Opinion ID: 196272
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Singh Grievance

Text: 2. The Singh Grievance The Company refused to arbitrate the Singh grievance on the grounds that it was not filed within the time limits established in Article 20 of the collective bargaining agreement. Article 20 provides that any grievance must be presented to the employee's appropriate supervisor no later than fifteen (15) calendar days following the date of the grievance or the Employee's knowledge of its occurrence. Article 20 also provides: The time limits provided in this article are conditions precedent for the filing and processing of grievances under this Article. The district court held that the Singh grievance was arbitrable, reasoning that because an 'untimeliness' defense is a classic case of procedural arbitrability that should be decided by the arbitrator, [the Company's] contention to the contrary will prove unsuccessful. (emphasis added). Again, the court declined to award the Union its attorneys' fees. Our discussion of this issue must begin with the distinction between substantive arbitrability and -7- procedural arbitrability. Substantive arbitrability refers to whether a dispute involves a subject matter that the parties have contractually agreed to submit to arbitration. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1228, AFL-CIO v. WNEV-TV, New Eng. Television Corp., 778 F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir. 1985). For example, the Onanibaku grievance raised a matter of substantive arbitrability -- the parties to the collective bargaining agreement specifically agreed not to arbitrate grievances alleging discrimination. Thus, the question for the district court was whether the Onanibaku grievance alleged discrimination. Procedural arbitrability, on the other hand, concerns such issues as to whether grievance procedures or some part of them apply to a particular dispute, whether such procedures have been followed or excused, or whether the unexcused failure to follow them avoids the duty to arbitrate. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964). See also Beer Sales Drivers, Local 744 v. Metropolitan Distribs., Inc., 763 F.2d 300, 302-03 (7th Cir. 1985). In John Wiley, the Supreme Court established that issues of substantive arbitrability are for the court to decide, and issues of procedural arbitrability are for the arbitrator to decide. Once it is determined [by a court] that the parties are obligated to submit the subject matter of a dispute to arbitration, 'procedural' questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition should be left to the arbitrator. 376 U.S. at 557. -8- Thirty years of Supreme Court and federal circuit court precedent have established that issues concerning the timeliness of a filed grievance are classic procedural questions to be decided by an arbitrator, a description appropriately adopted by the district court. See supra p.7. Unfortunately, the district court failed to properly apply the consequences of this description. Because the law is clear on this issue, and has been for some time, the Company was without justification in refusing to arbitrate the Singh grievance, and in forcing the Union to litigate its arbitrability in federal district court. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in holding to the contrary. The Company argues that the timeliness requirement was a bargained-for condition precedent to arbitration and therefore that it is for the court to decide whether the parties intended to arbitrate this particular grievance. In support of this argument, the Company notes the Supreme Court's statement that [i]n the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, . . . only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail. AT & T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 650 (quoting Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 584-85). The Company argues that this is a case of an express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, and maintains that to conclude otherwise is to deprive the Company of the benefits of its bargain. -9- The Company's position misapprehends the distinction between substantive and procedural arbitrability. In John Wiley, the employer maintained that it had no duty to arbitrate because: (1) the collective bargaining agreement set out a three-step grievance procedure, and the first two steps had not been followed, 376 U.S. at 555-56; and (2) the union allegedly failed to comply with the following provision of the agreement: Notice of any grievance must be filed with the Employer and with the Union Shop Steward within four (4) weeks after its occurrence or latest existence. The failure by either party to file the grievance within this time limitation shall be construed and be deemed to be an abandonment of the grievance. Id. at 556 n.11. As noted, the Court held that once it is determined that the parties are obligated to arbitrate the subject matter of the dispute, then any procedural questions growing out of the dispute and bearing on its final disposition should be left to the arbitrator. Id. at 557. The John Wiley Court reasoned that, because the role of a reviewing court is only to determine whether the subject matter of the dispute is arbitrable under the agreement, and not to rule on the merits of the dispute, and because procedural questions are often inextricably bound up with the merits of the dispute, procedural questions should be decided by the arbitrator along with the merits. See id. at 557. There is no principled distinction between the timing issue deemed procedural in John Wiley and the timing issue in -10- this case. Both are conditions precedent to arbitration; but the fact that something is a condition precedent to arbitration does not make it any less a 'procedural' question[] which grow[s] out of the dispute and bear[s] on its final disposition . . . . The dispute in this case concerns whether Singh was fired without just cause -- a cause of action clearly covered by the arbitration clause contained in the agreement. The Company's timeliness defense is merely a procedural question arising out of that dispute. Supreme Court and circuit court cases demonstrate that this rule is clear and well-established. For example, in International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Flair Builders, Inc., 406 U.S. 487 (1972), the Supreme Court held that once the court determines that the subject matter of a dispute is covered by the collective bargaining agreement, then a claim by one of the parties that the particular grievance is barred by the equitable defense of laches is a question for the arbitrator to decide. Id. at 491-92. Similarly, in Trailways v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, 343 F.2d 815 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 879 (1965), this court rejected the employer's argument that the union failed to file certain grievances within the time conditions imposed by the collective bargaining agreement. We cited John Wiley for the proposition that: The company's contention that the union failed to file the grievances relating to discharge of the employees within the requisite time limits, is