Opinion ID: 3064716
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: a border patrol agent’s statutory

Text: AUTHORITY To be guilty of juvenile delinquency, JF must have assaulted or resisted a federal officer who was “engaged in . . . the performance of official duties.” See 18 U.S.C. § 111(a). JF argues that Djokich was not engaged in the performance of official duties because a Border Patrol agent exceeds the scope of his statutory grant of authority when he investigates a drug trafficking crime. As federal officers, Border Patrol agents are limited to their statutory powers. Ortiz v. U.S. Border Patrol, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1326 (D.N.M. 1999) (“Border Patrol agents are not general law enforcement officers. Instead, . . . their authority and duties are circumscribed by statute and limited in scope.”); see also United States v. Santa Maria, 15 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 1994); cf. United States v. Diamond, 471 F.2d 771, UNITED STATES v. JUVENILE FEMALE 6267 773 (9th Cir. 1973) (“[C]ustoms agents are not general guardians of the public peace, as are state or local police. Their powers . . . to search and arrest persons are limited by statute.”). “To hold otherwise would grant Border Patrol agents unfettered discretion to investigate suspected violations of any and all cognizable criminal laws . . . ; it would, in effect, give to the Border Patrol the general police power that the Constitution reserves to the States.” United States v. Perkins, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1126 (W.D. Tex. 2001). Although the parties do not dispute that Djokich stopped and attempted to arrest JF because of suspected drug activity, they do dispute the precise contours of the statutory grant of power to the Border Patrol. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(5)(B), a Border Patrol agent may make a warrantless arrest for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States . . . if the officer or employee is performing duties relating to the enforcement of the immigration laws at the time of the arrest and if there is a likelihood of the person escaping before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest. [9] If Djokich was limited to the powers enumerated in § 1357, the warrantless arrest of JF would be beyond the scope of his authority because he was not performing immigration duties at the time. See id.; see also Santa Maria, 15 F.3d at 883 (“We conclude that § 1357(a)(3) does not authorize the Border Patrol to search only for drugs. The Border Patrol is empowered by § 1357(a)(3) to conduct administrative searches for aliens.”). In order to resolve the issue in this case, however, it is necessary to determine what statutory powers have been granted to the Border Patrol in the wake of the dissolution of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). 6268 UNITED STATES v. JUVENILE FEMALE The DHS was created in 2003 by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (“HSA”), Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2003). Pursuant to the HSA, the DHS is an executive department whose mission is, among other things, to (1) “carry out all functions of entities transferred to the Department,” and (2) “monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism . . . and otherwise contribute to efforts to interdict illegal drug trafficking.” 6 U.S.C. § 111(b)(1)(D) & (H). [10] The Border Patrol program was transferred from the INS to the Directorate for Border and Transportation Security (“DPTS”), a subset of the DHS, id. § 251, which was also tasked with securing the border and administering the customs laws, id. § 202. The Customs Service (a subsection of DPTS) was subsequently renamed the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) and was to “contain the resources and missions relating to borders and ports of entry of the Customs Service, [and] the INS, including the Border Patrol and the inspections program.” Id. § 542 note (incorporating President Bush’s Reorganization Plan, H.R. Doc. No. 108-32). The Government argues that, as a result, Border Patrol agents are also empowered to “stop, search, and examine . . . any vehicle, beast, or person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there is merchandise . . . introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law.” 19 U.S.C. § 482 (delegation of authority to the customs administration). We agree. It is true that there are no statutes or federal regulations that specifically empower Border Patrol agents to enforce customs laws.3 The agencies, however, were combined into the same department, and the purpose of the DHS was to create a “sin- 3 In fact, every relevant mention of the Border Patrol in the Code of Federal Regulations continues to appear solely under the Immigration Regulations. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§ 100.2, 100.4, 103.1, 235.1, 239.1, 274.2, 287.1, 287.4, 287.5, 287.7, 287.8, 1235.1. UNITED STATES v. JUVENILE FEMALE 6269 gle, unified structure, noting that today numerous Federal entities across the government are charged with responsibilities having to do with homeland security.” See H.R. Rep. 107609(I), at 66 (2002), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1352, 1356. “Different priorities and divergent policies coupled with various leadership structures, has led to inconsistent inspections and lapses of information. The Department of Homeland Security was established to unite the incoming agencies in the mission of protecting the homeland.” Department of Homeland Security, Border Reorganization Fact Sheet (2003), available at http:// www.dhs. gov/xnews/releases/press_ release_0073.shtm. [11] In light of the purpose and language of the HSA, we conclude that Border Patrol agents, acting within the other statutory limits on their powers, also have the authority, under 19 U.S.C. § 482, to “stop, search, and examine . . . any vehicle, beast, or person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there is merchandise . . . introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law.” [12] Although we have never expressly articulated a rule, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 111, “[t]he test of a Government agent’s conduct is whether he is acting within the scope of what he is employed to do, as distinguished from engaging in a personal frolic of his own.” United States v. Lopez, 710 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Cho Po Sun, 409 F.2d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 1969); cf. Amaya v. United States, 247 F.2d 947, 951 (9th Cir. 1957) (holding that an immigration officer who questioned the patrons of a bar regarding their place of birth “was clearly within the scope of his duty in inquiring”). Because Djokich was “within the scope of what he is employed to do” when he stopped and arrested JF, the District Court correctly denied the motion for a judgment of acquittal.