Opinion ID: 1098403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: law jury issue on undue influence

Text: It is cogently argued that no jury issue at all was made on undue influence, but even viewed in the best possible light for the contestants, at the least the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. It is pointed out that Mrs. Vick on her own wrote a handwritten will on June 24, 1981, reflecting full comprehension of her wishes, that Mr. Finch was her attorney and no one else's, and that on April 5, 1982, she clearly reaffirmed her wishes by executing the will. Later, Mr. Finch sent her a statement for legal services rendered, and on June 18, 1982, she paid him by a check entirely in her own handwriting. On August 3, 1984, she wrote Mr. Finch to send her a copy of her will, which he did, and it is argued she re-adopted the will by not requesting any further changes. She never in any way expressed to her attorney a desire to change her will. It is further pointed out that Conner was the only person she could have depended on for immediate personal needs, Willola being 70 miles away in Memphis, and Jane several hundred miles away in Texas. There was no proof of Willola having anything to do with employing Mr. Finch when the will was written, consulting with him, or paying him for legal services. To the contrary, all the evidence clearly shows Mr. Finch considered himself the exclusive attorney for Mrs. Vick, and obligated to look after her interest alone, which he manifestly did quite well. We are reminded of the most solemn obligation any court can have: to see that the true intent of the testator is carried out. Costello v. Hall, 506 So.2d 293 (Miss. 1987), and further that it is not the court's function to decide whether a will was in fact unfair or unjust, Matter of Last Will of Dickey, 542 So.2d 903 (Miss. 1989), this being for the sole determination of the testator. Indeed, there is no Constitutional right more jealously safeguarded than the absolute freedom of a testator to dispose of his own property as he chooses. This is his business, and his business alone. These are well known and accepted principles of law. While we fully agree with counsel's argument, there is another facet, ignored by counsel. Mrs. Vick was convinced that her husband was leaving all his property consisting of 750 acres, and solely in his name, to the boys. This motivated her to get from him a warranty deed to her of an undivided one-half interest in his property. In all likelihood, in Mr. Vick's physical and mental condition at the time, she could have secured a deed from him of his entire interest. She did not do this, however, but only a deed to an undivided one-half interest. The purpose of this was to see that, while Mr. Vick might himself wish to will all his property to his sons, the total interest they received would not exceed an undivided one-half interest. She thus preserved an undivided one-half interest for their three daughters. She clearly showed two things on her mind: she had no desire to deprive the sons of an undivided one-half interest, and also, the most she wanted for the girls was an undivided one-half interest. Mrs. Vick's intent, as so clearly testified by Mrs. Still, the proponents' own witness, was to see that all the children were treated equally. It was only because she thought Mr. Vick was willing all his property to the sons that she was herself leaving the entire one-half interest deeded to her to the daughters. This was for the jury to hear and take into due account. But, ah, Mrs. Vick was mistaken! We will never know whether the conviction she had as to Mr. Vick's planned disposition of his property was a well-founded or unfounded suspicion. The failure of the children to cooperate with Mr. Finch, and the sons' placing Mr. Vick under a conservatorship without saying anything to her certainly added to her fears. The point, however, is that she believed it, acted upon it, and was mistaken as events developed. This, too, the jury heard and could take into account. Nor, could it have escaped the jury's attention that had Mrs. Vick been completely satisfied in her own mind that Mr. Vick's will was treating all the children equally, and that there would not be any deviation from this, she probably would have had no desire to write a will as she did. The jury could have, and may very well have concluded that the will Mrs. Vick wrote, and the will she executed, in fact accomplished a result she did not intend, and would never have written had she known events would develop as they did. Indeed, the jury could have concluded that only by setting aside Mrs. Vick's will could her genuine desire be accomplished. A mistaken belief of an extrinsic fact, even though it causes a testator to make a will differently than he otherwise would had he known the truth is insufficient to avoid a will. As was stated by the New Jersey court in Re Gluckman's Will, 87 N.J. Eq. 638, 101 A. 295 (1917): It is more important that the probate of the wills of deceased persons be effectively shielded from the attacks of a multitude of fictitious mistakes than that it be purged of