Opinion ID: 1509677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Joint Appeal of Tarvis and Porraro

Text: The indictment charged defendants with murder in violation of G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 11-23-1, which defines murder as [t]he unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. [1] Further, the statute provides: Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of wilful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated killing    or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being    is murder in the first degree. Any other murder is murder in the second degree. Id. The murder statute empowers the jury to utilize the provisions of § 12-17-14 to find a defendant guilty of a lesser degree of murder or any lesser included offense if the jurors find that the state has not demonstrated that defendants committed the charged offense. In addition to instructions on first-degree murder, defendants requested that the trial justice instruct the jury that the length of premeditation is the primary difference between first- and second-degree murder. The defendant further requested instructions on the elements of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. The trial justice, however, instructed the jury that [s]ometimes in a case where the state brings a charge of murder, the judge has to spend some time talking about second degree murder and manslaughter. That is not the case here. This is a case of first degree murder where the verdict will be either guilty or not guilty as to each defendant. Counsel for both defendants voiced timely objections to the trial justice's omission of the requested instructions concerning the difference between first- and second-degree murder and the elements of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. On appeal, therefore, defendants might contend that the trial justice erred in refusing to grant these instructions. See Super.R.Crim.P. 30. [2] The defendants now set forth two theories upon which the jury could have rationally found, on the basis of the evidence presented, that defendants were guilty of second-degree murder. These are (1) that assault with a dangerous weapon, as an inherently dangerous felony, could have served as the basis for a second-degree felony-murder conviction and (2) that defendants' actions were unintentional but were wanton and reckless and, as such, could have led the jury to convict defendants of second-degree murder. At trial, however, counsel for both defendants requested the following instruction in respect to second-degree murder: Murder of the second degree results when there is an unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought but the conscious design or intent to kill existed for only a moment. As we have indicated, the trial justice refused to grant the requested instruction, and both defendants voiced timely objections, thus preserving this point for appeal. The requested instruction contained nothing, however, regarding the theories of second-degree murder that defendants now assert to this court as the basis for a second-degree-murder instruction. In State v. Cole, 121 R.I. 39, 394 A.2d 1344 (1978), the defendant completely failed at trial to request a particular instruction yet on appeal challenged the trial justice's omission of that instruction. We refused to consider Cole's argument on this point. Id. at 43, 394 A.2d at 1346. Unlike Cole, the case before us involves a situation in which defendants purported to comply with Rule 30 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. The problem we must confront, however, lies in the requested instruction's failure to articulate the theories that defendants now assert as the rationale for the granting of the instruction. This problem, however, is susceptible of swift resolution. This court has frequently held that if a defendant has neither objected to a charge on the ground urged on appeal nor requested a different charge, the charge given becomes the law of the case. State v. Collazo, R.I., 446 A.2d 1006, 1012-13 (1982); State v. Giordano, R.I., 413 A.2d 93, 94 (1980). (Emphasis added.) The second-degree-murder instruction that defendant requested addressed the difference between first- and second-degree murder in respect to the length of premeditation. If trial counsel for defendants believed that the evidence warranted a second-degree-murder instruction because defendant acted in a wanton and reckless manner or in the course of an inherently dangerous felony, they should have requested specific instruction regarding these theories of second-degree murder. [3] As we pointed out in State v. Cole, supra , Rule 30 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure requires trial counsel to object to the charge as given and articulate the objections in such a fashion that the trial justice is made aware of the exact nature of his alleged error, be it of commission or omission. 