Opinion ID: 2598149
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: One-way Intervention

Text: The class action is a product of the court of equitycodified in section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It rests on considerations of necessity and convenience, adopted to prevent a failure of justice. [Citation.] [H] But while [section 382] was designed to foster justice, class actions may create injustice. The class action may deprive an absent class member of the opportunity to independently press his claim, preclude a defendant from defending each individual claim to its fullest, and even deprive a litigant of a constitutional right. ( City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 458, 115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701.) As originally adopted, the class action device included no rules governing when to resolve merits and class issues. (See Code Civ. Proc, § 382; Fed. Rules Civ.Proc, former rule 23, as adopted in 1937, 28 U.S.C.) One resulting potential injustice was the possibility for one-way intervention, a consequence of actions for damages in which a decision for or against one member of the class did not inevitably entail the same result for all. One party could style the case a `class action,' but the missing parties would not be bound. A victory by the plaintiff would be followed by an opportunity for other members of the class to intervene and claim the spoils; a loss by the plaintiff would not bind other members of the class. (It would not be in their interest to intervene in a lost cause, and they could not be bound by a judgment to which they were not parties. [Citation].) So the defendant could win only against the named plaintiff and might face additional suits by other members of the class, but it could lose against all members of the class. This came to be known as 'one-way intervention,' which had few supporters. ( Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. National Electrical Contractors Assn., Inc. (7th Cir.1987) 814 F.2d 358, 362; see also American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah (1974) 414 U.S. 538, 545-547, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713.) One-way intervention left a defendant open to being pecked to death by ducks. One plaintiff could sue and lose; another could sue and lose; and another and another until one finally prevailed; then everyone else would ride on that single success. This sort of sequence, too, would waste resources; it also could make the minority (and therefore presumptively inaccurate) result the binding one. ( Premier Electrical Construction Co., at p. 363.) In the federal courts, this problem provisionally was solved by amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rule 23. In 1966, the rule was rewritten to end one-way intervention by requiring that class issues be resolved [a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action. (Fed. Rules Civ.Proc, former rule 23(c)(1), as amended in 1966, 28 U.S.C; see Fed. Rules Civ.Proc., rule 23, advisory com. note on 1966 amendments [Under proposed subdivision (c)(3), one-way intervention is excluded; the action will have been early determined to be a class or nonclass action, and in the former case the judgment, whether or not favorable, will include the class, as above stated]; American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 547, 94 S.Ct. 756 [1966 amendments were designed to end one-way intervention].) Under the revised rule, potential class members retain the option to participate in or withdraw from the class action only until a point in the litigation `as soon as practicable after the commencement' of the action when the suit is allowed to continue as a class action and they are sent notice of their inclusion within the confines of the class. Thereafter they are either non-parties to the suit and ineligible to participate in a recovery or to be bound by a judgment, or else they are full members who must abide by the final judgment, whether favorable or adverse. ( American Pipe & Construction Co., at p. 549, 94 S.Ct. 756.) [1] While the federal system dealt with the problem of one-way intervention by amending its rules of procedure, California responded judicially, beginning with a pair of decisions in the 1970's, Home Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 1006, 117 Cal.Rptr. 485 ( Home Savings I ) and Home Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Superior Court (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 208, 126 Cal.Rptr. 511 ( Home Savings II) (collectively Home Savings). In Home Savings I, the plaintiffs filed a putative class action challenging loan-agreement late charges. The trial court proposed to try first the issues whether the late charges were invalid penalties and whether the defendant bank's affirmative defenses barred recovery, and only then to resolve class issues. The Court of Appeal issued a writ of prohibition restraining the trial court from proceeding to trial on the substantive merits of the cause without prior adjudication of the procedural class-action issues, viz. suitability of the action as a class action, determination of the composition of the class, and appropriate notification of members of the class. ( Home Savings I, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at p. 1015, 117 Cal.Rptr. 485.) The problem with the trial court's procedure, the Court of Appeal explained, was that it exposed the defendant to one-way intervention. Prompt and early determination of the class was necessary so that class members might receive notice. ( Home Savings I, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at p. 1010, 117 Cal.Rptr. 485.) In contrast, [t]he vice in the procedure