Opinion ID: 1058084
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Residual Doubt Argument

Text: Ivy next contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow defense counsel to argue that any residual doubt as to Ivy's guilt could be considered as a mitigating circumstance. The State replies that the trial court did not err. The record reveals that defense counsel told the jury that if you have any residual doubt about his guilt for the first phase, you found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but if you had any residual doubt you can use that as well. The trial court, out of the jury's presence, told defense counsel that the argument as to residual doubt was inappropriate and that residual doubt would not be charged to the jury as a mitigating circumstance. The trial court explained: [P]roof regarding residual doubt may be appropriate in instances where the State has concealed exculpatory evidence that the defense somehow finds ... or the defense on [its] own uncovers.... [T]he argument of residual doubt is not intended to allow the defense to argue at sentencing to sort of reargue the case that was presented at the guilt phase to sort of go over all of the ... inconsistencies that exist in the guilt phase.... The trial court concluded that the defense was precluded from arguing residual doubt with nothing more specific. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial court's ruling was erroneous but that the error did not affect the outcome of the proceeding. We begin our review of this issue by noting that residual doubt evidence  may consist of proof admitted during the sentencing phase that indicates the defendant did not commit the offense, notwithstanding the jury's verdict following the guilt phase. State v. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d 291, 307 (Tenn.2002) (citing State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44, 55-56 (Tenn. 2001)). We have held that a defendant is allowed to present evidence at a re-sentencing hearing to establish residual doubt as a non-statutory mitigating circumstance. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d at 55. This holding was based partly upon statutory provisions: In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the punishment and may include, but not be limited to, the nature and circumstance of the crime; the defendant's character, background history, and physical condition; any evidence tending to establish or rebut the aggravating circumstances enumerated ...; and any evidence tending to establish or rebut any mitigating factors. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(c). Our holding was not limited to a defendant's introduction of residual doubt evidence during the sentencing or re-sentencing phase of a capital trial. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d at 307. Instead, we clarified that a defendant may also rely upon residual doubt argument based on evidence that was heard by the jury in the guilt phase of the trial. Id. As we explained in McKinney : An argument during sentencing that refers to evidence from the guilt phase is not improper simply because it has the effect of alluding to residual doubt. As we have long held, the manner and conduct of closing argument by the parties is left to the discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, where a defendant seeks to argue residual doubt based on the evidence introduced or in response to an argument made by the prosecution, the trial court should exercise its discretion by resolving any doubt in favor of the defendant's argument. Id. at 308 (citations omitted). In this case, the trial court erred in refusing to allow defense counsel to argue that the jury could consider residual doubt based on the evidence presented during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. Contrary to the trial court's reasoning, there is no requirement that residual doubt argument be based on new residual doubt evidence. Id. The trial court's error, however, does not require a new sentencing proceeding for several reasons. First, since this was not a re-sentencing hearing, the sentencing jury had already heard the evidence presented in the guilt phase and had reconciled any conflicts against Ivy's theory of innocence. Indeed, given that the evidence of Ivy's guilt was overwhelming, any argument as to residual doubt would have been of dubious value in mitigation. Second, although the trial court refused to instruct the jury on residual doubt, the instructions to the jury as a whole informed the jury that it could consider any mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence at either the guilt or sentencing hearing, or both, and that it could consider any aspect of the circumstances of the offense favorable to the defendant which is supported by the evidence. Finally, the two aggravating circumstances found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt were strongly supported by the evidence. In sum, the defendant has not shown that the error affected the jury's verdict to his prejudice, and therefore the trial court's error was harmless. See id.