Opinion ID: 2976260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pay Discrimination

Text: Mynatt alleges that he was discriminated against in his compensation, because Corey, a white Producer/Director in the same salary grade, was paid more than he was. Appellant’s Br. at 43-46. After the parties submitted their briefs, the Supreme Court decided Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007), the holding of which severely curtails Mynatt’s pay discrimination claim. In Ledbetter, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the time for filing a charge with the EEOC begins when the discriminatory act occurs. Id. at 1265. In a pay discrimination case, “pay-setting” is the “discrete act” that triggers the limitations period. Ibid. A “new violation does not occur, and a new charging period does not commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent nondiscriminatory - 15 - Mynatt v. Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. No. 06-6319 acts that entail adverse effects resulting from the past discrimination.” Id. at 2169. In other words, “[a] discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge . . . is merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal consequences.” United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977) (quoted in Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2168). In this case, Mynatt filed his EEOC complaint on October 25, 1999. Therefore, he is timebarred from complaining of any discriminatory acts occurring more than 300 days before that date. The 300-day limit applies because it appears that Mynatt first filed a complaint with the Tennessee Human Rights Commission (THRC), although the exact filing date is not indicated. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Assuming Mynatt benefits from the longer 300-day time limit, he is time-barred from asserting any pay discrimination claim based on discriminatory conduct which occurred prior to late December 1998. Therefore, we may consider only those pay decisions made after December 1998. In his briefs, Mynatt asserts only that racial animus infected his entire compensation history with LMES. Mynatt presents no evidence of any race-based pay discrimination occurring during any part of his tenure at LMES, let alone post-December 1998. Corey’s superior performance and length of time in his position are legitimate reasons for different pay. Mynatt has not shown any evidence that these reasons were mere pretext. Mynatt’s bare assertion that “unequal pay is unequal pay,” Appellant’s Br. at 44, ignores the explicit direction of Title VII that unequal pay premised on non-racial factors is acceptable. Therefore, although our analysis differs from that of the district court, we affirm summary judgment for LMES on the pay discrimination claim. - 16 - Mynatt v. Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. No. 06-6319