Opinion ID: 1927182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Original Tenant Firm

Text: The landlord argues that the trial court erred in its determination that the members of the original tenant firm, Chapman, Duff & Paul, although not actual parties to the Pennsylvania proceeding, were fully represented at that proceeding, and therefore in privity with the Schmidt estate. The doctrine of res judicata applies to and is binding, not only on actual parties to the litigation, but also to those in privity with them. Stevenson v. Silverman, 417 Pa. 187, 208 A.2d, 786, 788 (1965). Privity has been described as mutual or successive relationships to the same right of property, or such an identification of interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal right. Montella v. Berkheimer Associates, 690 A.2d 802, 804 (Pa.Commw.Ct.1997). Traditional categories of privies include those who control an action although not parties to it; those whose interests are represented by a party to an action; and successors in interest. Smith v. Jenkins, supra, 562 A.2d at 615 (quoting Lawlor v. National Screen Service, 349 U.S. 322, 329 n. 19, 75 S.Ct. 865, 869 n. 19, 99 L.Ed. 1122 (1955)). Whether preclusion is justified depends upon the situation involved, and the issue must be determined in light of the circumstances in each case. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency v. Dowdey, 618 A.2d 153, 164 (D.C. 1992). It is the landlord's contention that the CDP defendants, as members of the original tenant, have not demonstrated that they shared a sufficient mutuality of interest with the Schmidt estate in the former litigation to establish privity. It is argued that those defendants, whose liability is premised upon their being party to the original lease agreement, shared no interest with those members who, like Schmidt, joined through consolidation, and whose liability depended upon a finding that the consolidated firm had assumed liability under the lease. [25] Indeed, the landlord suggests that the interests of the CDP partners potentially were adverse to those of Schmidt and the other RSDH partners in the prior litigation in that a determination that the consolidated firm had not assumed liability under the lease might have tended to increase the proportional burden of the liability bore by members of the original tenant. Appellees respond by noting that the June 1990 complaint demanded judgment against members of the original tenant firm only to the extent of their respective interests in the partnership assets or property of [the consolidated firm] as of June 30, 1987. [26] They maintain that, as a consequence, the landlord may only establish their liability on the theory that they were members of the consolidated firm which had assumed the lease. Even if we were to adopt such a crabbed reading of the current complaint, [27] we fail to see how this affects the relationship of the CDP partners to the Pennsylvania litigation. There is simply no evidence in the record that these defendants, in their capacity as members of the original tenant firm, had a mutuality of interest with the Schmidt estate in the Pennsylvania court's resolution of the liability of members only of the consolidated firm, let alone that their interests were fully represented. Under the circumstances of this case, we agree with the landlord that the CDP defendants may not be considered to have been in privity with the prior proceeding, and that they may not assert res judicata as a defense in this action.
We turn next to the question whether the CDP defendants may properly rely upon the collateral estoppel effect of the Pennsylvania judgment to preclude a finding of their liability under the lease agreement. Whereas claim preclusion applies to entire claims, issue preclusion precludes the relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of a prior case involving the party against whom estoppel is asserted, even if such issues are subsequently presented as part of a different cause of action. Moreover, while claim preclusion operates only between the parties to the prior litigation and those in privity with them, a stranger to the first action may invoke issue preclusion against a party to that action. 18 MOORE, supra note [11], § 131.13[1] (3d ed.1997). Hence the CDP defendants, while not privy to the prior dispute, are not thereby necessarily prevented from asserting defensive non-mutual collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Jackson v. District of Columbia, 412 A.2d 948, 952 (D.C.1980); Thompson v. Karastan Rug Mills, 228 Pa.Super. 260, 323 A.2d 341, 344 (1974). The landlord contends that the Orphans' Court's resolution of the Schmidt estate's liability under the lease should not be given issue preclusive effect because the remaining issue involved in the current dispute, whether the CDP tenants remain liable on the original lease agreement, is entirely different from the one involved in the Schmidt litigation. There, the Orphans' Court did not reach the issue of the original tenant's liability; it simply determined that the consolidated firm had not assumed liability under the lease. In describing the rule of collateral estoppel we have said that when an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim. Pipher v. Odell, 672 A.2d 1092, 1095 (D.C.1996) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27). An issue is actually litigated when it is (1) properly raised, by pleadings or otherwise, (2) submitted for determination, and (3) determined. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. d). Pennsylvania law is in accord. See Lebeau v. Lebeau, 258 Pa.Super. 519, 393 A.2d 480, 483-84 (1978) ([P]reclusion applies only to issues actually litigated and determined, and not to matters which might have been raised in the first proceeding, but were not.). [28] We agree with the landlord that even had it actually litigated its claim against the Schmidt estate, the scope of issue preclusion would be limited only to those issues which were resolved by the Orphans' Court. The Orphans' Court held only that the consolidated firm, of which Schmidt was a member, was not liable on the lease. It did not, however, resolve the liability under the lease of the original tenants. Its finding that the RSDH partners did not assume liability under the lease would not preclude a subsequent judicial determination that the original tenants remained liable. Therefore, those defendants who were members of Chapman, Duff & Paul are not protected by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. [29] Because we conclude that this breach of contract action is not barred by the doctrines of claim preclusion or issue preclusion with respect to the former CDP partners, we reverse the summary judgment in their favor and remand for further proceedings. In all other respects, the decision below is affirmed. So ordered. RUIZ, Associate Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: This appeal arises from actions for breach of a lease filed by the landlord against over sixty individuals who were members of three different tenant law firms which occupied the leased premises in the District of Columbia. The principal question presented on appeal is whether the trial court properly dismissed the landlord's actions on the ground that they are barred under principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel by the final order of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a probate proceeding distributing the estate of Harold R. Schmidt, one member of the law firm tenants that succeeded the original tenant. The order in that Pennsylvania probate case, adjudicated in the context of a single defendant's estate, is erected by the majority as a bar to the landlord's claims against approximately fifty of the named defendants who, like Schmidt, also were members of law firm tenants that succeeded the original tenant. The majority reasons that the landlord's claim against Schmidt's partners is precluded because it is the same claim that was rejected in the Schmidt estate proceeding and the landlord had a full and fair opportunity in that proceeding to litigate the merits of its claim. I submit this conclusion is incorrect. Proper application of claim preclusion principles requires that we first ascertain whether the basis for the final order in Pennsylvania is one applicable to Schmidt's partners. In other words, there is no res judicata bar unless Schmidt's partners are in privity with Schmidt with respect to the matter previously decided. Here, we have no assurance that that is the case because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not express any opinion at all. Thus, we do not know whether its judgment in favor of the Schmidt estate was on a basis shared by Schmidt's partners or, rather, for reasons specific to Pennsylvania probate law which are inapplicable in the present action to Schmidt's partners. The majority's sweeping application of res judicata in this case has consequences out of proportion to the limited action taken by the landlord in the Pennsylvania estate proceeding, and enforces what is essentially a default judgment entered in a probate proceeding for the purpose of adjudicating claims against only the Schmidt estate, one of the more than sixty defendants in the present litigation. Precluding the present litigation in this context does not serve the purposes of res judicata, to avoid multiplicitous and vexatious litigation and conserve judicial resources, for here the landlord had proceeded in a straightforward and efficient manner, by filing actions involving all relevant parties in Superior Court, which has authority to adjudicate the landlord's claims against all the defendants. The substantive issue in the present case is whether the individual tenants are liable to the landlord under the lease. Resolution of that issue may have been, but need not have been, the basis for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's final order in the probate proceeding. I conclude that because the thing decided in the Pennsylvania proceeding may well have been different from the issue presented for adjudication in the landlord's present action in the District of Columbia against Schmidt's partners, we are consequently unable to determine whether they are Schmidt's privies. Given this uncertainty, Pennsylvania law prohibits application of either res judicata or collateral estoppel. As to all the defendants but Schmidt, therefore, I would reverse and remand for consideration of the landlord's claims on the merits. [1] By statute, all courts in the United States must give the judicial proceedings of any state the same full faith and credit ... they have by law or usage in the courts of such State. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 para. 3 (1994). [2] Therefore, we look to the law of Pennsylvania to determine the effect of the Pennsylvania courts' orders on the actions filed in the District of Columbia. [3] The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained the policy and purpose underlying res judicata: The doctrine of res judicata is based on public policy and seeks to prevent an individual from being vexed twice for the same cause ... As pertinently stated in Hochman v. Mortgage Fin. Corp., 289 Pa. 260, 263, 137 A. 252, 253 (1927): `The rule should not be defeated by minor differences of form, parties or allegations, when these are contrived only to obscure the real purpose, a second trial on the same cause between the same parties. The thing which the court will consider is whether the ultimate and controlling issues have been decided in a prior proceeding in which the present parties actually had an opportunity to appear and assert their rights. If this be the fact, then the matter ought not to be litigated again, nor should the parties, by a shuffling of plaintiffs on the record, or by change in the character of the relief sought, be permitted to nullify the rule.' Stevenson v. Silverman, 417 Pa. 187, 208 A.2d 786, 788 (1965). Under Pennsylvania law res judicata and collateral estoppel apply only if certain conditions are met: It is well settled that for the doctrine of res judicata to prevail there must be a concurrence of four conditions: 1) identity of issues, 2) identity of causes of action, 3) identity of persons and parties to the action, and 4) identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing or being sued. With respect to collateral estoppel we have recently stated that a plea of collateral estoppel is valid if, 1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the one presented in the later action, 2) there was a final judgment on the merits, 3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication, and 4) the party against whom it is asserted has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question in a prior action. Thus, for [a party] to invoke either res judicata or collateral estoppel the issues presented before [the first court] must be the same as those raised in the instant action. Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 463 Pa. 567, 345 A.2d 664, 668 (1975) (citations omitted); accord, e.g., Mintz v. Carlton House Partners, Ltd., 407 Pa.Super. 464, 595 A.2d 1240, 1246 (1991). Pennsylvania law also provides that, in considering whether a prior adjudication is res judicata, a court must look to the judgment of the highest court deciding the issue. See Speyer, Inc. v. Good-year Tire and Rubber Co., 222 Pa.Super. 261, 295 A.2d 143, 146 (1972). In this case, that is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Applying the above principles to the landlord's claim against the Schmidt estate, res judicata applies to bar the claim filed in Superior Court if it was or could have been brought against the estate in the probate proceeding. See Stevenson, supra, 208 A.2d at 788; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19 cmt. a. Thus, claim preclusion bars the landlord's present claim against the Schmidt estate. Claim preclusion does not directly apply to bar the landlord's claims against Schmidt's partners, however, because those claims not only were not brought against Schmidt's partners, but they could not have been brought against the partners in the context of a probate proceeding to distribute the Schmidt estate. The majority reasons that the landlord's claims against Schmidt's partners are barred under principles of claim preclusion, not collateral estoppel, because the partners are in privity with Schmidtin essence arguing that they are the same party for claim preclusion purposes. Before that indirect application of claim preclusion can be accomplished, however, it must first be determined whether the issue decided in the Pennsylvania adjudication is one as to which Schmidt's partners in the instant litigation can claim to be in privity with the Schmidt estate. [4] With respect to application of res judicata to bar the landlord's claims against Schmidt's partners, therefore, our primary question is whether the issue decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the probate action concerning the Schmidt estate was the same or different from the issue presented to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia with respect to Schmidt's partners. Therefore, in this context, the difference between claim preclusion and collateral estoppel is a distinction without much practical difference. The cause of action filed in the District of Columbia was for breach of a lease contract. The issues to be resolved in that case are whether some or all of the partners of the various firms and their successors that occupied the landlord's premises after the original tenant are liable under the landlord's lease with the original tenant and, if so, in what amount. The action filed by the landlord in Pennsylvania that is claimed to bar the present suit was to protect the landlord's lease claim against the Schmidt estate, in the context of a probate proceeding. Specifically, triggered by Schmidt's death and the start of probate proceedings in Pennsylvania, one week before filing the present action in Superior Court the landlord filed a notice of its claim against real property of the estate within the statutorily prescribed period. [5] The landlord then sought to defer distribution of the Schmidt estate's assets until after the lease claim against Schmidt and the