Opinion ID: 1298434
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Lee's Nervousness

Text: In further support of the district court's finding of reasonable suspicion, the State argues in its brief that [w]hen Lee was contacted by the officers, she was found to be extremely nervous. Brief for appellee at 10. In State v. Anderson, 258 Neb. 627, 605 N.W.2d 124 (2000), we discussed nervousness as a factor in evaluating reasonable suspicion. In Anderson, citing U.S. v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir.1998), we observed that nervousness, as a basis for reasonable suspicion, must be treated with caution. 258 Neb. at 638, 605 N.W.2d at 135. The reason nervousness is of limited value is the recognition that `[i]t is common knowledge that most citizens ... whether innocent or guilty, when confronted by a law enforcement officer who asks them potentially incriminating questions are likely to exhibit some signs of nervousness.'  U.S. v. Hall, 978 F.2d 616, 621 n. 4 (10th Cir.1992). Although nervousness is an appropriate factor for consideration within the totality of the circumstances, its presence is of limited significance generally. U.S. v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1534 n. 4 (10th Cir.1996) (stating that nervousness alone is not sufficient to justify further detention; however, in combination with other suspicious circumstances, it might contribute to a finding of articulable suspicion); State v. Anderson, supra . We will therefore include Lee's nervousness as a factor within the totality of the circumstances in our ultimate determination of reasonable suspicion. However, such factor will be accorded minimal significance.