Opinion ID: 2970947
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failing to Investigate the Victims

Text: 5 Bowling’s first claim of ineffective assistance, which was In addition to arguing that the denial of a specific instruction in the penalty phase violates federal law, Bowling also claims that this denial discussed extensively at oral argument though not given much violated a state statute that requires judges to give particularized attention in the parties’ appellate briefs, is that his counsel did instructions on mitigating factors. See K Y . R EV . C O D E . A N N . not properly investigate the Earleys’ involvement with drugs. § 532.025 (2) (“In all cases of offenses for which the death penalty may be authorized, the judge shall consid er, or he shall include in his If his counsel had performed a proper investigation, Bowling instructions to the jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or argues, they would have discovered that Eddie Earley had aggravating circumstances o therwise authorized by law and any of the informed Lexington police of the drug activities of Donald following statutory aggravating or mitigating circumstances which may Adams and that Donald Adams was the one who presumably be supported by the evidence.”). Bowling argues that he did present shot the Earleys. sufficient evidence to merit a specific instruction on these facts und er state law. W hether or not we would agree with him on this point, Bowling ignores the fact that this co urt gene rally does not review alleged violations of state law in federal habeas proceedings. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 6 W e merely hold here that the state trial court’s determination that Bowling W e note at the outset that the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed was not entitled to instructions on these factors is not so fundam entally and rejected all of Bowling’s claims of ineffective assistance that we unfair as to violate due p rocess. consider here. Bowling II, 981 S.W.2d at 549-52. No. 01-5832 Bowling v. Parker 23 24 Bowling v. Parker No. 01-5832 To support his claim, Bowling points to a memorandum deficient for not investigating this theory. In light of the written by his attorneys roughly six weeks before trial. This tenuous connection between Adams and the murder, memorandum lists twenty-seven tasks that counsel said they counsel’s decision not to investigate further does not seem needed to accomplish before trial. One of these, task number unreasonable. In fact, the memorandum that Bowling uses to twenty one, is an interview with Larry Walsh, who was the show that his attorneys were deficient seems to support the chief of Lexington police at the time. The memorandum opposite conclusion. The memorandum reveals a states that they should interview Walsh because he was methodically organized defense team, and the mere fact that “friends with the victims” and because Eddie Earley Bowling’s attorneys failed to accomplish all of the tasks they “provided information concerning Donald Adam[’s] drug set out for themselves may be an indication of their early activity.” J.A. at 1237. We note that task number twenty is ambitiousness rather than their later negligence. counsel’s statement that they should interview Donald Adams, who “supposedly had [an] affair with Tina, and sold Moreover, Bowling has put forth no evidence of prejudice. dope to Eddie.” J.A. at 1237. Bowling has not shown that anything inculpatory about Adams would have come out of an interview with the police Counsel never interviewed Walsh. Bowling claims that if chief. Bowling suggests that his attorneys would have at least Walsh had been interviewed, Bowling’s counsel would have discovered that Eddie Earley had previously informed on found that Donald Adams was the one who killed the Earleys, Donald Adams and that Donald Adams may have slept with or, at the very least, Bowling’s counsel would have been able Tina Earley. Bowling’s attorneys, however, already to create reasonable doubt by arguing that Adams committed suspected this. Bowling has put forth no evidence going the murders. beyond these facts; Bowling has not shown that Donald Adams was in any way actually connected to the Earleys’ We must note that Bowling’s theory that Donald Adams murders. Bowling has therefore not shown that the Kentucky was involved in the murders is farfetched. Though Bowling Supreme Court’s decision denying relief on this claim was never really explains how Donald Adams could have been the unreasonable. Bowling II, 981 S.W.2d at 550. murderer under the facts adduced in the case, he seems to intimate that Adams must have stolen Bowling’s car, 2. Failing to Consult with Bowling committed the murders, and then deposited Bowling’s car on the Bowling family’s property. Among the more obvious As explained in Part I.B, supra, Bowling first claimed problems with Bowling’s theory is the fact that Bowling does ineffective assistance in the trial itself. Between the guilt and