Opinion ID: 3010166
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 1. In assessing this argument, our controlling

Text: concern is congressional intent. See, e.g., Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501-02 & n.4 (1982) ([L]egislative purpose . . . is of paramount importance in the exhaustion context because Congress is vested with the power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under which claims may be heard in federal courts. . . . [T]he initial question whether exhaustion is required should be answered by reference to congressional intent.). If Congress intended to delay federal court review of claims by aliens against whom deportation proceedings have been instituted until the conclusion of the administrative proceedings, then neither the district court nor this court can override that decision. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992) (Bivens claim) (Of `paramount importance' to any exhaustion inquiry is congressional intent. Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required. But where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs.) (citations omitted); Giammario v. Hurney, 311 F.2d 285, 287-88 (3d Cir. 1962) (The recent amendment providing for exclusive review of final orders of deportation in the courts of appeals of the United States, 8 U.S.C.A. 1105a(a), is challenged in petitioner's brief as violating his constitutional rights[.] [W]e see no merit to [this argument]. It is well settled that Congress may provide whatever procedure that it deems appropriate for judicial review of administrative orders.) (citation omitted); see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. at 152 (Because Congress has not required exhaustion of a federal prisoner's Bivens claim, we turn to an evaluation of the individual and institutional interests at stake in this case.) (emphasis in original); Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561, 579-80 (1989); Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. at 502 n.4 (Of course, exhaustion is required where Congress provides that certain administrative remedies shall be exclusive.) (citing Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938)); Commonwealth of Virginia v. United States, 74 F.3d 517, 523 (4th Cir. 1996) (It is settled that `when Congress has chosen to provide the circuit courts with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from agency [actions], the district courts are without jurisdiction over the legal issues pertaining to final [actions].) (alterations in Commonwealth) (citation omitted); Maxon Marine v. Director, OWCP, 39 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1994) (When a statute specifies a procedure for obtaining judicial review of a federal agency's actions, that procedure normally is exclusive.) (citations omitted); see generallySaulsbury Orchards & Almond Processing, Inc. v. Yeutter, 917 F.2d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 1990) (Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act) (We are also mindful of the fact that the exhaustion requirement in this case is statutorily provided and not judicially created. Although judicially developed exhaustion requirements might be waived for discretionary reasons by courts, statutorily created exhaustion requirements bind the parties and the courts. `When a statute requires exhaustion, a petitioner's failure to do so deprives this court of jurisdiction. Only if there is no statutory exhaustion requirement may we exercise our discretion to apply judicially-developed exhaustion rules.') (quoting Reid v. Engen, 765 F.2d 1457, 1462 (9th Cir. 1985)); II Kenneth Culp Davis et al., Administrative Law Treatise 15.3 at 318 (3d ed. 1994) (Most agency organic acts do not address exhaustion. When they do, however, courts are not free simply to apply the common law exhaustion doctrine with its pragmatic, judicially defined exceptions. Courts must, of course, apply the terms of the statute.). 2. We turn then to the question whether Congress has expressed an intention to preclude an alien in plaintiff's position from initially asserting his constitutional claims in an action in district court and to require the alien instead to exhaust administrative remedies and then petition for review in the appropriate court of appeals. Our analysis of this question is guided by the Supreme Court's decision in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 114 S. Ct. 771 (1994). Thunder Basin involved a statutory-review scheme similar to that of the INA. Under the statute at issue in Thunder Basin, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977 (the Mine Act), 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq., challenges to the Secretary of Labor's enforcement actions are subject to review by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, 30 U.S.C. 815, 823, and final orders of the Commission are reviewable by means of a petition for review filed in the appropriate court of appeals. 30 U.S.C. 816. In Thunder Basin, a mine operator filed an action in district court seeking pre-enforcement injunctive relief on constitutional grounds, but the court of appeals held that the Act's scheme of enforcement and administrative review precluded district court jurisdiction over the mine operator's claims. In reviewing this decision, the Supreme Court began by observing: In cases involving delayed judicial review of final agency actions, we shall find that Congress has allocated initial review to an administrative body where such intent is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme. Whether a statute is intended to preclude initial judicial review is determined from the statute's language, structure, and purpose, its legislative history, and whether the claims can be afforded meaningful review. 114 S. Ct. at 776 (citations and footnote omitted). Applying these factors, the Court found that the Mine Act's comprehensive enforcement structure, combined with the legislative history's clear concern with channeling and streamlining the enforcement process, establishes a `fairly discernible' intent to preclude district court review in the present case. 114 S. Ct. at 780-81 (citation omitted). The Court added that [n]othing in the language and structure of the Act or its legislative history suggests that Congress intended to allow mine operators to evade the statutory-review process by enjoining the Secretary from commencing enforcement proceedings. Id. at 781. Under the Thunder Basin test, we must consider the language of 106 of the INA, its stated purpose, its legislative history, and the overall structure of the administrative process, as well as whether plaintiff will be able to secure meaningful review of his claims after exhaustion. We find that all of these factors suggest that, whenever an alien is the subject of deportation proceedings, 106 is intended to delay judicial review until after administrative exhaustion. We thus conclude that there is a fairly discernible congressional intent to delay federal court review in the circumstances present in this case. 3. Under 106(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1105a(c), an order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be reviewed by any court if the alien has not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him as of right under the immigration laws and regulations. Section 106(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1105a(a), further provides that, subject to statutory exceptions not invoked here, the sole and exclusive procedure for . . . the judicial review of all final orders of deportation is by the filing of a petition for review in the appropriate court of appeals pursuant to the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2342. In addition, 242(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252(b) -- which sets forth a specialized administrative procedure applicable to deportation proceedings, Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 308 (1955) -- expressly states that [t]he procedure so prescribed shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the deportability of an alien under this section. 8 U.S.C. 1252(b). Furthermore, even where an alien is attempting to prevent an exclusion or deportation proceeding from taking place in the first instance and is thus not, strictly speaking, attacking a final order of deportation or exclusion, it is well settled that judicial review is precluded if the alien has failed to avail himself of all administrative remedies, one of which is the deportation or exclusion hearing itself. See, e.g., Xiao v. Barr, 979 F.2d 151, 153 (9th Cir. 1992); see also 3 Charles Gordon & Stanley Mailman, Immigration Law and Procedure 81.02[2], at 81-26-28 (1996) (A person against whom a deportation proceeding is brought may feel that the proceeding is unjustified and illegal but generally has no right to go to court immediately to stop the proceeding. Congress has provided an administrative device for passing upon an alien's deportability, and generally there must be a final administrative ruling before judicial review can be initiated.). According to the legislative history of 106, the purpose of this section is to create a single, separate, statutory form of judicial review of administrative orders for the deportation and exclusion of aliens from the United States, by adding a new section 106 to the Immigration and Nationality Act. H.R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in, 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2966 (1961). [T]his section would vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal courts of appeals to review deportation orders, id. at 2971, and, [i]n an effort to curtail, if not to eliminate repetitious and unjustified appeals to courts for interference with the enforcement of deportation orders, the section declares that an order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be reviewed by a court if the alien has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Id. at 2971-72; see alsoFoti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1963) (The fundamental purpose behind 106(a) was to abbreviate the process of judicial review of deportation orders in order to frustrate certain practices which had come to the attention of Congress, whereby persons subject to deportation were forestalling departure by dilatory tactics in the courts. . . . The key feature of the congressional plan directed at this problem was the elimination of the previous initial step in obtaining judicial review -- a suit in a District Court -- and the resulting restriction of review to the Courts of Appeals, subject only to the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.); id. at 232 (We believe that the controlling intention of Congress, in enacting 106(a), was to prevent delays in the deportation process by vesting in the Courts of Appeals sole jurisdiction to review `all final orders of deportation.'). The administrative regulation of deportation proceedings is detailed and comprehensive. See generally 8 U.S.C. 1251-1254; 8 C.F.R. 241-244; see also, e.g., United States v. Jalilian, 896 F.2d 447, 449 (10th Cir. 1990). But for present purposes, a broad overview will suffice. Deportability determinations are made initially by an immigration judge after a formal hearing. See 8 U.S.C. 1252(b); 8 C.F.R. 242.16(a). If the immigration judge decides that the alien should be deported from the United States, the alien may pursue an administrative appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. See 8 C.F.R. 242.21. The Board's decision is administratively final unless the case is referred to the Attorney General for review. See 8 C.F.R. 3.1(d)(2), (h). Following final administrative action, the sole and exclusive procedure for obtaining judicial review of deportation orders is by direct review in the appropriate United States Court of Appeals. See 8 U.S.C. 1105a(a). A court of appeals may review a final order of deportation made against an alien within the United States and all matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent. See INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 937-39 (1983). Thus, the courts of appeals generally may provide meaningful review as to any properly exhausted claims directly attacking a final order of deportation. See id.; see generally Gottesman v. INS, 33 F.3d 383, 386-87 (4th Cir. 1994). Based on the above, we conclude that Congress intended to delay federal court review of claims by aliens against whom deportation proceedings have been instituted until the conclusion of the administrative proceedings. Thus, plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies and, if he still so desires, file a petition for review in this court. By filing suit in the district court to enjoin the deportation proceeding, Ruiz Massieu, like the plaintiff in Maxon Marine, not only failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but sought review in the wrong court. See Maxon Marine, 39 F.3d at 147. Put simply, Congress has removed jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims from the district courts and has vested exclusive federal court jurisdiction in this court after the exhaustion of available administrative remedies.