Opinion ID: 2624305
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Excusal for Cause of Prospective Juror C.B.

Text: Defendant contends that Prospective Juror C.B. was improperly excused for cause during voir dire. We disagree. During voir dire, C.B. made clear her general support for the death penalty. However, she stated that she would have difficulty serving on the penalty phase jury because she had not been part of the jury that had found defendant guilty. In her colloquy with the judge she stated: what happens if the other 12 people made a mistake and he is innocent. See, that's my problem with this whole situation. If I had listened to him and found the gentleman guilty, then that's a whole different circumstance[]. After explaining her general support for the death penalty, C.B. reiterated her difficulty with being a juror in this particular case. I'm going to be honest with you. I could do it, but I don't want to be on this jury. I didn't find this man guilty, and I don't want to be sentencing him to life without parole. What happens if he's innocent . . . that's what bothers me. . . . I can't sit in judgment of someone that . . . . At this point, the court interrupted her and solicited from her the statement that she could perform her function as a juror. The court then allowed the prosecutor and defense counsel to question C.B. In response to defense counsel's inquiry as to whether she could serve on the jury, C.B. stated: Of course, I'll be able  I may be blond[e], but I'm not that stupid. Yeah, I could be capable of that. But I'm telling you up front it bothers me that I wasn't on the first jury, okay. The prosecutor moved to challenge for cause, which defense counsel opposed. The trial court granted the motion. In response to defense counsel's argument that C.B. had said she could function when the Court asked her if she could function, the trial court responded: I have some real doubts about that. She appears to be very hesitant, very unsure, very positive as a matter of fact that she could not. And, she's trying to say, I believe, or give the correct responses so that she is not looked upon as, like she says, a dumb blond[e]. (1) Defendant argues the trial court erred in excusing C.B. for cause. The relevant legal principles are well settled: In Wainwright v. Witt [(1985)] 469 U.S. 412 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844], the United States Supreme Court set forth the proper procedures for choosing jurors in capital cases. That case `requires a trial court to determine whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. [Citation.] Under Witt, therefore, our duty is to `examine the context surrounding [the juror's] exclusion to determine whether the trial court's decision that [the juror's] beliefs would substantially impair the performance of [the juror's] duties. . . was fairly supported by the record.' [Citations.] [¶] In many cases, a prospective juror's responses to questions on voir dire will be halting, equivocal, or even conflicting. Given the juror's probable unfamiliarity with the complexity of the law, coupled with the stress and anxiety of being a prospective juror in a capital case, such equivocation should be expected. Under such circumstances, we defer to the trial court's evaluation of a prospective juror's state of mind, and such evaluation is binding on appellate courts.' ( People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 696 [27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289] ( Roldan ).) Defendant contends that Prospective Juror C.B.'s reservation about serving on the jury, properly understood, was the reservation that she would have to sentence someone to death notwithstanding the fact that she had some lingering doubt about his innocence, and that the court should have made clear that lingering doubt was properly considered at the penalty phase. But the record reveals that C.B. had a more fundamental objection to the proceeding: she made clear her discomfort at not having been on the jury that found defendant guilty and in expressing that discomfort, she did not focus on the imposition of the death penalty but stated that I didn't find this man guilty, and I don't want to be sentencing him to life without parole.  The fact that she expressed a reluctance to serve on a penalty phase jury even if that jury sentenced the defendant to life without parole indicates not a concern with whether lingering doubt could justify a refusal to vote for the death penalty, but rather an objection to participating in any kind of sentencing decision when she had not served on the jury that determined defendant's guilt. (2) Defendant also argues that C.B. should not have been excused for cause because she, at several points, affirmed her ability and willingness to serve on the penalty phase jury. It is true that the mere expression by a prospective juror that he or she anticipates that a juror's duties will be difficult is not by itself grounds for discharging a juror. ( People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 530 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076].) On the other hand, C.B. expressed great reluctance in undertaking her duties under the particular circumstance, and such reluctance, taken into account with the juror's hesitancy, vocal inflection, and demeanor, can justify a trial court's conclusion regarding the juror's mental state that the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 697.) The trial court made a determination, based on its judgment about C.B.'s credibility and demeanor, that her attitude toward serving on the penalty phase jury without having determined defendant's guilt would in fact substantially impair the performance of her duty as a juror in the present case. Under these circumstances, we defer to the trial court's determination. ( Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 696.) Defendant further contends that C.B. should not have been disqualified because she expressed support for the death penalty. There is no dispute that C.B. was death qualified in the conventional sense. The reason for her exclusion was not her lack of support for the death penalty but, as discussed, her resistance toward serving on a penalty phase jury when she had not determined guilt. As explained above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that her attitude disabled her from serving on this particular jury.