Opinion ID: 2446726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instruction on Undue Influence

Text: [¶ 8] Burnham also argues that the Superior Court erroneously instructed the jury regarding the relationship between proof of a confidential relationship and a finding of undue influence. He contends that this issue is controlled by Ruebsamen, 340 A.2d at 37, which held that the presumption of undue influence arising from proof of a confidential relationship disappears if the factfinder is persuaded that the probabilities as to undue influence are in equilibrium. The court's instruction to the jury, which required Burnham to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that undue influence did not exist in order to overcome the presumption, was plainly contrary to this standard. As Theriault asserts, however, the instruction was in accord with M.R. Evid. 301(a), which states: In all civil actions and proceedings, except as otherwise provided by statute or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence. [¶ 9] The approach applied in Ruebsamen was based on Hinds v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 Me. 349, 364, 155 A.2d 721, 730 (1959), which stated: [A] disputable presumption persists until the contrary evidence persuades the factfinder that the balance of probabilities is in equilibrium, or, stated otherwise, until the evidence satisfies the jury or factfinder that it is as probable that the presumed fact does not exist as that it does exist. More recently, we have held in other contexts that Rule 301 supercedes the Hinds rule regarding presumptions. See Estate of Lewis, 2001 ME 74, ¶ 6, 770 A.2d 619, 622; Poitras v. R.E. Glidden Body Shop, Inc., 430 A.2d 1113, 1119 n. 1 (Me.1981). [3] M.R. Evid. 301(a) applies to presumptions [i]n all civil actions and proceedings, except as otherwise provided by statute or by these rules. There is no statute or rule that exempts an action for undue influence from the rule. Thus, the Ruebsamen equilibrium standard has been superceded by Rule 301(a)'s preponderance standard. [¶ 10] Burnham, citing In re Will of Fenwick, 348 A.2d 12 (Me.1975), counters that Rule 301 does not apply because proof of a confidential relationship merely creates a permissible inference of undue influence, rather than a presumption. We are not persuaded. [¶ 11] In re Will of Fenwick held that in a will contest, evidence of a confidential relationship between the testator and the person who is asserted to have influenced the testator permits an inference of undue influence, but does not give rise to a presumption of undue influence. 348 A.2d at 15. Our jurisprudence draws a clear distinction, however, between will contests and actions for tortious interference. [4] The complainant in a will contest seeks to set aside a testator's entire will, while the complainant in a civil tort generally seeks only monetary damages. For this reason, our decisions have adopted a more stringent standard of proof in will contest proceedings than in actions for tortious interference. Compare Avery, 670 A.2d at 925 (stating that a plaintiff in a tortious interference case must prove a confidential relationship by a preponderance of the evidence), with Estate of Lewis, 2001 ME 74, ¶ 7, 770 A.2d at 622 (stating that a plaintiff in a probate matter must prove a confidential relationship by clear and convincing evidence and noting that a party's reliance on Avery was misplaced because Avery was not a will contest). The more demanding approach toward proof of undue influence embraced in Fenwick does not apply in the less demanding setting of this civil tort action. [¶ 12] The Superior Court correctly applied M.R. Evid. 301 in its instructions to the jury. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.