Opinion ID: 2680015
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Video Cameras as Interfering with the Easement

Text: [¶16] In determining the reasonableness of an alleged interference with the use of an easement, “[w]e review the court’s relevant factual findings for clear error and the court’s legal conclusion of reasonableness de novo.” Flaherty, 2011 ME 32, ¶ 63, 17 A.3d 640. [¶17] As with the interpretation of a contract, the interpretation of a settlement, and whether it is ambiguous, is reviewed de novo. See id. ¶ 40. When contract language is unambiguous, it “must be interpreted according to its plain and commonly accepted meaning.” Cookson v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2012 ME 7, ¶ 8, 34 A.3d 1156. “If the language of the contract is ambiguous, however, its interpretation is a question of fact for the factfinder.” Estate of Barrows, 2006 ME 143, ¶ 12, 913 A.2d 608. [¶18] The trial court did not expressly determine whether the 2006 settlement was ambiguous as to whether it permitted video surveillance. With the parties electing not to submit any new evidence, we interpret the 2006 settlement de novo because we conclude that it is unambiguous with regard to the video surveillance cameras at issue here. See Flaherty, 2011 ME 32, ¶ 40, 17 A.3d 640. 9 [¶19] The relevant language of the 2006 settlement provides, “there’s been a lot of controversy with respect to particularly Mr. Woods’[s] approach to various easement holders and that they anticipate that part of the nondisturbance clause includes the fact that peaceful users of the access are not gonna be photographed, approached, or questioned while they’re enjoying the easement.” In interpreting this language, the trial court noted that although the 2006 settlement “addressed the subject of photographing users of the easement in general,” it “did not specifically address the use of surveillance cameras as part of an access system.” However, the court concluded that “the clear implication of the [2006 settlement] strongly disfavors the use of surveillance cameras.” [¶20] We recently described video surveillance as “a phenomenon that is lawful in many situations and increasingly common in modern society.” State v. Strong, 2013 ME 21, ¶ 9, --- A.3d ---. A more general survey has observed that “[i]n an age of ubiquitous recording, citizens have already learned to expect that virtually anything they do outside of their home may be recorded by someone.” Glenn H. Reynolds & John A. Steakley, A Due Process Right to Record the Police, 89 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1203, 1210 (2012). Such common, unobtrusive recording by a stationary video camera or cameras installed on one’s own property for surveillance or security purposes is not the type of confrontational, in-your-face 10 photography described in the record in Flaherty and addressed in the nondisturbance clause of the 2006 settlement agreement. [¶21] Property, although subject to an easement, remains within the ownership and control of the owner of the servient estate. That ownership and control is subject only to the restriction that the owner of the servient estate not “materially impair” or “unreasonably interfere with” the use of the right-of-way that is allowed by the easement. See Flaherty, 2011 ME 32, ¶ 63, 17 A.3d 640 (quoting Morgan v. Boyes, 65 Me. 124, 125 (1876)). This principle is further limited to application only within the bounds of the easement. See Badger v. Hill, 404 A.2d 222, 227 (Me. 1979); see also Stanton v. Strong, 2012 ME 48, ¶ 10, 40 A.3d 1013. The owner of the servient estate “has the right to use its land in a manner not inconsistent with the dominant estate holder’s right.” See Flaherty, 2011 ME 32, ¶ 63, 17 A.3d 640 (quoting Drummond v. Foster, 107 Me. 401, 407, 78 A. 470 (1910)). [¶22] The dominant estate holder’s “right” here is the right of access to Secret Beach over the walkway easement. [¶23] The placement of security cameras at or near the gate across the easement providing access to the beach does not, in any way, impair or interfere with the rights of access that have been guaranteed to those authorized to access the beach across the easement. The video cameras impede access to no greater 11 extent than the placement of video cameras outside and inside courthouses impedes access to those buildings and courtrooms. Further, there is no evidence suggesting that the video recordings will be used for any purpose other than surveillance for security purposes. [¶24] The defendants, like any other property owners, may engage in reasonable measures to provide security and surveillance of any part of their property, and certainly may monitor uses of the easement to assure that the easement is not overburdened or used by individuals without authority to access the beach by crossing the easement. The means selected—unobtrusive, stationary video cameras—do not intrude on the easement in any way. [¶25] Interpreting the 2006 settlement’s ban on photography to include stationary video cameras is not reasonably related to prohibiting the personally confrontational photography practices or other acts addressed in the 2006 settlement agreement. The placement of video cameras at issue here does not unreasonably interfere with the access easement benefitting the J-Lot owners, nor do the unobtrusive video cameras violate the non-disturbance clause that limited confrontational, in-person photography practices conducted in or near the easement right-of-way. 12 The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants on the video camera issue. On the briefs: James A. Billings, Esq., and Walter F. McKee, Esq., McKee Law, P.A., Augusta, for appellants Helen Muther, Paul Woods, and the Buffett Coastal Trust Thomas R. McNaboe, Esq., Cumberland Foreside, for appellees Mary Arnold, Robert Flaherty, Sherry Flaherty, and Steve McGrath Stephen D. Bither, Esq., Portland, for appellees Russell Pierce, Jacqueline Pierce, Todd Colpitts, Niamh Colpitts, David House, Susan House, Paulette York, David Meagher, and Ellen Meagher At oral argument: James A. Billings, Esq., for appellants Helen Muther, Paul Woods, and the Buffett Coastal Trust Thomas R. McNaboe, Esq., for appellees Mary Arnold, Robert Flaherty, Sherry Flaherty, Steve McGrath, Russell Pierce, Jacqueline Pierce, Todd Colpitts, Niamh Colpitts, David House, Susan House, Paulette York, David Meagher, and Ellen Meagher Cumberland County Superior Court docket number RE-2008-98 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY