Opinion ID: 6536839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Superior Court Applied The Proper Standard Of Proof.

Text: The Lachers also claim that the McCavits waived their argument that the superior court improperly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof because they did not request the court to apply a different standard. The McCavits respond that [p]arties do not have to invoke burdens of proof and persuasion; they are automatic. Preponderance of the evidence is the general burden of persuasion in civil cases. 13 A party that wants the court to apply a higher standard of proof must request it; 14 failure to raise this issue before the trial court fails to preserve the issue for appeal. 15 When a party fails to preserve such  an issue for appeal, we review it for plain error. 16 To demonstrate plain error, the McCavits must prove that an obvious mistake has been made which creates a high likelihood that injustice has resulted. 17 Such a mistake is not present in this case. In Fernandes v. Portwine we explicitly held that preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate standard of proof for nuisance cases. 18 The McCavits primarily rely on Spenard Action Committee v. Lot 3, Block 1, Evergreen Subdivision 19 to argue that clear and convincing evidence should apply. But we distinguished Spenard Action Committee in Fernandes . 20 In Spenard Action Committee the statutes at issue were quasi-criminal nuisance statutes 21 that imposed heavy sanctions and therefore demanded a higher burden. 22 In Fernandes we rejected the suggestion that the higher burden was appropriate in the absence of such concerns and held that a preponderance of the evidence standard applied in private nuisance cases. 23 The McCavits have failed to demonstrate that the present case demands the higher standard employed in Spenard Action Commitee . The superior court did not plainly err by applying the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. C. We Extend Our Rule Of Reasonable Use To Riparian And Littoral Landowners And Remand For The Superior Court To Apply The Rule To Determine Whether The McCavits' Dock Was An Unreasonable Interference With The Lachers' Littoral Rights.
Alaska is unique in that [t]he people of the state have a constitutional right to free access to and use of the navigable or public water of the state. 24 This constitutional right does not create a private cause of action; rather, the constitutional right of free access to and use of navigable or public water is a right shared by the public 25 and enforced by the State. 26 Litigation over water rights frequently involves competing consumptive uses, such as a riparian or littoral landowner's right to appropriate a quantity of water for purposes such as agriculture. 27 Alaska  has adopted the Water Use Act to regulate the appropriation and consumptive use of water. 28 But the McCavits' dock is not a consumptive use of water; the McCavits built a structure in the water and the Lachers allege that the placement of the structure affects their property rights. Our previous cases regarding non-consumptive uses of water have not involved the rights of riparian neighbors. We have considered competing non-consumptive uses in the context of the natural flow of surface water, specifically surface water drainage, 29 melting permafrost drainage, 30 and surface water diversion. 31 We have generally applied the reasonable use rule allowing the riparian or littoral landowner to make a reasonable use of his land, even though the flow of surface waters is altered thereby and causes harm to others, but incurs liability when his harmful interference ... is unreasonable. 32 We must now consider different non-consumptive uses: the right of access and the right to use. Because we have applied the reasonable use rule in other cases involving the non-consumptive use of water, we extend its application to this arena. In applying such a rule, we must consider what rights each littoral landowner has and how those rights affect a neighbor's correlative rights.

Before statehood there was a general common law riparian and littoral right of access to deep or navigable waters. 33 Under this general law, a riparian or littoral landowner had the right of access to [deep or navigable] waters for the purpose of navigation, upon which the owner could base an action against an intruder who places obstacles on the shore that prevent him [or her] from having access to the navigable waters. 34 Several cases affirmatively recognized this general rule before Alaska became a state. 35 After statehood, in Wernberg v. State we specifically recognized that the right of riparian and littoral landowners of access to deep or navigable waters from their upland properties was a private property right that could not be taken for public use by the government unless it paid just compensation. 36 We were particularly concerned that, due to Alaska's unique geography and economy, taking such a right from a riparian or littoral landowner without just compensation would render property valueless or greatly reduce its value. 37 Without discussing the full scope of this right, we noted that the right of access includes more than just access to the main stream of a channel. 38  We revisited the issue in Classen v. State, Department of Highways , setting some limits on the right of access. In that case, a riparian owner challenged the construction of a bridge that would interfere with his floatplane business. 39 We held that the bridge was not a taking of the landowner's riparian right of access because he still ha[d] unlimited access to the river itself, for whatever use he cho[se] to make of it; only his access to the air via the river was obstructed. 40 Thus, although Wernberg had broadened the right of access, it was not so broad as to include a riparian or littoral landowner's right of access to the air via navigable water.
