Opinion ID: 775590
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Angwin's Bruton Claim

Text: 29 Angwin also contends that the admission of Khamis's statement violated his Confrontation Clause rights under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968), since Khamis did not testify and was not subject to cross-examination. 30 Under Bruton and its progeny, the admission of a statement made by a non-testifying codefendant violates the Confrontation Clause when that statement facially, expressly, clearly, or powerfully implicates the defendant. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36; Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208, 95 L. Ed. 2d 176, 107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987) (limiting Bruton to statements that are incriminating on their face or expressly incriminating since statements that only become incriminating when linked with other evidence are inherently less prejudicial); United States v. Hoac, 990 F.2d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that a codefendant's statement that does not incriminate the defendant unless linked with other evidence introduced at trial does not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights). A statement is not facially incriminating merely because it identifies a defendant; the statement must also have a sufficiently 'devastating' or 'powerful' inculpatory impact to be incriminatory on its face. United States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1195 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Wright, 742 F.2d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 1984), overruling on other grounds recognized by United States v. Valles-Valencia, 823 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1987)). 31 Angwin argues that Khamis's statement was incriminating in several ways. First, Khamis told USBP Agent Searle that she observed Angwin talking to another man while they were stopped by the side of the road and that Angwin told her to get back into the motorhome and to remain silent. Second, Khamis's statement failed to corroborate Angwin's testimony regarding the details of the real estate venture he was purportedly evaluating, thereby impeaching his testimony and negating the only legitimate explanation for his presence in the remote area. Third, Khamis's counsel used Khamis's statement to argue in his closing that Angwin duped Khamis into participating in the crime. According to Angwin, that the jury found Angwin guilty on all four counts while only finding Khamis guilty on two counts is powerful proof of the incriminating nature of Khamis's statement. 32 Angwin's second and third arguments fail as a matter of law. Khamis's failure to corroborate Angwin's testimony regarding his business activities is not facially incriminating; it is by definition only incriminating when linked with other evidence introduced at trial (namely, Angwin's testimony). That Khamis's counsel used Khamis's statement in his closing to argue that she was duped is also insufficient to make the statement facially incriminating. Her counsel's argument was not evidence introduced against Angwin. Moreover, Khamis's statement did not contain any facts that would suggest that she was duped, and her counsel's argument regarding her statement does not transform the statement itself into incriminating evidence. 33 Angwin's first argument is also unpersuasive. While Khamis did tell Searle that she saw Angwin talking to a man by the motorhome, that Angwin told her to get into the motorhome, and that Angwin told her not to say anything, none of that evidence is powerfully or clearly incriminating. Khamis's statement could support a view that Angwin planned the rendezvous, brought her along for cover, and ordered her to remain silent as part of his role in the criminal enterprise, but her statement could also simply reflect Angwin's anxiety as a person who had been threatened and who was worried about Khamis's safety. See Section II. A. 1 supra (noting that Angwin's testimony was not irreconcilable with Khamis's statement). At most, Khamis's statement was only mildly incriminating, particularly since it was consistent with Angwin's own testimony at trial. As a result, Khamis's statement does not approach the expressly inculpatory confession at issue in Bruton. 34 Even if the district court erroneously admitted Khamis's statement under Bruton, that error was harmless. To establish that the district court's error was harmless, the United States must show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 761 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that an appellate court should not reverse a conviction if substantial, independent and credible evidence of the defendant's guilt overwhelms whatever incriminating aspects inadmissible statements may have had in isolation). 35 Here, there was substantial evidence establishing Angwin's guilt. He rented and drove a vehicle with fourteen illegal aliens hidden in various compartments. He exhibited signs of nervousness such as an inability or unwillingness to maintain eye contact and a trembling in his hands. When asked by USBP Agent Mikuski whether he and Khamis were the only occupants of the vehicle, he lied, and when confronted about his story after the USBP's search revealed the aliens, Angwin stammered and stuttered and changed his story, suggesting that he was lying again. 2 The material witness Vincente-Morales also testified that the motorhome stopped right where his group had been waiting only about fifteen minutes after they arrived. Even without Khamis's statement, the United States had sufficient evidence to persuade a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Angwin was guilty. 36 Moreover, the district court issued an appropriate limiting instruction that Khamis's statement was not to be used against Angwin right before Searle testified regarding Khamis's statement. See Davis, 932 F.2d at 761 (noting that such instructions are normally sufficient to prevent prejudice to a codefendant). 37 Thus, because Khamis's statement was not facially or powerfully incriminating, the district court did not violate Angwin's Confrontation Clause rights by admitting the statement and refusing to sever the trial. Even if the district court committed error, the United States has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. 38