Opinion ID: 1698697
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Absence of other insurer.

Text: Appellant insists that the court erred in hearing the testimony and proceeding to judgment without the presence of another insurer, Continental Union Insurance Company, who allegedly had insured the trailer involved in the accident. The adjuster, Reader, testified that in December, 1956, he took a statement from Hightower. A statement, purportedly signed by Hightower and attested by Reader, appears in evidence and is dated December 18, 1956. Reader testified that the occasion of taking this statement was the first time that he, Reader, found out from Hightower that Continental Union Insurance Company had insurance on his other equipment. Thus it appears that appellant's agent, Reader, acting within the scope of his agency, in December, 1956, acquired knowledge of the existence of other insurance some twenty months prior to the hearing on October 9, 1958. We think appellant is chargeable with this knowledge. On July 11, 1958, appellant filed its answer alleging that at the time of the accident, the trailer being towed was insured by Continental Union Insurance Company. The filing of the answer was two days short of three months before the hearing on October 9, 1958. On September 12, 1958, the court set the hearing for September 23, 1958. It appears that the hearing was continued to October 9, 1958. Appellant's cross-bill making Continental a respondent thereto was filed October 4, 1958. Although appellant had knowledge of Continental twenty months earlier as aforesaid, appellant made no effort to bring in Continental until the last mentioned date, five days before the hearing, so far as we find from the record. This court has said:    The principle declared in our cases is that a trial on the original and cross-bill is to be had at the same time. But when the cross-complainant has not taken needed steps to get the cross-bill at issue and prepare same for trial, the court may proceed on the original bill and answer though there is also a cross-bill. Thomas v. Skeggs, 223 Ala. 598(4), 137 So. 443. When an answer is also a cross-bill its nature as an answer is not affected. Burns v. Lenoir, 220 Ala. 422(5), 125 So. 661. Wilkins v. Reliance Equipment Co., 259 Ala. 348, 352, 67 So.2d 16. We are therefore of opinion that the court was not in error in proceeding without Continental unless Continental was an indispensable party. We have not been cited to nor have we found any case squarely on all fours with the instant case as to whether or not Continental was an indispensable party. Continental was at least a proper party. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hubbard, D.C., 22 F.Supp. 697. As to parties in declaratory proceedings, this court has said concerning § 166, Title 7, Code 1940, formerly referred to as § 7881(11), Michie's Code, that: The Declaratory Judgment Act, Michie's Sup.Code, § 7881(11) required necessary parties to be brought in. Regardless of this statute the presence of necessary parties is jurisdictional. Holland v. Flinn, 239 Ala. 390, 392, 195 So. 265, 266. The court has also said, however, that § 166, Title 7,    does not render it mandatory that every interested person shall be made a party since it further provides that `no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties'. But it is said that the absence of interested persons may induce the court to exercise its discretionary power to refuse to render a declaratory judgment when it would not terminate the controversy. This is by reason of section 161, Title 7, Code.    Trammell v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 259 Ala. 430, 435, 66 So.2d 537, 542. We hold that Continental was not an indispensable party and that, in view of appellant's delay in making Continental a party, the court did not abuse its discretion in rendering a declaratory decree with Continental absent. Continental, as we view it, was not an indispensable party to the controversy between appellant and appellees. The issue in this proceeding is appellant's liability vel non to defend and indemnify its insured. There can be a complete adjudication of the rights of the parties to the instant case, as between insurer and insured, without making Continental a party. Any decision reached in this proceeding will not prejudice the rights of Continental. § 166, Title 7, Code 1940. The decree will be modified as aforesaid, and, as modified, is affirmed. Modified and affirmed. LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON, SIMPSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.