Opinion ID: 3011640
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conflict Inquiry

Text: Duncan argues that the trial court err ed in failing to conduct a sua sponte hearing into Roberts' apparent conflict of interest when the attorney introduced himself at Duncan's trial as Pedicini's partner. Duncan cites Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347, for the proposition that a trial court must make such an inquiry if it knows or reasonably suspects that a conflict of interest exists. The r elevant quotation from the Cuyler opinion makes clear that no such sua sponte inquiry was called for in this case: Holloway requires state trial courts to investigate timely objections to multiple representation. But nothing in our precedents suggests that the Sixth Amendment requires state courts themselves to initiate inquiries into the propriety of multiple r epresentation in every case. Defense counsel have an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representations and to advise the court promptly when a conflict of interest arises during the course of trial. Absent special circumstances, therefore, trial courts may assume either that multiple representation entails no conflict or that the lawyer and his clients knowingly accept such risk of conflict as may exist. Indeed, . . . trial courts necessarily rely in large measure upon the good faith and good judgment of defense counsel. . . . Unless the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry. 446 U.S. at 346-47 (citations and footnotes omitted). In Cuyler, the Court found nothing to indicate the trial court had a duty to inquire into potential conflicts of interest where the co-defendants' trials were severed; no 16 participant in the petitioner's trial made any objection to the multiple representation; and the attor ney's outline of his defense strategy both appeared compatible with the view that none of the defendants was connected with the [crime] and suggested that the petitioner's attorney was not afraid to call witnesses whom he might need in later trials (although the attorney ultimately made a strategic decision to rest on the government's case). Id. at 347-48. Roberts' and Pedicini's association was much mor e tenuous than that of the lawyers in Cuyler who worked together on three co-defendants' cases. Her e, Pedicini never appeared at Duncan's trial or vice versa , and the only evidence linking Roberts and Pedicini was Roberts' single statement of law-firm affiliation. Duncan has not shown that Roberts' written submissions to the trial court indicated this affiliation or that any other evidence before the court would have pointed to it. Therefore, Duncan's trial judge may not have suspected any multiple representation in Duncan's case, much less the type of special circumstances that would trigger a conflict inquiry into an otherwise presumptively permissible multiple representation. Moreover , the trial court had every reason to believe Roberts intended to pursue Duncan's defense zealously. For example, Roberts had identified Alvin as a witness and subpoenaed him, even though he decided not to call him. It follows that there was no basis for the trial court to initiate an inquiry into the possibility of a conflict of interest on Roberts' part.