Opinion ID: 1212936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Appellant argues that the specific quantum of proof necessary for revocation has not been adequately specified in Nevada and that the proof should be convincing by objective standards and not in the unfettered discretion of the trial court. He has asked us to reject the reasonably satisfied standard enunciated in Lewis v. State, 90 Nev. 436, 529 P.2d 796 (1974), in favor of a preponderance of the evidence standard adopted in several other jurisdictions. See, e.g., United States v. Iannece, 405 F. Supp. 599 (E.D.Pa. 1975); Henderson v. State, 568 P.2d 297 (Okl.Cr. 1977). We are unpersuaded. The United States Supreme Court made it clear that a revocation hearing is not to be equated with a criminal prosecution but, rather, is a narrow inquiry in which the process should be flexible. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). Accord, Anaya v. State, 96 Nev. 119, 606 P.2d 156 (1980). Clearly, conviction is not a precondition to probation revocation, United States v. Markovich, 348 F.2d 238, 240 (2d Cir.1965), and here, because the unrefuted evidence presented at the hearing was reliable and obviously sufficient to satisfy the trial court that Dail had violated the terms of his probation, we adhere to the rule announced in Lewis v. State, 90 Nev. 436, 529 P.2d 796 (1974). Our Lewis standard represents the weight of authority in this country and, as well, is consistent with due process and fairness. [3] A greater standard would often result in high-risk individuals remaining at liberty, consequently against the public interest. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 483, 92 S.Ct. at 2601. It would also hamper the effective operations of our trial courts, by requiring more formal and plenary violation proceedings. This would be contrary to our evidence code which exempts revocation proceedings from its general application. NRS 47.020(3)(c). Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the applicable standard of proof in probation revocation hearings, its opinion in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 789-90 n. 12, 93 S.Ct. at 1763 n. 12, indicates that the Court believes that probation could be revoked on less than a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Here the court thought it was obvious that appellant was selling or possessing narcotics. We will not disturb the trial court's discretion in the absence of a clear showing of abuse. We affirm the order revoking probation. MOWBRAY, C.J., and THOMPSON and BATJER, JJ., concur.