Opinion ID: 219723
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Shifting the Burden of Proof on EED

Text: David Eugene Matthews asserts that he was denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment because the decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Matthews v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414, 420-421 (Ky.1985), was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Put another way, he asserts that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of murder because the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The certificate of appealability does not include a claim that the instructions to the jury were erroneous. Therefore, we must look to see if the Supreme Court of Kentucky failed to follow the criteria in 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Kentucky Supreme Court did not shift the burden of proof to the defendant under the EED defense. Although it cited the case of Wellman v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 696 (Ky.1985), it went on to say that the trial court's instructions in regard to extreme emotional disturbance were adequate, and the proof supported the jury's findings of intentional murder. Matthews, 709 S.W.2d at 421. It did not apply Wellman to Matthews's case, because it assumed that the prosecution bore the burden of proving absence of EED once Matthews produced some evidence of EED. Unlike the decision in Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97 (Ky.1980) ( Gall I ), it addressed the sufficiency of the evidence claim head-on, and the proof at trial was sufficient to show the absence of EED beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority is correct in its conclusion that EED was only an element of murder if the defendant raised a reasonable doubt as to its presence. It further concludes that Matthews had the initial burden of production to show EED. Matthews met that burden, but the Kentucky Supreme Court did not shift the burden of proof to the defendant and its opinion did not say it did. Moreover, the murder instructions, Numbers 3 and 7 in this case, clearly show that the burden of proof had never shifted to Matthews. They read as follows: You will find the defendant, David Eugene Matthews, guilty under this instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following: (a) That in this county on or about the 29th day of June, 1981, he shot [the victims] with a pistol which resulted in [their] death[s]; AND (b) That in so doing he caused [the victims' deaths] intentionally and not while acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable justification or excuse under the circumstances as he believed them to be. The remainder of the instructions included finding the defendant not guilty unless the jury was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt he was guilty. There was no jury instruction which required Matthews to have either the burden of production or of proof. Although Matthews claims that the prosecution produced no evidence to contradict his threshold showing of EED in his case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky found that the prosecution had rebutted the evidence of EED sufficiently to present the issue to the jury. It recited the facts that [i]n addition to the circumstances of the crime, the proof was that when he returned to his mother's house after the crime, ... he took steps to hide the gun and clean his clothes. Shortly thereafter, he gave a false statement to the police. Matthews, 709 S.W.2d at 421. Obviously, we must follow the decision in Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265 (6th Cir.2000) ( Gall II ), if it is applicable. However, we stated in Gall II that the Commonwealth did not even claim to have rebutted the showing of EED in the brief it filed in this court. Id. at 291. The majority opinion here holds that the Kentucky Supreme Court should have followed Gall I in the direct appeal. The Kentucky Supreme Court did cite Gall I for its authority that the Commonwealth did not have to produce direct evidence to show an absence of EED. Matthews, 709 S.W.2d at 421. The majority here admits that the Commonwealth did not have to produce direct evidence to sustain its burden of proof on the absence of EED. Moreover, in his brief before this court, Matthews argues that the Kentucky Supreme Court clearly applied Gall I.  His argument appears to be that he was saddled with the alleged unconstitutional burden of production for EED evidence announced in Gall I. The law in Kentucky was that when a party raised a defense such as EED, the Commonwealth was not required to rebut it with an expert witness, but could rebut evidence of EED through cross-examination of the expert witness and through all of the circumstances of the crime. See, e.g., Hayes v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 583, 585-86 (Ky.1981) (finding the cross-examination of the expert sufficiently raised factual issues as to whether the defendant acted under EED); see also Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Ky.1984) (finding lay testimony used to rebut an expert's testimony as to sanity was sufficient); Newsome v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Ky.1963) (finding insanity to be an issue of fact to be determined by the jury even though the accused introduced evidence of insanity). This rule is similar to that in other states. See, e.g., State v. Coe, 233 S.W.3d 241, 251 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (When the state has the burden of proving a negative fact, ... it may be proven by circumstantial evidence.); State v. Gonzalez-Rivera, 48 Conn.App. 784, 713 A.2d 847, 853 (1988) (affirming court's rejection of the affirmative defense of EED where the prosecution rebutted expert testimony with only circumstantial evidence of events surrounding the crime). The majority asserts that these cases shed little light on whether the prosecution carried its burden on EED in this case. Admittedly, some of these cases involve an affirmative defense under which the accused bears the burden of persuasion, but, as the majority agrees, the burden of production was upon Matthews and he produced his expert witness. As the district court found: What is required is that at the conclusion of the evidence, a reasonable jury be able to find beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of EED.... Substantial evidence in this case allowed reasonable jurors to do so. Matthews v. Simpson, 603 F.Supp.2d 960, 972 (W.D.Ky.2009). In Gall II, we held that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. 231 F.3d at 288. The evidence in this case was much different from the evidence produced in Gall. For instance, Gall introduced the testimony of two experts that he suffered from a severe psychotic disorder, specifically chronic paranoid schizophrenia. Against that, the Commonwealth admitted it had not rebutted the evidence of EED. Id. at 291. In Matthews's case, he had one expert who testified that Matthews was suffering from an adjustment disorder, causing temporary impairment of judgment, poor self-control and diminished awareness. Matthews, 709 S.W.2d at 417. The psychiatrist did not find that Matthews suffered from a psychosis. In addition, the Commonwealth rebutted the EED evidence not only by the cross-examination of the psychiatrist, but also by all of the circumstances of the homicide as outlined in Matthews. The cumulative effect of the evidence demonstrates that the trial court did not err when it denied the motion for a directed verdict of acquittal and allowed the jury to decide the EED issue under the instructions, which did not shift the burden of proof to Matthews. That procedure was not contrary to Kentucky law at the time nor was it contrary to any Supreme Court case. [1]