Opinion ID: 821294
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mootness in Challenges to Ongoing Policies

Text: Our mootness inquiry, however, is not complete. Some cases hold that disputes over an ongoing policy may continue, even after the specific offense precipitating the suit has become moot. See, e.g., Super Tire Eng’g Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 121-24 (1974); Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. United States, 570 F.3d 316, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1118 (9th Cir. 2003). In those cases, if a litigant challenges the policy through a declaratory judgment, then the case should proceed when “ ‘the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.’ ” Super Tire Eng’g Co., 416 U.S. at 122 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)). In addition, the ongoing 18 No. 11-2314 policy must be a “continuing and brooding presence” that “casts . . . a substantial adverse effect on the interests of the petitioning parties.” Id. The foundational Supreme Court case establishing this mootness exception is Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115. In that case, New Jersey state regulations provided welfare benefits to striking workers. Id. at 116. A company sought two forms of relief: an injunction to prevent the State from using funds for those benefits and a declaratory judgment to find that several federal laws preempted the state regulations. Id. at 118-19. Before the district court could rule, the strike at issue ended. Id. at 120. Although the district court still reached the merits, the Third Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. Id. at 12021. The Supreme Court, however, found that the claim for declaratory relief still presented a live controversy. Id. at 122. Even though intervening events had settled the act precipitating the suit, the case was not moot because “the challenged governmental activity . . . has not evaporated or disappeared, and, by its continuing and brooding presence, casts . . . a substantial adverse effect on the interests of the petitioning parties.” Id. The Court also found that the case fit within the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception, but that was merely an alternative holding. Id. at 125-26. Subsequent cases support finding a separate exception for mootness when a suit challenges a policy with the kind of lasting effects discussed in Super Tire Engineering Co. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 No. 11-2314 19 U.S. 320, 327-28 (2000) (declaratory judgment on the propriety of electoral redistricting is not moot, even when the next election will not occur until after data from the next census becomes available, because the previous redistricting, if valid, will form the baseline upon which to judge future redistricting), superseded on other grounds by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(c); Del Monte Fresh Produce Co., 570 F.3d at 321 (“a plaintiff’s challenge will not be moot where it seeks declaratory relief as to an ongoing policy”); N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. Grandeau, 528 F.3d 122, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J.) (challenge to an order to report certain billboard expenses as lobbying activity is not moot, even when the dispute about the particular billboard has ended, because there was a challenge to an alleged ongoing policy); Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 165 n.6 (3d Cir. 2008) (challenge by school board to the district court’s finding that a regulation was facially unconstitutional is not moot, even when the contract of the faculty member challenging the regulation expired, because the school board cannot enforce the regulation as to any other faculty members); Harris v. City of Houston, 151 F.3d 186, 191 n.5 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[r]equests for declaratory relief may sustain a suit only when the claims challenge some ongoing underlying policy rather than merely attacking an isolated action”) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted); City of Houston v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 24 F.3d 1421, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[i]t is well-established that if a plaintiff challenges both a specific agency action and the policy that underlies that action, the challenge to the policy is not necessarily 20 No. 11-2314 mooted merely because the challenge to the particular agency action is moot”). There is tension, however, between applying the “time frame” approach to mootness and preserving challenges to ongoing policies. Typically, when a concrete dispute ends, the individual involved would no longer have the ability to bring suit (and would thus lack “standing in a time frame”). Yet, cases like those discussed above have proceeded, and the Supreme Court did not explicitly mention this exception as one overlooked by the time frame conception. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190-91. For that reason, it is tempting to lump these cases into the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception. Doing so would smooth out any incongruity, as the Supreme Court did acknowledge the incompleteness of the “time frame” approach when that exception applies. Id. at 190. In fact, the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception could be an alternative holding for some cases in which challenges to ongoing policies are not moot. See Super Tire Eng’g Co., 416 U.S. at 125-26. In other situations, however, using the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception is more like fitting a stepsister’s oversized foot into Cinderella’s dainty glass slipper. This narrow exception “applies only where (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.” United States v. Juvenile Male, 131 S. Ct. No. 11-2314 21 2860, 2865 (2011) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The Ninth Circuit, in particular, has shoehorned ongoing policy challenges into that exception. Its case law creates a new variant of the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception for such disputes, even when the parties would not otherwise