Opinion ID: 2328760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Molding of the Verdict

Text: Next, KMA claims that the Superior Court erred in affirming the trial court's judgment of a molded verdict of $5,641,200. KMA makes two related but nonetheless distinct arguments. First, KMA contends that molding of the verdict was improper or in violation of its due process rights because it allowed each member of the class to recover $600, although no evidence of liability and amount of out-of-pocket costs was of record for any member of the class except Bassett. Essentially, the manufacturer re-asserts its prior arguments regarding the certification of the class and the sufficiency of evidence to prove a breach of the express warranty. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313-14, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (constitutional predicate of sufficiency claim is due process clause). Second, KMA states that molding of the verdict was improper because the trial court did not conduct claims proceedings per its pre-trial order of May 16, 2005 (May 16th Order), which disposed of KMA's motion to bifurcate the trial into proceedings on what KMA perceived as common versus individual issues. The May 16th Order stated: AND NOW, this 16th day of May, 2005, upon consideration of the Motion to bifurcate of Defendant, Kia Motor [sic] America, Inc., it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion is DENIED. Each class member's entitlement to recover if plaintiff class prevails, shall be determined at claims proceedings. Tr. Ct. Order, 5/16/05. According to KMA, in light of the May 16th Order, the trial court molded the verdict without forewarning and in violation of KMA's constitutional due process rights. Regarding its due process claim, KMA also insists that the improper certification of the class denied KMA the opportunity to present a defense as to each member of the class and have its merits fairly judged. KMA claims that the trial of the case as a class action improperly expanded the substantive rights of class members other than Bassett, who were awarded damages for a harm they did not prove. KMA's Brief at 28-32. Bassett and the class respond that KMA distorts the record. According to Bassett, the evidence was crystal clear that this case was tried on a class basis and defended on a class basis. Bassett's Brief at 39. She states that the jury entered a verdict for the class and not for Bassett alone, as the jury questionnaire reflected. Question 5 on the jury questionnaire stated: State the amount of damages if any, sustained by each [c]lass member:    b) For repair expenses, reasonably incurred, as a result of defendant's breach of warranty. Jury Verdict Special Interrogatories, 5/27/05. After the jury awarded $600 per class member, the trial court merely realized the plain intent of the jury by multiplying the per person award by the stipulated number of class members, and arrived at the molded verdict. The trial court then entered judgment pursuant to Rule 1715(d), which required the court to specify who was bound by the judgment. Bassett emphasizes that KMA waived any claim of error regarding the molding of the verdict by failing to raise a timely objection at trial. According to Bassett, the trial court's May 16th Order did not relieve KMA of the obligation to object when the trial court molded the verdict. [28] Bassett regards as dubious KMA's position that it detrimentally relied on the May 16th Order to reserve its defenses until an evidentiary claims proceedings phase. Bassett points out that KMA failed to identify any defenses that it was allegedly prevented from asserting at trial. Bassett also reemphasizes that the nature of her proof and of the class proceedings was known or should have been known to KMA and its attorneys, who failed to object at any time to class-wide proof of damages, or to the jury questionnaire, or to the molding of the verdict. Thus, Bassett says, KMA's assignment of error via post-verdict motions and on appeal is untimely. Finally, Bassett offers her own due process and fairness arguments in support of maintaining the class and sustaining the verdict. [29] In its reply brief, KMA asserts that its objection to the molded verdict was timely, because the first appropriate opportunity to object was in its motion for post-trial relief; the post-trial motion gave the trial court every opportunity to correct its error. KMA's Reply Brief at 12 n. 12. According to KMA, the jury questionnaire, which referenced damages of each class member, was consistent with the May 16th Order, which, according to KMA, required that there would be claims proceedings in which each class member would have to prove entitlement to a recovery. Id. (emphasis in the original). Thus, the molding of the verdict created the inconsistency to which, KMA states, its timely objection was raised. Id. In its Rule 1925(b) statement, KMA raised the molding of the verdict issue in terms similar to those in its appellate brief to this Court. Unfortunately, the trial court addressed the narrower (and somewhat different) issue of whether there was error in its denial of the motion to bifurcate the damages and liability phases of trial. The court concluded that bifurcation was not necessary because the risk of prejudice against the defendant, common, for example, in catastrophic personal injury cases, was not present here. Tr. Ct. Op., 12/29/06, at 39. The Superior Court agreed and affirmed the judgment on the molded verdict. The panel also added that the record contained sufficient evidence to support a verdict of $600 per class member (and indeed of up to $1,005). According to the court, all class members were entitled to have good brakes on their cars that did not require repeated trips to the dealership for replacement to avoid brake failure. Super. Ct. Op., 10/24/07, at 3-4. We address each of KMA's related claims separately.
