Opinion ID: 2047279
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Dr. Salter's Opinion

Text: As previously noted, the question posed to Dr. Salter in this case was: [W]ere you able to formulate an opinion as to a reasonable degree of professional certainty about whether the respondent's pedophilia makes it likely that he will engage in predatory acts of a sexually-violent nature if he's not confined in a secure facility? This question essentially asked whether Palmer met one of the elements of the statutory definition of sexually violent predator. The Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) defines sexually violent predator as a person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from an mental abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility. Iowa Code § 229A.2(11). The definition can be broken down into three main elements: (1) commission of a sexually violent offense, (2) mental abnormality, and (3) makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses if not confined in a secure facility. Id. In this case, there was no dispute that Palmer had committed a sexually violent offense and that he had a mental abnormality as defined by the statute. The third element of the definition was the fighting issue at trial. The third element of the definition contains within it three statutorily defined phrases: (1) likely to engage in predatory acts of violence, see id. § 229A.2(4) (defining the phrase as the person more likely than not will engage in acts of a sexually violent nature), (2) predatory, see id. § 229A.2(6) (defining the term as acts directed toward a person with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization), and (3) sexually violent offense, see id. § 229A.2(10) (defining the phrase as any violation of chapter 709 or various other sexually motivated offenses). Under rule 5.704, the question propounded to Dr. Salter was not objectionable solely because it embraced an ultimate issue in the case. Thus, to the extent that the objection by Palmer raised this point, it was properly overruled by the district court. Yet, upon close examination of the complete record, Palmer's objection was that the witness was being asked to render an opinion by utilizing the statutory standard of likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses. We must therefore consider whether this specific ground makes the testimony sought by the question otherwise inadmissible. We have previously noted the problem presented by questions that convey a witness's undefined legal standard. Yet, the statutory definition of likely is more likely than not. Iowa Code § 229A.2(4). This definition is essentially the same as the common usage of the term. See Hearst, 563 F.2d at 1351 (stating that testimony containing a legal conclusion is not inadmissible where [t]he average layman would understand those terms and ascribe to them essentially the same meaning intended). When, as here, the popular meaning is nearly the same as the legal meaning, there is no concern that the legal term results in an opinion of law that could be incorrectly understood by the jury or the witness. Torres, 758 F.2d at 151; 1 McCormick § 12, at 56. Moreover, there was an abundance of testimony by Dr. Salter concerning the meaning of the term likely. Under these circumstances, Dr. Salter's use of the statutorily defined term likely did not render her opinion inadmissible. See Weinstein § 704.04[2][b], at 704  14 (Opinion testimony using legal terms may be admissible if there is no conflict between the legal definition and the meaning of the term in common usage.). However, the same rationale does not apply to the two remaining statutory terms used in the question posed to Dr. Salter, predatory and sexual violent offense. These statutorily defined terms have a separate, distinct and specialized meaning in the law different from that present in the vernacular. Torres, 758 F.2d at 151. Thus, the question asked and the opinion given created a danger of misleading the jury  that is, of Dr. Salter and the jury not being on the same page with respect to the meanings of those terms. Accordingly, the State should have been required to break down the question into its factual elements. Nevertheless, we have previously explained: Because the function of an objection is to invoke a rule of evidence to regulate admission of proof at trial, it is sufficient if it alerts the trial court to the principle sought to be invoked. `In determining the formal sufficiency of an objection, it is enough if the substance of the defective feature of the evidence offered is made clear by any choice of language. Care must be taken that the objection strike at the very heart of the infirmity.' State v. Nimmo, 247 N.W.2d 228, 231 (Iowa 1976) (quoting Mason Ladd, Objections, Motions and Foundation Testimony, 43 Cornell L.Q. 543, 551 (1958)). Palmer's objection did not address the State's use of these two distinct legal terms in its question as ground for error and did not alert[] the trial court to the principle sought to be invoked. Id. `Care must be taken that the objection strike at the very heart of the infirmity.' Id. (citation omitted). The proper objection would have been that the question called for a legal conclusion, for an opinion that was not the proper subject of expert testimony, Schlichte v. Franklin Troy Trucks, 265 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Iowa 1978), or for an opinion whose probative value would be substantially outweighed by the danger of misleading the jury, Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. More importantly, Palmer was required to identify the specific legal terms that rendered the question objectionable. We conclude the objection was insufficient to preserve error in this case. Moreover, even assuming that error was preserved, the result would be the same because no prejudice resulted from Dr. Salter's opinion. The existence of error at trial does not itself warrant corrective action on appeal. Rather, under the `harmless error' rule, the determinative factor in ascertaining whether remedial measures are warranted is the prejudicial impact of the error. Adams & Weeg § 5.103.14, at 54. No prejudice results from erroneous admission of evidence on an issue that is undisputed. Id. at 59 (citing Oakes v. Peter Pan Bakers, Inc., 258 Iowa 447, 453, 138 N.W.2d 93, 97 (1965)). Palmer never asserted that any future acts he might commit would not meet the legal definition of predatory or sexually violent offenses. Rather, his argument was limited to challenging the likelihood that he would reoffend. Thus, the problematic part of Dr. Salter's opinion went to what amounted to an undisputed issue in the case and resulted in no prejudice. Id.