121 R.I. at 42-43, 394 A.2d at 1346; see State v. Williams, R.I., 432 A.2d 667 (1981). A similar requirement of specificity is applicable to the requests for instructions. We hold that trial counsel's failure to make such requests precludes us from considering defendants' challenge to the trial justice's refusal to give a second-degree murder instruction. [4] See, e.g., State v. Collazo, 446 A.2d at 1013; State v. Giordano, 413 A.2d at 94; State v. Cole, 121 R.I. at 43, 394 A.2d at 1346; Super.R.Crim.P. 30; cf. State v. Romano, R.I., 456 A.2d 746, 764-65 (1983) (objections to jury instructions and the rationale for such objections must be articulated in clear and distinct language at the time of trial); State v. Vargas, R.I., 420 A.2d 809, 815-16 (1980) (a defendant cannot challenge jury instructions on appeal unless the defendant objected to the charge as given). Consequently, we need only address defendants' contention that the trial justice erred in omitting from his jury instructions a delineation of the elements of involuntary manslaughter. As we noted in State v. Cline, R.I., 405 A.2d 1192, 1204 (1979), this court has long followed the doctrine that instructions should not be given on lesser degrees of murder or manslaughter unless there is evidence in the case to support such a finding   . Although defendants concede, for the sake of argument, that the evidence could have supported a finding of first-degree murder, they assert that it could have equally supported a finding of involuntary manslaughter. Accordingly, they contend that the trial justice should have instructed the jury on this lesser offense. It is elementary that a defendant must have killed unintentionally to be guilty of involuntary manslaughter. See State v. Vargas, 420 A.2d at 815; LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law § 78 at 587 (1972). In the case before us, the crux of the state's case was that Porraro intended to kill Bruce Ottiano when he mistakenly shot Mary Wendolowski. Indeed, the evidence was overwhelming that Porraro formed such an intent soon after his defeat at the hands of Jody Petrarca. Porraro expressed this intent to Bruce's sister, Gail, and then to Tarvis and Bourdeau. His actions in directing Bourdeau's driving of the car indicate that Porraro fired at the apartment in 470 Manton Avenue where he believed Bruce lived and was then present. In short, we are of the opinion that the evidence of intent to kill was such that the jury could not have rationally found defendants guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Accordingly, the trial justice properly denied defendants' request for a jury instruction on the elements of this crime.
The defendants three times joined in motions for severance. Counsel for Tarvis first made such a motion prior to the start of testimony. He asserted that the theory of the state's case would necessitate that he magnify everything that Thomas Porraro did and suggest to the jury that he should be found guilty of murder and not John J. Tarvis. Accordingly, Tarvis's attorney moved that his client be tried separately from Porraro, whose attorney joined in the motions. Basing his opposition to the motion on a judicial-efficiency argument, the prosecutor asserted that any prejudice that might be caused by a joint trial could be mitigated by cautionary instructions to the jury. Apparently, the trial justice agreed. Relying on this court's recent decision in State v. Gibbons, R.I., 418 A.2d 830 (1980), he denied the motion to sever. The defendants renewed the motion twice during the course of the trial. Counsel for Tarvis made the first renewal of the motion after he attempted to demonstrate during cross-examination of Gail Ottiano that only Porraro threatened Gail when defendants entered her apartment looking for her brother, Bruce. Porraro's attorney joined in the motion, but it was denied. The second renewal occurred after Tarvis's attorney cross-examined Bourdeau regarding whether or not Tarvis ever threatened Bourdeau, actively participated in Porraro's vendetta, or encouraged Porraro's actions. Counsel for Porraro objected to the line of questioning, moved for severance, and was joined in the motion by counsel for Tarvis. Once again, the trial justice denied the motion. Recently, in State v. Clarke, R.I., 448 A.2d 1208, 1209 (1982) and State v. Gibbons, 418 A.2d at 835, we reaffirmed the established principle that a defendant is not entitled to a severance as a matter of right and that the trial justice's ruling on a motion to sever lies within his or her sound discretion. In denying such a motion, the trial justice abuses his or her discretion only when the denial causes the defendant to suffer prejudice sufficiently substantial to impinge upon his right to a fair trial. State v. Patriarca, 112 R.I. 14, 28, 308 A.2d 300, 310 (1973). We shall overturn a trial justice's denial of a motion to sever only upon a defendant's affirmative showing of such prejudice. E.g., State v. Clarke, 448 A.2d at 1209. The defendants argue that separate trials were warranted because their defenses were antagonistic; Tarvis claims that the state's aiding and abetting theory caused him to point an accusatory finger at Porraro, who contends that he was therefore forced to fend off the attacks of both the prosecutor and defendant. Consequently, both