Opinion ID: 1189000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: merck's claimed contractual delegation of its duty to warn

Text: Merck claims that since it contracted with the government to provide the necessary warnings to accompany this vaccine, the government, and not Merck, should be liable for any faults in the warning process. As stated above, a jury would be justified in finding that the warnings ultimately given to the consumers were inadequate. Merck wants to be relieved of any responsibility for these faulty warnings because it contracted-out its duty to warn of the dangers inherent in this vaccine. Merck claims in its brief that it did not participate in the preparation of the Important Information form, but does not deny knowing of its contents. Merck puts the legal question in this case to be whether it was negligent for Merck to rely on the Center for Disease Controlthe foremost authority in the world on the subject. A jury could definitely conclude that the answer to this question is, yes. Almost anyone who reads the Important Information handout should be able to see immediately that it does not warn of the possible risks of blindness, deafness and permanent brain damage. As discussed in the preceding section, a jury could find that the warning given was inadequate and that Merck knew that the warning that was being promulgated with its vaccine was inadequate. This fact accompanied by Merck's admitted knowledge of the Center for Disease Control's bias and concern that manufacturers would overwarn of the risk of the vaccine, ( see footnote 16) tells us that a jury could have properly found that Merck was marketing a substance which it knew was (albeit, unavoidably) unsafe, and did so knowing that the accompanying written warnings were inadequate. Thus a jury could reasonably conclude that Merck was negligent in purveying this dangerous vaccine when it was unaccompanied by an adequate warning. [17] The only question here, as we see it, is whether Merck can free itself from any liability simply by delegating that duty and by contracting out that duty to a third partyin this case the Center for Disease Control. There are two lines of cases on the question of whether a manufacturer can absolve itself of strict liability by delegating its duty of due care to warn of the dangers of a supposedly unavoidably unsafe drug. In Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc ., cited by Merck, the Third Circuit Court held that it was permissible for a manufacturer to abdicate its responsibility and turn it over to the CDC, provided that the manufacturer (Merck) did not misinform or mislead the CDC. 964 F.2d 1348, 1368 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 463, 121 L.Ed.2d 371 (1992); see also Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968). The other, better view is expressed in Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428 (8th Cir. 1984). Petty is right on point here. Petty involved a manufacturer's failure to warn of risks associated with the swine flu vaccine. The court held: We recognize that the government has attempted to statutorily assume [sic] the duty to warn the vaccinees, however, we do not find that this delegation thereby relieves the manufacturer from liability for any resulting inadequacy of the warning. The duty is imposed on the manufacturer and in a mass-immunization context, ... the duty extends to the ultimate recipient of the vaccine. Delegation of the duty does not, in itself, relieve the manufacturer of its obligation, nor should it insulate the manufacturer from liability for deficiencies in the manner in which the chosen intermediary effectuates the manufacturers duty. Although on the sidelines, Merrill-National [drug company] is assumed to have had the knowledge of the warning issued and to have had the ability to affect the warning. Id. at 1440; see also In re Jones, 804 F.2d 1133, 1139 (10th Cir.1986) (attempt to limit contractually strict liability for product defects void as against public policy). Since failure to give proper warning, under all legal theories, renders a product defective, we conclude that although a manufacturer may decide to assign its duty to warn of the unsafeness of its product to others, a manufacturer cannot be relieved of ultimate responsibility for assuring that its unsafe product is dispensed with a proper warning. Although there is authority to go either way, it seems to us to be far the better rule that Merck should not be allowed to walk away, on summary judgment, from its duty to warn users of the dangers of its vaccine, especially when there is evidence from which a jury could find that the warning actually given was faulty.