Opinion ID: 2554909
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: General Unanimity Instruction Typically Suffices

Text: In Probst v. State, [6] this Court explained that a general unanimity instruction typically suffices to insure that the jury is unanimous on the factual basis for a conviction. But, Probst also recognized that the general rule does not apply where there are factors in a case which create the potential that the jury will be confused. [7] The Court in Probst then explained that a more specific jury instructiona single theory unanimity instructionis required if the case presents the following three circumstances: (1) [the] jury is instructed that the commission of any one of several alternative actions would subject the defendant to criminal liability, (2) the actions are conceptually different, and (3) the State has presented evidence on each of the alternatives. [8] The Court in Probst carefully explained that this test has narrow applicability: [T]his Court does not hold that a specific unanimity instruction is required in every case where a defendant may be convicted as a principal or as an accomplice. In fact, this Court recognizes that even when principal and accomplice liability theories are advanced, a general unanimity instruction is usually sufficient in the absence of a defense request for a specific instruction or in the absence of unusual circumstances creating a potential for confusion, e.g., alternative incidents which subject the defendant to criminal liability. [9] Probst was the exception to the rule that a general unanimity instruction typically suffices. In several cases since Probst, we have held that the trial court did not err in not giving a specific unanimity instruction because we concluded that the underlying actions in those cases were not conceptually different. [10]