Opinion ID: 2343052
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rent to Double D

Text: For her second point on appeal, Jones argues that the trial court erred in awarding Double D rent on the property until and unless all proceeds of the sale of the property, less lawful taxes and other lawful charges are paid to Appellant. She argues that Double D is not entitled to take possession of the property, and thus not entitled to collect rent, because she was illegally taxed prior to the sale of her property by the Commissioner. This argument is nothing more than a discussion of the substance and merits of her illegal-exaction complaint, which the trial court denied her permission to file. Accordingly, we will not address this argument beyond the trial court's ruling. The record reflects that the trial court's award of rent to Double D appears to be based on the specific agreement made by the Joneses prior to the first appeal when they posted their supersedeas bond. The bond provides that the Joneses agreed to pay and satisfy all rents, costs or damages to the subject property during the pendency of the appeal, and that as security for such bond, they pledged all interest they, their heirs and assigns, may have in the principle sums on deposit with the Commissioner as a result of the tax sale conducted on April 11, 2001. The trial court's order awarding rent to Double D specifically reflects this agreement by the Joneses. Jones has offered no authority, convincing or otherwise, as to how the trial court's ruling on this issue is in error. This court has repeatedly stated that it does not consider assignments of error that are unsupported by convincing authority. See, e.g., Holcombe v. Marts, 352 Ark. 201, 99 S.W.3d 401 (2003); Bonds v. Carter, 348 Ark. 591, 75 S.W.3d 192 (2002); Cadillac Cowboy, 347 Ark. 963, 69 S.W.3d 383. Moreover, Jones does not challenge the amount of rent, $700 per month, awarded to Double D. We thus affirm the trial court's judgment on this point. Affirmed.