Opinion ID: 546189
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Heading: the holley bill

Text: 5 In 1980, the United States Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (CERCLA), designed to accomplish the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. CERCLA established liability standards for persons responsible for unsafe hazardous waste sites and created Superfund, a fund that the federal government can use when responsible parties do not conduct the cleanups. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9607. CERCLA provides for two types of cleanup actions: remedial actions, which are generally long-term or permanent containment or disposal programs, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9601(24); and removal efforts, which are usually short-term cleanup arrangements of a more immediate nature, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9601(23). 6 A critical step in the implementation of a rational, safe hazardous waste program is the creation of new [hazardous waste disposal] facilities. 132 Cong.Rec. S14,924 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Chafee). Because Congress perceived that few states had developed programs to assure continued disposal capacity in the long run, Congress amended CERCLA in 1986 by enacting the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), Pub.L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 26 & 42 U.S.C.). Congress was concerned that certain states, because of political pressures and public opposition, were not able to create and to permit sufficient facilities within their borders to treat and securely dispose of (or manage) the amounts of wastes produced in those states. Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. EPA, Assurance of Hazardous Waste Capacity: Guidance to State Officials [hereinafter EPA Guidance Doc.], at 2 (Dec.1988). See S.Rep. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985) (Pressures from local citizens place the political system in an extremely vulnerable position.... The broader social need for safe hazardous waste management facilities often has not been strongly represented in the ... process [of creating new facilities]. A common result has been ... no significant increase in hazardous waste capacity over the past several years.). 7 The provision of SARA at issue in this case, section 104(c)(9), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604(c)(9), requires that each state present a proposal to EPA showing that the state will have adequate capacity available to dispose of the hazardous wastes generated within the state for the next twenty years. 2 If the state does not provide such capacity assurances deemed adequate by EPA, 3 the state is prohibited from receiving Superfund money for remedial cleanup actions taken within the state. 4 8 Congress recognized that--because of geological factors or for other reasons--every state may not be able to create new disposal facilities within its borders and will not be able to dispose of its own wastes within its own borders for the next twenty years. SARA contemplates that a state may meet its section 104(c)(9) capacity assurance requirements by planning to use other states' disposal facilities and privately owned disposal facilities. 132 Cong.Rec. S14,924 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Chafee). Section 104(c)(9) provides that a state may base its capacity assurance plan on such facilities if the state has entered into an agreement for the use of those facilities. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604(c)(9)(B). For example, a state that cannot safely dispose of its wastes within its borders (an exporting state) may reach agreements with another state or group of states (importing states) under which the importing states agree to allocate a portion of their disposal capacity to the exporting state. An exporting state may also contract with a privately owned waste management facility. See EPA Guidance Doc. at 3; S.Rep. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985). SARA places the burden of making capacity assurances on the exporting (waste generating) state, and not on the importing state. SARA nowhere requires that an importing state enter into interstate or regional agreements, but most states will need to enter into such agreements because most states lack the capacity to dispose of all types of hazardous wastes within their borders. 5 9 In the light of SARA's capacity assurance requirement and the concern of Alabama's leaders over the large amounts of other states' hazardous wastes being disposed of in Alabama, 6 the Alabama legislature in 1989 enacted Ala.Code Sec. 22-30-11, popularly called the Holley Bill. This provision prohibits the owner or operator of a commercial hazardous waste management facility located in Alabama from treating or disposing of hazardous wastes generated in a state other than Alabama, if the other state either (1) prohibits the treatment or disposal of hazardous waste within its borders and has no facility for such; or (2) has no facility existing within that state for the treatment or disposal of hazardous waste and has not entered into an interstate or regional agreement for the disposal of its wastes to which Alabama is a signatory. The Holley Bill also prohibits commercial waste management facilities in Alabama from contracting with a state other than Alabama to satisfy the other state's capacity assurance obligation. 7 10 Under authority of this bill, Alabama has issued a blacklist which, on September 13, 1989 (the effective date of the Holley Bill), precluded Emelle from accepting hazardous wastes from twenty-two states and the District of Columbia. 8 Between January 1, 1989 and October 1, 1989, Emelle received wastes from seventeen of the twenty-two states on the Holley Bill's blacklist. In addition, Emelle has ongoing contracts with waste generators in most of the banned states.
11 Plaintiffs contend that the Holley Bill violates the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 8, cl. 3. We agree. As discussed below, we hold that hazardous waste is an object of commerce, that the Holley Bill erects a barrier to the interstate movement of hazardous wastes, and that Congress did not--by enacting the SARA amendments to CERCLA--authorize this restriction on interstate commerce.
