Opinion ID: 2274434
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The RUS and the Society

Text: The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of the Society, based on her conclusion that the Society was the fee owner of the property where the incident occurred, but that it did not charge an admission for entrance onto the Cliff Walk. She further found that there was no evidence in the record that the Society discovered [p]laintiffs in a position of peril, and therefore the Society was shielded from liability by the RUS. Before this Court, plaintiffs proffer several reasons to support their argument that the RUS does not apply to the facts in this case. As we shall explain in this opinion, it is our conclusion that with or without the protections afforded to landowners by the RUS, the Society does not owe a duty of care to those who enter upon the Cliff Walk. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Society, but we do so on grounds other than those relied upon by the hearing justice. See Lynch, 770 A.2d at 847 (stating that the Supreme Court may affirm a judgment of the Superior Court on grounds other than those relied upon by the trial court to justify its ruling). However, we shall briefly address the issues that plaintiffs raise to support their contentions that the Society should be answerable in tort in this case. The plaintiffs argue that because the Society charged an admission to The Breakers which they contend includes a fee to experience the Cliff Walkthe RUS does not apply. The plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the case at bar from the situation in Hanley v. State , in which this Court held that the state, as landowner, could invoke the protections of the RUS because the fee it charged the injured plaintiff to park her car did not constitute a fee for admission. See Hanley v. State, 837 A.2d 707, 714 (R.I.2003) (recognizing that the state charged patrons for parking, not admission). The difficulty with this argument becomes clear when one considers the statute's plain language: a charge is defined as the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land[.] Section 32-6-2(1) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that plaintiffs paid an admission fee to visit The Breakers mansion and grounds; it is clear that the fee did not include admission to the Cliff Walk. If Simcha's injury occurred while he was inside the mansion or in the gated backyard, both areas that required payment of a fee in exchange for permission to enter, then the RUS would be of no assistance to the Society. Simcha's injury, however, occurred outside the area for which he paid an admission fee; it occurred on the public easement. If plaintiffs chose not to visit The Breakers, they nonetheless could have entered the Cliff Walk, free of charge, at Shepard Avenue, or they could have gained access from a number of other points, including the area known as Forty Steps. See Cain v. Johnson, 755 A.2d 156, 159 (R.I.2000) (recognizing the Cliff Walk's multiple entrance points). Thus, the fee that plaintiffs paid to tour the mansion and enclosed grounds was not a charge to get access to the Cliff Walk as contemplated by the statute. Second, plaintiffs argue that the RUS does not apply because they were the Society's invited guests; this Court previously has determined that the RUS does not apply to a landowner's invited guests. See Bucki, 914 A.2d at 497-98. The Cliff Walk, however, is free and open to the public; an invitation to visit is not necessary. The plaintiffs place great emphasis on the fact that The Breakers' tour guide invited them to experience the Cliff Walk after the tour and argue that this invitation places the Society outside the protections afforded by the RUS. The fact remains, however, that plaintiffs did not need an invitation of any kind to visit the Cliff Walk. Unlike the private backyard at issue in Bucki, the Cliff Walk has all of the attributes of public propertyit is a public easement over private land and is open to all for recreational purposes. See id. at 498 (recognizing that the backyard was not free and open to the public as evidenced by a No Trespassing sign and the landowner's use of specific invitations for entry). Finally, plaintiffs contend that the Society and the city were engaged in a joint enterprise, sufficient to satisfy the limiting language in the RUS with respect to liability for the willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity after discovering the user's peril[.] Section 32-6-5(a)(1). After careful review of the record before this Court, we are of the opinion that the defendants were not so engaged, such that each is liable for the negligence of the other, or that a duty on the part of one defendantthe city as we ultimately determine in this casemay be imputed to the Society. The record discloses that in 2005, the original hearing justice observed that there was some sort of joint venture going on among the Society, city, and state concerning the Cliff Walk. A joint enterprise requires such circumstances that each has the authority    to act for all in respect to the control of the means or agencies employed to execute such common purpose   . Salmeron v. Nava, 694 A.2d 709, 712 (R.I.1997) (quoting Farrar v. Edgewood Yacht Club, 111 R.I. 376, 380, 302 A.2d 782, 784 (1973)). Despite the hearing justice's rather loose use of the term joint venture, there is not a scintilla of evidence in this record suggesting that the Society and the city were involved in a joint enterprise; indeed, the evidence points to a contrary conclusion. As far back as 1970, in response to a request from the Army Corps of Engineers, the city passed a resolution, giving assurance that the city will maintain the public easement of passage along the Cliff Walk. See Council Resolution No. 12-70; see also Cain, 755 A.2d at 169-71 (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the city's maintenance and control over the Cliff Walk). The record also contains evidence of a 1991 letter from the mayor of the City of Newport to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which stated that [the state] and the City of Newport admit and acknowledge that one or the other, or both, have the responsibility to supervise and maintain the Cliff Walk. [9] The evidence submitted in this case in no way establishes that the landowners whose property abuts the Cliff Walk, including the Society, agreed or even contemplated acting in such a close relationship with the city (or state) that a joint enterprise is a plausible construction of their relationship. [T]he mere fact that two persons are doing something together does not make each chargeable with the negligence of the other, nor does the mere fact that they have certain plans in common. Najjar v. Horovitz, 54 R.I. 224, 227, 172 A. 255, 256 (1934) (quoting McGinley v. Winters, 110 N.J.L. 540, 166 A. 166, 167 (1933)). Having discussed the issue of the availability of the RUS to the Society, we turn now to the penultimate issue of what, if any, is the duty of care owed by the Society to the multitude of tourists who annually visit the Cliff Walk.