Opinion ID: 673769
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admission of Written Confession

Text: 17 McFarland asserts that a written statement in which McFarland implicated himself in the robbery and murder was unconstitutionally admitted against him at trial because he had not validly waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Both the trial court and the Supreme Court of Indiana determined that McFarland had knowingly waived his Miranda rights. McFarland, 381 N.E.2d at 1063. State-court determinations of the validity of Miranda waivers are subject to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d). E.g., Baskin v. Clark, 956 F.2d 142, 145 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 109 (1992); Mikel v. Thieret, 887 F.2d 733, 739 (7th Cir.1989). The state-court determinations are supported by the testimony of two police officers that McFarland made only one statement, which was written, and that the statement was given after McFarland had signed two written waivers of rights. McFarland's self-serving testimony to the contrary is insufficient to rebut the presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d). 18 McFarland also asserts that his written confession was involuntary under the totality of the circumstances. This is a question of law subject to de novo review. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115 (1985). The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973) (citation omitted). Our review of the record reveals that McFarland's confession was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. 19