Opinion ID: 4510937
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of the Standing Requirement

Text: To intervene, SUWA must establish standing. The majority relies on Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., for the proposition that SUWA need not establish standing because it seeks the same relief as the United States. See Kane III, 928 F.3d at 887–88 (citing 137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017)). Town of Chester’s holding was a narrow one—where an intervenor pursues separate relief from a party, it must establish standing under Article III. See 137 S. Ct. at 1648. But the case assuredly does not hold that where the intervenor seeks relief similar to the existing parties, it may avoid establishing standing. See id. at 1651 (holding merely that “at the least, an intervenor of right must demonstrate Article III standing when it seeks additional relief beyond that which the plaintiff 4 requests” (emphasis added)). The majority’s reading of Town of Chester to embrace this more expansive point conflicts with case law from the Supreme Court and this court establishing that any person seeking relief from a federal court must demonstrate standing to do so. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704 (2013) (“One essential aspect of [the powers conferred by Art. III] is that any person invoking the power of a federal court must demonstrate standing to do so.”); United States v. Colo. & E. R.R. Co., 882 F.3d 1264, 1269 (10th Cir. 2018) (“Any party, whether original or intervening, that seeks relief from a federal court must have standing to pursue its claims.”); Safe Streets All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865, 912 (10th Cir. 2017) (“Rule 24(a)’s provisions cannot remove the Article III hurdle that anyone faces when voluntarily seeking to enter a federal court.”). The majority’s attempt to distinguish these cases falls short. With respect to Colo. & E. R.R., the majority quotes a description of the district court’s opinion, claiming that the case is inapposite because there was no “live controversy” between the parties in Colo. & E. R.R. and here there is. See Kane III, at 887 n.11. This point is not what the decision on appeal was based on. See Colo. & E. R.R. Co., 882 F.3d at 1269 (“Because the record conclusively establishes that the relief requested by [the party seeking to establish standing] will not redress any assumed injury to it . . . we resolve [the] appeal on that basis.”). With respect to Safe Streets and Hollingsworth, the majority argues the statements in Safe Streets were merely dicta and that, regardless, Hollingsworth “applied the piggyback standing rule.” Kane III, at 887 n.11. But nothing in Hollingsworth 5 suggests its statements with respect to standing constitute an affirmation of the piggyback standing rule. Indeed, this court has already recognized Hollingsworth as abrogating that rule. See Safe Streets, 859 F.3d at 913. Accordingly, under Town of Chester, Hollingsworth, and our precedent, SUWA invariably must establish standing in order to join this suit. In excusing SUWA from this requirement, the majority performed an end-run around the constitutional limit that Article III places on the power of the federal courts. Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 704. Even accepting the majority’s premise that standing is excused where an intervenor seeks similar relief to that of an existing party, the majority’s conclusion still suffers a fatal inconsistency. To justify its contention that SUWA seeks the same relief as the United States, the majority concedes that the United States “seeks retention of the maximum amount of property and will argue for the smallest widths it can based on the historical evidence”—in other words, “the same relief that SUWA seeks.” Kane III, 928 F.3d at 887. According to the majority, SUWA’s interests are thus similar enough to the United States’ to avoid having to establish its own standing under Town of Chester. But this contradicts the majority’s later conclusion that the United States will not adequately represent SUWA’s interests. See Kane III, 928 F.3d at 898 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (“If SUWA seeks identical relief to the United States—that is, federal retention of the maximum amount of property—then the United States provides adequate representation of SUWA’s interests . . . . If SUWA seeks relief different from the United States—because the government does not, in fact, wish to retain maximum 6 property—then SUWA must demonstrate that it possess standing according to Town of Chester.”). Were this a case regarding the administration of the land at issue, as opposed to merely its ownership, the majority could potentially thread the needle in the manner it seeks to here. See Kane III, 928 F.3d at 898 n.1 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting). For example, in administrative cases like the ones cited by the majority, the United States usually must consider a wide array of interests and engage in extensive balancing. See, e.g., Doe v. Zucker, No. 117-CV-1005, 2019 WL 111020 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2019). This could lead to the type of symmetry in relief sought, yet asymmetry in ultimate resolution objectives, that could justify intervention along the lines the majority proposes. But in the context of a property dispute like the present one, such fine distinctions break down.