Opinion ID: 853470
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reasonable Probability of a Different Result

Text: Prowell's condition obviously raised significant issues as to an insanity defense, whether a guilty or guilty but mentally ill plea was appropriate, and the appropriate sentence. Counsel failed to develop mental health testimony and conducted only the most cursory investigation of Prowell's behavior and background before advising him to plead guilty. This performance of Prowell's trial counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms. The second prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel is whether there is a reasonable probability that the deficiencies in counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Prowell's claims that but for his counsel's ineffective assistance, he would not have pleaded guilty. In State v. Van Cleave, 674 N.E.2d 1293, 1296-97 (Ind.1996), this Court applied the Strickland standard to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where the defendant pleaded guilty. We held that in order to establish that a guilty plea would not have been entered if trial counsel had performed adequately, the petitioner must show that a defense was overlooked or impaired and that there was a reasonable probability of success at trial. Van Cleave, 674 N.E.2d at 1299-1300. Van Cleave dealt with a trial that could produce only two results, guilty or not guilty. A more precise formulation, relevant here, is that the petitioner must show a reasonable probability of a different result. Prowell's hypothetical trial could produce a result of either guilty, not guilty, or guilty but mentally ill. Thus, the question in this case is whether there was a reasonable probability a trial would have produced a result of either not guilty or guilty but mentally ill. Although the evidence that Prowell killed Powers and Fillbright is uncontroverted, the evidence at postconviction established a reasonable probability that a jury would have found Prowell guilty but mentally ill if an adequate defense had been presented. Although a guilty but mentally ill conviction or plea does not guarantee a defendant that the death penalty will not be imposed, Harris v. State, 499 N.E.2d 723, 725-27 (Ind. 1986), as a practical matter, defendants found to be guilty but mentally ill of death-penalty-eligible murders normally receive a term of years or life imprisonment. [8] See Dunlop v. State, 724 N.E.2d 592, 596 (Ind. 2000) (sentenced to life imprisonment after jury verdict of guilty but mentally ill); McIntyre v. State, 717 N.E.2d 114, 119 (Ind.1999) (sentenced to life imprisonment after jury verdict of guilty but mentally ill); Whipple v. State, 523 N.E.2d 1363, 1365 (Ind. 1988) (sentenced to term of years after a jury verdict of guilty but mentally ill). Prowell focuses on the statement by Judge Young in the Anderson case that the death penalty is inappropriate for a defendant found guilty but mentally ill. We believe the Strickland test is to be applied without regard to the propensities of an individual judge or jury. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Nevertheless, we believe Judge Young's view is shared by many and therefore the view he expressed meets the test of a reasonable probability as an objective matter. There is a second aspect to counsel's deficient performance in this case. Here counsel advanced pleading guilty without having developed either expert opinion or background information that were highly relevant to an evaluation of Prowell's mental health which in turn was relevant in both the guilt and penalty phases. Postconviction hearing established that the prosecutor refused a guilty plea in exchange for two consecutive life sentences. It also established that Prowell's counsel never considered seeking a guilty but mentally ill plea agreement, with or without an agreement as to the penalty. Even with no agreement on penalty, such a plea agreement would most likely have averted the death penalty. There is a reasonable probability that failure to seek such an agreement, and the prosecutor's presumed rejection, are both attributable to failure to develop before the plea the evidence that was presented to the postconviction court.