Opinion ID: 1508567
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: admissibility: relevance and reliability

Text: The decision of whether to admit a voice exemplar is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Vandegrift, 82 Md.App. at 639, 573 A.2d at 66. Trial judges are afforded broad discretion in the conduct of trials in such areas as the reception of evidence. Void v. State, 325 Md. 386, 393, 601 A.2d 124, 127 (1992) (quoting McCray v. State, 305 Md. 126, 133, 501 A.2d 856, 860 (1985)). Accordingly, in our appellate review, we extend the trial court great deference in determining the admissibility of evidence and will reverse only if the court abused its discretion. Robinson v. State, 348 Md. 104, 121, 702 A.2d 741, 749 (1997) (The determination of whether specific evidence is relevant in a given case rests with the trial court, and that determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.); Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 404-05, 697 A.2d 432, 439 (1997) (explaining that appellate courts generally will not reverse a trial court on issues of the admissibility of relevant evidence unless a clear abuse of discretion can be shown); Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724, 737, 679 A.2d 1106, 1113 (1996) (A trial judge's determination on relevance will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.); Ricks v. State, 312 Md. 11, 31-32, 537 A.2d 612, 622, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832, 109 S.Ct. 90, 102 L.Ed.2d 66 (1988) (refusing to reverse trial court for allowing videotape identification); Straughn v. State, 297 Md. 329, 334, 465 A.2d 1166, 1169 (1983) (noting that admissibility of police identification photographs is a discretionary matter for the trial court.); Schear v. Motel Management Corp., 61 Md.App. 670, 682, 487 A.2d 1240, 1245-46 (1985) ([A] determination as to relevance is left to the discretion of the trial judge.). This Court has not had occasion to determine when trial courts may admit in-court voice identification evidence. A number of other jurisdictions, however, have. The Supreme Court of Nebraska has noted, for example, that the nontestimonial nature of a voice exemplar does not automatically require its admission into evidence. The [party seeking admission] must still show that the voice exemplar is relevant and reliable. State v. Newman, 250 Neb. 226, 244, 548 N.W.2d 739, 752 (1996). The New York Court of Appeals also has held that [t]he test of whether voice exemplar evidence should be admitted ... [is] whether it is relevant and reliable. People v. Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d 769, 777, 530 N.Y.S.2d 83, 525 N.E.2d 728, 732 (1988) (citing United States v. Esdaille, 769 F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923, 106 S.Ct. 258, 88 L.Ed.2d 264 (1985)). In Maryland, evidence, including a voice exemplar offered for identification purposes, is relevant if it tends to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would have been without the evidence. Md. Rule 5-401. Even if relevant, however, evidence can be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Md. Rule 5-403. Other states have adopted the same methodology. See Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d at 777, 530 N.Y.S.2d 83, 525 N.E.2d at 732 (applying the same rules of relevancy to exemplar evidence); see also People v. Davis, 151 Ill.App.3d 435, 439, 104 Ill.Dec. 283, 502 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1986), cert. denied, 114 Ill.2d 548, 108 Ill.Dec. 420, 508 N.E.2d 731 (1987) (explaining that trial court has wide discretion to weigh whether probative value of in-court voice identification was substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 394 Pa.Super. 316, 323, 575 A.2d 921, 924-25 (1990) (noting that trial courts have far-reaching discretion with respect to compelling a defendant to don clothing, including evaluating the act's probative value (quotation omitted)). In considering the reliability of a voice exemplar, other courts have noted the problems unique to this form of identification evidence. For example, voice exemplars, as compared to other forms of personal demonstrative evidence like scars or tattoos, are easy to feign for purposes of trial. See Newman, 250 Neb. at 245, 548 N.W.2d at 752 (noting that [a]n accent can be exaggerated or muted through a person's conscious efforts, such as avoiding particular words that one cannot pronounce without an accent.); see also Esdaille, 769 F.2d at 107; Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d at 778, 530 N.Y.S.2d 83, 525 N.E.2d at 732. Some courts have adopted a list of factors enunciated by the Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199, 93 S.Ct. 375, 382, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), to consider in determining the reliability of identification evidence when due process challenges are at issue: [2] (1) the ability of the witness to hear the assailant speak, (2) the witness's degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of any prior identifications the witness made, (4) the period of time between the incident and the identification, and (5) how certain the witness was in making the identification. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977); United States v. Duran, 4 F.3d 800, 803 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1078, 114 S.Ct. 894, 127 L.Ed.2d 87 (1994). Relevance and reliability are considered separately. If the exemplar is irrelevant, reliability is not an issue because the evidence is inadmissible. It is only when identification evidence is relevant in the first instance that reliability need be assessed. Generally, it is in the assessment of reliability that the Biggers test has been utilized. The majority of jurisdictions adopting the Biggers factors determine reliability based on a two-pronged test: The admissibility of a challenged in-court identification is subject to a two part test. Initially, we must decide if the identification procedure was unduly suggestive. If the threshold determination that an identification was suggestive is made, we then examine whether the identification was so reliable, in view of the totality of the circumstances, as to prevent a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 556 (7th Cir.1995) (citation omitted). See also United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 666 (2d Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1115, 116 S.Ct. 1343, 134 L.Ed.2d 491 (1996) (applying the two-pronged test to determine whether a pretrial identification procedure tainted the subsequent in-court identification). The second prong of the reliability inquiry is when courts consider the five factors set forth in Biggers. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 63 F.3d at 557; United States v. Rutledge, 40 F.3d 879, 889 (7th Cir.1994), rev'd on other grounds, 517 U.S. 292, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996); United States v. Tortora, 30 F.3d 334, 338 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 970 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 935, 113 S.Ct. 1323, 122 L.Ed.2d 709 (1993); United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 226, 230 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 964, 113 S.Ct. 438, 121 L.Ed.2d 357 (1992); United States v. Rundell, 858 F.2d 425, 426 (8th Cir.1988); State v. Clausell, 121 N.J. 298, 326, 580 A.2d 221, 234 (1990). This inquiry into reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.... Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. at 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d 140. The majority of the cases applying the distinct two-step reliability process, however, are constitutional due process cases. That is, the criminal defendants alleged the identification procedures, whether in-court or pre-trial, were so impermissibly suggestive and unreliable that they deprived the defendant of his or her right to due process. As we previously have noted, no such violation has been alleged in the case before us. We shall utilize the relevancy-reliability determination, taking into consideration the five Biggers factors only with respect to the reliability issue, as various other courts have done when reviewing the admissibility of identification evidence. [3] In State v. Bolanos, 743 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Mo.Ct.App.1987), the Missouri Court of Appeals used the Biggers factors to find a voice identification admissible. The court noted that the witness had heard the assailant's voice several times, had a high degree of attention after having been threatened with a knife, had given a prior description, and demonstrated certainty in her voice identification. Id. Similarly, a victim's identification of the defendant's voice in a voice line-up was held admissible in Wilson v. State, 282 Ark. 551, 553-57, 669 S.W.2d 889, 891-92 (1984). In that case, the Supreme Court of Arkansas said the voice line-up was reliable despite its suggestive nature because the assailant, who had a distinct accent, spoke often during the crime and called and approached the victim after the incident. Id. Additionally, the victim, in her identification of the assailant, was positive. Id. at 557, 669 S.W.2d at 892. In Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d at 778-79, 530 N.Y.S.2d 83, 525 N.E.2d at 733, the Court of Appeals of New York held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting a proposed voice exemplar by the defendant because, essentially, the exemplar was not reliable. In two cases consolidated for appeal, the defendants presented defenses of mistaken identity and alibi. At one of the defendant's trials, the victim testified that her assailant had no noticeable speech impediment and she could understand his statements during the robbery. That particular defendant sought to introduce evidence that he had a speech impediment. The other defendant sought to introduce similar evidence at his trial. In each case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts' rulings denying admission of the exemplars because those exemplars were unreliable. The appellate court reasoned: In neither case did the victim rely on defendant's voice to identify him. Moreover, the foundation for the admission of the evidence, in each case did not rule out the possibility that defendants could feign the existence of a speech defect. Even the speech therapist, called as an expert witness ... testified that he could have camouflaged any speech problem.... Id.