Opinion ID: 522306
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Imputed negligence

Text: 51 Harvey argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it gave a jury instruction allowing the jury to impute the negligence of the driver, Schade, to the passenger, Harvey. The giving or refusal to give tendered jury instructions in a diversity action, as here, is governed by federal law and rules. Brownlow v. Aman, 740 F.2d 1476, 1490 (10th Cir.1984); Achin v. Begg Tire Center, 694 F.2d 226, 228 (10th Cir.1982). An instruction is properly given if supported by competent evidence. Brownlow, 740 F.2d at 1490. However, a determination of the substance of a jury instruction in a diversity case is a matter of state substantive law. Id. Instruction No. 26 reads as follows: 52 If you find that the driver, Chris Schade, was negligent in his operation of the Corvette, then you may consider whether this negligence should be imputed to the plaintiff. Schade's negligence may be imputed to Harvey if you find that Harvey exercised actual control over the operation of the vehicle at the time of the accident. In order to exercise actual control, it is not necessary that Greg Harvey actually operated the vehicle. You may find that Harvey had some degree of actual control over the operation of the vehicle if you find that Harvey gave instructions to Schade and directed Schade as to his operation of the vehicle. 53 Harvey argues that the instruction was improper because the case presented no evidence of actual control or joint economic enterprise as is required under Wyoming law. Our review of Wyoming law reveals no definition of the term actual control. Harvey also cites Martinez v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 714 F.2d 1028, 1032 (10th Cir.1983), for the following proposition: 54 A driver's negligence under Wyoming law cannot be imputed to a passenger unless the conduct of the passenger had a material bearing upon the driver's operation of the car at the time of the accident. 55 Likewise, we find no definition of material bearing. 56 Our reading of Palmeno v. Cashen, 627 P.2d 163 (Wyo.1981), Porter v. Wilson, 357 P.2d 309 (Wyo.1960), and Edwards v. Harris, 397 P.2d 87, 90 (Wyo.1964), however, persuades us that the trial judge in the instant case did not abuse his discretion in giving the challenged instruction. In Palmeno, the trial court found that the passenger had no control over the vehicle in which she was riding at the time her injuries occurred, and refused to impute the negligence of the driver to her. On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court stated: 57 The law in this state is well settled that imputation of a driver's negligence will not occur unless the spouse-owner-passenger had actual control over the vehicle at the time of the accident. Porter v. Wilson, Wyo.1960, 357 P.2d 309; Edwards v. Harris, Wyo.1964, 397 P.2d 87; Hume v. Mankus, Wyo.1965, 401 P.2d 703; Mooneyham v. Kays, Wyo.1965, 405 P.2d 267. The trial judge found that appellee had no control over the vehicle in which she was riding at the time her injuries occurred. There is substantial evidence in the record, as we have previously outlined, to support that finding; thus we must uphold it. Since appellee was found to have had no control over the vehicle, the trial judge's determination not to impute Mr. Cashen's negligence, as driver, to her was correct. 58 Palmeno, 627 P.2d at 166. In Edwards, 397 P.2d at 90, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that ownership alone does not form a basis for imputing negligence. The case makes clear that in deciding the propriety of giving an instruction on the imputation of negligence, the passenger's giving of direction and suggestions as to the operation of the vehicle are factors to consider. Consistent with Edwards, Porter holds that the negligence of a husband who was driving a vehicle was not imputable to his wife who was a passenger in the vehicle, where the husband was in physical and actual possession of the vehicle, was driving as he desired without instruction or suggestion from anyone, and his wife, who owned the vehicle, had no actual control whatever over the vehicle. 59 In the instant case, contrary to the facts in Porter, there was evidence that the passenger initiated the test-drive, encouraged the driver, Schade, to drive the Corvette faster than the speed limit, and wanted the driver to see what the car [would] do. There is evidence that Schade may have been driving the car at a speed in excess of 100 miles per hour immediately prior to the accident. These actions create a question of fact for the jury whether Harvey legally controlled Schade's operation of the vehicle. We are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in giving instruction No. 26 permitting the jury to impute Schade's negligence to Harvey.