Opinion ID: 719595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tinker

Text: 124 The School's power to prohibit invidious discrimination by student clubs is reinforced by a line of Supreme Court cases beginning with Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). In Tinker, the Court held that public schools may suppress speech or expressive behavior that materially and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school or impinge[s] upon the rights of other students, even if the expression could not be suppressed outside a public school. Id. at 509, 89 S.Ct. at 738 (internal quotations omitted). See also Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266, 108 S.Ct. 562, 567, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school. (internal quotations and citations omitted)). After all, one purpose of public education is to inculcate students with values that will make them better citizens: 125 The[ ] fundamental values of habits and manners of civility essential to a democratic society must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even when the views expressed may be unpopular. But these fundamental values must also take into account consideration of the sensibilities of others, and, in the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow students. The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior. 126 Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 3163, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986). 127 True, we analyze this case under the Equal Access Act, while the Tinker line of cases concerned the limits on First Amendment rights in public schools. Nevertheless, the Equal Access Act strikes the same balance that the Supreme Court has struck between First Amendment free speech rights and a public school's right to maintain order: the Act grants broad free speech rights under § 4071(a), and restricts those rights, under § 4071(c)(4), when club meetings materially and substantially interfere with the orderly conduct of educational activities within the school. 30 See also 20 U.S.C. § 4071(f). 128 Thus, a school may deny recognition to a student group that would otherwise be entitled to protection under the Equal Access Act, if there are grounds for concluding that recognition of the group would materially and substantially interfere with the school's overarching mission to educate its students, as this standard has been explained by Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier. Valid grounds may include a school's concerns that a club's discriminatory policies would disadvantage, subordinate, or stigmatize the excluded students, debase the morals of students who practice the exclusion, or frustrate the teaching of the fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 106 S.Ct. at 3163 (internal quotations omitted). These values include tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even when the views expressed may be unpopular, id., but also disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to others. 31 Id. at 683, 106 S.Ct. at 3164. See Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 519-20 (2d Cir.1977) (school can prohibit student newspaper's attempt to distribute sex questionnaire to 9th and 10th graders, because substantial basis exists for concluding that they will be subjected to peer contacts and pressures which may result in emotional disturbance), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925, 98 S.Ct. 1491, 55 L.Ed.2d 519 (1978). 129 The School District contends that its nondiscrimination policy is the only way it can achieve an important educational objective: that students be free of any type of discrimination. Discrimination, says the District, creates multiple 'classes' of students, balkanizes the student community and breeds contempt, distrust and dissen[s]ion. But of course, high school students are subjected to discrimination and selection all the time: sports teams may be divided into girls and boys teams, some students may be allowed on the honor roll and others may not be, upper-level courses may be open to juniors and seniors but not to others, extracurricular activities may be closed to students who do not maintain a certain grade point average, see Pope v. East Brunswick Bd. of Ed., 12 F.3d 1244, 1255-56 (3d Cir.1993), and leadership positions in a club like Students Against Drugs may be inaccessible to students who advocate the legalization of drugs. Clearly, some types of discrimination are permissible in a high school setting, and some are not. The district court concluded that a school-recognized club that is permitted to discriminate on the basis of religion likely would be disruptive to the educational mission of the school, because it would be invidious and would impinge on the rights of other Roslyn students to be free from discrimination in school. 876 F.Supp. at 462. But as we explained in section V.A., supra, religious discrimination is not automatically invidious in a religious club; and the right of other students to be free from invidious discrimination is not infringed here. As the Court said in Fraser, a school may encourage tolerance of divergent political and religious views as part of its mission to inculcate fundamental values, 478 U.S. at 681, 106 S.Ct. at 3163, although this type of tolerance need not extend to highly offensive or highly threatening speech. Id. at 683, 106 S.Ct. at 3163. The School does not (and we think cannot) argue that the discriminatory leadership policy of the Walking on Water Club is highly offensive or threatening. 130 It is a delicate task to supervise student discrimination and exclusion to ensure that it is consistent with fundamental values and is not invidious. Schools may encounter student religious groups that want to discriminate invidiously on the basis of religion, by excluding others out of bias or by stigmatizing those excluded. We admit that the line between invidious and non-invidious discrimination does not glow in the dark. But for better or worse, schools have had to draw that line ever since the Tinker case in 1969. 131 In doing so, public school administrators must be given a great deal of autonomy in deciding how best to run their schools: [T]he education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273, 108 S.Ct. at 571. We must recognize, however, that the Equal Access Act is a definite, though measured, interference in these purely local decisions. A school's conclusory statement that prayer meetings will substantially and materially impede the orderly conduct of the school is an insufficient weight in the balance struck by the Act. 32 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 89 S.Ct. at 737 ([I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.). And here, the School offers nothing beyond these conclusory assertions. Based on this record, we conclude that allowing the Walking on Water Club to guarantee that three of its prayer leaders will be Christians does not constitute substantial and material interference with the School's mission of educating and disciplining.