Opinion ID: 1085485
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: standard of review

Text: 47 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 48 of 79 Because Puiatti filed his § 2254 petition before the April 24, 1996 effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), we review his claims under pre-AEDPA law. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1273 (11th Cir. 2003). “Under pre-AEDPA standards, [a] state court’s factual determinations that are reasonably based on the record are presumptively correct . . . . We review state court determinations of law de novo.” Thompson v. Haley, 255 F.3d 1292, 1295 (11th Cir. 2001). Also “[u]nder pre-AEDPA law, this Court reviews de novo the district court’s denial of [Puiatti’s] § 2254 petition and the court’s subsidiary legal conclusions. The district court’s findings of fact, however, are subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard.” Turner, 339 F.3d at 1273 (internal citations omitted). Any factual findings made by the district court are reviewed for clear error, but its legal conclusions and mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo. Id. IX. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN PENALTY PHASE
Puiatti’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is governed by the Supreme Court’s two-pronged test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). See Pooler v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 702 F.3d 1252, 1269 (11th Cir. 2012). Under Strickland, to establish constitutionally ineffective 48 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 49 of 79 counsel, a defendant must show that (1) his attorney’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. We first consider the performance prong, discussing trial counsel’s pre-trial investigation, her work with the expert witnesses, and Puiatti’s suggestion that his trial attorney ignored “red flags” of child abuse.
The Strickland performance standard is “objectively reasonable attorney conduct under prevailing professional norms.” Johnson v. Upton, 615 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 2010); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065 (“The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”). We look at what professional norms existed at the time that the attorney acted. See Johnson v. Sec’y, DOC, 643 F.3d 907, 931 (11th Cir. 2011). The question is “whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. A petitioner bears the burden of proving, “by a preponderance of competent evidence, that counsel’s performance was unreasonable.” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); accord Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 770, 790 (2011) (“Strickland . . . calls for an 49 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 50 of 79 inquiry into the objective reasonableness of counsel’s performance, not counsel’s subjective state of mind.”). In answering this question, even pre-AEDPA, we are mindful that “[t]rial counsel’s performance is entitled to ‘highly deferential’ judicial scrutiny.” Turner, 339 F.3d at 1275 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994) (“It is important to note that judicial scrutiny of an attorney’s performance is appropriately highly deferential . . . .”). We therefore, “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Turner, 339 F.3d at 1275 (internal quotation marks omitted). “For a petitioner to show that the conduct was unreasonable, a petitioner must establish that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.” Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315. Under the professional standards in place in 1983 and 1984, when trial counsel represented Puiatti, a defense attorney in a capital case had a duty “to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary,” and to present at sentencing mitigating evidence uncovered during that investigation. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395–98, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1514–15 (2000) (counsel’s performance was deficient because counsel “did not 50 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 51 of 79 fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background”); Cooper v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 646 F.3d 1328, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 2011) (observing that counsel had an obligation to conduct “an adequate background investigation”); Johnson, 643 F.3d at 931 (“The Supreme Court has held that based on standards applicable in 1980 . . . an attorney representing a capital defendant has an obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.”). An attorney’s strategic choices “made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. However, “strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Id., 104 S. Ct. at 2066. “In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney’s investigation, . . . a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2003). Of course, “a complete failure to investigate may constitute deficient performance of counsel.” Parker v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 331 F.3d 764, 787 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Housel v. Head, 238 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that “a 51 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 52 of 79 failure to investigate can be deficient performance in a capital case when counsel totally fails to inquire into the defendant’s past or present behavior or life history”). That said, “no absolute duty exists to investigate particular facts or a certain line of defense.” Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1318. Instead, a court’s assessment of an attorney’s investigation hinges on whether that investigation—or the decision to limit it—was reasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. Finally, “[a] decision to limit investigation is ‘accorded a strong presumption of reasonableness,’” Mills v. Singletary, 63 F.3d 999, 1021 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “to be effective a lawyer is not required to ‘pursue every path until it bears fruit or until all hope withers.’” Williams v. Head, 185 F.3d 1223, 1237 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Foster v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 402, 405 (11th Cir. 1987)). Although we must assess a decision not to investigate “for reasonableness in all of the circumstances,” when doing so we apply “a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. We keep in mind that a defense attorney “preparing for the sentencing phase of a capital trial,” is not required “to scour the globe on the off chance something will turn up.” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (2005). Rather, “reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think that further investigation would be a waste.” Id., 125 S. Ct. at 2463. 52 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 53 of 79
