Opinion ID: 2467177
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Separate accounts

Text: In considering a motion for summary judgment, a judge may consider pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Ark.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The only basis for Edward H. Peevy's motion for summary judgment was his contention that the indebtedness to Hallmark he had guaranteed was secured by collateral which had been sold without notice to him, thus barring Hallmark from obtaining a deficiency judgment. There is no doubt he had guaranteed the entire indebtedness of Garry Peevy to Hallmark; however, there is doubt as to the extent to which that indebtedness was secured by the collateral which was sold without notice to him. While the complaint filed by Hallmark stated only that Edward H. Peevy was liable under the guaranty agreement for $38,899.81 and $812.61, without dividing the larger figure into fixture and open account portions, the documents attached to the complaint and referred to in it clearly showed the two balances comprising the larger figure and referred to them as separate accounts. The factual underpinning for Edward H. Peevy's motion was Hallmark's response to this question: Did the Plaintiff [Hallmark] have any collateral pledged on the fixture account ? (Emphasis supplied.) The response was: Peevy Enterprises granted Hallmark a security interest in trade fixtures, card racks, related equipment and proceeds therefrom pursuant to a Security Agreement dated September 3, 1981. Hallmark thus has not admitted that there was collateral pledged with respect to anything other than the fixture account. The security agreement to which Hallmark's answer to the interrogatory referred is not in the record before us. We have no idea whether the collateral was pledged only on the Open Fixture Balance portion of the indebtedness or secured all indebtedness of Garry Peevy to Hallmark. At least a partial summary judgment was appropriate in this case. See Ark.R. Civ.P. 56(d). However, the answer to the interrogatory on which Edward H. Peevy based his motion for summary judgment was a sufficient basis only with respect to establishing that Hallmark was not entitled to judgment with respect to the so-called fixture account. It remains to be seen upon remand whether the security agreement extended beyond that account by pledging the collateral for all indebtedness of Garry Peevy to Hallmark.