Opinion ID: 2330422
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Absence of Fingerprint Evidence and Reasonable Doubt

Text: Appellant's main challenge is to the instruction that informed the jury that the absence of any fingerprint evidence, standing alone, does not constitute reasonable doubt as to the firearm charges here. He argues, first, that the judge imposed her view of what was or was not reasonable doubt on the jury, thereby violating his Sixth Amendment right to have a fair and impartial jury determination of all facts essential to establishing guilt. Second, appellant contends that this instruction, when coupled with the instructions advising the jury that the government had no duty to collect fingerprint evidence and did not need to negate all possible inferences of innocence, was at odds with the reasonable doubt instruction. Specifically, he argues that they had the effect of lowering the government's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt  thereby depriving him of his right under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to be convicted only on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant objected solely to the no duty instruction (the first two of the four sentences in the instruction he challenges on appeal, discussed supra ), and no objection was made to the last two of the four sentences in the instruction. Objection to one portion, of an instruction does not suffice to preserve an objection to another. See 1 KEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 7.04 (5th ed. 2000) ([A]n instruction cannot be objected to on one ground in the trial court and attacked in the appellate court on a different ground, nor will an objection to one portion of the charge permit a party to assert error on appeal on a different part of the charge.) (collecting cases). Superior Court Criminal Rule 30 provides that, No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the grounds of the objection. Super. Ct.Crim. R. 30. The obvious reason for requiring that objections to instructions be made before the jury retires is to afford the trial court an opportunity to correct any instructional defect and thereby avoid error which otherwise might necessitate a new trial. Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 708 (D.C.1976) (en banc). If a party fails to raise a timely objection at trial, our review is limited to plain error. See Green v. United States, 718 A.2d 1042, 1056 (D.C. 1998) (citing Robinson v. United States, 649 A.2d 584, 586 (D.C.1994)). Appellant maintains that application of the plain error standard is unwarranted here because at trial he objected on the ground that the instruction overall was not a correct statement of law. He claims that although he did not articulate his objection as extensively as he has in this appeal, the court was sufficiently on notice that the instruction was legally deficient. But not any objection will suffice to ensure plenary appellate review. Because the purpose of Rule 30 is `to give the trial court the opportunity to correct errors [in] and omissions' from the charge to the jury, Green, 718 A.2d at 1056 (quoting ( Linwood ) Johnson v. United States, 387 A.2d 1084, 1089 (D.C.1978) (en banc)), the rule requires a distinct statement of what was wrong with the instruction and a precise explanation of the grounds for the objection. Id.; see also ( Joyce) Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 465, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (This Rule [30] is simply the embodiment of the `familiar' principle that a right `may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.') (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). This is in keeping with our policy of having arguments presented first to the trial court, so that the trial judge is given the opportunity to consider and decide the question presented. ( James) Brown v. United States, 726 A.2d 149, 154 (D.C. 1999). We recognize that trial counsel may not have had the time to reflect and articulate an objection during the press of an ongoing trial that appellate counsel is afforded in preparing a brief on appeal. Given the requirement of a distinct objection, however, defense counsel's generic assertion at trial that the instruction misstated the law because there is no law that says they have to or don't have to collect fingerprint evidence, without more, was too imprecise to put the court on notice of the claimed error. See Dotson v. Scotty's Contracting, Inc., 86 F.3d 613, 616 (6th Cir.1996) (A global objection of the sort offered here  an objection, on unspecified grounds, to everything in the charge other than what had been proposed by the objecting party  is hardly an objection `stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection.'); O'MALLEY, at § 7.04 (collecting cases). Therefore, this claim of instructional error is subject to plain error review.
