Opinion ID: 185165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Walter Mathis

Text: 15 The indictment charged only one conspiracy (the Mathis Castro conspiracy); the government's evidence of the Mathis Coley conspiracy therefore constituted other crimes evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and, Walter Mathis claims, was improperly admitted. 7 We review the district court's admission of other crimes evidence for abuse of discretion. Graham, 83 F.3d at 1472. Evidence of an uncharged crime or bad act is admissible if it is relevant, 8 probative of a material issue (such as intent) other than the defendant's character 9 and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 10 See Gaviria, 116 F.3d at 1532. In a conspiracy prosecution, the government is usually allowed considerable leeway in offering evidence of other offenses to inform the jury of the background of the conspiracy charged, to complete the story of the crimes charged, and to help explain to the jury how the illegal relationship between the participants in the crime developed. 11 United States v. Williams, 205 F.3d 23, 33-34 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and quotation omitted).Evidence of the Mathis-Coley conspiracy was relevant to show Walter Mathis's intent to act in concert with his brother Eddie Mathis to possess drugs with the intent to distribute them. Furthermore, the probative value of the Mathis-Coley conspiracy is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Evidence tending to demonstrate intent, plan, preparation, and motive ... is particularly probative where the government has alleged conspiracy, United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 659 & n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citations omitted), and as discussed supra, evidence of the Mathis-Coley conspiracy did not substantially prejudice Walter Mathis. In light of the government's recognized latitude in using other crimes evidence in a conspiracy prosecution and the probative value of the Mathis-Coley conspiracy to show intent, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the Mathis-Coley conspiracy. 16 Walter Mathis also raises two challenges under the Guidelines. First, he claims that the district court erroneously failed to apply section 3B1.2(b) which provides a two-level reduction for a minor participant, defined as any participant who is less culpable than most other participants.U.S.S.G. 3B1.2, Application Note 3. A minor participant's relevant conduct must involve more than one participant and  'culpability for such conduct [must be] relatively minor compared to that of the other participant(s).'  United States v. Edwards, 98 F.3d 1364, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). Walter Mathis contends that his role in the MathisCastro conspiracy was similar to Lee's (who did receive the minor participant reduction) and therefore the district court erroneously found that his was not a relatively minor role compared to the other participants' roles. Because [t]he application of section 3B1.2 is inherently fact-bound it is largely committed to the discretion of the trial judge.Caballero, 936 F.2d at 1299. Ultimately, we uphold the district court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.United States v. Bridges, 175 F.3d 1062, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 17 The district court decided Lee was a minor participant because he was used only as a messenger or a gopher in small deals. Sentencing Tr. 1/6/99 at 72. Lee did not play a role in the planning of the criminal enterprise. Id. at 73.Walter Mathis, on the other hand, participated in a series of telephone calls in which he, Eddie Mathis and others planned, discussed and arranged for the delivery of 5 kilograms of cocaine, which was the largest single delivery of drugs in the whole case. Id. at 47-48. Although we have concluded that the November 5 reverse sting was not part of the offense of conviction, the district court may nonetheless consider it at sentencing as relevant conduct. See United States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Nichols, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994)). The district court correctly considered Walter Mathis's relevant conduct in the November 5 reverse sting and, accordingly, it did not clearly err in failing to apply section 3B1.2(b)'s minor participant reduction to him notwithstanding its treatment of Lee to the contrary. 18 Finally, Walter Mathis contends that the district court erroneously applied section 4A1.1(d)'s two-point increase to his offense level because the government did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was on parole at the time of his offense. 12 In view of the government's concession, 13 we conclude that the district court clearly erred in this factual determination and we remand for resentencing because of the incorrect addition of a two-level adjustment under section 4A1.1(d). See Drew, 200 F.3d at 874.