Opinion ID: 846467
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: application of lukity

Text: Notwithstanding my belief that the error involved in this case always requires automatic reversal, the majority's ruling in Lukity requires it. The majority in this case was the same majority in Lukity. It states that the failure here to instruct the jury on Frank Hawthorne's accident defense did not undermine the reliability of the verdict against him. It relies on the fact that the court instructed the jury on statutory involuntary manslaughter. The majority hypothesizes that the jury had no doubts about defendant's guilt of second-degree murder. Otherwise, it reasons, the jury would have convicted defendant of statutory involuntary manslaughter. The majority believes that, because the jury found that defendant's intent was not simply to point a weapon at the victim, the jury would have disregarded an accident defense instruction. That is sheer guesswork. Only four years ago, this Court rejected the very logic used by the majority now. People v. Silver, 466 Mich. 386, 646 N.W.2d 150 (2002). [7] Silver held that it was not harmless error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense. It reasoned that [n]ot to give [the jurors] an instruction that allowed them to agree with defendant's view of the events ... undermines the reliability of the verdict and violates MCL 768.32(1). Id. at 393, 646 N.W.2d 150. The majority does not and cannot reconcile its opinion here with its pronouncement in Silver. [8] It is undisputed that, at various points throughout the trial in this case, defendant presented evidence that the shooting was an accident. Even so, the trial court failed to give defendant's requested accident instruction. As in Silver, defendant was thereby deprived of a jury instruction on his view of the events. Therefore, just as in Silver, the failure here to give the instruction undermined the reliability of the verdict. This is emphasized by the majority's supposition about the rationale used by the jury in its verdict. Such a guessing game is inconsistent with this Court's precedent and the general concept of fair proceedings as recognized in Lukity and People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999).