not explain why Adams would choose to frame Bowling for penalty phases, Bowling sought to have his counsel removed the murders, how Adams stole Bowling’s car, how Adams because Bowling felt they were unprepared. Bowling claimed knew where Bowling’s family property in rural Powell that he did not have ample chance to explain the facts of the County was located, and — most importantly — how Jack case to his attorneys because he had “not spent an hour, total, Mullins and Jack Strange could have both identified Bowling with any of them from day one.” J.A. at 4921 (Trial Tr.). near the Powell County property if he had not been there. The few times that they did talk, Bowling claims, he was interrupted and ignored. While Bowling’s attorneys did not The implausibility of Bowling’s thesis that Donald Adams put on a single witness, Bowling claimed that there were was in fact the killer makes it virtually impossible for numerous witnesses who could have been called. Bowling to prove that his counsel was constitutionally No. 01-5832 Bowling v. Parker 25 26 Bowling v. Parker No. 01-5832 The Kentucky Supreme Court quickly rejected this claim Conviction Relief) (italics added). Moreover, the one-hour on direct appeal, stating that “[t]he trial judge determined that figure seems implausible, given that Bowling’s trial lawyers the trial strategy used by Bowling’s counsel had a better could not have found the witnesses who testified at the chance of success than any of which the trial judge could penalty phase (which included Bowling’s coworkers and jail think in light of the strong evidence of guilt presented by the supervisors) or discovered the rest of their submitted evidence prosecution.” Bowling I, 873 S.W.2d at 180. without Bowling’s aid. It also seems strange, for example, that Bowling’s lawyers would have Bowling attend a This claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. First, psychological examination with a psychologist for nine hours it is not clear that Bowling has shown constitutional and meet with him for only one. deficiency. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the focus of the Sixth Amendment is not on “the accused’s Even, however, if the one-hour total consultation figure is relationship with his lawyer,” but on “the adversarial accurate and Bowling has made out deficiency, Bowling has process.” Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) not shown the prejudice that his Strickland argument requires. (quotation omitted); see also Dick v. Scroggy, 882 F.2d 192, As noted by the federal district court, Bowling has not shown 197 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding, in a non-capital case, that how additional time spent with counsel could have altered the Strickland was not violated when the defendant’s attorney did outcome of his trial. Bowling claimed in the colloquy with not interview the defendant until the night before trial, and the state trial judge that numerous witnesses could have been then for only thirty to forty-five minutes). Yet, the one-hour called, but Bowling never specifically named anyone and total consultation time that Bowling cites is alarming, and stated in front of the trial judge that he would not testify courts have granted habeas relief under such conditions. See, himself. Bowling has not even alleged factually how e.g., Harris By and Through Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d additional time with his counsel would have aided his case or 1432, 1436, 1438-39 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that Strickland helped counsel obtain names of people to testify on his was violated when the defendant’s counsel, among many behalf. Bowling cannot therefore show prejudice; the mere other deficiencies, met with his client in a capital case for less fact that counsel spent little time with him is not enough than two hours). under Strickland, without evidence of prejudice or other defects. As a result, Bowling has not shown that the We are concerned, however, by the fact that Bowling has Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision denying him relief on done nothing to substantiate this bare allegation. Bowling has this ground is unreasonable. not even submitted a personal affidavit verifying the one-hour total consultation figure. Bowling’s trial counsel signed 3. Failing to Present EED and Other Mitigating affidavits stating their general strategy and admitting that they Evidence never interviewed Chief Walsh of the Police Department. Though they easily could have done so, these affidavits never Bowling’s next claim is that his counsel was ineffective in mention the one-hour total consultation figure. Instead of their efforts to present evidence of an EED defense in the providing that sort of substantive evidence, Bowling simply guilt phase and to present general evidence of mitigation in raises this claim in his briefs, often making very limited the penalty phase. Bowling claims that his lawyers did not claims like, “Lead