Opinion ID: 2804428
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mineral locations

Text: Article VIII, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution establishes the basis for locatable mineral rights. It provides: “Prior discovery, location, and filing, as prescribed by law, shall establish a prior right to these minerals and also a prior right to permits, leases, and transferable licenses for their extraction.” -32- 7011 Holders of mining claims acquired by discovery, location, and filing do not have an automatic right to mine their claims. To actually extract minerals, they must acquire the necessary permits.44 Likewise, they have no automatic right to engage in intensive exploration activities, that is, in activities that are not generally allowed to any member of the public without a permit.45 For intensive exploration activities, a MLUP is required. 4. Why the MLUPs are disposals of an interest in land The Public Notice Clause of the Alaska Constitution, article VIII, section 10, prohibits disposals of interests in state lands without prior public notice. The central question posed by Nunamta’s appeal is whether the MLUPs are disposals of interests in state land under the Public Notice Clause. A permit that is revocable at the will of the grantor is generally considered a license.46 We recently stated that “[t]he grant of an easement is a conveyance or disposal of an interest in land within the meaning of [the Public Notice Clause], but the transfer of a license or a permit generally is not.”47 44 See Beluga Mining Co. v. State, Dep’t of Natural Res., 973 P.2d 570, 575 (Alaska 1999) (noting that company with claim “had no right to mine” but had to seek permission to do so). 45 See 11 AAC 96.020; supra pp. 29-30. 46 N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. State, Dep’t of Natural Res., 2 P.3d 629, 635 n.23 (Alaska 2000) (citations omitted). 47 SOP, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Natural Res., Div. of Parks & Outdoor Recreation, 310 P.3d 962, 967 (Alaska 2013) (citing Laverty v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 13 P.3d 725, 736 & n.54 (Alaska 2000)); see also JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY , JR ., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND § 11:1 (2014) (“Generally a license is not viewed as an interest in the land.”); see also, e.g., Rau v. Collins, 891 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Md. App. 2006) (noting that license is a personal privilege rather than an interest in the land); Wilson v. Staats, 751 S.E.2d 747, 751 (W. Va. 2013) (noting that essential characteristic of license is that it does not create an interest in land, only a “personal and (continued...) -33- 7011 Nonetheless, whether a transfer may be characterized as a license is not necessarily determinative of a contention that the Public Notice Clause applies, and we hold here, consistent with Northern Alaska, that licenses that are functionally irrevocable under the tests set out in that case48 are interests in land requiring prior public notice under the Public Notice Clause. We further hold that the MLUPs in this case are functionally irrevocable.49 We so conclude because their revocation or non-renewal would substantially destroy PLP’s investment of hundreds of millions of dollars and would leave in place large-scale and long-lasting changes to the land which cannot be removed without significant damage to it, and because the State has recognized the public importance of allowing PLP’s exploratory activities to proceed as a necessary step in the development of a mine. 47 (...continued) revocable privilege”). But see RESTATEMENT (FIRST ) OF PROPERTY § 512 cmt. c (1944); 4 RICHARD R. POWELL , POWELL O N REAL PROPERTY § 34.25 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2014) (“So long as it continues, a license derogates from the completeness of the servient owner’s ownership, and this requires its recognition as an ‘interest in land.’ ”); 8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY , SECOND THOMAS EDITION § 64.02(b) (David A. Thomas, ed. 1998). Cf. AS 44.88.900(14) (including licenses in “interests in land” for Alaska Industrial Development and Export Authority). 48 N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr., 2 P.3d at 637-39. 49 We do not decide here that all MLUPs are disposals of interests in State land; MLUPs authorize a wide variety of activities, some of which are low-impact and temporary and are clearly not functionally irrevocable. Public notice is constitutionally required only when a MLUP is functionally irrevocable. Cf. AS 38.05.850(c) (requiring prior public notice of easement or right-of-way that director determines is not functionally revocable). -34- 7011 In Northern Alaska, we adopted from the D.C. Circuit two tests of functional irrevocability.50 We used these tests to assess whether a right-of-way that was revocable on its face was truly revocable and thus exempt from the best interest finding of the Alaska Land Act.51 The first test as we described it in Northern Alaska “focuses on the likelihood of revocation as opposed to the mere legal right to revoke.”52 We explained that “where revocation would result in the destruction of the licensee’s sizeable investments” a permit would not be revocable because the reserved right of revocation is contradicted by “the reality that the permit is functionally irrevocable.”53 We described the second test as focusing “on whether, upon revocation, the licensee could remove the installed structures, or otherwise vacate the land, without permanently damaging or destroying the property for governmental use.”54 We noted that in Wilderness Society the court found that the permit failed to pass this test because a proposed gravel work pad “could not ‘be removed without producing permanent and deleterious changes in the underlying land.’ The court cited harmful effects with respect to vegetation, erosion, and the permafrost.”55 Both the State and PLP argue that the Northern Alaska /Wilderness Society analysis as to whether a permit is functionally irrevocable should not be applied to determine whether the constitution’s Public Notice Clause has been triggered because 50 N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr., 2 P.3d at 638. 51 Id. at 637-39. 52 Id. at 638 (quoting Wilderness Soc’y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 871 (D.C. Circ. 1973) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 53 Id. 54 Id. 55 Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Wilderness Soc’y, 479 F.2d at 874-75). -35- 7011 both Northern Alaska and Wilderness Society involved statutory and regulatory requirements, not constitutional interpretation. But they offer little or nothing by way of substantive reasons as to why the revocability analysis of those cases should not apply. Both the Alaska Land Act and the Public Notice Clause concern disposals of interests in land.56 Indeed, the Alaska Land Act was meant to provide guidance as to the type of process to be used when the State disposes of an interest in land.57 The functional irrevocability analysis is designed to determine whether permits purporting to be revocable at will, and thus akin to licenses, are not truly revocable, and therefore are more like easements.58 The premise of the analysis is that the substance of an interest rather than its form should control when considering its legal effect.59 This premise surely applies as strongly to effects under constitutional provisions as to those under statutes or regulations. Indeed, in Northern Alaska we decided that we should analyze the permit there for functional irrevocability because article VIII of the Alaska 56 Compare Alaska Const. art. VIII, § 10, with AS 38.05.035(e). 57 See Alyeska Ski Corp. v. Holdsworth, 426 P.2d 1006, 1010-11 (Alaska 1967) (observing that legislature enacted the Alaska Land Act in accordance with the Public Notice Clause). 58 See SOP, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Natural Res., Div. of Parks & Outdoor Recreation, 310 P.3d 962, 967-68 (Alaska 2013) (discussing difference between easements and licenses). 59 Our cases consistently demonstrate that we look at the substance of the interest rather than its form in considering whether the Public Notice Clause applies. For example, in Laverty v. Alaska Railroad Corp., we decided that what the Railroad called a “license” was in fact an easement, specifically a profit, because it permitted the removal of gravel from the land. 13 P.3d 725, 735-36 (Alaska 2000). And in SOP, Inc., we decided that permits for ATV use on state park lands were easements because they were revocable only for cause and had other easement characteristics. 310 P.3d at 968-69. -36- 7011 Constitution reflects the “importance of our land resources and of the concomitant necessity for observance of legal safeguards in the disposal or leasing of state lands.”60 Article VIII “reflects the framers’ recognition” of these concerns.61 Just as they serve as a guide to interpreting statutes and regulations, they should also guide the interpretation of a constitutional provision. Turning to the question of the applicability of the Wilderness Society tests to this case, Nunamta argues that under both tests, the MLUPs are functionally irrevocable. As to the first — the destruction of the licensee’s investment test — Nunamta points to trial testimony by PLP’s vice-president of environment that PLP had invested “$300-$400 million” dollars in exploration since 2002.62 According to Nunamta, the superior court incorrectly and inappropriately focused only on “permanent, concrete and steel infrastructure” in examining PLP’s investment; instead Nunamta asserts “that the size of the investment at risk is enough, in itself, to deter revocation” because if development is stopped, PLP’s investment will have no value. Nunamta argues that the State is also invested in the continuation of the project, pointing to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the State and PLP, under which PLP agreed to reimburse the State for costs associated with, among other things, the State’s 60 N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr., 2 P.3d at 638 (quoting Alyeska Ski Corp., 426 P.2d at 1011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 61 Alyeska Ski Corp., 426 P.2d at 1011. 