Opinion ID: 2980676
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plummer’s arguments for equitable tolling

Text: Having determined the proper standard for equitable tolling, we now apply that standard to Plummer’s case. Plummer’s primary argument is that her physical disabilities entitled her to equitable tolling. She also insists that the district court denied her due process by not giving her notice and an opportunity to be heard before denying her petition as untimely.
Plummer contends that she received no notice that the statute of limitations would be fatal to her case. Her position is unavailing. The record shows that she either knew or should have known that her petition was untimely and could be dismissed for that reason. First, Plummer recognized that her petition was late when she filed it. When the district court dismissed her original petition, it set forth in detail the time frame within which she would have to exhaust her state remedies and reassert her claims in federal court. While Plummer did not timely file her second habeas petition, she did include with it a “Statement of Facts Explaining Delay” that she signed the same day she filed the petition. The statement reads in relevant part : “My Application for Leave is delayed because: a. I had to find help. b. I am not experienced or educated in the law.” While Plummer makes no mention of medical disabilities as an explanation for her -6- No. 10-2253 Plummer v. Warren delay, she nonetheless offered a justification for the tardiness of her filing. Her need to provide a justification cuts against her argument that she had insufficient notice of the statute-of-limitations issue. Second, Respondent raised the statute of limitations as a defense in its response. The response read: “Respondent now answers the petition and amended petition and requests that both be denied for the reasons stated in the Argument section herein. In addition, Respondent asserts any and all available defenses, including the statute of limitations.” While Respondent did not elaborate on the invocation of the statute of limitations defense, Plummer did not address the issue in her traverse. Noting that she was “not contending that she was unaware of the statute of limitations or its possible fatal effects on her petition,” Plummer nonetheless contends that “she was not given adequate notice that the court would be making that determination based on the Respondent’s passing reference to the defense in her answer.” The Supreme Court has explained that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a habeas petition for untimeliness but only after giving the parties “fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions.” Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210 (2006). Plummer is trying to import the sua sponte standard to a circumstance where the respondent raised the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. As to the lack of legal argument or explanation with regard to the statute of limitations, respondents only need to raise or state the statute of limitations as a defense, not explain it. See id. at 202 (“Ordinarily in civil litigation, a statutory time limitation is forfeited if not raised in a defendant’s answer or in an amendment thereto.”); Fed. Habeas Corpus R. 5(b) (response “must -7- No. 10-2253 Plummer v. Warren state whether any claim in the petition is barred by . . . a statute of limitations.”). Respondent raised the statute of limitations in her response, and the district court considered the defense and Plummer’s reasons for the delay in filing the petition even though Plummer chose not to respond to the statute of limitations in her traverse. No additional notice was necessary. 2. Physical disability and entitlement to equitable tolling Plummer contends that she suffers from severe physical disabilities that are the type of “extraordinary circumstance” Holland envisions. Affidavits Plummer included in the district court record suggest that she suffered from migraines, hip deterioration and dislocation, severe pain, wheelchair confinement, seizures, liver disease, hepatitis C, pneumonia, severe stomach troubles, and rectal bleeding. According to Plummer she was physically unable to go to the law library, prepare filings, and could not understand the law. Respondent argues that because Plummer’s evidence of physical disability was attached to motions for extensions of time, not to her petition or traverse, it should not be considered in the equitable tolling analysis. We need not answer that question because even considering the evidence Plummer points to in the record she would not be entitled to equitable tolling as she cannot demonstrate an extraordinary circumstance. “Illness—mental or physical—tolls a statute of limitations only if it actually prevents the sufferer from pursuing his legal rights during the limitations period.” Price v. Lewis, 119 F. App’x 725, 726 (6th Cir. 2005). Plummer’s evidence–affidavits submitted by herself and Donna Trapani, -8- No. 10-2253 Plummer v. Warren another inmate at Plummer’s prison–does not show that she was prevented from pursuing her legal rights during the limitation period. In their affidavits, Plummer and Trapani concede that Plummer did not do her own legal work. Plummer affirmed that “I have always had to have all my legal filings researched and prepared by others” and “I had to rely on a prisoner law clerk to do all legal work for me including this Writ of Habeas Corpus pending before the Court.” Trapani stated that “Plummer relies on the law library clerks to do all her legal work for her.” Because Plummer was not doing her own legal work, her physical disabilities could not have impacted the timeliness of their filing. Further, a comparison of Plummer’s federal habeas petition and the petition for collateral review that she filed with the Michigan trial court demonstrates that she raised the exact same issues in both. Additional legal work was thus unnecessary. Plummer’s alleged disabilities would not have prevented her from pursuing her legal rights. We are not persuaded that the information Plummer points to in the record regarding her physical disability shows that extraordinary circumstances prevented her from filing her petition.1 Likewise, the district court correctly concluded that the reasons Plummer actually gave for the delay in filing her petition—namely her need to find help and inexperience in the law—are not extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling. See Griffin v. Rogers, 399 F.3d 626, 637 1 Because we find no extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling, we do not address the other prong of Holland—whether Plummer was pursuing her rights diligently. -9- No. 10-2253 Plummer v. Warren (6th Cir. 2005) (“ignorance of the law alone is not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling.”); Smith v. Beightler, 49 F. App’x 579, 580-81 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that the petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling because he was blind and had to rely on others to assist him in accessing the courts). Accordingly, Plummer was not entitled to equitable tolling of the limitation period.