Opinion ID: 783131
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inconsistencies in special verdicts and interrogatories

Text: 65 Inconsistencies involving findings of fact, such as those in special verdicts and interrogatories, may arise in similar ways as inconsistencies between general verdicts. First, a jury may return answers that plainly violate its instructions. Second, under the evidence presented in the case, one or more findings of fact may be inconsistent with a determination of liability, whether that determination is made by the jury (as in a general verdict with interrogatories) or by the trial court (as in a special verdict). This sort of inconsistency was alleged in Pierce. See 823 F.2d at 1370. Finally, one or more findings of fact may be legally irreconcilable with each other or with a legal conclusion. Here, the appellants argue that the jury's answers on the breach of contract claim, awarding $86,000 in damages while finding $87,500 in wages willfully withheld, presents the third type of inconsistency because it is legally impossible for double damages to exceed base damages and for an employer to withhold willfully more wages than are due. 66 The typical case of factual findings conflicting with legal conclusions arises in the context of a special verdict or a general verdict with interrogatories. In the case of a special verdict, inconsistencies are problematic and require a new trial only if they arise between two or more factual findings; otherwise, the determination of liability can simply be conformed to the factual findings. Similarly, in the case of a general verdict with interrogatories, the trial court has the discretion to enter judgment on the factual findings, even if they conflict with the jury's conclusion as to liability, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(b); only if there is a conflict within the factual findings would a new trial be required. 67 The alleged inconsistency here, however, arises not between two factual findings, or between a factual finding and the ultimate determination of liability, but between a factual finding and subsidiary legal conclusion within a single claim. On the issue of double damages, the trial court is required to enter judgment according to the jury's factual findings, awarding damages of $87,500; but to do so would conflict with the jury's legal conclusion as to the base damages, which it found to be $86,000. Although both damage awards are legal conclusions, this inconsistency does present a problem of legal irreconcilability because double damages are normally predicated upon, and cannot exceed, base damages. Thus if the trial court were to have followed the principle that judgment should be entered according to the jury's factual finding, it would have entered an apparently irreconcilable verdict where double damages exceeded base damages. 68 The district court's actual response to this dilemma was to remit the double damages award to $86,000, thus preventing any irreconcilable conflict in the final judgment. But a trial court cannot ignore the jury's factual findings in an attempt to reconcile the ultimate legal conclusions; to the contrary, legal conclusions should be conformed to the factual findings, if at all possible. We must determine whether the jury's answers were truly irreconcilable, because if they were, remittitur could not save the verdict. 10 69 The appellants bear a high burden to establish an irreconcilable inconsistency. The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States except according to the rules of the common law. We must accept any reasonable interpretation of the jury's actions, reconciling the jury's findings by exegesis if necessary, Gallick v. Baltimore & O. R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119, 83 S.Ct. 659, 9 L.Ed.2d 618 (1963); a search for one possible view of the case which will make the jury's finding inconsistent results in a collision with the Seventh Amendment. Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364, 82 S.Ct. 780, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962). Furthermore, we review the consistency of the jury's verdict in light of the instructions given. Grosvenor Properties, Ltd. v. Southmark Corp., 896 F.2d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir.1990). 70 The jury was specifically instructed to award damages for breach of contract exclusive of damages previously awarded for discrimination: 71 [I]f you find for plaintiff on his sixth claim for breach of contract, your damage award for that claim must be limited to the lost wages and benefits from the date of termination to September 29, 1999. Any damages you award for plaintiff's sixth claim should not include any damages you have previously awarded plaintiff on his [discrimination claims]. 72 In other words, the jury was instructed not to double-count any lost wages that had been withheld due to discrimination and awarded as damages on the discrimination claim. For double damages, the jury was simply asked how much in wages and benefits had been willfully withheld from Zhang prior to September 29, 1999; the jury was given no similar instruction against double-counting. 73 We agree with the district court's analysis that these answers can be reconciled because some of the lost wages likely were awarded as damages for the discrimination claim. If the jury had determined that at least $1500 of Zhang's wages prior to September 29, 1999, had been withheld due to discrimination and awarded that amount as part of the damages for discrimination, there would be no inconsistency. The total amount of lost wages and benefits, including those awarded as part of the discrimination award, may have been substantially greater than $86,000 or $87,500. 11 74 Washington law allows for double damages for lost wages and benefits that were willfully withheld, but it does not specify that lost wages also awarded as damages for another claim, and not double-counted for the breach of contract claim, cannot form the basis for doubling. Thus, under applicable law, it was possible for the jury to award more in double damages than in damages for the breach of contract claim, because some of the damages that otherwise would have been awarded for breach of contract were already awarded for discrimination. It is a reasonable possibility that the jury was not confused and that its answers were not inconsistent. In such a case, we must honor the jury's verdict. 75 The trial court did not err in refusing to vacate the jury's damages awards for breach of contract. The verdict was not irreconcilable, and the deference owed to jury verdicts under the Seventh Amendment requires that any reconcilable verdict must stand.