Opinion ID: 1280501
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issues

Text: CONCLUSION. Foster parents do not have a right, based on statute or case law, to intervene in dependency proceedings. Permissive intervention, however, may be granted in the proper case at the informed discretion of the trial court. The foster parents moved to intervene in the dependency action pursuant to the Superior Court Civil Rules, specifically CR 24, which provides in pertinent part: (a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. (b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application, anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) When a statute confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) When an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.... In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. At the time the foster parents attempted to intervene in the juvenile court actions, no statute existed which conferred an unconditional right on foster parents to intervene in juvenile dependency proceedings. The first section of the above intervention of right rule (CR 24(a)(1)) thus does not apply. The second section of the intervention of right rule (CR 24(a)(2)) requires that the prospective intervenor show: (1) an interest relating to the subject matter of the action; (2) that the ability of the intervenor to protect that interest may be impaired by disposition of the action; (3) that the interest is not being adequately protected by existing parties; and (4) that the motion to intervene is timely made. [7] It is only the first factor  an interest in the subject matter  that is at issue in this case. [1] The meaning of interest is broadly interpreted, requiring flexibility and a case-by-case analysis and balancing of the relative concerns of the prospective intervenor, the original parties to the lawsuit and the public in the efficient resolution of controversies. [8] The interest which the intervenor seeks to protect must be one recognized by law. [9] The foster parents argue that they are the psychological or de facto parents of J.H. and C.H. and therefore have a recognizable legal interest in maintaining a family relationship with the children. [10] The concept of psychological or de facto parent recognizes that children become attached to the adults who take care of their physical and emotional needs for affection and care on a day-to-day basis. [11] Whether any adult becomes the psychological parent of a child is based thus on day-to-day interaction, companionship, and shared experiences. The role can be fulfilled either by a biological parent or by an adoptive parent or by any other caring adult  but never by an absent, inactive adult, whatever his biological or legal relationship to the child may be. J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 19 (2d ed. 1979). In certain limited circumstances our appellate courts have recognized the importance of psychological parents to the welfare of children. For example, in In re Marriage of Allen, 28 Wn. App. 637, 626 P.2d 16 (1981), a marriage dissolution case, the court found that the psychological relationship between a young deaf child and his stepmother and her daughters was equivalent to that of a natural family entity. [12] The trial court awarded the stepmother custody of the child even though neither of the child's parents was unfit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the custody award, holding that custody of a child may be awarded to a nonparent when it would be detrimental to the child's growth and development to be placed with a legal parent. [13] The Court of Appeals noted, however, that a different standard of proof is required in juvenile court cases. [14] The importance of the relationship between a child and nonparent caretakers also has been recognized in some juvenile dependency and termination cases. [15] [2] While the law recognizes the importance of the psychological parent to the child, this recognition does not go so far as to establish a right on the part of a foster parent to have the foster family relationship continue permanently where the placement of the child is by its very nature temporary, transitional and for the purpose of supporting reunification with the legal parents. [16] Not only does case law not support intervention of right in such situations, but Washington statutes do not establish an interest sufficient to support the foster parents' intervention as a matter of right. The statutes governing dependency actions [17] do create an expectancy on the part of the children, their legal parents and of the public that children will not be moved from any home at the mere whim of an agency. An agency's actions with respect to placement of a child in foster care are to be guided by the child's best interests and unnecessary changes in placement are to be avoided. The Legislature has recognized that [p]lacement disruptions can be harmful to children by denying them consistent and nurturing support, RCW 74.13.310, and has enacted legislation requiring out-of-home placements to be selected with a view toward the fewest possible placements for each child. If possible, the initial placement shall be viewed as the only placement for the child. RCW 74.13.290. While the child may benefit from these enactments, neither these statutes, nor others in effect at the time this action was initiated, grant foster parents a right to challenge arbitrary removal of children in foster care. [18] In many cases foster parents who have provided a child a home for 90 days or more must be given at least 5 days' advance notice of any proposed move of the child. [19] The statute is clear, however, that the notice provision is not intended to require a court hearing prior to a change in foster placement and that it is not intended to create any substantive custody rights in the foster parents. [20] Recent legislative efforts to expand the rights of foster parents would have required written notice to foster parents stating the reasons for removing a child from the foster home. The law also would have created a right to administrative review of the removal decision. The vote to adopt this legislation was unanimous in both the State Senate and the House of Representatives; however, the sections of the legislation that created such rights in foster parents were vetoed by the Governor. [21] We cannot reasonably conclude that the existing statutes go further than the Legislature's attempted express amendment by holding that existing statutes grant a right to judicial review upon the request of foster parents. The foster parents thus do not have a legal interest sufficient to mandate intervention in the dependency action under CR 24(a)(2), governing intervention as a matter of right. [3, 4] It is true that in the situation presented some juvenile court judges may have granted permissive intervention and allowed the foster parents to challenge the move from their home to another foster home. Foster parents' intervention rights are limited, however, and intervention would be appropriate only to the extent that the rights of the foster parents and the rights of the legal parents do not conflict. [22] Any such decision permitting intervention is within the juvenile court's informed discretion and as an appellate court we must review such decisions under an abuse of discretion standard. [23] `An abuse of discretion exists only when no reasonable person would take the position adopted by the trial court.' [24] Based on the meager record before us, we are unable to conclude that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the foster parents' motion to intervene.