Opinion ID: 2629894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Applicability of NRS 281.005(1) to NRS chapter 241

Text: The Legislature enacted the general open meeting law, codified as NRS chapter 241, in 1960. [6] A provision of the original law, codified as NRS 241.030, specified that nothing in it was to be construed to prevent closed executive sessions to consider the appointment, employment or dismissal of a public officer or employee or to hear complaints or charges brought against such officer or employee, unless the officer or employee requested a public hearing. [7] The Act did not define public officer. This court had by then, however, considered the nature of a public office and the criteria that distinguished a public officer from an employee. In State ex rel. Mathews v. Murray, [8] we noted that there was a considerable body of authority on the subject, with many criteria used in the analysis, but that the authorities uniformly appeared to agree upon one point: A public office is distinguishable from other forms of employment in that its holder has by the sovereign been invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government. We also noted that the court had previously, in defining a public office, quoted a treatise as follows: The right, authority and duty conferred by law by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or through the pleasure of the creating power of government, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The warrant to exercise powers is conferred, not by contract, but by law. [9] We then held that the director of the Public Service Commission Drivers License Division was not a public officer because the position was created by the agency administrator and not by law, and his duties also were specified by the administrator and not by law. [10] Before Mathews, we had considered the nature of a public office in State ex rel. Kendall v. Cole. [11] The Kendall opinion gathered many additional definitions of public office and public officer from a wide variety of authorities. We noted in Kendall that a great many courts had held that to be a public officer one must be charged by law with duties involving an exercise of some part of the sovereign power of the state. [12] After considering the authorities and their many definitions, we held that the position occupied by the superintendent of Nevada exhibits at the Panama-Pacific exposition was not a public office. We stated: None of the sovereign power of the state is intrusted to him. His compensation, period of employment, and the details of his duties, are all matters of contract with the board of directors. For, while the act says the board may employ superintendents, directors, clerks, and other persons for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the act, and for the further purpose of cooperating and advising with the exposition commissioner, it is apparent that the board had the authority to contract as to what the specific duty of each employee should be, otherwise there would be a corps of advisers, and none to execute. [13] To these judicial definitions of public office and public officer, which were controlling when the open meeting law was adopted, the Legislature added a new definition. In 1967 the Legislature enacted NRS 281.005(1), defining public officer as the term is used in NRS chapter 281, which contains general provisions applicable to public officers and employees. [14] The Legislature's statutory definition of a public officer incorporates the fundamental criteria we applied in Mathews and Kendall, and is in harmony with those cases, as we subsequently confirmed in Mullen v. Clark County. [15] NRS 281.005(1)(a), which specifies that the position must be established by state constitution or statute, or by a charter or ordinance of a political subdivision of the state, encompasses the fundamental principle that a public office is created by law. NRS 281.005(1)(b), which specifies that the position must involve the continuous exercise of a public power, trust or duty, and that this exercise of public responsibility must be part of regular and permanent government administration, encompasses the fundamental principle that a public officer's duties are fixed by law and involve an exercise of the state's sovereign power. Thus, because NRS 281.005(1) is in harmony with the judicial definitions used in contexts broader than NRS chapter 281, we conclude that it may generally be used to determine who is a public officer, absent a stated legislative preference for the use of some other definition in a particular context. Having concluded that NRS 281.005(1) applies, we next must decide whether the community college president is a public officer within this definition. As noted, the definition has two parts. The first part, NRS 281.005(1)(a), specifies that the position must be created by state constitution or statute, or by a charter or ordinance of a political subdivision of the state. The second part, NRS 281.005(1)(b), specifies that the position must involve the continuous exercise of a public power, trust or duty, and that this exercise of public responsibility must be part of regular and permanent government administration. We will address these two subsections separately.