Opinion ID: 853224
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: What it Means to Have Special Needs

Text: Three cases, in particular, are important to understanding why NSC's random drug testing program violates Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
The special needs doctrine, in the context of searches by school officials, has its roots in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985), where the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment's usual probable cause standard should not apply in a school setting. In T.L.O., a teacher discovered two students smoking in a school lavatory in violation of school rules. The teacher took the pair to the assistant principal's office, where T.L.O., in response to the assistant principal's questioning, denied having ever smoked. Searching T.L.O.'s purse, the assistant principal found a pack of cigarettes along with various drug paraphernalia. T.L.O. was later adjudged a delinquent. T.L.O. claimed that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court agreed that the Fourth Amendment applied to searches conducted by school officials, but nevertheless concluded that school officials may conduct searches in the absence of the requirements imposed by the Fourth Amendment on other governmental searches. Id. at 340, 105 S.Ct. 733. The Court offered this explanation why a level of suspicion lower than that of probable cause is required for searches conducted by school officials, at least in the context of searches for evidence of school rule violations: [T]he legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search. Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider whether the ... action was justified at its inception, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. [1], at 20 [88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ]; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place, ibid. Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. Id. at 341-42, 105 S.Ct. 733. However, the Court also emphasized that there were limits to the authority of school officials to conduct a search under this lowered constitutional bar. Specifically, the reasonableness standard should ensure that the interests of students will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools. Id. at 343, 105 S.Ct. 733. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion introduced the phrase special needs into the public discourse on school searches. He expressed concern that a balancing test might become the rule rather than the exception. To curb this potential, he wrote, Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers. Id. at 351, 105 S.Ct. 733 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Searches in a school setting based on a lower standard are appropriate, he concluded, because of the need for immediate action on the part of teachers attempting to maintain order in the classroom.
The next principal case is Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995), on which the majority relies to justify its conclusion that NSC's drug testing program is reasonable. In Vernonia, the United States Supreme Court upheld a random drug testing program instituted by an Oregon school district. The plan called for testing of athletes only. In upholding this plan, the Court specifically endorsed Justice Blackmun's concurrence in T.L.O. and found that, on the facts presented, the Vernonia school district established a special need justifying the imposition of drug testing on a specific group of students. The Court relied heavily on the facts found by the district court that the Vernonia school district was faced with an immediate crisis and had been able to target the instigators as coming from the student-athlete population. Id. at 663, 115 S.Ct. 2386. [1] The Court relied on T.L.O. for the proposition that, in the public school context, a search unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional when the district demonstrates special needs, i.e. where strict adherence to the probable cause requirement would undercut `the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools.' Id. at 653, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S.Ct. 733). The Court cited three factors supporting the reasonableness of the Vernonia programthe decreased expectation of privacy of the student athletes, the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity of the need met by the search. None of these three is present in force to support NSC's plan. NSC's program applies to athletes, student drivers, and participants in a wide range of extra-curricular and co-curricular activities from Future Farmers of America to the school band. NSC's evidence of substance abuse in its schools is a survey conducted by the Indiana Prevention Resource Center in 1995 and given to students in grades seven through ten. Notably absent from the results is any data suggesting that students who claimed to have used a given substance also participated in one of the activities covered by NSC's testing program. The testing intrudes on students who in no way qualify for the lessened expectation of privacy some cases, like Vernonia, have attributed to athletes.
In Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997), the United States Supreme Court explained in further detail when it is appropriate to apply the special needs doctrine. The Court in Chandler found unconstitutional Georgia's policy of requiring certain candidates for public office to submit to drug testing. Justice Ginsburg, writing for an eight-member majority, explained that to successfully make the case that a special need exists, a government actor must demonstrate a concrete danger demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment's main rule. Id. at 319, 117 S.Ct. 1295. Georgia argued that its testing policy passed constitutional muster based on the Court's earlier decisions upholding suspicionless testing of student athletes, Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564, certain United States Treasury employees, Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989), and certain railroad employees, Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). The Court explained that the employees subject to testing in Von Raab were directly involved [in] drug interdiction, [2] Skinner offered evidence of drug and alcohol abuse by railway employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks, and Vernonia responded to an immediate crisis prompted by a sharp rise in students' use of unlawful drugs. Georgia's plan to screen candidates for public office failed to address a concrete danger, the Court explained, because: (1) the record did not suggest that the hazards argued by the state were real and not simply hypothetical for Georgia's polity; (2) the requirement was not well designed to identify drug users; (3) it was feasible, within the environment of public office, to note erratic conduct that would lead to a suspicion of drug use; and (4) the risk to public safety was neither substantial nor real. 520 U.S. at 319-23, 117 S.Ct. 1295. Although this case and Vernonia both address school programs, for several reasons NSC's plan is closer to Georgia's plan for wanna-be officeholders than the Vernonia plan for its students. First, the survey and other evidence relied upon by NSC may establish a drug problem, but not among the categories of students tested. Second, the testing, though intended to prevent school-wide drug use, identifies only drug users among the population of students who submit to the program. Third, it is feasible, as NSC's own policy makes clear, for NSC officials to determine when a reasonable suspicion of drug use exists. Fourth, NSC has not shown any evidence, of the type presented in Vernonia, of drug use as a source of significant problems in conducting the school's educational program.