Opinion ID: 148092
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Knight first contends there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423(a), (b) because the government failed to establish that he intended to have illicit sexual relations with S.S. before he arrived in Alabama. Knight points out that S.S. described him as a family friend, and he asserts they never had a sexual relationship in Kansas. Furthermore, Knight argues there was no evidence to corroborate S.S.’s testimony that they had sexual intercourse in Alabama. We review de novo whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a jury’s verdict. United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009). We will affirm if “a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A federal conviction . . . can be based on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness.” United States v. Hoskins, 628 F.2d 295, 296 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). Since the jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence, we must accept any credibility determination it makes that is 4 reasonable. United States v. Garcia, 447 F.3d 1327, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006). However, we may reverse a conviction if testimony credited by the jury “is so inherently incredible, so contrary to the teachings of basic human experience, so completely at odds with ordinary common sense, that no reasonable person would believe it beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Chancey, 715 F.2d 543, 546, 548 (11th Cir. 1983). 18 U.S.C. § 2423 prohibits the following transportation of minors: (a) Transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity. – A person who knowingly transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce . . ., with intent that the individual engage in . . . any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than ten years or for life. (b) Travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct. – A person who travels in interstate commerce . . . , for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2009). “The statute does not require that the government prove that actual sexual activity took place,” only that the defendant “formed the intent to engage in sexual activity with a minor when he crossed state lines.” United States v. Hersh, 297 F.3d 1233, 1245-46 (11th Cir. 2002). However, a defendant’s intent may be bolstered by evidence that the defendant did engage in sexual activities with the minor after crossing state lines. See id. at 1247 (concluding that 5 defendant’s intent “was further established by the fact that upon returning from Honduras to Florida, he continued to engage in sexual activities with Juan, a minor”). Contrary to Knight’s contention, the evidence sufficiently established his intent to engage in sexual activity with S.S. before he completed his interstate journey. The government introduced photographs depicting Knight and S.S. kissing in December 2007, something which S.S. said she did not want to do. Phone records showed that he called S.S. approximately 100 times in the weeks leading up to their planned trip. Although Knight agreed to drive S.S. to California, rental car receipts indicated that he only rented a car from Alabama for a three-day period. He immediately told her upon picking her up that “plans have changed” and he would be taking her back to Alabama to live with him because he had feelings for her. He instructed her to throw away her cell phone so she could not be tracked by the police and warned her that they would go to jail if caught. All of this evidence demonstrated that, prior to their arrival in Alabama, Knight had formed the intent to have illicit sexual relations with S.S. Moreover, Knight’s intent to have sexual relations with S.S. was bolstered by S.S.’s testimony that as soon as they arrived at his residence in Alabama, Knight pushed her on the bed, took off her clothes, and had sexual intercourse with her despite her protests and attempts to fight him off. These non-consensual sexual 6 activities continued until she was rescued by the police. Such evidence supports a finding of intent. See id. Although Knight disputes S.S.’s testimony on appeal, it was up to the jury to assess her credibility. See Chancey, 715 F.2d at 546. Her description of what happened is not inherently incredible or contrary to common sense. See id. Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to establish Knight’s requisite intent on counts one and two.