Opinion ID: 431030
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Chain of Custody Contentions

Text: 21 Harris also contends that four of the counterfeit $100 bills introduced into evidence over his objection were erroneously admitted, since no chain of custody was proven to show that these bills were the ones attributed to Harris and passed or possessed by him as charged by the specific counts in question. 22 Without detailed discussion, we find no merit to the contention with regard to the three counterfeit bills introduced to prove guilt of Count III (passing two counterfeit bills to the General Nutrition Center on November 16) and Count V (transferring and delivering three counterfeit bills to Georgia Pierre on November 16--two of which were subsequently passed to the General Nutrition Center). The evidence adequately proves by chain of custody that the bills introduced into evidence at the trial were the counterfeit bills involved in those two offenses. 23 However, a much more substantial issue is presented with regard to the counterfeit $100 bill introduced into evidence, over Harris' objection, to prove his guilt of Count II--passing a counterfeit bill at the Swiss Colony Store on November 8, a week earlier. The store clerk, who had accepted the bill as genuine, testified that upon examination of it by her store manager, and his assertion it was not genuine, she found the bill was counterfeit. The evidence is devoid of what happened to this bill thereafter, and the government concedes that no chain of custody is proven. The evidence also shows that Harris had twenty genuine $100 bills in his vehicle. 24 The physical evidence of this particular counterfeit bill introduced to prove guilt of Count II, concededly improperly omitted, furnished strong corroboration of the otherwise somewhat speculative testimony of the store clerk that the bill she had accepted was counterfeit. Harris' argument is substantial that the improper admission of this bill could not be harmless error insofar as his conviction of Count II. 25 However, the sentence on Count II is concurrent with that on Counts I, III, and IV. We have determined that the interests of justice will adequately be served if we vacate the sentence on Count II, under this court's application of the concurrent sentence doctrine. [I]f a prisoner is serving two or more concurrent sentences, and a reviewing court determines that one of the sentences is valid, the court may decline to review or consider the remaining sentence(s). Williams v. Maggio, 714 F.2d 554, 555 (5th Cir.1983). 26 In United States v. Cardona, 650 F.2d 54 (5th Cir.1981), we found that the concurrent sentence doctrine may be utilized to avoid unnecessary review of a concurrent count, in proper circumstances, by vacating a judgment and conviction that provides for a concurrent sentence (but not the jury verdict of guilt itself)--  'equivalent in practical effect to a suspension of the sentence. If it later develops that the interest of justice so requires, the sentence can be reimposed on a concurrent basis. The conviction could then be subject to appellate review.'  650 F.2d at 58. We quoted with approval that such a vacation of justice  'does not impair any need of the government, avoids the possibility of adverse collateral consequences to defendant, and furthers the general interest of the administration of justice.'  Id. 27 In accordance with these principles, we vacate the conviction of Harris on Count II.