Opinion ID: 1859460
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Sound an Adequate Audible Warning

Text: ¶ 12. Clark also asserts that ICR negligently failed to properly sound the locomotive's whistle and engine bell warning Martin of the train's approach. All parties agree that this claim escapes the grasp of federal preemption. Clark submitted deposition testimony of five individuals who reside near the subject crossing. Each witness testified that they did not hear a whistle or bell sound prior to the collision, though all testified that they did hear the collision. ¶ 13. ICR submitted the deposition testimony of Whiddon and William J. Carter, the train's conductor, that Whiddon began blowing the locomotive's whistle and sounding the engine bell when they passed the whistle post, a point on the track labeled as such to notify the engineer of the appropriate location to sound the whistle. Whiddon testified that he sounded the engine bell and blew the whistle from that point until impact with Martin's automobile. ¶ 14. This testimony is corroborated by the affidavit testimony of Professor MacRae, who reported the recordings of the train's event recorder. The event recorder notes each time the whistle was blown and it recorded the whistle sounding approximately 900 feet south of the crossing. ¶ 15. Additionally, ICR relies upon Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. Yates as authoritative precedent that the type of testimony presented via deposition on behalf of Clark is insufficient to sustain their prima facie case. This reliance is misplaced. ICR specifically points out that [t]he testimony of witnesses that they did not hear the ringing of the bell on a locomotive as it approached a crossing, without proof that the witnesses listened for the bell, or that their attention was in any way directed to it, or that they probably must have heard the bell if it did ring, cannot prevail against the positive testimony of other credible witnesses that the bell did ring at the time in question. Yates, 334 So.2d at 368 (citing Mobile & O.R. Co. v. Johnson, 157 Miss. 266, 271, 126 So. 827, 828 (1930)). This situation is distinguishable from the instant case. Procedurally, both the Yates decision and the Johnson decision were appeals from a jury verdict and not before this Court on review from summary judgment. Thus, the standard of review applicable to evidence presented at trial and evidence contained in a summary judgment record are decidedly different. While such testimony alone may not be able to sustain a jury verdict, it certainly presents a version of events contradictory to ICR's, producing a classic question for the fact finder to resolve. ¶ 16. Additionally, the language in the above-quoted passage promotes a certain strand of semantics that produces rather circular logic. For example, an applicable excerpt of deposition testimony of Aliva Ann Rogers went as follows: MR. KNIGHT: Was the first thing you heard the accident happening? Tell me what was the first thing you heard. MRS. ROGERS: I just heard the crash. MR. KNIGHT: You don't remember hearing anything before that? MRS. ROGERS: No. MR. KNIGHT: Okay. Is that what first let you know that the train was there? MRS. ROGERS: Right. MR. KNIGHT: Okay. So, then did you hear a locomotive whistle? MRS. ROGERS: No. MR. KNIGHT: Okay. Do you know if the whistle blew? MRS. ROGERS: I don't know. I didn't hear it. So, you know, if it did, I didn't hear it. It appears as though ICR wants this Court to hold that because Mrs. Rogers and four other witnesses said I didn't hear it instead of saying The whistle did not blow, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to Clark's failure to adequately sound an audible warning claim. We decline to so. One treads into murky waters when parsing such distinctions from incomplete deposition testimony. How can one truthfully say that the whistle did not blow, as opposed to saying they didn't hear a whistle blow? If it didn't blow, certainly, no one heard it. However, if it did blow, those living behind a railroad track crossing that sees up to eight trains a day may eventually tune out as familiar those sounds which are striking to others. This again is a question for the jury to resolve. ¶ 17. We believe the better approach concerning cases not reaching a jury verdict is found in Walker v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 571 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1978). The Walker decision arose out of a wrongful death action against the railroad by the estate of the deceased for damages as a result of the collision between the decedent's vehicle and a train operated by the named railroad. The Walker court, interpreting Mississippi law, found that where inconsistent testimony regarding whether the whistle sounded and witnesses so situated in the ordinary course of events would have heard or seen the fact had it occurred was sufficient to require a full jury trial. Id. at 868. ¶ 18. This Court has held that a trial court should err on the side of denying motions for summary judgment. Doe v. Stegall, 757 So.2d 201, 204 (Miss.2000). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion need only present a material issue of fact. Id. at 206. The trial judge should have allowed this issue to proceed to trial.