Opinion ID: 2343191
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: issues as to co-indictee reese (# 14, 15, 21, 24, 33, 34, 35, 38, & 47)

Text: Reese testified for the better part of two (2) days during the Commonwealth's case-in-chief as to the events beginning with his escape with Appellant from jail in Durant, Oklahoma and continuing through Brady's kidnapping and murder. The Commonwealth's theory of the case was premised largely upon Reese's testimony, which fingered Appellant as the person who killed Brady. As a result, Appellant raises several allegations of error that address the trial court's rulings on matters relevant to Reese's testimony and Appellant's ability to impeach and otherwise discredit that testimony. We find no grounds for reversal in any of Appellant's allegations. Appellant sought to attack Reese's credibility with evidence that he suffered from Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID)  a condition that the defense argued prevented Reese from having the ability to accurately recall and relate events and would lead him to confabulate events. After he learned that Reese had been previously diagnosed with DID by a Dr. Joann Ondrovik, who examined Reese in 1993 in connection with a criminal prosecution for murder in Oklahoma, Appellant sought an order directing that [Reese] be subjected to a comprehensive forensic mental health evaluation, with particular focus on the diagnosis of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), by a professional who is specially qualified in the field, prior to testifying against the accused herein[.] The trial court denied Appellant's motion, but stated that it would reconsider its ruling [i]f information is obtained that the defendant feels would be appropriate to bring this motion in the future. Appellant subsequently unsuccessfully moved the trial court to reconsider the prior ruling, but Appellant submitted no additional relevant information at that time for the court's consideration. Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court should have ordered the examination he sought pursuant to CR 35.01 as well as principles of due process and fundamental fairness. We find no error. CR 35.01, which is applicable to criminal proceedings by virtue of RCr 13.04, provides: When the mental ... condition of a party, or of a person in the custody or under the legal control of a party, is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order the party to submit to a ... mental examination by a physician ... or appropriate health care expert, or to produce for examination the person in his custody or legal control. (Emphasis added) Although Reese was Appellant's co-indictee, he plead guilty three (3) years before Appellant's case came to trial and thus was not a party to the action at the time of Appellant's motion. Appellant provides no warrant for his assertion that Reese was in the custody or under the legal control of a party, namely the Commonwealth. To the contrary, Reese's trial testimony demonstrated that his permanent home was the Oklahoma State Prison. It thus appears that Reese was on loan from Oklahoma in order to testify at Appellant's trial, but was not in the custody or under the legal control of a party within the contemplation of CR 35.01. Accordingly, CR 35.01 provides no basis for ... an independent examination. Bart v. Commonwealth, Ky., 951 S.W.2d 576, 578 (1997). While we recognize that this Court has held that due process and fundamental fairness may, depending on the circumstances, entitle the defendant to have the alleged victim examined by an independent expert, Mack v. Commonwealth, Ky., 860 S.W.2d 275, 277 (1993) (emphasis added), the critical question is whether the evidence sought by the appellant is of such importance to his defense that it outweighs the potential for harm. Turner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 767 S.W.2d 557, 559 (1988). And, [w]e must be vigilant not to open the door to the opportunity for a defendant in a criminal case to invade the privacy ... or to harass the witness. Id. at 559. In this case, Dr. Ondrovik testified for the defense at trial regarding her diagnosis of Reese, and Appellant was able to present this evidence to the jury notwithstanding the trial court's denial of his motion for an evaluation, which effectively denied Appellant only a more recent diagnosis to present to the jury. The trial court appropriately denied Appellant's request for additional psychological testing because Appellant failed to demonstrate that the evidence sought was sufficiently important to outweigh the potential for harm. In a related allegation of error, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion for an order that would have required the Commonwealth to provide Appellant with copies of any and all mental health records concerning... Reese, in the custody and control of any agent of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or of the State of Oklahoma, or known by either such agency to exist, or in the custody and control of any current or former agent of, or attorney or mental health professional employed by or on behalf of, Dennis Reese[.] We observe that Eldred v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 694 (1994), defined the Commonwealth's obligations with respect to mental health records much more narrowly: [t]he Commonwealth's obligation includes records actually in the hands of the prosecutor, its investigator, and other agencies of the state. Id. at 702 (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58-59, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1001-02, 94 L.Ed.2d 40, 58 (1987)). Significantly, when his motion was heard by the trial court, Appellant's trial counsel conceded that the Commonwealth was not required to serve as Appellant's investigator: The Commonwealth's position appears to be that they don't have any obligation to obtain this stuff that is not in their possession, we can obtain it by subpoena. And