Opinion ID: 3172548
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Personal Solicitation Clause

Text: Wolfson contends that Arizona’s Personal Solicitation Clause, which prohibits him, while running for judicial office, from personally soliciting funds for his own campaign, fails strict scrutiny. He argues that Arizona’s interest is not narrowly tailored, and that Williams-Yulee does not control our decision because Florida and Arizona have different interests in upholding their respective personal solicitation prohibitions. 7 With the exception of the level of scrutiny addressed in Part II, above, Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in Williams-Yulee garnered a majority. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1662. WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 11
Wolfson does not contend that Arizona lacks a compelling interest behind this solicitation prohibition. Instead, he argues that Arizona’s interest is significantly different than Florida’s interest in Canon 7C(1), making the Court’s strict scrutiny analysis in Williams-Yulee inapplicable to Arizona’s Clause. Attempting to distinguish the two states’ interests, Wolfson first points to Florida’s Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1 and its commentary: “Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon public confidence in the integrity and independence of judges. The integrity and independence of judges depend in turn upon their acting without fear or favor.” Code of Judicial Conduct for the State of Florida 6 (2014), http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/ethics/Code _Judicial_Conduct.pdf. He compares this language to that of Arizona’s Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 1.2 and Comment 5, which he contends demonstrate that Arizona’s interest is protecting the public’s perception of “the judge’s honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness.” Ariz. Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 1.2 (2014), cmt. n.5, http://www.azcourts.gov/ portals/137/rules/Arizona%20Code%20of%20Judicial%20 Conduct.pdf. An interest in judicial “honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness,” Wolfson argues, is different than a concern for “fear or favors.” This is a distinction without a material difference. Even if we consider the language to which Wolfson points, the Supreme Court did not uphold Florida’s prohibition because of an interest in curbing “fear or favors.” Instead, the Court was broad in its language and reasoning. “We have recognized the ‘vital state interest’ in safeguarding ‘public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation’s elected 12 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON judges,’” Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666 (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009)), because the “judiciary’s authority . . . depends in large measure on the public’s willingness to respect and follow its decisions.” Id. Arizona’s interest, outlined in Rule 1.2 and its comments, is similar, if not identical. Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized that the “concept of public confidence in judicial integrity does not easily reduce to precise definition.” Id. at 1667. Even if Arizona adopted slightly different language for its articulation of its interest,8 Arizona is similarly interested in upholding the judiciary’s credibility. There are no magic words required for a state to invoke an interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity of the state’s sitting judges. Arizona’s interest behind its Personal Solicitation Clause is compelling.
Wolfson’s arguments that Arizona’s Personal Solicitation Clause is not narrowly tailored are precluded by WilliamsYulee. First, Wolfson contends that the Personal Solicitation Clause is overbroad because it covers solicitation methods, such as mass mailings and speeches to large groups, that 8 Wolfson’s articulation of Arizona’s interest stresses selective words and ignores the plain language of Rule 1.2 which is nearly identical to the interests Florida stated in Canon 1. “A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” Ariz. Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 1.2 (2014), http://www.azcourts.gov/portals/137/rules/Arizona%20Code%2 0of%20Judicial%20Conduct.pdf. WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 13 would not result in a quid pro quo. However, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the state may prohibit only solicitation methods that are the most likely to erode public confidence. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1671. The Court held that the argument “misperceives the breadth of the compelling interest” and that, though that “interest may be implicated to varying degrees in particular contexts, . . . the interest remains whenever the public perceives the judge personally asking for money.” Id. Second, Wolfson argues that the Personal Solicitation Clause is not the least restrictive means to effectuate Arizona’s interest because Arizona could have adopted contribution limitations or a mandatory recusal rule. Again, the Supreme Court did not consider this argument persuasive. Id. at 1671–72. Forced recusals would disable jurisdictions with a small number of judges, erode public confidence in the judiciary, and create an incentive for litigants to make contributions for the sole purpose of forcing the judge to later recuse himself or herself from the litigant’s cases. Id. Contribution limits would be similarly ineffective. The improper appearance of a judicial candidate soliciting money would still remain and, even though the Court had previously held that contribution limitations advance the interest against quid pro quo corruption, a state is not restricted to pursuing its interest by a single means. Id. at 1672. We hold that Arizona’s Personal Solicitation Clause is narrowly tailored to achieve the state’s compelling interest. The state reasonably wants to uphold the public’s perception of publicly elected judges as being fair-minded and unbiased, and may do so by prohibiting judicial candidates from making personal solicitations. 14 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON