Opinion ID: 754754
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Molina's Failure to Rehire the Plaintiffs

Text: Violated Their First Amendment Rights 32 The County advances a number of arguments as to why Molina's failure to rehire the Plaintiffs, even if motivated by their political activities in support of Hillegeist, nonetheless did not violate their First Amendment rights. We consider each of these arguments in turn. 33
34 basis of political affiliation 35 The County first observes that, through relevant provisions of the Texas Local Government Code, the Texas Legislature has manifested a clear intention that deputy sheriffs serve[ ] at the pleasure of the sheriff. TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 85.003. It contends that [w]hether to endorse a patronage system is a policy decision that should be left to the judgment of the people's elected representatives. The County therefore argues that our First Amendment jurisprudence should defer to Texas's right to decide ... whether patronage practices will exist as part of local political systems. This argument need not detain us long. 36 For more than two decades, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge or threaten to discharge public employees solely for not being supporters of the political party in power, unless party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the position involved. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 64, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990); see also Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). In essence, the County asks us to overrule the long line of Supreme Court authority placing limits on political patronage practices, along with the substantial body of case law in this circuit interpreting and applying that authority. See, e.g., Kinsey v. Salado Indep. Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 988 (5th Cir.1992) (en banc); McBee v. Jim Hogg County, 730 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.1984) (en banc). This is something that we obviously lack the authority to do, even if we had the inclination. 37 In a similar vein, the County argues that the Plaintiffs were well aware that they served at the pleasure of the sheriff and that their tenures ended automatically with the end of the sheriff's term. It therefore contends that the Plaintiffs had no legitimate expectation of, or right to, being rehired by Molina. The County thus claims that Molina's failure to rehire the Plaintiffs, even if based upon their political activities in support of Hillegeist, could not have violated their First Amendment rights. In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), the Supreme Court observed that, [f]or at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. Id. at 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694. The denial of a public benefit may not be used by the government for the purpose of creating an incentive enabling it to achieve what it may not command directly. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 361, 96 S.Ct. 2673 (Brennan, J.). In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), the Court observed that [i]t is too late in the day to doubt that the libert[y] of ... expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege. Id. at 404, 83 S.Ct. 1790. If it was too late in the day three-and-a-half decades ago to consider the County's argument that the Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights could not have been violated by Molina's failure to rehire them because they had no right or expectation of being rehired, it is certainly too late to consider it now. 38 The County finally contends that it is unfair to subject it to a new round of lawsuits every four years when a new sheriff is elected merely because Texas law allows patronage dismissals by county sheriffs. The answer to this contention is that, if the Texas legislature wishes to minimize the potential liability of local governments for unconstitutional practices by local governmental officials, it can pass laws constraining the ability of such officials to engage in unconstitutional practices. As the County acknowledges, the legislature has done just that by giving counties the option of creating a civil service system for sheriff's departments that at least limits to some degree the sheriff's ability to engage in unconstitutional hiring practices. The fact that the Fort Bend County Sheriff's Department chose not to utilize this option provides no justification for allowing constitutional violations by the County's sheriff to go unremedied.
