Opinion ID: 752068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: IRCA's Legalization Program and Subsequent Litigation.

Text: 7 The alien legalization program established by IRCA in 1986, and the subsequent litigation challenging the INS regulations implementing that program, form the necessary context for the jurisdiction-limiting provision of IIRIRA. IRCA offered amnesty to illegal aliens who had been continuously residing unlawfully in the United States since January 1, 1982. These aliens could apply for temporary resident status, and then, after a one-year wait, apply for permanent resident status. To be eligible for temporary resident status, it was necessary to show that the alien (i) had resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status since January 1, 1982; (ii) had been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986 (the date of the enactment of IRCA); and (iii) would have been otherwise admissible as an immigrant. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)-(4) (1994). An alien seeking legalization under IRCA was also required to file an application with the INS between May 5, 1987 and May 4, 1988. See 8 U.S.C § 1255a(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(a)(1) (1997). 8 Two large class actions arose out of the IRCA legalization program and the INS regulations issued to implement it. The first, Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Meese, 685 F.Supp. 1149 (E.D.Cal.1988), aff'd sub. nom. Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 956 F.2d 914 (9th Cir.1992), vacated sub nom. Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993) (hereinafter CSS ), challenged the INS's interpretation of IRCA's requirement that applicants prove their continuous physical presence in the United States since November 6, 1986. In order to mitigate this requirement, CSS, 509 U.S. at 47, 113 S.Ct. at 2490, Congress created an exception for brief, casual, and innocent absences, which would be deemed not to interrupt an alien's otherwise continuous physical presence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3)(B) (1994). The INS construed this exception to mean that an absence would be deemed brief, casual, and innocent only if an alien had obtained permission from the INS before leaving the country. An alien who failed to obtain this advance parole from the INS would become ineligible for legalization. CSS, 509 U.S. at 47, 113 S.Ct. at 2490. 9 The plaintiffs in the CSS class action challenged the advance parole requirement, arguing that it was an impermissible interpretation of IRCA. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California agreed, invalidated the advance parole requirement, see id., 685 F.Supp. at 1159-60, and required the INS to extend the deadline for legalization applications for class members who knew of the advance parole regulation, but who concluded that they would be ineligible for legalization, and who therefore did not file a timely application. CSS, 509 U.S. at 48-49, 113 S.Ct. at 2491. 10 The second class action (of which Fernandes claims to be a member), concerns an INS regulation interpreting IRCA's continuous unlawful residence requirement. League of United Latin American Citizens v. INS, No. 87-4757, 1989 WL 252578 (C.D.Cal.1989), aff'd sub. nom. Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 956 F.2d 914 (9th Cir.1992), vacated sub nom. Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993) (hereinafter LULAC ). This requirement, like the continuous physical presence requirement challenged in the CSS class action, contained an exception for brief trips abroad. The INS regulation challenged by the LULAC plaintiffs provided that the continuous unlawful residence requirement would be defeated if an alien travelled abroad and then re-entered the United States by presenting documents that were facially valid. The INS reasoned that the use of such documents rendered an alien's subsequent presence in the United States lawful for the purposes of § 245A of IRCA. CSS, 509 U.S. at 49-50, 113 S.Ct. at 2491-92. The United States District Court for the Central District of California held that the regulation was invalid, and subsequently extended the deadline for legalization applications for class members who had failed to apply because they had been ineligible for legalization under the invalidated regulation. Id. at 52, 113 S.Ct. at 2491. 11 The INS appealed the district court decisions in CSS and LULAC, arguing (1) that the judicial review provisions of IRCA barred the district courts from exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims; and (2) that the district courts erred in extending the application period beyond the 12-month period specified by Congress. The appeals were consolidated, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 956 F.2d 914, 923 (9th Cir.1992). 12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari for the purpose, inter alia, of resolving a conflict between circuits on the jurisdictional issue. As an initial matter, the Court rejected the INS's argument that IRCA § 245A(f)(1), which created an exclusive scheme for administrative and judicial review of any determination respecting an application under IRCA, precluded the district courts from exercising jurisdiction over an action challenging the legality of INS regulations. CSS, 509 U.S. at 56, 113 S.Ct. at 2495. However, the Court found another jurisdictional hurdle in the way of the CSS and LULAC plaintiffs: ripeness. Id. 13 The mere promulgation of the INS regulations did not give the CSS and LULAC class members ripe claims because the effects of the regulations were not felt in a concrete way by the class members. Id. at 57-58, 113 S.Ct. at 2495-96 (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967)). The Court therefore concluded that a class member's claim would ripen only once he took the affirmative steps that he could take before the INS blocked his path by applying the regulation to him. CSS, 509 U.S. at 59, 113 S.Ct. at 2496. A class member who succeeded in filing, but whose application was then formally denied by the INS by reason of the alien's failure to comply with the challenged regulation, would thus fulfill the ripeness requirement. Id. at 60, 113 S.Ct. at 2497. 14 The Court surmised, however, that some potential applicants for legalization under IRCA who took every necessary affirmative step may have had their applications rejected for filing under the INS's front-desking policy. Id. at 61-62, 113 S.Ct. at 2497-98. Under this policy, INS employees reviewed applications before accepting them for filing; if an alien was ineligible for legalization because, for example, the alien failed to obtain advance parole before leaving the country, the INS would refuse to accept the application for filing. The Court concluded that 15 [A] class member whose application was front-desked would have felt the effects of the advance parole or facially valid document regulation in a particularly concrete manner, for his application for legalization would have been blocked then and there; his challenge to the regulation should not fail for lack of ripeness. 16 Id. at 63, 113 S.Ct. at 2498. In a footnote, the Court noted the possibility that other class members who were not literally front-desked might also have ripe claims: 17 Although we think it unlikely, we cannot rule out the possibility that further facts would allow class members who were not front-desked to demonstrate that the front-desking policy was nevertheless a substantial cause of their failure to apply, so that they can be said to have had the advanced parole or facially valid document regulation applied to them in a sufficiently concrete manner to satisfy ripeness concerns. 18 Id. at 66 n. 28, 113 S.Ct. at 2500 n. 28. Ultimately, the Court found that there was insufficient evidence to support a decision as to whether any CSS or LULAC class members had actually been front-desked. Accordingly, it vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the cases for a determination of whether any class members were in fact front-desked. Id. at 66-67, 113 S.Ct. at 2500. On remand, the district court in the CSS case modified the definition of the class to include persons who had been front-desked, as well as any persons within the ambit of footnote 28. Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Reno, 134 F.3d 921, 923-24 (9th Cir.1998) (amended opinion). 19