Opinion ID: 1295363
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Due Process and Retroactive Legislation

Text: ¶17 Retroactive legislation is presumed constitutional. Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶16. It is the challenger's burden to overcome that presumption, Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 200, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995), by demonstrating the statute's unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt, Matthies v. Positive Safety Mfg. Co., 2001 WI 82, ¶26, 244 Wis. 2d 720, 628 N.W.2d 842. ¶18 We have determined that the due process clauses of Article 1, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution [11] and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution are substantially equivalent. [12] Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶8; Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 198 n.6. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution in pertinent part provides that [n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. In arguing that retroactive applications of Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1m) and (1r) are unconstitutional, the particular right Dorian appears to be asserting is the right not to be deprived of property, [13] without due process of law. [14] ¶19 As the parties correctly note, this court adopted a balancing test to determine whether a retroactive statute comports with due process. Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 201. The Martin balancing test examines whether the retroactive statute has a rational basis, [15] Matthies, 244 Wis. 2d 720, ¶27; Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶9, requiring a reviewing court to weigh the public interest served by the retroactive statute against the private interests that are overturned by it, Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 201 (citation omitted). Implicit within this analysis is a consideration of the unfairness created by the retroactive legislation. Id. (citation omitted). ¶20 However, our precedent instructs us to determine first whether application of the statute in question to the party challenging the statute actually has a retroactive effect, Matthies, 244 Wis. 2d 720, ¶19, Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶14; see Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 199-200, an inquiry that turns on whether the right is vested, Matthies, 244 Wis. 2d 720, ¶¶21-23; see Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶14. As noted in Neiman, [t]he concept of vested rights is `conclusorya right is vested when it has been so far perfected that it cannot be taken away by statute.' Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶14 (citation omitted). Only upon concluding that the statute in question retroactively affects a substantive right that accrued before the passage of the legislation, do we proceed with the Martin balancing test. Matthies, 244 Wis. 2d 720, ¶27. ¶21 As discussed above, in 1983 the circuit court had discretion to make a revision if cause or justification was shown, but it had no obligation to do so. See supra Section II.B. In 1982, Dorian was ordered to pay child support. The circuit court's discretionary power to reduce or cancel Dorian's arrearages at a particular point in time after that did not vest a right in him to have the arrearages reduced or cancelled. Woodmansee v. Woodmansee, 151 Wis. 2d 242, 248-49, 444 N.W.2d 393 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing Miller v. Miller, 67 Wis. 2d 435, 448, 227 N.W.2d 626 (1975)). ¶22 However, because neither party argued that Dorian did not have a vested right, we will assume he did have a vested right and turn to applying the Martin test. We begin by considering the public interest served by retroactive applications of Wis. Stat. § 767.32 (1m) and (1r). The retroactive application of legislation must serve a public purpose that is `substantial, valid and intended to remedy a general economic or social issue.' Matthies, 244 Wis. 2d 720, ¶31 (quoting Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶23). ¶23 In reviewing the steps the legislature took to arrive at the current formulations under Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1m) and (1r), we see that its first step in restricting a court's authority to revise past due child support amounts began with 1987 Wis. Act. 27, § 2135i. The revision was made on the recommendation of the Governor's Welfare Reform Commission [the commission]. Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting Record for 1987 Wis. Act. 27. The commission recommended implementing a new federal requirement that prohibits retroactive adjustments to child support orders, Governor's Welfare Reform Commission, Report on Recommendations of the Governor's Welfare Reform Commission 13 (May 22, 1987), apparently referring to 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9)(C). [16] The State may have risked jeopardizing its eligibility for certain federal funds if it had not complied. See Schulz, 155 Wis. 2d at 594-95; Woodmansee, 151 Wis. 2d at 246-47. As one commentator has summarized the pertinent legislative history, the Commission and the Legislature (1) were concerned about the loss of federal . . . funds; (2) wanted to reduce the welfare budget by having non-custodial parents (instead of the state) support their children; and (3) wanted to protect custodial parents from having to return child support payments should the support order later be reduced. Aaron Bransky, An Unfortunate Change of Circumstances: Wisconsin Prohibits Retroactive Revision of Child Support Orders, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 1123, 1138. ¶24 Further restriction on retroactive modification of child support arrearages was passed in 1993, which prohibited credit to the obligor against child support arrearages, 1993 Wis. Act. 481, § 119, regardless of when the underlying child support order was entered, id. at § 9326. These amendments were also intended to bring Wisconsin into compliance with federal law. Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting Record for 1993 S.B. 44. [17] Prior to the 1993 statutory changes, the court of appeals had recognized the soundness of a rule prohibiting credit against an arrearage for voluntary expenditures made in a manner not specifically ordered, noting that [a]llowing credit for such payments or expenditures would condone the unilateral modification of court orders and interference with the custodial parent's right to decide how support money should be spent. O'Brien v. Freiley, 130 Wis. 2d 174, 181, 387 N.W.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing Hirschfield, 118 Wis. 2d at 471). After the 1993 statutory changes, the court of appeals explained that the amendments apparently were based on a public policy determination that the public interest in addressing the problem of nonpayment of child support is best served by limiting payments to those made in accordance with the divorce judgment. This policy fixes arrearages with certainty and facilitates the determination as to who owes arrearages and what amount. Fisher, 200 Wis. 2d at 815. ¶25 Then, in 1997, the Family Law Section of the State Bar of Wisconsin recommended language that it believed both complied with federal law and was fair, allowing credit to be granted a child support obligor under specifically articulated circumstances. Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting Record for 1997 Wis. Act. 273. The State Bar's proposal served as the foundation for 1997 Wis. Act. 273, which allowed credit to be granted under carefully described circumstances. See id.; 1997 Wis. Act 273 §§ 1-7. ¶26 In sum, the retroactive application of Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1m), which generally forbids modification of past due child support, serves: (1) the general public purpose of financially providing for children; (2) the more particular and corollary purpose of requiring parents, rather than the State, to provide financial support for their children; and (3) the pragmatic goal of securing federal funds for the State via compliance with federal law. ¶27 The retroactive application of Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1r), which allows a child support payer to be granted credit only under specifically enumerated circumstances, was also enacted to maintain the State's eligibility for certain federal funds, but further recognizes the public's interest in having changes to child support arrangements be supervised by a court, so that children's needs are met as fully as possible by their parents. ¶28 Having considered the public interest served by Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1m) and (1r), in accordance with the Martin test, we next consider the private interest affected. Of primary concern is whether the retroactive statute unfairly overturns the challenger's settled expectation in any accrued rights. Schultz v. Natwick, 2002 WI 125, ¶26, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 N.W.2d 266; Matthies, 244 Wis. 2d 720, ¶¶42-43; Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶¶20, 22. Consistent with that concern, we also consider whether the statute's challenger had reasonably relied on prior law. Neiman, 236 Wis. 2d 411, ¶21. ¶29 As noted earlier, Dorian contends that his right to due process, that is, the right not to be deprived by the State of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, is violated here. At stake, according to Dorian, is his private interest in property, specifically his economic viability and his ability to contract freely. ¶30 Although the total amount Dorian will have to pay in order to satisfy the child support arrearages, plus interest, is considerable, we conclude that in light of the circumstances, his private interest in property here is weak. Dorian's obligation to pay $30 a week in child support to the county clerk was explicit in the 1982 court order. Wisconsin Stat. § 767.32 provided Dorian the opportunity to return to court and request a modification of the order. [18] He chose not to do so. Instead, he waited until he was called into court to pay the arrearages. ¶31 Dorian argues that his extrajudicial agreement with Barbara subsequent to the 1982 order was enforceable at the time of its creation, which he alleges was in 1983. However, as discussed above, the prevailing law in 1983 regarding revision of child support arrearages was that the circuit court had discretion to make a revision if cause or justification was shown. See supra Section II.B. As all that Dorian had to rely on under prior law was the court's discretionary power, Dorian's expectation that he could successfully enforce his extrajudicial agreement with Barbara regarding child support was far from settled. [19] ¶32 In sum, we conclude that Dorian has not established beyond a reasonable doubt that retroactive applications of Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1m) and (1r) violate his right to due process. Balancing the public's interest against Dorian's private interest, we weigh the public interest as more substantial. Retroactive applications of § 767.32(1m) and (1r) serve significant public purposes, while remedying general social and economic issues. Any expectations Dorian may have had regarding his child support obligation were not well-founded in the law, and moreover, throughout these proceedings, Dorian has never asserted that he was unable to pay $30/week in support or that John had no need for his financial support. Accordingly, his private interest in property is weak. As the Martin analysis demonstrates, retroactive applications of § 767.32(1m) and (1r) are rational and do not violate state or federal constitutional due process provisions. [20]