Opinion ID: 1736896
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Florida's Slip and Fall Law

Text: All premises owners owe a duty to their invitees to exercise reasonable care to maintain their premises in a safe condition. See, e.g., Everett v. Restaurant & Catering Corp., 738 So.2d 1015, 1016 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). Despite this general proposition, when a person slips and falls on a transitory foreign substance, the rule has developed that the injured person must prove that the premises owner had actual knowledge or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition in that the condition existed for such a length of time that in the exercise of ordinary care, the premises owner should have known of it and taken action to remedy it. Colon v. Outback Steakhouse of Florida, Inc., 721 So.2d 769, 771 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). [4] Constructive knowledge may be established by circumstantial evidence showing that: (1) the dangerous condition existed for such a length of time that in the exercise of ordinary care, the premises owner should have known of the condition; or (2) the condition occurred with regularity and was therefore foreseeable. Brooks v. Phillip Watts Enter., Inc., 560 So.2d 339, 341 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). In the latter category, evidence of recurring or ongoing problems that could have resulted from operational negligence or negligent maintenance becomes relevant to the issue of foreseeability of a dangerous condition. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reggie, 714 So.2d 601, 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Nance v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 436 So.2d 1075, 1076 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). In both Owens and Soriano, the appellate courts determined that the aging condition of the banana alone was insufficient to survive a directed verdict because the aging appearance, without more, was insufficient to show the storeowners' constructive knowledge. The last time this Court addressed the issue of the quantum of circumstantial evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on constructive notice was nearly thirty years ago in Montgomery. In Montgomery, this Court upheld a jury verdict for the plaintiff where the plaintiff presented evidence that she had been in the area of the fall for fifteen minutes before falling; no other shoppers were in the area when she fell; no employee swept the floor while she was there; two employees were nearby when the accident occurred; the collard leaf upon which she slipped was old, wilted and dirty looking; and water was on the floor where she fell. 281 So.2d at 303. As Judge Sharp correctly pointed out in her dissent in Owens, we did not determine in Montgomery whether the condition of the collard leaf alone would have been sufficient to establish constructive notice of a dangerous condition. Owens, 729 So.2d at 451 (Sharp, J. dissenting). Instead, we noted that constructive notice may be proved, like any fact, by circumstantial evidence. Montgomery, 281 So.2d at 304. We stated that [s]ince there was a conflict in the evidence, the trial court properly submitted the matter to the jury. Id. at 303. Since Montgomery, Florida's appellate courts have struggled to determine whether in a given case sufficient evidence exists to create a jury question on the issue of constructive notice. Depending on the description of the transitory foreign substance, some appellate courts have concluded that the appearance of the transitory foreign substance may in itself be sufficient to create a jury question on constructive notice. See Ramey v. Winn Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 710 So.2d 191, 192-93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (partially melted butter with lumps in it); Woods v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 621 So.2d 710, 711 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (unidentified substance described as very dirty, trampled, containing skid marks, scuff marks, and chewed up); Ress v. X-tra Super Food Ctrs., Inc., 616 So.2d 110, 110-11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (substance that appeared to be sauerkraut was gunky, dirty and wet and black); Hodges v. Walsh, 553 So.2d 221, 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (sticky substance in bowling alley had dried); Washington v. Pic-N-Pay Supermarket, Inc., 453 So.2d 508, 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (collard green leaves were old, nasty and looked like they had been there for quite a while); Camina v. Parliament Ins. Co., 417 So.2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (ice cream was thawed, dirty, and splattered). The Third District's decision in Newalk v. Florida Supermarkets, Inc., 610 So.2d 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), illustrates a case where the court concluded that the condition of a transitory foreign substance created a jury question on constructive notice. In Newalk, the court held that testimony that oil spots were on the floor and that the spots appeared old was in itself sufficient for the question of liability to go to the jury. Id. at 529-30. In determining that the trial court correctly denied the supermarket's motion for directed verdict, the court stated: Newalk's friend's testimony that oil spots were on the floor and that the spots appeared old was as least some evidence indicating the unidentified spots were present for a sufficient length of time for the owners in their exercise of reasonable care to have acted to remedy the condition. Thus, because the testimony of Newalk's friend was at least some evidence of negligence, we conclude the question of the market's liability properly went to the trier of fact. Here, it was up to the jury to conclude whether the substance had been on the floor for a sufficient length of time that the owner should have known of the condition and corrected the condition regardless of who created it. Id. at 529-30 (citations omitted). In contrast, where there was nothing about the description of the substance that would indicate the length of time it was on the floor, courts have precluded the jury from deciding the issue of negligence. See Publix Super Market, Inc. v. Sanchez, 700 So.2d 405, 406 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (a piece of cake was on the floor, but there was no evidence as to how long it had been on floor); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. King, 592 So.2d 705, 707 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (slippery, oily, clear substance, but no evidence of signs of age, such as skid marks, smudges, or the like); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Marcotte, 553 So.2d 213, 215 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (slippery substance, but no evidence as to how or when it got on the floor, or the length of time it was there before the fall); Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Gaines, 542 So.2d 432, 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (loose dried rice and beans, but no evidence that they appeared old or were ground into the floor or crushed, and no evidence of broken packages). In addition, even where there may be something about the transitory foreign substance to indicate its aging or deteriorated condition, some appellate decisions have precluded the jury from resolving the issue of constructive notice. For example, in Bates v. Winn-Dixie Supermarkets, Inc., 182 So.2d 309, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966), the case relied upon by both the Owens and Soriano majorities, the plaintiff slipped on a banana peel and the only evidence of constructive knowledge was that the peel was dark, over ripe, black, old, and nasty looking. 182 So.2d 309. In affirming summary judgment for the grocery store, the Second District explained: To infer from the color and condition of the peeling alone that it had been there a sufficient length of time to permit discovery, we would first have to infer that the banana peel was not already black and deteriorated when it reached the defendants' floor. This is the type of mental gymnastics prohibited by the [ Food Fair Stores v.] Trusell [131 So.2d 730 (Fla.1961)] decision ... since the latter inference, under the circumstances, is not to the exclusion of all other reasonable inferences. Id. at 311. Contrary to the Second, Fourth and Fifth Districts, the Third District has held that a jury question was created based on the condition of the transitory foreign substance, even though the plaintiff could not establish to the exclusion of all other reasonable inferences that the condition of the substance resulted from the length of time it was on the floor. See Teate v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 524 So.2d 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). In Teate, the Third District held that evidence of the description of the substance was sufficient for the jury to infer constructive knowledge: Teate presented evidence that there was some water on the floor around the peas. Teate contends that the water was there because the peas had been on the floor for some time and had thawed. The jury could believe this and find that the peas had been on the floor for a sufficient time to put Winn Dixie on notice of the dangerous condition. Winn Dixie counters that the water was a result of permafrost or ice crystals on the bag of peas that instantly melted when it hit the floor. The jury could choose to believe this argument, find the peas had fallen perhaps only seconds before the fall, and decide that there was insufficient notice. Id. at 1061 (emphasis supplied). Thus, the Third District determined that the jury could decide whether the existence of the water around the peas was evidence of the length of time the peas were on the floor, and accordingly, evidence of constructive knowledge. As to the grocery store's argument that the jury was being required to speculate by building one inference on another, the Third District explained: Since it was established that there was some water on the floor, it was completely within the jury's province to decide why the water was there. The jury needed to draw only one inference from direct evidence to reach a decision as to the defendant's constructive notice of the condition. It was entitled to believe Teate and to select the inference that it did. Id. (citations omitted). See also Thoma v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 649 So.2d 277, 279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (the fact that there might be a plethora of reasonable inferences other than the inferences raised by appellants creates a jury issue). Even by broadening the permissible inferences a jury may consider as a result of the condition of the substance, the threshold question of whether a jury issue is created in any given case may still depend on the transitory foreign substance showing some signs of deterioration or aging. Thus, with case law making constructive notice of the dangerous condition the linchpin of liability, an injured person's ability to establish constructive notice is often dependent on the fortuitous circumstance of the observed condition of the substance.
