Opinion ID: 795116
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Mr. Jones' Motion to Continue

Text: 19 Mr. Jones asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his second motion to continue. We have recognized that, as a general rule, once a trial date has been set, the court ought to adhere to that date unless there are compelling reasons to grant a continuance. See United States v. Farr, 297 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir.2002). Nevertheless, the court cannot have a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable reason for delay. United States v. Robbins, 197 F.3d 829, 846 (7th Cir.1999) (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964)). In evaluating a request for a continuance, a district court should weigh a number of factors, including the following non-exhaustive list: 20 1) the amount of time available for preparation; 2) the likelihood of prejudice from denial of the continuance; 3) the defendant's role in shortening the effective preparation time; 4) the degree of complexity of the case; 5) the availability of discovery from the prosecution; 6) the likelihood a continuance would satisfy the movant's needs; and 7) the inconvenience and burden to the district court and its pending case load. 21 United States v. Vincent, 416 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir.2005); see also Farr, 297 F.3d at 655. We shall not reverse the denial of a motion to continue unless we find an abuse of discretion and a showing of actual prejudice to the defendant. See Vincent, 416 F.3d at 598. 22 Upon review of the record before us, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion when it determined that the Vincent factors did not weigh in favor of a continuance. Invoking the third factor, Mr. Jones attempts to excuse his role in reducing his amount of preparation time as inadvertent because it arose from his counsel's reasonable misunderstanding concerning the written statement. 3 Appellant's Br. at 21. However, the district court found that Mr. Jones' counsel had been made aware as early as March 13, 2002 that Mr. Jones produced a written statement. The court took the view that it was not obliged to grant another continuance to accommodate defense counsel's tardiness in reviewing discovery materials that had been available to him. Indeed, we have held that the denial of a continuance to consult with an expert regarding government evidence was not an abuse of discretion when defense counsel had failed to review the discovery in a timely manner. See United States v. Baum, 435 F.2d 1197, 1202 (7th Cir.1971). 4 Although Mr. Jones contends that the misunderstanding regarding who actually wrote the statement was inadvertent, such negligence does not excuse him from failing to review the statement in a timely manner to determine both the scrivener and the signer. 23 Mr. Jones also contends that the expert testimony would have aided the jury in judging the credibility of Mr. Jones and Detective Ramey. Nevertheless, the district court was entitled to conclude that such testimony would have been of limited value in the overall presentation of his case. 24 Finally, Mr. Jones submits that there is no indication that a delay would have wasted judicial resources or would have interfered with the smooth operation of the court's calendar. Appellant's Br. at 23. The district court did not make any specific statements regarding inconvenience to itself or any party; however, we have noted that this factor is simply one of many factors that the court may weigh and consider. See United States v. Miller, 327 F.3d 598, 605 (7th Cir.2003). Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion; after weighing the appropriate factors, the trial judge chose an option that was ... within the range of permissible options from which we would expect the trial judge to choose under the given circumstances. United States v. Depoister, 116 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir.1997). 25 Furthermore, Mr. Jones has not demonstrated that he suffered any prejudice from the denial of his motion to continue. Since Mr. Jones had not yet hired the handwriting expert witness and obtained an analysis, we certainly are not assured that the handwriting expert would have testified that the statement was not written by Mr. Jones. Even if the expert had given such testimony, the evidence against Mr. Jones was overwhelming. Detective Ramey testified that Mr. Jones had confessed orally and had provided a written statement. Detective Stalet testified that Mr. Jones confessed to him that he had intended to sell the drugs. Additionally, many of the items seized from 940 North Main Street were evidence that Mr. Jones had lived at 940 North Main Street. This evidence included his Illinois identification card, men's shaving items and clothes, pages from his address book, a letter addressed to Mr. Jones and a cell phone receipt made out to Mr. Jones. 26 Moreover, any prejudice to Mr. Jones was minimized by his counsel's examination of Government witnesses. His counsel cross-examined Detective Ramey about Mr. Jones' statement, through which counsel established that no one else had observed Mr. Jones make the oral or written statements and that there was no video or audio recording of Mr. Jones making these statements. Also, Mr. Jones testified that he did not write the statement in question. 27 Mr. Jones also contends that the denial of his motion for a continuance violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective representation. However, only an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay violates the right to the assistance of counsel. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Vincent, 416 F.3d at 599. Here, before deciding to deny the motion to continue, the district court considered Mr. Jones' failure to review relevant discovery, as well as possible prejudice to Mr. Jones. Based on this record, we cannot say that the district court's decision was unreasoning or arbitrary.