Opinion ID: 1878473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Ability and Willingness to Provide Care

Text: ¶ 38. Adam contests the Chancellor's ruling that Dawn has better parenting skills. Adam claims that the Chancellor's finding was erroneous because it was based on one isolated incident that occurred prior to his custody of Darby. The Chancellor stated: Each party has exhibited good parenting skills, and each are willing to provide primary care. The Court has weighed this factor in favor of Dawn based on the evidence of Adam's having, while the parties were still living together, left the baby in the crib until noon, unfed and unchanged; and his now leaving the child one or two times a month alone with his invalid father. Even though Adam's mother testified her ex-husband had only limited use of his arms and hands, Adam stated, she is alright, she never wakes up. The Court is clearly convinced Dawn has better parenting skills. Adam refers to Tucker v. Tucker, 453 So.2d 1294, 1297 (Miss.1984), where this Court stated the `totality of the circumstances' must be considered ... an isolated incident ....does not in and of itself justify a change in custody. ¶ 39. While it is clear that the Chancellor gave weight to the incident where Adam left Darby unattended until noon, it cannot be said that the Chancellor's ruling was based solely on this one incident. This Court does not see that the Chancellor abused her discretion in her consideration of ability and willingness to provide care in order to determine who received custody of Darby. It also cannot be said that the Chancellor's decision regarding ability and willingness to provide care is manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or the result of the application of an erroneous legal standard.
¶ 40. Adam purports that he was wrongfully penalized by the Chancellor when she ruled against him in her custody determination of Darby for: A) not having a medical waiver signed; and for B) visitation problems. Adam correctly states that the only purpose of a custody determination is to advance the best interest of the child. Albright, 437 So.2d at 1005. Adam is also correct in asserting that a custody determination should not have the purpose of punishing an offending party unless the offense directly threatens the best interest of the child. Crowson v. Moseley, 480 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Miss.1985). Analysis of the medical waiver and visitation issues follow.
¶ 41. The record does not clearly indicate why a medical waiver was never executed by Adam. Apparently there was disagreement or misunderstanding between counsel for both parties as to who was to provide the form to be signed. What is clear is that a medical waiver was executed by Dawn and some of her medical records were admitted into evidence. No medical records were introduced into evidence against Adam because he never executed a medical waiver. When discussing the health of the parties the Chancellor stated: If anything, the Court would hold Adam's failure to sign his medical waiver against him. His attorney's explanation that they hadn't presented them with one is unconvincing. The issue of medical waivers was fully discussed with the Court, when Dawn delivered hers, Adam certainly had the opportunity to deliver a signed waiver. ¶ 42. Adam claims that the Chancellor's holding Adam's failure to sign his medical waiver against him constitutes a serious misapplication of the broad powers granted to a Chancellor. Adam refers to Belding v. Belding, 736 So.2d 425 (Miss.Ct. App.1999), where the Mississippi Court of Appeals addressed the issue of a chancellor that ordered psychological examinations be conducted on both parents and their child in a child custody proceeding. The Court of Appeals ruled that, at least in Mississippi, there is no authority for a Chancellor to order disputant spouses to undergo either a mental or physical examination. Id. at 431. The Court of Appeals also referred to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 503 which states: A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing (A) knowledge derived by the physician or psychotherapist by virtue of his professional relationship with the patient, or (B) confidential communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of his physical, alcohol or drug addiction, among himself, his physician or psychotherapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician or psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family. M.R.E. 503(b). The Court of Appeals then stated that [t]he Supreme Court has acknowledged that `an increasing number of jurisdictions have, either by judicial decision or statute, created exceptions to the physician psychotherapist-patient privilege in child abuse and neglect cases, custody and termination of parental rights proceedings when the mental health of the parent could impact the welfare of the child.' Id. (quoting Lauderdale County Dep't of Human Servs. v. T.H.G., 614 So.2d 377, 383 (Miss.1992)). However the Court refused to create an exception to Rule 503, reasoning that `[s]hould the legislature determine that the privilege should be waived in termination of parental rights cases, it is their prerogative to make the necessary statutory changes.' Id. ¶ 43. Although not clear from the record, it appears that both parties agreed at some point to execute medical waivers so that each party could have access to the other's medical records. This would explain the Chancellor's reaction and comments to Adam's counsel during the trial. Evidently the Chancellor had concluded that both sides had agreed to provide each other medical waivers. This would present a fact situation very different from the facts in Belding. Here we have a Chancellor attempting to hold a party to an agreement it made with counsel opposite. Dawn had executed a medical waiver and was waiting on Adam to provide one, which he ultimately refused to do. This gave Adam a clear advantage because the Chancellor would be able to view Dawn's medical records that were obtained upon an agreement between the parties, but the Chancellor would not see Adam's. Also different from Belding, at no time was there any order or attempted order by the Chancellor to force either party to submit to a medical examination. ¶ 44. Dawn contends that even if this Court determines that the Chancellor's actions constituted an order by the trial court to waive medical privilege, that the medical records being sought were past and would fall under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 503(f). Rule 503(f) states, Any party to an action or proceeding subject to these rules who by his or her pleadings places in issue any aspect of his or her physical, mental or emotional condition thereby and to the extent only waives the privilege otherwise recognized by this rule. This exception does not authorize ex parte contact by the opposing party. ¶ 45. Dawn also represents that a party who refuses to waive the medical privilege may face an adverse unfavorable inference. Ward v. Foster, 517 So.2d 513 (Miss.1987); Jackson v. Brumfield, 458 So.2d 736 (Miss. 1984). This unfavorable inference has been applied to family law matters in other jurisdictions. Brodsky v. Brodsky, 233 S.W.2d 829 (Mo.App.1950). ¶ 46. In his reply brief Adam contends that Dawn is asking this Court to adopt a new rule that would penalize a party in a custody case for failing to waive his or her physician-patient privilege. This is simply not the case. This Court would be incorrect to punish a party for failing to waive his or her medical privilege. Failure to waive is certainly within a party's right. What Adam is being penalized for by the Chancellor is for making an agreement with the other party to have both waive their privilege; getting the sought after medical records from the other side; and subsequently deciding to not waive the medical privilege, leaving the other party at a disadvantage. Such conduct by a party should not be condoned or ignored by a Chancellor.