Opinion ID: 162747
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Guilt Phase

Text: 101
102 Mr. Le notes the prosecution's reliance on Mrs. Nguyen as the only eye-witness to the events surrounding Mr. Nguyen's death. Mr. Le points out that his version of events conflicts in varying degrees with that of Mrs. Nguyen but that his trial counsel failed to cross-examine Mrs. Nguyen during the guilt phase of the trial. While Mr. Le admits that their testimony is in agreement on various issues— including the fact that Mr. Le intended to rob the Nguyens, that he was the initial aggressor that morning, that he was the person who went to the kitchen and grabbed the knives—there are a few relevant points of difference. In particular, Mr. Le points out that Mrs. Nguyen, at the preliminary hearing, suggested that her husband had held on to Mr. Le during the altercation and that she had retained control of the barbell during the duration of the fight. Mrs. Nguyen's testimony at trial conflicted with her earlier testimony on these two points. 103 Mr. Le suggests that the conflict should have been brought to the jurors' attention, as Mrs. Nguyen's initial testimony was far more supportive of [Mr.] Le's version of the fight ... Aplt's Br. at 51-52. Mr. Le argues that this information might have affected the trial in three ways. First, his counsel might have convinced the court to give the requested instruction on first degree manslaughter. Second, the court might have given an instruction on self-defense. And third, Mr. Le suggests that this conflict in Mrs. Nguyen's testimony would have exposed the altercation as a crime of passion, rather than as a premeditated, calculated effort to murder and rob the Nguyens. Mr. Le claims that there is no trial strategy that could justify his counsel's failure to impeach Mrs. Nguyen with her own prior testimony. 104 The Court of Criminal Appeals explained that raising these inconsistencies before the jury would not have had any of the proposed effects. As there was adequate evidence that Mr. Le remained the aggressor during the altercation, this inconsistency in Mrs. Nguyen's testimony would not have allowed for an instruction on self-defense. See Le I, 947 P.2d at 556-57. Further, regardless of the inconsistencies of Mrs. Nguyen's testimony, there was no evidence that adequate provocation existed to entitle Mr. Le to a manslaughter instruction. See id. Finally, Mrs. Nguyen's testimony at trial was supported by Mr. Le's confession, which means her conflicting testimony would not have been impeachable by Mr. Le at trial. For these reasons, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that trial counsel's decision not to argue with Mrs. Nguyen was a reasonable trial strategy and Mr. Le could not show prejudice, as required to succeed in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. at 557. In light of its persuasive reasoning, we hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals' analysis on this point was not an unreasonable application of federal law. 105
106 Mr. Le also objects to his counsel's failure to call him as a witness during the guilt phase of the trial. Mr. Le contends that if he had been called, he would have been able to introduce evidence in support of his theory that he only came to Oklahoma City to reclaim the $10,000.00 he felt he was owed by the Nguyens. The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that regardless of whether Mr. Le intended to rob the Nguyens or simply to reclaim $10,000.00 that was allegedly his, sufficient evidence existed to show that Mr. Le formed the intent to murder Mr. Nguyen. See Le I, 947 P.2d at 557. The Court of Criminal Appeals also held that Mr. Le failed to show he was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to raise this point. See id. 107 Had Mr. Le's trial counsel called him to the stand during the guilt stage of the trial, Mr. Le would have had to address the inconsistency in his initial statement to the police, which said nothing about the alleged business plan between Mr. Le and Mr. Nguyen. While Mr. Le rightly points out that this conflict had to be addressed anyway during the second stage when he raised the issue of the money, it is not beyond reason to imagine that his attorney deemed it better not to have Mr. Le impeached in a fundamentally-significant manner during the guilt stage of the trial. When a person is on trial for robbery and capital murder, among other charges, we do not think it an obviously incorrect trial strategy to avoid having the defendant impeached in this way. At the very least, under AEDPA, we cannot hold the Court of Criminal Appeals' ruling on this matter to be an unreasonable application of federal Sixth Amendment law. 108
109 Mr. Le objects to his counsel's failure to request any self-defense instructions at the first stage of the trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that such an instruction could not have been given, [e]ven giving [Mr.] Le the benefit of every possible doubt [based on] this evidence ... Le I, 947 P.2d at 547. In Oklahoma, self-defense is not available to an aggressor. See Ruth v. Oklahoma, 581 P.2d 919, 922 (Okla.Crim.App.1978). Even assuming that Mrs. Nguyen had retained the barbell so as to threaten Mr. Le or that Mr. Nguyen had picked up the bar Mr. Le allegedly dropped and then used it to fight back, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that Mr. Le never ceased being the aggressor. See Le I, 947 P.2d at 547. We agree. For this reason, it cannot have been error for his counsel not to request a self-defense instruction. There being no error, the Court of Criminal Appeals did not unreasonably apply federal law on this point. 110
111 Mr. Le argues that his trial attorney made at least two errors in the closing arguments during the guilt phase. Mr. Le complains that his attorney conceded Mr. Le's guilt by explaining to the jury why Mrs. Nguyen was not cross-examined. Mr. Le also suggests that it was error for his trial attorney never to argue Mr. Le's version of the events to the jury. 112 With respect to the first point, Mr. Le's attorney said to the jury: 113 Now this has been a short trial. The state mentioned, for example, that the victim's wife [was not] cross-examine[d]. Well, one thing I'll tell you is that I don't want to start with and insult your intelligence and I wouldn't insult her.... 114 I didn't say [Detective Bemo] cheated or planted evidence or inferred that he was racially biased or prejudiced because he's not. 115 And I didn't insult your intelligence or him by inferring that.... 116 This trial wasn't a circus. This wasn't a mockery of the system. This system didn't have bumbling prosecutors or bumbling police or things of that nature. This case was put on in an orderly manner and you as jurors take that into consideration and determin[e] this case based upon the facts and the law that you have here. 117 Tr. vol. IV, at 587-90. 118 While Mr. Le argues that these comments concede Mr. Le's guilt, taken in context and [g]iven the first stage evidence, [they appear] to be a reasonable attempt [by counsel] to ingratiate himself and, by extension, [Mr.] Le with the jury. Le I, 947 P.2d at 557. As already discussed, attempting to impeach Mrs. Nguyen would not necessarily have benefitted Mr. Le, and this statement does not in fact concede Mr. Le's guilt. Therefore, we cannot hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion on this point was unreasonable. 119 As for Mr. Le's argument that counsel should have at least mentioned Mr. Le's theory during the guilt stage of the trial, we have concerns that counsel may have abdicated his responsibility in this respect. It seems that Mr. Le's trial counsel apparently had little in the way of strategy during the guilt phase except to challenge the validity of Mr. Le's confession and not to insult the jury by attacking Mrs. Nguyen or the police. However, a review of the trial transcript shows that trial counsel made objections, cross-examined witnesses, and argued legal points to the judge. Although from this record we cannot discern a comprehensive strategy, we cannot conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals' determination on counsel's failure explicitly to present Mr. Le's theory was unreasonable. 120