Opinion ID: 591424
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: contract and estoppel claims

Text: 17 The record reflects that after being rehired in 1964, Fisher was treated as if he had been working at Combustion Engineering since 1958 for purposes of company awards recognizing employee service. Specifically, Fisher received 10, 15, 20, and 25 year service pins from the company based on a start date of 1958. Upon Fisher's retirement in 1985, Combustion Engineering recognized his 27 years of service with the company. 18 In the district court, the plaintiff pointed to the service pins and Ben Gibbs' alleged oral assurance of requested service credit in order to advance contract and estoppel claims. He argued that the company must be held to its alleged promise concerning his service date, and that it should be estopped from denying such credit where it invited his reliance on a 1958 service date for all other purposes. 19 ERISA preempts state law and state law claims that relate to any employee benefit plan as that term is defined therein. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1553, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987). An exception to this ERISA preemption provision appears in § 1144(b). That subsection provides that ERISA preemption shall not apply with respect to any cause of action which arose, or any act or omission which occurred before January 1, 1975. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(1). 20 Fisher argued below that ERISA did not preempt his contract and estoppel claims because Combustion Engineering's alleged promises and deceptions occurred before January 1, 1975. 2 The district court, however, observed that even were Fisher able to avoid ERISA preemption the Tennessee six-year statute of limitations on contract claims ran well before the commencement of this suit.... The court then went on to state that in any event, Fisher's contract and estoppel claims relate to the company's ERISA plan, and therefore are preempted under § 1144(a). 21 On appeal, Fisher argues that although the acts or omissions giving rise to his state law claims occurred prior to 1975, his state law causes of action should not be time-barred because they did not accrue until his benefits claims was denied in 1985. We need not reach this issue, for we agree with the district court that Fisher's state law claims are preempted by ERISA because they relate to the company's ERISA plan. 22 [T]he express pre-emption provisions of ERISA are deliberately expansive. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 45-46, 107 S.Ct. at 1552. The phrase 'relate to' is given broad meaning such that a state law cause of action is preempted if 'it has connection with or reference to that plan.'  Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCE Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1275 (6th Cir.1991) (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 730, 732-33, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 2384, 2385, 85 L.Ed.2d 728) (emphasis added). See also Authier v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796, 800 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 888, 106 S.Ct. 208, 88 L.Ed.2d 177 (1985) (Congress used 'relate to' in its broadest sense.). 23 In light of the breadth of § 1144(a), we hold that Fisher's contract and estoppel claims are preempted under ERISA. This case is unlike that of Perry v. PIE Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1166, 107 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1990), which the plaintiff cites in support of his non-preemption position. In Perry, employees claimed that their company wrongfully induced them to participate in an employee stock investment plan which was expressly subject to ERISA. They sued for rescission and restitution of the wage reduction implemented by the plan. In defense, the company argued that plaintiffs' claim was preempted by ERISA. The Sixth Circuit rejected the company's argument. Citing Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968, 102 S.Ct. 512, 70 L.Ed.2d 384 (1981), the court stated that preemption should apply to a state law claim only if Congress has provided a remedy for the wrong or wrongs asserted. 872 F.2d at 162. Because Congress did not provide for the rescissionary or restitutive remedies sought in Perry, the court held that there was no ERISA preemption for the plaintiffs' state common-law claims of fraud, misrepresentation and promissory estoppel. 24 The unique remedies sought in Perry are not present here. Unlike the plaintiffs' claim in Perry, Fisher's claims, in essence ... [are] for the recovery of an ERISA plan benefit. Cromwell, 944 F.2d at 1276. Thus, ERISA preempts Fisher's state law claims.