Opinion ID: 1602971
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claims against defendant memorial hospital at gulfport based on the one-year statute of limitations set forth in mississippi code section 11-46-11(3).

Text: ¶ 9. The trial court granted MHG's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment; thus, dismissing the action against MHG as time-barred pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 11-46-11(3), which states in part: All actions brought under the provisions of this chapter shall be commenced within one (1) year next after the date of the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability phase of the action is based, and not after; provided, however, that the filing of a notice of claim as required by subsection (1) of this section shall serve to toll the statute of limitations for a period of ninety-five (95) days from the date the chief executive officer of the state agency receives the notice of claim, or for one hundred twenty (120) days from the date the chief executive officer or other statutorily designated official of a municipality, county or other political subdivision receives the notice of claim.... Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3) (Rev.2002). The trial court determined that any negligence for which MHG would be liable had to have occurred on or before March 14, 2003, the date on which Mr. McDonald was discharged from MHG and admitted to SSH. The trial court ruled that since MHG did not receive notice of the claim until March 22, 2004, a little more than one year after Mr. McDonald's discharge from MHG, the action was barred by the statute of limitations. ¶ 10. However, since the trial court did not address the discovery rule with respect to section 11-46-11(3), we must do so today for the sake of clarity. This Court has held that a discovery rule applies to claims under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). See Caves v. Yarbrough, 991 So.2d 142, 154 (Miss.2008) (we therefore shall continue to recognize a discovery rule with respect to Section 11-46-11(3)). In Caves, decided after the trial judge's entry of judgments in today's case, this Court stated: We hold today that the MTCA's one-year statute of limitations begins to run when the claimant knows, or by exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of both the damage or injury, and the act or omission which proximately caused it. We further hold that the finder of fact (in this case, the trial judge) must decide when those requirements are satisfied. Caves, 991 So.2d at 155. Therefore, when analyzing claims under the MTCA one-year statute of limitations, trial courts must employ the discovery rule. When applying this rule to the facts of the case sub judice, it is evident that McDonald complied with the one-year statute of limitations. McDonald assuredly had no way of knowing of both the damage or injury, and the act or omission which proximately caused it until at least March 24, 2003, when her husband vomited blood and eventually died later that day. Id. McDonald submitted the statutory notice to MHG on March 22, 2004; so, even assuming arguendo that she discovered an actionable injury on March 24, 2003, McDonald complied with the one-year statute of limitations imposed by Section 11-46-11(3). Thus, the trial court erred in ruling that McDonald's claims were barred based on the statute of limitations. ¶ 11. However, the trial court correctly determined that [w]ithout a genuine issue of material fact as to causation established by experts plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment. McDonald designated three experts: Judith Kidd, Dr. Galvez, and Dr. Nichols. As addressed by the trial court, Nurse Judith Kidd testified via deposition to alleged breaches of nursing standards of care and their application to Mr. McDonald's treatment while a patient at MHG, but she failed to address causation. In her deposition testimony, Nurse Kidd (a registered nurse certified as a medical/surgical nurse and as a gerontological nurse) stated I don't speak to medical causation, acknowledging that she was not competent to testify as to medical causation. The two other experts, Dr. Galvez and Dr. Nichols, did not offer testimony regarding any alleged breach by MHG. ¶ 12. In order to establish a prima facie case of medical negligence, McDonald must prove that (1) the defendant had a duty to conform to a specific standard of conduct for the protection of others against an unreasonable risk of injury; (2) the defendant failed to conform to that required standard; (3) the defendant's breach of duty was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and; (4) the plaintiff was injured as a result. Delta Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Venton, 964 So.2d 500, 504 (Miss. 2007) ( citing Burnham v. Tabb, 508 So.2d 1072, 1074 (Miss.1987)). As a general rule, expert testimony must be used in proving these elements. Not only must this expert identify and articulate the requisite standard that was not complied with, the expert must also establish that the failure was the proximate cause, or proximate contributing cause, of the alleged injuries. Barner v. Gorman, 605 So.2d 805, 809 (Miss.1992) ( citing Latham v. Hayes, 495 So.2d 453 (Miss.1986)). Although McDonald offered evidence regarding breach of duty, she failed to produce any expert testimony that MHG or its agents were the cause of Mr. McDonald's injuries or death. As a result, the trial judge did not err in finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to causation, and the trial court thus properly granted summary judgment in favor of MHG. ¶ 13. We thus find this issue to be without merit.