Opinion ID: 77433
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Confession Claim

Text: 26 Valle argues that because he individually and through his attorney invoked his rights to silence and to have counsel present during interrogation, the trial court erred in admitting the subsequently obtained confessions into evidence, and the state courts' adjudication was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Here, Valle claims that he invoked his right to silence and his right to counsel when he told Detective Wolf, an interviewing officer, that he had consulted with a public defender and that she had advised him not to speak to anybody or to sign anything. Further, the lieutenant with custody of Valle was instructed through counsel, and the lieutenant agreed, not to permit police officers to question Valle. Valle contends that under Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), this was sufficient to invoke the Edwards v. Arizona rule forbidding further questioning. See 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (holding that when a suspect invokes the right to consult with an attorney, the suspect is not subject to further interrogation until counsel is made available). Valle cites Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349, 1365 (11th Cir.2001), in support of his contention that we must review his claim involving his right to silence de novo because the Florida Supreme Court did not address Valle's argument on this point. 27 The State responds that the confession claim was properly denied. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found Valle never asserted his right to remain silent or to have counsel present, either himself or through the public defender. The Florida Supreme Court reached the same conclusions. According to the State, the district court properly applied the AEDPA standard of review and determined that Valle had not rebutted the presumption of correctness afforded state court factual findings and that the state court's conclusions were not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 28 In this case, there was an evidentiary hearing where the trial court heard the testimony of the public defender, Wolf, and other participants in the arrest and interrogation of Valle. The trial court found that Valle never told the public defender that he intended to invoke his rights to silence and counsel, that Wolf was unaware that Valle had spoken to an attorney until after Valle himself advised him of this fact during the interrogation, and that Valle's statement to Wolf was that he had spoken with the public defender who had told him not to say anything or sign anything. The trial court further found, as a matter of law, that at no time did [Valle] ever assert his constitutional rights to remain silent or to have counsel present or in any way invoke any of his constitutional rights under . . . Miranda . . ., that the defendant never intended to and did not invoke his rights to remain silent and to counsel through [the public defender], and that Valle's subsequent written waiver of his constitutional rights was freely, knowingly and voluntarily executed by . . . Valle, and that he freely and voluntarily first spoke with Detective Wolf and then freely and voluntarily made a formal written confession. 29 The Florida Supreme Court found that Valle waived his Miranda rights and did not subsequently invoke them. Valle II, 474 So.2d at 798-99. Valle's statement that his lawyer had advised him not to sign anything or answer any questions was, the Florida Supreme Court said, at best equivocal, and as such, interrogating officers were permitted to clarify Valle's wishes. Id. at 799. Valle's statement that he had several experiences with police officers in the past and that he had cooperated in the past and was willing to do so on that occasion showed that Valle voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Id. Further, only the defendant may invoke the right to counsel. Id. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that Valle's statement, combined with the previous oral waiver, a later express written waiver, and the fact that at not [sic] time before, during, or after questioning did [Valle] request an attorney, convinces us that he made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. Id. 30 In Miranda, the Supreme Court recognized that an accused has a constitutional right not to be compelled to make incriminating statements during the process of interrogation. 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624. Because [t]he circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, a suspect in custody also has the right to consult with counsel prior to and during questioning. Id. at 469, 86 S.Ct. at 1625. The defendant may waive the privilege against self-incrimination, but the prosecutor must show that the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Id. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. 31 Here, while it is not disputed that Valle informed Wolf that he had spoken to an attorney and that she had advised him not to speak to anybody or to sign anything, it was not unreasonable nor contrary to precedent for the state courts to conclude that this was not an invocation of Valle's Miranda rights. See, e.g., Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 771 (5th Cir.1979) (requiring officers to seek clarification of the suspect's wishes when the suspect's statements are ambiguous), abrogated by Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (clarifying that a suspect must unambiguously assert the right to counsel in order to stop interrogation until counsel is available). This is further buttressed by Valle's statement that he had always cooperated with police and his execution of a written waiver of his Miranda rights. The state courts also reasonably rejected Valle's claims that his attorney invoked his rights to silence and to counsel for him. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1147 n. 4, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (explaining that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination can only be invoked by the defendant). Therefore, Valle's claims based upon the denial of his motion to suppress do not warrant habeas relief.