Opinion ID: 793137
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District Courts' Evidentiary Ruling On Grand Juror Testimony

Text: 25 We review the exclusion of evidence pursuant to Rules 403 and 606(b) for abuse of discretion. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 n. 1, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 110 (2d Cir.1998). We turn first to Rule 403.
26 Under Rule 403, so long as the district court has conscientiously balanced the proffered evidence's probative value with the risk for prejudice, its conclusion will be disturbed only if it is arbitrary or irrational. See United States v. Han, 230 F.3d 560, 564 (2d Cir.2000); see also Hester v. BIC Corp., 225 F.3d 178, 181 (2d Cir.2000) (A district court's evidentiary rulings will be disturbed only if they are `manifestly erroneous.') (quoting Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 217 (2d Cir.1997)); United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir.1977) (clarifying abuse of discretion standard for district courts' decisions pursuant to Rule 403). The district court found that Rule 403 requires that the grand jurors be precluded from testifying as to their subjective impressions of Awadallah's testimony because the prejudicial effect of the proposed testimony substantially outweighs its probative value. Awadallah, 401 F.Supp.2d at 318. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that this ruling involved no abuse of discretion. 6 Rule 403 provides: 27 Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 28 FED. R. EVID. 403. 29 Rule 403 required the court to balance the probative value of evidence relevant to the knowing requirement of the perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1623, against a range of dangers contemplated by the Rule and then decide whether the evidence should be admitted or excluded. The court did just that. As we show below, the record reflects that it considered the relevant factors, conducted the appropriate balancing, and arrived at a narrowly crafted compromise.
30 The Government's principal argument for abuse of discretion is that the district court necessarily struck the wrong balance between relevance and prejudice by dramatically understating, or underappreciating, the probative value of the grand juror testimony. According to the Government, Judge Scheindlin ignored that this powerful evidence of Awadallah's guilt is the strongest, most reliable evidence the Government can present to prove the knowing element of perjury, the element upon which this case will most likely turn. 31 We find this argument curious in light of the fact that, as the district court noted, the Government has tried hundreds, if not thousands, of perjury cases without eliciting opinion evidence from a grand juror to prove knowledge. None of our opinions indicate that a grand juror has ever previously been called in this Circuit to give such testimony and, as authority, the Government has uncovered only a lone out-of-circuit case where a grand juror testified about a subject matter other than materiality of a defendant. 7 As the district court noted, a trial strategy is not improper merely because it is innovative; but, when such a strategy has almost never been used, there is generally a good reason. Suffice it to say, we have some difficulty understanding why a class of testimony that is unprecedented in this Circuit can, at the same time, be the most reliable, powerful evidence available to the Government in a relatively straight-forward perjury prosecution. 32 Probative value is also informed by the availability of alternative means to present similar evidence. Specifically, the Supreme Court has advised that the Rule 403 `probative value' of an item of evidence... may be calculated by comparing evidentiary alternatives. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 184, 117 S.Ct. 644. The availability of alternative testimony does not alone provide a basis for excluding evidence and the district court did not rely on such a basis here; however, it did properly consider alternatives as a factor in balancing the probative value and the risk of prejudice. See id. 33 The defendant stresses that, in addition to calling the grand jurors (who are permitted to testify under the limitations imposed by the district court), the Government could also elicit essentially the same testimony from other categories of witnesses, such as the court reporter, the interpreter, or Assistant United States Attorneys who were present during the Grand Jury but are not expected to participate at trial. 34 The Government responds that the grand jurors' testimony is the most probative and reliable evidence of Awadallah's demeanor because the Government attorney would be cross-examined for bias, and the court reporter and interpreter who both participated in the proceeding are unlikely to have been as attuned as a grand juror would be to Awadallah's demeanor. They could also be cross-examined for bias based on, for example, their employment arrangements with the Government. We are not especially persuaded. It seems intuitively unlikely that the interpreter or the court reporter, both of whom presumably were present for the entirety of Awadallah's testimony, would not have been attuned to his facial expressions, the pace of his answers, or his general demeanor. These observations are, to a certain extent, beside the point, since the Government is, of course, free to select whichever witnesses it believes will most effectively advance its case. But the fact remains that we see nothing about the grand jurors that makes them clearly more reliable than other witnesses to the events that transpired in the grand jury room.
