Opinion ID: 2219142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: ISSUE TWO â VOLUNTARY STATEMENTS

Text: ś 80. Knapp contends that the circuit court correctly ruled that the statements taken from Knapp by the DCI agents were inadmissible in the State's case-in-chief. However, Knapp argues that the circuit court erred in finding that his statements were voluntary. Accordingly, Knapp asks this court to hold that all statements given to DCI agents during his interview are inadmissible for any purpose. ś 81. Knapp maintains that the statements taken from him by DCI agents should be inadmissible for any purpose because they were taken in violation of Miranda, and were the involuntary product of police coercion. Knapp states that the DCI agents planned a ruse to induce Knapp to give a statement. (R. 103:52; Def. App. 387.) The plan was to tell Knapp that they were there to investigate constitutional violations by members of the Watertown Police Department, including Roets. (R. 103:53, 67; Def. App. 388-89.) The ruse was necessary, according to Knapp, because DCI agents believed that Knapp would not talk otherwise. (R. 103:53, 123, 125, 146; Def. App. 388-89, 397, 401, 405). ś 82. Knapp points out that the circuit court found as a matter of fact that: If the defendant had been read his Miranda rights, he most likely would not have spoken. If the defendant had not been deceived as to the nature and scope of the interview, he almost definitely would not have spoken. There is no question in the Court's mind that but for the deception and failure to follow Miranda, the defendant would not have made a statement to DCI agents on November 10th, 1998. (R. 108:11; Def. App. 285). ś 83. Knapp states that awareness of the adversarial nature of the encounter is an important component of voluntariness. [16] Knapp contends that once it became clear to him as to why he was being questioned, he walked out of the interview and invoked his right to counsel. (R. 103:74-75, R. 107; Def. App. 391-92, 397; R. 104:28; Def. App. 420). ś 84. Knapp argues that the DCI agents went out of their way to be friendly to him and to portray themselves as his allies. Following Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969), Knapp argues that the deception coupled with a Miranda violation overcame Knapp's free will, when reviewed in the light of the totality of the circumstances. [17] ś 85. Knapp argues that the circuit court erroneously relied upon State v. Albrecht, 184 Wis. 2d 287, 516 N.W.2d 776 (Ct. App. 1994) in finding that the DCI interview was voluntary. In support of his position, Knapp cites United States v. Walton, 10 F.3d 1024 (3d Cir. 1993), [18] and United States v. Veilleux, 846 F. Supp. 149 (D. N.H. 1994). [19] ś 86. Knapp argues that the exclusionary rule in Dickerson precludes any use of statements made to DCI agents. Knapp argues that the logic of Patane and Kruger [20] apply to the facts of this case. He further maintains that the conduct of the officers was so egregious that the fruits of their inappropriate efforts should be excluded for any evidentiary purpose. ś 87. The State disagrees with Knapp and asks this court to uphold the ruling of the circuit court that the statements given to DCI agents during a prison interview in 1998 were voluntarily given and were not the result of coercive or improper police conduct. The State argues that the statements should be available to the State at trial for impeachment purposes. ś 88. The State concedes that the statements were obtained during prison interrogation, not preceded by advice concerning and waiver of Miranda rights. However, the State claims that while Knapp's statements are not admissible in the State's case-in-chief, they can be used for impeachment purposes. ś 89. The State contends that this is a pure legal question, and must be decided under a well-established legal standard set forth in State v. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 235-36, 401 N.W.2d 759 (1987). Clappes held that: In determining whether a confession was voluntarily made, the essential inquiry is whether the confession was procured via coercive means or whether it was the product of improper pressures exercised by the police . . . . The presence or absence of actual coercion or improper police practices is the focus of the inquiry because it is determinative on the issue of whether the inculpatory statement was the product of a free and unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of choice. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 235-36 (internal citations omitted). ś 90. The State concedes that there is no doubt that police employed intentional deception and trickery. However, the State argues that police deception, without more, does not render a suspect's statement involuntary. See, e.g., Albrecht, 184 Wis. 2d 287. The State argues that Knapp's free will was manifested when, after figuring out the ruse, he cut off the interview and departed the roomâ with no interference of any kind from the officers (R. 108:16). Accordingly, though deception and trickery were present, the State claims that there was no improper or coercive means employed at any time. ś 91. In response to the State's argument that deception alone does not render a confession involuntary, Knapp argues that in this case there was more than just police deception. Knapp argues that the agents made a calculated decision not to Mirandize Knapp because they feared he might exercise his rights. The intentional failure to read the Miranda warnings, Knapp argues, rendered the deception coercive because it affirmatively misled [Knapp] about the scope of his constitutional protection against self-incrimination. Veilleux, 846 F. Supp. 149. ś 92. Although the State urges this court to follow DeSumma and Sterling, which held that Dickerson did not extend the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to derivative evidence, Knapp contends that DeSumma and Sterling erroneously reached the conclusion that Dickerson's reference to the controlling force of  Miranda and its progeny in this Court foreclosed the argument that fruits of a Miranda violation may be suppressed. Furthermore, Knapp argues that De-Summa and Sterling erroneously relied upon the proposition that Dickerson endorsed the extension of the Elstad-Tucker rule. ś 93. Knapp maintains that Patane carefully analyzes the holding in Dickerson and concludes that the exclusionary rule does apply to derivative evidence, including statements.