Opinion ID: 836476
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Definition of Related Offenses[3]

Text: The majority's attempt to distinguish the language of MCR 6.120 from the authority cited in Tobey ignores Tobey's central holding. Certainly, some of the authority on which Tobey relies quotes language that differs from the language of the court rule. [4] However, Tobey's holding did not incorporate any language from those sources that is inconsistent with the definition of related offenses in MCR 6.120. [5] The key portion of the Tobey opinion states: We adhere again to our earlier precedents and hold: a judge must sever two or more offenses when the offenses have been joined for trial solely on the ground that they are of the same or similar character and the defendant files a timely motion for severance objecting to the joinder ... a judge has no discretion to permit the joinder for trial of separate offenses committed at different times unless the offenses are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan. [ [6] ] Tobey therefore held that joinder is appropriate when charged offenses are of the same or similar character, but the charges must be severed if a timely motion for severance is filed. Tobey also held that offenses cannot be joined unless they are based on (1) the same conduct, (2) a series of acts connected together, or (3) a series of acts constituting parts of a single scheme or plan. The language used in 1 through 3 is virtually identical to the language used in MCR 6.120 when it defines what constitutes a related offense. [7] Moreover, just as Tobey rejected connecting offenses solely on the basis that they are of the same or similar character, MCR 6.120 omits that language from its definition of related offenses. [8] Therefore, the court rule's definition of related offenses requires the same connection between criminal offenses for joinder and severance purposes that Tobey did.