Opinion ID: 1290968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defenses to Strict Liability

Text: There has been some confusion in this case regarding the available defenses to a strict liability action. Since this case is being remanded for a retrial, we will briefly comment on what we perceive to be appropriate defenses. Assumption of the risk as stated in § 402A is a defense to strict liability. Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., supra . In this context, it is defined as: voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger. Comment n, Restatement ( Second ) of Torts § 402A. More particularly, the defendant must demonstrate that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the specific danger posed by the defect in manufacture or design, and not just a general knowledge that the machinery could be dangerous. Culp v. Rexnord & Booth-Rouse Equipment Co., Colo.App., 553 P.2d 844. [8] The defendant has the burden of establishing this defense. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal.3d 136, 104 Cal.Rptr. 443, 501 P.2d 1163. We stress that ordinary contributory negligence, consisting of failure to exercise due care to discover a defect or to guard against its possible existence, is not a defense to strict liability. Comment n, Restatement ( Second ) of Torts § 402A. Our view is in accord with the great weight of authority. E. g., Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 104 Cal.Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153; Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857; Deem v. Woodbine Manufacturing Co., 89 N.M. 50, 546 P.2d 1207. Cf. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 298 N.E.2d 622. Union Supply asserts that it can also use what has become known as the open and obvious defense. It argues that since the dangers of the conveyor were obvious to everyone no warning was necessary to alert intended users, and thus Union Supply cannot be liable for a failure to give a warning. See Tomicich v. Western-Knapp Engineering Co., 292 F.Supp. 323 (D.Mont.), aff'd, 423 F.2d 410 (9th Cir.). The apparent origin of the open and obvious rule was in the case of Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802, which has been recently overruled in Micallef v. Miehle Co., Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115. From its inception, it has been frequently attacked by courts and legal scholars. One commentator has perceptively argued that:    [t]his [use of the `open and obvious' defense] amounted to applying an assumption of the risk defense as a matter of law, with the added disadvantage that the defendant was relieved of the burden of proving that plaintiff had subjectively appreciated a known risk. Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: A Primer, 2 Hofstra L.Rev. 521, 541 (1974). We hold that the alleged patent nature of a defect is not in and of itself a defense to strict liability. Simply because a hazard is open and obvious does not prevent it from being unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. Approval of the rule would be contrary to sound public policy. As the Washington Court of Appeals has commented:    [T]he manufacturer of the obviously defective product ought not to escape because the product was obviously a bad one. The law, we think, ought to discourage misdesign rather than encouraging it in its obvious form. Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713.