Opinion ID: 2975823
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional Standing Generally

Text: As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs argue that the district court improperly decided the merits of the constitutional claim before addressing the issue of standing. In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), the Supreme Court held that courts must decide jurisdictional questions as a threshold matter. Id. at 94-95. “The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States and is inflexible and without exception.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A court should not analyze or resolve substantive issues before addressing the issue of standing. “Before turning to the merits, [a court] must address the plaintiffs’ standing to raise several constitutional claims and [ ] must do so even though some of those constitutional claims are easier to resolve than the standing question attached to them.” 1064 Old River Road, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 137 F. App’x 760, 764 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (unpublished opinion). A district court may not avoid the standing issue and proceed to a determination on the merits because “standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff’s contention that particular conduct is illegal.” McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 227 (2003) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)). In the instant case, since the district court analyzed the constitutionality of the sign regulations and used the resolution of that issue to deny standing, the court’s decision is procedurally improper. In this case, the district court erred in finding that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action. To make a determination with respect to standing, this Court must determine whether Plaintiffs “have suffered an injury in fact – an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) “Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Each element of standing will be discussed below. Plaintiffs can demonstrate an injury in fact that satisfies the first element of the standing inquiry. Notably, the district court’s opinion addressed only Midwest’s standing claims and did not make a determination with respect to CTI’s and Speckert’s standing claims. Since CTI’s and Speckert’s claims are separate and independent from Midwest’s claims, the district court erred in failing to address those claims. The record shows that Midwest submitted sign applications to the Township specifically on behalf of CTI and Speckert. Defendant denied the applications. The denial of the applications precluded CTI and Speckert from disseminating commercial speech and messages, and may have had a chilling effect on protected speech. See Bd. of County Com’rs, Wabaunsee County, Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (recognizing that a chilling effect is a “constitutional violation[ ] [that] may arise from the deterrent, or chilling, effect of governmental [efforts] that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights.” (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972)). Since the Township used the sign regulations to deny the sign applications, CTI and Speckert can demonstrate a direct injury and have standing to challenge the regulations. See, No. 06-3828 Midwest Media Property, et al. v. Symmes Twp., Ohio Page 14 e.g., Epicenter of Steubenville, Inc. v. City of Steubenville, 924 F. Supp. 845, 849-50 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (holding that the inability to obtain a municipal zoning permit constitutes injury in fact); see also V. Jacobs & Sons v. Saginaw County Dep’t of Pub. Health, 284 F. Supp. 2d 711, 716 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Horizon Outdoor, L.L.C. v. City of Industry, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Although Midwest does not have an injury as direct as the injury alleged by CTI and Speckert, the record clearly shows that Midwest lost income it would have received if the sign applications had been approved. Midwest’s economic loss qualifies as an injury for standing purposes. Cf. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters of St. Louis v. City of Ferguson, 283 F.3d 969, 974 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting that indirect economic injury may constitute an injury in fact); Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Horstkoetter v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 159 F.3d 1265, 1279 (10th Cir. 1998) (same). Since the denial of the applications directly curtailed CTI’s and Speckert’s speech and reduced Midwest’s income, Plaintiffs have suffered a requisite injury in fact. Plaintiffs also satisfy the second element of the standing inquiry because there is a causal connection between their alleged injuries and the Township’s conduct. See Am. Canoe Ass’n, 389 F.3d at 542. Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are fairly traceable to the Township’s sign regulations, particularly because Defendant used the sign regulations to deny the sign applications. See Lockridge v. City of Oldsmar, Fla., 475 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1249-50 (finding that the denial of a sign application was “causally connected to the allegedly unconstitutional ordinance upon which the application denials were based.”). Finally, Plaintiffs satisfy the third element in the standing inquiry because it is likely that their injuries would be redressed by a favorable decision. The majority avers that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action because the complaint failed to challenge the size and height restrictions set forth in the Township’s sign regulations. This contention is simply wrong and demonstrates a flagrant disregard for the plain language and express allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ complaint. In this case, the complaint expressly challenges “the Township’s Sign Regulations” and “refers specifically to Article XXXI of the Symmes Township Zoning Resolution and, collectively to those sections of the Resolution that define [or] otherwise regulate signs, including provisions located in Articles III (Definitions), XVIII (Board of Zoning Appeals), XIX (Zoning Certificates), and XXVIII (Violations and Penalties).” (J.A. 13) The Township’s size and height restrictions are found in Article XXXI, and Plaintiffs expressly challenge this article and all of its provisions in the complaint. Moreover, the complaint repeatedly alleges that all aspects of the Township’s sign restrictions “are constitutionally invalid and inseparable from the remainder of the regulations,” (J.A. 25), and that “no valid regulation prohibited [the] requested signs,” (J.A. 23) Contrary to the majority’s assertions, Plaintiffs do not challenge a discrete piece of Article XXXI; rather, the allegations in the complaint challenge all provisions contained in the article. The majority’s reading of the complaint is simply wrong because this Court is charged with applying a liberal standard of review to the complaint and with viewing the pleadings and evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Pagan v. Fruchey, 492 F.3d 766, 770 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc)(discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56); Hildebrand v. Bd. of Trs. of Mich. State Univ., 607 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir. 1979) (“Under the liberal pleading allowances of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allegations made in pleadings must be broadly construed.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. The notice pleading requirement is satisfied because Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to put No. 06-3828 Midwest Media Property, et al. v. Symmes Twp., Ohio Page 15 Defendant on notice of the injury being alleged.3 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) (“The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.”); see also Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted Village Sch. Dist., 428 F.3d 223, 228 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that “under the notice pleading standard of the Federal Rules, courts are reluctant to dismiss colorable claims which have not had the benefit of factual discovery”) (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 48). In the absence of a heightened pleading requirement, there is no basis for finding that the allegations of Plaintiffs’ complaint fail to challenge the size and height limitations set forth in the Township’s sign regulations.