Opinion ID: 563814
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Propriety of Forfeiture

Text: 21 Finally, Puma raises three objections to the forfeiture of property ordered by the trial court. First, he argues that the indictment failed to advise him of the precise extent of the forfeiture sought by the government, in violation of both Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(2) and Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(e). Second, he argues that the jury's special verdict regarding the Diamond Oaks Motor Company inadequately specified the property that had been forfeited, in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(e). Third, Puma objects that there was insufficient evidence to support the forfeiture of certain automobiles listed in the amended order of forfeiture granted to the government by the trial court. 22
23 Puma did not raise with the district court his present objection to the indictment's specification of property subject to forfeiture. We therefore ask only whether the indictment states the essential elements of an offense. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(2). As we noted in United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1347 (5th Cir.1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005, 104 S.Ct. 996, 79 L.Ed.2d 229 (1984), [t]he purpose of the notice of forfeiture in the indictment is to inform the defendant that the government seeks forfeiture as a remedy. The designation of property subject to forfeiture is sufficiently specific if it puts the defendant on notice that the government seeks forfeiture and identifies the assets with sufficient specificity to permit the defendant to marshal evidence in their defense. Id. 24 In this case, count 2 of the indictment states that the government sought forfeiture of the Diamond Oaks Motor Company, 4249 Denton Highway, Haltom City, Texas and $5,030.00 in U.S. currency. This description of Puma's car lot business is amply sufficient to notify Puma that the government sought forfeiture of all of the company's assets. Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1347; United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 939 (3d Cir.1982) (by alleging that all of the appellants' interest in the enumerated corporations was subject to forfeiture, the indictment alleged the 'extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture'  required by Rule 7(c)(2)), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022, 103 S.Ct. 1272, 75 L.Ed.2d 494 (1983). Moreover, count 3 of the indictment alleges precisely how the government intended to link the Diamond Oaks Motor Company both to money-laundering and to the proceeds of unlawful activity. 25 The indictment as a whole described the property and how it was illegally used. This was more than sufficient to allow Puma to marshall any defense. United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 351 (5th Cir.1981) (specificity of forfeited property's description in indictment should be judged from indictment as whole), modified, 686 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965, 104 S.Ct. 404, 78 L.Ed.2d 344 (1982). It therefore violated neither Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(2) nor Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(e). 26
27 We also reject Puma's challenge to the jury's special verdict. The jury found that the Diamond Oaks Motor Company had been used to control, and had been purchased by the proceeds of, a continuing criminal conspiracy. This finding identifies with sufficient specificity the asset subject to forfeiture. The jury is under no obligation to select only certain of that entities' assets for forfeiture...., Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1349. See also United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1188 (5th Cir.1982) (jury's special verdict need not identify which rooms of hotel were used in criminal enterprise for whole hotel to be forfeited). If any part of the motor company was purchased by, or used to control, the proceeds of a continuing criminal conspiracy, then it is readily apparent that the entire property was subject to forfeiture, United States v. Possick, 849 F.2d 332, 341 (8th Cir.1988). The jury's special verdict, therefore, complied with Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(e)'s requirement that the verdict identify the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture. 28
29 in Order of Forfeiture 30 Puma's last contention is that there was insufficient evidence to support the order of forfeiture of numerous automobiles and equipment. Puma argues that there was evidence that the vehicles were legitimately and legally bought without involvement of the proceeds of a criminal enterprise; they should not be forfeited because they do not fall[ ] within the special verdict forfeiting 'Diamond Oaks Motor Company'. 31 There was ample evidence presented to the jury that the Diamond Oaks Motor Company was both derived from the proceeds of a criminal enterprise and afforded Puma control over a criminal enterprise. This evidence included physical evidence and testimony that the business was used to store amphetamine; testimony that the business was intended by Puma to be a front for amphetamine trafficking; and evidence that Puma's legitimate income was not large enough to cover the cost of purchasing the business. 32 Puma seems to be arguing that individual items belonging to the company were not involved in a criminal enterprise and that, therefore, those assets should not be forfeited. This is not the law. If the motor company was forfeitable, then all the individual assets of the company were also forfeitable, without any proof that each individual asset had been used in, or purchased by the proceeds of, a criminal enterprise. Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1349. See also Tunnell, 667 F.2d at 1188 (jury's special verdict need not identify which rooms of hotel were used in criminal enterprise for whole hotel to be forfeit); Possick, 849 F.2d at 341.