Opinion ID: 2221475
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: right to remedy

Text: ¶ 41. Aicher contends that Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55(1)(b) and 893.56 are constitutionally infirm because they precluded her right to seek remedy for a wrong. Article I, § 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without being obligated to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws. ¶ 42. Article I, § 9 is something of a constitutional enigma. Our decisions trace its origin to Paragraph 40 of the Magna Carta, which states: To none will we sell, to none will we deny, or delay, right or justice. Vol. I Wisconsin Statutes 1898, Sanborn and Berryman's Annotations at 9. The purpose of the clause was explained by Justice Marshall in Christianson v. Pioneer Furniture Co., 101 Wis. 343, 347-48, 77 N.W. 174, 77 N.W. 917 (1898). [11] [E]very subject ... may take his remedy by the course of the law and have justice and right for the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay. Id. at 348. Marshall asserted that state constitutional provisions incorporating this principle do not grant the right of remedy but rather preserve remedies that existed at common law. [12] Id. [7] ¶ 43. It is possible to mine the pronouncements of Wisconsin courts for evidence that art. I, § 9 creates rights, or that it authorizes courts to fashion rights. In its recent interpretation of the provision, however, this court has stated that art. I, § 9 confers no legal rights. Roberta Jo W. v. Leroy W., 218 Wis. 2d 225, 238, 578 N.W.2d 185 (1998); Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 262; Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 79 (Bradley, J., dissenting); Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 189-90, 290 N.W.2d 276 (1980). Rather, art. I, § 9 applies only when a prospective litigant seeks a remedy for an already existing right. In Makos, Justice Bradley described this right as a legislatively recognized right: The Mulder court emphasized that its prior Wis. Const. art. I, § 9 analysis in Kallas stood for no more than the proposition that the `remedy for wrongs' section might have `possible application. . .where a remedy is sought for a `legislatively recognized right. ' Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 79 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (quoting Mulder, 95 Wis. 2d at 189-90 n.3). The right-to-remedy clause thus preserves the right to obtain justice on the basis of the law as it in fact exists. Mulder, 95 Wis. 2d at 189. ¶ 44. What is the law as it in fact exists? One of the common-law rights recognized by the legislature is the right to bring a medical malpractice claim. Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 206-09, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995). Between 1975 and 1979, the legislature modified the terms under which persons can initiate medical malpractice actions. Among these changes were statutes of limitations that were more restrictive than those laid out for other tort actions, as well as the statutes of repose at issue here. These legislative determinations circumscribed the remedy for medical malpractice. These legislative actions defined how the law in fact exists. ¶ 45. From time to time, this court has suggested that art. I, § 9 is inconsistent with legislation barring a suit before an injury actually occurs. Makos, 211 Wis. 2d at 52-54 (lead opinion); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 393, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975); Rosenthal v. Kurtz, 62 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 213 N.W.2d 741 (1974). On occasion, this court has argued that such legislation is unconstitutional. But we find no decision from this court, not even Rosenthal, squarely invalidating a statute on this ground. Courts may shudder at the unfairness visited by statutes of repose, but we generally acknowledge the policies underlying these limiting statutes. For instance, in Rosenthal, a case in which this court struck down a statute of repose because of suspect classification, the court raised serious questions about art. I, § 9, but we admitted: Some statute of repose is obviously desirable as a matter of public policy. 62 Wis. 2d at 11. ¶ 46. The question of what the statute of limitations or the statute of repose for a particular action should be is a fundamental question of public policy. The legislature has recognized the importance of prompt litigation of claims and a need to protect defendants from fraudulent or stale claims. Statutes of limitations and statutes of repose bring finality to disputes, at least in the respect that they close judicial tribunals to the prosecution of claims. Pritchard vs. Howell, 1 Wis. 131, [118], [123] (1853). A statute of limitations takes the action away altogether....