Opinion ID: 773006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Maritime Employment

Text: 13 Section 2(3) of the Act defines a covered employee as any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder and ship breaker. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3). An employee is engaged in maritime employment as long as some portion of his job activities constitutes covered employment. See Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 275-76 (1977). Maritime employment is not limited to the occupations specifically enumerated in Section 2(3), but also encompasses any employment that is an integral or essential part of loading or unloading a vessel. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Schwalb, 493 U.S. 40, 45 (1989). 14 Implicitly invoking Schwalb's integral or essential test, the ALJ concluded that Marinelli's performance of his shop steward duties was an integral part of and essential to [ASL's] maritime business. The ALJ based this conclusion on findings that Marinelli (i) represented the interests of both ASL and the union members, and (ii) facilitated the day-to-day operation of [ASL's] business so as to remove interpersonal obstacles which might otherwise obstruct such ongoing operations. 15 The Board affirmed, finding that the ALJ's conclusion was supported by substantial evidence and consistent with numerous state court cases holding that shop stewards and other union officials are entitled to workers' compensation benefits from employers because they act in the interest of employers as well as unions, as the negotiation and implementation of collective bargaining agreements prevents unrest and promotes the uninterrupted operation of an enterprise. Marinelli, 2000 WL 1133566, at  n.5 (collecting cases). 16 On appeal, ASL argues that Marinelli's claim fails under Schwalb's integral or essential test because (i) non-union longshoring operations do better without a shop steward, (ii) ships loaded and unloaded even when [Marinelli] was not present, and (iii) Marinelli's duties were the same as a shop steward in Kansas at a tire plant. 3 17 The first of these three claims is without merit because the relevant question is whether Marinelli's shop steward duties were integral or essential to ASL's stevedoring operations - operations that were carried out by unionized employees - not whether shop steward duties are integral or essential to stevedoring operations in general. 18 As for the second and third claims, the Director correctly points out that virtually identical claims were explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in Schwalb. Schwalb concerned railroad employees at waterfront coal terminals who performed maintenance and repair work on the equipment used to dump coal from rail cars and to convey it from the dumping area to the ships' holds. Schwalb, 49 U.S. at 43. The Court held that employees who are injured while maintaining or repairing equipment essential to the loading or unloading process are covered by the Act. Id. at 47. The Court explained that such employees are not 19 removed from coverage if they also have duties not integrally connected with the loading or unloading functions.... When machinery breaks down or becomes clogged or fouled because of the lack of cleaning, the loading process stops until the difficulty is cured. It is irrelevant that an employee's contribution to the loading process is not continuous or that repair or maintenance is not always needed. 20 Id. (emphasis added). This reasoning applies equally to defeat ASL's second contention that because ships sometimes were loaded and unloaded without Marinelli being physically present, he was not needed. It is irrelevant to Marinelli's claim that his contribution to the loading process was not always needed. 21 The Schwalb court also stated that [i]t makes no difference that the particular kind of repair work [the workers were] doing... might be done by railroad employees wherever railroad cars are unloaded. Id. at 48. This reasoning applies equally to defeat ASL's third claim that Marinelli's work as a shop steward was not particular to the stevedoring industry. It makes no difference that the particular kind of shop steward work Marinelli performed might have been performed by a shop steward at a tire plant in Kansas. 4 22 In sum, the ALJ's determination that Marinelli was engaged in maritime employment was supported by substantial evidence. 5