Opinion ID: 2827594
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: C.J., LEE, concurring in the result

Text: ¶26 I see no basis for the trustee’s standing in light of the above. Trustees may pursue claims “if [the] claim is a general one, with no particularized injury arising from it, and if that claim could be brought by any creditor of the debtor.” See, e.g. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 884 F.2d 688, 70–1 (2d Cir. 1989). Conversely, where a claim is “specific” to a creditor (such as when one creditor holds a perfected security interest), it is a “legal or equitable interest only of the creditor,” and the trustee lacks standing to bring it. Bd. of Trs. of Teamsters Local 863 Pension Fund v. Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d 164, 169–70 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). ¶27 Claims that are general, with no “particularized injury” arising from them, and that “could be brought by any creditor” are precisely the sorts of claims that belong to the bankruptcy estate. But claims that belong to one creditor, the denial of which would result in a “particularized injury” and which accordingly could not “be brought by any creditor of the estate” do not belong to the estate, 1 (...continued) J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[Under] a traditional formulation of standing . . . an assertion of injury [is required to] sustain[] a private action. . . . Standing is not a judge-made principle of judicial restraint subject to common-law evolution over time. It is an essential element of the constitutional provisions defining and limiting the judicial power”). The majority critiques my analysis on the ground that it “turns on significant factual determinations.” Supra ¶ 13, n. 17. But the existence of factual questions has never been enough to establish standing. Standing requires a threshold showing of injury, causation, and redressability. See City of L. A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–102 (1983) (“The plaintiff must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury . . . and the injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973) (holding that there is no standing because the injury cannot be remedied by the relief sought). And questions on those matters must be subject to factual investigation and resolution by the court. See, e.g., City of Grantsville v. Redevelopment Agency of Tooele City, 2010 UT 38, ¶ 9, 233 P.3d 461 (acknowledging the “factual determinations” that must be made on standing issues, and the deference owed to district court findings on such issues). Otherwise the mere existence of a factual conflict would establish the court’s jurisdiction. 11 RUPP v. MOFFO A.C.J. LEE, concurring in the result and thus are not within the reach of the trustee. The trustee simply has no third-party standing to sue on behalf of such a creditor, and therefore suffers no particularized injury. ¶28 This problem is apparent in the district court’s award of the rents to Rupp. After deeming the transfer fraudulent, the court awarded $34,200 to Rupp, to then be placed in the bankruptcy estate for creditors to sort through. But those rents belonged to Bayrock, not Rupp or any of the debtor’s other creditors. Giving them to someone else is not an appropriate exercise of our judicial power. For that reason the trustee lacks standing. I would reverse on that basis, without reaching the merits. 12