Opinion ID: 4541259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Remedies and Ripeness

Text: The Harers ground their backward-looking access-tocourt claim in the theory that the defendants’ alleged coverup frustrated their wrongful death and other tort claims against Flores. The Harers argue that the defendants obstructed their meaningful access to court both before and after they filed their lawsuit; specifically, that the oﬃcers have been purposefully misleading and lying to them about the underlying facts of the investigation to cover up Samantha’s murder at the hands of Flores. The Harers essentially allege that the police department sabotaged its investigation and is still concealing and obscuring important facts about Samantha’s 14 No. 19-3334 death. To this day, the Harers assert, the police seek to prevent the Harers from uncovering the truth about what happened to their daughter. To determine whether a plaintiﬀ has meaningful and effective access to court, we require the plaintiﬀ to identify: (1) a nonfrivolous, underlying claim; (2) the oﬃcial acts frustrating the litigation; and (3) a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in a suit or settlement. See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415; Steidl v. Fermon, 494 F.3d 623, 633 (7th Cir. 2007); Snyder, 380 F.3d at 296 (Ripple, J., dissenting); see also Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590, 602 (5th Cir. 2019); Flagg v. City of Detroit, 715 F.3d 165, 174 (6th Cir. 2013); Broudy v. Mather, 460 F.3d 106, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2006). We can assume for the sake of argument that the Harers’ claim satisfies the first and second elements. (This assumption we make for the purposes of decision is a substantial one, given our doubts about what constitutes clearly established law in this context. Infra at 22; see also Owsley, 2020 WL 2832116 at –2 (expressing “doubts” and “skepticism” about a similar access approach).) The Harers’ claim nevertheless fails on the third element: They have not specified what remedy the alleged police cover-up has put out of reach. Cf. Rossi, 790 F.3d at 736 (“Whether a cover-up (or a clear failure to investigate) occurred is merely one, albeit important, factor in determining whether a denial of judicial access occurred; the plaintiﬀ must also show that the police’s actions harmed his ability to obtain appropriate relief.”). Generally speaking, “[a] backwards looking access claim may arise where a plaintiff alleges an underlying claim cannot be tried, or be tried with all the evidence, because official conduct caused the loss or inadequate resolution of that claim.” No. 19-3334 15 Lynch v. Barrett, 703 F.3d 1153, 1157 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 625 (9th Cir. 1988) (requiring an access-to-court plaintiff to “causally connect[ ]” the defendants’ actions to a “failure to succeed in the present lawsuit”). The Channahon defendants have not caused the loss or inadequate resolution of the Harers’ underlying tort claims. Quite the contrary, the Harers’ are actively litigating those claims with evidence they have adduced. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the remedy the Harers seek is “not otherwise available” in their pending lawsuit against Flores. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415. We could debate whether the Harers’ allegations, if true, will aﬀect the Harers’ ability to recover on the underlying claims. They may or may not; it is just “too early to say. Unless and until the [Harers’] claim against [Flores] suﬀers some concrete setback traceable to the defendants’ alleged cover-up, their allegation that the defendants impaired their eﬀort to bring that claim is no more than speculation about an event that may or may not come to pass.” Waller, 922 F.3d at 602; see also id. at 603 (“[A]ny harm … has yet to manifest.”); Swekel, 119 F.3d at 1264 (“A plaintiﬀ cannot merely guess that a … remedy will be ineﬀective because of a defendant’s actions.”). We need look no further than the Harers’ own appellate brief to realize that “[t]he extent to which Channahon[ ] … has permanently impeded Plaintiﬀs’ ability to demonstrate that Flores murdered Samantha Harer is unknown.” This uncertainty is why an access-to-court claim ordinarily may not proceed at the same time and in the same case as a timely-filed underlying claim; a remedy cannot be ineﬀective if it is yet to be realized. Cf. Swekel, 119 F.3d at 1264 16 No. 19-3334 (“[H]ow is this court to assess whether … access was in fact ‘eﬀective’ and ‘meaningful’?”). The filing of a case undermines the argument that an individual lacks access to court. See Delew v. Wagner, 143 F.3d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[B]ecause the Delews’ wrongful death action remains pending in … court, it is impossible to determine whether this [foreclosure of access] has in fact occurred.”); see also Pollard v. Pollard, 325 F. App’x 270, 272 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Pollard’s timely-filed wrongful death action is pending … and therefore she cannot credibly assert that Defendants’ actions foreclosed her ability to file suit.”). We simply cannot measure the adequacy of relief if the pursuit of relief—i.e., the prosecution—is ongoing. For this reason, relief must be “completely foreclosed,” Broudy, 460 F.3d at 120 (citation omitted), whether by “[1] the loss or inadequate settlement of a meritorious case, [2] the loss of an opportunity to sue, or [3] the loss of an opportunity to seek some particular order of relief,” Christopher, 536 U.S. at 414 (citations omitted). In other words, a plaintiﬀ must “demonstrate substantial and irreparable prejudice” to his or her sought-after remedy. Flagg, 715 F.3d at 179 (indicating that “merely ‘arguable claims are settled, bought, and sold,’” so “even a marginal weakening of the underlying claim might suﬃce … because it might have irreversibly reduced the amount for which the defendant would be willing to settle.”) (citation omitted). Any other rule would contradict the Supreme Court’s direction that a remedy available “in some suit that may yet be brought” or for “a presently existing claim” defeats this element of a plaintiﬀ’s access-to-court claim. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415–16; see also id. at 414 (“These cases … look … backward No. 19-3334 17 to a time when specific litigation ended poorly, or could not have commenced, or could have produced a remedy subsequently unobtainable.”) (emphasis added). Resolution of the underlying claims is essential because the entire paradigm of backward-looking access “turns on … an opportunity already lost, [and] the very point of recognizing any access claim is to provide some eﬀective vindication for a separate and distinct right to seek judicial relief for some wrong.” Id. at 414–15; see also id. at 415 (“[The Supreme Court’s] cases rest on the recognition that the right is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiﬀ cannot have suﬀered injury by being shut out of court.”). We remain mindful that “[t]here is … no point in spending time and money to establish the facts constituting denial of access when a plaintiﬀ would end up just as well oﬀ after litigating a simpler case without the denial-of-access element.” Id. at 415. Indeed, perhaps that is why courts often describe access claims as arising in a separate lawsuit from the underlying litigation. See, e.g., In re Maxy, 674 F.3d 658, 660–61 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Relief for the denial of access to the courts is intended to remedy rights denied in a separate case due to the impediment.”).2 2 To be clear, wedo not hold “that a filed suit on the underlying claim is a prerequisite for a backward-looking access claim, because [such a holding] would foreclose access claims in the most heinous cases where a cover-up was so pervasive that any timely attempt to litigate would have seemed futile.” Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416 n.14; see also Bell, 746 F.2d at 1261 (“To deny such access defendants need not literally bar the courthouse door or attack plaintiﬀs’ witnesses . … Though [the plaintiﬀ] filed a wrongful death claim in … court soon after the killing, the cover-up and 18 No. 19-3334 Here, it is precisely because the Harers are in court on the underlying claims that they do not have an access-to-court claim. The Harers were able to file this lawsuit and present substantial facts of central importance to their case. See Sousa v. Marquez, 702 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[A] plaintiﬀ who has knowledge of the facts giving rise to his claim and an opportunity to rebut opposing evidence does have adequate access to a judicial remedy.”). “Indeed, this very opinion demonstrates that the [Harers] have been able to develop the facts in this case quite eﬀectively.” Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 512 (3d Cir. 2003). Not only are the Harers’ claims pending in federal court, the Harers have the full discovery process available to them. They can submit requests for documents, issue interrogatories, take depositions, and the like as part of trying to learn, confirm, or uncover facts to support their theories of wrongful death and related cover-up. All discovery will occur under the district court’s supervision, and the court can address any fraud it finds. Discovery provides the Harers with access to information, and as a result, access to court. Our point is that the Harers may yet obtain damages through their wrongful death and other tort claims against Flores for allegedly murdering their daughter, not to mention their Monell claim against Crest Hill. See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 421–22 (determining that other avenues were open for the recovery of money damages in additional pending causes of action, such as an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, so there was no basis for an access-to-court claim); see resistance of the investigating police oﬃcers rendered hollow his right to seek redress … .”). No. 19-3334 19 also Steidl, 494 F.3d at 633 (concluding plaintiﬀ was requesting same relief in access claim, compensatory and punitive damages, that he would procure if he eventually prevailed on his underlying false imprisonment and Monell claims). At bottom, the Harers’ backward-looking access-to-court claim is untenable because their underlying tort claims are timely, facially plausible, and still pending. With the ultimate resolution of their wrongful death case in doubt, the Harers’ access-to-court claim is not ripe for judicial review.3 See Waller, 922 F.3d at 603 (adopting the Ninth Circuit’s approach of resolving these types of undeveloped backward-looking access-to-court claims on ripeness grounds). While the wrongful death case is pending, we cannot determine whether the police cover-up thwarted the eﬀectiveness of any potential remedies because those remedies do not yet exist. See Church of Our Lord & Savior Jesus Christ v. City of Markham, Ill., 913 F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 2019) (defining the objective of ripeness as “avoid[ing] premature adjudication” of “claims premised on uncertain or contingent events”). All the same, it is theoretically possible that the Harers will be able to plead an access claim in the future if their wrongful death action falters in later states of litigation. Because the Harers’ claim requires further factual development, it is not ripe. See Amling v. Harrow Indus. LLC, 943 F.3d 373, 378 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted) (describing ripeness as barring us “from deciding a question that depends on so many future events that a judicial opinion would be ‘advice about remote 3 This holding applies with equal measure to the Harers’ allegations of both pre- and post-filing conduct. As explained infra, however, their post-filing allegations are likely nonactionable. 20 No. 19-3334 contingencies.’”). We therefore order the dismissal without prejudice of the Harers’ access-to-court claim (Count II).