Opinion ID: 2625875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Denial of Defense Continuance Requests

Text: Defendant contends the trial court's denial of defense requests for continuances prior to and during trial deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel (in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution), a fair and reliable penalty verdict (Eighth Amendment), and a fair trial (Fourteenth Amendment). We disagree. Continuances in criminal cases may only be granted for good cause. (§ 1050, subd. (e).) While a trial court may not exercise its discretion over continuances so as to deprive the defendant or his attorneys of a reasonable opportunity to prepare ( People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 646, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152; People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1107, 31 Cal. Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36), the court's rulings in this case had no such effect. Defendant complains of the trial court's treatment of defense motions for continuance on four occasions before, during and after trial. We consider each occasion separately.
This court's remittitur, upon reversal of defendant's first conviction, was filed in the superior court on January 26, 1988, and the matter was placed on calendar for March 7, 1988. On that date, the court reappointed Halvor Miller and Elizabeth Harris, defendant's attorneys in the first trial, to represent him on retrial. The case was continued to March 30 for pretrial conference. On March 30, Ms. Harris was relieved, and H. Clay Jacke was appointed as Miller's cocounsel. The next day, at defense request, the case was continued to April 18 for further pretrial proceedings. On April 18, 1988, the parties made their first appearance before the Honorable Jack B. Tso, who would be the trial judge. Judge Tso indicated he was in trial on another capital case and would not be available until the end of May. Defendant made his Faretta motion, which was withdrawn on April 22 as discussed ante, in part II., and, with the agreement of both parties, the court set a pretrial conference date of June 24. On June 10, June 24, July 22, August 19, and September 9, 1988, various defense motions were made and heard. On September 9, the court denied defendant's motion to recuse the district attorney's office and, with the agreement of both parties, set a further pretrial/trial setting conference for December 13, 1988, anticipating that jury voir dire would begin early in January 1989. On November 29, 1988, the defense made a written motion for continuance, asserting that counsel needed more time for factual investigation. At the hearing on December 13, attorney Miller asked for a March 24, 1989, date, which he thought would be ample time to complete the defense preparation. With agreement of both parties, the court set a readiness conference date of March 1, 1989, which, with a 20-day time waiver, would mean beginning jury selection on March 21. On March 1, 1989, defendant moved for a further continuance, asserting that Attorneys Miller and Jacke expected to be engaged in other trials through April and June, respectively. Miller suggested July 28 as a trial date. Although disturbed that counsel had allowed other trial commitments to interfere with the agreed date for trial in this case, the court granted the continuance to July 10,1989, with a 10-day time waiver. The court ordered defense counsel not to become engaged in any other proceedings that would interfere with this trial. On May 26, 1989, the court held a status conference. The prosecutor stated that the People would be ready to begin trial proceedings on July 10, the date previously set. Defense Attorney Miller, however, stated the defense would not be ready because (1) the guilt phase investigation was not complete, (2) the penalty phase investigation had not been started, (3) Cocounsel Jacke was continuously engaged in other trials and had been unable to assist, and (4) Miller and Jacke had planned a joint vacation (at a legal conference in China) for late August through early September. Jacke said he was representing a defendant in the Ninja murder case who would not waive time; he did not expect to finish that trial until late November 1989. The court suggested that Jacke consider resigning as counsel and that Miller consider obtaining new cocounsel. The court ordered counsel back for a trial setting conference on June 28. On June 28, 1989, Miller stated he was still not ready because Jacke had been unable to help with trial preparation. Jacke not being present, the matter was put over to June 30. On that date, Jacke again explained that he had unexpectedly had to go to trial in another case, which he expected to be finished by November. Miller suggested a firm date for trial would be sometime in January 1990, and Jacke suggested the court hold a trial setting conference in November 1989. The court granted the continuance, setting a date of November 17, 1989, for the trial setting conference. Counsel were ordered not to become engaged in any other trials after November 17. On November 17, 1989, the court filed and read a letter from defendant complaining of the delay in beginning his retrial and indicating that another attorney might be willing to take over for Jacke. Both attorneys then asked to be relieved of their appointments, though Miller indicated he could begin trial in four or five months with the prospective new cocounsel, Charles Maple. Jacke explained that he would not be done trying his current capital case until February or March of 1990. The court relieved Jacke, agreed to Maple's appointment, and continued the matter to February 27, 1990. Miller was ordered not to become engaged in any other case. On February 27, 1990, the court pushed counsel to begin trial in March. Miller protested that he had a conflict with another case ( People v. Louis) in which he was also being ordered to trial, and that he could not be ready to try Snow's case by March 13. Cocounsel Maple suggested March 27 or March 30. The court set trial to begin with jury selection on March 27 and ordered the clerk to notify the jury commissioner that the court would need 100 potential jurors on March 27. On March 13, 1990, Miller moved for a continuance, asserting that he and Maple needed additional time to prepare for trial. On the same day, he filed letters to Judge Tso and to the Honorable Judith Chirlin, also of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, the trial judge in People v. Louis, complaining that because of competing orders in the two cases he was being forced to try to prepare both at once. On March 21, Maple filed a continuance motion, asserting that more time was needed because the prosecution apparently had some photographs, taken in connection with the paint analysis, that had not been provided to the defense, and because the defense wished to conduct its own analysis of the paint samples. On March 23, 1990, the court observed that Judge Chirlin had continued her capital case, so Miller was available to try the Snow case. The court also ordered the prosecution to give defense counsel access to any lab photos and results. On March 27, 1990, the date set for trial, Miller announced not ready. He declined the court's invitation to elaborate on his claim that he needed more time for preparation. The court denied Miller's motion, ruling that the blanket statements in Miller's written motion as to the need for further preparation time were inadequate to justify a further continuance. After eliciting the prosecutor's assurance that all paint photographs in his possession had been given to the defense and that the defense could contact the prosecution expert to determine if there were more photographs, the court also denied Maple's motion; the court observed that the defense could continue its investigation of the paint samples, as to which the court would appoint an expert if the defense desired, and that if necessary a short continuance in connection with the expert analysis would be considered. We conclude the denial of continuance motions on March 27, 1990, was not an abuse of the court's discretion, good cause for the requested continuance not having been shown (§ 1050, subd. (e)), nor did it deprive counsel of a reasonable opportunity to prepare the defense. On that date the case had been pending in the superior court for 26 months. The court had already granted numerous and lengthy continuances at defense request. Defendant had repeatedly waived his right to a speedy trial, but had also expressed frustration at counsel's continual need for continuances. Attorney Miller, who had previously defended defendant on these same charges, had been reappointed over two years before, on March 7, 1988. Miller had previously stated that he expected to be ready for trial in March 1989 and again in July 1989. In November 1989, he stated that he could be ready with new cocounsel, Maple, in March or April 1990. The court did not abuse its discretion in failing to credit Miller's bare assertion, which he declined to explain further, that he needed more preparation time. Attorney Maple was more recently appointed, but had had several months to acquaint himself with the evidence. Maple did not indicate that he was personally unprepared for trial; rather, his motion rested on the assertion that the paint samples, of which the prosecution had obtained an expert comparison analysis, and related photographs, had not yet been made fully available to the defense. The court ordered all results and photographs produced; indicated it would, if desired, appoint a defense expert to analyze the samples; and would consider a request for a short continuance on these grounds if and when the issue arose. In the absence of concrete information as to the length of time a defense expert analysis would take, the court did not abuse its discretion in beginning the lengthy capital jury selection process on March 27. Defendant cites Little v. Superior Court (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 667, 168 Cal.Rptr. 72 for the proposition that a trial court may not lawfully require counsel to proceed to trial unprepared. In Little, the deputy public defender assigned to represent the defendant was unable to appear at the preliminary hearing because of a calendaring error. ( Id. at p. 670, 168 Cal.Rptr. 72.) A supervising deputy appeared, explained the problem, and moved for a continuance. The prosecutor, who had witnesses summoned for that date, objected, and the court denied the continuance despite the supervisor's representation that he had never talked to the defendant and was completely unfamiliar with the case. ( Ibid. Little ) is obviously not on point; defendant here began trial with two attorneys, one of whom had defended him before on the same charges and had been reappointed more than two years earlier, the other of whom had been appointed four months earlier. Nor does Hughes v. Superior Court (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 1, 164 Cal.Rptr. 721, upon which defendant also relies, support his position. In Hughes, the appellate court overturned a contempt order made against a defense attorney who refused to participate in a trial for which he was unprepared. The attorney, a deputy public defender, had been assigned to two cases set for trial on the same Monday. He guessed incorrectly which trial would actually go forward, used the weekend to prepare that case, and then was denied a continuance on the other, unprepared case. ( Id. at p. 3, 164 Cal.Rptr. 721.) The limited record before the appellate court did not indicate why he had announced ready on both cases when he was not prepared on one of them; nor, as far as the appellate opinion reflects, did it indicate whether he had had a significant period of time prior to the weekend before trial in order to prepare. (See id. at pp. 5-6, 164 Cal.Rptr. 721.) In the present case, Attorney Miller had more than two years to prepare to represent defendant. He had repeatedly been warned not to take on other trial obligations and was not in fact forced to trial in two cases simultaneously; rather, he was granted continuances in the Louis case, which freed him to finish preparation for, and go to trial on, defendant's case. The trial court was not obliged to credit his claim that because he did not know which case was actually going to trial he could not prepare either. The court did not abuse its discretion, or deny Miller a reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial, in refusing to grant an additional continuance on March 27, 1990.
On April 19, 1990, during jury selection, defense counsel moved orally for a continuance, asserting they needed 45 to 60 days to finish the expert paint comparison work. In an in camera hearing, counsel asserted that the prosecution expert who had previously compared the bubble shield and post paints, Stephan Schliebe, had been uncooperative as to providing his data and samples to the defense and that, once the defense had these materials, their own examination would take up to 30 days. [2] The court suggested Schliebe be subpoenaed to appear the next day in order that the court could order him to produce any needed materials. The court further indicated that it considered excessive the defense estimate of time needed to complete the expert examination and that no continuance would be granted on that basis. After the conclusion of this confidential hearing, defense counsel stated that they intended to seek writ relief in the Court of Appeal. [3] Later that day, as voir dire was completed and the court prepared to swear in the jury, defense counsel moved to defer swearing the jury until the defense writ petition was heard. The court denied that motion. The court also denied a prosecution request for a three-day continuance to get my witnesses and coordinate the evidence, noting that you've had two years to be able to get them. [4] The court did not, by these rulings, abuse its discretion or deprive the defense of a reasonable opportunity to prepare. Counsel's bare assertion that they would need 30, 45, or 60 days to complete their examination of the paint samples did not constitute good cause for such a lengthy continuance, especially as the prosecution had not even begun to present its own case. Nor does the record indicate the defense was actually prejudiced by the denial of a lengthy continuance for examination of the paint materials. [5] Nor, finally, has defendant even attempted to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the trial court's swearing in the jury panel before his writ petition was heard and decided.
The jury returned its guilt verdict and special circumstance finding on June 4, 1990. On request of defense counsel, the court ordered the penalty trial to begin on June 12. On June 11, however, Attorney Miller filed a continuance motion asserting that counsel needed additional time for penalty investigation and consultation. At a hearing on June 12, Miller estimated they needed 30 to 45 days to complete their investigation. Despite its astonish[ment] that counsel, having previously represented defendant in a penalty trial and having been reappointed for more than two years, was still unprepared, the court granted the motion for continuance, setting July 17 for the start of the penalty trial. The penalty trial began on July 17, 1990, with presentation of the People's opening statement and evidence. After the prosecution rested, the defense also rested without giving a statement or presenting any evidence. Defense counsel did not at either time seek an additional continuance or assert they were unprepared for the penalty trial. But on appeal, apparently claiming he should have received a longer continuance before the penalty phase, defendant attributes his trial attorneys' inaction during the penalty phase to the court's earlier denials of continuances for trial preparation. We must reject this contention as completely unsupported by the record. In addition to the more than two years Counsel Miller had already represented defendant, the defense was given 42 days (from June 5 to July 17) after the close of the guilt trial to prepare for the penalty trial. That time included a continuance requested by the defense and granted by the court. At the penalty trial, counsel did not request more time, nor did counsel claim that their failure to call any penalty witnesses or present other mitigating evidence was due to lack of preparation. There is thus no basis for the claim that the court's earlier denial of continuances deprived counsel of a reasonable opportunity to prepare for the penalty phase.
