Opinion ID: 2264593
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Funding for Eyewitness Experts

Text: The defendant asserts that the trial justice committed reversible error when he refused to authorize public funding for the retention of an eyewitness testimony expert. He maintains that because eyewitness identification was to be a crucial element in the state's case, he should have been permitted to explore the unreliability of such testimony through the use of an eyewitness expert who he believes would have testified about how eyewitness testimony could be influenced by the effects of stress relative to perception, weapon-focus-attention variables, and witness perception. He additionally asserts that because of the lack of an eyewitness expert, his defense counsel was prevented from effectively preparing for trial and from effectively representing him during trial. Pursuant to Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, the trial justice denied the defendant's request. He reasoned that the proposed eyewitness expert's opinion testimony would not be admissible at trial and would, if admitted, only tend to confuse the jury. We agree with that finding. Although an indigent defendant may be entitled to public funding to retain experts necessary for an adequate defense, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 76, 80, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1094, 84 L. Ed.2d 53, 64 (1985), the actual admissibility of any particular proposed expert testimony should, of course, be addressed in the first instance by the trial justice. It is well settled that questions regarding the admissibility and relevancy of evidence are left to the sound discretion of the trial justice. State v. Greene, 726 A.2d 471, 473 (R.I.1999) (order). This Court will not reverse a determination of relevance absent a showing that the trial justice has clearly abused his or her discretion. Id. In State v. Porraro, 121 R.I. 882, 892, 404 A.2d 465, 471 (1979), this Court long ago determined that the trustworthiness in general of eyewitness observations, [is] not beyond the ken of the jurors. We stated that: [t]hrough cross-examination, defense counsel was able to probe into the witness' capacity and opportunity for observation, her attention, interest and distraction. The jury was perfectly capable of assessing the witness' credibility by weighing the inconsistencies and deficiencies elicited in cross-examination. Id. at 893, 404 A.2d at 471. In State v. Gomes, 604 A.2d 1249 (R.I.1992), we once again concerned ourselves with the admissibility of eyewitness expert testimony. There, we stated that the presentation of expert testimony concerning the unreliability of eyewitness identification would lead to confusion of the issues and mislead the jury. Id. at 1256. In addition, we stated that [t]he expert's blanket assumptions concerning eyewitness identification under stressful situations would not be appropriate in a situation where several witnesses observed a gunman from different angles and under different conditions of stress. Id. See also State v. Sabetta, 680 A.2d 927, 933 (R.I. 1996) (upholding the exclusion for similar reasons). In State v. Gardiner, 636 A.2d 710 (R.I.1994), we also upheld the exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony when the trial justice, after a lengthy voir dire, determined that the proposed testimony would not be relevant. In the present case, the trial justice, citing Porraro and Gomes, as well as his own personal disastrous experience in a previous trial in which he had admitted eyewitness expert testimony, stated that [b]ased on the little experience I have had within one case, and based on the Porraro case and the Gomes case, and Rule 403 I'm satisfied that the motion should be denied, and I do deny it. Becausethe trial justice determined that the proposed expert testimony in this case would not be admissible at the defendant's trial, he did not err in denying the defendant's motion to obtain public funding for the retention of an eyewitness expert. The defendant's ancillary assertion, that denial of such funding inhibited his preparation of an effective defense at trial, has no merit. A review of the record reveals that defense counsel was permitted to extensively cross-examine all the state's witnesses on the reliability of their identification of the defendant. The trial record additionally reveals that each witness, when cross-examined, remained steadfast in his or her recollection of whom they had seen invading the Harris residence and that those well tested recollections were all accepted by the trial jury.