Opinion ID: 2351833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court's Ruling Regarding Taxes

Text: As a sanction for the District's failure to adequately respond to discovery requests and orders, in November 1992, the trial court ruled there was no obligation to pay the taxes then due and owing on the property. The trial court also purported to set aside these taxes when ruling on UJAF's motion for summary judgment in February and March 1993. We conclude that each of these orders, if reviewed as a discovery sanction, was an abuse of discretion and therefore error. Accordingly, we reverse this order. District of Columbia Code § 47-3307 (1990 Repl.), the so-called Anti-Injunction Act, provides, No suit shall be filed to enjoin the assessment or collection by the District of Columbia ... of any tax. As no one disputes, this precludes a court from suspending the collection of taxes by the District except in extraordinary circumstances not applicable here. 1776 K Street Assocs. v. District of Columbia, 446 A.2d 1114, 1114 n. 1 (D.C.1982). The statutory bar precludes declaratory as well as injunctive relief. Barry v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 563 A.2d 1069, 1073 (D.C.1989); see also Shaw v. United States, 331 F.2d 493 (9th Cir.1964) (penalties for failure to pay tax cannot be enjoined given Anti-Injunction Act). [3] The trial court's order to the effect that none of the past due taxes on the property could be collected, even if intended as a discovery sanction, clearly ran afoul of the Act. The District did not make the anti-injunction law arguments when the two motions raising the question were before the trial court. Nonetheless, it asserts that since the trial court was without jurisdiction to enjoin the collection of taxes, the questions can be reviewed. The District's vehicle for this argument was its motion under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 60(b)(4), which it invoked when it moved to have the initial orders vacated. It is the denial of that motion that we now consider. Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), the losing party can challenge an order on the basis that the court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. See Kammerman v. Kammerman, 543 A.2d 794, 799 (D.C.1988). Here, the District claims that the court went beyond its jurisdiction in addressing the taxes. Under D.C.Code §§ 47-3303, -3307, a suit seeking the voidance or adjustment of taxes paid to the District will lie only after certain paths are taken (i.e., the taxes are paid and then challenged). Barry, supra, 563 A.2d at 1073. The statutory prerequisites were not met here, as no one disputes. Accordingly, the trial court was without jurisdiction to enjoin the taxes. See National Trust for Historic Preservation v. District of Columbia, 498 A.2d 574, 575-76 (D.C.1985). UJAF argues that this analysis is inapplicable here, asserting that the subject matter of the suit was § 1983 and the voiding of the tax deed, and the setting aside of the taxes was only subsidiary of that. Since the focus of the suit was within the court's jurisdiction, goes this argument, the subsidiary acts were impervious to jurisdictional challenge. We first note that the test of whether an action runs afoul of the Anti-Injunction Act is not whether the purpose of the suit is solely to question the liability of the party requesting the relief. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 739-42, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 2048-49, 40 L.Ed.2d 496 (1974). Rather, the question is whether, because of the action requested or taken, any assessment or collection of [ ] taxes will be prohibited. Crenshaw County Private Sch. Found. v. Connally, 474 F.2d 1185, 1188 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908, 94 S.Ct. 2604, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974). The blanket cancellation of the taxes here prohibited the assessment or collection of taxes due upon the property. Moreover, UJAF's approach  though it has a certain resonance  would improperly empower a court to do anything so long as it has jurisdiction over the case, regardless of directly binding prohibitions. UJAF's argument also misappreciates the nature of a jurisdictional challenge. Whether or not jurisdiction is in all respects proper is not necessarily implicated by the mere filing of suit by itself, since a suit generally belongs, by definition, in a court. Rather, it is the questions presented by the suit (including counterclaims) and the relief requested and granted that necessarily force the question of jurisdiction. See United States v. Forma, 42 F.3d 759 (2d Cir.1994). Here, for example, the jurisdictional question is not whether the § 1983 action belonged in Superior Court, but whether the Superior Court had the power to order the relief that it did (i.e., the cancellation of taxes). We caution that the word tax is not a talisman that deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to remedy wrongs with which tax questions are intertwined. Therefore, we remand the case to the trial court to determine whether the taxes should be set-off against the rents, understanding that the trial court retains broad discretion to fashion an appropriate discovery remedy short of cancellation of the taxes. [4]