Opinion ID: 748875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instructions on Damages

Text: 77 McCardle contends first that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the question of punitive damages. We see no error. 78 A party is not entitled to have the court give the jury an instruction for which there is no factual predicate in the trial record. See, e.g., Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 153 (2d Cir.1997); Gadaleta v. Nederlandsch-Amerekaansche Stoomvart, 291 F.2d 212, 214 (2d Cir.1961); 9A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2556, at 448 (2d ed.1995). In order to justify an award of punitive damages, the defendant's unlawful conduct must surpass a certain threshold. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). A jury may be permitted to award punitive damages in a § 1983 action when it finds that the defendant's violation of federal law was intentional, see, e.g., id. at 51, 103 S.Ct. at 1637-38, or when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others, id. at 56, 103 S.Ct. at 1640; see also Meriwether v. Coughlin, 879 F.2d 1037, 1048 (2d Cir.1989) (affirming vacatur of jury award of punitive damages in absence of evidence of evil motive or intent). Consequently, a plaintiff is not entitled to an instruction allowing the jury to award punitive damages unless there is evidence that the defendant's conduct could be so characterized. 79 In the present case, while the jury was entitled to conclude that Haddad's search of McCardle's automobile exceeded his legal authority, the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding that Haddad had acted with malice or any other evil motive. Indeed, McCardle testified that as Haddad was about to give her a citation for several infractions, she asked him to give her a break, and that although he said that to do so might jeopardize his job, he did in fact give her a break by crossing off one of the charges he had written onto the ticket. 80 Nor are we persuaded by McCardle's argument that because Haddad's search of the car was in violation of clearly established Fourth Amendment principles, his conduct ipso facto revealed reckless or callous indifference to her rights. To accept that proposition would essentially expose a defendant to an award of punitive damages for any conduct not protected by qualified immunity, and would thereby make the availability of punitive damages equal to the availability of compensatory damages. That proposition is contrary to the principles discussed above. 81 We conclude that the district court properly ruled that the evidence as to Haddad's conduct could not justify an award of punitive damages.