Opinion ID: 1866833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Negligent Failure to Furnish

Text: Accurate Information As an alternative theory of recovery, Swanson alleges that as an attorney and personal representative of the estate, Ptak had a duty as a trustee to furnish accurate information to Swanson regarding the administration of the estate and her status as a beneficiary. She further alleges that Ptak breached this duty by providing her with information which he knew or should have known to be inaccurate. The precise legal underpinning of this theory of recovery is unclear. Swanson cites Johnson v. Richards, 155 Neb. 552, 52 N.W.2d 737 (1952), in which this court held that a petition alleged extrinsic fraud sufficient to justify setting aside the probate of a will. No fraud is alleged here. Swanson also relies upon Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 at 135 (1965), which provides that [o]ne who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking . . . if certain conditions are met. Swanson alleges no physical harm. She also relies on Restatement, supra, § 552 (1977), adopted by this court in Gibb v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 246 Neb. 355, 370, 518 N.W.2d 910, 921 (1994), which creates liability on the part of one who negligently supplies false information `for the guidance of others in their business transactions.' The damages recoverable under this theory of liability are limited to `pecuniary loss caused . . . by . . . justifiable reliance upon the information.' Id. at 370, 518 N.W.2d at 921, quoting Restatement, supra. Here, Swanson does not contend that Ptak furnished false information for her guidance in any business transaction, and the damages she claims are not reliance damages, but, rather, the difference between the $99,000 advance she received and the total amount she would have received if Wilma's heirs had agreed to share the estate. The record reflects that Ptak initially proceeded as personal representative of the estate under the belief, based upon statements made to him by Wittler in 1998, that Fillmore and Wittler would agree to share one-half of the estate with Swanson and other descendants of Allan. In 1999, when Fillmore and Wittler advised Ptak that they would not agree to this division of the estate, Ptak promptly notified Swanson. Fillmore denied that he had ever agreed to share any portion of the estate with Swanson. These facts do not establish any legal duty on the part of Ptak in his individual capacity which would form the basis of the recovery sought by Swanson in this action.