Opinion ID: 2320924
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: marks' contentions

Text: Marks argues that his right of cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment was violated by the improper admission of statements by a non-testifying co-defendant, namely Muhammad. Specifically, Marks challenges the introduction of Muhammad's redacted confession, which contains references to Marks' house, and to Muhammad's presence at Marks' house, on the night of the shooting. Muhammad's statement referred to two different persons named Tony  Tony James Stroman, the driver of the car in which the defendants traveled to and from the scene of the shooting, and Tony Antonio Marks (appellant), to whose house Muhammad went after the shooting. The distinction between these two Tonys was made clear to the jury after the statement was read. Muhammad's statement did not mention or describe any participant in the shootings other than himself and the driver of the car, Tony Stroman. No implication was made that the Tony who lived on Gaylord Street  appellant Marks  participated in the shooting. In fact, Muhammad's statement, on its face, seems to suggest that while Muhammad was shooting at the Littles brothers, Marks was at his home in Maryland. Muhammad's statement was therefore not incriminating on its face. It probably became incriminating when it was linked to other evidence presented at trial, but under established precedent from the Supreme Court and this court, such linkage does not violate the Confrontation Clause. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208-209, 107 S.Ct. 1702; Gray, 523 U.S. at 195-196, 118 S.Ct. 1151; Plater, 745 A.2d at 960-961 & n. 11. In his supplemental memorandum, Marks argues that the meaning and rationale of Crawford nullifies the Richardson v. Marsh edict that statements that are only incriminating through linkage to other evidence is not a violation of the Confrontation Clause. But Crawford does not even mention Bruton or any of the later cases which followed it and applied its teaching. Consequently, Marks' contention that this court should in effect overrule Richardson through its application of Crawford must be rejected because only the Supreme Court can overrule its own cases. E.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997). [24] Marks cites no authority to support his assertion that Crawford overrules or supersedes Richardson, and the limited authority that does exist is to the contrary. See, e.g., Cuong Gia Le, 316 F.Supp.2d at 338. Thus, as to Marks, we find no Sixth Amendment violation and no ground for reversal.