Opinion ID: 1057944
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Mitigation Instructions and Testimony

Text: Prieto alleges that the circuit court erred, both in instructing the jury and in the verdict forms, by including the allegedly limiting term of the offense following aggravation and mitigation. Specifically, the jury verdict forms stated that We the jury . . . having considered all the evidence in aggravation and mitigation of the offense. . . . Prieto argues that this erroneously narrowed the jurors' focus to the offense at hand and would lead them to believe that they could not consider the larger mitigating evidence of his early life. This argument is without merit. The language on the verdict forms tracks the statutory language from Code § 19.2- 264.4 and is consistent with Virginia law. In addition, the jury instructions given by the circuit court repeatedly refer generally to evidence in mitigation without the phraseology of the offense. Finally, the jury's deliberation followed days of mitigating evidence not directly related to the offense, with no limiting instruction from the circuit court. A reasonable jury 30 would not have gathered from the circuit court's instructions and the circumstances of the trial that it was compelled to discount any of the evidence presented. Instead, the instructions referred to consideration of all the mitigating evidence.
Prieto argues that the circuit court erred in unduly limiting mitigating evidence in testimony from Dr. James Garbarino, Teodora Alvarado, and Yolanda Loucel. But a review of the record clearly shows that objections sustained during the questioning pertained to the method of questioning, such as leading the witnesses or posing vague questions. In all instances the circuit court allowed counsel the opportunity to rephrase the questions to obtain the desired information. Although the scope of admissible mitigating evidence is wide, it is in the sound discretion of the circuit court to supervise the presentation of witnesses. See, e.g., Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 542, 450 S.E.2d 365, 374 (1994) (stating that the determination of the permissible scope of witness testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1161 (1995). Here, there is no evidence that the circuit court abused its discretion or that its rulings were prejudicial to Prieto in any way. H. Appointment of the Commonwealth's Mental Health Expert 31 Prieto contends that the circuit court erred in appointing Dr. Samenow as the Commonwealth's mental health expert under Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F). We disagree. Code § 19.2-264.3:1 provides that, in the event of a conviction, a defendant charged with capital murder intending to present expert testimony to support a claim in mitigation relating to his history, character, or mental condition, may be subject to evaluation by one or more of the Commonwealth's own mental health experts. The expert appointed must be (i) a psychiatrist, a clinical psychologist, or an individual with a doctorate degree in clinical psychology who has successfully completed forensic evaluation training as approved by the Commissioner of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services and (ii) qualified by specialized training and experience to perform forensic evaluations. Code § 19.2-264.3:1(A), (F). Prieto does not dispute that Dr. Samenow satisfied these professional requirements. Instead, Prieto argues that Dr. Samenow was not qualified for appointment because he has exhibited significant bias throughout his career against the possibility of mitigating evidence based on a defendant's history or background. To support this claim, Prieto first relies on Dr. Samenow's opinions, expressed in a book and newspaper article, that criminals think differently, that sociological and physiological 32 determinism merely provides excuses to criminals, and that criminals freely choose their way of life. See Stanton E. Samenow, Inside the Criminal Mind (2004); Stanton E. Samenow, Psyching Out Crime Excuses, The Washington Times, Aug. 25, 2004. Next, Prieto cites an opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in which one judge noted: Dr. Samenow's professed and public views make him incompetent to aid a defendant in finding and presenting mitigating factors at a defendant's sentencing phase. Ramdass v. Angelone, 187 F.3d 396, 411 n.1 (4th Cir. 1999) (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Lastly, Prieto points to Dr. Samenow's testimony that Prieto was superficially polite, uncooperative, and remorseless during the examination. Even if Dr. Samenow is biased against mitigating evidence as Prieto alleges, we fail to see how that bias disqualified Dr. Samenow from being appointed as the Commonwealth's mental health expert under Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F). Unlike the circumstances presented in Ramdass, Dr. Samenow was not appointed in this case to assist the defense in the preparation and presentation of mitigating evidence. Code § 19.2-264.3:1(A). Instead, he was appointed to assist the prosecution in rebutting such evidence. Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F). Thus, because there is no question that Dr. Samenow satisfied the professional requirements for appointment set out in Code § 19.2-264.3:1(A), we conclude that 33 the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in appointing him as the Commonwealth's mental health expert under Code § 19.2- 264.3:1(F).