Opinion ID: 4246843
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Search of Fulton’s Cell Phone

Text: In 2014, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases involving the warrantless search of a cell phone – one involving a smartphone and one involving a flip phone – to determine “whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.” Riley/Wurie, 134 S. Ct. at 2480. In Riley, police arrested the defendant for possessing concealed, loaded firearms. Police seized a smartphone from the defendant incident to his arrest and accessed the phone without a warrant. Observing notations in his [J-55-2017] - 12 contact list that signified gang involvement, the arresting officer turned the phone over to a detective specializing in gangs, who further examined the contents of the phone. The videos and photographs observed on the phone resulted in Riley being charged in connection with an earlier shooting, for which he was ultimately convicted and given an enhanced sentence because the crimes were committed for the benefit of a gang. In Wurie, police seized a flip phone from the defendant incident to his arrest for drug delivery. The phone, which was already powered on, received repeated calls from a number identified in the phone as “my house” on the phone’s external viewing screen. Id. at 2481. Without first obtaining a warrant, police opened the phone and observed that the wallpaper of the phone was a photograph of a woman and a baby. Police then accessed the phone’s call log with the press of a button, and pressed another to discern the phone number assigned to “my house.” Id. Police then used the phone number to search a web-based phone directory to identify the address associated with that number. The police went to that address and observed a woman through the window who resembled the woman in the photograph on the wallpaper of Wurie’s phone. The police then obtained and executed a warrant to search the residence, which resulted in the discovery and seizure of a large amount of drugs, paraphernalia, a firearm, ammunition and money. The United States Supreme Court held that although the warrantless seizure of the cell phones from Riley and Wurie was permissible as the result of a search incident to arrest, the subsequent searches of their phones was not. Instead, the Court held that to lawfully search a cell phone, police must first obtain a warrant. Id. at 2485, 2493. The Court explained that although cell phones contain information that is, in substance, [J-55-2017] - 13 the same as physical items that are permissibly searched incident to an individual’s arrest pursuant to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence (e.g., an address book, a wallet or a purse), the quantity and quality of data that can be stored on cell phones place them in an entirely different class for purposes of a search. Id. at 2488 (“That is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping them together.”) The Riley/Wurie Court reasoned that the privacy concerns related to the search of a cell phone far exceed any such concerns related to the search of these other physical items, as cell phones “place vast quantities of personal information literally in the hands of individuals,” all in one place. Id. at 2485, 2489 (referring to the name “cell phones” as a “misleading shorthand,” as they “could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers”). The variety of information that can be stored, the details about a person’s life that the information can convey, and the length of time the information can remain catalogued in a cell phone, which are carried by the great majority of people, led the Court to conclude that data stored on a cell phone is entirely distinguishable from any physical evidence counterpart. Id. at 2489-90. Notably, the high Court rejected the government’s reliance on Smith and FloresLopez, the very cases upon which the trial court in the case at bar relied to explain its authorization of the warrantless search of Fulton’s phone. The Riley/Wurie Court explained that unlike the use of a pen register (which the Court in Smith held was not a search and thus did not require a warrant), accessing the call logs on a cell phone was unquestionably a search – one that yields not only phone numbers, but whatever other [J-55-2017] - 14 identifying information the cell phone owner attaches to that number (e.g., names, nicknames, photographs, addresses, etc.). Id. at 2492-93. Further, the Court disagreed with the government’s argument that the search of a cell phone for information that police could have obtained from a pre-digital counterpart was permitted without a warrant. Id. at 2493. The Riley/Wurie Court noted the holding of Flores-Lopez as stating, “[i]f police are entitled to open a pocket diary to copy the owner’s address, they should be entitled to turn on a cell phone to learn its number,” id. (citing Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 807), but found that decision to be in error: [T]he fact that a search in the pre-digital era could have turned up a photograph or two in a wallet does not justify a search of thousands of photos in a digital gallery. The fact that someone could have tucked a paper bank statement in a pocket does not justify a search of every bank statement from the last five years. And to make matters worse, such an analogue test would allow law enforcement to search a range of items contained on a phone, even though people would be unlikely to carry such a variety of information in physical form. In Riley's case, for example, it is implausible that he would have strolled around with video tapes, photo albums, and an address book all crammed into his pockets. But because each of those items has a pre-digital analogue, police under California's proposal would be able to search a phone for all of those items – a significant diminution of privacy. Id. Concerned that “an analogue test would launch courts on a difficult line-drawing expedition to determine