Opinion ID: 778658
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenges to the defendants' sentences

Text: 92 Garcia, Pineda, Alfonzo Meza, Arturo Meza, 90 Hilario Solis, Mendez, and Jose Meza argue that their sentences violate the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey 91 because the indictment failed to allege drug quantity and cause of death as required for sentencing under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) and because findings on these factual matters were not made either by a jury or upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 92 We address the claimed Apprendi violations as to drug quantity and cause of death in turn. 93 Following Apprendi, [t]he district court must submit to the jury any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, and, [i]f the government seeks an enhancement of the penalties for a crime based on the amount of drugs, the quantity must be stated in the indictment and submitted to the jury for a finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 93 In the absence of enhancing drug quantities, Section 841(b)(1)(C) sets the statutory maximum for an offense involving an unspecified amount of a Schedule I substance at 20 years in prison, and [h]eroin is a Schedule I substance. 94 94 However, section 841(b)(1)(C) provides that, if death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance [the defendant] shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than twenty years or more than life. 95 We conclude that, pursuant to Apprendi, like drug quantity, whether death or bodily injury has resulted from a drug offense is a fact that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the finder of fact. 96 Consistent with the conclusions reached in our Apprendi case law regarding drug quantity under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), whether death or serious bodily injury results from the uses of such substance calls for a factual determination which significantly increases the maximum penalty from 20 years ... to life imprisonment. 97 As such, the fact of cause of death is a fact used in sentencing that does ... increase a penalty beyond the statutory maximum and so need[s to] ... be alleged in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 98 95 Looking first to the alleged Apprendi errors involving drug quantity, no objection was raised at trial to the failure to include drug quantity in each count of the indictment or the failure to submit drug quantity to the jury for determination upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and, at sentencing, no objection was made to the judge's determination of drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence standard. Only the sentences imposed in excess of 240 months on any given count are subject to Apprendi challenge, 99 such that only the defendants' respective sentences for Counts 1, 6, 9, 12, 26, 27, and 28 are subject to their Apprendi challenges. 100 In the indictment here, as to these counts, a drug quantity of cocaine and/or heroin was alleged only in Count 26 against Garcia, stating only more than 100 grams of heroin and listing the count as a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) with a potential penalty of not less than 5 years nor more than 40 years, and in Count 28 against Pineda and Garcia, stating more than 100 grams of heroin and approximately 250 grams of cocaine and listing the count as a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) with a potential penalty of not less than 5 years nor more than 40 years. Drug quantities were also alleged in Overt Acts 9, 15, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 35, 38, 39, and 40 listed under Count 1 for conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. 96 In the absence of an objection at trial or sentencing, we review the alleged Apprendi errors as to drug quantity for plain error only. 101 Under a plain error analysis, the court can correct an error not raised at trial only if there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects the appellant's substantial rights, and further, if all three of these conditions are met, the court may exercise its discretion to notice the forfeited error only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 102 97 As to the failure to charge drug quantities in the indictment as to Counts 1, 6, 9, 12, and 27, the government argues, inter alia, that there is no Apprendi error because the penalty provision listed in Count 1 for conspiracy and Counts 6, 9, 12, and 27 provided the defendants with notice that they could be sentenced to imprisonment of [n]ot less than 20 years not more than life. However, the district court here imposed sentences on the defendants of greater than 240 months for Counts 1, 6, 9, 12, and 27 not based on drug quantities but based on a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the users of the heroin in Counts 6, 9, and 12 and of the cocaine and heroin in Count 27 died as a result of the drugs distributed to them by the defendants or their co-conspirators. Indeed, this comports with the penalty provision listed under Count 1, which matches up with the statutory sentencing ranges under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 841(b)(1)(B), and 841(b)(1)(C) of not less than 20 years or more than life where death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance and not the ranges in 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 841(b)(1)(B) based on specified drug quantities in the absence of death or serious bodily injury caused by the use of the drug. 103 The basis for the district court's sentences is further confirmed by a review of the presentence investigation reports on the defendants, each of which the district court adopted in relevant part at sentencing. 