Opinion ID: 1040177
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: “Joint Venture” Doctrine

Text: In analyzing Getto’s claims within the constitutional restrictions exception, the District Court applied the “joint venture” doctrine adopted by some of our sister circuits. Getto, 2010 WL 3467860, at ; see generally United States v. Valdivia, 680 F.3d 33, 52 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the exclusionary rule analysis applies if “United States agents’ participation in the investigation is so substantial that the action is a joint venture between United States and foreign officials”). We note that in the context of the Fourth Amendment, 24 No. 11-1237-cr the joint venture doctrine has been applied by other courts with inconsistent, even confusing, results. Compare United States v. Behety, 32 F.3d 503, 511 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding no joint venture where American agents provided information for a search, were present at the search, and videotaped part of it), with Peterson, 812 F.2d at 490 (finding joint venture where American officials described their actions as a “joint investigation” and were “involved daily in translating and decoding intercepted transmissions, as well as advising [foreign] authorities of their relevance”). We have repeatedly declined to adopt the joint venture doctrine in the context of the Fourth Amendment. See Lee, 2013 WL 2450533, at  n.4; Maturo, 982 F.2d at 61-62. As we have explained above, the purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is “to inculcate a respect for the Constitution in the police of our own nation.” Lee, 2013 WL 2450533, at  (internal quotation marks omitted); see also note 7, ante. This purpose of deterrence is not served in instances where American law enforcement officers, not intentionally seeking to evade our Constitution, participate in a so-called “joint venture” but do not direct or otherwise control the investigation. See Part II.A.ii, ante. We, therefore, decide again not to adopt the joint venture doctrine and, instead, reaffirm the longstanding principles of “virtual agency” and intentional constitutional evasion described in this opinion as the applicable analytic rubric to determine whether “cooperation with foreign law enforcement 25 No. 11-1237-cr officials may implicate constitutional restrictions.” 10 See Lee, 2013 WL 2450533, at ; Maturo, 982 F.2d at 60-61. For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the District Court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence gathered abroad by foreign law enforcement officials.