Opinion ID: 354019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Bribery Counts

Text: 45 In count twelve appellant Tate was charged with having given appellant Evans five hundred dollars at the time Evans left his job at the Republic National Bank of Dallas and started to work for H.E.W., in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 201(f). Count thirteen charged Evans with having accepted that unlawful five hundred dollar gratuity in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 201(g). The only probative evidence of any significance that was presented in the government's case in chief was a statement made by Evans acknowledging that he had accepted the money. At that point, Tate's name had been deleted from the statement. The jury was carefully instructed that the statement could be considered only against Evans. After Evans took the stand in his own defense, an unexpurgated version of the statement was placed before the jury which mentioned Tate by name. Both Tate and Evans moved for judgments of acquittal when the government rested; the motions were renewed at the close of all the evidence. In addition, Tate filed a post-verdict motion for a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. 46 Tate did not take the stand, and presented only character evidence in his own behalf. The fact that his co-defendant testified cannot imply a waiver by Tate of his objections to the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Arias-Diaz, 497 F.2d 165, 168-69 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,420 U.S. 1003, 95 S.Ct. 1445, 43 L.Ed.2d 761 (1975); Cephus v. United States, 324 F.2d 893, 897-98 (D.C.Cir.1963). He has renewed his objection on this appeal. 47 The test to be applied by the trial court in passing on a motion for a judgment of acquittal is whether, taking the view most favorable to the government, a reasonable minded jury could accept the relevant evidence as adequate and sufficient to support the conclusion of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a); United States v. Jeffords,491 F.2d 90, 91 (5th Cir. 1974). When the sufficiency of the evidence is attacked on appeal, the same standard must be met. United States v. Lowry,supra; United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032, 1040 (5th Cir. 1971). When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a case involving extrajudicial admissions, corroborating evidence also must be evaluated. In Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 75 S.Ct. 158, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954), the Supreme Court held that an accused's extrajudicial admissions of essential facts or elements of the crime, made subsequent to the crime, are of the same character as confessions, and corroboration by independent evidence is required. The corroboration need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti. It is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential admitted facts sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth; but those facts plus the other evidence must be sufficient to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We examine appellants' contentions separately. 48 With respect to Tate, the government concedes that the evidence was not sufficient to withstand a motion for a judgment of acquittal. We agree. At the close of the government's case, when Tate's first motion for judgment of acquittal was timely made, there was no significant evidence on which Tate's guilt under count twelve could be determined. Up to that point, his name had been deleted from Evans' statement. Thus, the motion for judgment of acquittal was well founded and should have been granted. United States v. Arias-Diaz, supra; Cephus v. United States, supra. The government suggests that we should apply the concurrent sentence doctrine to pretermit any decision on the sufficiency of the evidence and the concomitant motions for judgments of acquittal. We disagree and reverse Tate's conviction under count twelve. 49 The concurrent sentence doctrine provides that if a defendant is given concurrent sentences on several counts and a conviction on one count is sustained then the reviewing court need not consider the validity of the convictions on the other counts. E. g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 n.6, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 87 L.Ed. 1774 (1943); United States v. Crockett, 514 F.2d 64, 74 (5th Cir. 1975). See generally Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 527. However, the question of whether the concurrent sentence doctrine is to be applied in a given case is addressed to our judicial discretion. United States v. Abigando, 439 F.2d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 1971). In this case, in which several defendants were charged with a complex interrelated series of offenses, the lack of prejudice is not apparent and the possibility of adverse collateral consequences does not appear remote. Thus, we decline to exercise our discretion to ignore Tate's attack on his conviction under count twelve. 21 See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 848 n.16, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 791, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969); United States v. Casey, 428 F.2d 229, 232 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 839, 91 S.Ct. 78, 27 L.Ed.2d 73 (1970). Most significant, and dispositive, to our decision not to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine is the fact that here the government has agreed that there was not sufficient evidence on which to convict Tate under count twelve. The government admits that it has failed to meet its burden of proof on count twelve; yet, would have us apply a doctrine of appellate judicial economy to uphold the conviction. We cannot countenance such a result. The government has not affirmatively demonstrated that the likelihood of harm either in the form of collateral consequences or of prejudice in sentencing and at trial was so remote as to be insignificant on the facts. See United States v. Binetti, 547 F.2d 265, 269 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 552 F.2d 1141 (1977); Note, The Federal Concurrent Sentence Doctrine, 70 Colum.L.Rev. 1099, 1117 (1970). See generally, Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 527. Here the conviction under count twelve was not so inextricably bound up with the other convictions to require their invalidation. See United States v. Plyman, supra. 50 Since United States v. Musquiz, 445 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1971),  the usual practice of this Circuit when reversing a conviction due to insufficient evidence has been to remand with directions for a new trial if a motion for a new trial was made in the trial court. Greene v. Massey, 546 F.2d 51, 56 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 432 U.S. 905, 97 S.Ct. 2949, 53 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1977) (citations therein). In Musquiz this Court attempted to reconcile Supreme Court case law concerning the constitutionality, under the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, of permitting an accused to be retried after his conviction has been reversed for lack of evidence to support the verdict. Compare Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552, 70 S.Ct. 317, 94 L.Ed. 335 (1950) and Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373, 75 S.Ct. 422, 99 L.Ed. 426 (1955) and Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416, 80 S.Ct. 481, 4 L.Ed.2d 412 (1960). In dictum that has since become the general rule in this Circuit, this Court concluded that (t)he distinction between Bryan, on the one hand, and Forman and Sapir on the other, seems to turn, under the present state of the law at least, on whether the defendant made a motion for a new trial in the district court, if such a motion was made then, a retrial is permissible. United States v. Musquiz, supra, 445 F.2d at 966 (emphasis supplied). 22 This approach has been re-examined recently in the context of related intervening Supreme Court pronouncements. This Court determined that the additional scrutiny by the Supreme Court of instances when the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes appeals by the Government does not move the procedure begun with Bryan and adopted by our Musquiz decision from the shadows of uncertainty into the sunlight of clarity. Greene v. Massey, supra, 546 F.2d at 55 n.12. To hold, as we do, that Tate is not subject to being retried under count twelve, we need not, and do not, reach the constitutional issue. 23 We need not reach that issue first, because we immunize Tate from a second jeopardy, and second, because we base our holding on Title 28, United States Code, Section 2106. 24 In Greene v. Massey, supra at 56 n.16, this Court noted: 51 It is important to recognize that the Musquiz rule is not a mandatory practice in all instances. The wording of § 2106 speaks in terms of . . . such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances. (emphasis in original) 52 Since the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated when this Court immunizes a defendant from a second trial, the section 2106 just under the circumstances standard permits this Court to direct that, as to Tate, count twelve of the indictment be dismissed on remand when, as here, the prosecution has had an opportunity to fully develop its case and failed to do so or when the prosecution did fully develop its case, and it is determined that a judgment of acquittal should have been granted because of insufficient evidence to support a conviction. Greene v. Massey, supra at 56 n.16; United States v. Brumley, 560 F.2d 1268, 1277 (5th Cir. 1977), citing, United States v. Koonce, 485 F.2d 374, 382 (8th Cir. 1973). See United States v. Bass, 490 F.2d 846, 852-53 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Peterson, 488 F.2d 645, 651 n.14 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 828, 95 S.Ct. 49, 42 L.Ed.2d 53 (1974); United States v. Parks, 460 F.2d 736, 746 (5th Cir. 1972). 53 The issue of the sufficiency of the evidence regarding Evans is decidedly different, and we must decide it differently. Evans did testify, and his testimony cured the deficiency in the government's case. His voluntary statement, 25 which was read to the jury, acknowledged that he had received five hundred dollars just prior to leaving his job at the Republic National Bank, at a time when the donor knew that Evans had accepted a position in the Office of Education at H.E.W. Evans also admitted, in the statement, that he had previously recommended collection agencies to educational institutions which were clients of Republic National Bank, and that he had received money in appreciation for this business relationship. 54 During his testimony at trial, Evans insisted that the five hundred dollar payment had been handed to him physically by Gent, rather than Tate. He admitted, however, that he knew that the money had ultimately come from Tate, as President of CRCAP. 26 We find significant corroboration of Evans' extrajudicial statement in his intrajudicial admissions which we find to be credible when considered with his acknowledgment that he had previously received payments from Tate for referring collegiate customers of the Republic National Bank to CRCAP. During the course of his testimony at trial, Evans also admitted that he believed that Tate, through these payments, was just really trying to buy (his) friendship. He also admitted that he accepted two hundred dollars from Tate in January of 1974, although he said he was surprised to receive the money; the reason for the gift was not discussed. 55 These facts, when considered in the context of the entire transcript, permitted the jury to infer Evans' guilty knowledge with respect to count thirteen. The corroborating evidence, as a whole, cured any supposed deficiency in the government's proof that Evans received an unlawful gratuity from Tate, as charged in count thirteen. 27 Evans has argued that the district court committed error in denying his motions for judgments of acquittal, made at the conclusion of the government's case and at the close of all the evidence, regarding count thirteen. We must affirm the denial of the two motions. Initially, Evans' decision to take the stand was a waiver of his objection to the denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of the government's evidence: (W)e adhere to the well established, albeit criticized, rule in the Fifth Circuit that when a defendant puts on evidence in his behalf after making a motion for acquittal under F.R.Crim.P. 29(a) he waives objection to the denial of that motion . . . (footnotes omitted) United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859, 863 (5th Cir. 1976) (citations therein). See also, e. g., United States v. Phipps, 543 F.2d 576, 577 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir. 1974). Secondly, the denial of Evans' motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence was proper since there was substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the jury finding of guilt. United States v. Lowry, supra; United States v. Harper, supra; United States v. Jackson,444 F.2d 1389, 1389-90 (5th Cir. 1971).