Opinion ID: 2997148
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ryczek Affidavit

Text: We agree with the district court that the plaintiffs were on notice prior to the close of discovery that Martha Ryczek, Chicago Cable’s collections manager, had information pertinent to this matter and was a potential witness, despite the fact that she was not listed in any of the defendants’ discovery responses or offered in response to the plaintiffs’ Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice. Because the plaintiffs had a fair opportunity to seek discovery from Ryczek prior to the No. 03-3484 7 deadline for filing summary-judgment motions, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike her affidavit or allow additional discovery. Richard Baucom, the defendants’ designated Rule 30(b)(6) deponent, discussed Ryczek and her job responsibilities during his deposition in response to detailed questions by the plaintiffs’ counsel. Those questions were quite clearly directed at finding additional witnesses who would assist plaintiffs in the discovery process. We reproduce the relevant deposition testimony in full: Q: Who sets computer-set standards for sending a bill from your company to Credit Protection Association, L.P.? A: Designated employees within our organization. Q: Who would be such a designated employee within your organization? A: A Martha Ryczek. Q: Spell her last name, please? A: R-y-c-z-e-k. Q: What is her title? A: Credit and Collections Manager. Q: And where does she work? A: Schaumburg. Q: And does she do the day-to-day operations as it relates to collection of accounts for your company? A: Define “day-to-day operations.” Q: She’s the one who oversees collectors making phone calls, making sure that they do them in a certain way, making certain that letters are sent out in a certain manner and in a certain frequency and so forth? 8 No. 03-3484 A: It would be under her purview. She does not do it directly. Q: But she’s the one in charge? A: Yes. She reports to me. Q: Okay. She reports to you and you supervise her only in a very—in a limited fashion? You don’t like watch over her to see that she’s running things in [sic] a day-to-day basis? A: No. Q: No, that’s correct or no, I’m incorrect? A: No, that’s correct. Q: Okay. This is like hide and seek. I’m actually trying to find the people who are going to be responsive to my requests. (R. 62, Ex.12 at 118-19); see also (R. 62, Ex. 3 at 29-30) (Ryczek mentioned, six days after Baucom’s deposition, by Diane Evans, debt collector CPA’s representative, as CPA’s Chicago-area collections manager contact at AT&T Broadband to whom they report.) Plaintiffs argue now that the above did not put them on notice that Ryczek possessed relevant information about Chicago Cable’s internal and external collection processes, reasoning that because she reported to Baucom, Baucom would possess the same information as Ryczek. But Baucom’s and Evans’s testimony should have alerted the plaintiffs that Ryczek would have more and better information with regard to collections than would Baucom. Specifically, their testimony revealed that Ryczek oversaw Chicago Cable’s dayto-day collections operation, was supervised only minimally by Baucom, and was CPA’s direct client contact.3 3 In particular, the plaintiffs protest that Ryczek’s surprise affidavit testimony stating that Chicago Cable’s billing system auto- (continued...) No. 03-3484 9 Based on the above, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Ryczek’s affidavit to stand. Although the defendants did have an obligation to seasonably supplement their Rule 26(a) disclosures and interrogatory responses, such amendments are required only in certain circumstances, such as when the additional information “has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1), (2); see also David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 2003). Here, the plaintiffs knew of Ryczek and the fact she possessed information relevant to this case through Baucom’s and Evans’s depositions. Finally, although we in no way condone the defendants’ choice to provide Baucom, a largely unresponsive witness, as their Rule 30(b)(6) deposition representative, we also note that the plaintiffs made a tactical decision not to insist that the defendants produce better witnesses after Baucom proved inadequate. Such a request very likely would have been viewed favorably had it been made prior to the close of discovery, with possible sanctions levied against the defendants for failing to provide an appropriate deponent in the first instance. Yet, the plaintiffs raised their dissatisfaction with Baucom after the close of discovery, in the midst of summary-judgment briefing, and with prior knowledge that better witnesses, like Ryczek, existed. The district judge was not required to belatedly punish the defendants by striking Ryczek’s affidavit or reopening discovery in such circumstances. See, e.g., Grayson v. O’Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 816 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Where a party’s own lack of diligence 3 (...continued) matically forwarded Rydel’s account for collection damaged their case. But, as reflected at the beginning of the deposition excerpt quoted above, the plaintiffs directly asked Baucom who set the computer-set standards for forwarding a bill to CPA. He told them that Ryczek did. 10 No. 03-3484 is to blame for that party’s failure to secure discoverable information, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny a Rule 56(f) motion.”), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 155 (2003); Kalis v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 231 F.3d 1049, 1057 n.5 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Pfeil v. Rogers, 757 F.2d 850, 857 (7th Cir. 1985)).