Opinion ID: 1547315
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Right to Call Defense Witness

Text: Appellant argues for reversal on the grounds that the trial court violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by precluding him from calling as a witness his former co-defendant, McNeil. He contends that McNeil's testimony was central to his defense in that McNeil was in the best position to testify about whether he obtained the crack cocaine from him. He argues that the remaining evidence was weak on the issue, since Investigator Prince did not see the item that McNeil received from appellant and could not describe the objects McNeil dropped by shape, size or color, and the $180 recovered from him came from his sock. The accused in a criminal trial has a right to call witnesses on his own behalf. Howard v. United States, 656 A.2d 1106, 1117 (D.C.1995) (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967)) (other citation omitted). This right, which is fundamental to our system of justice, is one protected by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses to establish a defense, which includes the right to compulsory process to secure their presence. Id. (citations omitted). This right is not absolute, and the exclusion of evidence is generally a matter of trial court discretion. Id. (citing Johns v. United States, 434 A.2d 463, 473 (D.C.1981)); King v. United States, 550 A.2d 348, 353 (D.C.1988) (citing Ronson v. Comm'r of Corr. of State of N.Y., 604 F.2d 176, 178 (2d. Cir.1979)). For example, the right, must, for obvious reasons, give way to the proposed witness' privilege against self-incrimination. Id. (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972)). The failure to assert the right timely may result in the loss of an opportunity to call a witness. See id. However, the waiver of this right is not to be inferred lightly. See id. at 355. (citation omitted). Thus, when exercising its discretion in determining whether to preclude a defense witness' testimony, the trial court must weigh such considerations `against the constitutional rights of a defendant to present a defense.' Howard, 656 A.2d at 1117 (quoting Clark v. United States, 639 A.2d 76, 81 (D.C.1993) (citing Bassil v. United States, 517 A.2d 714, 716 (D.C.1986)). In reviewing a decision by the trial court denying a defendant the right to call a witness, the first inquiry is whether the error amounts to the violation of a constitutional right. Howard, supra, 656 A.2d at 1117-18. If a constitutional error has occurred, reversal is required unless the government shows it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Id. This means that Where ... the trial court's evidentiary ruling wholly deprived the defendant of any opportunity to cross examine a witness or present evidence concerning bias or a central issue in the case, we may only affirm if we are convinced that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, applying the test set forth in Chapman, 386 U.S. [at 24, 87 S.Ct.824]. Howard, 656 A.2d at 1118 (quoting Clark, supra, 639 A.2d at 81). If a non-constitutional error has occurred, it is subject to reversal under Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946) which sets forth a less stringent test for harmless error than Chapman. Id. In this case, the trial court precluded appellant from calling his former co-defendant, McNeil. McNeil entered a plea of guilty on the day of trial. During the plea proceeding, he agreed to the government's factual proffer, which included that he obtained the drugs from the appellant. When the trial court inquired whether there was any part of the statement with which he did not agree, McNeil responded, No, I guess. The court pressed him further, asking, whether he accept[ed] those facts as true facts in your case, and McNeil responded yes. When defense counsel indicated during the presentation of appellant's case that he intended to call McNeil as a witness, the court responded that he had failed to identify McNeil as a defense witness earlier. Defense counsel reminded the court that the witness had just become available after the plea. The trial court ruled that McNeil would not be permitted to testify, with the explanation that [d]efendant McNeil entered a guilty plea. He pled guilty to a specific factual proffer and that factual proffer would be the testimony that he's expected or the question[s] he's expected to be asked and the testimony he's expected to give would be completely contradictory to the factual proffer that he accepted as true in his case and would, in my view, possibly constitute perjured testimony and I'm not going to allow it. In addition, he sa[t] in this courtroom during most of the Government's case. Thus, the three factors guiding the court's decision were: (1) the timing of the request; (2) the violation of the rule on witnesses; and (3) the prior statement of the proffered witness would be inconsistent with any exculpatory evidence that McNeil could provide. The question is whether these factors are sufficient to weigh against appellant's right to call his former co-defendant in his defense. The first factor considered by the trial court, the timing of the request, is not one which would weigh against appellant in this case. McNeil did not become available as a witness until the day of trial. Until that time, he could have invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See King, supra, 550 A.2d at 355. Moreover, the defense had not rested its case when McNeil was called, and the government did not object. In King, a case similar to this one, defendant King had rested and requested to reopen her case to call her co-defendant after he announced that he was willing to testify on her behalf, but the trial court precluded it. Id. Under these circumstances, we found that the timing of the request operated in King's favor in the analysis used to determine whether King was denied her right to present a crucial eye-witness. Id. Similarly, in this case, appellant made a request to call McNeil just a short time after he became available, and before he rested his case. Here also, the timing factor weighs in appellant's favor. The second factor