Opinion ID: 2351127
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The First Exception.

Text: The stipulation aforesaid recites that the witness whose personal appearance was waived by it would testify, if present, that she was a stenographer in the office of the scrivener of the will at the time it was executed, and was one of the witnesses thereto, that the testator was a stranger to her, and said no more in her presence than to answer Yes when the will, as drafted, was presented to him, and he was asked if it was his last will and if he desired that it be witnessed. She would testify, also, it declares, that the testator, his wife, and the subscribing witnesses were together in the scrivener's office while all the signatures appearing on the document were affixed thereto, that the testator signed it in the presence of the witnesses, and that they signed it in his presence, and in the presence of the others. The case does not disclose whether the same witnesses subscribed the will of the wife. The testimony of the scrivener, who was one of the witnesses to the will, relates the circumstances attendant upon the preparation and execution of it, and his long acquaintance with the testator, and carries his declaration of opinion that the testator was sane at the time. That of the third witness to the will (second in order of signing) covers less than three pages in the record. She, also, was a stenographer in the office of the scrivener. Her evidence confirms the recitals of the stipulation, and the testimony of the scrivener, concerning the manner in which the will was executed. She was not asked to give her opinion whether the testator was of sound mind, either by the proponents or the appellants, but admitted, in effect, on cross-examination, that she had declared in the Probate Court, at the first hearing on the will, that she did not hear the testator say enough to permit her to form any opinion as to his mental capacity. This exception is grounded in the fact that the stipulation, and the evidence of the third witness, particularly as given, according to her admission, in the Probate Court, establish conclusively that two of the three subscribing witnesses to the will gave no thought when signing it to whether the testator was of sound mind, to use the words of our statute of wills, R.S.1944, Chap. 155, Sec. 1. The exception is a dual one, alleging errors (1) in the refusal of appellants' motion that the will be disallowed, made at the close of proponents' direct case, and (2) in the decision carried in the decree, that the requirements of the statute were satisfied, despite omission of the witnesses to form an opinion that the testator possessed a sound mind. The claim of the appellants cannot be said to be entirely without foundation in precedent. In New York one ancient case, at least, may be said to support it. It was so construed, in any event, by Judge Redfield, an eminent writer on the law of wills. The case, Scribner v. Crane, 2 Paige Ch. 147, 21 Am.Dec. 81, was decided in 1830. It involved an instrument purporting to be the will of a very feeble lady, nearly ninety years of age, who, while lying on her bed helpless, had placed her mark on a document drawn by her physician, with a hand guided by him. He subscribed it thereafter, as a witness, as did two other persons, who testified, when it was offered for probate, that they had relied partially, if not entirely, on the declarations of the physician as to the capacity of the testatrix. The will was disallowed because neither of these two witnesses had sufficient knowledge on the subject to give legal evidence of the due execution of the will. Judge Redfield included this case in his collection of leading cases on the law of wills, American Cases on Wills, 137, attesting to the distinction of the author of the opinion, Chancellor Walworth, and subscribing to the desirability of a more stringent rule about the proper function of witnesses to wills than that generally recognized. It is his comment, thereafter, however, which bears directly on the present case. This reads as follows: We do not expect to be able to restore the office of the attestation of the subscribing witnesses to a will to its former healthy state. The law, upon all questions, must conform in some degree to existing usage and custom, however unwise we may deem it. And the fact that most men execute their wills in the most informal manner, away from their dwellings, in the offices of attorneys, calling the first persons they can find to witness them, must in a great degree deprive the attestation of all judicial character. Formerly, wills were prepared with great care, by giving formal instructions to solicitors, and designating the persons who were to act as witnesses, some near friends more commonly, and always such as were well acquainted with the testator and his family. The actual execution of one's will under such circumstances, became a very solemn act, somewhat in the nature of a religious rite, like a baptism or burial. It was then very proper to regard the formal attestation by the witnesses as a sort of judicial authentication, much like probate in common form. At that time a witness who attested the execution of a will, and then testified to the incompetency of the testator, was regarded much in the light of a perjured person. But now this is every day's occurrence, without exciting any surprise or rebuke. We can not but feel that the old practice was the better one; but we do not well see how it is to be restored, except by statute, and statutes are not so likely to be enacted in order to revive obsolete usages as to inaugurate new ones. The appellants do not cite Scribner v. Crane, supra, but they do cite an Annotation in 35 A.L.R., noted hereafter, which identifies it, several decisions of this Court, some Massachusetts cases and one from Illinois, and quote excerpts from several of them to sustain their position that witnesses to wills must form opinions about the soundness of mind, or otherwise, of those executing them. Gerrish v. Nason, 22 Me. 438, 39 Am.Dec. 589; McKeen v. Frost, 46 Me. 239; Robinson v. Adams, 62 Me. 369, 16 Am.Rep. 473; In re Trinitarian Congregational Church and Society of Castine, Appellant, 91 Me. 416, 40 A. 325; In re Wells, Appellant, 96 Me. 161, 51 A. 868; In re Martin, Appellant, 133 Me. 422, 179 A. 655; Chase v. Lincoln, 3 Mass. 236; Brooks v. Barrett, 7 Pick., Mass., 94; Hastings v. Rider, 99 Mass. 622; Nunn v. Ehlert, 218 Mass. 471, 106 N.E. 163, L.R.A.1915B, 87; and Allison v. Allison, 46 Ill. 61, 92 Am. Dec. 237. The quoted excerpts have a tendency, without doubt, to confirm the claim of the appellants that the purpose underlying the requirement that wills be executed in the presence of credible witnesses is to have reliable evidence of the execution of them, and provide security against fraud. Many of the cases suggest the desirability of honest and unbiased opinions from such a source, concerning the soundness of the mind of a testator. None, however, except Allison v. Allison, supra, rejected a will because one or more of the witnesses formed no judgment on that question at the time it was executed, and that decision is explained by the court's declaration therein that the Illinois statute required before a will can be admitted to probate, that the subscribing witnesses shall swear they believe the testator to have been of sound mind and memory. It is not difficult to find statements in judicial opinions which, without reference to their context or the issues under consideration, lend color of support to implied principles of law the cases cannot be considered as having declared. In Robinson v. Adams, supra, for example, which the appellants cite as declaring that sanity on the part of the testator is one of the things a witness must be qualified to attest at the time of the act, i. e., the signing, Judge Kent, after quoting Greenleaf on Evidence in its statement that: Witnesses to a will are permitted to testify as to the opinions which they formed of testator's capacity, at the time of executing his will, declared expressly that such witnesses might express such opinions although they were suddenly called in and heard only the request to sign and the declaration that the paper they were asked to sign was a will. This was in 1870. At a later date, 1902, Judge Powers, in Re Wells, Appellant, supra, 96 Me. 161, 51 A. 869, dealing with a case in which two of the witnesses to a will had expressed no opinion about the soundness of mind of the testatrix, and the third, a nurse who had been in attendance on her throughout the day the will was executed, had testified that she was out of her mind all that day, set aside a jury verdict that the testatrix was not of sound mind, with express declaration that it is not necessary, to establish a will: that any of the subscribing witnesses should testify to the sanity of the testator. Finally, in 1920, in Re Goodridge, Appellant, 119 Me. 371, 111 A. 425, 427, this court, in dismissing an appeal from the allowance of a will, where the issues were due execution, fraud and undue influence, noted that one of the subscribing witnesses had not recalled the execution of the will until after his memory was refreshed, and that the others had no recollection whatsoever of what occurred at the time of their attestation, but had merely identified their signatures. The true function of witnesses to wills is to prove due execution, and that is done by the identification of the signatures of the testator and themselves. Canada's Appeal, 47 Conn. 450. In the Annotation aforesaid, 35 A.L.R. 79, and in the text of American Jurisprudence, 57 Am.Jur. 232, Sec. 302, the rule is asserted to be, with rare exceptions, that it is the duty of a subscribing witness to a will to observe and judge of the mental capacity of the testator. Both the Annotation and the text recognize, however, as the latter states expressly in the paragraph following that wherein the quoted words appear, that: the rule that an attesting witness is under a duty to observe the mental capacity of the testator is, in some respects, honored more in the breach than in the observance, since courts which uphold it do not carry it to the extent of invalidating a will for the reason that the attesting witnesses did not perform the duty imposed by the rule. The proper function of witnesses, asked to attest wills, is well stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Wilde, in Hawes v. Humphrey, 9 Pick., Mass., 350, 20 Am.Dec. 481. Therein, after asserting that the statutory requirement that wills be witnessed was intended to protect a testator, who might be in extremis, or greatly debilitated by age or infirmity, from fraudulent practices, and made them, in some sense, the judges of sanity, he said that: It is their duty to inquire into this matter, and if they think the testator not capable, they should remonstrate and refuse their attestation. The appellants do not assert that the evidence presented in the Supreme Court of Probate could not support a finding that Narcisse Paradis was of sound mind. They admit that it could. They declare, expressly, in their Bill of Exceptions, that: While there was conflicting evidence, want of mental capacity is not raised in these exceptions. It was the right and privilege of the appellants to have each of the subscribing witnesses to the will express an opinion whether the testator was of sound mind at the time of its execution, and to develop facts to show the opportunity, or lack of opportunity, each had for forming a considered opinion on the subject. They elected not to do this, but to rely entirely on the technical question of law they have raised. We have considered it at length, notwithstanding it might have been dismissed rather summarily on the express authority of In re Wells, Appellant, and in accordance with the plain implication of In re Goodridge, Appellant, both supra, because we deem it desirable to make it entirely clear that no will should be disallowed in this State on the ground asserted. Our statute gives persons of sound mind the right to dispose of property by will upon complying with stated formal requirements. It may be to the advantage of those seeking to exercise the privilege that they select witnesses who will be able to vouch for their capacity, but capacity is a question of fact to be resolved on the evidence presented. It is not an issue to be decided on such a technical ground as that some particular person or persons, even those selected as witnesses to attest execution, formed no opinion on it. The first exception is overruled.