Opinion ID: 6500747
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ADA/KCRA failure to accommodate claim

Text: Sublett next alleges that MHK failed to accommodate her disability in violation of the ADA and the KCRA. To prevail on her failure to accommodate claim, Sublett must establish that: “(1) she was disabled within the meaning of the [statute], (2) she was otherwise qualified for her position, with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) the defendant knew or had reason to know about her disability; (4) she requested an accommodation; and (5) the defendant failed to provide the necessary accommodation.”4 Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Educ. of Danville Indep. Schs., 4 MHK argues that the requested accommodation must be for an “essential function” of the employee’s job. See Appellee’s Br. at 51-52. However, there is no requirement that the requested accommodation relate to an essential function. See, e.g., Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 847 F.3d 384, 391 (6th Cir. 2017) (“An employee is deemed qualified only if she can perform all of the essential functions of her job, whether accommodated or not.”); see also Sanchez v. Vilsack, - 14 - Case No. 21-5959, Sublett v. Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc. 974 F.3d 652, 669 (6th Cir. 2020). While there is “no bright-line test for when the form of an employee’s request is sufficiently clear to constitute a request for an accommodation, . . . [an employee] must make it clear from the context that [the request] is being made in order to conform with existing medical restrictions.” Deister v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 647 F. App’x 652, 657 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). As stated previously, MHK does not contest that Sublett is disabled or that she is otherwise qualified for the position, and we presume Truax knew about Sublett’s disability. The sole remaining disputes are therefore whether Sublett requested any accommodations and whether MHK failed to provide necessary accommodations. Sublett alleges that she made multiple accommodation requests: (1) to stop waiting on residents at Miralea’s cafeteria; (2) to get closer parking; and (3) to be excused from other physically demanding tasks such as heavy lifting and rearranging furniture. For each of these three requests, she asserts that she specifically linked her request to her disability. In response, MHK argues that Sublett did not specify that any of her requests were due to her disability, citing testimony from Truax.5 Summary judgment in favor of MHK was proper on Sublett’s claims. Regarding waiting on residents, Sublett does not deny that Truax relieved her of this responsibility upon request. She was thus granted the accommodation she requested and cannot establish a failure to accommodate claim on this point. 695 F.3d 1174, 1181 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[E]mployers are not relieved of their duty to accommodate when employees are already able to perform the essential functions of the job.” (quoting Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 740 (9th Cir. 1993))). 5 MHK also asserts that the district court found that Sublett had not made any accommodation requests. However, the portion of the district court opinion MHK cites appears to state only that there were no accommodations requested beyond those which were granted. It does not explicitly state that the initial request for closer parking, or the request to stop waiting on residents, were not accommodation requests, and appears to treat them as though they were. - 15 - Case No. 21-5959, Sublett v. Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc. Regarding parking, Sublett testified that she asked Truax to help her find closer parking, and that he told her to park in the employee overflow lot, which was closer to the building. On its face, this accommodation appears reasonable. Sublett did testify that she was unable to use the door near the overflow lot, and eventually resorted to the main employee lot, where she still had to walk a distance in the heat. However, she does not allege that she informed Truax that the provided accommodation was insufficient to alleviate her difficulties. Thus, her initial request for accommodation was reasonably granted. While it may not have been sufficient in the end, she did not request further accommodation or inform her superior that the accommodation was unacceptable. For that reason, her failure to accommodate claim in relation to parking also fails. Finally, even taking into account the attestations in Sublett’s affidavit,6 Sublett has provided insufficient evidence that she made an accommodation request regarding heavy lifting or furniture rearrangement. The only evidence Sublett provides on this issue consists of statements in her affidavit, which she attached to her response to MHK’s motion for summary judgment. These statements—found only in a self-serving affidavit, and not anywhere in Sublett’s deposition testimony or other evidence revealed in discovery—do not specify dates for the alleged requests or describe the tasks beyond general terms. This showing amounts to no more than a “scintilla” of evidence, and thus is insufficient to create a genuine dispute for trial. See Anderson., 477 U.S. at 247–48. Sublett further asserts that MHK failed to engage in an interactive process to discuss accommodations. This claim fails as interactive process claims require that the employee have 6 The district court excluded these statements as contradicting her deposition testimony. It is unnecessary for us to decide this issue, as even with the statements in her affidavit, Sublett has failed to provide sufficient evidence that she made an accommodation request regarding these activities. - 16 - Case No. 21-5959, Sublett v. Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc. requested an accommodation that was denied, see Thompson v. Fresh Prods., LLC, 985 F.3d 509, 525 (6th Cir. 2021), and Sublett has not, as described, sufficiently proven that she made such a request. Thus, Sublett’s failure to accommodate claim fails.