Opinion ID: 8704897
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discrimination Based on Sex and National Origin

Text: In the Third Amended Complaint, Ms. Konah seeks to hold Unity liable for discrimination based on sex and national origin under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the D.C. Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C.Code § 2-1401.01 et seq. 16 She has, however, abandoned her claim that she was subject to disparate treatment on the basis of her Liberian national origin. See PI. Opp. & Mem. L. Def. Unity MSJ (PI. Unity Opp.) [Dkt. 71] at 24 (conceding she has not put forth sufficient evidence to support Count II). Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in Unity’s favor on that claim. The Court turns to Ms. Konah’s sex discrimination claim against Unity, which is based on the theory that Unity “created an abusive work environment” and “failed to remedy sexually offensive conduct by inmates/staff, gender specific abusive language and sexual assault [that] was ongoing and [ ] continuous.” Compl. ¶¶ 42-43. “To determine whether a hostile work environment exists, the court looks to the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, its offensiveness, and whether it interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1201 (D.C.Cir.2008). To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that her employer subjected her to “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)). The conduct must be sufficiently extreme to constitute an alteration in the conditions of employment, so that Title VII does not evolve into a “general civility code.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998). “[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” Id. Employers can be liable for a hostile work environment created through the actions of third parties, such as inmates. Beckford v. Dep’t of Corr., 605 F.3d 951, 957-58 (11th Cir.2010). In such cases, the employer may be liable if he “fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action in response to a hostile work environment of which the employer knew or reasonably should have known.” Id. (discussing “uniformf]” approach of circuit courts to this issue). 17 As a threshold matter, the Court notes that its analysis of the sex discrimination claim focuses primarily, though not exclusively, on the August 5, 2009 incident involving Ms. Konah. She has alleged that the “sexually offensive conduct by inmates/staff, gender specific abusive language and sexual assault” was “ongoing and a continuous practice.” Compl. ¶ 42. But she has put forth only meager, unpersuasive evidence that such incidents were anything other than isolated incidents of the regrettable yet inevitable kind that should be expected to occur in jails. See Powell v. Morris, 37 F.Supp.2d 1011, 1017 (S.D.Ohio 1999) (“[Ajnyone who works at a prison, particularly in a position with frequent inmate contact, must expect some off-color interactions.... It is absurd to expect that a prison can actually stop all obscene comments and conduct from its inmates.”). The April 21, 2009 letter of complaint from the group of ten nurses is in the record, and Sgt. Jefferson and Di;. Kargbo both testified that they were aware of inmates using foul language, throwing fecal matter or urine, or masturbating in front of correctional employees. Jefferson Dep. at 41-49, 91-92; Kargbo Dep. 68-69. But both stated that these behaviors were directed at male and female workers, guards and nurses alike. Ms. Konah testified only that she “was not the only nurse that [sexually harassing insults had] been said to,” and when pressed for details or names, she said: “I won’t be able to pinpoint because I can’t recall. So I can just tell you that there were other incidents where inmates have told nurses these things.” Konah Dep. at 233-35. She has not identified any other incidents in which inmate misconduct was directed at her other than vaguely attempting to adopt the events in the April 21, 2009 letter as having happened to her. Id. at 68-69. She claims she reported prior incidents she experienced to Unity but has not provided any evidentiary support for those assertions, id.; the absence of any such evidence is notable in a case in which Unity’s business records are extensive. Courts in this Circuit “frown[] on plaintiffs who attempt to bootstrap their alleged discrete acts of [discrimination or] retaliation into a broader hostile work environment claim.” Baloch v. Norton, 517 F.Supp.2d 345, 364 (D.D.C.2007), aff'd, 550 F.3d 1191. Accordingly, the Court relies on the testimony of Sgt. Jefferson and Dr. Kargbo and the nurses’ complaint letter for context but focuses on the August 5, 2009 incident involving Ms. Konah in evaluating her hostile work environment claim. Unity argues that it worked with the D.C. Department of Corrections (DOC) to ensure that there were “reasonable policies in place to prevent inmates from assaulting nurses.” Unity MSJ at 11. Noting that DOC, not Unity, is “responsible for all safety and security procedures at CDF,” Unity emphasizes that it implemented a policy requiring nurses ,to administer inmate medications in the sick call rooms, effective May 1, 2009, and that Ms. Konah, who had been trained on this policy, violated it on August 5, 2009. Id. Unity also argues that Ms. Konah’s allegations do not support a hostile work environment claim because the August 5, 2009 incident was isolated and not “extremely serious” as case law requires. Id. at 15-16 (citing, inter alia, Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998)). Ms. Konah’s primary argument derives from what she perceives as Unity’s “ ‘negligence and ratification’ of the harassment through its failure to take appropriate and reasonable responsive action” to “Plaintiffs and other nurses[’] complaints of an abusive environment.” Pl. Unity Opp. at 12 (citing Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 538 (9th Cir.2006)). Characterizing Unity’s efforts to protect its nurses as “minuscule,” “ineffective and not prompt,” Ms. Konah devotes the bulk of her opposition brief to arguing that disputes of fact regarding the medication distribution policy and practice preclude summary judgment. Id. at 12-24. The Court concludes that Unity took reasonable and appropriate corrective steps to ensure that the environment for Unity nurses at CDF would be as safe and non-hostile as a job situation in a jail requiring direct contact with inmates could be. As a contractor with DC DOC, Unity was ultimately bound by DOC’s security policies. Unity SUF ¶ 6. Unity also worked with DOC to develop its own policies applicable to Unity employees to ensure their safety, such as requiring Unity nurses to be escorted at all times by an officer. The record demonstrates that Unity was responsive to security concerns raised by its nurses, reacting to the April 2009 complaint letter by instituting the sick call room policy: “Effective May 1, medication administration and dispensing by the nursing and pharmacy staff will take place in the sick call rooms on the housing units.” 4/22/09 Zabiheian Memo at 1. The follow-up by Unity and DOC to the August 5, 2009 incident was also comprehensive, including the immediate medical evaluation of Ms. Konah by the infirmary, a meeting with the warden, the offer of criminal prosecution, and the use of the internal CDF disciplinary system to which inmates are subject. The mere existence of security measures might be disregarded if Ms. Konah were unaware of them, but there is no genuine dispute of material fact that she knew of the escort policy and the sick call room policy. Unity--SUF ¶ 11 (Ms. Konah used a sick call room in March 2009), Konah Dep. at 95, 100 (Ms. Konah was aware of the escort policy and typically followed it), Nursing Staff Meeting Record at Bates UNITY 132-33 (Ms. Konah signed attendance sheet for training on sick call room policy). Ms. Konah was, apparently, in violation of Unity policies when the August 5, 2009 incident took place. Indeed, Ms. Konah says she normally waited for a guard to escort her and offers no explanation for why, on August 5, she departed from this practice. Her brief speculates that Unity “could have gone outside of DOC and brought the matter to the attention of higher level officials” or “properly monitored [and] developed a clear policy on dispensing medication and provided safety equipment for the nurses,” PI. Unity Opp. at 23-24, but Ms. Konah herself concedes that “Unity was not on the unit with me. It was the officer that was on the unit with me. So I’m-the officer was the one that should have done something to prevent the incident happening to me,” Konah Dep. at 113. Unity took reasonable measures to prevent harassment and is not-liable. See Beckford, 605 F.3d at 959-60 (listing as reasonable measures, inter alia, accompaniment of female staff by security; requiring officers to write disciplinary reports; permitting female staff to report misconduct by inmates; and permitting nurses “to use screens at cell windows and in the bubble to prevent harassment”).