Opinion ID: 1947466
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Omitted Cross-Claims and Counterclaims

Text: The courts of appeals have also treated omitted cross-claims and counterclaims inconsistentlydespite our holding in Bandera. In Bandera, the trial court signed an order with a Mother Hubbard clause that did not mention the defendant's counterclaims. 946 S.W.2d at 337. This Court explained that [b]ecause the order contained a Mother Hubbard clause denying all other relief, it also purported to dispose of [the defendant's] counterclaims. Bandera, 946 S.W.2d at 337. But several courts have refused to apply Mafrige in this situation, maintaining that a summary judgment that does not mention counterclaims or cross-claims cannot purport to be final-regardless of whether it contains finality language. E.g., Sommers v. Concepcion, 20 S.W.3d 27, 33 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); Hervey v. Flores, 975 S.W.2d 21, 25 (Tex. App.El Paso 1998, pet. denied); cf. Coleman Cattle Co., Inc. v. Carpentier, 10 S.W.3d 430, 433 n. 2 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2000, no pet.). Other courts have followed Bandera 's mandate, holding that finality languagesuch as plaintiff takes nothing renders a judgment final for appeal purposes, despite omission of any reference to defendant's counterclaims. In re Monroe, No. 05-99-01758-CV, 2000 WL 378519 (Tex.App.-Dallas Mar.31, 2000, orig. proceeding) (not designated for publication), 2000 WL 378519, at -2; see also Kaigler, 961 S.W.2d at 275-76. The Court's rule does not provide a satisfactory remedy for this situation either. The Court states: An order that adjudicates only the plaintiff's claims against the defendant does not adjudicate a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, nor does an order adjudicating claims like the latter dispose of the plaintiff's claims. An order that disposes of claims by only one of multiple plaintiffs or against one of multiple defendants does not adjudicate claims by or against other parties. An order does not dispose of all claims and all parties merely because it is entitled final, or because the word final appears elsewhere in the order, or even because it awards costs. Nor does an order completely dispose of a case merely because it states that it is appealable, since even interlocutory orders may sometimes be appealable. Rather, there must be some other clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case. 39 S.W.3d at 205. Under its modified finality rule, the lower courts' disagreement in this area will continue because too many questions are left unanswered. For example, should a final summary judgment order stating that defendant is granted summary judgment in all things dispose of a cross-claim by another defendant as well as the claim by the plaintiff that brought the original claim? In this situation, there is no doubt that the order is unambiguous. However, it is likewise clear, but not from the order, that the third party's claim against the defendant was never considered. Should an order granting summary judgment for a plaintiff that recites it is a final and appealable order be final for counterclaims not mentioned in the motion or order? The order unequivocally states that it is a final, appealable order. Nonetheless there is a counterclaim that has not been considered. The Court states that a summary judgment granted for a plaintiff does not adjudicate a counterclaim and then goes on to say that to make the order final there must be some other clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case. 39 S.W.3d at 205. In the example above, does the additional statement that this is a final, appealable order provide this other clear indication? These very issues are repeatedly raised in the courts of appeals, and the Court's modified rule simply does not resolve them.