Opinion ID: 158091
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: claims subject to procedural default

Text: 121
122 In June 1986, after Mr. LaFevers' first conviction and sentence of death, Mr. LaFevers entered a plea of nolo contendere to charges of robbery, kidnapping, and assault with intent to rape of a Ms. Paden and Ms. Austin. These crimes took place after the murder of Ms. Hawley. During the penalty phase of Mr. LaFevers' second trial, the state introduced the nolo contendere pleas to help prove the continuing threat to society aggravator. Mr. LaFevers' claims the pleas were involuntarily given because he was not aware they could be used against him in a future criminal proceeding. 123 This claim must fail because it has been procedurally defaulted. The claim was not raised in Mr. LaFevers' second trial or on direct appeal. Indeed, the argument was first raised in Mr. LaFevers' state habeas petition, and, there, the state court deemed it waived on an independent and adequate state law ground. See LaFevers, 934 P.2d at 358 n.9. Having failed to properly present the claim to the state courts, there is a procedural default in the state court and a procedural default for purposes of federal habeas. 124
125 Petitioner next contends he was entitled under the United States Constitution to DNA testing. The constitutional premise upon which this contention is based is uncertain. To be sure, petitioner mentions in passing the Eighth and Fifth Amendments, but neither contention is supported by any legal analysis or citation to federal case law. Ultimately, however, we can overlook this defect because this claim is procedurally defaulted. 126 The claim was not raised in either of the two trials or in either of the two direct appeals in this case. Indeed, the argument was first raised in Mr. LaFevers' state habeas petition, and, there, the state court deemed it waived on an independent and adequate state law ground. See LaFevers, 934 P.2d at 358 n.9. Therefore, as in the previous claim, this too is defaulted. 127 D. CLAIMS HEARD IN THE FIRST INSTANCE BY THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT WHICH ARE NOT BARRED BY PROCEDURAL DEFAULT 1. Other Claims Regarding DNA Testing 128 Mr. LaFevers presents two other claims pertinent to DNA testing: his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to ask for such tests after trial; and the federal district court improperly denied his discovery request for DNA testing. Ultimately, he postulates DNA evidence would prove that he was not present when Ms. Hawley was brutally murdered. 129
130 Mr. LaFevers believes his state appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to request DNA testing or at least raise the issue on direct appeal. To establish his counsel was constitutionally defective, petitioner must demonstrate that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 131 This claim fails for the simple reason that the DNA testing argument on direct appeal would have been frivolous because even favorable DNA test results would not make a difference in this case. As the district court found: 132 At most, the 'DNA testing' requested by Petitioner will prove whether Petitioner was bleeding at the time he was at the crime scenes or whether Petitioner bled on the clothing found in Cannon's home. The DNA testing cannot, despite Petitioner's assertions to the contrary, prove that he was not at the crime scenes or that he was not involved in Ms. Hawley's murder. 133 Furthermore, even assuming the claim was not frivolous, case law provides appellate counsel has no constitutional obligation to raise every non-frivolous issue, whether requested by the defendant or not. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 750-54, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3312-14 (1983). As the Ninth Circuit has stated: 134 [The] weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy.... [E]very weak issue in an appellate brief or argument detracts from the attention a Judge can devote to the stronger issues, and reduces appellate counsel's credibility before the court. For these reasons, a lawyer who throws in every arguable point--just in case--is likely to serve her client less effectively than one who concentrates solely on the strong arguments. 135 Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Jones, 463 U.S. at 751-53, 103 S. Ct. at 3313. 136 b. Did the Federal District Court Abuse its Discretion When it Denied Mr. LaFevers' Discovery Request for DNA Testing? 137 In a related claim, Mr. LaFevers urges the federal district court improperly denied his discovery request for DNA testing. Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires a habeas petitioner to show good cause before he is afforded an opportunity for discovery. Good cause is shown if the petitioner makes a specific allegation that shows reason to believe the petitioner may be able to demonstrate he is entitled to relief. