Opinion ID: 2995506
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 1228,

Text: 1234 (Ind. 1994) (Indiana has long recognized that intentional interference with a contract is an actionable tort.). Given the backdrop of the Sims and Samm cases, Mr. Goetzke’s tortious interference claim most likely constitutes an independent tort within the meaning of the exclusivity provision of the Indiana statute. However, a second component is necessary before the claim falls within the scope of the statute. Specifically, the independent tort must have been committed by the worker’s compensation administrator in adjusting or settling a compensation claim. See Ind. Code 22-3-4- 12.1(a). One Indiana court has provided some elaboration on this element. In Samm v. Great Dane Trailers, 715 N.E.2d 420, 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), an employer discharged the plaintiff for allegedly filing a fraudulent worker’s compensation claim. In response to his termination, the plaintiff filed a defamation action against the employer in state court. The Indiana superior court, however, dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction stating that the cause of action fell within the exclusivity provision of the worker’s compensation statute. In reversing this decision, the Court of Appeals of Indiana emphasized that the independent tort must have been part of [the worker’s compensation administrator’s] procedure for ’adjusting or settling’ [a plaintiff’s] claim for worker’s compensation benefits. Samm, 715 N.E.2d at 427. As such, if the defamatory statements were made within the context of the benefits denial, . . . the complaint would seem to allege an independent tort which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board. Id. at 427. However, had the defamatory statement followed the denial of benefits, the claim would fall outside of the exclusivity provision because the defamatory action would appear to be related to but separate and independent from [the defendant’s] procedure for ’adjusting or settling’ a request for benefits. Id. As the court could not determine whether the defamation claim was intertwined with or separate from the procedure for adjusting or settling the plaintiff’s worker’s compensation claim, it remanded the case for further fact finding. As Samm makes clear, to fall within the ambit of the statute, Crawford’s alleged tortious conduct must have occurred as part of its procedure for adjusting or settling Mr. Goetzke’s claim for worker’s compensation benefits. This element is simply not present in this case. Specifically, Mr. Goetzke contends that Crawford engaged in a pattern of conduct designed to oust him from his job at Ferro. If Crawford actually engaged in such conduct, such actions would not form part of Crawford’s procedure for adjusting or settling Mr. Goetzke’s claims. Because the tortious interference claim falls outside of the scope of the exclusivity provision, Mr. Goetzke has stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Thus, the district court properly addressed the merits of this count of Mr. Goetzke’s complaint. E. Finally, we must determine whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Crawford on the tortious interference claim. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. To maintain a tortious interference claim under Indiana law, a plaintiff must demonstrate (i) the existence of a valid and enforceable con tract, (ii) defendant’s knowledge of the contract, (iii) defendant’s intentional inducement of breach of the contract, (iv) absence of justification and (v) damages resulting from defendant’s wrongful inducement of the breach. Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 1228, 1235 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). At a minimum, Mr. Goetzke has failed to prove the third element of the tort--that Crawford intentionally induced his termination. Specifically, Mr. Goetzke has failed to submit any evidence that would lead a reasonable juror to conclude that Crawford intentionally attempted to have him fired from his job. To establish this element, Mr. Goetzke again relies on the numerous phone calls between Crawford and Ferro in the nine-months prior to his termination. To infer inducement from this evidence is mere speculation. Moreover, Ferro, not Crawford initiated the investigation into the possible fraudulent nature of Mr. Goetzke’s back injuries. In particular, a Ferro official, Steve Hartford, requested that Crawford perform surveillance on Mr. Goetzke. Finally, Ferro has submitted uncontroverted testimony that Crawford had no involvement in the termination decision. Specifically, only Ferro officials comprised the group that ultimately decided to discharge Mr. Goetzke. Because Mr. Goetzke cannot prove the third element of the tort, the district court properly granted summary judgment on this claim.