Opinion ID: 773251
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Allegedly Discriminatory Utterances and Related Workplace Mistreatment

Text: 55 In order to sustain her burden of persuasion on pretext, Straughn needed to demonstrate either that her dismissal was (i) more likely motivated by discrimination than by the explanation proffered by Delta, or (ii) the proffered explanation [was] unworthy of credence in circumstances where the suspect denial, taken together with other facts, suggests such a motivation. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05); see also Fite v. Digital Equipment Corp., 232 F.3d 3, 6-7 (1st Cir. 2000). The burden of persuasion on pretext may be met, inter alia, by showing that discriminatory comments were made by the key decision maker or those in a position to influence the decision maker. Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 55 (discriminatory comments by direct supervisor, along with similar comments by key decision maker, constitute evidence of pretext where direct supervisor was consulted by key supervisor during decision making process) (emphasis added). 56
57 Straughn testified on deposition that Giglio frequently used an offensive southern black accent at meetings attended by her and other Delta employees. Although Giglio denies the charge, it must be credited at summary judgment. See id. (citing DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 308 (1st Cir. 1997)). 58 For present purposes, we assume arguendo that there are circumstances in which use of an offensive southern black workplace accent, by a superior in a position to influence the key decision maker, would constitute probative evidence that the proffered explanation for disciplining an employee was pretextual. Cf. id. (Discriminatory comments, by key decision maker and another person in position to influence decision maker, could lead a jury to conclude that [the employer's] proffered reasons for firing [plaintiff] were actually a pretext for discrimination.). As we have acknowledged, in combination with other evidence[,] see McMillan v. Massachusetts Soc'y for Prev. of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 300 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999), so-called stray remarks may permit a jury reasonably to determine that an employer was motivated by a discriminatory intent, id. But though such stray remarks may be material to the pretext inquiry, their probativeness is circumscribed if they were made in a situation temporally remote from the date of the employment decision, or . . . were not related to the employment decision in question, or were made by nondecisionmakers. Id. at 301 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See, e.g., Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 55 (remarks within two weeks of discharge probative of pretext); Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 583 (remarks at time of employment action probative of pretext); cf. McMillan, 140 F.3d at 301 (remoteness heightened where at least one of three remarks occurred several years before challenged employment action). 59 Although statements directly related to the challenged employment action may be highly probative in the pretext inquiry, see Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 55; Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 583, mere generalized stray remarks, arguably probative of bias against a protected class, normally are not probative of pretext absent some discernible evidentiary basis for assessing their temporal and contextual relevance. Compare McMillan, 140 F.3d at 301 (workplace remarks by male department head at time remote from incident in dispute -- regarding physical traits and sexual activities of female co-workers, but bearing no direct relationship to employment -- held not probative of pretext where challenged decision involved lower salaries for female employees), with Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 583 (comments by decision maker -- including I don't need minorities; I don't need residents on this job; I don't have to hire you locals or Cape Verdean people -- were not mere stray remarks where challenged employment action concerned refusal to rehire dark-skinned residents of Cape Verdean descent). Accordingly, even if we were to assume that the assertedly offensive workplace accent is somehow suggestive of racial bias, 7 it would not be significantly probative of pretext absent some discernible indication that its communicative content, if any, materially erodes the stated rationale for the challenged employment action. 60 Straughn proffered no evidence that Giglio ever used the nondescript southern black accent either during or in relation to the challenged employment action. Nor is there competent evidence from which a rational fact finder might fairly infer that the communicative import of the nondescript accent pertained to employment matters, let alone to Straughn or her employment. Indeed, Straughn herself has never intimated either a rationale or a circumstantial predicate for reasonably inferring that the southern black accent amounted to anything other than insensitive banter. Thus, Straughn's naked ipse dixit was insufficient to generate a genuine issue of material fact. 61 Accordingly, we conclude that the southern black accent allegedly used on occasion by Giglio, without more, is not probative of pretext on the part of Delta, given (i) the absence of any discernible contextual or temporal relationship between the discharge decision and the workplace accent used by Giglio, (ii) the demonstrably self-sufficient basis for the management recommendation by Richard Ealey to discharge Straughn due to her persistent work-related dishonesty, and (iii) the distinctly subordinate role Giglio played in the dismissal decision. 62
63 Straughn claims that Giglio singled her out for inferior work assignments, unfairly criticized her performance, and withheld various perquisites and inducements accorded similarly situated sales representatives. The district court determined that the evidence Straughn tendered to demonstrate pretext was insufficient in light of the countervailing evidence that Delta management reasonably believed that Straughn repeatedly lied to her superiors regarding her receipt and wrongful retention of workers' compensation benefits while absent on accident leave and receiving full salary. See District Court Opinion, at 24. 8 After evaluating Straughn's differential treatment claim against the totality of the evidence . . . 'as part of an aggregate package of proof[,]' Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 581 (citation omitted), we conclude that the district court ruling is founded on adequate record support. 64 Although pretext may be established with evidence of differential treatment in the workplace[,] id. (quoting Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 824 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted), Straughn failed to sustain her evidentiary burden in relation to the claim that she was singled out for inferior work assignments. The record discloses that the Vermont and Western New Hampshire sales territory, to which Straughn initially was assigned, historically has generated lower revenues than all but one other sales territory within the Boston Marketing Office area and accordingly has been selected in the past as a training territory for relatively inexperienced sales representatives. 65 Nor did Straughn tender evidence that there was any normal time frame within which sales representatives in training customarily were transferred to more lucrative sales territories. Similarly, she proffered no evidence regarding any criteria utilized by Delta in determining when newer sales representatives were considered eligible for transfer to more desirable sales territories. 66 On the other hand, the record plainly discloses that a white male sales representative drew the Maine sales territory, which is comparable to the Vermont-Western New Hampshire sales territory in terms of the driving distances and relatively low sales revenues. Yet Straughn proffered no evidence regarding the tenure of her counterpart in the Maine sales territory. Finally, there is no record evidence that Straughn's experience or tenure differed in any material respect from that of her predecessors in the Vermont-Western New Hampshire sales territory. 67 Since Straughn tendered no competent evidence that her initial assignment as a sales representative differed materially from that of other relatively new sales representatives in the Boston Marketing Office, summary judgment was appropriate. Se id.; Conward, 171 F.3d at 20 (Where . . . the plaintiff in a disparate treatment race [or gender] discrimination case offers comparative evidence . . . to raise an inference of racial [or gender-based] discrimination, [she] must provide a suitable provenance for the evidence by showing that others similarly situated . . . in all relevant respects were treated differently by the employer.) (emphasis added). 68
69 Similarly, Straughn tendered insufficient other evidence to generate a trial worthy issue on pretext. Instead, she simply pointed to evidence that Giglio reprimanded her for tardiness, driving excessive miles, visiting too few sales accounts, and failing to generate adequate shuttle flight ticket sales. She maintains that these criticisms were unjustified, given the undisputed evidence that (i) sales representatives in the Boston Marketing Office were not required to report to work at any particular hour; (ii) her sales territory necessitated more driving, as it is one of the two largest in geographic area; and (iii) it normally generates fewer shuttle ticket sales. 70 Straughn relies almost exclusively upon the Thomas case, which held that where poor work performance is the stated reason for discharging an employee, pretext may be established by demonstrating that the evaluation process itself was tainted by racial bias and that the plaintiff's abilities and qualifications were equal or superior to employees who were retained. Thomas, 183 F.3d at 65 (quoting Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1119 (1st Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Thomas case is inapposite. 71 There is no record evidence that Straughn's discharge was related in any way to work performance. For that matter, there is no evidence that Straughn ever received a poor work evaluation. See id. at 62-63. On the contrary, following the only documented review of her work performance with the Boston Marketing Office, Straughn received a high rating from none other than Giglio and Meinhold. Consequently, the present contention provides no support for the claim that Straughn was subjected to differential treatment in the workplace. Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 581. 72 Straughn also testified that various privileges available to other sales representatives were withheld from her, including authorization to: (a) provide clients with free promotional flight tickets, (b) obtain reimbursement for meals while entertaining clients, and (c) work on a part-time basis from a virtual home office. Nevertheless, she failed to proffer competent evidence that she and these other sales representatives were similarly situated in all or even most relevant respects. See Conward, 171 F.3d at 20. 73
74 Straughn asserts, in conclusory fashion, that all sales representatives in her office were permitted, at their discretion, to give promotional flight tickets to their respective clients, whereas she rarely was allowed to do so. She makes no attempt to approximate the number of occasions on which promotional flight tickets were made available to her or to other Delta sales representatives. Instead, she focuses on a single instance in which Helen Meinhold directed her to recover a promotional flight ticket which Straughn had made available to the spouse of a client. It is undisputed that Delta policy contemplates that these promotional flight tickets are to be made available to Delta clients, not their spouses. The record also indicates that the episode referred to by Straughn occurred during the first six months of her tenure as a sales representative. Yet Straughn presented no competent evidence that she and these other sales representatives were similarly situated, either in regard to tenure, experience, or the numbers of clients served. 75
76 Straughn asserts that some sales representatives were reimbursed for meal costs incurred while entertaining Delta clients. The one person she names - Jane Martin - began work with the Boston Marketing Office two weeks before Straughn. Other than similar starting dates, however, Straughn tendered no evidence that she and Martin were similarly situated, most notably in regard to the particular characteristics of their respective sales territories and clienteles. Moreover, Straughn admitted that she was never denied reimbursement. Instead, she states that she was reprimanded by Meinhold on one occasion for purchasing donuts for the personnel in a couple of offices and warned not to do so again. See also note 8 supra. 77
78 Straughn testified that all other sales representatives in the Boston Marketing Office were granted the virtual home office privilege. See Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 824 (noting that evidence of differential treatment in the workplace supports pretext claim). Yet Straughn points to no evidence that she and these other sales representatives were similarly situated. 79 Competent proof that the plaintiff was denied privileges and opportunities available to similarly situated employees may constitute probative evidence that an adverse employment action was motivated by discriminatory animus. See Thomas, 183 F.3d at 63 (evidence that supervisors prevented minority employee from making important presentation and withheld appropriate developmental opportunities and computer training, all of which were accorded non-minority employees, supports disparate treatment claim). Straughn testified on deposition that she made at least three requests to work from a virtual home office. The record also reflects that some sales representatives were permitted to work from a virtual home office. Yet Richard Ealey denied Straughn permission to do so following her extended absence from work, since her doctor had advised that, though able to work, Straughn was not yet well enough to drive an automobile - hence unable to service clients, the primary responsibility of her position. 80 As concerns Straughn's previous requests to work from a virtual home office, one was denied by Meinhold and several by Giglio. The record reflects that her first request to Giglio was made within six months of her hiring. Straughn presented no evidence that other new sales representatives were accorded the privilege so early in their tenure. With regard to the other requests which Giglio denied, she points to no evidence (i) that she was similarly situated to any sales representative who was accorded the privilege, or (ii) that she met Delta's criteria for evaluating such requests. Instead, she simply asserts in conclusory fashion that everyone else was permitted to work part-time from a virtual home office. Thus, she failed to present competent evidence that the proffered reason for the challenged employment action was pretextual. See Fernandes, 199 F.2d at 581; Conward, 171 F.3d at 20; Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 824. 81 Moreover, given the overwhelming weight of the evidence that the proffered reason for the dismissal action was both sound and sufficient, the tenuous disparate treatment evidence presented by Straughn was plainly insufficient to enable a reasonable fact finder to conclude that Giglio had fabricated the report about Straughn's prevarications relating to her wrongful retention of the workers' compensation benefits. 9 Nothing more is exigible. 82