Opinion ID: 166965
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence to Support Instruction.

Text: The district court denied King Soopers’ motion to strike Hussmann’s comparative negligence defense, stating: “Here, the jury can find from the evidence that’s in this case that this fire would not have had the disastrous . . . consequences if there had been reasonable care in the manner in which this building was designed and constructed.” Aplee. App. at 1556. King Soopers appeals from this ruling, contending that the district court abused its discretion because there was insufficient evidence to support the comparative negligence instruction. We review the district court’s decision to give a particular jury instruction for abuse of discretion. Allison v. Bank One - Denver, 289 F.3d 1223, 1241 (10th Cir. 2002). “Under federal law, an instruction is properly given if supported by competent evidence; only where there is sufficient evidence to support an issue or theory is the party offering an instruction entitled to have the instruction given.” Brownlow v. Aman, 740 F.2d 1476, 1490 (10th Cir. 1984); see also Thompson v. United States, 223 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000). Under Colorado law, comparative negligence is an affirmative defense to the plaintiff’s negligence action. E.g., Harris v. Ark, 810 P.2d 226, 231 (Colo. -6- 1991) (en banc). Colorado’s comparative negligence statute, § 13-21-111, provides in relevant part: (1) Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in any action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person for whose injury, damage, or death recovery is made. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111(1). Comparative negligence rules apply only when the evidence “would substantiate a finding that both parties are at fault.” Powell v. City of Ouray, 507 P.2d 1101, 1105 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973). Colorado’s comparative negligence statute requires a jury to “apportion the relative percentages of fault attributable to the plaintiff and the defendant.” Huntoon v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 969 P.2d 681, 687 (Colo. 1998) (en banc). Comparative negligence ensures that “no party shall be responsible for more than its share of the losses [and] that each shall account for its share.” Painter v. Inland/Riggle Oil Co., 911 P.2d 716, 719 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995), aff’d, 925 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1996) (en banc). In comparative fault, the plaintiff “has the duty to act as a reasonably prudent person by avoiding undue risk of harm to himself.” Fay v. Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc., 644 P.2d 68, 70 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981). After review of the evidence presented, we conclude that the district court -7- did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on comparative negligence. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that both Hussmann and King Soopers were at fault for the fire that destroyed the building. The evidence established that Anderson almost had the fire out, but then the fire spread in a rolling fashion because of the presence of the combustible insulation and old ceiling tiles. King Soopers built the store with combustible insulation without either draft stops or sprinklers above the drop ceiling. Several witnesses testified that the presence of draft stops or sprinklers above the drop ceiling could have prevented the loss of the building. Graham and Schumacher testified that combustible insulation should be covered with dry wall, but King Soopers left its insulation exposed despite manufacturer’s warnings printed on the insulation. Michael Bray, who is King Soopers’ architect, admitted that, if the change in insulation made the building combustible, the 1976 Uniform Building Code required the use of draft stops and sprinklers above the ceiling. Craddock testified that the store violated the building code because it had combustible insulation without either draft stops or sprinklers. Because there was ample evidence presented that would support a jury finding that both parties were at fault for the loss of the building, the district court did not abuse its discretion in submitting the comparative negligence instruction to the jury. -8-