Opinion ID: 3158526
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Definition of “Use”

Text: Daves first argues the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the definition of “use” for purposes of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-101,1 which imposes an additional term of imprisonment when a person “uses a firearm while committing a felony.” To succeed on his instructional claim at this stage, it’s not enough for Daves to show the challenged instruction was wrong. Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1357 (10th Cir. 1997). Instead, he “must show that, in the context of the entire trial, the error in the instruction was so fundamentally unfair as to deny [him] due process.” Tiger v. Workman, 445 F.3d 1265, 1267 (10th Cir. 2006). In response to a question from the jury, the trial court gave the following supplemental instruction defining “use”: As a general proposition, a firearm is “used” if [it] is available to facilitate the underlying offense, and it is not required that the weapon be actually brandished or fired. One method in which a firearm may be used is to protect the underlying criminal enterprise. Further, a firearm can be used as a device to embolden or lend courage to the actor, or as a device to intimidate the alleged victim. Daves v. State, 249 P.3d 250, 254 (Wyo. 2011). In his direct appeal, Daves argued the instruction “allow[ed] the jury to convict him even if they [sic] found he merely possessed, or even constructively 1 As part of his instructional argument, Daves suggests § 6-8-101 is unconstitutionally vague. He also argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the supplemental instruction defining “use.” Because he did not raise these arguments in his § 2254 petition, we decline to address them in the context of his application for COA. See United States v. Viera, 674 F.3d 1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2012) (declining to consider defendant’s request for COA based on issues defendant did not present to district court). 3 possessed, the gun without actively employing it in the commission of the predicate felonies.” Id. at 256. The Wyoming Supreme Court rejected this argument, concluding, “The entire tenor of the instruction indicates that the ‘use’ contemplated by the statute had to be in the context of actually facilitating the crime.” Id. In any event, the court pointed out, the evidence established Daves “‘used’ the firearm in accordance with the plain definition of the term by employing it for the purpose of making the victim submit to his will.” Id. Thus, the court concluded, Daves wasn’t prejudiced by the instruction.2 Id. The federal district court rejected Daves’ instructional claim because Daves “offered neither evidence nor argument to support a finding the ‘use of a firearm’ instruction ‘so infected the trial’ as to deny him due process.” Ord. Dismissing Pet., Doc. 42, at 20-21. Because Daves provides no argument that “demonstrate[s] . . . reasonable jurists would find [this] assessment . . . debatable or wrong,” we deny a COA on this claim. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. 2 The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed Daves’ instructional argument for plain error, concluding defense counsel failed to object to the proposed supplemental instruction. Daves, 249 P.3d at 255. To the extent we might read Daves’ application for COA as suggesting this conclusion constitutes an unreasonable determination of the facts for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), we reject that argument. The Wyoming Supreme Court acknowledged that, “[a]t first, defense counsel stated that he did not believe the jury needed to be instructed on the definition” and that the court should instead instruct the jury “to ‘use their common understanding of the word.’” Id. at 254-55. But once the district court decided on the language of the written instruction, “defense counsel did not object.” Id. at 254. To the extent Daves suggests the Wyoming Supreme Court erred in concluding defense counsel’s initial reservations were insufficient to constitute an objection to the language of the instruction, that argument challenges a legal conclusion, not a factual finding subject to review under § 2254(d)(2). 4