Opinion ID: 2514669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The ICA Erred In Affirming The Circuit Court's Failure To Provide A Specific Unanimity Instruction To The Jury Regarding The Charge Of Kidnapping.

Text: Kassebeer argues that reversible error was committed when the circuit court chose not to issue, sua sponte, a specific unanimity instruction to the jury concerning the charge of kidnapping. In response to Kassebeer's claim, the prosecution proffers a pair of counterarguments: (1) a specific unanimity instruction was not necessary because the prosecution effectively elected the specific act upon which it relied to establish the conduct element of the kidnapping charge; and (2) the jury could not have found Kassebeer guilty of kidnapping merely due to his holding the complainant down in the early morning hours of April 10, 2004, because there was no evidence that he did so with any of the mental states required by the kidnapping statute, HRS § 707-720. See supra note 2. In State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai`i 1, 928 P.2d 843 (1996), this court held that, when separate and distinct culpable acts are subsumed within a single count charging a sexual assault  any one of which could support a conviction thereunder  and the defendant is ultimately convicted by a jury of the charged offense, the defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict is violated unless one or both of the following occurs: (1) at or before the close of its case-in-chief, the prosecution is required to elect the specific act upon which it is relying to establish the conduct element of the charged offense; or (2) the trial court gives the jury a specific unanimity instruction, i.e., an instruction that advises the jury that all twelve of its members must agree that the same underlying criminal act has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 32-33, 928 P.2d at 874-75 (emphasis added). Although Arceo was concerned with sexual assault, the requirement expressed therein has been discussed in cases involving a variety of offenses where multiple acts and jury unanimity were at issue. See, e.g., State v. Rapoza, 95 Hawai`i 321, 328-30, 22 P.3d 968, 975-77 (2001) (holding that the act of discharging a firearm multiple times did not amount to separate and distinct culpable acts requiring an Arceo instruction); State v. Valentine, 93 Hawai`i 199, 208-09, 998 P.2d 479, 488-89 (2000) (stating that, although the defendant made multiple attempts to wrest control of an officer's sidearm, the actions comprised only a single episode that did not mandate an Arceo instruction). Moreover, according to Valentine, two conditions must converge before an Arceo unanimity instruction, absent an election by the prosecution, is necessary: (1) at trial, the prosecution adduces proof of two or more separate and distinct culpable acts; and (2) the prosecution seeks to submit to the jury that only one offense was committed. Moreover, it bears repeating that the purpose of an Arceo unanimity instruction is to eliminate any ambiguity that might infect the jury's deliberations respecting the particular conduct in which the defendant is accused of engaging and that allegedly constitutes the charged offense. 93 Hawai`i at 208, 998 P.2d at 488. In this case, the prosecution claims that, by solely referencing the latter of the two events that took place on April 10, 2004 in its closing argument, a de facto election of the specific act was effected. However, in State v. Maumalanga, 90 Hawai`i 58, 976 P.2d 372 (1998), this court indicated that more was required to effectuate an election of the particular conduct upon which a charge is based. In Maumalanga, the defendant's conviction of place to keep loaded firearm, in violation of HRS §§ 134-6(c) and (e) (1993), was upheld in spite of his argument that there was evidence that [the defendant] took the guns from his home to his work place. Then, [the defendant] took one of the guns from the work place to pick up his friends to take them home. Based on these facts, ... there were two episodes which could be deemed to be separate and distinct culpable acts. Under Arceo, the prosecution must elect ... which of the two episodes upon which it is relying to establish the conduct element of the charged offense or the court must instruct the jury on the requirement of an unanimous verdict as to the underlying conduct. Id. at 63, 976 P.2d at 377. In affirming the ICA's decision, this court explained the means by which the prosecution successfully elected the specific conduct that supported the charge against the defendant as follows: In its cross-examination of [the defendant] and in closing argument, the prosecution focused its development of the facts and its argument on [the defendant's] conduct in taking the loaded firearm with him when he left his workplace to take his friends home and when he stopped for gas. No attempt was made to question [the defendant] whether his firearms were loaded or enclosed in containers when he transported them from his home to [his workplace]. Instead, he was questioned regarding the condition of the firearm at the gas station and whether he knowingly took it with him when he departed from his place of business. Similarly, in closing argument, the prosecution stated, Defendant told you that [the gun] was in his waist[ ]band because, remember, when he was in the car, he remembered the gun was in his waist[]band and he told you he pulled it out, thereby clearly focusing on [the defendant's] transportation of the firearm to the gas station. Accordingly, inasmuch as no effort was made to develop the facts necessary to establish a violation of HRS § 134-6 with regard to the period in which [the defendant] transported his firearms from his home to his place of business or to argue that the aforementioned act constituted a violation, we hold, on the present record, that the prosecution made an effective election, in satisfaction of the Arceo requirements, to base its charge of place to keep loaded firearm on [the defendant's] conduct in taking the firearm from his workplace to the gas station where the shooting incident occurred. Id. at 64, 976 P.2d at 378 (some brackets added and some in original) (some emphasis added and some in original). In contrast to Maumalanga, the prosecution in this case included conduct by Kassebeer in its development of the facts that could serve as a basis for multiple instances of kidnapping. Considering that the prosecution opposed Kassebeer's motion in limine to have the early morning event of April 10, 2004 excluded from the trial and then subsequently questioned the complainant and Kim, in detail, as to the incident, it would seem impossible for the prosecution now to argue that  no effort was made to develop the facts necessary to establish the earlier event as a separate, culpable act which would in turn necessitate the circuit court's issuance of an Arceo unanimity instruction. See id. (emphasis in original). Therefore, while the prosecution in the present case avoided reference to the separate, culpable act in its closing argument (as did the prosecution in Maumalanga, 90 Hawai`i at 64, 976 P.2d at 378), the decision to elicit testimony developing the facts of the early morning incident of April 10, 2004 effectively trumps the silence that followed because the prosecution's election of the specific act must take place at or before the close of its case-in-chief, Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 33, 928 P.2d at 875 (emphasis added), thereby rendering insufficient its attempt to do so during closing arguments. Therein lies the difference between the effective election in Maumalanga and the abortive attempt made by the prosecution in the current appeal. In any event, the prosecution's closing argument, without more, cannot take the place of a specific unanimity instruction because, just as arguments of counsel cannot substitute for evidence, State v. Quitog, 85 Hawai`i 128, 144, 938 P.2d 559, 575 (1997), so too may they not cure defects in jury instructions[.] Arguments by counsel cannot substitute for an instruction by the court. Arguments by counsel are likely to be viewed as statements of advocacy, whereas a jury instruction is a definitive and binding statement of law. State v. Perkins, 243 Wis.2d 141, 626 N.W.2d 762, 773 (Wis.2001). State v. Nichols, 111 Hawai`i 327, 340 n. 8, 141 P.3d 974, 987 n. 8 (2006). Alternatively, the prosecution argues that the jury could not have determined that the evidence of the early morning event established the elements of the kidnapping charge. We believe that the prosecution is mistaken. The testimony of Andrew Kim and the complainant regarding the incident could establish the elements of HRS § 707-720(1)(e). On direct examination, the complainant testified to the following: [Prosecutor]: What happened, if anything, when you got home? [Complainant]: I opened the door, I was talking to [Hashimoto-Matautia], and then I went into my hallway, and then all of a sudden [Kassebeer] is magically in my hallway, grabs me from the back, drops me to the ground, hits my head against the tile and tells me []who are you fucking, who are you fucking,[] grabs the phone away from my ear and hits it across my chin, and asks me who am I fucking. And then [Kassebeer] tells [Kim]: [Kim], [Kim], [Kim], come. Bring the pictures, bring the pictures.[] [Prosecutor]: Now, when [Kassebeer] is doing this, what [are] his emotions like? [Complainant]: Angry and psychotic. [Prosecutor]: Now, he's telling [Kim], [Kim], [Kim], come bring the pictures.[] Where are you at this time? [Complainant]: On the ground in the hallway. [Prosecutor]: And where's [Kassebeer] at? [Complainant]: On top of me. [Prosecutor]: And how is he on top of you? [Complainant]: I'm lying down, and he's on top of me holding me down. Moreover, Andrew Kim, a prosecution witness and Kassebeer's long-time friend, stated the following on direct examination: [Prosecutor]: Mr. Kim, isn't it true that you told Detective Kim that on the following day of his arrest, April 11th, 2004, you said[,] So she come home, and he grabbed her and threw her to the ground asking who is he, holding her mouth, covering her mouth because she is going to be hysterical. [Kim]: Yes. The complainant also testified that Kassebeer threatened to strike her when she attempted to grab her phone. While not as violent as the event that would follow later in the day, the jury could find, based on the foregoing testimony, that Kassebeer intentionally or knowingly restrain[ed] [the complainant] with intent to terrorize her. See HRS § 707-720(1)(e). The circuit court's instruction regarding the kidnapping count injects further uncertainty as to whether the jury was unanimous with respect to the culpable act constituting the conduct element of the offense. The circuit court instructed the jury, in relevant part, as follows: A person commits the offense of [k]idnapping if he intentionally or negligently restrains a person with the intent to terrorize that person. There are three material elements of the offense of [k]idnapping, each of which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. These three elements are: (1), [t]hat on April 10, 2004 on the island of Oahu, [Kassebeer] restrained [the complainant]; and, (2), [t]hat [Kassebeer] did so intentionally or knowingly; and (3), [t]hat [Kassebeer] did so with the intent to terrorize [the complainant]. . . . . Restrain means to restrain a person's movement in such a matter as to interfere substantially with his or her liberty by means of force, threats or deception. (Emphasis added.) While the circuit court instructed the jury as to the date of the charged offense, it did not further explicate the time of the offense. Accordingly, the jurors could have found that Kassebeer's culpable acts of either the morning or afternoon of April 10, 2004 established the conduct element of the kidnapping count. Although Kassebeer did not raise a timely objection to the circuit court's failure to provide an Arceo instruction or to the prosecution's failure to elect a specific act, this court has noted that [w]e may recognize plain error when the error committed affects substantial rights of the defendant. [ S]ee also [ State v.] Kinnane, 79 Hawai`i [46,] 50, 897 P.2d [973,] 977 [(1995)] (It may be plain error for a trial court to fail to give an ... instruction even when neither the prosecution nor the defendant have requested it... because ... the ultimate responsibility properly to instruct the jury lies with the circuit court and not with trial counsel.) Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 33, 928 P.2d at 875 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Under Arceo and its progeny, it was plain error for the circuit court not to issue a specific unanimity instruction to the jury regarding Kassebeer's kidnapping charge. See, e.g., Arceo 84 Hawai`i at 33, 928 P.2d at 875 (vacating and remanding the circuit court's conviction, because the circuit court plainly erred in failing to provide a specific unanimity instruction to the jury). Accordingly, we hold that the ICA erred in affirming the circuit court's kidnapping conviction under HRS § 707-720.