Opinion ID: 2246592
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Victim Impact Remark

Text: Defendant's twelfth argument is that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing because the prosecution improperly injected evidence, and improperly made comments, concerning the families of his victims. Defendant specifically objects to the testimony of Dudek's neighbor, and several statements to the same effect by the prosecutor, who stated, at trial, that Dudek planned to spend Thanksgiving with her family. Defendant also objects to the testimony of Nancy Tarnowski, one of defendant's former victims, who stated that she and her family moved away as a result of the sexual assault that defendant committed. Defendant contends that these various statements pertaining to the victims' families caused the jury to improperly focus its attention on something other than the defendant himself. Defendant contends that recent Supreme Court precedent requires that he be granted a new sentencing hearing. (See South Carolina v. Gathers (1989), 490 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876; Booth v. Maryland (1987), 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440.) We are not persuaded by defendant's argument that the Constitution, as the Supreme Court has interpreted it, requires that defendant be granted a new sentencing hearing in the present case. In Booth, the Supreme Court ruled that victim impact statements are not admissible at a capital sentencing hearing because they act to shift the focus from the defendant, and whether he is particularly suited for the death penalty, to the victim. In Gathers, the Court expanded this rule to include statements that the prosecutor makes which have the same effect of shifting the jury's focus. In the present case, the prosecutor's statement concerning the victims' families, and the trial evidence that alluded to this, were isolated and inconspicuous. In Booth, the entire victim impact statement was read to the jury. In Gathers, the prosecutor made an extensive dissertation on how the victim was a religious man and how he practiced his religion. In the present case, however, we find no likelihood that the jury's focus was shifted from anything but those factors of which defendant was aware when he committed the crimes with which he was charged. As such, we will not disturb his death sentence. Cf. People v. Harris (1989), 132 Ill.2d 366, 395-98, 138 Ill.Dec. 620, 547 N.E.2d 1241 (entire victim impact statement made part of the record); People v. Phillips (1989), 127 Ill.2d 499, 535-38, 131 Ill.Dec. 125, 538 N.E.2d 500; People v. Crews (1988), 122 Ill.2d 266, 286-88, 119 Ill.Dec. 308, 522 N.E.2d 1167 (diminished risk of focus-shifting when sentencing hearing is held before a judge alone); People v. Simms (1988), 121 Ill.2d 259, 271-76, 117 Ill.Dec. 147, 520 N.E.2d 308 (several victim impact statements considered by the sentencing judge were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).