Opinion ID: 801822
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Attempted-Murder Case

Text: On the evening of July 11, 2002, Mr. Ulrey watched a car drive by his residence. In it were Daniel Courtney, with whom Mr. Ulrey shared a history of animosity, and Michael McClean. Although accounts differ, someone at some point shouted an expletive.7 Mr. Courtney stopped his car and got out, and he and Mr. McClean 6 In any event, the record reveals that Mr. Ulrey was well-aware, both prior to and during the plea hearing, that his guilty plea to the possession charge carried a possible sentence of eight to twenty-four years, and that the court could in its discretion sentence him to any term within that range. See State R., Vol. II, at 90 (Pet. to Enter Plea of Guilty, accepted Jan. 16, 2003); State R., Plea Hr’g Tr., Jan. 16, 2003, at 19–20. 7 Mr. Courtney claimed that Mr. Ulrey shouted “Fucking pussies!” as the two drove past. State R., Presentence Report, filed Jan. 16, 2003. Bystanders claimed that (continued...) 20 approached Mr. Ulrey’s house. Mr. Ulrey was in his garage with the garage door open. He was holding a handgun. Messrs. Courtney and McClean, by contrast, were unarmed, although Mr. Ulrey asserts that he thought Mr. Courtney was armed because Mr. Courtney reached toward an ankle holster he was known to have. Mr. Ulrey fired his weapon and hit Mr. Courtney in the chest. He also fired at Mr. McClean but missed, and the latter took cover as Mr. Ulrey fled the scene. Like the other two cases, Mr. Ulrey’s ineffective-assistance claim with respect to this case rests on the offer of proof he made in state court. He points to seven witnesses whose putative testimony or statements to police, in his view, provide a strong basis for self-defense or the “make my day” defense. He argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to interview or follow up with these witnesses. In addition, he says that forensic evidence at the scene—blood spatter,8 gunshot residue, and shell casings—bolsters the “make my day” defense because it “would have conclusively proved Dan Courtney was in Appellant’s garage when he was shot.” Appl. for COA at 22. We review the CCA’s treatment of this claim in the context of the proffered testimony and forensic evidence below. 1. Sarah Allen told police she heard Mr. Ulrey and Mr. Courtney exchange 7 (...continued) Mr. Courtney yelled “Fucking midget!” (a reference to Mr. Ulrey, who is 5’5”) and “You’re dead, motherfucker!” from the car. State R., Vol. II, at 346–48. 8 Both Mr. Ulrey and the CCA vacillate between the terms “blood spatter” and “blood splatter.” For consistency, we use the term “blood spatter” except where quoting from Mr. Ulrey’s pleadings, the CCA’s opinion, or other portions of the record. 21 words as Mr. Courtney drove past. Her observations ended there because she then went into her own house. She later heard six gunshots. See State R., Vol. II, at 346. The CCA found that Ms. Allen’s interview “did not yield any information relevant to defendant’s theories of defense.” ROA, Vol. 1, at 624. 2. Richard Garrett told police he heard Mr. Ulrey and Mr. Courtney exchange words and saw Mr. Courtney approach the garage. Mr. Ulrey was holding a silver handgun; Mr. Courtney was apparently unarmed but at one point reached toward his sock and threatened to kill Mr. Ulrey. “Three feet outside the garage door,” Mr. Ulrey shot Mr. Courtney. State R., Vol. II, at 348. As Mr. Garrett fled the scene, he heard three to five more gunshots. See id. at 346–48. The CCA highlighted plea counsel’s testimony at the Rule 32(d) hearing that Mr. Garrett “was not going to be a good witness” because his statement that Mr. Ulrey was outside the garage when he fired was undercut by the forensic evidence. ROA, Vol. 1, at 623. (Shell casings from Mr. Ulrey’s gun were found inside the garage.) The CCA also found that Mr. Garrett’s statement tended to disprove the defense theories because he would have testified that Mr. Ulrey came out of the garage to shoot. See id. at 623–24. 3. After the incident, Mr. Courtney testified at a deposition in a civil case that he filed against Mr. Ulrey’s mother. (The case was later dismissed.) Mr. Ulrey highlights three aspects of the testimony that allegedly contradicted what Mr. Courtney initially told police. At his deposition, Mr. Courtney (a) “denied any dispute with Ulrey about a missing gun,” but initially told police that there was such a dispute, State R., Vol. II, at 347; (b) “testified that his reaction to having a gun pulled on him [wa]s to try to take it away,” but initially told police that he “stopped walking” when he saw Mr. Ulrey’s gun, id. at 347–49; and (c) “testified that he went to Ulrey’s house as a ‘novelty,’ to just take McClean on a ‘tour’ of his old drug houses,” but initially told police he went there “to confront Ulrey,” id. at 349. The CCA noted that Mr. Courtney’s original statements to police were available to plea counsel and that his later inconsistent statements surfaced only after Mr. Ulrey pleaded guilty. See ROA, Vol. 1, at 624–25. 