Opinion ID: 167116
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First confession.

Text: 19 We now turn to the question of whether Lopez's first confession made during the second interview, on the evening of May 18, was voluntary. The voluntariness determination reflects 20 an accommodation of the complex of values implicated in police questioning of a suspect. At one end of the spectrum is the acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool for the effective enforcement of criminal laws. . . . At the other end of the spectrum is the set of values reflecting society's deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness, and that the possibility of unfair and even brutal police tactics poses a real and serious threat to civilized notions of justice. In cases involving involuntary confessions, th[e Supreme] Court enforces the strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will. 21 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 224-25, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (quotation, alterations omitted). 22 The determination of voluntariness is based on the totality of the circumstances. Relevant circumstances embrace both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. Such factors include (1) the age, intelligence, and education of the defendant; (2) the length of detention; (3) the length and nature of the questioning; (4) whether the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights; and (5) whether the defendant was subject to physical punishment. 23 Toles, 297 F.3d at 965-66 (citations omitted); see also Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Here, we address first the details of the interrogation, before considering Lopez's personal characteristics, because his personal characteristics are relevant only if this court first concludes that the officers' conduct was coercive. United States v. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1249 (10th Cir.1998). 24
25 The most troublesome detail about the interrogation is Agent Hopper's use of the pieces of paper marked with the terms murder, mistake, 60, and 6. The district court found that Agent Hopper's use of these papers amounted to a promise of leniency. 26 The message that Hopper intended to convey from these sheets of paper is clear — Hopper used these sheets of paper to inform [Lopez] that if he stated that his alleged actions were a mistake, he would get six years in prison. On the other hand, if [Lopez] did not confess and explain that his actions were the result of a mistake, he would face sixty years in prison. . . . [T]his is not a vague and non-committal promise. . . . Rather, it is a promise that [Lopez] will spend fifty-four fewer years in prison if he confesses. 27 The Government challenges the district court's characterization of Agent Hopper's actions as a promise to Lopez of leniency if he were to confess to killing Box by mistake. The district court's determination that Agent Hopper's actions amounted to a promise of leniency is a factual finding. See United States v. Morris, 247 F.3d 1080, 1089, 1090 (10th Cir. 2001) (determining that district court's factual finding, that officers' actions in showing a suspect photos of past criminals and telling the suspect that the ones who cooperated had received more lenient sentences was not a promise of leniency, was not clearly erroneous); see also Toles, 297 F.3d at 966 (holding that the district court's finding that there was no evidence of any . . . promise made in exchange for [the defendant's] statements is not clearly erroneous); Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1540, 1540-41, 1543 (10th Cir.1993) (noting, in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant coerced the plaintiff into make incriminating statements during a criminal investigation, jury made factual finding as to whether the defendant made promises of lesser punishment to the § 1983 plaintiff); Reed v. Turner, 444 F.2d 206, 208 (10th Cir.1971) (noting, in state prisoner's habeas proceeding, that it is for the trier of the facts to determine whether promises by an official were made). Further, the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence fall within the province of the district court. United States v. Kimoana, 383 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir.2004). Here, we cannot say that the district court's factual finding— that Agent Hopper's use of the pieces of paper marked mistake, murder, 6, and 60 was a promise of leniency— was clear error. See Morris, 247 F.3d at 1090. 28 Under Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent, a promise of leniency is relevant to determining whether a confession was involuntary and, depending on the totality of the circumstances, may render a confession coerced. Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing cases). And while this court has held that the fact that an officer promises to make a defendant's cooperation known to prosecutors will not produce a coerced confession, see United States v. Roman-Zarate, 115 F.3d 778, 783-84 (10th Cir.1997) (citing cases), that is not what occurred in this case. Rather, as the district court found, [T]his is not a vague and non-committal promise. This is also not a promise to make defendant's cooperation known to the United States Attorney or the Judge, which courts condone. As found by the district court, Agent Hopper used the terms mistake, murder, 6, and 60, in order to promise Lopez that he would spend fifty-four fewer years in prison if he would confess to killing Box by mistake. Thereafter, Agent Hopper reinforced this promise of leniency by telling Lopez about other suspects who had received lenient sentences after confessing to killing by mistake. Accordingly, the promise of leniency presented in this case is not a type of limited assurance which we have held to be a permissible interrogation tactic. See United States v. Lewis, 24 F.3d 79, 82 (10th Cir.1994). Rather, the nature of this promise is of the sort that may indeed critically impair a defendant's capacity for self-determination. See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1466-67. 29 In addition to Agent Hopper's promise to Lopez of leniency, the record, read favorably to Lopez, also supports the conclusion that the federal agents also misrepresented and exaggerated the evidence they had against Lopez. It is well-settled that a confession is not considered coerced merely because the police misrepresented to a suspect the strength of the evidence against him. Clanton, 129 F.3d at 1158 (addressing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim); see also Lucero v. Kerby, 133 F.3d 1299, 1303, 1311 (10th Cir.1998) (citing cases; addressing state prisoner's habeas petition). Nevertheless, in this case, the agents' misrepresentation of the evidence against Lopez, together with Agent Hopper's promise of leniency to Lopez if he confessed to killing Box by mistake, are sufficient circumstances that would overbear Lopez's will and make his confession involuntary. See Clanton, 129 F.3d at 1158-59. 30 There are certainly factors in this case that may, to some extent, have mitigated these coercive circumstances. The agents did give Lopez his Miranda warnings before talking to him. And Lopez confessed only one hour into the interrogation. But, under the facts of this case, these factors were not sufficient to eliminate the government coercion that produced Lopez's confession. Cf. United States v. Bustillos-Munoz, 235 F.3d 505, 517 n. 8 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting [a] suspect cannot be subjected to invalid coercion to obtain a confession just because he earlier was given a valid Miranda warning). 31
32 In determining whether Lopez's confession was involuntary, we also consider Lopez's personal characteristics. See Toles, 297 F.3d at 966. The record contains little evidence to indicate that Lopez was unusually susceptible to coercion because of age, lack of education, or intelligence. Id. (quotation omitted). Lopez was thirty-three years old and had completed the eleventh grade. There is nothing to suggest that he has a limited intelligence. Id. Further, Lopez had been arrested and given Miranda warnings on earlier occasions, indicating that he had previous experience with the criminal justice system. Toles, 297 F.3d at 966. 33 During this interview, however, Lopez was suffering from the beating he had received two days earlier, when he was not in police custody. Nevertheless, Lopez does not suggest that these injuries affected his decision to confess. Cf. United States v. Morris, 287 F.3d 985, 987-89 (10th Cir.2002) (holding hospitalized suspect was not mentally impaired, and knowingly and voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, even though suspect had been in hospital for ten days after being shot twice and was taking mild painkiller). Moreover, there is no evidence that the agents withheld his medication in an effort to coerce [Lopez's] confession or took any other actions to use Lopez's injuries to coerce his confession. McGregor v. Gibson, 219 F.3d 1245, 1254 (10th Cir.2000), overruled on others grounds on reh'g en banc, 248 F.3d 946 (10th Cir.2001). 34 Lopez's personal characteristics, therefore, do not suggest he was unusually susceptible to coercion. 35
36 Despite our conclusion about Lopez's personal characteristics, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and in particular the federal agents' promising Lopez that he would spend 6 rather than 60 years in prison if he admitted to killing Box by mistake and the Agents' misrepresenting the strength of the evidence they had against Lopez, resulted in Lopez's first confession being coerced and, thus, involuntary. The district court, therefore, did not err in suppressing that confession. 37