Opinion ID: 1907107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Liar

Text: It is unquestionably improper for a prosecutor to state that the defendant has lied. Washington v. State, 687 So.2d 279, 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (quoting O'Callaghan v. State, 429 So.2d 691, 696 (Fla.1983)). This is especially true in an instance where the defendant takes the stand in his own defense because the prosecutor's reference to the defendant as a liar encroaches on the jury's job by improperly weighing in with his or her own opinion of the credibility of the witnesses. See, e.g., Gomez v. State, 751 So.2d 630, 632 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). However, courts have held that where such commentary is supported by the evidence, there will be no reversal. See, e.g., Lugo v. State, 845 So.2d 74, 107-08 (Fla.2003) (holding that where the evidence substantially proved the defendant's deceitful actions, the prosecutor's remarks calling into question the defendant's veracity were nothing more than appropriate comments on the evidence). In Craig v. State, 510 So.2d 857, 865 (Fla.1987), this Court stated that when the prosecutor called the defendant a liar it was somewhat intemperate. However, this Court also stated that when it can be understood that the name liar is made in reference to that person's testimony, then the prosecutor is merely submitting to the jury a conclusion he has drawn from the evidence. Id. It is only when, viewed in the totality of the case, the prosecutor's comments drift far afield from the evidence adduced at trial that they may constitute fundamental error. Lugo, 845 So.2d at 101. This issue was preserved for review, and appellate counsel did not raise it on appeal. In all probability, however, had this issue been raised, it would have been deemed meritless. Thus, appellate counsel's failure to raise this meritless issue cannot be deemed ineffective assistance. See Valle v. Moore, 837 So.2d at 908; Rutherford, 774 So.2d at 643. The prosecutor's comments refer to Zack's testimony and the evidence at trial. Zack testified on direct examination that he had lied in the past. He was asked if he had problems stealing and lying and if he had lied to the jury about what happened with Smith. Zack said, No, I did not lie, and I did not lie to [the police]. Defense counsel was dealing with this negative evidence up front so the prosecutor could not introduce it first. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Zack if he was a convicted felon, admitted thief, and an admitted liar. Zack responded that he was. Zack again disputed the accusation that he was lying in this trial. In closing arguments for the guilt-phase trial, the prosecutor told the jurors to look at the evidence, that Zack testified, and that his testimony was to be considered the same as any other witness. The prosecutor asked if Zack was straightforward and honest in answering the questions, whether he had self-interest, and whether his testimony was consistent with the other evidence at trial. The prosecutor asked the jury to consider whether Zack had previously been convicted of a crime, and told them that Zack admitted to having committed five crimes. He asked the jurors to assess the testimony of the other witnesses by the same considerations, i.e., to consider whether they were straightforward and whether their testimony was consistent with the other evidence. The prosecutor then pointed to an inconsistency in the evidence and said that Zack did not tell the truth at one point. He talked about lies in general, saying there is usually an element of truth in a lie. He told the jurors to use their common sense and go through the evidence and pick out the truth. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial saying that this was the second time the prosecutor made reference to the defendant as a liar. The court denied the motion for mistrial, but told the prosecutor not to use the word liar. When considered in context, the prosecutor did not call Zack a liar; rather, he examined the totality of Zack's testimony as well as the other evidence presented and drew a conclusion that he was lying. The failure to raise this claim on direct appeal does not amount to deficient performance on the part of appellate counsel because the commentary was supported by the evidence and because the claim would have been unsuccessful on appeal. See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So.2d at 643 (the failure of appellate counsel to raise what in all probability would be a meritless issue will not render appellate counsel's performance ineffective). We therefore deny relief on this claim.