The jury returned its penalty verdict on July 19, 1990. The court indicated it would set August 16, 1990, as the date for hearing the automatic motion for modification of verdict and for sentencing, but at the request of defense counsel set those matters instead for August 23, a week later. On August 10, 1990, asserting that the defense needed additional time to prepare a motion for new trial based on the discovery of new evidence, Defense Counsel Miller filed a motion for continuance of the sentencing and dification hearing. On August 23, the court granted that motion, setting a new date of September 21. On September 20, Miller again filed a motion for continuance, again asserting, without particulars, that more time was needed to investigate newly discovered evidence. On September 21, the court denied the motion for failure to give two days' notice and for lack of specific facts showing good cause. Because Miller was absent due to a fire in his office building, however, sentencing and the modification motion were continued to September 24. On September 24, however, Miller was again absent, this time because of a family emergency. Attorney Maple declared himself unprepared to make the motion for new trial. The court put the matter over to the next day. On September 25, Maple renewed the earlier continuance motion. Maple explained that in order to corroborate the defense theory of a police conspiracy to frame defendant (apparently by getting his fingerprint on a bubble shield similar to that worn by the killer), the defense had been seeking, but had had difficulty obtaining, Pasadena Police Department reports and hospital records relating to automobile accidents discussed on a police dispatch tape. These reports and records would, the defense hoped, show the true origin of the bubble shield introduced at trial. The court again denied the continuance. We conclude the court's ruling did not deprive the defense of a reasonable opportunity to prepare a new trial motion. As the prosecutor noted in opposing the continuance, the defense theory of a police scheme to plant evidence against defendant was of long standing (see People v. Snow, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 220, 242 Cal.Rptr. 477, 746 P.2d 452), and counsel failed to explain why the records now under investigation had not been investigated in preparation for defendant's first trial or in the two and one-half years since Miller was reappointed to defend defendant in the retrial. Nor did counsel's explanation demonstrate that a continuance was likely to be useful (see People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1013, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183); it was far from clear, that is, that a reasonable continuance would allow the defense to obtain records tending to show that the police officers' testimony about finding the bubble shield was false and that the shield actually had been obtained from some accident scene. There was no good cause to continue the modification and sentencing hearing.
Defendant contends that the trial court's hostile and disparaging comments during trial exhibited such a degree of bias against defense counsel, and so interfered with counsel's examination of witnesses, as to deprive defendant of a fair trial, the effective assistance of counsel, and a reliable penalty determination. We disagree. First, because counsel failed to object to, or seek a jury admonition regarding, any of the instances of alleged judicial intemperance, the issue is waived on appeal. ( People v. Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1108, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36; People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 411, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221.) Moreover, the claim is without merit; though the trial judge, the Honorable Jack Tso, was sometimes impatient with the attorneys for both parties, and though a few of his exchanges with defense counsel were especially contentious, neither separately nor together do these instances of harsh language amount to an unconstitutional display of judicial bias. Although the trial court has both the duty and the discretion to control the conduct of the trial ( People v. Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1108, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36), the court commits misconduct if it persistently makes discourteous and disparaging remarks to defense counsel so as to discredit the defense or create the impression it is allying itself with the prosecution ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 353, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708). Nevertheless, [i]t is well within [a trial court's] discretion to rebuke an attorney, sometimes harshly, when that attorney asks inappropriate questions, ignores the court's instructions, or otherwise engages in improper or delaying behavior. ( United States v. Donate (D.C.Cir.1996) 99 F.3d 426, 434.) Indeed, [o]ur role ... is not to determine whether the trial judge's conduct left something to be desired, or even whether some comments would have been better left unsaid. Rather, we must determine whether the judge's behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial. ( United States v. Pisani (2d Cir.1985) 773 F.2d 397, 402.) Defendant cites several minor instances assertedly showing the court's impatience with, or irritation toward, counsel. [6] But such manifestations of friction between court and counsel, while not desirable, are virtually inevitable in a long trial. The trial court frequently addressed the prosecutors in an equally brusque manner. [7] Defendant maintains the court frequently disparaged and upbraided defense counsel during counsel's examination of witnesses. Upon examination, we conclude that, whether or not the court's evidentiary ruling in each cited instance was correct, [8] in no case did the court display overt bias against the defense so as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. In asking defense counsel whether a line of questioning, on recross-examination of the prosecution fingerprint examiner, was within the scope of redirect, the court neither disparaged counsel's efforts nor prevented counsel from pursuing cross-examination. Similarly, when the court told counsel not to argue with a police investigator, defense counsel rephrased and reposed his question without objection or court interference. Again, when the court interrupted counsel's cross-examination of a prosecution witness who had heard the gunshots, urging counsel to get right to the issue, counsel complied but eventually returned to the interrupted line of questioning. Whether or not the court's rulings on cross-examination of Stephan Schliebe, the prosecution paint expert, were correct (see post, pt. VII.), the court, contrary to defendant's claim, did not berate counsel in making them. Counsel's cross-examination was extensive, technical, and at points confusing, and the court's occasional impatience with repetitious or vague foundational questions did not convey a judicial bias against the defense. On redirect examination of Adolfo Lara, defendant's attorney in the robbery trial, confusion arose over two aspects of the prosecutor's cross-examination: On cross, Lara had been confronted with prior testimony in which he described his reaction to the news of Koll's death as disbelief, and had also been denied an opportunity to explain why, once he was convinced Roll really had been killed, he was not shocked. On redirect, defense counsel attempted to read additional prior testimony going to the question of what Lara meant by disbelief. The court, apparently misrecalling the cross-examination, thought Lara had wanted to explain his disbelief but had been denied that opportunity; the court told defense counsel, instead of reading the testimony, simply to ask Lara what he meant by disbelief. Lara then eliminated the source of the confusion by testifying that he was using shock and disbelief in the same sense, i.e., to convey that when the robbery prosecutor, Haney, told him Roll had been killed, Lara at first thought Haney was either joking or testing his reaction. The court's repeated direction that counsel ask Lara what he meant rather than read