Opinion ID: 1873533
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reasonableness of the dog sniff

Text: ¶ 38 Succinctly stated, the question we must decide is whether the 78 second intrusion upon Arias's liberty that was caused by the dog sniff was reasonable. Reasonableness . . . depends `on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.' Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (citation omitted). A seizure becomes unreasonable when the incremental liberty intrusion resulting from the investigation supersedes the public interest served by the investigation. Id. In sum, an unconstitutional continuation of a once lawful seizure can occur when the extension of time for that needed to satisfy the original concern that caused the stop becomes unreasonable or when the means used to continue the seizure becomes unreasonable, both of which are evaluated under the totality of the circumstances presented. ¶ 39 Under the totality of the circumstances before us, we examine the public interest, the degree to which the continued seizure advances the public interest and the severity of the interference of Arias's liberty interest. Griffith, 236 Wis.2d 48, ¶ 37, 613 N.W.2d 72. The dog sniff occurred so Rennie could ascertain whether there were drugs in Schillinger's vehicle. In that regard, the public interest in prevent[ing] the flow of narcotics into distribution channels has long been recognized as significant. Place, 462 U.S. at 704, 103 S.Ct. 2637. The use of a narcotics sniffing dog furthers this public interest by locating narcotics that may not otherwise be detected. [18] The dog sniff was part of the on-going traffic stop of Schillinger that occurred because she was a minor and was transporting alcohol that Arias had placed in her vehicle. The dog sniff of Schillinger's vehicle took 78 seconds to further the public's interest. This brief 78-second extension of Arias's seizure is significantly outweighed by the importance of preventing the flow of illegal drugs. [19] ¶ 40 In addition, Rennie diligently pursued his investigation in a manner that could quickly confirm or dispel his suspicions relative to the stop of Schillinger's vehicle. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568. He observed beer being loaded into a car that was driven by Schillinger, whom he knew was under age. He quickly sought to ensure that Schillinger was not intoxicated, first by administering a preliminary breath test to her and then by inquiring whether drugs were in the vehicle. He released D'Jango to sniff the outside perimeter of the car. All these tasks took only 4 minutes, 10 seconds to accomplish. Rennie's actions were systematic and efficient. Arias was not taken to a non-public location as the defendant was in Royer. He remained seated in the passenger compartment of Schillinger's vehicle. Therefore, the incremental intrusion on Arias's liberty is time-focused, as it was in Griffith. On balance, we conclude that the incremental intrusion upon Arias's liberty interest that resulted from the 78-second dog sniff is outweighed by the public's interest served thereby. Accordingly, Arias was not subjected to an unreasonable seizure. ¶ 41 Our conclusion is consistent with the discussion in Gaulrapp. In Gaulrapp, the court of appeals was faced with the contention that asking a question about drugs and firearms, without a reasonable suspicion that Gaulrapp possessed either, caused a lawful seizure to become constitutionally infirm. Gaulrapp, 207 Wis.2d at 608, 558 N.W.2d 696. In its discussion, the court of appeals correctly noted that no seizure occurs when law enforcement asks a question without a reasonable suspicion justifying the question so long as an answer is not compelled. Id. at 609, 558 N.W.2d 696. The court then noted that it was the extension of a detention past the point reasonably justified by the initial stop, not the nature of the questions asked, that [may] violate[ ] the Fourth Amendment. Id. Gaulrapp is in accord with numerous federal and state courts. [20] Similarly to Gaulrapp, here the relevant inquiry is not whether a dog sniff was conducted, or a question was asked, but whether Arias's detention was unreasonably extended. Id.; see also, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). ¶ 42 Arias contends that Caballes stands for the proposition that a dog sniff conducted without reasonable suspicion of drug possession is per se violative of the federal Constitution unless the dog sniff is conducted simultaneously with activities germane to what precipitated the traffic stop in the first instance. We disagree. We do not read Caballes so narrowly. Indeed, Caballes observes that a traffic stop may become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the activities attendant to the stop. