Opinion ID: 1990002
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consideration of Fault

Text: The husband argues first that the court mischaracterized the parties' reconciliation following the incident of abuse and impermissibly considered fault in determining that the wife is entitled to alimony. More particularly, he argues that there is no basis in the record for the court's determination that he induced [the wife] to return to the marriage following [the] physical assault. We agree that there is no evidence to support the court's finding that the husband induced [the wife] to return to the marriage following [the] physical assault. At trial, the wife testified that she returned to the home following the assault because [her] children were still young, [t]hey didn't know why their mother left, and the husband explained to [the children] that he had done something wrong. We have not found, and the wife has failed to provide, any evidence that supports the court's deduction from this testimony that there was inducement. Because this finding was clearly erroneous and was central to the court's decision regarding alimony, we vacate the award and remand. The husband also contends that the court should not have considered his conduct because the parties stipulated to a divorce on irreconcilable differences grounds and the court adopted their stipulation. Pursuant to RSA 458:7-a (Supp. 2007), parties are entitled to a no-fault divorce if irreconcilable differences . . . have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage. The intent of this statute is to permit parties to dissolve their marriage, while minimiz[ing] the acrimony attending divorce proceedings. Murphy v. Murphy, 116 N.H. 672, 673, 366 A.2d 479 (1976). Because this purpose could be defeated should a party offer evidence of fault in a no-fault divorce, we held in Murphy that in a divorce under RSA 458:7-a . . . the trier of fact may properly in [its] discretion exclude evidence of fault on the issue of alimony. Id. at 674, 366 A.2d 479. We later broadened our interpretation of RSA 458:7-a in Chabot v. Chabot, 126 N.H. 793, 795, 497 A.2d 851 (1985). There, we stated that, when a court grants a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences, fault would not be considered on the questions of property division or alimony. Id.; see also Boucher v. Boucher, 131 N.H. 377, 379, 553 A.2d 313 (1988) ([E]vidence of fault may be considered in an award of alimony or division of property if a fault ground is proven to be the primary cause of the marital breakdown. (quotation omitted)). This rule is in accord with the alimony statute itself, which limits consideration of fault to cases where fault was the basis of the divorce and caused the breakdown of the marriage. See RSA 458:19, IV(b) (adopting the definition of fault provided by RSA 458:16-a, II( l ) (2004); to wit, the fault of either party as specified in RSA 458:7 [the fault-based divorce statute] if said fault caused the breakdown of the marriage). In the instant case, the court stated that it was permitted to consider the underlying circumstances giving rise to the divorce and proceeded to recite the following: [The husband] testified that he knew at least five years, and maybe as much as ten years, prior to the separation that he intended to divorce [the wife]. This was near to the time that he induced [the wife] to return to the marriage following a physical assault upon her. Had he shared this information with [the wife] in a timely way, she might have been better able to secure other employment that would give her greater income and a more substantial retirement in old age. His failure to share this information, and his inducement for her to return to the marriage, has impeded her ability to be self sufficient. Even if she were to return to school at a cost of $13,000 to $15,000 over two to three years, she could not receive a master's degree soon enough to have a vested pension. Additionally, [the wife] had a reasonable expectation that support from [the husband]'s parents would continue. The Court concludes that [the wife] is in need of alimony. The husband's argument is essentially that consideration of these underlying circumstances was tantamount to consideration of fault. A similar argument was put forward by the defendant in Boucher, 131 N.H. at 379-80, 553 A.2d 313. In that case, a marital master granted divorce on irreconcilable differences grounds, but nevertheless cited the defendant's conduct throughout the marriage as support for its decision to award the parties' primary residence to the plaintiff. Id. at 379, 553 A.2d 313. On appeal, the defendant argued that the master's consideration of such conduct was indistinguishable from consideration of fault. Id. The plaintiff, in contrast, asserted that the master's reference to conduct throughout the marriage referred to the defendant's vacating of, and loss of interest in the home. Id. She argued that the master had not erred because such disinterest could be relevant on the issue of a party's contribution and attachment to an asset. Id. at 379-80, 553 A.2d 313. We acknowledged that the defendant's conduct could have been used by the master for both the impermissible purpose of analyzing fault, and for the permissible purpose of ascertaining his contribution to the home. Id. at 380, 553 A.2d 313. Because we could not determine from the record what conduct the master had considered, we remanded the case. Id. Here, as in Boucher, the court's discussion of the husband's conduct could be construed in several ways. The court could have been considering the husband's conduct as relevant to its ultimate determination that the wife has an impeded . . . ability to be self sufficient. Such use of the husband's conduct would be permissible because the court was required to consider the party in need['s] . . . [ability] to be self-supporting prior to awarding alimony. RSA 458:19, I(c). But, it is also possible that the court believed that it had the discretion to consider what it thought to be each party's fault in the breakdown of the marriage, as intimated from its statement that it could consider the circumstances giving rise to the divorce. If that is the case, the court was in error. Because we cannot determine from the record in precisely what fashion the court considered the husband's conduct, we must remand. Boucher, 131 N.H. at 380, 553 A.2d 313.