Opinion ID: 217673
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Withdrawal and Statute of Limitations

Text: Mr. Thornburgh argues that the five-year statute of limitations applicable to the charges in this case had expired by the time the initial indictment was filed on November 30, 2007. This is because he claims he withdrew from the conspiracy on July 23, 2002. He argues that this provides him a complete defense. Mr. Thornburgh accordingly asserts his motion for an acquittal or his motion to dismiss the case against him should have been granted. “A conspirator . . . is only liable for the acts of co-conspirators until the conspiracy accomplished its goals or that conspirator withdraws.” United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 817 (10th Cir. 2000) (further quotation omitted). In this case, the jury was instructed that Mr. Thornburgh claimed he had withdrawn from the conspiracy by November 30, 2002 (five years before the indictment was filed). In finding him guilty, the jury implicitly rejected that claim. Mr. Thornburgh also attempts to use his claimed withdrawal to support his argument that the statute of limitations had run by the time he was indicted. While convictions for the conspiracies at issue here (to commit money laundering and to commit wire and/or mail fraud) do not “require proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,” Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 219 -10- (2005), 5 proof of overt acts can be useful for other purposes. For example, they can be useful in “(1) showing that a conspiracy begun more than five years before the return of an indictment continued into a period within the statute of limitations; [or] (2) showing that a particular defendant knowingly joined (or remained a member of) a conspiracy.” Green, 599 F.3d at 372. Similarly, evidence of withdrawal can “have some limited uses such as . . . start[ing] the running of the statute of limitations.” United States v. Williams, 374 F.3d 941, 950 n.11 (10th Cir. 2004). Therefore, we will consider Mr. Thornburgh’s arguments about his withdrawal, including evidence of overt acts occurring after the date he claims he withdrew, because he claims they show that the statute of limitations had expired by the time he was indicted. In considering these arguments, “[o]ur review is de novo as to the sufficiency of the evidence and denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal.” United States v. Smith, 2011 WL 1367032, at  (10th Cir. April 12, 2011). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict 5 Other cases support the proposition that these conspiracies do not require proof of overt acts to establish guilt. See United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 372 (4th Cir.) (‘We are mindful that . . . a money laundering conspiracy does not require proof of an overt act.”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 271 (2010), and Boyd v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 340 (2010). We recently stated, in the unpublished decision relating to Mr. Searles (one of Mr. Fishman’s co-conspirators) that “[u]nder §§ 1349 (Count One) and 1956(h) (Count Two), it is not necessary for the government to allege that an overt act occurred within the limitations period.” Searles, 2009 WL 302306, at  (citing Whitfield, 543 U.S. 209 (holding that criminal conspiracies modeled after the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, rather than 18 U.S.C. § 371, do not require proof of an overt act to obtain conviction)). -11- as we ascertain whether any rational jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not weigh the evidence, nor do we make determinations of witness credibility. “[W]e merely ask whether a rational trier of fact could find each element of the offense charged viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” Id. “[T]he defense of termination by withdrawal requires that the defendant show that he or she has done ‘some act to disavow or defeat the purpose’ of the conspiracy.” United States v. Gonzalez, 596 F.3d 1228, 1234 (10th Cir.) (quoting Cherry, 217 F.3d at 817-18 (quoting Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369 (1912))), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 172 (2010). Communicating one’s withdrawal from a conspiracy is not overly difficult: it can be accomplished by affirmative actions “inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy and communicated in a manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 464-65 (1978). Mr. Thornburgh claims he withdrew from the conspiracy no later than July 23, 2002. The government claims he continued to participate in the conspiracy, although he no longer communicated with Mr. Searles; rather, both Mr. Thornburgh and Mr. Searles continued to participate in the conspiracy -12- through Mr. Fishman. Both parties quote transcripts of trial testimony to support their positions. 6 Mr. Thornburgh quotes from the following testimony of co-conspirator Mr. Searles: Q. Now, in your testimony, you alluded to the year 2002, and you made mention that at some point during that year, you and Mr. Thornburgh went your separate ways; is that correct?