After considerable review of the record and under the particular circumstances of this case, we conclude that the district court properly concluded that trial counsel conducted a reasonable investigation of Puiatti’s background and developed a penalty phase mitigation strategy supported by the evidence her investigation produced. Although that strategy did not yield the outcome that counsel and her client desired, it was nevertheless a reasonable one to pursue and her performance was not ineffective. During her investigation, trial counsel, among other tasks: (1) met with Puiatti several times and explained to him the nature of mitigating evidence and the importance of developing a comprehensive picture of his background; (2) directed Puiatti to write a history of his life; (3) interviewed Mr. and Mrs. Puiatti on multiple occasions, advised them about the nature of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and even visited the Puiatti family home; (4) interviewed sister Wright and advised Wright about the importance of gathering all information possible about Puiatti’s background; (5) interviewed Puiatti’s former wife; and (6) spoke on the telephone with Puiatti’s uncle, Joseph Puiatti. In addition to meeting with Puiatti’s family members, trial counsel solicited and received numerous records of Puiatti’s life, including school, hospital, military, and jail records. Counsel also sent a letter to Puiatti’s high school 53 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 54 of 79 guidance counselor, seeking to identify individuals in New York who may have known Puiatti when he was a child and had relevant background information about Puiatti’s childhood. In seeking records, trial counsel was “just trying to get all the records [she] could think of that might document independently [Puiatti’s] situation and his life and see what they might reveal.” Trial counsel not only personally completed these investigative tasks but also hired an investigator to help her. She also hired two mental health experts and instructed at least one of them to conduct his own independent investigation of Puiatti’s background, which that expert did by interviewing Puiatti and his parents too. In short, trial counsel’s investigation was comprehensive and thorough. We have previously determined that an attorney performed a reasonable investigation of his client’s background after the attorney performed only some of the actions that Garrett performed. See, e.g., DeYoung v. Schofield, 609 F.3d 1260, 1285 (11th Cir. 2010) (attorneys interviewed members of petitioner’s family and an investigator subpoenaed petitioner’s school and work records); Housel, 238 F.3d at 1295 (attorney instructed petitioner to “prepare a life history to help with the investigation” and contacted petitioner’s family members). After completing her investigation, trial counsel decided to present a mitigation strategy that centered on Puiatti’s having come from a good family who 54 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 55 of 79 stood willing to assist him in his rehabilitation, as well as Puiatti’s history of drug abuse, the major traumas and disappointments he had endured, his brain damage, and the fact that he was not prone to violence. Because trial counsel made this decision after a thorough investigation of Puiatti’s background, we consider her decision “virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. Trial counsel’s chosen mitigation strategy was also a reasonable one given the evidence, recounted above, that she did uncover. During the penalty phase hearing, Mrs. Puiatti testified about how much she and her husband cared for Puiatti. Specifically, she talked about how they had obtained counseling for their son when he started to abuse drugs, allowed Puiatti to live with them as an adult after he suffered repeated setbacks, and sought to obtain help for Puiatti when his drug problems did not abate during adulthood. Furthermore, Dr. Meadows independently confirmed that Puiatti came from a good family that “imbued [him] with a rather strong moral code.” Indeed, trial counsel reasonably chose her mitigation strategy based primarily on the information that she received from Puiatti, his family members, and two mental health experts. Puiatti told counsel he came from a good family and he never wanted for anything. Puiatti told the sentencing judge he came from a “good and crime-free” family. In all of the interviews defense counsel conducted 55 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 56 of 79 of Puiatti and his family members, no one ever disclosed the pattern of systemic child abuse endured by Puiatti, which came to light only years after Puiatti was sentenced. We have repeatedly held that “[a]n attorney does not render ineffective assistance by failing to discover and develop childhood abuse that his client does not mention to him.” Williams, 185 F.3d at 1237; see also DeYoung, 609 F.3d at 1287–88 (holding that counsel’s investigation was reasonable in light of the fact that there was “no evidence that DeYoung mentioned to his trial or appellate counsel or to any mental health experts (before trial or even afterward) . . . that there was significant internal strife or dysfunction in his family”); Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1202 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that “[b]ecause information about childhood abuse supplied by a defendant is extremely important in determining reasonable performance, ‘[w]hen a petitioner . . . does not mention