Opinion ID: 1859235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Challenging the Ultra Vires Acts of Government

Text: Green alleged that the action by the City Council was void. Green asserted in his complaint that the City Council's attempt to approve or disapprove his final plat was arbitrary, capricious, ultra vires and of no effect whatsoever.... Green also sought an injunction to stop the City Council from acting outside its authority. Green did not assert that the City Council made the wrong decision regarding approval of his final plat, rather; he asserted that the City Council was without authority to make any decision on approval of the final plat. Where a governmental entity lacks the authority by statute, and where authority may not be necessarily or fairly implied from powers expressly granted, an act is ultra vires and void. Town of Mena v. Smith, 64 Ark. 363, 42 S.W. 831 (1897). See also Wiegel v. Pulaski County, 61 Ark. 74, 32 S.W. 116 (1895). The authority to hear complaints of ultra vires acts exists in equity. [2] Arkansas Tech Univ. v. Link, 341 Ark. 495, 17 S.W.3d 809 (2000); Jensen v. Radio Broad. Co., 208 Ark. 517, 186 S.W.2d 931 (1945). Green properly filed his action in chancery court. When municipalities exceed their delegated powers, the act is ultra vires and, of course, ineffective. They function within the limits fixed by the constitution and law. Neal v. City of Morrilton, 192 Ark. 450, 92 S.W.2d 208 (1936). Green seeks a declaration that the City was without authority to veto the planning commission and substitute its own judgment. In other words, he argues that the act of the City Council was void, so an appeal to reconsider whether the sidewalks should have been required is simply nonsensical. The propriety of the decision of the City Council regarding installation of sidewalks is not at issue, and Green does not seek review of whether the City correctly decided the application of the ordinance. Thus, the issue of whether the City Council erred in deciding that the regulations required construction of sidewalks is not before this court and was not before the circuit court. See, e.g., Murphy v. City of West Memphis, 352 Ark. 315, 101 S.W.3d 221 (2003). This case is simple. Green asked a court of equity to restrain an alleged ultra vires act of a public corporation. There is no doubt but that equity will exercise jurisdiction to restrain acts or threatened acts of public corporations or of public officers, boards, or commissions, which are ultra vires and beyond the scope of their authority, or which constitute a violation of their official duty.... Wilson v. Pulaski Ass'n of Classroom Teachers, 330 Ark. 298, 302, 954 S.W.2d 221 (1997) (quoting Jensen, 208 Ark. at 520, 186 S.W.2d 931); Shellnut v. Ark. State Game & Fish Comm'n., 222 Ark. 25, 31, 258 S.W.2d 570 (1953) (quoting Jensen, 208 Ark. at 520, 186 S.W.2d 931). The circuit court failed to exercise its jurisdiction. While clearly an appeal was neither possible, sought, nor perfected under Ark.Code Ann. § 14-56-425, jurisdiction does lie in equity for a claim that the City Council acted beyond its authority in even considering whether Green complied with the regulations in failing to install sidewalks. The case should be remanded to the trial court for consideration of Green's claim that the City Council acted ultra vires.