35 As the Supreme Court, considering Rule 403, has explained the term `unfair prejudice,' as to a criminal defendant, speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the fact finder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged, or in other words `an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.' Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180, 117 S.Ct. 644 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's notes). 36 Here, the district court identified two potential sources of prejudice: (1) a trial juror would likely unduly identify with, and give unwarranted weight to the testimony of, a grand juror witness, and (2) the introduction of grand juror testimony is likely to confuse the different standards of proof that apply to a trial jury and a grand jury. On the first potential source of prejudice, the court noted: 37 There is a real risk that the trial jury will give undue weight to the testimony of the grand jurors. Similarly, the trial jury may well defer to what they will perceive as the grand jurors' determination that Awadallah's testimony was knowingly false, rather than making its own determination. Rule 403 requires that evidence be excluded, even if relevant, if the jury will place undue weight on that evidence, to the neglect of their duty to evaluate the trial evidence for themselves. The danger of prejudice is heightened here because the proposed testimony goes to an ultimate issue in the case: any testimony from a grand juror that Awadallah appeared not to be confused, or that he appeared lucid and coherent, is tantamount to a statement that, in the grand juror's opinion, Awadallah's statements were knowingly false. 38 Awadallah, 401 F.Supp.2d at 318-319. Judge Scheindlin then identified a separate, but related, source of potential prejudice: 39 One of the fundamental risks at a criminal trial is that the jury will infer the defendant's guilt from the fact of his indictment. Courts always stress that an indictment is merely a charge or accusation and that the Government must now prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Government's proposed use of grand jurors to testify, in essence, as to their opinion of Awadallah's guilt and their reasons for indicting him, is squarely at odds with that policy. 40 Id. at 319. 41 The concerns articulated by the district judge are undoubtedly substantive ones. She acted well within the broad discretion afforded her when she concluded that permitting testimony by grand jurors regarding whether or not, in their opinion, the defendant's false statements were the product of confusion and/or intimidation potentially causes significant prejudice to the defendant because it could be interpreted as a grand juror giving the petit jurors advice on how to determine the central issue of the case. However, as the district court explained, to the extent that the grand jurors' proposed testimony goes to the objective, external circumstances of Awadallah's testimony, and not to the ultimate issue of his intent or knowledge, it is less prejudicial, and therefore admissible. Awadallah, 401 F.Supp.2d at 319 n. 47. 42 The Government contends that it simply seeks to elicit the grand juror's impressions of Awadallah's demeanor and appearance, not their opinion of his mental state. This distinction draws an extremely fine line, one best entrusted to the trial court's expertise. Here, the court could easily view the proffered testimony as opinion and advice regarding the defendant's mental state, the key element in the case. 43 The Government argues that grand jurors often testify regarding materiality and that the proffered testimony in this case is no different. However, testimony regarding materiality typically concerns the scope and purpose of the grand jury's investigation. See United States v. Byrnes, 644 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir.1981); United States v. Alu, 246 F.2d 29, 34 (2d Cir.1957); see also United States v. Conley, 186 F.3d 7 (1st Cir.1999). Such testimony contrasts markedly with testimony from grand jurors regarding their subjective impressions of a witness. Although materiality and knowledge are both elements of perjury — § 1623 is violated by one who knowingly makes any false material declaration — the danger of prejudice attached to these two types of testimony significantly differs. Testimony about materiality involves factual statements, such as the subject matter of the grand jury investigation, not the mental impressions of grand jurors, the type of testimony excluded by the district court here. Thus, cases such as United States v. Conley, supra, on which the Government relied, where grand jurors have testified on materiality are not especially helpful since they do not involve the type of prejudice identified by the district court. 44 The Government contends that any potential bonding between the grand juror witness and the petit jurors could be cured through an appropriate instruction. We know that limiting or curative instructions cannot always undue the damage of prejudicial evidence. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). The district court believed that an instruction would not appropriately address the prejudice arising from the introduction of grand juror testimony. From this vantage point the answer to that inquiry is unknowable. It is also not determinative since the resolution of the problem was left to the district judge who has broad discretion under Rule 403 to balance the probative value of evidence against the risk of prejudice. Only rarely — and in extraordinarily compelling circumstances — will we, from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a district court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative value and unfair effect. Conley, 186 F.3d at 16 (internal quotation omitted). Because the testimony, although relevant, indisputably has potential to be highly prejudicial, we cannot say that the district court's limitation on the testimony of grand jurors was arbitrary or irrational. See United States v. Perez, 387 F.3d 201, 209-10 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Han, 230 F.3d 560, 564 (2d Cir.2000). 45 The line that the district court drew between permissible statements regarding objective manifestations and impermissible statements of subjective opinions will likely elide as actual questions are put to grand juror witnesses. At that time, the district court will, in the exercise of its judgement, determine on which side of the line a specific question falls. 8 We decline the government's invitation to define this line more precisely based on hypothetical questions. The district court will make such determinations when appropriate, and we leave it to its expertise. II. Remanding to a different judge 46 Remanding a case to a different judge is a serious request rarely made and rarely granted. Reassignment is warranted only where special circumstances warrant it, that is, where we are persuaded that the original judge would have substantial difficulty in putting out of her mind her previously expressed views, or where reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice. United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 795 (2d Cir.1996). Significantly, as the Government points out, the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York has not made such a request since 1973 and that request was denied. United States v. Griesa, 481 F.2d 276, 278 (2d Cir.1973). In fact, as the amicus curiae 9 notes, in each of the cases the Government cites where a reassignment request has been granted, the request has been submitted by the defendant or initiated sua sponte by the court on the defendant's behalf. 