Opinion ID: 296468
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Correspondence

Text: 71 The distaste with which some observers view prolonged segregated confinement attaches as well to that kind of isolation flowing from restrictions on and censorship of prisoners' correspondence: 72 The harm censorship does to rehabilitation cannot be gainsaid. Inmates lose contact with the outside world and become wary of placing intimate thoughts or criticisms of the prison in letters. The artificial increase of alienation from society is ill advised. 43 73 The values commonly associated with free expression-- an open, democratic marketplace of ideas, the self-development of individuals through self-expression, the alleviation of tensions by their release in harsh words rather than hurled objects-- these values that we esteem in a free society do not turn to dross in an unfree one. 'Letter writing keeps the inmate in contact with the outside world, helps to hold in check some of the morbidity and hopelessness produced by prison life and isolation, stimulates his more natural and human impulses, and otherwise may make contributions to better mental attitudes and reformation.' Palmigiano v. Travisono, 310 F.Supp. 857 (D.R.I. Aug. 24, 1970). Suppression of diversity and dissenting views is probably not less apt in a prison than elsewhere to hasten the stagnation and bureaucratization of the institution that indulges in it. See T. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment 3-15 (1966). 74 Whatever wisdom there might be in such reflection, we cannot say with requisite certitude that the traditional and common practice of prisons in imposing many kinds of controls on the correspondence of inmates, lacks support in any rational and constitutionally acceptable concept of a prison system. See McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1964) ('Control of the mail to and from inmates is an essential adjunct of prison administration'). See also, Diehl v. Wainwright, 419 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1970); Abernathy v. Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Stahl, 393 F.2d 101 (7th Cir.) cert. denied 393 U.S. 879, 89 S.Ct. 181, 21 L.Ed.2d 152 (1968); Carey v. Settle, 351 F.2d 483, 485 (8th Cir. 1965). 44 We note that Sostre did not contest the validity of Warden Follette's action in striking the name of his sister from the list of Sostre's authorized correspondents after it was learned that he was using letters addressed to his sister as vehicles for unauthorized correspondence. See fn. 4, supra. Discipline and prison order are sufficient interests to justify such regulation incidental to the content of prisoners' speech. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949); Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meikeljohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 11 (1965). 75 Sui generis in both logic and the case law, however, are letters addressed to courts, public officials, or an attorney when a prisoner challenges the legality of either his criminal conviction or the conditions of his incarceration. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969); Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 62 S.Ct. 1068, 86 L.Ed. 1453 (1942); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 61 S.Ct. 640, 85 L.Ed. 1034 (1941); Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905, 907 (4th Cir. 1966) (nocensorship permitted of mail between inmate and court with jurisdiction to hear prisoner's complaints); McCloskey v. Maryland, supra; Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 920, 84 S.Ct. 678, 11 L.Ed.2d 615 (1963) ('reasonable access to the courts is basic to all other rights protected by' the Civil Rights Act). It would be inappropriate on constitutional grounds, ironic, and irrational to permit drastic curtailment of constitutional rights in the name of punishment and rehabilitation, while denying prisoners a full opportunity to pursue their appeals and postconviction remedies. The generous scope of discretion accorded prison authorities also heightens the importance of permitting free and uninhibited access by prisoners to both administrative and judicial forums for the purpose of seeking redress of grievances against state officers. The importance of these rights of access suggests the need for guidelines both generous and specific enough to afford protection against the reality or the chilling threat of administrative infringement. 76 Thus, we do not believe it would unnecessarily hamper prison administration to forbid prison authorities to delete material from, withhold, or refuse to mail a communication between an inmate and his attorney, see Burns v. Swensen, 430 F.2d 771, (8th Cir., Aug. 31, 1970) protecting correspondence with the ACLU), or any court, or any public official, unless it can be demonstrated that a prisoner has clearly abused his rights of access. Obviously, the transmittal of contraband or laying plans for some unlawful scheme would constitute such an abuse. In addition, if it were clear that a prisoner's recitation of complaints about his confinement in otherwise protected correspondence were a mere pretaxt to accomplish his sole motivating purpose of communicating instead about restricted matters, then prison officials may block the inmate's scheme by deleting that portion of such a communication unrelated to the complaints. See Carothers v. Follette, 314 F.Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 15, 1970); In re Ferguson, 55 Cal.2d 663, 12 Cal.Rptr. 753, 361 P.2d 417, Cert. denied sub nom. Ferguson v. Heinze,368 U.S. 864, 82 S.Ct. 111, 7 L.Ed.2d 61 (1961). In such a case, the need to restrain the abuse outweighs the danger that prison authorities may by inadvertence or design hamper the prisoner's access. 77 On the other hand, if a communication is properly intended to advance a prisoner's effort to secure redress for alleged abuses, no interest would justify deleting material thought by prison authorities to be irrelevant to the prisoner's complaint. The danger that an official will improperly substitute his judgment for that of the correspondent's then preponderates. For similar reasons, prison officials may not withhold, refuse to mail, or delete material from otherwise protected communications merely because they believe the allegations to be repetitious, false, or malicious. See Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970) (absent some countervailing interest other than that prisoner's letter contained 'lies,' authorities may not prevent inmate from seeking legal assistance); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F.Supp. 370, 377 (D.D.C.1962) (right to seek redress of grievances was abridged by punishment for alleged false accusations about prison conditions in prisoner's letter of complaint to public officials). 78 Accordingly, we agree with Judge Motley that it was improper for Warden Follette to delete material from correspondence between Sostre and his attorney merely because Follette thought the material irrelevant to Sostre's appeal of his conviction. We believe it was also improper for Follette to refuse to mail a letter of complaint to the Postal Inspector. We leave a more precise delineation of the boundaries of this protection for future cases. We need only add that when we say there may be cases which will present special circumstances that would justify deleting material from, withholding, or refusing to mail communications with courts, attorneys, and public officials, we necessarily rule that prison officials may open and read all outgoing and incoming correspondence to and from prisoners.