Opinion ID: 2445010
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waiver of Jury Trial in Felony Cases

Text: Running throughout the above cases and others to be mentioned herein was a theme of uncertainty as to whether an accused in a criminal case could or could not waive trial by jury. Even under a plea of guilty, statutes, not repealed until 1979, required the impaneling of a jury to hear the evidence and fix the time of confinement in felony cases unless otherwise provided in other sections of the Code. T.C.A. § 40-2310 (now repealed). This uncertainty, reflected in the Metzner case, supra, and seemingly an integral basis for the decision, was also reflected in two opinions of this Court decided in 1960. In State v. Moore, 206 Tenn. 95, 332 S.W.2d 176 (1960), the State Attorney General insisted that a defendant cannot waive a jury trial upon an indictment charging him with a felony. 206 Tenn. at 98, 332 S.W.2d at 177. Responding to that insistence the Court said: An examination of the authorities discloses it to be a fact that there is a considerable difference of opinion between textwriters and courts as to whether a defendant can legally waive a jury trial in a felony case. Ibid. The Court found it unnecessary to decide the issue in that case. In another case released the same day, however, Jones v. State, 206 Tenn. 245, 332 S.W.2d 662 (1960), the Court held that it was not error for the trial judge in a felony case to insist upon the impaneling of a jury. After quoting the various constitutional guarantees regarding a jury trial, the Court said: Neither of these provisions expressly provides for or prohibits a waiver of the rights conferred. The bench and bar of this State, however, has tended to assume that there could be no waiver of these rights, due, no doubt, to the fact that at common law there could be no waiver of such right, i.e., trial by jury and by reason of the esteem and sanctity in which this right has always been held and regarded. 206 Tenn. at 252, 332 S.W. at 665-66. Earlier the Court had sustained statutes permitting waiver of jury trials in misdemeanor cases and the imposition of a fine up to fifty dollars. State v. Simmons, 199 Tenn. 479, 287 S.W.2d 71 (1956). However, in the Jones case, supra, involving a felony, the Court said: Since there is no such statute on our books, however, we think the trial judge was not in error in refusing this request for a waiver of a trial by jury and the assignment is overruled. 206 Tenn. at 254, 332 S.W.2d at 666. Thereafter, and apparently as a partial outgrowth of these cases, the General Assembly enacted Tennessee Public Acts 1965, ch. 49, expressly permitting an accused in a felony case to waive trial by jury and to submit his case to the trial judge for decision both as to guilt and punishment provided that this was seasonably done by motion filed by the defendant, that there was concurrence by the district attorney general, and that the motion was granted by the Court. [7] The statute remained in effect until repealed in 1979, and part of its provisions were incorporated in Rules 5 and 23, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. This was the procedure utilized by appellee in the instant case. Following its enactment, this statute was held constitutional by the Court in Seale v. Luttrell, 221 Tenn. 548, 428 S.W.2d 312 (1968). There the accused filed a motion to waive the jury and submit the case to the trial judge. The State concurred. The trial judge granted the motion and imposed a penitentiary sentence. On petition for habeas corpus the accused insisted that the statute authorizing waiver of jury trials in criminal cases was unconstitutional. Pointing out that the Court in Jones v. State, supra , had noted the absence of a statute authorizing such waiver, the Court said: It seems to us that the statute here in question was amended so as to meet the proposition just stated in the Jones case. We think there is no argument about the proposition and that a proper interpretation of the quotation just above from the Jones case is that one might waive a trial by jury and that such a waiver would be constitutional if there was a statute permitting the same. 221 Tenn. at 552, 428 S.W.2d at 313. The Court noted that at common law an accused had no right to waive a trial by jury. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965). The Court held that nothing in either the state or federal constitutions prohibited the Legislature from conferring such a right, under appropriate safeguards, and these were found to have been provided in the 1965 legislation. Accordingly, since the 1965 act the right to waive a jury trial in felony cases has been regarded as settled law. State v. Johnson, 574 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tenn. 1978). Neither the Seale nor the Johnson case, supra, however, specifically involved Article VI, Section 14, with respect to the imposition of fines. The 1965 legislation did not refer to that subject, although it did permit waiver of a jury trial and submission of a felony case to the trial judge for decision both as to guilt and punishment, under the conditions above referred to. Prior to the present case it has never been specifically held by this Court that the trial judge could impose a fine exceeding fifty dollars. The practice of doing so was at least implicitly recognized in Capri Adult Cinema v. State, 537 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1976). In that case corporate defendants and an individual defendant had reached a plea agreement with the trial court, and an order had been entered signed by them and by their counsel as follows: After being advised of all rights regarding the Court fixing a fine in excess of $50.00, the Defendants expressly waive all constitutional provisions and agree for the Court to fix a fine in excess of $50.00. Subsequently the trial court had imposed such a fine, which was paid. Thereafter the Act under which the fine was imposed was held unconstitutional, and the corporate parties sought to recover the same by filing the record in this Court for review on writ of error. Recovery was denied for reasons stated in the opinion. There was a dissent, but neither the majority opinion nor the dissent raised any question concerning the procedures which had been followed or the imposition of the fine by the trial judge. The parties themselves had not presented such a question, nor did they attempt to revoke the waiver which they had executed. While that case does not stand as strong authority for the imposition of a fine in excess of fifty dollars, since the issue was not raised by the parties or by the Court, it does reflect an understanding among practitioners and trial judges at the criminal bar that since 1965 it has been possible to waive a jury trial in felony cases and for the trial judge to impose both fines and penitentiary sentences. Such also was the understanding of the Advisory Committee to this Court which drafted the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and their comment to Rule 5 so indicates.