Opinion ID: 2293877
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Up or Down Vote on Petition

Text: [¶ 43] Neither the governing statute nor LURC's procedural rules explicitly require LURC to immediately vote up or down on a petition as submitted at the close of a hearing. Section 4.05 of LURC's rules requires that LURC must act upon a petition for proposed changes to district boundaries within 90 days after the final closure of the public hearing, if a public hearing is held, but the section also provides that LURC may elect to reopen the public hearing record and extend the time period for public comment to such date as it may designate. 4 C.M.R. 04-061 004-7 § 4.05(10)(b), (c). This ability to reopen the record and consider additional comments provides LURC with discretion regarding how to proceed at the close of a public hearing, if one is held. [¶ 44] Furthermore, both the governing statute and LURC's procedural rules indicate that LURC may take an active role in the adoption or amendment of land use district boundaries because both permit LURC to initiate such a process. Title 12 M.R.S. § 685-A(7-A)(A) provides: The commission or its staff may initiate and any state or federal agency, any county or municipal governing body or any property owner or lessee may petition for adoption or amendment of land use district standards, district boundaries or land use maps. LURC's rules provide that the Commission or its staff may initiate the adoption or amendment of a land use district boundary. 4 C.M.R. 04-061 004-6 § 4.05(2). LURC's ability to modify a redistricting petition by proposing its own amendments is consistent with LURC's independent authority to initiate such redistricting on its own. Forcing LURC to do no more than accept or reject a petition as drafted and submitted by a private party risks wasting agency resources in situations when LURC finds merit in some aspects of the plan proposed in the petition but not others. [¶ 45] Finally, a requirement that LURC immediately vote up or down on a petition at the end of a hearing would be contrary to general principles of administrative law. The procedure for amending land use district standards, district boundaries, and land use maps is clearly defined by statute as a rulemaking procedure. 12 M.R.S. § 685-A(7-A)(B). Although LURC's written decision repeatedly referred to the hearing as an adjudicatory hearing, when read in context, this reference mischaracterizes both what actually occurred and the nature of LURC's authority when it engages in rulemaking. [10] Under the Maine Administrative Procedure Act, a rule is a judicially enforceable standard adopted by an agency: Rule means the whole or any part of every regulation, standard, code, statement of policy, or other agency guideline or statement of general applicability, including the amendment, suspension or repeal of any prior rule, that is or is intended to be judicially enforceable and implements, interprets or makes specific the law administered by the agency, or describes the procedures or practices of the agency. 5 M.R.S. § 8002(9)(A) (2011). In contrast, an adjudicatory proceeding is defined as any proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of specific persons are required by constitutional law or statute to be determined after an opportunity for hearing. 5 M.R.S. § 8002(1). Although the rulemaking process in this case was not initiated by LURC itself, the ensuing process, the standards employed, and the approved plan were all steeped in LURC's statutory authority to engage in rulemaking. [11] [¶ 46] Unlike adjudications, which are quasi-judicial determinations of individual rights, rulemaking is focused on policy matters of general applicability. The outcome of the procedure outlined in 12 M.R.S. § 685-A is LURC's adoption of new land use standards for an area within the unorganized and deorganized areas of the state. This is not a situation in which LURC's decision adjudicates Plum Creek's rights, or the rights of other specified parties, as would occur with the approval or denial of a building permit or other land use authorization. Those processes will come later, when and if Plum Creek or others apply for permits to develop particular parcels within the bounds of the newly rezoned area. See 12 M.R.S. § 685-B. In this case, LURC performed a quasi-legislative act that has as its outcome the amendment of zoning boundaries and standards governing the use of land within those boundaries. See id. § 685-A(7-A). [¶ 47] LURC's ability to exercise its planning and zoning functions would be greatly diminished if it were compelled to simply accept or reject a proposed concept plan as originally submitted. Such a constricted view of LURC's authority is contrary to the scheme set forth in section 685-A(7-A) because the statute implicitly recognizes that, regardless of whether a petition to adopt or amend land use district boundaries is initiated by LURC, its staff, another agency, county or municipal government, or a property owner or lessee, the rulemaking process that ensues is the same. See id. § 685-A(7-A). As already noted, the statute, like LURC's own rules, specifically provides that LURC can reopen the public hearing record and extend the time for public comment at any time before adopting land use district standards or boundaries. Id. § 685-A(7-A)(B)(3). This dynamic process is critical to ensuring an effective rulemaking process. It would be stymied if we were to adopt NRCM and Forest Ecology Network's position that once a property owner submits a proposed concept plan, LURC ultimately may do no more than take an up or down vote on the plan as originally proposed. [¶ 48] Because LURC was acting in its rulemaking capacity, it was both reasonable and within LURC's authority to develop amendments to Plum Creek's original concept plan.