Opinion ID: 179980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: penalty-phase severance claim

Text: Puiatti does not contend that joint penalty phases in capital cases are prohibited or are always per se unconstitutional. Rather, Puiatti argues that, under the particular circumstances of his capital case, the state trial court's denial of his severance motion violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment right to an individualized sentencing determination. [15] Although Puiatti's argument intertwines severance and individualized sentencing, we explain why these are separate and different concepts. We start with established federal principles about joinder and severance, next review Puiatti's constitutional right to an individualized sentencing determination, and then analyze Puiatti's claims about his joint penalty trial. Joinder and severance first. [16]
Joint trials play a vital role in the criminal justice system. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537, 113 S.Ct. 933, 937, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (quotation marks omitted); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1708, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). The general rule or preference is that defendants indicted together should be tried together. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 537-38, 113 S.Ct. at 937; United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1236 (11th Cir.2005). Joint trials generally serve the interests of justice by avoiding inconsistent verdicts and enabling more accurate assessment of relative culpabilityadvantages which sometimes operate to the defendant's benefit. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 210, 107 S.Ct. at 1708-09. The Supreme Court has admonished that [i]t would impair both the efficiency and the fairness of the criminal justice system to require ... that prosecutors bring separate proceedings, presenting the same evidence again and again, requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying, and randomly favoring the last-tried defendants who have the advantage of knowing the prosecution's case beforehand. Id. Joint trials have long been a common and preferred procedure in both federal and state courts. Although these Supreme Court cases involve the guilt or innocence issue, the same considerationsserving justice, avoiding inconsistent verdicts, enabling more accurate assessments of relative culpability, fairness, and efficiencythat militate in favor of joinder of co-defendants' trials in the guilt phase also favor joint penalty trials. See United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 892 (4th Cir.1996). Accordingly, co-defendants charged with capital murder have been jointly tried not only in Florida but also under federal statutes for both the guilt and penalty phases. See United States v. Bernard, 299 F.3d 467, 475 (5th Cir.2002); United States v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407 (5th Cir.1999); Tipton, 90 F.3d 861. [17] Nonetheless, trial courts have discretion to grant a severance if a defendant carries his burden to show both that (1) a joint trial would actually prejudice the defendant and (2) a severance is the proper remedy for the prejudice, rather than jury instructions or another remedy. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539-41, 113 S.Ct. at 938-39; United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1268-69 (11th Cir.2007); see also United States v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 1122 (11th Cir.2004) (noting that in Zafiro, the Supreme Court set down a two-step test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to a new trial due to a district court's refusal to sever). [18] As to the first Zafiro step, a defendant must carry the heavy burden of demonstrating the lack of a fair trial due to actual, compelling prejudice. United States v. Chavez, 584 F.3d 1354, 1360 (11th Cir.2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 436, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, 79 U.S.L.W. 3245, 2010 WL 3646192 (2010); see United States v. Gari, 572 F.3d 1352, 1365 (11th Cir.2009) (We will not reverse the denial of a severance motion absent a clear abuse of discretion resulting in compelling prejudice against which the district court could offer no protection. (quoting United States v. Walser, 3 F.3d 380, 385 (11th Cir.1993))), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1562, 176 L.Ed.2d 146 (2010); United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 989 (11th Cir.2001) (stating a defendant must discharge the `heavy burden' of demonstrating `compelling prejudice' from the denial of a motion to sever (quoting United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 650-51 (11th Cir.1984))). In Zafiro, the Supreme Court explained that [m]utually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se.  [19] Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538, 113 S.Ct. at 938; see Blankenship, 382 F.3d at 1122 (stating Zafiro specifically rejected the notion that defendants who have contradictory defenses are inherently prejudiced). And it is well settled that defendants are not entitled to severance merely because they may have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540, 113 S.Ct. at 938. As to the second Zafiro step, severance is not automatically required even if prejudice is shown. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539-40, 113 S.Ct. at 938. A court's limiting instruction to the jury will often cure any prejudice resulting from a joint trial. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539, 113 S.Ct. at 938. Zafiro teaches that a district court should grant severance only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Id. Under Zafiro, there are only two circumstances in which severance is mandatory: where there is a serious risk that a joint trial (1) would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or (2) would prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. United States v. Thompson, 422 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir.2005) (quoting Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539, 113 S.Ct. at 938); Browne, 505 F.3d at 1269; Blankenship, 382 F.3d at 1122-23. [20] Aside from the two categories of defendants specified by the Supreme Court, most other defendants prejudiced by a joint trial are entitled only to curative instructions. Blankenship, 382 F.3d at 1123 (discussing the two-step test in Zafiro ). The decision whether to grant a severance lies within the trial court's sound or substantial discretion. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538-39, 113 S.Ct. at 938; Chavez, 584 F.3d at 1360 (We will not reverse the denial of a severance motion in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.); United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1352 (11th Cir.2005) (We will not reverse the denial of a severance motion absent a clear abuse of discretion resulting in compelling prejudice against which the district court could offer no protection. (quoting Walser, 3 F.3d at 385)). Appellate courts are generally reluctant to second-guess a trial court's decision on severance. United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1236 (11th Cir.2005); Ramirez, 426 F.3d at 1352; United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d at 989. Before analyzing Puiatti's claims about his joint trial, we review the Supreme Court decisions establishing his constitutional right to an individualized sentencing determination because Puiatti tries to link severance with that right.
We start with Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), where the Supreme Court vacated a death sentence because the Ohio statute narrowly limited the type of mitigating factors the sentencer could consider. [21] A Supreme Court plurality discussed the concept of individualized sentencing, stressing [t]he need for treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual. Id. at 602, 605, 98 S.Ct. at 2963, 2965. The Supreme Court plurality noted the historical repudiation of mandatory death sentences for certain crimes, and how the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties. Id. at 604-05, 98 S.Ct. at 2964-65. The Supreme Court plurality concluded that in capital cases, the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death. Id. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion)) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court plurality conclude[d] that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Id. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964-65 (emphasis omitted). To meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors. Id. at 608, 98 S.Ct. at 2967. The Supreme Court held the Ohio statute invalid because it permitted consideration of only three mitigating factors. [22] Id. A few years later, a Supreme Court majority followed Lockett in Eddings v. Oklahoma, where a capital defendant presented mitigating evidence about his troubled childhood and emotional disorders, but the Oklahoma courts ruled that the sentencer could not consider that mitigating evidence. 455 U.S. 104, 105-10, 102 S.Ct. 869, 872-74, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). [23] The Oklahoma statute provided that evidence may be presented [in sentencing] as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in this act. Id. at 106, 102 S.Ct. at 872. The sentencing judge, however, stated he could not consider the fact of this young man's violent background. Id. at 109, 102 S.Ct. at 873. The Oklahoma appellate court affirmed, effectively excluding family history as a factor excusing or mitigating the capital defendant's behavior. See id. at 109-10, 102 S.Ct. at 874 (citing Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159, 1170 (Okla.Crim.App.1980)). The Supreme Court in Eddings found that the limitations placed by these [Oklahoma] courts upon the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule in Lockett. Id. at 113, 102 S.Ct. at 876. The Eddings Court described Lockett as the product of considerable history reflecting the law's effort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the uniqueness of the individual. Id. at 110, 102 S.Ct. at 874 (emphasis added). The Eddings Court reasoned that [j]ust as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence. Id. at 113-14, 102 S.Ct. at 876-77. Further, the sentencer may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence, but may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration. Id. at 114-15, 102 S.Ct. at 877. Next came the capital sentencing case of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), overruled on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), where the Supreme Court vacated Penry's death sentence, stating, To provide the individualized sentencing determination required by the Eighth Amendment,... the sentencer must be allowed to consider mitigating evidence. 492 U.S. at 316, 109 S.Ct. at 2945. Texas's statute directed that the jury would decide Penry's sentence by answering three questions, called special issues. [24] The Supreme Court previously had upheld that statute, concluding that the special issues would be interpreted broadly enough to permit the sentencer to consider all of the relevant mitigating evidence a defendant might present in imposing sentence. Id. at 315, 109 S.Ct. at 2945. Although Penry presented mitigating evidence of mental retardation, organic brain damage, and a childhood of deprivation and physical abuse, the jury was given only the three questions and was never instructed that it could consider and give effect to Penry's mitigating evidence in imposing sentence. [25] Id. at 320, 322, 109 S.Ct. at 2947-48. The Penry Court stressed that [u]nderlying Lockett and Eddings is the principle that punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant. Id. at 319, 109 S.Ct. at 2947. In Lockett, Eddings, and Penry, the constitutional defect lay in the fact that relevant mitigating evidence was placed beyond the effective reach of the sentencer. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 366, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 2668, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993) (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 475, 113 S.Ct. 892, 902, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993)). Recently, the Supreme Court again examined a Texas death penalty statute in Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 127 S.Ct. 1654, 167 L.Ed.2d 585 (2007). [26] The trial court instructed the jury to decide only two special issues: (1) whether the defendant's conduct that caused the victim's death was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result; and (2) whether there was a probability that the defendant ... would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Id. at 238, 127 S.Ct. at 1660. The Texas statute mandated a death sentence if the jury answered yes to both special issues. [27] Id. at 239, 127 S.Ct. at 1660. Abdul-Kabir presented mitigating evidence from his mother, aunt, and mental health experts. Id. at 239-40, 127 S.Ct. at 1660-61. The trial court refused Abdul-Kabir's requested jury instructions that would have authorized a negative answer to either of the special issues based on mitigation evidence. Id. at 242, 127 S.Ct. at 1662. The jury answered yes to both special issues, and Abdul-Kabir was sentenced to death. Id. The Supreme Court observed that the sentencing process is fatally flawed when the jury is not permitted to give meaningful effect or a `reasoned moral response' to a defendant's mitigating evidencebecause it is forbidden from doing so by statute or a judicial interpretation of a statute. Id. at 264, 127 S.Ct. at 1675. Abdul-Kabir's mitigating evidence had relevance to his moral culpability beyond the scope of the two special questions in the Texas statute, and the denial of his requested instructions provided the jury with no vehicle for expressing its `reasoned moral response' to that evidence. Id. at 252-53, 256-57, 127 S.Ct. at 1668, 1670 (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 185, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2333, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). [S]entencing juries must be able to give meaningful consideration and effect to all mitigating evidence that might provide a basis for refusing to impose the death penalty on a particular individual. Id. at 246, 127 S.Ct. at 1664. In summary, Lockett and its progeny establish that Puiatti has a constitutional right under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments not only (1) to present any relevant mitigating evidence as to his unique, individual background, character, and record and the circumstances of his crime, but also (2) to have the sentencing jury or judge give meaningful consideration and effect to his mitigation evidence without such restrictions by state statute, judicial interpretation, or jury instructions. [28] Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 264-65, 127 S.Ct. at 1675; Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112-15, 102 S.Ct. at 875-77; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05, 98 S.Ct. at 2964-65. The core substantive ingredient in the constitutional right to an individualized sentencing is mitigation evidence relevant to the capital defendant as an individual or unique person (whether his background, character, mental health record, or circumstances of his crime), which a jury may consider to assess personal moral culpability and to determine an individualized sentence. None of these Supreme Court cases mentions joinder or severance. The constitutional right involved is not based on, or tied to, a separate trial. Rather, the constitutional right stems from the need for a presentation of, and consideration of, mitigation evidence relevant to the defendant as a unique individual. With this background, we turn to Puiatti's claims about his joint trial.
