Opinion ID: 198329
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Davis & Geck's Appeal

Text: 10 Davis & Geck argues that its post-verdict motions were improperly denied because Ramos failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that he had been constructively discharged. It further argues that the district court erred by failing to require proof that Davis & Geck intended to force Ramos to quit as an element of a claim of constructive discharge. Neither argument is availing. 11
12 A judgment as a matter of law is only warranted if no reasonable jury could have returned a verdict adverse to the moving party. Havinga v. Crowley Towing & Transp. Co., 24 F.3d 1480, 1483 (1st Cir.1994). In reviewing the denial of a request for such a judgment, we may not assess the credibility of witnesses, evaluate the weight of the evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony, but rather must view all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 28 (1st Cir.1992). Our review of the denial of a request for a new trial is similarly circumscribed, but counsels ample deference to the district court's exercise of discretion. Rolon-Alvarado v. Municipality of San Juan, 1 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir.1993). A new trial should only be ordered if [the court] believes that the outcome is against the clear weight of the evidence such that upholding the verdict will result in a miscarriage of justice. Velazquez v. Figueroa-Gomez, 996 F.2d 425, 427 (1st Cir.1993). 13 The court instructed the jury to apply an objective standard of constructive discharge, requiring a determination whether work conditions were so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign. Calhoun v. Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 561 (1st Cir.1986) (quoting Alicea Rosado v. Garcia-Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir.1977)). While the focus is upon the 'reasonable state of mind of the putative discriminatee' [in this case Ramos] ... the law does not permit an employee's subjective perceptions to govern a claim of constructive discharge. Id. (internal citations omitted). The question, then, is whether Ramos presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to credit his claim that a reasonable employee would have felt compelled to resign under the circumstances. 14 It is true that Ramos' demotion did not entail changes in salary and benefits. However, the fact that salary and benefits have not been decreased has never been held to be a conclusive factor; courts applying the objective standard in ADEA constructive dismissal cases consider a variety of often case-specific factors. Serrano-Cruz v. DFI Puerto Rico, Inc., 109 F.3d 23, 26 (1st Cir.1997). Davis & Geck complains that a mere change in cubicle location, change in work title, change in duties, a requirement that the employee work on his vacation time, and an extremely harsh confrontation with a supervisor can not accumulate into a constructive discharge. Ramos, 968 F.Supp. at 779. However, this catalogue is incomplete and the totality of the facts may not seem mere to a reasonable employee, or to a reasonable jury. We agree with the district court that the jury was entitled to find that Davis & Geck constructively discharged Ramos.
15 Davis & Geck argues that the imposition of objectively oppressive work conditions should not suffice to establish a constructive discharge without proof that the employer created the intolerable work conditions with the specific intent of forcing the employee to resign. Such a requirement of proof of employer intent would plainly be at odds with our settled precedent: We have long applied an 'objective standard' in determining whether an employer's actions have forced an employee to resign. Serrano-Cruz, 109 F.3d at 26 (citing Calhoun, 798 F.2d at 561). The test is whether a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign Calhoun, 798 F.2d at 561 (emphasis added), irrespective of employer intent. 3 16 Davis & Geck cites language in our Calhoun opinion in arguing for consideration of the employer's intent. In Calhoun, we used an extended quote from a Fourth Circuit opinion which reads in part: An employee is protected from a calculated effort to pressure him [or her] into resignation through the imposition of unreasonably harsh conditions, in excess of those faced by his [or her] coworkers. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir.1985)). Although this reference to a calculated effort may suggest that proof of the employer's intent is an element of the constructive discharge, we articulated the constructive discharge standard in Calhoun as an objective one and we have not required proof of employer intent in subsequent cases. 4 See id.; Serrano-Cruz, 109 F.3d at 26; Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 3 F.3d 476, 481 (1st Cir.1993). 17 Indeed, such a requirement would be inconsistent with the purpose of the constructive discharge doctrine to protect employees from conditions so unreasonably harsh that a reasonable person would feel compelled to leave the job. The doctrine reflects the sensible judgment that employers charged with employment discrimination ought to be accountable for creating working conditions that are so intolerable to a reasonable employee as to compel that person to resign. One can imagine an employer who subjectively desires an employee to remain, so long as the employee is willing to accept unreasonable, oppressive conditions. Such an employer commits a constructive discharge. In this case, the jury was free to find that a constructive discharge had occurred without proof of Davis & Geck's intent to cause such a discharge.