Opinion ID: 6328976
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bill of Lading

Text: Above, we mentioned that Michigan State Police Oﬃcer Daryl Myers became suspicious when he saw several inconsistencies on the bill of lading associated with the transport of a Mercedes SUV. One of the inconsistencies was that the number listed for the recipient of the vehicle had a Madison, Wisconsin area code instead of an area code for somewhere near the destination in Sturgis, Michigan. When the government moved to admit the bill of lading, counsel for Hidalgo-Sanchez objected, asserting that it constituted hearsay if oﬀered for the truth of any of the matters asserted therein. The government explained that it was only offering the bill of lading to show why oﬃcers investigated further (because of the inconsistencies), and not for the truth of what was asserted on it. Counsel for Hidalgo-Sanchez followed up by asking the court to give a limiting instruction to the jury explaining what it was being admitted for. The court explained that it would give “legal instructions” at the end of the case, and it admitted the bill of lading for the stated purpose over the objection. Toward the end of the trial, Hidalgo-Sanchez submitted a proposed limiting instruction. It read: The court received into evidence government Ex- hibit 369, which is the bill of lading seized from the car-hauler during the stop and search in Michigan on July 25, 2017. The bill of lading has certain information written on it. The government represented to Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 13 the court that the exhibit was oﬀered not for the truth of any writing contained on the exhibit; but, rather, only [to] demonstrate the eﬀect it had on the oﬃcer conducting the stop and the search of the cars, and to explain the next steps he took. You may consider the bill of lading for that purpose only. You may not consider it for the truth of any matter written on the bill of lading. He supported this instruction by citing Federal Rule of Evidence 105, which states, “If the court admits evidence that is admissible … for a purpose—but not … for another purpose—the court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.” Fed. R. Evid. 105. The government responded that “bills of lading should be admissible … as substantive evidence, not for a limited purpose.” Then, he acknowledged that “it was initially admitted only for the purpose of the eﬀect on the listener,” but then moved for the bill of lading to be admitted into evidence without limitation. The court explained that it did not think the bill of lading was being admitted for the truth of the matter asserted and that it did not see any reason to give an instruction. The court added, “It’s not being admitted to show that this is where this shipment was going and this is who ordered the shipment to go there and the jury knows that.” Thus, it seems that the court denied Hidalgo-Sanchez’s proposed instruction and the government’s motion to admit the bill of lading without limitation. Later in the trial, when the government discussed the Michigan seizure of the Mercedes SUV, it explained how the 14 Nos. 20-2673 & 21-1158 shipment was coordinated but never explicitly mentioned the bill of lading. The only mentions of the phone number used to arrange the shipment are: • “[I]t’s ultimately up to the jury to decide whether or not Mr. Hidalgo-Sanchez is, in fact, the one that coordinated the shipment of drugs from Stockton, California to Sturgis, Michigan, but there is certainly a call that details that, and that call is connected to Mr. Hidalgo-Sanchez by one of the phone numbers on the wire.” • “Both the calls, Government [exhibits] 366 and 367, are intercepted on target number (608) 404-4032, telephone with a Madison phone number that was being utilized by Pablo Hidalgo-Sanchez.” Notably, the government did not mention the information on the bill of lading in its closing.