Opinion ID: 2336032
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Collateral consequences exception to mootness

Text: Joan notes that several other courts have applied the collateral consequences exception to mootness in the involuntary commitment context. She points to social stigma, [13] adverse employment restrictions, [14] application in future legal proceedings, [15] and restrictions on the right to possess firearms [16] as recognized consequences from involuntary commitment orders. She argues we should adopt the collateral consequences exception to mootness and urges us to do so without adopting case-specific requirements; she contends a commitment proceeding will not focus on future collateral consequences and the record available for appellate review will be inadequate. Joan also argues that when we decline to review the merits of involuntary commitment orders, we should vacate them rather than leaving them in place. The State acknowledges there are collateral consequences from an involuntary commitment order, but argues that: (1) an exception from the general rule of mootness requires a case-specific analysis; and (2) Joan has not established any actual collateral consequences arising from her involuntary commitment order. At oral argument the State also argued that certain collateral consequences from an involuntary commitment order, such as restrictions on the right to possess a firearm, are important, and we therefore should consider an appeal's merits rather than simply vacate the underlying commitment order. We have previously recognized that the collateral consequences doctrine allows courts to decide otherwise-moot cases when a judgment may carry indirect consequences in addition to its direct force, either as a matter of legal rules or as a matter of practical effect. [17] Both Joan and the State have articulated sound reasons to adopt the doctrine, at least to some extent, in the involuntary commitment order context. We conclude that there are sufficient general collateral consequences, without the need for a particularized showing, to apply the doctrine in an otherwise-moot appeal from a person's first involuntary commitment order. But we do note that some number of prior involuntary commitment orders would likely eliminate the possibility of additional collateral consequences, precluding the doctrine's application. [18]