Opinion ID: 2468420
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Punishment Phase

Text: Two witnesses testified at the punishment phase about the defendant's prior criminal conduct which did not give rise to convictions. The testimony was not objected to. The defendant now argues that the trial judge should have excluded this evidence sua sponte. We do not agree. Some of the evidence may have been hearsay, but hearsay evidence may be received and used in support of findings if there is no objection. [9] The defendant's roommate testified that the defendant had admitted an Arkansas burglary to him, and the defendant himself admitted having entered his girlfriend's father's safe, and so the incidents were established by evidence which is not hearsay. The jury at the punishment phase is entitled to full information about the defendant and his previous conduct. [10] The defense challenges the submission of statutory aggravating circumstances. The court submitted three aggravating circumstances, as follows: 1. Whether defendant murdered Stanley Albert for the purpose of the defendant receiving money or any other thing of monetary value from Stanley Albert. [Section 565.032(2)(4), RSMo 1986]. 2. Whether the murder of Stanley Albert involved torture or depravity of mind and that as a result thereof it was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman. [Section 565.032(2)(7), RSMo 1986]. 3. Whether the murder of Stanley Albert was committed while the defendant was engaged in the perpetration of or the attempt to perpetrate robbery.... [Section 565.032(2)(11) ]. The jury found the first and third of these, but not the second. The defendant complains that there is no evidence of robbery. This would not be fatalto conviction. Our cases consistently hold that, if the jury properly finds a single statutory aggravating circumstance, then a finding of another one is not prejudicial even though not supported by the evidence or otherwise infirm. [11] We conclude, furthermore, that both of the aggravating circumstances found are supported by the evidence. The defendant clearly acted for the purpose of depriving Albert of possession of the Camaro and appropriating it to his own use for so long as he was not disturbed in his possession. He obtained a thing of monetary value. The jury could find, moreover, that the defendant did forcibly steal the vehicle, even though the evidence did not show exactly how he got Albert out of the picture and assumed possession himself. It is not necessary that the victim be aware that he is being robbed. [12] The jury could infer that the shooting was an essential step in the defendant's taking possession of the car. The defendant goes on to argue, however, that there was prejudicial error in submitting both of these circumstances to the jury in Instructions 18, 19 and 20, based on MAI-CR3d 313.42, 313.44 and 313.46. He contends that the two circumstances cover essentially the same conduct and that there is an impermissible doubling effect in telling the jury that it may weigh both of them against such mitigating circumstances as it might find, in determining whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating. We do not agree. The first and third circumstances are related, but they emphasize different facets of criminal activity. The first one has to do with the defendant's greed, and the third with the use of force. Both are amply established in the setting of this record. The submission was in accordance with the law. There is no reason to consider what the situation would have been if one of the circumstances had been found to be improperly submitted. The defense claims that the court should have intervened sua sponte when the prosecutor tried to argue the good character of the victim, citing Booth v. Maryland, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987). Counsel has to present the point in this manner because no objection was taken. There is no plain error. The defendant had referred to Albert's asserted homosexuality in his argument, and so the state's response might be characterized as retaliatory. The comparison to Booth is not appropriate. There the state, over objection, was allowed to read a detailed account about the effect of the murder on the victim's family, including such items as the interference with wedding plans. The Court found that the sole purpose of this evidence was to inflame the jury, and criticized a statutory provision for victim impact statements. Here the passages were relatively brief and were confined to the record. The arguments, both at the guilt phase and the punishment phase, were not unduly inflammatory. The absence of objection is fatal to the defendant's claim. The last point is in aid of our mandatory proportionality review. The case was fairly tried, and we find no indication that the verdict was tainted by passion or prejudice. Nor do we find that the sentence was disproportionate. The defendant was comparatively young, 21, but death sentences against younger defendants have been upheld. State v. Blair, 638 S.W.2d 739 (Mo. banc 1982); State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487 (Mo. banc, 1983); State v. Lashley, 667 S.W.2d 712 (Mo. banc 1984); State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. banc 1987). [13] The evidence of guilt, though essentially circumstantial, was very strong. The defendant had prior convictions for burglary and assault and the evidence properly showed other serious misconduct. The defense cites cases which it considers to be much more aggravated than this one and in which juries in their wisdom have not decreed the death penalty. [14] The cases cited, though very aggravated, do not demonstrate the extended deliberation which characterizes this one. Under our decisions, furthermore, only relative proportionality is required. [15] A death sentence does not have to be set aside simply because the jury decreed life imprisonment in what might seem to be a more aggravated case. [16] This defendant willfully murdered a person who had done nothing to provoke him, simply to satisfy his urge to possess a sports car. He plotted his course of action over a period of several weeks. It is hard to imagine a clearer example of a deliberate homicide. To one who believes in capital punishment, this is a strong case for the ultimate sanction. There is no hint of impaired mental capacity. Cf. State v. McIlvoy, 629 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. banc 1982). The case is comparable to State v. Bannister, 680 S.W.2d 141 (Mo. banc 1984), State v. Johns, 679 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. banc 1984), and State v. Blair, 638 S.W.2d 739 (Mo. banc 1982). See also State v. Pollard, 735 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. banc 1987), involving a killing in order to acquire an automobile. The judgment is affirmed as to conviction and sentence. BILLINGS, C.J., and DONNELLY, WELLIVER, ROBERTSON and HIGGINS, JJ., concur. RENDLEN, J., concurs in result.