Opinion ID: 2612481
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: separation of powers analysis

Text: With respect to the separation of powers issue we will decide whether the new 301 requirement, that the state consent to the court's deferral of further proceedings and placement of defendants on probation without entry of a judgment of conviction, infringes on the judicial department's sentencing power in violation of the principle of separation of powers explicitly stated in Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1.
In White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102, 105 (Wyo. 1984), we reviewed the separation of powers issue using these principles: We recognize the principle articulated in Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, Wyo., 606 P.2d 310 (1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 824, 101 S.Ct. 86, 66 L.Ed.2d 28 (1980): Courts have a duty to uphold the constitutionality of statutes which the legislature has enacted if that is at all possible, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of constitutionality. Witzenburger v. State, Wyo. 1978, 575 P.2d 1100, 1112; Lund v. Schrader, Wyo. 1971, 492 P.2d 202, 206. Though the supreme court has the duty to give great deference to legislative pronouncements and to uphold constitutionality when possible, it is the court's equally imperative duty to declare a legislative enactment invalid if it transgresses the state constitution. Witzenburger, supra, 575 P.2d at 1114. In our consideration of this case, we have consistently kept these basic principles in mind to avoid a declaration of unconstitutionality  but doubt is not present. We also are cognizant of our duty in any case in which the constitutionality of a statute is in issue: It is this court's obligation to make sense out of a statute and give full force and effect to the legislative product. Yeik v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, Wyo., 595 P.2d 965 (1979). In construing statutes the intention of the law-making body must be ascertained from the language of the statute as nearly as possible. Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of Casper, Wyo. 1976, 551 P.2d 687 (1976). We must not give a statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of another interpretation. McGuire v. McGuire, Wyo., 608 P.2d 1278, 1283 (1980). See also Hopkinson, 664 P.2d at 54, which involved, inter alia, a separation of powers issue. These principles will guide our way here. Additionally, [a]ll statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing state of law with reference thereto and statutes are therefore to be construed in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of an overall and uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but also with reference to the decisions of the courts. Civic Association of Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, 1941, 57 Wyo. 213, 238, 116 P.2d 236, 245. Matter of Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 486 (Wyo. 1976).

Under the Wyoming Constitution, the legislative power is vested in a senate and house of representatives. Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 1. The executive power is vested in a governor. Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 1. The judicial power is vested in a supreme court, district courts and such subordinate courts as the legislature may establish. Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 1. The Wyoming Constitution contains a definitive separation of powers provision: Powers of government divided into three departments.  The powers of government of this state are divided into three distinct departments: The legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted. Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1. The state's framers probably borrowed this provision from the constitutions of our neighboring states of Idaho and Montana. R. Prien, The Background of the Wyoming Constitution 56 (August 1956) (unpublished thesis); see also R. Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, XXI Land & Water L.Rev. 527, 534 (1986). During the floor adoption of that provision at the 1889 constitutional convention, the framers discussed precious little about that provision. Journals and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Wyoming, 44, 210, 247, 315-16 (1893) (where Mr. F.H. Harvey said it was the form found in most of the western states). It is likely more was said in committee, but we will never know since committee reports are not extant. [6] In determining the meaning of the separation of powers provision in the face of such meager evidence, we must consider the probable intention of the framers of the constitution   . [T]he language is to be understood in the sense in which it was used at the time when it was adopted. Witzenberger v. State ex rel. Wyoming Community Development Authority, 575 P.2d 1100, 1111-12 (Wyo. 1978). In what sense, then, did our state's framers use the separation of powers language in 1889? Claiming that one department of government may not encroach upon functions belonging to another, these criminal defendants contend it is essential that we preserve each of the powers in separate, air-tight compartments. They refer us, however, to neither legal authority nor historical evidence that our state's framers had in mind principles of separation of powers any different from those recognized as implicit under the Federal Constitution. [7] Surveying our state constitution, we identify convincing evidence that our state's framers intended an integration of dispersed powers into a balanced, workable government. Our state constitution, like the Federal Constitution, places the respective powers of the three departments of government into three articles. Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 1, concerning the legislative power, is similar to the U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 1, concerning the executive power, is similar to the U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 1, concerning the judicial power, is similar to U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. Under both the Federal Constitution and our state constitution, although the legislative bodies propose and enact laws, the executive bodies exercise veto power, which by its nature injects the executive department into the business of the legislative department. [8] Under both constitutions the judicial department has and exercises the power to adjudicate and declare legislative enactments unconstitutional, which by its nature injects the judicial department into the business of the legislative department. Under both constitutions, although the judicial department adjudicates and imposes legislatively determined sentences upon adjudicated criminal defendants, the executive department has and exercises a pardon power, which by its nature injects the executive department into the business of both the legislative and judicial departments. [9] Moreover, in Wyoming, the courts, as courts of general jurisdiction, have traditionally elaborated the state's common law and participated in a partnership of sorts with the state legislature in shaping the state's law. Keiter, supra, p. 535. If the state legislature disagrees with the court's common law decisions, it can legislatively reverse them. Id. From the foregoing discussion, we see that Wyoming's constitutional scheme of state government is, like the federal scheme of national government, replete with checks and balances. Considering the organizational structure, the placement of powers and the system of checks and balances, we are convinced that the state's framers had in mind a pragmatic, flexible view of differentiated governmental power. They intended that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635, 72 S.Ct. 863, 870, 96 L.Ed. 1153, 1199, 26 A.L.R.2d 1378 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring opinion). Separation of powers, then, merges into balanced government. [10] We adopt this view and reject the air-tight compartment view of these criminal defendants.
