 Texas Employers' next argues that payment was not late in this case because payment should be considered to have been made at the time the check was made available to claimant. Appellant's Brief at 18. Texas Employers' asserts that payment was made in this case for two alternate reasons. First, Texas Employers' asserts that because of its prior course of dealings with Lauzon, it justifiably relied on its assumption that Lauzon would come to Texas Employers' office and pick up the check. Second, Texas Employers' argues that it had an express agreement with Lauzon's wife that Lauzon would pick up the check at Texas Employers' office. 3 19 This Court holds that a course of conduct such as the one alleged here is insufficient as a matter of law to constitute payment for purposes of the LHWCA. Moreover, an express agreement with some third person other than the claimant is also insufficient as a matter of law. 20 First, the language of the LHWCA requires that compensation be paid ... directly to the person entitled thereto.... 33 U.S.C. Sec. 914(a) (emphasis added). This Court is hard put to understand how issuing and holding a check in the office of the insurer is payment directly to the claimant. 21 Second, section 915 states that no agreement by an employee to waive the employee's right to compensation shall be valid. The District of Columbia Circuit applied this provision to an alleged waiver of the section 914(e) penalty. That court stated, it is well established that the 'right to additional compensation under section 14(e) cannot be waived.'  Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Cooper Associates, 607 F.2d 1385, 1387 (D.C.Cir.1979) (brackets, citation and footnote omitted). Likewise, this Court does not believe that additional compensation under section 914(f) can be waived by an implied agreement. To imply an agreement from a previous course of dealings is tantamount to holding that a claimant can waive the penalty by his or her prior actions. This Court hesitates to go so far. 4 Furthermore, this Court refuses to hold that an express agreement with some third party, even the claimant's spouse, is sufficient to constitute payment. It is not unreasonable, given section 914(a), to require the employer or its insurer to deal directly with the claimant. 22 Finally, this Court has stated that section 914(f) coupled with section 918(a) provides a quick and inexpensive mechanism for the prompt enforcement of unpaid compensation awards, a theme central to the spirit, intent, and purposes of the LHWCA. Tidelands, 719 F.2d at 129. It would be inconsistent with that intent to adopt an amorphous definition of payment. The definition sought by Texas Employers' would indicate that payment is made merely because a spouse agreed that the claimant would pick up the check or that payment is made because the claimant agreed to pick up the check only because he or she had done so in the past. Such a holding would spawn litigation over whether, under innumerable sets of facts, a claimant has been paid. Such a rule undermines the intent of the statute as well as the statutory system that this Court has termed self-executing.