Opinion ID: 77432
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arguments Made at Trial

Text: 26 At the close of the Government's case, Smith moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 for a judgment of acquittal, claiming insufficient evidence to prove the interstate nexus with regards to both 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and insufficient evidence to prove that he knowingly possessed child pornography in violation of § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The district court denied his motion. Of these arguments, Smith only claims on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knew the victim was a child. We review a district court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v. Dulcio, 441 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2006). In determining whether the government produced sufficient evidence, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the jury's verdict. Id. We need only determine that a reasonable fact-finder could have determined that the evidence proved the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Peters, 403 F.3d 1263, 1268 (11th Cir.2005). 27 Because Smith did not testify at trial, any evidence regarding his knowledge of the victim's age must necessarily be circumstantial. The evidence presented by the Government included the following: (1) the testimony of Officer Mayo—one of the officers who executed the search warrant and who had no specific training regarding sex crimes or child exploitation— who described the females in the photographs as very, very young girls; (2) the testimony of Detective Dickie, a sex crimes/sex abuse investigator with sixteen years of related experience, who testified that some of the photographs were of females under eighteen and whose follow-up investigation of such photographs led her to the victim; and (3) the actual photographs of the victim. Given this evidence, and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was so obviously a minor that the defendant must have known as much. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. 28