Opinion ID: 2733246
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: General Principles of Finality

Text: Under § 1291, a “final” decision is “one that conclusively determines the pending claims of all the parties to the litigation, leaving nothing for the court to do but execute its decision.” Citizens Accord, Inc. v. Town of Rochester, N.Y., 235 F.3d 126, 128 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978)). “The purpose of this rule is to provide the parties with an opportunity for a single review of all the questions raised at the trial level and thereby to avoid the waste of time and the delay in reaching trial 11 finality which ensue when piecemeal appeals are permitted.” Nelson, 468 F.3d at 119 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). “Finality is determined on the basis of pragmatic, not needlessly rigid pro forma, analysis.” Fiataruolo v. United States, 8 F.3d 930, 937 (2d Cir. 1993). In general, “[a]ll that is required [to confer appellate jurisdiction] is that there be some manifestation by the district court that it intends the decision to be its final act in the case.” Nelson, 468 F.3d at 119 (internal quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, a district court’s intent, standing alone, is not sufficient to confer finality upon every decision. See Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 246 F.3d 176, 181 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A] district court’s assertion of finality cannot deliver appellate jurisdiction to review a decision that is not otherwise ‘final’ for purposes of § 1291.”). Instead, the district court’s intent “is relevant for purposes of § 1291 [only] when the court’s rulings reveal that the action could be final and it therefore matters whether the trial judge contemplated further proceedings.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also Dudley v. Penn-America Ins. Co., 313 F.3d 662, 668 (2d Cir. 2002) (Sotomayor, J. concurring) (“The determination of whether a final judgment has been rendered is made by examining the record of the case both for the necessary elements of such a judgment . . . and for the court’s intent that its ruling represent the final disposition of the case.”). Ultimately, “[a]ppealability turns on what has been ordered, not how it has been described” by the district court. Henrietta D., 246 F.3d at 181 (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying these principles, the district court’s December 2010 remand order is not final. First, by remanding to Reliastar the issue of Mead’s eligibility for “any occupation” benefits without addressing the merits of that issue, the court’s order did not “conclusively 12 determine[ ]” Reliastar’s liability for Mead’s sole federal claim under § 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA.4 See Citizens Accord, 235 F.3d at 128. Reliastar argues that Mead’s eligibility for “any occupation” benefits is a separable issue that “has no legal effect or impact” on our review of the only issue it seeks to challenge on appeal—the propriety of the district court’s determination that Mead was eligible for “own occupation” benefits. While it may be true that Mead’s eligibility for “any occupation” benefits has no practical effect on whether she is entitled to receive “own occupation” benefits, this has no impact on our jurisdiction because a district court’s decision that does not dispose of all of the plaintiff’s claims for relief is not “final.” See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976) (decisions granting partial summary judgment but leaving the “award[] of other relief . . . to be resolved have never been considered . . . ‘final’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291”). Second, even if we could distinguish between Mead’s requests for “own occupation” and “any occupation” benefits for purposes of our jurisdictional analysis, the district court’s decision as to “own occupation” benefits would itself not be final because the court did not determine the amount of those benefits owed to Mead. Instead, the court remanded this 4 In her initial complaint, Mead sought only a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to 24 months of “own occupation” benefits, and did not allege that she was entitled to “any occupation” benefits. In her first summary judgment motion, however, Mead requested a monetary judgment awarding benefits for the “any occupation” benefits period. Following the district court’s first 2008 remand, Reliastar determined that Mead was not entitled to “any occupation” benefits based on its conclusion that she was not totally disabled and Mead, without objection from Reliastar, sought judicial review of this determination in her second summary judgment motion. Because the parties have consistently treated Mead’s eligibility for “any occupation” benefits as part of her overarching ERISA claim, we treat this issue as if Mead raised it in her initial complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) (“When an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties’ express or implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings.”); accord Jund v. Town of Hempstead, 941 F.2d 1271, 1287 (2d Cir. 1991) (refusing to exclude claims not alleged in complaint where claims had been addressed on the merits both on summary judgment and at trial). 