Opinion ID: 601792
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the first amendment concerns

Text: 62 Pennzoil also expansively contends that [i]t is beyond dispute that the district court's order constitutes a plain restraint on Pennzoil's constitutional right to commercial free speech as recognized by this court in United States Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 937 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816, 111 S.Ct. 58, 112 L.Ed.2d 33 (1990). Pennzoil urges that if its motor oil improves in the future and thereby provides better protection from viscosity breakdown than does Castrol motor oil, Pennzoil would nonetheless be restrained from advertising this truism. 63 The Supreme Court has held that commercial speech is within the ambit of First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9, 99 S.Ct. 887, 894, 59 L.Ed.2d 100 (1979); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1826, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976) (Society and consumers both have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information.). 64 Paragraph (c) of the permanent injunction granted by the district court prohibits Pennzoil from: 65 (c) broadcasting, publishing or disseminating, in any form or medium, any commercial or advertisement that claims, directly or by clear implication that: 66 (i) Pennzoil motor oil outperforms any leading motor oil against viscosity breakdown; 67 (ii) Pennzoil motor oil gives the most protection against viscosity breakdown of any leading motor oil;(iii) Pennzoil motor oil provides better protection against engine failure than any leading motor oil; 68 (iv) Pennzoil motor oil provides better protection against engine wear than any leading motor oil; or 69 (v) Pennzoil motor oil provides longer engine life or greater engine durability than any other leading motor oil. 70 Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co. & Pennzoil Prods. Co., 799 F.Supp. 424, 441 (D.N.J.1992). 71 In essence, the district court has enjoined Pennzoil only from broadcasting, publishing, or disseminating the very statements which the court found to be literally false. Pennzoil argues that this is a prior restraint, in contravention of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. At this moment, however, these claims are false, and it is well settled that false commercial speech is not protected by the First Amendment and may be banned entirely. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 2709, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977). Moreover, the prior restraint doctrine does not apply in this case because there has been an adequate determination that [the expression] is unprotected by the First Amendment. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 2561, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973). The injunction is also not overbroad because it only reaches the specific claims that the district court found to be literally false. If, in the future, Pennzoil should improve its motor oil to surpass Castrol for viscosity breakdown, Pennzoil can at that time apply for a modification of the present injunction. See F.T.C. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 44 (D.C.Cir.1985). 72 The Second Circuit rejected a similar argument regarding a preliminary injunction, stating: 73 Any time a court issues a preliminary injunction there is some chance that, after the issuance of the order but prior to a full adjudication on the merits, changes in the operative facts will undercut the court's rationale. We will not, however, require the district court to draft a technical and narrow injunction to address the possibility of additional tests which are, at this time, purely hypothetical. If tests supporting its claim do come to light, [Appellant] may move to modify or dissolve the injunction. 74 Castrol, Inc. v. Quaker State Corp., 977 F.2d 57, 66 (2d Cir.1992); accord Flavor Corp. of Am. v. Kemin Indus., Inc., 503 F.2d 729, 732 (8th Cir.1974); 11 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2961, at 604 (1973). 75 Although the dissent correctly points out that we should not supervise all debate in a given area, we have a statutory duty to supervise repetition of claims that have been found to be literally false. 76 We therefore hold that commercial speech that is false when uttered does not enjoy the protection of the First Amendment. The district court thus committed no error in enjoining it. 10