Opinion ID: 2524968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Venue for resolution of fee award ownership disputes

Text: Defendants asked in their petition for review that we announce in this case a rule requiring that all litigated disputes between attorneys and their clients over statutory fee awards be resolved by the trial judge who handled proceedings in the matter to which the fees relate. They ask us to bar collateral proceedings like the instant suit. Defendants, however, did not raise this issue in the Court of Appeal. As a matter of policy, on petition for review, we normally do not consider any issue that could have been but was not timely raised in the briefs filed in the Court of Appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(b)(1).) Citing Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 654, 209 Cal.Rptr. 682, 693 P.2d 261, defendants suggest that our considering their additional issue notwithstanding our normal policy would not prejudice plaintiff, and that we should, therefore, address it as one involving an important question of law implicating the jurisdiction of the courts. Defendants obtained summary judgment in the trial court, both as defendants and as cross-complainants. A judgment rendered with consent of the appellant is not appealable. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 189, p. 244.) It was plaintiff, of course, who appealed the trial court's summary judgment rulings with the result that led to defendants' petitioning us for review. Nevertheless, it ill behooves defendants to disparage the trial court's competence to hear the merits of the instant suit, inasmuch as defendants themselves sought affirmative reliefa declaration of their entitlement to the disputed feesin the trial court. There is substantial authority for the proposition that a party who has invoked or consented to the exercise of jurisdiction beyond the court's authority may be precluded from challenging it afterward, even on a direct attack by appeal. (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Jurisdiction, § 324, p. 900, citing numerous authorities.) Defendants do not persuade us that we should depart from our ordinary policy in this case. Ultimately, we cannot conclude that defendants' novel proposal regarding fee dispute resolution raises extremely significant issues of public policy and public interest ( Fisher v. City of Berkeley, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 655, fn. 3, 209 Cal.Rptr. 682, 693 P.2d 261) such as may have caused us on infrequent prior occasions to depart from it.