Opinion ID: 1583758
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: jury instruction on sole proximate cause

Text: Sonja contends that the court's giving of supplemental jury instruction No. 6 was reversible error as a matter of law because the instruction (1) implied that there could be only a single proximate cause of Austin's injuries and damages; (2) distracted the jurors from a direct assessment of Kolbeck's negligence and was intended to put Sonja's acts or omissions before the jury as an intervening cause; (3) misstated Sonja's burden of proof; (4) directly conflicted with supplemental instruction No. 7 by imputing Sonja's negligence to Austin; and (5) improperly emphasized Kolbeck's defense by negating language in other instructions. Sonja does not contend that the evidence was insufficient to support a sole proximate cause instruction. Kolbeck contends that the record is insufficient to review any of Sonja's assigned errors. Kolbeck also contends that because Sonja's claim was dismissed, she was a nonparty to the action and he was entitled to the conduct of nonparty third person pattern instruction in NJI2d Civ. 3.44. Supplemental instruction No. 6 followed the pattern instruction in NJI2d Civ. 3.44 and provided: [Kolbeck] claims that Sonja Worth's conduct was the only proximate cause of Austin Worth's injuries. By doing so, [Kolbeck] is simply denying that his conduct was a proximate cause of the injury. Remember, [Sonja] must prove that [Kolbeck's] negligence was a proximate cause of the injury. In an appeal based on a claim of an erroneous jury instruction, the appellant has the burden to show that the questioned instruction was prejudicial or otherwise adversely affected a substantial right of the appellant. [8] Jury instructions do not constitute prejudicial error if, taken as a whole, they correctly state the law, are not misleading, and adequately cover the issues supported by the pleadings and evidence. [9] A litigant is entitled to have the jury instructed upon only those theories of the case which are presented by the pleadings and which are supported by competent evidence. [10] Kolbeck argues that the second sentence of supplemental instruction No. 6 explained that he was simply denying that he was a proximate cause of Austin's injuries. The comments to NJI2d Civ. 3.44 clarify that this instruction is appropriate when the defendant claims that the negligence of someone other than the defendant is the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages. [11] A defendant's conduct is a proximate cause of an event if the event would not have occurred but for that conduct, but it is not a proximate cause if the event would have occurred without that conduct. [12] In actions filed on behalf of a child, this court has long held that `the negligence of a parent . . . cannot be imputed to an infant who is injured through the carelessness of another party....' [13] This rule has been applied not only in cases in which separate actions were filed by the parent and the child, [14] but also to actions filed solely on behalf of a child for personal injuries. [15] But if a third person is the sole proximate cause of an innocent plaintiff's injuries, the plaintiff's recovery from a defendant is barred because the plaintiff's injuries are not attributable to the defendant's negligence. In Pearson v. Schuler, [16] a case dealing with the general rule that a driver's negligence may not be imputed to a passenger guest, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that . . . the driver of the automobile in which plaintiff's decedent was riding, at the time of the collision, was negligent, and that such negligence . . . was the sole proximate cause of the collision and resulting injuries to plaintiff's decedent, then your verdict will be in favor of the defendant. . . . On appeal, the deceased passenger's representative assigned error to this instruction. This court held that a passenger may not recover from a defendant for injuries sustained in a collision if the negligence of the passenger's driver was the sole proximate cause of the accident. We stated: This instruction does not tell the jury that the negligence of [the driver] was imputed to the deceased [passenger]. It does state that if it found [the driver's] negligence was the sole proximate cause of the collision and resulting injuries to the . . . decedent, it should find for the defendant . . . . That amounts to instructing that if [the driver's] negligence was the sole cause of the injury then it should return a verdict for defendant. That [the driver's] negligence was not otherwise imputed to the plaintiff's deceased is made more clear by instruction No. 11 which reads in part as follows: . . . if you find that the injuries to plaintiff's decedent were the proximate result of the negligence of [the defendant] and the driver . . . and that such injuries would not have occurred except for the negligence of each of said parties, it is no defense to this action for the defendant . . . to prove that the negligence of [the driver] was a contributing cause to the injuries sustained by plaintiff's decedent. [17] Pearson demonstrates that the third person's negligence is not imputed to an innocent plaintiff by a sole proximate cause instruction. The concept of sole proximate cause `rests on the notion that some third party or other independent event was the sole cause of the plaintiff's injuries.' [18] Here, Kolbeck did allege that Sonja's conduct was the sole proximate cause of Austin's injuries, but in medical malpractice cases, it is not necessary that the independent event or cause be the result of negligence. [19] Other courts, however, including this court, also require trial courts to give a limiting instruction that explains the plaintiff's right to recover if the plaintiff proves the defendant's negligence proximately caused or proximately contributed to the plaintiff's injuries. [20] In Barry v. Moore, [21] this court held that a trial court must