Opinion ID: 1691626
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proximate CauseCompensatory Damages

Text: As to the extent of liability of the original publisher of defamatory material for damage caused by its subsequent publications, the rule is as follows: So far as `proximate cause' is concerned, recovery has been limited very definitely to those damages which are regarded as reasonably foreseeable or normal consequences of the defamation. Formerly it was held that the original defamer was liable only for the damages caused by his own publication, and was not responsible for repetition by others, on the theory that the `last human wrongdoer' must be responsible, and there is still some authority to this effect; but there has been the same broadening of `proximate cause' as in other fields of liability, and the prevailing view now appears to be that there is liability for damages due to such a repetition when it was authorized or intended, or when the circumstances were such that it might reasonably have been anticipated.  W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 112, at 795 (5th ed.1984) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). The Restatement describes the rule similarly: The publication of a libel or slander is a legal cause of any special harm resulting from its repetition by a third person if, but only if, (a) the third person was privileged to repeat it, or (b) the repetition was authorized or intended by the original defamer, or (c) the repetition was reasonably to be expected. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 576 (1977). The statements made by Chief Wilson fall squarely within this rule. Consequently, I would hold that the jury in this case could have awarded compensatory damages on the ground that Chief Wilson's initial statements were the proximate cause of harm resulting from the foreseeable and intended repetition by the media. Therefore, I concur in the result as to the award of compensatory damages. [1]