Opinion ID: 2614001
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants

Text: (38a) Defendant urges that the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, which requires a meaningful basis for distinguishing the cases in which the death penalty properly is imposed from those in which it is not ( Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 U.S. 420, 433 [64 L.Ed.2d 398, 409-410, 100 S.Ct. 1759] (plur. opn.)), is not satisfied by a death penalty law that fails to narrow the class of defendants found guilty of first degree murder who are eligible for the death penalty. In particular, defendant contends that the categories of murder subjecting a defendant to eligibility for the death penalty have been expanded to the extent that the death penalty law does not perform the mandated narrowing function. This development, defendant asserts, is reflective of an original unconstitutional purpose, harbored by the proponents of the law, to apply the death penalty in every case of murder. In support of this claim, defendant asserts that the most common types of murders are, or are likely to be, covered by the special circumstance provisions. Defendant also relies upon this court's decision upholding the constitutionality of the lying-in-wait special circumstance ( People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d 527, 557), as well as the passage by the voters in 1990 of Proposition 114 [adding certain law enforcement personnel to § 190.2, subd. (a)(7) (murder of a peace officer engaged in official duties]) and Proposition 115 (adding § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(xi) [rape with a foreign instrument]). (39) As we recently explained in People v. Bacigalupo, supra, 6 Cal.4th 457, 465, the United States Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between the narrowing and selection aspects of capital sentencing, describing narrowing as pertaining to a state's `legislative definition' of the circumstances placing a defendant within the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. ( Zant v. Stephens [, supra, ] 462 U.S. 862, 878 [77 L.Ed.2d 235, 250-251]; Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, 446 U.S. 420, 428 [64 L.Ed.2d 398, 406].) To comport with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment, the legislative definition of a state's capital punishment scheme that serves the requisite `narrowing' function must `circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.' ( Zant v. Stephens, supra, 462 U.S. 862, 878 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 250-251].) Additionally, it must afford some objective basis for distinguishing a case in which the death penalty has been imposed from the many cases in which it has not. ( Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, 446 U.S. 420, 433 [64 L.Ed.2d at pp. 409-410].) A legislative definition lacking `some narrowing principle' to limit the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and having no objective basis for appellate review is deemed to be impermissibly vague under the Eighth Amendment. ( Maynard v. Cartwright [(1988) 486 U.S. 356,] 361 [100 L.Ed.2d 372, 108 S.Ct. 1853]; Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 428 [64 L.Ed.2d at p. 406].) ( People v. Bacigalupo, supra, 6 Cal.4th 457, 465.) (38b) As we further explained in Bacigalupo, under the 1978 death penalty statute the role of special circumstances in requiring that a death verdict be premised upon a jury finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the truth of at least one special circumstance, `thereby limit[ing] the death sentence to a small subclass' of murders, is essentially identical to their role under California's 1977 death penalty law, which the United States Supreme Court upheld in Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 51, and footnote 13 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 40-41, 184 S.Ct. 871] (also noting that California's 1978 death penalty law greatly expanded the number of special circumstances). ( People v. Bacigalupo, supra, 6 Cal.4th 457, 467.) In California, the special circumstances serve to `guide' and `channel' jury discretion, `by strictly confining the class of offenders eligible for the death penalty.' [Citation.] ( Ibid. ; People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th 988, 1015.) In support of his theory that the special circumstances nonetheless inadequately narrow the class of death eligibles, defendant asserts that [p]robably the most common types of murders occurring in California are those arising from drug deals, robberies and/or burglaries and domestic disputes, all of which fall, or are likely to fall, within one category or another of the enumerated special circumstances. In People v. Wader, supra, 5 Cal.4th 610, the defendant made virtually the same contention, which we rejected, observing: [Defendant] states that all of these types of murders are likely to qualify as capital crimes under a special circumstance. But defendant has not demonstrated on this record, or through sources of which we might take judicial notice, that his claims are empirically accurate, or that, if they were correct, this would require the invalidation of the death penalty law.  ( Id. at p. 669, italics added; see People v. Brown, supra, 6 Cal.4th 322, 339, fn. 16.) We find defendant's contention in the present case unpersuasive for the same reasons. We also specifically have rejected the contention that the assertedly broad application of the lying-in-wait special circumstance negates the function of the death penalty law designed to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. (See People v. Wader, supra, 5 Cal.4th 610, 669; People v. Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th 271, 322-323.) Moreover, the statutory addition of several subcategories of victims, the murder of whom now may provide the basis for the allegation and finding of a special circumstance, occurred subsequent to the commission of the present offenses and therefore has no bearing upon the constitutionality of the death penalty statute applicable to defendant. Even taking into account this statutory expansion, however, we believe the death-eligibility component of California's capital punishment law does not exceed constitutional bounds. Accordingly, we reject defendant's contention.