KMA argues that the molding of the verdict was improper because evidence as to Bassett's claim was not probative of the claims of other class members and, as a result, the class failed to carry its burden of proof at trial. The car manufacturer essentially incorporates and re-asserts its prior claims of trial court error regarding the sufficiency and weight of the evidence to justify the jury's verdict as the basis for its due process argument. We have already discussed at length and dismissed KMA's prior claims. Accordingly, we also reject this repetitive claim. Jackson, supra .
KMA argues that the molding of the verdict was erroneous in light of the May 16th Order. In April 2005, KMA filed a motion to bifurcate, seeking separate trials on common issues from issues that it identified as individual, i.e., defect manifestation, notice and opportunity to cure, causation, and damages. According to KMA, its request was for a court order confirming that issues of fact and law identified by KMA [t]herein [would] be adjudicated in future, class-member-specific proceedings, in the event that [Bassett] prevail[ed] in the . . . common issue trial. See KMA's Motion to Bifurcate, 4/25/05, at 14, 19. The trial court denied the motion and stated that class members' entitlement to recover[,] if plaintiff class prevails, shall be determined at class proceedings. Tr. Ct. Order, 5/16/05. Thereafter, the parties proceeded to trial and Bassett introduced evidence to prove the claims of all the members of the class. On May 25 and 26, 2005, the trial court conferred in chambers with both parties regarding their requested jury instructions and the jury verdict sheet, and sought to provide prompt resolution to the parties' objections. The court described its jury instructions and jury questions in terms of amount sustained by each class member, inter alia, for repair expenses as a result of defendant's breach of warranty. The trial court asked if there were any objections to the questions on the jury verdict form as explained and KMA's counsel responded No, Your Honor. N.T., 5/25/05, Vol. 7, at 70-73. Both the jury instructions and the verdict form reflected the discussion in chambers. Indeed, after providing a description of the damages requested by the class in its charge to the jury, the court explained: [b]ecause you're rendering a verdict for each class member, I will take care of making sure that the Class members recover. At sidebar, immediately after the damages instruction, the court again asked attorneys for both parties if there were any objections to the charge and the attorneys responded in the negative. N.T., 5/26/05, Vol. 3, at 50-53. The court then released the jury for deliberations. The questions on the verdict sheet, in relevant part and with the jury's answers, read: Question No. 1: Did [KMA] breach its express warranty on the cars purchased by the class? X Yes___________ No    Question No. 5: State the amount of damages if any, sustained by each Class member: b) For repair expenses, reasonably incurred, as a result of [KMA]'s breach of warranty. $ 600.00 Jury Verdict Special Interrogatories, 5/27/05; accord N.T., 5/27/05, Verdict, at 3-8. After the trial court recorded the jury's answers to the questions on the verdict slip, the court multiplied the $600 damages award by the agreed-upon number of class members9,402and recorded a verdict of $5,641,200 on behalf of the class. After dismissing the jury, the court asked the parties if there was anything further they wished to address at that time. Counsel for KMA answered No, Your Honor. Thanks to the Court. The court concluded proceedings. N.T., 5/27/05, Verdict, at 4-8. On appeal, KMA concedes that it raised an objection to the molding of the verdict premised on the May 16th Order for the first time in its post-trial motion, re-asserted it in its Rule 1925(b) statement, and argues that such an objection afforded the trial court sufficient opportunity to correct its error. In the Rule 1925(b) statement, KMA asserted that Bassett had consented to undertake post-verdict claims proceedings to determine each class member's entitlement to recover, yet the trial court  sua sponte and in derogation of its own order on bifurcation, transformed this bifurcated class action trial into a unitary verdict in favor of the class. The manufacturer also raised an alternate, facially contradictory, argument that [t]he time for determining whether class members have claims against KMA is at trial, not `at claims proceedings' following trial and verdict. KMA's Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, ¶ 3. KMA had initially asserted the latter, but not the former, argument in its post-trial motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. KMA's Motion for Post-Trial Relief, ¶ 9. On appeal, KMA insists that absent reversal and decertification of the class, KMA's due process rights will have been violated. KMA's Brief at 30-32; KMA's Reply Brief at 12 n. 12. [30] We disagree with KMA that its objection, which it concedes was offered for the first time in a post-trial motion, was timely under the circumstances. Under prevailing Pennsylvania law, a timely objection is required to preserve an issue for appeal. Pa.R.C.P. No. 227.1(b)(1) & n.; Pa.R.A.P. 302; Straub v. Cherne Indus., 583 Pa. 608, 880 A.2d 561, 567 (2005); Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114, 116-17 (1974). Here, KMA failed to object to the verdict sheets when composed and offered to the jury, to the related jury charge, or, at the latest, contemporaneous with the actual molding of the verdict. As a result, the issue of whether the May 16th Order precluded the trial court from molding the verdict was waived. The substance of the trial court's May 16th Order does not affect this conclusion. This Court's Straub decision is particularly instructive. In Straub, after the parties rested, the trial court discussed the verdict sheets with the parties and stated that it aimed to explain to the jury that the plaintiffs were forwarding two independent claims, and that the plaintiffs could win on one claim but lose on the other or vice versa. The parties agreed and the trial court issued its instruction. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs on one claim but not on the second. The defendant did not object to the jury questionnaire, the trial court's instructions, or the jury's verdict. Then, in post-trial motions, the defendant sought a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that once the jury found that the product was not defective respecting the first claim, it should have found in its favor on all counts. The trial court did not rule on the post-verdict motions and entered judgment on the verdict; the Superior Court reversed and remanded. This Court, however, held that the Superior Court erred in rejecting the plaintiffs' waiver argument and reversed. We concluded that the defendant premised its claim of error on the argument that the jury's verdict was incompatible with a principle of law. But, this alleged error should have been evident when the verdict sheets and the trial instructions were agreed upon and formulated. Yet, the defendant did not object to the verdict sheets, to the trial court's related instructions, or to the verdict itself when it was rendered. By failing to object, the defendant had waived its claim. 880 A.2d at 567. Here, we have a similar scenario. KMA argues that the molded verdict was incompatible with the May 16th Order, which it poses as the law of the case, and upon which it claims it relied to allegedly forego pursuit of undisclosed defenses to the class claims. [31] Pursuant to Straub, however, this so-called reliance was not sufficient to excuse KMA's obligation to raise a timely objection when, in its view (as alleged now), the court acted contrary to the prior order. KMA should have objected contemporaneously to the jury questionnaire or, at the latest, contemporaneously to the actual molding of the verdict in order to give the trial court a contemporaneous opportunity to address the alleged error and to preserve the present issue for appeal. Indeed, the object of contemporaneous objection requirements respecting trial-related issues is to allow the court to take corrective measures and thereby to avert the time and expense of appeals or new trials. See Criswell v. King, 575 Pa. 34, 834 A.2d 505, 509-10 (2003) (listing policy considerations behind contemporaneous objection requirement). KMA simply did not do that here. As a result, the manufacturer's claim of error in the molding of the verdict, premised upon a supposed inconsistency with the May 16th order, is waived for failure to record a contemporaneous objection.