Opinion ID: 2059116
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Negligence Theory

Text: We now briefly address that portion of the appellants' argument that sounds in negligence. We begin by noting that it is frequently appropriate to assert both breach of contract and negligence claims in an agency case. Where both claims are asserted, however, they tend to overlap. Thus, an agent's duty is, in many circumstances, equivalent to an agent's contractual obligation and a breach of that duty equivalent to a failure to satisfy a contractual obligation. See, e.g., Gallun v. McLaughlin Co., D.C.App., 321 A.2d 216, 217 n.1 and 220. Cf. Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc., supra 401 F.2d at 656 (whether the charge is breach of contract or negligence, the agent is bound to exercise reasonable care and skill). Yet, under some circumstances, this court has held that even if there is no contractual obligation to provide insurance an individual can still be held liable for breach of an assumed duty. See Franklin Investment Co., Inc. v. Huffman, D.C.App., 393 A.2d 119, 122 (1978) (although automobile installment contract required purchaser to maintain collision insurance, seller's assignee subsequently assumed the duty to provide insurance and was estopped from arguing absence of obligation). In the Huffman case, this court adopted Restatement (Second) of Agency § 378 (1958) which provides: One who, by a gratuitous promise or other conduct which he should realize will cause another reasonably to rely upon the performance of definite acts of service by him as the other's agent, causes the other to refrain from having such acts done by other available means is subject to a duty to use care to perform such service or, while other means are available, to give notice that he will not perform. See also Dawson v. National Bank & Trust Co., D.C.App., 335 A.2d 259, 261 (1975). See generally W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 56, at 343 (4th ed. 1971). Even assuming, then, that the agency agreement in the instant case did not specify an obligation to notify any of the Glekases or the insurance broker and did not specify an obligation to see that the fire insurance was renewed, a jury could reasonably infer that Boss & Phelps breached an assumed duty owed to the Glekases. Mr. Morris and the Glekases entered into a real estate management contract. In the context of this principal-agency relationship, Mr. Morris spoke to Helen Glekas on the phone to notify her of the approaching expiration date. [8] Mr. Glekas, the agent of the Glekases who handled most business and real estate matters, was ill at the time. Mr. Morris apparently was aware of this fact, but did not send a written notification to Mr. Glekas and did not notify any of the Glekases other than Helen. Viewing these disputed and undisputed facts in light of Restatement § 378, we conclude that a jury could fairly infer that the conduct of Mr. Morris caused the Glekases reasonably to rely on Boss & Phelps to give them proper and effective notice of any approaching expiration dates or to see that their fire insurance policy was renewed and that, therefore, they justifiably refrained from renewing the policy or from communicating with Mr. Bogdanoff. Analyzing the disputed and undisputed facts in the light most favorable to the appellants, we are unable to conclude Boss & Phelps sustained its burden of proving that there is no issue of material fact or that inferences which could be drawn from the evidence in favor of the appellants are too incredible to be accepted by reasonable minds. The appellants set forth more than merely formal allegations, [9] and we must resolve all doubts against the appellee. We reverse the grant of appellee's motion for summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded.