Opinion ID: 173350
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantive reasonableness of Webb's 37-month sentence

Text: Webb next contends that his 37-month sentence is substantively unreasonable, arguing that the district court erred by giving improper weight to two of the sentencing factors contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a): (1) the need to protect the public, and (2) providing the defendant with an opportunity for rehabilitation of his substance-abuse problems. The district court must consider all of the relevant § 3553(a) factors and impose a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of § 3553(a)(2). United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 520 (6th Cir.2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A sentence may be considered substantively unreasonable when the district court selects a sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider relevant sentencing factors, or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor. Id. Although the district court below imposed an above-Guidelines sentence, such a sentence is not presumptively un reasonable. See id. (emphasis in original). As an initial matter, we observe that the government's brief addresses the split of authority regarding the tension between 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D), which permits a sentencing court to analyze the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner, and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a), which instructs sentencing courts to recogniz[e] that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation. See In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 848-49 (D.C.Cir.2009) (comparing cases that have held that § 3582(a) does not bar a court from imposing a longer prison term in order to promote rehabilitation and those that have come to the opposite conclusion). The district court's decision to select a 37-month sentence in order to give Webb the opportunity to receive substance-abuse rehabilitation at least potentially implicates the concerns embodied in § 3582(a). Webb, however, does not argue on appeal that his sentence runs afoul of § 3582(a). We therefore decline to address the issue. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 403 n. 18 (6th Cir.1999) (declining to address an argument not properly raised on appeal in the appellant's opening brief). Turning now to the reasonableness of Webb's sentence, we acknowledge that the district court gave significant emphasis to protecting the public and the need for Webb to enter a substance-abuse rehabilitation program. In addition to charges for aggravated assault, theft, operating a vehicle on a suspended license, leaving the scene of an accident, forgery, and possession of a controlled substance, Webb had previously been arrested at least four times for public intoxication and at least twice for driving while intoxicated. The district court's emphasis on these two factors was therefore warranted in light of (1) Webb's lengthy history of substance abuse, (2) the significant number of crimes that Webb has committed while inebriated, and (3) the likelihood that Webb could injure someone while drinking and driving or while committing a similar offense. See United States v. Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629, 633-36 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that the weight that the district court gave to the defendant's four prior drunk-driving convictions and the need to protect the public was reasonable and supported an above-Guidelines sentence for an illegal reentry conviction). The weight that the district court gave to these two factors was thus not unreasonable. Indeed, it was justified given Webb's background. Moreover, the district court discussed several of the other § 3553(a) sentencing factors. This discussion included Webb's family life and upbringing, the question of whether the counterfeit victims had been compensated, and whether Webb's sentence would create a sentencing disparity when compared to other similarly situated defendants. The court also explained that if Webb successfully completed his rehabilitation program, he would receive a 12-month reduction in his sentence. Finally, the court informed Webb that it was imposing a 37-month sentence rather than a 36-month sentence because the latter sentence would not qualify Webb for good-time credits to reduce his sentence even further. In short, the record reflects that the district court carefully considered many of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, gave appropriate weight to the most relevant factors, and ultimately reached a reasoned conclusion. Webb argues for the first time on appeal that the district court failed to recognize that his eligibility for the substance-abuse rehabilitation program is within the discretion of the Bureau of Prisons, and that even if he successfully completes the program, the Bureau is not required to reduce his sentence. To support this argument, Webb cites 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), which provides that [t]he period a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent offense remains in custody after successfully completing a treatment program may be reduced by the Bureau of Prisons, but such reduction may not be more than one year from the term the prisoner must otherwise serve. Webb, however, does not argue that a remand is warranted because of the district court's apparent misapprehension. Rather, he asserts that this court's review for reasonableness should be of his 37-month sentence, independent of any potential reduction he may receive. As this opinion makes clear, our reasonableness review is of Webb's 37-month sentence.