that's okay. We will proceed to get subpoenas and obtain those records as best we can so long as the Commonwealth asserts that it has complied or turned over to us every record which is in its control, which is within the control of its agents, or which it has knowledge of and the ability to obtain control over. And so long as the Commonwealth is aware of its obligation... and asserts that it is complying with that, that's okay. As far as the remainder of the record, we will obtain them by subpoena with the Court's cooperation. After the Commonwealth explained that it had turned over the one and only report that had come into our possession, the trial court denied Appellant's motion to require the Commonwealth to accumulate Reese's mental health records, but expressly permitted Appellant to subpoena the records himself. And it is clear from the record in this case that the trial court subsequently issued a subpoena duces tecum for Dr. Ondrovik to provide records upon which she based her diagnosis and that Appellant received additional psychological records as a result. Appellant's brief identifies no coherent claim of error. Shortly before Dr. Ondrovik testified at trial, she learned that her mother had just suffered a stroke. During Appellant's direct examination of her, he first solicited testimony concerning her name, address, occupation, and employment. Then Appellant's trial counsel asked: Doctor, before we go any further, I just want to let the jury know if you appear nervous or upset, it is not about testifying here, is it? Simultaneously, Dr. Ondrovik replied no, my, and the Commonwealth objected. The trial court sustained the objection. Appellant argues that the trial court's ruling prevented him from communicating to the jury that the trial proceedings were running later than usual that day because Dr. Ondrovik needed to get on her way because of a family emergency and thereby abridged his right to present a defense, denied him due process of law, a fair trial, and reliable capital sentencing. We find no merit to this assertion. The trial court correctly sniffed this out as an attempt to introduce evidence that, while clearly irrelevant, could engender sympathy for the witness. The trial court thus properly sustained the Commonwealth's objection. Even if the trial court had the discretion to prohibit attorneys from communicating with their witnesses during mid-testimony recesses, compare Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 283-4, 109 S.Ct. 594, 601-2, 102 L.Ed.2d 624, 635 (1989) ([T]he judge must also have the power to maintain the status quo during a brief recess in which there is a virtual certainty that any conversation between the witness and the lawyer would relate to the ongoing testimony) with Reams v. Stutler, Ky., 642 S.W.2d 586, 589 (1982) (characterizing a trial court's admonition that prohibited counsel from conferring with his own witness ... when a recess was called as an abuse of discretion), it did not abuse that discretion when it denied Appellant's motion for an order prohibiting the Commonwealth from communicating with Reese during any trial recesses that occurred in the course of his testimony. Although it is ordinarily improper for the Commonwealth to show during its case-in-chief that a co-indictee has already been convicted under the indictment, see Tipton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 640 S.W.2d 818, 820 (1982); Parido v. Commonwealth, Ky., 547 S.W.2d 125, 127 (1977), we find no reversible error in Appellant's unpreserved and improperly-preserved claims regarding the Commonwealth's introduction of such evidence in this case. Appellant's trial counsel's opening statement included the following: Another fact: Dennis Reese was present and played a role in Frank Brady's murder. You'll hear a lot of different versions most of them coming from Dennis Reese as to what role he played. But the fact is he was there. He played a role in it. And he has confessed before this Court to the murder of Frank Brady. ... Dennis Reese, I will remind you again, the man who stood in this very courtroom in front of this very judge and confessed and pleaded guilty to the murder of Frank Brady. The very first question asked during the defense's cross-examination of Reese zeroed-in on the fact that Reese had entered a negotiated plea of guilty, and subsequent cross-examination demonstrated to the jury that, by pleading guilty to the Kentucky charges, Reese had avoided the death penalty without really losing anything, because he was already facing consecutive sentences in Oklahoma of life without possibility of parole and one-hundred sixty (160) years. Appellant, of course, raised no objection to the Commonwealth's similar questioning during its direct examination of Reese, and it is apparent that the holdings of Tipton and Parido are inapplicable here because this case illustrates the exception to the rule... when the defendant permits the introduction of such evidence without objection for the purpose of trial strategy. Tamme v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 13, 33 (1998). Having employed that strategy, Appellant cannot be heard to complain after the strategy failed. Id. We additionally hold that the Commonwealth's introduction, through the Bullitt Circuit Court Clerk, of portions of Reese's plea colloquy was permissible in this case to rebut the defense's opening statement characterization of that plea as a confession to the murder of Frank Brady, which created an inference that Reese had stated during his plea that he had personally shot and killed Brady. Cf. Commonwealth v. Gaines, Ky., 13 S.W.3d 923, 924 (2000) (defense opened door to testimony about co-defendant's plea during its cross-examination of co-defendant). In its opening statement, the Commonwealth informed the jury that it would hear what Michael St. Clair said to Dennis Reese about murdering Keeling, the man who Appellant killed in New Mexico after abducting him and stealing his