Opinion ID: 2567159
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether There Was Prosecutorial Misconduct

Text: [¶ 18] Jensen claims that the prosecutor engaged in improper cross-examination when he repeatedly asked Jensen if Spears or an investigating officer were lying in their testimony. The first instance of such questioning occurred when Jensen expressed disagreement with certain facts in the investigating officer's report: Q: And did Officer Hannigan talk to you about blocking [Spears] in the bathroom? A: Officer Hannigan asked me what happened that night. I explained up to the bathroom, and when he  it started  asking about blocking and all of that other stuff, the conversation on my part ended. Q: Did you tell Officer Spears [sic]  or Officer Hannigan  I'm sorry  that you did block Spears' way out of the bathroom because she did not wish  because you did not wish her to leave? A: No. Q: So if Officer  if Officer Hannigan put that in his report, then he's not telling the truth? A: There's [sic] a few things that Officer Hannigan put in there that did not even come out of my mouth. I actually talked to the officer that booked me in last night, and she couldn't remember anything about that. Q: Officer Hannigan lied about several things? A: I'm pretty sure Officer Hannigan put a few things that weren't valid in that. Q: How are you sure about this? A: Because I remember that night. I may have blown a .81[sic], but when something that crucial happens in my life, it's almost like every detail is right on the back of my head. I can remember that night picture perfect. Q: Okay. So it was Officer Hannigan was wrong then, or he lied then when he wrote this police report out? A: He was wrong. I ended it at the bathroom, yes. The cross-examination of Jensen continued in a similar vein as the prosecutor repeatedly asked him whether Spears or Officer Hannigan were lying, not telling the truth, making it up, or untruthful in those aspects of their testimony that conflicted with Jensen's. In his closing argument, the prosecutor continued by saying, In fact, Mr. Jensen says it's all a lie.... and [Jensen] claims that he's here today because Ms. Spears is lying, making this up to get him. And Officer Hannigan is lying and made up all the testimony that you heard today. Jensen argues that resolution of this case hinged on the credibility, or lack thereof, of the witnesses, and that since he and Spears were the only witnesses to the charged crimes, prejudice resulted from the prosecutor's use of this cross-examination tactic because it put the jury in the position of having to call Spears and a police officer liars. [¶ 19] We have said in the context of closing argument that it is not reversible error for a prosecutor to argue that a defendant is a liar when the evidence supports a reasonable inference that such is in fact the case. Beaugureau v. State, 2002 WY 160, ¶ 14, 56 P.3d 626, ¶ 14 (Wyo.2002) (citing Barnes v. State, 642 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Wyo.1982)). In this case, there existed express contradictory testimony rendering a reasonable inference that at least one of the witnesses was lying. Beaugureau, ¶ 14; Wheeler v. State, 691 P.2d 599, 604-5 (Wyo.1984). The prosecutor was presenting an argument to the jury based upon reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. Furthermore, while making this argument, the prosecutor made it clear to the jury that the decision rested with them when he quoted the jury instructions that stated, ... if an attorney hints by a question that certain things are or are not true, you should disregard the hint. A question is not evidence, and it should be considered only to the extent that it supplies meaning to the answer. We find no error in the prosecutor's statements in closing argument. [¶ 20] Turning to the prosecutor's cross-examination of Jensen, we note, generally, that a defendant who testifies in a criminal case may be cross-examined regarding his credibility just like any other witness. Gist v. State, 766 P.2d 1149, 1152-53 (Wyo.1988); MacLaird v. State, 718 P.2d 41, 47 (Wyo.1986); Porter v. State, 440 P.2d 249, 250 (Wyo.1968). In Beaugureau, however, we observed that there was a limit to the cross-examination of a criminal defendant: Nonetheless, it is likewise error and misconduct for the prosecutor to cross-examine a defendant using the lying or mistaken technique ( i.e., well, then if so-and-so said such-and-such, was he mistaken or lying?). Such questions are improper. If the prosecutor merely asked Beaugureau about what other witnesses had to say, allowing the jury to draw its own conclusions, the cross-examination would not have been objectionable. State v. Diggs, 272 Kan. 349, 34 P.3d 63, 72-73 (2001); State v. Manning, 270 Kan. 674, 19 P.3d 84, 100-3 (2001) (Questions which compel a defendant or witness to comment on the credibility of another witness are improper. It is the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. (collecting