Opinion ID: 2352091
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: circumstances surrounding appellant's confession

Text: Although we hold that the trial court properly denied Appellant's motion to suppress his videotaped confession, we find that the trial court committed reversible error when it prohibited Appellant from introducing evidence concerning the circumstances under which he made that confession. Specifically, the trial court prohibited Appellant from introducing evidence that he confessed to committing the crimes only after Lt. Payton informed him that he had failed a polygraph examination and that the polygraph examination in question was not conducted in accordance with administrative regulations and accepted procedures. We agree with Appellant that the trial court's ruling was erroneous and prejudicial. In Crane v. Kentucky, [20] the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant's right to present a meaningful defense includes the right to present evidence regarding the credibility of his or her confession: [T]he physical and psychological environment that yielded the confession may ... be of substantial relevance to the ultimate factual issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence. Confessions, even those that have been found to be voluntary, are not conclusive of guilt. And, as with any other part of the prosecutor's case, a confession may be shown to be insufficiently corroborated or otherwise ... unworthy of belief. Indeed, stripped of the power to describe to the jury the circumstances that prompted his confession, the defendant is effectively disabled from answering the one question every rational juror needs answered: If the defendant is innocent, why did he previously admit his guilt? Accordingly, regardless of whether the defendant marshaled the same evidence earlier in support of an unsuccessful motion to suppress, and entirely independent of any question of voluntariness, a defendant's case may stand or fall on his ability to convince the jury that the manner in which the confession was obtained casts doubt on its credibility. . . . Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. We break no new ground in observing that an essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard. That opportunity would be an empty one if the State were permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence bearing on the credibility of a confession when such evidence is central to the defendant's claim of innocence. In the absence of any valid state justification, exclusion of this type of exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's case encounter and survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. [21] The Commonwealth argues that Kentucky's long-standing exclusion of evidence of polygraph results, [22] and rejection of any reference to polygraph examinations, [23] constitutes a valid state justification for the trial court's ruling. We hold, however, that, in the circumstances of this case, the defendant's right to present a defense trumps our desire to inoculate trial proceedings against evidence of dubious scientific value. The crux of Appellant's defense is that he was coerced and coached into a confession by the interrogation techniquesincluding the use of a polygraph examinationemployed by Lt. Payton and Det. Kearney. Appellant contends that when the investigating officers informed him that he had failed the polygraph examination and that he had lied to Lt. Payton in the process, hein large part because of his limited intellectual capabilities (see Part III(A)(3), supra )  confessed to a crime he did not commit. By preventing Appellant from making any reference to the polygraph examination, the trial court pulled the proverbial rug out from under Appellant's defense and left Appellant unable to present the jury with the factual circumstances that he alleged caused him to confess falsely. While this Court's position on the admissibility of polygraph evidence is clear, we also recognize that [e]vidence relating to the circumstances surrounding [incriminating] statements... may be indispensible to [an] appellant's right to present a defense to the crime charged. [24] In Commonwealth v. Hall, [25] the Court of Appeals reversed a trial court order suppressing allegedly incriminating statements made [p]rior to, and in preparation for, [a polygraph] examination... in the same room where the polygraph equipment was located. [26] The Hall panel, however, held that, although evidence of her confession was admissible, Hall could choose to introduce the circumstances of that confessionincluding the presence of the polygraph machineat trial in order to place before the jury all relevant evidence surrounding the circumstances of her questioning... for the purpose of impugning the credibility of her confession. [27] In support of its holding, the Hall panel relied upon an opinion from the Supreme Court of Minnesota, State v. Schaeffer . [28] The Schaeffer court addressed the defendant's right to present a defense in circumstances factually analogous to those presented herei.e., where defense counsel ... wanted to elicit some evidence about the polygraph exam in order to show the jury that the interrogation leading to the confession had coercive aspects to it. [29] The Schaeffer court held that such evidence was admissible despite Minnesota's general prohibition against polygraph evidence: Cases of both the United States Supreme Court and this court hold that after the trial court denies a motion to suppress a confession as an involuntary confession, the defense may present evidence to the jury on the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession[.] .... Notwithstanding the general inadmissibility of polygraph evidence, the trial court had no real choice but to grant defense counsel's request.... The choice rests with the defense attorney as to whether or not to inject the polygraph issue into the case for the purpose of attempting to show that it or the technique was a coercive factor. [30] We agree with the Schaeffer court and hold that, although polygraph evidence is not admissible in Kentucky, a defendantand only the defendanthas the right, as a matter of trial strategy, to bring evidence of a polygraph examination before the jury to inform the jury as to the circumstances in which a confession was made. In the circumstances of this case, we believe the trial court's exclusion of this evidence prevented Appellant from placing relevant evidence as to the credibility of his confession before the fact-finder, and we thus hold that the trial court erred to Appellant's substantial prejudice when it prevented Appellant from informing the jury as to the circumstances surrounding the disputed confession.