Opinion ID: 46
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Obstructing Governmental Administration Instruction

Text: We review challenges to a district court's jury instructions de novo. Gordon v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir.2000). A jury instruction is erroneous if it misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard or does not adequately inform the jury on the law. LNC Investments, Inc. v. First Fidelity Bank, N.A., 173 F.3d 454, 460 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). During the jury charge, the District Court instructed the jury that the offense of obstructing governmental administration was committed by interfering with an official function, without defining that term. Appellants contend now, as they did below, that an arrest is only an official function under New York law if it is lawful that is, if it is made with probable cause. Accordingly, they argue, the District Court should have instructed the jury, regarding Higgenbottom's false arrest claim, that [i]f ... probable cause was lacking for Ms. Cameron's arrest, then defendants' actions were not authorized by law and [the jury's] verdict must be for Ms. Higgenbottom. J.A. 53. Although the District Court was right to reject the precise formulation that Appellants requested, Appellants' understanding of New York law is correct. Therefore, if on retrial Appellees argue that Higgenbottom's arrest was justified on the basis of a charge of obstruction of governmental administration, then the jury should be instructed that that basis for arrest could only be lawful if Cameron's arrest was itself lawful. [11] Under New York law, obstructing governmental administration has four elements: (1) prevention or attempt to prevent (2) a public servant from performing (3) an official function (4) by means of intimidation, force or interference. Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1995); see also N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05. In New York, however, for an arrest to be an official function, it must be lawful. See, e.g., People v. Perez, 47 A.D.3d 1192, 1193-94, 851 N.Y.S.2d 747, 749 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2008); People v. Greene, 221 A.D.2d 559, 560, 623 N.Y.S.2d 144, 145 (App. Div.2d Dep't 1995); cf. People v. Stevenson, 31 N.Y.2d 108, 111, 335 N.Y.S.2d 52, 286 N.E.2d 445, 448 (1972) ([T]he crime of resisting arrest does not occur if the arrest is illegal or unlawful.). Appellees essentially argue that any arrest, lawful or otherwise, by a police officer is an official function. But this proposition finds no support in New York case law. Accordingly, if Ramos and Rivera's arrest of Cameron was not lawful e.g., if they knew that they did not possess probable cause to arrest her for any crimethen they could not have probable cause to arrest Higgenbottom for obstructing governmental administration. On retrial, an instruction explaining this legal nuance to the jury would be appropriate. That said, the specific instruction that Appellants requested at trial was not quite correct. Ramos and Rivera legitimately could have arrested Higgenbottom for disorderly conduct even if they did not have probable cause to arrest her for the separate offense of obstructing governmental administration. See N.Y. Penal Law § 240.20. As a result, a more appropriate instruction with respect to an arrest based on obstruction of government administration might read along the following lines: For an arrest to be an official function, it must be lawful and supported by probable cause. Therefore, if the Officers did not have probable cause to arrest Ms. Cameron, they could not have had probable cause to arrest Ms. Higgenbottom for obstructing their efforts to effect Ms. Cameron's arrest. Nothing we have said here with respect to the jury charge is intended thereby to limit what Appellees may present as bases for the arrest of Higgenbottom, and the District Court is obviously free on retrial to accommodate its charge to whatever theories of liability and defense the parties may present.