Opinion ID: 547478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Counting of Violations

Text: 51 PDT argues that PIRG double counted violations and that the district court improperly granted summary judgment for these violations. PDT identifies essentially two varieties of overcounting. First, a single reported exceedance for a pollutant was counted as a violation of both the average concentration limit and the maximum concentration limit for that pollutant. Second, a single reported exceedance for a pollutant was counted as a violation of both the seven day discharge limit and the thirty day discharge limit for that pollutant. 52 PDT's first argument is easily refuted. PDT's permits provide limits for both the daily average and daily maximum concentration of certain pollutants. See e.g. 1978 NPDES Permit, Joint App. p. 2145. These are clearly separate limitations and we see no reason why PDT should not be penalized separately for violating each limitation. 28 While the permit requires that PDT test a minimum of three effluent samples there is no limit on the maximum number of samples that PDT may test. Therefore, if one sample contained a concentration in excess of the maximum for a particular pollutant, PDT could have taken measures to clean up its discharge and take more samples in the hope that later samples would have lower concentrations and so bring the daily average within the permit limits. PDT did not do so and therefore is subject to penalties for violating both the average and maximum concentration limits. 53 The second variety of overcounting alleged by PDT involves multiple limits for the same parameter. PDT contends that the district court erred by counting a single exceedance as a violation of both the seven day average limit and the thirty day average limit. PDT argues that section 309(d) of the Act prohibits multiple penalties for such a single operational upset. As we held, the single operational upset defense of section 1319(d) is not available to PDT in this case. PDT's argument on this point is without merit. 29 54 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment against PDT.