Opinion ID: 1180394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The standard of equal protection: in order to comply with the requirement of the equal protection of the laws the classification of section 34311 must rest upon a compelling state interest and must be necessary to further any such interest.

Text: We set forth, first, the legal principles of equal protection of the laws that control the instant situation. (2) Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state. Subject only to its own laws and constitution, the state may create, expand, diminish, or abolish such subdivisions, and all this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. ( Hunter v. Pittsburgh (1907) 207 U.S. 161, 179 [52 L.Ed. 151, 159, 28 S.Ct. 40]; see San Francisco v. Canavan (1872) 42 Cal. 541, 557-558.) Yet this extensive reach of the state to determine whether and how to create, or alter, municipal corporations does not compose an unlimited power (see Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960) 364 U.S. 339, 342-345 [5 L.Ed.2d 110, 113-116, 81 S.Ct. 125]) since in any instance of state action the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the state afford the equal protection of the laws to all persons. [11] (3) Section 34311, and the acts of the respondents pursuant to the mandate of that section, unquestionably constitute state action, and therefore are subject to the precepts of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In any event, the California Constitution also contains equal protection provisions (art. I, §§ 11, 21), to which all state statutes must conform. (4) In determining the validity of legislative distinctions, this court and the United States Supreme Court apply a two-level test. (See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1972) 406 U.S. 164 [31 L.Ed.2d 768, 92 S.Ct. 1400].) In the typical equal protection case the classification need only bear a rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose; [12] [on] the other hand, in cases involving `suspect classifications' or touching on `fundamental interests,' ... the court has adopted an attitude of active and critical analysis, subjecting the classification to strict scrutiny. [Citations omitted.] Under the strict standard applied in such cases, the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose. ( Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 784-785 [87 Cal. Rptr. 839, 471 P.2d 487], vacated on other grounds (1971) 403 U.S. 915 [29 L.Ed.2d 692, 91 S.Ct. 2224].) [13] (5) The strict standard particularly applies to classifications involving voting rights. The decisions of the United States Supreme Court have established that, [B]ecause of the overriding importance of voting rights, classifications `which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined' where those rights are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause. ( McDonald v. Board of Election (1969) 394 U.S. 802, 807 [22 L.Ed.2d 739, 744, 89 S.Ct. 1404]; accord, Dunn v. Blumstein (1972) 405 U.S. 330, 336 [31 L.Ed.2d 274, 280-281, 92 S.Ct. 995].) And in Kramer v. Union School District (1969) 395 U.S. 621 [23 L.Ed.2d 583, 89 S.Ct. 1886], the court, holding invalid a statute limiting the right to vote in school district elections, stated that we must give the statute a close and exacting examination. `[S]ince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).... This careful examination is necessary because statutes distributing the franchise constitute the foundation of our representative society. (395 U.S. at p. 626 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 589].) [14] Respondents contend, however, that section 34311 does not involve voting rights because the section's protest procedure does not provide for an election. We find it unnecessary to decide whether that procedure constitutes an election; our obligation of active and critical analysis [15] is not limited to statutes establishing electoral qualifications as such, but extends to laws which touch upon or burden the right to vote. Thus the United States Supreme Court has applied the strict equal protection test not only to laws which deny persons the right to vote (e.g., Kramer v. Union School District (1969) 395 U.S. 621 [23 L.Ed.2d 583, 89 S.Ct. 1886]), but also to those which condition voting upon payment of a fee ( Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections (1966) 383 U.S. 663 [16 L.Ed.2d 169, 86 S.Ct. 1079]), or which dilute the vote of residents of one locality against those of another (e.g., Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 533 [12 L.Ed.2d 506, 84 S.Ct. 1362]). In Williams v. Rhodes (1968) 393 U.S. 23 [21 L.Ed.2d 24, 89 S.Ct. 5], the court applied the compelling state interest requirement to a pre-election law which specified procedures for placing candidates on the ballot. The challenged Ohio statutes in that case required new political parties to file petitions signed by 15 percent of the electorate by the February preceding the election, which as a practical matter erected a virtually insurmountable barrier to a new party's placing its presidential electors on the state ballot. The court in Williams observed that the state laws place burdens on two different, although overlapping, kinds of rights  the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively. (393 U.S. at p. 30 [21 L.Ed.2d at p. 31].) Accordingly the court inquired into whether the state could claim a compelling interest in restricting these fundamental rights. Ohio contended that its law served both to promote a two-party system and to ensure that the winning electors receive a majority of the votes cast. The court found these objectives insufficient; it concluded that the State has here failed to show any `compelling interest' which justifies imposing such heavy burdens on the right to vote and to associate. ( Id. at p. 31 [21 L.Ed.2d at p. 32].) Although California predicates the formation of a new city upon a favorable vote in an election in which all adult residents within the proposed boundaries cast one vote each (§§ 34324-34326), section 34311 grants to the landowners within those boundaries the prior power to bar this election. That grant plainly does not proceed upon any theory that the landowners constitute a state administrative agency; the section provides for no hearing before the landowners, no standards for making decisions, and no duty upon any landowner to disregard his own pecuniary interest and cast an impartial vote. To the contrary, the Legislature has clearly endowed landowners with this power because it recognizes that they are individuals who financially and politically are interested in the question of whether a new city should be formed, and thus in whether an election should be called for that purpose. Section 34311 excludes from its coverage all residents who own no land, although these persons admittedly are also financially and politically interested in whether an election will be called. The section allocates power to the landowners in proportion to the assessed value of their land, so that the persons owning less land, or land of lower valuation, suffer a limitation in power and choice. The allocation, moreover, takes no account of the value of improvements. If one resident owns vacant land worth $40,000, and his neighbor has placed a $30,000 house on land worth $10,000, they pay the same real property taxes, but the resident with un improved land has four times the voice of the other. The statute thus draws a threefold distinction: between those who own land and those who do not, between those who own more valuable land and those owning less valuable parcels, and between owners of unimproved land as against owners of improved land. Thus section 34311 grants to owners of land, as such, the special power to prevent the incorporation election. [16] They can thereby deny to residents the right to vote on the issue of incorporation. Since nonlandowners cannot protest the decisions of the landowners under section 34311, and since the interests of nonlandowners play no part in determining the sufficiency of a protest under that section, the section 34311 procedure may totally deprive them of any voice on the matter of incorporation. (6) We conclude that a statute which confers power to halt an election, and thus to prevent all qualified voters from casting their vote, must be considered to touch upon and to burden the right to vote, and therefore must be examined under the strict equal protection standards. [17]