Opinion ID: 184828
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Angle of Draw Presumption

Text: The Association's most vigorous challenge is to the regulation establishing a rebuttable presumption of causation: If damage to any non-commercial building or occupied residential dwelling or structure related thereto occurs as a result of earth movement within an area determined by projecting a specified angle of draw from the outermost boundary of any underground mine workings to the surface of the land, a rebuttable presumption exists that the permittee caused the damage. The presumption will normally apply to a 30-degree angle of draw. 30 C.F.R. s 817.121(c)(4)(i) (1998). As the agency explained,the angle of draw is the angle of inclination between thevertical at the edge of the underground mine workings andthe point of zero vertical displacement at the edge of asubsidence trough. 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,738. It is one wayto define the outer boundary of subsidence displacement thatmay occur at the surface. Id. Once the presumption is triggered, the burden shifts to themining company to offer evidence that the damage is attributable to another cause. The regulation suggests some examples: that the damage predated the mining in question; thedamage was proximately caused by some other factor orfactors and was not proximately caused by subsidence; or thedamage occurred outside the surface area within which subsidence was actually caused by the mining in question. 30C.F.R. s 817.121(c)(4)(iv). Appellant claims that this presumption actually shifts theburden of proof to mining companies to show a negative-- that their operations did not cause subsidence--and that sucha shift runs afoul of the Administrative Procedure Act giventhe agency's posture in such situations as proponents of anorder. See 5 U.S.C. s 556(d) (1994); Director, Office ofWorkers' Compensation Programs, Dep't of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 281 (1994). The governmentresponds that the agency's regulation merely shifts the burden of production not the burden of persuasion, and it is onlythe latter that the APA forbids. See id. at 279-80. Althoughwe recognize that at a certain point along an evidentiarycontinuum a shift in the burden of production can become defacto a shift in the burden of persuasion, we do not think it isnecessary in this case to draw the line. For a factualpresumption that causes a shift in the burden of productionmust be reasonable (as we explain below, this means essen- tially that the circumstances giving rise to the presumptionmust make it more likely than not that the presumed factexists, see Secretary of Labor v. Keystone Coal Mining Corp.,151 F.3d 1096, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). For two reasons,the agency's presumption fails that test. The first is that thenature of subsidence evidence that triggers the presumptionhas become hopelessly confused in this litigation, and thesecond is that the geographical boundary in which the presumption obtains--the angle of the draw--is irrationallybroad. The regulation states that the presumption is employedwherever damage to a structure covered by the EnergyPolicy Act occurs as a result of earth movement within theangle of the draw, 30 C.F.R. s 817.121(c)(4), which gives riseto the question: What is the conceptual relationship betweensubsidence (which, it will be recalled, the parties agreerefers to mining subsidence) and earth movement? Onappeal, contrary to its position in the district court, thegovernment explains that earth movement does not meanany earth movement but only earth movement consistentwith subsidence and that any resulting damage to coveredstructures (also necessary to trigger the presumption) is alasconsistent with the kind of damage caused by subsidence. Appellant cries foul. It claims the government cannot shiftthe meaning of the regulation during litigation. Before thedistrict court the government appeared to argue that proof ofsubsidence in fact (that is, coal mining subsidence) was necessary to trigger the presumption. It is not uncommon, however, when an agency regulation is challenged in a facial attack,as Congress permits parties to do, that the meaning ofdisputed provisions does not appear clearly until the case isbefore the courts of appeals. We typically accept the agency's construction--which often eliminates or narrows the dispute--because we recognize the agency is entitled to deference as to the meaning of its own regulation. Auer v.Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462-63 (1997); Serono Lab. v. Shalala,158 F.3d 1313, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Association of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246, 1251-52 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P.,117 F.3d 579, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom.Pollin v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 118 S. Ct. 1184 (1998). Yet, we are entitled to expect that at least by the time of oralargument the agency will have settled on an interpretationthat reflects its fair and considered judgment, Auer, 519U.S. at 462--and that such an interpretation is understandable. The government assures us that, despite some vacillation, ithas come to rest, but, unfortunately, if it has, we do notunderstand its conceptual resting point. Pressed at oralargument to define just what earth movement consistentwith subsidence means, the government, with manifest circularity, explained that the term refers to earth movement notcaused by non-subsidence (i.e., earth movement not caused byearthquakes, floods, etc.). Establishing the cause of thedamage, however--whether subsidence or something else--isthe whole purpose of the evidentiary presumption. Indeed,as appellant correctly observes, one of the ways in which amining company rebuts the presumption is to produce evidence that the damage was proximately caused by somefactor other than mining. See 30 C.F.R. s 817.121(c)(4)(iv). It thus does not help to define the trigger for the presumption in terms of the presumption's intended result. In short,we have no clue what earth movement consistent with subsidence means and the government's efforts to enlighten uscreated instead hopeless confusion. We, of course, cannot approve a regulatory presumptionthat the agency's lawyers cannot interpret in an intelligiblefashion. But even if we did understand the relationshipbetween subsidence and earth movement, as those terms areused in the regulation, it could not stand because the geographical boundary of the area in which the presumptionoperates--the angle of the draw--is both arbitrary and capricious. That is to say, the presumption simply does not serveas a reasonable proxy to explain subsidence damage to structures. Appellant contends that the record reveals that the kind ofsubsidence that occurs within the angle of draw (pure vertical subsidence) is not the kind of subsidence (differential verticaland horizontal displacement) that ordinarily results in damage to surface structures. The very authors of the scientificstudies on which the agency relied in its proposed rulemaking, the Association points out, have specifically rejected thepredictive value of the angle of draw. And, even this evidence does not support the agency's decision to base anationwide presumption of causation on the angle of