Opinion ID: 2823793
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Closure Violated Hassenâs Sixth Amendment Right to a Public Trial

Text: Â¶11Â Â Â Â Â Â It is undisputed that the trial court did not formally apply Waller. The People argue, however, that this was a mere oversight; they suggest that even though the trial court did not mechanically apply Waller pro forma, the closure itself substantively satisfied the Waller requirements. We disagree. The record clearly establishes that the closure here failed to comply not only with the letter of Waller, but also with its spirit. Â¶12Â Â Â Â Â Â The People contend that protecting the identities of the undercover officers constituted âan overriding interestâ in accordance with Wallerâs first element. That is a matter of debate. See People v. Echevarria, 989 N.E.2d 9, 15â16 (N.Y. 2013) (recognizing that â[t]he safety of law enforcement officers unquestionably may constitute an overriding interestâ but that âthe proponent of closure must demonstrate a substantialÂ probability that the identified interest will be prejudiced by an open courtroomâ (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 14 (1986))). But we need not resolve this debate here. Even assuming, arguendo, that concern for the officersâ safety satisfied the first Waller prong, the closure met none of the remaining requirements. Although a âclosure must be no broader than necessary,â Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, here the trial court excluded the entire public, including Hassenâs family. Moreover, the trial court failed to consider any potential alternatives to closing the courtroom. Finally, it made no specific findings in support of the closure, instead simply stating, âIâll close the courtroom for this witness over [Hassenâs] objection.â Therefore, because the closure failed to comply with at least three of the four Waller prerequisites, the Peopleâs asserted interest in securing the officersâ safety cannot render the closure permissible. Cf. Presley, 558 U.S. at 216 (â[E]ven assuming, arguendo, that the trial court had an overriding interest in closing [the courtroom], it was still incumbent upon it to consider all reasonable alternatives to closure. It did not, and that is all this Court needs to decide.â). Â¶13Â Â Â Â Â Â The People nevertheless insist that even if the closure failed to comply with Waller, it was so trivial that it did not implicate Hassenâs Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. In so doing, the People encourage us to import the âtrivialityâ analysis from the Second Circuitâs decision in Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1996). In that case, the district court closed the courtroom during the testimony of an undercover witness. Id. at 41. Following that witnessâs testimony, the defendant briefly took the stand, but the district court neglected to reopen the courtroom due to âan administerial mistake.â Id. Shortly thereafter, defense counsel alerted the court that the courtroom had remained closed during the defendantâs testimony, and she moved for a mistrial.Â Id. The district court denied the motion, finding âthat no prejudice can be shown against the defendant in terms of this administerial mistake.â Id. at 42. Â¶14Â Â Â Â Â Â The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that âeven an unjustified closure may, on its facts, be so trivial as not to violateâ a defendantâs right to a public trial. Id. at 40. The court was careful to distinguish between triviality analysis and harmless error review: A triviality standard, properly understood, does not dismiss a defendantâs claim on the grounds that the defendant was guilty anyway or that he did not suffer âprejudiceâ or âspecific injury.â It is, in other words, very different from a harmless error inquiry. It looks, rather, to whether the actions of the court and the effect that they had on the conduct of the trial deprived the defendantâwhether otherwise innocent or guiltyâof the protections conferred by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 42. Thus, in advocating for a triviality standard, the People do not argue that the trial court made a minor error; such an argument would irreconcilably clash with our clear jurisprudence that invalid court closures over a defendantâs objection are structural errors requiring automatic reversal. See supra Â¶ 7. Rather, the People suggest that the closure was so trivial that, in fact, no error occurred. Â¶15Â Â Â Â Â Â We have never considered whether to adopt the Second Circuitâs triviality framework, but we need not rule on its propriety today. Even if Petersonâs triviality analysis applied, the closure here was plainly not trivial. In Peterson, the court recognized that the public trial right promotes four specific goals: (1) âto ensure a fair trialâ; (2) âto remind the prosecutor and judge of their responsibility to the accused and the importance of their functionsâ; (3) âto encourage witnesses to come forwardâ; and (4) âto discourage perjury.â 85 F.3d at 43 (citing Waller, 467 U.S. at 46â47). The courtÂ then held that, because the closure was âextremely shortâ and âentirely inadvertent,â it did not compromise any of these goals and was therefore trivial. See id. at 44. Â¶16Â Â Â Â Â Â The facts here are markedly different. Given that the testimony of the two undercover officers totaled roughly twenty-seven pages in the trial transcript, we cannot conclude that the multiple closures were âextremely short.â Moreover, the closure prevented potential witnesses from coming forward to contradict (or corroborate) the officersâ testimony. 3 Finally, because the closure here was intentional rather than inadvertent, it failed to discourage perjury, as the witnesses were fully aware that the courtroom was closed. Contra id. at 43 (â[S]ince the defendant did not know of the closure and he was the only one to have testified during it, the closure was most unlikely to have encouraged perjury.â). Â¶17Â Â Â Â Â Â Therefore, we need not decide today whether Petersonâs triviality framework is generally appropriate. Instead, we simply conclude that the closure here was not trivial. Accordingly, we hold that the closure violated Hassenâs Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Because such an error is structural, Hassen is entitled to a new trial. 4