Opinion ID: 2544268
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Erroneous Accomplice Liability Instruction

Text: An instruction that relieves the State of its burden to prove every essential element of an offense cannot be subject to harmless error analysis and is reversible per se. The accomplice liability instruction given here relieved the State of its burden to prove every essential element of the offenses charged. Consequently Borrero's convictions should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. The accomplice liability instruction given in this case, instruction 20, provides as follows: A person who is an accomplice in the commission of a crime is guilty of that crime whether present at the scene or not. A person is an accomplice in the commission of a crime if, with knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, he or she either: (1) solicits, commands, encourages, or requests another person to commit the crime; or (2) aids or agrees to aid another person in planning or committing a crime. The word aid means all assistance whether given by words, acts, encouragement, support, or presence. A person who is present at the scene and ready to assist by his or her presence is aiding in the commission of the crime. However, more than mere presence and knowledge of the criminal activity of another must be shown to establish that a person present is an accomplice. An accomplice may be tried for the crime, even though another person is not prosecuted. CP at 55 (emphasis added). Aside from the last sentence, which is irrelevant to the present issue, this instruction mirrors the language of WPIC 10.51. See 11 Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal (2d ed.1994). We have recently concluded, on two separate occasions, an accomplice liability instruction modeled on WPIC 10.51 is erroneous if it permits accomplice liability to attach when the defendant knows he is aiding in the commission of any crime as opposed to the crime with which he is charged. State v. Roberts, 142 Wash.2d 471, 511, 14 P.3d 713 (2000); State v. Cronin, 142 Wash.2d 568, 578-79, 14 P.3d 752 (2000). Roberts was a death penalty case. Michael Roberts argued the accomplice liability instruction given at his trial, which referred to a crime as opposed to the crime, improperly allowed the jury to convict him of aggravated premeditated first degree murder if they found he had general knowledge that his confederate was going to commit any crime. Roberts, 142 Wash.2d at 509, 14 P.3d 713. We agreed and held while general knowledge of the crime is sufficient, knowledge by the accomplice that the principal intends to commit `a crime' does not impose strict liability for any and all offenses that follow. Id. at 513, 14 P.3d 713. We concluded such an interpretation was contrary to the the statute's plain language, its legislative history, and supporting case law. Id. The plain language of the accomplice liability statute reads: (1) A person is guilty of a crime if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable. (2) A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: .... (c) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the crime. (3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if: (a) With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he (i) solicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other person to commit it; or (ii) aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it[.] RCW 9A.08.020 (emphasis added); see also Roberts, 142 Wash.2d at 509-10, 14 P.3d 713. Thus, an accomplice liability instruction which refers to a crime rather than the crime is in direct conflict with the plain language of the accomplice liability statute. 142 Wash.2d at 510, 14 P.3d 713. Moreover the legislative history surrounding the accomplice liability statute does not reflect an intention to create strict liability for accomplices. Id. The statute, which is based on section 2.06(3) of the Model Penal Code, establishes a mens rea requirement of `knowledge' of `the crime.' Id. at 510, 14 P.3d 713. The comment to Model Penal Code § 2.06(3)(a), which is identical to RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a), requires the accomplice to `have the purpose to promote or facilitate the particular conduct that forms the basis for the charge' and states, `he will not be liable for conduct that does not fall within this purpose.' Id. at 510-11, 14 P.3d 713 (quoting Model Penal Code § 2.06 cmt. 6(b) (1985)). An instruction which refers to a crime rather than the crime impermissibly allows a jury to impose strict liability on a defendant. Id. at 511, 14 P.3d 713. Finally, we determined in Roberts that nothing in our case law supports the proposition that an accomplice who intends to commit a crime is necessarily an accomplice to all crimes committed by his confederate. Id. at 511-13, 14 P.3d 713 (analyzing State v. Davis, 101 Wash.2d 654, 682 P.2d 883 (1984); State v. Sweet, 138 Wash.2d 466, 980 P.2d 1223 (1999); State v. Hoffman, 116 Wash.2d 51, 804 P.2d 577 (1991); State v. Rice, 102 Wash.2d 120, 683 P.2d 199 (1984)). Shortly after we decided Roberts, we issued our opinion in Cronin, 142 Wash.2d 568, 14 P.3d 752. There we again determined an accomplice liability instruction based on WPIC 10.51 which refers to a crime rather than the crime is erroneous because it is contrary to the plain language of the accomplice liability statute, its legislative history, and supporting case law. Id. at 578-79, 14 P.3d 752. We specifically referenced Roberts and concluded, as we did there, the fact that a purported accomplice knows that the principal intends to commit `a crime' does not necessarily mean that accomplice liability attaches for any and all offenses ultimately committed by the principal. Id. at 579, 14 P.3d 752 (citing Roberts, 142 Wash.2d at 513, 14 P.3d 713). Rather, our case law supports imposing criminal liability on an alleged accomplice only so long as that individual has general knowledge of `the crime' for which he or she was eventually charged. Id. Thus an accomplice instruction that imposes liability if an individual has knowledge of `a crime' as opposed to `the crime' is deficient. Id. The fact that the instruction was modeled on a Washington pattern instruction for a criminal case does not alter [the] conclusion. Id. Under Roberts and Cronin, the instruction given here was clearly erroneous. It permitted the jury to convict Borrero for all crimes committed by his confederates so long the jury found he intended to aid in the commission of any single crime. The State claims an erroneous accomplice instruction which permits the jury to convict a defendant as an accomplice if he knowingly participated in the commission of a crime as opposed to the crime is subject to harmless error analysis. Borrero contends such an error requires automatic reversal. Without any discussion, our majority simply assumes harmless error analysis applies. I disagree. Independent review of the pertinent case law supports Borrero's position. I begin with State v. Rader, 118 Wash. 198, 203 P. 68 (1922). There, Ingram Rader was convicted of second degree murder and appealed. Id. at 199. The sole matter considered by this Court on appeal concerned certain instructions given the jury at trial. Id. The jury instruction for murder made no provision that the defendant could escape conviction if the killing was justified. Id. When we examined Rader's conviction we noted, Murder in any form is the felonious killing of a human being. It is a killing without justification or excuse, yet all reference to this element is omitted by the court in its definition of murder in the first and second degrees. Id. at 203. Thus the instruction as given permitted the jury to convict the defendant irrespective of how justifiable his actions may have been. Id. We held the defendant was clearly entitled to have the element of justification brought before the jury and therefore we reversed. Id. at 204, 207. Ten years later we cited Rader with approval in State v. Hilsinger, 167 Wash. 427, 9 P.2d 357 (1932). Defendant Hilsinger, like Rader, was convicted of second degree murder under an instruction which erroneously failed to mention where the killing was excusable or justifiable the defendant was not guilty of murder. Id. at 433-34, 9 P.2d 357. We observed the appellant `was entitled to have the element of justification called to the attention of the jury in its definitions of the degree of murder.' Id. at 434, 9 P.2d 357 (quoting Rader, 118 Wash. at 204, 203 P. 68). We concluded the trial court committed reversible error in leaving out of its instruction defining murder in the second degree the elements of excuse or justification. Id. at 434, 203 P. 68 (emphasis added). Similarly, in State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wash.2d 799, 817, 259 P.2d 845 (1953), we found a jury instruction given at trial erroneously omitted an essential element of the offense of bribery. We observed: `In instructing a jury as to the statutory definition of the crime with which a defendant stands charged, all of the pertinent elements contained in the statute should be set forth.' Id. at 820, 259 P.2d 845 (quoting Hilsinger, 167 Wash. at 434, 9 P.2d 357). We concluded our prior decisions in Rader and Hilsinger required reversal. Id. at 821, 259 P.2d 845. State v. Allen, 101 Wash.2d 355, 678 P.2d 798 (1984), echoed this principle. We observed, It is clear that the trial court must instruct the jury on every element of the crime. Id. at 358, 678 P.2d 798 (citing Emmanuel, 42 Wash.2d at 819, 259 P.2d 845). We further noted, Failure to inform the jury that there is an intent element is thus a `fatal defect' requiring reversal. Id. (citing State v. Carter, 4 Wash.App. 103, 110-11, 480 P.2d 794 (1971)). More recently we concluded in State v. Byrd that [t]he State must prove every essential element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt for a conviction to be upheld, and [i]t is reversible error to instruct the jury in a manner that would relieve the State of this burden. 125 Wash.2d 707, 713-14, 887 P.2d 396 (1995). We held specific intent was an essential element of the crime with which Byrd was charged and, because the instruction given relieved the State of its burden to prove such intent, reversal was required. Id. at 716, 887 P.2d 396. State v. Eastmond, 129 Wash.2d 497, 919 P.2d 577 (1996), reconfirmed our commitment to the rule in Byrd. By relieving the State of its burden of proving every essential element beyond a reasonable doubt, the omission of an element of the crime produces [reversible error]. 129 Wash.2d at 503, 919 P.2d 577 (citing Byrd, 125 Wash.2d at 714, Allen, 101 Wash.2d at 358, 678 P.2d 798). We specifically addressed whether a jury instruction which omitted an essential element of the crime charged was subject to harmless error analysis in State v. Smith, 131 Wash.2d 258, 930 P.2d 917 (1997). Smith was convicted of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Id. at 259, 930 P.2d 917. On appeal the State conceded Smith was convicted under an erroneous instruction but argued the error was harmless. Id. at 262-63, 930 P.2d 917. We rejected this argument because while the jury instruction purported to set forth all the essential elements of the crime charged, in reality it did not. Id. We reversed the conviction and observed, Our holding today is in accord with prior cases out of this court holding that failure to instruct on an element of an offense is automatic reversible error. Id. at 265, 930 P.2d 917 (emphasis added). Finally, we noted these opinions were consistent with the then recent Supreme Court decision in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). This Court applied the rule of automatic reversal for failure to instruct on every element of the offense charged in State v. Jackson, 137 Wash.2d 712, 976 P.2d 1229 (1999); Cronin, 142 Wash.2d 568, 14 P.3d 752; and State v. Bui ( Cronin's companion case). These decisions are particularly germane to the case at bar because each involved an erroneous instruction on accomplice liability. Michael and Laurinda Jackson were convicted of felony murder of their foster daughter Breighonna. Jackson, 137 Wash.2d at 719, 976 P.2d 1229. Laurinda appealed her conviction on several grounds, one of which was that the accomplice liability instruction given at trial misstated the law. Id. at 720, 976 P.2d 1229. We agreed the instruction was erroneous and concluded the error required reversal. Id. at 727, 976 P.2d 1229. We held, In the final analysis, the instruction relieved the State of its burden of proving every essential element of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt .... The instruction, therefore, is not susceptible to harmless error analysis. Id. (citing Eastmond, 129 Wash.2d at 503, 919 P.2d 577; Byrd, 125 Wash.2d at 713-14, 887 P.2d 396). Our most recent case on point is Cronin. Like Borrero, Cronin was convicted of premeditated first degree murder on the basis of accomplice liability. Cronin, 142 Wash.2d at 577, 14 P.3d 752. At trial the jury was erroneously instructed it could find Cronin guilty as an accomplice to first degree murder so long as he was an accomplice to a crime (as opposed to the crime) committed by his confederate. Id. at 579, 14 P.3d 752. Like here, on appeal the State argued even if the instruction given was erroneous, such error was harmless. Id. We disagreed and concluded such error was not subject to harmless error analysis. Id. at 580, 14 P.3d 752. `The State must prove every essential element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt for a conviction to be upheld. It is reversible error to instruct the jury in a manner that would relieve the State of this burden.` Id. (quoting Jackson, 137 Wash.2d at 727, 976 P.2d 1229 (quoting Byrd, 125 Wash.2d at 713-14, 887 P.2d 396)). We further observed, In order to convict Cronin as an accomplice to premeditated murder, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Cronin had general knowledge that he was aiding in the commission of the crime of murder. Id. at 581-82, 14 P.3d 752 (citing Rice, 102 Wash.2d at 125, 683 P.2d 199; Davis, 101 Wash.2d 654, 682 P.2d 883). However, the accomplice instruction given permitted the jury to convict Cronin of premeditated murder merely if it found that he knew he promoted or facilitated `the commission of a crime.' Id. at 582, 14 P.3d 752. The error effectively relieved the State of the burden of having to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Cronin knew he was facilitating the crime of murder, [and thus] the instructional error cannot be deemed harmless. Id. We reached the same conclusion in Cronin's companion case, State v. Bui, 142 Wash.2d at 581, 14 P.3d 752. Bui was convicted on three counts of first degree assault on the basis of accomplice liability. Id. at 573, 14 P.3d 752. Again, the accomplice instruction referred to a crime rather than the crime. Id. at 572, 14 P.3d 752. We found, the jury instruction may have allowed the State to secure a conviction without having to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bui knew he was facilitating the commission of the crime of assault. Alleviating the State of this burden cannot be said to be error that is harmless. Id. at 581, 14 P.3d 752. The specific facts of the Bui case also help demonstrate why a rule of automatic reversal is well grounded. The jury in Bui, after being provided the erroneous accomplice liability jury instruction, asked the trial court judge whether a crime meant the crime charged or a crime of any kind. Id. at 573, 14 P.3d 752. This query alone serves as a recent example of how the improper use of a in the instruction in fact misleads juries to speculate about whether the defendant had knowledge he was promoting or facilitating the commission of any crime  charged or uncharged. In situations like here where juries may speculate about uncharged crimes, our majority provides no adequate remedy. While the majority provides no authority for its position that harmless error applies, my review of the case law suggests possible support for their position includes: State v. Hartley, 25 Wash.2d 211, 170 P.2d 333 (1946); State v. Thompson, 38 Wash.2d 774, 232 P.2d 87 (1951); State v. Martin, 73 Wash.2d 616, 440 P.2d 429 (1968). However, none of those cases specifically held an error which relieves the State of its burden to prove every essential element of an offense is subject to harmless error. Hartley does suggest a first degree murder instruction which erroneously omitted the words `unless it is excusable or justifiable'  was harmless error, if error at all. 25 Wash.2d at 225, 170 P.2d 333. However this statement was made only as an aside and only after we specifically concluded, It is thus apparent that the jury was fully and adequately instructed as to all the elements of murder in the first degree. Id. Similarly, while carefully selected language from Thompson seems to support the State's position, the actual holding of the case does not. Thompson involved an instructional error which did require reversal. We only speculated the instruction might not have constituted prejudicial error if there had been no conflict in the evidence, i.e., if Thompson's confession had specifically included the omitted element. 