Opinion ID: 1105055
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying the Fletchers' Motion To Amend.

Text: ¶25. Dabbs argues this issue is not properly before the Court, as the notice of appeal did not contain any reference to the order denying the motion to amend. However, the Fletchers' statement of issues and appellant brief clearly show they are appealing the order denying the motion to amend. See K.D.F. v. J.L.H., 933 So.2d 971, 974 n. 2 (Miss.2006) (finding basis of appeal clear from statement of issues and appellant brief). Under Rule 3(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, [a]n appeal shall not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice of appeal. Miss. R.App. P. 3(c). Therefore, we consider the merits of this issue. ¶26. This Court considers a denial of amendment under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Moeller v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 812 So.2d 953, 961 (Miss. 2002). Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend a pleading as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served.... Otherwise a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court or upon written consent of the adverse party; leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. Miss. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (emphasis added). This Court has stated leave shall be freely given when: [T]he underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reasonsuch as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.the leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely given. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 812 So.2d at 962. ¶27. Before the trial court, Dabbs and the Lyleses argued the additional claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Neither defendant asserted any prejudice, and the additional claims clearly relate to the facts and averments in the original complaint. However, this Court must consider whether the potential claims are the proper subject of relief or futile as the trial court found. See id. ¶28. The trial judge found as a matter of law that if the Lyleses had knowledge of the two inspection reports, then such knowledge would support only a claim of fraud. As alluded to by the trial court, the extent of the Lyleses' knowledge is a material fact in dispute. The record discloses only that the Lyleses saw the Walker report, and the report only mentioned a possible foundation problem. Additionally, the engineering report disclosed only an uneven slab, whereas the Fletchers have asserted numerous other defects in their complaint, which were not addressed by the engineering report. Furthermore, the Lyleses have never admitted that they had knowledge of the defects which the Fletchers discovered. ¶29. This Court has stated `[t]he basis for damages from negligent misrepresentation is the lack of care; the basis for damages resulting from fraud is the want of honesty.' Stonecipher v. Kornhaus, 623 So.2d 955, 964 (Miss.1993) (quoting First Money, Inc. v. Frisby, 369 So.2d 746, 750 (Miss.1979)). We find it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to determine that as a matter of law (especially during the discovery phase), the Fletchers could not have proven by a preponderance of evidence a lack of care on the part of the Lyleses. Id. The Lyleses' alleged knowledge of these two reports does not of necessity preclude a claim of negligence. This Court finds the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Fletchers' motion to amend to include the additional claims of negligent inducement and negligent misrepresentation. ¶30. This Court must also determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Fletchers leave to amend to assert a cause of action for the alleged violation of Mississippi Code Section 73-35-21(1)(a) and Rule IV.B.7 of the rules and regulations of the Mississippi Real Estate Commission. [6] Section 73-35-21(1)(a) prohibits a real-estate agent from [m]aking any substantial misrepresentation in connection with a real estate transaction. Miss.Code Ann. § 73-35-21(1)(a). Under Rule IV.B.7, [a] real estate broker must keep on file for three years following its consummation, complete records relating to any real estate transaction. M.R.E.C. Rule IV.B.7 (emphasis added). ¶31. The trial court found the Simmons/Rodriguez sale was not completed and, therefore, was never consummated, and as such, Dabbs was not required to maintain any documents and could not be found to have violated Miss.Code Ann. § 73-35-21 as a matter of law. The trial court further found that any amendment would be futile based on the fact that Simmons and the Rodriguezes never consummated their real-estate transaction by closing on the home. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to amend to add claims under Section 73-35-21 and Rule IV.B.7.