Opinion ID: 3065342
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the conspiracy indictment

Text: Forrester alleges that his indictment for conspiracy was insufficient. The second superseding indictment at issue reads: Beginning at a date unknown to the grand jury and continuing up to and including October 18, 2001, within the Southern District of California, and elsewhere, [Forrester and 18 other named defendants], 6 In Forrester I, we rejected a similar argument that the district court’s overstatement made Forrester less likely to waive counsel. 512 F.3d at 507-08. We emphasized in that context, however, that harmless error review does not apply to Faretta waivers. Id. at 508. By contrast, errors relating to plea hearings are subject to harmless error review. See United States v. Minore, 292 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1146 (2003). 322 UNITED STATES v. FORRESTER all charged elsewhere, did knowingly and intentionally conspire together and with each other and with other persons known and unknown to the grand jury to manufacture and distribute a controlled substance, to wit, 3,4 Methylenedioxyamphetamine (“MDA”), commonly known as “ecstasy”, a Schedule I Con- trolled Substance, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 846 and 841(a)(1). Forrester filed a motion to dismiss for deficiency, and the district court denied the motion without explanation. [12] An indictment “must be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1). “An indictment is sufficient if it (1) contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against him which he must defend and (2) enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.” United States v. Lazarenko, 564 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Generally, an indictment is sufficient if it sets forth the elements of the charged offense so as to ensure the right of the defendant not to be placed in double jeopardy and to be informed of the offense charged.” United States v. Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 949, 958 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). With respect to conspiracies, “[a]n indictment under 21 U.S.C. § 846 . . . is sufficient if it alleges: a conspiracy to distribute drugs, the time during which the conspiracy was operative and the statute allegedly violated, even if it fails to allege or prove any specific overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Tavelman, 650 F.2d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). [13] Forrester contends that the indictment is insufficient because it fails to specify a beginning date for the conspiracy, thereby possibly subjecting him to double jeopardy. However, although an indictment cannot be completely open-ended, see UNITED STATES v. FORRESTER 323 United States v. Cecil, 608 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1979), an indictment that specifies an end date is sufficient to apprise defendants of the charges and enable them to prepare a defense, see United States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429, 435 n.7 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that an indictment alleging that the conspiracy extended until “at least” 1980 was sufficient). [14] In addition, uncertainty regarding a conspiracy’s beginning and ending dates does not render an indictment fatally defective so long as overt acts alleged in the indictment adequately limit the time frame of the conspiracy. United States. v. Laykin, 886 F.2d 1534, 1542 (9th Cir. 1989) (18 specific facts alleged in the indictment were sufficient to limit the time frame). Here, the second superceding indictment tracks the language of the conspiracy statute, identifies a location and co-conspirators, and alleges the purpose of the conspiracy. It also alleged a semi-discrete time period (it gave an end date but no beginning date) and certain overt acts. Taken together, the indictment was sufficient to apprise Forrester of the charges against him, enable him to prepare a defense, and to avoid double jeopardy on the same charge. We thus conclude that the district court did not err in denying Forrester’s motion to dismiss the indictment.