Opinion ID: 524999
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: qualified immunity and equal protection

Text: 50 The majority correctly holds that the plaintiff's section 1983 claim should be dismissed against the officers, in their individual capacities. The plaintiff's right to equal protection, in light of her summary judgment evidence, was not clearly established at the time of the incident in such a way that a reasonable [police officer] would understand that what he [was] doing would violate that right. Melear v. Spears, 862 F.2d 1177, 1183 (5th Cir.1989) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). I do not, however, agree with the majority's approach to the dismissal of plaintiff's section 1983 claim against the officers. 51 Instead of holding that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity, the majority holds that McKee has presented no evidence at all to support her underlying equal protection claim, thereby never reaching the immunity issue. 2 The majority, I believe, has erroneously read the summary judgment evidence against the nonmovant, McKee. 52 Two summary judgment hurdles stand in McKee's way in this case. First, McKee must show that an issue of fact exists concerning the officers' authority under Texas law to arrest Streetman, McKee's boyfriend, as a predicate to McKee's claim that the police violated her right to equal protection by refusing to arrest Streetman. The majority discusses the issue at length, inconclusively stating it is not clear that the police would, under these circumstances, have developed the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an arrest. As I shall demonstrate, McKee has presented sufficient summary judgment evidence to raise a jury question on this issue. 53 The second summary judgment barrier to McKee's claim concerns the elements of an equal protection violation. McKee maintains that the officers discriminated against her because she is a female. The majority holds that no evidence supports her claim of gender discrimination. I believe that McKee has offered summary judgment evidence sufficient to shoulder this burden, and I believe that the same evidence would allow a jury to infer the discriminatory intent necessary to find an equal protection violation. The majority does not reach this last issue. McKee's evidence is not extensive, but it allows the reasonable inference that the police treated her based upon illegitimate stereotypes and archaic notions of women.
54 I address an issue at the threshold that is not central to the majority's decision, but is sure to stand important in the future. The majority discusses at length the Supreme Court's recent decision of DeShaney v. Winnebago County, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), stating that DeShaney, which concerns the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, is nonetheless relevant to our analysis of this case, which concerns an equal protection claim. The majority apparently views DeShaney as a general statement that governmental officers, in their actions, enjoy a zone of discretion regardless of the Fourteenth Amendment right involved. 55 DeShaney should play no role in McKee's case. DeShaney seeks to define a bright line limit to the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986) (holding that substantive component of Due Process Clause does not protect the right to engage in homosexual sodomy). DeShaney specifically does not address claims based upon illegitimate distribution of public services in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The State may not, of course, selectively deny its protective services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection Clause. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). But no such argument has been made here. DeShaney, 109 S.Ct. at 1004 n. 3. 56 The Supreme Court states that the Due Process Clause was intended to prevent [the] government 'from abusing [its] power, and employing it as an instrument of oppression....'  DeShaney, 109 S.Ct. at 1003. In substantive due process analysis, it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf--through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty--which is, the 'deprivation of liberty' triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other means. DeShaney, 109 S.Ct. at 1006. 57 Equal protection values are not tied to the scope or limits of governmental discretion, but are tied, instead, to the government's obligation not to make illegitimate distinctions among those to whom the government provides services. Although there is no general constitutional right to police protection, the state may not discriminate in providing such protection. Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kansas, 857 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir.1988); cf. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1161, 1179 (1988) (Equal Protection Clause ...is grounded in a norm of equality that operates largely as a critique of traditional practices). 58 Imagine that in DeShaney, Winnebago County had an intentional policy to intervene only in family abuse cases when the family is white, not to intervene when the family is black, that Joshua DeShaney was black and died because of the County's failure to intervene. The majority would have us believe that no equal protection violation exists because [f]ootnote three [of DeShaney ] does not permit plaintiffs to circumvent the rule of DeShaney by converting every Due Process claim into an Equal Protection claim via an allegation that state officers exercised discretion to act in one incident but not in another. 59 The democratic political processes upon which the majority rests its hope that all people receive equal protection of the law is not adequate for the task of protecting people when distinctions are made upon suspect and quasi-suspect classifications. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783 n. 4, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938); Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights: Another Look at United States v. Classic, 90 Yale L.J. 741, 746-60 (1981) (tyranny of the majority). We hold dear equal protection values, in large part, because the legislative process may fall short of the Constitution's commands. There can be no discretion to discriminate invidiously. 60
