Opinion ID: 1795326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Morales and Wolens

Text: The Supreme Court has discussed the scope of the ADA's express preemption clause on two occasions. It first considered the ADA's preemptive scope in Morales, 504 U.S. at 374, 112 S.Ct. 2031. There, the Court examined whether the ADA preempted enforcement of guidelines concerning regulation of airline fare advertising through Texas's consumer protection statutes. Id. at 378, 112 S.Ct. 2031. The Court focused on the preemption clause's relating to language. Id. at 383-86, 112 S.Ct. 2031. Relying on its ERISA line of cases and the ordinary meaning of the statute's words, the Court construed the phrase relating to broadly to preempt State enforcement actions having a connection with, or reference to, airline `rates, routes, or services.' Id. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 2031. Based on this broad preemptive purpose, the Court rejected contentions that section 1305(a)(1) [3] only preempted states from actually prescribing rates, routes, or services, or that only state laws specifically aimed at the airline industry were preempted. Id. at 384-86, 112 S.Ct. 2031. Although the Court warned that `some state actions may affect [airline fares] in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner' to have preemptive effect, it concluded that the obligations imposed by the guidelines would impact airlines' ability to market their product and the fares they charged. Id. at 390, 112 S.Ct. 2031 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 100 n. 21, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983)). Thus, the guidelines had a forbidden significant effect on the airlines' rates, routes, and services, primarily because they restricted fare advertising, which relates to price. Id. at 388-89, 112 S.Ct. 2031. The Court held that, under these circumstances, the ADA preempted the fare advertising provisions in the general state consumer protection statutes at issue. Id. at 391, 112 S.Ct. 2031. The only other time the Court has addressed the scope of the ADA's preemption provision was in American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 115 S.Ct. 817, 130 L.Ed.2d 715. That case involved state law consumer fraud and breach of contract claims arising from retroactive changes in an airline's frequent flyer program. Id. at 224-25, 115 S.Ct. 817. The Court focused on another portion of the ADA's preemption clausethe phrase enact or enforce any lawsto determine the ADA's preemptive scope. Id. at 226, 115 S.Ct. 817. It held that, like the guidelines at issue in Morales, Illinois's consumer fraud statute serve[d] as a means to guide and police the marketing practices of the airlines. Id. at 228, 115 S.Ct. 817. Thus, the ADA preempted the plaintiffs' consumer fraud claims. Id. The Court then turned to the plaintiffs' breach of contract claims. Id. It held that the ADA's preemption clause did not shield airlines from suits alleging no violation of state-imposed obligations, but seeking recovery solely for the airline's alleged breach of its own, self-imposed undertakings. Id. at 228, 115 S.Ct. 817. The Court reasoned that some of the terms and conditions airlines offer, such as frequent flyer programs, are private obligations and do not amount to State `enactment or enforcement [of] any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law' within the meaning of section 1305(a)(1). Id. at 228-29, 115 S.Ct. 817. The Court limited its holding, however, to suits based on the terms of the parties' bargain with no enlargement or enhancement based on state laws or policies external to the agreement. Id. at 233, 115 S.Ct. 817. Courts have interpreted this to mean that if a contract claim cannot be adjudicated without resort to external law, the claim is preempted by the ADA. See, e.g., Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 257 (4th Cir.1998); Boon Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 17 S.W.3d 52, 58-59 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied); Howell v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 99 Wash.App. 646, 994 P.2d 901, 905 (2000). C