Opinion ID: 2981094
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance Evidence

Text: The evidence of defense counsel David Dean’s substance abuse consists substantially of testimony by Janice Barnum, Dean’s former legal secretary and private investigator. Barnum -9- Nos. 10-2419, 10-2420 Freeman v. Trombley testified on September 13, 1991, in post-conviction proceedings stemming from a 1989 prosecution, People v. Randy Overton, St. Clair Cir. Ct. No. 89-1872-FC, in which Dean had represented the defendant Overton. Her testimony included her observations that Dean’s abuse of alcohol, cocaine and crack had begun to noticeably affect him in 1987, and that Dean had voluntarily admitted himself to a substance abuse rehabilitation program in 1988. In the Overton case, moreover, Dean’s substance abuse was ultimately found to have contributed to his rendering of ineffective assistance to his client. The district court carefully considered Dean’s trial performance in light of this evidence and in light of the Michigan Court of Appeals’ earlier rejection of Freeman’s ineffective assistance claim. The district court concluded that Freeman had failed to show that substance abuse by his attorney contributed to deficient performance that prejudiced the defense. We find no error in this assessment. As the district court observed, Dean mounted a vigorous defense on Freeman’s behalf. Although Freeman, with the benefit of hindsight, continues to criticize certain strategic choices made by his attorney because they turned out to be unsuccessful, his contention that substance abuse played a role in those decisions is supported by nothing but speculation. Evidence of Dean’s substance abuse, generally, at or near the time of Freeman’s trial, offers no support for his gateway actual innocence claim. The second new item advanced in support of Freeman’s ineffective assistance claim that is potentially relevant to his actual innocence claim is Freeman’s own affidavit, executed on September 23, 2004. In relevant part, the affidavit states: - 10 - Nos. 10-2419, 10-2420 Freeman v. Trombley Affiant strongly desired to testify in his defense. Based on his conversations with Mr. Dean, he assumed he would be called to testify. However, Mr. Dean—despite affiant’s protests and without his consent—declined to call affiant to the stand. When affiant wished to protest to the court his counsel’s refusal to call him, the court refused to hear him, telling him he would have to address the court through his attorney. The only explanation offered affiant by Mr. Dean was that affiant had been present during the trial and would for that reason not be allowed to testify. Affiant was at no time told that he had an absolute right to testify in his defense. Mr. Dean also threatened to withdraw from the case when affiant demanded to be allowed to tell the court that he wanted to testify. R. 1-5, Freeman Aff. at ¶ 40. Freeman thus alleges, seventeen years post-trial, that his failure to testify in trial was not an exercise of his right to remain silent, and was not the result of a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to testify, but was against his will and due to his attorney’s improper interference. The district court recognized that such a self-serving affidavit must be reviewed with great skepticism. The court also recognized that waiver of a defendant’s right to testify is presumed unless there is evidence that he notified the trial court of his desire to testify and of his disagreement with defense counsel. See United States v. Bass, 460 F.3d 830, 839 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Webber, 208 F.3d 545, 550-51 (6th Cir. 2000). Further, the court recognized that the trial record was devoid of evidence that Freeman ever protested counsel’s refusal to allow him to testify or that he otherwise alerted the trial court to his desire to testify. Yet, notwithstanding these three reasons to reject the claim, the district court ignored the presumption recognized by controlling Sixth Circuit law and fully credited Freeman’s inherently suspect and unsupported affidavit. Freeman’s affidavit statement that Dean prevented him from exercising his right to testify and even from alerting the trial court to his disagreement with counsel, being essentially refuted by - 11 - Nos. 10-2419, 10-2420 Freeman v. Trombley the silence of the trial record, is inherently unreliable.3 This is the very situation for which the presumption of waiver is recognized. See Webber, 208 F.3d at 551. Because defense counsel is presumed to have informed his client of his rights, “[b]arring any statements or actions from the defendant indicating disagreement with counsel or the desire to testify, the trial court is neither required to sua sponte address a silent defendant and inquire whether the defendant knowingly and intentionally waived the right to testify, nor ensure that the defendant has waived the right on the record.” Id. “A defendant who wants to testify can reject defense counsel’s advice to the contrary by insisting on testifying, communicating with the trial court, or discharging counsel.” Id. When a defendant does not alert the trial court to a disagreement, waiver of the right to testify is presumed. Id.; see also Goff v. Bagley, 601 F.3d 445, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying presumption). Hence, because the trial record shows that Freeman did not alert the trial court during trial to what he now claims was a disagreement with defense counsel about whether he should testify, he is presumed as a matter of law to have waived his right to testify. Indeed, “[a] contrary rule would require courts to hold an evidentiary hearing any time a defendant who did not testify at trial filed an after-the-fact statement saying that he wanted to testify but was prevented from doing so.” Hodge v. Haeberlein, 579 F.3d 627, 639 (6th Cir. 2009). Freeman’s own self-serving affidavit, otherwise unsupported, is insufficient to rebut the presumption that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his 3 Freeman’s statement is also refuted by prosecuting attorney Robert Cleland’s affidavit, recounting the circumstances he observed surrounding Freeman’s decision not to testify. R. 49-2, Cleland Aff. ¶¶ 33-40. - 12 - Nos. 10-2419, 10-2420 Freeman v. Trombley right to testify. Freeman’s affidavit thus carries little weight in furtherance of showing actual innocence.