a history of physical abuse, a lawyer is not ineffective for failing to discover or to offer evidence of abuse as mitigation’” (alterations in original) (additional internal quotation marks omitted)); Stewart v. Sec’y , Dep’t of Corrs., 476 F.3d 1193, 1210–11 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The Constitution imposes no burden on counsel to scour a defendant’s background for potential abuse given the defendant’s contrary representations or failure to mention the abuse.”). A lawyer is also not ineffective when the “family members petitioner directs his lawyer to talk to . . . do not 56 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 57 of 79 mention a history of physical abuse.” Van Poyck. v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 290 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002). Although Puiatti relies on Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), that decision is wholly different. The record showed “that Williams’ parents had been imprisoned for the criminal neglect of Williams and his siblings, that Williams had been severely and repeatedly beaten by his father, that he had been committed to the custody of the social services bureau for two years during his parents’ incarceration . . . , and then, after his parents were released from prison, had been returned to his parents’ custody.” Id. at 395, 120 S. Ct. at 1514 (footnote omitted). In Williams, “counsel did not begin to prepare for [the penalty phase] of the proceeding until a week before the trial.” Id. at 395, 120 S. Ct. at 1514. During their preparation, Williams’s attorneys did not merely conduct an inadequate background investigation, “[t]hey failed to conduct an investigation” at all. Id., 120 S. Ct. at 1514. Nevertheless, evidence of Williams’s “nightmarish childhood” was readily available in state records, which counsel erroneously believed they could not access. Id., 120 S. Ct. at 1514. Unlike the attorneys in Williams, the record here shows that: (1) Puiatti’s attorney began preparing for the penalty phase well in advance of the trial; (2) counsel conducted a thorough investigation of Puiatti’s background; (3) the evidence of Puiatti’s childhood abuse was not readily attainable in state records; 57 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 58 of 79 (4) Puiatti told his counsel he came from a loving and supportive family; and (5) in fact, the child abuse was concealed from Puiatti’s attorney by both Puiatti and his family members. If anything, the differences between this case and Williams support the district court’s denial of Puiatti’s ineffective counsel claim here. The decision in Wiggins v. Smith is also instructive. There, trial counsel stopped their investigation of Wiggins’s background upon receiving: (1) a onepage presentence investigation report (“PSI”) that noted Wiggins’s “misery as a youth”; and (2) Department of Social Services (“DSS”) records of Wiggins’s various placements in foster care. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523–24, 123 S. Ct. at 2536 (internal quotation marks omitted). The DSS records actually revealed that Wiggins’s “mother was a chronic alcoholic; Wiggins was shuttled from foster home to foster home and displayed some emotional difficulties while there; he had frequent, lengthy absences from school; and, on at least one occasion, his mother left him and his siblings alone for days without food.” Id. at 525, 123 S. Ct. at 2537. Despite having these records, counsel did not discover or present mitigating evidence regarding severe physical and sexual abuse petitioner suffered at the hands of his mother and while in the care of a series of foster parents. Id. at 516– 17, 123 S. Ct. at 2532–33. Counsel did not offer expert testimony about Wiggins’s background and mental composition in light of this abuse. Id. at 516, 123 S. Ct. at 2532. Given the known information, it was “[c]ounsel’s decision not to expand 58 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 59 of 79 their investigation beyond the PSI and the DSS records [that] fell short of the professional standards that prevailed [at the time].” Id. at 524, 123 S. Ct. at 2536. In comparison here, Puiatti’s attorney did not receive any document that suggested that Puiatti was abused as a child. To the contrary, Puiatti affirmatively told trial counsel that his family loved and supported him, and family members confirmed that this was true. Puiatti’s attorney retained two expert witnesses, both of whom testified about Puiatti’s loving and supportive family. No expert reported child abuse. The known evidence here would not have led a reasonable attorney to investigate further. Rompilla v. Beard also does not help Puiatti. The attorneys in Rompilla had easy access to Rompilla’s prior conviction file, a public document stored at the courthouse where Rompilla was to be tried, which showed that “Rompilla was reared in the slum environment of Allentown, Pa. vicinity. He early came to the attention of juvenile authorities, quit school at 16, and started a series of incarcerations.” 545 U.S. at 384, 390–91, 125 S. Ct. at 2464, 2468 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Rompilla’s attorneys failed to examine the prior conviction file, despite knowing that the prosecution intended to seek the death penalty by attempting to establish that “Rompilla had a significant history of felony convictions indicating the use or threat of violence, an aggravator under state law.” Id. at 383, 125 S. Ct. at 2464. The Supreme Court concluded that, 59 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 60 of 79 because Rompilla’s attorneys actually knew that “[t]he prosecution was going to use the dramatic facts of a prior offense,” they “had a duty to make all reasonable efforts to learn what they could about the offense.” Id. at 385, 125 S. Ct. at 2465. Unlike in Rompilla, Puiatti’s trial attorneys did not fail to obtain documents that were easily accessible. Notably, nothing in this record suggests that there was any existing document in 1984 that recounted the child abuse Puiatti suffered, much less that it was easily accessible at the courthouse. In fact, after interviewing Puiatti, his family members, and two mental health professionals, trial counsel went to great