Opinion ID: 1684481
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: appropriations power.

Text: [5] I simply believe that Congress shall make no law means Congress shall make no law. Hugo Black, A Constitutional Faith 45 (1969), referring, of course, to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. That simple textual interpretation mirrors the primary rule of constitutional construction: There is no room for construction of a Constitution outside of the words themselves, if they are unambiguous. . . . Button v. Drake, 302 Ky. 517, 195 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1946). When the framers of the Constitution use language that is in no sense ambiguous, it is not a function of this court to construe that language as meaning something that the framers of the Constitution did not say, or to hold that while the Constitution says something definitely and unequivocally, no special importance is to be attached to its language. Harrod v. Hatcher, 281 Ky. 712, 137 S.W.2d 405, 407 (1940). See also Pardue v. Miller, 306 Ky. 110, 206 S.W.2d 75, 78 (1947) (The basic rule . . . is to interpret a constitutional provision according to what was said and not what might have been said . . . .). That rule applies to the unambiguous words of Section 230 of the Constitution of Kentucky, viz: No money shall be drawn from the State Treasury, except in pursuance of appropriations made by law . . . . We have consistently held that this provision means exactly what it says. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong v. Collins, 709 S.W.2d 437, 441 (Ky.1986) (It is clear that the power of the dollarthe raising and expenditure of the money necessary to operate state governmentis one which is within the authority of the legislative branch of government. The Constitution of the Commonwealth so states and we have so stated.); L.R.C. v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 925 (The budget, which provides the revenue for the Commonwealth and which determines how that revenue shall be spent, is fundamentally a legislative matter.); Ferguson v. Oates, 314 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Ky.1958) ([T]he purpose of [Section 230] was to prevent the expenditure of the State's money without the consent of the Legislature.) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the United States Constitution contains wording almost identical to that of Section 230, and the United States Supreme Court has consistently given that provision its literal meaning. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321, 57 S.Ct. 764, 770, 81 L.Ed. 1122 (1937) (It means simply that no money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress.); Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 291, 13 L.Ed. 693 (1850) (However much money may be in the Treasury at any one time, not a dollar of it can be used in the payment of any thing not thus previously sanctioned.). Its purpose is to vest in Congress, the branch of government that is most representative of the people, the power to determine how the people's money will be spent. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 427-28, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 2473, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (But the Clause has a more fundamental and comprehensive purpose. . . . It is to assure that public funds will be spent according to the letter of the difficult judgments reached by Congress as to the common good and not according to the individual favor of Government agents or the individual pleas of litigants.); Cincinnati Soap Co., 301 U.S. at 321, 57 S.Ct. at 770 (The provision of the Constitution . . . that, `No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law,' was intended as a restriction upon the disbursing authority of the Executive department. . . .). The object is apparent upon the slightest examination. It is to secure regularity, punctuality, and fidelity, in the disbursements of the public money. As all the taxes raised from the people, as well as revenues arising from other sources, are to be applied to the discharge of the expenses, and debts, and other engagements of the government, it is highly proper, that congress should possess the power to decide how and when any money should be applied for these purposes. If it were otherwise, the executive would possess an unbounded power over the public purse of the nation; and might apply all its moneyed resources at his pleasure. The power to control and direct the appropriations, constitutes a most useful and salutary check upon profusion and extravagance, as well as upon corrupt influence and public peculation. . . . Joseph Story, 2 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1348 (3d ed. 1858). It is an axiom of American government that the legislature holds the purse strings. The federal and most state constitutions, for example, require that the budget originate in the House of Representatives, the arm of government most representative of the populace. This is traditionally viewed as the means by which the representatives of the people hold their most powerful check and balance upon the executive branch. Snyder & Ireland, supra, at 225. The Governor asserts that Section 230 applies only if the General Assembly has enacted a budget bill. As noted at the outset of this opinion, there is no provision in the Constitution of Kentucky requiring the General Assembly to enact a budget bill. Such is purely a statutory requirement. Since Section 230 preexisted that statutory scheme, the Framers could not have intended for the Section to apply only when the General Assembly enacts a budget bill. Accordingly, we hold that, in the absence of a specific appropriation, or a statutory, constitutional, or federal mandate as discussed below, the unambiguous language of Section 230 prohibits the withdrawal of funds from the state treasury.