Opinion ID: 2343734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sua sponte grounds for the decision

Text: ¶ 31. In this case, the trial court made detailed findings of fact and concluded that defendant was negligent in failing to object to a faulty jury instruction on reasonable doubt and failing to challenge the instruction on appeal. The court did not make a factual finding on whether the negligence proximately caused harm to plaintiff. Instead, the trial court applied an actual innocence rule developed in other jurisdictions to preclude plaintiff from recovering any damages for defendant's negligent acts. Both parties devoted all of their written and oral arguments in this portion of the case to the merits of applying the actual innocence rule as a matter of law. The majority affirms the trial court, but specifically declines to address the arguments on the use of the actual innocence rule, and instead decides the case on an alternative rationale raised sua sponte by the Court. ¶ 32. The appellate process normally calls for the Court to decide legal issues raised by the appellant after both sides have had adequate notice of the issues and opportunity for briefing and argument. State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 222-23, 500 A.2d 233, 234-35 (1985); State v. Taylor, 145 Vt. 437, 439, 491 A.2d 1034, 1035 (1985) (It is only in the rare and extraordinary case that this Court will consider, sua sponte, issues not properly raised on appeal before us.); State v. Settle, 141 Vt. 58, 61, 442 A.2d 1314, 1315 (1982) (We have held, and we reiterate here that, in all but a few exceptional instances, matters which are not briefed will not be considered on appeal.); see also V.R.A.P. 28(a) (appellant's brief should explain what the issues are, how they were preserved, and what appellant's contentions are on appeal, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on); V.R.A.P. 30(a) (appellant must file printed case that contains extracts from record below as are necessary to present fully the questions raised). ¶ 33. The opportunity to present arguments on the legal issue upon which a case is to be decided is fundamental to sound legal process, and it is important to public confidence in the judiciary. See generally A. Milani & M. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 Tenn. L.Rev. 245, 271-79 (2002). Milani and Smith argue that sua sponte decisions by appellate courts are: (1) inconsistent with the fundamental principles of due process that parties should have notice and opportunity to be heard on the determinative issue in the case; (2) inconsistent with the American judicial system's reliance on the adversary process because they are contrary to its (a) central premise that the adversarial clash provides a court with the best arguments and analysis on an issue; (b) emphasis on neutral and passive decision makers; and (c) commitment to party presentation of evidence and arguments; and (3) an abuse of judicial discretion. Id. at 262-90. ¶ 34. The Court occasionally departs from the usual process and decides cases on legal grounds not raised or briefed by the parties or decided by the trial court, invoking authority to decide cases on any legal ground shown by the record. See, e.g., In re Handy, 171 Vt. 336, 764 A.2d 1226 (2000). In some cases, the practice has been justified because the parties were on notice of the issue and the Court heard `reasoned arguments' from the party against whom [it] decide[d] the question. Harris v. Town of Waltham, 158 Vt. 477, 479 n. 1, 613 A.2d 696, 697 n. 1 (1992). The practice has also been justified when the parties were provided the opportunity for supplemental briefing. Merrilees v. Treasurer, 159 Vt. 623, 623-24, 618 A.2d 1314, 1315-16 (1992) (mem.). In other cases, the Court has simply decided an issue without benefit of notice and briefing or argument, and without explaining why it has dispensed with briefing. See, e.g., Larkin v. City of Burlington, 172 Vt. 566, 772 A.2d 553 (2001) (mem.); In re Handy, 171 Vt. at 337, 764 A.2d at 1230. ¶ 35. The fact that the Court engages in this practice does not ensure that it has considered all meritorious arguments on the issue decided. The cases cited show that our Court, like others, has not yet developed consistent standards for when briefing should be invited and when it is unnecessary. See S. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 Marq. L.Rev. 251, 257-65 (2004). Cravens recognizes that [t]here is no apparent agreement on a practical course of action when the parties arguably miss the point in their briefs, and she discusses the extent to which appellate courts should recast issues sua sponte when, among other circumstances, the court sees a completely different framework in which to view the case. Id. at 262, 251. Unlike Milani and Smith, Cravens advocates an activist approach based on the premise that the purpose is to reach the most correct resolution of an issue. [6] Id. at 294. Even accepting this premise, the question is whether dispensing with briefing in a particular case will achieve this result. ¶ 36. Vigorous dissents are not uncommon when cases are decided on unbriefed grounds, and these dissents highlight the important policies underlying the practice of notice and briefing. See, e.g., Harris, 158 Vt. at 484, 613 A.2d at 700 (Allen, C.J., dissenting). As Chief Justice Allen explained in Harris, [a] principal reason for not considering issues not presented by the parties at trial or in their briefs is the great risk of deciding important issues without hearing reasoned arguments on both sides of the question, especially a novel question. Id. at 485, 613 A.2d at 700; see also Favreau v. Miller, 156 Vt. 222, 233, 591 A.2d 68, 75 (1991) (Dooley, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority should not decide an issue where [w]e have not had the benefit of briefing and argument on that issue). ¶ 37. In a case where the majority found a legislative act unconstitutional without a constitutional challenge having been raised, the dissent faulted the majority for deciding the case without argument on the legal basis for the decision, which it noted had been subject to scholarly criticism. In re Handy, 171 Vt. at 351-52, 764 A.2d at 1240 (Johnson, J., dissenting). According to the dissenting justices, the majority's decision to strike down the statute by asserting its authority to affirm on any grounds stretched the maxim beyond its breaking point. Id. at 352, 764 A.2d at 1240. ¶ 38. In this case, the majority concludes that because attorney's fees would have been charged even if there had been no negligence, defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of the payment of attorney's fees, and therefore it cannot be the proximate cause of damages in a malpractice case seeking return of payment. This theory, which is case-dispositive, appears for the first time in the majority decision. The trial court's approach to the entire issue of causation was to apply the actual innocence rule: plaintiff's guilt alone formed the basis of the ruling on causation, and no other aspect of causation was considered. [7] The approach taken by the majority was not addressed by the trial court or by the parties in their briefs or at oral argument. The approach is not so obvious that the parties should have foreseen it as important and addressed it. Indeed, it is absent from most if not all of the many decisions from other states that have addressed the applicability of the actual innocence rule. See Part III, infra. ¶ 39. The parties had no reason to suspect that the Court would decide the case on any grounds other than the one on which the trial court clearly based its decision, and on which plaintiff based his appeal. Neither party has had the opportunity to consider or present argument on the analysis underlying the majority's ruling, nor challenge its conclusion, based on a 1972 Louisiana case, that plaintiff cannot recover attorney's fees paid to defendant as long as defendant took some action `for which plaintiff[] received some value.' See ante, ¶ 27 (citing Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 263 La. 774, 269 So.2d 239, 246 (1972)). ¶ 40. The Court has been deprived of the benefit that comes from a full airing of the legal issues, including analysis and arguments presented by advocates, and dialogue that would be helpful in evaluating the wisdom of a proposed rule of law. [8] As the Court has previously stated, a broad new doctrine of lawyer malpractice liability should not be based on a record that is wholly inadequate to make this decision. Roberts v. Chimileski, 2003 VT 10, ¶ 18, 175 Vt. 480, 820 A.2d 995 (mem.). ¶ 41. At the very least, I would notify the parties that the Court was considering alternative grounds on this portion of the case, provide an opportunity for supplemental briefing, and schedule the case for reargument. See Jewett, 146 Vt. at 223, 500 A.2d at 234-35. Even Cravens, who argues that judges should not be limited to the arguments raised in the briefs on appeal, recognizes that inviting supplemental submissions by the parties may be warranted where there is an omitted issue or an argument that might be dispositive or highly influential in the decision. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, supra, at 296. The majority has decided the case based on unexamined reasoning. Such an approach, without an explanation of why it is justified in this case, does not demonstrate respect for the contributions counsel and parties may be able to make, or promote confidence in the justness of the process or outcome. The proposed basis for the decision should be presented to the parties for briefing.