Opinion ID: 1378709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant's Statement to the Police Officer.

Text: The police officer who first came upon the scene was called to testify by the state. The trial court held a Jackson-Denno hearing (Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368) to determine whether or not the statement made by the defendant was admissible under Miranda, supra. The trial judge ruled that appellant's statement was admissible as part of the on-the-scene investigation which was reasonable in order to protect the officer. The defense takes the position that the officer had witnessed the offense of discharging a firearm occur and therefore had sufficient information to arrest the defendant at that point. For this reason, the defense contends that Miranda warnings were immediately required and that it was error not to give them. The issue to be decided is whether or not the appellant was in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way in order to trigger the requirement that Miranda warnings be given. Some restraint on individual freedom is clearly permissible without the warnings. In the context of Miranda, custody is not defined as any deprivation of freedom, but rather as a significant deprivation of freedom. See Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation. 25 S. C. L. Rev. 699, 706 (1974). However, the Miranda requirement for warnings is not limited to station-house interrogation. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U. S. 324 (1969). The defendant in Orozco, when interrogated by the police, was not free to go where he pleased but was under arrest. Is the test of Custody that triggers the Miranda admonitions simply that the defendant is not free to go or is more required to make the warnings necessary? Some courts have defined custody in terms of whether the defendant was deprived of his freedom of action. See People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438 (426 P2d 515). We think a more reasonable test recognizes this as a factor to be considered, but also recognizes the possibility of a more limited type of detention in which the defendant is not free to go but the Miranda warnings are not required at the initial contact. See United States v. Coates, 495 F2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Illustrative of this limited detention situation are the Terry-type investigative detentions, which are not equivalent to custody, and also the on-the-scene investigations in which a police officer prevents anyone present from leaving before a preliminary investigation is made. Both are recognized, at least implicitly, in Miranda and, of course, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1. The Supreme Court has not clearly defined the bounds of constitutionally permissible police investigative techniques. Miranda, by its own terms, does not apply to general on-the-scene investigation. The police on the scene of a crime are likely to detain temporarily anyone who tries to leave before a preliminary investigation. See, Allen v. United States, 390 F2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see, also, Arnold v. United States, 382 F2d 4 (9th Cir. 1967). Because of the diversity of street encounters between police and citizens, the courts are left with a case-by-case determination of whether constitutional rights have been violated by police activity. In Terry investigative detentions, the citizen is detained, but Miranda does not always attach to these circumstances. In Terry, there is an indication that some inquiry is permissible. The court's holding recognizes that a police officer in the course of investigating unusual behavior can make reasonable inquiries to dispel his reasonable fears for his own safety and that of others. 392 U. S. 30. In Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968), and its companion case, Peters was asked what he was doing in an apartment building. When the answer given was not satisfactory to the officer, a pat-down was begun that led to the discovery of burglary tools. As a noted writer points out, in the street encounter the suspect either gives an explanation that satisfies the officer or adds to the officer's suspicion and leads to the suspect's arrest. See W. LaFave, Street Encounters and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 40 (1968). In Georgia, both the Terry-type detention and the general on-the-scene investigation have been recognized. Appellant relies heavily on Conoly v. Imperial Tobacco Co., 63 Ga. App. 880, 885 (12 SE2d 398) (1940), a false imprisonment case in which arrest is defined as the taking, seizing, or detaining of the person of another, either by touching or putting hands on him, or by any act indicating an intention to take such person into custody, and which subjects such person to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest. This definition is implicitly approved in Davidson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 502, 504 (188 SE2d 124) (1972). However, this court subsequently, in Brisbane v. State, 233 Ga. 339, 343 (211 SE2d 294), recognized the possibility of a Terry-type search in Georgia where there are some reasonable articulable grounds for suspicion. See also, State v. Swift, 232 Ga. 535 (207 SE2d 459) (1974). In Brisbane, a limited investigative inquiry was found to be justified. In Terry custody cases, the individual becomes subjected to a limited investigative detention caused by the officer's reasonably founded suspicion of the individual's activities. The earlier Conoly decision, defining arrest in a damage suit, had no occasion to consider these factors and is not controlling here. In Wilburn v. State, 230 Ga. 675 (198 SE2d 857) (1973), the defendant was convicted of murder in the shooting death of his wife. Police officers were summoned to the defendant's home and they found the defendant sleeping in the front seat of his car. There were bloodstains on the dashboard of the car. The defendant stated to the officers he did not know where the bloodstains had come from and that he did not know where his wife was. Later, defendant spontaneously remarked that he blew her brains out. The court in Wilburn relied on the fact that Miranda applies only to custodial interrogations and concluded there was no error in the admission of the defendant's statements in that case. See also, Britton v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 109 (170 NW2d 785) (1969). Similarly, where a non-suspect who was not free to leave answered threshold inquiries made by police executing a search warrant, the answers were found to be admissible. Jones v. State, 127 Ga. App. 137 (193 SE2d 38) (1972). In making the distinction between custodial and noncustodial interrogation the U. S. Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit, has outlined several criteria: these include probable cause to arrest, subjective intent of the police, subjective belief of the defendant, and focus of the investigation. Brown v. Beto, 468 F2d 1284, 1286 (5th Cir. 1972). These all point to attempts by the police to gather incriminating information. See, United States v. Mandujano, 496 F2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1974). All of these factors are significant elements to be weighed in determining the custody issue. Of course, the police may not delay the arrest of a suspect or use a Terry rationale as a subterfuge to coerce the suspect into incriminating himself without the benefit of Miranda warnings. See Windsor v. United States, 389 F2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968). Under the facts of the present case, it appears that, for all practical purposes, the appellant was in custody from the moment he was ordered by the officer to spread-eagle himself upon the ground and the officer began to search him for weapons. However, in our opinion, the single threshold inquiry of the officer as to what was happening was not an impermissible interrogation under Miranda. The Court of Appeals, in Jenkins v. State, 123 Ga. App. 822 (182 SE2d 542) (1971, cert. den.) dealt with the definition of interrogation in connection with background and descriptive information obtained in the booking process. There the defendant, not in response to any particular question during the booking process, blurted out an admission. The court relied on Professor Kasimar's definition: Although the question is not entirely free from doubt, it seems that ... routine police `questioning' not related to the investigation of the case nor designed, expected, or likely to elicit information relevant to guilt may not amount to `custodial interrogation' within the meaning of Miranda ... Kasimar, Custodial Interrogation Within the Meaning of Miranda, in Criminal Law and the Constitution, pp. 358, 360 (1968) (Inst. of Continuing Legal Education). In Owens v. United States, decided by the D. C. Court of Appeals on July 7, 1975, 17 Cr. L. 2317, it was held that an officer's question, What are you doing here? asked of a suspect who was apprehended at gunpoint on the roof of a store about 2:00 a. m. was not an interrogation that first required Miranda warnings. As noted by that court: Interrogation forbidden by Miranda is not a single question at the threshold of the encounter arguably aimed at determining the nature of the situation confronting the police. We think this statement fairly characterizes the circumstances of the present case. In another case similar to the present case, the Illinois Appellate Court found in dicta that statements made to a police officer were voluntary as opposed to being the result of interrogation. People v. Jenkins, 13 Ill. App. 49 (268 NE2d 198) (1971). In Jenkins, an off-duty police officer saw the defendant drag the victim from a tavern. A few moments later he was told the victim had been stabbed, so he followed defendant and demanded that he stop. The officer asked where the knife was and put defendant under arrest. He then stated, Don't you know you just killed a woman back there? Defendant replied, The bitch needed killing. Although the statements were admitted at the trial without objection, the court stated that the whole exchange was admissible as voluntary and spontaneous. The court noted there that what the police officer said was not interrogation but was an explanation of why he was arresting the defendant. In summary, we believe that in the present case the police officer was not interrogating appellant for the purpose of obtaining evidence to establish appellant's guilt of a crime. In the state of confusion that apparently existed at the scene of this incident, we believe the officer was seeking to determine the nature of the situation confronting him. The single threshold inquiry he made to appellant, which evoked the statement by appellant, could easily have been directed towards ascertaining if there were any current danger to the officer or to others present at the scene. Therefore, we hold this statement by appellant was admissible in evidence despite the absence of Miranda warnings to appellant before he made the statement.