Opinion ID: 2524910
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Age Element

Text: Elements of a particular offense may have differing mens rea requirements. Section 18-1-503(2) specifically states that a culpable mental state may be required with respect to some or all of the material elements of the offense. The culpable mental state of a statute may speak to conduct, circumstances, result, or any combination thereof, but not necessarily to all three. See Copeland, 2 P.3d at 1286. In construing a statute, we consult the legislative context. See Gross, 830 P.2d at 940 (stating that perhaps the best guide to intent is the declaration of policy which frequently forms the initial part of enactment). Here, we look to the origination of the contributing to the delinquency of a minor statute in determining whether the mens rea requirement applies to the age element. The General Assembly passed Colorado's first contributing to the delinquency of a minor statute in 1903. See An Act to Provide for the Punishment of Persons Responsible for or Contributing to the Delinquency of Children, ch. 94, 1903 Colo. Sess. Laws 198; see also Gibson v. People, 44 Colo. 600, 600-01, 99 P. 333, 333 (1909). This statute was the first of its kind in the United States. See id.; see also Gilbert Geis & Arnold Binder, Sins of Their Children: Parental Responsibility for Juvenile Delinquency, 5 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 303, 305 (1991). The contributing to the delinquency of a minor statute resided in the Children's Code until 1987, when the General Assembly recodified the statute and moved it to section 18-6-701, 6 C.R.S. (1999), as part of the Criminal Code. See Recodification of Children's Code, ch. 138, sec. 22, 1987 Sess. Laws 817. When originally enacted, the contributory delinquent law prescribed punishment for designated persons who are responsible for, or contribute to, the delinquency of a delinquent child or a juvenile delinquent person. See Gibson, 44 Colo. at 601, 99 P. at 333. The stated purpose of the delinquent children law, also enacted in 1903, was to furnish, through agencies of the state, for delinquent children that care, custody, and discipline which shall approximate, as nearly as may be, that which should be given by their parents. See id. In the early 1900s, contributing to the delinquency statutes were designed as an attempt to save children from morally corrupting sectors of society until the children were able to fend for themselves. See Glenn W. Soden, Comment, Contributing to Delinquency: An Exercise in Judicial Speculation, 9 Akron L.Rev. 566, 567 (1976). In Gibson, we stated that the avowed purpose of the contributing to the delinquency of a minor statute is praiseworthy[,] and an intelligent and wise exercise of the powers it confers is calculated to develop the good qualities of children to the benefit of organized society. Gibson, 44 Colo. at 601-02, 99 P. at 334. The overriding purposes of the Children's Code have not substantially changed since that case: to preserve and strengthen family ties while securing a child's welfare, to draw a distinction between adults and children who violate the law, and to protect and rehabilitate juveniles who violate the law. See Nicholas v. People, 973 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Colo.1999). The legislature's intent in enacting Colorado's contributing to the delinquency of a minor statute instructs our decision that the culpable mental state of knowingly does not apply to the statute's age element. The statute's purpose is the protection of minors. In analogous circumstances, the defendant's awareness of the victim's age is not the focus of the statute's mens rea requirement. The legislature holds the defendant responsible for the offense if the defendant engaged in the prohibited conduct and the victim's age fell within the statutorily defined age element. See, e.g., People v. Deskins, 927 P.2d 368, 372-73 (Colo.1996) (holding that defendant did not need to know that child was in vehicle to be convicted of reckless child abuse when defendant's car struck that vehicle); People v. Davis, 935 P.2d 79, 86 (Colo.App. 1996) (finding no indication that the General Assembly intended to require a defendant to have knowledge of age of victim to be charged with a crime against an at-risk adult); People v. Metcalf, 926 P.2d 133, 138 (Colo.App.1996) (holding that offender does not need to know custody order exists for offense of violation of custody order because such an interpretation furthers purpose of protecting children and society from violation of court orders); People v. Suazo, 867 P.2d 161, 169-70 (Colo.App.1993) (concluding that plain language of assault on elderly statute does not require defendant to know that victim was sixty years of age or older).