Opinion ID: 2635333
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Limited Nature and Purpose of the Nunc Pro Tunc Resentencing Remedy

Text: ¶ 17 In Grimmett's view, the district court's January 2005 order that he be resentenced nunc pro tunc reopened the section 77-13-6(2)(b) time frame and permitted him to file a motion to withdraw at any time before the actual resentencing. In other words, Grimmett reads the term sentence in the 2003 statute as including a resentence. He thus reads the 2003 statute as meaning that [a] request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence [or resentence] is announced. We reject this interpretation. ¶ 18 In State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981), we instructed district courts to resentence criminal defendants nunc pro tunc when those defendants were prevented from bringing timely appeals through no fault of their own. Under Johnson, nunc pro tunc resentencing restarted the appeal clock and provided defendants with an opportunity to bring direct appeals of their convictions. Id. The Johnson nunc pro tunc resentencing regime stood until our decision in Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628, which was decided about two weeks before Grimmett filed his initial brief in this case. ¶ 19 In Manning, we discarded nunc pro tunc resentencing in light of the 1996 enactment of the PCRA, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to -110 (2002 & Supp.2006), and corresponding revisions to rules 65B and 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We concluded that resentencing [was] no longer a preferred remedy, in part because resentencing tends to create more problems than it resolves. Manning, 2005 UT 61, ¶ 28, 122 P.3d 628 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Grimmett's case nicely illustrates the problematic nature of the Johnson remedy. ¶ 20 Our opinion in Manning made clear that the Johnson remedy was ultimately designed to restore a denied right to appeal. Id. Our decisions in both Manning and Johnson were fashioned to address a single, key constitutional concern: [W]e must provide a readily accessible and procedurally simple method by which persons improperly denied their right to appeal can promptly exercise this right. Id. 26; accord Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38 ([If a] defendant was denied a constitutional right [to a timely appeal, he] must be provided an opportunity to take a direct appeal from his conviction.). Johnson and its progeny thus established the limited scope and purpose of the nunc pro tunc resentencing remedy. ¶ 21 Our decision in State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350 (Utah 1996), affirms the limited scope of the Johnson remedy. In Gordon, a criminal defendant who had been resentenced nunc pro tunc moved for a new trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence. Id. at 353. This court explained that the motion for a new trial was untimely: The only effect of the [resentencing] order was to provide [the defendant] with another opportunity to pursue the direct appeal that he was previously denied. In other words, [the defendant's] resentencing merely returned him to the position he was in before his appeal was dismissed. It did not allow him another opportunity to present postconviction motions. Id. at 356 (emphasis added). ¶ 22 Gordon relied in part on our decision in State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1993), in which we explained that [o]nce a trial court on habeas review determines that a defendant has been denied the constitutional right to appeal, a direct appeal should be provided immediately, without adjudication of any other claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Thus, Gordon and Hallett both illustrate that nunc pro tunc resentencing is a limited remedy designed to reinstate the crucial constitutional right to appeal. In both cases, we expressly rejected the view that the reinstatement of the right to appeal opened the door for the consideration of post-conviction motions. ¶ 23 The 2003 amendment to section 77-13-6(2)(b) did not undercut our reasoning in Gordon. Under the 1989 statute, a defendant was required to move to withdraw his plea within 30 days after the entry of the [final judgment]. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1995) (amended 2003); see also Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ¶ 11, 31 P.3d 528. This time frame was changed by the 2003 statute, which required that the motion be filed before sentence is announced. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (2003). Though this change is not insignificant, it does not render Gordon inapplicable. Our holding in Gordon did not hinge on the thirty-day deadline imposed by the 1989 statute; it was based instead on the limited scope and purpose of the nunc pro tunc resentencing remedy. We fail to see how modification of the statutory deadline bears on either the nature or the scope of the nunc pro tunc resentencing remedy. ¶ 24 We therefore conclude that the district court's January 2005 resentencing order did not reopen the filing window established by section 77-13-6(2)(b). We expressly hold that the Johnson nunc pro tunc resentencing remedy, which is no longer available to criminal defendants, Manning, 2005 UT 61, ¶ 11, 122 P.3d 628, does not permit a criminal defendant to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after the jurisdictional deadline established by section 77-13-6(2)(b). ¶ 25 Because Grimmett's motion to withdraw was untimely under both versions of section 77-13-6(2)(b), we have no jurisdiction to consider his challenge to the validity of his guilty pleas. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, ¶ 3, 40 P.3d 630 ([B]ecause [the defendant] did not move to withdraw his guilty plea within thirty days after the entry of the plea, we lack jurisdiction to address [his challenge to his guilty plea] on appeal.). ¶ 26 Our decision today does not leave Grimmett without a remedy, however. Section 77-13-6(2)(c) (2003) expressly states that an untimely challenge to a guilty plea shall be pursued under the PCRA and rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [1] We further note that should Grimmett avail himself of this remedy, he may be appoint[ed] counsel on a pro bono basis, Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-109(1) (2002). But see Hutchings v. State, 2003 UT 52, ¶ 20, 84 P.3d 1150 (stating that defendants have no statutory or constitutional right to counsel in a civil petition for post-conviction relief). Given the circumstances that have led him to this point and the fact that the merits of his argument have not yet been addressed, Grimmett appears to be a prime candidate to benefit from the district court's discretion to appoint counsel.