Opinion ID: 1858107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: Drug Rehabilitation Records/Assignment of Error 20

Text: Defendant asserts the trial court allowed the State to introduce at the penalty phase defendant's records from drug rehabilitation clinics which had been improperly released to the State at an ex parte hearing without defendant's knowledge. On March 3, 1995, the trial court held a hearing with the State, without notice to or the presence of defendant, regarding the admission of defendant's rehabilitation records from the Baton Rouge Alcohol and Drug Center and the Baton Rouge Detoxification Center. The hearing was held as a result of the refusal of these two organizations to respond to the State's subpoena duces tecum requesting the records. As a result of the hearing, the records were released to the State and later introduced by it at the penalty phase of trial. Under 42 C.F.R. § 2.65(a)(emphasis added), An order authorizing the disclosure or use of patient records to criminally investigate or prosecute a patient may be applied for by the person holding the records or by any person conducting investigative or prosecutorial activities with respect to the enforcement of criminal laws. The application may be filed separately, as part of an application for a subpoena or other compulsory process, or in a pending criminal action. Certainly, the prosecution of a first degree murder case includes the penalty phase wherein the character and propensities of the offender are at issue, and the sentence is determined. According to 42 C.F.R. § 2.65(d), a court may only order disclosure and use of these confidential records for the prosecution of a case if: (1) The crime involved is extremely serious, such as one which causes or directly threatens loss of life or serious bodily injury including homicide, rape, kidnapping, armed robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and child abuse and neglect. (2) There is a reasonable likelihood that the records will disclose information of substantial value in the investigation or prosecution. (3) Other ways of obtaining the information are not available or would not be effective. (4) The potential injury to the patient, to the physician-patient relationship and to the ability of the program to provide services to tother patients is outweighed by the public interest and the need for the disclosure.... In the instant case, a double murder is patently an extremely serious crime, the records were more than likely to reveal information regarding defendant's drug addictiona pivotal part of defendant's defense at the penalty phase, there was no other way to obtain these records, and disclosure of the records would greatly further the public's interest in prosecuting, convicting, and properly sentencing criminals. The regulation does not require notice to the criminal or that he be given an opportunity to be present or heard. Only the agency which received the application for disclosure of the records has these rights. There was no violation of the federal regulations governing record confidentiality. Neither does the release of the records violate the health care provider-patient privilege of La. C.E. art. 510. Article 510(C)(2)(a) provides no provider-patient privilege exists when the communication is relevant to an issue of the health condition of the accused in any proceeding in which the accused relies upon the condition as an element of his defense. In the usual criminal case, the provisions of Article 510(C)(2)(a) operate to ensure state access to health care diagnosis and treatment information relating to a condition or mental health issue urged by defendant in the nature of a defense to a conviction. We see no reason why a defendant's decision in the penalty phase of a first degree murder case to use the health condition of drug addiction as a defense to the State's efforts to persuade the jury to recommend the death penalty should be treated any differently. As such, La. C.E. art. 510 was clearly not violated by the release and introduction of these documents. In a sub-argument, defendant additionally alleges his due process rights were violated because he was not notified of the State's intent to use this information at a sentencing hearing and was thus unable to properly prepare, citing Jackson, supra . In Jackson, this court held that with respect to unadjudicated criminal conduct, [f]undamental fairness requires that when a prosecutor intends to use evidence of unrelated conduct to ... increase the punishment for the charged crime, the accused must be notified in order that he may prepare. 608 So.2d at 957. Without deciding whether Jackson even applies to require the State to notify defendant of its intent to introduce evidence related to defendant's drug use, or attendance at substance programs, we note defense counsel did not dispute the prosecutor's assertions at trial that she had turned over copies to him of everything released by the clinics, and, in fact, defense counsel conceded as much. Defendant therefore had actual notice of the documents and their contents, and there is no Jackson violation here. Finally, and most importantly, defendant cannot be heard to complain of the introduction of these documents since they mirrored precisely the kind of information the defense presented to convince jurors to spare defendant's life. After conceding factual guilt, the defense's strategy in the penalty phase was to focus on defendant's deprived and violent childhood, his few intellectual assets, his lack of opportunity to lift himself beyond his circumstances and his familial predisposition to addictive chemical substances. Any information contained in the rehabilitation centers' reports to this effect only served to duplicate the defense's own evidence. This assignment lacks merit.