Opinion ID: 2514211
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did Detective Herndon omit facts material to the magistrate's probable cause determination?

Text: Clark claimed under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), that Detective Herndon made two material omissions or misstatements to the issuing magistrate, viz., failing to mention that he had made a brief but inconclusive search of the van prior to applying for the search warrant and failing to mention that Doll-Iffrig told him she thought she saw Roxanne in bed with her sister when she returned at midnight of April 1, 1995. Clark contends that had these facts been included in the affidavit, no reasonable magistrate could have found probable cause to issue the search warrant. In order to invalidate the warrant on this ground Clark must show evidence of deliberate material omission or statements made in reckless disregard of the truth. State v. Garrison, 118 Wash.2d 870, 872, 827 P.2d 1388 (1992). `[A]llegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient.' Id. (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674). As the court noted in O'Connor, 39 Wash.App. at 117-18, 692 P.2d 208, Franks and the relevant Washington decisions do not illuminate what constitutes reckless disregard for the truth. However O'Connor applied the test of United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 694 (D.C.Cir.1979), where the court deemed recklessness shown where the affiant `in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth' of facts or statements in the affidavit. O'Connor, 39 Wash.App. at 117, 692 P.2d 208 (quoting United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 694 (D.C.Cir.1979) (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968))). Such serious doubts are shown by (1) actual deliberation on the part of the affiant, or (2) the existence of obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports. O'Connor, 39 Wash.App. at 117, 692 P.2d 208 (citing Davis, 617 F.2d at 694). If these requirements are not met the inquiry ends. Garrison, 118 Wash.2d at 873, 827 P.2d 1388. At Clark's Franks hearing, the trial court found the following with respect to Detective Herndon's affidavit: [T]he omission of details regarding Ms. Doll-Iffrig's statement of her observations is not material. The statement in the affidavit that Ms. Doll-Iffrig was unsure of whether she saw Roxanne is truthful. This was the substance of oral statements made to Det. Herndon by Ms. Doll-Iffrig; the progression of Gail's thought processes was indicated by the fact that her second written statement is more vague than her first statement. The court finds that the failure to recite all of Ms. Doll-Iffrig's statements or comments was neither an intentional nor a reckless attempt to mislead Judge Fisher. The omission of a statement describing Det. Herndon's cursory search of the van on April 2, 1995 was not relevant or material. The purpose of the April 3, 1995 search warrant was for trace evidence. During his initial cursory search on April 2, Det. Herndon did not see anything remarkable; this does not mean that there would not be trace evidence in the van. This was not an intentional nor a reckless misleading omission. Since there were no misleading misrepresentations or omissions contained in any of the affidavits, no portions of the affidavits will be excised. 5 CP at 995-96. The trial court found no actual deliberation or effort to omit material information by Detective Herndon, or obvious reasons to doubt his veracity in making the affidavit. A trial court's finding on whether an affiant deliberately excluded material facts is a factual determination, upheld unless clearly erroneous. State v. Cord, 103 Wash.2d 361, 367, 693 P.2d 81 (1985) (citing In re Welfare of Sego, 82 Wash.2d 736, 513 P.2d 831 (1973)). With respect to Detective Herndon's statement that Doll-Iffrig was unsure whether Roxanne was in bed at midnight on April 1, 1995, this would seem to be an accurate summary of Doll-Iffrig's statements on the matter. Doll-Iffrig turned the light on in her daughter's room only momentarily, and was unsure whether she saw Roxanne or a large doll, which she testified her daughters often slept with. With respect to Detective Herndon's April 2, 1995, consensual search of Clark's van, he testified he was merely looking for something obvious that would connect with Roxanne Doll and not for trace evidence of Doll. RP (Jan. 29, 1996) at 23 (3.6 hearing). Herndon further testified at the Franks hearing he neither intentionally omitted information from his affidavit nor had he lied. The trial court had the latitude to believe Herndon's testimony, and nothing else in the record would support the conclusion that the trial court's findings on this issue were clearly erroneous. Assuming the trial court clearly erred in that the failure to include information about the prior consensual search was a material omission, and that Detective Herndon materially misstated what Doll-Iffrig saw in her daughter's bed on April 1, 1995, the test is to add the omitted facts to the affidavit and subtract the misstatements. Garrison, 118 Wash.2d at 873, 827 P.2d 1388; Kinder v. Mangan, 57 Wash.App. 840, 846, 790 P.2d 652 (1990). If probable cause nevertheless exists the warrant stands. Given the difference between the search for trace evidence contemplated by the search warrant and the cursory search Detective Herndon performed the day before, and given Doll-Iffrig's numerous statements as to her uncertainty whether she saw Roxanne in bed, we would uphold the probable cause determination even under the Garrison test.