Opinion ID: 199400
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Two Summary Judgment Opinions

Text: 22 The district court originally denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. Geffon v. Micrion Corp., No. 96-11596-REK (D. Mass. Sept. 24, 1998) (memorandum and order) [hereinafter Geffon, First Summary Judgment Opinion]. The court held that there were multiple plausible interpretations of the statements at issue, and that a reasonable jury could find that any of the three statements was misleading in context. See id. at 6-8. The court also found that genuine dispute[s] of fact existed as to whether the statements were material. Id. at 9. Most notably for our purposes, the court noted that the question of scienter should ordinarily be left to the trier of fact, id. at 10 (quoting In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989)), and concluded that because evidence has been proffered... that defendants knew that Read-Rite had not committed itself to purchasing the 50 machines from Micrion, a genuine dispute of fact existed as to the question of scienter, id. at 10-11. Although the district court refused to grant summary judgment for defendants, it explicitly noted that it would not allow this case to proceed to a jury trial until plaintiffs have identified factual issues for submission to the jury, and it reserved the option of reconsidering its summary judgment ruling should it not be persuaded that a material fact was genuinely in dispute. Id. at 13. 23 After accepting proposed jury questions and limited additional evidence (immaterial for the purposes of this appeal), the court revisited its summary judgment opinion. It determined that the evidence proffered by appellants was insufficient to show a genuine dispute of material fact. Geffon, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 148. It based this determination on its conclusion that, as a matter of law, the Agreement constituted a firm order for 25 units and a blanket order for 50 units. Id. As a result of this legal conclusion, the court determined that no reasonable jury could find Micrion's use of the word order to be false and misleading in the respect alleged by plaintiffs, and thus no actionable misrepresentations had been made by Micrion or Micrion officers. 5 To the extent the court addressed the question of scienter, it noted that its conclusion that defendants were entitled to summary judgment was reenforced by consideration of Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999), which had required heightened pleading requirements with respect to scienter after passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the PSLRA).