Opinion ID: 1158890
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Specific Intent Issue

Text: (2) Rocha's principal contention is that assault with a deadly weapon is a specific intent crime. In People v. Hood, supra , the issue of whether simple assault and assault with a deadly weapon are general or specific intent offenses was reexamined. Faced with the assertion that voluntary intoxication should be a defense to those crimes, we declined to categorize the intent requirement as either general or specific, but ruled that the nature of the requisite intent is such that it is not susceptible to negation through a showing of voluntary intoxication. Nevertheless, our opinion in Hood has been interpreted, albeit with conflicting results, as being determinative of the issue. [1] In People v. Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d 444, it was recognized that the terms, general and specific intent, are often indistinguishable when viewed in contexts other than the applicability of the defense of voluntary intoxication. [2] Policy considerations, not the specific intent-general intent dichotomy, were the principal bases of that opinion. Since alcohol is so often a factor inducing simple assaults and assaults with a deadly weapon it would be anomolous to permit exculpation because of intoxication. However, an additional factor was the variance between the nature of the intent to commit a battery which has always been deemed a general intent and the intent to commit an assault for the purpose of causing a particular additional result (e.g., assault with intent to murder or rape). The latter intent has been labeled a specific intent. The legislative history of Penal Code section 245 indicates that the Legislature differentiated assault with a deadly weapon from specific intent crimes. When the Penal Code was adopted in 1872 section 245 read, Every person who, with intent to do bodily harm, commits an assault with a deadly weapon is guilty of a felony. [3] All reference to intent was deleted from the section in 1873 when it was amended to its present form. In People v. Turner, 65 Cal. 540, 542 [4 P. 553], the court rejected defense counsel's argument that the 1873 amendment had not changed the essential elements of the crime and stated that it was unnecessary for the indictment to charge or for the jury to find that the assault was made with the intent to cause great bodily harm. Some earlier cases held that because of an assumed failure of the Legislature to include intent as a requirement of the crime, a violation of Penal Code section 245 could be predicated upon mere reckless conduct. [4] In People v. Carmen, 36 Cal.2d 768 [228 P.2d 281], we disapproved those cases and held that mere reckless conduct alone cannot constitute an assault. [5] It does not follow, however, that assault with a deadly weapon should be classified as a specific intent crime. Traditionally, simple assault and assault with a deadly weapon have been referred to as general intent crimes. [6] The mens rea of such offenses is established by showing an intent to perform an act of such a nature that the law declares its commission punishable as a criminal offense. [7] The act must be committed wilfully but knowledge that it is unlawful or a belief that it is wrong need not be proven. We adhere to those cases that hold that assault with a deadly weapon is a general intent crime. It remains to define what that intent is. [8] (3) An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with the present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another, or in other words, it is an attempt to commit a battery. (1 Witkin, Cal. Crimes (1963) § 255, p. 241; People v. McCaffrey, 118 Cal. App.2d 611 [258 P.2d 557].) Accordingly the intent for an assault with a deadly weapon is the intent to attempt to commit a battery, a battery being any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another. (Pen. Code, § 242.) We conclude that the criminal intent which is required for assault with a deadly weapon and set forth in the instructions [9] in the case at bench, is the general intent to wilfully commit an act the direct, natural and probable consequences of which if successfully completed would be the injury to another. Given that intent it is immaterial whether or not the defendant intended to violate the law [10] or knew that his conduct was unlawful. The intent to cause any particular injury ( People v. Carmen, supra, 36 Cal.2d 768, 776), to severely injure another, [11] or to injure in the sense of inflicting bodily harm [12] is not necessary. In the case at bench there was ample evidence from which the jury could infer that the defendant had the intent to commit a battery upon the victim, Piceno, and the instructions given clearly informed the jury of the elements of assault with a deadly weapon. [13] ( People v. Wilson, 66 Cal.2d 749, 765 [59 Cal. Rptr. 156, 427 P.2d 820].)