Opinion ID: 1670351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: advisory recommendation

Text: On the other hand, and compared to our ability to review the actual findings of fact made by the trial judge, there could hardly be any meaningful appellate review of a Florida jury's advisory recommendation to a trial judge since that review would rest on sheer speculation as to the basis of the recommendation, whether considering the jury collectively or the jurors individually. In other words, from a jury's bare advisory recommendation, it would be impossible to tell which, if any, aggravating circumstances a jury or any individual juror may have determined existed. And, of course, a recommendation is hardly a finding at all. Justice Shaw has previously explained that the jury's verdict does not encompass reviewable findings of fact: As a matter of law, as we hold here, the jury's recommendation is merely advisory; the trial judge is the sentencer and must base the sentence on an independent weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors, notwithstanding the jury recommendation. Second, under section 921.141, the jury's advisory recommendation is not supported by findings of fact. This presents a serious Furman [v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) ] problem because, if Tedder [v. State, 322 So.2d 908 (Fla.1975) ] deference is paid, both this Court and the sentencing judge can only speculate as to what factors the jury found in making its recommendation and, thus, cannot rationally distinguish between those cases where death is imposed and those where it is not. Florida's statute is unlike those in states where the jury is the sentencer and is required to render special verdicts with specific findings of fact. Combs v. State, 525 So.2d 853, 859 (Fla. 1988) (Shaw, J., specially concurring). Indeed, this Court has stated that a judge can find aggravating circumstances that have never been presented to a jury. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 703 So.2d 1055, 1061 (Fla.1998) (We have held that it is not error for a judge to consider and find an aggravator that was not presented to or found by the jury.); Sims v. State, 681 So.2d 1112, 1119 (Fla.1996) (finding that the court did not commit error by finding an aggravating circumstance which was not alleged by the state and for which the jury received no instruction). Our reliance upon the trial judge's exclusive authority to make findings of fact as to aggravation is exemplified by our holding in Engle v. State, 438 So.2d 803, 813 (Fla.1983). In that case, a capital defendant asserted that his due process rights were violated when the State was permitted to argue two aggravating factors before the judge at sentencing which had not been argued before the jury. See id. The defendant argued that he should have been allowed to have the existence and validity of aggravating circumstances determined as they were placed before his jury. Id. We rejected this argument, stating specifically that the trial judge is not limited in sentencing to consideration of only that material put before the jury, is not bound by the jury's recommendation, and is given final authority to determine the appropriate sentence. Id. Of course, Florida's statutory scheme also vests authority in the trial judge to override the jury's advisory recommendation in some instances. See § 921.141(3), Fla. Stat. (2001) (Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death....). Hence, in some cases, the participation of the jury, however defined, may be discounted.