Opinion ID: 1459555
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: There Was Insufficient Evidence Supporting the Charges Against Tran.

Text: Tran also contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, and for two counts of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. We review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Antonakeas, 255 F.3d 714, 723 (9th Cir.2001). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we must determine whether any rational jury could have found [the defendant] guilty of each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Esquivel-Ortega, 484 F.3d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir.2007). It is the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 1. Conspiracy Conviction Tran argues that the government failed to prove that he participated in the conspiracy to possess marijuana for distribution. To successfully prosecute Tran on the conspiracy charge, the government was required to prove: (1) that within five years leading up to and including June 27, 2006, there was an agreement between two or more people to commit the crime of possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute it; and (2) that Tran became a member of the conspiracy, knowing of at least one of its objects and intending to help accomplish it. [O]nly a slight connection is necessary to support a conviction of knowing participation in a conspiracy. United States v. Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d 1166, 1167 (9th Cir.1991). `[S]light connection' in this context does not mean that the government's burden of proving a connection is slight. United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, 263 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2001). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence was insufficient to show that Tran had even a slight connection to the conspiracy. The principal evidence presented to the jury was:  The in-court testimony of Nguyen, in which Nguyen stated that Tran was present in the car during the drug transaction but denied that Tran was involved in the drug conspiracy.  The testimony of government agents describing the marijuana distribution operation generally, but not mentioning any role by Tran in the conspiracy.  A single sentence in Nguyen's plea agreement stating that Tam Phu Quy Nguyen, together with Hao Quang Tran, picked up approximately 70 pounds of marijuana for re-distribution that night.  The testimony of Agent Ingersoll admitted solely for impeachment, recounting that, during a pretrial interview with the FBI and the prosecuting attorney, Nguyen had implicated Tran in the drug conspiracy.  The testimony of two government witnesses, Pham and Shaw, describing their prior drug dealings with Tran, admitted for the limited purpose of showing Tran's knowledge. Once these pieces of evidence are confined to the purposes for which they were admitted, the government's proof against Tran only amounts to: (1) Tran's presence as Nguyen's passenger during the marijuana deal; and (2) Tran's knowledge of marijuana distribution tactics, based on the testimony of Pham and Shaw that was admitted for the limited purpose of showing Tran's knowledge under Rule 404(b). The evidence presented against Tran and the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence do not support even a slight connection between Tran and the conspiracy. The evidence at trial showed the sophisticated drug distribution ring and named several individuals connected to it. Tran's name, however, was not mentioned during that testimony. Tran's name was mentioned only in connection with his arrest. Tran did not own the silver Mustang carrying marijuana in the trunk, nor was he the driver. No evidence was introduced at trial from which it could be inferred much less proved beyond a reasonable doubtthat Tran participated in the conspiracy in any manner. Tran's presence as a passenger in the silver Mustang while the marijuana was transported, and his knowledge of marijuana and marijuana distribution was insufficient as a matter of law to establish his guilt on the conspiracy charge. It is not a crime to be acquainted with criminals or to be physically present when they are committing crimes. Herrera-Gonzalez, 263 F.3d at 1095. Our cases have established that presence at the location of a conspiracy's activities, while the activities are taking place, knowing that they are taking place, without proof of intentional participation in the conspiracy, cannot support a conspiracy conviction. Id. at 1097. Under our case law, Tran's conviction on the conspiracy charge cannot stand. Two other cases in which we found insufficient evidence of participation in a conspiracy are illustrative. In Sanchez-Mata, law enforcement agents linked a silver Audi to a remote location where marijuana was discovered. 