98 As to Garcia's sentences for Counts 26 and 28 and Pineda's sentence for Count 28, there is no error in failing to include specific drug quantities in the indictment as to these counts if, as was the question presented in our recent decision in United States v. Moreci, 104 the information provided in each count is sufficient to inform a defendant of the specific charges made against him, including the quantity of drugs alleged for the purpose of sentencing enhancements and what those enhancements may be, in satisfaction of Apprendi.  105 Unlike the facts presented Moreci, in which this court addressed this question as a matter of first impression, here Counts 26 and 28 did not include the identification of any particular subsection of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), but it did note that the possible penalties ranged from 5 year to 40 years imprisonment. Such a penalty range is found only in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), which provides that, in the case of a violation involving 100 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of heroin, 106 an offender upon conviction shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years or more than life and if death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance shall be not less than 20 years or more than life. 107 In the face of such information, Garcia and Pineda were on sufficient notice that they were being indicted for violations of section 841(a)(1) for an amount of more than 100 grams but less than one kilogram of heroin, which could not implicate the penalty provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), including its maximum of 20 years in prison. 108 There is no Apprendi error with regard to drug quantity alleged in the indictment in Counts 26 and 28. 99 Having established that there is no Apprendi error in the indictment as to Counts 26 and 28, we turn to the alleged Apprendi error in the district court's failure to charge the jury as to drug quantity on these counts. Here, we apply both plain and harmless error analysis. 109 Assuming there would otherwise be plain error, 110 we conclude that any error was harmless because, as in United States v. Green, 111 there was extensive, detailed, and uncontroverted testimony regarding the quantities of drugs charged in Counts 26 and 28. 112 Our review of the record indicates that it contains no evidence which could lead the jury to rationally conclude contrary to the quantities of drugs charged in Counts 26 and 28. The jury had the indictment with it during deliberations, including the drug quantities charged in Counts 26 and 28, and the defendants offered no testimony controverting the amount of drugs involved in the charged drug transactions at trial and point to no such testimony or evidence on appeal. 113 We conclude that the district court's error in failing to instruct the jury to find a specific amount of drugs beyond a reasonable doubt as to Counts 26 and 28 was harmless. 100 We turn then to the alleged Apprendi errors in the omission of allegations as to cause of death from Counts 1, 6, 9, 12, and 27 of the indictment and the district court's failure to either charge the jury to make factual findings as to cause of death or to make such a determination itself upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. No objection was raised at trial to the failure to submit cause of death facts to the jury for determination upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. At sentencing, however, the defendants objected to the failure to submit the evidence of the causes of death resulting from the use of the drugs to a jury for determination by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The government therefore concedes that our review of these challenges is de novo but argues that the absence of cause of death from the indictment was the result of the defendants' own motion to strike and so any such violation of the rule of Apprendi is invited error. We agree. 101 We have recently summarized the doctrine of invited error: 102 The doctrine of invited error provides that when injection of inadmissible evidence is attributable to the actions of the defense, the defense cannot later object to such `invited error.' Under this doctrine, a defendant cannot complain on appeal of alleged errors which he invited or induced, especially where the defendant may not have been prejudiced by the error. We will not reverse on the basis of invited error, absent manifest injustice. 114 103 Here, the cause of death facts were alleged in the indictment under Counts 1, 6, 9, 12, and 27, 115 but the defendants successfully moved to have these allegations stricken from the indictment and kept out of evidence through a Motion to Strike Surplusage in Indictment and Motion in Limine. The defendants argued at trial, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. United States, 116 that the deaths caused by drugs alleged in Counts 1, 6, 9, 12, and 27, for which increased mandatory minimum and maximum sentences were available under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), were merely sentencing factors and not properly included in the indictment or the jury charge. They argued that it was unnecessary for the jury to make any determination regarding the deaths or injuries as alleged in the indictment because causing death or injury is not an element of the offense with which the defendants were charged and that, because the deaths or injuries do not relate to guilt or innocence, inclusion of these allegations in the indictment would unduly prejudice the defendants. The defendants successfully argued further that no evidence of the deaths or injuries to drug users should be presented to the jury. 104 The defendants clearly induced the erroneous omission, by way of a motion to strike, of the allegations regarding cause of death from Counts 1, 6, 9, 12, and 27 of the indictment and the subsequent failure to charge the jury to make factual findings by proof beyond a reasonable doubt on these matters. As counsel admitted at oral argument, there were clear strategic advantages to keeping such prejudicial material from the jury, and the defendants received the benefit of their successful efforts to insulate the jury from this information. The government, in response to the motion to strike, agreed that causing death or injury was not an element of the charged offenses, but sought to present evidence of the deaths or injuries to drug users as proof of the conspiracy, showing the defendants' motive, knowledge, and intent. 105 The defendants cannot maintain at trial that causing death or injury is not an element and is simply a sentencing enhancement, thereby inducing the district court to take the allegations from the indictment and keep the evidence from the jury, and then argue at sentencing that causing death or injury is an element and must be decided by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, by the district court, if not by a jury. The defendants elected to have the cause of death or injuries issue decided as a sentencing matter by the court by the usual preponderance standard at sentencing, and not by the jury at trial by proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of guilt or innocence. The defendants knew that the differential standards of proof were the accompanying baggage when they succeeded in shuttling this issue to sentencing and away from trial. 117 106 That the defendants later tried to renege on this bargain is of no moment, because they had waived their rights to have this issue determined by a jury as a matter of guilt or innocence, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 118 Our conclusion might be different if the defendants had sought simply to waive their rights to have a jury decide the cause of death or injury issues and had elected to have the district court decide this issue as a matter of guilt or innocence by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But this was not the strategy the defendants pursued or the bargain they struck — the total package the defendants sought and received was to take this issue entirely from the jury's consideration and from the trial to determine their guilt or innocence, on the ground that the issue involved only sentencing enhancements to be decided by the court by the well-settled preponderance standard. 107 As a result, we find no manifest injustice will flow from our refusal to correct any such invited Apprendi errors. We therefore reject the defendants' Apprendi challenges to their various sentences for Counts 1, 6, 9, 12, and 27.
108 For the first time at oral argument, Jose Solis argued that his sentence was imposed in violation of the rule of Apprendi because the district court imposed his sentence under the twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence based on the district court's cause of death findings by a mere preponderance of the evidence. We may decline to address this issue because it was not first raised in the briefs. 119 We need not do so, however, because the contention that Apprendi applies to mandatory minimums is meritless in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Harris v. United States. 120 109
110 Several of the defendants raise challenges to the sufficiency or propriety of the evidence supporting the district court's cause of death findings for purposes of sentencing the defendants. We address these arguments in turn.
