Opinion ID: 1097817
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: goodner's jury demand

Text: Goodner claims that the trial court disregarded its timely jury demands in violation of its constitutional right to trial by jury, Ala. Const. art. I, § 11. Republic and the insurers argue that the jury demands were untimely or that Goodner otherwise waived its right to a jury trial. Goodner was of course entitled to seek a jury trial on its tort liability for damages in the procedural context of a declaratory judgment action, Rule 57, Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. However, to be had as a matter of right a jury trial must be demanded within the time specified by Rule 38(b). This rule requires that a jury demand be served no later than 30 days after the last pleading directed to the issues on which a jury trial is sought. Unless a party specifies issues in his demand, he shall be deemed to have demanded trial by jury for all the issues so triable, Rule 38(c). Failure to serve a timely demand constitutes a waiver of trial by jury under Rule 38(d). After a proper demand, ordinary principles of waiver and estoppel applicable to any personal right may still operate to bar a jury trial. Once lost as a matter of right, a jury trial may be had only in the court's discretion under Rule 39(b). To apply these principles it is helpful to set forth the proceedings below, the intricacy of which apparently has confused everyone involved. Goodner's first jury demand, filed as part of its answer to Republic's cross-claim, after Republic had moved for default, read as follows: Defendant demands a jury for the trial of the issues presented by this cross-claim and all other issues presented in the entire case. Goodner then answered Marley, demanding a jury trial of all issues under this crossclaim. In next answering the insurers' complaint, Goodner made no jury demand. Republic filed a Motion to Strike Jury Demand on the ground of untimeliness. In response the trial court issued the following order on July 2, 1981: This cause was duly set on this date upon a motion to strike the jury demand as filed by one of the parties. The Court heard statements and arguments of counsel and finds as follows: 1. The original action is one for a declaratory judgment and is properly triable before the Court without a jury. 2. The crossclaims or counteractions filed by parties other than the Plaintiff present issues which may be issues of fact and properly triable to a jury on the law-side of this Court. Accordingly, it is CONSIDERED, ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court as follows: ONE: The demand for a jury for the trial of the original action as filed by the Plaintiff against the several Defendants is hereby denied and the cause shall proceed to trial on the date already set for a trial without a jury. TWO: The crossclaims and counteractions above-mentioned are hereby each disjoined from the said `main case' for future orders of this Court. A two-day trial was held. Afterwards the trial court issued a substitute order, granting Republic's motion to strike Goodner's jury demand as untimely, further granting a nonexistent jury demand supposedly filed by Republic and ordering a bench trial of the entire case except for Republic's disjoined counterclaim against Goodner. No further proceedings took place prior to the appeal. A chronology follows: 1980 October 15 Insurer's complaint for declaratory judgement v. Marley, Republic, Goodner and Brown. November 21 Marley's answer v. insurers and cross-claim v. Goodner and Brown. December 23 Republic's answer v. insurers and cross-claim v. Goodner and Brown. 1981 February 23 Trial court denied Goodner's motion to dismiss insurers' complaint and allowed Goodner 20 days to answer insurers. March 30 Order setting trial for May 19. April 15 Trial court denied Goodner's motion to dismiss Republic's cross-claim, gave Goodner 10 days to answer and again gave notice of May 19 trial date. May 8 Republic's motion for default v. Goodner and Brown. May 11 Goodner's answer v. Republic with jury demand and motion for continuance of May 19 trial. May 13 Goodner's answer v. Marley with jury demand. May 18 Trial court granted continuance, resetting trial for July 13. No ruling on Republic's motion for default. May 26 Goodner's answer v. insurersno jury demand. June 11 Republic's motion to strike Goodner's jury demand as untimely. July 2 Trial court's order on Republic's motion to strike jury demand. July 13 & 14 Trial. August 5 Trial court's Substitute Order, striking July 2 order. August 31 Final judgment. Before considering the matter of timeliness, it is first necessary to determine to which