Opinion ID: 747770
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendants' Contentions on Appeal Must Fail

Text: 30 In light of the foregoing discussion, it should come as no surprise that we are unwilling to overrule our own firmly established precedent and thrust ourselves into conflict with every other circuit that has considered this issue. Accordingly, we hold that the district court's instructions to the jury interpreting § 2423(b)'s purpose element properly reflect this circuit's law. At the most fundamental level, the defendants fail to convince us that Mortensen's use of the word dominant grafted a new requirement onto the Mann Act that an immoral purpose must be the dominant purpose of interstate travel. 10 Congress has not used the word dominant in either the Mann Act or § 2423(b), and we are not prepared to read such a requirement into the statutes. Assuming the existence of such a requirement and assuming that precedent was irrelevant, we might agree with Defendants that, because dominant means prevailing over all others, WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 374 (1990), it should follow that there can be only one dominant purpose of any endeavor. Courts, though, have consistently used the word dominant to mean merely significant or compelling or efficient; there has never been any implied requirement of preeminence of purpose. We are simply not willing to break ranks with our sister circuits on this matter for the sake of semantic purity. 31 We must also reject the defendants' contention that the Rule of Lenity counsels a different result. This rule of statutory construction applies only if there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of the Act. United States v. Neal, 46 F.3d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir.1995) (en banc) (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831, 94 S.Ct. 1262, 1271-72, 39 L.Ed.2d 782 (1974)). As mentioned above, the word dominant does not appear in sec.2423(b). The dicta of Mortensen remains nothing more than a judicial gloss upon the clear language of the statute. The concerns of fair notice and arbitrary enforcement that animate the Rule of Lenity are not implicated by allowing a conviction under § 2423(b) when criminal sexual activity with a minor is a purpose, though perhaps not the purpose, of interstate travel. 32 Accordingly, we affirm the defendants' convictions under § 2423(b). 33