Opinion ID: 200358
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Common Law Presumption of Access

Text: 56 In addition to any constitutional right, there is also a presumption of public access to judicial records under the common law. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978); Anderson, 805 F.2d at 13. The Herald argues that this presumption invalidates the sealing of Connolly's CJA eligibility documents. Assuming that any common law right has not been displaced by the statute, see Gonzales, 150 F.3d at 1263, we hold that the presumption is not applicable to these types of documents, and that if it were, the magistrate judge still correctly exercised his discretion in finding it overcome by countervailing interests. 57 The common law presumption is limited to judicial records. As we have established already, we do not think that CJA eligibility documents qualify as such. Rather, they are administrative paperwork generated as part of a ministerial process ancillary to the trial. While the review of these documents is conducted by a district judge or magistrate judge, that role could have been assigned to another institution. 58 In cases considering the common law right, this court has often used a definition of a judicial record which refers to materials on which a court relies in determining the litigants' substantive rights. See, e.g., Providence Journal, 293 F.3d at 16 (quoting Anderson, 805 F.2d at 13). The Herald seizes on this language and argues that the right to counsel in a criminal trial is, of course, a substantive right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. This argument takes our shorthand definition out of context. In Anderson, where it originated, the phrase was used to distinguish documents presented to a judge in connection with a discovery dispute from the record on which a judge actually decides the central issues in a case. 805 F.2d at 13 ([D]iscovery is fundamentally different from those proceedings for which a [common law] public right of access has been recognized.). Similarly, we have applied this definition to documents on which a court relied in approving a consent decree because that approval settled a civil enforcement action. Standard Fin. Mgmt., 830 F.2d at 408-09. 59 Here, in contrast, the court did not conduct its review of Connolly's finances in order to dispose of any issue as to the elements of the criminal charges against him. As in Anderson, the CJA eligibility documents related merely to the judge's role in management of the trial. Cf. Standard Fin. Mgmt., 830 F.2d at 408 (excluding from presumption documents which play no role in the adjudication process). Other administrative decisions that effectuate constitutional rights are made outside the judiciary entirely, and create no presumption of access to the documents used in the decision. For example, prisoners are constitutionally entitled to medical treatment, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), but the decision to provide treatment is not thereby judicial, nor do a prisoner's medical records thereby become judicial documents. Cf. Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 315-16 (3d Cir.2001) (privacy of prisoner medical information). 60 Even assuming that CJA eligibility documents were covered by a common law presumption of access, we would still affirm the magistrate judge's decision to maintain the sealing of Connolly's CJA application materials. The standard for our review is abuse of discretion. Siedle v. Putnam Invs., Inc., 147 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir.1998) (The trial court enjoys considerable leeway in making decisions of this sort.). [T]he decision as to [common law] access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599, 98 S.Ct. 1306. The magistrate judge's short but clear order balanced the public interest in the information against privacy interests, and his conclusion was not an abuse of discretion. 61 Personal financial information, such as one's income or bank account balance, is universally presumed to be private, not public. See United States v. Amodeo ( Amodeo II ), 71 F.3d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir.1995) (courts analyzing common law presumption should consider the degree to which the subject matter is traditionally considered private rather than public). The magistrate judge sensibly concluded that Connolly's strong interest in the privacy of his and his family's personal financial information outweighs any common law presumption in these circumstances. 62 Recognition of the importance of financial privacy is also enshrined in public policy. The Freedom of Information Act, applicable only to executive branch materials, exempts personal and confidential financial information from disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2000). Congress recently singled out financial information for special privacy protection when it approved an overhaul of the nation's banking regulations. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLB Act), Pub.L. No. 106-102, §§ 501-510 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2000)); Trans Union LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 295 F.3d 42 (D.C.Cir.2002) (upholding regulations implementing GLB Act's privacy provisions). See generally Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/glba. States are also considering greater protection for financial privacy. See Gen. Accounting Office, Financial Privacy (April 2002) (summarizing state implementation of GLB Act's provisions concerning insurance industry); A. Clymer, North Dakota Tightens Law on Bank Data and Privacy, N.Y. Times, June 13, 2002, at A28 (reporting that 72 percent of voters in statewide referendum supported tighter financial privacy restrictions than federal law); R. Gold, States Mull Opt-In, Opt-Out Rules, Wall St. J., Mar. 13, 2002, at B8, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3388589 (reporting greater interest in state legislatures because consumers [are] increasingly worried about having their financial data open to scrutiny). 63 In addition, the Supreme Court has explained that a court considering the common law presumption enjoys supervisory power to deny access where court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes and to insure that its records are not `used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal.' Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (quoting In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 29 A. 259, 259 (R.I. 1893)). The magistrate judge would be well within his discretion to consider this factor as well. 64 Finally, the invasiveness of the disclosure sought here is further intensified because the information pertains not only to Connolly, but also to his wife and children. See Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050 (giving increased weight to privacy interests of innocent third parties). 65 Thus, even if a common law presumption applied to Connolly's CJA forms and statement of prior legal fees, we would still affirm the magistrate judge's decision.