Opinion ID: 793031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: 21 Appellants contend that their son was denied a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment due to an invalid assessment of his individual needs and pursuant to an overarching policy against the integration of disabled students. The ALJ, after holding a six-day hearing, rejected these contentions in a lengthy and extraordinarily thorough opinion, and the District Court affirmed.
22 The central questions in the proceedings before the ALJ and the District Court were whether the Board carried its burden of demonstrating that in the spring of 2002 M.S. could not be satisfactorily educated in the regular classroom, with supplementary aids and support services, Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1207, and whether he was, to the maximum extent appropriate, educated with nondisabled students. Both the ALJ and District Court, having placed the burden on the Board, found that it had done so. 23 Appellants contend that the District Court improperly affirmed the ALJ's conflation of the FAPE analysis with the LRE analysis. They point to the following language in the ALJ's decision: the relevant inquiry is not whether the program established for M.S. by his parents was `better' for M.S.; but whether the placement of M.S. in the Hubbard program for the spring semester of 2002 was appropriate. (A64.) Appellants are correct that whether an education is appropriate for purposes of the FAPE analysis and whether a student has been integrated to the maximum extent appropriate are distinct questions. Their argument, however, that the analyses were conflated is unavailing. The ALJ accurately outlined the appropriate standards and then, in applying them, demonstrated an understanding of what the statute required. In stating the framework for decision, the ALJ correctly distinguished between the FAPE and LRE analyses, and properly distilled the question before her as whether the Hubbard School placement was the least restrictive environment . . . in which M.S. could receive a FAPE. (A54; see A54-57 (detailing the analytical steps required by relevant Third Circuit precedent).) 24 The ALJ's later indication that the relevant inquiry is not whether the program established for M.S. by his parents was 'better' for M.S., but whether the placement of M.S. in the Hubbard program for the spring semester of 2002 was appropriate, does on its face appear to conflate the sufficiency of the educational benefits for purposes of FAPE analysis with whether M.S. could be more fully mainstreamed while still receiving a FAPE. Nevertheless, in light of the ALJ's earlier detailed and accurate recitation of the relevant standards, this language is most fairly read to address only the question of whether the Hubbard Program was appropriate. The ALJ, as evidenced by her careful review of the testimony and ultimate conclusion that M.S. could not receive a satisfactory educational opportunity in a less restrictive environment, (A65), demonstrated an understanding of the distinct LRE issue in play. 25 The District Court considered and explicitly rejected the argument appellants raise here, namely that the ALJ did not separately address the LRE question. The Court was convinced, as are we, that the ALJ properly understood the legal framework and addressed in all material respects the facts in that light. The ALJ, the Court found, credit[ed] the testimony of educational experts who had observed M.S. and held that the CST seriously considered and reconsidered less restrictive placements for M.S. prior to offering placement at the Hubbard Program. (A97.) In the end, however, the CST determined that such a placement would not provide him with satisfactory educational opportunities. ( Id. ) We believe that both the ALJ and the District Judge apprehended, and in all material ways applied, the appropriate legal standards. What remains for us to decide is whether the factual findings of the ALJ, as affirmed by the District Court (i.e., finding appellees' witnesses more credible and compelling with regard to whether M.S. could receive a FAPE in a less restrictive environment) were clearly erroneous. 26 The ALJ and the District Court relied upon evidence supporting a finding that M.S. could not receive a satisfactory education in the regular classroom and that the IEP adopted by appellees provided for an education in the LRE. That evidence, as outlined by the ALJ, included the testimony of officials and educators who recounted their opinion that the Hubbard School was the most inclusive environment in which M.S. could receive an appropriate education. 27 In appellants' estimation, however, the record is devoid of any evidence to support a finding that [M.S.] could not have been educated satisfactorily in a regular classroom with supplementary aids and services. (Appellees' Br. at 23.) They ask us to find that the Board predetermined that M.S. would be in a segregated environment. In support of that contention, they quote Ms. Moore's deposition testimony that she did not interview the Pinnacle staff to determine whether M.S. could continue there with supplemental aids and services. That testimony, however, is simply not enough to call into question, much less to counter, the evidence and testimony found credible by the ALJ, who opined that M.S. could not receive an appropriate education in an environment less restrictive than the Hubbard School program. The fact that appellants disagree does not make that evidence less substantial or render it insufficient to support a grant of summary judgment. 