Opinion ID: 2295141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: As a threshold issue, we consider WASA's argument that the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction to consider Euclid Street's claims because Euclid Street was required by statute to timely appeal the WASA Hearing Officer's decision directly to this court. [2] We conclude that because this case did not arise from a contested case over which this court has exclusive jurisdiction, the complaint was properly filed in Superior Court. The District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that [a]ny person suffering a legal wrong, or adversely affected or aggrieved, by an order or decision of the Mayor or an agency in a contested case, is entitled to a judicial review thereof in accordance with this subchapter upon filing in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals a written petition for review. D.C.Code § 2-510(a) (2001) (emphasis added); see also D.C.Code § 2-509 (discussing the procedures for adjudicating a contested case). [3] It is well established that the APA vests this court with exclusive jurisdiction to review an agency's decision regarding a contested case. See, e.g., 2348 Ainger Place Tenants Ass'n, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 982 A.2d 305, 308 (D.C.2009) (Where the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in this court over review of administrative actions, the Superior Court may not maintain concurrent jurisdiction.). Thus, a Superior Court action that constitutes a challenge to a previous agency action . . . would be brought in the wrong court. Id. (quoting Fair Care Found. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Ins. and Sec. Regulation, 716 A.2d 987, 997 (D.C.1998)). Only certain types of administrative proceedings are governed by the procedural requirements of a contested case, however. The APA defines a contested case as a proceeding before the Mayor or any agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by any law . . . or by constitutional right, to be determined after a hearing before the Mayor or before an agency. D.C.Code § 2-502(8). We have held that the phrase contested case refers to a trial-type hearing that is adjudicatory and is concerned basically with weighing particular information and arriving at a decision directed at the rights of specific parties. Dupont Circle Citizen's Ass'n v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n, 343 A.2d 296, 299 (D.C.1975) (en banc); accord Timus v. District of Columbia Dep't of Human Rights, 633 A.2d 751, 756 (D.C.1993) (en banc). In contrast, if an agency is acting in a legislative capacity, making policy decisions directed toward the general public, then administrative proceedings are not governed by the contested case requirements of the APA. Dupont Circle Citizen's Ass'n, 343 A.2d at 299. Although we have recognize[d] . . . that the distinction between legislative and adjudicative proceedings is not always precise, id. at 300, we have adopted the factual distinction that: Adjudicative facts are the facts about the parties and their activities, businesses, and properties. Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury case. Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion. Id. (quoting 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 7.02 at 413 (1958)); accord Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown, Inc. v. Washington, 291 A.2d 699, 704 & n. 14 (D.C.1972). The procedures that allow WASA's customers to contest any water bill, 21 DCMR § 400.1, in an administrative proceeding would, in most instances, involve a determination of adjudicative facts. See generally King v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Auth., 803 A.2d 966 (D.C.2002) (considering an appeal from a WASA Hearing Officer's order dismissing customer protest of four water bills). WASA's regulations specifically provide that contest[ed] bills may be challenged at a hearing, the purpose of which is to provide the petitioner with an opportunity to appeal . . . [t]he validity of any water. . . service charge. 21 DCMR § 410.1(a). A Hearing Officer has broad powers to preside over a hearing and may issue subpoenas, take testimony, grant requests for discovery, hold settlement conferences, request additional investigative reports by WASA, and rule on motions. 21 DCMR § 414.4. WASA is also vested with the authority to investigate a challenged bill by verifying computations and meter readings and conducting an on-site inspection of the premises and the water meter, among other powers. 21 DCMR § 403.2. Here, however, the petition that Euclid Street filed with WASA was not the usual challenge to the particulars of a water bill, and the proceeding before the Hearing Examiner did not address the who . . . what, where, when, how, [or] why of a specific bill and lacked the most basic hallmarks of a contested case as it did not involve the presentation and consideration of evidence. [4] Rather than focusing on adjudicative facts, Euclid Street's petition to WASA focused on questions of law and policy, Dupont Circle Citizen's Ass'n, 343 A.2d at 300, such as: [w]hether new tenants are liable to WASA for the delinquent accounts of former tenants, [w]hether Euclid Street is liable to WASA for the delinquent WASA accounts of the tenants, and [w]hether WASA's policy of placing and maintaining liens on [1]460 Euclid Street . . . violates the Due Process Clause of the Constitution . . . [and] the Takings Clause of the Constitution. Indeed, the WASA Hearing Officer concluded that she did not have authority to review Euclid Street's petition in part because it was clear that neither party [at the hearing] . . . was able to identify the specific bill or bills that the customer believed were inaccurate. Nor, apparently, did Euclid Street identify which bills were being disputed, and were therefore subject to the hearing. Thus, as the Hearing Officer explained, [a]fter more than an hour of testimony, it became clear that this hearing was not about the accuracy of the bills, but rather about the method that WASA chose to try to collect unpaid bills. [5] We similarly conclude that although the hearing before WASA pertained to a specific property1460 Euclid Streetthe issues articulated by counsel were legal in nature and did not require an evidentiary hearing to determine disputed facts. See Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown, Inc., 291 A.2d at 705 (holding that a hearing by the District's Zoning Commission was not adjudicative in part because [i]t is difficult to conceive that factual findings would be required on the particular status of specific individuals). Indeed, Euclid Street's request appears to have been, for all practical purposes, a request for a declaratory order under D.C.Code § 2-508, [6] and we are barred by the APA from directly reviewing an agency's refusal to issue such an order. Id. WASA does not dispute that the Hearing Officer properly determined she was not authorized to entertain a petition asking for such relief. As the administrative hearing petition did not involve a contested case, Euclid Street's appeal was properly brought before the Superior Court, and need not have been filed first with WASA. [7]