Opinion ID: 1192229
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonable Suspicion of Safety Risk Sufficient for a Terry Frisk

Text: Kenerson next argues that Officer Williams lacked specific and articulable facts necessary to form a belief that Kenerson was armed or dangerous and conduct a protective frisk following the traffic stop. Under United States v. Pedroza, 269 F.3d 821, 827 (7th Cir.2001), a protective pat-down search ... is appropriate only if the agents have at a minimum some articulable suspicion that the subject is concealing a weapon or poses a danger to the agents or others.... The standard is less demanding than probable cause and requires only a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). Courts must determine reasonable suspicion based on the totality of circumstances, not by considering each factor in isolation. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). When evaluating a situation, officers are entitled to consider practical considerations of everyday life, United States v. Lawshea, 461 F.3d 857, 859 (7th Cir.2006) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)), as well as the prevalence of criminal activity in a particular location, United States v. Jackson, 300 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir.2002). The government asserts that the combination of factors surrounding Kenerson's traffic stop justifies a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed. In particular, it emphasizes the violent nature of the drug trade, United States v. Cooper, 19 F.3d 1154, 1163 (7th Cir.1994) (weapons are `tools of the trade' of drug dealers), and the frequency of gun crime in the Century Woods area. From an objective standpoint, these bits of information supplement an otherwise suspicious situation, give rise to a reasonable concerns about safety for Officer Williams, and justify a Terry frisk of defendant-appellant. While the transaction taking place at 1415 3rd Street was unlikely to be a major drug dealper the anonymous tip, the officers could not have expected much more than a few ounces of crack to change handsit is an unfortunate fact of life that trade in controlled substances is dangerous for all involved. Dealers may arm themselves for protection against competitors, addicts, and the police. In fact, a rational drug dealer may well carry a gun, given these same realities and expectations. Officer Williams was aware of these trends; he had personally arrested armed individuals in the Century Woods area after he and Officer Carlson began their special detail. The peculiar interaction between the heavy-set man, Kenerson, and the passengers of the Plymouth in front of the apartment building also strongly suggested a covert exchange of some sort. At 11:30 p.m. on a January night, people generally don't walk up to a car, briefly talk to the drivers, walk away, call someone, talk to an acquaintance, follow the acquaintance to the car, and walk away for good, especially with minute-long pauses punctuating the actions. The suspicious nature of such activity was supplemented by the existence of a tip that drug deals would be going on at this specific address. Once pulled over, Kenerson made a furtive movement with his shoulders that made Williams concerned about the possible presence of a weapon in the car. Finally, when Officer Carlson asked Byrd, the driver of the Plymouth, about whether she knew Kenerson, the man in her back seat, she claimed that she picked Kenerson up to get beer because he looked cold (Officer Williams previously witnessed an entirely different meeting between the two and notified Carlson accordingly). This attempt to obfuscate the nature of the encounter between Byrd and Kenerson makes the conclusion that an illegal transaction involving Kenerson had just transpired all the more likely. Together, these factors all justify a reasonable suspicion by Officer Williams that the rear-seat passenger of the Plymouth was a drug dealer who may be armed and dangerous. Appellant's invocation of Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), a case whose holding Terry and its progeny significantly narrowed, see, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993), does nothing to alter this conclusion. We therefore hold that the district court made a correct determination that Officer Williams validly carried out a Terry frisk of Kenerson.