Opinion ID: 1355273
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion for procedure governing jury composition

Text: Defendant Thomas next contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for separate juries for the guilt and sentencing phases of trial. We disagree. The trial court does not have any discretion to grant a motion for separate juries for the guilt and sentencing phases of trial. See State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458 app. at 478 n. 1 (Tenn.), cert. den. 537 U.S. 1090, 123 S.Ct. 695, 154 L.Ed.2d 635 (2002). Indeed, Tennessee law specifically requires that following a conviction for first degree murder, a sentencing hearing shall be conducted as soon as practicable before the same jury that determined guilt. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(a). Moreover, our supreme court has previously rejected this argument. See Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d app. at 478-79; State v. Harbison, 704 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153, 106 S.Ct. 2261, 90 L.Ed.2d 705 (1986) (rejecting the argument that a defendant is denied a fair trial by the systematic exclusion of jurors who are against the death penalty); see also State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679 app. at 717 (Tenn.1997) (rejecting the argument that the manner of selecting death qualified jurors results in juries that are prone to conviction). Defendant Thomas also contends that a criminal defendant's constitutional rights are violated by excusing prospective jurors for cause when their personal beliefs concerning the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair their performance as a juror in accordance with their instructions and their oath. This issue, similarly, has been decided adversely to the Defendant. See Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d app. at 479 n. 2; State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161, 167 (Tenn.1994), cert. den. 516 U.S. 846, 116 S.Ct. 137, 133 L.Ed.2d 84 (1995), (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)). Accordingly, Defendant Thomas is entitled to no relief on these grounds.