Opinion ID: 1249485
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Denial of Fair Trial: Jury Misconduct

Text: Harrison asserts that each of the three incidents amounts to jury misconduct which denied him a fair trial. We note that in prior case law, this court has used the term jury misconduct to refer to at least two distinct types of misconduct: (1) misconduct involving an improper communication between a nonjuror and a juror and (2) misconduct by a member or members of the jury, including predeliberation discussions of the case. Different standards of proof apply to these distinct types of misconduct; therefore, we first note that we consider each of the three incidents in the present case to be misconduct involving an improper communication between a nonjuror and a juror and analyze them accordingly. The January 8 incident and the January 9 elevator incident clearly fall under the category of nonjuror communications because they involved jurors' hearing the comments of a nonjuror and there was no indication of a response by or discussion among the jurors. The January 9 hallway incident also involved comments by a nonjuror in the presence of jurors, but there was additional testimony that a juror responded to the nonjuror's comments by saying that he would never think by looking at Harrison that he could be a `cold killer.' As we read the comment by the juror, it reflects that the juror had not decided the issue in the case; the nonjuror comments did not affect the juror and therefore did not amount to a predeliberation discussion or misconduct by the juror as asserted by Harrison. Accordingly, we analyze each of the three incidents as instances of misconduct involving an improper communication between a nonjuror and a juror. A criminal defendant claiming jury misconduct bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) the existence of jury misconduct and (2) that such misconduct was prejudicial to the extent that the defendant was denied a fair trial. State v. Jackson, 255 Neb. 68, 582 N.W.2d 317 (1998). We review the district court's decision in this postconviction proceeding under a clearly erroneous standard. See State v. Becerra, 263 Neb. 753, 642 N.W.2d 143 (2002). In a criminal case, misconduct involving an improper communication between a nonjuror and a juror gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of prejudice which the State has the burden to overcome. Jackson, supra . Extraneous material or information considered by a jury may be deemed prejudicial without proof of actual prejudice if the material or information relates to an issue submitted to the jury and there is a reasonable possibility that the extraneous material or information affected the verdict to the detriment of a litigant. State v. Williams, 253 Neb. 111, 568 N.W.2d 246 (1997). The question of whether prejudice resulted from jury misconduct must be resolved by the trial court's drawing reasonable inferences as to the effect of the extraneous information on an average juror. Id. The test to determine whether extraneous material was prejudicial looks to the possible effect of the extraneous material on an average juror's deliberative process. Id. We review the district court's determinations regarding Harrison's claims of jury misconduct in light of the above standards. Regarding the factual question whether misconduct occurred in each of the three incidents alleged by Harrison, it is apparent that the district court found that the three incidents of communication between a nonjuror and jurors occurred because the district court continued the analysis in its order and evaluated whether prejudice resulted from such communications. From our review of the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, we determine that the district court's findings that the three incidents occurred were not clearly erroneous. We next review the district court's determination that the three incidents were not prejudicial to Harrison's defense. We determine that the district court's determination that no prejudice occurred was not clearly erroneous. Under the standards recited above, once a defendant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that jury misconduct involving improper communications between a nonjuror and a juror has occurred, a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises which the State has the burden to overcome. The question whether the misconduct was prejudicial to the extent that the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial is ultimately a question for the trial court and is to be resolved upon the basis of an independent evaluation of all the circumstances in the case and consideration of the effect of the communication on an average juror. Williams, supra . The proper analysis with regard to each incident in the present case is to make an evaluation of all the circumstances to determine whether there was a reasonable possibility that the improper communication affected the jury's verdict. A review of the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing shows that under all the circumstances at the underlying trial, there was not a reasonable possibility that the nonjuror communications to the jurors affected the verdict and that, therefore, the district court's determination that the three incidents were not prejudicial was not clearly erroneous. The record shows that the communications at issue consisted mainly of the nonjuror's assertions of her belief that Harrison was guilty and that he was crazy. The three incidents were predeliberation occurrences, and evidence was received subsequent to the incidents. In addition, we observe that prior to the jury's beginning its deliberations, and subsequent to the three incidents, the trial court instructed the jury that [i]n determining any questions of fact presented in this case, you should be governed solely by the evidence introduced before you. See State v. Anderson, 252 Neb. 675, 564 N.W.2d 581 (1997). It is evident that the average juror would have heeded the trial court's instructions to base his or her decisions on the evidence rather than on a comment by the nonjuror. In light of all the circumstances, the communications of the nonjuror would not have affected the average juror's decision and there was not a reasonable possibility that the communications by the nonjuror would have affected the jury's verdict. We therefore determine that the district court was not clearly erroneous in determining that no prejudice resulted from the three incidents. We reject Harrison's arguments with regard to jury misconduct and conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Harrison's claims related to such misconduct.