Opinion ID: 1698242
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: legal effect of terms under which the savings account and lock box were set up and the certificates of deposit were purchased.

Text: In a 1951 case, this Court stated: The general rule of law seems to be that in instances where a joint tenancy has been created by a clear and unambiguous agreement, and the evidence of the existence of a contrary intention is not present, the Courts have held that a true joint tenancy has been created with respect to the contents of a safe deposit box and the surviving tenants become vested with title thereto. Duling v. Duling's Estate, 211 Miss. 465, 479, 52 So.2d 39, 45 (1951). The statutes of Mississippi have now abolished the need to prove intent in determining ownership of joint accounts. In 1988, the Legislature amended the statutes to expressly state the establishment of any such joint accounts creates an automatic presumption of intent to give ownership to the person or persons named on the accounts, whether living or as survivors. [7] Writing for the Court, Justice Robertson noted in Cooper v. Crabb, 587 So.2d 236, 240 (Miss. 1991), that § 81-5-63 also covers ownership of certificates of deposit issued in two or more names. In addressing the effect of purchasing certificates of deposit as joint tenants, the Cooper Court found the language which stated such certificates were payable to either named person or the survivor was unambiguous. Id. And the Court further stated, [W]e have never given cause for doubt that we will enforce express survivorship clauses. Id. Under the rules of law in this state, established both by statute and through case law, then, Madden presumptively held title to the cash and certificates of deposit in the safe deposit box and the cash in the savings account as the surviving joint tenant. Such presumptive title may be defeated, however, upon proof of forgery, fraud, duress, or an unrebutted presumption of undue influence. See Cooper v. Crabb, 587 So.2d 236, 242 (Miss. 1991). The Special Chancellor found that, absent the unrebutted presumption of undue influence, Madden would have been entitled to the contents of both the savings account and lock box, in their entirety. He rightly recognized the statutorily-created presumption of an intent on Sierra's part to vest title in Madden, although there was uncontradicted testimony Sierra stated at the time he set up the accounts with her name on them that he only did so so she could transact his business in the event he was unable to do so for himself. The chancellor's finding on that point was not in error, insofar as it relates to this case. [8] Our inquiry must turn next, then, to the issue of undue influence.