Opinion ID: 3063986
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Estrada-Escobedo

Text: Estrada-Escobedo was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he first appears to contend that he should have received a minor-role reduction, as the court should have taken into account the fact that he did not have any decisionmaking authority, did not plan or organize the offense, and was only a “rudimentary” participant. He also argues that his sentence was unreasonable, because he was taken into custody in the United States, and, by no fault of his own, he became an illegal alien in this country subject to deportation and exposed to several disparate sentencing and confinement conditions.
A district court’s determination of a defendant’s role in an offense constitutes a factual finding to be reviewed only for clear error. United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 937 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The defendant bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to a 9 mitigating-role reduction. Id. at 939. The guidelines provide for a two-level reduction for a minor participant, which is defined as a defendant “who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 and cmt. (n.5). To determine whether this reduction applies, a district court first should measure the defendant’s role against the relevant conduct for which the defendant has been held accountable. De Varon, 175 F.3d at 940-41. The amount of drugs, in particular, is a material consideration in assessing the defendant’s role, and “may be dispositive–in and of itself–in the extreme case.” Id. at 943. Further, “when a drug courier’s relevant conduct is limited to [his] own act of importation, a district court may legitimately conclude that the courier played an important or essential role in the importation of those drugs.” Id. at 942-43. Although, in many cases, this first method of analysis will be dispositive, the district court also may measure the defendant’s culpability in comparison to that of other participants in the relevant conduct. Id. at 944-45. Two sub-principles guide this application of the analysis: (1) the district court should look only to other participants who are identifiable or discernable from the evidence; and (2) only those participants who were involved in the relevant conduct attributed to the defendant may be considered. Id. at 944. “The conduct of participants in any 10 larger criminal conspiracy is irrelevant.” Id. Because the record demonstrates that Estrada-Escobedo’s role in the offense was identical to his relevant conduct, and he failed to show that he was less culpable than the other crew members in the relevant conduct of transporting the cocaine, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err by finding that he did not qualify for a minor-role reduction.
We may review a sentence for procedural or substantive reasonableness. See Gall, 552 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 597; see also United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d 1180, 1182 n.3 (11th Cir. 2006). Although Estrada-Escobedo preserved his reasonableness challenge, he did not raise below the specific argument regarding his status as an illegal alien. Accordingly, review of this argument is for plain error. See United States v. Gresham, 325 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court has explained that a sentence may be procedurally unreasonable if the district court improperly calculates the guideline imprisonment range, treats the guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the appropriate statutory factors, bases the sentence on clearly erroneous facts, or fails to adequately explain its reasoning. Gall, 552 U.S. at __, 128 S. Ct. at 597. “[T]here is a range of reasonable sentences from which the district court may choose,” and “[a] district court may impose a 11 sentence that is either more severe or lenient than the sentence we would have imposed.” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). A court is free to determine the appropriate weight to be given to each of the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct. 3040 (2007). Because we conclude from the record that the district court correctly calculated the advisory guideline range and considered the factors enumerated in § 3553(a), and Estrada-Escobedo’s sentence was at the bottom of the guideline range, we hold that the district court imposed a procedurally and substantively reasonable sentence. Further, Estrada-Escobedo’s argument that the district court erred by not considering the sentencing disparity between himself and a non-alien is without merit because a sentencing court is not required to discuss each § 3553(a) factor, and the weight that the court assigned to each factor is within its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm Estrada-Escobedo’s sentence.