lengths to obtain documents relating to Puiatti’s background and none of them reported any child abuse. If anything, Rompilla shows that Puiatti’s claim fails. We recognize that Puiatti relies on Ferrell v. Hall, 640 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2011), where Ferrell and his family members (his parents and his brother) did not disclose Ferrell’s abusive upbringing to his trial attorneys. Id. at 1230. The pivotal fact there though was that Ferrell’s attorneys conducted only a “limited character investigation—which asked, essentially, only whether Ferrell was trustworthy and had a good reputation.” Id. at 1231. And they did not investigate or ask questions about Ferrell’s childhood background. Id. at 1230. Counsel would have discovered helpful evidence of childhood abuse “had [they] only asked these witnesses about the defendant’s background and childhood.” Id. 60 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 61 of 79 Unlike the attorneys in Ferrell, Puiatti’s attorney did not conduct only a “limited character investigation.” See id. at 1231. Rather, Garrett explained to Puiatti and his family members the nature of mitigating evidence, and stressed to them the importance of developing a complete picture of Puiatti’s childhood, background, and family history. Counsel’s shortcoming in Ferrell was their general failure to ask any questions about Ferrell’s “background and childhood.” Id. at 1230. Here, Puiatti’s trial attorney did ask those questions. The facts here— Puiatti and his family members concealed the child abuse and that Garrett received misleading answers—do not negate the adequacy of Garrett’s investigation. 12 We also reject Puiatti’s contentions regarding James Thatcher, Wright’s former husband. Puiatti’s brief alleges that: “Garrett was explicitly told that Thatcher would have critical information about Puiatti, a fact that Garrett emphasized in her notes with an asterisk.” The record, however, does not support this allegation. It is true that Garrett’s notes contained a reference to Wright and “Jimmy,” which Garrett assumed referred to James Thatcher. And, there was an asterisk next to the reference to “Angela and Jimmy.” But when Puiatti’s habeas 12 In Cooper v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 646 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2011), counsel interviewed only the petitioner and his mother, who did not disclose the abuse inflicted by Cooper’s father and brother. Counsel offered no excuse for not speaking with those family members. Id. at 1352. In any event, Cooper’s attorneys, in fact, uncovered the evidence of Cooper’s childhood abuse from the deposition of a clinical psychologist who evaluated Cooper. Id. at 1340, 1352. The attorneys, for strategic reasons, decided not to call the psychologist to testify. Id. at 1352. Unlike in Cooper, Puiatti’s counsel did speak with his siblings, other family members, and the two mental health experts, and Garrett never learned about child abuse. 61 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 62 of 79 attorney asked Garrett why there was an asterisk, Garrett responded: “I can’t be a hundred percent sure. Now, when I’m making notes like this I make an asterisk if it’s something I have to do. It’s my reminder when I look through the notes later I’ve got to do something about that.” Garrett then added: “So, I don’t know—I can’t recall now if that was my practice back then or if it was just something to—it was something to draw attention to that. I was making that asterisk to draw attention to it in some fashion.” There is nothing in Garrett’s notes or her testimony about Thatcher having “critical information about Puiatti,” much less that her asterisk emphasized that. More importantly, Strickland requires that we make “every effort . . . to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight . . . and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. Counsel had already interviewed Wright, Thatcher’s wife, and could have reasonably concluded that any information Thatcher could provide would be derivative of Wright’s (as Puiatti’s sister) first-hand perspective on the Puiatti family. See Williams, 185 F.3d at 1238 (noting that the § 2254 petitioner’s trial attorney’s failure to interview Williams’s sister and father did not make her investigation constitutionally inadequate, regardless of whether it “would have been better if [the attorney] had . . . interviewed” these individuals). 13 13 Puiatti also criticizes his trial attorney for not contacting Puiatti’s childhood neighbors in New York, but trial counsel did attempt to locate individuals who knew Puiatti as a child in New York by sending a letter to Puiatti’s guidance counselor. To the extent that Puiatti wishes 62 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 63 of 79 Puiatti further contends that trial counsel ignored “red flags” of child abuse. Puiatti’s alleged “red flags” are either not actually suggestive of child abuse, or are not suggestive absent the beneficial lens of hindsight. For example, Puiatti claims that Wright’s statement that things were “not as they seemed” or that her parents painted a “rosy picture” which was “not so,” should have caused trial counsel to suspect that Mr. and Mrs. Puiatti physically and verbally abused their children. This argument wholly ignores that Wright actually provided ample context for what her statement meant, none of which had anything to do with child abuse. Wright told Puiatti’s attorney that: (1) Mr. Puiatti was a corrupt and incompetent businessman; (2) Puiatti received very little affection from his father; (3) Mrs. Puiatti often could not pay her bills and tried to avoid debt collectors; and (4) when Wright encountered Puiatti after he committed the crimes, Puiatti showed little remorse. Thus, trial counsel reasonably could have concluded that Wright had thoroughly explained the reasons for her comment and that additional follow-up inquiries were unnecessary. 14 And although these statements suggested that the Puiatti family had its troubles, they would not have caused a that his trial attorney had done more to track down New York witnesses, counsel “did not have endless time, energy, or financial resources.” See Williams, 185 F.3d at 1237. 