Opinion ID: 1122968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: motions for evidentiary hearing and mistrial based upon alleged juror misconduct

Text: Defendant's next assignment of error concerns allegations of juror misconduct, which arose from the fact that one juror had a son who was an inmate, housed in a cell near defendant's cell at the Marion County Corrections Facility, during parts of defendant's trial. The record discloses the following sequence of events. Four days into the penalty phase, defendant's counsel reported to the trial court that, according to defendant, the juror had been discussing defendant's case with her son on a regular basis. At the close of testimony on that same day, the court questioned the juror, who confirmed that her son was an inmate at the Marion County Corrections Facility. In response to the court's question whether there was any basis for defendant's allegations, the juror responded: Absolutely not. He [the juror's son] called me on the phone, and I have not talked to him since then, and he stated Well, as I was talking to him I said, I've just been really really busy and I'm on jury duty now. And I knew the minute I said that I shouldn't have said it. And he immediately asked me if Iif it was this particular case. And I did lie to him. I said, no, that name does not sound familiar to me. The juror told the court that that conversation had taken place several weeks before, near the beginning of defendant's trial. The court then stated: All right. The Court is satisfied that there's no conduct on your part that would interfere with the instructions I've given you in that regard. [17] Ten days later, defendant's counsel told the trial court that a second inmate had reported that, before the jury began deliberating after the guilt phase, the same juror had told her son that defendant was guilty and was going to receive a death sentence. The court first determined, through questioning defendant's counsel, that the juror allegedly had made those statements before the court had questioned the juror about improper communications with her son. The court then stated: All right. With that, I'm not going to ask [the juror] to come in here and testify again because I have accepted her testimony already as absolutely credible, and I'm certainly not going to ask her to repeat that. And for the record, I do find the testimony of a juror under oath as not being put down by the statements not under oath made by not only the person we referred to before, who was that juror's son, but also a third prisoner and the Defendant, who for these purposes have no credibility for the Court. Defendant's counsel moved to make an offer of proof, which the court denied. The next day, defendant's counsel submitted a letter, prepared by defendant's investigator, that detailed the incidents described by the second inmate. The trial court received that letter for the purpose of defendant's offer of proof. The following day, defendant's counsel filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing on the issue, accompanied by his own affidavit. The affidavit essentially summarized the second inmate's allegations and also stated that defendant's counsel believe[d] it [was] not only possible that [the juror] could have communicated to [her son] her feelings about the case, but that [her son] may have communicated to his mother his observations of the Defendant    and his activities in the Marion County Jail. Finally, during deliberations after the penalty phase, defendant's counsel, believing that the trial court had not fully decided the issue of juror misconduct, moved for an evidentiary hearing. After the court denied that motion, defendant's counsel moved for a mistrial, which the court also denied. Defendant assigns error to two aspects of the trial court's actions. Defendant first contends that the court erred, because it fail[ed] to allow defendant to make an offer of proof concerning the alleged juror misconduct. In defendant's view, the court should have allowed defendant to offer the testimony of defendant, the juror's son, and the second inmate. We disagree that the trial court denied defendant an opportunity to make a sufficient offer of proof. Although defendant correctly asserts that one method of making an offer of proof is through witness testimony, by question and answer, [i]t also is acceptable    for a party's counsel to state what the proposed evidence is expected to be. State v. Phillips, 314 Or. 460, 466, 840 P.2d 666 (1992). In this case, the trial court accepted the letter of defendant's investigator, which summarized an interview with the second inmate, and also heard the arguments of defendant's counsel, which specified the substance of the alleged communications between the juror and her son. The court also had before it the affidavit of defendant's counsel that reiterated the second inmate's allegations. Taken together, we conclude that the trial court had sufficient information to make its determination concerning the alleged misconduct and that defendant offered sufficient information to complete the record for purposes of review. In other words, the offer of proof was sufficient to demonstrate the content of the evidence sought to be admitted. Phillips, 314 Or. at 466, 840 P.2d 666. Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial or, alternatively, that the court erred in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of juror misconduct. The decision to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, who is in the best position to assess and to rectify the potential prejudice to the defendant. State v. Pratt, 316 Or. 561, 574, 853 P.2d 827, cert. den. 510 U.S. 969, 114 S.Ct. 452, 126 L.Ed.2d 384 (1993) ( Pratt II ) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we review the denial of defendant's motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. Ibid. Because the trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion for an evidentiary hearing required similar judgment on the trial judge's part, we also review that decision for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Wright, 323 Or. 8, 20, 913 P.2d 321 (1996) (reviewing a trial court's ruling that denied the defendant's post-verdict motion to contact jurors to investigate misconduct for abuse of discretion). We disagree with defendant that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motions. After learning of the alleged communications between the juror and her son, the court immediately questioned the juror and satisfied itself that no misconduct had occurred. When defendant's counsel brought the matter to the court's attention a second time, the court specifically stated that it had found the juror's testimony to be credible and saw no need to question the juror any further. In similar cases, this court has deferred to trial court determinations of the extent of misconduct or prejudice to a defendant and also to trial court assessments of juror credibility. See, e.g., Pratt II, 316 Or. at 574-75, 853 P.2d 827 (no abuse of discretion when the trial court carefully assessed whether [inappropriate] comments by [an] alternate juror could have caused any possible prejudice to defendant [and]    concluded that no harm had been done); State v. Rogers, 313 Or. 356, 382, 836 P.2d 1308 (1992), cert. den. 507 U.S. 974, 113 S.Ct. 1420, 122 L.Ed.2d 789 (1993) (no abuse of discretion when the record supported the trial court's finding, after the questioning of a juror who had been contacted by the mother of a victim, that [the] juror    was not contaminated by the contact and could still serve as an impartial juror). As in those cases, we conclude here that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motions.