Opinion ID: 2110453
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Heading: The Effect of Iowa Code Section 321J.13(4).

Text: Prior to the enactment of Iowa Code section 321J.13(4) in 1986, parallel proceedings in a case involving an allegedly drunk driver, i.e., a criminal prosecution and a separate administrative proceeding to revoke the driver's license, were held to be separate and distinct. See, e.g., Westendorf v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 400 N.W.2d 553, 556 (Iowa 1987). However, section 321J.13(4) linked the two proceedings and allowed administrative proceedings to be reopened in the limited situation in which an adjudication on the admissibility of evidence relevant to the implied consent law ha[d] been made in a criminal proceeding growing out of the same facts. Manders v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 454 N.W.2d 364, 366 (Iowa 1990). The court in Lubka's criminal case suppressed the blood test, and Lubka claims that he should have been allowed to reopen the record in his separate revocation case to establish that fact. The problem with this argument is that the provision on which he relies was repealed by an amendment effective July 1, 1997. This was after Lubka's arrest but before the district court suppressed the test results in the criminal proceeding. In Wieslander v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 596 N.W.2d 516 (Iowa 1999), we held that at the time the statute was repealed, the licensee had only a hope or expectation that the court would suppress the test in the parallel criminal case. As of the time the statute was repealed, Lubka, like the licensee in Wieslander, had no acquired right to the benefit of the repealed statute. We affirm the revocation of Lubka's license and deny his application for attorney fees on appeal. AFFIRMED.