[I]t annihilates the remedy. Id. ¶ 47. Although art. I, § 9 guarantees a suitor a day in [ ] court, a statute of limitations may preclude a plaintiff's action, and a defendant may rely on the statutory bar, even if the plaintiff did not discover the injury. Rod v. Farrell, 96 Wis. 2d 349, 355-56, 291 N.W.2d 568 (1980) (per curiam), rev'd on other grounds, Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d 550; CLL Assoc. v. Arrowhead Pacific Corp., 174 Wis. 2d 604, 614-15, 497 N.W.2d 115 (1993); Halverson v. Tydrich, 156 Wis. 2d 202, 214-16, 456 N.W.2d 852 (Ct. App. 1990). ¶ 48. This court has worked to soften the effect of these consistent rulings by recognizing a common-law discovery rule for actions sounding in tort that are not covered by other statutory discovery rules. Claypool, 209 Wis. 2d at 294. In Hansen, we held that a statute of limitations begins to run for tort claims when the plaintiff discovers the injury. 113 Wis. 2d at 560. In Hansen, however, the court did not disturb the constitutional holdings of Rod v. Farrell as to art. I, § 9. CLL Assoc., 174 Wis. 2d at 614 n.4; Hartland-Richmond Ins. v. Wudtke, 145 Wis. 2d 682, 694, 429 N.W.2d 496 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, Funk v. Wollin Silo & Equip., Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 59, 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989). ¶ 49. Last term, this court ruled that a woman's right to pursue a medical malpractice claim from 1979 was barred because she failed to file a notice of claim with a government entity within 120 days of the injury-causing event, even though she did not discover the injury until 1995, more than 15 years later. Snopek v. Lakeland Med. Ctr., 223 Wis. 2d 288, 588 N.W.2d 19 (1999). Although our Snopek decision did not examine constitutional issues, we applied a former legislative determination that a notice of claim must be filed with a governmental unit as a prerequisite to litigation. ¶ 50. We see no distinction between closing the doors to the courtroom for claimants when an injury has not been discovered within a fixed period of time after some act or omission and closing the doors to the courtroom for a person whose injury has not yet occurred within a fixed period of time after some act or omission. The effect of extinguishing a remedy in court is the same. This court has concluded many times that the legislature may sever a person's claim by a statute of limitations or a statute of repose when the person has had no possibility of discovering the injury  when the person has been blameless in every respect. These decisions represent judicial deference to the stated policy of the legislature. Protecting the interests of those who must defend claims based on old acts or omissions is a policy concern that legislative bodies have weighed for centuries. Even persons who intentionally commit criminal batteries and other crimes benefit from these policy considerations. John v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 183, 194, 291 N.W.2d 502 (1980). [13] ¶ 51. The legislature formulates the statutory law of Wisconsin, pursuant to constitutional authority. The legislature's authority includes the power to define and limit causes of action and to abrogate common law on policy grounds. ¶ 52. This court itself has determined that sound public policy may justify limitations on liability. Rolph v. EBI Cos., 159 Wis. 2d 518, 464 N.W.2d 667 (1991); Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 541, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 774, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 517, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Hass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 48 Wis. 2d 321, 179 N.W.2d 885 (1970). In other words, we ourselves have placed limitations on people's rights to recover for personal injury in order to advance the overall interest of justice. Article I, § 9 does not empower this court to substitute its views for legislative policy any more than art. I, § 9 prevents this court from using sound policy to influence tort law. ¶ 53. Statutes limiting the time period for filing actions historically have been policy decisions within the province of the legislature. See Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 254. Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) recognizes a right for medical malpractice claims only when the plaintiffs seek recovery either within three years of the injury or within one year of discovery, provided that five years have not passed since the act or omission. Section 893.56 extends the limitation period for minors to the age of 10 years. These provisions reflect the legislature's view that prompt litigation ensures fairness to the parties. A case such as this one, in which the physician allegedly responsible for the malpractice is deceased and no longer able to defend himself, illustrates precisely the type of stale claim that statutes of limitations and statutes of repose are designed to ameliorate. [8] ¶ 54. We remain persuaded that the time limitation periods articulated by statutes of repose inherently are policy considerations better left to the legislative branch of government. Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 254. No right to remedy resides here because the legislature expressly chose not to recognize a right based on a claim discovered more than five years after the allegedly negligent act or omission or after the child reaches the age of 10. We cannot preserve a right to obtain justice where none in fact exists. See Mulder, 95 Wis. 2d at 189-90. Were we to extend a right to remedy outside the limits of these recognized rights, we effectively would eviscerate the ability of the legislature to enact any statute of repose.