Opinion ID: 1630881
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether robert's right to a speedy trial was violated.

Text: ¶ 10. Robert argues that the State failed to bring him to trial within the 270 day period prescribed in Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (2000), as amended, and, as a result, his case should be dismissed. The State responds that delay was attributed to the defendant's actions. ¶ 11. The record discloses the following pertinent dates: 8/24/1999 arrest 9/23/1999 indictment 12/9/1999 waiver of arraignment 12/21/2000 motion to exclude or limit photographs filed 1/31/2000 first trial date 1/31/2000 motion for severance filed 12/31/2000 reciprocal discovery filed 3/1/2001 order granting motion for trial severance and mental health examination 3/3/2001 order reversing ruling on defendant's motion to exclude photographs 7/10/2001 order creating special term of court 7/12/2001 defendant's demand for speedy trial 7/27/2001 motion to dismissviolation of 270-day rule 10/16/2001 actual trial date
¶ 12. The analysis for the 270 day rule from Miss.Code. Ann. § 99-17-1, is very fact specific and relies heavily on whether the prosecution or defense caused the delays. Sharp v. State, 786 So.2d 372, 376 (Miss.2001). Section 99-17-1 provides that, [u]nless good cause be shown, and a continuance duly granted by the court, all offenses for which indictments are presented to the court shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy (270) days after the accused has been arraigned. ¶ 13. The Sharp analysis for the 270 day rule is as follows: Thus, the reason for the delay is as important as who is responsible. The first step is to calculate the total number of days between arraignment (the statute clearly states that is when the right attaches) and the actual trial. For this purpose, [t]he date of arraignment is not counted but the date of trial is and weekends are counted unless the 270th day is a Sunday. Sharp, 786 So.2d at 378 (citations omitted). ¶ 14. Under this analysis the time between the waiver of arraignment and the actual trial date was approximately 277 days. The 277 days is past the 270 day limit, but to see if the 270 day rule has been violated, each delay should be examined separately to determine whether the prosecution or defense is responsible for the delay. Baine v. State, 604 So.2d 258, 264 (Miss.1992). ¶ 15. Fifty-three days elapsed between the wavier of arraignment (12-9-1999) and the first trial (1-31-2000). The time required for defendant to prepare for trial is left up to the sound discretion of the trial judge, taking into consideration the particular circumstances of the case. Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008,1012 (Miss. 1991). This 53 day period is definitely not overly lengthy when the complexities of the case are considered: a capital murder, conspiracy, and robbery with three co-defendants. ¶ 16. Robert filed motions for severance, mental health examination and reciprocal discovery on the first trial date (January 31, 2000). These late-filed motions show that Robert was not prejudiced by the delay, and that, in actuality, he was not even ready for trial and needed extra time to prepare. The trial court ruled on Robert's motions on March 1, 2000, and a new trial day was set for September 11, 2000. The days between the first trial and the time the motions were granted toll the 270 day period. These days are charged against Robert because he requested the severance, mental examination and reciprocal discovery. Motions made and granted on behalf of the defense are charged against them. Herring v. State, 691 So.2d 948, 953 (Miss.1997); Jasso v. State, 655 So.2d 30, 35 (Miss.1995). Also, the delay can be attributed to the complexity of the crime, the number of defendants involved and a congested docket, all of which is viewed as good cause if a continuance is actually granted for those reasons. Johnson v. State, 666 So.2d 784, 791 (Miss. 1995), overruled on other grounds, Hennington v. State, 702 So.2d 403, 414-15 (Miss.1997); State v. Harrison, 648 So.2d 66, 69 (Miss.1994). ¶ 17. The delay in Robert's case is a result of his own actions and inactions. When a defendant causes a delay, he cannot complain and obtain relief. Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194, 199 (Miss.1982). The 29-day period from the filing of the motions to the ruling on the same should be subtracted from the 277-day delay, leaving a 248-day delay. This length of time does not violate the 270-day rule, and thus this issue is without merit.
