Opinion ID: 2759803
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tape-Recorded Phone Conversation

Text: Wade asserts that his trial counsel should have objected to the admission of a tape recording of a phone call between Jackson and Cole, posing as the Sumners, and Detective David Meacham of the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office. The recording was introduced into evidence through Detective Meacham. During the call, Jackson and Cole stated that they were Reggie and Carol Sumner and that they were in Delaware attending a family member’s funeral. They claimed that a friend from the neighborhood called to tell them that their car had been stolen and inquired about how to unfreeze the Sumners’ bank accounts. Wade argues that the recording was irrelevant and hearsay. The postconviction court concluded that the recording was not hearsay and was relevant to establishing the crime and the identity of the perpetrators. Further, the postconviction court concluded that Wade did not demonstrate deficiency because: (1) he did not establish a legal basis for objecting to the recording; and (2) trial counsel made a reasonable, strategic decision to not object to the evidence. The postconviction court did not err. - 16 - The State’s theory of prosecution was that Wade was guilty of robbery, kidnapping, and first-degree murder as a result of his own actions and as a principal to the actions of Jackson, Cole, and Nixon. A defendant is guilty as a principal if he “aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is committed or is attempted to be committed.” § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2005). Accordingly, so long as the State offered evidence to establish that Wade aided Jackson and Cole—which it did, for example, through Nixon’s testimony—evidence of the actions of Jackson and Cole was relevant to the prosecution of Wade. The recording thus was relevant because it was probative of Jackson and Cole being responsible for the Sumners’ disappearance and the group’s effort to access the Sumners’ bank accounts. Moreover, the recording was not hearsay. The recording was not offered to prove the truth of its content—that the Sumners were alive and well in Delaware— but to establish that Jackson, Cole, and their accomplices were responsible for the murders. See Jackson v. State, 25 So. 3d 518, 530 (Fla. 2009) (“[I]f the statement is offered for some purpose other than its truth, the statement is not hearsay and is generally admissible if relevant to a material issue in the case.” (quoting Penalver v. State, 926 So. 2d 1118, 1132 (Fla. 2006))). Accordingly, Wade has not shown that trial counsel had a basis for objecting to the admission of the recording. - 17 - In addition, the postconviction court’s conclusion that trial counsel made a reasonable, strategic decision to not object to the recording is also supported by the record and this Court’s precedent. Trial counsel, therefore, was not ineffective. See Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000) (“[S]trategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.”). At the evidentiary hearing, attorney Refik Eler, who was primarily responsible for the guilt phase of Wade’s trial, testified that given the evidence linking Wade to Jackson and Cole, he felt that the defense had to admit some wrongdoing by Wade in order to maintain credibility with the jury. Eler stated that he thought the best defense was to argue that Wade was “an accessory after the fact to the theft,” who helped “get rid of and dispose of the fruits of the crime” and hoped to be given the victims’ car and some money in exchange for cooperating with Jackson and Cole. The defense would argue that Jackson and Cole “sucked [Wade] into this” and that Wade did not participate directly in the robberies, kidnappings, or murders. Because Eler intended to argue that Jackson was the mastermind of the crime and Wade’s role was minimal, Eler reasoned that “the more that Michael Jackson’s name is mentioned and Tiffany Cole[’s] and the less that Alan Wade’s - 18 - ame is mentioned the better.” Eler testified that his strategy was to let the State “present any evidence about Michael Jackson and Tiffany Cole any time so a jury could hear how—how much they were involved and how little Alan Wade was involved.” As for the recorded phone conversation in which Jackson and Cole impersonated the Sumners, Eler explained that he thought about objecting but decided not to because he concluded that the evidence was “helpful to the strategy of the defense blaming Michael Jackson and Tiffany Cole.” Attorney Frank Tassone, who primarily handled Wade’s penalty phase, testified that a “joint decision” was made to not object to evidence that implicated Jackson and Cole. Tassone explained that any information, piece of evidence, photograph, [or] conversation that linked Tiffany Cole and Mr. Jackson together I probably and almost assuredly would not have objected to knowing what I knew then because I wanted the jury to believe as did Mr. Eler that Mr. Jackson, and, secondly, Ms. Cole were the leaders of this and that Alan [Wade] was essentially just a stupid young man who got caught up in it, so that applies to the dealing with the car rental, things like that. Tassone reiterated that he made a decision to not object to or attempt to suppress “those specific items [or] a piece of evidence or testimony [that] would help heap more guilt onto Mr. Jackson or Ms. Cole and keep it away from Mr. Wade.” A concession of guilt to some of the prosecutor’s claims can be a “good trial strategy and within defense counsel’s discretion in order to gain credibility and acceptance of the jury.” Atwater v. State, 788 So. 2d 223, 230, 231 (Fla. 2001) - 19 - (concluding that trial counsel acted reasonably in conceding Atwater’s guilt of second-degree murder in an attempt to “maintain credibility with the jury”); see also Jackson v. State, 127 So. 3d 447, 472-73 (Fla. 2013) (“[Counsel’s] decision to not object reflects a trial strategy oriented toward admitting certain crimes (i.e., theft) and not others (i.e., murder and kidnapping), and otherwise presenting Jackson in the best light, which included efforts to not appear as unnecessarily obstructionistic. Without other support for this claim, Jackson has not demonstrated that counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland.”). This Court also has concluded that it can be a reasonable strategy for defense counsel to attempt to shift blame to a codefendant, even when doing so concedes the defendant’s guilt. See Shere v. State, 742 So. 2d 215, 221 (Fla. 1999) (concluding that trial counsel acted reasonably in admitting a statement in which codefendant admitted firing fatal shot even though evidence was a “double-edged sword”); Meeks v. State, 418 So. 2d 987, 988 (Fla. 1982) (“We also reject the second contention that appellant’s trial counsel was deficient by allowing evidence of the codefendant’s participation in the crime. It clearly appears that defense counsel attempted to make the codefendant the more dominant participant.”). Based on the foregoing, the postconviction court did not err in concluding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the - 20 - recorded phone call. The evidence was admissible and consistent with trial counsel’s reasonable theory of defense.