Although Rule 30 requires the defendant to lodge an objection to jury instructions with the trial court to avoid forfeiture of a claim of instructional error, Rule 52(b) ameliorates the absolute language of that provision, with the caveat that [p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the Court. Super. Ct.Crim. R. 52(b); [5] see D.C.Code § 11-721(e) (On the hearing of any appeal in any case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.). The Supreme Court has delineated a two-step process which is to be employed in identifying which errors, though unobjected to at trial, will qualify for appellate relief. A plain error is identified by three qualities: first, there must be an error; second, this error must be plain in the sense that it must be obvious to the trial judge; and third, the error must affect substantial rights. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Once these three factors are present, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to take notice of the error, even though it was not preserved before the trial court. See id. at 735-36, 113 S.Ct. 1770. [R]eversal for plain error . . . should be confined to `particularly egregious' situations, Dixon v. United States, 565 A.2d 72, 75 (D.C. 1989) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)), and is limited to where the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)); see ( Joyce) Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469-70, 117 S.Ct. 1544 (When the first three parts of Olano are satisfied, an appellate court must then determine whether the forfeited error `seriously affects the fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings' before it may exercise its discretion to correct the error. (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770).) To make clear, as the Supreme Court counseled in Olano, waiver is different from forfeiture. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Thus, while our discussion considers whether appellant has forfeited review of this issue by failing to lodge an objection below, it is clear that he did not waive  i.e., he did not make an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)  his right to have his guilt adjudicated by a jury, without interference by the trial judge into matters entrusted solely to that jury's prerogative. Though deferential and confined, review for plain error nevertheless may require appellate intervention in certain cases. Our need to encourage all trial participants to seek a fair and accurate trial the first time around, must be balanced against our insistence that obvious injustice be promptly redressed. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982). Therefore, even though not properly raised, yet if a plain error was committed in a matter so absolutely vital to defendant[ ], we feel ourselves at liberty to correct it. Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 658, 16 S.Ct. 1127, 41 L.Ed. 289 (1896); cf. Hall v. United States, 343 A.2d 35, 37 (D.C. 1975) ([C]ourts of appeal, for good reason, are not disposed to notice alleged errors which are raised for the first time on appeal absent a clear showing of miscarriage of justice.). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that this is such a case.
We turn to consider first the judge's instruction that the absence of any fingerprint evidence, standing alone, does not constitute reasonable doubt as to the firearm charges. Appellant contends that the instruction was erroneous because it fatally overstated the degree of doubt required under the reasonable doubt standard, [6] and removed from the jury's consideration evidence that had been introduced in the case: the absence of fingerprint evidence. The government advances a narrower reading of the instruction, one that emphasizes the phrase standing alone, and suggests that the court merely instructed that the jury's assessment of the evidence should not stop at the absence of fingerprint evidence: that the lack of fingerprint evidence does not, as a matter of law, mean that the jury must acquit. At trial, the government relied on an incorrect interpretation of our holding in Banks as legal support for this instruction. In that case, we rejected the argument that the evidence was insufficient to support a CPWL conviction, even though no fingerprints were found on the handgun at issue, holding that the lack of fingerprint evidence had no effect because the law is clear that the government is not required to negate all possible inferences of innocence before one can be found guilty of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 287 A.2d at 87. That the government is not required to introduce fingerprint evidence to present a legally sufficient case does not, however, logically lead to the conclusion that the jury is precluded from grounding reasonable doubt on the lack of such evidence in a particular case. In the course of discussing appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in Banks, we simply noted that the absence of fingerprints was not dispositive as a matter of law because the government's evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, Bernard v. United States, 575 A.2d 1191, 1194 (D.C.1990), nor compel a finding of guilt. See Taylor v. United States, 601 A.2d 1060, 1062 (D.C.1991). Delineating the proper scope of our review as to whether the evidence is sufficient to permit the jury to convict is a much different issue from whether the jury is to be instructed that the lack of fingerprint evidence is insufficient to constitute a reasonable doubt on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The latter's impact is to prohibit the jury from acquitting on this basis. We conclude that the jury instruction was erroneous, though the nature of the error lies somewhere in between the differing analyses provided by the parties. Contrary to appellant's reading of the instruction, the instruction allowed the jury to consider the lack of fingerprint evidence, along with the other evidence submitted for its consideration, and could factor it into its analysis of the case against him; and, contrary to the government's reading on appeal, the jury was told that