Opinion ID: 2581959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: The Minivan

Text: [¶ 67] The appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to preserve the minivan because the prosecution released the minivan from its possession without the permission or knowledge of [the appellant] or his counsel.... [18] According to the appellant, the minivan had obviously been through the hands of many people by the time it was located at a Nebraska salvage yard in April 2002, and was subjected to unknown alterations or conditions in the interim. Because the existing crime scene photographs of the minivan could not give information such as depth, length, type or cause of the scrapes visible in the photographs, the minivan, in an unaltered state, was absolutely critical evidence. The appellant concludes that the minivan was therefore potentially exculpatory material evidence because if there was any indication whatsoever that the scraping marks came from a police vehicle, then the evidence was material to the appellant's guilt. [¶ 68] According to Trooper Lewis, the minivan was impounded, taken to a towing company and secured inside the vehicle storage there, and later moved to the state department of transportation shop and put into storage there. Trooper Lankford testified that he and Trooper Lewis examined, measured, and photographed the minivan while it was at the department of transportation shop. It was trial counsel's understanding that the minivan, which minivan apparently belonged to Bobbie Decker, was subsequently released to an insurance company and in February 2002, an outfit out of Casper auctioned the minivan to a Nebraska salvage yard. [¶ 69] There is a conflict in the record regarding the circumstances of the minivan's release from the prosecution's possession. Trial counsel stated in an affidavit attached to an April 2002 motion to continue the trial that the prosecution released the minivan without consulting defense counsel. Trooper Lewis testified at trial that a prior prosecutor in the case [19] apparently, got with [the appellant's trial counsel] and we got the information from him that it was okay for us to release the vehicle. In late October or November 2001, according to Trooper Lewis, the prosecutor talked with trial counsel, who said that there was nothing he wanted to do with the van. He didn't want to have anybody look over it or anything and it was okay to release the van. Trial counsel did not object or challenge this testimony at trial, although his co-counsel elicited the testimony while cross-examining Trooper Lewis. [¶ 70] As we previously stated, the appellant's trial counsel became aware in early October 2001 of the rumor that law enforcement had forced the appellant off the road or bumped the minivan during the pursuit, and had the rumor investigated. The investigator did not inspect the minivan himself at that time, nor did trial counsel. Nevertheless, the investigator determined that there was simply no evidence of any kind of contact between the police vehicle and the [appellant's] vehicle and trial counsel concluded that there was not a scintilla of evidence to suggest that the police officer's vehicle had come into contact with the minivan and dropped that defense strategy in October or November of 2001. [¶ 71] Although trial counsel had previously received the prosecution's crime scene photographs of the minivan, he did not notice the scrape marks depicted on the minivan's right rear quarter panel until the appellant pointed them out a couple weeks prior to the April 23, 2002, court hearing. After the appellant pointed out these scrape marks in the photographs of the minivan, trial counsel demanded in writing that the prosecution produce the minivan. The prosecutor's office did the foot work and located the minivan at the salvage yard in Nebraska. Trial counsel stated to the district court at that time that the minivan has been produced and it is available for us. He further characterized the circumstances in April 2002 as follows: We're ready, willing and able to go to Ainsworth, Nebraska, if we have to, load the van back on a flat bed, bring it back to Wyoming. I presume Cheyenne  and maybe I'm speaking out of turn here for the Public Defender's Office. Of course, this would all be at the expense of the Public Defender's Office. But, in essence, have someone look at not only those scrapes but look at the van for any other indications that it had been bumped[.] Quite frankly, I haven't done it before because there hadn't been a scintilla of evidence to suggest that, your Honor. Trial counsel stated that he would call the salvage yard that day and put a hold on the thing. Co-counsel for the appellant indicated at an August 2002 pretrial conference that the defense did locate the vehicle. It was in a junk yard. It had been moved to Nebraska. And I'm not exactly sure if there was some alteration, but an expert did look at it. [¶ 72] Notwithstanding the conflicting information regarding the minivan's release from the prosecution's possession, the appellant has presented no evidence that the prosecution failed to preserve the minivan. [20] The appellant does not contend on appeal that the minivan was lost, destroyed, or contaminated by the prosecution, and his statement that the minivan was subjected to unknown alterations or conditions following its release from the prosecution's possession is purely speculative. Indeed, when the minivan was located in Nebraska in April 2002, the salvage yard sent a current, digital photograph of the minivan to the prosecutor, who shared the photograph with trial counsel. The digital photograph depicted the minivan's right, rear, quarter panel, ... clearly showing the strafe marks. Trial counsel noted [i]t's the very same vehicle, it's still usable for parts, and the vehicle was sitting there to be parted out, not to be smashed. The appellant presents no evidence that the minivan's condition in April 2002 prevented him, or his expert, from examining, photographing, or testing the scrape marks at issue. See Wheeler, 691 P.2d at 602-03 and United States v. Wolf, 839 F.2d 1387, 1391-92 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 923, 109 S.Ct. 304, 102 L.Ed.2d 323 (1988) ([i]f the means of obtaining the exculpatory evidence has been provided to the defense, however, a Brady claim fails, even if the prosecution does not physically deliver the evidence requested). [¶ 73] The appellant has also failed to establish that the minivan's exculpatory value was sufficiently apparent at the time the prosecution released the minivan from its possession. [21] On appeal, the appellant characterizes the minivan as potentially exculpatory evidence and states that if the scrape marks at issue indicated that they were caused by a police vehicle, the minivan would have been material evidence. The appellant also contends that the prosecution knew that the minivan was potentially exculpatory because the police department investigated the rumor that a police vehicle forced the appellant off the road. However, when evidence is potentially useful or exculpatory, [22] as even the appellant has characterized the minivan, the appellant must also demonstrate that the prosecution acted in bad faith in allegedly failing to preserve the evidence. The appellant does not argue that the prosecution acted in bad faith in releasing the minivan from its possession. [¶ 74] The appellant has similarly failed to establish that the minivan's condition impaired his ability to advance his theories at trial. The appellant clearly had access to the minivan itself well in advance of trial (the district court having granted the appellant a trial continuance in April 2002 to examine the minivan), an expert had examined the minivan in Nebraska on the appellant's behalf, and the appellant had crime scene photographs of the minivan depicting the scrape marks at issue. [23] At trial, the appellant's counsel chose to use the crime scene photographs of the minivan's right and left rear quarter panels extensively to cross-examine Trooper Lewis and Trooper Lankford regarding the scrape marks, and also referred to the scrape marks during closing argument in attacking Trooper Lewis' investigation and arguing that Officer Vranish forced the minivan off the road. The record does not reveal why the appellant's trial counsel chose to rely on the crime scene photographs at trial rather than the minivan itself, or the expert that examined the minivan, but the reason was not, based on the record before us, due to a lack of information or opportunity to examine, photograph, or test the minivan. See Vap, 852 F.2d at 1256; Young, 849 P.2d at 765; Gale, 792 P.2d at 588; and Warhop, 732 F.2d at 776-77.