Opinion ID: 1193917
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of the Firearm `In Connection With' a Controlled-Substance Offense

Text: The second issue on appeal is whether the district court correctly concluded that Goodman possessed the firearm in connection with a controlled-substance offense under the 2004 Sentencing Guidelines, § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A). The government asks us to hold that Goodman waived any objections to the district court's determination when he agreed to the factual basis. It is true that a defendant may waive objections if he intentional[ly] relinquish[es] or abandon[s] . . . a known right. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). In particular, we agree with the court in United States v. Sloman that `[a]n attorney cannot agree in open court with a judge's proposed course of conduct and then charge the court with error in following that course.' United States v. Aparco-Centeno, 280 F.3d 1084, 1088 (6th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Sloman, 909 F.2d 176, 182 (6th Cir.1990)), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 948, 122 S.Ct. 2638, 153 L.Ed.2d 818 (2002). By claiming a broad waiver, the government obscures exactly what arguments Goodman waived when he agreed to the factual basis. Because he agreed to the factual basis, Goodman cannot now dispute either that Arnwine stated to police officers that she saw the victim with the gun before Goodman and the victim left to sell crack cocaine or that the government would have called witnesses who would have testified that Goodman was selling crack cocaine in a nearby park prior to the shooting. Although those two points are unassailable, it is important to note that at no point did Goodman agree that Arnwine or the potential government witnesses were correct; in fact, the district court made it clear to Goodman during his rearraignment that he was specifically not agreeing to the underlying accuracy of the statements. Thus, Goodman is not precluded from arguing that the district court erred in concluding that he possessed the firearm in connection with a controlled-substance offense. Goodman attacks in a multitude of ways the district court's conclusion that he possessed a firearm in connection with a controlled-substance offense. We identify three attacks on the validity of the district court's decision: (1) Goodman now claims that he objected at the rearraignment to the factual basis by attempting to deny the underlying accuracy of what Arnwine told the police; (2) in the objections to the PSR Goodman claimed that the district court should not consider the factual basis's statement that the government would have presented at trial the testimony of witnesses regarding Goodman's drug sales in the park; and (3) at the sentencing hearing Goodman's counsel accepted the government's gloss on Goodman's PSR objection as stating that the firearm should not be considered as having been possessed in connection with a controlled-substance offense. The first two of these attacks fail. At sentencing, the district court correctly considered as ineffective Goodman's attempt at rearraignment to attack the underlying truth of Arnwine's statement in the factual basis. At the rearraignment, after the district court explained to Goodman that by agreeing to the factual basis Goodman was explicitly not accepting the underlying accuracy of Arnwine's claims, [2] Goodman accepted the factual basis upon that understanding. Goodman's only attempt to deny Arnwine's statements was aborted. Furthermore, Goodman never even attempted to question the factual basis's statement regarding the witnesses that the government said it would have presented at trial to testify that Goodman and the victim had sold crack cocaine in the nearby park. Thus, the district court did not err in considering the factual basis during Goodman's sentencing. As we already noted, however, Goodman agreed only that he could not deny that Arnwine made the statement regarding the gun and that the government had witnesses who would have testified that Goodman and the victim were trafficking crack cocaine, not that Arnwine was correct or that Goodman was actually trafficking cocaine. Thus, Goodman could have presented contravening evidence at his sentencing hearing. Even though Goodman failed to controvert the government's evidence, we agree with Goodman that [t]he government did not establish a sufficient connection with a felony drug offense for the district court to apply the enhancement for such [an] offense. Appellant Br. at 18. Goodman makes this argument in two ways: (1) he claims that the district court cannot consider unindicted conduct, and (2) he claims that the facts that the district court possessed did not support the one-level enhancement. While we disagree with Goodman on the first point and conclude that unindicted conduct is appropriately considered as part of § 4B1.4(b)(3), we agree that the district court clearly erred in concluding that Goodman possessed a firearm in connection with a controlled-substance offense. In making this determination, we look not only to cases involving § 4B1.4(b)(3), but also to cases involving § 2K2.1(b)(5), which uses the exact same in connection with language. See United States v. Rutledge, 33 F.3d 671, 674 (6th Cir.1994) (noting the equivalency in language between §§ 4B1.4(b)(3) and 2K2.1(b)(5)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1193, 115 S.Ct. 1258, 131 L.Ed.2d 138 (1995). We conclude that the district court did not err when it considered unindicted conduct. Section 2K2.1 makes it clear that the in connection with another felony offense language refers to any offense (federal, state, or local) punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, whether or not a criminal charge was brought, or conviction obtained. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. 4 (emphasis added). Thus, the district court did not err by considering the alleged drug trafficking even though Goodman was never indicted or convicted for that drug trafficking. In evaluating whether the government's evidence supported the district court's application of the one-level enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with a controlled-substance offense, we apply a deferential standard of review. See United States v. Ennenga, 263 F.3d 499, 502 (6th Cir.2001); see also United States v. Clay, 346 F.3d 173, 178 (6th Cir.2003) (reviewing for clear error). The government bears the burden of establishing that Goodman possessed the firearm in connection with a controlled-substance offense. Lancaster, 501 F.3d at 675. Under § 2K2.1, and therefore under § 4B1.4 as well, [t]he full burden of proof on the particular enhancement sought . . . remain[s] with the government. Clay, 346 F.3d at 179. In contrast, the commentary to § 2D1.1, which lacks the in connection with language, applies a two-level enhancement when a firearm was possessed, and employs a burden-shifting approach that places on the defendant an obligation to show that it was clearly improbable that the firearm was connected to the other offense. Id. ; U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. 3 (The adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbably that the weapon was connected with the offense.). Under § § 2K2.1(b)(5) and 4B1.4(b)(3), however, the burden remains with the government to show that the firearm was possessed in connection with a controlled-substance offense. In carrying its burden, [s]o long as the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the firearm served some purpose with respect to the felonious conduct, section 2K2.1(b)(5)'s `in connection with' requirement is satisfied. United States v. Carter, 355 F.3d 920, 925 (6th Cir.2004) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Spurgeon, 117 F.3d 641, 644 (2d Cir.1997)). The government can satisfy its burden by showing that the weapon facilitated or potentially facilitated the felonious conduct, or emboldened the defendant during the felonious conduct.' Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Sanders, 162 F.3d 396, 404 (6th Cir.1998)). However, possession of firearms that is merely coincidental to the underlying felony offense is insufficient to support the application of § 2K2.1. Ennenga, 263 F.3d at 503; see also United States v. Kolley, 330 F.3d 753, 757 (6th Cir.2003) (same). In the instant case, we conclude that the government has not carried its burden and that the district court clearly erred in reaching the opposite conclusion. As suggestive as it may have been, the evidence that the government presented to the district court did not establish that Goodman possessed the firearm in connection with the alleged drug-trafficking crime. First, it was agreed in paragraph b of the government's factual basis that Arnwine, while not under oath or making out a sworn statement, had previously told investigators that she saw the victim with a gun and saw that the gun was gone when Goodman and the victim left to sell crack cocaine. This statement, if true, establishes only that Goodman or the victim took the gun when they left. Second, it was agreed in paragraph c of the government's factual basis that the United States would have presented at trial witnesses who would have testified that Goodman and the victim had been selling crack cocaine in a park. The factual basis does not state that these witnesses saw either Goodman or the victim with the gun while they were selling crack cocaine. In summary, the evidence that the government gave to the district court, if true, would establish only the following things: (1) the victim had a gun at Arnwine's residence at some point earlier on the day of the shooting, (2) after Goodman and the victim left, Arnwine did not notice the gun at her residence, (3) Goodman and the victim sold crack cocaine prior to the shooting, [3] and (4) after the victim was shot, Goodman carried a gun, which was not the murder weapon, into Arnwine's residence. It is important to note that the government's factual basis does not state the following: (1) who took the gun from Arnwine's residence, (2) whether either the victim or Goodman had the gun when they went to sell crack cocaine, and (3) whether the gun that Arnwine claimed to observe earlier was the same gun that the police discovered when they arrived at Arnwine's residence. Given these significant factual gaps, the district court clearly erred when it concluded that Goodman possessed a firearm in connection with a controlled-substance