Pre-statehood courts considered the right to wharf out as a subsidiary to the right of access, meaning a riparian or littoral landowner only had the right to wharf out as the means by which he or she exercised the right of access. 41 In Dalton v. Hazelet the Ninth Circuit noted that owners of land bordering on or bounded by navigable waters ... ha[ve] the right to a free and unobstructed access to such waters. 42 In Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co. v. Northern Lumber Mills , the territorial court noted that the right of access to navigable water meant access to or from the water in the usual way by which such access is attained and enjoyed; and that is dependent upon the purpose for which such access is desired, and upon the reasonableness of the manner in which it is proposed to make such right available. 43 Comparing the right of access to navigable waters to that of access to a highway, the court explained that a littoral landowner had the right to wharf out not because he [or she] ha[d] a right to erect a structure on the shore, but because he [or she] ha[d] a right of access to the deep water, and ... [could not] enjoy that right except by means of a wharf. 44 But the territorial court limited this right: [T]he use must be reasonable. ... And 'what shall be deemed a reasonable and proper use of a way depends largely on the local situation and on the public usage.'  45 It announced that reasonable access, according to circumstances, [is] all the upland owner [is] entitled to. 46 Additionally, the territorial court noted that it would not intervene if a riparian or littoral landowner has other and equally convenient means of access to navigable waters or if the landowner had not yet reasonably exercised his or her right of access. 47 Since statehood we have had only one opportunity to discuss the right to wharf out, in State, Department of Natural Resources v. Alaska Riverways, Inc. 48 There we concluded that Wernberg did not create an independent right to wharf out, and all that existed was the common-law right ... that was recognized in territorial days. 49 We noted, however, that this common-law right to wharf out is limited by the state's exercise of its authority under the public trust doctrine as incorporated by the Alaska Constitution  and Alaska Statutes. 50 Thus, the right to wharf out is the means by which a riparian or littoral landowner may exercise his or her right of access to deep or navigable waters, and it may not be unreasonably obstructed. This right is a qualified right and subject to the State regulations. 51
Article VIII, § 16 of the Alaska Constitution establishes a right to common use of public and navigable state waters that protects a riparian and littoral landowner's right to use the water abutting the land: No person shall be involuntarily divested of his right to the use of waters ... except for a superior beneficial use or public purpose and then only with just compensation and by operation of law. 52 We noted in Classen that the decision in Wernberg implied that [this language] is coterminous with riparian rights. 53 Thus, a riparian or littoral landowner has an individual property interest in the use of water abutting his or her land, but we have never specified what types of uses this may include. 54 Other jurisdictions have upheld a riparian right to use water for recreational purposes. 55 We need not specify types of uses allowed because a reasonable use rule allows for a riparian or littoral landowner to use the abutting waters in any lawful way so long as that use is reasonable.
We now extend our rule of reasonableness to determine a riparian or littoral landowner's water rights. In so doing we take into account Alaska's unique public trust doctrine and historical common-law rights. Riparian and littoral landowners have the right of reasonable access to and use of adjacent navigable and public waters of the State, as they are defined by the legislature, so long as the access or use is lawful and does not unreasonably interfere with the correlative rights of other riparian or littoral landowners. 56 What is reasonable is a question of fact, 57 to be determined by weighing a variety of factors.
All riparian and littoral landowners have correlative water rights associated with their upland properties. When one landowner's exercise of his or her right interferes with a neighboring landowner's exercise of the same, the court must compare the two uses. The court must consider: (1) whether the injured landowner's allegedly interfered-with use is reasonable, and (2) whether the use causing the alleged interference is unreasonable. To determine the reasonableness of each landowner's use, the fact finder must consider various factors in the context of the specific facts and circumstances of the particular case. The Restatement (Second) of Torts helpfully outlines various factors that a court may consider: (1) the use's purpose; (2) the use's suitability; (3) the use's economic value; (4) the use's social value; (5) the extent or amount of harm the use causes; (6) the practicality of adjusting the use or method of use to avoid harm; (7) the practicality of adjusting  the quantity of water used; (8) existing values of the use; and (9) the justice of requiring the user causing harm to bear the loss. 58
Because we are announcing a new rule for the unreasonable interference with riparian or littoral rights, the superior court did not have the benefit of the rule in its application of the law. Pursuant to the rule we now announce, we must vacate the judgment and remand to the superior court to apply it. On remand the superior court must determine the reasonableness of the McCavits' and Lachers' respective littoral uses and conduct the proper balancing test to determine whether the McCavits' use unreasonably interferes with the Lachers' use. 59 The superior court must conduct this test before it can determine whether the McCavits' dock constitutes a private nuisance. An unreasonable interference with a riparian or littoral right might, but also might not, be a private nuisance. While the two torts likely overlap in the present case, they are distinguishable and may not always overlap in every instance. 60 Moreover, if the superior court determines on remand that the McCavits' dock is reasonable or that the Lachers' use is unreasonable, the McCavits' dock necessarily cannot be a private nuisance. The superior court therefore must first go through the unreasonable interference with riparian or littoral rights analysis to determine whether the McCavits' dock constitutes an unreasonable interference with the Lachers' littoral rights before it can determine whether it constitutes a private nuisance. D. Private Nuisance Only if the superior court determines that the McCavits' dock constitutes an unreasonable interference with riparian rights should it consider whether it also constitutes a private nuisance. Alaska Statute 09.45.255 defines private nuisance as a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of real property, including water. In Riddle v. Lanser we considered whether odors emanating from a farmer's storage of [roughly 10 million gallons of] septage on his farmland created a nuisance to adjacent landowners. 61 There, the odors were so significant and the nuisance was so obvious that we found it unnecessary to conduct a balancing test. 62 Here the nuisance is not so obvious. Additionally, while the Lachers could have and did bring both riparian rights and nuisance claims, these claims overlapped entirely because the Lachers asserted only that the McCavits' dock affected their interests in the access to and use of the water abutting their land. 63 While it is possible that the Lachers could have claimed that the McCavits' dock affected other property rights - such as view and property value - they did not do so. As such, while view and property value  may be factors for the court to consider on remand, they may not become new claims and the Lachers are not entitled to any damages based on loss of view or diminution of property value. E. Attorney's Fees Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82(a) states that, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties or provided by law, the prevailing party in a civil case shall be awarded attorney's fees. The superior court has broad discretion to determine the prevailing party. 64 But because we remand this case and announce a new balancing test that may affect the superior court's prevailing-party analysis, 65 we vacate the superior court's award of attorney's fees.