In contrast to cases that address whether the defendant had constructive notice of the specific transitory foreign substance, we have on a limited basis recognized that, by virtue of the nature of the business or its mode of operation, the requirement of establishing constructive knowledge is altered or eliminated. See Wells v. Palm Beach Kennel Club, 160 Fla. 502, 35 So.2d 720, 721 (1948). In Wells, the plaintiff allegedly injured herself when she fell on an empty bottle in the aisle of the grandstand of a dog track. Id. at 720. The dog track moved for a directed verdict, claiming that the plaintiff was unable to establish either constructive or actual notice. In rejecting the position of the defendant, the Court explained: It is true that such a rule [requiring actual or constructive notice] has been imposed on stores, banks, shops and other business places of that character, but we think a different rule applies to a place of amusement like a race track where patrons go by the thousand on invitation of the proprietors, and are permitted to purchase and drink bottled beverage of different kinds and set the empty bottles anywhere they may find space to place them.... Places of amusement where large crowds congregate are required to keep their premises in reasonably safe condition commensurate with the business conducted. If the owner fails in this, and such failure is the proximate result of injury to one lawfully on the premises, compensatory damages may be recovered if the one injured is not at fault. One operating a place of amusement like a race course where others are invited is charged with a continuous duty to look after the safety of his patrons. Both sanitary and physical safety of its patrons require that receptacles be provided for bottles and that they be so placed. We do not mean to imply that they are insurers of the safety of their patrons, but we do say that reasonable care as applied to a race track requires a higher degree of diligence than it does when applied to a store, bank or such like place of business. Id. (citations omitted). Although this Court has never extended the mode of operation theory to a supermarket or grocery store setting, neither has this Court specifically rejected the mode of operation theory as a permissible theory of liability in these settings. In Carls Markets, Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So.2d 789, 791 (Fla.1953), for example, this Court indicated that the mode of operation principle would extend to a supermarket setting if the issue were properly pled. In that case, we explained that the Wells dog track or public amusement rule might be applicable to a supermarket or grocery store where the creator of a dangerous condition would necessarily know about the condition and therefore be held responsible for his or her own creation. See Carls Markets, 69 So.2d at 791. We explained that in Wells the peculiar facts made it unnecessary for the plaintiff to meet the burden of establishing actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition. In that case it was manifest that the defendant was selling bottled drinks, without providing a place for the deposit of empty bottles which could be expected therefore to roll around underfoot and become hazards to the unwary. In other words, the dangerous obstacles were the creations of the defendant who in effect was on notice as soon as the bottled refreshments were sold. Carls Markets, 69 So.2d at 791. We thus acknowledged that if the plaintiff's could convince the jury that the dangerous condition was created by persons connected with the store the matter of notice was inconsequential. Id. Despite this pronouncement, the First District has squarely rejected an extension of the mode of operation theory to supermarkets. See Rowe v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 714 So.2d 1180, 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). In a dissenting opinion, Judge Lawrence disagreed, explaining: The instant case is distinguishable from the usual slip-and-fall case: The defendant, in the usual case, is not charged with creating a hazardous condition, but only with having actual or constructive knowledge that such a condition exists. The Rowes, by contrast, allege that Winn Dixie created the hazardous condition by negligently operating the seafood salad display. The Rowes urge that, despite that it is undisputed that the seafood salad was spilled by a customer, nevertheless Winn Dixie created the risk that such spills would occur by offering food samples without stationing an attendant at the display, and without providing eating utensils, napkins, or any waste receptacle. Id. at 1182 (Lawrence, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied). Although no other reported appellate case in Florida has squarely rejected the application of the negligent mode of operation theory to a supermarket, at least two other appellate cases have appeared to severely limit its application. See Publix Super Market, Inc. v. Sanchez, 700 So.2d 405, 406 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (store's operation of demonstration table at which pieces of cake were made available for customers to sample was not inherently dangerous and was not being operated in a negligent manner even though at time plaintiff fell the demonstration table was not manned by a Publix employee as was required by Publix store policy); Schaap v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 579 So.2d 831, 834 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (store's cookie program was not inherently dangerous or conducted in a negligent manner).