Opinion ID: 1730914
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Law of Termination

Text: Dismissal of certificated school employees is governed by Miss Code Ann. § 37-9-59 (Supp. 1992), which provides good cause reasons for dismissal as well as the right to a public hearing. See Hoffman v. Board of Trustees, 567 So.2d 838, 842 (Miss. 1990); Merchant v. Pearl Municipal Separate School District, 492 So.2d 959, 963 (Miss. 1986). Section 37-9-59 further provides that the hearing procedures for such dismissals are those set out in Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-111. See § 37-9-59; Merchant, 492 So.2d 959, 961 (Miss. 1986). Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-111(4) provides for a hearing before the school board (or a hearing officer), at which the employee may present matters relevant to the reasons given for the board's decision, present witnesses and other evidence on his own behalf, and cross-examine the witnesses against him. The statute further provides that the school board can base its decision solely on the matters presented before it and notify the employee in writing of its final decision. Under Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-113, an employee aggrieved by a final decision of the board may appeal to the chancery court. This statute mandates the chancellor's standard of review as follows: The scope of review of the chancery court in such cases shall be limited to a review of the record made before the school board ... to determine if the action of the school board is unlawful for the reason that it was: (a) Not supported by any substantial evidence; (b) Arbitrary or capricious; or (c) In violation of some statutory or constitutional right of the employee. See Harrison County School Board v. Morreale, 538 So.2d 1196, 1201 (Miss. 1989). On appeal of the Chancellor's decision, this Court applies the same standard of review. Spradlin v. Board of Trustees of Pascagoula Municipal Separate School District, 515 So.2d 893, 898 (Miss. 1987). We proceed to Harris' first assignment of error: I. THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING THAT THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S DISMISSAL BY THE CANTON SEPARATE MUNICIPAL SCHOOL BOARD. Houston and Harris gave directly conflicting testimony regarding the alleged assaults. At a board hearing on termination, the burden rests on the superintendent to prove by a preponderance of the evidence adequate grounds for dismissal. Merchant, 492 So.2d 959, 961 (Miss. 1986). If there is substantial, credible evidence undergirding the school board's finding of fact, those findings may not be disturbed on appeal. Noxubee County Board of Education v. Givens, 481 So.2d 816, 819 (Miss. 1985). According to the termination letter sent by the Board to Harris, the more credible evidence proved he had assaulted Houston on January 25, and threatened her life January 30, 1989. Apparently, after the he said/she said drama of the hearing, the board chose to believe Houston. Where there is a conflict of testimony presented to the board, the board is entitled to determine which testimony it will give the most weight. Everett v. Board of Trustees of the Meridian Municipal Separate School District, 492 So.2d 277, 283 (Miss. 1986). Certainly the Board was in a position, as neither the Chancellor nor this Court can be, to evaluate the demeanor of the witnesses at the hearing, and it is this Court's policy to accord great weight and deference to school administrators when their discharge of responsibilities is challenged. Noxubee County Board of Education v. Givens, 481 So.2d 816, 819 (Miss. 1985). Substantial evidence means evidence which is substantial, that is, affording a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. Central Electric Power Association et al. v. Hicks, 110 So.2d 351, 357 (Miss. 1959); See also Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938). It is something more than a mere scintilla of evidence, Johnson v. Ferguson, 435 So.2d 1191 (Miss. 1983), and does not rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence. Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. McClain, 149 So.2d 523 (Miss. 1963); See also Delta CMI v. Speck, 586 So.2d 768, 773 (Miss. 1991). In sum, the evidence in the record that Harris assaulted Houston on January 25th and threatened her on January 30th is substantial, being more than a mere scintilla and providing reasonable inferences therefrom. Accordingly, the Board and the Chancellor did not err in finding that there was substantial evidence which more probable than not supported the superintendent's termination of Harris. Therefore, we affirm. II. THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN HIS FINDINGS THAT APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS WAS NOT VIOLATED PURSUANT TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AS A RESULT OF AN IMPARTIAL AND BIASED HEARING CONDUCTED BY THE CANTON SEPARATE MUNICIPAL SCHOOL BOARD. Harris, a public employee under contract at the time of his dismissal, had an expectancy in continued employment at least through June 19, 1989, when his contract was due to expire. That is, he had a property interest in his continued employment with the school district. Spradlin v. Board of Trustees of Pascagoula School District, 515 So.2d 893, 897 (Miss. 1987); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Therefore, Harris was entitled to the protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and Section 14 of Miss. Const. Art. III (1890). Hoffman v. Board of Trustees, East Mississippi Junior College, 567 So.2d 838, 840 (Miss. 1990); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). The process that is due is set out in Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-111. See Spradlin, 515 So.2d at 898. There is no question that the Board complied with the procedural requirements of Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-111 in providing Harris with a properly noticed and timely hearing. Harris' due process claim concerns the nature and origin of the evidence presented against him. The Board argues that it provided an impartial and unbiased forum in which to hear Harris' cause, in that none of the board members participated in the investigation of the matter (i.e., none attended the meeting on the morning of February 3, 1989, at which Houston's statement was taken), nor did they participate in Galloway's decision to terminate Harris. In considering due process claims by employees appealing terminations, this Court has held that there is a presumption of honesty and integrity in board members serving as adjudicators in conducting hearings and rendering decisions on employee dismissals. Spradlin, 515 So.2d at 898; Dampier v. Lawrence County School District, 344 So.2d 130, 132 (Miss. 1977), citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975). In order to rebut this presumption, the dismissed employee must show that the board members had a personal or financial stake in the decision, or that there was some personal animosity toward him. Spradlin at 898; Dampier, at 132, citing Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Educational Association, 426 U.S. 482, 96 S.Ct. 2308, 49 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976). At the February 3rd meeting, Houston was reluctant to discuss the incidents she had reported to Galloway, responding to questions, I'd rather not say. At this point, board attorney John Christopher stated: I want to make sure that you understand that your failure to cooperate with the Board in finding out what happened could lead to your being terminated as a teacher in the system. That is not what the Board is interested in, that is not their choice at this point. But you still don't want to cooperate with us and tell us what happened? In sum, the only evidence to support Harris' allegation that Houston's testimony was coerced is the statement of the Board's attorney above. It could be inferred from Houston's reluctance to speak at the meeting and from her affidavit that she felt compelled to testify or lose her job. However, we find that this evidence of coercion is insufficient to overcome the Board's presumption of integrity. Therefore, we find that the procedures surrounding Harris' dismissal were not tainted, as Harris claims, and that no violation of his due process rights occurred.