Opinion ID: 2747813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: {¶ 10} We affirm because the petition for a writ of procedendo is barred by res judicata, the case is moot, and Gregley’s arguments are wrong on the merits. {¶ 11} As held by the court of appeals, the petition is barred by res judicata because Gregley challenged the failure to impose postrelease control, and the imposition of postrelease control, by both direct appeal and collateral attack, and the 2011 order imposing postrelease control was reversed. 3 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 12} Moreover, the action is moot because the imposition of postrelease control in the original sentence was vacated by the trial court after the court of appeals reversed that judgment. {¶ 13} And finally, as also pointed out by the court of appeals, Gregley misreads the case law on postrelease control. Gregley relies almost exclusively on State ex rel. Carnail v. McCormick, 126 Ohio St.3d 124, 2010-Ohio-2671, 931 N.E.2d 110, for the proposition that his entire sentence is void and should be vacated because of the defect regarding the imposition of postrelease control. However, we have rejected an argument that an entire sentence is void because of an error in imposing postrelease control, holding that only the offending portion of the sentence is subject to review. State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 38-39. {¶ 14} We affirm. Judgment affirmed. O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. _____________________ Duane Gregley, pro se. Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and James E. Moss, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. _____________________ 4