his prior testimony betrayed judicial confusionwhich was soon dispelled by Lara's testimonyrather than bias. Defendant complains of the court's treatment of counsel during the direct examination of Ramesh Rar, the defense's paint comparison expert. Rar's testimony begins on page 4306 of the reporter's transcript. Not until page 4394 did defense counsel ask Rar to give his opinion as to whether the paints on the metal post and bubble shield matched each other. Part of the intervening testimony involved the effect of Bremstrahlung radiation on electron microscopy of materials. Rar testified that the examiner must adjust for the Bremstrahlung effect, which can mask the presence of certain elements and create spurious indications of other elements. When counsel further asked Rar to illustrate the Bremstrahlung effect using a projected graph, the court barred the illustration on its own motion, saying, I don't need it illustrated. The jury doesn't require it. Let's get the matters that are relevant. Kar then testified that the prosecution's paint comparison expert had apparently not adjusted for the Bremstrahlung effect. When counsel asked Rar if the prosecution examiner's unadjusted data would lead Rar to the same conclusion he had independently reached about the materials, the court objected that counsel was assuming facts not in evidence: no conclusion about the materials had yet been elicited from Rar. The court told counsel, Now, I don't know what his conclusion pertains to, so why don't we get to it, counsel, please. As defense counsel began to lay the foundation for Kar's opinion, however, the court periodically interposed, or solicited from the prosecutor, objections to the phrasing of certain questions. After the court again urged counsel to get to the bottom line, the following exchange occurred: Q. By Mr. Maple: Do you have an opinion, Dr. Kar, as to whether the paint taken from the The Court: By whom? Q. By Mr. Maple:snap ring of the bubble shield The Court: That he took, right? Not the one that Schliebe took; is that correct? Mr. Maple: That is right. Because nobody can test that, your Honor. He [Schliebe] threw it away. Mr. Holliman: I'll object to counsel editorializing. The Court: Disregard the statement of the attorney. Counsel, I cautioned you. Let's not have any of this. All I'm trying to do is to speed up the process because we have an expert here that can give us his opinion, and the standard way of doing it is to qualify the expert; ask him what his opinion is as to thewhatever he's going to compare. Then he'll give his opinion and then simply ask him what the basis of his opinion is, at which time he may then bring in focus all of his qualifications for all of us. But you're shot gunning, counsel. That- Mr. Maple: Well, your Honor and I differ, and I apologize to the court for the difference. The Court: Counsel, I told you how much this court costs to operate. Counsel then elicited Kar's opinion (that the paints differed) without further difficulty. While some of the court's comments during the examination of Kar would have been better left unsaid ( United States v. Pisani, supra, 773 F.2d at p. 402), we do not believe the court's behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial. ( Ibid ). That the court became impatient with counsel's examination of the expert was perhaps understandable, but its instructions on how to question the witness should have been given outside the jury's hearing. Nonetheless, we believe the effect of the court's remarks was not to discredit the defense or create the impression it is allying itself with the prosecution. ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 353, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) The jury may well have received the impression that the court disliked counsel's methods of examination, but not that the court disparaged or discredited Kar's favorable evidence itself. Finally, defendant claims that the court undermined the credibility of an expert witness the defense attempted to call to testify regarding eyewitness identification evidence. [9] However, as this expert's proposed testimony was excluded as irrelevant (see post, pt. X.), how defendant could have been prejudiced by any damage to her credibility is unclear. We conclude that imperfect as the trial court's behavior may occasionally have been, it did not deprive defendant of a fair trial, the effective assistance of counsel, or a reliable penalty determination.
Defendant cites four instances in which the court assertedly restricted jury voir dire. [10] In only one of these cases, however, does the record show the court actually cut short the defense attorney's questioning on a topic. During the general voir dire of Prospective Juror N., the defense questioned her in some detail about the murder of two of her cousins, which occurred in 1958 when N. was 19 years old. N. stated that the killer had been apprehended, had been found not guilty by reason of insanity and confined in a psychiatric hospital. The following exchange ensued: Mr. Maple: All right. Had he been in some sort of relationship with your cousins? Prospective Juror N.: They were all mutually investing in The Court: Just a moment. What is the relevance of this, counsel? Mr. Maple: Well The Court: Let's go on to another subject matter. Maple then asked the prospective juror whether knowing what happened to her cousins would affect her ability to judge this case fairly. She replied in the negative. Defendant contends it was error to cut off defense counsel's line of questioning, which assertedly might have revealed similarities between the murder of N.'s cousins and the present case. Perhaps, defendant suggests, N. would have answered by saying that the cousins were murdered to prevent them from testifying against the murderer. But N.'s actual answers that the killer and victims had been in business together and the killer was found to be insane at the timedo not suggest any particular similarity to the present case. Given the remoteness in time of the cousins' killing (32 years before this trial) and the lack of any apparent close similarity, we conclude the court's exercise of discretion to expedite the examination ( People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 419, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221) did not affect defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury ( People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1086, 259 Cal.Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659) or the reliability of the penalty verdict.
Defendant claims he was denied his rights of confrontation and effective assistance of counsel, his right to a reliable death verdict, and his right to present a defense by the court's ruling sustaining a relevance objection to defense counsel's question of the victim's wife, Gladys Koll, regarding the contents of the pharmacy safe. Gladys Koll testified that after her husband's death she checked the pharmacy inventory and records and found that no controlled narcotics, which were kept in the safe, were missing, and that the safe hadn't been disturbed. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Mrs. Koll, What kinds of narcotic items were kept in the safe? The court sustained the prosecutor's relevance objection because of the preliminary testimony by this witness that the safe was not disturbed. Defendant argues counsel's question directly pertained to the accuracy and completeness of the witness's knowledge about the narcotics and thus the answer would have affected her credibility about whether, indeed, the safe had been `disturbed' in that respect. But Mrs. Koll had testified that she compared the contents of the safe with written inventory records, not with her own memory of the narcotics kept therein. Moreover, the trial here took place almost eight years after Koll was killed. Mrs. Koll's ability or inability, at that late date, to remember what particular drugs had been kept in the safe would not have had a tendency in reason to prove or disprove the accuracy of her inventory check. The relevance objection was therefore properly sustained (Evid.Code, § 210), and none of defendant's asserted rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution were infringed.
