Opinion ID: 1112493
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: juror inquiry in mississippi

Text: This Court has studied the procedures suggested and implemented via the Federal Court's interpretations of Fed.Rule Evid. 606(b) and has reached the conclusion that we must now adopt our own prophylactic method to uniformly execute juror inquiry, under M.R.E. 606(b), within this state. There is no general prohibition in this state against contact with jurors after they have been discharged, yet this Court is aware that some districts in this state have local rules or practices which prevent or inhibit this contact. Brake, 605 So.2d at 36. Any local rules or procedures which inhibit or prevent juror contact are now expressly revoked. This Court will not stand for any local rule which affects juror contact; any inconsistency with the procedures implemented here shall no longer be the law of this state. This Court notes that it is well settled law among the Federal Courts which have interpreted Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) that there is a general reluctance after verdict to haul in and probe jurors for potential instances of bias, misconduct or extraneous influences. See Infelise, 813 F. Supp. at 605; Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234. We also similarly conclude that inquiry will not be permitted as a mere fishing expedition. See Gravely, 840 F.2d at 1159. However, contrary to the Fifth Circuit's finding in Bolton, we think it more prudent to set out the procedure for trial judges to employ in alleged juror misconduct cases. See Bolton, 871 F.2d at 1275. As a beginning to this inquiry, the trial court and opposing counsel must be made aware of any potential juror misconduct when this evidence is manifested. Thus, if a juror approaches an attorney for one of the parties or the court itself, or if either subsequently learns such through alternative means, all parties involved should be made aware of the allegation as expeditiously as possible. However, to prevent either party from fishing for a way to change the undesirable conclusions rendered in their jury's verdict, a balance must be struck between the right to inquire into the jury verdict and the right of each juror to be free from harassment and secure in their verdict. Once an allegation of juror misconduct arises, then the next step is to consider whether an investigation is warranted. In order for the duty to investigate to arise, the party contending there is misconduct must make an adequate showing to overcome the presumption in this state of jury impartiality. Juror polling shall only be permitted by an attorney, outside the supervision of the court, upon written request. At the very minimum, it must be shown that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that good cause exists to believe that there was in fact an improper outside influence or extraneous prejudicial information. The Eleventh and Fourth Circuits have stated the showing must express clear, strong, substantial, and incontrovertible evidence ... that a specific, non-speculative impropriety has occurred. See generally Tejada, 941 F.2d at 1561; Cuthel, 903 F.2d at 1382; Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543; Infelise, 813 F. Supp. at 605. This standard is too stringent for application by this Court. Although a minimal standard of a good cause showing of specific instances of misconduct is acceptable, the preferable showing should clearly substantiate that a specific, non-speculative impropriety has occurred. The sufficiency of such evidence shall be determined by the trial court if a post-trial hearing is indeed warranted under these standards. The trial court has the inherent power and duty to supervise these post-trial investigations to ensure that jurors are protected from harassment and to guard against inquiry into subjects beyond which a juror is competent to testify under M.R.E. 606(b). The trial court's supervision is warranted to protect the interest of the parties and jurors. Inquiry is allowable outside the presence of the trial court, upon written request and trial court permission, yet when the trial court determines that either the likelihood of juror harassment is evident or inquiry into a range of information beyond which testimony is permitted under Rule 606(b) is subject to occur, the inquiry should be interwoven with the trial judge's supervision. In the absence of a threshold showing of external influences, an inquiry into the juror verdict is not required. When the threshold showing is made under the standards previously outlined, the court should conduct a post-trial hearing. The scope of the hearing is however, limited; the proper procedure is for the judge to limit the questions asked the jurors to determine whether the communication was made and what it contained. Once it is determined that the communication was made and what the contents were, the court is then to decide whether it is reasonably possible this communication altered the verdict. See Infelise, 813 F. Supp. at 611-12; citing, Haugh, 949 F.2d at 917. We agree with the Supreme Court that in the interests of protecting the jury system, and the citizens who make it work, rule 606 should not permit any inquiry into the internal deliberations of the jurors. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 125, 107 S.Ct at 2750, 97 L.Ed.2d at 109; citing S.Rep. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., p. 13-14 (1974); See also, United States v. Dotson, 817 F.2d 1127, 1130 (5th Cir.1987). We adopt the view held by the Ninth Circuit in Hard that inquiry is subject to the following limitation; the Federal Rules of Evidence 606(b) prohibits juror testimony about the deliberative process or subjective effects of the extraneous information. See Hard, 812 F.2d at 485; Abatino v. United States, 750 F.2d 1442, 1446 (9th Cir.1985). We conclude that in the course of post-trial hearings, juror testimony is only admissible as to objective facts bearing on extraneous influences on the deliberation process.