issues and parties Goodner's jury demands applied. Arguably, Goodner never sought a jury trial against the insurers, because, after including jury demands with its answers to Republic and Marley, Goodner included no jury demand in its answer to the insurers' complaint, which specifically alleged Goodner's negligence. On the other hand, Goodner's first demand specified that a jury trial was sought for all issues in the entire case. Moreover, Republic's and Marley's cross-claims had also put in issue Goodner's negligence and the terms of the July 2 order indicate the trial judge understood some party to have demanded a jury against the insurers. In view of these facts and the presumption in Rule 38(c) that jury demands apply to all issues unless specifically limited, we shall assume that Goodner's first jury demand was operative on the negligence issues raised in the insurers' complaint. Cf. Ex parte Collins, 394 So.2d 952 (Ala.1981) (doubt on whether an issue is of a sort triable to a jury should be resolved in favor of a jury trial); Mobley v. Moore, 350 So.2d 414 (Ala.1977) (discretion under Rule 39(b) should be exercised liberally in favor of a jury trial). Goodner argues that it satisfied the timeliness requirement of Rule 38(b) by including its jury demands with its answers. Republic argues persuasively in reply that its motion for default precluded Goodner from claiming a jury trial as a matter of right, because Goodner's demand was timely only in relation to its late answer, see Dorcal, Inc. v. Xerox Corporation, 398 So.2d 665, 670 (Ala.1981). In Dorcal we noted that a party could preclude filing of a late answer and jury demand by previously securing an entry of default. Here, Republic's motion for default was never ruled upon. It was sufficient, however, for Republic simply to have filed its motion. The trial court then had discretion under Rule 55 to enter a default judgment and thus preclude an answer and jury demand. Subsumed within this discretion was the alternative of allowing Goodner to proceed, but without a jury. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court was justified in striking Goodner's jury demand as untimely against Republic. However, unlike Republic, the insurers did not move for default. Therefore, Republic's own argument shows that Goodner's jury demand was timely against the insurersgiven our assumption that the first jury demand was operative against them. Accordingly, were timeliness the only issue, the appropriate procedure would have been for both Republic and the insurers to try the issue of Goodner's negligence before a jury. Such a result would follow from the fact that Goodner's jury demand was timely with respect to one of the two pleadings raising identical negligence claims. However, the timeliness issue is not dispositive, because Republic and the insurers contend in the alternative that Goodner proceeded to waive its right to a jury. We agree that Goodner's conduct of the litigation precludes it from now claiming denial of trial by jury. Since Goodner did not intend to give up its right, the issue is best thought of in terms of estoppel, not waiver. [3] Goodner argues that the posttrial Substitute Order, which struck its jury demands as untimely, was the first indication that there would be no jury trial on the negligence issues. This argument is inconsistent with what transpired before and during the trial. The order of July 2 specifically denied a jury for the trial of the insurer's original action, while finding that the cross-claims presented issues of fact properly triable to a jury. It was incumbent upon Goodner to inform itself and the trial court that the insurers' complaint sought judgments against Goodner and Brown for their alleged negligence, which was an issue properly triable to a jury. The confusion became evident at the opening of trial, when the attorneys asked whether Goodner's and Marley's crossclaims were to be tried. This exchange followed: THE COURT: Yes. I want to hear everything to conclusion in this case. [BROWN'S ATTORNEY]: Well, I understand Your Honor had severed or disjoined the cross-claims. And that was that's my understanding of it. And I came up here on that basis. THE COURT: Well, I got so many cases. I can't remember all of them. I will have to read my order. If I did it, I did it. [GOODNER'S ATTORNEY]: Here, Your Honor, I have a copy of it. . . . THE COURT: I don't see how I can try the cross-claims since there is a jury demand in the case and they would need the employment of a jury since there has been a jury demand. And this is waivered. [MARLEY'S ATTORNEY]: ... I don't want a jury trial in my case. I want the Court to adjudicate the issues