Opinion ID: 2689
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Because Maiwand was ordered removed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B), [2] we have jurisdiction to review only constitutional claims or questions of law raised [in his] petition for review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see also § 1252(a)(2)(C) (providing that its jurisdictional limitations apply when an alien is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in, inter alia, section 1227(a)(2)(B)). [T]he term `constitutional claims' clearly relates to claims brought pursuant to provisions of the Constitution of the United States. Xiao Ji Chen v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 315, 324 (2d Cir.2006). The phrase questions of law encompasses the same types of issues [over which] courts traditionally exercised [jurisdiction] in habeas review over Executive detentions, id. at 326-27, which the Supreme Court has noted is broader than habeas review over other types of detentions resulting from judicial determinations, St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301, 121 S.Ct. 2271. In determining whether we have jurisdiction, we must study the arguments asserted . . . [and] determine, regardless of the rhetoric employed in the petition, whether it merely quarrels over the correctness of the factual findings or justification for the discretionary choices. Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 329. If so, we do not have jurisdiction to review it. See id. We have observed, generally, that we have jurisdiction to review the application of law to fact, including what evidence may satisfy a party's burden of proof. Gui Yin Liu v. INS, 475 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
Former INA section 212(c) granted the Attorney General discretion to waive deportation orders issued to LPRs who have lived in the United States for at least seven consecutive years. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 294-95, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001). This provision was repealed by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). Section 212(c)'s waiver of inadmissibility relief nonetheless remains available to aliens who pled guilty to crimes prior to the month of April 1997, in which IIRIRA became effective, and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for § 212(c) relief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326, 121 S.Ct. 2271. Maiwand first disputes the IJ's and BIA's conclusions that his testimony about the heroin transaction in his hearings before the IJ was inconsistent. He asserts that the apparent inconsistency resulted from superficial questioning of him about his role in the offense at his first hearing. Because this attack essentially disputes the correctness of an IJ's fact-finding, Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 329, we are without jurisdiction to review it. Maiwand next argues that his strong family ties to United States citizens, along with other favorable factors, warrant a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(c) notwithstanding the negative weight that attaches to his drug conviction. This argument amounts to a challenge to the wisdom of [the IJ's] exercise of discretion, id., and we therefore have no jurisdiction to review it. Maiwand also asserts that the BIA ignored a psychiatrist's report that provided evidence of his rehabilitation and the hardships his family would endure if he was removed. He contends that the BIA thereby abused its discretion and violated his right to due process. But while an IJ's unambiguous mischaracterization of the record raises a question of law, Gui Yin Liu, 475 F.3d at 138, an argument that merely quibbles with the IJ's description of the facts, Khan v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir.2007), does not. Here, the BIA explicitly referenced the report in its opinion. Accordingly, we conclude that Maiwand's complaint regarding the extent of the agency's reliance on the report amounts to nothing more than a quarrel[ ] over the . . . justification for the discretionary choices made, a decision we cannot review. Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 329.
Regulations implementing CAT provide that once an alien establishes that `it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal,' the United States may not remove him or her to that country. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 184 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)). Maiwand contends that the BIA failed to cite any basis for its decision that he had failed to meet his burden of proof and that the decision was clearly in error, unsupported by the record, and without any basis in fact. Maiwand Br. at 51, 52. Because the latter argument essentially disputes the correctness of an IJ's fact-finding, Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 329, we are without jurisdiction to review it, id. To the extent that Maiwand challenges the IJ's application of facts to the standard of proof required under the CAT regulations, we find the challenge to be without merit.
Maiwand also contends that his motion to terminate the removal proceedings should have been granted because he is statutorily ineligible for removal on the ground that his refugee status was never revoked in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4). This is a question of law that we do have jurisdiction to review. See Romanishyn v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 455 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir.2006) (Whether an alien who entered the country as a refugee and subsequently acquired LPR status may be placed in removal proceedings even though his refugee status was never terminated under 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4), is a question of law.).