Opinion ID: 1273626
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Taking of Private Property

Text: The Thomasons argue that section 15-67-270 is unconstitutional because it authorizes a taking of private property in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We disagree. Statutes are to be construed in favor of constitutionality, and this Court will presume a legislative act is constitutionally valid unless a clear showing to the contrary is made. State v. Brown, 317 S.C. 55, 451 S.E.2d 888 (1994). A legislative enactment will be declared unconstitutional only when its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution. See Westvaco Corp. v. South Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 321 S.C. 59, 467 S.E.2d 739 (1995). Section 15-67-270 allows a court of equity to issue a temporary license to an adjoining landowner for the purpose of improving his property only when it is otherwise impossible to accomplish the improvements and only after just compensation has been paid to the adjoining landowner. The statute is highly specific and only allows a license to be issued once particular requirements have been met. First, the statute requires that a petition be filed only after a good faith effort to obtain permission to enter the adjoining property has been made and the petitioner presents evidence of an actual request and denial of entry, or the imposition of unreasonable conditions upon entry. See S.C.Code Ann. § 15-67-270(B). Second, the statute requires the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing where a temporary license can be issued upon a finding: (1) the entry upon the adjoining property does not irreparably or unreasonably damage the adjoining property; (2) the grant of license is not an unreasonable encroachment or burden upon the adjoining property; and (3) the license is reasonably necessary for the improvement or preservation of the petitioner's property. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-67-270(D)(1)-(3). Further, section 15-67-270 requires the temporary license to specify the nature of the improvements, the dates of the operation of the license, the amount of compensation, that a copy of the court order will be provided to any person making improvements, and any other terms or conditions the trial court considers important. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-67-270(E)(1)-(6). The government is empowered by the state and federal constitutions with the authority to legislate for the protection of the public health, welfare, and morals. State v. Langley, 236 S.C. 583, 115 S.E.2d 308 (1960). Courts will not interfere with the enforcement of regulations designed for the protection of health, welfare, and safety of citizens unless they are determined to be unreasonable. Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955). The exercise of police power is subject to judicial correction only if the action is arbitrary and has no reasonable relation to a lawful purpose. Town of Hilton Head Island v. Fine Liquors, Ltd., 302 S.C. 550, 397 S.E.2d 662 (1990). The individual's privilege to use property freely is always subject to a legitimate exercise of the police power under which new burdens and restrictions may be imposed when the public welfare demands. Peoples Program for Endangered Species v. Sexton, 323 S.C. 526, 529, 476 S.E.2d 477, 479 (1996). The State has a legitimate interest in preserving property and can properly exercise its police powers to do so. Section 15-67-270 ensures property does not fall into such disrepair as to threaten the health and safety of the public. We find that section 15-67-270 has a reasonable relation to the lawful purpose of property preservation and is a valid exercise of the Legislature's police power. [1] Although we find section 15-67-270 is a valid exercise of the State's police powers, we will address whether it authorizes an unconstitutional taking under both the federal and state tests. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. 5. There are two main categories of takings: (1) where state law authorizes a permanent physical occupation of property; and (2) where state law so regulates property that it has lost all economic value. See generally Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) (holding a taking occurs where the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial use of property in the name of the common good); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (holding a permanent physical occupation authorized by the government is a taking without regard to the public interest it may serve). In this case, the temporary license did not authorize a permanent physical occupation because the license only allowed Main to enter the Thomasons' property for a temporary period, after fully compensating them for the intrusion. Further, the Thomasons did not lose all economic value in their property because they were still able to sell, rent, lease, and use their home despite the temporary license. Both federal and state jurisprudence have developed tests to determine whether a taking of private property has occurred. According to the United States Supreme Court, a balancing test must be used to determine whether a law or regulation causes a taking of private property. Three factors are typically balanced to determine whether the public benefit from the regulation outweighs the private harm to the landowner: (1) the character of the government action; (2) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; and (3) the degree to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment backed expectations. Penn Central v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). Under South Carolina's jurisprudence, a two prong test is used to determine when a taking has occurred. According to Long Cove Club Assocs. v. Town of Hilton Head, 319 S.C. 30, 458 S.E.2d 757 (1995), a land use regulation does not constitute a taking if: (1) the law in question substantially advances a legitimate state interest; and (2) the law in question does not deny