Opinion ID: 1412109
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: THE SECTION 232, SUBDIVISION (a)(6) FINDING INABILITY DUE TO MENTAL ILLNESS.

Text: Section 232 (see fn. 3, ante. ) provides that [a]n action may be brought for the purpose of having any person under the age of 18 years declared free from the custody and control of either or both of his parents when such person comes within any of the following descriptions ... (6) [Person] [w]hose ... parents are, and will remain incapable of supporting or controlling the child ... because of mental deficiency or ... illness. The court impliedly found that Mrs. B. ... [was] and [would] remain incapable of supporting or controlling the [children] in a proper manner because of mental ... illness under subdivision (a)(6) of the statute. (2) Mentally ill persons under section 232 have been judicially defined as those persons (a) [w]ho are of such mental condition that they are in need of supervision, treatment, care or restraint or (b) [w]ho are of such mental condition that they are dangerous to themselves or to the person or property of others.... ( In re Baby Boy T. (1970) 9 Cal. App.3d 815, 820 [88 Cal. Rptr. 418]; see also In re Eugene W., supra, p. 628, fn. 2.) [7] Kern County Welfare Department, as amicus curiae, urges the obsolescence of this definition and suggests that this court adopt a broader interpretation of mental illness consistent with what it deems the implications of sections 232.5, 237, and 232, subdivision (a)(7), emphasizing the welfare of the child. We decline the invitation to reinterpret the meaning of mental illness under the statute. Notwithstanding that on reenactment or amendment [8] the Legislature is presumed to have adopted the judicial construction of statutory language ( People v. Hallner (1956) 43 Cal.2d 715 [277 P.2d 393]; Perry v. Jordan (1949) 34 Cal.2d 87 [207 P.2d 47]; People v. Curtis (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347 [34 Cal. Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33]; Ladd v. Board of Trustees (1972) 23 Cal. App.3d 984 [100 Cal. Rptr. 571]), amicus suggests no cogent reason for altering the definition that is now incorporated in the legislative scheme. Its brief asks for the meaning of mental illness to be liberalized to facilitate the termination of the parental relationship where the parents are demonstrably incapable of providing proper care but are nevertheless not so incapacitated as to require ... supervision, treatment ... or restraint. The courts in In re Baby Boy T., supra, 9 Cal. App.3d 815 and In re Eugene W., supra, 29 Cal. App.3d 623, have upheld the existing definition, and the tenor of their opinions is consistent with the proposition that family rights, both the parent's and the child's rights, should not be vulnerable to a too easy finding of mental illness. Indeed, the strictness of this definition of mental illness has acted as a safeguard to protect the primacy of the family. Moreover, although it can be argued that the present standard prevents severance in some cases where the parents may be incapable of providing proper care, it is evident that any significant harm to the child's welfare can be adequately addressed by subdivision (a)(7). Section 232, subdivision (a)(7) provides that a child may be freed from parental custody and control [w]ho has been cared for in one or more foster homes ... for two or more consecutive years, ... [if] the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that return of the child to his parent[s] ... would be detrimental to the child.... [9] (3) The section, accordingly, balances the interests of the child in secure and sufficient parenting with the conjoined interests of both parent and child in preserving the familial bond. The subdivision has the added advantage of permitting the parents a longer period, two years, in which to rehabilitate themselves to a position whereby they can properly support this most fundamental responsibility. Such an accommodation, inherent in the structuring of section 232, affords the fullest opportunity to the parents for exercise of their rights not inconsistent with the ultimate best interests of the child. Accordingly, amicus' proposed definition of mental illness appears unnecessary to achieve the purpose of the statute in securing the welfare of the child; considering the fundamental interests here involved, we should not, in the absence of language clearly expressing such a standard, so interpret the statute. (4) In the instant case, there is insufficient evidence to show Mrs. B. was mentally ill under the standard of In re Baby Boy T., supra, 9 Cal. App.3d 815 and In re Eugene W., supra, 29 Cal. App.3d 623. The evidence of her mental condition was contained in the probation officer's report and testimony which anticipated the psychiatric evaluation and the testimony of one of the examining psychiatrists. The report stated: Mrs. [B.] comes across as a well-meaning individual who is emotionally too weak to [properly] care for her children. Dr. Vargas, the psychiatrist corroborated this assessment at the hearing. He said that mental illness was any type of mental disorder which incapacitates an individual to live normally ... continuing, that he and his colleagues thought that Mrs. B. was suffering from mental illness in that sense, and, because of her inability to cope with stress situations, she would be unable to take care of the children. However, both Ms. Bell and Dr. Vargas acknowledged that their conclusions of her mental condition were based on Mrs. B.'s neglect in failing to prevent the injuries that resulted in the children being made wards of the court, and her purported inability to cope in Washington, D.C. Ms. Bell, the author of the report, said she had never met Mrs. B., and Dr. Vargas said his judgment of her mental condition was made from an hour interview and her past history. Moreover, Dr. Vargas verified on cross-, and recross-examination that he had only seen Mrs. B. once, and that her establishing a separate residence apart from Mr. B. with welfare assistance and guidance ... could be tried, thereby conceding that whatever the classification of her mental state, Mrs. B.'s problems constituted no immediate danger to herself or her children. Clearly, under such a showing, it could not be said that Mrs. B. was and would remain incapable of supporting or controlling her children according to this subdivision. There was, therefore, no substantial evidence for a finding that Mrs. B. was mentally ill, and the trial court erred to the extent it based its decision to grant the petition on this ground.