Opinion ID: 1106265
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was Due Process Afforded?

Text: As for Godsey's claim that the MDOC failed to give him a timely parole revocation hearing, Godsey asserts a due process constitutional violation. Due process rights of a parolee have been addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). Morrissey states: We begin with the proposition that the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations. Cf. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 19 L.Ed.2d 336, 88 S.Ct. 254 (1967). Parole arises after the end of the criminal prosecution, including imposition of sentence. Supervision is not directly [sic] by the court but by an administrative agency, which is sometimes an arm of the court and sometimes of the executive. Revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions. [408 U.S. at 481, 92 S.Ct. at 2600] We turn, therefore, to the question whether the requirements of due process in general apply to parole revocations. [408 U.S. at 482, 92 S.Ct. at 2601] ... . ... [T]here is no interest on the part of the State in revoking parole without any procedural guarantees at all. What is needed is an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee's behavior. [408 U.S. at 486, 92 S.Ct. at 2603] Morrissey v. Brewer 408 U.S. at 480-484, 92 S.Ct. at 2600-2602, 33 L.Ed.2d at 494-496. Morrissey sets out the minimum procedure required of states to assure the requisite amount of due process to be afforded a parolee. Such guarantees have been incorporated into Mississippi statutory law in Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-27 (Supp. 1990). That statute provides, inter alia, that: A parolee convicted of a felony while on parole, whether in the State of Mississippi or another state, shall immediately have his parole revoked upon presentment of a certified copy of the commitment order to the board. At the next meeting of the board held after the issuance of a warrant for the retaking of any offender, the board shall be notified thereof; and if the offender shall have been taken into custody, he shall then be given an opportunity to appeal to the board in writing or in person why his parole should not be revoked. The board may then, or at any time in its discretion, terminate such parole or modify the terms and conditions thereof. A charge similar to Godsey's was made in Bobkoskie v. State, 495 So.2d 497, 500 (Miss. 1986), and this Court answered as follows: Bobkoskie's reliance on Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), for the proposition that his parole revocation does not satisfy the requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution is misplaced. Morrissey's parole was revoked on the basis of information that he had violated the conditions of parole by buying a car under an assumed name and operating it without permission, giving false statements to police concerning his address and insurance company after an accident, obtaining credit under an assumed name, and failing to report his place of residence to his parole officer. Nothing in the Morrissey record indicated that petitioners had admitted the violations[,] and assertions made by responding in the court were not based on any public record but upon interviews with two of the members of the parole board, and on remand that court stated, If it is determined that petitioners admitted parole violations to the Parole Board, as Iowa contends, and if those violations are found to be reasonable grounds for revoking parole under state standards, that would end the matter. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 499, 92 S.Ct. at 2609. Bobkoskie admits to the conviction of a felony while on parole. Conviction of a felony by a parolee is a reasonable ground under Mississippi standards for revocation of parole. That this is apparent can be seen by the recent amendment to Section 47-7-27, Mississippi Code Annotated (Supp. 1986), and also Section 47-7-29, Mississippi Code Annotated (1972), as amended, which provides: Any prisoner who commits a felony while at large upon parole and who is convicted and sentenced therefor shall be required by the board to serve such sentence after the original sentence has been completed. The admitted evidence shows that Godsey violated the conditions of his parole in two respects: (1) two Tennessee felony convictions, and (2) failure to waive extradition back to Mississippi. All of these were reasonable grounds for revoking Godsey's parole; therefore, all procedural guarantees were met in this case. The trial court properly denied Godsey's petition for writ of habeas corpus. In sum, Godsey could not challenge the legality of his extradition from Tennessee after his return to Mississippi. There was no denial of due process in the parole revocation hearing. The decision of the trial court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS and McRAE, JJ., concur.