Opinion ID: 837953
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: retroactivity under federal law

Text: New legal principles, even when applied retroactively, do not apply to cases already closed. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 758, 115 S.Ct. 1745, 131 L.Ed.2d 820 (1995). This is because at some point, `the rights of the parties should be considered frozen' and a `conviction... final.' Id., quoting United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 296, 90 S.Ct. 1033, 25 L.Ed.2d 312 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). There are, however, certain special concerns  related to collateral review of state criminal convictions  that affect which cases are closed, for which retroactivity-related purposes, and under what circumstances. Id. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), the United States Supreme Court set forth the federal standard for determining whether a rule regarding criminal procedure should be applied retroactively to cases in which a defendant's conviction has become final. Teague established the general rule that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced. Id. at 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060. However, Teague laid down two exceptions to this general rule: first, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places `certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,' id. at 307, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (citation omitted); and second, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of those procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the first question under Teague is whether the rule in Halbert constitutes a new rule. `[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.' Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 314, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (citation omitted). Deciding whether a rule is new requires a court to determine whether `a state court considering [the defendant's] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution.' O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156, 117 S.Ct. 1969, 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997) (emphasis added and internal citations omitted). If a reasonable jurist would not have felt compelled by existing precedent, then the rule is new. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 413, 124 S.Ct. 2504, 159 L.Ed.2d 494 (2004). In other words, the relevant question is not simply whether existing precedent might have supported the rule, but whether the rule was dictated by then-existing precedent. Id. at 413, 124 S.Ct. 2504 (emphasis in original). We conclude that the rule in Halbert constitutes a new rule. Although Halbert found support in the earlier United States Supreme Court decision of Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963), that case did not clearly require the outcome in Halbert. Douglas held that when a state grants a first appeal as of right, the state is required to appoint appellate counsel for indigent defendants. Id. at 357, 83 S.Ct. 814. Because Michigan does not grant an appeal as of right to a defendant who pleads guilty, [1] and because the United States Supreme Court had previously decided that appointment of appellate counsel is unnecessary when an appellate court, such as a state's highest court, has the discretion to choose whether to reach the merits of a defendant's appeal, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974), a reasonable jurist could well conclude that Douglas did not compel the result in Halbert. Because it is more difficult ... to determine whether [the Supreme Court] announce[d] a new rule when a decision extends the reasoning of [its] prior cases, Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990), the new rule principle is designed to validate[] reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990). In Halbert, the dissenting Supreme Court justices argued against extending Douglas, further supporting the conclusion that Douglas did not compel the result in Halbert and that this Court's previous interpretation was reasonable. Because the rule in Halbert was new, the remaining question under Teague is whether either of the two Teague exceptions applies. The first exception is clearly inapplicable, as the rule in Halbert does not concern a rule that `forbid[s] criminal punishment of certain primary conduct ... [or] prohibit[s] a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.' O'Dell, supra at 157, 117 S.Ct. 1969 (citation omitted). Thus, the only issue is whether Halbert constituted a watershed decision that involved procedures ... implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478, 113 S.Ct. 892, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the limited scope of the second Teague exception. The Court has observed that because any such rule would be so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt [that it is] unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge, it should come as no surprise that we have yet to find a new rule that falls under the second Teague exception. Beard, supra at 417, 124 S.Ct. 2504 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has referred to the right to counsel set forth in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), as an example of a rule that would fall into the second Teague exception. It is significant that in referring to this example, the Supreme Court observed, In providing guidance as to what might fall within this exception, we have repeatedly referred to the rule of Gideon (right to counsel), and only to this rule.  Beard, supra at 417, 124 S.Ct. 2504 (emphasis added and internal citation omitted). Notably, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel articulated in Gideon and its progeny has a constitutional basis distinct from that underlying the Douglas line of cases addressing the right to counsel on appeal that are rooted in the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, considering that Halbert is unlikely to apply to any situation other than Michigan's unique legislative system of appeals from plea-based convictions, we agree with the Sixth Circuit that [i]t does not represent a shift in `bedrock procedural elements' and it cannot be said to be `on par' with Gideon.  Simmons v. Kapture, 474 F.3d 869, 887 (C.A.6, 2007) (Reeves, J., dissenting), adopted by Simmons v. Kapture, 516 F.3d 450, 451 (C.A.6, 2008) (holding that Halbert is not retroactive under Teague ). Additionally, a state is not required to provide any appellate proceedings at all for defendants who plead guilty. Halbert, supra at 610, 125 S.Ct. 2582. In Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 115 S.Ct. 1275, 131 L.Ed.2d 152 (1995), the Supreme Court held that [b]ecause due process does not require a State to provide appellate process at all, a former fugitive's right to appeal cannot be said to be so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt as to fall within this exception.... Id. at 120, 115 S.Ct. 1275 (citations and internal quotations omitted). [2] Considering these holdings, the provision of appointed counsel for such a proceeding can hardly be said to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Accordingly, in our judgment, Halbert cannot be construed as a watershed decision, neither of the Teague exceptions applies, and Halbert thus is not retroactive under federal retroactivity jurisprudence.