Opinion ID: 2523730
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Postsentencing Motions

Text: Defendant filed a timely motion for a new sentencing hearing and a timely motion to reduce sentence. Defendant's motions included two arguments relevant to this appeal. First, defendant's motion for new sentencing hearing argued that the court erred in applying the no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of death standard when the legislature had changed the standard effective November 19, 2003, to whether `death is the appropriate sentence.' At the hearing on defendant's motions, the court acknowledged that the standard had been changed. The court explained: When I wrote my notes on the yellow sheet of paper, I had both standards because Mr. Baez I thought had the right to elect both, and I certainly thought I said that death was the appropriate sentence. Those words I do not see in the transcript, even though I read it quickly. I certainly didn't see them. But it is clear that under either standard, death is the appropriate sentence. There were mitigating factors, but there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of death. And, therefore, death in this Court's opinion was the appropriate sentence in the case. Later, the court added: I wouldn't have used the wrong standard, but I've indicated that I had the benefit of both standards, and I think that they go hand in hand. If there were mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of death, then of course death would not be the appropriate sentence. Because there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of death, then death is in fact without a doubt in my mind the appropriate sentence. Defendant's motion to reduce sentence also argued that the court erred in failing to find that defendant suffered from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Similarly, the motion to reduce sentence argued that the court failed to give proper weight to Dr. Heinrich's testimony. On that point, the court stated, Doctor Heinrich's testimony was not credible. He was just not a credible witness. Specifically, the court noted Heinrich's assertion that multiple diagnoses on axis II were impermissible, an assertion contradicted in court by Dr. Coleman and in the report by Dr. Henry. The court also noted that although Heinrich had testified that defendant did not have antisocial personality disorder, he had agreed on cross-examination that defendant met every single one of the diagnostic criteria. The court denied both of defendant's motions in their entirety.