Opinion ID: 1057832
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tennessee's Sentencing Scheme

Text: This appeal is governed by Tennessee's Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 (the Reform Act) which, prior to its amendment in 2005, established a presumptive sentence for each class of felonies other than capital murder. Absent enhancing or mitigating factors, the presumptive sentence for Class B, C, D, and E felonies was the minimum in the applicable range. [7] Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c) (Supp.2001). For Class A felonies, the presumptive sentence absent enhancing or mitigating factors was the midpoint in the applicable range. Id. A sentencing court could not increase a defendant's sentence above the presumptive sentence except upon the application of statutory enhancement factors. See id.; see also State v. Jones, 883 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Tenn.1994) (The sentence imposed [for most felonies] cannot exceed the minimum sentence in the range unless the State proves enhancement factors.). A sentencing court determined the existence of enhancement factors by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Carico, 968 S.W.2d 280, 287 (Tenn.1998). Once the trial court found enhancement factors, it had the authority to set the sentence above the minimum in [the sentencing] range but still within the range. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-210(d) (Supp.2001). The weight afforded enhancement factors was left to the trial court's discretion. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-210, Sentencing Comm'n Cmts. (1997); see also State v. Shelton, 854 S.W.2d 116, 123 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992). In sum, a maximum sentence could not be imposed absent a judicial finding of enhancement factors. In our previous analysis of the Reform Act, which was conducted in light of Booker but without the benefit of Cunningham , we determined that the relevant inquiry is whether the Reform Act mandates imposition of a sentence increased above the presumptive sentence when a judge finds an enhancement factor. Gomez I, 163 S.W.3d at 661 (emphasis changed). We interpreted Booker to hold that the mandatory increase of a sentence is the crucial issue which courts must consider in determining whether a particular sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment. Id. Because the Reform Act did not require a trial court to increase a sentence upon finding one or more enhancement factors, we held that the Reform Act did not offend the Sixth Amendment under Apprendi . Id. We are instructed by Cunningham , however, that [i]f the jury's verdict alone does not authorize the sentence, if, instead, the judge must find an additional fact to impose the longer term, the Sixth Amendment requirement is not satisfied. 127 S.Ct. at 869. Applying Cunningham , we conclude that the Reform Act failed to satisfy the Sixth Amendment insofar as it allowed a presumptive sentence to be enhanced based on judicially determined facts. [8] That is, to the extent the Reform Act permitted enhancement based on judicially determined facts other than the fact of a prior conviction, it violated the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Apprendi , Blakely , and Cunningham . In this case, the trial court increased all of the Defendants' sentences beyond the presumptive sentences on the basis of two enhancement factors: their previous history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior in addition to those necessary to establish the appropriate range, and upon its determination that each was a leader in the commission of an offense involving two (2) or more criminal actors. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1), (2) (Supp. 2001). As to the Defendants' convictions for facilitation of felony murder, the trial court also applied as an enhancement factor that each possessed or employed a firearm, explosive device or other deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. Id. at (9). On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the trial court had properly applied factors (1) and (2) but that application of factor (9) was not supported by the evidence. Nevertheless, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the Defendants' maximum sentences. The trial court's application of the enhancement factor for a previous history of criminal convictions does not offend the Sixth Amendment. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Having reconsidered the Reform Act in light of Cunningham , we now conclude that the trial court's application of the two other enhancement factors breached a clear and unequivocal rule of law. [9] The second prerequisite for plain error review is therefore satisfied.