Opinion ID: 427022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidentiary Rulings in the Sentencing Hearing

Text: 45 Skillern's final substantial contention is that his fundamental right to a fair trial at the sentencing hearing was violated by the admission, over his counsel's objection, of the incompetent expert opinion of a forensic pathologist, based upon a hypothetical question, that there was a probability that Skillern would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. 46 On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that although the admission of the doctor's answer was error because he was incompetent to testify as an expert and lacked firsthand familiarity with Skillern's personality to testify as a lay witness, it was harmless error due to the other evidence of Skillern's violent propensities adduced by the prosecution. Sanne v. State, supra, 609 S.W.2d at 773-74. The defendant's attorney extensively cross-examined the doctor and established in the presence of the jury that the doctor was not formally licensed to practice psychiatry and that his opinion as to future behavior was strictly based upon a hypothetical situation. The state appellate court concluded that the incremental effect of the doctor's opinion was not great enough to have had a persuasive effect on the mind of the average juror. Id. 609 S.W.2d at 774. The dissenting opinion in that court does set forth, however, strong reasons why the doctor's testimony was prejudicial to Skillern's defense against receiving a capital sentence. Id. 609 S.W.2d at 777, 778-79. 47 The role of a federal habeas court is more limited than that of the state appellate court. We do not sit as a super state supreme court to review error under state law. Porter v. Estelle, 709 F.2d 944, 957 (5th Cir.1983); Mendiola v. Estelle, 635 F.2d 487, 491 (5th Cir.1981), quoting Cronnon v. Alabama, 587 F.2d 246, 251 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974, 99 S.Ct. 1542, 59 L.Ed.2d 792 (1979). An evidentiary error in a state trial does not justify federal habeas corpus relief unless it is of such magnitude as to constitute a denial of fundamental fairness under the due process clause. Porter, supra, 709 F.2d at 957, and decisions there cited. Thus, even the erroneous admission of prejudicial testimony does not justify habeas relief unless it is material in the sense of a crucial, critical, highly significant factor. Porter, supra, 709 F.2d at 957; Anderson v. Maggio, 555 F.2d 447, 451 (5th Cir.1977); Hills v. Henderson, 529 F.2d 397, 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Hills v. Maggio, 429 U.S. 850, 97 S.Ct. 139, 50 L.Ed.2d 124 (1976); Corpus v. Beto, 469 F.2d 953, 956 (5th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 932, 94 S.Ct. 236, 38 L.Ed.2d 162 (1973). 48 We are unable to say that the erroneous admission of the doctor's opinion, even conceding with the state appellate dissent that it may have caused some prejudice, 15 caused prejudice of constitutional magnitude as tested by these standards. 49 Similarly so tested, the admission of the indictment of Skillern for the murder with malice of his brother, proper under state law, Sanne v. State, supra, 609 S.W.2d at 773, possesses no merit as a basis for federal habeas relief. In any event, the defendant could not have been harmed by the introduction of the indictment, as the jury immediately was informed that Skillern was convicted of murder without malice. The authenticating witness, a practicing attorney and former prosecutor, explained to the jury during cross-examination by the defendant's counsel, the legal difference between murder with malice and murder without malice.