Opinion ID: 1864993
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Inconsistent as a Matter of Law)

Text: We must examine the general verdict of the jury against the two theories of recovery stated in the separate counts of the complaint and under the evidence upon which the case was submitted to the jury. Count I of the complaint declared a breach of the insurance contract of Mrs. Haney with USF&G under which Mrs. McKinnon was insured; in this instance against damages suffered as the result of the negligence of an uninsured motorist. Count II complains of fraudulent misrepresentation that Mrs. McKinnon was insured under the policy. Implicit in this is the allegation that Mrs. McKinnon was not, in fact, insured. The proof relied on in support of both counts were the same representations made with knowledge of the facts about Mrs. McKinnon's residence being otherwise than in the same household with her mother. USF&G claims that since the jury's verdict was for the sum of $55,000, the jury found the issues in favor of Mrs. McKinnon under both counts of the complaint. Such a finding, it contends, is self contradictory. We agree. May damages be recovered for breach of an existing contract and at the same time recover damages for fraud for representing there was a contract when, in fact, there was none? We think not. The theories of recovery, are factually inconsistent, therefore, the general verdict of the jury in this case is self contradictory. It had the effect of finding both that there was a contract and that there was not. We find no prior case where this precise situation was presented and dealt with by this court. However, the analogous reasoning in cases dealing with the inconsistencies of verdicts that find against an employer and in favor of an employee, where the employer's liability is vicarious, is persuasive support for our holding the verdict in this case to be inconsistent as a matter of law. In Carter v. Franklin, 234 Ala. 116, 173 So. 861 (1937), the following was said:    where employer and employee are sued in tort, the liability charged to the employer resting solely on the negligence or wanton conduct of the employee, a verdict against the employer and in favor of the employee is due to be set aside on proper motion. It is self contradictory. It says in one aspect that the employee was guilty of negligence proximately causing injury, and because of such negligence in the line and scope of his employment, his employer is liable, while in the other aspect, it says the employee was not guilty of negligence, the proximate cause of injury. Such a verdict on its face discloses that the jury has misconceived the issues, or was prompted by bias against the employer or in favor of the employee. If a proper jury case was presented in the evidence, such verdict should, on proper motions, be set aside in toto, that the cause be retried on the merits, unhampered by questions of res adjudicata.    (emphasis added) The emphasized statement quoted above is no less illustrative of the self contradiction of the verdict in that case than, logically, it is of the self contradiction of the general verdict in this case. In this case the proof offered would authorize submission of the case to the jury for a finding by it, if the issues were resolved against USF&G, that either there was a breach of contract and USF&G was estopped to assert an affirmative defense or there was no contract but there was fraud in representing there was one. In neither case would the evidence of record support an award of punitive damages. In fraud cases essentially based on § 108, Tit. 7, Code 1940, punitive damages are only allowed where a material misrepresentation is made knowingly and falsely, was relied on by the injured party, and the fraud was gross, malicious, oppressive, and committed with an intent to injure. Old Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Woodall, 295 Ala. 235, 326 So.2d 726 (1976); Hall Motor Co. v. Furman, 285 Ala. 499, 234 So.2d 37 (1970). We find no evidence in this record to authorize a jury to find gross, malicious, oppressive fraud committed with intent to injure. The evidence would support an award of compensatory damages only in this case. They would be the same in the event the jury found for plaintiff either on the breach of contract theory or on the fraud theory: recompense for the losses and damages suffered by plaintiff as a result of the negligence of the uninsured motorist; to the limit of the $20,000 coverage. For the reasons assigned the judgment below must be reversed. REVERSED AND REMANDED. TORBERT, C. J., and BLOODWORTH, FAULKNER and ALMON, JJ., concur.