Opinion ID: 2557538
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Vested Rights Analysis Is Inapposite.

Text: The Maryland Constitution prohibits the Legislature from impairing retrospectively vested rights. One necessarily asks, in performing such an analysis, what constitutes a protected vested right? From its infancy, our vested rights jurisprudence focused on a plaintiff's ability (or inability) to bring a cause of action. Thus, 150 years ago in Thistle v. The Frostburg Coal Co., 10 Md. 129, 144 (1856), we confronted a purported retrospective legislative provision which enabled adverse possessors of real property to challenge paper title holders on the basis of mere use, rather than the then-law, actual enclosure. Because the statutory provision changed the elements of adverse possession to make it easier for adverse possessors to challenge successfully paper title holders, we deemed it invalid. Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md., Inc., 370 Md. 604, 623, 805 A.2d 1061, 1072 (2002) (citing Thistle ); see also Thistle, 10 Md. at 145 (Hence, ... it was not in the power of the legislature to change this rule of law, so far as to give it retroactive operation, because it would virtually be taking the land of one man, held [previously] by a good legal title, and giving it to another, who the law has said had none.). We made clear in Thistle, however, that it was within the power of the legislature, to alter and remodel the rules of evidence and remedies, to which parties claiming title and possession of land, might resort. ... Thistle, 10 Md. at 145 (emphasis added). Reflecting in Dua on our Thistle holding, we concluded that there is a vested right in an accrued cause of action. Dua, 370 Md. at 632, 805 A.2d at 1077. As in Thistle, we recognized that there is a difference between the Legislature abrogating the right to bring a cause of action, and the Legislature altering the remedy sought by, but not yet conferred upon, a plaintiff. In particular, we relied on Baugher, et al. v. Nelson, 9 Gill 299, 308 (1850), which upheld a retrospective provision because [i]t [was] no more than the exercise of the legislative authority over the subject of remedies[, a] power which the legislative may unquestionably exercise at pleasure in relation to past as well as future contracts. We looked also to WSSC v. Riverdale Fire Co., 308 Md. 556, 564, 520 A.2d 1319, 1323 (1987), in which we observed that a statute governing [only] procedure or remedy will be applied to [all] cases, whether they be accrued, pending or future. ... WSSC, 308 Md. at 563 n. 2, 564, 520 A.2d at 1323. In addition, we invoked Allen v. Dovell, 193 Md. 359, 363, 66 A.2d 795, 797 (1949), which acknowledged that [i]t is thoroughly understood that a statute of limitations, which does not destroy a substantial right, but simply affects remedy, does not destroy or impair vested rights. We expressed some reservations in Dua regarding the distinction between remedy and substantive right, but, in the process, strengthened further the ultimate holding that the Legislature may change, under many circumstances, the former with retrospective effect, but not the latter. In particular, we quoted from State, use of Isaac v. Jones, 21 Md. 432, 437 (1864) for the contention that the ` abrogation or suspension of a remedy, necessary to enforce the obligation of an existing contract,... is void.' Dua, 370 Md. at 635, 805 A.2d at 1079 (emphasis added). We relied on Allen, 193 Md. at 363-64, 66 A.2d at 797 to underscore that by cut[ting] off all remedy ... in such a way as to preclude any opportunity to bring suit, the Legislature deprive [s improperly] a party of his [accrued] cause of action. ... (Emphasis added.) In these and other cases, we recognized that the Legislature may legislate retrospectively, as long as the effect does not cut off all remedy. Contrary to this principle, the Majority concludes that the Maryland Constitution protects not only a plaintiff's accrued right to bring a cause of action, but also his or her associated prospect of recovering an amount of as-of-yet unidentified, uncertain, and unawarded damages. See Majority op. at 486-87, 19 A.3d at 881.