Opinion ID: 518071
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the law governing stays and dismissals of federal

Text: ACTIONS IN FAVOR OF ONGOING PROCEEDINGS 9 The first question to be considered in this case is whether the district Court was correct in suggesting that a stay was an appropriate means of avoiding questions arguably posed by Younger and Pennzoil. Under the Younger/Pennzoil doctrine of abstention, or equitable restraint, a federal court may dismiss an action when there is a direct conflict between the exercise of federal and state jurisdiction and considerations of comity and federalism dictate that the federal court should defer to the state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45, 91 S.Ct. at 750-51; Pennzoil, 107 S.Ct. at 1525-26. By choosing to grant a stay rather than to dismiss the case, the District Court apparently believed that it could avoid deciding whether Younger abstention was proper. This position is mistaken as a matter of law. The Supreme Court has clearly held that a stay is as much a refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction as a dismissal, because a decision to defer to proceedings in state court necessarily contemplates that the federal court will have nothing further to do in resolving any substantive part of the case, whether it stays or dismisses. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 28, 103 S.Ct. 927, 943, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). 10 Although Moses H. Cone involved a stay under the Colorado River doctrine, see Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976), rather than equitable restraint under Younger or Pennzoil, the Court's reasoning is equally applicable here. Regardless of the theory invoked, both a stay and a dismissal operate to deny the plaintiff a federal forum. Consequently, while it might be appropriate to stay rather than dismiss a case if dismissal is otherwise justified, see Bledsoe v. Crowley, 849 F.2d 639, 645 (D.C.Cir.1988), the court must first determine that it is warranted in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction. The District Court, however, offered no justification for its denial of Hoai's federal forum, and we can find no basis to support the court's stay. 11 It is difficult to understand why the parties at trial looked solely to Younger/Pennzoil, with no apparent recognition of the possible applicability of Colorado River and Moses H. Cone. The Colorado River doctrine, which was amplified in Moses H. Cone, instructs that only truly exceptional circumstances will allow a federal court to stay or dismiss a federal action in favor of a concurrent action before a state court. The court in Colorado River noted that the circumstances permitting the dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration are considerably more limited than the circumstances appropriate for abstention. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818, 96 S.Ct. at 1246; accord Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 15, 103 S.Ct. at 936. However, even though the Colorado River doctrine is narrower in application than the Younger doctrine, the Court has also pointed out that abstention itself  'is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.'  Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813, 96 S.Ct. at 1244 (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89, 79 S.Ct. 1060, 1062-63, 3 L.Ed.2d 1163 (1959)). 2 12 The policies underlying the Younger and Colorado River doctrines are somewhat different, with the latter focused principally on situations involving parallel or concurrent proceedings in federal and state courts. The main point here is that neither the Younger/Pennzoil doctrine nor the Colorado River/Moses H. Cone doctrine admits of a significant exception to the duty of a district court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it; and we can find no basis under either doctrine to justify a dismissal or stay of appellant's case.