62 PLP contends that “Nunamta improperly looks outside the trial record” to make these arguments. Although Nunamta discusses positions taken by the State and PLP at earlier phases of the litigation and the evidence submitted by them to support these positions, Nunamta also points to trial testimony and exhibits to support its arguments. -37- 7011 consideration of PLP’s requests for permits.63 By the time of trial, the estimated costs associated with the MOU for the fiscal years 2007 to 2011 totaled more than $2 million; the MOU listed a number of state employees whose salaries could be paid in part by PLP. To further support its argument that the permits were functionally irrevocable because of potential loss of investment, Nunamta cites arguments and affidavits submitted by PLP and the State during the preliminary injunction phase of the case that contended there would be significant “destruction of the licensee’s investments” resulting even from a preliminary injunction. PLP argued at the preliminary injunction phase that “Pebble’s ability to further this project, and to realize a return on its investment, would be impaired by an injunction,” claiming that a preliminary injunction “would have a ripple effect throughout the entire operation, and would cause a major loss of jobs and economic activity in Alaska.” PLP objects to Nunamta’s reliance on the affidavits, asserting that only evidence presented at trial can be used in our review of the case.64 PLP specifically 63 The MOU had an initial term of only part of 2004, but it was extended several times. The MOU appears to contemplate a continuing relationship between the State and PLP: “Specific tasks to be addressed” by the interagency review team included “[d]am permitting efforts for any tailings impoundments, water supply reservoirs, etc.” and “provid[ing] a coordinated effort on the State’s part in the NEPA process.” 64 The case PLP relies on is distinguishable. In Paula E. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children’s Services, we held that we would not consider unadmitted exhibits in the trial record, including a home study, in our review of the trial court’s factual findings. 276 P.3d 422, 430 (Alaska 2012). We expressed concern that parties have no opportunity to respond to exhibits that are not admitted, and we concluded that the trial court had not relied on the documents in reaching its decision in any event. Id. (citation omitted). Here the documents in question are affidavits that were offered by parties opposing Nunamta, cf. Alaska R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (defining as not hearsay an admission by a party-opponent), so there is no question of the opposing (continued...) -38- 7011 refers to Nunamta’s use of the affidavit of Richard Hughes, “an employee of the Alaska Department of Commerce, Community and Economic Development” at the time he signed his affidavit.65 Hughes’s affidavit detailed the importance of the exploration project and tied investment in exploration to investment in mine development; he attested to the importance of mining to the Alaska economy. The superior court, at the State’s request, ruled before trial that Nunamta could not present evidence about “economic issues” at trial, including the testimony of an expert in “Natural Resource Economics” that Nunamta had retained to address the information in Hughes’s affidavit. The superior court narrowed the issues to be presented at trial to include “any actual impact the exploration activities or permit issuance has had.” By removing economic information from the trial, the superior court in effect prevented the presentation of evidence on one of the tests of functional revocability — whether the licensee’s investment depends on the continuing availability of the permit — and thereby took away from Nunamta any opportunity to present this type of evidence at trial.66 Under these circumstances, we conclude that Nunamta can properly rely on the affidavits; PLP does not argue that they 64 (...continued) parties lacking an opportunity to respond to or challenge the evidence now questioned on appeal. In addition, PLP does not contest the authenticity or veracity of the affidavits. We also note that the superior court specifically mentioned one of the affidavits — that of Richard Hughes — in its oral decision denying a preliminary injunction. 65 We note there was considerable pretrial motion practice about the possibility of Hughes being a trial witness. 66 N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. State, Dep’t of Natural Res., 2 P.3d 629, 638 (Alaska 2000) (quoting Wilderness Soc’y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)). -39- 7011 are inaccurate, and the affidavits and arguments from the earlier proceedings provide context for application of the destruction of the investment test.67 The State argues that the destruction of sizable investment test only applies where the licensee builds improvements on the property, not where the investment is in exploration. Noting the inherently speculative nature of mineral prospecting, the State contends that [t]he value of the information Pebble collects depends not on the permit it was collected under, but on the value of Pebble’s claims, which in turn depends on a host of other factors like ore quality, the markets, technology, and, ultimately, whether Pebble can secure permission to mine. But the risk that the stars will not align is Pebble’s to bear. . . . To illustrate its point, the State quotes from a law journal article on the Pebble exploration that states “[w]here government approval is required but not assured for a project, any investment in that project is akin to a business gamble.”68 The superior court based its decision that “revocation would not result in the destruction of Pebble’s investment” on the lack of “permanent infrastructure or installments on the land.” Although the superior court acknowledged that “Pebble has spent a significant amount of money on exploration and environmental studies,” the court also considered that the sole purpose of these activities was “to collect intellectual property.”69 It then found that “[e]vacuating the site upon revocation would not damage 67 See also Laverty v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 13 P.3d 725, 728 (Alaska 2000) (noting railroad’s prior statements from legislative audit about nature of agreement). 