13 issue for Reliastar to calculate the amount, explicitly recognizing when denying Reliastar’s first stay motion that “there ha[d] been no monetary award in th[e] case” and that its December 2010 “judgment” did not “set out an amount that Reliastar [was] required to pay.” Because the district court left unresolved the amount of relief, its December 2010 order was not final. See Henrietta D., 246 F.3d at 180-82 (declaratory judgment found not appealable where it “did nothing more than determine liability, leaving the measure of prospective relief for another day”); In re Fugazy Express, Inc., 982 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1992) (“An order granting summary judgment on the issue of liability, but requiring a calculation of damages, is not an appealable final order); see also Rekstad, 238 F.3d at 1262 (“[A] district court’s grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff on an ERISA claim that [leaves] the question of damages unresolved [is] not a final appealable order.”). With respect to the above rule, Reliastar argues that it is entitled to application of the exception under which an order resolving liability but not damages is considered final when only “ministerial tasks relating to computation of damages remain[.]” In re Penn Traffic Co., 466 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 2006). The “ministerial” designation, however, is “reserved for the case where an award can be executed after a simple arithmetic calculation or where there remains only some other mechanical task.” Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aera Boliviana, 99 F.3d 538, 541 (2d Cir. 1996). Here, the formula used by the Plan to calculate Mead’s “own occupation” benefits is dependent upon resolving a number of underlying factual questions that, as Reliastar acknowledges, remain disputed following Reliastar’s calculation of the benefits amount on remand.5 These continuing disputes regarding the total amount of the 5 The district court summarized the Plan’s formula for calculating benefits as follows: 14 award convince us that the calculation of Mead’s “own occupation” benefits is not a “ministerial” task. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 841 F.2d 494, 496 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (citing the parties’ disagreement regarding damages calculations as evidence that those calculations were not “ministerial” for purposes of determining finality). The district court’s directive to “close the case” and its subsequent entry of a separate “judgment” does not alter the conclusion that the December 2010 order is not final. As we already have observed, finality ultimately turns on the substance of the district court’s order, such that “a district court’s assertion of finality cannot deliver appellate jurisdiction to review a decision that is not otherwise ‘final’ for purposes of § 1291.” Henrietta D., 246 F.3d at 181. Where, as here, the substance of the remand order from which the appeal is taken leaves unresolved issues as to liability and prospective relief, the district court’s entry of a separate judgment and its “directive to close the case [are] insufficient to vest this Court with The Plan’s Schedule of Benefits provided that for Total Disability an individual would ordinarily be covered under a Base Plan which provided a Monthly Income Benefit of “[t]he lesser of 40% of your Basic Monthly Earnings or $15,000.00, minus Other Income.” Basic Monthly Earnings was defined as “salary or wage you receive for work done for the Policyholder.” Basic Monthly Earnings included bonuses “for those employees with a written bonus agreement that is specifically based on sales of ReliaStar Financial . . . products and/or products of a Relia[s]tar Financial . . . subsidiary,” but did not include, among other things, incentive compensation. According to the Plan, “Other Income” includes among other things federal and state social security and disability benefits, “[s]alary continuance benefits provided through your employer; and “[s]alary, commission, bonus or any other income you earn from any work while receiving benefits, except as explained for Residual Disability or the Rehabilitative Work Benefit;” and “voluntarily selected” early retirement benefits. If the receipt of “Other Income” reduced the benefit to less than $50.00, the Plan provided that a minimum monthly income benefit of $50.00 be paid. Mead, 755 F.Supp.2d at 519 (citations and footnote omitted). 15 jurisdiction under § 1291.” Id. at 179-81 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Young, 671 F.3d at 1215-16 (although the district court entered “what purported to be a final judgment,” ERISA remand not “final” because the court “did not end [the plaintiff’s] case and left unresolved her entitlement to benefits under the Plan”); Gerhart v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 574 F.3d 505, 511-12 (8th Cir. 2009) (district court’s direction to “terminat[e]” the case and its entry of a separate judgment did not render an ERISA remand order “final” where the court’s order lacked a “clear and unequivocal manifestation . . . that its order [was] the end of the case”); Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 1153, 1161 (10th Cir. 2007) (same). Reliastar expresses concern that it will lose its future right to appeal the remand order unless we reverse the district court’s “judgment closing the case.” This concern is not unwarranted. For example, if, on remand, an ERISA plan administrator issues a determination sufficiently favorable to a plaintiff that the plaintiff has no reason to seek further judicial review, then the plan administrator is without an obvious avenue to challenge any eligibility determinations made by the district court in its remand order. That is, there is no explicit path by which a plan administrator may reenter the federal court and seek appellate review of substantive rulings made in remand orders. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (not listing plan administrators as “[p]ersons empowered to bring a civil action”); see also Bowers, 365 F.3d at 537 (recognizing that ERISA plan administrators may not be able to challenge their own eligibility determinations). To protect the plan administrator’s appellate rights, four circuits have attempted to ensure that either party, including the plan administrator, can return to the same district court and obtain entry of a final judgment, which may be appealed 16 and thus provide procedurally for a challenge to the remand order. See Petralia, 114 F.3d at 354; accord Dickens, 677 F.3d at 234; Young, 671 F.3d at 1216; Bowers, 365 F.3d at 537. As the First Circuit explained in Petralia: Ordinarily implicit in a district court’s order of remand to a plan fiduciary is an understanding that after a new decision by the plan fiduciary, a party seeking judicial review in the district court may do so by a timely motion filed in the same civil action, and is not required to commence a new civil action. To avoid any misunderstanding that might otherwise occur, we state that we interpret the order of the district court in this case as having retained jurisdiction, in this sense, to hear and decide any timely motion for judicial review filed after further proceedings before the plan fiduciary. This is so regardless of whether the case is formally held open or instead administratively closed on the district court docket in the meantime. Petralia, 114 F.3d at 354; accord Dickens, 677 F.3d at 234 (adopting this rule); Young, 671 F.3d at 1216 (adopting this rule); Bowers, 365 F.3d at 537 (adopting this rule and noting that it “allow[s] either party to challenge the [plan administrator’s] ensuing eligibility determination [on remand] by motion before the same [district] court”). We believe that this rule is a sensible one that does not run counter to ERISA’s statutory text. Although ERISA authorizes various types of “civil action[s]” by specifying the permissible plaintiffs, defendants, claims, and remedies for each action, see generally 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), it does not contain any provisions governing remands to plan administrators once those actions have been initiated, nor does it explain how judicial review of determinations made on remand is to occur, compare 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (authorizing “a civil action” to challenge a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security and defining the district court’s power to remand and to review the Commissioner’s decisions on remand). Thus, while ERISA, by its terms, may preclude a plan administrator from challenging its own determination by filing a separate civil action because plan 17 administrators are not listed as permissible plaintiffs in § 1132(a), nothing in the statutory text prevents a plan administrator from seeking the entry of a final judgment after its determination on remand by filing a motion in a pending civil action. Once the court enters a final judgment, the plan administrator may then challenge the remand order on appeal from that judgment. See In re Barnet, 737 F.3d 238, 246 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[A]n appeal from any . . . final order[] opens the record and permits review of all rulings that led up to the judgment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We thus adopt the rule that a district court’s ERISA remand order will generally be interpreted as having retained jurisdiction over the case such that either party may seek to reopen the district court proceeding and obtain a final judgment. The district court’s December 2010 remand order in this case is amenable to such an interpretation. As discussed, notwithstanding its directive to “close the case” and its entry of a separate judgment, the district court’s December 2010 remand order was nonfinal as a result of its failure to resolve conclusively the issues of liability and damages. The district court’s actions following the entry of its remand order also suggest that it retained jurisdiction in anticipation of taking further action once the proceedings on remand occurred. The court acknowledged that “there ha[d] been no monetary award in th[e] case” and that its “judgment” did not “set out an amount that Reliastar [was] required to pay,” thus indicating that it intended to rectify that omission once Reliastar calculated the appropriate amount. The district court also denied Mead’s motion to reopen after Reliastar denied her request for “any occupation” benefits on the ground that it “lack[ed] jurisdiction to reopen th[e] case” while this appeal remained pending. See Webb v. GAF Corp., 78 F.3d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 1996) 18 (“[T]he filing of a notice of appeal ordinarily divests the district court of jurisdiction over issues decided in the order being appealed.”). We see this as a further indication that the district court intended to retain jurisdiction during the proceedings on remand because the court gave no suggestion that the filing of a new action was necessary for it to consider the arguments raised in Mead’s motion. Cf. Somoza v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 538 F.3d 106, 113 n.5 (2d Cir. 2008) (determining that the district court intended to relinquish jurisdiction in its order remanding to an agency because, inter alia, the court suggested in its remand order “that any further action in federal court would require the filing of a new complaint”). Reliastar may therefore return to the district court after the proceedings on remand and seek the entry of a final judgment, which it may then appeal. For all of these reasons, the district court’s December 2010 remand order is not “final” under the general principles of finality. As a result, it is immediately appealable only if the collateral order doctrine applies. That doctrine permits an immediate appeal of an otherwise nonfinal order if the order conclusively “resolve[s] important questions separate from the merits” that is “effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.” Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). The December 2010 order is not appealable under this doctrine because, among other reasons, the question that it resolved— whether Mead is eligible for “own occupation” benefits under the Plan—is central to the merits of the parties’ dispute and, as we have discussed, may be appealed following the entry of a final judgment after the proceedings on remand. See Swint, 514 U.S. at 42. 19