Opinion ID: 1559080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grounds for a New Trial

Text: The Company's argument for a new trial based on an erroneous jury charge, however, stands on better ground. It contends that the trial court erred in giving the no-excuse charge. It contends that the charge could have referenced only to the two ordinances, Mobile's ordinance § 45-61 and Chickasaw's ordinance § 18-158, and that neither ordinance has any application to this case. We agree. A party is entitled to have the jury correctly instructed on the law, provided the requested instruction is relevant to the case and is not confusing or misleading. McGregory v. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 736 So.2d 571, 579 (Ala.1999) (emphasis added). [I]t is the duty of the trial court to instruct the jurors fully and correctly on the applicable law of the case and to guide, direct, and assist them toward an intelligent understanding of the legal and factual issues involved in their search for truth. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Williams, 591 So.2d 854, 856 (Ala.1991). See First Commercial Bank v. Spivey, 694 So.2d 1316, 1324 (Ala.1997) ([T]he trial court has the responsibility to give the jury instructions ... that will allow it to adequately respond to the evidence and the issues presented.). Thus, depending on the issues and evidence presented, jury instructions that are entirely `proper in many cases, [may be] totally improper in the instant case.' Jefferson v. Fleming, 669 So.2d 870, 873 (Ala.1995). It requires no speculation to conclude that the no-excuse charge was referable solely to the two municipal ordinances. The case involved no other statutes or ordinances, and the jury's question whether an ordinance [is] a law was a clear indication that the jury had made that connection. Nor can it be doubted that the combination of the ordinances and the charge implied to the jury some mandatory duty on the part of the Company. That is the unmistakable import of the words [i]gnorance of the law is no excuse, meaning that ignorance of the law is no excuse for not following the law. However, the plain meaning of the ordinances in the context of the facts of this case belie any such duty. The ordinances differ in no respect relevant to this case. They state, in pertinent part: Whenever in a building or structure where the gas service has been discontinued and a hazardous report from the [Company] has been sent to the applicable municipal-inspection authority, approval from such authority is required before reconnection to the gas supply may be effected. Notably, the ordinances do not require the Company to disconnect service under any circumstances. Neither do they require the Company to send a hazardous report under any circumstances. Thus, they shed no light on the dispositive issue, which is whether the Company acted reasonably in initiating service at the gas meter at the Robinson residence in June 2004 despite the hazards it discovered at that time. Although there is evidence indicating that service had been disconnected at 306 4th Avenue before Robinson's tenancy, there is no evidence indicating that the cause of the disconnection was the hazards that existed in June 2004. Certainly, there is no evidence indicating that the Company ever sent a hazardous report to any Chickasaw official. There is no evidence, therefore, indicating that the provisions of the Chickasaw ordinance were ever triggered. Because the ordinances were inapplicable under the facts of this case, the no-excuse instruction served no purpose other than to distract and confuse the jury. Indeed, the purpose and import of the charge is nowhere better exemplified than in the following argument by Robinson's counsel regarding the motion for a JML made at the close of Robinson's case-in-chief: The Chickasaw ordinance says that `whenever a building or structure where gas service has been discontinued'  okay, so there is no gas service  `and a hazardous report from [the Company] is sent to the codes inspector, it shall be necessary that an investigation fee be paid, investigation of the hazardous conditions be conducted, that the inspection by the codes inspector and an approval by the codes inspector be obtained before reconnection to the gas supply may be effected.' ... [The Company] cannot reconnect to the supply under the binding law; and [it] just want[s] to ignore the law. [It] want[s] to ignore the law. [It] cannot reconnect without waiting until and having confirmation that the hazardous appliances have been repaired. So the fallacy of [the Company's] argument is what [it has] absolute control over, which is this thing right here, and all the pipes leading up into it, and the knowledge that the appliances in the house have deadly hazards associated with them, and there is not a single one in there on June 3 that doesn't, [it] know[s] that. [ The Company] cannot legally supply gas. [It] cannot legally do it.  (Emphasis added.) It is clear that the jury was led to conclude, incorrectly, that, somehow, one, or both, of the ordinances was binding on the Company under the facts of this case, and that, therefore, the Company had illegally provided gas service to Robinson's residence. Because the ordinances were inapplicable under the facts of this case, the giving of the no-excuse charge was reversible error. The judgment is, therefore, reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.