Opinion ID: 516001
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether there were any oral modifications of the January 11, 1983 written contract.

Text: 24 2. Whether Mr. Willoughby knew that Frito-Lay could not take all his potatoes because he had missed the shipping dates specified in the written contract. 25 3. Whether Frito-Lay waived its option to refuse late shipments. 26 4. Whether Mr. Willoughby was responsible for requesting a written release to sell to others. 27 5. Whether deliveries accepted after the week of June 27, 1983 were part of the written contract between Frito-Lay and Barton Willoughby. 28 Frito-Lay's Statement of Material Facts Which Are In Dispute, Br. for Appellee at appendix. Appellee persuasively argues that items 1, 3, 4, and 5 are not matters of fact, and that item 2, while a question of fact, is not material. While we are inclined to agree that appellant failed to state facts, we are even more convinced that it failed to state them with the requisite specificity and support them with appropriate references to the record before the District Court. 29 These obligations cannot be met by mere allegation or denial[ ], but instead, require a showing by affirmative evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 256-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service, 391 U.S. 253, 290, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1593, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (plaintiff could not defeat the properly supported summary judgment motion without offering any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (the nonmovant must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts ... the nonmoving party must come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial'  (citations and emphasis omitted)). Likewise in Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236 (D.C.Cir.1987), we made clear that to survive the government's properly supported motion for summary judgment, plaintiff was required to provide evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find in his favor. Id. at 1242 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, and Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514). We find the Fifth Circuit's discussion of this issue in Nissho-Iwai Am. Corp. v. Kline, 845 F.2d 1300, 1307 (5th Cir.1988), to be persuasive. After rejecting appellant's argument that the district court erred in failing to consider an unsworn affidavit in opposition to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the Kline court ruled that the trial court had no duty to consider certain deposition testimony in the record that appellant failed to bring to the court's attention. Relying on Celotex, the court held that appellant's failure to designate facts evidenced in the deposition that would support her case was fatal. In reaching this decision, the court rejected the incorrect assumption that the entire record in the case must be searched and found bereft of a genuine issue of material fact before summary judgment may be properly entered. Id. 30 We similarly reject appellant's claim that the district court should have examined the entire record when considering Mr. Willoughby's summary judgment motion. Br. for Appellant at 11 n. 4. Appellant's failure to designate and reference triable facts was, in light of the language of Rule 56(c) and governing precedent, fatal to its opposition. Cf. Thompson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 394 F.2d 774, 777 & n. 9 (D.C.Cir.1968) (District Court not obligated to consider nonmovant's deposition, which was merely generally incorporated ... without reference to any portion thereof as setting forth facts).Type of Evidence 31 Throughout the course of this litigation, and despite the clear teaching of Celotex on this point, appellant has labored under the mistaken belief that unless the moving party introduces affidavits in support of its motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party bears no burden to introduce evidence to oppose the motion. 1 At the hearing of the motions, for example, appellant argued that Willoughby has not filed any affidavits in this case and, obviously, we didn't have an obligation to file any counteraffidavits. J.A. at K32. Likewise, in petitioning the trial court to reconsider its decision, appellant stated that [s]ince Mr. Willoughby did not present new or additional evidence supporting its motion for summary judgment, Frito-Lay did not have to submit additional evidence opposing the motion. Frito-Lay's Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Its Motion To Reconsider at 4. (If Mr. Willoughby had submitted an affidavit, Frito-Lay certainly would have submitted evidence opposing the affidavit. Id. at n. 2.) Likewise, appellant argues here as it argued below that it had the right to rest on its pleadings, which it points out challenged all the factual and legal determinations made by the Secretary.... Br. for Appellant at 9 (citing J.A. at I2). (Appellant's Petition for Consideration before the District Court stated that the Secretary's factual findings are not supported by the evidence. J.A. at 12.) 