Opinion ID: 1418556
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the effect of the first amendment as requiring a modification of the common law of defamation

Text: If the overriding necessity of protecting the First Amendment against the inhibiting effect of the law of defamation is to be properly understood, it is highly desirable that careful attention be paid to what is said in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra , and certain cases following and expanding the rule of Times. Such careful attention is all the more desirable because Gertz does not disavow Times' strong support of the First Amendment rationale by which it curtailed the otherwise existing remedy for defamation under state law. Times, at page 256, posed the question involved as the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct. The court concluded, at pages 279-80: The constitutional guarantees require ... a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice  that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. In the later case of St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732, 20 L.Ed.2d 262, 88 S.Ct. 1323 (1968), the court further explained the meaning of malice: Nor will [professions of good faith] be likely to prevail when the publisher's allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put them in circulation. Likewise, recklessness may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports. The Times court proceeded on the premise that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment, and that libel as a formula for the repression of expression is therefore not immune from the First Amendment, but must be measured by its standards. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra at 269. The First Amendment, of course, is a restriction on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666, 69 L.Ed. 1138, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925). The Times court, at page 270, quoted the remarks of Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76, 71 L.Ed. 1095, 47 S.Ct. 641 (1926), that: `Those who won our independence believed ... that public discussion is a political duty ...' The court emphasized the Times case would have to be considered against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra at 270. Other commentators have noted that a prime purpose of the First Amendment was to protect newspapers against government censorship. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715-17, 29 L.Ed.2d 822, 91 S.Ct. 2140 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); 1 B. Schwartz, A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States  Part III, Rights of the Person 262-63 (1968); 28 Sw. L.J. 1038, 1043 (1975). The court further pointed out that falsity of ideas and beliefs did not create an exception to the First Amendment. The court said: Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth ... The reason is that: [E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and ... must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the `breathing space' that they `need ... to survive.' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra at 271-72, quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 9 L.Ed.2d 405, 83 S.Ct. 328 (1963). Accordingly, the court held that a defense of truth would not suffice to remove the publication from the First Amendment's protection, the Times court stating at page 279: A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions  and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount  leads to a comparable self-censorship. The court pointed out that the self-censorship effect of the common-law libel rule would deter more than false speech because of doubt whether the criticism can be proved in court, or fear of the expense of having to do so. The Times court said at page 279: The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court approved some strong language from a District of Columbia Circuit Court's opinion in which a congressman's libel suit against a newspaper charging him with anti-Semitism in opposing a judicial appointment was dismissed. The Times court said at page 272, quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.1942): The interest of the public here outweighs the interest of appellant or any other individual.... Whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate. The second element of common-law libel, that the publication may have been defamatory as well as false, was also not enough to remove the protection of the First Amendment. The Times court said at pages 272-73: Injury to official reputation affords no more warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise be free than does factual error.... Criticism of . .. official conduct does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is effective criticism and hence diminishes their [elective city officials'] official reputations. Finally, the court held that even if both elements of common-law libel combined in the same remark, that fact is likewise inadequate to remove the constitutional shield from criticism of official conduct ... New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra at 273. The court then emphasized the inhibiting effect of damage awards in civil suits upon the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. The inhibiting effect comes from three sources: (1) the possibility of being punished for criticism of public officials without the criminal law safeguards of the requirements of indictment and proof beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) a large judgment award without proof of actual pecuniary loss; and (3) the possibility of other judgments being awarded for the same publication. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra at 277-78. The Times court said at page 278: Whether or not a newspaper can survive a succession of such judgments, the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive. Professor Kalven, in his article The New York Times Case: A Note on The Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191, 220, suggested that a negligence standard would not protect the constitutional freedoms in question. He said: [T]he Court's concern has been with the kind of inevitable factual error and exaggeration that are not extraordinary accompaniments of robust criticism. It is willing to forgive this kind of error. Its affirmative policy need not extend to deliberate falsehoods. The Times test, announced in the context of the public official, was expanded to apply to the public figure who was not a public official. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094, 87 S.Ct. 1975 (1967). Then came Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 29 L.Ed.2d 296, 91 S.Ct. 1811 (1971). Rosenbloom held at page 52: [A] libel action, as here, by a private individual against a licensed radio station for a defamatory falsehood in a newscast relating to his involvement in an event of public or general concern may be sustained only upon clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Calculated falsehood, of course, falls outside the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964). (Footnote omitted.) In arriving at this result, the court emphasized the importance of robust discussion on matters of general public concern. The court pointed out also that many public issues exist in which persons other than a public official or a public person are involved. The mere fact that a private individual is involved does not destroy the necessity for protecting the First Amendment right to free press and free speech. Justice Brennan, the author of the majority opinion in Times and of the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom, said in Rosenbloom: Moreover, the constitutional protection was not intended to be limited to matters bearing broadly on issues of responsible government. [T]he Founders . .. felt that a free press would advance `truth, science, morality, and arts in general' as well as responsible government. Id., at 147 [ Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra ] (opinion of HARLAN, J.). Comments in other cases reiterate this judgment that the First Amendment extends to myriad matters of public interest. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, [385 U.S. 374, 17 L.Ed.2d 456, 87 S.Ct. 534 (1967)], we had no doubt that the ... opening of a new play linked to an actual incident, is a matter of public interest, 385 U.S., at 388, which was entitled to constitutional protection. Butts held that an alleged fix of a college football game was a public issue. Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), a companion case to Butts, established that the public had a similar interest in the events and personalities involved in federal efforts to enforce a court decree ordering the enrollment of a Negro student in the University of Mississippi. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., supra at 42. Self-governance in the United States pre-supposes far more than knowledge and debate about the strictly official activities of various levels of government. The commitment of the country to the institution of private property, protected by the Due Process and Just Compensation Clauses in the Constitution, places in private hands vast areas of economic and social power that vitally affect the nature and quality of life in the Nation. Our efforts to live and work together in a free society not completely dominated by governmental regulation necessarily encompass far more than politics in a narrow sense. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., supra at 41. We are aware that the press has, on occasion, grossly abused the freedom it is given by the Constitution. All must deplore such excesses. In an ideal world, the responsibility of the press would match the freedom and public trust given it. But from the earliest days of our history, this free society, dependent as it is for its survival upon a vigorous free press, has tolerated some abuse. In 1799, James Madison made the point in quoting (and adopting) John Marshall's answer to Talleyrand's complaints about American newspapers, American State Papers, 2 Foreign Relations 196 (U.S. Cong. 1832): `Among those principles deemed sacred in America, among those sacred rights considered as forming the bulwark of their liberty, which the Government contemplates with awful reverence and would approach only with the most cautious circumspection, there is no one of which the importance is more deeply impressed on the public mind than the liberty of the press. That this liberty is often carried to excess; that it has sometimes degenerated into licentiousness, is seen and lamented, but the remedy has not yet been discovered. Perhaps it is an evil inseparable from the good with which it is allied; perhaps it is a shoot which cannot be stripped from the stalk without wounding vitally the plant from which it is torn. However desirable those measures might be which might correct without enslaving the press, they have never yet been devised in America.' 6 Writings of James Madison, 1790-1802, p. 336 (G. Hunt ed. 1906) (emphasis in original). Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., supra at 51. The New York Times standard was applied to libel of a public official or public figure to give effect to the Amendment's function to encourage ventilation of public issues, not because the public official has any less interest in protecting his reputation than an individual in private life. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., supra at 46. The Supreme Court of Washington had earlier adopted the constitutional limitation upon recovery for defamation of the public official and public person. Grayson v. Curtis Publishing Co., 72 Wn.2d 999, 436 P.2d 756 (1967). Miller v. Argus Publishing Co., 79 Wn.2d 816, 490 P.2d 101 (1971), adopted the rationale of the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom. Then came Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974). In Gertz, attorney Elmer Gertz sued Robert Welch, Inc., for alleged libels published in its magazine, American Opinion. Although the jury found the remarks defamatory and untrue, the federal district court entered judgment for respondent Welch. The court held that Gertz, although not a public figure or public official, was involved in a trial which was an event of public or general interest and, therefore, was required to show that respondent had published the libel with the reckless disregard required by the New York Times and Rosenbloom rules. The Supreme Court of the United States reexamined and declined to reaffirm the mandatory extension of the New York Times standard made in Rosenbloom, which had held that at least reckless disregard for the truth by the defendant publisher was necessary for recovery for defamation, even when the plaintiff was not a public official or public figure but was involved in an event of public or general interest. However, rather than substituting a new standard of its own creation to replace Rosenbloom's, the court held that because of each state's legitimate interest in compensating private individuals who have been defamed, each state should undertake to design its own standard within certain limits. [S]o long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra at 347. The court required, however, that no such state standard for defamation of private persons adopt the common-law's liability without fault. This limitation was imposed to shield the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for defamation. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra at 348. The Gertz court also added a second limitation upon any new state standards at page 349: States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Thus, in Gertz at page 350, only damages sufficient to compensate ... for actual injury are permitted, unless the plaintiff establishes a liability under the standards of New York Times. The court's reasons for the second restriction were twofold: First, the common-law's presumed damages as well as punitive damages unnecessarily increase the possibility of press self-censorship. Second, both of these kinds of damages permit the jury to punish unpopular opinions. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra at 349-50. The court's first premise in Gertz, at page 341, was the same as in New York Times  that defamatory statements are not outside the protection of the First Amendment. The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters. The Gertz court's second premise, however, was one not strongly emphasized  namely, the importance of protecting the reputation of the individual. In New York Times, this interest was not emphasized because of the plaintiff's status as a public official. Therefore, in Times there was not explicit balancing of these two interests. Gertz, at page 342, however, emphasized that when a private person is subject to defamation, the task is to accommodate and balance the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury. Times and Curtis, the court went on to say, did achieve such a proper accommodation. However, the Gertz court stated at page 343, that, for the circumstances in which the Rosenbloom rule operated, the state interest in compensating injury to the reputation of private individuals requires that a different rule should obtain with respect to them. In explaining its rejection of the rationale of Rosenbloom, the court stated what it perceived to be important differences between private persons and persons who are either public figures or public officials: (1) the latter usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy ( Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra at 344); and, (2) the public officials and public figures have usually voluntarily assumed their prominent position in society and, therefore, have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them. Thus, the court concluded: [P]rivate individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra at 345. The court further pointed out the Rosenbloom rule would abridge the legitimate state interest in protecting the private individual to a degree that we find unacceptable. The court also found the Rosenbloom rule impractical and possibly arbitrary because it required the drawing of a thin line between the drastic alternatives of the New York Times privilege and the common-law's strict liability based upon an ad hoc decision by the judge of whether or not the publication addressed an issue of public or general interest. If the judge found that New York Times applied, this would work an undue hardship on the private plaintiff who would have to meet the rigorous requirements of Times; and, if the Times rule didn't apply because the judge deemed there to be no issue of general or public interest, the result would be unfair to the publisher or broadcaster, who would be held liable in damages, including presumed damages, even if it took every reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy of its assertions. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra at 346. Justice Blackmun joined four other justices to form the majority in Gertz, even though he concluded: [T]he step taken in Rosenbloom, extending the New York Times doctrine to an event of public or general interest, was logical and inevitable. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra at 353. He had two reasons for his concurrence. First, the court's requirement that actual damages must now be shown in absence of New York Times malice eliminates significant and powerful motives for self-censorship that otherwise are present in the traditional libel action; and second, the necessity of having a clearly defined majority position in the defamation area was paramount. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra at 354. Accordingly, the court, without itself holding that a standard less than malice was proper, permitted the states to so hold if they wished so to do, or to adhere to the malice standard in Rosenbloom notwithstanding that a private individual was involved.