Opinion ID: 678573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Under Greenholtz and Its Progeny, the Georgia Parole

Text: 73 Scheme Creates a Liberty Interest In Parole 74 A state creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on official discretion. 4 The most common means by which a state creates such an interest is by establishing 'substantive predicates' to govern official decisionmaking, and, further, by mandating the outcome to be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met. 5 Thus, the repeated use of explicitly mandatory language in connection with requiring specific substantive predicates demands a conclusion that the State has created a protected liberty interest. 6 The substantive predicates necessary to create a liberty interest have been described as  'particularized standards or criteria [that] guide the State's decisionmakers.'  7 75 Greenholtz is the seminal case on liberty interests in parole. The Nebraska parole statute at issue in Greenholtz provided, in pertinent part: 76 Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the opinion that his release should be deferred because: 77 (a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole; 78 (b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect for the law; 79 (c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline; or 80 (d) His continued treatment, medical care, or vocational or other training in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding life when released at a later date. 8 81 The statute further provided a list of 15 factors that the Board was obligated to consider in reaching a parole decision. Factor number 15 read: Any other factors the board determines to be relevant. 9 The Supreme Court concluded that this statute gave rise to an expectancy in release 10 protected by the due process clause. 82 Some years later, in Board of Pardons v. Allen, the Supreme Court passed upon the Montana parole statute, which provided, in pertinent part: 83 Prisoners eligible for parole. (1) Subject to the following restrictions, the board shall release on parole ... any person confined in the Montana state prison or the women's correction center ... when in its opinion there is reasonable probability that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner or to the community[.] 84 . . . . . 85 (2) A parole shall be ordered only for the best interests of society and not as an award of clemency or a reduction of sentence or pardon. A prisoner shall be placed on parole only when the board believes that he is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen. 11 86 Relying on the use of mandatory language and substantive predicates, the Supreme Court concluded that this statute, like the Nebraska statute at issue in Greenholtz, created a liberty interest in parole. As further support for its conclusion, the Court pointed to the legislative history of the Montana statute: the statute quoted above was enacted in 1955 to replace a 1907 statute that had granted absolute discretion to the Board. The Court saw the 1955 change in the law as an indication of a legislative intent to cabin the discretion of the Board. 12 87 It is inconceivable that the Nebraska and Montana statutes at issue in Greenholtz and Allen create a liberty interest in parole while the Georgia parole scheme does not. The Georgia statute, which is entitled Parole guidelines system, provides: 88 (a) The board shall adopt, implement, and maintain a parole guidelines system for determining parole action. The guidelines system shall be used in determining parole actions on all inmates, except those serving life sentences, who will become statutorily eligible for parole consideration. The system shall be consistent with the board's primary goal of protecting society and shall take into consideration the severity of the current offense, the inmate's prior criminal history, the inmate's conduct, and the social factors which the board has found to have value in predicting the probability of further criminal behavior and successful adjustment under parole supervision. 89 (b) The guidelines system required by subsection (a) of this Code section shall be adopted by rules or regulations of the board. The rules or regulations shall be adopted in conformity with Chapter 13 of Title 50, the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act. 13 90 Certainly the language of this statute is no less mandatory than that of the Nebraska or Montana statutes at issue in Greenholtz and Allen. The Georgia statute mandates implementation of a parole guidelines system, mandates use of the system in making parole decisions, and mandates the criteria that the system must take into consideration. 91 Likewise, the criteria that guide the Board's decisionmaking under the Georgia parole scheme are no less particularized 14 than the criteria in the Nebraska or Montana statutes at issue in Greenholtz and Allen. Under the Georgia scheme, the Board must arrive at each parole decision by following a step-by-step procedure. First, the Board must assign the inmate a Crime Severity Level, which is determined by reference to a table that lists dozens of specific crimes, with each crime assigned a level between I and VII. 15 Second, the Board must assign the inmate a Parole Success Likelihood Score. This score is calculated based on the following eight factors: 92 (a) Age at First Commitment; 93 (b) Prior Juvenile and Adult Convictions; 94 (c) Prior Incarcerations Since Age 17; 95 (d) Probation/Parole Failure; 96 (e) Use, Possession, or Attempt to Obtain Heroin or Opiate Drugs; 97 (f) Commitment Offense Involved Burglary or Forgery; 98 (g) Fully Employed During the Six Months Prior to Current Offense. 16 99 Each of these eight factors is designated a numerical scoring system designed to reflect the inmate's success or lack thereof as to that factor. The numerical scores for each of the eight factors are added together to arrive at the Parole Success Likelihood Score, which ranges from zero to 20. 17 Third, the Board must take the Crime Severity Level and the Parole Success Likelihood Score and apply the Parole Decision Grid to determine the number of months the inmate must serve: 100 The [Parole Success Likelihood Score] shall be used in conjunction with the Crime Severity Level finally to determine a recommended number of months to serve from the Parole Decision Guidelines grid. 101 . . . . . 102 PAROLE DECISION GRID. The Parole Decision Grid is the final component of the Parole Decision Guidelines, the application of which determines the months-to-serve recommendation. 18 103 As this detailed procedure demonstrates, the criteria that guide the Board under the Georgia scheme are far more detailed and particularized, and go much farther in limiting the Board's discretion, than the criteria in the Nebraska and Montana statutes at issue in Greenholtz and Allen. For example, under the Nebraska statute, the Board could consider [a]ny ... factors the board determines to be relevant, 19 while the criteria set out in the Georgia statute and Guidelines grant the Board no such discretion. Likewise, the criteria in the Montana statute were very few and very general, thus permitting the Board far more discretion than the very particularized criteria in the Georgia scheme. 104 Finally, the Georgia Guidelines, like the Nebraska and Montana statutes, contain mandatory language that  'creat[es] a presumption that parole release will be granted' when the designated findings are made. 20 The Guidelines provide: 105 TENTATIVE PAROLE MONTH. The Tentative Parole Month, during which the offender may expect to be released, absent new information or other cause to cancel the Board's tentative release decision, shall be calculated by adding the recommended months-to-serve to the compute-from date of the controlling sentence. 21 106 The Greenholtz decision turned upon the Supreme Court's finding that language of the Nebraska statute created an expectancy of release on parole. 22 The provision quoted above, coupled with the mandated procedure by which the Board must arrive at the recommended months-to-serve, creates more of an expectancy of release than the Nebraska and Montana statutes at issue in Greenholtz and Allen. Other provisions in the Guidelines confirm this expectancy of release. For example, in a section setting out the benefits of the system, the Guidelines provide: By eliminating the uncertainty of release dates, inmate morale and sincere participation in rehabilitation programs is enhanced. 23 The Guidelines eliminate uncertainty by mandating that an inmate's Tentative Parole Month, during which he may expect to be released, be set by applying the Parole Decision Grid to the inmate's Crime Severity Level and Parole Success Likelihood Score. Thus, like the statutes at issue in Greenholtz and Allen, the Georgia parole written procedures use mandatory language that requires the Board to apply particularized criteria to arrive at a parole decision. Under Greenholtz and Allen, the Georgia scheme creates a liberty interest in parole. 107 The majority's reasoning is not grounded in the Greenholtz and Allen decisions. I give three specific examples. First, the majority begins its discussion of the Georgia parole system with the statement: we must keep in mind that our analysis is inherently subjective. 24 The majority does not cite and I am not aware of any authority to support the proposition that a Greenholtz-type analysis is inherently subjective. Under Greenholtz and its progeny, we must look to the language of the state parole scheme and determine whether that language places substantive limitations on official discretion. 25 I see nothing inherently subjective in this analysis. 108 Second, the majority concedes that the Guidelines provide a set of particularized criteria that the Board must consider in making parole determinations. 26 Nevertheless, the majority concludes that this set of particularized criteria does not indicate the existence of a liberty interest because the Guidelines leave the Board significant discretion in applying the various factors.... The Guidelines do not envision the rote application of specific criteria and a predetermined outcome if those criteria are met. 27 In so concluding, the majority ignores the teaching of Allen, in which the Supreme Court distinguished between two types of discretion: 109 In essence, the Court [in Greenholtz ] made a distinction between two entirely distinct uses of the term discretion. In one sense of the word, an official has discretion when he or she is simply not bound by standards set by the authority in question. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 32 (1977). In this sense, officials who have been told to parole whomever they wish have discretion. In Greenholtz, the Court determined that a scheme awarding officials this type of discretion does not create a liberty interest in parole release. But the term discretion may instead signify that an official must use judgment in applying the standards set him [or her] by authority; in other words, an official has discretion when the standards set by a statutory or regulatory scheme cannot be applied mechanically. Dworkin, supra, at 31, 32; see also id., at 69 ([W]e say that a man has discretion if his duty is defined by standards that reasonable [people] can interpret in different ways). The Court determined in Greenholtz that the presence of official discretion in this sense is not incompatible with the existence of a liberty interest in parole release when release is required after the Board determines (in its broad discretion) that the necessary prerequisites exist. 28 110 The discretion upon which the majority relies in concluding that the particularized criteria in the Guidelines do not indicate the existence of a liberty interest is clearly the second type of discretion described by the Court in Allen. The majority fails to recognize that this type of discretion is not incompatible with the existent of a liberty interest. Just as a liberty interest may exist when the standards set by a statutory or regulatory scheme 'cannot be applied mechanically,'  29 so a liberty interest may also exist when [t]he Guidelines do not envision the rote application of specific criteria.... 30 111 Finally, the majority fails to recognize the significance of the 1980 change in the Georgia law. In Allen, the Supreme Court relied on a change in the Montana parole statute to support its conclusion that the new statute created a liberty interest in parole. Noting that the old statute granted absolute discretion to the Board, the Court found that the new statute provided an indication of a legislative intent to cabin the discretion of the Board. 31 Similarly, prior to 1980 in Georgia, there was no statutory requirement that the Board exercise its parole powers in accordance with any specific guidelines or regulations. The Georgia statutes did not place limits on the Board's discretion to determine when an eligible inmate was to be released on parole. In 1980, however, the Georgia legislature enacted O.C.G.A. Sec. 42-9-40, thereby mandating that such parole determinations be made in accordance with a parole guidelines system. Under Allen, this change in the law is at least some indication of legislative intent to cabin the discretion of the Board. 32 112 The majority is able to reach the conclusion it does only by ignoring both the statutes at issue in Greenholtz and Allen and the teachings of those two cases. Under Greenholtz and its progeny, the Georgia parole scheme gives rise to an expectancy of parole that is protected by the due process clause. 113