Opinion ID: 1842904
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of District Court Convictions

Text: In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) the Court held that, under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, a jury's discretion to impose a death sentence must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. The Louisiana Legislature thereafter enacted a capital sentencing scheme which requires a separate sentencing hearing after an accused has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a specific intent homicide in the guilt phase of the trial. La.Code Crim.Proc. art. 905 and 905.1. Article 905.3 further requires that the jury in the sentencing hearing find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the aggravating circumstances listed in Article 905.4 in order to recommend a death sentence, a recommendation which can only be made after consideration of any mitigating circumstances. As to evidence and procedure in the sentencing hearing, Article 905.2 provides as follows: The sentencing hearing shall focus on the circumstances of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender. The hearing shall be conducted according to the rules of evidence. Evidence relative to aggravating or mitigating circumstances shall be relevant irrespective of whether the defendant places his character at issue. Insofar as applicable, the procedure shall be the same as that provided for trial in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The jury may consider any evidence offered at the trial on the issue of guilt. The defendant may testify in his own behalf. In the event of retrial the defendant's testimony shall not be admissible except for purposes of impeachment. (emphasis added). [2] The case of State v. Sawyer, 422 So.2d 95 (La.1982), presented the issue whether the prosecutor in the case-in-chief in a capital sentencing hearing may introduce evidence of a defendant's unrelated convictions for crimes other than those specifically enumerated as aggravating circumstances in Article 905.4(c). [3] The prosecutor in the case-in-chief had introduced evidence of defendant's prior conviction in Arkansas of involuntary manslaughter. Objecting on the basis that the involuntary manslaughter conviction did not qualify as a prior conviction of an unrelated murder under Article 905.4(c), the defense argued that the aggravating circumstances specified in Article 905.4(c) constituted an exclusive listing of those aspects of the character of the accused on which evidence may be introduced during the prosecutor's case-in-chief in a capital sentencing hearing. Otherwise, according to the defense, evidence of the defendant's character may be introduced only if the defendant places his character at issue. This court rejected that argument, holding that because the sentencing statute creates a penalty phase of the bifurcated trial in which the focus is on the character and propensities of the defendant (as well as the circumstances of the crime), the defendant's character is at issue and indeed is one of the principal issues. 422 So.2d at 104 (emphasis in original). The decision reasoned that the usual prohibition against the prosecution's initiation of the inquiry into defendant's character is simply not applicable in the penalty phase, where the focus on character is one of the statutory means of channeling the jury's sentencing discretion. Id. at n. 18. The Sawyer decision was criticized in George W. Pugh & James R. McClelland, Developments in the Law, 1982-83-Evidence, 44 La.L.Rev. 335 (1983), which predicted that a logical extension would authorize an inquiry into many unrelated aspects of the past life of the accused. Defense counsel in the present case argues that the worst case scenario looms here with the possible introduction of twenty-four prior criminal acts ranging back to 1969 when defendant was nine years old. We reaffirm our basic holding in Sawyer that a conviction of first degree murder puts the defendant's character at issue in the sentencing hearing. See also State v. Jordan, 440 So.2d 716 (La.1983). The purpose of the enumerated aggravating circumstances in the original sentencing statute was not to control admissibility of evidence; rather, the purpose was to impose a required jury finding in the penalty phase so that only those first degree murderers against whom a statutory aggravating circumstance could be proved beyond a reasonable doubt were even eligible for consideration for capital punishment. [4] As long as one statutory aggravating circumstance is proved, the prosecutor can introduce other evidence relevant to and probative of the circumstances of the murder and the character and propensities of the murderer. [5] The linchpin for admissibility is relevance. Evidence of convictions of serious unrelated crimes is extremely probative of and relevant to the character and propensities of the defendant and may be useful for the jury to evaluate in performing its awesome task of deciding whether or not to recommend execution. Nevertheless, because evidence of every conviction, no matter how minor the crime, may tend to inject an arbitrary factor into the hearing, some limitations are necessary. Since this court in Sawyer has interpreted the capital sentencing statute expansively to allow evidence of convictions of crimes other than those enumerated in Article 905.4 A(3) and since the statute contains no defined limitations, it is appropriate for this court to set limitations. We recognize that trial courts need more specific guidance in these highly charged cases in order to avoid reversals that become necessary when the imposition of a death sentence is influenced by arbitrary factors. Focusing on the seriousness of the crime, we limit the convictions on which the prosecutor may introduce evidence during the case-in-chief to crimes classified as felonies. [6] The classification reflects a legislative determination that the conduct was serious enough to warrant imprisonment at hard labor. Further, we limit the evidence supporting the conviction to the document certifying the fact of conviction and to the testimony of the victim or of any eyewitness to the crime, and we specifically prohibit evidence of the original charge when the conviction is for a lesser offense.