Opinion ID: 1698242
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did madden present clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of undue influence?

Text: The history of our state's law governing the presumption of undue influence began in the case of Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190 (1858). There, this Court held a will or deed from a ward to his guardian raises a presumption of undue influence which can be overcome by the grantee/beneficiary's showing full deliberation on the part of the grantor and abundant good faith on the part of the grantee. Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190, 258-59 (1858). As early as 1908, this Court addressed the presumption in relation to professionals and gifts from those with whom the professionals had a confidential or fiduciary relationship. We stated in Hitt v. Terry : [T]he law presumes that, where a will or deed is made by a patient to his physician, to the exclusion of those to whom, ordinarily, his property would go, no reason existing why such exclusion of relations should occur, the law raises the prima facie presumption that the will is void [9] on grounds of public policy; in other words, that in those conditions in life in which confidential relations exist between parties, such as attorney and client, physician and patient, etc., the law presumes deeds or wills made by the client to the attorney, or the patient to the physician, to be prima facie void, and therefore requires such beneficiary under the will to show the absence of undue influence and the like... . Hitt v. Terry, 92 Miss. 671, 710-11, 46 So. 829, 839-40 (1908) (emphasis added). The Hitt Court referred back to the factors of Meek v. Perry  the showing of full deliberation on the part of the grantor and the abundant good faith on the part of the grantee  to illustrate what evidence would suffice to rebut the presumption of undue influence. Hitt, 92 Miss. 671 at 711, 46 So. 829 at 840 (1908). In 1926, the case of Ham v. Ham came before this Court. There the Court found that the proof presented to rebut the presumption of undue influence fell short. See Ham v. Ham, 146 Miss. 161, 110 So. 583 (1926). The Court adopted the language of 2 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.) § 957, in stating that the presumption could be overcome by clear and convincing evidence of the good faith of the grantee, full knowledge of the grantor, and of independent consent and action of the grantor. Id., 110 So. at 585. The Ham Court continued: The usual method of proving independent consent and action in such cases, and probably the only way it can be clearly proven, is by showing that in making the deed the grantor acted on the advice of a competent person disconnected from the grantee and devoted wholly to the grantor's interest. [Citations omitted.] Ham, 110 So. at 585. This Court has fluctuated through the years in attempting to find a suitable definition of independent consent and action by the grantor. Many cases have relied on the literal words of Ham in defining the third prong of the test. These independent consent and action cases were countered by our independent advice line of cases. See Justice Robertson's discussion of this dichotomy in Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1193-94 (Miss. 1987). Murray v. Laird, 446 So.2d 575 (Miss. 1984), attempted to settle the issue of the requirements needed to rebut the presumption of undue influence. Murray set forth its interpretation of the Ham three-prong test: (1) good faith on the part of the grantee/beneficiary; (2) grantor's full knowledge and deliberation of his actions and their consequences; and (3) advice of (a) a competent person, (b) disconnected from the grantee and (c) devoted wholly to the grantor/testator's interest. Murray, 446 So.2d at 578. Only three years later this Court was confronted with another undue influence case, and we changed the statement of the law yet again. In Mullins v. Ratcliff , we re-stated the third prong of the Murray test, declaring that `independent consent and action' is the appropriate third prong of the test. Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1194 (Miss. 1987). Murray v. Laird is still an important case, however, for it lists factors, gleaned from the common law and years of this Court's case law, which will help dispel the presumption of undue influence. See Murray, 446 So.2d 575 at 578-79. Madden attempted to prove Sierra's intentions that she receive the assets. Where is the proof in this record that  in placing Madden's name on the safe deposit box agreement, opening a savings account, and purchasing savings certificates with her name on them  Sierra intended to make a gift of all of his and his wife's cash assets, over $80,000.00? There is no such proof outside the written language of the deposit agreements. The bank employees said Sierra's stated intention in placing Madden's name on the accounts was to enable a woman he and his wife trusted to take care of their business in the event he became unable to do so. No one suggested otherwise. No independent person  indeed, not even Madden  came forward with any statement from Sierra that he, in truth, wanted all the $80,000.00 to go to Madden if he died. It is, of course, now impossible to prove what either Mrs. Sierra or Sierra intended, because they are both dead. It is precisely for this reason the law presumes the gift of this money to Madden, the person the Sierras trusted and depended so heavily upon, resulted from undue influence. The only person on the face of this earth who could shed any light whatever upon the background circumstances in Sierra's making this transfer is Madden  the sole beneficiary. We are not called upon to try to ascertain Sierra's intentions, nor is Madden called upon to try to prove them. What is required of Madden is to give clear and convincing proof that she showed good faith, that Sierra had full knowledge and deliberation of precisely what he was doing and its consequences, and that Sierra showed independent consent and action. We must look, then, at the evidence presented to the Special Chancellor.
Madden described, in detail, the events that took place on November 14. Here, Madden's testimony wears thin. According to Lisa Jones, the Merchants Bank employee, Sierra stated to her, in Madden's presence, that Madden was his nurse and he wanted her name on the account so she could look after his business if he became unable to do it. If Madden had admitted at trial she heard this statement, it would, of course, conclusively show the real purpose of this financial arrangement. It would have conclusively shown the arrangement was only to enable Madden to transact business for Sierra if he was incapacitated  clearly, not to make her a gift of the money. On the other hand, if Sierra's purpose was to make her a gift of his small fortune, Madden knew she was ethically obligated and bound to say to him, Mr. Andy, before you do anything like that, you need to talk to someone besides me. [10] Madden gave no such warning, but she escaped confronting this ethical dilemma at trial by testifying she did not recall any such statement. Madden admitted it would be unethical for her, a registered nurse, to accept gifts of significant value from a patient. As a hospice volunteer, Madden conceded, she performed many of the same kinds of services she had rendered as a nurse for Anna Sierra. Finally, she further admitted she had been instructed, too, that a hospice volunteer could not ethically accept substantial gifts knowingly. Madden never testified that Sierra told her at any time he intended to give her his and Mrs. Sierra's life savings. Madden took Andrew Sierra in her car to a bank of her own choosing, Merchants Bank, where she had done business before and knew some bank employees, instead of to Hancock Bank or Southern Federal Bank, where he had done business before and was known. Madden said she knew Sandy Rogers and she could talk to him if she ever ran into any trouble; however, Sierra had never met any of the officers or employees of Merchants Bank before. He was a total stranger to them. Thus, Sierra was deprived of the one last chance of having some friend or acquaintance in one of those banks to give him a bare minimum of caution or advice. Madden, the nurse, decided, on her own, to become Madden, the financial advisor. Madden testified she knew when they set up the accounts on November 14, 1988, they were set up as joint tenancies, with right of survivorship. She admitted she knew that meant she would legally own the contents if Sierra died, even the next day, although Anna Sierra was still alive. Madden also conceded she did not suggest Sierra talk to anyone else  no one at the Merchants Bank, no attorney, no other friend, no relative  before setting up accounts which would, at his death, benefit her, rather than his wife of more than forty years. Madden  the financial advisor  also admitted on the stand she had suggested to Sierra he invest in certificates of deposit, although he had never done so before; and she said she and her husband had invested in CDs for several years. Madden first denied having any knowledge of the existence of the CDs before Payne opened the lock box; however, she admitted on cross-examination she did know about the CDs before that. Payne, too, testified Madden told him when they first met at Merchants Bank to open the lock box they might find some CDs with her name on them in the box. Special Chancellor Walker concluded Madden had failed to present clear and convincing evidence of her good faith in these transactions. We concur.
