Opinion ID: 1390955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: board's failure to specify charges

Text: Sydney Speigel was a continuing contract teacher who had taught for nineteen years prior to receiving the notice of termination. By statute it is provided that continuing contract teachers shall be employed ... on a continuing basis from year to year without annual contract renewal ... § 21.1-154, W.S. 1957, 1975 Cum.Supp. We recognized in Roush v. Sweetwater County School District No. 1, Wyo., 497 P.2d 540, that a continuing contract teacher has a constitutionally-protected interest in his or her job. We said in Roush, supra, at page 542: ... but in any event we left no doubt (referring to Monahan v. Board of Trustees of Elementary School District No. 9, County of Fremont, Wyo., 486 P.2d 235, 236-237) that absent good cause to the contrary a continuing contract teacher has a reasonable expectation of continued employment. As observed in Endicott v. Van Petten, D.C.Kan., 330 F. Supp. 878, 882: `   The very purpose of tenure and continuing contract laws is to give recognition to a constitutionally protectible interest. This type of statute gives teachers a certain degree of security in their positions and guarantees freedom to teach by protecting them from removal on unfounded charges   .' [Parenthetical matter and emphasis supplied] When a continuing contract teacher is to be terminated notice must be given under § 21.1-156, W.S. 1957, 1975 Cum.Supp. The matter on appeal here was properly considered under the aegis of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act [§§ 9-276.19 to 9-276.22]. The notice sections of that act are found at § 9-276.25(a) and (b)(1) through (4), and provide in relevant part as follows: § 9-276.25. Contested cases; procedure generally; subpoenas.  (a) Notice to be given.  In any contested case, all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing after reasonable notice served personally or by mail ... (b) Statement in notice.  The notice shall include a statement of:       (4) A short and plain statement of the matters asserted. If the agency or other party is unable to state the matters in detail at the time the notice is served, the initial notice may be limited to a statement of the issues involved, and thereafter upon application a more definite and detailed statement shall be furnished.  [Emphasis supplied] In this case, Mr. Spiegel made timely motion for a more definite statement of the charges which had been lodged against him, as contemplated by § 9-276.25(b)(4), especially relating to the Board's allegation of (a) conflict of philosophy, and (b) lack of ability to work harmoniously. The motion was denied. He was sent to defend himself against the general charges of the resolution which he said were so indefinite that he could not prepare a defense. In contemplating such a question as this, we said in Glenn v. Board of County Com'rs, Sheridan County, Wyo., 440 P.2d 1, 4 (1968): ... The important question is whether or not the parties had fair notice of the issues involved ... Does a party have fair notice of what his accusor has in mind when he is confronted with the following (from the Board's resolution)?: ... Further for the reason that his philosophy on teaching methods and procedures has been in conflict with that of the administration and of the Board of Trustees and that this gap in philosophy has not narrowed as anticipated with the passage of years; and further that he does not have the ability to work harmoniously and cooperatively with the administration and Board of Trustees ... In Jergeson v. Board of Trustees of School District No. 7, Wyo., 476 P.2d 481, the charge against the teacher was that `Your philosophy and practice of education is detrimental to the best interests of the high school students.' Jergeson did not complain about the vagueness of that charge until after the hearing. Here the motion was timely made but the Board refused to specify the meaning of these hazy accusations. The motion should have been granted. The appellee had a statutory and constitutional right to have it granted. For the contestant to have to defend against these vague and indefinite charges was a denial of not only his rights under the statute, but also a constitutional denial of due process. The case of Sorin v. Board of Education, 39 Ohio Misc. 108, 315 N.E.2d 848 (1974) seems uniquely in point. In that case the charges against the school superintendent were, among other things, that he interjected philosophies inconsistent with the Board of Education of Warrensville Heights. The court held: After a careful consideration of the charges contained in this matter, it is the opinion of this court that the charges taken one at a time or collectively are for the most part so vague and unanswerable as to set forth generalities and not specific specifications of which the plaintiff could answer; consequently, they are not in accordance with the requirements contained in R.C. 3319.16, as interpreted in the case of State ex rel. Kohr v. Hooker [106 Ohio App. 1, 152 N.E.2d 788], supra. See, also, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570. As stated, R.C. 3319.16 requires full specifications of the grounds for the termination of a contract, and a notice that lacks such specification is defective. The failure to do so deprives an individual of the essential elements of due process stated in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287, which held that minimum procedural safeguards are required in an administrative proceeding.