Opinion ID: 2975683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Alter and Amend

Text: Cook contends that the district court erred by considering his August 25, 2005 motion as a motion to reconsider under Rule 60(b) instead of under Rule 59(e). Specifically, Cook argues that the district court should have treated his motion to reconsider as timely filed (for purposes of Rule 59(e)) on August 19, 2005 instead of the date it was actually filed—August 25, 2005. Cook reasons that his motion would have been timely but for circumstances out of his control—namely, that a district court clerk sent his counsel the wrong login and password for the ECF and that this prevented his counsel from filing the motion on time.5 We reject this argument. 5 In essence, Cook is appealing the district court’s denial of his Rule 60(b) motion to reconsider because he believes Rule 59(e) was the correct rule to apply. He does not challenge the merits of the district court’s denial of his Rule 60(b) motion. Therefore, we do not address the merits, nor do we consider Cook’s arguments concerning the underlying judgment dismissing his § 2255 petition. See GenCorp, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 477 F.3d 368, 373 (6th Cir. 2007) (“‘[A]n appeal from [the] denial of Rule 60(b) relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for review.’” (quoting Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978)) (alteration in original)). No. 06-5276 Cook v. United States Page 6 First, we note that in the recent case of Bowles v. Russell, the Supreme Court concluded that deadlines that are statutorily imposed in civil cases are mandatory and jurisdictional. --- U.S. ----, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 2364-66 (2007); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c). In reaching this conclusion, the Court clarified the distinction between jurisdictional rules (where the timelines are dictated by statute) and claim-processing rules (where the timelines are dictated by procedural rules and time prescriptions adopted by the court). Bowles, 127 S.Ct. at 2364-66. The Court concluded that jurisdictional rules are mandatory; therefore, their time limits cannot be waived. On the other hand, claim-processing rules are not jurisdictional—thus, their time limits can be waived. Id. The Court explained that, “[b]ecause [o]nly Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction . . . it was improper for courts to use the term ‘jurisdictional’ to describe emphatic time prescriptions in rules of court.” Id. at 2364. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, and second alteration in original). As such, “when an appeal has not been prosecuted in the manner directed, within the time limited by the acts of Congress, it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.” Id. at 2366 (quotation marks omitted). In light of Bowles, we recently concluded that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 6(b) are claim-processing rules because their time limits are not statutorily imposed. See National Ecological Found., et al. v. Alexander, et al., --- F.3d ----, 2007 WL 2213278, at  (6th Cir. Aug. 3, 2007). Therefore, such rules may be waived absent a timely objection. Id. However, “[a]lthough not jurisdictional, a claim-processing rule is nonetheless mandatory and ‘district courts must observe the clear limits of [time prescriptions] when they are properly invoked.’” Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 126 S.Ct. 403, No. 06-5276 Cook v. United States Page 7 406 (2005)) (second alternation in original). Pertinent to the matter before us, “[a]ll Rule 59(e) motions must ‘be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.’” Johnson v. Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539, 542 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)).6 The district court may not enlarge or extend the ten-day time limit for any party seeking relief under Rule 59(e). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). Hence, “[w]here a party’s Rule 59 motion is not filed within the mandatory 10-day period, it is appropriate for a court to consider the motion as a motion pursuant to Rule 60 for relief from judgment.” Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., 141 F.3d 264, 268 (6th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, because Rules 59(e) and 6(b) are claim-processing rules, their time prescriptions may be waived if not properly invoked. See Alexander, --- F.3d ----, 2007 WL 2213278, at ; Robinson, 480 F.3d at 1146. Here, the district court’s order denying Cook’s § 2255 petition was filed on August 5, 2005 and entered on August 8, 2005. Thus, any relief sought by Cook under Rule 59(e) should have been filed within ten days of the entry of judgment—August 22, 2005. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) and 59(e); Johnson, 357 F.3d at 542. Cook’s motion to reconsider was filed on August 25, 2005. The district court recognized that Cook’s motion to reconsider was filed outside the ten-day limitations period and properly invoked the time prescriptions, thereby construing his motion under Rule 60(b) instead of Rule 59(e). See Feathers, 141 F.3d at 268; United States v. Partin, 109 F. App’x 767, 768 (6th Cir. 2004); Fortune v. United States, 106 F. App’x 386, 387 (6th Cir. 2004). To the extent that Cook argues that the reason he failed to file within the ten-day period was 6 A timely filed Rule 59(e) tolls the running of time limitations for filing a notice of appeal until the district court rules or otherwise disposes of the motion. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). No. 06-5276 Cook v. United States Page 8 because his counsel was given an incorrect login and password to the ECF, this argument is unavailing. Even if Cook’s counsel attempted to electronically file the motion on Friday, August 19, 2005, and this attempt failed, Cook’s counsel had until Monday, August 22, 2005 to file the motion. Cook offers no evidence as to why his counsel did not attempt to re-file the motion electronically, or to file through other methods, nor does he show even that his counsel attempted to contact the clerk’s office about the problem by the end of the day on Monday. Indeed, the letter offered by Cook’s counsel explaining his late filing indicates that his eventual communication with the clerk’s office about the purported faulty password was not until August 23, 2005, after the deadline had already expired. The district court acknowledged the mandatory claim-processing rule and properly invoked the ten-day procedural rule. Accordingly, the district court did not err by refusing to treat Cook’s motion to reconsider (filed after the ten-day time period) under Rule 59(e), and therefore, did not abuse its discretion in denying Cook’s subsequent Rule 59(e) motion to alter and amend.