Opinion ID: 221743
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Level of Process

Text: We now turn to the second prong of the due process inquirythat is, whether plaintiffs were afforded sufficient process to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the district court found plaintiffs could not establish the deprivation of a protected property interest, it did not reach this question, and appellate briefing is sparse. We therefore remand to the district court for further proceedings on this issue. In so doing, we note the procedural due process analysis is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances, but rather is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Ward v. Anderson, 494 F.3d 929, 935 (10th Cir.2007) (quotations omitted). To determine what process is due where the government effects a deprivation, a court must balance the three factors laid out by the Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976): (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. See also Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11, 111 S.Ct. 2105. Although the exact procedures required by the Constitution depend on the circumstances of a given case, the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. PJ v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1200 (10th Cir.2010) (quotation and alterations omitted). Where the government has a preexisting right to the property at issue, it has a heightened interest [that] in certain circumstances can provide a ground for upholding procedures that are otherwise suspect. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 12 n. 4, 111 S.Ct. 2105 (finding the creditor's interests served by prejudgment attachment statute did not justify ex parte procedure where he had no existing interest in [the property owner's] real estate when he sought the attachment[,] but only sought to ensure the availability of assets to satisfy his judgment if he prevailed). One of our cases is illustrative. In Cobb v. Saturn Land Co., we acknowledged that recording a notice of a lien prejudiced the rights of the property holder. 966 F.2d 1334, 1337-38 (10th Cir.1992). Nonetheless, we upheld the contested lien statute because state law automatically granted an oil and gasoline lien in favor of unpaid workers and companies that had fulfilled contracts relating to the extraction of these resources. Id. The fact that the creditors had an interest in the property before recording the notices justified the limited process granted by the state. Id.; see also Doehr, 501 U.S. at 12 n. 4, 111 S.Ct. 2105 (observing that a mechanic's lien statute could be upheld where state law gave the mechanic an interest in the property at issue predating the actual recording of notice); id. at 29, 111 S.Ct. 2105 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (stating that a postsequestration hearing provides sufficient process for filing a notice of lis pendens, as the filing party already claims an interest in the property that he seeks to enforce through a concurrent lawsuit). Thus, resolution of this point will require the district court to determine whether the City had a preexisting interest in the burdened property under the Subdivision Agreement or Wyoming law. The court should also consider whether plaintiffs have received any postdeprivation process and the extent to which state law mandates additional procedures.