Opinion ID: 1940167
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Claim 2: Failure to Challenge the Introduction of Improper Evidence

Text: In his second claim, Duncan challenges the following penalty phase testimony of one of the State's witnesses, Detective Nazarchuck: Q (Prosecutor): In the course of your investigation, did you as a representative of law enforcement become aware that Carrieanne Bauer indicated Donn Duncan made certain statements right after or, you know, within minutes after Deborah Bauer's stabbing? A (Detective Nazarchuck): Yes. Q: And those statements would be, would have included, I hope you die? Before the witness could respond, defense counsel objected to the testimony. The following colloquy then occurred in a bench conference: Defense counsel: Although the rules of evidence are relaxed in this type of proceeding, I think we're going, the state is going beyond the bounds of proprietary; that witness testified in this matter, there was testimony of the statement that they were afraid. This is just once again repetitive, a rehash of testimony that's already been entered in this case. Prosecutor: I have  well, I don't know your, what your legal objection is. What's the legal objection? Defense counsel: I put it on the record, ma'am. Prosecutor: Impropriety? I am questioning this witness, and what I'm establishing is what Carrieanne Bauer told law enforcement concerning the defendant's statements, there's actually a remarkable similarity to what he said in 1969, and after killing Willie Davis. That goes directly to  the defense is asking about whether or not he's, whether or not he has the ability to comprehend the criminality of his conduct. Both of these cases he clearly, he understood the criminality of the conduct. I'm establishing by identifying the statement, that is Carrieanne in no way could have had any idea what he said back in 1969; that he truly said those. The similarity, I want to establish they knew about the statements and they were recorded before law enforcement ever found the details of his case in Marion County. Defense counsel: That doesn't  Prosecutor: It makes it clear there was no hankey-panky about the similarity of the statements. Defense counsel: That not [sic] does not address the issue of it being repetitive testimony which has already been presented. Prosecutor: I am allowed to go into these things on the sentencing. The court: Okay. Prosecutor: I have to have him identify what statements his testimony is going to be about. The court: Okay. Defense counsel: The other thing, she was leading the witness. Prosecutor: I can ask him to repeat the statements. I was just trying to move it along. The court: Sustain the object as to leading. As far as the other objection, repetitious is an objection in the discretion of the Court. I think the time lag between the testimony that was given at the trial and the purpose the prosecutor wants to introduce the statements, at this time I think it's appropriate. It would not be appropriate to sustain an objection based on that. So I'll overrule that objection. The direct examination of the detective then continued: Q (Prosecutor): Detective Nazarchuck, could you tell us the statements that Carrieanne Bauer was to advise you during the course of the investigation that Donn Duncan had made after the stabbing of her mother? A (Detective Nazarchuck): Something to the effect, do you want some of this, of this, bitch. Then said I hope you die, bitch. I did this on purpose. I'll sit here and wait for the police. Q: Now, at the time that you became aware of Carrieanne Bauer's testimony as to what Donn Duncan said and as to his exact words, did you, as far as, you know, or any local representative of law enforcement have any information as to the details of the old Marion County case? A: I was not aware of any details until much later. The State had no further questions, and defense counsel did not cross-examine the witness. Essentially, Duncan is asserting two issues relating to the testimony of Detective Nazarchuck. First, Duncan maintains that the detective's testimony was impermissible double hearsay, as the State did not demonstrate that Carrieanne Bauer, who heard the statements made by Duncan, was unavailable to testify. Second, Duncan maintains that by allowing the detective to testify to Duncan's statements, the trial court permitted the State to present improper anticipatory rebuttal evidence of a mitigating circumstance, namely whether the defendant's ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired, for which no evidence had been or ever was presented. This anticipatory rebuttal allowed the State to present improper nonstatutory circumstances in aggravation. Duncan concludes that appellate counsel's failure to raise either of these claims on direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance. This Court has held that [t]o be preserved for appeal, `the specific ground upon which a claim is based must be raised at trial and a claim different than that will not be heard on appeal.' Spann v. State, 857 So.2d 845, 852 (Fla.2003) (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 609 So.2d 493, 499 (Fla.1992)). Further, we have also held that appellate counsel cannot be considered ineffective under [ Strickland ] for failing to raise issues that are procedurally barred because they were not properly raised during the trial court proceedings and do not present a question of fundamental error. Downs v. Moore, 801 So.2d 906, 910 (Fla.2001). In Knight v. State, 746 So.2d 423 (Fla.1998), Knight argued that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated when a detective who testified during his capital sentencing proceeding recounted a prior witness's sworn statement. See id. at 429-30. There, we held: [B]ecause Knight never specifically objected to [the detective's] testifying as to the contents of the pilot's statement, we find this claim procedurally barred. Id. at 430. In the instant case, defense counsel clearly objected to the State's line of questioning. However, the grounds raised for the objection were repetitiveness and leading; defense counsel did not object on the basis of double hearsay, anticipatory rebuttal, or the presentation of nonstatutory aggravation evidence. Pursuant to Spann, appellate counsel would only have been able to raise a claim on appeal, challenging the detective's testimony, based on one of the two grounds asserted during trial when defense counsel objected to the testimony. Duncan is now claiming appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert claims he was procedurally barred from bringing. As we held in Downs, appellate counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to raise issues that were procedurally barred. [9]