32 According to the Supreme Court in Celotex, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552 (emphasis added). As noted above, in opposing a properly supported motion, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'  Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), 56(e)); see also International Distrib. Corp. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 569 F.2d 136, 139 (D.C.Cir.1977) (a party may not avoid summary judgment by mere allegation unsupported by affidavit). Consequently, appellant's reliance on its pleadings is clearly insufficient. 33 Appellant alternatively argues that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment can reference and rely on sworn testimony, certified transcripts or similar materials to show a material dispute. Reply Br. for Appellant at 4 (citing International Distrib., 569 F.2d at 138) (transcript and affidavit sufficient to grant summary judgment). While the proposition is unassailable, the four specific items that appellant claims constituted a sufficient showing before the District Court are of no help. Appellant cites to: (1) the certified copy of the Secretary's decision, which shows there is a sharp conflict in the testimony; (2) its own motion for summary judgment, which referred to and incorporated the factual disputes; (3) Mr. Willoughby's testimony which was appended to appellant's motion and highlighted the inconsistencies in his sworn statements; and (4) its motion to reconsider, which included portions of Mr. Willingham's testimony show[ing] that there were no oral agreements. Reply Br. for Appellant at 3-4. 34 The latter three are easily dismissed. As for appellant's own motion, far from refer[ring] to and incorporat[ing] the factual disputes, the motion argues that there are, for purposes of that motion, no facts in dispute. Likewise, the appended transcript of Willoughby's testimony before the Secretary fails to evidence dispute. Indeed, if anything, appellee's testimony actually supports the grant of summary judgment in that it indicates that oral agreements were reached. As for the evidence attached to appellant's motion to reconsider, it is well established that the obligation of this Court is to look at the record before the District Court at the time it granted the motion, not at some later point. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33, 37 (D.C.Cir.1987); Ramsey v. United States, 463 F.2d 815, 817 (D.C.Cir.1972) (per curiam) (refusal to consider affidavit not before Court when motion granted); see also Kline, 845 F.2d at 1307 (our review is confined to an examination of materials before the lower court at the time the ruling was made; subsequent materials are irrelevant), and cases cited therein. While equally unavailing, appellant's reliance on the Secretary's decision as creating a genuine issue warrants separate discussion. Reliance on the Secretary's Decision 35 By statute, the record before the District Court consisted of the Secretary's Decision and Order and the pleadings filed before the Secretary. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 499g(c). Appellant argues that the Secretary's decision--which leaves no doubt there was a factual dispute between the parties--is in and of itself sufficient to demonstrate a triable issue. Certainly if appellant had offered the District Court the sworn testimony which prompted the stray comment in the Secretary's decision, the task of that court and this would have been a different one. But appellant did not. As we have said before in reviewing summary judgment, [o]ur sole and limited task is to assess with care the record before the District Court at the time it granted [the motion]. Catrett, 826 F.2d at 37. Granted, appellant's counsel asserted to the District Court at oral argument of the cross-motions I've got a whole transcript of sworn testimony in the administrative hearing ... [and] that testimony is sworn and it is very verified and therefore, it does create a disputed fact on that pivotable [sic] issue. J.A. at K33. But appellant did not present that transcript full of sworn testimony into the District Court's record. We cannot speculate at this date on what would have been the result had appellant done so. The fact remains, appellant did not. As Judge Leventhal said for this Court, a party moving for summary judgment is entitled to the benefit of any relevant presumptions, and if the established facts and relevant presumptions would have entitled him to a directed verdict at trial, he is entitled to a summary judgment under Rule 56. United States v. General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420, 441-42 (D.C.Cir.1975); see also 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2713.1 at 616 (2d ed. 1983). Had appellee in this case never made this motion and this case proceeded to trial, appellee obviously could have relied on the statutorily created prima facie case by introducing the decision of the Secretary as it did at the motions stage. In such a trial appellant could hardly have opposed a motion for directed verdict by resting and then arguing that it had a transcript full of evidence which it had not introduced. Neither can it do so at summary judgment.