Opinion ID: 2635753
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: License Status

Text: ¶ 10 Holz v. Burlington N. R.R., 58 Wash. App. 704, 711-13, 794 P.2d 1304 (1990), is informative. Holz died when he unwittingly drove his motorcycle at night into a black railroad tank car straddling an unlit road. Id. at 705, 794 P.2d 1304. Holz's family sued Burlington Northern for damages. Id. At the time of the accident, Holz had neither a motorcycle endorsement nor a learner's permit. Id. at 705-06, 794 P.2d 1304. ¶ 11 Burlington Northern sought to prove contributory negligence. Prior to trial, the plaintiffs moved to exclude any reference to the fact that Holz was not licensed to ride a motorcycle. Id. at 705, 794 P.2d 1304. Burlington Northern argued that Holz's unlicensed status was relevant because it was a cause-in-fact of the accident ( i.e., without Holz's violation of the statute, there would have been no accident). Id. at 705-06, 709, 794 P.2d 1304. The trial judge excluded the evidence. Id. at 705, 794 P.2d 1304. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the standard for such decisions is whether there is a causal connection between the statutory violation and the accident. [8] Id. at 708, 794 P.2d 1304. [T]he crucial question [is]: Would a person with a motorcycle endorsement, enabling that person to ride unsupervised and at night, have been any better off, i.e., any less likely to have suffered the same fate?... If a rider with a motorcycle endorsement would have suffered the same fate, evidence that Jody Holz lacked an endorsement would be irrelevant. Id. at 707-08, 794 P.2d 1304 (citing ER 401). [9] ¶ 12 The Court of Appeals rejected Burlington Northern's cause-in-fact argument as insufficient to establish a causal connection. Id. at 709, 794 P.2d 1304. The Holz court also distinguished foreign cases where evidence of license status had been admitted, noting that in each case, the evidence supported an inference that the alleged negligence was a proximate cause of the injury. Id. at 710, 794 P.2d 1304. And the court emphasized that in Holz's case there was no evidence that a properly licensed operator would have been less likely to collide with the tank car. Id. at 710, 794 P.2d 1304. Rather, the crucial factor contributing to the accident was poor visibility, which would have affected licensed and unlicensed riders equally. Id. at 711, 794 P.2d 1304. The Court of Appeals held that because a properly licensed rider would have suffered the same fate, the evidence of Holz's unlicensed status was properly excluded. Id. at 713, 794 P.2d 1304. The court also held that even if the excluded evidence were relevant, it was inadmissible under ER 403 because it had the danger of unfair prejudice. [10] Id. at 708, 794 P.2d 1304. ¶ 13 The trial court in this case applied similar reasoning: The general rule as set forth in Holtz [sic] is ... the fact that somebody is not licensed... is irrelevant.... I can't find that the fact that Mr. Lutz was operating without a valid endorsement is really relevant to how he operated the motorcycle. The real issue in this case is was he ... negligent? ... The fact that he wasn't fully qualified under state law as a motorcycle operator doesn't mean that he was or wasn't negligent. Report of Proceedings, Motions in Limine (Sept. 20, 2005) at 15 (second and fourth alterations in original). The Court of Appeals approved. See Kappelman, 141 Wash. App. at 584-85, 170 P.3d 1189 (quoting Holz, 58 Wash.App. at 707, 794 P.2d 1304). ¶ 14 We caution that evidence of unlicensed status may be relevant in other cases. Under our modern rules of evidence, the threshold to admit relevant evidence is low and even minimally relevant evidence is admissible. State v. Gregory, 158 Wash.2d 759, 835, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006). Another trial court may have decided that evidence of Lutz's license violations was relevant. But even relevant evidence must be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Here, the trial court recognized that this kind of evidence carries a very high potential of unfair prejudice. And the probative value of such evidence was relatively low because the jury heard other evidence relating to Lutz's skill and experience operating motorcycles. The trial court's decision to exclude the evidence was based on these legitimate considerations, and therefore we cannot say it was based on untenable grounds.