Opinion ID: 545173
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Occupational Disability (maximum) $100 $110 $120

Text: 58 The collective bargaining agreement also provides that: 59 The parties acknowledge that during the negotiations which resulted in this Agreement, each had the unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and proposals with respect to any subject or matter not removed by law from the area of collective bargaining, and that the understandings and agreements arrived at by the parties after the exercise of that right and opportunity are set forth in this Agreement. The agreement further provides: 60 This agreement represents the complete understanding of the parties and may be added to or amended only after mutual agreement by instrument in writing duly executed by the parties hereto. 61 Despite the inclusion of these integration clauses in the collective bargaining agreement, and despite the apparently clear and unambiguous language of Exhibit C, Appellees argue that the occupational disability benefits set out in Exhibit C were not part of the contract. Appellees claim that Schmitt's affidavit is admissible as parol evidence to show that the benefits were included as the result of a mutual mistake. Appellees are correct. Horner v. Bourland, 724 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir.1984). Appellees further contend that Schmitt's version of the contractual negotiations is undisputed, and that they are therefore entitled to have this court reform the contract and grant summary judgment. On this point we disagree. 62 The material fact at issue here is Appellees' contractual obligation to pay Meza the occupational disability benefits provided for in Exhibit C of the collective bargaining agreement. At the time of Appellees' motion for summary judgment, the evidence presented on this issue included the collective bargaining agreement itself, with the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the district court had in evidence some record of the UAW's original suit against Appellees in which the Union sought the Exhibit C occupational disability benefits on behalf of three named plaintiffs. Finally, the court was presented with the affidavit of Robert Schmitt. 63 We do not question the probative value of Schmitt's affidavit on the question of mutual mistake. However, we reject Appellees' attempt to raise the status of Schmitt's evidence from probative to dispositive. The fact that Meza did not counter Schmitt's affidavit does not detract from the probative weight of the contractual language itself, which Meza submitted to the trial court with his own motion for summary judgment. At best, Schmitt's affidavit raises a question whether Exhibit C is a valid term of the collective bargaining agreement. The affidavit only raises the question; it does not answer it. Furthermore, Appellees are wrong in asserting that the issue of mutual mistake is undisputed. If, as Appellees claim, the UAW never intended these benefits to be part of the agreement, the UAW's prior suit for the same benefits is largely inexplicable. 64 Drawing all justifiable inferences from this evidence in Meza's favor, as we must, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have returned a verdict for Meza. This is especially so in light of the heavy burden Appellees must overcome to prove mutual mistake. We do not speculate whether, on remand, Appellees will be able to adduce additional evidence in support of their mutual mistake claim, or ultimately prove with clear and convincing evidence that a mutual mistake was made; as the Supreme Court stated, at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Liberty Lobby, supra, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. Rather, we conclude that at this juncture, Appellees have not provided us with sufficient evidence to justify granting summary judgment on the alternative ground of mutual mistake. 65 B. Res Judicata Redux: Are Appellees Barred From Claiming 66 Mutual Mistake on Remand? 67 In an attempt to avoid Appellees' mutual mistake argument completely, Meza argues that Appellees are barred from raising this issue, either on appeal or on remand, because they failed to raise it in the prior lawsuit between Appellees and the UAW. This argument is without merit. 68 Meza cites the Supreme Court's decision in Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 47 S.Ct. 600, 71 L.Ed. 1069 (1927) in support of his claim. In Phillips, the Court stated: 69 The effect of a judgment or decree as res judicata depends on whether the second action or suit is upon the same or a different cause of action. If upon the same cause of action, the judgment or decree upon the merits in the first case is an absolute bar to the subsequent action or suit between the same parties or those in privity with them, not only in respect to every matter which was actually offered to sustain the demand, but also as to every ground of recovery which might have been presented. 70 Phillips, supra, 274 U.S. at 319, 47 S.Ct. at 602 (emphasis added); see also D-1 Enterprises, Inc. v. Commercial State Bank, 864 F.2d 36, 38 (5th Cir.1989) (Essential to the application of the doctrine of res judicata is the principle that the previously unlitigated claim to be precluded could and should have been brought in the earlier litigation.); Aerojet-General, supra, 511 F.2d at 715 (Looking beyond the pleadings to what could have been pleaded, however, is precisely what is required by the federal law of res judicata.). Meza reasons that because Appellees could have pleaded mutual mistake and made their demand for reformation in the prior suit, they are precluded from raising these issues in the present suit. This argument completely ignores the requirement for identity of the parties as a prerequisite of res judicata. Phillips, supra; Nilsen, supra, 701 F.2d at 559. 71 We have already decided that Meza was neither a party or privy in the prior action, and therefore not bound by the judgment. Nevertheless, Meza attempts to benefit from claim preclusion because Appellees were parties to the prior lawsuit and had an opportunity to raise the claim of mutual mistake there. In other words, Meza urges us to apply non-mutual claim preclusion against Appellees. However, as this court recently stated, our circuit has not foresworn its reliance on mutuality or identity of parties as the standard criterion for claim preclusion, abetted by the concepts of privity and virtual representation. Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 871 F.2d 1279, 1288 n. 14 (5th Cir.1989) (citing Benson and Ford, Inc., supra, 833 F.2d 1172); see also Sidag Aktiengesellschaft v. Smoked Food Prods., 776 F.2d 1270 (5th Cir.1985) (non-parties could not benefit from prior judgment where there was no formal relationship and no concert of activities). Nor will we foreswear our reliance on the principles of mutuality and identity of parties in this case. On remand, Appellees are free to raise the issue of mutual mistake as a defense to Meza's contractual claims.C. Defect in the Parties 72 Meza argues that even if Appellees are not precluded from claiming mutual mistake and requesting reformation of the agreement, reformation should not be granted because the proper parties are not before the court. As we have already pointed out, the trial court never addressed the question of mutual mistake in the collective bargaining agreement. Since it never reached this issue, the trial court had no opportunity to decide whether reformation was required. We believe that the district court should have an opportunity to address these matters in the first instance, and we have indicated that Appellees are free to raise the issue of mutual mistake on remand. The propriety of reformation must await the district court's determination of the mutual mistake claim. Because it is not certain whether reformation is or will become an issue that must be decided, any discussion of the proper parties to such reformation would be pure speculation. This court will not indulge in speculation, and we need not determine at this juncture whether the UAW should be joined in the subsequent proceedings.