Opinion ID: 6331052
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Hybrid Witnesses

Text: Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in excluding in part and limiting in part the testimonies of the Timpsons’ hybrid witnesses. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) requires any party who identifies a witness it may call at trial to include “a written report—prepared and signed by the witness—if the witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case.” See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (“The requirement of a written report in paragraph (2)(B) . . . applies only to those experts who are retained or specially employed to provide [expert] testimony . . . or whose duties as an employee of a party regularly involve the giving of such testimony.”). Hybrid witnesses—fact witnesses with expertise that will inform their testimony— do not fall under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)’s purview. But most witnesses do not qualify as hybrid witnesses. See Indianapolis Airport Auth. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 849 F.3d 355, 371 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[H]ybrid fact/expert witnesses . . . must testify from the personal knowledge they gained on the job,” and “[t]he district court certainly may preclude these witnesses from testifying beyond the scope of facts they learned and opinions they formed during the course of their project duties.”); Downey v. Bob’s Disc. Furniture Holdings, Inc., 633 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that a hybrid witness whose opinion testimony arose “not from his enlistment as an expert but, rather, from his ground-level involvement in the events giving rise to the litigation” fell “outside the compass of Rule 26(a)(2)(B)”). 20 If a party wants to present opinion evidence through a hybrid witness, it still must disclose: “(i) the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705; and (ii) a summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C). Failure to comply with either requirement typically will result in mandatory exclusion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); S. States Rack & Fixture, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 318 F.3d 592, 595–96 (4th Cir. 2003). The Timpsons’ hybrid witness disclosures failed to satisfy Rule 26(a)(2)(C)(ii). The disclosures included only “the subject matter on which” the Timpsons expected McPherson, Mullis, and Thomas to testify. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C)(i); see J.A. 373–75, 378–79. At no point, however, did the disclosures set out “a summary of the facts and opinions to which” each was expected to testify. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C)(ii). And the Timpsons cite no record evidence in their briefs before us to support their broad claim that they satisfied Rule 26(a)(2)(C)’s requirements in full. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in preventing the claimed hybrid witnesses from providing expert testimony. But even if the Timpsons had properly disclosed McPherson, Mullis, and Thomas, the district court would not have erred in holding they failed to qualify as hybrid witnesses. None had any relevant factual evidence pertaining to the Timpsons’ claims. McPherson and Thomas had never met Johnny. And Mullis had only interacted with him briefly seventeen years before trial (well outside the statutes of limitations). Thus, their only involvement in the case occurred in the context of having been hired to provide their opinions, meaning the Timpsons should have produced expert reports for each under Rule 21 26(a)(2)(B). Because they failed to do so, the district court properly excluded these witnesses from offering their expert opinions during trial.