Opinion ID: 1843293
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: law i. whether appellant's motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial should have been granted?

Text: McGee argues that his trial and conviction violate Miss. Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (Supp. 1991) which requires that a defendant be brought to trial within 270 days of arraignment unless good cause is shown. Excluding the time consumed by continuances granted upon motion by the defendant, [1] McGee was tried some 669 days after his arrest and arraignment. [2] The relevant events and the times at which they occurred are set out below: DELAY FOLLOWING EVENT DATE EVENT (IN DAYS) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10-18-88 Arraignment 3 10-21-88 Court ordered continuance until April, 1989 term for 174 good and sufficient cause 4-12-89 Defendant moved for continuance; case continued until 65[] June 16, 1989 6-16-89 No trial occurred; record reflects no motion or order for 209 continuance 1-11-90 State moved for continuance; case continued until April 82 term, 1990 (to begin on April 3) 4-3-90 No trial occurred; record reflects no motion or order 135 for continuance 8-16-90 Defense moves that case be continued until defendant 1[] has had opportunity to hear tape recording in State's possession; case continued until following day 8-17-90 Trial ____ ________ TOTAL 669 []Less delay attributable to defendant - 66 ________ DELAY FOR WHICH STATE MUST SHOW GOOD CAUSE PURSUANT TO § 99-17-1 603 At issue are the three delays for which the record reflects no contemporaneous expression of cause (October 21, 1988 to April 12, 1989; June 16, 1989 to January 11, 1990; and April 3, 1990 to August 16, 1990). These three delays, totaling 518 days, are the ones McGee emphasized in his August 16, 1990 motion to dismiss. [3] Neither the trial court nor the parties recorded explanations for the delays at issue. The October 21, 1988 Order of Continuance merely states that [f]or good and sufficient cause the Court is one [sic] of the opinion that the above stated case should be continued until the next term of court. Such a bland and generic recitation of good cause does not suffice to satisfy the requirements of § 99-17-1. Yarber v. State, 573 So.2d 727, 729 (Miss. 1990); Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371, 1375 (Miss. 1988). The record does not even reflect continuances for the delays beginning June 16, 1989 and January 11, 1990. At the August 16, 1990, hearing on McGee's motion to dismiss, however, the trial court found as follows: The motion will be denied for these reasons: One, in the past five years the number of indictments and cases coming before this Court for disposal have greatly increased, most of them  most of the increase being in dealing directly with drug offenses. For example, the Court remembers one term, I believe it was last year, where out of sixty indictments, thirty-nine of them were for illicit drug dealings. Two, there simply does not exist enough days during term of this Court to deal with the large number of cases that this Court must dispose of in the allotted time. Three, the availability of drug analysts to testify is severely restricted and there appears in this case at least one continuance for this very reason. Next, number four, there is a growing problem with getting the results of drug analyses of the Mississippi State Crime Lab because of the overload of cases that they have to handle, and sometimes as long as a year elapses before the analysis is ready. The Court, therefore, finds that it was not physically and humanly possible for the cases to be brought forward and tried within the two hundred and seventy days and that it is through no fault nor neglect of the State's attorney that this case has been delayed; therefore, the motion will be denied. The trial court's conclusions, while perhaps valid from an administrative standpoint, are general and contain no specific findings regarding the instant case per se. Given that the Holmes County Circuit Court system and the State Crime Lab are overwhelmed with drug cases, the State nevertheless bears the burden of positively demonstrating that the backlog actually caused the delay in this particular case. See Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 877 (Miss. 1987) (state bears burden of persuasion); Nations v. State, 481 So.2d 760 (Miss. 1985) (same). If the State can so demonstrate, then the trial court's denial of McGee's motion to dismiss may be proper since docket congestion can constitute good cause for delay. See Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 876-77 (Miss. 1987) (under extant facts, congestion of dockets constituted good cause for delay); see also Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165, 167 (Miss. 1991) (congested docket may give rise to good cause for continuance); Yarber v. State, 573 So.2d 727, 729 (Miss. 1990) (same); Kinzey v. State, 498 So.2d 814, 816-17 (Miss. 1986) (same); Bailey v. State, 463 So.2d 1059, 1063 (Miss. 1985) (same); State v. Sistruck, 404 So.2d 564, 565 (Miss. 1981) (same). Otherwise, the ruling must fall for lack of evidence to support it. On remand, the trial court is directed to consider whether the specific facts of the instant case give rise to good cause for delay. The court should make specific findings as opposed to stating general conclusions. McGee argues that even if crowded dockets did in fact delay his trial, the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss since the reasons for delay were not made part of the record at the time when the delays occurred. After-the-fact justifications, according to McGee, will not suffice. In his brief, McGee contends: Good cause is determined at the time the case is continued and not at the time of trial as was done in the instant case. If the lower court thought that its calendar was overcrowded, that the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics was understaffed and overworked, it could have easily indicated these facts or reasons in its orders. However there are at least two terms of court where no orders of continuance were even entered. McGee relies upon Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371 (Miss. 1988) which states: [W]here the record is silent regarding the reason for delay, as the record is silent here, the clock ticks against the State because the State bears the risk of non-persuasion on the good cause issue. Id. at 1375. As the State correctly points out, however, Vickery is distinguishable in that the lower court there never made an explicit finding or expression of good cause. Vickery neither states nor implies that expressions of cause must occur contemporaneously with the delay. Thus, Vickery does not support McGee's argument that post-delay expressions of cause are insufficient. Furthermore, in Barnes v. State, 577 So.2d 840 (Miss. 1991), this Court recently directed a trial court on remand to determine whether good cause existed for a delay exceeding 270 days. See id. at 844. The Court explained: We cannot on the present record make this determination [as to whether good cause existed], but instead remand to the circuit court for that purpose. Id. Implicit in the Court's ruling is the assumption that post-delay determinations of cause are permissible. See also Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 877 (Miss. 1987) (Court accepted state's after-the-fact explanation that delay resulted from congested dockets). Although the State must at some point demonstrate the existence of good cause for delay, the law does not require the State, at the time of delay, to speak now or forever hold your peace.
In addition to his statutory claim, McGee also cites the speedy trial guarantees found in the United States and Mississippi constitutions as grounds for dismissal. For purposes of evaluating constitution-based speedy trial claims, this Court has adopted the four-part analysis set out by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). See Craig v. State, 284 So.2d 57, 58 (Miss. 1973) (first published Mississippi case to adopt Barker analysis). Under Barker, the Court weighs the following factors in determining whether a delay offends constitutional speedy trial guarantees: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the defendant has been prejudiced by the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-93. Regarding the second factor, reason for delay, the State again points to the lower court's observations concerning docket congestion and the difficulty in obtaining analysts and reports from the State Crime Lab. As we stated in connection with McGee's 270-Day-Rule argument, however, the present record does not clearly establish that these factors caused the delay in this particular case. Consequently, we are not in a position to evaluate McGee's constitutional speedy trial claim. On remand, the trial court is directed to consider whether good cause for delay existed for purposes of the Barker analysis as well as for the 270 Day Rule.