61 McKee presented sufficient evidence to raise a jury question concerning whether the officers possessed authority to arrest Streetman without a warrant under Texas law. McKee's evidence is sufficient because the Texas legislature in 1985 broadened the authority of police officers to arrest without a warrant. Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Art. 14.03(2) (Vernon) (Sept.1985). McKee's assault occurred in 1986. To appreciate the legislative revision, one must understand the applicable rules of law before 1985. Traditionally, in Texas, an officer with probable cause could only arrest a suspect without a warrant in two situations: (1) if the officer personally observed the arrestee commit either a felony or a misdemeanor; or (2) if the officer had reason to believe that the arrestee committed a felony. See Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Art. 14.01 & 14.03 (Vernon) (1967). 62 Texas subdivides assault into simple assault (22.01) and aggravated assault (22.02). 3 3] In Texas, the crime of simple assault is only a misdemeanor. Tex. Penal Code Sec. 22.01 (Vernon). A person commits [the offense of simple assault] if the person: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another ... or (2) ... threatens another with imminent bodily injury.... Tex. Penal Code Sec. 22.01. In contrast, the crime of aggravated assault is a felony. A person commits [the offense of aggravated assault] if the person commits assault as defined in Section 22.01 of this code [simple assault] and the person: (1) causes serious bodily injury to another.... Tex. Penal Code Sec. 22.02 (Vernon). The alleged crime of simple assault, a misdemeanor, is involved in this case. 63 As used in the assault statutes and the arrest statutes, the terms bodily injury and serious bodily injury are defined by statute.  'Bodily injury ' means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. Tex.Penal Code Sec. 1.07(7) (Vernon) (emphasis added). Serious bodily injury is defined as bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. Tex.Penal Code Sec. 1.07(34) (Vernon). 64 Under the Texas assault statutes, and the pre-1985 arrest statutes, the officers would need to find evidence of serious bodily injury--an element of an aggravated assault, which is a felony--before they could arrest a person for an assault committed outside of their presence. For the officers to make a misdemeanor arrest for simple assault, an element of which is bodily injury, either they would have to witness the incident or they would have to procure a warrant. To procure a warrant, it is necessary for the complaining party to file a complaint. 65 Effective September 1, 1985, the Texas legislature dramatically revised the applicable law. No longer is serious bodily injury necessary for an officer to be able to arrest a suspect without a warrant if the act of violence was committed outside of the officer's presence. A police officer may arrest, without warrant: ... (2) persons who[m] the [police] officer has probable cause to believe have committed an assault resulting in bodily injury to another person and the [police] officer has probable cause to believe that there is danger of further bodily injury to that person.... Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Art. 14.03(2) (Vernon) (1985) (emphasis added). Only bodily injury, the standard embodied in the simple assault statute, is now necessary for an officer, as of 1985, to be able to make an arrest in a case in which the officer did not observe the assault. 66 The majority states that [t]he only evidence of the alleged assault was McKee's allegation. Yet the officers could see no physical indicia of an assault. Physical marks on a victim's body are not necessary to constitute bodily injury under Texas law. Texas requires that the victim experience physical pain, illness or any impairment of any physical condition for the victim to suffer bodily injury under the statute, Tex.Penal Code Sec. 1.07(7), but this standard does not necessarily require welts, cuts, bruises or any other physical indicia of injury. Someone who is punched in the stomach may experience physical pain, but there may not be any marks or other physical indicia of the blow. 67 Texas courts have addressed clearly the physical pain/bodily injury issue. Yarbrough v. Texas, 656 S.W.2d 200, 200-01 (Tex.App.--Austin 1983) (a kick to a man's groin found to be sufficient physical pain to sustain the requirement of bodily injury); Rangel v. Texas, 747 S.W.2d 32, 32-33 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1988) (slap to the face met bodily injury standard); Madrigal Rodriguez v. Texas, 749 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1988) (placing a knife tip at a person's neck, without any evidence of the knife puncturing the victim's skin, gave rise to sufficient physical pain). The important factor is whether the victim experiences physical pain, not whether there is any physical indicia of a serious bodily injury. 