Opinion ID: 3171512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Bravata’s Attorneys

Text: Because Bravata lacked the means to retain an attorney, the court appointed two defense attorneys with white-collar defense experience. During trial preparations, Bravata asked the court to appoint a securities attorney and later asked to represent himself with “assistance of counsel” for procedural matters. The court denied the request for a securities specialist, and Bravata later withdrew his request to proceed pro se. Bravata now claims these rulings violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice, a structural error requiring reversal. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006). Because the government employed a securities attorney, Bravata argues that the Sixth Amendment demanded appointment of a securities attorney for the defense as well. Although a criminal defendant enjoys the right to counsel, an “indigent defendant has no right to have a particular attorney represent him and therefore must demonstrate good cause to warrant substitution of counsel.” United States v. Mooneyham, 473 F.3d 280, 291 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Iles, 906 F.2d 1122, 1130 (6th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We reverse a district court’s denial of substitution only when the - 20 - Case Nos. 13-2380, 13-2381, 13-2591, 15-1370, United States v. Bravata court abused its discretion. Id. We consider timeliness of the substitution request, the adequacy of the inquiry into the request, and attorney-client conflict. Id. Bravata’s motion was timely, but the other factors weigh against finding an abuse of discretion. During its inquiry into Bravata’s substitution request, the court explained that the appointed attorneys are “both experienced criminal practitioners and they both engage[] in white collar crime cases.” And Bravata admitted “there’s nothing wrong with the court-appointed attorneys” other than they were not securities-law specialists, and revealed no conflict or lack of communication that hampered his defense. Without more, we cannot find that the court abused its discretion in refusing to substitute a securities attorney for two experienced whitecollar litigators, especially where the court left open the possibility of obtaining an expert to testify regarding the securities business. Bravata also protests the court’s denial of his motion for limited hybrid representation allowing him to cross-examine the government’s witnesses. Because “there is no constitutional right to hybrid representation,” the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bravata’s request. United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 681 n.12 (6th Cir. 2004). Post-conviction conflicts between Bravata and appointed counsel eventually led Bravata to appeal pro se. Because the district court never permitted appointed counsel to withdraw, counsel noticed Bravata’s joinder in several motions filed by Antonio in the district court. By accepting these filings, Bravata argues, the court committed misconduct. Bravata directs us to no authority providing that a district court commits misconduct when it accepts counsel’s filings when it has not yet permitted counsel to withdraw. - 21 - Case Nos. 13-2380, 13-2381, 13-2591, 15-1370, United States v. Bravata