Opinion ID: 1249328
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: anti-marital fact privilege

Text: One of the witnesses called by the state at the grand jury proceeding was Ms. Lorraine Cohen. Ms. Cohen was married to Cohen from 1949 until they were divorced in 1976. The Cohens were remarried in September 1984 and were married at the time of the grand jury proceedings. The trial court granted the motion to remand after finding that Cohen's anti-marital fact privilege had been violated when the state questioned Ms. Cohen regarding events occurring during her marriage to Cohen. Concluding that the privilege applies only to damaging testimony, the court of appeals reversed. The anti-marital fact privilege is a creature of A.R.S. § 13-4062(1), which provides that: A person shall not be examined as a witness in the following cases: 1. A husband for or against his wife without her consent, nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, as to events occurring during the marriage... . The court of appeals interpreted the statute to forbid testimony from a person which is against that person's spouse in the sense that it concerns events during marriage which at least impliedly suggest criminal conduct. 169 Ariz. at 553, 821 P.2d at 214. Because it found that Ms. Cohen's testimony was neither relevant nor prejudicial to [Cohen's] criminal liability it held that her interrogation did not violate his marital privilege. Id. at 554, 821 P.2d at 215. We disagree. The statute contains no substantive testimonial limitation. The words for or against do not mean favorable or unfavorable. They mean simply on behalf of a spouse or on behalf of a party opposing a spouse. This court has interpreted the privilege to forbid any testimony, not just damaging testimony, as to events which occurred during marriage unless the non-testifying spouse consents. See State v. Williams, 133 Ariz. 220, 231-32, 650 P.2d 1202, 1213-14 (1982) (decided under previous version of the statute which did not limit the privilege to testimony concerning events which occurred during the marriage); State v. Whitaker, 112 Ariz. 537, 540, 544 P.2d 219, 222 (1975). The fact that Ms. Cohen was called by the state to testify about events occurring during the marriage in a proceeding against her husband satisfies the statute. Cohen had a right to keep her from giving any testimony as to events which occurred during their marriages, not just testimony which actually damaged his interests. Because Ms. Cohen was occasionally questioned regarding events occurring before the 1976 divorce or after the 1984 marriage, or at least asked questions which were not specifically limited to the 1976-1984 period when the Cohens were not married, Cohen's anti-marital fact privilege was in fact violated. But this is not the end of the inquiry. Remand of an indictment is appropriate only where the person under investigation is denied a substantial procedural right. Rule 12.9, Ariz.R.Crim.P. Evidence elicited in violation of a privilege denies the accused a substantial procedural right only when actual prejudice is shown. See State v. Baumann, 125 Ariz. 404, 409, 610 P.2d 38, 43 (1980); State v. Hocker, 113 Ariz. 450, 454-55, 556 P.2d 784, 788-89 (1976). Over and above its construction of the statute, the court of appeals found no prejudice in fact. Cohen does not argue to the contrary in his petition for review. Thus, while we disagree with the court of appeals' construction of the statute, we affirm its reversal of the remand order as it relates to the anti-marital fact privilege issue.