Opinion ID: 1284136
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the gates totality of the circumstances approach

Text: In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, the magistrate issued a search warrant based on the following affidavit: Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that heroin, marijuana, barbituates and other narcotic and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the above described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law. Id. at 109, 84 S.Ct. at 1511, 12 L.Ed.2d at 725. The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction because the affidavit did not provide a sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause. The Court required that: The magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant .. . was credible or his information reliable. Id. at 114-15, 84 S.Ct. at 1513-14, 12 L.Ed.2d at 729. Therefore, the two-pronged test required that the affidavit establish (1) the informant's basis of knowledge, and (2) the informant's credibility or the reliability of his information. The U.S. Supreme Court modified the Aguilar test in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. For the first prong requiring basis of knowledge, the Court allowed some detailed tips from informants to be self-verifying. In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered, it is especially important that the tip describe the accused's criminal activity in sufficient detail that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation. Id. at 416, 89 S.Ct. at 589, 21 L.Ed.2d at 644. In addition, independent police corroboration of details in the informant's tip could establish the informant's credibility or the reliability of his information under the second prong. Id. at 417, 89 S.Ct. at 589, 21 L.Ed.2d at 644. In construing provisions of the Alaska Constitution similar to the United States Constitution, we give careful consideration to the holdings of the United States Supreme Court, although we are not bound by them. State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 876 (Alaska 1978). Thus, we have followed the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis in cases involving both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution. See, e.g., Keller v. State, 543 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1975) (adopting under our state constitution Aguilar-Spinelli's requirement that an affidavit establish both informant's basis of knowledge and his veracity), Harrelson v. State, 516 P.2d 390, 394-95 (Alaska 1973) (rejecting in part United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971) and requiring affidavit to specify the underlying circumstances to allow a magistrate to independently assess an informant's veracity). In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the United States Supreme Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test in favor of a totality of the circumstances approach. Under this approach, [t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. 103 S.Ct. at 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d at 548. The sole task of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Id. The state asks us to apply the Gates test under the state as well as the federal constitution to uphold the search warrant in this case. We decline this request. As the Washington Supreme Court stated regarding the Gates test: Prior reliance on federal precedent and federal constitutional provisions [does] not preclude us from taking a more expansive view of [the state constitution] where the United States Supreme Court determines to further limit federal guaranties in a manner inconsistent with our prior pronouncements. State v. Jackson, 102 Wash.2d 432, 688 P.2d 136, 140-41 (1984). [2] Similarly, we may construe Alaska's constitutional provisions such as Article I, Section 14 as affording additional rights to those granted by the United States Supreme Court under the federal constitution. State v. Glass, 583 P.2d at 876 n. 12. The Supreme Court offered several reasons for abandoning the Aguilar-Spinelli test. The Court asserted (1) that probable cause is a fluid concept involving an assessment of probabilities in a particular factual context, rather than a neat set of legal rules, 103 S.Ct. at 2328, 76 L.Ed.2d at 544; (2) that the basis of knowledge and veracity elements of the Aguilar-Spinelli test should not be accorded independent status so that a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability, id. at 2329, 76 L.Ed.2d at 545; (3) that affidavits are normally drafted by nonlawyers and issued on the basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen, id. at 2330, 76 L.Ed.2d at 546; (4) that a court's scrutiny of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review, id. at 2331, 76 L.Ed.2d at 547; (5) that if courts subject affidavits to greater scrutiny, police may resort to warrantless searches with the hope of relying on consent or some other exception to the warrant clause that might develop at the time of the search, id.; and (6) that rigorous application of the Aguilar-Spinelli requirements will impede the task of law enforcement, diminishing the value of anonymous tips in police work. Id. at 2331-32, 76 L.Ed.2d at 547-48. These propositions do not persuade us that we should abandon the Aguilar-Spinelli test under Article I, Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution. As for proposition (1), the two-pronged test has not reduced probable cause to a neat, artificial set of legal rules. Rather, the two-pronged test simply provided a structure for probable cause inquiries, and if not rigidly applied, allowed sufficient room for assessment of the unique facts of the particular case. [3] We find Justice Brennan's defense of Aguilar-Spinelli persuasive: Aguilar and Spinelli require the police to provide magistrates with certain crucial information. They also provide structure for magistrates' probable cause inquiries. In so doing, Aguilar and Spinelli preserve the role of magistrates as independent arbiters of probable cause, insure greater accuracy in probable cause determinations, and advance the substantive value of precluding findings of probable cause, and attendant intrusions, based on anything less than information from an honest or credible person who has acquired his information in a reliable way. Gates, 103 S.Ct. at 2357, 76 L.Ed.2d at 580 (Brennan, J., dissenting). We have also emphasized the independent role of a magistrate in the determination of probable cause. Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d 275, 281 (Alaska 1978). When an affidavit relies upon the assertion of a confidential informant to establish probable cause, the affiant must set forth sufficient facts to enable the magistrate to assess the informant's probable credibility. Only if this requirement is met can a reviewing court be certain that the magistrate has fulfilled his constitutional duty to render an independent determination that probable cause exists. Keller v. State, 543 P.2d at 1216. As for proposition (2), a strong showing on one prong should not overcome a deficiency in the other prong. For example, we have held that a sufficiently detailed tip could support an inference of an informant's personal knowledge under the basis of knowledge prong. Davis v. State, 499 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Alaska 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). However, a detailed description by itself sheds no light on an informant's veracity. If the informant were concocting a story out of whole cloth, he could fabricate in fine detail as easily as with rough brush strokes. Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 313 A.2d 847, 862 (1974). Conversely, a strong showing of the informant's veracity does not compensate for a failure to explain how the informant reached his conclusions. Truthful persons can be the bearers of hearsay, rumor, gossip, or bare conclusions, as surely as can be liars. State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d at 142. Without a requirement of an adequate basis of knowledge, the magistrate may mistakenly rely on a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation in making a probable cause determination. Keller v. State, 543 P.2d at 1218 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 416, 89 S.Ct. at 589, 21 L.Ed. at 637). In proposition (3), the Supreme Court notes that nonlawyers often draft affidavits in the haste of criminal investigation. In Keller, we stated: The purpose of the warrant requirement is to prevent the police from hasty, ill-advised, or unreasonable actions in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Id. at 1219 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436, 440 (1948)).  Because nonlawyers are so often involved in the initial probable cause determination, there is a need for a test that provides more guidance than a totality of circumstances approach. [4] As Justice White states in his concurring opinion, it will often be a difficult question whether a particular anonymous tip provides the basis for issuing a warrant. However, rather than totally abdicating our responsibility in this area, we should attempt to provide more precise guidance for the police and magistrates. Gates, 103 S.Ct. at 2350, 76 L.Ed.2d at 571 (White, J., concurring). [5] Proposition (4) states that a court should not undertake a de novo review of the sufficiency of the warrant. Under Alaska law, a magistrate's initial determination of probable cause is given considerable deference. The resolution of doubtful or marginal cases should be largely determined by the preference accorded to warrants. Johnson v. State, 617 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Alaska 1980); Lockwood v. State, 591 P.2d 969, 970-71 (Alaska 1979). Therefore, proposition (4) merely reiterates the present state of the law in Alaska. We find proposition (5) equally unpersuasive. Under Alaska law, there has been a strong preference for the warrant process. We have previously stated: the principle of antecedent justification is so central to the Fourth Amendment that subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127, 132 (Alaska 1971) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967)). See also Keller v. State, 543 P.2d at 1219-20; Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 735 (Alaska 1979) (expressing strong preference for the warrant process under the state constitution). Finally, in proposition (6), the Gates majority asserted that rigid application of the two-pronged test could seriously impede law enforcement by diminishing the value of anonymous tips in police work. In part, the United States Supreme Court was probably influenced by the Illinois court's application of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. The Illinois Supreme Court held that police corroboration of details in an anonymous letter could never satisfy the veracity prong, especially if only innocent details were corroborated. Gates, 103 S.Ct. at 2327, 76 L.Ed.2d at 543. In contrast, however, Alaska case law reflects a flexible application of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. For example, in Schmid v. State, 615 P.2d 565 (Alaska 1980), police corroboration of details provided by a confidential informant sufficiently established probable cause. We rejected the defendant's argument that police should verify an incriminating fact before corroboration could be used to demonstrate an informant's credibility, because this would severely limit the use of informants to provide probable cause. Id. at 577. See also Kralick v. State, 647 P.2d 1120, 1123-24 (Alaska App. 1982) (magistrate could conclude that informant's tip was based on his personal observations because the tip's information was sufficiently detailed to support an inference of personal knowledge. Additionally, the informant's credibility was demonstrated by police observations). Under Alaska law, the anonymous tip continues to play an important role in police work. [6]