Opinion ID: 1268681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Ordinance Was Properly Enacted

Text: The trial court ruled that the Ordinance was properly enacted pursuant to the police powers granted to the County by S.C.Code Ann. § 4-9-25 (Supp.2001). [5] Further, the trial court found that the Ordinance is not part of the Zoning Ordinance and did not have to be enacted pursuant to the South Carolina Local Government Comprehensive Planning Enabling Act of 1994, S.C.Code Ann. § 6-29-310 et seq. (Supp.2001) (Comprehensive Planning Act). Platinum Plus and Heartbreakers argue that the trial court erred because the Ordinance is clearly a zoning ordinance. Furthermore, they argue that if the Ordinance is not a zoning ordinance, it should be struck down as an illegal land use control act because the County cannot enact such ordinances unless it complies with the Comprehensive Planning Act. We disagree. The trial court correctly concluded that the Ordinance was not part of the County's Zoning Ordinance. This does not mean, however, that the Ordinance itself could not fairly be characterized, in general terms, as a zoning ordinance. [6] The real issue is whether this type of ordinance must be adopted pursuant to the Comprehensive Planning Act. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that this type of ordinance may be adopted pursuant to the County's general police powers and that the Comprehensive Planning Act does not, in effect, preempt this particular type of local legislation. In order to pre-empt an entire field, an act must make manifest a legislative intent that no other enactment may touch upon the subject in any way. Bugsy's, Inc. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 340 S.C. 87, 94, 530 S.E.2d 890, 893 (2000); accord Town of Hilton Head Island v. Fine Liquors, Ltd., 302 S.C. 550, 397 S.E.2d 662 (1990) (same). In Fine Liquors, we held that while the Legislature gave the Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the sale of beer, wine, and alcohol, it had not preempted the field to preclude Hilton Head from passing a zoning ordinance which prohibited internally illuminated red dot signs. Similarly, in Bugsy's, we held that the Legislature's enactment of a comprehensive regulatory scheme for video poker did not preempt a municipality from enacting a zoning ordinance that also regulated video poker. We commented as follows in Bugsy's: [W]hile the General Assembly has enacted a comprehensive scheme regulating many aspects of video poker machines, the scheme does not manifest an intent to prohibit any other enactment from touching on video poker machines. State regulation of video poker machines does not preclude a municipality from passing a zoning ordinance which impacts businesses which have video game poker... Bugsy's, 340 S.C. at 94, 530 S.E.2d at 893. In the instant case, while the Comprehensive Planning Act governs zoning, it simply does not evince a legislative intent to completely prohibit any other local enactments from touching upon zoning or land use. See id. That fact, in conjunction with the liberal reading we are required to give section 4-9-25, compels us to conclude that this type of ordinance may be properly enacted pursuant to the County's police powers. We note that North Carolina has addressed this issue under similar circumstances and arrived at the same conclusion. In Onslow County v. Moore, 129 N.C.App. 376, 499 S.E.2d 780, review denied, 525 S.E.2d 453 (N.C.1998), the appellants argued that a county ordinance regulating the location of sexually oriented businesses was a zoning ordinance, and as such is invalid since it was not adopted pursuant to a comprehensive zoning plan for the County. Id. at 784. The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that `[c]ounties may enact ordinances regulating land use in two fashions: one, pursuant to a comprehensive zoning plan, ... and two, pursuant to their police powers ...' Id. at 785 (quoting Maynor v. Onslow County, 127 N.C.App. 102, 488 S.E.2d 289, appeal dismissed, 347 N.C. 268, 493 S.E.2d 458, cert. denied, 347 N.C. 400, 496 S.E.2d 385 (N.C.1997)) (internal citations omitted). The trial court relied on both Maynor v. Onslow County and Onslow County v. Moore and we find that reliance appropriate. Furthermore, we note the Comprehensive Planning Act does not require that counties zone their entire area. S.C.Code Ann. § 6-29-330 (Supp.2001) (A county may exercise the powers granted under the provisions of this chapter in the total unincorporated area or specific parts of the unincorporated area.) (emphasis added). Thus, the Act envisions that a county may, like the County in the instant case, have both zoned and unzoned areas. If we accepted Platinum Plus and Heartbreakers' contention that any land use regulation not enacted pursuant to the Comprehensive Planning Act is unlawful, the effect would be to disallow a county from regulating its unzoned land in any way. We find the Legislature clearly could not have intended that result. Instead, it is logical that the County should be able to enact, pursuant to its police powers, one ordinance to regulate sexually oriented businesses and have the ordinance apply to both zoned and unzoned areas. Platinum Plus and Heartbreakers also contend that the detailed specifications set out in the Comprehensive Planning Act, see §§ 6-29-710 through -960, indicate the only way a County can regulate land use is through a comprehensive plan; they cite I`On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 526 S.E.2d 716 (2000), in support of their argument. The I`On Court was faced with the issue of whether zoning by initiative and referendum is allowed in South Carolina. The Court concluded that the detailed nature of zoning acts like the Comprehensive Planning Act indicates a legislative intent that zoning matters must be decided only in the manner specified in those acts. Id. at 415, 526 S.E.2d at 721. I`On held that by passing the Comprehensive Planning Act, the Legislature did not intend to allow voters to enact more complex zoning measures by initiative and referendum. Significantly, the Court stated the following: [T]he comprehensive and detailed nature of [the Comprehensive Planning Act's] provisions ... reveals our Legislature's intent that zoning decisions should be made by a cross-section of unbiased officials after careful deliberation. Whether the zoning decisions involve the development of an overall zoning system or master plan, or the application of established rules in a particular case, [the Comprehensive Planning Act] is designed to allow ample planning and ensure due process for all interested parties. Id. at 416, 526 S.E.2d at 721 (emphasis added). I`On does not stand for the proposition that any ordinance affecting land use must be part of the comprehensive plan and enacted pursuant to the Comprehensive Planning Act. Instead, I`On simply held that land use regulation cannot be effected via the referendum and initiative process. Thus, I`On is not dispositive. To accept Platinum Plus and Heartbreakers' expansive reading of I`On would necessarily eviscerate a County's ability to exercise its police power if that exercise in any way impacted land use. Moreover, we note that in the instant case, the Ordinance was passed by a cross-section of unbiased officials after careful deliberation, with the involvement of the County Planning Commission, and therefore does not run afoul of the dangers with which I`On was concerned. See id. at 416-17, 526 S.E.2d at 721 (indicating that an initiative and referendum process could result in arbitrary decisions and patchwork zoning with little rhyme or reason). In sum, the Comprehensive Planning Act does not pre-empt passage of the Ordinance outside of the County's Zoning Ordinance. See Bugsy's, supra ; Fine Liquors, supra . Therefore, we affirm the trial court's holding that the County permissibly enacted the Ordinance pursuant to its police powers. [7] See § 4-9-25; Onslow County v. Moore, supra ; Maynor v. Onslow County, supra .