Opinion ID: 2402261
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Double Jeopardy For Earl

Text: On the second day of the trial the Trial Court declared a mistrial. The mistrial was not declared pursuant to a motion by the defendant. The order granting a mistrial recites no grounds for the granting of the mistrial. Six days later, the Trial Court entered in the record a document entitled Findings of Fact, in which it was stated: It is the court's belief that Earl Eugene Oliver, the defendant on trial, has improperly influenced his brother, Victor Oliver, in this matter. The circumstances surrounding Victor's refusal to give evidence, including his refusal to even be sworn as a witness, suggests the type of misconduct which required sustaining the Commonwealth's motion for a mistrial. The Commonwealth argues that Earl can be retried because the termination of the trial was manifestly necessary within the meaning of K.R.S. 505.030(4)(b). A majority of this Court disagrees; we do not feel that the Trial Court stated sufficient grounds to support a finding of manifest necessity. Victor was acting within the scope of his constitutional rights when he refused to testify, so, whether he was improperly influenced to do so is irrelevant. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States guarantees that no person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, and it is manifestly clear that after the jury had been empaneled, after evidence had been received, jeopardy had attached. It is also clear that the defendant did not ask for a mistrial, nor did he concur therein. Therefore the conclusion is inescapable that Earl cannot be retried. The Constitution makes no exceptions for people who are obviously guilty. Indeed, the cases which established the rights and liberties which we enjoy usually involved persons whose lives are less than exemplary. So much of the Opinion and Order of the Court of Appeals which prohibits the respondent Judge from proceeding to a retrial of Earl Oliver, and ordering the dismissal of the indictment against Earl Oliver for the murder of Claude Fletcher, is affirmed. So much of the Opinion and Order of the Court of Appeals which reverses the order of the Trial Court holding attorney Taylor in contempt is reversed, but so much of said Opinion and Order which prohibits punishment therefor is affirmed. STEPHENS, C.J., GANT, STEPHENSON, VANCE and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., and O. GRANT BRUTON and OSCAR GAYLE HOUSE, Special Justices, sitting. STEPHENS, C.J., and GANT, STEPHENSON and VANCE, JJ., concur.