Opinion ID: 1663653
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: lapse of the pre-emptive right to purchase

Text: The trial court finally found in the alternative that even if Johnson was orally offered a pre-emptive right to purchase Mandan Radio's real property, and even if said pre-emptive right to purchase was not barred by the statute of frauds or the parol evidence rule, Johnson's pre-emptive right to purchase lapsed when it was not timely exercised. The record reveals that the Mattco-Mandan Radio contract was signed on February 7, 1973. The record further reveals that Johnson was informed by telephone on February 9, 1973, as well as by a letter on February 14, 1973, that a sale of Mandan Radio's real property was being transacted and that Pursuant to [the] action taken at the annual meeting of the stockholders of Mandan Radio Association, Inc., held on May 25, 1964 ... Mandan Radio granted Johnson a sixty day period from the time of notification to match Mattco's offer. The record finally discloses that Johnson did not attempt to exercise his pre-emptive right to purchase Mandan Radio's real property until May 16, 1973-96 days after he was notified by telephone on February 9, 1973, as corroborated by the letter of February 14, 1973; thus allowing his interest to lapse. Johnson urges that his sixty-day pre-emptive time period should not be calculated from February 14, 1973. Rather, he contends that it should be figured from March 26, 1973, for three related reasons: (1) March 26, 1973 was the date Johnson received Mandan Radio's expense records for the real propertyinformation which Johnson had requested when he learned of his possible pre-emptive interest on February 9, 1973; (2) Johnson never received a reply or any negative indication to his letter to Mr. Strutz of March 27, 1973, in which letter Johnson had stated that he assumed that he had sixty days from March 26, 1973; and (3) that, since both Mattco and Mandan Radio were aware of the foregoing facts through their attorneys, their failure to object to Johnson's extension of his pre-emptive period should be held to constitute acquiescence in such extension. We reject Johnson's contentions. Johnson's alleged pre-emptive right to purchase was specifically limited to sixty days from the date of notice, and such time is of the essence. 77 Am.Jur.2d Vendor and Purchaser § 42 (1975); 8A Thompson on Real Property §§ 4445, 4446 (1963). See Horgan v. Russell, 24 N.D. 490, 140 N.W. 99, 101-103 (1913). The holder of a pre-emptive right to purchase real property cannot unilaterally enlarge its time period or add conditions to its running. Such modifications must be in writing and be signed by the party to be charged. § 9-06-04(4), N.D. C.C.; 8A Thompson on Real Property § 4461 (1963); and 91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 12 (1955). Further, the relationship between an attorney and a client is one of agency and cannot be presumed to be as broad as Johnson asserts herein. 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 67 (1937). Absent a showing of actual authority to modify the terms of the alleged pre-emptive right to purchase, neither Mandan Radio's nor Mattco's attorney could be presumed by Johnson to possess authority to modify the terms of the alleged pre-emptive right to purchase, and it could not be inferred from Mandan Radio's and Mattco's authorization of the execution of the agreement by their respective officers. 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 85 (1962). The judgment of the district court is affirmed. SAND and VOGEL, JJ., and DOUGLAS B. HEEN, District Judge, concur. ERICKSTAD, C.J., deeming himself disqualified, did not participate, DOUGLAS B. HEEN, District Judge of the Second Judicial District, sitting in his place.