other defendants was resolved in one of two actions that already had been filed for that purpose and which involved all the relevant parties: either in the present action filed in the District of Columbia by the landlord or in the declaratory judgment action filed by the survivor firm in Pennsylvania state court in Pittsburgh, later removed to the federal district court. The Pennsylvania courts rejected the landlord's request to defer distribution of the estate. [6] Before we can compare the issues in the present case with those decided in the Pennsylvania litigation to determine whether they are the same, it is necessary first to describe the law regarding distribution of the assets of an estate in Pennsylvania. In Pennsylvania, an estate may be distributed in two ways: An at-risk distribution without an accounting and audit and a distribution after an accounting and audit. See 20 PA. CONS.STAT. ANN. §§ 3532, 3533 (1975). After an at-risk distribution has been made, a claimant loses his claim unless he files a timely written notice of claim. Id. § 3532(a). Once distribution is made in conformity with a final decree following an accounting and audit, the personal representative has no liability for claims against the estate. Id. §§ 3386, 3533. [7] If those were the only rules, then it would appear that the only way that a claimant could recover on a claim if an executor has filed an accounting, as was the case here, is to object and present the claim for adjudication prior to final audit. See id. § 3386 (providing that any claim not admitted by the personal representative or presented by the claimant at an audit cannot be satisfied out of the distributed assets). However, where the claim already has been submitted to another court, as also was the case here, Pennsylvania law permits the probate court, in its discretion, to delay all or part of a distribution pending the result in the other litigation: When any claim not proved in the orphans' court division is being litigated in any other division or court, State or Federal, having jurisdiction thereof, the court may make such provision for the distribution or satisfaction of the claim as shall be equitable. Id. § 3389 (emphasis added). In In re Estate of Mellon, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court listed some of the factors the probate court should consider in deciding whether to delay distribution pending the outcome of litigation in another court: (1) the nature of the claim being asserted before the other tribunal, (2) the hardship, if any, which deferred distribution of principal or income would impose on the estate or the individual or charitable beneficiaries, and (3) the adverse effect of refusing any withholding and thereby precluding satisfaction from estate assets of a possibly meritorious claim being adjudicated in another court. 455 Pa. 294, 314 A.2d 500, 503 (1974). The court also noted that the commissioner's comment to section 3389 states that the section gives the orphans' court the opportunity in its discretion to postpone final distribution where advisable or to make final distribution where the claim, in justice to other interested persons, should be presented in the orphans' court. The court, in addition to using its discretion as to whether any fund will be withheld, will exercise a[sic] discretion as to the amount to be withheld. Id. (emphasis added). Turning to the case at hand, the landlord, in its presentations to the probate court, clearly requested only that final distribution be stayed pending conclusion of the litigation in either the survivor firm's declaratory judgment action in Pennsylvania or in its own action which had previously been filed in the District of Columbia. In the landlord's Statement of Objections to Account, filed January 5, 1990, it noted the pendency of its action in the District of Columbia and requested that the at-risk distributions already made be returned to the estate ... pending resolution of the claim ... against the estate. The statement did not attempt to state in any way the merits of the landlord's claim under the lease. The landlord's second filing, on January 12, 1990, in response to the executrix' accounting was even clearer. It was captioned Petition for Continuance of Audit and Distribution of Estate Pending Resolution of Litigation Against Estate. The landlord repeated its previous request for relief, attaching a copy of its District of Columbia complaint to the petition. Again, the landlord did not address or even mention the merits of its action in the body of its petition. Furthermore, the petition expressly cited section 3389 of the Pennsylvania Code, mentioned the pendency of both the District of Columbia action and the survivor firm's declaratory judgment action then pending in federal court in Pittsburgh, and concluded: Whether the District of Columbia action or the Pittsburgh action will go forward to judgment has not yet been decided; but, in whichever court the action ultimately is concluded, the issue of . . . liability of decedent. . . will be decided. (Emphasis added). Even though the landlord may not have intended to seek and, indeed, actively resisted, any adjudication in the probate court of its lease claim against the Schmidt estate, it is quite clear that the probate court did consider the landlord's claim against the Schmidt estate on the merits, and denied the claim. After a hearing which the landlord did not attend consistent with its position that