Opinion ID: 2387024
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the arrest and search

Text: (3) A defendant may move to suppress evidence on the ground that [t]he search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable. (§ 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) A warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable, and the prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating a legal justification for the search. ( Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th 119, 127.) The standard of appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citations.] ( People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729] ( Glaser ); see People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711, 718 [195 Cal.Rptr. 503, 669 P.2d 1278].) [10] As explained below, we conclude the prosecution established that the search of defendant and his vehicle was reasonable. (4) Vehicle Code sections 4462 and 12951 long have required that the person in the immediate control of an automobile present evidence of registration and a driver's license upon proper command of a peace officer. ( In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60, 67 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 581, 38 P.3d 433], fn. omitted.) Upon defendant's failure to provide a valid registration and his provision of false identification of himself as Richard Redd, Jansing had authority to place defendant under arrest. (See § 148.9, subd. (a) [any person who falsely identifies himself to a peace officer upon lawful detention or arrest to evade his proper identification by the investigating officer is guilty of a misdemeanor]; Veh. Code, § 4000 [no person shall leave standing in an offstreet public parking facility any vehicle unless it is registered].) Moreover, Jansing had authority to search defendant incident to this arrest. ( United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 235 [38 L.Ed.2d 427, 94 S.Ct. 467] (5) [A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.].) [11] Defendant asserts, however, that Jansing's testimony concerning the arrest was not credible, and that this court should accept defendant's version of the events, which established that Jansing seized the wallet before checking on the identification offered by appellant. Defendant's testimony does not establish defendant's version of the events. [12] Instead, defendant bases his assertion upon trial counsel's calculation that only 26 seconds elapsed between the time the dispatch office stated that there was no record of Richard Redd, and the time Jansing informed that office of defendant's true identity and driver's license number. Because 26 seconds assertedly was too short a period of time for Jansing to have ordered defendant out of his vehicle, placed him in handcuffs, found defendant's driver's license in his pocket, and relayed the information to the dispatch office, defendant concludes Jansing must have seized the wallet before Jansing learned there was no record of a driver's license for Richard Redd and before he arrested defendant. In light of the circumstance that Jansing was communicating with the dispatch office by way of a portable radio while he stood next to the door of defendant's vehicle, we do not find it incredible that only 26 seconds (according to trial counsel's calculations) may have elapsed between the time Jansing ordered defendant out of his vehicle and the time he radioed defendant's true name to the dispatch office. We also reject defendant's contention that we should question Jansing's credibility because he could not recall various facts, such as whether other vehicles in the parking area were occupied, whether he used a key to open the vehicle's trunk, and whether he contacted the FBI before opening the trunk. None of these asserted lapses of memory suggests that Jansing was untruthful with respect to the facts he recalled. Therefore, we accept the trial court's implied finding that the search was conducted during or after the arrest, a finding supported by Jansing's testimony. (See Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 362 [We defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence.].) In any event, even if Jansing had seized the wallet before he began effecting the arrest, the evidence thereby obtained would not be subject to exclusion. It is undisputed that Jansing already had contacted his dispatcher concerning the birth certificate. Therefore, Jansing would have learned, without the information gained from the wallet, that defendant was not Richard Redd. Thus, the wallet inevitably would have been discovered in the search of defendant incident to the arrest that Jansing effected based upon the Vehicle Code violations and defendant's having provided a false name. ( Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 444 [81 L.Ed.2d 377, 104 S.Ct. 2501].) Accordingly, even under defendant's factual theory on appeal, the exclusionary rule would not apply. Because Jansing had arrested defendant, and because the vehicle's registration had expired more than six months earlier, Jansing had authority under state law to impound defendant's vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 22651, subds. (h)(1) [an officer may remove a vehicle when the officer effects a valid arrest of the person in control of the vehicle] & ( o )(1) [a peace officer may remove a vehicle found on an off-street parking facility with a registration expiration date in excess of six months prior to the date the vehicle is found].) Having impounded the vehicle, Jansing had authority to conduct an inventory of the vehicle's contents aimed at securing or protecting the car and its contents. ( South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 373 [49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 96 S.Ct. 3092].) [13] The record establishes that Jansing's inventory was conducted for the purpose of securing and protecting the vehicle's contents. Jansing testified that he followed Park Police General Order No. 2501, which states: Inventory procedures serve to protect an owner's property while it is in the custody of the Force, to ensure against claims of lost, stolen or vandalized property, and to protect officers from danger. A vehicle should not be released to a crane service until it has been inventoried. The impounding officer shall conduct a thorough inventory of the vehicle as soon as possible after it is impounded. The officer shall open closed containers whose contents the officer is unable to ascertain from the container's exterior and characteristics. ( Id., § 2501.06(A), p. 6.) This testimony also established that the inventory was conducted pursuant to standard criteria, and that Jansing was not allowed so much latitude that [the search could turn] into `a purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of crime,' [citation]. ( Florida v. Wells (1990) 495 U.S. 1, 4 [109 L.Ed.2d 1, 110 S.Ct. 1632] ( Wells ); see also Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 374, fn. 6 [93 L.Ed.2d 739, 107 S.Ct. 738] ( Bertine ) [Our decisions have always adhered to the requirement that inventories be conducted according to standardized criteria.].) (6) Defendant asserts that because the search occurred on city and county property, the People were required to establish that the local authorities had a property inventory search policy and that Jansing complied with that policy. He fails to cite any pertinent authority in support of this contention. Moreover, the reasons supporting the requirement that an inventory search be conducted pursuant to an established policy support the conclusion that Jansing satisfied this constitutional requirement by following the policy of the Park Police. The requirement of established procedures is based on the principle that an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence. The policy or practice governing inventory searches should be designed to produce an inventory. ( Wells, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 4.) In addition, in rejecting an argument that the police should weigh whether a thorough inventory is appropriate, the United States Supreme Court has observed that `[a] single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.' [Citation.] ( Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 375.) The purpose of countering general rummaging does not require that the Park Police follow the policy of the jurisdiction in which they temporarily act as peace officers; the purpose of providing a single familiar standard is served by a rule requiring that the Park Police follow the federal policy in all circumstances. Defendant provides no reason to impose a different requirement. (7) Because the warrantless arrest and search of defendant and the warrantless search of his vehicle were lawful, we need not address the question whether the affidavit supporting issuance of the search warrant obtained the following day by the Brea police would have supported issuance of a search warrant, absent the information obtained through Jansing's search. In light of our conclusion that Jansing's actions were a lawful response to defendant's failure to provide a valid driver's license and vehicle registration, we need not address whether the officer's actions also were justified by defendant's parole status.