Opinion ID: 1436616
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The contentions of the parties and the standard of review.

Text: Anthony contends that the prosecutor's misstatement of Janice Jackson's testimony, first made early in her rebuttal argument and then repeated immediately after the bench conference which had been prompted by the vigorous defense objection, unfairly prejudiced his defense and denied him a fair trial. He claims that the prejudice was heightened by the fact that the misrepresentation occurred during rebuttal, so that his attorney had no opportunity to respond, and that it was further aggravated when, over objection, the prosecutor was permitted to repeat the misstatement after counsel had discussed the defense objection at the bench  an event which arguably conveyed to the jury that the prosecutor's assertion was acceptable to the judge. Anthony argues that the only remedial measure taken by the judge  an instruction that counsel's statements are not evidence and that the jury's recollection controls  did not cure the prejudice, and that he is entitled to a new trial. Prompted by a post-argument order of this court directing that an additional issue be briefed, Anthony now also contends that the trial judge erred by ruling on the defense objection when, unable to recall with certainty whether Ms. Jackson had testified as the prosecutor claimed that she had, the judge failed to obtain the readily ascertainable facts  Ms. Jackson's actual testimony  from the court reporter. The government responds that the judge properly exercised his broad discretion by immediately instructing the jurors that their recollection controls, that the prosecutor's misstatement was unintentional and did not warrant the extreme remedy of a mistrial, that the defense contention that alternative measures ( e.g., directing the court reporter to read back the relevant portion of Ms. Jackson's testimony to court and counsel) was not preserved, and that any hypothetical error was harmless. We have no doubt that Anthony's underlying claim  that the prosecutor's misstatement denied him a fair trial  was preserved for appeal. Anthony's attorney objected vigorously to the prosecutor's first misstatement; indeed, her assertion, within the hearing of the jury, that the prosecutor's statement was absolutely false prompted an immediate rebuke from the trial judge. Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial, requested that the prosecutor not be permitted to repeat her misrepresentation, and again moved for a mistrial when the prosecutor mischaracterized Ms. Jackson's testimony a second time following the discussion at the bench. The defense objection was asserted far more vigorously in this case than in Lee v. United States, 668 A.2d 822, 830 (D.C. 1995), in which we treated defense counsel's simple statement Objection! as sufficient to preserve a similar claim of prosecutorial misstatement of the evidence. [10] The regulation of closing argument is confided to the sound discretion of the trial court. United States v. Sawyer, 143 U.S.App. D.C. 297, 298 n. 5, 443 F.2d 712, 713 n. 5 (1971); Harris v. United States, 489 A.2d 464, 467 (D.C.1985). A trial judge's determination whether or not to declare a mistrial is likewise reviewable only for abuse of discretion. Najafi v. United States, 886 A.2d 103, 107 (D.C. 2005); Wright v. United States, 637 A.2d 95, 100 (D.C.1994) (standard of review is deferential). The trial court's discretion must, however, be exercised in accordance with correct legal principles. Randolph, 882 A.2d at 219; ( James ) Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 361 (D.C. 1979). The dispositive question before us is whether the judge exercised his discretion in a legally permissible manner when, in response to what turned out to be a serious misstatement of the evidence by the prosecutor, the judge instructed the jurors that their recollection controls and that counsel's statements are not evidence, but took no other remedial action.