Opinion ID: 2764987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Coverage Under Colorado Law

Text: State Farm contends on appeal that the district court erred in concluding that Colorado law prohibits tying UIM coverage to occupancy of the insured vehicle. It argues that “the policy provisions which define an insured as a person occupying the business named insured’s vehicle as shown on the declaration page are valid and not contrary to the [Colorado UIM] statute nor public policy in Colorado.” Aplt. Br. at 18. It recognizes that DeHerrera v. Sentry Insurance Co., 30 P.3d 167 (Colo. 2001), said that the UIM statute “require[s] an insurer to provide [UIM] benefits . . . without regard to the vehicle occupied by the insured at the time of injury,” id. at 169, so that the insurer in that case could not decline UIM benefits to the son of a named insured on the ground that the son, who was injured while riding a motorcycle, did not occupy the insured automobile when he was injured. But State Farm asserts that Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Anderson, 260 P.3d 68, 79 (Colo. App. 2010), interpreted DeHerrera as permitting policies to define insured based on occupancy in the insured vehicle so long as the person seeking coverage is not the named insured or a resident relative. The argument is a respectable one, perhaps even correct. But we do not address it. When State Farm raised it in its Rule 59(e) motion, one of the grounds on which the 5 district court rejected it was that it was untimely. We review a denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of discretion. See Butler v. Kempthorne, 532 F.3d 1108, 1110 (10th Cir. 2008). And we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the motion untimely. State Farm does not dispute that a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) “is not appropriate to . . . advance arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing.” Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). But it contends that it had presented the argument before its motion. The district court did not think so. And the record supports the court. Our review of the record indicates, as the district court found, that State Farm had never previously raised the argument in its Rule 59(e) motion that Colorado law permitted its policy provision limiting UIM coverage to persons occupying the insured vehicle when injured. In its motion for summary judgment, State Farm advanced three arguments: (1) Minnesota law applied and prohibited stacking of UIM policies; (2) the Suburban was not a covered vehicle under the language of the Minnesota Policies; and (3) the Kiplings did not meet the definition of insured under the language of the Minnesota Policies. None of State Farm’s arguments addressed Colorado law; they assumed that Minnesota law applied. The opening paragraph of the motion’s Conclusion section makes this clear: Both under the effective choice of law provision in the Minnesota policy contracts, and applying the most substantial relationship test, Minnesota law would apply to this question of contract interpretation and 6 Plaintiff would not be allowed to stack the UIM coverages of the four vehicles and would be exclusively limited in her recovery to the UIM coverage for the vehicle she was occupying at the time of the accident—the 2005 Chevrolet Suburban. Aplt. App., Vol. 1 at 43. In response, Plaintiff expressly advanced the opposite of what State Farm now asserts, saying that “State Farm’s attempt to tie Mr. Kipling’s entitlement to UIM benefits to the car he was occupying at the time of the accident is prohibited under Colorado law.” Id. at 98. State Farm’s reply brief did not challenge this assertion of Colorado law but merely reiterated its view that “Minnesota law applies, and it permits the language in the policy.” Id. at 126. Likewise, at the hearing on summary judgment State Farm did not respond to Plaintiff’s contention that under Colorado law, coverage is “person oriented rather than vehicle oriented.” Id. at 173. Indeed, when the court asked whether, if Colorado law governed, it would matter “whether Mr. Kipling was in your car as the insurance policies define that because Colorado law would prohibit tying coverage to a particular automobile,” id. at 150, State Farm responded that “if he qualifies as an insured under a Minnesota policy and Colorado law applies then it doesn’t matter what vehicle that insured might be in under Colorado law,” id. at 150–51. And after Plaintiff agreed “that if Minnesota law applies then under the anti-stacking rules the plaintiffs have received everything to which they’re entitled,” id. at 151, State Farm acknowledged that the only 7 issue was which state’s law applied. It later responded to the Court, “Generally, what the Court’s asking is does—which law applies and I agree that that’s the issue.” Id. at 153. State Farm’s pretrial motion for reconsideration of the summary-judgment ruling went no further. It argued only that the district court erred in its conflict-of-laws analysis and reiterated that “the central dispute in the matter” was “whether Colorado or Minnesota law” applied. Id., Vol. 2 at 202 (internal quotation marks omitted). And State Farm’s reply in support of the motion stated Colorado law on UIM coverage in conformity with Plaintiff’s views and argued that applying Colorado law to the Minnesota Policies would produce unacceptable results. In its order on the motion for reconsideration, the court naturally stated that “it is undisputed that under Colorado law State Farm is not allowed to tie its underinsured motorist coverage to occupancy in a particular automobile.” Id. at 241 (citing DeHerrera, 30 P.3d 167). State Farm points to its motion for a directed verdict at trial. But that motion only renewed State Farm’s previous arguments made in its motions for summary judgment and reconsideration. Also, we reject State Farm’s assertion that Plaintiff conceded in her response to the Rule 59(e) motion that it had raised this issue of Colorado law. Because the district court properly determined that State Farm had failed to raise its Colorado-law argument before its Rule 59(e) motion, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely.