Opinion ID: 4538050
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Elonis v. United States

Text: ¶43 The U.S. Supreme Court seemed positioned to settle this debate in Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015), where the Court had its first opportunity to apply the true threats doctrine to statements communicated over social media, specifically, posts the petitioner made on Facebook. There, the petitioner was convicted under a federal statute that makes it a crime to transmit in interstate commerce “any communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person of another.” Id. at 2004 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2018)). The statute makes no reference to a required mental state. Id. at 2008. The jury was instructed that to convict Elonis, it had to find that he intentionally communicated a statement that 19Some have also reasoned that it would be unfair to penalize a speaker for the unintended consequences of their communication. See Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech and Guilty Minds, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1255, 1282 (2014). 24 a reasonable person would foresee would be regarded by the listener as a threat.20 Id. at 2004, 2007. The question before the Court was “whether the statute also requires that the defendant be aware of the threatening nature of the communication, and—if not—whether the First Amendment requires such a showing.” Id. at 2004. ¶44 Ultimately, the Court resolved the case on statutory grounds and did not consider any First Amendment issues. It concluded that reading in only a “reasonable person” standard where a federal criminal statute is silent on the required mental state would be inconsistent with the principle that “wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal.” Id. at 2012 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952)). The Court held that a defendant’s purpose or knowledge would satisfy this requirement but did not address whether recklessness would also be sufficient. Id. Justices Alito and Thomas each wrote separately, criticizing the majority’s failure to resolve the split in the circuit courts regarding the requisite 20 Specifically, the jury was instructed that [a] statement is a true threat when a defendant intentionally makes a statement in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007. 25 level of intent. See id. at 2014 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Did the jury need to find that Elonis had the purpose of conveying a true threat? Was it enough if he knew that his words conveyed such a threat? Would recklessness suffice? The Court declines to say. Attorneys and judges are left to guess.”); see id. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[The majority’s] failure to decide throws everyone from appellate judges to everyday Facebook users into a state of uncertainty.”). Thus, after Elonis, the proper test for true threats remains an unsolved doctrinal puzzle. ¶45 A definitive framework for discerning a true threat has been similarly elusive in Colorado, though our appellate courts have tended to embrace some form of an objective test. For example, in People v. Baer, 973 P.2d 1225 (Colo. 1999), this court appeared in passing to endorse a reasonable speaker test, parenthetically describing a true threat as “one which a reasonable person would foresee would be interpreted by the recipient as a serious threat to inflict death or bodily injury.” Id. at 1231. And in an earlier, widely cited special concurrence in People v. Janousek, 871 P.2d 1189 (Colo. 1994), then-Justice Mullarkey described the “critical inquiry” under true threats jurisprudence as more of a reasonable listener test: “whether those who hear or read the threat reasonably consider that an actual threat has been made.” Id. at 1198 (Mullarkey, J., specially concurring); see also R.D., ¶ 10 (reciting Janousek concurrence formulation); Stanley, 170 P.3d at 787 (same); 26 McIntier, 134 P.3d at 472 (same). More recently, the court of appeals division in Stanley specifically rejected the contention that Black required more than an objective test. See 170 P.3d at 786–89. B. Distinguishing True Threats from Protected Speech in the Age of Social Media ¶46 This court has not had occasion to revisit the framework for assessing whether a statement is a true threat since the U.S. Supreme Court issued its 2003 decision in Black. And as this case demonstrates, the ways in which technology has transformed our everyday communication complicates the constitutional inquiry. We take this opportunity to refine our test for discerning whether a statement is a true threat, taking into account this altered communication landscape. ¶47 First, it is foundational that the “‘basic principle[] of freedom of speech, . . . like the First Amendment’s command, do[es] not vary’ when a new and different medium for communication appears.” Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)). That said, “[e]very medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems which must be examined in the light of the circumstances which are interwoven with the speech in issue.” People v. Weeks, 591 P.2d 91, 95 (Colo. 1979) (citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 502–03, and Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)). In this case, we are alert to the 27 competing concerns that “[s]ocial media make hateful and threatening speech more common but also magnify the potential for a speaker’s innocent words to be misunderstood.” Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Linda Riedemann Norbut, #I U: Considering the Context of Online Threats, 106 Calif. L. Rev. 1885, 1885 (2018). ¶48 Words communicated online and without the interpretive aid of body language are easily misconstrued. Indeed, our reliance on nonverbal cues was implicit in Chaplinksy, where the U.S. Supreme Court first articulated the “fighting words” doctrine. There, the Court recognized that “[t]he English language has a number of words and expressions which by general consent are ‘fighting words’ when said without a disarming smile.” 315 U.S. at 573 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 762 (N.H. 1941)). Modern replacements for such cues, like emojis and gifs, often lack standard meaning and can be difficult to interpret. Complicating things further, emojis may look different depending on the sender’s or recipient’s operating system. For one example, an emoji that resembles a toy squirt gun in a message sent on one platform may appear as a revolver on a recipient device. Cf. Lidsky & Norbut, supra, at 1908 (explaining that the gun emoji in the article’s title “looks like a space pistol on some platforms and like a revolver on others”). ¶49 The chance of meaning being lost in translation is heightened by the potential for online speech to be read far outside its original context. These days, 28 one needs no more than a whim and a smartphone to broadcast to a massive audience. A message posted in Denver can reach New York, Tokyo, or Munich in an instant. Indeed, the term “viral” is apt for the rapidity with which an online statement can spread. A recipient might retransmit a message to audiences not foreseeable to the original speaker. A message might be recirculated after an intervening event that alters its impact. And online speech transmitted in the heat of the moment—which, if uttered verbally, would not linger beyond the speaker’s apology—might be archived and subjected to scrutiny years after the fact. ¶50 The risk of mistaking protected speech for a true threat is high. But so are the stakes of leaving true threats unregulated. With the click of a button or tap of a screen, a threat made online can inflict fear on a wide audience. See, e.g., Julie Turkewitz & Jack Healy, ‘Infatuated’ with Columbine: Threats and Fear, 20 Years After a Massacre, N.Y. Times (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/us/columbine-shooting-sol-pais.html (reporting that “millions of parents, students, and educators across Colorado” awoke on Columbine’s 20th anniversary to news of an individual’s alarming social media posts and threats to friends and family, and that hundreds of schools across the state closed in response). Indeed, a single online post can trigger the diversion of significant law enforcement resources. See, e.g., United States v. Bradbury, 848 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2017) (observing that defendant’s Facebook post 29 precipitated an extensive police investigation). Or such a threat may be directed to a known and vulnerable victim in the privacy of their home. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2017 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Threats of violence and intimidation are among the most favored weapons of domestic abusers, and the rise of social media has only made those tactics more commonplace.”). Online communication—in particular, the ability to communicate anonymously—enables unusually disinhibited communication, magnifying the danger and potentially destructive impact of threatening language on victims. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 889 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[C]yberspace allows speakers and listeners to mask their identities.”). In short, technological innovation has provided apparent license and a ready platform to those wishing to provoke terror. ¶51 Given this changed landscape, we are convinced that the various objective tests previously articulated by this court and the court of appeals are insufficient to distinguish “what is a [true] threat . . . from what is constitutionally protected speech.” Watts, 394 U.S. at 707. Judging a statement from the vantage point of a “reasonable speaker” or “reasonable listener,” in our view, inadequately accounts for potentially vast differences in speakers’, listeners’, and disinterested fact-finders’ frames of reference. We therefore hold that a true threat is a statement that, considered in context and under the totality of the circumstances, an intended 30 or foreseeable recipient would reasonably perceive as a serious expression of intent to commit an act of unlawful violence.21 We believe that this refinement of the objective standard strikes a better balance between giving breathing room to free expression and protecting against the harms that true threats inflict. ¶52 In determining whether a statement is a true threat, a reviewing court must examine the words used, but it must also consider the context in which the statement was made. Particularly where the alleged threat is communicated online, the contextual factors courts should consider include, but are not limited to (1) the statement’s role in a broader exchange, if any, including surrounding events; (2) the medium or platform through which the statement was communicated, including any distinctive conventions or architectural features; (3) the manner in which the statement was conveyed (e.g., anonymously or not, privately or publicly); (4) the relationship between the speaker and recipient(s); and (5) the subjective reaction of the statement’s intended or foreseeable recipient(s). 21In the absence of additional guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court, we decline today to say that a speaker’s subjective intent to threaten is necessary for a statement to constitute a true threat for First Amendment purposes. But even assuming that the First Amendment requires proof of such subjective intent, the statute here required the government to show beyond a reasonable doubt that R.D. “initiate[d] communication . . . in a manner intended to . . . threaten bodily injury.” § 18-9-111(1)(e). 31 ¶53 Courts should start, of course, with the words themselves, along with any accompanying symbols, images, and other similar cues to the words’ meaning. Cf. United States v. Edwards, No. 2:17-CR-170, 2018 WL 456320, at  (S.D. Ohio Jan. 17, 2018) (in witness retaliation case, analyzing Facebook post that called confidential informant a snitch and included laughing faces and a skull emoji). This inquiry should include whether the threat contains accurate details tending to heighten its credibility. See, e.g., Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005–06 (noting the accuracy of the details in defendant’s Facebook post conveying a threat against his wife, including a diagram of her house and directions to “fire a mortar launcher . . . from the cornfield behind it because of easy access to a getaway road” and “a clear line of sight through the sun room”). It should also examine whether the speaker said or did anything to undermine the credibility of the threat. See, e.g., Watts, 394 U.S. at 707–08 (noting that petitioner’s threat to kill the President was made conditional upon induction into the Armed Forces, an event petitioner vowed would never occur). ¶54 Importantly, “what a defendant actually said is just the beginning of a threats analysis.” Haughwout v. Tordenti, 211 A.3d 1, 11 (Conn. 2019). For example, a veiled statement may carry a true threat. See, e.g., Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 482 (“[O]ne cannot duck [a threats prosecution] merely by delivering the threat in verse or by dressing it up with political (and protected) attacks on the legal system.”); Planned 32 Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (concluding that, viewed in context, “Wanted”-style posters listing the names of doctors who had performed abortions could be true threats); cf. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2015 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“To hold otherwise would grant a license to anyone who is clever enough to dress up a real threat in the guise of rap lyrics, a parody, or something similar.”). On the other hand, words that are threatening on their face may actually be just creative expression, jest, or hyperbole. See, e.g., Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 482 (“[A] song, a poem, a comedy routine or a music video is the kind of context that may undermine the notion that the threat was real.”); Burge v. Colton Sch. Dist. 53, 100 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1060, 1069 (D. Or. 2015) (concluding eighth grader’s comment on Facebook that a teacher at school “need[ed] to be shot” was reasonably understood to be merely a critique of the teacher’s skills); State v. Boettger, 450 P.3d 805, 818 (Kan. 2019) (imagining a police protester standing near police officers and quoting the lyrics of N.W.A.’s “Fuck tha Police,” (Straight Outta Compton (Ruthless/Priority 1989)), “[t]ak[e] out a cop or two”). In short, words matter. But so does context. ¶55 Particularly when evaluating online communication, courts should consider whether the statement was part of a larger exchange, including surrounding events. If so, the court should take note of the overall tone of that conversation, as 33 well as the origin of the allegedly threatening language—for example, whether it was spontaneous or responsive to some other communication. It should also consider how surrounding events may impact the statement’s tenor. United States v. Voneida, 337 F. App’x 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2009) (concluding that recency of Virginia Tech shooting supported finding that student’s posts to his MySpace page, including that “[s]omeday [he would] make the Virginia Tech incident look like a trip to an amusement park,” were true threats). But see Watts, 394 U.S. at 711 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting danger of policing alleged threats “under circumstances when intolerance for free speech [is] much greater than it normally might be” (quoting Note, Threatening the President: Protected Dissenter or Political Assassin, Geo. L. J. 553, 570 (1969))). ¶56 Relatedly, the court should consider the medium or platform used to communicate the alleged threat. First, the choice of medium itself may be revealing. See, e.g., United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2011) (reasoning that posting violent messages about the President on financial message board blunts the perception that the statements are true threats). And evidence regarding prevailing norms in a particular genre or even internet subforum may also help recast violent language in a less threatening light. See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 301 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that “hyperbolic and violent language is a commonly used narrative device in rap, 34 which functions to convey emotion and meaning—not to make real threats of violence”). In the context of social media, the court should also consider the platform’s distinctive architectural features, cf. Unsworth v. Musk, No. 2:18-CV-08048-SVW-JC, 2019 WL 4543110, at –7 (C.D. Cal. May 10, 2019) (in defamation case, reasoning that Twitter’s 280-character limit rendered dubious the notion that short-hand supports an inference that text in question was opinion rather than fact), and conventions, see, e.g., Matter of Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 2019) (distinguishing direct messages from mentions on Twitter). ¶57 The manner in which the statement was conveyed may also provide insight. For example, “a speaker’s anonymity could influence a listener’s perception of danger.” Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1120–21 (but concluding there was no reason in that case to think the speaker’s anonymity made it more, rather than less, likely that a violent post regarding the President was a serious threat). The directness of the message may also be revealing. See, e.g., Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“‘Taken in context,’ lyrics in songs that are performed for an audience or sold in recorded form are unlikely to be interpreted as a real threat to a real person,” whereas “[s]tatements on social media that are pointedly directed at their victims . . . are much more likely to be taken seriously.”); A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 865 (Chutich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reasoning that accused’s having posted a “tweet storm of 40 35 posts, all of which specifically tagged [the target’s] Twitter handle,” supported a finding of malicious intent). ¶58 Courts should also consider the speaker’s familiarity with the recipients or targets of the threat and the nature of the relevant parties’ personal history. For example, in Elonis, the defendant’s alleged threats included lyrics posted to Facebook that threatened violence against his wife soon after she left him and took with her their two children. 135 S. Ct. at 2004. Relatedly, courts should consider whether a threat’s intended recipient or target is particularly vulnerable, whether because of personal characteristics or the parties’ relationship. See, e.g., A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 844 (considering “an unrelenting torrent of cruel tweets at . . . an individual diagnosed with autism and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder” encouraging the target to commit suicide). ¶59 Finally, the subjective reaction of a statement’s target or foreseeable recipients will be an important clue as to whether the message is a true threat. See, e.g., Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (reasoning that in part because of listeners’ laughing response, defendant’s statement could not be interpreted as true threat). This inquiry need not be limited to the recipient’s immediate reaction. See, e.g., D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 758, 764 (8th Cir. 2011) (teenage recipient of threats via instant message initially responded “lol”—shorthand for “laughing out loud”—but was concerned enough to tell trusted adult); Haughwout, 36 211 A.3d at 14 (observing that some students initially “elected to treat [the remarks at issue] as made in jest,” but that “some of those same students nevertheless were sufficiently perturbed to contact the university police”). ¶60 That said, courts should be wary of placing significant weight on the subjective reaction of a statement’s unintended recipients. To do so risks punishing a speaker for the content of a message that has been decoupled from its context. This is of heightened concern given the vast temporal, geographic, and cultural distance current technology permits speech to travel. We are mindful that someone who stumbles upon a message he perceives as threatening may experience sincere fear and anxiety. But to construe the true threats exception to protect every passive internet user from the risk of such harms gives the doctrine too wide a scope. ¶61 Moreover, a listener’s subjective reaction, without more, should not be dispositive of whether a statement is a true threat. We acknowledge that the true threats exception serves to protect individuals from “the fear of violence,” and “from the disruption that fear engenders.” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388. But whether a particular reader or listener will react with fear to particular words is far too unpredictable a metric for First Amendment protection. Such a rule would not give sufficient “breathing space” to the freedom of speech. Cf. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 37 at 573 (“The word ‘offensive’ is not to be defined in terms of what a particular addressee thinks.” (quoting Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 762)). ¶62 The factors discussed here are not meant to constitute an exhaustive list. Depending on the facts and circumstances, other considerations may be relevant to the overarching goal of examining a statement in all its context to discern whether it is a true threat or protected expression. Relatedly, the fact-finder has discretion to weigh each factor in the balance, and to decide whether a particular factor cuts for or against finding a true threat. Finally, in considering each factor, courts may find it helpful to admit expert testimony to help illuminate coded meanings, explain community norms and conventions, or bridge other contextual gaps.