Opinion ID: 1252842
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutor's recommendation against death penalty

Text: ¶ 20 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to accept as a nonstatutory mitigating factor the prosecutor's belief that on this record the death penalty was inappropriate. Defendant claims that Hammond's testimony, that this was a run of the mill murder, was relevant evidence and should have been considered and weighed, especially in light of State v. Gallegos, 178 Ariz. 1, 870 P.2d 1097 (1994). Gallegos holds that a recommendation of leniency from authorities who are intimately involved in a case carries significant weight and may constitute a mitigating circumstance. Id. at 20, 870 P.2d at 1116. ¶ 21 Other instances in which we have allowed recommendations for leniency by authorities as mitigating factors include State v. Lee, 185 Ariz. 549, 556, 917 P.2d 692, 699 (1996) (sentencer considered prosecutor's recommendation against death penalty as mitigating factor), and State v. Rockwell, 161 Ariz. 5, 15-16, 775 P.2d 1069, 1079-80 (1989) (in weighing mitigating factors, court considered probation officer's presentence report recommending against death penalty). ¶ 22 In his special verdict in the case at bar, Judge Hancock states: The opinion of Marc Hammond is irrelevant, carries no weight and is not a fact in this case supporting a mitigating circumstance. The opinion of Jill Lynch is equally irrelevant. ¶ 23 The defendant is correct that Judge Hancock's statement is inconsistent with prevailing authority. The prosecutor's opinion is relevant and should have been considered by the trial judge. But the opinions of Hammond and Lynch were merely opinions. We have independently weighed these statements as factors of mitigation, both separately and cumulatively, and conclude they are easily outdistanced by White's and Susan Johnson's premeditated scheme to murder David Johnson and thereby reap the benefits of his life insurance. This is an expectation of pecuniary gain in the most classic sense. It is akin to murder for hire. ¶ 24 We reaffirm the principle that a recommendation for leniency given by authorities intimately connected with the case should be considered by the sentencer as a nonstatutory mitigating factor, and we are mindful of the argument by our dissenting colleagues on this point, but in our view the financial gain factor on this record is so abundantly clear and forceful that the opinion of the prosecutor is grossly insufficient to warrant a change in sentence under A.R.S. § 13-703.01 (Supp.1998). See State v. Summerlin, 138 Ariz. 426, 435-36, 675 P.2d 686, 695-96 (1983) (dismissing the argument that the weighing process results in unconstitutionally arbitrary and capricious results).