Opinion ID: 2974007
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of a Statutory Right

Text: Plaintiffs claim that 42 U.S.C. §§ 657(a) and 654(b), when read together, create individual rights enforceable through § 1983. In particular, plaintiffs urge that the statutory language creates a binding obligation on the States to provide full distribution of received payments within two days of receipt to the custodial parents, the intended beneficiaries of the statutes. The district court found that Congress did not create an enforceable individual right when it enacted these provisions. Instead, the court found that the provisions were intended to be instructive to the state agencies, and that the Title IV-D enforcement scheme militates against the finding of enforceable individual rights. Hughlett v. Romer-Sensky, No. 01-CV-476 at 12-13 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2005) (hereinafter “slip op.”). In so finding, the court agreed with the Eighth Circuit’s ruling in Walters v. Weiss. In Weiss, the court found that § 657(a) did not require strict compliance for the distribution of collected support, and that it was not intended to confer an individual right to payments free of administrative costs. 392 F.3d 306, 313 (8th Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs appeal this decision of the district court. No. 05-3299 Hughlett, et al. v. Romer-Sensky, et al. Page 4 To decide whether these provisions give rise to individual rights enforceable through § 1983, we look at the language of the statute to decipher congressional intent. In Blessing v. Freestone, the Court set out the following three-step inquiry to determine whether a statute gives rise to a federal right: First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so “vague and amorphous” that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. In other words, the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory terms. 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (internal citations omitted). Later, in Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Supreme Court clarified the first Blessing inquiry, ruling that it is not enough for a plaintiff to fall “within the general zone of interest that the statute is intended to protect.” 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002). “Anything short of an unambiguously conferred right” will not support a cause of action under § 1983. Id. at 282. The Court explained that although the first Blessing inquiry requires a determination as to whether Congress intended the provision to benefit the plaintiff, it is only the violation of a conferred right that gives rise to an action under § 1983. “[I]t is rights, not the broader or vaguer ‘benefits’ or ‘interests’ that may be enforced under [Section 1983].” Id. at 283; accord Harris v.Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 460 (6th Cir. 2006). The Gonzaga Court engaged in a three-part analysis to decide whether a statute created an actionable right. First, the statute must contain rights-creating language that is unmistakably focused on the individuals benefitted. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287. Second, the statute must have an individual focus, rather than a systemwide or aggregate focus. Id. at 288. And third, the statute must lack an enforcement scheme for aggrieved individuals. Id. at 290.
The plaintiffs claim that 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 654b(c)(1), when read together, confer individual rights. The provisions state, in relevant part: a) In general Subject to subsections (d) and (e) of this section, an amount collected on behalf of a family as support by a State pursuant to a plan approved under this part shall be distributed as follows: