Opinion ID: 2802554
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the item is material to preparing the defense;

Text: (ii) the government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial; or (iii) the item was obtained from or belongs to the defendant. 1 Each internet network is assigned a separate IP address; this address refers to the physical location of that particular network. A GUID number is produced whenever a peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing application (like LimeZilla) is installed or updated on a computer, and remains associated with the computer whenever the filesharing program is in use. R. 1-1 (Criminal Compl. at 11) (Page ID #12). Pirosko’s GUID number thus remained the same over the course of the investigation, even though he logged onto different internet networks (with different IP addresses) across the country. No. 14-3402 United States v. Pirosko Page 4 Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E). In support of this motion, Pirosko submitted a letter from Interhack, a computer analysis company, which noted that “[a]nalysis of the tools used by investigators to create records can determine whether law enforcement officers manipulated data on the subject computer, the error rates in records used, or whether the GUID in question at a particular time is connected to a particular installation of LimeZilla.” R. 26-1 (Exh. in Mot. to Compel Disc. at 4) (Page ID #181). The government responded by noting that it had connected with Pirosko’s computer using ShareazaLE, a proprietary program used exclusively by law enforcement. According to the government, this program allows officials to download files exclusively from a target’s computer (users of publicly available file-sharing programs download from multiple sources in order to expedite the download process). It opposed Pirosko’s request for access, stating that ShareazaLE was a form of “sensitive law enforcement surveillance software protected . . . by qualified privilege.” R. 32 (Resp. to Mot. to Compel Disc. at 4) (Page ID #199). In addition, the government argued that Pirosko had failed, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, to show materiality. The district court denied Pirosko’s motion to compel, relying largely on the government’s privilege argument and finding that Pirosko had failed to show a particular need for access.