Opinion ID: 162841
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of Trailers Never Entering Libya

Text: 21 Mr. Soussi first argues, since the trailers never entered Libya, his actions amount to no more than an attempt to export trailers to Libya. He claims his conviction cannot be sustained where the evidence proved no more than an attempt, and neither the federal statute, 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b), at the time of the offense, nor the executive order and regulations, include attempt to export to Libya as a crime. 22 After conducting a de novo review of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, see United States v. Hall, 20 F.3d 1084, 1088 (10th Cir.1994), we reject Mr. Soussi's argument. The 1991 statute clearly criminalizes any violation of orders or regulations issued under the Act. 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b) (1991) (Whoever wilfully violates any license, order, or regulation issued under this chapter ... may be imprisoned for not more than ten years.). The Executive Order prohibits [a]ny transaction by any United States person which evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, any of the prohibitions set forth in this Order. Exec. Order No. 12,543 § 1(h), 3 C.F.R. 1181 (1986). The regulations prohibit [a]ny transaction for the purpose of, or which has the effect of, evading or avoiding any of the prohibitions set forth in [the regulations]. 31 C.F.R. § 550.208 (1991). The evidence demonstrated Mr. Soussi wilfully engaged in transactions for the purpose of evading or avoiding the ban on exports to Libya. 2 Since engaging in the transactions alone was prohibited conduct, Mr. Soussi's conduct cannot fairly be categorized as an attempt. 23 Mr. Soussi offers several arguments in hopes of persuading us to give less than full weight to the language of the Executive Order and regulations. He claims the language `any transaction which evades or avoids,' like the statute, contemplates a completed or successful evasion or avoidance. He believes the language in the Executive Order was only meant to define the specific intent necessary to violate the export ban. Mr. Soussi does not provide, nor can we find, any support for this argument. 24 Mr. Soussi next argues the language of the Executive Order cannot proscribe an attempt where the statute itself does not. Mr. Soussi appears to argue that if the Executive Order prohibits his conduct, then the Order went beyond the power delegated to the President in the Emergency Economic Powers Act. We disagree with Mr. Soussi. Under the Act, [t]he President's authority is limited to meeting a foreign threat `to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States,' that is `unusual and extraordinary,' and only then if he is able to declare the threat a `national emergency.' United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1093 (4th Cir.1993) (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1701). Subject to these limitations, the Act grants the President authority to define criminal conduct. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702. We conclude prohibiting transactions designed to avoid the Libyan export ban falls well within the authority delegated to the President by Congress. 25 Mr. Soussi also calls our attention to a 1996 amendment to the penalty section of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The Act now reads: Whoever willfully violates, or willfully attempts to violate, any ... regulation issued under this chapter ... may be imprisoned for not more than ten years. 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b) (2002) (emphasis added). Thus, Mr. Soussi argues there would be no need to have amended the statute if the language ... contained in the Executive Order and [31 C.F.R.] § 550.208, were sufficient to cover an attempt. In support of his position, Mr. Soussi directs us to a small piece of congressional testimony. The testimony states: During the course of many investigations, a loophole in [the Act] has been identified: parties that attempt to export a commodity to a `sanctioned' country but fail, for whatever reason, including interception of the shipment prior to entering the export stream, do not violate [the Act]. Weapons Proliferation Staff Statement (Minority Staff), Hearings on Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials, Before the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 104th Cong. (1996), available at 1996 WL 7137464. Consequently, Mr. Soussi asks us to conclude he did not violate the Act because his actions occurred before the words or willfully attempts to violate were added. 26 Mr. Soussi's argument, although facially persuasive, again misses the mark. Even assuming Mr. Soussi's morsel of legislative history was sufficient to show an attempt to export goods to Libya was not illegal in 1991, we must emphasize Mr. Soussi was not charged with attempting to export goods to Libya. Mr. Soussi was charged with, and convicted of, wilfully, knowingly, and unlawfully participating in transactions with the purpose of evading and avoiding the Libyan export ban. The Executive Order and related regulations, under specific Congressional authority, prohibited this conduct in 1991 before Congress amended the International Emergency Economic Powers Act in 1996. We must, consequently, conclude Mr. Soussi's conduct was prohibited in 1991, even though the trailers never actually reached Libya. 27