Opinion ID: 1760241
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Foote Affidavit

Text: Crowell further argues that the circuit court erred in excluding the Foote affidavit. Crowell wanted to introduce the affidavit to show what Foote found while correcting the fistula. She also sought to have her expert Bruce Halbridge, M.D. rely on the affidavit. We first address the issue of the affidavit's admission to prove Barker's conduct. Admission of evidence is under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Martin v. Arkansas, 354 Ark. 289, 119 S.W.3d 504 (2003). Foote was never deposed. While this case was being prepared for trial, Foote was diagnosed with cancer. During treatment he passed away from an unexpected pulmonary embolism. Prior to his death, many months passed while Foote was still sufficiently healthy to submit to a deposition; however, Foote was never deposed. By the time of trial, the only evidence of Foote's opinion was his medical records and the affidavit provided by Crowell. The medical records were used at trial. We hold that the affidavit was correctly excluded from evidence. Where testimony is offered by way of an affidavit from a person who is not present at trial, the affidavit constitutes inadmissible hearsay. Greenlee v. State, 318 Ark. 191, 884 S.W.2d 947 (1994). Further, we have stated that [a]n affidavit is not admissible to prove a fact in issue. Harris Constr. Co v. Powers, 262 Ark. 96, 115, 554 S.W.2d 332, 341 (1977). We have repeatedly held that the affidavit of one not present at the trial cannot be used as independent evidence. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 220 Ark. 373, 376, 247 S.W.2d 966, 968 (1952), citing Smith v. Feltz, 42 Ark. 355, 357 (1883), where this court stated, a statement or declaration, though made under the sanction of an oath, and reduced to writing, is not allowable as evidence on the trial of an issue raised by the pleading, unless an opportunity has been afforded the adverse party to cross-examine the witness. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in excluding the Foote affidavit. We also hold that there was no error in refusing to allow Haldridge to base his testimony on the affidavit. We review the admission of expert testimony under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Collins v. Hinton, 327 Ark. 159, 937 S.W.2d 164 (1997). Evidence of what Barker did during the course of the hysterectomy was introduced at trial by way of medical records and testimony. Foote's medical records were available and were relied upon by the experts in this case. Medical records are the quintessential example of the type of facts or data reasonably relied upon by experts in the field of medicine. Glidewell v. S.C. Management, Inc. 923 S.W.2d 940 (Mo.App.1996). Arkansas Rule of Evidence 703 provides that the facts or data relied on by an expert need not be admissible in evidence if it constitutes facts or data reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject. The test stated in the rule is whether the expert's reliance is reasonable. Collins, 327 Ark. at 165, 937 S.W.2d at 165; Dixon v. Ledbetter, 262 Ark. 758, 762, 561 S.W.2d 294, 296 (1978). Rule 703 is obviously not intended to give an expert witness license to merely repeat hearsay for the sake of bringing such information before the fact finder. Rather, it is to enable the expert to make certain assumptions for the purpose of arriving at an opinion within the witness's area of expertise. Sims v. Safeway Trails, Inc., 297 Ark. 588, 592, 764 S.W.2d 427, 429 (1989). Counsel for Crowell stated to the circuit court that, [o]n May 6, 2004, I provided the affidavit. TR441. Crowell's counsel further stated that Foote was identified as an expert prior to preparation of the affidavit; [i]t was indicated that, I'm going to use this guy and here's his opinion. It's a writing under oath. TR442. Thus, the affidavit was prepared by counsel in anticipation of litigation. Affidavits prepared by counsel in anticipation of litigation do not constitute facts or data of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions. See, e.g., United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that a doctor's report prepared at the request of counsel for the government was a forensic medical opinion and not of the type relied upon by experts in forming opinions). The court stated that, [r]eports specifically prepared for purposes of litigation are not, by definition, `of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field.' Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d at 1143 (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 703). The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the affidavit. Affirmed.