Opinion ID: 2000007
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Error Is Fundamental

Text: The last factor that the trial court had to consider in granting appellee's petition for writ of error coram nobis was whether the error was `of the most fundamental character.' Moon v. United States, supra, 106 U.S.App.D.C. at 303, 272 F.2d at 532 (quoting United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69, 35 S.Ct. 16, 19, 59 L.Ed. 129 (1914)). First of all, we reject the government's argument that because the appellee has not argued that his conviction must be reversed, the error could not be fundamental. United States v. Higdon, supra , involved a challenge to sentencing yet the court did not in any way suggest that coram nobis was not an appropriate vehicle to challenge a sentence (as opposed to the underlying conviction). Moreover, sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal trial; to a criminal defendant, perhaps the most important. See United States v. Pinkney, 177 U.S.App.D.C. 423, 429, 543 F.2d 908, 914 (1976), and United States v. Green, 220 U.S.App.D.C. 147, 680 F.2d 183 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 1204, 75 L.Ed.2d 445 (1983). In his dissent in Green, supra, Senior Circuit Judge David L. Bazelon eloquently stated that [s]entencing is the most important part of the typical criminal trial. Effective legal representation at sentencing is critical to meeting society's urgent interest in reaching determinations that accurately and fairly build upon the past and honestly attempt to create hope for the future.       [T]he first essential element of effective assistance of counsel is counsel able and willing to advocate fearlessly and effectively. Id. 220 U.S.App.D.C. at 155-56, 680 F.2d at 191-92 quoting United States v. Hurt, 177 U.S.App.D.C. 15, 20-21, 543 F.2d 162, 167-68 (1976). See also American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, § 5.3(e) (1968) ([t]he defense attorney should recognize that the sentencing stage is the time at which for many defendants the most important service of the entire proceeding can be performed). The requirements of due process are not suspended with the pronouncement of guilt, but continue to operate in the sentencing process. United States v. Lemon, 232 U.S.App.D.C. 396, 407, 723 F.2d 922, 933 (1983). Appellee's lawyer presented virtually no evidence in mitigation. A sentencing procedure in which significant mitigating information was deliberately not presented to the trial court for consideration due to fear of reprisal does not comport with due process, not only because of the duress itself, but also because of its consequences; a sentence based on incompletethereby inaccurateinformation. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948); United States v. Bass, 175 U.S.App.D.C. 282, 535 F.2d 110 (1976); United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.1970). The language in the court's decision in United States v. Malcolm regarding the requirements of due process in sentencing has been quoted many times: Misinformation or misunderstanding that is materially untrue regarding a prior criminal record, or material false assumptions as to any facts relevant to sentencing, renders the entire sentencing procedure invalid as a violation of due process. Id. at 816, citing Townsend v. Burke, supra, 334 U.S. at 740-41, 68 S.Ct. at 1255 (emphasis added.). In Townsend, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a defendant who, without the assistance of counsel, was sentenced on the basis of assumptions concerning his criminal record which were materially untrue. The sentencing judge in Townsend read aloud a list of eight convictions, passing sentence in reliance thereon too quickly for the uncounseled defendant to object that, in fact, in two of the cases he had been found not guilty, and that the charge at the basis of a third conviction had indeed been dismissed. The Court stated that It is not the duration or severity of this sentence that renders it constitutionally invalid; it is the careless or designed pronouncement of sentence on a foundation so extensively and materially false, which the prisoner had no opportunity to correct by the services which counsel would provide, that renders the proceedings lacking in due process. Id. at 741, 68 S.Ct. at 1255. While the facts in Townsend involved a denial of due process of law when a defendant was prejudiced by a court's careless interpretation of evidence before it at sentencing, Townsend and lower federal court cases support the conclusion that the omission of material evidence from the sentencing hearing would be regarded no less significantly. As the court stated in United States v. Lemon, supra, 232 U.S.App.D.C. at 407, 723 F.2d at 933: [T]he sentencing judge may not rely on mistaken information or baseless assumptions.... [H]owever, courts must be concerned not merely when a sentencing judge has relied on demonstrably false information, but when the sentencing process created a significant possibility that misinformation infected the decision. Quoting United States v. Bass, 175 U.S. App.D.C. 282, 290, 535 F.2d 110 (1976) (citations