Opinion ID: 2627082
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: means of committing criminal assault

Text: ¶ 10 Alternative means crimes are ones that provide that the proscribed criminal conduct may be proved in a variety of ways. As a general rule, such crimes are set forth in a statute stating a single offense, under which are set forth more than one means by which the offense may be committed. See State v. Arndt, 87 Wash.2d 374, 384, 553 P.2d 1328 (1976). Criminal assault is just such a crime. ¶ 11 The legislature has codified four degrees of criminal assault. [5] Between the crimes of first, second, and third degree assault, the legislature has delineated a total of seventeen alternative means of commission. See RCW 9A.36.011-.031. As promulgated by the legislature, the second degree criminal assault statute articulates a single criminal offense [6] and then provides six separate subsections by which the offense may be committed. RCW 9A.36.021(1)(a)-(f). Each of these six subsections represents an alternative means of committing the crime of second degree assault. Accord State v. Whitney, 108 Wash.2d 506, 510-11, 739 P.2d 1150 (1987) (noting that separate subsections of RCW 9A.44.040 provide alternative means by which to commit rape in the first degree); State v. Stockmyer, 83 Wash.App. 77, 86, 87, 920 P.2d 1201 (1996) (`alternative means' cases generally involve charges under a statute which contains several alternative ways of committing one crime, and the defendant has been charged with conduct which may fulfill more than one [statutory] alternative); State v. Martinez, 76 Wash.App. 1, 884 P.2d 3 (1994); State v. Barefield, 47 Wash.App. 444, 458-59, 735 P.2d 1339 (1987) (separate subsections within RCW 46.61.520 provide alternative means by which to commit the crime of vehicular homicide); State v. Gillespie, 41 Wash.App. 640, 643, 705 P.2d 808 (1985) (separate subsections within RCW 9A.56.020 provide alternative means by which to commit first degree theft). ¶ 12 In State v. Linehan, 147 Wash.2d 638, 56 P.3d 542 (2002), we stated that the alternative means of committing criminal assault are not provided for in the common law definitions, but rather are provided in the [above] statutes delineating the degree of assault. Linehan, 147 Wash.2d at 647, 56 P.3d 542. Notwithstanding our conclusion in that case, Smith argues that jury unanimity principles require that we hold that the uncodified common law assault definitions constitute alternative means of committing assault. We decline to make that holding for two reasons. ¶ 13 First, we agree with the Court of Appeals' determination in this case that the assault definitional instructions do not create additional alternative means of committing the crime of assault. That holding is consistent with a line of decisions, from our court and the Court of Appeals, holding that the reach of the alternative means doctrine has not been extended to encompass a mere definitional instruction. See Linehan, 147 Wash.2d at 646, 56 P.3d 542 (citing State v. Laico, 97 Wash.App. 759, 763 n. 4, 987 P.2d 638 (1999)); see also State v. Al-Hamdani, 109 Wash.App. 599, 36 P.3d 1103 (2001) (definition of mental incapacity does not create another means by which rape can occur); State v. Marko, 107 Wash.App. 215, 220, 27 P.3d 228 (2001) (definitions of threat do not constitute alternative means of the crime of intimidating a witness); State v. Garvin, 28 Wash.App. 82, 85, 621 P.2d 215 (1980) (definitions of threat do not create alternative means of committing crime of second degree extortion, but merely defined an element of the crime). As applied to the criminal assault charging statutes, the common law assault definitions merely elaborate upon and clarify the terms assault or assaults, which are used throughout chapter 9A.36 RCW. Therefore, consistent with our prior jurisprudence, [7] we decline to extend the reach of the alternative means doctrine beyond those statutory alternatives already directly provided for by the legislature in the assault charging statutes to encompass the common law assault definitions when submitted as a separate definitional instruction. ¶ 14 In response to this authority, Smith correctly notes that Divisions One and Three of the Court of Appeals have held that the common law definitions of assault, when submitted as a jury instruction, do create alternative means of committing the crime charged. See State v. Bland, 71 Wash.App. 345, 860 P.2d 1046 (1993); State v. Hupe, 50 Wash.App. 277, 748 P.2d 263 (1988). We have reviewed these cases and conclude that they do not control the outcome in this case for the following reasons. First, the cases upon which those courts relied to support their conclusion are inapposite to their determination because they primarily involved the question of whether there was sufficient evidence to support statutory alternatives. See, e.g., Whitney, 108 Wash.2d 506, 739 P.2d 1150. Second, the cases are devoid of any analytical discussion of why the common law definitions of assault constitute alternative means. Third, a majority of these cases were handed down prior to this court's 2002 determination in Linehan that definitions do not create additional alternative means of committing an offense, thereby rendering their authority questionable. Fourth, we have never treated the common law assault definitions as alternative means and are not inclined to do so here. Therefore, we disapprove of the decisions in Hupe, Bland, State v. Rivas, 97 Wash.App. 349, 352, 984 P.2d 432 (1999), and State v. Nicholson, 119 Wash. App. 855, 84 P.3d 877 (2003), to the extent those cases can be read as endorsing a hard and fast rule that the common law definitions of assault constitute