Opinion ID: 1003748
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Availability Of Liquidated Damages

Text: The closest and most beguiling question in this case is whether liquidated damages were at all available to Fiserv. This issue can actually be broken down into two separate questions. First, is Tidewater procedurally barred from making this argument? Second, did a partial breach, which would trigger liquidated damages, ever occur? The Fourth Circuit has held that a party who does not move for judgment as a matter of law on an issue pursuant to Rule 50(a) waives its right to move to set aside a verdict for that reason pursuant to Rule 50(b). Smith v. University of North Carolina, 632 F. 2d 316, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1980). Further, a party who waives an argument before a district court may not appeal the same argument to this court. Id. Consequently, this court does not review the sufficiency of evidence not challenged on a Rule 50(a) motion. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 41 F. 3d 182, 188 (4th Cir. 1994). Fiserv argues that Tidewater did not raise a challenge to the liquidated damages clause in its answers or in either of its Rule 50 motions and therefore may not raise the issue here. Tidewater, however, asserts that the district court erred, and that it did, in fact, raise the issue in its answers. In its answer to Fiserv’s counterclaim, Tidewater stated, affirmatively that the wording of the agreement does not impose any liability upon Tidewater. The district court found that such language was simply boilerplate and did not suffice to plead an affirmative defense. This language does not specifically mention the liquidation clause and, therefore, Tidewater should be procedurally barred from raising this issue. Even if Tidewater is not procedurally barred from raising the issue of partial versus total breach, there is enough evidence in the record for a reasonable jury to find that Fiserv notified Tidewater of a partial breach making an award of liquidated damages appropriate under the contract. For example, as a result of the March 2, 1999, conversation between the parties - a conversation in which Fiserv first learned that Tidewater was terminating the services - Fiserv calculated the liqui- 8 TIDEWATER FINANCE CO. v. FISERV SOLUTIONS, INC. dated damages and sent Tidewater a letter indicating what the termination liquidated damages were. This letter indicates Fiserv’s intention to declare a partial breach as it specifically mentions the remedy of liquidated damages, a remedy that would only be appropriate under a partial breach of the agreement. SETTLEMENT The issue of settlement in this matter, as explained by the trial judge and as suggested by the statement of the facts in this case, is a classic he said, she said. Such an issue of historical facts and credibility determinations is one for the jury to decide. THE COURT’S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS A. Standard of Review This court reviews challenges to evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Whittington, 26 F. 3d 456, 465 (4th Cir. 1994). B. Discussion 1. The Default Letter Based on the standard of review applicable to evidentiary rulings, this court finds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing testimony about the default letter under the Best Evidence Rule. 2. Prevention of Performance Instruction Tidewater claims that the district court abused its discretion by instructing the jury about the doctrine of prevention of performance which states that a party is excused from performing its contractual obligations if the other party prevents performance. One of Fiserv’s defenses to the breach of contract claim against it was that if the jury found it breached (which the jury found it did not, so this point is essentially moot), then it could use the defense of prevention of perTIDEWATER FINANCE CO. v. FISERV SOLUTIONS, INC. 9 formance. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing such an instruction.