Opinion ID: 2630971
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Deptulas' Claims Against the Estate Are Precluded Because the Deptulas Waived Their Right to Disclosure.

Text: The Deptulas argue that the superior court erred in concluding that the Estate did not owe them a duty to disclose the fact that Ms. Johnson died in the Bannister house. The Estate responds that the Deptulas waived any right to disclosure. We agree with the Estate. Alaska Statutes 34.70.010-.200 govern disclosures in residential real property transfers. Under Chapter 70 a party selling residential real property is required to complete a disclosure form in good faith and deliver it to potential buyers. [11] The written disclosure statement requires disclosure on conditions ranging from Roof or Other Leakage to Average Annual Utility Costs to Soil Stability. [12] A buyer can choose to waive his or her right to receive the written disclosure statement from the seller. Under AS 34.70.110, the disclosure requirement does not apply to the transfer of an interest in residential real property if the transferor and transferee agree in writing that the transfer will not be covered under this chapter. To facilitate such waivers, the disclosure form includes a page entitled Waiver By Agreement. This page succinctly states the purpose for which it may be used: If both parties agree to waive the requirement to complete this disclosure statement, please sign below. To be enforceable, a waiver must meet certain requirements. The waiver must be knowing and voluntary. [13] Although statutorily created rights can generally be waived, parties may not waive statutory rights [where] a question of public policy is involved, or where rights of third parties, which the statute was intended to protect, are involved. [14] The record here shows that the Deptulas' waiver of statutory disclosure was valid and enforceable. The Deptulas' own statements show that they understood they could walk away from the transaction if they were unwilling to waive their right to receive disclosure. Chester Deptula stated that he understood the legal effect of the waiver, namely that he would not be receiving disclosures about the condition of the Bannister house. The waiver form stated in unambiguous language that signatures by both parties would obviate the need to complete the form. [15] Further, public policy was not contravened by giving effect to the Deptulas' waiver. Both the legislature and the Real Estate Commission have voiced their approval of the use of waivers of statutory disclosure. [16] Indeed, Williams's own circumstances illustrate how waivers can promote alienability by allowing a party who may be incapable of warranting the condition of a home to avoid having to complete the disclosure form. Finally, third party rights are not affected because the terms of the real estate disclosure statutes protect only the purchaser, not the public at large. The Deptulas' arguments for invalidating the waiver were not preserved in the superior court and in any event are unpersuasive. The Deptulas argue mutual mistake of fact, but they failed to raise this argument below. Accordingly, it is waived. [17] The Deptulas next rely on AS 34.70.060, which requires that disclosures be made in good faith. But this statute applies only to a person who makes a disclosure . . . under this chapter. Because the Estate did not make any disclosures, AS 34.70.060 is inapplicable. In sum, the Deptulas' waiver of their right to receive statutory disclosures about the Bannister house was valid. [18] Because the Deptulas waived their right to statutory disclosure, their statutory claims against the Estate are precluded.