Opinion ID: 779053
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conflict of Interest Claim

Text: 30 Where a constitutional right to counsel exists, [the Supreme Court's] Sixth Amendment cases hold that there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981). When a trial court is made aware of an attorney's actual or potential conflict of interest, Supreme Court precedent requires that the trial court either appoint separate counsel or ... take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk was too remote to warrant separate counsel. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978). The trial court's failure to appoint separate counsel or inquire into the attorney's potential conflict of interest amounts to a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. See id. 31 Campbell has established that the trial court knew that a potential conflict of interest existed. Based on the representations of the prosecutor at the in-chambers hearing, the trial court knew that defense counsel McCann was being prosecuted by the same district attorney's office that was prosecuting Campbell. Campbell has also shown that the trial court neglected its duty to appoint separate counsel or inquire further into the nature of the conflict. The trial judge did not ask McCann any questions concerning her ability to represent Campbell effectively while engaging in plea negotiations on her own behalf and facing the possibility of prosecution by the district attorney. The only question that the court asked McCann was whether she wish[ed] to make any statement at this time. When McCann declined to make a statement, the trial judge terminated the inquiry. 32 Even though the trial court knew of a potential conflict of interest and failed to make an inquiry, however, Campbell cannot obtain relief unless he can show that his attorney's conflict of interest adversely affected her performance. Mickens v. Taylor, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1245, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002). Campbell argues that defense counsel McCann's conflict of interest adversely affected her representation of Campbell because she failed to aggressively defend Campbell in order to curry favor with the district attorney's office. Specifically, Campbell argues that McCann's conflict resulted in her failure to: (1) challenge the admissibility of DNA evidence without a hearing; and (2) oppose the prosecutor's motion to preclude Campbell from referencing other burglaries that occurred in the same geographical area as the burglaries Campbell was charged with committing. 33 The California Court of Appeal concluded that McCann's potential conflict of interest did not adversely affect her representation. The California Court of Appeal specifically rejected the two examples of adverse effects raised by Campbell. The court wrote that [t]here is no indication on the record on appeal or from Campbell's habeas corpus petition that any challenge to the admissibility of the DNA evidence would have been successful. The court also noted that because the DNA testing procedure used in this case was subsequently approved of, it is difficult to imagine that Campbell's representation suffered any adverse effect from his counsel's failure to insist upon a ... hearing. Regarding McCann's willingness not to mention other burglaries that occurred in the same geographical area as the burglaries Campbell was charged with committing, the California Court of Appeal held that [d]efense counsel was entitled to conclude that on balance, evidence of other crimes in the same area would not be helpful in Campbell's defense. 34 Campbell has not shown that the California Court of Appeal's analysis of the potential adverse effect of these actions was an objectively unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. Bell, 122 S.Ct. at 1852. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of the writ on Campbell's conflict of interest claim.