Opinion ID: 2045911
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Does Chapter 229A Violate Morrow's Right to Due Process?

Text: Due process requires fundamental fairness in a judicial proceeding. In re R.B., 493 N.W.2d 897, 898 (Iowa App.1992). Morrow claims that it was impossible for him to have a fair trial before a jury in view of the evidence that he had committed sexually violent offenses in the past. He argues that a jury would find him to be a sexually violent predator on the basis of [his] bad character. Litigants cannot challenge the constitutionality of a statute unless they can show they have been injured by it. Norland v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 578 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1998). Here, the State withdrew its jury demand and the respondent's trial was to the court. Accordingly, the respondent cannot show that he was injured by the provision in the statute allowing a jury trial at the State's request. No evidence of prior bad acts or prior convictions was placed before a jury and, therefore, the respondent was not subjected to the asserted risk that the jury would misuse such evidence. Moreover, Morrow's due process claim cannot be saved on the ground that the possibility of a jury trial caused him to agree to a trial on a stipulated record in exchange for the State's waiver of a jury. At trial, the respondent's attorney stated: After reviewing the record in total, including the great number of documents that [the State] provided from the Department of Corrections, I concluded that even though the standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, no sufficient defense could be raised to the facts, and that is another reason we're stipulating here today. Morrow also acknowledges in his brief that one of the reasons he agreed to a trial on stipulated facts was to protect his privacy. It is also clear the respondent has never contended the risk that evidence of prior bad acts and convictions would be misused existed in a bench trial. As the respondent acknowledges in his brief, A judge... is experienced in weighing the effect of prior acts on the present elements at issue. In view of the procedural history of this case, we conclude that the respondent has not been injured by the statute's provision for a jury trial at the State's request. Therefore, he cannot challenge the constitutionality of chapter 229A on this basis. AFFIRMED. All justices concur except NEUMAN, J., who takes no part.