Opinion ID: 2736929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: History will often lean in favor of closure

Text: Finally, the logic and experience test is harmful because it has justified and will likely continue to justify closures. A survey of what Washington judges have done at chambers since statehood reveals that in-chambers conferences to discuss legal matters have long been seen as constitutional and within the discretion of the trial judge. Ellington & Lutzenhiser, supra, at 517-18 & n.193 (citing In re Oet. of Ticeson, 159 Wn. App. 374,384-85,246 P.3d 550 (2011), abrogated on other grounds by 12 No. 85809-8 (Wiggins, J., concurring in result) Sublett, 176 Wn.2d at 71-72). Because the experience and logic test calls for review of historical practices, it is possible that most such proceedings will eventually be excluded from the public. 6 Indeed, our court and the Court of Appeals have applied the test to limit the public trial right. See majority at 2 (sidebars); Koss, No. 85306-1 (preliminary in-chambers conferences to discuss jury instructions); Sublett, 176 Wn.2d at 76, 77 (public trial right does not attach to conference to discuss question from jury about its instructions); see also State v. Miller, 179 Wn. App. 91, 316 P.3d 1143 (2014) (public trial right does not attach to pretrial in-chambers discussion of statute or in-chambers discussion of proposed jury instruction); State v. Burdette, 178 Wn. App. 183, 313 P.3d 1235 (2013) (in-chambers discussion about responses to jury's question about an instruction or to initial jury question requesting clarification about how to proceed if it felt it was deadlocked); State v. McCarthy, 178 Wn. App. 90, 312 P.3d 1027 (2013) (trial court's response to jury's request for a tape measure and masking tape); Love, 176 Wn. App. 911 (parties' use of peremptory and for-cause challenges at a sidebar); State v. Halverson, 176 Wn. App. 972, 309 P.3d 795 (2013) (in-camera questioning of impaneled juror for alleged misconduct during deliberations), review denied, 179 Wn.2d 1016 (2014); Wilson, 174 Wn. App. 328 6 Strangely, history informs the inquiry at times and is ignored other times. For example, inchambers voir dire appeared to be a common practice before Strode, 167 Wn.2d 222. See Lauren A. Rousseau, Privacy and Jury Selection: Does the Constitution Protect Prospective Jurors from Personally Intrusive Voir Dire Questions?, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. PoL'Y 287, 311 (2006) (author surveyed 18 federal judges; [v]irtually all of them allowed potential jurors to answer intrusive or embarrassing questions privately at the bench or in chambers, with only the judge, the court reporter, and the opposing counsel present). Yet, the majority held in Paumier and Wise that voir dire must be conducted in an open court. See Paumier, 176 Wn.2d at 35; Wise, 176 Wn.2d at 11-12. 13 No. 85809-8 (Wiggins, J., concurring in result) (excusal of jurors for illness-related reasons). In light of these cases, we should reevaluate and abandon the logic and experience test. IV. We Should Presume All Stages of Trial Are Open I would reject the logic and experience test as a well-intentioned but ultimately unworkable test. Instead, I would hold that all phases of trial are presumed open. I would reiterate that a judge should not close any step in the proceeding without engaging in a Bone-Club analysis. If there is a timely objection, a trial judge must conduct a Bone-Club analysis on the record before closing a proceeding. If part of the trial has been closed to the public without objection and without a Bone-Club analysis, an appellate court will usually not review the issue unless a party can establish manifest error affecting a constitutional right. RAP 2.5(a)(3). In evaluating whether a trial closure is manifest error, I would require an adequate record as well as a showing of actual prejudice. In an extreme case, such as closure of the entire voir dire process, the court could evaluate whether the closure has so undermined our confidence in the outcome of the trial that the closure should be considered structural error. A. Benefits of requiring an objection at trial: clear rule for trial judges and fairness Unlike the logic and experience test, requiring an objection at trial provides clear guidance to trial court judges that they should not close any part of trial without conducting a Bone-Club analysis. Instead of drawing arbitrary lines between different types of proceedings, this rule properly places responsibility on trial attorneys to prepare their cases and make objections on the record. It also reduces strategic failures to object solely for purposes of appeal. Our current practice of automatically 14 No. 85809-8 (Wiggins, J., concurring in result) reviewing every claimed violation of the public trial right could create an incentive for trial counsel to sit mute, deliberately not raising a constitutional error that might have little or no effect on trial but that may be the basis for a successful appeal. In sum, a requirement that defense counsel object preserves the integrity of the trial and reduces unnecessary appeals. Relatedly, requiring an objection in most cases is fair because this rule acknowledges that there are sometimes tactical reasons not to object. In many situations, both parties might willingly consent to closing part of a trial or, indeed, might prefer it. In State v. Shearer, a case involving a domestic dispute, juror 7 indicated that she had experience with domestic violence but did not want to talk about it. The trial judge asked if anyone objected to questioning juror 7 in chambers, and neither the defense nor the state objected. In chambers, juror 7 revealed that her grandson was killed by his father in their home. Defense moved to dismiss juror 7 for cause, the State did not object, and juror 7 was excused. State v. Shearer, No. 86216-8, slip op. at 3-4 (Wash. Sept. 25, 2014). In S/ert, the lead opinion notes that [q]uestioning the jurors about their disqualifying knowledge in open court in front of the other jurors could have been potentially devastating to Slert's right to a fair trial. Slert, slip op. at 10. I would hold that neither party should be permitted to benefit by silently allowing the trial judge to close a portion of the trial without a Bone-Club analysis. See State v. Rinkes, 70 Wn.2d 854, 859, 425 P.2d 658 (1967) (The general rule is that one cannot voluntarily elect to submit his case to the jury and then, after an adverse verdict, claim error which, if it did exist, could have been cured or otherwise 15 No. 85809-8 (Wiggins, J., concurring in result) ameliorated by some action on the part of the trial court.); State v. Perry, 24 Wn.2d 764, 167 P.2d 173 (1946); State v. Case, 49 Wn.2d 66, 72, 298 P.2d 500 (1956). B. On appeal, benefits of requiring an objection: establishes a record, abides by our rules of appellate procedure, and protects the public trial right Requiring an objection in most cases has the benefit of developing an adequate record for appeal. We have before us two other cases in which the record fails to make clear whether there has been a violation of the public trial right: State v. Koss, No. 85306-1 (Wash. Sept. 25, 2014), and State v. Njonge, No. 86072-6 (Wash. Sept. 25, 2014 ). In each case, the record is inadequate because neither the parties nor the trial court raised the public trial right. 