Opinion ID: 1095462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: interpretation guidelines

Text: It is the prerogative and responsibility of this Court to make the final interpretation of our State's Constitution. Alexander v. State, by and through Allain , 441 So.2d 1329, 1333 (Miss. 1983), and this document is presumed capable of ordering human affairs decades beyond the time of ratification, under circumstances beyond the prescience of the draftsmen. Id. at 1334. Our purpose in construing Section 109 is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of those who adopted it, Moore v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 155 Miss. 818, 822, 125 So. 411, 412 (1930); and while its words must be the sole boundary [of its meaning], State v. Henry, 87 Miss. 125, 144, 40 So. 153, 154 (1906), ascertained from the plain meaning of the words and terms used within it, Ex parte Dennis, 334 So.2d 369, 373 (Miss. 1976), we should likewise look to the circumstances under which the provision was ordained, the objects ..., the evils to be avoided or cured, and thereby arrive at the reasonable meaning..., keeping in mind [it was] intended to stand ... for a long, long time. Trahan v. State Highway Comm'n., 169 Miss. 732, 749, 151 So. 178, 182 (1933). It is not the function of judges to dwarf the grandeur of a Constitution by decisions which stifle any of its promises. Our interpretation should not be too literal, Dunn v. Love, 172 Miss. 342, 355, 155 So. 331, 333 (1934); City of Jackson v. Deposit Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 160 Miss. 752, 133 So. 195 (1931); and we have recognized that no constitutional prevision requires to be done that which is thoroughly impracticable. Gulf Refining Co. v. Stone, 197 Miss. 713, 741, 21 So.2d 19, 21 (1945). We have likewise stated that our Constitution should be interpreted: ... In the light of developments which have appeared at the time of interpretation, and may therefore include things and conditions which not only did not exist but were not contemplated when it was drafted, so long as the new developments are in their nature within the scope of the purposes and powers for the furtherance of which the constitution was established. Stepp v. State, 202 Miss. 725, 729, 32 So.2d 447, 447, suggestion of error overruled, 202 Miss. 725, 33 So.2d 307 (1947). Our task, then is to carefully examine the words of § 109, the circumstances attending its adoption, and the evils it sought to avoid, thereby ascertaining the intent of its authors in light of the times in which we presently live. While it is unnecessary that we attribute to them supernatural ability, we must recognize that the body adopting our Constitution was composed of practical men of sound judgment, endowed with an abundance of common sense. The evils they envisioned in adopting this action were not imaginary in 1890, and they have not vanished in the ensuing years. The problems they addressed no doubt then, and most certainly now, can occur in a wide variety of factual settings. Returning to our observation that § 109 is to protect our state government, we must interpret this section in accordance with the plain meaning of its words so long as it bears some rational relationship to this purpose. Yet no meaning, however abstractly valid, should be carried into practical effect if doing so would cause grave risks to be imposed on the sound government of the people of this State. Such an interpretation would insult the common sense of our predecessors when they adopted § 109. Finally, in our interpretation we must take into account the rejection by the people in 1984, and again in 1986 of proposed amendments to § 109. Article 3, Sections 5 and 6 of our Constitution leave no doubt that all political power is vested in, and derived from, the people, and the people have the sole and exclusive right to ... alter ... their constitution.