Opinion ID: 76559
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Witness Sequestration Claim

Text: 39 Before discussing the merits of Lynn's claim that the government pollinated, primed and pumped witnesses to testify to a parade of perjury, we note that there are two ways in which to view Lynn's claim. The first is that Lynn is providing additional evidence that the government was involved in the known witness sequestration violations whereby the witnesses discussed and tailored their testimony to conform to each other's. The second way to view Lynn's claim is that Lynn is actually making a new, separate claim of prosecutorial misconduct; namely, that government agents fed information to prosecution witnesses from both other witnesses and from government agents themselves. Out of an abundance of caution, we address both versions of Lynn's claims. 40 To the extent Lynn raises a pure witness sequestration claim, Lynn has filed new affidavits, but they do not establish cause to overcome his procedural default of that claim. First, Eyster's brief on direct appeal stressed the intentional witness sequestration violations by the same witnesses, Sheehy and Purvis. Eyster's brief asserted that Sheehy, Purvis, and others intentionally violated the witness sequestration order by discussing and conforming their testimony to one another's while confined in jail during the trial. 23 This Court's Eyster decision already states that the record in that case reflected that both the district court and the government were lax in upholding the witness sequestration rule. Id. at 1211 (emphasis added). Because Eyster raised this very issue, Lynn has not shown that his claim about the government's involvement with the witness sequestration violations was unavailable at all on direct appeal. 41 Further, Lynn has not shown that any objective factor external to the defense prevented him from raising his witness sequestration claim on direct appeal. Jones, 256 F.3d at 1145; Johnson, 256 F.3d at 1171; McCoy, 953 F.2d at 1258. Rather, the factor preventing Lynn from raising his witness sequestration and improper vouching claims on direct appeal was his unlawful escape from custody. If Lynn had not escaped, this Court would have addressed not only his improper vouching claim but also his witness sequestration claim in his direct appeal. 42 Second, to the extent Lynn raises a pure, but stronger, witness sequestration claim, Lynn has not shown cause because he has not satisfied the standards for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. This Court has concluded that § 2255 motions based on new evidence are subject to the standards generally applicable to motions for a new trial based on new evidence. Greene, 880 F.2d at 1306-07; Bentley v. United States, 701 F.2d 897, 898 (11th Cir.1983); Everitt v. United States, 353 F.2d 532, 532 (5th Cir.1965). There are now five requirements that a movant must satisfy before a new trial will be granted based on newly discovered evidence. United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1287 (11th Cir.2003). The five requirements are as follows: 43 (1) the evidence was discovered after trial, (2) the failure of the defendant to discover the evidence was not due to a lack of diligence, (3) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching, (4) the evidence is material to issues before the court, and (5) the evidence is such that a new trial would probably produce a different result. 44 Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, we have held that motions for a new trial are highly disfavored, and that district courts should use great caution in granting a new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Lynn would have to satisfy these five requirements to obtain a new trial based on new evidence if the issue was raised on direct appeal. The standard is arguably higher, but certainly no lower, for Lynn to obtain a new trial based on new evidence through a § 2255 proceeding. 45 We need not analyze all five requirements because Lynn's new evidence of the government's involvement in the witness sequestration violations does not meet the third requirement, that the evidence not be merely cumulative or impeaching. Id. Here, Lynn's new evidence merely provides further impeaching evidence of witness testimony and is also cumulative of evidence already proffered by Lynn's codefendants in the district court and in their direct appeals. Because neither cumulative nor impeaching new evidence is sufficient to satisfy Lynn's burden in a § 2255 proceeding, the district court correctly found that Lynn failed to show cause for his procedural default of his witness sequestration claim.