Opinion ID: 2645892
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The wiretap warrant application.

Text: The parties agree that the electronic case filing copy of the July 2, 2009 wiretap application did not contain the full and complete authorization memorandum from the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). In the proceedings below, Aguiar sought an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the application was ever complete, arguing that if the court was not presented with a copy of the entire Title III authorization memo then the July 2, 2009 wiretap was void, and any communications obtained under its authority had to be suppressed. In 24 response, the government submitted an affidavit affirming that the memorandum submitted to the district court was complete, and any missing pages were the result of a scanning error by the clerk’s office. The government attached to the affidavit a copy of the complete memorandum it claimed was filed with the court, which the district court found sufficient proof. Appellants challenge that ruling on appeal. The government argues the district court was entitled to rely on affidavit evidence to prove a complete memorandum was submitted by the DOJ. We agree. The affidavit submitted to the district court attached a complete copy of the filing that the government received from the clerk’s office, and it is unclear what else the government could do to prove its contention that it submitted a complete application to the court. We find no error in the district court’s refusal to conduct a hearing. D. Whitcomb’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, or, in the alternative, for a new trial, based on the insufficiency of the evidence against him. It is well‐established that a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence “bears a heavy burden.“ United States v. Hawkins, 547 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). “On such a challenge, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all inferences in the 25 government’s favor and deferring to the jury’s assessments of the witnesses’ credibility.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We must uphold the jury’s verdict as long as “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). On a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, the court must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Writers & Research, 113 F.3d 8, 11 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997)(citation omitted). The evidence must be considered “in its totality, not in isolation, and the government need not negate every theory of innocence.” United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2000). On a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 motion for a new trial, the court may grant the motion “if the interest of justice so requires.” In deciding a Rule 33 motion, the court “must examine the entire case, take into account all facts and circumstances, and make an objective evaluation.” United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2001). “The ultimate test . . . is whether letting a guilty 26 verdict stand would be a manifest injustice.” Id. To grant the motion, “[t]here must be a real concern that an innocent person may have been convicted.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Whitcomb argues that the evidence at trial establishes merely the existence of a buyer‐seller relationship, nothing more. In United States v. Parker, 554 F.3d 230, 238 (2d Cir. 2009), we held that a buyer‐seller relationship, “[w]ithout more,” is insufficient to establish a conspiracy, because while a drug sale is a substantive crime, it lacks a separate criminal object, necessary for the showing of a conspiracy. Significantly, the fact that a buyer‐seller relationship exists between co‐conspirators does not insulate a buyer from a conspiracy charge “if the facts support such a charge.” Id. at 232. In other words, the exception “does not protect either the seller or buyer from a charge [that] they conspired together to transfer drugs if the evidence supports a finding that they shared a conspiratorial purpose to advance other transfers, whether by the seller or by the buyer.” Id. at 235. Indicia of such a relationship include repeat transactions and an indication of trust such as by selling drugs on credit. Id. at 237. Whitcomb does not challenge the existence of a conspiracy, but rather argues that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that he was a 27 member of the conspiracy. Appellant failed to satisfy his burden. The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that Whitcomb repeatedly purchased cocaine from Aguiar. Recorded conversations showed that Aguiar and Whitcomb were intimates, and included evidence that Aguiar complained to Whitcomb about problems Aguiar had collecting money from other distributors, with Whitcomb advising him to temporarily withhold cocaine from these other conspirators in order to give them incentive to pay their debts. We agree that much of the evidence could be read to have an innocent meaning, but when the evidence raises two permissible inferences then we must resolve such conflicts in favor of the prosecution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. There was no error.