Opinion ID: 2315948
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Mitigating Factor c(5)(h)

Text: Before the sentencing proceeding, defense counsel requested that several factors relating to sympathy and to Biegenwald's personal history and prior sentences be charged separately to the jury. At the pre-sentencing hearing counsel expanded the request to include listing the factors individually on the special verdict form. Defense counsel argued that in adopting N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h) (c(5)(h)) (mitigating factors include [a]ny other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense), the Legislature intended that if the evidence established multiple non-specific-statutory factors, they should be presented to the jury individually rather than merely as evidence of one catch-all factor. Counsel asserted that in order to ensure fair consideration of non-specific-statutory mitigating factors, the factors should be listed on the jury-verdict sheet. According to defense counsel, to require jurors to remember the other factors would be to trivialize those factors, particularly in light of the listing of statutory aggravating and mitigating factors. On appeal defendant presses further, arguing that relegating to secondary consideration the other factors submitted pursuant to c(5)(h) contravenes the United States Supreme Court's mandate that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. [ Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964, 57 L.Ed. 2d 973, 990 (1978); accord Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed. 2d 316 (1990); id. at ___, 110 S.Ct. at 1201, 108 L.Ed. 2d at 333 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (indicating unanimity on the ruling in Lockett ); State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 294-95, 524 A. 2d 188.] The State did not oppose generally charging or listing the requested factors individually, although it objected to one proposed factor on the basis of relevance. The State did voice concern, however, that if the court were to list the factors requested by defense counsel, the jury might conclude that those were the only factors to be considered and would totally disregard something that neither defense counsel nor the court had considered as a mitigating factor. Expressio unus est exclusio alterius. The court, citing the concern raised by the State, denied the request to list the proffered factors separately but indicated that it would allow defense counsel to point out the factors in his summation. The court also indicated that in charging the jury on c(5)(h), it would mention the evidence tending to support the defense's argument. We have long recognized, as has the Supreme Court, that above all, capital sentencing must be reliable, accurate, and nonarbitrary. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, ___, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 1262, 108 L.Ed. 2d 415, 427 (1990); accord Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed. 2d 859 (1976). [D]ecisions to impose the death sentence [must] be consistent (in the sense of consistency with other decisions to impose or not to impose death) and    reliable (in the sense that the individual defendant is deserving of the punishment). Sometimes conflicting, the two principles of consistency and reliability reflect the increased demands of accuracy and fairness, rising to constitutional dimension, in the implementation of this unique criminal sanction. [ Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 185, 524 A. 2d 188.] Consistent procedural treatment of mitigating factors in capital-sentencing proceedings advances those interests of fairness, reliability, and justice. We are aware that in at least one other capital-murder prosecution, non-specific-statutory mitigating factors proffered by the defendant were listed on the jury-verdict form. (The jury sentenced that defendant to life imprisonment with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility.) Any other factor relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h), that a defendant submits for consideration and that could be established by some reliable evidence, see N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2), should be listed on the jury-verdict form. That does not mean that every factor proffered by a defendant must be listed. See State v. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 103, 549 A. 2d 792 (sentence of co-defendant inadmissible); Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 146, 548 A. 2d 887 (evidence of general non-deterrent effect of death penalty inadmissible). The trial court must evaluate the factors offered by a defendant in accordance with the language of c(5)(h). The State argues that were a court to list non-specific-statutory mitigating factors on a defendant's request, jurors might conclude that they would be precluded from finding and giving effect to mitigating factors not listed, possibly thereby violating Lockett. That contention is without merit for at least two reasons. First, we are not persuaded that a procedure that permits a defendant to itemize for the jury those mitigating factors on which he or she relies possibly violates Lockett. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, listing non-specific-statutory mitigating factors does not diminish the trial court's responsibility to inform the jury how mitigating evidence may affect its decision. The jurors must be told that the list of mitigating factors is non-exclusive and that mitigating factors other than those listed may be found and considered whether or not non-specific-statutory mitigating factors are listed on the jury verdict form. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545, 107 S.Ct. 837, 841, 93 L.Ed. 2d 934, 942 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (the jury instructions  taken as a whole  must clearly inform the jur[ors] that they are to consider any relevant mitigating evidence about a defendant's background and character); Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 169, 548 A. 2d 887 (The requirement that capital sentencing must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating circumstances would be hollow without an explanation of how the evidence can mitigate the imposition of the death penalty.). See generally Judges Bench Manual for Capital Cases XXXI.C., at 141-42 (1990) (same). The State's less-paternalistic arguments that listing of non-specific-statutory mitigating factors is not required are equally unpersuasive. The contention that listing separate factors under c(5)(h) will lead to impermissible double counting of mitigating factors has been addressed previously. See State v. Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 599, 575 A. 2d 816 (The court should instruct the jury that the same evidence may be used to prove multiple mitigating factors.). Furthermore, the treatment of aggravating factors  e.g., limiting possible aggravating factors to those enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4), considering multiple murder convictions as evidence of only one aggravating factor  is not relevant to the treatment of mitigating factors, nor can it be. Jurors must be permitted to consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence. Conversely, sentencers are strictly limited in their deliberations to consideration of only those aggravating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4). Common sense compels the determination that when evidence of wholly-unrelated circumstances is offered pursuant to c(5)(h), it is not intended to be considered as a single factor by the sentencer. The language of the provision is too broad to permit a contrary conclusion. For example, a defendant could offer evidence of a violent and abusive childhood, of his or her potential for rehabilitation, and of specific past acts of discrimination against the defendant. To consider that evidence as probative of only one factor is not only illogical but also runs afoul of the requirement that mitigating circumstances receive individualized consideration. See Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 161, 548 A. 2d 887. Each circumstance must be presented to the jury, with the determination of the weight to be accorded it left for the jury after proper instruction from the court. Turning to the specific factors requested by defendant prior to the resentencing proceeding, all but one meet the relevance requirements of c(5)(h). The request relating to sentences imposed on defendant after other murder convictions raises the specter that a jury in this case may be unduly influenced by the determination of another jury made on a substantially different record. Because the sentencing determination is fact specific and remains subject to significant sentencer discretion, the sentence imposed in another case under different circumstances has little probative value to the present jury's sentencing decision. A properly-impanelled jury in a capital case is aware of the limited options available in sentencing a defendant convicted of murder. Furthermore, the argument that defendant will never be eligible for parole in his lifetime can be made based on the current proceeding. Evidence of sentences imposed on defendant for his other murder convictions should not be admitted.