Opinion ID: 2354195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Issue of Standing

Text: The trial court held that appellant did not qualify as a tenant organization because it had failed to demonstrate that it represented the majority of individual tenants in the two buildings and had not registered with the Mayor. See D.C.Code § 42-3401.03(18) (defining tenant organization) and § 42-3404.11 (establishing registration requirement). We cannot find this analysis of the facts to be clearly erroneous. [2] The court also declined to allow appellant to amend its complaint to substitute individual tenants as plaintiffs, concluding that our decision in West End Tenants Ass'n precluded them from bringing suit under the Sale Act. The conclusion that individual tenants have no standing may seem problematic in the circumstances of this case. The Sale Act specifically states that [a]n aggrieved owner, tenant, or tenant organization may seek enforcement of any right or provision in this chapter through a civil action in law or equity.... D.C.Code § 42-3405.03 (emphasis added). [3] However, this court has twice held that individual tenants were not aggrieved within the meaning of § 42-3405.03 and thus did not have standing to sue. [4] This apparent inconsistency might be explained by reference to other portions of the Act which allow individual tenants to negotiate to buy a single-family accommodation, [5] or one with two to four units, [6] but require the tenants to form a tenant organization in order to make a contract to purchase a building with five or more units. [7] (Of course, the buildings at the center of this litigation have more than five units.) On the other hand, the tenants are not at this point attempting to purchase the buildings. They are seeking to enforce their alleged rights as individuals to receive notice of the transaction and an offer of sale. Recognizing the challenge presented by footnote 1 in West End Tenants, appellant urges us to treat that discussion as dictum. We cannot do so, however, because it provided the analytical basis for dismissing the appeals of individual tenants. 640 A.2d at 721 n. 1. Nor can we, as a division, accept appellant's invitation to reconsider that holding. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971) (only the en banc court may overrule the holding of a division of this court). Appellant asks us, therefore, to grant it associational standing. See Friends of Tilden Park, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 806 A.2d 1201, 1207-10 (D.C.2002). We need not resolve this complicated standing issue. Rather, we rely on a body of cases which permits us to assume for the sake of argument that a party has standing if the issue clearly must be resolved against that same party on alternate grounds. [8] This course is especially proper in these circumstances, where appellant directly links the viability of its CPPA claim to the merits of its Sale Act claim. In other words, as we explain below, we have to determine whether there was a violation of the Sale Act in order to resolve appellant's claim under the CPPA. (And there is no issue of standing there. The Tenants Association and individual tenants alike fit within the statutory definition of a person entitled to bring a civil action under the CPPA. See D.C.Code §§ 28-3901(1) and 28-3905(k)(1)). We therefore proceed to the question of whether this 95/5 transaction was a sale.