Opinion ID: 2633588
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Is plaintiffs' CFCA claim barred as one for educational malfeasance?

Text: The complaint alleges that the charter school defendants submitted false claims to obtain ADA funds for pupils who were not [actually] students enrolled in and receiving instruction, educational materials, or services from [the defendants'] schools. As noted above, the gravamen of this claim is that, in the operation of their distance learning schools, the defendants did little more than collect attendance forms from their ostensible pupils, while failing to provide the educational services, equipment, and supplies promised in the schools' charters and promotional materials, and required by law. Among other things, the complaint asserts that the defendants overcharged for educational software readily available from other sources, never furnished promised computers for online learning and testing at home, and failed to provide the services of educational facilitators who, for each student, were supposed to order necessary equipment and supplies, develop an individualized curriculum plan, and make weekly home visits for personal instruction, testing, and evaluation. The trial court concluded that these were all impermissible claims for educational malfeasance (see Peter W., supra, 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 131 Cal.Rptr. 854), but the Court of Appeal disagreed. The Court of Appeal reasoned that the complaint's allegations required no judgments about the methodology or quality of defendants' educational servicesa matter upon which reasonable persons could disagree. Rather, the appellate court observed, the complaint presented only the straightforward and comprehensible claim that the defendants defrauded the state by collecting public education funds for pupils to whom they provided no service beyond the timely collection of attendance forms. We agree in principle with the Court of Appeal. Insofar as the complaint alleges, not that the defendants provided a substandard education, but instead that they (1) offered no significant educational services, (2) did, or failed to do, specific, quantifiable acts in violation of their charters or applicable law, or (3) improperly caused students, parents, or guardians to incur monetary charges or overcharges for particular educational materials and equipment supplied by or through the defendants, it does not state a barred claim for educational malfeasance. We explain our reasoning in detail. In Peter W., supra, 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 131 Cal.Rptr. 854, an 18-year-old former public school student sued his school district, asserting causes of action for negligence, breach of mandatory duty, and fraud. The complaint alleged as follows: The district negligently and carelessly failed to perceive the plaintiff's learning disabilities, assigned him to classes beyond his reading abilities with instructors unqualified to meet his special needs, passed him from grade to grade with knowledge that he had not achieved necessary skills, and permitted him, in violation of state law, to graduate even though he could not read above the eighth grade level. During this time, the district made representations to plaintiff's mother, which representations the district knew were false or had no basis to believe were true, that he was performing at or near his grade level. As a result, he graduated with fifth grade reading and writing skills, thus permanently limiting his employment opportunities and earning capacity. Defendant's demurrer was sustained, the suit was dismissed, and the plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The court concluded that the complaint failed to allege the district's breach of a duty the law would recognize. As the court noted, classroom methodology affords no readily acceptable standards of care, or cause, or injury. Pedagogical science, the court observed, is fraught with different and conflicting theories about how children should be taught; moreover, educational success or failure is influenced by a host of factors, both personal and external, which affect the pupil subjectively and often are beyond the control of educators. ( Peter W., supra, 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 824, 131 Cal.Rptr. 854.) We find in this situation, said the court, no conceivable `workability of a rule of care' against which defendants' alleged conduct may be measured [citation], no reasonable `degree of certainty that . . . plaintiff suffered injury' within the meaning of the law of negligence [citation], and no such perceptible `connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered,' as alleged, which could establish a causal link between them within the same meaning [citation]. ( Id. at p. 825, 131 Cal.Rptr. 854.) Peter W. also identified other public policy considerations, even more important in practical terms, that counsel against an actionable `duty of care' in persons and agencies who administer the academic phases of the public educational process. ( Peter W., supra, 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 825, 131 Cal.Rptr. 854.) The opinion noted that the public schools are already beset by social and financial problems including widespread dissatisfaction with their academic performance, and are subject to the limitations imposed upon them by their publicly supported budgets. ( Ibid. ) Subjecting such institutions to an academic duty of care under these circumstances, the opinion concluded, would expose them to the tort claimsreal or imaginedof disaffected students and parents in countless numbers. . . . The ultimate consequences, in terms of public time and money, would burden themand societybeyond calculation. ( Ibid. ) As the instant Court of Appeal made clear, however, the considerations identified in Peter W. that preclude an action for personal educational injury based on inherently subjective standards of duty and causation do not apply to a claim that school operators fraudulently sought and obtained public education funds for doing nothing more than collecting attendance forms. Resolution of such a claim does not require judgments about pedagogical methods or the quality of the school's classes, instructors, curriculum, textbooks, or learning aids. Nor does it require evaluation of individual students' educational progress or achievement, or the reasons for their success or failure. It simply obliges the court to determine whether the operator offered any significant teaching, testing, curriculum oversight, and educational resources to ostensible students. Similarly, nothing in the rationale of Peter W. precludes a claim that a school operator's claim on state funds was false insofar as the school committed objectively identifiable breaches of its charter, applicable state law, or promises it made to induce enrollment. For example, Peter W. does not bar assertions that a school operator failed to provide promised equipment and supplies, used teachers who lacked necessary credentials, violated specific rules governing independent study programs, or caused students, parents, or guardians to incur improper fees or charges, [35] so long as such claims do not challenge the educational quality or results of the school's programs. [36] For the most part, plaintiffs' CFCA allegations, detailed above, conform to these principles, and thus avoid preclusion under Peter W. As the Court of Appeal held, the trial court thus erred in concluding that the CFCA cause of action was wholly barred as a claim for educational malfeasance. We note, however, a single passage of the complaint which alleges that One2One fails to provide the education it promises but falsely collects State educational funds as if the education were provided. Insofar as this particular allegation seeks to raise issues of the quality of education offered by the charter school defendants, or of the academic results produced, we believe it falls within the rule that courts will not entertain claims of educational malfeasance. To that extent, therefore, the allegation is not actionable.