Opinion ID: 2533702
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction to Review the HLRB's Order

Text: UPW contends that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to review the HLRB's order under HRS § 91-14 because the HLRB's order did not result from a contested case. HGEA, on the other hand, maintains that, pursuant to HRS §§ 91-8 and 91-14, a contested case was unnecessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the circuit court. The right to appeal is purely statutory and exists only when jurisdiction is given by some constitutional or statutory provision. Burke v. County of Maui, 95 Hawai'i 288, 289, 22 P.3d 84, 85 (2001); Oppenheimer v. AIG Hawai'i Ins. Co., 77 Hawai'i 88, 91, 881 P.2d 1234, 1237 (1994); Chambers v. Leavey, 60 Haw. 52, 57, 587 P.2d 807, 810 (1978). Jurisdiction is conferred upon circuit courts to review administrative decisions by HRS § 91-14, which provides in pertinent part: (a) Any person aggrieved by a final decision and order in a contested case or by a preliminary ruling of the nature that deferral of review pending entry of a subsequent final decision would deprive appellant of adequate relief is entitled to judicial review thereof under this chapter.... In other words, appellate review of a final administrative decision is available where the decision results from a contested case. See Pub. Access Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 79 Hawai'i 425, 431, 903 P.2d 1246, 1252 (1995) [hereinafter, PASH ]. A contested case is defined in HRS § 91-1(5) (1993) as a proceeding in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law to be determined after an opportunity for agency hearing. In Bush v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 76 Hawai'i 128, 134, 870 P.2d 1272, 1278 (1994), this court held: If the statute or rule governing the activity in question does not mandate a hearing[ [9] ] prior to the administrative agency's decision-making, the actions of the administrative agency are not required by law and do not amount to a final decision or order in a contested case from which a direct appeal to circuit court is possible. (Emphasis in original); see also PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 431, 903 P.2d at 1252. Thus, pursuant to HRS § 91-14, in order for proceedings before an agency to constitute a contested case from which an appeal can be maintained, the agency must be required by law to hold a hearing before a decision is rendered. Stated differently, discretionary hearings are not contested cases because they are not required by law. See Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai'i 64, 68, 881 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1994). In the instant case, the HLRB's order was issued pursuant to HRS § 91-8 and HAR Rule 12-42-9. HRS § 91-8 provides: Any interested person may petition an agency for a declaratory order as to the applicability of any statutory provision or of any rule or order of the agency. Each agency shall adopt rules prescribing the form of the petitions and the procedure for their submission, consideration, and prompt disposition. Orders disposing of petitions in such cases shall have the same status as other agency orders. (Emphasis added). HAR Rule 12-42-9 was promulgated pursuant to HRS § 91-8 and states in pertinent part: Declaratory rulings by the board. (a) Any public employee, employee organization, public employer, or interested person or organization may petition the board for a declaratory order as to the applicability of any statutory provision or of any rule or order of the board. .... (f) The board may, for good cause, refuse to issue a declaratory order. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the board may so refuse where: (1) The question is speculative or purely hypothetical and does not involve existing facts or facts which can reasonably be expected to exist in the near future. (2) The petitioner's interest is not of the type which would give the petitioner standing to maintain an action if such petitioner were to seek judicial relief. (3) The issuance of the declaratory order may adversely affect the interests of the board or any of its officers or employees in a litigation which is pending or may reasonably be expected to arise. (4) The matter is not within the jurisdiction of the board. .... (h) Hearing: (1) Although in the usual course of processing a petition for a declaratory ruling no formal hearing shall be granted to the petitioner, the board may, in its discretion, order such proceeding set down for hearing. (2) Any petitioner who desires a hearing on a petition for declaratory ruling shall set forth in detail in a written request the reasons why the matters alleged in the petition, together with supporting affidavits or other written evidence and briefs or memoranda or legal authorities, will not permit the fair and expeditious disposition of the petition and, to the extent that such request for hearing is dependent upon factual assertion, shall accompany such request by affidavit establishing such facts. (Emphases added). As illustrated above, HRS § 91-8 and HAR Rule 12-42-9 do not require the HLRB to hold a hearing prior to issuing a ruling on a declaratory petition. In fact, HAR Rule 12-42-9(h)(1) specifically provides that a hearing is discretionary. Because there is clearly no statutory mandate or administrative rule entitling the DOT to a hearing, it would appear that the HLRB's order does not result from a contested case. HGEA, however, contends that the HLRB's order need not result from a contested case and that, read together, HRS §§ 91-8 and 91-14 conferred jurisdiction upon the circuit court. We agree. HRS § 91-8 provides that [o]rders disposing of petitions [for declaratory rulings] shall have the same status as other agency orders. Inasmuch as the phrase other agency orders is not defined anywhere in the Hawai'i Administrative Procedure Act (HAPA), HRS Chapter 91, and is unclear on its face, we look to extrinsic aids in order to determine what the legislature intended by other agency orders. See Freeland, 96 Hawai'i at 149-50, 28 P.3d at 984-85 (When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists.... In construing an ambiguous statute ... the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent.) One avenue in construing an ambiguous statute is the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool. Id. According to a House Standing Committee Report, a basic purpose of HAPA is to provide for judicial review of agency decisions and orders on the record, except where the right of trial de novo, including the right of trial by jury, is provided by law. Hse. Stand. Com. Rpt. No. 8, in 1961 House Journal at 655 [hereinafter, House Report]. Additionally, in addressing an agency's refusal to issue a declaratory ruling under HAPA  such as that in the instant case  the House report states that, [s]ince the refusal in itself would be an agency order, in appropriate cases, application for judicial review on the grounds that denial was an abuse of discretion on the part of the agency may be made. Id. at 659. Thus, we believe the legislature intended the phrase other agency orders to permit review of petitions for declaratory relief. Moreover, we note that this court has consistently recognized that circuit courts have jurisdiction, pursuant to HRS § 91-14, to review orders disposing of petitions for declaratory rulings. See e.g., Vail v. Employees' Ret. Sys., 75 Haw. 42, 49-51, 856 P.2d 1227, 1232-33 (1993) (entertaining an appeal, brought pursuant to HRS § 91-14, of an HRS § 91-8 declaratory order); Fasi v. State Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 60 Haw. 436, 437-43, 591 P.2d, 113, 114-16 (1979) (noting that the circuit court acquired jurisdiction [over a declaratory ruling] ... pursuant to HRS § 91-14); see also Sierra Club v. Hawai'i Tourism Auth., 100 Hawai'i 242, 264, 59 P.3d 877, 899 (2002) (explaining that HAPA applies only to judicial review of contested case hearings, see HRS § 91-14, or... a declaratory order from an agency regarding the `applicability of any statutory provision or of any rule or order of the agency,' HRS § 91-8). Accordingly, we hold that orders disposing of petitions for declaratory rulings under HRS § 91-8 are appealable to the circuit court pursuant to HRS § 91-14. Consequently, the circuit court in the instant case had proper jurisdiction to review the HLRB's order.