Opinion ID: 1331614
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony by Ms. McQuaide Regarding Statements of the Child

Text: Pursuant to Rule 803(4) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, [t]he following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.  Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. See also Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W.Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990) (restating that rule). In syllabus point five of Edward Charles L., this Court explained as follows: The two-part test set for admitting hearsay statements pursuant to W.Va.R.Evid. 803(4) is (1) the declarant's motive in making the statements must be consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment, and (2) the content of the statement must be such as is reasonably relied upon by a physician in treatment or diagnosis. The medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule, as it applies to psychological treatment of alleged victims of child abuse, has received considerable attention in recent years. The unique circumstances involved in such cases have prompted many states to extend the medical treatment exception to situations in which the alleged victim makes statements to a treatment provider regarding the identity of the abuser and information about the abuse. Such discussions are perceived as being pertinent to the treatment being undertaken. See Eakes v. State, 665 So.2d 852 (Miss.1995) (statement to physician as to identity of abuser of child sexual abuse victim admissible under medical treatment exception); State v. Vosika, 83 Or.App. 298, 731 P.2d 449 (1987) (allowed testimony of physician who reasonably relied on child sexual abuse victim's identification of her abuser as a family member in treating); Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253, 104 S.Ct. 3539, 82 L.Ed.2d 844 (1984) (statements by victim to nurse and a physician identifying defendant as abuser were admissible). [5] Courts have observed that `testimony pertaining to the identity of the defendant and the nature of the sexual assault [are] wholly relevant and pertinent to proper diagnosis and treatment of the resulting physical and psychological injuries of sexual assault. . . .' State v. Cruz, 260 Conn. 1, 792 A.2d 823, 831 (2002) (quoting State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 770 A.2d 908, 928 (2001)). Statements presented under the medical treatment exception which identify the perpetrator of the sexual abuse are deemed allowable because medical treatment in sexual abuse cases entails emotional and psychological injuries and the necessity to protect the victim from the abuser. United States v. George, 960 F.2d 97, 99-100 (9th Cir.1992). [6] Circumstances very similar to those encountered in the present case were addressed in the criminal context in State v. Pettrey, 209 W.Va. 449, 549 S.E.2d 323 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1142, 122 S.Ct 1096, 151 L.Ed.2d 994 (2002). In syllabus point nine of Pettrey, this Court explained as follows: When a social worker, counselor, or psychologist is trained in play therapy and thereafter treats a child abuse victim with play therapy, the therapist's testimony is admissible at trial under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the hearsay rule, West Virginia Rule of Evidence 803(4), if the declarant's motive in making the statement is consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment and the content of the statement is reasonably relied upon by the therapist for treatment. The testimony is inadmissible if the evidence was gathered strictly for investigative or forensic purposes. 209 W.Va. at 452, 549 S.E.2d at 326 (emphasis supplied); see also State v. Shrewsbury, 213 W.Va. 327, 329-30, 582 S.E.2d 774, 776-77 (2003). Applying that standard to the circumstances of the present case, Ms. McQuaide's testimony relating the child's statements would be admissible if the child's motive in making the statement was consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment and the content was relied upon by Ms. McQuaide. The testimony would be inadmissible if it was gathered strictly for investigative or forensic purposes. This Court has thoroughly reviewed Ms. McQuaide's testimony, as contained in the video-taped transcript from the family court hearing. The transcript contains extensive discussion regarding the distinctions between forensic (investigative) and clinical (treatment) elements. Ms. McQuaide unequivocally stated that she worked in a dual capacity, initially evaluating the situation in a forensic manner in order to gather information necessary for evaluation and treatment and subsequently treating the child over the course of numerous counseling sessions. Thus, the information accumulated by Ms. McQuaide was not gathered strictly for investigative or forensic purposes. Pettrey, 209 W.Va. at 452, 549 S.E.2d at 326. The child revealed intimate issues regarding the sexual abuse to her counselor, Ms. McQuaide, in the process of participating in ongoing treatment. The content of the child's statements was reasonably relied upon by Ms. McQuaide for treatment. Consequently, this Court finds that the requirements of Pettrey for the introduction of Ms. McQuaide's testimony regarding statements made to her by the child during counseling were satisfied. The circuit court order acknowledged that Pettrey would permit the testimony if the motive in making the statement is consistent with the purposes of treatment. . . . However, the circuit court found that Pettrey would not permit introduction of this testimony because the use made of the child's out-of-court statements . . . was to find that the child was sexually abused by the Petitioner's husband. The court concluded that it was therefore clear that this evidence was considered not for purposes of treatment, but to support the finding of fact that the Petitioner's husband committed the sexual abuse that was alleged. This is an `investigative or forensic' purpose forbidden by Pettrey.  We reverse the circuit court's finding that such testimony was inadmissible. The Pettrey standard requires an examination of the child's motive in originally making the statement. On the contrary, the circuit court examined the matter in terms of the use ultimately made of the child's statement. [7] By so examining the statement, the circuit court erroneously concluded that the testimony was inadmissible.