Opinion ID: 1754285
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: compensation for lost production or temporary taking

Text: Respondents contend that the burning and the order prohibiting production, otherwise referred to as the quarantine, were interrelated activities of the same canker eradication program and that the interruption can be viewed as incidental to the burning process. The respondents then argue that the nurseries are not fully compensated unless the program's entire effect, i.e., all the actions connected with the taking, are considered. In the alternative, the respondents analyze the quarantine imposed for decontamination purposes as a separate action which allegedly constituted a temporary taking of the entire nursery. We conclude that the trial court erred in permitting this alleged component of full compensation to be presented to the jury and that the damages awarded by the jury for lost or retarded production of new stock are therefore not sustainable under either analysis proffered by the respondents. As the district court below noted, if the claim for lost production is analyzed as incidental to the taking of the personal property, these damages are not recoverable as compensation under article X, section 6, of the Florida Constitution. The constitutional right to receive full compensation under eminent domain is not a right to receive general damages. The taking of the citrus plants authorizes the nursery owners to receive full compensation for the destroyed plants. With respect to this theory, the district court correctly stated: The claim for lost production is a claim for consequential, business damages. It is well established that the right to business damages is a matter of legislative grace, not constitutional imperative. Jamesson v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 322 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1975). See also State, Dep't of Transp. v. Fortune Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 532 So.2d 1267 (Fla. 1988); Texaco, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 537 So.2d 92 (Fla. 1989). The legislature has not graced these nursery owners with a statute authorizing business damages. 541 So.2d at 1250-51. We accordingly answer the second certified question in the negative. Respondents cite State Plant Board v. Smith, 110 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1959), and state that this Court noted that an owner whose healthy plants were destroyed by a state program should be compensated `for at least loss of profits.' The Court's actual statement was that [i]n the Corneal case this court held that the so-called `pull and treat' program adopted by the State Plant Board ... could not be carried out on a compulsory basis without compensating the grower for `at least, the loss of profits sustained by the owner whose healthy trees are destroyed... .' Smith, 110 So.2d at 403. Respondents' reliance on Smith is misplaced. It is clear from Corneal v. State Plant Board, 95 So.2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1957), that the Court's conclusion that the Board had a clear legal duty to compensate grove owners for at least the loss of profits sustained when healthy trees were destroyed was made with regard to determining the compensation required for destruction of the healthy trees. [4] As noted, the fact remains that some of these healthy trees will be fully productive for at least a year or two and others for several years, depending on their proximity to a tree infested with burrowing nematodes. Id. at 6. The profit that would have been derived from the healthy trees is certainly a reasonable consideration in determining full compensation under the circumstances present in Corneal. Respondents' reliance on Anhoco Corp. v. Dade County, 144 So.2d 793 (Fla. 1962), is likewise misplaced. Respondents contend that in Anhoco, this Court upheld an outdoor theater owner's claim for compensation for temporary loss of access to its facilities which loss was occasioned as an incident to the taking of the theater's fee interest in a roadbed. In reviewing the district court decision regarding a condemnation action to acquire fee simple title to Anhoco's property and property rights, including the right of access, this Court stated that in any eminent domain proceeding any damages suffered by the abutting property owner may be adjudicated and awarded. Id. at 797. A careful reading of the decision, together with the Court's prior decision in Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Anhoco Corp., 116 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1959), however, reveals that the Court expressly granted [the property owner] the opportunity `to present evidence of the value to them of the property and property rights, including the right of access which will be acquired for limited access facilities.' 144 So.2d at 795 (emphasis added). It was determined that the right of access was not merely regulated, but destroyed, and the abutting property owners are entitled to compensation for the destruction of their previously existing right of access. Id. at 797. Even if Anhoco could be read as standing for the broad proposition that all damages may be adjudicated and awarded in a condemnation proceeding, respondents' reliance on the decision is to no avail because the alleged damages flowing from the imposed quarantine were not adjudicated. The trial court granted the nurseries' motion for leave to file a second amended complaint on December 20, 1985. The second amended complaint refers only to the Department's burning of existing nursery stock and alleges only that the destruction of such trees and budwood constituted a taking for which the owners were entitled to full and fair compensation. No allegations regarding the imposed quarantine were made. The trial to determine liability was conducted on September 24, 1986, Judge Oliver L. Green, Jr. presiding. Respondents did file a motion for leave to amend the second amended complaint on October 6, 1986, subsequent to the liability trial, to add a paragraph alleging they were entitled to recover damages for loss of use of business assets, lost profits, etc. No ruling was made on this motion at that point in time. Instead, the trial court's order of liability for taking was issued on October 10, 1986. [5] This order does not expressly find the decontamination process to be a taking, referring instead only to respondents' nursery stock. The lost production damages can therefore not be upheld on the basis of the respondents' argument that the quarantine constituted a temporary taking of the nursery properties either. Because this measure of compensation was not alleged in the complaint upon which the trial court issued its order of taking and because there was no determination in the order of taking rendered subsequent to the trial on liability that the quarantine constituted a temporary taking, this measure of compensation should not have been presented to the jury. It is unnecessary to our decision and we therefore do not decide at this time whether a temporary taking such as alleged is compensable under the Florida Constitution and, if so, whether the quarantine at issue would constitute a compensable temporary taking. Although we approve that portion of the district court's decision which concludes that the respondents may not recover damages for lost production in this case, we quash the district court's directions that the nursery owners be permitted, upon remand, to amend their complaint in an effort to allege a temporary taking. Such a result is precluded by the rule against splitting causes of action, which flows from the doctrine of res judicata. The rule against splitting causes of action makes it incumbent upon plaintiffs to raise all available claims involving the same circumstances in one action. See Schimmel v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 506 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So.2d 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), review denied, 492 So.2d 1331 (Fla. 1986). The rule against splitting causes of action is predicated on the following basic policy considerations: (1) finality in court cases promotes stability in the law; (2) multiple lawsuits arising out of a single incident are costly to litigants and an inefficient use of judicial resources; and (3) multiple lawsuits cause substantial delay in the final resolution of disputes. See Stanley Builders, Inc. v. Nacron, 238 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1970); Schimmel; Eagle-Picher. As respondents so strongly contend, the prohibition against beginning new citrus production for a period of time was an incident of the Department's destruction of the nursery stock, imposed for purposes of decontamination. The Department's alleged liability for this prohibition, as well as the facts necessary to prove it, existed at the time the first trial relating to liability commenced. In summary, we approve in part and quash in part the decision of the district court below. We remand to the district court with directions to remand to the trial court for proceedings pursuant to chapter 89-91, Laws of Florida, and this Court's decision in Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services v. Bonanno, 568 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1990). It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, BARKETT and GRIMES, JJ., concur. KOGAN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.