Opinion ID: 1847474
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The Court of Appeals affirmed the review panel's conclusion that the trial judge was divested of jurisdiction to hear Russell's second enforcement order because Kerry had perfected its appeal of the trial judge's first enforcement order. It relied on cases in which we have held that a district court is divested of jurisdiction when a party perfects an appeal from the court's final judgment. We do not believe those cases apply. We have held that after a party perfects an appeal to an appellate court, the lower courts are divested of subject matter jurisdiction over that case. [5] But this rule is applied when a party appeals the trial court's final judgment. Here, Kerry was not appealing from the award. It was appealing from a separate postjudgment proceeding to enforce the award. Neither party appealed from the trial judge's determination that Russell was entitled to benefits for temporary total disability and temporary partial disability. The award was therefore final 30 days after the trial judge entered it. [6] Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-125 (Cum. Supp. 2008) clearly authorizes the compensation court to enforce an award by assessing a waiting-time penalty, attorney fees, and interest for all delinquent payments made 30 days after the award becomes final. The issues raised by Russell's first enforcement motion and Kerry's appeal involved only (1) the trial judge's determination that Kerry had not timely paid benefits by August 11, 2006, and (2) the judge's assessment of interest. That appeal obviously divested the trial judge of jurisdiction to reconsider the issues decided in that proceeding. But an employer's appeal from a postjudgment proceeding to enforce a workers' compensation award does not disturb the finality of an award imposing a continuing obligation on the employer to pay benefits. And Kerry's appeal of the first violation was entirely independent of its second violation of the award. We believe these enforcement proceedings are akin to postjudgment contempt proceedings in other types of civil cases. And courts generally hold that an appeal of a contempt order does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to consider a separate act of contempt. [7] To conclude otherwise would give the offending party carte blanche to decide whether to comply with the court's order pending its appeal. We conclude that the trial judge had continuing jurisdiction to enforce Kerry's obligation to pay benefits pending its appeal of the judge's previous order imposing a penalty and costs for a delayed payment. [8]