Opinion ID: 2049012
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the parties' general contentions

Text: Section 42(a) creates a civil, private cause of action for persons subjected to acts of discrimination prohibited by the County Codes of Montgomery, Prince George's, and Howard Counties only. As noted supra, at the time the present actions commenced, § 42(a) provided: Authorized.In Montgomery County, Prince George's County, and Howard County, in accordance with this subtitle, a person who is subjected to an act of discrimination prohibited by the county code may bring and maintain a civil action against the person who committed the alleged discriminatory act for damages, injunctive relief, or other civil relief. § 42(a). At issue in the present case is whether WSSC properly may be considered a person subject to suits brought pursuant to § 42(a). According to WSSC, it does not qualify as a person subject to actions for employment discrimination brought pursuant to § 42(a) and county anti-discrimination ordinances. The Commission maintains that, under well-established rules of construction, the term person in a statute ordinarily does not include the State or its agencies and instrumentalities unless the statute provides specifically otherwise. WSSC notes first the obvious, that § 42(a) does not refer specifically to the State as a person. As such, according to WSSC, the State and its agencies and instrumentalities are not persons and, thus, as a State agency, WSSC is not a proper object for an employment discrimination suit under § 42(a). In addition, WSSC maintains that, if the Court were to determine that WSSC is a unique agency, rather than a more traditional State agency, it is nevertheless immune from suit under § 42(a) because nothing in § 42(a) suggests that the General Assembly intended for the section to apply to unique agencies. Finally, WSSC argues that the application of PGCC § § 2-186 and 2-222 to it through § 42(a) would imbue improperly the County Code provisions with extra-territorial effect and render them unconstitutional general laws. [9] In countering WSSC's contentions, Phillips, Sillers, and Cartwright submit that the term person, as it is used in § 42(a), includes the State. In urging the Court to adopt their interpretation of § 42(a), they cite certain definitions contained in § 15, which, they maintain, indicate that the General Assembly intended for the term person to include the State. Thus, in light of the rule of statutory construction that instructs a court to interpret similar, related statutes in harmony with each other, Phillips, Sillers, and Cartwright contend that the same definition of person should apply to § 42(a). Therefore, in their view, because the term person in § 42(a) includes the State, WSSC, a State agency or instrumentality, is subject to suits brought pursuant to that provision. In the alternative, they maintain that, even if § 42(a) does not apply to State agencies generally, WSSC's unique characteristics qualify it nevertheless as a person under § 42(a).