Opinion ID: 1193995
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Built-In Bias Question

Text: We turn next to another subtler, but equally serious constitutional infirmity which it is argued would result regardless of whether governmental consolidation in Clark County be implemented under Sections 13 and 126, rather than 163. Now, we will consider whether those sections, which likewise contemplate that Las Vegas residents will elect a predominant number of county-city commissioners to serve on both city and county governing boards, are constitutionally sound; or whether, to the contrary, such a scheme of local government violates constitutional principles by denying disfavored residents of North Las Vegas, Henderson, and Boulder City, and unincorporated areas of Clark County, equal access to the political system. As Nevada's able new Legislative Counsel acknowledges, all of Chapter 648 must fall if, in the context of this case, its provisions for two types of commissioners, of whom a minority are granted lesser perquisites than the majority, constitute an invidious discrimination against citizens who can vote only for one of the less potent commissioners. As the Legislative Counsel perceives, there is no possibility that these fundamental provisions could be severed from Chapter 648 as a whole. At the outset, we note that there of course is no absolute constitutional prohibition against consolidating city and county offices. (See, for example, State of Nevada v. Swift, 11 Nev. 128 (1876), which concerned legislation initially incorporating Carson City, and empowering the Sheriff of Ormsby County to act as ex-officio marshal of Carson City.) [15] However, this does not foreclose the prospect of an inherent constitutional infirmity. At the outset, we also reject any suggestion that a plan comparable to the one contemplated here was considered and approved by the High Court in Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 91 S.Ct. 1904, 29 L.Ed.2d 399 (1971). The reapportionment plan approved in Abate was based on population figures. There an 18-person county legislature was chosen from five districts. Each district contained one of the five towns within the county. The only mention of a dual board was under the previously existing plan. Under that plan, the town supervisors from all towns, which encompassed the entire county, were also county supervisors. In its decision, the High Court stated: We emphasize that our decision is based on the long tradition of overlapping functions and dual personnel in Rockland County government and on the fact that the plan before us does not contain a built-in bias tending to favor particular political interests or geographic areas. And nothing we say today should be taken to imply that even these factors could justify substantially greater deviations from population equality. But we are not prepared to hold that the Rockland County reapportionment plan violates the Constitution, and, therefore, we affirm. 403 U.S. at 187, 91 S.Ct. at 1908. No long tradition of overlapping functions and dual personnel exists in Clark County. Further, as will be hereinafter discussed, and as the Legislative Counsel has virtually acknowledged, the county-city commissioner system of NRS Chapter 648 contains a built-in bias tending to favor particular political interests. This in mind, we turn to consider the plan at hand. It is, of course, well established that the right to vote is fundamental in a free democratic society. Every citizen has an unalienable right to full, effective participation in the political process. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). Thus, a voter has the constitutional right to have his vote given as much weight as any other vote and not to have his vote denied, debased, or diluted in any manner. Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50, 52, 90 S.Ct. 791, 25 L.Ed.2d 45 (1970). These principles are applicable to the local government process. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 20 L.Ed.2d 45 (1968). Any alleged infringement of this right must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized. Reynolds v. Sims , cited above. Appellants apparently believe that if the commissioner districts were somehow apportioned with equal population, the one man, one vote principle would be satisfied. We believe, however, that any such mechanical treatment of fundamental rights is unsatisfactory. Equal apportionment is merely the starting point of any consideration. Reynolds v. Sims , cited above. Population, itself, does not possess any talismanic quality in fair representation cases. Indeed, to rely upon population statistics, to the exclusion of all other factors, is to give these statistics greater sanctity than that which the law permits or requires. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1303 (5 Cir.1973). Even an equally apportioned scheme can be objectionable where it operates to cancel, minimize, or dilute the voting strength of a political interest group. Whitcomb v. Chavis , cited above 403 U.S. at 143, 91 S.Ct. 1858; Zimmer v. McKeithen , cited above. We must, therefore, look behind the equal apportionment aspect and ascertain whether Chapter 648 would cancel, minimize, or dilute the voting strength of residents outside the corporate limits of Las Vegas. The scheme of local government set forth in Chapter 648 does not require complete consolidation of city and county government, but, instead, provides for two different governing boards, one for each entity. The city board consists of commissioners elected from districts within the municipal boundaries  or, as Section 126 originally was written, substantially within such boundaries. In addition, these same individuals also serve on the county board. Thus, a voter within one of these districts is electing a representative who will be serving his or her interests on two different boards. In contrast, a voter residing in a district outside the major city would elect a representative who serves his or her interests only on the county board. Las Vegas provides a splendid example of how dilution of one's voting strength will occur. There, a majority of the commissioners (originally specified as eight in number) would be elected to govern the city. That same majority also would sit on the eleven-man county board. At a city board meeting, the majority could decide to take action deemed in the best interest of the city constituency, without thought to detriment that might result to the balance of the county. They then could switch hats and go to the county board meeting to affirm their previous action, purporting to act in the best interest of the entire county. In these circumstances, the possible incursion of bad faith surely is a disturbing prospect; however, even though the county-city commissioners might attempt to act in total good faith, decisions or compromises reached at city board meetings would inevitably tend to restrict meaningful discussion and compromise at later meetings of the county board. Once the Las Vegas county-city commissioners determined the destinies of both the city and the county at a city commission meeting, the subsequent county commission meeting would be a matter of form, in many if not in all cases. Later efforts by the minority county commissioners, to change earlier decisions, would at worst be totally foreclosed whenever the county-city commissioners had arrived at firm understandings, express or tacit, in reaching their consensus. At best, efforts to gain a reconsideration would likely be hampered because individual county-city commissioners, having already considered the issue, would already have made up their minds. In short, under the dual commissioner system structured in Chapter 648, the county-city commissioners would effectively control the development and growth of the major city, of the county, and of other cities within the county  paying little or no heed to the mere county commissioners, just as they might choose. As compared to county-city commissioners, the county commissioners, therefore, would have a severely diminished capacity to represent their constituents' interests. Access to the political process is the barometer of dilution of voting strength. Zimmer v. McKeithen , cited above. Can it be said that a voter in North Las Vegas, Henderson, Boulder City or the unincorporated county areas has access to the political process merely because he or she can participate in the election of a representative, when the statutory scheme denies that representative an effective voice in governmental affairs? Manifestly, it cannot. This is not the situation where an interest group has found itself outvoted and is thus without representation. See Whitcomb v. Chavis , cited above. On the contrary, while residents outside Las Vegas would elect representatives, those representatives would be without effective political power to protect county interests conflicting with policies established by the county-city commissioners acting in a vacuum on the city board. These lesser, second-class commissioners could not provide representation responsive to the needs of the county. This dilutes the votes of all those not favored by the plan, Zimmer v. McKeithen , cited above, and we believe the dilution of one's vote merely because he or she resides outside Las Vegas impairs basic constitutional rights just as much as invidious discrimination based on such factors as race or economic status. Reynolds v. Sims , cited above. During oral argument, Mr. Daykin, the Legislative Counsel, admitted that the county-city commissioners could take unconscionable advantage of the county commissioners. [16] However, as apologia, Mr. Daykin suggested: (1) that we must have faith in our elected officials; and (2) that the possibility of unconscionable action exists even with independent boards. To the contrary, we believe that our constitutional form of government does not proceed upon gratuitous assumptions of good faith. Instead, fundamental to our government is the checks and balance system inherent in separation of power. Our Constitution, as its preamble recites, is intended to secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity. Where one group's political rights are left insecure, and another group is empowered to trample those rights at will, we believe that it is no answer, from a Constitutional standpoint, to say the former should not complain but should have trust in their fellow men and women. Of course, it is true that the possibility of unconscionable action also exists even with independent boards, just as unconscionable action is possible in most governmental affairs. However, the scheme envisioned by Chapter 648 facilitates, almost mandates, the commissioners representing the county's largest city to take unconscionable advantage, to resolve matters among themselves, to become insensitive to the views of mere county commissioners. Under Chapter 648, effective debate on a city issue affecting the county can be foreclosed by a city meeting held prior to the county meeting. With independent boards, the same decision might well be made at a city meeting. However, the city officials who decided that issue would not be voting at the county meeting. Unconscionable or insensitive predetermined action could still occur, but only through the bad faith actions of separate individuals. While local government may need many innovations to meet changing urban conditions and there is nothing to prevent experimentation to achieve the best result, still, the equality of the voting rights cannot be debased or diluted. Hadley v. Junior College District , cited above. Under the scheme set forth in Chapter 648, the voting strength of persons outside Las Vegas is diluted and the political machinery is structured so that the Las Vegas county-city commissioners may readily take unconscionable advantage of the other commissioners and their constituents. Indeed, not only is Chapter 648 structured so that the county-city commissioners can routinely decide issues without concern for the lesser county commissioners, but they would be paid extra while doing so. See Sec. 13(5). Accordingly, we believe that there exists a built-in bias tending to favor particular political interests. In our view, in the instant case it is no answer to say that unfairness might also occur in a system where built-in bias was absent. Certainly the manifest unfairness of a poll-tax could not be justified by comparable means  i.e., by noting that, even absent the poll-tax, those unfairly advantaged might successfully utilize other means to keep constitutionally-intended Blessings of Liberty from all. The foregoing brings into focus related principles, concerning the propriety of having city commissioners also serve on the county board, as here structured. Public policy demands that an office holder discharge his duties with undivided loyalty. Kaufman v. Pannuccio, 121 N.J. Super. 27, 295 A.2d 639 (1972). By permitting city commissioners to sit on the county board, the electors of both the city and county are deprived of undivided allegiance to their interests. See People v. Bagshaw, 55 Cal. App.2d 155, 130 P.2d 243 (1942). As noted in McDonough v. Roach, 35 N.J. 153, 171 A.2d 307 at 309-310 (1961): [T]he county board is bound to consider the interests of all of its citizens while the local governing body has a like obligation to the citizenry of the municipality alone. No man, much less a public fiduciary, can sit on both sides of a bargaining table. He cannot in one capacity pass with undivided loyalty upon proposals he advances in his other role.    `It is no answer to say that the conflict in duties ... may never in fact arise. It is enough that it may in the regular operation of the statutory plan.'