Opinion ID: 2512108
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hardship excusal of Prospective Juror R.W.

Text: Defendant contends the trial court improperly excused Prospective Juror R.W., despite defense counsel's refusal to stipulate to the excusal, on grounds R.W. was a full-time student. Defendant claims the excusal was not permitted, under the governing statute and rules, because R.W. did not affirmatively request he be excused and because the record does not show R.W. faced hardship sufficient to justify an excusal. The error, defendant asserts, implicates his federal and state constitutional rights to a fair and impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) We are not persuaded. The pertinent facts are as follows: On September 10, 1992, at the outset of jury selection, the trial court directed introductory remarks to the entire venire. Among other things, the court explained that the trial would begin in early December, and could take as long as four weeks, not counting jury deliberations or the hiatus that would occur between the guilt phase and any penalty phase. The daily trial schedule, said the court, would generally be from 1:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. on Mondays and Wednesdays, and from 11:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. on Tuesdays and Thursdays, with Fridays off. The court further indicated that, because it was responsible for empanelling a fair and impartial jury, an excusal from service on the case would not be easy to obtain, but the court nonetheless would consider certain kinds of hardship excuses, including significant loss of employment income, prepaid vacations, medical problems, and full-time student status. The court said it would take up any prospective juror's hardship issues during individual voir dire. During the subsequent individual voir dires, counsel stipulated to, and the trial court granted, hardship excusals to students L.S. and A.K. On her juror questionnaire, Prospective Juror L.S., a self-identified 22 year old with strong pro-death-penalty views, had indicated she was currently attending California State University, Hayward (Cal State Hayward). [14] In response to a question about her job status, she had circled full-time student, and had handwritten that she [c]an't afford to miss my classes cuz it's already been paid for. During voir dire, the court obtained L.S.'s oral representation that she would be taking 17 units at Cal State Hayward, [15] and that her class schedule primarily fell during daytime weekday hours. Defense counsel indicated she would stipulate to L.S.'s excusal, and the prosecutor concurred. The court excused L.S., advising her that we are going to excuse you for hardship. We don't want to interrupt your schooling. On his juror questionnaire, Prospective Juror A.K., self-described as 34 years old and with strong pro-life views, had indicated he was a full-time student pursuing a master's degree in clinical psychology at the University of California, Berkeley. When A.K. appeared for individual voir dire, the court placed on the record that he had supplied official verification of his student status and advised him that because of your school commitment, ... both sides have stipulated you can be excused. Thereafter, the court conducted individual voir dire of Prospective Juror R.W. On his juror questionnaire, R.W. had described himself as 19 years old, and had indicated that a life sentence was preferable to the death penalty in all but severe cases. Like L.S. and A.K., he had circled full-time student on his questionnaire. He indicated he was studying criminal justice at Cal State Hayward. During his death-qualification voir dire, R.W. confirmed that he was open to the death penalty in severe cases like serial or multiple murder, and said he could also consider it in this single-murder case because the victim was stabbed to death. While examining R.W. during the immediately following general voir dire, defense counsel asked what R.W. intended to do with his criminal justice major. At this point, the following colloquy occurred: The Court: Can I interrupt for just a second? Are you still in school, Mr. [W.]? [¶] Prospective Juror Mr. [W.]: Yeah. [¶] THE COURT: Are you a full-time student? [¶] Prospective Juror Mr. [W.]: (Nods head.) [¶] The Court: You are a full-time student? [¶] Prospective Juror Mr. [W.] Yes. [¶] the Court: Where are you going? [¶] Prospective Juror Mr. [W.]: Cal State Hayward. [¶] The Court: Cal State Hayward. And how many units are you taking? [¶] Prospective Juror Mr. [W.]: Seventeen. [¶] The Court: And you're in school right now; right? [¶] Prospective Juror Mr. [W.]: Yeah. At this point, defense counsel interjected, There hasn't been any complaint about that. We don't have anything written about that. The court responded, But I'll accept it. Defense counsel then asked R.W. if he had a problem sitting on a jury for a trial that might take one or two months. R.W. answered, It depends on the time schedule. Counsel repeated the day-to-day schedule the court had given earlier, Tuesdays and Thursdays 11:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Mondays and Wednesdays 1:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m., with Fridays off. The court added, Plus you may be deliberating all day for three or four days or longer. I don't know. [¶] The point is, Mr. [W.], we don't want to screw up your semester at school. Defense counsel argued, however, that if the trial schedule could work around R.W.'s school schedule, and [if] he is not claiming a hardship, we don't have to insist that he take it. At this point, the prosecutor indicated he would stipulate to R.W.'s excusal. However, defense counsel stated she would not do so, and want[ed] to hear what [R.W.] has to say. The court said to R.W. that I notice here you circled full-time student. Then the court explained that [w]e've been letting students off, because they might get so far behind academically that they could not catch up, and [t]hat's my concern. The court continued: And we've let a lot of students off here now. If you think you can do it both ways, that's okay. But if you think it's going to be a burden, you know, to go to school full time, taking 17 units and maybe sitting here as a juror for a month, two months, you let me know now. Because if it's going to be a real problem, I will seriously consider letting you go. [¶] What do you think? The following exchange then occurred: Prospective Juror Mr. [W.]: This is during the month of December? [¶] The Court: December and probably January. [¶] And that's around finals time; right? [¶] Prospective Juror Mr. [W.]: Yeah. [¶] The Court: See, that's the problem. [¶] Prospective Juror Mr. [W.]: Most likely it would probably be a burden. [¶] The Court: I think it will. Yeah. [¶] All right. [Defense counsel], over your objection I'm going to excuse