Opinion ID: 3168856
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Juror Impartiality

Text: Herrera’s third argument is that the district court should have excluded a juror that he says was biased. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to trial by a panel of impartial jurors. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). In most cases, we review a district court’s decisions on juror impartiality for abuse of discretion. United States v. Shackelford, 777 F.2d 1141, 1145 (6th Cir. 1985). Here, however, Herrera never asked the court to exclude the juror, which means we review instead only for plain error. See United States v. Herndon, 156 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998). After the opening statements at trial, Juror 27—an alternate juror—disclosed to the court that he had previously interacted with one of the case agents and that he had prior knowledge of the case from social interactions with officers. R. 310 at 2209–14. The juror also stated that he had seen one of Herrera’s co-defendants at the casino where the juror worked. The juror had not told the court about these previous interactions during the voir dire. See id. at 2152–83. When the district court questioned the juror about these 9 Nos. 15-3076/3078, United States v. Herrera disclosures, the juror indicated that nothing about his prior knowledge or interactions would affect his ability to be fair and impartial. Id. at 2210–14. Neither party objected to Juror 27 at trial, nor did Juror 27 participate in deliberations. R. 314 at 3319. Herrera’s argument that it was error for the district court to seat Juror 27 as an alternate is without merit. A juror need not be “totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved,” and it is “sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, there is nothing to indicate that these brief interactions affected Juror 27’s ability to serve as an impartial juror. When the court questioned the juror about previous encounters with officers, the juror stated that nothing about these occurrences would affect his ability to be impartial or to follow the court’s instructions. R. 310 at 2209-12. He also said that the co-defendant’s visits to the casino where the juror worked would have no impact on his ability to decide the case. Id. at 2214. The conclusion that Juror 27 was not partial is bolstered by the fact that neither the prosecution nor the defense was concerned enough about Juror 27’s disclosures to object to his seating at trial. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 396 (2010) (explaining that the defendant’s failure to object to jurors at trial was “strong evidence” that the defendant did not believe the jurors were biased). Furthermore, Juror 27, as an alternate, did not participate in the jury’s deliberations and accordingly had no impact on the verdict. See United States v. Lawrence, 735 F.3d 385, 442 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Skilling, 561 U.S. at 395 & n.31 (2010) (a defendant was not deprived of a constitutional right when no biased juror sat on the jury); Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988) (noting that a claim that the jury was partial 10 Nos. 15-3076/3078, United States v. Herrera must focus on the “jurors who ultimately sat”). Thus the district court committed no error, plain or otherwise, by seating Juror 27 as an alternate.