Opinion ID: 1338679
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Judge or Jury Sentencing

Text: In Ballard v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 213, 321 S.E.2d 284 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1085, 105 S.Ct. 1848, 85 L.Ed.2d 146 (1985), this Court decided that a juvenile who is transferred to circuit court and prosecuted for capital murder, but convicted by a jury of first degree murder, was properly sentenced by the judge rather than the jury. We specifically reserved decision on the question presented here, viz., whether a juvenile who is convicted by a jury of capital murder should be sentenced by the judge in accordance with Code § 16.1-272, part of the juvenile law, or by the jury pursuant to §§ 19.2-264.3 and -264.4, two of the death penalty statutes. Ballard, 228 Va. at 215 n. 3, 321 S.E.2d at 285 n. 3. In pertinent part, Code § 16.1-272 provides as follows: A. In the hearing and disposition of felony cases properly before a circuit court having criminal jurisdiction of such offenses if committed by an adult, the court, after giving the juvenile the right to a trial by jury on the issue of guilt or innocence and upon a finding of guilty, may sentence or commit the juvenile offender in accordance with the criminal laws of this Commonwealth or may in its discretion deal with the juvenile in the manner prescribed in this law for the hearing and disposition of cases in the juvenile court. Code § 19.2-264.3 provides in pertinent part as follows: A. In any case in which the offense may be punishable by death which is tried before a jury the court shall first submit to the jury the issue of guilt or innocence of the defendant of the offense charged in the indictment.... .... C. If the jury finds the defendant guilty of an offense which may be punishable by death, then a separate proceeding before the same jury shall be held as soon as is practicable on the issue of the penalty, which shall be fixed as is provided in § 19.2-264.4. As pertinent here, Code § 19.2-264.4 reads as follows: A. Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of an offense which may be punishable by death, a proceeding shall be held which shall be limited to a determination as to whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. In case of trial by jury, where a sentence of death is not recommended, the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life. Thomas contends he should have been sentenced by the judge, rather than the jury. He recognizes that jury sentencing is the general rule in Virginia and that, in capital cases, Code §§ 19.2-264.3 and -264.4 provide for jury sentencing in a separate penalty trial. He argues, however, that Code § 16.1-272 provides a specific exception to the general rule of jury sentencing. This exception, he says, accords with the state's policy in dealing with juveniles in criminal casesrehabilitation, not retribution, is the goal. We disagree with Thomas's interpretation of the cited statutes. Code § 19.2-264.3(A) and (C) provide that, in any case tried by a jury in which the offense may be punishable by death, the jury shall fix the penalty. Read alone, this language permits no exceptions, even where the accused is a juvenile who has been certified for trial on a capital case as an adult. But if, when Code § 16.1-272 is read along with §§ 19.2-264.3 and -264.4, a conflict may appear, an ordinary rule of statutory construction serves to resolve the conflict. The rule is that when one statute speaks to a subject in a general way and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more specific manner, the two should be harmonized, if possible, and where they conflict, the latter prevails. Va. National Bank v. Harris, 220 Va. 336, 340, 257 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1979). See also Hudler v. Cole, 236 Va. 389, 393, 374 S.E.2d 39, 42 (1988). Sections 16.1-272, 19.2-264.3, and 19.2-264.4 all deal with the subject of punishment of criminal offenders. Section 16.1-272 speaks to the subject in a general way, referring to the broad class of felony cases and prescribing no set penalty, while §§ 19.2-264.3 and -264.4 speak to the subject in a specific way, confining their range to the narrow class of capital cases and prescribing definite penalties. We think a conflict does exist between § 16.1-272, on the one hand, and §§ 19.2-264.3 and -264.4, on the other, so far as the punishment of juveniles certified for trial on capital cases is concerned, and, therefore, that the latter statutes prevail.