Opinion ID: 1163274
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Teachings of Oliver

Text: Brashier argued below and on certiorari that the Oliver litigation risk factor (the risk of non-recovery) [20] should be considered in awarding him counsel fees. He was allowed that additional counsel-fee recovery of $5,000. It was based on Oliver' s teachings. The insurer's certiorari brief is silent on this issue, although its appellate brief urges that the entire counsel-fee award is excessive and unreasonable. Oliver incorporates the State ex rel. Burk v. City of Oklahoma City [21] common-law criteria for measuring the counsel-fee award and teaches that the contingent nature of the litigation is one factor to be considered when setting the amount. [22] According to Oliver, the correct procedure for arriving at a reasonable fee is to (a) first determine the compensation based on an hourly rate and (b) then enhance it by adding an amount computed according to the Burk guidelines. A bad-faith counsel-fee award that is rested on the Oliver risk-litigation factor is entirely consistent with the teachings of Christian [23] and Burk. [24] Attached to Brashier's nisi prius counsel-fee application is a detailed list of the hours spent in the prosecution of the litigation. According to counsel for the insured, 258 hours had been expended by four lawyers, each charging different hourly rates, which totaled $32,262.50. Brashier's trial brief pressed for an amount to be added to the sum total of hourly compensation as an Oliver risk-litigation premium. We hold that the trial court's basic counsel-fee award to Brashier of $26,387.50 and an additional allowance of $5,000 for the Oliver factor rest on competent evidence. Gauged by the applicable common-law standards of review, the amount awarded is not excessive. [25]