Opinion ID: 3045669
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Florida Supreme Court’s Decision

Text: The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, concluding that counsel rendered reasonably effective representation in light of “the record at retrial, the facts of the case, the law in Florida at the time, and counsel’s experience and knowledge of the case.” Reaves v. State, 942 So. 2d 874, 878 (Fla. 2006). The court noted that, in order to assert a viable voluntary intoxication defense, Reaves had to “present evidence of intoxication at the time of the offense that would show his inability to form the requisite specific intent,” not merely evidence of a history of drug abuse. Id. at 879. The court then emphasized that: (1) other than his own assertions of being “high,” Reaves did not present any “direct evidence” to show his level or state of intoxication at the time of the murder; (2) 22 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 23 of 42 Reaves’ expert witnesses had no objective evidence to support their opinions that he was intoxicated at the time of the shooting; (3) Reaves’ other statements to the police, including his detailed account of the circumstances of the crime, indicated that “he knew exactly what he was doing at the time of the shooting,” which essentially “negated any voluntary intoxication defense that trial counsel could have presented on [his] behalf”; and (4) Hinton’s trial testimony, insofar as it quoted Reaves as telling the officer, “One of us got to go,” and indicated that Reaves appeared to be in full control of his faculties after the shooting, “further negated the use of a voluntary intoxication defense.” 8 Id. at 879–80. The Florida Supreme Court also underscored the point that under its Chestnut decision, which was the law in effect at the time of the 1992 retrial, Reaves could not have offered evidence of the combined effect of intoxication and a mental defect to support a voluntary intoxication defense. Id. at 880. Offering combined effect evidence was not permitted, the court explained, until State v. Bias, 653 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1995), which was decided three years after Reaves’ retrial. Id. Based on these considerations, coupled with trial counsel’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the Florida Supreme Court found that counsel made a “strategic choice of excusable homicide as a defense over involuntary intoxication” 8 As we explain later, the Florida Supreme Court properly discounted the relevance of Hinton’s 1999 affidavit on the issue of counsel’s ineffectiveness because Hinton refused to testify at the 1992 retrial, which means that the information contained in the later affidavit was not available at the time of the retrial. See Reaves, 942 So. 2d at 881–82. 23 Case: 12-11044 Date Filed: 05/30/2013 Page: 24 of 42 which was “reasonable under the facts of the case and the law at the time,” and as a result, counsel’s performance was not deficient under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Id. at 880–81. Given the lack of deficient performance, the court did not address Strickland’s prejudice prong. Id. at 881.