Opinion ID: 1212962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Excessiveness and Passion and Prejudice

Text: As we have already mentioned, the trier of fact chose to believe competent evidence that: (1) Post-accident, pretrial pain was experienced by the plaintiff (2) in order to avoid or minimize this pain, the plaintiff refrained from engaging in some of his accustomed pleasures of life, and (3) some pain was likely to occur in the future. Thus, the only question which remains is whether the sum of $49,500.00 awarded for pain and loss of enjoyment of life is excessive or the result of passion and prejudice. In Fitzsimonds v. Cogswell, Wyo., 405 P.2d 785, 787 (1965), appellant appealed the amount of a personal injury award given by a trial judge and we said: There was an accident and plaintiff was injured. It cannot be denied she has suffered loss from the accident. There was testimony tending to show she has had substantial pain and suffering, and according to the physician who treated her she is left with a worsened physical condition and continuing pain and discomfort. The amount of damages was within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we cannot say there was an absence of evidence to support the award made. What we said in Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Like, supra, [381 P.2d 70, 76 (Wyo. 1963)] is particularly apropos here. The amount to be assessed for damages suffered by a plaintiff as a result of personal injuries is within the sound discretion of the trier of fact, unless the award is so excessive as to indicate passion or prejudice; and there is nothing in this case to indicate either passion or prejudice on the part of the trial judge. See also, Vivion v. Brittain, Wyo., 510 P.2d 21 (1973). The appellant argues that a comparison of this award to other awards for similar injuries would show that this award is excessive. We stated in Fitzsimonds v. Cogswell, supra, at 787, that We are sure counsel realizes that there is no way of obtaining uniformity in the amount juries and trial judges may award for damages in personal-injury cases. Because of the unique circumstances of each case as well as the adjustments which would necessarily have to be made for inflation, it is awkward to discuss the size of an award through comparison with past decisions. However, in researching other aspects of this case, we noted a 1972 decision from Missouri upholding against a charge of excessiveness an award of $30,000.00 for whiplash. Warriner v. Eblovi, Mo. App., 485 S.W.2d 700, 707 (1972). All but $1,512.15 of the ward was in the form of general damages. In Warriner the plaintiff had not suffered any pain other than the whiplash. In the instant case, the plaintiff clearly suffered pain from additional injuries. If allowance is made for this difference and for the marked erosion of the dollar since 1972, [4] the Warriner case would suggest that the amount awarded in the instant case is proper. Turning our attention to the remarks by the trial judge complained of by the appellant, we do not find evidence of passion or prejudice. Appellant complains that the trial judge supplied the missing diagnosis when he stated in response to a remark by plaintiff's counsel: Probably a soft tissue injury and you couldn't find it anyway. However, this comment came directly after the plaintiff's counsel conceded that he couldn't provide medical evidence of the plaintiff's neck injury. Obviously the plaintiff was alleging some sort of cryptic injury. The trial judge's remark indicated that he was willing to entertain a claim for such an injury. His remark may have also revealed his experience that most claims for neck injuries are allegations of soft-tissue injuries which do not show up on X-rays. As we have said in this opinion, the plaintiff is competent to establish past pain without medical evidence and this necessarily gives a plaintiff the right to present a claim of a cryptic injury. In indicating his willingness to entertain such a claim, the trial judge was merely stating the law. The plaintiff was not required to present a medical diagnosis, and the trial judge's remark therefore did not supply a necessary element of this case. It is true that the judge displayed an interest in the insurance liability limits. However, he respected appellant's desire not to disclose the limit and in this respect received the same answer that an inquisitive juror would have received. Curiosity is not evidence of passion or prejudice. The judge indicated that he had seen the file and knew the facts of the accident which facts had caused the defendant-appellant to concede liability. We do not think this shows prejudice. A judge will know and hear many things in the course of a trial that a jury will not. This is an obvious fact which we assume both counsel considered in deciding whether or not to request a jury trial. Finally, the judge remarked that he was sympathetic with the plaintiff's delicate situation with respect to the plaintiff's claim that the accident had impaired his ability to function in his present job. However, this sympathy was of no value to the plaintiff, since the trial judge awarded 0 for future lost wages (plaintiff had argued at trial that the injuries received in the accident retarded his promotion schedule) and awarded only $1,346.42 for past lost wages, an amount that was apparently attributable to the plaintiff's missed work immediately after the accident. Since we do not find the amount of the awards for past pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life to be excessive as a matter of law and since we do not find evidence of passion or prejudice on the part of the trial judge, we affirm these awards. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.