Opinion ID: 1665544
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Modification of Custody or Visitation on Parental Relocation

Text: At the outset, it should be noted that the effect of relocation by a parent with the child on custody and visitation must be viewed as either pre-or post-decree. KRS 403.340, the modification of custody statute, speaks to modification of a custody decree. By definition, a decree is a final judgment, Black's Law Dictionary 440 (8th ed.2004), denoted in Kentucky law as being final or appealable. CR 54.01. Prior to entry of a decree, a court may enter temporary custody orders pursuant to KRS 403.280, and may determine timesharing/visitation pursuant to KRS 403.320, which may be modified whenever it is in the child's best interests to do so. Any such decisions are pendente lite, interlocutory or non-final. As we have determined in a case that was argued with this one and is being rendered at the same time, Frances v. Frances, 266 S.W.3d 754, (Ky.2008), when the court is making its final and appealable custody decree, it must do so based on KRS 403.270, the best interests standard. However, when a final custody decree has been entered, as in this case, and a relocation motion arises, any post-decree determination made by the court is a modification, either of custody or timesharing/visitation. If a change in custody is sought, KRS 403.340 governs. If it is only timesharing/visitation for which modification is sought, then KRS 403.320 either applies directly or may be construed to do so. This pre- or post-decree designation is important when modification of custody is sought, because of the standard the trial court must apply when a change is sought within two years of issuance of the custody decree, the serious endangerment or abandonment to a de facto custodian standard. Prior to 1972, trial courts in Kentucky could modify custody decrees upon proof that the conditions under which the original decree was entered were changed. See Skidmore v. Skidmore, 261 Ky. 327, 87 S.W.2d 631, 634 (1935); Williams v. Williams, 290 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Ky.1956); Hatfield v. Derossett, 339 S.W.2d 631, 632-33 (Ky.1960); Ward v. Ward, 407 S.W.2d 709, 710 (Ky.1966). Though the change of conditions standard still plays a role in the consideration of custody modifications, modification must now be evaluated under the terms of KRS 403.340, originally enacted in 1972, which contains a two-year limitation period on modification of custody from the date of the custody decree. [3] In 1973, this Court applied the statute when it first held that a custody decree cannot be modified within the two-year limit unless one of the two that a custody decree cannot be modified within the two-year limit unless one of the two statutory exceptions, serious endangerment or abandonment to a de facto custodian, is established. Day v. Day, 490 S.W.2d 483 (Ky. 1973). This was reaffirmed in 1976 when the Court held that a trial court's sua sponte review and modification of a custody order within the two year period was in error. Chandler v. Chandler, 535 S.W.2d 71 (Ky. 1976). Visitation, on the other hand, can be modified upon proper showing, at any time, having no two-year restriction pursuant to KRS 403.320. [4] And, after two years from the date of the custody decree, the standard reverts to review of the best interests of the child, either under KRS 403.270 or KRS 403.30(3). Since Kentucky accepted joint custody as a custodial arrangement equally tenable and commensurate with sole custody, and given that very individualized time-sharing arrangements have developed under shared joint custody or split sole custody, whether a custodian's relocation with the minor child changes the inherent nature of the custody the parties have or merely affects timesharing/visitation has become a frequent and pertinent question. This issue has been commonly approached in two ways. Litigants have characterized the motion as one to modify visitation pursuant to KRS 403.320 or one to modify custody pursuant to KRS 403.340. The obvious problem is that parties often ask for one thing when they are actually seeking the other, due to the unique nature of their shared (joint) custody or split (sole) custody. Courts have struggled ever since the concept of joint custody emerged with what part physical or residential possession of the child plays in each type of custody. [5] However, a modification of custody means more than who has physical possession of the child. Custody is either sole or joint (or the subsets of each) and to modify it is to change it from one to the other. On the other hand, changing how much time a child spends with each parent does not change the legal nature of the custody ordered in the decree. This is true whether the parent has sole or joint custody: decision-making is either vested in one parent or in both, and how often the child's physical residence changes or the amount of time spent with each parent does not change this. This is perhaps too legalistic in a reality-based world. To most people, having custody means having possession of the child. Parties have addressed this understanding by applying terms such as primary residence or residential parent, in their agreements. This type of thinking is often inconsistent with the legal meaning of joint custody, wherein both parents are equal legal custodians, but is nonetheless prevalent. In 2003, this Court did an extensive review of custody and relocation issues in Fenwick v. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d 767 (Ky. 2003), a case that arose when the mother and father, who had temporary joint custody and nearly equal timesharing, disputed whether the mother could relocate with their two daughters a distance of some thirty-five miles to Jefferson County, Kentucky. The mother filed a motion requesting the court's approval to relocate with the children. The father objected, claiming that the move was contrary to the children's best interests, and asked that if the mother did move, he be named primary residential custodian. In a pendente lite order, the court found that it was not in the children's best interests to relocate, continued temporary joint custody, and left the mother designated primary caregiver, with the option of relinquishing that designation if she decided to relocate. This order was later made the final custody decree on December 8, 1997. Fenwick has an extensive, learned discussion on the confusion that surrounds relocation, custody and timesharing/visitation. However, much of what this Court discussed in Fenwick must henceforth be disregarded, because this Court applied the wrong statute. Like the Frances case also rendered today, the relocation in Fenwick was raised prior to entry of the final custody decree, and consequently KRS 403.270, with its best interests standard should have been applied by this Court as it was by the trial court. Instead, the Fenwick Court focused its relocation determination on who was the primary residential parent, which alone is not the proper basis for a modification of custody. Rather, had the relocation motion been made post-decree, as it was in this case, the focus should have been on whether an actual change in custody was being sought. Fenwick directs the parent opposing relocation of the children to file a motion for change of custody pursuant to KRS 403.340, yet subsequently acknowledges that the essence of joint custody is shared decision-making, and that the joint custody itself will remain unaffected by [the mother's] relocation because [the father] will still be able to continue sharing substantial time with his children through personal contact and other means.... 