Opinion ID: 2032938
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: petition for dissolution

Text: We turn next to Gertrude and Norwest's argument that Lawrence lacks standing to pursue the dissolution of Airlite. As an aspect of jurisdiction and justiciability, standing requires that a litigant have such a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy as to warrant invocation of a court's jurisdiction and justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers on the litigant's behalf. Mutual Group U.S. v. Higgins, 259 Neb. 616, 611 N.W.2d 404 (2000); Ritchhart v. Daub, 256 Neb. 801, 594 N.W.2d 288 (1999). Because the requirement of standing is fundamental to a court's exercising jurisdiction, a litigant or court before which a case is pending can raise the question of standing at any time during the proceeding. Id. Although this court has not previously addressed a situation such as the instant case, courts in Illinois and New York have concluded that the purchase of stock pursuant to an option agreement deprives the vendor of standing to pursue a corporate dissolution action. See, Dolezal v. Plastic & Reconstructive Surg., 266 Ill.App.3d 1070, 640 N.E.2d 1359, 204 Ill.Dec. 10 (1994); Weiner v. Anesthesia Associates, 203 A.D.2d 455, 610 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1994); Hesek v. 245 South Main Street, Inc., 170 A.D.2d 956, 566 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1991); Martin Enterprises, Inc. v. Janover, 140 A.D.2d 587, 528 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1988). For instance, in Hesek v. 245 South Main Street, Inc., supra , the petitioner sought judicial dissolution of a corporation. The corporation gave timely notice of its intent to redeem the stock pursuant to a stock redemption agreement executed by the petitioner's deceased husband. Id. The court determined: Under the circumstances, respondents were entitled to an order directing petitioner to transfer the stock owned by decedent to the corporation pursuant to the 1973 agreement. Because petitioner is no longer the lawful holder of a stock interest in the corporation, respondents' cross motion for summary judgment dismissing her petition for a judicial dissolution of the corporation ... should have been granted. Id. at 957, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 127. Similarly, in Martin Enterprises, Inc. v. Janover, supra , the petition seeking dissolution was held properly dismissed. The court stated: Prior to commencement of the dissolution proceeding, the petitioner ... was divested of her interest in the corporation under an option agreement for repurchase of stock entered into between the founder of the closely held corporation and his three children.... Since the petitioner was not a shareholder entitled to vote, she was without standing to bring a proceeding to dissolve the corporation.... Id. at 587, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 856. The basis of Lawrence's petition is Neb. Rev.Stat. § 21-20,162 (Reissue 1997), which provides in relevant part that [t]he court may dissolve a corporation ... (2)[i]n a proceeding by a shareholder if it is established that ... (b) [t]he directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent. This statute clearly requires that the court's jurisdiction to dissolve the corporation is premised upon the petitioner's being a shareholder of the corporation. In the instant case, the record establishes beyond dispute that Gertrude and Norwest exercised their options under the Agreement in August 1997 by notifying Lawrence through counsel that the options were being exercised and then tendering the purchase price established by the Agreement. Under the terms of the Escrow Agreement, once the Crosbys tendered the purchase price, which was done on August 6, 1997, the escrow agent was required to deliver the shares to the Crosbys. After the tender of the purchase price, John's estate was no longer the owner of these shares. Since John's estate did not own any shares, John's estate and Lawrence did not have standing, after August 6, 1997, to pursue the dissolution of Airlite. Furthermore, the record establishes that either Gertrude or Norwest was in physical possession of the stock certificates at the time the options were exerciseda fact judicially admitted by Lawrence in his counterclaim for conversion. See Anderson v. Cumpston, 258 Neb. 891, 606 N.W.2d 817 (2000). As Lawrence had no standing to maintain the action, both the district court and this court are deprived of jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, the appeal in case No. S-99-631 must be dismissed. We therefore do not reach Lawrence's assignments of error relating to the alleged oppression of Airlite's minority shareholders and to the dissolution of Airlite.