Opinion ID: 2307785
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the monmouth county court complaint.

Text: This complaint against Pennica charged that he misrepresented certain facts to the Monmouth County Court during the course of argument on an application in a criminal case for admission of his client to bail pending appeal. After hearing, the Ethics Committee of Union County found that the factual misrepresentations had been made, that Pennica was therefore guilty of unethical conduct, and more particularly of a violation of the principle of Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Canon 22 requires that the conduct of lawyers before the court should be characterized by candor and fairness. Accordingly, such a presentment was submitted to this court for consideration. The charge against respondent arose under an unusual set of circumstances. His client had been convicted of performing an abortion. He had not represented her at the trial but had been called into the case by her family for purposes of prosecuting an appeal. She had been incarcerated upon conviction, and notice of appeal had not yet been filed. Since it was considered advisable to make an application for release on bail pending appellate decision, respondent obtained a substitution of attorney and the file from the office of trial counsel. The file contained trial counsel's notes, a transcript of the testimony of certain witnesses, and of the prosecutor's summation, and a memorandum prepared by trial counsel in support of a motion for a new trial. This file apparently represented the source of Pennica's information as to what happened at the trial. The motion for bail was returnable on August 10, 1960. Argument began on that day and was continued to August 24 to enable the court to obtain and examine the entire transcript of the testimony. On both those days the County Court was operating under its summer schedule. The judge sitting was not the one before whom the case had been tried. The trial judge was on vacation. The assistant prosecutor, who appeared for the State, had not participated in the trial; that person was on vacation. The prosecutor's file did not contain a transcript of the testimony. No appeal had yet been taken, and so there had been no occasion to have the record transcribed. It was in this rather virgin territory that respondent made his application for bail. In order to obtain release on bail pending appeal, a defendant must show that the case involves a substantial question which should be determined by an appellate court. R.R. 1:4-4. Almost at the outset of the argument on August 10 the court advised respondent that he knew nothing about the case and was totally unprepared. Whereupon Pennica replied that he could inform the court by oral argument and demonstrate by reference to the facts that a serious question existed as to whether the trial judge should not have granted the defense motion for a judgment of acquittal. This inquiry followed: The Court: Would it not be necessary for me to read the entire transcript before I could make a determination as to whether or not the State presented a prima facie case? Mr. Pennica: I have that portion of the transcript applicable to this particular point to advise and inform your Honor that there is a substantial question that would have to be passed upon by the Appellate Division. What I have done, your Honor, I have cut down the amount of the transcript which your Honor would need to read in order to arrive at the conclusions which I respectfully propose to your Honor   . (Emphasis added) Respondent then proceeded to advise the court and to argue that the proof of the State showed only a self-induced abortion and no proof sufficient to make a jury question that the defendant had used any instruments on the victim for the purpose of causing an abortion. After some discussion the court said he would reserve decision on the point until he could read the entire transcript of the State's case. Respondent then presented another ground on which he relied, i.e., that the Prosecutor had made improper, inflammatory and prejudicial remarks in his summation to the jury. Particularizing, he said the Prosecutor had referred to an alleged attempt on the part of the abortee and her husband to blackmail the defendant into paying them $20,000 in return for which they would appear before the Grand Jury and tell the truth. And he asserted that there was no testimony or reference by counsel for the defendant at the trial to a blackmail attempt. Determination of this ground was also continued to August 24. On that day, in the same connection, the following took place: The Court: Did Mr. Juska make any reference to a blackmail of $20,000 or $10,000? Mr. Pennica: No, your Honor. The Court: Not during the entire trial? Mr. Pennica: No. Thereafter, Pennica indicated that there had been some discussion in chambers between the Prosecutor and Mr. Juska, defense counsel, before the trial began, about a shakedown, and that this was done to eliminate any testimony on that subject. In the course of his statement he said,    there was no testimony with reference to this $20,000 or reference to Mr. Juska's position. And the court asked: The Court: And no statement made by Mr. Juska in his opening? Mr. Pennica: No, sir, no, your Honor. And later: The Court: Do you represent to the Court that Mr. Juska in his opening made no reference to the blackmail, the $20,000 blackmail? Mr. Pennica: Yes, sir. Pennica was then asked if he had the transcript and on answering in the negative, the court inquired further as to how then he could make the representation. He replied that he had Mr. Juska's notes (which apparently did not show one way or the other that Juska had referred to the matter of blackmail in his opening). He based the representation also on the form in which Juska had voiced an objection to the Prosecutor's summation at its conclusion, which was to the effect that it was improper to refer to a conference had in the trial court's chambers before the trial began. On this second day of argument of the matter the court had the transcript before him. From it he called respondent's attention to the very substantial evidence of the use of instruments by the defendant to induce the abortion. Pennica's explanation was that although the complainant had testified that defendant had inserted an instrument into her body, because of the position she occupied at the time she could not say that the instrument she saw in defendant's hand was inserted. Further, the court pointed out from the transcript that Mr. Juska had specifically referred in his opening to the jury to an alleged conversation between complainant and her husband and the defendant in which complainant suggested she would go to the Grand Jury and tell the truth if defendant gave them $20,000. Pennica's explanation was that what he meant in his argument and answers to the court was that Mr. Juska had not used the word blackmail in the opening, and that the Prosecutor had used it in his summation. The use of that word, Pennica said, was the basis for his objection that the summation was improper and prejudicial. At the conclusion of the argument the court denied the motion for bail. He also informed respondent of his feeling that deliberate misrepresentations had been made and that he intended to bring the matter to the attention of the Supreme Court. His subsequent letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court resulted in a reference for hearing to the Ethics Committee. At the Committee hearing, Pennica's explanation for his conduct was that since he had not tried the case it was necessary to rely upon trial counsel's notes, memorandum of law and the partial transcript of the testimony, and to draw the inference therefrom that seemed justifiable. He insisted that he did not willfully make misstatements with intent to deceive the court. When a Committee member asked why he gave such unequivocal answers to the court, he said: I say, you ask me this question, `Why do you say so and so, so definitely? You haven't read the transcript.' Here's how: When the question struck me, it hit me immediately about this meeting in chambers, that they had an agreement, that they decided what to do. And it was my conclusion that they decided not to mention blackmail. That's how I got into that trap. It wasn't that I set out to do all this, set out to plan, the fact of blackmail. When I began to substantiate my position before Judge Simmill, I hadn't the transcript to use; I didn't have anything. But I relied on my intuition as a plaintiff's attorney, that no plaintiff attorney would use the word blackmail in an opening. And I took a stand. Why did I take such a stand? I wanted my client out on bail, and I wanted her to be afforded due process of law, and I wanted to be sincere and honest with the Court. I had nothing before me and the Prosecutor didn't say anything. He was standing beside me. Then it was when he came around to the fact of the $20,000 blackmail thing, I didn't make it to mislead the Court or to change anything; it happened in our argument as I was on my feet. Another member inquired as to whether he would have prejudiced his client's application if he had told the court that since he had not seen the full transcript he could not be certain about his representations. He replied that it would have, because then the court would probably have suggested waiting for the full transcript and it would have meant a delay for my client who was sitting in jail. The Committee found that Pennica had made misrepresentations to the court but they believed his testimony that he did not willfully and deliberately set out to make them. Their finding was that he made them recklessly to serve what he considered to be the interest of his client; that he made them because he lacks the moral sensibility which an attorney should possess, and that he was and is wholly unaware that his conduct before the County Court was improper and unethical. They finally concluded that whether Pennica's actions were intentional or unintentional in character, or resulted from being unschooled or unprincipled, he was guilty of departure from the standard of ethical behavior which must be observed by a member of the bar. A lawyer's responsibility partakes of a double character. He owes an obligation of fidelity to his client, but he also owes the duty of good faith and honorable dealing to the judges before whom he practices his profession. People ex rel. v. Beattie, 137 Ill. 553, 574, 27 N.E. 1096, 1103 ( Sup. Ct. 1891). The importance of being absolutely fair with the court cannot be overestimated. In the ever present search for truth, judicial tribunals must have the right to rely upon the frank assistance of members of the bar. To the extent that the right is not respected, the worth of the historic partnership of bench and bar in that quest must decline. Our study of the record satisfies us that the Committee's appraisal of Pennica's conduct was sound. His attitude before the County Court reveals a reckless indifference to the need for knowledge of facts before they are advanced as truth in a judicial proceeding. Moreover, his rationalization before the Committee of the course he pursued demonstrates devotion to the philosophy that the end justifies the means. Such conduct and attitude are not consistent with the true art of advocacy; they constitute a perversion of it which cannot be permitted to exist if the legal profession is to be worthy of the esteem of the public.