Opinion ID: 1320789
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Petitioner has an adequate remedy available.

Text: Petitioner concedes that the power of the State Highway Commission to operate a bus service within the project is discretionary under | 33-253, Code 1950 as amended. It also concedes that under that section, as construed in Almond Day, 199 Va. 1, 97 S.E.2d 824, the State Highway Commission itself is authorized to acquire and operate the bus facilities. It contends, however, that when the State Highway Commission has exercised its discretion that such services should be afforded, but that it will not acquire and operate the bus facilities itself, then its functions thereafter are not discretionary, but are ministerial and clearly defined, and that in such event it was the duty of the State Highway Commission to allow petitioner, which is the only certificated carrier, to render that service. Petitioner further contends that it does not seek to cause the respondents to undo an act, because the performance of an act contrary to a duty imposed is not a performance, and that it has no other adequate remedy to obtain the relief prayed for in its petition. A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedial process, which is not awarded as a matter of right but in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion. Due to the drastic character of the writ, the law has placed safeguards around it. Consideration should be had for the urgency which prompts an exercise of the discretion, the interests of the public and third persons, the results which would follow upon a refusal of the writ, as well as the promotion of substantial justice. In doubtful cases the writ will be denied, but where the right involved and the duty sought to be enforced are clear and certain and where there is no other available specific and adequate remedy the writ will issue. It will not lie where it would serve no useful purpose or where it would work an injustice or hardship or be harmful to the public interests. 34 Am. Jur., Mandamus, | 32, p. 829. Mandamus will issue to compel public officers to execute their purely ministerial duties under the law, but where the public officer or board is vested with a discretion or judgment, their actions cannot be controlled or reviewed by mandamus in the absence of statute providing therefor. If they refuse to exercise their discretion, they may be compelled to do so by mandamus. 12 M.J., Mandamus, | 14, p. 357. We have no such statute in this Commonwealth. In 55 C.J.S., Mandamus | 51, pp. 87, 88 it is said: Before the writ may properly issue, at least three elements must coexist: (1) The existence of a clear right in plaintiff or the relator to the relief sought,   . (2) The existence of a legal duty on the part of respondent or defendant to do the thing which the relator seeks to compel,   . (3) The absence of another adequate remedy at law,   , and, although the co-existence of these elements, standing alone, will not always suffice to justify the issuance of the writ, in the discretion of the court,   , the absence of either of these elements will make the issuance of the writ invalid. In the early case of Page Clopton, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 415, 417, Judge Burks, in discussing the writ, stated: The office of the writ of mandamus is to compel corporations, inferior courts and officers to perform some particular duty incumbent upon them, and which is imperative in its nature, and to the performance of which the relator has a clear legal right, without any other adequate specific legal remedy, to enforce it; and even though he may have another specific legal remedy, if such remedy be obsolete or inoperative, the mandamus will be granted.    The remedy is extraordinary, and if the right is doubtful, or the duty discretionary, or there be any other adequate specific legal remedy in use, this writ will not be allowed. And in the recent case of Vaughan Board of Embalmers, 196 Va. 141, 152, 82 S.E.2d 618, we restated the principle that where an officer or a board is vested with discretion, such discretion cannot be controlled or reviewed by mandamus. State Board of Education Carwile, 169 Va. 663, 673, 674, 194 S.E. 855. We held in Almond Day, supra, that the provision in | 33-253, Code 1950, as amended, which authorizes the State Highway Commission to provide bus facilities for the transportation of passengers through and over said project does not violate Section 185 of the Constitution. That Section of the Code, which is a portion of the State Revenue Bond Act, reads in part as follows:    For the purposes of this | 33-253 the word 'project' shall, in relation to the project described in said paragraph (j), include approach highways thereto and bus facilities for the transportation of passengers through or over said project if the Commission shall deem it advisable to construct such approach highways or acquire such bus facilities; and the term 'cost of the project' shall, in relation to the projects described in said paragraphs (b) and (j), include an amount sufficient to reimburse the Commission for expenditures or advances theretofore made by the Commission on account of the cost of either or both of said projects, and shall, in relation to the project described in said paragraph (j), include provision of a sum, deemed by the Commission to be sufficient for the purpose, to be utilized by the Commission for the payment of employment severance benefits to employees of the Commission rendering services in connection with the projects mentioned in paragraphs (g) and (i) of subsection (2) of said | 33-228, and shall include the cost of constructing approach highways and of providing bus facilities if the Commission shall deem it expedient to construct such approach highways or acquire such facilities as a part of the project described in said paragraph (j).    We do not interpret the word acquire as used in the above quoted section to denote ownership alone. This word not only has the meaning to obtain as one's own, but also has the meaning of procure. The Highway Commission had the right to acquire such bus facilities by purchase, lease or by contracting with private enterprise to provide the desired services as its agent, as was done here. It also had the right not to provide any bus facilities. It was a discretionary duty to be performed and not a clearly defined ministerial one imposed upon the respondents. Such being the case an essential element for mandamus is lacking and that is not the appropriate remedy to be pursued by petitioner for the relief sought. Having reached this conclusion we do not deem it necessary to discuss other phases of the case argued in the briefs. For the reasons stated the respondents' demurrer to the petition is sustained and the petition for a writ of mandamus is dismissed. Demurrer sustained and the petition dismissed. MILLER (In Part) MILLER, J., dissenting in part. In the majority opinion it is stated that the question presented for decision by the pleadings (the petition and demurrer) is whether mandamus is the appropriate remedy to be pursued by petitioner in the relief prayed for in its petition. (Emphasis added.) The opinion concludes by sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the petition. It thus holds that mandamus is not the appropriate remedy to be invoked, yet it does not indicate the proper remedy. I take no issue with the opinion insofar as it holds that an action by mandamus is not an appropriate remedy. I think a proceeding under the declaratory judgment act, | 8-578, et seq., Code 1950, offers a more appropriate means to determine the rights of the several litigants than does an action of mandamus. The demurrer should have been sustained solely on that ground and the petition dismissed, and nothing should have been said about the powers and rights of the litigants. 34 Am. Jur., Mandamus, | 42, p. 835; 12 M.J., Mandamus, | 9, p. 346. However, as the powers of the State Highway Commission, (hereinafter at times called the Commission) under the questioned legislation are stated, the rights of litigants discussed, and the case, in reality, decided upon its merits, I am constrained to express my disagreement with that part of the opinion. The majority opinion is a significant sequel to the decision in Almond Day, 199 Va. 1, 97 S.E.2d 824, from which I dissented. It was there held that | 33-253, as amended by Acts 1954, ch. 319, did not violate | 185 of the Constitution of Virginia, and that the Commission was empowered to provide and operate a garage and terminal facilities and a fleet of busses for the transportation of passengers for hire over the bridge-tunnel project. There the court quoted as follows from Code | 33-253, as amended by Acts 1954, ch. 319, p. 389. '   For the purposes of this | 33-253 the word project shall, in relation to the project described in said paragraph (j), include    bus facilities for the transportation of passengers through or over said project if the Commission shall deem it advisable to    acquire such bus facilities, and the term cost of the project shall,    include the cost of    providing bus facilities if the Commission shall deem it expedient to    acquire such facilities as a part of the project described in said paragraph (j).   ' (Emphasis added.)