Opinion ID: 2600307
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Submission of Kidnapping Charge on a Legally Inadequate Theory

Text: Defendant contends the kidnapping charge was improperly submitted to the jury on a legally inadequate theory to support a conviction. He claims the evidence established an asportation with three segments, one from the door of the Club to the entrance of the company lot, one that began six seconds later ... a few feet inside the entrance to the parking lot, and continued for 245 feet to the southeast corner of the concrete enclosure where Ms. Wong's body was found, and one, a subset of the second, began at the foot of the stairs leading to the concrete enclosure and ended 37 feet away in the southeast corner of the enclosure. He argues that the instructions given to the jury allowed [him] to be found guilty based on ... [the 37 foot] segment of the asportation that began ... at the foot of the stairs leading to the entrance to the concrete enclosure and ended where Wong's body was found. Defendant also argues that the prosecutor's closing arguments at trial encouraged the jury to return a verdict of guilt on simple kidnapping based on a legally inadequate theory. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that, under the law in effect at the time defendant committed his offenses, the prosecutor did argue two separate theories of kidnapping, one of which was legally inadequate. In turn, because we cannot determine from the record on which theory the general verdict of guilt as to simple kidnapping rests, we agree with defendant that his kidnapping conviction must be reversed and that the kidnapping-murder special circumstance finding must be set aside. The prosecutor argued to the jury that what constituted a substantial distance is a question of fact for you, and that [n]o one is going to tell you a particular number of feet is a kidnapping. We don't say 20 feet is a kidnapping, 40 feet, three miles. It is a juror's determination as to whether or not that distance is slight or trivial, or whether or not it is substantial. The prosecutor then suggested to the jurors that they could look at certain things as far as this consideration. You can look at the locations and the boundaries over which this occurred; the fact that he is taking her in a darkened parking lot; the fact that he is dragging her up some stairs; the fact that he has her by her hair and dragging her on the ground; that this is a substantial distance, it is not trivial. Number two, you can look at the distance in view of the context served. The fact of the matter is he is taking Leonora Wong from a public place, a place that is open to public view, to a place where she is going to be hidden. A place which substantially increases her danger. See, the reason he took her there was so no one would see her. He could do whatever he wanted to her inside that enclosure without being seen, he thought. So him moving her was more than a slight or trivial distance. It is not like he is taking her two feet around the back of a car or moving her just a couple of inches in a parking lot, he is moving her a substantial distance, which increased the risk of her harm. The prosecutor then told the jury that the difference between the kidnapping and felony false imprisonment is false imprisonment doesn't require somebody to be moved a substantial distance, which is more than trivial.... So ... if you think he just moved her a trivial distance, you will find it is false imprisonment. I submit this was a substantial distance that increased her risk of harm. In his closing argument, defense counsel focused the jury's attention on whether the circumstantial evidence shows there is a substantial movement. He told the jury that the prosecutor would say that because it is 208 feet from ... the entry to the parking lot to the enclosure, that that is a substantial distance. Defense counsel then argued there is a reasonable doubt that the second photograph that captured an image of defendant and Wong at 208 feet from the foot of the steps depicts defendant forcibly moving Wong towards the enclosure in which she was sexually attacked and then killed. He argued that the unusual pose in the photograph in which Wong was stopped and leaning forward was ambiguous and could depict a moment when Wong's heel slipped or a playful swing or anything else. Defense counsel then argued, if there was a reasonable doubt whether the photograph depicted the beginning of a kidnapping, the jury must conclude the forced movement began some other place, if at all, on its way to the enclosure and that then and only then do you get to the questions of whether or not that is a substantial distance. Counsel next told the jury, And for the life of me you can't get beyond the fact that any movement, any movement at all, is simply along the side of one building.... If you have a reasonable doubt that there is a substantial movement by force or fear more than simply ... along the building into the enclosure, then the benefit of that doubt has to befall [sic] the accused. At the end of his argument to the jury, defense counsel reiterated, The argument of the prosecution is that that [second] picture shows some unconsensual movement. My statement to you is that that is susceptible of many different interpretations. On rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that defense counsel seems to think that for some reason I have to prove that a kidnapping started ... 