Opinion ID: 1859460
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Obstructed View of the Crossing

Text: ¶ 6. In support of this claim, Clark offered several photographs of the crossing taken from various angles and the affidavit testimony of Dr. Ken Heathington. Dr. Heathington's report of the site inspection of the crossing at Old Pearson Road outlines his opinion of whether a motorist's view would be obstructed when approaching the crossing. Dr. Heathington found that sight distances from the road looking down the track were severely restricted from all angles. He noted that the crossing was positioned at a 44 degree angle, providing approximately fifteen feet of crossing width to an automobile. Dr. Heathington further found that in order to avoid a collision, an automobile traveling ten miles per hour and a train traveling 49 miles per hour approaching the crossing in question from different directions, the vehicle operator must see the train 711 feet from the crossing when the vehicle operator is 70 feet from the crossing. Deposition testimony included in the record and information submitted during oral argument place the driver's clear sight distance down track in a range from 175 feet to approximately 28 feet from the crossing. Thus, a jury question is presented regarding where clear sight distance down track occurs and whether that amount of space is a reasonable distance to see an oncoming train and stop, given the peculiarities of the crossing. Although Dr. Heathington's report is based upon a slightly elevated train speed, this provides an area ripe for cross-examination by counsel for ICR. ¶ 7. Ordinary care requires the railroad company to meet the unusual conditions of a railroad crossing with unusual precautions, particularly where the dangerous condition results from obstructions of view which prevent a traveler from seeing an approaching train until he is dangerously close to the track. New Orleans & Northeastern R. Co. v. Lewis, 214 Miss. 163, 172, 58 So.2d 486, 489 (1952). The nature of the obstruction and whether one must come dangerously close to the crossing before being able to see the train are factual questions to be resolved by the finder of fact. Badger v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 414 F.2d 880, 882-83 (5th Cir. 1969). On point with the factual situation in the case sub judice, it has been held that negligence claims against a railroad that permitted the view at a crossing to become obstructed by trees, bushes, weeds and grass were matters for the jury to decide when a vehicle operator would have to proceed to a point of peril upon or dangerously near the railroad company's tracks before obtaining an unimpeded view of a train at an appreciable distance. Stacey v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 491 F.2d 542, 544 (5th Cir.1974). ¶ 8. ICR submits that the recent Norfolk S. Ry. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 146 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000) decision federally preempts Clark's state tort claim based upon the excessive vegetation growth. The Shanklin decision and its precursor, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993), which both involved wrongful death actions resulting from trains colliding with automobiles at railroad crossings, are distinguishable from the case at bar. In Easterwood, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of federal preemption of claims rooted in accidents allegedly caused by inadequate warning devices at particular railroad crossings. Easterwood, 123 L.Ed.2d at 404. The Court held that where federal funds are expended for the installation of warning signs or devices at railroad crossings, state law claims for failure to provide additional warning devices are preempted by the Federal Rail Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101 et seq., and the Highway Safety Act of 1973(HSA), 23 U.S.C. §§ 130 et seq. 123 L.Ed.2d at 401. The Easterwood decision is cited with approval in Shanklin. ¶ 9. In Shanklin, the plaintiff argued that federal preemption should not apply despite the fact that federal funds were used to install passive warning devices. Shanklin, 120 S.Ct. at 1476. The United States Supreme Court reasoned that preemption arose under the Secretary of the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) regulations because, by approving and funding grade crossing improvements, the FHWA replaces state common law standards for measuring the adequacy of warning devices. It is this displacement of state law concerning the device's adequacy, and not the State's or the FHWA's adherence to the standard set out in [23 C.F.R.] §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) ... that pre-empts state tort law actions. Shanklin, 120 S.Ct. at 1476. Sections 646.214(b)(3) and (4) are applicable when three requirements are satisfied: (1) The FHWA approves a crossing improvement project; (2) the improvements are actually installed and operating; and (3) federal funds participate in the crossing improvement project. Shanklin, 120 S.Ct. at 1476. ¶ 10. ICR argues that the holding in Easterwood and reaffirmed in Shanklin also covers the railroad's duty to maintain a crossing clear of vegetation. ICR believes that because federal funds were spent on the warning devices found at the Old Pearson Road crossing, they are free of any extraneous but related claims that accrue under state tort law. We disagree. The Shanklin decision presents a very precise question for resolution; that being whether §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) are applicable to all warning devices actually installed with federal funds 120 S.Ct. at 1467. The language and discussion throughout the decision refer exclusively to the installation and maintenance of warning devices alone and not the maintenance of general track conditions. Herein lies the essential difference between Clark's claim and Easterwood and its progeny. Clark's obstructed view claim has nothing to do with the adequacy of the warning devices found at the Old Pearson Road crossing. It therefore falls outside of the narrow confines of Shanklin's holding. See also Hester v. CSX Transp., Inc., 61 F.3d 382, 384 (5th Cir.1995) (citing Easterwood, yet allowing remaining negligence theories including obstructed view by vegetation to go to trial despite railroad's federal preemption claim). ¶ 11. Principles of federalism operate with particular force to preserve traditional spheres of state law. The ultimate goal to be achieved, either through the application of state negligence law or federal regulations, is reasonable safety at grade crossings. It would be illogical and against firm public policy to find that the railroad has been excused from its common law duty to maintain an otherwise safe crossing simply because the FHWA signed off on a request for funds to install the passive warning devices at this crossing. See Miss.Code Ann. §§ 77-9-257 (Supp.2000) [1] . Under aforementioned precedent, we reverse the trial court's finding and remand for trial on Clark's obstructed view claim.