Opinion ID: 203825
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Congressional Intent Is Clear and Unambiguous

Text: To determine whether a statute exhibits  Chevron -type ambiguity, ... courts look at both the most natural reading of the language and the consistency of the `interpretive clues' Congress provided. Succar, 394 F.3d at 22 (quoting Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 586, 124 S.Ct. 1236). The Supreme Court has stated: The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent. If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect. Id. (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447-48, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)).
In determining the meaning of a statute, our analysis begins with the language of the statute. Id. (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004)). We construe language in its context and in light of the terms surrounding it. Id. (quotation marks omitted); see also Morales, 524 F.3d at 57. In examining the plain language of the statute for purposes of step one of the Chevron analysis, we examine the common, ordinary meaning of the words of the statute at the time of enactment. See Carcieri, 129 S.Ct. at 1064; BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 184, 124 S.Ct. 1587, 158 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004). As explained above, the issue here is whether Mrs. Taing retained her status as a spouse after her husband died in order for her to qualify as an immediate relative under the INA. The government argues that the definition of spouse in federal law and the common, ordinary meaning of the term spouse compel the conclusion that Mrs. Taing ceased to be a spouse, and hence an immediate relative, when Mr. Taing died. We disagree with both arguments. The federal law to which the government cites is as follows: In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word marriage means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word spouse refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (emphasis added). By reference to this statute, the government argues that one is a spouse only if one is a husband or wife within a legal marriage. Further, it contends that due to Mr. Taing's death, Mrs. Taing is no longer the wife of her deceased husband, and thus no longer a spouse. The government overreaches here. This definition originated in the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). Pub.L. No. 104-199, § 7, 110 Stat. 2419-20. DOMA was intended to limit the institution of marriage to heterosexual unions, not to alter the traditional meaning of the word spouse, which, as we discuss immediately below, includes surviving spouse under its common, ordinary meaning. See Lockhart, 561 F.3d at 619 (noting that § 7 of DOMA emphasizes that spouses shall be of the opposite sex, it does not mandate that spouses lose their status as such with the death of either one of them. (quoting Taing, 526 F.Supp.2d at 184)). Indeed, nothing in the legislative history of DOMA contemplates upsetting Congress's intent behind its use of the word spouse in the immigration context. See id. at 619 n. 1; see also Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 484, 123 S.Ct. 1655, 155 L.Ed.2d 643 (2003) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Statutory interpretation is not a game of blind man's bluff. Judges are free to consider statutory language in light of a statute's basic purposes.). We conclude that it would be improper for us to give the definition of spouse in DOMA such unintended breadth. Turning to the government's second argument, we do not agree that the plain meaning of the term spouse does not include surviving spouse. Because Congress has chosen not to define [a phrase] in the statute itself, we can look to the dictionary for clarification of the plain meaning of the words selected by Congress. Pérez-Olivo, 394 F.3d at 49. [3] Thus, we look to the sixth edition of Black's Law Dictionary, published in 1990, and available at the time Congress amended the INA by adding the second sentence of § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). [4] This edition includes surviving spouse within its definition of spouse and defines spouse as follows: Spouse. One's husband or wife, and surviving spouse is one of a married pair who outlive the other. Black's Law Dictionary 1402 (6th ed.1990). This definition of spouse clearly includes Mrs. Taing, who is one of a married pair who outlive[d] the other. [5] See id. The government's contention that we should not consider a surviving spouse like Mrs. Taing a spouse is unpersuasive given that the term surviving spouse is subsumed within the dictionary definition of spouse. [6] Further, the plain language of § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) confirms that spouse includes surviving spouse. The second sentence of this section refers to a surviving spouse simply as spouse without using any qualifying terms. See Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1039. That sentence states that the alien ... shall be considered, for purposes of this subsection, to remain an immediate relative after the date of the citizen's death but only if the spouse files a petition under section 1154(a)(1)(A)(ii) ... within 2 years after such date and only until the date the spouse remarries. 8 U.S.C. 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added). The fact that within the same subsection, Congress uses the word spouse to refer to a living spouse and a surviving spouse lends support to the argument that it intended for spouse to include surviving spouse. See Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1039-41; see also Robinson, 554 F.3d at 369 (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (Congress used `spouse' to refer to a continuing marital bond between the deceased petitioner and a surviving husband or wife.). This reading is consistent with one of the principal rules of statutory construction which is to give terms consistent meaning. See Robinson, 554 F.3d at 369 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
