Opinion ID: 2220705
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The search of Krebs' vehicle.

Text: Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 99 S.Ct. 421, 425, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 394 (1978) (quoting Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 1569, 36 L.Ed.2d 208, 214 (1973)). The standard for measuring Davis' claim is whether he possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148, 99 S.Ct. at 433, 58 L.Ed.2d at 404; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); State v. Caffrey, 332 N.W.2d 269, 274 (S.D.1983). Therefore, our threshold question is whether Davis had a legitimate expectation of privacy such that a search could have violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Davis bears the burden of proving he had a legitimate expectation of privacy. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2562, 65 L.Ed.2d 633, 641 (1980). The United States Supreme Court has stated: [T]he fact that they were legitimately on [the] premises in the sense that they were in the car with the permission of its owner is not determinative of whether they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular area of the automobile searched.... We have on numerous occasions pointed out that cars are not to be treated identically with houses or apartments for Fourth Amendment purposes. [citations omitted] But here petitioners' claim is one which would fail even in an analogous situation in a dwelling place, since they made no showing that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car in which they were merely passengers. Like the trunk of an automobile, these are areas in which a passenger qua passenger simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49, 99 S.Ct. at 433, 58 L.Ed.2d at 404. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the factors set forth by the First Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether there is a legitimate expectation of privacy: At least the following factors are relevant to a privacy expectation: legitimate presence in the area searched, possession or ownership of the area searched or the property seized, prior use of the area searched or the property seized, ability to control or exclude others' use of the property, and a subjective expectation of privacy. United States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 965 (1st Cir.1982); United States v. Carter, 854 F.2d 1102, 1105 (8th Cir.1988). The factors are viewed under the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Aguirre, 839 F.2d 854, 856-57 (1st Cir.1989). Ownership of the property seized is not determinative of a legitimate expectation of privacy; it is but one factor to be considered. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105, 100 S.Ct. at 2562, 65 L.Ed.2d at 642. Rakas emphatically rejected the notion that `arcane' concepts of property law ought to control the ability to claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Id. Here, the trial court found that Davis had failed to meet his burden of proving a legitimate expectation of privacy. The record indicates the car did not belong to Davis, Davis was not driving the vehicle, did not control the keys or registrationin short, he did not own or possess the automobile. The record does not show Davis established any prior use of the area. Nor does the record indicate he established any ability to control or exclude others from the area searched or property seized. The trial court found there was no mark or label to identify either the baggie or vial of pills seized from the glove box or the blue bag seized from the trunk as the property of Davis. The trial court determined Davis had not carried his burden of establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy. Under the totality of the circumstances, we do not find the trial court's holding to be clearly erroneous.
For consent to a search to be valid, the totality of the circumstances must indicate that it was voluntarily given. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2058-59, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 875 (1973); State v. Woods, 374 N.W.2d 92, 100 (S.D.1985). The presence or absence of consent to search is a question of fact. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49, 93 S.Ct. at 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d at 875; State v. Nemeti, 472 N.W.2d 477, 478 (S.D. 1991); Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d at 628. The state bears the burden of demonstrating consent. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49, 93 S.Ct. at 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d at 875; Woods, 374 N.W.2d at 100. Our standard of review concerning consent to search is as follows: Because the presence or absence of consent to search is a question of fact, the trial court's resolution of that question will be upheld unless our examination of the evidence, construed in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings, convinces us that the finding was clearly erroneous. Nemeti, 472 N.W.2d at 478. Krebs' testimony indicates he left his automobile voluntarily; he was not coerced to leave the vehicle. There is no indication that Krebs was verbally threatened in order to obtain his consent to the search. Nor is there any evidence Krebs was physically threatened or given any promises in return for his consent to the search. The only physical contact the record indicates was an officer restraining Krebs' arm when he made an aggressive movement toward Wermers. Krebs claims he consented to a search but then limited Wermers' search to the cigarette package and lighter. Wermers testified Krebs agreed to the search as long as Krebs could watch. Wermers agreed that Krebs could watch him as long as Krebs did not stand near his right side, within reach of his weapon. The trial court, which is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witness, found the only condition Krebs put on his consent to search was that he wished to watch the procedure. The United States Supreme Court has recently stated that the scope of a search pursuant to consent is circumscribed by the officer's reasonable belief as to the extent of consent. United States v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. ___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1804, 114 L.Ed.2d 297, 302 (1991). We agree. Where Wermers believed Krebs consented to a search contingent only upon being allowed to watch, and the trial court so found, a review of the record, examined in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings, does not reveal the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous.
One of the recognized exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's requirement of a search warrant is the automobile exception. We have discussed the exception in the following manner: Based on increased mobility and decreased privacy expectations in a vehicle, both the United States and the South Dakota Supreme Courts have held that: [W]hen a law enforcement officer stops a vehicle, and the officer has probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband, the vehicle may be searched without a warrant. The search may include the interior of the car, as well as the trunk. Under the vehicle exception, the Constitution permits a search to proceed without a warrant, but not without probable cause. Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d at 627 (citations omitted). We have described the probable cause required for a search as follows: Probable cause justifying a search is present where the facts found by the court or the magistrate would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe its fairly probable that a crime had been committed and that evidence relevant to the crime would be uncovered by the search. Although the evidence supporting the probable cause determination must be more than a bare suspicion, it need not establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even proof by preponderance. Furthermore, each element of evidence need not be individually assessed for veracity and basis of knowledge. Rather, the probable cause determination is a function of the totality of relevant circumstances. Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d at 629 (citations omitted). Krebs did not consent to the search of the trunk. The trial court found the search of the trunk was based upon the pills and rolls of quarters found in the glove compartment, the pencil-marked map, the black quilted welder's cap which matched the description in the flyer and the fact that Krebs and Davis left the residence a few minutes after Krebs told Wermers they would be staying for the night. The trial court determined the facts established probable cause. Once probable cause existed to search the vehicle, it extended to anywhere in the vehicle the objects of the search might reasonably be found. Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d at 631. While factual findings are reviewed by this court under the clearly erroneous standard, the question of whether the facts add up to probable cause is a question of law, fully reviewable de novo. Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d at 629-30. Confirmation of information contained in the flyer, combined with the evidence uncovered in the search of the interior of the car, provided far more than a bare suspicion that Krebs and Davis were involved in the burglaries. Clearly, the police had probable cause to search the trunk.