Opinion ID: 515812
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing phase

Text: 373 One of Petitioner's main contentions in his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is that his defense team failed to render effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial. Because the record was silent as to a number of important questions, the Court felt that an evidentiary hearing was indicated. See generally Townsend v. Zain, supra. The Court has heard the trial attorneys for Petitioner as well as several other witnesses, who offered testimony that Petitioner argues should have been presented in mitigation in 1975. 374 The hearing evidence shows that Thomas Knight grew up in an impoverished home. He was the eldest son, one of fifteen children of Anna and S.T. Knight. Thomas and the other children were frequently beaten by their alcoholic and violent father. The father was sent to prison when Thomas was nine for attempting to rape or raping one of Thomas's sisters. Thomas was shortly thereafter sent to a boys' school at the age of nine because of a lack of supervision at home and because he had been getting into juvenile trouble repeatedly. Thomas was sent to Raiford when he was fourteen. He was a patient at a mental hospital when he was eighteen. The record evidences the extremely disadvantaged early years of Petitioner. The other conditions and circumstances of the unhappy family life of Petitioner were the subject of testimony from Petitioner's sisters, mother, aunt, schoolteacher, probation officer, boys' school headmaster, and an old family friend. 375 The standard for determining ineffectiveness of counsel is the same for both the guilt and sentencing phase of a trial. Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. at 686] 80 L.Ed.2d at 693 [104 S.Ct. at ---]; King v. Strickland, 748 F.2d 1462, 1463 (11th Cir.1984). A defendant challenging a death sentence must show that without the error, there is a reasonable probability that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Id. (quoting Washington, [466 U.S. at 695] 80 L.Ed.2d at 698 [104 S.Ct. at 2068]. 376 In the instant cause, the testimony of Petitioner's trial counsel shows that then-defendant Knight refused to allow his defense lawyers to put his mother on the stand to offer what his counsel felt would be potentially mitigating evidence. The lawyers were in agreement on this. The lead attorneys, Matthews and Meadows, each felt that presenting the mother to the jury would have created some sympathy for the defendant, against whom they recognized the case was very strong. The Petitioner adamantly refused to allow the lawyers to present his mother and to elicit testimony from her. The lawyers testified that more than once they attempted to dissuade Petitioner from this course, but he would not change his position. Petitioner wanted to leave her out of it. Although Mrs. Knight had been subpoenaed, and prepared to testify, she was not called. Additionally, Petitioner instructed his attorney not to involve his wife, Beatrice, in the case. The wife, in turn, expressed reluctance at becoming involved. In any event, she did not provide any particularly useful information to the attorneys. Attorney Hutchinson testified that Petitioner became almost vehement when Beatrice appeared at the pretrial hearing. 377 Moreover, the lead attorneys each testified that the Petitioner did not want his family background or history explored and made public for mitigation purposes. The lawyers testified that Petitioner did not want the subject of his father brought out at the penalty phase. Petitioner's lead attorney, Matthews, recalled that Petitioner did not want his family's history of mental illness or his father's imprisonment for the rape incident to become matters of public knowledge. Petitioner's reluctance was based, Matthews recalled, on the intensely personal subject matter (which he had not been able to face in his adult life) rather than mere embarrassment. Matthews recalled that the defense team considered other witnesses, but felt that none could have done as well as the mother as far as relating the family history and eliciting sympathy from the jury for Petitioner. Matthews also testified that he felt that the defendant would be disruptive and make it unbearable in the courtroom if the attorneys circumvented his wishes by putting on the information themselves. Matthews also testified that coming from the mother, the history would have been sympathetic, but it would not have been sympathetic coming from a cold piece of paper. The idea of putting the defendant on the stand was also considered, but rejected because of the attorneys' conclusion that he was quite vulnerable. His counsel felt that the State would have eaten him alive. The attorney testified further that Petitioner was not considered to be a promising witness in mitigation on his own behalf because of his temperament. Lt. Duval was also considered, but the attorneys felt that his testimony in mitigation would not have been sympathetic. 378 The sisters and aunt of Petitioner testified at the evidentiary hearing that they were not approached by defense counsel at the time of trial for the purpose of questioning or testifying on Petitioner's behalf. However, attorney Matthews testified that after learning of the defendant's decision not to go into the subject matter of his childhood and family background, the problems with his father, and his refusal to allow his mother or his wife to participate, Matthews did not pursue other character witnesses. The defendant's refusal made Matthews desperate, but it was decided to build the penalty phase presentation around anything favorable to Knight that had been produced during the guilt phase of the trial. 379 The questions presented by this case--where counsel did not present additional witnesses during the sentencing phase--seem to be governed by the cases of Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 886 (11th Cir.1985) and Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir.1986). In Mitchell, the defendant, who had pled guilty to murder, instructed his attorney, to leave his father and his family out of the case. The attorney felt that the father was the only avenue into the defendant's family situation. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that [w]hen a defendant preempts his attorney's strategy by insisting that a different defense be followed, no claim of ineffectiveness can be made. Foster v. Strickland, 707 F.2d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 993, [80 L.Ed.2d 847] 104 S.Ct. 2375 (1984); See Autrey v. McKaskle, 727 F.2d 358, 360-61 (5th Cir.1984). Id. at 889. Although a capital defendant's stated desire not to use character witnesses does not negate the duty to investigate, it limits the scope of the investigation required. Id. at 890 (citing Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086, 1094 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 910, [76 L.Ed.2d 815] 103 S.Ct. 1886 (1983)). 