Opinion ID: 484754
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dates and Locations of Offenses

Text: 81 Appellants Slusser and Champion contend that they were prejudiced by variances concerning the dates and locations of the charged offenses. Slusser argues that his convictions on Counts 18 and 19 must be reversed because the indictment charged Slusser with importation and possession with intent to distribute on or about April-May 1981 in Dade County, Florida. Slusser contends that the only evidence of his involvement in 1981 related to events in May-June 1981 outside of Dade County near Lake Okeechobee. 82 Appellant Slusser's variance claims are without merit. First, evidence at trial linked Slusser to the cow pasture load in May 1981. This proof is not at variance with the indictment's allegation that Slusser committed the substantive offenses on or about April-May 1981. When the prosecution uses the on or about designation, proof of a date reasonably near to the specified date is sufficient. United States v. Grapp, 653 F.2d 189, 195 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug.1981). Second, although proof at trial indicated that Slusser's involvement in the cow pasture load took place near Lake Okeechobee rather than in Dade County, Slusser has presented no evidence of prejudice. An indictment that specified the place of the offense as the Southern District of Florida would have sufficiently informed Slusser of the place of his alleged offense. See United States v. Harrell, 737 F.2d 971, 975 n. 4 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1164, 105 S.Ct. 923, 83 L.Ed.2d 935 (1985). Although a material variance may exist where an indictment specifies the wrong county, Slusser's showing of prejudice amounts to a generalized allegation of inability to defend. Variance from an indictment is not, however, prejudicial in all cases, and prejudice is not assumed. United States v. Ard, 731 F.2d 718, 725 (11th Cir.1984). Any variance in this case is therefore immaterial because Slusser has failed to demonstrate any prejudice to his substantial rights. 83 Champion's argument is more difficult to decipher. He seems to contend that he was prejudiced by the fact that the jury was told about five or six uncharged loads which operated to obliterate the appearance of structure in the conspiracy charge, leaving no overall conspiracy that was found by the jury. In addition, he argues that the fact that he was acquitted of certain substantive counts somehow necessitates a conclusion that the jury could not have found an overall conspiracy. 84 Appellant's arguments miscomprehend the nature of what constitutes a material variance. As we stated in United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 813 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217, 105 S.Ct. 1196, 84 L.Ed.2d 341 (1985), a variance exists where the evidence at trial proves facts different from those alleged in the indictment, as opposed to facts which, although not specifically mentioned in the indictment, are entirely consistent with its allegations. The evidence relating to certain uncharged loads during the time period of the indicted conspiracy, 19 and evidence relating to charged loads for which Champion was later acquitted, is entirely consistent with the alleged conspiracy. Appellant's claim must, therefore, fail because no material variance existed.