Q. Why did you center on the date July 23 rd? A. That’s the day he wrote a letter and ended the thing. .... Q. That was on July 23rd, 2002 . . . . A. Yes. .... Q. And you accepted that as notice that you and he were no longer going to do business together? A. I accepted that, that he was serious, that he meant it. Tr. of Trial Proceedings, Fishman Record, Vol. 3, Part 8 at 1379-80. The government responds that the only change after July 23, 2002, was that Mr. Thornburgh and Mr. Searles stopped talking to each other and, instead, worked with Mr. Fishman as their “mediator.” The government accordingly cites the testimony of Mr. Searles and three investors, all of whom testified about 6 As indicated above, Mr. Thornburgh and Mr. Fishman were tried together. While each of them provided a separate record for their appeals, the bulk of the trial transcript is contained in Mr. Fishman’s appellate record. We will identify any citations to Mr. Fishman’s appellate record if we cite therefrom. -13- continued interactions and dealings with Mr. Thornburgh after July 23, 2002. Mr. Searles described the situation as follows: Q. Okay. So is there, then, a falling-out between you and Mr. Thornburgh? A. Yes. Q. And when that falling-out takes place, where does Mr. Fishman land? A. I guess in the middle. He’s still doing business with both of us, as far as I know. Q. All right. And are you still making contact with the investors, the American investors? A. Yes. Q. To your knowledge, is Mr. Thornburgh still making contact with those American investors? A. I don’t know. Some of them told me they had tried to reach him. Some of them told me they had reached him. . . . .... Q. And did you do anything in writing with [the] American investors? Bringing ourselves up to March of ‘03. A. Yes. Q. What did you do? A. As time is progressing on, by December [2002], I’m beginning to get written demands to me with some of these American investors to get back their money. So by January, the pressure is building. So I told Mr. Fishman . . . something has got to happen. So he said, well, Mr. Thornburgh has entered into a hold harmless agreement with someone, and . . . I think this will help you . . . . .... So he sent me a copy of the document he had drawn up for Mr. Thornburgh. So I took that document, and I revised it for my own needs with my 15 investors, and I sent it to Mr. Fishman. And he critiqued it for me and sent it back to me. And I executed it with the 15 people. And basically, I said, if I give you back your money, I don’t owe you anything else. Id. at 1266, 1269. -14- The government also cites testimony from a number of investors, including Marsha Longaberger, Jeff Hayslett and Dr. Wayne Maltz, who all described discrete “overt acts” by Mr. Thornburgh after the time he claimed to have withdrawn. Investor Marsha Longaberger described interactions with Mr. Thornburgh in March and April 2003, relating to her investment, including Mr. Thornburgh’s request in April that she lie to the postal inspector investigating the Caribou conspiracy. Jeff Hayslett testified that in May 2003, Mr. Thornburgh presented a document to Mr. Hayslett, explaining that “Thornburgh’s portfolio manager is now able to provide a line of credit on the bonds, which will result in profits from the joint venture [i.e., the Caribou scheme].” Tr. of Trial Proceedings, Fishman Record, Vol. 3, Part 7 at 968. Furthermore, Mr. Hayslett testified that Mr. Thornburgh convinced him in August 2003 to make yet another bond investment, in a purportedly different type of bond (the Chinese bonds). Additionally, Dr. Wayne Maltz testified that, in late 2002, on numerous occasions in 2003, and on a few occasions in 2004 and 2005, he had, at Mr. Thornburgh’s request, paid for Mr. Thornburgh’s living expenses and hotel bills incurred while Mr. Thornburgh was in Europe allegedly following through on the bond investments. Some of these payments were characterized by Mr. Thornburgh as necessary to keep the whole bond enterprise afloat. Additionally, Dr. Maltz stated that, in June 2005, Mr. Thornburgh had approached him about further bond -15- investments (the Chinese bonds). Investors Henry Pham and David Franco testified as to contact with Mr. Thornburgh in 2003 and 2004. Based on the above testimony, the jury could easily determine that while Mr. Thornburgh may have decided not to deal directly with Mr. Searles after July 23, 2002, he remained active in the Caribou bond conspiracy well into 2005. Furthermore, and significantly, the district court specifically submitted to the jury the question of whether Mr. Thornburgh withdrew from the conspiracy before November 30, 2002 (five years before the indictment was filed). The jury obviously rejected this defense. As indicated above, our own review of the evidence amply supports the jury’s determination. Accordingly, the statute of limitations affords Mr. Thornburgh no defense.