Opinion ID: 2220610
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Hazard Vehicle Exemption

Text: On appeal to this Court, Riley and Wilson (claimants) contend that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) does not exempt hazard vehicleslike snowplows and street sweepersfrom the rules of the road. [1] Rather, they assert that section 1103 (b) exempts such vehicles only from the stopping, standing and parking regulations of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1202 (a). We agree with the trial courts and the Appellate Division that section 1103 (b) exempts all vehicles actually engaged in work on a highwayincluding the vehicles here from the rules of the road. Some degree of risk, of course, is inherent in travel on public highways. Certain classes of vehicleslike snowplows and street sweepersare intended to minimize the risk by keeping the roadways clean and safe for everyone. While serving an important public function, however, those vehicles may themselves cause risks to ordinary motorists with whom they share the road. Over the years, courts and legislatures have struggled to define the rules under which these vehicles may operate and the standard of care they owe to others. At common law, all vehicles, including emergency vehicles, were held to an ordinary negligence standard ( see, e.g., Farley v Mayor of City of N. Y., 152 NY 222, 227-228 [1897]; Garrett v City of Schenectady, 268 NY 219, 223-224 [1935]; Ottmann v Village of Rockville Centre, 275 NY 270, 273 [1937]). [2] But the common law also recognized that the level of care owed by emergency and road work vehicles must be tempered by the nature of their work. Fire trucks, for instance, were permitted to drive at the greatest practicable speed, since the safety of property and the protection of life may    depend upon celerity of movement ( Farley v Mayor of City of N. Y., supra, at 227). In addition, many emergency vehicles were, by statute, given the right of way ( see, id. ). Nevertheless, the common law required that such vehicles exercise their right of way with care and caution    measured by the purpose and necessity of the right ( Hashey v Board of Fire Commrs. of Roosevelt Fire Dist., 192 NYS2d 767, 769-770 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]). In 1957, the Legislature enacted what is now title VII of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (§ 1100 et seq. ), creating a uniform set of traffic regulations, or the rules of the road ( see, L 1957, ch 698). That legislation was intended to update and replace the former traffic regulations, and bring them into conformance with the Uniform Vehicle Code adopted in other states ( see, Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1957, ch 698, at 35-37). The Vehicle and Traffic Law states that the rules of the road apply to all vehicles unless otherwise provided by law ( see, Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1101, 1103 [a]). Except for the provisions regarding driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, however, the rules of the road explicitly do not apply to persons, teams, motor vehicles, and other equipment while actually engaged in work on a highway (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 [b]). [3] Section 1103 (b) adds that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1202 (a), which regulates stopping, standing and parking, does not apply to hazard vehicles while actually engaged in hazardous operation on or adjacent to a highway but shall apply to such persons and vehicles when traveling to or from such hazardous operation. Similarly, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 exempts emergency vehicles, such as ambulances, police vehicles and fire vehicles ( see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 101), engaged in emergency operations from the rules of the road, subject to specified conditions. The language of these statutes seems clear: all vehicles actually engaged in work on a highwayjust as all emergency vehicles engaged in emergency operationsare exempt from the rules of the road. In the cases at hand, the street sweeper and the snowplow were engaged in work on a highway. The street sweeper was cleaning the street; the snowplow was clearing the road during a snowstorm. Thus, the Appellate Division correctly held that section 1103 (b) exempts both vehicles from the rules of the road. We reject claimants' contention that designated hazard vehicles are exempt only from the stopping, standing and parking regulations of section 1202 (a), even when they are engaged in work on a highway. Section 1103 (b) says no such thing. Rather, by its plain language, section 1103 (b) excuses all vehicles actually engaged in work on a highway from the rules of the road, regardless of their classification. To be sure, the statute also gives protection to designated hazard vehicles engaged in hazardous operation (as defined by sections 117-a and 117-b), excusing them from the stopping, standing and parking rules of section 1202 (a). But the statute nowhere states that hazard vehicles are a distinct class from work vehicles, nor does it deny hazard vehicles the special protection given to all vehicles actually engaged in road work. [4] The legislative history of section 1103 (b) confirms this plain language reading. We note at the outset that it is appropriate to examine the legislative history even though the language of section 1103 (b) is clear. The primary consideration of courts in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92 [a], at 177). Of course, the words of the statute are the best evidence of the Legislature's intent. As a general rule, unambiguous language of a statute is alone determinative ( see, Matter of Washington Post Co. v New York State Ins. Dept., 61 NY2d 557, 565). Nevertheless, the legislative history of an enactment may also be relevant and is not to be ignored, even if words be clear (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 124, at 252). `When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no rule of law which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on superficial examination' ( New York State Bankers Assn. v Albright, 38 NY2d 430, 437). Pertinent also are the history of the times, the circumstances surrounding the statute's passage, and    attempted amendments (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 124, at 253). Varying concerns may bear on the weight to be given legislative history ( see generally, Abner J. Mikva and Eric Lane, An Introduction to Statutory Interpretation and the Legislative Process, at 27-41 [1997]), but they do not justify abandoning this Court's long tradition of using all available interpretive tools to ascertain the meaning of a statute. Here, the history of section 1103 (b) explicates the legislative intention to create a broad exemption from the rules of the road for all vehicles engaged in highway construction, maintenance or repair, regardless of their classification. In 1954, the Committee that proposed the original version of the statute stated that the law was intended to exempt from the rules of the road all teams and vehicles that build highways, repair or maintain them, paint the pavement markings, remove the snow, sand the pavement and do similar work ( see, 1954 NY Legis Doc No. 36, at 35). Thus, the exemption turns on the nature of the work being performed (construction, repair, maintenance or similar work)not on the nature of the vehicle performing the work. Further, the legislative history shows that the reference to hazard vehicles in section 1103 (b) is wholly unrelated to the provision excusing vehicles engaged in road work from the rules of the road. Notably, the original version of section 1103 (b), enacted in 1957, exempted vehicles engaged in work on a highway from the rules of the road, and did not contain any separate provisions concerning hazard vehicles ( see, L 1957, ch 698, § 4). [5] In 1970, the Legislature amended the Vehicle and Traffic Law to create the hazard class of vehicles, enacting section 117-a defining hazard vehicles, and amending section 1103 (b) to exempt hazard vehicles from the standing, stopping and parking regulations ( see, L 1970, ch 197). The Memorandum in Support of that amendment explained that it was intended to clear up confusion as to the meaning of different flashing colored lights, and thus four distinct classes of vehicles were created (emergency vehicles, hazard vehicles, privately owned vehicles of volunteer firemen and privately owned vehicles of volunteer ambulance drivers), each of which is identified by a different colored flashing light ( see, Bill Jacket, L 1970, ch 197, at 4). The amendment was not intended to curtail the exemption for any vehiclesincluding hazard vehiclesengaged in work on a highway ( see, Dugan Letter, Bill Jacket, L 1970, ch 197, at 16 [noting the exemption of hazard vehicles and emergency vehicles from the rules of the road]). Thus, we conclude that section 1103 (b) exempts from the rules of the road all vehicles actually engaged in work on a highway, including the hazard vehicles in the cases before us.