Defendant contends that two rulings during the cross-examination of Stephan Schliebe, the prosecution's paint comparison expert, deprived him of the rights of confrontation and effective assistance of counsel, his right to a reliable death verdict, and his right to present a defense. In the first instance, defense counsel Maple was questioning Schliebe about his analysis of paint samples from the metal pole. This exchange followed: Q: Okay. Now, can you tell me, sir, what the percentage of the zinc is? A: No. I didn't do a quantitative analysis. Q: If you were to do a quantitative analysis, how would you do that, sir? The Court: Counsel, that's irrelevant at this stage. He didn't do it. When Maple tried to explain the question's relevance, the court twice cut him off, saying, Your next question. According to defendant, the court's ruling prevented the jury from fully evaluating the witness's overall expertise and his familiarity with the particular testing equipment which he used. Schliebe, however, was extensively cross-examined on those topics both before and after the complained of ruling. Defendant was not constitutionally entitled to ask the expert how a test the expert did not do would have been done had he done it; even the expert's confession of ignorance as to how such a test is done would not have discredited his data and conclusions as to the analyses he did perform. (See People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 531-532, 262 Cal.Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129 [expert may be cross-examined on the reasons for his opinion, and on certain relevant material that the expert failed to consider in reaching his opinion, but not on matters irrelevant to the import or credibility of his opinion].) Second, defendant complains that the court interfered with counsel's effort to cross-examine Schliebe about his failure to account for the Bremstrahlung effect in certain of his analyses. These parts of the cross-examination are very difficult to understand, partly because counsel himself confused the exhibits with one another, partly because counsel and the witness both sometimes referred to exhibits as this or that rather than by number or by reference to the source of the paint samples analyzed, but mainly because counsel mixed inquiries about the Bremstrahlung effect with inquiries about apparent quantity differences in individual elements, such as zinc and iron, in the samples; as a consequence, the general subject of the examination became uncertain, and it was unclear which of counsel's technical questions were foundational and which called for conclusions. The court may or may not have helped matters by interrupting, with various requests for clarification and admonitions to avoid repetition, counsel's apparent attempt to ask the expert whether the Bremstrahlung effect could have masked minor differences between blue paint taken from the bubble shield and that taken from the metal pole. Nevertheless, when the brush had been cleared and counsel was finally in a position to ask that question directly, he unaccountably abandoned the effort and instead asked Schliebe to account for the difference in the iron or Fe & T. Counsel did, earlier on, get Schliebe to admit generally that the Bremstrahlung effect may have masked small amounts of elements in the various paint samples. His failure to elicit more specific testimony regarding comparison of the two blue paint samples was not the fault of the trial court.
Before trial, defendant moved to recuse the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office as prosecutor, claiming that the expected receipt of testimony from two deputy district attorneys employed by that office, Gerald Haney and John Krayniak, made prosecution by the district attorney's office improper under section 1424. Haney was the deputy who prosecuted defendant on the Koll pharmacy robbery. Krayniak was, at the time of the killing, a Pasadena police officer involved with the investigation, but he had since joined the district attorney's office as a prosecutor. [11] Both ultimately did testify at trial. Neither Haney nor Krayniak was claimed to be participating in the murder prosecution. Rather, defendant claimed that the testimony of both these witnesses ... is so subject to colored interpretation as to vitiate the defendant's rights to a fair trial.... In argument on the motion, defense counsel claimed that because of the camaraderie in the district attorney's office the prosecutors could not but have a zealous approach to this particular case beyond that ordinarily shown in an evenhanded manner in an ordinary case. The court denied the motion, finding the defense had not shown that a conflict of interest in our present case would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial. We recently reiterated the applicable principles in Hambarian v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 826, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 725, 44 P.3d 102 ( Hambarian ). The standard for a motion to disqualify the prosecutor is set forth in Penal Code section 1424: `The motion may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.' We detailed the history of this statute and the associated legal principles in [ People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 59 Cal. Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310], where we explained that a `conflict,' for purposes of section 1424, `exists whenever the circumstances of a case evidence a reasonable possibility that the DA's office may not exercise its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner.' ( Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 592, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310, quoting People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 148, 193 Cal.Rptr. 148, 666 P.2d 5.) However, `the conflict is disabling only if it is so grave as to render it unlikely that defendant will receive fair treatment' during all portions of the criminal proceedings. ( Eubanks, supra, at p. 594, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310.) The statute thus articulates a two-part test: `(i) is there a conflict of interest?; and (ii) is the conflict so severe as to disqualify the district attorney from acting?' ( Ibid. ) ( Hambarian, supra, at p. 833, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 725, 44 P.3d 102, fn. omitted.) Defendant argues the trial court applied the wrong standard: according to him, the court was called upon only to determine whether there was a `reasonable possibility' that the D.A.'s office might not exercise its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner. Defendant is clearly wrong: such a determination would satisfy only the first part of the two-part test outlined in Eubanks and Hambarian. The trial court correctly refused to recuse the district attorney's office without a showing that prosecution by that office would render fair treatment unlikely. ( Hambarian, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 833, 118 Cal. Rptr.2d 725, 44 P.3d 102.) [12] As defendant does not contend the trial court's ruling was an abuse of discretion (see People v. Eubanks, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 594-595, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 927 P.2d 310) under what we have explained is the correct legal standard, we need not decide that question. We note, however, that recusal of an entire district attorney's office, especially a large one such as Los Angeles County's, has generally not been held required merely because one or more employees of that office are witnesses in the case. (See People v. Hernandez (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 674, 678, 286 Cal.Rptr. 652; Trujillo v. Superior Court (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 368, 370, 373, 196 Cal.Rptr. 4; People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 180, 191-192, 205-212, 150 Cal.Rptr. 156.)
Defendant claims error in the admission, over defense objection, of evidence that defendant had asked to delay his response to the robbery plea bargain offer until after the lunch hour. Because the communication to his attorney of this request was privileged, he contends, its admission denied him due process and a fair trial. Gerald Haney, the deputy district attorney who prosecuted defendant for the robbery of Roll's pharmacy, testified that on the morning of November 3, 1980, he and Adolfo Lara, defendant's attorney, were in plea negotiations in the trial judge's chambers. Haney made an offer, which Lara left to discuss with defendant. Over defense objection, Haney testified that when Lara returned he told Haney, `My guy wants to think about it overduring the lunch hour.' Defendant's statement to Lara was not a confidential communication, within the meaning of Evidence Code section 952, because, by its nature, it was meant to be communicated by the attorney to the prosecutor. Thus, it was not privileged. ( Solon v. Lichtenstein (1952) 39 Cal.2d 75, 79-80, 244 P.2d 907; 2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Witnesses, § 119, p. 375.) Defendant's constitutional contention, which depends on his claim of privilege, fails as well.