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407, 125 S.Ct. 834. As we have stated above, the time taken to complete the traffic stop and the dog sniff were reasonable. ¶ 43 Furthermore, Arias's reliance on Betow and Gammons is misplaced. In Betow, the court of appeals concluded that Betow's continued detention after he was stopped for speeding was not warranted by the facts available to the detaining officer. Betow is distinguishable from the case before us because the incremental intrusion on Betow's liberty interest was unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances presented. This is so because Betow's traffic stop for speeding had been concluded when the officer asked if he could search Betow's vehicle. Betow, 226 Wis.2d at 92, 593 N.W.2d 499. Betow refused the officer's request. Id. Betow also asked the officer for permission to leave. Id. Notwithstanding Betow's request, the officer refused to permit him to leave. Additionally, instead of honoring Betow's request, the officer had his dog make several passes around the car. Id. at 93, 593 N.W.2d 499. Next, the officer placed the dog inside Betow's car, where the dog located a packet of marijuana. Id. ¶ 44 By contrast, the traffic stop of Schillinger was on-going when the dog sniff of the outside of the vehicle occurred; the dog was not placed inside of Schillinger's vehicle; Arias had not asked to leave and been required to remain. Accordingly, the incremental intrusion upon Betow's liberty was significantly greater than that which occurred here. ¶ 45 We note that Betow contains broad dicta that might be read so as to cause confusion with the appropriate inquiry for evaluating the constitutionality of a continuing seizure. For example, Betow asserts: [T]he scope of the officer's inquiry, or the line of questioning, may be broadened beyond the purpose for which the person was stopped only if additional suspicious factors come to the officer's attention  keeping in mind that these factors, like the factors justifying the stop in the first place, must be particularized and objective. Id. at 94, 593 N.W.2d 499. This dicta misstates the manner in which courts are to evaluate the reasonableness of the continuation of a seizure that was lawful at its inception. Betow was clarified by Gaulrapp's explanation that, [n]o seizure occurs when police, without the reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop, ask questions of an individual . . . so long as the police do not convey that compliance with the request is required. Gaulrapp, 207 Wis.2d at 609, 558 N.W.2d 696. The dicta in Betow quoted above is also inconsistent with Bostick, which concludes that law enforcement questions do not result in a seizure, so long as answers are not compelled. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382. As we have explained, the appropriate inquiry involves balancing the public interest in the seizure, the degree to which the continued seizure advances the public interest and the severity of the interference with the liberty interest of the person detained. Griffith, 236 Wis.2d 48, ¶ 37, 613 N.W.2d 72. ¶ 46 Gammons is also distinguishable from the totality of the circumstances presented here. In reversing the circuit court's refusal to suppress the evidence, the court of appeals in Gammons employed, in part, the dicta from Betow. Gammons, 241 Wis.2d 296, ¶ 18, 625 N.W.2d 623. However, in examining the totality of the relevant circumstances we note that the reason for the initial seizure had been satisfied, id., ¶ 2; the driver and the two passengers had provided identification, id.; the officer had run computer checks on all three, id.; the officer asked to search the vehicle and the driver had refused, id., ¶ 3. Thereafter, the officer threatened the driver with the further detainment so that he could use a drug sniffing dog, id., and the driver then consented to the search of the vehicle, id. Accordingly, the incremental intrusion upon Gammons's liberty interest was significantly greater than the intrusion upon Arias's liberty interest. ¶ 47 In sum, we observe that neither the Fourth Amendment nor Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution prohibit all seizures. Only unreasonable seizures are violative of constitutional rights. In examining the reasonableness of Arias's seizure, we balance the public's interest in preventing the distribution of illegal drugs, the furtherance of that interest by the continued seizure of Schillinger's vehicle and the effect on Arias's liberty interest under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109, 98 S.Ct. 330; Griffith, 236 Wis.2d 48, ¶ 37, 613 N.W.2d 72. The incremental extension of time expended in this stop that was occasioned by the dog sniff was a brief 78 seconds. It was only the 78 seconds of the dog sniff that added to Rennie's efficient efforts to confirm or allay his suspicions that led to the initial stop. This incremental liberty intrusion does not outweigh the public interest served by it; therefore, the incremental intrusion occasioned by the dog sniff satisfies our test for reasonableness. Griffith, 236 Wis.2d 48, ¶ 38, 613 N.W.2d 72. Accordingly, the controlled substance investigation comported with the strictures of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.