Opinion ID: 807543
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Same Act or Transaction

Text: Thompson claims that the district court improperly joined and refused to sever his cases from Baggett's, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b) (joinder of offenses is proper if the offenses charged are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses). With respect to coconspirators, joinder may be proper where there is an overall scheme in which each conspiracy member participated. United States v. Liveoak, 377 F.3d 859, 865 (8th Cir. 2004). Importantly, not every defendant joined must have participated in every offense -13- charged. United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1143 (8th Cir. 1996). Rather, in general, 'persons charged in a conspiracy or jointly indicated on similar evidence from the same or related events should be tried together.' United States v. Lewis, 557 F.3d 601, 609 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thompson argues his case should not have been tried with Baggett's because the offenses for which the two men were tried were not part of an overarching conspiracy and were therefore not part of the same series of acts or transactions. Although it is true that Baggett was only indicted for firearms offenses, whereas Thompson was indicted for firearms, gambling, and immigration offenses, these charges are nevertheless all part of the same overarching scheme in which Thompson made money by operating an illegal gambling business, selling firearms, and receiving money in exchange for arranging a marriage to contravene immigration laws. See Liveoak, 377 F.3d at 865 (holding that [t]hough charges linked merely by common conspiracy members may not be joined, the particular charges were properly joined because they were linked not only by common conspiracy members, but also by an overall scheme in which each conspiracy member participated to fraudulently charge the government for health care costs). Furthermore, the significant overlap in evidence relevant to these two defendants indicates that joinder was proper here. See United States v. Pou, 953 F.2d 363, 368 (8th Cir. 1992) (Ordinarily, indicted coconspirators should be tried together, especially where the proof of conspiracy overlaps.). The cases against both men required evidence of the sources of Thompson's income, Thompson's relationship with Baggett, and Baggett's knowledge of Thompson's criminal history and activities. The presumption against severing properly joined cases is strong. United States v. Ruiz, 412 F.3d 871, 886 (8th Cir. 2005). The district court instructed the jury that it must give separate consideration to the evidence about each individual defendant and it must consider, separately, each crime charged against each individual defendant. The mere possibility that a defendant's chances for acquittal -14- may be better in separate trials is an insufficient justification for severance. Id. at 887; see also Pou, 953 F.2d at 368–69 (This preference for joint trials is not limited by any requirement that the quantum of evidence of each defendant's culpability be quantitatively or qualitatively equivalent. (internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Thompson's motion. 2. Prejudice to Baggett From Thompson's Refusal to Testify Baggett argues that the district court improperly denied his motion to sever his and Thompson's trials, because Thompson's assertions of his Fifth Amendment right to not testify prejudiced Baggett by denying Baggett's right to present a complete defense and his right to compel a witness in his favor to testify. Had the trials been separate, Baggett asserts, Thompson would have testified that he did not tell Baggett he was a felon until after Baggett provided him with firearms. Therefore, Baggett could not have been convicted of charges that he aided and abetted a felon's possession of a firearm, conspired to dispose of ammunition to a felon, and made false statements to agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms about these incidents. However, [s]everance is not mandated simply because a codefendant might testify and thereby only increase the chances of acquittal or tend to rebut some aspect of the government's case. Exculpation is required. United States v. Foote, 920 F.2d 1395, 1400 (8th Cir. 1990) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, even if Thompson would have testified at a solo trial for Baggett,3 the testimony he 3 For evidence that Thompson would have testified at a separate trial for Baggett, Baggett points only to Thompson's failure to deny Baggett's statement that Thompson would testify at a pretrial hearing. However, the government argues that Thompson would not likely testify, pointing to an ongoing prosecution of Thompson in Massachusetts, for which there is no known end date. It is not clear that Baggett has demonstrated a sufficient likelihood that Thompson would testify in his favor. -15- would have provided would not have been exculpatory. The government has several probative pieces of evidence to rebut potential testimony by Thompson that Baggett did not know of Thompson's felony status. Most convincingly, this evidence includes a letter Baggett wrote to a state court judge in 2003, stating that he had known Thompson for nearly twenty years and asking the judge to show mercy to Thompson at a criminal sentencing. Such evidence would cast serious doubt on any testimony by Thompson that Baggett did not know of his felony status and on the chances that such testimony would exculpate Baggett. Thus, the district court did not commit an abuse of discretion resulting in clear prejudice when it denied Baggett's motion to sever. 3. Charges Against Thompson Thompson argues the district court erred in denying his motion to sever the charges against him. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) (joinder of offenses against the same defendant is proper where those offenses are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan). Because Thompson could not testify regarding his felonin-possession-of-firearms charges without incriminating himself, he also chose to not take the stand to address the gambling and marriage fraud charges, for which he viewed his testimony as important. These facts do not establish clear prejudice to Thompson sufficient to render the district court's decision an abuse of discretion. [A] defendant does not suffer any See United States v. Crumley, 528 F.3d 1053, 1063–64 (8th Cir. 2008) (It is not enough for a defendant to claim that he needed a separate trial in order to call a codefendant as a witness. He must show that it is likely his codefendant would have testified and that the testimony would have been exculpatory. (internal marks and alterations omitted)). -16- undue prejudice by a joint trial if the evidence is such that one crime would be probative and admissible at the defendant's separate trial of the other crime. United States v. Little Dog, 398 F.3d 1032, 1037 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Evidence presented at trial showed that Thompson received firearms as payment for gambling debts, and that the person Thompson aided and abetted in committing marriage fraud was also an agent of Thompson's gambling business. Thus, even if the district court had granted the motion to sever, allowing Thompson to testify at one trial for the gambling and marriage charges, his testimony would likely have opened the door to questions about the firearms charges. Thompson did not suffer clear prejudice and the district court did not abuse its discretion.