With this view of workable, balanced government, we now review this court's past decisions that identify the division of the government's powers in the criminal law area among the three departments. With these past decisions this court has painted the landscape of those powers. On review, we keep in mind the contentions of these criminal defendants. They contend the judicial department has the power to decide whether to defer a criminal prosecution and place a defendant on probation during the time period those prosecution proceedings are being deferred. Next, they claim that the disposition of deferral and probation without the entry of a final judgment of conviction or guilt is a sentence, and also that this power to decide to defer emanates from the judicial power to impose a sentence. MJP v. State, 706 P.2d 1108, 1110 (Wyo. 1985). They maintain that, as a result, the state's consent requirement placed by the legislature in new 301 is a constitutionally impermissible encroachment on the judicial power by the executive department. We disagree with these contentions. In its exercise of the legislative power, the legislative department has the exclusive power to determine and declare what acts shall constitute crimes and to prescribe punishments for those crimes. Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 882 (Wyo. 1987); Cook v. State, 710 P.2d 824, 826 (Wyo. 1985); Williams, 692 P.2d at 235; Schuler v. State, 668 P.2d 1333, 1342 (Wyo. 1983); Evans v. State, 655 P.2d 1214, 1223 (Wyo. 1982). In its exercise of the judicial power, the judicial department has the exclusive power to adjudicate, to pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect. W.R.Cr.P. 33; S.Doc. No. 16, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 631 (1987) ( Constitution of the United States-Analysis and Interpretation ). By entering a judgment whether of acquittal or of conviction or of discharge, the judicial department is performing a significant act of government. W.R.Cr.P. 33(b); Vigil, 563 P.2d at 1344. On the other hand, the judicial department has no power to initiate a criminal prosecution. That department's exercise of the prosecution power would be a constitutionally impermissible encroachment on the executive department's prosecution power. Petition of Padget, 678 P.2d 870, 873 (Wyo. 1984). The judicial department has no inherent power to refuse to try a criminal charge upon considerations extraneous to the legality of the charge, such as a belief that the particular act made criminal by law ought not to be treated as criminal. Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42, 37 S.Ct. 72, 74, 61 L.Ed. 129, 140-41 (1916), cited in Evans v. State, 655 P.2d 1214, 1224 (Wyo. 1982). Where the court finds no legal error on which to reverse a final judgment of conviction, the court has no inherent power to expunge that judgment for the purposes of restoring the defendant's civil rights or of alleviating the defendant's fear of being classified as a habitual criminal in the event he commits further offenses. Because expungement of a final judgment of conviction has the effect of a pardon and the pardoning power belongs exclusively to the executive department, the judicial department's exercise of an expungement power would be a constitutionally impermissible encroachment on the executive department's pardoning power. Stanton v. State, 686 P.2d 587, 589 (Wyo. 1984). Similarly, the judicial department has no power to grant an annulment of a final judgment of conviction. Ward v. State, 735 P.2d 707, 708 (Wyo. 1987). The judicial department has no inherent power to refuse to impose a sentence fixed by statute or to refuse to execute such a sentence when imposed. Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. at 41-42, 37 S.Ct. at 74, 61 L.Ed. at 140, cited with approval in Evans, 655 P.2d at 1224. The judicial department has no inherent power to suspend a sentence. That power belongs exclusively to the legislative department. Evans, 655 P.2d at 1224. In Evans, this court relied favorably on State v. Mabry, 96 N.M. 317, 320, 630 P.2d 269, 272 (1981), where the New Mexico Supreme Court said:    The vast majority of jurisdictions which have considered the question whether the courts have the inherent power to suspend sentences have answered in the negative.    A leading case is Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 37 S.Ct. 72, 61 L.Ed. 129 (1916), in which the Supreme Court held that federal courts do not have the power, absent authorization by Congress, to indefinitely suspend a sentence on good behavior. The Court examined common law authorities and found no support for the proposition that courts at common law had the inherent authority to suspend sentences indefinitely. Evans, 655 P.2d at 1224. The judicial department has no power, after imposing sentence, to reduce the sentence imposed to one the court was not authorized by the legislature to impose at the original sentencing. The judicial department has no power to either impose a sentence below the statutory minimum at the time of the original sentencing or impose a sentence within the statutory minimum and maximum and then suspend execution of a portion of that sentence. Williams, 692 P.2d at 236-37. The judicial department has no power to impose a sentence different from the sentence mandated by the legislative department. We have held that the legislature in old 301 properly exercised its power to prohibit the court from considering probation for habitual offenders with life sentences. Schuler, 668 P.2d at 1342. The judicial department has no inherent power to grant probation. The legislative department has exclusive authority over sentencing. Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743, 752 (Wyo. 1975). And, the judicial department has no power to grant parole after incarceration. The legislative department, in the exercise of its authority over sentencing, has placed that parole power with the board of parole, an arm of the executive department. Sorenson, 604 P.2d at 1036-37. Obviously, our Wyoming decisions agree with that said in Geraghty v. United States Parole Commission, 719 F.2d 1199, 1211 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103, 104 S.Ct. 1602, 80 L.Ed.2d 133 (1984), Unlike interpreting the constitution or adjudicating disputes, sentencing is not inherently or exclusively a judicial function. The executive department, in the exercise of its executive power to faithfully execute the laws, has the exclusive power to make the charging decision and prosecute the person who has allegedly committed the act determined by the legislative department to be a crime. Padget, 678 P.2d at 872-73. In Padget this court declared unconstitutional a legislative act that purported to authorize the court to exercise the prosecution power belonging exclusively to the executive department. Although this court stated that, once the prosecution made the decision to prosecute, the process which leads to acquittal or sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature, we recognized that within the judicial process of criminal prosecution the prosecutor's power to dismiss charges, to reduce charges, to defer charges, in sum to control the prosecution, was exclusive and not shared by the judicial department. We quoted from several different sources: The prosecutor has broad discretion to decide whether or not prosecution of an alleged crime will serve the public interest. [Citations.] He may, and should, consider a wide range of factors that bear on the merits of prosecution  the nature of the offense, the nature and severity of the sanctions that will be imposed upon conviction, the personal circumstances of the accused, the expense of prosecution and congestion in the courts.    Hoines v. Barney's Club, Inc., [28 Cal.3d 603, 170 Cal. Rptr. 42, 620 P.2d 628, 635 (1980)] (Tobriner, J., dissenting). A prosecutor's discretion in charging, deferring or requesting dismissal is limited by pragmatic factors, but not by judicial intervention. See Miller and Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant Decision: A Study of Current Practices, 1964 Wash.U.Law Quarterly 1. People v. District Court in and for County of Larimer, [186 Colo. 335, 527 P.2d 50, 52 (1974)]. Id. at 873. In Jahnke, we upheld against a separation of powers challenge the constitutionality of W.S. 14-6-203(c) (1977), which placed the decision as to the appropriate court in which to prosecute a juvenile within the discretion of the prosecutor as an officer of the executive department. After noting that there is no constitutional right to be tried as a juvenile, this court stated: Any decision to initiate criminal proceedings is vested in the prosecuting attorney, and the decision is discretionary. Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 19 L.Ed. 196 (1869); State v. Faltynowicz, Wyo., 660 P.2d 368 (1983) (Thomas, J., concurring). Since one does not have an inherent right to be prosecuted as a juvenile but that is a privilege granted by the legislature, the legislature can restrict or qualify the privilege as it sees fit, so long as there is not involved any arbitrary or discriminatory classification. Woodward v. Wainwright, [556 F.2d 781, 785 5th Cir. (1977)]. See, e.g., Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972). Jahnke, 692 P.2d at 929. We also added that [t]he legislature of the State of Wyoming has chosen to vest in the prosecuting attorney the discretion with regard to what charges to file and in what court they should be filed. There may be circumstances which would justify judicial review of the prosecutorial discretion, but in the absence of such suspect factors as race, religion or other arbitrary classification, the exercise of discretion by the prosecutor in deciding whether to charge as a juvenile or adult involves no violation of due process or equal protection of the law. Id. (citations omitted). These principles relating to the prosecutor's power to control the prosecution of a criminal charge were earlier expressed by the United States Supreme Court in this way: In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring    generally rests entirely in his discretion. Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation so long as the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 506, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 [1962]. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668-69, 54 L.Ed.2d 604, 610-11 (1978). In Gooden, 711 P.2d at 409-10, this court recognized another aspect of the prosecutor's power when it held that a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to any plea bargain with the prosecutor, nor to the reduction or dismissal of charges. The process of plea bargaining or whether it will be engaged in is left to the prosecutor's discretion. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 560-61, 97 S.Ct. 837, 846, 51 L.Ed.2d 30, 42-43 (1977). Accord, Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 223, 99 S.Ct. 492, 499, 58 L.Ed.2d 466, 476-77 (1978). The executive department, through the prosecutor as its officer, has the absolute right to prosecute. United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 289, 291, 292, 64 L.Ed. 333, 342-43 (1919). As expressed in Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 561, 97 S.Ct. at 846, 51 L.Ed.2d at 43: It is a novel argument that constitutional rights are infringed by trying the defendant rather than accepting his plea of guilty. In our review of the prosecutor's power to control the prosecution of a criminal case, we must also consider the prosecutor's common law power. We have consistently said that we will read our statutes in harmony with the common law. Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1061 (Wyo. 1984). In this light, we focus attention on the prosecutor's common law power of nolle prosequi. At common law the power to initiate and control criminal proceedings is within the exclusive domain of the prosecutor. United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100, 101-03 (S.D.Ill. 1945); Thompson, 251 U.S. at 413-14, 40 S.Ct. at 292, 64 L.Ed. at 342; Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457, 19 L.Ed. 196 (1869); U.S. v. Schumann, 2 Abb.U.S. 523, 7 Sawy. 439, 27 F.Cas. 984, 985 (C.C.D.Cal. 1866) (No. 16,235); Padget, 678 P.2d at 872-73; State v. Faltynowicz, 660 P.2d 368, 377 (Wyo. 1983) (Thomas, J., specially concurring, with whom Raper and Rose, JJ., joined); Comment, The Nolle Prosequi Under Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Det.C.L.Rev. 491 (1978). Indeed, as stated in 8B J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 48.02[1], 48-5 (2d ed. 1989): At common law, a prosecutor had unfettered authority to initiate, control and discontinue a proceeding at any stage prior to appeal. [11] An important feature of the prosecutor's unfettered power was his power to enter a nolle prosequi to discontinue a criminal proceeding he had earlier initiated.  Nolle prosequi means: `I am unwilling to prosecute.' Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. at 101. As described in Brokaw: The rule at the common law seems to have been, and in the present-day common law courts to remain, that prior to trial the prosecutor has the absolute uncontrolled power to enter a nolle prosequi; that after the empaneling of the jury until the return of a verdict the power is subject to the control of the court since it may not be used at that time to the prejudice of the defendant; and that following the return of the verdict the uncontrolled power of the prosecutor to enter a nolle revives and continues until such time as judgment is entered and sentence imposed. (emphasis added). Id. at 102. (citations omitted). See also 8B J. Moore, supra, 48.02[1] at 48-5; 6 L. Orfield and M. Rhodes, Orfield's Criminal Procedure Under the Federal Rules § 48.2-48.7, pp. 243-49 (2d ed.) (Lawyer's Co-op 1987); Comment, Criminal Law  Nolle Prosequi  Trial Court has Power to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution, 41 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 996-1001 (1966) (placing the initial appearance of nolle prosequi in Stretton & Taylor's Case, 1 Leon. 119, 74 Eng.Rep. 111 (K.B. 1588)). Commenting on the prosecutor's nolle prosequi power, the court in United States v. Woody, 2 F.2d 262, 262-63 (D.C.Mont. 1924), observed: The power to determine whether a case shall be prosecuted to a conclusion must, of course, be lodged somewhere, and by common law the district attorney is made its repository. By no statute has Congress deprived him of it, in ordinary criminal cases. It is assumed he will exercise his power under a heavy sense of duty to enforce the law, to prosecute offenders, and to protect society, and with wisdom and justice. The court cannot control him, unless, as in some states, it is given the power by statute. He is not even required to give a reason for dismissal. In United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.1965), cert. denied sub nom. Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935, 85 S.Ct. 1767, 14 L.Ed.2d 700, the court noted, It follows, as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions. In a concurring opinion, it was said: Responsibility for determining whether a prosecution is to be commenced or maintained must be clearly fixed. The power not to initiate    has to reside somewhere. And the more clearly pinpointed it is, the more the public interest is served through the focus of relentless publicity upon that decision. It may not, with safety, be left to a body whose great virtue is the combination of anonymity, transitory authority, and political unresponsibility. Id. at 182. (Brown, J., concurring specially). In another concurring opinion, Judge Wisdom reviewed the separation of powers doctrine, the exclusive power of the executive department to prosecute, the incompatibility of the functions of prosecutor and judge, and the prosecutor's power to enter a nolle prosequi. In light of his review, he observed that, within the context of law enforcement, a government's policy is involved. The executive department of that government is charged with carrying out the government's policy on law enforcement and is usually informed on more levels than the other two departments of government. Id. at 193. In such a situation, a decision not to prosecute is analogous to the exercise of executive privilege. The executive's absolute and exclusive discretion to prosecute may be rationalized as an illustration of the doctrine of separation of powers. Id. Wyoming is a common law state, except in those areas where the common law has been changed by statute or court rule. W.S. 8-1-101 (Aug. 1978 Repl.); Schlattman v. Stone, 511 P.2d 959, 961 (Wyo. 1973); Krug v. Reissig, 488 P.2d 150, 152, 52 A.L.R.3d 748 (Wyo. 1971); Goldsmith v. Cheney, 468 P.2d 813, 816 (Wyo. 1970); Johnston v. Laird, 48 Wyo. 532, 538, 52 P.2d 1219, 1220 (1935); State v. Foster, 5 Wyo. 199, 208, 38 P. 926, 927-28 (1895). Wyoming's statutory adoption of the common law of England originated from C.L. 1876, ch. 25 § 1. Our research has not uncovered any early Wyoming decision involving the prosecutor's power to enter a nolle prosequi at common law. We have found, however, that by virtue of Laws 1890, ch. 73 § 133, the Wyoming legislature enacted W.S. 7-198 (1957) which, until superseded by W.R.Cr.P. 45(a), [12] provided: No indictment or information shall be nol-prossed, except by order of the court on the motion of the prosecuting attorney, and such motion must be in writing, and the reasons therefor must be stated in such motion and read in open court, before such order is made. Other states have modified the common law [of nolle prosequi ] to give courts a responsible role in the dismissal of a pending criminal proceeding   . [13] United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 509-10 (5th Cir.1975). [T]he Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure recommended the common law approach be adopted requiring additionally only that prosecutors file motions with the court including reasons for the nolle prosequi. J. Moore, supra, ¶ 48.02[1], at 48-3. The committee submitted the recommended rule to the United States Supreme Court. Reviewing the proposed rule, the Court questioned the legal basis and wisdom of such a rule. Comment, 1978 Det.C.L.Rev. supra, at 494-95. Resubmitting the proposed rule, the committee added only the requirement of obtaining the defendant's consent to the motion if filed during the trial. Id. at 495. The Court deleted the proposed rule's requirement of a prosecutor's statement of reasons and added a requirement by leave of court. Id. As formally adopted by the Court, F.R.Cr.P. 48(a) states: Rule 48. Dismissal (a) By Attorney for Government. The Attorney General or the United States attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed during the trial without the consent of the defendant. Nearly twenty-three years after the United States Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Wyoming Supreme Court's adoption of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure became effective February 11, 1969. [14] Boggs v. State, 484 P.2d 711, 714 n. 2 (Wyo. 1971). W.R. Cr.P. 45(a) states: Rule 45. Dismissal (a) By the prosecuting attorney.  