Opinion ID: 1454621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant's Conversation With a Fellow Jail Inmate About Escaping

Text: (21) Anthony David Brooks, a jail inmate whom defendant met while in custody awaiting trial, testified that defendant asked his assistance in escaping. Brooks reported defendant's request to jail authorities. Defendant denied making the request. Citing out-of-state cases, defendant argues that evidence of an escape attempt was not probative on the issue of his guilt because he was being held on more than one charge and that it is impossible to determine from which charge defendant escaped and fled. (E.g., State v. Sanders (Mo. 1971) 473 S.W.2d 700, 703.) He invites us to reverse his conviction because of the alleged prejudicial effect of the escape-attempt evidence. We decline the invitation. At trial defendant moved to exclude Brooks's testimony, asserting that jailhouse informants are unreliable witnesses. The trial court held a pretrial hearing on the motion, but made no ruling. Defendant failed to request a ruling and made no objection when Brooks's testimony was offered. As a result of these events, defendant has waived any claim of error in the introduction of Brooks's testimony for two reasons. First, defendant failed to object to the escape evidence when it was offered. ( People v. Rodgers (1976) 54 Cal. App.3d 508, 517 [126 Cal. Rptr. 719].) In contrast to the immunity agreement issue (see pt. VII, ante ), the trial court never made a ruling on Brooks's testimony. Defendant was obligated to press for such a ruling and to object to Brooks's testimony until he obtained one. He failed to do so, thus depriving the trial court of the opportunity to correct potential error. Second, defendant failed to advance in the trial court the specific ground for exclusion he now urges. Defendant's motion was directed to the alleged unreliability of jailhouse informants, not to any inherent ambiguity in escape-attempt evidence when multiple crimes are charged. The motion was therefore not sufficiently specific to preserve the alleged error. (Evid. Code, § 353; People v. Coleman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 777; People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 766.) Because of defendant's procedural omissions, the trial court had no fair opportunity to consider excluding this evidence. Therefore, defendant cannot challenge its ruling on appeal. We also reject the claim on the merits. Evidence of a planned escape permits an inference of consciousness of guilt, even if the escape was not actually attempted. ( People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1127, 1143-1144 [245 Cal. Rptr. 635, 751 P.2d 901].) California follows the majority rule in allowing evidence of an attempted escape even when multiple crimes have been charged. ( People v. Remiro (1979) 89 Cal. App.3d 809, 845 [153 Cal. Rptr. 89, 2 A.L.R.4th 1135]; Annot., Attempted Escape (1981) 3 A.L.R.4th 1085, 1087-1093.) We see no reason to consider changing the rule. In any event, as in People v. Williams, any error in the abbreviated reference to escape plans was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt.