Opinion ID: 3044975
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Simple Assault Instruction

Text: Appellant argues that the evidence in the record would have permitted a jury to convict him of a simple assault and therefore the District Court erred in refusing to give that instruction. “[A] lesser-included offense instruction is proper where there is a disputed issue of fact which would enable the jury rationally to find that, although the elements of the charged greater offense have not been proved, all the elements of one or more lesser offenses have been.” United States v. Methvin, 441 F.2d 584, 586 (5th Cir. 1971) (quoting Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 451, 85 S. Ct. 1004, 1010, 13 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1965) (alterations omitted).8 We review a district court’s refusal to give a requested instruction for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cornillie, 92 F.3d 1108, 1109 (11th Cir. 1996). “An 7 Appellant’s desired instruction actually is a “defense of others” defense—Defendant’s testimony at trial indicates that he was acting in defense of his father. DE 61:34-35. We need not comment on the availability of this defense under federal law because Appellant failed to request this instruction. For the purpose of this opinion, however, we use self-defense in place of “defense of others.” 8 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981. 11 Case: 12-13809 Date Filed: 01/16/2014 Page: 12 of 25 abuse of discretion may occur where the evidence would permit a rational jury to find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense and not the greater.” Id. An assault is not classifiable as a “simple assault” if the assailant had physical contact with the victim. Martinez, 486 F.3d at 1246. Here, witness testimony from both the government and Appellant, not to mention the securitycamera footage, made it abundantly clear that Appellant made physical contact with Degraves. Because Appellant and R.A. Gutierrez both conceded in their testimony that Appellant touched Degraves, it was proper for the District Court to deny the instruction. Appellant argues that the defense of simple assault is not foreclosed because at trial Appellant did not concede that he had the requisite intent for forcible assault. Appellant cites Fallen and Martinez for the proposition that Appellant needed to intend to inflict serious bodily injury on the victim to be eligible for forcible assault. According to Appellant, unlike in Martinez—where the defendant conceded he had the requisite intent—here, Appellant disputed he had the intent to cause serious bodily injury and thus was entitled to a simple assault instruction. Appellant misreads Fallen and Martinez. In Fallen, we held that forcible assault could exist without physical contact where there was a willful attempt to inflict injury plus something more, “such as a willful attempt or threat to cause serious bodily injury, coupled with an apparent 12 Case: 12-13809 Date Filed: 01/16/2014 Page: 13 of 25 present ability” to do so, which causes reasonable apprehension of serious bodily harm to the intended victim. Fallen, 256 F.3d at 1088 (emphasis added). The assault in Fallen exemplified the kind of intent necessary to constitute forcible assault without physical contact. Despite Appellant’s contention to the contrary, Fallen does not require the jury to find intent to inflict serious bodily injury where physical contact has been made. The intent instruction we upheld in Martinez illustrates that the intent required under § 111(a)(1) is to voluntarily intend the act that constituted the assault—that is, where there is physical contact, it is irrelevant whether the defendant intended to cause serious bodily injury. 486 F.3d at 1245-46; see also Ettinger, 344 F.3d at 1160 (holding that specific intent is not required under § 111). Accordingly, because it was undisputed that Appellant made physical contact with Degraves, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give an instruction relevant only to a scenario in which no physical contact had occurred.9 9 Appellant also argues that the jury charge did not include an instruction for the offense described in § 111(a)(1), though, he claims, this is the offense for which he was found guilty. This argument is meritless. Appellant was charged with violating § 111(a)(1) and (b)—for which he was found guilty. Section 111(b) is merely an enhancement to the offense enumerated in § 111(a)(1). Section 111(a)(1) requires a finding that Appellant forcibly assaulted a federal officer while he was performing his official duty. Section 111(b) requires the jury to find an additional element—that bodily injury was inflicted on the victim of the assault. The jury was so instructed. Appellant was entitled to receive an instruction that would have described the elements of § 111(a)(1) separately—that is, the lesser-included offense of forcible assault with physical contact that did not require a finding of bodily injury. Appellant, however, rejected this 13 Case: 12-13809 Date Filed: 01/16/2014 Page: 14 of 25