14 Moreover, Wright’s statements at the evidentiary hearing cast doubt as to whether, even if Puiatti’s attorney had specifically asked about child abuse, Wright would have been forthcoming with details of Puiatti’s claimed abuse. Wright testified that, during this conversation, she “was still in fear of [her] parents because they were around so [she] wasn’t able to say what [she] really wanted to tell them about the abuse that [Puiatti] and [she] had suffered.” 63 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 64 of 79 reasonable attorney to believe that Puiatti was physically abused by his own parents, especially given that Puiatti himself said he came from a loving and supportive family. Puiatti also argues that the basic fact that he abused substances on a daily basis beginning at the early age of 13 should have alerted counsel that Puiatti was abused by his parents, but, as the district court observed “[t]here are innumerable reasons why certain individuals develop addictions to drugs.” Although Puiatti’s experts, Drs. Olander and Greenberg testified that there was likely a link between Puiatti’s drug abuse and his experiences of childhood abuse, these experts did not discover the child abuse by way of the drug abuse. Rather, Puiatti told them about being abused as a child, and then they linked that physical abuse to Puiatti’s struggles with drugs. In 1984, trial counsel and the trial experts did not enjoy the same benefit of Puiatti’s candor. Trial counsel cannot be faulted for failing to link Puiatti’s history of drug abuse with an otherwise-undisclosed history of child abuse. Puiatti stresses Dr. Meadows’s statement to trial counsel that Mrs. Puiatti sometimes “broke spoons” when disciplining her children. Importantly, this statement did not cause Dr. Meadows, an experienced mental health professional, to diagnose or even suspect a history of child abuse. As the district court stated, “[i]t strains credulity to think that not only was trial counsel ineffective as an 64 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 65 of 79 attorney in investigating Puiatti’s background in 1984, but so too were Drs. Meadow[s] and DelBeato incompetent and unable to evoke pivotal information regarding Puiatti’s allegedly abusive childhood.” Puiatti also argues that his altercation with Mr. Puiatti shortly before the murder should have caused trial counsel to suspect child abuse. This altercation, however, did not occur when Puiatti was a child. Rather, it occurred in the months preceding Puiatti’s 1983 crimes, after Puiatti was married, served in the military, and moved back to the family home and developed depression due to the death of his infant son. As Mr. and Mrs. Puiatti both testified, the altercation was the result of Puiatti’s living in the family home, his father suspecting drug usage, and Puiatti having a negative attitude. We do not believe that this isolated altercation between two adults (that did not actually result in physical violence beyond shoving) during an emotionally charged period of both adults’ lives should have suggested to trial counsel a history of child abuse. Puiatti’s last supposed “red flag” is Puiatti’s handwritten life history, specifically Puiatti’s express statement that his parents did not punish him “without reason.” Puiatti contends that this statement “and its placement in the life history should have signaled a larger underlying problem of abuse.” But Puiatti’s statement did not describe what the “punishment” was, much less hint at child abuse. This is especially so, given various other statements in Puiatti’s life history 65 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 66 of 79 discounted any suggestion of child abuse, including his statements that: (1) his “childhood was pretty normal”; (2) his parents “insisted [he] go see a counselor” about his substance abuse; and (3) he “never wanted for anything.” 15 Thus, for all of the reasons explained and considered together, Garrett’s investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence was not deficient and Puiatti has not established unreasonable performance of counsel.
Even if we were to conclude that trial counsel’s pre-trial investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence were ineffective assistance, we still deny the petition because Puiatti has not carried his burden to establish prejudice. For prejudice, the standard is whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Rose v. McNeil, 634 F.3d 1224, 1241 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 190 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068). To satisfy the prejudice prong, the “likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington, 562 U.S.at —, 131 S. Ct. at 792. “Counsel’s 15 Finally, we reject Puiatti’s contention that trial counsel “misdirected the expert witnesses,” and prevented Drs. Meadows and DelBeato from independently uncovering evidence of child abuse. The record fully establishes that this was not the case. Additionally, as the district court aptly observed, “the pivotal difference between the examinations by Drs. Meadows and DelBeato in 1984 and the examinations by Drs. Greenberg and Olander in advance of the 2012 evidentiary hearing [in the § 2254 case] is that, while Puiatti concealed or otherwise failed to mention his allegedly abusive upbringing during the 1984 examinations, he freely offered details of abuse during the 2012 examinations.” 66 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 67 of 79 errors must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 787–88 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Puiatti alleges ineffective assistance in the penalty phase, he must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Rose, 634 F.3d at 1241–42 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In assessing prejudice, “we consider the totality of the available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding—and reweigh it against the evidence in aggravation.” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41, 130 S. Ct. 447, 453–54 (2009) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 26, 130 S. Ct. 383, 390 (2009) (“[T]he reviewing court must consider all the evidence—the good and the bad—when evaluating prejudice.”).
