Opinion ID: 2001143
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: admitting modus operandi evidence.

Text: Appellant argues that the trial judge by allowing the Commonwealth to present modus operandi evidence had abused his discretion and that because of this the appellant's rights to a fair trial and due process of the law were abridged. The appellant and his co-defendants had been charged with six counts of armed robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery in the Philadelphia area which occurred in 1973 with the exception of one which occurred in 1975. Appellant had not been identified as the perpetrator of any of these crimes, however, the planning and execution of the crimes was detailed by an informing witness, Sandra Cornish. Ms. Cornish was an accomplice both before and after each of the Philadelphia robberies. Appellant and his co-defendants were also indirectly identified by victims of these six robberies. Appellant concedes that given the testimony of Sandra Cornish, if believed by the jury, coupled with corroborating facts that were detailed by the victims of the robberies, there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendants during the trial of the six robbery charges. What the appellant objects to is the introduction of evidence of fourteen other robberies which had occurred outside the Philadelphia area in 1973 and 1974. Over objection of appellant's counsel the trial judge permitted the Commonwealth to prove these robberies as modus operandi evidence; evidence which tended to prove a common scheme or plan on the part of the defendants which related to six crimes with which the defendants had been charged. Concerning four of the fourteen robberies, there had been testimony by the victims which would have identified at least one of the three defendants who had been on trial. Appellant argues, however, that as to the remaining ten robberies which were proven during the trial, there was no valid identification testimony which added anything to the evidence the Commonwealth had already presented. Appellant claims that the prejudicial impact of allowing evidence of these robberies far outweighs its probative value. Appellant, in challenging the exercise of discretion by the trial court bears a heavy burden. The standard which must be met is a stringent one. The abuse of discretion is not merely an error in judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the evidence on the record, discretion is abused. Commonwealth v. Braithwaite, 253 Pa.Superior Ct. 447, 385 A.2d 423 (1978). As a general rule, evidence of one crime is not admissible to prove the commission of another. Commonwealth v. Fortune, 464 Pa. 367, 346 A.2d 783 (1975); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 444 Pa. 117, 281 A.2d 864 (1971). Reference to a defendant's other criminal conduct is incurably prejudicial. Commonwealth v. Allen, 448 Pa. 177, 292 A.2d 373 (1972); Commonwealth v. Williams, 230 Pa.Superior Ct. 72, 327 A.2d 367 (1974). However, where the ends of justice require it and the evidence is otherwise trustworthy and relevant, the Common Law has provided a necessary exception to this rule. Where evidence of other crimes has relevance to crimes being tried, where it tends to prove such elements as motive, intent, common scheme, plan or design embracing the commission of crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to prove the others or where crimes are so clearly identical in character and method as to earmark them as the handiwork of the person being tried  evidence of other crimes is admissible for such limited purposes. Commonwealth v. Banks, 454 Pa. 401, 311 A.2d 576 (1973); Commonwealth v. Lasch, 464 Pa. 573, 347 A.2d 690 (1975). Because there had not been any direct identification of the appellant and his co-defendants, the Commonwealth's evidence revolved primarily around the testimony of Sandra Cornish through her recollection of conversations with appellant and his co-defendants. However, her testimony would be carefully scrutinized because of her participation in the scheme. The Commonwealth believed the need for corroboration was essential. The Commonwealth claimed that by introducing evidence of other robberies it sought to corroborate Ms. Cornish's testimony. It also sought to show that the modus operandi was so similar that proof of one tended to prove the other, to establish identity of appellant and his co-defendants, prove the conspiracy, introduce physical evidence obtained in non-Philadelphia robberies which was also used in previous Philadelphia robberies and explain the time lapse between the six robberies. Because there were no eye witnesses to the crimes charged, the Commonwealth could only prove a conspiracy and connect the robberies to the perpetrators by showing the web of circumstances manifested in their modus operandi, the modus operandi consisting of other crimes in circumstantial evidence relevant to prove the scheme, plan (conspiracy) and the identity of the perpetrators. Commonwealth v. Banks, supra; Commonwealth v. Lasch, supra. Criminal conspiracy can seldom, if ever, be proven except by circumstantial evidence  evidence from which the ultimate fact is to be inferred. Where the ultimate facts, the terms, the objectives, the scope of an unlawful agreement are to be inferentially drawn from other facts and circumstances  there is a need for greater latitude in admission of the basic evidence. Commonwealth v. Cohen, 203 Pa.Superior Ct. 34, 199 A.2d 139 (1964). In the instant case, the challenged evidence was determined by the lower court to be relevant, probative and necessary to prove the identity of the perpetrators as well as the terms and objectives of their criminal scheme. [2] In his discretion, the trial court judge determined that the proffered evidence came within the exception to the general rule. As to the claim of the evidence's prejudicial impact outweighing its probative value, the trial judge specifically instructed the jury that they were not to conclude from this evidence that the defendant was guilty of the crimes charged or predisposed to criminality. This served to dissipate any prejudice which inhered in the evidence. There is no indication from the record that the trial judge had overridden or misapplied the law, or that this was a result of partiality, prejudice or ill will. The judge acted within his discretion, therefore, the appellant's claim is without merit.