Opinion ID: 2093052
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Separate Proceedings

Text: Because the double jeopardy clause prohibits punishing a defendant more than once in separate proceedings, we must also determine whether the civil forfeiture proceeding in the instant case was separate from the criminal proceeding initiated against Kimery. The State argues that the forfeiture and criminal proceedings against Kimery were not separate, but rather were part of a single, coordinated prosecution of Kimery. As a result, the State contends that the double jeopardy clause was not violated. In support of its argument, the State cites United States v. Millan (2d Cir.1993), 2 F.3d 17, and United States v. One Single Family Residence Located at 18755 North Bay Road, Miami (11th Cir.1994), 13 F.3d 1493, each decided prior to Kurth Ranch and holding that civil forfeiture and criminal cases pursued as part of a coordinated effort amounted to a single proceeding for double jeopardy purposes. The Supreme Court has made clear that the government may seek[] and obtain[] both the full civil penalty and the full range of statutorily authorized criminal penalties in the same proceeding, provided that the total punishment does not exceed that authorized by the legislature. ( Halper, 490 U.S. at 450, 109 S.Ct. at 1903, 104 L.Ed.2d at 503; see also Missouri v. Hunter (1983), 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678, 74 L.Ed.2d 535, 542.) Courts have employed varying approaches to determine when a civil forfeiture action and a parallel criminal prosecution can properly be considered components of a single proceeding so that the double jeopardy clause is not implicated. The courts have reached different results. The Second and Eleventh Circuits have held that parallel criminal and civil forfeiture actions constitute a single proceeding which does not implicate double jeopardy concerns. (See Millan, 2 F.3d at 20-21; One Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d at 1499.) In deciding that parallel civil and criminal actions constitute a single proceeding, the Second Circuit in Millan relied on the following factors: (1) warrants for the civil seizures and criminal arrests were issued on the same day, by the same judge, and were based on the same affidavit; (2) a stipulation entered into by the government and defendants included both the property seized in the civil forfeiture and named in the criminal indictment; (3) the forfeiture complaint incorporated the criminal indictment; and (4) the defendants were aware of the criminal charges against them when they entered into the stipulation. ( Millan, 2 F.3d at 20.) In resolving the issue, the court also stated that it did not find dispositive the fact that the civil and criminal actions were filed separately with their own docket number, noting that under the Federal system civil and criminal suits had to be filed and docketed separately. Therefore, courts must look past the procedural requirements and examine the essence of the actions at hand by determining when, how, and why the civil and criminal actions were initiated. ( Millan, 2 F.3d at 20.) The court further noted that one of the Supreme Court's concerns in Halper was that the government might act abusively in seeking a second punishment when it was dissatisfied with the punishment levied in the first action. The court in Millan noted, however, that such a concern was not present in that case because the civil and criminal actions were contemporaneous, not consecutive, and the parties were fully aware that the government intended to pursue all criminal and civil remedies against them regardless of the outcome of the proceeding. Millan, 2 F.3d at 20; accord One Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d at 1499 (relying in part on Millan in finding that the double jeopardy clause was not implicated when the government pursued simultaneous criminal and civil sanctions against a defendant within a single, coordinated prosecution); United States v. Smith (N.D.Ala.1995), 874 F.Supp. 347, 350 (following Single Family Residence). In contrast, other circuits have rejected the view expressed in Millan and have instead concluded that civil forfeiture actions and parallel criminal prosecutions constitute separate proceedings for double jeopardy purposes. (See United States v. Torres (7th Cir.1994), 28 F.3d 1463, 1465; United States Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216-18; see also Ursery, 59 F.3d at 575.) In reaching the above conclusion, the Ninth Circuit in United States Currency stated: We fail to see how two separate actions, one civil and one criminal, instituted at different times, tried at different times before different factfinders, presided over by different district judges, and resolved by separate judgments, constitute the same `proceeding.' In ordinary legal parlance, such actions are often characterized as `parallel proceedings,' but not as the `same proceeding.' A forfeiture case and a criminal prosecution would constitute the same proceeding only if they were brought in the same indictment and tried at the same time. (Emphasis in original.) ( United States Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216.) Although both proceedings resulted from the same violation of law, the court stated that it was unwilling to whitewash the double jeopardy violation in this case by affording constitutional significance to the label of `single, coordinated prosecution.' United States Currency, 33 F.3d at 1217. The apparent inconsistencies between the Ninth and Second Circuits' approaches may depend more on factual and procedural differences in the cases rather than a fundamental difference in double jeopardy analysis. However, the Ninth Circuit's rationale in United States Currency does suggest that parallel civil and criminal proceedings will always violate the double jeopardy clause (see United States Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216 (A forfeiture case and a criminal prosecution would constitute the same proceeding only if they were brought in the same indictment and tried at the same time (emphasis in original)); see also Ursery, 59 F.3d at 575), while under the Second Circuit's approach, parallel proceedings, although literally separate, may under certain circumstances constitute a single proceeding for double jeopardy purposes. The Second Circuit's approach, however, may be undercut by Kurth Ranch in which the civil and criminal prosecutions were filed contemporaneously, but were considered separate proceedings by the Supreme Court. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at ___ n. 21, 114 S.Ct. at 1947 n. 21, 128 L.Ed.2d at 780 n. 21 (remarking that the case involved separate sanctions imposed in successive proceedings); see also McCaslin, 863 F.Supp. at 1304; 1 D. Smith, Prosecution & Defenses of Forfeiture Cases § 12.10, at 12-141 n. 33 (1995). In the present case, we find that insofar as the existence of a single coordinated proceeding would satisfy the requirements of the double jeopardy clause, the facts in the present case fail to reveal such a single, coordinated proceeding. ( Ursery, 59 F.3d at 575.) Here, the State brought and tried the civil forfeiture action completely separately from the criminal prosecution. The actions were initiated and docketed separately. The State sought to try the actions at different times and before different judges which resulted in separate judgments against defendant. The civil forfeiture complaint did not incorporate the criminal indictment, nor did it refer to the indictment. Moreover, the cases were handled by different attorneys from the State's Attorney's office, and there is no indication in the record of any communication between the prosecuting authorities in the forfeiture and criminal cases. The only coinciding factor between the forfeiture and criminal proceedings was that they were based on the same offense. This factor alone, however, is insufficient to support a determination that the actions in question were part of a single proceeding, even under the Second Circuit's analysis. Moreover, we find that the fact the State instituted and proceeded with the forfeiture action against defendant before it knew the outcome of the criminal proceedings is also not outcome determinative. (See McCaslin, 863 F.Supp. at 1305 (asserting that the prosecutor's state of mind cannot determine whether a defendant has been placed in double jeopardy).) Based on the foregoing discussion, we conclude that the forfeiture proceeding was separate from the criminal proceeding and not part of a single, coordinated procedure. See 1979 Cadillac DeVille, 632 So.2d at 1229; Oakes, 872 F.Supp. at 824-25. Because we have found double jeopardy applies in Kimery's case, we hold that further prosecution of Kimery following the forfeiture of his vehicle was prohibited by the double jeopardy clause.