Opinion ID: 760419
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of the Statutes

Text: 19 Mack contends based on an agency theory that the terms receive and possess in 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) do not include the acts of private citizens receiving or possessing weapons from local law enforcement agencies in order to destroy them. He argues that the application of the statutes to this type of conduct would undermine and contradict long-established federal gun control policy that fosters and supports state-based gun control laws. Thus, Mack does not contest that he knowingly possessed or received the weapons at issue. Instead, he contends that the conditions under which he obtained and then exercised dominion and control over them exempts him from punishment under the statutes. We conclude, however, that Mack's conduct is not exempt from the prohibitions of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(k). 20 The plain language of the statutes indicate that they apply to any person. Title 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) states: 21 It shall be unlawful for any person ... to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. 22 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (emphasis added). Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) provides in relevant part: 23 It shall be unlawful for any person ... to possess or receive any firearm which has had the ... serial number removed, obliterated, or altered and has, at any time, been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 24 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (emphasis added). 25 There is a strong presumption that the plain language of [a] statute expresses congressional intent. Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135, 112 S.Ct. 515, 116 L.Ed.2d 496 (1991) (quotation and citation omitted). The presumption is rebutted only in rare and exceptional circumstances, when a contrary legislative intent is clearly expressed. Id. at 135-36, 112 S.Ct. 515 (quotation and citations omitted). We can find no indication that Congress clearly expressed a contrary intent other than that found in the plain language of the statute. Therefore, we are bound to take Congress at its word. Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 118 S.Ct. 838, 841, 139 L.Ed.2d 849 (1998). 26 In response to this construction of these statutes, Mack claims that such a literal approach will cause havoc to rain down upon the normal operations of local police agencies. He foresees 27 mischievous and absurd consequences: local police may still be able to confiscate illegal firearms, but they will no longer be able to store them in property rooms run by civilian custodians. 28 He also argues that law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and defense counsel will be precluded from having firearms examined by independent laboratories; and that the Alpine County California Sheriff's Department will be unable to ship such a firearm via UPS to the state forensic laboratory in California for examination. 29 Even if some of Mack's parade of imponderables were to come to pass, however, such consequences of a sweeping law against deadly weapons used primarily by robbers and other violent criminals are best addressed by the legislative branch of government, not by us. It is common knowledge that the primary purpose of shortening a shotgun or a rifle under the permitted length is to make it concealable and thus effective in the commission of serious crimes such as bank robbery, murder, drug trafficking, and gang violence. The same purpose attaches also to the obliteration of serial numbers on handguns: The act of obliteration makes them harder to trace. Congress surely is within its power when it acts decisively to protect the nation from such weapons, and to ensure that once they are seized, they do not immediately leak again into commerce or the private sector. 30 More to the point, however, the law has long recognized that the reach of a strictly-constructed statute stops short of nonsensical consequences. The Supreme Court has recognized that a statute shall be construed to exempt the government if application of the statute to the government would create an absurdity. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383-84, 58 S.Ct. 275, 82 L.Ed. 314 (1937). The statutes at issue here would create an absurd situation if any duly authorized employee of a state or local law enforcement agency could be punished for possessing confiscated weapons in the scope and course of the employee's duty. Neither statute expressly includes the government within their prohibitions. Thus, we conclude that local law enforcement agencies and their employees are able, without running afoul of the statutes, to possess the prohibited weapons in order generally to enforce the law, to prosecute defendants, and to destroy the weapons. 4 31 Mack's conduct does not fit within Nardone 's governmental exception. Mack was expressly and accurately warned by federal authorities on more than one occasion that he was not allowed to possess the contraband weapons. His federal license did not confer upon him the power to do so. Moreover, he was unable to show that any local law enforcement agency considered him to be its employee for one simple reason: he wasn't. When the evidence is viewed even in the light most favorable to him, at best he was a self-appointed private interloper who steadfastly created a false impression as to the scope of his authority in connection with his federal license. He came into possession of the weapons by misleading the police. 32 The facts of this case sharply illustrate the wisdom of Congress' purpose strictly to control the handling of dangerous weapons identified as contraband and to cause them to be confiscated and destroyed. To allow state or local law enforcement agencies to deliver unsupervised possession of such weapons into the hands of non-agency persons is tantamount to permitting the seized weapons to be released once more into the private world from which they were taken. To permit the release from government control of contraband once seized-be it cocaine, heroin, child pornography, knock-off Rolex watches, or anthrax-would be a senseless act. Practically speaking, once these weapons were under Mack's dominion and control, he had the raw power to do with these weapons whatever suited his fancy. The special attributes of government agencies that justify their regulated possession of contraband are nowhere to be found in this set of disquieting facts, either in Mack's perishable license or his sometimes bankrupt business. In fact, according to his own testimony, his previous store was invaded at least twice by burglars and robbers in 1992 resulting in the loss to the invaders of a lot of merchandise. One doubts that robbers and burglars would destroy the NFA weapons as required by law. Moreover, Mack's claim that his guiding purpose was to destroy the weapons is undercut by his desuetude in so doing. Under these circumstances, our dissenting colleague's anguished cries of federal prosecutorial power run amok strike a false note. 33 The jury had substantial evidence on which to convict him under both statutes of exercising dominion and control over the prohibited firearms.