Opinion ID: 781032
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waiver of the Invalidity Defense and Counterclaim.

Text: 53 The defendants argue that they did not waive the right to a trial on the issue of invalidity by failing to raise it in opposition to the cross-motion for summary judgment as to the issue of infringement. We agree. 54 On remand of this case from our first decision, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment as to all defendants, asking that the district court enter[ ] judgment of infringement against the Defendants and in favor of the Plaintiffs on claim 3 of the '046 patent. (Suggestions of Pls. In Support of Their Mot. for Summ. J. of Aug. 31, 2001, at 20). As noted above, the plaintiffs did not request summary judgment of liability, only infringement. Nor did the plaintiffs seek summary judgment with respect to the affirmative defense and counterclaim of invalidity asserted in the defendants' answers of May 17, 1999. 55 Supreme Court precedent and our cases make clear that patent infringement and patent validity are treated as separate issues. In Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 113 S.Ct. 1967, 124 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993), the Supreme Court held that a finding that a patent is not infringed does not render the counterclaim for patent invalidity moot. Id. at 102-03, 113 S.Ct. 1967. The Court determined that [a] party seeking a declaratory judgment of invalidity presents a claim independent of the patentee's charge of infringement.  Id. at 96, 113 S.Ct. 1967 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that of the two questions, validity has the greater public importance. Id. at 100, 113 S.Ct. 1967 (citation omitted); see also Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 365-366, 63 S.Ct. 1115, 87 L.Ed. 1450 (1943) (holding that a finding of noninfringement does not render the distinct claim of patent invalidity moot). 56 Similarly, this court has long recognized that patent infringement and invalidity are separate and distinct issues. Though an invalid claim cannot give rise to liability for infringement, whether it is infringed is an entirely separate question capable of determination without regard to its validity. Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 1583, 220 USPQ 97, 111 (Fed.Cir.1983) (noting that although the district court was correct in its determination that the patents in suit were invalid, the better practice would have been to resolve the issue of infringement as well); see also Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 936 n. 2, 220 USPQ 481, 484 n. 2 (Fed.Cir.1983) (the district court erroneously combined the analysis of validity with that of infringement). 57 We have applied this rule in a variety of contexts. For example, in Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Reeves Bros., Inc., 752 F.2d 630, 224 USPQ 536 (Fed. Cir.1985), we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a party's delayed motion to amend its pleadings to add a defense of invalidity: 58 While we recognize that the issues of infringement, interference, validity, and unenforceability are normally addressed together, they are distinct and separate issues. Thus, Tenneco had the duty to place this distinct and separate issue in its pleading if it wished the court to consider the matter. Given that the infringement and validity issues are normally addressed together, Reeves (and the trial court) could reasonably have assumed that Tenneco's silence [in its original pleading] expressed its intention not to raise the validity issue. 59 Id. at 635 n. 4, 752 F.2d 630, 224 USPQ at 539 n. 4 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 60 In Fin Control Systems Pty, Ltd. v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d 1311, 1321, 60 USPQ2d 1203, 1207 (Fed.Cir.2001), we held that a district court could not sua sponte grant a party summary judgment of patent invalidity in response to a motion for summary judgment that was focused exclusively on the issue of noninfringement: 61 [the] defenses of invalidity and unenforceability were not the subject of any motion before the district court, nor does the record indicate that these aspects of the case had been fully litigated at the time that the district court entered judgment. Therefore, the district court's sua sponte grant of summary judgment of invalidity and unenforceability was procedurally improper because it did not provide the parties with adequate notice or an opportunity for FCS to present evidence and argument in opposition to the motion. 62 Id. at 1321, 265 F.3d 1311, 60 USPQ2d at 1210. 63 Hence, the issue of invalidity is a separate issue from infringement, and an alleged infringer's failure to raise it in opposition to a motion for summary judgment of infringement is not a waiver. This conclusion is strongly supported by cases declining to find a waiver of invalidity defenses in other contexts. See, e.g., Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670-71, 89 S.Ct. 1902, 23 L.Ed.2d 610 (1969) (accepting a license under a patent is not a waiver of the right to challenge the validity of that patent); Ecolab, Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., 285 F.3d 1362, 1376, 62 USPQ2d 1349, 1358-59 (Fed.Cir.2002) (narrowly construing a consent decree provision admitting invalidity); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 481, 20 USPQ2d 1241, 1250 (Fed. Cir.1991) (same); Scosche Indus. v. Visor Gear, Inc., 121 F.3d 675, 679, 43 USPQ2d 1659, 1662-63 (Fed.Cir.1997) (a party does not waive its right to assert invalidity as a defense by offering a judgment under Fed. R.Civ.P. 68 admitting infringement). 64 The district court therefore erred in limiting the trial to the determination of the plaintiffs' award of damages. The case must be remanded for the purpose of allowing the defendants to try their invalidity defense and counterclaim. 3