Opinion ID: 1842845
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Arising Out of the ... Use of an Uninsured Motor Vehicle.

Text: We have previously considered the meaning of the phrase arising out of in the context of UM provisions of an insurance policy substantially identical to the UM provision at issue in this case. In Hollingsworth, we indicated the phrase should be broadly construed and that it only requires some causal relationship between injury and risk for which coverage is provided. 553 N.W.2d at 595 (quoting Kalell v. Mut. Fire & Auto. Ins. Co., 471 N.W.2d 865, 867 (Iowa 1991)). While this standard requires something less than the traditional concept of proximate cause in the context of UM coverage, it requires something more than the mere fact that the vehicle was the situs of the injury. Id. at 595-96. From an analytical standpoint, we observe that the arising out of phrase is tied directly to the phrase use of the vehicle. Nevertheless, these two phrases actually require separate inquiries. See 8 Couch § 119:37, at 119-57 ([T]he concepts of use and legal cause should be analyzed separately, avoiding the traditional proximate cause concepts.). This means the use of the vehicle at the time of the injury must not only be a contemplated use and inherent in the purpose and nature of vehicles, but the use must be causally related to the injury. See Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 190 W.Va. 526, 438 S.E.2d 869, 872-73 (1993) (Use must be foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the vehicle as a vehicle.); see also Detroit Auto. Inter-Insurance Exch. v. Higginbotham, 95 Mich.App. 213, 290 N.W.2d 414, 418-19 (Mich.Ct.App.1980). Like the arising out of phrase, the term use is broad, but not so broad as to embrace acts independent of the operation of a vehicle. See 1 No Fault and Uninsured Motorist Automobile Insurance § 9.10[2], at 9-20 to -22 (MB 2000). The vehicle must be more than the site of the tortious conduct. Widiss § 11.5, at 687. The district court found UM coverage applied because Petersen was a passenger in the uninsured vehicle being driven by Adcock, and she was injured while attempting to escape from the vehicle to avoid the assaultive actions of Adcock. American Family asserts the vehicle served as nothing more than the situs of a crime, and the cause of Petersen's injuries was the criminal acts of Adcock and the contact of her body with the pavement of the street after she jumped from the vehicle. We agree with American Family that the vehicle was merely the situs of the initial assault perpetrated on Petersen while it was in the parking lot. See U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Lehman, 579 So.2d 585, 586 (Ala.1990) (stabbing of passenger did not arise out of use of vehicle under uninsured motorist provision of policy even though the injury occurred while vehicle was moving). However, during the course of the efforts by Petersen to extract herself from the subsequent assaults, the vehicle was used as a means of transportation, clearly a contemplated use. Thus, the use of the vehicle was causally related to the injuries she sustained when she jumped from the vehicle. Under these circumstances, the use of the vehicle became a causal factor of her injuries. We acknowledge the causal link between the use of the vehicle and the injuries suffered can be difficult to establish when intentional acts or crimes are involved. See generally Larry D. Scheafer, Annotation, Automobile Liability Insurance: What Are Accidents or Injuries Arising Out of Ownership, Maintenance, or Use of Insured Vehicles, 15 A.L.R.4th 10, 17 (1982) (noting prefatorily the general difficulty in determining whether the required causal relationship can be established in various case settings). However, intentional acts and crimes do not necessarily preclude recovery. See id. Additionally, this case involved more than a crime, and included conduct of the passenger in reacting to the crime. We conclude the evidence supported the finding of the district court.