Opinion ID: 2978168
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Parole and Good-Time Credits

Text: In a supplemental pro se brief, Vallellanes argues that United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), effectively required a return to the sentencing regime in place prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”), Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, 98 Stat. 1987 (Oct. 12, 1984). Vallellanes argues that his sentence should have been based on the old law, which provided for parole and additional good-time credits (both of which were repealed by the SRA). See 18 U.S.C. § 4201 et seq. (parole) (repealed 1984, effective Nov. 1, 1987 for offenses committed after that date); 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (good-time credits) (repealed 1984, effective Nov. 1, 1987 for offenses committed after that date). Vallellanes fails to recognize, however, that although Booker severed and excised the mandatory provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines, it also made clear that the “remainder of the [SRA] ‘function[s] independently.’” Booker, 543 U.S. at 259 (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)); see also United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 541 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2493 (2008). Booker invalidated just two provisions of the SRA: “the provision that requires sentencing courts to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range (in the absence of circumstances that justify a departure), see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) . . ., and the provision that sets forth standards of review on appeal, including de novo review of departures from the applicable Guidelines range, see § 3742(e).” Booker, 543 U.S. at 259. Although Vallellanes contends that Booker’s excision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) somehow requires invalidation of the SRA provisions repealing parole and good-time credits, this argument is contrary to Booker’s clear directive that the “remainder of the [SRA] ‘function[s] independently.’” Id. (quoting Alaska 9 Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684). Because Booker did not invalidate the SRA’s repeal of the pre-SRA parole and good-time-credit provisions, we conclude that Vallellanes’s argument lacks merit.