Opinion ID: 2671505
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intent to Retaliate

Text: A defendant is guilty of retaliating against a witness if he knowingly kills a person with intent to retaliate against that person for being a witness at an official proceeding or “for providing to a law enforcement officer any information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(A), (B). A defendant who conspires to commit the offense of -33- retaliation is subject to the same penalties. § 1513(f). “[T]he government need not adduce direct evidence of Appellant’s knowledge of a witness’s informant status in order for the jury to infer his intent to retaliate.” United States v. Ashley, 606 F.3d 135, 140 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Smalls argues that there was insufficient evidence presented to sustain his convictions for retaliation and conspiracy to retaliate because the government did not introduce evidence of intent to retaliate. No witness testified as to Smalls’s intent to retaliate against Gantz for his cooperation as a federal informant. To reach this conclusion, Smalls maintains, the jury had to infer that Smalls was connected to drug traffickers or had a particular dislike of informants, which the evidence did not establish. While a jury may have inferred that Smalls acted in expectation of a reward payment for a hit on Gantz, there was no evidence that he acted out of a hatred of informants or to satisfy drug traffickers. To make such a finding, says Smalls, the jury would have had to impermissibly pile “inference upon inference.” United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 1294 (10th Cir. 2005). The government points to three pieces of evidence as support for the verdict: (1) Melgar testified that Smalls told him Gantz was a “rat” and had provided information about others in a federal case, R., Vol. V at 619; (2) Melgar testified that Smalls had told him that a letter about Gantz had been passed around prison and said Gantz was to be killed because he’s a rat, id. at 643–44, 647–48; -34- and (3) Cook testified that Smalls told him Gantz was cooperating with the government, others wanted him dead, and there was a hit on him, id. at 1094–95, 1098. Melgar also testified that Smalls encouraged him to participate based on Gantz’s past cooperation that resulted in the capture of four “Michoacanos,” who Smalls described as Melgar’s “people.” Id. at 648. The evidence allows for a reasonable inference that Smalls killed Gantz in retaliation for Gantz’s previous cooperation with the government. The fact that Smalls discussed Gantz’s cooperation with the government in the murder’s planning stages is enough to infer that Gantz’s cooperation was a substantial motive in the murder. Based on Smalls’s knowledge and discussion of Gantz’s cooperation, his pressure on Melgar to participate based on Gantz’s previous cooperating activities, and his knowledge of the hit on Gantz, a reasonable juror could infer an intent to retaliate. Smalls’s theory that it was more likely that he committed the murder for his own monetary benefit is not inconsistent with being motivated by an intent to retaliate. In Ashley, the court upheld a defendant’s conviction under § 1513 where the defendant was paid for his attempt to have an informant killed in retaliation for giving information to law enforcement about a fellow inmate. Ashley, 606 F.3d at 139–40. Smalls’s ultimate purpose may have been to collect a reward for killing Gantz, but the purpose of the bounty was to encourage a retaliatory attack.