Opinion ID: 994564
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was Corrigan Disabled?

Text: The threshold requirement for coverage under the Act is that the plaintiff be an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); see also Gupton v. Virginia, 14 F.3d 203, 205 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1994). The Act defines the term individual with a disability as any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B). EEOC Regulations state that the term major life activities refers to basic functions, such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1996). A plaintiff must demonstrate that, due to a physical or mental impairment, one of these major life activities is substantially limit[ed], which means that the plaintiff is: (i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 29 U.S.C. § 1630.2(j). Thus, the Act covers an individual only if that individual is unable to perform or significantly restricted in his ability to perform a major life function compared to the average person. The parties agree that at relevant times Corrigan was subject to several medical restrictions: he should not lift more than twenty-five pounds, he should not work above his head or extend his head and neck frequently, and he should not drive a forklift. Corrigan contends that these limitations rose to the level of a disability for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act. Corrigan's claim runs squarely into this Circuit's recent Williams 9 holding, supra. This court held there that a plaintiff who was told by her doctor to refrain from lifting more than twenty-five pounds as well as to avoid pushing or pulling heavy objects was not disabled under the ADA. See Williams, 101 F.3d at 349. The opinion in Williams reflected the Act's exclusion of less serious impairments from the category of disabilities. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) app. (Many impairments do not impact an individual's life to the degree that they constitute disabling impairments). 6 The Act protects only people whose impairments are so severe that theysignificantly restrict[ ] a person's ability to perform major life activities when compared to the abilities of the average person in the general population. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii). In Williams, we held, as a matter of law, that a twenty-five pound lifting limitation-- particularly when compared to an average person's abilities -- does not constitute a significant restriction on one's ability to lift, work, or perform any other major life activity. Williams, 101 F.3d at 349 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Corrigan argues that his medical restrictions are more severe than Williams's limitations because he may not operate a forklift or work frequently above his head. Like the district court, we conclude that these additional restrictions are insufficient to remove Corrigan from the rule laid down in Williams. Employees with basic lifting restrictions often have associated limitations that do not materially alter the character of the limitation. Williams herself, besides the twenty-five pound lifting limitation, could not push or pull heavy objects. See also Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1207 (8th Cir. 1997) (denying disability status to a radiology technician who could not lift more than twenty-five pounds or push heavy equipment); McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., 110 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1997) (denying disability status to a plaintiff who could not lift more than twenty pounds, use vibrating equipment, or make repetitive use of her right hand); Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir. 1995) _________________________________________________________________ 6 The EEOC interpretive guidelines (the EEOC Guidelines), in which the statement regarding less serious impairments appears, are not binding on this court but do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 10 (denying disability status to a plaintiff who could not lift more than twenty pounds, work in a cold environment, or work with meat products). At some point, the question whether additional restrictions combine with a lifting restriction to form a disability becomes an question of fact. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) app. ([A]n individual who has a back condition that prevents the individual from performing any heavy labor job would be substantially limited in the major life activity of working because the individual's impairment eliminates his or her ability to perform a class of jobs.). Corrigan, however, has not tendered any evidence on the effects of the lifting and associated restrictions upon his eligibility for other jobs that may be available. The district court laid particular emphasis on this, noting his failure to provide evidence on three factors set out in Forrisi, 794 F.2d at 933, to wit, [1] the number and type of jobs from which the impaired individual is disqualified, [2] the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access, and [3] the individual's job expectations and training. See also Bolton, 36 F.3d at 943-44. Accordingly, both because of our holding in Williams relative to the inability to lift more than twenty-five pounds, and because of Corrigan's failure to present any evidence as to how his restrictions may have affected his eligibility for other jobs, we find that Corrigan did not create a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether he was disabled under the Act, making summary judgment appropriate. See Williams, 101 F.3d at 350. B. Was Corrigan Denied a Reasonable Accommodation? Besides not establishing that he was disabled within the Act, Corrigan's case has another flaw: Corrigan's tendered evidence was insufficient to show that he requested and was then denied a reasonable accommodation. This latter point may seem surplus given Corrigan's failure to establish disability. We discuss it, however, as it rebuts a contention that Corrigan raised in his complaint and now mentions on appeal, namely that, even if not disabled, he was wrongfully treated because the Department perceived he was disabled and discriminated against 11 him. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (including within the definition of individual with a disability those who areregarded as having a disability). Corrigan asserts that the district court improperly decided this issue by entering summary judgment without hearing and opportunity for argument. Assuming arguendo that the district court erred, and assuming also that Corrigan has preserved this issue, any error below is rendered harmless by Corrigan's failure to establish that he was denied a reasonable accommodation. We turn to that matter. The EEOC Guidelines place the burden of requesting an accommodation on the disabled employee. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 app. (In general, . . . it is the responsibility of the individual with a disability to inform the employer that an accommodation is needed.). The parties dispute whether the evidence indicates that Corrigan made an appropriate request for an accommodation. Corrigan contends that he repeatedly alerted his supervisors informally of his need for an accommodation; the Department argues that Corrigan failed to take any formal steps whatever to ask for an accommodation by reassignment for fear that he would be downgraded. The record is clear that Corrigan never filed a written request for a permanent accommodation with the Department's personnel office until after he had walked off of the job and was no longer able to work. Although Corrigan says he did not realize that he needed to submit a written request in order to obtain an accommodation, he had submitted in 1993 a request for a temporary accommodation on the same form that he would have used to request a permanent accommodation. We need not decide, however, whether Corrigan's alleged informal complaints to his supervisors suffice to create an issue of fact over whether Corrigan submitted an appropriate request for an accommodation. Even if Corrigan's statements to his supervisors can qualify as proper requests for an accommodation, the record compels the conclusion that the Department's informal policy allowing Corrigan to work within his medical limitations satisfied the legal requirement that the Department provide a reasonable accommodation. The EEOC Regulations accompanying the Rehabilitation Act require an agency to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an applicant or employee who is a qualified individual with handicaps unless the agency can demon12 strate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operations of its program. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(c)(1); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1614.102(a)(8) (same, in the Regulations that govern Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity). According to the Regulations, a reasonable accommodation may include, but is not limited to: (i) Making facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with handicaps; and (ii) Job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modification of examinations, the provision of readers and interpreters, and other similar actions. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(c)(2). An employer need not alter the essential functions of a job in order to accommodate a disabled employee. 29 C.F.R.§ 1630.2(o) app. Essential functions are the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.7 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). If a disabled person cannot perform a job's essential functions even with a reasonable accommodation, the Regulations establish a policy in favor of reassignment, including reassignment to a lower grade position if necessary. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(g); see also § 1614.102(a)(9). By tailoring Corrigan's job responsibilities to fit his medical restrictions, the Department complied with the demands of the Act. The Department, to be sure, may have gone further than required in _________________________________________________________________ 7 Whether a function is essential to a specific job is a fact-specific inquiry; the EEOC Regulations list a number of considerations that may indicate whether a function qualifies as essential. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). We need not decide whether lifting and operating a forklift were essential to Corrigan's position as a work leader because neither party has raised the issue. Even assuming they could be considered essential, Corrigan's supervisors, by waiving them in his case, could create a job-restructuring constituting an accommodation. 13 its efforts to accommodate Corrigan in that particular position. By relieving Corrigan of the necessity to lift and operate a forklift, the Department arguably abrogated several of the essential functions of a work leader. Still, the undisputed evidence establishes that, although Corrigan remained in a position that demanded on paper that he exceed his medical restrictions, his supervisors never ordered him to do so. Rather, Corrigan was told to respect his medical limitations and was evaluated on the basis of the work that he could actually perform, not on his job description. Under this informal job restructuring, Corrigan received consistently satisfactory performance reviews. In pursuing this policy, the Department satisfied its duties under the law. Corrigan argues that he was denied an effective accommodation, and that under the policies discussed above he should have been given a job transfer, even though he himself took no formal steps to request one. We cannot agree. First, there is no evidence that the Department's accommodation was ineffective. Although Corrigan has submitted affidavits to support his assertion that he was compelled to exceed his abilities, he is unable to indicate the source of that compulsion. Corrigan received consistently satisfactory performance ratings and admits that he was never told to work outside of his limitations by any other Department employee or supervisor. When Corrigan exceeded his medical limitations, it was because he held himself to a standard that his doctors had forbidden and his supervisors did not demand. Corrigan's refusal to accept the conditions of an accommodation did not impose an additional duty upon the employer. Cf. 29 C.F.R.§ 1630.9(d) (providing that if a disabled employee refuses to accept a reasonable accommodation, that employee is no longer considered to bea qualified individual with a disability). Corrigan admitted that the duties that he performed during the entire period of his employ following his first surgery conformed to the accommodation that he had in mind. On these facts, and given that and other admissions, we cannot say that the Department's chosen if informal accommodation was ineffective. Second, even assuming Corrigan's requests to supervisors for an accommodation can be viewed as requesting transfer to another job, he was not entitled to insist upon a transfer in preference to the restructuring of his current job. Although an employee's preference 14 for one accommodation over another must be taken into account, the employer providing the accommodation has the ultimate discretion to choose between effective accommodations, and may choose the less expensive accommodation or the accommodation that is easier for it to provide. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 app. Indeed, the accommodation chosen by the employer need not be the `best' accommodation possible, so long as it is sufficient to meet the job-related needs of the individual being accommodated. Id. Any reasonable accommodation by an agency is sufficient to satisfy its legal obligation. See Schmidt v. Methodist Hosp. of Indiana, Inc., 89 F.3d 342, 344-45 (7th Cir. 1996). Thus, Corrigan would not have been entitled to insist upon a particular accommodation, such as reassignment, even had he made this desire clear. We hold that the undisputed facts in this record are insufficient to establish that Corrigan was disabled under the Rehabilitation Act. We further hold that, even if the Department perceived Corrigan to be disabled, the record indicates that the Department provided Corrigan with a reasonable accommodation. AFFIRMED 15