Opinion ID: 662464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: historical & procedural background

Text: 12 In 1981, following a two-year pilot project, Oklahoma instituted its first statewide system of public defenders. Before that time, in all but Tulsa and Oklahoma Counties, indigent criminal defendants were represented solely by appointed members of the private bar. The Oklahoma Appellate Public Defender System was given responsibility for appeals by all indigent defendants except those in Tulsa and Oklahoma Counties, who continued to be represented by county public defenders. Except for cases involving conflicts of interest, the Public Defender had no authority to refuse cases assigned to it by the courts. 13 Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Public Defender was assigned a steadily increasing number of felony appeals. This increase in caseload was not met with a corresponding increase in funding and staffing, however, and a backlog of unbriefed cases began to develop. With only five attorneys briefing noncapital cases, the Public Defender fell further and further behind. At the end of fiscal year (FY) 1986, the Public Defender had a total of 367 unbriefed cases. 2 By the end of FY 1989, that number had risen to 705. 14 In an effort to maximize the use of its limited resources, the Public Defender implemented a first-in, first-out policy, pursuant to which the oldest cases were briefed first. The Public Defender also began seeking lengthy extensions from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals on a routine basis. The Public Defender would ask for an initial extension of 360 days to be followed, if necessary, by subsequent requests for extensions of 180 days or less. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ordinarily granted these extensions. 3 15 Although the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals was distressed by the Public Defender's inability to handle the number of cases assigned to it, the court felt it had no power to remedy the situation directly. 4 In response to a mandamus petition by an indigent criminal defendant who sought an order directing the Public Defender to file appellate briefs in his two cases with no further delays, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals regretfully commented: 16 It is obvious that the office is understaffed to handle the number of appeals that are presently being handled by the office but due to the lack of funding by the State, the office is apparently doing the best that they can under the circumstances. We are powerless to cure this problem. It can only be cured by the legislature through the use of its budgetary powers. Petitioner is not entitled to have his appeal handled prior to others who are in similar circumstances and have been delayed even longer. 17 Manous v. State, 797 P.2d 1005, 1005-06 (Okla.Crim.App.1990). Enter Anthony Jerome Harris. 18 Harris was sentenced on September 29, 1988, and the Public Defender was appointed to represent him on appeal. On April 16, 1990, in response to his inquiry, the Public Defender sent Harris a letter stating:  'It will be at least 3 years before we are able to file your brief with the court.'  Harris I, 938 F.2d at 1064 (quoting Letter from Public Defender to Harris of 4/16/90). Believing that he should not have to wait that long to obtain a review of his conviction and sentence, Harris filed a habeas petition in federal district court and argued that the anticipated delay in adjudicating his direct criminal appeal should excuse his failure to exhaust his state remedies. 19 By the time we issued our opinion in Harris I on June 17, 1991, almost three years had passed since Harris' sentencing and the Public Defender had yet to file a brief on his behalf. We concluded that the briefing delay, which was authorized by the numerous extensions granted by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, was attributable to the State and was not justified. Therefore, we excused Harris from exhausting his state remedies before proceeding in federal court. We also noted that the delay raised potential independent violations of Harris' constitutional rights, namely the right to equal protection, the right to due process, and the right to effective assistance of counsel. 20 We reversed the district court's dismissal of the habeas petition for failure to exhaust and, in light of the problems encountered by Harris and other Oklahoma habeas petitioners who had raised the issue of delay to this court, we directed the district court on remand 21 to consider this petitioner's claims within the context of the systemic operations of the [Public Defender]. Once the constitutional scope of the problem is known, the district court should consider what relief is appropriate for this petitioner as well as such systemic relief, if any, as may be needed to prevent any ongoing constitutional violations that may be occurring as a result of the inability of the [Public Defender] timely to prepare appeals for [its] indigent clients. 22 Harris I, 938 F.2d at 1071 (footnote omitted). Further, we instructed the district court (1) to consolidate, to the extent possible, any other habeas cases pending in the Northern District of Oklahoma that raised a constitutional challenge to the delay by the Public Defender in filing briefs in direct criminal appeals and to coordinate its review of those petitions with the review of similar petitions by the courts in the Western and Eastern Districts of Oklahoma; (2) to conduct a full hearing, as expeditiously as possible, into possible systemic delays of the [Public Defender] in preparing and filing appellate briefs for [its] indigent clients; (3) to make detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law and ... enter orders specifically addressing and remedying any constitutional violations that may be found; and (4) to appoint experienced counsel to represent the petitioners in the collective cases. Id. at 1071, 1073. 23 Two months later, we considered an appeal by another state habeas petitioner who was represented by the Public Defender in his direct criminal appeal. The opening brief there was not filed until two years and nine months after the notice of appeal. Hill, 942 F.2d at 1495. At the time we issued our decision, Hill's appeal had been pending three years and four months with no decision by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Hill contended that the delay in adjudicating his appeal excused his failure to exhaust state remedies and violated his right to due process. 24 Based on our decision in Harris I, we reversed the district court's dismissal of Hill's habeas petition for failure to exhaust. On remand, we instructed the district court to consolidate Hill's habeas action with that of Harris for hearing. We further instructed the district court to consider the period both before and after the Public Defender filed its brief and to determine what part of the whole period of delay caused by the state may have violated Hill's right to due process. Id. at 1496-97. We thereby expanded the scope of inquiry on remand to excessive delay in the entire Oklahoma criminal appellate system. 25 During this time, sweeping changes were taking place in Oklahoma's public defender system. In June 1990, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that Oklahoma's system for appointing and compensating trial counsel for indigent defendants was unconstitutional. State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1159 (Okla.1990). 26 In its 1991 session, the Oklahoma legislature responded to the Lynch decision by overhauling the entire indigent defense system, both at the trial and appellate levels. The Oklahoma Indigent Defense Act, Okla.Stat. tit. 22, Secs. 1355-68, which took effect on July 1, 1991, created the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System, and assigned it the responsibility of providing both trial and appellate counsel, as well as counsel on capital post-conviction matters, for indigent defendants in all but Tulsa and Oklahoma Counties. The legislature also authorized the Public Defender to hire two more attorneys to handle noncapital felony appeals. 27 Pursuant to our remand order in Harris I, in July 1991, judges in the three federal districts in Oklahoma began identifying pending habeas cases that raised the issue of delay by the Public Defender and transferring them for hearing to the then-Chief Judge of the Northern District of Oklahoma, who was designated to sit in all three judicial districts. In January 1992, the district court appointed counsel to represent the petitioners in these cases (the Harris group), which at that time numbered sixteen. 28 On February 28, 1992, the petitioners in the Harris group, which then consisted of thirty habeas cases, presented the court with reams of statistical and other data gathered from the Public Defender, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Attorney General. This evidence showed that for noncapital felony appeals filed in 1989, the Public Defender filed only three percent of its briefs within six months of the date they were due; fifty-six percent of its briefs were at least three years late; and thirty-one percent of its briefs had yet to be filed by the beginning of 1992. Almost all the Public Defender briefs due in noncapital felony appeals filed in 1990 and 1991 had yet to be filed by the beginning of 1992. During much of the operative period, therefore, an indigent appellant could expect a delay of two to four years before his or her appellate brief would be filed. 29 The Public Defender was not the only entity having problems managing its caseload, however. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals also had a steadily growing backlog of cases. 5 Each year the court was struggling to dispose of the cases pending from the previous year and was making virtually no progress on the new cases filed that year. At the end of FY 1989, there were 1,148 undecided cases pending before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals; a year later, there were 1,407 undecided cases pending. 6 Even the Attorney General was beginning to slip. Data collected from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals showed that although the Attorney General filed almost all her briefs within six months of the due date, starting in 1987, there was a clear trend of a decreasing number of briefs timely filed. R., Doc. 27, Ex. 3(b) at 12. It was clear from the evidence presented that the appellate criminal justice system in Oklahoma was in a crisis. 30 In the spring of 1992, the Oklahoma legislature began taking steps to alleviate the crisis. It appropriated $400,000 for the Public Defender to use to contract with private attorneys to handle noncapital felony appeals on which the Public Defender had been appointed. As a result, the Public Defender contracted out approximately 176 of its cases that spring. In the fall, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals also took steps to speed up the appellate process. The court adopted a summary opinion format to be used in all cases that would not be published. By reducing the amount of legal analysis and discussion set forth in its unpublished opinions, the court eliminated lengthy conferences concerning the precise wording of the opinion, as well as the need for separate opinions when judges concurred in the outcome but not in the analysis. 31 Meanwhile, the petitioners in the Harris group, which by then had grown to 108 habeas cases, increased their pressure on the State by filing a supplemental and amended complaint that named as defendants the State of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals and its individual members, the Public Defender and its board members and administrative officers, as well as all the Oklahoma wardens, among others. The complaint, filed in July 1992, asserted against all the named defendants both habeas claims and claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 7 . The Harris petitioners also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals from granting any further extensions of time to the Public Defender, and a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking the release of those petitioners who had been, or reasonably could be expected to be, in custody for 11.7 months or longer without receiving a final adjudication of their appeal. 