Opinion ID: 1382773
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Johanns and Paramount Land Applied to the Table Grape Commission

Text: The framework of statutes governing the Commission is sufficiently similar to the schemes addressed in Johanns and Paramount Land for us to conclude that the State exercises effective control over the Commission's activities. In other words, the Commission's message is from beginning to end that of the State. See Paramount Land, 491 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560, 125 S.Ct. 2055). The founding of the Commission, its structure, and its relationship to the State of California is strikingly similar to the beef program at issue in Johanns and the Pistachio Commission considered in Paramount Land. Like the beef program and the Pistachio Commission, the Commission was established by an act of the Legislature, the Ketchum Act. §§ 65500 et seq. The California Legislature intended for the Commission, like other commissions established by the State, to [i]mplement public policy through their expressive conduct. § 63901(a). The Commission is tasked with [e]nhance[ing] the image of California agricultural and seafood products to increase the overall demand for these commodities. § 63901(e). Also similar to the beef program in Johanns and identical to the Pistachio Commission in Paramount Land, the Legislature provided an overriding directive for the sorts of messages the state commissions should promote: [T]he Legislature intends that the commissions and councils operate primarily for the purpose of creating a more receptive environment for the commodity and for the individual efforts of those persons in the industry, and thereby complement individual, targeted, and specific activities. § 63901(e). The California Legislature was quite specific about its expectations for the Commission and its messaging. The Legislature declared that [g]rapes produced in California for fresh human consumption comprise one of the major agricultural crops of California, and the production and marketing of such grapes affects the economy, welfare, standard of living and health of a large number of citizens residing in this state. § 65500(a). The Legislature further defined the purpose of the Commission's work by declaring that the Commission should focus on: [t]he promotion of the sale of fresh grapes for human consumption by means of advertising, dissemination of information on the manner and means of production, and the care and effort required in the production of such grapes, the methods and care required in preparing and transporting such grapes to market, and the handling of the same in consuming markets, research respecting the health, food, and dietetic value of California fresh grapes and the production, handling, transportation, and marketing thereof, the dissemination of information respecting the results of such research, instruction of the wholesale and retail trade with respect to handling thereof, and the education and instruction of the general public with reference to the various varieties of California fresh grapes for human consumption, the time to use and consume each variety and the uses to which each variety should be put, the dietetic and health value thereof ... § 65500(f). The specifics contained in § 65500(f) go much further in defining the Commission's message than the Beef Act and Beef Order's general directive that the Operating Committee's programming should discuss different types of beef and that it should refrain from using brand names. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 561, 125 S.Ct. 2055. Like the Operating Committee in Johanns and the Pistachio Commission in Paramount Land, the Commission is tasked with developing specific messaging campaigns. Importantly, the Secretary of the CDFA possesses the power of nomination over all of the table grape commissioners. §§ 65550, 65575.1. The Secretary's power in this respect is greater than either the Secretary of Agriculture's power in Johanns (the Secretary has the power to appoint all Beef Board members, but only half of the Operating Committee, see Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560, 125 S.Ct. 2055) or the Secretary of the CDFA's power in Paramount Land (eight pistachio commissioners are elected by industry and only one is appointed by the Secretary of the CDFA, see Paramount Land, 491 F.3d at 1006). The Secretary also has the power to remove a table grape commissioner. §§ 65550, 65575.1. The State possesses additional oversight powers over the Commission, as the Commission is required to keep accurate books, records, and accounts of all of its dealings and must make those records open to review by the State. § 65572(f). Of course, there are some important differences between the Ketchum Act on the one hand and the programs considered in Johanns and Paramount Land on the other. Unlike the Beef Order and the Pistachio Act, the Ketchum Act does not require any type of review by the Secretary over the actual messages promulgated by the Commission. Under the Beef Order, the Beef Board and Operating Committee send all plans to the Secretary for final approval. 7 C.F.R. §§ 1260.68 & 1260.169. Likewise, the Pistachio Commission must submit to the secretary, for his or her concurrence, an annual statement of contemplated activities ... including advertising, promotion, marketing research, and production research. § 69051(q). We recognize that final approval has been statutorily provided to the relevant secretaries in other commodities programs that courts have approved since Johanns. See Am. Honey Producers Assoc., Inc. v. U.S.D.A., 2007 WL 1345467, at  (E.D.Cal. May, 8, 2007) (determining that honey program funded by industry assessments involved government speech and was therefore immune to constitutional challenge, the court noted that the Act includes a provision that gives the Secretary final approval power over messages before they can be disseminated to the public); Avocados Plus, Inc. v. Johanns, 421 F.Supp.2d 45, 47-48 (D.D.C.2006) (same, for avocado program); Cricket Hosiery, Inc. v. United States, 30 C.I.T. 576, 429 F.Supp.2d 1338, 1346 (2006) (same, for cotton program). We do not discount the significance of the power over specific messaging. An additional noteworthy difference between the Ketchum Act and the Pistachio Act, in particular, concerns the Secretary's power to require the [Pistachio] commission to correct or cease any existing activity or function that is determined by the secretary not to be in the public interest or to be in violation of this chapter. Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 69032. The Ketchum Act does not grant a similar power to the Secretary. Rather, under Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 65660, the Commission may recommend to the Secretary that its operation be suspended, or producers may file a petition with the Secretary recommending the same. At that point, the Secretary causes a referendum to be conducted among producers. § 65660. Although less direct, this route for review still involves the Secretary in the oversight process. And, of course, the ultimate power of review and oversightthe Secretary's authority to remove table grape commissionerscannot be discounted. The bulk of Delano Farms's remaining arguments distinguishing the State's effective control over the Commission as compared to the beef program and the Pistachio Act largely rely on pointing out that the Secretary and the CDFA have, in practice, performed virtually no supervision of the Commission. Delano Farms notes that the Secretary does not attend meetings and does not review advertising and promotional activities, nor does the State review the Commission's budgets. The record also reflects that the CDFA had very few documents in its possession related to the Commission's work. In any event, Delano Farms's laissez-faire argument is foreclosed by Paramount Land, in which we underscored that passivity is not an indication that the government cannot exercise authority. 491 F.3d at 1011. Our focus in this case, as in Paramount Land, is the statutorily-authorized control the State has over the Commission, and not the actual level of control evidenced in the record. While we acknowledge that there are differences in statutorily-prescribed oversight afforded to the government in the case of the Commission, the beef program, and the Pistachio Commission, these differences are legally insufficient to justify invalidating the Ketchum Act on First Amendment grounds. In sum, we are mindful of Paramount Land 's admonition that [t]o draw a line between these ... approaches to oversight risks micro-managing legislative and regulatory schemes, a task federal courts are ill-equipped to undertake. Paramount Land, 491 F.3d at 1012.