Opinion ID: 4537471
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Montoya asserts that the district court erred by affirming the county court’s orders denying his motions to suppress the fruits of the stop, to suppress the fruits of the arrest, and to suppress the DataMaster test results for lack of foundation. He also asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and that his sentence was excessive. We disagree with Montoya’s arguments and affirm the judgment of the district court. 6 State v. Draganescu, 276 Neb. 448, 755 N.W.2d 57 (2008). 7 State v. Smith, 302 Neb. 154, 922 N.W.2d 444 (2019). 8 State v. McCurdy, 301 Neb. 343, 918 N.W.2d 292 (2018). 9 Id. - 597 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MONTOYA Cite as 305 Neb. 581 Motions to Suppress Under Fourth Amendment [9] Montoya’s motions to suppress the fruits of the stop and to suppress the fruits of the arrest were brought under the Fourth Amendment. Both the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. 10 Evidence obtained as the fruit of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in a state prosecution and must be excluded. 11 There are three tiers of police encounters under Nebraska law. 12 The first tier of police-citizen encounters involves no restraint of the liberty of the citizen involved, but, rather, the voluntary cooperation of the citizen is elicited through noncoercive questioning. 13 This type of contact does not rise to the level of a seizure and therefore is outside the realm of Fourth Amendment protection. 14 Only the second and third tiers of police-citizen encounters are seizures sufficient to invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 15 [10] The second category, the investigatory stop, as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 16 is limited to brief, nonintrusive detention during a frisk for weapons or preliminary questioning. 17 This type of encounter is considered a “seizure” sufficient to invoke Fourth Amendment safeguards, but because of its less intrusive character requires only that the stopping officer have specific and articulable facts sufficient to 10 State v. Hartzell, supra note 3. 11 Id. 12 State v. Schriner, 303 Neb. 476, 929 N.W.2d 514 (2019). 13 Id. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). 17 State v. Schriner, supra note 12. - 598 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MONTOYA Cite as 305 Neb. 581 give rise to reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is committing a crime. 18 [11] The third type of police-citizen encounters, arrests, is characterized by highly intrusive or lengthy search or detention. 19 The Fourth Amendment requires that an arrest be justified by probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a crime. 20 The stop of Montoya’s vehicle after the radar detected he was speeding was a second-tier encounter. Montoya argues that the evidence was insufficient to support reasonable suspicion for the stop because Thorson did not memorialize in his police report his visual estimation of Montoya’s traveling speed and because his radar gun could, in theory, have malfunctioned. We find no merit to this argument. [12-14] Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification for detention, something more than an inchoate and unparticularized hunch, but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause. 21 Whether a police officer has a reasonable suspicion based on sufficient articulable facts depends on the totality of the circumstances and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 22 When a motion to suppress is denied pretrial and again during trial on renewed objection, an appellate court considers all the evidence, both from trial and from the hearings on the motion to suppress. 23 [15] The witnessing of a driving violation, however minor, is sufficient to support a stop. 24 Although we have held that the accuracy of the radar equipment must be demonstrated in order to support a conviction for speeding—if the evidence was based 18 Id. 19 Id. 20 Id. 21 State v. Rogers, 297 Neb. 265, 899 N.W.2d 626 (2017). 22 Id. 23 State v. Piper, 289 Neb. 364, 855 N.W.2d 1 (2014). 24 See State v. Barbeau, 301 Neb. 293, 917 N.W.2d 913 (2018). - 599 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MONTOYA Cite as 305 Neb. 581 on the radar readings 25—we have never held that a police report containing a preradar visual estimation of speed is necessary to demonstrate such accuracy. Rather, reasonable proof that the particular radar equipment employed on a specific occasion was accurate and functioning properly is all that is required. 26 [16,17] More to the point, reasonable proof of the accuracy of the radar equipment indicating to the law enforcement officer that the defendant was speeding need not be demonstrated in order to support reasonable suspicion for a stop of the vehicle for speeding. 27 The appropriate inquiry for an investigatory stop for speeding is whether a reasonable police officer had a minimal level of objective justification for the belief that speeding had occurred. Thorson testified that he had checked his police cruiser’s radar device at the beginning of his shift to ensure it was working properly, he waited until the best moment to take the radar reading, there was a good Doppler tone, and the radar read that Montoya was driving 50 miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour zone. This provided ample circumstances demonstrating that the stop was based on more than an inchoate and unparticularized hunch. We conclude, like the county court and the district court on intermediate appeal, that the radar reading gave Thorson reasonable suspicion to stop Montoya’s vehicle for speeding. We find it unnecessary to reach the question of whether Thorson’s observation of the vehicle crossing the centerline also supported reasonable suspicion for the stop. And Montoya does not challenge the continuation of the second-tier detention based on Thorson’s observations that led him to administer the field sobriety tests. The county court did not err in overruling Montoya’s motion to suppress the fruits of the stop, and the district court did not err in affirming that ruling. 