Opinion ID: 552246
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claim of erroneous denial of suppression of evidence

Text: 80 All the defendants except Jimmy Wright contend that the district court erroneously allowed the introduction of illegally seized evidence. 27 They challenge an allegedly warrantless search of the residence of Tammy and Eugene Fisher, an allegedly faulty affidavit to support the issuance of the search warrants, and they claim that there were overly broad searches conducted by the state officers under the search warrants.
81 On the morning of the July 20, 1988 raids, officers searched the suspected lab sites and the residences of Russell and Mary Sullivan and Steve Brown pursuant to search warrants issued by the District Judge of McCurtain County. The warrants authorized the seizure of specified contraband, lab equipment, and other described personal property. At about the same time, the officers also searched the mobile home of Tammy and Eugene Fisher, located approximately 50 yards from the Sullivan's residence. 82 The law enforcement officers characterized their search of the Fisher's mobile home as a protective sweep, intended to assure their safety. IX R. at 19. Later that day the state officers obtained a further search warrant for the Fisher's residence and returned to carry out a comprehensive search of it. 28 The defendants contend that the initial search of the Fisher's mobile home was unlawful and that it tainted the seizure later that afternoon of evidence introduced at trial and used against defendant Eugene Fisher. 83 On this appeal, the government responds to the claims of error in the admission of evidence from the Fisher's mobile home and of alleged error in denial of suppression, arguing also the protective sweep theory. On examination of the affidavit and search warrant, we are persuaded that the protective sweep theory need not be reached. The trial judge was correct in his denial of suppression because, we conclude, the initial search warrant was supported by probable cause clearly shown by the affidavit of Officer Means. Moreover, the initial warrant adequately described the mobile home and authorized its search. 29 The property description specifically covers a white mobile home and says it is one facing west with a redwood deck. It is true that in the concluding portion of the search warrant authorizing search there is a provision for search of said person, vehicle and/or house, building and premises, the curtilage thereof.... Despite this singular reference to house, we feel the warrant should be read in a practical sense and as a whole. Doing so, we hold that the warrant and authorization were intended to cover the mobile home. The phrase last quoted would appear to be a standard form of language of a boilerplate sort, and this should be read with the particular description of the property in the earlier part of the warrant. 84 In sum, we are convinced that the trial judge properly denied suppression of the unfiled or draft income tax return, firearms and truck seized at the Fisher's mobile home. 85
86 Defendants contend that all of the search warrants were invalid because they were saturated with false information and argue that at the suppression hearing, Mr. Means admitted information in the affidavit was false, although he denied that the information was intentionally false. Brief in Chief of Appellant Eugene Fisher at 20-21. 87 After a hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial judge entered a written order with findings adverse to the defendants and denied the motion. I R., Item 20 at 6-9. The order found that the affidavit of probable cause, which was attached to the affidavits for the search warrants, relied on information from previously reliable informants, the affiant's personal observations and confirmations of the informants' information, and the affiant's experience and expertise as a narcotic agent. Id. at 6. Under the totality of the circumstances standard of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2331-32, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the search warrants were upheld. The trial judge noted that the task of the issuing magistrate under Gates was simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in a particular place. 88 The trial judge rejected the contention that there was knowingly false information furnished in the affidavits. The judge noted that the affiant admitted at the hearing on the motion to suppress that the allegation of the actual presence of a drug lab at more than one of the locations was an error, since the same affidavit was used for all four locations. However, the trial judge found this was an inadvertent error and that there was sufficient probable cause without that allegation in the other three affidavits for the magistrate to find probable cause. The judge found there was a substantial basis for the issuing magistrate to find probable cause for the issuance of all four warrants under Gates and United States v. Martinez, 764 F.2d 744 (10th Cir.1985). I R., doc. 20, at 7. 89 We are satisfied that the findings of the trial judge were not clearly erroneous. The affidavit here in question did contain errors. The drug agent in charge of the raids admitted an erroneous identification of the drug locations. 30 The trial judge accepted the credibility of the drug agent in his statement that the mistakes were inadvertent. The defendants have not demonstrated that the findings of the judge were clearly erroneous. Under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2684, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), it was the burden of the movants to demonstrate deliberate falsity or reckless disregard for the truth by the affiant. We hold that the findings underlying the judge's order were not clearly erroneous and the denial of suppression was not error. 90
91 Lastly, the defendants say the warrant was overly broad and constitutionally deficient, because it merely directed the officers to seize a laundry list of personal papers likely to be found in any Oklahoma home, as well as drugs and drug paraphernalia and equipment. Brief in Chief of Appellant Eugene Fisher at 26. 92 The issue implicates the Fourth Amendment mandate that warrants not issue without particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized, inter alia. The trial judge considered the affidavits and warrants and their descriptions of the property which constituted evidence of criminal conduct. 31 The descriptions of the property as constituting evidence of criminal conduct were broad. We agree with the trial judge, however, that the language of the warrant was sufficiently specific in detail to avoid the evils of a general search. In United States v. Lamport, 787 F.2d 474, 476 (10th Cir.1986), we upheld a description against such a claim when it included records of a physician constituting insurance billings, a record book of payments from insurance companies, checkbook stubs for two years, financial records and any other property that constitutes evidence of commission of the criminal offense. In light of the on-going drug activities described in the affidavits, and the nature of the operations, we feel the descriptions were sufficient to be valid under the constitutional standard.