Opinion ID: 2615564
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to challenge the extradition proceedings

Text: McNelton contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. He argues that counsel should have argued that the state relied on hearsay documents and that the case the district court relied on in denying his motion is not controlling in Nevada and is wrong as a matter of federal law. McNelton also argues that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to fully investigate and demand an evidentiary hearing on the extradition issue. In his motion to dismiss, McNelton argued that Nevada's failure to follow Article III(a) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) (codified at NRS 178.620) warranted dismissal. Article III(a) essentially provides that a state must bring a defendant under a term of imprisonment in another party state to trial within 180 days if: (1) the defendant has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, (2) during the continuance of that term of imprisonment the charges in question are pending against the defendant in another party state, (3) a detainer based on such charges has been lodged against the defendant, and (4) the defendant has caused written notice and request for final disposition of the charges to be delivered to the appropriate prosecuting authorities and court. State v. Wade, 105 Nev. 206, 208, 772 P.2d 1291, 1293 (1989) (quoting United States v. Hutchins, 489 F.Supp. 710, 713 (N.D.Ind. 1980)); see NRS 178.620, Article III(a). Failure to bring the defendant to trial within 180 days results in dismissal of the charges with prejudice. Wade, 105 Nev. at 208, 772 P.2d at 1293 (citing NRS 178.620, Article V(c)). After hearing argument on the motion, the district court concluded that McNelton made an Article III request to California authorities no later than June 19, 1991, [2] which triggered California's obligation to notify Nevada to retrieve McNelton and try him. The court concluded that McNelton was not even brought to Nevada until after the 180 days had run. The court entered its written order granting McNelton's motion on August 18, 1992. The state moved for rehearing on the ground that at the time it granted McNelton's motion, the court was operating under the mistaken belief that McNelton had signed the request for disposition of the charges on June 19, 1991, when that form was actually not dated. The state also argued that because McNelton had been released on parole prior to being sent to Nevada, the IAD did not apply. As support, the state attached an affidavit of Nadine Mulkey, the extradition coordinator for the Clark County District Attorney's office. The affidavit stated that Mulkey did not receive from either McNelton or California prison authorities a request for disposition of the charges against him. It further stated that Mulkey examined the request for disposition and other documents attached to McNelton's motion to dismiss and was not aware that those documents existed. At a September 15, 1992 hearing on the state's motion, the district court was concerned because Mulkey's affidavit contained different facts than the court was aware of previously. The court said that Mulkey's affidavit was hearsay and the court could not consider it as evidence of facts. The court took the matter under submission. The next day, however, the court vacated its order dismissing the case and granted the state's motion solely to reconsider whether McNelton had been under a term of imprisonment pursuant to Article III(a). On September 17, 1992, believing that the district court's order granting its motion for rehearing was a legal nullity, the state appealed from the district court's order dismissing the case. This court dismissed the appeal, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the district court vacated the order appealed from. In a footnote, this court stated that the district court was free to consider the applicability of any recent opinions of the United States Supreme Court, specifically citing Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993). State v. McNelton, Docket No. 23898, 109 Nev. 1418, 875 P.2d 1080 (Order Dismissing Appeal, April 27, 1993). At a hearing on May 6, 1993, the district court stated that although its original order on this issue was consistent with the dissent in Fex, it believed that the majority in Fex obligated the court to deny McNelton's motion to dismiss. Fex holds that Article III(a)'s 180-day time period does not begin to run until a prisoner's request for final disposition of the charges against him is actually delivered to the court and the prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him. Fex, 507 U.S. at 52, 113 S.Ct. 1085. Defense counsel agreed that Fex was dispositive. The court granted the state's motion for reconsideration, denied McNelton's motion to dismiss, and set the matter for trial. We conclude that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying McNelton's motion to dismiss. See Steese v. State, 114 Nev. 479, 490, 960 P.2d 321, 328 (1998). First, the court was not bound by its statement at the September 15, 1992 hearing that Mulkey's affidavit was hearsay. The court could consider Mulkey's statement in her affidavit that the prosecutor's office did not receive from McNelton a request for final disposition of the charges against him. Second, Fex is directly on point, and the district court did not err in applying it. See Fex, 507 U.S. at 52, 113 S.Ct. 1085. Thus, had appellate counsel argued on appeal that the district court erred in considering the affidavit because it was hearsay and Fex did not apply, there is not a reasonable probability that this court would have reversed the judgment. We further conclude that trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to demand an evidentiary hearing on this issue. McNelton does not specify what evidence trial counsel would have presented such that there is a reasonable probability that the district court would have granted the motion.