Opinion ID: 371005
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: gibson's financial condition

Text: 7 Gibson contends that the court erred when it permitted the prosecutor to ask questions designed to cast doubt on whether (Gibson's) income from his decorating business was sufficient to support his life style. Gibson Br. 16. The gist of his argument is that the prosecutor unfairly implied that the only way he (Gibson) could support his opulent life style was through pimping. Fowler asserts that because of his association with Gibson, he too was prejudiced by this line of questioning. Fowler Br. 15. The Government characterizes these contentions as an effort by appellants to extract from rather innocuous and generally unobjected evidence a scenario of impermissible prejudice. Government Br. 8. 8 Appellants object to the prosecutor's questioning at two points in the trial. First, they refer to the testimony of Gwendolyn Clark, Gibson's fiancee and a prosecution witness. 7 During direct examination, she identified the automobile pictured in Exhibit Number 1, a 1976 Lincoln Continental, as her car. She Volunteered that she purchased it from Mr. Gibson. Tr. I 166. Then responding to questions, Clark stated that she paid Gibson approximately $5600 for the car in January, 1978, (Id.); and that he borrowed the car in March, 1978, ostensibly for a short vacation. Id. 167. Neither defense counsel objected to any part of this colloquy. 9 The prosecutor then asked Clark whether Gibson was employed at the time? Defense counsel objected for the first time, but the objection was overruled. The witness answered that Gibson was an interior decorator. Tr. I 168. The prosecutor continued his questioning, eliciting that Gibson returned the car after about two or three days, that he owned a 1970 Marquis at that time, and that he ran his work from that car rather than from an office. Id. 169. The prosecutor then asked whether Gibson had racks in his car (presumably for use in decorating) and whether he had a truck to do interior decorating? Defense counsel objected, and although the objection was overruled (outside the hearing of the jury), the witness never answered the question. 10 Appellants also take exception to certain portions of the prosecutor's cross-examination of appellant Fowler. 8 After Fowler testified that he drove to Washington with the four women for a vacation, the prosecutor asked whether Gibson was also on a vacation. Fowler answered that Gibson was on vacation . . . (from) his work . . . (as) an interior decorator. Tr. II 48. The prosecutor asked whether Gibson had an office, and after the objection by defense counsel was overruled, Fowler said no. The prosecutor then asked if Gibson work(ed) out of a truck. Id. 49. The defense objection was overruled, and Fowler explained that Gibson used a 1970 Mercury Marquis in his work. The prosecutor concluded this colloquy by asking a series of questions about the 1976 Lincoln that Gibson sold to his fiancee. Objections were overruled, and Fowler stated that Gibson did not use the 1976 Lincoln in his interior decorating business. Id. 49-50. 11 Taken together, the two colloquys identified by appellants included the following testimony: (1) Gibson sold a 1976 Lincoln Continental to Clark for $5600; (2) Gibson borrowed the car from Clark for his vacation to Washington, D.C.; (3) Gibson was an interior decorator; (4) Gibson used a 1970 Marquis in his interior decorating business; (5) Gibson did not have an office; and (6) Gibson did not use a truck in his business. Defense counsel contends that questioning about these matters substantially prejudiced appellants' right to a fair trial, and therefore that they are entitled to a new trial. We disagree. 12 First, most of this numbered testimony was elicited without objection. Defense counsel never objected to Clark's testimony that Gibson sold the 1976 Continental to her (1); that he borrowed the car from her for his vacation (2); and that Gibson ran his business from his 1970 Marquis, rather than an office (4, 5). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 13 (e)rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected and . . . (i)n case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record . . . . 14 Fed.R.Evid. 103(a). If testimony, even though improper, is introduced into evidence without objection, it becomes part of the record and is available to be considered for its probative value by the trier of fact. United States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir. 1977). Courts will make an exception to this rule only if the admission of the testimony constituted plain error affecting substantial rights. United States v. Dawson, 576 F.2d 656, 658 (5th Cir. 1978), Cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1127, 99 S.Ct. 1043, 59 L.Ed.2d 88 (1979). Accord: United States v. Popejoy, 578 F.2d 1346, 1350 (10th Cir. 1978), Cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896, 99 S.Ct. 257, 58 L.Ed.2d 243 (1979); United States v. Smith, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 221, 226, 490 F.2d 789, 794 (D.C.Cir.1974). See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a) and (d), Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). In other words, 15 (i)n order to require a new trial, the prejudicial effect of improper matter, viewed in the context of the particular trial, must not be overwhelmed . . . by evidence of guilt. Rather, a significant possibility must exist that, considering the other evidence presented by both the prosecution and defense, the statement had a substantial impact on the verdict of the jury. 16 United States v. Archbold-Newball, 554 F.2d 665, 680 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1000, 98 S.Ct. 644, 54 L.Ed.2d 496 (1977). As we explain Infra, the Government's case is exceptionally strong. Since appellants have not established that the testimony at issue here was critical to the Government's case, we hold that admission of that testimony was not error, much less plain error warranting a new trial. 17 Second, we are not persuaded that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony that was objected to. The prosecutor's questions, which established that Gibson borrowed from his fiancee the 1976 Lincoln Continental was used to transport the four women to the District of Columbia, were relevant. Interstate transportation is one of the principal elements of the offense, and how this was accomplished, who drove, who furnished the car, who paid the expenses, who arranged a place for the young women to stay, etc., is probative of one of the principal elements of the offense that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, Fowler claimed that appellants went to Washington on a vacation. It was vacation from school for Fowler but vacation from Work for Gibson. Gibson's fiancee, who was hardly an impartial witness, also testified that he borrowed the car for a short vacation. Tr. I 167. It was thus permissible for the prosecutor to explore the Vacation defense further. The suggestion that appellants were on vacation implied that they engaged in a regular occupation or activity other than pimping. The prosecutor was entitled to test the Bona fides of this claim, for if either appellant had no regular business or activity other than pimping, then the trip to Washington would hardly be a vacation. It certainly was no intended vacation for the young women. 18