Opinion ID: 2723232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Factual Allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint

Text: According to the Complaint, Plaintiff Ford was the state legislator who sponsored the bill proposing Amendment 744 in 2003. He is also currently the mayor of the City of Tuskegee in Macon County. According to the Complaint, Ford and four of the five other individual plaintiffs—Maxwell, Samuel, Robinson, and Howard—all voted for Amendment 744 when it was put to a popular referendum in Macon County. 1 Each of these individuals is also the officer of an organization that received a license to operate bingo games pursuant to Amendment 744.2 Although the caption of the Complaint names each of these individuals only in his or her “individual and representative capacit[y],” 3 the body of the Complaint indicates that they also brought suit in their official capacities as representatives of these organizations. Each of the licensed organizations contracted with a third party, VictoryLand, to operate games in Macon County on 1 Plaintiff Patterson was not registered to vote in Macon County until 2007. 2 Ford is the mayor of the City of Tuskegee and the chairman of the Utilities Board. Maxwell is the chairman of the Macon County Commission. Samuel is the president of the Macon County Board of Education. Robinson is the director of the Tuskegee Repertory Theatre. Howard is the president of the Tuskegee-Macon County branch of the NAACP. 3 Plaintiffs sought to be certified as class representatives. See infra Part I.C. 3 Case: 14-10326 Date Filed: 09/03/2014 Page: 4 of 26 the license-holder’s behalf. 4 Plaintiff Patterson is a former VictoryLand employee. VictoryLand is not a party to this case. Defendant Bentley is the Governor of the State of Alabama. He is a white member of the Republican Party. Defendant Strange is the elected Attorney General of the State of Alabama. Both defendants were sworn into office in January 2011. Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants subsequently used their powers as state officers to have VictoryLand shut down as part of a scheme to disempower black and Democratic voters in Macon County. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants caused certain equipment at VictoryLand to be seized, removed, or destroyed, including electronic gaming machines that the Macon County sheriff had had certified as “legal bingo games,” in compliance with Amendment 744 and regulations issued thereunder. It is clear that Defendants acted under at least the pretext of a valid law-enforcement action. See Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d 337, 340, 355 (Ala. 2013) (per curiam) (ordering the lower court to issue a warrant authorizing the search of VictoryLand “as to certain allegedly illegal gambling devices” and stating that the Macon County sheriff’s opinion is not binding “on all other law-enforcement officers”). Plaintiffs insinuated in the Complaint, however, that Defendants actually shut down VictoryLand because its existence tended to 4 Amendment 744 expressly authorizes a “nonprofit organization” to “enter into a contract with any individual, firm, association, or corporation to have the individual or entity operate bingo games or concessions on behalf of the nonprofit organization.” Ala. Const. amend. 744(4). 4 Case: 14-10326 Date Filed: 09/03/2014 Page: 5 of 26 benefit the Democratic Party. Plaintiffs also insinuated that Defendants showed favoritism toward Indian gaming interests (to VictoryLand’s detriment) in exchange for financial and political support. Plaintiffs further alleged that VictoryLand’s demise caused its employees—presumably including Plaintiff Patterson—to lose their jobs and that it will cause local citizens to lose public services that had previously been funded from VictoryLand’s revenues. C. Plaintiffs’ Legal Claims in the Original Complaint Plaintiffs brought suit in their individual and official capacities and also sought to be certified as representatives of the class of “all residents and qualified voters of Macon County who are injured by the statutory and constitutional violations alleged in this complaint.” In their Complaint, Plaintiffs brought four counts. In Count One, Plaintiffs claimed a violation of their rights under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, on the ground that Defendants had implemented “unprecleared policies and practices affecting voting.” 5 The district court dismissed this claim sua sponte following the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), and Plaintiffs have since abandoned it. 5 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act contains an implied private right of action. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557, 89 S. Ct. 817, 827 (1969). 5 Case: 14-10326 Date Filed: 09/03/2014 Page: 6 of 26 In Count Two, Plaintiffs claimed a violation of their right to vote under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.6 Plaintiffs’ theory was apparently that Defendants had infringed their voting rights, and the voting rights of African-Americans in the putative class, by taking actions that undermined Amendment 744 years after those voters had supported it. In Count Three, Plaintiffs claimed “purposeful discrimination” in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 7 Plaintiffs’ theory was that Defendants had acted with the racially-discriminatory purpose and effect of denying them, and African-American voters in Macon County more broadly, “the ability to choose by constitutional amendment the laws and means of their enforcement in their own counties” and “the ability to exercise home rule in their respective counties.”8 Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants had 6 A majority of the Supreme Court has indicated that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act contains an implied private right of action. Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 232, 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1212 (1996) (two Justices); id. at 240, 116 S. Ct. at 1216 (three Justices). These Justices quoted from a Senate Judiciary Committee report that was generated during the 1982 amendment process. S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 208 (“[T]he committee reiterates the existence of the private right of action under section 2, as has been clearly intended by Congress since 1965.”). 7 Plaintiffs brought their constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “provides a cause of action for constitutional violations committed under color of state law.” Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187–88 (11th Cir. 1999). 8 In this regard, Plaintiffs alleged that Alabama is majority white and that Macon County and the City of Tuskegee are majority black. Plaintiffs also alleged, inter alia, that the 6 Case: 14-10326 Date Filed: 09/03/2014 Page: 7 of 26 “abridged and negated the 2003 vote enacting Amendment 744 and [had] devastated and continue to devastate Tuskegee, Macon County, and its citizens.” Plaintiffs explained that, “[b]y the closing of Victory[L]and, a historically poverty stricken area of black citizens will remain so and public services that Victory[L]and’s operating revenue would have funded will be curtailed or eliminated altogether.” In Count Four, Plaintiffs claimed “fundamental unfairness” in violation of their “due process rights.” Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants had unlawfully caused the invalidation of their rights in their licenses to operate bingo games in Macon County pursuant to Amendment 744. Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint for both lack of standing and also failure to state a claim. After full briefing, the district court granted Defendants’ motions on both grounds. Plaintiffs appeal that decision. D. Plaintiffs’ Proposed First Amended Complaint In the court below, Plaintiffs moved for leave to file a First Amended Complaint. We summarize a subset of the most substantial proposed amendments. First, Plaintiffs proposed to add as plaintiffs the sheriff of Macon County, the organizations licensed to operate bingo games in Macon County are “headed by predominantly black leaders and serve the predominantly black citizens of Macon County.” 7 Case: 14-10326 Date Filed: 09/03/2014 Page: 8 of 26 Macon County Racing Commission, and the Macon County Water Authority. 9 Second, Plaintiff Patterson proposed to prosecute the lawsuit both on his own behalf and also as a representative of all others who had lost their jobs as a result of VictoryLand’s demise. Third, Plaintiffs specifically alleged that Defendant Strange had “not operated in an even-handed manner” because, in another lawsuit, he had asserted that the Alabama Poarch Band of Creek Indian Casino Operators (“Poarch Creeks”) were operating gaming machines in violation of state law, but he had not raided, seized equipment from, or otherwise adversely affected the Poarch Creeks’ operations. Fourth, Plaintiffs alleged in greater detail the economic injury that the closing of VictoryLand had caused Macon County, its citizens, and the organizational plaintiffs. 10 Fifth, Plaintiffs proposed to add three additional counts, which we describe below. In the first proposed additional count, Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants conspired to deny them their “constitutional right to vote without due process of law and as a denial of the equal protection [sic] as guaranteed by the First, Fifth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States 9 Plaintiffs also proposed to explicitly name all of the aforementioned organizational plaintiffs in the caption. 10 For example, Plaintiffs alleged the loss of 2300 local jobs, which were primarily held by African-Americans, and the loss of revenue to “various governmental and charitable organizations” (including at least some of the organizational plaintiffs) in the form of taxes, fees, and gaming revenues. Plaintiffs also indicated that at least some of the organizational plaintiffs had cut, or would cut, projects or services as a result. 8 Case: 14-10326 Date Filed: 09/03/2014 Page: 9 of 26 Constitution in violation of [42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983]” by “intentionally nullify[ing]” their votes in favor of Amendment 744, its sponsor (thenRepresentative Ford), and the elected sheriff of Macon County. In the second proposed additional count, Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants participated in a racially- or class-motivated conspiracy to deny them their “property right to contract, or to own, operate, and maintain a bingo business in Macon County, Alabama[,] without due process of law as guaranteed by the First, Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in violation of [42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985]” by usurping the authority vested in the sheriff of Macon County and shutting down VictoryLand, while permitting the Poarch Creeks and another facility in Greene County to use the same or similar machines. In the third proposed additional count, Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants had negligently allowed their rights to be infringed in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986. After full briefing, the district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint on the ground that the proposed amendments were futile. Plaintiffs appeal that decision. E. Defendant Strange’s Motion for Sanctions Two days after receiving the initial Complaint, Defendant Strange notified Plaintiffs’ counsel, Donald LaRoche, of his intent to seek sanctions under Rule 11 9 Case: 14-10326 Date Filed: 09/03/2014 Page: 10 of 26 unless the Complaint was voluntarily dismissed. Plaintiffs did not voluntarily dismiss the Complaint, and Defendant Strange filed a written Motion for Sanctions. Plaintiffs opposed the motion in writing without requesting a hearing or any additional process. The district court granted the motion on the ground that attorney LaRoche should have known that Plaintiffs’ claims were “objectively frivolous.” 11 Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 87 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). Plaintiffs appeal that decision. We address each of the three appealed decisions in turn.