Opinion ID: 3066178
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Brady and Mooney-Napue Claims

Text: Davis Would Receive A Sentence Reduction Appellants posit that a new trial is warranted because the government’s failure to disclose a tacit agreement to reduce Davis’ sentence contravened Brady. “Under Brady, the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.” United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011), as amended (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “There are three components of a Brady violation: the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Id. (citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). “To determine whether prejudice exists, we look to the materiality of the suppressed evidence. When looking to materiality, the question is whether admission of the suppressed evidence would have created a reasonable probability of a different result, so the defendant must show only that the government’s evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The record reflects that there was no Brady violation premised on Davis’ cooperation. Although the government initiated the process under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 to reduce Davis’ sentence on the same day the jury found Appellants guilty, we are unable to conclude that this temporal proximity alone establishes a Brady violation. 36 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ At trial, Davis testified that early termination of his sentence was possible based on his cooperation. Davis related that the letter agreement required that he testify truthfully and that the agreement did not provide any promises of leniency or a sentence reduction contingent upon the trial’s outcome. As reflected by Davis’ testimony, the government fully disclosed the letter agreement and the FBI interviews.9 Appellants failed to demonstrate that any of the government’s postverdict actions were inconsistent with the letter agreement or were premised on an undisclosed tacit agreement.10 We conclude that no Brady violation occurred because there was no tacit agreement to disclose. See United States v. Price, 566 F.3d 900, 910 n.11 (9th Cir. 2009) (“If the record is conclusive that all relevant agents of the government did not know about the Brady material, then, of course, no Brady violation has occurred as the government has no obligation to produce information which it does not possess or of which it 9 Appellants maintain that Davis falsely denied that he expected any leniency based on his testimony. However, Appellants have not presented any evidence of a tacit agreement for leniency or that Davis was aware of any such agreement. 10 Appellants’ reliance on Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011) is unavailing. In that case, the witness testified that certain charges were dismissed but “he did not know whether the prosecutor’s office was involved in the dismissals.” Sivak, 658 F.3d at 904. The witness also testified that he cooperated based on fears for his family’s safety and that he was not “seeking any particular favoritism from State authorities in exchange for his testimony . . .” Id. at 903 (internal quotation marks omitted). We held that there was a Brady violation based on undisclosed letters reflecting a tacit agreement for leniency. See id. at 909–10. Davis, unlike the witness in Spivak, acknowledged that he hoped that his cooperation would result in a sentence reduction and no tacit agreement for leniency was unearthed. UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ 37 is unaware. . . .”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in the original). The district court also cautioned the jury that Davis “may have received, or may receive, benefits from the government in connection with this case” and that the jury should examine Davis’ testimony “with greater caution than that of other witnesses.”11 Davis’ credibility, therefore, was significantly undermined irrespective of any tacit agreement for a sentence reduction.
Appellants also argue that a new trial is required because the government failed to disclose that Davis served as a DEA informant. Although it is arguable that the government was required to disclose this information as impeachment evidence, see United States v. Si, 343 F.3d 1116, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (observing that “these [informant] reports can be considered favorable to [the defendant] because, as information about [the witness’s] ongoing informant activities, they would constitute impeachment evidence tending to show [the witness’s] motives in testifying for the government”), its disclosure would not “have led to a different result. . . .” United States v. Olsen, 704 F.3d 1172, 1184 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). As discussed, Davis’ credibility was sufficiently undermined by the defense, given his admitted cooperation with the prosecution, his extensive criminal 11 Appellants maintain that the district court’s instruction was ineffective because it required the jury to speculate. However, it is unclear how the district court’s instruction was ineffective as it specifically cautioned the jury about the potential impact of any benefits Davis received for his cooperation. 38 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ history, and his illicit prison activities. Although the DEA report may have further demonstrated Davis’ willingness to cooperate with the government, Appellants do not point to any benefits that Davis received from his cooperation, particularly as Appellants do not rebut the government’s representation that Davis was never classified as a DEA informant. “The cross-examination of [Davis] raised reasonable doubts as to his motivation for testifying and there was sufficient impeachment evidence for the jury to question seriously the veracity of [Davis’] original statement. Thus, regardless of the failure to disclose the informant status of [Davis], [Appellants] received a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 F.3d 884, 905 (9th Cir. 2013), as amended (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Si, 343 F.3d at 1123 (holding that information of witness’s role as an informant in unrelated cases was not material).
Appellants contend that the government knowingly failed to correct Davis’ false testimony that he was not promised a sentence reduction in violation of Mooney and Napue. “A conviction obtained using knowingly perjured testimony violates due process, even if the witness’s perjured testimony goes only to his credibility as a witness and not to the defendant’s guilt.” United States v. Houston, 648 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). “The government’s failure to correct testimony that it later learns is perjured is also a Mooney–Napue violation.” Id. (citation omitted). “To prevail on a Mooney–Napue claim, the defendant must show that (1) the testimony was actually false, (2) the prosecution knew or should have known that the UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ 39 testimony was actually false, and (3) that the false testimony was material.” Id. (citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). “In assessing materiality under Napue, we determine whether there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury; if so, then the conviction must be set aside. Under this materiality standard, the question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Id. (citation omitted). “However, if it is established that the government knowingly permitted the introduction of false testimony reversal is virtually automatic.” Id. (citation omitted). Appellants’ Mooney-Napue claim is premised on their contention that there was a tacit agreement that the government would assist Davis in receiving a sentence reduction based on his favorable testimony. However, Appellants failed to proffer any evidence of a tacit agreement, particularly as the government’s post-verdict actions were consistent with the fully disclosed letter agreement and with Davis’ testimony that the letter agreement was not contingent upon the trial’s outcome. Appellants are unable to demonstrate that Davis’ testimony “was actually false” or that “the prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was actually false . . .” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, a new trial was not warranted.12 12 Although Appellants maintain that cumulative error warrants a new trial, there were no errors, cumulative or otherwise, requiring reversal of Appellants’ convictions. See Pineda-Doval, 614 F.3d at 1036 (holding that even if the defendant had been permitted to introduce evidence 40 UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