Opinion ID: 2369265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The son's estate.

Text: As in the case of the other beneficiaries, we are asked to determine what estate, legal or equitable, the son acquired under the will. In the brief of counsel for the widow, the issues are stated substantially in these words: (a) After the death of his mother did the testator intend his crippled helpless son to have an absolute estate? (b) Did the testator intend that the corpus of his estate should be invaded without limit, with limit, or not at all, for the welfare and benefit of his crippled helpless son after the death of the mother? The interests of the son under the will are found in E(3), which will become operative if and when the son shall survive his mother. The construction of this provision of the will is requested at this time to enable the executors to properly carry out their duties, particularly with respect to the federal estate tax. It is readily understood that this tax is of very substantial consequence to the estate and to the beneficiaries and ought to be determined in the near future. The issues do not center upon the precise obligations of the trustees in the exercise of their wide discretionary authority in the expenditure of net income for the support, maintenance, comfort, welfare, benefit and enjoyment of my said son. See In re Murray, 142 Me. 24, 45 A.2d 636; Alford v. Richardson, 120 Me. 316, 114 A. 193. The net income can be spent only for the benefit of the son. Any unexpended income will pass to the charities under E (4). The testator threw about his son the protection of a prohibition against anticipation or alienation by his own will or in invitum. The Courts will be open to direct the trustees and to guard the interest of the son.    when trustees who are vested with the exercise of a discretion, fail to properly exercise that discretion, either from lack of good faith or because of a misunderstanding of the scope of the trust and their powers and duties therein, a court of equity has jurisdiction to interfere and give directions to the end that the trust may be properly carried out. Woodward v. Dain, 109 Me. 581, 583, 85 A. 660, 661. See also Restatement, Trusts 2d § 187; 2 Scott on Trusts § 187.2 (2d ed.). The chief point in issue is whether the trustees may in the exercise of their discretion invade the corpus of the estate for the welfare and benefit of the invalid son. The argument for invasion hinges upon the meaning of the language quoted below from E(3) and E(4). My Trustees may also, in their sole and absolute discretion pay such sums at such times as they shall determine to my said son, or if a guardian or conservator shall be appointed for my said son, said Trustees may pay such sums at such times as they shall determine to such guardian or conservator for the welfare and benefit of my said son. (E(3)).    I give, bequeath and devise all of said trust estate which shall then remain, real, personal and mixed, wherever/found and however situated, both principal and unexpended income,    (E(4)). In our view the sentence from E(3) relates back to the several provisions on net income. It touches authority in the expenditure of net income, and not authority to draw on the principal of the trust for the benefit of the son. It may well be convenient for all concerned that the trustees make payments from the net income directly to the son, or to his guardian or conservator, for payment of, let us say, the usual recurring living and househould expenses. The provision is designed to relieve the trustees of responsibility in this type of situation. If the testator had intended to reach the result sought in behalf of the son, namely, that the trustees could invade the principal of the trust for his benefit, we may reasonably believe the testator would have so expressed his purpose in apt words. It is further urged that the gift to the charities in E(4), and in particular the words which shall then remain, point irresistibly to a right of invasion on the part of the trustees, and also to an absolute estate in the son free from trust. We do not agree with this contention. It is unnecessary to repeat the discussion under the widow's estate on this score. The principles stated in Stewart v. Stewart, supra, are no more applicable here than in the case of the widow. The interest of the son under his father's will is found within the trust under Clause E, and more particularly under E(3). This interest cannot be extended under E (4). In short, there is a valid trust, with net income plus limited principal for the widow for her life, and thereafter with net income in hands of trustees for benefit of the son for his life, and with the remainder to charities at the end of the life interests.