28 Appellants also argue that the Board was being disingenuous when it agreed to find an integrated placement for M.S. in February 2002. We summarily reject that argument. The Board offered its opinion regarding the proper placement of M.S. and appellants turned it down. In light of that rejection, the Board made efforts to accommodate appellants' wishes; indeed, the efforts made on M.S.'s behalf in February 2002 were quite appropriately treated by the ALJ and the District Court as evidence of the Board's good faith attempts to find a placement acceptable to appellants who, as parents, have an integral role in the statutory scheme, while maintaining its view that that placement was not appropriate for M.S. Moreover, the ALJ and the District Court found that the Board considered a full range of options for M.S., giving his situation the individualized assessment required by the IDEA. 29 In sum, the Board did not believe that M.S. could receive an appropriate education in an integrated classroom with supplemental services. The ALJ, in the end, was persuaded by the testimony on behalf of the Board and rejected that offered by appellants. The District Court believed that the ALJ's findings were supported by the record. We see no basis, particularly in the wake of Schaffer, to upset those findings. Cf. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1222 (In short, the parties' experts disagreed on the respective benefits of a segregated versus an integrated placement for [the student], and the district court was in a better position than we are to evaluate their testimony. We therefore defer to that court's findings, which, at all events, are not clearly erroneous.).
30 The ALJ found in favor of appellants on the question of whether the IEP offered adequate speech therapy, a finding affirmed by the District Court. The ALJ determined that M.S. suffered from severe articulation problems, which required that he receive more individual speech therapy than . . . offered in the IEP. (A66.) She therefore ordered the Board to partially reimburse appellants for the difference between the amount of time offered and the amount of time M.S. should have been offered for speech therapy. 31 Appellants have concluded from this that the ALJ [a]llow[ed] the Board a credit for speech therapy from which the ALJ explicitly determined M.S. would not benefit, in the absence of any claim or evidence that the speech therapy provided by M.S.' parents was inappropriate. . . . (Appellants' Br. at 51.) The ALJ clearly stated, however, that M.S. needed more speech therapy than provided by the Board, not that the Board's therapy provided no benefit. We agree with the ALJ and the District Court that partial reimbursement was appropriate. 11
32 Appellants also dispute the adequacy of the Board's IEP for the 2002-2003 school year. 12 As noted above, M.S. began at an integrated placement in September 2002 and was offered supplemental services by the Board. Appellants were satisfied with the placement but objected to the provision of services by unnamed professionals, arguing that the Board failed to establish through its IEP that the providers would be able to provide him with a FAPE. They contend that the ALJ incorrectly found that an IEP need only provide some educational benefit. (A64 (Clearly, the program was sufficient to provide some educational benefit upon M.S.)) We see no error; indeed, the same language — some educational benefit — is found in our Kingwood Township decision. That decision clearly confirmed that some educational benefit requires provision of a meaningful educational benefit, 205 F.3d at 577, the standard the ALJ clearly and accurately outlined earlier in her opinion. 33 The District Court's determination that the ALJ did require the Board to adduce evidence to prove that the related services would have conferred a meaningful educational benefit to M.S. will, therefore, not be disturbed. We reject appellants' suggestion that the ALJ and the District Court were stating an ipso facto rule that all the Board needed to do was offer certified professionals. The District Court's opinion, for example, evidences consideration of the actual services to be provided, their adequacy, and the certification and experience of the providers. Moreover, that finding arose in the context of assessing whether the Board carried a burden it no longer bears. Appellants offered no evidence to the ALJ or to the District Court, and on appeal suggest none that they could offer, calling into question the qualifications of the Board's providers of supplemental services. 13
34 Finally, we reject appellants' argument that a Board policy of segregating disabled students was behind M.S.'s placement. The District Court, finding no IDEA violation and noting the ALJ's supportable findings regarding individualized assessment, correctly granted summary judgment to appellees on appellants' claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.