Opinion ID: 2514039
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Snyder Is Estopped from Raising Claims Already Decided in Snyder I.

Text: The State argues that Snyder I collaterally estops Snyder from raising any of his claims regarding whether he initially refused the breath test. But Snyder is estopped only from raising those claims already decided in Snyder I. In Briggs v. State, Department of Public Safety, Division of Motor Vehicles, we considered the collateral estoppel effect of a criminal DWI case on a subsequent license revocation arising from the same incident. [17] We held that where the criminal case resulted in suppression on due process grounds of the defendant's breath test results, the State was collaterally estopped from relitigating the suppression issue in a subsequent license revocation proceeding. [18] The breath test results deemed inadmissible in the criminal case remained inadmissible in the administrative proceeding. Similarly, in this case, the parties may not relitigate Snyder I's remedial presumption that Snyder's breath test results would have exonerated him of DWI. To the limited extent that this presumption is relevant to Snyder's claim not to have refused the breath test, Snyder is entitled to rely on the presumption. The State correctly argues, and Snyder concedes in his reply brief, that Snyder is estopped from claiming that his refusal is negated by the police's failure to allow an independent blood test. Snyder I established the remedy for the state's failure to allow an independent blood test: Snyder gained the benefit of a presumption that the blood test results would have been favorable to him. [19] He is thus estopped in this case to the extent that he claims other remedies for the same violation, including dismissal of the case and suppression of evidence. However, because collateral estoppel applies only to claims that are precisely the same as [those] presented in the action in question, any other claims raised in this case are not barred. [20]