Opinion ID: 2997392
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Determinations of Fact

Text: Hubanks challenges the reasonableness of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ findings of fact. The appeals court found that the exhibits were not destroyed in bad faith, but rather were disposed of pursuant to a policy of the police department. The appeals court found further support for lack of bad faith in both the timing of the evidence’s destruction and the fact that no tests were pending when the exhibits were destroyed. In addition, the court of appeals found that the destroyed evidence lacked true exculpatory value because it could not have eliminated Hubanks as one of the two assailants. Hubanks first argues that it was unreasonable for the court of appeals to find that the exhibits were destroyed pursuant to departmental policy when the policy was unwritten, the police gave somewhat inconsistent explanations for why the exhibits were destroyed, and the exhibits at one point bore notations that they were to be preserved. The record, however, supports the court of appeals’ finding. It contains evidence that the exhibits bore a notation by police, albeit an incorrect one, that Hubanks had pleaded guilty and that therefore the exhibits could be destroyed in one year, pursuant to departmental policy. The exhibits were destroyed 15 months later. Hubanks fails to rebut the pre- 6 No. 04-1043 sumptive reasonableness of these findings. That the police department’s policy for retention of exhibits was unwritten is not proof that the policy did not exist or that the practice was not routinely observed. Similarly, the inconsistencies to which Hubanks refers may be indicative of confusion within the department, but they are far from clear and convincing evidence of bad faith. Finally, while evidence that the exhibits bore two contradictory notations— one to preserve the exhibits pending a “possible” appeal, and the other erroneously referencing a guilty plea—may reflect careless police work, it is not clear and convincing proof that the police acted in bad faith. See Montgomery v. Greer, 956 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding, “mere negligence, without more, does not amount to a constitutional violation”). Hubanks also argues that it was unreasonable for the court of appeals to find that the police department had a policy that violated state law. Hubanks refers here to a Wisconsin statute, which provides: The retention and disposal of all court records and exhibits in any civil or criminal action or proceeding of any nature in a court of record shall be determined by the supreme court by rule. WIS. STAT. § 757.54 (1987-88). The Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule (“SCR”) stated: SCR 72.01 Retention of original record. Except as provided in SCR 72.03 to 72.05, the original paper records of any court shall be retained in the custody of the court for the following minimum periods: (46) Criminal case exhibits, paper and non- paper. One year after the time for appeal has ex- pired, provided that return of the exhibit has been offered to the proffering party. SCR 72.01(46). It appears that the substance of the police department’s policy for retention of trial exhibits is conNo. 04-1043 7 sistent with state law, with the possible exception of the proviso to SCR 72.01(46). Both require preservation of exhibits for one year after the time for appeal has elapsed. That being the case, and there being evidence in the record that the police believed Hubanks had pleaded guilty, the mere existence of the state law is not clear and convincing proof that the police acted in bad faith. Second, Hubanks argues that it was unreasonable for the court of appeals to find that the passage of time and lack of a pending test request indicated an absence of bad faith, because the police should have been aware of the long-range exculpatory potential of DNA testing. The record indicates that the exhibits were destroyed 15 months after Hubanks’ trial. During that 15-month period, no requests were made to conduct further tests on the evidence. It was reasonable for the appeals court to interpret these factors as evidence that the exhibits were not destroyed in bad faith, but rather pursuant to departmental policy. Third, Hubanks argues that the court of appeals unreasonably found that the exhibits lacked exculpatory value. To support this contention, Hubanks proposes a hypothetical scenario in which DNA testing of the lost evidence inculpates not one but two assailants, neither of whom are Hubanks. This speculation does not rebut the appeals court’s finding.