Opinion ID: 2620444
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pay the Board's reasonable costs and

Text: expenses incurred in the administration and management of the account. Code § 33.1-23.03:9(A)-(B) (emphasis added). The record is therefore sufficient to establish that all revenue derived from Project tolls would fund the Project. Accordingly, we hold that tolls on the Midtown Tunnel, Downtown Tunnel, and MLK Extension, which are (1) paid in exchange for a particularized benefit, (2) not compelled by government, and (3) collected solely to fund the Project are user fees, not taxes. C. Whether the General Assembly Unconstitutionally Delegated the Authority to Set Toll Rates to Public and Private Entities in the PPTA Meeks assigns cross-error to the circuit court's refusal to enter summary judgment in his favor on Counts 1 and 2 of the Complaint for the alternative reason that the PPTA unconstitutionally delegates to public and private entities the General Assembly's authority to set toll rates. Meeks argues that the PPTA violates Article IV, § 1 of the Constitution of Virginia because it authorizes public and private entities to set toll rates on the same project from which the private entity will derive a return on its investment. Article IV, § 1 provides, [t]he legislative power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Delegates. Meeks contends that the ratemaking at 21 issue is a wholly legislative function within the jurisdiction of the State Corporation Commission (SCC). Meeks argues that the PPTA impermissibly delegates ratemaking authority to VDOT, a state agency that lacks true legislative power. We disagree. The SCC does not hold regulatory authority over toll rate setting in projects authorized by the PPTA. It is well established that the SCC has no inherent power simply because it was created by the Virginia Constitution; and therefore its jurisdiction must be found either in constitutional grants or in statutes which do not contravene that document. VYVX of Va., Inc. v. Cassell, 258 Va. 276, 290, 519 S.E.2d 124, 131 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither the Constitution nor the Code provides the SCC with jurisdiction over toll rate setting for the Project. Section 156(b) of Article XII of the Constitution of Virginia of 1902 3 clearly and unambiguously delegated regulatory 3 Section 156(b) provided, in relevant part: The [SCC] shall have the power, and be charged with the duty, of supervising, regulating and controlling all transportation and transmission companies doing business in this State, in all matters relating to the performance of their public duties and their charges therefor, and of correcting abuses therein by such companies; and to that end the [SCC] shall, from time to time, prescribe, and enforce against such companies, in the manner hereinafter authorized, such rates, charges, 22 authority over transportation . . . companies doing business in the Commonwealth to the SCC. Thus, if it were still in effect, Section 156(b) of the Constitution of Virginia of 1902 would have placed ERC, a transportation company doing business in the Commonwealth, within the jurisdiction of the SCC's constitutionally delegated authority. However, in 1971, the General Assembly enacted the present Constitution of Virginia through a complete revision of its predecessor, the Constitution of Virginia of 1902. With this change, Section 156(b) of the Constitution of Virginia of 1902 became Article IX, § 2 of the present Constitution of Virginia of 1971, which currently provides, in relevant part: Subject to such criteria and other requirements as may be prescribed by law, the [SCC] shall have the power and be charged with the duty of regulating the rates, charges, and services and, except as may be otherwise authorized by this Constitution or by general law, the facilities of railroad, telephone, gas, and electric companies. classifications of traffic, and rules and regulations, and shall require them to establish and maintain all such public service, facilities and conveniences, as may be reasonable and just, which said rates, charges, classifications, rules, regulations and requirements, the [SCC] may, from time to time, alter or amend. (Emphasis added.) 23 (Emphasis added.) When the words [and] terms of a provision of the Constitution are not doubtful or ambiguous, we are limited to the language of the section itself and are not at liberty to search for meaning, intent or purpose beyond the instrument. Harrison v. Day, 200 Va. 439, 448, 106 S.E.2d 636, 644 (1959). Article IX, § 2 delegates jurisdiction over rates, charges, and services of railroad, telephone, gas, and electric facilities to the SCC. This list of facilities is exclusive. Thus, with the enactment of the present Constitution of Virginia in 1971, the facilities within the SCC's regulatory authority no longer include transportation . . . companies doing business in this State. Just as the Constitution of Virginia does not delegate jurisdiction over transportation companies to the SCC, neither has the General Assembly delegated such jurisdiction over the Project to the SCC. The authority to authorize and regulate toll roads throughout the Commonwealth is addressed in the Virginia Highway Corporation Act of 1988, Code § 56-535 et seq. (VHCA) and in the PPTA. The VHCA provides that [n]o person may construct, operate[,] or enlarge any [privately owned or operated highway for which a toll is imposed] without