Opinion ID: 1612803
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was entryway under control of Piggly Wiggly as well as under control of Owens?

Text: The initial argument of Piggly Wiggly is that it cannot be negligent under the safe-place statute because the entryway was not under its control at the time of the accident and, hence, negligence, if there were any, must be attributed to Owens, to whom control had been surrendered. The jury in its special verdict determined that, at the time and the place of the accident, Piggly Wiggly had not turned exclusive control over to Owens. The only question for the determination of this court is whether there is any credible evidence that under a reasonable view supports the verdict. The resolution of the question of control is important in this case, for we have held that ownership per se of the premises is not determinative of the liability for an unsafe condition. We have said: Legal liability under sub. (13), sec. 101.01, Stats., is not predicated alone on absolute ownership of a place of employment. Where a right to present possession, control, or dominion of such place exists, the holder of such right may be held liable, Freimann v. Cumming (1924), 185 Wis. 88, 200 N. W. 662. Potter v. Kenosha (1955), 268 Wis. 361, 371, 68 N. W.(2d) 4. See also Werner v. Gimbel Brothers (1959), 8 Wis. (2d) 491, 493, 493b, 99 N. W. (2d) 708, 100 N. W. (2d) 920; Schwenn v. Loraine Hotel Co. (1961), 14 Wis. (2d) 601, 607, 111 N. W. (2d) 495. This court said in Potter, supra, page 372: We are constrained to hold that when an owner turns over to an independent contractor the complete control and custody of a safe place, whereon or where under the contractor creates a place of employment for the purpose of fulfilling the terms of the contract, the owner reserving no right of supervision or control of the work excepting that of inspection or to change the plan with reference to the construction to be furnished, if thereafter in the performance of the work under the contract the premises are changed by the contractor and as a result a hazardous condition is created, the owner does not become liable to the contractor's employee injured as a consequence of such hazardous condition while acting in the scope of his employment. (Emphasis supplied.) See also Burmeister v. Damrow (1956), 273 Wis. 568, 582, 79 N. W. (2d) 87; Weber v. Hurley (1961), 13 Wis. (2d) 560, 569, 109 N. W. (2d) 65. We conclude that there is evidence to support the jury's verdict in this regard. Arnold, the manager of Piggly Wiggly, in answer to a question, stated that he said nothing about giving control or custody of any part of the store to Owens. There was testimony also that when Owens wanted the electricity that operates the foot-treadle door opener turned off, he asked Arnold to disconnect the plug, though the plug was just inside the door. Arnold stated that he continued to be in charge of all the store, including the front entrance where customers were coming in and out during the whole time in question. When the electricity was disconnected, Owens was directed by Arnold to block the other two doors in an open position so customers could get in and out. It is clear that Arnold, as manager of Piggly Wiggly, was in control of that portion of the store and he, in fact, exercised control during the period relevant in this case. There is credible evidence to support the jury's verdict in this respect.