Opinion ID: 2083112
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury's request for instruction.

Text: After the jury began deliberating it requested a dictionary. When this request was refused, it requested a supplemental definition of willful and wanton. Trial court sent the following communication to the jury: Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury: I have received your request for a further definition of willful or wanton. The definition of those words applicable to this case is contained in Instruction 6. In instruction 6 trial court had provided the jury with the following definition of willful and wanton: This means a conscious and intentional driving which the driver knows, or should know, creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Trial court's communication was given to the jury in defendant's absence, but with the consent of defendant's counsel. Nonetheless, at defendant's request, the court repeated the communication in open court in defendant's presence and refused defendant's request to amplify the definition. This refusal is assigned as error by defendant. At the outset we note that the court's communication was not an instruction under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(7)(g). State v. Dreessen, 305 N.W.2d 438, 440 (Iowa 1981). Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(7)(g) leaves it in the discretion of the trial court whether additional instructions will be given. In this case the definition of willful and wanton submitted to the jury had been approved by this court in State v. Kernes, 262 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Iowa 1978), an involuntary manslaughter prosecution. Trial court's definition was as clear as the several definitions defense counsel read from Black's Law Dictionary when making the in-chambers motion. We find no abuse of trial court discretion in refusing to expand on its definition of willful and wanton.