Opinion ID: 2770506
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Second-Degree Intentional Murder

Text: The State concedes that Killings preserved this instructional issue for appeal by requesting a second-degree intentional murder instruction at the jury instruction conference. 11 Second-degree intentional murder is a lesser included offense of premeditated first-degree murder because the only difference between the two crimes is the element of premeditation. See K.S.A. 21-3401(a) (first-degree premeditated murder is the killing of a human being committed intentionally and with premeditation); K.S.A. 21-3402(a) (second-degree intentional murder is the killing of a human being committed intentionally); State v. Warledo, 286 Kan. 927, 951, 190 P.3d 937 (2008) ([S]econddegree intentional murder is a lesser included offense of first-degree premeditated murder because all the elements of second-degree murder are identical to some of the elements of first-degree murder [citing K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(b)].). Accordingly, an instruction on second-degree intentional murder would have been legally appropriate. With regard to whether an instruction for second-degree intentional murder would have been factually appropriate, K.S.A. 22-3414(3) states that [i]n cases where there is some evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crimes . . . , the judge shall instruct the jury as to the crime charged and any such lesser included crime. Killings points out that the district court, in ruling that the evidence presented at trial did not support giving a lesser included offense instruction on seconddegree intentional murder, stated: The jury could find this was an intentional premeditated act . . . . We agree with Killings' argument that the district court verbalized the wrong legal standard. But we conclude that this error was harmless. Even if we assume that the evidence presented at trial made a second-degree intentional murder instruction factually appropriate under K.S.A. 22-3414(3), we conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the jury, had it been instructed on the lesser included offense, would have found Killings guilty of second-degree intentional murder instead of premeditated first-degree murder because of the overwhelming evidence presented on premeditation. See State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 565, 256 P.3d 12 801 (2011) (If an error implicates a constitutional right, then a Kansas court must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no impact on the trial's outcome, i.e., there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict.), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012); see also State v. Brown, 298 Kan. 1040, 1051, 318 P.3d 1005 (2014) (if constitutional harmless error standard is met, then lower statutory standard under K.S.A. 60-261 is also satisfied). Again, the only difference between premeditated first-degree murder and seconddegree intentional murder is the element of premeditation. This court has explained premeditation as follows: [P]remeditation means to have thought the matter over beforehand and does not necessarily mean an act is planned, contrived, or schemed beforehand; rather, premeditation indicates a time of reflection or deliberation. [Citations omitted.] Further, it is not necessary that there be direct evidence of either intent or premeditation. Instead, premeditation, deliberation, and intent may be inferred from the established circumstances of a case, provided the inferences are reasonable. [Citation omitted.] In other words, '[i]ntent . . . may be shown by circumstantial evidence, and a person is presumed to intend all the natural consequences of his acts.' [Citation omitted.] In considering circumstantial evidence, Kansas caselaw identifies factors to consider in determining whether the evidence gives rise to an inference of premeditation that include: '(1) the nature of the weapon used; (2) lack of provocation; (3) the defendant's conduct before and after the killing; (4) threats and declarations of the defendant before and during the occurrence; and (5) the dealing of lethal blows after the deceased was felled and rendered helpless.' [Citations omitted.] But the analysis of what inferences can be reasonably drawn is not driven by the number of factors present in a particular case because in some cases one factor alone may be compelling evidence of premeditation. [Citations omitted.] Use of a deadly weapon by itself, however, is insufficient to establish premeditation. [Citation omitted.] State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 509, 525-26, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014). 13 Killings' jury was instructed on the concept of premeditation: 'Premeditation' means to have thought the matter over beforehand, in other words, to have formed the design or intent to kill before the act. Although there is no specific time period required for premeditation, the concept of premeditation requires more than the instantaneous, intentional act of taking another's life. There was abundant evidence presented at trial which established that Killings' act of killing Jackson was premeditated and, thus, constituted a first-degree murder. After Killings learned from McCray that Jackson—the man who had previously robbed him— was at her apartment, Killings expressed an interest in going to McCray's apartment. Armed with a gun, Killings walked with McCray back to her apartment. When he followed McCray into the apartment, Killings signaled to Metcalf and Moore to remain quiet and followed McCray to the bedroom. Upon entering the bedroom, Killings pulled out his gun, pointed it at Jackson, and taunted him. He then fired his gun multiple times at Jackson, hitting him once. It can be clearly inferred from this evidence that once Killings realized he had an opportunity to exact revenge upon Jackson, he seized upon that opportunity. Prior to firing his gun at close range at Jackson, Killings had a significant amount of time to deliberate upon his chosen course of action while he walked from his house to McCray's apartment carrying a loaded gun. This evidence, along with the unprovoked nature of the shooting and the taunt Killings directed at Jackson prior to firing his weapon at him, all indicate the premeditated nature of Jackson's murder. In support of his argument that there was a reasonable possibility the jury could have convicted him of second-degree intentional murder had it received an instruction on 14 that crime, Killings points to Love's testimony in which she stated that when Jackson saw Killings, Jackson lunged at him. Killings argues that the jury could have inferred from Love's testimony that he only shot Jackson once he perceived that Jackson was going to attack him. As the State points out in its brief, the problem with this argument is that Love did not testify that Jackson lunged at Killings before Killings had his gun out. Love stated that Jackson lunged at Killings after Killings began firing his weapon. Love speculated that Jackson lunged at Killings in order to avoid getting shot or to make an attempt at getting the gun away from Killings. Accordingly, Love's testimony did not establish that Jackson lunged at Killings and Killings shot him in response. Instead, Love's testimony corroborated the other witnesses' testimonies establishing that Killings, unprovoked on that particular evening, shot Jackson. Based on the evidence recounted above, we conclude that any error based on the district court's failure to instruct on second-degree intentional murder constituted harmless error.