Opinion ID: 757428
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence to Convict Castaneda

Text: 75 Castaneda also challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his conspiracy conviction. He argues that because he was acquitted on the possession count, his conviction for conspiracy must be reversed as it was essential to the conviction for conspiracy that Castaneda possess the cocaine. He further contends that the only evidence presented by the government to support his conviction was his presence in the vehicle containing cocaine. 76 This court need not address Castaneda's argument that his conviction for conspiracy was inconsistent with his acquittal on the possession count. Consistency in the verdict is not necessary. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932); see also United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 62-64, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984) (reaffirming rule established by Dunn ); United States v. Jaynes, 75 F.3d 1493, 1508-09 (10th Cir.1996) (upholding conspiracy conviction despite defendant's acquittal of aiding and abetting substantive offenses). This court's review is thus limited to determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support Castaneda's conspiracy conviction. 12 See Powell, 469 US. at 67; Jaynes, 75 F.3d at 1509. 77 Contrary to Castaneda's assertions, there was ample evidence to support his conviction. Much of the evidence supporting Briseno-Mendez's conviction also supports Castaneda's conviction. Like Briseno-Mendez, Castaneda was a participant in a highly suspicious three-day trip. From evidence that the Bondo was still fresh, jurors could infer that the cocaine was placed in the vehicle during the trip. As discussed above, the evidence that the modifications to the car were apparent from the inside is sufficient to support an inference that the passengers in the vehicle knew the cocaine was present. Furthermore, Farrier's boyfriend testified that Castaneda and Briseno-Mendez fit the description of two of the persons who were present when the vehicle was purchased. 78 In addition, checkpoint agents testified that Castaneda lied about his and Briseno-Mendez's citizenship status; that Castaneda originally claimed he had borrowed the car from one of his girlfriends and changed his story after cocaine was found; and that Castaneda told them he had traveled from Bell to El Paso, spending only one night in El Paso, just to get away from Bell and to see what El Paso was like. At trial, however, Castaneda testified to a different version of events. He claimed that the car had come from Silva's daughter; that he drove all night, completely exhausted, because Silva had offered him an undisclosed amount of money; and that he never lied about his or Briseno-Mendez's citizenship status. Additionally, there were discrepancies between what Castaneda told agents he did while in El Paso and his own testimony as to what he did during the trip. Significantly, Castaneda claimed for the first time at trial that he and Silva entered Mexico. His testimony regarding the alleged trip to Mexico was not supported by a 72-hour lane check and was internally inconsistent. 79 The above evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Castaneda agreed with Silva and Briseno-Mendez to possess cocaine, that Castaneda had knowledge of the essential objectives of the conspiracy, that he voluntarily participated in the conspiracy, and that the coconspirators were interdependent. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence supports an inference that Castaneda acquired the vehicle which was used to transport the cocaine, either borrowing it from a friend or helping to purchase it. There is also evidence that the modifications to the vehicle were apparent from inside the car; jurors could thus infer Castaneda had knowledge of the cocaine. Castaneda did most, if not all, of the driving and the explanation he offered for the 800-mile trip lacked credibility. Castaneda's actions in acquiring the car, driving between Bell and El Paso, and trying to bluff defendants' way through the checkpoint helped further the defendants' common goal of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute. There was thus sufficient evidence to support Castaneda's conspiracy conviction. SENTENCING GUIDELINES A. Minimal Participant 80 Castaneda contends the district court erred in failing to find that he was a minimal participant in the conspiracy. He argues that by acquitting him of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, the jury determined that he played a minimal role in the conspiracy. Section 3B1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides a four-level decrease in a defendant's offense level if the court finds the defendant was a minimal participant in the criminal activity, a two-level decrease if it finds the defendant was a minor participant, and a three-level decrease if it finds the defendant was more than a minimal participant but less than a minor participant. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. In determining whether a defendant is entitled to a reduction under § 3B1.2, courts examine the defendant's culpability relative to that of other participants in the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 application notes 1, 3; see also United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1524 (10th Cir.1995). 81 Castaneda bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to an offense level reduction under § 3B1.2. See Williamson, 53 F.3d at 1523. A district court's decision that a defendant is not a minor or minimal participant in an offense is a factual finding which this court reviews only for clear error. See id. A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it is without factual support in the record, or if after reviewing the evidence we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 82 Based on our review of the record, this court cannot say the district court's finding that Castaneda was neither a minimal nor minor participant in the conspiracy was clearly erroneous. Castaneda's acquittal on the possession count does not require this court to hold otherwise. Jurors were asked to determine whether or not Castaneda was guilty of the offenses, not to determine his relative role in each offense. As a consequence, Castaneda's acquittal on the possession charge does not necessarily reflect upon his relative participation in the conspiracy. Nor does Castaneda's denial of culpability compel a finding that he was either a minor or minimal participant. As discussed above, there is substantial evidence that Castaneda was a knowing participant in the conspiracy and played a critical role in transporting a large amount of cocaine. 83 Finally, even if the district court had found that Castaneda was recruited by Silva and Briseno-Mendez to act as a courier, it would not be required to grant him an offense level reduction under § 3B1.2. While commentary to § 3B1.2 suggests that a downward adjustment may be appropriate where an individual was recruited as a courier for a single smuggling transaction involving a small amount of drugs, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 application note 2, this court has firmly rejected the argument that a defendant's status as a courier alone compels an offense level reduction under § 3B1.2. See United States v. Ballard, 16 F.3d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir.1994) ([T]his court has refused to adopt per se rule that couriers are minor or minimal participants.); United States v. Carter, 971 F.2d 597, 600 (10th Cir.1992) (discussing indispensable role couriers play); see also United States v. Montoya, 24 F.3d 1248, 1249 (10th Cir.1994) (collecting cases). Even if Castaneda was involved in the conspiracy solely as a courier, there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's conclusion that he was not a minor or minimal participant, especially in light of the distance traveled and the quantity of cocaine found in the vehicle. The district court therefore did not err in denying Castaneda a downward adjustment under § 3B1.2. B. Criminal History Category 84 Finally, Castaneda argues that due to numerous substance abuse related convictions, his criminal history exaggerated his past criminal conduct and his need to be punished and that the district court therefore should have departed downward in sentencing him. This court lacks jurisdiction to review a district court's discretionary decision not to depart downward absent evidence that the district court erroneously believed it lacked authority to depart. See United States v. Belt, 89 F.3d 710, 714-15 (10th Cir.1996).  '[U]nless the judge's language unambiguously states that the judge does not believe he has authority to downward depart, we will not review his decision.'  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 30 F.3d 1318, 1319 (10th Cir.1994)). There is no evidence that the district court did not believe it had discretion to depart downward in this case; we therefore do not have jurisdiction to review Castaneda's claim.