Opinion ID: 1121511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Probable Cause Hearing.

Text: Petitioners argue that an adversarial probable cause hearing is required by due process considerations. During the 45-day period prior to trial, despite repeated requests, petitioners were denied the opportunity to appear personally in court. Although this detention is preceded by a judicial determination that probable cause exists, RCW 71.09.040, the decision is made ex parte and without prior notice to the detainee. In contrast, under RCW 71.05 (involuntary commitment), an individual is subject first to a 72-hour detention for evaluation and treatment. RCW 71.05.150(1)(b). That statute also requires a psychological evaluation within the first 24 hours of detention. RCW 71.05.210. A probable cause hearing, at which the individual may be present, is then held to determine if an additional 14-day detention is warranted. RCW 71.05.200. [27] The standard for determining the appropriate level of procedure that is due prior to depriving an individual of his right to life, liberty or property is well established: [T]he specific dictates of due process generally requires [ sic ] consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976). We have said that this is [t]he appropriate test for reviewing the constitutional adequacy of involuntary commitment procedures. In re LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 221, 728 P.2d 138 (1986) (citing Dunner v. McLaughlin, 100 Wn.2d 832, 839, 676 P.2d 444 (1984)); see also In re Schuoler, 106 Wn.2d 500, 510, 723 P.2d 1103 (1986); In re Harris, 98 Wn.2d 276, 285, 654 P.2d 109 (1982). Thus, the court must balance the extent of the individual's interest against the interests of the State. [28] In addition, equal protection principles of the Fourteenth Amendment and article 1, section 12 of our constitution require that we examine the protections contained in the Statute in light of protections afforded those who are committed under the involuntary commitment statute. The equal protection clause requires that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purposes of the laws receive like treatment. [14] In re Knapp, 102 Wn.2d 466, 473, 687 P.2d 1145 (1984). To determine if equal protection has been violated, we examine the purpose of the Statute  incapacitation and treatment of violent offenders. It is important to note at the outset that there are good reasons to treat mentally ill people differently than violent sex offenders. See People v. Pembrock, 62 Ill.2d 317, 322, 342 N.E.2d 28 (1976) (A sexually dangerous person creates different societal problems, and his past conduct is different in degree and kind from the conduct of persons in the larger, more inclusive class defined under the Mental Health Code.). Sexually violent predators are generally considerably more dangerous to others than the mentally ill. Treatment methods are also markedly different for the two populations. See RCW 71.09.010. Nevertheless, these distinctions between the two groups must be related to any differences in treatment under the respective statutes. That is, [e]qual protection does not require that all persons be dealt with identically, but it does require that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111, 15 L.Ed.2d 620, 86 S.Ct. 760 (1966). The Supreme Court has said that the dangerousness of the detainee may be a reasonable distinction for purposes of determining the type of custodial or medical care to be given, but it has no relevance whatever in the context of the opportunity to show whether a person is mentally ill at all . (Some italics ours.) Baxstrom, at 111. [29] All individuals who are involuntarily committed are entitled to procedural and substantive protections. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 724, 32 L.Ed.2d 435, 92 S.Ct. 1845 (1972). Thus, the Court in Jackson held: that by subjecting Jackson to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses, and by thus condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for commitment or the opportunity for release ... Indiana deprived petitioner of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 730. A person cannot be deprived of procedural protections afforded other individuals merely because the State makes the decision to seek commitment under one statute rather than another statute. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 512, 31 L.Ed.2d 394, 92 S.Ct. 1048 (1972). Thus, in regard to the initial determination of whether there is probable cause for detention, an individual is entitled to the same opportunity to appear before the court to contest detention in any civil commitment proceeding. [30-32] Application of the due process and equal protection principles discussed above requires that detainees under the Statute be afforded an opportunity to appear in person to contest probable cause. Petitioners' liberty interests are substantially infringed during the 45-day period leading up to trial. Absent an opportunity to appear and respond to the petition for commitment, we believe that the risk of wrongful detention is too great. In contrast, the burden of providing notice and an opportunity for a detainee to appear is not too onerous. The breadth of such a hearing would remain within the discretion of the trial court. Insofar as this hearing is limited to verification of the detainee's identity and the determination of probable cause to believe that he or she is a sexually violent predator, we do not anticipate a lengthy proceeding. Because many of the individuals affected will be imprisoned prior to commitment, see RCW 71.09.030, notification of the proceedings is simple. In Harris, we imposed such requirements as a function of inherent judicial power. In re Harris, 98 Wn.2d 276, 287, 654 P.2d 109 (1982). [D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972). On several prior occasions, we have supplemented the commitment procedures of RCW 71.05 to bring that statute into compliance with procedural due process guaranties. In re Schuoler, 106 Wn.2d 500, 510, 723 P.2d 1103 (1986); In re Cross, 99 Wn.2d 373, 662 P.2d 828 (1983); In re Harris, supra . In addition, we often interpret statutes in a manner which renders them constitutional. State v. Browet, Inc., 103 Wn.2d 215, 219, 691 P.2d 571 (1984). Here, too, additional procedures are needed to ensure that the Statute is enforced fairly. Therefore, we hold that a 72-hour hearing is required by the constitutional guaranty to due process, and must be available to detainees under the Statute. While this requirement was not complied with here, it had no bearing on the ultimate outcome of petitioners' trials; thus the omission in this instance does not require reversal.