The trial court excluded, as irrelevant, the defense's proffered expert testimony on the factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identifications. The court also gave no jury instructions on this subject. Defendant contends that exclusion of the evidence and the court's failure, sua sponte, to instruct on this topic were error. No eyewitness identified defendant as the person who shot and killed Koll. Testifying at the preliminary hearing in the prior robbery case, however, Koll had identified defendant as one of the robbers. The expectation that Koll would again so testify at the robbery trial provided, according to the prosecution theory of this murder case, the motive for defendant to kill Koll. Defendant's knowledge of that likelihood, and his understanding of the strength or weakness of that expected identification, were clearly relevant to motive; indeed, defense evidence going to these points was admitted. (See ante, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 283, 284, 65 P.3d at pp. 759, 760.) But a psychologist's testimony regarding the factors generally affecting the reliability of eyewitness identifications did not, in itself, have any tendency to show defendant's motive to kill or lack thereof. Nor was the reliability of eyewitness testimony a matter closely and openly connected to the facts before the court and ... necessary for the jury's understanding of the case ( People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1047, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 874 P.2d 903), such that instruction on the topic was required of the court sua sponte. The proffered evidence being irrelevant, and the suggested instructions unconnected with the evidence, defendant's assertion that the claimed errors deprived him of due process, compulsory process, trial by jury, the right to present a defense, and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment must also be rejected.
During and immediately following the direct examination of defendant, defense counsel sought to interrupt defendant's testimony in order to call Ramesh Kar, the defense paint comparison expert. The court refused the request, stating that [t]he People have a right to timely cross-examine this witness. The court also denied counsel's request to make a further record. Defendant contends the refusal of counsel's request to make a record was an abuse of the court's discretion depriving him of due process and a fair trial. We disagree. When counsel made the request, he had the opportunity to briefly state his reasons for wanting to immediately call Kar, but said only that Kar is an individual who is internationally known. The court firmly believed that delay of defendant's cross-examination would be unfair to the prosecution, Kar's asserted fame notwithstanding, a judgment well within the court's discretionary control over trial proceedings and the order of proof. (§ 1044; Evid.Code, § 354.) It was neither an abuse of discretion, nor a denial of fair procedure, for the court to close discussion on this procedural point.
The defense attempted to present, through the testimony of Pasadena Police Officer Eugene Gray, evidence that during the investigation of the robbery Koll had identified (from photographic arrays) three different individuals as the robbers, even though there were only two robbers. The trial court sustained a prosecution objection to such evidence, finding it irrelevant and further finding that the consumption of time and the risk of confusion necessitated by receipt of the evidence outweighed any probative value it held. (Evid.Code, § 352.) We agree the evidence was excludable under Evidence Code section 352. Evidence that Koll had made an erroneous identification of one of the robbers from a photographic array would have been only slightly probative on the issues in defendant's murder trial. While defendant's knowledge of weaknesses in the robbery prosecutor's case was relevant as tending to show lack of motive, the murder jury did receive such evidence in the form of testimony from Attorney Lara and defendant. At most, Gray's proposed testimony would have tended to corroborate that evidence. [13] Even the knowledge of a weakness in Koll's robbery identification did not, however, tend strongly to disprove motive, since defendant had a motive to kill Koll, who had identified him at the preliminary hearing, regardless of whether that identification could have been challenged at trial. Possible corroboration of the existence of that flaw in the identification, then, bore only an attenuated and weak tendency to disprove motive. At the same time, exploration of the details of Koll's pretrial robbery identifications threatened a significant consumption of time and potential for confusion. Indeed, the prosecutor and defense counsel differed, in discussion before the trial court, as to whether the evidence even showed that Koll had made any misidentification of defendant in the robbery case. [14] The trial court could reasonably anticipate that substantial time would be needed to obtain all evidence on this question. Admission of the evidence, moreover, would have tended to confuse the jury as to the questions for its decision. The more examination time spent on this issue, the greater the risk that the jury would lose sight of the fact that Koll's identification of defendant as a robber was not directly at issue in the murder case, and would decide the murder case on a legally incorrect ground. The trial court did not abuse its discretion ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 945, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183) in finding that the consumption of time and the risk of jury distraction were not justified by the marginal probative value of the proffered evidence. Nor, contrary to defendant's assertion, was the evidence of such probative strength that its exclusion violated his constitutional right to present a defense. Application of the ordinary rules of evidence, such as Evidence Code section 352, generally does not deprive the defendant of the opportunity to present a defense ( Frye, supra, at p. 945, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183); certainly the marginal probative value of this evidence does not take it outside the general rule.
