Opinion ID: 1095444
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the trial court err in allowing the in-court identification of defendant following what he alleges were suggestive pre-trial identification procedures?

Text: Appellant challenges the legal adequacy of the photographic spread and subsequent lineup, and claims that these out of court identifications influenced and tainted his in court identification as the perpetrator of the crime. In support thereof, he cites Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), a United States Supreme Court case in which it was held that a criminal defendant may claim that an identification procedure was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identity that it led to a denial of due process of law. Appellant contends that that case also stands for the proposition that the determination to be made must be on the totality of the circumstances. Also, in support of his case he cites Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), in which the United States Supreme Court delineated the following factors to be considered in analysis of the legal sufficiency of the identification procedure: (1) opportunity to view; (2) the degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the description; (4) the witness's level of certainty; and (5) the time between the crime and the confrontation. Appellant claims that several of these factors were not met in his own identification as the alleged assailant in the rape, and as such the identification procedure suffers from a legal inadequacy. Hence, he avers, his cause is therefore reversible. Our own law concerning the admissibility of identification both pre- and post-trial is set out at length in York v. State, 413 So.2d 1372 (Miss. 1982). In York, we presented the history of trial court problems with identification and traced the United States Supreme Court decisions dealing with such. See York at pages 1374-1382, citing U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967); and Stovall, supra . These United States Supreme Court cases have presented a plethora of claims by defendants asserting their constitutional rights have been violated. Numerous causes of action presented to this Court have addressed these claims, [1] but our decision in York, concerning due process violations in the identification, serves as the best reference for the issues in the case at bar. In York, supra, at 1383, Justice Hawkins discussed at length allegedly suggestive pre-trial procedures and the effect they have on in-court identification, and held that: An impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification does not preclude in-court identification by an eyewitness who viewed the suspect at the procedure, unless: (1) from the totality of the circumstances surrounding it (2) the identification was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Even if testimony is proffered of the out-of-court identification itself, the same standard exists as to the above, with the omission of the word irreparable. In determining whether these standards are fulfilled, Neil v. Biggers states the following may be considered: ... the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. 409 U.S. [188] at 199, 93 S.Ct. [375] at 382 [34 L.Ed.2d 401]. In the final analysis, under Manson v. Brathwaite, reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility... . Specifically, our review is limited to these standards as set forth above, given the totality of the circumstances test as set forth in Stovall, and whether or not the pre-trial identification was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification. York, at 1383. The victim and her companion first participated in an identification process at the police station, where officers presented them with seven pictures. Previously, in their description of the assailant, we are led to believe (although the record is not entirely clear) that they had described their assailant as being a black male, around 18 to 25 years of age, wearing jeans, a dark shirt or jacket, and a cap. They testified that they had had ample opportunity and sufficient light to get a good look at him. Further testimony showed that together they eliminated one photo after another until there was one left, at which point the rape victim claimed if it's any of them, it's him. The photo of Jones is slightly larger than the other six pictures. He also is the only one wearing a cap, though not a New York Yankee cap, and a casual dark/black jacket. Too, he is the sole person of the seven men standing in front of a measuring device. However, the officers testified that this was the only picture of the defendant in their possession, and it was made with a different camera than the others. All of the pictures are of young black men about the same age and size. There is a suggestion of impermissibility. But, is it so impermissibly suggestive so as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification? We do not think so, and for the following reasons: While the cap had been found at the scene of the crime and apparently played a significant part in the defendant's identification, and ultimately in his conviction, numerous corroborative circumstances are present in support of his identification as well. Two officers had viewed the defendant in a Yankees' cap on previous occasions: once by Sheriff East a few days before, and again by an Oxford Police Department detective captain on the day the crime was committed. We note also that both the Oxford police and sheriff's department were apparently well acqainted with defendant. Finally, in dispensing of any remaining problem concerning the cap, we would point out that the record reveals that such a distinctive looking item worn by the rapist could not have had the effect of tainting the in-court identification when the police had been given an accurate and complete description of the man prior to the photographic identification and police lineup, and he was identified as well with great assurance at trial. We believe that this identification testimony was competent, raising a jury issue of defendant's guilt, and find no error in permitting the in-court identification of the defendant.