As noted earlier, Puiatti claims that the trial court's denial of his severance motion (and resulting joint trial) violated his constitutional right to an individualized sentencing determination. For numerous reasons, Puiatti's claim wholly fails. First, Puiatti was not prevented from presenting any mitigating evidence. Puiatti has not proffered a single piece of evidence he was unable to put before the jury or judge for consideration by virtue of the joint penalty phase. Second, no state statute nor judicial interpretation nor jury instruction restricted the jury or judge from considering, or acting upon, Puiatti's mitigation evidence. Rather, the Florida trial court appropriately instructed the jury during the penalty phase to carefully weigh and consider all of the evidence presented, stating, Before you ballot you should carefully weigh, sift and consider the evidence, and all of it, realizing that human life is at stake, and you should bring to bear your best judgment in reaching your advisory sentence. The state trial court also instructed the jury about the potential sentences for Glock and Puiatti separately and individually. [29] Jurors routinely serve as impartial factfinders in cases that involve sensitive, even life-and-death matters and [i]n those cases, as in all cases, juries are presumed to follow the court's instructions. Hammond v. Hall, 586 F.3d 1289, 1334 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Hensley, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2139, 2141, 173 L.Ed.2d 1184 (2009)). Courts presume that the jury heard, understood, and followed the court's instructions. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208-11, 107 S.Ct. at 1708-09. Third, although Puiatti attempts to connect and intertwine severance with his constitutional right to an individualized sentencing determination, we can locate, and Puiatti has cited, no Supreme Court decision doing so. Lockett and its progeny do not address joint penalty phases or say that the presence of a co-defendant at a capital defendant's penalty phase trial has any Eighth Amendment implications whatsoever. None of the Lockett line of cases relates to severance or helps Puiatti's claim at all. Puiatti, like the district court, cites no precedent that suggests a joint penalty trial is improper for co-defendants who were properly joined in the guilt phase. The Supreme Court has never intimated, much less held, that the special concerns in capital cases require, or even suggest, that severance is necessary. Fourth, while we consider Puiatti's § 2254 appeal separately from Glock's, this Court already has rejected Glock's claim that a joint trial deprived him of an individualized sentencing determination. See Glock V, 84 F.3d at 385-86 (rejecting as non-meritorious Glock's claim that his sentence should be set aside because ... the trial court refused to sever his sentencing proceeding from his co-defendant's, thereby depriving him of individualized sentencing). For all four reasons, Puiatti has not shown the state trial court's severance denial deprived Puiatti of his constitutional right to an individualized sentencing determination. We could stop here but for the fact that Puiatti, as a pre-AEDPA petitioner, also tries to advance a new constitutional theory. [30] Even though a separate penalty trial is not part of his constitutional right to an individualized sentencing determination, Puiatti argues that the severance denial and joint penalty phase, under the facts of his case, prejudiced him to the point of effectively denying his constitutional right to an individualized sentencing decision or at least a fair hearing. A threshold problem for Puiatti is that he has not shown any severance error at all, much less severance error rising to the level of a constitutional violation. For example, Puiatti has not satisfied the prejudice requirement at Zafiro 's first step for analyzing severance claims. Puiatti claims he was prejudiced because his mitigation theorysubstantial domination by Glockwas undermined by Glock's mitigation defense that Glock was a follower, too. However, Glock's expert Dr. Mussenden, although testifying Glock was a follower, also testified that Glock's role in Ritchie's murder was an expression of [Glock]'s anger and resentment towards women and all of the failure and rejection he had experienced all his life. [31] In closing, Glock's counsel never argued that Glock was under the substantial domination of Puiatti at the time of the crime and expressly disclaimed any argument to that effect. If anything, Glock and Puiatti presented similar mitigation theoriescounsel for Puiatti and Glock both argued their clients were insecure, easily led men who were under stress because of personality problems, unfortunate circumstances, and poor relationships with their families, but who nevertheless would not have committed the murder but for the presence and association of the other. Simply put, the defendants did not present antagonistic mitigation defenses. In any event, the Supreme Court has held expressly that [m]utually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538, 113 S.Ct. at 938. The Supreme Court has held that co-defendants do not suffer prejudice simply because one co-defendant's defense directly inculpates another, or it is logically impossible for a jury to believe both co-defendants' defenses. Blankenship, 382 F.3d at 1125 (discussing Zafiro ). This also underscores the vital role of a joint trial in preventing inconsistent verdicts. Puiatti also complains that Glock's counsel (as well as the State) got to cross-examine Puiatti's mental health experts, Drs. DelBeato and Meadows. This also did not prejudice Puiatti. Glock's counsel's questioning of DelBeato and Meadows was brief, with only a few questions each. Glock's counsel had DelBeato and Meadows admit that neither expert had examined Glock and that whether Puiatti was influenced by Glock depended on Glock's psyche as well as Puiatti's. [32] Glock's counsel's cross-examination did not cause the introduction of irrelevant or incompetent evidence. [A] fair trial does not include the right to exclude relevant and competent evidence. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540, 113 S.Ct. at 938. Puiatti also argues that the fact that Glock testified, and Puiatti did not, prejudiced him. Puiatti points to no case in which the Supreme Court or this Court has held that a non-testifying defendant is prejudiced by the mere fact that one of his co-defendants chooses to testify. In fact, we have concluded that favorable observation of the willingness of one of several co-defendants to testify does not constitute an impermissible comment on the failure of the other co-defendants to testify. United States v. O'Neill, 767 F.2d 780, 786 (11th Cir.1985) (quoting United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1363 (11th Cir.1983)). Moreover, Puiatti's argument ignores that Glock testified briefly and only about the remorse he felt for Ritchie's murder. Puiatti used multiple penalty-phase witnesses to testify that he too was remorseful. Puiatti was able to, and did, impart similar testimony to the jury without testifying. [33] If anything, the fact that Glock testified helped Puiatti because Glock did not deny the joint confession's statements that Glock suggested the idea of killing Ritchie and Glock fired the last two shots that killed her. Puiatti also argues the fact that Glock argued the mitigating factor of no significant prior criminal history applied to him highlighted Puiatti's lack of ability to argue this factor for himself. However, Puiatti's own penalty-phase witnesses testified that Puiatti was involved in a burglary and was on probation at the time of Ritchie's murder. Even in a separate penalty trial, the jury would know Puiatti already had a criminal history. [34] There was no vast disparity in either the quality or quantity of mitigation evidence presented by Puiatti and Glock. The bottom line is Puiatti's prejudice claim essentially rests upon an implicit contention that a separate penalty trial is required whenever a co-defendant's presence might reduce a defendant's chance to avoid a death sentence. We have found nothing in severance law or Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to support this position. See Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540, 113 S.Ct. at 938 (stating that it is well settled that defendants are not entitled to severance merely because they may have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials). Puiatti has failed to show any specific way that he was prejudiced by being tried jointly with Glock at the penalty phase. Indeed, the specific facts of this case made a joint penalty phase particularly appropriate. Puiatti and Glock acted together in planning and effecting the abduction, robbery, and murder of Ritchie. Both Puiatti and Glock fired shots at Ritchie. It was Puiatti who was the first to fire shots at and strike the helpless victim from close range. Puiatti and Glock issued a joint interlocking confession that agreed on how many shots were fired, who fired each of them, and when. Puiatti and Glock kept driving by and shooting Ritchie until they were sure she would die. As the state trial court aptly noted, this case is a classic example of why joint defendants ought to be [tried] together in order to get justice. In fact, Puiatti's joint trial with Glock avoided the inequity of inconsistent verdicts and one capital defendant going second with the benefits of previewing the State's evidence and arguments. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 210, 107 S.Ct. at 1708-09 (stating, Joint trials generally serve the interests of justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts and by not randomly favoring the last-tried defendants who have the advantage of knowing the prosecution's case beforehand). The Lockett-Eddings-Penry-Abdul-Kabir principle that the sentencer must be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence, see Eddings, 455 U.S. at 117, 102 S.Ct. at 878, is quite compatible with a joint trial. To the extent any arguable tension may exist between joint trials and individualized sentencing, it did not occur here. See Bernard, 299 F.3d at 475 (noting potential tension between joinder and a defendant's right to an individualized capital sentencing decision, but affirming defendant's death sentence in a joint trial). If any two capital co-defendants could be properly joined in a penalty phase, it was Puiatti and Glock. Puiatti has not shown that his severance denial violated any constitutional right.