Opinion ID: 2570471
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Double jeopardymerger of offenses

Text: Peck's double jeopardy claim is based on his first trial, which ended in a mistrial. Prior to the district court declaring a mistrial, the jury foreman had signed verdict forms finding Peck both guilty and not guilty of Count I, Sexual Assault, the digital penetration of the victim's vagina. Peck claims that Count I could not be litigated again in a second trial based upon the principles of double jeopardy and merger of offenses. The prohibition against double jeopardy protects against three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Lomas, 114 Nev. 313, 315, 955 P.2d 678, 679 (1998); see also Gordon v. District Court, 112 Nev. 216, 220, 913 P.2d 240, 243 (1996). Peck was not acquitted at his first trial. Although the jury foreman signed the verdict form finding Peck not guilty of Count I, the verdict was not accepted by the district judge. The jury was not polled to determine if the verdict was unanimous, and the verdict was not recorded in the minutes of the court. Instead, the district judge declared a mistrial after questioning the jury foreman and ascertaining that the jury was unable to reach a verdict. When a mistrial has been declared by a district court, a defendant may be retried without implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. Beck v. District Court, 113 Nev. 624, 939 P.2d 1059 (1997). Peck contends that the two counts of sexual assault should be merged, citing Townsend v. State, 103 Nev. 113, 734 P.2d 705 (1987), in support of his claim. In Townsend, we held that only one sexual assault occurred when Townsend's actions were continuous and did not stop between the different acts. Townsend began lubricating the victim's vaginal area, stopped to put more lubricant on his finger and then penetrated the child's vagina with his finger. We held that these acts could not be charged as more than one sexual assault because [s]uch a hypertechnical division of what was essentially a single act is not sustainable. Id. at 121, 734 P.2d at 710. Peck also cites Oswald v. State, 715 P.2d 276 (Alaska Ct.App.1986), as authority that an act of digital penetration merges with the act of genital penetration into one offense. However, the Oswald case was overruled a year later in Rodriquez v. State, 741 P.2d 1200 (Alaska Ct.App.1987), wherein the court held that separate convictions are permissible where each conviction is for a different type of sexual penetration. The Alaska court reinforced the holding in Yearty v. State, 805 P.2d 987 (Alaska Ct.App.1991), where it upheld separate convictions for multiple acts of penetration which involved different types of sexual penetration. The court held that the convictions did not merge. Id. at 993. Peck testified at trial that he first fondled the victim digitally, partially removed some of her clothing, and then stopped before engaging in sexual intercourse. The great weight of authority supports the proposition that separate and distinct acts of sexual assault committed as a part of a single criminal encounter may be charged as separate counts and convictions entered thereon. Deeds v. State, 97 Nev. 216, 217, 626 P.2d 271, 272 (1981); see also Hamill v. State, 602 P.2d 1212 (Wyo.1979); People v. Perez, 23 Cal.3d 545, 153 Cal.Rptr. 40, 591 P.2d 63 (1979); People v. Saars, 196 Colo. 294, 584 P.2d 622 (1978); People v. Robinson, 80 Mich.App. 559, 264 N.W.2d 58 (1978); State v. Hill, 104 Ariz. 238, 450 P.2d 696 (1969). We have previously upheld four counts of sexual assault that occurred during one attack upon a victim. Hutchins v. State, 110 Nev. 103, 867 P.2d 1136 (1994). In this case, there was no merger between the forced digital penetration and the coercive sexual intercourse because both acts were separate and distinct acts of sexual assault. These separate acts cannot be considered a hypertechnical division of what was ... a single act. Townsend, 103 Nev. at 121, 734 P.2d at 710.