Opinion ID: 155168
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relevance Versus State Interests

Text: 22 Mr. Richmond argues the testimony the victim owned condoms and had a male visitor was relevant and material to his defense because it tended to show the following: 1) the victim was not a sexually naive/innocent girl; 2) because the victim was sexually active, she could detail a sexual incident even though she had not had one with Mr. Richmond; 3) someone other than the Mr. Richmond was the cause of the victim's hymenal damage. 23 Each of these arguments assumes the condom and visitor evidence was relevant to show the victim was sexually active. At best, however, this evidence was only marginally relevant to show the victim was sexually active. The defense could offer no testimony the victim had actually used the condoms, or that the victim had engaged in sexual intercourse with the male visitor. 6 Rather, the defense attempts to introduce evidence to create an inference the victim was sexually active based on conjecture and speculation. We refuse to equate a twelve-year-old girl's possession of condoms, or her friendship with a boy, with sexual activity. 24 It is also noteworthy the defense was not foreclosed from cross-examining the medical witnesses, or from introducing testimony to suggest the hymenal damage was due to a source other than Mr. Richmond. Specifically, the defense cross-examined the doctors as to whether the victim's use of tampons could have caused the hymenal damage. While one of the doctors, Dr. Jenny, testified such damage could not occur from tampon use, another doctor, Dr. Shepherd, testified on cross-examination the hymenal damage was consistent with tampon use. The defense also introduced testimony by the victim's mother that the victim used tampons. Consequently, while the defense was precluded from admitting testimony regarding the condoms and the victim's male visitor, it was not precluded from admitting testimony providing an alternative explanation of the victim's hymenal damage. We hold, however, in regard to the proffered testimony, without further evidence the victim actually used the condoms or had intercourse with the visitor, the excluded testimony was only marginally probative as to whether the victim was sexually active prior to the incidents involving Mr. Richmond. 25 We now turn to the state's interests involved. As stated, whether a state may limit a defendant's right to present relevant evidence depends upon the competing weights of the interests of the state and the defendant. Here, the trial court relied on Colorado's rape shield statute in excluding the evidence. Specifically, the trial court held that under the statute, because the evidence of the condoms and male visitor did not point to a specific instance of sexual conduct tending to exonerate the defendant, the evidence was presumptively irrelevant and excludable. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-3-407. 26 As the Supreme Court has said, rape shield statutes represent[ ] a valid legislative determination that rape victims deserve heightened protection. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 150, 111 S.Ct. at 1746. Colorado's rape shield statute was enacted for the following purposes: to protect the victims of sexual assault from humiliating and embarrassing public fishing expeditions into their sexual conduct; to overcome victims' reluctance to report incidents of sexual assault; and to protect victims from psychological or emotional abuse in court as the price of their cooperation in prosecuting sex offenders. Colorado v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 585 P.2d 275, 278 (1978). 27 The evidence the defense sought to introduce is certainly of the kind Colorado's rape shield statute was enacted to exclude; allowing the defense to inquire as to the condoms and the male visitor would not only have subjected the victim to embarrassment and humiliation, but could have had the effect of deterring future victims from reporting sexual assaults. 28 Further, under the Colorado rape shield law, a defendant is allowed to present presumptively irrelevant evidence if it follows the prescribed notice and hearing requirements, requirements that are meant to provide the victim with protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 150, 111 S.Ct. at 1746; Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-3-407. Here, the defense failed to follow the requirements. While the trial court did not explicitly rely on the defense's failure to follow the rape shield statute's notice and hearing requirements in excluding the evidence, the existence of the requirements and the defendant's failure to follow those procedures are germane to our weighing of interests in this case. Here, where the evidence was only marginally probative as to the victim's sexual activity, the state had an interest in protecting both the prosecution and the victim from surprise and unnecessary invasions of privacy due to the defendant's failure to follow the rape shield statute's procedures. 29 In sum, on one side of our scale rest the state's interests in protecting sexual assault victims and in encouraging such victims to cooperate with the prosecution--interests that are both legitimate and important. On the other side of the scale rests the defendant's interest in admitting testimony that is, at best, only marginally relevant. Additionally, the defense was not foreclosed from introducing testimony suggesting an alternative cause of the victim's hymenal damage. Consequently, we hold the balance of interests in this case weigh heavily in favor of the state and, therefore, in favor of the testimony's exclusion.