Opinion ID: 2547215
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to Admit Evidence of Victim's Behavior and Character.

Text: Pursuant to KRE 412(c)(1), Appellant filed a motion a few weeks before trial asking the court to allow evidence of L.M.'s previous sexual behavior. Appellant wanted to question L.M. about evidence that he had told a physician that a janitor at his school had tried to sexually assault him. The morning of trial, the trial judge heard arguments on the motion in chambers. Appellant argued that the fact that L.M. apparently never repeated this allegation to other counselors or police officers who interviewed him, as well as the lack of corroborating evidence, led to the inference that the allegation was false. The judge denied the motion because of the lack of information about the allegation. The judge pointed out that there was no information about when the alleged sexual assault happened or any details about what it involved. Appellant argues that he was entitled to a hearing under KRE 412(c)(2), with the victim present, to ask him about the allegation and to argue to the trial court that this evidence should be admissible. The trial judge did not err in his handling of this issue. For the reasons explained below, the trial judge applied the proper standard in denying the motion, and Appellant was not entitled to a KRE 412(c)(2) hearing on the issue. KRE 412 limits the admission of character evidence about a victim of sexual misconduct. It was designed to protect victims from irrelevant and embarrassing attacks on their character based on their sex lives. See Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 2.30[2][3] (4th ed.2003). In this ease, the initial question is whether KRE 412 even applies to the evidence at issue. Evidence of a false allegation of sexual assault is not, in a literal sense, [e]vidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior or [e]vidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition, the two categories that KRE 412 addresses. KRE 412(a)(1)-(2). However, this Court has held that an assertion that a victim has made a false allegation implicates KRE 412 because of the danger that the underlying purpose of the ruleto protect victims of sexual misconduct from unwarranted attacks based on their sexual historymay be circumvented. Dennis v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 466, 472 (Ky.2010). Inquiry into a purportedly false allegation has the potential to shift[] the focus from the real issues and effectively put the victim on trial. Kreps v. Commonwealth, 286 S.W.3d 213, 221 (Ky.2009) (quoting Hall v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Ky. App.1997)). And if the victim is telling the truth about the prior allegation, then the evidence would clearly fit under the other sexual behavior category of KRE 412(a)(1). Because of these concerns, this Court held in Dennis that KRE 412 does apply to evidence of a prior false allegation, and the proponent of [evidence of a false allegation] is required to make a preliminary showing that the prosecuting witness made a prior accusation and that the accusation was in fact false. Dennis, 306 S.W.3d at 472. Therefore it was appropriate for the trial judge to consider this evidence under KRE 412. The next question is whether Appellant met his burden of making a preliminary showing that L.M.'s allegation against the janitor was false. In Dennis, this Court held that a defendant must show that the victim's prior allegation was demonstrably false. Id. at 474-75. This fairly high standard had previously been adopted by the Kentucky Court of Appeals as well as other state courts. [5] See Capshaw v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 557 (Ky.App.2007); Hall, 956 S.W.2d 224; see also Dennis, 306 S.W.3d at 472-73 (discussing the standards used in various states). Dennis explained that demonstrably false means that there is a distinct and substantial probability that the prior accusation was false. Id. This heightened standard of proof is meant to exclude the evidence where the proponent's only proof of falsity is the alleged perpetrator's denial and/or an inconclusive investigation of the allegation. Self-serving denials and investigations that do not exonerate but merely fail to substantiate are not sufficiently probative of falsity to justify breaching the alleged victim's shield. Id. Here, Appellant did not make a preliminary showing that L.M.'s allegation against the janitor was demonstrably false. Appellant argues that the fact that L.M. only told one physician about the janitor's alleged misconduct, and not any of the other doctors, counselors, and police officers who interviewed him, supports an inference that it is false. Appellant also argues that there was never any corroborating proof of the allegation, and that this supports an inference that it was false. This evidence clearly does not meet the demonstrably false standard. The fact that L.M. told only one person about the janitor's misconduct does not demonstrate that the allegation was false. There are many possible explanations for why a young teenager who had suffered sexual abuse would only tell one person about it. And the fact that there was apparently no investigation that could have provided corroborating proof has no bearing on the truth or falsity of L.M.'s allegation; a young victim of sex abuse obviously has no control over whether an investigation is conducted. The trial judge was correct in his ruling that the information provided by Appellant was simply too vague to justify breaching the alleged victim's shield. Id. Appellant argues that he was entitled to a hearing under KRE 412(c)(2) on the issue of the admissibility of the evidence. KRE 412(c)(2) provides: Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must conduct a hearing in camera and afford the victim and parties a right to attend and be heard. The motion, related papers, and the record of the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal unless the court orders otherwise. Appellant interprets this rule as giving him the right to a hearing to make the preliminary showing that the prior allegation against the janitor was demonstrably false. He argues that the victim must be present in order to have a proper KRE 412(c)(2) hearing, or at least that the defendant has the right to request the victim's presence in order to make the victim available for questioning at such a hearing. Appellant would have used the hearing to question L.M. about his allegation against the janitor. For the reasons explained below, Appellant's interpretation of KRE 412(c)(2) is incorrect. This section of the rule is designed to further the underlying purpose of KRE 412 of protecting the victim of sexual misconduct. See Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 2.30[6] (4th ed.2003). Everything about KRE 412(c)(2) is concerned with protecting the victim: any hearing must be conducted in camera and all the records and related papers must be sealed, and there is the unusual provision that the victim has a right to be heard, if he or she wishes, before the trial court allows the evidence. KRE 412(c)(2) only requires a court to conduct a hearing [b]efore admitting evidence under this rule, not whenever a court makes a ruling about KRE 412 evidence. This is because KRE 412(c)(2) is focused on protecting the victim; obviously the victim would have no need to be heard if a judge rules not to admit evidence under KRE 412. This section does not give the defendant the right to a hearing to make the showing that the prior allegation was demonstrably false (although if a KRE 412(c)(2) hearing is held, the defendant has a right to attend and be heard). The defendant has the same right to have the trial court consider his motion to admit KRE 412 evidence as he would to have the court consider any other evidentiary question. Whether a prior allegation is demonstrably false is a preliminary question that must be answered by the trial judge in deciding whether this type of evidence is admissible under KRE 412. Thus, the decision is governed by KRE 104, which deals with preliminary questions. In Dennis, this Court held that a prior accusation is not admissible at trial unless the proponent of the evidence establishes at a KRE 104 hearing that the prior accusation was demonstrably false. Dennis, 306 S.W.3d at 475. If the trial judge reviews the motion and the parties' arguments and decides that the prior accusation is not demonstrably false, there is no need to continue on to a KRE 412(c)(2) hearing. That is what happened in this case. The trial judge reviewed the motions, held a KRE 104 hearing, and decided that Appellant had not met his burden of showing that the prior allegation was demonstrably false. Therefore a KRE 412(c)(2) hearing was not necessary. A KRE 412(c)(2) hearing is appropriate if, after reviewing relevant evidence and arguments, the trial judge is inclined to allow the evidence or wants to hear more information about the issue. In that situation, the victim must be given the opportunity to be heard before the trial judge makes the decision to allow the evidence. For these reasons, the trial judge did not err in denying Appellant's motion to allow evidence of L.M.'s prior allegation against the janitor.