first having obtained a certificate of authority from the [SCC] authorizing such construction, operation[,] or enlargement. Code § 56-538; see 24 also Code §§ 56-536, 56-542. Thus, the VHCA granted the SCC the authority to authorize and regulate toll roads throughout the Commonwealth. However, the PPTA, enacted by the General Assembly in 1995, provides that [n]othing in the [VHCA] shall apply to qualifying transportation facilities undertaken pursuant to the authority of this chapter. Code § 56-574. Although the VHCA authorized the SCC to have regulatory jurisdiction generally over transportation facilities, the PPTA carved out an exception for qualifying transportation facilities undertaken pursuant to the PPTA. Id.; see also Code § 56-560. We hold that neither the Constitution of Virginia nor the Code supplies the SCC with jurisdiction over toll rate setting in projects authorized by the PPTA. The General Assembly was therefore not required to delegate any legislative power employed in the execution of the Project exclusively to the SCC. D. Whether Extending the Legislative Power to Impose and Set the Rates of User Fees to VDOT and ERC Was Constitutional We now turn to the constitutionality of the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees being extended to VDOT and ERC. 4 At all times in the discussion below, unless 4 The issue of the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees being extended to VDOT and ERC is one of Virginia constitutional law, and one resolved by state-law principles. This Court has, over time, looked to federal law to help provide guiding principles or to exemplify a point. 25 otherwise indicated, the legislative power specifically being addressed is the power to impose user fees in the form of tolls and the power to set the rates of those tolls. In addressing this issue, we are not evaluating—and indeed cannot speak to—the merits of the various policy decisions underlying this case. Our role is simply to ascertain whether the political entities have acted within the constitutional boundaries that limit the exercise of their governmental power. If so, then their policy decisions are subject to, and properly evaluated by, the political will of the people, and we have no authority to override such political decisions. See Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc., 232 Va. 350, 354, 350 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1986) (Where, as here, the issue involves many competing economic, societal, and policy considerations, legislative procedures and safeguards are particularly appropriate to the task of fashioning an appropriate change.); Commonwealth v. County Board, 217 Va. 558, 581, 232 S.E.2d 30, 44 (1977) (Conscious of the respective roles of the General Assembly and See, e.g., DuVal v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 216 Va. 226, 228-29, 217 S.E.2d 844, 846-47 (1975) (discussing American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 329 U.S. 90 (1946)). Resolving the constitutional propriety of extending state legislative power to both public and private entities, however, is a state-law issue not compelled by, or necessarily coextensive with, federal jurisprudence. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983). 26 the judiciary, we decline to intrude upon . . . a singularly political question. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Evaluating the extension of legislative power to VDOT and ERC requires resolving two issues. First, whether extending the legislative power to VDOT and ERC is constitutionally permissible. Second, if such an extension of the legislative power is constitutional, whether that extension was done correctly. We address these points in turn. 1. The Legislative Power to Impose and Set the Rates of User Fees May Be Constitutionally Extended to VDOT and ERC The Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches are separate and distinct under the Constitution of Virginia. Va. Const. art. I, § 5; Va. Const. art. III, § 1. This directive prevents one branch from engaging in the functions of another. Taylor v. Worrell Enterprises, Inc., 242 Va. 219, 221, 409 S.E.2d 136, 138 (1991); see, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Allman, 215 Va. 434, 445, 211 S.E.2d 48, 55 (1975) (courts cannot rezone property because the classification of lands under zoning ordinances involves the exercise of the legislative power of the Commonwealth); Fugate v. Weston, 156 Va. 107, 116-17, 157 S.E. 736, 739 (1931) (the General Assembly cannot vest the Governor with the power to suspend or remove an officer without subsequent judicial adjudication because the requisite jurisdictional facts 27 necessary to sustain [such an action] is always essentially a judicial function). Therefore, because [t]he legislative power of the Commonwealth is vested in a General Assembly, Va. Const. art. IV, § 1, the General Assembly is the branch of government that wields legislative power. However, we have long recognized that the separation of powers between the branches of government is not absolute. See, e.g., Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 381, 154 S.E. 579, 584 (1930). Practical considerations of modern governance require some degree of intermixing governmental powers between branches. See Baliles v. Mazur, 224 Va. 462, 472, 297 S.E.2d 695, 700 (1982) ([T]here is not a single constitution of any state in the [U]nion which does not practically embrace some acknowledgement of the [separation of powers] maxim and at the same time some admixture of powers constituting an exception to it. (internal quotation marks omitted)). This is particularly true in the area of the Executive Branch's administration and enforcement of law enacted by the General Assembly. As we have acknowledged, [g]overnment could not be efficiently carried on if something could not be left to the judgment and discretion of administrative officers to accomplish in detail what is authorized or required by law in general terms. Thompson, 155 Va. at 379, 154 S.E. at 584. 