Opinion ID: 200103
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Toleration of Harassment

Text: 61 Marrero also alleges that Goya retaliated against her by tolerating harassment by its employees. As we explained in the previous section, environmental harm such as harassment by co-workers or supervisors is actionable under Title VII if it is so severe or pervasive that it alters the conditions of the plaintiff's employment. Just as an employer will be liable for discrimination if it tolerates a racially or sexually hostile work environment, it will be liable for retaliation if it tolerates severe or pervasive harassment motivated by the plaintiff's protected conduct. See White, 221 F.3d at 262; Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir.1999). 62 Here, however, any suggestion that Marrero was subjected to a retaliatory hostile work environment is belied by the undisputed fact that she spent less than three days at Goya after filing her complaint with the EEOC. See Conto v. Concord Hosp., Inc., 265 F.3d 79, 82 (1st Cir.2001) (rejecting as a matter of law a hostile work environment claim based on harassment occurring during a four-day period on the ground, inter alia, that the greatly abbreviated time period substantially undermined [plaintiff's] contention that the [harassing] conduct was either sufficiently frequent or severe (footnote omitted)). Her retaliation claim is, by definition, based on the events that occurred within that three-day period. Obviously, no one at Goya could have harassed Marrero in retaliation for her protected conduct until after she engaged in that conduct. 63 That said, the preceding year and a half of sexual harassment undoubtedly colored Marrero's perception of the events in her last three days at Goya, as it would for any reasonable employee in her position. Thus, we do not view those three days in a vacuum, but consider them in light of all that came before. To that limited extent, Marrero's experiences before engaging in the protected conduct are relevant to her retaliation claim. 64 Even when examined in that light, however, the evidence of retaliatory harassment falls far short of the mark. Marrero testified that, during the time she spent in the Human Resources Department, Nieves and Ramos pressured and snubbed her. Moreover, Cárdenas continued to bother her in her new position. The jury reasonably could have found that some of that harassment was motivated by Marrero's protected conduct. Cárdenas once said to Marrero: you thought that you were going to get me into hot waters but you ended up being in hot waters. He also laughed at her in a taunting fashion, indicating, I got away with it. 65 A few incidents over the course of three days cannot reasonably be deemed pervasive retaliatory harassment, particularly when those incidents are of the same type and kind that repeatedly occurred in the workplace before the plaintiff engaged in the protected activity. Thus, it was incumbent on Marrero to show that the retaliatory harassment was so severe that it rendered her work environment objectively hostile and abusive notwithstanding the extremely short time span. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (explaining that isolated incidents are not sufficient to create actionable harassment unless [they are] extremely serious). The conduct by Nieves and Ramos, while certainly unpleasant, was not particularly severe. As such, it does not support the imposition of liability under Title VII. 66 Cárdenas's comments present a slightly closer question. Given that Marrero had endured a year and a half of harassment while under his supervision, it would not be unreasonable for her to find his taunting especially offensive. Moreover, Marrero presented evidence from which the jury could have found that Nieves was aware of Cárdenas's behavior. That fact surely contributed to her feeling that the environment in the Human Resources Department was hostile. But the question remains whether these acts were severe enough, without the added weight of repetition over time or cumulation with other acts of [retaliatory] harassment, to stand alone as the basis for a harassment claim. Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 808 (7th Cir.2000) (finding sufficient severity based on two incidents of forcible sexual contact with overtones of ... attempted sexual assault). We conclude that they were not. Title VII does not guarantee[] a working environment free from stress. Calhoun, 798 F.2d at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted). Something more egregious than rudeness and mockery is needed before we can permit a finding of a retaliatory hostile work environment based on intermittent contact over a three-day period. 67 In sum, we conclude that the district court erred in denying Goya's motion for judgment as a matter of law on Marrero's claim of retaliation. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that Marrero was subjected to an adverse employment action as a result of her protected conduct.