Opinion ID: 2557538
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Substantial Compliance or Waiver for Good Cause under the LGTCA?

Text: Because, in my view, Longtin's false arrest/imprisonment causes of action accrued in February 2000, his October 2000 notice to the County was untimely. If, however, Longtin complied substantially with the LGTCA notice requirement or demonstrated good cause, he should be permitted nonetheless to pursue his civil claims. Substantial compliance is possible ordinarily when a plaintiff files timely notice, but fails to abide some other procedural requirement, e.g., service on a proper recipient. See Faulk v. Ewing, 371 Md. 284, 299, 808 A.2d 1262, 1272-73 (2002) ([S]ubstantial compliance is such communication that provides ... requisite and timely notice of facts and circumstances giving rise to the claim.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In the present case, Longtin's notice was untimely and, thus, a poor fit for substantial compliance. Waiver for good cause, in the context of the § 5-304 notice requirement, is possible where the claimant prosecuted his [or her] claim with that degree of diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances. Heron, 361 Md. at 271, 761 A.2d at 63. Based on a survey of other jurisdictions, we recognized in Heron that circumstances justifying good cause fit [normally] into several broad categories: excusable neglect or mistake, see e.g., ... Kleinke v. Ocean City, 147 N.J.Super. 575, 371 A.2d 785 (N.J.Super.App.Div.1977); serious physical or mental injury and/or location out-of-state; the inability to retain counsel in cases involving complex litigation; and ignorance of the statutory notice requirement. ... Heron, 361 Md. at 272-73, 761 A.2d at 63-64 (citations omitted). A plaintiff is not excused, however, because he or she is occupied preparing for a criminal trial. See id. In Kleinke, the Superior Court of New Jersey found excusable neglect where the plaintiff, among other things, was confine[d] to a hospital for two months and was incapacitat[ed by a complication] of an embolism. ... Kleinke, 147 N.J.Super. at 580, 371 A.2d at 788. Unlike the plaintiff in Kleinke, Heron was imprisoned for two days, but then released and delayed filing his notice. He argued that the Court should grant a waiver for good cause because, post-release, he was immersed in the planning of his defense to the criminal charges. We held that Heron, who was no longer imprisoned, was not so burdened by his preparation for the impending criminal trial as to prevent the filing of a simple written notice. Heron, 361 Md. at 271, 761 A.2d at 63 (We agree... that an ordinarily prudent person, in [ Heron's ] circumstances, would have been able, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, to file ... a Notice of Claim.) (emphasis added). In the present case and unlike Heron, Longtin was imprisoned for a substantial period of time, while the notice period(s) for his causes of action was (were) running. It was not a matter simply of finding time to file the notice; it was finding a way to file notice while confine[d] and incapacitat[ed], like the plaintiff in Kleinke. At bottom, then, I would conclude that Longtin acted with the due diligence of a reasonable person isolated in a detention center for eight months, such that his neglect should qualify under the first Heron category for waiver of strict compliance with the LGTCA notice requirement.