Opinion ID: 2358338
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consent to the Adoption

Text: We begin by examining whether the basic statutory requirements for an adoption were met in this case. Those requirements, particularly the provisions requiring consent of the natural parents, are set forth in KRS Chapter 199 and provide important context for our decision. KRS 199.500(1) states that [a]n adoption shall not be granted without the voluntary and informed consent, as defined in KRS 199.011, of the living parent or parents of a child born in lawful wedlock .... [2] KRS 199.490 directs that [a]ny consent to adoption shall be filed prior to the entry of the adoption judgment. The phrase voluntary and informed consent in the adoption statute means that ... the consenting person was fully informed of the legal effect of the consent, that the consenting person was not given or promised anything of value except those expenses allowable under KRS 199.590(6), that the consenting person was not coerced in any way to execute the consent, and that the consent was voluntarily and knowingly given. KRS 199.011(14). The consent must be in writing, be signed, and include nine specific pieces of information. [3] The item in the record most closely resembling a consent to adoption is the consent to custody form that Appellant signed. That form, however, never mentions adoption and does not include the information required by KRS 199.011(14). As such, the consent form simply is not sufficient under the statute as proof of Appellant's consent to the adoption. Like the Court of Appeals, we must acknowledge that the failure to appropriately document Appellant's consent to the adoption was a flaw in the original adoption proceeding and it cannot be explained by reference to the record. Despite irregularities in the adoption proceedings, such judgments are not ordinarily subject to review after one year under Kentucky law. KRS 199.540(2) provides a one year statute of limitation for a challenge to an adoption, regardless of the basis for the challenge: After the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the entry of judgment of adoption, the validity thereof shall not be subject to attack in any action, collateral or direct, by reason of any irregularity or failure to comply with KRS 199.470 to 199.520, either procedurally or substantively. This prohibition ensures the finality of adoption judgments, thereby minimizing the potential for traumatic changes in the lives of adoptive parents and children long after their relationship has been formalized. That being said, Kentucky case law contemplates the possibility that the limitation statute is not absolute. We have indicated that there may be one exception: when the adoption is alleged to have been obtained through fraud. See Jones v. Sutton, 255 S.W.2d 658, 659 (Ky.1953) (Appellees contend that appellants are estopped to contest the validity of the adoption judgment, and rely in part upon KRS 199.540 which fixes a limitation period of two years within which to attack a judgment of adoption for `irregularity in procedures'. Without deciding the question, we are inclined to the view that if a forgery constitutes a fraud upon the court, the judgment might be adjudged void without regard to statutory limitations based upon `irregularity'. We will, therefore, assume appellants have the right in this proceeding to question the judgment's validity. (emphasis added)). Although the Court suggested that proof of fraud might allow a petitioner to avoid the limitation imposed by the statute, it expressly declined to decide the issue. Moreover, Appellant has never alleged that the adoption of B.L.M. and A.R.M. was the product of fraud or the like. As such, we need not rule on whether fraud is sufficient to avoid the limiting effect of KRS 199.540(2). Instead, Appellant has argued that the failure to strictly comply with the statutory and procedural safeguards renders the judgment of adoption void. We have never allowed an exception to the limitation period merely for a failure to follow the procedural requirements. Indeed KRS 199.540(2) specifically bars a challenge based on failure to comply with the procedures contained in the adoption statutes. We decline to create another exception, especially one that flatly contradicts the language of the limitation statute. To conclude otherwise would amount to a substantial and unjustifiable departure from the principle underlying KRS 199.540(2), namely, the expectation of finality associated with a judgment of adoption. We hold that because Appellant failed to challenge the adoption during the year immediately following entry of the judgment, her challenge based on the failure to comply with the statutory adoption procedures is barred by KRS 199.540(2).