Opinion ID: 613518
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: United States v. Remmer was abrogated by Smith v. Phillips

Text: The dissent begins by stating the law is clear, the facts are clear and our Court is clearly mistaken in its view that defense counsel were not `diligent'; he then asserts that in Remmer the Supreme Court established a clear procedure to deal with this kind of ex parte communication. In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties. The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954). The dissent would accordingly place the burden on the prosecutor to show that there was no bias, and bias is presumed absent such a showing. As the district court recognized, however, Remmer was abrogated in part by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Phillips , which held that the defendant has the burden to show that there has been actual prejudice. 455 U.S. 209, 215-17, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (stating that [t]his Court has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias; that Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 70 S.Ct. 519, 94 L.Ed. 734 (1950) a pre- Remmer case, rejected [a] claim of implied bias and held that [p]reservation of the opportunity to prove actual bias is a guarantee of a defendant's right to an impartial jury; and that Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 101 S.Ct. 802, 66 L.Ed.2d 740 (1981) a post- Remmer case, held that the appropriate safeguard against juror bias is the defendant's right to demonstrate that the ability of the jury to fairly adjudicate the case was compromised) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see R. 131 (Op. & Order) at 62 (following Sixth Circuit precedent that holds that Smith v. Phillips changed the Remmer rule); see also United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528, 536 (6th Cir.2000) (recognizing that Smith v. Phillips changed the Remmer rule and placed the burden on the defendant to show actual prejudice from ex parte juror communication); Kowalak v. Scutt, 712 F.Supp.2d 657, 691-92 (E.D.Mich.2010) (same). Given the clear holding of Smith v. Phillips and the recognition by the district court and other 6th Circuit cases that Smith v. Phillips changed the Remmer ruleit is clear that the district court did not unreasonably apply the applicable Supreme Court precedent.