Opinion ID: 2995221
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Order [NGSC] to make whole all individuals

Text: adversely affected by the unlawful practices described above, by providing the affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful practices. R.1 at 3-4. /5 The court also noted that, under 29 U.S.C. sec. 626(b), it had the authority to order the re- straint of the continued withholding of the amounts due to the employees if and when the EEOC proved the alleged discrimination. R.59 at 12. However, the court distinguished this statu- tory remedy from injunctive relief and held that the remedy under sec. 626(b) did not necessitate an injunction. In the district court’s view, the statutory remedy available under sec. 626(b) rendered the EEOC’s separate request for an injunction unnecessary and moot. /6 The district court further determined that the public interest in a monetary recovery was mini- mal because (1) the damages would be awarded directly to the teachers, (2) NGSC already had abandoned the discriminatory ERP, (3) NGSC understood the need to remedy discrimination and already had adopted an apparently nondiscriminatory plan, (4) the deterrent effect would be minimal because two other early retirement plans recently had been held in violation of the ADEA, and (5) the financial cost imposed on local taxpayers undermined the beneficial impact on the public interest. /7 In cases brought under Title VII and the Ameri- cans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the EEOC also is precluded from seeking monetary relief for individuals who themselves are barred from bringing the same suit because, in such circumstances, the EEOC’s suit serves only a minimal public interest. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 812-13 (4th Cir. 1999) (When the EEOC seeks ’make-whole’ relief for a charging party, the federal policy favoring enforcement of private arbitration agreements outweighs the EEOC’s right to proceed in federal court because in that circumstance, the EEOC’s public interest is minimal, as the EEOC seeks primarily to vindi- cate private, rather than public, interests.), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3726, 69 U.S.L.W. 3624, 3628 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2001) (No. 99-1823); EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1543 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the EEOC’s claim on behalf of an individual is moot under Title VII when the individual has settled the claim because the public interest in a back pay award is minimal); EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1361 (6th Cir. 1975) (suggesting that a prior settlement may limit the scope of the relief that the EEOC may seek for the private benefit of individuals under Title VII). In the specific context of arbitration agree- ments, the Sixth Circuit created a split in the circuits when it held that the EEOC is not barred by a preexisting arbitration agreement from seeking monetary relief on behalf of an individu- al. Compare EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 462 (6th Cir. 1999), with Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 813 (holding that an arbitration agreement precluded the EEOC from pursuing individual monetary relief in an ADA case), and EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 300-01 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee precludes the EEOC from seeking purely monetary relief for the employee under the ADEA in federal court). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Waffle House. /8 Lorance involved a Title VII challenge to an allegedly discriminatory seniority system. Although Lorance’s specific holding has been abro- gated by statute--42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-5(e)(2) now gives employees injured by the application of a seniority system which has been adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose in violation of Title VII the option of measuring the limita- tions period from the date of that application-- its reasoning remains persuasive outside of the Title VII/intentionally discriminatory seniority system context. Huels v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 121 F.3d 1047, 1050 n.1 (7th Cir. 1997) (quota- tion marks omitted). /9 As a result of our conclusion, the EEOC’s piggybacking argument is moot. Piggybacking occurs when individuals who have not filed charges or who have filed untimely charges of discrimination join an action in which at least one individual has filed a timely charge that alleged class-wide discrimination or that claimed to represent a class of employees. See Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 852 F.2d 1008, 1017 (7th Cir. 1988). Assuming that piggybacking is appropriate in a case brought by the EEOC, as opposed to a private individual, see EEOC v. Ky. State Police Dep’t, 80 F.3d 1086, 1095 (6th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Wilson Metal Casket Co., 24 F.3d 836, 839-40 (6th Cir. 1994), because Anthis’ and Schleter’s charges were untimely, there are no charges onto which the EEOC could piggyback the claims of the re- maining five teachers. /10 In addition to arguing that the EEOC is precluded from bringing suit because the individuals it represents are barred from doing so, NGSC raises two alternative arguments. Both arguments fail. First, NGSC asserts the doctrine of laches. However, NGSC fails to raise a question of mate- rial fact as to whether it has been materially prejudiced by the alleged delay. See Jeffries v. Chicago Transit Auth., 770 F.2d 676, 679 (7th Cir. 1985). Second, NGSC claims that it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity pursuant to Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). However, NGSC is not an arm of the state government and therefore is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999).