Opinion ID: 62823
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Independent-contractor exception

Text: “It is elementary that ‘[t]he United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . , and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.’” United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 7 No. 07-60499 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)). “Courts must strictly construe all waivers of the federal government’s sovereign immunity, and must resolve all ambiguities in favor of the sovereign.” Linkous v. United States, 142 F.3d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc. 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992)). The FTCA constitutes a “limited waiver of sovereign immunity, making the Federal Government liable to the same extent as a private party for certain torts of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.” United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813 (1976). The relevant provision of the FTCA provides that: the district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). By its own terms, the FTCA only waives sovereign immunity for injuries caused by an “employee of the Government,” § 1346(b)(1), but excludes from that waiver injuries caused by “‘any contractor with the United States,’” Orleans, 425 U.S. at 813-14 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2671); Means v. United States, 176 F.3d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (“The alleged tortfeasor’s status as an ‘employee of the government’ is the sine qua non of liability under the FTCA.”). This is known as the independent-contractor exception to the FTCA, and it must be given due regard when a court considers whether jurisdiction exists. Orleans, 425 U.S. at 814; see also Linkous, 142 F.3d at 275; Broussard v. United States, 989 F.2d 171, 174 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). 8 No. 07-60499 When there is a dispute whether the independent-contractor exception bars a lawsuit, it is most often the case that the dispositive question is whether or not the individual that caused the plaintiff’s injuries is an employee of the federal government or of an independent contractor. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Sarabyn, 129 F.3d 760, 765 (5th Cir. 1997); Linkous, 142 F.3d at 276-77; Broussard, 989 F.2d at 177-76. This is a question of federal law, and we have stated that the “critical factor in determining whether an individual is an employee of the government or an independent contractor is the power of the federal government to control the detailed physical performance of the individual.” Linkous, 142 F.3d at 275 (citing Orleans, 425 U.S. at 814; Broussard, 989 F.2d at 174). This is exactly the type of analysis the district court undertook to resolve this case. However, the district court focused its attention on whether Linn was an independent contractor or an employee of the United States. The district court summarized its understanding of the plaintiffs’ argument by stating that: “[i]n essence, it is the plaintiffs’ position that the independent-contractor exception to the FTCA does not bar the instant case . . . because the United States, through the Department of the Air Force, exercised effective control over the CASS project[,] thereby converting Linn into an employee of the United States.” After reviewing the evidence concerning the government’s alleged control of the CASS project, the district court determined that the facts “weigh[ed] heavily in favor of Linn being an independent contractor in relation to the United States as opposed to an employee.” As a result, “pursuant to the independent-contractor exception to liability under the FTCA, the court conclude[d] that the United States [was] immune from liability for Linn’s terrible and tragic death.” The government continues on appeal to argue that the independentcontractor exception bars the plaintiffs’ claims because Linn was an employee 9 No. 07-60499 of an independent contractor, not an employee of the United States. We disagree. First, it is simply irrelevant to the plaintiffs’ claims whether Linn worked for an independent contractor. See, e.g., Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 179-82 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that an employee of an independent contractor could bring a suit under the FTCA based on the government’s allegedly negligent failure to provide safe access to an office trailer on a naval base); Will v. United States, 60 F.3d 656, 660 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a district court erred in dismissing an independent contractor’s suit under the FTCA). The independent-contractor exception is concerned with whether the tortfeasor was an employee of the United States or an independent contractor, not with the status of the plaintiffs’ decedent. See Rodriguez, 129 F.3d at 765; Linkous, 142 F.3d at 276-77; Broussard, 989 F.2d at 177-76. Second, the plaintiffs in this case are not seeking to hold the United States vicariously liable for the acts of SunBelt, Kenny Betts or any other independent contractor. Rather, they are seeking to hold the United States directly liable for Linn’s death because federal employees (CAFB personnel) failed to adequately warn, train and supervise him, and failed to adequately abate dangerous conditions on federal property. The mere fact that independent contractors might also have caused Linn to be injured does not implicate the independentcontractor exception. See Phillips v. United States, 956 F.2d 1071, 1077-78 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that the independent-contractor exception did not bar the suit of an independent contractor’s employee because the employee sought to hold the Army Corps of Engineers responsible for its own negligent failure to carry out its safety responsibilities). In Sandoval v. United States, 980 F.2d 1057, 1058 (5th Cir. 1993), a federal prisoner brought suit against the United States under the FTCA because a United States marshal negligently placed him in a prison facility run by a private corporation where he was injured as a result of the corporation’s tortious 10 No. 07-60499 conduct. The district court dismissed the case, determining that the action could not be maintained under the FTCA because the government could not be held responsible for the acts of an independent contractor. Id. We reversed, however, since the prisoner was merely attempting to seek to hold the government responsible for the government’s own conduct, namely, negligently placing hm under the care of the corporation’s employees. Id. at 1059. Similarly, here, the plaintiffs are seeking to hold the United States liable for the conduct of its employees, not the acts of independent contractors.