Opinion ID: 2637000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶ 14] In the section of her brief dedicated to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction, Weidt also asserts several claims that are best characterized as alleged evidentiary errors. We need to address those claims first since they impact any consideration of the evidence in support of Weidt's conviction. The admission of evidence is consigned to the sound discretion of the district court judge. Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo.1995). If no objection is posed, then review is under the plain error standard. Plain error exists when 1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him. Yetter v. State, 987 P.2d 666, 668 (Wyo.1999) (quoting Sandy v. State, 870 P.2d 352, 358 (Wyo.1994)); see also Mora v. State, 984 P.2d 477, 480 (Wyo.1999). Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 535 (Wyo.2000). [¶ 15] First, Weidt contends that the trial court should have admitted into evidence an order issued on October 4, 1999, setting forth the initial custody and visitation rights between Weidt and Sherard. Weidt contends that the order would have shown that custody, as used in subsection (d), did not reside exclusively with Sherard. Weidt notes that Sherard referred to a court order barring him from entering Weidt's property on numerous occasions in his testimony. She insists that admission would have impeached Sherard's testimony on this point. [¶ 16] At trial, the State introduced into evidence, without objection, a copy of the district court order restricting Weidt's visitation rights with her daughter. Later, defense counsel sought admission of a court order, which apparently arose out of the first custody hearing between Weidt and Sherard. Sherard was recalled to the stand by the defense whereupon defense counsel sought to impeach Sherard on his claim that he was prohibited from entering Weidt's property by court order. The following exchange then took place between the court and defense counsel: The Court: The[defense counsel], if the only reason you want this in evidence is to demonstrate to the jury that there is no written order of the Court after the September 1, 1999 hearing prohibiting Mr. Sherard from going on Ms. Weidt's property, I do not want to admit the document into evidence, because there's a number of other items contained therein that might provide some confusion. Is there any other purpose? [Defense counsel]: That would be the only purpose[.] The Court: [Prosecutor], do you stipulate and agree that there is no order from the Court in Defendant's Exhibit A that would prohibit Mr. Sherard from going onto Ms. Weidt's premises? [Prosecutor]: We would stipulate, Your Honor. The Court: Okay. You may accept that fact as proved. The Court is going to deny admission of the exhibit into evidence for the reasons stated. (Emphasis added.) Weidt never argued to the district court that the order was offered for any reason other than to impeach Sherard on his claim that a court order prohibited him from entering her property. The prosecutor stipulated that no such order existed. The Court felt that the order contained extraneous material that could create confusion for the jury. Weidt fails to offer us any argument on why admission of the order would not cause confusion to the jury. Instead, she makes an argumentthe order could have been used to defeat a claim under subsection (d) that she concealed, harbored or refused to reveal the girl's locationthat was not raised by defense counsel during the trial. We will not consider whether the order should have been admitted into evidence on a theory raised for the first time in this Court on appeal. The district court's decision to deny admission of the proffered order was a discretionary act within its authority. [¶ 17] Related to her argument on the admissibility of the order, Weidt argues that even eliciting testimony alluding to the prior judicial rulings in this case was error. She claims that any reference by Sherard to the previous order was reversible error. Relying on our decision in Sheeley v. State, 991 P.2d 136 (Wyo.1999), Weidt contends that testimony appears to quote [the] judge on an ultimate issue invading the province of the jury and depriving her of a fair trial. Essentially, Weidt claims that the references to the previous court orders effectively constituted an expression of opinion on the evidence indicating a possible bias on the part of the trial judge. [¶ 18] Weidt's argument has no merit. Sherard testified that he did not enter Weidt's property to ascertain whether his daughter was there because he believed that he was prohibited from doing so by an order of the court. Sherard offered this testimony solely as an explanation for his actions. We fail to see how this testimony constituted a representation by the judge on the evidence. In Sheeley, the prosecutor asked a witness during cross-examination whether or not an investigator recalled what the victim had been told by a judge during the preliminary hearing regarding her testimony in that proceeding. The investigator responded that he thought the judge cautioned her in regard to perjury. We held that this exchange was reversible error for the obvious reason that it injected possible judicial bias into the trial. 991 P.2d at 139-40. Eliciting the testimony concerning the judge's statement in another proceeding may have allowed the jury to conclude that the trial judge believed the evidence favored a finding of guilt. Id. In that case, the judge, through the prosecutor's line of questioning, was effectively commenting on the weight and quality of the evidence. That is not the situation before us in this case. There is nothing in the transcript or the record indicating that a witness testified about a statement made by the judge in another proceeding. Similarly, there is nothing in the record indicating that the judge made any comment about the testimony or any other evidence in front of the jury that could be considered improper. What the record does show is that Sherard was testifying about his personal belief of what he could or could not do pursuant to a court order. Our decision in Sheeley simply bears no relevance to the situation in this case, and we find no error. [¶ 19] Next, Weidt suggests that the district court should have stricken specific testimony of Sherard relating to a phone call from Weidt where she allegedly stated that he wasn't going to ever see [their daughter] again, that [Weidt] was going to hide her out in the prairie dog fields; and [that Sherard] would never see her again. Weidt describes this testimony as fantastic and incendiary, which was improperly elicited by the prosecutor. Again, Weidt fails to offer any cogent reason why this testimony was improperly solicited or why it should have been stricken by the district court. The testimony is clearly not hearsay. W.R.E. 801(d)(2). Weidt does not offer an analysis pursuant to W.R.E. 403 that the statement's probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice beyond attaching labels like fantastic and incendiary to it. Again, Weidt has failed to present a cogent argument, and we will decline to consider her argument any further. [¶ 20] Mixed within her arguments about the district court's handling of the evidence, Weidt manages to offer a contention that the evidence does not support her conviction for interference with custody. The appellate test for sufficiency of evidence is whether a rational trier of fact could have been sufficiently armed by the evidence to find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In assessing that issue, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, affording them the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. It is not our task, let alone our place, to reweigh the evidence or reexamine the credibility of the witnesses. Nollen v. State, 12 P.3d 682, 684 (Wyo.2000) (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 962 P.2d 141, 148 (Wyo.1998) and Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 375 (Wyo.1995)). [¶ 21] Our review of the evidence indicates a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense of interference with custody beyond a reasonable doubt. The essential elements of interference with custody are that Weidt: (1) having no privilege to do so; (2) failed or refused to return a minor to the person entitled to have custody. Sherard had custody of the girl while Weidt had limited visitation rights. Despite the restrictions of her visitations with their daughter, Sherard elected to drop her off so she could visit with Weidt for two hours. When Sherard returned, Weidt and the girl were gone. Sherard located Weidt's van at her home but did not go onto the property because he believed, incorrectly as it turned out, that he could not enter onto it. Nevertheless, Sherard attempted to contact Weidt by phone but never received an answer. Sherard informed law enforcement, which maintained a lookout for Weidt. Several days later, Weidt called Sherard and told him that he was never going to see his child again. For 17 days, Weidt kept the girl with her. A deputy testified that when Weidt was arrested, her van was parked around the back of a friend's house out of view from the street. This is sufficient evidence to support Weidt's conviction. [5]