Opinion ID: 3003910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: On appeal from the grant of a preliminary injunction, we review the district court’s legal rulings de novo, its factual determinations for clear error, and its balancing of the factors for an abuse of discretion. See United Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines Pilot’s Ass’n, Int’l, 563 F.3d 257, 269 (7th Cir. 2009). 3 All parties agree that “pm” is a typographical error, and that 12:30 a.m. was intended. 8 No. 09-2082 The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving a person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” This prohibition applies with equal force to municipalities. See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913). We take a two-step approach to procedural due process claims: first, we ask whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected liberty or property interest; if so, we ask whether the deprivation occurred without due process. Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 526 (7th Cir. 2003). Once granted, an Illinois liquor license is a form of property within the meaning of the due process clause. See Club Misty, Inc. v. Laski, 208 F.3d 615, 618 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 94849 (7th Cir. 1983)). This interest extends to the license’s annual renewal. Id. Like revocation during the term of a license, nonrenewal requires cause and a hearing. Id.; see also 235 ILCS 5/7-1 to 7-14 (detailing the revocation process). The City maintains, however, that from the beginning, Pro’s license was for the limited hours suggested by Alderman Hutson, and thus no deprivation occurred when the license was renewed with limited hours. Pro’s, on the other hand, maintains that it was granted an unrestricted liquor license and was later deprived of that license. Determining the nature of Pro’s original license is a matter of statutory interpretation and thus a question of law that we review de novo. Tammi v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 536 F.3d 702, 709 (7th Cir. 2008). Under Illinois law, municipal ordinances are interpreted according to the No. 09-2082 9 traditional rules of statutory construction. Neri Bros. Const. v. Village of Evergreen Park, 841 N.E.2d 148, 153 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). Illinois directs courts to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the enacting body, the clearest indicator of which is the language of the ordinance itself. Id. at 153-54; see also People v. Donoho, 788 N.E.2d 707, 715 (Ill. 2003). The original proposed ordinance would have granted Pro’s a Class A liquor license without additional restrictions. The version signed by the mayor and clerk is identical. Under Illinois law “the official acts of municipal corporations must be recorded and the records are the only lawful evidence of the action to which they refer.” See Western Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of Cornwall, 119 N.E.2d 261, 264 (Ill. 1954); see also 65 ILCS 5/1-2-6 (“The contents of all municipal ordinances . . . may be proved by the certificate of the municipal clerk, under the seal of the corporation.”) Here, the municipal record—the signed ordinance—does not contain any hours limitation. The City advances two different but related arguments to contest the straightforward language of the ordinance. First, the City argues that the signed ordinance does not reflect the city council’s action on November 26, 2007 because of a scrivener’s error. Rather than adopt the proposed ordinance, the City maintains, the council adopted an amended ordinance with limited hours. In the alternative, the City suggests that we interpret the ordinance based on the intent of the council, which it argues was to impose an hours restriction on Pro’s. 10 No. 09-2082 Because there was never a vote on Alderman Hutson’s proposed amendment—indeed, the ordinance had not yet been introduced at the time the amendment was dis- cussed—the City relies on Mayor Welch’s comments before the roll call vote to establish that the council voted on the amended ordinance. However, Welch’s comments were at best ambiguous, if not actually contradictory. He first stated, “This is amended,” but went on to say, “We’ll have to put this into a formal ordinance at the next council meeting.” The City argues that the mayor meant only that the clerk would have to change the text of the ordinance so that its language reflected the time limitations, but that would not require action at the next council meeting. It is unclear how the amendment could take effect without a vote. Thus, it appears that the published ordinance accurately reflects the proceedings before the city council on November 26, 2007. It is true that we have previously refused to hold a city to a scrivener’s error in the published version of a municipal ordinance. See Christ Universal Mission Church v. City of Chicago, 362 F.3d 423, 428 (7th Cir. 2008). But there is no evidence of a clerical error here. The City has not argued that the text of the ordinance considered by the city council at the November 26, 2007 meeting differs from the text of the ordinance signed by the mayor and clerk. Cf. Christ Universal, 362 F.3d at 428. Nor does it contain an obvious typographical error, like writing “12:30 p.m.” when it is clear from the context that “12:30 a.m.” was intended. Rather, the City is arguing that the clerk should have added an hours restriction to the text of the ordinance before its publicaNo. 09-2082 11 tion. But the clerk did not have authority to make this change, as the council passed no amendment to the ordinance before adopting it. We also decline the City’s invitation to rewrite the ordinance so that it conforms to its characterization of the council’s intent. If “the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to other aids of construction.” Carter v. Tennant Co., 383 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing In re D.L., 727 N.E.2d 990, 994 (Ill. 2000)). The plain language of the ordinance confers a Class A license on Pro’s. A separate section of the municipal code defines the hours of operation for Class A license holders. Nothing in the text of the ordinance suggests that the council intended to amend that section or to exclude Pro’s from its effects. Thus, Pro’s has a protected property interest in a liquor license with the same hours as other license holders in the City of Country Club Hills. Having established a property interest, Pro’s must still show that it has been deprived of that property without due process of law. Pro’s did not receive a pre-deprivation hearing or any of the other protections of the revocation process. See 235 ILCS 5/7-1 to 7-14. We have previously held that denying renewal to a liquor license holder without a hearing or other adjudication violates due process. Club Misty, Inc., 208 F.3d at 622. The City acknowledges that Pro’s did not receive any sort of hearing when its hours were curtailed. Instead, relying on Veterans Legal Defense Fund v. Schwartz, 330 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 2003), and New Burnham Prairie 12 No. 09-2082 Homes, Inc. v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1480 (7th Cir. 1990), the City argues that a state court action for mandamus would provide all the relief that the plaintiffs seek, precluding their procedural due process claim. These cases rest on the principle that when a state officer acts in a “random and unauthorized” way—by unpredictably departing from state law, for example— the state has no opportunity to provide a pre-deprivation hearing and may instead satisfy due process by providing an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1402 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc). But mandamus would be an incomplete remedy here. Pro’s is asking for more than an injunction compelling the City to issue an unrestricted liquor license. Cf. Schwartz, 330 F.3d at 941 (holding that plaintiffs, who sought injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, could get same relief in a state court mandamus action). The owners of Pro’s seek damages to compensate them for the period of time in which the restricted hours were enforced against them. They allege these damages were substantial, resulting in lost business in excess of $50,000. Because no state remedy exists to compensate plaintiffs for these damages, Pro’s is not foreclosed from bringing a due process claim. Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s balancing of the preliminary injunction factors. A preliminary injunction requires both a showing of irreparable injury and a likelihood of success on the merits. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009). The district court concluded that the harm to Pro’s was irreparable because it was difficult to ascertain the specific amount No. 09-2082 13 of revenue being lost, and because damages might come too late to adequately compensate the plaintiff’s business. See Hess Newmark Owens Wolf, Inc. v. Owens, 415 F.3d 630, 632 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is precisely the difficulty of pinning down what business has been or will be lost that makes an injury ‘irreparable.’ ”); Somerset House, Inc. v. Turnock, 900 F.2d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that harm is irreparable where damages “would come too late to save the plaintiff’s business”). The district court heard live testimony on Pro’s financial situation and the difficulty of determining exactly how much revenue Pro’s was losing to other bars who could remain open later. Nothing suggests that the district court’s factual findings were erroneous. The City argues that allowing the preliminary injunction to stand harms the public interest in alcohol regulation. Whatever force the City’s argument might otherwise have, the City cannot have an interest in enforcing an ordinance that it did not enact. Given the strong likelihood of success on the merits, the concrete and irreparable harm to Pro’s outweighs any interest advanced by the City in continuing to enforce the hours limitation.