Opinion ID: 2402235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preponderance of the Evidence Standard

Text: We face here, as a matter of first impression in this jurisdiction, the argument that § 16-2388(f) [2] of the guardianship statute is unconstitutional on its face because it permits the trial judge to grant a petition for permanent guardianship upon a preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than the more demanding standard requiring clear and convincing evidence. We must first decide whether we may or should review this issue at all on this appeal. Appellant never objected to the trial court's use of the preponderance standard when it ruled on the guardianship issue. However, before us, appellees have not asserted that appellant waived the argument and that as a result we are to apply, at most, a plain error standard of review. The District's brief actually appears to invite plenary decision whether the preponderance standard survives constitutional attack, as applied to these guardianship proceedings. Therefore, the District might well be said to have waived its waiver argument. In re T.L., 859 A.2d 1087, 1090 n. 6 (D.C.2004) (quoting United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 362 U.S.App. D.C. 512, 515, 374 F.3d 1337, 1340 (2004)). Moreover, this constitutional issue of first impression has been briefed and involves important legal rights. In this posture, we elect to address the issue notwithstanding appellant's failure to raise any objection before the trial court. See id. ; In re K.A., 484 A.2d 992, 997 (D.C.1984) (addressing constitutional attack on termination of parental rights statute, despite that appellants raised it for the first time on appeal). We turn to the merits of appellant's claim. It is a basic principle that [p]arents have a due process right `to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.' In re A.H., 842 A.2d 674, 684 n. 14 (D.C.2004) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000)). The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). In light of these constitutional considerations, to completely terminate parental rights, the government must support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence. [3] Id. at 748, 102 S.Ct. 1388. Though we have held that the preponderance standard in the context of neglect proceedings is constitutional, In re N.H., 569 A.2d 1179 (D.C.1990), neither the Supreme Court nor this court has had occasion to decide whether the clear and convincing standard-constitutionally mandated for termination of parental rights-also applies to the recently enacted permanent guardianship status in neglect proceedings. [4] However, in examining statutes similar to our guardianship act, both the Colorado Supreme Court and the Washington Court of Appeals have held-and we agree-that for statutes terminating only some of a parent's rights to his or her child, the preponderance of the evidence standard does not violate the Constitution's due process requirements. [5] In re R.W., 10 P.3d 1271, 1276 (Colo.2000) (en banc); Dependency of F.S., 81 Wash.App. 264, 913 P.2d 844, 846-47 (1996), petition for review denied, 130 Wash.2d 1002, 925 P.2d 988. Both courts apply the three-prong standard of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) as articulated in the parental rights context in Santosky, supra . These cases require that a court balance (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the jurisdiction's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure. Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. at 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 893; Santosky, supra, 455 U.S. at 754, 102 S.Ct. 1388. In substance, the greater the deprivation, the greater the procedural protection provided to parents. In re R.W., supra, 10 P.3d at 1276. The similar analysis of the Colorado and Washington courts is in our judgment compelling and, without extensive reiteration, we follow and adopt it. The preponderance standard complies with due process requirements of the Constitution because § 16-2388(f), like the statutes analyzed in the Washington state and Colorado cases, does not operate as a final and absolute termination of the natural parents' rights. Indeed, the statute explicitly retains many important rights for the natural parents: Entry of a guardianship order does not terminate the parent and child relationship, including: [t]he right of the child to inherit from his or her parents; [t]he parents' right to visit or contact the child (except as limited by the court); [t]he parents' right to consent to the child's adoption; [t]he parents' right to determine the child's religious affiliation; and [t]he parents' responsibility to provide financial, medical, and other support for the child. D.C.Code § 16-2389(c). Because the impact of guardianship is not tantamount to termination, the statute does not call for the strictures of the clear and convincing standard. [6] Dependency of F.S., supra, 913 P.2d at 847. Moreover, with respect to the risk of error, the statute reserves to the parent, under the court's continuing jurisdiction, the right to move to terminate the guardianship order at any time, and the court must do so if it would be in the best interests of the child. D.C.Code §§ 16-2389, -2390. The statute's lack of permanency further weighs in favor of the preponderance standard. See D.C.Code § 16-2390 (court's jurisdiction lasts until the child's eighteenth birthday, at which point the guardians' legal rights to the child expire). Because the court's interference between the natural parent and his child under the guardianship statute is significantly less than with the termination of parental rights, [7] the lower preponderance standard is accordingly warranted. See Dependency of F.S., supra, 913 P.2d at 846 (holding that the preponderance standard provides adequate due process because the guardianship order results in neither an irreversible decision nor a complete severance of the parent's contact with the child); In re R.W., supra, 10 P.3d at 1278 (preponderance standard is constitutional [b]ecause Petitioner is not deprived of all her parental rights, and because the trial court retains jurisdiction to modify its existing order). In sum, because we are confident that the preponderance standard set forth under § 16-2388 comports with the Constitution's due process demands and carefully balances the natural parent's rights against the best interests of the child, the statute is not violative of the Constitution. In re A.B.E., 564 A.2d 751, 754-55 (D.C.1989) (While the rights of the natural parents to bring up their children are subject to the protection of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment ... these rights are not absolute, and must give way before the child's best interests (citations omitted)).