Opinion ID: 2999924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: In reviewing a defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we view all evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Olson, 450 F.3d 655, 664 (7th Cir. 2006). We will only reverse the conviction if we conclude that no rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Cohen contends that there was insufficient evidence to support her perjury conviction because the government did not prove that she made a “false declaration.” See 18 U.S.C. § 152(3) (Any person who “knowingly and fraudulently makes a false declaration . . . under penalty of perjury” during a bankruptcy proceeding is guilty of perjury). She asserts that the questions posed to her during the bankruptcy proceeding were “fundamentally ambiguous,” (and therefore inappropriate for submission to a jury) because Shanle’s attorney did not refer to a specific year when he questioned her about whether she had received Shanle’s lottery proceeds. The Seventh Circuit has held that when a question and answer may have “more than one meaning standing alone, their intended meaning is ordinarily” a jury issue, but where there is a “fundamental ambiguity,” the issue must be taken from the jury. United States v. Martellano, 675 F.2d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1982). This court has yet to squarely define what constitutes a fundamentally ambiguous question, and we need not do so here. When we consider the questions asked of Cohen in context, as we must, the questions are neither ambiguous, nor fundamentally so. See Martellano, 675 F.2d at 943 (“The context of the question and answer is often of critical importance if it is claimed the question was ambiguous or was misunderstood as it is in this case.”). Although Cohen claims that she was hopelessly confused by Shanle’s attorney’s questions, it is clear that Shanle’s attorney was referring to Cohen’s obligation to pay Shanle in 1998. As the government noted at oral argument, the questions posed to Cohen could only relate to the years following her receipt of the loan–1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001. Given that the bankruptcy proceeding occurred in 2000, Shanle’s attorney could not have been accusing Cohen of failing to pay the 2001 debt, which was not yet due. Nor could Shanle’s attorney have been referring to the 2000 or 1999 checks, which were garnished by her lender and Shanle, respectively. Since Cohen paid Shanle his $9000 in 1997, only the 1998 check could have been at issue. Nonetheless, if we assume that Cohen was somehow confused by Shanle’s attorney’s questions, we note that she offered the same responses to the bankruptcy judge’s subsequent questions of unmistakable clarity: Q. Okay. So in the documents that you signed with them [the lender], it No. 6-1503 Page 5 authorized them to cash the [lottery] check.
Q. And you indicate that it was your understanding with whoever that $9,000 was to be withheld to be paid to Mr. Shanle. Q. That’s correct. A. Who was to withhold that money, the Lottery or [the lender]? Q. I was under the impression that [the lender] was to do that. A. Okay. So that when they got the check, they were to take out 9,000 for Mr. Shanle and then the balance went to them? Q. Right. App. at 33-34. Without question, then, Cohen intended to represent to the bankruptcy court that the obligation to make the annual $9000 payments to Shanle always rested with the lender. Despite her contrary representation, the jury could have found that Cohen knew that she, in fact, had the obligation to pay Shanle his annual lottery payment. Indeed, Cohen admits that in 1997 she deposited a $9000 check received from her lender and turned that sum over to Shanle. Finally, that Cohen boldly denied having received two $9000 checks bearing her endorsement (dated in 1997 and 1998) from the lender suggests a pattern of deception and cuts against any argument that her prior false testimony was unintentional or the result of misunderstanding. The jury was certainly at liberty to conclude that Cohen intentionally made a false declaration during the course of the bankruptcy proceedings. The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.