Opinion ID: 794021
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 9 The Supreme Court held in Williams v. New York 5 that admission of hearsay evidence at sentencing did not violate the due process clause. In that case, a jury had recommended life imprisonment for a murderer but the judge imposed a death sentence because the presentence investigation revealed additional aggravating evidence that the jury had not heard. The Court explained that, 10 both before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law. 6 11 This may include affidavits and, in smaller communities, the judge's own knowledge. When Williams was decided in 1949, presentence reports had just begun to be considered, the Court noted, to implement a prevalent modern philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime, so that the death sentence was no longer an automatic and commonplace result of convictions. 7 Individualization of sentences made it especially necessary to review a broad range of sentencing information that was not appropriately submitted to juries considering guilt. 12 Congress has since provided by statute that the hearsay rule and other evidentiary limitations do not apply to sentencing: 13 No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence. 8 14 We require only that the testimony be accompanied by some minimal indicia of reliability. 9 In this case, that criterion is plainly satisfied by the judge's personal observation of the defendant's demeanor during his testimony, the wire transfers and their significance, and testimonial inconsistencies noted by the sentencing judge. 15 Littlesun argues that these longstanding principles have been implicitly overruled and that the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington 10 requires that the Confrontation Clause be interpreted to exclude hearsay at sentencing. But Crawford does not expressly speak to sentencing. It holds that, with the possible exception of dying declarations, the Confrontation Clause demands two things for admissibility of testimonial hearsay at trial: unavailability of the witness and prior opportunity for cross-examination. 11 Crawford speaks to trial testimony, not sentencing. 16 Littlesun's argument nevertheless has some force. Though the meaning of testimonial in Crawford is not entirely clear, there can be no question that Littlesun's wife's testimony is testimonial if Crawford applies to sentencing. And the record is clear that Littlesun never had an opportunity to cross-examine his wife about what she said. Cross examination might have been productive, because her participation in the methamphetamine conspiracy and her own interest in lenience, her boyfriend among the Mexicans, his girlfriend, and the prior occasion when she stabbed Littlesun all might have given rise to an inference that she was not telling the truth when she cast the blame on her husband for the additional ounce. 17 But it is not for us to overrule the Supreme Court's decision in Williams. Under Agostini v. Felton, 12 we are bound to apply controlling Supreme Court precedent until it is explicitly overruled by that Court. 13 And Crawford does not explicitly overrule Williams. Thus the law on hearsay at sentencing is still what it was before Crawford: hearsay is admissible at sentencing, so long as it is accompanied by some minimal indicia of reliability. 14 18 The same conclusion has been reached by the First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, 15 and none of our sister circuits have reached a contrary conclusion. And we have previously held that [f]ederal law is clear that a judge may consider hearsay information in sentencing a defendant. 16 19 Littlesun counters with our decisions in United States v. Comito 17 and United States v. Martin, 18 but those cases involved revocation of parole and supervised release, not sentencing. Those decisions were grounded in the Supreme Court's decision in Morrissey v. Brewer 19 which expressly held that a parolee is entitled to cross-examine witnesses at a revocation proceeding, 20 subject to balancing certain factors. That requirement has since been codified in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 21 but neither Morrissey nor the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure say anything about Williams or the right to examine adverse witnesses at sentencing. A court is presented with quite a different set of circumstances when it has to decide whether someone is guilty and must go to prison than when it is deciding how long a convicted criminal must serve. We rejected an attempt to graft Crawford's Sixth Amendment rule onto Morrissey's Due Process requirement at revocation proceedings in our recent decision in United States v. Hall. 22 United States v. Corral 23 holds that reversal is necessary where the sentencing judge relies on what was concededly unreliable hearsay. 24 It does not hold that accomplice hearsay is unreliable even where there are sufficient indicia of reliability. The government conceded on appeal in Corral that the hearsay was unreliable, but had not done so at sentencing. 25 Corral expressly recognizes that hearsay is admissible at sentencing. 26 The reliability of Littlesun's wife's hearsay might have become doubtful because she was an accomplice with a penal interest and had demonstrated her hostility to her husband, but the wire transfers and inconsistencies the district court noted were significant indicia corroborating Littlesun's role. 27
20 Littlesun also challenges the district court's denial of a downward adjustment because he was a minimal or minor participant in the conspiracy. 28 Much of his argument is that the conspiracy sold a lot more methamphetamine than he participated in, but the judge took this into account in attributing to Littlesun only 32.5 grams, not the 210 grams the indictment charged. The district judge relied on Littlesun's wife's statement, as well other material in the presentence report to conclude that he had a smaller role than some others in the conspiracy, but it was by no means small enough for a role adjustment. We review denial of a role adjustment for clear error, 29 and there was none because the court accepted the evidence of Littlesun's wife's statement. 21 The district court's determination that hearsay was admissible at sentencing and its guideline calculation were each correct. However, we grant a limited remand to allow the district court to answer the question whether it would have imposed a different sentence had it viewed the Guidelines as advisory. 30 22 AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED.