Opinion ID: 1771186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Erred by Allowing Deputy Kevin Stevens to Give Testimony Regarding Privileged Information.

Text: ¶ 4. The admission of Stevens's testimony was error; however, the evidence was more than sufficient for conviction without that testimony. Therefore, in view of our case law in this area, the admission of the testimony was harmless error. ¶ 5. At trial, the State called Deputy Kevin Stevens to testify that he heard Jasper say that the air conditioner that he had stolen was not worth more than $250.00. Jasper objected to this testimony because the comment was overheard during plea negotiations, at the time when Deputy Stevens's presence was not known or expected. Jasper cites Evans v. State, 725 So.2d 613 (Miss.1997), and M.R.E. 410 for the proposition that that this statement was a communication made by a client to an attorney and District Attorney during plea negotiations and, as such, was not admissible. ¶ 6. The only evidence in the record with regard to this testimony is the trial transcript and the defense counsel's objection to Stevens as a witness. Stevens testified that he believed the parties were discussing a plea petition when he entered the courtroom and overheard the remark. Jasper also testified that he was discussing and considering a plea agreement at the time this comment was overheard. [1] The District Attorney claimed not to remember engaging in a plea negotiation with Jasper on that day. ¶ 7. As Jasper correctly argues, a statement made during plea negotiations is privileged and its admission is prohibited by M.R.E. 410(4), which provides, in pertinent part: Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussion: (4) Any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which does not result in a plea of guilty or which results in a plea of guilty later withdrawn. This Court has held that statements made by the defendant during plea negotiations are inadmissible where the following two-tiered analysis is satisfied: the accused exhibits an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and; where the accused's expectation was reasonable given the totality of the circumstances. Barnett v. State, 725 So.2d 797, 800 (Miss.1998); Evans v. State, 725 So.2d at 640. ¶ 8. The trial court erred in allowing Stevens to testify about what he overheard in a discussion between the defendant, defense counsel and the District Attorney. The testimony of both Jasper and Stevens indicates that both men believed that the parties were engaged in plea negotiations at the time that the remark was overheard. The District Attorney could not remember. In finding the testimony admissible, the trial court and the Court of Appeals appear to rely on the fact that Jasper was not making the remark directly to Stevens or in response to a question by Stevens. However, this is not the correct analysis of admissibility under our case law. ¶ 9. The admission of Stevens's testimony as to what he overheard when Jasper, his attorney and the prosecutor were engaged in plea negotiations was error and, arguably, violates Jasper's constitutional right to a fair trial. In that regard, reversal of the conviction is required unless the Court determines that the error was harmless. Hoover v. State, 552 So.2d 834, 840 (Miss.1989). In Hoover, the exclusion of a prior inconsistent statement sought to be admitted by the defendant was found to be an error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 841. The U.S. Supreme Court established the determination of harmless error for violations of constitutional rights, holding that the question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (citing Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963)). The error in Chapman involved the prosecution's comments on the defendant's failure to testify, and the Court declined to find the error harmless, holding that the State failed to demonstrate that the prosecution's comments did not contribute to the conviction. The Court noted that such violations of fundamental rights as denial of right to counsel and introduction of a coerced confession are not harmless errors. 386 U.S. at 26, 87 S.Ct. 824. ¶ 10. Under the facts of this case it is certainly reasonable and more probable that Jasper would have been convicted despite Stevens's testimony where the air conditioner was found in the trunk of his car only minutes after it was taken from Hutto's. We hold that the trial court should have excluded Stevens's testimony; however, we find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was sufficient for conviction without that testimony. Therefore, the admission of the testimony was harmless error.