Opinion ID: 2328760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Authority of Trial Court to Enter Counsel Fee Order

Text: Next, KMA argues that the counsel fee award should be vacated because, when the award was issued, the trial court had been deprived of jurisdiction by KMA's appeal from the judgment on the verdict. According to KMA, Bassett entered judgment pursuant to Rule 227.4(1)(b) on October 25, 2005, while the attorney's fee petition of June 6, 2005, was still pending. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 227.4(1)(b) (upon party's praecipe, prothonotary to enter final judgment on jury's verdict if court does not dispose of all post-trial motions within one hundred twenty days after filing of first post-trial motion). The manufacturer appealed the judgment on October 28, 2005, and the trial court decided the fee petition on January 23, 2006, nearly three months later. According to KMA, the MMWA requires that the counsel fee award be entered `as part of' the underlying judgment. But, here, the trial court issued the fee award months after and, thus, it was not part of the final judgment entered. The manufacturer argues that, pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure 1701(a), the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to act on the petition for counsel fees once Bassett entered voluntary judgment on the verdict. Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a) (Except as otherwise prescribed by these rules, after an appeal is taken . . . the trial court . . . may no longer proceed further in the matter.). Thus, KMA asserts that the trial court's award of counsel fees should be vacated. See KMA's Brief at 34. [32] Bassett answers that the award of costs was proper. She recognizes that the MMWA is the statute authorizing legal fees here, but argues that matters of trial court jurisdiction and procedure related to the award of attorneys' fees are governed by Pennsylvania law and rules. According to Bassett, petitions for attorneys' fees are ancillary to the judgment on the merits and the trial court does not lose jurisdiction to decide them separately after an appeal on the merits is filed. Bassett's Brief at 49-50 (citing Old Forge Sch. Dist. v. Highmark Inc., 592 Pa. 307, 924 A.2d 1205 (2007); Miller Elec. Co. v. DeWeese, 589 Pa. 167, 907 A.2d 1051 (2006) ( Miller )). Bassett notes that the MMWA does not control trial and appellate jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. Indeed, Bassett claims that the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that counsel fees may be awarded separately from the judgment on the verdict and later incorporated into the judgment. Id. at 51 (citing Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 200, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988)). The trial court agreed with Bassett that the fee petition and award were timely. According to the court, issues regarding attorneys' fees and costs are collateral or ancillary to the merits and may be addressed by the trial court after an appeal has been filed. Entry of judgment and the appeal therefore did not divest the court of jurisdiction to decide Bassett's pending fee petition. Tr. Ct. Supp. Op.Findings of Facts & Conclusions of Law, 11/14/07, ¶ 122 (citing Budinich, supra ; Miller, supra ; Rosen v. Rosen, 520 Pa. 19, 549 A.2d 561 (1988)). The Superior Court affirmed without further addressing this issue. Rule 1701 provides that [e]xcept as otherwise prescribed by these rules, after an appeal is taken . . . the trial court. . . may no longer proceed further in the matter. Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a). But, after an appeal is taken, the trial court may take other action ancillary to the appeal. Pa. R.A.P. 1701(b)(1). In Pennsylvania, the trial court's action on a petition for counsel fees has been deemed to be ancillary to the appeal from the judgment on the merits. Miller, 907 A.2d at 1057. Therefore, if the petition for counsel fees is timely filed, the trial court is empowered to act on it after an appeal was taken. Pursuant to the MMWA, a consumer who prevails on a claim under that statute or on a claim for breach of warranty may recover as part of the judgment the reasonably incurred amount of cost and expenses (including attorneys' fees based on actual time expended). 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2). [33] In Budinich, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that statutes and decisional law authorizing counsel fees are inconsistent in characterizing the fees as either costs or part of the merits judgment. 486 U.S. at 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717. But, the Court noted that, as a general matter, a claim for attorney's fees is not part of the merits of the action to which the fees pertain. Such an award does not remedy the injury giving rise to the action, and indeed is often available to the party defending the action. Id. at 200, 108 S.Ct. 1717. The Court also stated that [a]t common law, attorney's fees were regarded as an element of `costs' awarded to the prevailing party, which are not generally treated as part of the merits judgment. Many federal statutes providing for attorney's fees continue to specify that they are to be taxed and collected as `costs.' Id. at 200-01, 108 S.Ct. 1717 (citations omitted). As here, the statute at issue in Budinich provided that the judgment would include a reasonable attorney fee in favor of the winning party, to be taxed as part of the costs of the action. Id. at 197, 108 S.Ct. 1717 (citing Colo.Rev.Stat. 8-4-114 (1986)). The prevailing plaintiff took judgment on the jury's verdict on March 26, 1984, and the defendant filed post-trial motions, which were denied May 14, 1984. The district court issued its final order concerning attorneys' fees on August 1, 1984. The defendant took its only appeal on August 19, 1984, as to all issues. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the appeal was untimely as to all issues except the attorneys' fees. According to the Court, the judgment on the merits was final and appealable on May 14, 1984, and its finality did not turn upon the characterization of [attorneys'] fees by the statute or decisional law that authorizes them. Id. at 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717. The High Court explained that the important value at stake in adopting this uniform interpretation of finality was the preservation of operational consistency and predictability with respect to jurisdictional and procedural rules governing the time to appeal. Id. at 202, 108 S.Ct. 1717. Like the Colorado statute at issue in Budinich, the MMWA describes the same paradoxical characterization of attorneys' fees as both a cost of litigation and as part of the judgment. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2). In the interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court, similar statutory language conveyed no legislative intent to modify jurisdictional and procedural rules applicable to determine the finality of an order for purposes of appeal. Following the High Court's lead, we hold that the trial court's authority to proceed on the petition for attorneys' fees does not turn on the MMWA's characterization of those fees. We have no reason to believe that, if faced with this question, the High Court would decide otherwise. Council 13, Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v. Rendell, 604 Pa. 352, 986 A.2d 63, 77 (2009) ( Council 13 ) (It is fundamental that by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, the State courts are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court with respect to . . . federal law, and must adhere to extant Supreme Court jurisprudence.). Similar to the U.S. Supreme Court, we have a strong interest in the preservation of consistency and predictability in the operation of our appellate process. Pennsylvania law is well established that a petition for attorneys' fees is an ancillary matter, which the trial court retains authority to decide after entry of judgment on the verdict. Here, there is no dispute that the application for attorneys' fees was timely when filed on June 6, 2005. Accordingly, the trial court was authorized to decide Bassett's application for attorneys' fees in January 2006, irrespective of KMA's appeal on October 28, 2005, from the judgment on the verdict dated October 25, 2005. We must reject KMA's request for relief from the fee award on this ground. [34]