Opinion ID: 161569
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant Susan Donnell, Ph.D.

Text: 27 The facts concerning Dr. Donnell's involvement in the circumstances underlying this lawsuit are undisputed. She was employed as a clinical psychologist with the Indian Health Service, a federal agency, during the relevant time. She participated in a grief counseling session with students at St. Stephen's School after A.T.B.'s boyfriend, who was a student there, was killed in a hit-and-run accident. Dr. Donnell discussed with a school counselor her concerns about A.T.B., who had made suicidal gestures before the accident and who appeared depressed after her boyfriend's death. Ms. Elertson-Johnson told Dr. Donnell that she had advised A.T.B.'s mother, E.F.W., of her concerns, but that E.F.W. refused to allow her daughter to receive treatment. Dr. Donnell told Ms. Elertson-Johnson that if A.T.B. appeared at imminent risk of harming herself and her mother continued to refuse to allow treatment, Ms. Elertson-Johnson should contact SATSS and report her suspicion of medical neglect. Dr. Donnell further informed her that A.T.B. would receive the medical care she needed if SATSS were to obtain custody. 28 After learning that A.T.B. had been taken into protective custody by SATSS and transported to Pine Ridge Hospital, Dr. Donnell contacted the hospital and referred A.T.B. for admission as a suicide risk so that her treatment costs would be paid by the Indian Health Service. Dr. Donnell attended a staff meeting at the hospital, at which the hospital staff expressed concern over A.T.B.'s condition. Dr. Donnell met with A.T.B. after the meeting and A.T.B. told of physical abuse she had received from her mother and other family members. Dr. Donnell immediately reported this information to defendant Kennah of the SATSS and to the Bureau of Indian Affairs Criminal Investigator's Office. Dr. Donnell subsequently attended court proceedings regarding A.T.B. but did not testify. She had no involvement with A.T.B.'s medical care after those proceedings. 29 Plaintiffs sought relief against Dr. Donnell under section 1983, claiming that her participation in A.T.B.'s removal from her mother's custody and her placement at Pine Ridge Hospital deprived them of their constitutional rights under color of state law. Dr. Donnell moved for summary judgment, asserting that the undisputed facts reveal she was not a state actor for purposes of section 1983. The district court granted the motion, concluding the undisputed evidence showed the utter lack of invocation of the authority of the State of Wyoming, whether it be by statute, legal process or court order. App., vol. II at 335. The court held that the fact issues posited by plaintiffs concerning whether Dr. Donnell's conduct was based on a mistaken understanding of the situation or was otherwise improper were irrelevant to her motion for summary judgment because, even viewing these questions most favorably to plaintiffs, they did not show that Dr. Donnell acted under color of state law. In addition, citing Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461 (10th Cir. 1996), the court observed that a mental health expert does not act under color of state law by participating in the decision to transport a patient to a hospital for psychiatric evaluation pursuant to state law. The court recognized that a federal official may be liable under section 1983 if she conspires with state officials, but pointed out that the officials with whom Dr. Donnell acted were Tribal employees. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the Tribal officials with whom Dr. Donnell interacted were state actors due to the provisions of the Intergovernmental Agreement, reiterating its prior holding that SATSS had not become a state actor by agreeing to adopt state rules, regulations, and forms. Finally, the court held that even if the assumption of custody over A.T.B. by SATSS did not comply with Tribal law, the action was not for that reason converted to one under color of state law. 30 The acting under color of state law component of a 1983 action cannot be created by default because federal or tribal officers or employees may have failed to comply with the federal or Tribal law, Code or Regulations under which they purported to act. Thus, exceeding or improperly complying with federal or Tribal law or regulations does not convert federal or tribal employees into state actors. 31 App., vol. II at 344. 32 On appeal, plaintiffs assert Dr. Donnell acted under color of state law for two reasons: that in authorizing the seizure of A.T.B. Dr. Donnell was performing a traditional governmental function, and that she was acting in concert with Tribal officials who were themselves state actors by virtue of the Intergovernmental Agreement. We have already held above that the Tribal defendants did not become state actors by virtue of the Agreement. We therefore turn to plaintiffs' argument that Dr. Donnell became a state actor because, in participating in A.T.B.'s placement in protective custody, she was performing a function traditionally performed only by the state. 33 If the state delegates to a private party a function traditionally exclusively reserved to the State, then the private party is necessarily a state actor. This test is difficult to satisfy. While many functions have been traditionally performed by governments, very few have been exclusively reserved to the State. Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1456 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 34 While it is true that states have traditionally removed children from their homes and placed them into protective custody, that action is not one exclusively reserved to the states. Indian tribes are separate sovereigns with the power to regulate their internal and social relationships, Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1326-27, including the right to regulate domestic matters, see Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59 & n.9. Indeed, as discussed above, the Agreement at issue specifically provides that a child of the Wind River Reservation may not be removed from her home or maintained in a place other than her home except pursuant to the provisions of the Tribes' Law and Order Code, see App., vol. I at 145, and that SATSS and its agents and employees are not agents of the State. Thus even assuming that Dr. Donnell's conduct can be viewed as removing A.T.B. from her mother's custody, 6 we reject plaintiffs' argument that she was a state actor in so doing because she was performing a function exclusively reserved to the states. Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted in her favor.