pickup truck in Colorado. Reese testified that he remembered that the murder took place in New Mexico approximately seven (7) miles before they reached the Texas border because Appellant made a statement to the effect that they enforce the death penalty in Texas. According to Reese, after Appellant killed Keeling, he then went through [Keeling's] wallet and tore the picture up of his little girl and thr[ew] it out the window. Appellant objected to these portions of Reese's testimony on the grounds that the Commonwealth had failed to comply with its RCr 7.24(1) discovery obligation by failing to disclose the substance of this testimony, which he alleges involved Appellant's oral incriminating statements. The trial court sustained Appellant objection to his they enforce the death penalty in Texas statement and ordered it stricken from the record. Although Appellant alleges that the introduction of this evidence necessitated a mistrial, the record does not demonstrate a manifest necessity ... or an urgent or real necessity, Skaggs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 672, 678 (1985), for a mistrial, and the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant's motion. Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 662 S.W.2d 483, 484 (1983) ([W]e must rely on the good sense of the trial court in not declaring a mistrial[.]). Because Reese's testimony concerning Appellant's destruction of Keeling's child's picture did not involve any statement by Appellant, the Commonwealth had no obligation under RCr 7.24(1) to inform Appellant of it, and the trial court correctly overruled Appellant's objection, which was premised exclusively on an alleged breach of RCr 7.24(1). Appellant is correct that the trial court erroneously overruled his hearsay objection to Reese's testimony that he had spoken with Kincaid, see infra Part III(D)(6), regarding Kincaid's testimony and that [h]e [Kincaid] told me [Reese] what Michael had told him at one point andI  asked me if it was true and I told him yes and I told him he should write . Given that Kincaid subsequently testified to what Michael had told him, and Reese's testimony made it abundantly clear that, from his perspective, Kincaid's account, which identified Appellant as Brady's murderer, was true, the error was harmless in this case. See Garland, 127 S.W.3d at 540. Appellant's final allegation of error in connection with Reese's testimony involves issues of privilege and waiver, and this allegation requires a more extensive factual explanation than some of the prior allegations. In its attempts to impeach Reese's credibility as a witness, the defense: (1) argued that Reese had utilized discovery materials that were provided to him to fill in the gaps and to supply details in his testimony that were consistent with the Commonwealth's other evidence; and (2) suggested that Reese had a motive to lie because he had agreed to testify against Appellant in exchange for the plea agreement that spared his life. During its direct examination of Reese, the Commonwealth sought to rebut these claims: Comm.: I want to make this clear. At any time when I have spoken to you  when any representative of the Commonwealth has spoken to you, have they ever handed you your statements and told you to keep them? Reese: No, sir. Comm.: Have they ever let you read your statements? Reese: No, sir. Comm.: Have they ever let you listen to tape recordings that you may have made? Reese: No, sir. ... Comm.: Are you expecting any benefit or has it been suggested to you from anybody that you would receive a benefit for testifying here today? Reese: No, sir. Comm.: Did you ever sign an agreement that you would testify? Reese: No, sir. During its cross-examination of Reese, Appellant's trial counsel explored Reese's expectations at the time of his plea as to whether he would be asked to testify against Appellant: Defense: Now, when you were back here and entered your guilty plea you sort of expected this day would come, didn't you? Reese: Yes, sir. Defense: All right. You knew when you entered that plea that if Michael St. Clair ever went to trial here you would be called to testify against him. Reese: I suspected that. Defense: You talked about it? Reese: I don't remember talking about it. Defense: You don't remember talking to your attorneys about it? Reese: We may have. Defense: Did it seem important? Reese: I was concerned about the plea bargain that I was signing. Defense: My question is: Do you remember any discussion about whether or not you're going to have to testify against Michael St. Clair if he went to trial as he is now? Reese: Yes, sir. Defense: You do remember that? Reese: Yes, sir. Defense: And the answer was if they called you, you would have to come testify. Right? Reese: If I didn't have no appeal pending. To provide further evidence relevant to these topics of impeachment, Appellant informed the trial court of its intention to call Rebecca Murrell, an attorney who represented Reese on his Kentucky charges, to testify as to whether she recalls providing him with copies of his discovery and whether the likelihood of his being required to testify against St. Clair if he entered that plea was in fact something that was discussed between them. At a bench conference, Murrell explained that Appellant's trial counsel had informed her of the questions he intended to ask her, that she had discussed this with Reese, and that Reese had told her he does not wish to waive the attorney[-]client privilege and does not wish either myself or [co-counsel] Ms. Schmidt as his counsel in connection with this case, to testify concerning any matters pursuant to client communication. Appellant argued that: (1) the attorney-client privilege was not relevant to Appellant's proposed question as to whether Reese's attorney had provided him with discovery materials; and (2) by testifying himself about discussions concerning whether his plea agreement would require him to testify, Reese had waived his