Opinion ID: 1925998
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of Taylor's New Trial Motion

Text: In Taylor II, we confined the proceedings on remand to a single issue: whether Taylor's proposed tape-to-tape comparison was minimally reliable and therefore admissible. If the trial court found the tape-to-tape comparison minimally reliable, it was to order a new trial; if not, appellant's conviction would stand affirmed. See 661 A.2d at 648. Taylor describes his appeal as being from a new trial motion pursuant to this court's remand order in Taylor II; the government argues that Taylor's claim is procedurally barred as beyond the scope of the remand order and as an untimely motion for new trial under Super. Ct.Crim. R. 33. Taylor filed his motion for a new trial more than seven years after the verdict and fourteen months after the trial court's decision on the second remand. A new trial motion based on grounds other than newly discovered evidence shall be made within 7 days after verdict or finding of guilty. . . . Super. Ct.Crim. R. 33 (2000). At the relevant time, a new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence had to be filed only before or within two years after the verdict or finding of guilty. Super. Ct.Crim. R. 33 (1999). [5] The time periods for filing the new trial motion are jurisdictional; this court has no power to consider an untimely new trial motion, even if the result seems harsh and it is difficult to see how the alleged newly discovered evidence would have been available within the jurisdictional period. See Diamen v. United States, 725 A.2d 501, 506 (D.C.1999) (citation omitted). Thus, if Taylor's motion for a new trial is pursuant to Rule 33, as the government argues, then it is barred as untimely. We disagree with the government, however, that Taylor's motion is for a new trial pursuant to Super. Ct.Crim. R. 33, whether based on newly discovered evidence or otherwise. Rather, despite Taylor's own representation to the contrary, we understand Taylor's motion to be before the court pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110, a motion which may be made at any time. D.C.Code § 23-110(b)(20002). The nature of a motion is determined by the relief sought and not by its caption or what a party represents the motion to be. See Diamen, 725 A.2d at 506; Vincent v. Anderson, 621 A.2d 367, 370-71 (D.C.1993) (nature of a motion is determined by the relief sought, not by its caption). Taylor's is a collateral attack on his conviction based on the trial court's unexpected finding, on second remand, that the quality of the police tape was so poor that no identification from the tape would be reliable. Taylor argues that because he has been denied the opportunity to use the police tape in comparison with an exemplar of his voice to show that the voice of the robber on the tape was not his, evidentiary parity requires that the government not have been able to use the tape recording to identify Taylor at trial. That Taylor's motion is pursuant to § 23-110, however, does not necessarily mean that the motion is properly before this court for review. Relief under § 23-110 is appropriate only for serious defects in the trial which were not correctable on direct appeal or which appellant was prevented by exceptional circumstances from raising on direct appeal. Head, 489 A.2d at 451. Where a defendant has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless he shows both cause and prejudice as a result of his failure. Id. The trial court ruled that Taylor failed to show the requisite cause and prejudice for his failure to have raised this issue in his two prior appeals. We agree that Taylor could have objected to the admission of the tape at trial, and he candidly admits he could have, but chose not to do so because he believed the police tape was reliable for identification purposes. However, after two remands from this court, the trial court found that the police tape was not reliable for voice identification. Accepting, as he must, the trial court's finding, Taylor's argument is that the same ruling of inadmissibility of the police tape that has been applied against him should similarly have been applied to the prosecution. As this argument was not available until the trial court's order after the second remand, we believe Taylor has demonstrated just cause for his failure to raise it heretofore. Likewise, Taylor adequately demonstrates prejudice. If the government was able to use evidence at trial for a certain purpose, Taylor also should have been able to use the same evidence for the same purpose. Cf. Spencer v. United States, 688 A.2d 412, 419 (D.C.1997) (Having permitted the prosecutor to ask the expert whether certain facts were consistent with guilt, [the trial court] could not then refuse to allow defense counsel to ask whether the same facts were consistent with innocence.). Accordingly, we will reach the merits of Taylor's claim.