Opinion ID: 2338786
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellee's Position and The Court's Ruling

Text: MVA raises a number of procedural and substantive issues, which need to be viewed not only in the context of the declaratory ruling but also in light of appellee's challenge to the law and regulation. Distilling the allegations in appellee's pleading, as supplemented by the evidence presented in the circuit court, his complaint is essentially this: The statute (§ 21-1306) prohibits persons, on pain of a criminal conviction, from riding on a motorcycle unless they are wearing protective headgear that meets the standards established by the Administrator. The statute authorizes the Administrator to approve (or disapprove) particular headgear as well as to adopt and enforce regulations establishing standards for the approval of protective headgear, and it directs that the Administrator publish lists of headgear that he or she approves. The Administrator, through COMAR 11.13.05, has adopted FMVSS 218 as the standard for approval, a decision mandated by the preemption provision of Federal law (49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)). The Administrator has not chosen, however, to approve or disapprove any particular headgear or to publish a list of headgear that complies with FMVSS 218, and thus as well with COMAR 11.13.05 and § 21-1306. Instead, the regulation states that the Administration shall accept all helmets which comply with the requirements of FMVSS 218.... Appellee contends, and was able to establish in court, that neither he nor Mr. Krajewski could reliably determine, from merely reading FMVSS 218 and without conducting engineering tests beyond their ability to conduct, whether a particular helmet complies with that standard. Appellee's position is that FMVSS 218, as written, is a highly technical standard directed at manufacturers of protective headgear and is not intended to be applied, and cannot practicably be applied, by ordinary laypersons in deciding which helmets are acceptable and which are not. It is this dilemma, he urges, that makes the statute, coupled with the COMAR regulation, impermissibly vague and unenforceable. He offered other evidence indicating that some helmets containing the DOT label do not, in fact, comply with FMVSS 218, and that a consumer cannot, therefore, rely on the existence of that label as an assurance that the helmet meets the requirements of the COMAR regulation. Unless MVA in some way determines which headgear is acceptable and publishes a list of that headgear, the law, in his view, is impermissibly vague and, as a result, effectively prohibits people from riding on motorcycles. The circuit court essentially accepted that argument. It found as an established evidentiary fact that merely because a motorcycle helmet bears the symbol `DOT' does not mean that the helmet has actually passed the tests required by COMAR 11.13.05.02. It also concluded that, although MVA has adopted a standard, [c]itizens of ordinary intelligence cannot know how to use FMVSS 218. People of ordinary intelligence cannot reasonably be expected to know what FMVSS 218 commands of them. The court concluded that the Legislature was likely aware of that difficulty and, for that reason, directed the Administrator, using the expertise at his disposal, to publish a list of protective headgear which had passed the scientific standards of FMVSS 218. Because one cannot rely with assurance simply on the existence of a DOT label, the court concluded, in the end, that the Administrator must publish a list of approved headgear.