which digital files are comparable to physical records,” the Court precluded a case-by-case approach to determining whether the search of a cell phone required a warrant. Id. Instead, the Court held that in all cases, “even when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest,” the search of a cell phone requires a warrant. Id. In short, the high Court summarized its holding with a simple rule: when police want [J-55-2017] - 15 to search a cell phone, “get a warrant.” Id. at 2495. The Court was unanimous on this point. In the lone minority opinion authored in the case, Justice Alito stated, “The Court strikes [the balance between law enforcement and privacy interests] in favor of privacy interests with respect to all cell phones and all information found in them,” and agreed that there is no “workable alternative” to this blanket holding. Id. at 2467 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Fulton argues that pursuant to Riley/Wurie, police were not permitted to access the flip phone at all without a warrant and that the act of opening and turning on his phone constituted a search. Fulton’s Brief at 19. The Commonwealth, attempting to distinguish this case from Riley/Wurie, counters that no search of the phone occurred because police navigated the menus of the phone only to obtain the phone’s assigned number, which is “public information” in which Fulton had no expectation of privacy.16 16 Instead of constituting a search, the Commonwealth asserts, without explication or discussion, that police powered on and obtained the flip phone’s assigned number as part of the “police caretaking function.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 16 n.2. The Commonwealth suggests, through citation Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (addressing the lawfulness of an inventory search of a vehicle), that Detective Harkins powered on the cell phone to “secure and protect” the phone. Commonwealth’s Brief at 16 n.2. The Commonwealth fails to cite any evidence of record that would support this finding. It further fails to discuss the community caretaking doctrine at all or how it would be applicable under the circumstances of this case. In particular, the Commonwealth makes no attempt to reconcile the requirement that a caretaking inventory search must be conducted pursuant to a standard police procedure with the absence of any testimony that any such procedure existed, let alone that the search was conducted pursuant thereto. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372-74; Commonwealth v. Lagenella, 83 A.3d 94, 103 (Pa. 2013). Indeed, the record reflects that the police in the case at bar did not follow another established procedure as they failed to place the seized phones on a property receipt. N.T., 8/21/2013 (motion), at 57 (Detective Harkins testifying, that (continued…) [J-55-2017] - 16 Commonwealth’s Brief at 16-28. Emphasizing the factual differences between the case at bar and Riley/Wurie, the Commonwealth argues that the type of information accessed here “did not come close to violating the central concern in Riley/Wurie: that cell phone data that could be used to discern ‘[t]he sum of an individual’s private life,’ be protected.” Id. at 28-29 (quoting Riley/Wurie, 134 S. Ct. at 2489).17 When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court is bound by the factual findings made by the suppression court that are supported by the record but review its legal conclusions de novo. Commonwealth v. Cooley, 118 A.3d 370, 373 (Pa. 2015). Our scope of review is limited to the record developed at the suppression hearing, considering the evidence presented by the Commonwealth as the prevailing party and any uncontradicted evidence presented by Fulton. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 160 A.3d 127, 138, 139 n.12 (Pa. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. Pennsylvania, __ U.S. __, 2017 WL 4285216 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2017). (…continued) “[d]epartmental policy indicates that property taken into custody should be properly receipted,” and that this procedure was not followed for the seized cell phones). As this contention is undeveloped and entirely untethered to both the facts and the law, it warrants no further consideration. 17 The Commonwealth also contends Fulton failed to establish that he had a privacy interest in the Samsung flip phone because the phone was unmarked, unlocked and seized from Bell’s vehicle, and that he lacked standing to bring his motion to suppress. Commonwealth’s Brief at 12-15. Neither argument was ever raised at the hearing on Fulton’s suppression motion. See generally N.T., 8/21/2013 (motion), at 81-93 (Commonwealth’s argument at the suppression hearing). In fact, the Commonwealth court not have advanced either argument before the trial court because its case against Fulton hinged upon him being “Jeff,” the owner of the Samsung flip phone. As such, the Commonwealth is estopped from now raising the argument that Fulton lacked a possessory interest in the Samsung flip phone or standing to challenge its seizure and subsequent search. See In re S.A.J., 838 A.2d 616, 620 (Pa. 2003) (“As a general rule, a party to an action is estopped from assuming a position inconsistent with his or her assertion in a previous action, if his or her contention was successfully maintained.”). [J-55-2017] - 17 Riley/Wurie does not support the decisions of the lower courts (nor the Commonwealth’s arguments in support thereof). Riley/Wurie could not be clearer: in order to access any information on a cell phone, police must first obtain a warrant.18 The high Court created no exception for what police or courts may deem a “minimally invasive” search, as the trial court in the case at bar found, or a “minimal intrusion,” as found by the Superior Court. As the above discussion of the case reveals, the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected a case-by-case approach to determining whether a warrant was required prior to accessing certain information contained in a cell phone, opting instead to adopt a categorical rule prohibiting police from looking for any information on a cell phone without a warrant. The Riley/Wurie Court held that in the absence of an applicable exception, any search of a cell phone requires a warrant. This is because, like one’s home, an individual’s expectation of privacy is in the cell phone itself, not in each and every piece of information stored therein. Consequently, a warrant is generally required for law enforcement to search a cell phone. See Riley/Wurie, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (“[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any form – unless the phone is [in the house].”) (emphasis original). 