without merit. It can raise that -11- defense before the arbitrator but not before this court. Id. at 818. See also Bechtel Constr., Inc. v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 812 F.2d 750, 753 (1st Cir. 1987) (failure to submit grievance to committee, as required by step grievance procedure, is a classic question of 'procedural arbitrability' for the arbitrator to decide). The employer in Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local Union 765 v. Stroehmann Bros. Co., 625 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1980), made an argument almost identical to that of the Company in this case. The employer argued that a grievance was not arbitrable because the submission to the American Arbitration Association was untimely, and maintained that the court, not the arbitrator, must make the determination that all preconditions to arbitration have been met. Id. at 1093 (emphasis added). The court easily rejected this argument: [T]he significance of a default in literal compliance with a contractual procedural requirement calls for a determination of the intention of the parties to the contract. Such a determination is no different in kind from a dispute over a substantive contract provision. Both types of determinations are, under the governing case law, matters for the arbitrator. Id. A plethora of circuit court cases have interpreted John Wiley in the same or similar fashion. See, e.g., Denhardt v. Trailways, Inc., 767 F.2d 687, 689 (10th Cir. 1985) (dispute as to employer's compliance with time limit for conducting a hearing is a procedural matter for arbitrator); Beer Sales Drivers, Local -12- 744 v. Metropolitan Distribs., Inc., 763 F.2d 300, 302-03 (7th Cir. 1985) (union's alleged failure to submit its members' grievances within time limitation specified in agreement is an issue of procedural arbitrability for arbitrator); Nursing Home & Hosp. Union 434 v. Sky Vue Terrace, Inc., 759 F.2d 1094, 1097 (3d Cir. 1985) (the law is clear that matters of procedural arbitrability, such as time limits, are to be left for the arbitrator); Automotive, Petroleum & Allied Indus. Employees Union, Local 618 v. Town & Country Ford, Inc., 709 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1983) (whether grievance was barred from arbitration due to union's alleged failure to submit complaint to employer within five days from notice of discharge, as required by agreement, is question of procedural arbitrability for arbitrator); Hospital & Inst. Workers Union Local 250 v. Marshal Hale Memorial Hosp., 647 F.2d 38, 40-41 (9th Cir. 1981) (alleged noncompliance with timing requirements of a multiple step procedure is a question for the arbitrator); United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers v. Interco, Inc., 415 F.2d 1208, 1210 (8th Cir. 1969) (arbitration ordered despite union's failure to file arbitration within 90 days). The Company has directed us to no cases to the contrary. In Washington Hospital Center, supra, the employer argued that a grievance was not arbitrable because the union failed to follow the timing requirements of the step-grievance process. Relying on John Wiley, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the employer's position on the grievance was sufficiently frivolous and unreasonable to warrant -13- a fee award. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 746 F.2d at 1510.2 The court reasoned that the employer's position was frivolous and unreasonable since it made no attempt to distinguish its case from the facts of John Wiley, and relied solely on an inapposite case from another circuit. Id. at 1510-11. The Union in this case relied heavily on John Wiley in its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, the Company made no attempt to distinguish John Wiley in its responsive memorandum. Indeed, it did not even mention the case. Instead, it relied almost exclusively (although cursorily) on a case from the Massachusetts Court of Appeals decided under state, not federal law. The Company does little better on appeal, citing two pre-John Wiley cases, including one from this circuit, for the proposition that: This court has held that it is for 'the courts to determine whether 2 The court noted that John Wiley created a clear and certain rule with regard to procedural arbitrability. We agree with its comment that: The benefits of the rule's certainty -- that all disputes as to procedural arbitrability are for the arbitrator -- outweigh any countervailing factors. As the Supreme Court said in Wiley, any other rule would engender delay with the potential to 'entirely eliminate the prospect of a speedy arbitrated settlement of the dispute, to the disadvantage of the parties . . . and contrary to the aims of national labor policy.' Id. at 1512 (quoting John Wiley, 376 U.S. at 558). -14- procedural conditions to arbitrate have been met.'3 As demonstrated above, it is clear that this proposition did not survive John Wiley. Moreover, in its sole attempt to distinguish John Wiley, the Company compares the time bar provisions of its collective-bargaining agreement with a wholly immaterial contract provision from John Wiley.4 Finally, the Company has directed this court to no federal circuit or district court precedent to support its position. 3 The two cases cited are Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 258 F.2d 516 (1st Cir. 1958) and Brass & Copper Workers Fed. Labor Union No. 19322 v. American Brass Co., 272 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 845 (1960). The Company also indicates that one of these cases -- it is somewhat unclear which -- is quoting from John Wiley. This is, of course, a rather dubious proposition considering that both cases were decided before John Wiley. We will give the Company the benefit of the doubt that it intended to say cited in John Wiley, as both cases are cited therein as examples of circuits that have held that it is for the court to determine procedural questions, John Wiley, 376 U.S. at 556 n.12, a proposition rejected by John Wiley and its progeny. Supra. 4 The Company's brief states: Compared with the defendant's contract language which plainly states 'The time limits provided in this Article are conditions precedent for the filing and processing of grievances under this Article . . ., we submit that there is no comparison or similarity to Wiley, who's [sic] contract language simply holds 'No dispute alleging discrimination shall be subject to grievance or arbitration unless no remedy therefore is provided . . .' (emphasis in original). In fact, the actual time bar at issue in John Wiley was very similar to that in this case. It stated that: The failure of either party to file the grievance within this time limitation shall be construed and be deemed to be an abandonment of the grievance. 373 U.S. at 556 n.11. -15- Under these extraordinary circumstances, we think the Company's position regarding the Singh grievance has been and continues to be frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in deciding to the contrary.5 Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court to assess and impose attorneys' fees and costs upon the Company for its refusal to arbitrate the Singh grievance.