Opinion ID: 2499424
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: remaining jurisdictional issues

Text: [¶ 45] The remaining jurisdictional issues have been raised by OSA as challenges to the district court's original jurisdiction to issue the TRO. OSA contests the standing of the Town to seek a TRO, as well as the district court's subject matter and personal jurisdiction.
[¶ 46] OSA asserts that the Town did not have, or even allege, a tangible interest in this matter sufficient to confer standing to bring its Petition, and that the proper plaintiff in this action would have been a parent or guardian of one of the potentially impacted children. We disagree. [¶ 47] Standing is a legal concept designed to determine whether a party is sufficiently affected to insure that the court is presented with a justiciable controversy. In re Guardianship of Parkhurst, 2010 WY 155, ¶ 10, 243 P.3d 961, 965 (Wyo.2010) (quoting In re Adoption of CF, 2005 WY 118, ¶ 39, 120 P.3d 992, 1004-05 (Wyo.2005)). This Court has described the standing doctrine and its requirements as follows: The doctrine of standing is a jurisprudential rule of jurisdictional magnitude. At its most elementary level, the standing doctrine holds that a decision-making body should refrain from considering issues in which the litigants have little or no interest in vigorously advocating. Accordingly, the doctrine of standing focuses upon whether a litigant is properly situated to assert an issue for judicial or quasi-judicial determination. A litigant is said to have standing when he has a `personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.' This personal stake requirement has been described in Wyoming as a `tangible interest' at stake. The tangible interest requirement guarantees that a litigant is sufficiently interested in a case to present a justiciable controversy. Parkhurst, ¶ 10, 243 P.3d at 965 (quoting CF, ¶ 39, 120 P.3d at 1004-05). [¶ 48] The Town filed its Petition out of concern for the welfare of approximately two-hundred Boy Scouts aged seven to fourteen. Government has long been recognized as having a compelling interest in the well being of its youth. Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 2836, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989); Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-39, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 1280, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1968). This interest of the Town is expressly recognized by its statutory authority. By statute, a town may sue or be sued, and it may [r]egulate, prevent or suppress riots, disturbances, disorderly assemblies or parades, or any other conduct which disturbs or jeopardizes the public health, safety, peace or morality, in any public or private place. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-103(a)(xviii) (LexisNexis 2011). [¶ 49] We conclude that the Town's asserted interest in protecting its youth gave it a sufficient stake in the outcome of these proceedings to allow it standing to bring its Petition.
[¶ 50] OSA contends that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the Petition because the Town did not file a complaint invoking the court's jurisdiction before it filed its Petition requesting the TRO. We conclude that the filing of a complaint is not an essential predicate to a petition or motion for a temporary restraining order and thus reject this jurisdictional challenge. [¶ 51] The appropriate procedure for seeking a temporary restraining order has been described by one prominent authority as follows: The appropriate procedure for requesting a preliminary injunction is by motion, although it also commonly is requested by an order to show cause. As indicated in Rule 7, the motion should describe the preliminary injunction sought and state with particularity the grounds for granting it. The motion may be part of the written notice of the hearing on the preliminary injunction. As was observed by Judge Tuttle in an analogous context: The grant of a temporary injunction need not await any procedural steps perfecting the pleadings or any other formality attendant upon a full-blown trial of this case. Indeed, although it is preferable to file the complaint first, a preliminary injunction may be granted upon a motion made before a formal complaint is presented. 11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2949 (2d ed. 2011) (footnotes omitted). [¶ 52] We agree that while the better practice would be to have a complaint on file before a motion or petition for temporary restraining order is submitted, the lack of a complaint does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to act. See Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 694 (2nd Cir.1966) (although it would have been better to file a complaint along with motion and affidavit, court could treat affidavit as complaint); Ruscitto v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 777 F.Supp. 1349, 1352 (N.D.Tex.1991) (exigent circumstances allow injunction to precede filing of suit); Nat'l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 F.Supp. 945, 950 n. 5 (N.D.Cal.1985) (Owing to the peculiar function of the preliminary injunction, it is not necessary that the pleadings be perfected, or even that a complaint be filed, before the order issues.).
[¶ 53] As its final jurisdictional argument, OSA asserts the TRO is void because the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over it. We find that OSA waived any objection to personal jurisdiction and therefore also reject this challenge to the district court's jurisdiction. [¶ 54] This Court has held as follows concerning personal jurisdiction and its effect on a court's judgment: In order for a court to acquire jurisdiction over a defendant, that defendant must be properly served or must voluntarily appear. A judgment entered without the court having jurisdiction is null and void. A defendant may waive his right to challenge a court's jurisdiction. Such a challenge should be made at the defendant's soonest opportunity. Failure to timely broach the issue with the court may result in waiver of that defense. Most importantly for this case, where a defendant appears voluntarily, without questioning the court's personal jurisdiction, that appearance is the equivalent of proper service of process. Matter of Adoption of MSVW, 965 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Wyo.1998); and see Ostermiller v. Spurr, 968 P.2d 940, 943 (Wyo.1998) (consent to court's jurisdiction for one purpose may result in court's jurisdiction for any related purpose). JAG v. State Dep't of Family Servs., 2002 WY 158, ¶ 13, 56 P.3d 1016, 1019 (Wyo.2002); see also Walton v. State ex rel. Wood, 2002 WY 108, ¶ 10, 50 P.3d 693, 697 (Wyo.2002) (failure to question personal jurisdiction at earliest opportunity deemed a waiver); CRB v. State, 974 P.2d 931, 936 (Wyo.1999) (party must assert lack of personal jurisdiction by W.R.C.P. 12(b) motion or its equivalent). [¶ 55] OSA did not file a motion to dismiss the Petition. Instead, it filed a Notice of Appeal and entered an appearance through its counsel. OSA then filed a brief with this Court, in which it requested a remand to district court for consideration of an affirmative award of damages against the Town. With these actions, OSA waived any objection to personal jurisdiction and submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court. See In re Adoption of MSVW, 965 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Wyo.1998) (When a defendant voluntarily appears without questioning the court's personal jurisdiction over him, his appearance is the equivalent of proper service of process.); Cotton v. Brow, 903 P.2d 530, 531 (Wyo.1995) (defendant's filing of brief on appeal affirmatively invoked jurisdiction of court); Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 519 P.2d 972, 977-78 (Wyo.1974) (defendant waived objection to personal jurisdiction when he sought damages as affirmative relief).