Opinion ID: 2633001
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Do other grounds exist for affirming the dismissal of the excessive force claim?

Text: The Municipality argues that even if there is an unresolved issue of fact as to whether Maness pointed a firearm at the police, the dismissal of his excessive force claim can be affirmed on other grounds. Procedurally this argument is a proper one because this court may affirm a judgment on any appropriate basis, including grounds that are neither relied on nor raised in the superior court. [13] The Municipality contends that there are two such grounds in this case. First, the Municipality relies on AS 11.81.370(a)(2). [14] This statute permits a police officer to use deadly force when necessary to make the arrest or terminate the escape from custody of a person who is in possession of a firearm. But this statute places conditions on the use of deadly force. It may be used only when and to the extent the officer reasonably believes the use of deadly force is necessary to make the arrest or terminate the escape. [15] This means that deadly force is only authorized to the extent that its use is reasonably necessary to accomplish the stated objectives. On this record, and because issue preclusive effect may not be given to the district court's factual findings at the sentencing hearing, there are unresolved factual questions that prevent us from so concluding. The Municipality's second argument relies on AS 09.65.210(1). [16] The Municipality argues that [b]y fleeing into the woods armed with an assault rifle, and attempting to elude police, Maness knew or should have known that he had created an extremely dangerous situation, posing a significant risk that he might be shot. While this argument has a certain appeal, the statute requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that the felony substantially contributed to the personal injury. Here the felony was the mere possession of a firearm. We agree with the observation made by the superior court that [t]he mere fact that [Maness] illegally possessed a firearm while fleeing in the woods would not alone enable the officers to use excessive force in his apprehension. . . . The crime, standing alone, could not then be said to have substantially contributed to his injury. Accordingly, we conclude that the court's dismissal of Maness's excessive force claim cannot be affirmed on alternative grounds. A remand for further litigation of this claim is therefore necessary.