Opinion ID: 2637722
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the district court commit reversible error when it denied richardson's request for new counsel?

Text: On August 21, 2006, the district court conducted a hearing on pretrial motions. During the hearing, Richardson addressed the court and asserted that his appointed counsel had a conflict of interest and had spoken with other parties about matters relating to his defense. He also asserted that his previous appointed counsel had communicated confidential information to his new counsel. He contends on appeal that he had a valid reason for seeking appointment of new counsel and the district court committed reversible error when it denied his request for new counsel. The decision whether to appoint new counsel is subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McGee, 280 Kan. 890, 894, 126 P.3d 1110 (2006). Judicial discretion is abused when the district court's action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. The test for abuse of discretion is whether any reasonable person would take the view adopted by the district court. 280 Kan. at 894, 126 P.3d 1110. To warrant the appointment of new trial counsel, a defendant must show `justifiable dissatisfaction' with his or her appointed counsel. `Justifiable dissatisfaction' may be demonstrated by showing a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in communications between the defendant and his or her appointed attorney. [Citation omitted.] 280 Kan. at 894, 126 P.3d 1110. The district court engaged in an extended dialogue with Richardson, his attorney, and the attorney for the State and inquired at length about the nature of the asserted conflicts and the basis for Richardson's dissatisfaction with his attorney. Richardson's objections to his counsel were vague and had more to do with Richardson's unhappiness with being prosecuted than with the details of counsel's performance. Richardson said that he did not trust his attorney, that his attorney may not have spent enough time preparing for the trial, and that his attorney had spoken with a potential alibi witness. The court noted that Richardson was being represented by his fourth attorney at the time, that the attorney was a respected lawyer with decades of trial experience, and the attorney had read the complete transcript of the first trial and had attempted to contact an alibi witness. The court allowed an extended recess for Richardson to speak with his attorney privately. The court allowed Richardson to attempt to contact his alibi witness. The court also allowed recesses for Richardson and his attorney to speak with the prosecutor regarding a possible plea. The State offered to reduce the charge to attempted fleeing or eluding a police officera severity level 10 felonyand to reduce the requested sentence to time served. Richardson rejected that offer. The court found that Richardson's attorney had committed no breach of the attorney-client privilege and that contacts with other parties had been made solely for the purpose of preparing the best available defense. The court elected to deny Richardson's request for new counsel. Nothing in the record demonstrates a compelling communications problem or an irreconcilable conflict of such magnitude between Richardson and his attorney that this court would find that justifiable dissatisfaction necessarily existed. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to appoint new counsel.