Opinion ID: 4101144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court‘s Misstatement of Law

Text: ¶117 Met argues that the district court erred in sentencing him on the aggravated murder charge because it mistakenly believed that life without parole was the presumptive sentence for aggravated murder. During sentencing, the court correctly determined the presumptive sentence for Met‘s child kidnapping conviction with aggravating circumstances to be life in prison without parole. See UTAH CODE § 76-5-301.1(3)(b). But the court incorrectly stated that the presumptive sentence for Met‘s aggravated murder conviction was life in prison without parole. The court then sentenced Met to life in prison without the possibility of parole for his aggravated murder conviction. The court ordered the two life-without-parole sentences to be served concurrently. ¶118 Contrary to the court‘s statement, Utah Code section 76-3- 207.7 provides that those convicted of noncapital aggravated murder shall be sentenced to ―life in prison without parole[] or an indeterminate prison term of not less than 20 years and which may be for life.‖ UTAH CODE § 76-3-207.7 (2007) (emphasis added). The statute‘s plain language does not contain the presumption the district court described. Rather, it is within the court‘s discretion, after considering and weighing the applicable sentencing factors, to sentence Met to either an indeterminate term of not less than twenty years or for a term of life in prison without parole. ¶119 We have previously considered how to proceed in a similar circumstance. In State v. Reece, the defendant argued that the sentencing court abused its discretion by sentencing him to life in prison without parole based on the incorrect belief that that sentence was the presumptive sentence under Utah Code section 76-3-207.7. 2015 UT 45, ¶ 81, 349 P.3d 712. The sentencing court imposed a sentence of life in prison without parole after considering ―the totality of the circumstances‖ and weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id. ¶ 84. The court‘s later post-trial ruling, however, stated that life in prison without parole ―was the presumptive sentence.‖ Id. We agreed that this was an incorrect interpretation of the statute and noted ―that the due process clause of the Utah Constitution ‗requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence.‘‖ Id. ¶ 81 (citation omitted). ¶120 Although we determined that the sentencing court had misconstrued the statute, we could not discern whether the sentencing court‘s incorrect understanding of the law had affected its sentencing decision. See id. ¶¶ 82–84. To resolve this ambiguity, we 44 Cite as: 2016 UT 51 Opinion of the Court remanded the sentencing decision to the district court. Id. ¶ 84. We directed the sentencing court to first ―determine whether its incorrect reading of the sentencing statute affected its decision to impose [life in prison without parole].‖ Id. If the court determined that its incorrect statement of law had no effect on its sentencing decision, no further action by the court was required. See id. If, however, the sentencing judge determined that the incorrect understanding of the statute did impact its sentencing decision, then we directed the court to vacate the original sentence and ―hold a new sentencing hearing.‖ Id. ¶121 Similarly here, we remand the issue to the district court to allow the original sentencing judge to determine whether the incorrect statement affected the decision to impose life in prison without parole on the aggravated murder conviction. If the original sentencing judge concludes that it did, then the court must vacate the aggravated murder sentence and resentence Met on that conviction. If the original sentencing judge is unavailable or otherwise unable to consider the remanded issue, then the newly sitting judge must vacate the sentence and resentence solely on the aggravated murder conviction.26