Opinion ID: 3036695
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Disclosure of Who Pays for a Communication

Text: Once registered, a nongroup entity must also comply with two provisions requiring that it disclose who is paying for a communication. AKRTL challenges both provisions. First, Alaska Stat. § 15.13.090 requires that most campaign communications be accompanied by a statement indicating who financed the communication. Specifically, it provides: (a) All communications shall be clearly identified by the words “paid for by” followed by the name and address of the candidate, group, nongroup entity, or individual paying for the communication. In addition, candidates and groups may identify the name of their campaign chairperson. (b) The provisions of (a) of this section do not apply when the communication
independently of any group or nongroup ALASKA RIGHT TO LIFE v. MILES 3035 entity and independently of any other indi- vidual;
ballot proposition as that term is defined by AS 15.13.065(c); and
(A) a billboard or sign; or (B) printed material other than an advertisement made in a newspaper or other periodical. As defined by § 15.13.400(3), a “communication” means an “announcement or advertisement” that “directly or indirectly identif[ies] a candidate or proposition[.]” Second, Alaska Stat. § 15.13.135(b) requires much the same kind of disclosure as § 15.13.090 for “independent expenditures.” Specifically, it provides: (b) An individual, group, or nongroup entity who makes independent expenditures for a mass mailing, for distribution of campaign literature of any sort, for a television, radio, newspaper, or magazine advertisement, or any other communication that supports or opposes a candidate for election to public office (1) shall comply with AS 15.13.090; and (2) shall place the following statement in the mailing, literature, advertisement, or other communication so that it is readily and easily discernible: This NOTICE TO VOTERS is required by Alaska law. (I/we) certify that this 3036 ALASKA RIGHT TO LIFE v. MILES (mailing/literature/advertisement) is not authorized, paid for, or approved by the candidate. [18] In effect, both provisions require that voters be informed of the source and nature of funding for campaign communications. Section 15.13.090 requires, with certain specified exceptions, that communications be accompanied by such information. Section 15.13.135(b) requires that, in addition to complying with § 15.13.090, communications supporting a candidate paid for by independent expenditures must notify voters that the candidate did not authorize or pay for the communication. AKRTL does not argue that Alaska Stat. §§ 15.13.090 and 15.13.135(b) require disclosures for communications whose anonymity is protected under McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), and Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004). AKRTL’s challenge is quite narrow. It only argues that to the degree disclosure of its identity is required for “issue advocacy” communications or their “functional equivalent,” there is no compelling state interest that would justify such a requirement. We disagree for two reasons. First, as discussed above, the Court held in McConnell that the line drawn in Buckley between express and issue advocacy is not constitutionally compelled. Second, even if there were some relevant protection of issue advocacy, and even if disclosures of the nongroup entity’s identity were required in connection with such issue advocacy, there is a compelling state interest justifying such a requirement. [19] Leaving aside McIntyre-type communications which are not implicated by the Alaska law, we believe that there is a compelling state interest in informing voters who or what entity is trying to persuade them to vote in a certain way. The Court in McConnell quoted approvingly from the opinion of the district court in justifying a requirement in BCRA that the ALASKA RIGHT TO LIFE v. MILES 3037 identity of a corporation or labor union funding “purported ‘issue ads’ ” be disclosed to the voters. The district court had written, Plaintiffs [who object to the disclosure requirement] never satisfactorily answer the question of how “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” speech can occur when organizations hide themselves from the scrutiny of the voting public . . . . Plaintiffs’ argument for striking down BCRA’s disclosure provisions does not reinforce the precious First Amendment values that Plaintiffs argue are trampled by BCRA, but ignores the competing First Amendment interests in individual citizens seeking to make informed choices in the political marketplace. 540 U.S. at 197 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 251 F.Supp.2d 176, 237 (D.D.C. 2003)). We understand the reasons given by the Court in MCFL for differentiating between corporations and labor unions, on the one hand, and so-called MCFL organizations, on the other, when substantial burdens on raising or spending money for political speech are at issue. But we do not believe that those reasons apply when disclosure of the entity funding a campaign communication is at issue. “[I]ndividual citizens seeking to make informed choices in the political marketplace,” id., have an equal need to know what entity is funding a communication, whether that entity is a corporation, a labor union, or a “nongroup entity” as defined under Alaska law. [20] We therefore conclude that the compelling state interests of “providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding any appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering restrictions,” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196, justify the application of Alaska Stat. §§ 15.13.090 and 15.13.135(b) to nongroup entities. 3038 ALASKA RIGHT TO LIFE v. MILES b. As-Applied Challenge to Disclosure Requirements [21] In McConnell, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ as-applied challenges to disclosure requirements in BCRA because the plaintiffs had not presented evidence in the district court establishing the “requisite ‘reasonable probability’ of harm” to persons making the required disclosures. 540 U.S. at 199. In this case, as in McConnell, AKRTL has not shown a “ ‘reasonable probability’ of harm,” in the sense intended in McConnell, as a result of its being required to make the disclosures required under the Alaska campaign law. We therefore reject its as-applied challenge.