Opinion ID: 1713516
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Count II, Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability Was Properly Dismissed.

Text: Appellants allege in count II of the complaint that the McNeil Company breached an implied warranty of habitability. On appeal, appellants claim that the district court erred when it dismissed count II for failure to state a cause of action. We conclude the district court did not err in dismissing count II. It has been stated that the basic elements of the implied warranty of habitability are that it applies to purchasers of residences against builders and ensures that there are no defects in materials or workmanship that make a dwelling unfit for habitation. . . . The premise behind the warranty is that every contract to erect a structure contains an implied warranty that the structure shall be fit to live in. 3 C. Allen Foster et al., Construction and Design Law § 20.4a at 44 (1998). Relying primarily on language found in Lange Indus. v. Hallam Grain Co., 244 Neb. 465, 507 N.W.2d 465 (1993), and Henggeler v. Jindra, 191 Neb. 317, 214 N.W.2d 925 (1974), appellants assert that Nebraska has indicated its approval of a cause of action based on implied warranty of habitability. On appeal, appellants argue that we should extend such purported cause of action in favor of subsequent owners such as appellants. However, contrary to appellants' reading of Lange and Henggeler, Nebraska has not adopted a cause of action based on implied warranty of habitability. The cases cited by appellants involved issues pertaining to whether the structures had been constructed in a workmanlike manner, and the language on which appellants rely was merely incidental to the decisions therein. See, similarly, Eliker v. Chief Indus., 243 Neb. 275, 498 N.W.2d 564 (1993). We are aware that the implied warranty of habitability has been adopted by a great many states and extended to subsequent owners. E.g., Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill.2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324, 65 Ill.Dec. 411 (1982); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo.1979). We are also aware of authority to the contrary. E.g., Arvai v. Shaw, 289 S.C. 161, 345 S.E.2d 715 (1986). In a case describing the implied warranty of habitability, it has been observed that [h]abitability is synonymous with suitability for living purposes; the home must be occupiable. Aronsohn v. Mandara, 98 N.J. 92, 104, 484 A.2d 675, 681 (1984). In the instant case, there are numerous allegations describing defects in the house, but there are no allegations in the complaint which could fairly be taken to allege that the house is not fit for habitation. Given the allegations in the complaint and given the state of the law in Nebraska where we have not recognized an implied warranty of habitability in favor of original owners, we are not inclined to adopt such cause of action in the first instance in favor of subsequent purchasers. The district court did not err in dismissing count II alleged only against the McNeil Company for failure to state a cause of action.