Opinion ID: 2534434
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Separate juries for guilt and aggravation/penalty phases

Text: ¶ 81 Anderson argues that he was constitutionally entitled to have the aggravation and penalty issues decided by the same jury that decided guilt. However, Ring III rejected that argument, holding that a defendant holds no absolute right to a penalty trial with the same judge or jurors who heard the evidence on guilt, and reasoning that the ability to re-sentence capital defendants by a new jury is implicit in the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence. 204 Ariz. at 551 ¶¶ 39-40, 65 P.3d at 932. [14] ¶ 82 Anderson next argues that because A.R.S. § 13-703.01(E) allows the aggravation phase jury to consider evidence presented at the guilt phase, the statute precludes the impaneling of a new jury. But the burden of proof at the aggravation phase is on the State. See A.R.S. § 13-703(B). Therefore, when a new jury is convened for the aggravation phase, the State must present to that jury  as it did in this case  any trial evidence it wishes considered in determining aggravation. Anderson suffered no prejudice from this procedure. ¶ 83 Anderson further argues that because the jury at the penalty phase may consider any mitigation evidence presented during the guilt phase, A.R.S. § 13-703.01(I), a different jury cannot sit in the penalty phase. But § 13-703.01(I) applies on its face only when the penalty jury is the same jury that determined guilt. Moreover, Anderson does not suggest that he was prevented from presenting to the penalty phase jury any mitigation evidence that was introduced at the guilt phase. Nor does he identify any mitigation evidence that the penalty phase jury failed to hear. ¶ 84 Anderson also argues that the penalty phase jurors had the issue of guilt thrust upon them in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to an individualized sentencing determination. He asserts that the issues of guilt and punishment are too interwoven to be bifurcated and tried to different juries, in particular because guilt phase jurors may have residual doubt that makes them less likely to sentence a defendant to death. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 181, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) ([T]he fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.) (citation omitted). ¶ 85 The fact that Anderson had different juries for the guilt and aggravation/penalty phases, however, did not deprive him of an individualized sentencing determination. Anderson does not argue that he was prevented from presenting any mitigation evidence. Indeed, the aggravation and penalty phases were essentially a full-blown re-presentation of the entire case. Nearly every trial exhibit was admitted, and the only trial witnesses who did not testify at the sentencing hearings were the two Illinois state troopers who arrested Anderson. As to those witnesses, nothing prevented Anderson from offering their guilt phase testimony had he found it helpful to his case. ¶ 86 In response to Anderson's complaint that the second jury was not allowed to revisit the issue of guilt or innocence, we note that the same result occurs when a single jury sits for the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial. During the aggravation and penalty phases, a jury may not revisit its initial guilty verdict. The only issue at the aggravation phase is whether any aggravating circumstances have been proved; the only issue during the penalty phase is whether death is the appropriate sentence. A.R.S. § 13-703.01(E), (H). [15]