Opinion ID: 781399
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: G's Request for an Award of Compensatory Education

Text: 38 G next asserts that the district court erred in denying his request for an award of compensatory education based on FBDS's failure to provide him a FAPE during the 1994-1996 school years. We conclude that the district court erred in rejecting G's claim on the ground that his parents failed to object to his IEPs during 1994-1996, and accordingly reverse its judgment and remand for reconsideration of this issue. 39 In a section of its opinion entitled Was a FAPE provided for school years 1994-1996?, the district court addressed and rejected G's claim that he was entitled to compensatory education relating to those school years. 18 (J.A. at 174-80.) The district court noted that G's parents had not asserted their claim regarding FBDS's failure to provide a FAPE during the 1994-1996 school years until November 1996, when G's mother requested that [FBDS] pay for G's homeschooling and Lovaas instruction, and thus FBDS was not aware that G's parents objected to the educational services he received during those school years until well after they had concluded. (J.A. at 179.) The district court reasoned that [i]f the parents believed that [FBDS was] denying their child a FAPE, it was incumbent on them to bring that to the school's attention via the available statutory mechanisms, and on that basis denied relief. (J.A. at 179.) In this connection, the district court noted that [s]chool boards must be given adequate notice of problems if they are to remedy them, and must be given sufficient time to respond to those problems before they can be held liable for failure to act. (J.A. at 179-80 (citing Combs, 15 F.3d at 363-64).) 40 Several of our sister circuits have concluded that an award of compensatory education — educational services ordered by the court to be provided prospectively to compensate for a past deficient program — may be appropriate relief under the IDEA. See, e.g., Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 249 (3d Cir. 1999) (recognizing appropriateness, in some circumstances, of award of compensatory education beyond age 21 and remanding for determination of whether it should be awarded); Board of Ed. of Oak Park & River Forest High School Dist. 200 v. Illinois State Bd. of Ed., 79 F.3d 654, 656 (7th Cir.1996) (stating that the IDEA's authorization to courts to grant appropriate relief encompasses the full range of equitable remedies and therefore empowers a court to order adult compensatory education if necessary to cure a violation); Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir.1994) (same); Pihl v. Massachusetts Dept. of Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 188 (1st Cir.1993) (same); Hall v. Knott County Bd. of Ed., 941 F.2d 402, 407 (6th Cir.1991) (same); Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Breen, 853 F.2d 853, 857-58 (11th Cir. 1988) (same); Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 753 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing appropriateness of compensatory education award and holding that plaintiff was entitled to recover compensatory education if she prevailed in her claim that she was denied a FAPE for several years). Compensatory education involves discretionary, prospective, injunctive relief crafted by a court to remedy what might be termed an educational deficit created by an educational agency's failure over a given period of time to provide a FAPE to a student. We agree with every circuit to have addressed the question that the IDEA permits an award of such relief in some circumstances. As we explain below, because the district court's basis for rejection of G's compensatory education claim involved an erroneous legal conclusion, we reverse its rejection of that claim and remand for reconsideration. 41 The district court concluded that an award of compensatory education was inappropriate in this case because G's parents failed to object during the 1994-1996 school years to the IEPs under which G was receiving educational services. As we have noted, the district court cited Combs as authority for this proposition, stating that the IDEA should cannot be used as a sword to punish school districts unaware of parents' concerns. (J.A. at 179 (citing Combs, 15 F.3d at 363-64).) 42 We addressed in Combs whether a party may recover attorneys' fees as the prevailing party in an action brought under the attorneys' fees provision of the [IDEA] against the School Board where the School Board's actions were deemed to be in accordance with the [IDEA], but the School Board later made some changes that comported with [the plaintiff's] demands. Id. at 357-58. Thus, our statement in Combs referred only to liability of the school district where its actions were in compliance with the IDEA, and is inapplicable here. Moreover, other courts have concluded that failure to object to [a child's] placement does not deprive him of the right to an appropriate education. Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 250 (rejecting the contention that failure to object to an IEP while in force categorically bars relief related to that IEP). Accordingly, the district court's rejection of the compensatory education claim was based on an erroneous legal conclusion, and we therefore reverse the court's judgment as to this issue. 19 We think it worthwhile, however, to note that our reversal is predicated only on the district court's erroneous legal conclusion, and not on an assessment of the merits of an award of compensatory education in this case. We leave that issue to be decided on remand.