18 The Riley/Wurie Court left open the possibility that “case-specific exceptions” (e.g., consent or exigent circumstances) could justify the search of a particular cell phone. Riley/Wurie, 134 S. Ct. at 2494. [J-55-2017] - 18 A search occurs when police intrude upon a constitutionally protected area without the individual’s explicit or implicit permission. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012)); Commonwealth v. Shabezz, 166 A.3d 278, 288 (Pa. 2017). To constitute such an intrusion, the action need not uncover something “of great personal value”; even a small, seemingly insignificant act of information gathering by police in a constitutionally protected area is a search. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987). In Hicks, for example, the high Court held that the act by police of moving stereo equipment to view its serial number was a search under the Fourth Amendment: “A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.” Id. Any actions taken unrelated to an otherwise authorized intrusion that result in exposing “concealed portions” of an area in which a person has a protected privacy interest is, for constitutional purposes, a search. Id. Our review of the record in this case reveals that Detective Harkins conducted three distinct searches of Fulton’s cell phone without a warrant. The first occurred when the detective powered on the phone. The record reflects that Fulton’s flip phone was one of three phones recovered by detectives investigating a separate crime unrelated to Toll’s murder. N.T., 8/21/2013 (motion), at 30, 45. The phones were transferred to the homicide detectives investigating Toll’s murder because the phones were believed to have possible evidentiary value based on Toll’s call log, which indicated that he communicated several times with “Jeff” at the Target Number within a short period of time prior to the shooting. Id. at 26, 46-47. Fulton’s flip phone was off when it was [J-55-2017] - 19 received by Detective Harkins. Therefore, in order to discern the assigned number of the phone, Detective Harkins powered on the phone. Id. at 47. The act of powering on Fulton’s flip phone constituted a search, i.e., an intrusion upon a constitutionally protected area (Fulton’s cell phone) without Fulton’s explicit or implicit permission. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6. Turning on the phone exposed to view portions of the phone that were previously concealed and not otherwise authorized by a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325. Powering on the phone is akin to opening the door to a home. It permitted police to obtain and review a host of information on the cell phone, including viewing its wallpaper, reviewing incoming text messages and calls, and accessing all of the data contained in the phone. Detective Harkins engaged in a second warrantless search when he obtained the phone’s assigned number. After powering on the phone, Detective Harkins navigated through the menus of the flip phone to obtain its number. N.T., 8/21/2013 (motion), at 47. By virtue of this search, Detective Harkins learned that the number assigned to Fulton’s flip phone was the same number labeled as “Jeff” in Toll’s phone. Id. at 47-48. As stated above, the Riley/Wurie Court rejected the Flores-Lopez decision and its conclusion that accessing a cell phone to obtain its phone number was permissible without a warrant. See Riley/Wurie, 134 S. Ct. at 2493. The act of navigating the menus of a cell phone to obtain the phone’s number is unquestionably a search that required a warrant. Detective Harkins conducted a third warrantless search of the phone when he monitored incoming calls and text messages. To aid in his investigation of Toll’s [J-55-2017] - 20 murder, he kept the phone powered on, monitoring the calls and text messages that came through by viewing the number and/or assigned name of the individual calling or texting on the flip phone’s internal or external display. N.T., 8/21/2013 (motion), at 48. The day after the phone was delivered to homicide, Detective Harkins reviewed “a number of calls and texts that were incoming during the course [of time] that the phone was in the homicide unit,” and then answered a phone call from Warrington. Id. As stated by Detective Harkins at the suppression hearing, his decision to answer Warrington’s phone call “wasn’t by chance”; his testimony reflects that he made an informed decision, through his review of the calls and texts coming in, to take her call. Id. at 48, 58. Contrary to the finding of the trial court and the argument advanced by the Commonwealth before this Court, there is little difference between monitoring the internal and external viewing screens on a cell phone and searching the phone’s call logs. Both result in accessing “more than just phone numbers,” but also “any identifying information that an individual might add” to his or her contacts, including the caller’s photograph, the name assigned to the caller or sender of the text message. See Riley/Wurie, 134 S. Ct. at 2492-93. Further, and unlike a call log, monitoring a phone’s incoming text messages allows the viewer to see the content of a text message, which indisputably constitutes private data. This is all information that, pursuant to Riley/Wurie, cannot be accessed by police without a warrant. The rule created by Riley/Wurie is exceedingly simple: if a member of law enforcement wishes to obtain information from a cell phone, get a warrant. The failure [J-55-2017] - 21 to do so here violated Fulton’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
