Opinion ID: 657237
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consolidation of Firearm Counts

Text: 7 Leticia argues that the district court wrongly denied her pre-trial motion to eliminate all but one of the seven firearm charges against her on the ground that the counts were multiplicative. We review de novo the district court's ruling. United States v. Douglass, 780 F.2d 1472, 1477 (9th Cir.1986). 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c) provides that: 8 Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking ... uses or carries a firearm shall in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime be sentenced to imprisonment for five years. 9 There are two distinct elements to a Sec. 924(c) violation: the carrying of a firearm and the predicate drug trafficking offense in relation to which the firearm is utilized. When there are multiple Sec. 924(c) charges, the indictment must tie each firearm charge to a separate offense. United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 894 (9th Cir.1991). 10 Thus, an indictment is multiplicative if the same offense and the same underlying facts that form the basis for that offense are used to support more than one firearm count. Id. at 894. However, if the elements of the two predicate offenses are different, each may form the basis of a firearm count notwithstanding that both offenses stem from the same set of facts. United States v. Fontanilla, 849 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir.1988) (because murder of one person and assault of another in same episode were properly charged as separate crimes, it was permissible to charge defendant with two separate firearm counts). Similarly, a defendant may properly be charged with committing the same offense more than once as long as each count depends on a different set of predicate facts. 11 Under the rule first pronounced in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946), each conspirator is liable for the criminal act of a co-conspirator if: 1) the substantive offense was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, and 2) the offense could reasonably have been foreseen to be a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement. Id. at 647-48, 66 S.Ct. at 1184; Douglass, 780 F.2d at 1476. A conviction under Sec. 924(c) may be based on Pinkerton. United States v. Johnson, 886 F.2d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089, 110 S.Ct. 1830, 108 L.Ed.2d 959 (1990). Thus, a conspirator may be held vicariously responsible for her co-conspirator's carrying of a firearm in relation to a specified drug trafficking offense. 12 Although Leticia was charged with committing the same predicate possession offense six times, each offense depended on a separate set of facts. Counts 52, 56, and 58 charged use of a firearm in relation to Angulo-Lopez's possession offenses; count 68 was tied to Umansor-Alvarez's possession offense; count 72 was tied to Ornelas-Martinez's possession offense; and count 21 was tied to Victor's possession offense. While the proof at trial overlapped to some degree, each predicate offense relating to Leticia's firearm counts required proof of a different set of facts. Accordingly, the firearm charges against her were not multiplicative.