Opinion ID: 1402024
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Health and Safety Code section 11556 could constitutionally apply to this case

Text: We do not accept defendant's contention that Health and Safety Code section 11556 constitutes an unconstitutional infringement upon an individual's right of association or violation of due process in that it purports to punish mere presence without participation in criminal conduct. Health and Saftey Code section 11556 provides that: It is unlawful to visit or to be in any room or place where any narcotics are being unlawfully smoked or used with knowledge that such activity is occurring. The words with knowledge that such activity is occurring (Stats. 1957, ch. 2157, § 1, p. 3814) were added by the Legislature in 1957 after two Court of Appeal decisions had held the previous provision unconstitutional. ( People v. Drake (1957) 151 Cal. App.2d 28, 49-50 [310 P.2d 997] (petition for hearing denied July 10, 1957); Bonwell v. Justice Court (1957) 148 Cal. App.2d 906, 907-908 [307 P.2d 716] (petition for hearing denied May 1, 1957).) In Bonwell the court observed that the government cannot constitutionally forbid individuals from entering a place where narcotics are being used if this provision would prohibit, under penalties, the citizens or inhabitants from entering such a place, innocently, not knowing its character, or for any lawful purpose, and without reference to its object....' ( Id. at p. 907.) In People v. Brim (1968) 257 Cal. App.2d 839, 842 [65 Cal. Rptr. 265], the Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of section 11556 as now constituted on the ground that on Brim's facts, the statute is constitutionally clear. A person of common intelligence would understand section 11556 by its plain meaning is designed for a person like Brim who knowingly, wilfully and intentionally involves himself with unlawful marijuana smoking or using. In Brim the record showed ample testimony that defendant actually possessed marijuana, had been seen smoking marijuana during a marijuana party in his own apartment, and had said as the police officers approached, Here they come now, they have seen us. Defendant's apartment was strewn with cigarette papers, marijuana cigarettes, butts, debris, and stems. Similarly, in People v. Lee (1968) 260 Cal. App.2d 836 [67 Cal. Rptr. 709], another Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of section 11556 in a case in which the record contained enough evidence to indicate defendant's possession of marijuana in his family's automobile. Defendant exhibited symptoms of being under the influence of marijuana, the car contained the fresh odor of marijuana smoke, and two partially burned marijuana cigarettes lay within defendant's reach. The defendant here contends that if his mere presence at a locality where marijuana was in use would constitute sufficient evidence to infer his knowledge of its use on the premises, the amended Health and Safety Code section 11556 would suffer from the same constitutional infirmity as its predecessor. (See In re Ah Jow (Cir.Ct.Cal. 1886) 29 F. 181, 182; Bonwell v. Justice Court, supra, 148 Cal. App.2d 906, 907-908; cf. In re Cregler (1961) 56 Cal.2d 308, 312 [14 Cal. Rptr. 289, 363 P.2d 305].) We recognize that a literal reading of Health and Safety Code section 11556 could proscribe some kinds of conduct which cannot constitutionally be considered criminal. If one purchases a ticket and enters a motion picture theater where one has every right to remain, and midway through the film one views a person in the theater whom one knows to be smoking marijuana, must one (a) leave immediately for fear of prosecution under section 11556, or (b) force the smoker to stop using the narcotic? An individual might find himself in situations, such as at a party, theater, or dance hall, or in a hotel lobby, bus, apartment, or taxi, or even in a private automobile, where he had no relation to the acts of others who might be disposed to use marijuana. As this court has held: If the defendant `did not act to aid, assist, or abet' the perpetration of the crime, he is guilty of no violation of law from the mere fact that he was present ... and knew of its commission. ( People v. Woodward (1873) 45 Cal. 293, 294 (defendant admitted he had seen offense but had not acted to prevent it).) Yet in one's own residence or automobile one may have the responsibility to prevent the use of the narcotic for illegal purposes in that one has some control over the premises or vehicle. (4) In the Brim and Lee cases, and in the present case, the record showed that the defendant controlled the place in which the marijuana was being used; in fact, the trial court found that defendant here had possession of marijuana in his apartment. [16] Thus, section 11556 could constitutionally apply to these three cases. (See People v. Redrick (1961) 55 Cal.2d 282, 288-289 [10 Cal. Rptr. 823, 359 P.2d 255].) Defendant has never at any time before this court contended that the record lacked sufficient evidence to support the conviction. We must, of course, view the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent, and in support of the judgment presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. ( People v. Mosher (1969) 1 Cal.3d 379, 395 [82 Cal. Rptr. 379, 461 P.2d 659].) Section 11566, as applied here, is without doubt constitutional. The judgment is affirmed.