4. Anesci Joan Huff told police she saw Messrs. Courtney and McClean approach the garage, “heard firecracker sounds,” then saw Mr. Courtney fall. State R., Vol. II, at 349. She heard Mr. Ulrey shout, “What are you going to do now?” and watched him run inside the house. Id. The CCA found that Ms. Huff’s statements did not “reveal any information pertinent 22 to self-defense or Make My Day.” ROA, Vol. 1, at 625. 5. Kenny Lockner lived across the street and witnessed the incident but “has now disappeared, and various efforts to find him and serve him have failed.” State R., Vol. II, at 350. Mr. Ulrey’s mother would have testified that Mr. Lockner said “he saw someone come out of the garage yelling he had been shot.” Id. at 349. The CCA found that Mr. Lockner’s putative testimony, although relevant to the “make my day” defense, was inadmissible hearsay; that his statement concerning Mr. Courtney’s location when shot was directly contradicted by Mr. Garrett; and that nothing he said was relevant to a self-defense theory. See ROA, Vol. 1, at 625–26. 6. Michael McClean told police that Mr. Courtney had consumed two or three beers that evening and became angry when he heard Mr. Ulrey shout, “Hey, you pussies!” State R., Vol. II, at 350. He and Mr. Courtney approached the garage, and he saw Mr. Ulrey raise his gun. Id. He heard a “pop,” saw Mr. Courtney fall, and took cover as Mr. Ulrey fired at him. Id. The CCA found that Mr. McClean’s statements were available to plea counsel and that they did not bolster Mr. Ulrey’s defense theories. See ROA, Vol. 1, at 624. 7. Tawni Miller (nee Ansel) visited Mr. Courtney in the hospital after the incident, and Mr. Courtney told her that he intended to kill Mr. Ulrey that evening. Mr. Courtney also told her that “he was at the threshold of the garage when he was shot.” State R., Vol. II, at 351. The CCA found that Mr. Ulrey “already knew that [Mr. Courtney] had a reputation for violence, obviating the need for [Ms. Miller] to corroborate that reputation. Plea counsel testified that she and defendant discussed this in at least one of their conversations about self-defense.” ROA, Vol. 1, at 623. In his offer of proof, Mr. Ulrey also highlighted forensic evidence that he says strengthens a possible “make my day” defense. He noted that police found six .45-caliber shell casings in the garage, even though he was charged with firing only four shots. See State R., Vol. II, at 356. He also alleged that bullet holes were found behind the location where he was standing, “in the hood and glass of the vehicle that was parked partially in the garage,” which “raises the issue that [either Mr. Courtney or Mr. McClean] was 23 armed.” Id. Finally, he stated that neither a blood-spatter analysis nor an analysis of possible gunshot residue on the hands of Messrs. Courtney and McClean was performed. Id. He acknowledged that plea counsel and her investigator reviewed crime-scene photographs with the prosecution. See id. at 356–57. He also stated that the investigator visited the garage “and observed what appeared to be blood splatter on the north facing part of the south garage door and also what may have been blood or a right hand print on the driver side of the red vehicle parked in the garage.” Id. at 357. However, “Ms. Heller did not follow up with tests or blood splatter analysis.” Id. The CCA found Mr. Ulrey’s arguments concerning the forensic evidence unpersuasive, reasoning as follows: [A]lthough defendant contends that there were bullet holes behind where he was allegedly standing and there were more bullet holes than shots that he was charged with firing, he does not assert that any witness would testify that either of the victims actually had and discharged weapons. Additionally, defendant does not assert facts to show that [gunshot residue] testing and blood splatter analysis would support his self-defense theory, nor does he provide facts to indicate that plea counsel failed to consider these tests. Conversely, plea counsel testified at the Crim. P. 32(d) hearing that she went to the police department to look at the evidence in the cases and brought her investigator with her. She also testified she and her investigator went to defendant’s garage to investigate the issue of possible blood spatter and discussed that information with the prosecutor in trying to get a better deal for defendant. Further, plea counsel testified that she was unaware whether [gunshot residue] tests were done, but it would not have made any difference in her analysis of this case. ROA, Vol. 1, at 627–28. The CCA concluded that Mr. Ulrey failed to show that counsel gave “faulty advice” or failed to perform an adequate investigation. Id. at 629. 