followed by the trial court is that it allows so-called 'one-way intervention,' a procedure under which potential members of the class can reserve their decision to become part of the class until the validity of the cause asserted by the named plaintiffs on behalf of the class has been determined. While one-way intervention has obvious attractions for members of the class on whose behalf an action has been brought in that it creates for them a no-lose situation, for a defendant it holds the terrors of an open-ended lawsuit that cannot be defeated, cannot be settled, and cannot be adjudicated. To him it presents a classic no-win option. ( Id. at p. 1011, 117 Cal.Rptr. 485.) Moreover, in Home Savings I, one-way intervention was no mere chimera; seven other class actions involving the same issues were already pending. ( Id. at p. 1009,117 Cal.Rptr. 485.) On remand, the plaintiffs sought summary adjudication that the defendant bank's late charges were a void penalty. Once again, the Court of Appeal granted writ relief precluding a ruling on the motion until class issues had been resolved. It rejected any distinction between permitting trial before class certification and permitting adjudication of substantive issues by motion. ( Home Savings II, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at p. 211, 126 Cal.Rptr. 511.) Other Courts of Appeal thereafter generally followed the Home Savings rule precluding merits rulings before resolution of class issues. (See Hypolite v. Carleson (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 566, 583, 125 Cal. Rptr. 221 [holding [t]he rule should be and still isthat the class issues tendered in a complaint filed as a class action should ordinarily be resolved before the cause is tried on its merits]; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1977) 65 Cal.App.3d 751, 756-757, 135 Cal.Rptr. 579 [concluding that under Home Savings, [t]he law is now firmly established that the trial court in a class action should first try the issue of identity of the class and designate the appropriate form and manner of notice to such class before trying the issue of the defendant's liability]; Kass v. Young (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 100, 104-106, 136 Cal. Rptr. 469 [vacating default judgment entered before class certification in violation of Home Savings ]; Rose v. City of Hayward (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 937, 179 Cal.Rptr. 287 [holding class defendants have right to haves class issues resolved before merits]; but see Lowry v. Obledo (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 14, 23-24, 169 Cal. Rptr. 732 [declining to follow Home Savings in a case primarily seeking declaratory and injunctive relief].) We first noted and discussed at length the Home Savings rule in People v. Pacific Land Research Co. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 10, 16-17, 141 Cal.Rptr. 20, 569 P.2d 125. We assume[d], for the purposes of the present proceeding, that the reasoning in the [Home Savings cases was] sound. ( Id. at p. 17, 141 Cal.Rptr. 20, 569 P.2d 125.) However, because the case involved a public attorney-general action, not a private class action, we had no occasion to test that assumption and left open the question of the rule's validity and scope. Thereafter, we formally adopted the Home Savings rule in Green, supra, 29 Cal.3d 126, 172 Cal.Rptr. 206, 624 P.2d 256, in the context of a belated motion to decertify a class. In an action challenging aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) regulations, the trial court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment and certified a class. It subsequently partially granted the defendants' motion to decertify the class, limiting the class to present and future AFDC recipients and excluding past recipients. ( Id. at pp. 133-134, 172 Cal.Rptr. 206, 624 P.2d 256.) We reversed. We cited the Home Savings rule with approval: [O]ur courts have held that procedural class-action issuesincluding the composition of the classmust ordinarily be resolved before a decision on the merits. ( Green, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 146, 172 Cal.Rptr. 206, 624 P.2d 256, citing Home Savings I, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014, 117 Cal.Rptr. 485, and Home Savings II, supra, 54 Cal. App.3d at pp. 211-214, 126 Cal.Rptr. 511.) We explained the rule's rationale: `[U]nless a decision on the merits is postponed until after the class issues are decided, a defendant is subject to one-way intervention, which would allow potential class members to elect whether to join in the action depending upon the outcome of the decision on the merits. Thus, if the merits were decided favorably to the class, and notice followed such determination, most class members would join in the action, whereas they would decline if the determination was against the class. [%] From a defendant's viewpoint, this is said to result in an open-ended lawsuit that cannot be defeated, cannot be settled, and cannot be adjudicated. [Citation.]' ( Green, at pp. 146-147, 172 Cal.Rptr. 206, 624 P.2d 256, quoting People v. Pacific Land Research Co., supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 16-17, 141 Cal.Rptr. 20, 569 P.2d 125.) We then extended the rule, holding that it should apply not only to protect defendants from a belated motion for certification, but also to protect plaintiffs from a belated motion for decertification; a defendant should not be allowed to sandbag a plaintiff, withholding its best case against certification and then seeking decertification if it suffered an unfavorable merits ruling. ( Green, at p. 147, 172 Cal.Rptr. 206, 624 P.2d 256.) Thus, whether the motion to certify or decertify