Opinion ID: 2167974
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assignability of Cause of Action.

Text: If a cause of action survives it is assignable. Lehmann v. Farwell (1897), 95 Wis. 185, 70 N. W. 170. Sec. 331.01, Stats., provides that in addition to actions surviving at common law, actions for damage done to the property rights or interests of another, and for damages done to real or personal property, as well as other actions, also survive. It is often said that at common law contract actions survive while tort actions die with the person. Wogahn v. Stevens (1940), 236 Wis. 122, 294 N. W. 503. However, the basic principle of survivability at common law was that wrongs which diminished property formed the basis of survivable actions while personal injuries did not. 1 Am. Jur. (2d), Abatement, Survival, and Revival, p. 86, sec. 51. Of course, if the principal wrong was a personal injury, the action would not survive even though property rights were incidentally affected. Howard v. Lunaburg (1927), 192 Wis. 507, 213 N. W. 301. In Frey v. Duluth, S. S. & A. R. Co. (1895), 91 Wis. 309, 64 N. W. 1038, it was held that a right of action for compensation for partial taking of lands was assignable. In Kuhl v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (1898), 101 Wis. 42, 77 N. W. 155, the Frey Case was explained as holding that the obligation when a statutory remedy for just compensation is pursued is one in implied contract. Defendant misses the mark when it argues that the appeal of the basic condemnation award is not assignable. The cause of action is assignable; the appeal is merely a procedure by which it is enforced.