Opinion ID: 322177
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Criminal Procedure Issues

Text: 29 In addition to the judicial administration issues, several issues of criminal procedure are raised by appellants. We find these contentions also to be without merit. 30 (a) Appellants assert that the warrantless search of their truck by the Kentucky state police officers and the seizure of the blasting caps and other items violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The Government contends that once the police officers in the course of issuing a traffic citation spotted the boxes labeled 'danger electrical blasting caps' (or language substantially to that effect) in the camper, then justification existed for the warrantless search and seizure. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the Government's position under the circumstances of this case. 31 (1) The Fourth Amendment provides: 32 'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shal issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.' 33 'The Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as are unreasonable.' Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147, 45 S.Ct. 280, 283, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 34 It is universally accepted that 'the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure.' Terry b. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879. Searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, except in 'a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Among the exceptions arguably relevant to this case are searches for evidence in plain view of a police officer justified in being where he is, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-472, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968), searches in certain exigent circumstances, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-455, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948), searches of a moving vehicle, Carroll v. United States, supra, and searches incident to a lawful arrest, Chimel v. Californis, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145 (1925). In a recent case, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), the Supreme Court held that 'in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that Amendment.' 35 No amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent one of the exceptions. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. at 468, 91 S.Ct. 2022. Similarly, use of each of the exceptions to justify a warrantless search hinges on the presence of probable cause to search. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U.S. at 155-159, 45 S.Ct. 280; and the Court's statement in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2537, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973), 'Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for the search.' 36 Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within their (the officers') knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed. Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U.S. at 162, 45 S.Ct. at 288. 37 Probable cause means 'more than bare suspicion.' Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). It means 'a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.' Id. 38 ( 2) In the present case, the state police officers aided by the beam from their cruiser's headlights observed the marked boxes through the window in the camper as they approached the pickup. If this observation constituted a search, it clearly was a reasonable one within the circumstances of this case. Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 45 S.Ct. 280; United States v. Booker, 461 F.2d 990, 992, 993 (6th Cir. 1972) (majority and concurring opinions). Nothing in the Fourth Amendment could be held to require police officers stopping a vehicle in the middle of the night in order to issue a traffic citation to turn off their cruiser's headlights before approaching the stopped vehicle. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234, n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), emphasizes the danger of assaults on police officers in the course of making arrests for such traffic offenses. 39 (3) After the officers in the present case observed the marked boxes, they proceeded to the front of the pickup where they asked the driver, appellant Lewis, for his license. While standing at the front of the truck, the officers noticed two rifles and certain tools in the cab of the truck. 40 Concerning the sequence of events after the officers reached the front of the truck, Trooper Alexander Collins, one of the two officers, testified as follows in Perry Magistrate's Court, District # 2: 41 'A. Well, we asked to see the operator's license, of Mr. Lewis. At this time I didn't know the reputation of these people, but Trooper Thompson seemed to know them fairly well, and since they did have weapons in the truck and tools, we asked them to get in the cruiser and he placed them under arrest and give them their rights. 42 'Q.25 What did he arrest them for? 43 'A. Possession of burglary tools. 44 'Q.26 Are those the tools that he arrested them for? 45 'A. Yes, sir, they are. 46 'Q.27 And that's a conventional lug wrench and a conventional set of bolt cutters? 47 'A. Yes, sir.' 48 Trooper Leroy Thompson was the only one of the two arresting officers to testify in the trial at the District Court. He was not asked expressly if he and Trooper Collins observed the rifles and burglary tools at the time they were at the front of the pickup. However, he testified that the two rifles were standing upright in the middle of the cab and the tire tool and the bolt cutters were on the floor (as opposed to being under the seat). Thus the rifle and tools were positioned in readily observable locations. 