Opinion ID: 2779443
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Preservation of Religious Freedom Act

Text: The Defendant further contends that she is entitled to a hearing pursuant to Tennessee’s Preservation of Religious Freedom Act, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (b) Except as provided in subsection (c), no government entity shall substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. (c) No government entity shall substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion unless it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is: (1) Essential to further a compelling governmental interest; and 8 We acknowledge that the Establishment Clause issue gives us pause, as the statutory text and the legislative history, taken together, appear to indicate that the spiritual treatment exemption was enacted for the benefit of the Christian Scientist denomination of the Christian faith. The Establishment Clause provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,” U.S. Const. amend. I, and the corresponding provision in the Tennessee Constitution provides “that no preference shall ever be given, by law, to any religious establishment or mode of worship,” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 3. In Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court held that “[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.” The Court’s explication in Larson reflects the view of James Madison, the author of the First Amendment, who asserted that “[t]o give exemption to some denominations and not to all offends the equality with which all men enter society.” James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (June 20, 1785), reprinted in John T. Noonan, Jr., The Lustre of Our Country: The American Experience of Religious Freedom 73 (1998). Applying these principles, courts in other jurisdictions have questioned spiritual treatment exemptions similar to our own. See, e.g., Walker, 763 P.2d at 876 (Mosk, J., concurring) (“[T]he [E]stablishment [C]lause requires at a minimum that the exemption be granted irrespective of denominational affiliation or practice. The conclusion is thus inescapable that the religious exemption . . . violates the establishment clauses of the California and federal [c]onstitutions.” (footnote and citations omitted)); Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1112 (Del. 1991) (“[W]e recognize the possibility that the spiritual treatment exemptions may violate the ban against the establishment of an official State religion guaranteed under both the Federal and Delaware Constitutions. Clearly . . . the language providing an exemption only to those individuals practicing ‘in accordance’ with the ‘practices of a recognized church or religious denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof’ is intended for the principal benefit of Christian Scientists.”); Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d at 934-35 (concluding that Ohio’s spiritual treatment exemption violated both the Establishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause). -17- (2) The least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. .... (e) A person whose religious exercise has been burdened by government in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in any judicial or administrative proceeding . . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-1-407(b)–(c), (e). Prior to trial, the Defendant claimed that the State had burdened the free exercise of her religion by charging her with child neglect. The Defendant asked the trial court to dismiss the charge pursuant to the Preservation of Religious Freedom Act unless the State could establish that the prosecution was essential to further a compelling governmental interest and was the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The trial court concluded that the Preservation of Religious Freedom Act, which took effect in 2009, did not apply retroactively. This Court has recognized two circumstances that make it appropriate to apply a statute retroactively: (1) when the “clear legislative intent” mandates retroactive application, Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 797 (Tenn. 2001); and (2) when the statute is “remedial or procedural in nature” such that it “does not affect the vested rights or liabilities of the parties,” Nutt v. Champion Int’l Corp., 980 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tenn. 1998). In this instance, there is nothing in the Preservation of Religious Freedom Act or its legislative history demonstrating that the General Assembly intended for the statute to apply retroactively. See Van Tran, 66 S.W.3d at 798 (“[T]he absence of express language providing for retroactive application supports the conclusion that the legislature did not expressly intend such an application.”). Moreover, because the Defendant seeks to use the statute to establish a defense to a criminal charge, it would substantially “affect the vested rights or liabilities of the parties,” and cannot, therefore, be properly classified as “remedial or procedural in nature.” Nutt, 980 S.W.2d at 368. Accordingly, like the Court of Criminal Appeals, we hold that the Preservation of Religious Freedom Act does not apply retroactively and cannot afford relief to the Defendant.