Opinion ID: 3009964
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waterworks conviction

Text: reliability of identifications), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1017 (1988). Woessner's observation of defendant from the stand has destroyed the curative capacity of a line-up, and to remand for a line-up at this juncture would neither assist the court in determining the reliability of Woessner's testimony nor vindicate defendant's constitutional rights. Apart from the contested surveillance photographs, there is no physical evidence linking defendant to the Waterworks robbery. The government refers us to evidence that defendant had an expensive drug addiction and unexplained income, as well as his post-arrest comment to another inmate that he would beat the case. The government also relies on testimony of three persons, each of whom knew defendant, that he was the person in the Waterworks surveillance photographs. Of the government's three witnesses, one testified he had seen defendant only two or three times; the second was an admitted drug user on probation for a prior drug conviction; and the third was a convicted drug offender with pending charges for drug and prostitution offenses. App. at 166, 180, 191-93. In his defense, defendant's mother and two friends testified that he was not the person in the surveillance photographs. App. at 344-45, 350, 362. Defendant also introduced expert testimony from a surgeon who had compared the dimensions of defendant's face to those of the robber in the surveillance photographs and concluded that he was 100 percent certain that they are not the same two people. App. at 407-08. In rebuttal, two government experts testified that the calculations made by defendant's expert were unreliable. Woessner's testimony was crucial evidence on the robber's identity, the only issue at trial, and we cannot conclude that her testimony was unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue. Yates, 500 U.S at 403. A conviction should not be permitted to stand under such circumstances, and accordingly, we conclude that the error was not harmless. Heeding the advice of Justice Black in his Foster dissent, we will clarify the proceedings to follow. Foster, 394 U.S. at 445 (Black, J. dissenting) (where appellate court vacates conviction for unconstitutional admission of identification testimony, court should specify which testimony by witness is barred at retrial). First, because the hearings on defendant's motions to suppress and for a new trial elicited all the relevant facts and left nothing in dispute, another hearing on the reliability of Woessner's identification testimony is unnecessary. Second, on remand for a new trial, the district court is directed to exclude in-court and out-of-court identification testimony by Woessner. To admit evidence of Woessner's recognition of defendant in the courthouse hallway would violate the due process clause for the same reasons as did admission of the in-court identification testimony. Third, subject to any other objections not herein considered, we do not limit the ability of the government or defendant to question Woessner on other aspects of the case, including the robbery itself, her initial description, and her failure to select defendant's photograph from the array.