39 The County next contends that Molina could not have violated the Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights because he merely declined to rehire them rather than firing them. In McBee v. Jim Hogg County, 730 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.1984) (en banc), we addressed a factual scenario identical in all material respects to the one at issue here and concluded that the fact that the deputies were terminated by a 'failure to rehire' rather than a 'dismissal' is irrelevant to the question of whether they were impermissibly terminated for exercising their First Amendment rights. Id. at 1015 (footnote omitted); see also Warnock v. Pecos County, 116 F.3d 776, 779 n. 1 (5th Cir.1997) (For our purposes, there is no difference between firing and declining to re-appoint.). 40 The Supreme Court subsequently reached a similar conclusion in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990), where it determined that the same limitations that the First Amendment imposes upon a public employer's power to discharge employees based upon their political affiliation apply to a public employer's decisions to transfer, recall, and hire on that basis. Id. at 74, 110 S.Ct. 2729; cf. Branti, 445 U.S. at 512 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 1287 ([T]he lack of a reasonable expectation of continued employment is not sufficient to justify dismissal based solely upon an employee's private political beliefs.). While Rutan addressed only political patronage, we have applied it to cases involving public employer retaliation for employees' exercise of their right to free speech. See Pierce v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, Institutional Div., 37 F.3d 1146, 1149-50 (5th Cir.1994); Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 110-11 (5th Cir.1992). The County's claim that a failure to rehire a public employee cannot violate the employee's First Amendment rights therefore lacks merit. 41
42 the interests of the Plaintiffs as citizens 43 In further support of its contention that Molina's failure to rehire the Plaintiffs did not violate their First Amendment rights even if based upon their political activity and affiliation, the County makes two additional arguments that are closely intertwined. First, it argues that sheriff's deputies in Texas may be freely dismissed on political patronage grounds. Second, the County argues that governmental interests outweighed the Plaintiffs' interest in engaging in political activity in support of Hillegeist. A summary of the relevant First Amendment law as established in Supreme Court precedent and as applied in this circuit will facilitate a clear disposition of these claims. 44
45 It is well established that the First Amendment places certain constraints upon dismissals from public employment based upon political affiliation and speech. As noted in Part III.B.1, supra, limitations on dismissals based upon a public employee's political affiliation, or political patronage dismissals, emerged from the Supreme Court's decisions in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). In Elrod, the Court held that a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee can[not] be discharged or threatened with discharge from a job that he is satisfactorily performing upon the sole ground of his political beliefs. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 375, 96 S.Ct. 2673 (Stewart, J., concurring). 5 In Branti, the Court clarified the rule announced in Elrod regarding when party affiliation may serve as a legitimate basis for terminating a public employee as follows: 46 It is equally clear that party affiliation is not necessarily relevant to every policymaking or confidential position. The coach of a state university's football team formulates policy, but no one could seriously claim that Republicans make better coaches than Democrats, or vice versa, no matter which party is in control of the state government. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the Governor of a State may appropriately believe that the official duties of various assistants who help him write speeches, explain his views to the press, or communicate with the legislature cannot be performed effectively unless those persons share his political beliefs and party commitments. In sum, the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label policymaker or confidential fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. 47 Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287. 48 In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983), the Supreme Court held that certain limitations exist on the ability of a government employer to discharge employees based upon the employees' exercise of their right to free expression. Specifically, the Court concluded that the First Amendment precludes a discharge based upon an employee's exercise of his right to free expression if two criteria are satisfied. First, the expression must relate to a matter of public concern. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684; Kinsey v. Salado Indep. Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 988, 992 (5th Cir.1992) (en banc) (plurality opinion). Second, the employee's interest in commenting upon matters of public concern must outweigh the public employer's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731; see also Kinsey, 950 F.2d at 992. 