Opinion ID: 154142
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assumption of the Risk Instruction Requested

Text: -3- Sauer contends the district court erred by refusing to give a requested instruction on assumption of the risk. We disagree. Assumption of the risk is not a defense under FELA. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 57 (1943). 45 U.S.C. § 54 provides: In any action brought against any common carrier [under the FELA]. . . to recover damages for injuries to . . . any of its employees, such employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his employment in any case where such injury . . . resulted in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier. Sauer requested two instructions on assumption of the risk. The court rejected his requested instruction 32, which quoted the statute, but gave his requested instruction 11, which defined contributory negligence, and concluded with the following: You may not find contributory negligence on the part of the Plaintiff, however, simply because he acceded to the request or direction of responsible representatives of his employer that he work at a dangerous job, or in a dangerous place, or under unsafe conditions. Appellant's append. 56. Although instruction 11 did not use the phrase assumption of the risk or quote the statute, it was sufficient to prevent the jury from improperly relieving BN from liability based on assumption of the risk. In Joyce v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 651 F.2d 676, 683 (10th Cir. 1981), this court held that when the evidence could support either contributory negligence or assumption of the risk, instructions which only define contributory negligence are not sufficient to prevent the jury from applying assumption of the risk. The court held the jury instructions should also include the following admonition: You may not find contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, however, simply because he acceded to the request or direction of the responsible representatives of his employer that he work at a dangerous job, or in a dangerous place, or under unsafe conditions. Id. at 683 (quoting Devitt and -4- Blackmar, Fed. Jury Prac. and Instructions (3d ed.), § 94.16). The same instruction has been held sufficient by other circuits. See Fashauer v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 57 F.3d 1269, 1280 (3d Cir. 1995); Jenkins v. Union Pacific R. Co., 22 F.3d 206, 209-10, 212 (9th Cir. 1994); Gish v. CSX Transp., 890 F.2d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 1989). Because instruction 11 was sufficient, the district court did not err in refusing to give requested instruction 32.