Opinion ID: 63111
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of objection to testimony as hearsay

Text: Elio Johnson testified for the government and revealed that McCullen had recruited him to cash fraudulent loan checks. Johnson testified that he was paid $4,200 for endorsing a $20,000 loan check. Upon cashing the check, Johnson testified that he and McCullen returned to the barracks at Fort Polk, where several of McCullen’s friends had gathered. Johnson identified Pillows as one of the people gathered at the barracks. Johnson testified that, as he and McCullen left the barracks, Pillows called McCullen back into the building to talk. Although Johnson did not hear the conversation between Pillows and McCullen, he testified that McCullen told him that Pillows had asked McCullen for money and that McCullen had given it to him. Pillows’s counsel objected to Johnson’s testimony about the conversation between McCullen and Pillows as hearsay. The district court overruled the objection and admitted Johnson’s testimony as statements by a co-conspirator. Pillows’s counsel moved for a mistrial, stating that the district judge had erred in openly characterizing the statement as that of a co-conspirator because he “opin[ed] in front of the jury that there is a conspiracy.” The district court denied the motion. Defense counsel did not request that the district court instruct the jury contemporaneously regarding its statements to the jury. The court issued a general instruction to the jury at the close of evidence stating that the responsibility for determining guilt or innocence belongs to the jury, which is 7 No. 07-30238 free to disregard the opinions of the court. Pillows now argues that Johnson’s statement did not qualify as the statement of a co-conspirator because it was outside the scope of the conspiracy and, therefore, inadmissible. Pillows also argues that the district court’s conclusory remarks in open court regarding the existence of a conspiracy unduly prejudiced him. We review the district court’s admission of hearsay statements made by a co-conspirator under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Delgado, 401 F.3d. 290, 298 (5th Cir. 2005). A review of the record indicates that the conversation between Johnson and McCullen regarding Pillows’s involvement in the conspiracy took place immediately after one of the fraudulent loan checks had been cashed; indeed, part of the proceeds from that check was paid to Pillows at the time the conversation took place. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the statements Johnson testified to were not outside the scope of the conspiracy, even if the statements were outside the transaction that took place between McCullen and Pillows.1 Because Pillows did not request a contemporaneous limiting instruction or object to the instruction given to the jury regarding its duty as the fact-finder and obligation to disregard as evidence any opinions of the judge stated during the trial, we review the sufficiency or lack of a limiting instruction for plain error. See Delgado, 401 F.3d at 299. The record reveals that the district court 1 Even if the district court abused its discretion and erroneously admitted Johnson’s testimony, “the error is still subject to the doctrine of harmless error” and “will not require reversal if beyond a reasonable doubt the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” United States v. Hall, 500 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The government did not rely solely upon Johnson’s testimony to prove Pillows’s involvement in the conspiracy. Indeed, McCullen’s testimony and the testimony of several others provided ample proof of Pillows’s involvement. Therefore, any error by the district court was, at most, harmless. 8 No. 07-30238 made proper statements to the jury regarding its duties, and that any error did not affect the outcome of the trial, given the weight of evidence against Pillows. (2) Limitation of witness’s testimony and Sixth Amendment confrontation rights Jemelra Freeman testified on behalf of the government against Pillows in exchange for possible leniency on a separate, unrelated drug charge. Freeman testified that he had been recruited by Pillows into the conspiracy to endorse and cash fraudulent checks, but declined to participate. On cross-examination, Pillows’s counsel established Freeman’s prior conviction for theft, and attempted to ask Freeman about whether he had violated his probation supervision after serving his sentence. The district court prohibited that line of questioning. Pillows appeals that ruling, arguing that the refusal by the district court to allow his counsel to pursue the line of questioning related to his parole violation in order to impeach or discredit Freeman violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and was not harmless error. A defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights are “satisfied where defense counsel has been ‘permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’” United States v. Restivo, 8 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)). “A district court’s limitation of cross-examination of a witness is reviewed for abuse of discretion,” but this review “is only invoked if the limitation did not curtail the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.” United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2006). “Whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated is reviewed de novo.” Id. at 156. To establish a violation of his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights, Pillows need only establish that “[a] reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of [the witness’s] credibility had [defense] 9 No. 07-30238 counsel been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986). But “[w]hether the exclusion of evidence is of a constitutional dimension depends on the [district] court’s reason for the exclusion and the effect of the exclusion.” Kittelson v. Dretke, 426