Opinion ID: 612140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mistrial Based Upon Jerry Parks' Statements

Text: 48 Whited also argues that the district court should have granted defendants' motion for a mistrial following remarks made by Jerry Parks on cross-examination. 49 Parks was questioned by Robert Murr's counsel regarding the $35,000 to $40,000 he estimated he was paid by the government to compensate him for his services and his expenses. In explaining what the money was used for, and why he was uncertain whether his estimate was correct, he told the jury that 50 [a] lot of this money, and I don't know whether it is listed here or not, is for my protection. I have been threatened by these witnesses. I have been threatened by the defendants and their wives. I have been threatened by several people. I actually recorded ... [r]ecorded threats, who has a contract on me. I had to move. I had to get more money from the FBI. I don't know whether this represents all of it or not. I am telling you I spent a lot of their money. This is what they say I spent. I don't know whether this is extra money, whether this represents every single nickel I got from the FBI. I spent a lot of money. 51 After Parks finished his statement, Murr's counsel did not raise an objection but continued his line of questioning. 52 At the close of the day's proceedings, defendant Mary Lawson's attorney moved for a mistrial on the basis of Parks' remarks concerning the threats he allegedly received from defendants and their spouses. The other defendants subsequently joined the motion. The district court replied: 53 Now, in regard to Mr. Parks' response, it was in response to the cross-examination of him being paid all this money. The inference being raised to the jury, well, you know, that's a lot of walking around money, 35, $40,000. That's outrageous. Why would the Government be paying you all kinds of money like that for services and/or expenses? And I allowed him to defend himself. This was in response to cross-examination, direct response as to why it would take 35 or $40,000. And that's what he has to say. That's what he had to say. It may not be true. The jury may not believe it. 54 But, Mr. Hicks, the books are full of cases where threats have been made, glaring, intimidating looks have been made in order to--and witnesses have been murdered, witnesses have been murdered. And that is--if that happens, it is competent, it is relevant, and the circuits have upheld that kind of testimony for as long as I can remember. 55 So your motion for mistrial is overruled. 56 Lawson's counsel went on to express surprise that the district court would allow bald assertion[s] of threats and intimidation into evidence. The court, however, opined that it allowed the testimony to come in for what it's worth.... It goes to the weight of the testimony and not its admissibility. When Lawson's counsel persisted in claiming that Parks' statements were unfounded, the court asked: You want me to have Mr. Parks go into it again tomorrow morning in more detail to see if there is a factual basis in front of this jury? Lawson's counsel answered in the negative; instead, he wanted the jury admonished that Parks' bald assertion that these defendants tried to kill him is not to be used as far as Mary Lawson is considered. The court refused, and also refused similar requests by the other defendants. 57 A defendant may move for a mistrial where there is a legitimate claim of seriously prejudicial error, such that the defendant is unable to obtain a fair trial. United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215, 220 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1590, 113 L.Ed.2d 654 (1991). The denial of a mistrial is generally within the discretion of the trial court, and our review of the court's ruling is confined to whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. 58 Here, the government did not elicit the allegedly prejudicial statements and did not repeat them. See, e.g., United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1413 (D.C.Cir.1988). Significantly, defendants did not make a contemporaneous objection to the remarks on grounds of prejudice, or on any other grounds. As the district court pointed out, the remarks might not have been prejudicial at all. They were surely not what defendants wanted to hear, but they were offered as a legitimate response to a question concerning substantial payments to Parks by the government. The existence of these payments might well have damaged his credibility, if not justified to the jury's satisfaction. Parks' claim of threats was not wholly implausible on its face; such incidents have been known to occur. Defendants had an opportunity to challenge the veracity of the claim; they deliberately chose not to take up the cudgel. While certain statements are so prejudicial that the defense should not be required to rebut them, and the jury should not be left to weigh their value, we are convinced that the instant case did not involve such a situation. 59 We also note that, in the case at bar, the remarks at issue constitute[d] but a small portion of the total testimony at trial. United States v. Bowers, 739 F.2d 1050, 1055 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 861, 105 S.Ct. 195, 83 L.Ed.2d 128 (1984). They were made well before the start of the jury's deliberations, deliberations which produced not guilty verdicts on several of the counts charged in the indictment. For all of these reasons, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' mistrial motion.