be made by the plaintiff or the defendant, [it must] be determined `before the decision on the merits.' ( Id. at p. 148, 172 Cal.Rptr. 206, 624 P.2d 256, citing Fed. Rules Civ.Proc, rule 23(c)(1), 28 U.S.C.) However, we also decline[d] to fashion an iron-clad standard removing all jurisdiction from a trial court to decertify a class or part thereof after such a decision on the merits. ( Green, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 148, 172 Cal.Rptr. 206, 624 P.2d 256.) Instead, we allowed belated decertification in limited instances: It would be both unduly rigid and unjust to force the maintenance of [a class] action even when there is a proper reason for decertification after judgment. [Citation.] Before judgment, a class should be decertified `only where it is clear there exist changed circumstances making continued class action treatment improper.' [Citation.] A fortiori, a similar showing must be made to warrant decertification after a decision on the merits. This standard will prevent abuse on the part of the defendant while providing the trial court with enough flexibility to justly manage the class action. ( Ibid. ) Of course, just as we recognized in Green that there was no reason not to apply the general Home Savings rule to decertification motions, so there is no reason not to apply this limited Green exception to certification motions. Thus, under Green, postmerits certification may be permitted when there is a clear showing of changed circumstances. Elsewhere, we have had occasion to consider the application of the Home Savings rule in the slightly different context where a defendant either fails to object or itself initiates a merits motion before class certification and notice have been resolved. In Civil Service Employees Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 362, 149 Cal. Rptr. 360, 584 P.2d 497 ( Civil Service Employees Ins. Co.), the plaintiff sought class certification and, one week later, partial summary judgment of certain affirmative defenses. As in this case, the trial court granted both motions simultaneously. By way of a writ, the defendant challenged the grant of partial summary judgment solely on procedural grounds, arguing that it violated the Home Savings rule. We found no error because the defendant had failed to object to the motion as premature before the trial court ruled on it, holding that a defendant waives whatever due process rights it may possess when it voluntarily accedes to a trial court decision on the merits of an issue before notice is provided to absent class members. ( Civil Service Employees Ins. Co., at p. 373, 149 Cal.Rptr. 360, 584 P.2d 497.) By failing to object, the defendant assumed the risk that it might win arid be unable to bind unnotified class members, or lose and face the prospect of one-way intervention. ( Id. at p. 374, 149 Cal.Rptr. 360, 584 P.2d 497.) [2] In Employment Development Dept. v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 256, 178 Cal.Rptr. 612, 636 P.2d 575, before class certification or notice had been addressed, the defendant successfully demurred to an action challenging an unemployment benefits statute as discriminatory. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the statute was in fact unconstitutional, and on remand the trial court certified a class over the defendant's Home Savings objection. Following the principles set out in Civil Service Employees Ins. Co., supra, 22 Cal.3d 362, 149 Cal.Rptr. 360, 584 P.2d 497, we denied writ relief. Because the defendant had filed a demurrer and sought early resolution of the merits, it could not complain that resolution of the merits preceded any class determination. ( Employment Development Dept., at pp. 263-265, 178 Cal.Rptr. 612, 636 P.2d 575; see also hinder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 440 & fn. 7, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 179, 2 P.3d 27 [defendants are free to bring precertification dispositive motions]; Rose v. City of Hayward, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at p. 937, 179 Cal.Rptr. 287 [Where a defendant voluntarily accedes to a trial court hearing on the merits prior to determination of the class issue, he thereby waives his right to a class certification prior to hearings on the substantive merits].) From these precedents we glean the following rules governing the parties' and trial court's orderly conduct of putative class action cases. First, a defendant must actively preserve its protection against one-way intervention by objecting. If it fails to timely object, or affirmatively seeks resolution of the merits before certification, it will be deemed to have waived its rights. (See Civil Service Employees Ins. Co., supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 373-374, 149 Cal.Rptr. 360, 584 P.2d 497; Employment Development Dept. v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 262-265,178 Cal.Rptr. 612, 636 P.2d 575.) Second, plaintiffs should seek certification before moving for any resolution of the merits. (Cf. