Opinion ID: 2617619
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the constitutionality of the statutes

Text: Sharp's second argument is that if he is subject to Section 5-113, it is unconstitutional in that it violates his equal protection rights by impinging on his right to be a candidate for political office, and burdening the right to vote of all the registered voters in the district by limiting their choice of candidates. He urges that it is a violation of his equal protection rights because the statute, in its grandfather clause, treats an incumbent board member differently from other candidates. The United States Supreme Court has on many occasions confronted the question of the constitutionality of state election laws and laws regulating the eligibility to be a political candidate. The analysis begins with the recognition that the rights to vote, the right to be associated with a political party and the right to be a political candidate are important and invaluable rights in our democracy. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, ___, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992). No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Wesberry, v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 535, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964). Primarily, two different types of cases have emerged in this area: (1) ballot access cases which limit the candidate's access to the ballot and (2) voter's rights cases which limit the ability of the individual to participate in the voting process. Although the two are clearly different, the Supreme Court has minimized the extent to which voting rights cases are distinguishable from ballot access cases, stating that `the rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation.' Burdick, 504 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2065-66, quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 855-56, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972). In approaching restrictions on candidacy, it is essential to examine in a realistic light the extent and nature of their impact on voters. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1568-69, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1982) quoting Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143, 92 S.Ct. at 855-56. Although the right to be a candidate is certainly an important right, it is not absolute, and cannot escape all regulation by the state. Burdick, 504 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2063; Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193, 107 S.Ct. 533, 536, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986). Common sense dictates that the state government must structure elections and candidacy to a certain degree. [A]s a practical matter there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1279, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974); see also Burdick, 504 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2063. Furthermore, the regulation of candidate eligibility has only an indirect impact on the rights of voters. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143, 92 S.Ct. at 855-856. Here, it is not the absolute right to vote which is implicated, but it is the right to vote for a particular candidate. See, e.g., Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526, 1531 (11th Cir.1992). While the right to vote is fundamental, the right to be a candidate is not. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 2843-44, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982) (plurality opinion); see also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. at 143, 92 S.Ct. at 855-56. [3] The fact that a state sets regulations tending to limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose ... does not of itself compel close scrutiny. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143, 92 S.Ct at 855-56; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. at 1569-70. Although these rights of voters are fundamental, not all restrictions imposed by the States on candidates' eligibility for the ballot impose constitutionally suspect burdens on voters' rights to associate or to choose among candidates ... To achieve [fairness in elections], States have enacted comprehensive and sometimes complex election codes. Each provision of these schemes, whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects  at least to some degree  the individual's right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends. Nevertheless, the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. at 1569-70. (Emphasis added) [4] The states enjoy a breadth of power to regulate elections and candidacy, provided this power is to be exercised within the confines of the Equal Protection Clause. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 134, 92 S.Ct. at 851. [5] Traditional equal protection analysis requires that there be a fundamental right or a suspect classification before strict scrutiny will be employed. Clements, 457 U.S. at 963, 102 S.Ct. at 2843-44; San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 17, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1288, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). [6] In a situation such as the one at bar, where the statute does not impinge on a fundamental right, and when the classification used by the legislature is not based on a suspect class, the overlay of constitutional principles governing ballot access is called into play. Thus, when considering a challenge to a state election law, a court must weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate, against the interests of the state in enacting the provisions. Burdick, 504 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2063; Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 213-14, 107 S.Ct. 544, 547-49, 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986). There is no absolute requirement that strict scrutiny, or any other level of scrutiny, be employed. The rigorousness of the inquiry depends on the extent to which the law burdens constitutional rights. There is no litmus-paper test  the rule is not self-executing and is no substitute for the hard judgments that must be made. Storer, 415 U.S. at 730, 94 S.Ct. at 1279. [7] Not every limitation or incidental burden on the right to vote or the right to be a candidate is subject to a stringent standard of review. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 134, 92 S.Ct. at 851; McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969). [8] When the state imposes reasonable nondiscriminatory regulations, the state's interest in regulation of the electoral process will generally suffice to justify the restriction. Burdick, 504 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2063-64; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. at 1569-70. [9] Clements v. Fashing is particularly instructive on this issue. [10] In Clements, two California state constitutional provisions were questioned. These provisions regulated the eligibility of a political candidate by requiring that the candidate resign any public office before running for election for another office, and by requiring that certain officers complete their terms before declaring candidacy for another elected office. The Supreme Court stated that the burdens on the plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendments were insignificant, while the state's justification for the provisions were reasonable and nondiscriminatory. The provisions were not an absolute bar to candidacy; the potential candidate could change employment status to become eligible. Reasonable classifications prescribing candidate qualifications, such as those based upon a person's age, integrity, training, residence and citizenship, have generally been upheld. Id., citing Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 625, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 1888, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969), Matter of Spencer v. Bd. of Educ., 39 A.D.2d 399, 334 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1972), Landes v. Town of North Hempstead, 20 N.Y.2d 417, 284 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443, 231 N.E.2d 120, 121-22 (1967). When deciding whether these limitations are constitutionally permissible, it is essential to examine in a realistic light the extent and nature of their impact on voters. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 134, 92 S.Ct. at 851. In Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973), the Supreme Court upheld several California regulations which set eligibility requirements. These requirements included: (1) a prohibition of candidacy as an independent if the individual has been registered with a party less than 12 months preceding the primary election, and (2) nominating petitions containing signatures of at least 5% of the number of voters voting in the preceding general election. The Court upheld both of these eligibility requirements on candidacy. In so holding, the Court stated that states have a legitimate interest in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot to prevent the clogging of election machinery and the confusion of voters. Id. at 732. The Tenth Circuit addressed a similar issue in Rainbow Coalition v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 844 F.2d 740 (10th Cir.1988). The plaintiffs contended that they were denied equal protection under statutes which governed the process by which minority political parties are recognized by the state. They urged that the statutes denied them access to the ballot. The court began its analysis by noting that the United States Supreme Court neither demanded a compelling state interest nor insisted that the state demonstrate it has achieved this end by the least restrictive means. Id. at 743. The state has an interest in seeing that the democratic processes run smoothly and may enact legislation to facilitate this goal. State laws requiring that a candidate, before he or she can be eligible for candidacy, submit signatures showing support, have been repeatedly upheld. See Jennets v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971); Populist Party v. Herschler, 746 F.2d 656 (10th Cir.1984). The Tenth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Oklahoma statutes regulating ballot access. New York has addressed the issue of whether eligibility requirements on candidates for school boards were violative of equal protection. The court held that the state's regulation of candidacy requirements was constitutional. In Rosenstock v. Scaringe, 40 N.Y.2d 563, 388 N.Y.S.2d 876, 357 N.E.2d 347 (Ct.App. 1976), the state's regulation barring the candidacy of individuals who were related to other members on the board was upheld. The court held that the regulation did not directly infringe on the right to vote, but only indirectly imposed on the right by narrowing the field of eligible candidates. Applying the rational basis test, the court held that the state's interest in preventing conflicts of interests which might arise from two family members on the same school board was sufficient to uphold the constitutionality of the regulations. Id. at 719. Both the First and Second Circuit Courts