Opinion ID: 3090871
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Obstruction of Justice (Simpson)

Text: Simpson next argues that there is insufficient evidence supporting his conviction for obstruction of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) provides that 11 Case: 12-10574 Document: 00512501580 Page: 12 Date Filed: 01/15/2014 No. 12-10574 “Whoever corruptly. . . alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding” shall be punished. This conviction was based on Simpson’s deletion of his electronic communication with Faulkner after search warrants for Faulkner’s home and offices were executed. Simpson argues that “mere deletion of email” is insufficient to convict under this section, and that the government did not prove the deletion was in connection with any particular proceeding as required by the statute. Simpson cites no support for his assertion that deleting electronic communication in response to being told about the execution of search warrants at a co-conspirator’s home and office is insufficient to support a conviction of obstruction of justice. Further, there is evidence that Simpson did more than simply delete emails. Simpson told the FBI agents that he had become concerned by the search warrants and Faulkner’s advice to him to hide his assets and had deleted the communications. When asked for the drives that the communications had been deleted from, Simpson told the agents that the drive had failed and that he tried to reformat the drive, which would make data harder to recover. When the agents wanted the drive anyway, Simpson said that it had been part of an array (a set up in which two drives must be read together), and that he no longer had the other part of the array. Simpson did provide the drive to the agents. The agent who analyzed the drive testified that it had no usable data on it, and it was as if the data had been “splashed all over the drive,” supporting the inference that Simpson did more than simply remove emails from his inbox. Simpson also argues that there was an insufficient connection between the deletion of the email and an official proceeding. Though a proceeding need not be actually pending at the time of the obstructive act, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f), 12 Case: 12-10574 Document: 00512501580 Page: 13 Date Filed: 01/15/2014 No. 12-10574 an obstruction of justice conviction requires some “nexus” between the obstructive act and some official government proceeding, see Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 707-08 (2005); United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599-600 (1995). A proceeding must at least be “foreseen,” such that the defendant has in contemplation some particular official proceeding in which the destroyed evidence might be material. See Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 707-08; see also United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1151-52 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 606 (7th Cir. 2011). We find that this requirement was satisfied here. Simpson admitted that he deleted the emails after learning about the executed search warrants. Simpson also instructed Cargill, an employee and co-conspirator, to delete anything she thought ought to be deleted from her computer, anticipating that their company would also be investigated. This provided sufficient evidence of Simpson’s intent to interfere with the administration of justice at an official proceeding that he anticipated would occur, and which had already begun with the execution of the first search warrants.