Opinion ID: 2433175
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sudden emergency instruction AMI 614

Text: In her second point for reversal, Mrs. Druckenmiller argues in the alternative that, if there was a submissible issue concerning her negligence, she was still entitled to the benefit of the sudden emergency instruction, AMI Civil 3d, 614: A person who is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with danger to himself or others not caused by his own negligence is not required to use the same judgment that is required of him in calmer and more deliberate moments. He is required to use only the care that a reasonably careful person would use in the same situation. Mrs. Druckenmiller proffered AMI 614 during the reading of instructions, and the trial court refused to give it but noted the proffer. The evidence presented at trial, however, showed that the sudden emergency instruction was not appropriate. Recently, we have said that in order to warrant the giving of AMI 614, the driver must be in a stressful situation that dictates a quick decision regarding possible courses of conduct. Diemer v. Dischler, 313 Ark. 154, 852 S.W.2d 793 (1993). Before a person is entitled to the instruction, she must have been aware of the danger, must have perceived the emergency, and must have acted in accordance with the stress caused by the danger. Id. For example, in McElroy v. Benefield, 299 Ark. 112, 771 S.W.2d 274 (1989), we approved the giving of the sudden emergency instruction because of the circumstances surrounding the accident. The appellee, Benefield, testified that, as he came over a rise in the road, he saw the appellants' vehicle sitting at the edge of the highway, and he decided to ease over to avoid hitting it. As he was doing so, however, the McElroys suddenly pulled out in front of him. Benefield slammed on his brakes, skidding a distance of 108 feet to the point of impact. We held that the evidence supported Benefield's contention that he was confronted with a sudden emergency. On the other hand, in Diemer v. Dischler, supra , we held that the trial court had a sound basis for finding that the danger was not so sudden or unexpected as to justify the instruction. 313 Ark. at 159, 852 Ark. at 795. There, the appellant, Diemer, had rounded a curve some distance from an intersection where a forklift driven by the appellant, Dischler, had begun to cross and was in her lane of traffic. Dischler stated that he saw Diemer's car heading toward him from a distance of between 200 to 300 feet at what appeared to be a pretty fast speed, and two accident reconstructionists testified that, given the posted speed limit and natural reaction time, Diemer could have stopped before hitting the forklift or could have exercised at least two options. In the Diemer case, we noted that where the evidence of some negligence on the part of the requesting party is very strong, that party is not entitled to the sudden emergency instruction. This view represents an attempted reconciliation of two previous, apparently inconsistent approaches, and was first formulated by the Arkansas Court of Appeals in Ashmore v. Ford, 267 Ark. 854, 591 S.W.2d 666 (App.1979): Two lines of Arkansas Supreme Court cases have developed on the propriety of giving this instruction. Some say the language of the instruction pointing out that it applies only where the negligence of the party seeking the instruction did not cause the emergency is a sufficient safeguard, thus implying the instruction may be given even when there is some evidence of negligence on the part of the party seeking the instruction. See, e.g., Hooten v. DeJarnatt, 237 Ark. 792, 376 S.W.2d 272 (1964). Others say a party is not entitled to the instruction where his own negligence has created the emergency. See, e.g., Williams v. Carr, et al., 263 Ark. 326, 565 S.W.2d 400 (1978). These approaches are not inconsistent. When they are combined, the result is that the trial judge may give the instruction in cases where there is some negligence on the part of the party seeking the instruction, but the instruction should not be given where the evidence is very strong that the party requesting the instruction has created the emergency by his own negligence. 267 Ark. at 860, 591 S.W.2d at 670. We explicitly adopted the Ashmore v. Ford synthesis in Scoggins v. Southern Farmers' Ass'n, 304 Ark. 426, 803 S.W.2d 515 (1991), where we quoted the language of the opinion by the Court of Appeals and declared that We regard that reasoning as sound.... 304 Ark. at 433, 803 S.W.2d at 519. In considering the present case, however, we have concluded that Ashmore v. Ford 's very strong standard is a confusing and misleading statement of the law where AMI 614 is concerned, and for this reason we retreat from our position set forth in both Scoggins v. Southern Farmers' Ass'n, supra , and Diemer v. Dischler, supra . The language of the sudden emergency instruction speaks in terms of [a] person who is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with danger to himself or others not caused by his own negligence  and supplies no verbal qualifier or intensifier to justify the very strong standard. Thus, our cases since Scoggins v. Southern Farmers' Ass'n, supra , have interpolated a position regarding the instruction that is in fact inconsistent with AMI 614's clear language. Specifically, in Diemer v. Dischler, supra , we held that, under the scenario presented, the trial court could have readily found that the evidence was sufficiently strong that Diemer had been speeding and thus helped to create the emergency and, therefore, that the trial court correctly refused to give AMI 614. The corollary to this rationale would necessarily be that if the evidence of negligence on the part of one seeking to invoke AMI 614 is merely slight, he or she is entitled to have the instruction read to the jury. The application of such a principle would amount to a subversion of the sudden emergency doctrine. In reexamining the language of AMI 614 itself, we conclude that, when an emergency arises wholly or partially from the negligence of the person who seeks to invoke the sudden emergency doctrine, AMI 614 has no application and should not be delivered to the jury. See Smith v. Stevens, 313 Ark. 534, 855 S.W.2d 323 (1993); Williams v. Carr, supra ; Johnson v. Nelson, 242 Ark. 10, 411 S.W.2d 661 (1967); Hooten v. DeJarnatt, supra . Applying this narrower reading of AMI 614, we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the sudden emergency instruction. As quoted above, Mrs. Druckenmiller acknowledged that when she saw Mr. Cluff turning in the intersection, at a distance of between seventy-five to one hundred feet, she decided to continue heading toward him in the belief that she could get around him. She did not apply her brakes until she was about fifty feet away from the truck, and, further, she did not have to slam on my brakes. Like the appellant in Diemer v. Dischler, supra , Mrs. Druckenmiller had a clear view of a vehicle already in an intersection. Unlike the situation in McElroy v. Benefield, supra , there was no sudden veering into the path of an oncoming vehicle. If there was an emergency here, it was one of Mrs. Druckenmiller's making. One who creates an emergency cannot take advantage of AMI 614. Smith v. Stevens, supra . As we have indicated, the instruction applies, by its own terms, only to emergencies not caused by a person's own negligence. Id. In the Smith case, two vehicles collided at the crest of a hill, and both drivers stated that they did not see the other vehicle until about two seconds before the impact and that they immediately made efforts to stop. We rejected one party's assertion that the other had created the emergency. Any emergency, we held, was created by the nature of the hill and the road. 313 Ark. at 538, 855 S.W.2d at 326. In the present case, though, Mrs. Druckenmiller had the benefit of a level road and a clear field of vision. She simply waited too long to begin braking. To reiterate, one cannot create an emergency by her own action and then seek to benefit by requesting an instruction on sudden emergency. Williams v. Carr, supra . Hence, as we have held, the trial court did not err in declining to read AMI 614 to the jury. Affirmed. GLAZE, J., concurs.