Opinion ID: 164078
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act And The Continuing Violation Doctrine

Text: 49 We reverse the district court's application of the continuing violation doctrine to toll Ms. Maestas's failure to comply with the notice provisions of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 24-10-101 et. seq. Mr. Lujan originally raised this issue in the context of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Rule 12(b)(1) motions generally take one of two forms. Stuart v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 271 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir.2001). The moving party may (1) facially attack the complaint's allegations as to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, or (2) go beyond allegations contained in the complaint by presenting evidence to challenge the factual basis upon which subject matter jurisdiction rests. Id. We review de novo the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), and review findings of jurisdictional facts, if any, for clear error. Id. 50 At trial, Mr. Lujan's Rule 12(b)(1) motion argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction based on Ms. Maestas's failure to give notice of her tort claim within 180 days of discovering her injury. The district court denied that motion. The statutory notice provisions of the CGIA apply when federal courts hear Colorado tort claims under supplemental jurisdiction. 2 Renalde v. City & County of Denver, Colo., 807 F.Supp. 668, 675 (D.Colo. 1992) (holding that Colorado tort claims brought by a private plaintiff under pendent jurisdiction are subject to the notice provisions of the CGIA as a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit). Section 24-10-109(1) of the CGIA states: 51 Any person claiming to have suffered an injury by a public entity or by an employee thereof while in the course of such employment, whether or not by a willful and wanton act or omission, shall file a written notice as provided in this section within one hundred eighty days after the date of the discovery of the injury, regardless of whether the person then knew all of the elements of a claim or of a cause of action for such injury. Compliance with the provisions of this section shall be a jurisdictional prerequisite to any action brought under the provisions of this article, and failure of compliance shall forever bar any such action. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 24-10-109(1). 52 The CGIA requires that anyone with a claim against a public entity must file a written notice of the claim within one hundred eighty days after the date of the discovery of the injury, regardless of whether the person then knew all of the elements of a claim or of a cause of action for such injury. Gallagher v. Bd. of Trs. for Univ. of N. Colo., 54 P.3d 386, 390-91 (Colo.2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Complying with the notice of claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. Id. at 391. Furthermore, section 24-10-109(1) is a non-claim statute, meaning that failure to comply with the 180-day period is an absolute bar to suit. Gallagher, 54 P.3d at 393. [N]on-claim statutes and the issue of subject matter jurisdiction are not subject to equitable defenses such as waiver, tolling, or estoppel. Id. 53 Ms. Maestas filed formal notice of her outrageous conduct tort claim on April 1, 1999. 3 At first blush, then, the CGIA bars any injuries that occurred to Ms. Maestas prior to October 1, 1998. With a few exceptions, the bulk of the incidents that form the foundation for Ms. Maestas's outrageous conduct claim occurred before October 1, 1998. 54 The district court, relying upon Patel v. Thomas, 793 P.2d 632 (Colo.Ct. App.1990), held that the continuing violation doctrine remedied Ms. Maestas's alleged failure to comply with the CGIA's notice requirement. The continuing violation doctrine allows, under proper circumstances [in Title VII cases], a plaintiff [to] recover for discriminatory acts that occurred prior to the statutory limitations period if they are part of a continuing policy or practice that includes the act or acts within the statutory period. Davidson v. America Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir.2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 55 The Colorado Court of Appeals, in Patel, applied the continuing violation doctrine to toll the CGIA notice requirements in a sexual harassment case. Patel, 793 P.2d at 638. At the time of the district court's ruling, the Colorado Supreme Court had yet to address the application of the continuing violation doctrine to the CGIA. Thus, the district court, at the time it made its ruling, appropriately applied Patel. Craven v. University of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 260 F.3d 1218, 1231 (10th Cir.2001) (While not binding on this court, decisions by a state's intermediate appellate courts provide evidence of how the state's highest court would rule on the issue, and we can consider them as such.) (internal quotations omitted). 