Opinion ID: 2135955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: year-to-year tenancy

Text: The Court of Appeals first found that the tenant and landlord had entered into negotiations before the lease terminated and that the tenant had remained on the property after the lease terminated. The Court of Appeals then found that a factual question existed as to whether the tenant had continued to be recognized by the landlord as a tenant after the lease terminated, or in other words, whether the landlord had consented to the tenant's holding over, thereby creating a year-to-year tenancy for which 6 months' notice to terminate would be required. The Court of Appeals erred in making this finding and in remanding the cause on that basis. The Court of Appeals stated that authority exists to support the proposition that negotiations for a new lease may give rise to a finding that a tenant's continued occupation of leased property after termination of the lease is with the landlord's consent. For this proposition, the Court of Appeals cited comment k. to the Restatement (Second) of Property § 12.3 (1977), a section dealing with the time within which a vacating tenant must restore leased property to its former condition or remove annexations. Comment k. states: If the tenant remains on the leased property after the termination of the lease with the consent of the landlord, the lease is not terminated for the purposes of this section until the consent is withdrawn. ... The usual situation that gives rise to the continuation by the tenant of his occupation of the leased property with the landlord's consent is where they enter into negotiations for a new lease and the negotiations have not resulted in an agreement by the time the original lease ends. The tenant continues his occupancy of the leased property with the acquiescence of the landlord, and some time later the negotiations collapse and the landlord orders the tenant to vacate the leased property. (Emphasis supplied.) While comment k. suggests that a landlord may allow a tenant to remain on the property during negotiations for a new lease, the reverse of that suggestion is that the landlord can withdraw that consent and order the tenant to vacate the leased property when the negotiations fail. We have not been cited to any cases dealing with the effect of negotiations on the status of a tenant who holds over after the expiration of a farm lease, nor has our research disclosed any such cases. With regard to other types of leases, courts have stated generally that when a tenant remains in possession of leased property after the expiration of his lease, but at the same time negotiates with the landlord for a new lease, such negotiations negate the possibility of any acquiescence or election by the landlord to create a holdover tenancy. See, e.g., Masterson v. DeHart Paint & Varnish Co., 843 S.W.2d 332 (Ky.1992); Ebert v. Dr. Scholl's Foot Comfort Shops, 137 Ill.App.3d 550, 92 Ill.Dec. 323, 484 N.E.2d 1178 (1985); Potter v. Henry Field Seed Co., 239 Iowa 920, 32 N.W.2d 385 (1948). No cases have been cited to us nor have we found where this court has determined the effect in Nebraska of negotiations on the status of a tenant holding over after the expiration of the tenant's lease. We have held, however, that when farmland is leased to a tenant for 1 year for a stipulated rent reserved, and after the expiration of the lease, the tenant, without further contract, remains in possession and is recognized as a tenant by the landlord in the receipt of rent for another year, this will create a tenancy from year to year. See Moudry v. Parkos, 217 Neb. 521, 349 N.W.2d 387 (1984). This court has also held that a holdover tenancy upon the same conditions as specified in the original lease may be created when, after a year lease has ended and without further agreement, the tenant remains in possession and is recognized by the landlord by receiving rent or in any other way, showing that both parties regard the relation of landlord and tenant as still continuing. See Otto v. Hongsermeier Farms, 217 Neb. 45, 348 N.W.2d 422 (1984). Only a presumption of a tenancy from year to year arises from such a holding over, and the presumption is rebuttable by proof of a different agreement or of facts inconsistent with the presumption. Barnes v. Davitt, 160 Neb. 595, 71 N.W.2d 107 (1955). Generally, in Nebraska, in the absence of any different agreement, a yearly lease of farmland begins on March 1 and ends on February 28 of the succeeding year. Moudry, supra . In this case, the lease was not for a full year, but for a term approximately 24 days less than a year. When a lease is for less than a year and a tenant holds over with the landlord's consent, a holdover tenancy for the same duration as the original lease is usually created. See Otto, supra . We need not address what the duration of any holdover tenancy would have been in this case. That is because the evidence is uncontroverted that the landlord never intended or agreed to create a holdover tenancy in regard to the same property that was covered in the original lease. Although the tenant attempted to negotiate a renewal lease with the landlord, the landlord steadfastly refused to rent to the tenant for another term the 135 acres of cropland covered by the March 25, 1990, lease. Instead, the landlord offered to rent to the tenant only some of the same property involved in the March 25, 1990, lease. The landlord's desire to rent to the tenant only some of the same property was communicated to the tenant (1) by the landlord in a letter to the tenant dated September 7, 1990, (2) by her farm manager's offer of the new lease sent to the tenant the day before the original lease expired, and (3) by the landlord's attorney in a letter to the tenant dated April 23, 1991. The landlord's communications, which uniformly excluded the cropland, show that the landlord did not want the tenant to rent for another term on the same terms as specified in the original lease. The record contains no evidence of a different agreement between the parties, nor does it contain evidence that the landlord accepted rent or that the tenant ever attempted to pay the landlord rent for another term. The evidence is uncontroverted that the tenant was unsuccessful in negotiating a new lease and that the landlord offered the tenant a lease for less property than was covered by the March 25, 1990, lease. This evidence negates the tenant's claim that the landlord had acquiesced or consented to a holdover tenancy for another term, which, by operation of law, would have been upon the same terms and conditions as specified under the original lease. From these facts, the county court properly found that the tenant was unlawfully and forcibly holding over his tenancy and that the landlord was entitled to regain possession of her property in Colfax County. Implicit in these findings is the county court's determination that the landlord had not, through negotiations or otherwise, recognized the tenant as a holdover tenant or consented to the tenant's holding over. The county court was not clearly wrong in finding for the landlord upon her forcible entry and detainer petition or in granting the landlord a writ of restitution to her Colfax County property. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in remanding the cause for further proceedings.