Opinion ID: 664140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: As Applied Substantive Due Process Challenge

Text: 14 The district court held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Kawaokas' as applied challenge to the City's water moratorium and general plan because these challenges were not ripe for review. The Kawaokas' as applied claim alleges that because the City had no specific procedures or fee schedules for applying for specific plans when the general plan was adopted, the specific plan requirement as applied to the Kawaokas' property is an arbitrary means by which the City is blocking development of the Kawaokas' land. 3 The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. Reebok Int'l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enterprises, Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir.1992). 15 Ripeness requirements are relevant only to as applied challenges, and not to facial challenges. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 507 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 382, 116 L.Ed.2d 333 (1991). The ripeness doctrine serves the purpose of avoiding premature adjudication of administrative actions. A constitutional challenge to land use regulations is ripe when a property owner or developer has received the planning commission's  'final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question.'  MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 2567, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986) (quoting Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3118, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985)). We have held that MacDonald and Williamson require a final decision by the government agency that inflicts a concrete harm on the landowner. Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043, 108 S.Ct. 775, 98 L.Ed.2d 861 (1988). Typically, before a decision is final the landowner must have submitted one formal development plan and sought a variance from any regulations barring development in the proposed plan that have been denied. Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090, 109 S.Ct. 1557, 103 L.Ed.2d 860 (1989); Kinzli, 818 F.2d at 1454-55. 4 16 We have recognized a futility exception to the final decision requirement, under which the resubmission of a development plan or the application for a variance from prohibitive regulations may be excused if those actions would be idle or futile. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd. v. Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1501 (9th Cir.1990); Herrington, 857 F.2d at 570. However, this futility exception does not alter a party's obligation to file at least one meaningful development proposal. Herrington, 857 F.2d at 569. 17 In applying this doctrine to the present case, the district court ruled that because the Kawaokas never submitted any formal development plans or filed a specific plan application, their as applied challenges were unripe for review. Kawaoka, 796 F.Supp. at 1325. This ruling is correct. The Kawaokas cannot argue that the specific plan requirement imposes unworkable restrictions on the property, such that it cannot be used and cannot be sold, when they have never applied for a specific plan that has been denied. 18 The Kawaokas challenge this ruling on several grounds, none of which are persuasive. First, they argue that applying for a specific plan was impossible or futile. Specifically, they contend that the City had no ordinance specifying how a specific plan would be adopted and that they were specifically informed in July of 1990 that they could not at that time apply for a specific plan. While this is true, in May 1991, the City adopted procedures for specific plan applications. Although this occurred after the Kawaokas filed their action in district court, it was a full year before the district court entered its order. It therefore was not impossible or futile for the Kawaokas in the interim to apply for a specific plan. 5 19 Moreover, the district court properly concluded that this nine month delay is neither unreasonable nor excessive. We have stated that for a delay to be excessive, it must be substantial, since the Supreme Court has held a claim to be unripe even where the application process covering a development project required approximately eight years. Kinzli, 818 F.2d at 1454 n. 5 (citing to Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108). Moreover, in the context of takings cases, courts have held that a short term delay in the development or use of property is not unreasonable. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2517 n. 9, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1988) (stating that [m]ere fluctuations in value during the process of governmental decisionmaking, absent extraordinary delay, are 'incidents of ownership' ); Zilber v. Town of Moraga, 692 F.Supp. 1195, 1206 (N.D.Cal.1988) (one and a half year moratorium is not a taking). 20 The Kawaokas cite to Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, for the proposition that they are not required to seek a legislative amendment to undo that which has just been done by the legislature. In Hoehne, the plaintiffs, whose property was zoned to permit subdivision into twelve lots, applied to subdivide their land into four lots. After they were denied, they applied for a subdivision of three lots and were again denied. The City subsequently amended the general plan to permit only one lot on the plaintiffs' sixty-acre parcel. We held that the City had made a final decision with respect to the Hoehne's property such that the Hoehnes were not required to apply for a general plan amendment before they could file a suit. 870 F.2d at 535. Hoehne is unhelpful to the Kawaoka's claim because even in Hoehne, the appellants had applied to the City to develop their property and been rejected; in the present case, the Kawaokas have filed no such application. See Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 922 F.2d at 503. 6 21 The Kawaokas also cite to Sierra Lake Reserve v. City of Rocklin, 938 F.2d 951, 957 (9th Cir.1991), vacated, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 31, 121 L.Ed.2d 4 (1992), on remand, 987 F.2d 662 (9th Cir.1993), for the proposition that the harm from a substantive due process claim occurs at the time of the government's action. They suggest that this eliminates the requirement that they apply for a specific plan. This argument confuses the ripeness requirement with the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies that was at issue in Sierra Lake. The language quoted by the Kawaokas explains that in contrast to individuals who bring claims for procedural due process violations based on random acts of agency officials, parties who bring substantive due process claims are not required to exhaust all state remedies prior to seeking adjudication in federal court. Id. This doctrine is distinct from the ripeness requirement, which requires that the plaintiff have a final agency decision and therefore a concrete controversy before bringing an action in federal court. Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1407 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016, 110 S.Ct. 1317, 108 L.Ed.2d 493 (1990); see also David R. Mandelker et al., Federal Land Use Law Sec. 2.05(h), at 2.58 & n. 106. 22 Because the Kawaokas' as applied challenges to the City's actions are unripe, the district court properly dismissed those claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.