Opinion ID: 2585362
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether the sentence of death is excessive

Text: Dennis contends that his sentence of death is excessive. He asks this court to compare his background, character, crime, and the mitigating and aggravating circumstances found in his case to those of defendants in other first-degree murder cases where we have either affirmed the judgment of death or determined the death penalty to be excessive. He contends that under this comparative review, his death sentence must be vacated because the relevant sentencing factors in his case are most similar to those in two cases where we concluded that the death penalties were excessive: Haynes v. State, 103 Nev. 309, 739 P.2d 497 (1987), and Chambers v. State, 113 Nev. 974, 944 P.2d 805 (1997). The State argues that the comparative review sought by Dennis is unnecessary and suggests that such a review is tantamount to proportionality review, which was formerly required by NRS 177.055(2)(d), but was abolished by our Legislature in 1985. See 1985 Nev. Stat., ch. 527, § 1, at 1597. Thus, we must determine whether the comparative review of death penalty cases has any proper role in our excessiveness analysis under NRS 177.055(2)(d). From 1977 through 1985, NRS 177.055(2)(d) required that on appeal from a judgment of death, this court must consider [w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases in this state, considering both the crime and the defendant. 1977 Nev. Stat., ch. 585, § 10, at 1545; 1985 Nev. Stat., ch. 527, § 1, at 1597. Proportionality review required that we compare all [similar] capital cases [in this state], as well as appealed murder cases in which the death penalty was sought but not imposed, and set aside those death sentences which appear comparatively disproportionate to the offense and the background and characteristics of the offender. Harvey v. State, 100 Nev. 340, 342, 682 P.2d 1384, 1385 (1984). However, in 1984, the United States Supreme Court decided Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43-44, 50-51, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984), holding that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution [5] does not require a proportionality review of death sentences, i.e., an inquiry into whether the death penalty is unacceptable in a particular case because it is disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others similarly situated. The following year, the Nevada Legislature amended NRS 177.055(2)(d) to repeal the proportionality review requirement. See 1985 Nev. Stat., ch. 527, § 1, at 1597. In its current form, NRS 177.055(2)(d) provides only that this court must consider on appeal from a judgment of death [w]hether the sentence of death is excessive, considering both the crime and the defendant. We have recognized that pursuant to the 1985 amendment to NRS 177.055(2)(d), this court no longer conducts proportionality review of death sentences. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 114 Nev. 1127, 1148, 967 P.2d 1111, 1125 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 830, 120 S.Ct. 85, 145 L.Ed.2d 72 (1999); Guy v. State, 108 Nev. 770, 784, 839 P.2d 578, 587 (1992). Instead, we review a death penalty for excessiveness considering only the crime and the defendant at hand. Guy, 108 Nev. at 784, 839 P.2d at 587. In dispensing with proportionality review, we have recognized that penalties imposed in other similar cases in this state are irrelevant to the excessiveness analysis now required by NRS 177.055(2)(d). See id. Nonetheless, we have not entirely abandoned comparative review as part of that analysis. As noted by Dennis, in Chambers, 113 Nev. at 984-85, 944 P.2d at 811-12, we considered whether the imposition of a death sentence was warranted based upon comparisons between Chambers and his crime and defendants and crimes in other cases in which we have reviewed judgments of death. Specifically, we compared and found that the circumstances of the crime and defendant in Chambers were similar to those in two cases where we had determined the death penalty was excessive: Haynes and Biondi v. State, 101 Nev. 252, 699 P.2d 1062 (1985). Chambers, 113 Nev. at 985, 944 P.2d at 811. We also compared the circumstances of the murder and the defendant in [ Chambers ] with the circumstances in other cases in which this court has affirmed the death penalty. Id. at 984, 944 P.2d at 811. After considering the crime and defendant in Chambers, and in light of our comparative review, we ultimately concluded that the sentence of death was excessive. Id. at 984-85, 944 P.2d 805. Nonetheless, Chambers does not stand for the proposition that this court will conduct proportionality review of death sentences as part of the excessiveness analysis despite the Legislature's abolishment of such review. The fact that others guilty of first-degree murder may have received greater or lesser penalties does not mean that a defendant whose crime, background and characteristics are similar is entitled to receive a like sentence. However, as apparent in Chambers, our determinations regarding excessiveness of the death sentences of similarly situated defendants may serve as a frame of reference for determining the crucial issue in the excessiveness analysis: are the crime and defendant before us on appeal of the class or kind that warrants the imposition of death? See NRS 177.055(2)(d) (court must consider whether sentence of death on appeal is excessive, considering both the crime and the defendant). This inquiry may involve a consideration of whether various objective factors, which