Opinion ID: 1058909
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: In the context of unwholesome food, the proof necessary to sustain a cause of action based upon negligence or breach of warranty is the same. [T]he burden requires the plaintiff to show `(1) that the goods were unreasonably dangerous either for the use to which they would ordinarily be put or for some other reasonably foreseeable purpose, and (2) that the unreasonably dangerous condition existed when the goods left the defendant's hands.' Harris-Teeter v. Burroughs, 241 Va. 1, 4, 399 S.E.2d 801, 802 (1991) (quoting Logan v. Montgomery Ward, 216 Va. 425, 428, 219 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1975)). The implied warranty of wholesomeness applies to the sale of food by restaurants. Levy v. Paul, 207 Va. 100, 106, 147 S.E.2d 722, 726 (1966). With regard to proximate causation where there is no direct proof, the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient to show that the causation alleged is a probability rather than a mere possibility. Southern States Coop. v. Doggett, 223 Va. 650, 657, 292 S.E.2d 331, 335 (1982). In his order setting aside the jury verdict, the trial judge opined that the testimony of Dr. Gaylord lacked a sufficient factual basis, and the remaining circumstantial evidence consisting of lay testimony was insufficient to support the jury verdict. We disagree with both of the trial court's holdings. Certainly, expert testimony is inadmissible if it is too speculative or lacks a sufficient factual basis. Forbes v. Rapp, 269 Va. 374, 381, 611 S.E.2d 592, 596 (2005); John v. Im, 263 Va. 315, 319-20, 559 S.E.2d 694, 696 (2002); Countryside Corp. v. Taylor, 263 Va. 549, 553, 561 S.E.2d 680, 682 (2002); see Code §§ 8.01-401.1 and -401.3. According to the trial court, Dr. Gaylord's testimony lacked sufficient factual basis because of the non-contemporaneous medical examination, the lack of laboratory testing, and the discrepancy in the timeline. We will address each issue seriatim. Dr. Gaylord examined Bussey less than two days after the onset of her illness. At that time, he analyzed the factors discussed in his testimony and reviewed the emergency room report prepared the previous evening. The essential nature of Bussey's symptoms remained the same from onset of illness until Dr. Gaylord's examination. Next, the trial court cites the lack of laboratory tests showing the existence of staphylococcal bacteria. We have never required positive proof by scientific testing to establish a factual basis for medical diagnosis and opinion. Dr. Gaylord cited a multitude of factors, including laboratory testing that excluded other causes of illness, which contributed to his opinion. Moreover, he testified that food poisoning is a fairly common illness for which scientific testing would not be cost effective, and the emphasis is on the last meal before the event. We are satisfied on this point that Dr. Gaylord's opinion was based sufficiently on facts known to him and was not speculative. Cf. Forbes, 269 Va. at 382, 611 S.E.2d at 597 (excluding expert testimony given off the top of [his] head). With regard to the alleged timeline discrepancy, Golden Corral makes much of the two hour difference between Bussey's testimony concerning the onset of illness four hours after eating, and Dr. Gaylord's testimony that most cases of bacterial food poisoning with manifestations such as hers arise within 6 to 24 hours. Of course, Bussey cannot rise above her own testimony, Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, 114 S.E. 652 (1922), but here the suggested conflict merely reflects the difference between symptoms experienced in the general population and those experienced by Bussey in particular, and created a jury issue regarding the weight to be given to the testimony. For these reasons, we hold that Dr. Gaylord's expert testimony concerning causation had a sufficient factual basis and the evidence was properly before the jury. Turning to the lay testimony, we begin with the proposition that, generally, lay testimony is admissible to prove proximate causation. Todt v. Shaw, 223 Va. 123, 127, 286 S.E.2d 211, 213 (1982) (lay testimony sufficient to raise a jury question even when expert testimony failed to establish causation); Sumner v. Smith, 220 Va. 222, 226, 257 S.E.2d 825, 827 (1979) ([direct medical] evidence is not a prerequisite to recovery). In Sumner, we held that testimony of the plaintiff, indirect medical evidence, and the reasonable inferences derived therefrom presented a jury issue as to causal connection. 220 Va. at 225-26, 257 S.E.2d at 827. See also Gwaltney v. Reed, 196 Va. 505, 509, 84 S.E.2d 501, 503 (1954) (plaintiff's testimony of pain occurring soon after an accident was sufficient to raise a jury question on causation). All that is required is that a jury be satisfied with proof which leads to a conclusion with probable certainty where absolute logical certainty is impossible. Bly v. Southern Ry. Co., 183 Va. 162, 176, 31 S.E.2d 564, 570 (1944). Our holdings in Sumner and Bly are directly applicable here. Cases involving food poisoning present unique circumstances because the primary source of evidence is usually consumed and transmuted in the ordinary course of its use. As a result, most cases will necessarily rely upon circumstantial evidence. We hold that the lay testimony coupled with the doctor's diagnosis was sufficient to support the jury verdict. Bussey ate only one meal within a 36 hour period, the meal consisted of beef that smelled bad, and thereafter she suffered a sudden illness that was diagnosed as food poisoning. The evidence is neither speculative nor scant, and the jury verdict naturally follows from fair inferences drawn from the evidence. The right to a trial by a jury in a civil case is constitutional in origin. Article 1, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia provides that in civil suits respecting property interests, trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred. A jury's verdict should be set aside only where it is plainly wrong or there is no credible evidence in the record to support that verdict. Such circumstances did not exist in this case.