Opinion ID: 3153495
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: WPA Claims

Text: [¶32] Under Maine law, the cause of action for whistleblower retaliation consists of three elements: (1) that the employee engaged in a protected activity; (2) that the employer took adverse employment action against the employee; and (3) that there was a causal connection between the two. Walsh, 2011 ME 99, ¶ 24, 28 A.3d 610. Therefore, at trial an employee asserting a WPA retaliation claim must present evidence that would allow a fact-finder to reasonably find each of the three elements of the claim. Id. That standard is the same in assessing an employee’s case that is challenged through a motion for summary judgment. See Corey, 1999 ME 196, ¶ 7, 742 A.2d 933. In both situations, the employee must present evidence that would allow the fact-finder “to rule in the [plaintiff’s] favor.” Lougee Conservancy v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2012 ME 103, ¶ 12, 48 A.3d 774 (quotation marks omitted). [¶33] Because of the way a WPA claim is defined under Maine law, in a summary judgment motion—just as at trial—the employee must not only produce evidence that she engaged in protected activity and later suffered an adverse employment action, but in the first instance she must also produce some evidence of the employer’s unlawful motivation. Walsh, 2011 ME 99, ¶ 24, 28 A.3d 610. Without evidence of a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action, the employee has not presented a prima facie case for 24 WPA retaliation, and the employer is entitled to summary judgment. Alternatively, if the employee presents evidence of a causal connection between protected activity and adverse employment action, then the employee has created a record sufficient to defeat an employer’s motion for summary judgment. [¶34] This requirement serves to distinguish WPA retaliation cases from Title VII cases. Under McDonnell Douglas, the employee with a Title VII claim does not have an obligation to produce evidence of causation—that is, discriminatory animus—until after the employer satisfies the second step of the process by producing evidence of a lawful explanation for the adverse employment action. In a WPA case, on the other hand, even before the burden of production would shift to the employer under the McDonnell Douglas model, the employee would already have been required to present evidence of causation. When an employee has presented evidence of (1) protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal relationship between the two, she has already presented a case that would be sufficient to go to a jury, and therefore one that is sufficient to defeat the employer’s motion for summary judgment. [¶35] Once the employee has presented evidence covering the elements of a WPA retaliation claim, the employer’s evidence of a lawful reason for the adverse employment action, presented as the second step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, merely creates a dispute of material fact and precludes the court from 25 granting summary judgment to the employee, because it is evidence that the employer may use to contradict or otherwise call into question the employee’s evidence that the employer acted with a retaliatory motivation. In other words, it is evidence presented by the employer to dispute the truth of the employee’s evidence of wrongful conduct in the workplace. Similarly, any evidence presented by the employee at the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, that the legally benign explanation offered by the employer to explain its action was actually a pretext, does not affect the fact that with her initial showing, she had already presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the employer’s conduct was actionable. [¶36] Therefore, the second and third phases of the McDonnell Douglas model require an analysis that, on a summary judgment motion in a WPA retaliation case, is duplicative. In summary judgment proceedings in WPA retaliation cases, if the employee presents evidence encompassing the three elements of a WPA claim, there is no reason to shift the burdens according to McDonnell Douglas, because the evidence that must be produced by the employee in the first instance is by itself sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Farrell, 206 F.3d at 286; Henderson v. Jantzen, Inc., 719 P.2d 1322, 1324 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (“A plaintiff’s prima facie case does not 26 disappear merely because a defendant asserts a non-discriminatory reason which may or may not persuade the trier of fact.”). [¶37] Elimination of the burden-shifting process does not limit the scope of the evidence presented in summary judgment motion practice in WPA retaliation cases, when compared to the evidence that would be presented under the McDonnell Douglas model. With or without the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting process, the question of whether the record on summary judgment contains evidence of causation requires the court to recognize any evidence that the employer had a lawful reason for the adverse action taken against the employee, and any evidence that that proffered reason is merely a pretext. Accordingly, the evidence that would be presented in the second and third stages of the McDonnell Douglas framework will still fall within the analytical framework applicable to summary judgment motions in WPA retaliation cases because that evidence still bears on the allegation of causation. Causation is an essential element of a claim of WPA retaliation, and so the parties are entitled to present evidence of the reasons for the employer’s action, but without any need to follow the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting structure. Without McDonnell Douglas, the court will now consider that evidence in a unitary way and simply determine whether the record as a whole would allow a jury to reasonably 27 conclude that the adverse employment action was motivated at least in part by retaliatory intent. [¶38] Eliminating the burden-shifting analysis set out in McDonnell Douglas for WPA retaliation claims is analytically similar to the approach taken by some federal courts in Title VII cases, which are directly governed by that case. Those courts essentially presume that the employee has presented evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie case and that the employer has articulated a lawful reason for its actions. They then focus almost exclusively on the question of whether the record could reasonably sustain an argument of causation. E.g., Brady, 530 F.3d at 494; Lapsley, 999 F. Supp. at 514-15. Thus, that approach functionally diminishes the first two steps of McDonnell Douglas almost to the point of invisibility, thereby eliminating the burden-shifting exercise, and instead proceeds directly to the question of causation. The effect of that approach is the same as we prescribe here, which is to examine the record as a whole to determine simply whether the employee has presented evidence that could support a finding that the adverse employment action was motivated at least in part by protected activity. [¶39] For these reasons, we are now convinced that application of the McDonnell Douglas framework to the summary judgment stage of WPA retaliation cases, which would shift the burden of production back and forth after 28 the employee had made out a case for retaliation, is unnecessary and only serves to complicate a proper analysis of the employee’s claim.9 See Trott, 2013 ME 33, ¶ 28, 66 A.3d 7 (Silver, J. concurring) (stating that the “rigid and artificial trifurcation of the causation analysis confuses rather than clarifies the ultimate issue in employment discrimination cases: whether there is evidence of discrimination” (quotation marks omitted)). Instead, we hold that at the summary judgment stage in WPA retaliation cases, the parties are held to the same standard as in all other cases. The employer has the burden to “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,” M.R. Civ. P. 56(c), and that “the evidence fails to establish a prima facie case for each element of the cause of action,” Budge, 2012 ME 122, ¶ 12, 55 A.3d 484 (quotation marks omitted). As part of that process, the employee must produce evidence generating a triable issue on each of those elements. Lougee Conservancy, 2012 ME 103, ¶ 12, 48 A.3d 774. If the evidence in the summary judgment record would allow a jury to find for the 9 Because this case reaches us on summary judgment, it does not present us with occasion to consider whether the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting structure should still be treated as a useful analytical device at trial. Compare Maine Human Rights Comm’n. v. Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Me. 1979) (“The special rules developed by the federal courts provide a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.” (quotation marks omitted)), and Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tenn. 2010) (approving “the McDonnell Douglas framework . . . to permit the trier of fact to better evaluate the evidence as to whether the employer was motivated by a discriminatory or retaliatory intent”), with Palmquist v. Shinseki, 689 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 2012) (indicating that at trial, “the McDonnell Douglas framework, with its intricate web of presumptions and burdens, becomes an anachronism”). 29 employee on each element of the employee’s case, then the employer is not entitled to summary judgment. [¶40] Here, Brady produced evidence sufficient to generate a genuine issue of material fact on each of the three elements of his claim for retaliation, including the element that his demotion was motivated at least in part by retaliation. Accordingly, the County is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Determinations of the weight to be given to that evidence, including whether Brady can prove that the County’s explanation for the adverse employment action was pretext for a retaliatory motive, are necessarily left for a fact-finder’s decision at trial. For these reasons, we vacate the summary judgment entered in favor of the County and remand for further proceedings. The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On the briefs: Jonathan M. Goodman, Esq., and William K. McKinley, Esq., Troubh Heisler, PA, Portland, for appellant Gerard Brady Peter T. Marchesi, Esq., and Cassandra S. Shaffer, Esq., Wheeler & Arey, PA, Waterville, for appellee Cumberland County 30 At oral argument: Jonathan M. Goodman, Esq., for appellant Gerard Brady Peter T. Marchesi, Esq., for appellee Cumberland County Androscoggin County Superior Court docket number CV-2013-56 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY