Opinion ID: 1646569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The present Louisiana capital sentencing procedure, enacted in 1976, adopted the significant features of the Georgia statute which had been approved in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). The statute requires a separate sentencing hearing after a verdict of guilty of first degree murder (which in 1976, was defined as any specifically intended killing). The hearing focuses on the circumstances of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender. After the hearing, the jury, in order to recommend the sentence of death, (1) must find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the aggravating circumstances listed in the statute and (2) must, after considering any mitigating circumstances, unanimously agree on the appropriateness of capital punishment. When the jury recommends the death sentence, there is an automatic appeal to this court, which must determine (among other things) that the jury's finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance is supported by the evidence. Prior to Gregg, The United States Supreme Court had held that the death penalty is not appropriate punishment for all killings. [2] Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). The aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the Georgia statute were designed to provide standards for guiding the jury's discretion in choosing between those murderers who should be sentenced to death and those who should be sentenced to life imprisonment. Gregg v. Georgia , above. Thus, the aggravating circumstances included in the Louisiana statute enacted in 1976 represented a legislative attempt to define the most serious situations under which murders are committed and the most serious propensities of an offender which indicate the likelihood that he will commit similar crimes in the future. [3] The cases construing the statutory aggravating circumstances have therefore turned primarily on questions of legislative intent. The statutory aggravating circumstance at issue in this case was first construed by this court in State v. English, 367 So.2d 815 (La.1979). The evidence established that defendant intended to kill three kidnapped persons by shooting each one individually at short range, but that two of the intended victims escaped. This court considered, but rejected, the argument that the aggravating circumstance contemplated only a single act (such as exploding a bomb in a crowd) which killed one person and at the same time created the risk of death or great bodily harm to at least one more person. This court concluded that the more likely intention of the Legislature was to include the risk of multiple deaths (or great harm) created by a single consecutive course of conduct in which at least one person was killed. [4] The court further noted that such a construction provides sufficient objective guidelines to guard against arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty. In State v. Martin, 376 So.2d 300 (La. 1979), the defendant, after shooting the intended victim, immediately turned his weapon on three others who were in the same room of the house trailer and shot them to death. Determining that the evidence is sufficient to support the conclusion that the defendant murdered the victims one after the other as a part of a single consecutive course of conduct, the majority concluded that the act of the defendant is within the interpretation of the statutory aggravating circumstance. The dissenting opinion expressed a preference for the distinct act interpretation, noting that defendant only planned to kill the primary victim (who was having an affair with his wife) and that the evidence did not support a finding that defendant at the time of the first killing had formed an intent to kill the other occupants. In State v. Sonnier, 402 So.2d 650 (La. 1981), defendant shot and killed two victims, who were lying side by side, with six rapid rifle shots. The unanimous decision held that this aggravating circumstance is established when the defendant by a single and consecutive course of conduct contemplates and causes a great risk to more than one person. [5] In State v. Monroe, 397 So.2d 1258 (La. 1981), the defendant entered the victim's apartment at night. After stabbing the victim to death, defendant also stabbed the victim's daughter in the back and told her he was going to kill her, but she escaped and survived. The court held that this aggravating circumstance is established when the defendant by a single and consecutive course of conduct contemplates and causes a great risk to more than one person. In 1979, the Legislature amended La.R.S. 14:30 to add the requirement of an aggravating element as an essential element of first degree murder, which had previously been defined as any specifically intended killing. [6] Thus, the Legislature incorporated the discretion-channeling function of aggravating circumstances into the definition of first degree murder, thereby requiring the finding of an aggravating element in the guilt phase of the trial before the offender could even be subjected to a penalty hearing. However, the language of the more than one person aggravating element in La.R.S. 14:30(3) was different from the language of the parallel aggravating circumstance in La.C.Cr.P. Art. 905.4(d). [7] In State v. Glass, 455 So.2d 659 (La. 1984), and State v. Wingo, 457 So.2d 1159 (La.1984), two separate cases involving the same crime, defendants broke into the home of a middle-aged couple, bound and robbed them, and then shot them to death one after another. The court repeated the language utilized in Sonnier and Monroe with regard to the proof of the pertinent aggravating circumstance in the penalty phase. However, the sufficiency of the evidence as to the parallel aggravating element in the guilt phase was not raised by the defendant or discussed by the court. In State v. Welcome, 458 So.2d 1235 (La.1984), the defendant was involved in a confrontation with his aunt and her friend. After defendant shot and killed the friend, he reloaded his weapon, chased his aunt down the street, and fired five shots into her as she begged for mercy. The court reviewed the statutory construction adopted in English and pointed out that this construction has been applied in subsequent cases. The court then concluded: These decisions indicate that one of two factors must be present to satisfy the requirements for the aggravating circumstance: Either a single act of homicide by an offender must create a genuine risk of death or great bodily injury to more than one person, such as the risk created by the explosion of a bomb in a crowded building; or, a single consecutive