Opinion ID: 3009853
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Two Steps of the Laurit!oice of Law Inquiry

Text: The solution to the lack of guidance lies in approaching the Lauritzen analysis in a way that is faithful to its nature as a specialized form of interest analysis designed to ensure that American maritime law of personal injuries applies only where significant American interests are implicated and only in conformity with international law. Specifically, we interpret the notion of “substantial contacts” to embody these twin concerns in a two-step inquiry derived from international law. We conclude below that, in a Jones Act or general maritime law case, a court deciding whether American contacts are “substantial” (so that American law applies) must at the threshold ask whether one of the following factors is involved in the incident, in which case there is a basis for prescriptive jurisdiction (which, we explain infra subsection 1, means that significant American interests are implicated): injury to an 34 American seaman or a seaman with American dependents, injury in American territory, American defendants, an American flagged ship, or a contractual choice-of-law clause specifying American law. If so, the second step in the substantial contacts inquiry is for the court to ascertain whether application of American law is reasonable under the circumstances, in which case (as subsection 2 describes) international law is satisfied.0 In this case, as we explain below, the plaintiff succeeds on both steps of the inquiry. Her American citizenship satisfies the threshold requirement of a basis for prescriptive jurisdiction, and consideration of the Lauritzen factors reveals that the American interests at stake here are such that American law may be reasonably applied. Hence, the American contacts are “substantial” and the plaintiff was entitled to sue under American law. 0 The dissent rejects our analysis, suggesting that “under the Lauritzen test, the plaintiff must prove that a simple majority or preponderance of the factors weighs in favor of United States law.” Dissenting op. infra at 7-8 (emphasis supplied). While the meaning of this is somewhat unclear (for it seems a hybrid of a counting test and a balancing test), it does not constitute an accurate rendering of the “substantial contacts” formulation adopted in Rhoditis. The “substantial contacts” concept was borrowed from Judge Medina, who explained that “something between minimal and preponderant contacts is necessary if the Jones Act is to be applied.” Bartholomew, 263 F.2d at 440 (emphases supplied). This articulation of the “substantial contacts” standard occurs in the paragraph of Judge Medina’s opinion immediately preceding the paragraph that the Supreme Court quoted. Judge Medina’s explanation of “substantial contacts” is thus crucial to understanding the approach adopted by the Court in Rhoditis, and it shows that the American contacts must be more than minimal but need not be preponderant. Hence, the dissent’s proposed standard is too stringent. 35 In the following analysis, we “rely on the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law for the relevant principles of international law. Its standards appear fairly supported in the decisions of [the Supreme] Court construing international choiceof-law principles ([e.g.,] Lauritzen, Romero, and McCulloch [v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 83 S. Ct. 671 (1963)]) . . . .” Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2920 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). A primary reason for relying on the Restatement of Foreign Relation Law is that one of the Court’s chief motives for cabining the potentially unlimited scope of the Jones Act in Lauritzen was a concern that the legislation not violate norms of international law. While the dissent argues that the sections we rely on “were not meant to apply in a tort case such as this,” dissenting op. infra at 4 (quoting RESTATEMENT Pt. IV, Ch. 1, Introd. Note, at 237), the passage it quotes reveals that the Restatement’s rules are not unconditionally irrelevant to tort cases: they only “do not necessarily apply.” Id. at 5 (different emphasis supplied). However, “[i]n some circumstances, issues of private international law may also implicate issues of public international law, and many matters of private international law have substantial international significance and therefore may be considered foreign relations law[.]” RESTATEMENT § 101, cmt. c, at 23 (emphasis supplied). The Jones Act and American maritime law more generally are examples of just such matters, as is reflected by the Supreme Court’s concern in Lauritzen about the prospect of 36 violating international law.0 See also infra note 40(discussing 0 While the Restatement of Conflict of Laws is by its terms applicable to cases with foreign elements, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 10 (1971) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS], this is only “usually” the case, see id. § 10, cmt. c, and “[t]here are significant differences between interstate and international cases,” see id. § 10, cmt. d. Additionally, to the extent that the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law might seem inapplicable, and the Restatement of Conflicts applicable, we note that these two Restatements in many respects do not fundamentally differ. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law explains that “[t]he concepts, doctrines, and considerations that inform private international law also guide the development of some areas of public international law, notably the principles limiting the jurisdiction of states to prescribe, adjudicate and enforce law.” RESTATEMENT § 101, cmt. c, at 23. The Restatement of Conflicts provides that “[a] court may not apply the local law of its own state to determine a particular issue unless [that] would be reasonable in the light of the relationship of the state and of other states to the person, thing or occurrence involved.” RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 9, at 31. This is the same sort of analysis employed in our opinion. Indeed, the reasonableness factors of § 403 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, see infra note 44 and accompanying text, incorporate the general choice of law factors of § 6 of the Restatement of Conflicts, see RESTATEMENT § 403, reporters’ note 10, at 254; the latter are used to determine the state with the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, the law of which state governs (under the Restatement of Conflicts) the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to tort issues, see RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 145, at 414. Additionally, although “[]public international law is dealt with only incidentally” in the Restatement of Conflicts, the rules of the Restatement of Conflicts “do conform . . . to the requirements of public international law.” Id. § 2, cmt. d, at 6. There is thus important congruence between the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law and the Restatement of Conflicts with respect to the issues before this court. However, the Restatement of Conflicts rule for personal injury actions specifies that “the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless . . . some other state has a more significant relationship . . . to the occurrence and the parties . . . .” Id. § 146, at 430. This rule gives far too much general significance to the place of the wrongful act to constitute a satisfactory interpretation of Lauritzen. See infra at 57-57 (discussing the variable significance of this factor). Indeed its very formulation seems alien to Lauritzen-type analysis, which is the touchstone of Part III of our opinion; this suggests 37 difference between maritime laws and conventional tort law). Furthermore, the views of Lea Brilmayer, one of the leading authorities in the area, support use of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law here. Professor Brilmayer has analyzed conflict of laws as “the domestic counterpart of the international law issue of the extraterritorial application of American law.” Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 L. & Contemp. Probs. 11, 11 (Summer 1987). Of particular relevance here, she has noted the unhelpfulness of the public/private distinction as regards international law: “Whether or not that distinction is viable, it does not describe the different roles of the two Restatements. Some private law cases, such as Lauritzen v. Larsen, fall under the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law.” Id. at 12 (footnote observing that Lauritzen is mentioned in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law § 403, reporters’ note 2 omitted; emphasis supplied).0 the inappropriateness of the Restatement of Conflicts to this case, whatever the declarations of the drafters. Thus, despite the dissent’s comments, we are convinced that our reliance on the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law is proper. 0 Cf. also Mary B. McCord, Responding to the Space Station Agreement: The Extension of U.S. Law into Space, 77 GEO. L.J. 1933, 1945 (1989) (suggesting combining the Lauritzen and Restatement of Foreign Relations Law factors to determine propriety of applying American law to incidents aboard hypothetical multinational space station). Additionally, we believe that relying on current versions of the Restatement to interpret both general maritime law and the Jones Act--even though it was adopted long after the Supreme Court announced the Lauritzen factors--is permissible because the Jones Act was not locked rigidly into place when adopted, see, e.g., McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 225 n.6, 78 S. Ct. 1201, 1204 n.6 (1958) (discussing change in Jones Act statute of limitations upon amendment of FELA after enactment of Jones Act); the Act was relatively recently 38 1. Do the Contacts Show a Basis for Prescriptive Jurisdiction? The first essential question in Lauritzen analysis is whether the suit implicates significant interests of the United States. In accordance with Lauritzen’s direction to construe American maritime law so as not to violate international law, we identify this preliminary inquiry with the question whether there is a basis for the United States to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over the incident at issue. “International law has long recognized limitations on the authority of states to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe in circumstances affecting the interests of other states.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW Pt. IV, Introd. Note, at 230 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The Restatement defines prescriptive jurisdiction--which is not to be confused with subject matter jurisdiction--as the authority of a state “to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of person in things . . . .” RESTATEMENT § 401(a). It lists several alternative bases for prescriptive amended, see Pub. L. 97-389, Title V, § 503(a), 96 Stat. 1955 (Dec. 29, 1982); when the Court in Rhoditis adopted the concept of “substantial contacts” in 1970, it did not specify how to determine whether a case in fact involves such contacts with the United States; as we have stated, see supra note 37, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law factors on which we rely below derive from the general choice of law factors of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law, which was adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute in 1969; and “United States courts have considered [rules of international law as to prescriptive jurisdiction], and interpreted the known or presumed intent of Congress, in the light of changing understandings,” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW Pt. IV, Ch. 1, at 236-37 (1987) (emphasis supplied). 39 jurisdiction. As a general matter (subject to restrictions we discuss below), nations may prescribe law with respect to (1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory;