Opinion ID: 1954124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Board Member Absence

Text: Next, the plaintiffs argue that their procedural due process rights were violated because a board member voted upon the proposed CDS even though he missed two of the multiple hearings on the proposal. We address this argument under the Federal Constitution only as the plaintiffs have failed to cite any provision under the State Constitution. See State v. MacElman, 154 N.H. 304, 310, 910 A.2d 1267 (2006). Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of `liberty' or `property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Under the Federal Constitution, analyzing a party's due process claim requires review of three factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Id. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. The record reveals that the plaintiffs received all of the process to which they were constitutionally entitled. The board member at issue missed only two hearings over several years and he voted after having visited the site and reviewing applicable notes. [T]he Constitution does not [necessarily] require that all members of an administrative board must take part in every decision, or that the failure of one participating member to attend one hearing vitiates the entire process. Simard v. Board of Education of Town of Groton, 473 F.2d 988, 994 (2d Cir.1973). The plaintiffs mistakenly rely upon Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 46-47, 635 A.2d 456 (1993), and Petition of Smith, 139 N.H. 299, 302-05, 652 A.2d 154 (1994), to support their argument. In Petition of Grimm, we examined an exception to the general rule that in administrative proceedings . . . an administrative officer may act on a written record of testimony by witnesses whom he has not personally seen or heard. Petition of Grimm, 138 N.H. at 46, 635 A.2d 456 (quotation omitted). In that case, we ruled that where the board elects to make factual determinations as a hearing panel and the record does not provide a reasonable basis for evaluating the kind of testimony in question, and the matter at issue turns upon witness credibility, due process requires all panel members deciding the case to be in attendance for all of the parties' testimony, plus any other testimony on the issue of credibility, in order to effectively assess the issue of credibility. Id. at 46-47, 635 A.2d 456. For similar reasons, we also applied this exception in Petition of Smith, 139 N.H. at 302-04, 652 A.2d 154. Both Petition of Grimm and Petition of Smith are factually dissimilar to the instant case. Here, unlike Petition of Grimm and Petition of Smith, the board's decision did not turn upon credibility. Nor did the board make findings about credibility. This case is thus unlike Petition of Grimm [and Petition of Smith ] in which the failure of board members to attend a hearing rendered them unable to resolve a crucial credibility contest. Appeal of Alton School Dist., 140 N.H. 303, 314, 666 A.2d 937 (1995).