Opinion ID: 1043932
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: J. 39, 39 (Jan. 1995).

Text: Rather than searching for hidden questions, appellate courts prefer to know immediately what questions they are supposed to answer. Bryan A. Garner, Garner on 2 “Scope of review” defines the issues that may be reviewed by an appellate court when an order or judgment has been properly appealed. See Holt v. Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 38 A.3d 711, 738 (Pa. 2012); Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 18 Seattle U. L. Rev. 11, 13 (1994). It “refers to the matters (or ‘what’) the appellate court is permitted to examine.” Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 997 A.2d 1152, 1160 n.11 (Pa. 2010). In contrast, the related, yet distinct, concept of “standard of review” reflects the relationship and the allocation of power between reviewing courts and lower tribunals. It defines how a reviewing court “must look at” the lower tribunal’s decision. Jeffrey P. Bauman, Standards of Review and Scopes of Review in Pennsylvania – Primer and Proposal, 39 Duq. L. Rev. 513, 515 (2001). The standard of review “defines the level of examination the court may apply, including the degree of deference it will accord to the [lower] court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.” 19 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 206.1 (3d ed. 2009); see also Booth v. State, 251 P.3d 369, 372 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011); Fields v. Saunders, 2012 OK 17, ¶ 6 n.5, 278 P.3d 577, 580 n.5; Turner v. Jackson, 417 S.E.2d 881, 887 n.5 (Va. Ct. App. 1992); Peplinski v. Fobe’s Roofing, Inc., 531 N.W.2d 597, 599 n.1 (Wis. 1995); Robert J. Martineau, Appellate Practice and Procedure 779 (2d ed. 1987) (“Martineau”). 3 Issues not raised in the trial court or in the intermediate appellate courts may be deemed waived when presented to this Court. Brown v. Roland, 357 S.W.3d 614, 620 (Tenn. 2012); see also In re Adoption of E.N.R., 42 S.W.3d 26, 32 (Tenn. 2001); Alexander v. Armentrout, 24 S.W.3d 267, 273 (Tenn. 2000). -7- Language and Writing 115 (2009); Robert L. Stern, Appellate Practice in the United States § 10.9, at 263 (2d ed. 1989). Accordingly, “[a]n effectively crafted issue statement will define the question to be considered and begin disposing the court to decide in the client’s favor.” Judith D. Fischer, Got Issues? An Empirical Study About Framing Them, 6 J. Ass’n Legal Writing Directors 1, 25 (2009); see also State v. Williams, 914 S.W.2d 940, 948 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (stating that “[e]ach issue should . . . relate the conclusion that the party wants the appellate court to reach”); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Lecture on Appellate Advocacy, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 627, 630 (1962) (stating that “the first thing that comes up is the issue and the first art is the framing of the issue so that if your framing is accepted the case comes out your way”). Appellate review is generally limited to the issues that have been presented for review. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b); State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tenn. 2007). Accordingly, the Advisory Commission on the Rules of Practice and Procedure has emphasized that briefs should “be oriented toward a statement of the issues presented in a case and the arguments in support thereof.” Tenn. R. App. P. 27, advisory comm’n cmt. Appellants and parties seeking relief under Tenn. R. App. P. 11 must include in their application for permission to appeal4 and in their brief5 a statement of the issues they desire to present to the court and an argument with respect to each of the issues presented.6 The issues should be framed as specifically as the nature of the error will permit in order to avoid any potential risk of waiver. Fahey v. Eldridge, 46 S.W.3d 138, 143-44 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Williams, 914 S.W.3d at 948. Appellees who have not filed a notice of appeal and parties who have not filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application of their own have three options with regard to framing the issues on appeal. First, they may simply accept the issues as framed by the appellant.7 Second, they may reframe the issues presented by the appellant if they find the appellant’s formulation of the issues unsatisfactory.8 Third, they may present additional issues of their own seeking 4 Tenn. R. App. P. 11(b) requires that an application for permission to appeal contain a statement of “the questions presented for review and, for each question presented, a concise statement of the applicable standard of review . . . .” 5 Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(4); see also Bunch v. Bunch, 281 S.W.3d 406, 410 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). 6 Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7)(A). 7 Tenn. R. App. P. 27(b). 8 Tenn. R. App. P. 27(b). -8- relief on grounds different than the grounds relied on by the appellant or the party filing the Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application.9 Parties who have not filed their own application for permission to appeal may present issues other than those presented by the appellant or party seeking Tenn. R. App. P. 11 relief.10 To do so, however, Tenn. R. App. P. 27(b) requires a party to include in its brief “the issues and arguments involved in [its] request for relief as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant [or party seeking Tenn. R. App. P. 11 relief].” See also Eller Bros., Inc. v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Nashville, 623 S.W.2d 624, 625 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 100 (Tenn. 1999). An issue may be deemed waived, even when it has been specifically raised as an issue, when the brief fails to include an argument satisfying the requirements of Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7). See Baugh v. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372, 381 (Tenn. 2011); Sneed v. Board of Prof’l Responsibility, 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010). By the same token, an issue may be deemed waived when it is argued in the brief but is not designated as an issue in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(4). See ABN AMRO Mortg. Grp., Inc. v. Southern Sec. Fed. Credit Union, 372 S.W.3d 121, 132, (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011); Childress v. Union Realty Co., 97 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). B. Mr. Craig has properly raised and presented two issues in this case. The first issue is whether Ms. Hodge’s representations regarding the identity of her son’s biological father may support a claim for common-law fraud, intentional misrepresentation, or negligent misrepresentation. In the context of this issue, Mr. Craig asserts that we should follow the lead of other state courts that have recognized a claim for “paternity fraud.” The second issue is whether the trial court’s damage award derived from Mr. Craig’s post-divorce payments of child support, medical expenses, and medical insurance premiums is an impermissible retroactive modification of a child support order. 9 Tenn. R. App. P. 27(b). 10 The Advisory Commission on the Rules of Practice and Procedure has pointed out that Tenn. R. App. P. 13(a) “permits the appellee to raise issues allegedly decided erroneously by the intermediate appellate court.” Tenn. R. App. P. 11, 1999 advisory comm’n cmt. The Commission has also pointed out that Tenn. R. App. P. 13(a) “rejects use of the notice of appeal as a review-limiting device” and, therefore, that “[a] separate application for permission to appeal is not necessary to bring up a question of law . . . upon Supreme Court review of the final decision of an intermediate appellate court.” Tenn. R. App. P. 13(a), advisory comm’n cmt. -9- The statement of the issues in Ms. Hodge’s brief required by Tenn. R. App. P. 27(b) contains only two issues. The first issue, one also raised by Mr. Craig, is whether an award of damages based on post-divorce payments of child support, medical expenses, and medical insurance premiums is a retroactive modification of a child support order. The second issue is whether damages for emotional distress and attorney’s fees may be awarded incident to a claim that a child’s mother negligently, intentionally, or fraudulently misrepresented the parentage of a child to her former spouse. These two issues, however, are not the only issues contained in Ms. Hodge’s brief. In the argument section of her brief, which, with the exception of several non-substantive revisions, appears to be little more than a repetition of the arguments in the brief and supplemental brief she filed with the Court of Appeals, Ms. Hodge raises at least three more issues. First, she insists that Mr. Craig cannot recover for fraud because he did not include a claim for fraud in his “counter petition.” Second, she urges this Court “not to establish new law” permitting the recovery of damages for misrepresentations regarding paternity because doing so would not be in a child’s best interests. Third, she asserts that the “totality of the evidence” does not support a claim of misrepresentation. Based on the statements of the issues contained in the briefs filed by Mr. Craig and Ms. Hodge, the parties have properly presented two issues to this Court in the manner envisioned by Tenn. R. App. P. 27. The first issue, presented solely by Mr. Craig, is whether Ms. Hodge’s representations regarding the paternity of her son can support a claim of common-law fraud, intentional misrepresentation, or negligent misrepresentation. The second issue, raised by both Mr. Craig and Ms. Hodge, is whether a damage award derived from Mr. Craig’s post-divorce payments of child support, medical expenses, and medical insurance premiums is an impermissible retroactive modification of a child support order. The issues regarding whether Mr. Craig is entitled to recover $100,000 in damages for emotional distress and whether Mr. Craig is entitled to attorney’s fees are not before us for two reasons. First, Mr. Craig did not take issue, either in his application for permission to appeal or in his brief, with the decision of the Court of Appeals to vacate the awards for emotional distress or attorney’s fees. Second, while Ms. Hodge may present issues that were not presented by Mr. Craig, Tenn. R. App. P. 27(b) limits those issues to ones in which she is seeking “relief from the judgment” of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in Ms. Hodge’s favor with regard to Mr. Craig’s claim for damages for emotional distress and to the award of attorney’s fees. Therefore, Ms. Hodge could not have been seeking relief from these portions of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The issue regarding the proper measure of damages in cases such as this one is likewise not before the Court because neither party properly raised and presented this question. -10- Ms. Hodge would have been well-served had the statement of the issues in the brief she filed in this Court contained explicit issues matching the points made in the argument section of her brief. However, despite the shortcomings regarding her presentation of the issues, the argument section of the brief Ms. Hodge filed with this Court repeatedly asserts that “the facts in this case do not support a finding of fraud or misrepresentation” on her part. In light of the circumstances of this case, we will exercise our discretion to consider, in addition to the issues that have been properly presented, whether the record supports the trial court’s and the Court of Appeals’ determination that Mr. Craig proved all the elements of a common-law intentional misrepresentation claim by a preponderance of the evidence.