Opinion ID: 1173567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Promises of Leniency

Text: Promises of lenient treatment by police officers or other persons in authority will taint admissions or confessions only if the promises were a motivating cause of the defendant's statements. ( People v. Johnson (1969) 70 Cal.2d 469 [74 Cal. Rptr. 889, 450 P.2d 265]; People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 548 [58 Cal. Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908]; People v. Brommel (1961) 56 Cal.2d 629, 632 [15 Cal. Rptr. 909, 364 P.2d 845].) As we noted in Johnson, If there was conflicting evidence, or if the facts admit of substantially conflicting inferences, the admissibility of the confession might depend on determining what was the motivating cause. [Citation.] (P. 478.) In the present case, the evidence regarding the motivation for defendant's inculpatory statements was conflicting. On the one hand, both the testimony of the interrogating officers and the inferences reasonably drawn from the tape-recorded interviews with defendant indicate that he was not motivated in any way by any promises of leniency. Detective Orman testified that before defendant's first and third interviews, the officer advised defendant that if he had a mental problem, the officer would try to help defendant by arranging treatment for him. According to Orman, no specific offers of help or treatment were discussed, and defendant showed neither interest in, nor made any response to, Orman's offer. Moreover, the transcripts fully support the view that defendant's confession of guilt was not a product of Orman's prior offer of help. The recorded interview during which that confession was made is very illuminating. It reveals that defendant had calmly and consistently denied any complicity whatever in the killings until the interrogating officer first accused defendant of stealing money from Mrs. Holland and then abruptly changed topics and asked defendant to relate what he did after he entered the bedroom and saw Theresa and the baby. This question apparently triggered a deep emotional response, for defendant lost his composure, began to cry, and immediately thereafter admitted that I hit the little baby. I don't know, I don't know, I don't know.... I hit her. Defendant's further responses, interspersed with sobbing, included the statement that he thought he hit Mrs. Holland with a hammer, and that I hit her, I hit her and I hit her and I hit her. Indeed, the majority seems to acknowledge that the officer's prior offer of help was not the motivating cause of defendant's admissions: Appellant continued to maintain innocence until the officers asked him to remember going in and seeing Theresa and the baby. This question had caused appellant, in the first interrogation conducted the day before, to lose his composure and begin sobbing. Again, the question triggered the same response from appellant. After 30 seconds of sobbing and crying and several more questions, appellant said that he had hit the little baby. ( Ante, p. 842, italics added.) In contrast, defendant told the jury that his admissions were motivated, in part at least, by the officer's offer of medical treatment, which defendant said he assumed meant that he would spend some time in a mental institution. The trial court was unimpressed. Yet the majority ( ante, pp. 839-840) seemingly accepts this testimony at face value, without considering the real possibility that it was pure fabrication designed to fit the legal principles above described. In any event, it was the trial court's responsibility to resolve the conflicting evidence on the question of motivation. In the present case, following a careful examination of the recorded interviews and live testimony by defendant and the interrogating officers, the trial court concluded that, although defendant may not have deliberately lied regarding his motivation, the reason he broke down and confessed was the type of questions that were being asked at that time, rather than any previous offer of medical assistance. The trial court denied on this very basis defendant's pretrial motion to exclude his statements, and accordingly we, in our appellate review, must accept the trial court's resolution of conflicting evidence.... ( People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d 595, 607.) The trial court was clearly in a better position than are we to decide whether an offer of help or treatment motivated defendant's confession. That is its function. Indeed, several cases from other states uphold trial court rulings on precisely this issue. ( State v. Traub (1962) 150 Conn. 169 [187 A.2d 230, 236] [prior offer of psychiatric treatment not linked to confession]; Thessen v. State (Alaska 1969) 454 P.2d 341, 346-347 [prior offer of help not motivating cause of waiver of Miranda rights]; Townes v. Commonwealth (1974) 214 Va. 683 [204 S.E.2d 269] [officers assured defendant that the courts would do something for his mental problem if he were guilty of the offense].) As expressed by the Virginia court in Townes, The trial court was entitled to find that the statement was not made to induce and in fact did not induce defendant's confession. (P. 271.) Likewise, in the present case the trial court was entitled to find that defendant's inculpatory statements were induced by perfectly legitimate police questioning immediately preceding those statements, rather than by earlier offers of help. The majority's contrary conclusion ignores the conflicting evidence on this issue and erroneously usurps the trial court's proper role in resolving such conflicts.