Opinion ID: 2422438
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Authority to Modify the Divorce Judgment

Text: [¶ 8] The parties disagree on whether the $63,000 allocation to Christiane in the divorce judgment was part of a property distribution or spousal support. Russell argues that the allocation was a property distribution and that the court erred by modifying it. See Wardwell v. Wardwell, 458 A.2d 750, 752 (Me. 1983) ([C]ourts are without jurisdiction to [modify a judgment dividing marital property].). Christiane argues that the allocation was part of the divorce court's award of spousal support and therefore it could be modified. Spousal support provisions may be modified as authorized by statute. 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(4) (2010). Although an original divorce judgment may contain a non-modification provision to prevent modification of spousal support, see Hale v. Hale, 604 A.2d 38, 41 (Me.1992), the parties here agree that their divorce judgment contained no such provision, and the spousal support award is subject to modification. [¶ 9] The final divorce judgment stated, The allocation of the entire $63,000 in current equity value to Ms. McAllister shall be deemed an allocation of property in lieu of any alimony obligation on or after October 1, 2009 and the court determines that this allocation is grounds for a deviation from the presumptive period of general spousal support payments pursuant to 19-A MRSA § 951-A(2)(A)(1). (Emphasis added.) In a footnote, the court further addressed the nature of the $63,000 award: [Christiane's] Motion for Reconsideration suggests this allocation is a post-judgment allocation of property, outside of the court's jurisdiction. The court disagrees. It is delaying the sale of the marital property until after the minor child's graduation, and clearly has that authority, and could order that all of the proceeds then be divided equally. . . . It is slightly adjusting this approved practice by ensuring that Ms. McAllister receives the $63,000 the court awards in lieu of general spousal support, and the balance of any increase in the equity be divided equally. (Emphasis added.) The specific language used by the court and its reference to 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(2)(A)(1) (2010) [2] demonstrate the court's intent to award Christiane general support through two different modalities: first, through monthly payments of an amount sufficient to allow her to maintain the marital home, and second, through a lump sum award once the perceived need to maintain the home had ended. [¶ 10] Because the $63,000 allocation to Christiane is a form of spousal support, contrary to Russell's assertion, the court had the authority to modify this part of the final divorce judgment. See 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(4) (An award of spousal support is subject to modification when it appears that justice requires. . . .).