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.764(b) [A motion for class certification should be filed when practicable].) If they seek certification after seeking resolution of the merits then, in the absence of a defense waiver, they must demonstrate changed circumstances or other good cause justifying the belated motion before the trial court may consider it. (See Green, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 148, 172 Cal.Rptr. 206, 624 P.2d 256.) Third, though trial courts generally have broad discretion to manage and order class affairs, [3] in the absence of a defense waiver they should not resolve the merits in a putative class action case before class certification and notice issues absent a compelling justification for doing so. These rules are the logical consequence of the need to protect against the harms of one-way intervention, harms sufficiently real that the federal courts amended rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C.), to counter them. Indeed, in dicta we have gone so far as to attribute to defendants a due process right to avoid one-way intervention. (See People v. Pacific Land Research Co., supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 16, 141 Cal.Rptr. 20, 569 P.2d 125; accord, Rose v. City of Hayward, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at p. 937, 179 Cal.Rptr. 287; Home Savings I, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at p. 1012, 117 Cal.Rptr. 485.) To prevent one-way intervention, courts must ensure that affected parties are bound before the merits are decided; to bind absent plaintiffs, courts must give them notice; and to give plaintiffs notice, courts must first resolve whether and on what scale a class is appropriate. The Court of Appeal read Green as establishing no more than a weak general preference for deciding class issues first and held that trial courts retain broad discretion to depart from that order of operations. This overstates matters considerably. While it is true we declined to strip trial courts of all authority to certify or decertify a class after a decision on the merits, we confined the trial court's authority to do so to situations involving a clear showing of changed circumstances. ( Green, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 148, 172 Cal.Rptr. 206, 624 P.2d 256.) We further recognized that it is desirable for the trial court to retain some measure of flexibility in handling a class action ( ibid. ); consequently, in an individual case compelling justifications may exist that will support a trial court's decision to depart from the usual order. Absent a finding of a compelling justification, however, for the trial court to refuse the defendant's request to resolve class issues before merits issues is an abuse of discretion. Conversely, Fireside Bank depicts the rules governing the order of operations in class action proceedings as mandatory in the absence of a defense waiver. They are not. As class actions are originally creatures of equity ( City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 458, 115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701), so the rules for administering them must be equitable. By leaving open a narrow exception for cases presenting compelling justifications, we intend the trial courts to retain sufficient discretion to avoid inequitable outcomes in a given case. [4] Thus, the rules are neither as flexible as the Court of Appeal would have them nor as rigid as Fireside Bank portrays them. Contrary to the Court of Appeal's intimation, the rules have clearly defined parameters; contrary to Fireside Bank's argument, they are not sacrosanct, in recognition of the broad discretion trial courts rightfully possess to order class action proceedings. The rules provide flexibility, but not infinite, open-ended flexibility: trial courts may not depart from the usual order of decision for simply any reason that seems appropriate at the time.
We next consider the range of motions that implicate the rules governing one-way intervention. Here, Gonzalez argues, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that her motion for judgment on the pleadings on Fireside Bank's claim against her is not such a motion. We begin with the recognition that the scope of any rule should be coextensive with its rationale. That is, the interest in postponing a substantive ruling in a case until after resolution of class issues depends precisely on the extent to which the ruling gives rise to concerns about one-way intervention. In turn, the extent to which a given ruling gives rise to such concerns depends not on the form of the ruling but on its substance. The Home Savings II court effectively recognized as much in concluding that precertification summary adjudication, as much as precertification trial, should be disapproved: The key words in Home [Savings ] I are substantive merits, not trial. The controlling factor is not the way the superior court determines the substantive merits of the cause, but whether it does so prior to adjudication of the procedural class issues and prior to notification of the members of the class for whose benefit the action has been brought. ( Home Savings II, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at p. 211, 126 Cal.Rptr. 511.) Thus, the relevant question is whether a given ruling affects the merits of the class claims in a way that would create a risk of one-way intervention. Decisions reached after trial, or on summary judgment or summary adjudication, or on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all may do so to varying extents, depending on the subject matter of the ruling. [5] Thus, the fact the ruling here resolved Fireside Bank's claim against Gonzalez, and not Gonzalez's claim against Fireside Bank, does not alone immunize it from Green's requirements. In justifying its refusal to apply Home Savings and Green here, the Court of Appeal noted that many rulings may offer substantial hints as to the likely substantive outcome of a given case. We agree. But this is no reason not to require trial courts to postpone such rulings until after certification and class notice, if any. The interest in postponing bringing or ruling on any motion until after class issues have been resolved is directly proportional to the extent to which a ruling would implicate one-way intervention concerns. The greater the concern, the more compelling a contrary justification will be needed to support immediate resolution; the lesser the concern, the more slender a contrary justification will suffice. In each instance where a defendant asserts its Home Savings rights, the trial court should consider (1) the degree to which the given motion poses one-way intervention problems, balanced against (2) the compelling justifications proffered by the moving party for nevertheless deciding the given motion in advance of reserving class issues. The greater the concerns, the more compelling the countervailing justification must be. That one-way intervention concerns cannot always be avoided offers no reason not to avoid them when to do so is possible and no more compelling interest justifies disregarding them. Gonzalez further argues that the rules governing one-way intervention should not come into play because the trial court's decision leaves unresolved Fireside Bank's various affirmative defenses. We reject the argument. In Home Savings II, supra, 54 Cal. App.3d 208,126 Cal.Rptr. 511, the Court of Appeal addressed a parallel situation. The plaintiffs there sought partial summary judgment of the key legal issue in the casewhether the defendant's late charges violated Civil Code section 1670. Resolution of that issue would leave other questions unresolved, but because the issue was the principal one in the case, the Court of Appeal correctly recognized that its resolution would create a significant risk of one-way intervention. (Home Savings II, at pp. 211-213, 126 Cal.Rptr. 511.) Notably, in Civil Service Employees Ins. Co., supra, 22 Cal.3d 362, 149 Cal.Rptr. 360, 584 P.2d 497, the plaintiff brought a motion for summary adjudication of only two affirmative defenses. However, there again, [a]s a practical matter [the] motion requested the court to resolve the principal legal issue presented by the case. ( Id. at p. 369, 149 Cal.Rptr. 360, 584 P.2d 497.) The defendant invoked its Home Savings rights on appeal, and we implicitly recognized the rule would otherwise apply before concluding on the facts that the defendant had waived its rights. What was implicit in Civil Service Employees Ins. Co., we make explicit here: It matters not the form of a motion or whether it may leave some issues unresolved. What matters is the extent to which a motion impacts the principal legal issue or issues in a case and thereby poses for the defendants the risk of one-way intervention depending on its outcome.
Here, Gonzalez brought a motion for judgment on the pleadings on Fireside Bank's individual claim against her. She thereafter filed a motion for class certification. [6] Fireside Bank timely raised a Home Savings objection. The trial court granted both motions. Although the trial court's ruling on Gonzalez's motion on the pleadings leaves unresolved Fireside Bank's affirmative defenses, it squarely resolves the central issue in Gonzalez's (and the putative class's) claims against Fireside Bankwhether Fireside Bank's notices violated the Rees-Levering Act and thus whether they were unlawful for purposes of the UCL. It matters not that the substantive motion was brought by Gonzalez as a defendant, while the motion for class certification was brought by her as plaintiff in her cross-action. As a practical matter, because the motion for judgment on the pleadings involves determination of substantive issues common to both actions, it presents the same one-way intervention concerns a ruling on Gonzalez's affirmative claims would. As such, it is subject to the rules governing one-way intervention. The trial court was warranted in deciding the issue before a class had been notified only if it found a compelling justification existed. Given a trial court's broad discretion to structure and streamline class action proceedings, the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion. Here, there was no compelling justification for resolving the merits issue first; indeed, there was no justification at all. The trial court could have held the motion for judgment on the pleadings in abeyance, as it indicated to the parties it would, and thereby eliminated any conceivable harm to Fireside Bank's interests. Gonzalez did not argue delay of her motion for judgment on the pleadings would materially prejudice her. To the contrary, she openly acceded to the proposed delayed ruling on her motion. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion by reversing the order of operations and ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings simultaneously with its ruling on class certification, before sending out class notice. The Court of Appeal nevertheless thought no relief was warranted because it concluded Fireside Bank could show no prejudice from the trial court's adverse ruling granting Gonzalez's motion for judgment on the pleadings. It is true that, had the motion been denied, the premature attempt to resolve the merits might have resulted in little prejudice: a ruling that declined to decide whether Gonzalez was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because factual issues remained would have left open the possibility that either side might prevail on the principal issue in this case. But the grant of Gonzalez's motion prejudiced Fireside Bank by necessarily exposing it to the problem of one-way intervention. Where, as here, the trial court has issued a pro-plaintiff ruling on the merits, the effect is to weight against opting out the metaphorical coin that potential class members receiving notice of the action might toss to decide whether to remain in the class, virtually eliminating any incentive to opt out, likely reducing the number of opt-outs, and increasing Fireside Bank's exposure in the action. The Court of Appeal erred in finding no prejudice.