defendants assert that the trial justice's denial of the motions to sever deprived them of their constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial. Indeed, this court has recognized that the antagonistic defenses of codefendants in a joint trial may warrant severance if the conflict    is real and substantial and of such an irreconcilable nature that it is likely the jury will infer guilt on the basis of the conflict alone. State v. Clarke, 448 A.2d at 1209; State v. Gibbons, 418 A.2d at 835. Perhaps the most obvious example of such a conflict between defenses arises when both the prosecutor and a codefendant attack the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Thibodeaux, 315 So.2d 769, 771 (La. 1975); State v. Clarke, 448 A.2d at 1209-10. In State v. Clarke, supra , three defendants were tried jointly for the ice-pick murder of a man who had requested that one of the defendants remove two automobiles from his property. The evidence indicated that all three defendants had attacked the victim but that only one defendant held an ice pick during the fight. During the trial, one defendant took the stand in his own defense, denied participation in the alteration, and claimed to have seen Clarke stab the victim several times with the ice pick. Clarke, however, never testified in his own defense. Nevertheless, the trial justice denied the defendant's motion for severance, which, like the motion in this case, was made in the form of a renewal motion after damaging testimony. We reversed. As Tarvis's reliance upon Clarke indicates, the facts of that case superficially resemble those that gave rise to this appeal. This similarity evaporates, however, when examined in the light of the difference between the two cases in respect to the facts and the legal theories upon which the state based its prosecution. First of all, Tarvis, unlike Clarke's codefendant, elected to exercise his constitutional right not to testify instead of taking the stand to assert his noninvolvement in the shooting spree. Moreover, the cross-examination of Bourdeau and Gail Ottiano that Tarvis's counsel conducted indicates that he intended to assert that Tarvis was just along for the ride. In Clarke, on the other hand, the codefendant who testified claimed that he could not be held responsible for the stabbing because he was not within striking range of the victim when the victim was fatally stabbed. Furthermore, the codefendant in Clarke testified to rebut the direct testimony of a prosecution witness that the testifying codefendant was present at the scene and held an ice pick. In this case, no one testified that Tarvis, rather than Porraro, fired the shot that killed Mary Wendolowski. Indeed, the testimony of prosecution witness Bourdeau and the state's ballistics evidence both support the proposition that Porraro, not Tarvis, fired the fatal shot during defendants' second attack on 470 Manton Avenue. This last factual distinction reveals, in fact, the fatal flaw in defendants' argument that their defenses were antagonistic. In Clarke, the state clearly believed that the defendant who ultimately testified was the person who stabbed the victim, yet it charged all three defendants with murder under a joint-enterprise theory. In this case, on the other hand, the state charged Porraro as the principal and Tarvis as the aider and abettor. This theory explains why the state never contended that Tarvis was the principal criminal actor. By claiming that a defense of just along for the ride exculpated Tarvis in a manner antagonistic to Porraro's interests, counsel for Tarvis misinterprets the state's theory. Whether or not Tarvis actually verbally threatened Bourdeau, drew a weapon on Gail Ottiano, fired the shot that killed Mary Wendolowski, or physically participated in any of the criminal actions with which he and Porraro were charged, he could still be held responsible as an aider and abbettor to Porraro's criminal actions. LaFave & Scott, § 64 at 502-03; see State v. Gazerro, R.I., 420 A.2d 816, 828-29 (1980). Moreover, Porraro could be found guilty as a principal regardless of Tarvis's passivity. Furthermore, the cross-examination of Bourdeau and Gail Ottiano in which they testified that only Porraro threatened them served only to buttress the testimony that they gave on direct examination. Although this testimony certainly reinforced the state's case against Porraro, it did not concurrently weaken the state's charge that Tarvis aided and abetted Porraro's actions. In addition, the trial justice quoted extensively from State v. Gazerro, supra , when he instructed the jury that Tarvis's presence at the scene of the various crimes, in and of itself, was insufficient to warrant conviction of Tarvis as an aider and abettor. This instruction properly lessened the possibility, as argued by Tarvis on appeal, that the jury would find Tarvis guilty solely because of the inevitable rub-off of Porraro's guilt upon him. Accordingly, we find that the trial justice properly denied Tarvis's motion for severance. Similarly, we are of the opinion that the joint trial in no way impinged upon Porraro's right to a fair trial.