Opinion ID: 3011274
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: District Court's Final Order of

Text: December 16, 1999 Appellants next contend that the district court erred in affirming the magistrate judge's letter opinion and order entered June 30, 1999, which granted appellees' motion for discovery sanctions against appellants pursuant to Rule 37(b) and (d).15 As we previously mentioned, the magistrate _________________________________________________________________ 14. We also will dismiss appellants' Spill Act claim under Count IV. See n.11, supra. Moreover, as we previously mentioned, count V of the complaint pleaded a claim for damages stemming from appellees' alleged acts, omissions and breaches. App. at 66a. The district court dismissed this count, stating that [b]ecause plaintiffs have failed to adduce sufficient evidence in support of their breach of contract claims, they cannot recover the damages outlined in Count Five of the Complaint. Id. at 16a. Inasmuch as we agree with the district court's dismissal of counts I through IV of the complaint, we will affirm the district court's dismissal of count V, as there is no independent substantive basis for appellants' claim for relief. 15. Appellants also maintain that the district court erred in dismissing appellees' counterclaim without prejudice. The counterclaim sought a declaratory judgment that remediation of the Property under the Agreement included use of engineering and institutional controls, and an order requiring appellants to consent to them. App. at 80a-81a. Appellees explain that their counterclaim actually sought an order compelling appellants to consent to their use of a Classification Exception Area (CEA), which is a remediation by passive rather than active means. App. at 845a. As we previously mentioned, appellants initially sought partial summary judgment to dismiss the counterclaim with prejudice, but the district court denied their motion in its order of August 10, 1999, reasoning that appellants failed to demonstrate that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court observed that appellants failed to cite any authority in support of the motion, andmerely allege[d] that `Plaintiffs do not and need not consent' to the engineering and institutional controls. App. at 16. After the court dismissed the amended complaint in its entirety, appellees moved for summary judgment on the counterclaim. After oral argument on appellees' motion, the court entered an order dismissing the counterclaim without 41 judge agreed with appellees' argument that Berger's conduct warranted a sanction in the form of precluding appellants from asserting a position and introducing evidence contrary to the position Berger asserted during his deposition. In addition, the magistrate judge concluded that Berger's lack of preparedness at his deposition justified the imposition of monetary sanctions pursuant to Rule 37(d) in the form of costs and attorney's fees associated with taking the deposition and bringing the sanctions motion before the court. App. at 22a. The magistrate judge clearly set forth the factual and legal basis for his ruling, relying primarily on the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's decision in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Southern Union Co., 985 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1993) (Southern Union): Here, Berger was not completely prepared on any occasion for which he sat for a deposition. Further, his _________________________________________________________________ prejudice, because, in its view, there was no current case or controversy with respect to the subject matter of the counterclaim. We have reviewed the entire record, and we agree with the district court's disposition of the counterclaim. It appears that the appellees instituted the counterclaim in response to certain statements by appellants to the effect that they would not consent to the use of a CEA to remediate the Property, and would oppose any application that Essex made to the DEP for that purpose. Appellees' br. at 14. Nevertheless, the court's dismissal of the counterclaim was appropriate because appellees do not dispute that Essex has not applied for a CEA, and presently cannot do so. Accordingly, appellants' threats to the effect that they would not consent to the use of a CEA do not present a controversy ripe for resolution, and the court did not err in dismissing the counterclaim without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers v. Ridge, 150 F.3d 319, 323 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing and applying ripeness doctrine in context of claims seeking declaratory relief, and noting that [t]he function of the ripeness doctrine is to prevent federal courts, `through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.' ) (quoting Abbot Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105, 97 S.Ct. 980 (1977)); The Presbytery of N.J. v. Florio, 40 F.3d at 1462 (addressing ripeness issue in context of suit seeking declaratory relief and stating that [i]t is the plaintiff 's responsibility to allege