380 In this instance, the attorneys for defendant Knight did not fail to conduct any investigation whatsoever. They spoke repeatedly to the defendant's mother, and spoke also to his wife. The defendant emphatically instructed them not to explore the subject matter that he now contends was erroneously omitted. The trial attorneys for the Petitioner conducted an independent investigation, according to Matthews, which led them to Ft. Pierce, Lt. Duval, and to MacClenny Hospital. But Matthews did not discuss other family members with the Petitioner because Petitioner's adamancy about his mother's not testifying and about the family history being left alone led Matthews to conclude that he just knew it was out of the question to request other family members to testify. 381 The Mitchell court found that Mitchell's attorney had acted reasonably when he decided not to pursue an investigation independent of Mitchell or his father. 382 In Thompson v. Wainwright, the defendant, convicted of a heinous murder, instructed his attorney, Solomon, not to investigate his childhood and early family life. Thompson contended that his attorney should not have heeded his request because Solomon was aware that Thompson was experiencing mental difficulties. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that although Thompson's directions may have limited the scope of Solomon's duty to investigate, they could not excuse Solomon's failure to conduct any investigation of Thompson's background for possible mitigating evidence. Id. (emphasis in original) Solomon's explanation that he did not investigate potential mitigating evidence because of Thompson's request was particularly disturbing to the court where Solomon himself believed that Thompson had mental difficulties. Based upon these circumstances, the court found that Solomon's failure to conduct any investigation of Thompson's background fell outside the scope of reasonably professional assistance (although the petition was denied for failure to show prejudice). Id. 383 Here, an investigation was undertaken. Counsel testified that the investigation into the defendant's background was curtailed after the defendant indicated that he would not permit the fruits of the investigation to be presented to the jury. Counsel further testified that he did the best he could with what he had to work with after the defendant persisted in his refusal to let his mother testify or to let aspects of his family background be presented. Matthews testified that his strategy would be to incorporate by reference into the penalty presentation any favorable material regarding the defendant's upbringing and mental history which had been uncovered during the trial. The record shows that this was done. (It is also significant that the State presented no witnesses during its sentencing presentation.) 384 The Thompson court noted that Solomon's failure to investigate was particularly disturbing because it was motivated by instructions from a defendant about whose mental condition Solomon was himself doubtful. In the instant cause, trial counsel for Petitioner found him at times lucid and involved and at other times, like he was not even there. However, Matthews testified that, in his layman's opinion, he did not think that Knight was incompetent, but rather that the stress of the situation caused him to psych himself to eliminate events from his mind. While defense counsel argued to the jury that the defendant was insane or significantly impaired at the time of the offense, there is no indication that they felt that his mental condition precluded him from making rational choices at the time of preparing for the trial. The medical opinions rendered at the relevant times also bolster the conclusion that Petitioner was able to assist in his defense. A review of the record discloses, in fact, a rather articulate and aggressive Defendant. 385 An attorney has expanded duties when representing a client whose condition prevents him from exercising proper judgment. Thompson, 787 F.2d at 1452 (referring to Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-12 (Fla.Stat.Ann.1983). While hindsight may reveal Petitioner's considered decision not to let his mother testify and counsel's decision not to call the mother to have been poor decisions, there is no indication that counsel simply abandoned Knight after he told them not to use the evidence they wanted. As indicated, the testimony adduced at the evidentiary hearing shows that Matthews tried more than once to persuade the Petitioner to let his mother testify about the family background. Matthews had the mother visit her son to try to persuade him herself. Counsel here made the strategic choice to incorporate by reference at the penalty phase that favorable material which had been raised at the trial rather than risk the adverse consequences of an outburst by defendant in the courtroom (defendant had been obstreperous in the courtroom on earlier occasions). Established legal precedent does not require that counsel, in order to be effective, submit to the jury all arguably mitigating character evidence that might exist. Griffin v. Wainwright, 760 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir.1985) (citing to Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, [71 L.Ed.2d 1] 102 S.Ct. 869 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, [57 L.Ed.2d 973] 98 S.Ct. 2954 (1978)). When an attorney makes an informed choice between alternatives, his tactical judgment will almost never be overturned on habeas corpus. Griffin v. Wainwright, 760 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir.1985) (citing Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 966 (11th Cir.1983)). Counsel will not be deemed constitutionally deficient merely because of tactical decisions. Griffin, 760 F.2d at 1513; Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804 (11th Cir.1983). Notwithstanding the possibility that other lawyers may have employed another strategy, a finding of constitutionally ineffective representation is not automatically mandated. Griffin, 760 F.2d at 1514 (citations omitted). While it is a close question, the Court finds that trial counsel for the Petitioner were not ineffective for pursuing the strategy they employed--under the circumstances described--relying on background information and evidence of diminished capacity developed during the guilt phase of the trial. 386