Opinion ID: 1999761
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rear-view mirror.

Text: Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in not finding the defendant Moths negligent as a matter of law in reference to lookout, in that he was operating a vehicle which was not equipped with a rear-view mirror as required by secs. 346.88 (3) (c) and 347.40, Stats. Plaintiffs further argue that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, in that, although the court instructed the jury as to the requirements of these statutes, such instruction was incomplete because no further instruction was given to the effect that violation of the safety statutes constitute negligence per se. Secs. 346.88 (3) (c) and 347.40, Stats., require that no vehicle shall be driven upon a highway so loaded, or with any object so placed in or upon the vehicle as to obstruct the driver's clear vision through the rear window, unless such vehicle is equipped with an outside rear-view mirror so located as to reflect to the driver a view of the roadway for a distance of 200 feet to the rear of such a vehicle. Under the facts of this case, as in Czarnetzky v. Booth (1933), 210 Wis. 536, 246 N. W. 574, a rear-view mirror would not disclose the presence of any one so close to the rear of the truck as Randall and could not be considered a casual factor in plaintiff's injury. The undisputed evidence indicates that the truck Moths was driving had two rear-view mirrors that provided a clear view to the rear of the truck but for a blind spot of some 20 feet immediately behind the truck. This evidence indicates no violation of these safety statutes. Sec. 346.88 (3) (c), Stats., envisions vehicles where the driver's view to the rear may be obstructed, but requires that such a risk be alleviated, in part, by the addition of operatable rear-view mirrors. Under these circumstances, a blind spot of some dimension, depending upon the size of the vehicle, will always exist. Defendants' truck met the requirements of secs. 346.88 (3) (c) and 347.40. Therefore, defendants are not negligent in this regard. The jury was, nevertheless, instructed as to these statutes, and, in addition, the trial court instructed that: You are further instructed that a violation of any of the requirements of this safety statute would be considered negligence. The trial court gave proper consideration to this issue.