offense. These factual gaps make the district court's application of the one-level enhancement clearly erroneous because the factual basis provides no connection between the possession of the gun and the alleged drug trafficking. Goodman did not admit to possession of every weapon discussed in the factual basis; he admitted to possessing only the weapon that was discovered in Arnwine's residence, that Goodman claimed to have simply carried in from the yard after he tripped on it near the victim's body. The government wanted the district court to believe that Goodman possessed this police-discovered firearm in connection with a controlled-substance offense; the government attempted to imply that Goodman and the victim must have possessed the firearm while drug trafficking. Our precedent requires that there be a clear connection between the gun that served as the basis for the conviction for felon in possession of a firearm and the gun possessed during the other offense that triggers the enhancement. United States v. Howse, 478 F.3d 729, 733 (6th Cir.2007). In this case, there must be a clear connection between the gun Goodman admitted to possessing and the gun that he allegedly possessed during the controlled-substance offense. The factual basis, however, provides absolutely no evidence establishing that Goodman and the victim were armed during the drug trafficking. Similarly, even if they were armed during the drug trafficking, the factual basis provides no evidence establishing that the firearm they possessed during the trafficking was the same firearm that the police discovered in Arnwine's residence. There is no evidence establishing that the police-discovered firearm was in any way connected to the alleged drug trafficking. In short, the government failed to sustain its burden on the applicability of the one-level enhancement, and the district court's application of the enhancement was clearly erroneous. In a case where we reached the opposite conclusion in holding that the district court did not clearly err when it found that the defendant possessed a gun in connection with a drug crime under § 2K2.1, we specifically noted the importance of the fact that the defendant's possession was neither accidental nor coincidental. United States v. Richardson, 510 F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir.2007). We cannot say, based on the sparse evidence here, that Goodman's possession of the firearm was anything more than accidental or coincidental as it related to the alleged drug trafficking. Although it may be true that Goodman engaged in drug trafficking earlier on the day of the shooting, because there is no evidence connecting the firearm to the drug trafficking, there is no evidence to suggest that Goodman's subsequent possession of a firearm was anything more than an unfortunate coincidence. Thus, the district court's conclusion was clearly erroneous and the district court should not have applied the one-level enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with a controlled-substance offense. The government asserts that even if the district court incorrectly applied the one-level enhancement, any error regarding the enhancement is harmless because the Guidelines sentencing range without the one-level enhancement would have yielded a sentencing range of 168 to 210 months (instead of 188 to 235 months with the one-level enhancement), which is inclusive of the 200-month sentence that Goodman received. This argument is without merit. Recently, the Supreme Court stated that failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range was a procedural error. Gall v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Similarly, we recently observed that we cannot find that a sentencing court has properly considered the § 3553(a) factors if it miscalculated the advisory Guidelines range which it must consider together with the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Lalonde, 509 F.3d 750, 763 n. 5 (6th Cir.2007). The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion when it stated that we conclude that such an `overlap' [of the applicable ranges for the correct and incorrect Guidelines calculations] does not necessarily render an error in the Guidelines calculation harmless. United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 216 (3rd Cir.2008). Moreover, in this case there is no indication that the district court would have selected the same sentence even without the one-level enhancement. Thus, the miscalculation, even though Goodman's sentence would be within the Guidelines range either with or without the one-level enhancement, was not a harmless error. Because [t]he government had the burdens of production and persuasion, . . . we see no reason why it should get a second bite at the apple. No special circumstances justified, or even explained, the government's failure to sustain these burdens. United States v. Leonzo, 50 F.3d 1086, 1088 (D.C.Cir.1995). Thus, the case must be remanded for resentencing on the present record, since `[t]he government was entitled to only one opportunity to present evidence on this issue.' United States v. Gill, 348 F.3d 147, 156 (6th Cir.2003) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Wyss, 147 F.3d 631, 633 (7th Cir.1998)).