111 Alfonzo Meza argues that, even under a preponderance standard, the government's proof at the cause of death hearing failed to establish that the individuals' deaths, as charged in Counts 6, 12, and 27 of the indictment, were caused by the use of heroin. Thus, he contends that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2). 112 Alfonzo Meza argues that the government admits that neither Rob Hill (Count 12) nor Erin Baker (Count 27) died from heroin overdoses but rather from an asthma attack (Hill) and a pulmonary embolism (Baker). Alfonzo Meza observes that the government's expert witness testified that heroin caused Hill's asthma attack but that a combination of heroin, cocaine and diphenhydramine caused Baker's embolism. He asserts that, because these opinions were not supported by a competent medical or scientific study, case report, or other evidence indicating that heroin can cause asthma attacks or blood clots, the government did not provide competent and trustworthy expert evidence to show a link between heroin and Hill's and Baker's deaths. Alfonzo Meza further argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Milan Malina (Count 6) died from a heroin overdose because it is equally probable he died from a cocaine overdose but cocaine was not charged in Count 6 or discussed in the presentence report (PSR). 113 Because we have determined that the defendants waived any right they had to have the cause of death issue as to Counts 1, 6, 9, 12, and 27 resolved as a matter of guilt or innocence by a jury by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the district court's cause of death findings were only required to be made by a preponderance of the evidence to support an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2) based upon the usual rules governing a court's factual findings for sentencing purposes. 121 We review the district court's factual findings for clear error only, and, in making its findings, the district court may consider any information which bears sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy, including hearsay evidence, without regard to admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence which govern at trial. 122 The district court's findings are not clearly erroneous if they are plausible in light of the record reviewed in its entirety. 123 114 At sentencing, the defendant bears the burden of rebutting the evidence used against him for purposes of sentencing by proving that it is materially untrue, inaccurate or unreliable. 124 Mere objections do not suffice as competent rebuttal evidence. 125 115 Alfonzo Meza does not deny that he supplied the heroin alleged in Counts 6, 12, and 27, only that the heroin caused the respective users' deaths. We have recently held that § 2D1.1(a)(2) is a strict liability provision and does not require proof of proximate causation or reasonable foreseeability such that a defendant can be held responsible for overdose deaths if the government could show a reasonable medical probability that heroin supplied by [the defendant] caused the deaths. 126 116 Dr. William Rohr, the medical examiner who performed the autopsies of Malina and Hill, testified that there was a reasonable medical probability that the heroin used by Hill and Malina proximately caused their deaths, and the defendants offered no evidence to refute this expert testimony. Dr. Mark Andrew Krause, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy of Baker, testified that there was a reasonable medical probability that heroin and cocaine, in some combination, caused Baker's death, i.e., that it is more likely than not that Baker would not have died had she not ingested the cocaine and heroin, even though the proximate cause of death was the pulmonary embolism. 117 Alfonzo Meza essentially attempts to argue a standard which we have already rejected for purposes of sentencing under section 2D1.1(a)(2), that the drugs supplied by the defendant must be `a direct cause of death, not a possible or remote cause.' 127 Although Dr. Krause stated that he could not say that the heroin Baker ingested alone caused her death, his testimony that the heroin and cocaine in combination contributed to or caused Baker's death is sufficient to support the district court's finding that cocaine and heroin together caused the death of Baker. 128 Again, the defendants offered no rebuttal evidence to the contrary. 118 Accordingly, based on our review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that heroin caused the deaths of Hill and Malina and that cocaine and heroin together caused the death of Baker, such that Alfonzo Meza was properly sentenced on the basis of these users' deaths pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2).
119 Arturo Meza argues that the district court erred in admitting evidence offered by the government at the cause of death hearing of cocaine allegedly supplied by the defendants in connection with the death of Erin Baker as alleged in Count 27. He contends that this was error because it differed from the factual basis offered for Baker's death in the PSR, to which the government did not object, and that the government therefore waived any error arising from discrepancies on this point in the PSR. 120 We review challenges to the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion only, subject to a harmless error analysis. 129 We have held that the government waived any error as to discrepancies in the findings in a PSR regarding drug quantity and equivalencies, which the district court had accepted in making its calculations, by failing to object to the findings in the PSR before the district court. 130 Arturo Meza offers a unique spin on this holding, arguing that the district court erred in allowing the government to offer evidence that Erin Baker died from cocaine or heroin when the PSR provides only that her death resulted from heroin use and the government offered no objection to this finding in the PSR. 131 121 The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the government to present evidence in support of findings beyond those contained in the PSR. Although it is well-settled that a district court may adopt the facts contained in a PSR without further inquiry if those facts have an adequate evidentiary basis with sufficient indicia of reliability and the defendant does not present rebuttal evidence or otherwise demonstrate that the information in the PSR is unreliable, 132 the district court is not limited at sentencing to the findings in the PSR and the evidentiary bases therefor. The authority upon which Arturo Meza relies is inapposite, holding that the government waives its right to challenge on appeal the district court's findings where the district court adopted the findings of the PSR and the government failed to object to the relevant findings in the PSR in the district court. 133 122 Moreover, the district court provided the defendants with time in the course of the hearing to prepare to challenge the government's evidence regarding cocaine distribution and use once the government indicated its intention to present this evidence following Dr. Krause's testimony that Baker's death was caused by the ingestion of a combination of cocaine and heroin. Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence at the cause of death hearing that the defendants supplied cocaine which caused Baker's death.
123 Pineda argues that the district court erred in denying his objection to the portions of the PSR in which his base offense level was calculated to be 38 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2). He contends that he was not involved with the deaths of Milan Malina (Count 6), George Wesley Scott (Count 9), Rob Hill (Count 12), or Erin Baker (Count 27) or the serious bodily injury to Daniel Mierek (Count 16). Pineda argues that the government presented no evidence that he was involved in the conspiracy at the time the deaths of Malina, Scott, and Hill occurred. He also asserts, without supporting argument, that the government presented insufficient evidence of causation regarding the deaths of Malina, Hill, Scott, and Baker and the injury to Mierek. 124 We have already determined that there was insufficient evidence to convict Pineda of Counts 6 and 9, and, although acquittal is not a barrier to consideration of the underlying conduct at sentencing so long as that conduct was proven by a preponderance of the evidence, 134 under the circumstances presented here, Pineda's involvement in the conspiracy prior to August 1997 was not even proven measured against this lower standard. As to the death of Hill (Count 12) and Baker (Count 27), however, Pineda has shown no clear error in the district court's finding that Pineda was criminally responsible for the drugs which resulted in these users' deaths. We have found, based on a reasonable doubt standard, that there was sufficient evidence to convict Pineda based on Pinkerton liability on Counts 12 and 27, and there is likewise sufficient evidence in the record on which to sentence Pineda for his involvement in the conspiracy which resulted in these users' deaths. 135 Moreover, based on the discussion above as to Alfonzo Meza's challenges to his sentences and our conclusion that sufficient evidence exists in the record to support Pineda's convictions on Counts 12 and 27 on the basis of Pinkerton liability, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the drugs charged in the respective counts caused the deaths of Hill and Baker. 136
125 Mendez argues that there is insufficient evidence to tie him to a cocaine conspiracy and so insufficient evidence to sentence him for the deaths of victims alleged in Counts 6, 9, 12, and 27, particularly Baker's death alleged in Count 27. Mendez also argues that the district court erred in allowing the admission through a government witness of the inherently unreliable, redacted statements of Jose Meza in violation of Mendez's Fifth Amendment rights as developed in Bruton. Based on our rejection of Mendez's challenges to his convictions on these same grounds, we reject his points of error.
126 Pineda argues that the district court erred in denying him a two-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, where he was willing to plead guilty to Count 1 prior to trial but wanted to challenge any sentencing enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) and U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 and to challenge the rulings on his pretrial motions to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds and to suppress. He notes that he has pled guilty in other proceedings to several of the charges alleged in Count 1 and argues that he has admitted the essential elements of guilt from the start. Thus, he contends that this is the rare situation in which a defendant is not precluded from reduction for acceptance of responsibility even though he exercised his right to trial. 127 While we generally review a district court's factual finding under the Guidelines for clear error, [a] district court's determination of whether a defendant is entitled to a reduction of his offense level for acceptance of responsibility is reviewed with even more deference than the pure `clearly erroneous' standard. 137 As such, [w]e will affirm a sentencing court's decision not to award a reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 unless it is `without foundation.' 138 128 This is not one of the rare situations in which a defendant who put the government to its proof at trial is nevertheless entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. At the very least, Pineda's suppression issue, which relates to his factual guilt, his failure to debrief the probation officer, and his challenge to the substantive counts against him, notwithstanding his offer to plead guilty to the conspiracy count, distinguish this case from those in which such a reduction would be warranted. 139 129 Given our deferential standard of review, the district court did not commit reversible error in denying Pineda a two-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility. 130