925 F.2d at 1167. Sanchez-Mata was never seen in that vicinity. Id. When officers stopped the silver Audi, Sanchez-Mata was a passenger. Id. The agents could smell marijuana from the outside of the car, and discovered 141 pounds of marijuana in the trunk of the Audi. Id. Sanchez-Mata did not resist arrest or carry a weapon. Id. There were no drugs in the passenger compartment of the Audi. Sanchez-Mata did not own the car, nor did he have a key to it. His fingerprints were not on the drugs. Id. At trial, the government offered evidence that Sanchez-Mata previously pleaded guilty to a drug-related charge. Id. at 1168. This evidence was admitted for the limited purpose of showing that Sanchez-Mata knew what marijuana smelled like and must have recognized the strong odor present. Id. Sanchez-Mata was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Id. at 1167. We reversed both convictions. Id. at 1170. With respect to Sanchez-Mata's conspiracy conviction, we observed that there was insufficient evidence of even a slight connection between the defendant and the conspiracy. Id. at 1167-68. Although the government had offered evidence from which the jury could have concluded that Sanchez-Mata knew that marijuana was present, we held that knowledge that drugs are present is not enough to prove involvement in a drug conspiracy. Id. at 1168 ( citing United States v. Penagos, 823 F.2d 346 (9th Cir.1987), United States v. Lopez, 625 F.2d 889 (9th Cir.1980), and United States v. Cloughessy, 572 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.1977)). Although it was undisputed that a conspiracy existed, there was insufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have concluded that Sanchez-Mata was a participant in that conspiracy. Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d at 1170. In United States v. Estrada-Macias, 218 F.3d 1064, 1064 (9th Cir.2000), the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents learned of large shipments of pseudoephedrine tablets, often used to make methamphetamine. Id. at 1065. The tablets were delivered to an apartment. Id. Agents followed a man, Ramirez-Vasquez, driving a truck carrying ten cases of the tablets from that first apartment to a second apartment. Id. Less than two hours later, a car driven by another man, Garcia, arrived at the second apartment. Id. The car was stopped and Garcia was questioned. Id. Estrada-Macias was a passenger in that car. Id. That same day, the agents learned that a second shipment of tablets was being shipped to another house. Id. Within hours of the delivery of the tablets to that house, Garcia and Estrada-Macias were observed being picked up by Ramirez-Vasquez. Id. After obtaining a warrant, the agents searched the house and a trailer parked in the driveway of the house. Id. They found substantial evidence that methamphetamine was being manufactured in the trailer. Id. Estrada-Macias, Vasquez-Ramirez, and Garcia were all arrested. Id. at 1066. Estrada-Macias initially lied to the agents about where he lived, but quickly admitted that he had been living in the trailer for the preceding three months. Id. Estrada-Macias was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. Id. In reversing that conviction, we held that the evidence was certainly sufficient to raise a strong inference that [Estrada-Macias] must have known that several individuals living around him were engaged in a conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. That inference is not strong enough to permit conviction. `Mere casual association with conspiring people is not enough.' Id. ( quoting Cloughessy, 572 F.2d at 191). Absent evidence of Estrada-Macias's participation in the conspiracy, his knowledge of the conspiracy, and sleeping in a trailer used to manufacture methamphetamine was insufficient to support his conviction. Id.; see also Herrera-Gonzalez, 263 F.3d at 1097 (discussing Estrada-Macias ). Like the appellants in Sanchez-Mata and Estrada-Macias, Tran was clearly present when a drug conspiracy was underway. Law enforcement officers and co-defendant Nguyen testified that Tran was the passenger in a car that was carrying a large quantity of marijuana in its trunk. And as in Sanchez-Mata and Estrada-Macias, a rational trier of fact could have inferred that Tran had knowledge of the presence of drugs and that a drug conspiracy was underway. As in Sanchez-Mata and Estrada-Macias, however, the government produced insufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have concluded that Tran had even a slight connection to the conspiracy. Tran's name was never mentioned by the law enforcement officers who described the marijuana smuggling operation at Tran's trial. Tran did not drive the car carrying the marijuana, nor was he the owner of that car. The marijuana was found in the trunk of the car, but not in the passenger compartment with Tran. The government urges us to affirm Tran's convictions, but it did not even attempt to distinguish Tran's case from Sanchez-Mata or Estrada-Macias, nor did it point to any cases in support of its position. The evidence against Tran was not sufficient to support his conspiracy conviction. The testimony by two government witnesses, Pham and Shaw, attesting to Tran's earlier connections with marijuana distribution were admitted solely for the limited purpose of showing that Tran knew what marijuana was and how those involved in a marijuana conspiracy distribute the contraband. Agent Ingersoll's testimony recounting what Nguyen, the driver of the silver Mustang, told both him and the prosecuting attorney about Tran's role in the conspiracy was admitted solely to impeach Nguyen's credibility and for no other purpose. The court acknowledged that these two pieces of evidence were admitted for those limited purposes. Lastly, there is the single sentence in Nguyen's redacted plea agreement's statement of facts that Tam Phu Quy Nguyen, together with Hao Quang Tran, picked up approximately 70 pounds of marijuana for redistribution that night. A rational jury could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Tran was guilty of conspiracy on the basis of Nguyen's statement, which supports no more than Tran's presence at the site of conspiratorial conduct carried on by others. Accordingly Tran's conviction for conspiracy to possess marijuana with the intent to distribute is vacated. 