Opinion ID: 1781968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the pecuniary gain aggravator was applied in a vague and overbroad manner in violation of the federal constitution and mississippi law.

Text: Although the jury was instructed to consider whether the crime was committed for pecuniary gain, Foster argues there was no evidence adduced at trial that the killing occurred for the purpose of pecuniary gain. Further, Foster argues the pecuniary gain aggravator was duplicative of the during the commission of the crime of robbery instruction in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Finally, Foster contends that the pecuniary gain instruction, if examined in isolation, is unconstitutionally vague as pecuniary gain does not provide each juror with a principled way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 1859, 100 L.Ed.2d 372, 381 (1988) quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1767, 64 L.Ed.2d 398, 406-07 (1980). Since the pecuniary gain aggravator could apply to intentional homicides for hire (i.e., a compensated assassin) just as well as intentional homicides actuated to prohibit police from intercepting an illegal money-making operation (i.e., shooting an officer during a police raid), and as the aggravator could apply to intentional homicides for pecuniary gain (i.e., robbing a store clerk) just as well as unintentional homicides where the perpetrator steals from the victim after completing the unintentional crime (i.e., involuntary manslaughter followed by plundering of the body), Foster contends the pecuniary gain instruction must be followed with a limiting instruction. Along this line, Foster points out this Court has criticized the coactive implementation of the robbery and pecuniary gain instructions. Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 681 (Miss. 1991). In Willie, this Court established prospective precedent regarding use of the pecuniary gain and robbery, holding the use of both aggravators reversible where the aggravators essentially comprise one course of conduct. When life is at stake, a jury cannot be allowed the opportunity to doubly weigh the commission of the underlying felony and the motive behind the underlying felony as separate aggravators. Willie, 585 So.2d at 681. Previous cases holding to the contrary were overruled by this Court. Id. In his reply brief, Foster submits he faces no retroactivity barrier to relief which may have existed in Willie under Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d 1171, 1182-83 (Miss. 1992). [3] Foster argues that the Jenkins Court, relying on Willie and Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743, 763 (Miss. 1991) cert denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 663, 116 L.Ed.2d 754 (1991), held William Jenkins was entitled to relief under Willie and Ladner for the stacking of pecuniary gain and robbery aggravators even though his trial was concluded before Willie and Ladner were handed down. Jenkins, 607 So.2d at 1182-83. Citing Clemons v. State, 593 So.2d 1004, 1006 (Miss. 1992), this Court restated its well-worn principle that it will not reweigh remaining, constitutionally valid aggravators once the jury has been infected with instructions pertaining to one or more constitutionally infirm aggravators. Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d at 1182-83. Foster's reliance on Jenkins for authority that Willie has been overruled is misplaced. This Court in Jenkins reaffirmed its holding in Willie, pointing to the prospective nature of the decision and reminding the trial courts that it would be reversible error to give the two aggravators separately in future cases subsequent to Willie. The Court in Jenkins, in both the guilt and sentencing phases, emphatically stated those issues which it held were reversible error. The issue of the giving of the two aggravators was not one where the Court held reversible error. Jenkins was reversed on several grounds in both the guilt and sentencing phases, but any suggestion that Jenkins changed Willie is erroneous. The State contends that Foster is procedurally barred from raising this assignment as he did not make a proper objection to SSP-4, the State's central instruction containing a listing of the aggravators the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt. The State asserts [t]he only specific objection made to the sentencing instruction made by Foster was that it did not list all of the mitigating circumstances that he wished included. Foster claims that he objected to the entirety of SSP-4 as an incorrect statement of the law, but he failed to say how it was such an incorrect statement of the law other than to claim that the instruction did not contain an exhaustive list of mitigating factors requested by Foster. It is clear that Foster's only specific objection was that the instruction failed to contain all the factors of mitigation the defense asked the jury be allowed to consider. This objection by Foster is too broad to give notice and opportunity for a ruling by the circuit judge on any specific objection other than the one raised by Foster pertaining to the list of mitigating factors. This Court addressed this issue in Edwards v. Thigpen, 433 So.2d 906 (Miss. 1983), wherein Edwards claimed that his interjection of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances was raised and preserved at trial. At trial, Edwards' attorney lodged a broad objection that all of the evidence violated Edwards' constitutional rights under the fifth, sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendment. Id. at 909. This Court in Edwards stated: We have repeatedly held that the trial court will not be held in error for overruling an objection which is couched in such broad terms as to insufficiently put the trial court on notice as to precisely what error is being alleged. Assuming arguendo that the objection was sufficient to preserve the point for appeal, this ground was not assigned as error or argued on direct appeal and, since the petitioner has accepted the trial court's determination, the issue is barred. Id. The State also contends that the determination in Willie that the jury cannot be instructed on pecuniary gain and robbery aggravators in most circumstances does not apply to Foster as his trial was completed before Willie was handed down. The State is correct in its contention. This Court was clear in Willie, when it stated: This decision is to be prospective and will take effect from this date forward, 585 So.2d at 681. Willie provided instruction to prosecutors and trial courts that they could not use these two statutory aggravating factors separately in the future. The claim relating to the giving of the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance is procedurally barred as Foster waived the right to raise this claim on direct appeal by failing to specifically object to the sentencing instruction on this basis. Foster's claim is afforded no relief under Willie, which granted prospective relief only. There is no merit to this issue, in addition to the procedural bar.