Defendant sought to introduce a copy of parts of the Pasadena police dispatch tape for the late afternoon and evening of November 3, 1980. On the tape, according to a transcript in the record, the police dispatcher is heard to discuss, briefly and sporadically with various police officers and records personnel, an investigation she had apparently been asked to make into recent motor vehicle collisions in Pasadena. [15] In one discussion the dispatcher suggests to a Lieutenant Roberts that with Prentice Snow in custody she thought maybe we didn't need the visor. Roberts corrects her: We need everything we can get on this one. Earlier on the tape the dispatcher mentions to another officer that at Roberts's request she has been looking for something in revab in connection with a suspect in custody from Walnut. At another point she inquires of a department administrator whether an accident at Lincoln and Walnut two days earlier involved a motorcycle. Told it did, she asks whether the motorcyclist was wearing a helmet. Told he was not, she thanks the administrator and ends the conversation. The prosecution police witnesses had testified that the bubble shield that bore defendant's fingerprint was found in a Pasadena street around 12:40 p.m., shortly after Roll's death. Interpreting the dispatch tape excerpts as showing that the police were still in search of a visor, or face shield, much later in the day, the defense argued at the hearing on admissibility of the tape that the dispatch tape impeaches the prosecution witnesses and tends to show the existence of a police conspiracy to manufacture evidence against defendant. The prosecutor objected to the tape as irrelevant hearsay. After listening to the tape, the court stated that it had heard no reference to a bubble shield or visor. Interpreting the dispatcher's remarks about defendant's case as simply her impressions, the court excluded the tape as irrelevant. We agree with the trial court that the tape was irrelevant. Nothing said on the tape indicates the existence of a conspiracy to frame defendant. The dispatcher apparently knew little or nothing about the Roll murder investigationuntil told by officers in the taped conversations, for example, she did not know who the suspected killer was or that he was in custody. Her remarks on tape are, as the trial court said, merely her impressions and not evidence of a police plan. Moreover, neither she nor any of the officers to whom she speaks discuss any plan to manufacture evidence against defendant. The defense theory of relevance is apparently that discussion of a visor and a motorcycle accident in the late afternoon or evening of November 3 contradicts police testimony that the bubble shield introduced at trial was recovered in the early afternoon, and hence tends to show that testimony to be false and that the police intended to find an unrelated bubble shield and somehow link it to defendant. Even setting aside some obvious questions regarding the plausibility of the defense theory, [16] the tape is equally or more consistent with an innocent explanation than with the alleged conspiracy. Because the bubble shield had been found in a street some distance from the crime scene, it was possible that it had been deposited there as the result of a prior motorcycle accident and had nothing to do with Koll's killer. The investigating officers would logically want to exclude that possibility by determining that there had been no such accident in the vicinity in the recent past. If any inference may be made from the tape, that appears the most reasonable. More to the point, the defense offered, and offers, no coherent factual theory for conspiratorial use of a later-recovered visor. Defendant himself testified, at both his trials, that the bubble shield introduced at trial bore his fingerprint because he pushed at it when it was thrust at him during the afternoon court session on November 3. The defense further presented testimony of an attorney trying another case on that day that a helmet with a bubble shield was brought into his courtroom during the afternoon session. But if, as defendant asserts, the tape shows that into the evening of November 3 the police were still looking for a bubble shield with which to frame him, how could they have already obtained his fingerprint on one at midafternoon? Whether taken on its own, therefore, or viewed in the context of all the trial evidence, the tape had no tendency in reason (Evid.Code, § 210) to show a police conspiracy to manufacture evidence against defendant. For the same reason, the tape's exclusion did not deprive defendant of his constitutional rights, and any error in excluding it would be considered harmless under any standard.
Defendant repeats his earlier contention that the trial court improperly denied the defense a continuance to further investigate the police conspiracy theory for presentation in a new trial motion. We have already rejected that contention. (See ante, pt. III.D.) The defense was given more than two months after the penalty verdict to further investigate its theory. There was no indication that a further continuance of reasonable length would have allowed defense counsel to obtain the information they asserted they were still seeking. Denial of the continuance therefore was not an abuse of discretion and did not deprive defendant of his constitutional rights to confront witnesses, to effective assistance of counsel, or to a reliable penalty determination.
On cross-examination of defendant, the prosecutor asked whether People's 6, the bubble shield had been stolen from defendant's apartment building along with his blue helmet. Defendant answered that it had. On redirect, defendant said he had not heard the prosecutor ask him about exhibit 6, the bubble shield introduced at trial; rather, his answer related to the bubble shield he had purchased to use with his helmet. Later, defense counsel moved to strike the portion of defendant's cross-examination in which he had answered that exhibit 6 had been stolen from him. Counsel represented that the prosecutor had said that eliciting that answer had been inadvertent. Asked to confirm this, the prosecutor stated that he had said that from the context, it was clear that we were talking about the bubble shield that he said that he had purchased. The court denied the motion to strike. Defendant argues the cross-examination should have been stricken, and the jury told not to consider it, because the prosecutor's questioning regarding exhibit 6 was inadvertent. Inadvertently or not, however, the question did elicit the admission from defendant that he previously had possession of exhibit 6, on which his fingerprint was found and which was found on a Pasadena street shortly after Koll's death. Although the prosecutor was apparently unaware he was asking this, and thought he was simply reviewing defendant's direct testimony with regard to a bubble shield he had owned, defendant's answer was responsive to the question asked. Defendant cites no provision of the Evidence Code limiting testimony to that the questioner intended to elicit. [17]
Before the defense began its guilt phase argument, the trial court indicated it would allow only one attorney (Miller, the lead defense attorney) to argue, despite counsel's suggestion that Maple could better argue the technical aspect of the experts. At this point, at least, the court was apparently unaware of section 1095, which permits two counsel to argue in a capital case. During a break in Miller's argument, however, the court reversed itself in part, offering to allow Maple to argue the bubble shield and paint expert testimony. Defense counsel accepted the offer: Maple said he would argue only the particular technical aspects. Court and counsel, however, apparently understood the proposed division of argument differently; the court thought Maple would argue only the paint comparison evidence, while Maple and Miller believed Maple was to argue all the expert testimony. Thus, when Maple, after a long discussion of the paint evidence, began talking about the fingerprint on the bubble shield, the court interrupted to urge him to stay on the subject of paint because Mr. Miller, as you know, is going to cover all the other aspects, or so I've been told. Maple, on the other hand, observed that there is a technical aspect of this bubble shield and the fingerprint examination that he wished to address. The court gave Maple an opportunity to tie ... up the two subjects, and Maple argued that the absence of fingerprint powder on the bubble shield's exterior (convex) surface cast doubt on the fingerprint evidence. But when Maple then began to address the testimony of the prosecution handwriting expert, the court precluded him from continuing to do so, suggesting that Miller pick this up instead. Defendant contends the trial court violated section 1095 and so restricted the defense argument as to deprive defendant of the effective assistance of counsel. The Attorney General maintains that the court's order for division of argument was within its discretionary control over trial proceedings under section 1044 and that counsel gave a competent argument. We need not decide whether the trial court's restriction on the division of argument violated section 1095 or was within the court's discretion under section 1044. Any error did not preclude counsel from arguing the case effectively. Maple was permitted to argue the technical aspect of the fingerprint evidence, as he wished to do, and made such an argument before trying to also discuss the handwriting evidence. Maple's only question regarding the handwriting expert drew an objection, which was sustained on grounds not challenged on appeal. The record does not reflect what, if any, additional topics regarding the handwriting evidence Maple would have discussed had he been permitted to continue on that subject; nor does it provide any reason to imagine that Miller was incapable of discussing those topics, if there were any. To the extent Miller needed preparation time in order to address the handwriting (or fingerprint) evidence, the record reflects that, not long after he resumed arguing, the court recessed for the day, and reconvened the next day, providing an opportunity for such additional preparation. Thus, the record reflects no prejudice, and in particular no infringement of the right to effective assistance, resulting from the court's ruling. ( People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1184-1186, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1; People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 694-695, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217, overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) Nor do we decide whether counsel's guilt phase argument was, taken as a whole, constitutionally inadequate, a point disputed by the parties on appeal. Though Miller did not address the handwriting evidence in his resumed argument, that may well have been a tactical decision. Even if the prosecution expert's testimony were successfully attacked, the spiralbound notebook remained linked to defendant because it was found in his automobile. The defense, as the Attorney General points out, may have decided that as to this topic the less said, the better. In these circumstances, where the appellate record does not reveal whether counsel had a legitimate reason for a litigation choice, we generally reserve consideration of any ineffective assistance claim for possible proceedings on petition for writ of habeas corpus. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 674-675, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392; People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267, 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134.)