25 See State v. Snyder, 184 Neb. 465, 168 N.W.2d 530 (1969). 26 State v. Kudlacek, 229 Neb. 297, 426 N.W.2d 289 (1988). 27 See Taylor v. Wimes, 10 Neb. App. 432, 632 N.W.2d 366 (2001). - 600 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MONTOYA Cite as 305 Neb. 581 Montoya also asserts on appeal that the fruits of the thirdtier encounter, the arrest, should have been suppressed because Thorson lacked probable cause. Montoya argues that Thorson lacked probable cause to arrest him for driving under the influence because Montoya was seated while Thorson performed the horizontal gaze nystagmus, there was no video of Thorson’s administering the horizontal gaze nystagmus test to confirm it was performed correctly, and Thorson did not know if Montoya had regurgitated anything containing alcohol during the observation period for the preliminary breath test. [18] Montoya did not preserve this error for appellate review. A failure to object to evidence at trial, even though the evidence was the subject of a previous motion to suppress, waives the objection, and a party will not be heard to complain of the alleged error on appeal. 28 Foundation for DataMaster Results and Confrontation Clause Montoya next argues that the county court should have granted his motion to suppress the DataMaster test results, because the certificates of analysis accompanying the calibration solutions originally did not contain the name of the person who actually tested them. Montoya argues that the test results were thus supported by insufficient foundation because there is no authority under title 177 for amended certificates and the amended certificates did not “accompany” the solutions in strict compliance with title 177. 29 He also argues that the admission of the amended certificates violated the Confrontation Clause because he had no opportunity to confront Hale. [19] The four foundational elements which the State must establish as foundation for the admissibility of a breath test in a driving under the influence prosecution are as follows: (1) that the testing device was working properly at the time of the 28 State v. Goynes, 303 Neb. 129, 927 N.W.2d 346 (2019). 29 Brief for appellant at 30. - 601 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MONTOYA Cite as 305 Neb. 581 testing, (2) that the person administering the test was qualified and held a valid permit, (3) that the test was properly conducted under the methods stated by the Department of Health and Human Services, and (4) that all other statutes were satisfied. 30 Reasonable proof is all that is required to meet the foundational requirements. 31 [20] Section 60-6,201(3) provides that “[t]o be considered valid,” breath tests “shall be performed according to methods approved by the Department of Health and Human Services.” The rules and regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services relating to the analysis for the determination of alcohol content in blood or breath are contained in title 177, chapter 1, of the Nebraska Administrative Code. We have held with regard to the admission of breath sample test results where the records of the maintenance of a machine are relied on to prove that the machine was properly maintained, the records admitted at trial must show by satisfactory evidence that the inspections complied with all requirements of title 177. 32 [21-25] The construction of the regulations is a matter of law in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent determination regardless of the ruling of the court below. 33 For purposes of construction, a rule or regulation of an administrative agency is generally treated like a statute. 34 An appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words that are plain, direct, and unambiguous. 35 A collection of statutes pertaining to a single subject matter are in pari materia and should be 30 State v. Jasa, 297 Neb. 822, 901 N.W.2d 315 (2017). 31 See State v. Kudlacek, supra note 26. 32 State v. Bullock, 223 Neb. 182, 388 N.W.2d 505 (1986). 33 See In re Application No. OP-0003, 303 Neb. 872, 932 N.W.2d 653 (2019). 34 State v. McIntyre, 290 Neb. 1021, 863 N.W.2d 471 (2015). 35 Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Freudenburg, 304 Neb. 1015, 938 N.W.2d 92 (2020). - 602 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MONTOYA Cite as 305 Neb. 581 conjunctively considered and construed to determine the intent of the Legislature, so that different provisions are consistent, harmonious, and sensible. 36 It is impermissible to follow a literal reading that engenders absurd consequences where there is an alternative interpretation that reasonably effects a statute’s purpose. 37 The DataMaster is an approved breath testing device 38 and, under the regulations, must be calibrated by the maintenance officer every 40 days and within 40 days prior to an analysis. 39 Section 008 encompasses the “List of Approved Methods, Breath Testing Instruments, Calibration Devices, and Internal Reference Standards.” Before placement into service at a testing site, the “internal quartz standard” of the DataMaster shall have the calibration checked with an alcohol wet bath simulator solution or dry gas standard. 