Opinion ID: 2119366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Sufficiency and Evaluation of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

Text: The defendant argues that the State failed to prove the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt as required by Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9. The defendant argues further that assuming, arguendo, the State did prove the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the death penalty is inappropriate in this case because the mitigating circumstances were not outweighed by the aggravating circumstance. In its Application For Death Sentence, the State charged the defendant with intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit rape, child molesting, or criminal deviate conduct. Following preliminary instructions and opening statements in the penalty phase of the defendant's trial, all of the evidence presented during the guilt phase was stipulated into evidence for purposes of the penalty phase. In addition, the State introduced the two photographs previously discussed in this opinion, and the defendant called several witnesses to testify on his behalf. Following final arguments, instructions, and deliberations the jury returned its decision recommending that the death penalty be imposed. The trial court then ordered a pre-sentence investigation report. Upon its receipt, sentencing was conducted on December 19, 1985. The trial court entered judgment accepting the jury recommendation and imposed the death penalty. In its findings, the trial court summarized the facts underlying the conviction to be that the defendant and the juvenile co-participant struck the victim about the head with a piece of wood while both were committing or aiding each other in committing rape and/or criminal deviate conduct of the victim, resulting in the victim's death. With respect to the charged aggravating circumstance upon which the State's death penalty count was based, the trial court found that the defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit rape, child molesting or criminal deviate conduct, and that the State thereby proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least an aggravating circumstance exists. Record at 207-08. As to mitigating circumstances, the trial court made the following express findings: 1. The defendant had significant criminal history as a juvenile and has one prior felony conviction as an adult for resisting and for which he received a two-year suspended sentence. 2. While evidence was presented to show that defendant suffers from mental illness, the evidence was clear that defendant was not under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when he committed or aided in the commission of the murder. 3. There was no evidence presented that the victim participated or consented to the defendant's conduct. 4. While evidence was presented as to a fourteen-year-old juvenile co-participant, the evidence was that defendant's actions were clearly more than that of an accomplice or a minor participant. 5. The Court does not believe that defendant, a twenty-three year-old married man, would have acted under the substantial domination of the fourteen-year-old juvenile co-participant. 6. While it is clear to the Court that defendant suffers from mental illness, it is equally as clear to the Court that the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, was not impaired as a result of mental disease or of intoxication. 7. There was no evidence of any other circumstances appropriate for consideration as mitigating circumstances as to the defendant. Record at 207-208. The trial court concluded by expressly finding that the State of Indiana has met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least an aggravating circumstance and, further, that the aggravating circumstances [sic] outweigh any mitigating circumstances. Record at 209. The defendant's argument that the State failed to prove the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt reiterates the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to support the jury's verdict in the guilt phase. He argues that such evidence was likewise insufficient to prove that the defendant intentionally killed Woods while committing or attempting to commit rape, criminal deviate conduct, or child molesting. Our discussion in Issues 3 and 4 determined that the evidence was sufficient to support the determination beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged crimes. With respect to felony murder, we found the evidence sufficient to prove that the defendant killed the victim while committing criminal deviate conduct. Likewise, our finding that the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant aided in the commission of rape or criminal deviate conduct applies to the sufficiency of proof of the aggravating circumstance. The aggravating circumstance charged by the State is established in Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(b): The defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape, or robbery. Each act enumerated within this statutory aggravating circumstance constitutes a separate criminal offense. This is further indicated because the statute uses the language  committing or attempting to commit  and enumerates the formal names for statutory offenses. An offense is deemed committed under Indiana law when a person knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense... . Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. Therefore, the evidence found sufficient to prove the defendant aided in the commission of rape or criminal deviate conduct is likewise sufficient to prove the offenses of rape and criminal deviate conduct which, combined with the intentional killing, constitute the charged aggravating circumstance. Citing Enmund v. Florida (1982), 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140, the defendant contends that the Eighth Amendment forbids imposition of the death penalty on one who aids and abets a felony in which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill or intend that a killing take place or that a lethal force be employed. This issue was further addressed in Tison v. Florida (1987), 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127, in which the death penalty was held to be constitutionally applied to two persons who participated in the murders of four members of a family, but did not specifically intend to kill the victims and did not inflict the fatal gunshot wounds. Tison stated that major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement, and thereby permit application of the death penalty. 481 U.S. at 158, 107 S.Ct. at 1688, 95 L.Ed.2d at 145. The court further noted that it did not doubt that there are some felonies as to which one could properly conclude that any major participant necessarily exhibits reckless indifference to the value of human life. Id. at 158 n. 12, 107 S.Ct. at 1688 n. 12, 95 L.Ed.2d at 145 n. 12. In the instant case, we find that the evidence demonstrates that the defendant's participation in the murder of and other criminal acts upon the victim were clearly major and indicative of a reckless indifference to human life. The defendant requests that we reconsider our recent decisions holding that it is constitutional to not require that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Spranger, 498 N.E.2d 931; Harris v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 723, cert. denied (1987), 482 U.S. 909, 107 S.Ct. 2490, 96 L.Ed.2d 382; Moore v. State (1985), Ind., 479 N.E.2d 1264, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1026, 106 S.Ct. 583, 88 L.Ed.2d 565. We decline. The defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury and trial court finding that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances. He argues that mitigating evidence was improperly disregarded or not accorded sufficient weight. The trial court sentencing statement expressly addressed each of the seven mitigating circumstances listed under Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(c), and found none to be established by the evidence. Arguing that the trial court disregarded or erroneously assessed the evidence, the defendant argues that several of the statutory mitigating circumstances were shown. Notwithstanding the defendant's prior conviction of a Class D felony, the defendant argues that the trial court should have found no significant history of prior criminal conduct. We disagree. Such a finding was not compelled under this circumstance. With emphasis on a variety of evidence regarding the defendant's emotional and mental problems, the defendant concedes that the evidence was in conflict as to the degree of defendant's mental illness. We find no error in the trial court's refusal to find from such evidence the statutory mitigating circumstance of  extreme mental or emotional disturbance when the murder was committed.  Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(c)(2). While noting that the defendant suffers from mental illness, the trial court similarly declined to find his condition sufficiently severe to impair his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, as specified by Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(c)(6). Such a finding was not error. With respect to the statutory mitigating circumstances applicable when a defendant's participation in the murder was relatively minor or when he acted under the substantial domination of another, the defendant's arguments are without merit, and the trial court's rejection of these claims is well-supported by the evidence. The defendant cites three additional non-statutory circumstances in mitigation which he asserts should have been considered: the defendant's age (23), the disproportionate treatment accorded Johnnie Winners for his participation in the crime, and the defendant's turbulent childhood. While such circumstances, particularly the defendant's difficult experiences in childhood and adolescence, may have been sufficient to have been accorded recognition as a mitigating circumstance to be weighed, the trial court was not under an obligation to so find. While such evidence certainly could have been considered by a trial court as evidence in mitigation, it does not lead only to a conclusion opposite that reached by the trial court. Having concluded that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficiently shown to merit evaluation as against the proven aggravating circumstance, we find that the trial court did not err in finding that the aggravating circumstance outweighs any mitigating circumstances. For these reasons, we reject the defendant's contention that the trial court erred in its consideration and evaluation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.