Opinion ID: 785761
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Family and Medical Leave Act Claims

Text: 21 The stated purposes of the FMLA are to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families and to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) and (2). The FMLA seeks to accomplish these purposes in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3). In furtherance of these objectives, the FMLA requires that an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of twelve workweeks of leave during any twelve month period if the employee has a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). 6 After an eligible employee returns from an FMLA leave, the employee is entitled to be reinstated to his or her former position, or an equivalent one. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). This right to reinstatement is qualified by a statutory directive that it does not entitle a restored employee to a right, benefit or position to which the employee would not have been entitled had the employee not taken the leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3)(B). Thus, for example, if an employee is discharged during or at the end of a protected leave for a reason unrelated to the leave, there is no right to reinstatement. 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a)(1). 22 In order to protect these substantive rights, the FMLA proscribes an employer from engaging in certain acts. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615. Section 2615(a)(1) makes it unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter. Section 2615(a)(2) makes it unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter. Finally, § 2615(b) provides that [i]t shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual because such individual — (1) has filed any charge, or has instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding, under or related to this subchapter; (2) has given, or is about to give, any information in connection with any inquiry or proceeding relating to any right provided under this subchapter; or (3) has testified, or is about to testify, in any inquiry or proceeding relating to any right provided under this subchapter. The FMLA grants employees a cause of action against employers who violate § 2615. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617. 23 In addition, the United States Department of Labor (DOL) has promulgated regulations implementing the FMLA, as authorized by 29 U.S.C. § 2654. Of particular significance here, § 825.220(c) of those regulations provides: 24 An employer is prohibited from discriminating against employees or prospective employees who have used FMLA leave. For example, if an employee on leave without pay would otherwise be entitled to full benefits (other than health benefits), the same benefits would be required to be provided to an employee on unpaid FMLA leave. By the same token, employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions; nor can FMLA leave be counted under no fault attendance policies. 25 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c). The DOL's regulations also provide that [a]ny violations of the [FMLA] or of these regulations constitute interfering with, restraining, or denying the exercise of rights provided by the Act. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b). `Interfering with' the exercise of an employee's rights would include, for example, not only refusing to authorize FMLA leave, but discouraging an employee from using such leave. It would also include manipulation by a covered employer to avoid responsibilities under FMLA. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b). Moreover, [e]mployees cannot waive, nor may employers induce employees to waive, their rights under FMLA. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d). 26 Finally, the DOL's regulations impose upon the employer obligations to communicate with employees regarding their rights under the FMLA. In particular, the regulations require employers to provide employees with individualized notice of their FMLA rights and obligations. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(a), [i]n all circumstances, it is the employer's responsibility to designate leave, paid or unpaid, as FMLA-qualifying, and to give notice of the designation to the employee.... If an employer provides employees with a handbook concerning employee benefits, the handbook must incorporate information on FMLA rights and responsibilities and the employer's policies regarding the FMLA. 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(a)(1). If the employer does not provide such a handbook, such information must be provided when an employee requests leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(a)(2). Moreover, each time the employee requests leave, the employer must, within a reasonable time thereafter — one or two business days if feasible, provide the employee with written notice detailing the specific expectations and obligations of the employee and explaining any consequences of a failure to meet these obligations. 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(b)(1), (c). This specific notice must include, among other things, whether the leave will be counted against the employee's annual FMLA leave entitlement, 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(b)(1)(i), and the employee's right to restoration to the same or equivalent job upon return from leave, 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(b)(1)(vii). Neither party in this case has challenged the validity of these regulations. 27 There are two arrows to Conoshenti's FMLA bow. He insists that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment against him because (1) PSE & G failed to advise him of his FMLA rights and thereby interfered with his ability to meaningfully exercise his right to an FMLA leave; and (2) PSE & G use[d] the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in its decision to discharge him on April 17, 2000. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c). We will address each of these independent theories of liability in turn.
28 Conoshenti argues that PSE & G's failure to advise him of his right to twelve weeks of FMLA leave, after he properly gave notice of his serious health condition, constituted an interference with his FMLA right to that protected leave. Had he received the advice PSE & G was obliged to provide, Conoshenti insists, he would have been able to make an informed decision about structuring his leave and would have structured it, and his plan of recovery, in such a way as to preserve the job protection afforded by the Act. We conclude that this is a viable theory of recovery and that the District Court accordingly erred in granting summary judgment on it against Conoshenti. 29 As we have noted, the parties stipulated in the District Court that, for purposes of summary judgment, PSE & G did not advise Conoshenti of his rights under the FMLA. As we have also noted, the regulation under the FMLA imposed a duty on PSE & G to do so. It follows, we believe, that Conoshenti will show an interference with his right to leave under the FMLA, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), if he is able to establish that this failure to advise rendered him unable to exercise that right in a meaningful way, thereby causing injury. Neither PSE & G in its brief nor the District Court in its opinion contest the theoretical basis for this claim, and we believe that basis is supported by the relatively sparse authority relevant to the issue. 30 In Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 122 S.Ct. 1155, 152 L.Ed.2d 167 (2002), the Supreme Court had before it the FMLA regulations requiring an employer to advise employees of FMLA rights. It was called upon to determine the validity of a regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 825.770(a), 7 which imposed a penalty on an employer who failed to advise that a leave taken by an employee would count against her FMLA entitlement. Under this regulation, the twelve week FMLA leave did not commence until this advice was given. In Ms. Ragsdale's case, this would have entitled her to 30 weeks of leave, even though she could not show that she was in any way prejudiced by the employer's breach of duty. The Court struck down this penalty provision, noting that it was unconnected to any prejudice the employee might have suffered from the employer's lapse and, accordingly, incompatible with the FMLA's comprehensive remedial mechanism which affords no relief absent prejudice from a statutory violation. Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 88-89, 122 S.Ct. 1155. 31 The Ragsdale Court expressly noted that the validity of notice requirements of the regulations themselves was not before it. Accordingly, Ragsdale is not dispositive of anything before us. It is helpful, however, because the Court found reasonable Ragsdale's suggestion that a failure to advise of FMLA rights could constitute an interference with an employee's exercise of basic FMLA rights in violation of § 2615: 32 Section 825.700(a), Ragsdale contends, reflects the Secretary's understanding that an employer's failure to comply with the designation requirement might sometimes burden an employee's exercise of basic FMLA rights in violation of § 2615. Consider, for instance, the right under § 2612(b)(1) to take intermittent leave when medically necessary. An employee who undergoes cancer treatments every other week over the course of 12 weeks might want to work during the off weeks, earning a paycheck and saving six weeks for later. If she is not informed that her absence qualifies as FMLA leave — and if she does not know of her right under the statute to take intermittent leave — she might take all 12 of her FMLA-guaranteed weeks consecutively and have no leave remaining for some future emergency. In circumstances like these, Ragsdale argues, the employer's failure to give the notice required by the regulation could be said to deny, restrain, or interfere with the employee's exercise of her right to take intermittent leave. 33 This position may be reasonable, but the more extreme one embodied in § 825.700(a) is not.... [It] establishes an irrebuttable presumption that the employee's exercise of FMLA rights was impaired — and that the employee deserves 12 more weeks. There is no empirical or logical basis for this presumption, as the facts of this case well demonstrate. Ragsdale has not shown that she would have taken less leave or intermittent leave if she had received the required notice. 34 Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 89-90, 122 S.Ct. 1155. This portion of the Ragsdale opinion, together with our own assessment of the reasonableness of the notice regulations, persuades us that the Supreme Court would find an actionable interference in violation of § 2615(a) here in the event Conoshenti is able to show prejudice as a result of that violation. 