Opinion ID: 3063728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v. Harris, 20 F.3d 445, 452 (11th Cir.1994). In doing so, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and make all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in the government’s favor. Id. To sustain a verdict of guilt the evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, as long as a reasonable factfinder choosing from among reasonable constructions of the evidence could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Sepulveda, 115 F.3d 882, 888 (11th Cir.1997). Therefore, we will reverse only if no reasonable trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Gunn, 369 F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004). 13 Also, “[t]he jury [is] free to disbelieve [a defendant’s] statements and to take them as substantive evidence to the contrary.” United States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1272 (11th Cir. 2008). To convict a defendant of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute drugs, the government must prove that (1) an illegal agreement existed to possess with the intent to distribute marijuana; (2) the defendant knew of the agreement and its “essential nature”; and (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined the agreement. United States v. Charles, 313 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002). Where the government’s proof of these elements is based on circumstantial evidence, “reasonable inferences, and not mere speculation, must support the jury’s verdict.” Id. Regarding the knowing participation element, in United States v. Sullivan, 763 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1985), we held that “[m]ere presence is insufficient to establish knowing participation in a conspiracy, as is mere association with conspirators.” (internal citations omitted). In that case, in which the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, the evidence against the defendant was as follows. See id. at 1219. Police officers saw the defendant in a hotel parking lot near a red van. A codefendant arrived in a blue van and approached the defendant. They then approached two other men, and the 14 four “walked around the parking lot for about five minutes.” The defendant and codefendant then walked to the blue van, removed a small bag, and entered the hotel. A police officer arrested the parties. At the time of the arrest, the defendant was with his codefendant, who was carrying a small bag containing a gun. The police officers also knew that the alleged conspirators were going to the hotel parking lot to meet the men who were meant to distribute the marijuana, but did not know who the drivers were expected to be. Id. We concluded that this evidence was “totally insufficient,” as there was no evidence that the defendant knew that the alleged conspirators were planning to transport marijuana or that the blue van would be used to do so or that he knew of the existence of the pistol. Id. Sufficient evidence supports both Orozco-Cuellar and Villegas-Tello’s convictions. See Harris, 20 F.3d at 452. Though the evidence against OrozcoCuellar and Villegas-Tello is not plentiful, it is not so scant as to suggest that no reasonable jury could have found them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sepulveda, 115 F.3d at 888; Gunn, 369 F.3d at 1234. The jury did not need to speculate, but could reasonably infer from the evidence that Orozco-Cuellar and Villegas-Tello (1) knew of the conspiracy, as they purchased phones, seemingly together, and traveled to the site where the marijuana was to be retrieved; and (2) voluntarily joined the conspiracy, as Villegas-Tello drove the U-Haul and 15 Orozco-Cuellar participated in the lead car - load car - chase car driving pattern. See Charles, 313 F.3d at 1284. The jury also could have inferred from the facts that the parties used phones and drove in a pattern commonly used by drug dealers and couriers that Villegas-Tello knew he was retrieving marijuana rather than, say, stolen furniture. See id. Also, although the evidence could support a conclusion of innocence, and Villegas-Tello testified to a specific construction suggesting innocence, the jury was free to reject Villegas-Tello’s story and choose the construction suggesting guilt. See Sepulveda, 115 F.3d at 888; Ellisor, 522 F.3d at 1272.