Opinion ID: 1951369
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cases Interpreting Similar Statutes

Text: The Supreme Court has upheld similar statutes that regulate conduct but which are claimed to abridge First Amendment rights. In O'Brien, discussed above, the Court considered whether a federal statute prohibiting the knowing[ ] destr[uction] of a Selective Service card violated the First Amendment. 391 U.S. at 375, 88 S.Ct. 1673. O'Brien burned his draft card in an antiwar demonstration. The Court noted that on its face, the statute regulated conduct, not speech, and did not abridge the First Amendment. The Court stated, however, that when `speech' and `nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. Id. at 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673. Addressing O'Brien's claim that the statute was unconstitutional as applied and as enacted because Congress's purpose was to abridge free speech, the Court applied the test discussed earlier. Id. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673; see Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407, 109 S.Ct. 2533 (noting that the O'Brien standard is limited to those cases in which `the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression'). The Court held the statute met all of these requirements and upheld the conviction. Id.; cf. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49, 655-56, 104 S.Ct. 3262, 82 L.Ed.2d 487 (1984) (holding unconstitutional as impermissibly content-based a federal statute prohibiting the photographic reproduction of U.S. currency except for historical, newsworthy, or certain other purposes, but upholding the statute's size and color requirements for permissible reproductions as reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions). The Court subsequently upheld against a First Amendment challenge a federal statute similar to section 843.085(1), although it struck part of a related statute. In Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 90 S.Ct. 1555, 26 L.Ed.2d 44 (1970), the Court considered whether a conviction for wearing parts of a U.S. Army uniform without authorization violated the First Amendment. The defendant, who was not in the military, performed in a skit at an antiwar rally while wearing an official U.S. Army shirt with a shoulder patch and a military hat with the then-current official insignia of Army officers. He was convicted under the following statute: Whoever, in any place within the jurisdiction of the United States or in the Canal Zone, without authority, wears the uniform or a distinctive part thereof or anything similar to a distinctive part of the uniform of any of the armed forces of the United States, Public Health Service or any auxiliary of such, shall be fined not more than $250 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 702 (1964) (emphasis added). The defendant claimed that he was authorized to wear the uniform under a separate provision, which permitted an actor in a theatrical or motion-picture production to wear the uniform [w]hile portraying a member of the armed forces. Id. at 59-60, 90 S.Ct. 1555 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 772(f) (1964)). The Court first addressed the validity of the statute prohibiting anyone from wearing an armed forces uniform without authorization. Citing O'Brien, the Court stated that its previous cases would seem to make it clear that 18 U.S.C. § 702, making it an offense to wear our military uniforms without authority is, standing alone, a valid statute on its face. Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61, 90 S.Ct. 1555. The Court thus recognized that the government had the authority to regulate who could wear all or even part of its armed services uniforms. The Court in Schacht did invalidate a clause in the separate actor's exemption, which authorized actors to wear armed services uniforms, but only if they portrayed the military in a positive light: When wearing [of military uniforms] by persons not on active duty authorized. . . . . (f) While portraying a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, an actor in a theatrical or motion-picture may wear the uniform of that armed force if the portrayal does not tend to discredit that armed force. 10 U.S.C. § 772(f) (1964) (emphasis added). The Court explained that [t]his clause on its face simply restricts § 772(f)s authorization to those dramatic portrayals that do not tend to discredit the military, but, when this restriction is read together with 18 U.S.C. § 702, it becomes clear that Congress has in effect made it a crime for an actor wearing a military uniform to say things during his performance critical of the conduct or policies of the Armed Forces. 398 U.S. at 62, 90 S.Ct. 1555. In other words, the statute exempted only actors positively portraying the military. This was clearly a content-based restriction on speech. Important for this discussion, the Court invalidated only the clause prohibiting an actor from discrediting the military. Id. at 63, 90 S.Ct. 1555. Finally, in State v. McLamb, 188 Ariz. 1, 932 P.2d 266, 271-72 (Ct.App.1997), the defendant challenged on First Amendment grounds his conviction for the unauthorized wearing of a city's police insignia under an ordinance similar to section 843.085. The defendant was a retired Phoenix police officer. He was arrested operating a booth at a gun show while wearing his police retirement uniform with its official department insignia shoulder patches. Id. at 268. The city ordinance at issue made it unlawful for any person to wear a fireman's or policeman's badge or insignia, or the badge or insignia of any public officer or inspector of the City when not properly authorized to wear such badge or insignia. Id. at 269 (quoting Phoenix, Ariz., City Code § 23-21). Relying on Schacht, the court rejected the defendant's claim that the ordinance facially violated the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech. The court noted that, unlike the actor exemption in Schacht, the ordinance was not content-based and thus prohibit[ed] the unauthorized wearing of an official insignia without regard to a particular expressive activity or the political viewpoint communicated by the wearer. McLamb, 932 P.2d at 272. Because of the context in which he wore the insignia, however, the court determined that his conduct was expressive. McLamb had adorned his gun show booth with banners declaring, e.g., Police Support Your Right to Bear Arms, and testified that he wore the uniform to convey to others that he was a former officer who advocated a particular, political agenda. Id. at 273. Noting that on its face the ordinance was unrelated to the suppression of free speech, however, the court applied O'Brien and held the ordinance valid. 932 P.2d at 274. The court also held that the ordinance was not overbroad. The law was not directed at a particular group, did not censor any viewpoint, and did not significantly infringe on the First Amendment right of free speech. Id. at 275 (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 616, 93 S.Ct. 2908). As these cases demonstrate, the government may constitutionally prohibit certain conduct even if it incidentally affects speech. Yet in holding the Florida statute unconstitutionally overbroad, the majority analyzes none of these cases. Instead, it quotes several pages from our decision in Wyche v. State, 619 So.2d 231, 234-36 (Fla.1993). Majority op. at 1018-20. Contrary to the majority's assertion, however, Wyche does not apply in this context. In Wyche, this Court was concerned that the loitering statute potentially applied to protected freedoms, such as chatting on a public street and strolling aimlessly. Id. at 235. Unlike the conduct in Wyche, however, neither the unauthorized use of an official law enforcement uniform nor giving the false impression that one is a law enforcement officer is an otherwise innocuous activity. Nor is it a ubiquitous activity in which each citizen is entitled to engage, such as chatting and strolling. Rather, this case involves a statute, like the one in Schacht, which reserves the use of official uniforms and other indicia of government authority to those authorized to use that authority.