Opinion ID: 1190882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: ) Legal Distinctions

Text: The state's alternative theory (and that of the Court of Appeals) is that the precise location of the beach, whether bordering on the ocean or only nearby, is not the point. Hay, it is argued, did not make such distinctions. Although much has been written, both in criticism and in praise, about the Hay case since it was announced, [11] no decision of this court since Hay has elaborated on it. The decision certainly has something in it for everybody. It has, for example, expansive language that gives comfort to the analysis of the Court of Appeals and the argument of the state. When the court indicated that it wished to avoid any need for tract-by-tract litigation, or said that [o]cean-front lands from the northern to the southern border of the state ought to be treated uniformly, it was speaking in sweeping terms as to the potential scope of its decision. But the court made other statements suggesting that its decision had a more narrow focus. Its frequent reiteration of the phrase, dry-sand area, for example, suggests at the very least that the court's attention was focused only on those coastal areas characterized by that substance rather than cliffs or rocky headlands. Its discussion of the elements of custom noted that the beach at Cannon Beach had been used uniformly with similarly situated lands elsewhere. Id. at 597, 462 P.2d 671 (emphasis supplied). Moreover, the court noted at the end of its opinion, The rule in this case, based upon custom, is salutary in confirming a public right, and at the same time it takes from no man anything which he has had a legitimate reason to regard as exclusively his.  Id. at 599, 462 P.2d 671 (emphasis added). All these statements suggest that the court was speaking only about those coastal areas that had histories of use like the Cannon Beach area. Finally, the court recognized that there could be circumstances in which declaring the right of the public to use private property for recreation could constitute a taking of that property  something the court apparently did not intend to do or believe it was doing in Hay. Id. at 591, 599, 462 P.2d 671; Or. Const., Art. I, § 18; see also Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987). Although these various sets of statements in Hay could appear to be somewhat inconsistent, we do not think they are inconsistent. The court at all times had before it a record made with respect to a particular beach and a particular area on the northern Oregon coast. At the same time, the court and the parties were aware that the practice at Cannon Beach was representative of the practice at many beaches up and down the coast. If prescription were to be the theory upon which Hay was decided, the court anticipated that the result would be a fight over every other beach in the state, with each upland owner claiming that as to that owner's parcel the elements of prescription had not been established, even if they had been shown concerning the parcels on either side of that particular owner. By relying instead on the somewhat broader doctrine of custom, the court reasonably anticipated that much litigation could be avoided. [12] But nothing in Hay fairly can be read to have established beyond dispute a public claim by virtue of custom to the right to recreational use of the entire Oregon coast, no matter what the topography of a particular place. Hay might make it clear that the doctrine of custom would apply to places similarly situated, but it has to have been obvious to the court and the parties that not all areas of the coast necessarily were similarly situated. We take as a first premise that, to be similarly situated, a piece of land must abut the ocean. It need not, however, have a classic, dry-sand beach like that found at Cannon Beach. Dry-sand area as used in that case can apply equally to gravel beaches, beaches strewn with or even made up of boulders, and other areas adjacent to the foreshore which, like the beach in Hay, have long been used for recreational purposes by the general public. Most such locations will be well-known in their own area, thus obviating any need for litigation, the outcome of which would be a foregone conclusion. But there may also be areas to which the doctrine of custom is not applicable. It follows that the Court of Appeals erred in stating that the rule of State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay applied indiscriminately to areas of fine sand, coarse pebbles or solid rock. It applies to such areas if they abut the ocean and if their public use has been consistent with the doctrine of custom as explained in Hay; otherwise, other rules of law will apply. We do not retreat today from anything said in Hay. That case was well considered and decided, and we adhere to it. But Little Whale Cove is an area to which the rule of Hay does not apply. The evidence establishes that the cove has been in private hands since statehood and that for many years trespassers have been discouraged and even, on occasion, evicted. The only access to the cove is over private property or across a dangerous, uneven field of rocks on the foreshore of the headland immediately to the north of the property. The narrow beach on the eastern bank of the cove does not abut the ocean. There is no testimony in this record showing customary use of the narrow beach on the bank of the cove. The unique physical geography of the cove and its banks (separated as they are from the ocean's tidal limits by both the basalt sill and distance) does not suggest any likelihood of consistent utilization by ancient inhabitants. The doctrine of custom announced in Hay simply does not apply to this controversy. The public has no right to recreational use of the narrow beach at Little Whale Cove by virtue of the doctrine of custom, because there is no factual predicate for application of the doctrine. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.