Opinion ID: 1196239
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: trial judge's statement

Text: Defense counsel inquired extensively about spousal abuse during voir dire in an effort to ferret out jurors who could not judge the case on the evidence presented because Ryan had abused his wife. At one point, defense counsel attempted to challenge a potential juror for cause because she admitted that she had strong feelings about spousal abuse. In response to the challenge for cause, the trial judge stated: Well, [defense counsel], what I've heard her say is that she is not for spousal or domestic abuse. That is a criminal act. I think if you ask all these people, Do you have strong feelings about murder, they would probably say, Yes. That does not disqualify them from serving on this jury. I think it's important they be able to separate, perhaps, the two, that Mr. Ryan is here not because he hit his wife, but because he murdered his wife, and whether or not they have strong feelings about domestic violence or hitting their wives, that isn't going to disqualify them from serving on this jury. During the next in-chambers conference, defense counsel moved for a mistrial asserting that the statement tainted the entire jury panel. The motion was denied, and the trial judge gave the following curative instruction upon returning to the courtroom: Ladies and gentlemen, the attorneys have pointed out to me that I said that Mr. Ryan is here not because he hit his wife, but because he murdered his wife. I should have said, He's not here because he's charged with hitting his wife, he's here because he is charged with having murdered her. I did not intend to imply that the Court has any opinion as to guilt or innocence of the defendant. In fact, the Defendant is presumed to be innocent, and the burden of proof is on the State to prove that he's guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and what the Court thinks about guilt or innocence, if anything, is irrelevant because that is the decision for the jury alone. We have stated that: [T]he trial judge must `be careful and cautious and not comment on the evidence.' Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456, 458 (Wyo.1979) (quoting Peterson v. McMicken (Nelson's Estate), 72 Wyo. 444, 499, 266 P.2d 238, 261 (1954)). In a trial before a jury, the trial judge must abstain from expressing or indicating, by word, deed, or otherwise, his personal feelings on the weight or quality of the evidence. Id. Comments or expressions of opinion on the evidence which have the tendency to indicate bias on the trial judge's part are regarded as being an infringement on the jury's duties and are prejudicial to the defendant. Id. Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1118 (Wyo. 1997). Ryan asserts that the trial judge's comment rises to the level of error per se. We disagree. More than a mere misstatement is necessary to show that the trial judge improperly expressed his opinion on the evidence. Moreover, the curative instruction alleviated any possible prejudice to Ryan.