Opinion ID: 1701776
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting a new trial on the issue of damages conditioned upon appellants' refusal of a remittitur?

Text: The scope of review, when an appellant declines to accept a remittitur and appeals from an order granting a new trial because of excessive damages, is limited to the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial. Cortez v. Brown, 408 So.2d 464 (Miss. 1981). Generally, this Court looks with favor upon the action of the trial court in granting an additur or remittitur pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated 11-1-55 (Supp. 1981). Mississippi State Highway Comm. v. Antioch Baptist Church, Inc., 392 So.2d 512 (Miss. 1981). By appealing the trial court's granting of a new trial due to inadequacy of damages, the appellants are asking that this Court reinstate the judgment and by their very act of appealing they must be willing to accept the verdict in all other respects, including the determination of liability. Screws v. Parker, 365 So.2d 633 (Miss. 1978). Liability was admitted in this case and there is no question of contributory negligence. The sole question is whether the jury verdict of $41,000 was substantiated by the evidence or was excessive. In Biloxi Electric Co. v. Thorn, 264 So.2d 404 (Miss. 1972), this Court pronounced the guidelines for determining the excessiveness of damages: As to any excessive verdict, it is said in 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages section 366, p. 473 (1965): The damages, therefore, must be so excessive as to strike mankind, at first blush, as being, beyond all measure, unreasonable, and outrageous, and such as manifestly show the jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice, or corruption. In short, the damages must be flagrantly outrageous and extravagant, or the court cannot undertake to draw the line; for they have no standard by which to ascertain the excess. (264 So.2d at 405) The question of the adequacy or inadequacy of damages is one of the most perplexing questions with which the courts must struggle. Dickey v. Parham, 295 So.2d 284 (Miss. 1974). Awards fixed by juries are not merely advisory and will ordinarily not be set aside except where so unreasonable in amount as to strike mankind at first blush as being beyond all measure, unreasonable, and outrageous. Mississippi State Hwy. Comm. v. Antioch Baptist Church, supra. Evidence of bias, passion, or prejudice on the jury's part is an inference to be drawn from contrasting the amount of a verdict with the amount of damages. Walton v. Scott, 365 So.2d 630 (Miss. 1978). In the case sub judice, appellants alleged damages to their crops in the amount of $102,015.50. Liability was not disputed. At the time the chemical applications were made, the wind speed varied from zero to six miles per hour. It was undisputed that the railroad tracks traversed the farm for approximately 3 1/2 miles. The remaining evidence as to the extent of damages was sharply in conflict. Appellants' witnesses consisted of Bill Schoppe, Robert Kennedy and Fred Grossman. Schoppe was a partner in the ownership of Refuge Plantation while Kennedy and Grossman were employees thereof. Schoppe, through his boll and pod counts in late August and early September, asserted a damage figure of $81,485.03. This figure was based on a 75% yield reduction to 225 acres of cotton affected by the chemical spray and a 65% yield reduction to 102 acres of soybeans affected by the spray. Grossman, who became farm manager in late July or early August, substantiated the amount of acreage affected by the spray as testified to by Schoppe. Kennedy, an employee of the Refuge Plantation for twenty-six years, asserted the damage to the crops extended from the railroad tracks midway to the highway. Although none of the witnesses had any formal education in agriculture, the three witnesses had numerous years of experience in farming (Schoppe, 8 yrs.; Kennedy, 26 yrs.; and Grossman, all his life). Formal education is not the sole process of becoming an expert in a field. An expert witness may qualify to give an opinion through his experience only. Ludlow Corp. v. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 317 So.2d 47 (Miss. 1975). Appellee's witnesses consisted of Bill Doyle, the farm manager of Refuge Plantation during 1977, Albert Lee Frazier, Jr., a crop-damage investigator, and Dennis Ford Bouchard, the entomologist employed by the Refuge Plantation in 1977. Their witnesses approximated appellants' damages as between $2850 and $5500, asserting a substantially lesser amount of acreage being affected by the spray. These witnesses denied that Schoppe's method of computing his yield loss was accurate and also contended that the A.S.C.S. records of the Refuge Plantation were not compatible with the extent of loss claimed by appellants. Appellee contends its witnesses were more credible because of their qualifications and lack of interest in the cause. Opinions of experts, however, are merely advisory and are not to be blindly followed by a jury. Rather they are to be weighed and judged in view of all the testimony in the case and the jury's own general knowledge of affairs and are to be given such consideration as the jury believes they deserve. Mississippi State Hwy. Comm. v. Madison County, 242 Miss. 471, 135 So.2d 708 (1961). Nor can it be said that appellee's witnesses were disinterested in the cause. The experts were hired by appellee, and Bill Doyle had previously been fired by appellants. The amount of time each witness spent on the plantation was an issue to be considered by the jury as to how much weight should be accorded the witnesses' testimony. The amount of damages awarded by the jury was certainly within the range of evidence presented by both sides. Although Schoppe's computation of damages may not have been the most accurate method, his approximation remained in evidence. Nor can the A.S.C.S. records produced by the appellee be blindly followed. 1977 was the first year appellants farmed the Refuge Plantation. According to Schoppe, their farming methods were drastically different and better than those used by the previous owners. Since different methods were employed on the plantation during 1977, aside from different atmospheric conditions, these records were of little value to the jury as far as determining the amount of yield reduction appellants suffered as a result of the chemical spray. After a careful examination of the entire record and the briefs, this Court is of the opinion that the trial court abused its discretion by granting appellee's motion for a remittitur or, in the alternative, a new trial on the issue of damages. Appellants, through their numerous years of experience in farming, approximated their damages based upon their investigation and experience. Appellee's evidence was in serious conflict therewith. However, it was not for the trial judge to choose in effect to disregard appellants' evidence and remit the jury's award of damages which was well below that testified to by appellants. The remittitur ordered by the learned trial judge reduced the jury award by approximately two-thirds and that testified to by appellants by approximately six-sevenths. The credibility of the witnesses was for the jury's determination. Therefore, this case should be and is hereby reversed and the jury verdict reinstated. REVERSED AND JURY VERDICT REINSTATED. PATTERSON, C.J., SUGG and WALKER, P. JJ., and BROOM, ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING, HAWKINS and PRATHER, JJ., concur.