Opinion ID: 867512
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Charging more than one act in Count One of the Indictment.

Text: ¶ 54 [E]ach offense must be charged in a separate count in an indictment or complaint. State v. Whitney, 159 Ariz. 476, 480, 768 P.2d 638, 642 (1989) (citing Ariz. R.Crim. P. 13.3(a)). Charging more than one act in a single count is forbidden because it does not provide adequate notice of the charge to be defended, ... present[s] a hazard of a non-unanimous jury verdict, and ... make[s] a precise pleading of prior jeopardy impossible in the event of a later prosecution. Id. (citations omitted). ¶ 55 We considered an argument similar to the one Davis now makes in Spencer v. Coconino County Superior Court (State), 136 Ariz. 608, 667 P.2d 1323 (1983). In Spencer, a father was charged with one count of incest and one count of molestation for a series of offenses occurring over the course of nearly four years. Id. at 609-10, 667 P.2d at 1324-25. We concluded that the defendant was put in jeopardy in the two counts charged for any one of what could be one hundred separate criminal offenses. Id. at 611, 667 P.2d at 1326. Charging in this manner does not give a defendant clear notice of the crime with which he is charged, and does not allow him to mount an adequate defense. State v. Martin, 139 Ariz. 466, 471, 679 P.2d 489, 494 (1984). Although the scale is smaller in Davis's case, the principle applies. ¶ 56 But the State asserts, and the court of appeals agreed, that State v. Schroeder, 167 Ariz. 47, 804 P.2d 776 (App.1990), disposes of Davis's claim. In Schroeder, the defendant was charged with only one count of sexual abuse, but the victim testified to seven distinct acts of fondling that occurred one evening. Id. at 51, 804 P.2d at 780. The defendant argued that the charge was duplicitous because it failed to specify the particular act on which the charge was based. Id. ¶ 57 The court in Schroeder held the charge not duplicitous because it determined the question to be simply one of credibility; only if the jury unanimously accepted the victim's version of the events could they find defendant guilty of sexually abusing her. Id. at 53, 804 P.2d at 782. ¶ 58 The acts alleged by T.E., on the other hand, occurred eleven days apart, and, unlike the defendant in Schroeder, Davis offered more than one defense. Davis offered an alibi defense for the charge that he engaged in sexual conduct with the victims over the Super Bowl weekend and contended that he did not have sex with T.E. at all. He also attempted to show that T.E. could have engaged in sex with another person staying at his house during the Super Bowl weekend. Thus, the two distinct acts here differ from the evening's events in Schroeder, and call for a different conclusion. ¶ 59 We conclude that Davis's case is more like Spencer's. Spencer, 136 Ariz. at 611, 667 P.2d at 1326. We think it possible that some jurors may have believed Davis's alibi defense and convicted him for an offense on January 18, while other jurors may have convicted him for the Super Bowl weekend offense, based on the doctor's testimony that T.E. had engaged in sex within the preceding week. Because we cannot be certain which offense served as the predicate for the conviction, we conclude that the real possibility of a non-unanimous jury verdict exists. ¶ 60 The State contends, however, that the charge is not duplicitous because the date of the offense is not an element of the crime of sexual conduct with a minor. See Jones, 188 Ariz. at 543, 937 P.2d at 1191. While we agree with the general proposition, the case on which the State relies is inapposite to the point. In Jones, the evidence showed and the jury found the same number of sexual assaults as alleged in the indictment. Id. Here, Davis was convicted of one count, based on proof of two acts. ¶ 61 If the indictment, the evidence, the jury instructions, and jury forms reflect the same number of offenses, the State does not need to prove the exact date of the offenses. When, however, the evidence shows, or tends to show, that several acts of intercourse have occurred between defendant and prosecuting witness, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to elect which one of such acts it relies upon for a conviction. Hash v. State, 48 Ariz. 43, 50, 59 P.2d 305, 308 (1936). Failure to do so results in a duplicitous charge. That is what happened here, and the resulting risk that the jury returned a non-unanimous verdict constituted error.