Opinion ID: 1135115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Elvik's inculpatory statements

Text: Elvik argues that the district court erred in admitting the statements that he made during the interrogation conducted by Tustin police officers on the evening of his arrest because he did not knowingly waive his Miranda rights, his mother was not present, he was not informed that his statement could be used against him in criminal court and he could be tried as an adult, and his statements were coerced. Elvik first claims that he did not waive his Miranda rights because, after one of the officers recited the rights and asked Elvik if he wished to speak to the officers, Elvik replied yea, I guess. Elvik insists that this reply was ambiguous, and did not constitute a formal waiver. We conclude that the language of Elvik's reply was sufficient to indicate his agreement to speak with the officers. Elvik's colloquial style of verbal expression throughout the interrogation was consistent with his reply, suggesting that his choice of the words yea, I guess, rather than yes, was not indicative of an unwillingness to speak to the officers. For example, the officer who read Elvik his Miranda rights stopped after each passage to ask Elvik if he understood, to which Elvik's replies were ah huh, yeah, yeah, and ah huh, respectively. Elvik next contends that the interrogating officers violated two requirements that apply only to the interrogation of juveniles. Specifically, the officers did not allow Elvik's mother to be present during the interrogation, and did not advise him that his statements could be used in criminal court. Elvik's mother was present at the police station during Elvik's interrogation, and signed a consent form to allow the interrogation, but she was not allowed to be present during the interrogation. When a defendant waives his Miranda rights and makes a statement during a custodial interrogation, the State bears the burden of proving voluntariness, based on the totality of the circumstances, by a preponderance of the evidence. Quiriconi v. State, 96 Nev. 766, 772, 616 P.2d 1111, 1114 (1980). Although Elvik provides no authority requiring the presence of a parent during the interrogation of a juvenile, we believe that, in light of Elvik's age, the absence of a parent during his interrogation should be considered in reviewing the totality of the circumstances bearing on the voluntariness of his statements. See People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202 (Cal.1967) (age and presence of parent are factors in determining voluntariness). The interrogating officers failed to inform Elvik that his statements could be used against him in an adult trial in criminal court. Clearly, neither police officers nor juvenile authorities should be allowed to mislead a youth in order to obtain a confession. A juvenile should be advised of his rights and informed of the possibility of an adult trial. But where the nature of the charges and the identity of the interrogator reflect the existence of an unquestionably adversary police atmosphere and the suspect is reasonably mature and sophisticated with regard to the nature of the process, resulting statements will be admissible in a criminal trial provided that the record otherwise supports a finding of voluntariness. Quiriconi, 96 Nev. at 771, 616 P.2d at 1114 (citation omitted). Although Elvik was not informed of the possibility of an adult trial, he knew that he was being questioned by police investigators who wished to discuss the shooting incident, and the interrogation took place at a police station. Hence, the nature of the charges and the identity of the interrogator reflected the existence of an unquestionably adversary police atmosphere. We further note that Elvik was reasonably mature and sophisticated with regard to the nature of the process, as he is of above average intelligence and had been arrested on at least one previous occasion. [7] Accordingly, we conclude that the interrogating officers' failure to explain to Elvik that his statements could be used against him in an adult trial in criminal court is not alone sufficient to render Elvik's statements inadmissible. Finally, Elvik argues that his statements were not voluntary because the interrogation was coercive. A confession is inadmissible unless freely and voluntarily given, Rowbottom v. State, 105 Nev. 472, 482, 779 P.2d 934, 940 (1989), and, [i]n order to be voluntary, a confession must be the product of a `rational intellect and a free will.' Passama v. State, 103 Nev. 212, 213-14, 735 P.2d 321, 322 (1987) (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960)). In determining whether a confession is the product of a free will, this court employs a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether the defendant's will was overborne when he confessed. Passama, 103 Nev. at 214, 735 P.2d at 323; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). However, a confession obtained by physical intimidation or psychological pressure is inadmissible. Thompson v. State, 108 Nev. 749, 753, 838 P.2d 452, 455 (1992) (citations omitted). The officers did not threaten Elvik during the interrogation, and Elvik does not allege any specific instance of physical or psychological intimidation. False promises or misleading statements also do not appear to be an issue, as the officers indicated that they could not promise Elvik lenient treatment if he agreed to talk about the shooting incident. Although the officers did not intimidate or mislead Elvik, Elvik argues that the officers applied prolonged psychological pressure, to which he was particularly vulnerable at the time. Throughout the interrogation, Elvik claimed that he did not remember shooting Mr. Gibson. Despite Elvik's insistence, the officers repeatedly stated that Elvik did remember, and attempted to persuade Elvik to discuss the incident. The officers appealed to Elvik's conscience, suggested that his girlfriend and his mother would want him to tell the truth, and told him that things would be better for him in the future if he would tell the truth. Elvik raises numerous examples of the coercive pressure he claims to have been under during the interrogation; however, a line by line discussion of the interrogation would not facilitate our analysis. The United States Supreme Court, in Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962), recognized that juveniles are more susceptible than adults to high pressure interviewing tactics when a parent or attorney is not present: [A] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any conception of what will confront him when he is made accessible only to the police. That is to say, we deal with a person who is not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights.... ... A lawyer or an adult relative or friend could have given the petitioner the protection which his own immaturity could not. We conclude that the investigators' tactics did not involve physical or psychological intimidation and, therefore, were not alone coercive. Despite this conclusion, we also acknowledge that the totality of the circumstances attendant to the interrogation were such as to create a close question concerning the voluntariness of Elvik's inculpatory statements. The fact that Elvik did not have his mother or an attorney present, coupled with Elvik's youth and the officers' persistent refusal to accept Elvik's claimed failure to remember the shooting, cast some doubt on the voluntariness of Elvik's statements. However, Elvik's intelligence and experience with the criminal justice system also bear on the voluntariness of his statements. The [district court's] decision regarding voluntariness is final unless such finding is plainly untenable. Boggs v. State, 95 Nev. 911, 913-14, 604 P.2d 107, 109 (1979). Both the district court and the jury determined that Elvik's statements were made voluntarily and, although competing factors create a close question in this case, we conclude that the district court's finding was not plainly untenable. [8] Elvik next contends that his statements made at the second interrogation, which occurred on the day following his arrest, were also inadmissible. Elvik argues that the second interrogation was tainted by the impropriety of the first interrogation, and that the officers who conducted the second interrogation also failed to inform Elvik that he could face criminal charges and be tried as an adult. Based on our analysis of the first interrogation, we conclude that the district court's finding that Elvik's statements made at the second interrogation were voluntary was not plainly untenable.