Opinion ID: 1159154
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: reduction of punitive damages

Text: Leigh Furniture challenges the propriety of any damages on Isom's counterclaim, as discussed earlier, but advances no argument against the $35,000 verdict on punitive damages in particular. Isom's cross-appeal challenges the remittitur by which the district court reduced the punitive damages in reliance on the rule that the amount of punitive damages should ordinarily bear some reasonable relation to the actual damages sustained. Holdaway v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 77, 79, 505 P.2d 295, 296 (1973). Following the guide of Kesler v. Rogers, Utah, 542 P.2d 354 (1975), and Prince v. Peterson, Utah, 538 P.2d 1325 (1975), where this Court reduced punitive damages to an amount equal to twenty and eighteen percent of the compensatory damages, respectively, the district court found that $13,000 (exactly twenty percent of the compensatory damages awarded by the jury in this case) would adequately accomplish the purpose of punitive damages, and reduced them by remittitur to that amount. Isom asserts error in this mechanical application of a fixed ratio as a basis for such reduction. We agree. The purposes of punitive damages are well stated in Kesler v. Rogers, supra : They are: a punishment of the defendant for particularly grievous injury caused by conduct which is not only wrongful, but which is wilful and malicious so that it seems to one's sense of justice that mere recompense for actual loss is inadequate and that the plaintiff should have added compensation; and that the defendant should suffer some additional penalty for that character of wrongful conduct; and also that such a verdict should serve as a wholesome warning to others not to engage in similar misdoings. 542 P.2d at 359. Accord Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., Utah, 657 P.2d 267 (1982). As reflected in this statement of purpose and in numerous other authorities, punitive damages are awarded where the nature of the wrong complained of ... goes beyond merely violating the rights of another in that it is found to be willful and malicious,  Elkington v. Foust, Utah, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (1980) (emphasis added), or a result of reckless indifference toward, and disregard of the rights of others. Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., supra . [11] We have recently had occasion to review the factors that the fact-finder should consider in determining the amount of punitive damages. See First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., Utah, 653 P.2d 591 (1982). For purposes of this case, we need only reemphasize that the amount of compensatory damages is only one of a significant number of factors to be considered in that determination. Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, Utah, 605 P.2d 314, 328 (1979), modified on another point, 617 P.2d 700 (1980). The district court's reduction of punitive damages solely on the basis of that factor was therefore in error. The jury (or other fact-finder) has a broad discretion in weighing the various factors and arriving at its determination of an appropriate award of punitive damages. Ostertag v. La Mont, 9 Utah 2d 130, 133, 339 P.2d 1022, 1024 (1959). The standards that guide a court in reviewing the jury's determination are also reviewed and reaffirmed in First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards, supra, and need not be repeated here. This jury found $65,000 compensatory damages and $35,000 punitive damages. We find nothing in the ratio between those two amounts, or in the other circumstances of this case, to persuade us that the award of punitive damages was so flagrantly excessive and unjust as to indicate a disregard of the rules of law by which damages are regulated, or so grossly excessive and disproportionate to the injury or so excessive as to be shocking to one's conscience and to clearly indicate passions, prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury. First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards, supra, at 11. [12] The record contains abundant evidence that Leigh Furniture interfered with Isom's economic relations by improper means, including breaching its contract with the intent to injure Isom, a circumstance from which the jury could infer sufficient malice to justify their award of punitive damages. Economic motives will not insulate a defendant from liability for punitive damages where he acts maliciously. Fury Imports, Inc. v. Shakespeare Co., 554 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921, 101 S.Ct. 1369, 67 L.Ed.2d 349 (1981); Cherne Industrial, Inc. v. Grounds & Associates, Inc., Minn., 278 N.W.2d 81 (1979). On Isom's cross-appeal, the judgment is modified to reinstate the full amount the jury awarded as punitive damages. As modified in respect to punitive damages, the judgment on the verdict for defendant Isom is affirmed. Costs to respondent. HALL, C.J., STEWART, J., and VeNOY CHRISTOFFERSEN, District Judge, concur. DURHAM, J., does not participate herein.