Opinion ID: 77264
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Motion for Bifurcated Voir Dire

Text: 91 On this issue, Brown says the district court erred by denying his motion to bifurcate voir dire. Essentially, he sought an opportunity first to question jurors prior to the guilt-innocence stage of the trial, and then a second opportunity for voir dire before the penalty stage of the trial. Brown readily concedes that the natural consequence of this practice would be that the jury determining his guilt might not be the same one to determine his sentence. This issue is closely related to Brown's prior suggestion, that the jury should not have been death-qualified because qualification eliminates some jurors who, while unqualified to decide his sentence, would plainly have been qualified to determine his guilt or innocence. This is a question of law and again we review it de novo. See Murrell, 368 F.3d at 1285. 92 Although the government appears to concede that this issue was properly preserved, a review of the record again reveals that the magistrate judge denied the motion for bifurcated voir dire and that Brown did not appeal the ruling to the district judge. Thus, we have no jurisdiction to consider the ruling on appeal. See Brown, 342 F.3d at 1246. But, even if the parties are correct that the issue has been properly presented, Brown's argument fails on the merits. 93 First, the Federal Death Penalty Act requires, except in four circumstances that are not relevant here, that the sentencing hearing shall be conducted before the jury that determined the defendant's guilt. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b)(1). Thus, it would have been statutorily impermissible for the district judge to use one set of jurors for the guilt phase and then a different group for the penalty phase. See United States v. Williams, 400 F.3d 277, 281 (5th Cir.2005). 94 Second, Brown contends that the use of a death-qualified jury during the guilt-innocence stage violates his Eighth Amendment and due process rights by subjecting him to a conviction-prone jury. Constitutional challenges to the use of a death-qualified jury in the guilt-innocence portion of the trial have been soundly and repeatedly rejected. See, e.g., Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 176-84, 106 S.Ct. 1758; Williams, 400 F.3d at 281 (noting that constitutional challenges by defendants to unitary capital jury procedures have failed). Again, in Lockhart, the Supreme Court held that the use of a death-qualified jury during the guilt-innocence stage neither deprives a defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a representative cross section of the community nor his right to an impartial jury. The Supreme Court flatly rejected the claim that excluding jurors from the guilt-innocence phase who could not be impartial during the punishment phase resulted in a jury slanted in favor of conviction. 476 U.S. at 177-78, 106 S.Ct. 1758. Brown provides no rationale for why the identical argument would be any more persuasive if considered under the rubric of the Eighth Amendment, and he offers no case law in support of his position. Thus, even if the question were properly presented, we would be constrained to reject it. 95