Opinion ID: 2284324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Vaughn's transfer claim.

Text: In his complaint, Vaughn expressly invokes 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to challenge his transfer from Lorton to the Frio County facility. The trial court dismissed this claim on jurisdictional grounds. Since the court has jurisdiction over an action challenging the lawfulness of Vaughn's transfer, it was error to dismiss Vaughn's motion on jurisdictional grounds. Although we conclude that there was no jurisdictional basis for the dismissal of Vaughn's motion challenging the transfer, we nevertheless affirm the dismissal on the ground that Vaughn fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. As Vaughn makes plain in his brief on appeal, his motion attacks the legality of his transfer. Relying on D.C.Code § 24-402 (1989), [4] he contends that as a District of Columbia prisoner convicted of an offense against the United States, he may only be transferred from the District of Columbia correctional system into the federal correctional system. Thus, Vaughn reads D.C.Code § 24-402 as limiting the transfer power of the Attorney General to District and federal facilities. We do not agree. As we said in Cooper, supra, a prisoner confined to Lorton has no legally recognized interest in remaining in Lorton Reformatory. Under D.C. Code § 24-425 (1981), [5] persons convicted of crimes in the District of Columbia are committed to the custody of the Attorney General, who may order the transfer of any such person from one institution to another if, in his judgment, it shall be for the well-being of the prisoner or relieve overcrowding or unhealthful conditions in the institution where such prisoner is confined, or for other reasons. This authority is clear and apparently limitless. Curry-Bey v. Jackson, 422 F.Supp. 926, 932 (D.D.C.1976). Obviously, as long as section 24-425 is in the Code, a District of Columbia prisoner can have no legitimate expectation that he will remain at Lorton throughout his term. 483 A.2d at 322. See also Nowlin v. Director, D.C. Dep't of Corrections, 689 F.Supp. 26, 28 (D.D.C.1988) (prisoner has no legitimate expectation he will remain at Lorton throughout his term and, thus, no Due Process interest protecting him from summary deprivation); Pitts v. Meese, 684 F.Supp. 303, 315 (D.D.C.1987) (defendant and her family had no justifiable expectation that she would be incarcerated within District or metropolitan area and transfer did not violate her constitutional or statutory rights). In light of the express language of the statute and the caselaw interpreting it, we conclude that Vaughn fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted and, therefore, his motion was properly dismissed.