Opinion ID: 174055
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officers Alvarez and Lopez-Lopez

Text: In contrast to Officer Granado, Fennell did accuse Officers Alvarez and Lopez-Lopez of using excessive force. The district court found that Officers Alvarez and Lopez-Lopez were entitled to summary judgment because Fennell failed to present evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that a constitutional violation occurred. Fennell argues that the district court committed reversible error in arriving at its conclusion. We agree.
To prevail on an excessive force claim at summary judgment, a plaintiff must present evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find the following: “(1) an injury (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.” See Ontiveros, 564 F.3d at 382 (quotation marks omitted). The district court held that Fennell failed to present evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find for him on each of the three elements of an excessive force claim. Fennell argues that the district court’s conclusion as to the first two elements was premature and that he presented sufficient evidence of the final element. We will examine Fennell’s arguments in turn. The district court found that Fennell failed to present any evidence of an injury and, as a result, granted Officers Alvarez and Lopez-Lopez summary 7 Case: 07-50986 Document: 00511215100 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/25/2010 No. 07-50986 judgment. The district court’s injury finding was based solely on the portions of Fennell’s medical records that the officers found to be relevant and saw fit to produce. Before the district court granted the officers summary judgment, Fennell made a Rule 56(f) motion for a continuance to obtain certain medical documents allegedly showing that he had suffered an injury. Fennell argued in his motion that the defendants had those medical records in their possession and that he did not have access to them. The district court denied Fennell’s 56(f) motion. We review the district court’s denial of Fennell’s 56(f) motion for an abuse of discretion. Raby v. Livingston, 600 F.3d 552, 561 (5th Cir. 2010). “Rule 56(f) discovery motions are broadly favored and should be liberally granted because the rule is designed to safeguard non-moving parties from summary judgment motions that they cannot adequately oppose.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). A “request to stay summary judgment under Rule 56(f) must set forth a plausible basis for believing that specified facts, susceptible of collection within a reasonable time frame, probably exist and indicate how the emergent facts, if adduced, will influence the outcome of the pending summary judgment motion.” Id. “When a party is not given a full and fair opportunity to discover information essential to its opposition to summary judgment, the limitation on discovery is reversible error.” Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 720 (5th Cir. 1999). In his Rule 56(f) motion, Fennell identified the following pieces of evidence that he believed would allow him to create a jury question as to his alleged injury: (1) “Medical Reports from JT Montford;” and (2) “MRI Reports recently taken by JT Montford Hospital in Lubbock, Tx.” The discovery of such evidence could have allowed Fennell to create a fact issue as to whether he suffered an 8 Case: 07-50986 Document: 00511215100 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/25/2010 No. 07-50986 injury, and no party has pointed to anything in the record that shows that Fennell had a full and fair opportunity to discover this essential evidence. Moreover, the district court did not state its reasons as to why Fennell’s motion was denied. As a consequence, we conclude, on the basis of the record before us, that the district court’s denial of Fennell’s 56(f) motion was an abuse of discretion. As an alternative basis for judgment, the district court also found that Fennell failed to create a fact issue as to the third element of his excessive force claim. Specifically, the district court found that Fennell failed to produce evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that Officers Alvarez and Lopez-Lopez used force or that their use of force was excessive and clearly unreasonable. Fennell argues that his complaints, which were verified as true and correct, constituted such evidence. Based on a review of Fennell’s complaints and the fact that his verified complaints are competent summary judgment evidence, King, 31 F.3d at 346, we agree. A defendant’s use of force against a plaintiff is excessive and clearly unreasonable if the plaintiff posed no threat and the force was not used in a “good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.” See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992); Clark v. Gonzalez, No. 96-41146, 1997 WL 681275, at -3 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 1997) (holding that slamming a prisoner into walls was an excessive use of force when the prisoner was handcuffed and did nothing to provoke the officers);4 Carrington v. City of Lufkin, No. 94-40139, 1994 WL 500481, at  (5th Cir. Aug. 31, 1994) (finding that banging a person’s head into 4 While Clark is non-precedential, we find it to be instructive and persuasive. 9 Case: 07-50986 Document: 00511215100 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/25/2010 No. 07-50986 a car and dropping them to the ground when they posed no threat would be “an objectively unreasonable use of force clearly excessive to the need”). The district court found that Fennell failed to present evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that excessive and unreasonable force was used against him. In arriving at its decision, the district court appears to have accepted the version of the events contained in Officers Alvarez’s and LopezLopez’s affidavits, which assert that no one slammed Fennell into a wall and that Fennell twisted his own wrist in the food tray. Fennell’s original and amended complaints contain a different story. In his complaints, Fennell alleged that Officer Alvarez slammed him into a wall, injuring his shoulder, and that, when he was already behind bars in the segregation shower, Officer Lopez-Lopez forcefully twisted his wrist, resulting in an injury to his wrist and further injury to his shoulder. Fennell alleges that he did not provoke the officers and that he did nothing to require either officer to use any force against him. If proven, the version of events as testified to by Fennell would allow a reasonable jury to find that Officers Alvarez and Lopez-Lopez used excessive force in violation of the Constitution. “Any credibility determinations [that the district court] made between the officers’ and [Fennell’s] version of events [was] inappropriate for summary judgment.” See Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 753 (5th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in finding that Fennell failed to create a jury question as to whether any force was used or that such force was excessive and clearly unreasonable. In summary, Fennell may have alleged sufficient facts to create a jury question with respect to his excessive force claim against Officers Alvarez and Lopez-Lopez. However, we cannot definitively determine whether this is true 10 Case: 07-50986 Document: 00511215100 Page: 11 Date Filed: 08/25/2010 No. 07-50986 because Fennell may not have suffered any injury and further discovery is required to determine whether Fennell can obtain any evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that he suffered an injury.
The district court also granted Officers Alvarez and Lopez-Lopez summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. When a defendant pleads qualified immunity as an affirmative defense and moves for summary judgment on that basis, a court must decide two questions: (1) whether the plaintiff has presented evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that the defendants violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (2) whether the “defendant’s actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question.” See Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 410-11 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Ontiveros, 564 F.3d at 382; Tarver, 410 F.3d at 753. If we accepted the version of events found in Fennell’s verified complaint, we would find that Officers Alvarez and Lopez-Lopez were not entitled to qualified immunity. See Tarver, 410 F.3d at 753-54 (finding that an officer was not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when the record contained evidence showing that force was used against a plaintiff who posed no threat to the officer); Carrington, 1994 WL 500481 at ; see also Clark, 1997 WL 681275 at  (finding that officers were not entitled to qualified immunity at summary judgment when the record contained evidence showing that the prisoner, who had been handcuffed, had been beaten in an unprovoked attack). However, at this juncture in the litigation, we cannot definitively decide whether Officers Alvarez and Lopez-Lopez are entitled to qualified immunity because further discovery is necessary to determine whether Fennell has produced sufficient 11 Case: 07-50986 Document: 00511215100 Page: 12 Date Filed: 08/25/2010 No. 07-50986 evidence of a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the district court should revisit the issue of qualified immunity after discovery is complete.