Opinion ID: 2642473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the district court erred in barring the

Text: TESTIMONY OF DR. OFSHE ¶54 Mr. Perea argues that the district court also erroneously excluded the testimony of Dr. Richard Ofshe, a defense expert who intended to testify regarding false confessions. The district court ruled first that Dr. Ofshe could not testify as to the truthfulness of Mr. Perea’s confession. It next questioned whether or not an expert was needed to testify to the phenomena of false confessions and concluded that “a jury of lay people can decide the question as to whether or not a confession is reliable, involuntary, or coerced without having an expert testify on that issue.”5 Finally, the court 4 (...continued) in no way be viewed as the absolute truth.” Clark v. Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 537 (S.C. 2000). And we echo the Supreme Court of South Carolina in “encourag[ing] the [district] court to give a cautionary instruction” to the jury that it is not the absolute truth “and, like all evidence, it may be accepted or rejected in whole or in part.” Id. 5 We pause to note the distinction between false and coerced confessions. Whether a confession is coerced is a question of law that hinges on the manner in which the confession was obtained. In contrast, whether a confession is false is a question of fact that hinges (continued...) 14 Cite as: 2013 UT 68 JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court found that Dr. Ofshe’s methods were not “science” and refused to allow any of his proffered testimony. ¶55 Because we find that any error was harmless, we decline to consider whether the district court erred when it prohibited Dr. Ofshe from directly testifying as to the veracity of Mr. Perea’s confession. However, we find the district court did err when it barred Dr. Ofshe from testifying as to the phenomenon of false confessions generally. A. Because Any Error Was Harmless, We Decline to Consider Whether the District Court Erred in Prohibiting Dr. Ofshe From Testifying as to the Veracity of Mr. Perea’s Confession ¶ 56 Mr. Perea first argues that the district court erred when it ruled that Dr. Ofshe could not opine on the truthfulness of Mr. Perea’s confession. The State disagrees. In arguing as to the propriety of Dr. Ofshe’s proffered testimony on this point, both parties frame their arguments around rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which prohibits testimony as to a witness’s truthfulness on a particular occasion. See State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 1989). However, by its plain language, rule 608 applies only to a witness’s character for truthfulness. UTAH R. EVID. 608(a) (“A witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported by testimony about the witness’s reputation for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . . .” (emphasis added)). Because Mr. Perea never testified, he was not a witness in this case. Rule 608 is therefore not controlling. ¶57 Although rule 608 is not controlling here, it may be that the policy behind rule 608 is equally applicable to situations like this where a witness offers to testify as to the truthfulness of a nontestifying defendant’s out-of-court statement. Indeed, in Rimmasch, we relied on rule 608 to disallow expert testimony as to the veracity of a testifying witness’s specific out-of-court statement, recognizing the important public policy goal of preventing “trials from being turned into contests between what would amount to modern oath-helpers who would largely usurp the fact-finding function of judge or jury.” 775 P.2d at 392. This same public policy goal appears to be implicated in the case of a defendant’s out-of-court confession 5 (...continued) on the veracity of the confession. It is both possible to have a coerced, but true, confession, or a false confession that was not coerced. 15 STATE v. PEREA JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court when the defendant declines to testify. Thus, it may well be that rule 608’ s prohibitions should be extended to apply to the out-of-court statements of nontestifying witnesses. However, because the parties to this appeal did not brief this issue, and because we conclude that any error in refusing to admit Dr. Ofshe’s testimony is ultimately harmless, see infra Section V.A.2, we decline to resolve the issue here. ¶58 Thus, we do not reach the question of whether the district court erred when it prohibited Dr. Ofshe from testifying about the veracity of Mr. Perea’s confession. B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Refused to Allow Dr. Ofshe to Testify About False Confessions Generally ¶59 Mr. Perea argues that juries do not understand the phenomenon of false confessions and frequently disregard the possibility of a false confession. He also argues that juries do not understand the prevalence of false confessions, the aggressive and persuasive techniques employed by police to elicit confessions from suspects, or other factors that contribute to false confessions. accordingly argues that expert testimony was necessary to assist the jury in evaluating the truthfulness of his confession. The State responds that the district court