Opinion ID: 623016
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Iraqi Law Determination

Text: Arkel contends that the plaintiffs failed to prove Iraqi law because the only English translation of the Iraqi Civil Code is from 1990. At the summary judgment hearing, the district court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving Iraqi law. The plaintiffs have the burden of proving foreign law. Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 1006 (5th Cir.1990). These plaintiffs were obligated to present to the district court clear proof of the relevant . . . legal principles. Id. To determine foreign law, Rule 44.1 states that the court may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court's determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1. Accordingly, a district court's foreign-law determination is reviewed de novo. Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 713 (5th Cir.1999). Though proof of a foreign country's law is a plaintiff's burden, the court may engage in its own research on an issue of foreign law, and such research does not require formal notice to the parties. Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1 cmt. [T]he rule provides flexible procedures for presenting and utilizing material on issues of foreign law by which a sound result can be achieved with fairness to the parties. Id. To prove Iraqi law, the plaintiffs offered two affidavits of Feisal Amin Istrabadi, an expert on Iraqi law. In his first affidavit, Istrabadi discussed Iraq's three-year prescriptive period for delictual acts, i.e., a wrongful act or omission giving rise to a claim for compensation. See Black's Law Dictionary 492 (9th ed. 2009). In his supplemental affidavit, he provided a full-text translation of Article 232 of the Iraqi Civil Code, Iraq's prescription statute for delictual acts (torts), in addition to a website where Article 232 could be found in Arabic. According to Istrabadi's translation, Article 232 states: An action for compensation based upon a delictual act is not allowed after the passage of three years from the date on which the injured party knew of the occurrence of the injury and of the person who caused it, nor is an action allowed in all cases after the passage of fifteen years from the date on which the delictual act occurred. Istrabadi also stated that Article 232 is a discovery statute that begins once the claimant learns of two thingsthe occurrence of the injury and the person who caused it. He further stated that only when both conditions are satisfied does the three-year prescription begin to run. Although Arkel maintains that Istrabadi's translation is inconclusive, it does not put forth any alternative translation of the Iraqi Civil Code. Arkel cites to a website containing a 1990 English translation of Article 232. That translation provides the same understanding: A claim for damages resulting from whatever (kind) of unlawful act shall not be heard after the lapse of three years from the day on which the injured person became aware of the injury and of the person who caused it; in all cases the claim will not be heard after the lapse of 15 years from the day of occurrence of the unlawful act. Iraqi Civ.Code art. 232, available at http:// gjpi.org/library/primary/statutes. [3] We also have examined sources for Iraqi law, under the authority provided by Rule 44.1. We discover nothing to draw into question that the prescriptive period ends three years after a plaintiff becomes aware of the claim and the allegedly culpable party. As Arkel did not put forth any alternative translation and has not suggested how the translation might be inaccurate, we hold that Iraqi law on the period of prescription has been proven. See Northrop Grumman Ship Sys., Inc. v. Ministry of Def. of the Republic of Venezuela, 575 F.3d 491, 498 n. 8 (5th Cir.2009) (foreign law sufficiently proven where party submitted English translations of relevant statutes and opposing party had not alleged that the translation was inaccurate or misrepresented foreign law). Thus, Iraq has a three-year prescriptive period for tort claims that starts on the day the victim became aware of the injury and of the person who caused it. The summary judgment evidence reflects that the plaintiffs did not become aware of Arkel's alleged responsibility for their son's death until December 2005. At the hearing on summary judgment, the district court stated that the plaintiffs had failed to prove what Iraqi law was or that they complied with Iraqi law that might be applicable. The district court's discussion of the issue, however, focused on whether the plaintiffs had satisfied their burden to prove Iraqi law, not whether they had failed to comply with Iraq's statute of limitations. The court did not explicitly address whether, if Iraqi law were adequately proven, the plaintiffs could show that they complied with that law. We decline to determine an issue on summary judgment not clearly addressed by the district court. There was evidence presented in the district court that the earliest date on which the plaintiffs had notice of Arkel's participation was in December 2005. The plaintiffs brought suit in September 2008. Based on the information now before us, the plaintiffs' claims have not been shown to be barred under Iraqi law. A final determination, based on findings of when plaintiffs became aware of the injury and Arkel's possible role, can be made on remand.