Opinion ID: 799367
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantive Money-Laundering Offenses

Text: Hosseini challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on three of the substantive money-laundering counts. Count 4 centered on the sale of a car to an undercover officer posing as a drug dealer. The government alleged that Hosseini entered into this transaction with the same intent as the transactions with actual drug dealers: to conceal the proceeds of drug trafficking. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B). Hosseini argues that the government failed to prove his intent to conceal. He claims that although he told the officer that he would not file a Form 8300 in connection with this transaction, he in fact did so. Furthermore, while the officer mentioned dope money during the transaction, he never specifically said that the purchase money was drug money. Compared to the other money-laundering counts, the evidence on Count 4 was not particularly plentiful. Still, there was enough for the jury to infer that Hosseini engaged in this particular transaction with the same intent as all the others: to conceal the fact that the purchase money was drug money. First, the undercover officer told Hosseini that his name was John Russell but told Hosseini to use the name Russell John to avoid paperwork in his real name; Hosseini complied. Second, Hosseini omitted a Social Security number and driver's license number from the sales contract and did not indicate that payment$16,000was in cash. Finally, that the officer used the phrase dope money during the encounter is telling; no one would expect a drug dealer to specifically say that the purchase money was drug money. Finally, while it's true that Hosseini filed a Form 8300 for this transaction, he did not include a Social Security number as required. Based on this evidence, and particularly in light of the extended course of money laundering by the defendants, a rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Hosseini acted with intent to conceal laundered funds. See United States v. Kaufmann, 985 F.2d 884, 894 (7th Cir.1993). Counts 10 and 11 were based on two auto sales Obaei entered into on the same day; Hosseini was involved in these transactions only after the fact. As to these two sales, the government presented the following evidence: (1) Obaei collected the cash proceeds of the sales and placed them in a bag; (2) later that day Obaei gave the bag to Hosseini (this was captured on videotape); and (3) when one of Obaei's employees asked to borrow money later that day, Obaei responded that he gave all his cash to Hosseini. If this evidence stood alone, it might be hard to conclude that it was enough to infer Hosseini's knowledge and intent. But it does not stand alone. When the evidence on Counts 10 and 11 is considered against the backdrop of the entire pattern of conductmillions of dollars in cash auto sales to drug dealers over the course of a decadethe jury could reasonably infer that Hosseini knowingly and intentionally participated in these sales with intent to conceal laundered funds. We note in the alternative that the jury was instructed on the Pinkerton theory of liability, and this provides an alternative basis to uphold Hosseini's convictions on these counts. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). Under Pinkerton a defendant may be found guilty of a substantive offense committed by a co-conspirator if the offense was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy at the time the defendant was a member of the conspiracy. United States v. Pisman, 443 F.3d 912, 913 (7th Cir.2006). This is true even if the defendant neither participated in nor had knowledge of the substantive offense.  Id. (emphasis added). Here, the jury found both defendants guilty of conspiracy to launder the proceeds of drug trafficking. When Obaei entered into the two transactions charged in Counts 10 and 11, he committed a foreseeable act in furtherance of that conspiracy. Under Pinkerton Hosseini is liable for the crime even if he was unaware of the specifics of the transactions, however unlikely that may be.