Opinion ID: 1608424
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Properly Gave Jury Instructions 20 and 22.

Text: ¶ 20. When reviewing a challenge to a jury instruction, this Court asks whether the instruction at issue contains a correct statement of the law and whether the instruction is warranted by the evidence. See, e.g., Church v. Massey, 697 So.2d 407, 410 (Miss.1997) (citation omitted). A party has a right to have jury instructions on all material issues presented in the pleadings or evidence. Glorioso v. YMCA, 556 So.2d 293, 295 (Miss.1989) (citing Barkley v. Miller Transporters, Inc., 450 So.2d 416 (Miss.1984); Alley v. Praschak Mach. Co., 366 So.2d 661 (Miss. 1979)). When this Court reviews a claim of trial-court error in granting or denying jury instructions, all of the jury instructions are reviewed as a whole, and no instruction is read in isolation. See, e.g., Richardson v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 923 So.2d 1002, 1010 (Miss.2006) (citations omitted); Burton v. Barnett, 615 So.2d 580, 583 (Miss.1993) (citations omitted). Defects in specific instructions do not require reversal `where all instructions taken as a whole fairlyalthough not perfectly announce the applicable primary rules of law.' Burton, 615 So.2d at 583 (citations omitted). ¶ 21. Furthermore, this Court has held that when a jury instruction is offered at trial, it is the duty of the opposing party, in order to preserve this point for appeal, to state a contemporaneous objection in specific terms so that the trial court has an opportunity to correct any mistake. Young v. Robinson, 538 So.2d 781, 783 (Miss.1989) (citations omitted). [O]n appeal a party may not argue that an instruction was erroneous for a reason other than the reason assigned on objection to the instruction at trial. Id. (citations omitted). ¶ 22. The Solankis contend that the trial court erred in granting jury instructions 20 and 22. Instruction 20 is modeled after Mississippi Code Section 63-3-903, which states, in relevant part: (1) No person shall stop, park or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or improved or main traveled part of any highway outside of a business or residence district when it is practical to stop, park or so leave such vehicle off such part of said highway.... (2) This section shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle which is disabled while on the paved or improved or main traveled portion of a highway in such manner and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily leaving such disabled vehicle in such position. Miss.Code Ann. § 63-3-903(1)-(2) (Rev. 2004). Instruction 20 states: The Court instructs the jury that according to Mississippi law no person shall stop, park or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or main traveled part of any highway, unless it is impossible to avoid stopping in the roadway. Therefore, if you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that the decedent, Nilima Solanki, allowed her vehicle to stop in a lane of travel on the highway when it was possible or reasonably practicable for her to steer her vehicle onto the shoulder of the highway, then the Court instructs the jury that such acts constitute negligence on behalf of the decedent, and if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident, then it is your sworn duty to return a verdict for Melvin Ervin and The Merchants Company. If you find that such negligence of the decedent Nilima Solanki was a proximate contributing cause of the accident and that the negligence of Melvin Ervin was also a proximate contributing cause of the accident, then it is your sworn duty to decide the amount you would have awarded for her death, if any, and then reduce that amount by the percentage of Nilima Solanki's negligence. ¶ 23. The Solankis' counsel objected to instruction 20 (then instruction D-8) on the grounds that it was misleading, confusing, and I don't think it's based upon testimony in the court. Defendants argued that the instruction was based on Mississippi Code Section 63-3-903 and that it was applicable to the facts in this case. The trial court granted the instruction, informing the Solankis' counsel that [y]ou will be completely at liberty to argue that stop, park are affirmative actions and that she's certainly not guilty of affirmatively stopping and parking. ¶ 24. On appeal, the Solankis argue that the evidence demonstrated that it was not reasonably practicable for Nilima Solanki to move her car off I-220. They further assert that Defendants failed to demonstrate that it was reasonably practical for Decedent Nilima Solanki to pull her motor vehicle off of the highway after it stalled on I-220 and that it was clear that it was not reasonably practical for her to do so. As if by way of explanation, the Solankis claim in their appellate brief that [a] man may have figured out how to not get stopped in the roadway but many women, when given mechanical problems, do not know what to do. The Solankis quote testimony regarding Sidharth Solanki's discussion over the phone with Nilima Solanki before the accident, presumably to demonstrate that it was not reasonably practicable for Nilima Solanki to move her car off the highway. ¶ 25. Defendants assert that instruction 20 accurately reflects the law as set out in Section 63-3-903(1)-(2) and that the instruction includes the term reasonably practicable. Defendants point out that whether it was reasonably practicable for Nilima Solanki to steer her car off the highway is a question of fact for the jury. Defendants also claim that the issue was properly submitted to the jury along with this instruction, which provided proper guidance for the jury. Defendants further contend that the Solankis failed to preserve this issue for appeal by making a general objection to the instruction. ¶ 26. This Court finds that the trial court properly granted instruction 20 because it contains a correct statement of the law and was warranted by the evidence. See Massey, 697 So.2d at 410 (citation omitted). The language in instruction 20 is not identical to that in Section 63-3-903(1). Instruction 20 begins by stating that no person shall stop, park or leave standing any vehicle ... upon the ... highway, unless it is impossible to avoid stopping in the roadway. (Emphasis added.) Section 63-3-903(1) states, in relevant part, that [n]o person shall stop, park or leave standing any vehicle ... upon the ... highway ... when it is practical to stop, park or so leave such vehicle off ... said highway. Miss.Code Ann. § 63-3-903(1) (Rev.2004) (emphasis added). Section 63-3-903(2) states, in relevant part that [t]his section shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle which is disabled while on the ... highway in such manner and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily leaving such disabled vehicle in such position. Miss.Code Ann. § 63-3-903(2) (emphasis added). Notably, instruction 20 also instructs the jury that, if you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that the decedent, Nilima Solanki, allowed her vehicle to stop in a lane of travel on the highway when it was possible or reasonably practicable for her to steer her vehicle onto the shoulder of the highway, then the Court instructs the jury that such acts constitute negligence on behalf of the decedent. (Emphasis added.) Thus, this Court finds that instruction 20 fairly announces the applicable rule of law in that it includes the term reasonably practicable (rather than practical), even though it also includes the term impossible. See Burton, 615 So.2d at 583 (citations omitted). ¶ 27. Contrary to the Solankis' assertion that instruction 20 is not supported by the evidence presented by Defendants, this Court finds that there was an evidentiary basis for instruction 20. Solanki testified about his phone conversation with Nilima Solanki, during which she told him that she had been driving at seventy miles per hour when her car broke down and that her car was stopped by the yellow line on I-220 with the emergency lights activated. Solanki also testified that he did not know why his wife's car was stopped on the highway, as opposed to the median. Hannah admitted that, if Nilima Solanki had been driving at seventy miles per hour when her car stalled, then the car would have rolled a significant distance before coming to a complete stop. Hannah also testified that there was no physical barrier preventing Nilima Solanki's car from being moved off the highway and that he was not certain of the angle at which her car was pointed when it stopped. Messerschmidt testified that the evidence showed that Nilima Solanki's car had rolled to a stop and was positioned parallel to, and to the right of, the yellow line on I-220. ¶ 28. Thus, the testimony regarding the circumstances under which Nilima Solanki found herself prior to the accident established an evidentiary basis for instruction 20. The testimony also created a question of fact as to her ability to move her car off the highway. Both parties recognize that, ordinarily, such a question of fact should be submitted to the jury on proper instructions. Stong v. Freeman Truck Line, Inc., 456 So.2d 698, 708 (Miss.1984). Based on the testimony, this question of fact was not so clear that reasonable minds could not differ. Id. (citations omitted). Whether Defendants failed to demonstrate that it was reasonably practical for Decedent Nilima Solanki to pull her motor vehicle off of the highway, as the Solankis claim on appeal, was for the jury to determine. Therefore, this Court concludes that the question was properly submitted to the jury, along with instruction 20. Id. (citations omitted). Because we conclude that instruction 20 was a proper reflection of the law and supported by the evidence, the remainder of the parties' arguments will not be addressed. ¶ 29. Instruction 22 states: You are instructed that Mississippi law provides for comparative negligence, that is, more than one party may be responsible for causing a person's injury or death. Further, you are instructed that while operating her vehicle, the decedent, Nilima Solanki, had a duty to use reasonable care in the interest of safety of others on the roadway that a person of ordinary intelligence would exercise under the same or similar circumstances. If you find that Nilima Solanki did not exercise such reasonable care by failing to steer her vehicle onto the shoulder of the roadway as her vehicle began to stall and/or by talking on her cell phone instead of exiting the vehicle in order to move to a place of safety after her vehicle stopped, and if you further find that her failure to use reasonable care proximately caused or contributed to the accident or her own death, then it is your sworn duty to decide the amount you would have awarded for such death, if any, and then reduce your verdict by the percentage of Nilima Solanki's own negligence. Furthermore, should you find that Nilima Solanki's own negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident, then you shall return a verdict in favor of Melvin Ervin and The Merchants Company. ¶ 30. With respect to instruction 22 (then instruction D-11), the Solankis' counsel objected on the grounds of confusion, misleading, and not a true statement of the law, and it's not supported by the facts in evidence, and there's no evidence to support the instruction. It's based on pure speculation, conjecture, and no proof of negligence on her part. The trial court granted the instruction. ¶ 31. The Solankis maintain on appeal that instruction 22 is extremely confusing and misleading, in part because [s]aid [i]nstruction lays blame on Nilima Solanki [as] if she talked on her cell phone instead of exiting, without taking into consideration that a mother would not leave her child in the car and just try saving herself. The Solankis also rely on the fact that the trial judge granted instruction 23 (then instruction P-30)the Solankis' comparative negligence instructionreluctantly because he did not believe that there was evidence of Nilima Solanki's negligence. Instruction 23 states: If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that: 1. Melvin Tyrone Ervin was negligent but also, 2. That Nilima Solanki, Deceased, was negligent; 3. That the negligence of both Melvin Tyrone Ervin and Nilima Solanki, Deceased, were proximate, contributing causes of the accident in this case, and 4. That Nilima Solanki and the Plaintiffs sustained injuries and damages caused by the combined negligence of Melvin Tyrone Ervin and Nilima Solanki, Deceased, then you will, in arriving at your verdict, first determine that sum of money which will fairly and adequately compensate the Plaintiffs, for said injuries and damages, and then reduce this sum in proportion to the causal negligence of Nilima Solanki, Deceased, using the following method.... When this instruction was discussed at the trial level, the trial court stated: This is [a] comparative negligence statute, and I expected it to come from the defense, but I don't understand what negligence is there of the deceased? Defendants' counsel then argued for the instruction, stating that there was evidence that Nilima Solanki had an opportunity to steer her car into the shoulder of I-220 and that there was testimony that she had sat in her car for one-and-a-half minutes after her car had stopped. The Solankis' counsel then attempted to withdraw the instruction. The trial judge initially stated that he would not rule on the instruction at that time. However, after hearing further argument from Defendants' counsel, the trial court decided to give the instruction out of an abundance of precaution. ¶ 32. The Solankis end their argument on appeal by conclusorily stating that: One can clearly see that the Court did not see any negligence on the part of Nilima Solanki, and for the jury to have assessed her with 100% of the negligence evinces bias or prejudice on the part of the jury, or, shows that they were just confused as to what the law was and as to how they were supposed to rule. ¶ 33. Defendants counter that the Solankis' claim that the jury found Nilima Solanki one hundred percent negligent is incorrect. Defendants also contend that substantial evidence demonstrated Nilima Solanki's negligence. Defendants further argue that the Solankis waived any objection to this instruction because they requested, and were granted, their own comparative-negligence instructioninstruction 23. ¶ 34. Assuming arguendo that the Solankis can appeal this instruction (despite submitting their own comparative-negligence instruction), this Court finds that it contains a correct statement of the law and is warranted by the evidence. See Massey, 697 So.2d at 410 (citation omitted). Mississippi is a comparative-negligence state. See, e.g., Blackmon v. Payne, 510 So.2d 483, 486 (Miss.1987) (citing Evans v. Journeay, 488 So.2d 797, 799 (Miss.1986); Bell v. City of Bay St. Louis, 467 So.2d 657, 664 (Miss.1985); Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-15 (Rev.2004)). Also, instruction 22 is warranted by the evidence. There was testimony, reviewed above, regarding the location and positioning of Nilima Solanki's car on I-220, which is relevant to the issue of comparative negligence. Don Williams testified that he had observed Nilima Solanki sitting in the driver's seat of her car, with one leg on the highway, on her cell phone for one minute to one-and-a-half minutes. As stated above, Solanki also testified about his phone conversation with Nilima Solanki before the accident, although he stated that they had spoken on the phone for no longer than twenty seconds before the accident. Thus, the testimony provided an evidentiary basis for instruction 22. Therefore, this Court finds that instruction 22 was properly given. See Richardson, 923 So.2d at 1010 (citations omitted). Because we conclude that instruction 22 was a proper reflection of the law and supported by the evidence, the remainder of the parties' arguments will not be addressed.