Opinion ID: 753501
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lovett's Withdrawal Instruction

Text: 24 Appellant Lovett argues that the district court misstated the law when it included a jury instruction requiring him to take some affirmative act in order to prove withdrawal. 25 The district court issued the following instruction on withdrawal: 26 It is a defense to Count 2 through 21 of the indictment that a defendant withdrew from the scheme. 27 In order to withdraw from the scheme, a defendant must take some definite, decisive, and affirmative action to disavow himself from the scheme or to defeat the goal or purpose of the scheme. 28 Merely stopping activities or cooperation or merely being inactive for a period of time is not sufficient to constitute the defense of withdrawal.... 29 In deciding if a defendant took a step to disavow or defeat the scheme, you may consider several factors including whether the defendant intentionally alerted law enforcement to the scheme, whether the defendant told others in the scheme that his participation had ended, whether the defendant took steps to correct prior assistance to the group, and whether the defendant attempted to remedy any past act, or attempted to prevent any further progress of the scheme. 30 Lovett argues that the above instruction contradicts the law in U.S. v. Lothian, 976 F.2d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir.1992), which defines withdrawal as follows: To withdraw from a conspiracy a defendant must either disavow the unlawful goal of the conspiracy, affirmatively act to defeat the purpose of the conspiracy, or take 'definite, decisive, and positive' steps to show that the [defendant's] disassociation from the conspiracy is sufficient. 31 Although the district court in this case changed the language and sequence somewhat, it adequately captured all three methods of withdrawal. Therefore, the district court did not misstate the law in its withdrawal instruction. 32 However, the question remains whether the withdrawal instruction as a whole was misleading. Lovett correctly points out that an employee's resignation, after which he receives no financial benefit from the company, is prima facie evidence of withdrawal. Lothian, 976 F.2d at 1264. 33 Unfortunately, the district court in this case did not include resignation as an example of withdrawal. Nonetheless, we do not believe that the district court abused its discretion. Despite its choice of examples, the district court did not expressly exclude resignation as evidence of withdrawal. Apparently no better language was proposed, and this court in Lothian did not require that resignation be expressly highlighted for the jury. Hence, the withdrawal instruction is not a ground for reversal, even though it was less than ideal.