Opinion ID: 536607
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bar of Contract Claim

Text: 20 LeRoux Group argues that Wynfield's appeal of the directed verdict on the contract claim is barred because Wynfield has registered and accepted payment of the quantum meruit judgment. LeRoux Group reasons that Wynfield's acceptance of the quantum meruit judgment constitutes an election of remedies precluding Wynfield from pursuing a contract remedy on appeal. Wynfield argues that the contract claim is separate and distinct from its quantum meruit claim and that satisfaction of the quantum meruit judgment does not bar an appeal of the contract claim. 21 Two related doctrines are applicable in this case: the doctrine of election of remedies and the acceptance of benefits rule. The former determines when a litigant, who has chosen between two or more inconsistent and coextensive modes of relief, is precluded from resorting to the others. The latter determines whether a litigant who accepts the benefits of a judgment is foreclosed from pursuing an appeal. We hold that both doctrines preclude Wynfield's appeal of its contract claim.
22 The doctrine of election of remedies is an application of the doctrine of estoppel and operates on the theory that a party electing one course of action should not later be allowed to avail himself of an incompatible course. Barbe v. Villeneuve, 505 So.2d 1331, 1332 (Fla.1987); see Williams v. Robineau, 124 Fla. 422, 168 So. 644, 646 (Fla.1936). 23 When a party elects between two or more inconsistent courses and has knowledge of all the pertinent facts, he binds himself to the course he adopts first and cannot later withdraw from this knowing election. 24 Barbe, 505 So.2d at 1334. The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent duplicative recovery for the same wrong by requiring a party to elect between legally coexistent and inconsistent remedies. Id. at 1332-33; In re Alchar Hardware Co., Inc., 764 F.2d 1530, 1534 (11th Cir.1985). Inconsistent claims are claims that proceed from opposite and irreconcilable claims of right and [are] so inconsistent that a party could not logically follow one without renouncing the other. Barbe, 505 So.2d at 1333. 25 Generally, an election between inconsistent remedies is made after a verdict is entered but prior to the entry of judgment. Barbe, 505 So.2d at 1333. Wynfield, however, did not have an opportunity to elect its remedy before judgment because the district court directed a verdict on its contract claim. Thus, Wynfield was unable to elect a remedy at the phase of litigation when such elections are typically made. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Aetna Ins. Co., 436 So.2d 997, 1001 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983) (directed verdict on one count dispenses with the opportunity to make an election between inconsistent remedies). Wynfield, however, chose to pursue and collect the quantum meruit judgment after instituting this appeal. The legal issue, therefore, is whether Wynfield's post-judgment actions constitute an election of remedies barring its contract appeal. 26 LeRoux Group argues that Wynfield's collection of the quantum meruit judgment bars its appeal of the contract claim because Wynfield cannot collect a judgment on both a quantum meruit theory (restitution) and a contract theory (reliance). They assert that because Wynfield has elected, post-judgment, to receive the quantum meruit measure of recovery, it has waived its right to pursue an appeal of its contract claim. Wynfield counters that it may pursue a contract remedy on appeal because the contract remedy is not duplicative of a recovery under its quantum meruit theory. 27 LeRoux Group's position is persuasive. Under Florida law, recovery of damages under both a quantum meruit and a contract theory is inconsistent, such remedies being mutually exclusive and alternative measures of recovery. Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King Int'l, Inc., 267 So.2d 853, 858 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1972) (protection of the reliance interest and restitutionary interest are mutually exclusive). In this action, Wynfield voluntarily and knowingly chose to fully collect the quantum meruit measure of damages from LeRoux Group. This measure of recovery included Wynfield's loss of the reasonable value of its expenses, plans, processes, know-how, efforts, services and labors. Wynfield's claim is not that it has been denied full compensation under its quantum meruit claim. Instead, its contract appeal is based on Wynfield's expectation that a contract theory might have produced a larger damage award. The measure of recovery Wynfield sought under a contract theory included the loss of fees, charges and profits that Wynfield would have earned by developing, licensing, managing, and operating the two hotels as well as other hotels it might have developed in LeRoux's exclusive territory. In addition, under its contract claim Wynfield sought the recovery of the value of the confidential plans, processes and know-how supplied to LeRoux Group. Wynfield therefore essentially seeks to litigate a claim whose premise, the existence of a contract, is inconsistent with the quantum meruit judgment it has accepted and whose measure of recovery includes duplicate elements of damages. We hold that because Wynfield's post-judgment acceptance of the quantum meruit remedy is inconsistent with further pursuit of its contract claim, Wynfield is estopped from pursuing a contract remedy on appeal. Barbe, 505 So.2d at 1333. (If the allegation of facts necessary to support one remedy are substantially inconsistent with those necessary to support the other, then the adoption of one remedy waives the right to the other.) 28 Wynfield asserts that following a new trial on its contract claim, the district court would simply have to setoff Wynfield's recovery on the contract claim (if any) against the existing quantum meruit judgment. We view Wynfield's suggested procedure in a different light. Rather than a simple setoff, this procedure would require Wynfield to relinquish its quantum meruit judgment in order to elect recovery under the inconsistent contract remedy. This procedure is precisely the type of post-judgment election of remedies Wynfield cannot employ. In accepting payment of the quantum meruit judgment, Wynfield has elected its remedy. We conclude that Wynfield's decision to collect payment from LeRoux Group on the quantum meruit judgment prevents it from pursuing an inconsistent contract remedy on appeal.
