Opinion ID: 2594969
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Jury Instruction on Statutory Aggravating Circumstance

Text: Bridges asserts that the jury was erroneously instructed, at the penalty phase, on the statutory aggravating circumstance. Jury instruction No. 11 indicated that Bridges was charged with a single aggravating circumstance: The murder was committed while the person was engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit Kidnapping with Use of a Deadly Weapon. Bridges notes that the instruction omitted the requirement of first degree kidnapping, pursuant to NRS 200.033(4). [7] The special verdict form was consistent with the erroneous instruction. According to Bridges, the error was prejudicial because the jury could have believed that evidence of both the second degree kidnapping of Laurie and the first degree kidnapping of Blatchford could be considered as part of the statutory aggravating circumstance. We conclude that Bridges is not entitled to relief notwithstanding the erroneous instruction. [T]he Federal Constitution does not prevent a state appellate court from upholding a death sentence that is based in part on an invalid or improperly defined aggravating circumstance either by reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating evidence or by harmless-error review. . . . Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 741, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990); see also Pertgen v. State, 110 Nev. 554, 563, 875 P.2d 361, 366 (1994). First, we emphasize that there is no doubt concerning the propriety of the jury's finding of the aggravating circumstance, notwithstanding the erroneous instruction. Here, the jury had previously found Bridges guilty of the first degree kidnapping of Blatchford. Given the jury's prior determination of first degree kidnapping and the fact that Blatchford was killed in the course of that kidnapping, there is no doubt that the kidnapping aggravating circumstance applied. Thus, the only question is whether the error in the instruction resulted in an erroneous weighing of the aggravating versus mitigating circumstances. Bridges claims that the erroneous instruction might have caused the jury to place greater weight on the aggravating circumstance than it might have otherwise done because the jury could have improperly considered the second degree kidnapping of Laurie as part of the aggravating circumstance. We reject Bridges' argument and conclude that the jury's weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances could not have been tainted, under the unique circumstances of this case. As the State persuasively argued before the jury and on appeal, there is no compelling evidence in mitigation in this case. Thus, we are not persuaded that any error tainted the balancing process. To foreclose possible future litigation, however, we have elected to explicitly reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances based upon our independent review of the trial record, and to detail our determination. Here, we must reweigh any mitigating circumstances versus the valid aggravating circumstance insofar as it is limited to first degree kidnapping. See Pertgen, 110 Nev. at 563, 875 P.2d at 366 (Reweighing involves disregarding the invalid aggravating circumstances and reweighing the remaining permissible aggravating and mitigating circumstances.). None of the specific statutory mitigating circumstances apply. See NRS 200.035. Bridges had a significant prior criminal history, and he was thirty-four years old at the time of the offense. See NRS 200.035(1), (6). Bridges acted alone, and there was no compelling evidence presented at trial that he acted under duress or extreme mental or emotional disturbance. See NRS 200.035(2)-(5). Nor do we perceive any other non-statutory mitigating circumstance. See NRS 200.035(7). Accordingly, we conclude that there is no mitigating circumstance or circumstances sufficient to outweigh the single valid aggravating circumstance.