28 a. The General Assembly Can Delegate to VDOT the Legislative Power to Impose and Set the Rates of User Fees We first evaluate the General Assembly's extension of the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees to VDOT under the PPTA. This extension of legislative power is that most commonly encountered in modern governance, and is easily categorized as a delegation of legislative power to VDOT. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that this delegation of legislative power to VDOT is constitutionally permissible. The General Assembly's legislative powers are without limit, restricted only by express or necessarily implied prohibitions arising from the Constitution of Virginia or the United States Constitution. Marshall v. Northern Virginia Transp. Auth., 275 Va. 419, 432, 657 S.E.2d 71, 78 (2008); Harrison, 201 Va. at 396, 111 S.E.2d at 511. In the exercise of its broad, plenary power, the General Assembly can generally delegate its legislative powers to Executive Branch administrative agencies such as VDOT. Taylor, 242 Va. at 221, 409 S.E.2d at 137-38. Some types of legislative powers, however, are removed from this broad authority and cannot be freely delegated. When determining whether a particular legislative power can be delegated to an administrative agency, this Court consider[s] the explicit language of the 29 Constitution [of Virginia]. Marshall, 275 Va. at 432, 657 S.E.2d at 78. Meeks makes two arguments as to why the General Assembly's delegation of the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees to VDOT is constitutionally infirm. First, Meeks argues that the Project tolls are taxes. If the Project tolls were taxes, then the General Assembly's delegation of the power to impose and set the rates of such taxes to VDOT would be a constitutionally impermissible delegation of legislative power. Id. at 435, 657 S.E.2d at 7980. But as discussed extensively above in Part II.B., the Project tolls are not taxes. The Project tolls are user fees. The constitutional prohibition against delegating the legislative power to impose and set the rates of taxes does not apply to the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees. Second, Meeks argues that the power to impose and set the rates of the Project tolls is a wholly legislative function that can only be delegated to the SCC and not to an Executive Branch administrative agency like VDOT. But as discussed extensively above in Part II.C., the SCC is not the only entity to which the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees can be delegated. The mere existence of the SCC does not create a constitutional barrier prohibiting the General 30 Assembly from delegating the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees to an administrative agency. Thus considered, the General Assembly is not prohibited by either the Constitution or the Code from delegating the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees to the administrative agency VDOT. b. The General Assembly Can Empower ERC to Assist VDOT in Exercising the Legislative Power to Impose and Set the Rates of User Fees We now evaluate the General Assembly's extension of the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees to ERC. This extension of legislative power is different than a typical delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency, but is implicated here by the PPTA. For the reasons set forth below, this extension of the legislative power to ERC (an empowerment) is of a different kind than the extension of the legislative power to VDOT (a delegation). When the General Assembly delegates a legislative power directly to a private entity, [t]his is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936). The Supreme Court of the United States has held that when Congress delegates its legislative power to regulate an aspect of a specific industry to a private entity engaged in that very industry, that delegation offends the United States Constitution. Id. at 310-12 (Congress cannot 31 delegate power to fix maximum hours of labor in the coalmining industry to specified coal producers). But a private entity's mere involvement with making regulatory decisions, falling below actual delegation of legislative power, is not itself unconstitutional. For example, if Congress empowers a private entity to help regulate an aspect of a specific industry, but that private entity's authority is subordinate to a public entity's decision-making power, then the empowerment is constitutionally permissible. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 388, 399 (1940) (Congress can empower private entities to propose minimum prices pursuant to prescribed statutory standards because those proposals were subject to the National Bituminous Coal Commission's approval). Our previous decisions align with these principles. See, e.g., County of Fairfax v. Fleet Indus. Park Ltd. P'ship, 242 Va. 426, 432-33, 410 S.E.2d 669, 672-73 (1991) (holding that a legislative enactment, allowing private landowners to unilaterally veto zoning classifications as well as ordinances and regulations affecting property, was an impermissible delegation of legislative power because it gave the private parties total discretion); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Virginia v. Arlington Cnty., 213 Va. 339, 341, 192 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1972) (holding that a private telephone company's increased rates, when never properly authorized by the SCC, 32 were company-made rates and increases that violated both Virginia constitutional and statutory provisions). We therefore make explicit that, under the Constitution of Virginia, the General Assembly may empower private entities to assist public entities in the exercise of constitutionallydelegated legislative powers, but the General Assembly cannot delegate such legislative powers directly to private entities. 5 With these governing principles in mind, the PPTA is reviewed to determine whether ERC's involvement in the administrative process has become so prominent and without sufficient VDOT oversight that ERC's role [has] trespass[ed] into an unconstitutional delegation. Association of Am. R.R. v. United States Dep't. of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2013). In the PPTA, the General Assembly extended 5 This divide between delegation and empowerment is encapsulated in our previous decisions regarding when a legislative power has been impermissibly delegated to the private sector. However, we borrow the term empower as a means of contrasting a delegation from a related delegation context. In Ex Parte Bassitt, 90 Va. 679, 680 (1894), we evaluated the General Assembly's extension of the legislative power to appoint additional judicial officers between elections, if the public service so required, to county courts. We held that this extension of power was not a delegation of legislative power. Id. at 681. Instead, we recognized that the county courts [were] merely empowered to declare the event . . . upon which the act is to take effect within their respective counties. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, we recognized that the General Assembly can empower other entities to be involved in the exercise of legislative power, but such empowerment falls short of a delegation of legislative power. 33 directly to ERC some degree of authority to be involved with the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees. See, e.g., Code § 56-565(D) (allowing a private entity to make different classifications for assessing user fees); Code § 56-566(A) (directing VDOT and ERC to enter into a comprehensive agreement); Code § 56-566(B) (requiring a comprehensive agreement to provide for such user fees that the parties establish from time to time by agreement, and for the parties to negotiat[e] user fees). The PPTA, then, does allow ERC to have a role regarding the legislative power. But that role is subordinate to VDOT's ultimate decision-making authority. Indeed, the comprehensive agreement which dictates the exercise of the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees is subject to VDOT's approval. Nothing in the PPTA compels VDOT to enter into a comprehensive agreement containing terms to which VDOT does not assent. This means that VDOT has the option of ultimately rejecting the comprehensive agreement and looking for another proposal submitted by a different private entity. Such a rejection could be, amongst other reasons, because of the private entity's unwillingness to submit to VDOT's determination regarding user fees. 34 Meeks is correct in asserting that the Comprehensive Agreement, being a contract, must be made while VDOT and ERC stand on relatively equal footing as a matter of contract principles. See Envirotech Corp. v. Halco Eng'g, Inc., 234 Va. 583, 593, 364 S.E.2d 215, 220 (1988) (holding that grossly unequal bargaining power at the time the contract is formed can render a contract unconscionable). But VDOT retains the ultimate authority governing the progress of any given project by deciding which particular comprehensive agreement will be controlling. This power to reject a comprehensive agreement carries with it the power to shape the terms of the comprehensive agreement, including those terms relating to the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees. It is clear, then, that VDOT holds the ultimate power to establish the terms of a comprehensive agreement under the PPTA. This includes those terms regarding the exercise of the legislative power. The General Assembly does allow private entities such as ERC to contract and negotiate with VDOT in deciding what those terms are. But ERC has no ability to force VDOT to actually enter into such a comprehensive agreement. The General Assembly has therefore only empowered ERC, and has not delegated the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees to ERC. Thus considered, the General Assembly can constitutionally extend the legislative power to ERC, as a 35 private entity, to assist VDOT in imposing and setting the rates of user fees, because here it is a mere empowerment and not a delegation of legislative power. c. VDOT Can Authorize ERC to Be Involved in the Exercise of the Legislative Power to Impose and Set the Rates of User Fees We finally evaluate VDOT's extension of