Opinion ID: 2049323
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issue of inequitable and discriminatory assessment.

Text: Relevant statutory provisions relating to the determination of actual value of property for taxation purposes have been recently set out in Wunschel, supra, 217 N.W.2d at 577-578. The fair and reasonable market value of non-agricultural property is its actual value for assessment purposes, the assessed value being 27 percent of actual value. Section 441.21, The Code; Tiffany v. County Bd. Of Rev. In And For Greene Co., 188 N.W.2d 343 (Iowa 1971); Juhl v. Greene County Board of Review, 188 N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 1971). The burden of proof is upon the complainant attacking the assessor's valuation, but in protest or appeal proceedings where the complainant    offers competent evidence by at least two disinterested witnesses that the market value of the property is less than the market value determined by the assessor, the burden of proof thereafter shall be upon the officials or persons seeking to uphold such valuation to be assessed. Section 441.21, The Code; Maytag Company v. Partridge, supra, 210 N.W.2d at 596; Tiffany v. County Bd. Of Rev. In And For Greene Co., supra, 188 N.W.2d at 348. Statutory changes in recent years have not modified the long-standing principle that property cannot be assessed at more than its actual value and cannot be assessed inequitably as compared to other property. See Maxwell v. Shivers, 257 Iowa 575, 579, 133 N.W.2d 709, 711 (1965); Iowa Cent. Ry. Co. v. Board of Review, 176 Iowa 131, 134, 157 N.W. 731, 732 (1916). But where the latter ground is relied on,    it is essential the taxpayer prove (1) that there are several other properties within a reasonable area similar and comparable to his; (2) the amount of the assessments on those properties; (3) the actual value of the comparable properties; (4) the actual value of his property; (5) the assessment complained of; and (6) that by a comparison his property is assessed at a higher proportion of its actual value than the ratio existing between the assessed and the actual valuations of the similar and comparable properties, thus creating a discrimination. Maxwell v. Shivers, supra, 257 Iowa at 579-580, 133 N.W.2d at 711; see Maytag Company v. Partridge, supra, 210 N.W.2d at 594. Although these taxpayers did not protest on the ground of discriminatory (inequitable) assessment of their property, we cannot avoid concluding this is the real basis of their complaints. Taxpayers' brief states: The gravamen of the plaintiff's action    is that in view of the 55% and 60% discounts allowed by the taxing authorities on other taxpayers' parcels immediately abutting his property, then they should in fairness receive a greater percent discount because of the less favorable topography of their lots. Taxpayers made no attempt under the Maxwell rule to show the other properties referred to were comparable, the assessments on and actual values of those properties, the actual value of their property, or the required comparison of ratios between assessed and actual values of the subject and comparable properties. Their sole effort was to show that one of the factors employed in valuing the various parcelsthe deficiency discount for topographywas unfairly applied in their case. The assessor's cards in evidence indicated other valuation factors considered were street surface, curb and gutter, available utilities, frontage and depth. No one contends the fair and reasonable market value of the subject property and adjoining properties could not be ascertained by using the willing buyer-willing seller formula set out in § 441.21(1), The Code. The one valuation factor selected by the taxpayers as the basis for complaint essentially involves a judgment call by the assessing authorities. The impact of any error in the application of this factor might be offset by an error in the application or extent of another factor. Only a determination of the fair and reasonable market value of this property vis-a-vis its actual value determined by the taxing authorities, compared with those valuations of similar properties in the taxing district, would disclose whether these taxpayers ultimately suffered actual discrimination in the assessment of their property. Upon this record we cannot make such determination, even if we were to ignore the defense that taxpayers are precluded by the language of § 441.38 from raising this ground on appeal because it was not included in the protest filed with the board of review.