Opinion ID: 1903075
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of a youth court-imposed curfew.

Text: ¶ 7. Williamson complains that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the curfew order imposed against Eddie Smith by the youth court. He argues that the curfew order, which resulted from a fight Eddie had at school, was demonstrative of a violent and vicious nature and that Daniels, as she was present when the curfew was imposed, had notice of such. In this capacity, Williamson urges, the evidence was more probative than prejudicial and, therefore, should have been admitted. ¶ 8. This Court has long held that [t]he admission or suppression of evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Sumrall v. Mississippi Power Co., 693 So.2d 359, 365 (Miss.1997) ( quoting General Motors Corp. v. Jackson, 636 So.2d 310, 314 (Miss.1992); Walker v. Graham, 582 So.2d 431, 432 (Miss.1991)). The court below in considering whether evidence of the curfew order should be admitted, found the following: [T]he curfew order is an issue that would be misleading to the jury unless they were instructed that the curfew was not binding upon Ms. Daniels as a legal obligation to enforce it ... The only potential value that these orders have would be for the purpose of giving notice to the parent that the child has been found to be delinquent by a judicial authority. ¶ 9. It is apparent that the trial judge balanced the potential probative value of the curfew order against its prejudicial effect under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403, which states in part that [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. We find, as the trial court did, that the curfew order was of limited probative value in that it demonstrated only that Daniels was aware that her child had been adjudicated delinquent, a fact not seriously in dispute. At the same time, the evidence posed a substantial risk of misleading the jury in that it implied that Daniels owed a duty greater than that which all parents have to control their minor children; namely, that she had a legal duty to enforce the youth court's orders. We cannot say that the trial judge's decision to exclude the curfew order was an abuse of discretion. For the foregoing reasons, we find this assignment of error to be without merit.