Opinion ID: 2971590
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Speedy Trial Act Violation

Text: Robinson argues on appeal that his indictment should have been dismissed with prejudice under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161-74. It is undisputed that a violation of the Speedy Trial Act occurred and that the Act demands dismissal of the first indictment against the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3162(a)(2). The question before this Court is whether the district court properly dismissed the indictment without prejudice, allowing Robinson to be reprosecuted. The Speedy Trial Act does not specify whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice, nor does it contain a default presumption one way or the other. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3162(a)(2); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 334, 108 S.Ct. 2413, 101 L.Ed.2d 297 (1988). Congress did, however, provide three factors for a court to consider when making this determination. They are “the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice.” Id. at 333. In Taylor, the Supreme Court discussed the importance of the analysis: Where, as here, Congress has declared that a decision will be governed by consideration of particular factors, a district court must carefully consider those factors as applied to the particular case and, whatever its decision, clearly articulate their effect in order to permit meaningful appellate review. Only then can an appellate court ascertain whether a district court has ignored or slighted a factor that Congress has deemed pertinent to the choice of remedy, thereby failing to act within the limits prescribed by Congress. Id. at 336-37. The Court noted that the district court had not fully explicated its reasons for dismissing the indictment with prejudice, so the Court was “left to speculate in response to some of the parties’ arguments pro and con.” Id. at 337. The Court thus undertook analysis of the Speedy Trial Act factors and determined that the lower court had abused its discretion. This Court, on multiple occasions, has had the opportunity to examine a district court’s analysis of a Speedy Trial Act violation. In United States v. Pierce, 17 F.3d 146 (6th Cir. 1994), we reviewed a district court’s dismissal of the defendant’s indictment without prejudice. The Court found that the district court had discussed the three statutory factors when it dismissed the indictment without prejudice and again when it reaffirmed its previous decision. Id. at 148. After carefully examining the district court’s discussion of the three statutory factors, the Court found that the district court had acted within its discretion in choosing to dismiss without prejudice. Id. at 148-49. In Pierce, this Court stated, “Because Congress has given specific factors to be considered, a district court that does not set forth written findings with regard to these factors has abused its discretion and will be reversed.” Id. at 148 (relying on Taylor, 487 U.S. at 336). Since the district court had set forth written findings with regard to these factors, this statement is dictum. The holding in Pierce actually turned on whether the district court’s analysis was substantially sustainable. Likewise, in United States v. Moss, 217 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2000), the district court reviewed the three statutory factors in determining whether to dismiss the defendant’s indictment without prejudice. The Court focused on the fact that the district court had implied that the defendant alone caused the delay and had failed to recognize its own role in not issuing a ruling on the defendant’s pending motion. Id. at 431. Moreover, the Court looked at the district court’s analysis of the last factor. The district court had found that reprosecution would not hinder the administration of the Speedy Trial Act, nor the administration of justice, because the defendant had not shown that the delay would prejudice him at trial. Id. at 431. The Court noted that the district court had failed to address its own ten-month delay in rendering its opinion and such a delay was approaching the point of being presumptively prejudicial. The district court also failed to address any non-trial prejudice suffered by the defendant. Id. at 432. Furthermore, we found that the No. 02-2232 United States v. Robinson Page 4 district court had not adequately addressed the impact reprosecution would have on the administration of the Speedy Trial Act. Id. at 432. The Court concluded that the district court’s decision to dismiss the original indictment without prejudice was clearly erroneous. Although the district court had analyzed the statutory factors, this Court found that the district court had failed to adequately address all the factors because it did not acknowledge its own role in the delay. The instant case can be distinguished from Pierce and Moss because in this case the district court failed to set forth any findings regarding the statutory factors. The judge’s order dismissing Robinson’s indictment without prejudice merely stated: The court having been advised in the premises and after having reviewed the pleadings filed by the parties, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the indictment pending against the defendant is dismissed without prejudice. J.A. 92. It is without question that the district court should have made written findings considering the statutory factors. Although this Court has stated in dicta that a district court that fails to address the statutory factors should be reversed, we have not previously faced a case where a district court judge completely fails to make any mention of the statutory factors. Other circuits, however, have reviewed cases where district courts fail to set forth any findings regarding the statutory factors that should be discussed in a Speedy Trial Act analysis. These courts have concluded that the fact that the district court neglected to articulate its reasons for dismissal without prejudice does not require that the district court be automatically reversed. See, e.g., United States v. Blevins, 142 F.3d 223, 225 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Jones, 887 F.2d 492, 495 (4th Cir.1989)). In cases where the district court fails to set forth any findings, the appropriate remedy would ordinarily be a remand to the court with instructions to provide findings that are adequate. See United States v. Fox, 788 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir.1988). However, in certain cases, instead of remanding, the appellate court in its discretion may elect to conduct a more substantive review to ensure that the judgment is supported in terms of the factors identified in the statute. See Blevins, 142 F.3d at 225. Where, as here, the record is sufficient for the Court to make a determination of whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the defendant’s charges without prejudice, the Court may “undertake more substantive scrutiny to ensure the judgment is supported in terms of the factors identified in the statute.” See Blevins, 142 F.3d at 225 (citing Taylor, 487 U.S. at 337); Jones, 887 F.2d at 495 (“where the record amply supports the district court’s decision, we do not believe Taylor requires automatic reversal”); United States v. Pasquale, 25 F.3d 948, 952 (10th Cir. 1994) (“While the decision is generally the trial court’s in the first instance, remand for a hearing is not required if the answer is so clear that no purpose would be served by a remand.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Castle, 906 F.2d 134, 137-39 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Miranda, 835 F.2d 830, 834-35 (11th Cir.1988); United States v. Simmons, 786 F.2d 479, 485 (2d Cir.1986). The first step in reviewing the statutory factors is for this Court to determine whether the charges against Robinson are serious. Robinson does not dispute that the charges of which he was convicted are serious. In fact, Robinson was sentenced to a total period of imprisonment of 44½ years. See United States v. Howard, 218 F.3d 556, 561(6th Cir. 2000) (looking at the length of a sentence to determine the seriousness of an offense for a Speedy Trial Act analysis). Given the length of the sentence, the offenses charged against Robinson were serious and favored dismissal without prejudice. Second, this Court must consider the facts and circumstances which led to the dismissal. The government contends that Robinson’s second counsel was appointed on June 7, 2000. Robinson filed his first pro se motion for dismissal of the indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act on September 15, 2000. No judicial proceedings or motions involving Robinson were outstanding during this period of 101 No. 02-2232 United States v. Robinson Page 5 days. J.A. 75; 79. There were numerous defendants involved in this action, including one juvenile defendant. J.A. 73. The government states that the 31 day delay was inadvertent, due in large part to numerous motions, juvenile proceedings and plea negotiations involving both Robinson and his codefendants. The record indicates that the delay did not result from prosecutorial misconduct nor from any attempt to take advantage of the delay. Because of the many defendants involved in this case, including one juvenile, the United States Attorney’s Office inadvertently allowed this delay; this is not a case where the defendant has shown a pattern of negligence or bad faith on the part of the prosecutors. Additionally, there was no “protracted and inexcusable period of inactivity on the part of the district court” that would have warranted a dismissal with prejudice. Howard, 218 F.3d at 561; but see Moss, 217 F.3d at 431-32 (dismissing a defendant’s indictment with prejudice where the district court sat on a suppression motion for ten months without explanation). The 31-day delay by the district court, although not insubstantial, was not severe enough to warrant a dismissal with prejudice regardless of the other circumstances. See, e.g., U.S. v. Koory, 20 F.3d 844, 848 (8th Cir. 1994) (“We find that a 59-day delay, while not insubstantial, is not so substantial that dismissal with prejudice is mandated regardless of the other circumstances”). The last factor this Court must consider is the impact of the reprosecution on the administration of justice. “The main considerations that courts have taken into account when examining this factor are whether the defendant suffered actual prejudice as a result of the delay and whether the government engaged in prosecutorial misconduct that must be deterred to ensure compliance with the Act.” Howard, 218 F.3d at 562 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). First, Robinson does not appear to have suffered actual prejudice as a result of this delay. In Taylor, the Court stated, “[I]nordinate delay between public charge and trial, ... wholly aside from possible prejudice to a defense on the merits, may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and ... may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends.’” Taylor, 487 U.S. at 340, 108 S.Ct. 2413 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 537, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2195, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)). Robinson generally alleged that his liberty was impacted by this delay. However, Robinson does not specifically state how this 31-day delay affected his life circumstances, if at all. The government points out that Robinson received sentence credit for the 31-day period of incarceration. After Robinson was indicted a second time, the trial judge attempted to set an early trial date of December 2001 or January 2002. Robinson requested a later trial date of February 5, 2002 and stipulated to a further delay in his trial date to April 23, 2002. Considering that Robinson requested delays in setting a trial date, it does not appear that the 31-day delay at issue would have prejudiced him. Moreover, Robinson fails to allege any particularized prejudice to his defense, such as loss of evidence due to the delay. Secondly, as previously discussed, there was no evidence of either bad faith or a pattern of negligence on the part of the government that would warrant dismissal with prejudice. Since Robinson did not suffer any prejudice from the delay and there was no evidence of either bad faith or a pattern of negligence on the part of the government, we find no impact on the administration of justice that would mandate dismissal with prejudice. Thus, considering each of the three factors set out in the Speedy Trial Act, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Robinson’s indictment without prejudice. We hasten to note, however, that the district court should have conducted this analysis in the first instance. No. 02-2232 United States v. Robinson Page 6 II. The District Court’s Findings Regarding Defendant’s Use of Firearms Robinson contends that the district court failed to make sufficient findings with regard to the counts of aiding and abetting the brandishing of firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence. Robinson originally asserted that the trial court erred because he was not charged in the indictment with such aiding and abetting, the jury was not instructed on the elements of that offense, and the jury did not return a verdict as to that offense. However, Robinson conceded that Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) rendered this original argument moot.1 Since Robinson now asserts a different objection, the court will review his objection using the plain error standard. Under the plain error standard “before an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights.... [I]f all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In Harris, the Supreme Court stated that whether or not a firearm was brandished within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §924 (c)(1)(A)(ii) is a sentencing factor to be determined by the judge by a preponderance of the evidence. See Harris, 520 U.S. at 568-69. Robinson contends that the district court failed to issue specific findings of fact as to whether Robinson aided and abetted the brandishing of firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence on August 5, 1999 and October 25, 1999. The district court made the following statement during the sentencing hearing regarding Robinson’s knowledge of the use of firearms by his co-defendants: And you can say, yeah, he was the [getaway] driver, but he in the Court’s estimation knew exactly what was coming down. This was a planned bank robbery. They knew what they were doing. They knew what their technique was going to be. It wasn’t one of these, they’re going to walk into the bank and see what happens. They had a technique. The technique was to terrorize everybody, bank employees, the customers, anybody that was there to terrorize them, put them into fear of their lives, and he well knew that. The Court has no doubt about that at all. J.A. 746-47. The district court’s statement regarding Robinson’s aiding and abetting in the use of firearms2 was not in error. The district court’s statement was a sufficient statement of findings regarding this matter.