Opinion ID: 2348914
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the state violated brady by failing to turn over favorable material impeachment evidence

Text: Mr. Taylor argues that the motion court clearly erred when it denied relief on his claims that the prosecution destroyed and failed to turn over materially favorable evidence to the defense prior to trial. Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), due process is violated when the prosecutor suppresses evidence that is favorable to the defendant and material to either guilt or punishment. State v. Salter, 250 S.W.3d 705, 714 (Mo. banc 2008). There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 28, 36-37 (Mo. banc 2006). Mr. Taylor argues that the State improperly failed to disclose three key pieces of evidence: (1) letters that Mr. Perschbacher, the state's jailhouse witness, sent to Mr. Dresselhaus, the lead investigator for the prosecutor on this case, that Mr. Dresselhaus then destroyed without turning them over to the defense; (2) a memorandum that Mr. Dresselhaus composed memorializing one of his conversations with Mr. Perschbacher in which the latter referenced the likelihood of his testimony being needed against Mr. Taylor and contained false allegations of corruption on the part of two police officers; and (3) the state's intention to ask prosecutors to extend favorable treatment to Mr. Perschbacher on his pending charges if he gave helpful testimony against Mr. Taylor. [2]
Under the Missouri rules, upon the request of the defendant, without the need for a court order, the state is obligated to disclose the written and recorded statements of witnesses it intends to call as well as memoranda reporting or summarizing part or all of [a witness's] oral statements. Rule 25.03(A). In addition, due process requires that the state must disclose exculpatory evidence, including evidence that may be used to impeach a government witness. Williams v. State, 168 S.W.3d 433, 439 (Mo. banc 2005). In this case, Mr. Taylor requested that the state disclose all witness statements. Prior to trial, the defense sought to exclude Mr. Perschbacher as a witness because the state had not provided complete disclosure of his prior statements in his letters to prosecutors. On a hearing on that motion, Mr. Ahsens represented that the state dug through [its] files and everything we have [regarding Mr. Perschbacher] ... has been given to them. The trial court ordered Mr. Ahsens to investigate whether Mr. Perschbacher had written any additional letters that had not been disclosed to Mr. Taylor. The trial court further ordered the state to produce any correspondence they may have or to say what happened to the correspondence if they got it. Mr. Dresselhaus, the lead investigator for the prosecution in Mr. Taylor's trial, in fact had received dozens of letters from Mr. Perschbacher. Despite the court order directing the state to disclose what happened to the correspondence if they got it, it made no further disclosures regarding Mr. Perschbacher's letters. It did not inform either defense counsel or the judge that a lot of Perschbacher letters had been received and destroyed. At the evidentiary hearing on Mr. Taylor's post-conviction motion, Mr. Dresselhaus testified that he threw some of Mr. Perschbacher's letters away prior to Mr. Taylor's trial without disclosing them to the defense. He testified that no letter was case-specific, and that he considered them a nuisance, so he disposed of them once he was able to ascertain that they did not require an immediate response. When pressed as to how many of Mr. Perschbacher's letters were thrown away, Mr. Dresselhaus averred, I have no bloody  I have no idea how many were received, but he agreed that it was a lot. As the Perschbacher letters were thrown away, it is beyond dispute that they were not disclosed to Mr. Taylor. It is also self-evident that they were required to be disclosed to the defense by Missouri's rules of discovery and the explicit order of the trial court. The trial court's order that the fate of Mr. Perschbacher's letters should be disclosed, even if the letters themselves were unavailable, makes clear that the very fact of their destruction was favorable evidence that was required to be disclosed to the defense. The state also intentionally failed to disclose a memorandum that Mr. Dresselhaus composed regarding an April 2001 interview he conducted with Mr. Perschbacher. This memorandum plainly was within the scope of the disclosure required by the rules and the trial court's order. Yet, again, despite representing to the court and defense counsel that the state had disclosed everything we have, Mr. Ahsens testified at the evidentiary hearing on this motion that he had a copy of this memorandum prior to trial and he made a conscious choice not to disclose it to the defense (or the court). At the motion hearing, Mr. Ahsens testified that he did so because he personally saw no relevance whatsoever to [Mr. Taylor's] case in the memorandum. Mr. Ahsens so testified, and so concluded, despite the express statement in the memorandum that Mr. Perschbacher's information about the Taylor homicide could become important and it might become necessary for him to testify. Mr. Ahsens also testified that disclosure of the memorandum might reveal information about an ongoing highway patrol investigation into the truth of Mr. Perschbacher's allegations. In other words, the police were investigating whether Mr. Perschbacher's prior allegations were false, and Mr. Ahsens did not want to reveal this while the investigation was ongoing. [3] He made the choice not to disclose this memorandum despite the direct order of the trial court to produce all such evidence. No request was made for an in camera review of the memorandum by the trial court or for guidance by that court as to whether the memorandum could be excluded from the production the court had required. [4] Despite this evidence, the motion court adopted the prosecution's self-serving finding that his failure to disclose this memorandum was made in good faith. This was clear error. Neither the prosecution nor the defense has the authority to knowingly overrule a direct ruling by the trial court or to intentionally disobey this Court's rules designed to protect the integrity of the process. Here, this Court's rules and a direct order of the trial court required the document to be disclosed. The prosecutor's purposeful decision not to comply with the order or reveal his decision not to produce the document to the court simply is not an error that can be made in good faith.
