Opinion ID: 1134542
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: willful and wanton misconduct and exemplary damages

Text: At the close of all of the evidence in this case, the court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict relative to the issue of willful and wanton misconduct, or in the alternative, to dismiss that portion of plaintiffs' complaint relative to that issue. To determine the propriety of this action, this court must assume that the evidence in favor of plaintiffs is true, and give to it every favorable inference reasonably and fairly drawn from it. Brennan v. Laramie Newspapers, Inc., Wyo., 493 P.2d 1044 (1972); and Hester v. Coliseum Motor Co., 41 Wyo. 345, 285 P. 781 (1930). And the question of whether or not there was sufficient evidence to create a factual issue for the jury is solely one of law to be determined, on appeal, by this court without deference to the view of the trial court. Barnes v. Fernandez, Wyo., 526 P.2d 983 (1974). Doing so in this case reflects that as a matter of law there is sufficient evidence upon which a factfinder could determine that there was willful and wanton misconduct on the part of defendant if such determination were made. Willful and wanton misconduct is that which tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, or an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent. It is not with the intent to cause injury or damage, but it must be more than mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadventure, or simple inattention. An intentional omission to perform a statutory duty is not willful or wanton misconduct, unless a reasonable man in the actor's place would have been aware of great danger, and proceeded in face of it so entirely unreasonably as to evidence a knowledge, express or implied, that injury will be a probable result. Mitchell v. Walters, 55 Wyo. 317, 100 P.2d 102 (1940); Prosser, Torts 4th Ed., p. 185 (1971); Sanders v. Pitner, Wyo., 508 P.2d 602 (1973). Defendant exceeded the speed limit; he violated a no-passing zone requirement; he had a blood alcohol content sufficient to raise a presumption of intoxication; and he failed to negotiate a five-degree curve. Each of these are violations of statutorily imposed duties. It may be said as a matter of law that any one of them could not support a finding of willfulness or wantonness. Taken in toto, they would support such finding. The jury has found them sufficient to support a finding of gross negligence. As will be indicated later, wanton and willful misconduct is more aggravated than gross negligence, and it is conceivable that the jury, or any other factfinder, might find these facts insufficient to establish willful and wanton misconduct. But, that is the point. It is also conceivable that the jury could find them sufficient. If the jury had found these facts sufficient for willful and wanton misconduct  as it did for gross negligence  it could not be said as a matter of law that the verdict was not supported by the evidence. Exemplary damages have for their purpose the punishment of a defendant in a civil action for wrongful and aggravated conduct and to serve as a warning to others to deter. They are not recoverable to compensate the plaintiff. They are usually proper only in cases where wanton and willful misconduct is alleged. Since the question of willful and wanton misconduct was properly a jury question, damages arising therefrom are also a jury determination and could be awarded if not excessive. Petsch v. Florom, Wyo., 538 P.2d 1011 (1975); and Wilson v. Hall, 34 Wyo. 465, 244 P. 1002 (1926). See Combined Ins. Co. of America v. Sinclair, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1034 (1978), and Jackson v. Shaw, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1246 (1977). Plaintiffs contend that language in some Wyoming cases decided in 1871, 1902, 1913 and 1926 authorizes exemplary damages for gross negligence. We do not believe that the holdings in those cases  Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Hause, 1 Wyo. 27 (1871) (intentional trespass case); Cosgriff v. Miller, 10 Wyo. 190, 68 P. 206 (1902) (intentional trespass case); McIntosh v. Wales, 21 Wyo. 397, 134 P. 274 (1913) (malicious prosecution case); Wilson v. Hall, supra , (assault and battery case)  are as broad as indicated by plaintiffs, but, in any event, the proper rule is that enunciated in Petsch v. Florom, supra ; Wilson v. Hall, supra ; Town of Jackson v. Shaw, supra; and Combined Ins. Co. v. America v. Sinclair, supra. Plaintiffs further contend that the reference to exemplary damages in the wrongful death act (fn. 1, supra) authorizes a consideration of such damages by the jury in any case brought under that act. Such reference was only an enumeration of possible damages and not an enlargement of the basis for damages. The statutory language, may award such damages, pecuniary and exemplary, as shall be deemed fair and just,  reflects the legislative intention to authorize damages in accordance with the existing statutes and legal decisions which have established standards and procedures to determine the fairness of the award of damages in kind and amount. Civic Ass'n of Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, 57 Wyo. 213, 116 P.2d 236 (1941); and DeHerrera v. Herrera, Wyo., 565 P.2d 479 (1977). To statutorily direct an award of exemplary (punitive) damages in other than a criminal case and without regard to the degree of culpability would be unreasonable and oppressive and could well be an unconstitutional direction. Texas Co. v. Siefried, 60 Wyo. 142, 147 P.2d 837, reh. den. 60 Wyo. 174, 150 P.2d 99 (1944); McVicker v. Kuronen, 71 Wyo. 222, 256 P.2d 111 (1953); In Re Romer, Wyo., 436 P.2d 956 (1968). We are not here called upon to consider a constitutional question, and the proposition is mentioned only to emphasize the probable legislative intent. Exemplary damages can be awarded here only if the jury finds willful and wanton misconduct on the part of defendant. Inasmuch as the trial court may have removed the question of willful and wanton misconduct and exemplary damages from jury consideration, not only because he found as a matter of law that there was insufficient evidence to submit the same, but also because he believed that the jury should and would consider it in the context of determining relative degrees of comparative negligence and not as a separate item, there is yet to be considered the effect of the Wyoming comparative negligence statute, § 1-1-109, W.S. 1977, [5] on the issues of willful and wanton misconduct and exemplary damages. The Wyoming statute is a not as great as form of comparative negligence statute (similar to an equal to or greater than form) as distinguished from the pure form, under which the plaintiff may recover part of his damages if defendant's negligence is established regardless of the percentage of his own contributory negligence  such percentage being used only to determine the amount by which plaintiff's damages are reduced. The Wyoming act does not prevent contributory negligence from being a complete bar to plaintiff's recovery if his contributory negligence is as great as defendant's negligence. Accordingly, the comparative negligence statute has not changed Wyoming substantive negligence law (1) if there is no contributory negligence, or (2) if the contributory negligence exceeds 49 percent. If the contributory negligence is found to be 49 percent or less, substantive negligence law is changed in that contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to plaintiff's action, but only diminishes the damages proportionate to the degree of negligence. Procedurally, a new and important element results from the statute. When contributory negligence is a factor, the jury must determine the percentage of negligence attributed to each party, rather than the broad categorizations of ordinary negligence and gross negligence as before. Mitchell v. Walters, supra . This can result in exact computations such as those in Quady v. Sickl, 260 Wis. 348, 51 N.W.2d 3 (1952), in which the jury found plaintiff Quady 15.42 percent negligent, defendant Sickl 47.08 percent negligent, defendant Belden 14.17 percent negligent, and defendant Pankratz 23.33 percent negligent. The category of gross negligence will no longer be pertinent except in a few isolated circumstances. [6] The obsolescence of the term gross negligence will be no great loss toward the attainment of equity. The term has been characterized as an unhappy term of ill-defined content. Prosser, Torts 4th Ed., p. 10 (1971). But the category of willful and wanton misconduct can not be likewise relegated to obsolescence by the advent of comparative negligence. While ordinary and gross negligence differ in degree, ordinary negligence and willful and wanton misconduct differ in kind. [7] In apportioning the degrees of negligence between the parties, a jury will no longer be concerned with the point at which ordinary negligence becomes gross. It will consider the relativity of negligence from 0 degree to 100 degrees. But, this apportionment does not concern the difference in the kind of conduct which distinguishes negligence from willful and wanton misconduct. Willful and wanton misconduct, in the strict sense, is not negligence, since it involves intent rather than inadvertence, and is positive rather than negative. [8] `   Willful negligence involves the element of conduct equivalent to a so-called constructive intent.' `   Ordinary and gross negligence differ in degree of inattention, while both differ in kind from willful and intentional conduct which is or ought to be known to have a tendency to injure.'          `Willful misconduct is the intentional doing of something which should not be done, or intentional failure to do something which should be done, in the operation of the automobile, under circumstances tending to disclose the operator's knowledge, express or implied, that an injury to the guest will be a probable result of such conduct. It differs from negligence, even gross negligence, although it may include gross negligence, and involves a distinct positive element as distinguished from the merely negative element of negligence or carelessness. It is willfully designed to accomplish a specific result, and is not aimless of purpose or regardless of results.' Mitchell v. Walters, supra, 100 P.2d at 106-107. See 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 9(1)(c). The intent in willful and wanton misconduct is not an intent to cause the injury, but it is an intent to do an act, or an intent to not do an act, in reckless disregard of the consequences, and under such circumstances and conditions that a reasonable man would know, or have reason to know, that such conduct would, in a high degree of probability, result in substantial harm to another. Mitchell v. Walters, supra ; and 57 Am.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 101, p. 707. Ordinary contributory negligence has not precluded recovery where defendant's conduct is wanton or willful. Mitchell v. Walters, supra ; and Sanders v. Pitner, supra . [9] The conclusion, then, is that § 1-1-109 does not mandate reduction of damages on the basis of comparative negligence of the plaintiff if defendant's misconduct is willful and wanton. [10] To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the purpose behind the doctrine of comparative negligence. The doctrine is designed to ameliorate the harshness of the contributory negligence bar. The court decisions which have not applied the contributory negligence bar to willful and wanton misconduct had the same purpose. Damages resulting from willful and wanton misconduct are not damages for negligence as that term is used in § 1-1-109. [11] Defendant contends that plaintiffs did not properly protect the record by making sufficiently clear the grounds for their objection to the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury relative to willful and wanton misconduct and exemplary damages. Rule 51, W.R.C.P., provides in part that:    No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.    The purpose of this rule is to insure that the trial judge is aware of the nature and grounds of the objection so that he can consider the propriety of the instruction and so that he may have an opportunity to correct any possible error. Oeland v. Neuman Transit Company, Wyo., 367 P.2d 967 (1962); Edwards v. Harris, Wyo., 397 P.2d 87 (1964); Haley v. Dreesen, Wyo., 532 P.2d 399 (1975). The parties are in agreement that immediately prior to submitting the case to the jury the judge advised that he was removing reference to willful and wanton misconduct and exemplary damages and corresponding forms of verdicts from the instructions which had been submitted the previous day to counsel as the instructions to be given. Plaintiffs' objection was on the ground and for the reason that it [the instructions] does not include a form of verdict as how the jury is to consider willful and wanton misconduct and punitive damages. The fact that the objection was directed to a change in contemplated instructions which were a result of discussion and cooperation of counsel; the fact that the judge had obviously considered the change overnight and at length; the fact that the action was not only a refusal to give an instruction but was to sustain defendant's motion to dismiss the action insofar as it had to do with willful and wanton misconduct and exemplary damages; and the fact that both willful and wanton misconduct and exemplary damages were referred to in that objection, direct the conclusion that the trial judge was well aware of the ramifications of his action and had ample opportunity to consider possible error and corrections necessary to avoid error. Although the foregoing is determinative of this case, the other two issues presented on appeal will probably arise again on the retrial of this case. In such instance it is our right, if it is not our duty, to decide the question. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. City of Riverton, 70 Wyo. 119, 127, 247 P.2d 660, 663 (1952); Bartlett v. State, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1235, 1241 (1977); Goodman v. State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 400, 413 (1977).