Opinion ID: 2535625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying gilbert's motion for mistrial.

Text: ¶ 19. Gilbert claims that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for mistrial after Officer Sims testified to Gilbert's exercise of his Miranda rights. Specifically, Officer Sims testified that he had read Gilbert his Miranda rights and then Gilbert had refused to speak with [him] about the incident. Gilbert's attorney promptly objected to the testimony and moved for mistrial. The trial court sustained the objection, denied the motion for mistrial, and then admonished the jury to disregard Officer Sims's statement. ¶ 20. The standard of review for denial of a motion for mistrial is abuse of discretion. Rollins v. State, 970 So.2d 716, 720 (Miss.2007) (citing Withers v. State, 907 So.2d 342, 352 (Miss.2005)). The trial court must declare a mistrial when there is an error in the proceedings resulting in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the defendant's case. Gossett v. State, 660 So.2d 1285, 1290 (Miss. 1995) (citing URCCC 5.15). The trial court has considerable discretion in determining whether a mistrial is warranted since the judge is best positioned for measuring the prejudicial effect. Id. (citing Roundtree v. State, 568 So.2d 1173, 1178 (Miss.1990)). If the trial judge determines that the error did not result in substantial and irreparable prejudice, the judge should admonish the jury to disregard the impropriety in order to cure its prejudicial effect. Id. at 1291 (citing Perkins v. State, 600 So.2d 938, 941 (Miss.1992)). ¶ 21. Gilbert asserts that Officer Sims's testimony regarding Gilbert's invoking his right to silence violated his constitutional right to a fair trial. Officer Sims testified to the events that occurred after he had located Gilbert. The following is the relevant part of the testimony: [Prosecutor]: Once youso once you located him, what, if anything, did you do? Officer Sims: Well, I knocked on the door of the residence, and a gentleman opened the door which was not Mr. Gilbert. I asked him if Mr. Gilbert was at the residence. He said that he was. He kind of went back further in to the residence. Mr. Gilbert came to the door. He had blood-stained clothing. He had a large cut on his hand. At that time, I placed him under arrest, took him to the Clarksdale Police Department and read him his Miranda Rights and attempted to interview him, and he refused to speak with me about the incident. [Gilbert's Attorney]: I'm going to object to this. Court: I sustain thewell, exactly what are you objecting to? [Gilbert's Attorney]: I'm objecting to hismay we approach the bench, your Honor? Counsel approached the bench. Court: Sure. [Gilbert's Attorney]: The officer says that heI'm objecting to the fact that the officer is testifying that the defendant refused to talk to him. He had no obligation to talk to him. Court: Counsel is expanding on some of his answers. He needs to restrict his answers to the questions that are asked. You know, he simply askedI mean he advised him of his Miranda Rights. That answers the question. [Prosecutor]: I was trying not to lead, but with the Court's indulgence, I'll lead a little more. Court: I'll give you some limited latitude. [Prosecutor]: I'm not trying. [Gilbert's Attorney]: I would like again to move for a mistrial. Court: I'll sustain the objection, but I will overrule the objection for a mistrial. All counsel return from the bench. Court: The jury will disregard the last comment with regard to the defendant's statement. The defendant canactually they have a constitutional right to speak or not to speak, and if a defendant exercises his constitutional right not to speak, that is his right. ¶ 22. It is improper and ordinarily, reversible error to comment on the accused's post- Miranda silence. Emery v. State, 869 So.2d 405, 408 (Miss.2004) (citing Quick v. State, 569 So.2d 1197, 1199 (Miss.1990)). However, there are exceptions to this general rule. Id. Specifically, when the defendant's post- Miranda rights are mentioned only once and the judge admonishes the jury concerning the statement, the violation will not result in reversible error. Higgins v. State, 502 So.2d 332, 335 (Miss.1987); see also Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798, 806 (Miss.1984) (holding that the trial court did not commit reversible error when it refused to grant defendant's motion for mistrial after a testifying police officer referred to defendant's exercise of Miranda rights only once and the judge admonished the jury to disregard the remark). ¶ 23. In Higgins, the testifying officer stated that after he had given the defendant his Miranda rights, the defendant had stated I want to talk to my lawyer. Higgins, 502 So.2d at 334. The defense attorney then objected and moved for a mistrial. Id. The trial judge sustained the objection and then admonished the jury to disregard the officer's statement. Id. This Court found that, because there was only a single reference to the defendant's exercise of his Miranda rights and the judge had admonished the jury to disregard the testimony, the statement had not resulted in reversible error. Id. at 335. ¶ 24. Similar to Higgins and Williams, in the present case, there was only one mention of Gilbert's exercise of his Miranda rights. Further, the trial judge promptly admonished the jury to disregard Officer Sims's comment. Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied Gilbert's motion for a mistrial; therefore, we find this issue to have no merit.