Opinion ID: 213643
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The BOP Regulation

Text: The regulation Licon challenges has a long pedigree. The regulation finds its statutory basis in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) (1994), which empowers the BOP to reduce the sentence of a federal prisoner convicted of a nonviolent offense by up to one year if the prisoner successfully completes a substance abuse treatment program. [1] But the statute does not define the term nonviolent offense. Accordingly, in 1995, the BOP published an implementing rule and regulation providing eligibility standards. Specifically, the new regulation provided that prisoners would not be eligible for early release if convicted of a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). 28 C.F.R. § 550.58 (1995). To clarify its regulation, the BOP subsequently issued a Program Statement declaring that crimes of violence included, in relevant part, drug trafficking convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841 that involved possession of a firearm and felon in possession convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Program Statement No. 5162.02, § 9 (July 24, 1995). [2] Legal challenges to the eligibility rule and Program Statement resulted in a circuit split. The majority of courts facing the question, including our own, held the rule was invalid as applied by the Program Statement. We concluded drug trafficking with a sentencing enhancement for possession of a firearm could not be considered a crime of violence because our prior cases had found drug trafficking to be nonviolent within the meaning of § 924(c)(3). Fristoe v. Thompson, 144 F.3d 627, 631 (10th Cir. 1998). We further found the BOP's reliance on a sentencing factor in support of its policy violated the plain language of § 3621(e)(2)(B), which excludes prisoners  convicted of a nonviolent offense.  Id. (emphasis added). Other circuits reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Martin v. Gerlinski, 133 F.3d 1076, 1079-81 (8th Cir. 1998); Bush v. Pitzer, 133 F.3d 455, 456-57 (7th Cir.1997); Roussos v. Menifee, 122 F.3d 159, 161-64 (3d Cir.1997); Downey v. Crabtree, 100 F.3d 662, 669 (9th Cir.1996). Several circuits reached a contrary conclusion, finding the BOP's interpretation of the term nonviolent crime was reasonable, either because this reading was consistent with prior judicial interpretations of § 924(c)(3), see, e.g., Cook v. Wiley, 208 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir.2000), or because of the dangerous nature of firearms, see, e.g., Pelissero v. Thompson, 170 F.3d 442, 447 (4th Cir.1999). In response to the circuit split, the BOP issued an amended interim rule clarifying its position. The amended rule categorically excluded from early release inmates convicted of a felony [t]hat involved the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon or explosives. 28 C.F.R. § 550.58(a)(1)(vi)(B) (1997). But this rule did not purport to rely on the statutory exclusion for crimes of violence. Instead, the rule based its authority on the discretion allotted to the BOP Director to grant a sentencing reduction. 62 Fed.Reg. 53690, 53690 (Oct. 15, 1997). The BOP explained, even as the Bureau concedes that offenses related to this regulation are `non-violent' offenses, the implementing statute does not mandate that all `non-violent' offenders must receive an early release. The statute merely indicates that the sentence may be reduced by the Bureau of Prisons. 65 Fed.Reg. 80745, 80747 (Dec. 22, 2000). The amended rule provoked a second divide in the circuit courts, this time over the question of whether the categorical exclusion was a permissible exercise of the BOP's discretion to reduce sentences. Compare Bellis v. Davis, 186 F.3d 1092, 1095 (8th Cir.1999) (holding the new rule was a valid exercise of BOP discretion), and Bowen v. Hood, 202 F.3d 1211, 1220 (9th Cir.2000) (same), with Ward v. Booker, 202 F.3d 1249, 1256-57 (10th Cir.2000) (reaching the opposite result), and Kilpatrick v. Houston, 197 F.3d 1134, 1135 (11th Cir.1999) (same). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and resolved the conflict in Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 121 S.Ct. 714, 148 L.Ed.2d 635 (2001). There, the Court held § 3621(e)(2)(B) granted the BOP discretion to categorically deny early release eligibility to certain classes of inmates. The Court further found a rule excluding felons in possession of a weapon was a permissible exercise of that discretion: Having decided that the Bureau may categorically exclude prisoners based on their preconviction conduct, we further hold that the regulation excluding Lopez is permissible. The Bureau reasonably concluded that an inmate's prior involvement with firearms, in connection with the commission of a felony, suggests his readiness to resort to life-endangering violence and therefore appropriately determines the early release decision. Id. at 244, 121 S.Ct. 714. The 1997 interim rule became final without change in 2000. 28 C.F.R. § 550.58(a)(1)(vi)(B) (2000). The rule was again modified in 2009, which, as we discuss further below, confirmed the categorical exclusion of felons in possession reasonably implements § 3621.