Opinion ID: 3183410
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Kornegay contends that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to convict him of conspiracy and substantive Hobbs Act robbery counts because, “while the evidence may have established that thefts of cell phones occurred at each of the stores in question, it did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that those thefts were committed by the use of force or threatened use of force.” Def.’s Br. 12. We disagree. We review Kornegay’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions de novo, but he “bears a heavy burden,” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted), because we review the evidence on a sufficiency challenge “in the light most favorable to the government and draw[ ] all inferences in favor of the government,” United States v. Henry, 325 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2003). We will uphold a conviction if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Coplan, 703 F.3d at 62 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). 2 The Hobbs Act defines “robbery” to mean “the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of . . . anyone in his company at the time of the taking or obtaining.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1) (emphasis added).1 Although “Hobbs Act force does not require the brandishing of a weapon,” when a weapon has not been brandished we evaluate whether the requisite force was used by considering “(1) how a reasonable person in the victim’s position would perceive an action . . . ; (2) the perpetrators’ knowledge that a victim would perceive such action to be part of a pattern of violence, intimidation, or threats; and (3) the perpetrators’ intention to exploit their victim’s fears.” United States v. Santos, 449 F.3d 93, 100–01 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, we have observed that a defendant’s “reputation alone could be sufficient [to prove fear of injury] . . . as long as the reputation is knowingly used to instill a ‘fear of injury.’” Id. at 101 n.12 (internal quotation marks omitted). At trial, the government introduced sufficient evidence to prove that Kornegay used actual or threatened force, violence, or fear of injury with respect to each of the substantive Hobbs Act robberies in Counts 2 through 4. During the February 19, 2010, robbery of the T-Mobile store located at 595 Sixth Avenue (Count 2), according to the testimony of an assistant store manager who identified Kornegay at trial, one of the assailants “scream[ed] abruptly ‘F’ them. They are not doing anything. Take what you want.” App. 187. The assistant store manager further testified that “one of [the store] representatives tried to lock the door and with force [the assailants] were able to actually push the door open.” Id. The assailants also carried tools to cut the phones from their wiring. App. 187, 189. A salesperson similarly testified that one of the assailants “yelled out . . . I forgot one [phone] and nobody’s going to do anything about it,” and, as a result, the salesperson “backed off and everybody backed off.” App. 189–90. During the March 2, 2010, robbery of the AT&T store located at 350 Park Avenue (Count 4), according to the testimony of a sales representative, while certain employees attempted to “trap” one assailant “by the revolving door,” the assistant manager was “going back and forth with the taller [assailant]” and then stated “that he had to let [the taller assailant] go because he had pulled a 1A person violates the Hobbs Act if he, inter alia, “in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery . . . or attempts or conspires so to do.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). 3 knife on him,”2 after which the employees “eased up on the other individual and let him come out of the store without too much of a hassle.” App. 191–92. Reviewing the foregoing evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and drawing all inferences in its favor, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Kornegay used actual or threatened force during the robberies in Counts 2 and 4. With respect to the February 19, 2010, robbery of the T-Mobile store located at 869 Eighth Avenue (Count 3), the evidence showed that Kornegay had previously robbed the same store less than three months earlier, on December 8, 2009. App. 181–83. A sales representative present during both robberies, who identified Kornegay during trial, testified that one of the assailants during the 2009 robbery “had . . . a little altercation with the security guard and he had a knife in his hand,” and “told the security guard . . . don’t be a hero, old man” before the assailants left the store. Id. She further testified that the 2010 robbery was similar to the 2009 robbery except that the assailants during the 2010 robbery “cut the phones and the[n] left,” that “no one tried to stop them,” and that she did not interfere because “it was too much of a risk to [her]self.” App. 182–83. Reviewing the foregoing evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and drawing all inferences in its favor, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Kornegay exploited the residual fear of injury arising from the 2009 robbery to perpetrate the 2010 robbery in Count 3 without resistance. See Santos, 449 F.3d at 100–01 & n.12. The government also introduced sufficient evidence to prove a plan to use actual or threatened force, violence, or fear of injury with respect to the Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy charged in Count 1. We have “acknowledged that jurors are permitted to infer, based on circumstantial evidence alone, that two or more of the defendants had a tacit understanding to use force or a threat of force.” Id. at 103. A rational trier of fact could have inferred, in the circumstances presented here, that Kornegay and his coconspirators had at least a tacit understanding to use force or the threat of force as necessary during the robberies, especially in light of the evidence that the robberies charged as part of the conspiracy took place while the target stores were open for business, and that an assailant had used a knife to perpetrate at least one of them. Cf. id. (concluding, where defendants had planned to steal drugs by impersonating government agents, that “circumstantial evidence . . . , especially the presence of several knives, permit[ted] an inference that defendants had a tacit agreement to use Hobbs Act force”). 2Kornegay did not object to this testimony as inadmissible hearsay in the District Court, and the Court did not err, much less clearly err or plainly err, see United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010), by admitting the testimony, which met the present-sense-impression exception to the rule against hearsay, see Fed. R. Evid. 803(1). 4