68 Geoffrey Y. Parker et al., Pebble Mine: Fish, Minerals, and Testing the Limits of Alaska’s “Large Mine Permitting Process,” 25 A LASKA L. REV . 1, 49-50 (2008). 69 In support of this conclusion, the superior court cited its earlier findings about PLP’s exploration activities. -40- 7011 the scientific information Pebble has gathered.”70 We found no evidence that the scientific information has value independent of its use to develop the mine, and the superior court cited none; in earlier pleadings PLP asserted that “[t]he primary purpose of Pebble’s environmental baseline research is to provide the necessary information to enable Pebble to make informed business decisions” about mine development and engineering if development proceeded. We agree with Nunamta that the hundreds of millions of dollars invested in exploration by PLP, including the money PLP furnishes to the State to pay for the permitting process, is the investment that must be considered. The potential loss of an investment of this magnitude could deter DNR from cutting short PLP’s exploration process by revoking or not renewing a permit. Such an act could signal the end of the development and thus make useless the data that PLP had already gathered. We do not agree with the State that the destruction of sizeable investments test only applies to investment in physical improvements, as the superior court evidently believed. A land manager could easily be reluctant to revoke a permit if doing so rendered valueless an investment of hundreds of millions of dollars related to a necessary step in a significant economic venture regardless of whether physical improvements were created. The point of the test is that where large sums have been invested, the government is effectively forced to honor the full term of the permit, because revoking it prematurely would cause a significant loss. That is the case here. 70 The superior court’s record citation to support this statement is a reference to page 2 of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; that page only names some of the parties to the action. In its written closing argument in the superior court PLP relied on testimony of two of its witnesses to assert that intellectual property was created; neither witness testified that the information would have any value independent of the project. In the transcript portion cited by PLP, one witness testified about the lack of permanent, above-ground structures at the drilling sites; the other testified that mapping wetlands was done “for the environmental baseline document.” -41- 7011 Nunamta also argues that the perceived public importance of the exploration would deter revocation. Relying on the MOU Nunamta asserts that some 58 State employees have been assigned to work on the project and that PLP will reimburse the State at least in part for their work. Under the MOU an estimated two million dollars in billings were budgeted for reimbursement over five years. Additionally, according to Hughes’s affidavit, in excess of 610 jobs would be lost if PLP’s exploration efforts were shut down. Nunamta also cites Hughes’s testimony as demonstrating that the State’s perception is that the suspension of the exploration permits would harm the entire mining industry in Alaska. To discount Nunamta’s public importance argument the State contends that “[t]o the extent that Pebble is important to the public, it is the mineral deposits themselves and the potential mine that are important, not the exploration authorized by the MLUPs.” But the mineral deposits and potential mine can never be developed without the continuing, extensive exploration authorized by the MLUPs. The scope and number of the claims have expanded considerably since PLP and its predecessors began exploratory drilling under the MLUPs. We agree with Nunamta that the perceived public importance of the exploration also would deter DNR from cutting short the exploration process. According to Hughes’s affidavit, such an act would result in the loss of employment of many hundreds of people. In addition, according to Hughes, it would send a negative message to the mining industry that Alaska’s regulatory climate is unsettled and that Alaska has “seemingly capricious regulations.” This message would “deter companies looking for new projects,” “definitely impact exploration investment,” and harm “the mining industry in Alaska, and the Alaskan economy generally.” The perceived public importance of permitting the exploration of the Pebble ore deposit is underscored by a letter from the Governor of Alaska to the -42- 7011 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency urging the agency not to invoke a procedure that could effectively prohibit development of the Pebble mine “prematurely,” that is, without allowing the mine to advance to the development permitting phase. In the letter the Governor states: “There has been tremendous investment in the area based on the potential for mineral development. We cannot fathom the liability and legal challenges that could accompany an unprecedented, after-the-fact determination by the federal government that mineral development from these State lands is no longer viable.”71 We conclude that the first Wilderness Society test has been satisfied. It is easy to see how a state land manager