Opinion ID: 422139
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Immunity Under Recreational Use Statute.

Text: 12 Apart from the generally applicable Nevada rules governing tort liability, the Nevada recreational use statute 4 provides immunity for a landowner whose property is used for recreational purposes, subject, however, to several exceptions. In holding for the defendant, the trial court found that section 41.510(1), the immunity section, is applicable to the facts of this case and that neither of two possible exceptions contained in section 41.510(3) change the result. In particular, the district court found the consideration exception to the Nevada recreational use statute, subsection 41.510(3)(b), inapplicable on the ground that the various forms of consideration allegedly tendered by the Users--money for store purchases, moorage fees, and trailer space rental fees--were tendered not to the United States but to ECR and that [m]oney paid to the concessioner is not payment to the Government. 13 Plaintiffs challenge this holding on the ground that the consideration exception is applicable on the facts of this case. The Government contends that the district court's conclusion should be upheld for two reasons: (1) since the Users made no direct payments for permission to enter, no consideration in the sense of subsection 41.510(3)(b) was tendered; and (2) even if such consideration in the sense of subsection 41.510(3)(b) was tendered, it was not tendered to the United States. We reject both of the Government's contentions and conclude that the exception is applicable here. 5 14
15 The Government argues first that even if the Government itself had operated the Eldorado Canyon facility none of the various forms of consideration ECR received are the sort of consideration in return for permission to participate in recreational activities required under subsection 41.510(3)(b). Like any other visitors to Eldorado Canyon, the Users paid no direct fee to enter the Canyon, to boat on the Colorado, or to hike, fish, sightsee, or participate in any other recreational activity in the Canyon. The only consideration tendered was for the purchase of products or for the use of the artificial amenities of trailer spaces and boat slips. The Government insists that subsection 41.510(3)(b) is applicable only where a fee is specifically charged for permission to enter. We do not read the exception so narrowly. 16 No Nevada or Ninth Circuit cases construing Nevada law address the scope of the consideration exception to the Nevada statute. However, the statutory language, the principle of statutory construction governing statutes in derogation of the common law, the policy underlying the statute, and the case law of other jurisdictions all support a broad application of that exception. 17 First, the language of the consideration exception itself suggests a broad reading of section 41.510(3)(b). The exception is worded not in narrow terms of fee or charge, but rather in the far more encompassing terms, for a consideration. 6 Consideration is a term of art, a word with a well-understood meaning in the law, embracing any right, interest, profit or benefit. Black's Law Dictionary 277 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Used in a statute, it should be accorded that meaning. Application of Filippini, 66 Nev. 17, 24, 202 P.2d 535, 538 (1949). The statutory exception, then, is itself literally applicable to situations well beyond those involving a strict charging of a fee for permission to recreate. 7 18 Since the recreational use statute is in derogation of common law rules of tort liability, we take care to avoid an overbroad interpretation of the statute that would afford immunity that was not intended. See Rush v. Nevada Industrial Commission, 94 Nev. 403, 407, 580 P.2d 952, 954 (1978) (statute in derogation of common law should be read narrowly); West Indies, Inc. v. First National Bank of Nevada, 67 Nev. 13, 33-34, 214 P.2d 144, 154 (1950) (same); Copeland v. Larson, 46 Wis.2d 337, 347, 174 N.W.2d 745, 749-50 (1970) (recreational use statute construed narrowly since in derogation of common law). Consequently, exceptions to the statute, including the consideration exception, must be given the broadest reading that is within the fair intendment of the language used. 19 The policy underlying the adoption of a consideration exception to the Nevada recreational use statute is to retain tort liability in actions involving recreational use of land where the use of the land for recreational purposes is granted not gratuitously but in return for an economic benefit. 8 Since the potential for profit alone is thought sufficient to encourage those owners who wish to make commercial use of their recreational lands to open them to the public, the further stimulus of tort immunity is both unnecessary and improper. 9 Furthermore, where a landowner derives an economic benefit from allowing others to use his land for recreational purposes, the landowner is in a position to post warnings, supervise activities, and otherwise seek to prevent injuries. Such a landowner also has the ability to purchase liability insurance or to self-insure, thereby spreading the cost of accidents over all users of the land. 10 20 An ability to spread risks exists regardless of whether the economic benefit the landowner derives is in the form of direct entrance fees or in the form of revenues from a connected economic enterprise. Confining the term consideration in subsection 41.510(3)(b) solely to direct payments of entrance fees or charges would extend the immunity of the statute beyond those persons whom the statutory policy would protect. 