Opinion ID: 3011376
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Challenge to S 441f

Text: Section 441f provides that [n]o person shall make a contribution in the name of another person or knowingly permit his name to be used to effect such a contribution, and no person shall knowingly accept a contribution made by one person in the name of another person. 2 U.S.C. S 441f. Mariani argues that the prohibition inS 441f on contributions in the name of another to candidates for federal elective office violates the First Amendment because it fails to advance any compelling state interest and because it is underinclusive since it only applies to contributions of hard money (and can be circumvented by donating soft money). The Buckley Court accorded broad acceptance to the FECA's reporting and disclosure requirements, explaining that they impose only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1976). Although acknowledging the dangers of compelled disclosure of political activity, the Court found that the governmental interests in disclosure were of such magnitude that the requirements passed the strict test established by NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The Court accepted as compelling three purposes behind the disclosure requirement: to provide the electorate with information as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office; to deter actual or apparent corruption; and to gather the data necessary to detect violations of the contribution limits. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68. Buckley carefully considered the danger posed by compelled disclosure. It held that the state interests promoted by the FECA's reporting and disclosure requirements justified the indirect burden imposed on First 22 Amendment interests, and that the compelled disclosure requirements were constitutional in the absence of a reasonable probability that disclosures would subject their contributors to threats, harassment, or reprisals. Id. at 74. Proscription of conduit contributions (with the concomitant requirement that the true source of contributions be disclosed) would seem to be at the very core of the Court's analysis. In light of Buckley, we reject Mariani's argument that S 441f fails to advance a compelling state interest. We also conclude that Congress's decision to limit the disclosure requirement to contributions of hard money does not make the requirement fatally underinclusive. Mariani's argument that the disclosure requirement is fatally underinclusive is similar to his argument that S 441b(a) has been undermined by the rise of soft money. As with that challenge, however, we conclude that Congress was free to determine that disclosure of hard money donations was the most important form of disclosure, and to limit the regulation to that area.