Opinion ID: 2608677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: proceeds of the residence

Text: Concerning the family residence the settlement agreement provides as follows: It is agreed that from date of this agreement, until August 31, 1977, plaintiff shall have the right to occupy said family home, as her residence, provided, however, that in the event plaintiff terminates her occupancy of said property, or upon the expiration of the period ending August 31, 1977, whichever is earlier, the parties agree to sell said property and divide, equally, the net proceeds thereof; provided, further, that defendant shall have the right of first refusal to purchase plaintiff's undivided one-half (1/2) interest in the property, within thirty (30) days of the receipt of any offer acceptable to both parties, on the same terms and conditions as contained in said offer. If the property has not been sold prior to August 31, 1977, defendant shall have the option to purchase plaintiff's undivided one-half (1/2) interest in the property, which option defendant must exercise within sixty (60) days after plaintiff terminates her occupancy of the property, or August 31, 1977, whichever is earlier, with the purchase price to be paid by defendant to plaintiff for her undivided one-half (1/2) interest, in the sum of Eighty Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($87,500.00), cash, on closing. (Italics ours.) Mrs. Wagner and the courts below advance many reasons why the option was not valid and enforceable, including ambiguity, inconsistency, waiver and estoppel, and modification. Although this provision is not a model of clarity, and the actions of the parties were not always entirely consistent therewith, we disagree with the conclusion of the courts below. [4] In construing a contract, a court must interpret it according to the intent of the parties as manifested by the words used. See Patterson v. Bixby, 58 Wn.2d 454, 458, 364 P.2d 10 (1961). Courts can neither disregard contract language which the parties have employed nor revise the contract under a theory of construing it. Cf. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wn.2d 70, 73, 549 P.2d 9 (1976). An interpretation of a writing which gives effect to all of its provisions is favored over one which renders some of the language meaningless or ineffective. Newsom v. Miller, 42 Wn.2d 727, 731, 258 P.2d 812 (1953). This should be especially true when the writing is the product of a long period of negotiation with both parties having been represented by competent counsel. The provision quoted above considers three possibilities for the sale of the house: (1) The proceeds could be divided equally; (2) Mr. Wagner could exercise his right of first refusal; or (3) Mr. Wagner could exercise his option for a set price by a specified date. Practically speaking, Mr. Wagner was given an opportunity to decide which of the three choices he would exercise, and an election of any one would necessarily preclude exercise of the other two. This does not mean, however, that all three possibilities could not exist simultaneously until Mr. Wagner made his election. By the terms of the third choice it was necessary for Mr. Wagner to exercise his option by August 31, 1977, or within 60 days after Mrs. Wagner terminated her occupancy, whichever was earlier. The trial court made a finding of fact, unchallenged in this court, that Mrs. Wagner occupied the home until August 31, 1977. Two days thereafter ( i.e., within the 60-day period) Mr. Wagner chose to exercise his option and notified Mrs. Wagner of his election. By arguing waiver and estoppel, Mrs. Wagner in effect claimed Mr. Wagner made some irrevocable choice prior to August 31, 1977. We do not agree. [5, 6] Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is necessary that the person against whom waiver is claimed have intended to relinquish the right, advantage, or benefit and his action must be inconsistent with any other intent than to waive it. Further, to constitute a waiver, other than by express agreement, there must be unequivocal acts or conduct evincing an intent to waive. Birkeland v. Corbett, 51 Wn.2d 554, 565, 320 P.2d 635 (1958). Intent cannot be inferred from doubtful or ambiguous factors. White Pass Co. v. St. John, 71 Wn.2d 156, 163, 427 P.2d 398 (1967). Estoppel requires (1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement, or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement or act. Harbor Air Serv., Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 88 Wn.2d 359, 560 P.2d 1145 (1977). Mrs. Wagner argues that certain actions and inactions by Mr. Wagner make it inequitable for him to exercise the option. For example, she asserts he induced her to continue occupancy of the house. While it is possible such acts could have prevented him from contesting the issue of occupancy, the trial court did not so find and no error has been assigned to the absent finding. None of the claimed acts or failure to act, taken singly or collectively, constitute a waiver or estop Mr. Wagner's exercise of his option. Mrs. Wagner also relies on the fact that Mr. Wagner worked with her to sell the residence beginning in the fall of 1974. She points to the fact that each contributed one-half of the $10,000 retainer required for the Previews listing. This, however, does not evidence the election of one of the three choices. The settlement agreement impliedly required Mr. Wagner to aid in any attempts to sell the house. As his brief points out, It is interesting to consider what equitable doctrines would be applied to Mr. Wagner's conduct, if he had failed to cooperate fully in attempts to sell the house or if he had made any effort to prevent the sale until after August 31, 1977. [7] Mrs. Wagner also relies upon the beginning and ending dates of the Previews listing to establish a claimed modification of the contract. Mutual modification of a contract by subsequent agreement of the parties arises out of the intention of the parties and requires a meeting of the minds. Hanson v. Puget Sound Navigation Co., 52 Wn.2d 124, 127, 323 P.2d 655 (1958). Here also, intent cannot be based on doubtful or ambiguous factors. See White Pass Co. v. St. John, supra . There must also be consideration separate from that of the original contract. Rosellini v. Banchero, 83 Wn.2d 268, 273, 517 P.2d 955 (1974). We find neither a clearly manifested mutual intent nor any new consideration for the alleged modification. Mr. Wagner's assistance in the attempted sale did not mean he intended to forfeit his option if the house did not sell by August 31, 1977, as noted above. Further, it did not evince any intent to modify the contract so as to abolish his option. His acceptance of Mrs. Wagner's partial payment of the Previews retainer did not change this. It would have been to Mrs. Wagner's benefit for the house to have been sold since she would have received one-half of the increased proceeds pursuant to the separation agreement, and Mr. Wagner would not have been able to exercise the option. It could be said the payment was made in an attempt to make the exercise of the option impossible; it cannot be said, however, that it was made to induce Mr. Wagner to otherwise relinquish his option through modification of the agreement. Thus, the $5,000 paid by Mrs. Wagner does not amount to consideration. At best the Previews listing might have modified the separation agreement to the extent that it would have deferred the time at which Mr. Wagner's option would have ripened. Even if this were true, however, Mr. Wagner's attempt to exercise the option would be considered continuing. The only act required by him during the 60-day option period was to notify Mrs. Wagner that he desired to exercise it. Finally, it is important to note that the trial court made no express written findings on the elements of waiver, estoppel, or modification. This court is not in a position to supply those missing elements. [8] A court cannot, based upon general considerations of abstract justice, make a contract for parties which they did not make for themselves. Jackson v. Domschot, 40 Wn.2d 30, 34, 239 P.2d 1058 (1952); Merlin v. Rodine, 32 Wn.2d 757, 759, 203 P.2d 683 (1949). Mrs. Wagner has advanced no legal theory supported by the facts of this case. Thus, the option provision in the separation agreement should be enforced as written. The Court of Appeals is reversed on both issues and the cause is remanded to the trial court for disposition consistent with this opinion. UTTER, C.J., and ROSELLINI, BRACHTENBACH, HOROWITZ, DOLLIVER, HICKS, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.