Opinion ID: 622359
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Direct Attack on the LLNL Facility

Text: The DOE utilized its MCE scenario, developed in the original EA, to evaluate the outer bounds of a pathogen release. In Tri-Valley Cares I, we previously upheld the use of this centrifuge model for a bounding analysis of the impacts of abnormal catastrophic events, including earthquakes and accidental plane crashes. There, the model was applied not to measure the cause of the triggering event, but rather the outer limits of its impact. In selecting the centrifuge model to measure the potential impact of a direct terrorist attack on the LLNL BSL-3 facility, the DOE specifically reasoned that the catastrophic release model was analogous to the direct attack scenario because the triggering incidents (earthquake or accidental plane crash in the former, intentional plane crash or suicide bombing in the latter) would result in similar structural damage to the LLNL BSL-3 facility. Moreover, the DOE further refined its analysis of a terrorist attack using the centrifuge model by highlighting several key distinctions from the Army's original model that would significantly alter the consequences of such an event at the LLNL facilityspecifically: (1) the very limited quantities of biological agents generally in use; (2) the likely destruction of pathogens resulting from the fire caused by an airplane crash or explosive device; and (3) the likely destruction of pathogens resulting from general environmental exposure. Because the Army's catastrophic release scenario measured the effects of a catastrophic event at LLNL BSL-3, it was reasonable that the model be applied to consider the outer bounds of a threat of terrorist attack. We read Mothers for Peace II as supporting the proposition that use of an MCE model, such as the catastrophic release scenario applied here, is an acceptable method to simulate the bounds of a direct terrorist attack when the agency decision to use that model is reasonably supported by agency evidence. See Mothers for Peace II, 635 F.3d at 1113 (affirming assessment of a terrorist threat where agency projected pathogen release using maximum credible event). [3] Here, as in Mothers for Peace II, the DOE applied a general MCE analysis to measure the outer limits of the impact of a direct terrorist attack. The MCE centrifuge model used in the original EA was an outer bounding model for a hypothetical maximum credible event it was not designed to be unique to only one particular incident, or even type of incident. We find the DOE's use of the MCE centrifuge model sufficient under NEPA and Mothers for Peace II because the DOE reasonably justified its selection based upon record evidence and additional analysis of site-specific factors. Whether we agree that a centrifuge model was the best way to assess the threat of direct terrorist attack is not the inquiry before us. Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 988 ([w]hen specialists express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more persuasive.) (internal citations omitted). Under NEPA, we must refrain from acting as a type of omnipotent scientist, and instead must restrict ourselves to inquiring only whether an agency took a hard look at the potential environmental impacts at issue. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 814 (9th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989)). When reasonable scientists disagree on appropriate models for analysis, we must defer to agency experts. Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 988. Here, the DOE provided ample justification and evidence for why it used the centrifuge model to assess the impact of a terrorist attack: it analogized triggering events, compared critical distinctions, and considered uniquely different circumstances. Accordingly, because of the deference that must be afforded to the agency, we find that the DOE took the requisite hard look at the threat of direct terrorist attack.