the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees to ERC. This extension of legislative power is unique to the public entity/private entity collaboration context, and is implicated here by VDOT having authorized, through contract, ERC to exercise some degree of the legislative power in the Comprehensive Agreement. For the reasons set forth below, this extension of the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees is only a mere empowerment and not a delegation. The principles pertaining to the delegation/empowerment dichotomy are equally applicable here. This is true even though the schemes in the cases setting forth those principles are not directly on point. In contrast to the aforementioned cases, the current issue is not whether the General Assembly, through the PPTA, has directly delegated to or empowered ERC to engage in the exercise of legislative power. The issue is whether VDOT, having been delegated the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees by the General Assembly, 36 may subsequently authorize ERC, through contract, to exercise a degree of that legislative power. Despite these factual differences, the two schemes parallel one another. That is, VDOT's authorizing ERC to exercise the legislative power is substantially similar to the scenario of the General Assembly's directly delegating to a private entity, or empowering a private entity with, a legislative power. In fact, because the General Assembly delegated the legislative power to VDOT, VDOT's authorizing ERC to exercise that legislative power can be fairly described as being done on the General Assembly's behalf. It would be a poor check on impermissible delegation if administrative agencies could extend legislative powers in a manner in which the General Assembly could not. See Marshall, 275 Va. at 435, 637 S.E.2d at 80 (The General Assembly also may not accomplish . . . indirectly[] that which it is not empowered to do directly.). The issue here is therefore sufficiently comparable to a scenario in which the General Assembly directly delegates a legislative power to a private entity or empowers a private entity with a legislative power. We therefore make explicit that, under the Constitution of Virginia, an administrative agency may empower private entities (through contractual arrangements) to assist it in the exercise of constitutionally- 37 delegated legislative powers, but an administrative agency cannot delegate such legislative powers to private entities. As with the PPTA, then, the Comprehensive Agreement is reviewed to determine whether ERC's involvement in the administrative process has become so prominent and without sufficient VDOT oversight that ERC's role [has] trespass[ed] into an unconstitutional delegation. American R.R., 721 F.3d at 671. The Comprehensive Agreement makes clear that ERC does not exercise unilateral discretion in imposing and setting the rates of the user fees. True, ERC has the exclusive right and obligation to impose and establish the Project tolls. But that power must conform to the other terms of the Comprehensive Agreement. The Comprehensive Agreement requires the Project tolls to be set and raised in accordance with the Toll Rate Schedule. The Toll Rate Schedule—a document which VDOT negotiated with ERC, and which VDOT could have rejected—sets maximum transponder and non-transponder rates. So ERC's ability to exercise the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees is confined by limits which VDOT has expressly created by setting maximum toll rates. Moreover, ERC must give VDOT notice 60 days before any planned Project toll rate adjustment. VDOT therefore retains constant oversight of ERC's exercise of the legislative power to impose and set the rates 38 of user fees. In addition, VDOT retains the right, in its sole discretion, to immediately stop the imposition of Project tolls in certain emergencies. ERC's ability to impose and set the rates of the Project tolls is more than merely advisory. But VDOT retains a pervasive role in setting the limits on, and constantly reviewing, ERC's use of the legislative power. This makes ERC's ability to exercise the legislative power sufficiently subordinate to VDOT's decision-making authority for purposes of determining whether VDOT can authorize ERC to exercise some degree of that legislative power. See American R.R., 721 F.3d at 671 n.5 (reviewing multiple federal circuit court decisions that evaluated regulatory schemes involving private entities and holding that the defining characteristic making such schemes constitutionally permissible was that a private party [did not] stand on equal footing with a government agency). This determination is confirmed by Harrison, where we were presented with the General Assembly's creation of the Virginia State Ports Authority and delegation to the Ports Authority the legislative power to fix and revise charges for the use of the port facilities under its control. 