Opinion ID: 2981099
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The March 16, 2009 Continuance

Text: On March 16, 2009, Richardson’s counsel made an oral motion to continue the trial in order to further review discovery produced by the government. During this conference, Richardson’s counsel stated that he was having various problems with discovery in the case. He stated that he was having problems obtaining discovery from Richardson’s former counsel in the earlier case, he referenced the voluminous nature of the discovery, his trouble finding and obtaining certain discovery materials, the confusing ways in which certain discovery materials had been labeled, and trouble searching through discovery documents. After listening to the various reasons Richardson’s counsel set forth in support of the continuance, the court asked Richardson’s counsel “[i]s the bottom line here that you’re not going to be ready . . . by the 30th?” (Page ID # 1786.) In response, Richardson’s counsel stated “[t]here is no way, shape or form.” (Id.) When the judge asked Richardson’s counsel when he would be ready for trial, he said that he was thinking ninety days, but that he should be ready to go in sixty. Based on this context, the court found a continuance served the ends of justice for both Richardson and Welti, stating “it certainly seems that the ends of justice are served by rescheduling the trial and affording [Richardson’s counsel] an adequate time to prepare and assess the case, and that outweighs the public and the government’s interest in a trial, as well as the defendants’—plural—interest in a speedy trial.” (Page ID # 1795.) Accordingly, the court excluded the time from March 16 to June 8, 2009, from the speedy-trial clock, and the trial was set for June 8, 2009. No. 11-3127 United States v. Richardson Page 7 The court’s explanation for excluding this time from the speedy trial clock was sufficient under Zedner, 547 U.S. at 506–508, because given the context, the record clearly establishes that a continuance serves the ends of justice. Furthermore, in its order denying Richardson’s motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act, the court restated that “the continuance was necessary in the ends of justice to allow proper trial preparation.” (Page ID # 1436.) This ends-of-justice continuance was also properly excluded. See United States v. Stewart, 628 F.3d 246, 253 (6th Cir. 2010) (upholding an ends-of-justice consideration for a continuance where defense counsel explained in the unopposed motion that the case’s complexity warranted continuance, and where the court stated on the record that the continuance was in the interest of justice because counsel needed more time to prepare).