Opinion ID: 2315959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Constitutionality and Scope of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f)

Text: Defendant argues as plain error that N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(f) (c(2)(f)) denied him a fair trial because it subjected him to punishment for the prior murder of Gladys Colon. During the penalty phase, the State adduced evidence in support of aggravating factor N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(a) (c(4)(a)) that defendant had previously been convicted of murder. Section c(2)(f) provides in relevant part: Evidence offered by the State with regard to the establishment of    [aggravating factor c(4)(a)] may include the identity and age of the victim, the manner of death and the relationship, if any, of the victim to the defendant. That section describes the evidence that may be included when proving a prior murder under c(4)(a). Defendant contends that c(2)(f) violates his constitutional protection against double jeopardy and is an ex post facto law under both the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. V; N.J. Const. art. 1, para. 11 (double jeopardy); U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; N.J. Const. art. 4, § 7, para. 3 ( ex post facto ). The argument lacks merit. Pursuant to c(2)(f), the State sought to present various evidence about defendant's prior murder conviction. The State proffered the official record of the conviction, testimony of a police officer that defendant had confessed to murdering Colon, the autopsy report that described in detail the manner and cause of Colon's death, and the autopsy photographs of Colon's mutilated corpse. After considering the prejudicial effect of the evidence, the trial court disallowed introduction of the photographs and portions of the autopsy report, but allowed introduction of evidence of the conviction, a stipulated version of the autopsy report, and the testimony of the officer that defendant had confessed to murdering Colon. Although the trial court instructed the jury generally about weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, it did not issue any instructions about the limited purposes for which the prior-murder evidence could be used. We reject both of defendant's constitutional challenges to c(2)(f). That statutory provision neither constitutes an ex post facto law nor violates the prohibition against double jeopardy. Evidence of a prior murder is admissible under c(2)(f) not for the purpose of punishing defendant for that murder, but to enable the jury to determine the appropriate sentence for the present murder. As the State argues, c(2)(f) does not undertake to punish for the prior offense, but rather to enhance punishment for the subsequent murder offense. Generally, sentence enhancement based on the defendant's prior record does not violate either the federal or the New Jersey constitutions. See, e.g., McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 21 S.Ct. 389, 45 L.Ed. 542 (1901) (rejecting, inter alia, both a double-jeopardy and an ex post facto law challenge to a Massachusetts sentence-enhancement provision); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 16 S.Ct. 179, 40 L.Ed. 301 (1895) (rejecting, inter alia, a double-jeopardy challenge to a Missouri sentence-enhancement provision); In re Caruso, 10 N.J. 184, 89 A. 2d 661 (1952) (rejecting, inter alia, an ex post facto law challenge to a New Jersey sentence-enhancement provision). Although we have not previously considered the issue, courts of other states have upheld the introduction of prior-crimes evidence at capital-sentencing proceedings. See, e.g., Stano v. State, 473 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093, 106 S.Ct. 869, 88 L.Ed. 2d 907 (1986); State v. McDowell, 310 N.C. 61, 310 S.E. 2d 301 (1984). As we have previously noted, the need to guard against jury prejudice is critical in the penalty phase of a capital case. See Pitts, supra, 116 N.J. at 538-39, 562 A. 2d 1320 (discussing prejudice from autopsy photographs). Evidence of other crimes is of special concern because of its capacity to prejudice capital-sentencing deliberations. See, e.g., Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 585-87, 575 A. 2d 816 (recognizing potential prejudice in capital case from admission of prior murder conviction); State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 302, 558 A. 2d 833 (1989) (noting the widespread agreement that other-crimes evidence has a unique tendency to turn a jury against the defendant); Rose I, supra, 112 N.J. at 505-08, 548 A. 2d 1058. Because of that capacity, the trial court should instruct the jury about the limited use of evidence relating to defendant's prior murder conviction. Evid.R. 6; see M. Moore, supra, 113 N.J. at 276-77, 550 A. 2d 117 (requiring limiting instruction on prior-crimes evidence); Rose I, supra, 112 N.J. at 505-08, 548 A. 2d 1058 (requiring limiting instruction on prior bad-conduct evidence). Such an instruction should make clear that defendant has already been punished for the prior conviction and that the jury should consider the conviction only in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed for the present murder, not the earlier one. Defendant also challenges as plain error the admission of the stipulated autopsy report to prove the manner of death in the murder of Gladys Colon. With the agreement of both parties, the trial court admitted in evidence three pages from that report. The selected pages described not only the multiple stab wounds as the cause of death, but also the details of each wound. They also contained a diagram showing the location of the wounds. Contending that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, defendant now argues that the autopsy report should not have been admitted to prove the manner of death under c(2)(f). Although we do not find the admission of the stipulated report to constitute plain error, on remand defendant should not be bound by the stipulation. The history of c(2)(f) reflects the Legislature's concern about the amount of evidence of prior murders that is admissible on the penalty phase. The Judiciary Committee's statement explains that the purpose of c(2)(f) is to avoid turning the sentencing proceeding into a second trial of the previous case and at the same time to provide the jury with some information about the prior conviction. Senate Judiciary Committee Statement to Senate No. 950, at 2. We believe that the statutory purpose can be served with less than the stipulated evidence. The prejudicial effect of a graphic and detailed account of the victim's death might exceed its probative value. On remand, the purposes of the statute will be served if the evidence of the manner of Colon's death is described as multiple stab wounds to the chest, lungs, and heart.