Opinion ID: 2227915
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We first address the issue of whether the juvenile court properly exercised jurisdiction over Kelley and Heather. The guardian ad litem argues that the court properly exercised emergency jurisdiction pursuant to § 43-1203(1)(c)(ii) of the NCCJA. In contrast, the father argues that the court did not properly exercise jurisdiction under the NCCJA because the State of Texas is the home state and proper forum for the exercise of jurisdiction. When a jurisdictional question does not involve a factual dispute, determination of the issue is a matter of law, which requires an appellate court to reach a conclusion independent from that of the trial court. However, when the determination rests on factual findings, a trial court's decision on the issue will be upheld unless the factual findings concerning jurisdiction are clearly incorrect. In re Interest of Floyd B., 254 Neb. 443, 577 N.W.2d 535 (1998). The question as to whether jurisdiction existing under the NCCJA should be exercised is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court and is reviewed de novo on the record. As in other matters entrusted to a trial judge's discretion, absent an abuse of discretion, the decision will be upheld on appeal. Id. Section 43-1203(1) of the NCCJA, the emergency jurisdiction provision, provides in part that a court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if the child is physically present in this state and it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he or she has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected. Section 43-247(3)(a) is incorporated into the NCCJA and provides in part that the juvenile court in each county shall have jurisdiction of any juvenile who lacks proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits of his or her parent, guardian, or custodian. See, In re Interest of L.W., 241 Neb. 84, 486 N.W.2d 486 (1992); § 43-1202(3)(b). Physical presence of the child in this state alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court to make a child custody determination under § 43-1203(1)(c). In re Interest of Floyd B., supra ; In re Interest of L.W., supra . Thus, in In re Interest of Floyd B., we held that the juvenile court properly exercised emergency jurisdiction over a child even though neither the child nor his parents resided in Nebraska and the alleged abusive acts did not occur in Nebraska. In In re Interest of Floyd B., the child had been placed in the protective custody of the then Department of Social Services, now the Department of Health and Human Services, while he and his father were visiting relatives in Nebraska over a Thanksgiving holiday. Family members had noticed bruising on the child and contacted the police. The evidence indicated that although the department of social services in the father's home state had conducted an investigation, there were no proceedings pending there. We explained that the evidence presented at the hearing of an ongoing pattern of abuse, coupled with the fact that the child was physically present in Nebraska, conferred emergency jurisdiction on the juvenile court. We further explained that the emergency was ongoing because return of the child to either parent would put him at risk for future maltreatment. We also concluded that Nebraska was a convenient forum for the proceedings. To determine whether a court is an inconvenient forum under the NCCJA, the court considers the following factors, among others, to determine if it is in the best interests of the child that another state assume jurisdiction: (1) Another state is or recently was the child's home state; (2) another state has a closer connection with the child and his or her family; (3) substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily available in another state; (4) the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less appropriate; and (5) the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would contravene a purpose of the NCCJA. In re Interest of Floyd B., 254 Neb. 443, 577 N.W.2d 535 (1998); § 43-1207(3). A paramount consideration in the balancing of these various factors is a determination of what court is most able to act in the best interests of the child. See In re Interest of Floyd B., supra . We stated that despite the fact that Nebraska was not the home state, the Nebraska court was most able to act in the child's best interests. We noted that the Department of Social Services' investigation took place in Nebraska and that the Child Protective Services worker who had seen the child and his bruises was in Nebraska. We also noted that no other state had sought to exercise jurisdiction to protect the child. When the petitions were filed in the instant case, Kelley and Heather were physically present in Nebraska, and the evidence at the adjudication hearing indicated an ongoing pattern of abuse and a danger to the girls if returned to their father. While the father argues that there are many witnesses in Texas who could testify that they had never seen bruises or other evidence of abuse, this fact was undisputed at the hearing. Thus, the fact that these witnesses are located in Texas does not indicate that Nebraska is an inconvenient forum. In contrast, other witnesses, such as Schultz, who assessed the psychological damage caused by the abuse, and the girls themselves, are currently in Nebraska. Other than the father and stepmother, there appears to be no significant witness in Texas to the abuse, and the Texas courts have not undertaken any proceedings to protect the girls. Thus, we conclude that the Nemaha County Court, sitting as a juvenile court, had emergency jurisdiction and that it did not abuse its discretion in exercising such jurisdiction. However, we are concerned by the fact that in its exercise of emergency jurisdiction, the juvenile court ordered a case plan and report to be prepared by the Department of Health and Human Services, including a home study. Emergency jurisdiction under § 43-1203(1)(c) is by its very nature limited. Smith-Helstrom v. Yonker, 249 Neb. 449, 544 N.W.2d 93 (1996). It is temporary in nature and confers only the power to make temporary orders, including temporary custody for a limited period of time, pending proceedings in the state with regular jurisdiction under the NCCJA. In re Interest of Floyd B., supra . If the juvenile court attempts to continue to exercise jurisdiction over Kelley and Heather, it must do so under another provision of the NCCJA. Texas is the home state of the girls, and they were merely visiting Nebraska at the time they were taken into protective custody. Section 43-1203(1)(d), the default provision, provides for jurisdiction if another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child and if it is in the best interests of the child that this state assume jurisdiction. See In re Interest of Floyd B., supra . In order to assume jurisdiction under § 43-1203(1)(d), a communication must be received from the other state informing this state that it has declined jurisdiction and considers this state to be the more appropriate forum. See § 43-1207(9). Such information may be provided by one of the parties or obtained by the juvenile court; however, in obtaining such information, the court should avoid communications outside the presence of the parties. See State ex rel. Grape v. Zach, 247 Neb. 29, 524 N.W.2d 788 (1994). The parties or the court may attempt to gain such information pursuant to the mechanisms provided in the NCCJA, but absent such information from Texas, the Nemaha County Court should not attempt to continue to exercise jurisdiction.