Opinion ID: 2612481
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: the state's consent requirement of new 301 was constitutionally enacted

Text: Earlier we identified and explained what the legislature apparently did in 1987 to change old 203 into new 301 and old 301 into new 302. Now we will review the legislative history of House Bill 92 (H.B. 92) which became Chapter 157 of the 1987 Session Laws of Wyoming. Sponsored by the Joint Judiciary Interim Committee, H.B. 92 was a revision of Title 7 of the Wyoming statutes. Digest of House Journal, Forty-Ninth State Legislature, 183-84 (hereinafter H.J.). The title of the bill states in relevant part: Title 7 Revision. AN ACT    to amend, amend and renumber or renumber W.S.    7-13-101 through 7-15-107   ; revising Chapters 1 through 5, 13 through 15 and 17 of Title 7 of the Wyoming Statutes;    providing procedures for placing certain defendants on probation prior to entry of a judgment of conviction and for their discharge without adjudication of guilt upon successful completion of probation and conforming related statutes   . H.J. 183-84. H.B. 92 renumbered old 203 to new 301 and provided changes in the category of persons qualified for probation before sentence and the procedures to be used before and after placing a qualified person on probation. H.B. 92, Forty-Ninth State Legislature, 87LSO-0102.01, pp. 155-58 (1987). The original version of H.B. 92 contained the requirement of the defendant's consent to probation which was not contained in old 203. Id. at 156. Before leaving the House, new 301 was the subject of a few relatively minor amendments. H.J. 184-85. On January 21, 1987, H.B. 92 was read for the third time in the House and was passed. H.J. at 186. H.B. 92 then was sent to the Senate. There, several more amendments were made to new 301. The most significant amendment made by the Senate was the addition of the requirement of the state's consent to probation. H.J. 189. These amendments were adopted and passed in the Senate. H.J. 191-92. H.B. 92 then went back to the House on February 19, 1987, and the House voted not to concur in the Senate amendments. H.J. at 192. The matter was referred to a joint conference committee composed of several members from the House and Senate. H.J. at 192. The joint conference committee reported back a recommendation to adopt, among other amendments, the Senate amendment (H.B. 92SS1/AE) requiring the state's consent to probation. H.J. at 192. The committee also recommended several other minor changes to new 301. H.J. at 193. On February 28, 1987, the House and Senate voted to adopt the report of the joint conference committee. H.J. at 194. The act was signed by the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate that same day and by the Governor on March 5, 1987. H.J. at 194. H.B. 92 now appears as Chapter 157, 1987 Session Laws of Wyoming.
Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 20, provides, No law shall be passed except by bill, and no bill shall be so altered or amended on its passage through either house as to change its original purpose. The purpose of this kind of constitutional provision is to preclude last-minute, hasty legislation and to provide notice to the public of legislation under consideration irrespective of legislative merit. Anderson v. Oakland County Clerk, 419 Mich. 313, 353 N.W.2d 448, 455 (1984). See also Annotation, Construction and Application of Constitutional Provision Against Changing Purpose of Bill During Passage, 158 A.L.R. 421, 423 (1945). (Our research reveals no later supplementary annotation). In Scudder v. Smith, 331 Pa. 165, 200 A. 601, 604 (1938), the court said that kind of provision put the members of the Assembly and others interested on notice, by the title of the measure submitted, so that they might vote on it with circumspection. These criminal defendants claim that the original purpose of H.B. 92, as originally introduced, namely, providing procedures  including the requirement of the defendant's consent  for placing a defendant on pre-guilt adjudication probation and discharging the defendant upon successful completion of that probation, was impermissibly changed by the legislature's amendment that added the requirement of the state's consent. We disagree. In our resolution of this issue, we are guided by Smith v. Hansen, 386 P.2d 98 (Wyo. 1963), and Arbuckle v. Pflaeging, 20 Wyo. 351, 123 P. 918 (1912), 158 A.L.R. 421 (1945). In these cases this court looked to the title and the body of the original bill to determine its purpose and make a comparison of its purpose after amendment. In Arbuckle, certain livestock owners sued the state veterinarian to recover possession of their cattle which the state veterinarian had seized and was going to sell in order to recoup the cost he had incurred in seizing and medically treating the owner's cattle for scabies or mange after the owners had failed to treat them as he had earlier requested. The state veterinarian counterclaimed for the costs incurred in seizing and treating the cattle. The trial court certified to this court ten constitutional questions, one of which was whether the legislature violated the alteration of original purpose provision in the passage of 1909 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 164. As originally introduced, H.B. 137 stated in its title that it was an act to amend and reenact sections 148 and 150    of the Revised Statutes of Wyoming of 1899, relating to the duties of the State Veterinarian. Section 150 of the bill stated that the duty of the state veterinarian was to superintend the slaughter and burning of condemned animals and to pay the expense of that activity from any contingent fund appropriated for his office. The House amended the bill by the Jefferis amendment, which, in