Opinion ID: 184660
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prosecutor's Improper Remarks

Text: 24 Appellant argues that the prosecutor's closing argument was improper and prejudicial because it interposed the issue of race into the case with the intent of disparaging defense counsel and of fostering an identification of the prosecutor with the jury at the expense of defense counsel. The comments of which appellant complains arose from the prosecutor's apparent effort to rebut appellant's misidentification defense. At trial, appellant constructed a defense of misidentification based on the fact that all three men apprehended in the car in which the Glock was found basically fit the general description given by Hazelton to Creamer and that, in fact, one of these men, Kelvin Spinner, was approximately the same height and weight as appellant, was bald, had some sort of hat with him when arrested, and was seated directly behind the passenger seat under which the Glock was found. 25 In an apparent attempt to rebut this misidentification defense, the prosecutor made the following argument in reference to photographs of appellant and the three other men arrested that night: 26 Now you are going to have government's exhibits nos. 21-A, 21-B, 21-C, and 21-D. Now, if you think everybody looks alike, then maybe 21-A and -B, you can think that [Hazelton] made a mistake, ladies and gentlemen. But don't fall prey to, we all look alike, because [Hazelton] knew the difference. 27 4/11/97 Tr. at 629. On rebuttal, the prosecutor returned to this argument: Again, we don't all look alike, ladies and gentlemen. 4/11/97 Tr. at 669. 28 Appellant argues that the obvious suggestion underlying the prosecutor's remarks was that defense counsel's misidentification theory was itself based on a racial stereotype of the they all look alike variety. 13 The government argues that the more natural interpretation of her remark is that people in general do not all look alike, a neutral and inoffensive observation. It is true, as this court has noted, that courts  'should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning'  or that a jury  'will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations.'  United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 1441 (D.C.Cir.1984) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)). However, the prosecutor did repeat her we don't all look alike argument and there can be no gainsaying that the remark is instantly recognizable as a reference to racial stereotyping. Regrettably, we find under the circumstances that the risk was altogether too real that a juror would take from this reference the distinct impression that the prosecutor herself believed defense counsel to be flirting with racial stereotyping in constructing his misidentification defense. 14 29 Moreover, these references arose in the context of what must reasonably be read as a marked attempt by the prosecutor to portray defense counsel as an interloper in a world to which the other trial participants--the prosecutor, the defendant, Hazelton and the jurors--belonged. Defense counsel attempted in closing argument to challenge Hazelton's credibility by noting, among other things, that Hazelton was barely 17 at the time the incident occurred. 15 In her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor argued the following: 30 In Mr. Boss's [defense counsel's] world, 17-year-old boys don't have to have those responsibilities. In Mr. Boss's world, people don't come of age if they can drink alcohol, people who don't come of age become responsible until they can vote. In the District of Columbia, people come of age when they have to come of age, ladies and gentlemen. 31