Opinion ID: 182854
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nelson Datil

Text: Datil’s sole argument on appeal is that, on rebuttal, the prosecutor impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to him by arguing to the jury that Datil’s attorney, during his own rebuttal summation, had not contended that handwriting on certain fraudulent loan application forms was not Datil’s. The prosecutor stated during the Government’s summation: Now, you saw the documents that [the other prosecutor] put in front of you that show that it appears as Mr. Datil’s handwriting. And [Datil’s counsel] did not deny that it was his handwriting; he simply said [a customer’s grandmother] didn’t say she saw it, or that [the customer] didn’t say she saw him write it. Well, he could have written it at the dealership before he drove up to Hartford. Tr. of Trial Day 15 at 246. Following the completion of that summation, Datil moved for a mistrial on the ground that the quoted comment violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment. We see no error in the court's denial of the motion. An accused has a Fifth Amendment right to remain silent during his criminal trial, and the prosecution cannot comment on that silence, see, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965), or on his failure to present a defense, see, e.g., United States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 9899 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Walker, 835 F.2d 983, 988 (2d Cir. 1987). Remarks of the prosecutor in summation, however, do not amount to a denial of due process unless they constitute egregious misconduct. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974). In order to obtain reversal of a conviction on the ground that the prosecutor has crossed the boundary between permissible and impermissible argument, the defendant must also show that the improper argument caused him substantial prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. LaMorte, 950 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1991). -3- In assessing whether the comment complained of meets this test, we consider the severity of the misconduct, the measures adopted to cure it, and the certainty of conviction in the absence of the misconduct. United States v. Melendez, 57 F.3d 238, 241 (2d Cir. 1995); see, e.g., United States v. Millar, 79 F.3d 338, 343 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430, 437 (2d Cir. 1994). Even where a prosecutor's argument was clearly impermissible, we have been reluctant to reverse where the transgression was isolated, the trial court took swift and clear steps to correct the implication of the argument, and the evidence against the defendant was strong. See, e.g., United States v. Shareef, 190 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Cruz, 797 F.2d 90, 93 n.1 (2d Cir. 1986) (in light of the record, the argument as a whole, and the curative instructions, prosecutor's statement that [t]he defense . . . has to convince you, although improper, was held not to require reversal (internal quotation marks omitted)). In the present case, the trial judge, after hearing Datil's motion for a mistrial, sent the jury home, took the matter under advisement, and addressed the matter at the start of court the next day. The court denied Datil's motion but gave the jury a curative instruction stating: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, as you heard in my initial remarks to you and as you will again hear in my charge to you, during the course of my charge, I will remind you that in a criminal case, the Defendant has no burden to produce or to explain away any evidence. To the extent that the argument of government counsel called upon any defendant to explain away any evidence, such argument was improper, illegal, and should be ignored by you. The court reiterated such an instruction in its final jury charge, stating that [i]n a criminal case, the burden is at all times upon the Government to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . This burden never shifts to the Defendant . . . . Defense counsel does not have any obligation to deny or refute any aspect of the Government's case. Nor does the Defendant himself have any burden to deny the Government's arguments or proof, or to produce any evidence whatsoever. -4- Therefore, you may not conclude that the Defendant has conceded a point because his counsel did not address it. The prosecutor's inappropriate comment that Datil's counsel did not deny the handwriting was that of Datil was but a single sentence in the rebuttal summation. Our review of the record persuades us that the evidence against Datil was sufficiently strong that the trial court's excellent curative instructions were ample to prevent any denial of due process.