47 With the exception of personal bias, this Court examines the following principal factors to determine whether a case should be remanded to a different judge: 48 (1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected, (2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. 49 United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.1977) (per curiam). The Government's request for remand to a different judge is based on the second Robin factor — preservation of the appearance of justice. 50 The Government contends that the case should be remanded to a different judge because Judge Scheindlin: (1) repeatedly acted in a manner that could be viewed as that of an advocate for the defendant, rather than that of an impartial arbiter; and (2) repeatedly issued rulings that could be viewed as indicating that she has prejudged the most significant ultimate issues in the case in favor of the defendant and against the Government. Appellant's Br. at 79-80. 51 In support of these contentions, the Government points out that the district judge raised issues sua sponte that were at least potentially beneficial to Awadallah and detrimental to the Government. Appellant's Br. at 80. The Government points to the January 31, 2002 opinion where the district judge, while denying various defense motions, raised the possibility that the Government had set up a perjury trap and also suggested that it may be appropriate for her to exercise her supervisory power to suppress Awadallah's grand jury testimony. At the hearing regarding these issues and Awadallah's motion to suppress, Judge Scheindlin raised sua sponte the issue of whether the examination booklet was the fruit of the FBI's investigation on September 20 and 21, 2001. These three actions are cited as key examples of why remanding to a different judge is required. Appellant's Br. at 81, 85, 89. 52 The fact that the district judge raised these issues sua sponte is, to our minds, dwarfed by the fact that, in each instance, she ruled in the Government's favor: she concluded that no perjury trap had been set, she did not evoke her supervisory powers to suppress the grand jury testimony, and she did not rule on the issue she raised regarding whether the examination booklet was the product of the FBI's September 20 and 21 investigation. Notwithstanding the fact that Judge Scheindlin consistently ruled in the Government's favor on these points, the Government still maintains that these events illustrate that she regularly acted as an advocate for the defendant. 53 However, a district judge is not a spectator. We can readily envision occasions when active involvement by a trial judge is required to ensure that problematic issues are raised and examined. When a trial judge observes occurrences that potentially call into question the fairness of the proceedings or the thoroughness of a defense, it is incumbent on the judge to inquire. While impartiality is required, the distance between disengagement and officiousness leaves district judges considerable leeway to satisfy themselves that justice has been served. 54 In a similar way, the district judge's behavior on the evidentiary issue currently before us belies the Government's conclusion that she compromised the appearance of justice. The district judge originally issued an oral ruling at a pre-trial conference which limited the proffered testimony of grand jurors pursuant to Rule 701. After reconsideration, she explained in a written opinion: 55 Without a proffer of the proposed testimony, it is impossible to know whether it would be based on objective perceptions, or on information that would not otherwise be available to the jury. It would therefore be premature to exclude the testimony on that ground. To the extent that the Court's May 16 preliminary ruling was based on Rules 701 and 704, it was therefore in error. 56 Awadallah, 401 F.Supp.2d at 315. Rethinking and ultimately changing her mind regarding Rule 701 (although the outcome remained the same) illustrates intellectual flexibility. The court's initial oral decision was issued in the interest of efficiency. Given an opportunity to revisit the issue, Judge Scheindlin refined her thinking. As the Fourth Circuit has noted, a judge's willingness to reconsider previously expressed views weighs against a finding that reassignment is necessary to preserve the appearance of justice. United States v. North Carolina, 180 F.3d 574, 583 (4th Cir.1999). 57 We do not believe the appearance of justice is in jeopardy. During the course of managing a criminal case a trial judge is called on to rule on a host of substantive and procedural legal issues as well as many logistical ones relating to pre-trial proceedings and to the conduct of the trial. Inherent in an adversary system is the reality that typically one side wins and the other loses. If losses compromised the appearance of justice, this system would grind to a halt. 58 In Robin, we noted that the consideration of the preservation of the appearance of fairness must be balanced [against] counterveiling considerations of efficiency and feasibility. 553 F.2d at 11. We explained: 59 Where the original judge has gained familiarity with a detailed factual record, which is vital to the determination to be made on remand, and the reversal is not based on erroneous findings or the admission of prejudicial evidence that would be difficult to erase from the mind, the case may properly be remanded to the original trial judge, since assignment to a different judge would only entail wasteful delay or duplicated effort. 60 Id. On this appeal, we have found no erroneous findings. We also have no concern that the trial judge will have difficulty erasing evidence from her mind. 61 The Government contends that it is irrelevant whether Judge Scheindlin would have difficulty in applying legal precedent because its request is focused on the second Robin factor, whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice. Robin, 553 F.2d at 10. However, it is relevant to the Government's argument that the district judge acted as an advocate for the defense. 62 Each of the cases that the Government cites where this Court reassigned a case to a different judge involved remands for sentencing or re-sentencing. See United States v. Doe, 348 F.3d 64 (2d Cir.2003); Cullen v. United States, 194 F.3d 401 (2d Cir.1999); United States v. Padilla, 186 F.3d 136 (2d Cir.1999); United States v. Campo, 140 F.3d 415 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam); United States v. Londono, 100 F.3d 236 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775 (2d Cir.1976). In those cases, unlike here, on remand the judge would be the fact finder. Here, the district court will not be the fact-finder, the jury will determine the facts, and the jurors will come to their role having not been privy to the pretrial proceedings and the rulings that led to this appeal. For these reasons, we deny the Government's motion to remand this case to a different judge. We have considered appellants' additional arguments and find them without merit.