The undisputed testimony at trial disclosed the fact Sierra did not discuss the consequences of opening the savings account, renting the safe deposit box, nor of purchasing the CDs with Madden listed as his joint tenant with anyone at Merchants Bank. Nor was any evidence presented that Sierra had discussed his actions with anyone, other than Madden's contention that Mr. Sierra had talked it over with Mrs. Sierra. No credible evidence revealed any knowledge or deliberation by Sierra regarding the disposition of the assets in those accounts upon his death. Madden contended Sierra knew the consequences of his actions because he and Anne Sierra had held their house as joint tenants, with right of survivorship. However, Madden's contention relies on an assumption. Assumptions fall far short of the clear and convincing evidence required. The evidence in the record implies quite the contrary. For a man to hand over two-thirds of his and his wife's total estate, while his wife of over forty years was sick and confined to her bed defies logic. The chancellor found Madden had presented no clear and convincing evidence on this prong of the test. We agree with the chancellor's conclusion.
While this Court has modified the Murray requirements of [a]dvice of (a) competent person, (b) disconnected from the grantee and (c) devoted wholly to the grantor/testator's interest, such advice is still clearly the best way to show the independent consent and action still mandated by Mullins v. Ratcliff . For what constitutes independent consent and action? As we conceded in Murray, we have never set forth any clear definition, nor can we. Of necessity, each case must be determined individually on its merits. Murray v. Laird, 446 So.2d 575, 578 (Miss. 1984). Madden presented no credible evidence Sierra ever obtained the advice of any competent person, disconnected from Madden, and devoted wholly to the interest of Sierra, about the questionable transactions. She obviously failed the standard set forth in Murray. More importantly, she failed to meet the standard of Mullins, as well. Madden argues Sierra showed independent consent and action in several ways. First, Madden contends, Sierra showed it in going to the bank and purchasing CDs without her. Then, she argues, he showed it in changing the beneficiary on his union life insurance policy from Mrs. Sierra to Farley Rhodes. Finally, Madden would have us find independent consent and action in Sierra's renewing the safe deposit box rental under terms identical to the original rental agreement, without removing her name. Madden's arguments are not supported by the record. The record shows Sierra did not discuss the purchase of the certificates of deposit with anyone, other than Madden. While Sierra did go to the bank alone, Madden herself testified she stayed with Mrs. Sierra while Mr. Sierra ran errands, such as going to the bank. Mrs. Sierra was in no condition to be left alone. And Madden also admitted she suggested the purchase of the CDs and knew of their existence. This shows no independent advice and consent on Sierra's part. The purchases of the six certificates of deposit were made on three trips to Merchants Bank in a two-month period, beginning November 22, 1988, and ending January 31, 1989. This was within the time frame when the hospice service being provided to the Sierras by the hospital was in the process of termination. Moreover, while Sierra made each of these trips to the bank, on November 22 and December 31, 1988, and January 24 and 31, 1989, Madden was in his home, looking after and caring for Mrs. Sierra. There is no evidence of Sierra making any effort or having any intention to purchase any certificate of deposit after January 31, 1989. The chancellor could manifestly consider the emotional drain and the mental strain upon this old couple in this critical period of time. Madden's argument regarding the change in beneficiaries on Sierra's union life insurance policy is also faulty. Life insurance is something about which almost every lay person is somewhat knowledgeable. Also, it may have been the terms of the policy were exhaustively explained to Sierra at the time of purchase. Nonetheless, Sierra's knowing he could name Rhodes as beneficiary of a life insurance policy in no way shows Sierra knew Madden was automatically entitled to three-quarters of all his and his wife's assets. It in no way shows he knew she would get the funds upon his death, nor that he knew she could withdraw them from the bank at any time while he was still living. Again, this is no clear and convincing proof of independent advice and consent. Finally, in addressing Madden's last contention on this prong, we point out that accepting Sierra's renewal as an indication he ratified the account requires us to assume Sierra understood the transaction in the first place. The argument he meant to leave her owning the accounts because he failed to remove her name requires us to examine actions that Sierra did not take in the