cases)); State v. Stevenson, 70 Conn.App. 29, 797 A.2d 1, 7-9 (2002) (Such questions are improper because they require a defendant to comment on another witness' veracity ... invade the province of the jury, create the risk that the jury may conclude that, in order to acquit the defendant, it must find that the other witnesses lied, and distort the state's burden of proof.) (relying on State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 793 A.2d 226, 234-39 (2002)) (collecting cases); also see State v. Walden, 69 Wash.App. 183, 847 P.2d 956, 959 (1993); and State v. Pitts, No. 47488-0-I, 2001 WL 1641225 at  (Wash.App. Div. 1, Dec.24, 2001) (per curiam) (use of word lying is misconduct; use of word mistaken merely objectionable). Beaugureau, ¶ 17. The reasoning for prohibiting this type of questioning was succinctly summarized by the Iowa Supreme Court: [A] defendant who is asked whether another person lied is commenting directly on the other person's credibility. The issue then is whether any purpose is served in asking a defendant whether another witness is lying. We think the predominate, if not sole, purpose of such questioning is simply to make the defendant look bad, as implied by the Maryland court's observation in [ Fisher v. State, 128 Md.App. 79, 736 A.2d 1125, 1163 (1999)] that the accused's answer is unimportant.    The accused's answer is unimportant because the accused is in a no-win situation. If the defendant says the other witness is lying, then the defendant is put in the position of calling someone a liar, a particularly unenviable state when the other witness is a law enforcement officer. See [ State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 787 (Utah 1992)] (holding such questions are improper because they put the defendant in the untenable position of commenting on the character and motivations of another witness who may appear sympathetic to the jury). If the defendant says a contradictory witness is not lying, then a fair inference is that the defendant is lying. But, as any trial lawyer knows, there may be many explanations for differing descriptions of the same event. People have different perceptions of the same conversation that affect how and what they remember. Perhaps there was a misunderstanding of what was said; perhaps one person was distracted and did not fully or correctly hear the words uttered by the other person. People sometimes hear what they want to hear. It is unjust to make the defendant give an opinion as to who is lying when, in fact, it is possible that neither witness has deliberately misrepresented the truth. It is also unreasonable to expect the defendant to sift through the variables of human communication to offer an alternative explanation for contradictions in witnesses' testimony. We also think the use of this tactic  asking the defendant whether another witness is lying  is incompatible with the duties of a prosecutor. Unfairly questioning the defendant simply to make the defendant look bad in front of the jury regardless of the answer given is not consistent with the prosecutor's primary obligation to seek justice, not simply a conviction. Nor is such questioning consistent with the prosecutor's duty to the defendant to ensure a fair trial, including a verdict that rests on the evidence and not on passion or prejudice. [ State v. Casteneda-Perez, 61 Wash.App. 354, 810 P.2d 74, 79 (Wash.Ct.App.1991)] (holding prosecutor's questions asking witnesses whether other witnesses were lying was contrary to the duty of prosecutors, which is to seek convictions based only on probative evidence and sound reason). State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 872-73 (Iowa 2003) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). [¶ 21] The State attempts to excuse the prosecutor's form of cross-examination by claiming that it was Jensen who initiated the attack on the veracity of Spears and Officer Hannigan. The State argues that the prosecutor was merely attempting to clarify unexpected answers given by Jensen in response to questions exploring the contradictions between his testimony and that offered by Spears and the officer. The State characterizes the prosecutor's questions as not particularly artful but innocuous. [¶ 22] After reviewing the record, we cannot agree with the State's characterization. A review of the excerpt of Jensen's cross-examination quoted above shows that after Jensen disputed parts of the investigating officer's report, the prosecutor asked whether the officer was not telling the truth and then followed that up with multiple instances of questions that specifically asked whether the officer or Spears was lying. This is precisely the type of questioning that we found improper in Beaugureau. We stress again here that it is error and misconduct for the prosecutor to cross-examine a defendant using the lying or not telling the truth or mistaken technique. Beaugureau, ¶ 17; see also Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 13, ¶ 21, 17 P.3d 715, ¶ 21 (Wyo.2001). Even if Jensen had been the party that initially ventured into this territory by calling Officer Hannigan or Spears a liar, the prosecutor still has the duty to refrain from this type of questioning. Returning to the Iowa decision cited above, we agree with the conclusion of that court that a defendant cannot open the door to the prosecution's use of this tactic. [5] For the reasons discussed, we find more persuasive the rationale of those courts that have held it is improper to ask the defendant whether another witness has lied. We also decline to recognize an exception to this rule as a handful of courts have done. The underlying rationale of those courts recognizing an exception is that the defendant has opened the door by contradicting testimony of government witnesses in circumstances that exclude the possibility that the prosecution's witnesses may have been mistaken or [may have] testified to events based on assumptions or faulty memory. [ People v. Overlee, 236 A.D.2d 133, 666 N.Y.S.2d 572, 577 (1997); State v. Morales, 198 Ariz. 372, 10 P.3d 630, 633 (Ariz.Ct.App.2000); State v. Pilot, 595 N.W.2d 511, 518 (Minn.1999)] We think, however, that whether the defendant has invited the questioning is more properly considered in assessing the prejudice element of a due process claim. First of all, the justification for admitting this evidencethat the defendant has opened the doordoes not resolve the fundamental doubt as to the probative value of such questioning. [ State v. Flanagan, 111 N.M. 93, 801 P.2d 675, 679 (N.M.Ct.App.1990)] (Whether the defendant believes the other witnesses were truthful or lying is simply irrelevant.); People v. Berrios, 298 A.D.2d 597, 750 N.Y.S.2d 302, 302 (2002) (Whether the defendant believed that the other witnesses were lying is irrelevant. (Citation omitted.)) Secondly, the exception depends on a difficult determinationwhether alternative explanations exist for discrepancies in the witness' testimony, a decision that more properly rests with the jury. Finally, prosecutors and trial judges will have more guidance in assuring proper examination of witnesses with a bright-line rule that bars such inquiries without exception. For these reasons, we hold were-they-lying questions are improper under any circumstance. See [ State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 793 A.2d 226, 239 (Conn.2002)] (rejecting exception). Graves, 668 N.W.2d at 873. The proper approach for a prosecutor is to ask the defendant what other witnesses had to say [and allow] the jury to draw its own conclusions and then make a proper closing argument based on the testimony. Beaugureau, ¶¶ 14 and 17. The prosecutor's questions were not innocuous. They were improper. [¶ 23] The question before us, then, is whether the prosecutor's misconduct was prejudicial. Beaugureau, ¶ 18. Jensen failed to object to any of the prosecutor's questions so our review is through the plain error prism. [6] Prosecutorial misconduct `has always been condemned in this state.' Earll v. State, 2001 WY 66, ¶ 9, 29 P.3d 787, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2001) (quoting Valerio v. State, 527 P.2d 154, 156 (Wyo.1974)). Whether such misconduct has been reviewed on the basis of harmless error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and W.R.A.P. 9.04, or on the basis of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and W.R.A.P. 9.05, this Court has focused on whether such error affected an accused's substantial rights. The accused's right to a fair trial is a substantial right. Before we hold that an error has affected an accused's substantial right, thus requiring reversal of a conviction, we must conclude that, based on the entire record, a reasonable possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the accused. Earll, ¶ 9. Simmons v. State, 2003 WY 84, ¶ 15, 72 P.3d 803, ¶ 15 (Wyo.2003) (quoting Williams v. State, 2002 WY 136, ¶ 21, 54 P.3d 248, ¶ 21 (Wyo.2002)). [¶ 24] After reviewing the entire record, we cannot conclude that, in the absence of the prosecutor's misconduct, a reasonable possibility exists that the verdict would have been more favorable to Jensen. Although Jensen and Spears presented differing accounts of the events on the night in question, the circumstantial evidence presented at trial strongly corroborated Spears' testimony  most importantly, the physical injuries suffered by Spears and the spontaneous declaration by Jensen's son, S.O., that his daddy tried to hurt him. While corroborating Spears, the circumstantial evidence contradicted Jensen's testimony and it was not rebutted by him. The evidence was sufficient to sustain Jensen's convictions even taking into account the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's cross-examination. Therefore, within the context of the case, we conclude that the prejudice to Jensen was slight. Accordingly, we conclude that the error was harmless.