Opinion ID: 1217115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the leaseholds

Text: Lamar and Whiteco contend that the leases they executed with Williams and Norman created interests in the underlying real property which are condemnable interests entitling them to due process and just compensation. In this case, the City, acting pursuant to § 18.03 of the City Charter, acquired fee simple title to the property upon the filing of the condemnation petition and the deposit of the requisite funds with the court. At that point, all interests in the condemned property are transferred to the deposited fund. See May v. Dewey, 201 Va. 621, 633, 112 S.E.2d 838, 847 (1960) (citing Stanpark Realty Corp. v. City of Norfolk, 199 Va. 716, 101 S.E.2d 527 (1958)); Code § 25-46.28. Thereafter, the court distributes the fund `as to it may seem right, having due regard to the interest of all persons therein, whether such interest be vested, contingent or otherwise....' May, 201 Va. at 631, 112 S.E.2d at 846 (quoting former Code § 25-26). Where, as here, the condemned property is subject to a lease, the lessee is not a proper party to the condemnation proceeding but rather the proper course is to ascertain the entire compensation as though the property belonged to one person, and then apportion this sum among the different parties according to their respective rights. Fonticello Mineral Springs Co. v. City of Richmond, 147 Va. 355, 369, 137 S.E. 458, 463 (1927) (citation omitted). Although a lessee, in condemnation proceedings, may suffer a taking of, or damage to, his leasehold, for which he is entitled to compensation from the condemnation award, neither our prior decisions nor the authorities Lamar and Whiteco cite support their contention that a lessee has a separate, condemnable interest entitling him to a separate condemnation proceeding. Nevertheless, Lamar and Whiteco respond that the condemnation proceeding itself was invalid because they, as tenants of the freehold, were not given notice as required by § 18.03 of the City Charter. Therefore, they contend, the City was not vested with fee simple title in the property and their interests were not transferred to the award. This argument assumes Lamar and Whiteco were tenants of the freehold. We have defined tenant of the freehold as a tenant in possession appearing as the visible owner. Fonticello, 147 Va. at 369, 137 S.E. at 462. We agree with the trial court that Lamar and Whiteco were not tenants of the freehold because the mere presence of their outdoor advertising displays did not suggest that these billboard companies owned the premises. Therefore, we find that the condemnation proceeding under Richmond City Charter § 18.03 was not defective and that the City was properly vested with fee simple title to the property on February 21, 1989, thus transferring all interests including Lamar's and Whiteco's to the condemnation award.