Opinion ID: 765624
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The ADA and the Eleventh Amendment

Text: 32 DOCS contends that, as a state agency, it is immune from claims under the ADA because the ADA does not validly abrogate states' immunity to suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. We review this issue de novo because it involves the interpretation and constitutionality of a federal statute. See United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1120 (2d Cir. 1993). 33 In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55-58 (1996), the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for determining whether an act of Congress abrogates states' Eleventh Amendment immunity: (i) Congress must unequivocally express its intent to abrogate the immunity; and (ii) Congress must act pursuant to a valid exercise of power. Accord Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1999). DOCS does not dispute that the ADA satisfies the first element under Seminole Tribe. Indeed, in light of 42 U.S.C. § 12202, which provides that a State shall not be immune under the [E]leventh [A]mendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of [the ADA], any such contention would be difficult to maintain. Rather, DOCS focuses on the second Seminole Tribe element, arguing that Congress exceeded its powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting the ADA. 34 Recent Supreme Court precedent has clarified that Congress may abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment but not pursuant to any Article I power such as the Commerce Clause. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 2205; Close v. State of New York, 125 F.3d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 1997) (After Seminole, the only source of congressional abrogation stems from the Fourteenth Amendment.). 35 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to enact appropriate legislation to enforce its substantive provisions, including the Equal Protection Clause. A statute is appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection clause 1 if it is plainly adapted to that end and [if] it is not prohibited by but is consistent with the letter and spirit of the [C]onstitution. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (quotation omitted). In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Court explained that the authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment is a broad power to remedy discrimination and prevent future discrimination, see id. at 517-18, 536, and that Congress can prohibit activities that are not themselves unconstitutional in furtherance of its remedial scheme. See id. at 518, 529-30. It stressed, however, that Congress's power under § 5 must be linked to constitutional injuries and there must be a congruence and proportionality between the harms to be prevented and the statutory remedy. Id. at 520. This proportionality analysis has been further refined by Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board: for Congress to invoke § 5, it must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct. 119 S. Ct. at 2207. 36 The evil that Congress sought to combat by passing the ADA was irrational discrimination against persons with disabilities. 2 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) (stating, inter alia, some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities[;] . . . historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and . . . discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue[s] to be a serious and pervasive social problem; . . . discrimination . . . persists in . . . employment). Congress's finding in paragraph (a)(7) of § 12101 warrants particular emphasis: individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society . . . . 37 Congress spent hundreds of hours in hearings determining the scope of the problem and the best manner to address it. See Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 393, 393-94 & nn. 1-4 (1991) (reciting deliberative process as including eleven public hearings [in] the House of Representatives . . . and three by the Senate . . . [and] lengthy floor debates in the Senate and in the House of Representatives and collecting citations thereto); see alsoCoolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 436-37 & n.4 (5th Cir.) (recounting extensive deliberative and fact gathering process), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 58 (1998). Congress considered and rejected the assumption that the inferior economic and social status of disabled people . . . [was] an inevitable consequence of the physical and mental limitations imposed by disability, instead attributing the inferior status to discriminatory policies based on unfounded, outmoded stereotypes and perceptions, and deeply imbedded prejudices toward people with disabilities. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(III), at 25 (1990), reprinted in1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 447-48 (House Judiciary Committee Report). Congress intended that the ADA provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities, to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards to combat such discrimination, and to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in the enforcement of these standards through the full use of its legislative powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). 38 It is an established principle of constitutional law that the Equal Protection Clause protects against class- or group- based invidious discrimination. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits arbitrary and irrational discrimination even if no suspect class or fundamental right is implicated. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 83 (1988); see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-34 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (invalidating special use permit requirement for placement of home for mentally disabled where apparent rationale was irrational prejudice). Moreover, Congress may prohibit conduct that is not itself unconstitutional as prophylaxis against discrimination that may be subtle or difficult to detect. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529-30. In light of Congress's findings of the extent of discrimination against people with disabilities, and with due regard to the deference owed to Congress in making such judgments, we will not second-guess Congress's judgment that the ADA was targeted to remedy and prevent irrational discrimination against people with disabilities. See id. at 519-20 (Congress must have wide latitude in determining where [the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law] lies). 39 Moreover, we hold, in agreement with four of our sister circuits to have considered the issue, 3 that the ADA is a proportionate and congruent response to the discrimination that Congress sought to prohibit. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 (There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.). The ADA targets particular practices -- in this case, discrimination in employment -- and provides a remedy following the time-tested model provided by the anti-employment discrimination provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. SeeH.R. Rep. No. 101-485(III), at 26 (1990), reprinted in1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 449 (The [ADA] completes the circle begun [by the Rehabilitation Act] with respect to persons with disabilities by extending to them the same civil rights protections provided to women and minorities beginning in 1964.) (House Judiciary Committee Report); see also Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting analysis to ADA claim). 40 Despite the extensive hearings and findings that support the ADA, defendants argue that its reasonable accommodation provisions, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), (B), are not proportional or congruent to the discrimination that Congress identified. We disagree. The ADA employment provisions define discrimination as, among other things, not making reasonable accommodations for a disabled applicant or employee if those accommodations would not impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B) (addressing the denial of employment opportunities to a qualified disabled individual based on the necessity for making a reasonable accommodation). The employer need not make an accommodation if the steps to be taken would requir[e] significant difficulty or expense, considered in the light of several factors, including the cost of the accommodation and the size and resources of the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10). As the Fourth Circuit explained in Coolbaugh, Congress heard testimony that businesses would benefit from the improved labor pool that would result from making accommodations to the disabilities of potential employees. See 136 F.3d at 437-38 (citing testimony). Therefore, Congress enacted a proportional and congruent remedy in requiring employers to make those accommodations that did not impose significant difficulty or expense. 41 It is this proportionality and congruence that distinguishes the ADA from the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., which the Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional in City of Boerne. 4 See 521 U.S. at 511. Congress enacted RFRA in response to Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), in which the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise clause provided no exemption from neutral laws of general applicability. Congress purportedly sought to restore the test used by courts to adjudicate Free Exercise Clause cases prior to Smith by prohibiting any state or federal action that substantially burdened a person's exercise of religion unless the state action (1) [wa]s in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) [wa]s the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515-16 (quoting and discussing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb 1). The Supreme Court found that RFRA was so out of proportion to the problems identified that it could not be viewed as preventative or remedial legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 532. Noting the rigor of the test that Congress had prescribed, and more particularly, the applicability of RFRA to all government action in every conceivable field, the Court found that RFRA lacked congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved. See id. at 530-32. 42 In contrast to RFRA's [s]weeping coverage and intrusion at every level of government, see City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532, the anti-discrimination provisions of the ADA provide a narrowly tailored and reasonable response to the problem of discrimination against people with disabilities. Accordingly, Congress's enactment of the ADA was within its authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and its abrogation of states' Eleventh Amendment immunity is effective.