it had not filed a claim, the Pennsylvania probate judge concluded that the landlord had filed a claim, denied the landlord's request to withdraw the claim, and after an ex parte hearing on the merits, applied District of Columbia law to deny the lease claim based on evidence presented by the Estate, combined with the lack of any evidence whatsoever in support of [landlord's] position. In essence, the probate judge entered a default judgment. The probate court, sitting en banc, affirmed the probate judge's order without an opinion. The intermediate appellate court in Pennsylvania, the Superior Court, rejected the contention that appellant merely file[d] a request that the orphans' court division postpone distribution pending the resolution of the District of Columbia action. It also concluded that the probate court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the landlord's request to withdraw its claim and that it had jurisdiction to decide the claim. The merits of the claim were not presented to the Superior Court, and it therefore did not rule on the probate court's denial of the lease claim. In determining whether the landlord's present action against Schmidt's partners is barred by the probate proceedings in Pennsylvania, we look to the ultimate judgment which, in this case, was rendered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Speyer, supra, 295 A.2d at 146. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment without its own opinion and without adopting any of the opinions below. One justice dissented, also without opinion. Again, we look to Pennsylvania law to interpret the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling in the Schmidt case for purposes of determining its preclusive effect on the present action. Pennsylvania law provides that the findings of a trial court which are not relied upon on appeal should not remain res judicata. Id. In a case involving a subsequent action against a different party, as here, the appellate court in Speyer reasoned that it is clear that an appellate court's refusal to rest its affirmance on a certain finding is often indicative of an infirmity in the finding and that binding a party to a ground not relied upon on appeal would deprive the party of his statutory right to an appeal. Id. [8] If the contrary rule were adopted, appellate court rulings inadvertently could make questionable lower court findings res judicata. Id. [9] The Speyer Court aligned itself with the majority view that an appeal creates a clean slate, so to speak, for purposes of res judicata, upon which the appellate court's grounds for decision are inscribed. The Second Restatement of Judgments [10] addresses how to determine whether an issue has been decided, for preclusion purposes, in the context of appellate decisions from lower court rulings setting out different bases for decisions: If the judgment of the court of first instance was based on a determination of two issues, either of which standing independently would be sufficient to support the result, and the appellate court upholds both of these determinations as sufficient, and accordingly affirms the judgment, the judgment is conclusive as to both determinations.... If the appellate court upholds one of these determinations as sufficient but not the other, and accordingly affirms the judgment, the judgment is conclusive as to the first determination. If the appellate court upholds one of these determinations as sufficient and refuses to consider whether or not the other is sufficient and accordingly affirms the judgment, the judgment is conclusive as to the first determination. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. o (1982). In the present case, we are faced not with a higher court's rejection or refusal to consider a basis for the lower court's ruling, but with a bare affirmance by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, without opinion. Faced with this judicial silence, we simply do not know the basis for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's affirmance. The majority concludes, however, that the Supreme Court must have affirmed the substance of the lower court's opinion, not merely its judgment. That conclusion is at odds with Pennsylvania law that an appellate court considers, and either affirms or reverses, judgments not opinions. See Hader v. Coplay Cement Mfg. Co., 410 Pa. 139, 189 A.2d 271, 274 (1963) (Upon appellate review we are not bound by the reason or reasons advanced by the court below in support of a judgment or order for it is the judgment or order itself which is the subject of review.). There is no indication whatsoever from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that it intended to adopt any of the lower courts' varying opinions. Although we know the basis for two of the lower courts' orders, we know nothing of the reason behind the Supreme Court's affirmance. The Orphan's Court ruled on the merits of the claim and denied it; the Superior Court decided only that the Orphan's Court had authority to address the landlord's claim, but did not reach the merits of the claim. We also know that the landlord maintained at all levels up to the Supreme Court, [11] that the court had discretion pursuant to § 3389 and the factors outlined in In re Estate of Mellon, supra, to either defer or allow final distribution of the estate after taking into account the pendency of the landlord's claim in another forum. Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could have affirmed the lower court's judgment on either the probate court's reasoning that the lease claim was presented to it and properly denied, or on the second alternative ground, the Superior Court's reasoning, that the probate court had jurisdiction to hear the claim on the merits but that the landlord had waived its right to present the claim on the merits, or on the third alternative ground, based on the landlord's argument, that even if the claim was not before the probate court, it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to further delay distribution of the Schmidt estate notwithstanding that the claim was pending in another forum. [12] Any of these grounds would sustain the lower court's judgment, which was to foreclose the landlord's claim against the Schmidt estate. [A] correct decision will be sustained if it can be sustained for any reason whatsoever; in other words we will not reverse in such a case even though the reasons given by the court below to sustain its decision was [sic] erroneous [citing cases]. Hader, supra, 189 A.2d at 274-75 (quoting Sherwood v. Elgart, 383 Pa. 110, 117 A.2d 899, 901-02 (1955)). Of the possible grounds that could sustain the lower court's judgment, only one would constitute a holding by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relevant to the issue in the present action with respect to Schmidt's partners, that the landlord's claim under the lease was denied on the merits. See Stevenson, supra, 208 A.2d at 788 (A final valid judgment upon the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction bars any future suit between the same parties or their privies on the same cause of action.) (first emphasis added). Clearly, there would be no preclusive effect against Schmidt's partners if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had expressly ruled against the landlord's claim, not on the merits, but because it considered that the estate should be distributed without delay. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51(1)(b) (1982). Simply put, unless we know that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the landlord's lease claim against Schmidt on the merits, we cannot determine whether Schmidt's partners are privies for the purpose of applying either res judicata or collateral estoppel. The question before us is whether the ultimate and controlling issues [in the present litigation] have been decided in a prior proceeding. Stevenson, supra, 208 A.2d at 788. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said that where the grounds for the decision asserted to have preclusive effect cannot be ascertained and it would be pure speculation [to identify the issue decided,] ... we will not apply the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co., supra, 345 A.2d at 669-70. [13] It is entirely possible, as the majority states, that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower court's judgment because it agreed with denial of the landlord's claim against the Schmidt estate on the merits. It is also possible, however, that it did not. [14] Riding on our interpretation of that uncertainty in the Supreme Court's affirmance in the Schmidt estate case is the viability of the landlord's claims against fifty of Schmidt's partners in the present action. [15] The tenants have not met their burden of persuading us that the uncertainty should be resolved in their favor because they have not presented us with evidence that application of res judicata in this case would not be speculative. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 27, cmt. f (1982) (The party contending that an issue has been conclusively litigated and determined in a prior action has the burden of proving that contention.). I disagree with the majority's reliance on Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 3 Pa.Cmwlth. 560, 284 A.2d 326 (1971), for the proposition that res judicata applies even though the basis for the Supreme Court's affirmance may be unknown. As Hilliard makes clear, that holding applies as between the parties in this case. Id. 284 A.2d at 327. That means only that the landlord's claim against the Schmidt estate, the same parties to the probate action, is barred. Here, however, Schmidt's partners were not parties to the Schmidt estate proceeding. For the Schmidt estate judgment to have preclusive effect with respect to non-parties, such as Schmidt's partners, on the ground that they are in privity, one must first determine whether claim preclusion applies because they are privies of Schmidt with reference to the litigated matter or, what amounts to the same thing in this context, whether collateral estoppel should preclude the landlord from relitigating the same issue against Schmidt's partners that was litigated and decided in the Pennsylvania probate proceeding. As under Pennsylvania law we are not free to speculate upon the ground on which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may have affirmed the order of the appellate court, the statements of the various lower courts in Pennsylvania characterizing what the landlord presented to the probate court for decision and denying the landlord's claim under the lease do not preclude the landlord's present actions against third parties filed in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. I would reverse and remand the trial court's dismissal of all the claims except the one against Schmidt's estate.