Opinion ID: 2829984
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tony Iuli’s Conversation with His Wife

Text: Tony Iuli, along with Jay Palega, Tautai Seumanu and defendant, kidnapped and robbed Nolan Pamintuan, but aside from Tautai‘s testimony, the evidence showed that defendant alone fired the shotgun that killed the victim. The prosecutor eventually offered plea deals to Iuli and Palega in exchange for their testimony against defendant. During Iuli‘s testimony, the prosecutor, Angela Backers, questioned him about a conversation he had with his wife immediately following the crimes. When Prosecutor Backers asked Iuli what he told his wife, defense counsel objected on the ground the evidence was, among other things, hearsay. The court overruled the objection and Iuli replied that he told his wife that ―your fucking brother blew some dude away.‖1 Defendant contends the trial court erred in overruling his objection because the question called for hearsay to which no exception applied. Further, he argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court‘s alleged evidentiary error substantially undermined the reliability of his trial, violating his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (See, e.g., People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 423 [―high court decisions state as a general proposition that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prescribe heightened reliability for proceedings in capital cases‖].) ― ‗Hearsay evidence‘ is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.‖ (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) ―Hearsay is generally 1 Iuli‘s wife, Seu, was defendant‘s cousin, but Iuli testified that she was treated as, and considered, a sister to defendant. 8 excluded because the out-of-court declarant is not under oath and cannot be crossexamined to test perception, memory, clarity of expression, and veracity, and because the jury (or other trier of fact) is unable to observe the declarant‘s demeanor.‖ (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 608.) To challenge a testifying witness‘s own prior, out-of-court statement as inadmissible hearsay is unusual,2 but we agree with defendant that Iuli‘s own statement to his wife constituted hearsay evidence, for it was an out-of-court statement that was offered for its truth, i.e., that Seu‘s brother—defendant—killed someone. Both defendant and the People discuss the applicability of various exceptions to the hearsay rule but we need not address them because, even were we to assume the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence (see People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 956 [―a trial court‘s decision to admit . . . a hearsay statement . . . will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion‖]), any error was harmless under the Watson standard. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; see People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 618-619 [Watson standard applies to the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence].) Applying that standard, we conclude that, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, it is not ―reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error‖ (People v. Watson, supra, at p. 836), because the evidence of defendant‘s guilt was very strong, if not overwhelming. Iuli testified that he was with 2 ―Hearsay evidence is usually presented by someone other than the declarant. Typically, it consists of the testimony of a witness who heard the declarant make the statement . . . . [¶] Sometimes, however, the hearsay declarant is also a witness at the proceeding in which the out-of-court statement is introduced.‖ (1 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. Mar. 2014) Hearsay and Nonhearsay Evidence, § 1.9, pp. 7–8.) 9 defendant when they, along with Palega and Tautai, accosted the victim and robbed him, after which defendant shot and killed him. Iuli was thus an eyewitness to the crime. This evidence was corroborated by the testimony of Palega, also an eyewitness, and by evidence that Tautai told police that defendant was the shooter (although he later recanted). That Iuli told his wife the same information was cumulative to this eyewitness evidence and was thus not particularly prejudicial to defendant. Although defendant argues the admission of the challenged statement in Iuli‘s direct testimony, and not on redirect in an attempt to rehabilitate the witness‘s credibility, ―unduly magnified‖ the testimony such that it served as ―an effective and persuasive, if deceptive, vehicle for bolstering Iuli‘s credibility,‖ the claim is overstated. As Iuli‘s testimony was corroborated by Palega‘s testimony and evidence of Tautai‘s pretrial statements to police, and the jury was apprised of the circumstances and terms of Iuli‘s plea bargain, the jury had ample evidence with which to assess his credibility. Moreover, although the trier of fact did not observe Iuli when he made the statement to his wife, defendant remained free to cross-examine Iuli in front of the jury and have him recount the circumstances of the statement. In other words, defendant had a fair opportunity to challenge Iuli‘s ―perception, memory, clarity of expression, and veracity‖ (People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 608) about his assertion that defendant ―blew some dude away.‖ Under the circumstances, it is not ―reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.‖ (People v. Watson, supra, at p. 836.) We reach the same conclusion with regard to defendant‘s Eighth Amendment claim. Although the People argue defendant forfeited this claim by not specifically raising it at trial, we need not resolve the forfeiture question. Assuming for argument the issue was preserved, because there was no prejudicial 10 error under state law, any error regarding Iuli‘s testimony about his statements to his wife did not render defendant‘s trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate his right to a reliable penalty judgment under the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution. (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 194–195.) b. Iuli’s Opinion That Tautai Seumanu Intended to Take the Blame During the prosecutor‘s examination of Iuli, the witness described a pretrial encounter he had when he, Tautai and defendant were together in a holding cell. Iuli testified that defendant asked him and Tautai to ―take the blame off of him and that he would be out there taking care of us‖ by sending them money in prison. Iuli testified that he told defendant: ―Fuck no. You take your own beef.‖ According to Iuli, Tautai remained silent and did not appear angry. The following then occurred: ―Q. [Prosecutor Backers] What did Tautai do when [defendant] asked one of the two young guys to take the beef? ―MR. CIRAOLO [defense counsel]: Objection. Hearsay. ―THE COURT: Overruled. ―MS. BACKERS: Q. You can answer, sir. ―A. He didn‘t do nothing. ―Q. What was the look on his face? ―A. Don‘t know. ―Q. Did he get angry at [defendant] like you did? ―A. No. ―Q. Didn‘t you tell me he looked like he was going for it? ―A. Yes. ―MR. CIRAOLO: Calls for opinion and conclusion. Ask it be stricken. ―THE COURT: Sustained. It may be stricken. 11 ―MS. BACKERS: Q. Have you ever told anybody that Tautai looked like he was going to take the beef for somebody? ―A. Yes. ―Q. What made you say that? ―MR. CIRAOLO: Calls ultimately for the man‘s opinion and conclusion. It has been asked and answered. ―THE COURT: No. That is asking for factors he based his conclusion on. Overruled. ―MS. BACKERS: Q. What made you say that, Mr. Iuli? ―A. I think because it was his brother, his older brother. He wouldn‘t want to see his older brother go down.‖ (Italics added.) Citing the decision to overrule this last objection, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion under state law, and also violated the Eighth Amendment, by permitting the prosecution to introduce improper opinion testimony from Iuli regarding Tautai‘s intention to take the blame for the crimes. By doing so, defendant claims, the trial court allowed the prosecution to impeach Tautai‘s credibility before he was able even to take the stand and because Tautai was a key defense witness, such advance impeachment ―had a strength far in excess of its actual probative force.‖ Further, defendant argues, the prejudice from the error was amplified by the prosecutor‘s reference to Iuli‘s testimony on this point in her closing argument. Contrary to defendant‘s argument, Iuli‘s testimony regarding his perceptions was not improper opinion evidence from a lay witness. Evidence Code section 800 provides: ―If a witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to such an opinion as is permitted by law, including but not limited to an opinion that is: [¶] (a) Rationally based on the perception of the witness; and [¶] (b) Helpful to a clear understanding of his 12 testimony.‖ Likewise, we have explained that ―[a] lay witness may testify to an opinion if it is rationally based on the witness‘s perception and if it is helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony.‖ (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 153.) Iuli was a percipient witness to the encounter in the holding cell and he thus spoke from personal knowledge gleaned from his own participation in, and observation of, the event in question. Moreover, after he answered in the affirmative when asked whether he ―ever told anybody that Tautai looked like he was going to take the beef‖ for defendant, Iuli could properly describe his own motivation for telling someone that information. As noted, ante, the admission of evidence is generally tested by the abuse of discretion standard, and we find the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting Iuli‘s description of the encounter in the holding cell. Because there was no error under state evidence law, defendant‘s federal constitutional claim is meritless as well. (People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1196 [―Defendant‘s claims of federal constitutional error, entirely dependent as they are on his claim of state law error, likewise must fail.‖]; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 655 [same].) c. Evidence That Defendant Put Out a Contract to Kill Iuli During his testimony, Tony Iuli several times mentioned, or referred to, his understanding that defendant had taken out a contract on his life, presumably to prevent him from testifying or as retaliation for his decision to assist the prosecution. Defendant was initially successful in preventing questioning on this topic when the trial court sustained his hearsay objection. He did not, however, object to Iuli‘s later testimony on the same subject, which referenced the alleged contract three different times. He now claims the admission of this ―highly inflammatory‖ evidence violated the hearsay rule as well as his right to due 13 process of law and a reliable determination of facts in a capital trial, guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We address the three instances separately, and conclude no prejudicial error occurred. The issue of an alleged contract to have Iuli killed arose following Iuli‘s admission that his relationship with defendant soured after he told defendant to ―take [his] own beef.‖ The prosecutor then asked: ―Well, didn‘t you get a contract put out on you?‖ Defense counsel immediately objected, citing ―[h]earsay, opinion and conclusion,‖ which the trial court sustained. The court also sustained an immediate follow-up objection of ―no foundation.‖ The prosecutor pressed on and asked Iuli about an April 25, 2000, hearing at which both Iuli and Tautai were present in court. Iuli admitted he spoke to Tautai in Samoan at this hearing and told him of his intention to take an offered plea deal from the prosecution. Iuli advised Tautai that if the prosecution should offer him a similar deal, he should take it. The following colloquy then occurred: ―Q. [Prosecutor Backers] What else did you tell [Tautai]? ―A. I told him I have some heat on me. ―Q. You have some heat on you? ―A. Yes. ―Q. What does that mean? ―A. I have a contract out on me. ―Q. Did you tell him who put that out on you? ―A. Yes. ―Q. What did you tell him? ―A. I told him his brother did. ―Q. His brother Paki [i.e., defendant], right? ―A. Yes.‖ (Italics added.) 14 Defense counsel did not object to this first reference to the alleged contract on Iuli‘s life, an omission defendant acknowledges. The People argue defendant forfeited the claim by failing to object (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 894), but defendant contends we should find the issue is properly before us because his trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the above testimony. As we have often observed, whether or not to object to evidence at trial is largely a tactical question for counsel, and a case in which the mere failure to object would rise to such a level as to implicate one‘s state and federal constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel would be an unusual one. (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 493, fn. 3.) An attorney may well have a reasonable tactical reason for declining to object, and ― ‗[i]f the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.‘ ‖ (Ibid.) Here we discern two possible reasons why counsel may have refrained from objecting. First, counsel may have desired not to highlight the evidence by making an objection. ―[T]he decision whether to object, move to strike, or seek admonition regarding [undesired] testimony is highly tactical, and depends upon counsel‘s evaluation of the gravity of the problem and whether objection or other responses would serve only to highlight the undesirable testimony.‖ (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 165, italics added.) Second, defense counsel may have concluded—despite the trial court‘s initial decision to sustain a hearsay objection— that the challenged evidence was not hearsay because it was admissible not for its truth but as evidence of Iuli‘s state of mind that was relevant to his credibility. ―Evidence is relevant if it has 15 any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact or consequence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness. (Evid. Code, § 210 [citation.]) Thus, ‗ ―[e]vidence that a witness is afraid to testify or fears retaliation for testifying is relevant to the credibility of that witness and is therefore admissible. [Citations.] An explanation of the basis for the witness‘s fear is likewise relevant to [his] credibility and is well within the discretion of the trial court. [Citations.]