Opinion ID: 2284496
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: This case has been taken on direct appeal without allowance of interlocutory appeal by permission. Implicit in our exercise of jurisdiction in this case is a conclusion that an appeal from an order granting ARD over the Commonwealth's objection is effectively final, even though an order granting ARD with the consent of the Commonwealth and the defendant is deemed interlocutory. Cf. Commonwealth v. Feagley, 371 Pa.Super. 593, 538 A.2d 895 (1988); Commonwealth v. Hunter, 294 Pa.Super. 52, 439 A.2d 745 (1982). The critical distinction between Feagley and Hunter and this case may be explained as follows. Orders denying acceptance into ARD are not final because the challenge to the denial of ARD properly may be brought following trial if a conviction results. See Commonwealth v. Hunter, supra ; cf. Commonwealth v. Roeder, 353 Pa.Super. 137, 509 A.2d 373 (1986). Orders granting admission to ARD, acquiesced in by the Commonwealth and accepted by the defendant, are interlocutory because the parties have expressly agreed to have the charges held in abeyance pending completion or revocation of ARD. See Commonwealth v. Feagley, supra . When ARD is granted over an objection by either the Commonwealth or the defendant, however, any appeal would be rendered moot before appellate review could be had by the objecting party. That is the critical distinction. In Feagley, this author opined: Generally, an immediate appeal may only be taken from a final order. Pa.R.A.P. 341. A final order is one which disposes of the entire case or puts an appellant out of court with respect to a claim. Commonwealth v. Wills, 328 Pa.Super. 342, 476 A.2d 1362 (1984). In the instant case, appellant elected (wisely or not) to permit the charges against him to be held in in abeyance; the charges are not disposed of and he is not out of court on his claims. Thus, the order in question is not immediately appealable as a final order. Alternatively, even if an order is an interlocutory order rather than a final order, immediate appeal by right may be taken if the order is one of the types of interlocutory orders listed in Pa.R.A.P. 311. The instant order, however, is not. Consequently, the order in question is only appealable by right during appellant's participation in the ARD program if the order is appealable under the three prong  Cohen exception to the final order rule, also referred to as the collateral order doctrine. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The Cohen exception provides that an interlocutory order may be immediately appealed if: 1) the order is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action; 2) the right involved is too important to be denied review; and 3) the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claimed right will be irreparably lost. See Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 94, 501 A.2d 211, 214 (1985); see also Zarnecki v. Shepegi, 367 Pa.Super. 230, 532 A.2d 873 (1987). To qualify under the Cohen exception, all three factors must be met. See Fried v. Fried, supra, 501 A.2d at 214; Commonwealth v. Bonaparte, 366 Pa.Super. 182, 184-185 n. 1, 530 A.2d 1351, 1352 n. 1 (1987) (applying the Cohen test). In the instant case, any irreparable loss of appellant's ability to challenge the ARD conditions is clearly the result of appellant's election and not the order appealed. Consequently, I do not find this case to be appealable under the Cohen exception. 538 A.2d at 902. (Emphasis added). This limitation on the plurality decision highlights the critical distinction between Feagley and the instant case. In this case, unlike the situation in Feagley, appellee was admitted to ARD over the Commonwealth's objection. Because the delay in review in this case was not occasioned by an order to which the Commonwealth consented, Feagley is distinguishable and this case comes within the Cohen exception. Finally I note that this Court and our Supreme Court have previously entertained direct appeals in virtually identical cases (where ARD have been granted over Commonwealth objections) without finding the permissive interlocutory review practice applicable or required. See Commonwealth v. Lutz, supra ; Commonwealth v. Mowry, 358 Pa.Super. 233, 516 A.2d 1270 (1986); Commonwealth v. Kiehl, 353 Pa.Super. 353, 509 A.2d 1313 (1986). Thus, this appeal is properly before this Court for review.