Opinion ID: 623102
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Step Four Determination

Text: Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in her analysis at step four by failing to include a limitation for depression in the RFC determination underlying her inquiries to the VE at the hearing. We disagree. An ALJ need not question the VE about limitations not substantiated by the evidence. See Decker v. Chater, 86 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 1996). That was the circumstance here. The ALJ did not find an impairment based on depression, and the record supports that determination. A few treatment notes from the months leading up to the hearing reflect that Plaintiff had been prescribed Zoloft for depression; but there is no evidence that this condition caused any work-related functional limitation.1 A 1 Plaintiff’s reply brief suggests that her testimony at the hearing about poor (continued...) -3- “claimant must show more than the mere presence of a condition or ailment.” Hinkle v. Apfel, 132 F.3d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1988) (“The mere diagnosis of [a medical condition], of course, says nothing about the severity of the condition.”). Plaintiff did not show or even allege that depression had an adverse impact on her ability to work. Indeed, both she and her counsel effectively disclaimed any impairment in this respect at the hearing before the ALJ. 2 In short, whether viewed as a matter of 1 (...continued) school performance and limited math and reading skills reflects a functional limitation from mental impairment. Not only does this argument come too late, see Aviva Life & Annuity Co. v. F.D.I.C., 654 F.3d 1129, 1136 n.6 (10th Cir. 2011) (contention first raised in reply brief is waived), but also the testimony did not relate to depression or any other claimed impairment (counsel was just asking about skills Plaintiff acquired as a hairdresser that might transfer to other jobs). Plaintiff made a similarly inapt argument in the district court, referring to statements she had made about being “hyper,” “hot headed,” and having a “short [at]tention span” in a function report completed in May 2007. Aplt. App. Vol. 2 at 129-30. 2 Counsel told the ALJ that plaintiff had two theories of disability, neither of which included depression or mental impairment. Later, when examining Plaintiff, counsel referred to ankle pain, shortness of breath, and drowsiness from medication, and asked whether she had “any other problem,” to which she replied “No.” Aplt. App. Vol. 2 at 34. Plaintiff later mentioned in passing that she had been given medication for depression, but she did not say that this limited her in any way or had anything to do with her disability claim, and counsel did not pursue the matter. Finally, after the VE testified that Plaintiff could still work as a hairdresser based on the RFC found by the ALJ, counsel questioned the VE at some length but made no inquiries regarding the vocational effect of a depression impairment. -4- waiver, 3 or just a matter of evidentiary deficiency, Plaintiff failed to substantiate any work-related limitation that would have required inclusion in her RFC. We note that Plaintiff did not argue in the district court, nor does she contend on appeal, that the ALJ erred by failing to develop additional evidence relating to depression. Any issue in that regard has therefore been doubly waived. See Berna v. Chater, 101 F.3d 631, 632-33 (10th Cir. 1996). Given the effective disavowal of any mental impairment at the hearing and the paucity of evidence suggesting any such impairment, a duty-to-develop argument would not have been promising in any event. See Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1062-63 (10th Cir. 2009). Finally, Plaintiff attempts to expand on her step-four objection by citing Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017 (10th Cir. 1996), and arguing that the ALJ erred by failing to compare the mental demands of her past work as a hairdresser to the 3 In Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000), a plurality held that social security claimants “need not . . . exhaust issues in a request for review by the Appeals Council in order to preserve judicial review of those issues.” Id. at 112. (Justice O’Connor concurred on the limited basis that it was inappropriate to enforce a waiver rule without notice, and the regulations suggested there was no such rule. See id. at 112-14.). The Court noted, however, that it was not deciding “[w]hether a claimant must exhaust issues before the ALJ,” id. at 107; and some later circuit decisions have ruled that an issue was waived by not being presented to the ALJ. See Mills v. Apfel, 244 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001); see also Anderson v. Barnhart, 344 F.3d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying waiver without expressly distinguishing Sims). We need not resolve the ALJ-level waiver question here, because Plaintiff’s belated claim of a mental impairment fails on the evidence in any event. -5- mental limitations of her RFC. 4 But, as the magistrate judge explained, Plaintiff never alleged that she had any mental impairment. Nor, as we noted above, does the record demonstrate any mental impairment from depression. Hence the predicate for this Winfrey argument is absent.