68 McKee's summary judgment evidence gives rise to a jury question concerning whether a reasonable police officer would discern that McKee was experiencing physical pain, and therefore whether the officers had the authority to arrest Streetman under Texas law for simple assault, a misdemeanor. We accept the plaintiff's evidence, including the affidavit, as true at this stage in the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Phillips Oil Co. v. OKC Corp., 812 F.2d 265, 272 (5th Cir.1987). All reasonable inferences are to be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. See Phillips, 812 F.2d at 272. We are not to judge the credibility of the witnesses at this stage; such judgments must be made by the trier of fact at the appropriate time. 69 In her affidavit responding to defendants' motions for summary judgment, McKee states: 70 On and prior to April 30, 1986, I was living at the residence of Harry Streetman in Rockwall, Texas. On that date, I arrived home and was attacked and beaten by Mr. Streetman. I also discovered that Mr. Streetman had disabled my car and thereby prevented my escape. He also threatened me with severe personal injury. McKee goes on in her affidavit to state: 71 I informed the officers of the following facts: 72 A. That I had been physically assaulted by Harry Streetman. 73 B. That Harry Streetman had made threats of severe bodily injury and death against me. 74 C. That I was in fear of serious injury if Mr. Streetman was not restrained. 75 D. That my personal effects were in Mr. Streetman's apartment and that he would not allow me to retrieve them. 76 Additionally, I requested that the police arrest Mr. Streetman or take me to my parents' home, a place of relative safety. 77 A reasonable inference from McKee's affidavit is that she experienced physical pain from Streetman beating and assaulting her. McKee told the officers that she had been assaulted and that she feared imminent bodily injury from Streetman. Tragically, her fear came true. However, the officers did not believe McKee so they left the scene. Shortly after their departure, Streetman knifed McKee. 78 At this summary judgment stage, it is inappropriate for a court to test the credibility of the affiant. The majority errs by engaging in discussion which properly should occur within the enclosure of the jury room. We have a classic conflict about exactly what evidence was before the officers when they refused to arrest Streetman. I disagree with the majority's reasoning and characterization of the evidence concerning the authority of the officers to arrest Streetman. Two very different versions--McKee's and the officers'--tell the story of what McKee told the officers on April 30, 1986. For summary judgment purposes, we must believe McKee. Consequently, we should find that McKee has presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the officers had the authority to arrest Streetman for his beating of McKee before the officers arrived.
79 McKee maintains that a de facto policy or custom of the police officers of Rockwall, which treats victims of domestic assault less seriously than victims of nondomestic assault, purposefully discriminates against women. McKee also maintains that the actions of the officers involved in this case reflect the City of Rockwall's policy or custom and demonstrate an acceptance of the de facto policy by the individual officers. 80 The majority's holding exists in its statements that McKee has offered no evidence at all and has completely failed to adduce facts supporting her claim of gender-based discrimination. I respectfully disagree. McKee, the nonmovant, has produced summary judgment evidence short on extensiveness but long on meaning to support her claim that the city's de facto policy or custom, and the officers' individual actions, are not gender-neutral. Her evidence also allows an inference of purposeful or intentional discrimination, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), a necessary element of her claim. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 1920, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985); Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2292-93, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). The majority does not reach the intent issue, but it is clear that the Supreme Court does not require a nonmovant to produce a smoking gun to advance past the summary judgment stage. 81
82 A broad understanding of equal protection doctrine aids one's inquiry in this complex area. The equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not remove from the states and cities the ability to classify people, and accordingly treat the various categories differently. Certain classifications, however, in themselves supply a reason to infer antipathy. Race is the paradigm.    Classifications based upon gender, not unlike those based upon race, have traditionally been the touchstone for pervasive and often subtle discrimination. [citation omitted]. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2292-93, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979). 83 [The Supreme Court's] recent cases teach that such classifications must bear a close and substantial relationship to important governmental objectives, [citation omitted], and are in many settings unconstitutional. Personnel v. Feeney, 99 S.Ct. at 2293. 84 To decide whether evidence gives rise to an inference of gender discrimination, one must first determine whether the official action is gender neutral, or purposefully gender-based. Since the Supreme Court decided Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), a plaintiff, to utilize any sort of heightened scrutiny and thus realistically hope to demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, must demonstrate that the action taken was taken in part with discriminatory intent or purpose. [Washington v.] Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action rested solely on [sexually] discriminatory purposes.    When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, [ ] judicial deference is no longer justified. Arlington Heights, 97 S.Ct. at 563. 85 In many cases, a plaintiff challenges a statute and asserts that the statute is not gender neutral. See Feeney, 99 S.Ct. at 2293. Sometimes a plaintiff is not challenging the enacted, positive law, but, instead, is challenging the administration of a neutral statute. Discriminatory treatment is also subject to equal protection analysis. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). 86 Because the exact words of a statute cannot be examined in a discriminatory treatment case, one must analyze the policies, customs, attitudes, understandings and practices of the entity or persons making the alleged distinctions. Is the treatment gender neutral from the viewpoint of the persons or entity making the distinction? If so, an examining court must engage in a secondary line of inquiry and examine any alleged discriminatory impact to determine whether the adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination. Feeney, 99 S.Ct. at 2293. In contrast, if the entity or persons making the alleged distinction understand that men and women are purposefully treated differently through their actions--which in a discriminatory application case constitutes the classification scheme--then a court can conclude that the differing treatment is, in fact, gender-based. It is not necessary to receive a signed admission from one of the state actors that the differing treatment is invidious. Covert purposes and understandings are just as constitutionally relevant as overt purposes, see Feeney, 99 S.Ct. at 2293, and are much more likely to be the modus operandi of those persons who purposefully discriminate by their actions against others based upon invidious reasons. 87 Those who discriminate on the basis of race and gender do not usually parade down main street with their banners of bigotry unfurled. As our society continues to change, purposefully discriminatory actions occur more frequently behind closed doors and within the recesses of the mind than in the open square of public discourse. But whether on the corner square or within the dark passageways of the mind, purposeful discrimination is still invidious. 88 It is not necessary that the person or entity making an alleged illegitimate distinction be Attila the Hun. Malice and evil will are not the constitutional standards. [P]urposeful discrimination is the 'condition that offends the Constitution.' Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1276, 28 L.Ed.2d 554. Personnel v. Feeney, 99 S.Ct. at 2293. A person who acts according to stereotypical notions, can act purposefully if the person consciously intends to accomplish the action undertaken. From generation to generation we pass down ideas and beliefs about how the world works. Some of these traditions are, in fact, generalizations which are only stereotypes of how women and men are different. A person who consciously believes in the truth of the stereotype acts purposefully when the person implements the stereotype in a particular situation. This sort of purposeful action is what the guarantee of the Equal Protection Clause is all about. See generally Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982) (care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypical notions). Continuity of a stereotype through the generations combined with a person's action pursuant to the alleged truth, may be purposeful action on the person's part within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. 89 Imagine that the Greene family gets together every Sunday evening for supper. Mama Greene every week cooks a big meal. Most of the children and grandchildren attend. This is a family tradition: Sunday supper at Mama's table. When Anita Greene, the second daughter, thinks about what she is going to do next Sunday, she has to decide if she is going to eat supper at her parents' house. Maybe one week Anita decides she has too much work to do at the office, so she telephones her mother and tells her she cannot come on Sunday. The next week arrives, and Anita decides to go and have Sunday supper with the family. When she goes over to her parents' house and eats with the family, her actions are purposeful. She is a creature of free will. Anita purposefully goes and eats Sunday supper with her family, although her motivation in part results from habit. Sunday supper at the Greene house is a tradition. 90 Traditions may reflect purposes so ingrained that particularized decision-making instance by instance becomes unnecessary. Customs, traditions, and stereotypes often guide and motivate us in choosing what path we shall follow. Such choices can nevertheless be purposeful. Such purposefulness, when it is rooted in illegitimate notions of race or gender, is the sort of action that is not neutral under the Equal Protection Clause. 91 If an action is gender-based, then it is subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976); see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75, 92 S.Ct. 251, 253, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). The Supreme Court's decisions establish that the party seeking to ... classif[y] individuals on the basis of gender must carry the burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification. [citations omitted]. The burden is met only by showing at least that the classification serves 'important governmental objectives and the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'  Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982).
