Opinion ID: 2454387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Guilt-Phase Prosecutorial Misconduct

Text: Storey asserts error in the prosecutor's references to Frey teaching handicapped children, her serious relationship with Dan Cruz, and the match of fingerprints in Frey's apartment with Storey's inked prints on file with the St. Charles Police Department. Opening statement, previewing the evidence, may refer to admissible evidence. See State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641, 656 (Mo. banc 1993). Frey's occupation was admissible because her co-workers discovered her body. Frey's relationship with Cruz was relevant because he was the last person to talk to her and tried to call repeatedly the day after the murder. The reference to inked prints was permissible because police solved the crime by comparing Storey's inked prints with a bloody palm print in Frey's apartment. The prosecutor could not describe this key point without referring to the inked prints on file. The opening statement did not indicate why the police department had Storey's prints on file, and thus, did not necessarily imply a previous arrest to the jury. Point denied.
Storey argues that seven errors in the State's guilt-phase closing argument justify plain error reversal. A court should rarely grant relief on assertions of plain error at guilt-phase closing because, absent an objection, the trial court's options are limited to an invited interference with summation, which increases the risk of error. State v. Clemmons, 753 S.W.2d 901, 908 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948, 109 S.Ct. 380, 102 L.Ed.2d 369 (1988). First, Storey asserts error in the prosecutor's statement about finding Storey's palm print in Frey's apartment (despite his attempt to wipe prints away): Was it luck or was it divine intervention? Storey invokes State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641, 656 (Mo. banc 1993), where this Court cautioned both sides to avoid excessive Biblical references (but did not find plain error). Here, the prosecutor's reference to divine intervention was not excessive, and permissibly highlighted the police's good fortune that Storey missed the key palm print. Second, Storey claims that references to his inked prints were improper. This argument was identical to that at guilt-phase opening ( see section III.G.1. above), and was not improper. Third, Storey claims error when the prosecutor said the police were professional, did everything necessary, and he was proud of them. Other than the statement of pride, the references were permissible inferences from the evidence. Clemmons, 753 S.W.2d at 908. The prosecutor's statement of pride in the police, while unduly personal and irrelevant, is not so improper and prejudicial as to be plain error. See Debler, 856 S.W.2d at 656. Fourth, Storey claims error in the prosecutor emphasizing the implausibility of Storey's testimony by saying: I'm just sorry that we don't have a sixth count of perjury. Storey argues this both inflamed the jury and injected evidence of uncharged crimes. Storey testified at guilt phase, putting his credibility into issue. State v. Wren, 643 S.W.2d 800, 802 (Mo. banc 1983). The prosecutor's reference to perjury was a rhetorical means of arguing that Storey's testimony was not believeable. While overdone and not condoned, the reference was not plain error. See Clemmons, 753 S.W.2d at 908 (calling defense witnesses liars not prejudicial where evidence supported challenge to credibility). Fifth, Storey claims the prosecutor impermissibly personalized his argument by numerous uses of I. Using I does not automatically inject personal beliefs into the argument. Debler, 856 S.W.2d at 656. Review of the entire argument reveals no personalization rising to the level of plain error. Sixth, Storey claims the the prosecutor erred in arguing that, though no semen was found, Storey could still have sexual assault as a motive to enter Frey's apartment. Sexual assault does not require an emission. See §§ 566.010, .040, .050 RSMo 1986. The argument was legally accurate; permitting it was not plain error. Seventh, Storey claims error in the argument that everyone in the courtroom wanted a first-degree murder conviction. This rhetorical flourish was not plain error.