Opinion ID: 508452
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pretrial Motions, Jury Instructions, and Jury Confusion

Text: 19 Tracking the statutory language, Counts Three and Five charged that Duncan had filed a return which he did not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter and that Downing had advised the preparation of a return which was false and fraudulent as to a material matter in that the return represented (1) that Duncan was entitled to report the $115,000 item as a short term capital gain rather than as ordinary income, and (2) that Duncan was entitled to deduct the $8,800 item as interest when he had neither paid the interest nor taken the $8,800 paid by Desh into his own income. 20 A pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment, joined by both Duncan and Downing, argued that Counts Three and Five were duplicitous because each charged a defendant with more than one offense and created a danger of a nonunanimous verdict. 4 21 The motion sought dismissal or reformulation of the counts containing multiple specifications on the precise ground that a composite or patchwork nonunanimous verdict might result. The motion to dismiss was quite specific about this risk. Relying on United States v. Alsobrook, 620 F.2d 139 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843, 101 S.Ct. 124, 66 L.Ed.2d 51 (1980), and United States v. Droms, 566 F.2d 361, 363 (2d Cir.1977), defendants warned of the danger of conviction by a divided and less than unanimous jury ... if different members of the jury vote to convict on different violations charged in the count. Noting that two distinct falsities were alleged, requiring entirely different proof as to the two matters alleged, they urged that 22 [s]ix jurors, for example, may be convinced only that the interest expense deduction is improper, while the other six may believe only that the short-term capital gain is improper. 23 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Docket No. 11A, at 8-9. The District Court denied the motion. 24 At the conclusion of trial, the District Court charged the jury that as one of the elements for conviction, the Government was required to prove that 25 defendant Duncan did not believe that this tax return was true and correct as to every material matter 26 and that 27 defendant Downing knew the income tax return at issue was false or fraudulent as to a material matter. The Court ruled as a matter of law that: 28 I have concluded that the statements charged were material statements. Therefore, there is no issue of materiality for you to decide. 29 Tr. 1953, 1956, 1958. Finally, the Court's charge on unanimity was a standard one: 30 In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree. The verdict must be unanimous. Tr. 1970. The verdict form read: 31 Question three. We, the jury, unanimously find the Defendant Joe S. Duncan 32 ______ of the offense 33 not guilty/guilty 34 charged in Count 3 of the indictment. 35