Opinion ID: 185822
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Examination of the Other Officers

Text: 24 When the District Court issued its pretrial rulings, they had a legitimate basis. There was no indication during any of the pretrial proceedings that any of the other testifying officers worked closely with Officer Heinz. Therefore, there was no proper foundation for the line of inquiry that defense counsel sought to pursue. However, during trial it became apparent that the police witnesses who testified against appellant all worked on the same shift with Officer Heinz in the Third District. Officer Taggart, for example, testified that he had been working with Officer Heinz on the midnight shift for three or four years. 5/16/00 Tr. 78. Officer Heinz testified that he spoke with Officers Larsen and Johnson every night. 5/17/00 Tr. 55. This evidence indicated a close relationship between Officer Heinz and the testifying officers. Once this became clear, there was good reason to allow defense counsel to question the witnesses about their knowledge of appellant's complaint against Officer Heinz. 25 However, the defense did not renew its request to question the officers to determine whether, in light of the evidence indicating a close relationship between Heinz and the other officers, the District Court still meant to prevent defense counsel from questioning these other officers about their relationship with Officer Heinz and their knowledge of the civilian complaint that Sesay had filed against Officer Heinz. Thus, any error resulting from the exclusion of the evidence must be reviewed under the plain error standard. See FED.R.CRIM.P. 52(b). See also United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, at 47, 2002 U.S.App. LEXIS 22993, at  (D.C.Cir.2002) (Because [the defendant] did not object to the court's instruction at trial, we review this complaint solely to determine whether the district court committed plain error.); In re Sealed Case, 283 F.3d 349, 352 (D.C.Cir.2002) (If the defendant allows an alleged error to pass without objection ... he then assumes the burden of meeting the more exacting plain error requirement of Rule 52(b)....). 26 The Supreme Court has articulated the plain error requirements of Rule 52(b), as follows: 27 There must be an error that is plain and that affect[s] substantial rights. Moreover, Rule 52(b) leaves the decision to correct the forfeited error within the sound discretion of the court of appeals, and the court should not exercise that discretion unless the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 28 Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)); see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) ([B]efore an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.) (internal quotations omitted). Olano further explained that, for the plain error standard to affect substantial rights, 29 the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.... When the defendant has made a timely objection to an error and Rule 52(a) applies, a court of appeals normally engages in a specific analysis of the district court record — a so-called harmless error inquiry — to determine whether the error was prejudicial. Rule 52(b) normally requires the same kind of inquiry, with one important difference: It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. In most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless the defendant shows that the error was prejudicial. 30 Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. 31 On the record in this case, we cannot find prejudice, nor can we find that the alleged errors seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. We simply cannot say that the alleged error affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Therefore, defendant has not carried the burden of persuasion necessary to prevail under Rule 52(b). 32 Furthermore, lest there be any confusion on this point, defense counsel was not entirely foreclosed from advancing appellant's defense. For example, counsel could have asked the officers about the timing of events at the hospital, including when they first came to learn that the coat in the car belonged to appellant. This would have made clear whether the officers had reason to know that the coat belonged to Sesay before they searched it, and possibly supported appellant's view that the officers had time and knowledge sufficient to plant the gun so as to implicate Sesay. Counsel also could have sought permission to conduct voir dire of the police witnesses outside the jury's presence, after Officer Taggart testified that he had worked on the midnight shift with Officer Heinz for three or four years, or after it became apparent that the Government was not going to call Officer Heinz as a witness. We have no way of knowing whether defense counsel made strategic decisions not to pursue these lines of inquiry or mistakenly assumed that he could not renew his request to examine the officers in light of the newly uncovered facts about Heinz's relationship with the other officers. In any event, there is no plain error.