Opinion ID: 2626834
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court Had Authority to Revoke Defendant's Probation in CR 99-500.

Text: {7} Probation assumes that the best interests of the public and the offender will be served and also that the offender can be rehabilitated without serving the suspended jail sentence. State v. Baca, 90 N.M. 280, 282, 562 P.2d 841, 843 (Ct.App.1977). The suspension or deferment of a sentence is not a matter of right but is an act of clemency within the trial court's discretion. State v. Follis, 81 N.M. 690, 692, 472 P.2d 655, 657 (Ct.App.1970). Thus, probation is a matter of favor, Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220, 53 S.Ct. 154, 77 L.Ed. 266 (1932), providing a defendant with the opportunity to repent and reform. Coffey v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 760, 167 S.E.2d 343, 346 (1969). But, a defendant on probation is still convicted of a crime and has no contract with the court. James v. United States, 140 F.2d 392, 394 (5th Cir.1944) (Waller, J., specially concurring). {8} The Legislature has granted district courts the power to revoke probation when a probation condition is violated because rehabilitation, which is the primary goal, is not being achieved. See NMSA 1978, § 31-21-15 (1989) (providing that [a]t any time during probation the court may issue an arrest warrant or notice to appear for a defendant to answer a charge of a probation violation, and if the violation is established, the court may revoke probation); State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 24, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939 (stating that rehabilitation is the primary goal of probation). District courts also have authority to revoke probation prior to the commencement of the probationary term for violations occurring while a defendant is incarcerated. See Padilla, 106 N.M. at 421, 744 P.2d at 549. {9} In Padilla, the district court sentenced defendant to two years probation following his release from custody. While the defendant was serving jail time, he did not return from work release. As a result, the defendant's probation was revoked. The defendant argued that because he was not yet serving his probation term, the district court did not have the authority to revoke his probation. Id. The Court of Appeals disagreed, first holding that [t]he sentencing court retains jurisdiction to revoke a suspended sentence for good cause shown at any time subsequent to the entry of judgment and prior to the expiration of the sentence.  Id. at 422, 744 P.2d at 550 (emphasis added). The court stated that a defendant who violates his probation while serving his jail sentence should be treated no differently than a defendant who completes serving his sentence and then commits a violation while on probation. Id. Thus, the court held that a sentencing court's power to revoke probation is not impaired by the fact that the person convicted is still serving prison or jail time and has not yet begun his probationary period. Id. {10} In cases following Padilla, the district court's broad authority to revoke probation in other contexts has also been upheld. In Rivera, we upheld the district court's authority to revoke probation while a defendant's appeal was pending. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 1, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939. In State v. Martinez, the Court of Appeals upheld the district court's authority to revoke probation while a defendant was serving parole, but before he began serving his probationary term. 108 N.M. 604, 607, 775 P.2d 1321, 1324 (Ct.App.1989). {11} Defendant argues that these cases are distinguishable because the defendants in each were serving some portion of the underlying sentence when they violated conditions of their probation. Defendant asserts that the general rule, as stated in Padilla, that a sentencing court retains jurisdiction to revoke a suspended sentence for good cause shown at any time subsequent to the entry of judgment and prior to the expiration of the sentence only applies to the sentence actually being served at the time of the probation violation. 106 N.M. at 422, 744 P.2d at 550. We believe NMSA 1978, § 33-2-39 (1889) answers Defendant's argument. This section provides: [w]henever any convict shall have been committed under several convictions with separate sentences, they shall be construed as one continuous sentence for the full length of all the sentences combined.  (Emphasis added). In this case, the court ordered Defendant [to] be committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections under both cases. The district court did so at the same time after considering both cases. Therefore, we construe the consecutive sentences as one continuous sentence. Accordingly, consistent with Padilla, the district court retained jurisdiction to revoke Defendant's suspended sentence subsequent to the entry of its judgment and prior to the expiration of the entire continuous sentence. {12} We believe our application of Section 33-2-39 is consistent with the policy supporting probationary sentences. In Rivera, we noted that [t]he probation statutes themselves are structured in such a manner to give the sentencing court the broad power to ensure that the goal of rehabilitation is indeed being achieved. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 21, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939. The sentencing court has wide discretion to strictly monitor [defendants'] compliance [with probation conditions] with an eye toward the goal of prompt and effective rehabilitation. Id. This authority is justified because the court's decision in suspending a defendant's sentence is based on a showing of clemency. See State v. Serrano, 76 N.M. 655, 657, 417 P.2d 795, 796 (1966) (providing that suspension or deferment of sentence is not a matter of right but is an act of clemency). By failing to comply with probation conditions, a defendant demonstrates that clemency is not appropriate because he or she is not willing or able to be rehabilitated. It follows that the court must have broad power to adjust a defendant's sentence by revoking probation when necessary. {13} Our holding is also consistent with results reached in other jurisdictions. In Commonwealth v. Wendowski, the defendant's probation sentences in separate cases were revoked by two different judges after the defendant committed additional crimes. 278 Pa.Super. 453, 420 A.2d 628, 629 (Ct. 1980). One of the revocations was for a sentence not yet being served. The defendant argued that the lower court's revocation of probation prior to commencement of the probation term was unconstitutional. Id. The appellate court disagreed, holding that a term of probation `may and should be construed for revocation purposes as including the term beginning at the time probation is granted.' Id. at 630 (quoting Wright v. United States, 315 A.2d 839, 841 (D.C.1974)). The court also addressed the policy behind its decision. If at any time before the defendant has completed the maximum period of probation, or before he has begun service of his probation, he should commit offenses of such nature as to demonstrate to the court that he is unworthy of probation and that the granting of the same would not be in subservience to the ends of justice and the best interests of the public, or the defendant, the court could revoke . . . probation. . . . [T]he expressed intent of the Court to have him under probation beginning at a future time does not change his position from the possession of a privilege to the enjoyment of a right. Id. (quoting James, 140 F.2d at 394 (Waller, J., specially concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (first emphasis added). The court also noted that its decision was intended to prevent a defendant from committing `criminal acts with impunity . . . until he commenced actual service of the probationary period.' Id. (quoting Wright, 315 A.2d at 842). {14} The Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals also construed consecutive probation sentences as one cumulative sentence, holding that [u]ntil [a] suspended sentence has been fully served, a defendant remains under the jurisdiction of the trial court with the sentence subject to revocation. Demry v. State, 986 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Okla.Crim.App. 1999) (emphasis added). In Demry, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve consecutive probation terms in four different cases. Id. at 1146. But, after finding sufficient evidence that the defendant committed new offenses, the trial court revoked the suspended sentences in each case. Id. at 1146-47. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the defendant's argument that the trial court did not have the authority to revoke probation when the defendant did not commit a violation during the period of those sentences. Id. at 1147. The court held that the sentences were subject to revocation as long as the prosecutor filed an application to revoke before the expiration of the sentence. Id. {15} Therefore, we hold that after the court has entered an order of probation and before the full suspended sentence has expired, the court has the authority to revoke probation regardless of whether the probationary term has commenced, or whether a defendant is serving a portion of the underlying sentence. We do not believe it is sound policy to impair a district court's ability to revoke probation when a defendant violates conditions before beginning to serve the period of probation. Such an approach would frustrate the goal of rehabilitation because defendants could, prior to the commencement of a probation term, violate conditions of probation without any consequences. See Martin v. State, 243 So.2d 189, 191 (Fla.Dist. Ct.App.1971) (stating that to prevent a court from revoking probation before the commencement of the probationary term would make a mockery of the very philosophy underlying the concept of probation); Wendowski, 420 A.2d at 630. Thus, we reject Defendant's argument that the district court lacks jurisdiction to revoke probation unless a defendant is serving a portion of the sentence for which probation is being revoked. A court grants probation as a matter of grace in the hopes that a defendant may be rehabilitated without being incarcerated, and, in its discretion, the court may revoke probation when the goal of rehabilitation is not being achieved, even if a defendant has not yet commenced serving the probationary term being revoked. {16} In this case, the district court gave Defendant a chance to prove he was capable of rehabilitation by suspending eight years of Defendant's eleven-year sentence. Despite being given this opportunity, Defendant later admitted he committed multiple probation violations. The district court could find these violations incompatible with the goal of rehabilitation thereby justifying revocation of probation. Even though these probation violations occurred while Defendant was serving his first probation sentence, the district court maintained the authority to revoke Defendant's second probationary term at any time after the entry of the order of probation and before Defendant completed serving that sentence.