Opinion ID: 2353935
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claim of Illegal Sentence

Text: Finally, appellant insists that an error in the computation of the effective date of his sentence has resulted in imposition of a sentence for voluntary manslaughter which exceeds the statutory maximum. With this contention we agree. The effective date of appellant's sentence is presently recorded as December 13, 1962. Snyder has been incarcerated for the following periods: (1) December 4 to December 13, 1960  10 days, comprising the time span between arrest and the granting of bail; (2) December 27, 1961 to February 2, 1962  38 days, the time between imposition of sentence and the grant of a supersedeas by this Court; and (3) January 18, 1963 to date. Under the Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1036, § 1, 19 P.S. § 894, appellant was clearly entitled to credit for the time served after imposition of sentence and before the supersedeas was granted. Credit should also have been allowed for the ten day period prior to the grant of bail. The Act of August 14, 1963, P.L. 841, § 1, 19 P.S. § 898, provides: Any person who has been convicted of an offense in any court in this Commonwealth and sentenced to a term of imprisonment shall be given credit toward the service of his sentence for any days spent in custody on this offense prior to the imposition of his sentence, including any days spent in custody on this offense prior to the entry of bail.  (Emphasis supplied.) We hold that the words has been indicate a legislative intent that the statute apply to sentences imposed before as well as after the effective date of the act. Our conclusion is bolstered by the clear legislative indication in § 1 of the Act of 1937, 19 P.S. § 894, governing the computation of sentences, that a purely prospective application was intended. That section begins with the following phrase  From and after the passage of this act . . .  demonstrating that the Legislature, when it intended prospective application, employed language to that effect. Appellant was therefore entitled to credit for 48 days of time served. Subtracting 48 days from the date that appellant was last imprisoned  January 18, 1963  results in a conclusion that the proper effective date of appellant's sentence should be December 1, 1962, not December 13. Appellant's minimum sentence must therefore expire on December 1, 1968 and his maximum sentence on December 1, 1974; the record shall be changed to reflect this fact and is remanded to the Court of Oyer and Terminer and General Jail Delivery of Montgomery County for correction of the effective date of sentence. [23] Order affirmed. Mr. Justice COHEN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.