Opinion ID: 1224668
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Same parties, same cause of action

Text: The same parties are present here as in the federal district court case: Dahlie Plumber and the University of Alaska. While the same issue is involved  whether the August, 1993, evaluation was unfair and retaliatory  the causes of action are based on alleged violations of different laws. In the federal court case Plumber alleged in relevant part that the poor evaluation was in retaliation for her lawsuit and therefore violated the Alaska Whistleblower Act, AS 39.90.100(a). In her grievance, which appeal is presently before us, Plumber claimed that the motivation behind the evaluation and the manner in which it was conducted violated several university policies and regulations. Under these circumstances, it might be thought that the causes of action are not the same. However, res judicata bars not only relitigation of the same cause of action, but also new claims arising from the same transactions as those in the first suit. The same transaction, the August, 1993 evaluation of Plumber, is at issue in both the first suit in federal court and the present appeal in state court. A final judgment extinguishes all claims `with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions' out of which the previous action arose. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982). Tolstrup, 726 P.2d at 1306. What factual grouping constitutes a transaction is determined by whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, and whether they form a convenient trial unit. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(2) (1982). Plumber's August, 1993 evaluation (the motivation for it, the circumstances surrounding it, and the actual evaluation) is the only transaction at issue in this case. The events are closely related in time, space, origin and motivation and form a convenient trial unit. The events occurred within a short period of time, and are all directly related to the evaluation. The same facts, evidence and witnesses would be produced to prove a violation of the Alaska Whistleblower Act as those produced to prove violations of university policies and regulations. At issue in both the first and second suit is whether there was an improper motive in giving Plumber a poor evaluation, even if the theories of liability (violation of the Whistleblower Act or violation of university policies) differ. Because the same transaction was at issue both in the federal court suit and in the present appeal, res judicata bars Plumber's present claim. Plumber seeks to avoid the conclusion that her grievance is barred by res judicata by arguing that she was unaware of one of the effects of the August 1993 evaluation, that it would result in her losing a salary increase until after she entered into the settlement. Because she was unaware of one of the effects of the August 1993 evaluation, Plumber argues, she did not have an opportunity to litigate the issue. Under the holding of Cameron v. Beard, Plumber argues that she should not be barred by res judicata. Cameron, 864 P.2d 538, 545 (Alaska 1993) ([R]es judicata does not apply when one party has not had an opportunity to litigate an issue.). It is true that res judicata does not act as a bar when the conduct giving rise to the second suit occurs after the conclusion of the first suit. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. f (1982); see Pankratz v. State, Dep't of Highways, 652 P.2d 68, 73-74 (Alaska 1982). Plumber failed to receive a cost of living increase on January 2, 1994, after the conclusion of the first lawsuit. However, Plumber's argument is incorrect for three reasons. First, it is clear that university regulations in place throughout the period in question barred cost-of-living increases for employees who did not maintain at least satisfactory ratings. [5] Plumber, a long-time university employee of fairly high ranking, is presumed to be aware of the regulations as a general matter. Moreover, there is a clear suggestion that at least Plumber's counsel during the federal court litigation was aware of the effects of not receiving a satisfactory rating. In the letter of September 7 which counsel sent to the university complaining about the poor evaluation, counsel argued that Plumber was being singled out for a barrage of memoranda, and critical written materials, which seem clearly designed to ... justify future and further adverse actions. (Emphasis added.) Second, even if Plumber was entirely unaware of Regent's Policy 04.05.01(B)(4), ignorance of the effects of a final judgment is immaterial in determining whether res judicata applies. It is the general rule that if a plaintiff who has recovered a judgment against a defendant in a certain amount becomes dissatisfied with his recovery and commences a second action to obtain increased damages, the court will hold him precluded; his claim has been merged in the judgment and may not be split.... It is immaterial that in trying the first action he was not in possession of enough information about the damages, past or prospective, or that the damages turned out in fact to be unexpectedly large and in excess of the judgment. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 25, cmt. c (1982). As UAA persuasively argues in its reply brief: The fact that Plumber was not aware of one of the financial consequences of a settled claim does not allow Plumber to relitigate the same claim once she becomes aware of that financial consequence. If that were the case, the doctrine of res judicata would be eviscerated by a protestation of ignorance by a litigant as to the scope of damage. Plumber did have the opportunity to litigate the poor evaluation: it was an important part of her federal claim. That she did not litigate it further (because of a strategic decision or ignorance or other reason) does not change the fact that she had the opportunity to litigate it. As we noted in Pankratz, Res Judicata prevents the relitigation in a second suit for relief from judgment of matters which were adjudged or could fairly have been adjudged in the first suit. Pankratz, 652 P.2d at 74 (quoting Moran v. Poland, 494 P.2d 814, 815 (Alaska 1972)) (emphasis in Pankratz ). Third, Plumber's second suit was not based upon conduct occurring after she settled with UAA in federal court. While she does claim that she should be given the three percent cost of living salary increase, she does not contend that the regulation denying her the raise was improperly applied given her most recent evaluation. Rather, she challenges the evaluation itself, which occurred before the conclusion of the first suit. As noted above, a review of her grievance leaves no doubt that it arose from the same transaction as her first suit, the August 1993 evaluation. The denial of the cost of living increase was a trigger for the second action, but the validity of the denial was not at issue. As the Restatement provides, it is immaterial that in settling the first suit Plumber was not in possession of enough information about the potential future damages stemming from her evaluation. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 25, cmt. c (1982). The damages she obtained in settlement embody compensation for her entire injury from the evaluation. She is barred from relitigating to obtain a better settlement. We hold that her grievance, and this appeal, are barred by res judicata. The superior court denied the res judicata claim here on the following reasoning: [Plumber] raises a complex of issues she claims to arise because of violations of numerous provisions of the Regents' Policy. One of her allegations claims that Dr. Ader's appraisal was unfair and retaliatory. However, her administrative claim is not limited to that issue. For that reason the Court concludes that this administrative action did not involve the same cause of action as the federal suit. Accordingly, the Court rejects UAA's argument that the doctrine of Res Judicata bars [Plumber's] administrative action. We cannot agree with the reasoning of the superior court. As noted above, a review of Plumber's grievance (as stated both in the January 14, 1994 grievance to Dr. Ader, and the longer appeal to the grievance council of February 23, 1994) leaves no doubt that the only subject of her grievance was the August 1993 evaluation. As Plumber herself made clear in filing the grievance, I am filing this grievance because of the unfair manner in which my previous employee evaluation was rated. The superior court may have been misled by the fact that Plumber alleged that several Regents' Policies had been violated, but it is crystal clear that, in her words: The grievance concerns the August 23, 1993, appraisal of performance of grievant by Dr. Ader in which the overall rating was needs improvement and resulted in the loss of a 3% salary increase effective on or about January 2, 1994. The Regent's [sic] policies and University regulations which have been violated by the above action are as follows. (Emphasis added.) That Plumber alleged several policies had been violated does not change the essential fact: her grievance concerned only problems which she saw with the August 1993 evaluation. The August 1993 evaluation was the subject of the federal lawsuit. As such, the grievance (and this appeal) are barred by res judicata. We conclude that the res judicata issue is dispositive, and that the administrative appeal should have been dismissed by the superior court on res judicata grounds. Given this conclusion, it is not necessary to reach the two other issues presented in this appeal.