Opinion ID: 849329
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: private conversations on cordless telephones

Text: Defendant invites this Court to hold that, as a matter of law, a conversation held on a cordless telephone cannot be a private conversation. He relies on language in the Court of Appeals decision in Dickerson v. Raphael, 222 Mich.App. 185, 194, 564 N.W.2d 85 (1997), rev'd 461 Mich. 851, 601 N.W.2d 108 (1999), to argue that a cordless telephone works by sending a radio-like signal from the telephone's handset to its base, and that users of cordless telephones know that these signals can be intercepted by devices including other cordless telephones and police scanners. This knowledge, he concludes, renders unreasonable an expectation of privacy in a cordless telephone conversation. Id. We decline defendant's invitation because such an interpretation would negate an express protection in the eavesdropping statutes. Specifically, M.C.L. § 750.539c; MSA 28.807(3) protects private conversations against eavesdropping accomplished through the wilful use of any device. This protection indicates that the Legislature considered that a conversation can be private, yet can also be susceptible to eavesdropping through any device. Otherwise, it would have had no need to protect private conversations against such an intrusion. Indeed, were defendant correct that a conversation that a person knows is susceptible to eavesdropping through any device is not private, then the statutory protection against eavesdropping accomplished through any device would be null. This is because a conversation susceptible to eavesdropping with any device would, because of that characteristic, fall outside the protected class of private conversations, leaving no private conversation to be protected from eavesdropping with any device. Whenever possible, courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute. Morey, supra at 330, 603 N.W.2d 250. Therefore, to give effect to the statutory protection against eavesdropping accomplished through any device, we must reject defendant's position. Further, although a person who talks on a cordless telephone may know that technology makes it possible for others to overhear the conversation, that person also can presume that others will obey the criminal law. See Papadimas v. Mykonos Lounge, 176 Mich.App. 40, 47, 439 N.W.2d 280 (1989); Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed.), § 33, p. 201. Thus, although the victim may have known that her cordless telephone conversations could be wilfully intercepted with a device, she also could presume that others would not eavesdrop on her cordless telephone conversations using any device because doing so is a felony under the eavesdropping statutes, and is additionally prohibited by federal law. See 47 USC 1001 et seq. As a matter of law, it was not unreasonable for her to expect that her cordless telephone conversations were private. We recognize that our holding differs with many decisions concluding that cordless telephone users cannot expect privacy in their telephone conversations. See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 196 Ill.App.3d 997, 1009-1010, 143 Ill.December 610, 554 N.E.2d 545 (1990); Salmon v. State, 206 Ga.App. 469, 470, 426 S.E.2d 160 (1992), superseded by statute, Ga Code Ann § 16-11-66.1; McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.3d 1236, 1239-1241 (C.A.6, 1995). However, these cases were decided under statutes with language different from that of the Michigan eavesdropping statutes governing our decision in this case. Notably, other state courts have held that cordless telephone users can expect privacy in their telephone conversations when those states' governing statutes have so provided. See, e.g., State v. Faford, 128 Wash.2d 476, 486, 910 P.2d 447 (1996); State v. Bidinost, 71 Ohio St.3d 449, 460, 644 N.E.2d 318 (1994). In addition, although certain federal decisions, including McKamey, supra, held that there cannot be an expectation of privacy in cordless telephone conversations, federal law was subsequently amended to grant strict privacy protections to cordless telephone conversations. See 47 USC 1001. Thus, although our decision differs with several foreign authorities, it accords with current federal law, and accords full meaning to the Michigan eavesdropping statutes. Under those statutes, whether a person can reasonably expect privacy in a conversation generally will present a question of fact. See Dickerson, supra at 851. For example, although a person is not precluded from having a reasonable expectation of privacy in a conversation held on a cordless telephone, a person who converses on a party line may not reasonably expect the conversation to be private because perhaps that person should know that others will be able to listen to the conversation. Many such conversations may be subject to casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance, M.C.L. § 750.539a(1); MSA 28.807(1)(1), but the final determination will generally be for the factfinder.