relied upon by the trial court was a violation of the rule on witnesses. Excluding witnesses from the courtroom during the presentation of testimony or precluding them from discussing their testimony with other witnesses prevents improper attempts to influence or tailor the testimony to that of the other witnesses. See Benn v. United States, 801 A.2d 132, 141 (D.C.2002); Brown v. United States, 388 A.2d 451, 456 (D.C.1978) (citations omitted). Since the purpose of this procedure can be served by less severe remedies, violation of the sequestration order alone will not justify exclusion of the witness. Id. (citing Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91, 92, 14 S.Ct. 10, 37 L.Ed. 1010 (1893)). Generally, the violation of the court order must be so egregious that it `has somehow so discredited the witness as to render his testimony incredible as a matter of law.' Id. (citing Taylor v. United States, 388 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir.1967)). In this jurisdiction, we have held that a witness' testimony will be excluded only where the violation of the court order `was with the connivance or knowledge of the party and his counsel.' Id. (quoting Jett v. Jett, 221 A.2d 925, 927 (D.C.1966)) (other citations omitted)(emphasis in the original). The record fails to show the type of egregious violation of the order which would warrant the exclusion of the witness. When the trial court inquired whether any witnesses were present and asked any witnesses to leave, it does not appear that McNeil knew at that time that he would be called. The record reflects no effort to ascertain whether appellant or his counsel advised, counseled or otherwise brought about a violation of the court's order. It is not clear how long or during which portions of the testimony McNeil was present in the courtroom. The court indicated only that the witness was there for most of the government's case. The government had no objection, and therefore, likely anticipated no prejudice. Given these circumstances, this factor alone was insufficient to overcome appellant's right to call a witness in his own defense. The final factor relied upon by the trial court for its decision precluding the witness from testifying is the prior statement he gave which is inconsistent with appellant's innocence. This court has held that a defendant has a right to call a witness in his defense notwithstanding his apparent vulnerability to cross-examination. King, supra, 550 A.2d at 355-56 (citing United States v. Parker, 136 U.S.App. D.C. 97, 100, 419 F.2d 679, 682 (1969)). A prior inconsistent statement is insufficient to preclude the introduction of a co-defendant's testimony when it becomes available. Id. The prior statement could be used to impeach McNeil if inconsistent with his testimony at trial. Although taken in open court, the statement was not under oath, as his testimony would have been. It was for the factfinder, in this case the court, to assess the witness' credibility based upon his testimony at trial and any impeaching evidence. The factfinder might have believed the trial testimony instead of the blanket assent to the overall proffer, rather than each detail. Instead, without hearing McNeil's testimony, the court determined that it would be incredible in light of his admission at the plea proceeding. This anticipatory assessment of credibility was not a sufficient basis for precluding appellant from calling in his defense the one person who knew for certain from whom he received the drugs. [4] Since all three factors relied upon by the trial court in its decision precluding the witness from testifying weigh in favor of allowing the testimony, we can only conclude that the trial court erred in precluding appellant from calling McNeil as a witness in his defense. The government argues that the trial court's preclusion of McNeil's testimony, if error, did not affect appellant's substantial rights and was, therefore, harmless under the standard set forth in Kotteakos, supra, 328 U.S. at 757-65, 66 S.Ct. 1239 (error is harmless if we can say with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error). However, where the trial court's evidentiary ruling wholly deprive[s] the defendant of any opportunity ... to present evidence, harmlessness is determined applying the Chapman standard, i.e. harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Clark, supra, 639 A.2d at 81 (citing Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824). Here, the trial court's ruling deprived appellant of any opportunity to call the defense witness. Thus, the Chapman standard applies. Applying that standard, we conclude that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. McNeil was an eyewitness-participant in a criminal offense for which appellant was convicted. He was the only person who could refute the police officer's testimony that appellant gave him drugs. The government argues in support of its harmless error argument that it called two other witnesses to testify concerning appellant's misidentification defense and that the court, having heard from McNeil during his plea hearing, could evaluate his proposed testimony. First, only one witness called by the government testified that it was appellant, rather than someone else, who made an exchange with McNeil from whom drugs were recovered later. While identification was an issue at trial, also in issue was whether the drugs recovered from McNeil were the same objects that appellant gave to McNeil. Other evidence bearing on this issue was not substantial. Second, as previously stated, knowledge that a proposed witness has made a prior inconsistent statement is not grounds for excluding his testimony at trial. King, supra, 550 A.2d at 355-56 (citation omitted). The appellant had a right to call witnesses on his own behalf, here, the only witness who could provide exculpatory testimony on his behalf. Third, the evidence involved a central issue. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the erroneous exclusion of McNeil as a witness was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from hereby is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial. Reversed and Remanded.