12 All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded by definition at the outset. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 2534, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978). But when the dangers inhering in an object's movement far outweigh[ ] its worth in interstate commerce, a state can prohibit transportation of the object across state lines. Id. For example, the Supreme Court has said that a state may restrict interstate movement of an object when, on account of the object's existing condition, [it] would bring in and spread disease, pestilence, and death. Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 489, 8 S.Ct. 689, 700, 31 L.Ed. 700 (1888) (striking down state prohibition on interstate movement of liquor); see also Clason v. State of Indiana, 306 U.S. 439, 442, 59 S.Ct. 609, 611, 83 L.Ed. 858 (1939) (upholding Indiana's prohibition against interstate transportation of large dead animals because obvious purpose of the enactment [was] to prevent the spread of disease and the development of nuisances). 13 The Supreme Court in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey expressly concluded that the interstate movement of solid and liquid wastes is commerce. 437 U.S. at 621-23, 98 S.Ct. at 2534-35. In that case, the Court rejected the lower court's conclusion that the waste was not an object of commerce because it was valueless and could not be put to effective use. The Court held that the innate danger of the solid and liquid waste did not outweigh its worth in interstate commerce. 14 Although the hazardous waste involved in this case may be innately more dangerous than the solid and liquid waste involved in City of Philadelphia, 9 we cannot say that the dangers of hazardous waste outweigh its worth in interstate commerce. Congress has defined hazardous waste as a solid waste ... which ... may ... cause, or significantly contribute to a significant increase in mortality or an increase in serious ... illness, or ... pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6903(5) (emphasis added). The legislative and executive branches of the federal government together with the separate states have developed a comprehensive scheme for regulating the management of hazardous waste. Waste generators, transporters, and managers must comply with highly technical and rigid rules designed to ensure that the movement of hazardous waste is accomplished with a minimum of danger to the public and to the environment. To the extent these rules can and do provide for the safe transportation of hazardous waste, the dangers associated with hazardous waste movement do not outweigh the value of moving hazardous waste across state lines. 15 In concluding that hazardous waste is an object of commerce, we follow precedent of this circuit. See State of Alabama v. United States EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1555 n. 3 (11th Cir.1989) (To the extent plaintiffs also seem to assert injury based on the out-of-state nature of these wastes [PCBs and other toxic wastes], the Supreme Court has already held that the commerce clause bars such a distinction. (citing City of Philadelphia )), cert. denied sub nom. Alabama ex rel Siegelman v. United States EPA, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 538, 107 L.Ed.2d 535 (1989). Accord Hardage v. Atkins, 582 F.2d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir.1978) (controlled industrial waste, defined in Oklahoma statute as refuse products that are toxic to human, animal, aquatic, or plant life, is within purview of commerce clause). In addition, this conclusion comports with the Holley Bill, which banned the transport of hazardous wastes into Alabama only from certain states, not from all states, thereby suggesting hazardous waste is not inherently too dangerous to be a product in commerce.
16 Because hazardous waste is an object of commerce and because the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate the interstate movement of hazardous waste, a state's restriction of that movement is subject to constitutional scrutiny. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622-23, 98 S.Ct. at 2535. To determine whether the Holley Bill erects a barrier to interstate commerce, we follow the test set out by the Supreme Court in City of Philadelphia: 17 [W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected. The clearest example of such legislation is a law that overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a State's borders. But where other legislative objectives are credibly advanced and there is no patent discrimination against interstate trade, the Court has adopted a much more flexible approach, the general contours of which were outlined in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. [397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 25 L.Ed.2d 174] 18 Id. at 624, 98 S.Ct. at 2535 (citations omitted). The crucial inquiry, therefore, is whether the Holley Bill is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it is based on legitimate local concerns with effects on interstate commerce that are only incidental. Id. at 624, 98 S.Ct. at 2536. 19 The district court below concluded that the Holley Bill was directed toward a legitimate state concern: complying with SARA's capacity assurance requirements. The district court said that the Holley Bill was not an effort to isolate Alabama from the national economy. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 729 F.Supp. 792, 804 (N.D.Ala.1990). We disagree. First, the Holley Bill is not required for Alabama to comply with section 104(c)(9)'s capacity assurance requirement. According to the Senate Report on SARA and the EPA Guidance Document, Alabama may satisfy its capacity assurance requirements by any combination of three measures: (1) creating new disposal capacity within the state, (2) entering into interstate or regional agreements allowing Alabama to use capacity located in other states, and (3) contracting with private waste management facilities. S.Rep. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985); EPA Guidance Doc. at 3. If Alabama's capacity assurance plan depends on capacity provided by a commercial, privately owned management facility such as Emelle, the state should contract with the private facility for that capacity, instead of blocking the private facility from accepting wastes from other states. 20 Second, while the Alabama legislature made a finding that large volumes of hazardous waste entering the state increased the likelihood of accidents and the risk to Alabama's citizens and environment, see Ala.Act. No. 89-788, Alabama did not ban the shipment of all hazardous wastes into the state, but only shipments from certain states. [T]he evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626, 98 S.Ct. at 2536-37. Even if Alabama's purpose in enacting the Holley Bill was to protect human health and the environment in Alabama, that purpose may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently. Id. at 626-27, 98 S.Ct. at 2537. Plaintiffs presented testimony undisputed by defendants that the types of wastes accepted at the Emelle facility did not vary based upon the states in which the wastes were generated. The Holley Bill plainly distinguishes among wastes based on their origin, with no other basis for the distinction. 21 Because Alabama's law is a protectionist measure not based adequately on a legitimate local concern, the district court was wrong to apply the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. balancing test. The Holley Bill does not regulate evenhandedly and its effects on interstate commerce are not merely incidental. See Pike, 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 847, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970). On its face, the Holley Bill discriminates among out-of-state waste generators and imposes on these generators the burden of conserving Alabama's remaining hazardous waste disposal capacity. We reject the district court's conclusion that, because Alabama closed its borders to only some states and not all states, Alabama is not hoarding its disposal capacity. Alabama has attempted to isolate itself from a problem common to many by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628, 98 S.Ct. at 2538. 22 Contrary to defendants' arguments, the Holley Bill does not fall within an exception to the commerce clause carved out by the so-called quarantine cases. In these cases, the Supreme Court upheld state legislation that facially discriminated against out-of-state commerce involving articles that were highly dangerous. For example, the Court upheld a Maine statute that prohibited the importation of a certain type of baitfish not native to Maine because the baitfish contained a parasite that could have a serious detrimental effect on Maine's fisheries. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 106 S.Ct. 2440, 91 L.Ed.2d 110 (1986). Such state laws do not discriminate against interstate commerce, however, but simply prevent[ ] traffic in noxious articles, whatever their origin. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629, 98 S.Ct. at 2538. 23 Alabama's selective ban on out-of-state hazardous waste is no quarantine law. Alabama did not ban hazardous wastes from all other states on the ground that the wastes were dangerous to some human health or environmental aspect which Alabama has a right to regulate. Alabama's ban does not distinguish on the basis of type of waste or degree of dangerousness, but on the basis of the state of generation. The Holley Bill discriminates against interstate commerce.
24 A state statute that erects a barrier to interstate commerce may nonetheless be upheld where Congress authorizes the state to regulate in such a manner. Where state or local government action is specifically authorized by Congress, it is not subject to the Commerce Clause even if it interferes with interstate commerce. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 103 S.Ct. 1042, 75 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983). Congress may redefine the distribution of power over interstate commerce by permitting the states to regulate the commerce in a manner which would otherwise not be permissible. South-Central Timber Devel., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87-88, 104 S.Ct. 2237, 2240, 81 L.Ed.2d 71 (1984). Such congressional intent or authorization for states to affect interstate commerce, however, must be expressly stated and unmistakably clear. Id. at 91, 104 S.Ct. at 2242; see also White, 460 U.S. at 212-13, 103 S.Ct. at 1046-47 (city's requirement that certain percentage of work on public construction projects be done by local labor did not violate commerce clause because federal urban development programs affirmatively sanctioned improved opportunities for the poor, minorities, and unemployed). So, our task at this point is to determine whether Congress has authorized Alabama to erect its barrier to the interstate movement of hazardous wastes. 25 Defendants contend that SARA's section 104(c)(9) effected a redistribution of power over interstate commerce. According to defendants, the SARA amendments to CERCLA gave the states more responsibility for hazardous waste management, including an obligation to develop increased treatment and disposal capacity. But nothing in SARA evidences congressional authorization for each state to close its borders to wastes generated in other states to force those other states to meet federally mandated hazardous waste management requirements. 10 SARA places the burden of making capacity assurances for future hazardous waste management on the generating state and imposes a sanction on that state for failure to satisfy its obligation. 11 Congress has not, in our opinion, authorized Alabama to restrict the free movement of hazardous wastes across Alabama's borders. See State of Alabama v. United States EPA, 871 F.2d at 1555 n. 3 (Although Congress may override the commerce clause by express statutory language, it has not done so in enacting CERCLA. (citing Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 82, 104 S.Ct. at 2237)). If Congress intended to allow the states to restrict the interstate movement of hazardous wastes as Alabama has tried to do, Congress could (and still can) plainly say so. 12