Opinion ID: 789130
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Injury to their procedural interests

Text: 32 Appellants first allege that they suffered injury, as a result of the Secretary's failure to abide by the procedures prescribed by the Act, to their interest in the government's protection of their procedural rights. 33 As this Court sitting en banc described at length in Florida Audubon Society, a procedural-rights plaintiff must demonstrate standing by show[ing] not only that the defendant's acts omitted some procedural requirement, but also that it is substantially probable that the procedural breach will cause the essential injury to the plaintiff's own interest. 94 F.3d at 664-65. In other words, while we relax the imminence and redressability requirements, the procedural-rights plaintiff must still satisfy the general requirements of the constitutional standards of particularized injury and causation. See id. at 664. Although Appellants rely heavily on footnote 7 of Lujan in arguing procedural standing in this case, even in that case the Court required a showing that concrete interests had been invaded. 504 U.S. at 572 n. 7, 112 S.Ct. 2130. 34 Assuming arguendo that a procedural right designed to protect a concrete interest of the Appellants has been violated here, Appellants fail to demonstrate how they suffer actual injury to a concrete, particularized interest, caused by the challenged conduct. The chain of causation between the alleged procedural violation and the concrete interest is speculative at best. See infra pages 1160-61. Unadorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the judicial power. Physicians' Ed. Network v. Dep't of H.E.W., 653 F.2d 621, 627 (D.C.Cir.1981) (district court's opinion expressly adopted en toto by Court) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 44, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1927, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976)). 35 But even more importantly, Appellants appear to misunderstand the difference between the procedural right and the concrete interest in a procedural-rights case. See, e.g., Brief of Appellants at 23 (The Department's denial of this right constitutes sufficient injury to support standing.). The two things are not one and the same. Appellants must show both (1) that their procedural right has been violated, and (2) that the violation of that right has resulted in an invasion of their concrete and particularized interest. [A] prospective plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant caused the particularized injury, and not just the alleged procedural violation. Fla. Audubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d at 664 (emphasis added). In Lujan the Supreme Court disclaimed Appellants' conflation of concrete interest and procedural right in unambiguous language: If we understand this [argument] correctly, it means that the Government's violation of a certain ... class of procedural duty satisfies the concrete-injury requirement by itself, without any showing that the procedural violation endangers a concrete interest of the plaintiff (apart from his interest in having the procedure observed). We cannot agree. 36 504 U.S. at 573 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. at 2143 n. 8. Appellants must allege injury beyond mere procedural misstep per se to satisfy standing in a procedural-rights case, and they fail to do so here. 37 In sum, we hold that Appellants have failed to show that the alleged procedural violation caused actual injury to Appellants' concrete interests such that they satisfy Article III's requirement of standing. Fla. Audubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d at 664.