Opinion ID: 1963229
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: power to enter possession in condemnation before making compensation

Text: At oral argument of this cause the question was raised whether constitutionally possession could be taken by the party exercising the power of eminent domain prior to award and payment of the value of the lands in question. The general rule in most jurisdictions elsewhere is that constitutionally the State may enter into possession prior to payment for the lands taken. See Jahr, Eminent Domain (1953), sec. 40, p. 60, and authorities there cited. In the absence of a specific constitutional prohibition, there is nothing that requires the Legislature to condition the exercise of the power of eminent domain upon a prior payment of compensation. Williams v. Parker, 188 U.S. 491, 23 S.Ct. 440, 47 L.Ed. 559 (1903); McGehee, Due Process of Law (1906), p. 291. In Williams v. Parker, supra , Mr. Justice Brewer stated: So far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, it is settled by repeated decisions that a state may authorize the taking of possession prior to any payment, or even final determination of the amount of compensation. (188 U.S. at page 502, 23 S.Ct. at page 442, 47 L.Ed., at page 562.) N.J. Const. 1947, Art. I, par. 20, provides: Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Individuals or private corporations shall not be authorized to take private property for public use without just compensation first made to the owners. N.J. Const. 1947, Art. IV, sec. VI, par. 3 relating to the condemnation of property by agencies or political subdivisions of the State also provides such taking shall be with just compensation. It appears that the members of the Committee on Rights, Privileges, etc., of the 1947 Constitutional Convention were of the opinion that the State (or agencies or political subdivisions) could take property before payment under the New Jersey Constitution of 1844 (but individuals or private corporations could not). III Proceedings, N.J. Constitutional Convention of 1947, pp. 10-11, p. 174. This conclusion is buttressed by comparison of N.J. Const. 1844, Art. I, par. 16 (which related to condemnation by public agencies and did not require compensation first) and N.J. Const. 1844, Art. IV, Sec. VII, par. 8 (which related to condemnation by individuals and private corporations and required compensation to be first made), a distinction expressly carried over to the New Jersey Constitution of 1947 and incorporated therein in Art. I, par. 20, supra. N.J. Const. 1947, Art. IV, sec. VI, par. 3, supra, does not limit or alter this construction. In the 1844 Convention the question of time of compensation was thoroughly debated and a motion to insert the word first in the clause that later was adopted as N.J. Const. 1844, Art. I, par. 16, supra, was defeated. Proceedings, New Jersey Constitutional Convention, 1844, pp. 159-161, 414-418. This was confirmed in the discussions relating to N.J. Const. 1844, Art. IV, Sec. VII, par. 8, supra, where the requirement for payment of compensation before taking was limited to individuals and private corporations. Id., pp. 568-570. See also Id., pp. 591-592. Insofar as statutory authority of the State Highway Commissioner is concerned, at the time the present plaintiff or his predecessor in office took possession of the 20.70 acres of land involved in this action, R.S. 27:7-22, supra, authorized him to enter upon and take property in advance of making compensation therefor. R.S. 20:1-29 confirmed this authority.