Opinion ID: 772959
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Scope of FDPA

Text: 25 Allen argues that the remarkable breadth of the FDPA fails to narrow genuinely the class of persons eligible for execution and fails to channel adequately a sentencing jury's discretion. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 877. We agree with the Fifth Circuit that, under the Constitution, the FDPA adequately narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and sufficiently channels a jury's sentencing discretion. See Jones 132 F.3d at 248-49 (finding that the FDPA narrows a jury's sentencing discretion by first requiring that a defendant had the requisite intent and second that at least one statutory aggravating factor is present). Moreover, the FDPA limits the class of persons eligible for the death penalty even before the jury considers intent and aggravating circumstances by authorizing the death penalty only for certain federal crimes. In short, how broadly or how narrowly the death penalty should be applied as punishment, if at all, is essentially a political choice left to the people's elected representatives in the legislative and executive branches, and we find none of the Eighth Amendment's limitations on that legislative choice facially applicable to the FDPA. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (ruling that the death penalty for rape is grossly disproportionate and excessive and thus cruel and unusual punishment); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (prohibiting the death penalty where it is greatly disproportionate to a defendant's culpability). We therefore reject Allen's argument that the FDPA authorizes a sentence of death for too many federal crimes. In particular, with respect to this case, murder is a crime for which the death penalty has long been deemed appropriate.