Opinion ID: 777439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the denial of an offense-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility

Text: 30 In their final challenge to their sentences, Nobelda and Leda argue that the district court erroneously adopted the PSRs' findings that they were not entitled to reductions in their offense levels for acceptance of responsibility because they had minimized their culpability for the offense. Subsection 3E1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that a defendant's offense level should be decreased by two [i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) (2000). 14 Following the guidance provided in the commentary to section 3E1.1, this court recognizes that the sentencing court is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility and thus accords great deference to the sentencing court's finding on this issue. Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 5; see also United States v. Hooten, 942 F.2d 878, 883 (5th Cir.1991). 31 In an addendum to Nobelda's PSR, the probation officer explained his decision not to recommend a reduction in her offense level for acceptance of responsibility: 32 We maintain that [Nobelda] has not demonstrated full responsibility for her actions in this conspiracy, as she emp[h]atically denied being a smuggler and minimized her role by stating that she was only trying to help out her neighbors. 33 At the sentencing hearing, the government's attorney did not defend the PSR's recommendation regarding acceptance of responsibility, but rather stated that [i]t's hard for me to object [to an offense-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility] when the person comes in and pleads guilty to the offense short of trial and then she did debrief. After noting the PSR's conclusion that Nobelda had minimized the seriousness of her actions by stating that she was trying to help her neighbors, the district court asked Nobelda whether she would like to say anything about the acceptance of responsibility issue. 15 Nobelda responded: 34 I accepted my responsibility because ... I accepted the truth because I participated and I helped those people out, but I want it to be clear that at no moment I was caught with anybody, at no moment.... [A]t no moment did those people do the deal with me. They paid her (the lady with the children) but at no moment did they pay me. 35 The court then overruled Nobelda's objection and adopted the PSR's finding that she had not accepted responsibility to the extent necessary to warrant an offense-level decrease under section 3E1.1. 36 Turning to Leda's objection, the district court pointed to her written statement offered to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility, which the probation officer had deemed insufficient: 37 I am writing this statement so that I can attempt to express how I badly feel for my actions in committing the offense.... I knew that my sister, Nobelda Cabrera, was involved in helping aliens illegally enter the United States. She would do this by arranging for small children to accompany the aliens as they crossed the border. I am not sure of the exact details and I don't know how many times she did this. But I admit that I helped her on some occasions by — among other things — taking telephone messages regarding the smuggling, and picking up money that was paid because of the smuggling. I realize that I assisted her and contributed to her illegal conduct. 38 The probation officer determined that this statement minimized Leda's role by directing the aggravating role to Nobelda. Leda made a similar statement at the sentencing hearing when the district court gave her the opportunity to speak about her acceptance of responsibility: 39 I accept my responsibility. And I am asking you and all the authorities for forgiveness. I accept that I took messages for my sister. I accept that I knew ... what she was doing. But I don't have so much to do with this thing because many times I talked with her and she never gave me the specific explanation. 40 The district court also overruled Leda's objection and adopted the PSR's finding that she was not entitled to an offense-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility. 41 Pointing to the commentary to section 3E1.1, Nobelda and Leda argue that the district court erroneously denied them acceptance-of-responsibility reductions because they timely admitted the conduct comprising the offense of conviction and ha[ve] not falsely denied the additional relevant conduct for which [they are] accountable. Nobelda and Leda are correct that it is appropriate for the district court to consider whether a defendant has truthfully admitt[ed] the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction, and truthfully admitt[ed] or not falsely den[ied] any additional relevant conduct [i]n determining whether a defendant qualifies under subsection [3E1.1](a). U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 1(a) (2000). While the commentary accords particular importance to this consideration by deeming it significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility if accompanied by a timely guilty plea, see id. § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 3, 16 it is only one of the considerations that the commentary deems appropriate, and the commentary specifies that its list of appropriate considerations is not exhaustive, see id. § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 1. 42 Particularly in light of the great deference that we owe the district court's acceptance-of-responsibility findings, we cannot say that it was clear error to conclude that Nobelda and Leda's statements minimized their conduct to the extent that they were not completely truthful or that Nobelda and Leda falsely denied some of their relevant conduct. Moreover, even assuming Nobelda and Leda's statements were truthful and did not falsely deny their offense conduct, it would not have been clear error for the district to conclude that their minimization of their conduct outweighed this significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility. Nobelda and Leda bear[] the burden of demonstrating the recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility. Ayala, 47 F.3d at 690. Given that Nobelda and Leda's statements were somewhat equivocal and that the district court is particularly well-situated to ascertain whether defendants have demonstrated acceptance of responsibility, the district court's conclusion that Nobelda and Leda failed to meet this burden is not clearly erroneous.