Opinion ID: 2615564
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims concerning trial counsel

Text: McNelton argues that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to request a hearing pursuant to Petrocelli v. State, 101 Nev. 46, 692 P.2d 503 (1985), and failing to seek to exclude evidence concerning his arrest for possession of firearms. In his opening statement, the prosecutor said that during a search of McNelton's house, McNelton told LVMPD Officer Raymond Berni that he had a gun in the house and Berni impounded the gun. The prosecutor also said that Berni took a picture of McNelton. The defense did not object to these statements. Berni subsequently testified that on February 24, 1989, he was dispatched to 1237 Hart Street, the house McNelton was living in, because shots were fired from the residence. McNelton and another man gave Berni permission to search the house, and Berni found a shotgun and a pistol on the master bedroom floor. Berni identified a photograph of McNelton taken the day of the search as a Clark County Detention Center (CCDC) photograph; this testimony was stricken. However, the photograph, which had a piece of tape covering part of it indicating that it was taken at the CCDC, was apparently admitted into evidence. The trial judge then asked Berni what date the photograph was taken. Berni replied, The date of the arrest. This testimony was not stricken. After the next witness testified and outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that it was highly prejudicial for the jury to learn that McNelton was possibly arrested in February. The prosecutor stated that he had not wanted any information to come out about an arrest or the CCDC. In the argument on the motion, it came out that the judge had erroneously believed that one of the weapons that Berni found during the search was similar to the murder weapon. Despite this misunderstanding, the judge denied the motion. The judge agreed to admonish the jury with respect to Berni's testimony if the defense so requested, but the defense chose not to. The defense subsequently renewed the motion for a mistrial. The judge again denied the motion, concluding that McNelton had not suffered any prejudice. At the evidentiary hearing on the petition, the district court determined that a Petrocelli hearing should have been held. The court concluded that the trial judge should not have allowed evidence of the police response to the shots fired complaint because the guns involved had nothing to do with the gun used in the killing and that the trial judge misunderstood this. The court also concluded that although the photograph was relevant because it was included in a photographic lineup used to identify McNelton, testimony that the photograph was taken at the CCDC was properly stricken. The court further concluded that testimony that the photograph was taken the date McNelton was arrested should have been excluded, but that any prejudice resulting from this was slight considering the overwhelming evidence against him. Overall, the court concluded that the outcome of the trial would not have been affected even if the improper evidence had been excluded. McNelton argues that had trial counsel insisted on a Petrocelli hearing prior to the introduction of Berni's testimony, the judge would have known that neither of the guns found at the house was the murder weapon and the jury would not have learned that McNelton was arrested for possessing guns. McNelton argues that admission of the evidence was not harmless because it damaged his credibility and led the jury to disbelieve his alibi defense. We conclude that a Petrocelli hearing should have been held and evidence of the police response excluded. Prior to admitting evidence of a prior bad act pursuant to NRS 48.045(2), the district court is required to conduct a hearing on the record outside the presence of the jury and determine that: (1) the incident is relevant to the crime charged; (2) the act is proven by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. [1] Tinch v. State, 113 Nev. 1170, 1176, 946 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (1997); Petrocelli, 101 Nev. at 51-52, 692 P.2d at 507-08; see NRS 48.035(1). The CCDC photograph is relevant because it was used as part of a photographic lineup for witnesses. However, evidence that McNelton was arrested the day Berni searched the house and that guns were found in the house is not relevant and therefore not admissible pursuant to NRS 48.045(2). The district court's failure to hold a Petrocelli hearing does not necessarily require reversal of the conviction. Reversal is not necessary if: (1) the record is sufficient to determine that the evidence is admissible under Tinch; or (2) the result would have been the same if the trial court had not admitted the evidence. Qualls v. State, 114 Nev. 900, 903-04, 961 P.2d 765, 767 (1998). As discussed above, the evidence is not admissible under Tinch. Thus, we view Berni's testimony about the police response in light of all the evidence presented at trial to determine if the result would have been the same if the trial court had not admitted the evidence. Substantial evidence was presented against McNelton, namely the testimony of three witnesses, Andre and Linda Lee and Leroy Wilson, who witnessed McNelton shoot Glass. The evidence in support of McNelton's alibi defense was not as convincing. Randolph Lee, for whom McNelton worked from April through June 1989 in California as a laborer, testified that McNelton never missed work and never took time off to go to Las Vegas. However, Lee did not know if McNelton worked on May 13, 1989 (the day of the shooting), and did not keep any records. Further, Lee's testimony that McNelton never missed work to go to Las Vegas was undermined by the subsequent defense stipulation that McNelton was in Las Vegas on Monday, April 10, 1989, through Wednesday, April 12, 1989. Another of McNelton's former employers, Elmore Hearon, testified that McNelton worked for him in California for one year cleaning carpets beginning in February 1989. Hearon had time cards that he had initialed which showed that McNelton worked for him on May 13, 1989, from 5:00 to 9:30 p.m. However, the prosecutor called the validity of the time cards into question, arguing in rebuttal closing argument that the time cards were all initialed in the same ink even though Hearon claimed to have initialed them each day when the employees left work. McNelton's wife Wanda testified that on the day of the shooting, McNelton dropped her off at her friend Judy Lacy's house in Los Angeles. She and Lacy later went to a party where she met up with McNelton. At the end of the evening, McNelton dropped her off at Lacy's house, and he spent the night at a friend's house. The following morning, McNelton and Wanda returned to their house in Lancaster, California. Wanda's testimony was called into question during the state's rebuttal case. Richard Crotsley, a homicide detective for the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), testified that when he interviewed Wanda in September of 1993, she said that she did not remember what happened on May 13, 1989, because of an old head injury. She also said that her memory was not good. Wanda never mentioned the party to Crotsley. Lacy did not testify. We conclude that the result of the trial would have been the same if the court had not admitted Berni's testimony about the police response to the shots fired call. Accordingly, the district court's failure to hold a Petrocelli hearing where one was warranted does not mandate reversal of McNelton's conviction. Thus, McNelton was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to request a Petrocelli hearing, and therefore counsel were not ineffective.
