Opinion ID: 1298187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Second degree felony-murder doctrine

Text: There is no precise statutory definition for the second degree felony-murder rule. [5] (2a) In People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 795 [36 Cal. Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892], we defined the doctrine as follows: A homicide that is a direct causal result of the commission of a felony inherently dangerous to human life (other than the six felonies enumerated in Pen. Code, § 189) constitutes at least second degree murder. [Citations.] (3a) In determining whether the felony is inherently dangerous, we look to the elements of the felony in the abstract, not the particular `facts' of the case. ( People v. Williams, supra, 63 Cal.2d 452, 458, fn. 5; People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 [51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 414 P.2d 353]; People v. Henderson (1977) 19 Cal.3d 86, 93 [137 Cal. Rptr. 1, 560 P.2d 1180]; People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 829-830 [201 Cal. Rptr. 319, 678 P.2d 894].) The Court of Appeal's opinion in this case criticized the second degree felony-murder rule in its present form, suggesting the doctrine should either be completely eliminated or considerably reformed. In response, defendant and amici curiae on his behalf have urged us to abolish the rule. The People and their amici curiae, on the other hand, have asked that we reform the doctrine by looking solely to the actual conduct of a defendant, thereby dispensing with the requirement that the elements of the offense be viewed in the abstract. We decline both invitations for the reasons discussed below. The second degree felony-murder doctrine has been a part of California's criminal law for many decades. (See People v. Wright (1914) 167 Cal. 1, 5 [138 P. 349]; Pike, What Is Second Degree Murder in California (1936) 9 So.Cal.L.Rev. 112, 118-119.) In recent years, we have characterized the rule as anachronistic ( People v. Burroughs, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 829) and disfavored ( People v. Henderson, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 92), based on the view of many legal scholars that the doctrine incorporates an artificial concept of strict criminal liability that erodes the relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability. ( People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 783 [44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130]; People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 33 [98 Cal. Rptr. 33, 489 P.2d 1361, 50 A.L.R.3d 383].) The Legislature, however, has taken no action to alter this judicially created rule, and has declined our more recent suggestion in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 472, footnote 19 [194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697], that it reconsider the rules on first and second degree felony murder and misdemeanor manslaughter. In this case, our limited purpose in granting the People's petition for review was to determine the applicability of the second degree felony-murder doctrine to the crime of furnishing cocaine. We decline defendant's invitation that we determine the continued vitality of the rule. (See People v. Burroughs, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 829, fn. 3.) We also turn down the People's invitation that we expand the second degree felony-murder doctrine by eliminating the requirement of People v. Williams, supra, 63 Cal.2d 452, that the elements of the offense be viewed in the abstract, and by adopting a new standard focusing instead on the actual conduct of a defendant in determining whether the felony is inherently dangerous. In People v. Williams, supra, 63 Cal.2d 452, the defendants argued with their drug dealer and stabbed him to death, assertedly in self-defense. We reversed the convictions for second degree murder because of the trial court's improper instruction to the jury that the defendants were guilty of second degree murder if the jury found the killing had occurred in the perpetration of the felony of conspiracy to possess Methedrine without a prescription. We explained that, in evaluating the inherent dangerousness of a particular felony, we look to the elements of the felony in the abstract, not the particular `facts' of the case. ( Id., at p. 458, fn. 5.) We concluded that under this analysis the conspiracy involved in Williams was not a felony inherently dangerous to human life. ( Id., at p. 458.) Sound reasons support the Williams rule. As we observed in People v. Burroughs, supra, 35 Cal.3d at page 830: This form of [viewed-in-the-abstract] analysis is compelled because there is a killing in every case where the rule might potentially be applied. If in such circumstances a court were to examine the particular facts of the case prior to establishing whether the underlying felony is inherently dangerous, the court might well be led to conclude the rule applicable despite any unfairness which might redound to the defendant by so broad an application: the existence of the dead victim might appear to lead inexorably to the conclusion that the underlying felony is exceptionally hazardous. For the reasons set forth above, we are reluctant to significantly expand the scope of the second degree felony-murder rule, as the People have urged us to do. We have repeatedly said that the felony-murder rule deserves no extension beyond its required application. ( People v. Phillips, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 582; People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 462-463; People v. Burroughs, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 829.) Both the People's suggestion that we expand the second degree felony-murder doctrine and defendant's suggestion that we abolish it are matters appropriately left to the Legislature.