Opinion ID: 1389692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Delay in Consummation of Proceeding

Text: The trial court found, and the State asserts on this appeal, that the sole blame for the delay in the consummation of the condemnation proceedings rests on the Fribergs because they filed the first federal court action against the State, which resulted in an injunction against the State's proceeding with the I-215 project, and because they financially supported the second federal action challenging the sufficiency of the E.I.S., which also resulted in an injunction. The State also contends that when undue delay occurs in a condemnation proceeding the only remedy is dismissal of the action. Notwithstanding that position, the State has successfully opposed two motions to dismiss the action for the State's failure to prosecute the case to a conclusion. The Fribergs, on the other hand, contend that the dominant reason for the long delay between the service of summons and the final acquisition of title by the State some seven and one-half years later was the State's failure to prosecute. Indeed, even apart from the lengthy delays occasioned by the two federal actions, the Fribergs assert, and there is some record evidence to support the assertion, that the State had not even settled on a final alignment of the highway until some time in 1979 or 1980. Interstate 215 is a partially federally-funded project, and the State had to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). One requirement of that Act is the preparation and filing of a study on the impact of a federally funded project on the environment. Although the State now suggests that it was not subject to NEPA, it nonetheless stipulated in the first federal court action that it was and would file an Environmental Impact Statement. The injunction issued in that case and in the subsequent case, which was filed to test the adequacy of the State's E.I.S., had the effect of placing the whole project in limbo, including the legal proceedings against the Fribergs. Preliminary, we note that fault is not really the issue here. The law does not require landowners to meekly yield to the State's claim to condemn his or her land. Every landowner in this country has a right to resist with every legal means available the expropriation of his or her land. The right of eminent domain does not require docile passivity on the part of a landowner. Nor did the Fribergs engage in tactics that unjustifiably protracted this litigation by demands for a series of continuances. All they did was pursue an established, well-recognized and well-founded legal remedy to compel the State to comply with federal law. The Fribergs' neighbors then challenged the validity of the E.I.S. and the State's compliance with NEPA. Although the State may have had a goodfaith belief that it did not have to comply with NEPA, it nevertheless was stopped dead in its tracks by federal court injunctions because it failed to comply with that law. That failure existed even before the State commenced action against the Fribergs. Since the State has the burden of proving its right to exercise the power to condemn, Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consolidated Mines Co., 53 Utah 413, 174 P. 172 (1918); Tanner v. Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 105, 121 P. 584 (1911), the State must be prepared to establish that it has complied with all necessary conditions precedent. The delay occasioned by the federal actions cannot justify penalizing the Fribergs by denying them a part of the value of their property, which appreciated while those actions were pending. It was the State that had an affirmative obligation to comply with NEPA, [11] and it was basically the federal court proceedings that delayed the condemnation action. The contention that the Fribergs should lose the appreciated value of their property because of their participation in the federal action simply does not wash. The State, as a matter of constitutional law, cannot penalize the Fribergs' assertion of a federal right by requiring it to give up a state constitutional right. Cf. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 94 S.Ct. 316, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967); Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529, 42 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed. 352 (1922); Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 146 U.S. 202, 13 S.Ct. 44, 36 L.Ed. 942 (1892); Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.S. 186, 7 S.Ct. 931, 30 L.Ed. 915 (1887); Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 535, 24 L.Ed. 148 (1876); Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 22 L.Ed. 365 (1874). In sum, it would be a violation of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution to penalize a landowner's right to just compensation because of the assertion of a federal right, and it would be wholly unreasonable and invidious to penalize the assertion of a state right because somebody else asserted a federal right, as would be the case if the Fribergs were penalized because of the second federal lawsuit. In short, the Fribergs' right to just compensation cannot be defeated because they wanted to retain their land as long as possible. There was, after all, the possibility that the alignment, which apparently was not finally established until years after the filing of the lawsuit, might have been changed, thereby avoiding the necessity of taking the Fribergs' land. Under those circumstances, especially when combined with the State's failure to comply with federal law, the Fribergs had a reasonable expectation that the condemnation of their land might ultimately prove unnecessary.