Opinion ID: 852726
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Propriety of Vehicle Dog Sniff Following Traffic Stop

Text: The defendant does not dispute the propriety of the traffic stop but argues that the traffic stop was completed before any reasonable suspicion arose, and that the police therefore lacked any valid basis to conduct the dog sniff of his vehicle. The use of narcotics sniffing dogs by police has recently been addressed by the United States Supreme Court. Deciding [w]hether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detention dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop, the Court declared that the use of a narcotics-detection dog generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 837, 838, 160 L.Ed.2d 842, 846, 847 (2005). It reasoned that [o]fficial conduct that does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy is not a search subject to the fourth Amendment, that government conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband compromises no legitimate privacy interests, and that the expectation that certain facts will not come to the attention of the authorities is not the same as an interest in privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable. Caballes, 125 S.Ct. at 837-38, 160 L.Ed.2d at 847 (included quotations omitted). The Court held that conducting a dog sniff would not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner .... Caballes, 125 S.Ct. at 837-38, 160 L.Ed.2d at 848. The Court did note, however, that a seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it if prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission. Caballes, 125 S.Ct. at 837, 160 L.Ed.2d at 846. The defendant does not contend that the canine sniff prolonged his own detention by the police. Rather, his claim is that, once the stop was complete, his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the police thereafter conducting the canine sweep of his vehicle. This claim fails for two independent reasons. First, as explained in Caballes, a canine sweep of the exterior of a vehicle does not intrude upon a Fourth Amendment privacy interest. Second, the trial court properly determined that the canine sweep was conducted before the traffic stop was completed. Noting that [t]his short time period [from the commencement of the traffic stop at 1:19 a.m. to the canine sniff beginning at 1:32 a.m.] did not reflect any delay on the part of Sgt. Turner and supports the State's contention that the traffic stop was ongoing, the trial court also found that at the time the canine was performing its sniff of the exterior of the vehicle, Sgt. Turner was engaged in the process of explaining the traffic citation to the Defendant and that Officer Turner had not completed the traffic stop prior to the time of the canine sweep of the vehicle. Appellant's App'x 76-77. While the determination of reasonable suspicion and probable cause requires de novo review on appeal, a trial court's determination of historical fact is entitled to deferential review. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-99, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1661-63, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 918-20 (1996). Both the defendant and the State agree that the court on appeal does not reweigh the evidence but considers the evidence most favorably to the trial court's ruling. See Duncan v. State, 799 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); Sullivan v. State, 748 N.E.2d 861, 865 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). A trial court's factual findings will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 434 (Ind.1993). Because it is supported by the facts and inferences from the record, we find no error in the trial court's determination of historical fact that the canine sniff test occurred while the traffic stop was ongoing.