Opinion ID: 1907719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: counter-postscript

Text: I invite the unusually patient reader who has stayed with us this far to determine for himself or herself whether various contentions which Judge Ferren has attributed to me in his postscript correspond to the positions which I have actually taken in this dissenting opinion. I note only that it is the majority, and not yours truly, that has decide[d] not to apply a law after it became effective; that a Supreme Court decision involving a defendant who was sentenced before an ameliorative statute was enacted cannot (at least under any legal principles with which I am familiar) control cases in which a defendant is sentenced after the effective date of such a statute; and that if the legislative intent behind ameliorative statutes is obvious to the highest courts of New York and California (among many others), it ought to be apparent to my colleagues as well. I agree with the majority that [c]riminal conduct often brings tragedy. In the run-of-the-mill case, this goes with the territory, and the legislature can be presumed to have intended sad consequences because they could not be avoided. In this case, however, my colleagues ascribe to the Council the intention to inflict tragedy, after the effective date of the Act, even where the sentencing judge is satisfied that the defendant does not deserve the punishment that generates the misfortune. The MMSAA, as construed by the majority, thus brings a great deal of demonstrably unnecessary tragedy to the affected families and to the community at large. Statutes are not to be construed as ordaining gratuitous suffering if such a construction can reasonably be avoided. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this character. United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 482, 486-87, 19 L.Ed. 278 (1868) (emphasis added). Justice Chase's language for the Court in Noonan v. Bradley, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 394, 19 L.Ed. 757 (1869), a case involving the interpretation of a contract, is equally applicable to statutes: [W]hen an instrument is susceptible of two constructions  the one working injustice and the other consistent with the right of the case  that one should be favored which standeth with the right. Id. at 407; accord, Lowman, supra, 632 A.2d at 97-98 (concurring and dissenting opinion). I agree with the majority that it is this court's role to apply laws as the Council has written them, not as we would have ... written them ourselves. To do otherwise is to usurp a core legislative prerogative. In construing the Council's words, however, our lodestar must be actual legislative intent. Because in my view, the Council did not intend to compel judges to sentence Holiday, Burgess and Palmer to a mandatory minimum term of four years or, a fortiori, Ms. Park to a mandatory minimum term of five years, I dissent from those portions of the majority's decision that hold the contrary.