35 The District Court from which this appeal comes to us has previously endorsed the theory of recovery Conoshenti advances here. In Nusbaum v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 171 F.Supp.2d 377, 379-80 (D.N.J.2001), after plaintiff Margot Nusbaum learned that she required back surgery, she requested that her employer allow her to take medical leave and also requested information regarding the employer's medical leave policy. The employer refused to provide this information. Moreover, Nusbaum never received any materials providing information on FMLA leave and the employer had not complied with 29 U.S.C. § 2619's requirement that it post a notice outlining the FMLA's important provisions and the employees' FMLA rights. Her employer also failed to prospectively designate her leave as FMLA leave in violation of 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.208 and .700. Nusbaum took the leave required for her surgery, and was discharged during her absence. Nusbaum then brought suit, alleging that her employer's failure to notify her of her right to twelve weeks of FMLA-protected leave, and her subsequent termination, interfered with her FMLA rights in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). The District Court denied the employer's motion to dismiss, holding as follows: 36 [T]he purpose of the regulations enacted by the DOL ... is to ensure that employers allow their employees to make informed decisions about leave.... The overall intent of the FMLA is lost when an employer fails to provide an employee with the opportunity to make informed decisions about her leave options and limitations. Without such an opportunity, the employee has not received the statutory benefit of taking necessary leave with the reassurance that her employment, under proscribed conditions, will be waiting for her when she is able to return to work. 37 Id. at 385-86. The court concluded that Nusbaum was, therefore, not given the proper information that would have allowed her to structure her leave in a way that would have left her protected by the FMLA. Id. at 386. We find this reasoning of the Nusbaum Court persuasive. 38 The District Court in Conoshenti's case accepted his claim that the regulations imposed a duty on PSE & G to advise him of his FMLA rights and that a failure to do so could result in an interference under § 2615(a)(1). It distinguished Nusbaum, however, on the ground that Conoshenti had proven no prejudice as required by Ragsdale. In support of this conclusion, the Court first noted that his ignorance of the nature of his leave ended on December 27. Accordingly, it held that Conoshenti's reliance on Nusbaum could only be used to delay the commencement of his twelve weeks of FMLA-protected leave from December 6th to December 27th; this would, in any event, have left him unprotected by the FMLA before he returned to work. The Court then observed that Conoshenti had presented no evidence that he could have made a different choice had PSE & G informed him that his FMLA leave began on December 6, and made only the bare assertion that he could have made different decisions. App. at 16a. We hold that the District Court's analysis is at odds with well-established principles governing the propriety of summary judgments. 39 The record indicates that in December 1999, Conoshenti contacted his union in order to learn what he needed to do to protect his job during his recovery. In response to this inquiry, the union advised Conoshenti to inform PSE & G that he wanted his leave to be considered FMLA leave. The record further indicates that Conoshenti then sent a letter to PSE & G on December 27, 1999 stating that he would like to request an immediate leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. App. at 73a. Nothing in the record, however, indicates that Conoshenti knew that he was entitled to only twelve weeks of protected leave. Rather, the record simply reflects what Conoshenti was told to say and what he did say. The summary judgment record thus does not speak to Conoshenti's knowledge of his relevant FMLA rights on December 27th or thereafter during his leave. 40 Similarly, the summary judgment record, as the District Court correctly noted, contains no competent evidence regarding the alternatives that would have been available to Conoshenti had PSE & G advised him of his rights when he requested leave on December 6th. Only Conoshenti's brief contains a statement of what he would have done had he been advised of his rights. 8 41 While we agree with the District Court that these gaps in the record required it to deny Conoshenti's motion for summary judgment, they clearly did not warrant the grant of PSE & G's motion. It is well established that a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). With respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof, the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Here, PSE & G never asserted that Conoshenti could not meet his burden of proving that he could have structured his leave differently. Nor did PSE & G argue that a showing of prejudice was an essential element of Conoshenti's claim or that such a showing was material in any way. Accordingly, we conclude that PSE & G, as the moving party, did not satisfy its initial burden of pointing to an absence of evidence as to whether Conoshenti had been prejudiced. Conoshenti was therefore not required, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), to respond with specific facts establishing a genuine issue with respect to the prejudice requirement. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
42 Subsection 825.220(c) of the FMLA regulations provides: 43 An employer is prohibited from discriminating against employees or prospective employees who have used FMLA leave. For example, if an employee on leave without pay would otherwise be entitled to full benefits (other than health benefits), the same benefits would be required to be provided to an employee on unpaid FMLA leave. By the same token, employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions; nor can FMLA leave be counted under no fault attendance policies. 44 It is apparent from the face of § 825.220(c) that to be successful on this claim, Conoshenti must show that (1) he took an FMLA leave, (2) he suffered an adverse employment decision, and (3) the adverse decision was causally related to his leave. 9 There is no dispute that Conoshenti took an FMLA leave and that PSE & G discharged him on April 17, 1999. The issue for decision, accordingly, is whether the summary judgment record reflects a material dispute of fact as to whether there was a causal connection between the two. 45 PSE & G insists that Conoshenti was discharged because he violated the LCA. In support of his claim that his FMLA leave was responsible for that decision, Conoshenti points primarily to three documents: (1) the April 17th termination letter which assigned as the reason for the discharge all 92 days of his absence from work; (2) the draft termination letter dated December 20th stating that Conoshenti would be terminated because of his absence from work from December 6th to December 16th; and (3) Wasser's December 27th note indicating that Conoshenti would be discharged upon his return to work. 46 The District Court concluded, and PSE & G does not contest, that these documents were sufficient direct evidence of Conoshenti's FMLA leave having been a factor in the discharge decision to give Conoshenti the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). See Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506 (3d Cir.1997); Woodson v. Scott Paper, 109 F.3d 913 (3d Cir.1997) (both recognizing that Price Waterhouse may properly be applied in a retaliation case when there is direct evidence of retaliatory animus). Under the Price Waterhouse framework, when an FMLA plaintiff alleging unlawful termination presents `direct evidence' that his [FMLA leave] was a substantial factor in the decision to fire him, the burden of persuasion on the issue of causation shifts, and the employer must prove that it would have fired the plaintiff even if it had not considered [the FMLA leave]. Fakete, 308 F.3d at 338 (applying the direct evidence analysis to a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). 10 Justice O'Connor explained that this burden requires the employer: 47 To convince the trier of fact that it is more likely than not that the decision would have been the same absent consideration of the illegitimate factor. The employer need not isolate the sole cause for the decision; rather it must demonstrate that with the illegitimate factor removed from the calculus, sufficient business reasons would have induced it to take the same employment action. This evidentiary scheme essentially requires the employer to place the employee in the same position he or she would have occupied absent discrimination. 48 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276-77, 109 S.Ct. 1775. 11 49 The District Court held that there [was] no genuine issue of material fact regarding the proposition that [PSE & G] would have discharged [Conoshenti] for reasons not related to the FMLA leave. App. at 15-16. We agree. 50 Even when viewed in a light most favorable to Conoshenti, the record clearly indicates that Conoshenti would have been discharged absent any consideration of his twelve weeks of FMLA-protected leave. Conoshenti himself conceded to the District Court, as well as in his brief on appeal, that any violation of the LCA would be deemed automatic just cause and he would be fired. Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 2; Appellant's Br. at 7. Here, there is no question that Conoshenti exceeded his twelve weeks of protected leave and, under the LCA, he was subject to immediate discharge on the very first workday that he was both absent from work and no longer protected by the FMLA. 51 Ironically, the evidence that Conoshenti relies upon, while permitting an inference that his absence from work during the twelve weeks following December 6th was a substantial factor in the decision to discharge him on April 17th, also demonstrates that he would have been discharged on April 17th had that prior absence not occurred. The December 20th draft termination letter, the Wasser December 27th note, and the fact that the draft termination letter was not sent demonstrate that PSE & G was determined both to respect Conoshenti's right to FMLA leave and to discharge him under the LCA as soon as it could legally do so. While the reference to 92 days in the April 17th termination letter might, in isolation, support an inference that the protected leave was considered in connection with the discharge decision, it would not support a finding that Conoshenti would not have been discharged on April 17th in the absence of having taken 12 weeks of protected leave. 52 Because a rational trier of fact could not find in Conoshenti's favor, summary judgment in favor of PSE & G on this claim was appropriate. 12