Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Marsden Claim (Lewis)

Text: Lewis complains the trial court erred in denying his Marsden motion, and in not giving him an adequate opportunity to show that counsel should be replaced. He also argues that the court's actions had the additional legal consequence of violating his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment and the state Constitution. A claim of deficient representation also is raised under the Sixth Amendment and the state Constitution. As previously described, the issue arose on February 2, 1993, near the close of the prosecution's case at the guilt phase, and the day after the assault on counsel that Lewis initiated in the courtroom. By then, Richard Leonard had represented Lewis as either counsel or advisory counsel for over two years. Between December 14, 1990, and January 4, 1993, Lewis had twice assumed, and then relinquished, in propria persona status. On December 14, 1990, he assumed in propria persona status. On April 20, 1992, he relinquished it. On June 5, 1992, he again assumed in propria persona status. On January 4, 1993, he again relinquished it. Two days later, on January 6, 1993, shortly before jury selection began, James Leonard became cocounsel to Richard Leonard. In the Marsden hearing Lewis complained that counsel did not accept his innocence, did not visit him sufficiently, and had caused Jeanett Hudson to become a witness against him, harming his alibi defense. He said that he did not trust counsel and would not cooperate with them. He also cited the big confrontation in court the previous day. Richard Leonard replied that he had visited Lewis at least once a week for the last two years, felt comfortable representing him, and harbored no lingering resentment over the assault. James Leonard acknowledged that Lewis had acted badly and pushed him the preceding week. However, James Leonard also felt no resentment and could continue representing Lewis. The trial court allowed Lewis to respond to counsel's arguments, including Richard Leonard's claim that he regularly visited Lewis. Lewis ended the exchange by twice refusing to say anything further. He also refused to attend trial the next day. In denying the Marsden motion, the trial court noted that Lewis generally appeared to be cooperating with his attorneys in court, and that the prosecution was almost done presenting its case. The court praised counsel as being professional and the best you can get. The court also commented on Lewis's apparent attempt to generate conflict and distrust by physically attacking counsel late in the case. Lewis did not dispute those observations. No abuse of discretion occurred. In particular, we reject Lewis's claim that the trial court denied him an adequate opportunity to show the need for replacement counsel. The court also did not summarily resolve factual disputes against him (e.g., the number of counsel's jail visits). The court apparently viewed the Marsden motion  much like the courtroom assault  as a last-ditch effort to delay the jury verdict, and as having little bearing on the attorney-client relationship. Indeed, the court emphasized that, aside from the brawl, Lewis had largely cooperated with, and behaved well toward, counsel. We see no basis on which to disturb the ruling on appeal. (See People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 659, 274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849 [defendant's delay in expressing dissatisfaction with counsel gave the court reasonable grounds to question the sincerity of his current criticisms].)