Opinion ID: 2159886
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Parental Control Justification Defense

Text: [¶ 21] Hawthorne contends that the court should have applied the parental control justification defense, established in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 106(1) (1983), [4] which recognizes a parent's limited privilege to apply a reasonable degree of force necessary to prevent or punish a child's misconduct. In re Dorothy V., 2001 ME 97, ¶ 7, 774 A.2d 1118, 1121 (citing State v. Wilder, 2000 ME 32, ¶ 44, 748 A.2d 444, 455). Hawthorne also contends that even if the parental control justification defense does not apply by operation of statute, it must nonetheless be considered because it arises from a parent's fundamental liberty interest in familial relationships. Smith responds that the defense does not apply in this action because the protection from abuse statute specifically provides that the defense applies to actions premised upon section 4002(1)(A) (abuse in the nature of [a]ttempting to cause or causing bodily injury or offensive physical contact, including sexual assaults), but does not provide that it applies to actions premised upon section 4002(1)(B) (abuse in the nature of [a]ttempting to place or placing another in fear of bodily injury through any course of conduct). 19-A M.R.S.A. § 4002(1)(A) & (B). [5] [¶ 22] Although Hawthorne argued at the conclusion of the trial that the court should consider his actions in light of his role as a step-parent in determining whether his conduct constituted abuse, at no time did he raise the parental control justification defense or assert that it applied as a matter of either statutory or constitutional law. We do not, therefore, reach this issue because Hawthorne failed to present it to the trial court and, accordingly, it has not been properly preserved for appellate review. KeyBank Nat'l Ass'n v. Sargent, 2000 ME 153, ¶ 14, 758 A.2d 528, 533.