Opinion ID: 2037652
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: howard jones

Text: Defendant next argues that the prosecutor engaged in purposeful racial discrimination when he peremptorily challenged Jones. The prosecutor stated he struck Jones because he was a social worker for the Department of Children and Family Services who would have a liberal social worker attitude, had somewhat pained facial expressions during questions concerning the death penalty, and on a minor note, his wife was a teacher. Defendant argues (1) nothing in the record indicates that Jones had a liberal view on any matter, including criminal justice issues; (2) the prosecutor challenged Jones in part because his wife was a teacher, but another juror had a spouse who was a teacher, and a juror and alternate were teachers; and (3) the fact that the prosecutor struck a black member of the venire who was questioned for a seat as an alternate gives rise to the inference that Jones was challenged because of his race. In arguing that Jones never indicated he held liberal views, defendant relies on State v. Slappy (Fla.1988), 522 So.2d 18. In Slappy, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged two black members of the venire because they were both assistant teachers and would thus possess liberal traits. The supreme court of Florida found a Batson violation in Slappy because even though the prosecutor demonstrated that the unfavorable trait, liberalism, was neutral and reasonable, the prosecutor failed to question the two challenged jurors on the grounds alleged for bias. The Slappy court thus found that the prosecutor failed to connect the undesirable trait to the challenged jurors. Slappy, 522 So.2d at 23. Defendant also relies on Harris, 129 Ill.2d 123, 135 Ill.Dec. 861, 544 N.E.2d 357, where the defendant, relying on Slappy, argued that the State could not rely on assumptions concerning traits possessed by a broad group of people unless the State could show (1) there is some element of truth supporting those assumptions and (2) those particular traits are possessed by the venireperson being excluded. ( Harris, 129 Ill.2d at 176, 135 Ill.Dec. 861, 544 N.E.2d 357.) Defendant asserts that while this court rejected this argument in Harris, this court nonetheless found the two factors important. ( Harris, 129 Ill.2d at 178, 135 Ill.Dec. 861, 544 N.E.2d 357.) Defendant argues that the trial court failed to address these two important factors in the instant case. However, as this court noted in Harris, under Batson a prosecutor need only articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried. ( Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88.) Once the prosecutor has given a neutral explanation, the defense may attempt to rebut the prosecution's explanations as being pretextual. (See Young, 128 Ill.2d at 27,131 Ill.Dec. 78, 538 N.E.2d 453.) Here, defense counsel never attempted to rebut the prosecutor's explanation concerning Jones as being pretextual. The Harris court also gave the following examples as illustrations of this procedure: [I]f the State excluded an accountant from the jury solely because of the State's belief that accountants tend to be politically liberal and sympathetic to individuals, and it was demonstrated that there was no basis for this assumption about accountants, then the trial court might conclude that the State's explanation was pretextual. Similarly, if the accountant in the above scenario were excused, and the evidence during voir dire clearly demonstrated that the accountant-venireperson did not share the traits of liberalism and sympathy toward individuals, the trial court again might find that the State's explanation was pretextual. Harris, 129 Ill.2d at 178, 135 Ill.Dec. 861, 544 N.E.2d 357. No showing was made here that a basis did not exist for the prosecutor's suggestion that social workers have liberal traits. The trial court apparently found this assertion reasonable, and we do not disagree. Moreover, the evidence during voir dire does not clearly demonstrate that Jones would not possess liberal traits shared by social workers. In fact, the record suggests otherwise. During voir dire, Jones seemed particularly interested in the three phases of a murder trial where the death penalty could be imposed, and concluded that it must be for the extra measure for the safety of the accused. Also, when asked whether anything relating to his job at the Department of Children and Family Services would make him more or less in favor of the death penalty, Jones did not respond conclusively, as he replied, I don't think so. Finally, the prosecutor noted that Jones had a somewhat pained facial expression during the discussion of the death penalty. While the prosecutor acknowledged that Jones gave the right answers to his questions, and that the facial expression might have just been a personality trait, Jones' responses and demeanor nonetheless reinforced the prosecutor's view that Jones would have liberal traits. Again, the trial court, in the best position to observe Jones' demeanor, did not disagree with the prosecutor, and we cannot say that its decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant's second contention concerning Jones is also without merit. Defendant argues that the prosecutor challenged Jones because his wife is a teacher, but a white juror was married to a teacher, and another white juror and one white alternate juror were in fact teachers. Defendant relies on McDonald, where this court held that a prosecutor's proffered explanations for peremptorily striking black veniremen are inadequate in light of the [similar] characteristics of the white jurors whom the prosecutor accepted. ( McDonald, 125 Ill.2d at 199, 125 Ill.Dec. 781, 530 N.E.2d 1351.) While this is true, we noted earlier in the opinion that most jurors are challenged for a combination of traits. Here, the prosecutor did not rely solely on the fact that Jones' wife was a teacher. In fact, the prosecutor stated that Jones's wife's profession was a minor factor in striking Jones. The other jurors mentioned were not similarly situated with Jones. Finally, defendant argues that a prosecutor's challenge to bar a black member of the venire from serving as an alternate juror further gives rise to the inference that the prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenge against Jones was motivated by racial considerations. Defendant notes that the prosecutor struck Powe, who was questioned for a seat as an alternate juror. Defendant cites United States v. Grandison (4th Cir.1989), 885 F.2d 143, 148, for this argument. In Grandison, the court determined that no racial discrimination took place during jury selection. In finding this, the court noted that the prosecution could have used peremptory strikes against two black jurors and three black alternate jurors, but chose not to do so. The court noted that the members of the venire questioned for seats as alternate jurors would have had important roles in the case. Defendant believes this supports his argument. We do not agree. The Grandison court's point was that two black members of the venire served on the jury, and three black alternate jurors served important roles, even though the government could have challenged them if they intended to racially discriminate. Grandison, in fact, supports the State's argument, for the prosecution here could have struck the two black members of the venire that did serve on the jury, but chose not to do so. Grandison does not support defendant's claim.