Opinion ID: 4764
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Drug Courier Profile

Text: The Government concedes that drug courier profiles are not admissible as substantive evidence of guilt. (Appellee's Br. at 12) (citing United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552, (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Quigley, 890 F.2d 1019 (8th Cir. 1989) cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1091, 110 S.Ct. 1163 (1990)). The 4 Government maintains that the drug courier profile testimony in this case was not admitted as substantive evidence of Williams's guilt, but as background information. The record belies the government's assertion, however, and demonstrates that the district court admitted the testimony as evidence of Williams's guilt. The plain language of the record confirms Williams's contention that the drug courier profile was admitted to prove his guilt. First, the district court expressly stated that it admitted the testimony for its probative value, even after the defendant's attorney objected to it on the grounds of relevance and unfair prejudice. (R., vol. 2 at 119-20). Second, in an unrelated bench conference, the defendant's attorney stated that the court found it relevant, to whether or not a person is guilty of possession with intent to deliver cocaine, whether or not a person fits a drug courier profile, and the court agreed with this statement. (R., vol. 2 at 151-52). Third, the Government argued the profile as substantive evidence of Williams's guilt in its closing argument. After discussing each element of the profile that Williams matched, the Government attorney stated that the criteria of the profile by themselves do not add up to anything, but once that white, powdery substance was found and Officer Munday testified that he performed a field test on it, the drug courier profile, it proved to be not inaccurate. Nobody told you that it was a science. But it shows you one thing, that the defendant is guilty of the offense. (R., vol. 3 at 28) (emphasis added). In addition to the plain language of the record, the case law demonstrates that the profile evidence was admitted as substantive evidence of guilt. During Officer Hughes's testimony, he described 5 the profile itself and then proceeded to list the characteristics of the profile that Williams displayed. Other circuits have held that testimony expressly comparing an individual defendant's actions to a drug profile constitutes substantive evidence of guilt. See United States v. Quigley, 890 F.2d 1019 (8th Cir. 1989) (This point by point examination of profile characteristics with specific reference to [the defendant] constitutes use of the profile not as background to explain or justify an investigative stop, but as substantive evidence that [the defendant] fits the profile and, therefore, must have intended to distribute the cocaine in his possession.) cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1163 (1990); United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1991) (As in Quigley, here [the DEA agent] tied [the defendant's] actions to a drug courier profile for the purpose of proving [the defendant's] guilt.). Furthermore, the district court's failure to instruct the jury to consider the profile testimony only as background information supports the conclusion that the testimony was admitted as substantive evidence of Williams's guilt. See United States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 501 (9th Cir.) (finding no plain error when the district judge twice cautioned the jury to consider the profile testimony only as background material), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 363 (1990). In light of (1) the manner in which the testimony was admitted; (2) the district court's agreement with Mr. Fleury's statement that the court admitted the profile evidence because it was relevant to Williams's guilt; (3) the Government's statements 6 in closing argument that encouraged the jury to accept the profile as evidence of Williams's guilt; (4) the court's allowing the witness to compare Williams's conduct with the profile characteristics; and (5) the court's failure to limit the jury's use of the profile evidence, we cannot accept the Government's contention that the profile evidence was admitted as background information. The testimony regarding the drug courier profile was admitted as substantive evidence of Williams's guilt. This use of the drug profile was, as the government concedes, error. Quigley, 890 F.2d at 1024. Drug courier profiles have long been recognized as inherently prejudicial because of the potential they have for including innocent citizens as profiled drug couriers. United States v. Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1983). The profiles themselves are nothing more than a compilation of characteristics which aid law enforcement officials in identifying persons who might be trafficking in illegal narcotics. But the fact that an individual fits the profile does not necessarily mean that the evidence in a particular case will show that the person was carrying drugs. It is the evidence showing the person's connection to drug trafficking that must form the basis for the conviction. Id. While the government may introduce evidence that the defendant exhibited individual behaviors that make up the profile, it is something entirely different to tell the jury that all the behaviors together fit a law enforcement model of a drug courier. Despite the wide latitude district judges have in determining whether evidence is more probative than prejudicial, 7 Moye, 951 F.2d at 61, in our view the probative value of a drug courier profile is so low in relation to its prejudicial effect that its admission is error. But see, United States v. Teslim, 869 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that drug courier profiles may be introduced as substantive evidence of guilt); United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding no error in the admission of profile evidence as evidence of guilt). Having determined that the admission of the drug profile testimony was error, we must now determine whether the error was harmless. [U]nless there is a reasonable possibility that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the conviction, reversal is not required. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 92 S.Ct. 1056 (1972); United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 766 (1991). At least three other circuits have addressed whether the admission of a drug courier profile as substantive evidence of guilt was harmless error. In United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1991) the Ninth Circuit found that despite the district court's error in allowing the admission of a drug courier profile as substantive evidence of guilt, other overwhelming evidence of guilt rendered the error harmless: The remaining evidence in the record overwhelmingly demonstrated Lui's guilt. Lui was carrying nearly 28 pounds of high quality heroin in suitcases to which he had the keys and knew the numbers to the combination locks. His actions both before and after the discovery of the drugs were suspicious. Finally, his story for coming to the United States was completely discredited. Lui was unable to produce the jade figurines he claimed 8 to be carrying, and his nephew testified at trial that he did not own a shop and he had no plans to see Lui. United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1991). In United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1990), the Fourth Circuit found that the erroneous admission of profile evidence to prove guilt was harmless error in light of the other evidence of Jones's guilt. The evidence showed that an informant told the police that Jones was selling crack cocaine, and that he kept the crack cocaine in a brown medicine bottle in his pocket. The informant's story was corroborated by an undercover agent who had purchased crack from Jones in an undercover operation. The police instructed the informant to purchase crack from Jones, and the informant returned with the crack cocaine. The police searched Jones's house and seized 10.5 grams of cocaine, $2,173.00 in cash, and two guns. In the leading Eighth Circuit case on this issue, United States v. Quigley, 890 F.2d 1019 (8th Cir. 1989) cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1163 (1990), the court found that [i]ndeed, Quigley's conviction is supported by such substantial evidence that it is somewhat difficult to understand why the profile evidence was proffered. Quigley had in his possession, in plain view, within an arm's reach in the car, one kilogram of high-quality cocaine. This, together with the notes on his person indicating earlier drug transactions, the frequent trips to Los Angeles with tickets paid for in cash even though he was unemployed and the large amount of money in his possession when arrested provided ample evidence for Quigley's conviction and also provides a substantial basis for us to affirm the conviction. 9 Id. at 1024 (citations omitted). Two later Eighth Circuit cases also held that the use of a drug courier profile as substantive evidence was harmless error due to the overwhelming evidence of the defendants' guilt. See United States v. Carter, 901 F.2d 683, 685 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Wilson, 930 F.2d 616, 619 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 208 (1991). Excluding the improperly admitted evidence of a drug profile, the evidence in this case showed that (1) Williams appeared nervous when deplaning; (2) before handing Officer Hughes his ticket Williams removed it from the ticket jacket which contained the baggage claim tickets; (3) Williams's hand was shaking badly as he handed Officer Hughes the ticket; (4) Williams held a one-way ticket that had been purchased with cash that day, even though he said he had been visiting friends for a week or so; (5) the narcotics dog alerted to a suitcase with Williams's name on it; (6) Williams admitted that the suitcase belonged to him; (7) Williams's chest began heaving up and down when Officer Hughes asked whether the suitcase belonged to him; and (8) the officers found cocaine in the unlocked suitcase. Although there is no direct evidence of Williams's knowledge that the cocaine was in his suitcase, the circumstantial evidence is overwhelming. See United States v. Moye, 951 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that a defendant's state of mind cannot ordinarily be proved by direct evidence). Because the evidence bearing on Williams's guilt is overwhelming, Officer Hughes's testimony that Williams's behavior matched a drug courier profile did not substantially influence the jury. Therefore, the 10 error was harmless. United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1991).