Defendant attacks four standard instructions given in his case, CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.02, 8.83, and 8.83.1, each of which contains language advising the jury that if faced with two possible interpretations of the evidence, one reasonable and one unreasonable, you must accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the unreasonable. According to defendant each of these was constitutionally flawed because each sanctioned a permissive inference or factual finding against [defendant] even if it was less than more likely than not to be true. [18] We rejected this precise contention in People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1054, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544, and rejected closely related claims in People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1200, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969, People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 144, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887, and other decisions. Defendant's citation of federal decisions involving the constitutionality of permissive presumptions in criminal cases ( Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 166, fn. 28, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777; Schwendeman v. Wallenstein (9th Cir.1992) 971 F.2d 313, 316) adds no merit to his contention. The challenged CALJIC instructions do not create a presumption, permissive or mandatory, as they do not permit or require any particular ultimate fact to be inferred from any particular predicate fact; they simply direct the jury, in general, to choose a reasonable conclusion over an unreasonable one in evaluating circumstantial evidence. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130,181, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150.) Moreover, even if we viewed the instructions as creating permissive presumptions, we would find they met the more likely than not standard of Ulster County Court v. Allen, supra, 442 U.S. at page 166, footnote 28, 99 S.Ct. 2213. When only one inference may reasonably be made from circumstantial evidence, that inference is indeed more likely than not to be true. The instructions did not deprive defendant of due process or a fair and reliable penalty determination.
The jurors were instructed, by CALJIC No. 2.03, that if they found defendant made a willfully false or deliberately misleading statement concerning the crime, they could consider such statement as a circumstance tending to prove a consciousness of guilt, though not as evidence sufficient in itself to prove guilt. Defendant contends that the instruction lacked a proper evidentiary basis in this case, and that its giving therefore deprived him of his constitutional rights to trial by jury and due process. In response, the Attorney General points to two statements the jury could reasonably have found deliberately false or misleading: defendant's statement to his attorney in the robbery case that he wanted the lunch hour on November 3, 1980, to consider the prosecutor's plea bargain offer; and defendant's statement, later that day, that he needed to urinate before he could be tested for gunshot residue. We agree these statements constituted sufficient evidence to support the instruction. In reply, defendant first argues the instruction should not have been given because these statements were not inconsistent with any statement appellant made at trial. However, the instruction applies whether or not the defendant himself contradicts his earlier statement. ( People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 40, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468, overruled on other grounds in People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834, fn. 3, 226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99.) As defendant acknowledges, we have approved the instruction in several cases where the pretrial statement was shown to be false only by the testimony of prosecution witnesses. (See, e.g., People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 141, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980; People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1138-1140, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1; People v. Green, supra, at p. 40, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) Second, defendant argues that CALJIC No. 2.03 should not be given in a case where the defendant's testimony is consistent with his pretrial statements even though it is inconsistent with the prosecution's case. We need not decide whether that is a correct statement of the law (see People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 40-1, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468 [mentioning but not deciding the issue]) because the issue is not presented here. Although defendant testified, he did not testify that he wanted the lunch hour to consider the plea bargain offer or that he needed to urinate before being tested for gunshot residue. Indeed, he testified he did not make the latter statement. Because the instruction had a proper evidentiary basis, defendant's constitutional claims are without merit.
Defendant contends that references to innocence in four standard jury instructions unconstitutionally altered the burden of proof by suggesting to the jury that he bore the burden of proving his innocence, rather than the prosecution having to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [19] This court and the Court of Appeal have rejected this claim in prior decisions ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 958, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183; People v. Wade (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1491-1494, 1497, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 645), and we do so again here. In light of the numerous instructions directing the jury to convict only on proof beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt, [20] no reasonable likelihood the jury would have understood the challenged instructions otherwise exists. ( People v. Frye, supra, at p. 958, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) Taking all the instructions together, as required, the jurors would instead have understood that while the issue before them is defendant's guilt or innocence, a conviction may be returned only if the prosecution has proved defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Because there was no reasonable likelihood of misunderstanding, the challenged instructions did not deprive defendant of a fair trial or a reliable penalty determination.
Defendant complains that CALJIC No. 2.51, which, as given, stated that motive is not an element of the crime charged and need not be shown, but that its presence may tend to establish guilt, did not further caution the jury that proof of motive alone was insufficient to establish guilt. If the challenged instruction somehow suggested that motive alone was sufficient to establish guilt, defendant's point might have merit. But in fact the instruction tells the jury that motive is not an element of the crime charged (murder) and need not be shown, which leaves little conceptual room for the idea that motive could establish all the elements of murder. When CALJIC No. 2.51 is taken together with the instruction on the concurrence of act and specific intent (CALJIC No. 3.31) and the instruction outlining the elements of murder and requiring each of them to be proved in order to prove the crime (CALJIC No. 8.10), there is no reasonable likelihood ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 958, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183) it would be read as suggesting that proof of motive alone may establish guilt of murder.