Opinion ID: 169607
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Challenges to the Expedited Rem oval Order

Text: M r. Vaupel makes several arguments addressing the validity of the expedited removal order entered pursuant to § 1225(b)(1): (1) he is not an inadmissible arriving alien subject to expedited removal because (i) he was improperly granted humanitarian parole when other options for relief were available and (ii) he was eligible for an exception to inadmissibility as a VAW A petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A )(ii); (2) expedited removal is -4- inapplicable to VW P applicants; and (3) the expedited removal procedures denied him due process. The scope of judicial review of orders of removal under § 1225(b)(1) is extremely narrow. W ith very limited exceptions, “no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any individual determination or to entertain any other cause or claim arising from or relating to the implementation or operation of an order of removal pursuant to section 1225(b)(1).” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i). Specifically, no court has jurisdiction to review “a decision by the Attorney General to invoke the provisions of [§ 1225(b)(1)],” “the application of [that] section to individual aliens,” or “procedures and policies adopted by the Attorney General to implement [that section].” Id. at § 1252(a)(2)(A)(ii) - (iv). Judicial review of determinations made under § 1225(b)(1) is available in habeas corpus proceedings, but such review is limited to determinations of– (A) whether the petitioner is an alien, (B) whether the petitioner was ordered removed under such section, and (C) whether the petitioner can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, has been admitted as a refugee . . . or has been granted asylum. Id. at § 1252(e)(2)(A )-(C). Section 1252(e)(5) provides further that: In determining whether an alien has been ordered removed under section 1225(b)(1) of this title, the court’s inquiry shall be limited to whether such an order in fact was issued and whether it relates to the -5- petitioner. There shall be no review of whether the alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal. The district court recognized the limited scope of its jurisdiction to review the validity of M r. Vaupel’s expedited removal order and therefore considered only whether he is an alien, whether he was ordered removed under § 1225(b)(1), and whether he could prove he was an LPR, had been admitted as a refugee, or had been granted asylum. He does not assert that the district court’s findings on these issues were in error. But he argues that the district court erred in construing the scope of its jurisdiction under § 1252(e) too narrowly. For this proposition he relies on a district court case from outside this circuit which held that, in ascertaining whether an order of removal “relates to” the alien under § 1252(e)(5), a court may determine whether the expedited removal statute was lawfully applied to the alien. See Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Ashcroft, 272 F. Supp. 2d 650, 663 (E.D. M ich. 2003). W e respectfully disagree. The language of the statute clearly and unambiguously precludes review in a habeas proceeding of “whether the alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(5). See also Brumme v. INS, 275 F.3d 443, 447-48 (5th Cir. 2001) (rejecting claim that § 1252(e) permits habeas review of whether § 1225(b)(1) was applicable to petitioner); Li v. Eddy, 259 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001) (“On its face, [§ 1252(e)(2)] does not appear to permit the court to inquire into whether section 1225(b)(1) was properly invoked, but only -6- whether it was invoked at all. W ere there any doubt of congressional intent, it is resolved by [§ 1252(e)(5)], that expressly declares that judicial review does not extend to actual admissibility.”), vacated as moot, 324 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2003). M r. Vaupel does not specifically address whether we have jurisdiction to consider his claim that the expedited removal procedures violate his right to due process. Respondents assert, without supporting citation, that the court has jurisdiction because he presents a constitutional challenge to the expedited removal procedures. W e hold that under § 1252(a)(2)(A) we do not have jurisdiction to consider that claim. Nor is there an exception in § 1252(e) providing authority to review constitutional claims related to the application of § 1225(b)(1). 1 M oreover, § 1252(e)(3) sets forth the process for bringing a constitutional challenge to § 1225(b) or its implementing regulations. Such a claim may be brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and must have been filed no later than 60 days after the date the challenged section or regulation was first implemented. See id. at § 1252(e)(3)(A )-(B); see also Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Reno, 18 F. Supp. 2d 38, 46-7, 60 (D.D.C. 1998) (dismissing as time-barred aliens’ 1 In another context, Congress has specifically authorized judicial review of constitutional claims, notwithstanding statutory limitations on judicial review. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). But that provision applies to the construction of subparagraphs (B) and (C) of § 1252(a)(2), which are inapplicable here, and explicitly does not apply to other provisions of § 1252 limiting judicial review. It is also applicable only to constitutional claims raised in petitions for review filed in an appropriate court of appeals. See id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). -7- claims filed beyond the 60-day deadline; dismissing on the merits other aliens’ timely due process challenge to expedited removal procedures). Thus, to the extent M r. Vaupel raises a systemic challenge to the constitutionality of the expedited removal procedures, such a claim may not be brought in the courts in this circuit. See Li, 259 F.3d at 1136 (holding under § 1252(e)(3) that alien’s challenge to expedited removal system could not be brought in courts in Ninth Circuit). Because M r. Vaupel’s claims on appeal seek review of the expedited removal order beyond the limited scope of review permitted in habeas corpus proceedings by § 1252(e), we do not have jurisdiction to consider them.