2. Possession with the Intent to Distribute Convictions To successfully prosecute Tran on the charges of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, the government was required to prove: (1) that Tran knowingly possessed marijuana on June 27, 2006 (the date of his arrest); and (2) that he possessed it with the intent to distribute it, or that he aided and abetted Nguyen in the commission of the crime. A conviction for possession with intent to distribute may be based on one of three legal theories: (1) co-conspirator liability, Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-47, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946); (2) aiding and abetting, United States v. Savinovich, 845 F.2d 834, 838 (9th Cir.1988); and (3) exercising dominion and control over the contraband. United States v. Behanna, 814 F.2d 1318, 1319 (9th Cir.1987). Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d at 1168. Because the government failed to prove that Tran was part of a conspiracy, Tran cannot be guilty of possession with intent to distribute on a co-conspirator theory. Id. With respect to the aiding and abetting theory, we explained in Sanchez-Mata: Aiding and abetting ... makes a defendant a principal when he consciously shares in any criminal act whether or not there is a conspiracy. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 620, 69 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949). But it is necessary that the defendant in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed. Id. at 619, 69 S.Ct. 766. Id. at 1168-69. The government has not offered sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have found Tran guilty of possession on an aiding and abetting theory. The evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn from it support only a finding that Tran was present as a passenger in the silver Mustang and aware that the car contained marijuana. No evidence was offered from which a rational jury could find that Tran consciously share[d] in Nguyen's criminal act of possessing the marijuana with the intent to distribute it. Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d at 1169. Therefore, an aiding and abetting theory does not support Tran's convictions for possession with intent to distribute. Finally, the government may prove possession with intent to distribute by showing that Tran exercised dominion and control over the contraband. Under this theory, the government must prove that the defendant both knows of the presence of the contraband and has the power to exercise dominion and control over it. Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d at 1169 ( citing Behanna, 814 F.2d at 1319). Again, [m]ere proximity to contraband, presence on property where it is found, and association with a person or persons having control of it are all insufficient to establish constructive possession. United States v. Rodriguez, 761 F.2d 1339, 1341 (9th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, it is `well established that a passenger may not be convicted unless there is evidence connecting him with the contraband, other than his presence in the vehicle.' Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d at 1169 ( quoting United States v. Ramos, 476 F.2d 624, 625 (9th Cir.1973)). Again, our decision in Sanchez-Mata compels the reversal of Tran's convictions for possession with intent to distribute. In Sanchez-Mata, the government was able to show that the defendant was present in a car carrying 141 pounds of marijuana in its trunk. Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d at 1167. The car smelled so strongly of marijuana that the police could smell the drug from outside the vehicle. Id. The government offered evidence in the form of Sanchez-Mata's prior drug conviction which showed that Sanchez-Mata knew what marijuana smelled like. Id. at 1168. Nevertheless, we held that the government could not prevail on this theory because it failed to show that Sanchez-Mata had dominion or control over the drugs. Id. at 1169. We observed that Sanchez-Mata did not have a key to the car or its trunk, was not driving the car, and did not own the car. Id. The evidence showed that Sanchez-Mata was a passenger in the car, but no evidence connected him to the drugs. Id. Likewise, Tran was clearly present in the silver Mustang when law enforcement stopped it. There was a large quantity of marijuana in the trunk of the car. The jury could have reasonably concluded that, based on the testimony regarding Tran's past conduct relating to marijuana, he knew that marijuana was in the car. There was not, however, other evidence presented which would show that Tran exercised dominion or control over that marijuana. Tran was not driving the car, and the car was not his. Nothing but his presence connected him to the marijuana in the car. See id. ( quoting Ramos, 476 F.2d at 625 (explaining that it is `well established that a passenger may not be convicted unless there is evidence connecting him with the contraband, other than his presence in the vehicle. ') (emphasis added)); accord Esquivel-Ortega, 484 F.3d at 1225. Accordingly, the convictions for possession with intent to distribute also is vacated.