Opinion ID: 1726497
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantial Compliance Approach to Jurisdiction Requirements.

Text: The appellants argue that we should depart from prior precedent and recognize a substantial compliance approach to the timely bond requirement under Iowa Code section 62.6. A number of cases in other jurisdictions have adopted a substantial compliance approach in election law contexts. See Ex parte Williams, 613 So.2d 1266 (Ala.1993); Dobbins v. City of Anniston, 469 So.2d 583 (Ala.1985); Taft v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elections, 110 Ohio St.3d 471, 854 N.E.2d 472 (2006). In addition, there has been academic commentary criticizing courts for requiring literal compliance with bond requirements. Note, Developments in the Law, 88 Harv. L.Rev. 1298, 1310-11 (1975) (criticizing literal approach to bond requirements in light of strong public interest in ensuring fairness in elections). In the cases closest to the present controversy, however, the courts required that election challengers must file some kind of bond in a timely fashion to demonstrate substantial compliance. For example, in Dobbins, the district court rejected a claim of substantial compliance where the election challengers had difficulty getting authorities to establish the amount of the bond. Dobbins, 469 So.2d at 585. The court reasoned that if a bond in some amount had been filed in a timely fashion, it could later be amended in the event of an untimely refusal to approve the bond by election officials. Id. In Dobbins, however, no bond of any kind was filed within the statutory time frame. As a result, the Dobbins court found there was not substantial compliance with the statute. Id. Similarly, in Williams, the election challenger was advised that the filing fee was the equivalent of a bond and, relying upon this advice, did not file a bond. 613 So.2d at 1267. When the election challenger later attempted to amend the filing fee to a bond, the court held that the filing fee was not a bond and that the failure to file a bond in form at least meant that there was an incurable jurisdictional defect. Id. at 1267-68. On the other hand, in Taft, the court allowed an election challenge to proceed notwithstanding technical noncompliance with statutory requirements. 854 N.E.2d at 474-75. In that case, however, the election challenger did file a bond (albeit technically deficient and not supported by adequate security) in a timely fashion. Id. at 476. In light of Dobbins and Williams, even if we were to depart from our precedents in favor of a substantial compliance test for jurisdiction under Iowa Code section 62.6, a fatal defect would still be present under the facts of this case. As a result, it is not necessary for us to address the issue of whether we should depart from the strict construction approach of de Koning and Haas. Appellants cannot prevail under either the strict or the substantial compliance approach.