we have previously considered relevant to whether the death penalty is excessive in other cases, are present and suggest the death sentence under consideration is excessive. We conclude that, even using as a frame of reference the factors considered relevant to excessiveness in Chambers and Haynes, the cases upon which Dennis relies, the death penalty is not excessive here. In Haynes, we relied on several objective factors to determine that the death sentence was excessive, i.e., the killing in that case was `crazy' and motiveless; the defendant, Haynes, was a mentally disturbed person lashing out irrationally, and probably delusionally, and striking a person he did not know and probably had never seen before; and the single aggravating circumstance, a prior felony conviction for armed robbery, was fifteen years old at the time of the crime and committed by Haynes when he was eighteen years old. 103 Nev. at 319, 739 P.2d at 503. We concluded that the case was comparable to Biondi v. State, 101 Nev. 252, 699 P.2d 1062 (1985), where the defendant killed a man in a barroom confrontation among strangers in an emotionally charged atmosphere, and where the only aggravating circumstance was a prior conviction for armed robbery. [6] Haynes, 103 Nev. at 319, 739 P.2d at 503. We noted that in Biondi, we had reduced the death sentence to life without the possibility of parole. [7] Id. We finally concluded that Haynes did not deserve the death penalty. Id. As noted previously, we likewise determined the sentence of death was excessive in Chambers, after concluding the case was comparable to Haynes and Biondi. Chambers, 113 Nev. at 984-85, 944 P.2d at 811-12. In doing so, we relied on several objective factors, including that Chambers murdered the victim in a drunken state, which indicated no advanced planning, during an emotionally charged confrontation in which Chambers was wounded and his professional tools were being ruined. Id. at 985, 944 P.2d at 811-12. We further noted that the only valid aggravating factor in Chambers, prior felony convictions for robberies, referred to crimes that occurred eighteen years before the verdict in question, when Chambers was eighteen years old, which hardly shows a pattern of violence sufficient to justify the death penalty. Id. at 984-85, 944 P.2d at 811. Considering Dennis and his crime, we conclude that the objective factors relied on in Haynes and Chambers do not indicate the death penalty is excessive here. Dennis deliberately strangled Straumanis over the course of five to ten minutes and made efforts to assure her death. Unlike the defendants in Haynes and Chambers, evidence here shows a high degree of callousness and premeditation by Dennis. Dennis disputes this on appeal, suggesting that the evidence obtained during his interview with RPD should be discounted because much of what he said during his interview was puffing and macho-image making, designed to make detectives take seriously his desire to be put to death. [8] However, Dennis's account of the crime is not inconsistent with the physical evidence. No evidence indicates that Dennis exaggerated the willful, premeditated and deliberate nature of the crime or that his callous indifference toward Straumanis was contrived. No evidence shows that the killing was the result of uncontrollable, irrational or delusional impulses or occurred during an emotionally charged physical confrontation. Accordingly, neither Dennis's mental illness nor his being under the influence of alcohol at the time of the crime renders his death penalty excessive. Cf. DePasquale v. State, 106 Nev. 843, 803 P.2d 218 (1990) (death sentence not excessive although defendant had history of mental illness); Geary v. State, 115 Nev. 79, 977 P.2d 344 (1999) (death sentence not excessive where defendant was in drunken rage when he killed victim), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1090, 120 S.Ct. 1726, 146 L.Ed.2d 646 (2000). Further, in this case, the prior felony convictions found as aggravating circumstances demonstrate that Dennis is a dangerous and violent man. There is no indication that these crimes were committed during any physical confrontation or that Dennis was irrational, delusional or unable to control his actions at the time. One of the aggravating prior felonies was committed twenty-one years, and the others, sixteen years, before Straumanis's murder. Unlike the single valid prior felony aggravating circumstance in Haynes or Chambers, here the prior felonies are not isolated instances, but are part of a continuing pattern of violence, spread out over time and increasing in severity. Also, Dennis committed his first prior felony when in his early thirties and committed his second and third prior felonies when in his late thirties. Therefore, these felonies demonstrate Dennis's proclivity for violent crime, and their significance in this respect cannot reasonably be diminished by immature judgment at the time of the crimes. The record demonstrates that Dennis committed a calculated, cold-blooded and unprovoked killing and has a propensity toward violent behavior. We have affirmed the death penalty in similar cases. See, e.g., McKenna v. State, 114 Nev. 1044, 968 P.2d 739 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 937, 120 S.Ct. 342, 145 L.Ed.2d 267 (1999); see also Leslie v. State, 114 Nev. 8, 952 P.2d 966, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 860, 119 S.Ct. 146, 142 L.Ed.2d 119 (1998); Pellegrini v. State, 104 Nev. 625, 764 P.2d 484 (1988). After considering Dennis's contentions on appeal, we conclude that the death penalty is not excessive in this case.