Opinion ID: 1665643
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: summary judgment practice in kentucky courts and federal courts a comparison

Text: When comparing summary judgment practice in Kentucky courts under our past decisions, including the holding in Paintsville Hospital , with the new summary judgment standards announced in the 1986 trilogy of United States Supreme Court cases, we find some similarities and many obvious differences. First, as to the allocation of burden on the summary judgment motion, in both jurisdictions, the movant has the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. However, under the new federal standards, this burden does not necessarily require the movant to produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, but only that he show that there is an absence of evidence possessed by the respondent to support an essential element of his case. Under the present practice of Kentucky courts, the movant must convince the court, by the evidence of record, of the nonexistence of an issue of material fact. See, Chesser v. Louisville Country Club, Ky., 339 S.W.2d 194 (1960); Scheiber v. City of Louisville, Ky., 324 S.W.2d 822 (1959). Secondly, under the federal scheme, the test for summary judgment is the same as that for a directed verdict. In Kentucky, we have clearly held that the consideration to be given to the two motions is not the same and that a ruling on a summary judgment is a more delicate matter and that its inquiry requires a greater judicial determination and discretion since it takes the case away from the trier of fact before the evidence is actually heard. Payne v. Chenault, Ky., 343 S.W.2d 129 (1960); Rowland v. Miller's Adm'r, supra . Thirdly, under the federal summary judgment standard, the scintilla rule applies and summary judgment will be granted to the movant unless there is evidence on which a jury could reasonably return a verdict in the respondent's favor. Under the Kentucky standard, we conclude that the movant should not succeed unless his right to judgment is shown with such clarity that there is no room left for controversy. See, Isaacs v. Cox, Ky., 431 S.W.2d 494 (1968). Only when it appears impossible for the nonmoving party to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor should the motion for summary judgment be granted. See Harker v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville, Ky., 679 S.W.2d 226 (1984); Green v. Bourbon County Joint Planning Commission, Ky., 637 S.W.2d 626 (1982); Robert Simmons Constr. Co. v. Powers Regulator Co., Ky., 390 S.W.2d 901 (1965). Finally, under both the Kentucky and the federal approach, a party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion cannot defeat it without presenting at least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See, Gullett v. McCormick, Ky., 421 S.W.2d 352 (1967); Continental Cas. Company v. Belknap Hardware & Manufacturing Co., Ky., 281 S.W.2d 914 (1955).