Opinion ID: 2339039
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

Text: It was incumbent upon the Superior Court, in passing upon this issue, to accept all of the allegations of the complaint as true and to draw every reasonably favorable intendment therefrom and to sustain the complaint against challenge unless it could be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that under no set of facts which might be proven in support thereof might a claim be made out upon which relief could be granted. Redmond v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, R.I., 386 A.2d 1090, 1092 (1978); Rosen v. Restrepo, R.I., 380 A.2d 960 (1977); Bragg v. Warwick Shoppers World, Inc., 102 R.I., 8, 227 A.2d 582 (1967). Applying this stringent standard to the facts of the case at bar, we are constrained to conclude that the trial justice was correct in granting the motion to dismiss pursuant to the terms of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. An examination of the statute in question discloses that the Governor in making appointments to the Board of Elections, and the Senate in confirming them, shall consider the abilities and integrity of the qualified electors under consideration and their knowledge and/or experience in the workings of the election laws of the state. The complaint does not challenge the abilities, integrity, or knowledge and/or experience of the appointees. It does not suggest that they are not qualified electors. The sole point of challenge lies in the alleged failure to obey that portion of the statute which provides that [t]hey shall strive to select a board whose membership shall be representative of all citizens of the state and of their diverse points of view. Section 17-7-1. This language of the statute is clearly hortatory or directory rather than mandatory. We have held that in determining whether a statute is directory or mandatory, we must ascertain the legislative intent, Tiverton v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge # 23, 118 R.I. 160, 372 A.2d 1273 (1977), and its predominating purpose, Atlantic Refining Co. v. Director of Public Works, 98 R.I., 167, 200 A.2d 580 (1964). In applying this test to the statute in question, we must look at the word shall in context with the other words of the statute. The term strive is substantially a synonym for the word try or attempt and connotes the exercise of discretion as opposed to obedience to words of command. These words are not unlike the expression having due regard which has been construed as directory and not of mandatory significance. See Lape v. Lape, 99 Ohio St. 143, 124 N.E. 51 (1918). This language indicates a mild exhortation by the Legislature to the Governor and Senate to strive or try for diversity in conjunction with other characteristics. There is utterly no indication that the Legislature intended even to suggest any particular type of diversity. The plaintiffs assume, without support from the language of the statute, that the Legislature intended geographic, ethnic, religious, sexual, and racial diversity, as well as political. [3] In the light of the basic purpose of this statute-to achieve the appointment of persons who would oversee the fair conduct of elections-we cannot read any such intention into this statute. Insofar as the Legislature might give directory guidance to consider diversity, it would expect the Governor in the exercise of his discretion to select elements of relevant diversity. There is no reason to believe that the Legislature would consider ethnic, religious, racial, or sexual characteristics to be in any way compelling or even relevant qualities in the conduct of fair elections. The Governor may have believed that the term diverse relates to political diversity (which to some extent has been achieved by the appointments according to the complaint) and diversity in business or professional backgrounds (upon which subject the complaint is silent). These directory exhortations are too vague and indefinite to be considered terms of command. They repose in the appointing and confirming authorities wide discretion to carry out the task of appointing persons who meet the broad guidelines of qualification. Under no circumstances in construing such a statute may the court substitute its judgment in this exercise of discretion for that of the Governor and the Senate. Thus the complaint, read with every reasonable intendment in favor of the plaintiffs, has failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Consequently, although we believe that the trial justice had jurisdiction of the subject matter, that the matter was justiciable, and that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the action, the trial justice was correct in dismissing the action pursuant to Super.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Therefore, for the reasons stated, the plaintiffs' appeal is denied and dismissed, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court.