Opinion ID: 2405667
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Deposition of Chuck Needs

Text: On the date of the shooting, the resident manager was on vacation. Mr. Needs, the maintenance man, was left to respond to maintenance calls, check the lights, and help with the youth activity center. The complex employed no security guards. Either Mr. Needs or the manager would patrol the premises, especially if residents called and said they heard a noise, for example. In such a case, Mr. Needs would look around the area. If he saw some evidence, such as footprints, that a person had been outside an apartment, he would make a record of the incident. The steps the complex might take as part of security were checking the lighting, responding to tenant calls and making the rounds to check playgrounds, porches and driveways. If, for example, a tenant saw a person with a gun, the tenant might call him and he would call the police. After a hearing, the trial judge granted the motion for summary judgment. He relied on our recent decision of Bartley v. Sweetser, 319 Ark. 117, 890 S.W.2d 250 (1994), and found that the activities of RMI in making some efforts toward safety did not create a duty to provide security against the criminal acts of others. Mrs. Hall appeals from that ruling. This is the type of issue which is properly decided by summary judgment. It involves the question of whether a duty exists. This is always a question of law, not to be decided by a trier of fact. First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Engineering, 321 Ark. 210, 900 S.W.2d 202 (1995). Our most recent case concerning the duty of a landlord in these circumstances is Bartley v. Sweetser, supra . In that case, two men entered a tenant's apartment and raped her. The tenant sued her landlord claiming that the landlord provided her with a windowless door with a simple push-button lock, failed to provide adequate security and adequate lighting of the common areas, and failed to warn her that the complex was prone to criminal activity. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord and we affirmed. In our affirmance, we recognized the general rule that a landlord does not owe a duty to protect the tenant from criminal acts. However, the appellant alleges that the activities undertaken by RMI remove this case from the rubric of Bartley . She argues that RMI voluntarily undertook to provide security, thereby becoming liable for any negligence in doing so. We have implied that a landlord who assumes a duty not required of him is removed from the general rule. See Glasgow v. Century Property Fund XIX, 299 Ark. 221, 772 S.W.2d 312 (1989) and Kilbury v. McConnell, 246 Ark. 528, 438 S.W.2d 692 (1969) where we said that there was no evidence of an agreement or assumption of duty that removes the landlord from the general rule. (emphasis added). Indeed, this principle is widely recognized. R. Schoshinski American Law of Landlord & Tenant, § 4:15 (Supp. 1995); Walls v. Oxford Management Co., 137 N.H. 653, 633 A.2d 103 (1993); Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984); Hill v. Chicago Housing Authority, 233 Ill.App.3d 923, 175 Ill.Dec. 104, 599 N.E.2d 1118 (1992). So, the question left to us is whether RMI has removed itself from the general rule and assumed a duty to protect its tenants from criminal attacks. The answer is no. The provisions of the handbook and the procedures manual, along with the deposition testimony of Chuck Needs reflect that RMI had a concern for the general welfare of its tenants, and a desire to keep on-site management informed of the activities taking place on the grounds. Its implementation of certain practices such as lighting, evening patrols, and communicating with residents regarding suspicious activities help assure the quiet enjoyment and basic safety of the tenants, in addition to providing a modicum of deterrence to criminal activity. We are reluctant to hold that a landlord's use of these modest, conscientious measures imposes a full blown duty to protect tenants from third party criminal activities. The Alabama Supreme Court faced a similar issue in the case of Dailey v. Housing Authority for the Birmingham Dist., 639 So.2d 1343 (1994). There, the tenant argued that certain provisions in a procedures manual, similar to those here, and the hiring of a guard to patrol the grounds, gave rise to a duty to protect tenants from criminal attacks. The court said the following: all that the quoted statements from the documents and the HABD's hiring of a security guard indicate is an attempt by HABD to discourage crime in the Metropolitan Gardens area, not a voluntary assumption of a duty to provide [the tenant] with protection from all criminal acts. We find the actions of HABD to be commendable, both in hiring security personnel and in setting out in writing those persons' duties and roles. HABD was attempting to reduce the occurrence of crime in the Metropolitan Gardens neighborhood and to alleviate the fears and anxieties of its tenants. The provisions undertaken by RMI in this case do not rise to such a level that RMI has assumed a duty to protect its tenants from criminal attacks by third parties. Therefore, we hold that this case is controlled by the general rule enunciated in Bartley v. Sweetser . Affirmed.