Opinion ID: 1095043
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: was there prejudice?

Text: In applying the second prong of Strickland, the trial court held that [c]onsidering all the factors ... there is no reasonable doubt of [Leatherwood's] guilt; and that no prejudice resulted to the defendant by counsel advising the defendant to plead guilty. Obviously, the trial court went beyond the immediate context of the plea process, and considered the ultimate likelihood of a guilty verdict in analyzing Leatherwood's claim of prejudice. The State argues that the trial court correctly applied the standard of Strickland v. Washington , as directed by this Court in  Leatherwood II.  Furthermore, they contend, the overwhelming nature of the evidence of guilt, and the ultimate likelihood of an acquittal, can be considered when examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on a guilty plea to determine if prejudice has been shown. Leatherwood, on the other hand, contends that federal and state law limit the scope of the trial court's prejudice inquiry in this case to the plea process itself, without regard to the overwhelming nature of the evidence of guilt, or the ultimate likelihood of an acquittal. Under state and federal law, it is argued, the correct inquiry is whether but for counsel's error, the defendant would have pleaded guilty and foregone trial. In sum, the defendant argues that prejudice is established where the proof shows a reasonable probability that but for counsel's error, the result of the plea proceeding would have been different. As to the second prong, the focus is on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370, 88 L.Ed.2d at 210. The defendant can satisfy the prejudice prong by showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Id. Accord, United States v. Gavilan, 761 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir.1985); Reynolds, 521 So.2d at 918 (defendant must show that those errors proximately resulted in his guilty plea and that but for counsel's errors he would not have entered the plea.); Odom, 498 So.2d at 334; Coleman, 483 So.2d at 683. Further, a reasonable probability arises when the ineffectiveness is of such [sufficient] moment that the integrity of the [proceeding] or our confidence in the outcome has been shaken. Reynolds, 521 So.2d at 918, citing Merritt v. State, 517 So.2d at 520. Put otherwise in the context of this case, the defendant is entitled to a vacation of his guilty plea if he can show that he entered his guilty plea in substantial reliance upon the erroneous advice of his counsel. Coleman, 483 So.2d at 683. The State points to a portion of Hill v. Lockhart which it contends authorizes the analysis used by the trial judge below. That part of the opinion states as follows: In many guilty plea cases, the prejudice inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained through a trial. For example, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination whether the error prejudiced the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial. Similarly, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the prejudice inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial. See, e.g., Evans v. Meyer, 742 F.2d 371, 375 (CA7 1984) (It is inconceivable to us ... that [the defendant] would have gone to trial on a defense of intoxication, or that if he had done so he either would have been acquitted or, if convicted, would nevertheless have been given a shorter sentence than he actually received). As we explained in Strickland v. Washington, supra , these predictions of the outcome at a possible trial, where necessary, should be made objectively, without regard for the idiosyncrasies of the particular decisionmaker. Id. [466 U.S.] at 695. [104 S.Ct. at 2068] 474 U.S. at 59-60, 106 S.Ct. at 70-71, 88 L.Ed.2d at 210-11. The mistake in the State's reliance on these passages is easily discovered. First, the Hill court states rather clearly that the `prejudice' inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by Judge Coleman below in many, but certainly not all cases. Id. The court then lists two examples of this occurrence, neither of which encompass this case. We are not confronted with a failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence ..., nor are we faced with a failure to [advise] the defendant of a potential affirmative defense... . Id. As the court clearly states, predictions of the outcome at a possible trial are proper only where necessary ... Id. The case below does not present one of those incidences where prediction of the outcome of trial is necessary. Instead, counsel's erroneous advice to Leatherwood has no significance beyond the context of the plea process itself, and the prejudice inquiry should rightfully have been limited to a prediction of the outcome of the plea process only. The danger of the State's argument is that it compels a holding that a defendant can never be prejudiced in entering his guilty plea upon the erroneous advice of counsel so long as there is overwhelming evidence of guilt, and no reasonable likelihood of an acquittal. As this case pointedly demonstrates, however, the inquiry is not always whether the defendant appears overwhelmingly guilty or not, but is whether the defendant voluntarily and intelligently forewent the quantum of sacred constitutional rights to which he was entitled in the absence of a guilty plea. We are not alone in our view that a guilt or innocence-focused prejudiced inquiry in the area of guilty pleas presents both theoretical and pragmatic difficulties. This trial  oriented approach to prejudice in cases of claimed malpractice by counsel in the guilty plea arena surely is not dictated by Strickland, even if one makes the plausible assumption that defendants advancing such allegations may need to show some type of injury stemming from counsel's incompetent advice or other misconduct. The operative language in Strickland suggests that one must assess the effect of the incompetence on the proceeding actually at issue. Indeed, in Strickland, where the prisoner who pled guilty impugned his lawyer's performance only with respect to the sentencing hearing, both the majority and the dissent examined whether, with adequate assistance, the defendant would have escaped death. No one