Opinion ID: 202645
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Treatment as the Publisher

Text: Finally, liability under either the Florida securities law or the Florida cyberstalking law would involve treating Lycos as the publisher of the misinformation.4 UCS's securities claims are based on the theory that individuals were taking a short position in UCS stock and then spreading misinformation to depress the stock price, so as to profit from their short position.5 There is no allegation that Lycos has been involved in any UCS stock transactions; thus, any liability against it must be premised on imputing to it the alleged misinformation, that is, on treating it 4 On the federal cyberstalking claim under 47 U.S.C. § 223, in addition to finding the claim barred by Section 230, the district court also found that the cyberstalking statute does not provide a private right of action. UCS does not challenge this dispositive ruling on appeal, so we affirm the dismissal of the claim on that basis, expressing no view on the appropriateness of applying Section 230 immunity to a putative civil claim under 47 U.S.C. § 223. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this [title 47], . . . or any other Federal criminal statute. (emphasis added)). Nor do we express a view on whether the specific exception in § 230(e)(1) for federal criminal statutes might apply to analogous state statutes. UCS's brief might be read to suggest something along these lines, but issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). 5 To take a short position in a stock means to sell borrowed stock at the current price in the hope that the stock price will decline and the borrower will be able to return the borrowed stock by purchasing it at the later, lower price. -20- as the publisher of that information.6 Similarly, the alleged cyberstalking involves only the publication of a series of postings on the Raging Bull web site. Again, Lycos's liability would depend on treating it as the publisher of those postings. UCS argues that the prohibition against treating Lycos as the publisher only immunizes Lycos's exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions -- such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content, Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330, and not its decisions regarding the construct and operation of its web sites. This argument misapprehends the scope of Section 230 immunity. If the cause of action is one that would treat the service provider as the publisher of a particular posting, immunity applies not only for the service provider's decisions with respect to that posting, but also for its inherent decisions about how to treat postings generally. UCS is ultimately alleging that the construct and operation of Lycos's web sites contributed to the proliferation of misinformation; Lycos's decision not to reduce misinformation by changing its web site policies was as much an editorial decision with respect to that misinformation as a decision not to delete a particular posting. Section 230 immunity does not depend on the form that decision takes. See Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 6 We express no view on the viability of such a claim, absent Section 230 immunity. -21- 2003) (finding that liability for the alleged negligent failure to properly police [AOL's] network for content transmitted by its users . . . would 'treat' AOL 'as the publisher or speaker' of that content). We hold that, given the allegations in UCS's complaint, liability for Lycos under either the Florida securities statute or the Florida cyberstalking statute would involve treating Lycos as the publisher of information provided by another information content provider. Thus, we affirm the district court's ruling that both claims are barred by Section 230.