At Mr. Taylor's trial, defense counsel elicited testimony from Mr. Perschbacher that he had requested favors from the prosecution at various times. At the time of the trial, Mr. Perschbacher had at least four felony charges pending: first-degree burglary, second-degree robbery, and two counts of second-degree burglary. Mr. Perschbacher insisted that none of the favors he requested were connected to his testimony against Mr. Taylor. Defense counsel could and did argue to the jury in closing that Mr. Perschbacher should not be believed in part because he's getting the best deal of his life on his pending charges. But, Mr. Ahsens, in his rebuttal closing argument, stated to the jury, which was instructed to disregard the remark, that there was no deal with Mr. Perschbacher and that he was not a liar. These events would not be of particular significance except for certain facts that came out at the evidentiary hearing on this motion. Three weeks after Mr. Perschbacher testified, Mr. Ahsens sent a letter to the prosecutor in the county where Mr. Perschbacher had charges pending. The letter stated that Mr. Perschbacher, without requesting reward or being promised any benefit, testified for the state ... [and] [t]hat testimony was helpful in attacking the defendant's claim of mental disease or defect and aided us in successfully prosecuting the case. Mr. Ahsens concluded the letter by stating that fundamental fairness dictates I inform you of his cooperation for whatever weight you think it deserves. This letter was sent after the jury returned its verdict and recommended sentence, but before Mr. Taylor was finally sentenced. At the evidentiary hearing on this motion, Mr. Ahsens testified that he did not disclose his intention to write this letter to Mr. Taylor's defense counsel because he had not resolved to do so at the time of the trial. According to Mr. Ahsens testimony, he resolved to write the letter probably at or shortly before [he] wrote the letter. [5] Accepting the motion court's conclusion that there was no actual deal, Mr. Ahsens' testimony at this hearing shows that he was considering whether to write such a letter during the trial, even if he did not make the final decision until after he had heard Mr. Perschbacher's testimony. The very fact that the prosecutor apparently waited to see what Mr. Perschbacher would say, a witness who repeatedly asked for deals in return for information, was relevant impeachment evidence, however, for defense counsel could argue it gave him an incentive to testify strongly.