The prosecuting attorney may, by leave of court, file a dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint, and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed during the trial without the consent of the defendant. After the effective date of this rule, W.S. 7-198 (1957), the nolle prosequi statute, was superseded and of no further force or effect. W.R.Cr.P. 56. Since W.R.Cr.P. 45(a) is the same as F.R.Cr.P. 48(a), we give great weight to federal precedent under F.R.Cr.P. 48(a) when considering matters arising under W.R.Cr.P. 45(a). Dobbins v. State, 483 P.2d 255, 258 (Wyo. 1971). [15] According to Moore, the by leave of court requirement has been variously interpreted in the federal courts. Some federal courts believe they have broad discretion to protect public interests in fair administration of criminal justice. J. Moore, supra, ¶ 48.02[1], p. 48-4. Others adhere to the standard that the prosecution's motion to dismiss should be denied only if clearly contrary to manifest public interest. Id., ¶ 48.02[2], at 48-7. Despite this disagreement on the scope of the court's discretion, it is clear that the by leave of court requirement has modified the absolute power of the executive department so that the defendant is not harassed by charging, dismissing and recharging without placing the defendant in jeopardy. Id. ¶ 48.02[1], at 48-5; ¶ 48.02[2], at 48-8. The executive branch, however, essentially remains the judge of the decision to initiate a prosecution and to terminate it. Id. ¶ 48.02[1], at 48-5. And, [t]here is a presumption that the prosecutor's motion is made in good faith and in the proper discharge of his duties. Id. ¶ 48.02[2], at 48-7. We see a direct relationship between the prosecutor's dismissal power under W.R. Cr.P. 45(a) and the prosecutor's power under new 301 to consent to deferral of further prosecution without entry of judgment of conviction. In light of our foregoing analysis of the respective powers of the three departments of government in the criminal law area and of our tracing the evolution of the prosecutor's nolle prosequi power, we conclude that new 301 is the product of the legislative department's correct recognition of the executive department's power to initiate, control, and terminate criminal prosecutions before the judicial department exercises its power to enter a final judgment. Recalling the meaning of judgment of conviction under W.R. Cr.P. 33(b), we find that it correlates well with that phrase found in new 301: The court may, with the consent of the defendant and the state and without entering a judgment of guilt or conviction, defer further proceedings   . (emphasis added). This statute demonstrates the legislative department's proper understanding that until the judicial department enters a judgment of guilt or conviction (final judgment) the prosecutor possesses the executive department's power to control and terminate the prosecution at any time before final judgment. Thus, we find W.S. 7-13-301 compatible with W.R.Cr.P. 33(b) and 45(a) and solidly based on a proper understanding of and appreciation for the common law power of the prosecutor to control the criminal case even through verdict until the court enters a final judgment. In the face of extensive case law identifying and describing the legislative department's exclusive authority over sentencing, the contention of these criminal defendants that the judicial department has similar authority cannot stand. It is true that the judicial department has the power to impose sentence. W.R.Cr.P. 33(b); MJP, 706 P.2d at 1110. These criminal defendants are wrong, however, in concluding that probation without entry of a judgment under new 301 is the functional equivalent of a sentence. They fail to recognize what a sentence actually is. As we pointed out earlier in this opinion: There is only one final judgment. The final judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment. Berman v. United States, 1937, 302 U.S. 211, 212, 58 S.Ct. 164, 165, 82 L.Ed. 204. This is consistent with Rule 33(b), W.R. Cr.P., providing that, A judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the adjudication and sentence.    There is no judgment against the defendant until sentence is pronounced. Vigil, 563 P.2d at 1349. In Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 58 S.Ct. 164, 82 L.Ed. 204 (1937), the Court explained that the sentence is the final determination of the merits of the criminal charge. To create finality it was necessary that petitioner's conviction should be followed by sentence   . In criminal cases, as well as civil, the judgment is final for the purpose of appeal when it terminates the litigation    on the merits and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. Id., 302 U.S. at 212, 58 S.Ct. at 166, 82 L.Ed. at 205 (citations omitted). The deferral of further prosecution proceedings and placement of a criminal defendant on probation without entering a judgment of guilty or conviction under new 301 is by definition not a sentence. Deferral and probation without the entry of a judgment of guilty or conviction is not a final determination of the merits of the criminal charge. If the criminal defendant successfully completes probation, then the court discharges the defendant and dismisses the proceedings. In that event, there is finality. Discharge and dismissal occur without the court's adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence. W.S. 7-13-301(d) (June 1987 Repl.). On the other hand, if the criminal defendant violates probation, the court may proceed with the trial of the criminal charge if the criminal defendant has been charged but has not pleaded guilty or been tried and found guilty. W.S. 7-13-301(c)(ii). Or, if the criminal defendant violates probation, the court may, if the criminal defendant has previously pleaded guilty or been tried and found guilty, enter a judgment of guilt or conviction and proceed to impose sentence. W.S. 7-13-301(c)(i). Thus, for those criminal defendants who violate probation there will ultimately be a final judgment of either acquittal or of guilt and conviction followed by sentence. There is another reason why probation without entry of a judgment is not a sentence. A criminal defendant upon whom a court has imposed a sentence cannot reject that sentence. The court has the power to force that sentence on the criminal defendant. Under W.S. 7-13-301, since the criminal defendant's consent is required, the criminal defendant is free to reject the tender of probation without entry of judgment. If this disposition were truly a sentence, then the criminal defendant could not reject it. Viewed in this context, probation without entry of a judgment is analogous to a pardon. As Chief Justice John Marshall observed in