Opinion ID: 2508644
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did Daniels' Sentences Violate her Right to Trial by Jury and to Due Process of Law Where the Jury Instructions Defining Aggravated Robbery Omitted the Element of Bodily Harm?

Text: Daniels also argues that the error requires automatic reversal because the omitted element of bodily harm is what distinguishes severity levels of robbery. See State v. Crawford, 247 Kan. 223, 795 P.2d 401 (1990) (jury instruction on aggravated burglary which erroneously omitted the essential element that a human being was inside the house was clearly erroneous because jury could find not more than simple burglary). Daniels cites Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), for the premise that any fact which increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. As noted by the Court of Appeals, Apprendi held that using a judge's factual determination to enhance a defendant's sentence invaded the province of the jury to decide whether a defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals concluded that Apprendi did not apply in this case because the trial court did not make any factual determinations which increased Daniels' sentence beyond statutorily authorized limits and did not impose an upward departure sentence. Slip op. at 9. We agree with the Court of Appeals on this point. This court has discussed Apprendi in ruling on the validity of upward durational departure sentences ( State v. Gould, 271 Kan. 394, 23 P.3d 801 [2001]), upward dispositional departure sentences ( State v. Carr, 274 Kan. 442, 53 P.3d 843 [2002]), the hard 40 and hard 50 sentencing schemes ( State v. Conley, 270 Kan. 18, 11 P.3d 1147 [2000]; and State v. Douglas, 274 Kan. 96, 49 P.3d 446 [2002]), and the procedure for authorizing adult prosecutions ( State v. Jones, 273 Kan. 756, 47 P.3d 783 [2002]). However, this court has never applied Apprendi in a case involving erroneous jury instructions. Daniels does not cite any authority to support her theory. Furthermore, an examination of decisions of the United States Supreme Court leads us to conclude that even if an Apprendi -type error did occur, Daniels' argument fails because the alleged error was not structural. Thus, reversal is not automatic, and the analysis of Neder and Johnson still apply. Since Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court has unanimously reiterated that the trial court's failure to instruct a jury on all of the statutory elements of an offense is subject to harmless-error analysis. E.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19, [144 L. Ed. 2d 35, 119 S. Ct. 1827] (1999). Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. ___, 157 L. Ed. 2d 263, 269, 124 S. Ct. 7, 11 (2003). The Mitchell Court did not discuss Apprendi in relation to this issue. In United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (2002), the Court did find Apprendi error in the omission from a federal indictment of a fact that enhanced the statutory maximum sentence. However, as in Neder, the Court relied upon Johnson and concluded the error was not structural. 535 U.S. at 632. Consequently, the Cotton Court applied a plain error analysis, one aspect of which requires determination of whether the error affects substantial rights which usually means that the error `must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.' 535 U.S. at 632 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508, 113 S. Ct. 1770 [1993]). The Cotton Court compared the failure to include an element in the indictment to the situation in Johnson in which the district court failed to submit an element of the false statement offense, materiality, to the petit jury. The Johnson court noted that the evidence of materiality was overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted. 520 U.S. at 470. The Cotton court applied the same test and determined that the evidence regarding the omitted element of the indictment, the quantity of drugs, was overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted and concluded that [s]urely the grand jury would have found the quantity of drugs sufficient to meet the enhancement criteria. 535 U.S. at 633. Thus, even if there was Apprendi -type error, which we decline to decide, our analysis would still be that the evidence of bodily harm was essentially uncontroverted. Accordingly, we reject Daniels' arguments that the omission of the bodily harm element requires reversal.