Opinion ID: 5129329
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kusi’s Claims

Text: Kusi brings a host of challenges to his conviction, and we consider each in turn.
Kusi claims the Government improperly offered FBI forensic accountant Omar Martinez as an expert witness. But Martinez never testified as an expert, a point emphasized when Kusi’s counsel called Martinez an “expert,” prompting the Judge to remind him that “[h]e hasn’t been qualified as an expert.”3 (App. at 892.) And for that reason, Kusi’s challenge cannot prevail.
Next, Kusi challenges his conviction for conspiracy to commit mail fraud, arguing he did not know King and Reynolds were using fake checks to pay off his debts. As the District Court explained, a conspiracy may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence, and a jury may infer the existence of a conspiracy based on the totality of the evidence. 3 At another point, the Judge asked, “So what more do you want from a witness who doesn’t even pretend to be an expert?” (App. at 1388.) 4 United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 134 (3d Cir. 2005). Finding substantial evidence in the record, we will affirm Kusi’s conviction. King and Kusi both testified that at their initial meeting, Kusi explained his debt, and King agreed to provide Kusi with checks. King and Reynolds also informed Kusi that they would create the checks on a computer, and that Reynolds would use her “private estate” to manage the payoffs. And Kusi was familiar with money, using several business accounts to operate his car rental company. The jury had sufficient evidence to conclude Kusi understood the nature of these transactions and intended to join King in a conspiracy. So we will affirm.
Finally, Kusi challenges his convictions for six counts of mail fraud related to his payments to Mercedes-Benz, as well as two counts of bankruptcy fraud. The Government argues Kusi waived these challenges, and though his arguments are sparse, they are sufficient. But Kusi’s arguments fail on the merits. To prove mail fraud, the “evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt (1) the defendant’s knowing and willful participation in a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) with the specific intent to defraud, and (3) the use of the mails . . . in furtherance of the scheme.” United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 261 (3d Cir. 2001). As for elements one and two, much of the same evidence from which the jury could find Kusi guilty of conspiracy applies with equal force here. For example, when Bentley confronted Kusi with the bounced checks, Kusi claimed he would pay off the car within one week. But Kusi had sold the Bentley to a used car dealership for $82,000 and sent $25,000 of the proceeds to 5 King. Mercedes-Benz caught Kusi before he could repeat the sale, but it was reasonable for the jury to infer Kusi intended to defraud the company in the same manner. Kusi argues he was not “even aware that the mail would be used.” (Kusi Br. at 26.) That is of no moment, as the Government may prove a defendant “does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended.” Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1954) (emphasis added). In any event, the Government exceeded that bar by introducing evidence Kusi knew paying off debts meant King and Reynolds would send physical checks to multiple locations in and out of state. Kusi’s bankruptcy fraud appeal meets the same fate. To convict Kusi under section 1519, the Government must prove Kusi “knowingly…falsifie[d]” bankruptcy records “with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” a bankruptcy proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 1519. And to convict Kusi under section 152(2), the Government must prove Kusi “knowingly and fraudulently ma[de] a false oath or account in or in relation to” a bankruptcy proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 152(2). To overturn the convictions, we must find substantial evidence lacking. But there is plenty of evidence. The Government introduced testimony from a task force officer, a bankruptcy expert, an IRS employee, and the bankruptcy trustee who interviewed Kusi under oath to show that Kusi’s petition contained many false statements. Kusi claims that because the false statements are his lawyer’s fault, he did not possess the required intent under section 1519. But he asserted that defense at trial, and the jury 6 exercised its discretion in giving it little weight. As substantial evidence supports these convictions, we will affirm.