Opinion ID: 1111213
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instructions on Malice

Text: (12) Defendant contends the jury instructions were deficient and erroneous because they did not separately define malice in terms that related specifically to the fetus. He argues the instructions therefore improperly permitted the jury to transfer the malice found in Doreen's killing to the killing of the fetus. Defendant deems the alleged error to be of constitutional dimension on the theory that an essential element was omitted from the instructions on the fetal murder charge. He thus concludes that his federal constitutional due process and jury trial rights were violated, and that he was subjected to an unreliable and capricious finding of guilt in a capital case in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendant's contentions are meritless. The trial court read to the jury defendant's requested instruction on malice, as follows: There's a definition of malice aforethought. Malice may be either express or implied. Malice is express when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being. [¶] Malice is implied when the killing results from an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with a conscious and wanton disregard for human life and for a base anti-social purpose. [¶] When it is shown that the killing results from the intentional act with express or implied malice, no other mental state need be shown to establish the mental state of malice aforethought. [¶] The mental state constituting malice aforethought does not necessarily require any ill will or hatred of the person killed. [¶] Aforethought does not imply deliberation or the lapse of considerable time. It only means that the required mental state must precede rather than follow the act. (See CALJIC No. 8.11.) Defendant notes that the instruction limited express malice to a manifested intention unlawfully to kill a human being.  (Italics added.) He also notes the trial court told the jury that a viable fetus is not a human being for purposes of the crime of manslaughter.... He then argues the combined effect of the instructions allowed the jury to apply any malice found towards Doreen to the killing of the fetus, allowing a second degree murder verdict without a separate finding of malice with respect to the fetus. Defendant asserts that, under the instructions, the malice required for fetal murder would have been established by the jury's finding defendant acted with an intent to kill Doreen or a wanton disregard for her life. If defendant believed the instructions were incomplete or needed elaboration, it was his obligation to request additional or clarifying instructions. ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 391 [63 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708].) His failure to do so waives the claim in this court. ( People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1218 [283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163].) Even if we considered defendant's argument on its merits, it would fail. As the Attorney General points out, the trial court told the jury not to single out any individual point or instruction: You are to consider all the instructions as a whole and are to regard each in the light of all the others. The instructions made plain that malice was a separate element that had to be proved for each of the two murders charged. The trial court instructed the jury that a verdict of guilt of the alleged fetal murder required a finding that defendant killed the fetus with malice aforethought. The court gave no instruction on transferred intent that could have suggested to the jury that malice towards Doreen could satisfy the element of malice for the fetal murder as well. It is not reasonably likely the instructions misled the jury into thinking it could convict defendant of two murders while finding malice aforethought only as to one victim's death. (Cf. People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1078; Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1230.) We also note again that the jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder for killing the fetus. The jury instructions explicitly and repeatedly stated that a conviction for murder of a viable human fetus required proof that the killing was done with malice aforethought. The instructions on second degree murder included both express and implied malice: Murder of the second degree is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being, but the evidence is insufficient to establish deliberation and premeditation. [¶] Murder of the second degree is also the unlawful killing of a human being as the direct causal result of an intentional act involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death, which act is done for a base anti-social purpose and with wanton disregard for human life. [¶] In other words, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another, and who acts with conscious disregard for human life. [¶] When the killing is the direct result of such an act, it is not necessary to establish that the defendant intended that his act would result in the death of a human being. The verdict on the fetal murder charge plainly shows that the jury was not confused by the reference to human being in the second degree murder instruction. By the same token, only speculation could suggest the jury thought that the malice instruction's references to human being and human life excluded the fetus. Nothing suggests the jury believed that finding proof of malice for Doreen's killing obviated the need to find defendant killed her fetus with malice aforethought. (Cf. People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1245-1246 [278 Cal. Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899].)