Opinion ID: 865517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether parchman had a compensable injury

Text: PRIOR TO HIS TERMINATION. ¶42. Finally, Parchman argues that “[i]t is undisputed that James Parchman did not have a compensable injury until September 2002, when he was terminated because he had no loss of wage earning capacity.” Parchman further argues that the statute of limitations does not begin to run at the time of the injury, but rather when an employee becomes disabled. I disagree. Again, section 71-3-35(1) states that if “no application for benefits [is] filed with the commission within two years from the date of the injury or death, the right to compensation therefor shall be barred.” Thus, from the clear language of the statute, the date of the injury is determining. This issue is without merit. ¶43. In sum, I have already mentioned supra, that our standard of review concerning the application of a limitations statute is de novo since this issue no doubt involves a question of law; however, in order to answer this question in today’s case, we must consider the totality of the record and apply the facts of this case to the applicable law. One cannot but conclude, upon the reading of the majority opinion and this dissenting opinion, that any decision in today’s case is understandably fact-driven. Thus, in my opinion, we have before us today a mixed question of law and fact, and while we must review the interpretation of 22 law de novo, we review the factual findings of the lower court or agency for clear error. Franklin Collection Service, Inc. v. Kyle, 955 So. 2d 284, 287 (Miss. 2007) (citing Hewes v. Langston, 853 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Miss. 2003)). As we noted in Mississippi Sierra Club v. Department of Environmental Quality, 819 So. 2d 515, 519 (Miss. 2002), “[w]hen this Court reviews a decision by a chancery or circuit court concerning an agency action, it applies the same standard of review that the lower courts are bound to follow.” (Citing Miss. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. Chickasaw County Bd. of Supervisors, 621 So. 2d 1211, 1216 (Miss. 1993)). In other words, on appeal, this Court must consider “whether the order of the administrative agency 1) was unsupported by substantial evidence, 2) was arbitrary or capricious, 3) was beyond the power of the administrative agency to make, or 4) violated some statutory or constitutional right of the complaining party.” Miss. Sierra Club, 819 So. 2d at 519 (citing Miss. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, 621 So. 2d at 1215). See also Sierra Club v. Miss. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, 943 So. 2d 673, 677-78 (Miss. 2006) (citing McDermott v. Miss. Real Estate Comm’n, 748 So. 2d 114, 118 (Miss. 1999)). ¶44. With this being said, I respectfully submit that the majority has improperly re-weighed the evidence in reaching today’s decision. In the administrative arena, on disputed evidence, both the administrative law judge and the full commission found that the statute of limitations had expired. In the judicial arena, both the Monroe County Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed the full commission. I submit that there was substantial evidence to support the full commission’s decision, and we should affirm the Court of Appeals on this issue and all issues raised by James Walter Parchman. 23 ¶45. Because the majority holds otherwise, and for the reasons I have stated, I respectfully dissent. SMITH, C.J., JOINS THIS OPINION. 24