Opinion ID: 446623
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Adequacy of the Franks v. Delaware Hearing

Text: 30 Whether or not a defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing on a particular issue raised in a preliminary showing is a mixed question of law and fact. In United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc), this court spelled out a framework for deciding which mixed questions would be reviewed de novo, and which would be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, indicating that most mixed questions would be reviewed de novo. Id. at 1204. 31 However, in McConney, this court went on to identify two exceptions to the above-stated general rule: (1) Mixed questions in which the applicable legal standard provides for a strictly factual test, for example, when the issue is motive or intent; and (2) questions of negligence. Id. at 1203-04. 32 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), requires the district court to determine whether the defendant has made a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit. Id. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. at 2676. If a satisfactory preliminary showing is made, the district court examines the warrant for probable cause without the disputed material. 1 If the remaining content is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause, the defendant is then entitled to a hearing. Id. at 171-72, 98 S.Ct. at 2684. The decision to hold a Franks hearing is a determination about the legal sufficiency of a set of allegations, much like the district court's ruling on a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or summary judgment motion. This decision should be reviewed de novo. The district court's conclusion about whether the defendant has demonstrated recklessness or deliberate falsity after the Franks hearing, however, is a finding of fact reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. 33 Ritter's attack on the search warrant affidavit is based on a comparison of the report prepared by Agent Richhart six days after his interviews with Ritter, and the statements made by the same agent on the night of the arrest in his affidavit in support of a search warrant for Ritter's condominium. In the affidavit, Richhart stated, Ritter said Guillermo gave him cocaine last night, that's 8-2-83, and he took it home and kept it there overnight .... By contrast, in his report Richhart stated, Ritter stated that he got the cocaine last night (8-2-83) at the parking lot next to the deli ... (and) left the cocaine in his car, parked at his condo, overnight. 34 The trial court found the defendant's preliminary showing in this regard inadequate, because the misstatement was negligent at best, and was not material, since there is little difference, for probable cause purposes, as to whether the cocaine was in the car outside the condo or in the condo itself. The district court denied a Franks hearing on all but one of the discrepancies between the report and the statement. 35 In addition, there were several statements made by Ritter which appeared in Richhart's report, but not in the search warrant affidavit, including the following: 36 1. When Ritter received the cocaine it was in the boxes and packages just as it was recovered from his vehicle. Ritter had not touched it since it had been given to him at the deli. 37 2. There is no cocaine at Ritter's residence. 38 3. Ritter has never possessed or used or dealt in cocaine in the past. 39 The trial court found that the omission of the statements that Ritter had not touched the cocaine, and that he had never dealt or used cocaine in the past was probably not even negligent. The statements were determined to be self-serving, and no reasonable magistrate would believe that anyone would entrust one-half million dollars worth of cocaine to a novice. Our review of the record leaves us in agreement with the district court's decision not to hold a Franks hearing on the foregoing discrepancies. The record does not reveal any indication of willful or reckless omission or misstatement. 40 At the hearing, Agent Richhart testified that he omitted Ritter's statement about the lack of cocaine in his condominium because he didn't believe the statement, due to Ritter's demeanor, and other circumstances surrounding the making of the statement. Richhart testified that when he asked Ritter if he could search his condominium, Ritter stated, Sure, go ahead, there's nothing in there, but then refused to sign a consent to search form. In addition, Ritter was very nervous when he made the statement. 41 The trial judge agreed with the agent that in the context in which it was made, Ritter's statement was not worthy of belief, would neither add to nor detract from probable cause, and was, if anything, only negligently omitted from the affidavit. Indeed, the trial court appears to have applied the correct legal standard, and to have evaluated the statements and omissions in a thorough, common sense manner. 42 Implicit in the court's finding is the awareness that an affidavit, prepared in haste on the night of an arrest would, not surprisingly, contain less exacting detail than would a formal report, prepared under less hurried circumstances several days after the arrest and search in question. 43 The court's findings that the misstatements and omissions were not willful, but were at most negligent, is not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the trial judge's ruling in this regard will be upheld. 44