United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. (32 U.S.) 150, 160-61, 8 L.Ed. 640 (1833), a pardon is like a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance. A pardon may be rejected by the person to whom it is tendered. If that person rejects it, a court has no power to force it on that person. In Marshall's view, a pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the executive department's power to execute laws which exempts the person on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime that person has committed. The prosecutor's consent to probation without entry of a judgment, like a pardon, exempts the person on whom it is bestowed from further criminal proceedings, specifically including a judgment of guilt or conviction. In the light of this favorable comparison, the prosecutor's consent to that type of disposition is also seen as an act of grace, proceeding from the executive power. We are not surprised that the pardon power and the prosecutor's consent power reside within the same department of government. Seeing the prosecutor's consent in this light, the symmetry of treatment is compelling. On the pre-entry of judgment side of the adjudicated guilt line, the executive department possesses the power to divert, or not, a criminal defendant into probation and away from further criminal prosecution in furtherance of the social policy enacted by the legislative department. On the post-entry of judgment side of the line, the executive department also possesses the power to divert, or not, a criminal defendant into pardon and away from further punishment. Although new 301 uses the word probation, the legislature has used it only generally to describe the defendant's status before a final judgment of conviction or discharge has been entered. The legislature has not used it to mean a defendant's status after the court has entered a judgment of conviction. See Hicklin, 535 P.2d at 753. Probation before entry of judgment is not a punitive sanction. It is an opportunity for rehabilitation before sentencing. The probationer is not an adjudicated convict. If probation is successfully completed, the probationer may be discharged without adjudication of guilt. These criminal defendants mistakenly seize upon the single phrase in Padget that says when the decision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal or sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature. Padget, 678 P.2d at 872 (applied in People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal.3d 89, 94, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249, 252, 473 P.2d 993, 996 (Cal. 1970)). From that single phrase they claim that whatever happens to the criminal charge after that point is an exercise of judicial power, not executive power. We agree that the prosecution of a criminal charge is part of the judicial process. In the prosecution phase of that judicial process, the judicial department exercises its powers and the executive department exercises its powers. The judicial department exercises its powers to control its docket, to administer court business, to adjudicate legal issues concerning the criminal procedures that necessarily attend the criminal proceeding, and to adjudicate substantive legal issues raised by the litigants. What these criminal defendants have failed to understand, however, is that during this judicial process the executive department is also at work exercising its powers. The prosecutor, as an officer of that department, is making decisions and controlling the criminal prosecution. In the exercise of these powers, the prosecutor may decide to add charges, to drop charges, or to reduce charges. The prosecutor may decide to dismiss some, but not all, charges. The prosecutor may decide to enter into plea negotiations. The prosecutor may decide to dismiss all charges and terminate the prosecution under W.R.Cr.P. 45(a), the nolle prosequi rule. With respect to these decisions, and others like them, the prosecution is exercising its executive powers within the judicial process that leads to dismissal, discharge, acquittal, or conviction and sentencing. In their understandable zeal to seize upon the isolated phrase to support their position, these criminal defendants have overlooked this court's main teaching in Padget: during the prosecution phase of the criminal proceeding that is part of the judicial process, the prosecutor shall exercise executive powers unfettered by judicial intervention. To emphasize this point we quoted favorably from People v. District Court in and for County of Larimer, 186 Colo. 335, 527 P.2d 50, 52 (1974): A prosecutor's discretion in charging, deferring or requesting dismissal is limited by pragmatic factors, but not by judicial intervention. Padget, 678 P.2d at 873. These criminal defendants also mistakenly rely on People v. Tenorio , which this court found helpful in our separation of powers analysis in Padget. In Tenorio the defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana. He admitted an eight-year old prior conviction of marijuana possession. The marijuana possession statute provided no minimum term and a maximum term of ten years for a first-time offender. For a defendant with one prior conviction, like Tenorio, the statute provided a minimum term of two years and a maximum term of twenty years. A related statute provided that unless the prosecutor so moved the court could not dismiss from the accusatory pleading an allegation of fact which, if admitted, would change the penalty from what it would be if such fact were not admitted. In other words, if the prosecutor refused to move to dismiss Tenorio's admission of the prior marijuana possession conviction, the court could not on its own dismiss that admission from the accusatory pleading, but must sentence Tenorio to at least a mandatory minimum term of two years. In violation of that statute, the trial court dismissed, without the prosecutor's approval, Tenorio's admission of his prior conviction from the complaint and granted Tenorio probation. The state appealed the order granting probation. In affirming the order, the California Supreme Court concluded that the prosecutor's approval statute impermissibly infringed on the judicial power and violated California's separation of powers principle. By its decision, the California court reversed People v. Sidener, 58 Cal.2d 645, 25 Cal. Rptr. 697, 375 P.2d 641 (1962). The court reviewed the Sidener opinion, including Justice Schauer's lengthy dissent concurred in by two other justices that