Opinion ID: 695267
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Enhancement for Criminally Derived Property

Text: 51 Vazquez contends that the district court's imposition of a four-level enhancement of his base offense level was improper. Under the applicable Sentencing Guideline at the time of Vazquez's sentencing, a defendant's base offense level for a structuring conviction was thirteen. United States Sentencing Guidelines Sec. 2S1.3(a) (1992). The Guideline also provided for an increase of four levels if the defendant knew or believed that the funds were criminally derived property. U.S.S.G. Sec. 2S1.3(b)(1). The Presentence Report (PSR) observed that, although Vazquez was only charged with structuring transactions amounting to $1.5 million, a total of approximately $7.5 million had been processed through the four accounts controlled by Vazquez and his co-conspirator, Vermeul. Based on the amount of money involved and the fact that Vazquez's legitimate income did not support another explanation, the PSR stated that Vazquez could not have believed his money came from a legitimate source. At the sentencing hearing, the district court found Vazquez's check-kiting story incredible. In overruling Vazquez's objection to the four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. Sec. 2S1.3(b)(1), the court found that, even though it would never know with certainty what the source of the money was, it was convinced that Vazquez was being used and that the funds involved were derived from some illegal activity. Vazquez made a timely objection to the adjustment of his sentence. We review the district court's factual findings at sentencing under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Malgoza, 2 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir.1993). 52 Vazquez argues that there was no evidence presented at trial to suggest that the deposited cash was criminally derived or that Vazquez knew or believed it was. Thus, he contends, the district court's enhancement of Vazquez's sentence was based on speculation and was clearly erroneous. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 993 F.2d 214, 218 (11th Cir.1993) ([T]he district court must not speculate concerning the existence of a fact which would permit a more severe sentence under the guidelines.). The government responds that having rejected the check-kiting story as untruthful, the district court was left with a carpenter whose annual income did not exceed $15,000, but who had structured $1.5 million in cash through his bank accounts. 11 53 We hold that the district court's finding that Vazquez knew or believed his funds were criminally derived is not clearly erroneous. As explained in our sufficiency of the evidence discussion, a factfinder may reject a defendant's story as not credible and use it as substantive evidence of his guilt. The district court in this case did just that and was entitled to infer from Vazquez's false explanation that he was being used as a cover for some type of criminal endeavor. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 848 F.2d 1134, 1139 (11th Cir.1988) ([T]he [defendants'] explanation of their activities was dubious, if not wholly incredible. A reasonable jury might well disbelieve the explanation and conclude that the [defendants] were lying in an attempt to cover up illegal activities.); United States v. Eley, 723 F.2d 1522, 1525 (11th Cir.1984) ([W]holly incredible explanations may also form a sufficient basis to allow the jury to find that the defendant had the requisite guilty knowledge.). This inference, combined with the amount of money involved, is adequate evidence to support the district court's finding. 54