considered the likely results of a hypothetical trial on guilt. Since Strickland, several courts have rejected [this approach] and held that the appropriate inquiry is whether, but for counsel's derelictions, the result of the plea would have been different. This course seems sensible to me. As Judge Cudahy of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit correctly noted, assessing prejudice in terms of a putative outcome at trial is unworkable ... because the reviewing court has no trial record to review and consequently no way of evaluating the effect of counsel's errors in relation to the case as actually presented by the prosecution. In addition, insofar as the question of effective representation is inextricably intertwined with the issue of the plea's voluntariness, a trial-related prejudice test does not respond to the basic question whether the defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to trial. Yet some inquiry into causation appears to inhere in any analysis of whether either misinformation or lack of advice, from counsel or trial court, tainted the plea. That being so, it strikes me as useful to equate prejudice with causation: that is, the defendant demonstrates prejudice if he can show that counsel's misconduct played at least a substantial role in inducing the plea. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths  A Dead End? 86 Colum.L.Rev. 9, 110-11 (1986) (Citations and footnotes omitted); Accord Coleman, 483 So.2d at 687 (defendant entitled to have plea vacated if he can show he entered his guilty plea in substantial reliance upon the erroneous advice of counsel). As noted above, the language in Strickland clearly suggests the focus we adopt. There the court stated that a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. (Emphasis added). Several courts have adopted this plea oriented focus in deciding the question. See Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 884-85 (6th Cir.1988); Czere v. Butler, 833 F.2d 59, 63 (5th Cir.1987); Craker v. McCotter, 805 F.2d 538, 542 (5th Cir.1986); Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 864-65 (9th Cir.1986); Thomas v. Lockhart, 738 F.2d 304, 307 (8th Cir.1984). Likewise, we have adopted this approach on more than one occasion. Reynolds, 521 So.2d at 918; Odom, 498 So.2d at 333-34; Coleman, 483 So.2d at 683. Furthermore, a prejudice test which focuses on the outcome of the plea process itself, without regard to the estimated outcome of a trial on guilt, represents the only logical extension of pre- Strickland, Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence. Where the accused failed to receive appropriate data regarding sentence, a line of cases prior to Strickland held that the plea's voluntary nature turns on whether the defendant was aware of actual sentencing possibilities, and, if not, whether accurate information would have made any difference in his decision to enter a plea. In the context of claims of inadequate assistance, a post- Strickland standard of prejudice looking to whether counsel's errors caused the defendant to plead guilty, would seem to be consistent with (perhaps even identical to) the type of inquiry just described. That test would thus possess the virtue of familiarity for courts and litigants seeking to apply it. More important, the symmetry would be logical rather than merely formal. Regardless whether the claim is couched in terms of involuntariness or ineffectiveness, the prisoner is making the same complaint  that grossly deficient representation induced him to enter a plea of guilty. Furthermore, if courts required some added demonstration of prejudice in the sixth-amendment setting, defendants would simply clothe their arguments in the garb of coerced plea instead of ineffective assistance, thereby subverting doctrinal distinctions. 86 Colum.L.Rev. at 111, (footnotes and citations omitted). In view of the above, the trial court impermissibly exceeded the proper focus for determining whether Leatherwood has shown prejudice by considering the evidence of guilt, and the ultimate likelihood of an acquittal. Ordinarily, we affirm a trial judge on such findings unless manifestly wrong, provided the trial judge applied the correct legal standard in making his findings. Woodward v. State, 533 So.2d 418, 427 (Miss. 1988); Chisolm v. State, 529 So.2d 630, 633 (Miss. 1988); Watts v. State, 492 So.2d 1281, 1289 (Miss. 1986). However, where as here the trial judge applies an erroneous legal standard in making his findings, we will not hesitate to reverse. Factfindings made under an erroneous legal standard are not protected by our substantial evidence clearly erroneous standard of review. Assessing counsel's performance from its inception, counsel's advice to Leatherwood was plainly erroneous under the applicable law at the time the plea was entered. In other words, counsel's performance in advising the plea fell below the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, and amounts therefore, to deficient performance. Once properly focused, we are convinced further that counsel's deficient performance compromised the integrity of the plea process, rendering the plea involuntary, and that but for counsel's erroneous advice, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty to capital murder. There is substantial evidence in support of the finding that Leatherwood plead guilty in substantial reliance on the erroneous advice of counsel. Consequently, the trial judge's finding that Michael Dale Leatherwood enjoyed constitutionally effective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase is erroneous, and requires that we vacate his plea of guilty and remand to the local authorities for such further action as they deem appropriate. Such a resolution is consistent with prior decisions where we have held that mistaken advice of counsel may ... vitiate a guilty plea. Coleman, 483 So.2d at 683, quoting Tiller v. State, 440 So.2d 1001, 1006 (Miss. 1983), citing Baker v. State, 358 So.2d 401, 402 (Miss. 1978), and Sanders v. State, 440 So.2d 278, 284 (Miss. 1983). See also, Kennedy v. Maggio, 725 F.2d 269, 273 (5th Cir.1984) (a plea entered in reliance on the defendant's attorney's patently erroneous statement of the law in relation to the facts cannot be voluntary due to attorney's ineffectiveness).