Opinion ID: 2360513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: liability of defendants as members of the armory committee for the torts of this voluntary unincorporated association

Text: This is the first occasion this Court has had to determine and establish the extent of liability arising from membership of an individual in a voluntary unincorporated association in respect to tortious conduct attributable to the association. Our Court has addressed itself to the problem of individual member liability in such an association for the contractual obligations of the association. In Frost v. Walker, 1872, 60 Me. 468, our Court held in the case of a voluntary association formed for the purpose of engaging in business and making profits such as a joint-stock express company, that its members are mere partners and as such are personally liable for all its debts. See also, McGreary v. Chandler, 1870, 58 Me. 537. Courts, however, have differentiated between a voluntary unincorporated association organized for commercial profit-making and one organized for fraternal or social purposes, and have applied a different rule to determine the liability of individual members of the association. The Connecticut Court, in Azzolina v. Order of Sons of Italy, Conte Luigi Cadorna, No. 440, 1935, 119 Conn. 681, 691, 179 A. 201, 204, has clearly expressed the two distinctive bases of members responsibility concerning the contractual obligations of such an association in manner as follows: In the case of a voluntary association formed for the purpose of engaging in business and making profits, its members are liable, as partners, to third persons upon contracts which are within its scope and are entered into with actual or apparent authority, and a joint judgment against them in justified.    But when, as here, the purpose of the association is not business or profit, the liability, if any, of its members is not in its nature that of partners but that arising out of the relation of principal and agent, and only those members who authorize or subsequently ratify an obligation are liable on account of it. Our Court, without addressing itself to this differentiating aspect of voluntary unincorporated associations, did state the general rule to be that [a] person may become a member of a voluntary unincorporated association, and make himself liable to third parties upon contracts authorized by a vote of the association within its scope at a meeting of the association, even though he did not vote to give such authority, or did not attend the meeting. Cheney v. Goodwin, 1896, 88 Me. 563, 34 A. 420. But, in Cheney, supra, the Court found that there was no determinate membership distinct from the general public to form a valid voluntary unincorporated association, and thus the rule expounded by the Cheney Court was at best dictum. The same is true of McKenney v. Bowie, 1900, 94 Me. 397, 47 A. 918, where the Court regarded the note, upon which suit was brought, as the personal obligation of the defendant signers and not that of the association. In Chick v. Trevett, 1841, 20 Me. 462, the defendants were the signers of the instrument upon which their liability was based. They had authorized the obligation and such would be liable, notwithstanding the association they represented was of the nonprofit variety. See, Annotation, 7 A.L.R. at page 222 et seq., and cases cited. Although we intimate no opinion respecting the extent of viability of these dicta expressed by our Court nearly 75 years ago or more, we do believe, however, that, in the area of tort liability to be visited upon the individual members of a voluntary association, the distinction between voluntary associations set up for purely commercial profit-making purposes and those organized for fraternal or social ends should be recognized and a different rule respecting responsibility of the individual members for the torts of the association be adopted. A voluntary unincorporated association, formed to accomplish a common purpose, is duty bound to use the same care to avoid injury to others as natural persons are individually, but mere membership in the associate body does not make all the members liable for any and all unlawful or negligent acts of their associates. See, Feldman v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 1943, 4 Cir., 137 F.2d 266; Sweetman v. Barrows, 1928, 263 Mass. 349, 161 N.E. 272, 62 A.L.R. 311; Orser v. Vierra, 1967, 252 Cal.App.2d 660, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708. In the case of a voluntary association such as the Armory Committee, dedicated by the mandate of its bylaws to promote social services for the immediate benefit of its members and the ultimate interest of the National Guard units located at the Augusta Armory, while at the same time enhancing good public relations between the Guard and the area residents through their sponsored social events, individual members of the association do not, merely by virtue of their membership in such association, subject themselves to liability for injuries sustained as a result of the negligent conduct of their associates or their agents in the running of the social event sponsored by the association. Liability attaches only to those members of the association who are shown to have actively participated in the affair resulting in plaintiff's injuries. Lyons v. American Legion Post No. 650 Realty Co., 1961, 172 Ohio St. 331, 175 N.E.2d 733. In the instant case, the evidence was sufficient to support the factual inference that the Armory Committee had assumed control of the premises under the rental agreement with the Adjutant General's Department. The defect which caused the plaintiff's fall and consequential injuries was shown to have existed for a sufficient period of time to have permitted protective action such as salting and sanding and that the members of the Armory Committee or their agents, in charge of the affair, in the exercise of reasonable care should have known of, or discovered, the dangerous condition caused by the frozen ruts in the immediate approaches to the steps leading to the armory building where the dance was being held. The minutes of the meeting of the Committee in April 1966, indicating a unanimous vote of the attending members setting the charge of $2.00 per person for the New Year's Eve ball, establishes not only their presence at the meeting, but also, by justifiable inference, an active participation in the planned event by the defendants Pillsbury, Nichols, Bryant, Laflin, Perry, Fenderson, Quinn, Colford and Weymouth. The defendants Madore and Tondreau were shown to have approved the affair by the evidentiary records showing that they respectively held the office of treasurer during the period of planning and staging of the dance. The jury could have inferred active participation of the other defendants Musk, Lasso, Jacques, Hayes, Gagnon, Morang, Liscomb, Richards and Drapeau, by reason of their attendance record immediately prior to the holding of the event, Defendant Storr's direct involvement was evidenced by the fact that he applied for the use of the Armory. The record, on the other hand, is silent respecting defendant Turner's participation in, or attendance at, the meeting of the Committee in April, 1966 and indicates that he was absent from the October, November and December, 1966 meetings which preceded the dance. Under such circumstances, it was error as a matter of law for the jury to find the defendant Turner responsible to the plaintiff with the other defendants on the mere evidence that he was a member of the Armory Committee. All the other defendants actively participated, aided and abetted in the affair and are responsible to the plaintiff for the wrongful acts of omission of their associates or their agents in carrying out the social event duly authorized by the association.