Opinion ID: 2769789
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: legal framework governing first amendment

Text: RETALIATION CLAIMS To survive summary judgment on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a public employee must establish a prima facie case by “bring[ing] forth evidence showing that [1] he has engaged in protected First Amendment activity, [2] he suffered an adverse employment action, and [3] there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Dillon v. Morano, 497 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 2007). As relevant here, the First Amendment protects speech uttered by an employee in his or her capacity as a citizen regarding a matter of public concern. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378 (2014). To demonstrate a causal connection “a plaintiff must show that the protected speech was a substantial motivating factor in the adverse employment action.” Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff may establish causation either directly through a showing of retaliatory animus, or indirectly through a showing that the protected activity was followed closely by the adverse action. Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 108 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted). Since a direct showing requires plaintiff to provide “tangible proof” of retaliatory animus, “conclusory assertions of retaliatory motive” are insufficient. Id. Once the plaintiff “makes out a prima facie retaliation claim, a government defendant may still receive summary judgment if it establishes its entitlement to a relevant defense.” Anemone v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 629 F.3d 97, 114 (2d Cir. 2011). The Supreme Court identified one such defense in Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). “Because protected speech could not substantially cause an adverse action if the employer would have taken that action in any event,” Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 111 6 (2d Cir. 2011), once the employee has established a prima facie case, the employer may still be entitled to summary judgment based on the Mount Healthy defense by demonstrating “by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same adverse employment action ‘even in the absence of the protected conduct.’” Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe. Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006); see also Anemone, 629 F.3d at 114. A government employer may also challenge and, if successful, avoid liability under the balancing test established in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), which safeguards the government’s interest “as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees,” Piscottano v. Murphy, 511 F.3d 247, 269 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). Under Pickering, defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that “the plaintiff’s expression was likely to disrupt the government’s activities and that the harm caused by the disruption outweighs the value of the plaintiff’s expression.” Anemone, 629 F.3d at 115 (quoting Skehan v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 465 F.3d 96, 106 (2d Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds by Appel v. Spiridon, 531 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 2008)). Defendants need not present evidence that such harm or disruption—which may include “having the judgment and professionalism of the agency brought into serious disrepute”—has in fact occurred, but only that it made a “reasonable determination that the employer’s speech creates the potential for such harms.” Piscottano, 511 F.3d at 271.