Opinion ID: 2490
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Second Mathews Factor

Text: Next, we consider the risk of an erroneous deprivation under the procedures used by the City, along with the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. Spinelli argues that the post-deprivation procedures used by the City did not adequately afford her due process because they failed to provide either adequate notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard in a sufficiently timely manner. We agree.
Notice, to comply with due process requirements, ... must set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted). The particularity with which alleged misconduct must be described varies with the facts and circumstances of the individual case; however, due process notice contemplates specifications of acts or patterns of conduct, not general, conclusory charges unsupported by specific factual allegations. The degree of required specificity also increases with the significance of the interests at stake. Here, these interests, implicating the practice of one's chosen profession, Galvin v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 70 F.Supp.2d 163, 176 (E.D.N.Y.1998), are substantial, Barry, 443 U.S. at 64, 99 S.Ct. 2642. The notice actually provided in this case was constitutionally inadequate. The regulations specified that a license suspension will result in the issuance of a Notice of Determination Letter to the licensee, which shall state in brief the grounds for the suspension or revocation and notify the licensee of the opportunity for a hearing. 38 RCNY § 1-04(f). Had this regulation been complied with, the notice might have been sufficient, depending on the specificity of the grounds provided and the promptness of the hearing. The cursory letters sent to Spinelli, however, only informed her of the license suspension and the status of the investigation. Beyond the conclusory statement that security at Olinville was inadequate, there was no specificity as to the actual infractions. Spinelli was left to guess at the security breaches to which the letters referred. The notice given to Spinelli plainly failed to reasonably ... convey the required information that would permit her to present [her] objections to the City. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). The City relies on the fact that Chambers, Spinelli's able counsel, through successful investigation, was able to determine the factual nature of the charges. But adequate notice consists of more than not obstructing a lawyer's investigation. The fact that Spinelli's counsel eventually learned of the specific nature of the charges after meeting on various occasions with the City does not obviate the City's failure to provide adequate notice of those charges. The City has advanced no legitimate reason for not immediately providing Spinelli with the information she needed to prepare meaningful objections or a meaningful defense. [4] Notifying Spinelli of the specific security breaches at Olinville would have entailed little or no administrative inconvenience to the City; indeed, simply attaching Officer McSherry's report to the letters would have sufficed. The notice provided in this case was scarcely more than a gesture on the City's part, see Luessenhop v. Clinton County, N.Y., 466 F.3d 259, 269 (2d Cir.2006), and was not constitutionally adequate.
Despite the inadequate notice, Spinelli, with counsel's assistance, was able to reinstate her gun dealer license 58 days after its suspension. The City argues that, because Spinelli was able to have her license suspension lifted and to retrieve her property in less than two months, her due process rights were not violated. This is a non-sequitur. Spinelli's eventual success did not result from the City's affording her due process, but despite its absence. The City contends that because Spinelli voluntarily opted not to pursue a formal hearing through the administrative process, and instead chose to have her attorney negotiate with the City, she cannot challenge the City's process, which she never utilized. We do not think that Spinelli's being forced into self-help by the inadequacy of process can bar her from pressing this claim. The unstated premise of the City's argument is that Spinelli could have received a prompt hearing if she had wanted one. In fact, the contrary is true. The administrative hearing process was not available to Spinelli during the City's pending investigation into McSherry's report. Both Sergeant Kaplon, the officer in charge of the investigation, and Margaret Shields, a hearing officer in the License Division, testified that Spinelli would not have been entitled to a hearing until the completion of the investigation into McSherry's report, which Shields conceded could take months to... years to decide. Furthermore, although due process may tolerate some period of delay between a deprivation of property and a hearing, there is no justification for indeterminately delaying a hearing for a person in Spinelli's circumstances while the investigation runs its course. In Mallen, the Supreme Court held that, [i]n determining how long a delay is justified in affording a post-suspension hearing and decision, it is appropriate to examine the importance of the private interest and the harm to this interest occasioned by delay; the justification offered by the Government for delay and its relation to the underlying governmental interest; and the likelihood that the interim decision may have been mistaken. 486 U.S. at 242, 108 S.Ct. 1780; see id. (noting that the significance of such a delay [on due process] cannot be evaluated in a vacuum). Here, the City's blanket policy of only providing a hearing after the investigation is completed cannot be squared with due process. As we have noted, in this case the private interest was strong, and the City's delay in providing Spinelli with a prompt hearing while her business was closed threatened significant financial loss over an extended period. The City's concession that an investigation can take months to years to decide, negates any claim that Spinelli's investigation could be completed in a reasonable amount of time. As a blanket proposition, where livelihoods may be at stake and the timing is subject to the competences of varying investigators, the holding of a hearing possibly years after a license suspension cannot amount to a justif[iable] ... delay. Id. See Cain v. McQueen, 580 F.2d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir.1978) (plaintiff's due process rights violated where school district delayed formal hearing for two years); Brown v. Bathke, 566 F.2d 588, 593 (8th Cir.1977) (same). Nor does such a delay serve any important underlying governmental interest. Mallen, 486 U.S. at 242, 108 S.Ct. 1780. In fact, we believe the contrary to be true: Permitting a licensee both to promptly join issue with the grounds for the investigation and to present her views advances the City's understanding of the situation while facilitating prompt remediation, all in the public interest. The usefulness of a prompt hearing is exemplified by the instant casehad Spinelli not been able to afford an attorney, the City would have incurred significant costs by investigating the Olinville security lapses, only to determine months or years later that Spinelli could have remedied the situation with a few basic improvements to Olinville. In the meantime, the delay would have wiped out Spinelli's livelihood. We have no doubt that the delay conceded by the City would have violated Spinelli's due process rights. But what about the actual delay in this case that was limited to fifty-eight days due to Spinelli's self-help? Notwithstanding that ultimately it did not take years for the City to restore Spinelli's license and return her firearms, we conclude that the delay Spinelli actually experienced still exceeded the bounds of due process. [E]ven a brief and provisional deprivation of property pending judgment is of constitutional importance. Krimstock, 306 F.3d at 51-52; see Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 84-85, 92 S.Ct. 1983 ([I]t is now well settled that a temporary, non[-]final deprivation of property is nonetheless a `deprivation' in the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.); see also United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1192 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (noting that a temporary and non[-]final removal of a defendant's assets, pursuant to a federal criminal forfeiture statute and pending resolution of the criminal case, is, nonetheless, a deprivation of property subject to the constraints of due process) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, once the City took possession of Spinelli's property pending investigation, it was incumbent upon the City to provide a prompt hearing. The fact that Spinelli was able to retain an attorney familiar with the licensing system does not cure the City's failure to provide constitutionally adequate process by which Spinelli could be heard. In sum, nothing about the process employed by the City in this case provided any safeguards [against] an unacceptable risk of arbitrary and erroneous deprivations of personal liberties. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 793, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The fact that through Spinelli's efforts the period of her deprivation was reduced to fifty-eight days neither cures the constitutional infirmity, nor erases the risk of erroneous deprivation inherent in the City's policy. Thus, the second Mathews factor also favors Spinelli.