counsel at trial appears to have visited Mr. present evidence that could have garnered Bowling a Bowling for a mere hour, cumulative,” without any mitigating instruction under KY . REV . CODE ANN . supporting evidence. J.A. at 1843 (Motion for Post- § 532.025(2)(b)(2) and (7), which allow for mitigation upon No. 01-5832 Bowling v. Parker 27 28 Bowling v. Parker No. 01-5832 a showing of “extreme mental or emotional disturbance” or a Assuming that we — I mean, we are going to rest. We lack of capacity “to appreciate the criminality of his conduct were — I didn’t mean to seem like we were stringing [or to conform the conduct] to the requirements of law . . . as him along. I do want them to know that we were a result of mental illness or retardation or intoxication.” considering putting Dr. Veal [sic] on this afternoon. We needed to talk to him about some additional information Bowling makes several arguments. He argues that his that we had. He did not get back to us. On further lawyers failed to understand the Kentucky requirements of reflection, we decided to rest. EED. He argues that his lawyers hastily prepared their expert Dr. Beal and that they should have presented him in the J.A. at 4757. In isolation, this comment suggests that his penalty phase. Bowling alleges that his lawyers did not put attorneys may have chosen not to call Beal as a witness on Dr. Beal because Beal did not return a phone call. because they could not find him. Even if this is true, Bowling also argues that counsel in the penalty phase should however, it was better for Bowling that his attorneys did not have submitted evidence that Bowling had a growth removed call Dr. Beal to testify, as it is clear that Beal’s testimony was from his head at age seven, sustained serious head injuries, not going to help Bowling establish extreme emotional had a violent alcoholic father, and suffered a history of disturbance. Beal’s report states: alcohol abuse and blackouts. The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected all of these assorted claims. Bowling II, 981 S.W.2d There is no evidence that the mental disorders at 550. substantially impaired this man[’]s behavior with respect to the alleged actions, such that he lacked substantial Some of Bowling’s claims clearly have no merit. Bowling capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, or claims that Beal’s analysis was a hasty last-minute effort, but that he was unable to conform his conduct to the Beal spent nine hours with Bowling, interviewed several requirements of the law. In my opinion Mr. Bowling members of Bowling’s family, examined medical and family was legally sane at the time of the offenses for which he records, and wrote a written report. Bowling argues that his is charged. lawyers did not understand the Kentucky requirements of EED, but Bowling has offered no evidence to support this J.A. at 5320 (Beal Report). The report contains other claim, and our review of the transcript suggests otherwise. damaging observations as well. In his psychological assessment of Bowling, Beal reported Bowling as having a Bowling’s chief objection seems to be a challenge to his tendency to be “angry, irritable, resentful” and “asocial,” and counsel’s decision not to put Dr. Beal on the stand. Many said that his offenses could be expected to be “vicious and sensible reasons could justify this decision. First, if Beal had assaultative . . . senseless, poorly planned, and poorly testified to Bowling’s mental deterioration before the crime, executed.” J.A. at 5328. Moreover, it is clear that Dr. Beal that might have implicitly suggested to the jury that Bowling did not think Bowling was entitled to an EED instruction. was the murderer. The decision not to call Beal as a witness One of Bowling’s attorneys wrote a memorandum describing may have been a necessary consequence of Bowling’s his conversation with Dr. Beal, during which Dr. Beal insistence on not abandoning his claim of innocence in the suggested that “Bowling was in a frame of enraged anger guilt phase. Bowling claims, however, that his attorneys were prior to the murders, and we discussed that this did not simply lazy, pointing to the following statement that his appear to be a heat of passion kind of thing, but rather attorneys made in deciding to rest his case: something that had been developing several days earlier.” No. 01-5832 Bowling v. Parker 29 30 Bowling v. Parker No. 01-5832 J.A. at 5335 (Att’y Memorandum) (italics added). This alcoholic father, and a history of alcohol abuse and blackouts. would be very damaging information, for as we noted, supra As an initial matter, Bowling did present some of this at Part II.C, in our discussion of extreme emotional information. His sister and mother testified to his drinking, disturbance, it would, in fact, destroy Bowling’s request for the prevalence of mental illness in the family, and his strange an EED instruction under Kentucky law. See McClellan, 715 behavior during the weeks before the