Opinion ID: 1295082
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Philip Morris v. Mentz

Text: Mentz assigns cross-error to the trial court's refusal to set aside the verdict for compensatory damages as inadequate. The jury fixed Mentz's compensatory damages at $7,620. The parties stipulated his business losses as $1,820, which means the jury fixed his compensatory damages at $5,800 for the personal injury claim. Mentz claims that he spent $4,247 for medical treatment and, therefore, that the jury awarded slightly less than $1,600 for his mental anguish, pain and suffering and other non-monetary damages. Although there was no substantial dispute concerning the amount Mentz expended for medical treatment, there was a dispute as to the extent of his mental disability. We said in Modaber v. Kelley, 232 Va. 60, 69, 348 S.E.2d 233, 238 (1986), [t]he question whether a verdict is excessive is initially addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge who has observed the incidents of trial, which cannot be reproduced in the cold, printed pages of the appellate record. The same principle applies when addressing appellate complaints of an inadequate verdict. See Dinwiddie v. Hamilton, 201 Va. 348, 352, 111 S.E.2d 275, 279 (1959). An abuse of that discretion is manifested when the size of the award, whether excessive or inadequate, shocks the conscience of the Court and creates the impression that the jury was biased in favor of the plaintiff or prejudiced against the defendant or has misconceived or misunderstood the facts or the law, or if the award is so out of proportion to the plaintiff's injuries as to suggest that it is not the product of a fair and impartial decision. Modaber, 232 Va. at 69, 348 S.E.2d at 238. Because the jury has fixed the amount of the recovery, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Mentz was examined at the hospital on the evening of this incident, released, and sent home. The next day he saw his family doctor, who examined him, took blood samples, and released him. A few days later, the family doctor told Mentz everything was okay. Mentz lost no significant time or income from his work. A psychiatrist evaluated Mentz in May of 1982, three months after the incident, and diagnosed him as having a Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ... mild to moderate depression and ... marital maladjustment. The psychiatrist did not see Mentz again for seven months. At that time, he was diagnosed as continuing to suffer from a post-traumatic stress disorder and his depression was rated as very severe and a Major Affective Disorder. He improved with medication and psychotherapy, but developed alcoholism in July of 1983. Another psychiatrist saw Mentz in March of 1984 and indicated that Mentz's prognosis was good. Although that psychiatrist testified that Mentz's drinking was symptomatic, he indicated Mentz may have had some degree of control over his drinking had he chosen to exercise it. Given the delay in seeking treatment, the subjective nature of the extent of a post-traumatic stress disorder, the evidence of excessive drinking, which Mentz might have controlled, and the good prognosis one psychiatrist gave Mentz, we cannot say that the award bears no reasonable relation to the damages suggested by the facts in the case, and is manifestly out of line and at variance with the facts.... Bradner v. Mitchell, 234 Va. 483, 487, n. 2, 362 S.E.2d 718, 720 n. 2 (1987). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to set aside this verdict. (B) A-Line's Claim that Gore's and Mentz's Awards of Punitive Damages were Excessive A-Line argues that the punitive damages awarded Bonnie Jean Gore and Hubert C. Mentz are excessive and the trial court should have set those awards aside. The jury fixed Gore's compensatory damages at $30,000 and her punitive damages at $200,000, and Mentz's compensatory damages at $7,620 and his punitive damages at $50,000. A-Line correctly recognizes that no fixed standard exists for the calculation of punitive damages and that it is an issue largely within the discretion of the jury. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l. Ass'n. of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 213 Va. 377, 386, 192 S.E.2d 737, 743 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 418 U.S. 264, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 41 L.Ed.2d 745 (1974). Nevertheless, the amount of punitive damages awarded should bear some reasonable relationship to the actual damages sustained and to the measure of punishment required.... The Gazette v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 51, 325 S.E.2d 713, 747, cert. denied sub nom. Fleming v. Moore, 472 U.S. 1032, 105 S.Ct. 3513, 87 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985). In deciding whether a reasonable ratio exists between the compensatory damages and the punitive damages awarded to Mentz and Gore, we apply the standard for granting a new trial based on an excessive award of damages we set forth in Modaber, 232 Va. at 69, 348 S.E.2d at 238. We have reviewed the record on this issue in both cases, and we cannot say on the evidence before it that the jury abused its discretion in these awards. Therefore, we will deny A-Line's motion for a new trial on this ground.