Opinion ID: 169318
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dual Em ployment

Text: The Bains also object to the either/or nature of the jury verdict form: “W as Frintz an employee of Philco Construction, Inc. or was he a ‘special employee’ of IM C at the time of the accident?” J. App. at 204. They claim it ignored New M exico’s recognition of dual employment and allowed Philco to escape liability through the special employee defense without consideration of whether Frintz might remain in Philco’s employ at the same time. W e agree that New M exico law allowed the Bains to assert a dual employment theory, but even so, it would not have changed the outcome of trial. New M exico courts recognize dual employment. Rivera v. Sagebrush Sales, 884 P.2d 832, 834 (N.M . Ct. App. 1994) (“Under certain conditions, both the general and special employer are liable for workers’ compensation.”); Street v. -13- Alpha Constr. Servs., 143 P.3d 187, 191 (N.M . Ct. App. 2006) (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (“[W]orkers can have multiple employers, each of which is immune from suit” due to workers compensation preemption.). 6 Dual employment is especially relevant in co-employee workers compensation cases where the defendant employer and the special employer are both seeking insulation from liability or where the victim seeks benefits from both employers when one of them is unable to fully cover the workers compensation expenses. See 3 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s W orkers’ Compensation Law § 67.01[1] (2006). New M exico law also recognizes dual employment outside the workers compensation context. As the New M exico Supreme Court noted in Weese, “if one person lends his servant to another for a particular employment, the servant, for anything done in that employment, is dealt with as the servant of the one to whom he has been lent, although he remains the general servant of the person who lent him.” Weese, 312 P.2d at 547 (citing 35 Am. Jur. (M aster and Servant) § 541). But by recognizing dual employment while simultaneously rejecting a relinquishment requirement, the Weese court made clear that dual employment does not matter for purposes of respondeat superior liability. The defendant employer escapes liability by demonstrating the tortfeasor was the special employee of 6 Both Rivera and Street are workers compensation cases, but that does not undermine their relevance as it did when we analyzed the relinquishment requirement above. W orkers compensation preemption has no logical effect on whether an employee could have two employers. -14- another at the time of the negligent conduct regardless of whether the tortfeasor also remained an employee of the defendant. The Bains argue that under dual employment theory Frintz could still have been acting within the scope of his employment with Philco at the time of the accident, making Philco liable under Rivera. The Bains are correct that New M exico law recognizes dual employment. In the circumstances here, however, it is obvious that the district court’s failure to craft a different verdict form did not matter. If the jury had been presented with and chosen the option requested by the Bains, i.e., Frintz was both the special employee of IM C and the general employee of Philco, then Philco w ould still remain immune from liability. As Weese makes clear, a determination of special employment is the sole finding required to insulate the primary employer. A finding of dual employment in this case would necessarily also include the required finding of special employment by IM C— thereby sheltering Philco from liability for Frintz’s negligence. Accordingly, the district court’s instructions on dual employment did not affect the verdict.