shooting. Bowling has S.W.2d at 468. not submitted evidence that he suffered from a violent alcoholic father. Bowling’s evidence that he had a growth Because Beal’s testimony was not going to help Bowling, removed from his head and a serious head injury comes from it was certainly reasonable (and perhaps ultimately better for an initial doctor’s report noting the head growth and the fact Bowling) that Bowling’s counsel chose to rely on the that Bowling was in a boating accident as a child that left him testimony of their favorable lay witnesses, Bowling’s sister unconscious. Beal’s report, however, considered this earlier and mother, who testified to his deteriorating state of mind, as report, and did not think the head growth and childhood well as on the state’s mental health expert, Dr. Smith, whose injury worthy of mention. report seems more helpful to the defense than the one of Dr. Beal. See Bowling II, 981 S.W.2d at 550 (noting that the This evidence, though not presented, does not seem to have State’s profile “aided Appellant in his case more than his own much importance. Bowling’s counsel submitted these facts psychologist’s profile”). Dr. Smith, in contrast to Dr. Beal, to their expert, who seemed to view them as trivial and not believed that it was “unlikely but not impossible that Mr. worth pursing. It was therefore reasonable for counsel to Bowling, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked make the strategic decision to pursue other avenues of relief substantial ability to comprehend the criminality of his for Bowling by stressing his drinking, mood swings, and behavior or to conform his behavior to the requirements of increasing depression. Moreover, Bowling cannot show any law.” J.A. at 5186-87 (Smith Report). Smith’s report also prejudice from this alleged deficiency, because it is simply states that Bowling “suffers from Alcohol Abuse” and that at unrealistic to say that knowledge of these two minor the time of the accident Bowling either “suffered from a childhood incidents, which have no apparent connection to major psychiatric disorder or . . . was suffering an ordinary the present, could have changed anything. Bowling has not reaction to the loss of his wife occurring in an alcoholic shown deficiency or prejudice as those terms have been used individual with this [Antisocial and Borderline] personality in other binding precedent. Cf. Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 disorder.” J.A. at 5186. U.S. 362, 395-98 (2000) (finding ineffective assistance when counsel failed to introduce evidence that the defendant was Since Beal’s testimony was not going to aid Bowling, borderline mentally retarded and was severely and repeatedly Bowling cannot show ineffective assistance of counsel for the beaten by his father); Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, failure to present it. Even if Bowling is right and his 450-53 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding ineffective assistance when attorneys were not making a tactical error but were being counsel failed to report that the defendant was borderline deficient in failing to present Beal, Bowling cannot show mentally retarded and sexually abused by his grandmother prejudice. who involved him in her voodoo and group sex practices), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1031 (2002); Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d Finally, Bowling argues that his counsel could and should 581, 593-94, 600 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding ineffective have submitted evidence that Bowling had a growth removed assistance when counsel failed to introduce medical records from his head at age seven, serious head injuries, a violent showing multiple childhood and adult head injuries from No. 01-5832 Bowling v. Parker 31 32 Bowling v. Parker No. 01-5832 accidents and fights, and physician recommendations for has not even suggested anything that Baldani failed to ask. psychiatric hospitalization); Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, This claim therefore fails. 1208, 1211 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding ineffective assistance when counsel failed to introduce evidence showing that the 5. Failing to Investigate the Message With the Police defendant sustained organic brain damage before he was born and was mentally retarded as a result), cert. denied, 519 U.S. Bowling also argues that a message left within the police 910 (1996). department long before the trial took place suggests that there may be another witness to the crime. The message is from an 4. Failing to Prepare Because of the Indictment officer who had a friend whose boyfriend was a witness to the accident. The message reports only that the “incident occured Bowling next claims that his attorney Summers was [sic] over a fender bender type accident.” J.A. at 1779. unprepared because Summers was told on the first day of trial that he was being indicted. Bowling points to an affidavit Bowling