Opinion ID: 1387817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Impartiality and Fairness of the Jury

Text: Defendant argues that she was denied a trial which met the standards of fundamental fairness as established by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the jury impaneled for the case had previously been required to pass upon the credibility of a portion of the State's case in a trial immediately preceding the trial at bar. In that respect she contends that one Joe Dorador was tried and convicted in the court prior to her case, the members of the jury panel being the same for the two cases; and she points out that in the voir dire in her trial various questions were asked of potential jurors as to their being influenced by what had happened in the earlier case. She moved for a continuance and, if that should not be granted, that the members of the panel who had served on the Dorador case be excused. Both motions were denied and the voir dire proceeded. Some of the jurors who had served previously indicated that they might be influenced and in each such instance the juror was excused for cause. When the jury was finally selected, four persons who had sat in the Dorador case remained, each having stated positively that he would not be affected by what he had previously heard. It is of some moment to note that after both the State and the defendant had exercised their peremptory challenges a number of persons were still available on the panel. Defendant's objection to the court's ruling on this aspect seems to be grounded in the view that there was an implied prejudice arising from the fact that the jurors had served on the Dorador case. While such a concept has not been without its adherents, [1] it has been largely rejected. [2] Under the circumstances disclosed by the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's challenge of the jury panel.