Opinion ID: 794243
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statute of Limitations Challenge

Text: 6 Florez submits that, because his criminal conduct occurred in 1997, his 2004 indictment is necessarily time-barred by the five-year statute of limitations applicable to non-capital federal crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282. Florez acknowledges, as he must, that this limitations period is appropriately tolled during any time when he was a fugitive from justice. See 18 U.S.C. § 3290 (No statute of limitations shall extend to any person fleeing from justice.). Nevertheless, he submits that the district court erred in tolling the statute of limitations in his case from June 10, 1998, the date of Chepe's arrest, to May 24, 2003, the date law enforcement authorities discovered Florez's whereabouts, because he was not fleeing from justice during that time. We disagree.
7 To toll a statute of limitations, it is the government's burden to show that a defendant was fleeing from justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3290. In Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d Cir.1976) ( Jhirad II ), we concluded that, in the context of an extradition proceeding, this burden can be carried by a preponderance of the evidence. See also Ross v. United States Marshal, 168 F.3d 1190, 1193-94 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying preponderance standard to interpretation of flight under § 3290 in extradition proceeding). Since then, a number of our sister circuits have ruled that a preponderance showing also satisfies the application of § 3290 to a United States criminal prosecution. See United States v. Greever, 134 F.3d 777, 781 (6th Cir.1998); United States v. Marshall, 856 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir.1988); United States v. Gonsalves, 675 F.2d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir.1982). As the Ninth Circuit explained, because proof of flight is not determinative of guilt, it is not fairly viewed as an element of the crime of conviction requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Gonsalves, 675 F.2d at 1054 (citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 487, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972) (holding that government need only prove voluntariness of confession by preponderance of evidence and noting that guilty verdict is not rendered less reliable . . . simply because the admissibility of a confession is determined by a less stringent standard)). 8 One district court outside this circuit has ruled to the contrary, holding that § 3290 flight must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury just like any other element of the case. United States v. Owens, 965 F.Supp. 158, 163 (D.Mass. 1997). We are not persuaded. Due process demands proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [a defendant] is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Whether Florez fled from justice is not a fact constituting any part of the narcotics crimes with which he was charged. Rather, it is a fact that determines whether the law will toll the statute of limitations for Florez's prosecution on any non-capital crime. Thus, while proof of Florez's flight may well have been necessary to avoid a statute-of-limitations dismissal of his indictment, such flight did not thereby become an element of the charged narcotics offenses. For this reason, we conclude that the flight necessary to support § 3290 tolling is properly determined by the trial court rather than the jury. 2 Further, we join our sister circuits in holding that, in a criminal prosecution, the government carries its § 3290 burden when it proves a defendant's flight from justice by a preponderance of the evidence. 9 With this burden in mind, we review the district court's findings of fact relevant to the application of § 3290 only for clear error, and we review de novo its legal conclusion that these facts establish flight as specified by the statute. See Ross v. United States Marshal, 168 F.3d at 1193; United States v. Greever, 134 F.3d at 779; cf. United States v. Jaffe, 417 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that, in reviewing restitution component of sentence, issues of law are reviewed de novo and findings of fact for clear error).
10 In construing the flight requirement of § 3290, we begin with Streep v. United States, 160 U.S. 128, 16 S.Ct. 244, 40 L.Ed. 365 (1895), in which the Supreme Court considered the meaning of the phrase fleeing from justice as used in an earlier statute creating an exception to the application of a limitations period. In Streep, the Court stated: 11 It is unnecessary, for the purposes of the present case, to undertake to give an exhaustive definition of the[] words [any person fleeing from justice]; for it is quite clear that any person who takes himself out of the jurisdiction, with the intention of avoiding being brought to justice for a particular offence, can have no benefit of the [statute of] limitation[s], at least when prosecuted for that offence in a court of the United States. 12 Id. at 133, 16 S.Ct. 244. 13 Drawing from this language, most courts, including our own, have concluded that a person's mere absence from a jurisdiction is insufficient, by itself, to demonstrate flight under § 3290 (or its statutory predecessor); there must be proof of the person's intent to avoid arrest or prosecution. As we observed in Jhirad v. Ferrandina, in the context of an extradition proceeding, the phrase `fleeing from justice' carries a common sense connotation that only those persons shall be denied the benefit of the statute of limitations who have absented themselves from the jurisdiction of the crime with the intent of escaping prosecution.  