Opinion ID: 2304074
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: An Appeal to Our Discretion

Text: At his trial, Adams raised no objection to the repeated description of the jury instructions as advisory. Adams makes no attempt to rebut any presumption that he knowingly waived his right to challenge the instructions. [21] Rather, Adams contends that his failure to object is excused because special circumstances justify review of his conviction. [22] The dissent is correct in its contention that § 7-106 may not be applied to Adams's excusable waiver argument regarding the advisory jury instructions. Dissent op. at 302, 958 A.2d at 332-33. The first case of this Court expressing what appears to be the modern view of the waiver section of the post-conviction statute makes clear that: Consequently, we believe that the Legislature, when it spoke of waiver in subsection (c) of Art. 27, s 645A [now § 7-106(b) ], was using the term in a narrow sense. It intended that subsection (c), with its intelligent and knowing standard, be applicable only in those circumstances where the waiver concept of Johnson v. Zerbst and Fay v. Noia was applicable. Other situations are beyond the scope of subsection (c), to be governed by case law or any pertinent statutes or rules. Tactical decisions,[ [23] ] when made by an authorized competent attorney, as well as legitimate procedural requirements, will normally bind a criminal defendant. Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 149-150, 395 A.2d 464, 474 (1978) (Eldridge, J. writing for the Court) (emphasis added). Thus, Adams's contentions, if reviewable in this proceeding at all, must be governed by caselaw or rule. As discussed above, the caselaw governing erroneous jury instruction challenges is clear. Any later imagined flaw in jury instructions ordinarily is waived by a failure to object at trial. Further, the rules which permit an appellate court to notice plain error technically do not apply to post-conviction proceedings. As the Court noted in Walker :Rules 4-325(e) and 8-131(a), authorizing a court to take cognizance of plain error despite the waiver of an issue, literally apply only to direct appellate review of a judgment. Moreover, the similar special circumstances doctrine set forth in § 645A(c)(1) [now § 7-106(b)(1)(ii) ], authorizing a court in a post conviction action to excuse a waiver, is applicable only to situations encompassed by § 645A(c) [now § 7-106(b) ], i.e., situations requiring intelligent and knowing action before there is a waiver. Walker v. State, 343 Md. 629, 647, 684 A.2d 429, 438 (1996). [24] Nonetheless, it is recognized that the Court of Appeals possesses discretion to excuse a waiver, outside of § 7-106, in a post-conviction proceeding. Apparently relying on Rule 8-131(a), [25] we have noted that, [u]nder that rule, the appellate courts possess the discretion to excuse the waiver [in the trial] of a right or claim waivable by less than knowing and voluntary action. Hunt v. State, 345 Md. 122, 139, 691 A.2d 1255, 1263. Similarly, in Oken v. State, 343 Md. 256, 273, 681 A.2d 30, 38 (1996), we noted that, [u]nder Maryland Rule 8-131, this Court retains discretion to excuse a waiver [in a post-conviction proceeding]. This reliance on Rule 8-131 as the wellspring of appellate discretion to notice waiver in a post-conviction proceeding, independent of the explicit provisions of the Post-Conviction Act, has not been without its critics, however. The Court of Special Appeals summarized the discovery of this discretion: The Court itself noted the uncertain origin of this authority to excuse, since waivers of non-fundamental rights are not governed by the Act and since Maryland's rules of appellate procedure do not directly apply. [ Walker ] at 647, 684 A.2d at 438. Although Maryland courts have recognized the distinction between waivers of fundamental and non-fundamental rights since 1978, the first time the Court of Appeals ever spoke of such an excusal was in Oken v. State, 343 Md. 256, 273-74, 681 A.2d 30, 38 (1996), when it claimed such discretion under Rule 8-131. Prior to that time, a finding of waiver had always been dispositive, and the Court of Appeals had gone so far as to hold that a waived claim was not ... a proper subject for review in [a post conviction] proceeding. Trimble v. State, 321 Md. 248, 257, 582 A.2d 794, 798 (1990). The Walker Court premised its discretion to excuse on Oken but also indicated some measure of reliance on Foster v. State, 305 Md. 306, 503 A.2d 1326 (1986), which was not a post conviction case. More recently, in Hunt v. State, 345 Md. 122, 152, 691 A.2d 1255, 1269 (1997), discretion to excuse was again based squarely on Rule 8-131. But see State v. Rose, 345 Md. 238, 250, 691 A.2d 1314, 1320 (1997) (reversing this Court's grant of post conviction relief and remanding with instructions to affirm the circuit court's denial without allowing for this Court to consider whether to excuse the petitioner's waiver). Cirincione v. State, 119 Md.App. 471, 513-515, 705 A.2d 96, 116-17 (1998) Were we writing on a cleaner slate, revisiting the evolution and basis of this discretion might be a principled undertaking; however, like the summer rule of golf (play the ball as you find it), we shall save that endeavor for another day, if at all. [26] In the present case, the Circuit Court and Court of Special Appeals erroneously analyzed Adams's waiver issue as if it was governed by § 7-106. As noted above, and pointed out by the dissent, § 7-106 does not apply strictly. Thus, if Adams's waiver is to be excused, it must rest on the exercise of our discretion. For reasons to be explained, we shall not exercise our discretion to excuse Adams's waiver. Adams [27] contends that waiver should be excused in his case because (1) the law at the time of his trial was clear that advisory instructions were permissible; (2) at the time of the trial there was a misconception by a large segment of the Maryland bench and bar regarding the scope and application of Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights; and (3) the erroneous jury instructions constitute plain error. A.