Opinion ID: 1494306
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Maryland's Harassment Statute Survives Vagueness Analysis

Text: Whether  123 should be tested for vagueness on its face is immaterial;  123 survives the void-for-vagueness doctrine whether it is scrutinized using the agreed facts of the present case alone or employing the imagined facts of marginal cases. The statute, on its face and as applied to the facts of Galloway's case, provides fair warning to potential offenders and adequate guidelines to enforcement authorities when the judicial gloss of a reasonable person standard is read into the statute, along with the inherent restrictions in the statute and the requirement of specific intent. We agree with the reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals in Caldwell v. State, supra , and with those states finding that the terms annoy, alarm, and harass are commonly understood by ordinary people and, as such, provide fair notice to potential offenders and adequate guidance for enforcement. The definition of annoy is to disturb or irritate especially by repeated acts. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 47 (10th ed.1993). An alternative definition for annoy is to harass especially by quick brief attacks. [23] Id. (emphasis added). The definition of alarm is to strike with fear. [24] Id. at 26. The applicable definition of harass is to annoy persistently. [25] Id. at 529. These definitions are sufficient to qualify as common and generally accepted meanings; they comport with everyday understandings of the words they define and are as plain to law enforcement officials as to the general public. Williams, 329 Md. at 11, 616 A.2d at 1280; see also People v. Ewing, 76 Cal.App.4th 199, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 177, 183-84 (1999) (determining that California's similarly worded statute's definition of harasses establishes a standard of conduct which is ascertainable by persons of ordinary intelligence because [t]he language `conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices' (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 1542, 91 L.Ed. 1877 (1947))), reh'g denied, 76 Cal.App. 4th 1060 (App. 4th Dist.1999). We have discussed the intent requirementÔÇöwith intent to harass, alarm, or annoy the other personÔÇöand have determined, without difficulty in applying these terms, that certain factual determinations in a protective order provided evidence of intent as required by  123. We acknowledged that inclusion in the protective order that the defendant threaten[ed] to harm the victim provides some evidence of intent which must be proven as an element of  123. Streater, 352 Md. at 816, 724 A.2d at 119. We further stated that [t]he battery or assault and battery referred to in the protective order also may have special relevance to the intent element[ ] ... of the harassment ... charge[ ]. Id. Other jurisdictions have also determined that the words alarm and annoy have commonly understood meanings and definiteness. [26] For instance, In Ewing, 76 Cal.App.4th 199, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 177, the California appellate court determined that its stalking statute was not unconstitutionally vague. [27] In so doing, the court first analyzed, among others, the terms alarms and annoys and concluded that these words have a clear and understandable dictionary definition. Ewing, 90 Cal. Rptr.2d at 182. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky determined that the use of the words alarms and annoys to define stalk in the Kentucky stalking statute did not render the statute unconstitutionally vague because the statute, taken as a whole, had sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can determine what conduct is prohibited. Monhollen v. Kentucky, 947 S.W.2d 61, 62 (Ky.App.1997) (emphasis added) (discussing KEN.REV.STAT. ANN.  508.130). The Supreme Court of Montana determined that the presence of the word annoy in that state's harassment statute did not cause the statute to be unconstitutionally vague because annoy has a commonly understood meaning[ ] and is readily understood so that a reasonable person of average intelligence would comprehend ... [its] meaning. Montana v. Nye, 283 Mont. 505, 943 P.2d 96, 101-02 (1997) (discussing MONT.CODE ANN.  45-5-221). As demonstrated in the above discussion, not all reviewing courts have felt comfortable that there is a common understanding as to the meaning of the words annoy, alarm, and harass. It is often argued, as it was at oral argument in the present case, that these words are broad enough to cover telephone calls from creditors, as well as the actions of a street performer. See, e.g., Norman, 703 P.2d at 1267. Clearly the statute was not intended to cover such actions. See supra p. 859 (discussing the legislative purpose of  123). Cf. Coates, 402 U.S. at 618, 91 S.Ct. at 1689, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (White, J., dissenting) (Any man of average comprehension should know that some kinds of conduct, such as assault or blocking passage on the street, will annoy others and are clearly covered by the `annoying conduct' standard.... It would be frivolous to say that these and many other kinds of conduct are not within the foreseeable reach of the law.). Section 123 of the Maryland statute, like the California statute, has provisions that sufficiently limit the conduct covered. In addition, we read a reasonable person standard into the statute to narrow further its construction to ensure that  123 is not applied to such situations as creditor telephone calls and street performances. Section 123 contains the provision [a]fter reasonable warning or request to desist by or on behalf of the other person. (Emphasis added). See supra p. 856. We have held that such a warning ensures that the offender is aware that further conduct will alarm[ ] or seriously annoy[ ] the other person, and as such, the offender has fair notice that he or she may be subject to prosecution. Eanes, 318 Md. at 463, 569 A.2d at 617 (citing Bacheller v. State, 3 Md.App. 626, 634-35, 240 A.2d 623, 628 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 397 U.S. 564, 90 S.Ct. 1312, 25 L.Ed.2d 570 (1970); see also United States v. Occhino, 629 F.2d 561, 563 (8th Cir.1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 968, 101 S.Ct. 1487, 67 L.Ed.2d 618 (1981); Pennsylvania v. Weiner, 230 Pa.Super. 245, 326 A.2d 896, 898 (1974)). Requiring repeated conduct before a violation occurs has been found by other courts to mitigate against vagueness. [28] See United States v. Smith, 685 A.2d 380, 387 (D.C.1996) (declaring that the requirement of repeatedly in D.C.'s stalking statute helps to mitigate any potential vagueness problems), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 856, 118 S.Ct. 152, 139 L.Ed.2d 98 (1997); Johnson v. Indiana, 648 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995) (determining that because the State must prove engagement in a repeated or continuing course of conduct militates against arbitrary enforcement of Indiana's stalking statute). In addition to requiring a reasonable warning to desist,  123(a) also defines course of conduct by requiring a persistent pattern of conduct, composed of a series of acts over a period of time. Thus,  123 has two separate provisions requiring repeated acts, helping to buffer against potential vagueness. Additionally,  123 has a specific intent requirementÔÇö[w]ith intent to harass, alarm, or annoy the other person. We repeatedly have determined that such a requirement, while it may not be able alone to save a statute from constitutional infirmity, can help in avoidance of a legally factual conclusion. [29] See, e.g., Williams, 329 Md. at 9, 616 A.2d at 1279; see also Caldwell, 26 Md.App. at 103-04, 337 A.2d at 481-82. A specific intent requirement can ameliorate vagueness problems because [i]f an actor has specific intent to bring about a particular effect, he can be presumed to be on notice that his actions to effect that intent constitute a crime. Boychuk, supra, at 781; Caldwell, 26 Md. App. at 104, 337 A.2d at 482 (noting that a person already bent on serious wrongdoing has less need for notice and that a citizen who refrains from acting with morally bad intent is not endangered by the statutory sanction (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)). In Caldwell, the Court of Special Appeals explained that [b]y requiring such specific intent the legislature has sufficiently delineated in a constitutional sense, what is criminal conduct under the statute so that the citizens of Maryland need not engage in a guessing game as to their criminal liability.... Caldwell, 26 Md.App. at 105, 337 A.2d at 483. The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that a specific intent requirement aids in ensuring that an accused has fair notice that he or she is violating a criminal statute. In Screws v. United States , the U.S. Supreme Court stated: The Court, indeed, has recognized that the requirement of a specific intent to do a prohibited act may avoid those consequences to the accused which may otherwise render a vague or indefinite statute invalid. The constitutional vice in such a statute is the essential injustice to the accused of placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which the statute does not define and hence of which it gives no warning. But where the punishment imposed is only for an act knowingly done with the purpose of doing that which the statute prohibits, the accused cannot be said to suffer from lack of warning or knowledge that the act which he does in violation of law. 325 U.S. at 101-02, 65 S.Ct. at 1035-36, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (citations omitted). More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the presence of a scienter requirement in a statute ameliorated the concern that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it ensured that people of ordinary intelligence [have] a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct ... [the statute] prohibits. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 2498, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000). Reading a reasonable person standard into  123 helps to narrow further the construction of the statute, keeping in mind that a statute does not become unconstitutionally vague merely because it may not be perfectly clear at the margins. Williams, 329 Md. at 11, 616 A.2d at 1280. In other words, the vagueness doctrine does not require absolute precision or perfection. Williams, 329 Md. at 13, 616 A.2d at 1280-81 (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 94, 96 S.Ct. 316, 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975)). As noted, to avoid serious constitutional issues, this Court has repeatedly given a narrow construction to statutes containing broad general language. Schochet, 320 Md. at 729-31, 580 A.2d at 183-84 (providing as examples such cases as In re James D., 295 Md. 314, 455 A.2d 966 (1983), and Wilson v. Bd. of Sup. of Elections, 273 Md. 296, 328 A.2d 305 (1974)). We have stated [t]he objective `reasonable' test is used in many areas of the law as an appropriate determinant of liability and thus a guide to conduct. Eanes, 318 Md. at 461-62, 569 A.2d at 615-16. The California appellate court similarly factored in a reasonable person standard in California's stalking statute to aid in narrowing its construction. [30] Ewing, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d at 182. California demonstrated, using brackets as a visual aid to indicate those words that the court read into the statute, how the statute's definition of harass would read. According to the court, [t]he statutory definition of `harasses' becomes `a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that [a reasonable person would consider as] seriously alarm[ing], [seriously] annoy[ing], [seriously] torment[ing], or [seriously] terrorizes, the person' against whom it is directed. Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting CAL.PENAL CODE  649.9(e)). Moreover, unlike Oregon v. Sanderson, discussed supra, in which the Oregon court determined that it would not read in a reasonable person standard because the legislative history indicated an intention to create a catchall offense, the legislative history of  123 supports a contrary tact. [31] As demonstrated supra in the Summary of Committee Report, the purpose of the harassment statute is to help law enforcement agencies in their attempts to defuse ongoing feuds and longstanding disputes, to help avoid extreme situations, and to provide relief for victims of harassment who without this statute would be left without a means of legal redress. Summary of Comm. Rep. on H.B. 381, at 1-2; cf. supra note 26 (discussing the need for flexible harassment statutes to ensure that victims of harassment are provided with proper redress). The Governor's Task Force on Violence and Extremism supported the enactment of H.B. 381 because it felt that such a statute may assist the citizens in our State who are victims of harassment based on their racial, religious or ethnic background. Letter from Constance Ross Beims, Chairperson, Governor's Task Force on Violence and Extremism, to The Honorable Joseph E. Owens, Chairperson, House Judiciary Committee 3 (27 January 1986) (on file with State Library). It follows that  123 was in no way intended to cover such situations as repeated phone calls from creditors. Employing a reasonable person standard further ensures that the  123 is limited to its intended purposes. The last aspect of Petitioner's vagueness argument is whether without legal purpose is constitutionally adequate. The courts have come down on either side of the fence regarding the issue of whether without legitimate purpose is unconstitutionally vague. Compare Oregon v. Norris-Romine, 134 Or.App. 204, 894 P.2d 1221 (1995) (concluding the phrase legitimate purpose was unconstitutionally vague), review denied, 321 Or. 512, 900 P.2d 509 (1995), with Kansas v. Rucker, 267 Kan. 816, 987 P.2d 1080, 1094-95 (1999) (finding that the term legitimate purpose when read in conjunction with the rest of the statutory language do[es] not require that a person of common intelligence guess as to their meanings). We follow the latter line of cases, noting that the word legal is more definite and clear than legitimate. [32] Legal derives from or is found in law, as opposed to legitimate, which encompasses that which is legal and beyond. See MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 664-65. As for Petitioner's argument that the statutory exemption for conduct to express political views or provide information to others [33] is unconstitutionally vague, it is unfounded and unsupported. This same language in either a harassment or a stalking statute has not been challenged in any other jurisdiction. The language, however, when looked at in conjunction with the rest of the statute and with the underlying purpose of the statute, has a definite and clear meaning that helps in setting the boundaries for the enforcement of  123. See Webster v. State, 359 Md. 465, 480, 754 A.2d 1004, 1012 (2000) (stating that if a statute is clouded by ambiguity or obscurity, it is necessary not only to consider the literal and usual meaning of the words, but their meaning in light of setting, objectives, and purpose of enactment); Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 436, 639 A.2d 675, 678 (1994) (same); Williams, 329 Md. at 15-16, 616 A.2d at 1282 (We must discern legislative intent from the entire statutory scheme, as opposed to scrutinizing parts of the statute in isolation.); see also Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 327, 558 A.2d 715, 721 (1989) ([I]n addition to considering the specific words of the statute, we may consider the general history and prevailing mood of the legislative body with respect to the type of criminal conduct involved.). It is apparent that this language was included in the statute to help in avoiding application of the statute to such situations as, but not limited to, protected political and religious leafleting, commercial solicitations, and other types of informational leaflets or contacts such as store openings and community action programs. This language is of the same tenor as used by other jurisdictions that have stalking and harassment statutes that contain the phrase, or some variation of, does not include constitutionally protected activity. Those jurisdictions have not determined that such a phrase is unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Bouters v. Florida, 659 So.2d 235 (Fla.1995) (holding Florida's stalking statute, which contained the language [c]onstitutionally protected activity is not included in the course of conduct definition and constitutional protected activity includes picketing or other organized protests, was not impermissibly vague), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 894, 116 S.Ct. 245, 133 L.Ed.2d 171; Johnson, 648 N.E.2d at 668-69 (determining that an Indiana stalking statute specifically excluding constitutionally protected activity such as lawful picketing pursuant to labor disputes from its ambit was not unconstitutionally vague); Saunders, 695 A.2d at 722 (finding that a stalking statute, which specifically excluded constitutionally protected activity from the definition of course of conduct was not unconstitutionally vague). We conclude that the language in the Maryland statute is in no way unclear. None of the words and phrases under scrutiny in  123 are unconstitutionally vague. They have a common meaning and understanding known to the person of common or average intelligence. Moreover, employing a reasonable person standard and the inherent specific intent requirement alleviates further potential doubt. Finally, a potential offender does not have to be wary of unanticipated criminal liability because of the condition that there be a reasonable request to desist. In the present case, Javin, her parents, the assistant warden and psychologist at the prison, and Petitioner's former counsel told Petitioner not to send letters to Javin. Despite these warnings, Petitioner proceeded to send a large volume of additional letters to Javin within a relatively short period of time. The facts of the present case are also congruent with the intended purpose of the statute. As the Court of Special Appeals stated, [i]t strains credulity to suggest that ... [Petitioner] could not reasonably understand that these letters would alarm or seriously annoy a woman who [was] the victim of his prior crimes of kidnapping and stalking. Galloway, 130 Md.App. at 96, 744 A.2d at 1073.