Having shown that the prosecution requested favorable treatment for Mr. Perschbacher shortly after the jury trial concluded, failed to disclose Mr. Dresselhaus' memorandum, and failed to reveal the fact that Mr. Dresselhaus destroyed some of Mr. Perschbacher's letters, or to describe the contents of those destroyed letters, the question becomes whether these failures were material to this case. Mr. Taylor's due process rights are violated if the suppressed evidence is material to either guilt or to punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Although Mr. Perschbacher's testimony was presented to the jury during the guilt phase, the trial court instructed the jury, as required by law, that it may consider all of the evidence presented in both the beginning and punishment stages of trial in its penalty phase deliberations. See MAI-CR 3d 313.44A. Consequently, the Court must evaluate the materiality of the suppressed impeachment evidence with respect to both the guilt phase and the penalty phase of Mr. Taylor's trial. [6] Evidence is material only when there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed to the defense. Salter, 250 S.W.3d at 715. Here, although the state had told the jury that Mr. Perschbacher was credible and should be believed despite his impeachment on collateral matters, the court adopted its proposed findings that Mr. Perschbacher was so impeached in unrelated ways that he had been thoroughly discredited and the jury would have found him not believable. In particular, Mr. Taylor's attorneys had elicited testimony that Mr. Perschbacher was a white separatist and that the most renowned racial epithet for black people was a regular part of his vocabulary. Mr. Taylor's attorneys also impeached Mr. Perschbacher with his criminal history, drug abuse, and his many conduct violations during his periods of incarceration. [7] But, the motion court's conclusion that the additional suppressed impeachment materials on the core issue of credibility were not material because the impeachment that was accomplished of Mr. Perschbacher was sufficient was clear error. It is well-established that the fact that a witness was impeached in other ways does not conclude the materiality inquiry required under Brady . This Court has specifically recognized that impeachment evidence is not cumulative when it goes to the very root of the matter in controversy or relates to the main issue. Black v. State, 151 S.W.3d 49, 56 (Mo. banc 2004). This is because, by their very nature, a witness' accuracy, veracity or credibility ... are not collateral [issues]. Id. The United States Supreme Court rejected an argument nearly identical to that made by the state, that suppressed impeachment evidence was not material because the witness was already impeached on other matters, in Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 702, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004). In Banks , the state offered testimony from a jailhouse informant, but did not disclose to the defendant that the informant was receiving compensation in exchange for his testimony. Without the suppressed evidence, the informant was nonetheless impeached with evidence of his prior convictions, his poor reputation for truthfulness, his drug abuse, and his repeated pattern of falsifying pharmaceutical information. The state argued, and the Fifth Circuit concluded, that the suppressed evidence was merely cumulative impeachment information that did not satisfy the materiality threshold. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and rejected the state's argument. It held that the impeachment evidence that had been admitted was not directly relevant to [the informant's] part in Banks's trial and that one could not plausibly deny the existence of the requisite `reasonable probability of a different result' had the suppressed information been disclosed to the defense. Banks, 540 U.S. at 702-03, 124 S.Ct. 1256. Under Banks , the simple fact that Mr. Perschbacher was impeached in other ways is not sufficient to conclude that the suppressed impeachment evidence was not material. In determining whether the suppressed impeachment evidence was material, the reviewing court must evaluate not only the ways that Mr. Perschbacher was impeached, but also the ways that he was not impeached that would have been available had this evidence been disclosed. While the impeachment at trial was significant, it all amounted to general impeachment of Mr. Perschbacher's character. None of this impeachment evidence, with the possible exception of his solicitation of favors from the prosecution, was specific to his general reputation for truthfulness. Even on the solicitation of favors issue, as the state denied he had solicited favors here, the fact that he had done so repeatedly in the past, as the destroyed letters would have shown, was in itself relevant to his credibility. Similarly, the testimony that Mr. Perschbacher is a racist, for example, provides a reason that he might be biased against Mr. Taylor, but it does not provide a separate reason to doubt his credibility, and its significance is muted, and was downplayed by the prosecution (both to the judge prior to trial in resisting entry of an order requiring the state to produce the very documents the prosecution later withheld anyway and to the jury in penalty phase closing), because the victim also was black. Similarly, the evidence of his criminal history and conduct violations impeach Mr. Perschbacher's general background, but they do not attest directly to his veracity, as would have the undisclosed materials. None of the impeachment evidence before the jury demonstrated what the suppressed evidence shows: that Mr. Perschbacher has a documented history of lying to the state in an effort to obtain favorable treatment. Had defense counsel received Mr. Dresselhaus' memorandum, they could have pursued on cross-examination the truthfulness of those prior allegations made against police officers. If Mr. Perschbacher denied that the allegations were false, Mr. Taylor could have sought to present extrinsic evidence on the prior false allegations. See State v. Couch, 256 S.W.3d 64, 68 (Mo. banc 2008). Indeed, Mr. Taylor's post-conviction motion counsel deposed these officers, and both denied the allegations. Mr. Taylor could then argue that Perschbacher's allegations about Mr. Taylor feigning mental illness were similarly false and made for the same reason: to obtain favorable treatment from the state. Even without this suppressed evidence, Mr. Taylor's counsel of course could, and did, argue to the jury that Mr. Perschbacher was not to be believed. Absent the evidence of these prior false allegations made with the expectation of receiving favorable treatment from the state, and the evidence that he had previously and repeatedly offered to testify in return for favorable treatment, however, counsel's arguments about Mr. Perschbacher's credibility were deprived of significant evidentiary force. Similarly, the failure to disclose the fact that Mr. Dresselhaus destroyed many of Mr. Perschbacher's letters deprived Mr. Taylor of critical impeachment evidence. If this evidence had been disclosed, the state may not have been able to argue that Mr. Perschbacher was a bonus who confirmed their experts' accounts. He can only be portrayed as a bonus if one disregards (by suppression) the dozens of nuisance letters, many requesting favors, that he sent to Mr. Dresselhaus. Moreover, the prosecutor's argument that Mr. Perschbacher has no reason to lie would be deprived of much of its force, as the suppressed letters and memorandum together would have shown that he makes a habit of lying so frequently that his letters are more likely to be discarded than they are to be believed. Knowledge of these facts could have significantly undermined the legitimacy of Mr. Perschbacher's testimony and involvement in the case in a way that no other impeachment presented was able to do. Having failed to disclose this impeachment evidence, the state was able to claim much greater credibility from Mr. Perschbacher's testimony than the true facts would have warranted.
