Opinion ID: 118240
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statute Means What It Says

Text: Section 954(d)(1) provides: No payment shall be made under this section except upon application therefor which is submitted to the National Endowment for the Arts in accordance with regulations issued and procedures established by the Chairperson. In establishing such regulations and procedures, the Chairperson shall ensure that (1) artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public. The phrase taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public is what my grammar-school teacher would have condemned as a dangling modifier: There is no noun to which the participle is attached (unless one jumps out of paragraph (1) to press Chairperson into service). Even so, it is clear enough that the phrase is meant to apply to those who do the judging. The application reviewers must take into account general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public when evaluating artistic excellence and merit. One can regard this as either suggesting that decency and respect are elements of what Congress regards as artistic excellence and merit, or as suggesting that decency and respect are factors to be taken into account in addition to artistic excellence and merit. But either way, it is entirely, 100% clear that decency and respect are to be taken into account in evaluating applications. This is so apparent that I am at a loss to understand what the Court has in mind (other than the gutting of the statute) when it speculates that the statute is merely advisory. Ante, at 581. General standards of decency and respect for Americans' beliefs and values must (for the statute says that the Chairperson shall ensure this result) be taken into account, see, e. g., American Heritage Dictionary 402 (3d ed. 1992) (consider . . . [t]o take into account; bear in mind), in evaluating all applications. This does not mean that those factors must always be dispositive, but it does mean that they must always be considered. The method of compliance proposed by the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) selecting diverse review panels of artists and nonartists that reflect a wide range of geographic and cultural perspectivesis so obviously inadequate that it insults the intelligence. A diverse panel membership increases the odds that, if and when the panel takes the factors into account, it will reach an accurate assessment of what they demand. But it in no way increases the odds that the panel will take the factors into considerationmuch less ensures that the panel will do so, which is the Chairperson's duty under the statute. Moreover, the NEA's fanciful reading of § 954(d)(1) would make it wholly superfluous. Section 959(c) already requires the Chairperson to issue regulations and establish procedures . . . to ensure that all panels are composed, to the extent practicable, of individuals reflecting . . . diverse artistic and cultural points of view. The statute requires the decency and respect factors to be considered in evaluating all applicationsnot, for example, just those applications relating to educational programs, ante, at 584, or intended for a particular audience, ante, at 585. Just as it would violate the statute to apply the artistic excellence and merit requirements to only select categories of applications, it would violate the statute to apply the decency and respect factors less than universally. A reviewer may, of course, give varying weight to the factors depending on the context, and in some categories of cases (such as the Court's example of funding for symphony orchestras, ante, at 583) the factors may rarely if ever affect the outcome; but § 954(d)(1) requires the factors to be considered in every case. I agree with the Court that § 954(d)(1) imposes no categorical requirement, ante, at 581, in the sense that it does not require the denial of all applications that violate general standards of decency or exhibit disrespect for the diverse beliefs and values of Americans. Cf. § 954(d)(2) ([O]bscenity . . . shall not be funded). But the factors need not be conclusive to be discriminatory. To the extent a particular applicant exhibits disrespect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public or fails to comport with general standards of decency, the likelihood that he will receive a grant diminishes. In other words, the presence of the tak[e] into consideration clause cannot be regarded as mere surplusage; it means something, Potter v. United States, 155 U. S. 438, 446 (1894). And the something is that the decision maker, all else being equal, will favor applications that display decency and respect, and disfavor applications that do not. This unquestionably constitutes viewpoint discrimination. [1] That conclusion is not altered by the fact that the statute does not compe[l] the denial of funding, ante, at 581, any more than a provision imposing a five-point handicap on all black applicants for civil service jobs is saved from being race discrimination by the fact that it does not compel the rejection of black applicants. If viewpoint discrimination in this context is unconstitutional (a point I shall address anon), the law is invalid unless there are some situations in which the decency and respect factors do not constitute viewpoint discrimination. And there is none. The applicant who displays decency, that is, [c]onformity to prevailing standards of propriety or modesty, American Heritage Dictionary, at 483 (def. 2), and the applicant who displays respect, that is , deferential regard, for the diverse beliefs and values of the American people, id., at 1536 (def. 1), will always have an edge over an applicant who displays the opposite. And finally, the conclusion of viewpoint discrimination is not affected by the fact that what constitutes `decency'  or `the diverse values and beliefs of the American people'  is difficult to pin down, ante, at 583any more than a civil service preference in favor of those who display Republican-Party values would be rendered nondiscriminatory by the fact that there is plenty of room for argument as to what Republican-Party values might be. The political context surrounding the adoption of the `decency and respect' clause, which the Court discusses at some length, ante, at 581, does not change its meaning or affect its constitutionality. All that is proved by the various statements that the Court quotes from the Report of the Independent Commission and the floor debates is (1) that the provision was not meant categorically to exclude any particular viewpoint (which I have conceded, and which is plain from the text), and (2) that the language was not meant to do anything that is unconstitutional. That in no way propels the Court's leap to the counter textual conclusion that the provision was merely aimed at reforming procedures, and cannot be utilized as a tool for invidious viewpoint discrimination, ante, at 582. It is evident in the legislative history that § 954(d)(1) was prompted by, and directed at, the public funding of such offensive productions as Serrano's Piss Christ, the portrayal of a crucifix immersed in urine, and Mapplethorpe's show of lurid homoerotic photographs. Thus, even if one strays beyond the plain text it is perfectly clear that the statute was meant to disfavorthat is, to discriminate againstsuch productions. Not to ban their funding absolutely, to be sure (though as I shall discuss, that also would not have been unconstitutional), but to make their funding more difficult. More fundamentally, of course, all this legislative history has no valid claim upon our attention at all. It is a virtual certainty that very few of the Members of Congress who voted for this language both (1) knew of, and (2) agreed with, the various statements that the Court has culled from the Report of the Independent Commission and the floor debate (probably conducted on an almost empty floor). And it is wholly irrelevant that the statute was a bipartisan proposal introduced as a counterweight to an alternative proposal that would directly restrict funding on the basis of viewpoint. See ante, at 581-582. We do not judge statutes as if we are surveying the scene of an accident; each one is reviewed, not on the basis of how much worse it could have been, but on the basis of what it says. See United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U. S. 519, 535 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). It matters not whether this enactment was the product of the most partisan alignment in history or whether, upon its passage, the Members all linked arms and sang, The more we get together, the happier we'll be. It is not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 377 (1951). The law at issue in this case is to be found in the text of § 954(d)(1), which passed both Houses and was signed by the President, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 7. And that law unquestionably disfavorsdiscriminates againstindecency and disrespect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American people. I turn, then, to whether such viewpoint discrimination violates the Constitution.