Opinion ID: 1366919
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Was the State's violation of Odiaga's constitutional rights by questioning him after he invoked the right to counsel without first providing him with a public defender so shocking and outrageous as to warrant an acquittal?

Text: Odiaga was first given his Miranda rights immediately after his arrest at approximately 3:30 a.m., June 23, 1990. After asking to have his Miranda rights read to him again, Odiaga invoked his right to counsel. However, police officers repeatedly questioned Odiaga without providing an attorney. The public defender requested access to Odiaga from the morning of June 23rd until appointed by a magistrate to represent him on June 25th. Prior to this incident, all local police agencies were notified by letter that Mr. Elkins would be taking public defender appointments during June 1990. The letter also demanded, under I.C. § 19-853(a)(2), that Mr. Elkins be immediately notified if any suspect without his or her own attorney was detained for questioning. Although the public defender was not appointed until June 25th, the trial court correctly concluded that questioning between the time of Odiaga's arrest and that appointment was custodial interrogation, implicating Odiaga's Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). See State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 576, 634 P.2d 435, 438 (1981) (The test for determining whether questioning is custodial or merely investigative is whether the person is in custody or deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.). Odiaga was promptly advised of his constitutional rights before and during this interrogation, and invoked his right to counsel by saying I'd just as soon hire an attorney. The police extensively questioned Odiaga after he made this statement. Based on these facts, Odiaga moved the trial court to suppress statements elicited after Odiaga invoked his right to counsel or, alternatively, to dismiss the charges against him. The court granted Odiaga's motion to suppress in substantial part. On appeal, Odiaga assigns error to the trial court's failure to suppress testimony about a telephone conversation between Odiaga and his cousin's wife while he was in custody and the fact that it did not dismiss the prosecution against him. Odiaga did not include testimony about the telephone conversation in his motion to suppress, presented no argument on the issue at trial, and did not object to any portion of the court's order granting the motion to suppress. Odiaga's sole objection to this testimony at trial was that the State did not provide sufficient notice that the witness would be called for rebuttal. Evidence before the trial court indicated that the State received the information shortly before it was offered, and that the defense had interviewed this witness and was aware of the statements more than a year before they were offered. Both at trial and on appeal, Odiaga states no prejudice from the late disclosure of the information. The proper test in this situation is to determine whether lateness of disclosure so prejudiced defendant's preparation or presentation of his defense that he was prevented from receiving his constitutionally guaranteed fair trial. State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 751, 810 P.2d 680, 689 (1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1268, 117 L.Ed.2d 495 (1992). In this case, although the State's disclosure was late in the proceedings, the record indicates that the defense was aware of this witness and her potential testimony for more than a year before the testimony was offered. Even if the State's behavior had violated the duty to disclose, the trial court's refusal to exclude the evidence is not reversible error absent a showing of prejudice. State v. Marek, 112 Idaho 860, 868, 736 P.2d 1314, 1322 (1987). The question of whether this testimony resulted from the State's withholding Odiaga's access to counsel, after repeated requests from both Odiaga and Mr. Elkins, was not presented to the trial court and is not properly resolved here. If that issue is presented during the new trial ordered in this case, it will be a matter for the trial court to determine at that time. Alternatively, Odiaga relies on dictum from United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973), as a basis for dismissing the charges. That opinion states: We may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction. 411 U.S. at 431-32, 93 S.Ct. at 1642-43. While the State's actions were constitutionally defective, the court suppressed all testimony derived through those actions. The only prejudice Odiaga can plausibly argue at this point is from the admission of testimony about the telephone conversation, which was not included in this motion to suppress. If that issue is presented to the trial court, it would then be proper to consider the evidence and its relation to the motion to suppress or dismiss. At this juncture, there is no basis upon which Odiaga can allege significant prejudice which was not properly cured by the trial court's order suppressing the State's evidence.