Opinion ID: 2596743
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Crow

Text: The Crow court relied on several United States Supreme Court cases, including Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), to conclude it was permissible to require a defendant to challenge the admissibility of laboratory reports and to show the necessity of the testimony of witnesses who prepared such reports. See Crow, 266 Kan. at 698-99, 705-06, 974 P.2d 100. The focus of the Crow opinion was on ensuring that the statutory requirements for the certificate were sufficient to ensure the reliability of its statements. In discussing this objective, the Crow court's analysis is replete with references to the key phrase of the Roberts test  indicia of reliability  and is largely based on the since-rejected theory that unconfronted testimony was admissible as long as it bore indicia of reliability or particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. See Crow, 266 Kan. at 699, 704-05, 974 P.2d 100. Once the Crow court concluded that the requirements of 22-3437 were sufficient to pass the Roberts indicia of reliability test, the court examined the notice-and-demand procedure and, in doing so, concluded the only grounds for an objection that will lead to live testimony of the analyst is one that reveals there is a real contest about the certificate's trustworthiness or reliability. Crow, 266 Kan. at 704-06, 974 P.2d 100. In reaching this conclusion the court relied on decisions from other courts, first discussing State v. Sosa, 59 Wash.App. 678, 800 P.2d 839 (1990), and then two New Jersey decisions. Discussing Sosa, the Crow court stated: [I]f we choose to uphold the constitutionality of this statute, we analyze it much as the Washington Court of Appeals did in State v. Sosa, 59 Wash.App. 678, 684-86, 800 P.2d 839 (1990), where it was held: (1) unavailability need not be shown because persons involved in routine activity are unlikely to recall the details of the transaction and cross-examination would serve little or no purpose; (2) the certified copy of the lab report is reliable evidence because skilled professionals, many with advanced degrees, perform the tests with no motive to falsify the report; (3) the statute parallels the firmly rooted business records exception; (4) the failure to subpoena the lab expert by the defendant was a waiver of a right under the rule and not the constitution, and (5) defense counsel's failure to demand the presence of the expert was not ineffective assistance of counsel.... Crow, 266 Kan. at 700, 974 P.2d 100. These reasons bear striking similarities to many of the arguments made in the Melendez-Diaz dissent, points which were countered (and rejected) by the majority. For example, in arguments similar to the first reason listed by the Crow court, the Melendez-Diaz dissenters proffered a variety of reasons a laboratory analyst should not be considered a typical or conventional witness. The reasons included: (1) The witness is not accusatory; (2) the report is nearly contemporaneous, (3) the analyst has not observed the crime or any human action related to it, and (4) the report and certificate are not made in response to interrogation. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2543-44, 174 L.Ed.2d 314, 342-44 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J., Breyer, J., and Alito, J.). The majority rejected each of these points and other assertions posed by the dissent, noting among other things that the arguments would exclude all expert witnesses from confrontation. Melendez-Diaz, ___ U.S. at ___-___, 129 S.Ct. at 2534-36, 174 L.Ed.2d at 323-25. Further, the Court stated: The text of the [Sixth] Amendment contemplates two classes of witnesses  those against the defendant and those in his favor. The prosecution must produce the former; the defendant may call the latter. Contrary to respondent's assertion, there is not a third category of witnesses, helpful to the prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation. Melendez-Diaz, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2534, 174 L.Ed.2d at 323. In addition, the Melendez-Diaz Court responded to several of the dissenters' points which, like the second and third Crow rationales, were married to and dependent on the Roberts test regarding the reliability of the evidence. The majority in Melendez-Diaz summarized many of these points in the dissent as being ones suggesting that the certificate should be admissible because it is the `resul[t] of neutral, scientific testing' ... [or] because `one would not reasonably expect a laboratory professional ... to feel quite differently about the results of his scientific test by having to look at the defendant.' [Citations omitted.] Melendez-Diaz, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2536, 174 L.Ed.2d at 325. Rejecting these arguments, the Court observed: This argument is little more than an invitation to return to our overruled decision in Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, which held that evidence with `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' was admissible notwithstanding the Confrontation Clause. [448 U.S., at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531]. What we said in Crawford in response to that argument remains true: `To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.... Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.' [541 U.S., at 61-62, 124 S.Ct. 1354]. .... Nor is it evident that what respondent calls `neutral scientific testing' is as neutral or as reliable as respondent suggests. Forensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation. Melendez-Diaz, ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2536, 174 L.Ed.2d at 325-26. In addition, the Court rejected a business record justification, stating: [T]he affidavits do not qualify as traditional official or business records, and even if they did, their authors would be subject to confrontation nonetheless. Documents kept in the regular course of business may ordinarily be admitted at trial despite their hearsay status. See Fed. Rule Evid. 803(6). But that is not the case if the regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial. Our decision in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943), made that distinction clear. There we held that an accident report provided by an employee of a railroad company did not qualify as a business record because, although kept in the regular course of the railroad's operations, it was `calculated for use essentially in the court, not in the business.' [Citation omitted.] Melendez-Diaz, ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2538, 174 L.Ed.2d at 328. The Court further explained why drawing a parallel to the business records exception did not provide a grounds for determining the Confrontation Clause did not apply, stating: As we stated in Crawford: `Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial  for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.' [541 U.S., at 56, 124 S.Ct. 1354]. Business and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation not because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because  having been created for the administration of an entity's affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial  they are not testimonial. Whether or not they qualify as business or official records, the analysts' statements here  prepared specifically for use at petitioner's trial  were testimony against petitioner, and the analysts were subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. Melendez-Diaz, ___ U.S. at ___-___, 129 S.Ct. at 2539-40, 174 L.Ed.2d at 329-30. These conclusions by the Court are contrary to the first three rationales of the Crow decision. The fourth and fifth reasons stated by the Crow court  that the defendant's failure to subpoena the laboratory analyst was a waiver of a right under the rule and not the Constitution and that defense counsel should assert the right by subpoenaing the witness if a waiver is not intended  are also disputed by the Melendez-Diaz majority, which stated: Respondent [the State] asserts that we should find no Confrontation Clause violation in this case because petitioner had the ability to subpoena the analysts. But that power  whether pursuant to state law or the Compulsory Process Clause  is no substitute for the right of confrontation. Unlike the Confrontation Clause, those provisions are of no use to the defendant when the witness is unavailable or simply refuses to appear. [Citation omitted.] Converting the prosecution's duty under the Confrontation Clause into the defendant's privilege under state law or the Compulsory Process Clause shifts the consequences of adverse-witness no-shows from the State to the accused. More fundamentally, the Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court. Its value to the defendant is not replaced by a system in which the prosecution presents its evidence via ex parte affidavits and waits for the defendant to subpoena the affiants if he chooses. Melendez-Diaz, ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2540, 174 L.Ed.2d at 330. Hence, the Crow court's rationales that derived from the Wisconsin decision are not valid in light of Crawford and Melendez-Diaz. As additional support for its holding, the Crow court cited New Jersey decisions  specifically State v. Matulewicz, 101 N.J. 27, 30, 499 A.2d 1363 (1985), and State in Interest of J.H., 244 N.J.Super. 207, 217, 581 A.2d 1347 (1990). In Matulewicz, the New Jersey court imposed requirements to assure that the conclusions in a laboratory analyst's certificate are reliable. 101 N.J. at 30, 499 A.2d 1363. Then, in State in Interest of J.H., the New Jersey court concluded the statutory procedure may be construed to establish a procedural framework under which the State may ascertain before trial whether a defendant will object to the admission of a laboratory certificate and, if so, whether the certificate satisfies the tests of reliability set forth in Matulewicz.  State in Interest of J.H., 244 N.J.Super. at 218, 581 A.2d 1347. Relying on this authority, the Crow court concluded that 22-3437 imposed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness and assured the reliability of the certificate's contents by specifying the required contents of the certificate, including many matters that would establish that the analysis complied with professional standards. See K.S.A. 22-3437(2); Crow, 266 Kan. at 704-06, 974 P.2d 100. The Crow court extended this analysis beyond the holding of the New Jersey court by addressing the standard to be applied in judging whether a certificate was to be admitted even if the defendant had stated some form of objection. Noting that 22-3437 required the trial court to determine whether the objection was sufficient, the Crow court reasoned that to have a right to confront the witness the defendant would have to establish that the trustworthiness and reliability of the certificate was in issue because, if it was trustworthy and reliable, there was no confrontation right under Roberts. Specifically, the court required that the grounds of the objection have an indicia of merit, not be interposed for delay, and result in a valid issue being contested at trial; in discussing this test, the court explained that an objection with an indicia of merit was one which attacked the reliability of the hearsay. Crow, 266 Kan. at 706, 974 P.2d 100. This reasoning, grounded on the Roberts test, was undercut by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177. As explained in Melendez-Diaz, it does not matter how reliable the evidence may be; a defendant still has a right to cross-examine the witness. ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2536, 174 L.Ed.2d at 325-26. In addition, even before Crawford was decided, the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Miller, 170 N.J. 417, 435, 790 A.2d 144 (2002), rejected Crow's holding, which it categorized as a minority position, when it addressed the question it had not reached in either Matulewicz or State in Interest of J.H.  whether a specific objection could be demanded of a defendant before the State is required to produce a witness. Miller, 170 N.J. at 435, 790 A.2d 144. In Miller, the New Jersey Supreme Court focused on the sentence in that state's statute providing that 'a proffered certificate shall be admitted unless it appears from the notice of objection and specific grounds for that objection that the composition, quality, or quantity of the substance submitted to the laboratory analysis will be contested at trial.' N.J. [Stat. Ann. §] 2C:35-19c. (Emphasis added.) Miller, 170 N.J. at 432, 790 A.2d 144. This portion of the New Jersey statute is strikingly similar to one sentence in K.S.A. 22-3437(3), which states: A proffered certificate shall be admitted in evidence unless it appears from the notice of objection and grounds for that objection that the conclusions of the certificate, including the composition, quality or quantity of the substance submitted to the laboratory for analysis or the alcohol content of a blood or breath sample will be contested at trial. There are differences between the two statutes, however, one of which is the New Jersey statute's requirement quoted above that the objection include specific grounds. Nevertheless, this statutory difference was erased by the holding in Crow, which imposed a requirement that the grounds of the objection have an indicia of merit, not be interposed for delay, and result in a valid issue being contested at trial. Crow, 266 Kan. at 706, 974 P.2d 100. In effect, this judicially imposed requirement made a defendant state a specific objection. In concluding such a requirement was unconstitutional, the New Jersey court stated that a defendant cannot, as a matter of constitutional imperative, be assigned any burden to detail an objection to the admission of [a forensic] lab certificate. Miller, 170 N.J. at 436, 790 A.2d 144. Observing that the State has the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the Miller court stated a defendant should not be required to vault a legal hurdle in order to exercise his or her right to confront State witnesses. Miller, 170 N.J. at 434, 790 A.2d 144. Citing similar decisions from other states, the New Jersey court noted: `When a defendant attempts to surmount the barrier, he finds himself in the untenable position of having to identify specific grounds in order to confront the analyst, but being unable to confront the analyst in order to identify the specific grounds. Requiring a defendant to request the presence of the witnesses against him and to explain why he requires their presence in order to be afforded his constitutional right of confrontation places too heavy a burden on the assertion of a constitutional protection.' Miller v. State, 266 Ga. 850, 472 S.E.2d 74, 79-80 (1996). Miller, 170 N.J. at 435, 790 A.2d 144. See State v. Christensen, 135 N.H. 583, 586, 607 A.2d 952 (1992); State v. Kent, 391 N.J.Super. 352, 381-82, 918 A.2d 626 (2007). This reasoning is sound. The purpose of cross-examination, in part, is to explore weaknesses in the reliability of a witness' testimony and, when that witness is a laboratory analyst, in the results of forensic tests. See Melendez-Diaz, ___ U.S. at ___-___, 129 S.Ct. at 2536-38, 174 L.Ed.2d at 326-28. Demanding that a defendant determine the nature of an objection to the reliability of the tests before questioning the witness imposes a difficult burden. Yet, this burden would have to be met to satisfy the Crow requirement that the objection have an indicia of merit, and merely stating an intent to attack reliability of the report would fall short. Moreover, the justification for imposing the requirement that there be an indicia of merit  i.e., the belief that a confrontation right only arose if the hearsay evidence did not have particularized guarantees of trustworthiness  is no longer valid in light of Crawford. We, therefore, abrogate and overrule the holding in Crow and conclude that decision imposes an improper hurdle on the assertion of a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause as interpreted in Crawford and subsequent decisions. There remains the question of whether, in light of our abrogating and overruling of Crow, K.S.A. 22-3437 itself is unconstitutional. The New Jersey court in Miller determined it was the word `specific' that caused its statute to violate the Confrontation Clause. The court excised that word and left the language that is similar to our statute  i.e., that an objection state grounds contesting the composition, quality, or quantity of the substance tested. The New Jersey court viewed this language as merely imposing a procedural requirement that did not create a barrier to the assertion of the right to confront the witness. Nevertheless, the court stated: We agree with the majority view expressed in legislation and case law that a defendant cannot, as a matter of constitutional imperative, be assigned any burden to detail an objection to the admission of an lab certificate. However, unlike some other jurisdictions, we see no reason to invalidate the entire notice and demand procedure. Rather, to avoid constitutional infirmity, we interpret N.J.S.A. 2C:35-19c to require only that a defendant object to the lab certificate and assert that the composition, quality, or quantity of the tested substance will be contested at trial. Miller, 170 N.J. at 436, 790 A.2d 144. While we could provide similar direction, the Kansas statute would still have provisions requiring the court to rule on the objection. This potentially leads to a pitfall that is made apparent by the circumstances of this case where Laturner's objection was not directed at contesting the composition, quality, or quantity of the substance tested but at learning information left out of the certificate and accompanying report  i.e., which three of the four bags tested positive for methamphetamine. This detail could be critical in defending a constructive possession case. Yet, if a defendant raised the same objection as raised by Laturner, a district judge considering the objection would be faced with the sentence in K.S.A. 22-3437(3) stating that the certificate shall be admitted unless it is established that the test results will be challenged. The objection would not satisfy this test, the district judge could deny the motion, and the defendant would be deprived of the right to confront the witness and the ability to clarify an ambiguity that might be crucial to the defense. As this illustrates, it is combination of the two sentences  one requiring the district judge to rule on the objection and the other stating that the certificate shall be admitted unless it meets the narrowly defined, permissible objection  that imposes too heavy a burden on a defendant's rights and causes us to conclude K.S.A. 22-3437(3) is unconstitutional when applied in a criminal case.