Opinion ID: 790216
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hammel's ADA Claims

Text: 9 In July 2002, Hammel responded to his termination by filing suit against EGC under the ADA, alleging in his complaint that EGC intentionally discriminated against him in discharging him on the basis of his disability and failing to afford him reasonable accommodations. EGC, in their answer, denied discharging Hammel because of his disability, and instead claimed that he was let go because of his insubordination, consistent carelessness, poor work attitude/ethic, and concerns for his safety and the safety of other employees. In addition, EGC claimed that they had been unable to work out any reasonable accommodations for Hammel, but did not challenge Hammel's allegation that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. 10 Following discovery, Hammel and EGC each filed motions for summary judgment. After considering the respective submissions and arguments, the court granted summary judgment to Hammel in part on April 15, 2003, concluding that Hammel had produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his employer was motivated to discharge him because of his disability, based on a statement from EGC's owner, Buhlman, in his deposition. See id. at 2003 WL 21665133, at -9, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at -20. 6 In spite of the fact that the trial judge determined that Hammel was discharged because of his disability, the judge found that there was a genuine factual dispute as to whether Hammel was a qualified individual under the ADA, and reserved that issue for trial, along with the ultimate question of whether EGC's termination of Hammel was in violation of the ADA. 11 On June 6, 2003, EGC filed a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), requesting that the district court reconsider its earlier partial summary judgment order in favor of the plaintiff in which the court found that it was undisputed that Hammel was terminated because of his disability. EGC argued that evidence developed after the entry of the summary judgment order in favor of Hammel would establish that [Hammel] was not terminated as a result of his disability; [or] in the alternative was not terminated solely as a result of his disability. Defendant's Trial Brief and Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Reconsideration, p. 3. Accordingly, EGC sought to proffer evidence of Hammel's reckless behavior, refusal to follow job directions and poor attitude in order to establish that even if discriminatory intent had entered into the decision, Hammel would have been discharged due to his poor behavior alone and without regard to his vision problems. The trial judge denied EGC's motion on two separate grounds: (1) because it was untimely as filed, i.e., it was filed only two working days before the start of the trial; and (2) because it rested on evidence that should have been developed before [EGC] filed its motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is not a dress rehearsal or practice run; it `is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events.' Id. (quoting Schacht v. Wisconsin Dept. Of Corr., 175 F.3d 497, 504 (7th Cir.1999)). 12 Following the denial of EGC's Rule 59 motion, a two-day bench trial commenced. During the proceedings Hammel offered testimony concerning his perception of his work performance at EGC. Hammel stated that he felt physically capable of working as a general laborer at the cheese factory, and that none of his supervisors informed him of any problems with his job performance. However, Hammel did admit on cross-examination that he had been warned that he needed to be more careful when stacking and stamping the cheese wheels, and was told in no uncertain terms not to continue making personal phone calls on work time. Hammel, in support of his claims, also presented a vocational expert, Richard Davis, as a witness who proposed various accommodations that he believed EGC could have implemented that would have allowed Hammel to perform the essential functions of his job. 13 In response, EGC's owner, Buhlman, business manager Hemmy, and several of his supervisors and employees contradicted Hammel's testimony during the defense's case-in-chief by relating Hammel's record of insubordination, poor work attitude, reckless, careless and unsafe work habits, and overall deficiencies in his work performance. 7 Specifically, Hammel's co-workers recounted their concerns over Hammel's failure to perform his job with the requisite care for their safety as well as his own. Robert Pelke testified that Hammel frequently ran into other people and equipment and that he acted in a reckless manner, especially when he was using the trimming knife, and went on to state that he had spoken with Anibas prior to Hammel's termination concerning Hammel's recklessness and carelessness. Id. Steven Seller, another co-worker, stated that Hammel was usually careless when he brought the soft cheese wheels to the work tables and tended to throw them down on the table, that he had heard other employees complain about [Hammel] and his performance and [the] risks he posed, and opined that Hammel's carelessness in the factory was [not] related to his visual impairment. Id. at 2003 WL 21665133, at , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at . Another general laborer, Joseph Sabelko, testified that he attempted to assist Hammel with his performance problems, but whenever he attempted to explain how to properly perform a procedure, such as trimming cheese, [Hammel] would turn away and refuse either to listen or to change his procedure. Id. 14 EGC also introduced evidence of Hammel's checkered employment history; details Hammel omitted when he filed a less than accurate and truthful work application upon seeking employment at the company. EGC's proffered evidence established that Hammel in his application had: (a) failed to account for a gap in his employment history while he was in an addiction program; (b) falsely claimed that a job he held at Sears was full-time while in reality it was part-time employment; and (c) listed his job at the Ability Building Center as lasting eleven months, when in fact he had worked there only six months. Id. at 2003 WL 21665133, at , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at . The defense also demonstrated that Hammel had, for obvious reasons, omitted a previous employer from his work history, Schlosser Lumber in Durand, Wisconsin; a job he held shortly before starting at EGC and left after being criticized for not working and for failing to follow directions. Id. at 2003 WL 21665133, at , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at . Hammel's supervisor at Schlosser, Michael Berger, testified that he found it difficult to work with him, and recounted that he repeatedly explained to Hammel how to perform his duties, but Hammel refused to cooperate. Id. at 2003 WL 21665133, at , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at . For example, Berger explained that Hammel was supposed to pile certain size boards in certain piles [but] failed to do [so] properly, and that when he was forced to criticize Hammel's performance, Hammel became upset. Id. On one such occasion, Berger stated that Hammel pulled out his false eye, showed it to Berger and told him, `You can't fire me, I'm disabled. I'll sue you.' Id. at 2003 WL 21665133, at -6, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at -17. 15 Following the close of testimony, both parties moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). The trial judge, after considering the evidence and the law applicable thereto, granted EGC's motion concluding that Hammel had failed to demonstrate that he was capable of perform[ing] the essential tasks of the job in a way that met [EGC's] reasonable expectations, with or without reasonable accommodation, and thus was not a qualified individual with a disability as defined by the ADA. Id. at 2003 WL 21665133, at -9, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at -22 (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that Hammel's difficulties with work that were not the result of his poor vision but were related to his poor attitude, his carelessness and his unwillingness to accept criticism and take direction, and the danger he posed to his own safety as well as that of his fellow employees provided evidence of his inability to perform the job. Id. at 2003 WL 21665133, at -9, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at -21 (emphasis added). Judge Crabb went on to state that [e]ven if [Hammel] had been physically capable of performing the essential tasks of his job he was not a qualified individual under the ADA because of his unwillingness to make the adaptations, take the care or exert the effort necessary to allow him to perform the essential elements of the job. Id. at 2003 WL 21665133, at , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at . Accordingly, the court specifically concluded that EGC was not guilty of discrimination against [Hammel] by firing him because it believed his disability prevented him from performing his job, and furthermore found that although [EGC] failed to carry out its obligation to discuss possible accommodations with [Hammel, he] failed to show that there were any accommodations [his employer] could have made that would have enabled him to perform adequately. Without such a showing, the defendant is not liable for its failure to broach the issue of accommodations despite its knowledge of [Hammel's] disability. Id. 16 On appeal, Hammel argues that the court erred when it found his employer did not discriminate against him in violation of the ADA when terminating his employment and failing to provide accommodations for his disability. Hammel also contends that the court made several evidentiary errors that entitle him to a new trial. EGC cross-appeals, arguing that the court erroneously granted summary judgment to Hammel on the issue of whether EGC was motivated to terminate Hammel because of his disability.