Opinion ID: 2295091
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did Counterpart take an adverse action against Propp?

Text: Propp also meets the second prong of a prima facie retaliation claim, namely, that the employer took an adverse action against him. The DCHRA anti-retaliation provision makes it unlawful to coerce, threaten, retaliate against, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted or protected under [the DCHRA]. D.C.Code § 2-1402.61 (2001). More specifically and in accordance with how the Supreme Court has construed the analogous Title VII provision, Propp must demonstrate that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse which . . . means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [11] Propp presented evidence of two adverse actions Counterpart took against him after he complained of discrimination. First, that Counterpart chose not to pursue the $12 million in federal funding that had been earmarked for the Counterpart Communities initiative he had created and proposed to develop under a consulting agreement. Second, that Counterpart refused even to negotiate a contractual relationship with him unless he first released Counterpart of all claims, including his complaint of discrimination, as part of his termination. [12] With respect to the first point, there is conflicting evidence on whether Counterpart abandoned the potential funding for Propp's Counterpart Communities project. On the one hand, LeLaulu's October 12 e-mail to Counterpart staff worldwide states that Propp will no longer be working on CHAP-related duties[] but has agreed to concentrate on Counterpart Communities. . . . On the other hand, Counterpart did not engage Propp to pursue the funding for Counterpart Communities after terminating him. [13] Moreover, LeLaulu testified that if he had known in September 2004 that $12 million in federal funding for Counterpart Communities was on its way, I would not have let [Propp] go . . . I would have seriously considered retaining him. Thus, although it is undisputed that LeLaulu terminated Propp on October 12, and did not engage him to pursue the earmarked funding, it is not clear that Counterpart voluntarily abandoned the funding for Counterpart Communities. With respect to the second adverse action Propp claims was taken against him, refusing to negotiate and changing the terms for negotiating a consulting agreement, Counterpart does not contest that it required a release of claims as a prerequisite to negotiating a continuing business relationship. It argues in its brief, however, that the requirement that Propp sign a release of claims prior to entering into a consulting agreement was not based on any retaliatory motive, explaining that it simply wanted Propp to agree not to sue the organization before committing to a continuing relationship with him. This is not retaliation; it is prudence in action. Counterpart's brief also argues that the release requirement was always a prerequisite for a consulting position, even prior to Propp's complaint of discrimination. Counterpart, however, does not cite to any record evidence that supports that the release requirement had been presented as a prerequisite to negotiating (as opposed to executing) a consulting agreement at the time Propp was terminated on October 12. According to Propp's deposition, at the time he was terminated, Counterpart was willing to negotiate a consulting agreement once Propp accepted any one of the four options offered on October 12, two of which did not contain a release requirement. The documentary evidence supportsand Counterpart does not contestthat Propp was offered two options that did not require a release at the time he was terminated. See note 6, supra. Indeed, LeLaulu testified at deposition that had Propp chosen to resign or be terminated with no severance pay and no release on October 12, 2004, prior to his allegation of discrimination, they would have negotiated a consulting agreement. And Counterpart conceded in an admission that it never engaged or otherwise permitted [Propp] to concentrate on Counterpart Communities and other strategic opportunities for the organization because [he] refused to sign a separation agreement and release relating to the termination of his employment with Counterpart. (Emphasis added.) Thus, argues Propp, Counterpart changed its tune, to his detriment, after his counsel challenged his termination as discriminatory. There is a difference between the parties' positions which, though close, is not semantic and has legal consequences. Propp understood that he would be required to sign a release as part of a consulting agreement, although the record is unclear as to what Propp understood would be the scope of such a release. He has not argued that requiring such a release would be unlawful. What he objects to is having been required to sign a release as part of his termination, a new condition precedent to negotiating a consulting agreement imposed after he complained of discrimination. [14] For purposes of our retaliation analysis in this case, therefore, the issue is not whether releases are generally lawful and enforceable, [15] but whether the release requirement was taken in retaliation for protected activity. Moreover, one need not question whether obtaining a release was a prudent course for Counterpart under the circumstances. It is enough if retaliation was a substantial factor, even if not the only factor. Arthur Young, 631 A.2d at 369. Accordingly, it is important to distinguish between requiring a release of claims as part of a negotiated consulting agreement, and imposing a release of claims related to Propp's termination as a prerequisite for negotiating the consulting agreement that was contemplated when Propp was terminated. Stated otherwise, Propp's claim is that, once he complained of discrimination, Counterpart refused to negotiate a consulting agreement as it had agreed to do when it terminated him, and effectively withdrew two of the termination options that did not include a release that had been offered before his complaint because he had complained of discrimination. If proven, Counterpart's refusal to negotiate with Propp for a consulting position, as it had previously agreed to do, unless Propp signed a release as part of his terminationa requirement imposed only after he complained of discriminatory treatmentwould be an adverse action within the contemplation of the DCHRA's retaliation provision. The Supreme Court has broadly defined what constitutes an adverse action to include (in addition to termination, denial of promotion, etc.) actions taken by employers which a reasonable employee would have found . . . materially adverse, which . . . might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 77-78, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, simply because Counterpart may have had a business-related reason (prudence in action) for conditioning negotiations for the consulting agreement on a release of claims, it could not require a release of claims in response to Propp's complaint of discrimination. The statute contains no safe harbor for otherwise lawful acts done for an improper retaliatory purpose. Arthur Young, 631 A.2d at 367; see also Atlantic Richfield Co. v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human Rights, 515 A.2d 1095, 1101 (D.C.1986) (finding a threat to an employee that she would never work in the District of Columbia again if she pressed her discrimination claim to be retaliatory). That the consulting agreement was not guaranteed, and that Propp had only an expectation that he would be retained as a consultant based on LeLaulu's statement that they would negotiate a contractual relationship, does not preclude Counterpart's actions from being considered adverse. See Lockheed Martin, 444 F.Supp.2d at 419 (Whether severance benefits are a right or a discretionary gift or anything in between is . . . irrelevant.); Paquin, 119 F.3d at 32 (An employer's withdrawal of a voluntary benefit . . . may constitute adverse action.). In announcing that the definition of an adverse action should be broad, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 69, 126 S.Ct. 2405. The Court cited several employer actions found to be adverse, including the rescinding of a flex-time schedule, id. (citing Washington v. Illinois Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir.2005)), and [a] supervisor's refusal to invite an employee to . . . a weekly training lunch that contributes significantly to the employee's professional advancement[,] id. (citing 2 E.E.O.C. Manual § 8, p. 8-14 (1988)), and concluded that, a legal standard that speaks in general terms rather than specific prohibited acts is preferable, for an `act that would be immaterial in some situations is material in others.' Id. (quoting Washington, 420 F.3d at 661). In Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc'y, the D.C. Circuit held that an employer's cancellation of a symposium in an employee's honor after the employee filed charges of discrimination was an adverse action for purposes of Title VII. 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C.Cir.1991) (noting that the cancellation of the seminar humiliated [the employee] before the assemblage of his professional associates and peers from across the nation, and made it more difficult for him to procure future employment.). In Rochon v. Gonzales, the D.C. Circuit again broadly construed what constitutes an adverse action, holding that the refusal of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate, as it would ordinarily do for any member of the public, a death threat made against an FBI agent, after he filed a discrimination complaint against the agency was an adverse action. 438 F.3d 1211, 1220 (D.C.Cir.2006) (noting that a reasonable FBI agent well might be dissuaded from engaging in activity protected by Title VII if he knew that doing so would leave him unprotected by the FBI in the face of threats against him or his family.). Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in Hillig v. Rumsfeld, held that an employer's negative job references in connection with a former employee after the employee had complained of discrimination was an adverse action and actionable as retaliation under Title VII. 381 F.3d 1028, 1035 (10th Cir.2004). The employees in Passer, Rochon, and Hillig did not have a right to the so-called benefit, whether it be, respectively, a symposium in the employee's honor, having threats investigated, or not receiving negative job references. See 935 F.2d at 331, 438 F.3d at 1220, 381 F.3d at 1035. Nevertheless, the employers' refusal to provide the expected benefit was found to be an adverse action. Here, too, although Propp did not have a right to a consulting agreement, he had an expectation that Counterpart would negotiate in good faith based on LeLaulu's comments to him during their meetings on October 12. Propp's expectation was reasonable, as evidenced by LeLaulu's e-mail to Counterpart staff worldwide announcing that Propp had agreed to work on the Counterpart Communities program as well as other strategic opportunities for the organization. Similarly, Propp had reasonably pursued federal funding for the Counterpart Communities initiative with which he was professionally identified and for which he had succeeded in obtaining a soft earmark. To lose the consulting position and the opportunity to develop his initiative meant not only a financial blow, but a strike against his professional reputation and future prospects. According to Propp, Counterpart reneged on or abandoned those expected benefits once Propp complained of discrimination. A consulting arrangement after Propp was terminated would have permitted him to further his Counterpart Communities initiative with anticipated support from federal funding. Here, as in Lockheed Martin, defendants presented [Propp] with a Hobson's Choice: he could release his claim of discrimination or forfeit the opportunity to develop his initiative through the consulting position. 444 F.Supp.2d at 419. Such a stark choice, according to the Supreme Court, would have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, Propp has met the second prong of a prima facie retaliation case.