Opinion ID: 1190445
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether defendant's statements were voluntary

Text: During his interrogation on September 11, 1985, defendant gave three tape-recorded statements to the police. In his motion in limine to suppress them, he contended the third statement, and perhaps the second as well, was involuntary because the interrogation was unduly long and coercive. On appeal he challenges only the third statement  in which he admitted, contrary to his prior statements, that he was present at the time of the robbery and killings. (2) Our task is to examine the facts and determine independently whether the prosecution met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's statements were voluntary. ( People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 166 [266 Cal. Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857]; People v. Markham (1989) 49 Cal.3d 63, 71 [260 Cal. Rptr. 273, 775 P.2d 1042].) Defendant's contention of involuntariness is not supported by the record. Defendant arrived at police headquarters at 9:22 a.m. and was placed in an interview room. He was left alone for about three minutes and at his request was then taken to the restroom. He was returned to the interview room. Sergeant Medsker identified himself and explained that he was investigating the Brice killings. Sergeant Jerry Harris was also present. Defendant was orally advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436 ( Miranda ), and he signed a written acknowledgment that he had been so advised. He also indicated in writing that he nevertheless wished to speak with the police. Defendant was interrogated for about 50 minutes, during which time Sergeant Medsker took written notes. At 10:35 a.m. Sergeant Medsker began an audio recording of defendant's statement. Defendant asserted that he first learned of the Brice killings while watching the television evening news on August 15. The taping session lasted 27 minutes  until 11:02 a.m. Defendant was then left alone for a few minutes, taken to the restroom, and returned to the interview room. Sergeant Medsker asked defendant whether he wished to eat, defendant said, Yes, and Sergeant Medsker brought him food at 11:35 a.m. He was not questioned while he ate. At 12:04 p.m., Sergeant Medsker asked defendant if he was willing to take a polygraph examination. Defendant agreed. The examiner readvised defendant of his Miranda rights, and defendant signed an acknowledgment of the advisement. The polygraph examination then began and continued until shortly before 1:22 p.m. when defendant was returned to the initial interview room. In the presence of defendant and Sergeants Medsker and Harris, the polygraph examiner explained that defendant had not passed the examination. At 1:58 p.m. Sergeant Medsker resumed questioning defendant and continued until 3:13 p.m., a period of one hour and fifteen minutes. This session was not tape-recorded. Sergeant Medsker left the room. Four minutes later, defendant knocked on the door, Sergeant Medsker responded, and they spoke briefly. Sergeant Medsker again left the room and did not return until 3:52 p.m. When he returned, Sergeant Medsker showed defendant two photographs, left the room, and returned at 4:18 p.m. Three minutes later, he began a second taping session with defendant. Defendant was not given a third set of Miranda warnings before this session. He asserted that he knew the identity of the person who killed the Brices and that his first story to police was false because he did not want to snitch on the killer, so that I [defendant] don't get killed next. The second recording session lasted until 5:15 p.m., about 54 minutes. Sergeant Medsker left defendant alone in the interview room and returned about 15 minutes later to take him to the restroom. On the walk back to the interview room, defendant stated that he thought the killer's surname was McCray. Sergeant Medsker returned defendant to the interview room and left to obtain a photograph of McCray. At 5:48 p.m., Sergeant Medsker came back with a hot print photograph of McCray. Defendant identified the photograph subject as being the person responsible for the Brice killings. At 6:50 p.m. defendant was given a sandwich. Questioning resumed at 7:10 p.m. and continued until 10:05 p.m. Defendant was not readvised of his Miranda rights. Sergeant Medsker tape-recorded the latter portion of this session  from 9:16 p.m. to 10:05 p.m. In this third recorded statement, defendant admitted for the first time that he was present in Brice's jewelry store at the time of the robbery and killings. After this interrogation session, defendant was returned to jail. The next morning, after police had arrested and questioned Michael McCray, Sergeant Medsker sought again to interrogate defendant. For the first time, defendant invoked his Miranda rights. Defendant does not dispute the foregoing chronology of his interrogation. (3) He contends, rather, that approximately eight hours of actual interrogation (in five separate sessions) over a twelve-hour period was unduly lengthy and thus coercive, rendering involuntary his third recorded statement. Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that such a length of time is, in and of itself, unfairly coercive. The voluntariness of a confession must be tested by the totality of all the surrounding circumstances  both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. ( Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 226 [36 L.Ed.2d 854, 862, 93 S.Ct. 2041]; People v. Thompson, supra, 50 Cal.3d 134, 166; 1 LaFave, Criminal Procedure (1984) § 6.2(c), p. 444.) Defendant points to no circumstance other than the length of his interrogation. We are aware of no authority that would support a specific time limit on interrogation that would apply to all cases, regardless of their facts. Drawing such a bright line for all cases would be contrary to the totality of the circumstances test. Of course, custodial interrogation might continue for so long as to become unduly coercive under the circumstances of a particular case. ( Ashcraft v. Tennessee (1944) 322 U.S. 143, 153 [88 L.Ed. 1192, 1199, 64 S.Ct. 921] [suspect interrogated for 36 hours without sleep or rest by relay teams of police officers and lawyers].) This, however, is not such a case. The 12-hour period on September 11 was not one of continuous interrogation. The actual interrogation, which was divided into five sessions, comprised only about eight hours. The breaks between sessions were not of insignificant duration. Nor was the period of interrogation unduly lengthy under the circumstances. It took place during normal waking hours  from approximately 9:30 a.m. until 10 p.m. Defendant was promptly provided with food, beverages, and restroom breaks whenever he requested them. (He was fed shortly before the final session to which he now objects.) The final session lasted only three hours. The record does not reflect that defendant was unduly distressed or subjected to any abusive or improper interrogation techniques. Most important, defendant never once requested any break in the interrogation or asked that it be terminated. This weighs heavily against his claim of excessively long questioning. He was twice given Miranda warnings, which he acknowledged both times in writing. The record reflects that he was fully aware he could terminate the interrogation at any time. For example, the next morning, September 12, when Sergeant Medsker attempted to resume questioning, defendant invoked his Miranda rights. Interrogation ceased immediately. Neither the length nor circumstances of defendant's interrogation indicate that any of defendant's statements, including the third and final statement, was involuntary. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress.