Opinion ID: 204139
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Government's Cross-Appeal on Judgment of Acquittal

Text: The Government cross appeals the district court's grant of a judgment of acquittal to Merlino on count three, which charged the defendants with carrying an explosive grenade during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and which carried a 30-year mandatory minimum sentence, § 924(c)(1)(B). We review the district court's grant of Merlino's motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Olbres, 61 F.3d 967, 970 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 991, 116 S.Ct. 522, 133 L.Ed.2d 430 (1995). Like the trial court, we scrutinize the evidence in the light most compatible with the verdict, resolve all credibility disputes in the verdict's favor, and then reach a judgment about whether a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal only if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, could not have persuaded any trier of fact of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Bristol-Martir, 570 F.3d 29, 38 (1st Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In making our assessment, we do not weigh the evidence or make any credibility judgments, as those are left to the jury. United States v. Ayala-Garcia, 574 F.3d 5, 11 (1st Cir. 2009). We must uphold the verdict if it is supported by a plausible rendition of the record. Bristol-Martir, 570 F.3d at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted). Count three was presented under a Pinkerton [3] theory of liability, under which the Government may show `that a co-conspirator carried or used a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy and that this was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.' United States v. Bucci, 525 F.3d 116, 132 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Flecha-Maldonado, 373 F.3d 170, 179 (1st Cir.2004)). Merlino's conviction on count three should stand (and the judgment of acquittal should be reversed) if the evidence established that it was foreseeable to Merlino that one of his co-conspirators would be carrying a hand grenade during the robbery. The only evidence introduced at trial establishing Merlino's knowledge that a grenade would be used came from Romano, who testified about the meeting that took place the night before the planned robbery. Romano testified that the group met to discuss the final arrangements for the robbery and that there were times during the final meeting when some of the coconspirators were separate in the building for a while. He could not recall whether there were periods of time toward the end of the meeting when the weapons, the equipment, and the specific plans were being discussed that any of the four coconspirators left the group. According to Romano, Merlino left the meeting to retrieve the bags to be used for the money at some point during the meeting. However, in response to the specific question by the prosecutor about who was present when Rossetti told the group that he had guns and grenades, Romano replied, Everybody was there. Even though Romano did not include a discussion of the grenade in his notes made shortly after the meeting, a fact brought out by Merlino's attorney, he remained steadfast in his testimony that he remembered Merlino being present for the hand grenade discussion when questioned on cross examination (Q: And we only have your word that grenades and other weapons were discussed when Billy Merlino was there as opposed to when he wasn't, right? A: Right.), on redirect examination (Q: In reviewing that, do you still maintain at this point that Willy Merlino was present when you when Stephen Rossetti discussed guns and grenades for the robbery? A: Yeah.), and again on re-cross examination (Q: And your memory is also that when grenades were discussed, everyone was there, including Billy Merlino, right? A: Right.). The Government concedes that Romano's testimony provides the only evidence that Merlino was aware that a grenade would be used. In granting the motion for acquittal, the district court noted the long-standing rule that a conviction can rest on the uncorroborated word of an informant witness and concluded that in a purely legal sense, the verdict [wa]s unimpeachable. 204 F.Supp.2d at 92. The district court stated that it did not doubt the credibility of Romano's testimony on other important aspects of the case and had no reason to disbelieve that Romano's testimony about who was present when Rosetti informed the others of the grenade reflected Romano's best efforts to accurately remember. Nonetheless, because of Romano's other lapses of memory and the lack of any contemporary documentation or other corroborating evidence of his testimony on this point, it determined that the unadorned statement `Everybody was there' [was] too slender a reed to support the mandatory thirty year consecutive sentence that the law otherwise requires. [4] Id. The uncorroborated testimony of a government informant is sufficient to establish the facts underlying a defendant's conviction. United States v. Martinez-Medina, 279 F.3d 105, 115 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 921, 123 S.Ct. 311, 154 L.Ed.2d 210 (2002); United States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 219 F.3d 37, 46 (1st Cir.2000) (A conviction may be based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a confidential informant `so long as the testimony is not incredible or insubstantial on its face.') (quoting United States v. Ciocca, 106 F.3d 1079, 1084 (1st Cir.1997)). It is well-established . . . that determining a witness's credibility, even in the face of a furious attack, is a function that falls squarely within the province of the jury. Foxworth v. St. Amand, 570 F.3d 414, 427 (1st Cir.2009). Thus, it was for the jury to decide whether to believe Romano's testimony that Merlino was present when Rossetti told the group he was bringing a grenade. Although there was no corroborating evidence for Romano's testimony that Merlino was present when the grenade was discussed, neither was there any contradictory evidence. Merlino's attorney extensively cross-examined Romano about his recollection of what Merlino was doing during the meeting and why he did not mention the grenade in the notes he made after the meeting. Romano was unswayed in his testimony that Merlino was there when the grenade was discussed, and the jury, who heard all of the evidence, was free to believe his testimony. Romano's rendition of the eventsthat the group met, that they separated at times as they gathered things for the robbery, but that Merlino was present when Rossetti discussed the grenadewas certainly plausible if believed by the jury. See United States v. Rivera Rangel, 396 F.3d 476, 482 (1st Cir.2005) (So long as the guilty verdict finds support in a plausible rendition of the record,' it must be allowed to stand (and the acquittal must be reversed). (quoting United States v. Rivera-Ruiz, 244 F.3d 263, 266 (1st Cir.2001))). Having conducted a de novo review of the evidence, we conclude that Romano's testimony was sufficient to establish that it was reasonably foreseeable to Merlino that one of his coconspirators would be carrying a hand grenade, which was all that was needed to support Merlino's conviction under count three.