38 Wash.2d at 779, 232 P.2d 87. However that was not the issue presented and we did not address it further. One of the instructions issued in Martin failed to require the jury to find the defendant had knowledge of a certain fact. 73 Wash.2d at 625, 440 P.2d 429. Nevertheless we concluded the error was harmless because `knowledge of any particular fact may be inferred from the knowledge of such other facts as should put an ordinarily prudent man upon inquiry.' Id. at 626, 440 P.2d 429 (quoting former RCW 9.01.010 (1909), repealed by Laws of 1975, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 260). This is consistent with our later conclusion in State v. Deal, 128 Wash.2d 693, 911 P.2d 996 (1996) relating to permissive inferences. This differs markedly from the situation presented here where the State is relieved entirely of its duty to prove every essential element of the offense. When considering the legal authority for both sides, it appears the State has the weaker argument. While we have certainly applied harmless error analysis to erroneous jury instructions ( see Deal, 128 Wash.2d 693, 911 P.2d 996; State v. Bailey, 114 Wash.2d 340, 787 P.2d 1378 (1990); State v. Handran, 113 Wash.2d 11, 775 P.2d 453 (1989)), it is equally certain such analysis does not apply when, like here, the instruction relieves the State of its duty to prove all essential elements of the offense. We have consistently held an instructional error which operates to relieve the State of its burden to prove every element of the offense constitutes reversible error. The pedigree of this rule dates back to the early 1920s and we are bound to follow it. The foregoing review reveals the path we must follow when an instructional error relieves the State of its burden to prove every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt: the error requires a new trial. Cronin, 142 Wash.2d at 582, 14 P.3d 752 ([W]e have concluded that there was an instructional error that justifies a new trial for Bui on all of his convictions and a new trial for Cronin on his first degree murder conviction ....). Here the State was relieved of its burden to prove every essential element of the crimes for which it ultimately obtained Borrero's convictions. The improper use of a in Borrero's accomplice liability instruction allowed the jury to convict him for kidnapping or murder by speculating about whether he knew he was promoting or facilitating the commission of any crime whether charged or not. With the prosecution of Borrero for the charged crimes, sufficient evidence was also introduced supporting the conclusion Borrero committed two uncharged crimes, namely assault and robbery. This evidence suggested Borrero and others held guns to another person's body and then proceeded to rob that person. VRP (Mar. 2, 1998) at 125-27; VRP (Mar. 4, 1998) at 123-26. Under the erroneous accomplice liability instruction, it was therefore very possible the jury could have found Borrero was assisting in a crime, e.g., the uncharged assault or robbery, and used this finding to conclude he was guilty as an accomplice to the charged crimes. This requires reversal. The majority applies a harmless error analysis without explanation and concludes the instructional error was harmless. Majority at 259-260. However, even if harmless error is applied to this case, the State has failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice by meeting their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in this case did not contribute to the verdict. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-80, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); State v. Smith, 131 Wash.2d 258, 266, 930 P.2d 917 (1997); State v. Easter, 130 Wash.2d 228, 242-43, 922 P.2d 1285 (1996). We are not in a position to second guess the minds of each juror. Moreover, as acknowledged by the majority, the jury asked the trial judge during deliberation whether the accomplice liability instruction applied to both charged counts, and the judge told them that it did. CP at 31. From this the majority reasons the judge's response actually cured the error, remarking [t]he jury proceeded as though the proper instruction had been given. Majority at 259. This claim entirely overlooks the fact that the response only says the instruction applies to the charged crimes  it does not state the instruction does not apply to uncharged crimes for which there was evidence. [6] The only possible relevance the jury note has is that it is shows the jury was indeed focused on the erroneous accomplice liability instruction. This heavily weighs against any possible argument the State has that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. If the harmless error review even applies, and I do not believe it should, I would hold the State has not proved the instructional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.