Puiatti’s prejudice claim fails for several reasons. First, even accepting the new child abuse evidence as true, it is not certain or even likely that this evidence would have caused the jury to make a different recommendation or the state trial court in Puiatti’s case to find a statutory or non-statutory mitigating circumstance at all. It is undisputed that Puiatti’s childhood was not depraved and impoverished. We do recognize, however, that Puiatti presented evidence that he was: (1) 67 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 68 of 79 physically abused by his father and mother, sometimes with objects like wooden spoons, and sometimes without provocation; (2) verbally abused by his father, who compared him negatively to his sister; (3) worked with his father and observed his father cheat customers; and (4) had a mother who was abused by Puiatti’s father and let men inside the family home, while locking her children outside in the rain. Nevertheless, Puiatti came from a working class family who made various attempts to support him. For example, Puiatti’s parents obtained counseling for him when he developed a drug problem. They allowed him to return home after he left the military. When Puiatti entered into a marriage, against his mother’s advice, Mrs. Puiatti did all she could to support the young couple. 16 Of course, childhood abuse evidence can be mitigating during a capital sentencing proceeding. See, e.g., Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 516–17, 123 S. Ct. at 2523–33; Ferrell, 640 F.3d at 1239–41. Although Puiatti’s childhood was far from ideal, the record does not establish that the jury or the state trial court here would have necessarily found it a mitigating factor or a strong one at that. Second, even if we assume that Puiatti’s new evidence would have established a mitigating factor, we conclude that there is no reasonable probability 16 The possibility that the sentencing court might not have found the type of child abuse evidence in Puiatti’s case to be a mitigating factor is enhanced here by the fact that the same court heard a wealth of good family and potential rehabilitation evidence but did not find a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance based on that evidence actually presented, although that evidence was at least as compelling as the child abuse evidence Puiatti wishes counsel had presented. 68 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 69 of 79 that the state trial judge would have found that this mitigating evidence outweighed the undisputed aggravating circumstances. There is no dispute that, even if trial counsel had presented the evidence of child abuse, the trial court would have still found the three aggravating circumstances: (1) that Puiatti’s offense was committed during flight or to avoid arrest; (2) that it was committed for pecuniary gain; and (3) that it was committed in a “cold, calculated, and premeditated manner.” The trial court gave significant weight to the “cold, calculated, and premeditated” circumstance. In its post-sentencing statement of reasons, the trial court stated: “[i]t would be difficult to imagine a more cold, calculated or premeditated killing.” And the “cold, calculated, and premeditated” aggravator is one of “the most serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme.” Ponticelli v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 690 F.3d 1271, 1300 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999)). This Court has previously determined in cases like this one involving brutal murders where a sentencing court found three aggravating factors, that new mitigating evidence did not create a “reasonable probability” of a different outcome. See Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1313 (11th Cir. 2008); Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897, 938 (11th Cir. 2005). In Wood, this Court rejected the § 2254 petitioner’s claim that evidence of his limited mental capacity would have 69 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 70 of 79 led to a reasonable probability of a different outcome, when the sentencing judge stated that the three aggravating factors “far outweighed the mitigating circumstances in all regards.” Wood, 542 F.3d at 1313 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 17 Likewise, in Callahan, we held that a § 2254 petitioner did not establish prejudice based on counsel’s failure to offer mitigating evidence of child abuse when the sentencing court found three aggravating factors and there was “overwhelming evidence” that Callahan had “kidnapped, raped and murdered” his victim. Callahan, 427 F.3d at 938.18 We noted “the burden a defendant faces when trying to overcome . . . harsh aggravating factors with mitigating evidence.” Id. The conclusion that Puiatti cannot overcome this burden is even stronger here than in Wood or Callahan, as those cases did not involve a finding of a “cold, calculated, and premeditated” circumstance (or a similar factor) like the trial court found in this case.19 17 In Wood, the three aggravating factors the Alabama trial court found were: “(1) Wood murdered [the victim] during a burglary; (2) Wood had a prior violent felony conviction; and (3) Wood murdered [the victim] while on parole.” Wood, 542 F.3d at 1313. 18 In Callahan, the Alabama trial court found the following aggravating factors: (1) “the crime was committed while Callahan was under sentence of imprisonment”; (2) “the defendant had previously been convicted of a crime of violence”; and (3) “the murder was committed during a kidnapping.” Callahan, 427 F.3d at 938. 19 Although Callahan and Wood both involved Alabama’s death penalty statute, we note that the Alabama courts in those cases could have found, but did not, the following aggravating circumstance: “The capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel compared to other capital offenses.” Ala. Code 13A-5-49(8). 