Opinion ID: 323057
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the alpa procedures employed

Text: 16 Faced with the difficulties inherent in the fair and equitable resolution of seniority problems, and recognizing that such problems lend themselves readily to solution by negotiation and voluntary agreement, the Board in the Monarch-Challenger Merger Case 18 established the policy of noninterference with private negotiations between affected pilot groups on matters of seniority integration. Although the Board was later forced to decide such questions itself in the North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 19 it later warned that its action there was 'not to be construed as any departure from the declaration first made . . . in (Monarch-Challenger) that the integration of seniority of employees of merging operations should, if possible, be left to voluntary agreement . . ..' 20 Thereafter, the Board has consistently adhered to the Monarch-Challenger policy. 21 In view of the many considerations necessarily involved in the assimilation of a fair and equitable integrated seniority list, we recognize the wisdom on several practical grounds of leaving such considerations to the employees' freely chosen representatives for original negotiation. 17 In the instant case negotiations between the Delta pilots and the incoming Northeast pilots were governed by ALPA's Merger Policy. 22 Under this procedure, when the president of ALPA believes a merger to be imminent, he notifies the affected MEC's and directs them to meet and to activate ALPA Merger Policy and Procedures. The president then determines by ballot among the affected flight deck operating crew members their choice between two methods for compilation of a merged seniority list. Method #1 provides for a list compiled 'solely on the basis of length of service,' while Method #2 takes into account 'problems and factors peculiar to the merger, using length of service as a primary guide or reference point . . ..' 23 The majority of votes cast for either method governs for each respective airline, but where different airline pilot groups have elected dissimilar methods, the list is compiled in accordance with Method #2. Method #2 was decreed in the instant case because the two pilot groups split, Northeast pilots preferring #1 and Delta pilots opting for #2. 18 Continuing with the prescribed procedure, MEC-appointed committees compute current seniority lists for each airline and entertain challenges thereto. Within 10 days after Board approval of the merger, each MEC meets and elects two representatives vested with plenary authority to act for their respective flight deck crew members. 24 The merger representatives then 'by direct negotiation reconcile all their differences as to method of integration and compile the single acceptable flight deck operating crew member seniority list.' 25 Although progress reports are to be made every five days to the president of ALPA, 26 no provision exists for apprising the respective MEC's of the progress of negotiations. If no agreement is reached within 75 days of Board approval of the merger, the matter is submitted to arbitration for final resolution. 19 Conceding that its attack on the integrated list concerns 'procedural irregularities that fall short of directly violating . . . ALPA Merger Policy,' 27 petitioner first contends that 'the certified representatives of the Northeast pilots kept the details of the negotiations leading up to the merged list a secret from the pilots they represent, even after the agreement had been signed.' 28 Of course, the very nature of such negotiations requires that they be attended by a certain degree of confidentiality. More significantly, however, the merger representatives were freely chosen by the respective MEC's, who ostensibly could have revoked their authority at any time. 29 Moreover, petitioner concedes that it was aware as early as 28 January 1972 that the merger representatives would not reveal any details of the negotiations. Yet the negotiations continued until formal execution of the agreement on 1 June 1972, and it was not until 26 days later that petitioner met in special session to 'repudiate' the merged list. In light of these factors, coupled with petitioner's failure to allege bad faith on the part of the merger representatives, we are not convinced that the secret nature of the negotiations inhibited the compilation of a fair and equitable list. 20 Petitioner next argues that by failing to follow its instructions to seek a merged list based solely upon length of service, the merger representatives exceded the scope of their authority. 30 But the simple answer to this is that ALPA merger policy on the method to be used is to the contrary, and there was nothing that either the merger representatives or the MEC could have done to change it. The merger policy not only provides that the MEC's 'will certify these representatives as having complete and full authority to act for and in behalf of the flight deck operating crew members,' 31 thus proscribing any attempt by the MEC's to limit their representatives' authority, it also provided in this case for the use of Method #2 in the compilation of the merged list, thus rendering nugatory petitioner's effort to instruct its representatives to use Method #1. 21 Outland v. CAB, 32 involving the merger between Delta Airlines and C & S Air Lines, arose out of a factual context nearly identical to the case at bar. 33 The complaining pilots' petition before the Board was dismissed, the Board refusing to disturb the negotiated result absent a failure to negotiate or a claim of bad faith. On direct appeal we affirmed: 22 The Board would be placed in the position of dealing with issues not directly within its competence if it undertook to resolve conflicting claims on the interpretation of procedures established by collective bargaining agreements. The Board's experience and expertise is with transportation not labor relations problems. 34 23 That reasoning is equally appropriate to the facts before us. 24 Finally, petitioner argues that its members voted to requdiate the final agreement and should therefore not be bound by its terms. Petitioner attempts to find support in Outland, supra, where we noted that the integrated seniority list was approved by the merging carriers' respective MEC's. However, MEC approval vel non was not necessary to our determination of the issue in Outland. Additionally, as we indicate above, the ALPA policy in effect during the negotiations at issue in this case did not require (nor provide for) such MEC approval; the merger representatives were vested with complete and full authority. Moreover, ALPA, not the MEC (merely an administrative arm of ALPA), was the sole bargaining agent for the pilots. Only ALPA was authorized to negotiate a bargaining agreement with the surviving carrier. 25 In sum, we conclude that petitioner has failed to demonstrate any irregularity in the ALPA procedures followed below which would justify a conclusion that the final integrated seniority list was not compiled in a fair and equitable manner. We turn now to a consideration of petitioner's charges that the list is substantively defective. 26