McNelton argues that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to prevent the prosecutor from eliciting testimony from Michael Turner, McNelton's cousin, that McNelton was in custody prior to trial. Turner testified as an alibi witness. McNelton also argues that his trial counsel were ineffective because one of them testified with respect to this issue. During cross-examination, Turner mentioned that McNelton was in custody. The prosecutor asked Turner, Did you ever talk to [Wanda McNelton] about [McNelton] being arrested for murder? Turner replied, I found out through my family that my cousin was like incarcerated. Later in cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Turner about finding out that McNelton was incarcerated. On recross-examination, the prosecutor asked Turner about visiting McNelton in 1992 in Las Vegas, You mean to tell me that [McNelton] didn't ask you to testify in this matter way back in 1992? Turner replied, No, we didn't even talk about why he was in jail. The prosecutor then asked whether Turner knew why McNelton was in jail and whether anyone told Turner not to tell the jury that he had visited McNelton in jail. Mentioning that McNelton was incarcerated and eliciting that information from Turner was improper. We have previously stated that [i]nforming the jury that a defendant is in jail raises an inference of guilt, and could have the same prejudicial effect as bringing a shackled defendant into the courtroom. Haywood v. State, 107 Nev. 285, 288, 809 P.2d 1272, 1273 (1991). In Haywood, the prosecutor referred to the fact that the defendant had been in custody between the time of his arrest and trial; the prosecutor cross-examined the defendant about jail visits he received from friends and relatives. Id. at 287, 809 P.2d at 1273. We concluded in Haywood, however, that this error was harmless because five witnesses identified the defendant and other evidence connected him to the crime. Id. at 288, 809 P.2d at 1273. Likewise, we conclude that the error in the instant case was harmless because of the substantial evidence of McNelton's guilt. Counsel therefore were not ineffective on this ground. As noted above, McNelton also argues that one of his defense counsel, Drew Christensen, made matters worse by taking the stand shortly after Turner testified. Turner had testified on direct examination that the last time he saw McNelton was at the party in 1989. On cross-examination, however, Turner said that the last time he saw McNelton was when he visited him in the Las Vegas jail in 1992 and that Christensen told him not to say anything about that visit. When Christensen testified, he denied telling Turner not to mention visiting McNelton and said that he told Turner not to mention that McNelton was in jail because he did not want the jury to know that McNelton was incarcerated. Christensen could have bolstered Turner's credibility when he explained to the jury that Turner was not trying to hide anything, but simply thought that he had been instructed not to mention the jail visit. On the other hand, Christensen could have hurt McNelton if it appeared to the jury that Christensen was just trying to vindicate himself. We do not decide whether counsel's decision to have Christensen testify was right or wrong, but conclude that the decision was a tactical one and unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances not present here. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Howard v. State, 106 Nev. 713, 722, 800 P.2d 175, 180 (1990). Accordingly, we conclude that counsel were not ineffective on this ground.
McNelton argues that trial counsel were ineffective in failing to anticipate, prevent, and/or object to the prosecutor's statement in closing argument that McNelton failed to call Judy Lacy as an alibi witness. McNelton argues that this comment wrongly shifted the burden of proof to him. During rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor said: And then she [Wanda McNelton] comes into court during the course of this trial, and she tells you that she's certain that it was May 13th, 1989 that she went to this alleged party over at Felicia's house. And the Defendant was with her this entire time. And she's certain of it because of this illness that she had; she is positive. By the way, we never heard from Judy Lacy. I'm not saying that the Defense needs to bring her forward. But wouldn't it have been nice to hear from this person, the friend of the McNelton family? Regardless of that, and certainly don't hold that against them, it is my burden of proof to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. But when you're looking at credibility, certainly that's an issue for you to consider. (Emphasis added.) We disagree with the district court's conclusion that this comment went to Wanda McNelton's credibility and did not shift the burden to the defense. In Ross v. State, 106 Nev. 924, 926, 803 P.2d 1104, 1105 (1990), the prosecutor directed the jury's attention to the fact that a person whose testimony would have supported the defense theory did not testify and called on defense counsel to explain why [this person] didn't come forward. This court stated that such a comment could be viewed as impermissibly shifting the burden of proof to the defense. Such shifting is improper because it suggests to the jury that the defendant has the burden to produce proof by explaining the absence of witnesses or evidence. Id. at 927, 803 P.2d at 1105-06. This court concluded that the impact of the prosecutor's above comment, along with other of the prosecutor's statements including that the main defense witness was a liar, had the practical effect of shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. Id. at 927-28, 803 P.2d at 1106. The judgment was reversed on the ground that the errors were not harmless and deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Id. at 928-29, 803 P.2d at 1106-07. As in Ross, we conclude here that the prosecutor shifted the burden to the defense by commenting on Lacy's absence. If the prosecutor only intended to impugn Wanda McNelton's credibility, he could have asked the jury to consider why she failed to mention the party to LAPD Detective Crotsley when he interviewed her, or otherwise highlighted her admission that her memory was not good. However, we conclude that the prosecutor's comment did not deprive McNelton of a fair trial. Absent this comment, we conclude that the jury would have reached the same verdict. See id. As mentioned above, substantial evidence was presented against McNelton. See Rippo v. State, 113 Nev. 1239, 1253-54, 946 P.2d 1017, 1026 (1997) (because evidence of guilt was overwhelming, holding harmless error where prosecutor's closing argument comment that there was no testimony that the defendant was elsewhere when the murder was committed and other comments may have shifted the burden of proof to the defense), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 119 S.Ct. 104, 142 L.Ed.2d 83 (1998). Accordingly, we conclude that counsel were not ineffective on this ground.
McNelton argues that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to guilt phase jury instruction 18(a): In the State of Nevada the statute of limitations for the sale of a controlled substance is three years. This means that the office of the District Attorney may not commence a criminal proceeding against a suspect for sale of a controlled substance more than three years after the crime was committed. There is no statute of limitations for murder. McNelton argues that this instruction misled the jury about the fact that prosecution witnesses were receiving favorable treatment for their testimony, possibly because the instruction implied that the state's alleged failure to commence a criminal proceeding against prosecution witnesses indicated those witnesses were innocent. McNelton also argues that the jury was not alerted to those witnesses' bias in favor of the state. We conclude that this instruction did not mislead the jury in the manner McNelton suggests. First, McNelton does not produce any support for this argument, other than to generally allege that the state did not prosecute certain witnesses for selling drugs in exchange for their testimony. Although McNelton does not specify which witnesses received favorable treatment, he is presumably referring to Andre and Linda Lee and Leroy Wilson. Second, the jury would not infer from the instruction that the state refrained from prosecuting those witnesses because they were not involved in selling drugs. Andre Lee and Leroy Wilson admitted on direct examination that they sold cocaine at the time of the shooting. The jury may have discounted their testimony based on those admissions, regardless of whether those witnesses were ever convicted for selling drugs on that occasion. The jury may also have discounted those witnesses' testimony based on information elicited on cross-examination. For example, Andre Lee testified on cross-examination that in March 1993, he was convicted of attempted accessory to commit burglary and received a suspended sentence of two years in prison. Andre Lee also admitted that the main source of his income in 1989 was narcotic sales and that he used narcotics. On cross-examination of Linda Lee, she admitted that she sold cocaine. Finally, Wilson testified on cross-examination that he used cocaine and that drug sales were his only source of income. Accordingly, we conclude that counsel were not ineffective on this ground.
McNelton contends that trial counsel were ineffective because they failed to call his mother as a penalty phase witness. He argues that while counsel are bound, for example, by a client's decision regarding whether the client will testify, counsel were not bound by McNelton's decision that his mother not testify. Cf. SCR 152(1) (a lawyer shall abide by a client's decision concerning the objectives of representation). At the evidentiary hearing on the petition, defense counsel Christensen testified that although McNelton's mother was present in the courtroom, she was not called as a witness in mitigation because McNelton forbade the defense from calling her. The decision as to what mitigating evidence to present was a tactical one. See Howard, 106 Nev. at 722, 800 P.2d at 180. Because defense counsel attempted to have McNelton's mother testify but McNelton refused to allow them to do so, we conclude that defense counsel were not ineffective. Cf. Singleton v. Lockhart, 962 F.2d 1315 (8th Cir.1992) (holding that defense counsel was under no duty to put on mitigating evidence where the defendant made a knowing and intelligent decision not to present any mitigating evidence).