Opinion ID: 845769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The FOIA and the Frank Communication Exemption

Text: The Legislature codified the FOIA to facilitate disclosure to the public of public records held by public bodies. [17] However, by expressly codifying exemptions to the FOIA, the Legislature shielded some affairs of government from public view. The FOIA exemptions signal particular instances where the policy of offering the public full and complete information about government operations is overcome by a more significant policy interest favoring nondisclosure. [18] In many of these instances, the Legislature has made a policy determination that full disclosure of certain public records could prove harmful to the proper functioning of the public body. Indeed, in Federated we instructed that a circuit court should remain cognizant of the special consideration that the Legislature has accorded an exemptible class of records. [19] The frank communication exemption at issue in this case provides that a public body may exempt from disclosure as a public record [c]ommunications and notes within a public body or between public bodies of an advisory nature to the extent that they cover other than purely factual materials and are preliminary to a final agency determination of policy or action. This exemption does not apply unless the public body shows that in the particular instance the public interest in encouraging frank communication between officials and employees of public bodies clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure. [20] The frank communication exemption ultimately calls for the application of a weighted balancing test where the circuit court must weigh the public interest in disclosure versus the public interest in encouraging frank communication. Under the plain language of the provision, these competing interests are not equally situated, and the Legislature intended the balancing test to favor disclosure. The Legislature's requirement that the public interest in disclosure must be clearly outweighed demonstrates the importance it has attached to disclosing frank communications absent significant, countervailing reasons to withhold the document. Hence, the public record is not exempt under the frank communication exemption unless the public body demonstrates that the public interest in encouraging frank communication between officials and employees of public bodies clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure. [21] In addition to the statutory language initially favoring disclosure of a frank communication, it is important to consider carefully other words and phrases in the statutory text. First, we must be cognizant of the competing interests at stake in the particular instance. [22] Rather than speak in platitudes and generalities, the parties and the courts must consider how the unique circumstances of the particular instance affect the public interest in disclosure versus the public interest in encouraging frank communication. Second, the Legislature decided that the public has an interest in encouraging frank communication so that public officials' ongoing and future willingness to communicate frankly in the course of reaching a final agency determination is an essential component in the balancing test. Therefore, when a court interprets the particular instance in the frank communication exemption, it must remember that there is a valid public interest that officials and employees of a public body aspire to communicate candidly when the public body considers an issue that is preliminary to a final agency determination of policy or action. Before the trial court may apply the balancing test, the public body must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the trial court that the public record is a frank communication. [23] Drawing from the statutory language, the Court of Appeals has held that the public body must establish two things. [24] First, the document must cover other than purely factual materials, and, second, the document must be preliminary to a final determination of policy or action. We agree with the Court of Appeals precedent, but we conclude that a third qualification is apparent in the statutory language: the document sought must also be a communication or note of an advisory nature within a public body or between public bodies. Therefore, a document is a frank communication if the trial court finds that it (1) is a communication or note of an advisory nature made within a public body or between public bodies, (2) covers other than purely factual material, and (3) is preliminary to a final agency determination of policy or action. If, in the trial court's judgment, the document fails any one of these threshold qualifications, then the frank communication exemption simply does not apply. For example, if the document is composed entirely of purely factual materials, it is not a frank communication, and the public body must disclose the document to the requesting party unless it has asserted an alternate, valid basis for nondisclosure. In this case, the circuit court concluded that the Doyle letter was a frank communication. [25] It found that defendant carried its burden of proving (1) that the Doyle letter was of an advisory nature and covered other than purely factual materials, (2) the communication was made between officials and employees of public bodies, and (3) the communication was preliminary to a final agency determination. The circuit court then moved to the balancing test and concluded that the balance of interests favored nondisclosure. The court offered four reasons to support the balance it struck. Its third and fourth reasons specifically address the balance of interests favoring nondisclosure of the Doyle letter: (1) The letter contains substantially more opinion than fact, and the factual material is not easily severable from the overwhelming majority of the contents: Doyle's views concerning the President's involvement with the University House project. (2) The letter is preliminary to a final determination of policy or action. The communication was between officials of public bodies. The letter concerns Defendant's investigation and ultimate determination of what action, if any, would be taken regarding the University House controversy. (3) The public interest in encouraging frank communications within the public body or between public bodies clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure. Plaintiff's specific need for the letter, apparently to shed light on the reasons why a highly respected public official resigned in the wake of EMU being caught misleading the public as to the true cost of the President's house, or the public's general interest in disclosure, is outweighed by Defendant's interest in maintaining the quality of its deliberative and decision-making process. (4) Defendant conducted an investigation and recently published a voluminous and exhaustive report concerning its findings regarding the University House project, a copy of which was furnished to Plaintiff. The circuit court identified the two competing interests. On one hand, plaintiff had an interest in obtaining the letter to shed light on President Kirkpatrick's involvement in the University House project. On the other hand, defendant needed to preserve its deliberative and decisionmaking process to carry out an effective internal investigation. The circuit court found that defendant had published and distributed to plaintiff a voluminous and exhaustive report of financial data related to the controversy. Defendant hired Deloitte & Touche to audit the expenditures related to the University House project and disseminated this audit to plaintiffs about the time plaintiffs filed suit to obtain the Doyle letter. In the circuit court's judgment, the wave of data related to the University House project flowing from this independent report lessened plaintiff's interest in disclosure of the Doyle letter and tipped the balance in defendant's favor such that the public interest in encouraging frank communication clearly outweighed the public interest in disclosure.