Opinion ID: 1788217
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Warrant Requirement and the Exigent Circumstances Exception

Text: The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly identified physical entry of the home [as] the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972)). Throughout the Supreme Court's caselaw, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant. Id. at 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371. As the preceding sentence suggests, however, a well-established exception exists for the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described in our cases as `exigent circumstances,' that would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest or search. Id. at 583, 100 S.Ct. 1371. When the government invokes this exception to support the warrantless entry of a home, it must rebut the presumption that such entries are unreasonable. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984). To do so, it must demonstrate a grave emergency that makes a warrantless search imperative to the safety of the police and of the community. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 191, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). An entry is considered imperative when the government can show a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). As is often the case under the Fourth Amendment, [t]he reasonableness of an entry by the police upon private property is measured by the totality of existing circumstances. Zeigler v. State, 402 So.2d 365, 371 (Fla.1981). The circumstances in which the Supreme Court has applied the exigent circumstances exception are few in number and carefully delineated. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. at 318, 92 S.Ct. 2125. They include pursuing a fleeing felon, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967), preventing the destruction of evidence, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), searching incident to a lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), and fighting fires, Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942. Outside of those established categories, the Supreme Court has often heard, and steadfastly rejected, the invitation to carve out further exceptions to the warrant requirement for searches of the home. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 192, 110 S.Ct. 2793. In applying the exigent circumstances exception, we have explained its general parameters: The kinds of exigencies or emergencies that may support a warrantless entry include those related to the safety of persons or property, as well as the safety of police. Of course, a key ingredient of the exigency requirement is that the police lack time to secure a search warrant.... Moreover, an entry based on an exigency must be limited in scope to its purpose. Thus, an officer may not continue her search once she has determined that no exigency exists. Rolling v. State, 695 So.2d 278, 293 (Fla. 1997) (citations omitted). In other words, where safety is threatened and time is of the essence, we have recognized that the need to protect life and to prevent serious bodily injury provides justification for an otherwise invalid entry. Arango v. State, 411 So.2d 172, 174 (Fla.1982).