Opinion ID: 2021581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relevance of the Challenged Statements

Text: At the outset, we note that the same evidence may be admissible under different theories when offered for different purposes. Here, some of the statements at issue were relevant for different purposes with respect to the different charges for which defendant was tried. Specifically, although the March 18 declarations of Garcia and Torres were hearsay when offered to prove the murder and related charges of which defendant was acquitted, they were nonhearsay when offered to prove the only charge now before us  conspiracy. A conspiracy consists of an agreement to commit an underlying substantive crime (here, murder), coupled with an overt act committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy ( see Penal Law §§ 105.15, 105.20). Thus, with respect to the conspiracy charge, Garcia's acceptance of defendant's solicitation to murder Ortiz was relevant not for its truth, but rather as evidence of an agreement to commit the underlying crime  itself an essential element of the crime of conspiracy. In other words, whether or not Garcia in fact killed Ortiz, his acceptance of defendant's invitation to do so was a verbal act which rendered defendant and his coconspirators culpable for the inchoate crime of conspiracy, even if the planned substantive crime never came to fruition. Indeed, even if Garcia had no genuine intent ever to commit the murder, defendant would be guilty of conspiracy if he believed he had entered into such an agreement. [T]he `act' of agreeing is concrete and unambiguous as an expression of each actor's intent to violate the law. . . . The fact of agreement serves only to unequivocally establish a particular actor's intent to commit the object crime by acting with others. The identity and degree of participation by the other persons are wholly irrelevant. Also irrelevant are the niceties of contract law concerning when an agreement is consummated (e.g., meeting of the minds). It is the individual who is prosecuted [for conspiracy] and necessarily it is the individual who must have the prescribed mens rea. The requisite intent is to join with others to commit a substantive crime. If an individual believes he has so joined, it is sufficient to establish complicity, regardless of the actual fact of agreement. . . . This is particularly so. . . where . . . it appears that the individual defendant is the originator of the criminal plan and the one most anxious to see the successful completion of the criminal objective ( People v Schwimmer, 66 AD2d 91, 95-96 [2d Dept 1978], affd for reasons stated in op below 47 NY2d 1004, 1005 [1979]). Similarly, Torres's statement that he would provide the gun for a later homicide  even if ultimately untrue  was admissible for the fact that it was said, inasmuch as its utterance provided evidence of Torres's unlawful agreement with defendant and Garcia. Thus, because the March 18 statements were nonhearsay with respect to the conspiracy charge, the People had no obligation to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy in order for the statements to be admissible. The analysis differs respecting the admissibility of these declarations as relevant proof of the substantive crimes. Garcia's inculpatory offer to do it, if introduced as evidence that he had in fact committed the June 1 homicide, would  although proffered in that event for its truth  nevertheless be admissible at defendant's trial under the coconspirator's exception to the hearsay rule as evidence of defendant's complicity in the murder. In that event, however, a prima facie case would need to be established independent of the hearsay statement. The same rule applies to Torres's offer to provide the gun, if used to establish the conspirators' collective guilt of murder and weapon possession. Thus, the same declarations  relevant both to conspiracy and to the substantive crimes whose commission formed the basis of the conspiratorial enterprise  were admissible at defendant's trial under different theories and different rules, depending on which crimes they were offered to prove. Since the statements were nonhearsay with respect to the conspiracy charge  the only charge before us  defendant's challenge to their admissibility concerning that charge is without merit.