In addition to its plain language argument, the government asserts that Mrs. Taing should not be considered an immediate relative under § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) because she was not married to Mr. Taing for at least two years at the time of his death. It cites the second sentence of the statute for this two-year requirement and argues that this requirement extends to spouses described in the first sentence. The government insists that the inclusion of the phrase for purposes of this subsection in the second sentence supports its interpretation. The government's argument is undermined by the text and structure of the statute as well as related provisions concerning the right of a surviving spouse to adjust her status. [L]ooking to the `specific context in which [the] language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole,' Pérez-Olivo, 394 F.3d at 49 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997)), it is clear to us that the first two sentences in § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) should be read as creating separate and independent pathways. The second sentence does not modify or limit the meaning of the term spouse in the first sentence. See Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1039. The only term in the first sentence which contains a limitation is parents and the statute restricts the status of immediate relative to parents whose citizen children are at least twenty-one years of age. Id. There is no comparable qualifier to be a `spouse'  that is, a requirement that the marriage must have existed for at least two years. Id. The second sentence, rather than modifying the first as the government contends, creates a separate and independent right for certain alien spouses to self-petition for immediate relative status. [7] See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i); see also Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1041-42. This sentence addresses the situation of an alien spouse whose husband or wife died before filing an I-130 petition. It limits the surviving alien spouse's right to self-petition by requiring that spouses be married for two years prior to the citizen spouse's death. The two-year duration requirement places a limitation on the alien spouse's ability to obtain a new right. There is nothing in the language of the second sentence to imply that it was intended to strip away spouse status from a surviving spouse whose deceased spouse had already filed an I-130 petition. From the text and structure of these statutes, it is evident that Congress put in place two separate processes for petitioning for adjustment of status  the first sentence contemplates a situation like Mrs. Taing's where the citizen spouse has already filed a petition. In these situations, the duration of the marriage is of no importance. However, the second sentence deals with the situation where the citizen spouse has died before filing an I-130 petition on his or her spouse's behalf. Congress's decision to set up dual processes is reaffirmed by reading § 1151(a)(1)(A)(ii) in conjunction with related statutory provisions. For example, § 1154 states that [a]n alien spouse described in the second sentence of section 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) of this title also may file a petition with the Attorney General under this subparagraph for classification of the alien (and the alien's children) under such section. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). We agree with the Freeman court that [t]he inclusion of the word `also' in this subsection, as compared to the right given to living citizen spouses in § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i) (i.e., to file a petition on behalf of their alien spouse), further establishes that the right of self-petition is given to a select group of alien widows as an alternative to their citizen spouse's I-130 filing. 444 F.3d at 1042 n. 17. Moreover, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a states that an alien spouse who receives permanent resident status as an immediate relative before the second anniversary of her qualifying marriage does so on a conditional basis. That status can be terminated if the qualifying marriage is found to be improper. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a (b)(1). Notably, § 1186a(b)(1) provides that this finding can be made if it is determine[d], before the second anniversary of the alien's obtaining the status of lawful admission for permanent residence, that  the qualifying marriage ... has been judicially annulled or terminated, other than through the death of a spouse. Id. (emphasis added). As the Freeman court noted, this language, by excepting a spouse's death, presents compelling evidence that Congress did not intend its provision for a widow's self-petition for adjustment of status to have the implicit collateral consequence of terminating a citizen spouse's already pending petition-particularly when the effect would be to foreclose a grieving widow from any adjustment at all `through the death of [her] spouse.' 444 F.3d at 1042; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1)(A)(ii). Thus, § 1186a also lends support to our conclusion that § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) provides surviving spouses with two distinct processes to petition for adjustment of status. We are mindful of the cardinal rule that courts must strive to harmonize all the provisions of a statute to give them all force and effect. United States v. Roberson, 459 F.3d 39, 55 (1st Cir.2006). Applying this tool of statutory construction, and viewing § 1151 in the context of the entire statutory scheme concerning a surviving spouse's right to adjust her status, we are convinced that Congress plainly and unambiguously intended that surviving spouses like Mrs. Taing, who is the beneficiary of an I-130 petition filed prior to her spouse's death, remain eligible for immediate relative status.