‖ ‘ [Citation.] ‗Moreover, evidence of a ―third party‖ threat may bear on the credibility of the witness, whether or not the threat is directly linked to the defendant.‘ ‖ (People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 924–925.) That Iuli ―was willing to testify against a former member of the group despite his fear of retaliation was supportive of the credibility of his testimony‖ and thus admissible despite the rule against hearsay evidence. (People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 20, overruled on other grounds in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 239.) Where a sound legal basis exists for the admission of evidence, an attorney is not ineffective for failing to object to its introduction. (People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 403.) The testimony that Iuli believed defendant had taken out a contract on his life was admitted not to prove the contract actually existed, but rather to bolster Iuli‘s credibility by showing that he believed such a contract existed and was still willing to testify against defendant. There being a plausible reason why counsel did not object, we cannot conclude on this record that counsel‘s inaction lacked a reasonable tactical basis. In sum, not only did defendant‘s failure to object forfeit the issue for appeal, but the substantive claim is meritless. The issue of the alleged contract on Iuli‘s life arose again when he testified concerning what Tautai told him at that April 25, 2000, court hearing. This time, defendant adequately preserved the claim by making a timely, and continuing, objection: 16 ―Q. And what did Tautai say when you said that his brother Paki had put a hit on you, or put some heat on you? ―A. He said — ―MR. CIRAOLO [defense counsel]: Hearsay. Objection. ―THE COURT: Overruled. ―MS. BACKERS [the prosecutor]: Q. You can answer, sir. ―A. He said don‘t take — first he said he was going to take the blame, then he said: Don‘t take the deal and he‘ll try to talk to — try to talk to his brother. ―Q. To take the heat off of you, right? ―A. Yes. ―Q. So you are sitting here in the courtroom and you are about to take the deal, right? ―A. Yes. ―Q. You tell Tautai that his brother has put a hit on you? ―A. Yes. ―Q. You basically got a snitch jacket in this case, right? ―A. Yes. ―Q. You were the first one to confess back in May of ‘96? ―A. Yes. ―Q. And then on April 25th this year, here in this courtroom, when you told Tautai that his brother put a hit on you, he said he knew about it, right? ―A. Yes. ―Q. And he was going to try to talk you out of the deal? ―MR. CIRAOLO: Excuse me. Continued objection as to what Tautai said on hearsay grounds. ―THE COURT: Overruled.‖ (Italics added.) 17 Defendant contends this passage contains two pieces of inadmissible hearsay. The first is that Iuli believed that defendant had taken out a contract to have Iuli killed. As explained, ante, this evidence was not hearsay because it was admissible as circumstantial evidence of Iuli‘s credibility, i.e., that he was willing to testify despite the perceived danger of his being killed as a snitch. The second piece of allegedly inadmissible evidence was that Tautai knew about the contract. But the significance of Tautai‘s testimony was not simply that he was aware that defendant had initiated a contract to have Iuli killed, but that Iuli believed Tautai could convince defendant to rescind the contract if Iuli would change his mind and refuse to assist the prosecution. Thus, Iuli testified: ―MS. BACKERS: Q. Tautai was trying to talk you out of taking the deal, right? ―A. [by TONY IULI] Yes. ―Q. And he told you that if you didn’t take the deal that he could talk to his brother about taking the heat off of you, right? ―A. Yes. ―Q. What did you understand that to mean? ―A. Excuse me? ―Q. What did you understand that to mean, that Tautai would talk to [defendant] about taking the heat off, that he would lift the contract? ―A. Yes.‖ (Italics added.) Defendant contends the information embedded in this testimony—i.e., that defendant had taken out a contract to have Iuli killed—was inadmissible hearsay. We assume this claim was preserved by defendant‘s continuing hearsay objection ―to what Tautai said,‖ but as we have explained, the hearsay rule was inapplicable because the evidence of the contract was admissible not for its truth but to show Iuli‘s state of mind. The further point—that Tautai could convince defendant to 18 rescind the contract if Iuli changed his mind about testifying—was similarly admissible despite the hearsay rule, for this information was also relevant to Iuli‘s state of mind and, thus, his overall credibility: Iuli believed he could avoid being killed if he would decline to assist the prosecutor, but he was willing to testify against defendant anyway. The next part of Iuli‘s testimony on which defendant relies for this argument occurred just after the trial court overruled defendant‘s continuing hearsay objection to Iuli‘s testimony regarding Tautai‘s statements: ―Q. [Prosecutor Backers] And [Tautai] told you he was going to take the blame? ―A. [by Tony Iuli] Yes. ―Q. And part of your deal is that if you requested, you would be housed out of state, right? ―A. Yes. ―Q. During that conversation on April 25th, this year, towards the end of the conversation, did you tell Tautai that you have been sitting here for four years for something his fucking dumb-ass brother did? ―A. Yes.