Opinion ID: 3186961
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Give Adequate Jury Instructions

Text: Dvorin contends the district court erred in refusing to charge the jury with an apparent-authority instruction and a special unanimity instruction. We review a district court’s refusal to give a defensive jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Salazar, 751 F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 321–22 (5th Cir. 1998)). A refusal to give a requested instruction constitutes reversible error only if the proposed instruction (1) is 5 Case: 15-10142 Document: 00513429336 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/18/2016 No. 15-10142 Cons. w/ No. 15-10183 substantially correct, (2) is not substantively covered in the jury charge, and (3) pertains to an important issue in the trial, such that failure to give it seriously impairs the presentation of an effective defense. Id. (quoting Webster, 162 F.3d at 322).
During Dvorin’s trial, Dvorin attempted to create reasonable doubt regarding his “intent to defraud” by showing that he relied on Derrington’s apparent authority to approve his checks. Dvorin thus requested that the district court give the following instruction: “In order to prove that the defendant had the intent of tricking the bank, the government must show that the defendant did not rely on the apparent authority of one or more bank officials.” Rather than insert Dvorin’s proposed apparent-authority instruction, the court largely accepted Dvorin’s proposed good faith instruction: The word “willfully” . . . means that the act was committed voluntarily and purposely, with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law. A defendant does not act willfully if he believes in good faith that his conduct does not violate the law. This is so even if that belief is objectively unreasonable. The district court also instructed the jury that “[o]fficers, directors, or other employees of a financial institution cannot validate a fraud on the institution. Therefore, the knowledge of bank fraud by officers, directors, or other employees of the institution is not a defense to the charge of bank fraud.” Dvorin insists that the charge did not adequately address his apparentauthority defense because the good faith instruction was abstract rather than specific to the facts presented by Dvorin’s defense, and further argues that the district court’s instruction regarding an official’s inability to validate a fraud 6 Case: 15-10142 Document: 00513429336 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/18/2016 No. 15-10142 Cons. w/ No. 15-10183 undermined his apparent-authority defense. The government counters that the district court did not err because the court’s charge substantially and accurately covered the content of the proposed instruction. We conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on apparent authority because the district court’s good faith instruction makes clear that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Dvorin acted with the specific intent to violate the law. See United States v. Aubin, 87 F.3d 141, 147–48 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court’s good faith instruction adequately preserved the defendant’s ability to argue that he relied on the apparent authority of the bank official, such that an agency instruction was not necessary in spite of the court’s instruction regarding an official’s inability to validate a fraud on the bank). This instruction preserved Dvorin’s ability to argue that he had a good faith belief that the bank authorized Derrington to enter into the check-kiting arrangement with Dvorin, and in fact, Dvorin’s attorney made this argument during trial. The jury simply rejected Dvorin’s theory. Because the court’s charge substantially covered the content of Dvorin’s proposed instruction, we hold that the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury specifically on Dvorin’s apparent-authority defense.
Dvorin also asserts that the district court’s refusal to give the jury a special unanimity instruction was error. The district court instructed the jury using a general unanimity instruction, which read: “To reach a verdict, whether it is guilty or not guilty, all of you must agree. Your verdict must be unanimous on count one of the indictment.” The district court also gave the Fifth Circuit pattern jury charge on multiple conspiracies. 2 Dvorin requested 2 This instruction reads: 7 Case: 15-10142 Document: 00513429336 Page: 8 Date Filed: 03/18/2016 No. 15-10142 Cons. w/ No. 15-10183 that the district court add an instruction to the effect that the jury must unanimously find guilt as to the same conspiracy if “you find that the government’s proof tends to show that the defendant was actually engaged in more than one conspiracy.” The Sixth Amendment requires that a jury unanimously agree upon all elements of the offense. United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1977); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a). “In the routine case, a general unanimity instruction will ensure that the jury is unanimous on the factual basis for a conviction, even where an indictment alleges numerous factual bases for criminal liability.” United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 925–26 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1987)). However, such an instruction is insufficient if “there exists a ‘genuine risk that the jury is confused or that a conviction may occur as the result of different jurors concluding that a defendant committed different acts.’” Id. at 926 (quoting United States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104, 1114 (6th Cir. 1988)). Generally, a special unanimity instruction is not necessary where an indictment charges a conspiracy because “the crux of a conspiracy charge . . . [is] [t]he defendant’s voluntary agreement with another or others to commit an offense.” United States v. Dillman, 15 F.3d 384, 391 (5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis You must determine whether the conspiracy charged in the indictment existed and, if it did, whether the defendant was a member of it. If you find that the conspiracy charged did not exist, then you must return a not guilty verdict, even though you find that some other conspiracy existed. If you find that a defendant was not a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment, then you must find that defendant not guilty, even though that defendant may have been a member of some other conspiracy. 8 Case: 15-10142 Document: 00513429336 Page: 9 Date Filed: 03/18/2016 No. 15-10142 Cons. w/ No. 15-10183 omitted); see also United States v. Narviz-Guerra, 148 F.3d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 1998). Although Dvorin argues that the jury may have found multiple conspiracies, we conclude that this case falls within the general rule. The charged conspiracy involved the same course of conduct between the same two co-conspirators at the same bank over a period of five years. The court’s instruction regarding multiple conspiracies makes clear that the jury had to unanimously find Dvorin guilty of the single conspiracy charged in count one of the indictment; where a defendant is charged with one conspiracy, a special unanimity instruction is not required. See United States v. Royal, 972 F.2d 643, 648–49 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the district court did not err in refusing to give a special unanimity instruction where the court’s multipleconspiracy instruction reflected that the defendant was charged with only one conspiracy in the indictment); see also United States v. Musacchio, 590 F. App’x 359, 363 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam), aff’d. on other grounds, 136 S. Ct. 709 (2016); United States v. Mason, 736 F.3d 682, 684 (5th Cir. 2013) (denying petition for rehearing); United States v. Creech, 408 F.3d 264, 268–69 (5th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to charge the jury with Dvorin’s proposed special unanimity instruction.