Opinion ID: 1890965
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues raised by beaner

Text: Beaner filed pre-trial motions to suppress both the statement he made to Officer Myhand that he had just come from his girl friend's house [8] and physical evidence  namely, the Air Jordan shoes he was wearing when he was arrested  on the ground that there was no probable cause for his arrest. The thrust of Beaner's argument is that Officer Myhand lost sight of the suspects several times as they fled down the alley, and that he was not able to describe them with particularity (other than by their race and gender) when they initially fled from the Mazda. Therefore, Beaner contends, when Officer Myhand again saw two men running in the alley, it was unreasonable for him to conclude that they were the same persons who alighted from the Mazda. After a lengthy hearing, the trial court denied Beaner's motions. The court found that even though Officer Myhand lost sight of the two men who ran from the Mazda, there were no other people in the area, and only a brief amount of time had elapsed before two men were again seen running in close proximity to the Mazda. At this point, the court ruled, there was a sufficient basis for a Terry stop. [9] Officer Myhand then learned from the occupant of the home from whose back yard Beaner had emerged that he had had no visitors that night and that the back door was not in use. Additionally, the officer found out moments later that the cloth object which he saw fall along the chase route was a ski mask. Given these facts, the court was satisfied that the detention had lawfully ripened into an arrest based on probable cause. When reviewing a trial court's denial of a suppression motion, we review its findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. E.g., United States v. White, 689 A.2d 535, 537 (D.C. 1997). [T]he test for judging the existence of probable cause is whether a reasonably prudent police officer, considering the total circumstances confronting him and drawing from his experience, would be warranted in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. Peterkin v. United States, 281 A.2d 567, 568 (D.C. 1971) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Irby v. United States, 342 A.2d 33, 37 (D.C.1975) (probable cause exists when a police officer has a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and the person or persons being arrested committed it (citation omitted)). Beaner contends that there was no probable cause to arrest him because the broadcast lookout was insufficient, in that it contained no description of the assailants, and because Officer Myhand did not get a good enough look at the car occupants as they fled. [10] We hold, to the contrary, that the officer had probable cause to arrest Beaner at the moment he emerged from Mr. Davis' back yard. Beaner misses the mark by focusing on the broadcast description (or lack thereof) of the assailants rather than the description of the stolen car. When Officer Myhand saw the Mazda in his rear view mirror, he had already received the broadcast description of the stolen car, including its license number. Before deciding to investigate further, Officer Myhand asked for and received confirmation of that number. When he realized that it matched the number on the Mazda he saw on Florida Avenue, it was entirely reasonable for him to conclude that this was the very Mazda that had been reported stolen. Moreover, because Officer Myhand caught sight of the Mazda less than thirty minutes after it was stolen, it was reasonable for him to believe that its occupants were the thieves. See Irby, 342 A.2d at 37; Coleman v. United States, 137 U.S.App. D.C. 48, 53, 420 F.2d 616, 621 (1969); Ralph v. Pepersack, 335 F.2d 128, 132-133 (4th Cir.1964). The reasonableness of this belief was enhanced when the occupants took headlong flight when they surmised that the officer was coming after them. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). We hold that Officer Myhand was fully justified in concluding that the occupants of the Mazda were the ones who had committed the carjacking, and that this justification amounted to probable cause. Contrary to Beaner's argument, probable cause existed even though Officer Myhand briefly lost sight of the suspects during his pursuit of them. They were out of his line of sight for only a few seconds, and there were no other people in the area. Thus the odds that two other similarly dressed men entered the alley together within such a short time span  let alone two men running side by side at a full sprint  were extremely slim. When he saw the two fleeing individuals again, Officer Myhand was able to get an even better look at Beaner's clothing, which allowed him to recognize Beaner when he emerged from Mr. Davis' back yard. We hold accordingly that Officer Myhand was warranted in the belief that Beaner had fled from the stolen Mazda, see Hill v. United States, 627 A.2d 975, 977 (D.C.1993) (probable cause finding upheld when a man fitting a broadcast description was spotted even though five or ten minutes had elapsed), especially given the unlikely explanation Beaner offered for being in Mr. Davis' yard, see Williams v. United States, 304 A.2d 287, 289 (D.C.1973) (an inherently incredible explanation may be taken into account in probable cause determination).
In his pre-trial Motion for Resolution of Discovery Issues, Beaner argued that the government should be compelled to disclose the precise location where the ski mask was recovered, so that he could highlight for the jury . . . the distance the mask was found away from where he was arrested. The trial court denied this motion, holding that the government had satisfied its discovery obligations under Super. Ct.Crim. R. 16. Beaner argues on appeal that the court should have weighed the interests of both parties to determine whether disclosure of the exact location of the mask would be justified on the grounds of fundamental fairness or to aid in administrative efficiency. [11] Rule 16(a)(1)(C) requires the government, upon request, to allow the defense to inspect any documents or tangible objects that are material to the preparation of the . . . defense. See Wiggins v. United States, 521 A.2d 1146, 1147-1148 (D.C.1987). Whether evidence is material requires a prospective evaluation, from the point of view of the defendant prior to trial, of whether the evidence has potential value for the defendant's development of a defense. Id. at 1148 (citation omitted). Additionally, the request for the evidence must be reasonable, that is, it may not unduly burden the government. Id. (citation omitted). Before trial, the government disclosed to Beaner's counsel the exact location where one of the masks was recovered by providing a copy of the crime scene technician's report. As for the other mask, the government informed counsel that it was found in a nearby yard, but did not give an exact address. On these facts, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the government had satisfied its discovery obligations. Given the limited area where the pursuit occurred, this information certainly furnished defense counsel with an adequate starting point from which he could search for potential witnesses. Even if the government could perhaps have provided the exact address of the nearby yard, its failure to do so was not prejudicial. As the government points out, Officer Fosso provided detailed information about the location of the masks at trial when he testified on a Friday, but Beaner did not rest until the following Wednesday. Thus his counsel had five days, including a weekend, to locate any potential witnesses related to the ski mask. We are satisfied that the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying Beaner's motion.
At the close of the government's case, Beaner moved for a judgment of acquittal, but the court denied the motion. Beaner now argues that the trial court erred because the government failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the persons arrested were the same persons who committed the crime. He bases his argument on the fact that Antonio Brown, the only eyewitness to the crime, could not provide a particularized description of his assailants because they wore ski masks. Viewing the evidence as we must in the light most favorable to the government, see Nelson v. United States, 601 A.2d 582, 593 (D.C.1991) (citing cases), we conclude that the evidence of guilt in this case was very strong. Although the assailants masked their faces, Mr. Brown was able to determine their relative heights and complexions, and at trial both appellants stood side by side in the well of the court so that the jury could compare their heights. Officer Myhand apprehended Beaner after he fled from a Mazda bearing the license number of the Mazda reported stolen only a few minutes earlier, and wearing the very shoes identified as those stolen from Brown's feet. Ms. Bonney, notwithstanding some credibility issues (which were explored in full before the jury), testified that Beaner and Baham brought into her apartment several personal items belonging to Brown  including personal identification and a pager  and proceeded to divide up a quantity of money. In addition, she saw Beaner change out of black Timberland boots  identified by Brown as those worn by one of his assailants  upon returning to her apartment, and into the distinctive Air Jordan shoes which had been taken off Brown's feet. Viewed in its entirety, this evidence was more than sufficient to prove that Beaner was guilty of the crimes charged.