Opinion ID: 1947893
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: coverage of mental injuries under the act

Text: The central issues raised in this case are (1) whether mental injuries that are not caused by physical trauma are compensable under the Act, and (2) what standards should be applied in such cases. This Court has previously recognized the compensability of psychological and neurological disorders when they are the result of an industrial accident. E.g., Rice's Bakery v. Adkins, Del. Supr., 269 A.2d 215, 216-17 (1970) (The law seems settled that, provided a sufficient causal connection is proved by competent evidence between an industrial accident and a resulting psychological or neurotic disorder resulting therefrom, such disability is compensable under Workmen's Compensation Law.). Nevertheless, this Court has not previously addressed the issue of whether a mental injury is compensable when it is not preceded by a physical injury in the workplace. We begin our analysis of these questions by considering the purposes and language of the Act. This Court has recognized on numerous occasions that the two primary purposes of the statute are to provide a scheme for assured compensation for work-related injuries without regard to fault and to relieve employers and employees of the expenses and uncertainties of civil litigation. Kofron v. Amoco Chem. Corp., Del.Supr., 441 A.2d 226, 231 (1982). See also Frank C. Sparks Co. v. Huber Baking Co., Del.Supr., 96 A.2d 456, 461 (1953) (The philosophy of the Workmen's Compensation Law is to give an injured employee, irrespective of the merits of his cause of action, a prompt and sure means of receiving compensation and medical care without subjecting himself to the hazards and delays of a law suit.). Consistent with these goals, 19 Del.C. § 2304 provides: Every employer and employee, adult and minor, except as expressly excluded in this chapter, shall be bound by this chapter respectively to pay and to accept compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, regardless of the question of negligence and to the exclusion of all other rights and remedies. Id. (emphasis added). The decisions of this Court have explained that the by accident requirement focuses on an unintended cause or result, rather than a specific incident or unusual event. Duvall v. Charles Connell Roofing, Del.Supr., 564 A.2d 1132, 1134-36 (1989). As a result, an injury is compensable if the ordinary stress and strain of employment is a substantial cause of the injury. Id. at 1136. The more difficult question of statutory interpretation is determining whether a mental disorder can be considered an injury under the Act. The definition of injury is set forth in 19 Del.C. § 2301(12), which provides: `Injury' and `personal injury' mean violence to the physical structure of the body, such disease or infection as naturally results directly therefrom when reasonably treated and compensable occupational diseases and compensable ionizing radiation injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. Id. (emphasis added). The central issue, therefore, is whether violence to the physical structure of the body encompasses psychological injuries. Although this question has not been considered by this Court, it has been considered by the Superior Court of this State and by courts in other states. In Battista v. Chrysler Corp., Del.Super., 517 A.2d 295 (1986), appeal dismissed, Del. Supr., 515 A.2d 397 (1986), the Superior Court considered whether psychological injuries came within the statutory definition in 19 Del.C. § 2301(12). Battista, an employee of Chrysler Corp. (Chrysler), was hospitalized for shortness of breath and chest pains after being demoted several times and subjected to ethnic slurs and verbal abuse from at least one co-worker over a three-year period. Id. at 296. He was diagnosed as having a panic disorder with a secondary depression. Battista never returned to work and filed a petition for workers' compensation with the IAB. The IAB denied his petition, holding that without physical violence to the structure of the body a psychological injury is not compensable. Id. at 297. Battista appealed the IAB's decision to the Superior Court. In determining the compensability of psychological illnesses under the Act, the Superior Court considered the statutory definition of the terms injury and personal injury. Id. After carefully analyzing the definition in 19 Del.C. § 2301(12) and reviewing certain non-Delaware authorities, the Superior Court held that psychological illnesses can be compensable under the Act even if not preceded by physical trauma. Id. (emphasis added). [3] A number of decisions of courts from other jurisdictions have reached a similar conclusion. Nearly 40 years ago, the Texas Supreme Court in Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955), held that the phrase damage or harm to the physical structure of the body in the Texas Workmen's Compensation statute [4] included mental injuries not preceded by a physical trauma: The phrase physical structure of the body, as it is used in the statute, must refer to the entire body, not simply to the skeletal structure or to the circulatory system or to the digestive system. It refers to the whole, to the complex of perfectly integrated and interdependent bones, tissues and organs which function together by means of electrical, chemical and mechanical processes in a living, breathing, functioning individual. To determine what is meant by physical structure of the body, the structure should be considered that of a living person  not as a static, inanimate thing. Bailey, 279 S.W.2d at 318 (emphasis in original). See also Sparks v. Tulane Medical Ctr. Hasp. & Clinic, La.Supr., 546 So.2d 138 (1989) (holding that a mental disorder can constitute violence to the physical structure of the body). Professor Larson, a leading scholar on workers' compensation, has praised the reasoning of the Bailey decision. 2B Arthur Larson, Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law § 42.23(a), at 7-905-6 (1993) (hereinafter Larson). Larson observed over 20 years ago that the strength of the trend toward coverage suggests that the time is perhaps not too far off when compensation law generally will cease to set an artificial and medically unjustifiable gulf between the `physical' and the `nervous.' Arthur Larson, Mental and Nervous Injury in Workmen's Compensation, 23 Vand.L.Rev. 1243, 1260 (1970). In fact, Professor Larson's prediction has proven to be accurate as a growing number of states have elected to compensate mental injuries without requiring physical trauma. See Marc A. Antonetti, Workers' Compensation Statutes and the Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages in the Absence of Physical Injury, 1990 Ann.Surv.Am.L. 671, 695 (1992) ([T]he trend in the law has been towards granting awards for mental injury resulting from mental stress.). A broad construction of the phrase physical structure of the body is appropriate in light of the nature of the Act. We have observed that the Act is a remedial statute with a benevolent purpose. Delaware Tire Ctr. v. Fox, Del.Supr., 411 A.2d 606, 607 (1980). It is the settled law of this State that the Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose. Id.; Mosley v. Bank of Delaware, Del.Supr., 372 A.2d 178, 179 (1977). The realistic construction of the phrase physical structure of the body, as was used by the Texas Supreme Court in Bailey, best effectuates this remedial purpose. After consideration of the relevant authorities, we conclude that a disabling work-related mental disorder, whether or not preceded by a physical injury, is compensable under the Act. The nature of a mental injury does not make it less deserving of coverage. An impairment of a worker's mental faculties can be just as disabling as a physical injury. Although the cause and existence of a mental infirmity may be more difficult to establish than its physical counterpart, a clearly proven mental injury should be accorded equal treatment under the Act. Our conclusion is consistent with recent decisions of this Court. In Reese v. Home Budget Ctr., Del.Supr., 619 A.2d 907 (1992), we reaffirmed the compensability of psychological consequences resulting from a prior work-related accident. See also Rice's Bakery, 269 A.2d 215. The existence of a specific physical accident, however, is not a prerequisite to recovery. Duvall, 564 A.2d at 1136. As long as the ordinary stress and strain of employment is a substantial cause of the injury, compensation under the Act is available. Id. Because job-related stress can cause mental as well as physical injuries, it is appropriate to compensate all such injuries equally.