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300, 89 S. Ct. 1082, 1091 (1969); Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 138, 908, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 1799 (1997) (approving the Harris standard). We review a district court's decision on good cause for an abuse of discretion. See Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908, 117 S. Ct. at 1799. Given our previous Discussion, we have no doubt Mr. LaFevers has failed to show good cause for this discovery request. 138 2. Was There Sufficient Evidence to Support the Jury's Aggravating Circumstance That the Murder was Committed to Avoid Arrest or Prosecution? 139 Mr. LaFevers questions whether there was sufficient evidence presented in the penalty phase of the trial to support a finding on the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed to avoid arrest or prosecution. In determining whether a state court's application of its constitutionally adequate aggravating circumstance was so erroneous as to raise an independent due process or Eighth Amendment violation, the appropriate standard of review is the rational factfinder standard established in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979). See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781, 110 S. Ct. 3092, 3102 (1990). Jackson holds that where a federal habeas corpus claimant alleges his state conviction is unsupported by the evidence, federal courts must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789. These considerations apply with equal force to federal habeas review of a state court's finding of aggravating circumstances. Lewis, 497 U.S. at 782, 110 S. Ct. at 3103. Like findings of fact, state court findings of aggravating circumstances often require a sentencer to `resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.' Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789). 140 The federal district court reviewed the trial transcripts and exhibits and concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. The court stated: 141 After beating Ms. Hawley, Petitioner decided that he needed to get rid of her... to try to dispose of any future testimony or evidence. (TR 1091-92) Further, Petitioner told the investigating police officers that he and Cannon discussed Cannon's desire to kill Ms. Hawley because she had seen their faces and they could be identified from police lineups.... [¶] It is quite logical to assume that the jury concluded from the evidence that Ms. Hawley was kidnapped from her home and driven, in her stolen car, to a remote location so that she could be murdered before she identified Petitioner and Cannon as the men who burglarized her home and stole her car. 142 We agree with the district court's assessment of the evidence. 143 3. Was Trial Counsel Ineffective for Failing to Explain That Mr. LaFevers' Nolo Contendere Plea Could be Used Against Him in the Penalty Phase of the Second Trial? 144 Mr. LaFevers posits that at the time he made his nolo contendere pleas to the Paden/Austin crimes, he was told by his attorney the plea could never be used against him as an admission of guilt. Specifically, he argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to explain that his nolo contendere plea could be used against him in the penalty phase of the second trial. To succeed on this issue, however, petitioner must demonstrate that his lawyer's deficient performance prejudiced his defense. To make out prejudice, he must demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The proper focus is on whether counsel's ineffectiveness rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair or unreliable. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-73, 113 S. Ct. 838, 842-44 (1993). 145 The federal district court concluded there was no prejudice here because the state had presented other evidence of Mr. LaFevers' crimes against Ms. Paden and Ms. Austin. Specifically, the court stated: 146 Further, even if this Court were to agree that Petitioner's nolo contendere pleas were inadmissible (which it does not), evidence of Petitioner's crimes against Ms. Paden and Ms. Austin would have been admissible under state law. The Court of Criminal Appeals has been consistent in its approval of the use of unadjudicated bad acts as evidence to support the continuing threat aggravating circumstance. Ms. Paden and Ms. Austin testified as to the acts of Petitioner and [his co-defendant] Cannon during the second stage of Petitioner's trial.... 