Opinion ID: 1057707
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Stricken Testimony at Trial

Text: Our conclusion that the post-conviction court erred in striking this testimony does not end our inquiry. As set forth above, the stricken testimony supports Petitioner's claim of deficient performance only if this evidence would have been admissible at trial. The testimony at issue centered around statements allegedly made by Ms. Davis which implicated her in the victim's death. At trial, these statements would have been offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted: that Ms. Davis, not Petitioner, was responsible for the victim's death. Accordingly, at trial, these statements would have been properly characterized as hearsay. Generally, hearsay statements are not admissible. Tenn. R. Evid. 802. Hearsay statements may be admitted if they qualify as one or more of the enumerated hearsay exceptions. See Tenn. R. Evid. 803, 804. One of these exceptions is for a statement which . . . at the time of its making . . . so far tended to subject the declarant to . . . criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. Tenn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). Proof of a statement against penal interest, however, is not admissible under this exception to the hearsay rule unless the proponent of the proof demonstrates that the declarant is unavailable. Tenn. R. Evid. 804(b). In the context of a criminal trial, a declarant is unavailable if she: (1) [i]s exempted by ruling of the court on grounds of privilege from testifying; (2) refuses to testify despite a court order; (3) [d]emonstrates a lack of memory; (4) [i]s unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of . . . death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or (5) is absent from the hearing because of the inability to procure her attendance by process. Tenn. R. Evid. 804(a). The declarant of each of the statements in question is Ms. Davis. Had trial counsel called her to the witness stand at trial, she could have done one of three things. First, in response to questions about her responsibility for the victim's death, she could have refused to answer pursuant to her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. [27] See Dotson, 254 S.W.3d at 392 & n. 11. In that event, the trial court could have declared her exempt from testifying and she would have been deemed unavailable for purposes of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(a)(1). Id. Petitioner's witnesses could then have testified about her out-of-court statements pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). See id. Second, Ms. Davis could have responded by denying any involvement in the victim's death and denying that she had ever made any inculpatory statements. In that event, Petitioner's witnesses could have testified about Ms. Davis' alleged statements in order to impeach her credibility. See Tenn. R. Evid. 613(b). Third, Ms. Davis could have admitted to having made the inculpatory statements. In that event, the other witnesses' testimony about those statements would have been inadmissible hearsay. However, Ms. Davis' own admissions then would have been helpful to Petitioner's case. Because Ms. Davis did not testify at the post-conviction hearing, we do not know how she would have responded had she been called to testify at trial. However, under any of the three scenarios discussed above, trial counsel could have presented to the jury proof about Ms. Davis' inculpatory statements either directly through Ms. Davis or through Ms. Defosio, Ms. Jackson, Mrs. Wilson, Mr. Harris, Mr. Pylant, and Ms. Mills. In its brief to this Court, the State argues that petitioner's failure to produce Ms. Davis during his post-conviction hearing precludes a finding that he was prejudiced by her absence at trial and therefore obviates his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The State relies on Black for the proposition that, to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call a witness at trial, a post-conviction petitioner should present that witness at the post-conviction hearing. 794 S.W.2d. at 757. As a general rule, this is the only way the petitioner can establish that . . . the failure to have a known witness present or call the witness to the stand resulted in the denial of critical evidence which inured to the prejudice of the petitioner. Id. (emphasis added). This case does not fit the general rule, however, because Petitioner presented the critical evidence of Ms. Davis' alleged inculpatory statements through other witnessesan acceptable alternative strategy under the unique circumstances of this case given the very real possibility that Ms. Davis would refuse to testify to any such admissions and/or her alleged culpability in the victim's death. We emphasize, however, that post-conviction counsel generally risks the denial of a post-conviction claim if he or she fails to call at the post-conviction hearing all witnesses who they claim should have been called at trial.