an owner all economically viable use of his land. Id. Section 15-67-270 does not constitute a Fifth Amendment taking under either the Penn Central or the Long Cove standards. The character of the state action in question is an exercise of the police power in order to preserve property and prevent waste, not to acquire the Thomasons' driveway permanently for its own use. Section 15-67-270 advances the State's legitimate interest in preserving property, avoiding waste of valuable property, and promoting safe living environments. [2] The degree of economic impact on the Thomasons was nominal because they were paid $5,500 to compensate for the intrusion, and they have not claimed this amount is inadequate. Finally, there is no interference with investment backed expectations because the Thomasons retained the entire bundle of rights typically associated with property ownership during the duration of the temporary license, including the right of possession, right to sell, lease, devise, and rent their property. In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Broadway, Whitney Co., 57 Misc.2d 1091, 294 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1968) aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 927, 301 N.Y.S.2d 989, 249 N.E.2d 767 (1969), a similar licensing statute was held constitutional by the New York Supreme Court, Special Term and later affirmed by New York's highest court. The facts of the New York case are similar to this case. In Chase, the petitioner petitioned for a license to enter the respondent's premises for five days during a one month period in order to make necessary repairs to the rear wall of his premises. Id. at 417. The New York Supreme Court found the licensing statute was constitutional and a valid codification of well-settled principles of New York jurisprudence. While New York's property laws are more liberal than South Carolina's, our licensing statute is more protective and more specific than New York's. [3] For example, South Carolina requires the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine if the license is reasonably necessary and whether the license would cause irreparable harm to the adjoining landowner. The General Assembly also mandated that each license contain compensation as a necessary term. Finally, section 15-67-270(E) requires the license to specify the nature of improvements, the manner the improvements will be made, the dates of the license's operation, and any other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate to minimize disruption to the adjoining owner's or lessee's use and enjoyment of the property over which the license is granted. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-67-270(E)(1)(6).
The Thomasons argue section 15-67-270 is unconstitutional because it authorizes a taking of private property in violation of art. I, § 3 of the South Carolina Constitution. We find the Thomasons' claim under the South Carolina Constitution art. I, § 3 fails because section 15-67-270 is a valid exercise of the State's police power and does not constitute a taking. The South Carolina Constitution is more protective of due process rights than the United States Constitution because it specifically prohibits private property from being taken for solely private use, without the express consent of the owner. S.C. Const. art. I, § 23. Section 15-67-270 does not allow the State to take the Thomasons' driveway and turn it over to Main for his indefinite private use. This case concerns a temporary license. Moreover, section 15-67-270 concerns the exercise of the State's police power in order to preserve property for the public benefit. The cases relied upon by the Thomasons, Karesh v. City Council of Charleston, 271 S.C. 339, 247 S.E.2d 342 (1978), Clemson Univ. v. First Provident Corp., 260 S.C. 640, 197 S.E.2d 914 (1973), and Young v. Wiggins, 240 S.C. 426, 126 S.E.2d 360 (1962), are distinguishable from the instant case because they concern the State's eminent domain power, not the State's police power. See Karesh, supra (holding city could not use its eminent domain power to condemn land and then lease it to a private corporation to construct a parking facility); First Provident, supra (holding statute that allowed a permanent drainage ditch to be constructed over a neighbor's property was unconstitutional); Wiggins, supra (holding the use of the eminent domain power to create a private lake for private purposes was unconstitutional under the South Carolina Constitution). Furthermore, the other cases relied upon by Thomason, including Kline v. City of Columbia, 249 S.C. 532, 155 S.E.2d 597 (1967), Lindsey v. City of Greenville, 247 S.C. 232, 146 S.E.2d 863 (1966), and Webb v. Greenwood County, 229 S.C. 267, 92 S.E.2d 688 (1956), are distinguishable because they involve situations where government action occurring in the course of government operation results in injury to private property. See Kline, supra (holding a taking occurred where plaintiff's property was damaged as a result of a pulled gas line while the City was widening the street); Lindsey, supra (finding a taking where a government flood of private property was caused by release of water from a government operated dam); Webb, supra (finding a taking where damage to property was caused by government operation of a hydroelectric plant). These cases are distinguishable because no injury is caused to the Thomasons' property due to state action, the alleged damage comes from Main's ability to access their driveway and patio. [4] The Thomasons also argue that the interest given to Main was an easement, not a temporary license. Based on the plain meaning of the statute, we find the statute creates a temporary license, not an easement. An easement gives no title to land on which servitude is imposed, but it is a property or an interest in land. Morris v. Townsend, 253 S.C. 628, 172 S.E.2d 819 (1970). In this case, Main did not receive an ownership interest in the driveway, he only received permission to enter the Thomasons' driveway for a specific period of time. [5]