Opinion ID: 3013461
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Future Injury Claim

Text: With respect to the future injury claim, Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993), established the constitutional right required by the first prong of the Saucier test for qualified immunity. In Helling, the Supreme Court determined that a cause of action exists under the Eighth Amendment when a prisoner alleges that prison officials have exposed him, with deliberate indifference, to levels of ETS that pose an unreasonable risk of harm to his 7 future health. Id. at 35 (concluding that prisoner stated a claim where he was forced to share a cell with a five-packper-day smoker). As to the second part of the Saucier inquiry, the Helling Court clearly established the elements of a two-part test that a plaintiff must meet to state a valid claim under the Eighth Amendment. The Court explained that the first prong of the Helling test is an objective one: [The prisoner] must show that he himself is being exposed to unreasonably high levels of ETS. Id. at 35. With respect to the objective factor, the Court noted that beyond a scientific and statistical inquiry into the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that such injury to health will actually be caused by exposure to ETS, the Eighth Amendment requiresa court to assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk. Id. at 36 (emphasis in original). The Court stated: In other words, the prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that today’s society chooses to tolerate. Id. The second prong of the Helling test is a subjective one: whether prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm. Id. at 36. The Supreme Court has held that a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In concluding, the Helling Court held that the prisoner had properly claimed that the level of ETS to which he was exposed unreasonably endangered his future health. Helling, 509 U.S. at 35. The Court remanded the case so that the prisoner could attempt to prove the objective and subjective elements necessary to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. Since 1993, almost every Court of Appeals that has 8 addressed this issue has recognized that a prisoner’s right to be free from levels of ETS that pose an unreasonable risk of future harm was clearly established by Helling.3 See Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming District Court’s denial of Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity where a prisoner asserted that ETS exacerbated severe chronic asthma); Warren v. Keane, 196 F.3d 330, 333 (2d Cir. 1999) (denying prison officials’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity in an ETS case); Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882, 887-88 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding ETS claim was wrongly dismissed as frivolous where prison doctor issued report noting that prisoner required nonsmoking quarters), overruled on other grounds by Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 735 (2001); Rochon v. City of Angola, Louisiana, 122 F.3d 319, 320 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming District Court’s denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity where prisoner asserted that he was forced to live and work in an environment filled with tobacco smoke, even though the smoke had not yet harmed his health but allegedly posed a threat to his health in the future); Jacobs v. Young, No. 94-3241, 1995 WL 150402, at  (6th Cir. April 5, 1995) (unpublished opinion) (concluding prisoner’s right to be free from harmful levels of ETS was clearly established in 1993); see also Weaver v. Clarke, 45 F.3d 1253, 1256 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming District Court’s denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity where a prisoner alleged _________________________________________________________________ 3. Instead of relying upon cases that directly deal with the question of whether prison officials should be afforded qualified immunity in ETS suits, the dissent cites to cases which in our view are inapplicable. See Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 853 (7th Cir. 2000); Oliver v. Deen, 77 F.3d 156, 159 (7th Cir. 1996). The Henderson and Oliver Courts did not consider the issue of qualified immunity but affirmed grants of summary judgment to the defendants based on a lack of evidence. See Henderson, 196 F.3d at 853; Oliver, 77 F.3d at 159. Moreover, in a later case the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit arguably made the strongest ruling that ETS claims are clearly established for the purposes of qualified immunity:Given the decision in Helling, the right of a prisoner to not be subjected to a serious risk of his future health resulting from ETS was clearly established in 1998-99. Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 2001). 9 severe headaches, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, and breathing difficulties from rooming with heavy smoker); but see Mills v. Clark, No. 99-6334, 2000 WL 1250781, at  (4th Cir. Sept. 5, 2000) (unpublished opinion) (reversing District Court’s denial of qualified immunity on summary judgment for prison officials because it was not clearly established level of ETS in dormitories posed any unreasonable risk of future harm).4 In a case identical in facts and procedural posture to the present one, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a District Court correctly denied prison officials’ summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity where prisoners claimed to be suffering from sinus problems, headaches, dizziness, nausea, shortness of breath, chest pains and asthma from cellmates’ smoking in _________________________________________________________________ 4. The dissent distinguishes ETS cases that survive a motion to dismiss from those involving a denial of summary judgment by noting that the former require no evidentiary support for a plaintiff ’s claims: motions to dismiss [are submitted at] a much easier stage to survive than summary judgment because, unlike summary judgment, motions to dismiss require no evidentiary support for the plaintiffs’ claims. In making this argument the dissent appears to be evaluating the underlying evidence. This is the exercise that Ziccardi forbids us from undertaking on this appeal: As we understand Johnson, if a defendant in a constitutional tort case moves for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and the district court denies the motion, we lack jurisdiction to consider whether the district court correctly identified the set of facts that the summary judgment record is sufficient to prove; but we possess jurisdiction to review whether the set of facts identified by the district court is sufficient to establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. 