Opinion ID: 2329095
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bouchard's Other Contentions

Text: [¶ 23] Bouchard also contends that the court erred in instructing the jury, in excluding evidence, and in failing to merge the misuse of entrusted property count with the theft by unauthorized taking or transfer count. We conclude that each of these contentions is without merit.
[¶ 24] Bouchard argues that the court should not have instructed the jury regarding Maine's conflict of interest statute, 5 M.R.S.A. § 18, which provides: An executive employee commits a civil violation if he personally and substantially participates in his official capacity in any proceeding in which, to his knowledge, any of the following have a direct and substantial financial interest: A. Himself, his spouse or his dependent children; B. His partners; C. A person or organization with whom he is negotiating or has agreed to an arrangement concerning prospective employment; D. An organization in which he has a direct and substantial financial interest; or E. Any person with whom he has been associated as a partner or fellow shareholder in a professional service corporation. . . . 5 M.R.S.A. § 18(2) (2002 & Supp.2004). [¶ 25] At the close of the evidence, the court instructed the jury as to the elements of each of the offenses with which Bouchard was charged, and then informed the jury as to the substance of section 18. Bouchard did not object to the court's instruction. Our review is therefore for obvious error. See M.R.Crim. P. 52(b); State v. Small, 2000 ME 182, ¶ 5, 763 A.2d 104, 105. [¶ 26] The court accurately recited the provisions of the conflict of interest statute, and the information was helpful to the jury in understanding the context of various witnesses' testimony that Bouchard had violated State conflict of interest law. The court made clear that [t]his [conflict of interest statute] isn't a charge pending against the defendant. This is simply some law as it exists on our books. It was not error, much less obvious error, for the court to inform the jury regarding section 18.
[¶ 27] Although Bouchard did not object to the court's jury instruction regarding theft by unauthorized taking or transfer, he contends on appeal that the court erred by omitting the word unauthorized in its recitation of the elements of the offense. We again review the instruction for obvious error affecting substantial rights. See M.R.Crim. P. 52(b); Small, 2000 ME 182, ¶ 5, 763 A.2d at 105. [¶ 28] We review the jury instructions in their entirety to ensure that they informed the jury correctly and fairly in all necessary respects of the governing law. State v. Lemieux, 2001 ME 46, ¶ 2, 767 A.2d 295, 296 (quotation marks omitted). The substance of Bouchard's trial was his use of the State fuel credit card to obtain cash for unauthorized purposes. The entire trial was centered on whether Bouchard's use of the State credit card was authorized. When the jury instructions are viewed in their entirety, the omission of the word unauthorized from part of the jury instructions does not constitute obvious error.
[¶ 29] Bouchard also contends that the court erred in excluding evidence about other game wardens who were also employees of, but had no ownership interest in, private businesses that did business with the State. Because such evidence had little or no relevance, but had a great potential to confuse the jury, the court acted well within its discretion in excluding such evidence. See M.R. Evid. 403; Fitzgerald v. City of Bangor, 1999 ME 50, ¶ 10, 726 A.2d 1253, 1255.
[¶ 30] Finally, because neither the relevant facts nor the elements as legally defined are the same for either charge, we find no merit to Bouchard's contention that the misuse of entrusted property charge should be merged into the charge of theft by unauthorized taking or transfer. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 13-A (1983); State v. Poulin, 538 A.2d 278, 278 (Me.1988). The entry is: Judgment affirmed.