49 In applying the Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning public employers' adverse employment actions based upon employees' political affiliation and expression, this court has concluded that factual scenarios in which government employers discharge employees based upon their political affiliation, their exercise of their right to free expression, or some combination thereof locate themselves on a spectrum. McBee v. Jim Hogg County, 730 F.2d 1009, 1014 (5th Cir.1984). At one end of the spectrum lie the factual scenarios like the ones at issue in Elrod and Branti, where the employee was discharged based solely upon grounds of political affiliation. See id. We have observed that, in such scenarios, little Pickering / Connick -style weighing is necessary because the employees are discharged on the sole ground of their private and--for employment purposes--all but abstract political views. They [have] not campaign[ed], they [have] not even [spoken]: they [have] merely thought. Id. at 1014. 50 At the other end of the spectrum lie factual scenarios in which the government employee's exercise of his constitutional privileges [has] clearly over-balanced his usefulness as an [employee]. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We have cited as examples of factual scenarios occupying this position on the spectrum those at issue in Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.1970), and Duke v. North Texas State University, 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir.1972), where instructors had incited student disturbances that were sufficiently serious to call in question the ability of the academic authorities to maintain order on campus. McBee, 730 F.2d at 1014. 51 In circumstances falling between these two polar extremes, we have concluded that Connick /Pickering balancing constitutes the appropriate inquiry. See McBee, 730 F.2d at 1015. The Supreme Court recently confirmed the correctness of this approach in O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 116 S.Ct. 2353, 135 L.Ed.2d 874 (1996): 52 Elrod and Branti involved instances where the raw test of political affiliation sufficed to show a constitutional violation, without the necessity of an inquiry more detailed than asking whether the requirement was appropriate for the employment in question. There is an advantage in so confining the inquiry where political affiliation alone is concerned, for one's beliefs and allegiances ought not to be subject to probing or testing by the government. It is true, on the other hand, ... that the inquiry is whether the affiliation requirement is a reasonable one, so it is inevitable that some case-by-case adjudication will be required even where political affiliation is the test the government has imposed. A reasonableness analysis will also accommodate those many cases ... where specific instances of the employee's speech or expression, which require balancing in the Pickering context, are intermixed with a political affiliation requirement. In those cases, the balancing Pickering mandates will be inevitable. This case-by-case process will allow the courts to consider the necessity of according to the government the discretion it requires in the administration and awarding of contracts over the whole range of public works and the delivery of governmental services. 53 Id. 116 S.Ct. at 2358. 54 This summary of the applicable law provides the appropriate frame of reference from which to analyze the County's remaining arguments regarding whether Molina's failure to rehire the Plaintiffs, if based upon their political activities in support of Hillegeist, constituted a violation of the First Amendment. 55
56 The County's first argument--that sheriff's deputies in Texas may be freely dismissed on political patronage grounds--rests upon a contention that sheriff's deputies occupy a position with respect to which party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for ... effective performance. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287. The County thus argues that, to the extent that Molina was privileged to choose not to rehire the Plaintiffs based solely upon their political beliefs, he was necessarily privileged to choose not to rehire them on the basis of their expression of those beliefs. The County's second argument--that its interests outweighed the Plaintiffs' interest in engaging in political activity in support of Hillegeist--constitutes a contention that Molina's failure to rehire the Plaintiffs did not violate their First Amendment rights because the Pickering /Connick balance weighs in favor of the County. 57 We conclude that the County's second argument subsumes its first and that we therefore need only address the second argument. If we accept the County's second argument, then we have no need to determine whether Molina's failure to rehire the Plaintiffs would have been constitutional had he done so solely on the grounds of the Plaintiffs' political affiliation. By the same token, if we reject the County's second argument and conclude that Molina's failure to rehire the Plaintiffs was unconstitutional if based upon the combination of their political affiliation and expression of that affiliation, then we necessarily reject the County's argument that Molina's failure to rehire the Plaintiffs was constitutional even if he based the decision solely upon their political affiliation. Should we conclude that the Plaintiffs' expressive political activity in conjunction with their political affiliation did not sufficiently threaten to undermine the County's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees, Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, as to render Molina's failure to rehire the Plaintiffs on the basis of this activity constitutional, then we surely could not simultaneously conclude that the Plaintiffs' political beliefs alone threatened to undermine the County's interests to a degree sufficient to justify Molina's failure to rehire the Plaintiffs solely on the basis of their political belief. See Kinsey, 950 F.2d at 993-94; McBee, 730 F.2d at 1014; cf. Kinsey, 950 F.2d at 998-99 (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (concluding that, where the plaintiff superintendent claimed that the school board suspended him based upon both his political affiliation and speech on a matter of public concern, consideration of the plaintiff's speech was unnecessary because the fact that party affiliation was an appropriate requirement for the superintendent position of itself demonstrated that the suspension did not violate the plaintiff's First Amendment rights). 58 We therefore confine our inquiry to an application of the Pickering /Connick balance to determine whether Molina's failure to rehire the Plaintiffs, if based upon their political activity in support of Hillegeist, violated their First Amendment rights. 59
60 As noted earlier, we must determine, as a threshold matter, whether the expressive activity that the Plaintiffs contend motivated Molina's failure to rehire them constituted comment on a matter of public concern. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684; Kinsey, 950 F.2d at 992. While speech need not touch on a matter of public concern to possess First Amendment protection, 61 when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior. 62 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 103 S.Ct. 1684. Therefore, if the Plaintiffs' expressive activity cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for [Molina's failure to rehire them]. Id. at 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684. 63 We determine whether the Plaintiffs' expressive activity in this case constituted speech on a matter of public concern based upon its content, form, and context ... as revealed by the whole record. Id. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684; Kinsey, 950 F.2d at 992. The Plaintiffs testified that they engaged in a wide variety of political activity in support of Hillegeist. Fortenberry testified that he went to numerous political functions in support of Hillegeist and that he walked door-to-door campaigning for him. Leach testified that he walked door-to-door campaigning for Hillegeist and that, approximately once per week, he drove a truck with Hillegeist signs on the sides. Skinner testified that he placed Hillegeist signs in his yard and a Hillegeist bumper sticker on his van. He also testified that, when asked about the election, he would state his opinion that he considered Hillegeist to be the person most qualified for the sheriff position. Evans testified that he walked door-to-door campaigning for Hillegeist, put up Hillegeist signs, and participated in two fundraisers for Hillegeist. Rosas testified that he put up Hillegeist billboards, walked door-to-door campaigning for him, and wore Hillegeist paraphernalia. Brady testified that he made and put up Hillegeist signs, wore Hillegeist shirts, and spoke with people at the county fair in support of Hillegeist. Chamblee testified that he organized a barbecue cook-off in support of Hillegeist at the county fair and that he wore a Hillegeist shirt and cap at this event. He also testified that he polled for Hillegeist on election day. 64 The County does not claim that the above conduct did not constitute expressive conduct subject to First Amendment protection. However, the County contends that the expressive conduct did not constitute a comment on a matter of public concern because the Plaintiffs supported Hillegeist merely to promote their own job security; they did not support him based upon political ideology or concerns, or party affiliation. The County contends that this is evidenced by the fact that many of the Plaintiffs had worked at the sheriff's department for a number of years under a number of sheriffs and, during each sheriff's election, these Plaintiffs unfailingly supported the incumbent. 65 [T]here can be no question that ... campaigning for a political candidate ... relate[s] to a matter of public concern. Vojvodich v. Lopez, 48 F.3d 879, 885 (5th Cir.1995). The fact that the Plaintiffs may have been motivated to support Hillegeist out of a concern for their job security does not change our conclusion that their public displays of support for Hillegeist related to a matter of public concern. In Kinsey v. Salado Independent School District, 950 F.2d 988 (5th Cir.1992), this court considered en banc a claim that the school board suspended the plaintiff superintendent because he supported a political slate of incumbent board members who were defeated in the most recent election. See id. at 990. The losing slate supported the plaintiff's continued superintendency, and the winning slate opposed it. See id. In applying the Pickering /Connick balancing test, the plurality concluded that, [n]otwithstanding [the plaintiff's] interest in retaining his position as superintendent, his speech and association involved matters of great public concern--the performance of elected officials. Id. at 995. Kinsey thus indicates that the fact that the Plaintiffs may have been motivated by self-interest rather than abstract political ideology does not indicate that their expressive activity in support of Hillegeist did not address a matter of public concern. The Supreme Court recently confirmed the correctness of this conclusion in O'Hare when it stated that one's beliefs and allegiances ought not to be subject to probing or testing by the government. O'Hare, 116 S.Ct. at 2358. We conclude that the Plaintiffs' speech related to a matter of public concern, and we therefore proceed to the determination of whether the Plaintiffs' interests in their expressive activities in support of Hillegeist outweighed the County's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731. 