Opinion ID: 1170931
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Juror Questions and Instructions on the Firearm-use Enhancement.

Text: (23) Defendant contends that the court inadequately responded to juror questions concerning the allegations of personal firearm use in connection with the liquor store shootings. During deliberations, the jury through its foreman asked whether, in order to find the personal firearm-use enhancement true, it had to be established that defendant personally pulled the trigger, or whether his presence at the crime scene would suffice. The court responded by rereading the applicable paragraphs of CALJIC No. 17.19 (1980 rev.), defining the relevant concepts underlying a section 12022.5 gun-use enhancement. Amicus curiae concedes that the enhancement was correctly defined thusly: to display a firearm in a menacing manner, intentionally to fire it, or intentionally to strike or hit a human being with it. It is argued, however, that one or more jurors may have remained confused about when the enhancements could be deemed completed under these facts, since defendant displayed the gun when he initially confronted and robbed the victims  and at some later point the weapon was fired at all three victims. The court responded to a second inquiry [7] by rereading CALJIC No. 17.19 and No. 3.31 (concurrence of act and specific intent). Defendant and amicus curiae contend the court should have instructed the jury that the gun-use allegation under the murder count could only be found true if defendant used the gun to commit the murder, and that his earlier display or use of the gun in the commission of a separate felony (robbery) would be insufficient to support such a finding  even if he had already formed the intent to kill at that time. Defendant cites no authority for this proposition and it is far from self-evident, the jury having found that defendant murdered during commission of the felony of robbery. Section 12022.5 is intended to distinguish those who are willing to use firearms while committing felonies from those who are not, and to increase the penalty for the former. ( People v. Walker (1976) 18 Cal.3d 232, 240-243 [133 Cal. Rptr. 520, 555 P.2d 306]; People v. Chambers (1972) 7 Cal.3d 666, 672 [102 Cal. Rptr. 776, 498 P.2d 1024].) Defendant clearly belongs in the first category. In any event, we need not determine whether further clarifying instructions were in order, for on these facts there could be no prejudice. Defendant expressed a clear desire to leave no witnesses, used the gun to herd his victims into the back room, assaulted Romero in an attempt to kill him, and ordered Vasquez and Zamora to their knees. Even assuming for sake of argument that defendant's companion fired the shots, we do not find defendant's own gun use so separate from the actual shootings that prejudice could be inferred from the court's failure to more fully instruct.

The prosecution and defense stipulated that the evidence from the guilt phase could be considered by the jury in the penalty phase. Only a few additional witnesses testified. Officer Nichols testified for the prosecution about a conversation he heard through electronic monitoring between defendant and his cousin Lawrence Martin at the police station on September 26, 1979. During the conversation, defendant told Martin that he would have to get the gun from Danny (Officer MacIvor), and that Danny would have to be offed. [8] Officer MacIvor testified that at the conclusion of a preliminary hearing on October 30, 1979, defendant walked by him and the deputy district attorney conducting the hearing, turned toward the prosecutor and stated, The hell with getting a cop. I'll get me a D.A. The record further suggests that there may have been some mention of the September 26 Danny threat in connection with a bail motion made at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, perhaps thereby prompting defendant's D.A. threat. The deputy district attorney testified that when defendant walked by, defendant glared at him and made a comment. All the district attorney could make out was D.A. The defense presented several family members and friends as witnesses. Defendant's mother testified that defendant, now 21 years old, had grown up in a poor family with 7 brothers and sisters. Defendant worked and helped support the family. Defendant's sisters testified that defendant had helped them financially and emotionally on past occasions. Each wished him to live. A church secretary testified that defendant had done some yard work for her in the past. A friend of the defendant testified that he sometimes drove her to work. Defendant's girlfriend testified that he had helped her emotionally, that she thought he was innocent, and that she loved him and did not want him to die. Defendant testified and denied making the threats to the officer and the district attorney. He claimed he was innocent of the crimes and wished to live.

