Opinion ID: 465194
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Warranty Claims

Text: 49 This Court further concludes, however, that the district court erroneously applied the same conflict of laws analysis to the breach of warranty claims as it applied to the tort claims. In Boardman, 470 So.2d at 1031, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated: 50 First, the law of a single state does not necessarily control every issue in a given case. We apply the center of gravity test to each question presented, recognizing that the answer produced in some instances may be that the law of this state applies and on other questions in the same case the substantive law of another state may be enforceable. 51 (emphasis added). See also Fells v. Bowman, 274 So.2d 109, 112 (Miss.1973); Vick v. Cochran, 316 So.2d 242, 246 (Miss.1975). 5 52 This approach is in accord with the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. For example, section 175, which governs wrongful death claims generally, states that the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.... (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added). Accord Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws Sec. 145, Sec. 188. 6 53 The question presented to this Court, then, is whether a breach of warranty claim is an issue to which the Mississippi courts would apply a separate conflict of laws analysis. This Court concludes that the Mississippi courts would apply a separate analysis based on its adoption of certain relevant portions of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) governing warranties. 54 Price and Donaldson both asserted counts of breach of express warranties of fitness and merchantability and breach of implied warranties of fitness and merchantability. Record Vol. 1 at 12-15; Record Vol. II at 12-15. The U.C.C. presently provides that recovery for physical injuries is available on a warranty theory to purchasers and certain third party beneficiaries. Three provisions in the U.C.C. make recovery possible. Section 2-715(2)(b) states that injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty is a type of consequential damage that is recoverable. Mississippi has adopted this provision. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 75-2-715(2)(b) (1972). The U.C.C. also provides three alternatives, from which a state is to select one, for identifying those nonpurchasers who could recover for breach of a warranty, especially when suffering physical injury. U.C.C. Sec. 2-318. Mississippi has adopted the first of those three alternatives. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 75-2-318 (1972). 7 Finally, the U.C.C. provides that a [l]imitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable.... U.C.C. Sec. 2-719(3) (1972). Mississippi has adopted this provision. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 75-2-719(3). See W. Page Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS Sec. 98, at 693-94 (1984). 55 A claim based on a theory of breach of express or implied warranty, therefore, arises in large part under the U.C.C. and not under general tort theory. 8 Mississippi has adopted a specific conflict of laws rule for warranty claims, the emphasized portion of which is not generally found within the U.C.C. It provides: 56 (1) Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement, this code applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state. Provided, however, the law of the State of Mississippi shall always govern the rights and duties of the parties in regard to ... the necessity for privity of contract to maintain a civil action for breach of implied warranties of merchantability or fitness notwithstanding any agreement by the parties that the laws of some other state or nation shall govern the rights and duties of the parties. 57 Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 75-1-105 (1972) (emphasis added). 58 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Sec. 6 states that [a] court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law. Thus, at first glance, it would appear that Mississippi law governs the warranty claims in this action. Nevertheless, Mississippi's sole contact with this litigation is that it is the forum state. On remand, the district court is to address the constitutionality of applying Mississippi law to this case. See, e.g., Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 101 S.Ct. 633, 66 L.Ed.2d 521 (1981); Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410, 50 S.Ct. 338, 342, 74 L.Ed. 926 (1930). 59 Regardless of the specific applicability of the Mississippi U.C.C. conflict of laws rule, the district court should have separately addressed which state's law should govern the breach of warranty claims. See, e.g., Westerman v. Sears, Roebuck and Company, 577 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.1978) (Texas wrongful death statute held to govern negligence and strict liability in tort claims; Florida wrongful death statute held to govern breach of warranty claims); Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir.1969) 9 (court applied the place of injury rule to the tort claims and U.C.C. Sec. 1-105 choice of law rule to warranty claims; court held Georgia law governed both sets of claims). 10 60 ITT asserts that it is error to apply a separate analysis to the breach of warranty claims because this is a wrongful death action governed by section 175 and Mitchell. Under that analysis, ITT argues, Alabama law would apply regardless of the theory asserted as the basis for recovery. This Court disagrees. First, Mitchell involved only a tort claim; analysis of the conflict of laws issue in light of the general rules of tort was therefore clearly appropriate. That application in Mitchell, however, is not dispositive of claims under the U.C.C. or general contract law. Second, section 175 itself authorizes the issue by issue approach encouraged throughout the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Finally, Davis involved products liability claims, but the opinion does not apprise this Court of whether breach of warranty claims were presented. Moreover, the specific question presented to this Court does not appear to have been briefed or argued in that case. The issue is squarely presented in the instant case, and this Court holds that a separate conflict of laws analysis should have been applied to the breach of warranty claims. 61 ITT also makes several arguments concerning the merits of the breach of warranty claims asserted by Price and Donaldson. ITT argues that the statute of limitations has run in each state that might have an interest in this litigation. Moreover, ITT asserts that the requisite privity for asserting such claims is lacking under each state's law. These arguments were not presented to the district court and the district court has yet to have an opportunity to address these issues. It may do so on remand. 62 We remand this case to the district court for the initial determination of which state's law governs the breach of warranty claims. This Court declines to decide the question in the first instance. If ITT's arguments on the merits are supported, the district court may dispose of this case on those grounds. The parties are to be allowed to submit additional briefs and develop this area of law, particularly the applicability of the U.C.C. choice of law rule and/or general contract conflicts rules to these warranty claims. 11