49 With respect to why appellants were placed under arrest, Trooper Thompson was questioned as follows in the Magistrate's Court: 50 'Q.9 And when you placed them under arrest over at Busy, in Perry County, Kentucky, what did you advise them at that time that you were arresting them for? 51 'A. At the time I advised them: because of the tail lamps, because of the loud muffler, because of the burglary tools, and also because of the dynamite, but I didn't bring the dynamite charges against them. That case was taken by Detective Jarvis, and also AT&F agent, Larry Hatton.' 52 On cross examination in the Magistrate's Court, Trooper Thompson further testified: 53 'Q.48 Why did you arrest the passenger if you-- if the original charge was strictly a loud muffler and tail light? 54 A. Because I seen the dynamite caps, because the vehicle that was hauling them was not marked as such, because in my belief they were stolen.' 55 This testimony contains one of the few references in the record to the fact that appellants by the mere act of transporting the explosive materials without either the marking 'Explosives' or 'Danger' on the side of the pickup were committing a state statutory offense. K.R.S. 189.160. The federal statute, 18 U.S.C. 842(h), on the other hand, only makes it illegal to transport explosive materials if they are stolen. The appellants were never charged with a violation of K.R.S. 189.160. 56 ( 4) We come now to the question of whether probable cause existed for the search of the camper. Nothing in the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. 842(h), makes it illegal to transport blasting caps. Appellants' pickup carried a sign 'General Construction Company.' The police officers had no knowledge at the time of the arrest that blasting caps were missing from a construction company's magazine in a nearby county. The theft was not discovered until the next morning. The officers were not in the neighborhood investigating construction company thefts. They were staked out on a drunkenness complaint. 57 On the other hand, the officers noticed this heavily loaded pickup (not a transport truck as is usually required to carry explosive materials) traveling in a rural area of eastern Kentucky about midnight on a Sunday night of a Labor Day weekend. Further, the officers noticed a large supply of electrical blasting caps in the camper and appellants refused to state what was in the camper and declined to open the camper for the officers to inspect. The officers noticed two rifles and muddied tools which in their opinion were burglary tools. Considering these circumstances balanced against those in the previous paragraph, we hold that the officers had probable cause to search the camper. They had more than a 'bare suspicion' that the blasting caps were stolen. 58 (5) Given the presence of probable cause to search the camper, were the officers required by the Fourth Amendment to obtain a warrant prior to the search? For the reasons set forth below, we think not. 59 First, the marked boxes, which contained the stolen blasting caps and which were seized from the camper, were in 'plain view' of the officers. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. at 465-472, 91 S.Ct. 2022; Harris v. United States, supra, 390 U.S. at 236, 88 S.Ct. 992. 60 'What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.' Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. at 466, 91 S.Ct. at 2038. 61 The officers in the present case were justified in intruding on the appellants to issue them a traffic citation. In the routine performance of the their duties, they saw the incriminating evidence. 62 Second, exigent circumstances in the present case rendered it impractical for the officers to obtain a warrant and justified the warrantless search. Warden v. Hayden, supra, 387 U.S. at 298-299, 87 S.Ct. 1642; McDonald v. United States, supra, 335 U.S. at 454-455, 69 S.Ct. 191. In denying a motion to suppress the blasting caps the District Court listed the following factors which constituted exigent circumstances: 1) the presence of inherently dangerous explosives, 2) the officers' concern that dynamite might be stored along with the blasting caps (a wrecker operator refused to tow the truck), 3) the hour of night (about midnight), 4) the knowledge by one of the officers that at least one of the appellants was an exconvict, and 5) the mobility of the vehicle. 63 Further, the circumstances of this case fit within the exception to the warrant requirement that permits a search of an automobile on the highway where there is probable cause to support the search and 'where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.' Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U.S. at 153, 45 S.Ct. at 285. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra; Chambers v. Maroney, supra; Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 88 S.Ct. 1472, 20 L.Ed.2d 538 (1968). 64 The officers assuredly would have been derelict in their duties if, while believing that explosives were in the camper, they had taken appellants to jail and left the pickup abandoned in this rural area. The Supreme Court held recently in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973), that where the trunk of an automobile which an officer reasonably believed to contain a gun was vulnerable to intrusion by vandals, the search of the trunk was not unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 65 Finally, the Government contends that the warrantless search of the camper was justified because it was incident to a lawful arrest. Chimel v. California, supra; Agnello v. United States, supra. Initially, we should note that the arrest must be a lawful one in order to justify the search. Manning v. Jarnigan, 501 F.2d 408 (6th Cir. 1974). Moreover, the rule of this court was stated in Stidham v. Wingo, 452 F.2d 837, 841 (6th Cir. 1971), in which we quoted approvingly the following language of Chief Judge Murrah in United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1969): 66 'We are in complete agreement with the prevailing federal and state authority which condemns the search of persons and automobiles following routine traffic violations. Such searches can only be justified in exceptional, on the spot circumstances which rise to the dignity of probable cause.' 67 Subsequent to Stidham, the Supreme Court in the companion cases of United States v. Robinson, supra, and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 94 S.Ct. 488, 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973), sanctioned wider search of the person incident to traffic violations. In both cases probable cause was either conceded or clearly present. In United States v. Robinson, a police officer made a custodial arrest of a traffic offender for driving while his license was revoked. The officer made a search of the offender's person, in the course of which he found in an inside coat pocket a cigarette package containing heroin. The Supreme Court held that the heroin was admitted into evidence lawfully in the traffic offender's subsequent trial for a drug offense, saying that the search was not only incident to a lawful arrest but was also reasonable. Similarly, in Gustafson v. Florida, during the course of a patdown search of the person of a traffic offender who had been arrested for not having his driver's license in his possession, the arresting officer seized some marihuana cigarettes. The Supreme Court upheld this search and seizure on the same grounds stated in United States v. Robinson. See also United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974), for an even more recent statement by the Supreme Court on the validity of a search incident to an arrest. 68 In neither United States v. Robinson nor Gustafson v. Florida was any issue raised as to a warrantless search of the vehicle (as opposed to the person) subsequent to arrest for a traffic offense. Accordingly, if the appellants in this case had been arrested solely for the traffic offense of defective tail lights and loud muffler, 7 we would adhere to the rule in Stidham and decline to uphold the warrantless search of the camper as one properly conducted incident to an arrest for a traffic offense. 69 On the other hand, there is evidence from which the District Court could conclude that appellants were arrested for the traffic offenses and for the possession of burglary tools, or solely for the possession of burglary tools as suggested at one time by one of the officers in Perry Magistrate's Court. Considering all the exceptional circumstances of this case recited above, we hold the warrantless search of the camper was justified as being incident to the arrest for possession of burglary tools. 70 ( b) Appellants next contend that the District Court erred in permitting the Government to introduce into evidence a pair of bolt cutters and a tire tool because they were obtained without a warrant from Kentucky police officers. The Kentucky officers had used this evidence in two earlier prosecutions of appellants in Kentucky state courts. The appellants filed a motion for the return of the items after the first state trial. 71 This court previously has disposed of this issue in United States v. Gargotto, 476 F.2d 1009, 1014 (1973), in which we stated as follows: 72 'Evidence legally obtained by one police agency may be made available to other such agencies without a warrant, even for a use different from that for which it was originally taken. Gullett v. United States, 387 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1044, 88 S.Ct. 1645, 20 L.Ed.2d 307 (1968).' 73 The fact that a motion has been filed for the return of the evidence has no bearing on the rule that one police agency need not get a warrant prior to obtaining evidence from another police agency. 74 ( c) Appellants contend finally that the District Court erred to their prejudice in permitting the Government to introduce evidence in attempting to prove that appellants had stolen the blasting caps from a construction company's magazine. The claimed prejudice is that it would indicate to the jury their prior conviction in Leslie Circuit Court on a charge of breaking and entering. 75 To prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. 842(h), the Government had to show that appellants knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the blasting caps were stolen. Consequently, the prosecution had to prove a theft. Evidence that the appellants committed the burglary of the magazine was properly admissible as proof of the scienter required by 18 U.S.C. 842(h). 76 Appellants' reliance on United States v. Baker, 494 F.2d 1262 (6th Cir. 1974) is misfounded. In that case, it was conceded that the evidence which we found prejudicial was 'not relevant to proving the crime charged.' 494 F.2d at 1265. In the present case, the evidence of the burglary was directly related to the offense charged. 77 Affirmed.