Opinion ID: 3065267
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: United States v. Ferguson

Text: [2] We next consider the impact of Edwards in this case. In United States v. Ferguson, we considered whether Edwards would have affected the district court’s pre-Edwards decision to allow a defendant to proceed pro se. 560 F.3d at 1067-70. In answering this question affirmatively, we found that many statements in the record suggested the district court might have ruled differently under an Edwards standard. Id. at 1070 n.6. First, we found that the pre-Edwards psychiatric reports were “of limited value,” because they did not consider “whether Defendant is able ‘to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel.’ ” Id. at 1068 (quoting Edwards, 128 S. Ct. at 2386). Second, we noted that the defendant’s behavior was “decidedly bizarre.” Id.; see also id. at 1068-69 (discussing defendant’s demand that counsel follow six made-up “duties,” his insistence that the case be settled “in the private,” and his request to dismiss the case pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code). Finally, we addressed the defendant’s behavior at trial and sentencing, in which he did “absolutely nothing.” Id. at 1069. We also noted that both the district court and the parties repeatedly referred to the defendant’s “absolute right” to represent himself, once declared competent to stand trial. Id. at 1067. We considered it particularly troubling that the district court had stated prior to trial that “it would be desirable to have [the defendant] declared incompetent,” and that “it is terrible to let [the defendant] represent himself,” as well as the district court’s comments at sentencing that it had “never heard of an example of somebody that behaved at trial the way [the defendant] had.” Id. at 1069 (internal quotation marks omitted). We thus remanded to the district court “for the limited purpose of determining whether Edwards would have affected the district court’s decisions.” Id. at 1070. In 15884 UNITED STATES v. THOMPSON doing so, we held that “Edwards does not compel a trial court to deny a defendant the exercise of his or her right to selfrepresentation; it simply permits a trial court to require representation for a defendant who lacks mental competency to conduct trial proceedings.” Id. at 1070 n.6. [3] This case is markedly different from Ferguson. Unlike Ferguson, here the district court held a hearing to determine whether Thompson’s mental state would permit the court to proceed with trial, and expressly noted that the hearing was not a competency hearing. Thus, there is no indication that the district court conflated the standards for assessing Thompson’s competency to stand trial and his competency to represent himself at trial. Rather, the court noted several times that both the January 16 Hearing and the February 8 Hearing concerned Thompson’s readiness for trial, not his competency to stand trial. At the January 16 Hearing, the district court also expressed its willingness to revoke the defendant’s pro se status, but declined to do so in the absence of further information from doctors. That same willingness was conspicuously absent in Ferguson, where the trial court candidly expressed its perceived inability to do anything but let the defendant represent himself once he was determined to be competent. Here, by contrast, the court conducted two evidentiary hearings in order to inform itself concerning Thompson’s trial readiness. Based on those hearings, the court issued detailed findings of fact that Thompson was simply attempting to delay trial. The record provides ample support for those findings. [4] The record is also bereft of any statement by either the district court or the parties that because there was no dispute about Thompson’s competency to stand trial, he had an “absolute right” to defend himself. Compare Ferguson, 560 F.3d at 1068. Moreover, Thompson’s behavior throughout the proceedings was not “decidedly bizarre.” Rather, he engaged in lengthy colloquies with the district court in which he seemed acutely aware of what was occurring. Indeed, the district court noted the “strange coincidence” in connection with ThompUNITED STATES v. THOMPSON 15885 son’s repeated failure to appear for trial while he was faithfully present at all other court proceedings. Such coincidences are consistent with the district court’s finding that Thompson was malingering in order to delay trial. Finally, while some of the psychiatric reports considered Thompson’s mental competence to work with counsel at trial —the pre-Edwards standard—the February 8 Hearing proceeded under the assumption that Thompson would be representing himself. Therefore, the district court’s decision to proceed with trial focused on Thompson’s competence to represent himself in trial proceedings. The record also indicates that contrary to the actions of the defendant in Ferguson, Thompson participated extensively throughout his trial. [5] Therefore, we see no reason to remand to the district court in light of Edwards. Indeed, the district court did exactly what Edwards and Ferguson instruct; that is, it determined whether Thompson lacked the mental capacity to conduct trial proceedings. The district court’s conclusion that Thompson had such a capacity was not an abuse of discretion.