Opinion ID: 1418568
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Court Approval of Wrongful Death Compromises

Text: Appellant argues that the lower court failed to apply this Court's holding in syllabus point seven of Arnold v. Turek, 185 W.Va. 400, 407 S.E.2d 706 (1991), in which we held that [a]ll of the eligible beneficiaries may, by a written agreement, compromise a wrongful death claim and allocate the share to be paid to each. Such a settlement agreement will be binding in the absence of fraud, duress, or other invalidating factors. Id. at 401, 407 S.E.2d at 707. Because all three of the beneficiaries who could recover from the wrongful death action agreed to the terms of the distribution agreement with regard to the settlement of the legal claim, as evidenced by their signatures to such document, [9] and because there has been no evidence of any factors that would invalidate the agreement, Appellant contends that the lower court erred in failing to approve the distribution as to her. [10] Rather than squarely addressing our decision in Turek, [11] the trial court looked to the wrongful death statutes for authority to withhold its approval of the distribution agreement. See generally W.Va.Code §§ 55-7-5 to -8 (Repl. Vol. 2000). As authority for examining the distribution agreement, the trial court looked to the language of West Virginia Code § 55-7-6 which provides that [i]n every such action for wrongful death the jury, or in a case tried without the jury, the court, may award such damages as to it may seem fair and just.  W.Va.Code § 55-7-6(b) (emphasis supplied). Immediately following its recitation of this statutory language, [12] the lower court stated: Thus, the wrongful death statute's compromise and settlement mechanism specifically contemplates court approval. While we do not disagree with the lower court's deduction that court approval was required of the settlement distribution, we find distinct and explicit statutory authority for our conclusion. In a separate statutory provision that governs compromises of wrongful death claims, the following language is set forth: The personal representative of the deceased may compromise any claim to damages arising under section five [§ 55-7-5] of this article before or after action brought.... Upon approval of the compromise, the court shall apportion and distribute such damages, or the compromise agreed upon, after making provisions for those expenditures, if any, specified in subdivision (2), subsection (c), section six [§ 55-7-6(c)(2)] of this article, in the same manner as in the cases tried without a jury. W.Va.Code § 55-7-7 (emphasis supplied). Thus, court approval of compromise agreements is specifically contemplated in the wrongful death statutory scheme. See Stone v. CSX Transp., Inc., 10 F.Supp.2d 602, 604 (S.D.W.Va.1998) (stating that [u]nlike other types of actions for damages, the wrongful death statute's compromise and settlement mechanism specifically contemplates court approval). Confusion has apparently resulted from this Court's holding in Jordan v. Allstate Insurance Co., 184 W.Va. 678, 403 S.E.2d 421 (1991), through which we required court approval of any settlement agreements in a wrongful death action that involved the claim of a minor. Ibid. at syl. pt. 1, 403 S.E.2d 421. Our holding in Jordan was based upon interpretation of West Virginia Code § 55-7-7, as amended and in effect in 1982. The following statutory language, which was instrumental to our decision in Jordan, provided that if any such persons are incapable from any cause of giving consent, the personal representative may compromise with the approval of the judge of the court wherein any such action has been brought. W.Va. Code § 55-7-7 (1982). While that language is no longer included in the current version of West Virginia Code § 55-7-7, its removal has no effect on our ruling in this case. This is because both the 1982 version and the current version of West Virginia Code § 55-7-7 contain additional language that distinctly addresses in an all encompassing fashion the need to obtain court approval of a compromise or settlement in a wrongful death action. Cf. W.Va.Code § 55-7-7 (1982) to W.Va.Code § 55-7-7 (1989) (Repl. Vol. 2000) (recognizing that approval of compromise or settlement in wrongful death action is required prior to distribution of proceeds). To quell any lingering confusion over this issue, however, we wish to make clear that the language of West Virginia Code § 55-7-7 clearly contemplates and requires that all compromises of wrongful death actions be submitted to the circuit court for approval. Even in instances where the only beneficiaries to such a compromise are adults, the statute requires that such agreements be presented to the circuit court for approval. W.Va.Code § 55-7-7. Although the role of the trial court in those wrongful death cases involving only adult beneficiaries, all of whom have consented to the terms of the settlement agreement, is necessarily limited, the trial court must still ascertain that each potential beneficiary has been included in the agreement and make inquiry regarding the presence any factor that could potentially serve to invalidate the agreement.