Opinion ID: 3017105
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: James’ Contentions of Mistake or Neglect

Text: James cites, as neglect or mistake, alleged errors by the 7 District Court, opposing counsel, and her own counsel. With respect to the Court, James states that it erred in not considering Swierkiewicz and in not properly analyzing the Rule 60(b) motion.2 This “neglect” ascribed to the Court is an allegation of pure legal error, in applying the incorrect standard to James’ pleadings. She also contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in denying James a third extension on the time to file her opposition to the motion to dismiss. The “neglect” of the Magistrate Judge cannot fairly be characterized as erroneous, as he denied the extension as an exercise of discretion, and had previously noted (when granting the preceding extensions) that he was unwilling to further extend the time and that even the second extension “pushe[d] the limits.” App. of Appellants at 42 n.1. James concedes that the denial of the extension and the refusal to accept the late filing were within the Magistrate Judge’s discretion. See, e.g., Reply Br. of Appellant at 23. James faults opposing counsel in not citing to Swierkiewicz in her motion to dismiss, noting that attorneys have a duty to cite 2 The latter contention is, of course, irrelevant to the merits of the Rule 60(b) motion, as consideration of that issue is the purpose of this appeal. 8 controlling precedent, including precedent contrary to their own arguments. Opposing counsel’s alleged “neglect” is not actually neglect at all, in that the correct standard was cited. In its brief in support of its motion to dismiss, the Authority does not cite to any heightened pleading standard. In fact, the brief cites the liberal Rule 8 standard, and thus comports with Swierkiewicz, obviating the need to actually cite the decision. See App. of Appellant at 23. Finally, James describes her counsel’s error as failing to meet the deadline for filing her opposition to the motion to dismiss and failing to apprise the District Court of Swierkiewicz. The failure of James’ counsel to file timely opposition to the motion to dismiss would qualify as neglect, meriting the Pioneer analysis. Cf. Lorenzo v. Griffith, 12 F.3d 23, 27 (3d Cir. 1993) (employing excusable neglect analysis in the context of a failure to file timely discovery requests). However, James does not adequately allege counsel’s failure to file opposition as an independent ground for relief from the failure to cite Swierkiewicz. James’ arguments with respect to counsel’s neglect all refer to the consequence of the mistake as not providing the Court with the correct standard by which to judge the motion. However, as noted, the Authority’s 9 motion papers correctly describe the standard. In addition, the District Court’s denial of James’ Rule 60(b) motion makes it clear that the Court believed that it applied the correct standard and that it did not dismiss the case as a direct result of the lack of opposition from James. Therefore, it appears that James is not offering the failure to file opposition as an independent ground to grant relief from judgment, but rather as another reason why the Court made an erroneous ruling. This idea is reinforced by James’ statements that “[s]he made a timely Motion for Relief from Order upon learning that she had grounds,” Br. of Appellant at 17, and that “she could not have brought the error to the court’s attention any earlier because her counsel failed to recognize the error until recently,” App. of Appellant at 250. These statements clearly point to the failure of the Court to consider Swierkiewicz as the true error, and directly imply that counsel would not have cited that case in her opposition to the motion to dismiss (as she was unaware of it at that time). Cast in that light, the failure to file opposition is not, by itself, a stated ground for granting relief. B. The Significance of Legal Error Under Rule 60(b) As noted above, James’ contention of neglect is that the 10 District Court applied the wrong standard in granting the Authority’s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, before addressing the merits of this claim, we must decide whether such a contention of legal error can support a Rule 60(b) motion. This Court has stated that a “Rule 60(b) motion may not be used as a substitute for an appeal, and that legal error, without more does not warrant relief under that provision.” United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted); accord Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1988). As James points out, the precise bounds of this prohibition in the context of Rule 60(b)(1) are unclear. In Page v. Schweiker, 786 F.2d 150, 155 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1986), this Court set forth the positions of the other circuits on this issue: “some courts have held that legal error without more cannot be corrected under Rule 60(b)[, o]thers have held that legal error may be characterized as ‘mistake’ within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1), but only where the motion is made . . . within the time allowed for appeal.” Page, 786 F.2d at 154-55 (citations omitted). The Court noted that these positions were justified “under well-established principles [that] Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for an appeal” and explained that 11 “[w]ere the rule otherwise, the time limitations on appeal set by Fed.R.App. P. 4(a), and on motions to alter or amend judgments under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), would be vitiated.” Id. at 154. However, because the Court decided Page on other grounds, it stated that “[t]his court has yet to decide this issue, and we do not do so now.” Id. at 155 (footnote omitted). James argues that Page leaves open the possibility that legal error may be corrected under Rule 60(b)(1). The language in Fiorelli and Evans with respect to legal error and Rule 60(b), however, appears to foreclose this argument. At most, Page could be read to allow for the possibility that legal error could be addressed under Rule 60(b)(1) if a motion is made before the time for appeal has run. Here, James’ motion was filed well after the expiration of the window for appeal, and therefore Rule 60(b)(1) offers her no relief.3 There is absolutely no ambiguity over whether Rule 60(b)(6) may be used to correct legal error. This Court has unequivocally 3 James argues that she should not be penalized for failing to raise Swierkiewicz until after time for appeal had run, because her counsel failed to discover the case until then. See App. of Appellant at 227-28, 248. This actually undermines her argument, as it suggests that the proper avenue for the relief that she seeks would be an appeal, but that it was too late to file an appeal so she is trying to use Rule 60(b). This sort of behavior is precisely what the rules above attempt to curtail. 12 stated that “‘[s]ince legal error can usually be corrected on appeal, that factor without more does not justify the granting of relief under Rule 60(b)(6).’” Pridgen v. Shannon, 380 F.3d 721, 728 (3d. Cir. 2004) (quoting Martinez-McBean v. Gov’t of V.I., 562 F.2d. 908, 912 (3d Cir. 1977)); Page, 786 F.2d at 155 n.3. Therefore, neither Rule 60(b)(1) nor Rule 60(b)(6) can provide James the relief that she desires.