Opinion ID: 1036619
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Context in Which the Images Were Shown

Text: Shoemaker contends that the court erred when it allowed the jury to consider the context in which the images were displayed in determining whether the images were child pornography. Specifically, Shoemaker alleges error in the jury instructions, which allowed the jury to consider the 20 SHOEMAKER V. TAYLOR “setting” of the images, and the prosecutor’s arguments regarding the adult website on which six of the images were displayed. Shoemaker argues that Free Speech Coalition established that context is irrelevant in determining whether an image is child pornography. Shoemaker misreads Free Speech Coalition. In Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court struck down a federal law that banned materials marketed in such a way that “conveys the impression” that such materials depict minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Id. at 257. The Court was concerned that “[e]ven if a film contains no sexually explicit scenes involving minors, it could be treated as child pornography if the title and trailers convey the impression that [such] scenes would be found in the movie.” Id. The Court found the law overbroad because its analysis would not “depend principally upon the content of the prohibited work” but would instead “turn[] on how the speech is presented, not on what is depicted.” Id. The Court did not state, however, that the context in which an image is displayed may never be considered in determining whether an image is child pornography. In fact, the Court noted that how an image is pandered may be relevant in determining whether particular materials are obscene, citing Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966). 535 U.S. at 257–58. Thus, the Court left open the question whether the context in which an image is displayed may be considered as a factor in a child pornography determination. However, Free Speech Coalition does tell us that a child pornography determination may not “turn on” the context in which an image is presented. We read “turn on” to mean to “depend principally on.” In Free Speech Coalition, the Court rejected the government’s argument that “the determination SHOEMAKER V. TAYLOR 21 [of child pornography] would still depend principally upon the content of the prohibited work.” Id. at 257 (emphasis added). The Court instead found that “[t]he determination turns on how the speech is presented, not what is depicted” and therefore held that the challenged law was unconstitutional. Id. (emphasis added). The juxtaposition in the opinion between “depend principally upon” and “turns on” supports our view that the two phrases are treated as synonymous. Thus, we read Free Speech Coalition as clearly establishing that the context of how an image is presented may not be the principal consideration in determining whether that image is child pornography. We now turn to whether the state court unreasonably applied Free Speech Coalition in rejecting Shoemaker’s habeas claim regarding the jury instructions. The instructions allowed the jury to consider “[w]hether the ‘setting’ was sexually suggestive.” The jury may have understood “setting” to mean the backdrop depicted within the four corners of the photograph—for example, the sailboat in Exhibit 1 or the bathtub in Exhibit 7. This would make “setting” a factor relating to the content of the images rather than to the context in which they were displayed. Therefore, we cannot say that the state court was unreasonable in finding that the jury instructions, which tracked the widely-used Dost factors, were proper. The state court’s decision upholding the prosecutor’s closing argument presents a different question. The prosecutor repeatedly emphasized the context of the adult Beachbaby website on which six of the pictures were displayed. At the outset of his closing, the prosecutor argued that when someone like Shoemaker gets his hands on 22 SHOEMAKER V. TAYLOR hypothetical innocent photos of someone’s children at a nudist camp and: put[s] them on [his] website among other pictures, other pornographic pictures . . . it is that context, ladies and gentlemen, of my child, anyone’s child on the bear skin rug in the bathtub with the soapy hair, with the little brother, the little sister laughing in the bathtub naked. It is when you see that image in the context of how it appears when a person looks at that photo placed amongst others by [co- defendant] and Mr. Shoemaker that make that image the exhibition of the genitals for the purpose of stimulation of the viewer. (emphasis added). He said of each image in various formulations: Let’s assume for a minute that this image was taken at a nudist camp. Perfectly natural behavior for a nudist camp. Naturalist. When you take an image of a child out of their setting and put that into the setting of Beachbaby.com, of Blowout.com, this image is designed to stimulate the sexual desires of the viewer. And referring to another image, he said: Maybe there is nothing particular[ly] odd about the photograph. It is in a nudist camp and everybody is walking around naked. The child is just posing for the camera as many SHOEMAKER V. TAYLOR 23 kids may do. Again, it is the placing in the context of the website. And interestingly enough this one is, again, on the teens section of Beachbaby.com. In effect, the prosecutor argued that even if the nude images of children at issue here were not child pornography before they were on the website, they became child pornography in the context in which they were placed. In making this argument, the prosecutor did exactly what Free Speech Coalition forbid—he argued to the jury that its determination could “turn on” the fact that otherwise innocuous images were displayed in a pornographic context. Under clearly established Supreme Court precedent, the prosecutor erred. Nonetheless, we hold that the prosecutor’s error did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993); Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121–22 (2007) (holding that “in § 2254 proceedings a court must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a statecourt criminal trial under the ‘substantial and injurious effect’ standard set forth in Brecht, whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error”). Here, as we have already independently determined, the images in question were child pornography and several of the Dost factors were present in each. Each image presented a nude girl, a factor that the prosecutor also emphasized throughout his closing argument. Although we hold that portions of the prosecutor’s argument were erroneous, the prosecutor also repeated the instructions regarding the five factors that the jury should consider in determining whether the images were child pornography. In so doing, the whole of the prosecutor’s argument made the jury aware that its decision should rest on multiple factors. 24 SHOEMAKER V. TAYLOR Thus, although the state court unreasonably applied Free Speech Coalition when it rejected Shoemaker’s prosecutorial error argument, we reject Shoemaker’s claim because the error was harmless.