Opinion ID: 2428000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Use of In-Custodial Statement

Text: After his second Miranda warning, the appellant gave a statement to the Malvern police. He denied committing the crimes and placed the blame on someone else. At the same time, he admitted being at the crime scene and being involved, though he denied stabbing the victim. The state used the statement to rebut the appellant's testimony at trial, and the appellant contends that the statement was not knowingly and intelligently made. The appellant focuses particularly on not knowing what the word coercion meant in the waiver of rights form, which the appellant signed. An in-custodial statement may not be used for impeachment purposes if it was coerced. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). The burden is on the state to show that an in-custodial statement was made voluntarily, intelligently, and without hope of reward or fear of punishment. Jackson v. State, 284 Ark. 478, 683 S.W.2d 606 (1985). At a hearing on the admissibility of the appellant's statement, the Malvern police lieutenant and a juvenile court in-take officer who were present when the statement was given testified that no coercion had been employed. As a consequence, the circuit court found no coercion and ruled the statement admissible. Conflicts in testimony regarding whether a statement is knowingly and intelligently made are for the trial court to resolve. Jackson v. State, supra . Here, we hold that there was no abuse of discretion in admitting the statement into evidence.