(24) Defendant and amicus curiae contend that the 1978 death penalty law violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution because it fails to provide adequate guidance for the jury's exercise of its sentencing discretion, or to require the jury to state in writing its reasons for choosing death. He further argues that the law violates the due process clause by failing to require the jury to find death the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. We have repeatedly rejected identical constitutional attacks on each of these asserted grounds. (See People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1285 [232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115]; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777-779 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].)
(25a), (26a), (27a), (28a) Defendant contends that evidence of the D.A. and Danny death threats was inadmissible on three grounds: (1) the prosecution failed to give adequate notice of its intent to introduce such evidence in aggravation; (2) the police had a duty to preserve a tape recording of the monitored conversation in which defendant made the Danny threat; and (3) neither threat constituted a violation of a penal statute  a prerequisite for admissibility under section 190.3, factor (b). (See People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72 [222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423].) (27b), (28b) Only the last claim has merit, and then only with respect to the Danny threat. Moreover, the erroneous admission of evidence of the Danny threat was nonprejudicial.
(25b) Defendant contends that the prosecutor failed to give him proper notice of his intent to offer evidence of the death threats in aggravation at the penalty phase. Section 190.3 provides in relevant part: Except for evidence in proof of the offense or special circumstances which subject a defendant to the death penalty, no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial. (29) The purpose of the statutory notice is to advise the accused of the evidence against him so that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense for the penalty phase of trial. (See People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 96 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].) (25c) We are satisfied that there was substantial compliance with section 190.3. The record discloses that the prosecutor told defense counsel even before the case arrived in superior court that defendant had threatened a deputy district attorney and a police officer. In addition, a written notice of the intention to introduce such evidence in aggravation was filed a full week before commencement of the penalty phase. The trial judge conducted a hearing in chambers on the evidence to be admitted at the penalty phase. He personally recalled that from the time he was assigned the case the matter of the prior threats had been discussed in connection with courtroom security concerns. Moreover, defendant cannot be heard to complain that the notice of the October 30, 1979, courtroom threat against the deputy district attorney was lacking in specificity; the record reflects defense counsel was representing defendant at the preliminary hearing and was himself present in the courtroom when defendant uttered the threat. Finally, the record reveals counsel was fully aware of his right to seek a continuance to investigate and respond to any evidence of which he had not been afforded adequate notice. (See People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 419-425 [243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279].) A continuance was never sought. The trial court was satisfied that defense counsel had been afforded adequate notice of the prosecutor's intent to introduce evidence of the threats. We see no reason to reach a contrary conclusion.
(26b) Shortly after selling the gun to undercover Officer MacIvor (Danny), defendant and his cousin were detained at the police station on suspicion of burglary. Officer Nichols testified the two were placed in a room and their conversation secretly monitored. Defendant was overheard to tell his cousin he would have to get the gun back from Danny, and that Danny should be offed. Nichols testified off was a street term for kill. At the start of the penalty phase, the district attorney for the first time learned that the conversation at the police station had been tape-recorded as well as monitored. Officer Nichols testified that the threats were audible on the tape, but its quality was very poor because defendant and his cousin had been whispering. A copy of the tape was forwarded to homicide detectives whose attempts to enhance it electronically proved unsuccessful. The homicide detectives thereafter informed Officer Nichols that the tape was of no value to them. He kept the original for five or six months and ultimately reused it, making no special effort to preserve it for trial. Neither the original tape nor the copy were ever made available to the defense or prosecution during trial. Defendant contends that under People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal.3d 641, 652-653 [117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 527 P.2d 361], the officers' negligent destruction of the tape should have precluded admission of evidence of the Danny threats at the penalty phase. (30) The United States Supreme Court has recently formulated its own duty-to-preserve-evidence test in California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479 [81 L.Ed.2d 413, 104 S.Ct. 2528]. Under Trombetta, the duty to preserve extends only to evidence which both possess[es] an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and [is] of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. (467 U.S. at p. 489 [81 L.Ed.2d at p. 422].) (26c) Here it appears neither prong of the Trombetta test was met; defendant made no showing that the tape recording possessed any apparent exculpatory value, nor did he show why his opportunity to cross-examine Officer Nichols, who directly monitored the taped conversation, was inadequate to protect his rights. [9] In any event, as next shown, this claim is effectively mooted by our conclusion that evidence of the Danny threats was inadmissible for a more fundamental reason.