486 F.2d 442, 444-45 (2d Cir.1973) ( Jhirad I ) (emphasis added); accord United States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d 277, 283 (2d Cir.1995). Many of our sister circuits agree that such intent is a necessary component of flight. See Ross v. United States Marshal, 168 F.3d at 1194 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that fleeing from justice requires proof that the accused acted with the intent to avoid arrest or prosecution); United States v. Greever, 134 F.3d at 780 (6th Cir.) (holding that § 3290 requires proof that the defendant concealed himself with the intent to avoid prosecution); United States v. Fonseca-Machado, 53 F.3d 1242, 1244 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that a fugitive from justice . . . must be found to have absented himself from the jurisdiction with the intent to avoid prosecution); United States v. Marshall, 856 F.2d at 900 (7th Cir.) (concluding that defendant's intent to avoid arrest or prosecution must be proved in order to trigger the tolling provisions of Section 3290); United States v. Wazney, 529 F.2d 1287, 1289 (9th Cir.1976) (holding that intent to avoid prosecution is an essential element of `fleeing from justice'); Brouse v. United States, 68 F.2d 294, 295 (1st Cir.1933) (holding that essential characteristic of fleeing from justice is leaving one's residence, or usual place of abode or resort, or concealing one's self, with the intent to avoid punishment). 14 Although decisions by the Eighth and D.C. Circuits suggest that the specific intent to avoid prosecution is not essential to toll a statute of limitations on account of flight, see In re Assarsson, 687 F.2d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir.1982); McGowen v. United States, 105 F.2d 791, 792 (D.C.Cir.1939), the latter court, at least, has tempered this view when the evidence of flight does not show actual departure from the jurisdiction, see United States v. Singleton, 702 F.2d 1159, 1169-70 (D.C.Cir.1983) (concluding that showing of intent to avoid prosecution is required for § 3290 tolling when accused does not leave jurisdiction where crime was committed). No matter. In this circuit, the rule in criminal prosecutions remains that stated in Jhirad I and Rivera-Ventura: a finding of flight under § 3290 requires proof that a defendant intended to avoid arrest or prosecution. 15 Preliminary to reviewing Florez's claim that the district court erred in finding that he possessed the requisite intent to flee justice, we reiterate some basic legal principles relevant to this determination. First, while a person's intentional flight from justice may certainly be inferred from his failure to surrender to authorities once he learns that charges against him are pending, United States v. Catino, 735 F.2d 718, 722 (2d Cir.1984); see also United States v. Greever, 134 F.3d at 780 (collecting cases), formal charges are not essential to such an inference. As this court stated in United States v. Rivera-Ventura, where a person [is] aware that a criminal investigation [is] underway, a court may conclude that he intentionally `fle[d]' within the meaning of § 3290 even though no prosecution [has] been commenced in any jurisdiction. 72 F.3d at 283; see Streep v. United States, 160 U.S. at 133, 16 S.Ct. 244 (holding that fleeing from justice does not require that the course of justice should have been put in operation by the presentment of an indictment . . ., or by the filing of an information . . ., or by the making of a complaint . . . . It is sufficient that there is a flight with the intention of avoiding being prosecuted, whether a prosecution has or has not been actually begun). 16 Second, the government need not prove a defendant's actual departure from the jurisdiction in which the crime was committed to establish intentional flight from justice under § 3290. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, [i]t is enough that an accused leaves his usual place of abode and conceals himself for the purpose of avoiding arrest or prosecution. In modern large and heavily populated districts it is almost as easy to avoid arrest or prosecution by concealing oneself within the district as by fleeing the district. United States v. Wazney, 529 F.2d at 1289 (internal citations omitted); see United States v. Greever, 134 F.3d at 780 (There is nothing in the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3290 that requires the government to prove that the defendant left the jurisdiction.); Ferebee v. United States, 295 F. 850, 851 (4th Cir.1924) (holding that a defendant's departure from his usual place of abode and the concealing of himself within the district is equally within the meaning of a prior fleeing-felon statute as defendant's flight to another jurisdiction). Indeed, as we have recognized, [f]leeing from justice is not always a physical act; it may be a state of mind. United States v. Eng, 951 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.1991), abrogated on other grounds by Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 116 S.Ct. 1777, 135 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996) (holding that defendant who resisted extradition could be fleeing felon even though he was imprisoned in another jurisdiction). 17 Finally, a finding of intentional flight under § 3290 is not necessarily foreclosed by a hindsight determination that the government might have located the defendant sooner if it had taken certain actions. Rather, the nature and the extent of the efforts of government agents to locate the defendant is one factor to consider in determining whether it is reasonable to infer from the agents' failure to locate the defendant that the defendant was acting with the intent to avoid arrest or prosecution. United States v. Greever, 134 F.3d at 780 n. 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 18 Applying these principles to this case, we identify no error of law or fact in the district court's conclusion that, beginning on June 10, 1998, and continuing through May 24, 2003, Florez was fleeing from justice with the intent of avoiding arrest or prosecution for his narcotics trafficking.
19 After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that the evidence overwhelming[ly] indicated to a high probability that the defendant fled shortly after his brother[ Chepe's] arrest on June 10, 1998, and thereafter concealed himself for a number of years for the sole purpose of avoiding prosecution. Pretrial Tr. June 23, 2004, at 19. This evidence took various forms, starting with Florez's statements to two co-workers that his brother was in trouble. That acknowledgment, together with evidence that Florez and Chepe were joint participants in a large-scale drug trafficking operation, permitted the district court to infer Florez's awareness that law enforcement authorities were — or soon would be — seeking to apprehend him as well as Chepe. 20 The evidence further showed that, after June 10, 1998, the day of Chepe's arrest, Florez never returned to his workplace, although he had been employed there for approximately twelve years. Similarly, he ceased residing at the Queens home he had shared with Chepe. In response to law enforcement inquiries over the ensuing weeks and months, family and co-workers reported that Florez had returned to his native Colombia. Indeed, in 2001, Florez told a female acquaintance, Girleza Silva, that he had just returned from Colombia when he asked if he could list her Queens address — where he never lived — as his residence on a New York State driver's license application. Florez also used Silva's bank account to conduct financial transactions. 21 Although the totality of these circumstances strongly supports the district court's finding of flight with the intent to avoid arrest and prosecution, Florez submits that no such conclusion could be drawn in light of other evidence showing that (1) prior to June 1998, he routinely took several months' leave from his job during the summer months; and (2) he had lived openly at two Queens addresses, one belonging to a relative, the other to a friend, between October 2000 and January 2004. His argument is unconvincing. 22 However routine it may have been for Florez to take extended summer leaves from his employment, what was not typical was his total failure to return to his job, as occurred in the years after his brother's June 1998 arrest. The district court did not clearly err in rejecting the argument that Florez's disappearance from all known New York locations after that day was merely coincidental to his brother's arrest. It reasonably concluded from the totality of the evidence that Florez fled at that time with the specific intent to avoid arrest and prosecution. See United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 77 (2d Cir.2005) (`The fact that an innocent explanation may be consistent with the facts alleged' does not negate court's factual finding (quoting United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir.1985))); United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1530 (2d Cir.1997) (ruling that district court was entitled to reject defendants' belated innocent explanations for their conduct and to credit inculpatory evidence); cf. United States v. MacPherson, 424 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant's innocent explanations for conduct did not preclude jury from inferring requisite mens rea from other inculpatory evidence). 23 The fact that, at some point in 2000 or 2001, Florez may have returned to Queens, does not undermine this inference. To the contrary, the fact that Florez deliberately did not use either of the Queens addresses where he purportedly lived in securing his New York State driver's license, preferring instead falsely to list Girleza Silva's address as his residence, strongly indicates Florez's continued intent to conceal his true whereabouts in order to avoid being apprehended. That purpose is further evidenced by Florez's use of Ms. Silva's bank account, as opposed to that of the relatives or friends with whom he was actually residing, to deposit a $13,000 check for back pay from his former employer. Indeed, the fact that Florez paid Ms. Silva $3,600 — more than 25% of the check's value — for this use of her bank account indicates the particularly high value the defendant placed on effecting a rather routine transaction in a way that would minimize anyone's ability to locate him. Although Florez later tried to add his name to Ms. Silva's account to facilitate his access to the deposited funds, his hasty departure from the bank when he thought a teller was attempting telephonically to confirm his identification documents, further evidences his determination to avoid any inquiry that might draw official attention to himself and possibly lead to his arrest. 24 Finally, we identify no clear error in the district court's conclusion that the government's efforts to locate Florez throughout the period from June 10, 1998 to May 24, 2003, were reasonably diligent. Pretrial Tr. June 23, 2004, at 21. From June 10, 1998, well into 1999, law enforcement authorities actively sought to locate Florez at various Queens locations only to be told by co-workers and family members that he was in Colombia. When, in February 2001, officials received information that Florez had returned to the United States, relatives continued to insist that he was, in fact, still in Colombia. In February 2002, upon learning that Florez had used Girleza Silva's address to secure a New York State driver's license, authorities questioned Ms. Silva, who admitted her contacts with the defendant and denied actual knowledge of his whereabouts, but provided various leads, none of which bore fruit. Re-interviewed in February 2003, Ms. Silva provided further cooperation; nevertheless, ensuing surveillance efforts to locate Florez again proved unsuccessful. Florez was finally located on May 24, 2003, when, in reporting himself to be the victim of a carjacking, he provided local police with a Queens address. 3 Far from indicating law enforcement neglect in searching for Florez, this evidence of the government's prolonged inability to locate him despite numerous efforts over a five-year period supports the district court's conclusion that defendant's intent throughout was to avoid arrest and prosecution. See United States v. Greever, 134 F.3d at 780 n. 1 (observing that where government's reasonable efforts to locate the defendant are unsuccessful, court may infer that defendant was acting with the intent to avoid arrest or prosecution) (internal quotation marks omitted). 25 In sum, we conclude that the district court (1) correctly construed the flight requirement of § 3290; (2) committed no clear error in finding that Florez was intentionally fleeing from justice from June 10, 1998, to May 24, 2003; and (3) properly tolled the statute of limitations during that five-year period, rendering meritless Florez's timeliness challenge to his January 2004 indictment.