131 Pineda also argues that the district court erred in denying his objections to the paragraphs of the PSR wherein five levels were added to his base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.2 and 3D1.4. He argues that all of his violations of the drug statutes should have been grouped together under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d) because they involve substantially the same harm within the meaning of section 3D1.2. 140 132 We review de novo the district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines grouping rule. 141 On this review, [t]he sentence will be upheld if it was imposed as the result of `a correct application of the guidelines to factual findings which are not clearly erroneous.' 142 U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 provides: 133 All counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into a single Group. Counts involve substantially the same harm within the meaning of this rule: 134 (a) When counts involve the same victim and the same act or transaction. 135 (b) When counts involve the same victim and two or more acts or transactions connected by a common criminal objective or constituting part of a common scheme or plan. 136 (c) When one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the guideline applicable to another of the counts. 137 (d) When the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the total amount of harm or loss, the quantity of a substance involved, or some other measure of aggregate harm, or if the offense behavior is ongoing or continuous in nature and the offense guideline is written to cover such behavior. 143 138 We have explained that Section 3D1.2 divided offenses into three categories regarding grouping: (1) those to which the section specifically applies; (2) those to which the section specifically does not apply; and (3) those for which grouping may be appropriate on a case-by-case basis. 144 139 Pineda argues that the district court erred in not grouping all of his counts of conviction together pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d), obviating the application of a five-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, because they all involve substantially the same harm and because he was not proven responsible for any deaths alleged in Counts 6, 9, 12, and 27 and should therefore have been sentenced solely on the basis of drug type and quantity. Pineda also argues that, even if he is responsible for the deaths under Counts 6, 9, 12, and 27, U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d) applies because his offense behavior was ongoing or continuous in nature and the relevant offense guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2), is written to cover such behavior, providing a base offense level of 38 if the defendant is convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), or (b)(1)(C), or 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3), and the offense of conviction establishes that death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the substance. 145 Moreover, section 2D1.1 is an offense guideline explicitly covered by section 3D1.2. 146 Therefore, Pineda argues that his total offense level should have been 38 pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.2(d) and 2D1.1(a)(2) and not 43 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. 140 The district court grouped Counts 1, 14-15, 18-25, and 28 together pursuant to section 3D1.2(b) but formed five other groups containing Count 1 and each of Counts 6, 9, 12, 16, and 27, because these were characterized by the death or serious bodily harm caused to the user of the drugs alleged therein. 147 The district court's grouping resulted in six groups, with adjusted offense levels ranging from 34 to 38, which, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, resulted in a greater adjusted offense level of 38, to which five units were added, to reach a total offense level of 43. This offense level mandates a life sentence. 141 We have, however, reversed Pineda's convictions for Counts 6 and 9. Even assuming the district court correctly applied sections 3D1.2 and 3D1.4 to group Pineda's counts of conviction, our decision vacating his sentence on these counts reduces the number of groups and correspondingly the number of units by two. As such, the total offense level pursuant to section 3D1.4 would be 41, not 43, which, with Pineda's placement in Criminal History Category I, provides for a range of 324-405 months and not a mandatory life sentence. As such, we must reverse Pineda's sentences and remand for resentencing. 142 In order to provide guidance to the district court on resentencing, however, we address the issue and conclude that the district court did not err in its grouping analysis. The district court correctly looked for guidance in interpreting the applicability of section 3D1.2(d) to the background commentary to section 3D1.2, which in turn references the Introductory Commentary to Chapter 3, Part D of the Sentencing Guidelines. 148 The district court, guided by the analysis offered by the probation officer, concluded that section 3D1.2 does not account for multiple counts of death resulting from drug use, such that the prevailing commentary lies in the Sentencing Commission's observation that [c]ases involving injury to distinct victims are sufficiently comparable, whether or not the injuries are inflicted in distinct transactions, so that each such count should be treated separately rather than grouped together. 