contends that his counsel was ineffective for not filed by another of his trial attorneys, Baldani, who stated that taking steps to investigate who sent the message. Even Summers was “extremely upset” and asked Baldani to cross- assuming that Bowling could show his counsel was deficient examine the investigating officer, Detective Henderson. J.A. for failing to do so, Bowling cannot prove prejudice. at 1243 (Baldani Aff.). Bowling argues that if his counsel had been able to find this witness, then the witness could have rebutted the In Bowling’s post-conviction appeal, the Kentucky prosecution’s theory that Bowling had intentionally rammed Supreme Court analyzed this claim and stated that “[w]ith no the car, which would have entitled Bowling to an instruction evidence that counsel’s indictment had any negative on EED. Bowling, however, has no evidence that the witness implications on Appellant’s trial, we cannot conclude that would testify that the incident was accidental or that an Appellant was denied effective counsel in this respect.” accidental collision would have been sufficient to warrant an Bowling II, 981 S.W.2d at 550. instruction on EED. In fact, it seems likely that the witness would have hurt Bowling’s case. The only thing known The Kentucky Supreme Court is correct. Bowling has not about the witness is that she described the accident preceding even alleged that the performance of his defense team was the shootings as a fender bender. This tends to suggest that hampered when Baldani had to take over for Summers. the accident was an extremely minor one, which would Neither Baldani in his affidavit nor Bowling in his brief contradict Bowling’s claim that the accident was so jarring as makes any claim that Summers would have done a better job to make him lose control over his actions and shoot the than Baldani did. On direct examination, Detective Earleys. Moreover, as the Kentucky Supreme Court stressed, Henderson related the events surrounding Bowling’s arrest in “[i]t was not the lack of evidence pertaining to the collision, Knoxville, told of retrieving Bowling’s personal effects, and but rather the lack of evidence showing the effect the collision testified about interviewing the witnesses placing Bowling on had upon Appellant that precluded the EED instruction.” the road near where his car was discovered on the evening of Bowling II, 981 S.W.2d at 549. As a result, this claim of error the murder. On cross-examination, Baldani got Henderson to also fails. admit that none of the personal effects had blood on them and that the car itself did not have blood on it either. No part of Baldani’s cross-examination seems substandard and Bowling No. 01-5832 Bowling v. Parker 33 34 Bowling v. Parker No. 01-5832 6. Failing to Impeach the Prosecution’s Witnesses Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Specifically, Bowling wants to investigate whether the prosecution had any internal Bowling’s last claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is documents linking the Earleys to Donald Adams (and thus that his counsel inadequately cross-examined Clay Brackett.7 Donald Adams to the crime itself), and whether Bowling’s Bowling argues that an adequate cross-examination of counsel was defective for not further investigating Adams.8 Brackett, who sold Bowling the murder weapon, would have Bowling also seeks an evidentiary hearing to establish shown that he testified pursuant to a covert deal struck with whether his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate police who agreed not to pursue him for failing to register his a potential deal the government made with Clay Brackett. firearms. The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected this claim as Bowling was never granted any post-conviction evidentiary well. Bowling II, 981 S.W.2d at 550. hearing by the Kentucky state courts, but requested an evidentiary hearing in the direct appeal and post-conviction Bowling, however, has put forth no evidence of an agreement between Brackett and the government. Without any evidence supporting Bowling’s claim, we cannot say that 8 Although Bowling raises this Brady claim as a part of his general the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision to deny relief on request for an evidentiary hearing, see Appellant Br. at 51-54; Reply Br. these grounds was improper, let alone unreasonable. at 16-17, Bo wling does not discuss it outside of this context. Construing Bo wling’s appellate briefs generously, we will consider this part of E. Evidentiary Hearing Bo wling’s petition as stating a Brady claim as well as a claim that an evidentiary hearing sho uld be gran ted on this Brady issue. W e reject the Brady claim. First, we note that this claim is Bowling next claims that the district court erred by denying procedurally defaulted. Bowling raised three Brady issues in the federal him a federal evidentiary hearing in conjunction with his district court. He claimed that the prosecution did not disclose habeas petition. Bowling seeks an evidentiary hearing to exculpatory notes on the results of a photo lineup, documents establishing investigate one of his Brady claims and a few of his the extramarital affairs of Tina Earley and drug use by both Earleys, and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Brady v. a deal with Clay Brackett. See Bow ling III, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 879-885; J.A. at 109-12 (Pet. Br. in Dist. Ct.). He did not raise there the Brady claim he alludes to here: whether “[t]he prose cution failed to disclose 7 evidence regarding D onald A dams’ prosecution for drug charges, his In his brief to this court, Bo wling raise s for the first time the involvement in a drug ring, and the victims’ involvem ent with the police.” possibility that his counsel was also ineffective for failing properly to Appellant Br. at 53. Moreover, this claim was not presented to the cross-examine Detective H enderson . This claim was never presented to Kentucky Supreme Co urt. For these reasons Bo wling’s claim is the Kentucky S upreme C ourt an d was not even presented to the district defaulted. court below. It is therefore defaulted. Even if this claim were properly presented to the federal district court In any eve nt, we ho ld this claim has no merit. Bowling argues that and the Kentuck y Supreme Court, we would deny the claim on the merits. an adequate cross-examination of Henderson would have revealed that the Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (19 63), a prosecutor who prosecution had no explanation for why Bo wling comm itted the murders. suppresses evidence that is favorable to the defendant and “material either Bowling argues that his attorneys inappropriately chose not to ask to guilt or to punishment” violates due pro cess. Id. at 87; see also United Detective Henderson about whether Bowling knew the Ea rleys or not, States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (explaining that materiality after being warned by the judge that this would open the door to hostile exists when “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been evidence and after consulting with B owling himself. Bowling gives no disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been reason to think this was an unreasonable decision , and even if it was, different”). In the present case, however, Bowling has not put forth any Bowling does not explain how it could have prejudiced his case, as the evidence to show that the prosecution improperly suppressed information defense repeatedly stated throughout trial that there was no apparent about Do nald A dam s or that such a suppression would be material. W e motive. therefore reject Bowling’s Brady claim. No. 01-5832 Bowling v. Parker 35 36 Bowling v. Parker No. 01-5832 proceedings. We conclude that the district court did not err F.3d 442, 460 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted), cert. denied, in denying Bowling an evidentiary hearing. 123 S. Ct. 136 (2002). The first hurdle that Bowling must jump is 28 U.S.C. Bowling cannot show that the district court abused its § 2254(e)(2), which prevents federal courts from granting discretion in denying him an evidentiary hearing. Bowling’s evidentiary hearings to petitioners who “fail[] to develop the claims that Donald Adams was the one who murdered the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings.” The victims and that Clay Brackett had a deal with the Supreme Court has explained that “a failure to develop the government do not amount to anything more than conclusory factual basis of a claim is not established unless there is lack allegations. At oral argument, Bowling’s counsel argued that of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner Bowling could not make more than bald assertions precisely or the prisoner’s counsel.” Michael Williams v. Taylor, 529 because he had not had an evidentiary hearing. This circular U.S. 420, 432 (2000). This court has noted that “a finding of logic, however, would entitle every habeas defendant to an diligence would ‘depend[] upon whether the prisoner made a evidentiary hearing on any issue. Without some evidence in reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the support of Bowling’s implausible theory of the case, which is time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court.’” analyzed above in our discussion of Bowling’s ineffective Sawyer v. Hofbauer, 299 F.3d 605, 610 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing assistance of counsel claims, we cannot say that the district Williams, 529 U.S. at 435). court’s decision to deny an evidentiary hearing was an abuse of discretion.9 Bowling has met his burden under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Bowling repeatedly sought an evidentiary hearing in state F. Prosecutorial Misconduct court and, in those proceedings, introduced several documents attempting to corroborate the deal between Clay Brackett and Bowling’s fourth set of