omitted; emphasis in original). See also United States v. Ursillo, 786 F.2d 66, 68 (2d Cir.1986) (courts have long recognized the right of a defendant not to be sentenced on the basis of `material false assumptions as to any facts relevant to sentencing') quoting United States v. Malcolm, supra, 432 F.2d at 816. [19] The fact that the government was not responsible for Hamid's failure to present mitigating evidence at the original sentencing hearing does not prevent the duressand the resulting failure to inform of mitigating factorsfrom constituting fundamental error. The distinction between duress exerted by an agent of the state and a state agent's ( i.e., trial judge's) erroneous reliance on material misinformation due to an outsider's exertion of duress is not critical. The primary concern of courts is with the accuracy of the basis for the accused's sentence. Whether the duress is being exerted by the government or by an outsider, the purpose is to ensure that a defendant is sentenced properly, based on careful consideration of accurate information and all relevant, material factors. If the court does not have accurate, complete information before it in passing sentence, it should certainly be afforded the discretion to find that the missing information would have affected the sentence it imposed. [20] In United States v. Malcolm, supra, 432 F.2d 809, the trial judge was confused about appellant's criminal record partly because of omitted information. There, the court found that even though the extent of misinformation was not great, we cannot assume that Malcolm suffered no prejudice from the confusion. There can be no question that the garbled criminal record was the dominant factor influencing sentence. We cannot say that the sentencing judge would have given as heavy weight to the true history as he did to his distorted version.       The result of the procedural irregularity is that the sentence rests on a foundation of confusion, misinformation and ignorance of facts vitally material to mitigation. If justice is to be done, a sentencing judge should know all the material facts. The information which was curtailed and precluded here should therefore have been received and considered. Fair administration of justice demands that the sentencing judge will not act on surmise, misinformation and suspicion but will impose sentence with insight and understanding.       [N]o man can make valid judgments without knowledge of the facts. Id. at 816, 819 (citations omitted). Proceedings conducted while an accused was under duress have long been grounds for issuance of a petition for writ of error coram nobis. See Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318, 321 (1882) (all men are by our laws entitled to a fair [proceeding], in absolute freedom from restraint and entire liberty from fear of threats and violence. It is almost a mockery to call that a trial, or a judicial hearing, which condemns an accused upon a plea of guilty forced from his reluctant counsel by threats of an angry and excited mob); State of Kansas v. Calhoun, 50 Kan. 523, 537-38, 32 P. 38, 42, 34 Am.St.Rep. 141 (1893) (where the accused in a criminal prosecution in the district court is forced, through well-grounded fears of mob violence, to plead guilty to the criminal charge ... he has a right to relief from such a sentence or plea by an action or proceeding in the same court in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis ); Hardwick v. State, 220 Ark. 464, 466, 248 S.W.2d 377, 378 (1952) (this writ has been sustained where the defendant was induced to plead guilty to a charge of felony through fear and by reason of the threats of a mob); see also Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S.Ct. 510, 513, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962) (coerced involuntary proceedings are not constitutionally permitted: [t]here can be no doubt that, if the allegations (of coercion and duress) contained in the petitioner's motion and affidavit are true, he is entitled to have his sentence vacated. A guilty plea, if induced by promises of threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act is void.); People v. Butterfield, 37 Cal.App.2d 140, 99 P.2d 310, 311 (1940) (when a defendant is deprived of the right of trial by jury, by extrinsic fraud, misrepresentation, coercion or wrongful persuasion, the writ of error coram nobis may lie). The whole purpose of the writ of error coram nobis is to achieve justice. Appellee's counsel was not free to advocate for appellee. At appellee's original sentencing, Mr. Stow merely repeated the information contained in the barren presentence report, with which the trial judge was already familiar. The trial judge found that if the mitigating factors in question had been presented to him at the original sentencing, the recommended sentence would bear little resemblance to that actually imposed. The sentence the trial court gave appellee rest[ed] on a foundation of confusion, misinformation and ignorance of facts vitally material to mitigation, Malcolm, supra, 432 F.2d at 819. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the error here was of a fundamental nature.