wills containing a few real mistakes. The latter a testator may by due care avoid in his lifetime. Against the former he would be helpless. In this case, however, there was ample evidence from which the jury could have concluded that Willola, whether she in fact did or did not, significantly contributed by her statements and conduct to Mrs. Vick's reaching the conclusion that Mr. Vick was favoring the boys. Mrs. Vick may in fact have reached this conclusion on her own, unassisted by either Willola or Jane. Fraud and undue influence can only be proved by circumstantial evidence, however, and there was sufficient evidence in this record for the jury to conclude that Willola played a material role in implanting this firm conviction in Mrs. Vick's mind. Woodville v. Pizzati, 119 Miss. 442, 81 So. 127 (1919); Jamison v. Jamison, 96 Miss. 288, 51 So. 130 (1910). The question arising, therefore, is this: If the jury believed, as they very well may have believed from the evidence, that Willola played a material part in implanting in Mrs. Vick's mind the mistaken belief that Mr. Vick was excluding his daughters and leaving all of his property to his sons, is this ground for setting aside the will? This, of course, is not simply undue influence practiced by a strong and overpowering person on a weak person, but undue influence by deception as well. Should the girls be permitted to benefit from a misrepresentation which caused Mrs. Vick to execute this will? This is the first time this question has been before this Court. We cannot in this case unravel the secrets behind the bond between parent and child, child and parent, husband and wife. It is beyond cavil that one member of a family can very well be peculiarly vulnerable to entreaties, blandishments, threats from another member. A person to someone outside the family may be as fixed as the Rock of Gibraltar, but the solidity melts at the approach of another member of the family. There is generally a subtle recognition by one family member of what tune to play to get another member of the family to dance. Jamison v. Jamison, supra . In this case there was direct evidence of persistent efforts by Willola to get Mrs. Vick to secure for her some interest in the Vicks' property. There was also direct and circumstantial evidence from which the jury could conclude she used undue influence by constantly badgering Mrs. Vick when she was well advanced in years and in failing health. Likewise, there was, as noted, sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Willola played a material part in convincing Mrs. Vick that Mr. Vick had devised all his real property to their sons. Thus, there was evidence of undue influence exercised through a coupling of threats and entreaties with misrepresentation. In the treatise, 1 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills, § 14.3, 694 (rev. 1960), there is a distinction made between fraud and undue influence: Though the similarity between fraud and undue influence has often been pointed out, there is a very clear cut difference between the two concepts. Undue influence consists in exerting sufficient pressure or influence upon the testator to break down his will power and overcome his free agency or free will so that he is unable to keep from doing that which he would not otherwise do. Such undue influence need not involve the use of false and fraudulent need not involve the use of false and fraudulent representations or untrue statements. Unrelenting importunity that employs the use of perfectly true and accurate information may become so overbearing as to constitute undue influence, though such could not by any means constitute fraud. Fraud on the other hand need not involve the overpowering of the testator's free agency or will power, though it is by no means impossible that false statements may be so used to harass the testator to the point that he is both tricked and deprived of his will power. The basic ingredient of fraud however is that the testator is deceived through the use of false information, so that his free will or free agency, of which he is not deprived, is exercised upon the basis of false information. While the above observations are quite accurate, it is likewise true that one of the many ways of effecting undue influence upon a testator is by misrepresentation of fact. The misrepresentation may be made with the deliberate intent to deceive, knowing full well that it is false, as well as recklessly made without regard to its truth or falsity. In order to set aside a will resulting solely from the misrepresentation of a beneficiary, it must first, of course, be established that the representation was not true and actually influenced the testator to make a will he would not otherwise have made, that but for the misrepresentation by the beneficiary, the will would have been entirely different. 79 Am.Jur.2d, § 410; McCartney v. Holmquist, 70 App. D.C. 334, 106 F.2d 855, 126 A.L.R. 375 (1939); Re Shell's Estate, 28 Colo. 167, 63 P. 413 (1900); Terry v. Buffington, 11 Ga. 337 (1852); Ginter v. Ginter, 79 Kan. 721, 101 P. 634 (1909); Davis v. Calvert, 5 Gill & J. 269 (Md. 1833); Gockel v. Gockel, 66 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. 