Opinion ID: 2795687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Motion for Substitution of Counsel

Text: We review a district court’s denial of a motion to substitute counsel for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Simeonov, 252 F.3d 238, 241 (2d Cir. 2001). In undertaking this review, we examine four different factors: “(1) whether the defendant’s motion for new counsel was timely; (2) whether the district court adequately inquired into the matter; (3) whether the conflict between defendant and attorney was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense; and (4) whether the defendant substantially and unjustifiably contributed to the breakdown 2 in communication.” United States v. Hsu, 669 F.3d 112, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim centers on whether the second and third factor cut in his favor.1 They do not. A review of the record reveals that the district court conducted a sufficient inquiry into whether substitution was warranted and that there was not a total breakdown of communication between defendant and his counsel. The District Court carefully inquired into the state of defendant’s relationship with his counsel. A hearing was held, defendant’s allegations were explored, and, later that day, the District Court issued a thoughtful order denying Antomattei’s motion. In that order, the District Court made numerous determinations—including the determination that the defendant and his counsel were in communication2—to which we “[a]s a reviewing court … give strong deference.” United States v. John Doe No. 1, 272 F.3d 116, 124 (2d Cir. 2001). Thus, the District Court’s inquiry “was not merely a perfunctory, superficial inquiry . . . but instead was an inquiry detailed enough for the court to determine that substitution was unwarranted.” Id. The District Court also acted well within its discretion in casting doubt on defendant’s claim that there was a total breakdown in communication between him and his counsel. Antomattei’s complaints about his counsel’s performance—namely, that counsel failed to provide him with certain documents, that counsel was ill-prepared, that they lacked “chemistry,” and that there was a complete breakdown in their communication—were belied by the frequent communication between counsel and defendant during the pre-trial proceedings, their significant interactions during the trial, and defendant’s request for his counsel to be reinstated after the verdict. It cannot be said that the conflict between defendant and counsel was so great that it “resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.” Hsu, 669 F.3d at 123 (internal quotation marks omitted). 1The District Court held, and the parties do not dispute, that defendant’s motion was timely and that defendant did not substantially and unjustifiably contribute to the breakdown in communication. 2In its order dated September 11, 2013, the District Court observed that “Defendant and Counsel are communicating and Counsel appears to be fulfilling her duties.” Jt. App’x 75. 3 Accordingly, the District Court did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it refused to appoint substitute counsel.