It remains, then, for this Court to determine what evidence, if any, must be suppressed as a result of the unlawful warrantless searches of the flip phone. Fulton argues that all of the information obtained must be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree, including: the phone’s telephone number; the existence of Warrington; and Warrington’s statement to police and her trial testimony. Fulton’s Brief at 20 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963)). Conversely, the Commonwealth argues (assuming there was a search) that the only search that occurred was the navigation of the phone’s menus to discern the flip phone’s assigned number. Commonwealth’s Brief at 29-31. Regarding Warrington’s communication with police and her eventual identification of Fulton as “Jeff” with the Target Number, the Commonwealth asserts that it was attenuated from the search because obtaining the assigned number to the flip phone “did not cause Ms. Warrington to call it or to agree to testify at trial,” and her decision to testify was voluntary and “not in any manner caused by police conduct.” Id. at 31, 32. Evidence of any kind obtained by police through an unlawful search may not be used in any respect, including as evidence at trial against the subject of the search. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-85; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). Such evidence may only be used against the defendant “[i]f knowledge of [the evidence] is gained from an independent source,” Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 392, or “the evidence in question would inevitably have been [J-55-2017] - 22 discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct,” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984). The burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence illegally obtained would have ultimately or inevitably been discovered by legal means. Id. at 444. “The exclusionary remedy for illegal searches and seizures extends not only to the direct product of the illegality, the primary evidence, but also to the indirect product of the search or seizure, the secondary or derivative evidence.” Tainted evidence subject to exclusion – Secondary or derivative evidence: Fruit of poisonous tree, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 3:4 (2d ed.). The test to determine whether derivative evidence constitutes the fruit of an illegal search is not simply whether police would not have discovered the information but for the search, as derivative evidence may nonetheless be usable and admissible if the connection between the information obtained was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search, thus removing the taint of the original illegality. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88; United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980). To determine whether evidence must be excluded as the fruit of an unlawful search, courts must consider “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality.” Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959)); Shabezz, 166 A.3d at 289 (“The inquiry simply is whether the evidence was obtained via exploitation of the initial illegality.”); see also Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 (“the prosecution is not to be put in a better position than it would have been in if no illegality had transpired” but “the derivative evidence analysis ensures that the prosecution is not put in a worse position simply because of some earlier police [J-55-2017] - 23 error or misconduct”). “In applying this test, a court must evaluate whether the illegal search or any leads gained from the search tended to significantly direct the government toward discovery of the specific evidence being challenged.” Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 3:4. In the case at bar, evidence that the assigned number to Fulton’s flip phone was the Target Number was primary evidence, obtained directly from the illegal warrantless search of the phone. There is nothing in the record that supports a conclusion that police had an independent source to identify the phone number of that particular phone (i.e., no witness identified the Samsung flip phone as being the phone with that assigned number) or that the discovery of the assigned number to that phone was inevitable. The existence of Warrington was likewise primary evidence that Detective Harkins obtained from his illegal search of Fulton’s cell phone. There is no evidence of record that Detective Harkins had any knowledge of Warrington’s existence or of her relationship with Fulton outside of his conversation with her on Fulton’s flip phone. There was no testimony presented to support a finding that her discovery was inevitable or that police would have otherwise learned of her existence from a source independent of the illegal search. Warrington was not a witness to the crime in question, but rather was calling Fulton to purchase heroin. Detective Harkins learned of her existence solely as a result of his illegal searches, i.e., powering on the flip phone, monitoring its incoming calls and answering Warrington’s call. The discovery of Warrington through the illegal searches of the phone led to Detective Harkins arranging to interview Warrington and ultimately to her connecting [J-55-2017] - 24 Fulton to the number assigned to “Jeff” in Toll’s phone and identifying Fulton as “Lil Jeff” both in her interview with police and at trial. See N.T., 8/21/2013 (motion), at 57-58; N.T., 8/21/2013 (trial), at 51, 58. This evidence was derivative of the initial unlawful