Opinion ID: 202707
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Clarity and the Abrogation of Sovereignty

Text: 41 The Aroostook Band relies on rules of statutory construction that obligate us to construe `acts diminishing the sovereign rights of Indian tribes . . . strictly,' `with ambiguous provisions interpreted to the [Indians'] benefit.' Fellencer, 164 F.3d at 709 (ellipsis and alteration in original) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 702 (1st Cir.1994); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985)). The Aroostook Band asserts that prior to MICSA's enactment, it had the power to control all of its own employment matters as part of its inherent sovereignty. It contends that, judged against a backdrop of federal common law protecting Indian sovereignty, see Rhode Island, 19 F.3d at 701, MICSA was not clear enough to subjugate this aspect of the tribe's sovereignty to Maine law. 42 We disagree. Whatever powers are included within inherent tribal authority, Congress may abrogate those powers by statute. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200, 124 S.Ct. 1628, 158 L.Ed.2d 420 (2004); Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-71, 99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979). Although Congress must do so clearly, there is no requirement that talismanic phrases be employed. Thus, an effective limitation . . . need not use magic words. Narragansett, 449 F.3d at 25. 9 43 MICSA is clear. In § 1725(a) it not only made Maine Indians subject to . . . the laws of the State, and subject to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the State, but it expressly added the emphasizing phrase to the same extent as any other person. And § 1725(a) not only applies to Indians, but also to the Indian nations, . . . tribes[, and] bands of Indians themselves. Short of using magic words, it is hard to imagine how § 1725(a) could have been clearer. There is no internal tribal matters exception in the statute. 44 The Aroostook Band tries to interpret this clear statement by Congress as nevertheless exempting specific units of tribal government. Aided by the Houlton Band as amicus, the Aroostook Band sees significance in the fact that § 1725(a) does not apply state law to governing bodies like the Aroostook Micmac Council or the Houlton Band Council. Cf. 25 U.S.C. § 1722(a) (stating that the Houlton Band is represented by the Houlton Band Council); ABMSA § 3(1) (stating that the Aroostook Band is represented by the Aroostook Micmac Council). The inference we are asked to draw is that § 1725(a) applies state law to Maine tribes as polities but not to their governments. 45 This argument lacks merit. It is not a natural reading of the language and it creates an artificial distinction merely to suit tribal purposes. Further, MICSA recognizes that a governing Council exists as a representative of a tribe. See 25 U.S.C. § 1722(a). It is the tribe itself, as a legal entity, whose interest in sovereignty is really at issue. 10 See Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir.2000) (explaining that a tribal housing authority had sovereign immunity because it was an arm of the [t]ribe); Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1324 (10th Cir.1997) (holding that the members of a tribal government, sued in their official capacities, were protected by sovereign immunity because any relief would run against the [t]ribe itself). Under MICSA, § 1725(a) applies state law to Indian nations, . . . tribes[,] or bands. That is what matters. See Narragansett, 449 F.3d at 30 (holding that tribal officers have no sovereign immunity when they engage in activities that the tribe itself cannot lawfully authorize). 46 Amicus presents another argument why § 1725(a) was not clear in its abrogation of either Houlton or Aroostook tribal sovereignty. 11 Under 25 U.S.C. § 1727(a), the Passamaquoddy and the Penobscots have the opportunity to petition for exclusive jurisdiction over certain child custody matters. Amicus contends that the use of exclusive jurisdiction here, in contrast with the use of the sole word jurisdiction in § 1725(a), means that § 1725(a) merely grants the state nonexclusive authority and concurrent jurisdiction to apply [s]tate law to tribes like the Houlton Band and Aroostook Band. 47 But amicus ignores the fact that elsewhere in MICSA, the Passamaquoddy and the Penobscots were authorized to exercise jurisdiction, separate and distinct from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the State of Maine, to the extent authorized by the [state Settlement Act]. Id. § 1725(f). No such jurisdictional authorization was provided to the other Maine tribes, and thus we think it would clearly defeat congressional intent to nevertheless imply one. The language about exclusive jurisdiction in § 1727(a) is plainly nothing more than a helpful clarification in light of the peculiar jurisdictional status of the Penobscots and Passamaquoddy. It does not turn § 1725(a) into a mere grant of concurrent jurisdiction. The meaning of MICSA's § 1725(a) is clear: Maine law applies to this situation. 48