Opinion ID: 2113252
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The District argues that we should vacate the trial court's grant of summary judgment because the Superior Court improperly exercised jurisdiction to hear Verizon's complaint. According to the District, For the Superior Court to determine a matter that is already governed by interlocutory orders in a pending PSC proceeding poses a similar risk of interference with established regulatory processes as the sort of judicial involvement that gave rise to the primary jurisdiction doctrine. [3] The doctrine of primary jurisdiction comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which . . . have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body. United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64, 77 S.Ct. 161, 1 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956); see D.C. Water & Sewer Auth. v. Delon Hampton & Assocs., 851 A.2d 410, 417 (D.C.2004) (The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is rooted in teaching that `in cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies . . . should not be passed over.' (quoting Am. Ass'n of Cruise Passengers v. Cunard Line, 308 U.S.App. D.C. 177, 179, 31 F.3d 1184, 1186 (1994))). The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not negate that the court has jurisdiction; rather, it informs the court's determination whether to exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a specific matter. See Matthews v. District of Columbia, 875 A.2d 650, 655 (D.C.2005) (noting that under doctrine of primary jurisdiction, issues in claims that are originally cognizable in the courts may, nonetheless, be referred to an administrative body for resolution when the issue falls within the `special competence' of an agency) (citing Lawlor v. District of Columbia, 758 A.2d 964, 973 n. 11 (D.C.2000)). Therefore, unlike in cases where the trial court's jurisdiction is challenged, and we review de novo the legal issue of jurisdiction vel non, the Superior Court's determination whether to defer its authority in favor of an agency's determination applying principles of primary jurisdiction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Nat'l Tel. Coop. Ass'n v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 345 U.S.App.D.C. 257, 260, 244 F.3d 153, 156 (2001) (We review the district court's decision to the contrary only for abuse of discretion.); Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 789 (4th Cir.1996); Brumark Corp. v. Samson Res. Corp., 57 F.3d 941, 947-48 (10th Cir.1995); In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1162 (3rd Cir.1993). [4] The complaint before the Superior Court was for breach of contract, requiring interpretation of the Letter Agreement and enforcement of its terms. This is the type of case, as the trial court noted, regularly decided in the Superior Court, pursuant to well-established rules of contract interpretation. The parties did not dispute that they were bound by the Letter Agreement, and the only question before the court was at what point the District is required to make a true-up payment to Verizon for E911 service during the Interim Period. As the PSC recognized, it has no special competence in interpreting the terms of a private agreement between the parties, which did not involve technical issues within the Commission's expertise. See Fulton Cogeneration Assocs. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 84 F.3d 91, 97 (2d Cir.1996) ([T]he primary jurisdiction doctrine [is] inappropriate because the issues of contract interpretation here are neither beyond the conventional expertise of judges nor within the special competence of the PSC.). The District's contention that summary judgment was improper because the contract is ambiguous is premised on resolution of a legal issue. See Tillery v. D.C. Contract Appeals Bd., 912 A.2d 1169, 1176 (D.C.2006) (The proper interpretation of a contract, including whether a contract is ambiguous, is a legal question. . . .). Although interpreting the Letter Agreement required reading PSC orders referred to in the contract (in order to determine, for example, what precisely was meant by Formal Case No. 1005), and that agreement had to be read against the background of the proceeding pending before the Commission, see Patterson v. District of Columbia, 795 A.2d 681, 683 (D.C.2002) (noting that the objective reasonable person assessing the contract's language `is presumed to know all the circumstances before and contemporaneous with the making of the agreement' (quoting Adler v. Abramson, 728 A.2d 86, 87 (D.C.1999)), the obligations of the parties under the terms of the Letter Agreement were not themselves dependent on resolution of technical issues within the Commission's special competence. Thus, while the Commission determined as a matter of administrative law that the competitive tariff applied to the period from May 30, 2002 to April 1, 2004 (a determination that was affirmed by this court, also as a matter of administrative law), the remaining question of what constitutes the PSC's final decision that triggers the obligation for a true-up payment under the Letter Agreement, is purely a matter of contract law. Moreover, the Commission did not intend, as it made clear, that references to the Letter Agreement in its Orders (which it characterized as dicta) would define the obligations between the parties vis à vis the Letter Agreement, which was a contract solely between Verizon and the District. Nor would the court's consideration and disposition of Verizon's complaint for breach of contract interfere with or inhibit the Commission's ability to decide the pending rate proceeding that is within its special expertise to establish the rate for E911 service to apply post-April 1, 2004. We conclude that the interpretation of the contract was properly before the court, as it lay outside the expertise of the PSC. Therefore, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in exercising jurisdiction. [5]