it could not acquit if its doubt was based solely on the lack of fingerprint evidence. It is axiomatic that one of the quintessential functions of a jury  and of each juror in a jury  is to independently consider the evidence and attach a relative weight to each item of evidence. While a judge enjoys the common law privilege to comment upon the evidence, see Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1933), this privilege has inherent limitations and must be exercised cautiously, for a judge's influence on the jury `is necessarily and properly of great weight' and `his [or her] lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove to be controlling.' Id. at 470, 53 S.Ct. 698. Moreover, the judge may not exercise this privilege in a manner which intrudes upon functions which are within the sole province of the jury. See Billeci v. United States, 87 U.S.App. D.C. 274, 283, 184 F.2d 394, 403 (1950) (The difference between assisting the jury, which is the duty of a federal judge, and encroaching upon its responsibilities, which is forbidden, has been developed at great length many times. . . .). We have long recognized that [c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of [the] judge. Anderson v. Ford Motor Co., 682 A.2d 651, 654 (D.C.1996) (quoting Fry v. Diamond Constr., Inc., 659 A.2d 241, 245 (D.C.1995)); Feaster v. United States, 631 A.2d 400, 408 (D.C.1993) (It is for the jury to decide weight and credibility: neither the trial court nor the reviewing court can infringe upon that authority.) (internal quotations and citation marks omitted); 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2551 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981) (When evidential data are once admitted by the judge and there is a sufficiency of them to entitle the case to go to the jury, their individual and total weight or probative value is for the decision of the jury.). Indeed, we have said, it is the right of the jury to make such determinations. Curry v. United States, 520 A.2d 255, 263 (D.C.1987); Morrison v. United States, 417 A.2d 409, 413 (D.C.1980) (It is a first principle that the jury, as finder of fact, has the function of determining the credibility of witnesses, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of justifiable inferences from proven facts.). In determining whether an instruction is erroneous, we view the instructions given to the jury as a whole. See Montgomery v. United States, 384 A.2d 655, 661 (D.C. 1978). The trial judge properly gave the recommended reasonable doubt instruction, see Smith, 709 A.2d at 82, and the function of the jury instruction, which informed jurors that they were the sole and exclusive finders of fact, and encouraged the jurors to abide by their own convictions if they disagreed with the judge's assessment of the evidence. Even so, we do not believe that these instructions were sufficient to outweigh in the jurors' minds the instruction given here, which declared that the absence of fingerprint evidence tying appellant to the gun does not constitute a reasonable doubt. The reasonable doubt and function of the jury instructions were given in the course of a number of other instructions and preceded the challenged instruction concerning the lack of fingerprint evidence, which did not refer back to the previous instructions or in any other way explain how its admonition concerning the lack of fingerprint evidence fit into the instructions previously given. Moreover, the function of the jury instruction was itself immediately preceded by the judge's clear assertion of its final authority on matters of law, saying that it is your duty to accept the law as I state it to you. . . . You may not ignore any instruction or question the wisdom of any rule of law. [7] The judge's emphatic instruction that the absence of fingerprint evidence in the government's case does not constitute reasonable doubt is likely to have been taken by the jury as a legal injunction (the law as I state it to you) against basing acquittal on the absence of fingerprint evidence  an injunction that the jury had a duty to accept without question[ing its] wisdom, rather than as referring to the facts as to which the jurors were the sole and exclusive judges. See Quercia, 289 U.S. at 472, 53 S.Ct. 698 (Nor do we think that the error was cured by the statement of the trial judge that his opinion of the evidence was not binding on the jury and that if they did not agree with it they should find the defendant not guilty. His definite and concrete assertion of fact, which he had made with all the persuasiveness of judicial utterance, as to the basis of his opinion, was not withdrawn. His characterization . . . was of a sort most likely to remain firmly lodged in the memory of the jury. . . .). Because the instruction, viewed in context, was contrary to the elemental premise that a critical assessment of that evidence was for the jury, and not the judge, to make, we hold that it was erroneous, and that the first element of plain error review is satisfied. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 733-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (If a legal rule was violated during the [trial] court proceedings, and if the defendant did not waive the rule, then there has been an `error' within the meaning of Rule 52(b) despite the absence of a timely objection.). [8]
For an error to be noticed under the plain error standard, it also must be plain as in `clear' or, equivalently, `obvious.' Id. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. This requires a determination of whether the claimed error was clearly at odds with established and settled law. See id. (At a minimum, a court of appeals cannot correct an error pursuant to Rule 52(b) unless the error is clear under current law.). As the foregoing discussion shows, the principle that it is solely for the jury to evaluate and weigh an item of evidence is one of long standing. It was a clear violation of this rule for the judge to issue jury instructions that identified an item of evidence and assigned to it a certain evidentiary weight. Accordingly, the second factor relevant to identifying plain error also is satisfied.