21 Our conclusion is consistent with decisions of this and other courts, construing the consideration exceptions of the recreational use statutes of other states. In Graves v. United States Coast Guard, 692 F.2d 71, 73 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam), we held that the California recreational use statute did not immunize the United States from liability for injuries arising out of the use of a riverside cabana, even though the only alleged consideration was the payment of a fee to private entrepreneurs for the privilege of camping near the river. We held that since the use of the cabana and access to the river were implied benefits received as a consequence of the payment of consideration to the campground operators, the camping fee was considerationn return not merely for permission to camp but also to gain access to the river and to use waterside facilities within the meaning of the consideration exception to the California recreational use statute. Id. 22 Similarly, in Copeland v. Larson, 46 Wis.2d 337, 347, 174 N.W.2d 745, 749-50 (1970), the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied immunity under the Wisconsin recreational use statute to a lakeshore resort owner who had allowed free access to a dock and swimming area adjacent to his general store and short-order restaurant. The Wisconsin statute provided in pertinent part that the section does not limit the liability which would otherwise exist ... for injury suffered in any case where permission to hunt, fish, trap, camp, hike, sightsee, berry-pick or to proceed with water sports or recreational uses was granted for a valuable consideration. Id. at 340 n. 1, 174 N.W.2d at 747 n. 1. In Copeland, the plaintiff swam and dived from the pier without restriction and without paying any charge because no such charge was ever imposed. Id. at 339, 174 N.W.2d at 747. Although the plaintiff had been a patron of the store in the past, he had not made any purchases on the day of the accident. Id. The Wisconsin court nonetheless found the consideration exception applicable, holding that valuable consideration included not merely a monetary fee paid to the landowners but also non-monetary benefits and indirect economic benefits flowing to the owner from the recreational use of his land. Id. at 346, 174 N.W.2d at 750-51. 23 In Kesner v. Trenton, 216 S.E.2d 880 (W.Va.1975), the West Virginia Supreme Court held the West Virginia recreational use statute inapplicable to a marina operator, who coincident with renting spaces for private boats and parking spots with electricity, water, and toilet facilities, and operating a store, provided, without charge to the general public, areas for picnicking and swimming in the waters adjacent to [his] boat dock and marina. Id. at 882. The West Virginia statute denies immunity to landowners who make a charge to a person to enter or go upon the land. It defines charge as the amount of money asked in return for an invitation to enter or go upon the land. Id. at 885. Since the plaintiffs in Kesner had not paid to picnic or swim at the marina and had not rented a boat from the operator, the court noted that technically ... there was not an 'amount of money asked in return for an invitation to enter or go upon the land'  as literally required by the statute. Id. at 883, 885. Nonetheless, the court held that the defendant's reasonable expectation to attract prospective customers and thus, to increase sales and rentals at the marina by allowing people to swim in the lake at no cost was a sufficient 'charge' within the meaning of the statute to toll the imposition of tort immunity. Id. at 885. 24 As in the cases discussed, the Users did not pay an entrance or permission fee or charge to participate in recreational activities in Eldorado Canyon. But, just as in the other cases, similar amenities were offered by the concessioners, and all but one of the Users had rented boat slips or trailer spaces and all had regularly purchased goods from the cafe-store. 11 Moreover, all were concededly participating in recreational activities in Eldorado Canyon, and not elsewhere, at the time of the flood. We conclude that if the United States itself had operated the Eldorado Canyon facility the rentals and purchases by the Users would constitute consideration in return for permission to recreate in Eldorado Canyon within the meaning of the consideration exception to the Nevada statute. 12 25
