Opinion ID: 1938597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Application of the Standard to a Witness' Request for Her Own Grand Jury Testimony

Text: Appellant correctly states that this court has not issued an opinion wherein we have reviewed a trial court's ruling on a request arising in precisely this posturea trial witness' pretrial request for a transcript of her own grand jury testimony. However, appellant mistakenly concludes that because our decision in Alexander, supra, involved a defendant's request for the pretrial disclosure of a third party's grand jury testimony, the particularized need test announced in that case is not applicable to Ms. Mosby's request for her own grand jury testimony. [18] Instead, relying primarily on In re Sealed Motion, 279 U.S.App.D.C. 294, 880 F.2d 1367 (1989) (per curiam), a D.C. Circuit case which is not binding on this court, see M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971), appellant contends that a grand jury witness has a presumptive right of access to the transcript of her grand jury testimony absent a clear showing by the government that other interests outweigh the witness' right to [the] transcript. Sealed Motion, supra, 279 U.S.App. D.C. at 298, 880 F.2d at 1371. [19] Contra United States v. Lopez, 779 F.Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (considering and declining to follow Sealed Motion ). However, we view the holding of Sealed Motion in the particular context of that casenamely, a request by a witness for a transcript of the testimony she gave before a grand jury convened by an Independent Counsel. Because an investigation by an Independent Counsel concludes with a published report (regardless of whether indictments are returned) in which individuals who testified before the grand jury may be named, the Independent Counsel Act of 1987, 28 U.S.C. § 591 et seq., empowers the court to make such orders as are appropriate to protect the rights of any individual named in such [final] reports. Id. at § 594(h)(2). The need to protect these named witnesses gave rise to the court's conclusion that they were entitled to use the transcripts of their own grand jury testimony to prepare written comments in response to the Counsel's report. Sealed Motion, supra, 279 U.S.App.D.C. at 295-97, 880 F.2d at 1368-70 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(2)). We do not understand Sealed Motion to announce a new rule applicable to ordinary criminal proceedings. But see In re Heimerle, supra note 19 (adopting the presumptive right standard announced in Sealed Motion where a witness made a request for his grand jury transcript in the context of a subsequent criminal proceeding). Further, although the Sealed Motion court explicitly relied in its reasoning on the  sui generis nature of the Independent Counsel Act and its specific provisions, 279 U.S.App.D.C. at 295, 880 F.2d at 1368, the court buttressed its conclusion by stating that the particularized need standard relevant to requests made pursuant to judicial proceedings had been satisfied in any event. Id. We are more persuaded by the reasoning in Alexander and the application of the particularized need standard, which requires a showing that a requested disclosure of grand jury testimony is necessary to avoid a possible injustice, Alexander, supra, 428 A.2d at 53, and that the need for disclosure is greater than [any] continued need for secrecy. Id. See also Application of Executive Sec. Corp., 702 F.2d 406, 408-09 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818, 104 S.Ct. 78, 78 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983); United States v. Clavey, 565 F.2d 111, 114 (7th Cir.1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 954, 99 S.Ct. 351, 58 L.Ed.2d 345 (1978); In re Bast, 542 F.2d 893, 896 (4th Cir.1976); In re Bianchi, 542 F.2d 98, 100 (1st Cir.1976). Alexander sought to prevent the manipulation of a defense witness' testimony which might result if the defendant were to have pretrial access to the transcript of the grand jury testimony of that witness. The court stated that no showing of particularized need is made where a request for disclosure of a transcript is motivated by an interest in think[ing] about and explain[ing] any inconsistencies between that grand jury testimony and [the witness'] present recollections, Alexander, supra, 428 A.2d at 54, or to avoid impeachment. Id. [20] In the instant case, although Ms. Mosby initiated the request to disclose the transcript of her testimony, appellant acknowledges that she clearly intended to share it with defense counsel. We do not perceive in this request any cognizable interest in avoiding a possible injustice as required under Alexander, supra . Rather, by characterizing his counsel's actions as a request on Ms. Mosby's behalf, appellant attempts to circumvent the precedent established by this court in Alexander. Because a rule according a witness a presumptive right to a transcript of her own grand jury testimony would afford the defendant access to the grand jury testimony of that witness who, for the sole purpose of benefitting the defendant, was willing to make such a request, we require a showing of particularized need regardless of whether the defendant or a witness initiates the request for disclosure of grand jury testimony. [21] While we acknowledge that many of the traditional reasons for protecting the secrecy of grand jury transcripts, see Procter & Gamble, supra, 356 U.S. at 681-82 n. 6, 78 S.Ct. at 986 n. 6, are not implicated here (where the request is made subsequent to indictment and by the grand jury witness herself), the interest to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it, id., is pertinent. Thus, appellant has failed to establish the second prong of the Alexander test, which requires a showing that the need for disclosure is greater than any continuing need for secrecy. Given the structure of the grand jury system, and related discovery provisions, we conclude that the request presented here was not primarily a discovery request, but rather a hedge against impeachment. In any event, there was no attempt to make a showing of particularized need for release of the transcript of Ms. Mosby's grand jury testimony. On the facts presented we find no abuse of discretion. [22]