Opinion ID: 688371
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burke's Foyer Version

Text: 18 Under this version, the arrest took place inside the house in the foyer. According to Burke, he knocked on the door. Fredericks stated that he asked Thompson to see who's there. 2 Thompson answered and Burke asked Thompson if they could come in. Thompson said that they could. Once inside, Burke asked if Fredericks was there, but before Thompson could respond, Fredericks appeared and asked, how can I help you? Burke then placed him under arrest. 19 On appeal, Fredericks contends that Thompson was not his agent and that Thompson's consent, allowing the officers to enter Fredericks's home, was invalid and thus his warrantless arrest inside the residence was nonconsensual and violated the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. This contention lacks merit. 20 First, as the district court observed, and Fredericks concedes, consent may be valid under an agency theory. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1964); United States v. Baswell, 792 F.2d 755, 759 (8th 1986) (consent may be valid under an agency theory of authority). 21 Here, Fredericks asked Thompson to see who was at the door. In response, Thompson opened the door and consented to the officers' entry into the foyer of the house. Given these circumstances, the district court properly found that Thompson was acting as the agent for Fredericks to the extent he allowed the officers into the foyer of the house. See oner, 376 U.S. at 488-89; Baswell, 792 F.2d at 759. 22 Second, even if Thompson were not acting as Fredericks's agent, the fourth amendment is not violated when a law enforcement officer conducts a warrantless entry based on a reasonable belief that the consenting party has the authority to consent. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 15533 (9th Cir.) ([e]ven if the consenting third party does not in fact possess actual authority to consent, a warrantless search [and seizure] may be justified when the authorities have reasonable grounds to believe the consentor has apparent authority to consent), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866 (1988); United States v. Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Sledge, 650 F.2d 1075, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1981). The pertinent inquiry is whether the facts available at the moment would cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that the consenting party had authority over the premises. Illinois, 497 U.S. at 177-78; see also United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 865 (10th Cir. 1992) (validity of government agent's reliance on third party's apparent authority to consent to search or seizure rests entirely on the reasonableness of the officer's belief). 23 Here, Thompson appeared at the door in response to Burke's knock, responded affirmatively to the officer's requests to come in, and did not indicate that he was a guest in the house. Moreover, upon entering, the officers were immediately met by Fredericks, who did not object to the officers' presence in the foyer, but instead asked, how can I help you? Given these circumstances, the officers could have reasonably believed that their entrance into the foyer of the house was permissible. See Illinois, 497 U.S. at 177-78. 24 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's determination that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; Mendoza, 27 F.3d at 1360; Act Up!/Portland, 988 F.2d at 871. 3