Opinion ID: 3006256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: W. Downer & Co. once again shows why.

Text: There, we held that an out-of-state company had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Massachusetts by retaining the services of a Boston-based investment bank. Id. at 66-69. We rested that judgment on the company's voluntary solicitation of the bank's services; the active formation of a long-term contractual relationship with a - 14 - party reasonably known to be in Massachusetts (such that the contracted-for services would foreseeably be rendered there); and the performance of work under that contract by the bank, which was treated as contact with the forum by the out-of-state company because the voluntary contractual relationship had foreseeably led the bank to undertake that work. Id. at 66-67 ([The forum plaintiff]'s extensive Massachusetts activities in this case, given the context, were not unilateral. They were undertaken at [the non-forum defendant]'s request and are attributable to [the non-forum defendant]. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Those same factors are present here. United Excel recruited Cossart at his home in Massachusetts. The resulting employment contract, as negotiated by Hornbaker, contemplated that Cossart would continue to work from Massachusetts on United Excel's behalf and that the company would facilitate that work by providing the requisite office equipment. In the course of performing that contract, moreover, United Excel (through Hornbaker) voluntarily facilitated Cossart's work from Massachusetts by registering a sales office with the Commonwealth and keeping that registration current while Cossart remained a United Excel employee.3 In addition, in the course of 3 Indeed, the facts here show even greater purposeful availment than in C.W. Downer & Co. insofar as the non-forum defendants here actively facilitated -- and did not merely - 15 - the performance of that agreement, Cossart did significant work for United Excel in Massachusetts -- as the defendants clearly foresaw he would. That work included his efforts to secure the California deal, for which Cossart asserts he is owed a commission under the employment agreement. Finally, United Excel (again through Hornbaker) allegedly breached the employment agreement when it informed Cossart at his Massachusetts home that he would not be paid the commission on the California deal. The facts that prevented personal jurisdiction in Phillips v. Prairie Eye Center, 530 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2008), the principal case cited by defendants, are thus not present here. In Phillips, the non-forum defendant did negotiate a contract with a Massachusetts employee. 530 F.3d at 28-29. But the contract was to be performed by the employee in Illinois, not from a Massachusetts sales office that had been registered with the Commonwealth by the non-forum defendant. See id. 3. In light of our conclusion that the first two prongs of the specific-jurisdiction test are met, we could find that the Due Process Clause bars the exercise of personal jurisdiction over these defendants only if such exercise would not be fair and reasonable. See C.W. Downer & Co., 771 F.3d at 69. To determine reasonably foresee -- the plaintiff's performance of the contract from Massachusetts. - 16 - whether that is the case, we must consider the so-called gestalt factors: (1) the defendant[s'] burden of appearing [in the forum state], (2) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, (4) the judicial system's interest in obtaining the most effective resolution of the controversy, and (5) the common interests of all sovereigns in promoting substantive social policies. Id. Here, neither defendant has shown that some kind of special or unusual burden would result from Massachusetts serving as the forum. Bluetarp Fin., Inc. v. Matrix Const. Co., 709 F.3d 72, 83 (1st Cir. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also C.W. Downer & Co., 771 F.3d at 69 (Bioriginal identifies no special burden imposed by requiring it to litigate across the Canada–United States border . . . .). And Massachusetts clearly has an interest in being the forum that determines whether Cossart, who performed his work for the company in the Commonwealth, has a meritorious claim under the Massachusetts Wage Act. Cf. C.W. Downer & Co., 771 F.3d at 70 (Massachusetts has 'significant' interests in providing a convenient forum . . . when [its citizens'] commercial contracts are said to be breached by outof-state defendants.). The remaining factors relevant to the inquiry also do not indicate a problem with Massachusetts serving - 17 - as the forum state. We therefore conclude that constitutional due process does not bar Massachusetts from doing so.