56 After the district court's ruling, however, the Colorado Supreme Court held that plaintiffs cannot use the continuing violation doctrine to remedy untimely filings. Gallagher, 54 P.3d at 393. The Gallagher court reasoned as follows: 57 Comparison of the nature of the Title VII filing deadline to that of the CGIA 180-day notice of claim provision convinces us that the judicially-constructed continuing violation doctrine cannot be used to remedy an untimely filing under the CGIA.... [Plaintiff] additionally points to the court of appeals' case of Patel v. Thomas, 793 P.2d 632 (Colo. App.1990) to support his argument that the continuing violation doctrine should be invoked by this court. In Patel, the court of appeals applied the continuing violation doctrine to hold that a plaintiff's sexual harassment claims were not barred for failure to comply with the CGIA 180 day notice of claim deadline. We do not find the reasoning of Patel convincing and to the extent it is inconsistent with today's holding, we overrule it. Gallagher, 54 P.3d at 393. 58 Because the Colorado Supreme Court has now spoken to the issue, we apply Gallagher on appeal. Davidson, 337 F.3d at 1184 (Where a change in law occurs while a case is on appeal, we apply the law in effect at the time of our decision.). Given that the Colorado Supreme Court now prohibits the use of the continuing violation doctrine in the CGIA context, and has explicitly overruled Patel —a sexual harassment case — we reject Ms. Maestas's suggestion that Gallagher applies only to whistle-blower cases. 59 Next, we must determine when the CGIA 180-day clock began to run. [F]or purposes of the CGIA, the plaintiff need not yet know the cause of the injury nor must all elements of the claim have ripened before she must file her notice of claim.... [T]he 180-day time limit may expire if she waits to discover the cause of her injury before filing pursuant to the CGIA. Gallagher, 54 P.3d at 391 (citations omitted). [T]he CGIA notice period is triggered upon discovery of the injury[,] and ... when there are disputed issues of fact regarding when an injury is discovered, the trial court is the pre-trial fact-finder and must hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve those issues. Id. at 392. 60 The parties on appeal dispute (1) when Ms. Maestas filed proper CGIA notice, (2) when Ms. Maestas first knew of her tort injuries so as to trigger the CGIA 180-day notice requirement, and (3) if Ms. Maestas presented sufficient evidence to support an outrageous conduct tort claim. Mr. Lujan argues that Ms. Maestas filed her CGIA notice on April 1, 1999, and that Ms. Maestas knew of the alleged tortious behavior prior to October 1, 1998. Moreover, Mr. Lujan argues that we may, as a matter of law, determine that the behavior to which Ms. Maestas was subjected does not constitute the tort of outrageous conduct. See Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877, 883 (Colo.1994) (Although the question of whether conduct is outrageous is generally one of fact to be determined by a jury, it is first the responsibility of a court to determine whether reasonable persons could differ on the question.). Ms. Maestas, on the other hand, argues that she gave proper CGIA notice as early as April 28, 1998, and that she first knew of the alleged tortious behavior after October 1, 1998. Indeed, Ms. Maestas argues that the very nature of the tort of outrageous conduct, which often requires a series of outrageous events, precluded discovery of the injury resulting from outrageous conduct until after October 1, 1998. See Behunin v. Dow Chem. Co., 650 F.Supp. 1387, 1392 (D.Colo.1986) (holding that outrageous conduct normally requires a pattern of conduct). 4 61 As to Ms. Maestas's position, the district court, not a court of appeals, must answer the factual questions of when Ms. Maestas filed CGIA notice and when she first knew, or should have known, of her tortious injuries. Gallagher, 54 P.3d at 392 (factual issues regarding the filing of CGIA notice are for the trial court). 62 Turning to Mr. Lujan's final argument, [a]s a general rule, we do not consider an issue not presented, considered, and decided by the district court. United States v. Duncan, 242 F.3d 940, 950 (10th Cir.2001). Upon our review of the record, we find that Mr. Lujan raised the insufficiency of the evidence issue in a cursory manner, on an oral motion for judgment as a matter of law, without any reference to authority. Given this cursory presentation, it is questionable whether Mr. Lujan sufficiently presented this issue to the trial court. Regardless, we cannot conduct the relevant legal analysis without the factual determination of what conduct is, and is not, barred from consideration for failure to comply with the CGIA notice provision. In other words, we cannot determine whether sufficient evidence exists without full knowledge of what evidence is before us. 63 Given this factual quagmire, we remand to the district court with instructions to determine (1) when Ms. Maestas first discovered, or should have discovered, her tortious injury and (2) when she filed CGIA notice. See Gallagher, 54 P.3d at 392 (Given the factual dispute in this case regarding when [plaintiff] discovered or should have discovered through reasonable diligence that he was wrongfully injured, we reverse the holding of the court of appeals with directions to remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine when [plaintiff] discovered or should have discovered his injury and if [plaintiff], in fact, complied with the CGIA 180-day notice of claim provision.). Having made these findings, the district court shall modify the judgment against Mr. Lujan consistent with this opinion.