Opinion ID: 202688
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: González-Rivera's Sentence

Text: 25 González-Rivera makes three claims of error with respect to his sentence: (1) that the district court failed to adequately explain the reasons for choosing the sentence imposed; (2) that the district court violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection when it applied the disparate equivalency ratio between crack and powder cocaine; 14 and (3) that the sentence violates his Fifth Amendment right to due process and the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment because it is based on the crack to powder cocaine disparity. We review these legal challenges de novo. United States v. Rivera, 448 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir.2006). If an issue is not raised below, however, we review only for plain error. United States v. Carvell, 74 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir.1996).
26 In United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 518-19 (1st Cir.2006) (en banc), we outlined the appropriate post- Booker approach to sentencing under the federal guidelines to aid us in reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence. We directed trial courts to engage in a sequential determination of the guideline range, including any proposed departures, followed by the further determination whether other factors identified by either side warrant an ultimate sentence above or below the guideline range. Id. An important prerequisite to our reasonableness analysis is the district court's reasoned explanation for the sentence imposed, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). Id. at 519. This is true even if the sentence is within the guidelines range. See United States v. Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34, 40-41 (1st Cir.2006). We are, however, prepared to read a district court's less-than-explicit explanation in light of the record. United States v. Navedo-Concepción, 450 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir.2006). The more obvious the reasons for a [sentencing] choice, the less that needs to be explained. Id. 27 Although at times we have been willing to go to great lengths to infer the district court's reasoning from the record, there are limits. United States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440, 446-47 (1st Cir.2007). This case exceeds those limits. The district judge gave a one-sentence explanation of her choice of sentence, which conclusorily stated that she had considered the appropriate adjustments and the § 3553(a) factors. She did not explain her guidelines calculation, nor did she include any reasoned analysis or reference any evidence that influenced her decision. She merely stated the sentence and paraphrased three of the seven enumerated factors, which she apparently considered important. 28 Furthermore, we are unable to discern the court's reasoning by looking to the record of the parties' arguments. The government argued for a sentence at the top of the guidelines range considering two enhancements, whereas the defendant requested a sentence at the bottom of the range without the enhancements, citing mitigating factors. The district judge did not explain whether she applied one or both recommended enhancements, what the applicable guidelines range was, whether she thought the defendant deserved a sentence at any point within a particular range, or whether she was influenced by either sides' arguments enough to depart from one of the two ranges under consideration. 29 Consequently, this case differs from other cases in which we were able to understand with a modicum of certitude the reasons behind the district court's choice of sentence by reviewing the sentencing record. See, e.g., United States v. Vázquez-Rivera, 470 F.3d 443, 448 (1st Cir.2006) (affirming a sentence where the judge made clear findings on the record, referenced the sentencing factors, and made an explicit statement of the factual basis of the sentence); Navedo-Concepción, 450 F.3d at 57-58 (In this case, the district court's explicit concerns were the scope of the crime and the potential for dangerousness. Beyond that, the district court referred generally to the evidence presented during the trial' as justifying `a sentence at the upper end of the advisory guidelines.'); United States v. Scherrer, 444 F.3d 91, 94 (1st Cir.2006) (Taken at face value, these [mitigating] factors do at first seem to have weight; but the government gave some effective answers in the district court and it is fair to infer that the district court found them persuasive. That the district court did not elaborate on them—it said only that it took them into account—does not preclude the inference where the record explains it.); United States v. Alli, 444 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir.2006) ([Where the district court] simply stated, `[T]his is one of those cases . . . where I think the guidelines produce a sentence that is reasonable and perfectly consistent with the factors enumerated in the statute, 3553(a),' . . . we do not fault the judge for not speaking further about the § 3553(a) factors, given that none were raised for his consideration and, in his independent judgment, none were worthy of further discussion. (second and third alterations in original)). 30 The government argues that it is obvious that the district court chose not to apply the two recommended enhancements and that it then adopted the government's arguments for a sentence at the top of the resultant guidelines range. While this is certainly a plausible reading of the record, even if it were true, the district court's explanation would be insufficient as a matter of law. Section 3553(c)(1) requires that the trial judge identify its reason for selecting a sentence at a particular point within a range exceeding twenty-four months. See Gilman, 478 F.3d at 447 ([T]he statement here does not identify the reason that the district court imposed a sentence in the middle of the guideline range rather than elsewhere within that range (which spans more than 24 months), in direct violation of Section 3553(c)(1).). If the court below rejected the enhancements, which is by no means clear, the guidelines range of 168 to 210 months would exceed twenty-four months, and the court would have to explain why it chose the top of the range. 31 Because the court did not even approximate our Jiménez-Beltre approach nor provide any reasoned explanation for its determination, we will not infer several degrees of reasoning, including a specific explanation explicitly required by law, and guess what the district court was thinking. Therefore, on this ground, 15 we vacate González-Rivera's sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion and prior precedent. Id. at 446-47 ([I]f we are in fact unable to discern from the record the reasoning behind the district court's sentence, appellate review is frustrated and `it is incumbent upon us to vacate . . .' the decision below to provide the district court an opportunity to explain its reasoning at resentencing.). 32
33 The remainder of González-Rivera's arguments, none of which he raised below, involve the 100:1 equivalency ratio of crack to powder cocaine used to calculate his sentence. See United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 54-57 (1st Cir.2006) (describing the history of the disparate treatment of crack and powdered cocaine embedded in the federal sentencing guidelines (commonly referred to as the 100:1 ratio)). In 1994, we upheld the sentencing distinction between crack and powder cocaine against both due process and equal protection challenges under the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 740-41 (1st Cir.1994). We said that Congress had sufficient reasons for treating crack more harshly than powder cocaine, and that there are racially neutral grounds for the classification that more plausibly explain its [disparate] impact on [minorities]. Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). González-Rivera offers no arguments that we have not consistently rejected before, see Pho, 433 F.3d at 61-65 (rejecting a variety of arguments against the ratio, including those based on the Sentencing Commission's effort to ease the discrepancy), and even so, based on our clear precedent, there was obviously no plain error on the part of the district court in applying the equivalency ratios. 34 González-Rivera also challenges the equivalency ratio as so disproportional as to be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. The First Circuit has not squarely decided this issue, but every other circuit has rejected the argument that the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See United States v. Brooks, 161 F.3d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir.1998); United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1158 (11th Cir.1997); United States v. Fraiser, No. 94-30287, 1995 WL 528004, at  (9th Cir.1995) (unpublished opinion) (citing United States v. Harding, 971 F.2d 410, 414 (9th Cir.1992)); United States v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1421, 1424 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Smith, 34 F.3d 514, 525 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Fisher, 22 F.3d 574, 580 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 96 (3d Cir.1992); United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1034 (6th Cir.1990); United States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d 37, 39 (4th Cir.1990); United States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975, 980-81 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245, 1248 (D.C.Cir.1989). Moreover, we have stated many times before that [t]he decision to employ a 100:1 crack-to-powder ratio . . . is a policy judgment, pure and simple, and therefore it is up to Congress—not the courts—to adopt rational drug equivalency ratios. Pho, 433 F.3d at 62-63. 35 Although this is enough to defeat González-Rivera's argument under a plain error standard, we also point out that a defendant seeking proportionality review under the Eighth Amendment must demonstrate, at the threshold, an `initial inference of gross disproportionality' between the `gravity of [the] criminal conduct and the severity of the . . . penalty' imposed. United States v. Cardoza, 129 F.3d 6, 18 (1st Cir.1997) (internal citation omitted) (alterations in original). We have previously upheld a 280-month sentence for the distribution of 85.3 grams of crack cocaine against an Eighth Amendment challenge. United States v. Graciani, 61 F.3d 70, 76-77 (1st Cir.1995). Here, González-Rivera's sentence was seventy months less for a conviction involving over ten grams more crack. We therefore cannot infer gross disproportionality in this case.