Opinion ID: 1895310
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: DID THE CHANCELLOR ABUSE HER DISCRETION IN DENYING MR. McEWEN'S MOTION TO REDUCE HIS CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS?

Text: While a chancellor is accorded broad discretion in the area of modification of child support, this Court will reverse when the chancellor is manifestly in error in finding of fact or if there has been an abuse of discretion. Hammett v. Woods, 602 So.2d 825, 828 (Miss. 1992). To obtain a modification in child support payments, there must be a substantial and material change in the circumstances of one of the interested parties arising subsequent to the entry of the decree sought to be modified. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 594 So.2d 620, 623 (Miss. 1992). The change must not be one that could have been anticipated by the parties when the chancellor entered the original decree. Tingle v. Tingle, 573 So.2d 1389, 1391 (Miss. 1990). Mr. McEwen's heart attack approximately one year after the original decree was entered indisputably resulted in a precipitous decline in his income. On the testimony in this record if the original decree is left intact ordering $800.00 a month in child support, Mr. McEwen would currently be responsible for paying over one-half of his income in child support payments alone. It certainly cannot be argued that the parties at the time of the entry of the decree could have anticipated Mr. McEwen's heart attack. In Cupit v. Cupit, 559 So.2d 1035, 1038 (Miss. 1990), we held an award of $200 per child for two children to be clearly excessive in consideration of Mr. Cupit's net monthly income of $973.60. Mr. McEwen is presently required to pay an even greater percentage of his monthly income in child support than the excessive amount cited in Cupit. Mr. McEwen's ability to pay should have been more carefully considered by the chancellor when she denied his request for modification of child support payments. Examining the guidelines set forth in Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-101 (Supp. 1992), Mr. McEwen would be required to pay a total of approximately $305.00 per month for both children (20% of adjusted gross income). We have stated many times that these guidelines are only an aid to the chancellor and will be effectively rebutted by a finding contrary thereto. Hammett, 602 So.2d at 828; Thurman v. Thurman, 559 So.2d 1014, 1017-18 (Miss. 1990). It is significant to note, however, that the guidelines' suggestion and the actual child support ordered in this case constitute a difference of nearly $500 a month. It is also significant to note that the chancellor found that there had been some decrease in income, but not a material or substantial change in circumstances such as to warrant a reduction in child support payments. However, the chancellor did reduce Mr. McEwen's contribution to uninsured medical expenses. The chancellor specifically stated that since the children were currently enrolled in day care facilities which would constitute a significant portion of the child support money, the original decree should not be modified. The record actually indicates that the older of the two children would be starting kindergarten and the younger of the two would be starting pre-kindergarten. The chancellor presumably was referring to the babysitting cost of $240 a month for after school care, listed as an expense by Mrs. McEwen. The implication of the chancellor's ruling was that the children were getting a little older and starting school and therefore the $800 a month was needed for their well being. It is arguable, however, that child care expenses will actually decline when the younger child starts attending school. In Gillespie, 594 So.2d at 623, the chancellor anticipated additional expenses as a result of the child beginning kindergarten. This Court stated that beginning kindergarten did not necessarily result in additional expenses. The reasonable financial resources of the parents is one of the key factors in considering whether or not a modification in child support is in order. Mr. McEwen has the right to lead a decent life, and the present order of the chancellor will not allow him to do so. It was manifest error and an abuse of discretion for the chancellor to find that there had not been a material or substantial change in circumstances warranting a modification of Mr. McEwen's child support payments. The decree of the court below is reversed and the cause is remanded to the chancery court for a determination of Casey McEwen's present ability to pay. At rehearing, the chancellor may consider any relevant circumstances that have taken place since the decree appealed from was entered. REVERSED AND REMANDED TO THE CHANCERY COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI. HAWKINS, C.J., DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, P.JJ., and PITTMAN, BANKS, McRAE, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and SMITH, JJ., concur.