Opinion ID: 493352
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Settling Defendants Paid Their Proportionate Share

Text: 24 The trial court found no genuine issue of material fact existed to dispute that the directors' collective settlement represented their proper share of damages awarded plaintiffs. The lower court found support for this decision in 1) its earlier approval of the directors' settlements pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e), 2) the Harmsen files and records of which it took judicial notice, and 3) its settled belief and perception that Mrs. Smith was significantly more culpable than the directors. This court finds that the evidence on which the trial court based its decision fails to support adequately a conclusive finding that the settling defendants paid their proper share of damages. 25 In the court's determination of whether to approve a settlement pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e), the court considers factors that relate primarily to interests of the plaintiffs and the settling defendants. 3 See Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620, 623 (S.D.N.Y.1972). The interests of the nonsettling defendants are secondary. 4 Unlike a Rule 23(e) determination, how contribution should be apportioned among defendants turns primarily on the interests of and the relationship between the defendants in the case. See id. The different nature of the two proceedings does not allow a finding that a fair settlement was obtained under Rule 23(e) to be used as conclusive proof that a settling defendant has paid its proper share of damages relative to the nonsettling defendants in an action for contribution. The trial court in this case, therefore, improperly relied on the results obtained in its Rule 23(e) hearing as a basis for its decision in this action. 26 The trial court also based its decision on the record and files of the Harmsen litigation of which it took judicial notice. The record does, as the trial court found, reflect that Mrs. Smith was a highly culpable party. There is little, if any, evidence in the record, however, to establish the extent of the settling defendants' culpability and, more importantly, no evidence which either compares or allows a comparison of the extent of the fault of the settling and nonsettling defendants. 27 Finally, the trial court based its decision, in part, on its settled belief and perception that Mrs. Smith was more culpable than the settling defendants. It is important that a trial judge not confuse his own knowledge with judicial notice as his knowledge lacks the requisite indicia of indisputability. C. Wright & K. Graham, 21 Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 5104, at 192 (1986 Supp.). As stated, the facts of which the trial judge could take judicial notice are inadequate to support a finding that the settling defendants paid their proper share of damages. Thus, this court can give no weight to the trial judge's perception of the parties' relative culpability. 28 After de novo review, we find that the three bases for support used by the trial court are inadequate to support its finding that no genuine issue of material fact exists to dispute whether the directors paid their proper share of damages. 29 III. Whether to Reassign to Different Trial Judge 30 Mrs. Smith requests that on remand this court exercise its supervisory powers under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2106 to reassign the case to a different trial judge. See United States v. National Medical Enters., Inc., 792 F.2d 906, 914 (9th Cir.1986). Remand to a different trial judge is appropriate under a demonstration of personal bias or in unusual circumstances. See, e.g., Davis & Cox v. Summa Corp., 751 F.2d 1507, 1523 (9th Cir.1985); Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 765 F.2d 756, 763 (9th Cir.1984). To determine whether unusual circumstances exist the court considers:(1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected, (2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. 31 United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir.1979) (quoting United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.1977) (en banc )). 32 We find no evidence of any personal bias by the trial judge in this case. Nor do we believe he would have any difficulty in taking a fresh approach to the case on remand free from any previously-expressed views or findings. We, therefore, reverse the order granting summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.