Opinion ID: 169696
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of M otion to Amend Complaint

Text: The district court denied Dopp’s motion to amend based on the procedural posture of the case, in particular, the fact the State Defendants had filed a motion to dismiss based on the claims in the original complaint and resolution of that motion would be delayed if Dopp w ere allow ed to amend his complaint. It also noted any additional factual or legal arguments relevant to Dopp’s claims could be asserted in supplemental pleadings responsive to the State Defendants’ pending motion for summary judgment rather than in an amended complaint. Dopp argues the court erred in denying him leave to amend his complaint. He claims he timely attempted to amend his complaint to conform to the newly discovered information contained in the M artinez report and to add an allegation that any state post-deprivation remedy would be inadequate for him to challenge the loss of his cash. W e review the denial of leave to amend a complaint for an abuse of discretion. Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1126 (10th Cir. 1997). Rule -15- 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave of court to amend a complaint “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” “Refusing leave to amend is generally only justified upon a showing of undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith or dilatory motive, failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment.” Frank v. U.S. W est, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1365 (10th Cir. 1993). The district court did not abuse its discretion. Dopp sought to amend his complaint to conform to the subsequent pleadings and evidentiary materials, particularly, the M artinez report, and to assist the defendants and the court in responding to and resolving his claims by being more specific as to dates, incidents, and persons involved. However, the request to amend came almost a year after the M artinez report was filed. M oreover, the court provided Dopp an opportunity to clarify any facts in supplemental pleadings. Lastly, we reject Dopp’s claim that an amendment would have cured the deficiencies the court later used to dismiss his complaint, specifically, his failure to allege Oklahoma’s postdeprivation remedies were unavailable, unresponsive or inadequate to remedy the loss of his cash. Based on our disposition above, i.e., Dopp cannot state a due process claim based on the negligent deprivation of his cash, any amendment would have been futile.