26 The Government contends that, even if moorage and trailer fees and cafe-store purchases constitute consideration in the sense of 41.510(3)(b), the exception does not apply since ECR, and not the United States, operated the cafe-store and rental facilities. The Government argues that since ECR had no power to deny permission to the Users to recreate in Eldorado Canyon and since the Users paid ECR and not the United States for all rentals and purchases, the consideration is not in return for permission to recreate as required by subsection 41.510(3)(b). We reject that argument. 27 Subsection 41.510(3)(b) does not specify to whom consideration must be tendered. We think it a fair reading of the provision, however, that consideration must be tendered directly or indirectly to a person who has the power to grant or deny permission to participate in recreational activities. Since the concession agreement did not give ECR the power to deny permission to recreate in Eldorado Canyon, the exception is applicable only if consideration was tendered, directly or indirectly, to the United States in return for permission to recreate in Eldorado Canyon. We conclude that this condition is met in this case. 28 Before entering its concession agreement with ECR, the United States certainly was free to deny permission to recreate in Eldorado Canyon. See Jones v. United States, 693 F.2d 1299, 1302-03 (9th Cir.1982). Thereafter, however, it was not. The concession agreement required the concessioner to provide and maintain facilities, to offer services, and to pay to the government a fixed percentage of all revenues from operations. Implicit in the agreement was a commitment on the government's part that users would be allowed to enter the area to use the concession facilities. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the consideration tendered here by the Users to ECR was in return for permission to participate in recreational activities in Eldorado Canyon in the sense of subsection 41.510(3)(b). 13 29 In so holding, we break no new ground. While we recognize that the case law pertaining to the recreational use statutes of other jurisdictions must be viewed cautiously because of variations from statute to statute, we see our interpretation of subsection 41.510(3)(b) to be in keeping with this court's construction of similar consideration exception clauses in the recreational use statutes of other states. 30 In Graves v. United States Coast Guard, for example, the Ninth Circuit imposed liability on the United States although the plaintiff had paid his camping fee to a private campground operator, who had leased the camping area from the United States. 692 F.2d at 73. Noting that the statute did not specify to whom the consideration is to be paid, we held that even though the fee was paid to the government's lessee and not to the United States, the fee constituted a consideration in return for permission to enter for a recreational purpose and thereby invoked the consideration exception to deny immunity to the United States under the California recreational use statute. Id. 31 Similarly, in Thompson v. United States, 592 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir.1979), we denied immunity to the government. An injured motorcycle rider had paid a fee to a racing association in return for permission to participate in a motorcycle race. Id. at 1108. The racing association had previously paid a fee to the Bureau of Land Management for the right to hold a race on government land. Even though the injured rider had not himself paid a fee to the United States for permission to enter United States land, we nonetheless held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the rider had tendered consideration in return for permission to enter for [vehicular riding] purposes within the meaning of the consideration exception to the California recreational use statute. Id. 32 The denial of immunity in the cases we describe comports with the general policy considerations underlying the exception. The consideration exception is not simply a mechanical test to distinguish those recreational use cases that involve direct payments from user to landowner from those that do not. Rather, it is intended to serve more broadly as a proxy for differentiating the entrepreneur-landowner whose land is open for business reasons from the landowner whom the statute encourages to open his land on a gratuitous basis by the promise of immunity. 14 The relevant factor in determining whether to apply the consideration exception is thus not whether the consideration passes directly from user to landowner but rather whether economic benefit inures to the landowner. 33 ECR's failure to make payment on its concession agreement in 1974, the year of the accident, does not affect the result. All of the Users had actually purchased products at the ECR cafe-store in the time period immediately preceding the accident, and all but one had made rental payments to ECR for moorage and trailer spaces. Under the concession agreement the United States was entitled to 1 3/4% of ECR's gross receipts including those payments by the Users. The failure of ECR to make good on its monetary and other contractual obligations to the government, for whatever reasons, is irrelevant. The payments by the Users to ECR, as to which the United States is entitled to a share, constitute consideration in return for permission to recreate in Eldorado Canyon. 34 By holding the consideration exception applicable on the facts of this case, we do not imply that the exception applies to a broader geographic area than that over which the concessionaire has the explicit or implicit power to grant or deny permission to recreate. 15 All three of the Users were killed while in Eldorado Canyon, well within the geographical boundaries of ECR's concession facility. 16 35