Opinion ID: 2632630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District court denial of summary judgment

Text: UNLV contends the district court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment to dismiss the entire action. This court reviews summary judgment orders de novo. [2] Summary judgment is only appropriate when, after a review of the record in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there remain no issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [3] In determining whether summary judgment is proper, the nonmoving party is entitled to have the evidence and all reasonable inferences accepted as true. [4] In this appeal, we must determine whether the trial court erred when it denied UNLV's motion for summary judgment, holding that revocation of tenure is a ministerial act and that judicial review was not warranted.
In University of Nevada, Reno v. Stacey , this court held that a state university's decision to grant or deny tenure to a nontenured professor is a discretionary act, consequently the university is immune from civil liability. [5] This court was called upon to determine whether the district court erred in denying UNR's motion for summary judgment based upon the employment contract that the parties had executed. UNR contended that summary judgment was required since its decision to deny tenure was discretionary under the employment contract. Stacey contended that UNR was contractually obligated to grant him tenure because he had obtained excellent evaluations over the years. [6] We agreed with UNR and held that because the contract was unambiguous, its plain meaning controlled our analysis. [7] Numerous contractual provisions negated any theory that tenure was automatic. Instead, the contract provided that tenure was a privilege and that making a decision of such import involved consideration of numerous criteria. The contractual provisions clearly indicated the grant of tenure required the exercise of discretion and subjective decision making. [8] Furthermore, although the contract provisions controlled our analysis, we agreed with UNR's contention that it was immune from suit because its actions were discretionary. [9] NRS 41.032(2) provides qualified immunity to state agencies in the performance of discretionary acts. A discretionary act requires personal deliberation and judgment. [10] But when an act is ministerial or operational, the qualified immunity for discretionary acts does not apply. [11] In Stacey, we concluded that a university's decision to grant tenure is discretionary and that therefore, the university is statutorily immune from liability. [12] We are now called upon to determine whether UNLV may be held civilly liable for breach of contract in terminating a tenured faculty member. We conclude, based upon the specific facts presented, that UNLV may be sued for breach of contract. Nothing in Stacey indicates a university is immune from civil liability for breach of contract. Stacey simply held that, as a matter of law, the contract at issue indicated that granting tenure was a discretionary decision. [13] Here, UNLV entered into a contract with Sutton pursuant to a court order and reinstated his employment as a tenured professor, until, according to the specific terms of the contract, such time as his tenure is revoked by hearing held pursuant to the UCCSN code. We conclude that UNLV's president erroneously concluded that UNLV could proceed anew on the original 1992 complaint. First, the judgment in Sutton I reinstated Sutton's tenured employment by an integrated agreement that did not mention the prior evaluations. Second, the code prohibits the waiver of the requirement that hearings on tenure be conducted within six months of the filing of an administrative termination complaint. Third, the agreement incorporated the university code. Fourth, while the stipulated judgment allowed UNLV to initiate new proceedings at its discretion, the university erroneously pressed forward on the allegations of the 1992 complaint. Thus, UNLV breached the Sutton I settlement when it proceeded on the original 1992 complaint in 1999. Because the hearing violated the specific terms of the contract, we are not required to evaluate UNLV's employment decision as discretionary or ministerial and whether immunity attaches. The jury was required to make a factual determination as to whether the hearing was even appropriate based upon the contract's terms. Therefore, the district court properly allowed the breach-of-contract claims to proceed to trial.
UNLV contends alternatively that Sutton was limited in the district court to judicial review of UNLV's administrative procedure's conclusions only, and that the trial court erred by allowing Sutton to proceed to trial on his breach-of-contract claims. We disagree. We are mindful of the precedent that decisions made at the university level are generally limited to judicial review. [14] In Stacey, we stated: [W]e are not unaware of the long-standing precedent recognizing that faculty appointment at the university level is an area poorly suited for judicial supervision, and thus one where judicial restraint must be exercised. See Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.1980); Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir.1974). Indeed, other jurisdictions have held that a university's decision to grant tenure is a discretionary exercise of judgment that should not be actionable unless arbitrary or unconstitutional. See Harrison v. Goldstein, 204 A.D.2d 451, 611 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y.App.Div.1994); Coe v. Board of Regents, 140 Wis.2d 261, 409 N.W.2d 166 (Ct.App.1987); Goodisman v. Lytle, 724 F.2d 818 (9th Cir.1984). [15] We have further emphasized the importance of academic freedom in our society by reaffirming our commitment to protect a university's inherent right to govern itself within constitutional limitations. [16] In the present case, however, Sutton did not simply challenge UNLV's hearing process or the results of that process. His complaint alleged that, based on his 1999 employment contract, UNLV had no authority to hold the hearing. The 1999 contract contained an integration clause [17] and further included the provisions of the UCCSN code, which also contain an integration clause. [18] The UCCSN code requires UNLV to hold a hearing and make a recommendation to the university president within six months of the administrative complaint's filing. The code does not allow the parties to waive the six-month requirement. Here, UNLV held the hearing almost seven years after the unsatisfactory evaluations in 1990 and 1991, and the 1999 hearing related only to Sutton's conduct and evaluations in 1990 and 1991. If the contract did not allow the hearing, then UNLV breached the contract by proceeding with the hearing, and the result of the hearing and any decision rendered is of no effect. Thus, the question before the district court was not judicial review of a decision terminating a tenured faculty member's employment, but whether a court-ordered contract allowed UNLV to proceed with the hearing. If the district court were limited to judicial review of UNLV's administrative decision in this case, then one party to the contract  UNLV  would be in a position to determine whether the contract had been breached. Factual disputes regarding breach of contract are questions for a jury to decide. After such questions are first decided by the jury, judicial review of UNLV's decision would then be appropriate but only if UNLV did not violate the terms of the 1999 contract by proceeding with the code hearing. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err by allowing the breach-of-contract claims to proceed to trial.