Opinion ID: 2540605
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: This case is distinguishable from Blakely.

Text: Blakely is an extension of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 which held that, [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (Emphasis added). In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court extended Ring by declaring that the Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing applies even where a defendant pleads guilty. 542 U.S. at 305-06, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The defendant in Blakely pled guilty to kidnaping. Id. at 298, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The facts admitted in his plea hearing, standing alone, supported a maximum sentence of 53 months under Washington state law. Id. To the defendant's surprise, the judge imposed a 90-month sentence after finding that the defendant acted with deliberate cruelty. Id. at 299-300, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The Court held that the sentence violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights because the judge's finding of deliberate cruelty was neither admitted by the defendant nor found by the jury. Id. at 303-05, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The Court explained, The statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. Id. at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (emphasis added). The Court continued, nothing prevents a defendant from waiving his Apprendi rights. When a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents to judicial factfinding. Id. at 310, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (emphasis added). Blakely is distinguishable from the present case. The defendant in Blakely was surprised when his sentence was judicially enhanced, whereas Nunley strategically pled guilty in order to avoid jury sentencing. Nunley knew that the sole issue for trial was whether he would be sentenced to death or life in prison. He had already admitted to all of the facts of the crime and the statutory aggravators required by section 565.030.4(1). He wanted a judge, not a jury, to make all further determinations in reaching his sentence. This necessarily included the judgment fact [3] required by 565.030.4(2), whether the aggravating circumstances warrant imposing the death sentence and the judgment fact required by 565.030(3), whether the evidence in mitigation is sufficient to outweigh the evidence in aggravation. Ultimately, he wanted a judge to determine whether mercy should be exercised and the sentence reduced to life imprisonment pursuant to 565.030.4(4). Nunley was not surprised by the process, the statutory steps of the process, or the decision maker. He got what he asked for in these regards. He was only surprised by the result, when the trial judge decided to impose the death sentence. Blakely does not extend Sixth Amendment protections to defendants who strategically plead guilty and purposefully waive jury sentencing. See State ex rel. Taylor, at 649.