Opinion ID: 1860573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Chicone Decision

Text: In Chicone, we accepted jurisdiction to resolve the conflict between the district court's decision in Chicone v. State, 658 So.2d 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), and numerous other district court opinions on the issue of whether guilty knowledge is an element of possession of a controlled substance or possession of drug paraphernalia. We answered the question in the affirmative for both possession of the substance and the paraphernalia. In resolving this question we explained that the guilty knowledge element of possession actually involves two elements, knowledge of the presence of the substance and knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance. In the final analysis we clearly said both knowledge of the presence of the substance and knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance are essential elements of the crime of possession of an illegal substance. [4] Thus, we found the State was required to prove that Chicone knew of the illicit nature of the items in his possession. See Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d at 744. Accord Lambert v. State, 728 So.2d 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). We further indicated that lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance is not an affirmative defense to be raised and proven by the defendant. We said: The State, to its credit, does not claim that a defendant shown to be without guilty knowledge could be convicted under the possession statute. Rather, the State contends that lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of the item possessed should be raised and proven as an affirmative defense. We disagree. Nowhere has the legislature provided for such an affirmative defense. Furthermore, if the statute did not require guilty knowledge, then obviously a person who possessed an illicit object even without knowledge of its illicit nature would be as guilty of violating the statute (that had no scienter requirement) as one who did have knowledge. Lack of knowledge could hardly be a defense to a statute that did not require such knowledge. Hence, the State's position really supports our holding and we commend the State for its forthright approach and candor. Chicone, 684 So.2d at 744. Furthermore, we indicated that a jury instruction is required if requested. We specifically held: We stated earlier that the State must prove guilty knowledge to establish the defendant's possession of a controlled substance or drug paraphernalia. At trial, Chicone proffered instructions that required the jury to find that the substance he possessed was known to him to be cocaine and that the object he possessed was known to him to be drug paraphernalia in order to convict him. The trial court denied these instructions and gave the standard jury instructions set out above along with the standard jury instructions on reasonable doubt, which the trial judge read twice. While the existing jury instructions are adequate in requiring knowledge of the presence of the substance, we agree that, if specifically requested by a defendant, the trial court should expressly indicate to jurors that guilty knowledge means the defendant must have knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance allegedly possessed. Chicone, 684 So.2d at 745-746. It is implicit in this holding that the standard jury instructions on possession do not adequately inform the jury of the illicit nature of the substance requirement of the guilty knowledge element. See State v. Delva, 575 So.2d 643, 644 (Fla.1991). It is with this backdrop that we address the issues left open in our Chicone decision. [5]