Opinion ID: 621507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Unilateral Waiver by Section 2255 Motion

Text: In ruling that Gonzalez's communications to Wilder were nonetheless discoverable, the district court first concluded that they should be treated more as work product communications rather than true privilege[d] statements. 2010 WL 5399216, at -9. It then held that they were discoverable because of the necessity and unavailability of other means of discovering such work product. Id. This ruling conflicts with a number of this circuit's precedents establishing that the joint defense privilege is an extension of the attorney-client privilege, and does establish a duty of confidentiality on the part of the additional attorney and party to the agreement. Hunydee, 355 F.2d at 185; Cont'l Oil, 330 F.2d at 350; see also Austin, 416 F.3d at 1021; United States v. Stepney, 246 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1077 (N.D.Cal.2003). This distinction is important because [p]rivilege cannot be overcome by a showing of need, whereas a showing of need may justify discovery of an attorney's work product. Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1494-95 (9th Cir. 1989) (quotation omitted). Moreover, the case law is clear that one party to a JDA cannot unilaterally waive the privilege for other holders. See United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 817 (7th Cir.2007) (The privileged status of communications falling within the common interest doctrine cannot be waived without the consent of all of the parties.); John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 304A, 913 F.2d 544, 556 (8th Cir. 1990) (joint defense privilege cannot be waived without the consent of all parties to the defense); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d at 250 (holding that all documents related to common claim are subject to a joint defense privilege that [one party] may not waive unilaterally). The Restatement similarly indicates that one party to a common-interest arrangement lacks the ability to waive the privilege as to other members: Any member of a common-interest arrangement may invoke the privilege against third persons, even if the communication in question was not originally made by or addressed to the objecting member.... Any member may waive the privilege with respect to that person's own communications. Correlatively, a member is not authorized to waive the privilege for another member's communication. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 76, cmt. g. (2000). Nonetheless, the government argues that Paiz's filing of the section 2255 motion can act as a unilateral waiver of the privilege as to both her communications and those made by Gonzalez. To support its argument, the government cites to a number of cases in which co-clients (represented by the same attorney) later become involved in disputes with one another. See, e.g., In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Co., 493 F.3d 345, 366 (3d Cir.2007) (When former co-clients sue one another, the default rule is that all communications made in the course of the joint representation are discoverable.); FDIC v. Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 461 (1st Cir.2000) (joint defense privilege inapplicable to disputes between joint clients). These cases are inapposite, however, as Paiz and Gonzalez were not co-clients with the same counsel, and, moreover, are not adverse parties in this habeas litigation. The district court relied on this court's decision in Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir.2003), in which we noted the longstanding rule that where a habeas petitioner raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he waives the attorney-client privilege as to all communications with his allegedly ineffective lawyer. Id. at 716. We explained that there is an implied choice to the holder of the privilege: If you want to litigate this claim, then you must waive your privilege to the extent necessary to give your opponent a fair opportunity to defend against it. Id. at 720. In Bittaker, we relied on notions of fairness, and balanced the need for discovery against the petitioner's claim of privilege. Id. at 720-22. Here, although noting that Bittaker involved the waiver of the petitioner's own claim of privilege and not that of a third party, the district court relied on these underlying considerations to conclude that Gonzalez's interest in confidentiality should also yield because he faced no consequences from disclosure and yet the petition could not be fully and fairly resolved without it. While the district court identified valid concerns, they represent only half of the equation presented in Bittaker and the long line of cases decided before it: the holder of the privilege has a choice. [T]he holder of the privilege may preserve the confidentiality of the privileged communications by choosing to abandon the claim that gives rise to the waiver condition. Id. at 721. Gonzalez, of course, is presented with no such choice and is an unwilling third-party participant in this habeas proceeding. Thus, a Bittaker -type balancing test does not work here, where Gonzalez has not filed a petition and thus has not chosen to put his communications at issue. In addition, allowing unilateral waiver of confidential communications by a single codefendant without the consent of the others would likely severely undermine the rationale for the joint defense privilege in the first place. See Schwimmer, 892 F.2d at 243 (a lawyer's assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure, and joint defense privilege is an extension of that attorney-client privilege) (internal quotation omitted). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court's analyses regarding privilege versus work product and unilateral waiver by filing the section 2255 petition were in error, and reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.