Opinion ID: 1968342
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Trial Judge's Questioning of Witnesses

Text: Finally, appellant argues that the trial court took an inappropriately inquisitorial role in her trial and thereby denied her due process of law. Defense counsel, however, did not object to any of the court's questions at the time they were asked. Therefore, we review appellant's present claim that the trial court took on the role of prosecutor and exceeded its powers for plain error only. Handon v. United States, 651 A.2d 814, 816 (D.C. 1994); Golsun v. United States, 592 A.2d 1054, 1060 (D.C.1991). We find no plain error; indeed, we find no error at all. Courts are permitted to question witnesses in the aid of truth and the furtherance of justice. Womack v. United States, 350 A.2d 381, 382-383 (D.C. 1976); see Holmes v. United States, 615 A.2d 555, 557-558 (D.C.1992) (trial judge may ask questions to determine whether defendant could properly raise a particular defense); Johnson v. United States, 613 A.2d 888, 895-896 (D.C.1992) (trial judge may ask questions to clarify testimony); United States v. Spencer, 306 U.S.App. D.C. 399, 403-404, 25 F.3d 1105, 1109-1110 (1994) (trial judge may ask questions to establish background details); Roberts v. United States, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 75, 76-77, 284 F.2d 209, 210-211 (1960) (trial judge may ask questions to test the accuracy of the witness's memory . . . and thus to aid the jury in its determination of the witness's reliability and credibility). Of course, during a non-jury trial such as this one, a judge's questioning is less problematic because there is no risk of biasing a jury. See United States v. Roach, 323 U.S.App.D.C. 448, 455, 108 F.3d 1477, 1484, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 983, 118 S.Ct. 446 (1997), vacated in part on other grounds, 329 U.S.App.D.C. 54, 136 F.3d 794 (1998). Appellant bases her challenge to the trial court's questioning of witnesses on two cases, In re A.R., 679 A.2d 470 (D.C.1996), and Davis v. United States, 567 A.2d 36 (D.C.1989). These cases are inapposite because in each case the central issue was whether a trial judge could or should conduct an investigation outside the courtroom to develop the facts. In A.R., a termination of parental rights case, we affirmed a judgment against the father, rejecting his contention that the trial judge had erred by declining to interview [the child] in chambers or to attempt to expand in some other way the evidentiary record presented to her by the parties. See 679 A.2d at 475-476. In Davis we reversed convictions of unauthorized use of a vehicle and assault on a police officer because the trial judge had initiated an investigation to find out whether appellant had ever had a driver's license, 567 A.2d at 39, noting that under our system of laws, a judge is not an investigator. . . . Id. at 42. Nothing remotely comparable happened in this case. In the case before us, the trial court's questions of Officer James properly sought information to develop more fully a line of questioning already initiated by the prosecution. In one instance, the court simply inquired about what exactly was said to Officer James (What is the first thing that the individual you've just described, whom you have not yet named, said to you? . . . Was there any other conversation?). In another, the court attempted to avoid a hearsay issue by saying to counsel, Could you ask a more specific question so that you're not potentially eliciting hearsay? On a third occasion, the court questioned Officer. James to clarify his testimony (I know you testified to this twice, but I just want to make sure I got it right. Tell me again what the defendant said.). All of these questions, which are typical of others that were asked by the court, fit squarely into those categories of questions that are well established as acceptable questions from trial judges, especially in non jury trials. We find no error whatsoever in the judge's questioning of the witnesses.