24 We conclude that the CCA did not unreasonably apply Strickland or Hill. First, nothing in the proffered witness testimony strengthens Mr. Ulrey’s case for self-defense. Mr. Ulrey employed deadly force against two men approaching his house, and, as the CCA found, there is no evidence the two men were armed. Further, nothing else in the offer of proof suggests that it was reasonable for Mr. Ulrey to believe he was “in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily injury.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-704(2)(a). Finally, evidence concerning Mr. Courtney’s violent proclivities was known to plea counsel based on her conversations with Mr. Ulrey, thus diminishing the need for further investigation on this front. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“[W]hen the facts that support a certain potential line of defense are generally known to counsel because of what the defendant has said, the need for further investigation may be considerably diminished or eliminated altogether.”). For purposes of the “make my day” defense, the most relevant statement came from Mr. Garrett, who told police that Mr. Ulrey was “[t]hree feet outside the garage door” when he shot Mr. Courtney. State R., Vol. II, at 348. This fact, if true, conclusively negates a “make my day” defense—in the context of all other evidence—because it means that Mr. Courtney was not in the garage. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-704.5(2) (requiring “an unlawful entry into the dwelling”); People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 979 (Colo. 1987) (“[W]e hold that section 18-1-704.5 provides the home occupant with immunity from prosecution only for force used against one who has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling, and that this immunity does not extend to 25 force used against non-entrants.”).9 In contrast to Mr. Garrett’s statement, Mr. Ulrey’s best “make my day” evidence is the putative testimony of Mr. Lockner, who allegedly told Mr. Ulrey’s mother that Mr. Courtney “c[a]me out of the garage” after being shot. State R., Vol. II, at 349. But as the CCA found, this statement could not have been introduced at trial (had there been a trial) because it is inadmissible hearsay, and Mr. Lockner has not been located. Mr. Ulrey’s defense theories fare little better under the forensic evidence that he highlights. Plea counsel investigated the crime scene and crime-scene photographs, and we presume, as we must, that she reasonably adjudged the forensic evidence insufficient to establish a viable defense theory. Mr. Ulrey has offered nothing to undermine that presumption. The bullet-hole evidence is simply too weak to call counsel’s judgment into question, and as with the CCA, Mr. Ulrey points us to no facts to show that gunshotresidue testing or blood-spatter analysis would support theories of self-defense or the “make my day” defense. 9 Mr. Ulrey asserts that counsel should have interviewed Mr. Garrett before the police did. He claims that Mr. Garrett’s memory was “compromised by leading questions from the police investigator.” Appl. for COA at 14. Mr. Ulrey points to nothing in the record that supports that assertion. Further, we are not aware of any rule of law, much less one embodied in a Supreme Court decision, that says counsel performs deficiently when she fails to interview an eyewitness before the police do. It is true that Mr. Garrett’s statement is undercut by the presence inside the garage of shell casings from Mr. Ulrey’s gun. See State R., Rule 32(d) Hr’g Tr. at 99 (Test. of Ms. Heller). But even if Mr. Garrett’s statement were untrue or disbelieved by a jury, it would say nothing about the presence of Mr. Courtney inside the garage, the necessary prerequisite to a viable “make my day” defense. 26 In sum, we see nothing unreasonable in counsel’s advising Mr. Ulrey to plead guilty to attempted murder, and nothing unreasonable in the CCA’s decision so concluding. We further find that the propriety of the district court’s denial of habeas relief on this ground is not debatable among reasonable jurists.