149 However, this statement is followed by the instruction that [c]ounts involving different victims (or societal harms in the case of `victimless' crimes) are grouped together only as provided in subsection (c) or (d). 150 And section 3D1.2(d) provides that [c]ounts involve substantially the same harm within the meaning of this rule: ... if the offense behavior is ongoing or continuous in nature and the offense guideline is written to cover such behavior. 151 143 At sentencing, the probation officer agreed that Pineda's offense conduct was ongoing or continuous in nature. However, he argued that section 2D1.1(a)(2) was not written to cover offense conduct, such as Pineda's, causing multiple deaths because it simply provides a base offense level of 38 if the offense of conviction establishes that death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the substance. Therefore, the offense guideline does not allow the court to take into account more than one death. The district court agreed with the probation officer and determined that section 3D1.2(d) does not cover deaths and does not allow for aggregating multiple deaths. 144 Pineda responds that section 2D1.1(a)(2) was written to cover the harm caused by the use of the controlled substance at issue. He notes that section 2D1.1(a)(2) does not provide for the higher base offense level only if one death occurs or if multiple deaths occur. 145 We agree with the district court that section 3D1.2(d) does not apply because the offense guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2), is not written to cover such behavior, i.e., multiple counts alleging that the deaths of distinct victims resulted from the use of the drugs charged. 152 Accordingly, we are guided by the Sentencing Commission's observation that, unless sections 3D1.2(c) or 3D1.2(d) applies, counts involving different victims should not be grouped together. 153 Our conclusion is further supported by the Sentencing Commission's commentary that a rule requiring the grouping together of the stabbing of three prison guards in a single escape attempt was rejected because it probably would require departure in many cases in order to capture adequately the criminal behavior. 154 Given the operation of section 2D1.1(a)(2), we are persuaded that holding section 3D1.2(d) to require grouping multiple counts involving the deaths of distinct drug users would require departure in order to capture adequately the criminal behavior, and so the offense guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2), is not written to cover the behavior for which Pineda was convicted in multiple counts. 146 We vacate Pineda's sentences and remand for resentencing on Counts 1, 12, 14-15, 18-25, and 27-28 consistent with this opinion. 147
148 Hilario Solis argues that the government failed to present any competent evidence as to the quantity of two kilograms of cocaine attributed to him as relevant conduct. Mendez likewise argues that there is no corroborating evidence that he was in the conspiracy or chain of supply for the drugs that caused the users' deaths alleged in Counts 6, 9, 12, or 27, on the basis of which he was sentenced. He argues that the district court erred in failing to make individualized findings of his relevant conduct. 149 We review the district court's factual determination of a defendant's relevant conduct for sentencing purposes for clear error only. 155 To count as relevant conduct under the guidelines, [i]t is not necessary for the defendant to have been charged with or convicted of carrying out the other acts before they can be considered relevant conduct, although the conduct must be criminal. 156 Additionally, [i]t is well established that relevant conduct under the sentencing guidelines includes all reasonably foreseeable acts of coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. 157 150 It is also well-settled that a district court may adopt facts contained in a Presentence Report (PSR) without further inquiry if the facts have an adequate evidentiary basis and the defendant does not present rebuttal evidence. 158 Here, the district court relied upon the findings of relevant conduct in Hilario Solis's PSR, which had an adequate evidentiary basis for the two kilograms of cocaine attributed to Hilario Solis and to which Hilario Solis offered no rebuttal evidence. Under these circumstances, the district court properly adopted the PSR and relied upon the information contained therein to make its factual findings. 159 Moreover, because the relevant conduct finding challenged here did not affect Hilario Solis's combined adjusted offense level, any error was harmless. 160 151 As with Hilario Solis, the district court made sufficient individualized findings as to Mendez by adopting the PSR, to which Mendez offered no rebuttal evidence. Under these circumstances, the district court, which had heard all of the evidence presented against Mendez and his co-conspirators at trial, did not err in its determination of Mendez's relevant conduct. 161 152 We find no clear error in the district court's determination of relevant conduct for purposes of sentencing Hilario Solis or Mendez. The sentences imposed on these defendants are affirmed over these challenges.