Opinion ID: 2599107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: part iiconstitutional issues

Text: We turn now to the issues Kleypas raises concerning the constitutionality of the death penalty in Kansas. These issues include: Constitutionality of the Weighing Equation Constitutional and Evidentiary Challenge to the Avoid Arrest Aggravating Circumstance Constitutional Challenge to the Definition of the Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel Manner Aggravating Circumstance Proportionality of Sentence Constitutionality of Upward Departure for Conviction of Aggravated Burglary Instruction on Mercy Standard for Admission of Evidence During the Penalty Phase Effect of a Guilty Plea Under K.S.A. 21-4624 The Right to Life Under the Kansas Constitution Failure to Make Written Findings as to Mitigators Lethal Injection as Cruel and Unusual Punishment Death Penalty Under International Law Issue 23. Constitutionality of Weighing Equation Kleypas argues that the weighing equation set forth in K.S.A. 21-4624(e) violates the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment and the guarantees of due process because it mandates a sentence of death when aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found to be in equal balance. Under the facts of this case, we agree that the weighing equation violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. K.S.A. 21-4624(e) provides: If, by unanimous vote, the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in K.S.A. 21-4625 and amendments thereto exist and, further, that the existence of such aggravating circumstances is not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances which are found to exist, the defendant shall be sentenced to death; otherwise, the defendant shall be sentenced as provided by law. Kleypas argues that mandating death when aggravating and mitigating circumstances are found to be in equal balance produces unrealistic results, creates a presumption of death, shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to prevent imposition of a death sentence, and precludes the jury from giving effect to the mitigating evidence. The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law over which this court has de novo review. State v. Ponce, 258 Kan. 708, 709, 907 P.2d 876 (1995). We must decide if the weighing equation in the statute violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it mandates a sentence of death if the jury finds that the mitigating and aggravating circumstances are in equipoise. Equipoise is a result of mandating the death sentence if the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances. Kleypas contends that the Kansas weighing formula is unique among the 38 death penalty states by mandating a death sentence when there is equipoise. Although no other state statute has identical language to our statute, five states have similar language resulting in the same weighing equation. Kleypas first raised the equipoise issue by motion filed in the district court. The district court denied the motion, finding that the United States Supreme Court approved such a statutory scheme in Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 49 L. Ed.2d 913, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976). The district court's reliance on Proffitt is misplaced. In Proffitt, the Supreme Court noted: The jury found the defendant guilty as charged. Subsequently, as provided by Florida law, a separate hearing was held to determine whether the petitioner should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment. Under the state law that decision turned on whether certain statutory aggravating circumstances surrounding the crime outweighed any statutory mitigating circumstances found to exist. 242 U.S. at 245-46. Justice White in concurring also noted: Under Florida law, the sentencing judge is required to impose the death penalty on all first-degree murderers as to whom the statutory aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. 242 U.S. at 260 (White, J., concurring). The Florida weighing equation is not the same as ours. Under the Florida weighing equation, a death sentence cannot be imposed if there is a finding that equipoise exists. Proffitt does not support the district court's decision in the present case. In addition, the Florida jury returns an advisory verdict, and the judge has the ultimate responsibility for sentencing the defendant. Kleypas cites three cases in support of his constitutional challenge to K.S.A. 21-4624(e). The first is State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 524 A.2d 130 (1987). The New Jersey statute in effect at the time of the crime stated in part: `If the jury or the court finds that any aggravating factor exists and is not outweighed by one or more mitigating factors, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.' 106 N.J. at 58. The court considered the weighing equation sua sponte, finding it constituted plain error. The court stated: The error concerns the jury's function in balancing aggravating factors against mitigating factors, a function that leads directly to its ultimate life or death decision. Its effect was to allow a death sentence without a finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. We hold that such a finding was required by the Act at the time of defendant's trial as matter of fundamental fairness and that its absence mandates reversal and retrial of the penalty decision. Legislative policy also mandates this result, as indicated by the 1985 amendments to the Act; those amendments, furthermore, provide an independent basis for this result. 106 N.J. at 53. The court made it clear that the former rather than the latter was ultimately the basis for its decision: If anywhere in the criminal law a defendant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt, it is here. We therefore hold that as a matter of fundamental fairness the jury must find that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, and this balance must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. 106 N.J. at 62. In People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1991), the Colorado Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of their statutory weighing equation which required the jury return a sentence of death if the jury found insufficient mitigating factors to outweigh the statutory aggravating factors. The court noted that under this formula a death sentence was mandated if the mitigators and aggravators are equally balanced. 