Opinion ID: 1223760
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Heading: Whether exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrantless search of Lomeli's vehicle

Text: Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151-52, 45 S.Ct. 280, 284-85, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Supreme Court carved out one of those exceptions by holding that warrantless searches of automobiles were permitted when two criteria were satisfied: (1) the police had probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime was present in the vehicle, and (2) exigent circumstances existed to believe the car would be removed from the area. The State correctly notes, and Lomeli concedes, that the United States Supreme Court abandoned the exigency requirement in California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985). However, Nevada, like other state high courts, [3] continues to adhere to the requirement that exigent circumstances must be present to justify a warrantless automobile search. State v. Harnisch, 113 Nev. 214, 222, 931 P.2d 1359, 1365 (1997). As recently as January 1997, this court held in Harnisch that exigent circumstances did not exist to justify a warrantless search of an automobile because the car was not readily movable. Harnisch, 113 Nev. at 223, 931 P.2d at 1365. Thus, it is clear that Nevada still requires a showing of exigent circumstances. Therefore, in the present matter, the lower court's reliance exclusively on federal law to uphold the warrantless search was error. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3476-77, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983); Bowyer v. Taack, 107 Nev. 625, 628-29, 817 P.2d 1176, 1178 (1991). Nevertheless, this court may still uphold the warrantless search of Lomeli's car if exigent circumstances are present in the record. Thus, the dispositive issue in this case is whether the narcotics, located in Lomeli's car, were evanescent when his vehicle was searched. In other words, were the drugs likely to disappear before a warrant could be secured. The only offer of exigency advanced by the State was that Lomeli's girlfriend could have driven the vehicle out of the WalMart parking lot. In contrast, Lomeli argues that the vehicle, like himself, was seized for further felony investigation. NRS 171.123(3) states that any peace officer lawfully detaining an individual under this statute may do so only to ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad.  (Emphasis added.) In State v. Wright, 104 Nev. 521, 523, 763 P.2d 49, 50 (1988), this court recognized that a vehicle may be detained if the officer reasonably believes it is involved in criminal activity. Furthermore, the Nevada Attorney General advocates that a police officer may detain individuals while a search warrant is secured. Nev.Op.Atty.Gen. No. 88-3 (3-29-1988). In this case, it is undisputed that Lomeli was being detained for further felony investigation. When the pat-down search of Lomeli failed to reveal the presence of narcotics, the police immediately focused on the vehicle. Pursuant to NRS 171.123 and Wright, the police were justified in detaining Lomeli and his automobile for a maximum of sixty minutes. Thus, no individual could get in the car, drive away, and carry off the narcotics. Under these circumstances, we conclude that no exigency existed which justified a warrantless search of Lomeli's car. The one-hour statutory period prescribed in NRS 171.123(4) should have provided the Tri-Net agents with an opportunity to procure a telephonic warrant pursuant to NRS 179.045. [4] If, however, one hour would have been insufficient to secure a warrant, an exigency may have arisen. Nevertheless, this issue is never reached because it is undisputed that Tri-Net agents did not even attempt to attain a search warrant. Because this omission is wholly inconsistent with the well-grounded policy encouraging warrants when feasible, we cannot condone such behavior. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to grant Lomeli's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.