Opinion ID: 1096587
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court erred by denying a heat of passion jury instruction.

Text: ¶ 23. Stack contends he was entitled to a heat of passion jury instruction as to Count II (the victim was Larry Albert Chopones). Stack further contends he lacked the requisite intent to kill Chopones and that a manslaughter instruction should have been given. Stack made a Weathersby argument as to the issue of malice. See Weathersby v. State, 165 Miss. 207, 147 So. 481 (1933). ¶ 24. Mississippi's law is well settled as to appellate review of a trial court's grant or denial of jury instructions: The standard of review for challenges to jury instructions is as follows: [T]he instructions are to be read together as a whole, with no one instruction to be read alone or taken out of context. A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case. However, the trial judge may also properly refuse the instructions if he finds them to incorrectly state the law or to repeat a theory fairly covered in another instruction or to be without proper foundation in the evidence of the case. Humphrey v. State, 759 So.2d 368, 380 (Miss.2000)(citing Heidel v. State, 587 So.2d 835, 842 (Miss. 1991) (citations omitted)). Woodham v. State, 779 So.2d 158, 163 (Miss.2001). Thomas first complains of the trial court's refusal of D 14, which reads as follows: You are instructed that because the defendant was the only eye-witness to the alleged shooting, his version, if reasonable, must be accepted as true, unless substantially contradicted in material particulars by credible witnesses for the State or by facts of common knowledge. Thomas correctly states that this is derived from our decision in Weathersby v. State, 165 Miss. 207, 147 So. 481 (1933). He further directs our attention to Blanks v. State, 547 So.2d 29, 33 (Miss. 1989), where we reaffirmed the Weathersby rule and said the Weathersby rule is simply a statement of a well-recognized principle of law that where the defendant's, and sole eyewitness's, version of a slaying is uncontradicted, reasonable and credible, it must be believed. And, if such version creates an absolute legal defense, he is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. However, the State correctly argues that [t]he Weathersby rule ... is not a jury instruction but a guide for the circuit judge in determining whether a defendant is entitled to a directed verdict. Blanks v. State, 547 So.2d at 34; Griffin v. State, 495 So.2d 1352, 1355 (Miss. 1986); Harveston v. State, 493 So.2d 365 (Miss.1986). Consequently, this assignment of error is without merit. Thomas v. State, 818 So.2d 335, 349-50 (¶¶ 47-50) (Miss.2002). ¶ 25. In essence, Stack argues that he initially perceived an attack of his friend, Gene Livingston, and that his initial actions were taken in self-defense of his friend. However, Stack goes on to argue that prior to the cessation of the stabbing, the existing facts and circumstances created a Weathersby scenario. In support of this contention, Stack asserts that the only other person who was present at this time besides Stack and Chopones was Livingston, who did not testify at the trial. The State did, however, present a recorded statement taken from Stack several hours after the murder, in which Stack said: A. He (Chopones) reached for Gene (Livingston) and I took his arm away. Q. Then how, then how did ... A. And I stabbed him with his own knife. .... Q. He pulled it out and then what happened? A. He pulled it out of his own God D___pocket and I took it away from him and I hurt him. Q. What did he say when he pulled it out? A. He didn't say much because he was drunk but when people f___ with my friends, I go ballistic and when that, uh, the black people came from the uh, the store shand said oh my God, they're hurting him. They're like three f____ing black dudes on me. What the f___am I supposed to do? Yea, I stuck that m_____f_____, man when he (Thomas) tried to hit me, after he hit me hit me in the head once, once with that stick took my arm and wrapped it around and pulled up and stuck him, f___ yea I did. ... Q. Did you stick him or did you cut him, the white guy (Chopones)? A. No, I, I stuck him about 2 or 3 times and then I, I, then, do you want me to say into there? I sliced his throat. I didn't mean to hurt the old man but he never should have pulled a knife. In response to Stack's Weathersby argument, the State asserts that it not only relied on Stack's statement, but also on the forensic evidence. Chopones sustained extensive bruising, along with approximately nineteen slicing-type wounds and thirty stab woundsfour in the front, one in the upper abdomen, and the remainder distributed over the back from the base of the neck down both sides of the chest to the left flank with the lowest going into the left kidney. Many of these wounds were inflicted by Stack after Chopones was incapable of movement. ¶ 26. Stack is incorrect in asserting that we must rely on the Weathersby rule even though Stack's statement is the only eyewitness testimony available. The forensic evidence available in this case presents an issue for the jury to decide as to the question of whether Stack's actions were indicative of malice. The jury was correctly instructed as to the law in this area. There was no evidence presented to justify an instruction involving heat of passion manslaughter as to the killing of Chopones. Therefore, we find this issue to be without merit.