Opinion ID: 60708
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reduction of Attorney’s Fees & Costs

Text: “We review an award of attorney’s fees by the district court only for an abuse of discretion.” Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1326 (11th Cir. 2002). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the judge fails to apply the proper legal standard or to follow proper procedures in making the determination, or bases an award upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). GBA cross-appeals the district court’s order that reduced GBA’s proffered attorney’s fees by approximately sixty-five percent ($99,661.50 to $34,908.75) and reduced proffered costs from $25,921.05 to $611.00. Fees and costs were only recoverable under GBA’s ISRA claim—not GBA’s breach of contract or accounting claims. The district court found that GBA made no attempt to specify what fee entries related to which claim and submitted no testimony as to apportionment. See Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[F]ee counsel should have maintained records to show the time spent on the different claims, and the general subject matter of the 17 time expenditures ought to be set out with sufficient particularity so that the district court can assess the time claimed for each activity.”). The district court determined that GBA’s time was split fifty-fifty between the ISRA claim on the one hand, and the breach of contract and accounting claims on the other. As such, only fifty percent of the total fee was awardable. The court found that a further fifteen percent reduction was necessary in light of the excessive and redundant nature of the recorded entries; specifically, three lawyers worked on the case and the majority of the time was billed in full or half-hour increments. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination as to fees. As for costs, the trial court found that plaintiff’s request was either: (1) not recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920; or (2) not stated with requisite specificity. Specifically, GBA’s requests for mediation expenses, meals, courier/postage, Lexis-Nexis research, air fare, and lodging are not included under § 1920. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920; Duckworth v. Whisenant, 97 F.3d 1393, 1399 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (holding that “costs such as general copying, computerized legal research, postage, courthouse parking fees and expert witness fees . . . are clearly nonrecoverable” under § 1920). In addition, GBA requested a total of $6,698.82 for unspecified copying by an outside provider, which did not allow the court to determine whether the documents were necessarily obtained for use in the case. 18 See 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) ((providing for “[f]ees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case (emphasis added)). The district court also found that a general $4,602.90 charge for deposition transcripts lacked the requisite specificity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2) (providing for “[f]ees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case” (emphasis added)). As before, we find no abuse of discretion.