Opinion ID: 1205332
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the evidence is the fruit of a pretextual stop.

Text: Gama contends that the traffic stop was merely a pretext to search his car for drugs and, therefore, violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 18, of the Nevada Constitution, each of which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This court, recognizing a split of authority among the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, recently announced that it would follow the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits in applying the so-called would have test to cases involving alleged pretextual traffic stops. See Alejandre v. State, 111 Nev. 1235, 1239, 903 P.2d 794, 796 (1995); see also Taylor v. State, 111 Nev. 1253, 903 P.2d 805 (1995) (applying Alejandre ). In Alejandre, this court, applying the would have test, reversed and vacated the defendant's drug conviction. We reasoned that, but for the improper purpose of searching defendant's truck for drugs, a reasonable officer would not have made the stop. [2] Alejandre, 111 Nev. at 1240-41, 903 P.2d at 797. However, in the time since this appeal was submitted, the United States Supreme Court has held that a vehicle stop that is supported by probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a traffic infraction is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, even if a reasonable officer would not have made the stop absent some purpose unrelated to traffic enforcement. See Whren v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). The bottom line, therefore, is that the could have test prevailed over the would have test. We are thus constrained to overrule Alejandre and Taylor to the extent they require application of the now-discredited would have test in resolving pretext claims under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, because we now conclude that the Nevada Constitution's search and seizure clause provides no greater protection than that afforded under its federal analogue, at least in the area of pretextual traffic stops, we now recognize the could have test announced in Whren as the proper test under the Nevada Constitution as well. [3] In the present case, the district court ruled on Gama's motion to suppress prior to the filing of this court's decision in Alejandre. Not having the benefit of our holding in Alejandre, the district court applied the less-stringent could have formulation of the pretext rule. The district court, therefore, applied the proper rule of law. Accordingly, as there is clearly substantial evidence in the record to establish probable cause for a traffic stop, we conclude that Gama's contention that he was subjected to a pretextual traffic stop is without merit.