Opinion ID: 2631630
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ex Parte Temporary Involuntary Guardianship

Text: [¶22] In her first issue, Mother contends that Grandparents obtained temporary guardianship of MEO without adherence to the statutory requirements for notice and a hearing. She points to the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-106(a) (LexisNexis 2003) (emphasis added), which states: Upon the filing of a petition for a temporary guardian and after a hearing the court may appoint a temporary guardian subject to any notice and conditions the court prescribes. Mother asserts that the district court was required to hold a hearing before appointing temporary guardians and, in this case, no hearing was held. [¶23] After the temporary guardianship had been in place for nearly two months, the district court considered Mother's procedural objections. At that time, the district court considered the requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-106(a) and § 3-2-102 and affirmed its ex parte appointment of Grandparents as temporary guardians. In response to Mother's challenge regarding the lack of notice she had received prior to the appointment, the district court stated: The crux of the argument here is that there was no formal notice to [Mother], and, essentially, a lack of due diligence to determine whether or not she was back in town. Under the Statute, the Court is of the opinion that even had it known that she was in town, even had it  well, quite frankly, it could have said, even under those circumstances, notice was not required under the facts alleged in this Petition for this temporary guardianship. Essentially, the district court determined that Mother was not entitled to notice of, or the right to appear at, any hearing that might have been held prior to appointment because the language of § 3-2-106(a), subject to any notice and conditions the court prescribes, could mean no notice. [¶24] Additionally, the district court mentioned Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-102(b), which provides: Notice of filing of a petition for appointment of an involuntary guardianship shall be served on the proposed ward's parents, spouse and adult children who are known or who can be discovered with due diligence, except: . . . (ii) When for good cause the court determines that no notice is necessary if the proposed ward is under the age of eighteen (18) years. Considering the exception in § 3-2-102(b)(ii), the district court determined that it was afforded discretion to dispense with the notice requirements because MEO was a minor. The court concluded that there are no constitutional requirements that a parent have notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Court may enter an order appointing a temporary guardian[], as is required in a more formal and strict proceeding. [¶25] Grandparents endorse the district court's rationale but urge us to avoid review. They assert that any issues involving the temporary guardianship are now moot. Grandparents reason that all disputes between the parties were resolved when the district court appointed them permanent guardians of MEO, and upon that appointment, the temporary guardianship terminated and had no legal effect. [8] They claim that any decision on this issue would not be meaningful to the parties or any future litigant. Accordingly, Grandparents conclude that there is no justiciable controversy relating to establishment of the temporary guardianship. [¶26] We have previously considered the connection between Mother's challenge to the temporary guardianship and the order establishing the permanent guardianship. Mother appealed the district court's refusal to terminate the temporary guardianship. Once the guardianship was made permanent, Grandparents moved to dismiss the temporary guardianship appeal on mootness grounds. On August 4, 2005, we dismissed the appeal. However, our order of dismissal specifically allowed Mother to assert arguments she presented in the dismissed appeal, in this case. Understandably, Mother appears to have relied upon our order in stating her first issue. [¶27] In light of Grandparents' extensive briefing on mootness, we would be remiss if we did not examine whether a justiciable controversy is present. A court should not hear a case where there has been a change in circumstances occurring either before or after a case has been filed that eliminates the controversy. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 978 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Wyo. 1999) (citing International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 279 v. Civil Service Comm'n of Fire Dep't of City of Cheyenne, 702 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Wyo. 1985)). The doctrine of mootness encompasses those circumstances which destroy a previously justiciable controversy. This doctrine represents the time element of standing by requiring that the interests of the parties which were originally sufficient to confer standing persist throughout the duration of the suit. Thus, the central question in a mootness case is whether decision of a once living dispute continues to be justified by a sufficient prospect that the decision will have an impact on the parties. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 978 P.2d at 1143 (citations omitted). [¶28] A case will not be considered moot when it presents a controversy capable of repetition yet evading review. In re RM, 2004 WY 162, ¶ 9, 102 P.3d 868, 871 (Wyo. 2004). The parties disagree whether this case is one capable of repetition, yet evading review. Under such a rationale two requirements must be met. First, the duration of the challenged action must be too short for completion of litigation prior to its cessation or expiration. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again. Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 187, 99 S.Ct. 983, 992, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 349, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975)). Absent a finding of good cause, a temporary guardianship is statutorily limited to a maximum of one year, making it unlikely that litigation regarding a temporary guardianship could reach fruition before its expiration. [9] Because MEO is still a minor, it is not outside the realm of reasonable possibility that Grandparents would continue to pursue guardianship of MEO. Additionally, other courts have rejected claims that temporary guardianship issues are mooted by the passage of time because of the importance of the interests involved and the perception that such controversies would rarely persist for the duration of appellate disposition. E.g., Custody of Lori, 827 N.E.2d 716, 717 (Mass. 2005); Jason S. v. Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr. (In re L.S.), 87 P.3d 521, 524 (Nev. 2004). [¶29] Mother's claim does not concern a temporary circumstance that has since dissipated. Mother continues to be deprived of the custody of her daughter, and by this appeal she challenges how those circumstances arose. Considering a similar challenge to a permanent guardianship involving contentions that the preceding temporary guardianship had been established without notice, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded: We think that the petitioners were entitled to notice and opportunity to present evidence of their circumstances, characters, and habits before an order should be made to deprive them of their natural right of guardianship over their minor child and their right to her services during her minority. They were entitled to have these considerations presented to the probate court as a guide to the exercise of its discretion in passing upon the question of guardianship. The petitionee argues that the absence of notice is not now material, because in the present proceeding to vacate guardianship the petitioners Bioni have appeared and have been heard at length in the probate court and in the county court on appeal, and that the case has now been decided upon its merits and the guardian continued in office. But the issue in this proceeding was whether the appointment was invalid, by reason of the defects assigned, and not whether the welfare of Mary required . . . the continuance of the guardianship. The relative fitness of Mr. and Mrs. Bioni and of Mrs. Haselton was beside the point. The appointment of the latter having been made without notice, the proceedings in the probate court, for that purpose, were coram non judice and void. Bioni v. Haselton, 134 A. 606, 608 (Vt. 1926). [¶30] The record demonstrates that the temporary guardianship formed the basis for the district court's decision that is the subject of this appeal. The district court awarded the care, custody, and control of MEO to Grandparents in September. MEO moved to Texas a few months later. The temporary guardianship created circumstances that were critically important to the district court's analysis of MEO's best interests following the hearing on March 30, 2005. In its decision letter, the district court discussed MEO's best interests by comparing her experiences in Laramie to her circumstances in Texas. The district court also emphasized MEO's testimony that her strong desire is to remain in her current situation and she has stated a number of reasons for her preference. The district court afforded considerable weight to this expressed preference. The district court used Grandparents' temporary guardianship as the measuring stick of MEO's best interests, and by that measure, Mother was permanently denied the care, custody, and control of her daughter. We decline to view Mother's challenge to the temporary guardianship as moot where it is clear that the circumstances created by it directly impacted the permanent guardianship determination. [¶31] Turning then to the merits of Mother's argument, we address the district court's conclusion that an involuntary temporary guardianship of a minor may be granted to third parties without notice to a parent and without a hearing. The State, as Intervenor, asserts that when read properly, the guardianship statutes afford adequate procedural protections to a parent and are not constitutionally suspect. [10] The State concludes that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-102(b) requires that notice of the filing of an involuntary guardianship be given to the parents of the proposed ward and that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-102(d) requires that notice shall be given pursuant to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. According to the State, [r]eading these statutes and the [Rules of Civil Procedure] together leads to the conclusion that a petition for an involuntary guardianship, temporary or permanent, must be served upon the proposed ward's parents. Additionally, the State asserts that a parent will receive an opportunity to be heard because [t]he plain language of [Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-106(a)] requires a hearing before the appointment of a temporary guardian, satisfying due process requirements in that regard. The State asserts that the statutes are constitutional and afford adequate due process, if applied correctly. [11] We agree. In this case, however, we cannot conclude that the district court properly applied the statutes. [¶32] By statute, the notice of an involuntary guardianship proceeding shall be given in accordance with the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and as ordered by the court. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-102(d). There is no dispute that Mother was not served with notice that complied with the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. Because there was no summons, Mother was not informed of the time period she had to respond, how to respond, or what the consequences might be if she failed to respond. W.R.C.P. 4. Had she been properly served and the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure followed, Mother would have had time to respond before the requested relief was granted. As for the district court's interpretation of the subject to any notice language in § 3-2-106, we disagree that any notice can mean no notice. Read in conjunction with the notice requirements set forth in § 3-2-102 applicable to involuntary guardianships, we conclude that the notice language of § 3-2-106(a) authorizes the district court to prescribe additional or supplemental notice. [¶33] At the November hearing, the district court appeared to rely upon the exception stated in § 3-2-102(b)(ii) in reaching its conclusion that Mother was not entitled to notice before the temporary guardianship was established. We note that § 3-2-102(b) lacks some linguistic and structural precision and question whether the exception to notice in subsection (b)(ii) applies in this context. However, we need not reach that determination because the record is beyond dispute that prior to issuing the temporary guardianship order, the district court failed to make any finding of good cause to excuse the notice requirement. We find nothing in the record presented to us suggesting that good cause existed to excuse notice to Mother prior to appointing Grandparents as guardians. [¶34] Mother's procedural challenge to the temporary guardianship implicates constitutional principles as well. When a parent's fundamental liberty interest is at stake, the State must provide parents with fundamentally fair procedures. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). We have observed that: . . . custody litigation imperils parents' fundamental right to enjoy their children's companionship and to direct their children's upbringing. This peril is magnified by the difficulty of regaining physical custody once lost. The great weight of the parental liberty interest, together with the significant deprivation of that interest inherent in a loss of physical custody, entitles parents to custody procedures that meet the requisites of due process. KES v. CAT, 2005 WY 29, ¶ 16, 107 P.3d 779, 784 (Wyo. 2005). Notice and the opportunity to be heard are unquestionably incidental to affording due process of law. Barker Bros., Inc. v. Barker-Taylor, 823 P.2d 1204, 1208 (Wyo. 1992). Thus, we have held that a court must afford a parent notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before it can deny the parent custody of his or her children. Loghry v. Loghry, 920 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo. 1996) (citing Hall v. Hall, 708 P.2d 416, 421 (Wyo. 1985)). See also Jackson v. Jackson, 961 P.2d 393, 395 (Wyo. 1998) (Parents are entitled to due process in custody and visitation matters, which includes adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.). [¶35] Inexplicably, the district court concluded that Mother did not have a constitutional right to either notice or a hearing. We recognize that due process is a somewhat fluid concept, but the district court's conclusion is inconsistent with these fundamental constitutional protections. Due process requires that notice and the opportunity to be heard must be appropriate to the nature of the case. DH v. Wyo. Dep't of Family Servs. (In re H Children), 2003 WY 155, ¶ 39, 79 P.3d 997, 1008 (Wyo. 2003). The notice and hearing opportunity must also be at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Jones v. Jones, 903 P.2d 545, 548 (Wyo. 1995). Lack of notice is not, by any definition, meaningful notice. [¶36] More significantly, the district court's failure to hold a hearing before making the temporary appointment deprived Mother of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The fact that a hearing was scheduled two months away provided little consolation. See Custody of Lori, 827 N.E.2d at 721 (court held that mother was deprived of due process where the judge did not hold a hearing on the issue of the child's custody or the mother's unfitness before removing the child and she was not permitted to defend herself against the charge of unfitness at the time of removal and an evidentiary hearing did not occur until five months after the initial removal). [¶37] Grandparents contend that the requirement for a hearing was met, arguing that the district court considered evidence as recited in its order appointing them on a temporary basis. We find no merit in Grandparents' assertion. The recital in the order is merely pro forma. There is no indication that any hearing was scheduled, noticed, held, or even contemplated, before the order issued. We do not believe that, in the context of an involuntary guardianship of a minor, the after a hearing language in § 3-2-106(a) can be satisfied by a mere review of the allegations of the petition. [¶38] When addressing fundamental parental rights of constitutional magnitude, courts must accommodate to the keenest spirit of procedural due process. BDR v. BEB ( In re BJB), 888 P.2d 216, 219 (Wyo. 1995). One of the basic elements of due process is the right of each party to be apprised of all the evidence upon which an issue is to be decided, with the right to examine, explain or rebut such evidence. KES, ¶ 16, 107 P.3d at 784. [T]he right to hear and controvert all evidence upon which a factual adjudication is to be made includes the right to hear and cross-examine witnesses. JLJ v. AFM (In re SAJ), 942 P.2d 407, 410 (Wyo. 1997). Consistent with these principles, we have cautioned that child custody and visitation issues should be determined after an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 410 (district court abused its discretion in modifying Mother's visitation without affording meaningful opportunity to be heard or providing for development of evidentiary record); In re Adoption of BBC, 849 P.2d 769, 773 (Wyo. 1993) (remand for hearing did not allow district court to establish guardianship without hearing). [¶39] A hearing should have been afforded Mother to satisfy the basic element of due process even in the absence of a statutory requirement. However, a hearing was a statutory requirement. The district court simply ignored the unambiguous requirement of § 3-2-106(a) to hold a hearing before appointing Grandparents as guardians. [12] [¶40] Mother has demonstrated that she has a fundamental interest that has been affected in an impermissible way. Private action affecting a parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of her child may only be accomplished by court action taken pursuant to appropriate statutory authority. MBB, ¶ 10, 100 P.3d at 419. The district court erred in appointing Grandparents temporary guardians of MEO without adherence to the statutory requirements regarding notice and a hearing. Without affording Mother proper notice and an opportunity to be heard, the district court's establishment of the temporary guardianship lacked fundamental fairness. Meyer v. Norman, 780 P.2d 283, 289 (Wyo. 1989). These procedural defects cast a shadow over the permanent guardianship as well. Mother presents additional arguments concerning the validity of the permanent guardianship that deserve our attention.