Opinion ID: 2623194
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Court's Refusal to Excuse Two Prospective Jurors for Cause

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause against two prospective jurors because, he argues, they favored the death penalty and were biased against him. The issue is not cognizable on appeal. To preserve a claim based on the trial court's overruling a defense challenge for cause, a defendant must show (1) he used an available peremptory challenge to remove the juror in question; (2) he exhausted all of his peremptory challenges or can justify the failure to do so; and (3) he expressed dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately selected. ( People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 379, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1; see also People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1087, 259 Cal.Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659.) Here, defendant challenged both prospective jurors peremptorily and exhausted his peremptory challenges. But he never expressed dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately selected. Defendant claims he was, in fact, dissatisfied with the jury and would have challenged other jurors had he been able to do so. He also claims it would have been futile to ask the trial court for additional peremptory challenges. But defendant did not express any of this at trial on the record. A defendant must affirmatively demonstrate that the denial of his challenges for cause affected his right to a fair and impartial jury. ( People v. Maury, supra, at p. 380, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1; see also People v. Bittaker, supra, at p. 1087, 259 Cal.Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659.) This he cannot do. Moreover, we see no error. [T]he qualification of jurors challenged for cause [is a] matter [] within the wide discretion of the trial court, seldom disturbed on appeal. [Citation.] To find actual bias on the part of an individual juror, the court must find `the existence of a state of mind' with reference to the case or the parties that would prevent the prospective juror `from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to the substantial rights of either party.' ( Odle v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 932, 944, 187 Cal.Rptr. 455, 654 P.2d 225, quoting Pen.Code, former § 1073, now Code Civ. Proc., § 225, subd. (b)(1)(C).) When ... a juror gives conflicting testimony as to her capacity for impartiality, the determination of the trial court on substantial evidence is binding on the appellate court. ( People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 675, 276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278.) When a challenge is based on the prospective juror's views on the death penalty, the trial court must determine whether those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of that person's duties. ( People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 376, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) The standard of review of the court's ruling regarding the prospective juror's views on the death penalty is essentially the same as the standard regarding other claims of bias. If the prospective juror's statements are conflicting or equivocal, the court's determination of the actual state of mind is binding. If the statements are consistent, the court's ruling will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. ( Id. at pp. 376-377, 133 Cal. Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) Under this standard, we see no abuse of discretion. The first juror defendant complains about stated on her questionnaire that she believed life without the possibility of parole as an alternative to the death penalty is a waste of money, and that she strongly agreed that, after a fair trial and guilt finding, the state should execute everyone who kills another human being. But at voir dire, after the court explained the law to her, she assured the court she would not select the death penalty just to save the state money, and that she would do the best she could in deciding the question of punishment fairly. Ultimately, when the court asked her whether she could make a choice between the death penalty and life without parole, she said, That depends upon the case. I don't believe death is the only way, it just depends upon the circumstances and the case itself. She also stated on the questionnaire that if the defendant does not testify, he is probably guilty, and at voir dire she made some comments that the defendant would have the opportunity to prove his innocence. But she also explained that that had been her view at the time, and that she had never been involved [in] anything like this. When the court explained to her the law regarding the burden of proof and told her she would have to find defendant not guilty if the prosecution had not met that burden, she said she understood and had no problem with it. On this record, we must defer to the court's ruling. The second juror defendant complains about stated on the questionnaire that one of the most important problems in the criminal justice system is not enforcing the death penalty. At voir dire, she also indicated a belief that defendants, including the defendant in this case, are probably guilty or they wouldn't be there. She also, however, assured the court that she could follow the law, specifically including the prosecution's burden of proof. At one point, she indicated that she would always impose the death penalty for an intentional killing. When she said that, the court initially stated it would grant defendant's challenge for cause, but it permitted the district attorney to question her further. When the district attorney further explained to her the law, she stated she could return a verdict of life if she believed it appropriate under the law. She said she did not consider herself as being unfair, although she also said she would be leaning in the prosecution's direction. After considering this additional voir dire, the court denied the challenge for cause. This juror's statements were contradictory and equivocal, and she certainly said some things that would have supported granting the challenge for cause. But this is precisely where an appellate court must defer to the determination of the trial court, which was present and could observe her during the questioning. Her statements that she was fair, would follow the law, and would consider both possible punishments, support the court's ruling.