70 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 71 of 79 There is more though. If we remanded this case for a new penalty trial, the sentencing court might find not just three aggravating circumstances, but others. In 1984, the State agreed not to introduce evidence about the crimes Puiatti committed the day before he killed Ritchie, which resulted in convictions for attempted first degree murder, kidnapping, and armed robbery. In a new penalty phase trial, the State would not be bound by that 1984 stipulation. In fact, the State assures us that its case in aggravation “would include the prior violent felony aggravator for Puiatti’s [other] convictions.” See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b) (listing as an aggravating circumstance “[t]he defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person”). Not only would the evidence about the prior attempted murder come up in the State’s post-remand aggravation case, it would also be relevant to rebutting the new child abuse evidence Puiatti now wishes to present. When Puiatti’s new mental health expert, Dr. Greenberg, was cross-examined during the 2012 evidentiary hearing, he admitted that Puiatti had a high psychopathic deviant score. He also acknowledged that research shows that high scorers on this the psychopathic deviant test tend to engage in “asocial and antisocial acts including lying, cheating, stealing, sexual acting out and excessive use of alcohol and /or other drugs.” Dr. Greenberg conceded that Puiatti engaged in antisocial acts 71 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 72 of 79 consistent with what one would expect from a high scorer on the test. Among the acts that Dr. Greenberg acknowledged were consistent with Puiatti’s score on the psychopathic deviant test were: (1) the attempted murder and armed robbery that Puiatti and Glock committed the day before they murdered Ritchie; (2) Puiatti’s attempts to smuggle drugs while on death row; and (3) Puiatti’s placing personal advertisements on the internet, in violation of prison rules. If Dr. Greenberg were to testify at new penalty phase trial, a similar crossexamination would occur. The high score on the psychopathic deviant test, by itself, would hurt Puiatti’s case because it is damaging not mitigating. See DeYoung, 609 F.3d at1288 (noting that personality disorders involving antisocial traits “have been found not to be mitigating”); Cummings v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1368 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that “a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder . . . is not mitigating but damaging”); Parker v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 331 F.3d 764, 788 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding that “jury might not consider mitigating” clinical diagnosis that § 2254 petitioner “was antisocial and a sociopath”); see also Looney v. State, 941 So. 2d 1017, 1028–29 (Fla. 2006) (stating “a diagnosis as a psychopath is a mental health factor viewed negatively by jurors and is not really considered mitigation”). 20 20 We acknowledge that Dr. Greenberg did not necessarily diagnose Puiatti as a psychopath. However, in light of the extensive discussion of common characteristics of high scorers on the psychopathic deviant scale and how Puiatti’s actions fit with the description of 72 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 73 of 79 Furthermore, the exhaustive discussion of how Puiatti’s behavior was consistent with his high score on the psychopathic deviant test would cripple Puiatti’s mitigation presentation. As this Court has noted, a § 2254 petitioner cannot establish prejudice when there is a “virtual certainty” that the “‘good’ mitigation evidence” that the petitioner wishes was presented “would have led to the introduction of ‘bad’ evidence.” Reed v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 593 F.3d 1217, 1246 (11th Cir. 2010) (petitioner could not establish prejudice based on failure to offer testimony about his family background, when the State “assuredly would have brought out that Reed assaulted his own grandmother and threatened his brother’s wife”); see also Pooler, 702 F.3d at 1275 (“Much of the 3.850 evidence Pooler claims his trial counsel . . . should have presented in the penalty phase was not mitigating but aggravating, or else would have opened the door to the introduction of aggravating evidence that would have diluted its impact.”); Windom v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 578 F.3d 1227, 1251 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[A]ny potential benefit to be gained by presenting the relatively weak mitigating evidence in Windom’s case would have been severely undercut by rebuttal evidence of his own misconduct, specifically, his involvement in a large-scale drug-dealing operation.”); Wood, 542 F.3d at 1311–12 (holding that had counsel introduced high scorers, it is unlikely that a sentencer would give weight to any difference between a formal diagnosis as a psychopath and a high score on the psychopathic deviant test. And assuredly the State this time would have more expert testimony too. 73 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 74 of 79 evidence of § 2254 petitioner’s “limited intellectual functioning and special education classes,” that evidence would have opened the door, inter alia, to an expert’s report containing harmful information, including the petitioner’s long criminal history and details about his crime); Gaskin v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 494 F.3d 997, 1004 (11th Cir. 2007) (§ 2254 petitioner alleging deficient investigation for mitigating evidence could not establish prejudice when “the fact remains that further investigation and further evidence would have opened the door to damaging personal history evidence”); Robinson v. Moore, 300 F.3d 1320, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002) (§ 2254 petitioner alleging deficient investigation for mitigating evidence could not establish prejudice when new mitigating evidence about petitioner’s “loving relationships with women” would have opened the door to evidence that “five days after murdering and raping [the victim], Robinson allegedly raped and robbed another woman . . . in similar circumstances”). Not only does our precedent doom Puiatti’s claim, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wong v. Belmontes makes clear that a “‘more-evidence-isbetter’ approach,” like the one Puiatti advocates, is not always the best strategy for capital counsel. 