could feel tremendous pressure not to revoke or refuse to renew a MLUP thereby imposing a loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in exploration funds and hundreds of jobs as well as risking the loss of the State’s credibility as a location for future mining projects. Based on the record, there was a “negligible likelihood” that a MLUP would be revoked.72 With respect to the second Wilderness Society test, Nunamta starts with the language of Northern Alaska describing this test: “[T]he court focuses on whether, upon revocation, the licensee could remove the installed structures, or otherwise vacate the land, without permanently damaging or destroying the property for governmental use.”73 Nunamta argues that the remnant bore holes and their plugs are concrete and steel 71 Letter of September 21, 2010 from Governor Sean Parnell to The Honorable Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The Governor also notes that 70 percent of area residents are Alaska Native and 17 percent fall below the poverty level, and requests that the EPA “take into account that a . . . decision to preclude mining in this economically depressed region would abruptly and conclusively deny area residents any opportunity to avail themselves of the benefits they might seek from responsible mining.” 72 See N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. State, Dep’t of Natural Res., 2 P.3d 629, 639 (Alaska 2000) (holding that permit had “negligible likelihood of revocation”). 73 Id. at 638. -43- 7011 structures that cannot be removed without producing permanent harm. Nunamta also points to the “enormous quantity of waste materials” that PLP is “as a practical matter, allowed to store in perpetuity on State lands.” These materials include the cuttings from the bore hole drillings and “hundreds of thousands of pounds of drilling muds generated in the drilling process.” Nunamta claims that “there is no way to return the land to its previously undisturbed condition upon revocation.” Nunamta argues that if PLP had applied for permission to operate a landfill to bury “this quantity of concrete, steel, mud, cuttings and debris on state land” Article VIII would clearly demand “more than the closed-door issuance of a ‘temporary’ permit.” By contrast, the State characterizes the second Wilderness Society test as the “government use test.” The State argues that this test is satisfied as long as “the structures which the licensee proposes to erect are capable of being removed,” and “upon revocation the land may be left in suitable condition for Government use.”74 The State disagrees with Nunamta that the plugs and casings left underground in the drill holes are structures under this test, arguing that they do not affect the character of the land or leave it unsuitable for any use. The State also notes that the plugs and casings protect against environmental damage and views the second test as requiring “dramatic and long­ standing intentional transformation of the landscape,” arguing that no such transformation was contemplated by the permits here involved. We agree with Nunamta that the bore holes plugged with concrete and encased by steel are installed structures for the purposes of the second Wilderness Society test. These columns will remain in the land. They are not in a practical sense capable of being removed, and it is undisputed that removing them would increase the potential for environmental harm. In our view the buried sumps containing drilling mud and other 74 The State quotes Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc), for this premise. -44- 7011 drilling wastes should also be considered under the second test. The waste disposal sumps are not structures, but they are lasting alterations to the land. The landfill analogy used by Nunamta seems apt, for the sumps, like landfills, are used to dispose of potentially toxic material. The sumps of course could be dug up and the waste material removed, but only at great cost. The record does not reflect whether this would create additional environmental risks, but it seems clear that this will never occur. The State’s characterization of the second test as “the government use test” is flawed. The State focuses only on the final part of the test and ignores the question of whether installed structures can be removed.75 In the expression of this test, the question of suitability for government use is not reached unless the proposed structures are capable of being removed. The Wilderness Society court found that the second test was best represented by the Attorney General’s opinion concerning a proposal to grant a revocable permit to a railroad to lay tracks across a military reservation. This opinion stated, as quoted in Wilderness Society: If the permit is revocable at will by its terms, and if the structures which the licensee proposes to erect are capable of being removed in case of revocation, and if upon revocation the land may be left in suitable condition for government use, the fact that the licensee expects that the United States may not soon find it to its interest to revoke the license has no real bearing on the legal situation.[76] Thus, under the test, where the structures are not capable of being removed, the question of suitability for government use does not arise. 75 The superior court likewise did not consider removal of the materials used to plug the boreholes. In its findings, it said that “everything at the site, except for the bore hole drill casings and the material used to plug the holes, can be removed within a matter of weeks.” 