40 The regulations outline how testing device calibration and calibration verification shall be performed. 41 The regulations further specify that the wet bath simulator solution “must be accompanied by a certificate of analysis” and that the certificate of analysis “must contain” certain information, including the “[n]ame of the person who tested the solution.” 42 In State v. Krannawitter, 43 we held in the context of a motion for new trial that the discovery that the wrong name had been listed in the original calibration certificates did not mean the DataMaster test results would probably have been inadmissible. We explained that the discovery of the name error was 36 Id. 37 Id. 38 See 177 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 1, § 008 (2016). 39 See 177 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 1, §§ 009 and 010 (2016). 40 See 177 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 1, § 008.03A (2016). 41 See 177 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 1, § 008.04 (2016). 42 See 177 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 1, § 008.04A (2016). 43 State v. Krannawitter, ante p. 66, 939 N.W.2d 335 (2020). - 603 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MONTOYA Cite as 305 Neb. 581 accompanied by amended calibration certificates containing the correct name, which we held were independent foundational evidence supporting the admission of the DataMaster test results. We noted that whether there is sufficient foundation is a question for the trial court, and the trial court had found that the foundational elements were met by the amended certificates. The trial court likewise found here that the foundational elements for the admission of Montoya’s breath test results had been met, and we find no error in its judgment. In considering whether the trial court properly overruled a renewed objection at trial to evidence on the ground of lack of foundation, we consider the evidence submitted at trial as well as the evidence submitted at the pretrial hearing on the objection. 44 Though the name listed for the person who tested the solutions was originally incorrect, the certificates of analysis listed the correct name of the person who tested them by the time of the admission of the test results at trial. [26] In this context of a clerical error, we disagree with Montoya’s suggestion that to “accompan[y]” under § 008.04A is limited to the moment the solution is shipped to the relevant law enforcement agency. Although Montoya is correct that there is no reference to “amended certificates” in title 177, it does not follow that they are impermissible. The solutions utilized in calibrating the DataMaster within 40 days prior to the test of Montoya’s breath sample have at all times been accompanied by certificates of analysis containing all the categories of information required under title 177. There is nothing in title 177 suggesting that clerical errors in certificates of analysis cannot be corrected. The inflexibility Montoya proposes could have the absurd consequence that a DataMaster test could be deemed unreliable despite undisputed evidence at the time of trial that the records of maintenance of the machine complied with all regulatory requirements. We hold that amended certificates of analysis 44 See State v. Piper, supra note 23. - 604 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MONTOYA Cite as 305 Neb. 581 to correct clerical errors provide satisfactory evidence that the inspections of an approved breath testing device complied with the requirements of title 177. [27] We also disagree with Montoya’s suggestion that the amended certificates were inadmissible to provide foundation for the DataMaster test results because they violated the Confrontation Clause. The Confrontation Clause provides, in relevant part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” 45 Only testimonial statements “cause the declarant to be a ‘witness’ within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.” 46 “It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.” 47 If the statements are nontestimonial, then no further Confrontation Clause analysis is required. 48 [28,29] In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 49 the U.S. Supreme Court said that unless the regularly conducted activity of a business is the production of evidence for use at trial, business records are not testimonial. We have accordingly held that neither original simulator solution certifications 50 nor amended certifications 51 are testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. In either case, the simulator solution certifications are prepared in a routine manner without regard to any particular defendant. 52 In Krannawitter, we explained that there was no 45 U.S. Const. amend. VI. Accord Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006). 46 Davis v. Washington, supra note 45, 547 U.S. at 821. 47 Id. 48 State v. Fischer, 272 Neb. 963, 726 N.W.2d 176 (2007). 49 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2009). 50 See State v. Fischer, supra note 48. 51 See State v. Krannawitter, supra note 43. 52 See State v. Fischer, supra note 48. - 605 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MONTOYA Cite as 305 Neb. 581 indication either on the face of the amended certificates or in the testimony at trial that the amended certificates at issue in that case were prepared for a particular criminal proceeding. 