245 feet away. There is no specific distance for kidnapping. If you think it happened at 45 feet and at another 37 inside the enclosure, that if you believe it to be i substantial distance, more than slight or trivial, that is significant. It would be ridiculous to have a law say that to have a kidnapping you have to be more than 125 feet. It is absurd. Each case should rise and fall on its own facts. He is taking this woman to a place which substantially increases her risk of harm, and that is what we are talking about as far as the kidnapping. He later said, It is easy for a defense attorney to stand up here and say that this was a trivial distance, kidnapping, it is not a substantial distance, [but] it is kidnapping 45 feet. After the trial court sustained an objection to the prosecutor's asking the jury to consider whether that distance was trivial to Leonora Wong, the prosecutor continued, I submit that that is not a trivial distance, that is, a substantial distance that increased her risk of harm and likely [sic] to be killed. (Italics added.) At the time of the offenses in this case, what evidence could be included in a determination of substantial distance was governed by our holding in Caudillo. In 1978, this court held in Caudillo that `the determining factor in the crime of [simple] kidnaping is the actual distance of the victim's movements.' ( Caudillo, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 572, 146 Cal.Rptr. 859, 580 P.2d 274.) We stated, Neither the incidental nature of the movement, the defendant's motivation to escape detection, nor the possible enhancement of danger to the victim resulting from the movement is a factor to be considered in the determination of substantiality of movement for the offense of [simple] kidnaping. ( Id. at p. 574, 146 Cal.Rptr. 859, 580 P.2d 274.) In Caudillo, defendant forcibly moved his rape victim for an unspecified distance from the elevator to the storage room, and from the storage room to her apartment. ( Id. at p. 572, 146 Cal.Rptr. 859, 580 P.2d 274.) We concluded this was not substantial movement within the meaning of section 207. ( Caudillo, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 572, 146 Cal.Rptr. 859, 580 P.2d 274.) In 1980, while our holding in Caudillo was in effect, this court held that the 90 feet the victim was forcibly moved was insufficient as a matter of law to constitute substantial distance within the meaning of section 207, our simple kidnapping statute. ( Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 67, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) In Martinez, we noted that, [i]n cases involving simple kidnapping, the instructions currently provide that the victim must have been moved `for a substantial distance, that is, a distance more than slight or trivial.' (See CALJIC No. 9.50.) ( Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 237, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512.) We then overruled Caudillo and held that for simple kidnapping, with regard to future cases, it would be proper for the court to instruct that, in determining whether the movement is `substantial in character' [citation], the jury should consider the totality of the circumstances. Thus, in a case where the evidence permitted, the jury might properly consider not only the actual distance the victim is moved, but also such factors as whether that movement increased the risk of harm above that which existed prior to the asportation, decreased the likelihood of detection, and increased both the danger inherent in a victim's foreseeable attempts to escape and the attacker's enhanced opportunity to commit additional crimes. ( Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 237, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512.) We explicitly held that our decision in Martinez was not retroactive because it constitute] `judicial enlargement of a criminal Act' ( Pierce v. United States (1941) 314 U.S. 306, 311[, 62 S.Ct. 237, 86 L.Ed. 226]) for which defendant must have had fair warning to be held accountable. ( Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 239, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512.) We added that our holding in Martinez could not be applied retroactively to the defendant in Martinez or to any other defendant whose offense occurred while Caudillo was the law because, in overruling Caudillo we have not only expanded the factual basis for making that determination but in the process effectively overruled cases holding that specific distances failed to establish asportation. ( Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 239, 83 Cal. Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512.) We then explained, Two of those decisions are particularly relevant as to these facts. In People v. Brown [(1974)] 11 Cal.3d 784[, 114 Cal.Rptr. 426, 523 P.2d 226] [Brown], the defendant confronted the victim in her kitchen and `forcibly took her through [the] house in search of her husband.' ( Id. at p. 788[, 114 Cal.Rptr. 426, 523 P.2d 226].) They returned to the kitchen and then the living room, after which the defendant dragged her outside for an additional 75 feet. ( Id, at pp. 788-789[, 114 Cal.Rptr. 426, 523 P.2d 226].) Without considering any other factors, the court found the distance involved `insufficient to show that the movements were substantial.' ( Id. at p. 789[, 114 Cal.Rptr. 426, 523 P.2d 226].) Again, in People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at page 67[, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], a 90-foot movement was `insufficient as a matter of law' `[f]or the reasons stated in Brown ....'. ( Martinez, 20 Cal.4th at p. 239, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512.) Had defendant's criminal conduct against Wong occurred in 1999, after Martinez overruled Caudillo, the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments in this case would have been entirely proper. However, the crimes in this case occurred in May 1994, and, accordingly, Caudillo and Green governed defendant's case. Under those two holdings, the prosecutor's argument that the forced movement began when defendant got hold of Wong and managed to manipulate her out of this bar and that defense counsel could not be serious in arguing that the photograph taken 245 feet from where Wong was killed showed forceful pulling, a playful swing, a stumble set forth a legally adequate theory that defendant forcibly moved Wong for a distance of at least 245 feet. On the other hand, the prosecutor's argument that 45 feet or the 37 feet from the steps to the area in the enclosure where Wong was killed could constitute substantial distance by considering such factors as the boundaries crossed and the increased risk of harm to the victim presented a legally inadequate theory at the time of defendant's offense. Here, as in Green, in which the prosecutor improperly argued that 90 feet, as well as five miles or 20 miles met the simple kidnapping substantial distance requirement for asportation, [n]othing in the instructions ... disabused the jury of [the] notion that a distance less than 90 feet could constitute substantial distance under the law at the time in question. ( Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 68, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) The trial court simply instructed the jury that the crime is committed when the defendant moves a person by force or fear, against his will and without his consent, and that the asportation element of the both the kidnapping charge and the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance allegation required movement by force or fear for a substantial distance, that is, a distance more than slight or trivial. (CALJIC No. 9.50.) As discussed above, the trial court's jury instruction was proper, but, as in Green, [n]o further guidance was provided on the latter issue, although it [was at the time in question] `the determining factor in the crime of kidnaping' ( People v. Stanworth (1974) ... 11 Cal.3d [588,] 601[, 114 .Cal. Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058]). Finally, as noted above the jury's verdict was general, merely finding defendant guilty of the ... offense of kidnaping in violation in of section 207. ( Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 68-69,164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) We note that, after defendant's crimes but before his trial, in Rayford, we had clarified that there was no minimum number of feet to satisfy the asportation standard of aggravated kidnapping. Foreshadowing our overruling Caudillo, we noted in dicta that [b]ecause we interpret section 208 [, subdivision] (d) to incorporate the aggravated kidnapping asportation standard, we need not reach the question of whether Caudillo's rejection of certain factors other than the actual distance traveled should be revisited. We recognize that Caudillo's narrow approach might be subject to the criticism that it fails to appreciate that a primary reason forcible asportation is proscribed by the kidnapping statutes is the increase in the risk of harm to the victim that arises from the asportation. ( Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 22, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369.) This language in Rayford may have encouraged the prosecutor to argue that substantial distance for simple kidnapping could be based on factors other than actual distanse traveled, such as increased risk of harm, and may have discouraged an objection by defense counsel to that argument. However, in light of our interrelated holdings in Martinez that (1) Caudillo was the law until we overruled it in Martinez and (2) Martinez was not retroactive, we conclude that the prosecutor presented defendant's case to the jury on alternate theories, one of which was legally correct and the other legally inadequate at the time of defendant's offenses. We explained in Green that the record contains evidence that could have led the jury to predicate its kidnaping verdict on the legally sufficient portion of [the victim's] asportation. But it also contains evidence that could have led the jury to rely instead on either of the legally insufficient portions of that movement. The instructions permitted the jury to take the latter course; and the district attorney expressly urged such a verdict in his argument, at least with respect to the final 90 feet that the victim was transported. We simply cannot tell from this record which theory the jury in fact adopted. ( Green., supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 71, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) Accordingly, we set aside the kidnapping conviction and the related kidnapping-murder special circumstance. ( Id., at p. 74, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) In People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365, 847 P.2d 45 ( Guiton ), this court recognized that the Green rule, as applied to the facts of that case, is readily construed as coming with the ... category of a `legally inadequate theory' generally requiring reversal. At issue was whether 90 feet was sufficient asportation to satisfy the elements, or the `statutory definition,' of kidnapping. There was no insufficiency of proof in the sense that there clearly was evidence from which a jury could find that the victim had been asported the 90 feet. Instead, we held that the distance was ` legally insufficient.' [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 1128, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365, 847 P.2d 45.) Defendant's case falls within the rule in Green, as construed in Guiton. At issue here was whether the 37 feet argued by the prosecutor was sufficient to satisfy the elements or statutory definition of kidnapping at the time of defendant's offenses. There was no insufficiency of proof in the sense that there was evidence from which a jury could find that Wong had been asported 37 feet. However, Caudillo and Green require us to hold that 45 feet or less was legally insufficient at the time of defendant's offenses. The prosecutor's argument that 37 feet was adequate based upon factors other than distance, such as increased risk of harm, set forth a legally inadequate theory that requires reversal absent a basis in the record to find that the verdict was actually based on a valid ground. ( Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1129, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365, 847 P.2d 45.) Because here, as in Green, we are `unable to determine which of the prosecution's theories served as the basis for the jury's verdict' ( Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 70, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468), we must reverse the conviction for simple kidnapping. For the same reasons, the kidnapping-murder special circumstance must be set aside. ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 499, 117 Cal. Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754 ( Hillhouse ).) However, we need not reverse the first degree murder conviction. As we explain below, the evidence supported the unlawful-penetration special-circumstance finding. That finding shows the jury necessarily concluded the killing was committed in the course of an unlawful penetration with a foreign object. Thus, we know that the first degree murder verdict rested on at least one correct theory. [Citations.] ( Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 499, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754, and cases cited therein.)