qualify for the exception as articulated doctrinally. See L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 669 F.3d 956, 958 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012). Still, the Ninth Circuit has only applied this expanded exception when a civil class action would be inappropriate—namely, cases involving treatment of criminal defendants or prisoners. See Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2012); see also L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 669 F.3d at 958 n.1; United States v. Brandau, 578 F.3d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Howard, 480 F.3d 1005, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2007); Or. Advocacy Ctr., 322 F.3d at 1117-18. Considering that the parties here have neither asked us to adopt nor to broaden the Ninth Circuit’s already expanded approach (both of which would be required to apply it to this case), we need not address that question. Furthermore, without adopting the Ninth Circuit’s reading of the exception, this case plainly does not fall within the standard “capable of repetition, yet evading review” doctrine. There is no indication that the due process challenge of a probationary officer is too ephemeral to be sustained over the course of litigation. Rather, this concrete dispute ended only because Ramskugler voluntarily settled with the Board. Without the escape hatch of the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception, we return to the tension 22 No. 11-2314 between the “time frame” approach and the exception for challenges to policies with a “continuing and brooding presence,” Super Tire Engineering Co., 416 U.S. at 122. It seems likely, given that the Supreme Court has already acknowledged the incompleteness of the “time frame” approach, that these ongoing policy cases simply represent another way in which the approach does not account for an exception to mootness doctrine. Alternatively, one could view the “brooding presence” of a policy as an ongoing injury within the “time frame” of litigation. Only a few cases, however, clearly adopt that analysis, and, given the difficulty of cabining such a concept, we are reluctant to resolve the matter in that way without explicit briefing on the issue. A still third interpretation: perhaps federal courts are only prohibited from deciding cases when the issue is moot but have prudential discretion when merely the personal stake is moot. See Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 562, 599 (2009). Regardless, we do not need to answer definitively how the Super Tire Engineering Co. exception fits into the broader scheme of mootness doctrine. That question is for another day. Rather, applying the explicit language of Super Tire Engineering Co. resolves the issue here. To qualify for that mootness exception, the ongoing policy must “by its continuing and brooding presence, cast[ ] . . . a substantial adverse effect on the interests of the petitioning parties.” Super Tire Engineering Co., 416 U.S. at 122. Nothing of that sort exists here. As discussed, the MPA has not proffered any other member who is faced No. 11-2314 23 with Ramskugler’s predicament. Further still, the MPA has not referenced someone who was in that position previously, which implies that Ramskugler was merely trapped in a sparsely populated limbo. The MPA has not even pled a single injury-in-fact. As such, the MPA has given us no reason to find the continuing policy a “brooding presence” over it, much less one with a “substantial adverse effect.” Id. This case is now “an abstract dispute about the law” not linked to the rights of a particular plaintiff. Alvarez v. Smith, supra, 130 S. Ct. at 580. Federal courts cannot produce advisory opinions on such issues. It does not matter that the parties agreed to allow this suit to proceed as a declaratory judgment. They do not get to make that decision. Parties cannot contract around the limitations of federal court jurisdiction. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1986). 3. The Relationship Between Ripeness and Mootness Before concluding, a note on ripeness is warranted. When some of our sister circuits have considered challenges to policies that raise mootness concerns, they have addressed the cases under the doctrine of ripeness. See, e.g., Grandeau, 528 F.3d at 130-34 (analyzing a challenge to an alleged policy using ripeness doctrine because it was unclear to what extent the policy was officially adopted and to what extent the policy would be enforced in the future); Reg’l Mgmt. Corp. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 186 F.3d 457, 465-66 (4th Cir. 1999) (analyzing 24 No. 11-2314 a challenge to an ongoing policy against disclosing certain documents under FOIA using ripeness doctrine, when eventual receipt of the documents made the initial offense precipitating the challenge moot). Because this case was framed on appeal as a question of mootness, and that question was outcome determinative, we thought it the appropriate ground on which to rule. That said, we acknowledge that ripeness would have been a cleaner means by which to reach the same outcome. Like mootness, but unlike standing, ripeness is reevaluated throughout the course of litigation. See Anderson v. Green, 513 U.S. 557, 559 (1995) (per curiam) (when evaluating ripeness, “ ‘it is the situation now rather than the situation at the time of the decision under review that must govern’ ”) (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Reg’l Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140 (1974)). An inquiry into ripeness involves considering “ ‘the fitness of the issues for judicial decision’ and ‘the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’ ” Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland, 664 F.3d 139, 148 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983)). Here, the second factor is dispositive. As discussed earlier, the lack of injury pled by the MPA shows that it will face no hardship by with- holding consideration. In fact, at oral argument, the MPA admitted that it saw no obstacle to waiting until the situation happens again to bring suit. We think that is the correct thing to do. No. 11-2314 25