Opinion ID: 1891504
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Identification of Tressler and Simmons' Vehicle

Text: Next, Simmons claims the trial court erred in denying Simmons' motion to exclude or preclude the identification of Simmons' vehicle. [14] He argues that the procedures used to identify Simmons' vehicle and Tressler were unnecessarily suggestive because Ms. Renfro was shown only one photograph and one vehicle to identify Tressler and Simmons' vehicle, and Mr. Montz was shown only one vehicle over a year after he first viewed it to identify Simmons' vehicle. [15] The primary evil to be avoided in the introduction of an out-of-court identification is a very substantial likelihood of misidentification. Grant v. State, 390 So.2d 341, 343 (Fla.1980) (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972)). In Grant, this Court held that a suggestive confrontation procedure, by itself, is not enough to require exclusion of the out-of-court identification; the confrontation evidence will be admissible if, despite its suggestive aspects, the out-of-court identification possesses certain features of reliability. 390 So.2d at 343 (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977)). Therefore, the test for whether a suggestive identification procedure should be excluded has two prongs: (1) did the police employ an unnecessarily suggestive procedure in obtaining an out-of-court identification; [and] (2) if so, considering all the circumstances, did the suggestive procedure give rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Id. In Neil, the United States Supreme Court held that the factors a court should consider to determine the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view [the person or object] at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the [person or object], the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Neil, 409 U.S. at 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375. These factors have often been applied to cases involving the identification of defendants, see, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 518 (Fla.2005), and this Court has held that these factors also apply to the identification of physical evidence. Dennis v. State, 817 So.2d 741, 760 (Fla. 2002) (The factors to be considered in the determination of whether the identification of the vehicle was reliable are all comparable to factors considered in a witness's identification of a suspect.); Pittman v. State, 646 So.2d 167, 171 (Fla.1994) (holding that the Neil factors applied to identification of the defendant's wrecker). We agree with Simmons that the methods employed by law enforcement in this case were highly suggestive because only one photograph and one vehicle were shown to witnesses, resulting in an affirmative answer to the first prong of the out-of-court identification analysis. See Washington v. State, 653 So.2d 362, 365 (Fla.1994) (holding that the showing of a single photo [is] unduly suggestive); Way v. State, 502 So.2d 1321, 1323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (stating that the use of a single photograph is one of the most suggestive methods of identification possible and is impermissibly suggestive under most circumstances). However, we find no error in the rulings of the trial court that, considering the totality of the circumstances, the procedures did not give rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, and we answer the second prong of the out-of-court identification analysis in the negative concerning both Ms. Renfro's and Mr. Montz's identifications.
Ms. Renfro testified at trial that she saw a white car slow down at a red light when a woman tried to climb out, screaming, Help me, help me, please. She stated that the woman looked directly at her with fear in her eyes. As Ms. Renfro approached the car, yelling at the driver to stop, the car sped off, and she got in her van and chased after the car until she lost the car. Ms. Renfro testified that she thought the car was a Chevrolet Corsica, but she didn't really know [her] cars too well, just the body style reminded [her] of a Corsica. On December 4, 2001, three days later, Ms. Renfro wrote a statement describing the events and people she had witnessed, stating that the woman she saw was an older woman with shorter, pinned up brown hair and a white T-shirt. That same day, Detective Perdue showed her one picture of Tressler, which she was able to identify right away. Six days later, on December 10, Ms. Renfro met Detective Perdue at the sheriff's office to view a car parked in the sallie port, which she identified as the car she had seen on the night of December 1. She testified at the hearing that she was sure it was the same car because of the flag on the side window, a patriotic sticker in the rear window, and the car's blue interior. Based on these facts, we agree that showing Ms. Renfro one picture of Tressler and one vehicle was unduly suggestive. See Washington, 653 So.2d at 365. However, . . . a pretrial identification obtained from suggestive procedures is not per se inadmissible, but may be introduced into evidence if found to be reliable and based solely upon the witness' independent recollection . . . at the time of the crime, uninfluenced by the intervening illegal confrontation. Id. (quoting Edwards v. State, 538 So.2d 440, 442 (Fla.1989)). Ms. Renfro had an abundance of time and good lighting conditions to view the victim and the car. She also gave written descriptions of Tressler and the vehicle she saw the night of December 1 before viewing the single photograph of Tressler or Simmons' vehicle in the sallie port. Because of the timing of the descriptions, we find no error in the trial court's conclusion that they were the result of Ms. Renfro's independent recollection, uninfluenced by the intervening illegal confrontation. Id. We further conclude, using the Neil factors, that Ms. Renfro had adequate opportunity to view the woman and car she saw on the night of December 1; her descriptions were sufficiently accurate; she was certain of what she saw on the night of December 1; and the length of time between the crime and her identifications was only a matter of days. Therefore, any discrepancies between Ms. Renfro's descriptions and what Tressler and Simmons' car actually looked like, such as Simmons' claim that Ms. Renfro's description of Tressler's hair was inaccurate, were the proper subject of cross-examination, but not sufficient to amount to a bar to admissibility. Dennis, 817 So.2d at 761.
Mr. Montz's identification of Simmons' vehicle did not occur until a year after he initially described to Detective Perdue the car he witnessed, when Detective Perdue showed him a videotape of Simmons' car. Mr. Montz then identified the car without any hesitancy or uncertainty, and stated that he was sure it was the same car because of its color, the number of doors, the spoked rims, the amount of dirt, and its two dents. He also recalled the flag hanging from the car's window. [16] The trial court found that when applying the Neil factors, the lapse in time between when Mr. Montz initially saw the car and when he was able to identify it would weigh in favor of finding that there [was] a substantial likelihood of misidentification. However, the trial court held that after examining the totality of the circumstances, there existed no substantial likelihood for misidentification. First, as with Ms. Renfro, we conclude that Detective Perdue's showing Mr. Montz a videotape of only one vehicle constituted an unduly suggestive identification procedure under the first prong of the out-of-court identification analysis. Further, we agree with the trial court that the length of time that passed between Mr. Montz's first viewing of the car and his identification of it a year later could result in a substantial likelihood of misidentification. However, considering the other Neil factors, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Simmons has not satisfied the second prong of the test for whether a suggestive identification should be excluded. First, Mr. Montz had an adequate opportunity to view the car the night he witnessed it because the area was well lighted and there was nothing blocking his view. Second, Mr. Montz's degree of attention was high, judging from the accuracy of his description of the car, and his level of certainty was high as well.