Opinion ID: 1228754
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Our review on the issue at hand will therefore be confined to claimed facial unconstitutionality of the ordinance.

Text: Prefatorily we refer to Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) where the court aptly stated: The city is free to prevent people from blocking sidewalks, obstructing traffic, littering streets, committing assaults, or engaging in countless other forms of antisocial conduct. It can do so through the enactment and enforcement of ordinances directed with reasonable specificity toward the conduct to be prohibited. See also Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 554-555, 85 S.Ct. 453, 464, 13 L. Ed.2d 471 (1965); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87, 69 S.Ct. 448, 453, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949). V. In approaching the vagueness charge here leveled by defendant against the ordinance recognition should be accorded this general statement in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-2299, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972): It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. See also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. at 614-616, 91 S.Ct. at 1688-1689; Palmer v. City of Euclid, Ohio, 402 U.S. 544, 545, 91 S.Ct. 1563, 1564, 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971); State v. Robinson, 183 N.W.2d 190, 193-194 (Iowa 1971). It is at once evident, however, the principle enunciated in Grayned, supra, affords no answer to the question at hand, serving rather to merely point up the problem.