months following his wife's death. To infer any independent consent and action from actions not taken at a later date requires us to ignore the issue before us: Did Madden successfully rebut the presumption of undue influence in the procurement of the accounts and certificates of deposit? Madden contends the confidential relationship and any possible undue influence by her ended with the death of Mrs. Anna Sierra. This contention ignores the fact that all of the assets in dispute were obtained during the time that Mrs. Sierra still lived, when the confidential relationship and undue influence still existed. Madden would have us assume failure to negate a transaction equates with ratification of that transaction. Madden would have us assume  and that is all it can be, an assumption  Sierra did not take Madden's name off the accounts because he intended her to have the assets. However, an equally logical, and much more likely, assumption is Sierra simply did not know what he had done. Fortunately, we are not called upon to make such deductions at all. We do not hesitate to rule, when the evidence warrants, that a will is invalid because it was procured by undue influence. See, e.g., Croft v. Alder, 237 Miss. 713, 115 So.2d 683 (1959). Our inquiry here, too, must be directed toward the time of procurement. A search through the case law of all fifty state court systems, as well as all federal courts, has revealed not one single case in which failure to remove someone's name was held to equal ratification of an account set up because of the beneficiary's undue influence. Mississippi will not now set such an unwise precedent. We will recognize the later ratification of actions procured by undue influence only when we are confronted by clear and convincing evidence that ratification is, in fact, intended. Had Sierra ever stated to an advisor, such as his banker, lawyer, accountant, or even good friend, after Mrs. Sierra's death, I want to give Mrs. Madden this money; I want her to have it, or had Sierra ever made gifts to Madden after his wife's death, we would have a quite different scenario. This, however, never occurred. The evidentiary standard required is clear and convincing evidence  not suppositions and assumptions that we, the members of this Court, can somehow know what went on in Andrew Sierra's mind. Instead of relying on clear and convincing evidence, to find in Madden's favor on this point, the chancellor would have had to rely on insinuations, speculations, and assumptions. This he could not do, nor can we. This Court cannot ignore the fact the Sierras were an elderly couple who had no children during their long marriage. They had only each other. Andrew Sierra was in the tragic position of watching his beloved wife's life slip away before his very eyes while he devotedly cared for her, twenty-four hours a day, with very little respite. Only one who has been in such a situation can appreciate the overwhelming feelings of hopelessness, loss, and utter desolution that result when one of the partners in such a marriage dies. We cannot say, with any certainty, Sierra knew the legal consequences of his actions when he set up any of the accounts or purchased any of the CDs. We can say with even less certainty he realized the implications after the death of his wife and that he deliberately chose to leave his assets as situated. We cannot be blinded by the unique facts of this particular case when we apply the law. Counsel asks what Madden did wrong, the same question asked eighty years ago in Jamison v. Jamison, 96 Miss. 288, 51 So. 130 (1910), and answered there and by our decisions since. Once more we state it is not the function of a court, following a gift made by virtue of a fiduciary relation, to go beyond this fact and determine what the beneficiary, the receiver, did wrong. To the contrary, it is because the true facts surrounding the gift in such a circumstance are rarely, if ever, susceptible of proof, except from the beneficiary's lips, that the law requires other clear and convincing evidence. The law requires the beneficiary to prove, other than from himself, that the gift was, in truth and in fact, what the giver wished, and not the result of any undue influence or improper action by the beneficiary. From this record, however, it is clear Madden overstepped her prerogative when she took it upon herself to be the Sierras' financial advisor  a function over and beyond nursing  rather than referring them to someone qualified. She overstepped her prerogative when she drove Sierra to his bank to remove all his assets and transfer them to Madden's bank  rather unusual behavior for a nurse. And, by her own testimony, she did wrong if she ever, in fact, knew during this entire transaction Sierra intended to make her a gift and did not promptly tell him, as she was ethically obligated to do, Mr. Sierra, you should not give me any large gift unless you talk to someone else you trust, besides me. It is not now  and never has been  the