Opinion ID: 994896
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: lawson

Text: Lawson pleaded guilty to a charge of distributing cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The activity giving rise to the charge was the sale of .49 grams of cocaine base to a government informant in January 1994. In sentencing Lawson, the district court found that the 28 grams of crack that he distributed to guests at a Super Bowl party, including the same government informant, in January 1995 was part of the same course of conduct as the three grams of crack he possessed in January 1994, .49 grams of which he distributed to the government informant. See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3(a)(2) (1995). The result was that Lawson's Base Offense Level was 28, and his Total Offense Level was 25. Lawson contends that the district court erred in its relevant conduct assessment. We review the court's factual findings for clear error. United States v. Williams, 977 F.2d 866, 870 (4th Cir. 1992). The United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3(a)(2) (1995) provides for a sentencing adjustment forall acts and omis- 7 sions . . . that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. Activities are part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan if they meet the similarity, regularity and temporal proximity test of United States v. Mullins, 971 F.2d 1138, 1143-44 (4th Cir. 1992). Weak evidence for one prong of the Mullins test can be overcome by a strong showing as to the other prongs. Mullins, 971 F.2d at 1144. Because the charge to which Lawson pleaded guilty was a distribution charge, a proper frame of reference in evaluating the Mullins test is distribution, rather than necessarily conspiracy. Two transactions were described in Lawson's presentence report, and the government presented no further evidence at his sentencing. The district court concluded that the activities were similar. The government conceded that the crack came from different sources, but demonstrated that it was distributed in the same area on both occasions. The fact that the cocaine base in the two instances may have originated from different sources does not make the distributive conduct dissimilar. Moreover, it is clear from United States v. Washington, 41 F.3d 917 (4th Cir. 1994), that the sharing of cocaine base with friends at the 1995 Super Bowl party is a distribution of cocaine base equivalent to the sale of the drug. Thus, both distributions were similar in that they both involved cocaine base and occurred in the same area. The district court also concluded that the activities were temporally proximate. In United States v. Santiago, 906 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1990), the court found that drug sales that were eight to fourteen months prior to the drug distribution that resulted in conviction had sufficient temporal proximity and were properly attributed to the defendant as relevant conduct. The district court in the present case made a like finding, and we do not conclude that it was clearly erroneous. We need not address whether the two transactions are sufficiently regular because a sufficiently strong showing was made with regard to temporal proximity and similarity to overcome any weakness in regularity. Nevertheless, we observe that the district court may have construed the evidence regarding the 1995 Super Bowl party distribution as evidence of Lawson's intent to continue distributing cocaine base. Cf. Santiago, 906 F.2d at 873. Therefore, the district court did 8 not err by including the January 1995 cocaine base distribution in Lawson's sentencing. For the reasons discussed above, the judgments of the district court with regard to Alvarez and Lawson are AFFIRMED.