The plain error must affect substantial rights, meaning that viewed in the context of the trial, there is a reasonable probability that but for the error the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81-82, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (equating test for prejudice affecting substantial rights under plain error review with prejudice prong of Strickland and Kotteakos [ v. U.S., 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)] standard for harmless error review). There is one important difference between this inquiry, and the usual harmless-error analysis, see, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)  under plain error review, [i]t is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. [9] The erroneous instruction interfered with two foundational aspects of a criminal prosecution intended to protect the rights of the defendant: the right to a jury trial and the due process right to be convicted only if the state has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The full exercise of these rights is critical, particularly where the case presented was such as to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury. The government's investigation in this case was premised on an anonymous tip stating that an unidentified person in a red truck at a certain location had a gun. When the police responded to the location, they found appellant close to a red truck that he had been using. In the truck they found a firearm. On the scene, appellant initially disclaimed ownership of the vehicle and tried to flee; additionally, at the station house he provided a false name while he was being processed. The government presented sufficient evidence to convict because from these facts a jury reasonably could infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Curington v. United States, 621 A.2d 819, 824 (D.C.1993) (noting that judgment of acquittal is justified only where there is no evidence upon which a reasonable [juror] could infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt) (quoting Head v. United States, 451 A.2d 615, 622 (D.C. 1982)). But, although it was sufficient to convict, the evidence was not overwhelming. While appellant had been using the truck in which the gun was found, he was not the owner, and he had given over access to and control over the truck to several employees of the carwash before the police arrived on the scene, any one of whom could have placed the gun later found in the vehicle. Moreover, the officers testified that the gun was in plain view on the passenger seat of the vehicle where it obviously would have been noticed by these employees. But two of the carwash employees testified, however, that when they were in the truck, i.e., immediately after the appellant had relinquished control of the vehicle, they did not see any firearm despite the fact that they had been inside the truck to drive it and clean it. Appellant also testified that he saw an unidentified employee of the carwash working in his truck in the minutes preceding the arrival of the police, and that this employee left the scene as the police arrived. Significantly, appellant explained that the truck, which was locked when the police arrived, had an automatic locking mechanism. Although the government's theory was that appellant had initially kept the gun with him when he first turned the truck over to the carwash employees, and then placed the gun in the truck when he saw the police car arrive at the carwash, the government offered no evidence to rebut appellant's testimony concerning the truck's automatic locking mechanism, nor did it attempt to explain the sequence of events by which appellant  who did not have the keys when he was detained by police [10]  would have been able to access the locked truck to dispose of the gun he presumably had been holding while the truck was going through the carwash. In this uncertain context, the lack of hard evidence such as fingerprints tying appellant to the firearm found in the truck, could have been critical in creating reasonable doubt in the minds of jurors. Appellant could have argued, and the jury certainly would have been entitled to consider, the lack of fingerprint evidence in assessing whether the government had met its burden of proving appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Greer, 697 A.2d at 1210-12 (reversing the conviction where the jury was instructed that it should base its decision based on the evidence which has been presented and not on evidence that has not been presented, because a reasonable doubt may arise from the evidence, or from a lack of evidence); United States v. Hoffman, 296 U.S.App. D.C. 21, 24, 964 F.2d 21, 24 (1992) ([T]he absence of [fingerprint] evidence is a relevant `fact' which properly could have been argued to the jury.); accord Hughes v. United States, 633 A.2d 851, 852 (D.C.1993); United States v. Poindexter, 942 F.2d 354, 359-60 (6th Cir. 1991) (reversing conviction, after trial counsel was precluded from arguing to the jury that there was insufficient evidence that defendant handled a gun because of the absence of any fingerprints on the weapon; such an argument is permissible because, in every criminal case, the mosaic of evidence that comprises the record before a jury includes both the evidence and the lack of evidence on material matters. Indeed, it is the absence of evidence upon such matters that may provide the reasonable doubt that moves a jury to acquit); United States v. Thompson, 37 F.3d 450, 454 (9th Cir.1994) (Because evidence comes in various forms, some stronger and some weaker, a defendant is entitled to argue to the jury that the government's failure to present a particular type of strong evidence against her  e.g., fingerprints  weakens its case.); see also Smith, 709 A.2d at 82 (promulgating the standard instruction on reasonable doubt, and defining that concept as, inter alia, a doubt for which you have a reason based upon the evidence or lack of evidence in the case). We do not say that, had the jury been unimpaired in its consideration of the lack of fingerprint evidence, appellant would have been acquitted. But that high threshold is not required, even under plain error review. What is required  and what we find here  is that the identification of one piece of evidence which was probative of appellant's innocence in a case that presents sufficient, but not overwhelming evidence, and the erroneous instruction informing the jury that the exculpatory evidence was of such meager weight that it did not, standing alone, constitute a reasonable doubt, undermines a reviewing court's confidence in the verdict rendered. Cf. ( Joyce) Johnson, 520 U.S. at 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544 (even though judge invaded upon jury's fact-finding province, error was lacking in prejudice because the judge's instruction was with full and overwhelming support in the evidence).
