Opinion ID: 775981
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Provide a Franks Hearing

Text: 34 Graham also argues that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause because it contained allegedly misleading statements and material omissions. According to Graham, paragraphs 42 and 43 of the affidavit affirmatively misled the magistrate judge. Paragraph 42 states that on June 10, 1997, the affiant contacted the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record and found no firearms registered to Graham. It is followed by paragraph 43, which states that also on June 10, 1997, Graham told the undercover ATF agent that he owned a rifle and kept numerous firearms and ammunition at his home. J.A. at 156. Graham alleges that the inclusion and proximity of these paragraphs led the issuing magistrate to believe that Graham illegally possessed weapons which had not been properly registered, when, in fact, Graham was in legal possession of his weapons and was not required to register any of them. 8 35 In addition to misleading statements, Graham argues that the affidavit contained several material omissions which were arguably exculpatory and would have negated probable cause had they been included in the affidavit. The allegedly material omissions reveal not only that NAM members were interested in attacking federal targets and agents but also that they held peaceful protests and demonstrations. One statement also suggests that Graham exaggerated his urge to kill federal officers and destroy federal buildings. 36 Graham sought but was denied an evidentiary hearing before the district court under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), to assess the validity of the search warrant given these alleged misstatements and omissions. The district noted that the statements at issue in paragraphs 42 and 43 were not false, and that the omitted statements occurred after Graham had confessed that he believed his phone had been tapped. The district court then determined that, even if the omitted material had been included, the magistrate judge would still have had probable cause to issue the search warrant. 37 We review the district court's denial of a Franks hearing under the same standard as for the denial of a motion to suppress: the district court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error and its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. United States v. Hill, 142 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 1998). A defendant is entitled to a hearing to challenge the validity of a search warrant if he makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and [] the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). If, at the evidentiary hearing, the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search suppressed. Id. at 156. 38 As to the allegedly misleading statements, the government argues that paragraphs 42 and 43 must be read in the context of paragraph 41, which reports that on June 7, 1997, the CI was at a meeting at Metcalf's home where Metcalf showed the CI a .50-caliber machinegun as well as ammunition for the gun, and informed the CI that he intended to mount the weapon, possibly in the back of his pickup truck, to use as an anti-aircraft weapon. J.A. at 155 (Affidavit 41). Paragraph 42 then logically states that: 39 On June 10, 1997, your affiant contacted the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. They conducted a search and found no firearms registered to Bradford Metcalf. In a subsequent search, the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record also found no firearms registered to Ken Carter or RANDY GRAHAM. 40 J.A. at 156 (Affidavit 42). Paragraph 43 then states: 41 Also, on June 10, 1997, the ATF undercover agent met with RANDY GRAHAM at the East Towne Mall in Kalamazoo, Michigan. During this meeting GRAHAM told the ATF Special Agent that he not only owned a rifle but had numerous firearms and ammunition stored in his residence. 42 J.A. at 156 (Affidavit 43). Because paragraphs 42 and 43 are neither false nor misleading, the government contends that no Franks hearing was warranted. 43 We believe that even if Graham could make a substantial showing that Agent Semear recklessly or deliberately made false statements -- which he cannot because paragraphs 42 and 43 were, in fact, truthful -- Graham cannot meet the second prong of the Franks test because the affidavit contains sufficient probable cause even when the allegedly false statements are set aside. While the proximity of paragraphs 42 and 43 could have created the false impression that not only Metcalf but also Graham possessed weapons which were not properly registered, the affidavit clearly provided a sufficient basis for the magistrate judge to find a fair probability that criminal activity or contraband could be found at Graham's trailer home even without those statements. Removing paragraphs 42 and 43 would not have affected the sufficiency of the affidavit. 44 As to the allegedly material omissions, we have held that omissions are not immune from inquiry under Franks, [but] we have recognized that an affidavit which omits potentially exculpatory information is less likely to present a question of impermissible official conduct than one which affirmatively includes false information. United States v. Atkin, 107 F.3d 1213, 1217 (6th Cir. 1997). Indeed, a Franks hearing is only merited in cases of omissions in rare instances. Mays v. City of Dayton, 134 F.3d 809, 815 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 942 (1998). This is so because an allegation of omission potentially opens officers to endless conjecture about investigative leads, fragments of information, or other matter that might, if included, have redounded to defendant's benefit. Atkin, 107 F.3d at 1217 (internal quotation omitted). To merit a hearing, the defendant must make a preliminary showing that the affiant engaged in deliberate or reckless disregard of the truth in omitting the information from the affidavit. The court must then consider the affidavit along with the omitted portions and determine whether probable cause still exists. Id. 45 The affidavit here allegedly omitted certain statements made by Graham relating to the militia's political activity, such as protesting and demonstrating in front of a courthouse or a federal building, as well as the following two statements, the first from July 3, 1997 and the second from August 25, 1997: 46 That's the way I look at it right now, it's all mind warfare. You can't shoot -- you can go down to the courthouse and protest. 47 [W]hy would I blow up my property? I don't want to see innocent people die, and I'm sticking up for my freedom, my rights, and my friends' rights. 48 Appellant's Br. at 29. 49 We hold that the district court did not err in concluding that these omissions did not merit a Franks hearing. Even assuming Graham could such show that these omissions were made in reckless disregard for the truth, the affidavit along with the omitted portions of testimony would still amply establish probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal activity or contraband was contained in Graham's home. Viewing this evidence in its totality, including the fact that several of the statements were uttered after Graham had knowledge that he was a target of the government's investigation and that his phones were tapped, the magistrate judge could easily have concluded that, despite NAM members' legitimate activities, there was probable cause to believe that NAM members were engaged in illegal activity as well. Indeed, both types of activity were consistent with NAM's guiding principles. The allegedly exculpatory statements do not outweigh the inculpatory ones, such as an intercepted telephone conversation between Graham and Carter on July 9, 1997, in which Graham stated, If anybody wants to kick a door we go . . . shoot first and ask questions later . . . . I'm waiting for judgment day because they are all targets to me . . . every fucking one of them, J.A. at 159 (Affidavit 53). Therefore, the district court did not err by refusing to grant Graham a Franks hearing, and the denial of Graham's motion to suppress is AFFIRMED.