Opinion ID: 4557268
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mid-Trial Instruction

Text: Rodriguez contends that the district court, over her objection, gave an erroneous mid-trial jury instruction about the selection of the recordings introduced into evidence by the prosecution, thereby tilting the scales against her. The court gave the challenged instruction at the request of the government, which had argued that defense counsel’s aggressive objections and cross-examination “improperly suggested that Officer Gallardo and perhaps other members of the Santa Ana Gang Task Force intentionally withheld relevant evidence from the government’s counsel, defense counsel, and now the jury.” The court instructed the jury as follows: 8 [Y]ou heard testimony with regard to how the recorded passages you heard were selected. You also heard that the government did not prepare the complete transcripts for some recordings. 8 Part of the instruction, not excerpted here, dealt with the government’s ability to engage in stealth and deception, including the use of jailhouse informants. Rodriguez briefly asserts in a footnote that this part of the instruction constituted improper “vouching for a notorious jailhouse informant, without any balancing instruction that such testimony should be viewed with caution” and therefore “was also problematic.” This passing reference, without any meaningful supporting argument, is insufficient to raise this as an issue on appeal. United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1003 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008). 20 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ Once the government produced a recording, any party was free to make its own transcription. An opposing party is free to request the Court to order additional portions of a recording be played where necessary to place the portions played in context or to avoid any misleading impression resulting from just the portions played. Rodriguez contends that the court’s mid-trial instruction misstated the law, bolstered the government’s case, undermined the defense, and shifted the burden of proof, by suggesting that “both parties had equal ability to introduce recordings” even though she faced hearsay constraints that the government did not. She asserts that “the instruction suggested either that defendants had been dilatory in failing to request recordings be played, or that the court had already determined the selection of recordings was not, in fact, misleading”—and that, in either case, the court was inappropriately vouching for the government. She adds that it was a wholly permissible defense tactic to challenge the investigation as biased, and the court was wrong to undercut that approach. The district court has “substantial latitude” in formulating jury instructions, United States v. Hicks, 217 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended on denial of reh’g (July 31, 2000), and we conclude that the court did not abuse its wide discretion in giving the curative instruction. First, the instruction aligned with the substance of Rule 106 and thus did not constitute legal error. See Fed. R. Evid. 106 (“If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ 21 considered at the same time.”). Second, informing the jury that any party could seek to present certain evidence is distinct from telling the jury a party was required to do so— and the remaining jury instructions eliminated any possible doubt as to the burden of proof. The jury was otherwise instructed that the defense did not need to present any evidence, and that the government bore the burden of proving every element of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. The instruction also did not preclude Rodriguez from arguing that the government’s investigation was biased or conducted haphazardly. In fact, she repeatedly so argued, implicitly through cross-examination and explicitly during closing argument. Unlike the cases Rodriguez cites, the instruction here did not direct the jury not to consider potential methodological shortcomings or bias in the government’s investigation, or to avoid drawing a particular set of inferences. Indeed, the instruction said nothing about how the jury should evaluate the evidence before it—except to remind the jury that, ultimately, “it is for you to determine the weight to be given any item of evidence.” Therefore, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving its mid-trial instruction. 9 9 As the defense correctly points out, its strategy of attacking the investigation as biased, including arguing that the agents were biased in their selection of recordings presented to the jury, is a common one. Although we find no abuse of discretion here, the mid-trial instruction was unnecessary and, as formulated, ran the risk of being incomplete or potentially misleading. While the instruction was consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 106, it failed to fully capture the restrictiveness of the rule of completeness, including the defense’s need to overcome significant evidentiary hurdles. See, e.g., United States v. Collicott, 92 F.3d 973, 982–83 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing constraints on seeking 22 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