Opinion ID: 164215
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: contain a clearly defined purpose for the advisory committee;

Text: 45 (2) require the membership of the advisory committee to be fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be performed by the advisory committee; 46 (3) contain appropriate provisions to assure that the advice and recommendations of the advisory committee will not be inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or by any special interest, but will instead be the result of the advisory committee's independent judgment .... 47 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(1)-(3) (emphasis added). The requirements of § 5(b)(3) are made applicable to agencies by § 5(c), which states: To the extent they are applicable, the guidelines set out in subsection (b) of this section shall be followed by the President, agency heads, or other Federal officials in creating an advisory committee. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(c). 48 We conclude that § 5(b)(3) does not provide a meaningful standard of review for a court to apply. We are not concerned here with the phrase appointing authority because the appointing authority is the Secretary of the Interior and plaintiffs do not allege that the Secretary is inappropriately influencing the RAC's independent judgment. Instead, plaintiffs argue that Governor Owens is a special interest who, by virtue of his sponsorship of such a large group of nominees to these RACs has inappropriate influence over the independent judgment of these RACs. 49 The problem we have with this claim centers on the word inappropriate. The very structure of the statute and regulations calls for various special interest groups to recommend candidates for appointment to the RACs that will be giving advice on issues of interest to the recommending entities. It goes without saying that the special interests will recommend nominees who agree with their point of view. That is why the statute and regulations require nominees from a variety of backgrounds — to get different perspectives expressed on the RAC. So, it is not only obvious, but is apparently desired, that the nominees would be aligned with, and hence influenced by, the special interest groups that recommended them. The question is, what does § 5(b)(1)-(3) mean when it prohibits only inappropriate influence? Would a call from the recommending entity to a nominee about an issue under consideration constitute inappropriate influence? One would doubt it, but the statute does not give us any guidance as to when the line is crossed between appropriate and inappropriate influence. Perhaps bribes or threats from a recommending interest group to its nominee could be regarded as inappropriate influence, but there is no allegation of anything of that nature here and so we do not need to consider those extreme situations. 50 What is alleged here is simply that Governor Owens will have an inappropriate amount of influence over these RACs by virtue of having nominated or endorsed such a large percentage of the membership of these RACs. But whether Congress intended that kind of hypothetical future influence to be inappropriate, and hence illegal under § 5(b)(3), is something as to which we have absolutely no guidance, guidelines or standards from Congress. Thus, we hold that plaintiffs' claim under § 5(b)(3) is not justiciable. In this regard, we disagree with the Fifth Circuit in Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 339 n. 30 (5th Cir.1999), which held that claims under § 5(b)(3) were justiciable. 51 Plaintiffs' concern about inappropriate influence arising from an interest group sponsoring a disproportionate number of nominees to an RAC should, instead, be addressed under 43 C.F.R. § 1784.2-1(a), which requires a fair membership balance in the RAC. That is the substance of plaintiffs' third claim, and it is that claim to which we now turn. 52