Opinion ID: 2785746
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal FDCPA Claims

Text: Congress passed the FDCPA to address “what it considered to be a widespread problem” of consumer abuse at the hands of debt collectors. Frey v. Gangwish, 970 F.2d 1516, 1521 (6th Cir. 1992). It sought to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors [and] to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.” 15 U.S.C. §1692(e). In reaction to the size of the problem, it crafted “an extraordinarily broad” remedial statute. Frey, 970 F.2d at 1521. Among other No. 14-3278 Wise v. Zwicker & Assocs. Page 4 restrictions, the Act bars debt collectors from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, or using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt,” id. § 1692f. In each section, Congress provided a non-exhaustive list of examples of banned practices. Wise brought FDCPA claims under both the false-or-misleading-representations section, § 1692e, and the unfair-practices section, § 1692f, but both sets of claims reflect the same basic allegation. Wise contends that Ohio law barred American Express from obtaining attorney’s fees on the collection of his debt; the actions of the defendants in representing American Express— demanding attorney’s fees before the lawsuit and including the attorney’s fees provision in the complaint’s prayer for relief—were therefore misleading.1 Under the FDCPA, a plaintiff does not need to prove knowledge or intent to establish liability, nor must he show actual damages, which “places the risk of penalties on the debt collector that engages in activities which are not entirely lawful, rather than exposing consumers to unlawful debt-collector behavior without a possibility for relief.” Stratton v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 770 F.3d 443, 449 (6th Cir. 2014). In other words, if a debt collector seeks fees to which it is not entitled, it has committed a prima facie violation of the Act, even if there was no clear prior judicial statement that it was not entitled to collect the fees. See id. at 450–51. Notably, in Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer, & Ulrich L.P.A., 559 U.S. 573 (2010), the Supreme Court held that mistakes of law regarding the FDCPA itself constitute violations of the Act for which a debt-collector attorney may not invoke the Act’s bona fide error defense, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). Id. at 604–05. The Supreme Court declined to address whether the defense is available for mistakes of law other than the FDCPA itself, id. at 580 n.4, but the discussion of the affirmative defense makes clear that mistakes of state law can give rise to liability. 1 Specifically, Wise points to the following examples from the statute’s nonexhaustive lists of false and misleading representations and unfair practices:  § 1692e(2)(A): “The false representation of . . . the character, amount, or legal status of any debt.”  § 1692e(2)(B): “The false representation of . . . compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt.”  § 1692e(5): “The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken . . . .”  § 1692f(1): “The collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” No. 14-3278 Wise v. Zwicker & Assocs. Page 5 As the district court noted, the present case turns on the question of whether Utah or Ohio law governs the contract. This court has generally characterized Ohio law as “prohibit[ing] creditors from recovering attorney’s fees in connection with the collection of a consumer debt,” Barany-Snyder v. Weiner, 539 F.3d 327, 332 (6th Cir. 2008). It would be more precise to describe Ohio law as refusing to enforce such fee-shifting provisions. “Ohio has long adhered to the ‘American rule’ with respect to recovery of attorney fees: a prevailing party in a civil action may not recover attorney fees as part of the costs of litigation.” Wilborn v. Bank One Corp., 906 N.E.2d 396, 400 (Ohio 2009). The exceptions to the rule are “when a statute or an enforceable contract specifically provides for the losing party to pay the prevailing party’s attorney fees or when the prevailing party demonstrates bad faith on the part of the unsuccessful litigant.” Id. (citation omitted). Ohio common law historically refused to enforce contracts for fee-shifting, particularly in the context of collection on a defaulted debt. See Miller v. Kyle, 97 N.E. 372, 372–73 (Ohio 1911) (“In this state it has been firmly established, and long and constantly maintained, that such contracts for the payment of counsel fees upon default in payment of a debt will not be enforced.”); see also Leavans v. Ohio Nat’l Bank, 34 N.E. 1089, syllabus2 (Ohio 1893). In more recent years, Ohio courts have enforced fee-shifting provisions in a number of contracts, while maintaining the law of Miller and Leavans. See Wilborn, 906 N.E.2d at 401 & n.2. Finally, in 2000, the Ohio General Assembly passed a statute allowing for enforcement of fee-shifting provisions in certain commercial credit contracts. The statute limits the enforceability of such provisions to contracts for debt that is not “incurred for purposes that are primarily personal, family, or household,” and only if that debt is in an amount greater than $100,000. Ohio Rev. Code § 1319.02(A)(1).3 The General Assembly’s exclusion of “personal, family, or household” debt reinforces Ohio’s common-law rule that such provisions are not enforceable. If Ohio law clearly applied to this case, the analysis could end here; the fee-shifting provision would be unenforceable. See Barany-Snyder, 539 F.3d at 332 (discussing fee-shifting on a contract for personal indebtedness between an Ohio university and an Ohio student). And the defendants’ demands for fees during and outside litigation would therefore be misleading. 