Opinion ID: 2575903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Claim of Instructional Error Regarding Intent to Kill

Text: Defendant contends we must set aside the jury's findings that the special-circumstance allegations are true because the trial court committed instructional error when, in answer to the jury's question about the significance of the intent element, it gave the jury an erroneous definition of the mental state required for intent to kill. We agree that instructional error occurred, but conclude that it did not result in prejudice. Accordingly, there is no need to set aside the special-circumstance findings.
In 1983, we held that for a felony-murder special circumstance to be found true, subjecting the killer to a death sentence or life imprisonment without possibility of parole (ї 190.2), the prosecution had to prove that the killer intended to kill the victim. ( Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 153-154, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862, overruled by People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) Although we later overruled Carlos v. Superior Court in People v. Anderson, trials for crimes committed in the window period between Carlos and Anderson are controlled by Carlos. ( People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1150, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 227, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302.) As to offenses committed after Carlos but before Anderson . . . due process and ex post facto principles demand that the intent-to-kill requirement apply to any felony-murder special circumstance charged in connection with such offenses. ( People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 44, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673; see In re Baert (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 514, 519-522, 252 Cal.Rptr. 418.) Retroactive application of Anderson in these circumstances would deprive defendant of a defense against imposition of the death penalty which the law at the time of the crime plainly permitted. ( Fierro, supra, at p. 227, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302.) There is no question that the trial court understood that the intent-to-kill requirement applied in defendant's case. It instructed the jury, for each felony-murder special circumstance, that it must be proved that the defendant, Michael James Huggins, intended that a human being, to wit, Sarah Anne Lees, be killed.
On August 8, 1990, the jury, which was deliberating the case, requested that the meaning of intent be clarified. It sent the trial court a note containing these questions: Is intent only in the act itself, or with the end result[?] ([Example]: Knowing someone is shot but not tending to the person's best interest [if shot and let her die . . . is itself killing] [10] ), and Is intent before, during, or after the act[] of crime[?] The trial court responded: [Y]ou can't X-ray a person's mind. So how do you find out the intent with which an act is done? [І] . . . [І] . . . You can infer the intent from the nature of the act. [І] In other words, if you act in a certain way, knowing that a result, death, is likely to follow, whether you want to kill or not, you still have the intent to kill because if you act in a certain way, knowing that the result, death, is likely to happen, whether you desire to kill or not doesn't make any difference. You still have the intent to kill. The court directed the jurors to apply this definition of intent to the three special-circumstance allegations: that defendant committed the murder in the course of, or immediate flight from, burglary, robbery, and rape or attempted rape (ї 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(i), (iii), and (vii), now subd. (a)(17)(A), (C), and (G)). The next morning, defense counsel filed a motion to clarify the trial court's response. He asserted that the court had, in effect, substituted elements of implied-malice murder (see People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 300, 179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279) for intentional murder. The court refused to reinstruct the jury on the definition of intent it had given. Thereafter the jury returned its verdicts, including verdicts that all three alleged felony-murder special circumstances were true. Defense counsel filed a motion for new trial, again arguing that the trial court had instructed the jury according to elements of implied-malice murder and removed the element of intent from the jurors' consideration as they deliberated the truth of the felony-murder special circumstances. The court responded, Now, if I said reckless indifference or something, I would agree with you; but I thought I was fairly careful. In other words, if you act a certain way, knowing as a result that death is likely to follow, you . . . have the intent to kill. . . . Whether you desire to kill or not doesn't make any difference. Counsel argued, I think an intent to kill is a desire to have the consequences of death come about. The court queried, You have to intend the person being killed? Counsel replied, Yes. The court concluded the matter, declaring, We don't agree. The record's clear. It denied the motion for a new trial.
Defendant asserts that the definition of intent that the trial court provided in its response to the jury's question was faulty because it did not follow the definition of intent to kill set forth in People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425, 434, 162 Cal. Rptr. 306, 606 P.2d 341, judgment vacated and case remanded sub nomine California v. Velasquez (1980) 448 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 3042, 65 L.Ed.2d 1132, reiterated in its entirety People v. Velasquez (1980) 28 Cal.3d 461, 171 Cal.Rptr. 507, 622 P.2d 952. We agree that the court's response to the jury's question was flawed, but find no entitlement to relief. Contrary to defendant's focus on Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131, 197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862, this case does not involve Carlos error. The trial court knew that Carlos governed defendant's case and accordingly instructed on intent to kill. (Cf. People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 42, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) This disposes of part of defendant's ex post facto-based due process claim, which rests on a factual predicate that the court instructed the jury in the manner it would have if Anderson, rather than Carlos, were the governing lawБ─■a factual predicate that is contrary to the record. The court's response to the jury's question misstated the definition of intent, but the court did not instruct the jury in a manner similar to that in which it would have if Anderson had been the law governing defendant's case. The question before us is narrower: did the court properly instruct on intent? Defendant recognizes that this is the gravamen of the dispute in his reply brief, in which he comments that [t]he disagreement between [him] and respondentБ─■much like that between defense counsel and the trial courtБ─■revolves around the meaning of `intent to kill.' That is a correct statement of the posture of the case. At the time of trial, intent to kill as required under Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131, 197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862, was defined as follows: `For a result to be caused intentionally, the actor must either desire the result or know, to a substantial certainty, that the result will occur.' ( People v. Velasquez, supra, 26 Cal.3d 425, 434, 162 Cal.Rptr. 306, 606 P.2d 341; People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 262, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861.) The trial court's oral instruction in the present case stated that the jury could find that defendant intended to kill the victim if he act[ed] in a certain way, knowing that the result, death, is likely to happen. Although the court erroneously used the term likely instead of the term substantial certainty, reversal is not required, as explained below. The People rely on Velasquez and on People v. Lathus (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 466, 470, 110 Cal.Rptr. 921, for the proposition that the trial court's instructions hewed sufficiently close to the required standard for the judgment to be affirmed. We agree. There was error, but no prejudice. In addressing defendant's claim, we apply the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt prejudice standard of Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705. In our view, . . . instructional errorsБ─■whether misdescriptions, omissions, or presumptionsБ─■as a general matter fall within the broad category of trial errors subject to Chapman review on direct appeal. ( People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 499, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869; accord, id. at pp. 502-503, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869; see People v. Haley, supra, 34 Cal.4th 283, 310, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 877, 96 P.3d 170; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 681, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640 [applying Chapman prejudice standard to review of erroneous instruction on special circumstance].) Accordingly, we proceed to consider whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to this jury's verdict. ( Flood, supra, at p. 504, 76 Cal. Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869.) It is clear that the trial court's error in using the term likely rather than the term substantial certainty did not contribute to the jury's finding that defendant intended to kill Lees. The prosecution contended that defendant shot the victim at close range, intending to kill her. Defendant claimed that the gun discharged accidentally. By accepting the prosecution's version, the jury necessarily concluded that defendant intended to kill the victim. The jury was not presented with any version of the facts that required it to determine whether defendant committed an act knowing that it was substantially certain to kill the victim, rather than knowing that it was merely likely to kill her. We find beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. We would reach the same conclusion under the dissent's theory of the jury's question, i.e., that the jury was asking if intent to kill could be found if it concluded that defendant accidentally shot Lees but failed to render aid to her afterward. The dissent theorizes, as we understand it, that the trial court failed to recognize the meaning of the jury's question, but gave an answer that misled the jury into thinking that a failure-to-aid scenario could give rise to an intent to kill. We can discern nothing that would suggest that the trial court's erroneous use of likely would be taken by reasonable jurors as an implicit endorsement of a failure-to-aid theory. Moreover, even if the jury was misled, the question of prejudice would still turn on the difference between likelihood and substantial certainty. Would the jury have found that defendant thought Lees was not only likely, but substantially certain, to die if he did not summon aid? We conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that this question must be answered in the affirmative. The record discloses unambiguously that Lees was shot squarely in the center of her back at point-blank range, i.e., from a distance of 6 to 18 inches. The shotgun was bloodied, defendant left a trail of blood on the floor when he dragged Lees back to her bedroom, and blood lay about her body. Given the location and the obviously grievous nature of Lees's wound, the jury would have had to conclude that defendant knew Lees was substantially certain to die unless medical help arrived promptly. In short, the court's instruction, though erroneous, would not have affected the jury verdict, even if the dissent is correct in characterizing the gravamen of the jury's question. [11] Defendant urges that Velasquez's definition of intent is too broad and that we have impliedly rejected it in later cases. ( People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th 622, 681, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640; People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 423, fn. 2, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 666, 867 P.2d 777; see also People v. Harris (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 754, 758, 12 Cal.Rptr. 916; but see People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 163, 124 P.3d 730; People v. Colantuono (1994) 7 Cal.4th 206, 219, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 908, 865 P.2d 704; People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 262, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861 [all adhering to the Velasquez definition]; People v. Albritton (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 647, 659, 79 Cal. Rptr.2d 169; People v. Smith (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1485, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 604.) He appears to maintain that applying the Velasquez definition, when one more favorable to him later came into being, violates ex post facto-based due process principles. On its face the ex post facto clause [(U.S. Const., art. I, ї 10, cl. 1; Cal. Const., art. I, ї 9)] operates as a check only on the exercise of legislative power, but similar limitations apply to judicial enlargement of a criminal act under principles of due process. ( People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 391, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244.) Invalid ex post facto punishment occurs only when there are changes in law that (1) retroactively alter the definition of a crime or (2) retroactively increase the punishment for criminal acts. ( In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 640, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174.) Nothing of the sort occurred here; therefore, there was no violation of defendant's due process rights. We need not decide whether the Velasquez formulation still applies. The only reason defendant was entitled to an intent instruction at all is because of ex post facto principles. The intent requirement was later abolished, a change that could not have improved defendant's legal situation. Thus, what counts for ex post facto purposes is the law defining intent at the time of the crime, not what change in that definition may have occurred later, if any did. The Velasquez definition of intent clearly applied at that time. (See People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 262, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861 [citing Velasquez on this point four months before the crime].) Defendant received the most favorable treatment that the law had to offer at that time or, incidentally, at any time since. He cannot have it both ways, which he attempts to do by insisting on an intent charge to the jury (which he received, and which ex post facto rules required) and a narrower definition of intent (which ex post facto principles do not require). Defendant is not entitled now to the benefit of a different definition of intent than that which existed when he murdered Lees, even if the definition of intent was later narrowed, because now he would not be entitled to an instruction on intent at all. [12]