Opinion ID: 164842
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ms. ortiz

Text: Mr. Eden argues the district court improperly granted absolute immunity to Ms. Ortiz for her application for the search warrant. In granting Ms. Ortiz’s motion to dismiss, the district court held that her actions were within the prosecutorial duties of initiating an agency enforcement action and therefore entitled to absolute immunity. We conclude that the district court erred in granting Ms. Ortiz’s motion to dismiss on the ground of absolute immunity. We review the district court’s dismissal and its absolute immunity determination de novo. See Duran , 238 F.3d at 1270 (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal); Scott , 216 F.3d at 908 (absolute immunity). To decide whether Ms. Ortiz’s actions are entitled to absolute immunity, we apply a functional approach, looking at the type of function she performed; we do not consider her identity. See Kalina v. Fletcher , 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons , 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993). Ms. Ortiz “bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question.” Burns v. Reed , 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991). “[S]tate attorneys and agency officials who perform functions analogous to those of a prosecutor in initiating and pursuing civil and administrative enforcement proceedings” are “absolutely immune from suit under section 1983 concerning activities ‘intimately associated with the judicial . . . process.’” Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. , 929 F.2d 1484, 1490 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman , 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 . . . (1976)). Absolute immunity does not extend to actions “that are primarily investigative or -15- administrative in nature,” though it “may attach even to such administrative or investigative activities ‘when these functions are necessary so that a prosecutor may fulfill his function as an officer of the court.’” Id. (quoting Snell v. Tunnell , 920 F.2d 673, 693 (10th Cir. 1990)). . . . “The more distant a function is from the judicial process and the initiation and presentation of the state’s case, the less likely it is that absolute immunity will attach.” Id. (citing Snell , 920 F.2d at 687). Scott , 216 F.3d at 908-09. It is not always easy to identify acts entitled to absolute immunity; advocacy, however, is the determinative factor. Rex v. Teeples , 753 F.2d 840, 843 (10th Cir. 1985); see also Imbler , 424 U.S. at 431 n.33 (recognizing it will be difficult to draw line between advocacy and other functions); Prince v. Hicks , 198 F.3d 607, 612 (6th Cir. 1999) (whether prosecutor acts as investigator or as advocate depends on specific circumstances of case). In this case, we must decide whether Ms. Ortiz’s conduct was administrative or investigative in nature or whether she engaged in conduct of an advocate. Relying on the holding in Burns v. Reed , 500 U.S. 478, Ms. Ortiz argues she acted as an advocate and was entitled to absolute immunity. In Burns , the Court held that a prosecuting attorney’s participation in a probable cause hearing, which was held after an arrest, by appearing before the judge and presenting evidence to support an application for a search warrant, was entitled to absolute immunity. The Court reasoned that the prosecutor acted as an advocate, the judge’s issuance of a search warrant was a judicial act, and the prosecutor’s -16- appearance at the probable cause hearing was “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” 500 U.S. at 491-92 (quotation omitted). Notably, however, the Burns decision concerned only the prosecutor’s “participation in the hearing and not . . . his conduct outside of the courtroom relating to the warrant.” Id. at 487. 10 In this case, Ms. Ortiz did not participate in the hearing. R. doc. 1, ex. A (indicating Mr. Voss submitted application for warrant to state-court judge). Rather, only at issue is her preparation and signing of the application for the administrative search warrant. We are convinced that absolute immunity is unavailable under the specific circumstances presented here. While we agree with Ms. Ortiz’s assertion that obtaining an administrative search warrant was a preliminary step before initiating civil proceedings under the New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act, Aplee. Br. at 29, the step was so preliminary as to be an investigatory and not an advocacy step. There is a difference between evaluating evidence in order to prepare for trial and searching for evidence that might give probable cause to bring an action. See Buckley , 509 U.S. at 273; see also Burns , 500 U.S. at 495 (rejecting notion that absolute immunity is expansive 10 Just as the Supreme Court has not clarified whether preparation of an application for an administrative warrant is prosecutorial or investigative activity, other courts also have not definitively decided the issue. See generally Annotation, Immunity of Prosecutor from Suit, 67 A.L.R. Fed. 640, 652-57 (1984 & Supp. 2003). -17- enough to include any action by prosecutor that relates to ultimate decision to prosecute); Smith v. Garretto , 147 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Although all investigative activity could be considered in some sense to be ‘preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings,’ the Supreme Court has sought to draw a line between those preparatory steps that a prosecutor takes to be an effective advocate of a case already assembled and those investigative steps taken to gather evidence.”) (quoting Buckley , 509 U.S. at 273). An attorney engages in an investigatory function if the attorney makes a “preliminary gathering of evidence that might ripen into a potential prosecution.” Snell , 920 F.2d at 692 (quotation omitted). Ms. Ortiz’s conduct occurred before she could possibly claim to be acting as an advocate. See Buckley , 509 U.S. at 275; see also Milstein v. Cooley , 257 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) (investigating done as detective, after filing crime report and before empaneling grand jury, rather than as advocate, is not protected by absolute immunity); Prince , 198 F.3d at 612-13 (holding prosecutor was not entitled to absolute immunity because investigation was not intimately associated with judicial phase of criminal process). She was not evaluating evidence already assembled. See Buckley , 509 U.S. at 273. At most, she was engaged in the preliminary gathering of evidence that potentially could result in further NMED action against Mr. Eden. Cf. Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, -18- 340-43, 344 n.6 (1986) (holding that police officer who applies for warrant is not absolutely immune from suit because applying for warrant precedes first phase of criminal proceedings, which is seeking indictment); Rex , 753 F.2d at 844 (holding prosecutor’s interrogation of suspect was type of police work and therefore not subject to absolute immunity). Thus, she did not act as an advocate in preparing and submitting the application. Ms. Ortiz does not contend that she had cause to initiate an action against Mr. Eden before the investigation. And her later initiation of an action did not retroactively transform the investigative work into prosecution. See Buckley , 509 U.S. at 275-76. Additionally, Ms. Ortiz’s actions are not absolutely immune because she is an agency attorney. See id. at 273. Her title as a Special Assistant Attorney General and Assistant General Counsel to NMED is not dispositive to a consideration of whether she acted as an advocate. See id. at 269. Absolute prosecutorial immunity is justified “only for actions that are connected with the prosecutor’s role in judicial proceedings, not for every litigation-inducing conduct.” Burns , 500 U.S. at 494. We therefore hold that absolute immunity is unavailable to Ms. Ortiz’s activity of applying for an administrative search warrant, because she was acting in an investigative and not -19- a prosecutorial capacity at the time of application. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of absolute immunity to Ms. Ortiz.
Ms. Ortiz argues that if she is not entitled to absolute immunity, she is entitled to qualified immunity. An attorney acting in an investigative capacity may be entitled to qualified immunity. See Buckley , 509 U.S. at 273; Scott , 216 F.3d at 908-09. Once a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right and that the right was clearly established. Snell , 920 F.2d at 696. Because the district court decided Ms. Ortiz was entitled to absolute immunity, the court did not reach her alternative argument that she was entitled to qualified immunity. Mr. Eden did not address qualified immunity in either the district court or on appeal. Qualified immunity issues should “be resolved in the first instance by the trial court,” because qualified immunity is an “objective legal inquiry,” which is “fact-specific.” Id. Accordingly, we remand to the district court to address the qualified immunity issue in the first instance.