Opinion ID: 617052
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: TSA Exemption from Suit Under the Rehabilitation Act

Text: The question before us is whether the ATSA precludes a security screener, Field, from bringing suit under the federal Rehabilitation Act, [6] 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. We conclude that it does. The TSA takes the position that the ATSA excludes security screeners from filing suit in federal court under certain of the federal employment statutes incorporated under Title 5 of the United States Code, including the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. While consistently taking the position that suit cannot be brought under any of these Acts as to security screeners, the TSA Administrator has, within the TSA itself through Management Directives, provided certain corollary limited protections, which include some whistleblower protections and certain procedures for preventing and responding to sexual harassment. See TSA Management Directive No. 1100.75-5 (May 21, 2009) (Whistleblower Protections for Transportation Security Officers); TSA Management Directive No. 1100.73-3 (Jan. 6, 2009) (Prevention and Elimination of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace). [7] As to the Rehabilitation Act, the TSA Administrator has issued a Management Directive providing that employees may request a reasonable accommodation but that employees who fail to meet the statutory requirements for the security screener position are not eligible for such accommodations. See TSA Management Directive No. 1100.73-4 (Jan. 25, 2006) (Reasonable Accommodation Program). Pursuant to his statutory authority, the TSA Administrator has declined to fully extend the Rehabilitation Act standards to security screeners because, inter alia, the Rehabilitation Act standards are not consistent with the physical qualifications that the TSA Administrator has established for the screener position. The plain language of the ATSA supports the TSA position. It is well established that, when the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it according to its terms. Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118, 129 S.Ct. 681, 172 L.Ed.2d 475 (2009). The ATSA provides that the TSA Administrator may establish and enforce employment qualifications for security screeners [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law. 49 U.S.C. § 44935 (historical and revision notes). [T]he use of such a `notwithstanding' clause clearly signals the drafter's intention that the provisions of the `notwithstanding' section override conflicting provisions of any other section. Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Grp., 508 U.S. 10, 18, 113 S.Ct. 1898, 123 L.Ed.2d 572 (1993). As Cisneros observed, [a] clearer statement is difficult to imagine. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Liberty Mar. Corp. v. United States, 928 F.2d 413, 416 (D.C.Cir.1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The law of this circuit follows Cisneros. See United States v. Hyde, 497 F.3d 103, 108 (1st Cir.2007) (citing Cisneros for the holding that the language [n]otwithstanding any other Federal law in the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is an unambiguous indication that the statute overrides conflicting provisions in the federal Bankruptcy Code). Moreover, the ATSA enumerates specific physical qualifications for screeners, requires that screeners meet any such other physical qualifications as the TSA Administrator may establish, and requires the TSA to conduct annual evaluations to ensure conformity with such qualifications. 49 U.S.C. § 44935(e)-(f). Thus, under the ATSA, TSA cannot retain as security screeners individuals who are physically incapable of distinguishing between colors, hearing alarms, handling up to 70 pounds of baggage, or conducting a full-body pat-down. See id. Allowing security screeners to bring suit under the Rehabilitation Act would be inconsistent with these statutory mandates in several respects. First, these specific ATSA requirements as to security screeners and the assignment of qualifications to the TSA Administrator displace the broader and more general standards of the Rehabilitation Act. Compare 49 U.S.C. § 44935(e)-(f), with 29 U.S.C. § 794. Second, these provisions preclude second-guessing of TSA's decisions as to implementing the criteria Congress has established and the discretion as to employment decisions given to TSA. Third, in combination with the notwithstanding clauses, these provisions evidence a clear intent to free TSA from the costs and burdens of litigation in federal court over such decisions. Every circuit to address the issue has agreed that the language of the ATSA plainly precludes security screeners from bringing suit under certain of the federal employment statutes incorporated under Title 5 of the United States Code, including the Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g., Joren v. Napolitano, 633 F.3d 1144, 1146 (7th Cir.2011), reh'g en banc denied, 2011 U.S.App. LEXIS 5254 (7th Cir. Mar. 9, 2011), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 290, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, 2011 WL 4535993 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2011) (We now join every other circuit to have considered the question and conclude that the plain language of the ATSA preempts application of the Rehabilitation Act to security screeners.); Castro v. Sec'y of Homeland Sec., 472 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir.2006) (The plain language of the ATSA indicates that TSA need not take the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act into account when formulating hiring standards for screeners.); Conyers