Opinion ID: 1136816
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: suppression of the unmarked money

Text: At the time of Hawley's arrest he was found in possession of $1,157.00 in unmarked currency. At a hearing on a motion to suppress this evidence, the prosecution argued that its introduction would be justified because it had probative value tending to show that the defendant was probably engaged in illegal transactions requiring large amounts of cash. The court agreed that the currency's probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect and ruled it would be admissible. Hawley contends that the trial court erred in admitting this evidence because the evidence is irrelevant. We disagree. The admissibility of evidence is largely within the trial court's discretion and its rulings will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. See Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 260 (Alaska 1975). In Poulin, we enunciated the test for relevance: Alaska case law defines the test of relevancy. To be of sufficient relevance for admission, testimony, documents or other evidence must have some tendency in reason to establish a proposition material to the case. Hutchings v. State, 518 P.2d 767, 769 (Alaska 1974). The dual concepts of logical relevance, i.e., some tendency to establish the ultimate point for which the evidence is offered, and materiality, i.e., germaneness of the ultimate point to issues in the trial, have been emphasized repeatedly in our opinions. 542 P.2d at 260 (footnote omitted). [36] The proffered evidence has some tendency, when connected with the other evidence presented in this case, to establish the Hawley was engaged in drug trafficking. It is more likely than not that a person engaged in such activity would need a large amount of currency. Consequently, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence.