Opinion ID: 1196510
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: respondeat superior liability

Text: It is settled law that in order to hold an employer liable for the intentional tort of its employee, the plaintiff must show first, that the relation of master and servant existed at the time and second, that the tortious act was committed within the scope of his authority. Allison v. Gilmore, Gardner & Kirk, Inc., 350 P.2d 287, 293 (Okla. 1960); Tulsa General Drivers, Warehousemen, and Helpers Union v. Conley, 288 P.2d 750 (Okla. 1955). The majority recognizes the general rule that it is not within the scope of employee's employment to commit an assault on a third party, citing Hill v. McQueen, 204 Okla. 394, 230 P.2d 483 (1951), and Tulsa General Drivers, Warehousemen, and Helpers Union v. Conley, supra . The majority finds, however, that the facts of this case place it within the exception that liability will be imposed on the master where the servant commits an assault in furtherance of and fairly and materially incident to his master's business, and in doing so it likens this situation to those in decisions such as Hill v. McQueen, supra , Mistletoe Express Service, Inc. v. Culp, 353 P.2d 9 (Okla. 1959), and Russell-Locke Super-Service Inc. v. Vaughn, 170 Okla. 377, 40 P.2d 1090 (1935). Those cases however, are clearly distinguishable from the circumstances presented here and raise issues not before us. In Russell-Locke, for instance, we held the employer, an automotive battery sales and service business, was liable for its employee's assault because the facts warranted the jury's finding that the employee had been acting in behalf and under instructions of the employer which had sent him to the plaintiff's place of business to have plaintiff pay for a battery or retrieve the battery for which plaintiff had failed to pay. When the employee attempted to take the battery out of plaintiff's vehicle, plaintiff pulled him out of the car and a fight ensued. There, the employee was furthering his master's interest and engaged in following his instruction when the fight occurred which, we held, was therefore incident to performing the master's business. Noting there that the exception applies only when the employee's action is within the scope of employment, the Court stated: `[A]n act is within the course of employment if (1) it be something fairly and naturally incident to the business, and if (2) it be done while the servant was engaged upon the master's business and be done, although mistakenly or ill advisedly, with a view to further the master's interest, or from some impulse of emotion which naturally grew out of or was incident to the attempt to perform the master's business, and did not arise wholly from some external, independent, and personal motive on the part of the servant to do the act upon his own account.' 40 P.2d at 1094 (quoting Mechem on Agency, § 1960). See also Ada-Konawa Bridge Co. v. Cargo, supra ; Brayton v. Carter, 196 Okla. 125, 163 P.2d 960 (1945); Patsy Oil & Gas Co. v. Odom, 186 Okla. 116, 96 P.2d 302 (1939). The case at bar also differs from Mistletoe Express Service, Inc. v. Culp, 353 P.2d 9 (Okla. 1959), in which we found the employer, a common carrier, liable for the intentional tort of its employee, a driver known as Slugger, because the employer was aware of the employee's antagonistic, quarrelsome, pugilistic and hot-tempered nature and deliberately sent him with instructions to return an item which had previously been refused. The evidence showed: Mistletoe was expecting bad feelings about its return of the tube; and Mistletoe knowing this deliberately sent [Slugger] with specific instructions into a situation which, because of his known violent nature, was almost certain to trigger his temper and cause the very kind of result produced in this case. 353 P.2d at 15. In stating the applicable law, the Court noted: In other words, the fact that at the time of the assault upon the third person the employee or agent was about his employer's business is not sufficient to affix the liability for the resulting damages upon the employer, but it must be shown that the act complained of was done for the purpose of doing the work assigned to him.  353 P.2d at 16 (Emphasis added). The same cannot be said for the case at bar, however. The employee was attempting to bathe the patient. Use of such force as slapping was against the policy of the nursing home. This is not a case where the employee was furthering the employer's interests, or performing under the employer's instructions. At most, the evidence shows that the employee likely slapped the patient as a personal reaction to the patient's combativeness. Whatever the cause, the employee was not acting within the scope of his employment and authority when he slapped the patient and the employer cannot be held responsible for the intentional tort. In short, while bathing the patient was within the scope of his employment, slapping him was not. The nursing home does not contest on appeal that it was negligent in failing to properly investigate potential employees and train this employee. Whether the employee was properly trained in how to handle a combative Alzheimer's patient or not, there is no evidence to warrant a finding that assaulting the patient was within the scope of the employee's authority or employment. The employee's actions here were more in line with those of the employee/bus driver in Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Sandford, 258 P.2d 604 (Okla. 1953), in which the bus driver became angry at the driver of a car, exited from the bus, and assaulted the other driver. In Sandford we determined that the bus driver stepped aside from his employment to do an act which was neither beneficial to nor in the best interests of his employer. As a result, we concluded that the employer/bus line was not liable for the assault upon the automobile driver by the bus driver. So too, in Allison v. Gilmore, Gardner & Kirk, Inc., 350 P.2d 287, 293 (Okla. 1960), an action brought by plaintiff who was assaulted by the employee/driver of defendant when plaintiff attempted to test the temperature of the gasoline in defendant's truck, this Court concluded there was nothing connected with the employment of the truck driver, King, whose duties were to drive the truck of the defendant and deliver gasoline, that would warrant his fighting with plaintiff and did not come within the scope of his employment. See also, Tulsa General Drivers, Warehousemen, and Helpers Union v. Conley, supra , where we held that a union was not liable for the assault by one of its hired picketers upon a worker for the business being picketed because the picketer's actions could not properly be anticipated as an incident to the exercise of ordinary authority to act as a peaceable picketer. Although the nursing home may be liable to plaintiffs on the theory that the nursing home negligently failed to investigate its employee's background to determine whether he had a history of violence, a liability which the nursing home does not dispute, that failure to investigate amounts to negligence only. The defendant cannot be held responsible for the intentional assault upon a patient by its employee where it had no knowledge that the employee had a propensity to violence and where the employee's conduct was outside the scope of his authority and employment. Tulsa General Drivers, Warehousemen, and Helpers Union v. Conley, supra .