inform the jury of the respective legal rights and liabilities of the [parties] in the event that negligence of the defendant was found which was the proximate cause which cause was proximately contributed to by [the third person]. Specifically, the trial court must explain that [i]f [the defendant] was guilty of negligence which solely, or in concurrence with [the third person], or which proximately contributed to the accident, the plaintiff being in nowise responsible for it, the plaintiff was entitled to a recovery of her damages, if any, from him. [22] Failure to give this instruction is reversible error, even if not requested, when the evidence raises a jury question as to whether (1) the defendant's negligence was the sole cause of the plaintiff's injuries, (2) a third person's negligence was the sole cause of the plaintiff's injuries, (3) negligence of the defendant and a third person concurred to cause the plaintiff's injuries; and (4) negligence of a third person or the defendant proximately cause the injuries, but the other's negligence contributed to the injuries. [23] In other words, when the evidence is sufficient to raise a jury question as to whether a defendant's or a third person's negligence proximately caused or proximately contributed to a plaintiff's injuries, then a trial court must inform the jury that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages, if any, from the defendant if the jury finds that the defendant is guilty of negligence which solely or in concurrence with a third person proximately caused or contributed to the plaintiff's injuries. We have also applied this rule in a medical malpractice case when the plaintiff alleged that the defendant physician failed to provide appropriate postoperative care and neither party alleged a third person's negligence had caused the plaintiff's injuries. [24] There was evidence at trial, however, that the plaintiff's mother had failed to follow instructions for the plaintiff's postoperative care and that another physician had failed to correctly diagnose the plaintiff's condition. Relying on Barry, [25] this court concluded that [u]nder the evidence, the erroneous failure of the district court to inform the jury as to how to treat the separate independent negligent acts of more than one person which combined to proximately cause the same injury, if the jury found such to have been the case, violated the district court's duty and prejudiced [the plaintiff]. [26] A court does not err in failing to give an instruction if the substance of the proposed instruction is contained in those instructions actually given. [27] Here, supplemental instruction No. 5 advised the jury in part that [a] proximate cause need not be the sole cause. It may be a substantial factor or substantial contributing cause in bringing about the injury or harm. In addition, supplemental instruction No. 7 advised the jury that any act and/or omission of a parent does not relieve the Defendant of any liability the Defendant may have to the child for injuries or damages suffered by the child. In this case, if you find any acts and/or omissions on the part of Sonja L. Worth, caused or contributed to the injuries of Austin Worth[,] you must not consider them in deciding the damages, if any, to which the child is entitled. In another guest passenger case, this court held that the trial court did not err by instructing the jury on the defendant's theory that the driver of the car in which the plaintiff was riding was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury when the court also instructed the jury that the negligence of the driver could not be imputed to the plaintiff. [28] We conclude that, taken as a whole, the jury instructions were sufficient to ensure that Sonja's negligence did not operate to prevent Austin's recovery of damages if the jury concluded that Kolbeck's negligence was a concurring or contributing proximate cause of Austin's injuries. Sonja's reliance on Vieregger v. Robertson, [29] is misplaced. In Vieregger, the parents brought a malpractice action on behalf of their son against the mother's two perinatologists for injuries their son sustained during delivery. The combination of the mother's diabetic condition and weight gain contributed to her unborn child's enlarged size, which caused delivery complications. At trial, the jury was instructed that the parents had the burden of proving that each physician had been negligent and that each physician's `negligence was the proximate cause' of the son's injuries. [30] The Nebraska Court of Appeals was concerned that the instruction enhanced the parents' burden of proof by requiring them to prove that each doctor was the proximate cause of the child's injuries. That concern is not raised here. As in Vieregger, there were two alleged causes of Austin's injuries: Sonja's negligence and Kolbeck's negligence. But supplemental instructions Nos. 2 and 5 advised the jury that Sonja must prove Kolbeck's negligence was  a proximate cause of an injury to Austin (emphasis supplied) and that this requirement could be satisfied if the jury found Kolbeck's negligence was a substantial factor or substantial contributing cause in bringing about the injury or harm. The Court of Appeals was also concerned that the instruction would improperly allow the jury to consider, in searching for the proximate cause, the mother's causative role in the development of her overly large unborn child. We agree that a pregnant woman's causative role in her unborn child's injuries cannot prevent her child's recovery from a negligent defendant unless the mother was the sole proximate cause of those injuries. But the defendants in Vieregger did not contend that the mother was the sole proximate cause of her unborn child's injuries. Here, the instructions were sufficient to allow Austin's recovery unless the jury concluded that Kolbeck's negligence, if any, was not a substantial factor or substantial contributing cause in bringing about the injury or harm.