Opinion ID: 2563933
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Challenges to California's Capital Sentencing Scheme

Text: Defendant advances a number of constitutional challenges to the California death penalty law and to instructions given to the jury based upon that lawchallenges that, she concedes, we previously have rejected. Defendant provides no convincing reason for us to reconsider our previous holdings on these issues. Consequently, we reject defendant's argument that her death sentence violates articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which prohibit cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment and the arbitrary deprivation of life. International law does not compel the elimination of capital punishment in California. ( People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 127 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749].) We also have rejected the argument, presently made by defendant, that the assertedly regular imposition of the death penalty as punishment for a substantial number of homicidesas opposed to exceptional crimes such as treasonconstitutes cruel and unusual punishment because such punishment has been abolished in the majority of nations, including all of Western Europe. California's status as being in the minority of jurisdictions worldwide that impose capital punishment, especially in contrast with the nations of Western Europe, does not violate the Eighth Amendment. (See, e.g., People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 47-48 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591].) ( People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1143 [81 Cal.Rptr.3d 614].) California does not impose capital punishment as a `regular punishment for substantial numbers of crimes.' ( People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 43 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229], italics omitted.) The death penalty is available only for the crime of first degree murder, and only when a special circumstance is found true; furthermore, administration of the penalty is governed by constitutional and statutory provisions different from those applying to `regular punishment' for felonies. (E.g., Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; §§ 190.1-190.9, 1239, subd. (b).) ( Id. at p. 44.) This court's refusal to conduct intercase proportionality review of a death sentence does not violate the federal Constitution. [Citation.] ( People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1098 [81 Cal.Rptr.3d 651].) Furthermore, because capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants, the death penalty law does not violate equal protection by denying capital defendants certain procedural rights given to noncapital defendants. [Citations.] ( People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 681 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 126, 187 P.3d 970].) We previously have rejected defendant's challenges to the penalty phase jury instruction given in this case, CALJIC No. 8.88. The jury need not be told explicitly that it must return a verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances. ( People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978 [281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131].) The instruction that jurors may impose a death sentence only if the aggravating factors are `so substantial' in comparison to the mitigating circumstances that death is warranted does not create an unconstitutionally vague standard. ( People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 174 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357]; People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 190 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150].) There is no requirement in the federal or the state Constitution that the jury reach a unanimous agreement with respect to the factors in aggravation, that jurors find the factors in aggravation to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that the circumstances in aggravation outweigh those in mitigation before imposing the death penalty, or that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate punishment. ( People v. Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1097.) We have repeatedly held that the high court's recent decisions [in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348]; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428]; and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296] [159 L.Ed.2d 403, 124 S.Ct. 2531] do not compel a different answer. [Citations.] ( People v. Mendoza (2007) 42 Cal.4th 686, 707 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 274, 171 P.3d 2]; see also People v. Page (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 60 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 4, 186 P.3d 395]; People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 421 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 181 P.3d 947].) It is settled . . . that California's death penalty law is not unconstitutional in failing to impose a burden of proofwhether beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidenceas to the existence of aggravating . . . and mitigating circumstances, or the appropriateness of a sentence of death. [Citations.] ( People v. Alfaro (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277, 1331 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 433, 163 P.3d 118].) Section 190.3, factor (a), which allows the jury to consider `[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true pursuant to Section 190.1,' does not violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by allowing arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-976 [129 L.Ed.2d 750, 114 S.Ct. 2630]; People v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 211.) ( People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 755 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 630, 188 P.3d 580]; see also People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 648 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 691, 181 P.3d 1035]; People v. Alfaro, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1330.) As the United States Supreme Court noted in upholding factor (a) against an Eighth Amendment challenge, `our capital jurisprudence has established that the sentencer should consider the circumstances of the crime in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. [Citation.]' ( People v. Page, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 60.) Nor is section 190.3, factor (a) applied in an unconstitutionally arbitrary or capricious manner merely because prosecutors in different cases may argue that seemingly disparate circumstances, or circumstances present in almost any murder, are aggravating under factor (a). ( People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 401.) Rather, each case is judged on its facts, each defendant on the particulars of his [or her] offense. ( Ibid. )