Opinion ID: 2633509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Exclusion of Hearsay Evidence as to When Miller Paid His Rent

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in excluding hearsay evidence that Miller paid the rent for his Mar Mac Manor room only 20 or 30 minutes before he was killed, which defendant maintains would have tended to show he did not steal any money from Miller. Defendant does not argue that the evidence, statements of the Mar Mac Manor manager to the boarding house owner and to investigating officers, was within any statutory exception to the hearsay rule; instead, he urges this court to hold the evidence should have been admitted on the nonstatutory ground that it was critical reliable evidence offered in a capital trial. We conclude the trial court properly declined to recognize a nonstatutory exception for the proposed evidence in this case. The issue arises as follows. Detective Frogue, who investigated Miller's death, testified he reached the conclusion that all the cash found on defendant at his arrest belonged to Clarence Wissel, and he therefore gave the cash to a member of Wissel's family. Defense counsel's question whether Frogue learned something about the money from Herb Hamilton, the Mar Mac Manor manager, drew a prosecution hearsay objection, which was sustained. Out of the jury's presence, defense counsel offered to show that Hamilton, deceased by the time of trial, told Frogue that Miller had given him the rent at 9:00 or 9:30 on the night of January 10, after Miller had dinner at the Yum Yum Restaurant and shortly before he was killed. He argued such evidence was important to dispel any impression that at the time of his death Miller still had the hundreds of dollars the Yum Yum cashier observed, and hence that defendant stole that money from Miller. Counsel conceded he could think of no applicable exception to the hearsay rule, but argued due process required the trial court to admit the evidence under a catchall exception. The court excluded the offered hearsay, ruling it was not within any exception and was unnecessary in light of Frogue's testimony that he had concluded all the money found on defendant was taken from Wissel. The offer was later renewed, counsel noting that Hamilton's statement was recorded in two police reports, but again arguing not for any statutory exception to the hearsay rule but for a due process or catchall exception. The court adhered to its earlier ruling, stating as well that it did not consider the evidence entirely reliable. Marjorie McCrory, owner of the Mar Mac Manor, testified for the defense that she kept records of rent, which was paid to her manager, in a diary. The diary reflected that Miller had paid his $275 monthly rent on January 10, 1989, the day of his death. The entry did not say what time the rent was paid or whether it was in cash or by money order, but McCrory remembered that Miller always paid cash. Just before McCrory testified, addressing records we'll be seeking to use, defense counsel showed the court and prosecutor that, at the bottom of her diary entry regarding Miller, McCrory had written murdered by a parolee shortly after paying rent on January 10th. Counsel explained he had advised McCrory not to discuss that note during her testimony pending any ruling you [the court] might make on it, and that [a]ssuming that you find that that's not appropriate, I would ask the Court might also advise her similarly. The court then cautioned McCrory, out of the jury's presence, not to volunteer anything about her note regarding Miller's death. While the defense clearly made an offer of proof as to Frogue's testimony, the colloquy over McCrory's testimony does not demonstrate the defense sought to introduce her note regarding Miller's death or to elicit testimony to the same effect. Rather, it appears counsel (for obvious reasons) wanted to avoid McCrory saying that Miller was murdered by a parolee shortly after paying his rent. Counsel asked the court to caution McCrory not to discuss the note, and the court, without prosecutorial objection, did so. Defendant, by requesting exclusion rather than admission of the evidence, waived any appellate claim that the note, or testimony in accord with it, should have been admitted. (See Evid.Code, § 354.) Moreover, defense counsel did not suggest any statutory hearsay exception was applicable to either McCrory's or Frogue's testimony. Defendant now asserts the statement in McCrory's records was arguably within the business records exception (Evid.Code, § 1271) and the statement to Frogue might be viewed as an excited utterance ( id., § 1240), but he provides no actual arguments for either assertion, even in response to the Attorney General's detailed arguments to the contrary. The defense completely failed to establish at trial the foundational facts necessary for these exceptions, for example that McCrory's note as to the agency, criminality, and time of her tenant's death was made in the regular course of her boarding house business ( id., § 1271, subd. (a)) or that Hamilton's statement to Frogue was made spontaneously and while Hamilton was under the stress of excitement caused by perceiving the event narrated ( id., § 1240, subd. (b)). The burden of producing evidence to establish these foundational facts fell to defendant as the proponent of the evidence, and in the absence of such foundational evidence, we will not assume error. ( People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1177-1178, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.) Although California appellate courts have the authority to recognize nonstatutory exceptions to the hearsay rule, we do so cautiously in light of the venerable policy against admitting declarations by witnesses who cannot be cross-examined. ( People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 268, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3.) Whether or not an exception for critical reliable evidence in capital cases might deserve recognition, this case does not present a suitable occasion because the evidence at issue was neither critical nor entirely reliable. The jury heard that on January 10, 1989, Miller withdrew $340 from his bank account, paid his $275 rent, ate dinner at a restaurant, and had about $35 on his person when he died. Consistent with this, the jury also heard that the investigating detective had concluded the more than $1,000 in cash found on defendant when he was arrested came largely or wholly from Wissel. Defendant argues the testimony of the Yum Yum Restaurant cashier, that Miller had what looked like several hundred dollars in cash when he ate dinner, could have led the jury to surmise Miller had hundreds of dollarswhich defendant stoleeven after paying his rent. But no such inference arises naturally from the evidence; a juror could conclude at least as readily that Miller had disposed of his cash by paying his rent after dinner. Moreover, evidence Miller did pay the rent after dinner would not establish that he did not have additional cash on hand at the time of his encounter with defendant. Defendant fears one or more jurors might have imagined Miller had much more on hand during the day of January 10 than the $340 he had withdrawn, so much that even after paying his rent he still had hundreds of dollars when he ate dinner at the Yum Yum Restaurant. But a juror who imagined Miller had this much additional cash could as easily believe he still had it when he was attacked by defendant despite having paid his rent after dinner. The timing of Miller's rent payment does not show how much cash he had on January 10 in addition to the rent money. Finally, and most importantly, robbery murder was established as fully by evidence defendant attempted to rob Miller as by evidence he actually completed a robbery. The prosecution case for attempted robberyconsisting largely of the fellow tenants' testimony that Miller's assailant demanded moneywas unaffected by the defense suggestions that nothing was actually taken from Miller's room. The proposed evidence was therefore not critical to the defense. As to reliability, McCrory's note reflects a statement made by Hamilton that includes his conclusions, drawn from unknown sources, that the killing was murder by a parolee and states only that Miller had paid his rent shortly before being killed, which does not pin down the time to before or after dinner. Hamilton's statement to Frogue may be reliable enough in itself, and was apparently more precise as to timing, but, as the Attorney General notes, cross-examination of Hamilton, were he available, might have shed a different light on his statement, for example by showing Miller had a significant sum left even after paying his rent. The principle behind the hearsay rule, that declarations not subject to cross-examination are inherently unreliable, is applicable here and militates strongly against creating a new exception to the rule in this case. For the same reasonsthe evidence was neither critical to the defense case nor wholly reliableits exclusion did not deprive defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial.