Opinion ID: 200476
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stipulation Relating to Drug Amount

Text: Three of the defendants contend that the stipulation regarding the testimony of the government's forensic chemist was used improperly at trial. Each of these defendants attempts to draw on the principles set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Apprendi stands for the proposition that, other than a fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must both be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury for a determination under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. United States v. Eirby, 262 F.3d 31, 36 (1st Cir. 2001)(citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490). Ward-Bryan makes an express Apprendi claim, alleging that weight of the cocaine involved should have been submitted to the jury. Without referencing Apprendi directly, Sánchez-Hernández argues that the stipulation was used in a manner that violated his rights to due process and a jury trial, and Amparo-Hernández alleges that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in connection with the stipulation.
Ward-Bryan alleges that because his sentence was based on the weight of the cocaine involved in the crime, the failure to submit this issue to the jury for determination beyond a reasonable doubt violated his rights under Apprendi. Having failed to object to his sentence on this basis, Ward-Bryan's argument is reviewed on -15- appeal for plain error only. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993). Accordingly, Ward-Bryan bears the burden of proving (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997)(quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732). Even if he meets this burden, this court will only exercise its discretion to notice the error if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 467. The indictment specified that approximately 978 kilograms of cocaine were involved in the crime, a charge that exposed WardBryan to a sentence of ten years to life. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(g)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 960(b). He concedes in his brief that he stipulated at trial that the weight of the cocaine was 975 kilograms (an amount carrying the same penalties as the amount charged in the indictment) and that this may have been a tactical decision intended to limit juror prejudice by avoiding prolonged testimony focusing on the contraband itself.9 9 Ward-Bryan now contends that it is entirely likely that the stipulation to the drug amount (entered into in April 2000, prior to the Apprendi decision in June 2000) was made with the expectation that, consistent with then-existing practice, the jury would be instructed that it need not make a determination as to the quantity of cocaine involved. Thus Ward-Bryan would have had less of an incentive pre-Apprendi to dispute the drug quantity in front of the jury. Ward-Bryan now wishes to be relieved of the consequences of the stipulation (which he acknowledges may have provided some tactical advantage to him at trial). The failure to submit this stipulated issue to the jury does not constitute an error. -16- Ward-Bryan has not demonstrated any error on these facts. He was sentenced to 188 months' imprisonment, a term less than the statutory maximum (in this case, a life sentence). In such a case, Apprendi is irrelevant. Eirby, 262 F.3d at 37. Ward-Bryan concedes this point in his brief, but urges us to find that Apprendi extends to circumstances in which a defendant is sentenced to more than the mandatory minimum sentence. This suggested expansion of Apprendi is wholly inconsistent with our precedent, see United States v. Newton, --- F.3d --- , No. 01-2636, 2003 WL 1826135, at  (1st Cir. Apr. 9, 2003); Lopez-Lopez, 282 F.3d at 22; United States v. Robinson, 241 F.3d 115, 119 (1st Cir. 2001), and we are not empowered to revisit the issue. See United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446, 1449 (1st Cir. 1991)([I]n a multi-panel circuit, prior panel decisions are binding upon newly constituted panels in the absence of supervening authority sufficient to warrant disregard of established precedent.). We find no error in Ward-Bryan's sentencing. 2. Erroneous Jury Instruction (Sánchez-Hernández) In his pro se supplemental brief, Sánchez-Hernández also alleges that the stipulation regarding the forensic chemist's testimony was used in a manner that violated his rights, referring generally to his right to due process and to his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy and public jury trial. Sánchez-Hernández argues that he stipulated only to what the forensic chemist would testify -17- to, not to the accuracy of the witness's testimony. He contends that the district court erred in (1) failing to explain this distinction to the jury, and (2) affirmatively misstating the effect of the stipulation to the jury. The latter alleged error occurred immediately after the stipulation was read to the jury when the district court instructed the jury: Let me advise the jury first that the United States and the defendants having stipulated to the facts as stated in that stipulation, those facts stated in that stipulation as to the drug are facts that must be taken as true not subject to credibility. Tr. Apr. 4, 2000, 28:1-5 (emphasis added). Sánchez-Hernández made no contemporaneous objection to either alleged error, nor did he later request jury instructions or a form of verdict that would require the jury to determine the amount of cocaine involved beyond a reasonable doubt. Having failed to preserve these issues at trial, Sánchez-Hernández's arguments are reviewed for plain error. Olano, 507 U.S. at 731-32. Although Sanchez-Hernandez's argument may be technically correct that he stipulated to only the chemist's testimony about the drugs, and the district court therefore erred in characterizing the stipulation as a stipulation as to the drug[s], this error did not affect Sánchez-Hernández's substantial rights. As a factual matter, the defendants and their counsel treated the -18- stipulation as a stipulation to the quantity of cocaine,10 and no other evidence was presented that would have contradicted the testimony of the government's forensic chemist. As a matter of law, because Sánchez-Hernández was sentenced to less than the statutory maximum, the failure to present the issue of the drug amount to the jury has no constitutional significance.11 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; see also Section II.B.1., above. 3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Amparo- Hernández) Amparo-Hernández contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, both at the time he entered into the defendants' stipulation, and at the time counsel failed to object to jury instructions that did not require the jury to determine the 10 Prior to sentencing, Sánchez-Hernández, Amparo-Hernández, and Salazar each moved for a new trial or for sentencing at the mandatory minimum, alleging a violation of Apprendi because the amount of drugs involved was not determined by the jury. At their sentencing hearings on October 27, 2000, these defendants, through counsel, withdrew their motions after reviewing a copy of the stipulation regarding the testimony that would be offered by the government's forensic chemist. Similarly, at Downs's sentencing (which occurred three days before), Downs's counsel reviewed the motion filed on behalf of Sánchez-Hernández and asked that the same issues be preserved for his client. He later conceded, however, that the drug amount was agreed and stipulated. 11 Sánchez-Hernández also argues that the district court erred in instructing the jury that it need not determine the amount of cocaine as charged in the indictment. This argument is identical in all relevant respects to the Apprendi argument made by WardBryan, and is rejected for the reasons discussed in Section