Opinion ID: 1223875
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages

Text: Clark next contends that the circuit court erred by refusing to give its proposed Jury Instruction Nos. 29 and 30 regarding Tabieros's duty to mitigate his damages, inasmuch as [t]he instructions given by the court failed to explain the consequences of [such] a failure to mitigate[.] We agree, on the record before us, that Clark's proffered jury instructions  or, at least, the non-cumulative substance of them  should have been given as a supplement to the instructions actually given by the circuit court. This court has, on several occasions, noted that `[i]t is prejudicial error for the court to refuse to give an instruction relevant under the evidence which correctly states the law unless the point is adequately and fully covered by other instructions given by the court.' State ex rel. Bronster v. United States Steel Corp., 82 Hawai`i 32, 52, 919 P.2d 294, 314 (1996) (quoting Agee v. Kahului Trucking & Storage, Inc., 67 Haw. 365, 369, 688 P.2d 256, 259 (1984)); see also Carson v. Saito, 53 Haw. 178, 180, 489 P.2d 636, 637 (1971) ([I]t is error to refuse to give instructions requested which correctly state the law on issues presented, unless the points are adequately covered by the instructions given. (Citing Gibo v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 299, 304, 459 P.2d 198, 201 (1969)).). Correlatively, `[j]ury instructions... must be considered as a whole. Moreover, a refusal to give an instruction that correctly states the law is not error if another expressing a substantially similar principle is given.' Montalvo, 77 Hawai`i at 286, 884 P.2d at 349 (quoting Pioneer Mill, 64 Haw. at 180, 637 P.2d at 1140 (ellipsis points in original)); see also Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikiki Corp.), 76 Hawai`i 494, 504, 880 P.2d 169, 179 (1994) (The trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing a requested instruction that is substantially covered by other instructions, even when the refused instruction is a correct statement of the law.). Thus, the line demarcating sufficient from cumulative instructions is a fine one: The function served by jury instructions is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the current case. The boundaries of the trial judge's discretion in performing this function are defined by the obligation to give sufficient instructions and the opposing imperative against cumulative instructions. However, if any policy is to be preferred, it is that of allowing adequate and thorough instructions to be given, if they can be given without undue prejudice or confusion. The trial judge does not exceed the limits of his discretion by reason of his refusal of a requested instruction which is substantially covered by other instructions, even when the refused instruction is a correct statement of the law. Tittle v. Hurlbutt, 53 Haw. 526, 530-31, 497 P.2d 1354, 1357 (1972) (citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, we have held that it is not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to refuse to give requested jury instructions that single out and unduly emphasize certain facts, in order to avoid the injustice of misleading the jury into thinking that because the court has specifically referred to these facts, the court believes them to be true. Id. at 532, 497 P.2d at 1358 (citations omitted); see also Gelber v. Sheraton-Hawaii Corp., 49 Haw. 327, 331, 417 P.2d 638, 640 (1966) (This court has pointed out that an instruction which singles out and unduly emphasizes certain facts, tends to mislead the jury into thinking that because the court has specifically referred to these facts, the court believes them to be true. (Citations omitted.)). With these general principles in mind, we turn to Clark's contention that the circuit court improperly refused its proposed jury instructions addressing mitigation of damages. Clark's proposed Instruction No. 29 read: The Defendants in this action contend that had Plaintiff Tabieros sought psychotherapy, the damage he sustained would have been greatly reduced. If you decide that the Defendants, or either of them, are liable, and if there is any evidence tending to show that such a contention is warranted, it is for you as jurors to determine whether an ordinarily prudent person in the situation of Plaintiff Tabieros would have acted otherwise than he did act in this case. You should consider, in determining by this test whether his conduct was unreasonable, all of the factors which may affect such a determination. To name but a few examples, you should consider his age and his mental state at the time; the gravity of the condition; the extent of his knowledge of the condition; the likelihood of psychiatric treatment resulting in an alleviation of the condition and the inconvenience, if any, of undergoing psychiatric treatment. If you should determine that Defendants' contention is correct, then it becomes your duty to determine, as best you can, the extent to which any damages otherwise awardable to the Plaintiff should be reduced as being attributable to the injured person's unreasonable conduct in this regard. (Emphasis added.) Clark's proposed Jury Instruction No. 30 read: Defendant Clark also contends that Plaintiff Tabieros has failed to mitigate his damages by trying to seek alternative employment. A party who has been injured and claims that his earning capacity has been damaged as a result has a duty to seek alternate employment to mitigate his damages. If you find that Plaintiff Tabieros did not make the effort which a reasonably prudent man in his postiion [sic] would have made to find alternate employment then it becomes your duty to determine, as best you can, the extent to which any damages otherwise awardable to Plaintiff Tabieros for lost earnings should be reduced as being attributable to his own unreasonable conduct in this regard. (Emphasis added.) The circuit court refused to give Clark's proposed Instruction