Opinion ID: 1600921
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Validity of the Arbitration Provision

Text: Johnson argues alternatively that the trial court erred when it compelled Johnson to arbitrate her claims against JCRA because the arbitration provision at issue is and always was void under its own terms. Johnson's brief at 21. The Supreme Court of the United States noted in Prima Paint that a federal district court may adjudicate an issue which goes to the `making' of the agreement to arbitrate, such as fraud in the inducement. 388 U.S. at 403-04, 87 S.Ct. 1801. As the Supreme Court made clear in Buckeye Check Cashing, unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract's validity is considered by the arbitrator. 546 U.S. at 445-46, 126 S.Ct. 1204. Johnson asserts that the first provision in the MegaSweeps Official Rules, which Johnson characterizes as a separate addendum to the MegaSweeps contracts, expressly provid[es] that the Rules are void and unenforceable if the MegaSweeps is `prohibited by law.' Johnson's brief at 21. Rule 1 of the Quincy's MegaSweeps Official Sweepstakes Rules provides: 1. No Purchase Necessary to Win. A purchase will not improve the chance of winning. Void where prohibited by law. Thus, Johnson argues that the void-where-prohibited-by-law language renders the arbitration clause itself void and unenforceable. JCRA responds, first, that the void-where-prohibited-by-law language should apply only to the rule in which it appears, i.e., Rule 1, and not to all the official rules as argued by Johnson. JCRA's brief at 48. Alternatively, JCRA argues that even if Rule 1 were applicable to all the official rules, the rules themselves constitute the MegaSweeps contract; thus, JCRA contends, this alternative argument does nothing more than rehash Johnson's original argument that the MegaSweeps contract as a whole is void. JCRA is correct. Even though Johnson characterizes the official rules as a separate addendum to the MegaSweeps contract allegedly available on the [I]nternet and posted at the MegaSweeps facility, Johnson provides no citation to the record to support this proposition, nor does she clarify what, if anything, is included in the MegaSweeps contract, other than the Official Rules. Moreover, as JCRA notes, Rule 1 does not refer directly to the arbitration provision contained in Rule 8. In fact, Rule 1 does not refer to any of the other rules, individually or collectively. Thus, it appears that if the void-where-prohibited-by-law language were to apply to anything outside Rule 1, it would appear to apply to the MegaSweeps contract as a whole. Johnson does not argue that she was unaware of the arbitration agreement, that she was fraudulently induced to enter into the arbitration agreement, that the arbitration agreement itself is unconscionable, or any other issue that goes to the `making' of the agreement to arbitrate. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04, 87 S.Ct. 1801. Instead, Johnson in effect argues again that the contract containing the arbitration agreement is void. It is the role of the arbitrator, however, and not of the court, to determine whether the contract as a whole is void. Buckeye Check Cashing, supra. Therefore, the trial court did not err in ordering Johnson to arbitrate her claims.