Opinion ID: 77779
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Local Constitutional Amendments

Text: Plaintiffs maintain on appeal that three local constitutional amendments applicable only to Fulton County alter the default allocation of authority between a Georgia sheriff and the county established in Manders. In particular, Plaintiffs rely on the amendment they refer to as the Jail Local Constitutional Amendment (JLCA). [25] Plaintiffs contend that because the JLCA authorizes the County to maintain and operate detention facilities and designate a person to control those facilities, the Sheriff acts for the County rather than as an arm of the State in operating the County's Jail. We disagree. The three local amendments to which Plaintiffs draw our attention do not affect our reliance on Manders. We recognize that, in Manders, we stated in a footnote that a local act of the State legislature could give a Georgia county control over the county jail, such as a local act granting Chatham County control over its jail. [26] Manders, 338 F.3d at 1318 n. 34. The Chatham County act explicitly gives the commissioners of Chatham County the power to make rules and regulations for the government and control of the Chatham County jail and inmates. Further, the Chatham County act affirmatively vests the commissioners with the management and care of the jail. By contrast, the JLCA does not give the County power to make rules and regulations for the administration of the Jail. Therefore, the JLCA does not alter the relationship among the State, the County, and the Sheriff, as the County continues to have no say in how the Sheriff implements his policies at the Jail. However, even if the JLCA altered the analysis in Manders, the County has not exercised any potential authority granted to it under the JLCA because the Sheriff, an office established by the State legislature, continues to control the Jail. Under Georgia law, the office of sheriff carries with it all of its common-law duties and powers, except as modified by statute. Elder v. Camp, 193 Ga. 320, 18 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1942). Where a statute limits the common-law duties and powers of a sheriff, it must be strictly construed, particularly where the limitation or restriction applies to only one sheriff in the State. Warren v. Walton, 231 Ga. 495, 202 S.E.2d 405, 409 (1973). We cannot conclude the JLCA definitely and positively grants to the County the traditional powers allocated to the sheriff of a Georgia county, thereby altering the established allocation of power between the State, the County, and Sheriff Freeman. We therefore affirm the district court's determination that Sheriff Freeman is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and we dismiss Plaintiffs' claims against Sheriff Freeman in his official capacity to the extent Plaintiffs seek monetary damages. [27]