Opinion ID: 2373688
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Constitutionality of His Death Sentence

Text: Appellant contends that the sentence is constitutionally defective on three grounds. First, he argues that the sentencing court failed to define adequately the burden of proof as to mitigation. On this point, the court stated: The Commonwealth has the burden of proving aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant has the burden of proving mitigating circumstances, but only by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a lesser burden of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt. A preponderance of the evidence exists where one side is more believable than the other side. I have already defined for you in the case in chief what is a reasonable doubt. (T.T., October 4, 1984, p. 8.110). We find nothing defective in this language. We also reject his attached allegation that the court failed to define reasonable doubt, which it did on two occasions as the judge noted. Second, Appellant refers to statutory language used in the charge that the verdict must be death if there is at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, or if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, and that the verdict must be life in all other cases. (T.T., October 4, 1984, p. 8.111). 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). He complains that the court did not instruct the jury that if the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, that the verdict must be life imprisonment. (Brief, p. 74). A charge to this effect was unnecessary. The court's charge correctly stated the two instances in which death was required, and charged that in all other cases, the verdict must be life imprisonment. Obviously, mitigation outweighing aggravation falls within the ambit of all other cases. The court's charge followed the statute, which decides a tie, and equal balance of aggravation and mitigation, in favor of the defense. It is also incorrect to conclude that the charge did not adequately and fully explain the manner by which the jury was to make its determination. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983), reh'g. denied, 463 U.S. 1236, 104 S.Ct. 31, 77 L.Ed.2d 1452 (1983). The next contention is that he was chosen for death arbitrarily since his two accomplices were not so sentenced. Appellant personally murdered the victim and his punishment was not arbitrary. Finally, under our statutory duty to review death cases to determine whether the imposed sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, according to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(3)(iii), we have conducted an evaluation of all convictions of murder of the first degree prosecuted under the Act of September 13, 1978, P.L. 756, No. 141, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711. We have reviewed the data and information pertaining to similar cases that have been compiled by the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts (AOPC) pursuant to this Court's directive as enumerated in Commonwealth v. Frey, 504 Pa. 428, 475 A.2d 700 (1984). We find that the sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(3)(iii), and that the sentence was not the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(3)(i). For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the convictions and affirm the judgment of sentence based on the conviction for murder of the first degree and the sentence of imprisonment imposed for the conviction of possession of an instrument of crime. [9] NIX, C.J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion joined by ZAPPALA and CAPPY, JJ. CAPPY, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion joined by ZAPPALA, J.