Opinion ID: 767341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fairness of Liberian Courts1

Text: 21
22 The parties strenuously dispute who bears the ultimate burden of proof with respect to the fairness of the Liberian judicial system. Although there are cases in which the question of the burden might be significant, it does not ultimately matter here. Accordingly, we express no opinion on it. Even if Citibank were to bear both the burden of production and that of persuasion, it has come forward with sufficiently powerful and uncontradicted documentary evidence describing the chaos within the Liberian judicial system during the period of interest to this case to have met those burdens and to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thus, the U.S. State Department Country Reports presented by Citibank indicate that the Liberian judicial system was in a state of disarray, as do, more subtly, the affidavits by Citibank's Liberian counsel, H. Varney G. Sherman. 23 The only evidence Bridgeway has introduced in support of its position are three statements by Liberian attorneys: (1) an affidavit of James E. Pierre, Esq., a member of the Liberian Bar, stating that the procedural rules of Liberia are modeled on those of New York State courts; (2) an affidavit introduced by Citibank, in which H. Varney G. Sherman, Citibank's Liberian counsel, states that the Liberian Government is patterned after the state governments of the United States of America; and (3) an affidavit of N. Oswald Tweh, former Vice President of the Liberian National Bar Association, that Liberia's judicial system was and is structured and administered to afford party-litigants therein impartial justice. The first statement concerns the design of the Liberian judicial system, but says nothing about its practice during the period in question. 2 The second, in addition to suffering from the same defect as the first, does not even discuss the Liberian judicial system directly. And the third is purely conclusory. See Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 1996) ([C]onclusory statements, conjecture, or speculation by the party resisting the motion will not defeat summary judgment.). 24
25 Summary judgment cannot be granted on the basis of inadmissible evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). And Bridgeway raises many objections to the evidence relied upon by the district court in determining that Liberia's courts were, as a matter of law, unlikely to render impartial justice. Although the parties argue over a variety of different pieces of evidence, in the absence of any proof supporting Bridgeway's position, we need only consider whether Citibank adduced admissible evidence in sufficient amount to make the district court's decision regarding the performance of the Liberian judiciary during the civil war be supportable as well as uncontroverted. In fact, all of the district court's conclusions concerning this issue can be derived from just two sources: the affidavits of H. Varney G. Sherman (Sherman affidavits) and the U.S. State Department Country Reports for Liberia for the years 1994-1997 (Country Reports or Reports). 26 Bridgeway does not object to the admissibility of the Sherman affidavits (except on the ground that they support an argument that Bridgeway alleges Citibank is estopped from making). Indeed, in its brief, Bridgeway cites statements derived from these very affidavits in support of its own position. We will therefore assume that the Sherman material was properly relied upon by the district court. 3 27 The district court also relied quite heavily on the Country Reports. Bridgeway argues that these Reports constitute excludable hearsay. Citibank replies that the Reports are admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), which allows the admission of factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(C). 28 Rule 803(8) is based upon the assumption that public officers will perform their duties, that they lack motive to falsify, and that public inspection to which many such records are subject will disclose inaccuracies. 31 Michael H. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure 6759, at 663-64 (Interim ed. 1992). 'Factual finding' includes not only what happened, but how it happened, why it happened, and who caused it to happen. Id. at 689. The rule therefore renders presumptively admissible not merely . . . factual determinations in the narrow sense, but also . . . conclusions or opinions that are based upon a factual investigation. Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1991). 29 In order to fit within the purview of Rule 803(8)(C), the evidence must (1) contain factual findings, and (2) be based upon an investigation made pursuant to legal authority. Once a party has shown that a set of factual findings satisfies the minimum requirements of Rule 803(8)(C), the admissibility of such factual findings is presumed. The burden to show a lack of trustworthiness then shifts to the party opposing admission. See Ariza v. City of New York, 139 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 1998). 30 In this case, there is little doubt that the Country Reports constitute factual findings. Moreover, the Reports are certainly gathered pursuant to legal authority: federal law requires that the State Department submit the Reports annually to Congress, see 22 U.S.C. 2151n(d) (1994), 2304(b) (Supp. 1999). They are therefore presumptively admissible. 31 Bridgeway attempts to rebut this presumption by arguing that the Reports are untrustworthy, and it points to language in the State Department's description of their preparation. The State Department says that [w]e have given particular attention to attaining a high standard of consistency despite the multiplicity of sources and the obvious problems related to varying degrees of access to information, structural differences in political and social systems, and trends in world opinion regarding human rights practices in specific countries. Although this constitutes a frank recognition of the shortcomings intrinsic in any historical investigation, it does not amount (as Bridgeway argues) to an admission of the lack of trustworthiness required to reject the admissibility of these documents. 32 When evaluating the trustworthiness of a factual report, we look to (a) the timeliness of the investigation, (b) the special skills or experience of the official, (c) whether a hearing was held and the level at which it was conducted, and (d) possible motivation problems. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(C) advisory committee's note. With the exception of (c), which is not determinative by itself, cf. id. ([T]he rule . . . assumes admissibility in the first instance but with ample provision for escape if sufficient negative factors are present. (emphasis added)), nothing about the Reports calls into question their reliability with respect to these factors. The Reports are submitted annually, and are therefore investigated in a timely manner. They are prepared by area specialists at the State Department. And nothing in the record or in Bridgeway's briefs indicates any motive for misrepresenting the facts concerning Liberia's civil war or its effect on the judicial system there. 4 See Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying on Country Reports in granting summary judgment on the issue of the fairness of Iranian courts). 33 In addition to its reliance on the Sherman affidavits and the Country Reports, the district court took judicial notice of historical facts drawn from a variety of sources. See Bridgeway, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 278 n.2. Bridgeway objects to this. Even if we agreed with Bridgeway's objection, we would affirm the district court's decision because the facts of which the district court took judicial notice were merely background history and of no moment to the ultimate determination of the fairness of Liberia's courts during the period of the civil war. The information in the district court's opinion concerning the functioning of the Liberian courts during the war is drawn (or could easily be drawn) entirely from the Sherman affidavits and the Country Reports, both of which were clearly admissible. 34