66 We have read Pickering, as expounded in Connick, to require a comprehensive but flexible analysis--a balance which weighs the particular aspects of the government's interest in effective service and the plaintiff's interest in freedom of speech that arise in each fact situation. McBee, 730 F.2d at 1016. We have read the Supreme Court precedent applying Pickering to indicate that a number of factors are relevant in balancing the interests of the individual against those of the state, including the following: (1) the degree to which the employee's activity involved a matter of public concern; (2) the time, place, and manner of the employee's activity; (3) whether close working relationships are essential to fulfilling the employee's public responsibilities and the potential effect of the employee's activity on those relationships; (4) whether the employee's activity may be characterized as hostile, abusive, or insubordinate; (5) whether the activity impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among coworkers. See Click v. Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 112 (5th Cir.1992); Matherne v. Wilson, 851 F.2d 752, 760 (5th Cir.1988). 6 We have also concluded that, in cases involving public employees who occupy policymaker or confidential positions ..., the government's interests more easily outweigh the employee's (as a private citizen). Kinsey, 950 F.2d at 994; see also Vojvodich, 48 F.3d at 885. In this case, these factors militate strongly in favor of a conclusion that the Plaintiffs' political interest in political activity in support of Hillegeist outweighed the County's interest in efficiency in the services that it provides through its employees because any negative impact that the Plaintiffs' activity could have had on the efficiency of the sheriff's department was minimal, if their activity could have created any such impact at all. 7 67 The Plaintiffs' political activities in support of Hillegeist all took place while the Plaintiffs were off-duty. Their activities consisted of positive statements in support of Hillegeist rather than negative statements about Molina; 8 in no sense could their actions be characterized as hostile, abusive, or insubordinate. When asked at trial if he was aware of any negative statements about him made by the Plaintiffs, Molina responded that he was aware of none. In sum, this is a case of subordinate[s] who ... expressed a reasoned preference for another superior; it is not a case of subordinates who blackguarded [a superior's] honesty and ability up and down the county. McBee, 730 F.2d at 1017; see also Matherne, 851 F.2d at 761. 9 68 Furthermore, assuming that the Plaintiffs' former positions in the sheriff's department could be considered policymaking positions, 10 such a conclusion is not dispositive of our balancing inquiry. See Vojvodich, 48 F.3d at 884. As the Supreme Court observed in Branti, the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for effective performance of the public office involved. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287; see also Vojvodich, 48 F.3d at 884. Indeed, the Branti court expressly observed that party affiliation is not necessarily relevant to every policymaking or confidential position. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287. The record in this case strongly supports a conclusion that the Plaintiffs did not fall within the exceptional class of public servants of whom political allegiance may be demanded. Garcia v. Reeves County, 32 F.3d 200, 205 (5th Cir.1994). 69 At trial, Molina testified as follows regarding the necessity of having individuals who supported him politically in the positions occupied by the Plaintiffs:Q: Now, sir, wouldn't it be fair to say that it is your testimony that whether somebody supported Sheriff Hillegeist or whether they supported you would have nothing to do with the decision as to whether they were retained, demoted, transferred or let go? Correct? 70 A: That is correct. 71 Q: In other words, you didn't feel like you needed to have political--your own political supporters in any positions in the sheriff's department, correct? 72 A: That is correct. 73 ... 74 Q: Okay. Now, would it be fair to say that for the position of lieutenant you did not have to have a person in that position to support you in a sheriff's election campaign? 75 A: No one needed to support me. 76 Q: Including lieutenants, correct, sir? 77 A: That is correct. 78 Q: In other words, you ought to be able to work with-as sheriff of Fort Bend County, you ought to be able to work with a lieutenant who had supported Sheriff Hillegeist, correct? 79 A: Yes. 80 Q: In fact, you ought to be able to work with, as sheriff of Fort Bend County, somebody who actively supported Sheriff Hillegeist, correct? 81 A: Yes, sir. 82 Q: So, in going through the decisions that you made, all the personnel decisions that you made--hiring, firing, demotions, et cetera--none of those--in none of those decisions was the political support of Hillegeist or you ever a factor at all? 83 ... 84 A: It was never a factor. 85 Not only does this testimony indicate that the Plaintiffs, none of whom occupied a position higher than lieutenant in the sheriff's department chain of command, did not occupy positions for which political affiliation is an appropriate employment criterion, it also indicates that their political activity in support of Hillegeist had little if any potential for undermining close working relationships within the sheriff's department or for impairing discipline by superiors or harmony among coworkers within the department. We therefore conclude that the Pickering /Connick balance weighs in favor of the Plaintiffs and that Molina therefore was not privileged to decline to rehire them based upon their political support for Hillegeist. 86