Opinion ID: 3012223
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Eagar’s Testimony

Text: Defense expert Dr. Thomas Eagar opined that the most probable source of flammable fluid which caused the Osprey’s engine failure was hydraulic fluid. Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Eagar’s testimony regarding a leak of hydraulic fluid lacked an adequate factual basis because there was insufficient evidence of the presence of hydraulic fluid inside the engine. Under Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, experts may rely on facts from firsthand knowledge or observation, information learned at the hearing or trial, and facts learned out of court. Fed. R. Evid. 703.1 If the facts are of _________________________________________________________________
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. 9 the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon a subject, the facts or data need not be independently admissible in evidence. Id. See In Re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 747 (3d Cir. 1994). Rule 705 provides for the disclosure of facts underlying the expert’s opinion. Fed. R. Evid. 705;2 see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(B) and 26(e)(1) (relating to disclosure in advance of trial of the basis and reasons for an expert’s opinion). It is an abuse of discretion to admit expert testimony which is based on assumptions lacking any factual foundation in the record. See Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 756 n.13 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing Rules 702, 703, 402 and 403 and stating that foundational requirement for admissibility of expert testimony is found in the interstitial gaps among the federal rules). Rule 705, together with Rule 703, places the burden of exploring the facts and assumptions underlying the testimony of an expert witness on opposing counsel during cross-examination. See e.g. Ratliff v. Schiber Truck Co., Inc., 150 F.3d 949, 955 (8th Cir. 1998); Toucet v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 991 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1993). Here, the record reflects a factual foundation sufficient to support Dr. Eagar’s opinion that the most probable source of flammable fluid was hydraulic fluid. The record shows that, of the possible fluids involved in the accident, only hydraulic fluid is red. A red residue was found in the torquemeter housing. This red residue was tested for the Court of Inquiry and found to be a good match for hydraulic fluid. There was some hydraulic oil found in front of the engine and it may have gotten into the engine. Finally, a red residue containing hydraulic oil was discovered on the engine air particle separator, adjacent to the engine. Thus, the record reflects sufficient evidence of hydraulic fluid solvent in places it should not have been-- _________________________________________________________________
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross examination. 10 outside the engine, near the engine, and in the torquemeter housing--to form the factual foundation for Dr. Eagar’s testimony. It was within the discretion of the District Court to admit such testimony. Once Bell’s expert met the foundational requirements for admissibility, the burden shifted to plaintiffs to explore any deficiencies in the expert’s sources. A party confronted with an adverse expert witness who has sufficient, though perhaps not overwhelming, facts and assumptions as the basis for his opinion can highlight those weaknesses through effective cross-examination. See Ratliff , 150 F.3d at 955; Toucet, 991 F.2d at 10; cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (Vigorous crossexamination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.). The District Court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the testimony and permitting appropriate cross-examination of Dr. Eagar.3 _________________________________________________________________ 3. We appreciate our dissenting colleague’s criticisms of the factual foundation for Dr. Eagar’s testimony. These criticisms, however, raise precisely the type of issues that must be resolved by a fact-finder having the benefit of the adversary process. By raising these concerns, the dissent effectively conducts an independent evaluation of the weight of the evidence -- an exercise that we believe exceeds the appropriate boundaries of an abuse of discretion review. While the Federal Rules of Evidence call upon the courts to serve as gatekeepers who independently evaluate the admissibility of expert opinion testimony, they rely upon the discretion of the trial courts -- not the discretion of the courts of appeals. See In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 697 (3d Cir. 1999). Because the record contains some factual basis -- albeit shaky -- for Dr. Eagar’s testimony, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in performing this gatekeeping function. Moreover, we disagree with the dissent to the extent it concludes that no reasonable expert could base an opinion on Dr. Eagar’s factual foundation. In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d at 697. Such a conclusion would reject implicitly Dr. Eagar’s qualification to testify as an expert witness under Rule 702 -- a determination that the plaintiffs do not challenge and that we have no reason to reverse. See Elcock, 233 F.3d at n.13 (explaining the relationship between the foundation requirements of Rule 703 and the qualification requirements of Rule 702). 11