Opinion ID: 1192058
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Rooker-Feldman Requirements Applied to This Case

Text: Insofar as plaintiff seeks to recover for injuries sustained during the four-day period in which her child was removed from her custody, plaintiff's claims meet at least one of the Rooker-Feldman requirements by complaining of an injury caused by a state-court order. Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 87. The alleged injuries from the removal of plaintiff's child did not exist prior in time to the state-court proceedings; rather, they were caused by the Family Court's temporary removal order. McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (emphasis omitted). Nevertheless, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar jurisdiction in this action because plaintiff's claims do not meet at least two of the Rooker-Feldman requirements: plaintiff did not lose in state court and plaintiff does not invite district court review and rejection of a state court judgment. Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85 (citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517) (alteration omitted). First, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only to federal actions brought by state-court losers, and plaintiff is not a state-court loser. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517; see also Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85 (providing that the first Rooker-Feldman requirement is that the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court). Based on defendants' representations in an ex parte emergency hearing, the Family Court issued an order temporarily removing plaintiff's child from her custody. Four days later, after plaintiff appeared in Family Court to contest the removal order, the Family Court issued a superseding order returning plaintiff's child to her. The Family Court then adjourned the proceedings in contemplation of dismissal, after which the petition was automatically dismissed. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1039. We cannot say that those circumstances amount to a state-court loss for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Although there was no final adjudication in plaintiff's favor, see N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1051, there was also no final order of disposition removing her child, see id. § 1052, and plaintiff secured the reversal of the one form of interlocutory relief entered against her. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, therefore, does not bar plaintiff's claims, as she did not lose in state court. Second, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar plaintiff's claims because plaintiff does not invite district court review and rejection of a state court judgment. Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85 (citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517) (alteration omitted). Plaintiff's child has been returned to her, and thus she plainly has not repaired to federal court to undo the [Family Court] judgment. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293, 125 S.Ct. 1517. The only conceivable judgment against plaintiffthe temporary removal of her childhas already been undone. Our conclusion is underscored by the fact that plaintiff had no reason to seek and could not have soughtreview of the Family Court's temporary removal order by the U.S. Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. After plaintiff's child was returned to her and the Family Court proceedings were dismissed, the question of the validity of the temporary order of removal was likely moot and there was no basis for plaintiff to appeal. See, e.g., In re Javier R., 43 A.D.3d 1, 3, 840 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1st Dep't, 2007); In re Nicholas B., 26 A.D.3d 764, 811 N.Y.S.2d 235 (4th Dep't, 2006). The rationale underlying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is that only the U.S. Supreme Courtand not lower federal courtsmay review and reject[] state-court decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85 (citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517). That rationale is undercut if plaintiff had neither a practical reason nor a legal basis to appeal the state-court decision that caused her alleged injuries. Thus, plaintiff's inability to seek Supreme Court review of the Family Court's temporary removal order confirms that her federal action does not invite district court review and rejection of that order. [1] The situation would have been different if the Family Court had entered a final order of disposition permanently removing plaintiff's child from her custody and plaintiff had brought this action seeking the return of her child. In such a case, plaintiff could have appealed the Family Court's ruling to higher New York courts and, eventually, to the U.S. Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. If, at the completion of her appeals, plaintiff were to bring a § 1983 action in federal court seeking the return of her child, her action would unquestionably invite district court review and rejection of the Family Court's order of disposition and, assuming the other requirements were met, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would likely apply. See Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 87 (alteration omitted). Here, however, plaintiff brings a § 1983 action only after the Family Court proceedings were dismissed without a final order of disposition. Her action, moreover, complains only of injuries caused by a state-court order that was interlocutory, unappealable, and effectively reversed by a superseding order. Under those circumstances, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply. We therefore vacate the District Court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Specifically, we vacate the District Court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims related to the four-day period in which her child was removed pursuant to the Family Court order. We also vacate the District Court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims of municipal liability pursuant to Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611, as the District Court's dismissal of plaintiff's municipal liability claims was based on the District Court's dismissal of her claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.