76 Wilderness Soc’y, 479 F.2d at 872 (emphasis added). -45- 7011 This reading of the test thus emphasizes the importance of the continuing physical presence on the land of the structures constructed by the licensee. But it would be overly literal to suggest that where the structures cannot, or will not, be removed, their impact, or lack of impact, is irrelevant. In Northern Alaska we stated that the second Wilderness Society test required an analysis of “the long-term and harmful character of the environmental impact” resulting from the licensee’s activities.77 In applying this test in Northern Alaska we noted that the project there presented “the likelihood of irreversible ecological changes.”78 But we also used terms that encompassed less certain potential harms. We cited research that indicated that “vegetative clearing may result in the permanent thermal degradation of the sensitive Tanana Flats permafrost.”79 And in our conclusion, we referred to “potential long-term environmental damage”80 as supporting our finding of functional irrevocability. On the record of the present case it cannot be said that PLP’s exploration activities will likely cause irreversible ecological changes.81 However, there is the potential for environmental damage primarily through pollution of groundwater by the toxic waste that has been disposed of on the land and by acid rock drainage. In our view, this potential plus the continuing physical presence of the hundreds of concrete and steel 77 N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr., 2 P.3d at 638. 78 Id. at 639. 79 Id. (emphasis added). 80 Id. (emphasis added). 81 See supra pp. 15-17. -46- 7011 encased bore holes suffice to justify a conclusion that the second Wilderness Society test also points toward functional irrevocability.82 We conclude that the MLUPs are not functionally revocable in light of the investment in prior exploration activities that would be lost if they were revoked, and the strong reasons the State has for not pretermitting the Pebble exploration process. We also believe that the concrete plugs and steel casings in the bore holes represent a lasting occupancy of state lands that is inconsistent with the concept of revocability. Further, the hundreds of sumps containing toxic waste and chemically reactive material represent a continuing potential source of environmental harm that is also inconsistent with the concept of revocability. D. The TWUPs Are Not Disposals Of An Interest In Land. In the case of TWUPs, DNR did not issue just one permit for a given exploratory period. Rather, it issued PLP nine TWUPs in January 2007, and two additional TWUPs in May 2009. Most of the TWUPs each covered five separate water sources. Overall the nine 2007 TWUPs permitted taking water from 21 stream sources, 82 The two Wilderness Society tests are independent, and as used in that case, either would suffice to show functional irrevocability. In Northern Alaska we held that revocability should be assessed “under a hybrid approach” using both tests as factors for analysis. But we did not state that both tests must be satisfied for functional irrevocability to be found. Logically that should not be necessary. While the tests will often be complementary, a compelling case for functional irrevocability may be made when only one test is satisfied. For example, to draw on a case relied on by Wilderness Society, a chapel built on government land under a revocable permit could be removed without environmental damage but the loss of the licensee’s investment would deter revocation to such an extent that the permit should be considered functionally irrevocable. In such a case, as the Attorney General stated in the West Point Chapel case on which Wilderness Society relied: “[T]he government would find itself embarrassed either to endure a perpetuity of right in the license or exercise an invidious power.” Wilderness Soc’y, 479 F.2d at 871 (quoting Erection of Catholic Chapel at West Point, 21 Op. Att’y Gen. 537 (1897)). -47- 7011 18 pond sources, and five bore holes. Each TWUP covered a five-year period. The revocation clause in each TWUP provided: “Pursuant to 11 AAC 93.210(b), authorized temporary water use is subject to amendment, modification, or revocation by the Department of Natural Resources if the Department of Natural Resources determines that amendment, modification or revocation is necessary to supply water to lawful appropriators of record or to protect the public interest.” Because this language is similar to the “at will” clause in the regulations governing MLUPs, we assume that this language qualifies as an at will revocation clause.83 The TWUPs are specifically ancillary to the exploration project; they specify that the water will be used in support of exploration drilling operations. Any particular TWUP could be revoked for a number of reasons that would not threaten PLP’s overall exploration program. Thus a land manager would not inevitably feel pressured not to revoke a TWUP by the possibility of imposing an enormous financial loss on PLP or by the possibility of causing the loss of hundreds of jobs or threatening the State’s credibility with potential mining investors. Further, unlike in the case of MLUPs, there are no permanent structures or other features left in or on the land with respect to the water use permits. For these reasons, we conclude that the TWUPs do not meet the Wilderness Society tests for functional irrevocability.