Opinion ID: 779813
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Hughes

Text: 6 Prior to trial, Mr. Hughes moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the first count was duplicitous because it charged him with conspiring to make and to pass counterfeit currency. In his view, this allegation comprised two separate crimes and therefore should not have been included in a single count. The district court denied the motion. The court reasoned that a conspiracy, even one with multiple illicit objectives, constitutes a single crime. 7 Before this court, Mr. Hughes again submits that the first count of the indictment contained duplicitous charges. In his view, the district court should have dismissed this count of the indictment. `Duplicity' is the joining of two or more offenses in a single count. United States v. Marshall, 75 F.3d 1097, 1111 (7th Cir.1996). The overall vice of duplicity is that the jury cannot in a general verdict render its findings on each offense, making it difficult to determine whether a conviction rests on only one of the offenses or both. United States v. Buchmeier, 255 F.3d 415, 425 (7th Cir.2001) (internal quotations omitted). A duplicitous indictment also may expose a defendant to other adverse effects including improper notice of the charges against him, prejudice in the shaping of evidentiary rulings, in sentencing... and of course the danger that a conviction will result from less than a unanimous verdict. Id. at 425 (internal quotations omitted). 8 Count I of the indictment alleged that the defendants had conspired to make and to pass counterfeit bills in violation of the federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371. As Mr. Hughes notes, making counterfeit bills alone constitutes a federal crime; passing such counterfeit currency also constitutes a federal crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 471 (unlawful to counterfeit obligations); 18 U.S.C. § 472 (unlawful to pass falsely made counterfeit obligations). 9 Count I of this indictment, however, did not charge Mr. Hughes with either of these violations. Rather, the first count alleged a single criminal activity — conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States. To be sure, the indictment alleges that this single conspiracy had two illicit objectives, each of which constitutes a crime. However, as the Supreme Court has observed: A conspiracy is not the commission of the crime which it contemplates, and neither violates nor `arises under' the statute whose violation is its object.... The single agreement is the prohibited conspiracy, and however diverse its objects it violates but a single statute. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 54, 63 S.Ct. 99, 87 L.Ed. 23 (1942); see also United States v. Bruun, 809 F.2d 397, 405-06 (7th Cir.1987). Consequently, [t]he allegation in a single count of a conspiracy to commit several crimes is not duplicitous, for [t]he conspiracy is the crime, and that is one, however diverse its objects. Braverman, 317 U.S. at 54, 63 S.Ct. 99 (internal quotations omitted); see also Bruun, 809 F.2d at 406. 10 We have recognized that when several statutes are alleged as the objective of a conspiracy, the Government need only establish that the defendant's illicit objective involved one of those statutes to convict. United States v. Muelbl, 739 F.2d 1175, 1183 (7th Cir.1984). However, when several different crimes are the object of a single conspiracy, a jury possibly could find a defendant guilty of conspiracy even though the jurors do not agree on which crime was the object of the conspiracy. As the Government points out, however, the instructions concerning Count I given to the jury in this case told the jurors that, in order to convict Mr. Hughes on Count I, they had to agree unanimously that the defendants conspired to make counterfeit money; or that they conspired to pass counterfeit money; or that they conspired to do both. 2 Accordingly, the instructions negated any possibility that Mr. Hughes was convicted on the basis of a non-unanimous verdict. 11 The district court correctly determined that Count I of the indictment was not duplicitous.
12 Mr. Hughes also submits that the district court erred in calculating his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2B5.1(b)(2). In calculating the respective sentences of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Bovey, the district court relied, in part, upon U.S.S.G. § 2B5.1(b)(2). 3 The defendants vigorously contested the applicability of this provision to their conduct. In particular, relying on Application Note 4 to this provision, Mr. Hughes and Mr. Bovey submitted that U.S.S.G. § 2B5.1(b)(2) did not apply to individuals who produced the counterfeit bills through photocopying. In rejecting this contention, the district court took the view that the defendants had read too narrowly this application note. The court held that the application note did not exempt those who had photocopied from § 2B5.1(b)(2)'s six-level enhancement; rather, it exempted from an enhancement those individuals who had made obvious forgeries. On appeal, relying on Application Note 4 of this provision, Mr. Hughes renews his assertion that U.S.S.G. § 2B5.1(b)(2) does not apply to his conduct because he produced the counterfeit currency through photocopying. 4 13 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, an offense involving counterfeit currency of the United States mandates a base offense level of 9. See U.S.S.G. § 2B5.1. If the defendant manufactured or produced any counterfeit obligation or security of the United States, or possessed or had custody of or control over a counterfeit device or materials used for counterfeiting, the district court may increase the base level to 15 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B5.1(b)(2). The guidelines create, however, a narrow exception to this enhancement embodied in § 2B5.1(b)(2). At the time of Mr. Hughes' sentence, the commentary to § 2B5.1 provided that § 2B5.1(b)(2) and its enhancement do not apply to persons who merely photocopy notes or otherwise produce items that are so obviously counterfeit that they are unlikely to be accepted even if subjected to only minimal scrutiny. U.S.S.G. § 2B5.1, application n. 4. 5 14 However, contrary to Mr. Hughes' assertion, an individual's conduct is not removed from the ambit of § 2B5.1(b)(2) simply because he produced the counterfeit notes through photocopying. As we have explained, [t]he `obviously counterfeit' language in [Application Note 4] modifies and limits both the `merely photocopy' and the `otherwise produce' language, and therefore the [exception] describes only one situation: when the method used by the counterfeiter produces an obvious forgery — whether by photocopying or some other method. United States v. Baronia, 287 F.3d 607, 608 (7th Cir.2002). Simply put, [t]he proper inquiry for exclusion from [U.S.S.G. § 2B5.1(b)(2)] is not how the bills were made, but rather how well they were made. Baronia, 287 F.3d at 609. 15 The district court concluded that the notes were not obviously counterfeit. Sentencing Tr. at 89. In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that none of the merchants rejected the counterfeit currency, that Mr. Hughes produced the fake notes on heavier bonded paper, which made them very realistic, and that he produced the money with colored ink as opposed to black and white ink. Id. 16 Mr. Hughes used an ink jet printer and a copy machine to produce his counterfeit bills. However, as Baronia makes evident, that is not the dispositive inquiry in considering whether conduct falls within the ambit of Application Note 4. Because the district court concluded that the notes were not obviously counterfeit, it did not err in calculating Mr. Hughes' base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2B5.1(b)(2).