Opinion ID: 577004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Cross Examination: The Confrontation Clause

Text: 41 In barring Kevorkian's medical records and the observations of defendants' expert from evidence, the trial court noted that proper cross-examination will give this lay jury a good feel for this woman. And if in fact she turned on these particular individuals and fabricated [her account of defendants' participation in the payoff scheme,] ... the normal engine of truth discovery will obtain. Before us, defendants argue that no opportunity for proper cross examination was afforded them, and that, as a result, their rights under the United States Constitution were violated. 42 The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants an adequate opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 557, 108 S.Ct. 838, 841, 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988); United States v. Berrio-Londono, 946 F.2d 158, 160 (1st Cir.1991). And a government witness's psychiatric history is, under certain circumstances, a proper subject of cross-examination. United States v. Rivera-Santiago, 872 F.2d 1073, 1084 (1st Cir.1989). The right to cross-examination is not absolute, however. Berrio-Londono, 946 F.2d at 160. The confrontation clause guarantees  'an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination ... in whatever way, and to whatever extent the defense might wish.'  United States v. Noone, 913 F.2d 20, 32 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting Owens, 484 U.S. at 559, 108 S.Ct. at 842) (citation omitted). Once the defendant has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to question a witness' veracity and motivation, the trial judge enjoys broad discretion in determining the scope and extent of cross-examination.... Berrio-Londono, 946 F.2d at 160 (quoting United States v. Garcia-Rosa, 876 F.2d 209, 237 (1st Cir.1989)). 43 We consider first whether defendants were given an adequate or reasonable opportunity to examine Kevorkian. Before her cross-examination began, the government moved to prevent the defense from asking Kevorkian about any aspect of her psychiatric history. The district court refused the government's broad request, ruling that the defense was free to inquire about Kevorkian's psychological background--the nature of how she was feeling and her psychological problems generally--including her suicide attempt, hospitalization, and the contents of the psychologist's report, as far as she had discussed them with defendants. 13 The court expressly held out the possibility of broadening this approach, proposing to reassess its initial ruling on a question by question basis and adding that, should Kevorkian affirm any aspect of her psychiatric history, maybe we can go further. 44 Defendants chose not to exercise this option. During the more than two days of cross-examination, they asked Kevorkian not one question about her psychological difficulties. 14 In light of this, we are perplexed by defendants' contention that the court's order violated their constitutional rights. In our view, defendants were afforded a more than adequate opportunity to examine Kevorkian. 45 As for the trial court's limiting the scope of examination to matters discussed by Kevorkian with defendants, on this record we cannot find abuse. The court explicitly offered to revise its initial ruling, depending upon Kevorkian's responses to questions about her mental health. That defendants posed no such questions precludes them from arguing any impropriety to us. 15 In sum, defendants received their due under the Sixth Amendment. 16