Opinion ID: 393156
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the trial court's refusal to permit discovery

Text: 120 The appellants next argue that even if the government were entitled to summary judgment on the present state of the record, the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to permit them to conduct discovery before he ruled on the defendants' summary judgment motion. 105 Had discovery been permitted, they contend, they may have been able to uncover evidence sufficient to controvert the government's affidavits and thereby have avoided the award of summary judgment against them. 121 After careful consideration of this contention, we find no abuse by the trial court of its discretion. 106 In support of their view the appellants argue that the substantial questions which plaintiffs' filings raised concerning the substantive content of the affidavits relied upon by defendants ... demonstrated the need for discovery concerning the underlying bases for the conclusions expressed in the affidavits. 107 To satisfy this need, for example, the appellants wanted to question Secretary of State Vance's belief and judgment as expressed in his affidavit that confirmation or denial of news reports about the Glomar Explorer could cause harm to the national security. 108 As another example, they wanted to question the other affiants, including the Director of Central Intelligence, CIA Director of Finance Yale and CIA Deputy Director of the Directorate of Science and Technology Zellmer, about whether the adverse consequences predicted by the affidavits ha(d) ever happened. 109 In concluding their motion to the trial court for authorization to take the depositions of the government's affiants, the appellants summed up their position as follows: when the government attempts to make a record based on self-serving, conclusory assertions, the federal rules ... require allowing plaintiffs to test those assertions by way of deposition. 110 122 We part company with the appellants because we do not share their premise that the government's assertions were inadequate to the task, let alone conclusory. Had we been persuaded by the appellants' principal contention that so much already is known about the Glomar Explorer as to render the government's representations it has something left to hide inherently implausible, we might have reached a different conclusion on the issue of discovery. But we have rejected this line of argument. 111 We do not agree that the appellants succeeded in raising substantial questions ... concerning the substantive content of the affidavits relied upon by defendants, 112 so we must conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying them discovery concerning the underlying bases for the conclusions expressed in the affidavits; 113 having rejected the premise, we are forced to reject the conclusion. 123 We are well aware of the advantages of adversary procedures in testing the strength of the government's position in FOIA cases even those involving claims of secrecy. 114 Nonetheless, the basic purpose of Exemption 1 of the Act is to ensure that FOIA requests will not result in the disclosure of sensitive materials if a court has satisfied itself that the materials have been properly classified. In national security cases, some sacrifice to the ideals of the full adversary process are inevitable. 115 It is natural that the appellants should seek discovery in the hope that they might turn up details of the government's position that might be turned to the appellant's advantage. In national security cases, however, more detailed information itself may compromise intelligence methods and sources. 116 124 In the circumstances of the present case, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying discovery to the appellants, when it appears that discovery would only have afforded an opportunity to pursue a bare hope of falling upon something that might impugn the affidavits. 117