was well within its discretion to exclude the proposed expert testimony under rules 608(a) and 702(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence because such testimony constituted a comment on Mr. Perea’s credibility, and because the scientific methodology on which Dr. Ofshe relied is unreliable. ¶60 Issues relating to the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the reliability of confessions are similar to those relating to the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony that we recently examined in State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 223 P.3d 1103. We therefore begin by reviewing our analysis in that case. 1. Our Holding in Clopten Made Clear That Cautionary Instructions and Cross-Examination Are No Substitute For Expert Testimony ¶61 In February 2006, Deon Clopten was convicted of firstdegree murder for the shooting of Tony Fuailemaa outside of a nightclub in Salt Lake City. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ¶ 2. While Mr. Clopten claimed that a man named Freddie White was responsible for the shooting, several eyewitnesses testified that Mr. Clopten was the shooter. Id. Without strong physical or forensic evidence, the State relied in large part on the eyewitness testimony to convict Mr. Clopten. Id. 16 Cite as: 2013 UT 68 JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court ¶62 At trial, Mr. Clopten sought to introduce an expert in eyewitness identification, Dr. David Dodd, to testify regarding various factors that affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Id. ¶ 3. These factors included “cross-racial identification, the impact of violence and stress during an event, the tendency to focus on a weapon” and the “suggestive nature of certain identification procedures used by police.” Id. The district court refused to admit the expert testimony, reasoning that it was unnecessary because “potential problems with eyewitness identification could be explained using a jury instruction.” Id. ¶ 4. The court of appeals deferred to the district court’s judgment and upheld Mr. Clopten’s conviction. Id. ¶ 5. We granted certiorari to review the question of “whether expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification should be presumed admissible when timely requested.” Id. ¶ 6. ¶63 Our analysis in Clopten began with a review of State v. Long, in which we concluded that “[a]lthough research has convincingly demonstrated the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification, jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these problems.” 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986). In Long, we therefore “abandon[ed] our discretionary approach to cautionary jury instructions and direct[ed] that . . . [district] courts shall give such an instruction whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and such an instruction is requested by the defense.” Id. at 492. ¶64 Although it was not our intention in Long to preclude the admission of expert testimony regarding the infirmities of eyewitness identifications, that was what frequently occurred in practice. Many district courts took the position that a cautionary jury instruction entirely resolved the question of the reliability of eyewitness identifications, and therefore precluded expert testimony on that issue. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ¶ 13. We recognized in Clopten that “[t]his trend . . . is troubling in light of strong empirical research suggesting that cautionary instructions are a poor substitute for expert testimony.” Id. ¶ 14. We then noted that the more recent empirical evidence had conclusively established that the accuracy of eyewitness identification depends upon certain factors. Id. ¶ 15. Such factors included the race of the accused and the witness, the amount of time the accused was in view, lighting conditions, distinctiveness of appearance, the use of a disguise, and the presence of weapons or other distracting objects. Id. Unfortunately, “juries are generally unaware of these deficiencies . . . and thus give great 17 STATE v. PEREA JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court weight to eyewitness identifications” even when they are potentially unreliable. Id. ¶65 Without expert testimony, a defendant is left with only cross-examination and a cautionary jury instruction to convey the potential shortcomings of an eyewitness identification. We concluded, however, that “[b]oth of these tools suffer from serious shortcomings.” Id. ¶ 16. We noted that cautionary instructions were only given when requested by the defense and were considered ineffective at educating a jury because they are “given at the end of what might be a long and fatiguing trial . . . buried in an overall charge by the court” and “instructions may come too late to alter the jury’s opinion of a witness whose testimony might have been heard days before.” Id. ¶ 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). And we reasoned that cross-examination, while often able to expose lies or half-truths, is far less effective when witnesses are mistaken but believe that what they say is true. Even if cross-examination could expose the mistake, “[w]ithout the assistance of expert