We turn to the question of the appropriate remedy. Class actions are devices of courts of equity ... [created] to promote the interests of justice. ( Hypolite v. Carleson, supra, 52 Cal.App.3d at p. 582, 125 Cal.Rptr. 221; accord, Hansberry v. Lee (1940) 311 U.S. 32, 41, 61 S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22; City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 458, 115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701.) As such, any remedy to cure procedural missteps in handling a class action must itself be equitable. If a party seeks and obtains a merits ruling before moving for class certification, it must demonstrate changed circumstances to justify its belated motion for class certification. (Green, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 148, 172 Cal.Rptr. 206, 624 P.2d 256.) Absent a showing of changed circumstances, the trial court may not consider the motion; absent a further finding of a compelling justification, it may not grant it. In cases of an erroneous grant of certification, the class generally must be vacated. ( Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp. (7th Cir.1975) 523 F.2d 349, 354-355; see State v. Doody (Ind.Ct.App.1990) 556 N.E.2d 1357,1362.) This case presents a slightly different scenario. Here, although Gonzalez moved for judgment on the pleadings before seeking class certification, this order of filing was justified by changed circumstances. (See ante, fn. 6.) Moreover, Gonzalez thereafter agreed to have all class issues resolved before any ruling on the merits. Given the trial court's express acknowledgment that class issues should be resolved first and its indication it would do so, Gonzalez had no reason to withdraw her motion for judgment on the pleadings. She bears no responsibility for the trial court's subsequent error. On these facts, to bar Gonzalez from pursuing a class action in response to the trial court's error would be inequitable. Instead, vacating the trial court's premature merits ruling and ordering the trial court to disregard it and decide any future motion de novo will reduce the risk of one-way intervention for Fireside Bank without unduly punishing plaintiffs. We note that various Courts of Appeal have similarly recognized that a remedy short of barring further class proceedings may suffice. In Travelers Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 65 Cal.App.3d 751, 135 Cal.Rptr. 579, the trial court erroneously refused the defendant's request that it re: solve class issues before the merits. Taking guidance from our observation in Vasquez v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.3d at page 821, 94 Cal.Rptr. 796, 484 P.2d 964, that courts should be flexible and innovative in designing class procedures that were fair to the litigants and expedient in serving the judicial process, the Court of Appeal concluded it was not required to bar class certification. Instead, it achieved a more equitable result (Travelers Ins. Co., at p. 758, 135 Cal.Rptr. 579) by vacating the trial court's summary adjudication of liability against the defendant. And in Hypolite v. Carleson, supra, 52 Cal.App.3d 566, 125 Cal.Rptr. 221, emphasizing that class actions are intended to promote the interests of justice ( id. at p. 582, 125 Cal.Rptr. 221), the Court of Appeal concluded the equities of the case dictated no relief at all despite a Home Savings violation: the defendant had admitted all class allegations throughout and thus would not be prejudiced by a belated class certification (id. at pp. 581-583, 125 Cal.Rptr. 221). (See also Grigg v. Robinson Furniture Co. (1977) 78 Mich.App. 712, 260 N.W.2d 898, 906-908 [appellate court vacated premature damages award as inequitable, but allowed plaintiffs to pursue class certification on remand].) Fireside Bank complains that any remedy short of a bar against all further class proceedings would be ineffective, evidently believing that a significant number of potential class members who would otherwise have opted out will now, because of the trial court's ruling for Gonzalez and despite our direction that it be vacated, elect to remain in the class. Whatever the frequency with which parties generally opt out, [7] we think the likelihood of this risk materializing here is sufficiently small as to be outweighed by the equities against punishing Gonzalez and the putative class for the trial court's error. We conclude vacating the trial court's premature merits ruling will suffice to diminish any prejudice from one-way intervention.