Opinion ID: 884043
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the prosecutor violate Finley's right to due process and privilege against self-incrimination by commenting on his postarrest silence and is this issue reviewable under the common law plain error doctrine?

Text: Finley concedes that his counsel failed to contemporaneously object to the prosecutor's comments at trial and that he is not able to meet the requirements of § 46-20-701(2), MCA, Montana's plain error statute. However, he urges this Court to invoke its discretionary power of common law plain error review on the premise that his claims of error affected his substantial rights and denied him a fair trial. The State contends that because Finley does not meet the requirements of the plain error statute, this Court is without authority to review on appeal his claims of error under this issue. Accordingly, in this case we are faced squarely with the question of whether the doctrine of common law plain error review can continue to survive given the existence of Montana's plain error statute. We conclude that it can and must. Statutorily, § 46-20-104, MCA, establishes the scope of appeal by a criminal defendant. Specifically, § 46-20-104 (2), MCA, provides: Upon appeal from a judgment, the court may review the verdict or decision and any alleged error objected to which involves the merits or necessarily affects the judgment. Failure to make a timely objection during trial constitutes a waiver of the objection except as provided in XX-XX-XXX(2). [Emphasis added.] Section 46-20-701, MCA, was originally enacted in 1967, by the Montana Legislature, as a statutory exception to the legislative mandate that errors not objected to at trial would not be considered on appeal. As originally enacted, § 46-20-701, MCA, mirrored the federal plain error doctrine and, in essence, codified the common law doctrine of plain error. Subsequently, in 1983, the legislature substantially amended the plain error statute. Section 46-20-701 (2), MCA, [1] now provides: (2) Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. No claim alleging an error affecting jurisdictional or constitutional rights may be noticed on appeal, if the alleged error was not objected to as provided in XX-XX-XXX, unless the defendant [convicted person] establishes that the error was prejudicial as to his guilt or punishment and that: (a) the right asserted in the claim did not exist at the time of the trial and has been determined to be retroactive in its application; (b) the prosecutor, the judge, or a law enforcement agency suppressed evidence from the defendant [convicted person] or his attorney that prevented the claim from being raised and disposed of; or (c) material and controlling facts upon which the claim is predicated were not known to the defendant [convicted person] or his attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Montana's plain error statute uniquely restricts review of errors not objected to at trial. See, e.g., Rule 52(b), Fed.R.Crim.P.; Rule 52(b), North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure; Rule 615(a), Illinois Supreme Court Rules; Rule 30.20, Missouri Rules of Criminal Procedure. On the other hand, what might be referred to as the more conventional, unrestricted doctrine of plain error review has an extensive history in common law as well as in statute. The federal judiciary and many state courts invoke the common law doctrine of plain error to prevent manifest injustice. United States v. Makhlouta (9th Cir.1986), 790 F.2d 1400; United States v. Barcenas (5th Cir.1974), 498 F.2d 1110, cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 1036, 95 S.Ct. 521, 42 L.Ed.2d 312; Armstrong v. People (Co.1985), 701 P.2d 17; Russell v. State (1995), 247 Neb. 885, 531 N.W.2d 212; Mitchell v. Class (S.D.1994), 524 N.W.2d 860. The United States Supreme Court adopted the common law doctrine of plain error in order to correct errors that affect the fundamental constitutional rights of defendants. Noting that the doctrine of plain error confers a discretion that may be exercised at any time, no matter what may have been done at some other time, the Court stated that the doctrine is most appropriately invoked when rights are asserted which are of such high character as to find expression and sanction in the Constitution or Bill of Rights. Weems v. United States (1910), 217 U.S. 349, 362, 30 S.Ct. 544, 547, 54 L.Ed. 793, 796; see also United States v. Smith (11th Cir.1983), 700 F.2d 627, 633 (stating a court is more likely to review errors of constitutional magnitude). Adoption of the federal rules of criminal procedure ratified a federal appellate court's inherent power to notice errors that are obvious, or would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Atkinson (1936), 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555, 557. State courts have also traditionally used this common law and statutory doctrine of plain error to correct obvious, fundamental, constitutional, or substantial errors. Whatever name a court chooses to use for the doctrine, courts invoke plain error review to correct error not objected to at trial but that affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. The particular facts and circumstances of each case drive the applicability of the plain error doctrine. Barcenas, 498 F.2d at 1113. Moreover, the power of such review is inherent in the appellate process itself. Appellate courts have the inherent duty to interpret the constitution and to protect individual rights set forth in the constitution and necessarily have the correlative authority to invoke the plain error doctrine in order to carry out those duties. See Marbury v. Madison (1803), 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-74, 2 L.Ed. 60; Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-5, at 21-34 (2 ed. 1987). This power to interpret the constitution and to protect individual rights stems from the constitution being the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, that courts recognize and apply. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. [T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution. Cooper v. Aaron (1958), 358 U.S. 1, 18, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 1409, 3 L.Ed.2d 5, 17. Similarly, a state's highest appellate court is supreme in the exposition of the law of that state's constitution. See State v. Leslie (1935), 100 Mont. 449, 454, 50 P.2d 959, 962 (the Montana Constitution vests in the courts the exclusive power to construe and interpret legislative acts, as well as provisions of the Constitution.); State v. Toomey (1958), 135 Mont. 35, 44, 335 P.2d 1051, 1056 (the office of interpreting legislative and constitutional provisions lies exclusively in the courts). Montana's Constitution vests the judicial power of the State in the supreme court, district courts, justice courts, and such other courts as provided by law. Art. VII, Sec. 1, Mont.Const. The supreme court has appellate jurisdiction and may issue, hear, and determine writs appropriate thereto. Art. VII, Sec. 2, Mont.Const. Thus, the Montana Supreme Court has the inherent power and obligation to interpret the constitution, to protect individual rights, and, correspondingly, to review lower court decisions and actions for error. This Court adopted the common law doctrine of plain error in a civil case, Halldorson v. Halldorson (1977), 175 Mont. 170, 573 P.2d 169. Halldorson raised the constitutional issue of due process. In Halldorson, the appellant argued that he was deprived of due process of the law because the district court terminated the trial and denied him his day in court. Halldorson, 573 P.2d at 171. The respondent argued that an objection raised for the first time on appeal is not timely and therefore the appellant waived any error by failing to object at trial. This Court noted that although the doctrine of plain error had not been recognized in Montana, it had nationwide recognition in both federal and state jurisdictions. This Court adopted the plain error doctrine by stating that: Ordinarily errors not raised below will not be considered on appeal, however this rule is subject to the exception that when the question is raised for the first time on appeal it relates to the fundamental rights of the parties.... In adopting the plain error doctrine we believe that appellate courts have a duty to determine whether the parties before them have been denied substantial justice by the trial court, and when that has occurred we can, within our sound discretion, consider whether the trial court has deprived a litigant of a fair and impartial trial, even though no objection was made to the conduct during the trial. Halldorson, 573 P.2d at 171. In subsequent criminal cases, this Court has invoked the common law plain error doctrine to review claims of plain error and has, in other cases, declined to review claimed plain error based on the requirements of Montana's plain error statute. Unfortunately, we have not always done so in a consistent or particularly understandable fashion. Without going into each case, which is unnecessary to our decision here, we note, for example, that in State v. Wilkins (1987), 229 Mont. 78, 746 P.2d 588, a case involving the criminal sale of dangerous drugs, we observed that as a general rule, this Court will not entertain issues not raised at trial. However, we further noted that general rules are not without exception and that appellate courts may invoke the doctrine of plain error to prevent manifest injustice. Wilkins, 746 P.2d at 589. In Wilkins, this Court limited the application of the plain error doctrine to those cases where it is necessary to insure a fair and impartial trial. While this interpretation of the common law doctrine of plain error is compelling, the Court failed to discuss § 46-20-701(2), MCA, as substantially amended four years prior to our decision. Accordingly, Wilkins does not serve as particularly persuasive support for the continued existence of common law plain error review in the face of the restrictive requirements of § 46-20-701(2), MCA. In State v. Voegele (1990), 243 Mont. 222, 793 P.2d 832, the defendant pleaded guilty to his third offense DUI. The Missoula County Attorney's office petitioned for revocation of the defendant's probation. The defendant made no objection to the petition, and the defendant admitted the violations of his probation. The defendant's appellate counsel appealed, contending that defendant's suspended sentence had expired when the petition to revoke was filed, thus the district court did not have jurisdiction over the matter. The State countered that absent objection below, the defendant was barred from challenging the court's jurisdiction. The defendant acknowledged that he could not meet the requirements of § 46-20-701(2), MCA. We held that discretionary review under the plain error doctrine provides a remedy to prevent manifest injustice and will only be used in exceptional cases. Voegele, 793 P.2d at 834. Because the jurisdictional error in Voegele was simply one of arithmetic, we invoked the plain error doctrine. The Court employed sound reasoning, but relied on Wilkins as authority. In contrast, in State v. Rodgers (1993), 257 Mont. 413, 849 P.2d 1028, we chose not to invoke the plain error doctrine when the defendant asserted that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. The defendant argued that despite his failure to raise any objections at the trial level, prosecutorial misconduct denied him his right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, section 24 of the Montana Constitution. We restated our previous disapproval of the prosecutor's characterizing the testimony of a witness as lies. However, we held that § 46-20-701(2), MCA, precluded us from considering an alleged error on appeal unless a timely objection had been made at trial, or unless the statutory criteria of § 46-20-701(2), MCA, had been met. Nevertheless, while we stated that a rule requiring objections at the trial level gives the trial court an opportunity to rule on the alleged error and gives the trial court the opportunity to correct itself, we also recognized our inherent power of discretionary review, and chose not to foreclose the option of invoking the plain error doctrine in a future case involving prosecutorial misconduct. Rodgers, 849 P.2d at 1032; see also State v. Arlington (1994), 265 Mont. 127, 875 P.2d 307. In Arlington, although the defendant did not contemporaneously object to the prosecutor's alleged misconduct, he requested this Court to review the alleged error under the plain error doctrine. We held that the case did not represent the exceptional case envisioned to invoke the plain error doctrine and concluded that there was no evidence of any prosecutorial misconduct, much less plain error. Arlington, 875 P.2d at 322. Given the history of our application of common law plain error review and application of § 46-20-701(2), MCA, in criminal cases, it is appropriate and necessary that we articulate an understandable rationale and rule for this and future cases. While we acknowledge the constraints of § 46-20-701(2), MCA, we also recognize our inherent power and paramount obligation to interpret Montana's Constitution and to protect the various rights set forth in that document. Accordingly, we hold that this Court may discretionarily review claimed errors that implicate a criminal defendant's fundamental constitutional rights, even if no contemporaneous objection is made and notwithstanding the inapplicability of the § 46-20-701(2), MCA, criteria, where failing to review the claimed error at issue may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, may leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings, or may compromise the integrity of the judicial process. In so holding, we do not rely on Halldorson, Wilkins, or their progeny, but rather on our inherent power of appellate review under Montana's Constitution. Moreover, given the legislature's obvious intention to restrict the use of plain error review by its enactment of § 46-20-701(2), MCA, we will henceforth use our inherent power of common law plain error review sparingly, on a case-by-case basis, and we will invoke that doctrine only in the class of cases aforementioned. In so doing, we reemphasize the necessity for contemporaneous objections to claimed error, and we caution counsel that, except in the class of cases mentioned, the provisions of § 46-20-701, MCA, will be applied in the absence of contemporaneous objection. In the instant case, we conclude that Finley's claims of error implicate his right to due process of law and his privilege against self-incrimination, both undeniably fundamental constitutional rights. Given the importance of the legal issue raised and notwithstanding Finley's failure to contemporaneously object or to bring his claims of error within § 46-20-701(2), MCA, our failure to review such claims may leave unsettled a question as to the fundamental fairness of his trial. With that in mind, we next determine whether the prosecutor's comments violated Finley's right to due process of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, section 17 of the Montana Constitution and his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, section 25 of the Montana Constitution. Finley argues that the prosecutor's cross examination and closing argument impermissibly commented on his postarrest silence and thus violated his right to due process of the law as set forth in Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, and his privilege against self-incrimination. The State counters that Doyle is not applicable to the instant case because the record does not establish that the police advised Finley of his Miranda rights. The State also argues that a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination analysis does not apply in general to a prosecutor's comments on post- Miranda silence much less to Finley's postarrest silence. In Doyle, the United States Supreme Court discussed the issue of whether a state prosecutor may seek to impeach a defendant's exculpatory story told for the first time at trial, by cross-examining the defendant about his or her failure to tell the story after receiving Miranda warnings at the time of arrest. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 616-17, 96 S.Ct. at 2243-44. The United States Supreme Court held that: While it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such circumstances it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618, 96 S.Ct. at 2245. The crux of the Court's reasoning in Doyle was the defendant's reliance on the Miranda warnings and the government's assurance that the defendant's silence would carry no penalty. For that reason, in Fletcher v. Weir (1982), 455 U.S. 603, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490, the United States Supreme Court held that [i]n the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand. Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607, 102 S.Ct. at 1312. In Fletcher, the Court distinguished Doyle, noting that the record in Fletcher did not indicate that the defendant received any Miranda warnings, whereas in Doyle, the government induced silence by implicitly assuring the defendant that his silence would not be used against him. The Court was unwilling to broaden the Doyle analysis to an instance where the record did not support a conclusion that the police gave the defendant his Miranda rights. Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605-06, 102 S.Ct. at 1311-12. Similarly, in State v. Sadowski (1991), 247 Mont. 63, 76, 805 P.2d 537, 545, this Court chose not to broaden the Doyle analysis to include comments made on prearrest silence, i.e., before Miranda warnings were given. We reasoned that Doyle was based on principles of fundamental fairness that a defendant's silence after receipt of governmental assurances [would] not be used against him. Sadowski, 805 P.2d at 545 (citing State v. Furlong (1984), 213 Mont. 251, 258, 690 P.2d 986, 989). In Sadowski, this Court also held that there was no plain error or Doyle violation where the defense opened the door for the prosecutor's questioning on defendant's post- Miranda silence when the defendant raised the issue of his earlier silence and characterized it as proof of his innocence, and where he failed to object to the State's reference to that same silence, but then alleged that admission of such evidence constituted plain reversible error. Sadowski, 805 P.2d at 546. In Furlong, the defendant argued that the prosecutor's comments regarding the defendant's silence at the time of arrest, denied him due process of the law. We held that the Doyle analysis applied to and prohibited the State from seeking to impeach a defendant's exculpatory statement, told for the first time at trial, by commenting on the defendant's post- Miranda silence. Furlong, 690 P.2d at 989. In so holding, this Court reasoned that the Doyle analysis does not, however, apply to prearrest silence where the defendant has not been assured of the right to remain silent. Furlong, 690 P.2d at 989. In the instant case, the record does not support a conclusion that Finley received any Miranda warnings. Therefore, without evidence supporting that he was assured of his right to remain silent and a subsequent penalty for asserting that right, we hold that there was no Doyle error here. Finley also contends, however, that the prosecutor's comments on his failure to give his exculpatory statements until trial, violated his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and under Article II, section 25 of the Montana Constitution. The State contends that no United States Supreme Court opinion supports Finley's claim that adverse comments on post- Miranda silence violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In Doyle, the defendants argued not only that the state violated their rights to due process but also argued that the state violated their Fifth Amendment privileges against self-incrimination. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 626, 96 S.Ct. at 2248. The majority of the Court found it unnecessary to reach the additional issue of defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. In his dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, Justice Stevens expressed no doubt of the propriety of the cross examination of the defendant's failure to mention the purported frame at the time of arrest, but noted that the questions regarding defendant's failure to generally mention the frame before trial presented a more difficult question. Nonetheless, he opined that following current United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, a state court is free to regard the defendant's decision to take the stand as a waiver of his objection to the use of his failure to testify at an earlier proceeding or his failure to offer his version of the events prior to trial. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 628-33, 96 S.Ct. at 2251-52. In Jenkins v. Anderson (1980), 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86, the United States Supreme Court considered the question of whether the use of prearrest silence to impeach a defendant's credibility violates either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 232, 100 S.Ct. at 2126 (emphasis added). In Jenkins, the prosecutor attempted to impeach the defendant's credibility by suggesting that the defendant would have spoken out if he had in fact killed in self defense. The Court noted that [t]he Fifth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to remain silent during his criminal trial, and prevents the prosecution from commenting on the silence of a defendant who asserts the right. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 235, 100 S.Ct. at 2127. In Jenkins, the defendant did not remain silent throughout the criminal proceeding, but instead voluntarily took the witness stand in his own defense. The Court held that inquiry into prior silence may be proper because the immunity from giving testimony is one which the defendant may waive by offering himself or herself as a witness. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 235, 100 S.Ct. at 2127-28 (citing Raffel v. United States (1926), 271 U.S. 494, 46 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed. 1054). The Court concluded that the use of prearrest silence to impeach a criminal defendant's credibility does not violate the Fifth Amendment because the defendant is subject to cross examination impeaching his credibility just like any other witness. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 237-38, 100 S.Ct. at 2128-29. Here the prosecutor's comments regarding Finley's postarrest silence are similar to the prosecutor's comments regarding the defendant's prearrest silence in Jenkins because the comments were made before Finley was advised of any Miranda rights. In fact, the record here, does not show that Finley was ever advised of his Miranda rights. Finley voluntarily chose to take the stand, and as such, his credibility was subject to impeachment just like any other witness. While our opinion here should not be read as condoning the prosecutor's comments, in this instance where the record does not support a conclusion that Finley was advised of his Miranda rights, the comments did not infringe on his privilege against self-incrimination under either the Fifth Amendment or under Article II, section 25 of Montana's Constitution. After reviewing the claimed violation of Finley's fundamental constitutional rights under the plain error doctrine, we conclude that the comments made by the prosecutor did not implicate Doyle error nor did such comments infringe upon Finley's privilege against self-incrimination.