Opinion ID: 173058
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Application of Summary Judgment Standards

Text: On appeal, Mr. Kannady argues that the district court erred in holding that Krebs acted pursuant to the OPPRS and, consequently, with reference to an age of hiring... in effect under applicable State or local law on March 3, 1983. 29 U.S.C. § 623(j)(1)(A). First, Mr. Kannady argues that the district court erred in holding that, regardless of the precise date when Krebs refused to hire Mr. Kannady, Krebs acted under applicable law because it based Krebs's decision on the OPPRS. According to Mr. Kannady, if Krebs had refused to hire Mr. Kannady before October 2004, it could not have been acting under applicable law, since the precepts of the OPPRS only apply to participating municipalities, and Krebs was not a participating municipality before October 2004. Next, Mr. Kannady attacks the district court's conclusion that Krebs's refusal to hire Mr. Kannady actually occurred after October 2004 and there was no genuine factual dispute about this material matter. In support of this argument he first claims that Krebs failed to carry its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact because it offered no undisputed proof or facts concerning when the discriminatory conduct took place. Aplt. Opening Br. at 15. And second, Mr. Kannady argues that the district court erred in determining that it was undisputed that the recorded conversations between Mr. Kannady and Chief Cook occurred after October 2004. Our resolution of Mr. Kannady's contentions regarding the district court's application of summary judgment standards ultimately turns upon the district court's conclusion that all material facts indicated that Krebs refused to hire Mr. Kannady only after October 2004 (i.e., only after it affirmatively began participating in the OPPRS). If this conclusion is affirmed, there is no dispute that § 623(j)(1) is satisfied, because Krebs would clearly have acted pursuant to a plan in effect under covered state law. As Mr. Kannady highlights, Krebs did not argue in its motion for summary judgment that Krebs was entitled to summary judgment because it was undisputed that Krebs refused to hire Mr. Kannady only after October 2004. On the contrary, Krebs argued that the date it refused to hire Mr. Kannady was irrelevant. Aplt.App. at 397. Because Krebs made no attempt to demonstrate that the alleged discrimination did not occur until after October 2004, Mr. Kannady believes that Krebs failed to carry its initial burden of demonstrating that there was no evidence in the record to support judgment for Mr. Kannady. See Trainor, 318 F.3d at 979 (Even when ... the moving party does not have the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, it has both the initial burden of production on a motion for summary judgment and the burden of establishing that summary judgment is appropriate as a matter of law.). Thus, Mr. Kannady believes the district court improperly granted Krebs's motion for summary judgment. See id. (If a moving party fails to carry its initial burden of production, ... the nonmoving party may defeat the motion for summary judgment without producing anything. (quoting Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir.2000))). However, we conclude that even assuming arguendo that Krebsas the moving partyfailed to carry its initial burden under the analytic framework for summary judgment, the district court did not err in determining that Krebs could avail itself of § 623(j)(1)'s protection, based upon the record evidence concerning the date when Krebs denied employment to Mr. Kannady. Under our working assumptioni.e., that Krebs failed to carry its initial burdenwe view the district court's determination as effectively being a sua sponte resolution of the matter at issue. And, in limited circumstances, including those present here, the law permits district courts at the summary judgment phase to perform precisely that sua sponte function. Accordingly, so long as our de novo review confirms that the district court was correct in its sua sponte resolution of the issuethat is, when it held that there was no genuine factual dispute that Krebs denied Mr. Kannady employment after October 2004then we discern no error in the district court's ultimate conclusion (absent a subterfuge under § 623(j)(2)) that summary judgment was properly entered in favor of Krebs. A district court may grant summary judgment on a ground not formally raised in a summary judgment motion, `so long as the losing party was on notice that she had to come forward with all of her evidence.' Howell Petroleum Corp. v. Leben Oil Corp., 976 F.2d 614, 620 (10th Cir.1992) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); see Holmes v. Utah, Dep't of Workforce Servs., 483 F.3d 1057, 1067 (10th Cir.2007). If a losing party was not prejudiced by the lack of notice, we will not reverse simply because the grant of summary judgment came sua sponte. [8] Ward v. Utah, 398 F.3d 1239, 1245-46 (10th Cir.2005). A party is procedurally prejudiced if it is surprised by the district court's action and that surprise results in the party's failure to present evidence in support of its position. Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir.2000). In this case, Mr. Kannady cannot demonstrate prejudice because he clearly knew that the date of the alleged discrimination would be an issue, and he had a full opportunity to present evidence to support his position. After all, it was Mr. Kannadynot Krebswho raised this issue in his motion for summary judgment. When a district court's sua sponte determination is based on issues identical to those raised by a moving party, the risk of prejudice is significantly lowered because the judge already is engaged in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and the parties have been given an opportunity to present evidence designed either to support or refute the request for the entry of judgment. 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 (3d ed.1998); see Bridgeway Corp., 201 F.3d at 140 (The threat of procedural prejudice is greatly diminished if the court's sua sponte determination is based on issues identical to those raised by the moving party. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Jones v. Salt Lake County, 503 F.3d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir.2007) (holding that plaintiffs were not prejudiced where they previously had filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issues on which the court granted summary judgment sua sponte); Hynes v. Squillace, 143 F.3d 653, 656-57 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that since the plaintiff had moved for summary judgment on a retaliation claim before the magistrate judge, granting the defendants summary judgment sua sponte on the retaliation claim was not prejudicial because the plaintiff had had every incentive to submit all evidence supporting his retaliation claim); Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir.1991) (holding that the district court's sua sponte decision to grant summary judgment against the moving party was not prejudicial in part because the court's  sua sponte determination [was] based on issues identical to those raised by the moving party). Additionally, not only did Mr. Kannady raise this issue in his motion for summary judgment, he asserted in unequivocal terms that Krebs refused to hire him before October 2004, and he identified evidence in the record to support his claim. Consequently, the district court could reasonably view the record as including all of the evidence that Mr. Kannady deemed appropriate to support his claim and thus move to decide for purposes of summary judgment the timing question relating to Krebs's refusal to hire Mr. Kannady. See Bridgeway Corp., 201 F.3d at 140 (upholding a grant of summary judgment sua sponte because, inter alia, the issue did not arise out of the blue and the plaintiff repeatedly claimed to the district court that it had introduced sufficient evidence concerning that very issue). In this case, the district court, after reviewing Mr. Kannady's claim that the discrimination occurred before October 2004, actually came to the opposite conclusion: that the undisputed evidence demonstrated that the discrimination occurred after October 2004. For the reasons noted, we discern no error in the district court's conduct in making this determination on the timing issue related to Krebs's refusal to hire Mr. Kannady, even assuming arguendo that Krebs did not carry its initial summary judgment burden. We next review de novo whether the district court's conclusion is correct that the evidence unequivocally established that the refusal to hire Mr. Kannady occurred after October 2004. Mr. Kannady argues that the district court improperly weighed evidence and made inferences from the facts when it concluded that the recorded conversations between himself and Chief Cook occurred after Krebs began participating in the OPPRS in October 2004. We disagree. We conclude that the district court did not err in concluding that the recorded conversations occurred after October 2004 and there was no genuine factual dispute about this, because the conversations are self-dating. During one conversation, Mr. Kannady and Chief Cook make statements that demonstrate that the conversation took place on December 30, 2004. Mr. Kannady asks: What's tomorrow night is tonight New Yeartomorrow night's New Year's Eve. Aplt.App. at 116. Chief Cook responds: Yeah. Id. During the other conversation, Mr. Kannady indicates that this conversation occurred in February 2005. In discussing his plans to take a firearms training course, Mr. Kannady says: I'm going to go next month, I think, end of next month or first of April. I'm not sure whenwhen it is now, but I'm set up to go. Id. at 105. Because Mr. Kannady did not start looking for a job with Krebs until July 2004 at the earliest, these statements clearly demonstrate that the recorded conversations occurred after October 2004. Although Mr. Kannady asserted in his motion for summary judgment that the recorded conversations occurred before October 2004, the district court was under no obligation to accept a claim that was blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007); cf. Green v. Post, 574 F.3d 1294, 1296 & n. 4 (10th Cir.2009). At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a `genuine' dispute as to those facts. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). Since the recorded conversations clearly occurred after October 2004, [9] the district court did not err in determining that Krebs was participating in the OPPRS when it denied Mr. Kannady employment based on his age, and was, therefore, acting pursuant to age limits in effect under applicable State or local law on March 3, 1983. [10] 29 U.S.C. § 623(j)(1)(A).