Opinion ID: 171334
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Heartland analysis

Text: As part of the sentencing process, a district court may consider whether the case before it lies within the heartland of typical cases considered by the Sentencing Commission when it drafted the Guidelines. Even after Booker, the district court is still required to apply the Guidelines and to consider the recommended sentence as one factor in its decision. Gall v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 586, 596, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) ([A] district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). One step in applying the Guidelines is to determine whether or not to depart from the range specified in the Sentencing Table. See United States v. Sierra-Castillo, 405 F.3d 932, 936 n. 2 (10th Cir.2005) (Although district courts post- Booker have discretion to assign sentences outside of the Guidelines-authorized range, they should also continue to apply the Guidelines departure provisions in appropriate cases.); U.S.S.G. § 1A1.1 editorial note, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. n. 4(b) (When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure is warranted.). Before a departure is permitted, certain aspects of the case must be found unusual enough for it to fall outside the heartland of cases in the Guideline. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98,116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996); see also U.S.S.G. § 1A1.1 editorial note, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. n. 4(b) (The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each guideline as carving out a `heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes.). That is, whether the particular case lies within the heartland of similar offenses is a threshold question that a district court must decide when determining whether to grant a departure under the Guidelines. Although Koon was decided when the Guidelines were still mandatory, neither Booker nor any of the subsequent cases have altered the standard for when to depart from the recommended range. This kind of heartland analysis is also a legitimate part of the district court's analysis of whether to vary from the Guidelines. In Rita v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007), the Supreme Court specifically endorsed the use of this technique as part of the weighing of the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 2465 ([The sentencing judge] may hear arguments by prosecution or defense that the Guidelines sentence should not apply, perhaps because ... the case at hand falls outside the `heartland' to which the Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply.); see also United States v. Galarza-Payan, 441 F.3d 885, 888 (10th Cir. 2006) (Indeed the concept of a `heartland'or similarity among casesis a part of § 3553(a)(6) ..., and is a proper consideration when applied in a discretionary fashion.). Therefore, we have previously rejected the argument that a district court's use of the heartland analysis necessarily implies that it misunderstood the advisory nature of the Guidelines. In Galarza-Payan, the sentencing court stated that the defendant's circumstances would have to fall outside the heartland to support a departure, or downward adjustment. [2] Id. The defendant argued on appeal that the court's statement suggested that it applied the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion. We affirmed the sentence, noting that the district court, while using pre- Booker Guidelines terminology, did not sentence [the defendant] in a mandatory fashion. Id. After looking at the sentencing hearing as a whole, we were able to conclude that the district court understood its discretion and considered [the] § 3553(a) factors. Id.; see also United States v. Valgara, 223 Fed.Appx. 799, 803 (10th Cir.2007), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 385, 169 L.Ed.2d 270 (2007) (holding that the sentencing court's conclusion that there was simply no way to avoid the base offense level did not indicate mandatory application of the Guidelines); United States v. Smith, 219 Fed.Appx. 765, 769 (10th Cir. 2007) (determining that the district court's innocuous statement and use of certain nomenclature [including the phrase `major departure'] at sentencing did not indicate that the district court misperceived the advisory nature of the Guidelines). Because many of the same considerations are part of both the departure and variance analyses, there will, necessarily, be some overlap between the two, when a defendant seeks, and the courts consequently are called upon to consider, both forms of relief. Departures and variances are analytically distinct, and courts must be careful not to confuse them. But a sentencing judge does not commit reversible error by consolidating the two discussions. In Geiner, we held that when, in addressing [the defendant's] argument for a departure ..., the court discusse[s] various § 3553(a) factors, the resulting sentence is procedurally reasonable. Geiner, 498 F.3d at 1114. As long as the court takes into account all of the relevant considerations, the order in which it does so is unimportant. We do not suggest that a heartland comparison is sufficient, by itself, to satisfy the district court's responsibility to weigh all the relevant factors. When the Guidelines were mandatory, a court could not depart from the recommended range unless the case was exceptional. If the court determined that the case was within the heartland, then its analysis was effectively over. Now that the Sentencing Guidelines are only advisory, there are no mandatory requirements as to when a district court may sentence a defendant to an above- or below-Guidelines sentence. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 595 (holding that requiring extraordinary circumstances to justify a variance come[s] too close to creating an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines range.) Even in routine, heartland cases, the district court is obligated to consider the § 3553(a) factors. We, therefore, agree with Mr. Martinez-Barragan that the district court would have erred if it concluded that a case was within the heartland of similar cases and that, since it could not justify a departure under the Guidelines, it could not vary from the recommended range either. However, that is not what happened in this case.