Opinion ID: 6330211
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim Against Officer Kerschen

Text: The district court erred when it determined that Officer Kerschen was not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s failure to intervene claim. Plaintiff claims that Kerschen failed to stop Ziegler’s allegedly excessive takedown and struggle, and that Kerschen had the “requisite notice, means, and opportunity to verbally and/or physically intervene on [Plaintiff’s] behalf; however, he instead did and said nothing to aid [Plaintiff].” (Appellee’s Br. 20.) But an officer’s “mere presence during [an] altercation, without a showing of some direct responsibility, cannot suffice to subject [him] to liability.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 475 (6th Cir. 2013). Indeed, “the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that officers are not liable under failure-tointervene claims when the ostensible ‘opportunity and means’ to intervene does not last long enough for the officer to ‘both perceive what was going on and intercede to stop it.’” Pelton v. Perdue, 731 F. App’x 418, 426 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Burgess, 735 F.3d at 475). To overcome the timing and opportunity requirements for failure to intervene cases, Plaintiff argues that Officer Ziegler’s use of force included the verbal orders at the beginning of Ziegler’s encounter with Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff contends that by the time that Ziegler employed the takedown maneuver, “despite the passage of one minute and 12 seconds,” Kerschen “made no attempt whatsoever to move towards Plaintiff or offer any assistance whatsoever in arresting him.” (Appellee’s Br. 40 (emphasis omitted).) For these reasons, Plaintiff claims, a reasonable jury could conclude that Kerschen had the opportunity and means to intervene and prevent the force used against him. (Id. at 38–40.) The exchange between Plaintiff and Ziegler involved profane language and was certainly stern and loud. However, that exchange was sufficiently distinct from the takedown maneuver that it might or might not be considered the same use-of-force incident. See City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 615 (2015) (holding that a Plaintiff “cannot establish a Fourth Amendment violation merely on tactics that result in a . . . confrontation that could have been avoided”) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Indeed, just moments before Officer Ziegler engaged in the maneuver, he put away his taser to free his hands so that he could handcuff Plaintiff and end the interaction. At that point, Kerschen could not have been on notice that the contentiousness between Plaintiff and Ziegler would continue and would result in No. 21-1371 LaPlante v. City of Battle Creek, Mich., et al. Page 14 Ziegler employing a takedown maneuver. And, importantly, Officer Kerschen did rush over to assist as soon as he secured Robbins’ handcuffs. Contrary to Plaintiff’s contentions, the video indicates that Officer Kerschen did not have enough time “to ‘both perceive what was going on and intercede to stop it.’” Pelton, 731 F. App’x at 426 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Burgess, 735 F.3d at 475). Accordingly, Officer Kerschen was entitled to qualified immunity.