Opinion ID: 790214
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Firearm Error

Text: 38 Mr. Duran's first challenge is to the instructions regarding Count 9, the § 924(c)(1)(A) charge that we have addressed in the immediately preceding section. Although numerous weapons were introduced at trial as evidence, the superseding indictment based Count 9 on one weapon: the Beretta. Specifically, it alleged that Mr. Duran possessed a firearm, namely, a Beretta 9 mm semi-automatic handgun, with removed serial numbers in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, namely, conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 846, as more fully described in Count One of this indictment. Superseding Indictment at 11. The jury instructions, however, explained that [t]o sustain the charge of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime, as charged in Count 9, the government must prove... that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm in furtherance of that crime. Tr. at 899 (emphasis added). It further explained that, [w]hen the word `firearm' is used in these instructions, it means any weapon that will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. Tr. at 900. 39 Mr. Duran contends, and the Government concedes, that this invitation in the jury instructions to convict based on any weapon is a broadening of the weapon-specific indictment. A broadening of the indictment occurs when the government... the court ... or both, broadens the possible bases for conviction beyond those presented by the grand jury. United States v. Cusimano, 148 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Permitting an indictment to be constructively amended ... violates the Fifth Amendment, which states in pertinent part that `[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.' United States v. Folks, 236 F.3d 384, 391 (7th Cir.2001) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V). 40 We must decide whether this broadening of the indictment requires reversal. Mr. Duran did not object explicitly to the instructions' failure to identify specifically the Beretta; thus, our review is limited to searching for plain error. See United States v. Trennell, 290 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir.2002) (To assign error to any portion of the charge to the jury or omission therefrom a party must state `distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the grounds of the objection' before the jury retires to consider its verdict. (quoting Fed.R.Crim.P. 30)); see also Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b). 41 Mr. Duran first argues that this type of indictment broadening requires reversal per se. He relies on United States v. Pedigo, 12 F.3d 618 (7th Cir.1993), which explained in an analogous circumstance that broadening an indictment is reversible per se. Therefore, if an amendment occurred, the plain error standard of review will not save the conviction. Id. at 631 (citation omitted). However, Pedigo is not the current law of this circuit. This court has explained that when, as here, the indictment is broadened based on nonspecific jury instructions and when there was no objection to those jury instructions at trial, plain error review is appropriate. See United States v. Algee, 309 F.3d 1011, 1016 (7th Cir.2002); see also Cusimano, 148 F.3d at 828 n. 3 (explaining that, when plain error review is necessary, reversal per se is not warranted and collecting cases). 42 This court's decision in Algee is controlling. In Algee, 43 Count 3 of the superseding indictment charged Algee with knowingly possessing, after having previously been convicted of a felony, a firearm, that is a Norinco, model SKS, 7.62 caliber, semi-automatic rifle, and a Harrington and Richardson, model `Victor,' .22 caliber revolver. At trial, however, evidence of five firearms, including the two listed in the superseding indictment, were introduced. Further, the jury was instructed that it had to conclude only that Algee knowingly possessed a firearm to find him guilty on the count. 44 309 F.3d at 1015. The court began its review by explaining that, [b]ecause Algee forfeited the issue by failing to object, he had to establish not only that there was error and that it was plain, but also that the error affected `substantial rights.' Id. at 1016; see also United States v. Harbin, 250 F.3d 532, 543 (7th Cir.2001) (explaining that an effect on substantial rights generally is equated with prejudice); United States v. Raney, 342 F.3d 551, 559-60 (7th Cir.2003) (We will reverse a conviction under plain-error review only where it is necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice, and there is no miscarriage of justice if the defendant's guilt is so clear that he would certainly have been convicted even if the error had never been committed. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); United States v. Baker, 78 F.3d 1241, 1246 (7th Cir.1996) ([T]here is no plain error if a properly instructed jury nevertheless would have convicted [the defendant].). The court in Algee then went on to explain that Algee had not even attempted to meet his burden of establishing prejudice, [a]nd it is unlikely that Algee could have established prejudice in any case. As the government points out, there was an abundance of evidence proving that Algee did knowingly possess the two firearms specifically listed in the superseding indictment. Algee, 309 F.3d at 1016 (emphasis added). 45 Although Algee involved a different statutory provision, the felon-in-possession statute, there is no reason why its principle should not control this case. As our discussion relating to the sufficiency of the evidence reveals, there also was an abundance of evidence proving that the Beretta was possessed in furtherance of the drug-trafficking conspiracy. Id. Accordingly, Mr. Duran has not met his burden of proving that his substantial rights have been affected, and we must uphold his conviction. 7