Opinion ID: 29675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: trial continuance

Text: Hines first seeks a COA for his claim that the trial court violated his constitutional right to due process and effective assistance of counsel by denying him a trial continuance following jury selection to allow his DNA expert, Dr. Arthur J. Eisenberg, to conduct independent testing of blood samples found on Hines’ pants and underwear. The government subjected those samples to a serology test that found the blood contained A antigens, and therefore could not have come from the victim. The subsequent government DNA test matched the blood sample with the victim’s, however, and Hines sought a ten-week continuance to conduct an independent DNA test to resolve this discrepancy. The trial court denied this continuance, and Hines now argues this denial was unconstitutional. When a denial of a continuance is the basis of a claim for 7 habeas relief, for relief to be granted not only must the trial judge have abused his discretion, but the denial must have been “so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it violates constitutional principles of due process.” Hicks v. Wainwright, 633 F.2d 1146, 1148 (5th Cir. 1981). Here, petitioner claims that the denial violated his due process right to present an effective defense as guaranteed in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1985). In Ake the Supreme Court held a criminal defendant’s due process rights include the right to expert assistance where such help is necessary to give indigent defendants “an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary system.” Id. at 77, quoting Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974). Hines argues that by denying the continuance, the trial court robbed him of his ability to effectively use Dr. Eisenberg, thereby depriving him of the opportunity to mount an adequate defense. The Texas state courts and the district court offer compelling reasons why this claim fails. First, the state habeas court concluded that Hines did in fact receive expert assistance as required by Ake. Dr. Eisenberg testified at trial about the shortcomings in the prosecution’s DNA evidence, including the inconsistency with the serology test results, as well as the fact that the DNA test could not exclude that the blood on Hines’ clothes was that of his roommate Jimmy Knight. Dr. Eisenberg also assisted the defense in preparation of its cross-examination 8 questions, including questions to the State’s serologist Michele Skidmore that attempted to discredit her theory that the A antigens came from Hines’ sweat. Thus, even without additional testing, the state habeas court concluded the defense was able to use Dr. Eisenberg to raise reasonable doubt in juror’s minds about the state’s blood evidence. Hines fails on appeal to introduce evidence that suggests this conclusion of the state habeas court was an unreasonable application of or contrary to established Supreme Court precedent. Hines argues that had Dr. Eisenberg conducted additional testing, it would have provided evidence consistent with the theory that Hines is innocent, and inconsistent with the government’s test results. While such speculative benefits are possible, Hines forgets the admonishment of the Court in Ake that the state need not buy the indigent defendant all the assistance a wealthy man might get. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77. Rather, the test is whether the defendant was given an adequate opportunity to present his claims at trial. Here, Dr. Eisenberg’s testimony regarding the shortcomings in the state’s DNA evidence, as well as his assistance in drafting cross-examination questions of the state’s DNA and serology witnesses, gave Hines such an opportunity. Thus, Hines fails to develop the factual or legal basis of a valid Ake claim. Assuming arguendo that Eisenberg’s assistance to defense counsel was somehow inadequate, Hines has not demonstrated that he had the constitutional right to further DNA testing. As we 9 explained in Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 227 (5th Cir. 1993) non-psychiatric experts should be provided only if the evidence is “both critical to the conviction and subject to varying expert opinion.” Id. (citations omitted). In denying Hines’ claim on direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that petitioner failed to establish that additional DNA testing met the second prong of this test. It explained that Hines did not introduce evidence suggesting that further testing would produce a contrary result. In reaching this conclusion the state court noted that Dr. Eisenberg had testified that he believed that the government’s tests were conducted using proper procedures, suggesting further DNA testing would not produce different results. In finding this conclusion was not an unreasonable application of or contrary to established Supreme Court precedent, the district court added its own doubt that prong 1 of the test had been met, concluding that evidence as to the source of the blood on Hines’ clothes was not “critical” to his conviction. The district court came to this conclusion after considering the volume of other evidence against Hines, including his bloody palm print on Haupt’s wall. Hines argues that reasonable jurists would debate both of these conclusions. As to the former, Hines claims that the inconsistencies between the government DNA results and the serology report were sufficient to suggest that the results of a second DNA test might be different than the first. As to whether the evidence 10 was “critical” to conviction, Hines argues that contrary DNA evidence would have given him three benefits critical to his defense. First, the testing might have established the government’s DNA evidence was too unreliable to be admitted.2 Second, the test could have impeached Dr. Robert Giles, the government DNA expert. Finally, the results could have created rebuttal evidence consistent with the theory that Hines is innocent. Hines’ arguments do not lead us to believe that reasonable jurists would debate the district court’s conclusions. To be entitled to non-psychiatric expert assistance a defendant must show something more than a mere possibility that the desired assistance will be helpful. Yohey, 985 F.2d at 227. In this case Hines has not shown that there is more than the mere possibility that additional DNA testing would produce different results. Given the testimony of Skidmore that the contrary serology results were caused by Hines’ sweat, those results are insufficient to suggest that further DNA tests would produce a different result. Further, as the state court on direct appeal noted, defendant’s expert admitted that the state procedures for the DNA test were adequate. 2 Under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 702, expert testimony is only admissible if it is reliable and on balance is of assistance to the trier of fact. Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Such evidence is reliable if (a) the underlying scientific theory is valid; (b) the technique applying the theory is valid; and (c) the technique was properly applied in the case in question. Id. at 573. 11 This suggests that a second test likely would have produced the same results. Hines has also not shown that the evidence from the second DNA test would have been critical evidence at trial. As the district court correctly noted, the State has other scientific evidence tying Hines to Haupt’s apartment, including his bloody palm print on her wall. Additionally, the State had circumstantial evidence linking Hines to Haupt, as he had her belongings in his possession. Thus, the DNA link of Haupt to Hines’ clothes does not seem critical to the conviction. Moreover, even if the additional test produced contrary results, it would not have resulted in exclusion of the government’s DNA test, as by defendant’s own admission the government DNA test used proper techniques.3 At most it would have produced additional impeachment evidence.4 Given that Dr. Eisenberg already presented such evidence, we cannot conclude that 3 As noted above, the test for reliability for admission of expert testimony is whether (a) the underlying scientific theory is valid; (b) the technique applying the theory is valid; and (c) the technique was properly applied in the case in question. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573. As DNA evidence meets the first two prongs of this test in Texas, id. at 574, and defendant’s expert admits it was properly applied here, the evidence would have been admissible regardless of contrary test results produced by Eisenberg. 4 Hines argues that a DNA test showing the blood on his clothes was not Haupt’s would be independent evidence of his innocence. He argues that the blood was instead that of his roommate Jimmy Knight. But Hines has failed to explain how the fact that the blood belonged to Jimmy Knight, or anyone else other than Haupt for that matter, would exonerate him, as such evidence is in no way probative of innocence. At most, it would discredit one piece of the government’s case, which when considered in the context of the volume of other evidence against Hines, is not critical. 12 additional impeachment evidence meets the “critical” threshold. Accordingly, Hines’ request for a COA on this claim is denied.