Opinion ID: 3066075
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Distortion of the Fact-Finding Process

Text: Seda claims that he suffered from an uneven playing field because the government used its resources to obtain foreign evidence that was inculpatory but failed to assist him in obtaining exculpatory evidence, specifically bank records from Saudi Arabia and depositions from Egypt. The net result was, according to Seda, a distortion of the evidence. Seda analogizes his case to United States v. Westerdahl, 945 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1991), in which we held that even though a defendant may not compel the government to offer use immunity to a witness, intentional distortion of the fact-finding process by denying immunity may constitute prosecutorial misconduct. See also United States v. Straub, UNITED STATES V. SEDAGHATY 57 538 F.3d 1147, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Even where the government has not denied a defense witness immunity for the very purpose of distorting the fact-finding process, the government may have stacked the deck against the defendant in a way that has severely distorted the fact-finding process at trial.”). Not only does the record not support the argument, Seda also misunderstands the role of the court vis-a-vis the discovery he seeks. This case involved substantial evidence from abroad, which presented obstacles for both parties. Nevertheless, both parties conducted investigations overseas and were able to obtain some evidence from foreign countries. For example, Seda sent an investigator to Egypt and Saudi Arabia to interview witnesses, including Seda’s codefendant AlButhe. Seda located a potential witness in China, and the court granted Seda’s motion to allow testimony by videoconference. The government sent agents to observe an interview by Egyptian authorities with El-Fiki. The government also sought records pursuant to international treaties and through its powers to subpoena documents from financial institutions. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318. Some of these efforts were successful, while others were not. Although both sides faced obstacles in obtaining evidence from abroad, there was no “stacked deck.” To assist in obtaining evidence from Egypt, Seda asked the court to order the government to use a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (“MLAT”) between the United States and Egypt on his behalf. The express terms of the MLAT preclude Seda’s reliance on it as a source of discovery: “[T]he provisions of this Treaty shall not give rise to a right on the part of any private person to obtain . . . any evidence. . . .” Treaty Between the Government of the United 58 UNITED STATES V. SEDAGHATY States of America and the Arab Republic of Egypt on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Egypt, art. 1(4), May 3, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12948; see also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008) (describing the “background presumption . . . that ‘[i]nternational agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts’” (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 907, Comment a, p. 395 (1986))). Not only does Seda’s claim fail under the express terms of the treaty, the district court had no authority to order the Executive Branch to invoke the treaty process to obtain evidence abroad for a private citizen. See United States v. Rosen, 240 F.R.D. 204, 213–14 (E.D. Va. 2007) (explaining that “the right to compulsory process extends only as far as a court’s own process powers, and cannot be stretched to include compelling the invocation of treaty process powers available only to the Executive Branch”). Seda’s Westerdahl analogy, which relates to immunity in the domestic context, does not extend to the world of international treaties. Our review of the complete record also reveals that the government’s discovery conduct did not distort the factfinding process. Seda’s Westerdahl analogy also fails with regard to the letters rogatory. The government’s position on Seda’s motions for letters rogatory could hardly skew the discovery process because the decision to issue a letter rogatory rests squarely within the discretion of the court, not the government. See United States v. Staples, 256 F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir. 1958). Upon Seda’s request, the district court issued a letter rogatory asking the government of Saudi Arabia to UNITED STATES V. SEDAGHATY 59 assist in obtaining a deposition from Al-Sanad or facilitating his voluntary testimony at trial. The court received no response. The court declined to issue letters rogatory to Egypt with respect to El-Fiki, his son, and his employee because the potential testimony was not material. See United States v. Liner, 435 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2006) (explaining that in a criminal case, “the moving party must show the witness’s unavailability and the materiality of the witness’s testimony”). El-Fiki and the associated witnesses in Egypt did not know Seda, did not communicate with Seda, and had no knowledge of either Seda’s intent with regard to the tax return or the ultimate disposition of the donation. The court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that El-Fiki’s intent regarding use of the money was not probative of Seda’s own state of mind and thus was neither material nor necessary to ensure a fair trial.