Opinion ID: 610796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pole Attachment Act

Text: 10 Section 224 provides that in the absence of state regulation, the Commission shall regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments to provide that such rates, terms, and conditions are just and reasonable, and shall adopt procedures necessary and appropriate to hear and resolve complaints concerning such rates, terms, and conditions. 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1). According to the statute, a rate is just and reasonable if it assures a utility the recovery of not less than the additional costs of providing pole attachments, nor more than an amount determined by multiplying the percentage of the total usable space ... which is occupied by the pole attachment by the sum of the operating expenses and actual capital costs of the utility attributable to the entire pole.... Id. at § 224(d)(1). 2 The pole attachments subject to the FCC's regulatory authority are defined as any attachment by a cable television system to a pole ... owned or controlled by a utility. Id. at § 224(a)(4). 11 The basic issue in this case boils down to what Congress meant by the phrase cable television system. By now, the analytical framework for resolving this type of interpretive question is so familiar that it requires little elaboration. We ask first, using traditional tools of statutory construction, whether Congress expressed in the statute a clear intent on the precise issue presented, namely whether the FCC may regulate pole attachment rates where the cables attached are used in part to transmit nonvideo communications. See Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 966 F.2d 1478, 1481 (D.C.Cir.1992); United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1184 (D.C.Cir.1989). However, where ambiguity obscures our view of the congressional intent, we are obliged to defer to any reasonable construction of the statute offered by the Commission. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82; TRT Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 134, 146 (D.C.Cir.1989). 12 TU asserts that Congress, by conferring upon the FCC jurisdiction over pole attachments by a cable television system, meant clearly to limit regulation to those cables attached to distribute traditional television services, i.e., video programming. To the extent that a company attaches cables transmitting nonvideo communications, it is said to no longer be operating a cable television system and therefore ineligible for the [302 U.S.App.D.C. 240] regulated rate. On the other hand, the Commission does not regard the statutory language as unambiguous. Rather, it interprets the PAA as not distinguishing between the types of service transmitted over the cable, but only requiring that the attachment be made by a cable operator as part of a franchised cable television system. 13 At the outset, we note that the plain language of the PAA puts us immediately into something of an interpretive quandary. Because one does not ordinarily think of a system as having the capacity to attach anything, it seems incorrect, or at least imprecise, for the statute to speak of an attachment by a cable television system. At least two ways of resolving this predicament come to mind. The phrase might mean that § 224 rates apply only to attachments for a cable television system, or it might mean that the regulated rate applies to any attachment by a cable television system company. In other words, while it seems obvious that the attachments must bear some relation to a cable television system, it is not entirely clear whether the statute places greater emphasis on the type of service to be distributed over the attachment or the type of entity doing the attaching. TU presents several reasons why this facial ambiguity in no way detracts from what it considers to be a plain legislative intent to exclude from regulation attachments for nonvideo communications. 14 First, TU argues that the meaning of the statutory phrase cable television system should be drawn from the FCC's extant definition at the time the PAA was enacted. The agency's regulations defined a cable television system as a 15 non-broadcast facility consisting of a set of transmission paths and associated signal generation, reception, and control equipment, under common ownership and control, that distributes or is designed to distribute to subscribers the signals of one or more television broadcast stations.... 16 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(a) (1977). From this, TU concludes that the FCC's regulatory authority is limited exclusively to pole attachments that serve to distribute television broadcast signals. However, as the Commission noted in 1977, the definition was intended merely to set forth the essential technological characteristics shared by all cable television facilities, First Report & Order, 63 F.C.C.2d 956, 964 (1977), and not to restrict or exhaust the variety of services that could be offered over a cable television system. Indeed, if the phrase was construed narrowly, as TU suggests, to encompass only the distribution of signals from television broadcast stations, a system which provided services traditionally understood to be cable television, such as community access programming or made-for-cable programming, would not be considered a cable television system. That, the Commission observes, would be an unlikely result. 17 Moreover, the Commission explains, it has long recognized the potential of cable television systems to provide not only video programming, but also broadband cable services, including data transmission. Thus, the Commission explained in 1970 that CATV [Community Antenna Television] service represents the initial practical application of broadband cable technology, and that there is a substantial expectation that broadband cables, in addition to CATV services, will make economically and technically possible a wide variety of new and different services involving the distribution of data. Final Report & Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, 324-25 (1970). Some of the potential broadband services identified by the Commission in 1972 included [f]acsimile reproduction of newspapers, magazines, documents, etc.; electronic mail delivery; merchandising; business concern links to branch offices, primary customers or suppliers; access to computers ...; information retrieval (library and other reference material, etc.) and computer to computer communications. Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 144 n. 10 (1972). The Commission contends that while Congress' primary concern in enacting the PAA was no doubt to facilitate the provision of cable television service to the public, it was surely aware of the agency's longstanding view of the capacity of cable television systems. In fact, the Senate report accompanying the PAA noted that the introduction of broadband cable services may pose a competitive threat to telephone companies, and that [302 U.S.App.D.C. 241] the pole attachment practices of telephone companies could, if unchecked, present realistic dangers of competitive restraint in the future. S.REP. NO. 580, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 13, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 109, 121. We therefore cannot agree with TU that Congress, if it meant to incorporate the FCC's definition of cable television system, specifically intended to restrict rate regulation to attachments distributing television programming; even under the FCC regulation a system that distributes both video and nonvideo communication does not necessarily disqualify itself from being a cable television system. 18 Second, TU observes that an earlier version of the PAA would have regulated any attachment for wire communication  rather than the eventual any attachment by a cable television system. H.R.REP. NO. 1630, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976) (emphasis added). It argues that substitution of the narrower phrase cable television system evidenced Congress' plain intent to restrict rate protection to attachments for traditional television services, rather than for the full range of wire communications. We disagree that the legislative purpose is so clear. The switch was made at the behest of the Commission, which wrote to Congress explaining that 19 under the proposed bill, the Commission might be involved in assuring just and reasonable rates for the use of poles by not only cable television system operators but also by many other users of wire communications. We understand that, in addition to cable systems, a large number of other entities utilize space on utility poles. These include public safety uses such as police, fire and traffic signalling, in addition to use by communications common carriers such as Western Union.... It seems certain that the scope of a regulatory program designed to insure just and reasonable rates for the leasing of pole space by all of these entities would be much larger than that necessary to insure just rates for cable systems. We would recommend therefore that if the legislative intent of the bill is merely to remedy pole attachment problems which are of importance to the cable television industry, then its application should be so limited, preferably by inserting the term cable television system as defined by 47 C.F.R. 76.5(a) in lieu of wire communication. 20 H.R.REP. NO. 1630 at 30-31. Therefore, it appears the more precise language was used not to circumscribe the scope of communications to be regulated but to limit the type of entity or industry to be protected. 3 21 Finally, TU notes that in enacting the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act), 47 U.S.C. § 521, et seq., Congress defined cable system as a facility, consisting of a set of closed transmission paths and associated signal generation, reception, and control equipment that is designed to provide cable service which includes video programming and which is provided to multiple subscribers within a community. 47 U.S.C. § 522(6). Again, TU contends that this limited definition restricts the FCC's pole attachment jurisdiction to cable distributing conventional video programming. But, again, the congressional intent seems far from clear. First, the Cable Act states that the definition of cable system applies only for purposes of that statute. No reference is made to the PAA. Second, the House Report explains that the 22 term cable system is not limited to a facility that provides only cable service which includes video programming. Quite the contrary, many cable systems provide a wide variety of cable services and other communications services as well. A facility would be a cable system if it were designed to include the provision of cable services (including video programming) [302 U.S.App.D.C. 242] along with communications services other than cable service. 23 H.R.REP. NO. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1984), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4681. Thus, the Commission reasoned that because TCI's facilities were clearly designed to provide traditional cable services including video programming, its facilities are a 'cable system' within the meaning of the Cable Act, even though TCI also provides data transmission services over its system. 24 In sum, we find TU's attempt to discern in the statutory grant of jurisdiction over any attachment by a cable television system to a pole an express requirement that any such attachment be solely for the purpose of transmitting video programming unavailing. It is of course possible that Congress intended to exclude from protection cable attachments used in whole or in part to distribute nonvideo communications. That, however, is not the only or even the most plausible interpretation of the PAA. The Commission may instead be correct that, while Congress did not specifically discuss how to deal with cable carrying video and nonvideo communications, it meant for the agency to regulate pole attachments that are part of a cable company's cable television system, regardless of whether other types of service are being transmitted over that system as well. If, of course, the interpretive exercise clearly supported one party's interpretation, our task would be at an end. Each side, however, has staked out quite sensible interpretive positions.... Thus, in the [phrase] is to be found that frequently encountered statutory disease, ambiguity. Ass'n of Maximum Serv. Telecasters v. FCC, 853 F.2d 973, 978 (D.C.Cir.1988). We therefore examine next the reasonableness of the Commission's resolution of the ambiguity.