Opinion ID: 2224054
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Disclose a Material Fact to a Tribunal

Text: Respondent next asserts that the Review Board erred in finding that he committed a violation of Rule 3.3(a)(2) when he failed to advise the probate court that Nobani had closed Rice's account at Advance Bank and was in possession of a substantial amount of her funds. Rule 3.3(a)(2) provides: In appearing in a professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:    (2) fail to disclose to a tribunal a material fact known to the lawyer when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client. 134 Ill.2d R 3.3(a)(2). Respondent maintains that he could not have violated this rule because Nobani was not his client. The Administrator counters that the Review Board's decision was proper because respondent told several persons that he was Nobani's attorney and behaved as if Nobani was his client. We find that the Review Board erred in finding that respondent violated Rule 3.3(a)(2). The Hearing Board determined that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish that respondent was acting as Nobani's attorney or that respondent had any knowledge that a criminal or fraudulent act either had been committed or was going to be committed by Nobani. We cannot say that this finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. As previously stated, conflicting evidence was presented regarding respondent's statements concerning representation of Nobani. The Hearing Board assessed the credibility of the witnesses and the weight that should be afforded to their testimony, and ultimately settled the conflict in respondent's favor. Its conclusion was supported by the evidence. As respondent asserts, Rule 3.3(a)(2) applies if an attorney fails to disclose the criminal or fraudulent act of a client; we cannot apply the rule here, where the fact finder reasonably found the evidence to be insufficient to show that respondent represented Nobani. Likewise, with respect to knowledge of fraudulent conduct, the Hearing Board concluded that there was no evidence presented which demonstrated that respondent was in cahoots with Nobani or knew of Nobani's improper usage of Rice's funds. The evidence demonstrates that respondent was aware that Nobani withdrew money from Rice's account at Advance Bank, and although respondent testified otherwise, we do not believe that he was unaware of the actual sum removed, given that he was present during Nobani's conversations with the bank manager and physically in the same room when Nobani received the check. However, there is no indication that Nobani shared his plans to misappropriate the money with respondent, that respondent benefitted from the misappropriation or that respondent assisted Nobani in any fraudulent conduct. Accordingly, the Hearing Board's determination that the evidence was insufficient to prove a violation of Rule 3.3(a)(2) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We note, however, that our conclusion in this regard is not meant to condone respondent's conduct. Respondent attended the probate proceeding knowing that PLOWS was going to present a petition to freeze Rice's assets based on its belief that Nobani was improperly handling her finances. Respondent knew, at the very least, that Nobani walked out of Advance Bank with a check from Rice's account. Although respondent denies knowledge of Nobani's discussions with Alston Rucker at Advance Bank, the facts show that respondent sat next to Nobani during the entire transaction. It stands to reason that he was aware that Nobani closed Rice's CD account and had the check made payable to himself. Nevertheless, respondent stood silent as Nobani told the probate judge that he needed access to Rice's money so he could pay her bills, even though respondent had to know that Rice's bills did not exceed the amount already obtained by Nobani, particularly since the record establishes that respondent was in possession of the bills. Respondent should have disclosed this information to the court, as it was clearly significant in light of the nature of the proceedings at hand. While his failure to do so may not be sanctionable under Rule 3.3(a)(2), we feel compelled to note that respondent's conduct demonstrates a lack of judgment that is quite disturbing, particularly for a long-standing member of the bar who was previously sanctioned for dishonest conduct. We likewise remind respondent that [a] lawyer's `high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions.' In re Braner, 115 Ill.2d 384, 392, 105 Ill.Dec. 233, 504 N.E.2d 102 (1987), quoting People ex rel. Attorney General v. Beattie, 137 Ill. 553, 574, 27 N.E. 1096 (1891).