Opinion ID: 1807431
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 31

Heading: Spectator Conduct

Text: Boppre filed his affidavit and those of several members of his family, which stated that during their testimony certain members of the Valdez family, especially Valdez' brother, were mouthing obscene words or making various hand motions which distracted and upset them during their testimony. Boppre argues that he was prejudiced by the alleged misconduct of the various spectators [b]ecause of the nature of this case, and because of the extreme conflicting evidence which the record discloses, it is quite obviously extremely important that the defense witnesses be presented in a fair and impartial light to enable the jury to properly weigh their testimony. Since the jurors are the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility, based on watching the witnesses while testifying and observing their demeanor, etc., spectator influence on how a witness testifies or acts on the stand while testifying would adveresly [sic] affect the jurors' opinions as to whether or not the witness was telling the truth.... Brief for appellant at 48. In Lindsay v. State, 46 Neb. 177, 64 N.W. 716 (1895), as the defendant took the witness stand, the mother of the victim rose from her seat, stepped forward, pointed her finger at the defendant, and accused him in an excited manner, `You have killed my boy! You have killed my boy!' Id. at 182, 64 N.W. at 717. The judge then ordered the mother removed from the courtroom. We rejected the defendant's claim that this denied him a fair trial, stating at 182-83, 64 N.W. at 717: The language ... in Debney v. State, 46 [45] Neb., 856, [64 N.W. 446] so well illustrates the rule which should govern the branch of the case under consideration that without comment it is reproduced as follows: It appears that at the close of the argument of the county attorney to the jury the spectators applauded by stamping of feet and clapping of hands, which applause was immediately suppressed by the presiding judge, who rebuked the persons for making the same. It was also shown that the applause was without the knowledge or connivance of those connected with the prosecution.    The incident complained of occurred in the presence and hearing of the trial judge and he is better enabled than we to determine the effect, if any, the applause had upon the jury.... [T]he trial court must have been of the opinion that the demonstration was not of such a nature as to influence the verdict, and no prejudice being shown its determination will not be interfered with. In Wever v. State, 121 Neb. 816, 238 N.W. 736 (1931), the defendant contended he was deprived of a fair trial because of hissing and applauding on the part of spectators in the courtroom during trial. We rejected this argument, stating: The court promptly rebuked such conduct and stated that if it occurred again the courtroom would be cleared. Ordinarily, this would be sufficient, but, aside from that, no objection was raised by defendant; nor is there anything in the record to disclose the nature or extent of the applause, or who was guilty of the misconduct. If counsel for defendant at the time had reason to apprehend or believe that such conduct would prejudice the rights of defendant, they should have then requested the court to declare a mistrial. Instead, they elected to proceed with the trial without objection, and took the chance of a favorable verdict, and now seek to overturn the verdict for causes which they knew and did not object to before the case was submitted to the jury. ... Furthermore, it is a rule that demonstrations on the part of spectators do not constitute ground for a new trial where they are checked promptly and where it appears probable that the jury were not prejudiced thereby. [Citations omitted.] The evidence discloses nothing from which it could be inferred that defendant was in any wise prejudiced by whatever applause there may have been. Id. at 819-20, 238 N.W. at 737-38. See, also, Sundahl v. State, 154 Neb. 550, 48 N.W.2d 689 (1951). The responsibility for conducting a trial in an orderly and proper manner for the purpose of ensuring a fair and impartial trial rests with the trial court. Wamsley v. State, 171 Neb. 197, 106 N.W.2d 22 (1960). Boppre did not bring the spectators' actions to the district court's attention, request the district court to admonish the jury to disregard the spectators' actions, nor request a mistrial on the basis of the spectators' actions. There is no indication in the record that the district court judge was even aware of the spectators' actions. The district court impliedly determined, in ruling on Boppre's motion for new trial, that the witnesses were not so affected by the spectators' actions as to affect their credibility. There is nothing to show the district court abused its discretion in this determination.