Opinion ID: 1744621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Finding of dependency-neglect

Text: Porter contends that the trial judge's decision to remove the children from his custody was grounded entirely upon his consent to his daughter's marriage. This reliance was in error, he claims, because his consent was lawful under Act 441. Thus, Porter maintains that the trial judge violated his Fourteenth Amendment due-process right to make child-care decisions. DHS's retort is that the trial judge correctly found that the children were dependent-neglected and that this finding was supported by substantial evidence. This court reviews findings in dependency-neglect proceedings de novo, but we will not reverse the trial judge's findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Wade v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 337 Ark. 353, 990 S.W.2d 509 (1999). We have said that a finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court, based on the entire evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. Furthermore, this court defers to the trial judge's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses. Crawford v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 330 Ark. 152, 951 S.W.2d 310 (1997). A dependent-neglected juvenile is defined by the Juvenile Code as one who is at substantial risk of serious harm as a result of abuse, sexual abuse, neglect, or parental unfitness to the juvenile, or a sibling. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-303(18)(A) (Repl.2008). The statute goes on to define abuse as injury to a juvenile's intellectual, emotional, or psychological development as evidenced by observable and substantial impairment of the juvenile's ability to function within the juvenile's normal range of performance and behavior. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(3)(A)(iii). The statute also describes neglect as: (i) Failure or refusal to prevent the abuse of the juvenile when the person knows or has reasonable cause to know the juvenile is or has been abused; (ii) Failure or refusal to provide the necessary food, clothing, shelter, and education required by law, excluding failure to follow an individualized education program, or medical treatment necessary for the juvenile's well-being, except when the failure or refusal is caused primarily by the financial inability of the person legally responsible and no services for relief have been offered; (iii) Failure to take reasonable action to protect the juvenile from abandonment, abuse, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, neglect, or parental unfitness when the existence of this condition was known or should have been known; (iv) Failure or irremediable inability to provide for the essential and necessary physical, mental, or emotional needs of the juvenile, including failure to provide a shelter that does not pose a risk to the health or safety of the juvenile; (v) Failure to provide for the juvenile's care and maintenance, proper or necessary support, or medical, surgical, or other necessary care; (vi) Failure, although able, to assume responsibility for the care and custody of the juvenile or to participate in a plan to assume the responsibility; or (vii) Failure to appropriately supervise the juvenile that results in the juvenile's being left alone at an inappropriate age or in inappropriate circumstances, creating a dangerous situation or a situation that puts the juvenile at risk of harm. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-303(36)(A). We first address whether the trial judge erred in considering Porter's consent to his daughter's marriage as evidence of dependency-neglect. Parents, of course, have a fundamental right to direct the care and upbringing of their children. See Linder v. Linder, 348 Ark. 322, 72 S.W.3d 841 (2002). But the State of Arkansas has an equally compelling interest in the protection of its children. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-102. This court has clearly and succinctly said that it will not allow the rights of parents to override a child's best interests: While we agree that the rights of natural parents are not to be passed over lightly, these rights must give way to the best interest of the child when the natural parents seriously fail to provide reasonable care of their minor children. Parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and well-being of the child. J.T. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 329 Ark. 243, 248, 947 S.W.2d 761, 763 (1997) (quoting Burdette v. Dietz, 18 Ark.App. 107, 109, 711 S.W.2d 178, 180 (1986)). The evidence before the trial judge was that D.P.'s parents allowed her, as a fifteen-year-old, to date a thirty-four-year-old man, without appropriate supervision. The evidence showed that D.P. and Rodriguez had inappropriate sexual contact before their marriage, including the posting of sexually exploitative pictures on the internet. Moreover, D.P.'s parents consented to her marriage without inquiring into Rodriguez's age or background and allowed her to drop out of school and move to Mississippi. This easily qualifies as evidence of Porter's failure to appropriately supervise D.P., which resulted in her being left alone ... in inappropriate circumstances, creating a dangerous situation. See Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-303(36)(A)(vii). The trial judge was correct to consider this factor in determining dependency-neglect. We turn next to the issue of whether there is sufficient evidence overall to support the trial judge's finding of dependency-neglect. In addition to D.P.'s relationship with Rodriguez, the trial judge placed great weight on the testimony of D.P.'s therapist, Linda VanBlaricom, who testified that she believed D.P. had been neglected. Ms. VanBlaricom stated that D.P.'s problems were 95% to 99% the result of her parents' failure to provide a stable and nurturing environment and her exposure to substance abuse. She further testified that D.P. perceives that [Porter] had abandoned her a great deal, and that [g]iven [D.P.'s] long history of being the victim of neglect/trauma, attendance in multiple schools, placement in multiple home settings, her parent's substance abuse and mental illnesses, etc., [D.P.] has developed a lack of trust in most adults and institutions. The record further shows that Porter neglected to provide the necessary education, as required by law, for S.P. and D.P., as evidenced by the fact that the instant case began as a FINS case when S.P. and D.P. were reported for severe truancy. See Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-303(36)(A)(ii). After D.P. came into the care of the state, an assessment also revealed that she was not current in her immunizations. This is evidence that Porter neglected D.P.'s medical care. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(36)(A)(v). Additionally, it is clear from the record that Porter failed to provide appropriate shelter, as required by law, and failed, although able, to assume responsibility for the care and custody of D.P. and J.P. See Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-303(36)(A)(ii) and (vi). This is shown by the fact that Porter had legal custody of D.P. and J.P., and yet at the time this action was commenced, both children were living with their mother, whom Porter knew to have substance-abuse problems. With respect to J.P. and S.P., Robert Leal, an investigator with the Crimes Against Children Division of the Arkansas State Police, testified that he had recommended a true finding that J.P. had sexual contact with four of his siblings at both Porter's and Rolen's house. This demonstrated neglect by Porter inasmuch as he failed to notice or prevent the repeated sexual contact between J.P. and his siblings. See Ark.Code Ann. §§ 9-27-303(18)(A)(iii) and 9-27-303(36)(A)(i). We conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the trial judge to find that Porter had failed to provide for the essential and necessary mental and emotional needs of his children. See Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-303(36)(A)(iv). There was also sufficient evidence, based on this testimony, to find that Porter's behavior constituted abuse, as it had caused injury to D.P.'s emotional and psychological development. See Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-303(3)(A)(iii). In sum, there was sufficient evidence to find that Porter's conduct supported a finding of dependency-neglect for all three children. There is one related point. Even if D.P.'s marriage to Rodriguez is found to be valid, which we hold that it is in this opinion, the result in this case regarding DHS's custody of D.P. will not change. Arkansas law makes this point abundantly clear by providing that [a]ny juvenile within this state may be subjected to the care, custody, control, and jurisdiction of the circuit court. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-305. Further, a juvenile is defined as an individual who is [f]rom birth to eighteen (18) years of age, whether married or single. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-303(32)(A). Other jurisdictions support the principle of court jurisdiction over juveniles regardless of marriage. See generally W.R. Habeeb, Annotation, Marriage as Affecting Jurisdiction of Juvenile Court Over Delinquent or Dependent, 14 A.L.R.2d 336 (1950). For example, in the case of In re H.G., the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the marriage of a sixteen-year-old girl on the day before she was set to enter state custody did not affect the jurisdiction of the juvenile court or its ability to take action in regard to her discipline and control. 601 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 1999). The court said that the need to achieve the goals of the juvenile process must be paramount to any rights acquired by the child through marriage. Id. The court further noted that the juvenile court was in a better position to assess the effect of the marriage and the possibility that it might eliminate the need for continued state intervention. Id.; see also State ex rel. Johnson v. Wiecking, 200 Minn. 490, 274 N.W. 585 (1937). In short, the validity of D.P.'s marriage to Rodriguez has no effect on the State's ability to assume custody over D.P. and for our courts to order the same.