Opinion ID: 77060
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional Right of Companionship

Text: 8 Section 1983 is no source of substantive federal rights. Instead, to state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must point to a violation of a specific federal right. Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 583 (11th Cir.1996) (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 811, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (plurality opinion)). [I]n § 1983 cases grounded on alleged parental liberty interests, we are venturing into the murky area of unenumerated constitutional rights. McCurdy v. Dodd, 352 F.3d 820, 825 (3d Cir.2003) (citation omitted). When this happens, our first task is to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all. Id. at 826 (citations and internal quotations omitted). We should tread lightly because [b]y extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action. We must therefore `exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field,' lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2267-68, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997) (citations omitted). 9 A parent's due process right in the care, custody, and control of her children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the Supreme] Court. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion). While this right provides parents with both substantive and procedural protections, the Supreme Court cases extending liberty interests of parents under the Due Process Clause focus on relationships with minor children. McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 827; see also Isaac J.K. Adams, Note, Growing Pains: The Scope of Substantive Due Process Rights of Parents of Adult Children, 57 Vand. L.Rev. 1883, 1902 (2004) (reviewing Supreme Court caselaw and finding no explicit guidance on how to decide the question of whether parents have a right to companionship with their adult children). 10 The substantive component of a parent's right to care, custody, and control of her minor children has been relied upon to strike down several state statutes. The Supreme Court held a Nebraska law, which prohibited the teaching of any foreign languages to students until after the eighth grade, deprived parents of their right to establish a home and bring up children. . . [which has been] long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396-99, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (citations omitted). Similarly, an Oregon law requiring parents to send their children to public schools was found unconstitutional by the Court because it unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1541, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (holding application of Wisconsin's compulsory education law to Amish children unconstitutional under the First Amendment, in part, because [t]he history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944) (recognizing that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder) (citation omitted). 11 A parent's right to care, custody, and control of her minor children has also been the source of added procedural protections. For example, the Supreme Court struck down an Illinois statute that made children of unwed fathers wards of the state upon the death of their mother. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658-59, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1216-17, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). There, the biological father's interest undeniably warrant[ed] deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. Id. at 651, 92 S.Ct. at 1212. In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), the Court held a state is required to show by at least clear and convincing evidence that parental rights should be terminated because, among other reasons, [t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents. . . . Id. at 753, 102 S.Ct. at 1394-95; see also Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2160, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) (although refusing to hold the Due Process Clause requires the state to appoint counsel for parents at a termination hearing, noting that [a] parent's interest in the accuracy and injustice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is . . . a commanding one). 12 It is against this backdrop that we analyze Robertson's claim. She would have us hold that the parental rights already recognized by the Supreme Court include a right to companionship with an adult child. Robertson's claim could potentially involve two very separate questions: one, whether the asserted right exists; and two, if the asserted right does exist, under what conditions does a deprivation occur, i.e., are we looking for negligent behavior, an intentional act, etc. One must have a right before it can be deprived; therefore, the state-of-mind of the accused party is irrelevant to the initial inquiry. 13 There appear to be three possible resolutions of Robertson's claim: (1) she has a right and can recover for incidental deprivations; (2) she has a right, but cannot recover for incidental deprivations; and (3) she does not have a right. 14 The First, Third, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have rejected claims like Robertson's, 3 where the alleged deprivation was incidental to the defendant's actions. Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir.2005); McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 822; Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 656 (D.C.Cir.2001); Valdivieso Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir.1986). 4 Less clear is whether those cases recognized a right, assumed a right, or did not recognize a right. If a right has been recognized or assumed, then the incidental nature of the injury may be important, but it will not be important if there is no right. 15 Valdivieso Ortiz began by noting the critical difference between the asserted right and the Supreme Court cases recognizing a parent's substantive due process right to care, custody, and control her child: 16 [Those] cases do not hold that family relationships are, in the abstract, protected against all state encroachments, direct and indirect, but only that the state may not interfere with an individual's right to choose how to conduct his or her family affairs. The emphasis in these cases on choice suggests that the right is one of preemption; rather than an absolute right to a certain family relationship, family members have the right, when confronted with the state's attempt to make choices for them, to choose for themselves. 17 Valdivieso Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 8. The First Circuit also distinguished the procedural due process cases, such as Stanley and Santosky, by explaining that [t]hose cases have held only that when the state seeks to change or affect the relationship of parent and child in furtherance of a legitimate state interest is a [F]ourteenth [A]mendment liberty interest. . . implicated and the state therefore must adhere to rigorous procedural safeguards. Id. The preceding language seems to indicate a finding of no right, but the court continued: [W]e think it significant that the Supreme Court has protected the parent only when the government directly acts to sever or otherwise affect his or her legal relationship with a child. The Court has never held that governmental action that affects the parental relationship only incidentally—as in this case—is susceptible to challenge for a violation of due process. Id. 18 The Third Circuit's ultimate conclusion in McCurdy that the fundamental guarantees of the Due Process Clause do not extend to a parent's interest in the companionship of his independent adult child, McCurdy, 352 F.3d at 830, appears to indicate no right exists. But the McCurdy court also discussed the incidental nature of the injury: It would, therefore, stretch the concept of due process too far if we were to recognize a constitutional violation based on official actions that were not directed at the parent-child relationship. Id.; see also Russ, 414 F.3d at 789 (Under any standard, finding a constitutional violation based on official actions that were not directed at the parent-child relationship would stretch the concept of due process far beyond the guiding principles set forth by the Supreme Court.) (citations omitted). 19 In Butera, the District of Columbia Circuit specifically noted that it had no reason to consider how the injury occurred: 20 Because we hold that a parent-child relationship between two independent adults does not invoke constitutional companionship interests, we do not reach the District of Columbia's contention that Terry Butera's claim fails because the District of Columbia's actions were not intentionally directed or aimed at her relationship with her son. 21 Butera, 235 F.3d at 656 n. 23 (citation omitted). 22 Like the District of Columbia Circuit, we hold Robertson has not asserted a cognizable due process interest. 5 Robertson does not allege the state has interfered with how she raises her minor child, as was the case in Meyer and Pierce, nor does she claim the state action targeted her custody of her minor child, as in Santosky and Stanley. Therefore, her claim finds no support in Supreme Court precedent, and we decline to further expand the substantive protections of the Due Process Clause. 6