Opinion ID: 341392
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing to Prosecute the Action

Text: 7 In the district court the Attorney General did not challenge the standing of the plaintiff to pursue this litigation. The issue was not raised, perhaps for obvious reasons, by City, and apparently was given no consideration by the court. We have some hesitancy ourselves in bringing the issue forward for attention, confessedly finding the guidelines in this type of case for determining standing not of the precision for easy resolution of the question. Nevertheless, because lack of standing in recent Supreme Court cases has been the dispositive factor in cases analogous to the one before us, we find it necessary to address the problem. 8 The Attorney General's motion to dismiss was filed some months prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975), although that case was in the books prior to the district court's dismissal of the present action. Warth clearly establishes that (t) he rules of standing, whether as aspects of the Art. III case-or-controversy requirement or as reflections of prudential considerations defining and limiting the role of the courts, are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention. Id. at 517-18, 95 S.Ct. at 2215. In essence, the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues; and the inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise. Id. at 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197. Assuming that a claim is otherwise justiciable, a plaintiff must show an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1924, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). 9 In the present case, City's principal goal appears to be to enforce the right of its citizens to be considered for public employment as fire fighters or patrolmen in other municipalities of the metropolitan community. The plaintiff's concern for the right of its citizens does not automatically confer standing. If that were the case, the representative respondents in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976), would have met the threshold standing requirement. In any case where a municipal corporation seeks to vindicate the rights of its residents, there is no reason why the general rule on organizational standing should not be followed. Cf. Local 194, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v. Standard Brands, Inc., 540 F.2d 864, 866 (7th Cir. 1976). Unless City has alleged an injury to itself, it can establish standing only as a representative of its citizens who have been injured in fact. See Simon, supra at 38, 96 S.Ct. at 1924. 10 Nowhere in the complaint is there an allegation that the outlying  perimeter communities in the SMSA have excluded from public employment any black, Spanish-speaking, or female citizens of the City of Milwaukee. Absent such an allegation, it was inappropriate to allow City to invoke the judicial process as a representative of its citizens. See Warth, supra at 514, 95 S.Ct. at 2197. City's claim against the Attorney General has been cast in a form which attempts to raise the putative rights of others. Its failure to allege that perimeter communities have, in actual fact, discriminated against Milwaukee residents on the basis of race or sex means that the complaint cannot be fairly read as making out a claim that the rights of City's residents have been subjected to a deprivation. See Warth, supra at 513 n. 21, 95 S.Ct. at 2197 n. 21. Our post-Warth decision of Local 194, supra, is no support for concluding that standing exists in this case. There, the union had formally alleged discrimination in hiring and promotion directed against its black, Spanish-speaking, and female members. Id. at 865. 11 City also complains that it has been the object of a selective and discriminatory prosecution which has the effect of perpetuating racial segregation. Assuming that such a challenge to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion would be otherwise justiciable, this court experiences difficulty in locating the requisite allegation of injury in fact to City itself. City's averment that it has expended considerable sums of money in response to the Attorney General's recommendations does not allege that the expenditures were a result of the asserted non-enforcement of the civil rights laws in the suburban communities. Voluntary expenditures designed to achieve full compliance with the law of the land cannot fairly be characterized as a legal wrong or injury likely to be redressed by a favorable decision in the present case. Simon, supra at 38, 96 S.Ct. at 1924. 12 If the district court had granted the relief demanded by City, that exercise of the court's remedial powers would have redounded to the benefit of black, Spanish-speaking, and female Milwaukee citizens who have both the desire and the necessary qualifications for service as fire or police department personnel in suburban communities within the SMSA. 2 13 We fail to discern in the complaint as drafted any basis for saying that City has a sufficient stake in the outcome of the case to meet the case or controversy requirement of Article III. 14 Even if there were allegations supportive of a claim of injury in fact to City, a serious bar remains to a finding of standing under the so-called prudential rules of standing. We again are at this point concerned with what the plaintiff alleged and not with what it might have alleged although, of course, both the trial and the reviewing courts must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party, accepting as true all material allegations of the complaint. Warth, supra at 501. We do not think, however, that a holding in this case that there is no standing on the part of the plaintiff reflected in the complaint as drafted necessarily would terminate this litigation by an outright affirmance. We think it may be difficult but do not deny to lawyer ingenuity the possibility of alleging standing grounds. 3 An affirmance based solely on lack of standing would be particularly inappropriate when the matter played no part in the disposition of the case in the district court and the possibility of successful amendment exists. If the issue had been addressed, plaintiff might well have undertaken the task of rectification by amendment of its complaint. 15 Under the circumstances of this case with regard to standing, we ordinarily would give serious consideration to remanding to afford the opportunity to the plaintiff to attempt to amend. Before determining to do so, however, we consider it advisable to look at other aspects of the case to determine whether the further pursuit of this litigation would be fruitless even if the status of standing were achieved. We therefore turn to the matter of jurisdiction and, bearing in mind that standing itself often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted, Warth, supra at 500, 95 S.Ct. at 2206, we also look at the matter of the sufficiency, and likelihood of sufficiency, of the plaintiff's claim for relief.