Opinion ID: 657206
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conspiracy Finding

Text: 17 Moss, Kohn and Richardson contend that the district court erred in permitting into evidence co-conspirators' statements without making a finding that a conspiracy was established by a preponderance of the evidence. In order to render co-conspirator's statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy which are otherwise hearsay admissible pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), the government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the defendant against whom the statement is offered was a member of the conspiracy; and (3) the statement was made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Rios, 842 F.2d 868, 872 (6th Cir.1988) (per curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1031, 109 S.Ct. 840, 102 L.Ed.2d 972 (1989); United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074, 100 S.Ct. 1020, 62 L.Ed.2d 756 (1980); United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 986-87 (6th Cir.1978). The district court is required to make a finding that the government has met its burden, but may admit the statements in question subject to a later ruling that this burden was met. Vinson, 606 F.2d at 153. Here, the district court admitted co-conspirator statements subject to later ruling. 18 The government contends that the district judge made an adequate finding that the government met its burden of proof when, after the government pointed out that a finding had not yet been made, the court stated that he didn't make that determination on the record but clearly there is no problem. At that point, defendants made no objection or request for further findings. Generally, a district court's determination that the government carried its burden of proof is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Curro, 847 F.2d 325, 328 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 843, 109 S.Ct. 116, 102 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988). However, the government argues that the determination in this case should be reviewed only for clear error because defendants made no contemporaneous objection to the district court's failure to make Enright findings at trial or to the adequacy of its findings after the government brought it to the district court's attention. However, we need not reach the question of which standard of review is most appropriate because we conclude that no reversible error was committed. See Curro, 847 F.2d at 328 n. 3. 19 The circumstances of this case differ from those involved in United States v. Castro, 908 F.2d 85 (6th Cir.1990). In Castro, this court concluded that a limited remand for Enright findings was required where the parties neglected to request, and the district court did not make, any finding whatever. Castro, 908 F.2d at 91. Here, the district court made a finding, albeit conclusory. 20 The district court's determination in this case is more similar to the determination deemed adequate in Curro, 847 F.2d at 328-29. While the court cautioned that a mere conclusory statement will not always suffice as adequate Enright findings, it concluded that no specific findings were required where the conspiracy alleged involved many acts and people, and the court was able to say with confidence that the government met its burden. Id. In the instant case, the government's burden of proof likewise was clearly met. Notably, defendants herein do not cite specific co-conspirator statements to which they now object. We reiterate that more specific Enright findings are preferred and that a conclusory statement will not suffice in every case. However, we conclude that the district court, in this case, committed no error by failing to make more specific findings under the circumstances of this case.