Opinion ID: 1232846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Jury Charge on Voluntary Manslaughter

Text: Shuler argues the trial judge erred in failing to charge the jury on the use of deadly force in an attempt to thwart the commission of a felony, theft, or to apprehend a felon. We disagree. First, as a matter of law, Brooks' attempt to defend himself and resist Shuler's crimes is not sufficient legal provocation and does not justify a charge on voluntary manslaughter. Second, there was neither error nor prejudice from the trial judge's refusal to charge deadly force. This case does not involve a citizen's arrest. This case concerns a guard who was trying to defend himself during an armed robbery and kidnapping. Regardless, the trial judge charged the jury that excessive force by a victim during an arrest could constitute sufficient legal provocation for voluntary manslaughter. Had the jury accepted the defense's theory the victim was attempting to arrest Shuler, the jury could have found Shuler guilty of voluntary manslaughter under the trial judge's charge.
The trial judge determines the law to be charged on the presentation of evidence at trial. State v. Lee, 298 S.C. 362, 380 S.E.2d 834 (1989). The trial judge must charge the correct and current law of the State. State v. Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 529 S.E.2d 721 (2000) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 345, 148 L.Ed.2d 277 (2000). If there is any evidence to support a charge, the trial judge should grant the request. State v. Burriss, 334 S.C. 256, 513 S.E.2d 104 (1999). Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being in sudden heat of passion upon sufficient legal provocation. State v. Johnson, 333 S.C. 62, 508 S.E.2d 29 (1998). Both heat of passion and sufficient legal provocation must be present at the time of killing to constitute voluntary manslaughter. State v. Locklair, 341 S.C. 352, 535 S.E.2d 420 (2000) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 817, 148 L.Ed.2d 701 (2001). Provocation necessary to support a voluntary manslaughter charge must come from some act of or related to the victim in order to constitute sufficient legal provocation. Id. A victim's attempts to resist or defend himself from a crime cannot satisfy the sufficient legal provocation element of voluntary manslaughter. In State v. Tyson, 283 S.C. 375, 323 S.E.2d 770 (1984), this Court held evidence of a struggle between the victim and defendant during an armed robbery was not enough evidence to warrant a voluntary manslaughter charge. This Court found there was absolutely nothing to support finding sufficient legal provocation at the time of the killing because it was clear the victim was simply defending himself against an armed robber, and was killed in that attempt. See also State v. Ivey, 325 S.C. 137, 481 S.E.2d 125 (1997) (finding voluntary manslaughter charge not required when there was evidence the victim, who was a law enforcement officer, was acting lawfully and had a right to defend himself); State v. Tucker, 324 S.C. 155, 478 S.E.2d 260 (1996) (holding voluntary manslaughter charge not required if victim attempted to grab defendant's gun to resist burglary and armed robbery). Similar to the victim in Tyson, Brooks was simply defending himself from an armed robbery and kidnapping when he fired at Shuler. Consequently, there was no sufficient legal provocation, and a charge on voluntary manslaughter was not required. Furthermore, there was no prejudice from the trial judge's refusal to charge deadly force because other examples of sufficient legal provocation where charged by the trial judge. The trial court charged the jury: Certain acts of provocation committed by a victim are sufficient under our law to negate malice and constitute by law sufficient legal provocation. Some examples are acts which constitute legal provocation, negate malice, legally adequate to reduce the entire act of manslaughter include a threat of imminent dangerimminent deadly assault by the victim upon the defendant, an assault upon the defendant by the victim, the use of excessive force by the victim to effectuate an otherwise lawful arrest. (emphasis added). Assuming Shuler's theory is true and Brooks was attempting to arrest Shuler, the examples the trial judge provided of sufficient legal provocation would encompass this scenario and the jury could have found voluntary manslaughter.
At the close of the evidence, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, arguing the evidence only established voluntary manslaughter because Brooks used excessive force and assaulted Shuler during a citizen's arrest. The trial judge denied the motion, but charged voluntary manslaughter. The trial judge reasoned the jury could find voluntary manslaughter if they determined the guard fired first. After the charge, defense counsel argued the trial judge should have charged the following: Upon view of a felony committed or upon view of a larceny committed, any person may arrest a felon or thief and take him to a judge or magistrate to be dealt with according to law. Such arrest, however, must be made with the use of reasonable force. In making an arrest, it is unlawful to use deadly force in an attempt to thwart the commission of the felony or theft or to apprehend the felon. The trial judge stated it did not find Shuler's charge to warrant merit under the circumstances and the facts as presented in the trial of this case. According to the defense, this charge was based on S.C.Code Ann. §§ 17-13-10 to -20 (1976) and State v. Cooney, 320 S.C. 107, 463 S.E.2d 597 (1995). [4] In Cooney, this Court held it was reversible error not to charge the jury on the common law of citizen's arrest and the use of reasonable force. In that case, two defendants attempted to arrest the victim for robbing their store. The unarmed victim confessed to the robbery and began to flee the scene. The two defendants shot and killed the victim. Id. According to the Court, in order to invoke the defense of justifiable killing in apprehending a felon, the defendant, at a minimum, must show he had certain information a felony had been committed and he used reasonable means to effect the arrest. Id. at 109, 463 S.E.2d at 599. This Court found whether reasonable force was used to apprehend a fleeing felon is a factual question left to the jury, and the jury should have been charged on the common law of citizen's arrest. Shuler's argument is without merit because Cooney is distinguishable from the instant case. In Cooney, the defendant was attempting to argue citizen's arrest as a defense to murder. Moreover, Shuler was the initiator of this crime, and his actions directly put Brooks in danger. No evidence was presented at trial indicating Brooks was attempting an arrest rather than simply trying to protect himself during a robbery and kidnapping. Because there was no evidence to support Shuler's citizens arrest defense, the trial judge did not err in refusing to charge Shuler's Request to Charge.