Opinion ID: 1172467
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Propriety of Jury Instructions on Issue of Liability

Text: (4) National and Klein next object to certain jury instructions. They first complain of an instruction that ... [i]f a person initiating a judicial proceeding does not have an actual and honest belief in the validity of the claim asserted by him then he does not have a [ sic ] probable cause to initiate such proceedings. This is a correct statement of the law. Lack of probable cause may be established by proof that the action was commenced despite the initiator's knowledge of the falsity of the claim. ( Albertson v. Raboff, supra, 46 Cal.2d 375, 382.) The existence of probable cause is, in part, determined by an objective test  it is `a suspicion founded upon circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a reasonable man in the belief that the charge is true.' ( Lee v. Levison (1916) 173 Cal. 166, 169 [159 P. 438]; see also Kassan v. Bledsoe (1967) 252 Cal. App.2d 810, 816 [60 Cal. Rptr. 799].) But if the initiator knows that his claim is groundless he cannot have an actual or honest belief in its validity, and he may not escape liability for commencing an action based on such a claim merely because a reasonable man might have believed it was meritorious. (5) Defendants also challenge an instruction which sanctioned a finding of liability even if Bertero could prove that just one of three theories of liability embodied in defendants' cross-pleading was brought without probable cause. [4] In Singleton v. Perry, supra, 45 Cal.2d 489, the defendant had sworn to criminal complaints against the plaintiff who had thereupon been arrested in Cleveland, Ohio, and returned to California. After all charges had been dismissed following a preliminary hearing, plaintiff instituted two civil actions against defendant alleging, inter alia, malicious prosecution. Plaintiff was successful in but one suit and defendant appealed from that judgment. Recognizing that the adverse judgment from which no appeal had been taken was final against plaintiff, we did not question that liability for malicious prosecution could stem from the groundless criminal charge filed together with a complaint for which there was probable cause. Rather, the issue we faced was the task of assigning the burden of proving the proper allocation of damages between the harm caused by the legitimate and the groundless criminal complaints. Confronted with a similar question, the Supreme Court of Missouri reasoned, ... it would seem almost a mockery to hold that, by uniting groundless accusations with those for which probable cause might exist, the defendants could thereby escape liability, because of the injured party's inability to divide his damages between the two with delicate nicety. ( Boogher v. Bryant (1885) 86 Mo. 42, 50; cf., Gowin v. Heider (1964) 237 Ore. 266, 281 [386 P.2d 1, 391 P.2d 630].) We adopted the foregoing reasoning in Singleton and held that the plaintiff did not have the further burden of showing that her damage was specifically attributable to the malicious prosecution as opposed to the prosecution which the jury found was not malicious. ( Singleton v. Perry, supra, 45 Cal.2d 489, 498.) NGC attempts to distinguish Singleton on grounds that in criminal prosecutions each charge may independently subject the accused to incarceration while in this case only one remedy  the recovery of monies already paid Bertero under the contract  was sought with three theories for the recovery suggested. NGC reasons that applying the Singleton rationale to civil cases in which the plaintiff in the former action asserted separate theories of recovery will result in potential plaintiffs being unable to rely on multiple theories of liability stemming from a single occurrence. In Albertson v. Raboff, supra, 46 Cal.2d 375, the defendant had previously filed an action against the plaintiff seeking to recover on a promissory note and asserted therein a claim to plaintiff's real property on a theory of fraudulent conveyance. The defendant was successful in the prior action only as to the claim based on the note. Plaintiff then brought a suit charging slander of title and malicious prosecution. We held that a malicious prosecution action would lie on the claim of fraudulent conveyance despite the existence of probable cause for the remaining claims, citing Singleton. (Cf. Lerner v. Glickfeld, supra, 187 Cal. App.2d 514, 524-525.) In arguing against the application of Raboff and Singleton in the instant circumstances, NGC urges [t]he test should be whether [defendants] had reasonable grounds to seek the relief they sought in their Cross-Complaints, not whether they had such grounds for asserting each of the three theories contained in the Cross-Complaint. We disagree. A plaintiff acting in good faith may safely sue on alternative theories after full disclosure to counsel when he possesses a reasonable belief in the validity of each of those theories. If his original pleading (or cross-pleading) advances a theory which subsequent research or discovery proves to be untenable the pleading may be amended. We see no reason for permitting plaintiffs and cross-complainants to pursue shotgun tactics by proceeding on counts and theories which they know or should know to be groundless. [5] (6a) Defendants finally attack the instructions as a whole, alleging that the charge constituted a hortatory espousal of plaintiffs contentions and contending that several alleged incomplete formula instructions were purely