Opinion ID: 213250
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fisher v. City of Memphis, 234 F.3d 312 (6th Cir.2000).

Text: Fisher 's facts and procedural history are succinctly stated therein: On March 24, 1996, Officer William Taylor of the Memphis Police Department stopped to speak to two young women. As they spoke in the middle of Speed Street, they noticed a vehicle driven by Demetria Becton (Becton) approaching in their direction. To avoid being hit, the two women jumped onto the curb, and the Officer jumped onto the hood of his police car, simultaneously firing his gun at the car. The bullet went through the driver's side window and hit the passenger, Elitia Fisher. As a result of this incident, Ms. Fisher filed suit against Officer Taylor in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deprivations of her Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendant moved for summary judgment. . . . The court . . . denied the motion as to the Fourth Amendment claim, finding an issue of material fact as to whether Defendant's actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. . . . At trial, the jury reached a verdict for Plaintiff, and awarded her [damages]. Fisher, 234 F.3d at 315. On appeal, Officer Taylor argued that the district court should have instructed the jury that Fisher's wounding was accidental and thus not actionable under § 1983 or, alternatively, that the district court should have analyzed Fisher's claim as arising under the Fourteenth, rather than the Fourth, Amendment. This Court rejected both arguments: Defendant is correct in noting that to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Plaintiff must demonstrate more than just mere negligence. However, the intent in question is the intent to commit the act, not the intent that a certain result be achieved. Therefore, Officer Taylor's act of firing the gun was intentional, even if the result was not one he sought to achieve. Instructing the jury that more than negligence was required would likely confuse the jury as to the intent question. . . . Defendant's alternative argument is that the district court erred by analyzing his actions under the Fourth Amendment. . . [; he] specifically argues that this court should apply a shock the conscience standard . . . under the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . In addition, the United States Supreme Court has stated that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when governmental termination of freedom is through means intentionally applied. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 [109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628] (1989). Therefore, violation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control. As a result, a seizure occurs even when an unintended person or thing is the object of the detention or taking, so long as the detention or taking itself is willful. Id. In its recent decision in Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350 (6th Cir.2000), this Circuit applied Brower in determining whether a victim of an errant bullet in a shootout fell within the scope of Fourth Amendment seizure. While recognizing that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to § 1983 claims which seek remuneration for physical injuries inadvertently inflicted upon an innocent party by police officers' use of force while attempting to seize a perpetrator, Claybrook emphasized that police officers do seize any person who is a deliberate object of their exertion of force. Id. at 359. Here, Becton's car was the intended target of Defendant's intentionally applied exertion of force. By shooting at the driver of the moving car, he intended to stop the car, effectively seizing everyone inside, including the Plaintiff. Thus, because the Defendant seized the Plaintiff by shooting at the car, the district court did not err in analyzing the Defendant's actions under the Fourth Amendment. Fisher, 234 F.3d at 317-19.