draw. The nationwide presumption is further deficient, it is argued,because it overlooks the key distinction between high extraction and partial extraction mining (damage to structures fromthe latter method is said to be unlikely); it ignores the criticalvariable of mining depth (the deeper the mine, the greatersurface area is covered by the 30-degree angle of draw, yetthe less likely is actual structural damage at the surface); andit ignores other non-subsidence causes of earth movementthat are just as likely to cause damage to structures withinthe angle of draw.1 The government's response is anemic. It emphasizes thatthe regulation permits a state regulatory authority to petitionthe Department for a different angle if it can demonstratethat its proposed angle is more reasonable, see 30 C.F.R.s 817.121(c)(4)(i), and also permits a mining company torequest a different site-specific angle if it too could demonstrate a more reasonable calculation, see id.s 817.121(c)(4)(ii). But the government does not claim--norcould it--that these safety valve provisions could save theregulatory presumption if we thought it unreasonable. As wehave said repeatedly, an evidentiary presumption is onlypermissible if there is a sound and rational connection between the proved and inferred facts, and when proof of one __________ 1 Appellant also claimed that the Department unlawfully reliedon studies not mentioned in the proposed rule. But informalrulemaking does not contemplate a closed record; the governmentis entitled to rely on information not exposed to comment so long asit is supplementary. See generally Air Transport Ass'n of Americav. FAA, 1999 WL 110689, at -6 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 5, 1999). The realproblem with the studies is that they are inadequate support for thepresumption. fact renders the existence of another fact so probable that it issensible and timesaving to assume the truth of [the inferred]fact ... until the adversary disproves it. Keystone CoalMining, 151 F.3d at 1100-01 (quoting Chemical Mfrs. Ass'nv. Department of Transp., 105 F.3d 702, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1997)(quoting NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S.775, 788-89 (1990))) (emphasis added) (internal citation andinternal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). If there is an alternate explanation for the evidence that isalso reasonably likely, then the presumption is irrational. Id. We think the government has failed to justify its presumption. It has not offered any support, scientific or otherwise,that even begins to establish that the angle of draw delimitsthe surface area within which it is logical or reasonable toemploy an evidentiary presumption of causation. Indeed, thegovernment apparently concedes that it is not supported byavailable science. This is not surprising since, as appellantargues, science seems more supportive of the view that theangle of draw has nothing whatever to do with identifyingsubsidence-caused damage to structures. A leading textbookin the field, which the government paradoxically listed assupport for the presumption, see 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,738,defines the angle of draw in such a way as to seriouslyundermine (pun intended) the government's position. SeeSyd S. Peng, Coal Mine Ground Control 422-23 (2d ed. 1986)(defining angle of draw, noting that it varies from 15 to 45degrees, and then stating: The angle of draw is more or lessof academic interest. Because the subsidence profile levelsoff and subsidence becomes very small far before it reachesthe edges of the subsidence basin[,] from [a] structural damages point of view, it is practically meaningless.) (emphasisadded). Nonetheless, the government thinks it sufficient to explainthat the angle of draw is used merely to define the boundaries of the area within which earth movement resulting fromsubsidence, if any, will most probably occur. But the realquestion in using the angle of draw to set the applicable boundaries is whether subsidence-caused damage to structures within the angle is more likely than not to occur. Afterall, the mining company's potential liability is for causingdamage to protected structures, not for causing earth movement resulting from subsidence. Unless the governmentcan establish a likely connection between the former and theangle of draw, the presumption cannot stand. The agency rejected the suggestion that the presumptionbe limited to the so-called angle of critical deformation--asmaller angle, within the angle of draw, that measures theinclination from the edge of the underground mining area tothe surface point exhibiting the maximum tensile strain orstretching. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 16,738. (Dr. Peng, a leadingexpert in the field, estimates that the angle of critical deformation is on average 10 degrees smaller than the angle ofdraw. See Peng at 423.) Although the government concedesthat subsidence-caused damage to structures within the angleof critical deformation portion of the angle of draw is morelikely to occur than in the portion of the angle of draw beyondthe angle of critical deformation, it contends that its decisionto use the entire angle of draw is justified on possibilitygrounds--the larger angle defines the outer boundary ofsubsidence displacement that may occur at the surface. (Neither in its brief nor in the preamble to the final rule, see60 Fed. Reg. at 16,738-39, we should note, has the government offered any scientific support for even the possibility ofsubsidence-caused damage within the angle of draw.) To impose a presumption of causation of damage on a partybased merely on the possibility that the party caused thedamage is to convert a factual presumption into a counterfactual presumption. Although the government has never wavered from its insistence that the presumption is a factualone, we do not see how a counterfactual procedural devicecould be justified even as a matter of policy, see Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct. 818, 828 (1998),since the statute imposes liability only for causation. Moreover, the government simply has no response at all to thedevastating objection that the angle of draw is an inherentlyillogical measure since, as a matter of geometry, the deeperthe mine the wider the angle. Yet, it seems undisputed thatthe likelihood of any structural damage on the surface decreases with the depth of the mine. Since the agency recognized, in its preamble to the final rule, see 60 Fed. Reg. at16,740, that the depth and location of the mine (and theamount of coal extracted) are all factors that bear on thelikelihood of subsidence-caused damage, the Department never even adequately explains why it wishes to employ any sortof nationwide presumption. Essentially the government argues that its presumption isjustified by efficiency; it is easier to establish a mine'sliability. There are limits to that justification, otherwise thegovernment could dispense with enforcement proceedingsaltogether. To be sure, we would be obliged to defer to areasonable agency determination of probabilities--includingpredictions based on its own expertise and policies. But wesee nothing of the sort here. We have no difficulty concluding that this regulation is both arbitrary and capriciousbecause it is irrationally overbroad, and we therefore vacateit.