Opinion ID: 4540186
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Suppression of the Items Seized

Text: We now turn to Mendoza's contention that the evidence seized from the search should have been suppressed because the 19To the extent Mendoza's brief could be construed to also include the initial argument he made below, the same nevertheless fails. It is well established that coerced confession[s] [are] improper because [they are] not 'the product of a rational intellect and a free will.' United States v. Hufstetler, 782 F.3d 19, 21-22 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963)). However, we have held that even an officer's truthful description of [a] family member's predicament, without more, is permissible since it merely constitutes an attempt to both accurately depict the situation to the suspect and to elicit more information about the family member's culpability. Id. at 24. Mendoza does not share a familial connection to Colón. He was simply dating Colón's niece and thus any emotional impact caused by what happened to Colón would presumably be less than if she were a family member. Moreover, the record does not show, nor does Mendoza argue, that Agent del Valle's statement exaggerated the situation or was anything but truthful. See id. at 24-25. Even in cases involving a person with a closer tie to the defendant than Colón had with Mendoza here, we have taken no issue with an officer's utilization, to both gain more information and to elicit more intelligence about the individuals involved in the offense being investigated, of the fact that such person is a suspect and unless new information came to light to discount her culpability she would continue to be criminally liable, so long as the statement is a truthful representation of the person's predicament. See id. at 25. In light of this, together with the fact that Mendoza was informed about his rights prior to each interview, and the agents' testimony that Mendoza appeared calm, we cannot say that Mendoza's will was overtaken by the government's conduct. See id. at 22. 20We note that the facts established in this case suggest that the PRPD acted properly in its actions and, in particular, in respecting Mendoza's person and his rights. -30- search warrant was overbroad and not supported by probable cause. Specifically, he asserts that the facts in the affidavit supporting the application for the warrant did not show a reasonable suspicion . . . that the occupant had also hidden weapons or drugs inside the apartment and thus the warrant was improperly extended to the inside of the house. We find the argument unavailing. The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants be issued only upon a showing of probable cause. United States v. Rivera, 825 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV). Probable cause is a 'nontechnical conception' that relies on 'common-sense conclusions about human behavior' and 'the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent' people act. González-Arias, 946 F.3d at 22 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)). To satisfy this standard, [a] warrant application must demonstrate probable cause to believe that (1) a crime has been committed -- the 'commission' element, and (2) enumerated evidence of the offense will be found at the place to be searched -- the so-called 'nexus' element. Ribeiro, 397 F.3d at 48 (quoting Feliz, 182 F.3d at 86). We construe Mendoza's claim as a challenge to the nexus element of the probable cause standard. A magistrate judge determines if the nexus element is satisfied by making a practical, common-sense decision whether, -31- given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Id. at 49 (emphasis added) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). 'Fair probability' is another way of saying 'reasonable likelihood.' Rivera, 825 F.3d at 63. Here, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the suppression order, as we must, see United States v. McGregor, 650 F.3d 813, 823-24 (1st Cir. 2011), we can infer that there was at least a reasonable likelihood that the stolen cars and firearms would be found in Valle's residence (or its premises). The affidavit supporting the search warrant, prepared by Agent Marrero, narrated that an unidentified female had given a confidential report to the PRPD about a dark-skinned individual with short hair known by the name of Joshua (Valle) who was located at apartment C-16 at Vista de Atenas in Manatí and was in possession of two stolen Suzuki Vitara vehicles, for which the informant gave descriptions and license plate numbers. The informant had also reported that Joshua (Valle) had firearms and sold controlled substances in the town of Morovis. The affidavit indicated that Agent Marrero conducted surveillance on March 23, 2016, of the identified location and was able to corroborate the information given by the informant. The affidavit -32- also explained what Agent Marrero had observed: the blue Vitara with the license plate described by the informant parked at the residence, which the police confirmed as stolen. He also saw a white Vitara matching the description given by the informant arrive at the residence, driven by a dark-skinned individual. Agent Marrero then saw the individual exit the car and adjust around his hip what, based on his experience, he identified as a black firearm. According to the affidavit, when the individual entered residence C-16 with the firearm, Agent Marrero los[t] sight of him. Based on this information, a state magistrate judge issued a warrant authorizing the search of the residence for the two stolen Vitaras and firearms. We can, consistent with common sense, infer from the facts in the affidavit that there was at least a reasonable likelihood that the firearm Agent Marrero saw the individual (later identified as Valle) adjust before entering the home would be found in that residence. And the affidavit also contains evidence showing, and corroborating, that the stolen vehicles were on the residence's premises. The warrant was not solely based on the confidential informant's tip; Agent Marrero corroborated the report and personally observed the stolen vehicles parked at the residence and an individual carrying a gun into the home. See United States v. Greenburg, 410 F.3d 63, 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting -33- that where the basis for the magistrate's probable cause finding was information provided by an unnamed informant, the affidavit must provide some information from which the magistrate can assess the informant's credibility). Thus, it was reasonably likely that a search of the residence identified in the warrant would reveal incriminating evidence.21 Accordingly, we conclude that the warrant was supported by probable cause. This makes it unnecessary to assess the good-faith exception, upon which the magistrate judge relied, as we may affirm on any basis supported by the record. See United States v. Rivera-Carrasquillo, 933 F.3d 33, 39-40 (1st Cir. 2019). For these reasons, the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.