Opinion ID: 2960871
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equitably dividing military retirement pay

Text: The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA) provides that state courts “may treat disposable retired pay payable to a member . . . either as property solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court.”29 USFSPA defines disposable retired pay: 26 (...continued) services who is entitled for any month to retired pay and who is also entitled for that month to veterans’ disability compensation for a qualifying service-connected disability . . . is entitled to be paid both for that month without regard to sections 5304 and 5305 of title 38. During the period beginning January 1, 2004, and ending on December 31, 2013, payment of retired pay to such a qualified retiree is subject to [a phase-in schedule] . . . .”). 27 See 10 U.S.C. § 1413a(b)(3)(A) (“In the case of an eligible combat-related disabled uniformed services retiree who is retired under chapter 61 of this title, the amount of [CRSC] . . . for any month may not, when combined with the amount of retired pay payable to the retiree after any such reduction under sections 5304 and 5305 of title 38, cause the total of such combined payment to exceed the amount of retired pay to which the member would have been entitled under any other provision of law based upon the member’s service in the uniformed services if the member had not been retired under chapter 61 of this title.”). 28 See 10 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(1) (“The retired pay of a member retired under chapter 61 of this title . . . is subject to reduction under sections 5304 and 5305 of title 38, but only to the extent that the amount of the member’s retired pay under chapter 61 of this title exceeds the amount of retired pay to which the member would have been entitled under any other provision of law based upon the member’s service in the uniformed services if the member had not been retired under chapter 61 of this title.”). 29 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (emphasis added). -15- 7050 [T]he total monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled less amounts which — .... (B) are deducted from the retired pay of such member as a result of forfeitures of retired pay ordered by a courtmartial or as a result of a waiver of retired pay required by law in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38; (C) in the case of a member entitled to retired pay under chapter 61 of this title, are equal to the amount of retired pay of the member under that chapter computed using the percentage of the member’s disability on the date when the member was retired . . . .[30] In Mansell v. Mansell the United States Supreme Court applied USFSPA to retired pay waived in order to receive VA disability benefits, holding that USFSPA “does not grant state courts the power to treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay that has been waived to receive veterans’ disability benefits.”31 We applied Mansell in Clauson v. Clauson, noting that state courts do not have any power to “equitably divide veterans’ disability benefits received in place of waived retirement pay.”32 But we clarified that “neither the USFSPA nor prior Supreme Court decisions require our courts to completely ignore the economic consequences of a military retiree’s decision to waive retirement pay in order to collect disability pay.”33 We therefore considered “the economic consequences of a decision to waive military pay in order to receive disability pay” — in Clauson the member’s former spouse was barred from 30 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) (emphasis added). 31 490 U.S. 581, 594-95 (1989). 32 831 P.2d 1257, 1262 (Alaska 1992). 33 Id. at 1263. -16- 7050 receiving an agreed upon share of the military retirement benefits — and affirmed the superior court’s decision to grant the spouse’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion reopening the parties’ property settlement agreement.34 We finally explained that when reopening a property distribution trial courts may not “simply shift an amount of property equivalent to the waived retirement pay from the military spouse’s side of the ledger to the other spouse’s side. . . . Disability benefits should not, in either form or substance, be treated as marital property subject to division upon the dissolution of marriage.”35 In Young v. Lowery we affirmed our Clauson decision and held that “a court may not equitably divide total retired pay; it may equitably divide only the amount of retired pay remaining after the court deducts waived retired pay and the cost of purchasing survivor benefits.”36 We also held that “the trial court may expressly order [the service member] not to reduce his disposable retired pay and require [him] to indemnify [the former spouse] for any amounts by which her payments are reduced below the amount set on the date the amended qualified order is entered.”37