alternative means of committing assault, thereby requiring substantial evidence to support each of the alternative means charged or instructed. ¶ 15 Our second reason for holding that the common law definitions of assault, when submitted in a jury instruction as they were in this case, do not constitute alternative means of committing assault is that, properly understood, these definitions merely define an element of the crime charged and, thereby, give rise to a means within a means scenario. As stated above, a means within a means scenario does not trigger jury unanimity protections. Here, we conclude that the common law assault definitions represent such a means within a means because those definitions merely define the element of assault. Accord State v. Strohm, 75 Wash.App. 301, 308-09, 879 P.2d 962 (1994) (definition of traffic included in jury instruction did not create alternative means of trafficking in stolen property under RCW 9A.82.050(2) because the definition did not add to the criminal statute and its only purpose is to prove understanding of the term traffic or traffics); State v. Winings, 126 Wash.App. 75, 89-90, 107 P.3d 141 (2005) (definitional instructions do not create alternative means of committing second degree assault that necessitate applying jury unanimity principles). ¶ 16 In support of our conclusion that this is a means within a means case, we look to the decision in Laico, 97 Wash.App. 759, 987 P.2d 638. There, Division One of the Court of Appeals was presented with the question of whether the definition of great bodily harm constituted an alternative means of committing the crime of assault in the first degree. In that case, similar to the one charge before us here, the State charged the defendant with only one means of committing first degree assault: by means of inflicting great bodily harm. Id. at 761, 987 P.2d 638; RCW 9A.36.01 1(1)(c). In rejecting the defendant's assertion that the three alternative definitions of great bodily harm constituted alternative means of committing first degree assault by means of inflicting great bodily harm, the court reasoned that the definition is merely descriptive of a term that constitutes, among other things, an element of the crime of first degree assault. Laico, 97 Wash.App. at 763, 987 P.2d 638. To hold otherwise, Division One concluded, would go against the legislature's intent and would raise the spectre of a myriad of instructions and verdict forms. ¶ 17 Applying Division One's reasoning to the facts of this case shows that, like the definitions of great bodily harm, the common law definitions of assault, which we determined in State v. Davis, 119 Wash.2d 657, 664, 835 P.2d 1039 (1992), do not constitute essential elements of the crime, are merely descriptive of a term, assault, that constitutes an element of the crime of second degree assault. Consequently, it follows that, like the definition of great bodily harm, the common law definition of assault, when presented in its entirety as a separate jury instruction, gives rise to a means within a means situation. As applied to this particular case, the common law definitions of assault merely explain the assault by means of a deadly weapon alternative and, therefore, neither require jury unanimity nor have to be supported by substantial evidence on the record. ¶ 18 Notwithstanding the decision in Laico, Smith avers that this is not a means within a means case because the definitions of assault describe the very crime of assault. In making this assertion, Smith would have us conclude that a jury's unanimous verdict cannot stand in an assault case such as this unless the alleged additional means (the definitions of assault) by which the means of assault (by deadly weapon, here) are also supported by substantial evidence. But, as this court noted in In re Personal Restraint of Jeffries, when presented with (and disavowing) a similar argument, this `means within [a] means' argument raises the [troublesome] spectre of a myriad of instructions and verdict forms whenever a defendant is charged with such a crime. Jeffries, 110 Wash.2d at 339, 752 P.2d 1338; accord State v. James, 698 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Alaska 1985) (By requiring semantic uniformity [in jury verdicts] we encourage overcomplicated instructions and hung juries in cases in which the jurors actually [and unanimously] agree upon the defendant's guilt.). We fail to see how the result Smith urges us to reach advances the two underlying purposes of the alternative means doctrine, which are to prevent jury confusion about what criminal conduct has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and to prevent the State from charging every available means authorized under a single criminal statute, lumping them together, and then leaving it to the jury to pick freely among the various means in order to obtain a unanimous verdict. Accord State v. Petrich, 101 Wash.2d 566, 569-70, 683 P.2d 173 (1984) (alternative acts case); Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Instructions, Defendant Culpability, and Jury Interpretation of Law, 21 St. Louis U. Pub.L.Rev. 25, 31 (2002) (alternative means rule gives the jury much leeway to determine how much unanimity on theories or facts that it wants to underlie its [unanimous] verdict.). ¶ 19 In absence of legislative intent to the contrary, [8] we limit the reach of the alternative means doctrine to those alternative means directly provided for by the assault statutes. Accordingly, we do not apply the doctrine, as Smith urges us to do, to a mere jury instruction setting forth the common law definitions of assault as that term is used throughout the charging statutes in chapter 9A.36 RCW.