Opinion ID: 1490004
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Janikuak's Testimony

Text: The hearing justice first found that Janikuak's testimony concerning her discernment of truth, amounted to a clear endorsement of Emily's testimony. The statement in question concerned Janikuak's reaction to Emily's allegations of sexual abuse by her stepfather. PROSECUTOR: Upon learning this information, what was your reaction? What was your response? JANIKUAK: As to what she said to me? PROSECUTOR: Yes, without saying what she said. JANIKUAK: I was very cautious to make sure that what she was telling me was the truth because we're trained to be sure that just because someone makes an allegation does not mean it's true. The hearing justice said that [t]he trial counsel should have specified that his objection to the material was founded on impermissible bolstering. However, the hearing justice should not have revisited this issue during the course of Brown's collateral attack on his conviction. In Brown's direct appeal, we rejected his argument that Janikuak's testimony constituted impermissible bolstering. We held that Brown did not preserve the issue for appeal because John Brown failed to raise a specific objection with the trial justice. At first blush, this would appear to support the hearing justice's conclusion that this error formed a part of the mosaic with respect to John Brown's ineffective representation. But, this Court did not stop with the waiver issue. Indeed, we concluded that even if the testimony had been objected to properly, and thus preserved for appeal, Janikuak's testimony was not impermissible bolstering because, [t]aking the pastor's statement in the context of her entire testimony, we also believe it is clear that she was not attempting to bolster complainant's credibility, nor would a reasonable jury have so construed her testimony. Brown, 709 A.2d at 479. During the proceedings for postconviction relief, the hearing justice found that John Brown's failure to object to this testimony at trial contributed to her conclusion that he was ineffective. However, to deduce that John Brown was deficient for failing to object to this testimony, the hearing justice first had to find that it constituted impermissible bolstering. The hearing justice said, [t]he pastor's statement concerning her `training' regarding discernment of truth constituted, in this Court's opinion, clear endorsement of the victim's testimony. Given that this Court found the bolstering issue to be without merit, then John Brown's failure to specify that his objection was based on impermissible bolstering cannot be considered ineffective assistance because no prejudice could result from such an omission. Brown asks this Court to reconsider its previous ruling on this issue in light of additional evidence that he says was considered by the hearing justice that was not available to this Court when it decided the direct appeal. Specifically, the hearing justice noted that: Additionally, the very day Janikuak testified against petitioner she was featured in the Channel 12 evening news for performing a miracle by laying her hands on a crippled woman who had not walked in ten years. In fact, Mr. Brown viewed the report that very evening with his attorney. Yet, nowhere in the record is any request by defense counsel to poll the jurors. Brown contends, and the hearing justice apparently agreed, that this additional evidence added to the risk that the jury would hold Janikuak's testimony in high esteem because she was covered favorably by a local television news station. However, this new information does not change the fact that this Court ruled that Janikuak's testimony was not bolstering. Our decision in Brown's direct appeal did not hinge on whether Janikuak's testimony would be given any heightened import because of her stature in the community; rather, it was because we opined that the specifics of her testimony did not constitute bolstering. This Court concluded that: Significantly, a close look at Janikuak's overall testimony on this point reveals that the pastor herself could not determine whether complainant (in her allegations) or defendant (in his denials) was being truthful. And it also highlights the fact that the pastor was merely attempting to mediate this family crisis while moving cautiously in light of the serious nature of the allegations. Accordingly we conclude that Janikuak's overall testimony could not have been reasonably perceived by the jury as vouching for the credibility of complainant's sexual-abuse allegations. Brown, 709 A.2d at 480. In other words, because our determination that Janikuak's testimony was permissible was based on the content of her testimony and not on who she was, her appearance on the local television news would have had no impact on our decision. 2