Opinion ID: 827256
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: summary of champion

Text: In Champion, the plaintiff’s supervisor offered job security in exchange for sexual favors, and when the plaintiff refused, the supervisor used his authority to isolate the plaintiff in a remote portion of the building where they worked and raped her.2 This Court explained that under MCL 37.2103(i), a party pursuing a quid pro quo harassment claim in an employment context must establish “(1) that she was subject to any of the types of unwelcome sexual conduct or communication described in the statute, and (2) that her employer or the employer’s agent used her submission to or rejection of the proscribed conduct as a factor in a decision affecting her employment.” Champion, 450 Mich at 708-709. Like defendants in this case, the defendant in Champion argued that the plaintiff could not satisfy the second prong of a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim because the attacker was acting outside the scope of his authority when he raped the plaintiff and, as a result, was not acting as the defendant’s agent. This Court unanimously rejected that argument, stating that “when an employer gives its supervisors certain authority over other employees, it must also accept responsibility to remedy the harm caused by the supervisors’ unlawful exercise of that authority.” Id. at 712. We 2 Although many opinions address this issue in the context of workplace supervisorsubordinate relationships, those opinions are applicable to this case because the analysis is largely rooted in the recognition that a supervisor wields substantial authority over a subordinate, just as a sheriff’s deputy, acting under color of law, holds significant authority over a jail inmate. 2 further noted that “an employer rarely authorizes an agent to break the law or otherwise behave improperly; yet, liability is frequently imputed to an employer for such conduct.” Id. at 712 n 7. In concluding that the plaintiff could pursue a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim against the defendant, Champion explained that a contrary result would “create an enormous loophole in the statute” that “would defeat the remedial purpose underlying this state’s civil rights statute and would lead to a construction that is inconsistent with the well-established rule that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed.” Id. at 713, citing Eide v Kelsey-Hayes Co, 431 Mich 26, 34; 427 NW2d 488 (1988).