Opinion ID: 2059926
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Construction of the Statutory Scheme

Text: In examining the interrelationship between these two statutes [Section 722 and Section 729], we note that certain established rules of statutory construction appear applicable. Id. at 410 n. 10. First, [w]hen construing two provisions in a legislative enactment, the Court will attempt to harmonize them to the extent possible. Id. This is accomplished by reading two statutory provisions in pari materia. Id. Second, a statute should not be construed in such a way as to require an absurd or unreasonable result. Id. Under the interpretation of Section 729 followed by the Family Court and advanced by the Mother in this appeal, the best interests of the child standard becomes largely irrelevant in considering petitions to modify custody. This is so because under that interpretation the child's best interests are only considered after the parent seeking to modify a prior custody order can show either consent to the modification by the custodial parent or endangerment or impairment to the child from the present environment. See, 13 Del.C. § 729(b)(1)-(3). We find that the General Assembly did not intend such a result. [10] C. v. C., Del.Supr., 320 A.2d 717, 722 (1974). Section 729 is but one part of an entire statutory scheme addressing custody matters. See, 13 Del.C. §§ 721-731. While the language of Section 729 is similar to that found in Section 409 of the U.M.D.A., the proper interpretation of the standards by which custody may be modified requires this Court to go beyond the solitary language of Section 729. The paramount consideration in custody determinations has always been aimed at addressing the welfare and best interests of the child. William H.Y. v. Myrna L.Y., 450 A.2d at 409. The long established rule in Delaware is that the best interests of the child is the primary concern in matters of custody. See, e.g., Maureen F.G. v. George W.G., Del.Supr., 445 A.2d 934, 936 (1982); Cline v. Hartzler, Del.Supr., 227 A.2d 210, 212 (1967); DuPont v. DuPont, Del.Supr., 216 A.2d 674, 680 (1966); In re Two Minor Children, Del.Supr., 173 A.2d 876, 878-79 (1961); Smith v. Smith, Del.Super., 45 A.2d 879, 880-81 (1946); Cf. Solis v. Tea, Del.Supr., 468 A.2d 1276, 1283 (1983). To this end, Section 729 must be harmonized, if possible, with the broad statutory scheme and the best interests provisions set forth in Section 722. See, Hamilton v. Trivits, Del.Super., 340 A.2d 178, 180 (1975); Dupont v. Mills, Del.Ct. en banc, 196 A. 168, 177 (1937). The Father argues that this harmony can be achieved if 13 Del.C. § 729(a) and (b) are read together as creating a two-year moratorium on the modification of a custody decree, unless the moving party can make the showing required by the provisions of Section 729. The Father argues further that after the expiration of the two-year period, a proper reading of the statutory scheme requires the best interests of the child, as set forth in 13 Del.C. § 722, to be the determinative consideration. After examining the Delaware law on the subject of custody as a whole, we find that this is the logical and proper construction of the Delaware statutes. William H.Y. v. Myrna L.Y., 450 A.2d at 410 n. 10. [11] We hold that a person seeking to modify a custody decree, within two years of the prior decree, must satisfy the burdens imposed by Section 729(a) and (b). These two subsections should be read together as creating a two-year moratorium on modification of a custody decree unless the moving party can make the showing set forth in [Section] 729(b). William H.Y. v. Myrna L.Y., Del.Supr., 450 A.2d at 410, n. 10. A person seeking to modify a prior custody decree beyond this two-year moratorium must satisfy the burdens imposed by Section 722 in order to prevail. That is to say, beyond the two-year period governed by Section 729, each motion for the modification of a prior custody decree shall be decided according to the best interests of the child, in accordance with standards set forth in Section 722. This interpretation of the Delaware statutory scheme accomplishes the overriding policy purpose of the Delaware child custody laws, i.e., to provide for the best interests of the child on a continuing, but non-disruptive, basis. First, it requires initial custody decisions to be made in a child's best interests. 13 Del.C. § 722. Second, it recognizes the need for providing a child with a stable and continuous home life by imposing a two-year moratorium on a modification of custody, in the absence of compelling circumstances. 13 Del.C. § 729(a) and (b). Third, it recognizes that the factors which were determinative in a prior custody decision are susceptible to change and provides an opportunity for their re-examination in intervals of at least two years. This construction of the Delaware statutory scheme is compelled by the general statutory intention of the General Assembly. C. v. C., Del.Supr., 320 A.2d at 722.