that I have with my insurance carrier. [BROWN'S ATTORNEY]: We join in that also. THE COURT: Who demanded the jury? . . . [GOODNER'S ATTORNEY]: Our answer to [Republic's] cross-claims contain a request for a jury. We don't want to waive any right to a jury that we may have. However, that's not what I was asking the Court about. What I was concerned about was my cross-claim against Brown Mechanical, which, based on indemnity ... seeks clarification and interpretation. THE COURT: I appreciate your calling that to my attention. A cross-claim or counteraction that has a jury demand in it will be disjoined for obvious reasons. And the rest of the counterclaim, crossclaims, would be tried in this action. . . . [INSURER'S ATTORNEY]: One other point of clarification. You said you have a severance of one part of this. Do we have an understanding that we are going forward with the proof of our subrogation claim to a judgment? THE COURT: Yes. (Emphasis added.) Trial proceeded without objection on the issue, among others, of Goodner's negligence. The testimony of Goodner's three witnesses was relevant to this issue, as was Goodner's cross-examination of most of the other witnesses. No objection was made that evidence was irrelevant to the matters Goodner intended to litigate. Near the close of trial, Republic filed in open court a handwritten pleading, adding its contract claim to the negligence cross-claim previously filed against Goodner. This discussion took place: [REPUBLIC'S ATTORNEY]: I have placed on your desk an amendment to our cross-claim. THE COURT: All right. I will see it. . . . [GOODNER'S ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, point of clarification, the crossclaim has been severed has it not? THE COURT: Yes. The one that has a jury demand in it. [MARLEY'S ATTORNEY]: Just the one that has a jury demand? THE COURT: Is disjoined. I don't know whose that is. I don't remember off-hand. [GOODNER'S ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, if there is any contention that we are going to try the issues by the amendment in this litigation, looks like to me THE COURT: Is this the one with the jury demand? We are not going to try it in this court. [GOODNER'S ATTORNEY]: Okay. We agree with Goodner that the trial court's announced intention at the beginning and end of trial was to hear only those issues which were not the subject of a jury demand. However, Goodner was obliged to inform the trial court that its intentions were not being followedthat the insurers were litigating negligence issues for which Goodner had demanded a jury. The problem was apparent from the court's pretrial order and from the initial discussion at trial, when the insurers obtained everyone's assent to going forward with the proof of our subrogation claim to a judgment. Goodner's explanation for its failure to act is that all aspects of the case, including Goodner's involvement, would have to be tried in order to resolve both the insurers' claims against Brown Mechanical and Goodner's cross-claim for indemnity, as to which Brown never requested a jury! We do not think it was reasonable for Goodner to contemplate that its involvement would be litigated but not decided. Goodner should have known that the insurers sought, and the court had power to enter, a final judgment on all litigated factual issues. Clearly, a final judgment is binding regardless of who was the trier of fact. We conclude that Goodner is estopped from now claiming a jury, because it assented to a nonjury trial in what it should have known would be its only chance to litigate. That its assent may have been unintentional does not require that Goodner be given another chance. For example, an inadvertently late jury demand creates a waiver under Rule 38(d). Federal courts have reached similar results in applying constitutional and procedural requirements comparable to our own. See 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2321 at 101 (1971) (it is clear that the test of waiver that is applied to other constitutional rights, that there must have been `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,' is not applicable to the right to trial by jury), Fenstermacher v. Philadelphia National Bank, 493 F.2d 333, 338 (3rd Cir. 1974) (where plaintiff sought final equitable relief and acquiesced in consolidated hearing on preliminary injunction and the merits, he effectively waived jury trial though time for demand had not passed). Southland Reship, Inc., v. Flegel, 534 F.2d 639, 643-45 (5th Cir.1976) (after timely demand, party waived right to jury demand on liability issue by acquiescing in consolidated nonjury hearing with later jury trial limited to damages issue).