Opinion ID: 1798001
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Timeliness of filing of affidavits

Text: ¶ 11. The Quinns filed their complaint alleging inter alia that the defendants were negligent both in their operation of the baseball camp at Mississippi State University and employment and supervision of camp instructor Keith Kosh. Alternatively, the Quinns alleged that they entered into an implied contract with the university by paying the $265 fee for their son, Brandon, to improve his playing skills in the sport of baseball. The Quinns asserted that the defendants breached this implied contract, which required the safety of business invitees, by employing an instructor that failed to conduct the camp and its activities in a safe manner. ¶ 12. The defendants responded with a motion for summary judgment and filed a brief with the court on the day of the motion hearing. On that date, the judge provided the Quinns with thirty days to respond to the defendants' brief. The Quinns submitted affidavits with their brief. [2] ¶ 13. The defendants on appeal assert that the trial judge incorrectly allowed the Quinns to submit the affidavits because their filing was untimely according to Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The pertinent portion of Rule 56(c) reads: The adverse party prior to the day of the hearing may serve opposing affidavits. M.R.C.P. 56(c) (emphasis added). The defendants' position is that affidavits must be served prior to the day of the summary judgment hearing. The Quinns submitted their affidavits after the hearing when they filed their response to the defendants' brief in support of their motion for summary judgment. According to the defendants, any consideration of the affidavits by the trial judge of those affidavits is error. ¶ 14. In Richardson v. APAC-Mississippi, Inc., 631 So.2d 143, 147 (Miss.1994), this Court discussed the striking of affidavits not timely filed. There the Court stated that the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure flow from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court quoted from Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990), where the United States Supreme Court interpreted Rules 56(c) and 6(b) in a case where the nonmovant in a motion for summary judgment did not file opposing affidavits: Respondent's evidentiary submission was indeed untimely, both under Rule 56, which requires affidavits in opposition to a summary judgment motion to be served prior to the day of the hearing, Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c), and under Rule 6(d), which states more generally that [w]hen a motion is supported by affidavit, ... opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some other time. Rule 6(b) sets out the proper approach in the case of late filings: When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect ... This provision not only specifically confers the discretion relevant to the present issue, but also provides the mechanism by which that discretion is to be invoked and exercised. First, any extension of a time limitation must be for cause shown. Second, although extensions before expiration of the time period may be with or without motion or notice, any post-deadline extension must be upon motion made, and is permissible only where the failure to meet the deadline was the result of excusable neglect. Thus, in order to receive the affidavits here, the District Court would have had to regard the very filing of the late document as the motion made to file it; it would have had to interpret cause shown to mean merely cause, since respondent made no showing of cause at all; and finally, it would have had to find as a substantive matter that there was indeed cause for the late filing, and that the failure to file on time was the result of excusable neglect. Richardson, 631 So.2d at 147 (quoting Lujan, 497 U.S. at 895-97, 110 S.Ct. 3177). ¶ 15. The Quinns state that the judge allowed them an extension to file the affidavits by granting them thirty days to respond to the defendants' brief in support of summary judgment, and that the defendants had ample time to respond to both. Their argument, in effect, claims that the defendants suffered no prejudice by the judge allowing the affidavits. The defendants claim that the opportunity to respond to their brief granted by the trial judge did not provide authority to the Quinns to submit the affidavits. ¶ 16. We hold that any consideration by the trial judge of the affidavits submitted by the Quinns was harmless error. The affidavits only affirmed the contents of the complaint filed by the Quinns. Further, the record contains sufficient evidence that the judge granted an enlargement of time in which the Quinns could file the affidavits. [3] The judge granted the Quinns time to file a response because they had only received the defendants' brief on the day of the hearing. Also, the time granted was more than was requested. ¶ 17. The filing of the affidavits did not cause the judge to consider anything that he was not already obligated to consider under Rule 56(c). The trial judge is to consider all pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, and judgment is to be rendered if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. M.R.C.P. 56(c). In the absence of any timely filing of affidavits, the trial judge would have still had to have considered the complaint filed by the Quinns. The complaint is included in the term pleadings, [4] which Rule 56(c) states must be considered. Because the affidavit only affirmed what the complaint alleged, this Court finds that it was correct for the trial judge to consider the affidavits.