202 Va. at 977, 121 S.E.2d 622. The Ports Authority subsequently entered into a contract which, in part, leased a facility to a private railroad company. Id. at 970, 977, 121 S.E.2d at 617, 622. A provision 39 of this lease contracted away to the private railroad company the power to fix and enforce the rates and regulations for use of the leased facility, a legislative power originally delegated to the Ports Authority. Id. at 977, 121 S.E.2d at 622. Under that lease contract, the railroad company's rates and regulations were presumptively valid unless an unspecified governmental body determined those rates and regulations to be unfair or unlawful. Id. In reviewing a challenge of this contractual situation as being an unlawful delegation of the [Ports] Authority's responsibility to a private entity, we observed that [t]he General Assembly obviously did not think so, and simply held that there is no substance to the point. Id. at 978, 121 S.E.2d at 622. Such a summary dismissal of an identical challenge confirms the constitutionality of VDOT's authorizing ERC, through contract, to exercise the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees. The Harrison situation is analogous to the Comprehensive Agreement between VDOT and ERC. If anything, VDOT's confining the universe of ERC's potential actions with hard limits and continuing supervision of ERC's ability to adjust the Project tolls provides a greater degree of public entity oversight than that which existed in Harrison. Thus considered, in the Comprehensive Agreement VDOT can authorize ERC to exercise the legislative power to impose and 40 set the rates of user fees—a legislative power originally delegated from the General Assembly to VDOT—because here it is a mere empowerment and not a delegation of legislative power. 2. The Extension of the Legislative Power to Set User Fees Was Appropriately Accomplished a. The General Assembly Delegated the Legislative Power to VDOT with Constitutionally Sufficient Policies and Standards The General Assembly's ability to delegate its legislative power is not absolute. A delegation of legislative power allowing for discretionary exercise of that power is not, in and of itself, constitutionally impermissible. See DuVal, 216 Va. at 228, 217 S.E.2d at 846. However, delegations of legislative power are valid only if they establish specific policies and fix definite standards to guide the official, agency, or board in the exercise of the power. Bell v. Dorey Elec. Co., 248 Va. 378, 380, 448 S.E.2d 622, 623 (1994). Absent such policies and standards, a delegation of legislative power is unconstitutional. Id. Constitutionally sufficient policies and standards are those where the terms or phrases employed have a well understood meaning, and prescribe sufficient standards to guide the administrator. Id. at 382, 448 S.E.2d at 624 (citation omitted). The standards must be as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits. Ours Props., Inc. v. Ley, 198 Va. 848, 851, 96 S.E. 754, 757 (1957). But, general terms 41 are permissible if those terms get precision from the technical knowledge or sense and experience of men and thereby become reasonably certain. Id. at 852, 96 S.E.2d at 757. 6 The legislative power at issue is the ability to impose and set the rates of user fees. VDOT is correct in declaring that this is a matter[] of detail [that] may properly be left to administrative discretion. Thompson, 155 Va. at 381, 154 S.E. at 584. But this could not excuse a lack of constitutionally sufficient policies and standards, as VDOT argues. It is because VDOT can exercise administrative discretion in the exercise of a delegated legislative power that constitutionally sufficient policies and standards governing that discretion are required. Id. 6 Meeks asserts that a delegation of legislative power, when the General Assembly contemplates that power to be shared to some degree with a private entity, must be accompanied by policies and standards that are even more precise than generally required. No authority supports this proposition. This proposition does not align with the purposes of requiring specific policies and standards. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) ([S]tandards [must be] sufficiently definite and precise to enable Congress, the courts[,] and the public to ascertain whether the [administrative agency] has conformed to those standards.); Chapel v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 406, 410, 89 S.E.2d 337, 340 (1955) (holding that standards to guide administrative discretion ensure that the General Assembly does not divest itself of [the] function to determine and declare what the law shall be). Such a proposition would further confuse an already murky jurisprudential area to the point of removing any real standards for a reviewing court to apply. We therefore reject this proposition. 42 Therefore, we must evaluate those sources that might establish such policies and standards. For this inquiry, VDOT invokes both federal law and judicially imposed limitations on the exercise of the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees. But we look no further than the operative legislation: the PPTA itself. See Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Smit, 279 Va. 327, 340, 689 S.E.2d 679, 687 (2010) ([T]he legislature may delegate discretion to an administrative officer to determine the specifics of how a statute is to be enforced, but the legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to control in given cases. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). In fact, our review begins and ends with Code § 56-566(B). Code § 56-566(B) directs the comprehensive agreement to set forth the terms of imposing and setting the rates of user fees. In particular, specific guidance is provided for when parties are negotiating user fees under this section. Code § 56566(B). That guidance commands that the parties shall establish [user] fees that are the same for persons using the facility under like conditions except as required by agreement between the parties to preserve capacity and prevent congestion on the qualifying transportation facility. This consideration governs any exercise of the legislative power to impose or set 43 the rates of user fees. 7 Further, this consideration requires VDOT to consider whether the imposition and rates of the user fees will preserve capacity and prevent congestion. By the terms of Code § 56-566(B), then, VDOT's exercise of the legislative power is guided by the directive to preserve capacity and prevent congestion. Moreover, terms such as capacity and congestion are industry-specific goalposts. We have long held such standards to be constitutionally sufficient. See Reynolds v. Milk Comm'n of Virginia, 163 Va. 957, 965, 975, 179 S.E. 507, 509-10, 514 (1935) (upholding a statute allowing the Milk Commission to fix reasonable prices, whereby reasonableness is informed by industry-specific costs, charges, and prices). Thus considered, we hold that Code § 56-566(B) provides constitutionally sufficient policies and standards to govern the exercise of the legislative power: both the power to impose 7 This clause appears to be conditioned on the agreement between the parties. Code § 56-566(B). However, we read to preserve capacity and prevent congestion on the qualifying transportation facility as being a constant consideration that must be addressed by VDOT in the exercise of the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees. See Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183, 193, 715 S.E.2d 11, 16 (2011) ([W]e have a duty to construe statutes subject to a constitutional challenge in a manner that avoid[s] any conflict with the Constitution. (internal quotation marks omitted)). The agreement of the parties—that is, the Comprehensive Agreement which sets forth all aspects of exercising the legislative power—merely serves as the vehicle through which that consideration is addressed. 44 user fees and the power to set the rates of user fees. These policies and standards are sourced in the mandatory requirement that VDOT exercise the legislative power in order to preserve capacity and prevent congestion. Code § 56-566(B). We need not evaluate whether other considerations within Code § 56566(B) supply constitutionally sufficient policies and standards. The General Assembly's mandatory guidance that VDOT's exercise of the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees shall preserve capacity and prevent congestion, standing alone, provides sufficient policies and standards to satisfy the constitutional requirement discussed here. On this point, the circuit court erred. b. ERC Being Empowered, and Not Delegated To, Does Not Require Accompanying Policies and Standards The requirement of constitutionally sufficient policies and standards is one that accompanies the delegation of legislative power. See Volkswagen of America, 279 Va. at 33940, 689 S.E.2d at 686. Such a requirement does not extend to the empowerment of a private entity to be involved in the exercise of a legislative power. As discussed above in Part II.D.1.b., the General Assembly did not delegate the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees to ERC, but only empowered ERC to assist VDOT through the PPTA. And as discussed above in Part 45 II.D.1.c., VDOT did not delegate that legislative power to ERC, but merely empowered ERC to assist VDOT in the Comprehensive Agreement. As such, because ERC has not been delegated a legislative power, no requirement exists that constitutionally sufficient policies and standards must accompany ERC's empowerment. E. Whether the Comprehensive Agreement Unconstitutionally Abridges the Commonwealth's Police Power We now address Meeks' final argument assailing the constitutionality of the Project: that the Project has abridged the Commonwealth's police power. The Constitution of Virginia declares that the police power of the Commonwealth . . . shall never be abridged. Va. Const. art. IX, § 6. The police power, has no exact definition. Blue Cross of Va. v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 349, 358, 269 S.E.2d 827, 833 (1980). However, the police power is best described as the Commonwealth's inherent power, as a sovereign, to enact laws to promote the health, peace, morals, education[,] and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity. Mumpower v. Housing Auth. of Bristol, 176 Va. 426, 440, 11 S.E.2d 732, 737 (1940) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). The Commonwealth's police power is abridged when the government can 46 no longer use its discretion in exercising this governmental power. See, e.g., Nusbaum v. Norfolk, 151 Va. 801, 807-08, 145 S.E. 257, 259 (1928) (holding that if an ordinance, embodying the discretionary exercise of governmental power, could not be repealed, it would abridge the Commonwealth's police power). Meeks asserts that certain terms in the Comprehensive Agreement have the effect of abridging the Commonwealth's police power. These terms include: that the Project shall continue for 58 years; that ERC can assert claims for damages if certain specified events occur, including the construction or expansion of a facility that would have an impact on the Project and the imposition of certain state and local taxes; that VDOT must stand behind the $422,000,000 federal TIFIA loan to ERC; and that ERC can impose and collect the Project's tolls in accordance with the toll rate formula. In short, Meeks contends that these terms prevent the Commonwealth from responding to changing circumstances throughout the duration of the Comprehensive Agreement. We start with the understanding that the grant of authority to public entities in Code § 56-566 to enter into a comprehensive agreement is necessarily limited by the prohibition against any abridgment of the police power of the Commonwealth, as set forth in Article IX, § 6 of the Constitution of Virginia. See Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183, 47 193, 715 S.E.2d 11, 16 (2011). Thus, Code § 56-566 cannot be construed to empower public entities to abridge the Commonwealth's police power. Compare Victoria v. Victoria Ice, Light & Power Co., 134 Va. 134, 144-46, 155, 114 S.E. 92, 9596, 98 (1922) (holding that a statutory grant of power to municipalities to enter into contracts to fix the rates of public service corporations was necessarily limited by the constitutional prohibition of abridging the Commonwealth's police powers). However, that limitation on Code § 56-566 does not limit VDOT's basic ability to enter into contracts with private entities. Indeed, it is a longstanding rule that the Commonwealth and certain of its agencies, boards, and commissions, that is the arms of the Commonwealth, can enter contracts with private entities. 8 See South Hampton Apartments, Inc. v. Elizabeth City Cnty., 185 Va. 67, 79, 37 S.E.2d 841, 8 An arm of the Commonwealth is a description that has been used in referring to certain of its agencies and commissions. See Jean Moreau & Assocs. v. Health Ctr. Comm'n, 283 Va. 128, 141, 720 S.E.2d 105, 112 (2012) (explaining that whether an entity is an arm or agency of the State . . . depends on the nature of the entity); County of York v. Peninsula Airport Comm'n, 235 Va. 477, 481 n.1, 369 S.E.2d 665, 667 n.1 (1988) (observing that an entity that is not an arm of the Commonwealth, still may be a municipal corporation (and, thus, a political subdivision)); Prendergrast v. Northern Va. Reg. Park Auth., 227 Va. 190, 194, 313 S.E.2d 399, 401 (1984) (explaining that the attributes of the particular entity . . . must be examined to determine whether it is an 'arm' of the Commonwealth). 48 847 (1946) (counties); Tait v. Central Lunatic Asylum, 84 Va. 271, 277, 4 S.E. 697, 700 (1888) (the Commonwealth). So the mere fact that VDOT agrees to abide by the terms of the Comprehensive Agreement does not abridge the Commonwealth's police power. Moreover, these particular terms do not bind [VDOT or the Commonwealth] by contract not to exercise [its police powers] from time to time as the public good may require. Roanoke Gas Co. v. City of Roanoke, 88 Va. 810, 830, 14 S.E. 665, 672 (1892). The Comprehensive Agreement must be read as a whole as the embodiment of VDOT's determination of how to exercise the Commonwealth's police powers. This determination includes when not to exercise those police powers, as outlined by certain terms of the Comprehensive Agreement. VDOT, by merely entering into the Comprehensive Agreement, has not abridged the Commonwealth's police power. Compare Concerned Residents of Gloucester Cnty. v. Board of Supervisors, 248 Va. 488, 499-500, 449 S.E.2d 787, 793-94 (1994) (holding that Gloucester County could permissibly enter into a 20-year lease, which had the potential to impact the future prerogatives of the county, because the General Assembly explicitly authorized Gloucester County to do so without prescribing the precise terms of such a contract). Meeks' argument evolves to challenge that it is not the substantive obligations of the Comprehensive Agreement that 49 abridge the Commonwealth's police power, but the mere threat of the resulting breach of contract damages. In a related context, we held that neither monetary costs of contractual performance, nor monetary liability from breaching a contract, constituted a bartering away of [a county's] legislative powers. Id. at 494-95, 500, 449 S.E.2d at 791, 794. Similarly, the fact that the Comprehensive Agreement requires VDOT to pay costs or holds VDOT liable for monetary damages in light of a breach does not abridge the Commonwealth's police power. 9 The Comprehensive Agreement contains an additional term which further underscores how any monetary obligation arising from the Comprehensive Agreement does not abridge the Commonwealth's police power. The Comprehensive Agreement provides that the payment of any damages, losses[,] or any other amounts due and owing by [VDOT] shall be subject to appropriation by the General Assembly. The specter of monetary liability is one conditioned on the General Assembly's consent. The General Assembly can therefore decide not to 9 Meeks argues that the Comprehensive Agreement contains terms that amount to an impermissible penalty. See Boots, Inc. v. Singh, 274 Va. 513, 517, 649 S.E.2d 695, 697 (2007). We will not address this point. Neither a breach nor a particular monetary obligation has been alleged for us to evaluate. At any rate, penalties are unenforceable. See id. 50 appropriate the required funds if such a monetary obligation were ever to actually abridge the Commonwealth's police power. 10 We therefore hold that the Commonwealth's police power has not been abridged by VDOT's entering into the Comprehensive Agreement with ERC, by the substantive terms of the Comprehensive Agreement, or by the monetary obligations arising from performance or breach of the Comprehensive Agreement.