Opinion ID: 1608109
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Against the Coemployees

Text: Ms. Nickolson claims that the coemployees Harris, Howard, and Burnhart had a duty to provide Mr. Nickolson with a safe workplace and that they willfully breached that duty; that they willfully failed to control the conditions, methods, and manner in which his work was performed; that they willfully or intentionally removed, or failed to repair, a guard and/or safety device; and that they willfully caused or allowed the trailer to be improperly loaded. She contends that willful conduct on the part of the three coemployees proximately caused her husband's death. Section 25-5-11(b), Ala.Code 1975, allows an employee or his estate to file an action against any person whose willful conduct causes personal injury to the employee. Section 25-5-11(c), Ala.Code 1975, defining willful conduct, states in paragraph (1) that the term includes [a] purpose or intent or design to injure another and provides in that paragraph that if a person, with knowledge of the danger or peril to another, consciously pursues a course of conduct with a design, intent, and purpose of inflicting injury, then he or she is guilty of `willful conduct.' Evidence showing only a knowledge or an appreciation of a risk of injury will not entitle a plaintiff to a jury determination of whether the co-employee acted with a purpose, intent, or design to injure another. A co-employee must either have actual knowledge that an injury will occur from his actions or have substantial certainty that injury will occur. Bean v. Craig, 557 So.2d 1249, 1252 (Ala. 1990). (Citations omitted.) Ms. Nickolson argues that the coemployee defendants' willful conduct is demonstrated by their utter failure to supervise Gene Nickolson and to provide him with a safe workplace. She concedes that these defendants' did not purposely set out, did not intend, and had no design, to injure or kill Mr. Nickolson; however, she argues that a reasonable person in these defendants' position would have known that injury or death was substantially certain to follow from their actions. She argues that they acted willfully by doing nothing to prevent the poles from rolling off the trailer; by not limiting the number of poles to be loaded on the trailer; by not putting stanchions into the bolster dogs; and by not instructing Mr. Nickolson never to climb on the trailer unless the poles were secured by straps. Although the evidence may suggest that these defendants appreciated the risk that a pole would roll off the trailer and cause injury, the record does not support a finding that they had actual knowledge or knew to a substantial certainty that injury would occur. The defendant Harris did not work with Mr. Nickolson on the day of the accident and was not at the site at the time of the accident. The defendant Burnhart did not work with Mr. Nickolson on the day of the accident, but arrived at the site just as the accident was occurring. The defendant Howard worked with Nickolson on the day of the accident and had worked with him for eight or nine months before the accident. He testified that he did not expect the poles to roll off the trailer. Because Ms. Nickolson did not present substantial evidence indicating that the coemployee defendants acted willfully, the trial court properly entered the summary judgment in their favor.