Opinion ID: 2633651
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Joinder of the Clark and Benintende counts

Text: Defendant was charged in a single information with the killings of Clark and Benintende. Defendant did not move to sever the two counts. Defendant now claims the joinder of the Clark and Benintende charges resulted in gross unfairness depriving him of his federal constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and equal protection of the law. Section 954 governs joinder and severance, providing in pertinent part: An accusatory pleading may charge ... two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts . . . provided, that the court in which a case is triable, in the interests of justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the different offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately.... Defendant concedes the statutory requirements of joinder were met  the two murder counts charged crimes of the same class (see People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 100, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357) and were connected by a common murder weapon  and acknowledges his failure to move to sever the counts at trial forfeited any claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying severance. (See People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 392, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1; People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 939-940, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574.) He further acknowledges the trial court had no statutory duty to order severance on its own motion. (See ibid. ) He asserts, however, the specific claim that he is entitled to reversal of both murder convictions because joinder of the Clark and Benintende counts resulted in gross unfairness violating his right to due process of law under the federal Constitution. (See Bean v. Calderon (9th Cir.1998) 163 F.3d 1073, 1083-1086.) We have held that even if a trial court's ruling on a motion to sever is correct at the time it was made, a reviewing court still must determine whether, in the end, the joinder of counts or defendants for trial resulted in gross unfairness depriving the defendant of due process of law. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 162, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 409, 79 Cal. Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442; see also People v. Grant (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 579, 594, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 560 [finding gross unfairness even though trial court did not err in ruling on motion for severance].) Defendant asserts such review for gross unfairness is available even when no motion to sever ever was made. (See People v. Simms (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 299, 308-309, 317, 89 Cal.Rptr. 1 [reviewing joint trial for gross unfairness, and finding none, even in the absence of a motion to sever defendant's trial from that of codefendant]; People v. Chambers (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 23, 28, 34, 41 Cal.Rptr. 551 [reversing judgment in the absence of an objection to joinder of defendant's trial with that of codefendant, where joinder in combination with other errors resulted in gross unfairness and denial of due process]; cf. People v. Burns (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 238, 251-253, 75 Cal.Rptr. 688 [reviewing for gross unfairness following an untimely motion to sever]). This court never has adopted the position urged by defendant, however. We need not decide whether review for gross unfairness is available in the absence of a motion to sever or an objection to joinder, for even if such review is available, gross unfairness did not result in the present case. Ordinarily, [w]hen the statutory requirements for joinder are met, a defendant must make a clear showing of prejudice to warrant severance. [8] ( People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 27, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262; see also People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 172, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862.) The initial step in any review of a motion to sever is to examine the issue of cross-admissibility of evidence. Since cross-admissibility would ordinarily dispel any inference of prejudice [citations], we must inquire, had the severance motion been granted, would the evidence pertinent to one case have been admissible in the other under rules of evidence which limit the use of character evidence or prior similar acts to prove conduct [citations]. ( Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 448, 204 Cal.Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699, fn. omitted.) Under section 1101 of the Evidence Code, evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character ... is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion, but evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act is admissible when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident ...) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act. (Evid.Code, § 1101, subds.(a) & (b).) To be admissible, other-crimes evidence must be relevant to a material fact, and its admission must not be precluded by any rule or policy requiring the exclusion of relevant evidence. (See People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 146, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357.) Here, the identity of Benintende's killer was a disputed material fact. Defendant testified he had no memory of that killing, and defense counsel did not concede defendant killed Benintende. Further, evidence of the Clark killing was relevant to the issue of identity. We have explained: `To be relevant on the issue of identity, the uncharged crimes must be highly similar to the charged offense.' [Citation]. The similarity, considering the degree of similarity and the number of common marks, should amount to a signature. ( People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 111, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357; People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 403, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757; Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 450, 204 Cal.Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699.) Here, the Clark and Benintende murders shared a number of common and distinctive marks: both women were prostitutes who last were seen alive on Union Avenue in Bakersfield; both suffered multiple gunshot wounds to the torso; both bodies were dumped in the Arvin-Edison Canal, in rural areas about seven miles from each other; and both were killed with the same gun, which belonged to defendant. Accordingly, the evidence of the two attacks was probative of a common method or approach sufficient to support cross-admissibility on the issue of identity. ( People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 28, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262; see also People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1316-1317, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) Furthermore, no rule or policy would have required exclusion of the evidence pertaining to the Clark homicide in a separate trial on the Benintende count. The evidence was highly probative, and its probative value was not outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. (See Evid. Code, § 352.) The facts of the Clark killing, while sordid, were not unduly inflammatory. Accordingly, any inference that a joint trial prejudiced defendant's ability to defend against the Benintende charge is dispelled. (See People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 112, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357; People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 28, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) Likewise, at a separate trial of the Clark matter, evidence of the Benintende killing would have been admissible to establish intent to kill. Evidence demonstrating that defendant had killed another prostitute and dumped her body in the same canal in which Clark's body was found would have refuted defendant's claim that he killed Clark while in a dissociative state, and supported an inference that defendant intended to kill Clark. (See People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757 [`[T]he recurrence of a similar result ... tends (increasingly with each instance) to negative accident or inadvertence or self-defense or good faith or other innocent mental state, and tends to establish (provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the presence of the normal, i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such an act ...' quoting 2 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourne rev. ed.1979) § 302, p. 241]; see also People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d 867, 879-880, 248 Cal.Rptr. 172, 755 P.2d 355.) Further, the evidence was not more prejudicial than probative, because it did not encourage the jury to prejudge defendant's case based upon extraneous or irrelevant considerations. (See People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 958, 17 Cal. Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704.). Defendant asserts the joinder prejudiced him because, absent joinder, there likely would have been no capital charges. (See People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 110, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357 [prejudice may result from joinder where any one of the charges carries the death penalty or joinder of them turns the matter into a capital case].) If the cases had been severed, section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3) would not have applied, and under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2), the possibility of a death sentence would have arisen only if the first case to be tried had been the Benintende case, and only if there had been a conviction in that case. (Cf. Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 454, 204 Cal.Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699.) In view of the cross-admissibility of the evidence of the Clark homicide in the Benintende matter, however, conviction on the Benintende charges would have been likely even had the trials been severed. Accordingly, the joinder did not render the Clark offense a capital crime where otherwise it would not have been. We thus find that gross unfairness did not result from the joinder. Defendant argues the trial court's failure to instruct the jury it could not consider evidence of each murder as character evidence to show defendant's propensity to commit the other murder contributed to the prejudice resulting from the joinder. He further asserts this instructional lapse constituted an independent violation of his rights to due process and a fair trial. (See Panzavecchia v. Wainwright (5th Cir. 1981) 658 F.2d 337, 341; see generally Spencer v. Texas (1967) 385 U.S. 554, 561-563, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606.) We have held a trial court has no duty to furnish a limiting instruction on cross-admissible evidence in a trial of multiple crimes on its own motion. ( People v. Hawkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 942, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574; see also People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 281, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433; People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 163, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150.) In the context of limiting instructions concerning evidence of other crimes, we have recognized a narrow exception to the general rule not requiring sua sponte instruction: an objection may not be required in the occasional extraordinary case in which unprotested evidence of past offenses is a dominant part of the evidence against the accused, and is both highly prejudicial and minimally relevant to any legitimate purpose. ( People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 64, 177 Cal.Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534; see also People v. Lang (1990) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1020, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627; People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 251-252, 246 Cal.Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d 669.) Defendant contends this exception applies to the rule not requiring sua sponte instruction on the limited admissibility of cross-admissible evidence in joint trials. Assuming the exception applies, defendant would not benefit from it. The Benintende evidence was not a dominant part of the evidence concerning the Clark count. Although the Clark evidence was a major part of the evidence related to the Benintende count, it was neither highly prejudicial nor minimally relevant. Defendant's instructional claim thus fails. Defendant finally contends the joinder violated his Fifth Amendment right to testify on his own behalf in the Clark case while remaining silent in the Benintende case, his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense to the Benintende charges, and state and federal guarantees of equal protection of the laws (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7). Because defendant forfeited each of these claims by failing to raise them at trial (see People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 362, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708), we decline to address their merits. We note, however, that we previously have rejected an identical equal protection claim. ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 362, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.)