7 An objection by a party provides a forceful reminder that a Bone-Club analysis and an adequate record are both required. In addition, requiring an objection properly acknowledges that it is the duty of the parties to raise any objection and to establish a record of closure, thereby enabling adequate and full review on appeal. When a party appeals a closure to which there was no objection, we should apply RAP 2.5(a)(3), which applies to constitutional errors to which there was no objection at trial: The appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court. However, a party may raise the following 7 ln Koss,. the defendant claimed that the court held an in-chambers conference to discuss a question from the deliberating jury. But the record only showed that the jury exited, submitted a question and received an answer, and then returned with its verdict. The record does not reveal whether the judge discussed the question with counsel. See Koss, slip op. at 9-1 0. In Njonge, the defendant claimed the judge closed the courtroom to the public and media during voir dire. The record indicates that the judge explained that there was not enough room in the courtroom to accommodate all of the prospective jurors and the public, and stated that he would not permit the press to film the jury selection process. But no observer was actually asked to leave, there were no objections to the voir dire procedure, and there were no orders relating to a closure. Njonge, slip op. at 4-5. 16 No. 85809-8 (Wiggins, J., concurring in result) claimed errors for the first time in the appellate court: ... (3) manifest error affecting a constitutional right. When a party alleges constitutional error for the first time on appeal, we have traditionally required a RAP 2.5(a)(3) analysis. See, e.g., State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 926-27, 155 P.3d 125 (2007) (RAP 2.5(a)(3) analysis required where error affecting right to trial by impartial jury was raised for first time on appeal); State v. Clark, 139 Wn.2d 152, 155-56, 985 P.2d 377 (1999) (RAP 2.5(a)(3) analysis required where error affecting confrontation clause right was raised for first time on appeal). The party claiming error must identify the constitutional error and show that the error is manifest. State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 98, 217 P.3d 756 (2009). Manifest requires a showing of actual prejudice; that is, the defendant must show the error 'had practical and identifiable consequences in the trial of the case.' !d. at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 925, 155 P.3d 125 (2007)). Our Rules of Appellate Procedure properly limit the types of constitutional claims that may be raised for the first time on appeal. Constitutional errors require special appellate attention because they risk serious injustice to the accused as well as adverse effects on the public's perception of fairness and the integrity of judicial proceedings. State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 687, 757 P.2d 492 (1988) (citing State v. McHenry, 88 Wn.2d 211, 558 P.2d 188 (1977)). On the other hand, permitting every possible constitutional error to be raised for the first time on appeal undermines the trial process, generates unnecessary appeals, creates undesirable retrials and is wasteful of the limited resources of prosecutors, public defenders and courts. State 17 No. 85809-8 (Wiggins, J., concurring in result) v. Lynn, 67 Wn. App. 339, 343-44, 835 P.2d 251 (1992). A judicious application of the manifest standard balances these competing values. /d. Thus, as the plurality opinion in Sublett properly noted, under RAP 2.5(a)(3), we will review an alleged manifest error affecting a constitutional right even if not raised in the trial court. 176 Wn.2d at 78. But for relief to be granted, [a defendant] must show actual prejudice resulting from the error, and the error is nonetheless subject to harmless error review. /d. (citing O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 98-99). Finally, requiring an objection protects the public trial right by reminding the trial court and all parties of the importance of this right. In our earlier decisions, we assumed we could best protect the public trial right by allowing parties to raise the issue for the first time on appeal. Paumier, 176 Wn.2d at 36-37. But requiring an objection has proved to be equally or even more protective of the public trial right. A contemporaneous objection permits the trial judge to resolve the issue when it should be resolved-at trial. An objection reminds the judge not to close any step in the trial process without engaging in a Bone-Club analysis. In other words, the objection protects the public trial right by forcing the trial judge to evaluate the issue and reassess whether to close a part of the trial or not. It puts the decision and the ability to establish a record in the hands of the defendant. In addition, our prior latitude in not requiring an objection is no longer needed because the many recent published decisions discussing the open trial right should have alerted most, if not all, defense counsel to the importance of the issue. It would be a rare defense attorney in Washington who remained unaware of the public trial right after our 14 opinions concerning the issue published since 2012. See Ellington & Lutzenhiser, supra, at 18 No. 85809-8 (Wiggins, J., concurring in result) 497 (public trial issue so familiar that Bone-Club is now a verb in Washington courtrooms).