Opinion ID: 2410246
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Admissibility of deposition

Text: Mr. Jacobs attempted to introduce into evidence a deposition given by Sharlene Wilson. This deposition was a sworn statement recorded by a court reporter at Mr. Jacobs' attorney's office. At the time the statement was taken, Ms. Wilson was not represented by an attorney, and no one from the prosecutor's office was present. Ms. Wilson stated that Mr. Jacobs was out of town when the first two drug transactions with Ms. Potts took place and that all the drugs seized belonged to her and not to Mr. Jacobs. Ms. Wilson refused to testify at Mr. Jacobs' trial, invoking her Fifth Amendment rights. Despite Ms. Wilson's consequent unavailability, the Trial Court refused to admit the deposition, thus rejecting Mr. Jacobs' argument that the deposition was admissible hearsay under either Ark.R.Evid. 804(b)(1) or 804(b)(3). In reviewing a Trial Court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence, we will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. Sanders v. State, 305 Ark. 112, 805 S.W.2d 953 (1991). Arkansas Rule of Evidence 804(b) provides that certain items of evidence are not excluded by the hearsay rule. One such item is former testimony described as follows in subsection (1): Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. Rule 804(b)(3) makes a similar exception for a statement against interest. That subsection provides this definition: Statement against interest. A statement which at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability or to render invalid a claim by him against another or to make him an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offering to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Based on these rules, it does not appear the Trial Court erred in its decision not to admit Ms. Wilson's deposition. Considering Rule 804(b)(1), we note that Ms. Wilson's statement was not made in compliance with the law. Arkansas R.Crim.P. 19 makes no provision for the taking of depositions in a criminal proceeding. Depositions in civil proceedings are taken pursuant to Ark. R.Civ.P. 27, which requires notice to adverse parties in a manner provided by Ark.R.Civ.P. 4. Even if there were some authority to permit this kind of discovery in a criminal proceeding by analogy to Ark.R.Civ.P. 27, we would have to reject this particular deposition in view of the lack of record notice to the prosecution. With respect to Rule 804(b)(3), Mr. Jacobs offered the Trial Court no corroborating circumstances to indicate the trustworthiness of Ms. Wilson's statement. If the Trial Court had admitted the deposition, it would have given Mr. Jacobs the benefit of Ms. Wilson's testimony while allowing her to invoke the Fifth Amendment to prevent any cross-examination by the State. That would be an unacceptable use of the Fifth Amendment because it would permit defendants to introduce unchallengeable exculpatory statements, and that would not be fair. See Harris v. State, 303 Ark. 233, 795 S.W.2d 55 (1990).