Opinion ID: 771917
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Costa suffered adverse work conditions, and

Text: 2. Costa's gender was a motivating factor in any such work conditions imposed upon her. Gender refers to the quality of being male or female. If you find that each of these things has been proved against a defendant, your verdict should be for the plaintiff and against the defendant. On the other hand, if any of these things has not been proved against a defendant, your verdict should be for the defendant. It then went on to give the following instruction, which is the central issue in this appeal: You have heard evidence that the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff was motivated by the plaintiff's sex and also by other lawful reasons. If you find that the plaintiff's sex was a motivating factor in the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your verdict, even if you find that the defendant's conduct was also motivated by a lawful reason. However, if you find that the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff was motivated by both gender and lawful reasons, you must decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. The plaintiff is entitled to damages unless the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant would have treated plaintiff similarly even if the plaintiff's gender had played no role in the employment decision. Caesars' principal contention on appeal is that the district court erred by giving the jury a Price Waterhouse mixedmotive instruction rather than a McDonnell Douglas pretext instruction. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). It objected to the instruction at trial and offered a McDonnell Douglas pretext instruction, which the court rejected. Jury instructions must be formulated so that they fairly and adequately cover the issues presented, correctly state the law, and are not misleading. Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1996). Generally, we review the formulation of instructions for abuse of discretion. See Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 1998). However, [i]f the instructions are challenged as a misstatement of the law, they are then reviewed de novo. Mockler v. Multnomah County, 140 F.3d 808, 812 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although the instruction did not misstate the law, Caesars argues that it was legal error to give it on the basis of the evidence presented at trial. A Title VII employment discrimination claim may proceed on either a single-motive (or pretext) theory or a mixedmotive theory. In a pretext case, an employee must first make out a prima facie case of discrimination. If the employee succeeds, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer makes that showing, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted and the burden of production then shifts to the employee to show that the employer's reason was pretext and the real reason was discriminatory. That burden merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the employee has been the victim of intentional discrimination. See Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981). In contrast, the mixed-motive theory has two steps. First, the plaintiff must show the employer has knowingly giv[en] substantial weight to an impermissible criterion, even if that criterion is only one of the factors considered. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261-62 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Second, once a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's gender into account. Id. at 258 (plurality opinion). We have not heretofore addressed directly what amount of evidence a plaintiff must offer to prove her gender was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action. 2 However, the Second Circuit's reasoning in the leading case of Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1992), is persuasive. Ostrowski explained: [I]f the plaintiff presents evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decision making process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude, and that evidence is sufficient to permit the fact finder to infer that that attitude was more likely than not a motivating factor in the employer's decision, the jury should be instructed that if it does draw that inference the plaintiff is entitled to recover unless the employer has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer would have taken the same action without consideration of the impermissible factor. 968 F.2d at 182. In Fields v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation, 115 F.3d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1997), the court further explained that the Price Waterhouse analysis provides an affirmative defense to a defendant which becomes operative only after the plaintiff has proved motivation based on an impermissible reason. 3 In defense of the court's instruction, Costa relies mainly on two incidents as direct evidence of gender-based animus: (1) an allegedly discriminatory assignment of overtime hours, and (2) a supervisor's comment referring to Costa as a bitch. With respect to the overtime claim, Costa first testified that when she confronted her supervisor about why Mark Dudenake, a male coworker, received more overtime,I was flat out told he's a man and has a family to support. On cross-examination, however, Costa retracted this testimony, admitting that her supervisor had not used the word man. The supervisor's statement was gender neutral, and Costa has failed to show that it establishes either that Dudenake received extra overtime because he was male, or that Costa was denied overtime because she was female. Indeed, it is undisputed that Dudenake had a family to support while Costa did not. Comments motivated by consideration of parental or marital status do not establish gender bias, and neither statusis protected under Title VII. See Bruno v. City of Crown Point, 950 F.2d 355, 362-63 (7th Cir. 1991). Costa also points to the testimony of Jeff Graham, a male coworker, that Assistant Warehouse Manager Karen Hallett (allegedly one of three decisionmakers in Costa's termination) told him that she wanted to get rid of that bitch, in reference to Costa. The use of the word bitch, she argues, is direct evidence that gender was a motivating factor  in her termination. Graham further testified, however, that Hallett told him that she wanted to get rid of Costa because she did not like the way that Catharina did her job and because Costa was not a team player. Other employees testified to personal animosity between Costa and Hallett, possibly exacerbated by Costa's role as union steward during a period of contentious labor relations. Testimony also showed that Hallett's aggressive management style offended other warehouse employees, both male and female. In this context, Hallett's use of the word bitch does not show discrimination because of Costa's gender. See Barnett v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 153 F.3d 338, 342-43 (6th Cir. 1998) (use of word bitch by supervisor who made it known that he disliked plaintiff and used her as the butt of office jokes is consistent with personal dislike rather than discriminatory animus); Kriss v. Sprint Communications Co., 58 F.3d 1276, 1281 (8th Cir. 1995) (use of the word bitch is not an indication of general misogynist attitude where term was directed toward only one woman rather than women in general and was, therefore, not particularly probative of gender discrimination). Costa otherwise relies upon an alleged pattern of disparate treatment favoring her male coworkers in the application of disciplinary standards and working conditions to prove the discriminatory nature of her termination. Whatever the efficacy of Costa's anecdotal evidence in establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, it does not suffice under Price Waterhouse to show that gender was a substantial motivating reason for the adverse employment actions of which she complains. Fields, 115 F.3d at 120. Costa's case comes down to the fact that she was the only woman in her bargaining unit and was treated differently from her male colleagues, but the anecdotes she presents are not substantial evidence that she was treated differently or terminated because she was a woman. Accordingly, the district court erred in giving the jury a mixed-motive instruction. Because the effect of the instruction was to shift the burden of proof to Caesars, the error was not harmless. 4 See Caballero v. City of Concord, 956 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1992). Caesars was prejudiced, moreover, by the court's instruction that the jury had heard evidence that the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff was motivated by the plaintiff's sex, a statement not supported by the record. Accordingly, the judgment must be vacated. 1