Opinion ID: 1483909
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Sanction Issue

Text: We turn to Bar Counsel's advocacy of disbarment as a sanction rather than the Board's recommended five-year suspension with a fitness requirement for reinstatement. Bar Counsel vigorously argues that Mr. Weekes's misconduct warrants substantially different discipline in the District of Columbia pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c)(4), and hence, Mr. Weekes should be disbarred in this reciprocal discipline matter. [3] As the Board explained in its October 31, 2008 Report and Recommendation: Bar Counsel rests its disbarment recommendation on its assertion that Respondent committed intentional misappropriation, for which disbarment is the presumptive sanction in this jurisdiction. The Board rejected Bar Counsel's position because, in its view, [t]he presumption of disbarment under [ In re ] Addams, [579 A.2d 190 (D.C.1990) (en banc)], does not apply since no HM funds were entrusted to [Mr. Weekes]. We agree with the Board on this point. Our decision in In re Barrett, 966 A.2d 862 (D.C.2009) is instructive. There, respondent was the chief executive officer and sole director of NetFax, Inc. He opened a checking account, in the corporation's name, on which he was the sole signatory. Substantial sums of money were deposited in this account for which Mr. Barrett was responsible as a fiduciary. See In re Barrett, 447 Mass. 453, 852 N.E.2d 660, 661 (2006). The Board reasoned that Mr. Barrett, in his capacity as a fiduciary, intentionally converted corporate funds for his personal use and fabricated documents and made false statements to conceal his actions. Barrett, 966 A.2d at 863. Massachusetts follows the principle that [t]he presumptive sanction for . . . misappropriation of client funds is disbarment or indefinite suspension. Barrett, 852 N.E.2d at 668 (citation omitted). However, Massachusetts concluded that there was no misappropriation in Barrett (although there was a breach of fiduciary duty) because the $130,000 taken by the respondent from NetFax's account did not constitute a misappropriation of client funds while the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. 852 N.E.2d at 668. Unlike Massachusetts, which suspended Mr. Barrett for two years, we imposed the sanction of disbarment on Mr. Barrett, not because he had misappropriated funds, but because, like the respondent in In re Slattery, 767 A.2d 203 (D.C.2001), he was in sole control of a bank account belonging to an organization which trusted him to maintain the account properly, but he deceitfully withdrew funds from the account for his own personal gain, and then deceitfully concealed his action. Barrett, 966 A.2d at 864. In contrast to the situation in Barrett and Slattery, Mr. Weekes established no bank account with funds belonging to HM over which he was the sole signatory. Indeed, his function was to review and authorize requests for payments, not to make payments from an account he controlled. Thus, as the Board recognized, Mr. Weekes's case is readily distinguishable from both Barrett and Slattery. As in Barrett, the Massachusetts court did not sanction Mr. Weekes with disbarment (although it could have). Rather, it decided that the stipulated indefinite suspension was appropriate in light of Mr. Weekes's full restitution to HM. Similarly, the Board here followed Massachusetts in Mr. Weekes's case, recognizing that: under principles of reciprocal discipline, it is appropriate to defer to the Massachusetts finding, particularly where, as here, the [c]ourt could have considered the same mitigation had this case been before it as an original matter. Hence, the Board has recommended, as in Hallal, that the functionally equivalent discipline of a five-year suspension with a requirement to prove fitness to practice as a condition of reinstatement be imposed on Mr. Weekes as a sanction. 944 A.2d at 1086. We accept the recommendation of the Board. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Oscar W. Weekes, Jr. be suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for the period of five years, beginning June 24, 2008, with reinstatement in this jurisdiction conditioned on proof of fitness to practice. So ordered.