course of conduct by the offender must contemplate and actually cause the death of one person and the death or great bodily harm of another, such as slaying of four persons in close proximity and in rapid succession inside a house trailer. [8] The court in Welcome concluded unanimously that defendant's actions in that case were sufficiently connected in time and place to constitute a single episode so that it was reasonable for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant contemplated and caused the death of two victims in a single consecutive course of conduct. Again, the issue of the sufficiency of proof in the guilt phase of the more than one person aggravating element was not raised on appeal or discussed by the court, although this was the only aggravating element supporting the conviction. The court considered the statutory construction of La.R.S. 14:30(3) for the first time in State v. Andrews, 452 So.2d 687 (La.1984). In that case, after a barroom fight with two brothers, defendant left and obtained a gun. He returned and searched for the brothers with the expressed intention of killing both. Upon seeing one brother, defendant pursued him with the gun, but the man escaped. Continuing the search, defendant located the second brother and shot him on sight, killing him. He then searched unsuccessfully for the other brother. When he was arrested, defendant admitted that he intended to get both men. The sufficiency of the evidence supporting the risk ... to more than one person aggravating circumstance was not at issue on appeal, because the jury had recommended life imprisonment after the penalty hearing. However, this court set aside the first degree murder conviction because of insufficient evidence in the guilt phase that defendant, as he was shooting Patrick, simultaneously harbored a specific intent to kill Joel. [9] In its reasoning, the court relied on the definition of specific intent. The court pointed out that specific intent requires proof that the offender actively desired the proscribed consequences to follow his act. (Emphasis in original) La. R.S. 14:10(1). The court concluded that no rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Andrews, by firing at Patrick, actively intended to kill both Patrick and Joel. (Emphasis in original) Thus, while the decision could have turned on whether there was a reasonable doubt as to defendant's intent to kill two at the time of the actual killing of one or on whether the time and distance involved in the chase disqualified defendant's acts as a single consecutive course of conduct, the court used language which could be interpreted as construing La.R.S. 14:30(3) to require a single act and rejecting the English interpretation of the parallel aggravating circumstance. [10] In State v. Stewart, 458 So.2d 1289 (La. 1984), the defendant armed himself after quarreling with the woman with whom he was living. While defendant was restrained by the woman's son and sister, the woman ran outside and hid under the house. The sister then ran outside, whereupon defendant shot and killed the son. Defendant then went outside and discovered the sister trying to get into a car. He shot her in the chest, but she survived and testified against him. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, but did not return the death penalty. This court reversed the conviction of first degree murder. The plurality opinion stated that no rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant], by firing at [victim] inside the house or by any other act inseparable from the killing of [victim], actively desired as a result to kill or inflict great bodily harm to more than one person. 458 So.2d at 1291. (Emphasis added) The plurality thus did not construe La.R.S. 14:30(3) to apply only to a situation involving a single act by which the defendant killed one person while having an active desire to kill others as a result of the act. [11] While rejecting the theory that an intent to kill in a future and entirely separate criminal act would suffice to establish a specific intent to kill ... more than one person, the opinion stated that specific intent to kill through an act inseparable from the initial act of homicide would suffice. In the present case, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder solely on the basis of La.R.S. 14:30(3) and was sentenced to death solely on the basis of La.C. Cr.P. Art. 905.4(d). On appeal, defendant has raised the issue of sufficiency of evidence in both the guilt and penalty phases. This case therefore presents the first opportunity for this court to determine whether the aggravating element in La. R.S. 14:30(3) and the aggravating circumstance in La.C.Cr.P. Art. 905.4(d) should be construed similarly, despite the difference in statutory language. As to La.C.Cr.P. Art. 905.4(d), we reaffirm the English construction of the statutory aggravating circumstance that the Legislature intended to classify among the most serious murders those in which the murderer specifically intended to kill more than one person and actually caused the death of one person and the risk of death or great bodily harm to at least one other person, all by a single act or by a series of acts in a single consecutive course of conduct. We further conclude that such a murder also falls within the definition of first degree murder stated in La.R.S. 14:30(3). It is logical to construe those statutes in a parallel fashion. Although one statute involves the definition of a crime and the other involves the standards for jury discretion in sentencing, both serve the function of distinguishing between those murderers who may be sentenced to death from those who may be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Moreover, both statutes reflect the same legislative intent to provide the most severe sentencing exposure to those murderers who formed an intent to commit multiple killings and who did in fact create the risk of multiple deaths through a single act or a closely related series of acts that resulted in at least one death. Finally, both statutes provide sufficient objective guidelines to guard against the arbitrary infliction of capital punishment. Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the evidence presented in this case clearly supports a conclusion that defendant specifically intended to kill more than one person and actually caused the death of one person and the risk of great bodily harm to another by a series of acts in a single consecutive course of conduct. Therefore, the jury's findings of the aggravating element required for its verdict of first degree murder and of the aggravating circumstance required for its death sentence recommendation are supported by the evidence.