Opinion ID: 2144159
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Physical Invasion

Text: In its complaint, Hartford alleged that its subrogors were evacuated from their places of business. Hartford concludes that the evacuation was an unreasonable and substantial invasion of plaintiffs' property. Thus, according to Hartford, the complaint states a cause of action for nuisance as to all of its subrogors. A private nuisance is a substantial invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of his or her land. The invasion must be: substantial, either intentional or negligent, and unreasonable. Pasulka v. Koob, 170 Ill.App.3d 191, 208, 121 Ill.Dec. 179, 524 N.E.2d 1227 (1988); Statler v. Catalano, 167 Ill.App.3d 397, 403, 118 Ill.Dec. 283, 521 N.E.2d 565 (1988). The standard for determining if particular conduct constitutes a nuisance is the conduct's effect on a reasonable person. Belmar Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n, 34 Ill.2d 544, 547, 216 N.E.2d 788 (1966). The type of invasion that nuisance protects differs from the type of invasion that trespass protects. A trespass is an invasion of the interest in the exclusive possession of land, as by entry upon it.    A nuisance is an interference with the interest in the private use and enjoyment of the land, and does not require interference with the possession. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D, Comment d, at 101 (1979); see Colwell Systems, Inc. v. Henson, 117 Ill.App.3d 113, 116-17, 72 Ill.Dec. 636, 452 N.E.2d 889 (1983). Agreeing with the trial court, the appellate court held that some type of invasion is necessary to state an action for nuisance and that the physical invasion of water constituted such an invasion.    [W]e affirm the trial court's decision to dismiss only those plaintiffs whose property was not physically invaded by the flood. Hartford assigns error to this holding. Hartford argues that [t]he sine qua non of nuisance is not `invasion' of plaintiff's premises, but rather the use of land by one party that interferes with the ability of another to enjoy and use his own property. Invasion may be coincidental to a successful claim for private nuisance, but it is not mandatory. We cannot accept Hartford's contention. It is true that a private nuisance is described as a substantial interference with another's use and enjoyment of his or her property. Nonetheless, that interference is generally and traditionally thought of as an invasion, albeit a nontrespassory one. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D, at 100 (1979); 3 J. Lee & B. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law § 35.04, at 197 (1990). In other words, the interference with the use and enjoyment of property must consist of an invasion by something perceptible to the senses. In private nuisance, the typical activity at issue does not result in a crass physical invasion, as in trespass, but rather results in an invasion of another's use and enjoyment of his or her property. 1 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, Torts § 1.23, at 82-83 (2d ed. 1986); 3 J. Lee & B. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law § 35.10, at 203 (1990); see, e.g., Woods v. Khan, 95 Ill.App.3d 1087, 1090, 51 Ill.Dec. 470, 420 N.E.2d 1028 (1981) (The invasion of their land [by odors and flies] was both substantial and intentional). This court has repeatedly described a nuisance as something that is offensive, physically, to the senses and by such offensiveness makes life uncomfortable. Rosehill Cemetery Co. v. City of Chicago, 352 Ill. 11, 30, 185 N.E. 170 (1933) (and cases cited therein). Typical examples would be smoke, fumes, dust, vibration, or noise produced by defendant on his own land and impairing the use and enjoyment of neighboring land. 1 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, Torts § 1.23, at 76 (2d ed. 1986); see 3 J. Lee & B. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law § 35.11 (1990). Thus, as the appellate court noted, Illinois courts have allowed nuisance actions where the alleged invasion consisted of, e.g., noise and odors ( People ex rel. Traiteur v. Abbott, 27 Ill. App.3d 277, 282, 327 N.E.2d 130 (1975)), or odors and flies from a poultry farm ( Woods, 95 Ill.App.3d at 1090, 51 Ill.Dec. 470, 420 N.E.2d 1028); another example of a nuisance is the shooting of a bullet into another's home ( Statler, 167 Ill.App.3d at 403, 118 Ill. Dec. 283, 521 N.E.2d 565). In the present case, Hartford does not allege that those businesses whose property was not physically invaded by the flood waters suffered any other type of invasion of the use and enjoyment of their property. There is no allegation of noxious fumes or disagreeable odors, other types of seepage, disagreeable noises, or any other type of invasion. We assume that the evacuation of those businesses was psychologically depressing. However, absent any perceptible element that would influence the physical senses to make the location of those businesses less desirable, the complaint fails to state a cause of action for private nuisance. See Rosehill, 352 Ill. at 28-30, 185 N.E. 170.