Opinion ID: 2508472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of BAC test results

Text: The offense of driving under the influence is codified in I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a) which provides: It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol, drugs and/or any other intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of this section, or more, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open to the public. This section has been interpreted as establishing one crime with two ways of proving a violation. State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 881-82, 811 P.2d 488, 491-92 (1991)(citing State v. Knoll, 110 Idaho 678, 718 P.2d 589 (Ct.App.1986)). As the Court of Appeals has indicated, the first way to prove a violation is to show under the totality of the evidence that the defendant was driving under the influence. The second way to prove a violation is to establish the defendant drove with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more. The State may elect to proceed against the defendant under either or both theories of proof. Evidence that is relevant under one theory of proof is not necessarily relevant under the other. State v. Edmondson, 125 Idaho 132, 133, 867 P.2d 1006, 1007 (Ct.App.1994); State v. Andrus, 118 Idaho 711, 713, 800 P.2d 107, 109 (Ct.App.1990); State v. Knoll, 110 Idaho 678, 682, 718 P.2d 589, 593 (Ct.App.1986). Robinett argues the numerical BAC test results should not have been admitted because the State elected to prosecute solely under a driving under the influence theory. This Court has never decided whether a numerical BAC test result can be admitted where a defendant's BAC level is actually tested but the defendant is prosecuted solely under an impairment theory. The Court of Appeals has stated the impairment method of proof considers the totality of the evidence, meaning circumstantial evidence of impaired driving ability or other observable symptoms of intoxication. State v. Barker, 123 Idaho 162, 163, 845 P.2d 580, 581 (Ct.App.1992)(quoting State v. Knoll, 110 Idaho 678, 682, 718 P.2d 589, 593 (Ct.App.1986)). We hold today that a numerical BAC test result is relevant to a prosecution for driving under the influence (as opposed to a per se violation) only if a proper foundation is laid to assure the validity of the test result, including evidence extrapolating the result back to the time of the alleged offense. This case is distinguishable from State v. Sutliff, 97 Idaho 523, 547 P.2d 1128 (1976), where we held BAC test results need not be related back to the time of the offense as a foundational prerequisite to admissibility. In Sutliff, the defendant was charged with driving under the influence after he was involved in an accident which killed another person. Breath and blood samples were taken from the defendant fifty to sixty minutes after the accident. The defendant was prosecuted under a statute that provided certain presumptions depending on the percentage of alcohol in the body. We held the statute does not require extrapolation back but establishes that the percentage of blood alcohol as shown by chemical analysis relates back to the time of the alleged offense for purposes of applying the statutory presumption. Sutliff, 97 Idaho at 525, 547 P.2d at 1130. Although the statute in Sutliff was worded differently than the statute under which Robinett was prosecuted, it is clear the prosecutor in Sutliff was in effect prosecuting the case in a manner analogous to the current per se method of proof. Where the prosecution elects to use the per se method, the question is what the alcohol level was at the time the sample was taken. The lapse of time prior to the extraction of samples goes to the weight to be afforded the test results and not to their admissibility. Sutliff, 97 Idaho at 524, 547 P.2d at 1129. For that reason, it is appropriate to admit results drawn an hour or more after the alleged offense without having to actually extrapolate the evidence back to the time of the alleged offense. Unlike proceeding on a per se theory, admission of a numerical BAC test result for purposes of demonstrating impairment must be extrapolated back to the time of the alleged offense to be relevant. The whole purpose of admitting the BAC test results is to show there was alcohol in the defendant's blood and that the level of alcohol in his system would have impaired his ability to drive in some identifiable way. This requires there be evidence connecting the test result to the time of the alleged offense and evidence showing how the numerical result relates to the issue of impairment. In other words, numerical test results can be admitted in a driving under the influence prosecution if there is a connection shown between the numerical test result and driving impairment at the time the motor vehicle was operated. Therefore, the numerical results of Robinett's BAC tests are not relevant to a prosecution for driving under the influence because the results were not accompanied by any evidence that correlated the results to the time of the accident and how it would have impacted Robinett's ability to drive. Having concluded the numerical BAC test results were erroneously admitted, it must be determined if the error was harmless. The test for harmless error ... is whether a reviewing court can find beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result without the admission of the challenged evidence. State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 821, 965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998) (quoting Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 925, 877 P.2d 365, 369 (1994)). After reviewing the record, this Court cannot say the jury would have reached the same result without the numerical BAC test results and, therefore, the error in admitting the results without further foundation was not harmless.