Opinion ID: 78551
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reed's Claim: Performance Prong

Text: Reed argues that Nichols's investigation of mitigation evidence was objectively unreasonable, as was his decision not to present mitigation evidence to the jury in the penalty phase. Reed further argues that the Florida state courts' contrary conclusions were unreasonable. We disagree. As to Nichols's investigation, the Florida Supreme Court found that Nichols clearly investigated or was aware of Reed's background and mental health to an extent, given especially the materials Nichols submitted to the state sentencing court. Reed III, 875 So.2d at 436. As to Nichols's decision not to present mitigation evidence to the jury, the Florida Supreme Court determined that Reed did not show deficient performance by Nichols because (1) Reed steadfastly instructed Nichols not to present it and, (2) in any event, the proposed mitigation evidence present[ed] a double-edged sword and the testimony that could have been presented was just as likely to have resulted in aggravation against rather than mitigation for Reed. Id. at 436-37. For several reasons, the Florida Supreme Court's conclusion as to Nichols's performance was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, and was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. First, Nichols obtained considerable potential mitigation evidence. Specifically, Nichols had and reviewed Reed's medical records from Middle Tennessee MHI, Hendersonville Hospital, and Metropolitan Nashville General Hospital. Nichols, in fact, was the one who provided Dr. Miller with these records to assist in the background investigation and evaluation that was done by Dr. Miller and social worker Karen Kaldor, M.S.W. And, once Dr. Miller issued his report on Reed well before trial, Nichols had that as well. Dr. Miller's report and the hospital records already contained the vast majority of mitigation-related evidence along the lines later proffered at the Rule 3.850 hearing, such as: (1) Reed's mother shot and killed his father in self-defense; (2) Reed was removed from his mother's custody because of her alcoholism when he was four years old; (3) Reed was raised primarily by his grandparents (who obtained custody); (4) Reed had an eighth grade education, at which point he left school to work in a sawmill because his family needed money; (5) Reed was a self-described jack of all trades who had worked as a concrete worker and in the steel and oil industries; (6) Reed had a child, a girlfriend, and many friends; (7) Reed suffered a fractured bone in his face from being struck with a pool cue; (8) in 1979, Reed drank up to two or three cases of beer a day, but slacked off after a period of treatment for this, and by 1986 drank about a six-pack per week; (9) Reed began huffing gasoline at about age nine and continued to do so regularly; (10) Reed reported seizures associated with his gasoline huffing and, when high, exhibited bizarre and combative behavior, such as screaming and attacking trees and a garage door; and (11) Reed received medical treatment in 1981 for Valium dependence and for lead encephalopathy due to chronic lead poisoning from inhalation of gas fumes. Indeed, Nichols filed Dr. Miller's report with the state trial court on the first day of the guilt phase of trial. Despite all this evidence the defense had, Reed faults Nichols for not finding more. But again, except for Dr. Larson's testimony, Reed's 3.850 mitigation testimony largely just recounted, in somewhat more detailed form, the factual background that Nichols already obtained. While Dr. Larson's opinions may have differed from those of evaluators Dr. Miller and Kaldor, the facts remain that: (1) Nichols had a thorough evaluation of Reed conducted; (2) Nichols gave Dr. Miller a significant quantity of hospital and medical records; (3) Dr. Miller examined those and had Reed undergo a battery of mental status and neurological tests, including an electroencephalogram; (4) social worker Kaldor also participated in the evaluation; (5) Dr. Miller's report and the hospital records contained the significant information about Reed's childhood; and (6) Reed himself knew his own personal background and all of the more detailed facts later presented. [15] That Dr. Larson may disagree with Dr. Miller's evaluation does not make Nichols ineffective. Further, the mere fact a defendant can find, years after the fact, a mental health expert who will testify favorably for him does not demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to produce that expert at trial. Davis v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 1471, 1475 (11th Cir.1997). And, none of the evidence Nichols obtained would have convinced any reasonably competent counsel of a need to do a more extensive investigation. In this regard, Reed's case is similar to Van Hook, 130 S.Ct. at 19, in which the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant's trial attorneys were not deficient for not investigating more after discovering substantial mitigating evidence. In reinstating Van Hook's death sentence, the Supreme Court reasoned: This is not a case in which the defendant's attorneys failed to act while potentially powerful mitigating evidence stared them in the face, or would have been apparent from documents any reasonable attorney would have obtained. It is instead a case, like Strickland itself, in which defense counsel's decision not to seek more mitigating evidence from the defendant's background than was already in hand fell well within the range of professionally reasonable judgments. Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). Further, in Reed's case, Dr. Miller's conclusionsthat Reed was of average intelligence; he had a fair general fund of information; his cognitive faculties were intact; he was able to use verbal and mathematical abstractions well; he had a good ability to register, store, and retrieve data; he was not hallucinated or delusional; his motor, sensory, and cerebellar functions were normal; he had no pathologic reflexes; his electroencephalograph test was normal; he was competent to stand trial; and he was able to understand the nature, quality, and wrongfulness of his actions at the time of Mrs. Oermann's murdersuggested a further investigation of mental health evidence would be unlikely to bear fruit. [16] As the Florida Supreme Court concluded, Nichols's decision not to present mitigation evidence to the jury at the penalty phase was not objectively unreasonable either. Reed instructed Nichols that Reed did not want any of his family or friends to be subjected to the penalty-phase process and that he did not want any mitigation testimony from them. Reed also instructed Nichols that he did not want any mitigation evidence presented that implied he was guilty of Mrs. Oermann's murder. According to Nichols, this instruction extended to testimony about anything that had to do with [Reed's] psychiatric or medical condition. Reed's affidavit reveals that Nichols even advised Reed that his chances of receiving a death sentence were less if he pled guilty and presented mitigating psychological evidence, but Reed refused. The ultimate decision whether to use mitigating evidence is for the client. Dobbs, 142 F.3d at 1388. And Reed was undisputably competent to make that decision. Indeed, Reed never testified in the Rule 3.850 proceedings and never said that if he had known about the 3.850 evidence, he would have changed his mind at trial and let his counsel present the mitigation evidence to the jury at trial. Nichols also did not blindly follow Reed's instruction that he not present mitigation evidence. See Newland, 527 F.3d at 1208-09; Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 886, 889-90 (11th Cir.1985). Indeed, here Nichols also made an independent strategic decision not to present to the jury the mitigation evidence that was unearthed. At the Rule 3.850 hearing, Nichols testified that he decided to submit mitigation evidence to the state trial judge but not to the jury. Nichols explained that his strategic decision not to present the proposed mitigation evidence to the jury stemmed from his belief that, given the brutal nature of this crime, the jurors would not react well to the types of medical and psychiatric evidence about Reed he had discovered, and that jurors would find such evidence in Reed's case to be a shallow offer of mitigation and would probably not give it serious consideration. Nichols testified: It was a strategy decision. And Nichols's strategic decision was well informed by his extensive experience as a trial lawyer. At the time of Reed's trial, Nichols had served both as a prosecutor and a criminal defense attorney, had thirteen years' experience, and had tried more than thirty homicide cases, most of which were capital cases. The presumption that counsel's performance is reasonable is even stronger when counsel is particularly experienced. See Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1316 & n. 18 (11th Cir.2000) ( en banc ) (noting that, although [n]o one's conduct is above the reasonableness inquiry and even the very best lawyer could have a bad day, [e]xperience is due some respect). Because Nichols believed that the jury would not find significant the types of mitigation evidence in this case, he advised Reed against testifying and obtained an agreement with the State that neither side would submit new evidence at the penalty phase, but would proceed directly to their arguments. As part of this agreement, Nichols stipulated on Reed's behalf that he would not argue that the no-significant-criminal-history statutory mitigating factor existed (which Nichols thought he could probably not establish in any event), and in return the State would not introduce before the jury any evidence of Reed's prior convictions. In short, Nichols decided not to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, partly because of Reed's instructions to him and partly based on his own independent judgment that the jury would not react well to the types of mitigating evidence about Reed. Nichols made the strategic decision to argue residual doubt and to keep the jury from hearing new aggravating evidence from the State at the penalty phase in return for not making a mitigation-evidence presentation that he considered weak. See Parker v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 331 F.3d 764, 787-88 (11th Cir.2003) (noting that [c]reating lingering or residual doubt over a defendant's guilt is not only a reasonable strategy, but `is perhaps the most effective strategy to employ at sentencing'); Stewart v. Dugger, 877 F.2d 851, 856 (11th Cir.1989) (Trial counsel made a strategic decision that in light of the atrocious nature of the offense, [the defendant's] only chance of avoiding the death penalty was if some seed of doubt, even if insufficient to constitute reasonable doubt, could be placed in the minds of the jury .... Trial counsel cannot be faulted for attempting to make the best of a bad situation.). Under the circumstances, Reed has not overcome the presumption that ... the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 (quotation marks omitted). [17] For all of these reasons, we conclude that Reed has not satisfied his burden of showing that the Florida Supreme Court's determination that Nichols's penalty-phase performance was reasonable was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Nor has Reed demonstrated that the Florida Supreme Court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the state court record.