v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 388 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (Section 111(d) of the ATSA exempts TSA from laws that otherwise would apply to screener positions.); see also Conyers v. Rossides, 558 F.3d 137, 148 (2d Cir.2009) (holding that the [TSA] Administrator's decision not to utilize the [Federal Aviation Administration]'s personnel management system in deciding whom to `employ' or `appoint' as a security screener, `is committed to agency discretion' by ATSA Section 111(d) and, thus, is not reviewable under the [Administrative Procedure Act]) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)). Despite the unequivocally plain language of the ATSA, plaintiff argues that Congress could not have intended to deny security screeners the ability to sue under the Rehabilitation Act. To the contrary, not only is the reason for the ATSA's preclusion of suit under the Rehabilitation Act self-evident, but the Congressional history makes clear the intent to do so. The original version of the proposed ATSA made the provisions of Title 5 of the United States Code, including the Rehabilitation Act, applicable to all screeners hired. [8] Conyers, 558 F.3d at 140. However, before enacting the ATSA, Congress rejected that concept and replaced the original language with the statute's current language in § 111(d) in order [t]o authorize the employment, suspension, and termination of airport passenger security screeners without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, otherwise applicable to such employees. 147 Cong. Rec. S10,520 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (voice vote passing amendment 1881). Several members of Congress expressed their understanding that § 111(d) gave the TSA Administrator the authority to determine whether [screeners] can join a union; participate in the Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan and retirement options; and be covered by non-discrimination, health and safety, and whistleblower laws. 147 Cong. Rec. H8313 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2001) (statement of Rep. Schakowsky); see also 147 Cong. Rec. S11,982 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2001) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller) (expressing the understanding that under the ATSA health care, worker's compensation, and civil rights and whistleblower protection . . . are left to the discretion of the TSA Administrator). Plaintiff's fallback argument is that the ATSA exempts the TSA from suit under the Rehabilitation Act only insofar as the ATSA enumerates minimum physical and intellectual requirements in § 44935(f). Plaintiff proposes we adopt the view, expressed in several EEOC appellate decisions, that TSA's exemption from the Rehabilitation Act must be determined on a case-by-case basis, in light of the specific allegations made, and will depend on whether there is any conflict between the ATSA-mandated qualifications and the complainant's Rehabilitation Act claim. Chapman v. Chertoff, EEOC Appeal No. 0120051049, 2008 WL 3820633, at , 2008 EEOPUB LEXIS 2746, at  (Aug. 6, 2008); see Kimble v. Napolitano, EEOC Appeal No. 0120072195, 2009 WL 4573665, at , 2009 EEOPUB LEXIS 3302, at  (Nov. 24, 2009); Getzlow v. Chertoff, EEOC Appeal No. 0120053286, 2007 WL 1964480, at , 2007 EEOPUB LEXIS 2508, at -9 (June 26, 2007). We reject this argument. Congress gave the EEOC no role to play in interpreting the ATSA. [9] Instead, Congress vested primary authority for interpreting the ATSA in the TSA Administrator, 49 U.S.C. § 114(d)-(f), granting the Administrator broad flexibility to develop employment standards beyond those articulated in the statute, id. § 44935(e)(2)(A). Nor does the EEOC have any particular expertise in airport security needs. See Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 Colum. L.Rev. 1, 26 (2011) (describing the Supreme Court's growing wariness of agency interpretations that are not grounded in agency expertise and therefore [do] not merit deference). Additionally, the EEOC interpretation is contrary to the statute in that it requires engaging in a case-by-case analysis of whether TSA's decisions are correct under the Rehabilitation Act. Congress did not intend such a result. Plaintiff further argues that because TSA has voluntarily established through its Management Directive a limited version of reasonable accommodation, it has permanently waived its exemption from suit under the Rehabilitation Act. Again, not so. The TSA Management Directive establishing a limited reasonable accommodation program does so pursuant to Executive Order 13,164, which directs federal agencies to adopt reasonable accommodation procedures. See TSA Management Directive No. 1100.73-4 (Jan. 25, 2006) (Reasonable Accommodation Program). Significantly, by its terms, Executive Order 13,164 makes clear that the adoption of such procedures does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, its employees, or any person. Exec. Order No. 13,164, 65 Fed. Reg. 46,565 (July 26, 2000). In enacting the ATSA, Congress sought not only to give the Administrator wide latitude to determine the terms of employment of screeners, but also the flexibility to change those terms as necessary to ensure aviation safety. H.R.Rep. No. 107-296, at 64, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 589, 57. Thus, the statute provides that the Under Secretary shall also review, and revise as necessary, any standard, rule, or regulation governing the employment of individuals as security screening personnel. 49 U.S.C. § 44935(e)(3). The ATSA's mandate to set and revise terms of employment means that the Administrator's Management Directives cannot constitute waiver of ATSA § 111(d). [10]