Opinion ID: 601561
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Commissioner's policy

Text: 35 The Commissioner explained fully his reason for denying Livadas enforcement of her claim in the DLSE's letter of February 7, 1990: 36 It is our understanding that the employees working for Safeway are covered by a collective bargaining agreement which contains an arbitration clause. The provisions of Labor Code Section 229 preclude this Division from adjudicating any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of any collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration clause. 37 Labor Code Section 203 requires that the wages continue at the same rate until paid. In order to establish what the same rate was, it is necessary to look to the collective bargaining agreement and apply that agreement. The courts have pointed out that such an application is exactly what the provisions of Labor Code Section 229 prohibit. 38 The Commissioner thus made clear that his policy is not to enforce any claim that concerns the interpretation or application of any collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration clause, pursuant to California Labor Code § 229. He then interpreted § 229 to preclude enforcement in Livadas's case because deciding her § 203 claim would require applying her collective bargaining agreement, which contains an arbitration clause. 39 The Commissioner's statement of his policy is entirely consistent with the provisions of Labor Code § 229, which states: 40 Actions to enforce the provisions of this article for the collection of due and unpaid wages claimed by an individual may be maintained without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate. This section shall not apply to claims involving any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of any collective bargaining agreement containing such an arbitration agreement. 41 The California courts have interpreted § 229 as prohibit[ing] the Labor Commissioner from assuming jurisdiction to enforce claims for wages arising under collective bargaining agreements. Plumbing, Heating & Piping Employers Council v. Howard, 53 Cal.App.3d 828, 834-35, 126 Cal.Rptr. 406, 410 (1975). 42 The Commissioner points out that § 229 is intended to reflect principles of federal preemption in the area of labor relations. The court in Howard explained that the aim of § 229 is to recognize the importance of both collective bargaining agreements and arbitration, id. at 833, 126 Cal.Rptr. 406, and to maintain the primacy of federal labor law. Id. at 833-35, 126 Cal.Rptr. 406; see also Bechtel Constr., Inc. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 812 F.2d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir.1987). Similar to California's rule, the Supreme Court has held that state law claims are preempted if they are inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1912, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). We therefore understand § 229 to preclude the adjudication of claims that would be preempted by federal labor law. 43 The Commissioner's policy of not enforcing claims that concern the interpretation or application of collective bargaining agreements containing arbitration clauses is thus based on the idea that such enforcement would be preempted by federal law.