Opinion ID: 63383
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpretation of Indemnity Provision

Text: The parties agree that the Charter Agreement controlled the relationship between Sea Mar and OOSI on the date of Brown’s alleged accident and that the Charter Agreement is a maritime contract. We apply federal maritime law in interpreting and applying the contract.1 See Corbitt v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 654 F.2d 329, 332 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981) (The interpretation of an indemnity clause in a maritime contract is ordinarily governed by federal maritime law rather than by state law.). A maritime contract “should be read as a whole and its words given their plain meaning unless the provision is ambiguous.” Weathersby v. Conoco Oil Co., 752 F.2d 953, 955 (5th Cir. 1984). Further, indemnity agreements “should be construed to cover all losses, damages, or liabilities which reasonably appear to have been within the contemplation of the parties . . . .” Corbitt, 654 F.2d at 333. OOSI contends that Brown was not its “invitee” because OOSI was never an “occupant” of the CAPE COOK. In the alternative, OOSI argues that if we find that Brown was an invitee of OOSI, we must find that Brown was also an invitee of Sea Mar, resulting in circular indemnity. 1 Generally, the common law distinction between an invitee and a licensee does not apply in maritime law. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630–32 (1959). The Supreme Court chose to adopt “a single duty of ‘exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of each case,’ rather than to incorporate in the maritime law the complexities of the common law of invitee and licensee.” Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 163 n.10 (1981) (quoting Kermarec, 358 U.S. at 632); see also Smith v. Southern Gulf Marine Co. No. 2, 791 F.2d 416, 419 (5th Cir. 1986). Cases applying these principles concern the duty of care that arises by operation of law in the maritime context, and federal maritime law thus determined the framework of direct tort liability for Brown’s injuries. The instant case, however, is solely a contractual indemnity matter. The parties chose to incorporate the concept of an “invitee” to contractually define the circumstances under which the indemnification provision would apply. 4 No. 07-30112