Opinion ID: 2621130
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantial Evidence Supports the Department's Decision.

Text: Anderson challenges the department's finding that he did not overcome the presumption of non-residency in 1997that he lacked an intent to return and permanently remain in Alaska. [10] The PFD eligibility regulations established a presumption against eligibility for people absent from Alaska more than five years. [11] Those regulations required that the department consider six factors to determine whether an individual has rebutted the presumption of ineligibility, including: (1) the length of an individual's absence compared to the time the individual spent in Alaska before departing on the absence; (2) the frequency and duration of return trips to Alaska during the absence; the fact that the individual has returned to Alaska in order to meet the physical presence requirement of AS 43.23.005(a)(4) is not sufficient in itself to rebut the presumption of ineligibility; (3) whether the individual's intent to return or remain is conditioned upon future events beyond the individual's control, such as economics or finding a job in Alaska; (4) any ties the individual has established outside Alaska, such as maintenance of homes, payment of resident taxes, vehicle registrations, voter registration, driver's licenses, or receipt of benefits under a claim of residency in another state; (5) the priority the individual gave Alaska on an employment assignment preference list, such as those used by military personnel; and (6) whether the individual made a career choice or chose a career path that does not allow the individual to reside in Alaska or return to Alaska. [12] The department found that Anderson had not prevailed on a majority of the six factors, and denied his application. We applied the substantial evidence test in the PFD context in State, Department of Revenue, Permanent Fund Dividend Division v. Wilder. [13] In that case, Wildera military officerchallenged the department's decision that he failed to overcome the presumption of non-residency for five-year absences under 15 AAC 23.163(f). [14] We held that the department properly discounted paper ties to Alaska; correctly placed significance on the fact that Wilder had returned only once to Alaska during his absence; and appropriately relied on Wilder's failure to request reassignment to Alaska. [15] We stated that the department could properly consider whether the individual made a career choice or chose a career path that does not allow the individual to reside in Alaska or return to Alaska, [16] and that [w]ithout minimizing the unique nature and special demands of a career in the military, we conclude that Wilder has made a choice, and that choice is inconsistent with an intent `at all times' to return to Alaska. [17] Considering the evidence in the record, we held that substantial evidence supported the department's decision, even where competing inferences [could] be drawn from the testimony. [18] Anderson's case is similar to Wilder in some of the underlying facts, but ultimately proves to be a much closer question. Like Wilder, Anderson is a military officer; has been absent from Alaska more than five years; and has maintained his paper ties to Alaska. Unlike Wilder, Anderson has requested assignment to Alaska for each tour of duty; has returned to Alaska for three brief visits during his absence; and has been assigned to Alaska once on active military duty. But, even with the more favorable evidence of Anderson's intent to return, there is substantial evidence to support the department's finding that Anderson failed to rebut the presumption of non-residency.
The department principally relied on three factors when it denied Anderson's application: (1) the short period of Anderson's adult residency in Alaska as compared to his length of absence; (2) Anderson's career choice and his resulting lack of control with respect to residency; and (3) the infrequent and short duration of the return visits Anderson made to Alaska during his absence. Given this evidence, and the regulation requiring the department to give greater weight to the claims of individuals who make frequent, non-compulsory return visits to Alaska, [19] the department found that Anderson had not overcome the presumption of non-residency. After reviewing the evidence in the record, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Anderson failed to overcome the presumption of non-residency. That evidence includes Anderson's infrequent and short-duration return visits, his choice to use only a small percentage of his leave time visiting Alaska, his inability to control his residency, his choice to vote absentee in Alaska elections only once during his absence, his decision to accept a transfer to the East Coast knowing that this would lessen his chances of an Alaska assignment, and his short duration of adult residency compared to his time of absence.
Anderson asserts that there was substantial evidence to find that he overcame the presumption of non-residency. Anderson may be correct on this point. As noted above, Anderson presented evidence that he has always maintained his paper ties to Alaska; did not establish any ties to other states; always listed an Alaska assignment as his first choice for his job preference; consistently expressed a subjective intent to return; and made the statutory minimum return trips to Alaska. The combination of this evidence and reasonable inferences arising from it could support a finding that Anderson overcame the presumption of non-residency. But, as noted above, we are obligated to affirm the decision of an agency where it chooses between two alternatives, both of which are supported by substantial evidence. [20] Accordingly, the existence of substantial evidence to support Anderson's position does not in itself permit us to reverse the department's decision.