pertinent part, added to the bill a section 2 which provided that section 148 of the revised statutes of Wyoming 1899 was amended and reenacted so that the state veterinarian had authority to take steps to prevent the spread of contagious disease among animals, including ordering livestock owners to dip and treat their animals, seizing animals when their owners failed to treat their animals, treating the seized animals and selling them to recoup the cost of those activities. The plaintiff owners claimed that the Jefferis amendment was for a different purpose from that contemplated in the bill as originally introduced. This court disagreed. It found that the original bill's purpose concerned the state veterinarian's duty, as did the amendment. Both the original bill and its amendment related to that state official's duties concerning the prevention of the spread of infectious disease among cattle. This court found that the original bill and its amendment were not incongruous but related to that state official's duties to prevent disease, and that they were in furtherance of that purpose and within the scope of the subject of the bill. It held that the amendment adding further duties did not alter or amend the original bill's purpose. On this point, the court held the bill to have been constitutionally enacted. Using Arbuckle's analytical approach, we achieve the same result. As originally introduced, H.B. 92 stated in its title that it was an act to amend and renumber, among other statutory provisions, §§ 7-13-101 through 7-13-107, providing procedures for placing certain defendants on probation before entry of a judgment of conviction and for their discharge without adjudication of guilt upon successful completion of probation. As originally introduced, the body of the bill provided that the defendant's consent was required as part of these procedures. The senate amendment of the original bill added the state's consent requirement to the procedures for placing the defendant on this type of probation. The criminal defendants here assert that the senate amendment changed the purpose of the original bill. They correctly identify that purpose as being revision of procedures for placing certain defendants on probation. We agree that the purpose of the bill as originally introduced concerns procedures for deferring further prosecution and placing a defendant on probation without entry of adjudication of guilt and discharging the defendant if he successfully completes that probation. One of those procedures is obtaining the defendant's consent. The senate amendment refers to these procedures and simply adds one more procedure to accomplish the purpose of placing the defendant on probation. Both the bill and its amendment relate to those procedures and that purpose. They are not incongruous. They are in furtherance of that purpose, germane to and within the scope of the bill. The Smith case helps us make our point. Several beer wholesalers sued members and the director of the Wyoming Liquor Commission to enjoin the collection of an additional four cents per gallon in excise taxes on malt liquors. The wholesalers contended that the provisions of 1963 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 194, § 3(a), purporting to increase the tax from two cents per gallon to six cents per gallon, were unconstitutionally enacted in violation of both the alteration of original purpose provision of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 20, and the one subject provision, of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 24. Focusing first on the alteration of original purpose issue, this court noted that the bill's title, as originally introduced, stated that the act amended and reenacted a statute relating to the excise tax on liquors so as to prohibit a person's importation or transportation of untaxed liquor into or within the state. Thus, the bill's original purpose was to amend and reenact the statute so as to prohibit importation or transportation of untaxed liquors. The bill was amended, and the excise tax on malt liquors was increased from two cents to six cents per gallon. The legislature also established an identification card for persons twenty-one years or older to be presented when purchasing liquor. With these amendments, the bill contained three purposes: 1) prohibition of importation or transportation of untaxed liquor, 2) four cent tax increase on malt liquor, and 3) liquor purchase identification card. Because of these amendments, the legislature then amended the bill's original title to include mention of the identification card along with the prohibition of importation or transportation of untaxed liquors. The legislature, however, failed to amend the original title to include the mention of the tax increase. This court held that the new purpose or objective of the tax increase impermissibly changed the bill's original purpose of prohibition of importation or transportation of untaxed liquors. Smith, 386 P.2d at 100. By contrast, in our present case, the senate amendment adding the requirement of state's consent to the procedures provided in the original bill, unlike the new purpose or objective of a tax increase in Smith, did not change the original purpose of the bill. That purpose was, and remained after the amendment, the establishment of procedures for the deferring and placing of a defendant on probation without the entry of an adjudication of guilt and the discharging of that defendant upon successful completion of that probation. In light of the objective of the alteration of original purpose provision and our decisions in Smith and Arbuckle, we hold that Chapter 157 of the Session Laws of Wyoming 1987 was constitutionally enacted in compliance with Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 20.
Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 24, provides: No bill, except general appropriation bills and bills for the codification and general revision of the laws, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any subject is embraced in any act which is not expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed. (emphasis added). In past challenges to legislation on this constitutional ground, we have stated that the purpose of this constitutional provision is to prevent surprise or fraud in legislation. It is not intended that the title shall be an abstract of all provisions contained in a bill; or that the title must encompass all of the aspects of the statute; or that everything therein affected need be delineated. Brinegar v. Clark, Wyo., 371 P.2d 62, 66 [1962]; Morrow v. Diefenderfer, Wyo., 384 P.2d 601, 603 [1963]; Board of Com'rs of Laramie County v. Stone, 7 Wyo. 280, 51 P. 605, 607 [1897]. State v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 302 (Wyo. 1968). Sixty-five years ago we said that this particular constitutional provision must be liberally and reasonably construed: This court has long recognized the principle that this section of the constitution, though mandatory, must be liberally and reasonably construed. In the case In re Fourth Judicial District, 4 Wyo. 133, 142, 32 P. 850 [1893], the court quotes the language of Judge Cooley to the effect that the generality of the title is no objection to it, so long as it is not made a cover to legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having a necessary and fair connection. Cooley on Const.Lim. (7th Ed.) p. 206. In the same paragraph of that text (p. 205) it is said that, To require every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of a general object to be provided for by a separate act relating to that alone, would not only be unreasonable, but would actually render legislation impossible. And in the case of In re Boulter, 5 Wyo. 329, 339, 40 P. 520 [1895], it is said that an act is not invalidated for that reason so long as the subjects of legislation are congruous, cognate or germane, and in furtherance of the general subject of the enactment, even though the act may authorize many things of a diverse nature to be done. There may be subordinate subjects if they be legitimate offspring of the main subject. State ex rel. Wyckoff v. Ross, 31 Wyo. 500, 510-11, 228 P. 636, 638 (1924). This constitutional provision contains an important exception. The requirement in this one subject provision that a bill contain only one subject which shall be clearly expressed in the bill's title does not apply to a bill for the codification and general revision of the laws. We have recognized the meaning of this exception in State of Wyoming v. Pitet, 69 Wyo. 478, 243 P.2d 177 (1952). [20] Regarding revisions and codifications, Sutherland informs us: A revision is an act which restates the law embodied in one or more prior acts in order to clarify and harmonize the provisions of the prior acts and which may alter, add, or omit provisions. A codification is a revision and also a systematic arrangement of all the statutes of the state or all those concerning a general field of the law. (emphasis added). 1A Sutherland Stat. Const. § 22.27, p. 254 (4th ed. 1985). Defendants contend that H.B. 92 was not a revision because a revision, by its nature, is not intended to change anything but only to restate what has already been legislated, so that revisions of statutes are not presumed to change the law. State v. Baker, 195 Conn. 598, 489 A.2d 1041, 1045 n. 4 (1985). They argue that the state's consent requirement contained in new 301 changed, rather than restated, what had been the law under old 203, namely, that the court in its discretion would decide whether to place a defendant on probation. We disagree that a revision is merely a restatement of, not a change in, existing law. As noted earlier, Sutherland's definition of revision makes room for the legislation's altering, adding, or omitting provisions of existing law. We adopt that view. The court in Baker recognized that if the legislators use language in the revision that admits of a construction which changes the former law, then there is no presumption that the revision did not change the law. Baker, 489 A.2d at 1045 n. 4 (applying Bassett v. City Bank and Trust Co., 115 Conn. 393, 161 A. 852 (1932)). Considering the sweep of 1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws, evident in both its title [21] and in its body, we hold that H.B. 92 was a codification and general revision of Title 7 criminal procedure. We observe that, in addition to identifying the statutory provisions to which the revision act applied, the legislature used clear language to describe what the revision was accomplishing: amending; amending and renumbering; revising; eliminating duplication, redundancies and archaic provisions; moving, combining, deleting and renumbering; providing definitions; repealing provisions; modifying provisions; eliminating certain powers; providing procedures and deleting requirements. The revision act was not intended to be a mere restatement of former law. Obviously, the legislators used language that admits of a construction which in many instances changed the former law. Specifically with reference to §§ 7-13-101 through 7-13-107, which encompass old 203 and old 301, the act was to amend, amend and renumber or renumber those provisions providing procedures for placing certain defendants on probation prior to entry of a judgment of conviction and for their discharge without adjudication of guilt upon successful completion of probation and conforming related statutes   . 1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 157, p. 299. No one who read the title and was thus aware of the passage of the law could reasonably claim to have been surprised or misled into thinking that the revision act was a mere restatement of former law. We hold that since 1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 157, originally introduced as H.B. 92, was a proper codification and general revision of the laws to which it pertained, it was excepted from the requirements of the one subject constitutional provision. We also hold that it was constitutionally enacted.