Opinion ID: 2981351
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Essex’s Motion to Dismiss

Text: Plaintiffs summarily argue that the district court should have allowed leave to amend to consider additional facts outside the complaint with regard to the THRA claims against Essex. Appellants Br. at 13. A careful review of Plaintiffs’ brief on appeal, however, 10 No. 11-6146, Thompson, et al. v. City of Memphis, et al. reveals that they have failed to identify why they are entitled to relief against Essex under the THRA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.7 Upon our own de novo review, we find that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Essex upon which relief can be granted. The district court stated that Plaintiffs’ counsel admitted at oral argument that Essex’s alleged actions were taken while acting in her capacity as Director of Human Resources. R. 34 at 7 and 8.8 Therefore, Essex cannot be individually liable under the THRA under an accomplice liability theory. Welles v. Chattanooga Police Dep’t., No. 1:07-CV-71, 2007 WL 3120823, at  (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 23, 2007) (finding that there is no individual liability under the THRA for the alleged actions of a former chief of police where there is no indication his actions were outside the scope of his employment as chief); Rhea v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 696, 706 (W.D. Tenn. 2005) (granting motion to dismiss claim for individual liability under THRA against regional manager where employees did not allege that regional manager either aided, abetted, incited, compelled or commanded an employer to engage in a discriminatory act or practice). 7 Plaintiffs have waived appeal of the decision of the district court with regard to the § 1983 claims against Essex because they have failed to raise arguments in opposition on appeal. See Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 311 (6th Cir. 2005) (‘‘[A party’s] failure to raise an argument in his appellate brief constitutes a waiver of the argument on appeal.’’). The same can be said for the claim against the City for discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a violation of Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. 8 However, there is no transcript in the record on appeal of the hearing culminating in the June 29, 2010 court order granting Essex’s motion to dismiss in her individual capacity. 11 No. 11-6146, Thompson, et al. v. City of Memphis, et al. D. Plaintiffs’ Requests for Leave to Amend and Second Motion to Sever Parties Plaintiffs have not established that the district court should have granted them leave to amend the complaint. Plaintiffs did not properly seek leave to amend to consider additional facts outside the complaint with regard to the THRA claims against Essex. We disfavor such bare requests and they are not a substitute for a properly filed motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Begala v. PNC Bank, Ohio, N.A., 214 F.3d 776, 784 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Louisiana Sch. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 622 F.3d 471, 486 (6th Cir. 2010). The request to amend the complaint with regard to the THRA claims against Essex was also untimely. The district court entered a scheduling order (R. 7) that adopted February 17, 2010 as the date for amending the pleadings. Plaintiffs’ request regarding Essex was not made until April 19, 2010, at the earliest. According to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4), where the Court has entered a scheduling order that limits the time to amend the pleadings, the schedule “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” See Commerce Benefits Grp., Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 326 F. App’x. 369, 376 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motions to amend). Finally, the proposed amendments would be futile. Plaintiffs stated in their Response to Essex’s Motion to Dismiss (R. 26) that they wished to amend the complaint to include allegations that “Essex encouraged the City of Memphis to terminated (sic) their employment or discipline Plaintiffs and/or prevent City of Memphis from taking action to 12 No. 11-6146, Thompson, et al. v. City of Memphis, et al. prevent discrimination in the workplace.” R. 26 at 4. We agree with the district court that these allegations are merely conclusions not supported by well-pled factual allegations and they would not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Rose v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that a proposed amendment is futile if the complaint, as amended, would not withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim). The district court thus did not err in denying Plaintiffs' request to amend the complaint with regard to the THRA claims against Essex. The district court also did not err in denying Plaintiffs' second motion to sever parties with regard to the claims against the City. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument (Appellants Br. at 10), the allegations of Plaintiffs’ proposed severed amended complaints fail to meet the pleading requirements of Twombly. “When a proposed amended complaint does not state a cause of action, a motion to amend is properly denied.” Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1050 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Neighborhood Dev. Corp. v. Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 632 F.2d 21, 23 (6th Cir. 1980)). Therefore, amendment of the complaint would have been futile.