Opinion ID: 621801
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: David Cain's Remaining Claims

Text: In addition to the claims above, Cain argues that the delay in bringing his case to trial resulted in a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Cain originally raised this argument before Magistrate Judge Schroeder in the form of a motion to dismiss the indictment filed three months before trial was set to begin. Judge Schroeder recommended denial of the motion in a thorough, 32-page Report and Recommendation that was subsequently adopted by the district court. We see no basis for concluding that the district court abused its discretion in declining to dismiss the indictment. The Supreme Court's decision in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) sets forth the four factors that must be considered in analyzing whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his right in the run-up to the trial; and (4) whether the defendant was prejudiced by the failure to bring the case to trial more quickly. See id. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182; see also United States v. Jones, 129 F.3d 718, 724 (2d Cir. 1997). These factors must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant, and have no talismanic qualities. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Rather, they require courts to engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. Id. We review the district court's balancing of these factors for abuse of discretion. United States v. Williams, 372 F.3d 96, 113 (2d Cir.2004). The first of the Barker factors, the length of the delay, is in effect a threshold question: by definition, [a defendant] cannot complain that the government has denied him a `speedy' trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). In this case, the grand jury returned the original 4-count indictment charging David Cain, Jamie Soha and Patrick Ackroyd with violations of federal law on December 27, 2005. The government filed a superseding indictment adding Chris Cain as a codefendant and charging twenty-eight additional counts on May 5, 2006, and trial began on October 16, 2007. Although in Doggett the Supreme Court asserted in a footnote that [d]epending on the nature of the charges, the lower courts have generally found postaccusation delay `presumptively prejudicial' at least as it approaches one year, id. at 652 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686, we note that the delay in this case of less than 22 months was considerably shorter than that of other cases in which no Sixth Amendment violation has been found. United States v. McGrath, 622 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir.1980) (discussing a 24-month delay). The delay was particularly understandable given the presence of multiple defendants, the large number of allegations and the complexity of the racketeering case. Thus, while we assume that the delay was sufficient to trigger a speedy trial inquiry, the first Barker factor is largely neutral given the nature of the case. With regard to the second factor, as Cain himself acknowledges, a significant factor contributing to the delay was the need to determine whether it would be necessary to disqualify his lawyer, Musitano, due to a conflict of interest. While Cain disparages the move to disqualify Musitano as a deliberate delay tactic that should be counted against the government in the speedy trial calculus, given that we have concluded that the disqualification was proper, it follows a fortiori that the resulting delay was justified. Other sources of pretrial delay included scheduling complications arising from parallel criminal proceedings against David Cain in state and federal court and extensive pretrial motion practice involving Cain and his codefendants, none of which could have been avoided. Thus, the delay in bringing the case to trial resulted primarily from the practical difficulties occasioned by the complexities of the case and not from congestion of the calendar or bad faith or neglect on the part of the government or the district court. Accordingly, the reasons for the delay do not favor a finding that Cain's constitutional rights were denied. Moreover, although Cain has consistently asserted his right to a speedy trial, thereby satisfying the third Barker factor, he was not significantly prejudiced by the delay. Although a showing of prejudice is not a prerequisite to finding a [S]ixth [A]mendment violation, courts generally have been reluctant to find a speedy trial violation in the absence of genuine prejudice. Jones, 129 F.3d at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted). Cain's assertions of prejudice focus primarily on non-trial-related hardships that resulted from his pretrial detention, such as detriment to his business and family life. While incarceration in the pretrial period [is] a hardship and must be included in the assessment of `prejudice,' United States v. Vasquez, 918 F.2d 329, 338 (2d Cir.1990), we have generally required a showing of some significant trial-related disadvantage in order to establish a speedy-trial violation, see Flowers v. Warden, 853 F.2d 131, 133 (2d Cir.1988) (collecting cases). Although Cain asserts that the delays also impaired his defense by creating the risk of affected memories, witness [un]availability, and loss or destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence, he has not identified any lost witnesses or evidence and has made no serious effort to establish that these risks were significantly increased due to the relatively brief period in which his case was pending. Thus, based on our analysis of the Barker factors in light of the specific circumstances of this case, we find no basis to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds. Cain's remaining arguments are likewise unavailing. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's guilty findings with regard to counts eleven and thirteenwhich charged him with destruction of an aircraft and airplane hangar used in interstate air commerce. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 32(a), 844(h)-(i). In his counseled brief, Cain argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish the jurisdictional element of the offenses given that the plane in question, which belonged to Dan Gollus, was used primarily for non-commercial purposes. Cain does not dispute, however, that Gollus used the plane on numerous occasions to travel out of state in order to inspect equipment for purchase in connection with his tree service business. Under 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(24)(A)(i), interstate air commerce is defined to include the operation of aircraft in furthering a business or vocation between a place in . . . a State . . . and a place in another State. The jury was permitted to find that definition satisfied on the basis of Gollus's testimony. Likewise, because the hangar housed an instrumentality of interstate air commerce, the jury could fairly conclude that it constituted a building used in . . . [an] activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). The Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000), is not to the contrary. The threshold inquiry under 18 U.S.C. § 844 is what is the function of the building that is the subject of the offense, and when that is ascertained, the court then decides whether such function is one affecting interstate commerce. United States v. Logan, 419 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir.2005). In Jones, the Court addressed the threshold question and concluded that the statute's requirement that the building be used in an activity affecting commerce was most sensibly read to mean active employment for commercial purposes, and not merely a passive, passing, or past connection to commerce. 529 U.S. at 855, 120 S.Ct. 1904. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the arson of a private residence that had no significant commercial function could not be prosecuted under the statute. Id. at 859, 120 S.Ct. 1904. The facts of this case are far removed from those of Jones. A private residence is hardly comparable to an airport hanger housing an airplane used to travel interstate for commercial purposes. Moreover, Jones does not require that the proof in support of the second prong of the inquiry under Section 844whether the structure's commercial function is one affecting interstate commercedemonstrate anything more than a de minimis effect on interstate commerce. Indeed, the pervasive nature of congressional regulation of air travel suggests that the federalism concerns that animated the Court's decision in Jones are largely inapposite where Section 32(a) (which was not at issue in Jones ) is concerned. Also with regard to these convictions, Cain suggests in a supplemental pro se submission that our decision in United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 86 (2d Cir. 2003), limits the applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 32(a) to aircraft that are actually in flight at the time of their destruction. As the government correctly observes, this is a misreading of Yousef. Section 32(a) criminalizes the arson of any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate . . . air commerce (emphasis added). In Yousef, we held that because the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States is defined to include any civil aircraft of the United States while that aircraft is in flight, Section 32(a) covers any United States-flag aircraft while in flight, wherever in the world it may be. Yousef, 327 F.3d at 87. The while in flight requirement is not applicable to this case, however, because Cain was convicted under the employed in interstate air commerce prong of Section 32(a), rather than under the special aircraft jurisdiction prong. Finally, Cain argues in his supplemental pro se brief that one of the lawyers who represented him at trial, Joel Daniels, suffered from an unwaivable conflict of interest and was responsible for various lapses in representation that deprived Cain of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. In light of our baseline aversion to resolving ineffectiveness claims on direct review, United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 161 (2d Cir.1998), and the Supreme Court's admonition that in most cases a motion brought under § 2255 is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective-assistance, Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003), we decline to review Cain's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on the record now before us. Cain may pursue this claim in the context of a motion for relief from sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Khedr, 343 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir.2003).