Opinion ID: 2524595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was trial counsel's performance objectively reasonable?

Text: As the Court of Appeal correctly noted, the evidentiary landscape relevant to the competence question before us was created in several superior court proceedings, including those at which petitioner's guilty plea was entered and accepted, those on petitioner's motion to withdraw his plea, and those following the Court of Appeal's issuance of an order to show cause in response to petitioner's first habeas corpus petition, in which the parties stipulated as to how trial counsel would testify. Petitioner's second habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal, the subject of our review, incorporated all the evidence adduced in the prior proceedings. Whether trial counsel performed competently, that is, reasonably] under prevailing professional norms ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052), presents a mixed question of fact and law. Such questions are generally subject to independent review as predominantly questions of lawespecially so when constitutional rights are implicated and include the ultimate issue, whether assistance was ineffective, and its components, whether counsel's performance was inadequate and whether such inadequacy prejudiced the defense. ( People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 219, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) Where, as here, the superior court has denied habeas corpus relief after an evidentiary hearing (viz., the hearing held on the order to show cause ordered in response to petitioner's first habeas corpus petition) and a new petition for habeas corpus is thereafter presented to an appellate court based upon the transcript of the evidentiary proceedings conducted in the superior court, the appellate court is not bound by the factual determinations [made below] but, rather, independently evaluates the evidence and makes its own factual determinations. ( In re Wright (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 788, 801, 144 Cal.Rptr. 535.) [11] Accordingly, the Court of Appeal was entitled, as we are now, to undertake an independent review of the record [citation] to determine whether petitioner has established by a preponderance of substantial, credible evidence [citation] that his counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, that [he] suffered prejudice. ( In re Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 944-945, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 713, 830 P.2d 747.) While our review of the record is independent and we may reach a different conclusion on an independent examination of the evidence ... even where the evidence is conflicting ( In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 109, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 860 P.2d 466), any factual determinations made below are entitled to great weight ... when supported by the record, particularly with respect to questions of or depending upon the credibility of witnesses the [superior court] heard and observed. ( In re Wright, supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at p. 801, 144 Cal.Rptr. 535; see also People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 219, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) On the other hand, if our difference of opinion with the lower court ... is not based on the credibility of live testimony, such deference is inappropriate. ( In re Arias (1986) 42 Cal.3d 667, 695, 230 Cal.Rptr. 505, 725 P.2d 664; see also In re Hitchings, at p. 109, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 860 P.2d 466.) Petitioner and amici curiae strenuously urge us to declare that trial counsel's performance in advising petitioner about his guilty plea was constitutionally deficient simply because counsel failed to investigate the likely immigration consequences. We are not persuaded that the Sixth Amendment imposes a blanket obligation on defense counsel, when advising pleading defendants, to investigate immigration consequences or research immigration law. In any event, petitioner in this case does not allege a mere failure to investigate, so the question is not squarely presented. [12] As previously noted, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case.... ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052.) Petitioner urges the following as establishing that his trial counsel provided him with substandard representation.
The parties stipulated below that trial counsel Basinger, if called, would testify that he knew his client was an immigrant. All concede that counsel knew his client was a noncitizen.
