Opinion ID: 3023754
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Witness identification

Text: Ramon Ramos was involved in the supply of cocaine to the drug trafficking conspiracy in which Mr. Oppong and Mr. Mensah were convicted of participating. Mr. Ramos was arrested in July 1999 and entered into a cooperation agreement with the Government in 2000. He testified against the appellants. At the time, Mr. Ramos was awaiting sentencing by the New York courts. Before trial, the Government informed defense counsel that Mr. Ramos positively 3 identified photographs of a number of alleged conspirators, but did not positively identify photographs of Mr. Oppong or Mr. Mensah. Prior to Mr. Ramos’s in-court testimony, the Government learned that Mr. Ramos had seen Mr. Oppong in the courthouse lock-up and recognized him as a former businessmate. The Government disclosed this information to counsel, adding that Mr. Ramos was prepared to identify Mr. Oppong in court. The Government further explained that Mr. Ramos had not previously made a positive identification of Oppong, but had “indicated that a photograph [of Mr. Oppong] looked like the person named Cuaco that he had dealt with.” Trial Tr., App. at 750; see also id. at 857-858. In court, Mr. Ramos testified to this earlier, tentative identification of a man in a photograph as “Cuaco” and then proceeded to identify Mr. Oppong as Cuaco. Mr. Ramos’s testimony during both direct examination and cross-examination emphasized the tentative nature of his photo identification of Cuaco. See Trial Tr., App. at 865-66 (direct examination); 8787-79 (cross-examination). Defense counsel objected that this testimony contradicted the Government’s pretrial representation that Mr. Ramos did not positively identify photographs of the defendants. The District Court overruled this objection. In so finding, the District Court distinguished between “positive” and “tentative” identifications; both the Government and the District Court characterized Mr. Ramos’s photo identification as merely tentative. See, e.g., Trial Tr., App. at 861, 863, 2942. On appeal, Mr. Oppong argues that the Government engaged in a “blatant Giglio 4 violation” when it stated in a letter to defense counsel that Mr. Ramos did not positively identify Mr. Oppong. Cf. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Mr. Oppong maintains that the District Court, in order to sanction the Government, should have suppressed Mr. Ramos’s testimony regarding his prior tentative photo identification of Mr. Oppong (as Cuaco). The crux of Mr. Oppong’s claim is that the Government “intentionally gave [him] the misleading impression that Ramos had not previously identified [him] from a photo array,” causing his counsel to be “unfairly surprised” at trial by Mr. Ramos’s testimony. Oppong Br. at 63. Although defense counsel refers to this as a“Giglio violation,”1 it does not fulfill the basic criteria for either a Giglio or Brady violation. In both cases, the Supreme Court sought to avoid prejudicing the accused by requiring that favorable evidence––either for exculpatory or impeachment purposes––be disclosed. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 151, 154 (finding a Bradytype due process violation when the government suppressed material evidence of a leniency agreement with an accomplice witness); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (holding that suppression by the prosecution of material evidence favorable to and requested by the accused violates due process). Mr. Oppong’s complaint is not that favorable material evidence was not 1 The Government argues that during the trial Mr. Oppong’s counsel expressly stated that he was not claiming a Giglio violation, and therefore any such argument was waived. However, after reviewing the record, we conclude that the colloquy between the judge and defense counsel was not sufficiently unambiguous as to constitute such a waiver. Trial Tr., App. at 861-62. 5 disclosed––but rather that evidence, which ultimately was not entirely favorable to him, was disclosed in such a way that defense counsel may have anticipated that it would be entirely favorable. Specifically, Mr. Oppong asks this court to conclude that the District Court abused its discretion when it admitted testimony regarding Mr. Ramos’s tentative photo identification of Mr. Oppong, despite the Government’s earlier representation that Mr. Ramos did not positively identify Mr. Oppong.2 Cf. Trial Tr., App. at 863. We cannot so conclude in this case. We have previously acknowledged the distinction between tentative and positive identifications. See, e.g., Baker v. Barbo, 177 F.3d 149, 156 (3d Cir. 1999) (describing a victim’s initial photo identification of the defendant as tentative, while the in-court identification was definitive); Landano v. Rafferty, 856 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1988) (describing conflicting characterizations of an out-of-court identification as either tentative or positive); United States v. Gaines, 450 F.2d 186, 195, 198 (3d Cir. 1971) (noting that the witness initially tentatively identified the defendant but was unable to provide a positive identification). Moreover, we note that there is no general constitutional right to discovery in criminal cases. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a) (identifying categories of evidence that must be disclosed before trial). Further, the Government fully disclosed, 2 Mr. Ramos’s tentative identification of Mr. Oppong cannot be classified as exculpatory. In addition, Mr. Oppong does not present any way in which the tentative identification reflects upon Mr. Ramos’s credibility or could be used for impeachment purposes. Cf. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (finding due process violation only where government’s non-disclosure of evidence undermines confidence in trial outcome). 6 prior to Mr. Ramos’s testimony, that Mr. Ramos had “indicated that a photograph [of Mr. Oppong] looked like the person named Cuaco that he had dealt with.” Trial Tr., App. at 750. There is no reason to believe that Mr. Oppong’s counsel would have conducted his case any differently if this information had been provided earlier. Cf. United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983). Mr. Oppong also claims that Mr. Ramos’s in-court identification was tainted by the fact that the two men had a chance encounter in lock-up. Mr. Oppong has not shown, however, that the encounter was “so unnecessarily suggestive as to give rise to such a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification that admitting the identification testimony [was] a denial of due process.” United States v. Clausen, 328 F. 3d 708, 713 (3d Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Emanuele, 51 F.3d 1123, 1129 (3d Cir. 1995). In sum, we find that the District Court’s decisions to admit Mr. Ramos’s testimony regarding his tentative photo identification of Mr. Oppong and to allow Mr. Ramos’s incourt identification of Mr. Oppong did not constitute abuse of discretion.