Opinion ID: 2450246
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: We Remand For Further Proceedings On Whether AS 33.30.028 Allows Reimbursement For Pearce's Outside Medical Care.

Text: The superior court did not address the other statutory interpretation question raised in the summary judgment briefing whether AS 33.30.028 entitles the State to reimbursement for the cost of outside medical care from a prisoner without the specified funding sources. Pearce argues the statute allows reimbursement for the cost of outside medical care only from the specified funding sources. Pearce suggests a dichotomy based on differences in the subsections' language: under subsection .028(a), liability for medical care provided or made available to a prisoner is the responsibility of the prisoner and the [specified funding sources]. [21] But under subsection .028(b), prisoners without the specified funding sources are required to pay only for medical services provided to them by the department and then only to the extent of their ability to pay. [22] Pearce argues this language distinguishes between two types of medical care: in-house medical care provided to a prisoner by in-house providers, and outside medical care made available to a prisoner through outside providers. Pearce's interpretation also distinguishes between two types of prisoners: under subsection .028(a), prisoners who have access to the specified funding sources, and under subsection .028(b), prisoners who lack the specified funding sources. He concludes that only prisoners with the specified funding sources are responsible for the cost of outside medical care made available to them, while those who, like Pearce, lack the specified funding sources are not responsible for the cost of such outside medical care. Pearce contends this interpretation is supported by DOC's own regulation governing prisoner co-payments, 22 AAC 05.121. [23] The State contends that liability for the cost of outside medical care is imposed by AS 33.30.028(a) on all prisoners, regardless of their access to the specified funding sources, and that AS 33.30.028's legislative history provides no support for a distinction between medical care provided and made available. It argues that 22 AAC 05.121 is not relevant to its reimbursement claim against Pearce because the co-pay program established by the regulation is independent of the statute's reimbursement provision. The State also argued before the superior court that its interpretation of the statute merit[ed] some deference as an agency interpretation. Pearce's reading of AS 33.30.028 is not implausible, and the statute's relevant language may be ambiguous. Although the current record devotes attention to the legislative history of AS 33.30.028, we are not confident it alone provides sufficient information to allow us to fully address the statutory interpretation question left open by the superior court. The State's interpretation may be entitled to at least some deference, depending on the applicable standard of review for interpreting the relevant language; [24] in the absence of full briefing on the issue, we decline to decide which standard of review applies to this aspect of the parties' competing statutory interpretations and leave that matter for the superior court to determine in the first instance. We believe judicial interpretation of the statute requires a determination of the appropriate standard of review and further record development regarding the State's statutory interpretation as it may be reflected in: (1) promulgation of 22 AAC 05.121; (2) promulgation of department policies and procedures pursuant to AS 33.30.028 and 22 AAC 05.121; (3) other reimbursement-enforcement actions based on the statute; and (4) any other relevant sources. We therefore remand this question to the superior court for further proceedings. [25]