Opinion ID: 204952
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vásquez's Purported Right to be Warned About the Consequences of Expedited Removal

Text: In addition to his challenge to the BIA's interpretation of § 1229b, Vásquez urges us to remand to the IJ to determine if he was given the choice of being turned away after warning [sic] that the consequences of an expedited removal would pretermit a cancellation application. Vásquez contends that [t]he INA, its implementing regulations as well as a number of circuit and [BIA] decisions indicate that at the border, an applicant for admission to the United States should be warned of the consequences and be allowed to voluntarily withdraw his application for entry and be turned away. Vásquez did not, however, exhaust this argument in the administrative proceedings below, [10] and we therefore may not consider it. See, e.g., Silva v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir.2006) ([W]e may review a final order of the BIA only if `the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.' Under the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, theories insufficiently developed before the BIA may not be raised before this court. (quoting § 1252(d)(1))). Vásquez attempts to overcome this hurdle with a series of cursory counter arguments. First, citing United States v. Sosa, 387 F.3d 131, 136-37 (2d Cir.2004), he asserts that an exception to the exhaustion requirement exists in this case [g]iven the exclusivity with which the Customs and Border Patrol officials operate, and the fact that Vásquez interacted with them pro se. Second, Vásquez suggests that the exhaustion requirement may be excused here because [t]his court could ... determine that the time frame for determinations that [Vásquez] urges are nonexistent. Finally, Vásquez asserts that any attempt to raise the argument before the [BIA] would have been futile because the [BIA] does not hear constitutional issues. None of these arguments are persuasive. First, this case does not implicate the principles at issue in Sosa, which held that, where a previous deportation order is used as an element of a criminal offense, [a] failure to exhaust administrative remedies bars collateral review of [that deportation order] under [8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) ] ... only where an alien's waiver of administrative review was knowing and intelligent. Id. As for his nonexistent time frame contention, Vásquez offers nothing more than the above-quoted sentence to support this argument, and we cannot see how this case would satisfy that exception to the exhaustion requirement. Finally, regardless of it merits, Vásquez's last argument fails because Vásquez does not actually advance a developed constitutional claim. Although Vásquez's reply brief asserts that his right-to-a-warning argument is constitutional in character, Vásquez's main brief does not. Other than a few references to fairness and fundamental fairness, the brief never suggests that it is advancing a constitutional theory. In fact, the relevant section of the brief never expressly cites to any constitutional provision. Rather, it relies on citations to the INA, corresponding regulations, and case law analyzing the BIA's interpretation of the INA.