Opinion ID: 2265144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Necessity of Including Alleged Aggravating Factors in Indictment

Text: For the first time defendant contends on appeal that N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(e), that portion of the Act that requires the prosecuting attorney to give notice of the statutory aggravating factors he or she intends to prove at the penalty-phase proceeding violates the New Jersey Constitution. Defendant contends that the aggravating factors established in c(2)(e) amount to elements of the crime of capital murder and, as such, must be presented to a grand jury and included in the murder indictment before a defendant may face a death-penalty trial. We disagree. Capital-murder prosecutions begin with a grand-jury indictment for knowing and purposeful murder. Subsequently, the prosecutor, acting under guidelines in effect throughout the State, determines if the State has sufficient evidence to establish any of the statutory aggravating factors that make a murder eligible for a capital sentence. See State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 548 A. 2d 939 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S.Ct. 813, 102 L.Ed. 2d 803 (1989). If that determination is made in the affirmative, a Notice of Aggravating Factors, indicating the State's intention to seek a capital sentence, is served on the defendant pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-c(2)(e). That provision states: Prior to the commencement of the sentencing proceeding, or at such time as he has knowledge of the existence of an aggravating factor, the prosecuting attorney shall give notice to the defendant of the aggravating factors which he intends to prove in the proceeding. Defendant contends that that process is defective. He argues that the death-penalty statute actually creates two separate crimes: murder and capital murder. Under defendant's theory, the aggravating factors are the functional equivalent of elements of the crime of capital murder, thereby necessitating their presentment to a grand jury and inclusion in an indictment. The State asserts that the statutory aggravating factors affect only the sentence for knowing and purposeful murder and need not be included in the indictment. Defendant's argument rests on two separate but interrelated provisions of the Constitution. Article I, Paragraph 8 provides: No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on the presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases of impeachment, or in cases now prosecuted without indictment, or arising in the army or navy or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger. Paragraph 10 of Article I provides: In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right    to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation   . To satisfy constitutional mandates, an indictment must first `inform the defendant of the offense charged against him, so that he may adequately prepare his defense   .' State v. LeFurge, 101 N.J. 404, 415, 502 A. 2d 35 (1986) (quoting State v. LeFante, 12 N.J. 505, 509, 97 A. 2d 472 (1953)). Second, the indictment must be sufficiently specific to enable the defendant to avoid a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Finally, the indictment must be sufficiently specific `to preclude the substitution by a trial jury of an offense which the grand jury did not in fact consider or charge.' LeFurge, supra, 101 N.J. at 415, 502 A. 2d 35 (quoting State v. Boratto, 80 N.J. 506, 519, 404 A. 2d 604 (1979) (citations omitted)). The Constitution insures, as a matter of fairness, that defendants will be adequately informed of the alleged elements of the crimes with which they are charged so that they may mount an informed defense. In addition, the indictment prevents the prosecution of unfounded charges of criminal behavior. Those concerns are not raised, however, by factors that affect only the severity of the sentence that a convicted defendant faces. In State v. Washington, 47 N.J. 244, 220 A. 2d 185 (1966), we held that the Constitution does not require a grand jury presentment before a convicted defendant may receive an enhanced sentence based on his status as a habitual offender. In Washington, the defendant was convicted of breaking, entry, and larceny. Id. at 246, 220 A. 2d 185. A short time thereafter, the prosecutor, acting pursuant to statute, prepared an accusation charging the defendant with being a four-time offender. The defendant pleaded guilty to the accusation and, as a result, was sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment. Id. at 247, 220 A. 2d 185. The defendant challenged his sentence, arguing that his status as a repeat offender was an integral and inseparable part of the underlying criminal charge and should have been included in the original indictment as a matter of constitutional mandate. Ibid. We disagreed. The critical distinction in our analysis was that the statute in question did not create a new substantive crime, but rather impose[d] a greater penalty for the particular crime for which the defendant [had been] convicted. Id. at 248, 220 A. 2d 185. Thus, we concluded that the repetitive nature of defendant's convictions did not have to be included in the indictment. Ibid.; accord Buckley v. Butler, 825 F. 2d 895, 902-03 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1738, 100 L.Ed. 2d 201 (1988) (repeat-offender status relates only to the sentence for the new crime of which defendant has been convicted). The Act defines criminal homicide as having just two elements, a mental state of purposeful or knowing, and causation. Both of those elements must be presented to a grand jury and included in the murder indictment. The aggravating factors, on the other hand, merely enlarge the available sentencing options for certain defendants. That distinction was recognized in State v. Price, 195 N.J. Super. 285, 300, 478 A. 2d 1249 (Law Div. 1984), in which the trial court in a capital-punishment proceeding found that the state constitutional provisions relied on by defendant here relate[] to indictment by Grand Jury of the offense charged not the particular sentence or punishment, and held that the statutory aggravating factors were not indispensable components of a capital-cause indictment. The United States Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 90 L.Ed. 2d 123 (1986), in which it examined the double-jeopardy implications of a trial court's erroneous conclusion regarding the existence of aggravating factors during the penalty-phase proceeding. The Court stated that [a]ggravating circumstances are not separate penalties or offenses, but are `standards to guide the making of [the] choice' between the alternative verdicts of death and life imprisonment. Id. 476 U.S. at 156, 106 S.Ct. at 1755, 90 L.Ed. at 132 (quoting Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 1858, 68 L.Ed. 2d 270, 278 (1981)). In recent years, however, we have recognized the functional similarity of aggravating