‖ (Italics added.) Defendant relies on the highlighted portion of this testimony to argue the trial court abused its discretion in denying his continuing hearsay objection. This was evidence of an out-of-court statement made not by Tautai, but by Iuli, and was apparently offered for its truth (i.e., that Iuli had been in pretrial detention for a murder actually committed by defendant). We need not determine whether this statement was improperly admitted because, like the statement that Iuli told his wife that ―your fucking brother blew some dude away,‖ the admission of this hearsay statement, if error, was manifestly harmless. Ample evidence, ranging from Tony Iuli‘s and Jay Palega‘s eyewitness accounts of the crimes, to evidence 19 from Tautai Seumanu (before he recanted), as well as evidence that defendant was in possession of property stolen from the victim, that the victim‘s blood was on defendant‘s jacket, that the murder weapon was found in a car to which defendant had exclusive access, and that defendant‘s thumbprint was on a box of ammunition that fit the murder weapon, supported the case against defendant. Moreover, the statement evidence—assuming for argument that it was inadmissible hearsay—was provided by the declarant himself (Iuli) while on the stand, and the jury could thus fairly assess his credibility. In these circumstances, it is not ―reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached‖ had this stray comment been excluded. (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) Any error was thus harmless. We also find that the combined effect of any evidentiary errors in admitting certain comments Iuli made while testifying does not require reversal under either state law or federal constitutional law. In light of the ample evidence of defendant‘s guilt, admission of the various stray comments defendant now challenges, even if error, together do not convince us that it was ―reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached‖ had these comments been excluded. (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) There being no prejudicial error under state law, we also find that any error regarding Iuli‘s testimony did not render defendant‘s trial so fundamentally unfair so as to violate defendant‘s right to due process and a reliable penalty judgment under the federal Constitution. (People v. Jones, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 933.)3 3 Defendant also contends the prosecutor‘s subsequent reference during the penalty phase to the alleged contract defendant took out to have Iuli killed (footnote continued on next page) 20 d. Admission of Gang Status List Prior to the parties‘ opening statements, the court and attorneys discussed the various exhibits. As to exhibit 46, a chart bearing gang nicknames,4 the prosecutor made a showing in support of admissibility, saying that after Pamintuan‘s murder, while the four participants were in custody, defendant ―wrote out, in handwriting, on a piece of paper this particular chart, which named him first, ‗Uso for Life‘ means ‗Brothers for Life.‘ ―It names Paki [defendant] first, Mr. Smurf, and says America‘s Most Wanted Samoans. This was a badge of honor for him, a stripe for him. He did this after he committed the murder while he was in custody and he gave that to Tony [Iuli] and asked him to type it up on the computer at Juvenile Hall. ―It is my position that the fact he wrote this out and said his name first, and then said Samoan Style America‘s Most Wanted Samoans is an admission he did the murder, but indicates consciousness of guilt and indicates absolutely no (footnote continued from previous page) undermined the reliability of the jury‘s penalty determination. We address that issue, post, in part II.B.4., finding the claim was forfeited. 4 The exhibit appeared like this: USO 4 LIFE MR. SMURF BIG TONE MAC.JAY RIP TEO (I LOVE YOU 4-4) T. SPOON FAGASA LIL. VIC PETE LIL. JAY LIL. TONE SAMOAN STYLE AMERICA‘S MOST WANTED SAMOAN‘S!!! 21 remorse.‖ Defense counsel and the trial court both disagreed, the latter saying it was a ―stretch‖ to characterize the document as an admission by defendant that he had murdered someone. The prosecutor stated she planned on using the document when questioning Iuli and the court deferred judgment on it, saying, ―We will cover it again.