Opinion ID: 2518953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Do double jeopardy principles apply to aggravating factors?

Text: ¶ 10 A jury's imposition of a life sentence in a capital case generally constitutes an acquittal of the death penalty, prohibiting the State from seeking the death penalty in the event of a retrial. E.g., Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981). In Bullington, the Supreme Court held that jeopardy terminates when a jury acquits a defendant of the death penalty; thus, although the State may retry a defendant for the offense of murder, it may not seek the death penalty if a previous jury has found it unwarranted. Id.; accord Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 211, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984) (holding that an acquittal of the sentence of death bars any retrial of the appropriateness of the death penalty). ¶ 11 In the instant case, the State argues that the Court of Appeals erred by implicitly extending this general rule and holding that a jury's failure to find an aggravating factor during the penalty phase of a capital trial constitutes an acquittal of that aggravating factor. For support, the State relies on Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986). In Poland, the Supreme Court held that the State did not violate double jeopardy in seeking the death penalty upon retrial when the defendant was not acquitted of the death penalty in the first trial. Id. at 157, 106 S.Ct. 1749. The Poland Court rejected the argument that a capital sentencer's failure to find a particular aggravating circumstance alleged by the prosecution always constitutes an `acquittal' of that circumstance for double jeopardy purposes. Id. at 155, 106 S.Ct. 1749. The Court stated that such a holding would push the analogy on which Bullington is based past the breaking point. Id. at 156, 106 S.Ct. 1749. The Court distinguished aggravating factors from other offenses, stating that aggravating factors are not separate penalties or offenses but rather `standards to guide the making of [the] choice' between the alternative verdicts of death and life imprisonment. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bullington, 451 U.S. at 438, 101 S.Ct. 1852). The State thus argues that double jeopardy principles do not apply to aggravating factors. ¶ 12 Benn, however, contends that Poland does not survive Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and its progeny. Id. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (holding that aggravating factors are `the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense' for purposes of the Sixth Amendment (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000))). Despite Ring's elevation of aggravating factors to the equivalent status of elements under the Sixth Amendment, Poland's holding remains good law. ¶ 13 In the Supreme Court's post- Ring decision in Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003), Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that double jeopardy protections did not prevent the State from retrying a defendant for the death penalty where a jury deadlocked during the penalty phase of his first trial. Id. at 108, 123 S.Ct. 732 (citing Poland with approval). Justice Scalia then turned to the question of Ring in a section of the opinion that garnered only a plurality. Joined by Justices Thomas and Rehnquist, Justice Scalia held that in a post- Ring world, `murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances' is a separate offense from `murder' simplicitier.  Id. at 112, 123 S.Ct. 732. If a jury unanimously concludes that a State has failed to meet its burden of proving the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances, double-jeopardy protections attach to that `acquittal' on the offense of `murder plus aggravating circumstance(s).' Id. Under Justice Scalia's plurality, a State may retry a defendant for the death penalty unless the verdict forms establish that the jury, by unanimously rejecting all charged aggravators, acquitted the defendant of those aggravators and thereby created a `legal entitlement to a life sentence.' Id. at 110, 123 S.Ct. 732 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 563 Pa. 533, 548, 763 A.2d 359 (2000)). ¶ 14 Even under Justice Scalia's plurality, double jeopardy principles do not apply to individual aggravating factors. Courts interpreting the Sattazahn decision have rejected Benn's argument that a jury may acquit a defendant of an individual aggravating factor. E.g., Commonwealth v. May, 587 Pa. 184, 204, 898 A.2d 559 (2006) ( Sattazahn speaks to the situation where the original jury did not find any aggravating circumstances, and, thus, the sentence of life imprisonment was statutorily mandated. (emphasis omitted)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 557, 166 L.Ed.2d 414 (2006); see also State v. Deruise, 98-0541 (La.04/03/01), 802 So.2d 1224, 1243-44 (holding post- Apprendi that a jury's failure to find an aggravating factor during the penalty phase of a capital trial does not constitute an acquittal of that aggravating factor), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 926, 122 S.Ct. 283, 151 L.Ed.2d 208 (2001). ¶ 15 Had the jury in Benn's first case acquitted him of the death penalty, the State would not have been allowed to subsequently charge him for a capital offense without violating double jeopardy. However, Benn's first jury sentenced him to death. Thus, the State could have sought the death penalty again on retrial. A jury's failure to find the existence of an aggravating factor does not constitute an acquittal of that factor for double jeopardy purposes. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals on this issue.