attorney-client privilege with respect to any confidential communications concerning that topic. The trial court ruled that it would not require Murrell to answer the questions that Appellant's trial counsel had identified, but would permit Appellant to ask whether or not it was [Murrell's] usual and customary practice to furnish items of discovery furnished to her by the Commonwealth to her clients. Appellant called Murrell as a witness and, after establishing that she had represented Reese in her capacity as public defender, asked: Defense: Ms. Murrell, tell the jury what is meant by discovery in a criminal law context? Murrell: In laymen's terms discovery would be that process by which a defendant, through counsel, is furnished with information relating to the case, it is a process that is governed by applicable rules and statutory provisions. Defense: Do those rules provide that if the prosecution is in possession of a statement, whether written or taped, that they must provide it to you in discovery? Murrell: Yes, sir. Defense: Do those rules provide that other items of evidence, reports, photographs, so on, are provided to you in discovery? Murrell: Yes, sir. Defense: And once they are provided to you, is it your professional practice to copy those materials and provide them to your client? Murrell: Yes, sir. Defense: Is that something you make a point to do? Murrell: It is my professional practice to do that. Yes, sir. Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it would not allow him to ask the questions that he proposed to ask of Murrell, i.e. , whether she and Reese discussed the possibility that he would have to testify against Appellant and whether she had provided him with discovery materials. We agree with Appellant's contention that the trial court's rulings were erroneous, but find the errors harmless in this case. KRE 503(b) provides that: A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing a confidential communication made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client (i) between the client or a representative of the client and the client's lawyer or a representative of the lawyer.... KRE 503(a)(5) states that [a] communication is `confidential' if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication. Appellant's proposed question as to whether Murrell had furnished Reese with the discovery materials turned over to her by the Commonwealth did not implicate the KRE 503 privilege. Attorneys may testify as to matters affecting a client so long as such matters do not relate to confidential communications. Futrell v. Shadoan, Ky., 828 S.W.2d 649, 651 (1992) (citing Hyden v. Grissom, 306 Ky. 261, 206 S.W.2d 960, 963 (1947) (An attorney may testify as to matters affecting the client, except as to confidential communications.)). If Murrell had testified that she had furnished discovery materials to Appellant, her testimony would have been a revelation of an act in which [s]he participated, not of a confidential disclosure, United States v. Freeman, 619 F.2d 1112, 1119-1120 (5th Cir.1980), and the Kentucky Evidence Rules Study Commission's commentary to KRE 503 states that [t]he privilege does not extend to ... non-communicative acts. (emphasis in original). Because [c]ommunications from attorney to client are privileged only if they constitute legal advice, or tend directly or indirectly to reveal the substance of a client confidence, Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 5.10 at 233 (3d Ed.1993) (quoting United States v. Defazio, 899 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir.1990)), any vestige of communicative intent represented by a bundle of the opposing party's discovery materials that have been duplicated by an attorney for his or her client falls outside the scope of KRE 503. The trial court's erroneous ruling on this proposed question was harmless error in this case, however, because the record from the bench conference makes it clear that Murrell had no specific knowledge of whether she had furnished Reese with discovery materials and that her case file, which presumably might have refreshed her memory, had been destroyed in a flood. In fact, Appellant's trial counsel stated to Murrell during this bench conference that I know from our discussions, that even if you were to answer that question, your answer would have to be you don't know because the file was destroyed in the flood. Thus, even if the trial court had permitted Appellant to ask the question, Murrell's answer would not have been probative. And, by permitting Appellant to introduce evidence of Murrell's professional practice (a.k.a. her habit) of providing discovery to her clients, the trial court more than accommodated the defense by allowing it to introduce evidence that is inadmissible in Kentucky. See Burchett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 98 S.W.3d 492 (2003). We agree with Appellant's argument that Reese's testimony concerning discussions with his attorneys as to whether he would be required to testify against Appellant waived any privilege as to those communications under KRE 503. In response to questions posed to him on cross-examination, Reese testified at trial that he recalled discussions with his attorneys about whether he would have to testify and that the answer was that he would have to come testify unless he had an appeal pending. KRE 509 provides that [a] person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure waives the privilege if he ... voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter. Having disclosed the substance of his communications with his attorneys, Reese could not assert the KRE 503 privilege as a bar to testimony from his attorney as to those same communications. Given that Reese testified that it was his understanding that he would be required to testify, however, the trial court's erroneous ruling was harmless because, in the best case scenario for Appellant, Murrell's testimony would have been merely cumulative.