Opinion ID: 1618310
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hartford's Claims of Indemnity and Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Text: Line also argues that the trial court erred in permitting Hartford's claims of breach of fiduciary duty and indemnity to the jury. The record shows that Hartford did argue claims of breach of fiduciary duty and indemnity to the trial court, and those claims were presented to the jury. Although Line argues that Hartford took a different position before it entered into the pro tanto settlement with Ventura and became realigned as a plaintiff, [7] the critical question for our consideration is whether those claims were properly presented to the jury. The gist of Line's argument is that Hartford could have more explicitly designated Line as a fiduciary in the joint-control agreement and in any communication it had with Line. Thus, Line argues, Hartford presented insufficient evidence to permit submission of its breach-of-fiduciary-duty and indemnity claims to the jury. Our review of the jury's verdict is subject to a settled standard: A jury's verdict is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly erroneous or manifestly unjust. Crown Life Insurance Co. v. Smith, 657 So.2d 821 (Ala.1995). In addition, a judgment based upon a jury verdict and sustained by the denial of a postjudgment motion for a new trial will not be reversed unless it is plainly and palpably wrong. National Security Ins. Co. v. Donaldson, 664 So.2d 871 (Ala. 1995). Because the jury returned a verdict for the Phelpses, any disputed questions of fact must be resolved in their favor, and we must presume that the jury drew from the facts any reasonable inferences necessary to support its verdict. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Morris, 612 So.2d 440, 443 (Ala.1993). In short, in reviewing a judgment based upon a jury verdict, this Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the appellee. Liberty National Life Ins. Co. v. McAllister, 675 So.2d 1292 (Ala.1995). Dempsey v. Phelps, 700 So.2d 1340, 1342 (Ala.1997). In considering whether Hartford presented sufficient evidence of a fiduciary relationship with Line to warrant submission of its claims to a jury, we consider how a fiduciary duty may be created. This Court has stated: `[T]he [fiduciary] relation is not restricted to such confined relations as trustee and beneficiary, partners, principal and agent, guardian and ward, managing directors and corporation, etc. Davis v. Hamlin, 108 Ill. 39, 48 Am. Rep. 541[(1883)]; Cushing v. Danforth, 76 Me. 114; 32 Am.Jur. 835, Sec. 991[(1884)]; Probst v. Hughes, 143 Okl. 11, 286 P. 875, 878, 69 A.L.R. 929[(1930)]. It applies to all persons who occupy a position out of which the duty of good faith ought in equity and good conscience to arise. It is the nature of the relation which is to be regarded, and not the designation of the one filling the relation. Davis v. Hamlin, supra.' Morgan Plan Co. v. Vellianitis, 270 Ala. 102, 105, 116 So.2d 600, 603 (1959) (quoting Risk v. Risher, 197 Miss. 155, 157, 19 So.2d 484, 486 (1944)). More recently, the Court defined a fiduciary relationship as follows: [Such a] relationship is one in which `one person occupies toward another such a position of adviser or counselor as reasonably to inspire confidence that he will act in good faith for the other's interests, or when one person has gained the confidence of another and purports to act or advise with the other's interest in mind; where trust and confidence are reposed by one person in another who, as a result, gains an influence or superiority over the other; and it appears when the circumstances make it certain the parties do not deal on equal terms, but, on the one side, there is an overmastering influence, or, on the other, weakness, dependence, or trust, justifiably reposed; in both an unfair advantage is possible. It arises in cases in which confidence is reposed and accepted, or influence acquired, and in all the variety of relations in which dominion may be exercised by one person over another.' Bank of Red Bay v. King, 482 So.2d 274, 284 (Ala.1985) (quoting 15 C.J.S. Confidential (1967)). See also Power Equip. Co. v. First Alabama Bank, 585 So.2d 1291 (Ala. 1991). In this case, Line executed an agreement with Hartford in which he agreed to be Hartford's representative charged with the duty of cosigning checks issued by the conservatorship. Both his letter to the Tony King Insurance Agency and his testimony indicated that he understood that his duties were directed to the proper management of conservatorship funds for the benefit of Ventura and Hartford as the surety. The evidence was undisputed that these duties were distinct from any duties Line owed Dutton as her attorney. In the context of the fiduciary duty Line owed Hartford, the jury could also have found a duty to indemnify for damages resulting from Line's knowing or negligent failure to perform his duties. See, e.g., Ex parte Athens-Limestone Hosp., 858 So.2d 960 (Ala.2003); Alabama Kraft Co., a Div. of Georgia Kraft Co. v. Southeast Alabama Gas Dist., 569 So.2d 697 (Ala.1990); and American Southern Ins. Co. v. Dime Taxi Serv., Inc., 275 Ala. 51, 151 So.2d 783 (1963) (all standing for the general proposition that a principal is entitled to indemnification from its agent for damages caused by the agent's tortious conduct). We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to present Hartford's claims to the jury and to uphold the jury's verdict on that evidence. Dempsey, supra.