Opinion ID: 202976
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Malice Necessary to Overcome Conditional Privilege

Text: Having determined that Galarneau presented sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that the U-5 statement was false, we turn to Galarneau's evidence of malice. As noted above, where a statement is conditionally privileged, liability for defamation attaches only if the person who made the defamatory statements loses the privilege through abusing it. Lester, 596 A.2d at 69. As such, Merrill Lynch will have abused its conditional privilege if it knew the statement it made in the U-5 was false or if it recklessly disregarded its falsity. Id. Much of the evidence that supports a finding of falsity also supports a finding of malice. Evidence that Merrill Lynch approved the trading as it was taking place and defended the trading after it came under attack supports the jury's conclusion that the firm either knew the statement was false, or recklessly disregarded its falsity. See Rippett v. Bemis, 672 A.2d 82, 87 (Me.1996) (Evidence is sufficient to support a finding of reckless disregard for the truth if it establishes that the maker of a statement had `a high degree of awareness of probable falsity or serious doubt as to the truth of the statement.') (quoting Onat v. Penobscot Bay Med. Ctr., 574 A.2d 872, 874 (Me.1990)). Because we find there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of defamation, we affirm the district court's denial of Merrill Lynch's motion for judgment as a matter of law.