and simply virulent and coercive. The thrust of the assault is that the repetition of several key phrases and theories during the course of the charge was prejudicial, the theory being that the judge unduly influenced the jury in Bertero's favor. No material substantive errors bearing on liability other than those already discussed are raised. Initially, we note the jury was charged that (1) no undue emphasis was intended by repetition of any rule, direction or idea; (2) instructions on the measure of damages should not be interpreted to mean that liability must be found; and (3) the judge did not intend to intimate how any issue should be decided and if any juror believed such intimation was present such should be disregarded. Of course such admonitions will not salvage an inherently one-sided charge although the giving of such instructions should be considered in weighing the net effect of the charge. ( Lewis v. Doyle (1957) 149 Cal. App.2d 176, 183 [307 P.2d 965].) Focusing on the specifics of defendants' allegations relating to the charge as a whole, we find that the first questions the repetition of key words and theories relating to probable cause and malice. (7) Mere repetition of key words or emphasis on certain issues does not per se constitute prejudicial error ( Taha v. Finegold (1947) 81 Cal. App.2d 536, 544 [184 P.2d 533] and cases cited therein), but such repetition is a factor to be considered in determining whether the charge is prejudicial. (6b) Here, a lengthy and somewhat repetitive charge was unavoidable. The trial was long and bitterly contested and the issues, particularly malice and probable cause, were confusing. The jury was instructed on malice in relation to such issues as (1) the necessity of proving it as an element of the tort of malicious prosecution, (2) the allocation of the burden of proving it, (3) the various definitions of it, and (4) the manner in which it may be proven (i.e., through inference from lack of probable cause). It would have been error had the judge failed to explain the intricacies of that body of law. (8) Several instructions are challenged as incomplete formula instructions. Formula instructions may unduly emphasize one party's case and incomplete formula instructions often mislead the jury. Reviewing courts have long frowned on their use (see Taha v. Finegold, supra, 81 Cal. App.2d 536, 543) although, again, the mere giving of such instructions does not mandate a reversal. In analyzing whether the giving of an alleged formula instruction constitutes prejudicial error, the proper test is whether the instruction purports to state all the elements involved in the case and whether the omitted elements are covered by specific instructions elsewhere. ( Sandoval v. Southern Cal. Enterprises, Inc. (1950) 98 Cal. App.2d 240, 253 [219 P.2d 928]; Amidon v. Hebert (1949) 93 Cal. App.2d 225, 227 [208 P.2d 733]; cf. Spear v. Leuenberger (1941) 44 Cal. App.2d 236, 249 [112 P.2d 43].) One instruction so challenged here failed to mention the affirmative defense of reliance on the advice of counsel. The defendants cannot seriously argue that the jury was unaware of that defense or confused about its elements since it was fully explained in other unchallenged instructions. Nor could the challenged instruction have diverted the jury from that defense. One lengthy instruction discussed the three theories incorporated in defendants' affirmative defense in the prior action. Defendants contend it introduced irrelevant and prejudicial matters to the jury. They argue that the cross-action was merely a common count not necessarily based on the duress, lack of consideration or undue influence theories. For reasons heretofore considered in our discussion of multiple theories of recovery it is manifest that the argument ignores reality and is groundless. (6c) The defense did not propose a complete set of instructions to convey its theory of the case to the jury. [6] Although all instructions are deemed excepted to (Code Civ. Proc., § 647), it remains the duty of a party to propose complete and comprehensive instructions in accordance with his theory of the litigation. ( Switzer v. State of California (1969) 269 Cal. App.2d 627, 635 [75 Cal. Rptr. 371].) Defendants' failure to present evidence and to propose instructions consistent with their theory of the case necessarily resulted in a charge favorable to Bertero. However, in the absence of substantively incorrect instructions, our inquiry is limited to whether that charge was prejudicial to defendants. Whether a jury has been misled by an erroneous instruction or by the overall charge must be determined by an examination of all the circumstances of the case including a review of all of the evidence as well as the instructions as a whole. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475; Bridgman v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 443, 450 [2 Cal. Rptr. 146, 348 P.2d 696]; Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co. (1958) 49 Cal.2d 652, 660-661 [320 P.2d 500]; Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co. (1970) 10 Cal. App.3d 376, 407 [89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 47 A.L.R.3d 286].) Upon such a review we cannot say that the jury was misled or that it is reasonably probable that a different verdict on liability would be returned absent the alleged bias in the charge. Defendants' contention that the instructions were inadequate must, accordingly, be rejected insofar as they relate to defendants' liability for malicious prosecution.