Opinion ID: 2565095
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Essential Elements and Firearms Enhancements

Text: ¶ 10 A trial judge has an obligation not to accept a guilty plea without first determining that it is made voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea, and that a factual basis for it exists. [1] CrR 4.2(d). Easterlin claims that the trial judge failed to do this because, he says, she did not establish that he knew that there had to be a connection between his crime and his weapon before he could be deemed to be armed. See In re Pers. Restraint of Hews, 108 Wash.2d 579, 589-92, 741 P.2d 983 (1987); CrR 4.2(d). The State contends, and we agree, that his argument is predicated on the mistaken belief that the connection between the gun, the crime, and the defendant is itself an essential element of being armed. [2] ¶ 11 We take this opportunity to summarize our relevant holdings. A person is `armed' if a weapon is easily accessible and readily available for use, either for offensive or defensive purposes and there is a connection between the defendant, the weapon, and the crime. Valdobinos, 122 Wash.2d at 282, 858 P.2d 199; Barnes, 153 Wash.2d at 383, 103 P.3d 1219. However, the connection between the defendant, the weapon, and the crime is not an element the State must explicitly plead and prove. See State v. Willis, 153 Wash.2d 366, 374, 103 P.3d 1213 (2005) (holding that the jury need not be specifically instructed to find whether there is a connection between the defendant, the weapon, and the crime); see also Gurske, 155 Wash.2d at 138-39, 118 P.3d 333 (same); Barnes, 153 Wash.2d at 383, 103 P.3d 1219 (same). Instead, it is essentially definitional. ¶ 12 The State urges us to hold that in cases of actual possession of a weapon, it is never obligated to establish a connection on the theory that a person in possession of a weapon is clearly armed within common understanding. The Court of Appeals agreed, and we accepted review primarily to determine whether this is necessarily always correct. The State is likely correct that in actual possession cases, it will rarely be necessary to go beyond the commonly used readily accessible and easily available instruction. However, the instructions in a particular case must be adequate to permit the parties to argue their theory of the case. State v. Dana, 73 Wash.2d 533, 537, 439 P.2d 403 (1968) (citing Smith v. McDaniel, 53 Wash.2d 604, 610, 335 P.2d 582 (1959)). Depending on the evidence, it would not be error and would perhaps be appropriate for the court to instruct the jury there be a connection between the weapon and the crime to allow the parties to argue their theory of the case. [3] ¶ 13 Easterlin has not met his burden of establishing that his plea was invalid because he did not understand the nature of the charge.