Opinion ID: 694614
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Of Reasonable Description and Undue Burden

Text: 26 The FOIA requires that agency records be made available promptly upon a request that reasonably describes such records and ... is made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(3). Nine exemptions from the requirements are provided in the statute. See id. Sec. 552(b). Accordingly, to prevail on a summary judgment motion in a FOIA case, an agency must demonstrate that each document that falls within the class requested either has been produced, is unidentifiable, or is wholly exempt from the Act's inspection requirements. Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183, 186 (D.C.Cir.1973). We have held that [i]n order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment in a FOIA case, the defending agency has the burden of showing that its search was adequate. Carney v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 86, 130 L.Ed.2d 38 (1994). 27 The Tax Division does not claim that the Vaughn indices requested fall within any exemption provided in the statute. It cannot contend that the documents sought are unidentifiable, for the Ruotolos have identified them with great specificity. The Division can only contend that the description given by the Ruotolos was not sufficient, in light of their own filing systems, to permit retrieval of the information sought without an unduly burdensome search. As to our requirement that the agency demonstrate the adequacy of its search, the Tax Division apparently takes the position that no search at all is necessary where it appears that the search will be unduly burdensome. 28 We have no doubt that there is such a thing as a request that calls for an unreasonably burdensome search. We just do not believe that the Tax Division has yet demonstrated that this is such a case. It is unreasonably burdensome to request information that would require a page-by-page search through the 84,000 cubic feet of documents in the [CIA] Records Center, Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 353 (D.C.Cir.1978) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927, 100 S.Ct. 1312, 63 L.Ed.2d 759 (1980); a search through every file in [the IRS'] possession to see if a reference to Scientology appeared, Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 146, 151 (D.C.Cir.1986); a search of 3,500,000 files of patents as well as 1,000,000 other files, Irons v. Schuyler, 465 F.2d 608, 611-12 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076, 93 S.Ct. 682, 34 L.Ed.2d 664 (1972). It is also unreasonably burdensome to require a search of the files of over 5,000 criminal cases upon a general request for data to be gleaned from documents which have not been created. See Krohn v. Dep't of Justice, 628 F.2d 195, 198 (D.C.Cir.1980). In contrast, the Ruotolos specifically sought documents related to Vaughn indices, and it is clear that there were only 803 files to be searched. Certainly, the Tax Division should not be relieved from all duty to search under the circumstances. 29 Especially compelling is the fact that the Ruotolos offered the Tax Division a payment of $600 with a request that the Division begin compiling the most current material responsive to [their] request and work toward 1978. The Tax Division gave no excuse for failing to honor this request. It would have been a simple matter to begin with the most current of the 803 files and work backward in time to secure the specific information requested. When the funds supplied were exhausted, the Division could have stopped searching, furnished the material found and put forth an estimate of the cost of completion of the search. In response to the offer by the Ruotolos in their original request to pay the sum of $250, Mr. Ferrel of the Tax Division noted that the fees to be charged would greatly exceed the amount then offered and would have to be paid before any documents could be released. No amount was suggested, however, and no assistance was offered. 30 It was, in fact, the duty of the Tax Division to assist the Ruotolos in reformulating their request if it was thought that the request needed to be narrowed. Regulations require that a requester be advised as to additional information required or why the request is insufficient. See 28 C.F.R. Sec. 16.3(b). The same regulations require the agency to extend to the requester an opportunity to confer with Department personnel with the objective of reformulating the request. Id. The Tax Division has no right to resist disclosure because the request fails 'reasonably [to] describe' records unless it has first made a good faith attempt to assist the requester in satisfying that requirement. Ferri v. Bell, 645 F.2d 1213, 1221 (3d Cir.1981), modified on other grounds, 671 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.1982). We think that the Ruotolos reasonably described the records they sought, but even if they did not, the Division did not comply with the regulations requiring it to assist the Ruotolos. Indeed, the Tax Division merely directed them to restructure their request in order to narrow[ ] its scope and hence, its cost. 31 The Tax Division makes much of the burden imposed in ordering files from the Federal Records Center. Aside from the fact that the Ruotolos claim to have determined, in a single telephone call to the Records Center, that the production of closed files is not as time consuming as represented by the Tax Division, there is a statutory provision that deals with the problem. According to 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(6)(B)(i), the Tax Division has the authority to extend the time for processing a request when there is a need to search for and collect the requested records from field facilities or other establishments that are separate from the office processing the request. An extension of time to obtain records from another location is one thing. A refusal to make some effort to obtain them is quite another. 32 With respect to the Ruotolos' request for a listing of the Department of Justice's filing, categorizing, and/or indexing of the Vaughn index material requested, there appears to be a discrepancy between the information furnished by Ferrel in his correspondence with the Ruotolos and that furnished by Martin in connection with the summary judgment motion. In his letter of October 20, 1993, Mr. Ferrel advised that the files were indexed under the names of parties, that the Tax Division maintained some information relating to tax case processing procedures and that the Federal Register and the designated reading room were available as sources of information. Ms. Martin indicates that much more information was available in regard to filing, categorizing and/or indexing. She stated that there were computerized lists of cases that included case codes categorizing: the types of cases; names of attorneys; filing dates; closing dates; amounts at issue; relative complexity, etc. What is available under etc. is not apparent. What is apparent is that the Tax Division could have provided a great deal more filing information than it did. 33 We think that there are at least triable issues of fact under the FOIA as to whether the Tax Division improperly denied the Ruotolos' request for information. The Ruotolos certainly have made a strong showing at this point that they have given a reasonable description of the records they seek. The legislative history of the FOIA defines a reasonable description of records as one that enables a professional employee of the agency who [is] familiar with the subject area of the request to locate the record with a reasonable amount of effort. H.R.Rep. No. 93-876, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6271; see Goland, 607 F.2d at 353 n. 88. We think that there is strong evidence that the Ruotolos provided a reasonable description within that definition. They also have provided evidence that the search for Vaughn indices was not especially burdensome in light of the limited number of files and the amount of the payment they tendered. Moreover, it seems clear that the Ruotolos were not furnished with a full listing of the Tax Division's systems for filing and categorization. To add to it all, the Tax Division made no effort to assist the Ruotolos in narrowing or re-formulating their search requests. Under these circumstances, summary judgment in favor of the Tax Division was not warranted. 34