814 P.2d at 839. The court concluded that the statute violated the state constitution provision against cruel and unusual punishment, stating: The result of a decision that the relevant considerations for and against imposition of the death penalty in a particular case are in equipoise is that the jury cannot determine with reliability and certainty that the death sentence is appropriate under the standards established by the legislature. A statute that requires a death penalty to be imposed in such circumstances without the necessity for further deliberations, as does section 16-11-103(2)(b)(III), is fundamentally at odds with the requirement that the procedure produce a certain and reliable conclusion that the death sentence should be imposed. That such a result is mandated by statute rather than arrived at by a jury adds nothing to the reliability of the death sentence. The legislature has committed the function of weighing aggravators and mitigators to the jury. A jury determination that such factors are in equipoise means nothing more or less than that the moral evaluation of the defendant's character and crime expressed as a process of weighing has yielded inconclusive results. A death sentence imposed in such circumstances violates requirements of certainty and reliability and is arbitrary and capricious in contravention of basic constitutional principles. Accordingly, we conclude that the statute contravenes the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments under article II, section 20, of the Colorado Constitution, and deprives the defendant of due process of law under article II, section 25, of that constitution. 814 P.2d at 845. Although the decision in Young rests upon state constitutional grounds, the court found that the United States Supreme Court had not addressed the equipoise issue, stating: Key to the United States Supreme Court rulings is the conclusion that a limitation on the class of persons eligible for the death penalty is constitutionally required and may be accomplished by a finding of at least one aggravating factor, and that a weighing of all relevant mitigating factors is constitutionally required before a sentence of death can be imposed on a particular individual. Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3056 (plurality opinion); Boyde, 110 S. Ct. at 1196; Blystone, 110 S. Ct. at 1083. The basis for these requirements `is the principle that punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant.' Penry, 492 U.S. at 319, 109 S. Ct. at 2947. Thus, the Court in Penry stated that it is not enough simply to allow the defendant to present mitigating evidence to the sentencer. The sentencer must also be able to consider and give effect to that evidence in imposing sentence. Only then can we be sure that the sentencer has treated the defendant as a `uniquely individual human bein[g]' and has made a reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence.` Penry, 492 U.S. at 319, 109 S. Ct. at 2947 (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304, 96 S. Ct. at 2991) (citation omitted). Constitutional sufficiency is not assured simply because the jury is not limited in the mitigating factors it may hear and consider. The sentencer must also determine whether those mitigating factors are outweighed by the aggravating factors, Boyde, 110 S. Ct. at 1196; Blystone, 110 S. Ct. at 1083, or, stated alternatively, are sufficient to call for leniency, Walton, 110 S. Ct. at 3056. We find nothing in the reasoning in the United States Supreme Court cases cited that casts doubt on our conclusion that the Colorado death penalty statute fails to satisfy our own constitutional standards. We do not believe that the United States Supreme Court cases can be fairly read to contain any suggestion that the death penalty can be imposed when the sentencer finds aggravating and mitigating considerations to be equally balanced. Even if we are wrong in our understanding of federal precedent, however, we hold that to authorize imposition of the death penalty when aggravators and mitigators weigh equally, as does the current version of section 16-11-103, violates fundamental requirements of certainty and reliability under the cruel and unusual punishments and due process clauses of the Colorado Constitution. 814 P.2d at 846. The third case relied on by Kleypas is Hulsey v. Sargent, 868 F. Supp. 1090 (E. D. Ark. 1993). At issue in Hulsey was the Arkansas statute mandating a death sentence if the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances. 868 F. Supp. at 1092. The court noted the problem such an equation created: If a jury found the mitigating and aggravating circumstances in equipoise, neither one more probative than the other, or, could not fairly come to a conclusion about what balance existed between them, they would be obliged to impose the death sentence since the mitigating circumstances would not be found to outweigh the aggravating. The requirement that the aggravating circumstances justify the sentence of death, which could easily be (and was probably intended to be) construed as an independent inquiry (satisfied by a single finding of an aggravating circumstance) would not cure the presumption created by the equation. 868 F. Supp. at 1101. The court concluded: Here, it is explicit in the statute that mitigating must outweigh aggravating circumstances and no saving instruction is found. Here too, the strictures of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments with their requirements of individualized sentencing and full consideration of evidence in mitigation appear to require relief. 868 F. Supp. at 1103. The State does not bother to respond or attempt to distinguish the cases cited by Kleypas. Instead, the State relies completely on Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 111 L. Ed.2d 511, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990). In Walton, the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Arizona statute which provided that the court `shall impose a sentence of death if the court finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated... and that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.' 497 U.S. at 644. The State argues that the U.S. Supreme Court specifically addressed this issue in Walton and rejected Kleypas' argument. The State's argument is premised on its view that the Arizona statute is functionally indistinguishable from the Kansas statute in this respect. We disagree and find the two statutes distinguishable. The obvious distinction is the language used in each statute. The Arizona statute does not call for a weighing formula in which the mitigating circumstances must outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the very essence of the issue before this court. Such a weighing equation results in mandating a death sentence where the jury finds equipoise as to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances. As previously noted, the Colorado Supreme Court in Young distinguished the language in the Arizona statute from the Colorado statute and found that the issue of equipoise was not raised or decided in Walton. 814 P.2d at 846. We agree.