Opinion ID: 1969314
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Great weight and the deference due.

Text: [T]he deference which courts owe to the interpretation by agencies of statutes which they administer is at its zenith where the administrative construction has been consistent and of long standing. James Parreco & Son v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 567 A.2d 43, 48 (D.C.1989) (citation omitted). The executive construction of Section 24-431(a) by District of Columbia officials has been consistent for almost a decade. In Luck I, we applied the great weight principle solely on the basis of DOC Order No. 4340.2. In the present case, the force of the DOC's position is enhanced by the BOP's practice over a period of ten years [14] and, especially, by the interpretation of the relevant provisions by the Corporation Counsel. [15] The view of the Corporation Counsel as to the meaning of local statutes, while not binding on this court, is entitled to great weight. National Org. of Women v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 531 A.2d 274, 278 (D.C. 1987). In a context such as the present one, in which the Corporation Counsel acted in his capacity as legal adviser to District of Columbia agencies, rather than as a party to contested litigation, we should adopt the Corporation Counsel's construction unless plainly unreasonable or contrary to ascertainable legislative intent. Jordan v. District of Columbia, 362 A.2d 114, 118 (D.C.1976) (quoting Williams v. W.M.A. Transit Co., 153 U.S.App. D.C. 183, 189, 472 F.2d 1258, 1264 (1972) (Leventhal, J.)). [16] The views of the Corporation Counsel are especially significant in this case. Corporation Counsel's responsibility to represent the interests of the District and its citizens from a law enforcement perspective often places him in an adversarial position vis-a-vis the claims of prisoners. See, e.g., Luck I, supra ; Winters v. Ridley, 596 A.2d 569, 576-79 (D.C. 1991) (per curiam); [17] Abdullah v. Roach, 668 A.2d 801 (D.C.1995); White v. Hyman, 647 A.2d 1175 (D.C.1994). Indeed, the District's position in successive cases involving Sections 24-206(a) and 24-431(a)Corporation Counsel opposed the prisoner's more extreme claim in Luck I but supported Noble's more modest one herereflects an objective and impartial approach, a circumstance that should reinforce our disposition to accord weight to the District's construction. The USPC contends that [t]he [c]ourt owes no special deference to the DOC's interpretation of Sections 24-206 and 24-431(a). It further argues that because it (the USPC) is also entrusted with administering District of Columbia parole laws, its interpretation cannot be ignored. In my view, the first of these contentions is foreclosed by our opinion in Luck I. With respect to the USPC's second point, I agree that the Commission's views should be given some consideration. I note, however, that federal appellate courts have rejected the USPC's attempt to apply federal standards to District of Columbia legislation. See, e.g., Thomas v. Brennan, 961 F.2d 612, 617 (7th Cir.1992). Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals having certified the present case to this court in order to resolve a controlling question of District of Columbia law, it would be somewhat incongruous for us to be unduly deferential to the views of a federal agency as to the proper construction of our local statutory scheme. [18]