558 U.S. at 25, 130 S. Ct. at 389. There, Belmontes argued that his counsel at his murder trial should have, inter alia, offered expert testimony about Belmontes’s mental state at the time of his crime. Id. at 23–24, 130 S. Ct. at 388–89. The Supreme Court determined that, had Belmontes’s attorney introduced 74 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 75 of 79 expert testimony that attempted to “explain [Belmontes’s] behavior, or put[] it in some favorable context,” id. at 24, 130 S. Ct. at 389, the expert would have been cross-examined regarding another murder about which there was strong evidence Belmontes committed. Id. at 17, 25, 130 S. Ct. at 389. The Supreme Court declined to find prejudice because “[a] heavyhanded case to portray Belmontes in the best possible light, with or without experts, would have invited the strongest possible evidence in rebuttal—the evidence that Belmontes was responsible for not one but two murders.” Id. at 25, 130 S. Ct. at 389. Similarly here, a “heavyhanded case” to portray Puiatti as a sympathetic victim of his parents’ abuse would have invited harmful and compelling rebuttal evidence. The State would have mounted a strong rebuttal case to show that Puiatti’s murder of Ritchie was not the result of abuse inflicted upon him as a child. Rather, the murder was consistent with a pattern of antisocial behavior that Puiatti had been engaging in throughout his life and which was suggested by psychological test scores. This is not a case where the value of the mitigating evidence is so strong that it gives rise to a reasonable probability of a different outcome, notwithstanding the aggravating circumstances actually found, or that would be found on remand. For example, in Wiggins, the petitioner’s mother “frequently left Wiggins and his siblings home alone for days, forcing them to beg for food and to eat paint chips 75 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 76 of 79 and garbage.” 539 U.S. at 516–17, 123 S. Ct. at 2532–33. She also beat her children for breaking into the family’s locked kitchen and “had sex with men while her children slept in the same bed.” Id., 123 S. Ct. at 2533. In one instance, his mother “forced [Wiggins’s] hand against a hot stove burner” resulting in Wiggins’s hospitalization. Id. at 517, 123 S. Ct. at 2533. Additionally, Wiggins’s foster father and siblings molested and raped him. Id., 123 S. Ct. at 2533. As an adult, Wiggins was raped by a supervisor at his job. Id., 123 S. Ct. at 2533. The Supreme Court concluded that this evidence created a reasonable probability of a different outcome, stressing that “Wiggins does not have a record of violent conduct that could have been introduced by the State to offset the powerful mitigating narrative.” Id. at 537, 123 S. Ct. at 2543. Not only is Puiatti’s child abuse evidence not as powerful, but Puiatti, unlike Wiggins, does have a record of violent conduct that could be used to offset the child abuse evidence. See id. Puiatti contends that the child abuse evidence would have not only been mitigating in and of itself, but that it also would have caused the trial court to find other non-statutory mitigating circumstances, like a history of drug abuse. However, both the jury and the state trial court were well-versed in Puiatti’s struggles with drugs. Various explanations were offered for Puiatti’s development of a drug addiction, including: Puiatti’s hanging out with the wrong crowd, the family’s financial difficulties, and Puiatti’s inability to become a basketball player. 76 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 77 of 79 In fact, his attorney made Puiatti’s drug addiction a central aspect of her closing argument, noting “the vicious circle that he was caught in using drugs.” An additional explanation for why Puiatti was addicted to drugs would have been cumulative and would not necessarily have established the finding of a nonstatutory mitigating factor. See Rhode v. Hall, 582 F.3d 1273, 1287 (11th Cir. 2009) (“At best, the evidence would have been cumulative, providing more information about [the petitioner’s] . . . early exposure to drugs and alcohol.”). Puiatti’s crime was particularly egregious. The district court described the heinous nature of the crime, stating: “The defendants in this case shot Mrs. Ritchie, started to drive away, and then, noting she was not yet dead, turned the car around not once, but twice, to drive back to where Mrs. Ritchie was standing—bloodied and defenseless—and to execute her.” The district court went on: “Each time Puiatti and Glock drove off they had the chance to leave her be. Instead, both times they returned and shot her again, in order to ensure that the life was snuffed out of her.” In the face of such a gruesome crime, Puiatti’s attorney made extensive efforts to establish mitigating circumstances. She was unsuccessful. Puiatti now wishes his attorney had uncovered and presented mitigating evidence wholly different than the information presented at trial. However, the mitigating evidence that Puiatti wishes his counsel had presented would have opened the door to 77 Case: 12-15581 Date Filed: 10/15/2013 Page: 78 of 79 additional negative information about Puiatti. The damning effect of this new evidence would have blunted any mitigating effect that the child abuse evidence could have had. Therefore, no reasonable probability exists that the trial court would have spared Puiatti’s life even if it had known of his traumatic childhood.