searches (i.e., powering on the phone and monitoring its incoming calls). Whether to exclude her testimony and the information she provided to police in her interview requires additional considerations, as the United States Supreme Court has cautioned that courts must not “mechanically equate[]” live witness testimony with “inanimate evidentiary objects illegally seized.” U.S. v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 277 (1978). In addition to the question of whether the connection between the challenged evidence and the illegal search was sufficiently attenuated to remove the taint from the testimonial evidence, courts must consider two additional factors before excluding live testimony as a fruit of the unlawful search. The first factor is the witness’ willingness to testify. According to the Ceccolini Court, The greater the willingness of the witness to freely testify, the greater the likelihood that he or she will be discovered by legal means and, concomitantly, the smaller the incentive to conduct an illegal search to discover the witness. Witnesses are not like guns or documents which remain hidden from view until one turns over a sofa or opens a filing cabinet. Witnesses can, and often do, come forward and offer evidence entirely of their own volition. Id. at 276-77 (footnote omitted). The Court noted, however, that analysis of this factor differs “where the search was conducted by the police for the specific purpose of discovering potential witnesses.” Id. at 277 n.4. The second factor is the extent to which the witness can offer testimony about material and relevant facts that are wholly unrelated to the illegal search. Id. at 277. [J-55-2017] - 25 “[S]ince the cost of excluding live-witness testimony often will be greater, a closer, more direct link between the illegality and that kind of testimony is required.” Id. at 278. With respect to the first factor, the suppression record in the case at bar does not establish that Warrington was a likely volunteer to willingly testify. As stated above, Warrington, who was a heroin addict at the time, did not contact police on her own accord, thinking instead that she was contacting Fulton to purchase heroin. N.T., 8/21/2013 (motion), at 48-50. There is no reason to believe that she would have come forward to speak to police about Fulton on her own volition. Although she agreed to meet Detective Harkins when he asked for her cooperation, she would not give him her home address. Id. at 49. Instead, she agreed to meet the detective in a convenience store parking lot, she arrived more than a half an hour late for the interview, and came only after Detective Harkins called her (using Fulton’s flip phone) to ensure she would appear. Id. at 49-50. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the warrantless searches of Fulton’s cell phone strongly suggest that this is a case where police conducted the illegal search for the purpose of discovering potential witnesses. See Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 277 n.4. Detective Harkins monitored the calls and texts received on Fulton’s flip phone for more than a day before deciding to answer Warrington’s call, and his decision to answer the call from Warrington “wasn’t by chance.” N.T., 8/21/2013 (motion), at 48, 58. Upon answering the phone, he immediately identified himself as a detective investigating a murder and asked for her cooperation. Id. at 49. Thus, even if Warrington was a willing witness, this factor would not carry significant weight in favor of allowing her testimony at trial. [J-55-2017] - 26 Turning to the second factor, the suppression record reflects that Warrington did not provide police with relevant information that was unrelated to the illegal search. She was not a witness to the crime and did not have any information about the events at the scene of the murder. The purpose of the illegal warrantless searches of the phone was to determine whether the Samsung flip phone was the same phone assigned to “Jeff” in Toll’s cell phone and to identify the owner of the phone. Warrington’s only value as a witness was connecting Fulton to the phone number in question and to the name “Jeff.” See Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-38. The record also reflects no attenuation between the powering on and monitoring of the phone calls and the statement Warrington gave to police. As a matter of timing, the events happened on the same day, June 19, 2010, and there was no intervening event that would “break the chain flowing directly from” the illegal searches that resulted in the interview given to police by Warrington. See Shabezz, 166 A.3d at 290 (observing that the brief lapse of time between the illegal seizure and the subsequent search left “no viable argument that the search was sufficiently attenuated from the seizure so as to purge the taint of the initial illegality”). The illegal warrantless searches of the flip phone did not just lead the government to obtain the statement and testimony from Warrington, it was the only basis for her discovery. See Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 3:4. Here, “the witness’ identity was discovered or her cooperation secured only as a result of an unlawful search.” See Crews, 445 U.S. at 471-72. We therefore conclude that Detective Harkins obtained Warrington’s statement and her testimony at trial by his [J-55-2017] - 27 exploitation of the original illegal searches. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488; Shabezz, 166 A.3d at 289. Based on our evaluation of the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal searches of Fulton’s flip phone, we agree with Fulton that all of this evidence should have been suppressed. This includes the number assigned to the flip phone, the existence of Heather Warrington, and all aspects of her statement to police and trial testimony, including her identification of Fulton’s number as the Target Number and her identification of him as “Lil Jeff” or “Jeff.”