Opinion ID: 1989296
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Closing Argument Reference to Victim's Family

Text: Collins maintains the prosecutor's closing argument comments regarding the victim's family were impermissible under Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987). The State's Attorney noted in her concluding remarks during the sentencing phase: While you are back in that jury room, if you find that your strength is waivering or your conviction is waivering and you need an example of strength and conviction to look to, there it is right there (indicating). These people have sat throughout these proceedings and waited for the past 18 months for one thing, and that is justice. Counsel immediately objected to this reference as improper victim impact statements. The trial court overruled the objection. Collins' reliance on Booth is not appropriate. The prosecutor's brief comments here are not comparable to the admission of a victim impact statement (VIS) during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial. In Booth, the VIS provided the jury with two types of information. [11] First, it described the personal characteristics of the victims and the emotional impact of the crimes on the family. Second, it set forth the family members' opinions and characteristics of the crimes and the defendant. The Supreme Court noted, The focus of a VIS, however, is not on the defendant, but on the character and reputation of the victim and the effect on his family. These factors may be wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant. Id., 482 U.S. at 504, 107 S.Ct. at 2534, 96 L.Ed.2d at 449. The Booth Court continued: Allowing the jury to rely on a VIS therefore could result in imposing the death sentence because of factors about which the defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to the decision to kill. Id. The Supreme Court found that because of the nature of the information contained in a VIS, it creates an impermissible risk that the capital sentencing decision will be made in an arbitrary manner. Id. [T]he formal presentation of this information by the State can serve no other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant. Id., 482 U.S. at 508, 107 S.Ct. at 2536, 96 L.Ed.2d at 452. The Supreme Court concluded that the introduction of a VIS at the capital sentencing phase violates the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, the Maryland death statute was declared invalid to the extent it allowed consideration of VIS information. Md.Code (1957, 1986 Repl.Vol., 1989 Cum.Supp.), Art. 41, § 4-609(d); see Art. 27, § 413(c)(iv). [12] Later, in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988), petitioner claimed on appeal that the trial judge improperly allowed into evidence statements concerning the personal characteristics of the victim, allegedly in violation of Booth. [13] Since the majority found dispositive petitioner's argument that the jurors may not have understood the unanimity requirements of the sentencing instructions and jury charges, it failed to reach the VIS issue. Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for four dissenting justices, explained that Booth was not intended to preclude any reference or information about the victim: By contrast [to Booth], the summary admitted here gave only the barest details about [the victim] himself and no information at all about the impact of his death on others. I do not interpret Booth as foreclosing the introduction of all evidence, in whatever form, about a murder victim, and would thus conclude that the trial court did not commit error in admitting the summary in this case. Id. at 398, 108 S.Ct. at 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d at 408-09. The reasoning of Chief Justice Rehnquist was as follows: [The memorandum] did not purport to be, and the Maryland Court of Appeals found that it did not fall within the statutory requirements of, a victim impact statement under Maryland law. See Md. Code (1957, 1986 Repl.Vol.), Art. 41, § 4-609(c). The statements summarized in the memorandum did not describe the effect of the murder on the family and friends of the victim. Nor did the memorandum contain opinions and characterizations by [the victim's] brother and sister-in-law of the crime. At most, this thumbnail sketch of the victim's difficult childhood and frequent encounters with correctional authorities gave the jury a quick glimpse of the life petitioner chose to extinguish. Id. at 397, 108 S.Ct. at 1876, 100 L.Ed.2d at 408 (emphasis added). In the present case, we rule the prosecutor's comments were not evidence, were not inflammatory under these circumstances and therefore are not properly comparable to the admission of a VIS. The comments did not describe the effects of the murder on the Breeden family. See State v. Colvin, 314 Md. 1, 22, 548 A.2d 506, 516 (1988).