Opinion ID: 730970
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Language of Section 129

Text: 16 The precise question here is whether section 129 establishes different categories of MWC units based on unit MSW capacity for the purpose of determining MACT floors and standards. The language of section 129(a)(1) is critical to our analysis, and we set it out in full: 17 (a) New source performance standards 10 18 (1) In general 19 (A) The Administrator shall establish performance standards and other requirements pursuant to section 7411 of this title and this section for each category of solid waste incineration units. Such standards shall include emissions limitations and other requirements applicable to new units and guidelines (under 7411(d) of this title and this section) and other requirements applicable to existing units. 20 (B) Standards under section 7411 of this title and this section applicable to solid waste incineration units with capacity greater than 250 tons per day combusting municipal waste shall be promulgated not later than 12 months after November 15, 1990. Nothing in this subparagraph shall alter any schedule for the promulgation of standards applicable to such units under section 7411 of this title pursuant to any settlement and consent decree entered by the Administrator before November 15, 1990: Provided, That, such standards are subsequently modified pursuant to the schedule established in this subparagraph to include each of the requirements in this section. 21 (C) Standards under section 7411 of this title and this section applicable to solid waste incineration units with capacity equal to or less than 250 tons per day combusting municipal waste and units combusting hospital waste, medical waste and infectious waste shall be promulgated not later than 24 months after November 15, 1990. 22 (D) Standards under section 7411 of this title and this section applicable to solid waste incineration units combusting commercial or industrial waste shall be proposed not later than 36 months after November 15, 1990, and promulgated not later than 48 months after November 15, 1990. 23 (E) Not later than 18 months after November 15, 1990, the Administrator shall publish a schedule for the promulgation of standards under section 7411 and this section applicable to other categories of solid waste incineration units. 24 It is indisputable that section 129(a)(1) expressly differentiates among units based on unit MSW capacity when it states that standards for units with [a MSW] capacity greater than 250 [tons/day] must be issued by November 15, 1991, while standards for units with [a MSW] capacity equal to or less than 250 tons/day need not be issued until November 15, 1992. The only question remaining is whether in this provision Congress intended to create two categories of MWC units based on unit capacity for the purpose of determining what emissions controls will be imposed on the units, or whether it intended only to differentiate between the two types of MWC units for regulatory scheduling purposes. The EPA maintains that section 129(a)(1) simply sets out the deadlines by which emissions standards must be promulgated and does not create two categories of MWC units for substantive regulatory purposes. Petitioners unsurprisingly contend the opposite, that section 129(a)(1) plainly establishes two separate categories of solid waste incineration units, large MWC units (units with unit MSW capacities above 250 tons/day) and small MWC units (units with unit MSW capacities of 250 tons/day or less), for which emissions controls must be separately promulgated. 25 The text and structure of section 129(a)(1) and the rest of section 129 go to show that petitioners have much the better of the argument. Section 129(a)(1) begins by stating that the EPA shall promulgate standards and guidelines for each category of solid waste incineration units, and then proceeds to identify specific types of units and the date by which standards shall be issued for each type. The types of units identified are not only MWC units with a unit capacity above 250 tons/day and MWC units with a unit capacity of 250 tons/day or less, but also units combusting hospital and medical waste and units combusting commercial or industrial waste. The plain implication of section 129(a)(1) is that the types of units listed are the relevant categories for determining emissions standards. This implication is reinforced by the final part of section 129(a)(1), section 129(a)(1)(E), which states that the EPA shall publish a schedule indicating when standards applicable to other categories of solid waste incineration units will be promulgated. The reference to the EPA's authority to identify and set promulgation deadlines for other categories of solid waste incineration units plainly implies that certain categories of these units have already been identified. This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that at no other point in section 129 are any categories of solid waste incineration units identified in prior parts of the section. Instead, the language used in the following parts of section 129 assumes that the basic categories of solid waste incineration units have already been set and proceeds to give guidance on how the EPA should treat different units within the categories in determining emission standards, emphasizing in particular that the EPA is to distinguish between new and existing units within a category. For example, section 129(a)(2) instructs the EPA to require the maximum degree of emissions control that the EPA determines is achievable for new or existing units in each category, specifies that the EPA is to follow a different methodology in calculating MACT floor for new and existing units and authorizes the EPA to set [e]missions standards for existing units in a category [that are] ... less stringent than standards for new units in the same category, provided the standards for existing units are at least as stringent as the MACT floor. 26 Significantly, the EPA does not dispute that section 129(a)(1) sets out the basic categories of solid waste incineration units. According to the EPA, however, section 129(a)(1) should be read as differentiating among units on the basis of the type of waste being combusted, and thus the categories of units created in section 129(a)(1) are units combusting MSW (MWC units), units combusting medical, hospital and infectious waste, and units combusting commercial and industrial waste. The EPA maintains that reading the regulatory deadlines in section 129(a)(1) as establishing the different categories of solid waste incineration units would actually run counter to the legislative mandate, because this approach would preclude differentiation among units by the type of waste combusted. According to the EPA's view of petitioners' statutory argument, small MWC units and units combusting hospital waste, medical waste, and infectious waste would have to be considered as one category because these units are both listed in the same clause of section 129(a)(1) and assigned the same promulgation deadline. We have difficulty in following the EPA's logic. Section 129(a)(1) creates two categories of MWC units not simply because it imposes different dates by which the standards for large and small MWC units must be promulgated, but more compellingly because it separately defines these two types of MWC units. Since section 129(a)(1) also separately identifies units combusting hospital, medical, and infectious waste and units combusting commercial and industrial waste, these represent two additional categories of solid waste incineration units. Thus, the most logical and straightforward reading of section 129(a)(1) is that it establishes four categories of solid waste incineration units--MWC units with a unit capacity above 250 tons/day, MWC units with a unit capacity of 250 tons/day or less, units combusting hospital, medical and infectious waste, and units combusting commercial or industrial waste. 