Opinion ID: 783907
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Controlling Supreme Court Precedent

Text: 23 [T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (emphasis in original); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). That is, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require individualized consideration of mitigating factors in capital cases. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 606, 98 S.Ct. 2954; see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 317, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), overruled on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112, 102 S.Ct. 869. Relevant mitigating evidence includes evidence about a defendant's likely future behavior in prison. See Skipper, 476 U.S. at 7, 106 S.Ct. 1669 (A defendant's disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life in prison is itself an aspect of his character that is by its nature relevant to the sentencing determination.). 24 Supreme Court precedent in force at the time the California Supreme Court decided Payton's factor (k) arguments required that all potentially relevant mitigating evidence — pre-crime and post-crime — be available to the sentencer in a capital case. Moreover, Eddings makes clear that it is not enough simply to allow the defendant to present mitigating evidence to the sentencer. The sentencer must also be able to consider and give effect to that evidence in imposing sentence.  Penry, 492 U.S. at 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (emphasis added). 25 The Supreme Court had occasion to analyze the factor (k) instruction at issue here in Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990). Specifically, the Court addressed whether petitioner's capital sentencing proceedings violated the Eighth Amendment because the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with former CALJIC 8.84.1, including the `unadorned' factor (k). 494 U.S. at 377, 110 S.Ct. 1190. Boyde contended that factor (k) did not allow the jury to consider and give effect to non-crime-related mitigating evidence, such as his impoverished and deprived childhood and difficulties in school, because the instruction limited the jury to considering only evidence related to the crime. Id. at 378, 381, 110 S.Ct. 1190. The Court established a standard for reviewing jury instructions that allegedly are ambiguous and therefore subject to an erroneous interpretation — whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. Id. at 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190. Applying this standard to factor (k), standing alone, the Court concluded that there is not a reasonable likelihood that Boyde's jurors interpreted the trial court's instructions to prevent consideration of mitigating evidence of background and character. 7 Id. at 381, 386, 110 S.Ct. 1190. 26