Opinion ID: 789302
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Threat of Death Enhancement

Text: 25 Hazelwood finally disputes the district court's imposition of a two-point enhancement for a threat of death under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F), noting that the district judge had mentioned that, on this point, he had certainly got an argument that [he could] make to the Court of Appeals. Hazelwood relies on an Eleventh Circuit opinion that states that sentences imposing an increase for the use of a firearm or dangerous weapon, should not include an independent increase, whether by departure or otherwise, for an express threat of death. United States v. Bourne, 130 F.3d 1444, 1447 (11th Cir.1997) (citing United States v. LNU, 16 F.3d 1168, 1171 (11th Cir.1994)). In that case, the defendant had robbed a bank with a gun, and had also given a note to the tellers that stated he would kill them. The district judge there imposed both a brandishing or possessing a dangerous weapon three-point enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E) and a threat of death two-point enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). The Eleventh Circuit held this to be improper, noting that a threat of death is implicit when a dangerous weapon is displayed.... Bourne, 130 F.3d at 1447. 26 The Government has three responses to Hazelwood's argument. First, it notes that the threat of death enhancement here was made for the use of a threat separate from that implied by the brandishing of the firearm. Second, the Government notes that Hazelwood's firearm enhancement was not in fact a firearm enhancement under § 2B3.1(b)(2). Rather, it was a conviction on a separate use of a firearm to commit a violent felony charge, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). As a result, claims the Government, Hazelwood is not receiving two separate § 2B3.1(b)(2) enhancements. Finally, the Government argues that an application note that had previously forbidden the use of a threat of death enhancement in situations when a firearm-based enhancement or charge is applied has since been deleted from the Guidelines. Compare U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 n.4 (2004) with U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 n.4 (1998); see also United States v. Smith, 981 F.2d 887, 892-94 (6th Cir.1992). 27 In Smith, this Court held squarely that the 1992 version of the Guidelines (specifically, Application Note 2 to § 2K2.4) prohibited the use of a § 2B3.1(b)(2) enhancement in situations such as this one where a defendant has also been convicted of a firearm violation under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 1 The Court noted that the defendant had made a threat that was technically separate from the act brandishing the firearm when he said This is a stickup. Give me your money. Hurry up or you will be dead. Observing that § 2K2.2 n.4 prohibited the use of specific offense characteristic enhancements resulting from the possession, brandishing, use, or discharge of a firearm, the Court held that the defendant's express oral threat of death, while by nature a different act from brandishing the gun, was related to the use of the firearm, since it would be obvious that the threatened killing would involve the use of the gun. Smith, 981 F.2d at 893. As a result, we held that the threat spoken by the defendant was related to the use of the firearm for which the 924(c) conviction was imposed, and thus that counting the threat separately would result in double counting that was explicitly impermissible under Application Note 2 to § 2K2.4. Id. 28 While most of the content of Application Note 2 was later moved to Note 4, its content has not been altered in any way that should affect the Smith Court's conclusion. Although the example specifically mentioning robbery and the threat of death enhancement was removed, new language was added that precluded the use of enhancements for any firearm-related conduct related to an underlying offense when a defendant is also convicted under § 924(c). Compare U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 n.4 (2004) with U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 n.4 (1998); see also United States v. Reevey, 364 F.3d 151, 158-59 (4th Cir.2004) (invalidating a sentence on exactly the same grounds as Smith, and rejecting the Government's argument that the 2000 amendments to the Guidelines should alter this conclusion). Every other circuit to review this or related questions has agreed with Smith. See, e.g., Reevey, 364 F.3d at 158-59 (4th Cir.2004); United States v. Franks, 230 F.3d 811, 813-14 (5th Cir.2000); United States v. Murray, No. 97-6735, 1999 WL 187192 (4th Cir. Apr.6, 1999) (unpublished opinion); United States v. Triplett, 104 F.3d 1074, 1082 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1236, 117 S.Ct. 1837, 137 L.Ed.2d 1042 (1997); United States v. Duran, 4 F.3d 800, 804 (9th Cir.1993); United States v. Farrier, 948 F.2d 1125, 1127 (9th Cir.1991). As the Fourth Circuit noted in Reevey, the relevant inquiry under the current version of Application Note 4 is: 29 whether the threat-of-death enhancement was applied `for possession, brandishing, use, or discharge of an explosive or firearm.' In [defendant Reevey's] case, both of the threats made by [Reevey] were to shoot Jones (with a handgun that Reevey had already displayed), and they involved the firearm Reevey was convicted of possessing under § 924(c). 30 364 F.3d at 158-59. 31 Hazelwood's case is no different from Reevey's, or, for that matter, Smith's. Reevey, Smith, and Hazelwood all brandished guns, and all verbally threatened to kill others while doing so, during the course of a felony. All three defendants' threats were directly related to the firearm each was brandishing, regardless of whether they said I will shoot you or more generally I will kill you. See also Duran, 4 F.3d at 804 (reaching the same result where a defendant had merely said Don't move or we'll kill you.). The current Application Note 4 is clear that enhancements stemming from the possession, brandishing, use, or discharge of a firearm related to the underlying offense cannot be imposed for acts related to the conduct for which a defendant was also convicted under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). See, e.g., Reevey, 364 F.3d at 158-59. We therefore find that the 2000 amendments to the Guidelines do not dissuade us from applying the holding of Smith to Hazelwood's case. As a result, since the threat of death in the instant case was related to Hazelwood's brandishing of a firearm, the imposition of the two-point threat enhancement in his case was improper. The removal of these two points would result in a sentencing range where the lowest point (100 months) would be lower than the 120-month sentence Hazelwood received for the count to which this enhancement applied. As a result, under Sixth Circuit jurisprudence prior to the issuance of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2005), Hazelwood's sentence would have been vacated and his case remanded for resentencing. See, e.g., Smith, 981 F.2d at 893-94 (citing United States v. Rosado-Ubiera, 947 F.2d 644, 646 (2d Cir.1991)).