Opinion ID: 1660892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Richardson Hearing

Text: In this claim, Thompson asserts that counsel was ineffective in failing to request a Richardson hearing after it became apparent that the State might have committed a discovery violation. During the guilt phase, the following exchange occurred during the cross examination of Mr. Herman Smith: Q. [Defense Counsel] But on August 27th, 1986, did you work at the cemetery? A. Yes, sir. I had my crew working at the office that day. Q. Was Mr. Thompson working on that day? A. No. He had quit his job. Q. Did you see Mr. Thompson at the cemetery? A. No. Everybody that appeared there know Mr. Thompson because he was working in my crew at the time. Q. I'm not arguing with you about that, Mr. Smith, and I don't want you to think that I am. Can you just answer this question for me? On August 27th 1986, did you at any point in time while you were working on that day see Charlie Thompson on the grounds of the Myrtle Hill Cemetery? A. My crew have told me he was at that time. I got to explain myself. Q. No sir. Just tell me this: Did you, sir, see Thompson on August 27th at the cemetery? Did you see him? A. No, sir, but my crew did. My crew did. Q. When did your crew see him? A. I was the foreman out there this particular day. They was there working at the office when they seen Mr. Thompson go in there and carry Mr. Swack and Ms. Nancy. They said he had a gun in his pocket. THE COURT: Take the jury out. Thompson's defense attorney requested a curative instruction, and upon reconsideration, moved for a mistrial. The court declined to grant a mistrial and instead gave the jury a curative instruction. On direct appeal, Thompson argued that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay, non-responsive to the question asked, and that the curative instruction was ineffective. This Court declined to grant relief, reasoning: Although we can sympathize with the defense attorney's frustration in questioning a less than sophisticated witness, it is apparent from the record that this damaging hearsay response was invited by defense counsel's question. We note that the witness had already stated twice that he himself had not seen Thompson when counsel asked the question, When did your crew see him? Furthermore, the defense attorney initially told the trial judge that there was no need for a mistrial and that a curative instruction would suffice. The State did not utilize the hearsay testimony at any point throughout the remainder of the trial, and we specifically note no mention of it in final argument. We find that the trial judge did not err in refusing to grant a mistrial under these circumstances. Thompson, 648 So.2d at 695. The issue raised by Thompson in this subclaim, although based on the same incident, is different. Specifically, Thompson asserts that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to request a Richardson hearing once the State admitted that it had been privy to that information a few weeks prior to trial. Pursuant to Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla.1971): [W]hen the State violates a discovery rule, the trial court has discretion to determine whether the violation resulted in harm or prejudice to the defendant, but this discretion can be properly exercised only after adequate inquiry into all the surrounding circumstances. In making such an inquiry, the trial judge must first determine whether a discovery violation occurred. If a violation is found, the court must assess whether the State's discovery violation was inadvertent or willful, whether the violation was trivial or substantial, and most importantly, what affect [sic] it had on the defendant's ability to prepare for trial. Sinclair v. State, 657 So.2d 1138, 1140 (Fla.1995) (citations omitted); see also State v. Hall, 509 So.2d 1093 (Fla.1987). In this case, after the trial court removed the jury once Mr. Smith testified that members of his crew told him that they had seen Mr. Thompson at the cemetery on the day of the murders, the following colloquy took place: THE COURT: Mr. Watson [prosecutor], any objection to the jury being instructed to disregard the witness' last comments other than the answer that, no, I did not see him, to disregard the remainder of his answer? MR. WATSON: No. THE COURT: Now, I have another question. Mr. Watson, have you ever heard before the answer given by Mr. Smith before this day about the crew having seen Mr. Thompson carrying Mr. Swack and Ms. Nancy out of the office? MR. WATSON: Mr. Smith has told me that there was someone who worked on his crew named, I believe, Richie. THE WITNESS: Richard. THE COURT: Mr. Smith, just be quiet while I listen to the attorneys. MR. WATSON: That supposedly saw that. I asked him if he could attempt to locate and either find Richie or find someone who knew him. To the best of my knowledge he has never been able to locate Richie, and I've discussed with Mr. Smith how to answer my questions and that I wasn't going to ask him anything that called for what someone else saw. And I think if we had stopped with his answer no and left well enough alone instead of going on we wouldn't have run into this problem. THE COURT: Well, that's true, if the witness had stopped, but the witness didn't stop. MR. WATSON: Well, there was a pause between when he said no and when he begins again, and I think that Mr. Johnson could have cut him off and perhaps should have. THE COURT: Well, it's certainly not Mr. Johnson's fault that the witness volunteered this information. That's just the way it is. He volunteered the information. He wanted to say it. He wanted to get it out and he got it out. I'll instruct the jury to disregard all except the answer no by this witness to the last question. Mr. Watson, this concerns me. When was the first time that anybody from law enforcement, and I include the State Attorney's Office, knew about this information that Mr. Smith has just testified to? MR. WATSON: Probably THE COURT: About this alleged eye witness. MR. WATSON: Probably about two weeks ago when he came by my office. He came to my office via subpoena I had a discussion with him about what his testimony would be. THE COURT: So whether Detective Childers interviewed Mr. Smith on August 20, whatever it was, 7th or 8th, there was no mention of that? MR. WATSON: No. No. He was interviewed twice. He's interviewed once before. They have the incident at Clementi's and once afterward and at no time does Mr. Smith offer to the detectives any information about any third party seeing anyone. . . . . THE COURT: All right. I'm going to deny the motion for mistrial. I'm going to instruct the jury to disregard I'm inclined to call Detective Childers as a court witness and have him testify. MR. WATSON: Well, I plan to call him and either he can or I can, however you would like. MR. JOHNSON: Judge MR. WATSON: If he doesn't want it bought up. MR. JOHNSON: I'm not saying that. I'm going to give up opening and closing for the purpose of calling him back. [10] MR. WATSON: But if he doesn't want to ring the bell again with asking Detective Childers this man never told you that somebody else said anything, I don't want to ring the bell again. MR. JOHNSON: I don't want to do it, but I think that the Court is saying that is the Court is concerned that there may be something other than ringing the bell. I don't want to do it. I prefer to leave it alone. MR. MURPHY [Defense Co-Counsel]: Your Honor, I think that maybe we need to talk to Detective Childers out of the presence of the jury to find out indeed that he didn't hear this information. THE COURT: Well, I wouldn't just bring him in here and wait for him to say, oh, yes, I forgot to tell everybody in the world that Mr. Smith told me about this other witness. All right, I'll bring the jury back in. Are you going to have any further questions of Mr. Smith? MR. JOHNSON: No. I'll take my seat. These facts do not conclusively demonstrate that Thompson is entitled to no relief. Mr. Smith's testimony was the only direct evidence which placed Thompson at the cemetery near the time of the murders. Consequently, any further information which this witness might have had, and which was known by the State, would have likely been of some relevance. We therefore remand this claim to the trial court for consideration of this subject matter after an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Collins v. State, 671 So.2d 827, 828 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (remanding for evidentiary hearing to determine if defense counsel was ineffective in not requesting a Richardson hearing when witness gave testimony tending to locate defendant at scene of the crime). Because the interests of justice require an evidentiary hearing on at least those three addressed ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we hold that, other than those claims rejected herein, judicial fairness and efficiency require that the trial court also hear the balance of Thompson's claims regarding the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Thus, the trial court is to conduct a hearing and make findings regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised here that have not been rejected herein.