answered the majority's historical argument by noting that nolle prosequi never existed in California. Justice Schauer had argued that the common law power of nolle prosequi was not part of that Mexican law retained by California's 1849 constitution and that the nonexistence of nolle prosequi was codified by statute. Tenorio, 473 P.2d at 995. The Tenorio court concluded, however, that any arguments based upon California's legal history before 1850 were undeterminative. The court found that from and after 1850 neither decision nor legislation denied that the judiciary has the power to dismiss. Id. at 996. The court said: The judicial power is compromised when a judge, who believes that a charge should be dismissed in the interests of justice, wishes to exercise the power to dismiss but finds that before he may do so he must bargain with the prosecutor. The judicial power must be independent, and a judge should never be required to pay for its exercise. Id. at 996. The court made it clear that when an individual judge exercises sentencing discretion he exercises a judicial power, the exercise of which cannot be foreclosed by power given to the prosecutor by the legislature. We cannot follow Tenorio for several reasons. The subject statute in effect there operated as a mandatory sentence statute. Although the California Supreme Court apparently feels that such a statute cannot operate to deprive the court of sentencing discretion, this court does not agree. In Evans, 655 P.2d at 1224, this court upheld against a separation of powers challenge the constitutionality of old 301 which mandated a life sentence for a habitual criminal. We held that old 301, which precluded the court from suspending a habitual criminal's mandatory life sentence, was a proper exercise of the inherent legislative power to prohibit suspension of sentence in any given case. We further held that the legislative department, not the judicial department, had the inherent power to suspend a sentence, and that the legislature is free to retain or delegate sentencing discretion when defining and setting punishment. It may properly delegate that discretion in whole or in part in the exercise of its exclusive authority over sentencing. Id. We recognized Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. at 42, 37 S.Ct. at 74, 61 L.Ed. at 140-41, which holds that the judicial department does not have the inherent power to refuse to impose a sentence fixed by statute or to refuse to execute such a sentence when imposed. There, the court implicitly denied the judicial department has the power to refuse to try a criminal charge because it believed the act made criminal should not be treated as criminal. Id., 242 U.S. at 42, 37 S.Ct. at 74, 61 L.Ed. at 140-41. Tenorio's holding that the judicial department has the inherent power to dismiss a criminal charge in the interests of justice is directly contradicted by the United States Supreme Court's statement in Ex Parte United States (cited favorably in this court's Evans ) that the judicial department has no inherent power to refuse to try a criminal charge upon considerations extraneous to the legality of the charge; by the United States Supreme Court's holding that the executive department has the absolute right to prosecute ( Bordenkircher, Weatherford, and Corbitt ); by this court's holding that the prosecutor does not have to enter into plea negotiations with a defendant and has the right to prosecute rather than accept a plea bargain ( Gooden ); and by this court's holdings that the judicial department has no inherent power to suspend a sentence ( Evans ); to expunge a final judgment of conviction which was without legal error and only for the purposes of restoring a defendant's civil rights or of alleviating his fear of being classified as a habitual criminal ( Stanton ); to grant an annulment of a final judgment of conviction ( Ward ); to reduce the sentence imposed to one which the legislature has not authorized the court to impose at original sentencing ( Williams ); to refuse to impose a sentence ( Evans ); to grant probation ( Hicklin ); or to grant parole after incarceration ( Sorenson ). Tenorio is also out of step with United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89 (2d Cir.1989), [16] in which a federal statute requiring the prosecutor's motion before the sentencing court may impose sentence below the statutory minimum on the basis of the defendant's cooperation with the prosecution survived separation of powers and due process challenges. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), upon the prosecutor's motion, the court has the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. Claiming that sentencing is a judicial prerogative, Huerta contended that a scheme which delegates to the executive branch's prosecutorial arm the authority to control when a judge may consider cooperation with the government as a mitigating factor interferes with or usurps a constitutionally assigned judicial function. In upholding the statute, the court first noted that the statute does not permit the prosecution to engage in adjudication. That power remains with the court. Next, the court observed that the prosecutor's authority under the statute to affect sentences is more limited than other prosecutorial means by which it affects sentences, such as the exclusive authority to decide whether to prosecute and to choose among alternative charges. Next, the court believed that the prosecution is uniquely fit to resolve the question whether a defendant's cooperation has risen to the level of substantial assistance. Recognizing that sentencing is not inherently a judicial function, the court concluded that the statute does not usurp a judicial function and, further, Congress has the power to eliminate all discretion in sentencing judges. Finally, the court found no precedent establishing a due process right of judicial review of the prosecution's decision to forego a motion under the statute. Although Tenorio found that California's legal history before 1850 concerning the common law power of nolle prosequi was undeterminative, we do not have such uncertainty in Wyoming. Wyoming, as a common law state, with no historical legal ties to Mexican law, has recognized and continues to recognize the power of nolle prosequi in the prosecutor as an officer of the executive department. Finally, these criminal defendants argue that deferral and probation under new 301 must be sentencing because it is located in article 7, chapter 13, entitled Sentence and Punishment. That argument fails. As located, the statute is in close proximity to related statutes dealing with the treatment of criminal offenders. As these statutes comprise a coherent legislative scheme relating to criminal offenders, both before and after entry of judgment, it only makes sense that they occupy the location they do. In light of the case law identifying and describing these governmental powers, and since probation without entry of a judgment is not a sentence, we are compelled to conclude that the power to decide whether a criminal defendant who has never before been convicted of a felony shall be treated under new 301 belongs to the executive department as an integral part of its blended prosecution power. The defer-probation decision under new 301 is not a decision to impose sentence; rather, it is a decision intimately related to the decisions to file charges, to reduce charges, to plea bargain, and to dismiss charges. All these decisions are committed to the sound discretion of the prosecutor as an officer of the executive department. We hold, therefore, that the executive department, not the judicial department, has the power to decide whether to defer prosecution under new 301. [17] The exercise of that prosecutorial discretion is not subject to judicial review as long as any unjustifiable or suspect factors such as race, religion, or other arbitrary or discriminatory classification are not involved. Gooden, 711 P.2d at 408-09; Jahnke, 692 P.2d at 929. New 301 and new 302 are the product of the legislature's revisions of old 203 and old 301. In new 301 and new 302 the legislature simply adjusted its sentencing and probation discretion. New 301 provides for probation before entry of final judgment; new 302 provides for probation after entry of final judgment. Obviously, the legislature has used the act of final judgment as its point of reference or demarcation. As W.R.Cr.P. 33(b) informs us, final judgment means adjudication and sentence. See Vigil. The judiciary exercises the power of adjudication and imposition of sentence when it enters final judgment of conviction, but not before. The prosecution exercises its prosecution power before entry of final judgment, but not after. Probation before entry of final judgment occurs within the prosecution phase of the criminal judicial process. Since the prosecutor exercises the prosecution power during that phase, including the power to file charges, to reduce charges, and to dismiss charges, it is correct that the prosecutor also have the power to consent to deferral of prosecution proceedings before entry of final judgment. On the other hand, probation after entry of final judgment occurs within the adjudication phase of the criminal judicial process. Since the judiciary exercises the adjudication power during that phase, including the power to impose sentence, we are not surprised that the legislature did not attempt to require the state's consent to probation after entry of final judgment. It is correct that the judiciary have the power to impose probation after entry of final judgment. What the legislature has done in new 301 and new 302 is not contrary to what it had done in old 203 and old 301, which this court approved of as within the legislature's legitimate exercise of its sentencing and probation authority. As we recognized in Evans, the legislature can retain or delegate its sentencing and probation discretion as it sees fit. It saw fit to do it in the manner it did in new 301. It is not within the power of the judicial department to question the wisdom of that exercise of the legislative department. [18] We pass only on the legality and constitutionality of that exercise. Here, we hold that the exercise was legal and constitutional. These criminal defendants object to the prosecution's possession of the power to decide from case to case whether a particular criminal defendant shall suffer or not from the penalties and disabilities associated with and consequent upon entry of a judgment of conviction or guilt. Despite the prosecutor's long-recognized possession of the power to charge, to reduce charges, to dismiss some or all of the charges, to plea bargain, and to dismiss the prosecution under W.R.Cr.P. 45(a), and despite the executive department's long-recognized possession of the power to pardon, these criminal defendants wish that the power to consent to a criminal defendant's probation without entry of a judgment resided in the judicial department rather than in the executive department. Under the state constitution, that cannot be. Once the prosecutor has decided to file the criminal charge, a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to a preferred disposition of that charge. He has no right to a reduced charge, to a dismissal of some charges, or to a plea bargain. Gooden. Possessing the nolle prosequi power, the prosecutor has played the role of being able to terminate a prosecution at any time before final judgment of guilt or conviction. Possessing the pardon power, the executive department has also played the role of being able to grant a pardon before or after final judgment. [19] If granted before final judgment, the pardon prevented the attachment of conviction penalties, disabilities, and stigmas. If granted after final judgment, pardon removed conviction penalties, disabilities, and stigmas. Viewing in this light the prosecutor's possession of the power to consent, or not, to probation without entry of a judgment, we find no constitutionally impermissible reason why the consent power cannot reside where the legislative department has placed it. The power must reside somewhere and its residence with the executive department is constitutionally consistent with other similar powers at home there. In holding that new 301 is constitutional, we find that the legislature enacted it with full knowledge of the existing state of the law with reference thereto. We have construed the statute in harmony with the existing law and as a part of an overall and uniform system of jurisprudence; the statute's meaning and effect have been determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but also with reference to court rule and court decisions. Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d at 486 (citing Civic Association of Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, 57 Wyo. 213, 238, 116 P.2d 236, 245 (1941)). Having resolved the separation of powers issue, we next consider whether the legislature constitutionally enacted new 301.