Opinion ID: 1925283
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issue: Did the judge err by refusing to recuse himself?

Text: This Court is aware of constitutional and statutory provisions which regulate judicial conduct. However, these provisions are inapplicable under the facts of this case. See generally Buchanan v. Buchanan, 587 So.2d 892, 895 (Miss. 1991); Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657, 675-79 (Miss. 1990). The conduct of the trial judge in this case must therefore be examined in light of the dictates of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Code). Specifically, Canon 3(C)(1) of the Code requires disqualification of a judge when his or her: impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: (a) he [or she] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. In other words, would a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, harbor doubts about [the judge's] impartiality? See Jenkins v. State, 570 So.2d 1191, 1192 (Miss. 1990) (quoting Rutland v. Pridgen, 493 So.2d 952, 954 (Miss. 1986)). Canons such as 3(C)(1) enjoy[] the status of law such that we enforce it rigorously, notwithstanding the lack of a litigant's specific demand. Collins v. Dixie Transport, Inc., 543 So.2d 160, 166 (Miss. 1989); see also Jenkins v. Forrest County Gen'l Hosp., 542 So.2d 1180, 1181 (Miss. 1989); Bryan v. Holzer, 589 So.2d 648, 654 (Miss. 1991). Keeping in mind the maxim that a presumption of impartiality exists, this Court reviews a judge's refusal to recuse him- or herself via application of a manifest-error standard. Turner, 573 So.2d at 677; Ruffin v. State, 481 So.2d 312, 317 (Miss. 1984) (citing McLendon v. State, 191 So. 821, 823 (Miss. 1939)).
The evidence adduced reveals that the judge, as an attorney, had represented the Neshoba County General Hospital trustees for approximately four years prior to commencement of this action. The judge represented the hospital at a time when the hospital vigorously recruited one of the defendants in this case, Dr. Joshi. The judge participated in an interview of Dr. Joshi and signed the minutes of the meeting during which the hospital stated that it would do everything reasonably possible to help Dr. Joshi build and maintain a successful practice. In addition, the transcript of the hearing on the motion to recuse reveals interchanges between the judge and Davis' attorney, Laurel G. Weir, which reflect great personal tension. This tension seems to stem from a previous case during which Weir accused the judge of being racially biased. See generally Record Vol. IV, at 3-10. The judge resolved the recusal issue against the movant. In other words, the judge decided that the evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption of his impartiality. As an aside, he noted that a prior recusal had caused great inconvenience to the court and to the special judge who heard the case.
The issue for this Court to resolve is not whether the judge committed any wrongdoing, for example, by acting partial or biased. Rather, the issue is whether a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about [the judge's] impartiality. See, e.g., Jenkins, 570 So.2d at 1192 (quoting Rutland, 493 So.2d at 954). This Court resolves this issue in the affirmative. Clearly, the judge's former representation of the hospital created a conflict of interest which would lead a reasonable-minded person to question the judge's ability to be impartial. For further explanation, see Collins v. Joshi & Neshoba County Gen'l Hosp., 611 So.2d 898, 902 (Miss. 1992) (involving identical judge, defendants, plaintiff's attorney, and issue). Moreover, the personal tension which obviously existed between Weir and the judge would lead a reasonable-minded person to question whether the judge would have a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party ( i.e., Weir's client). See Miss.Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(C)(1). In sum, the judge manifestly erred in refusing to recuse himself in this case under these particular facts. This Court therefore reverses and remands this case on this issue.