114 S.W.3d at 789. If the latter is correct, and it is, then clearly a parent opposed to relocation, but not seeking a change in joint custody, does not need to make a motion for a change of custody, but rather a motion for modification of timesharing. In a sole custody arrangement, KRS 403.320 speaks clearly to visitation granted to a parent not granted custody and modification of that visitation based on the best interests of the child. Modification of the visitation schedule does not alter the sole nature of the custody. While there is no statute that specifically addresses modification of timesharing in a joint custody setting, it is reasonable to infer that modifying it does not alter the nature of joint custody. Also, since the nature of the custody does not change, the trial court is not bound by the statutory requirements that must be met for a change of custody, but can modify timesharing based on the best interests of the child as is done in modifying visitation. Thus, the first question on a custody modification or relocation motion is, Is the motion actually seeking modification of custody or visitation/timesharing? In Fenwick , the mother's motion to relocate ended up resulting in a modification of timesharing due to relocation. To oppose it, the father, who did not want the child to relocate, was directed by this Court to ask for a modification of custody. However, this would necessitate that he ask for a change from joint custody to sole custody, vested in him. What the father in Fenwick really wanted was to become the primary residential parent, which would be a modification of timesharing under joint custody. He was asking the court to consider what is in the best interests of the child as to where and to what extent the child spends time, not that he become the sole decision-maker. However, when the party opposing relocation is truly seeking a change in custody, from joint to sole (or vice-versa), the second pertinent question regarding modification of custody is, When was the custody decree issued? This will determine the standard of review for modification. If a parent opposing relocation files a motion to modify custody within two years of the date of the custody decree, then the moving party must establish that the move or other reason seriously endangers the child or that the child has been abandoned to a de facto custodian in order to modify custody. If the standard is met, and custody is changed, then that parent as sole custodian could prevent relocation of the child. But, if the only interest of the opposing party is to object to relocating the child, but not to alter joint decision-making, then he is seeking to have the existing visitation/timesharing arrangement changed, and need only establish that it is in the child's best interests not to relocate, which would thereby change the existing visitation/timesharing situation. While this may appear to undercut the purpose of the two-year limitation in KRS 403.340 on modification of the custody decree, when only visitation/timesharing modification is sought, the specific language of KRS 403.320(3) controls, which allows modification of visitation/timesharing whenever modification would serve the best interests of the child, and specifically directs that a court shall not restrict a parent's visitation rights unless allowing visitation would seriously endanger the child. As a matter of statutory construction, the more specific statute controls. If a motion for change of custody is made more than two years after the date of the custody decree, the court must then evaluate custody based on the best interests of the child, and determine whether a change of custody from joint to sole should occur on that basis. If so, relocation of the child will be prevented. If not, the question converts itself to whether the change in visitation/timesharing, either due to allowing relocation or denying it, is in the best interest of the child. Obviously, if a parent who has been the primary residential parent relocates and the child does not, the primary residential parent will change. Every case will present its own unique facts, and the change of custody motion or modification of visitation/timesharing must be decided in the sound discretion of the trial court. This is true whether the child lives with one parent in an arrangement like a sole custody arrangement or whether there is equal timesharing or something in between. Since serious endangerment or best interests is not defined, it is left to the sound discretion of the trial court whether the party opposing relocation has met his burden on either a modification of custody or visitation/timesharing. The party seeking modification of custody or visitation/timesharing is the party who has the burden of bringing the motion before the court. A residential parent who wishes only to change the visitation/timesharing due to his relocating with the child may bring the motion to modify visitation/timesharing under KRS 403.320. If that parent believes that the relocation will make a joint custody arrangement unworkable, then the motion should be made for a change of custody from joint to sole under KRS 403.340. Likewise, when one parent indicates an interest in relocating with the child, the parent opposed need not wait, but could file his own motion. A parent who has equal or nearly equal visitation/timesharing and who wants to prevent a child's relocation with the other parent, but does not want to change custody from joint to sole, could bring a motion for a change of visitation/timesharing under KRS 403.320. This could result in a designation of that parent as primary residential parent if the child is not allowed to relocate because it is not in his best interests to do so. If that same parent wants to change custody from joint to sole custody to him, he must bring the motion for a change of custody and proceed under KRS 403.340. Both parents may need to bring motions if their wishes differ. For example, if the residential mother makes a motion to modify visitation/timesharing to allow her to relocate with the child, the father may need to make a motion for modification of visitation/timesharing to name him as the residential parent, which would prevent relocation of the child. Or, the father could make a motion to be named sole custodian, and if he could meet his statutory burden, there would be a change of custody which would also defeat the relocation. If neither party wishes to change the nature of the custody, and the court determines that it is in the best interest of the child to relocate with the mother, the father's visitation/timesharing would be modified to an accommodation as reasonable as possible given the distance of the relocation and the means of the parties. To the extent that this Court's prior decision in Fenwick and its progeny is inconsistent with this Opinion, it is overruled.