Opinion ID: 2323065
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Declarations of Decedent Made in Good Faith

Text: Wraina also testified at trial concerning two statements Andrews made before he died. She testified that about two weeks before July 18, 1996, Andrews came to her house with Band-Aids on his left knee and told her that while he and a friend were walking from Elmwood Avenue towards Lockwood, four young men shot at him. Andrews purportedly identified the assailants as Hazard, Dennis Marrow, Lamont Lee and someone she referred to as Darky. Wraina also testified that on another occasion, a long time before the fatal shooting in 1996, Andrews told her that Roberts had robbed him and stolen his bicycle. The trial justice ruled that Wraina's testimony concerning Andrews's previous statements was admissible pursuant to Rule 804(c) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Rule 804(c) provides that [a] declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay if the court finds that it was made in good faith before the commencement of the action and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant. We previously have held that Rule 804(c) applies in criminal as well as civil cases. See State v. Burke, 574 A.2d 1217, 1222 (R.I.1990) (citing advisory committee's note to Rule 804(c)). However, because Rule 804(c) is not a firmly-rooted hearsay exception, out-of-court statements may be admitted into evidence only if they possess adequate indicia of reliability. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); State v. Lynch, 770 A.2d 840, 847 (R.I. 2001); Burke, 574 A.2d at 1223. Lassiter argues on appeal that Wraina's testimony concerning Andrews's disclosures was inadmissible hearsay because his statements did not bear the requisite indicia of reliability. In Burke, 574 A.2d at 1223, we affirmed the trial court's admission of a decedent's prior statements largely because the court held a voir dire hearing and made specific findings of reliability before the statements were ruled admissible. Lassiter contends that the failure of the trial justice to specifically find that each of Andrews's prior statements possessed sufficient indicia of reliability constituted reversible error. Although we agree that the trial justice failed to make the prerequisite findings of reliability, after a careful review of the record, we conclude that this argument was not properly preserved for appellate review. The proposed introduction of these statements was discussed extensively at sidebar between the trial justice and counsel. The trial justice explicitly stated that Wraina's testimony would have to come in    as a declaration of a deceased,person   . The record discloses that counsel for defendant failed to express any hearsay-based objection to the admissibility of the proposed evidence during that sidebar or at any point thereafter. The only objection posited by defense counsel concerned the relevancy of this evidence in the context of co-conspirator liability. After the sidebar conference defense counsel made a general objection to Wraina's testimony. Considering the previous extensive discussion of the proposed admissibility of Wraina's testimony, Lassiter's general objection was insufficient to preserve his hearsay-based contention on appeal. See R.I.R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits    evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and    Din case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection    appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context) (emphasis added); State v. Bettencourt, 723 A.2d 1101, 1107, 1108 (R.I.1999) (citing R.I.R. Evid. 103(a)(1) to hold that defense counsel asserted a general rather than a specific objection at trial [and]    therefore, the objection has not been preserved for appeal); State v. Toole, 640 A.2d 965, 972 (R.I.1994) (same); see also State v. Neri, 593 A.2d 953, 956 (R.I.1991) (when    the introduction of evidence is objected to for a specific reason, other grounds for objection are waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal). We therefore decline to pass upon defendant's hearsay-based assignment of error.