Opinion ID: 2630372
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Issue I Hearsay statements of Chris Hicks

Text: [¶ 13] At trial, Martinez testified, without objection, that Hicks told him in early September 2005 that he had arranged for a large quantity of marijuana, valued at approximately $500,000.00, to be delivered to Gillette for them to sell; Hicks subsequently received a telephone call around mid-September, during which he heard Hicks ask not to be killed or not to be blamed for something he didn't do; Hicks told Martinez that the shipment of marijuana had been lost and the supplier was holding him responsible for it; after Hicks told Proffit about the situation, Proffit informed them that he was connected and would take care of it; a day or two later, Proffit told them that they owed him favors for taking care of the problem; and Proffit later told them that one of the favors would be the killing of Forquer. [¶ 14] Proffit now contends that plain error occurred when the district court admitted into evidence Hicks' out-of-court statements to Martinez because the statements are hearsay [4] and do not qualify for admission under any of the hearsay exceptions. He also claims the admission of Hicks' statements violated his confrontation rights under both the state and federal constitutions. [¶ 15] We recently rejected an identical argument in Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 102, 191 P.3d 963, 2008 WL 3980841 (Wyo.2008). In that case we determined: Hicks' statements to Martinez would only be hearsay if they were being offered to prove the assertions being made by Hicks. Thus, the statements would be hearsay if they were being offered to prove, for instance, that Hicks had arranged a 500-pound marijuana deal, or that the deal had gone bad, or that he and Martinez were being threatened with death. The statements were not, however, offered for that purpose. Rather, they were offered for the purpose of showing the effect the statements had upon Martinez and [Proffit] See Kenyon v. State, 986 P.2d 849, 853-54 (Wyo.1999) (credibility of the declarant not the issue). The fact that Hicks' statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted also defeats [Proffit's] contention that admission of the statements violated his constitutional confrontation rights. Crawford, itself, notes that the confrontation clause does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted. Crawford [ v. Washington ], 541 U.S. [36], 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. [1354], 1369 n. 9[, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)]; Schultz v. State, 2007 WY 162, ¶ 11, 169 P.3d 81, 85 (Wyo. 2007); Szymanski v. State, 2007 WY 139, ¶¶ 20-26, 166 P.3d 879, 884-86 (Wyo.2007). [ Proffit ] has failed to show plain error. Proffit, ¶¶ 21-22, 191 P.3d at 970. Our decision in that case is equally dispositive of Proffit's claim in this case. [5]