purpose of the law to frustrate the true wishes of any person to make a gift or devise to whomever he pleases; nor, most assuredly, to prevent the making of a gift to a person to whom he owes a debt of gratitude. Indeed, expressions of gratitude should have every encouragement in law. But a court of equity has an equal obligation to be certain, in a transfer between parties in a fiduciary relation, that an elderly or weak person is not abused or overreached. There exists a very simple rule which should be observed by any compassionate or considerate person, aside from any rule of law: In the singular event you happen to be in the dominant position in a fiduciary relation and the person dependent upon you tells you he wants to give you his life's savings or property far beyond any sum you may have earned, have the decency to see that he talks to someone besides you. Put more simply, when a court of equity is faced with a large gift to a dominant party by the weaker in a confidential relation, it must hear from someone besides the beneficiary, or receive clear and convincing evidence beyond that from the lips of the beneficiary, this is, in truth and in fact, what the donor wished to do on his own. This rule of law can be quite easily satisfied by any conscientious person. It imposes no hardship or difficulty to the expected beneficiary. Yet, it is also the one safeguard against deceit, overreaching, fraud and plunder by a strong person over a weak person, dependent upon him. Not one person in this case, not even Madden herself, offered a word to indicate Sierra intended to give her his and his wife's lifetime savings. Indeed, as a volunteer, Madden obviously did not expect to be paid for her services; so the rule acts only to deprive her of an unexpected windfall. Had Mrs. Sierra outlived her husband, it would have been an outrage had Madden suggested she was still entitled to the funds. If we do not impose the rule, however, such will be the result in future cases. The chancellor found Madden presented no clear and convincing evidence that Sierra exhibited independent consent and action in setting up the accounts and purchasing the CDs. The record supports such a finding, and the chancellor did not err. We wrote in Culbreath v. Johnson : The trial judge saw these witnesses testify. Not only did he have the benefit of their words, he alone among the judiciary observed their manner and demeanor. He was there on the scene. He smelled the smoke of battle. He sensed the interpersonal dynamics between the lawyers and the witnesses and himself. These are indispensable. Culbreath v. Johnson, 427 So.2d 705, 708 (Miss. 1983). Special Chancellor Walker, after smelling the smoke of battle, concluded Madden had occupied a fiduciary position, was in a confidential relationship with Sierra. He also concluded the presumption of undue influence arose from the mere fact of that relationship's existence. And he finally concluded Madden did not dispel the cloud the presumption of undue influence spread over this dispute. Special Chancellor Walker, when faced with a situation involving two old people who stood to lose two-thirds of what they had worked a lifetime to accumulate, realized the danger of abandoning the presumption, recognizing the decision in this case will reach far beyond Madden and Rhodes. The argument Rhodes was no kin to the Sierras and no more entitled to the Sierras' assets than was Madden begs the issue. This Court was not called upon to decide who should get the money, but to review the findings of the chancellor: to make sure he employed the right legal standard, see he applied it correctly, and determine if his findings were adequately supported by the record before us. We have done so and hold the chancellor's decision was, in all respects, the correct one. It has also been suggested the rule of a presumption of undue influence in any inter vivos transaction when a confidential relationship exists is too harsh and that it be further weakened or abandoned altogether. This Court cannot stand silently by and see it happen. Our population is growing increasingly older. More and more of our elderly find themselves separated by great distances from their children or other close relatives. Unfortunately, many of our senior citizens find themselves, like Blanche DuBois, dependent on the kindness of strangers. [11] The increase in life expectancy has made it more likely our older citizens will be affected by cancer or other catastrophic illness. And the necessary concerns about rising health care costs make the alternatives of home health care or hospice care attractive ones. In such situations, our elderly are especially vulnerable to those who care for them. Added to these factors is the abolition of the Dead Man Statute in this state, so that it is easier to make claims of gifts from a deceased person. And the amendment of § 81-5-63 of the Code now raises an automatic presumption of co-ownership in accounts like those at issue in this case. This