¶ 18. In examining a constitutional challenge, there is no specified time period that renders the delay unconstitutional. Instead we use a test set out by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). See Brengettcy v. State, 794 So.2d 987, 992 (Miss.2001). The four factors of the test include: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2182; Brengettcy, 794 So.2d at 992. No one factor is dispositive, and the balancing test is not restricted to the Barker factors, so other factors may be considered.
¶ 19. Robert was arrested on August 24, 1999. The trial was on September 11, 2000. The length of the delay was not quite 13 months. In Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss.1989), we recognized that a delay of eight months or more is presumptively prejudicial. If the delay is not presumptively prejudicial, there is no need to consider the other Barker factors. Handley v. State, 574 So.2d 671, 677 (Miss. 1990). Since there were 384 days from the arrest to his date of trial, prejudice is presumed, and the other factors from the Barker test must be considered. Spencer v. State, 592 So.2d 1382, 1387 (Miss.1991).
¶ 20. The second factor in the Barker analysis calls for an inquiry into the cause of the delay. Delays caused by a party count against that particular party. Brengettcy, 794 So.2d at 993. See also Beavers v. State, 498 So.2d 788, 791 (Miss. 1986), overruled on other grounds, State v. Ferguson, 576 So.2d 1252, 1255 (Miss. 1991). The risk of non-persuasion is on the prosecution, and where no reason is mentioned in the record the factor weighs in favor of the defendant. Beavers, 498 So.2d at 790-91. The State bears the risk of non-persuasion regarding the reason for delay and must show whether the defendant caused the delay or that good cause existed for the delay. Fleming v. State, 604 So.2d 280, 299 (Miss.1992). ¶ 21. Robert was arrested on August 24, 1999. The first trial date was set for January 31, 2000. The day of the trial Robert filed a motion for severance, reciprocal discovery and mental health examination, which were ruled upon on March 1, 2000. Robert's delinquence in making these motions is the major reason for the delay. Therefore, this delay counts against Robert, not the State.
¶ 22. Robert made a demand for a speedy trial on July 12, 2000. Also, on that same date, Robert filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial.... Still he gains far more points under this prong of the Barker test where he has demanded a speedy trial. Jaco v. State, 574 So.2d 625, 632 (Miss.1990). However, a demand for a speedy trial is distinct from a demand for dismissal due to violation of the right to a speedy trial. Perry v. State, 637 So.2d 871, 875 (Miss. 1994); see also Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165, 169-70 (Miss.1991). ¶ 23. The record shows that Robert made a demand for a speedy trial and later a motion to dismiss on the basis that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. He correctly asserted his right before trial. This factor weighs in Robert's favor.
¶ 24. The last part of the Barker analysis, prejudice to the defendant, has two aspects: (1) actual prejudice to the accused in defending his case, and (2) interference with the defendant's liberty. Perry, 637 So.2d at 876. The U.S. Supreme Court has identified three main considerations that need to be addressed in determining whether the accused has been prejudiced by the delay: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2182; Brengettcy, 794 So.2d at 994. ¶ 25. Robert was in jail because of a parole violation and does not argue prejudice from being incarcerated. He does argue that the memories of two of the witnesses were not sharp due to the long delay and cites Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371 (Miss.1988), in support of his argument. Vickery 's fact situation is different, however. There, the defendant had been subject to rape and other terrible circumstances while he was incarcerated. In the case at bar, Robert was already in jail because of a parole violation. And his late-filed motions contributed to the delay and the witnesses' loss of memory, if any. ¶ 26. In conclusion, we are troubled by lengthy delays in bringing defendants to trial. However, in the case at bar, Robert was responsible for most of the delay. He fails to show any real prejudice as he did not state or prove any exculpatory evidence which would have been available had he been brought to trial earlier. For these reasons we find that this issue is without merit.