Opinion ID: 169003
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: C ompliance With R ule 32(i)(1)(A)

Text: M r. Cook next argues that the district court failed to comply with the requirement in Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(A) that the sentencing court “must verify that the defendant and the defendant’s attorney have read and discussed the presentence report and any addendum to that report.” H e contends that this rule requires the court to address the defendant personally and to ascertain clearly and unambiguously that he has discussed the PSR with his counsel. See Aplt. Br. at 17. M r. Cook further asserts that “an inquiry by the court in this case was especially crucial considering that the attorney who showed up at sentencing was making his first appearance in the case,” and, in so doing, “withdrew an objection that potentially could have saved Defendant 10 years of his life.” Id. at 16. The following colloquy occurred at the sentencing hearing: THE COURT: M s. Armijo, have you reviewed the presentence investigation report on behalf of the government? PROSECUTOR: Yes, Your Honor, I have, and I filed– THE COURT: A response. And I read it. PROSECUTOR: –my response to the objections. THE COURT: All right. Do you have any challenges to any of the factual statements in the report or any of the guideline proposals? - 10 - PROSECUTOR: Any challenge to it? THE COURT: Yes ma’am. PROSECUTOR: W e just disagree with the defense’s objections. THE COURT: Yes ma’am. M r. Solis, have you reviewed that report with your client? DEFENSE COUNSEL: We have, Your Honor. Aplt. App. at 56-57. Because M r. Cook did not object to the court’s alleged noncompliance with Rule 32(i), we review for plain error. W e need not look past the first prong of the analysis, however, because the district court did not err. Our precedent affords “the sentencing judge flexibility in determining that the mandates of Rule 32 were satisfied.” United States v. Rangel-Arreola, 991 F.2d 1519, 1525 (10th Cir. 1993). However, this flexibility is not boundless; the district court must verify that the defendant and his attorney “had the opportunity to read and discuss the presentence report.” Id. Accordingly, we have found error when the district court’s questioning revealed only that defense counsel had reviewed the PSR by himself. Id. at 1526. M r. Cook suggests that Rangel-Arreola is factually analogous because, here, “[t]he only inquiry the court made . . . was to counsel, and even that was questionable as to whether the court was asking counsel about the PSR or about the objections previous counsel had filed.” A plt. Br. at 15. He also asks us to follow a line of precedent from the Sixth and Seventh Circuits requiring the - 11 - sentencing court to direct a litany of specific questions to the defendant in order to ascertain whether he has discussed the PSR with his attorney. Both arguments are foreclosed by Rangel-Arreola. There, we held that the district court is not required to address the defendant personally and “may draw reasonable inferences from court documents, the defendant’s statements, and counsel’s statements in determining whether the defendant and counsel had the opportunity to read and discuss the presentence report.” 991 F.2d at 1525. The reasonable inference from the colloquy in this case is that M r. Cook reviewed the PSR with his counsel; the court asked defense counsel whether he had reviewed the PSR with his client, and defense counsel replied that he had. Rangel-Arreola also expressly rejected the requirement that “the district court . . . ask the defendant the following questions at sentencing: (1) whether the defendant had an opportunity to read the presentence report, (2) whether the defendant and defense counsel discussed the report, and (3) whether the defendant wishes to challenge any facts in the report.” Id. (citing United States v. Rone, 743 F.2d 1169, 1174 (7th Cir. 1984)). Accordingly, we must reject M r. Cook’s arguments that the district court failed to fulfill its obligations under Rule 32(i)(1)(A). 3 3 At the time Rangel-Arreola was decided, the requirement of ascertaining whether the defendant and his attorney discussed the PSR was contained in Fed. R. Crim P. 32(a)(1)(A). Although the requirement is now found in 32(i)(1)(A), the rule’s substantive content has not been altered. - 12 -