Opinion ID: 180651
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal Standards for Tolling Due to Mental Impairment

Text: The district court and parties put forth several different approaches for evaluating a petitioner's mental illness in this context. We start with the district court's formulation. Under the district court's analysis, Bills must show: he was unable by reason of mental defect to understand his need to timely file a habeas petition and unable to take steps to effectuate that filing. Included within this showing would be a demonstration that during the pertinent period, he was unable to ask for available assistance in filing the habeas [petition]. The court based that standard on its reading of Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam), where the Supreme Court held, in the context of whether a defendant is mentally fit to stand trial, the issue is whether [the petitioner] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understandingand whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Id. at 402, 80 S.Ct. 788. Bills argues this standardapplicable to mental competency to stand trialis too narrow. He contends his mental disabilities impaired his ability to communicate rationally with the federal courts, i.e., prepare a written application, thereby making it impossible for him to comply with AEDPA's filing deadlines. The state, in contrast, urges us to find Bills was competent if he had a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him and he has the current ability to consult his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. Each of these positions has some merit. To answer this question, like the district court, we start with applicable Supreme Court precedent. Several cases are instructive, though not fully on point. The first case is Dusky. In its brief per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court set forth the standard a defendant must meet to be competent to stand trial. Competency to stand trial includes both (1) whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; and (2) whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. 788. As the Court later emphasized in reiterating the Dusky standard, it has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975). Several years later, the Supreme Court expanded its use of the Dusky standard to pretrial proceedings. In Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993), the Court held the same standard should apply in determining whether a defendant is competent to plead guilty and knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to assistance of counsel. Id. at 398, 113 S.Ct. 2680 (rejecting the notion that competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to counsel must be measured by a standard that is higher than (or even different from) the Dusky standard). But in a 2008 case, the Supreme Court held a different standard for mental competency should apply to a defendant seeking self-representation at trial. In Indiana v. Edwards, the Court held defendants do not have a Sixth Amendment right to refuse court-appointed counsel and represent themselves if they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. 554 U.S. 164, 178, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008). Although the Court did not define precisely the self-representation competency standard, it did conclude competency to represent oneself is a higher bar than Dusky's competency to stand trial standard. Courts may take realistic account of the particular defendant's mental capacities, and find some defendants competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. Id. at 177-78, 128 S.Ct. 2379. None of these cases precisely apply here, but they are instructive for their reasoning. For instance, in Godinez the Court held the trial competency standard applies to plea hearings because while the decision to plead guilty is undeniably a profound one, it is no more complicated than the sum total of decisions . . . during the course of a trial. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398, 113 S.Ct. 2680. The Court observed, however, that the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself. Id. at 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680. And in Edwards the Court concluded that Godinez would not apply to self-representation because a defendant who would choose to forgo counsel at trial presents a very different set of circumstances . . . [and] calls for a different standard. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 174-75, 128 S.Ct. 2379. The contrast between Godinez and Edwards shows the competency standard does not exist in a vacuum it varies in relation to the task the defendant is expected to perform. A decision to stand trial or plead guilty is different from undertaking a self-defense at trial. Given this Supreme Court authority, any standard for equitable tolling due to mental impairment must evaluate whether the petitioner's condition made it impossible to comply with the filing deadline. See Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799. We recognize the myriad circumstances at playpetitioners may be representing themselves, employing counsel, or relying on available prison resources while incarcerated. The inquiry focuses on the ability of petitioners to comply with what the law requires given their particular circumstances. With these cases in mind, we conclude that eligibility for equitable tolling due to mental impairment requires the petitioner to meet a two-part test: (1) First, a petitioner must show his mental impairment was an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control, see Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562, by demonstrating the impairment was so severe that either (a) petitioner was unable rationally or factually to personally understand the need to timely file, or (b) petitioner's mental state rendered him unable personally to prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing. [2] (2) Second, the petitioner must show diligence in pursuing the claims to the extent he could understand them, but that the mental impairment made it impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of the circumstances, including reasonably available access to assistance. See id. To reiterate: the extraordinary circumstance of mental impairment can cause an untimely habeas petition at different stages in the process of filing by preventing petitioner from understanding the need to file, effectuating a filing on his own, or finding and utilizing assistance to file. The totality of the circumstances inquiry in the second prong considers whether the petitioner's impairment was a but-for cause of any delay. Thus, a petitioner's mental impairment might justify equitable tolling if it interferes with the ability to understand the need for assistance, the ability to secure it, or the ability to cooperate with or monitor assistance the petitioner does secure. The petitioner therefore always remains accountable for diligence in pursuing his or her rights. This standard flows naturally from Dusky, Godinez, and Edwards. All three of those cases ask whether the defendant or petitioner is mentally competent to do what the law requires: in Dusky, stand trial; in Godinez, plead guilty; and in Edwards, represent oneself at trial. Our standard requires the court to evaluate the petitioner's ability to do by himself the two functions involved in complying with the AEDPA filing deadlines i.e., understand the need to file within the limitations period, and submit a minimally adequate habeas petitionand to evaluate the petitioner's diligence in seeking assistance with what he could not do alone. [3] In practice, then, to evaluate whether a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling, the district court must: (1) find the petitioner has made a non-frivolous showing that he had a severe mental impairment during the filing period that would entitle him to an evidentiary hearing; (2) determine, after considering the record, whether the petitioner satisfied his burden that he was in fact mentally impaired; (3) determine whether the petitioner's mental impairment made it impossible to timely file on his own; and (4) consider whether the circumstances demonstrate the petitioner was otherwise diligent in attempting to comply with the filing requirements. With respect to the necessary diligence, the petitioner must diligently seek assistance and exploit whatever assistance is reasonably available. The court should examine whether the petitioner's mental impairment prevented him from locating assistance or communicating with or sufficiently supervising any assistance actually found. The record does not address whether Bills was diligent in seeking assistance with his claim. Nor does it address whether there was any assistance available to Bills on reasonable terms. The magistrate judge relied on the availability of a jailhouse lawyeran inmate who assists other prisoners with legal filingsto show Bills was not entitled to equitable tolling since he had assistance in preparing legal materials during the limitations period. In support of this conclusion, the magistrate judge noted that our cases have required prisoners to demonstrate diligence by showing they sought assistance from an inmate, library personnel, or other source, if it was available. See Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1070. The availability of assistance is an important element to a court's diligence analysis. For example, if prison officials or even other prisoners were readily available to assist Bills in filing his habeas petition but Bills refused to accept their assistance, a court could conclude Bills may not have been diligent in pursuing his claims such that he is entitled to equitable tolling. That is not to say a prisoner fails the diligence requirement for refusing jailhouse assistance. It is only part of the overall assessment of the totality of circumstances that goes into the equitable determination. Thus, in many circumstances, the existence of such help would be highly relevant to the question of whether a petitioner's mental condition made it impossible to file a timely petition. But the availability of jailhouse assistance could also cut the other way. If legal help is available only because a prisoner has to resort to bribery or succumb to extortion, and a prisoner does not do so, a court would not find a lack of diligence. Here it is unclear what assistance Bills had and how that assistance, if any, bore on his ability to meet the filing deadline. Given our clarification of the legal standard governing Bills's entitlement to equitable tolling, we conclude the district court did not properly frame its inquiry into the effects of Bills's mental impairment on his ability to pursue his claims diligently during the AEDPA limitations period, including whether he had reasonable access to assistance. We therefore remand for reconsideration under the standard set forth above.