Opinion ID: 78417
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Batson Violation and Trial Counsel's Effectiveness in Challenging a Peremptory Strike

Text: Next, Philmore asserts that the trial court erred in granting the state's peremptory strike of a prospective black juror, Tajuana Holt (Holt). According to Philmore, the state failed to articulate a genuine, race-neutral explanation as required by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Furthermore, Philmore asserts that his trial counsel did not effectively challenge the strike. Had counsel done so, Philmore contends there is a reasonable probability that Holt could have swayed the entire jury to vote for life imprisonment. Holt stated in her jury questionnaire that I feel that people shouldn't get the death penalty. Just let them stay in prison for the rest of their lives. Philmore, 820 So.2d at 929. During voir dire, however, Holt stated that the death penalty may be appropriate in some cases. See id. The prosecutor offered three reasons for peremptorily striking Holt: (1) Holt's answers in her questionnaire differed from her responses during voir dire; (2) Holt's mother, who was a managing clerk in the trial judge's division, had advised the prosecution that it would do better without her daughter on the jury; and (3) the prosecutor thought Holt was sleeping throughout voir dire. See id. at 929-30. Based on the variance between Holt's answers to the jury questionnaire and her responses during voir dire, the trial court concluded that the government's explanation was facially race neutral and therefore granted the peremptory strike. See id. at 930. Philmore's counsel, Garland, objected to the strike but did not renew the objection before the jury was sworn. See id. The Florida Supreme Court decided on direct appeal that Philmore's Batson claim had been waived because his trial counsel failed to renew his objection to the peremptory strike before the jury was sworn. See id. The Florida Supreme Court cited several cases where this procedural default rule had been regularly applied under Florida law. See id. The Florida Supreme Court alternatively ruled that even if this claim was not procedurally barred, it has no merit because the State has advanced a facially race-neutral non-pretextual reason for peremptorily challenging Holt. Id. In Philmore's post-conviction proceedings, the Florida Supreme Court reiterated that the substantive issue of the strike's validity was procedurally barred. See Philmore, 937 So.2d at 585. We are precluded from considering Philmore's Batson claim because the last state court rendering a judgment in the case clearly and expressly state[d] that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar. Parker v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 331 F.3d 764, 771 (11th Cir.2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A federal habeas claim may not be reviewed on the merits where a state court determined, as here, that the petitioner failed to comply with an independent and adequate state procedural rule that is regularly followed. See Siebert v. Allen, 455 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir.2006). We must abide by the Florida Supreme Court's decision, even though the court made an alternative merits ruling. See Parker, 331 F.3d at 774-75 (explaining that an alternative merits holding leaves the procedural bar in place). Furthermore, Philmore does not argue that there is any cause or prejudice to excuse his procedural default. See Siebert, 455 F.3d at 1272. The requisite cause ordinarily turns on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In the absence of any argument or evidence that cause and actual prejudice exists, we conclude that Philmore fails to satisfy this equitable exception to the procedural bar doctrine. We therefore turn to the issue of trial counsel's effectiveness in challenging the strike. Strickland requires a petitioner to show both that his counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced his defense. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. A deficient performance means that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id. An attorney's actions need only fall within the wide range of professionally competent assistance to pass constitutional muster. Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. Moreover, appellate courts should not second-guess counsel's assistance. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way. Id. To counteract the distorting effects of hindsight, the petitioner bears the burden of overcoming a strong presumption that the challenged action is sound trial strategy. Id. That presumption may be rebutted if the petitioner establishes that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take. Haliburton v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 342 F.3d 1233, 1243 (11th Cir.2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In order to establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. We need not analyze the prejudice prong if a defendant fails to establish deficient performance, or vice versa. See Porter v. Att'y Gen., 552 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir.2008) (per curiam). We agree with the Florida Supreme Court that Philmore cannot establish any prejudice from his attorney's performance given its previous alternative holding that the strike was facially race-neutral and non-pretextual. See Philmore, 937 So.2d at 585. Aside from the lack of prejudice, we also conclude that counsel was not deficient. Philmore contends that trial counsel failed to challenge the strike. To the contrary, Garland objected to the state's peremptory strike on grounds that it was race-based, and objected to the statement of the prospective juror's mother as being hearsay. Philmore argues that his attorney should have determined what questions the prosecution asked Holt's mother and whether the state had questioned family members of prospective white jurors. Such information would have made little difference, however, because the trial court based its decision on the prosecution's first reason for the strike  namely, the differences in Holt's answers regarding the death penalty. Accordingly, Philmore has failed to show that his counsel's performance fell outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, or a reasonable probability that, but for his attorney's actions, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 2068. The district court correctly denied habeas relief on this claim.