Opinion ID: 2625875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Faretta Motion

Text: On April 18, 1988, defendant moved to relieve his appointed attorneys, Halvor Miller and H. Clay Jacke, and represent himself. On April 22, before the court ruled on the motion, defendant withdrew it. Defendant now maintains the withdrawal was ineffective because it was motivated by confusion over whether the court was willing to appoint one of his current attorneys as advisory counsel and by counsel's unfulfilled promise to try to get him cocounsel status. He contends he was thereby deprived of his right of self-representation under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562. Defendant first moved for self-representation on April 18, 1988, but the request was put over to April 21. At a hearing on that day, defendant explained that although he wanted to proceed in propria persona, he wished to keep Attorney Jacke as advisory counsel. The court indicated that if it relieved Miller and Jacke, it was unlikely to appoint either as advisory counsel. The court stated it was not reasonable to be relieved, the attorneys, then have him come back as advisory counsel. If advisory counsel were needed, the court would decide whom to appoint, and [i]t may or may not include these two attorneys. The matter was continued to the next morning. On April 22, the court stated, inconsistently with the previous day's record of proceedings, that it had told defendant the previous day that in the event that he represented himself and he wished advisory counsel, that I would appoint advisory counsel and it would be between Mr. Jacke and Mr. Miller. It was up to him to decide. The court, however, noted it was unlikely to reappoint them if, at a later time, defendant decided he again wanted an attorney. Defendant thanked the court for making it clear to me what its intentions were, but stated he now would like to withdraw the motion to proceed in pro per. A short time later, the court again assured defendant that if he did represent himself and wanted advisory counsel, the court would appoint Jacke or Miller as such. The court would not, however, reappoint Jacke and Miller as defendant's attorneys. Defendant said he understood, though the court's intentions regarding advisory counsel appeared different than on the previous day. Defendant continued, nevertheless, my feeling is the court has determined it would not appoint Mr. Jacke or Mr. Miller as my attorney. That's when I decided not to continue with pro per status. The record makes plain that defendant's decision to withdraw his Faretta motion was not the product of confusion regarding the court's willingness to appoint Jacke as advisory counsel. Though on April 21 the court had suggested such an appointment was unlikely, on April 22 the court twice expressly stated that if defendant represented himself he could choose either Jacke or Miller as advisory counsel. Defendant twice indicated that he understood the court, but nonetheless wished to withdraw the motion. It was the court's unambiguously expressed unwillingness to consider future reappointment of Jacke and Miller as defendant's attorneys should he desire to terminate his self-representation, rather than its intentions regarding advisory counsel, to which defendant alluded in explaining his decision not to seek in propria persona status. In withdrawing his motion, defendant also noted that he understood from counsel that the court had indicated it was amenable, as an alternative to self-representation, to providing [him] some material to help prepare the case. The court agreed that appointed counsel could obtain certain law textbooks and other unspecified materials and that the court, or the department that had appointed counsel, could make an order allowing defendant to have such materials. Counsel subsequently sought, and in part received, permission from the court for defendant to have law library access and to keep research materials and a typewriter in his jail cell. Laterafter the Faretta motion was withdrawndefendant said that, in addition, he was under the impression that I was entitled to some type of legal status considering I was a sentenced prisoner .... The court observed that he was a state prisoner only as to his robbery conviction, since the murder conviction had been reversed and was to be retried. This issue was not resolved; the discussion ended with defense counsel stating they would file the appropriate motion at the appropriate time. It appears no motion for special legal status was filed. Defendant claims the withdrawal of his Faretta motion was invalid because it was induced in part by counsel's misrepresentation. We disagree. The record shows defendant twice stated he wished to withdraw his motion before counsel indicated they would file a motion regarding prisoner status. Defendant in no way indicated that he intended to condition the withdrawal on obtaining such status, and the record does not reflect any attempt to renew his Faretta motion when counsel failed to file a motion. Defendant may have been satisfied with the order allowing him access to research materials, or he may have become convinced that he was not entitled to state prisoner status because his conviction had been reversed. There is thus no indication in the record that the possibility of such status induced defendant to withdraw his request for self-representation.