Opinion ID: 6321084
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Conversion and D.C. Consumer Protection

Text: Procedures Act Claims Finally, the Qureshi Plaintiffs ask this court to reverse the District Court’s dismissal of their conversion and D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act (“CPPA”) claims. The conversion claim fails because Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege a possessory interest in “a specific identifiable fund of money.” Papageorge v. Zucker, 169 A.3d 861, 864 25 (D.C. 2017) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the conversion claim. The District Court’s analysis and rejection of Plaintiffs’ CPPA claim rested on its conclusion that Plaintiffs failed to allege that the University was bound by any implied-in-fact agreements relating to any commitments made to provide campus-based programs and facilities throughout the semester. See Qureshi, 537 F. Supp. 3d at 26, 29. For the reasons discussed in our analysis of Plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claims, we reject that conclusion. See Section II.B, supra. We therefore reverse the District Court’s dismissal of the CPPA claim and remand for the trial court to reconsider American’s motion to dismiss the CPPA claim in light of our analysis of Plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claims. In addition, the District Court on remand may be required to consider American’s alternative argument that the University is not subject to the CPPA, a theory the District Court declined to reach. See Qureshi, 537 F. Supp. 3d at 26 n.11. Although the D.C. Court of Appeals has held that “clearly a nonprofit educational institution is not a ‘merchant’ within the context of the [CPPA],” Save Immaculata/Dunblane, Inc. v. Immaculata Preparatory Sch., Inc., 514 A.2d 1152, 1159 (D.C. 1986) (citation omitted), the D.C. Council subsequently revised the statute “to expose nonprofits otherwise acting as ‘merchants’ to the same level of liability as for-profit corporations,” In re APA Assessment Fee Litig., 766 F.3d at 53 (citing Nonprofit Organizations Oversight Improvement Amendment Act of 2007, 2007 D.C. Legis. Serv. (West)). The statute now bars a CPPA claim against a nonprofit if the claim is “based on membership services” or “training or credentialing activities,” inter alia. D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(5) (2022). The University attempts to invoke those exceptions and also argues that the instruction it provides is not a consumer good or 26 service within the meaning of the statute. See id. § 283901(a)(2)(B)(i), (a)(7). As necessary, the District Court should reach these arguments in the first instance on remand. We express no opinion as to whether the CPPA claim ultimately should survive the University’s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s dismissal of the Qureshi Plaintiffs’ CPPA claim and remand for further proceedings.