Opinion ID: 2446007
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Nature of an As-Applied Challenge

Text: Even if the plain error standard did not apply, the very nature of his constitutional challenge requires appellant to create a record which establishes the relevant facts. An as-applied challenge requires that the application of the [statute], by its own terms, infringe[] constitutional freedoms in the circumstances of the particular case. United States v. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, 404 U.S. 561, 565, 92 S.Ct. 663, 30 L.Ed.2d 716 (1972); see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320, 329, 126 S.Ct. 961, 163 L.Ed.2d 812 (2006) (It is axiomatic that a statute may be invalid as applied to one state of facts and yet valid as applied to another.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Sanjour v. EPA, 312 U.S.App. D.C. 121, 128 n. 10, 56 F.3d 85, 92 n. 10 (1995) (as-applied challenges ask only that the reviewing court declare the challenged statute or regulation unconstitutional on the facts of the particular case); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 261 (9th ed. 2009) (an as-applied challenge is a claim that a statute is unconstitutional on the facts of a particular case or in its application to a particular party.). The record shows that the statute was applied to appellant under the following circumstances of the particular case. The deputy marshal found the gun under a mattress in an apartment where appellant was staying. Appellant denied owning the gun, telling the deputy at the scene that he ha[d] held the gun but he had never shot it, and it wasn't his. He testified at trial, however, that he had never seen or touched the gun and that he had told the deputy he did not know anything about it. After hearing all the evidence, the trial court found that each element of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. At sentencing the government represented that appellant had no prior criminal convictions and that he was twenty-five years old.
At the time of the offense (and at present) the District of Columbia's statutes established qualifications for firearms registration that supplemented, and were severable from, D.C.Code § 7-2507.10 (severability), the flat ban on registering handguns that was ruled unconstitutional in Heller. D.C.Code § 7-2502.03(a)(2), (3), (4) (2001) (criminal record), § 7-2502.03(a)(1) (age), § 7-2502.03(a)(5), (6), (mental health), § 7-2502.03(a)(7) (physical defect), § 7-2502.03(a)(8) (firearms negligence), § 7-2502.03(a)(10) (firearms safety knowledge), § 7-2502.03(11) (vision); see D.C.Code § 7-2502.03(a)(1)-(8), (10) (2010 Supp.) (placing the same restrictions on handgun registration); see also D.C. Law 17-372 § 3(d), 56 D.C.Reg. 1365 (Mar. 31, 2009) (revising the statute after Heller was decided). These restrictions are compatible with the core interest protected by the Second Amendment. See Plummer v. United States, 983 A.2d 323, 325 (D.C. 2009) (as amended on denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc, May 20, 2010) (We . . . hold that the UF and CPWL statutes are not facially invalid.); Howerton v. United States, 964 A.2d 1282, 1289 (D.C.2009) ([T]he Supreme Court reasoned in Heller [] [that] the Second Amendment protects `bearing arms for a lawful purpose' by `law-abiding, responsible citizens . . . in defense of hearth and home.' (quoting Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2813, 2821)). Although the Supreme Court did not consider the particulars of the District of Columbia's registration and licensing requirements, nothing in Heller compels the District to register a firearm for a resident who does not satisfy these statutory requirements. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2822 (Assuming that Heller is not disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights, the District must permit him to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home.); see also id. at 2816-17 ([N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill. . . .). Here the government conceded at sentencing that appellant was twenty-five years old and had no prior convictions. But the record on appeal does not establish that appellant could have met the other requirements for registering a firearmsuch as those pertaining to mental health history, prior adjudication for firearm negligence, and vision. Plummer, 983 A.2d at 337. An as-applied challenge asserts that a statute cannot be constitutionally applied in particular circumstances, [so] it necessarily requires the development of a factual record for the court to consider. Harris, 564 F.3d at 1308. Because appellant has not shown on the present record that he lawfully could have registered a firearm, he has not shown that the statute was unconstitutionally applied to him.
In many respects this case is like Plummer v. United States, 983 A.2d 323 (D.C. 2009) (as amended on denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc, May 20, 2010), where the defendant was convicted of carrying a pistol without a license and possession of an unregistered firearm. There, as here, the record was inadequate to determine whether Plummer could lawfully have registered his pistol, absent the categorical ban struck down in Heller. We remanded for a hearing to determine that mixed question of fact and law. Plummer, 983 A.2d at 342. A remand is not appropriate here, however, because appellant did not preserve the Second Amendment issue for appeal, whereas Plummer did. See id. at 334, 341 (noting that Plummer had preserved the Second Amendment issue by raising it years before the Supreme Court's decision in Heller ). We acknowledged in Plummer that the statutory scheme that existed before Heller amounted to an absolute prohibition on [Plummer's] application for a registration certificate, id. at 342, and  Heller made clear that the total ban on handgun possession in the home for self-defense, family defense, and property defense `fail[s] constitutional muster.' Id. at 341 (quoting Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817-18). However, Heller made it clear that a person could be `disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights,' id. at 342 (quoting Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2821-22), and we recognized that Mr. Plummer's Second Amendment rights would have been violated only if he was not disqualified from receiving a registration certificate. Id. Because it resolved the Second Amendment issue in accordance with then existing precedent in this jurisdiction, the trial court [in Plummer ] did not have an opportunity to decide the disqualification issue. . . . Id. Moreover, whether Mr. Plummer could have successfully obtained a registration certificate prior to the imposition of charges in this case [was] a question we [could] not resolve on th[e existing] record. Id. We therefore remanded for a hearing to determine whether, prior to the imposition of charges in th[at] case, Mr. Plummer would have been able to satisfy the then existing and applicable statutory and regulatory requirements for obtaining a registration certificate and license for his handgun[,] including age, criminal history, mental capacity, and vision. Id. As in Plummer, we cannot tell from this record whether Mr. Lowery could have successfully registered that, or any, handgun and it is tempting to remand for a hearing to determine the answer. Doing so, however, would violate the plain error rule and our precedent by shifting from the appellant the burden of demonstrating plain error on the existing record. Nor are we willing to erect a presumption that a defendant is an ordinary citizen, entitled to exercise Second Amendment rights unless disqualifying information affirmatively appears on the record. That, too, would amount to shifting the burden on plain error review, something we may not do and do not wish to do.