Opinion ID: 2180482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Negligent Assessment of the Need for Self-Defense

Text: Elizabeth contends that the duty to defend may still be predicated on the allegation in the complaint that Savickas negligently assessed a need for self-defense against Thomas before shooting him, citing State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Leverton, 289 Ill.App.3d 855, 225 Ill.Dec. 308, 683 N.E.2d 476 (1997); Topps v. Ferraro, 235 Ill.App.3d 43, 175 Ill.Dec. 895, 601 N.E.2d 292 (1992); Wegman v. Pratt, 219 Ill.App.3d 883, 162 Ill.Dec. 221, 579 N.E.2d 1035 (1991); and Blackburn v. Johnson, 187 Ill.App.3d 557, 135 Ill.Dec. 200, 543 N.E.2d 583 (1989). American Family urges that these authorities were decided incorrectly, and requests that we overrule them. We need not determine whether Illinois law supports a free-standing cause of action based on negligent assessment of the need for self-defense, however, because the criminal conviction estops Elizabeth and Savickas on this theory as well. At his criminal trial, Savickas argued that he was acting in self-defense and argued in the alternative that his offense should be reduced to second degree murder because he unreasonably believed that he was acting in self-defense. Savickas, 230 Ill.App.3d at 329-33, 171 Ill.Dec. 713, 594 N.E.2d 1233. By its verdict that Savickas was guilty of first degree murder the jury necessarily resolved both of these issues against Savickas. Accordingly, since we have already determined that in the declaratory judgment action the criminal conviction should be accorded preclusive effect with respect to both Savickas and Elizabeth, both are barred from asserting that Savickas believedeven unreasonablythat he was acting in self-defense.