Opinion ID: 4516140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Scope of the Receiver’s Powers.

Text: Johnson further argues that the district court abused its discretion by appointing a “general receiver” over his interests in the LLCs, when Minn. Stat. § 322C.0503, subd. 2, provides that a receiver may only be appointed “[t]o the extent necessary to effectuate the collection of distributions pursuant to a charging order in effect under subdivision 1.” This contention is without merit. Morgan Stanley’s motion for a charging order under Minn. Stat. § 322C.0503 properly relied on Federal Rule 69(a) and state law, while its motion for a receiver relied on the district court’s federal equitable powers under Rule 66. The district court’s order appointing a receiver was expressly based on “federal law and federal equitable principles,” not on Minn. Stat. § 322C.0503, subd. 2. We have concluded that the court’s appointment of a receiver was not an abuse of its discretion under federal law. At this interlocutory stage of the -8- proceedings, we are “limited to reviewing the question whether the [district] court has abused its discretion in making the appointment.” 12 Wright & Miller § 2986, at 45. The Order of the district court dated September 27, 2018, is affirmed. We deny Morgan Stanley’s motion to supplement the record on appeal. ______________________________ -9-