Opinion ID: 695155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Conscious-Avoidance Instruction

Text: 52 Hopkins also challenges the district court's instruction that the jury could find that Hopkins had the equivalent of knowledge if it found that there was a high probability that employees of Spirol were tampering with a monitoring device or method but [Hopkins] deliberately and consciously avoided confirming this fact so that he could deny knowledge if apprehended. Hopkins argues that such an instruction was inappropriate because it was contrary to the government's contention that he had actual knowledge. His challenge has no merit. 53 A conscious-avoidance charge is appropriate when (a) the element of knowledge is in dispute, and (b) the evidence would permit a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and consciously avoided confirming that fact, United States v. Rodriguez, 983 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir.1993). See generally United States v. Civelli, 883 F.2d 191, 194-95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 966, 110 S.Ct. 409, 107 L.Ed.2d 374 (1989). Such an instruction is not inappropriate merely because the government has primarily attempted to prove that the defendant had actual knowledge, while urging in the alternative that if the defendant lacked such knowledge it was only because he had studiously sought to avoid knowing what was plain. See, e.g., United States v. Mang Sun Wong, 884 F.2d 1537, 1541 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1082, 110 S.Ct. 1140, 107 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1990). 54 Both prerequisites for a conscious-avoidance instruction were present here. Though Hopkins did not testify at trial, his knowledge plainly was in dispute, for the thrust of his cross-examination and arguments was that he did not know about the tampering. For example, in his closing argument, defense counsel argued that Hopkins could have corrected matters if [he] had known what was going on. (Tr. at 253.) Further, though there was ample evidence that Hopkins himself had ordered the tampering with the samples that were to be sent to the laboratory, there was also evidence that he had studiously avoided confirming the tampering. Morrison testified, for example, that on 25-30 occasions when he presented Hopkins with satisfactory samples after having previously presented him with unsatisfactory samples, Hopkins said, I know nothing, I hear nothing. In light of Hopkins's litigation position and the evidence at trial, the district court did not err in instructing the jury that it could find Hopkins guilty based upon his conscious attempt to avoid actual knowledge that the samples had been falsified.