Having found the three elements of plain error  an error, which is obvious and affects substantial rights  we must now decide whether to exercise our discretion to correct that error by reversing appellant's conviction. [A] plain error affecting substantial rights does not, without more, satisfy the Atkinson standard. Olano, 507 U.S. at 737, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Under that standard, a plain error entitles the appellant to a new trial only where it seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (quoting Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160, 56 S.Ct. 391). Mindful that such discretion should be exercised only in particularly egregious situations, see Dixon, 565 A.2d at 75 (quoting Young, 470 U.S. at 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038), we conclude that the error in this case affected the fundamental fairness and integrity of the jury trial, and as such, requires reversal. The Constitution's guarantee of a jury trial is widely perceived as a hallmark of the fairness, integrity and public acceptance of judicial proceedings. Beyond serving an essential function in our system of criminal justice  ensuring that twelve independent minds, each with unique backgrounds, experiences and world views, are unanimous in their assessment of criminal guilt  the jury serves a fundamental purpose in our tripartite democracy. Just as suffrage ensures the people's ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). [11] Inherent in the right to trial by jury is the assumption that the jury will be allowed to weigh the evidence and determine criminal guilt without undue judicial intervention: The accused has a right to a trial by the jury. That means that his guilt or innocence must be decided by twelve lay[persons] and not by the one judge. A judge cannot impinge upon that right any more than he can destroy it. He cannot press upon the jury the weight of his influence any more than he can eliminate the jury altogether. Billeci, 87 U.S.App.D.C. at 283, 184 F.2d at 403. See also Minor, 475 A.2d at 416 (Jurors may be perverse; the ends of justice may be defeated by unrighteous verdicts but so long as the functions of the judge and jury are distinct, the one responding to the law and the other to the facts, neither can invade the province of the other without destroying the significance of trial by court and jury.) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952)). Judges have no power to weigh the evidence or to pass upon the credibility of witnesses. That is the function of the jury. V.E.M. Hotel Service, Inc. v. Uline, Inc., 190 A.2d 812, 813 (D.C.1963) (citing Cope Ford, Inc. v. Lastfogel, 184 A.2d 206 (D.C.1962)). When the trial court crosses the line of separation between its functions and those uniquely within the province of the jury, it diminishes the exercise of this fundamental right under our constitutional system. Given that this right is one of the cornerstones upon which our criminal justice system is balanced, when it is violated, or even diminished, the fairness, integrity or public reputation of that trial is called into question. This is not to say that every judicial encroachment into the role of the jury will be an error of such magnitude as to require reversal. Sometimes a judge may step into the jury's province, but that error will not rise to this high level, because the evidence against the defendant remains overwhelming, and he or she is not prejudiced by the encroachment. See ( Joyce) Johnson, 520 U.S. at 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544. As we have discussed, however, this is not such a case. In cases such as this, where the evidence requires careful weighing, the need for unfettered jury adjudication is at its zenith, and requires that each juror have considered all relevant evidence and be firmly convinced that there is no reasonable doubt as to the accused's guilt. When the court identifies one piece of evidence that favors the accused, and informs the jurors that it is only to be afforded minimal weight, the integrity of that jury trial is manifestly compromised. We conclude that appellant has shown a plain error which justifies reversal on appeal. We therefore reverse the judgment of conviction with respect to the weapons charges  and remand the case to the trial court. [12] So ordered.