Opinion ID: 6496572
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Best Interests – Findings

Text: [¶19] Mother complains that, in its default order, the court did not mention the best interest factors under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a), make any findings of fact about the children’s best interest, or explain why it altered her proposed default order so significantly. Though Mother accurately characterizes what the court did not include in its default order, neither party requested specific findings pursuant to W.R.C.P. 52(a). 4 3 Mother summarily argues the district court’s entry of the temporary order conflicts with our precedent. In Womack v. Swan, we recognized that “[i]n exercising its discretion to formulate parenting arrangements, there may be a circumstance for which a district court’s sua sponte temporary order is a reasonable response to specific problems and needs in the fair administration of justice.” Womack v. Swan, 2018 WY 27, ¶ 13, 413 P.3d 127, 134 (Wyo. 2018). For example, it may be appropriate to enter a brief temporary order while considering a petition to permanently change custody. Id. ¶¶ 12, 14, 413 P.3d at 134. We opine the district court abused its discretion in entering a temporary order under these circumstances. After the 2019 default hearing, the district court, on its own motion, issued a temporary order as a sort of probationary custody arrangement while Father was in prison. That temporary order remained in place for nearly two years—from October 2019 until the court entered the final order in August 2021. The district court may have believed it to be in the children’s best interest to award Mother sole physical custody while Father was incarcerated, thus shielding them from exposure to his imprisonment. But, by doing so, the court failed to ensure the children could begin building a relationship with him through, for example, telephone calls or letters and cards. However, the remedy where a court abuses its discretion in entering a temporary order is to remand for the entry of a final one, id. ¶ 16, 413 P.3d at 135, and here a final order is already in place. We therefore limit our examination to whether the court abused its discretion in ordering visitation and child support. 4 W.R.C.P. 52(a)(1)(A) provides: 4 [¶20] “[A] party who fails to request findings of fact prior to trial cannot complain later of the absence of formal findings, including the absence of findings addressing the [best interest] factors enumerated in § 20-2-201(a).” JT v. KD, 2008 WY 104, ¶ 15, 192 P.3d 969, 972 (Wyo. 2008) (citations omitted). “While we encourage district courts to spell out the reasons for their conclusions, they are not required to do so unless a Rule 52 request is made.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Castellow v. Pettengill, 2021 WY 88, ¶ 10, 492 P.3d 894, 898 (Wyo. 2021); Kimzey v. Kimzey, 2020 WY 52, ¶ 38 n.2, 461 P.3d 1229, 1241 n.2 (Wyo. 2020). Because she did not request specific findings, Mother cannot be heard to complain on appeal that the district court did not adequately address the statutory best interest factors or more fully explain its reasoning. See JT, ¶ 15, 192 P.3d at 972.