Opinion ID: 1881430
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Comment on Right to Remain Silent

Text: In his first claim, Downs argues that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated when the prosecutor elicited testimony from Downs about his post-arrest silence. During resentencing, Downs testified that while he had been a part of the conspiracy to kill Harris, he did not kill Harris and was not present at the time of the murder. On cross examination, the prosecutor asked Downs if at the time of his arrest or upon his return to Jacksonville, he told the Jacksonville police officers any of the information he testified to on direct examination. Downs replied that he did not. Downs contends that this question violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. He further contends that the prosecutor compounded this error during closing argument when he commented on the fact that after his arrest, Downs failed to tell the police anything about the circumstances of the offense. [3] Downs argues that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise this claim on appeal. The record reveals, however, that trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor's questions to Downs during cross-examination or to the prosecutor's comment during closing argument. As a result, any error in the State's questioning of Downs was not preserved for appellate review. Because appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise an unpreserved claim, see Rutherford, 774 So.2d at 643, this claim is without merit unless petitioner can demonstrate fundamental error. See Rutherford, 774 So.2d at 646; Robinson, 773 So.2d at 4. Fundamental error is defined as the type of error which `reaches down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.' McDonald v. State, 743 So.2d 501, 505 (Fla.1999) (quoting Urbin v. State, 714 So.2d 411, 418 n. 8 (Fla.1998)). Here, however, the underlying claim does not appear to constitute error, much less fundamental error. Downs argues that the prosecutor's question during cross-examination and his comment during closing argument were improper comments on Downs' post-arrest silence. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the use by the prosecution of a criminal defendant's post-arrest and post- Miranda [4] silence for impeachment purposes. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). The Court reasoned that [s]ilence in the wake of these warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda rights. Id. at 617, 96 S.Ct. 2240. Accordingly, the Court found that it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. Id. at 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240; accord State v. Hoggins, 718 So.2d 761 (Fla.1998) (holding that the Florida Constitution prohibits use of defendant's postarrest, post- Miranda silence as well as post-arrest, pre- Miranda silence). [5] However, this Court has held that Doyle's prohibition does not apply where the defendant does not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Valle v. State, 474 So.2d 796 (Fla.1985), vacated on other grounds, 476 U.S. 1102, 106 S.Ct. 1943, 90 L.Ed.2d 353 (1986). In Valle, this Court found that where a defendant refuses to answer one question out of many during a lengthy interrogation following the defendant's waiver of his constitutional rights, the State is not precluded from subsequently admitting evidence of the defendant's silence at trial. See id. at 801 (citing Ragland v. State, 358 So.2d 100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)). In the instant case, the State's question obviously was intended to impeach Downs and demonstrate to the jury that Downs' version of events was concocted sometime after his arrest. This questioning would be inappropriate under Doyle if it referred to Downs' post-arrest, post- Miranda silence and Downs had not waived his constitutional rights. However, the record in the instant case reveals that Downs waived his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest because he agreed to talk with the arresting officers. During the resentencing proceeding, Detective Jim Spaulding, one of the officers who arrested Downs in Alabama, testified that he and another officer, David Starling, read Downs his constitutional rights on the trip from Alabama to Florida, during which Downs waived his rights and agreed to talk with police upon their return to Jacksonville. [6] Based upon this record, we find that Downs waived his constitutional rights and expressed a desire to talk to the police. Accordingly, we find no error with regard to the State's question or comment. Appellate counsel's failure to raise this issue on appeal, therefore, does not constitute deficient performance under Strickland.