testimony, a jury may have difficulty assessing the import of those factors in gauging the reliability of the identification.” Id. ¶ 22. ¶66 On the other hand, we concluded that expert testimony “substantially enhance[s] the ability of juries to recognize potential problems with eyewitness testimony.” Id. ¶ 25. And although the actual number of wrongful convictions from mistaken eyewitness identifications is unknown, the possibility of such a wrongful conviction provided sufficient justification for us to review the implications of our decision in Long. Id. ¶ 16 n.7. ¶67 Because we found that the empirical research regarding the limitations of eyewitness identification had matured since our decision in Long, we held in Clopten that expert testimony regarding eyewitness identifications should be admitted as long as it met the standards set out in rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Id. ¶ 32. Our expectation was that the “application of rule 702 will result in the liberal and routine admission of eyewitness expert testimony.” Id. ¶ 30. Although we cautioned that the admission of eyewitness testimony is not mandatory, we warned that “the testimony of an eyewitness expert should not be considered cumulative or duplicative of cautionary instructions to the jury.” Id. ¶¶ 33–34. ¶68 We then applied our holding to the facts in Clopten. We noted that the witnesses “saw the shooter for no more than a few seconds, from some distance away, at night, and while in extreme fear for their own lives”; the shooter’s face was disguised; the 18 Cite as: 2013 UT 68 JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court shooter was a different race than the witnesses; and the weapon used in the murder may have distracted the witnesses. Id. ¶ 46. We concluded that “the circumstances found in the Clopten trial are exactly those under which the testimony of an eyewitness expert is most helpful to a jury.” Id. ¶ 47. We overruled the court of appeals, vacated the verdict, and remanded for a new trial because there was a “reasonable likelihood that, if allowed to hear Dr. Dodd’s testimony, the jury would have questioned the accuracy of the eyewitnesses more rigorously and would not have convicted Clopten.” Id. ¶ 48. 2. Our Reasoning in Clopten Is Directly Applicable to the Use of Expert Testimony with Regard to the Phenomenon of False Confessions ¶69 This case presents issues closely paralleling those we decided in Clopton. A confession, much like an eyewitness identification, is more or less reliable based on a number of factors. Unfortunately, however, research has shown that the potential infirmities of confessions are largely unknown to jurors.6 ¶70 False confessions are an unsettling and unfortunate reality of our criminal justice system. Just as the criminal law is “rife with instances of mistaken identification,” Long, 721 P.2d at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted), “[i]t is beyond dispute that some people falsely confess to committing a crime that was never committed or was committed by someone else,” State v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, ¶ 21, 67 P.3d 477. And like expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification, expert testimony about factors leading to a false confession assists a “trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” UTAH R. EVID. 702(a). ¶71 Recent laboratory-based studies have identified several factors that increase the likelihood of false confessions.7 Among the factors identified are sleep deprivation, the presentation of false 6 Our analogy to Clopton is limited to a recognition that factfinders can benefit from expert testimony relating to counterintuitive phenomena that are dependent on numerous interrelated factors. We make no judgment as to the relative merits of the studies relating to eyewitness identification versus those related to the prevalence of false confessions. 7 These studies are discussed in greater detail below. See infra Section II.B.3. 19 STATE v. PEREA JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court evidence and use of minimization techniques by questioners, the subject’s age and intelligence level, and certain personality traits. Though expert testimony regarding the phenomenon of false confessions would not be appropriate in every case, when such indicia are present, a defendant should be allowed to present expert testimony on the subject. ¶72 Importantly, the shortcomings in the use of cautionary instructions and cross-examination in lieu of expert testimony are even more acute when dealing with potentially false confessions than when dealing with potentially mistaken identifications. Crossexamination of eyewitnesses is routine in all cases. Conversely, the ability to examine the defendant is only possible if he waives his Fifth Amendment protections and testifies in his own case—a situation that is far from routine. To require a defendant to testify regarding the factors that contributed to his alleged false confession, rather than allow the use of an expert witness, opens the defendant up to cross-examination and impinges on his constitutionally guaranteed right against self-incrimination. For these reasons, expert testimony regarding the phenomenon of false confessions should be admitted so long as it meets the standards set out in rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and it is relevant to the facts of the specific case. 3. Dr. Ofshe’s Testimony Satisfied the Requirements for Admissibility Under Rule 702 ¶73 The two-part analysis articulated by rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of expert witness testimony. “First, the trial judge must find that the expert testimony will ‘assist the trier of fact.’” Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ¶ 31 (quoting UTAH R. EVID. 702(a)). Second, the party wishing to rely on the expert’s testimony must make a threshold showing that “the principles or methods that are underlying in the testimony (1) are reliable, (2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (3) have been reliably applied to the facts.” UTAH R. EVID. 702(b). We therefore analyze Dr. Ofshe’s proffered testimony under these requirements. a. Dr. Ofshe’s proposed testimony would have enabled the jury to evaluate Mr. Perea’s claim that he falsely confessed ¶74 Under rule 702(a), proposed expert testimony must “assist the trier of fact.” UTAH R. EVID. 702(a). Here, there is no question that Dr. Ofshe’s proposed testimony would have assisted the jury in evaluating the reliability of Mr. Perea’s confession. Testimony regarding the factors that can lead to false confessions is exactly the 20 Cite as: 2013 UT 68 JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court type of evidence that would have helped the jury assess Mr. Perea’s claim that he falsely confessed. Such testimony aids a jury in reaching a just verdict because it puts a jury on guard to protect against giving disproportionate weight to confessions where multiple indicia of false confessions are present. In other instances, however, such expert testimony may embolden juries to give more weight to confessions where no such factors are present. b. The science underlying Dr. Ofshe’s proffered testimony is sufficiently developed to satisfy rule 702 ¶75 Rule 702 next requires that proposed expert testimony be supported by reliable scientific study and methodology. UTAH R. EVID. 702(b). Rule 702 “assigns to trial judges a ‘gatekeeper’ responsibility to screen out unreliable expert testimony” and cautions that “trial judges should confront proposed expert testimony with rational skepticism.” UTAH R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. But this “threshold showing” requires “only a basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability for the testimony to be admissible, not that the opinion is indisputably correct.” Id. ¶76 Although a science in its infancy may not meet the reliability standards of rule 702, as it matures, the science may become sufficiently reliable to meet the “basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability for the testimony to be admissible.” Id. And that is what has happened to the science relating to false confessions. In the 1990s, little research had been conducted on the phenomenon of false confessions and many of the theories relating to it were not sufficiently supported. But more contemporary, laboratory-based studies have since been performed and demonstrate that the science surrounding false confessions now meets the reliability standards of rule 702. ¶77 The State argues that Dr. Ofshe has no reliable scientific evidence to support his conclusions about the factors that influence the rate of false confessions.8 It argues that Dr. Ofshe’s “work is 8 The State additionally argues that “[s]ince Dr. Ofshe and his allies have not been able to determine the rate at which false confessions occur, a fortiorari, they have not been able to determine the rate at which any particular feature they identify as a component of a false confession is associated with a false confession.” The State’s logic is mathematically flawed, however, because it is entirely possible to know that a factor increases, decreases, or has no effect (continued...) 21 STATE v. PEREA JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court predicated upon individual case studies of alleged false confession[s]” rather than empirical evidence or laboratory research. The State therefore contends that the defense cannot show that Dr. Ofshe’s “principles or methods” were “based upon sufficient facts or data.” ¶78 In support of its argument, the State principally relies on Professor Paul Cassell’s article, The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523 (1999). The district court agreed with the State, concluding Dr. Ofshe’s proposed testimony did not satisfy rule 702(b) because the false confession cases relied upon by Dr. Ofshe “are not uniformly accepted within the scientific community as being valid false confession cases,”and “[t]here is no empirical data or credible research that supports Dr. Ofshe’s opinions regarding false confessions.” The district court also explicitly stated that Professor Cassell was “more reliable” than Dr. Ofshe.9 ¶79 Professor Cassell’s article criticizes the lack of empirical evidence in Dr. Ofshe’s two original articles. But it does not speak to the wealth of studies generated in the intervening years that the 8 (...continued) on the underlying rate of false confessions without knowing the underlying rate itself. A common sense example is that it is possible to know that a car speeds up when the driver steps on the accelerator even if the exact starting or ending speeds are unknown. Therefore it is mathematically incorrect to say that nothing can be known about the way factors influence the likelihood of a false confession without knowing the underlying rate of false confessions. 