147 We agree with the district court's Conclusion that Mr. LaFevers' suffered no prejudice. Even if he had not pleaded nolo contendere, the prosecution would have in any event established the Paden/Austin crime through use of unadjudicated offense evidence. Although the district court looked exclusively to Oklahoma law on this point, we also have held due process is not violated by admission of unadjudicated offenses. See Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239, 1252 (10th Cir. 1999); Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1523 (10th Cir. 1997); Hatch v. State of Okla., 58 F.3d 1447, 1465-66 (10th Cir. 1995). 148 Furthermore, the prosecution presented additional evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. LaFevers was a continuing threat to society. The state relied on the specific circumstances of Ms. Hawley's brutal murder and two unadjudicated prison stabbings. With respect to the latter evidence, the jury heard that in 1987, after the first trial, LaFevers and another inmate went after Cannon and stabbed him twenty-two times in prison; and, in 1990, LaFevers and yet another inmate stabbed inmate, Charles Coleman, in a prison library altercation, during which LaFevers also struggled with a prison guard. See LaFevers, 897 P.2d at 307. Even if counsel's performance was deficient, the presence of other evidence of violent acts makes that deficiency inconsequential. Counsel's lack of explanation did not render the proceedings fundamentally unfair or unreliable. 149 4. Was Trial Counsel Ineffective During the Penalty Phase Because he Failed to Present Other Mitigating Evidence? 150 Mr. LaFevers contends that his trial counsel was aware of, but did not use, testimony of two men who claimed that the co-defendant in the case, Cannon, had confessed to them while they were incarcerated together in prison. Mr. LaFevers claims both men would have testified that Cannon took the responsibility for the murder and the burning of Ms. Hawley. While this does not excuse Mr. LaFevers from being guilty of the crime charged, petitioner argues, it could certainly prove critical when the jury deliberated the sentence during the second stage of the trial. 3 151 The district court reviewed this claim carefully and rejected it because it found no prejudice. The court noted: 152 Petitioner's two sentence summary of the two interviews ignores the true nature of the prisoners' rendition of Petitioner's involvement in the murder of Ms. Hawley. In each inmate's interview, it is clear that Petitioner was a principal in the burglary, robbery and kidnapping; that he purchased the gasoline which was poured on Ms. Hawley and her car; and he knew that Cannon intended on murdering Ms. Hawley, but did nothing to stop the murder. Further, both inmates stated that Petitioner served as the lookout while Cannon raped and killed Ms. Hawley. Finally, both inmates stated that Petitioner, Cannon and a third man worked together to burn Ms. Hawley's car. 153 These facts demonstrate that Petitioner was a major participant in the criminal activities.... Further, since Petitioner took no action to prevent the murder of Ms. Hawley it is clear that he acted with a reckless indifference to human life. Therefore, under Tison v. Arizona, Petitioner's death sentence would have been appropriate even if the inmates had testified and the jury believed their version of the rendition of the events. 154 Finally, it should be noted that Petitioner's trial counsel apparently made a tactical decision to not call these two inmates. Petitioner's trial counsel filed numerous pre-trial motions, including a Motion in Limine - Jail House Informants, in which he sought to exclude the testimony of jail house informants. In arguing for the exclusion of the testimony of jail house informants, Petitioner's trial counsel argued that the 'testimony form [sic] jail house informants is inherently unreliable. 155 Mr. LaFevers has provided no reason, nor could we find any, to quarrel with the district court's assessment on this issue. 156 5. Was Appellate Counsel Ineffective Because he Allegedly Failed to Communicate With Mr. LaFevers Before Filing the Brief on Direct Appeal and Failed to Appeal the Nolo Contendere Plea Issue? 157 In his last claim of constitutional error, Mr. LaFevers argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to communicate with him before filing the brief on direct appeal and failed to appeal the nolo contendere plea issue. We must deem both of these arguments abandoned. Mr. LaFevers' counsel simply arrogates: he overlooked or ignored the prior `no contest' plea of Mr. LaFevers; and most importantly he ignored his client by refusing to communicate with him prior to filing the brief on direct appeal. We have repeatedly warned litigants that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner and without developed argumentation are deemed waived on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995); Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1231 (10th Cir. 1990). This passing and unsupported reference is no different. Moreover, both contentions are wholly without merit.