Opinion ID: 1351576
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Instruct on Unanimity as to Evidence of Unadjudicated Offenses

Text: As noted in part IV.H, ante, the court instructed the jury that Before you may consider the evidence of the unadjudicated offense of kidnapping Karen Stange as an aggravating circumstance in this case, you must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant [Richard Allen Benson] did in fact commit such criminal [act]. (Brackets and bracketed material in original.) But it did not instruct them that their satisfaction must be unanimous. [14] (34) Defendant now contends that the court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the requirement of unanimous agreement. He claims the omission was contrary to the 1978 death penalty law and also violated certain rights assertedly guaranteed criminal defendants under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution  viz., due process of law (U.S. Const., Amends. V, XIV) and a reliable penalty determination ( id., Amends. VIII, XIV). The point must be rejected. In People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, we clearly, albeit impliedly, held that the 1978 death penalty law does not require an instruction on unanimous agreement. ( Id. at p. 99.) Further, we have never held that the United States Constitution requires such an instruction  neither, to our knowledge, has any other appellate court in a reported decision. And we decline to so hold now. As stated, in Miranda we concluded that the special rules governing the consideration of other crimes evidence in aggravation are statutorily based ( ibid. ) and not constitutionally mandated ( id. at p. 98). Defendant fails to show that our conclusion was unsound. (Compare People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1273 [rejecting essentially the same constitutional claim].) In People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 774 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250], we said with regard to the 1977 death penalty law: [W]e see nothing improper in permitting each juror individually to decide whether uncharged criminal activity has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and, if so, what weight that activity should be given in deciding the penalty. Here, we say the same with regard to the relevantly similar 1978 death penalty law.