Opinion ID: 1436706
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Although the LRAA does not provide for judicial review of a prison disciplinary decision under the contested case jurisdiction of D.C.Code §§ 1-1509, -1510, we are satisfied that Walton's regulatory challenge could be raised properly in Superior Court as a petition for habeas corpus. Following Abdullah, supra, 668 A.2d 801 (D.C.1995), we recognize that habeas corpus reaches not only the fact but also the form of detention. 668 A.2d at 809. One of the requirements of habeas corpus jurisdiction is the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Murray v. Stempson, 633 A.2d 48, 49 (D.C.1993). Here Walton's appeal to the Department did not raise any issue regarding the issuance of the Adjustment Board's written statement under 28 DCMR § 512.7. Nor did his appeal letter to Administrator Stempson raise any issue concerning the failure of the accusing official to fill out and sign the disciplinary report under 28 DCMR § 506.3. [15] The government maintained that Walton did not challenge the adequacy of the disciplinary board's written decision in his internal appeal to the administrator and therefore should be precluded from raising the issue here. [16] However, he did raise an issue as to whether the appeal Administrator's decision was based upon a reasonable assessment of the evidence presented, as required by 28 DCMR § 513.2. After Walton filed his complaint in the trial court, the trial judge remanded the matter to the Department because it [appeared] to the court that the Adjustment Board has not issued a written statement of findings setting forth the reasons for its disciplinary action as required by § 112.6 [28 DCMR § 512.7] of the Lorton Regulations Approval Act of 1982. The remand was not error because in order to rule on the reasonableness of the administrative appellate decision, the trial court believed that it needed a clear written statement to assess the sufficiency of the evidence. After the Department filed its response to the trial court's remand, Walton argued that: (1) the trial court erred in remanding the matter; (2) the Board's second statement was inadequate factually and legally, and (3) the Board's second statement was only signed by two of the three Board members in violation of 28 DCMR § 512.9 which requires the three Board members to sign, and was not issued within three working days of Walton's hearing, as required by 28 DCMR § 512.10.