Opinion ID: 2144018
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Johnson v. Edgar

Text: In Johnson v. Edgar, No. 81019, the plaintiffs filed a three-count complaint for declaratory judgment and injunction in the circuit court of Cook County on December 15, 1995. The named plaintiffs were the Illinois State Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (Illinois AFL-CIO), its president, Donald Johnson, and its secretary-treasurer, Margaret Blackshere. The Illinois AFL-CIO is an unincorporated labor organization representing over 1.2 million Illinois workers employed by private and municipal corporations and other business entities. The Johnson complaint named as defendants Governor Jim Edgar, Attorney General Jim Ryan, and the State of Illinois. The State was dismissed by agreement of the parties. The Johnson plaintiffs' complaint was directed primarily at the portion of article 6 of Public Act 89-428, which amended section 14-3 of the Criminal Code to create a new exemption for the offense of eavesdropping. As stated, this exemption allowed employers to monitor their employees' conversations in some circumstances. Count I of the plaintiffs' complaint charged that Public Act 89-428 violated the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution because it contained more than one subject. Count II charged that the eavesdropping provision in article 6 was so vague that it violated the plaintiffs' rights to due process of law under the Illinois and United State Constitutions. Count HI charged that the eavesdropping provision was overbroad and violated privacy rights in violation of the Illinois and United States Constitutions. The complaint sought a declaration on the constitutionality of the provision and an injunction against its enforcement. On January 16, 1996, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. On January 25, 1996, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs had no standing, the complaint failed to state a claim upon which injunctive relief could be granted, and the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of sovereign immunity. On May 7, 1996, the circuit court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The circuit court ruled that the plaintiffs had standing and that Public Act 89-428 was unconstitutional in its entirety because it encompassed more than one subject, in violation of article IV, section 8(d), of the Illinois Constitution. The court permanently enjoined the defendants from enforcing any provision of Public Act 89-428. The defendants appealed directly to this court, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(a) (134 Ill.2d R. 302(a)), from the declaration that Public Act 89-428 is unconstitutional. The defendants have not appealed the circuit court's ruling on the standing issue.