Opinion ID: 1759608
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Separation-of-Powers Analysis

Text: The State first argues that § 13-5-9.1 is unconstitutional because, it argues, that section improperly delegates to the judicial branch of government the authority to grant parole, a power reserved to the legislative branch, thereby violating the separation-of-powers clause contained in § 43, Ala. Const. of 1901. Kirby argues that a trial court's only authority under § 13A-5-9.1 is to modify the sentence of an inmate previously sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Although such a modification might then make that inmate eligible for parole, Kirby maintains that § 13A-5-9.1 does not confer upon the judicial branch the power to grant parole. Section 13A-5-9.1 directs the sentencing judge or the presiding judge to apply the provisions of § 13A-5-9 retroactively, thereby making the benefits of the 2000 amendment to the HFOA available to inmates who were sentenced pursuant to the HFOA before it was amended in 2000. Section 13A-5-9(c)(3), as amended in 2000, allows a sentencing judge to decide in certain circumstances whether a sentence of life imprisonment or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is appropriate for a particular inmate. In making that decision, the sentencing judge does not have the power to decide the secondary issue  whether the defendant will be granted parole should the judge sentence him or her to straight life imprisonment. [3] Under § 13A-5-9.1, a judge applying § 13A-5-9(c)(3) to a previously sentenced defendant merely has the authority to conduct a new sentencing hearing, and in the judge's discretion, to modify a previous sentence under which a defendant would never have been eligible for parole to a sentence of straight life imprisonment, under which a defendant might thereafter become eligible for parole, depending upon the factors then established by the Parole Board. The clear reference in § 13A-5-9.1 to the provisions of § 13A-5-9 makes it obvious that the trial court's only authority is to modify the sentence of an inmate who is not eligible for parole under the sentence imposed pursuant to the HFOA before its amendment in 2000, sentencing that inmate instead to a sentence under which he or she may become eligible for parole. If the trial court does determine that a defendant should receive a sentence of straight life imprisonment, that resentencing determination may trigger a parole evaluation by the Parole Board if the inmate has served a sufficient amount of time in prison. On the other hand, if an inmate has served so little time that he or she is not yet eligible for parole, that resentencing determination will not result in immediate parole consideration. Thus, § 13A-5-9.1 does not confer upon the judicial branch the power to grant parole.