of Appeal have upheld statutes similar to the one at bar. In Campbell v. Lehman, 728 F.2d 49 (1st Cir.1984), the plaintiff brought suit challenging a statute which prohibited any person who was related by blood or marriage to an employee of the school from being a candidate for school board. The plaintiff claimed that the statute was arbitrary. The court disagreed, stating that the statute served a legitimate interest in avoiding conflicts of interests. In Fletcher v. Marino, 882 F.2d 605 (2nd Cir.1989), a statute prohibited certain municipal employees and officials from being school board members. Using a standard less than strict scrutiny, the court held that this statute ensured fairness in governmental service. Id. at 612. The court noted that if an individual wanted to be a school board member, he or she was not completely prohibited from running. The individual need only give up the current municipal position to be eligible to run. In the present case we are concerned with an anti-nepotism statute which prohibits candidacy if the individual is related within the second degree to a school employee or another board member. Under Supreme Court guidance, we must first look to the extent and degree of limitation imposed upon candidacy. Burdick, 504 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2063; Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 213-14, 107 S.Ct. at 547-49. The statute prohibits only individuals who are related within the second degree of consanguinity. It limits eligibility only during the time period that a family member is employed by the school district or is a member of the board. It is a nondiscriminatory statute which prohibits certain individuals from being eligible for candidacy. Sharp argues that it is a discriminatory statute as it treats incumbent board members differently from prospective candidates. The statute states that board members who were serving at the time this legislation was enacted are exempt from this prohibition. We have found no case in which the Supreme Court elevated candidates to the status of suspect or quasi-suspect class deserving special protection. The Equal Protection Clause allows the States considerable leeway to enact legislation that may appear to affect similarly situated people differently. Clements, 457 U.S. at 962-63, 102 S.Ct. at 2843. As for the state's interest in enacting an anti-nepotism statute, the intent is clear from the body of Section 5-113; And that is to prevent potential conflicts of interest and avoid favoritism and the appearance of favoritism which could arise from family members serving as employees of each other. Other states have upheld similar statutes. In Parks v. City of Warner Robins, 841 F. Supp. 1205 (M.D.Ga. 1994), the federal district court upheld a municipal police department's policy of prohibiting nepotism within the department. Plaintiffs urged that the policy abridged the fundamental right to marry. The court disagreed, holding that the policy did not implicate a suspect class and affected the right of marriage only incidentally. If governmental action `does not affect a fundamental right or discriminate on the basis of a suspect classification, [the action is upheld] so long as it is rationally related to furthering a legitimate governmental interest.' Id. at 1213, quoting Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir.1992) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 95, 126 L.Ed.2d 62 (1992). The court concluded by holding that the policy furthered the municipality's interest in avoiding conflicts of interest, avoidance of the appearance of favoritism, and avoidance of family conflicts. The policy, rationally related to the objectives, was upheld. Townshend v. Board of Education, 183 W. Va. 418, 396 S.E.2d 185 (1990), presented a challenge to the school board's policy prohibiting nepotism. Again, the plaintiffs claimed that the policy interfered with their fundamental right to marry. The court disagreed and pointed out that a majority of courts who addressed the nepotism question had upheld the policies. [11] The policies prevented conflicts of interests and the appearance of favoritism. In Parsons v. City of Del Norte, 728 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir.1984) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 846, 105 S.Ct. 158, 83 L.Ed.2d 95 (1984), the Ninth Circuit upheld the sheriff department's policy of no nepotism. In so holding, the court refused to apply strict scrutiny for its Equal Protection analysis, and instead applied the rational basis test. The court concluded that the policy was within constitutional boundaries. Sharp also urges that Section 5-113 is unconstitutional because the state's interest could have been furthered by less restrictive means. This argument fails because only under the strict scrutiny test is the state required to use the less restrictive means. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788-89, 103 S.Ct. at 1569-70. And in the balancing test required by Anderson, the plaintiff's rights are weighed against the state's interest. We hold that the statute, Section 5-113, is constitutional. The state's interest in avoiding conflicts of interest, avoiding favoritism and the appearance of favoritism, is sufficient to uphold the legitimate regulation of candidacy. While this Court holds sacred the right to vote and to participate in the political process as a candidate, we also recognize that the latter is not an absolute nor fundamental right, but that the state may impose reasonable, non-discriminatory regulations. We find Section 5-113 to be one of these reasonable, non-discriminatory impositions.