Opinion ID: 778482
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Minimal Participant Adjustment

Text: 83 Johnson's third argument is that the district court erred by not reducing his offense level under § 3B1.2(a) to reflect his role as a minimal participant in the conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering. We review for clear error a district court's determination that a defendant does not qualify for minimal participant status. See United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1436 (9th Cir.1994). 84 The Guidelines provide for a four-level downward adjustment if the defendant is a minimal participant in the offense. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2(a) (1998). The notes to § 3B1.2 indicate that a minimal participant is one who is clearly among the least culpable in a criminal group. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2(a), cmt. n. 1 (1998). Clarifying this rule, we have held that a defendant's culpability is to be measured against his co-participants, not a hypothetical average participant. See United States v. Petti, 973 F.2d 1441, 1447 (9th Cir.1992). Finally, even if a defendant establishes that he was among the least culpable of the group, a downward adjustment under § 3B1.2(a) is appropriate only if the defendant was at least substantially less culpable than his co-participants. See United States v. Benitez, 34 F.3d 1489, 1498 (9th Cir.1994). 37 85 In support of his claim that he was only a minimal participant in the conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering, Johnson points to the fact that he did not engage in the financial transactions that completed the substantive offense of money laundering. In addition, Johnson notes that he did not work at AEA for the entire duration of the scheme. While the criminal activity in this matter ran from January of 1996 until June of 1997, Johnson worked at AEA from January through March of 1996, and again in late 1996 and the spring of 1997. 86 Johnson's argument fails to persuade. It is true that Johnson spent less time at AEA than the other reloaders, and that he was less directly involved in the actual money laundering than Eames or Rudisill. Thus, it may be fairly said that Johnson was the least culpable participant in the scheme at AEA. However, it is also true that Johnson was actively involved in the scheme for a substantial amount of time, and that his efforts as both a front man and reloader contributed significantly to the procurement of funds that were used to perpetuate AEA's illegal activities. Indeed, the record indicates that Johnson's efforts were uniquely instrumental, among the reloaders, in getting the scheme off the ground. He was the best front man in the early days of the operation, and was rewarded for his contribution by being the first sales person to receive a promotion to reloader. Under these circumstances, we cannot say with a definite and firm conviction that the district court erred in failing to find Johnson substantially less culpable than his co-participants. See United States v. Maldonado, 215 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir.2000) (stating that a decision is clearly erroneous only if it leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made). Therefore, we decline to disturb the district court's decision regarding Johnson's minimal participant status.