Opinion ID: 163300
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Continuing Offense Doctrine

Text: 21 The government also argues that the making of a false statement under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 should be treated as a continuing offense and the statute of limitations should not begin running before the statement has the potential to deceive and the government could reasonably discover the crime. Therefore, the government argues the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the audit report certified by Dunne was submitted to the SEC. Because the government did not raise this argument in the district court, it is reviewed on appeal for plain error. Cf. United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1297 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that if the government fails to object to the presentence report, the district court's reliance on the report is reviewed for plain error). 22 `Continuing offense' is a term of art that does not depend on everyday notions or ordinary meaning. United States v. Jaynes, 75 F.3d 1493, 1506 (10th Cir.1996) (quotations omitted). It is not the same as a scheme or pattern of illegal conduct. Id. Rather, it is, in general, [an offense] that involves a prolonged course of conduct, and its commission is not complete until the conduct has run its course. United States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d 277, 281 (2d Cir.1995); see also United States v. De La Mata, 266 F.3d 1275, 1288 (11th Cir.2001) (holding that [a] continuing offense is one which is not complete upon the first act, but instead continues to be perpetrated over time), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 989, 122 S.Ct. 1543, 152 L.Ed.2d 469 (2002). 23 In Toussie v. United States, the Supreme Court discussed the continuing offense doctrine and outlined when an offense should be considered continuing for statute of limitations purposes. 397 U.S. 112, 114-115, 90 S.Ct. 858, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970). Because questions of limitations are fundamentally matters of legislative... decision, and because there is tension between the purpose of a statute of limitations and the continuing offense doctrine, the Court held that the doctrine... should be applied in only limited circumstances. Id. at 121, 115, 90 S.Ct. 858 (quotation omitted). More specifically, the Court held that an offense should be considered a continuing one for statute of limitations purposes only if (1) the explicit language of the substantive criminal statute compels such a conclusion, or (2) the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one. Id. at 115, 90 S.Ct. 858. 24 The first of these possibilities is clearly inapplicable here. Nothing in the explicit language of § 1001 compels the conclusion that an offense committed thereunder is to be considered a continuing one. If Congress had intended that to be the case, it could have clearly stated so. See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3284 (The concealment of assets of a debtor in a Chapter 11 case shall be deemed to be a continuing offense until the date of final bankruptcy discharge). 25 Nor does the nature of the crime involved indicate that Congress intended that it be a continuing offense. Section 1001 was intended to protect the Government from the affirmative, aggressive and voluntary actions of persons who take the initiative; and to protect the Government from being the victim of some positive statement which has the tendency and effect of perverting normal and proper governmental activities and functions. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 413, 118 S.Ct. 805, 139 L.Ed.2d 830 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quotation omitted); see United States v. Niven, 952 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that, in determining whether a crime is a continuing offense, the court must focus on the nature of the substantive offense, [and] not on the specific characteristics of the conduct in the case at issue). Consistent with this purpose, § 1001 makes it illegal for a person 26 in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States [to] knowingly and willfully falsif[y], conceal[] or cover[] up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or make[] any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or make[] or use[] any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry.... 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994). 3 27 None of these criminalized acts, however, clearly contemplate[ ] a prolonged course of conduct. Toussie, 397 U.S. at 120, 90 S.Ct. 858. Rather, the statute contemplates a single act even though there may be continuing effects. The government appears to be arguing that Dunne committed a crime which had continuing effects after its completion. Such consequences, however, are not alone sufficient to warrant classifying violations of § 1001 as continuing offenses. See United States v. Bustamante, 45 F.3d 933, 942 (5th Cir.1995) (holding that because the defendant was not accused of committing a crime that has continuing effects after its completion, but rather was charged with accepting illegal gratuities over an extended period of time, he was therefore charged with continuing criminal behavior). 28 The government suggests that Congress did not intend the statute of limitations to run before the offense could reasonably have been discovered. The ability of the government, however, to learn of a particular offense is not a relevant factor under the Toussie analysis. The crime at issue in Toussie, failing to register for the draft, was arguably more difficult for the government to detect than the crime at issue here. 29 A few courts, however, have explicitly or implicitly described § 1001 as a continuing offense statute for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), which establishes venue in any district in which an offense was begun, continued or completed. United States v. Candella, 487 F.2d 1223, 1227-28 (2d Cir.1973) (concluding that venue for a § 1001 violation existed in the district where the falsified documents were delivered to public officials and in the district it was contemplated that the documents would eventually be transferred); United States v. Bin Laden, 146 F.Supp.2d 373, 376 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (discussing cases in which a court concluded the § 1001 violation to be continuing for § 3237(a) purposes and noting that in each the shared factual characteristic [wa]s ... a geographic discontinuity between the defendant's physical making of the disputed statement, whether oral or written, and the actual receipt of that statement by the relevant federal authority); United States v. Kouzmine, 921 F.Supp. 1131, 1136 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (concluding that [v]iolations of Section 1001 are continuing offenses for which venue is proper in any district in which the offense began, continued, or was completed). Although issues of venue are obviously different from issues involving statutes of limitations, the two concepts are clearly related. See United States v. Hernandez, 189 F.3d 785, 790 (9th Cir.1999) (noting that the act that triggers when a [statutory] violation is committed[,] ... also provide[s] a limit on where venue may lie, since [n]either the Constitution nor [the criminal statute at issue] permits venue in a location in which the defendant happens to be after the crime was completed, unless the defendant began, continued or completed his crime in that venue). Thus, these cases cannot be entirely ignored. 30 Nevertheless, we note that none of the cases involving issues of venue cited by the government applied the Toussie analysis in determining whether § 1001 offenses should be deemed continuing offenses. Instead, the cases focused almost exclusively on geographic factors, i.e., where the false statement was made and where it was received by the federal government. When the cases are closely examined, it is questionable whether they are defining § 1001 as a continuing offense crime as that term is defined in Toussie. Rather, when addressing venue, these cases use the phrase continuing offense to anticipate that § 1001 offenses can begin, continue, and be completed in more than one geographic location, and not that § 1001 offenses typically continue over a prolonged period of time. When viewed in this manner, these cases can be reconciled with the conclusion that § 1001 offenses are not continuing offenses for statute of limitations purposes. While § 1001 offenses do not typically involve a prolonged course of conduct, and thus do not fall within the continuing offense doctrine, they can begin, continue, and end in different geographic locations, depending largely on when and where the relevant federal agency assumes jurisdiction over the false statement at issue. For these reasons, we conclude that § 1001 offenses, such as the one that Dunne was charged with committing, should not be deemed continuing offenses for statute of limitations purposes. Therefore, the district court's conclusion that the statute of limitations had expired on the superseding indictment was not plain error.