Mr. [W.] I don't see any point in having this kid lose two months of school sitting here. [¶] I know you like him as a juror, but on the other hand, he should be treated like everybody else. He is a full-time student. Seventeen units is a big load to carry. And to sit here for two months I think would unduly burden him, and he admitted as much just now. Defense counsel argued that R.W. had not brought up the subject himself, had inquired about scheduling, and had admitted hardship only after great hesitation. The court responded, I'm not here to have kids flunk out of school by taking two months sitting here as a juror when we have a lot of other jurors. I know he is 19 years old, he is an African-American. You probably want to see him as a juror. I understand that. [¶] But I don't want [R.W.] to blow a whole semester at school because of this case. He can always serve during the summer when he is not in school. Under these circumstances, the court asserted, Why should he blow two months of school? It doesn't make any sense. It really doesn't. The court thereupon excused R.W. (3) [A] trial court has authority to excuse a person from jury service for undue personal hardship. [Citations.] Exercise of that authority is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] ( People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 665 [286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84]; see also People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 986, fn. 15 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044]; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 488 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373].) [16] Under the governing statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 204, subdivision (b), such excusals are to be granted only on a sufficient showing that the individual circumstances of the prospective juror make it unreasonably difficult for the person to serve or that hardship to the public will occur if the person must serve in the particular case. ( Visciotti, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1, 44, fn. 15.) [17] Here it is manifest, and defendant does not dispute, that the court applied a blanket policy of granting hardship excusals to prospective jurors who established to the court's satisfaction they were full-time students with academic schedules that would make jury service burdensome. The court made clear it believed such persons would suffer undue hardship and academic loss if forced to sit, during a critical period of their fall school terms, on a capital trial that might take two months to complete. Defendant fails to demonstrate that this determination was unreasonable. Nor did the court act unreasonably by concluding, in each student hardship case, that the requisite showing of full-time student status had been made. L.S. and R.W. each were excused after they stated under oath, in their questionnaires and/or in oral voir dire, that they were taking 17 units of college credit at Cal State Hayward. A.K. was excused when he provided the court with official verification of his full-time student status at the University of California, Berkeley. Nonetheless, defendant argues that the court excused R.W. improperly because (1) R.W. did not affirmatively claim a hardship exemption, but was coached and prompted by the courtacting in a misguided sense of paternalism toward a minority prospective jurorto say that jury service would burden him, and (2) the record does not establish that jury service would actually present an unduly burdensome conflict with R.W.'s class schedule and academic responsibilities. At the outset, we observe that the record indicates no clear-cut affirmative request for excusal in either of the other cases in which student hardship excusals were granted. L.S. did say in her questionnaire that she could not afford to miss prepaid classes, but she did not explicitly ask to be excused for that reason. While A.K. brought in documentary support for his claim of student status, his questionnaire contained no assertion that jury duty would interfere with this status, and the record includes no other indication that he requested excusal. Moreover, as a matter of reasonable discretion, we see no impropriety in the court's effort to protect the interests of one who reported his status as a full-time student, but did not immediately seek excusal on that basis. Whether R.W.'s inaction in this respect stemmed from initial ignorance that a hardship excusal might be available, or from a willingness to consider serving if service was practicable, the law did not require he be penalized, once he was before the court, for failing to demand excusal in the first instance. Defendant points to California Rules of Court, rule 2.1008 (rule 2.1008), formerly rule 860, adopted under authority of Code of Civil Procedure section 204, subdivision (b). Rule 2.1008(b) govern[s] the granting of excuses from jury service by the jury commissioner on grounds of undue hardship .... (Italics added.) The rule specifies, among other things, that [n]o class or category of persons may be automatically excluded from jury duty except as provided by law ( id., subd. (b)(1)) and that [a] statutory exemption from jury service [(i.e., for undue hardship)] must be granted only when the eligible person claims it ( id., subd. (b)(2)). Defendant also cites Code of Civil Procedure section 218, which provides that [t]he jury commissioner shall hear the excuses of jurors summoned, in accordance with the standards prescribed by the Judicial Council.... All excuses shall be in writing setting forth the basis of the request and shall be signed by the juror. (Italics added.) But these provisions, which apply explicitly to the jury commissioner's preliminary screening of hardship claims received in response to a general jury summons, have little or nothing to do with the procedures the trial court itself may subsequently employ to resolve hardship issues in the course of jury selection in a specific case. Defendant cites no authority suggesting that the statutes and rule he invokes limit the trial court's authority, upon its reasonable exercise of discretion, to examine and excuse individual prospective jurors on grounds of undue hardship. Finally, we see no basis to conclude the record demonstrates insufficient justification to excuse R.W. As noted, full-time students L.S. and A.K. had previously been excused without objection, and with little inquiry into their specific academic burdens. There appeared no reason to treat R.W. differently. He was carrying a full load of 17 units and, upon inquiry by the trial court, he conceded that service in a lengthy capital case, under the trial schedule proposed by the court, during the finals time months of December and January, would likely be a burden. Accordingly, we find no error in the excusal of this prospective juror. [18]