Opinion ID: 764700
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Della Absher

Text: 14
15 Although the four employees were entitled to summary judgment against Charles Absher, a serious question exists as to whether the actions of Della Absher violated the statute. Because this issue is not raised in the Abshers' brief, however, we would typically consider the issue waived. See Brindley v. McCullen, 61 F.3d 507, 509 (6th Cir.1995) (holding that the plaintiffs, by not briefing the question, had waived their appeal of the district court's decision not to sever their legal from their equitable civil right claims). But this rule is not jurisdictional, and the court may choose to entertain arguments not raised by the parties when the failure to do so would constitute a miscarriage of justice. See Mayhew v. Allsup, 166 F.3d 821, 823-24 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that the court would consider the application of a statute helpful to the defendant despite his failure to address it either at trial or on appeal when the failure to do so would constitute a miscarriage of justice). 16 We recognize that Mayhew applies only to exceptional cases. See id. This case, however, meets that criterion because we have concluded that the district court's disposition as to Della Absher was based on an erroneous interpretation of the statute. Moreover, the claims against Della Absher present a pure question of law, with no material facts being in dispute. Finally, the damages awarded against her appear disproportionate to her conduct. These considerations, taken together, are sufficient to overcome the very high bar against this court addressing issues neither raised below nor briefed on appeal. We will therefore exercise our discretion to reach the merits of the summary judgment motion against her because we believe that a failure to do so would constitute a miscarriage of justice. See id. 17
18 Della Absher's role in this controversy involved listening to the communications intercepted by her husband and typing out the termination notices dictated by him. The employees argue that this violated the statute in two ways. First, they contend that listening to the tape made by Charles Absher constituted use of an intercepted communication. Second, they contend that when Della Absher took dictation from her husband, she was using the tapes. 19 The question of whether the passive act of listening to an intercepted communication is an illegal use of that communication is an issue of first impression in this circuit. We have found only one court that has ever held that listening to an illegally intercepted communication, without more, constitutes illegal use. See Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F.Supp. 1535, 1547 (D.Utah 1993) (holding that listening constituted use in a divorce dispute involving the wiretapping statute). Other courts, however, have concluded that simply listening to an illegally intercepted communication is insufficient for liability to attach. See Reynolds v. Spears, 93 F.3d 428, 432-33 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that listening does not equal use under the wiretapping statute); Fields v. Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 985 F.Supp. 1308, 1313-14 (D.Kan.1997) (same). 20 The word use is defined as to put into action or service. Webster's New Third International Dictionary 2523 (1986). Using is best understood as active, while listening is passive. In everyday speech, the two words are not typically considered to be interchangeable. Congress could have explicitly proscribed listening if such had been its intent, but did not. We therefore hold, as a matter of law, that listening alone is insufficient to impose liability for using illegally intercepted communications. As a result, summary judgment for the employees was inappropriate to the extent that it was based on Della Absher's listening to the tape. 21 We turn next to Della Absher's taking dictation. There is no doubt that an individual who composes a letter based on intercepted communications would be using those communications. In this case, however, the record reveals that it was Charles Absher who composed the letters, and that Della Absher did nothing more than take dictation from him. We conclude that transcribing a letter that someone else composed from information based on illegally intercepted communications is too indirect to be considered a further use of those communications. Della Absher's role was exclusively mechanical. She simply transcribed Charles Absher's words. Although Charles Absher surely used the illegally intercepted communications, Della Absher did not. 22 The four employees have thus failed to present a viable legal theory under which liability can attach to Della Absher. Because there are no disputed facts, she is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the entry of summary judgment against Della Absher is reversed, and judgment is hereby granted in her favor.