92 McKee asserts that the City of Rockwall has a custom, practice, understanding or policy of treating domestic assault cases involving female victims less seriously then assault case involving strangers, thus denying her the equal protection of the law because such a custom or policy is an unconstitutional gender-based form of discrimination. McKee further maintains that the individual officers in this case have demonstrated through their actions similarly unconstitutional discrimination based upon gender. 93 The officers' decision not to arrest Streetman does not facially appear, at first glance, to be based upon considerations of gender. The officers did not state that they do not arrest domestic abuse suspects who beat women. If they had said this, of course, then the nonarrest of Streetman, assuming there was authority to arrest him, would on its face lead to the conclusion that gender discrimination entered into the nonarrest decision. Smoking guns, as I have discussed, are not required. Thus whether a reasonable jury could make factual findings from which one could infer that gender discrimination exists in this case depends on whether the attitudes and decisions of the Rockwall police concerning arrests in domestic violence situations, and in this case in particular, is supported by McKee's summary judgment evidence. 94 McKee presents two pieces of evidence which could permissibly lead to the inference that purposeful gender discrimination entered into the decision not to arrest Streetman: (1) the Chief of Police's statement; and (2) McKee's story of what happened to her. 95
96 The affidavit of McKee's mother states that: Within one or two days of the assault upon my daughter, my husband Roy McKee and I had a conversation with Chief Beaty of the Rockwall Police Department. During that conversation we asked the Chief why Harry Streetman had not been arrested when our daughter first called the police and reported his assault upon her. The Chief responded that his officers did not like to make arrests in domestic assault cases since the women involved either wouldn't file charges or would drop them prior to trial. 97 The Chief's statement explicitly distinguishes between men and women. According to the Chief, it is women who will not file charges, and it is women who will drop the charges prior to trial. The Chief concludes that because women act like this, police officers do not like to arrest their domestic assaulters. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 855 F.2d 1421, 1427 (9th Cir.1988) (reversing district court dismissal of equal protection claim in domestic assault case; remarks of officers strongly suggest ... an animus against abused women); compare Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kansas, 857 F.2d 690, 696-97 (10th Cir.1988) (summary judgment for defendant on equal protection claim reversed with respect to classification scheme of domestic/nondomestic violence, affirmed with respect to gender-based claim because plaintiff presented no evidence of either adverse impact or discriminatory purpose); see also Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026, 1030 (3rd Cir.1988). 98 The Chief's compacted but crucial statement is central to this case. Under our classification-based equal protection jurisprudence, whether a female plaintiff falls into a class of domestic abuse victims, or female domestic abuse victims, may determine the appropriate level of scrutiny a court conducts for her claim. The police chief's statement (did not like to make arrests in domestic assault cases since the women involved ...) should be enough for McKee to move beyond summary judgment on her gender-based claim. 99 The labels domestic violence or domestic assault tend to hide the gender of the victims in such cases. Numerous scholarly studies have recognized that women are primarily the victims of domestic abuse. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F.Supp. 1521, 1528 n. 1 (D.Conn.1984) (quoting Leeds, Family Offense Cases in the Family Court System: in 29 out of every 30 such cases the husband stands accused of abusing his wife); see Comment, Battered Women, 95 Yale L.J. 788 (cited in note 1, supra ). Our equal protection jurisprudence requires evidence of a classification; judicial notice will not do. 100 McKee has offered such evidence. When the Chief states--that women, not men, are the victims in domestic assault cases--the plaintiff hurdles a barrier which is extremely difficult to ascend. This supplies the understanding that domestic assault affects women. A general observation of our society confirms what the Chief easily recognizes, that is that women are the victims in domestic violence situations. 4 A Texas statute is a good example of the observation that women particularly suffer from violence in the home. The assault statute, Tex.Penal Code Sec. 22.01 was amended in 1979 to include the underscored words: A person commits an offense if he: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including his spouse.... The Texas legislature felt it was necessary to make it explicit that husbands cannot beat their wives. Presumably, before the Texas legislature made this clear, some people thought, and probably still think, that it is acceptable for husbands and boyfriends to beat their wives and girlfriends. 5 See Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F.Supp. 1521, 1528 (D.Conn.1984) (quoting from scholarly writings which set forth that at common law, husbands were permitted to beat their wives, within limits). 101 Women in their homes are vulnerable to the men with whom they live. Women's vulnerability is heightened by a police officer's hesitancy and sometimes refusal to invade the space of privacy which surrounds the family or unit of people living together. The Texas legislature has attempted to address and refute the historical belief that the curtilage of a man's home is sacrosanct. A man's home is his castle indeed. The officers' dislike affects women. 102 The Chief voices the sentiments and purposes of the officers he commands by stating that his officers did not like to make arrests.... The buried feeling among his officers, according to the Chief's statement, which we must take as true, is that women are responsible for the officers' disinclination to make arrests in domestic assault situations. This blaming of the victim operates to deprive women of the protection of the police from assault based upon their status as women. The majority states that a dislike is not a policy, and one officer's dislike [is not] binding on another. The majority's construction of the evidence against nonmovant is inappropriate. A trial may demonstrate that a dislike and a de facto policy are one and the same. The Chief is certainly competent to discuss whether a particular action or response in a given situation is a custom or de facto policy of the officers he commands. The Chief's statement creates an issue of fact concerning the discriminatory treatment of women in domestic assault situations. This evidence should be enough for plaintiff to survive summary judgment concerning the viability of her equal protection claim. 103
104 The officers' interaction with McKee constitutes evidence that, when coupled with the Chief's statement, would allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of McKee's equal protection claim. Again, because this is case is presented in the posture of defendants' motions for summary judgment, we must treat plaintiff's evidence as true. 105 In her affidavit, quoted above, McKee informed the officers that Streetman had beat her, and that she feared that he would do so again because he had threatened her. McKee states: The officers present refused to drive me to my parents' home and refused to arrest Mr. Streetman. Instead, they said that I was exaggerating the threat Mr. Streetman posed to me and suggested that I talk matters out with him.    They also indicated that after I had calmed down I probably would not want to file a complaint. At this time, Mr. Streetman threatened to burn my belongings if I went to the station [to file a complaint]. The police did not respond. (emphasis added). 106 The treatment McKee received calls to mind the archaic and stereotypical usage of the word hysteria. The Oxford English Dictionary, finally published in 1933 after 70 years of compilation, defines hysteria as follows: 1. Path[ological] A functional disturbance of the nervous system, characterized by such disorders as anaesthesia, hyperaesthesia, convulsions, etc., and usually attended with emotional disturbances and enfeeblement or perversion of the moral and intellectual faculties. The OED goes on to state: Women being much more liable than men to this disorder, it was originally thought to be due to a disturbance of the uterus and its functions. The officers' accusation that McKee was exaggerating the threat, and their suggestion that after she calmed down, she would not want to file a complaint, remind me of the mores of the century preceding even my birth. 107 In the linguistic history of our society, it is common to find women referred to as hysterical; it is uncommon to find references to hysterical men. Two thousand years of Western Civilization's stereotypes are not easy to undo from the hearts of its people. McKee probably was upset. Such a response is extremely rational and understandable if Streetman had beat her and threatened her physical safety to the point of death, and the police stood by and did nothing to protect her. 6 There is nothing hysterical about such a response. In contrast, Streetman threatened in the officers' presence to burn her belongings. The officers, who are all male, treated McKee's expressions in a condescending manner, while not responding to Streetman's threat. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 855 F.2d 1421, 1427 (9th Cir.1988) (officer's comment that he did not blame plaintiff's husband for hitting her because of the way she was 'carrying on'  suggests an animus against women). 108
109 The individual officers are before our Court seeking qualified immunity. The defense of qualified immunity for government officials represents a compromise between the confliciting concerns of permitting the recovery of damages for vindication of constitutional rights caused by the abuse of public office and permitting government officers to perform discretionary functions without fear of harassing litigation. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)[.] Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026, 1031-32 (3rd Cir.1988). [W]here an official's duties legitimately require action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better served by action taken with independence and without fear of consequences. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2739, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). [T]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates the law. Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S.Ct. at 3039; see also Melear v. Spears, 862 F.2d 1177 (5th Cir.1989). 110 I do not believe that a reasonable officer would know that a de facto city custom or policy, and his own actions manifesting the same notions, footed in stereotypes buried deeply in our culture, would violate the Constitution. No published decision in this Circuit sets forth such a theory of the Equal Protection Clause, and the Supreme Court has not spoken specifically on the subject. Qualified immunity is intended to protect individuals, when sued in their individual capacity, from personal liability when the area of law is evolving. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (If the law at the time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to 'know' that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful); see Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565, 98 S.Ct. 855, 861, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). 111 One of the fundamental reasons for qualified immunity is to protect the individual officers' discretion unless that discretion must be reined in due to constitutional considerations. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. at 2738 (governmental officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established ... constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known). The individual defendants should be granted summary judgment on McKee's section 1983 claim. Therefore, I concur in the majority's judgment dismissing the officers, in their individual capacities, with respect to plaintiff's section 1983 claim.