53 That is also true here. The amended certificates provided satisfactory evidence that the inspections of the DataMaster complied with the requirements of title 177, and their admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The trial court did not err in overruling Montoya’s motion to suppress the DataMaster test results for lack of foundation, and the district court did not err in affirming the order of the county court. Sufficiency of Evidence Montoya’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence depends upon the success of his argument that the DataMaster test results were inadmissible. Having concluded that the DataMaster test results demonstrating .134 of a gram of alcohol per 210 liters of Montoya’s breath were admissible, we find the evidence sufficient to support Montoya’s conviction for driving under the influence. Excessive Sentence Challenge Lastly, Montoya argues that his sentence to a jail term of 180 days was excessive. Montoya’s sentence was within the statutory limits. The statutory penalty range was a mandatory minimum of 90 days’ imprisonment and a $1,000 fine and a maximum of 1 year’s imprisonment and a $1,000 fine. 54 It is also required that a person convicted of driving under the influence who has had two prior convictions shall, as part of the judgment of conviction, have his or her operator’s license revoked for a period of 15 years. 55 [30-32] Absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court, an appellate court will not disturb a sentence imposed within the 53 State v. Krannawitter, supra note 43. 54 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-106(1) (Reissue 2016). 55 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197.03(4) (Cum. Supp. 2018). - 606 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MONTOYA Cite as 305 Neb. 581 statutory limits. 56 Where a sentence imposed within the statutory limits is alleged on appeal to be excessive, the appellate court must determine whether a sentencing court abused its discretion in considering and applying the relevant factors as well as any applicable legal principles in determining the sentence to be imposed. 57 An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision is based upon reasons that are untenable or unreasonable or if its action is clearly against justice or con- science, reason, and evidence. 58 [33,34] In determining a sentence to be imposed, relevant factors customarily considered and applied are the defendant’s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education and experience, (4) social and cultural background, (5) past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the offense and (8) the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime. 59 The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judgment and includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the defendant’s demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant’s life. 60 [35-37] Montoya asserts that the county court improperly considered the fact that he committed acts after March 12, 2017, leading to charges of crimes related to driving under the influence, but on which he has not been tried. The sentencing phase is separate and apart from the trial phase, and the traditional rules of evidence may be relaxed following conviction so that the sentencing authority can receive all information pertinent to the imposition of sentence. 61 A sentencing court has broad discretion as to the source and type of evidence and 56 State v. Iddings, 304 Neb. 759, 936 N.W.2d 747 (2020). 57 State v. Becker, 304 Neb. 693, 936 N.W.2d 505 (2019). 58 Id. 59 Id. 60 Id. 61 State v. Jenkins, 303 Neb. 676, 931 N.W.2d 851 (2019). - 607 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MONTOYA Cite as 305 Neb. 581 information which may be used in determining the kind and extent of the punishment to be imposed, and evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the sentence. 62 It is permissible for a sentencing court to consider the information that a defendant has been charged with but not yet tried for allegedly illegal acts committed after the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced. 63 And the court’s statements from the bench indicate it gave appropriate weight to the fact that Montoya had not actually been convicted of the charged crimes. Montoya also argues that his sentence was excessive in light of his efforts at obtaining employment and his recent diagnosis with an “alcohol use disorder” as a result of his initiative to receive treatment. Montoya asserts, further, that the court did not adequately take into account that no one was injured during the commission of his crime, no children were in the vehicle, and he was cooperative with law enforcement after he was stopped. [38] Causing bodily injury while driving under the influence is a separate crime with a different sentencing range; 64 the sentencing range for the crime Montoya was charged with already takes into account that no one was physically harmed. Although Montoya did not have children in the vehicle, there were two adult passengers placed at risk. And whether or not there are passengers in a vehicle, driving under the influence presents a serious threat to public safety. 65 [39] Montoya’s cooperation and his efforts toward employment and treatment were weighed by the sentencing court against the gravity of this third-time offense endangering public safety. It is not the function of an appellate court to conduct a 62 State v. Anglemyer, 269 Neb. 237, 691 N.W.2d 153 (2005). 63 See, State v. Becker, supra note 57; State v. Williams, 282 Neb. 182, 802 N.W.2d 421 (2011). 64 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,198 (Cum. Supp. 2018). 65 See State v. Rice, 269 Neb. 717, 695 N.W.2d 418 (2005). - 608 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MONTOYA Cite as 305 Neb. 581 de novo review of the record to determine whether a sentence is appropriate. 66 Like the district court, we find no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed.