Opinion ID: 831214
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: defendant's conviction under mcl 257.625(4) and (8)

Text: The next issue presented in this appeal is whether defendant's conviction under MCL 257.625(4) and (8) was proper. [10] In Derror, a majority of this Court held that 11-carboxy-THC, a byproduct of metabolism created when the body breaks down the psychoactive ingredient of marijuana, is a schedule 1 controlled substance under MCL 333.7212 of the Public Health Code. Derror, 475 Mich. at 319-320, 715 N.W.2d 822. Derror also clarified Schaefer by holding that in prosecutions involving a violation of MCL 257.625(8), the prosecution is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knew he or she might be intoxicated because the section does not require intoxication or impairment. Id. at 334, 715 N.W.2d 822. Thus, because the prosecution need only establish that a defendant had any amount of a schedule 1 controlled substance in his or her body while operating a motor vehicle, under Derror, a person who operates a motor vehicle with the presence of any amount of 11-carboxy-THC in his or her system violates MCL 257.625(8). Id. at 320, 715 N.W.2d 822. We hold that 11-carboxy-THC is not a schedule 1 controlled substance under MCL 333.7212 and, therefore, a person cannot be prosecuted under MCL 257.625(8) for operating a motor vehicle with any amount of 11-carboxy-THC in his or her system. As a result, Derror was wrongly decided, and because the doctrine of stare decisis supports overruling Derror, we overrule Derror to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion.
Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Potter v. McLeary, 484 Mich. 397, 410, 774 N.W.2d 1 (2009). The primary goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marlette Homes, Inc., 456 Mich. 511, 515, 573 N.W.2d 611 (1998). When a statute is ambiguous, judicial construction is appropriate to determine the statute's meaning. See id. When determining the Legislature's intent, the `statutory language is given the reasonable construction that best accomplishes the purpose of the statute.' Id. (citation omitted). Indeed, [i]t is a well-established rule of statutory construction that provisions of a statute must be construed in light of the other provisions of the statute to carry out the apparent purpose of the Legislature. Farrington v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 442 Mich. 201, 209, 501 N.W.2d 76 (1993). As a result, the entire act must be read, and the interpretation to be given to a particular word in one section arrived at after due consideration of every other section so as to produce, if possible, a harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole. Grand Rapids v. Crocker, 219 Mich. 178, 182-183, 189 N.W. 221 (1922).
MCL 257.625(8) states, in relevant part: A person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles, including an area designated for the parking of vehicles, within this state if the person has in his or her body any amount of a controlled substance listed in schedule 1 under section 7212 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.7212, or a rule promulgated under that section.... [Emphasis added.] Under § 7212(1)(c) of the Public Health Code, marijuana is listed as a schedule 1 controlled substance. MCL 333.7212(1)(c). Marijuana is defined as follows: Marihuana means all parts of the plant Canabis [sic] sativa L., growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant or its seeds or resin. It does not include the mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the mature stalks, except the resin extracted therefrom, fiber, oil or cake, or the sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of germination. [MCL 333.7106(3).] On the basis of these statutes, a majority of this Court concluded in Derror that 11-carboxy-THC is a schedule 1 controlled substance. The majority reasoned that the Public Health Code includes within the definition of marijuana every compound and derivative of the plant.... Derror, 475 Mich. at 325, 715 N.W.2d 822. After examining several medical dictionaries with diverse definitions, the majority chose the definition of derivative that it believed most closely effectuated the Legislature's intent, which was a chemical substance related structurally to another substance and theoretically derivable from it. Id. at 327-329, 715 N.W.2d 822 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Applying this definition of derivative, the majority concluded that 11-carboxy-THC was included in it because the compound is structurally related to THC. Id. at 329, 715 N.W.2d 822. As a result, the majority concluded that MCL 257.625(8) proscribes driving with any amount of 11-carboxy-THC in a person's body regardless of whether the person is actually under the influence of marijuana while operating the motor vehicle. Id. at 333-334, 341, 715 N.W.2d 822. That interpretation, however, was contrary to the statutory language.
Derror was wrongly decided. The Derror majority erred because it interpreted derivative by choosing a definition, out of several divergent definitions, that seemed to include 11-carboxy-THC as a derivative when experts were in disagreement about whether 11-carboxy-THC is a derivative. Derror, 475 Mich. at 327-328, 350-351, 715 N.W.2d 822 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). More importantly, however, the majority's interpretation ignored and was inconsistent with other relevant statutory provisions. Specifically, the majority failed to interpret MCL 333.7212 in a manner consistent with federal law, ignored the factors the Legislature indicated should be used to determine whether a substance should be classified as a schedule 1 controlled substance, and ignored the Legislature's definition of marijuana and the Legislature's list of schedule 1 controlled substances, which do not contain the term metabolite or the full or any abbreviated name of 11-carboxy-THC. When MCL 333.7212 is interpreted in the context of the statutory scheme, it does not appear that the Legislature intended for 11-carboxy-THC to be classified as a schedule 1 controlled substance. To begin with, our Legislature has declared that the provisions of the Public Health Code are intended to be consistent with applicable federal and state law and shall be construed, when necessary, to achieve that consistency. MCL 333.1111(1). Notably, while Michigan's definition of marijuana is virtually identical to the relevant portions of the federal definition, [11] no federal court has held that 11-carboxy-THC is a controlled substance. Moreover, federal courts have stated that the purpose of banning marijuana was to ban the euphoric effects produced by THC. United States v. Sanapaw, 366 F.3d 492, 495 (C.A.7, 2004), citing United States v. Walton, 168 U.S. App DC 305, 306, 514 F.2d 201 (1975) (stating that the `hallucinogenic' or euphoric effects produced by this agent led to the Congressional ban on possession, importation and distribution of marijuana). An expert in this case, however, agreed that 11-carboxy-THC has no known pharmacological effect. See, also, Derror, 475 Mich. at 321, 715 N.W.2d 822, indicating that the experts in that case agreed that 11-carboxy-THC `itself has no pharmacological effect on the body and its level in the blood correlates poorly, if at all, to an individual's level of THC-related impairment.' (Citation omitted.) By ignoring federal law, the majority's decision in Derror ignored our Legislature's proclamation that the Public Health Code is intended to be consistent with applicable federal law and  shall be construed ... to achieve that consistency. MCL 333.1111(1) (emphasis added). [12] In addition, in interpreting derivative by choosing a definition, out of several divergent definitions, that seemed to include 11-carboxy-THC, the Derror majority ignored other relevant statutory provisions that suggest that 11-carboxy-THC should not be considered a schedule 1 controlled substance. Our Legislature has indicated that the Michigan Board of Pharmacy must include a controlled substance in schedule 1 if the substance has high potential for abuse and has no accepted medical use or lacks accepted safety for use in treatment. MCL 333.7211. In addition, the Legislature has listed other factors to consider when making a determination regarding the classification of a substance: (a)The actual or relative potential for abuse. (b) The scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known. (c) The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the substance. (d) The history and current pattern of abuse. (e) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse. (f) The risk to the public health. (g) The potential of the substance to produce psychic or physiological dependence liability. (h) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already controlled under this article. [MCL 333.7202.] As the Derror dissent indicated,  [n]one of these factors that are used to determine if a substance should be classified as a schedule 1 controlled substance applies to 11-carboxy-THC. Derror, 475 Mich. at 349, 715 N.W.2d 822 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). Indeed, 11-carboxy-THC has no pharmacological effect on a person, and, therefore, it has no potential for abuse or potential to produce dependence. Id. Moreover, it is impossible to take 11-carboxy-THC and make it into THC; therefore, it is not an immediate precursor of a substance already classified as a schedule 1 controlled substance. Id. Thus, although MCL 333.7202 does not expressly prohibit the inclusion of particular substances in schedule 1, it would be absurd to suggest that 11-carboxy-THC, which fails to meet the criteria of MCL 333.7202, fits within that schedule. By ignoring the statutory provisions that are used to classify a controlled substance, this Court failed to carry out the purpose of the Legislature. Farrington, 442 Mich. at 209, 501 N.W.2d 76. In addition, 11-carboxy-THC is not a schedule 1 controlled substance under MCL 333.7212(1)(d). Under MCL 333.7212(1)(d), synthetic equivalents of various marijuana-related substances are included in schedule 1. Synthetic substances are substances that were altered, sometimes in minor ways, but that can still have pharmacological effects on a person. Derror, 475 Mich. at 352, 715 N.W.2d 822 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). This definition does not include 11-carboxy-THC, which is a metabolitea natural byproduct that is created when a person's body breaks down THC. Id. at 321, 715 N.W.2d 822 (majority opinion). Therefore, 11-carboxy-THC is not a synthetic substance and, thus, not a schedule 1 controlled substance under MCL 333.7212(1)(d). Finally, the definition of marijuana, MCL 333.7106(3), and the Legislature's list of schedule 1 controlled substances, MCL 333.7212, do not contain the term 11-carboxy-THC or any equivalent name. Nor do the statutes contain the term metabolite. The Legislature, however, knows how to use the term `metabolite' when it wants to. Derror, 475 Mich. at 352, 715 N.W.2d 822 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). In fact, MCL 722.623a requires a person to report suspected child abuse if a newborn infant has any amount of a metabolite of a controlled substance in his or her body. Id. It is a well-known principle that the Legislature is presumed to be aware of, and thus to have considered the effect on, all existing statutes when enacting new laws. Walen v. Dep't of Corrections, 443 Mich. 240, 248, 505 N.W.2d 519 (1993). The Legislature's decision to exclude the word metabolite from the relevant statutory provisions is further support that the Legislature did not intend that 11-carboxy-THC be classified as a schedule 1 controlled substance. Therefore, by failing to construe the applicable portions of the Public Health Code to achieve consistency with federal law, and by failing to examine the statute in light of other relevant statutory provisions, the Derror majority failed to effectuate the Legislature's intent. We hold that 11-carboxy-THC is not a schedule 1 controlled substance under MCL 333.7212 and, therefore, a person cannot be prosecuted under MCL 257.625(8) for operating a motor vehicle with any amount of 11-carboxy-THC in his or her system. Although the Derror majority's interpretation of the statute was probably unconstitutional, because we hold that 11-carboxy-THC is not a schedule 1 controlled substance, defendant's conviction under MCL 257.625(4) and (8) cannot stand. Thus, we need not address the constitutional issues raised. [13]
Deciding to overrule precedent is not a decision that this Court takes lightly. Indeed, this Court should respect precedent and not overrule or modify it unless there is substantial justification for doing so. While  stare decisis is essential to the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law, it is not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision[.] Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In Robinson v. Detroit, 462 Mich. 439, 613 N.W.2d 307 (2000), this Court formally established a test to determine when it is appropriate to depart from stare decisis. [14] First, this Court must consider whether the previous decision was wrongly decided. Id. at 464, 613 N.W.2d 307. This Court must then apply a three-part test to determine whether the doctrine of stare decisis nonetheless supports upholding the previously decided case. These include (1) whether the decision defies practical workability, (2) whether reliance interests would work an undue hardship if the decision were overturned, and (3) whether changes in the law or facts no longer justify the decision. Id. As previously explained, Derror was wrongly decided. Applying the three-part Robinson test, we further conclude that the doctrine of stare decisis does not support upholding Derror. The first factor weighs heavily in favor of overruling Derror because the decision defies practicable workability given its tremendous potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement based on the whims of police and prosecutors. Derror, 475 Mich. at 358-359, 715 N.W.2d 822 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a critical aspect of the vagueness doctrine is `the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.' Id. at 359, 715 N.W.2d 822, quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (citation omitted). In fact, the Court has stated that when the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit `a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.' Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (citation omitted). The Derror majority's interpretation of the statute, however, allows a person to be prosecuted for driving with any amount of 11-carboxy-THC in the person's system, even though the metabolite has no pharmacological effects. As a result, a prosecutor could choose to charge a person found to have 0.01 nanograms of 11-carboxy-THC in his system if the prosecutor so desires. Derror, 475 Mich. at 359, 715 N.W.2d 822 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). In addition, whether a person is deemed to have any amount of 11-carboxy-THC in his system depends on whatever cutoff standard for detection is set by the laboratory doing the testing. Id. at 356, 715 N.W.2d 822. As a result, Michigan citizens cannot be sure of what conduct will be deemed criminal. [15] Moreover, in 2008 the people of the state of Michigan legalized the use of marijuana in limited circumstances. The Michigan Medical Marihuana Act declared that changing state law will have the practical effect of protecting from arrest the vast majority of seriously ill people who have a medical need to use marihuana. MCL 333.26422(b). Under the majority's interpretation of the statute in Derror, however, individuals who use marijuana for medicinal purposes will be prohibited from driving long after the person is no longer impaired. Indeed, in this case, experts testified that, on average, the metabolite could remain in a person's blood for 18 hours and in a person's urine for up to 4 weeks. See, also, Derror, 475 Mich. at 321-322, 715 N.W.2d 822, and id. at 356, 715 N.W.2d 822 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting) (stating that 11-carboxy-THC could remain in a person's blood for a long period after the THC is gone and could remain in a person's system for weeks after the marijuana was ingested). And if scientific testing develops to detect 11-carboxy-THC from marijuana that was ingested one year ago, ten years ago, or 20 years ago, it is ... a crime to drive.... Id. at 358, 715 N.W.2d 822 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). As a result, long after any possible impairment from ingesting marijuana has worn off, a person still cannot drive according to the Derror majority's interpretation of the statute. Id. at 356, 715 N.W.2d 822. Thus, under Derror, an individual who only has 11-carboxy-THC in his or her system is prohibited from driving and, at the whim of police and prosecutors, can be criminally responsible for choosing to do so even if the person has a minuscule amount of the substance in his or her system. Therefore, the Derror majority's interpretation of the statute defies practicable workability given its tremendous potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [16] The second Robinson factor also weighs heavily in favor of overruling Derror because Derror has not become so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to everyone's expectations that overruling the case would result in significant dislocations. Robinson, 462 Mich. at 466, 613 N.W.2d 307. To begin with, the case was recently decided. Moreover, as this Court explained in Robinson, a citizen normally looks to the words of the statute itself when looking for guidance on how to direct his or her actions. Id. at 467, 613 N.W.2d 307. 11-carboxy-THC, however, is not listed anywhere in the statute that lists schedule 1 controlled substances, MCL 333.7212. Indeed, the Derror majority's conclusion that 11-carboxy-THC is a schedule 1 controlled substance required this Court to examine and choose from widely divergent dictionary definitions and ignored other statutory language that describes when a substance must be placed in schedule 1. See MCL 333.7202 and MCL 333.7211. Because this Court's interpretation of the statute confounded the legitimate expectations of citizens, it is this Court that has disrupted the reliance interest[s]. Robinson, 462 Mich. at 467, 613 N.W.2d 307. Finally, although the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act represented a change in the law that lends some support to the third Robinson factor, overall the first two Robinson factors support overruling Derror. Because this Court cannot adhere to its previous, distorted reading of the statute under the doctrine of stare decisis, we overrule Derror to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion.