Opinion ID: 1890550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Specificity of Pleadings

Text: The second prong of defendant's appeal involves the capacity in which he was sued. The defendant contends that this Court's decision in Feeney either alters the existing law concerning the applicability of prejudgment interest to municipal employees who are liable in tort, or, if the law remains the same, stands for the proposition that individual capacity must be pled specifically before prejudgment interest may be added to a damage award. Feeney dealt with a fact pattern similar to that of the instant case. In Feeney, a snow plow driver employed by the Providence Department of Public Works struck a pedestrian. The pedestrian sued both the driver and the City of Providence. The trial justice found the employee to be liable and ordered both the employee and the city to pay damages. Prejudgment interest was assessed only against the driver. On appeal, this Court found that the driver/city employee was not liable for damages because he had been sued in his official capacity. Feeney, 825 A.2d at 2. Therefore, we determined that damages were recoverable from the city only. Id. at 6. Despite defendant's claim that the Feeney court found that there was no individual liability where a city snowplow operator has an accident in the course of his duties, the Feeney decision made no such pronouncement. Although this Court determined that neither damages nor prejudgment interest should be assessed against the municipal employee in that case, we did not modify or reverse the law as established in Andrade and Pridemore. Feeney paves no new ground in the prejudgment interest field. Rather, this Court held the employee not liable for damages because he was sued only in an official capacity. [A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. Capital Properties, Inc. v. State, 749 A.2d 1069, 1081 (R.I.1999) (quoting Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)). Therefore, [c]apacity is critical to the damage award because in an official-capacity suit damages are limited by the Government[al] Tort Liability Act, Feeney, 825 A.2d at 4, and governmental immunity prevents the imposition of prejudgment interest against the city. On the other hand, in an individual capacity suit there is no limitation on damages, and prejudgment interest applies. See id. In Feeney, this Court relied on the language of the plaintiff's complaint, which clearly indicated her intent to sue the defendant only in his official capacity. In fact, this Court stated, we refuse to allow plaintiff to benefit from her own poor drafting, and [defendant] to be punished by the same. Id. at 5. Therefore, the plaintiff could recover only from the city, subject to the limitations of the Governmental Tort Liability Act, and not from the city employee. In the instant appeal, the evidence is equally clear that plaintiff did not sue defendant in his official capacity. Instead plaintiff's complaint names David B. Perry and Alan Lord, in his capacity as Finance Director of the Town of Kingstown, as defendants, and alleges the negligence of Perry, the operator of a vehicle owned by the Town of South Kingstown. Likewise, plaintiff's interrogatories are directed to the Defendant, David B. Perry. Nowhere is there any indication of, or reference to, official capacity as it relates to Perry, and there are no facts to support an inference of official capacity. Additionally, the general rule is that if a defendant wishes to contest his or her capacity to be sued individually, he or she must do so in the form of an affirmative defense according to Rule 9(a). Feeney, 825 A.2d at 4; see also Super.R.Civ.P. 9(a). The defendant in Feeney was not required to contest his capacity to be sued individually primarily because the plaintiff's complaint made it clear that she intended to sue the defendant only in his official capacity. Feeney, 825 A.2d at 4. This was not the case here. Perry had ample opportunity to contest the contents of the complaint and he failed to do so. Unquestionably, Perry was not sued in his official capacity. Yet, in his appeal, defendant contends that individual capacity was not pled and cannot be inferred, and as a result, plaintiff should not be awarded prejudgment interest. The defendant relies on federal civil rights cases for the proposition that personal capacity may not be inferred unless specifically asserted in a plaintiff's pleadings. With respect to civil rights suits filed under 42 U.S.C § 1983, some federal courts do not require capacity to be specifically pled, but rather look to `the substance of the plaintiff's claim, the relief sought, and the course of proceedings to determine the nature of a § 1983 suit when a plaintiff fails to allege capacity.' Pieve-Marin v. Combas-Sancho, 967 F.Supp. 667, 669 (D.Puerto Rico 1997). Conversely, others require that plaintiffs must expressly state whether they are suing the defendants in their individual capacities; otherwise, it is presumed that they are not. Id. at 670. Within the First Circuit, the District Court of Puerto Rico has adopted the former view, while the District Court of Rhode Island has aligned itself with the latter. See Charron v. Picano, 811 F.Supp. 768 (D.R.I.1993). Moreover, Feeney does not stand for the proposition that capacity must be stated in the pleadings. It simply holds that when a suit clearly is brought against an employee in his official capacity, prejudgment interest does not apply. As this Court discussed in Feeney, the Superior Court Rules do not require a plaintiff to specify capacity in her complaint. Feeney, 825 A.2d at 4. Rule 9(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party. When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, the party shall do so by specific negative averment, which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge. This Court utilizes a liberal pleading rule, and has recognized the sufficiency of complaints even when the claims asserted within those complaints lack specificity. Konar v. PFL Life Insurance Co., 840 A.2d 1115, 1118 (R.I.2004). We therefore hold that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to specifically state in his complaint that the defendant was being sued in an individual capacity in order to assess prejudgment interest on the judgment against him.