9 The district court went beyond the mandate of its gatekeeping role when it engaged in such weighing of competing expert testimony. A district court does not abuse its discretion when it concludes that expert testimony does not have sufficient foundational support under rule 702—and this conclusion may be based, in part, on a lack of consensus in the field. But a court exceeds its role when it bars expert testimony because it prefers one theory or researcher over another. An expert either meets or fails the standards under the rules of evidence. So-called “dueling experts” are a standard feature of trials in which expert testimony is presented. Rule 702 does not prohibit the admission of two reliable experts who draw opposite conclusions based on the underlying evidence. 22 Cite as: 2013 UT 68 JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court defense presented to the district court. Dr. Ofshe’s report states that his testimony not only relies on his original two articles, but also on several more recent articles which, in turn, cite to numerous studies performed by many other researchers.10 These studies are based on empirical data and laboratory research indicating that such factors as sleep deprivation, presentation of false evidence, minimization techniques, age, intelligence level, and personality traits all affect the rate of false confessions.11 This development of the science of false confessions is substantially similar to the development of the science of eyewitness identifications we considered in Clopten. ¶80 While a comprehensive review of the relevant studies is beyond the scope of this opinion, a few of the most important studies will be set forth here. For example, controlled laboratory experiments have proven that sleep deprivation, which may be present in prolonged interrogations, can increase susceptibility to influence and has been shown to increase the rate of false confessions. Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 16 (2010). “[S]leep deprivation markedly impairs the ability to sustain attention, flexibility of thinking, and suggestibility in response to leading questions.” Id.; see also, Mark Blagrove, Effects of Length of Sleep Deprivation on Interrogative Suggestibility, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 48 (1996); Yvonne Harrison & James A. Horn, The Impact of Sleep Deprivation on Decision Making: A Review, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 236 (2000). ¶81 Presentation of false evidence is another factor that has been shown to increase the rate of false confessions. Numerous 10 Specifically, his report states: “There are several more recent literature reviews which report research on which I also rely. These reviews include The Psychology of Interrogation and Confessions - Gudjonsson, John Wiley, New York 2003; The Psychology of Confessions - Kassin and Gudjonsson in Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 5, 2004, The Road to Perdition: Extreme Influence Tactics in the Interrogation Room, D. Davis and W O’Donahue in O’Donahue and Hollin (eds.), Handbook of Forensic Psychology, New York, Basic Books, 2004.” 11 For a list of the independent studies corroborating the existence of these factors see Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 14–22 (2010). 23 STATE v. PEREA JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court studies have demonstrated that the presentation of false evidence renders individuals more vulnerable to manipulation. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra, at 14. These studies reveal that the presentation of false information through confederates, witnesses, counterfeit test results, and false physiological feedback can alter the test subjects’ visual judgments,12 beliefs,13 perceptions of other people,14 behaviors towards other people,15 emotional states,16 selfassessments,17 and memories for observed and experienced events.18 Additionally, laboratory experiments have confirmed that the presentation of false evidence can increase the probability that an innocent person confesses. ¶82 In one study, college students were falsely accused of pressing a key on a computer, causing it to crash, after they were instructed to avoid the key. See Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False Confessions: Compliance, 12 E.g., Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS: GEN & APPLIED 1 (1956); MUZAFER SHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS (1936). 13 Craig A. Anderson et al., Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1037 (1980). 14 Henri Tajfel et al., Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour, 1 EURO. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 149 (1971). 15 ROBERT ROSENTHAL & LENORE JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM: TEACHER EXPECTATION AND PUPILS’ INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT (1968). 16 Stanley Schachter & Jerome E. Singer, Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional State, 69 PSYCHOL. REV. 379, (1962). 17 Jennifer Crocker et al., Social Stigma: The Affective Consequences of Attributional Ambiguity, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 218 (1991). 18 Elizabeth F. Loftus, Planting Misinformation in the Human Mind: A 30-year Investigation of the Malleability of Memory, 12 LEARNING & MEMORY 361(2005). 24 Cite as: 2013 UT 68 JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court Internalization, and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125(1996). Despite their innocence and initial denials, subjects were asked to sign a confession. In some sessions but not others, a confederate said she witnessed the subject hit the forbidden key. This false evidence nearly doubled the number of students who signed a written confession, from 48% to 94%. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra, at 17. Similar studies have replicated this experiment and found similar results even when the subject’s confession led to detrimental financial or other consequences. See, e.g., Robert Horselenberg et al., Individual Differences and False Confessions: A Conceptual Replication of Kassin and Kiechel, 9 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 1(2003); Allison D. Redlich & Gail S. Goodman, Taking Responsibility for an Act Not Committed: The Influence of Age and Suggestibility, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 141 (2003). The false confession rate in similar experiments was particularly acute among children and juveniles. See, e.g., Ingrid Candel et al., “I Hit the Shift-Key and Then the Computer Crashed”: Children and False Admissions, 38 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1381 (2005). ¶83 Minimization techniques used by police officers have also been shown to increase the rate of false confessions. Using the results from the experiment described above, it was found that remarks that minimized the subjects’ culpability significantly increased the false confession rate. Jessica R. Klaver et al., Effects of Personality, Interrogation Techniques and Plausibility in an Experimental False Confession Paradigm, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 71 (2008). In another study, the test subjects were paired with a confederate and given problem solving tasks. Melissa B. Russano et al., Investigating True and False Confessions Within a Novel Experimental Paradigm, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 481 (2005). They were instructed to work together on some problems and alone on others. Id. By design, some of the confederates sought help on a problem that was supposed to be solved alone while others did not. Id. at 483. The experimenter would then claim to find similarities in their answers and accuse the subject of cheating. Id. When the accusation was accompanied by minimization techniques, the rate of false confessions tripled. Id. ¶84 Paradoxically, anecdotal evidence suggests that a defendant’s actual innocence may actually increase an individual’s susceptibility to manipulation. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra, at 22–23. The innocent are often more likely to waive 25 STATE v. PEREA JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court their rights, believing that since they did nothing wrong, they have nothing to hide. Id. at 23. This comports with the commonplace, but naive, notion that only the guilty are accused of crimes and only the guilty need attorneys. Id. ¶85 We detail these studies not to endorse a particular position on the false confessions literature, but rather to emphasize the proper role of courts as gatekeepers under the rules of evidence. The aforementioned factors and studies are but a portion of the scientifically reliable information on risk factors of false confessions. And the defense presented this information to the district court, either directly through Dr. Ofshe’s proposed testimony or through the various articles on which Dr. Ofshe based his intended testimony. Rule 702(b)(2) requires that the district court consider all the relevant indicia of reliability in determining whether a threshold showing has been made. UTAH R. EVID. 702 advisory committee note. Therefore, even if Dr. Ofshe’s original two articles lacked the requisite foundation of “sufficient facts or data,” the district court could only properly exclude Dr. Ofshe’s testimony if it concluded that all the other studies on which the testimony is based also lacked “sufficient facts or data.” UTAH. R. EVID. 702(b)(2). At a minimum, the science behind these studies of false confessions is sufficiently developed to meet the threshold of admissibility. ¶86 The district court abused its discretion when it evaluated only the reliability of Dr. Ofshe’s two articles and failed to consider the dozens of other studies on which his testimony relied. Just as the science regarding eyewitness identifications has sufficiently matured to allow its routine introduction after Clopten, so too has the science regarding false confessions.