The Court now turns to the ultimate inquiry: whether the suppression of this evidence sufficiently prejudiced the defense that either a new trial or a new penalty phase is warranted. To answer this question requires looking at the way that Mr. Perschbacher was used as a witness by the prosecution in both the guilt phase and the penalty phase of the trial. In the guilt phase, there was no legitimate dispute regarding the basic facts of the crime. Indeed, Mr. Taylor's counsel admitted in opening argument that Mr. Taylor killed Mr. Thomas. The task of the jury, then, was a limited one: to determine whether Mr. Taylor, at the time of the crime, was capable of knowing and appreciating the nature, quality or wrongfulness of his conduct. Sec. 552.030.1. If this defense is successful, the defendant is not found criminally responsible for his conduct. Walkup, 220 S.W.3d at 754. This exception to criminal liability, however, is a narrow one. Although the defense succeeds in appropriate cases, see, e.g., State v. Watkins, 102 S.W.3d 570 (Mo.App. S.D.2003); State v. Gratts, 112 S.W.3d 12, 13-14 (Mo.App. W.D.2003); State v. Weekly, 107 S.W.3d 340, 342 (Mo.App. W.D. 2003) (all noting that defendant was acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect), it is difficult to prove, and it always requires expert testimony. Consequently, the bulk of the evidence during the guilt phase came from expert witnesses for the defense and the state. Although all five of the experts that Mr. Taylor presented (four of whom had been employed by the state to treat him at Fulton and Potosi) testified that he was profoundly mentally ill with a psychotic disorder, only one testified affirmatively that at the time of the crime Mr. Taylor was unable to appreciate the nature, quality or wrongfulness of his conduct. The state's experts each testified as to their belief that Mr. Taylor was not mentally ill. After summarizing the testimony of the state's experts during his closing argument at the guilt phase, Mr. Ahsens argued, Frankly, on top of all of that Scott Perschbacher is a bonus in the process of investigating this case. Mr. Taylor argues that this description of Mr. Perschbacher as a bonus signifies that Mr. Perschbacher's testimony was vital to the outcome of the guilt phase. This Court reaches the opposite conclusion: rather than trying to emphasize Mr. Perschbacher's testimony, the prosecutor was arguing that it was confirming, but not essential, to a finding of guilt because, although his testimony that Mr. Taylor was faking his mental illness buttressed the state's experts conclusions, it was not paramount to the narrow question that was the only one at issue at the guilt phase. In regard to that narrow question, this Court agrees. Mr. Taylor admitted the killing. The only issue was whether he knew right from wrong. There was substantial evidence that Mr. Taylor suffered serious mental illness, evidence that Mr. Perschbacher's testimony seriously undercut. But, merely believing that Mr. Taylor had a serious mental illness may not have been sufficient to persuade the jury that Mr. Taylor, at the time of the crime, did not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. Indeed, the fact that Mr. Taylor himself triggered the alarm to notify the correctional officers of his cellmate's death suggests that he knew it was wrong. In light of the weight of the testimony of the state's experts on these issues, the fact that only one of Mr. Taylor's own experts concluded that he did not know right from wrong, the facts and circumstances of the actual offense, and the narrowness of the exception for a defense of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility, the Court cannot conclude that the motion court clearly erred in concluding that there was not a reasonable probability that the result of the guilt phase of Mr. Taylor's trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed. The penalty phase, however, is a different matter. During the penalty phase, the jury is charged with the much broader task of considering Mr. Taylor's mental health and mental illness for purposes of mitigation. For this reason, instead of simply trying to determine whether Mr. Taylor could appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense, the jury specifically was instructed to consider two statutory mitigating circumstances: whether Mr. Taylor committed the murder while under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and whether his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. The jury must also consider nonstatutory mitigating circumstances if they are offered, such as the defendant's early childhood abuse and mental illness, in assessing the punishment. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (the jury's consideration of circumstances in mitigation cannot constitutionally be limited). Defendant presented substantial expert testimony on these issues. The expert testimony demonstrated that Mr. Taylor was born into a household where he was subjected to extreme physical abuse at the hands of his father and his mother. At an early age, he was recommended for mental health treatment by counselors and other professionals. Mr. Taylor was placed in a residential mental health facility for a month at the age of 12 to receive treatment for auditory hallucinations and suicidal tendencies. At age 18, while incarcerated for murdering one of his high school classmates, he was treated at Fulton State Hospital, where he was diagnosed with depressive disorder with psychotic features. After the murder of Mr. Thomas, he was evaluated again at Fulton State Hospital, and the prison psychiatrists each concluded that Mr. Taylor suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. Indeed, four of the five experts that Mr. Taylor presented evaluated, diagnosed and treated him for serious mental illness while they were in the employ of the department of corrections. In this context, then, the testimony of Mr. Perschbacher takes on a much deeper significance, as it goes to the separate issue whether Mr. Taylor was afflicted with the degree of mental illness that, under Missouri's statutorily adopted mitigating factors, constitutes mitigating evidence the jury should consider in deciding whether to impose a punishment other than death. See Sec. 565.032.3(2), (6). Although the State's experts may have been successful in undermining [the defendant's] claim to insanity, they did not necessarily undermine the potential mitigating effect of [defendant's] mental health evidence. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 706 n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). As if to demonstrate the heightened importance of Mr. Perschbacher's testimony at this stage of the trial, Mr. Ahsens did not limit his argument in the penalty phase to the statement that Mr. Perschbacher's testimony was a bonus. Rather, he urged the jury during his penalty phase closing argument that while Mr. Perschbacher might be a racist, that did not mean he was a liar, and he had no reason to lie. Similarly, as noted, he told the prosecutor who was reviewing pending charges against Mr. Perschbacher that the latter had been an aid in the successful prosecution of the trial and fairness demanded his help be considered. The prosecutor's representations to the court and to the jury in the penalty phase argument, and to the local prosecutor after trial, are inconsistent with the state's present argument that the impeachment of Mr. Perschbacher was so complete that the jury would have rejected him and his testimony completely. The available impeachment evidence that was not disclosed to the defendant would have demonstrated both that Mr. Perschbacher had a reason to lie and that he had made false allegations under similar circumstances in the past. Moreover, it would have demonstrated that Mr. Perschbacher's stories were so incredible that the State, although under an obligation to disclose his written statements, often threw them away as being worthless. This would have changed the complexion of the entire penalty phase of the trial. Without Mr. Perschbacher's testimony, the substantial evidence that Mr. Taylor had suffered serious mental illness since childhood and had been found to be seriously mentally ill and was receiving treatment from state doctors even up to and during trial would have taken on far greater significance. The importance of such impeachment evidence is heightened by the fact that the only evidence that the defense put on during the penalty phase was the videotaped deposition testimony of the superintendent of the prison where Mr. Taylor was then incarcerated as to the minimal risks Mr. Taylor presented to other inmates or correctional officers under the conditions of his confinement. Defense counsel did then tell the jurors that they should also consider all the evidence put on during the guilt phase about Mr. Taylor's mental illness, his childhood, and other mitigating factors. But, as the jury had just rejected this evidence as proof that defendant was not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, it needed a separate framework through which to understand the potential mitigating effect of this same evidence, how his mental illness and childhood abuse might support a finding that a life sentence was appropriate. Indeed, Mr. Taylor argues that counsel was ineffective at the penalty phase for failing to offer additional evidence in mitigation. [8] Particularly in the absence of other penalty phase evidence, impeachment of Mr. Perschbacher as a liar who had made false claims in the past in order to obtain benefits, could have made a material difference to the jury. Had he been impeached with this evidence, there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of Mr. Taylor's penalty phase would have been different. The motion court clearly erred in concluding otherwise.