latter change in our law reflects concern by many financial professionals over the liability of banks or other financial institutions when handing over funds in joint accounts. While it does clarify their legal position and release them from doubt as to whom to pay, the adoption of such a position has only made a bad situation worse for some of our elderly. For those who must, for whatever reasons, include someone else's name on their checking, savings, or other accounts, this change represents a greater danger that their entire life savings could be wiped out by an unscrupulous co-tenant. This could happen, without any notice to them at all by their banks, because the law now presumes that any named party is the legal owner of any or all deposits in the joint account. This Court can never know how many people in this state have placed the names of relatives or friends  including home health nurses  on their accounts, merely for the sake of convenience. There is absolutely no requirement the presumption of ownership such an action raises be explained to the depositor; nor that it be explained putting another's name on their account gives that other person ownership of all the funds at any time  including upon the death of the depositor. Nor must financial institutions explain that, by putting the name of another person on that account, the depositor has just expressly overruled testamentary dispositions of those monies. In such a legal climate, how can it be argued that the presumption of undue influence places a too harsh burden upon one seeking to claim benefits? While the vast majority of home-health or hospice workers are, no doubt, honest, compassionate, dedicated professionals, we must guard against the rare grasping opportunist. If such caution makes it slightly more difficult for some of the former to benefit from their kindnesses, it is a small price to pay for the protection of our older adults from the latter. It would be a very simple matter for one who is going to allow his or her name to be placed on the bank accounts of another person to suggest that the depositor talk to a lawyer, accountant, some bank officer, or even relatives, before doing so. Such an action would not only be evidence of the beneficiary's good faith, but would also show independent advice for the grantor/testator, which we have already said is the best way to prove independent consent and action. The argument has been made that requiring such proof amounts to requiring beneficiaries to jump through hoops. However, we do not hesitate to rule a holographic will invalid merely because the testator signed his name at the top of the page; similarly, we require that wills not wholly handwritten by the testator be signed by two witnesses. [12] If a holographic will is not signed at the bottom, the will is invalid. See Baker v. Baker's Estate, 199 Miss. 388, 24 So.2d 841 (1946). And if a typewritten will is not signed by at least two credible witnesses, it is invalid. See Batchelor v. Powers, 348 So.2d 776 (Miss. 1977). It matters not that the testator was of sound mind, was of appropriate age, had full knowledge of what properties he owned and of their value, or that he knew who his heirs-at-law were. If a holographic will is not subscribed at the bottom, or if an attested will is not signed by at least two witnesses, it does not matter if witnesses come bearing mountains of affidavits stating that the document expresses the true intentions of the testator. The will is invalid. Under such circumstances, it matters not if the witnesses include dozens of the most honest and clear-thinking men in the community. The wills are invalid. Some may think our requirement a holographic will be subscribed at the bottom or that an attested will be signed by at least two credible witnesses some hoop jumping, too. Nonetheless, we have strictly enforced the statute, and, as a result, we are no longer faced with appeals on the issue. Attorneys throughout the state, and many lay persons, too, know that holographic wills must be signed at the bottom and attested wills must be signed by at least two credible witnesses. Had we been as clear in setting forth our law governing confidential relationships and undue influence and consistent and firm in enforcing that law, that issue, too, would long ago have been settled. The chancellor's finding that Madden failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence is supported by the record before this Court. We hold the chancellor did not err in finding that, because of the unrebutted presumption of undue influence, Madden was not entitled to the funds in the Merchants Bank savings account, nor to the cash and certificates of deposit in the Merchants Bank lock box. Madden's other assignments of error do not merit discussion. AFFIRMED. DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, P.JJ., and SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and SMITH, JJ., concur. McRAE, J., dissents with separate written opinion.