29 Wynfield's appeal on the contract claim is also barred under the acceptance of benefits doctrine, which provides that a party who voluntarily and knowingly accepts the benefits of a judgment or decree cannot seek a reversal of the judgment or decree on appeal. McMullen v. Fort Pierce Financing Constr. Co., 108 Fla. 492, 146 So. 567, 568 (Fla.1933). This doctrine is based on the theory that a party who voluntarily collects a judgment is estopped from seeking reversal of the judgment because acceptance of payment acts as a release of claimed errors of the trial court. Id. The doctrine precludes an appeal unless (1) the judgment appealed from consists of two or more separate, distinct and unrelated parts; or (2) there is no controversy regarding the amount of a judgment to which a litigant is entitled in any event. Id. 146 So. at 568-69. 30 Because Wynfield accepted and collected the quantum meruit judgment, the acceptance of benefits doctrine precludes Wynfield's contract appeal unless one of the two exceptions apply. The first exception is inapplicable for the same reasons Wynfield's election of remedies argument fails: quantum meruit and contract remedies are inconsistent, mutually exclusive, and alternative measures of recovery. Beefy Trail, 267 So.2d at 858. In this case, because the two remedies arise from the same wrong, Wynfield's contract claim is not separate, distinct and unrelated to its quantum meruit claim. 31 The second exception is also inapplicable because Wynfield's entitlement to the amount of the quantum meruit judgment was not uncontested. McMullen, 146 So. at 568. As in McMullen, the parties contested the amount of damages throughout the litigation. Id. 146 So. at 569. LeRoux Group has never admitted that it owed Wynfield any amount of the quantum meruit judgment--instead the parties have intensely contested liability. Admittedly, because LeRoux Group did not file a cross-appeal on the quantum meruit judgment, Wynfield's entitlement to this judgment could be characterized on appeal as uncontested. It would be unfair, however, to permit Wynfield to collect the quantum meruit judgment, and then allow Wynfield to meet the second exception by claiming that LeRoux Group did not contest the judgment. Instead, a more principled approach recognizes that Wynfield's pursuit and acceptance of LeRoux Group's payment of the quantum meruit damages bars Wynfield's appeal on the contract claim. 32 Further, this action is unlike situations where a party whose entitlement to a particular amount of recovery is uncontested seeks additional recovery under a single legal theory. 5 The issue here is not whether LeRoux Group owes Wynfield some additional amount of quantum meruit damages beyond those allegedly uncontested; instead, the issue Wynfield advanced on appeal is whether LeRoux Group owes Wynfield greater damages under a different legal theory (i.e. a contract theory). Thus, Wynfield's appeal does not fall within the second exception and its acceptance of the benefits of the quantum meruit judgment bars its appeal on the contract claim.
33 In summary, Wynfield's collection of the quantum meruit judgment forecloses its appeal of the directed verdict on its contract claim for two reasons. First, Wynfield's decision to collect the quantum meruit judgment from LeRoux Group constitutes a post-judgment election of remedies which precludes its appeal on an inconsistent contract theory. Second, under the acceptance of benefits doctrine, Wynfield's acceptance of the benefits of the quantum meruit judgment prevents Wynfield from now appealing under a contract theory. Because Wynfield's appeal on its contract claim is barred, we need not address Wynfield's contentions that the district court erred in directing a verdict for LeRoux Group on the contract claim or erred in overruling Wynfield's pre-trial motions in limine to exclude certain evidence relating to the terms of the contract or post-execution negotiations. 6 34 A further limitation is the consent to judgment rule which provides that a party who accepts a judgment in toto without a reservation of rights to appeal may not later pursue an appeal. Fidelcor Mortg. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 820 F.2d 367, 369-70 (11th Cir.1987). This rule does not apply in this action because Wynfield specifically reserved its right to appeal in its motion to register the quantum meruit portion of the judgment. Wynfield did not consent to judgment in the entire action--it accepted only the quantum meruit judgment and reserved its right to appeal. The consent to judgment rule therefore does not prevent Wynfield's appeal of claims which are separate and divisible from the quantum meruit claim. Thus, Wynfield's appeal of the district court's directed verdicts against Wynfield on the fraud, punitive damages, and RICO claims is proper under the first exception because these claims are independent of and divisible from Wynfield's quantum meruit claim. Id. at 369.