Opinion ID: 626562
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Proper Application of the Plausibility Requirement

Text: When the district court ruled that Anderson did not state a plausible § 1 claim because  [u]nilateral parallel conduct [by the defendants wa]s completely plausible,  732 F.Supp.2d at 399 (emphases added); see also id. at 400, 407, the plausibility inquiry was misdirected. The question at the pleading stage is not whether there is a plausible alternative to the plaintiff's theory; the question is whether there are sufficient factual allegations to make the complaint's claim plausible. As discussed in Part II.A. above, the plausibility standard is lower than a probability standard, and there may therefore be more than one plausible interpretation of a defendant's words, gestures, or conduct. Consequently, although an innocuous interpretation of the defendants' conduct may be plausible, that does not mean that the plaintiff's allegation that that conduct was culpable is not also plausible. The view of the district court here that  it is plausible that each of the publisher Defendants unilaterally stopped shipping magazines to Anderson rather than pay the Surcharge, 732 F.Supp.2d at 400 (emphases added), was thus not a proper basis for finding that Anderson had not pleaded a claim that was plausible. The court also found that the possibility that each of the defendants had acted separately in deciding to stop supplying magazines to Anderson was [t]he most plausible scenario, id. at 407 (emphasis added). But on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion it is not the province of the court to dismiss the complaint on the basis of the court's choice among plausible alternatives. Assuming that Anderson can adduce sufficient evidence to support its factual allegations, the choice between or among plausible interpretations of the evidence will be a task for the factfinder.