Opinion ID: 2356627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Complicity instruction was proper.

Text: Appellant next argues that the trial court erred by giving the jury an alternative instruction whereby they could find him guilty either of intending to manufacture methamphetamine or of complicity, citing Parks v. Commonwealth, 192 S.W.3d 318 (Ky.2006). He further claims that: 1) since Mrs. Pate denied entering into an agreement with Appellant to manufacture methamphetamine and pled guilty to facilitation; and 2) since no one else was charged with aiding him in his intent to manufacture methamphetamine, he should have been granted a directed verdict on the complicity charge. We find the instruction proper and the present case distinguishable from Parks . Parks states that to convict a defendant of guilt by complicity, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was, in fact, committed by the person being aided or abetted by the defendant. Id. at 327. In Parks , we noted that the evidence showed the person the appellant allegedly aided and abetted could not have committed the underlying crime. Although Mrs. Pate's guilty plea to facilitation in the instant case did not conclusively establish that she actually committed the underlying offense of methamphetamine manufacturing, there was sufficient evidence at trial for the jury to find (1) that Mrs. Pate committed the offense and Pate acted in complicity with her or (2) that Pate acted as a principal in commission of the crime. Case law predating Parks holds that where evidence is sufficient to support a conviction as either an accomplice or as a principal, an instruction in the alternative is proper. Campbell v. Commonwealth, 732 S.W.2d 878, 880 (Ky.1987). The alternative instruction on complicity in Parks, supra , was not improper solely because some co-defendants in that case entered guilty pleas to facilitation. In fact, we did not consider in Parks whether there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Parks may have acted as an accomplice to Blakeman and Morris, the co-defendants who entered guilty pleas to facilitation. See id. at 326-27. Rather, we determined that there was no evidence to support a finding that Parks acted as an accomplice to Barnes in committing an underlying offense. See id. at 327. Since we noted that there was no evidence that Barnes ever possessed certain items, such as anhydrous ammonia and starting fluid, we found that Barnes could not have committed the offense of possessing these items with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Thus, since the evidence showed that Barnes could not have actually committed this underlying offense, there was no evidence to, support a finding that Parks was guilty of complicity in aiding and abetting Barnes in such an, offense. Given the lack of any evidence to support a finding of complicity, we held in Parks that alternative instructions on complicity and intent deprived Parks of his right to a unanimous verdict. In contrast to the appellant in Parks , not only did Mrs. Pate enter a guilty plea to facilitation but evidence presented at trial could support a finding that she together with her husband actually committed the underlying offense. Sergeant Lilly testified to finding Mrs. Pate with a variety of equipment that he recognized as commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine, to hearing her admit to him that it was used to make methamphetamine, and to seeing metal fixtures boiling on the stove when Mrs. Pate allowed the officers into the apartment. Importantly, Mrs. Pate was the only person in the apartment when Sergeant Lilly arrived. Again, the jury was not required to believe her testimony that she did not make an agreement with Appellant to manufacture methamphetamine. The jury could reasonably have found that either Appellant acted in complicity with her or that Appellant was principally liable for intent to manufacture methamphetamine, especially given his statements to police that the seized equipment belonged to him. Thus, the trial court committed no error. For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment and sentence of the Bracken Circuit Court is affirmed. LAMBERT, C.J.; McANULTY, MINTON, NOBLE, and SCHRODER, JJ., concur. CUNNINGHAM, J., concurs by separate opinion.