Opinion ID: 2174939
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judicial Delay

Text: Appellant contends that the lower court's failure to order a new trial sua sponte because of the inordinate delay between trial and decision was an abuse of discretion. Appellant is correct that the court below had the power to grant a new trial sua sponte, if in its opinion justice so required. Getz v. Balliet, 431 Pa. 441, 446, 246 A. 2d 108 (1968); Fisher v. Brick, 358 Pa. 260, 262, 56 A. 2d 213 (1948). The question, then, is whether the court abused its discretion by failing to do so. Nothing in the record indicates that any party was responsible for this delay; the fault appears to have been that of the trial judge. Such dereliction flouts the proud promise of the Magna Carta: to none will we . . . deny, to none delay, either right or justice. It contravenes the guarantee of the Constitution of this Commonwealth that . . . Every man . . . shall have . . . right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Article I, Section 11. It flies in the teeth of the statutory standard that the decision of a court sitting without a jury . . . shall be filed . . . as early as practicable, not exceeding sixty days from the termination of the trial . . . [1] The right to have justice administered without delay is a fundamental right which should not be infringed unless no other course is reasonably possible. Kelly v. Brenner, 317 Pa. 55, 59, 175 Atl. 845 (1934). We said in General Foods Corp., 429 Pa. 266, 271, 239 A. 2d 359 (1968), that as a matter of judicial administration we would not condone an eighteen month delay but that we could understand it. A seven year delay we neither condone nor understand; we can only deplore it. While there may have been extenuating circumstances of which we have no knowledge, we must express our sense of dismay and chagrin that a delay so protracted could occur in the courts of this Commonwealth in the 1960's. Our unhappiness with this delay is not, however, a sufficient ground for ordering a new trial, for such an order would still further defer the end to this litigation. If the facts of this case support the decision as rendered, we would compound the injustice by requiring the parties to return to their pre-1960 positions and begin anew the trial of this case. Accordingly, we hold that the lower court's failure to grant a new trial solely because of the long-delayed decision was not an abuse of discretion.