Opinion ID: 433446
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The First Seizure.

Text: 18 Supreme Court decisions identify, at least theoretically, three categories of police-citizen encounters: voluntary communication between law enforcement officers and citizens; brief, minimally intrusive, investigative stops; and highly intrusive, full-scale arrests. United States v. Wallraff, 705 F.2d 980, 988 (8th Cir.1983). Investigative stops and arrests are seizures within the meaning of the fourth amendment, and thus require some particularized and objective justification; voluntary communication does not. Id. An investigative stop by a law enforcement officer must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. The district court concluded that Ilazi's initial stop by Agent Olby and Officer Mortensen was so supported. We agree. 19 To be reasonable, the suspicion must be more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.'  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). It must be based on specific and articulable facts, and the rational inferences to be drawn therefrom by those trained and experienced in discerning in ostensibly innocuous behavior the indicia of narcotics trafficking. United States v. Forero-Rincon, 626 F.2d 218, 221-22 (2d Cir.1980). See also United States v. Wallraff, supra, 705 F.2d at 988. 20 Several recent Supreme Court decisions guide us in our application of these principles. In Florida v. Royer, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), a majority of the court agreed that two agents at the Miami International Airport had reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify a temporary detention when a casually dressed, nervous young man, carrying heavy American Tourister luggage and traveling under an assumed name, purchased a one-way ticket to New York City with cash, and wrote only a last name and his destination on the baggage identification tags, which called for name, address, and telephone number. The justices disagreed in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), whether the agents' observations provided the requisite suspicion to justify an investigatory stop. In that case, Mendenhall arrived at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport on an American Airlines flight from Los Angeles, a drug-source city. She was the last person to leave the plane and appeared very nervous, scanning the entire gate area as she deplaned. After leaving the plane, she walked past the baggage area without claiming any luggage and proceeded to an Eastern Airlines ticket counter where she picked up a boarding pass for her flight out of Detroit. Three justices found that the agents reasonably associated Mendenhall's conduct with criminal activity, noting that drug couriers often deplane last to detect more easily the presence of government agents in the gate area, and frequently travel without baggage and change flights en route to avoid surveillance. Id. 446 U.S. at 564-65, 100 S.Ct. at 1882. Four justices, on the other hand, did not find Mendenhall's conduct unusual, but rather the kind of behavior that could reasonably be expected of anyone changing planes in an airport terminal, her failure to claim luggage attributable to the fact that she was already ticketed on a flight out of Detroit on another airline and that fact confirmed by her receiving only a boarding pass at the Eastern Airlines ticket counter. Id. 446 U.S. at 572-73, 100 S.Ct. at 1886. 21 In Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980), a majority of the Court concluded that the agent could not, as a matter of law, have reasonably suspected Reid on the basis of what he observed. In that case, the agent knew that Reid arrived from Fort Lauderdale, a drug-source city, in the early morning when law enforcement activity was diminished. Reid and his companion apparently had no luggage other than the shoulder bags they carried, and they appeared to the agent to be trying to conceal the fact that they were traveling together. In rejecting these observations as sufficient to justify a reasonable suspicion, the majority noted that 22 only the fact that the petitioner preceded another person and occasionally looked backward at him as they proceeded through the concourse relates to their particular conduct. The other circumstances describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to conclude that as little foundation as there was in this case could justify a seizure. Id. (emphasis added). 23 The agent's belief that the petitioner and his companion were attempting to conceal the fact that they were traveling together, the majority observed, was more an unparticularized hunch than a fair inference in the light of the agent's experience. Id. 24 Although the question in the present case is a close one, we agree with the district court that Agent Olby and Officer Mortensen reasonably suspected Ilazi of criminal activity. Unlike the situation in Reid and more akin to that in Royer, most of the facts giving rise to the agents' suspicions in this case were based on Ilazi's own conduct, rather than on circumstances describing a very large category of presumably innocent travelers. As Ilazi deplaned, he aroused the suspicions of Agent Olby and Officer Mortensen, not simply because he carried no luggage and was among the last passengers to get off a plane that had just arrived from a drug-source city, but because he looked and acted stoned, and engaged in conduct that Agent Olby recognized as characteristic of cocaine users. Upon further observation, the agents noticed that Ilazi continually stomped both feet as if to pack down something concealed in his boots. On several occasions, as Ilazi proceeded down the concourse, he glanced over his shoulder at the agents as if fearful of detection. Finally, when Pinjoli returned to the bar to get Ilazi at Agent Olby's request, the agents saw Pinjoli signal Ilazi and saw Ilazi respond to that signal. These observations, made by agents familiar with the behavior and practices of narcotics couriers, together with the rational inferences to be drawn from them, provided the agents with the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop. 25 Defense counsel discusses each of the agents' observations and correctly points out that a number of them are subject to innocent explanations. In determining whether the requisite degree of suspicion existed, however, we must view the agents' observations as a whole, not as discrete and disconnected occurrences. United States v. Wallraff, supra, 705 F.2d at 988. In addition, as one court noted, It must be rare indeed that an officer observes behavior consistent only with guilt and incapable of innocent interpretation. United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 502 (2d Cir.1979). For that reason, conduct as consistent with innocence as with guilt may still indicate possible illicit activity and form the foundation for a valid investigatory stop. United States v. Wallraff, supra. 26