Petitioner in this case made plain to counsel that he deemed immigration consequences important in deciding whether to plead guilty to the charges against him. Indeed, the People conceded below that petitioner told his trial counsel he wanted to protect his permanent residency status. We long have recognized that criminal convictions may have dire consequences under federal immigration law ( People v. Superior Court (Giron), supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 798, 114 Cal.Rptr. 596, 523 P.2d 636) and that such consequences are material matters ( id. at p. 797, 114 Cal.Rptr. 596, 523 P.2d 636) for noncitizen defendants faced with pleading decisions. Thus, even before the Legislature expressly recognized the unfairness inherent in holding noncitizens to pleas they entered without knowing the consequent immigration risks (see § 1016.5, subd. (d), added by Stats. 1977, ch. 1088, § 1, p. 3495), we held that justice may require permitting one who pleads guilty without knowledge of or reason to suspect [immigration] consequences to withdraw the plea. ( People v. Superior Court (Giron ), at p. 798, 114 Cal.Rptr. 596, 523 P.2d 636 [permitting withdrawal of guilty plea to marijuana possession charge]; see also § 1016.5, subd. (c) [Nothing in this section ... shall be deemed to inhibit a court, in the sound exercise of its discretion, from vacating a judgment and permitting a defendant to withdraw a plea].) [13] The United States Supreme Court, too, has recognized that deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile. ( Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan (1948) 333 U.S. 6, 10, 68 S.Ct. 374, 92 L.Ed. 433.) To banish [noncitizens] from home, family, and adopted country is punishment of the most drastic kind whether done at the time when they were convicted or later. ( Lehmann v. U.S. ex rel. Carson (1957) 353 U.S. 685, 691, 77 S.Ct. 1022, 1 L.Ed.2d 1122 (cone, opn. of Black, J.).) Petitioner has lived in this country most of his adult life and has two children who are United States citizens. That petitioner discussed his permanent residency status with his counsel, emphasizing his desire to keep his green card, is therefore not surprising.
As discussed, petitioner testified that counsel told him that, if he pled guilty, he would have no problems with immigration except that he would not be able to become a United States citizen. Even among the federal and other courts cited by the Attorney General, the clear consensus is that an affirmative misstatement regarding deportation may constitute ineffective assistance. ( U.S. v. Mora-Gomez, supra, 875 F.Supp. at p. 1212.) [14] In the Court of Appeal, the Attorney General acknowledged that for trial counsel to have assured petitioner he would have no immigration problems if he pled guilty would have been irresponsible. More importantly, such advice would have been mistaken. Controlled substance violations are the most damning convictions in the Immigration and Nationality Act. There are very few situations where a plea to a narcotics violation would not have a fatal and permanent immigration consequence as an alien convicted of a crime 'relating to' controlled substances is deportable and excludable. (Brady et al, Cal.Criminal Law and Immigration (1997) Drug Convictions, Admissions, Trafficking, Addiction and Abuse, p. 3-1.) Owing to the enactment of IIRAIRA and AEDPA in 1996, petitioner became subject to expedited removal from the United States upon pleading guilty to the charges against him, both because they involved controlled substances and because drug trafficking is considered an aggravated felony. [15] The only contingency on which institution of actual removal proceedings at that point hung was that they be instituted upon the order of the [United States] Attorney General (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)), which indeed they were. The Attorney General suggests that petitioner's testimony about what his counsel told him was rebutted by counsel's declaration asserting it was his custom and practice to tell clients the government is always wanting to deport noncitizen felons. [16] Trial counsel does not recall what he actually told petitioner. Petitioner argues that, even if believed, counsel's declaration does not necessarily contradict his evidence that, at some point, counsel also told him specifically that a guilty plea would in fact generate no immigration problems. The Court of Appeal found counsel's characterization of his custom and habit unpersuasive. The Attorney General contends the Court of Appeal was insufficiently deferential to the trial court's stated conclusion that counsel's performance met an objective standard of reasonableness for Defense Counsel in this County. Although the Court of Appeal was not bound to accept the superior court's factual findings, those findings were, as previously noted, entitled to `great weight,' particularly where they involved assessment of witness credibility. ( People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 219, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) Having examined the record, we are not able to determine with certainty whether counsel conformed to his purported custom and habit or whether he supplemented any customary warning with a more specific, but incorrect, advisement. Ultimately, however, we need not resolve those factual questions. Even assuming that counsel affirmatively misadvised petitionerand that petitioner thus has satisfied the performance prong of his ineffective assistance claim ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052)petitioner to prevail must additionally demonstrate prejudice, and this, we conclude, he has failed to do.