8 32 The district court held a hearing on the pending motions on October 15, 1992, by which time the Harris group had grown to 193 habeas cases. The court noted at the outset that all the parties appeared to agree that delays in the Oklahoma criminal appellate system had risen to the level of constitutional violations, and it informed the parties that it rejected the Attorney General's position that only the Oklahoma legislature could provide a remedy for those constitutional violations. The court said it, too, could provide a remedy. 33 The Public Defender recommended that the court stay its hand because the legislature had appropriated more money for the Public Defender to contract out its cases, and the Public Defender intended to award contracts in an additional 354-400 cases the next morning. The contracts would require all opening briefs to be filed on or before April 30, 1993. The Public Defender stated that once these cases were contracted out to private counsel, the Public Defender could maintain brief filings on a current basis within the statutor[il]y allotted periods. Tr. 10/15/92 at 37. Counsel for the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals also suggested that the court wait six months to see if the clog in the system would resolve itself. When questioned about appropriate remedies, counsel argued that while release of petitioners during the period of excessive appellate delay might be an appropriate remedy, it would have to be considered on a case-by-case basis. The Attorney General, in turn, also argued that the propriety of any remedy depended on the individual circumstances of each petitioner. 34 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court noted that, although in the usual situation it would approach petitioners' claims on an individual basis, in light of the unusual circumstances presented, it proposed the following possible remedy: to release any petitioner whose appeal had not been fully briefed and submitted to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals for decision within fourteen months of the date of conviction. Each petitioner would be released on his or her personal recognizance until the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals issued its opinion; the State could apply for special terms and conditions of release in individual cases. The court gave the parties until October 23 to comment on the proposal and indicated it would issue a ruling shortly thereafter. Unfortunately, no ruling ever appeared. 35 Beginning in January 1993, various Harris group petitioners, who were anticipating release, began filing mandamus petitions with us seeking a ruling by the district court. By the end of February, there were seven such mandamus petitions pending, including one filed by counsel on behalf of all the Harris group petitioners. 36 On February 18, 1993, on motion of the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, approved by the Chief Judges of the Western and Eastern Districts, the Chief Judge of this court entered an order designating a three-judge district court panel to adjudicate common issues of law and fact in all the habeas cases alleging delay in the adjudication of direct criminal appeals in Oklahoma. The panel, which was composed of one judge from each of the three federal districts in Oklahoma, was formed in an effort to resolve uniformly and expeditiously the common issues arising in the approximately 275 habeas cases that by then made up the Harris group. 37 By order entered March 26, 1993 in the mandamus proceedings, we directed the district court panel to show cause why it should not be ordered, among other things, to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Harris cases insofar as those cases seek habeas relief because of delays by the [Public Defender] in preparing and filing briefs in petitioners' direct criminal appeals no later than May 10, 1993; and to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Harris cases insofar as those cases seek habeas relief because of delays by the [Attorney General] or the [Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals] no later than September 10, 1993. Harris v. United States Dist. Ct., Nos. 93-527, et al., at 7-8 (10th Cir. Mar. 26, 1993) (unpublished order). We also suggested that the district court certify those rulings for immediate appeal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). 38 In its response to the show cause order, the district court indicated that it had no objection to meeting the deadlines set forth in the show cause order. Therefore, on April 22, 1993, we entered a mandamus order directing the district court to enter the findings and conclusions requested in our show cause order and we also instructed the court to consider the issue of cumulative delay in its ruling due September 10. 39 On April 1, 1993, the Harris group petitioners filed a motion to disqualify two of the three members of the district court panel. Both motions were orally denied at a status conference on April 6, with the exception that Judge Thomas R. Brett, whose uncle was a member of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals until his death three months earlier, agreed to recuse on any claims for damages. 40 At an evidentiary hearing on April 9, the district court said it would grant respondents' motion to sever from the Harris group twenty-six habeas cases by petitioners who were not represented by the Public Defender in their direct criminal appeals. The court also said that it would close the Harris group as of that date and any subsequent habeas petitions raising the issue of appellate delay would be considered on an individual basis. As of April 9, 284 habeas petitions that raised the issue of appellate delay in the Oklahoma criminal justice system had been filed by criminal defendants represented by the Public Defender. 41 On May 6, 1993, the district court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning delay by the Public Defender and certified its ruling as final for purposes of appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b). Based on the Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the district court concluded that an appellate process that took up to sixteen months from the filing of the notice of appeal through the filing of appellate briefs would satisfy constitutional concerns. R., Doc. 143 at 21-22. In light of this standard, the court concluded that there has been inordinate delay attributable to [the Public Defender] in the filing of most of the appellant briefs herein. This delay has thus been systemic. Id. at 22. The court determined, however, that to decide whether the inordinate delay by the Public Defender gave rise to any independent due process violations, it would have to balance the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2191, which would require the court to consider each habeas petitioner's case individually. The court said it would defer this individual inquiry until after it had entered all the rulings required by our mandamus order of April 22. The court also deferred any rulings on the equal protection and ineffective assistance of counsel issues until it conducts the individual inquiries on due process. 42 The court further held that any habeas petitioner whose direct criminal appeal had been either affirmed or reversed with prejudice to retrial was not entitled to habeas relief as a result of delay in the appellate process. Finally, the court held that in the future, habeas petitioners would have to exhaust the issue of delay in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals before raising it in federal court. Petitioners filed their notice of appeal from the district court's order on May 28. 43 In August, the parties submitted documentary and testimonial evidence to the court concerning delays by the Attorney General and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, as well as cumulative delays in the system. Among other things, the court was advised that two pieces of legislation went into effect on July 1 that would speed the appellate process. 44 The first act established an Emergency Appellate Division of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals that can be activated whenever more than 100 noncapital felony appeals are at issue and pending in the Office of the Clerk of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Act of June 3, 1993, ch. 292, secs. 2-6, 1993 Okla.Sess.Laws Serv. 1548, 1549-51 (West) (codified at Okla.Stat. tit. 20, Secs. 60.1.-.5). Each emergency appellate panel consists of three trial judges, two of whom must concur in any decision. Okla.Stat. tit. 20, Sec. 60.3. Each panel must dispose of any cases assigned to it or return the cases to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals for resolution within ninety days. Decisions of the panels are final unless the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals grants a petition for review. Id. at Sec. 60.1. Judge Johnson of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals testified that sixty-six cases had been assigned to emergency appellate panels since the legislation went into effect, and three of the cases had already been decided. 45 The second act cut in half the time allowed for perfecting appeals in misdemeanor and felony cases (i.e., filing the record with transcripts); an appeal must be perfected in 90, rather than 180, days from the date the judgment and sentence are pronounced. Act of June 7, 1993, ch. 298, sec. 5, 1993 Okla.Sess.Laws Serv. 1562, 1564 (West) (codified at Okla.Stat. tit. 22, Sec. 1054). Because the briefing schedule does not begin to run until the appeal has been perfected, reducing the time permitted for perfecting the appeal effectively reduces delay on appeal by ninety days. 46 The district court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning delay by the Attorney General and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, as well as cumulative delay throughout the appellate system, on September 8, 1993. The court found that pursuant to data provided by the parties, there are approximately 302 matters now considered Harris cases as of August 13, 1993. R., Doc. 255 at 4. An appellate brief had been filed on behalf of the appellant in at least 301 of the cases and the Attorney General had filed a brief on behalf of the appellee in all but three cases. The Attorney General's briefs were filed within the statutory period in 130 cases and were filed more than sixty days after the statutory period in only sixty-seven cases. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had issued opinions in eighty-five of the cases, and 217 cases remained pending before the court. Of those, six were not yet at issue, 125 were at issue and ready to be assigned to a judge, and eighty-six were at issue and had already been assigned to a judge. 47 The district court found no evidence of systemic delay in filing briefs by the Attorney General and also determined that although delay by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals may have been inordinate in individual cases, it had not been systemic. The court further concluded that there was no cumulative inordinate systemic delay at present. The court held that a delay in adjudicating an appeal of more than two years from the notice of appeal or order permitting an appeal out of time to issuance of an opinion would be presumed to be unconstitutional absent a showing of good and sufficient cause or special circumstances. Id. at 8. The court again ruled that before a habeas petitioner could assert unconstitutional delay in federal court, he or she first had to raise the issue to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals and permit it to take appropriate action. 48 On September 28, petitioners filed their notice of appeal from the court's September 9 order, which the court certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). The two appeals were consolidated by our order of October 14, and we heard oral argument in the appeals on November 8, 1993. 49 On appeal, petitioners assert that the district court's findings and conclusions concerning their due process, equal protection, and ineffective assistance of counsel claims are incomplete and, in certain instances, erroneous. Petitioners also contend that Judge Brett, who was a member of the three-judge district court panel, should have recused himself on the habeas claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455. Finally, petitioners maintain that the district court erred in not awarding interim attorney fees against the State for work performed by counsel on behalf of petitioners. We will discuss each of these issues below.