Opinion ID: 718605
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Reasonableness Factors

Text: 36 Once a plaintiff has demonstrated the requisite minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state, a court is required to continue to the reasonableness stage of the inquiry and apply the five-factor test of Asahi to assess whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113, 107 S.Ct. at 1033 (quotation marks omitted); see A.I. Trade Fin., 989 F.2d at 83 (Once minimum contacts have been established, the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction must be determined by an evaluation of several factors including the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief.) (internal quotation marks omitted). 10 37 As our dissenting colleague points out, the Supreme Court has not had occasion to conduct the reasonableness inquiry in a general jurisdiction case--Asahi and Burger King were both specific jurisdiction cases. However, every circuit that has considered the question has held, implicitly or explicitly, that the reasonableness inquiry is applicable to all questions of personal jurisdiction, general or specific. In Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F.3d 848, 851 n. 2 (9th Cir.1993), the Ninth Circuit noted that [a]lthough neither the Supreme Court nor this circuit has explicitly engaged in a separate reasonableness inquiry in a general jurisdiction case, Asahi 's interpretation of International Shoe as entailing separate contacts and reasonableness inquiries is not limited to the specific jurisdiction context. See Donatelli, 893 F.2d at 465 (discussing application of minimum contacts and reasonableness analysis in general jurisdiction case); Bearry, 818 F.2d at 377 (Even if [the defendant's] connections ... could be said to be continuous and systematic, we are persuaded that the exercise of general jurisdiction in this case would not be fair and reasonable.). Inasmuch as we see no basis for distinguishing between general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction cases for the purposes of the reasonableness inquiry, and there is no indication that the Court intended to limit the inquiry to specific jurisdiction cases, we agree with other courts of appeals that it is appropriate in general jurisdiction cases. 38 The district court found that exercising general jurisdiction over Robertson in this case would be neither fair nor reasonable under the five-factor Asahi test: 39 Plaintiff, a non-resident suing on a cause of action that arose in Florida, has no interest in the lawsuit proceeding in Vermont. No witness or other evidence is located in Vermont, and defendant is a nonresident.... Florida, the locus of the alleged tort, and New York, plaintiff's domicile, have far more significant interests in resolving the dispute. 40 Having no interest in either the litigation or the parties, this court concludes that the exercise of general jurisdiction over Robertson-Ceco would be improper. 41 Our analysis leads to the same conclusion. 42
43 Certainly, there are many difficulties associated with requiring Robertson, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania, to defend this suit in Vermont. Significantly, none of its records, files, or witnesses with information about the litigation are located there. On the other hand, the conveniences of modern communication and transportation ease what would have been a serious burden only a few decades ago. Thus, while we believe this factor cuts slightly in favor of the defendant in the instant case, we recognize that, taken alone, it falls short of overcoming the plaintiff's threshold showing of minimum contacts. 44
45 We find that the dispute between Met Life and Robertson implicates absolutely no interest of the State of Vermont. The acts and omissions that serve as the basis for Met Life's suit occurred in Texas, Missouri, and Florida. Furthermore, unlike cases in which the forum state has an arguable interest in providing redress to its own citizens for injuries occurring outside of its jurisdiction, see Caruth v. International Psychoanalytical Ass'n, 59 F.3d 126, 129 (9th Cir.1995); Grand Entertainment, 988 F.2d at 483; Interfirst Bank Clifton v. Fernandez, 844 F.2d 279, 285 (5th Cir.1988), plaintiff Met Life is both incorporated in and has its principal place of business in New York. To the extent that Robertson's business contacts with Vermont might give the state a general interest in disputes concerning its products, we agree with the Fifth Circuit: 46 The concerns that injuries might occur in the state or might somehow implicate [citizens of the forum state] are adequately protected. [The defendant] is subject to the specific jurisdiction [of forum state] courts when its product causes injuries or when it breaches a contract [in the forum state]. 47 Bearry, 818 F.2d at 377 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we believe this factor weighs heavily against the reasonableness of the court's exercise of general jurisdiction over Robertson. 48
Effective Relief 49 For similar reasons, we fail to see how the plaintiff's interests in proceeding in a convenient forum would be served by subjecting the defendant to suit in Vermont. Met Life is not a Vermont citizen and it has not identified any witnesses or other evidence more convenient to that forum. It appears that Met Life's only interest in litigating in Vermont stems from its belief that the forum may offer a more generous statute of limitations--and indeed, may be the only jurisdiction in which Met Life's suit is not barred. If we thought this consideration relevant, this factor might weigh in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction, in the sense that Vermont could be the only jurisdiction that serves the interest of the plaintiff in obtaining effective relief. However, such questions are not permissible considerations in the context of a jurisdictional inquiry. As the Supreme Court stated in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 778, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 1480, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984): The question of the applicability of [the forum state's] statute of limitations ... presents itself in the course of litigation only after jurisdiction over respondent is established, and we do not think that such choice of law concerns should complicate or distort the jurisdictional inquiry. There the Court declined to accept the defendant's argument that permitting the plaintiff's suit to proceed in the only forum where the statute of limitations had not yet run would be fundamentally unfair. If choice-of-law considerations cannot be invoked by the defendant to demonstrate the unreasonableness of exercising jurisdiction, they likewise should not complicate our analysis of the plaintiff's interests in proceeding in Vermont. 50
51 In evaluating this factor, courts generally consider where witnesses and evidence are likely to be located. See Caruth, 59 F.3d at 129; Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1552 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 907, 113 S.Ct. 2334, 124 L.Ed.2d 246 (1993). As the district court well noted, [n]o witness or other evidence is located in Vermont, and defendant is a nonresident.... Florida, the locus of the alleged tort, and New York, plaintiff's domicile, have far more significant interests in resolving the dispute. This factor strongly favors Robertson. 52
53 This factor requires us to consider the common interests of the several states in promoting substantive social policies. Met Life has not suggested, much less shown, any substantive social policies that would be furthered by permitting this case to be heard in Vermont, and we can imagine none. This factor does not favor either party in our assessment of the reasonableness criteria. 54