Opinion ID: 1367095
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: authority to modify the decree

Text: The plaintiff Mrs. Johnson contends that the defendant's motion to modify the decree filed on June 22, 1973 and denied by Judge Davis on September 4 of that year was not properly before Judge Taylor when he issued his memorandum decision of March 8, 1974. Her argument may be summarized as follows. A proper motion to modify brought by a party to a judgment pursuant to AS 09.55.220 [4] was not before the court, and, accordingly, the court lacked jurisdiction and authority to reverse Judge Davis' prior order. In any event, it would ordinarily be improper for one judge to vacate the order of another judge of coordinate jurisdiction by what was, in effect, an ex parte order. Additionally, the doctrine of res judicata applies to decisions on motions where proceedings have permitted a full hearing on the merits, an appeal was available and a similar order or relief is again being sought by a party on the same state of facts in the same action, suit or proceeding. Judge Davis' order was such a final order; and since no motion for reconsideration or for leave to renew was filed and no appeal taken, the order was conclusive of the matters adjudged and binding on the parties in all subsequent proceedings. Assuming, without deciding, that the plaintiff's legal arguments are valid, their success turns upon whether Judge Davis' ruling on the motion must be construed as a final order or as merely an interim disposition, whether the matters before Judge Davis could be said to have been fully litigated and whether Judge Taylor's memorandum decision of March 8, 1974, in fact, reversed the September 4, 1973 decision of Judge Davis. The oral opinion in the case taken in its entirety [5] clearly demonstrates the temporary or interim nature of the order emanating from the September proceedings. After cataloguing the reasons for denying the motion to modify the decree at that time, Judge Davis elaborated: ... I'm of the opinion that this file should have been dealt with a long time ago. And I'm going to request that it be sent back to Judge Taylor for further proceedings in accordance with the decree that he entered back in 1967. It appears to me that this matter has gone on far too long. Now it may very well be that the proper way to handle this matter is to divide the property into 4 pieces and to transfer to the older children the  3/4 of the property, since they apparently don't wish to go to school anymore. At least, there's nothing to indicate that they do, and the father says they don't. Whether or not a 1/4 interest is sufficient to educate the younger child, I don't know; that's going to take evidence... . The youngest child, incidentally, has indicated by a letter here that she wants to go to school and she's going to require money to educate her... . But it's perfectly apparent to me that the title to this property should remain as is until this matter is straightened out. The denial of the motion to modify was in the context of preventing Mr. Johnson from conveying undivided interests in the land to his children and thereby cluttering the title to the homestead until it could be determined on the basis of further evidence and hearings to be conducted before Judge Taylor what measures would be most consistent with the intent of the original decree. It is important to note that Judge Davis himself suggested that some division of the property similar to that proposed by the defendant and identical to that eventually prescribed by Judge Taylor might be the most equitable remedy, but he indicated there was a need for more evidence concerning the value of the property and the cost of education of the minor child. This statement clearly indicates that Judge Davis did not believe that the matter had been fully litigated, and thus the plaintiff's res judicata argument must necessarily fail. Finally, Judge Davis unambiguously referred the matter to Judge Taylor for further proceedings consistent with the original 1967 decree. The motion to modify was, in fact, continued or held over, and the matter was not therefore raised sua sponte. Thus, Judge Taylor's jurisdiction and authority to consider the motion to modify arose directly from AS 09.55.220 which states: Any time after judgment, the court, upon the motion of either party, may set aside, alter, or modify so much of the judgment as may provide for alimony, or for the appointment of trustees for the care and custody of the minor children, or for their nurture and education, or for the maintenance of either party to the action. Judge Taylor was merely ruling on a motion brought by the defendant and referred to him by Judge Davis. Plaintiff's contention that one judge cannot overrule a prior order by a judge of coordinate jurisdiction is inapplicable since the Taylor ruling was in response to and consistent with the Davis ruling.