Opinion ID: 1665171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Trial Court Properly Denied Directed Verdict as to Indecent Exposure Charge.

Text: Harp contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict on the indecent exposure charge. We disagree. [47] The familiar standard for ruling on a motion for directed verdict is as follows: On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony. On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. [48] A person commits the offense of indecent exposure in the first degree if he intentionally exposes his genitals under circumstances in which he knows or should know that his conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm to a person under the age of eighteen (18) years. [49] The jury instruction on this charge was in accordance with KRS 510.148(1). Nevertheless, Harp contends that the indecent exposure charge merged with the sexual abuse charge. B.B. testified that once Harp showed her his penis and masturbated in front of her to the point of ejaculation. That specific episode could not have been simultaneously covered by a sexual abuse charge because exposure of Harp's penis without any touching of or by B.B. would have been insufficient to have constituted sexual abuse. [50] Thus, it was clearly not unreasonable for the jury to find Harp guilty of indecent exposure. [51]