Opinion ID: 1421477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Deference to Administrative Decisions

Text: As noted above, the statute vests the power to determine nondisability in the Board. RCW 41.26.140. Further, RCW 41.26.140(2) requires us to follow the clearly erroneous standard for review set by the administrative procedure act, RCW 34.04. The APA does not permit us to substitute our judgment for that of the administrative agency in factual matters ... Franklin Cy. Sheriff's Office v. Sellers, 97 Wn.2d 317, 325, 646 P.2d 113 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106 (1983). To reverse an administrative judgment, we must find a fact determination clearly erroneous in view of the entire record as submitted and the public policy contained in the act ... RCW 34.04.130(6)(e). The policy of the statute is to provide economic security to disabled fire fighters and law enforcement officers. But the policy also protects the fiscal integrity of the system by restoring workers to employment when they are no longer disabled. To this end, the statute permits periodic reexaminations and evaluation of new evidence by the Board. Evidence was produced at both Malland's and Kuaimoku's hearings to support a finding that each was able to perform his duties. A review of the record does not leave me with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wn.2d 255, 259-60, 461 P.2d 531 (1969). See also Franklin Cy. Sheriff's Office v. Sellers, supra .