Opinion ID: 76252
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ordinance 1204 As A Zoning Statute

Text: 40 Ordinance 1204 also contains zoning provisions regulating the location of adult entertainment establishments. Under Renton, a zoning ordinance that restricts the location of adult entertainment establishments must serve a substantial government interest and leave open ample alternative avenues of communication. 475 U.S. at 50, 106 S.Ct. 925. Fly Fish claims that Ordinance 1204 fails the second portion of this test because its zoning provisions provide only three sites for the four existing adult entertainment businesses, and set aside less than 1% of the City's acreage for such businesses. Ordinance 1204, § 2-2(a-c). Whether the sites available for adult businesses under a zoning ordinance provide reasonable avenues for communicating these businesses' erotic message is a question of law. David Vincent, Inc. v. Broward County, Fla., 200 F.3d 1325, 1335 (11th Cir.2000). 41 Fly Fish argues for a bright line test for this issue. Under this test, a zoning ordinance that provides fewer that the existing number of sites for adult businesses would not, as a matter of law, leave open ample alternative channels for communication of their erotic message. 42 The Fifth Circuit has explicitly adopted such a test. Lakeland Lounge of Jackson, Inc. v. City of Jackson, Miss., 973 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir.1992); Woodall v. City of El Paso, 959 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.1992). Under this test, an ordinance is constitutional only if [a]s a matter of arithmetic ... there are more `reasonable' sites available than businesses with demands for them. Lakeland, 973 F.2d at 1260. 43 Other circuits, while not viewing it as a bright line, have placed heavy emphasis on this supply and demand test. Buzzetti v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir.1998) (ordinance unconstitutional unless it permits all the City's existing adult establishments to continue to operate in the City, either at their current sites or at new locations); North Ave. Novelties, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 88 F.3d 441, 445 (7th Cir.1996) (there must be no evidence that any person has attempted to open an adult use, but was prevented from doing so by [the] ordinance); Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524, 1532-33 (9th Cir.1993) (invalidating adult business ordinance where the total number of adult businesses that could coexist was fewer than the number of adult businesses already operating at the time the ordinance was enacted); Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 928 F.2d 278, 284 n. 5 (8th Cir.1991) (ordinance must provide ample opportunity for relocation); Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City of Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir.1988) (striking down an ordinance that allowed only three of thirteen adult businesses to continue operating). 18 44 The rationale of this test is obvious. By guaranteeing that the number of sites available under a new zoning ordinance is not less than the existing sites, the ordinance does not suppress speech, but merely relocates it, as allowed by Renton. 475 U.S. at 52, 106 S.Ct. 925 (Cities may regulate adult theaters by dispersing them, ... or by concentrating them, as in Renton). Nothing in Renton indicates that an ordinance that purports to reduce the harmful secondary effects of protected conduct may do so by eliminating the protected conduct. Id. at 54, 106 S.Ct. 925 ([W]e have cautioned against the enactment of zoning regulations that have `the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful speech') (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 71, n. 35, 96 S.Ct. 2440). On the contrary, Renton requires that an adult entertainment ordinance refrain from effectively denying [adult businesses] a reasonable opportunity to open and operate an adult theater within the city. Id. at 54, 106 S.Ct. 925. 45 Recently, Justice Kennedy highlighted this aspect of Renton. In his concurrence in Alameda, 19 he cautioned us to remember that a city may not regulate the secondary effects of speech by suppressing the speech itself. 535 U.S. at 445, 122 S.Ct. 1728. 20 The purpose and effect of a zoning ordinance must be to reduce secondary effects and not to reduce speech. Id. See also Lakeland, 973 F.2d at 1260 (this ordinance does not reduce the number of establishments that can open in Jackson, so it does not limit expression) (citing Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 71, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981) (ordinance banning nude dancing in American Mini Theatres distinguished, because it did not affect the number of adult movie theaters that could operate in the city)). 46 Although we have repeatedly said that whether a zoning ordinance leaves open ample alternatives for communication must be resolved on a case-by-case basis, David Vincent, 200 F.3d at 1336; Boss Capital, Inc. v. City of Casselberry, 187 F.3d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir.1999), 21 we have also consistently recognized the importance of the correlation of available sites to existing adult businesses. David Vincent, id.; see also International Eateries of America, Inc. v. Broward County, 941 F.2d 1157, 1165 (11th Cir.1991) (twenty-six sites available for one existing adult entertainment business). We have cited with approval opinions of the Ninth and Fifth Circuits holding that adult businesses must be given a reasonable opportunity to relocate and that the number of sites available for adult businesses under the new zoning regime must be greater than or equal to the number of adult businesses in existence at the time the new zoning regime takes effect. David Vincent, 200 F.3d at 1337 n. 17 (citing Topanga, 989 F.2d at 1532-33 and Woodall, 49 F.3d at 1126). In no case have we upheld a zoning ordinance that provides fewer locations than there are presently operating adult establishments. 47 At least two district courts in this circuit have applied the supply and demand test to invalidate zoning ordinances providing fewer than formerly available sites for adult entertainment. University Books and Videos, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, 132 F.Supp.2d 1008 (S.D.Fla.2001); Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F.Supp. 1207 (N.D.Ga.1981). In Purple Onion, the Georgia court invalidated Atlanta's adult entertainment zoning ordinance because it squeezed out of business two-thirds of the existing establishments. 511 F.Supp. at 1224. Although recognizing that Georgia law permits municipalities to terminate, over time, pre-existing nonconforming uses, the district court held that such ordinances should be carefully scrutinized where First Amendment interests are affected. Id. Similarly, in University Books, the district court rejected a zoning ordinance that provided no more than a dozen locations for thirty-nine existing adult entertainment establishments. 132 F.Supp.2d at 1015. 48 A third district court in this circuit invalidated a zoning ordinance that curtailed all future access to the adult entertainment business. Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F.Supp. 696 (M.D.Fla.1978). The court characterized the zoning plan as for all practical purposes, a total ban on the establishment of new adult bookstores or movie houses. Id. at 702. Consequently, according to the court, the suppressive effects of the zoning scheme are readily apparent since, aside from those who presently do so, no one will be allowed a forum through which to disseminate sexually explicit ... forms of expression. Id. at 703. 22 49 Though we do not today adopt a bright line rule that a zoning ordinance that does not provide sufficient sites for the relocation of all existing adult entertainment establishments is unconstitutional, we conclude that this factor is dispositive in this case. Three adult entertainment establishments have operated in Cocoa for over twenty years. Sassy's has operated for over six years. When it opened in 1997, it offered nude dancing, but, since its dancers covered the anatomical parts specified by Cocoa's prior adult entertainment ordinance as defining nude dancing, the ordinance did not apply to it and the club was a conforming use. In 1999, the City amended its Adult Entertainment Ordinance to broaden the definition of adult business to include dancing for tips. This amendment effectively made Sassy's an adult business for licensing and zoning purposes. 50 Additionally, prior to 1999, all of Cocoa's existing adult businesses were nonconforming uses. They were non-conforming because none of them could meet the City's separation requirements from sensitive uses. Following the enactment of Ordinance 1204, the City eliminated the protection of nonconforming use status and instead required all nonconforming businesses to close after September 2002. 51 The City also abandoned its use of the conventional zoning provisions separating adult businesses from other commercial venues, and instead specified three lots by their metes and bounds legal description as the only lawful sites for adult entertainment establishments. These three sites were (and are) completely occupied by the other three adult entertainment establishments in Cocoa. As a result of these events, the City's 1999 zoning ordinance provided only three sites for four lawfully existing adult entertainment establishments. 52 Instead of leaving open ample alternative means of communication for Sassy's erotic message, the actions taken by Cocoa have effectively zoned Sassy's out of existence. 23 Furthermore, if enforced, the new ordinance would reduce the number of adult entertainment establishments by 25% in a town that has supported four establishments for many years. Neither of these results meets the Renton test. See D.H.L. Associates, Inc. v. O'Gorman, 199 F.3d 50, 60 (1st Cir.1999) (establishment that lawfully offered adult entertainment in [the city] since before the enactment of the 1987 zoning ordinance ... has a right to continue operating despite the fact that it is not located in the [designated] zone); Ebel v. City of Corona, 767 F.2d 635, 639 (zoning ordinance that did not provide alternate site for existing business unconstitutional). 53 Nor does our review of any of the other relevant factors, including the less than 1% of the city's total acreage remaining available to adult businesses, militate in favor of a holding that the ordinance leaves open ample alternative avenues of communication for the regulated, but protected, message. Accordingly, we hold the zoning provision of Ordinance 1204 unconstitutional.