(27c), (28c) Five years after trial in this case, this court held that [i]nsofar as section 190.3 contemplates consideration of defendant's criminal history (see [factors] (b), (c)), such evidence `must be limited to ... conduct that demonstrates the commission of an actual crime, specifically, the violation of a penal statute....' ( People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72; see also Boyd, [ People v. Boyd (1985)] 38 Cal.3d [762,] at pp. 776-778 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782].) ( People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 808 [248 Cal. Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310].) (27d) Defendant and amicus curiae contend that the courtroom threat, the hell with getting a cop, I'll get me a D.A., was not a crime in violation of a penal statute. Respondent asserts it was a violation of sections 69 or 71 (threatening an executive or public officer with intent to deter performance of his duties). We conclude that evidence of the courtroom threat would support a finding of a violation of section 69. Although defendant voiced the threat in a low voice, he turned to face the deputy district attorney when he communicated it. The deputy had just completed conducting a preliminary hearing in which defendant was held to answer, had argued against his release on bail, and was able to hear at least a portion of the threat. Given the murder and assault charges which defendant faced, it could reasonably be perceived that he had the apparent ability to carry out the threat. The evidence thus supports an inference that defendant intended to thwart or deter further prosecution of his case by threatening the deputy district attorney, and each requisite element of a violation of section 69 was shown on these facts. (See People v. Hopkins (1983) 149 Cal. App.3d 36, 40-44 [196 Cal. Rptr. 609].) Furthermore, the jury was instructed that the threats had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to qualify as factors in aggravation. ( People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 55 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279].) (28d) We agree with defendant that evidence of the Danny threat was inadmissible under the rule of Phillips and Boyd. Respondent contends that defendant's statement constitutes solicitation of his cousin Lawrence Martin to assist in a plan to murder Officer MacIvor, a violation of section 653f. But Officer Nichols's testimony concerning this threat does not bear out the claim; the words used by defendant are at best ambiguous and equally supportive of an inference that he was merely relating to Martin how he (defendant) would have to get the gun back and off Danny. [10] We conclude, however, that admission of evidence of the Danny threat was nonprejudicial. (Cf. People v. Belmontes, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 809.) This case was tried well before Phillips or Boyd were decided. The properly admitted aggravating evidence in this case  in particular, the circumstances of the crime (§ 190.3, factor (a))  was simply overwhelming. From that evidence the jury found defendant guilty in one incident of murdering one person and assaulting two others in execution-style shootings of unarmed and unresisting victims, two of whom were teenagers. One month later defendant viciously pistol-whipped a young woman and shot her twice in the head in order to facilitate his escape with her $11 and her car. The evidence of defendant's threats was dwarfed in comparison to the seriousness and excessive violence of the charged offenses. Nor did the prosecutor place heavy emphasis on the threats in his closing argument. He maintained that they constituted examples of other criminal activity involving a threat of violence and should thus be considered in aggravation, but he also cautioned the jury on three separate occasions to ignore the evidence unless they first found beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged criminal activity had actually occurred. He suggested the threats evidenced a callous and casual attitude toward the value of others' lives, but clearly communicated his belief that this attitude was established primarily by defendant's conduct in the charged offenses and his courtroom demeanor. Finally, the jury knew from the guilt phase that defendant twice met with undercover Officer MacIvor after communicating the Danny threat to his cousin and being released from custody. There was no evidence defendant ever attempted to make good on his threat. On these facts it would be sheer speculation for us to conclude that evidence of the threat affected the penalty verdict.
(31) Amicus curiae and defendant assail defense counsel for stipulating to introduction of all the guilt phase evidence at the penalty phase of trial. We find the contention wholly without merit. (See People v. Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 64; § 190.3, factor (a) [circumstances of the crime relevant to the penalty determination].) (32) The argument that guilt phase evidence of defendant's involvement in burglaries or receiving stolen property was inadmissible at the penalty phase must likewise fail. Evidence of defendant's possession and sale of stolen property was inextricably intertwined in proof of the People's case-in-chief at the guilt phase. In any case, the jury was specifically instructed to disregard any evidence of uncharged criminal activity which was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt or shown to involve a threat or use of force or violence under factor (b).
(33) Defendant and amicus curiae argue that the jury was misinstructed on the proper role of sympathy and general character and background evidence in the penalty phase. In reviewing such claim, we examine the instructions and arguments as a whole to determine whether the jury was adequately informed of the proper scope of mitigating evidence for its consideration. ( California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 546 (conc. opn. of O'Connor, J.) [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 943, 107 S.Ct. 837]; see Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 113-115 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 10-11, 102 S.Ct. 869]; People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 777; People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 536-537, 544, fn. 17 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440]; People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, & fn. 10 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813].) We have undertaken such a review here and conclude that the jury was not misled regarding its responsibilty to consider all of the mitigating evidence in the case. First, the jury was not instructed at the penalty phase with the nosympathy language embodied in CALJIC No. 1.00. (Compare People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 536-537, vacated sub nom. California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. 538 [wherein the high court held that the giving of the California standard anti-sympathy instruction (CALJIC No. 1.00) at the penalty phase is not unconstitutional per se].) The jury was specifically instructed that: [Y]ou were previously instructed you must not be influenced by pity for the defendant or swayed by sympathy for him. I instruct you that in this phase of the case, the penalty phase, pity and sympathy for the defendant would be proper considerations for you should you find them to be warranted in the circumstances. Next, although the jury did receive an instruction in the literal terms of factor (k) in this pre- Easley case ( People v. Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d 858), our review of the arguments as a whole reinforces our conclusion that, as instructed, the jury must have understood its obligation to consider and weigh all of defendant's mitigating evidence. After arguing to the jury that the law is neutral on what happens at the penalty phase, the prosecutor distinguished the penalty from the guilt phase of trial thusly: There's a difference, and that difference is that you previously have been told that pity or passion for a defendant, sympathy, that sort of thing, cannot enter into your deliberations.... This [the penalty phase] is the exception.... You still cannot look at sympathy or passion or prejudice for the victims in terms of how it would change facts. You can't do that, but you can consider passion or prejudice towards the defendant. [¶] [T]he instruction will say that ... in this  the penalty phase, pity and sympathy for the defendant would be proper considerations if you should find them to be warranted in the circumstances. If the defense raises anything in this case, which you may or may not have heard, any real evidence of so far, that there is a reason for sympathy towards this particular defendant, then of course that's something for you to weigh and something that you use in looking at the instructions on the case.  (Italics added.) Defense counsel told the jury they could consider Marvin's family as well. They have indicated to you that they have loved Marvin. They wish him to live, albeit in confinement, life imprisonment without possibility of parole. They have indicated to you that Marvin has done some worthwhile acts while he has been on this earth. That he is a human being, that he has done things to help others, that he has been worthwhile in his activities, that he is a person of worth. Defense counsel explained: The prosecutor indicated that the instruction provides as they do that you can consider passion and pity for the defendant if you find that to be appropriate. Finally, in his closing argument, the prosecutor again argued that defendant's proffered general character and background evidence was worthy of minimal mitigating weight: Marvin's family felt that he should live. You heard the testimony ... I would expect a family to say that. The evidence you heard the other day from the defense on Mr. Walker and his good deeds, the thing that stands out that mostly I think about is that there was almost nothing to say.... [¶] You're going to have instructions. You'll see how much value that is. Defendant directs us to the prosecutor's closing remarks in which he stated:  The mitigating factors are a possibility of two. And the aggravating factors are all the rest. (Italics added.) However, read in context, we believe the prosecutor was simply arguing his view of the state of the evidence; namely, that defendant's relative youth and his lack of prior convictions were the only two factors worthy of assignment of any mitigating weight. Nor do we view the prosecutor's argument under factor (k) as improperly suggesting to the jury that evidence thereunder related solely to the crimes  or that factor (k) evidence could be aggravating. (See People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 776 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782].) In his closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the testimony of defendant's family members and friends; including testimony that he had done some favors, loaned them money, done odd jobs for some, and given others rides to work. He never suggested that any evidence, or lack of evidence, regarding defendant's general background and character, was aggravating. Rather, he simply urged the jury to accord little mitigating weight to such evidence: if that's all you can say about somebody, that is very, very thin. Viewing the instructions and arguments as a whole, we conclude the jury here was adequately informed of the full nature of its responsibility to consider defendant's mitigating general character and background evidence.
(34) During his penalty phase argument, the prosecutor reviewed factors (a) through (k) of section 190.3 and argued how in his view the evidence fit under each factor, if applicable. He reviewed the general circumstances of the crimes as aggravating circumstances under factor (a), and urged that evidence of the threats was admissible as a circumstance in aggravation under factor (b). He observed that the absence of prior felony convictions was a mitigating circumstance under factor (c). When he got to factor (d)  whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance  he argued: [t]here is, of course, no evidence of that. He went on to characterize the manner in which defendant had shot his victims and concluded: emotional, extreme mental and emotional disturbance on his part, no. Absolutely cold when he did those things. At least, that's all the evidence we have. Regarding factor (e)  whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act  the prosecutor argued: Well, that one is there because again, these instructions are for all cases. He posited an example of a defendant's potential culpability for the death of an accomplice during commission of a crime, and suggested factor (e) had no application to the instant case. When he reached factor (f)  whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct  the prosecutor argued that in his view factor (f) had no application under these facts since defendant had shot his victims, all unknown to him, in an obvious attempt to eliminate each as witness to his crimes. He concluded: Simply doesn't apply to this case and again, is not in his favor. It's an aggravating circumstance. (Italics added.) Similarly, in summarizing the evidence under factors (g) (extreme duress or substantial domination of another); (h) (mental disease or defect, or the effects of intoxication); and (j) (whether or not defendant was an accomplice and played a relatively minor role in the crimes), the prosecutor argued his viewpoint that those factors did not apply under the instant facts, but in each instance concluded by labeling them another aggravating circumstance. Finally, the prosecutor at one point argued: The mitigating factors are a possibility of two. And the aggravating factors are all the rest.  (Italics added.) The prosecutor's argument constituted  Davenport error. ( People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].) In Davenport we held it improper for a prosecutor to argue that the mere absence of evidence of a statutory factor was itself an aggravating circumstance. ( Id., at pp. 289-290.) Although we stated in Davenport that such argument should not in the future be permitted ( ibid. ), we did not rely on the point in reversing the penalty judgment therein. Defendant and amicus curiae urge that the Davenport error requires reversal of the penalty verdict. We do not agree. Initially, we note that defendant is barred from complaining of any prosecutorial misconduct in this regard because he failed to object to the prosecutor's arguments, and because a simple admonition would have readily clarified any confusion and cured any harm. ( People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 27; see People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 777; People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1284.) Moreover, this case was tried five years before our opinion in Davenport, and as noted, our language in that case strongly indicates that its rule is prospective only. Turning to the question of prejudice, our review of the evidence, instructions, and arguments as a whole convinces us that the prosecutor's reference to the absence of mitigating evidence under factors (f), (g), (h), and (j) as aggravating circumstances could not, in reasonable possibility, have affected the jury's penalty verdict. (See People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 456 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) In each instance the misnomer was directly preceded by argument in which the prosecutor urged the jury to find each of the four factors inapplicable to this case. Stated otherwise, he argued that defendant could not possibly claim moral justification for the shootings (factor (f)), did not act out of extreme duress or the domination of another (factor (g)), did not commit the crimes due to intoxication or mental illness (factor (h)), and had not played a relatively minor role in the crimes (factor (j)). Given the guilt phase evidence and verdicts, it is not reasonably possible that the  Davenport  error misled the jury in their task of weighing the applicable aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Furthermore, we view the prosecutor's statement  [t]he mitigating factors are a possibility of two. And the aggravating factors are all the rest  as an exhortation that the evidence supported the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances overwhelmingly outweighed the mitigating circumstances in this case. Finally, we have observed that the impact of so-called Davenport error may be reduced where the jury fully understood the weighing function and the scope of its responsibilities and sentencing discretion at the penalty phase. (See, e.g., People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 456; People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 263, fn. 4 [250 Cal. Rptr. 83, 758 P.2d 25] (conc. and dis. opn. of Arguelles, J.).) As next shown, there was no prejudicial Brown error ( People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 412) in this case.
(35) Defendant and amicus curiae contend that the mandatory sentencing formula of section 190.3 is unconstitutional on the ground that it withdraws constitutionally compelled sentencing discretion from the jury. In People v. Brown [, supra, ] 40 Cal.3d 512, 538-544, vacated on other grounds sub nom. California v. Brown [, supra, ] 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934], however, we rejected that very contention. Defendant presents us with no compelling reason to reconsider our holding. ( People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 650 [244 Cal. Rptr. 181, 749 P.2d 836].) Although we found the statutory scheme of section 190.3 constitutional in Brown, We acknowledge[d] that the language of the statute, and in particular the words `shall impose a sentence of death,' leave room for some confusion as to the jury's role. ( People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 544, fn. 17.) Our concern in Brown was that former CALJIC No. 8.84.2, which was drawn verbatim from the statutory language, might mislead the jury in fully comprehending its sentencing discretion and responsibility in two interrelated ways: First, we pointed out that the jury might be confused about the nature of the weighing process. As we observed: `[T]he word weighing is a metaphor for a process which by nature is incapable of precise description. The word connotes a mental balancing process, but certainly not one which calls for a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. Each juror is free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value he deems appropriate to each and all of the various factors he is permitted to consider.' [Citation.] Second, we were concerned in Brown that the unadorned instruction's phrase, `the trier of fact ... shall impose a sentence of death if [it] concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances' (italics added), could mislead the jury as to the ultimate question it was called on to answer in determining which sentence to impose. Although the quoted phrase could be understood to require a juror (i) to determine whether `the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances' without regard to the juror's personal view as to the appropriate sentence, and then (ii) to impose a sentence of death if aggravation outweighs mitigation even if the juror does not personally believe death is the appropriate sentence under all the circumstances, we concluded in Brown that the statute was not intended to, and should not, be interpreted in that fashion. Instead we stated: `By directing that the jury shall impose the death penalty if it finds that aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating, the statute should not be understood to require any juror to vote for the death penalty unless, upon completion of the weighing process, he decides that death is the appropriate penalty under all the circumstances. Thus the jury, by weighing the various factors, simply determines under the relevant evidence, which penalty is appropriate in the particular case. ' ( People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 1276-1277, italics in original.) (36) Our review of counsel's arguments reveals nothing which would have confused the jury regarding the proper nature of the weighing process, our first concern in Brown. The prosecutor did not suggest that the weighing process was merely a mechanical or counting process. In explaining to the jurors their responsibility to weigh the evidence under the statutory factors, he argued: [T]he reason that [the law] gives the jury the ultimate, or one of the ultimate steps in the job in this determination is because all cases are different. If they weren't, you could do something else. You wouldn't have to subject twelve people to this. You could add it up or figure it out, compute it or something. It would be easy. But it's not. There are different facts. The prosecutor then argued: If the defense raises anything in this case ... any real evidence ... that there is a reason for sympathy towards this particular defendant, then of course that's something for you to weigh. ... (Italics added.) He explained that the procedure set forth in former CALJIC No. 8.84.2 was a weighing process: The instruction says, look at the factors and see which outweighs the other. (Italics added.) As previously noted, at one point in his argument the prosecutor stated, [t]he mitigating factors are a possibility of two. And the aggravating factors are all the rest. Read in the context of the prosecutor's entire argument, we conclude this one statement could not in and of itself have misled the jury into thinking the weighing process was a mere mechanical counting of factors, with the death penalty to be imposed if the aggravating circumstances numerically outnumbered the mitigating ones. Again, the prosecutor was simply arguing his view of the case; i.e., that the only evidence worthy of any mitigating weight fit under factor (c) (the absence of prior felony convictions), and factor (i) (defendant's relatively youthful age). Turning to our second concern in Brown ; whether the jury understood the full scope of its sentencing discretion as to the ultimate question it was being called upon to answer  which sentence to impose  our examination of the instructions and arguments as a whole convinces us that the jury understood its obligation to determine whether or not death was the appropriate penalty in this case. First, the court gave several supplemental instructions that helped clarify the jury's role. As previously noted, the jury was instructed that: [I]n this phase of the case, the penalty phase, pity and sympathy for the defendant would be proper considerations for you should you find them to be warranted in the circumstances. Immediately after instruction in the language of former CALJIC No. 8.84.2, the court instructed the jury that their penalty verdict must be the product of the individual opinion of each juror, and that [i]t is the duty of each of you to consider the evidence.... Each of you must decide the case for yourselves.... (See People v. Odle (1988) 45 Cal.3d 386, 420 [247 Cal. Rptr. 137, 754 P.2d 184].) Second, the prosecutor throughout his argument repeatedly stressed that the law in essence was neutral at the penalty phase, and that it was the jury's function to weigh the evidence under the relevant factors. He argued: the law is not fixed on what the penalty should be ..., and explained: You won't hear an instruction that says it's your duty to assume that one penalty or the other is proper. It's your duty to assume that this case, the law calls for a certain kind of verdict. You won't. In fact, it is neutral on the subject. It is entirely up to you what the facts are that you find to be the case. He reread former CALJIC No. 8.84.2 for the jurors and urged them to look at the factors and see which outweighs the others. He reiterated that sympathy and passion for the defendant were proper considerations at the penalty phase, although he forcefully argued his view that there was little mitigating evidence to justify harboring such emotions for this defendant. Several times during his argument, the prosecutor expressed disagreement with defense counsel's repeated characterization of the jury's task as being to determine whether to kill Marvin Walker. The prosecutor urged the jury to reject defense counsel's argument that a vote for the death penalty would be the easy or popular thing to do, tantamount to a cruel act of vengeance for which the jurors would ultimately suffer a guilty conscience. At one point the prosecutor argued: It's not necessary for either one of us to put this personal sort of blame on you. Defendant urges that the prosecutor's argument may have lessened the jurors' sense of responsibility to individually arrive at an appropriate penalty determination. (See, e.g., People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 255-256 [246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d 669].) Although such argument in isolation might raise a legitimate concern that the jury was being misled, it could not have had such a misleading effect here. Throughout his argument the prosecutor sought to impart to the jury the gravity of their task and sentencing responsibilities: I think the toughest thing that you will ever do, if you vote for the death penalty in this case, is to follow that instruction and do what the instruction says to do. To say that it's easy to vote for that [the death penalty] is a joke. Although there's nothing funny about it, it's extremely difficult. And we talked about that a great deal as this case started, and I don't think there is a person up there who thinks it's something easy.... [¶] No one on this jury answered the questions, led anyone to believe, counsel or myself, that you think it would be easy to vote for the death penalty. It is tough. It might be the toughest thing you ever do. But it's called for here. It's called for by the law.  (Italics added.) [11] Third, in responding to the prosecutor's argument, defense counsel conceded to the jury that in one sense he was seeking to impose a guilt trip on them. He explained that what he had hoped to do was to impress upon you a sense of responsibility, a personal responsibility in terms of your actions and what you must decide and how you must decide it. Whatever decision you make has to be your responsibility. Each one of us has to decide the issue individually, for your own as to what should be the appropriate circumstance. You can decide to kill Marvin, and that's what the death penalty is all about. It's killing people. Counsel told the jury: You are the ones. Nobody else. [¶] If you decide that he's going to die, you're not going to be there at the time that it's done, obviously, but you put that machinery in operation. He implored the jury not to vote for the death penalty in this case, urging them to consider that Marvin is a person, a human being. He urged them to look back upon their lives to the time they were 20 years of age when considering defendant's relative youth, to [c]onsider his family as well, and not to act from vengeance alone, but to show our understanding, our mercy.... Counsel concluded his argument with the statement: Your decision will be final. It will be the ultimate word on Marvin. I would only ask you for your mercy. Although the prosecutor and defense counsel plainly disapproved of one another's choice of language, each was in his own words seeking to impress upon the jurors the solemnity of their individual sentencing obligations. In this fundamental sense the arguments were not in conflict. This is not the type of case in which the jury was `left ... with the impression that its responsibility was merely to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors without regard to its view of the appropriateness of the alternative penalties, and that it was required to return a sentence of death if aggravation outweighed mitigation without, or even despite, each juror's personal conclusion from the evidence, about whether a sentence of death was appropriate under the circumstances for the offense and the offender.' ( Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1278, italics in original.) ( People v. Odle, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 420.) Viewing the arguments and instructions as a whole, we are satisfied they did not mislead the jurors as to the full nature of their sentencing discretion, and that the jurors realized the ultimate sentencing responsibility rested with them, and them alone. ( People v. Hendricks, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 655.)
(37) Defendant and amicus curiae contend that the trial court erred in failing to delete the nonapplicable or irrelevant statutory mitigating factors. (§ 190.3.) We have previously rejected this argument. (See People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 104-105; People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 776-777 [1977 death penalty law].) [A]s is apparent from the statutory language, it is for the jury to determine which of the listed factors are applicable or `relevant' to the particular case. (§ 190.3, par. 6.) ( Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 105.)
(38) One of the factors to be considered by the penalty jury if relevant is [t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime. (§ 190.3, factor (i).) Defendant and amicus curiae contend that the prosecutor committed misconduct in arguing that defendant's age of 20 years should be considered an aggravating factor. The prosecutor argued defendant certainly is old enough to know better, but he ultimately concluded defendant's relative youth could be considered a mitigating circumstance: You take it or leave it. You can give it to him as a mitigating factor. He never affirmatively argued that defendant's chronological age weighed in favor of the death penalty. The argument was permissible. ( People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 302 [247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052]; People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 775.)
(39) Defendant and amicus curiae contend that the prosecutor impermissibly argued lack of remorse as an aggravating factor. The prosecutor argued that the circumstances of the offenses, defendant's testimony, and his courtroom demeanor together evidenced his total lack of remorse for his crimes. Defendant's failure to object or request a curative admonition has waived any claim of misconduct on appeal with regard to the argument. ( People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 27; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 788.) Although it is clear that the People may not present evidence in aggravation unless it is relevant to a statutory aggravating circumstance ( People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 771-776), we have held that, under a prior death penalty law, the presence or absence of remorse is a factor relevant to the jury's penalty decision. ( People v. Coleman [(1969)] 71 Cal.2d [1159,] at p. 1168 [80 Cal. Rptr. 920, 459 P.2d 248].) The concept of remorse for past offenses as a mitigating factor sometimes warranting less severe punishment or condemnation is universal. ( People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 771.) Here, the prosecutor's comments on defendant's lack of remorse did no more than suggest the inapplicability of a mitigating factor. ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 790; People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 771.) Even were we to read the prosecutor's argument as affirmatively advancing defendant's lack of remorse as an aggravating circumstance, our review of the record convinces us that such remarks could not have affected the penalty verdict. ( Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 775-776.)