‖ The prosecutor did not, in fact, utilize exhibit 46 when questioning Iuli. When later cross-examining Tautai Seumanu, however, she referred to the exhibit in an attempt to impeach the witness. Tautai testified he did not remember the chart and had not previously seen the list. The prosecutor noted that if a gang member commits a murder, he ―earn[s] [his] stripes‖ and is ―going to be number one on that list,‖ and then asked, ―That is the whole idea behind it, right?‖ Tautai answered: ―Some.‖ Tautai testified that he killed Pamintuan to earn his ―stripes,‖ but admitted that although the murder ―[w]ouldn‘t necessarily move me to the top,‖ it would earn him respect in the gang. The trial court overruled defense objections that the questioning lacked a proper foundation (although it sustained some objections the questioning was argumentative or assumed facts not in evidence). Tautai confirmed ―uso‖ meant ―brothers for life,‖ and that the first person on the list (―MR. SMURF‖) referred to defendant, the third person on the list (―MAC.JAY) was Jay Palega, the fourth person (―TEO‖) was Iuli‘s brother, Tim Tao, who died in 1998, and the next entry, ―T.SPOON,‖ referred to himself, Tautai ―Teaspoon‖ Seumanu. Counsel objected on the basis that the prosecutor had failed to lay a proper foundation, and the prosecutor agreed to establish that the exhibit was in fact a gang status list. The prosecutor then asked the witness, ―Mr. Seumanu, . . . if you pulled the trigger in this murder, explain to the jury why you are number five on that list,‖ whereupon the trial court sustained defendant‘s renewed objection (based on lack of foundation) and the prosecutor moved on. 22 In a somewhat scattershot argument, defendant first contends the admission of testimony concerning the meaning of exhibit 46 was evidentiary error because the prosecutor failed to properly authenticate the exhibit and because it was hearsay. Defendant forfeited his hearsay claim because he failed to object on that ground. He did, however, object to the evidence on the ground that it was not properly authenticated, thereby preserving the issue for our review. We agree the prosecutor never authenticated exhibit 46: ―Authentication of a writing is required before it may be received in evidence.‖ (Evid. Code, § 1401, subd. (a).) ―Authentication of a writing means (a) the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is or (b) the establishment of such facts by any other means provided by law.‖ (Evid. Code, § 1400.) Tautai specifically denied having seen the document previously and disclaimed any knowledge that defendant was its author. Accordingly, Tautai could not authenticate the document, and because the prosecutor did not otherwise introduce evidence showing the list was in fact a status list for the Sons of Samoa street gang, the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to question Tautai about it. (Tony Iuli would later authenticate the document when he testified at the penalty phase.) But defendant‘s objection was eventually sustained, diminishing the possible prejudice. And Tautai exhibited general familiarity with the nicknames in the document and with the hierarchy of the Sons of Samoa gang in general, information that could have been elicited without reference to the list. Under the circumstances, we find any error in failing to authenticate the list was harmless. Second, defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by capitalizing on the improper evidence, ―inject[ing] herself into this case as a witness‖ and ―purveying hearsay,‖ and ―presenting information to the jurors that she could not reasonably expect to prove . . . by . . . other evidence.‖ He suggests 23 his federal constitutional rights were violated.5 Although defendant did not object on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct, we will assume for purposes of argument that the futility of an objection excused his failure to do so. Turning to the merits, however, we find no misconduct. The evidence of the gang status list was, for a time, admitted over defendant‘s objection for lack of foundation so the prosecutor did not act unethically by continuing to question Tautai about it until the court eventually sustained defendant‘s objection. The further claim Ms. Backers was ―purveying hearsay‖ cannot be sustained because the trial court never ruled the gang status list was hearsay. Finally, we have examined Backers‘s examination of Tautai and find her use of leading questions, which necessarily included stating facts she assumed the witness would affirm or deny, was justified because Tautai was an obviously hostile witness. We thus reject the claim the prosecutor‘s questioning of Tautai about the gang status list constituted misconduct. We further find no violation of defendant‘s right to confrontation, due process, and a reliable penalty trial under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.