Opinion ID: 170256
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discrimination based on familial status.

Text: Plaintiffs' contrary assertion notwithstanding, Title VII protects neither the family unit nor individual family members from discrimination based on their familial status alone. The district court avoided the issue, simply stating the Adamsons' sex-discrimination claims based on their status as husband, wife and daughter was even more enigmatic than Barry's age discrimination claim but opting to presume the existence of a prima fade case in order to rule definitively on the issue of pretext. The district court recognized this approach was somewhat peculiar given the implicit assertion that MCDS was the type of employer that discriminated both against men and women simultaneously, but proceeded in this manner because Defendants would prevail on the issue of pretext in any event. Aplt. App. III at 570, 572. While we recognize the utility of such an approach in this particular case, where evidence casting doubt as to the merit of the employer's proffered reasons is scarce, we cannot endorse it as a general matter. Requiring employers to answer and engage in costly discovery to refute an inference of discrimination that is not otherwise actionable is both inefficient and unjust. Familial status is not a classification based on sex any more than is being a sibling or relative generally. It is, by definition, gender neutral. The use of gender to parse those classifications into subcategories of husbands, wives and daughters is a social and linguistic convention that neither alters this fact nor elevates those subcategories to protected status. Discrimination on the basis of familial status gains traction as a sex-based distinction under Title VII only with reference to the anti-nepotism policy at issue in this case, and the female Adamsons' contention that the board applied the policy to promote gender-based discrimination, which we address below. Mr. Adamson's claim that he was terminated in violation of Title VII based on his status as Patricia's husband (and Jessica's father), and Patricia and Jessica's claims that they were terminated by virtue of being Barry's wife and daughter, respectively, fall outside the scope of Title VII and its purpose in protecting employees against invidious discrimination on the basis of sex, and we reject those claims without reference to McDonnell Douglas or its burden-shifting framework. To the extent the district court presumed the existence of a prima facie case of sex-based discrimination under Title VII based on familial status, the presumption was erroneous and we reject it. Assertions that an employer discriminated against an individual on the basis of his or her familial status alone state no cognizable cause of action under Title VII.