27 The EPA's claim that section 129(a)(1) is simply a scheduling provision is also implausible in light of the regulatory scheme detailed in the following subsection of the statute, section 129(a)(2). See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1061 (D.C.Cir.1995) (drawing on a neighboring CAA provision in determining that the EPA's interpretation of its authority to issue waivers for fuel additives violated the plain meaning of section 211(f)(4) of the CAA). Under the MACT methodology set out in section 129(a)(2), the emission standards must be at least as stringent as the MACT floors, and MACT floor for existing units is defined as the average level of emissions achieved by the best performing 12 percent of units in a category. Therefore, in order to promulgate emissions standards, the EPA must first calculate MACT floors, and the EPA cannot calculate the MACT floors until it has studied the emissions levels of all the units in the relevant category. When this MACT methodology set out in section 129(a)(2) is viewed in light of the regulatory deadlines established in section 129(a)(1), it becomes apparent that Congress must have intended large and small MWC units to represent separate categories of solid waste incineration units. If large MWC units are a separate category of units, the EPA can set emissions standards for these units before it gathers data on emissions at small MWC units; but if large and small MWC units are in the same category, the EPA cannot set standards for large MWC units until it has studied emissions at small MWC units, because the EPA would need this emissions data to calculate MACT floors. 28 That the EPA was able to avoid this dilemma in practice only by simultaneously studying emissions at all MWC units and then simultaneously promulgating new standards for large and small MWC units in 1994 does not detract from the plain import of the section's language and structure, which assumes differently timed regulatory actions. While section 129 certainly does not preclude the EPA from simultaneously studying and promulgating standards for large and small MWC units, nothing in section 129 either requires or even suggests such simultaneous action. Rather, it is clear from the text of section 129(a)(1), setting out different deadlines for when standards for large and small MWC units are to be promulgated, that Congress anticipated separate promulgation. The EPA's approach essentially reads these different deadlines out of the statute, and it is of course a well-established maxim of statutory construction that courts should avoid interpretations that render a statutory provision superfluous. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562, 110 S.Ct. 2126, 2132, 109 L.Ed.2d 588 (1990); Alabama Power Co. v. EPA, 40 F.3d 450, 455 (D.C.Cir.1994). In the final analysis the only interpretation of section 129's language that both gives meaning to the regulatory deadlines in section 129(a)(1) and coheres with the MACT methodology set out in section 129(a)(2) is one that reads section 129(a)(1) as creating two categories of MWC units for regulatory purposes, namely large and small MWC units. 29 The EPA points to section 129(a)(2), which states that the EPA may distinguish among classes, types ... and sizes of units within a category in establishing [MACT] standards as evidence that section 129 authorizes the EPA to group MWC units by aggregate plant capacity for MACT purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 7429(a)(2). According to the EPA, it has merely exercised its discretion under section 129(a)(2) and differentiated among three classes of MWC units: those located at plants with an aggregate MSW capacity above 250 tons/day, those located at plants with an aggregate MSW capacity of 250 tons/day or less, and those located at plants with an aggregate MSW capacity of 35 Mg/day or less. But this justification for the aggregate plant capacity approach of the 1995 standards assumes that Congress put all MWC units in one category in section 129(a)(1), since section 129(a)(2) only gives the EPA discretion to distinguish among units within a category. As discussed above, however, this assumption is indefensible in light of the distinction in section 129(a)(1) between MWC units with unit capacities above 250 tons/day and MWC units with unit capacities of 250 tons/day or less. 30 Given that section 129(a)(1) created these two categories of MWC units, section 129(a)(2) actually serves as further evidence that the aggregate plant capacity approach used in the 1995 standards violates the plain meaning of section 129. In section 129 Congress notably did not give the EPA much discretion to create categories of solid waste incineration units; rather, it listed several categories of solid waste incineration units and only allowed the EPA discretion to identify other categories of solid waste incineration units. In contrast, section 111 of the CAA, which applies to all stationary sources of air pollutants, and section 112, which applies to all stationary sources of hazardous air pollutants, give the EPA substantial discretion to create categories of sources for which standards must be promulgated. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(c)(1), 7412(c)(3). Neither the provision of discretionary authority to distinguish within a category in section 129(a)(2), nor the grant of authority to identify categories of air pollution sources in section 111, can, however, be used so as to eradicate the very specific limits placed on the EPA's authority to create categories of solid waste incineration units laid out in section 129(a)(1). 11 See, e.g., Mead Corp. v. Browner, 100 F.3d 152, 155-56 (D.C.Cir.1996) (EPA's general power to group hazardous waste sites for response purposes under CERCLA does not authorize the EPA to include a site on national site list that does not meet statutory listing criteria simply by grouping it with sites that do meet criteria); American Petroleum Institute, 52 F.3d at 1119 (EPA cannot rely on its general authority to make rules necessary to carry out its functions when a specific statutory directive defines the relevant functions of EPA in a particular area). Sections 111 and 112 act as counterindicators to the EPA's interpretation, since they illustrate that Congress knew how to bestow such category-defining discretion when it wanted to do so.