288 F.3d at 61; see also Sanders v. Brundage, 60 F.3d 484, 487-88 (8th Cir. 1995) (refusing to consider insufficient evidence argument on appeal from denial of qualified immunity on a motion for summary judgment for prisoner’s ETS claim). The present appeal from appellants’ denial of summary judgment, however, is interlocutory in nature and based on a denial of qualified immunity. Because the Supreme Court’s ruling in Johnson prevents us from weighing the evidence, the present case is more analogous to a 12(b)(6) motion, where we would not evaluate the underlying evidence to support the plaintiff ’s claims which the District Court chose to accept. See Ziccardi , 288 F.3d at 61. 10 Sing Sing prison. Warren, 196 F.3d at 333. The Warren Court held that after Helling it was clearly established that prison officials could violate the Eighth Amendment through deliberate indifference to an inmate’s exposure to levels of ETS that posed an unreasonable risk of future harm to the inmate’s health.5Id. Moreover, the Warren Court concluded that it would be unreasonable for prison officials to believe that they were not violating the prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights where the District Court determined that [p]laintiffs’ allegations, if believed, overwhelmingly describe a prison environment permeated with smoke resulting from, inter alia, under-enforcement of inadequate smoking rules, overcrowding of inmates, and poor ventilation. Id. In the present case, without weighing the underlying evidence with respect to Atkinson’s claim, we conclude that appellants are not entitled to qualified immunity on the ETS claim of future harm. As the Warren Court recognized, the Helling decision established the constitutional right required by the first prong of the Saucier test. Warren, 196 F.3d at 333; see also Helling, 509 U.S. at 35. Atkinson invokes the constitutional right claimed by the Helling prisoner: alleging that he was unwillingly exposed to levels of ETS that pose an unreasonable risk of future harm. Similarly, Atkinson has satisfied the second prong of the Saucier test. The right recognized by the Helling decision is clearly established so that a reasonable prison official would know when he is violating that right. See, e.g., Alvarado, 267 F.3d at 653 (Given the decision in Helling, the right of a prisoner to not be subjected to a serious risk of his future health resulting from ETS was clearly established in 1998-99.); Warren, 196 F.3d at 333 (We _________________________________________________________________ 5. The dissent characterizes Warren as a cursory opinion lacking persuasive value that is not binding on this Court. However, the dissent fails to acknowledge that Warren is directly on-point. See Warren, 196 F.3d at 333 (We hold that after Helling, it was clearly established that prison officials could violate the Eighth Amendment through deliberate indifference to an inmate’s exposure to levels of ETS that posed an unreasonable risk of future harm to the inmate’s health.). The facts and procedural posture of the Warren decision, a denial of qualified immunity on summary judgment, are a carbon copy of the present case. 11 hold that after Helling, it was clearly established that prison officials could violate the Eighth Amendment through deliberate indifference to an inmate’s exposure to levels of ETS that posed an unreasonable risk of future harm to the inmate’s health.). The facts of Helling are similar to the facts presented by the appellee. In Helling a prisoner was housed with a five-packs-per-day smoker and complained of certain health problems. Id. at 28. Here, appellee Atkinson was housed for over seven months with constant smokers. As to future harm Atkinson has offered some proof for each element of the alleged Eighth Amendment violation: 1) evidence that he was exposed to unreasonably high levels of ETS, the risk of which is not one that today’s society chooses to tolerate; and 2) evidence that prison officials knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. As to the first element, appellee’s deposition and interrogatory answers state that he was subjected to continuous smoking for at least seven months. Demonstrating a risk of future harm, A. Judson Wells, Ph.D. provided statistics and opined in his expert report that for Mr. Atkinson to continue in a smoke filled cell would increase his risk of death or non-fatal heart attack or stroke. With respect to the causal link between ETS and appellee’s symptoms, Dr. Rizzo’s letter concluded that there was a reasonable medical probability that appellee’s symptoms (itchy and burning eyes, chest pains, a sore throat, a persistent cough with sputum production, paroxysms of coughing and resulting headaches) were precipitated by second-hand smoke. Although other Courts of Appeals have affirmed a grant of summary judgment to prison officials on similar evidence as too speculative,6 we _________________________________________________________________ 6. For an example, see Henderson, 196 F.3d at 853. The procedural posture of Henderson, an appeal from a grant of summary judgment to prison officials for lack of evidence of future harm, allowed the Court of Appeals to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence. See id. If appellee can produce evidence of future harm, he may be able to recover monetary damages. See Fontroy, 150 F.3d at 244. However, the problematic quantification of those future damages is not relevant to the present inquiry concerning whether the underlying constitutional right was clearly established so that a reasonable prison official would know that 12 are deciding the issue of qualified immunity, and cannot evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319. In addition, appellee has presented evidence that society has become unwilling to tolerate the imposition on anyone of continuous unwanted risks of second-hand smoke, citing Executive Order 71, in which the Governor of Delaware banned smoking in state buildings except in certain designated areas.7 As to the second Helling element, defendants’ answers to Atkinson’s interrogatories and the depositions of Way, Phelps, and Parker demonstrate that appellants knew tobacco smoke was dangerous. Additionally, the District Court relied upon Atkinson’s statements that he either spoke or wrote to all appellants regarding unreasonable ETS he was experiencing.