claims relates to allegations of the government and to establish the culpability of Donald misconduct on the part of the prosecution. On direct appeal, Adams. We find this sufficient to show that Bowling was the Kentucky Supreme Court considered the claims of diligent in his state court litigation. prosecutorial misconduct together and found no merit in them. Bowling I, 873 S.W.2d at 178. However, the fact that Bowling is not disqualified from receiving an evidentiary hearing under § 2254(e)(2) does not entitle him to one. We must determine then whether the district court abused its discretion by denying him an 9 To the extent that Bowling seeks relief by arguing that the Kentucky evidentiary hearing. See Sawyer, 299 F.3d at 610. This court courts erroneously applied state law by denying him a post-conviction has held that “a habeas petitioner is generally entitled to such evidentiary hearing, we reject his claim. As we have noted in this opinion a hearing if he alleges sufficient grounds for release, relevant already, we generally do not review alleged vio lations o f state law in facts are in dispute, and the state courts did not hold a full and federal habeas p roceedings; there must be some independ ent constitutional error. Estelle v. Mc Guire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). fair evidentiary hearing.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Insofar as Bowling may be claiming that this alleged state-law error However, “[e]ven in a death penalty case, ‘bald assertions and violated due process, we believe that any po tential error was not so conclusory allegations do not provide sufficient ground to fundamentally unfair as to violate Bo wling’s due-process rights. Insofar warrant requiring the state to respond to discovery or to as Bowling may be claiming that this alleged error entitled him to an require an evidentiary hearing.’” Stanford v. Parker, 266 evidentiary hearing in federal court, we have considered and rejected this claim immediately above. No. 01-5832 Bowling v. Parker 37 38 Bowling v. Parker No. 01-5832 On habeas review, claims of prosecutorial misconduct are or in reverse. Is there anybody here that is not in neutral? reviewed deferentially. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, How did you like the way I viewed that? Thank you; I 181 (1986). To be cognizable, the misconduct must have “‘so have no other questions, Judge. infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Id. (citation omitted). J.A. at 3317-18. Bowling is correct when he states that a jury Even if the prosecutor’s conduct was improper or even must be told a defendant is presumed innocent. Taylor v. “universally condemned,” id., we can provide relief only if Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484-86 (1978). Given the context of the statements were so flagrant as to render the entire trial the prosecutor’s statement, it is clear that the prosecutor did fundamentally unfair. Once we find that a statement is not undermine that presumption; instead, the prosecutor was improper, four factors are considered in determining whether merely trying to make sure that the jury began the trial the impropriety is flagrant: (1) the likelihood that the remarks without presuppositions about the case. The same prosecutor would mislead the jury or prejudice the accused, (2) whether had made the following remark only seconds before: the remarks were isolated or extensive, (3) whether the remarks were deliberately or accidentally presented to the Do we all agree that this Defendant is, as he sits right jury, and (4) whether other evidence against the defendant here, innocent until proven guilty? We all understand was substantial. See Boyle v. Million, 201 F.3d 711, 717 (6th that there has been no evidence heard in this case. And, Cir. 2000). Under AEDPA, this bar is heightened by the as a result, if all of us had to vote right now, we would deference we give to the Kentucky Supreme Court’s have to vote not guilty because we haven’t heard any determination of Bowling’s prosecutorial-misconduct claims. evidence. Do we understand that? Okay; now, in See Macias v. Makowski, 291 F.3d 447, 453-54 (6th Cir. criminal cases, the burden of proving a person charged 2002) (“If this court were hearing the case on direct appeal, with a crime guilty beyond a reasonable doubt rests on we might have concluded that the prosecutor’s comments the Commonwealth . . . . The burden is on us; do you violated Macias’s due process rights. But this case is before understand that? us on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. So the relevant question is not whether the state court's decision was wrong, J.A. at 3315. Considering these statements together, it but whether it was an unreasonable application of clearly becomes apparent that the presumption of innocence was not established federal law.”). negated in this case. There is therefore no impropriety here, and this claim is easily dismissed. 1. The Presumption of Innocence