Nos. 29 and 30. Instead, it instructed the jury as follows: It is the duty of any person, who has been in an injury, to use reasonable diligence and reasonable means, under the circumstances, to prevent the aggravation of such injuries and to effect a recovery from such injuries. Any person who claims damages as a result of an alleged wrongful act of another has a duty, under the law, to use reasonable diligence under the circumstances to mitigate or minimize those damages. However, defendants have the burden of proofing [sic] that plaintiffs breached their duty to mitigate damages. In other words, defendants must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff Tabieros did not take advantage of reasonable opportunities he may have [had] to prevent the aggravation of his injuries so as to reduce or minimize the loss or damages. None of the circuit court's other jury instructions touched on the issue of mitigation of damages. Clark's proposed Jury Instruction Nos. 29 and 30, as far as they go, are substantially correct statements of the law. This court has held that, [i]n contract or in tort, the plaintiff has a duty to make every reasonable effort to mitigate his [or her] damages. The burden, however, is upon the defendant to prove that mitigation is possible, and that the injured party has failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate his [or her] damages. Malani v. Clapp, 56 Haw. 507, 517, 542 P.2d 1265, 1271 (1975) (citations omitted). With respect to medical treatment, It is ... incumbent upon the injured person to submit to reasonable treatment and to follow the advice of a competent physician. No damages will be allowed which might have been prevented by submitting to treatment to which a reasonably prudent [person] would have submitted to improve his [or her] condition. As a rule, if the injury is aggravated by the plaintiff's neglect to follow the directions of his [or her] physician, he is to that extent debarred from recovering. Franco v. Fujimoto, 47 Haw. 408, 427, 390 P.2d 740, 751 (1964) (quoting 15 Am.Jur. Damages § 37, at 436), partially overruled on other grounds by Barretto v. Akau, 51 Haw. 383, 393, 463 P.2d 917, 923 (1969). On the other hand, [t]he mere fact that the [treatment] might have been [efficacious] is not sufficient to hold that [the] plaintiff acted unreasonably in not resorting to such treatment. Other factors, such as the cost of the [treatment], the inconvenience resulting from it, and whether or not it had been recommended by a medical expert, [are] pertinent to the issue. Franco, 47 Haw. at 429, 390 P.2d at 752 (citations omitted). And, as indicated, [t]he defendant ha[s] the burden of proving the facts which would operate to bring the mitigation into effect. Id. at 429-30, 390 P.2d at 752 (citation omitted). In our view, Clark's proposed Instruction Nos. 29 and 30 neither highlighted nor unduly emphasized any facts in such a manner as would have tended to mislead the jury into thinking that, because the circuit court had specifically referred to those facts, the court believed them to be true. Moreover, a considerable portion of the trial testimony dealt with (1) whether Tabieros had sought appropriate treatment for his psychological problems, (2) whether other work, at comparable salary, was available for Tabieros, and (3) whether he had sought such employment. Thus, sufficient evidence had been elicited regarding these issues to warrant jury instructions addressing them. The jury instruction given by the circuit court correctly apprised the jury of Tabieros's duty to mitigate or minimize his damages and Clark's burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Tabieros breached the duty. Clark's proposed instructions, however, focused on two points not adequately and fully covered by the circuit court's instruction. See United States Steel Corp., 82 Hawai`i at 52, 919 P.2d at 314; Carson, 53 Haw. at 180, 489 P.2d at 637. First, the instructions framed the general principles of mitigation within the context of the specific case at hand. Such instructions are preferable, so long as they can be given without undue prejudice or confusion. See Tittle, 53 Haw. at 531, 497 P.2d at 1357. But, second, and more importantly, Clark's instructions apprised the jury of the potential consequences, with respect to a jury award, of any failure on Tabieros's part to use reasonable diligence under the circumstances to mitigate or minimize [his] damages. The court's instruction provided no guidance whatsoever to the jury on this issue. It was precisely this type of deficiency that was outcome-dispositive in Gibo. Although there was no question in Gibo that the issue of [the] plaintiff's duty to use reasonable care to effect a cure and to avoid aggravation of injuries [was] adequately covered by the instructions given, we ruled that the instructions did not adequately apprise the jury as to the consequences of [the] plaintiff's failure to use reasonable care in that regard. 51 Haw. at 305, 459 P.2d at 202 (emphasis added). Accordingly, because the defendant's proposed instruction correctly stated the law applicable to the facts of [the] case and the trial judge's refusal to give the instruction was prejudicial error, we reversed the judgment, entered in the plaintiff's favor, on the issue of damages and remanded for a new trial on that issue. Id. at 306, 459 P.2d at 202. In the present case, as in Gibo, the circuit court failed to instruct the jury regarding the consequences of a possible jury finding that Tabieros had not used reasonable diligence under the circumstances to mitigate his damages by seeking appropriate employment or treatment. Moreover, the circuit court refused Clark's proposed jury instructions, which expressly addressed the subject. We therefore hold, in the event that the issue of Tabieros's failure to mitigate his damages is fairly placed before the jury on retrial, that Clark is entitled to an instruction regarding the consequences of such alleged failure to mitigate.