factors    to the traditional proof of `elements of an offense' when determining the State's burden of proof with respect to the weighing of such elements. Biegenwald II, supra, 106 N.J. at 59, 524 A. 2d 130. In Biegenwald II we stated: Technically, of course, the death penalty is imposed as part of the sentencing proceeding, and under ordinary analysis, the State need not prove its contentions at the sentencing proceeding beyond a reasonable doubt, even those that are statutorily prescribed. Here, however, the sentencing proceeding calls for a different treatment because death is `profoundly different,' Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2965, 57 L.Ed. 2d 973, 990 (1978) (plurality opinion), both in terms of its consequences and because it is a procedurally unique sentencing scheme   . [ Id. 106 N.J. at 59-60, 524 A. 2d 130 (citations omitted).] In another context, in Ramseur, supra, we noted that [i]t its clear to us, however, that functionally, the aggravating factors in the Act are indistinguishable, for this purpose, from the elements of the crime. For example, no more or less than premeditation under our prior law, proof of an aggravating factor could mark the difference between imprisonment and death. [106 N.J. at 201 n. 27, 524 A. 2d 188.] Recently, in Purnell, supra, we held that when the State sought to establish, as an aggravating factor, that a murder was committed in the course of a felony, the defendant was entitled to have the jury consider the non-capital verdict of felony-murder during the guilt-phase deliberations. 126 N.J. at 534, 601 A. 2d 175. Thus, we concluded that in such circumstances, a charge of felony murder must be presented to the grand jury and included in the murder indictment. Ibid. Martini, of course, was charged in the indictment with felony murder and the crime of kidnapping, the basis of aggravating factor c(4)(g) (killing while engaged in the commission of a kidnapping). With respect to the other asserted aggravating factor, c(4)(f) (killing to escape detection), we stated in Purnell that [o]bviously, our Legislature did not intend, nor does constitutional principle require, that every aggravating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c that renders a murder death-eligible be the subject of an indictment and a guilt-phase verdict. For example, although factors c(4)(f), killing to escape detection, and factor c(4)(h), killing a police officer, can constitute separate criminal offenses, neither principles of constitutional law nor of fundamental fairness require that the factors be tried as separate indictable offenses in the guilt phase. If proper notice were given, the sentencing-phase jury could make its unanimous finding of such a factor without a prior guilty verdict and without unfairness in the trial. [126 N.J. at 533, 601 A. 2d 175.] We reaffirm that reasoning today. The Legislature clearly did not intend for each alleged aggravating factor to be included in the murder indictment. Unlike the statutes in other states, our Act does not expressly require that the State allege the aggravating factors in the indictment. For example, the Alabama and Indiana statutes create such a requirement. Ala. Code § 13A-5-40; Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 (1985). Furthermore, in some instances, inclusion of alleged aggravating factors in the indictment would create the unwanted situation of having the factors read to the jury at the start of trial. For example, if the State were seeking to establish aggravating factor c(4)(a), that defendant had previously been convicted of murder, a reading of the indictment to the jury during the guilt phase could substantially prejudice the trial's outcome. See Washington, supra, 47 N.J. at 249, 220 A. 2d 185. The Act also adequately ensures that capital-cause defendants are afforded both of the protections contemplated by the Constitution: adequate notice and well-founded prosecutions. As previously stated, a defendant facing the death penalty is served with a Notice of Aggravating Factors during the initial stages of prosecution. The defense is put on notice of the State's intentions and is given ample opportunity to prepare a rebuttal of the aggravating factors alleged. Furthermore, defendants have the opportunity to challenge the sufficiency of any alleged aggravating factors. We permitted judicial scrutiny of prosecutorial charging decisions at the pretrial level in State v. McCrary, 97 N.J. 132, 478 A. 2d 339 (1984). In that opinion we held that defendants who had been served with a notice of an aggravating factors could, through summary proceedings before the trial court, challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support those factors. Id. at 142, 478 A. 2d 339. The review established in McCrary has resulted in the nullification of a defendant's exposure to capital sentencing in at least one case in which the prosecutor had originally sought a death sentence. See State v. Matulewicz, 115 N.J. 191, 557 A. 2d 1001 (1989). Nor does our holding run afoul of the dictates of Mullaney v. Wilber, 421 U.S. 684, 698, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 1889, 44 L.Ed. 2d 508, 519 (1975). In Mullaney, the United States Supreme Court held that fundamental fairness prevented a State from requiring that a defendant prove by a preponderance that he or she killed in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in order to be convicted of manslaughter instead of murder. Ibid. The Court accepted the State's argument that murder and manslaughter were not distinct crimes but rather different degrees of the generic offense of felonious homicide, and that provocation, if established, concerned only the sentence that a defendant would receive. Id. at 688, 95 S.Ct. at 1884, 44 L.Ed. 2d at 513. However, the Court found that [t]he fact remains that the consequences resulting from a verdict of murder, as compared with a verdict of manslaughter, differ significantly. Id. at 698, 95 S.Ct. at 1889, 44 L.Ed. 2d at 519. Thus, applying reasoning that favors substance rather than    formalism[,] the Court concluded that the burden of proof could not be shifted to the defendant. Id. at 699, 95 S.Ct. at 1890, 44 L.Ed. 2d at 519-20. In so doing, the Court warned that States may not redefine the elements that constitute different crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment. Id. at 698, 95 S.Ct. at 1889, 44 L.Ed. 2d at 519. No such concerns are raised by our statute. Section c(2) expressly provides that the State has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any aggravating factors. Thus, the burden of proof does not switch to the defendant at any time, and the prohibition articulated in Mullaney is not circumvented. We conclude that Section c(2)(e) is constitutional; that defendant was properly charged with kidnapping (the underlying felony supporting aggravating factor c(4)(g)) in the indictment; and that to charge aggravating factor c(4)(f), (murder to escape detection) in the indictment was not necessary.