Opinion ID: 195970
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Liability: Reasonable Control

Text: 15 The Mobil cross-appeal asserts two related challenges to the district court ruling on liability. First, it contends that there is no record support for the finding that the actual cause of the soil contamination at the Four Corners service station remained unclear. Four Corners I, slip op. at 14. Mobil notes that Four Corners was the only gas station in the vicinity of the contamination; Four Corners had sole responsibility for maintaining the storage tanks and was the sole target of the DEQE notice of responsibility; Four Corners concededly did not comply with environmental statutes and regulations requiring periodic testing of its storage tanks for leakage, see Mass.Gen.L.Ann. ch. 148, Sec. 10 (1994); Mass.Regs.Code tit. 527, Secs. 5.05, 9.01 to 9.24 (1983); and noticeable wet spots were found on the outer shell of the storage tanks upon excavation. If Four Corners caused the contamination, Mobil argues, nonrenewal was not beyond Four Corners' reasonable control. 16 We review the district court factual finding on reasonable control and its subsidiary findings on causation only for clear error. See, e.g., Roberts v. Amoco Oil Co., 740 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir.1984) (legislative history of PMPA suggests that Congress intended to favor franchisees by treating reasonableness determination as an issue of fact); Serianni v. Gulf Oil Corp., 662 F.Supp. 1020, 1024 (E.D.Pa.1986); cf. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 972 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir.1992) (causation in environmental context is question of fact subject to clear error review). Reversal is warranted only if, after considering the entire record, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Holmes Transp., Inc., 983 F.2d 1122, 1129 (1st Cir.1993) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). 17 Significantly, the burden of proof on reasonable control lay with Mobil, not Four Corners. See 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2805(c). On appeal, Mobil must point to evidence that fairly compelled a finding that Four Corners--and Four Corners alone--caused the contamination. See Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Sys., 26 F.3d 1187, 1188 (1st Cir.1994) ( 'Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.' ) (citations omitted). Since it has not done so, we find no clear error. 18 First, DEQE found no holes in the tanks. Nor did the wet spots constitute conclusive evidence of tank leakage, since they could have been caused by contamination emanating outside the tanks. Four Corners cited a United States Environmental Protection Agency document which suggests that gasoline spills by oil transporters during gasoline delivery are among the most common causes of soil contamination at service stations. See 53 Fed.Reg. 37087, 37090, 37133 (1988). Finally, the notice of responsibility issued by DEQE rested on Four Corners' legal status as the current owner/operator of the service station facility for strict liability purposes only. It did not purport to represent a determination that Four Corners caused the contamination. 19 Likewise, the record evidence does not compel a finding that Four Corners might have averted the bulk of the soil contamination by more diligent testing of its tanks. Mobil neither produced evidence as to when the contamination occurred, nor asserted that the environmental detection statutes and regulations of the 1980s were retroactive. Further, there was no evidence which would exclude leakage from other pumping system components (pumps, hoses, pipes); that is, leakage which could not have been detected by testing the tanks. Finally, since there was no evidence that Mobil investigated any of these matters before it decided not to renew the Four Corners franchise, the district court might well have treated this contention as a post hoc rationalization. See Desfosses v. Wallace Energy, Inc., 836 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir.1987) (noting that PMPA notification requirements ensure that franchisor cannot invent after-the-fact justifications for termination or nonrenewal). As Mobil failed to meet its burden of proof on the factual issues underlying the district court ruling on reasonable control, the finding stands.
20 Mobil likewise challenges the district court ruling that Four Corners lacked the financial ability to remediate the soil contamination. It contends that the ruling was infected by legal error, in that the court wrongly regarded Four Corners' financial inability to pay for out-of-state disposal, the costlier but more expeditious method of remediation, as a circumstance beyond the franchisee's reasonable control. If this were true, Mobil argues, any franchisee who came upon hard times and could not afford to pay Mobil for its oil purchases would be exempt from unilateral termination. See, e.g., California Petroleum Distribs. v. Chevron U.S.A., 589 F.Supp. 282, 288 (E.D.N.Y.1984); Cantrell v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 574 F.Supp. 313, 317 (M.D.Tenn.1983). Even if we were to agree with the reasoning of the two decisions cited by Mobil, however, the district court simply did not find that Four Corners' choice of a less expeditious remediation program was beyond its reasonable control because Four Corners could not afford more expeditious measures. Indeed, Four Corners itself adduced evidence that its then owner, Richard Tenczar, could have obtained financing for out-of-state disposal if necessary. 21 Mobil's contention is a thinly veiled attempt to frame the present clear error challenge, see Roberts, 740 F.2d at 608, as an issue of law subject to de novo review. See Cumpiano v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico, 902 F.2d 148, 154 (1st Cir.1990) (The 'clearly erroneous' rule cannot be evaded by the simple expedient of creative relabelling.... by dressing factual disputes in 'legal' costumery.). The central inquiry--that of reasonableness--must be undertaken in light of all the circumstances. In that vein, we cannot ignore the subsidiary finding by the district court that Mobil repeatedly ignored Four Corners' pleas for guidance and assistance on how best to remediate service-station soil contamination. See Four Corners I, slip op. at 14 (Mobil offered no assistance that was refused by Four Corners which would evidence a lack of desire on the part of Four Corners to remedy the problem as expeditiously as possible.); cf., e.g., Malone v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 474 F.Supp. 306, 311 (D.Md.1979) (upholding franchise termination where franchisee deliberately failed to heed franchisor's warnings or accept its good faith advice about more profitable marketing strategies). Four Corners was left entirely to its own devices, in the awkward position of having to determine the most cost-effective remediation method, which involved balancing projected future service-station revenue losses occasioned by a more prolonged closure, against the unconfirmable--but unquestionably higher--immediate costs of a more expeditious remediation. In these circumstances, the district court reasonably could find that Four Corners acted in good faith, and that Mobil's reticence to assist was prompted by its desire to rid itself of the franchisee requesting its assistance. As there was no clear error, the liability judgment against Mobil must stand.