Opinion ID: 2973659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion for a View

Text: The district court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for a view of the location of the arrest. See Nw. Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Global Moving & Storage, Inc., 533 F.2d 320, 323 (6th Cir. 1976) (“The trial court has discretion whether to permit a view of premises that are the subject of litigation.”); Reid v. United States, 276 F. 253, 259 (6th Cir. 1921) (finding that an order permitting a jury view “was within the court’s discretion”); see also United States v. Crochiere, 129 F.3d 233, 236 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The decision to permit a view is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court.”). This court will reverse that decision only if the district court abused its discretion in rendering it. See Nw. Nat’l Cas. Co., 533 F.2d at 323 (“We do not think that [the view] complained -8- of by Northwestern demonstrate[s] an abuse of discretion.”); see also United States v. Woolfolk, 197 F.3d 900, 905-06 (7th Cir. 1999) (“It is well-established that the decision whether to grant . . . a motion [for a view] rests within the discretion of the trial court and is reviewable only for abuse of that discretion.”). “A court generally acts within [its] discretion in denying a motion for a view when there is sufficient evidence describing the scene in the form of testimony, diagrams, or photographs.” Crochiere, 129 F.3d at 236; see also United States v. Triplett, 195 F.3d 990, 998-99 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that the denial of a motion for a view did not constitute an abuse of discretion because “the evidence presented at trial included photographs and diagrams of the sites of Triplett’s arrests, as well as testimony regarding the circumstances and conditions at those locations at the relevant times”). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Simmons’s motion for a view. Viewing the Sixteenth Avenue North area was unnecessary because the district court, which was functioning as the factfinder at the suppression hearing, was familiar with the area, and Simmons introduced twenty-nine photographs, five maps, and testimony from Nashville’s lead mapper to describe where he was arrested. Views, as Simmons acknowledged in his brief, “‘are generally accepted when they are necessary to an understanding of the litigation and the requisite information cannot be introduced in any other way.’” (quoting 2 Jack B. Weinstein, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 403.07(4) (2d 2003). Here, the requisite information could be and was introduced through documentary evidence, testimony, and judicial notice. The First and Eighth Circuits have held that district courts do not abuse their discretion by denying a motion for a view when the scene is described by testimony and documentary evidence. Triplett, 195 F.3d at 998-99; Crochiere, 129 -9- F.3d at 236. We follow our sister circuits and hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Simmons’s motion for a view because ample evidence of the scene was presented at the suppression hearing. III. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Simmons’s motion to suppress and motion for a view. -10-