Opinion ID: 532532
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Procedural Argument

Text: 19 Lifschultz criticizes the district court's decision as to the meaning of the term booking as in essence, a summary judgment type of disposition, that should have [been] withheld ... until an appropriate record was assembled. We disagree with both the premise and the conclusion. 20 First, the record does not indicate that the court decided the present case as a matter of law. Though its ruling that the Agreement's use of the term booking was not ambiguous was a legal conclusion appropriate for summary judgment, its rulings as to Opel's role, the revenues of Lifschultz in Manhattan, and the revenues attributable to Opel were plainly findings of fact. 21 Second, the court did not err in deciding the meaning of the term booking without requesting more evidence. The court's statement that Hunt and Lifschultz had agreed to try this case upon the submitted papers was justified by the parties' express stipulation in the pretrial order that, with one exception not pertinent here, [t]he parties agree[d] that the trial of this action should be based on this order and upon the pleadings as amended .... We see no indication in the record that either party suggested to the district court that any witnesses or other documentary evidence was necessary in order for the court to decide the case. 22 While Lifschultz correctly states that the court need not accept the parties' view that the case is ripe for decision, and while, as discussed in Part II.C. below, there was a material gap in the record and findings, we conclude that the court did not err in concluding that no further evidence was required for a decision as to the meaning of the term booking. 23