1933), 92 A.L.R. 784; Re Gluckman's Will, 87 N.J. Eq. 638, 101 A. 295 (1917). Also, 94 C.J.S. Wills, § 222, note 75. In re Pohlmann's Estate, 89 Cal. App.2d 563, 201 P.2d 446 (1949); Duckett v. Duckett, 134 F.2d 527, 77 U.S.App. D.C. 303 (1943); In re Hollis' Estate, 234 Iowa 761, 12 N.W.2d 576 (1944); Leonard v. Stanton, 93 N.H. 113, 36 A.2d 271 (1944); Corpus Juris cited in In re Beneway's Will, 272 App.Div. 463, 71 N.Y.S.2d 361, 366 (1947); Morin v. Morin, 332 Mass. 223, 124 N.E.2d 251 (1955); O'Brien v. Collins, 315 Mass. 429, 53 N.E.2d 222 (1944); Mirick v. Phelps, 297 Mass. 250, 8 N.E.2d 749 (1937); Neill v. Brackett, 234 Mass. 367, 126 N.E. 93 (1920); In re Dand's Estate, 41 Wash.2d 158, 247 P.2d 1016 (1952); In re Bottger's Estate, 14 Wash.2d 676, 129 P.2d 518 (1942); Matter of Robinson's Estate, 231 Kan. 300, 644 P.2d 420 (1982); In re Spillette's Estate, 352 Mich. 12, 88 N.W.2d 300 (1958); In re Miller's Estate, 206 Or. 358, 292 P.2d 504 (1956); Matter of Weickum's Estate, 317 N.W.2d 142 (S.D. 1982); In re Ford's Estate, 19 Wis.2d 436, 120 N.W.2d 647 (1963); 68 C.J.S., p. 741, n. 2. In decisions from other jurisdictions, it has also generally been held that in order to invalidate a will resulting from a misrepresentation of an extrinsic fact, it must be shown that the beneficiary actually knew the representation to be false, and intended to deceive. 94 C.J.S., Wills, § 222, p. 1063; In re Newhall's Estate, 190 Cal. 709, 214 P. 231, 28 A.L.R. 778 (1923); 79 A.Jur.2d Wills, § 411, p. 656, n. 56, 57; Gockel v. Gockel, supra; 66 S.W.2d 867, 92 A.L.R. 784, In re Whitmarsh's Estate, 133 Misc. 858, 234 N.Y.S. 505 (1929). Page on Wills, supra, has some objection to this rule, § 14.1, pp. 690-691: There are a number of arguments one may use to question the desirability of the rule that a gift or an entire will induced by an innocent misrepresentation will be allowed to stand and that the heir or other disappointed person who would have taken but for the misrepresentation will be given no relief. While innocent misrepresentation occupies a place midway between mistake and fraud, its consequences, as far as they concern the validity of the instrument induced thereby, ought to be those of fraud rather than of mistake. Apart from the difficulty of showing a knowledge of falsity at the time that the misrepresentations are made, one who has obtained unfair advantage by a falsehood ought not to be permitted to retain it, even if he was acting in good faith when he made such statement. Page agrees that while a mistake as to an extrinsic fact made by the testator on his own affords no ground for setting aside a will, the situation is different when the mistake is caused by a misrepresentation made to him by a beneficiary, § 14.1, p. 691: It should be pointed out that while mistake in the inducement, for which relief is denied and the will is upheld as it is, is completely subjective and wholly within the testator's own mind, innocent misrepresentation has certain objective manifestations similar to those of fraud and undue influence in that the cause of the testator's mistaken frame of mind is caused by the conduct of a third person. Thus, for the court to inquire into the existence of innocent misrepresentation is not quite as hazardous as to inquire into mistake, for there would be some difference in the evidence available and less likelihood that the court would reach an improper conclusion on the facts. To prove an innocent misrepresentation should be no more difficult than to prove a fraudulent one... . And, in the California Supreme Court in the case of In re Arnold's Estate, 147 Cal. 583, 82 P. 252, 254 (1905), held that a misrepresentation made in bad faith could invalidate a will, even though the beneficiary believed the statement true: If he was acting in bad faith for the purpose of procuring the execution of the new will, the fact that he actually believed to be true some of the false representations by which he obtained the undue influence required would not make the transaction an innocent one, nor render a will so procured valid. The record reveals that in the Vick children fear, and its twin offspring greed and envy, ran rampant. We hold that there was no requirement under the facts of this case for the proof to show that Willola or Jane in fact knew the statement that Mr. Vick had devised all of his property to his sons was in fact false. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude it was made in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity, and no more should be required. Moreover, such statements could hardly be classified innocent misrepresentations made in good faith. Finally, neither Willola nor Jane could complain in the jury securing for them precisely that for which they contended all along during their parents' lives, an equal division of the property between all the children. We therefore conclude that under the facts of this case there was sufficient evidence of undue influence exercised upon Mrs. Vick, in the absence of which she would not have executed the will she made.