2 The syllabus of an Ohio Supreme Court opinion is binding law. Ohio Rep. Op. R. 2.2. 3 This statute was previously codified at Ohio Rev. Code § 1301.21. No. 14-3278 Wise v. Zwicker & Assocs. Page 6 The Agreement states, however, that “This Agreement and your Account, and all questions about their legality, enforceability and interpretation, are governed by the laws of the State of Utah.” And Utah law freely enforces fee-shifting provisions in consumer credit agreements: “A consumer credit agreement may provide for the payment of reasonable attorney’s fees in the event of default and referral to an attorney.” Utah Code § 70C-2-105. The question presented is whether the Summit County Common Pleas Court would have applied Ohio or Utah law in deciding whether to enforce the fee-shifting provision.4 Ohio has adopted sections 187 and 188 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to govern choice of law in contract disputes. Ohayon v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, 747 N.E.2d 206, 220 (Ohio 2001). Because the Sixth Circuit, in cases under federal common law, has also adopted these sections and the Ohio approach to applying them, both Ohio and Sixth Circuit precedents shed light on the appropriate application of the Restatement. See Med. Mut. of Ohio v. deSoto, 245 F.3d 561, 570–71 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting, in case brought under ERISA, Int’l Ins. Co. v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 86 F.3d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 1996), a case applying Ohio choice-of-law principles). Before actually answering the choice-of-law question, we must respond to Wise’s misunderstandings regarding choice-of-law analysis. Wise first argues that the court should apply the choice-of-law principles for torts because the FDCPA sounds in tort. But the issue on which there is a choice-of-law dispute is a contract issue—the enforceability of a provision of the Agreement. Wise then suggests that, if contract choice-of-law principles do apply, the court should take notice that the Agreement was a contract of adhesion—that American Express fully drafted the Agreement, including its designation of Utah law, without an opportunity for Wise to negotiate. He argues that the court should therefore disregard the choice-of-law provision of the contract because it does not reflect a choice of both parties. Regardless of whether the credit card agreement was adhesive under Ohio or Utah law, Wise’s blanket conclusion is faulty. The 4 Wise argues that Gionis v. Javitch, Block, Rathbone, LLP, 238 F. App’x 24 (6th Cir. 2007), makes the choice-of-law provision irrelevant. The agreement at issue in Gionis did include a choice-of-law provision that favored a state in which fee-shifting provisions are enforceable, but the Gionis defendants waived the argument that the other state’s law applied. See id. at 30 n.1 (Steeh, D.J., dissenting). All parties therefore agreed that Ohio law would govern the fee-shifting provision, rendering it unenforceable. Gionis held that an affidavit asserting a right under an unenforceable provision of a debt contract constitutes a misrepresentation of the debt and a threat to take action that cannot legally be taken. Gionis, 238 F. App’x at 29–30. No. 14-3278 Wise v. Zwicker & Assocs. Page 7 Restatement generally respects choice-of-law provisions, even in adhesion contracts. But it addresses such contracts, specifying that the adhesive nature of a contract merits more careful scrutiny to ensure that application of the choice-of-law provision does not “result in substantial injustice.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187, cmt. b. The appropriate analysis therefore begins with § 187, which instructs courts to generally respect choice-of-law provisions. See Tele-Save Merchandising Co. v. Consumers Distrib. Co., Ltd., 814 F.2d 1120, 1122 (6th Cir. 1987) (“Ohio choice-of-law principles strongly favor upholding the chosen law of the contracting parties.”). The Restatement then sets out two exceptions. The court should apply the choice-of-law provision unless either (a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or (b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2). The first exception does not apply to this case because there is a reasonable basis for the parties’ choice of Utah law—American Express’s Utah citizenship. The second exception requires a more complicated, three-part analysis. The court must determine (1) whether enforcing the fee-shifting provision of the Agreement would be contrary to a fundamental policy of Ohio; (2) whether Ohio has a materially greater interest in the determination of the particular issue; and (3) whether Ohio law would control the Agreement in the absence of the choice-of-law provision. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918, 924 (6th Cir. 2006) (applying federal common law). As the district court recognized, it would be against the fundamental policy of Ohio to enforce the fee-shifting provision. A rule of law “which is designed to protect a person against the oppressive use of superior bargaining power” will generally be interpreted to reflect the fundamental policy of a state. Century Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Barton, 967 N.E.2d 782, 794–95 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Restatement § 187 cmt. g); see also Tele-Save Merch. Co., No. 14-3278 Wise v. Zwicker & Assocs. Page 8 814 F.2d at 1123 (citing § 187 cmt. g). Ohio’s policy against enforcing fee-shifting provisions in consumer-debt contracts protects customers like Wise against the creditor’s superior bargaining power. A fee-shifting provision also encourages creditors to sue for defaulted debt and discourages debtors from fighting back. Fee-shifting presents “an ongoing threat that likely higher attorney fees would be assessed so long as the litigation continues.” Gionis, 238 F. App’x at 29. The second question is whether Ohio “has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(b)(2). For this question, Ohio courts evaluate the relationship of the two states to the agreement. Considering a consumer investment contract in Sekeres, the Ohio Supreme Court emphasized the location of the “act which ultimately created the contract” and the location of performance of the contract to determine whether Ohio had a “materially greater interest” than the chosen state. Sekeres, 508 N.E.2d at 942–43. In Jarvis v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 786 (Ohio 1985), the Ohio Supreme Court determined that Ohio did not have a materially greater interest in a contract where neither party to the contract was an Ohio citizen and the contract was not performed in Ohio. Id. at 789. Similarly, in the federal-law case of DaimlerChrysler, this court considered the location of the negotiation, execution, and performance of the contract. 448 F.3d at 927. The DaimlerChrysler court also considered the location of the parties with a relevant interest in the specific provision at issue. Id. (“[N]one of the Michigan entities involved in this litigation has an interest in which claimant prevails. The Plan will pay out the same amount of money regardless of to whom it is ultimately paid.”). Considering these cases together, a few main contacts emerge as primary considerations in determining whether a state has a materially greater interest in enforcement of a provision: the citizenship of the parties to the contract; the locations of creation, negotiation, and performance of the contract; and the location of parties with an interest in the specific provision of the contract. Returning to Wise’s Agreement, there is not enough evidence about these contacts to determine whether Ohio has a materially greater interest than Utah. One party to the contract is an Ohio citizen. “[T]he act which ultimately created the contract” was Wise’s use or retention of the credit card, which plausibly occurred in Ohio. See Sekeres, 508 N.E.2d at 943. Both Wise No. 14-3278 Wise v. Zwicker & Assocs. Page 9 (in Ohio) and American Express (in Utah) have an interest in the fee-shifting provision—one of them will be stuck with the lawyers’ bill. The location of performance of the agreement is less clear. “[A] bank credit card, as in this case, is a three-party, three-part agreement between the bank, the consumer and the merchant.” Bank One, Columbus, N.A. v. Palmer, 579 N.E.2d 284, 285 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (citing Preston State Bank v. Jordan, 692 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App. 1985)). The promise by the bank is to advance funds to merchants on the consumer’s behalf, in exchange for a promise by the consumer to repay those amounts on a monthly basis. Jordan, 692 S.W.2d at 742. There is no information in the record regarding the location of American Express’s advances to merchants on Wise’s behalf. As for Wise’s promise to repay, the performance of such a promise occurs where the contract requires that the repayment be made. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 195. Although “[m]oney lent by a bank is usually repayable at the bank itself,” id. § 195 cmt. d, the Agreement had a specific provision that overrode this default rule. The Agreement instructed Wise to send payments “to the payment address shown on your billing statement.” R. 1-2, PageID 14. In light of the national character of American Express, it is plausible that the payment address is located in Ohio. See Homa v. American Express Co., 558 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[American Express Centurion Bank] is a wholly owned subsidiary of [American Express Corporation], a New York corporation, and, despite the contract's statement that AECB is located in Utah, Homa must mail his credit card payments to Florida.”) abrogated on other grounds by AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). Instead of considering the relevant contacts, the district court simply noted that each state had some policy interest in the enforceability or non-enforceability of the provision and recited the statements from the Agreement itself: “Comparing both [Ohio’s and Utah’s] interests and considering that one party is located in Utah, holds the debtor’s account in Utah, and entered into the Agreement in Utah, the Court cannot say that Ohio’s interest is materially greater than Utah’s.” R. 40, PageID 416. The presence of a non-Ohio party to a contract and its general business operation outside the state is insufficient to determine that Ohio does not have a materially greater interest in the contract. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler, 448 F.3d at 927. No. 14-3278 Wise v. Zwicker & Assocs. Page 10 The final inquiry is whether, “under the rule of § 188, [Ohio] would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(b)(2). Section 188 provides: (1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the principles stated in § 6. (2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:

(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties. These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue. We must therefore also look to the factors articulated in § 6: (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. Application of §§ 6 and 188 of the Restatement requires a sensitive, fact-specific analysis. “The key to our analysis is that the choice of law principles found in the Restatement need not be given equal weight in every circumstance, nor are they intended to be exclusive. They also are relatively elastic, and in some cases equivocal.” Int’l Ins. Co., 86 F.3d at 606. “[E]ven when sections 6 and 188 are read together, it is clear they only provide a broad general framework for the resolution of choice of law issues in the context of a contract dispute. Within No. 14-3278 Wise v. Zwicker & Assocs. Page 11 that framework, a judge must balance principles, policies, factors, weights, and emphases to reach a result, the derivation of which, in all honesty, does not proceed with mathematical precision.” Id. In Jarvis v. First Resolution Mgmt. Corp., 983 N.E.2d 380 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012) (discretionary appeal accepted), the Ninth District Court of Appeals—which takes appeals from the Summit County Court of Common Pleas—applied this test to a credit card agreement without a choice-of-law provision. Id. at 387–88. As relevant factors, the First Resolution court examined where the consumer primarily used the card (where the card issuer performed its obligation under the agreement), where she paid her bill (performing her obligation under the agreement), where the final act creating the agreement took place, and where she decided not to pay the amounts owed. Id. at 388. A complete analysis of these factors would have revealed just how little information was in the record. Again, the ultimate creation of the contract plausibly occurred in Ohio, and it is not clear where the performance of the contract occurred. It is plausible from the complaint that Wise decided not to make payments in Ohio. The contacts with Utah relate to the contract in ways not considered relevant by the First Resolution court: One party to the contract is a Utah citizen, the initial offer was made from Utah, and the account is held in Utah. It is plausible that many of the relevant contacts will relate more closely to Ohio, such that Ohio law would apply absent the choice-of-law provision, but any certainty on the issue would be premature. In summary, by adopting § 187 of the Restatement, Ohio recognized two principles—that choice-of-law provisions in contracts are generally respected, and that § 187(2) contains exceptions to this principle that entail fact-intensive inquiry. Applying the exception in § 187(2)(b) begins with a determination of whether the choice-of-law provision to be enforced would violate a fundamental policy of Ohio. Because the fee-shifting provision here conflicts with such a fundamental policy, a careful examination of the contacts of each state to the agreement was necessary to determine whether Ohio has a materially greater interest in the fee-shifting provision and, if so, whether its law would have applied absent a choice-of-law provision. The pleadings do not provide sufficient facts to make a determination on these two issues, so the court should not have granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Wise can No. 14-3278 Wise v. Zwicker & Assocs. Page 12 provide answers to many of the unresolved questions above, including where he paid his bills, where he signed or accepted the credit card, where he made his purchases, and where he decided not to repay. It is therefore possible that the district court could resolve the choice-of-law issue with an affidavit from him. However, the district court may also determine that the issue would benefit from limited discovery into the contacts of each state to the contract.5