Opinion ID: 3063679
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The State Law Libel Claims

Text: The district court denied Hendrix’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on Bennett and Reid’s libel claims following the presentation of evidence at trial. Hendrix, however, filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on May 17, 2007, which the district court granted on November 9, 2007. Analogizing to some examples of offensive political speech from our nation’s history, the district court found the fliers were “loaded with innuendo, half truths, and rhetorical hyperbole” and concluded “[t]he campaign fliers—however offensive—were political speech of the highest order and deserving of the highest protection.” Accordingly, the court held “the First Amendment trumps the Plaintiffs’ right to recover damages for defamation.” Bennett and Reid contend the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Hendrix on the libel claims because the statements on the fliers do not constitute rhetorical hyperbole or nonliteral assertions of fact. Specifically, they argue the fliers 5 For these same reasons, we reject Bennett and Reid’s argument that the district court erred in failing to separately list the conspiracy claims on the jury verdict form. 27 contain “straightforward factual assertions” identifying Bennett and Reid as “convicted criminals” and thus are not protected by the First Amendment. Under Georgia law, “libel is a false and malicious defamation of another . . . tending to injure the reputation of the person and exposing him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.” O.C.G.A. § 51-5-1. To maintain an action for libel, the communication must be both false and malicious. Speedway Grading Corp. v. Gardner, 425 S.E.2d 676, 678 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). “In determining whether a statement is false, ‘[d]efamation law overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth. . . . [A] statement is not considered false unless it would have a different effect on the mind of the viewer from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.’” Jaillett v. Ga. Television Co., 520 S.E.2d 721, 724 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Brewer v. Rogers, 439 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)). The First Amendment, however, places constitutional limits on the application of the state law of defamation, including the type of speech that may be the subject of state defamation actions. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 16, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2704 (1990). “[B]oth the Supreme Court and this Court of Appeals have long recognized that a defamation claim may not be actionable when the alleged defamatory statement is based on non-literal 28 assertions of ‘fact.’” Horsley v. Rivera, 292 F.3d 695, 701 (11th Cir. 2002). “This provides assurance that public debate will not suffer for lack of ‘imaginative expression’ or the ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ which has traditionally added much to the discourse of our Nation.” Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20, 110 S. Ct. at 2706. Consistent with this principle, the Supreme Court has held use of the word “blackmail” to describe a real estate developer’s negotiating position was not slander when spoken at public meetings or libel when reported in a local newspaper because, within that specific context, “even the most careless reader must have perceived that the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole,” and “[n]o reader could have thought that either the speakers at the meetings or the newspaper articles reporting their words were charging [the developer] with the commission of a criminal offense.” Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14, 90 S. Ct. 1537, 1541–42 (1970). Likewise, we have found a television commentator’s statements that a guest on his show, an anti-abortion activist, was an accomplice to a doctor’s murder were protected under the First Amendment as rhetorical hyperbole when “no reasonable viewer would have concluded that [the commentator] was literally concluding that [the show’s guest] could be charged with a felony in connection with [the doctor’s] murder.” Horsley, 292 F.3d at 702. 29 The dispositive question is thus whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude the challenged statements imply an assertion that “is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false.” Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21, 110 S. Ct. at 2707; see also Edison v. Berry, 415 S.E.2d 16, 17 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (“The pivotal questions are whether [the challenged] statements can reasonably be interpreted as stating or implying defamatory facts about plaintiff and, if so, whether the defamatory assertions are capable of being proved false.”). In undertaking this inquiry, we must consider the circumstances in which the statements were expressed. Horsley, 292 F.3d at 702. If we conclude the statements consist of “the sort of loose, figurative language that no reasonable person would believe presented facts,” the First Amendment provides protection, and a plaintiff may not recover damages for libel. Id; see also Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21, 110 S. Ct. at 2707 (finding a newspaper column was not protected by the First Amendment because the challenged statements were not “the sort of loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language which would negate the impression that the writer was seriously maintaining that petitioner committed the crime of perjury”). Turning to the facts of this case, we conclude two of the fliers, Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 1 and 3, cannot sustain a damages award for libel under Georgia law because they do not contain false statements. The second page of both these fliers 30 features a photograph of a man who, according to the fliers, pled guilty to kidnapping. Text on these pages insinuates “convicted criminals,” “real criminals,” and “criminal cash” support Paxton’s campaign. A person who pleads guilty to kidnapping is a convicted criminal. See Black’s Law Dictionary 358, 402 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “convict” as “[t]o find (a person) guilty of a criminal offense upon a criminal trial, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere (no contest)” and “criminal” as “[o]ne who has committed a criminal offense” and “[o]ne who has been convicted of a crime”). Because the man who pled guilty to kidnapping is a “convicted criminal,” the statements on Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 1 and 3 asserting “criminals,” “real criminals,” “convicted felons,” and “criminal cash” support Paxton’s campaign are not false.6 Furthermore, the text specifically referring to Bennett and Reid on Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 1 and 3 does not contain false statements. On Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1, Bennett’s mug shot appears with the text, “Arrested and housed in the Forsyth County Jail, Bennett gave Paxton hundreds for his smear campaign on two occasions.” On Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 3, the text accompanying Bennett’s photograph reads, “Arrested and housed in the Forsyth County Jail, Bennett gave Paxton 6 Additionally, Reid testified at trial that he pled guilty to driving under the influence in the early 1980s. 31 hundreds to help finance Paxton’s smear campaign.” Both these statements are true. On both Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 1 and 3, Reid’s mug shot appears with the text, “Developer was arrested for refusing to obey order to stop construction. He is now giving substantial amounts of cash to Paxton.” Like the statements accompanying Bennett’s photograph on the fliers, the statements referring to Reid are true. Accordingly, because both the statements asserting “criminals” support Paxton’s campaign and the text accompanying Bennett and Reid’s photographs are true, Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 1 and 3 are not defamatory and cannot form the basis for a libel claim under Georgia law. See O.C.G.A. § 51-5-1; see also O.C.G.A. § 51- 5-6. (stating truth may be proved as a justification for an alleged libel). The same reasoning applies to the statements on the second page of Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2, which also contains a photograph of the man who pled guilty to kidnapping and similar language accompanying Bennett’s mug shot as appears on Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 1 and 3. We conclude Bennett and Reid cannot recover on their libel claims with respect to these particular statements. The front page of Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2, however, is a different matter. The front of this flier contains a mug shot of Bennett accompanied with the text, “Should a Candidate for Sheriff finance his campaign using cash from convicted 32 criminals?” Bennett is the only person featured on the front of this flier. Although he has a record of an arrest from 1995, Bennett is not a “convicted criminal” under any definition. Indeed, Hendrix, as a law enforcement officer, understood the definition of “convicted criminals,” and he testified at trial he knew Bennett was not one when the fliers were published in August 2000. The implication of a mug shot and the sentence, “Should a Candidate for Sheriff finance his campaign using cash from convicted criminals?”, is that the photo is of a convicted felon, and it is defamatory of Bennett, satisfying the definition of libel under Georgia law. See O.C.G.A. § 51-5-1. The question remains, though, whether the challenged language on the front on Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2 is protected by the First Amendment. Finding it constituted “rhetorical hyperbole,” the district court held the speech was “deserving of the highest protection” and could not be the subject of a defamation action. We disagree. The language on the front of the flier is not “the sort of loose, figurative language that no reasonable person would believe present[s] facts.” See Horsley, 292 F.3d at 702. A reasonable factfinder could conclude that, with the photo, the sentence, “Should a Candidate for Sheriff finance his campaign using cash from convicted criminals?”, is an assertion regarding Bennett—the only person featured on the page—that “is sufficiently factual to be 33 susceptible of being proved true or false.” See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21, 110 S. Ct. at 2707. Specifically, the challenged language asserts Bennett is a convicted criminal. Whether that assertion is false is verifiable from Bennett’s criminal records. Accordingly, the front page of Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2 is not protected by the First Amendment.7 The context in which the language on the front of the flier was expressed supports our conclusion that the First Amendment does not provide protection. The flier was published by the chief law enforcement officer of Forsyth County. The only person who appears on its front page is Bennett. The photograph of Bennett is a mug shot taken shortly after his 1995 arrest. In the photograph, Bennett has a disheveled appearance, and his hair is not groomed. The intended message is clear—Bennett is a convicted criminal—and a reasonable reader could conclude Hendrix, the sheriff of Forsyth County, was stating Bennett had been convicted of a criminal offense. Indeed, Hendrix acknowledged during his trial 7 In reaching this conclusion, we need not decide whether the challenged language involved a public figure or a private figure on a matter of public concern because the district court concluded the speech was protected under the First Amendment as rhetorical hyperbole. The First Amendment can provide protection against state law defamation claims on two bases: (1) the type of speech involved and (2) the person whom the speech concerns and the culpability of the speaker. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20, 110 S. Ct. at 2706–07. The inquiry associated with each has developed under two separate lines of Supreme Court cases. See id. We analyze only the type of speech involved here, as the district court’s decision did not rest on the person whom the speech concerned. 34 testimony it was “very possible” a recipient of the flier could read the flier and think Bennett was a convicted criminal. In this context, “convicted criminals” is “not the sort of loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language which would negate the impression that [Hendrix] was serious maintaining” Bennett was a convicted criminal. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21, 110 S. Ct. at 2707. We recognize “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S. Ct. 710, 721 (1964), and “language of the political arena . . . is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact,” Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708, 89 S. Ct. 1399, 1401–02 (1969). As one of our sister circuit courts has noted, “[P]olitical statements are inherently prone to exaggeration and hyperbole. If political discourse is to rally public opinion and challenge conventional thinking, it cannot be subdued. Nor may we saddle political speakers with implications their words do not literally convey . . . .” Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted). We are sensitive to the fact this flier was published during a heated political campaign, but this fact does not alter our analysis. The language on the front page of Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2 is exact, and the words literally convey the assertion that Bennett is a convicted criminal. False factual assertions are not protected under 35 the First Amendment, even if expressed within the context of political debate. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3007 (1974) (“[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues.” (quoting New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270, 84 S. Ct. at 721)). We also recognize the tone of the speech and its medium of expression can often signal opinion or nonliteral assertions of fact, especially within the political arena. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 6, 110 S. Ct. at 2707 (noting “the general tenor of an article” may negate a literal assertion); see also Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244, 1249 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting a campaign press release “is at least as likely to signal political opinion as a newspaper editorial or political cartoon”). That said, the front page of Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2 is not styled as a cartoon, parody, or editorial, and its tone is not satirical or exaggerated. Rather, it involves an assertion by an law enforcement officer regarding the criminal history of one of his opponent’s supporters, accompanied by a mug shot of that supporter. The tone of the flier supports our conclusion that it is not protected by the First Amendment. 36 The type of speech protected by the First Amendment is a context-driven inquiry, and we thus emphasize the unique circumstances of this case. If the challenged language on the front page of Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2 had been “criminals” instead of the more exact and literal phrase “convicted criminals,” this might be a different case. If a photograph of a convicted criminal had appeared alongside Bennett’s mug shot on the front page of the flier, this might be a different case. If Bennett’s mug shot had been omitted from the page, this might be a different case. Here, however, the use of only Bennett’s mug shot and the precise language of “convicted criminals” leads to one conclusion—the speech constitutes a false factual assertion and is not protected by the First Amendment.8 8 For these same reasons, we reject Hendrix’s argument that the speech is pure opinion protected under the First Amendment. Because the factual premises of the challenged language are revealed in the fliers, Hendrix argues the speech, in addition to constituting rhetorical hyperbole, amounts to pure opinion and is not actionable. The state of Georgia has immunized “not only statements of rhetorical hyperbole . . . but also statements clearly recognizable as pure opinion because their factual premises are revealed.” Jaillett, 520 S.E.2d at 726. “If an opinion is based upon facts already disclosed in the communication, the expression of the opinion implies nothing other than the speaker’s subjective interpretation of the facts.” Id. Although the front page of Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2 does state Bennett was “arrested and housed in the Forsyth County Jail,” the question “Should a Candidate for Sheriff finance his campaign using cash from convicted criminals?” is not Hendrix’s subjective interpretation of these facts. Hendrix’s own testimony undermines his argument, as he admitted at trial that being arrested did not make an individual a “convicted criminal.” The challenged language is not protected under the First Amendment as pure opinion. 37 Finally, in reaching our conclusion, we note, within the context of campaigns for law enforcement offices, the particular relevance of information regarding criminal and arrest records of candidates and their supporters. This information is crucial for the public to determine which individuals to entrust the responsibility of maintaining and executing the laws of this land. Such information, however, must be truthful. Candidates for law enforcement offices cannot misrepresent the criminal histories of their opponents and their opponents’ supporters with false factual assertions.9 In this case, the challenged language on the front of Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2 misrepresents Bennett’s criminal history with false factual assertions and crosses the line from healthy political debate and pertinent public information to defamation. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment as a matter of law in favor of Hendrix on Bennett’s state law libel claim.10 9 The First Amendment, however, may still provide protection to false factual assertions depending on the person whom the speech concerns and the culpability of the speaker. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20, 110 S. Ct. at 2706–07. Again, in this case, we only determine the type of speech involved and whether the First Amendment provides protection for it. 10 Hendrix has raised a number of alternative arguments on appeal. Specifically, he contends (1) he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the fliers did not constitute libel per se and Bennett and Reid offered no proof of special damages; (2) he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Bennett and Reid failed to prove actual injury; and (3) he is entitled to a new trial or remittitur because the verdict was excessive, the district court erred in refusing to allow evidence of a clarification and in refusing to charge presumed damages are a rebuttal presumption, and there was confusion of issues for the jury. We need not address these issues because the district court did not consider them in granting Hendrix judgment as a matter 38