Opinion ID: 596393
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Due Diligence Exception to the Double Jeopardy Bar

Text: 39 The above case law makes clear that the government will confront a double jeopardy bar when prosecuting a section 848 offense after obtaining a section 963 conviction unless the collaboration element of section 848 is satisfied by proving a newly discovered conspiracy. Boldin, 772 F.2d at 731. 40 Despite this double jeopardy bar to subsequent prosecutions, there are some instances in which the government can bring charges against a defendant for a greater offense after obtaining a conviction for a lesser included offense. In Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977), the Supreme Court laid out two exceptions to the double jeopardy bar discussed in Jeffers and other cases. First, a commonly recognized exception to the double jeopardy bar allows the government to bring a later prosecution when all events necessary to the greater crime have not taken place at the time the prosecution for the lesser is begun. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 151, 97 S.Ct. at 2216 (emphasis added); Garrett, 471 U.S. at 791, 105 S.Ct. at 2417; Brown, 432 U.S. at 169 n. 7, 97 S.Ct. at 2227 n. 7. Second, the government may also prosecute a defendant after a conviction for a lesser offense when the facts necessary to the greater were not discovered despite the exercise of due diligence before the first trial. Brown, 432 U.S. at 169 n. 7, 97 S.Ct. at 2227 n. 7 (emphasis added); see also Stricklin, 591 F.2d at 1123. Sixty years prior to Brown, the Supreme Court was confronted with a prime example of the need for the second exception to the double jeopardy bar: 41 The death of the injured person was the principal element of the homicide, but was no part of the assault and battery. At the time of the trial for the [assault and battery] the death had not ensued, and not until it did ensue was the homicide committed. Then, and not before, was it possible to put the accused in jeopardy for that offense. 42 Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 448-49, 32 S.Ct. 250, 251, 56 L.Ed. 500 (1911). Given the facts in Diaz, the Court held that [i]t follows that the plea of former jeopardy disclosed no obstacle to the prosecution for homicide. Id.