Opinion ID: 1651955
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a jury trial.

Text: ¶ 22. On December 26, 1996, Walls filed a motion for a jury trial. Walls argues that the charges of contempt were serious offenses, which entitled him to a jury trial. Walls was convicted of three counts of contempt, sentenced to a total of eighteen (18) months in the county jail and fined a total of $1,500.00. His sentences were to run consecutively. Walls encourages this Court to view his punishment in the aggregate instead of considering each count individually. The State argues that because Walls was not sentenced to more than six (6) months and not fined more than $500.00 dollars on any one count, the offense is considered petty and does not entitle Walls to a jury trial. We find that he was entitled to a trial by jury, and the Chancellor's denial of Walls' motion for same requires reversal in this case. ¶ 23. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.... U.S. Const. amend. VI; See also Miss. Const. art. 3, § 26. The Sixth Amendment and the common law reserve this jury-trial right for prosecutions of serious offenses, and there is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). ¶ 24. To determine whether an offense is properly characterized as petty, courts look at the objective indications of the seriousness with which society regards the offense. Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148, 89 S.Ct. 1503, 23 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969). To determine whether an offense is petty, courts consider the maximum penalty attached to the offense. Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 326, 116 S.Ct. 2163, 135 L.Ed.2d 590 (1996). The maximum penalty set by the legislature is the most relevant criterion with which to assess the character of an offense, because it reveals the legislature's judgment of the severity of the offense. Id. An offense carrying a maximum prison term of six months or less is presumed petty, unless the legislature has authorized additional statutory penalties so severe as to indicate that the legislature considered the offense serious. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543, 109 S.Ct. 1289, 103 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989). ¶ 25. In Mississippi, there is no maximum penalty for the crime of criminal contempt. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-11(4) (Supp. 1997). The statute does provide that [a] contemnor shall not be entitled to a jury trial unless the contemnor requests a jury trial and unless the fine exceeds five hundred dollars ($500.00), or the imprisonment exceeds six (6) months. Id. ¶ 26. In determining whether contempt is to be treated as serious or petty for the purpose of determining whether the person cited for contempt has a right to jury trial, this Court should look to the maximum penalty which could be imposed under statute. McGowan v. State, 258 So.2d 801, 802 (Miss.1972). Where the statute provides no maximum punishment, as in Walls' case, we look to the penalty actually imposed as best evidence of the seriousness of the offense. Id. ¶ 27. We have held that a defendant charged with contempt of court has no right to a trial by jury. Kitchens v. State, 293 So.2d 815, 816 (Miss.1974). The offense is petty where the defendant was sentenced to six months and fined $500.00 for constructive contempt. Hinton v. State, 222 So.2d 690, 692 (Miss.1969); Clark v. State, 332 So.2d 415 (Miss.1976). This Court should look to the punishment imposed when determining whether an offense is petty or serious. Hinton, 222 So.2d at 692. Recently, we said that where no punishment is provided by statute, the court must look to the penalty actually imposed on the defendant. Purvis, 657 So.2d at 798. The maximum penalty allowed by this Court without a jury trial has been six months imprisonment and a five hundred dollar fine. Id. (citing McGowan, 258 So.2d at 803). ¶ 28. The United States Supreme Court has rejected the argument that each contempt was a separate offense, and that because the punishment imposed on each count was not greater than six months and $500.00, each contempt was necessarily a petty offense triable without a jury. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2687, 41 L.Ed.2d 912 (1974). Codispoti was convicted, without a jury trial, of seven counts of direct contempt and sentenced to six months in prison on six of the counts and three months on the remaining count. The Court reversed and remanded his conviction because he was tried without a jury. In doing so, the Court noted that, [i]n terms of the sentence imposed, which was obviously several times more than six months, each contemnor was tried for what was equivalent to a serious offense and was entitled to a jury trial. Id at 517, 94 S.Ct. 2687. ¶ 29. The Court revisited the issue in Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 116 S.Ct. 2163, 135 L.Ed.2d 590 (1996). [2] The Court held that no right to a jury-trial exists where the defendant is prosecuted for multiple petty offenses. Id. at 330, 116 S.Ct. 2163. To determine whether an offense is serious or petty, courts look to the maximum penalty set by the legislature. Id. at 326, 116 S.Ct. 2163. If the offenses charged have been classified as petty, and imprisonment exceeds six months only because of the aggregation of the charges, the jury-trial right does not apply. Id. at 330, 116 S.Ct. 2163. ¶ 30. At first glance, Lewis seems to require that we affirm Walls' conviction for criminal contempt. Closer inspection reveals that Lewis denies a defendant a jury only where the offense has been deemed petty by the legislature. Id. at 330, 116 S.Ct. 2163. The facts of Walls' situation place his situation firmly under the Codispoti rationale. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 330, 116 S.Ct. 2163. ¶ 31. Although the Court in Lewis was faced with a defendant facing two counts of obstruction of the mail, the Court in Lewis discussed, at length, the criminal contempt charge present in Codispoti. `... Even where the contempt is not a direct insult to the court ... it frequently represents a rejection of judicial authority, or an interference with the judicial process ...` Lewis, 518 U.S. at 328-29, 116 S.Ct. 2163 (quoting Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 516, 94 S.Ct. 2687). The power of the judge combined with the often heated context which is present in a contempt proceeding presented the `very likelihood of arbitrary action that the requirement of jury trial was intended to avoid or alleviate.' Id (quoting Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 516, 94 S.Ct. 2687). A jury trial is a protection against the arbitrary exercise of official power, and is particularly important in the [contempt] context. Id. Finally, the Lewis court distinguished Codispoti in the following manner. The absence of a legislative judgment about the offense's seriousness, coupled with the unique concerns presented in a criminal contempt case, persuaded us in Codispoti that, in those circumstances, the jury trial right should be determined by the aggregate penalties actually imposed. Id. ¶ 32. As in Codispoti, we face a situation where legislature has not set forth a maximum penalty under the statute. See Miss. Code Ann. 11-51-11(4) (Supp.1997). Where the legislature has not specified a maximum penalty, courts use the severity of the penalty actually imposed as the measure of the character of the particular offense. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 329, 116 S.Ct. 2163 (citing Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 516, 94 S.Ct. 2687). Because we are faced with a statute lacking a maximum penalty, we must proceed under the rationale as set forth in Codispoti. ¶ 33. In the case sub judice, Walls was charged with and convicted of three counts of constructive contempt. Walls' conviction resulted from a single hearing held without a jury. Subsequently, he was sentenced to six months on each of the three counts for a total of 18 months to be served in the county jail. Applying Codispoti, we view Walls' punishment in the aggregate. Since Walls received an aggregate penalty greater than six months in jail, we have no choice but to reverse and remand his conviction for criminal contempt. ¶ 34. We hold that the chancellor committed reversible error in denying Walls' motion for a jury trial. The legislature has not set a maximum penalty for contempt under the statute. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-11(4)(Supp.1997). The statute does provide that a contemnor is not entitled to a jury trial unless the fine exceeds $500.00, or the imprisonment exceeds six months in jail. Id. Whether contempt is serious or petty cannot be determined from language of the statute. As noted above, this situation is analogous to the one faced by the Court in Codispoti. Where the legislature has failed to set a maximum penalty under the statute, this Court will view the punishment imposed on multiple charges in the aggregate. As Walls was sentenced to a total of 18 months in jail for contempt, we hold that the chancellor committed reversible error in failing to grant Walls' motion for a jury trial.