Opinion ID: 849289
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Heading: The Exclusionary Zoning Claim Under the Zoning Enabling Act

Text: Plaintiff argues that defendant's zoning ordinance violates § 12 of the CVZA. That section provides: A zoning ordinance or zoning decision shall not have the effect of totally prohibiting the establishment of a land use within a city or village in the presence of a demonstrated need for that land use within either the city or village or the surrounding area within the state, unless a location within the city or village does not exist where the use may be appropriately located or use is unlawful. [M.C.L. § 125.592; M.S.A. § 5.2942.] Accordingly, to sustain a claim that a city engaged in unlawful exclusionary zoning under § 12 of the CVZA, one must show that: (1) the challenged ordinance section has the effect of totally prohibiting the establishment of the land use sought within the city or village, (2) there is a demonstrated need for the land use within either the city or village or the surrounding area, (3) a location exists within the city or village where the use would be appropriate, and (4) the use would be lawful, otherwise. [10] Regarding the first requirement, plaintiff asserts that defendant's ordinance constitutes a complete prohibition of billboards. In determining whether a zoning ordinance constitutes a complete prohibition, a party must show that the prohibition is city-wide in scope. See Fremont Twp. v. Greenfield, 132 Mich.App. 199, 347 N.W.2d 204 (1984), where no violation existed under M.C.L. § 125.297a; M.S.A. § 5.2963(27a) of the Township Zoning Act, unless the prohibition was township-wide. See also Guy v. Brandon Twp., 181 Mich.App. 775, 785, 450 N.W.2d 279 (1989); Mount Elliott Cemetery Ass'n v. City of Troy, 171 F.3d 398, 407 (C.A.6, 1999). It is undisputed that, when plaintiff sought permission without success to erect a billboard in Holland, a significant number of billboards already had been erected and were in use there. Moreover, on its face, the challenged ordinance sections do not currently completely prohibit billboards in Holland. While new billboards are banned, current billboards may remain. Section 39-350(b) specifically permits a billboard owner to maintain and repair existing signs so as to continue their useful life. Also, § 39-350(e) authorizes a billboard owner to remove a sign from its location for repair and maintenance and then to replace it. Therefore, we hold that, although the ordinance sections do limit the number of billboards within the city, they do not constitute an impermissible total prohibition of billboards. See Ann Arbor, supra ; Mount Elliott Cemetery Ass'n, supra at 407; Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus, 76 F.3d 778, 790 (C.A.6, 1996), cert. den. 519 U.S. 823, 117 S.Ct. 81, 136 L.Ed.2d 39 (1996); Guy, supra at 785, 450 N.W.2d 279. [11] Because plaintiff failed to show that the challenged ordinance constitutes a total prohibition on the proposed use, its exclusionary zoning claim must fail. We need not discuss the remaining requirements of an exclusionary zoning claim. The Court of Appeals properly held that the trial court erred when it concluded that plaintiff had met its burden to demonstrate exclusionary zoning under § 12 of the CVZA.
We hold that §§ 39-348(g) and 39-350(b) of defendant's Zoning Ordinance No. 1100 are valid on their face under the HRCA and CVZA. Because defendant enacted them under the CVZA as part of its zoning ordinances, the HRCA's provision authorizing cities to regulate billboards in their charters need not be considered. Additionally, plaintiff failed to establish that §§ 39-348(g) and 39-350(b) are invalid under the CVZA, because the sections do not constitute a complete prohibition of billboards. Thus, we affirm the Court of Appeals decision that vacated the circuit court's injunction precluding enforcement of the challenged zoning ordinance provisions. CORRIGAN, C.J., and MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ., concur. WEAVER, J., concurs in the result only.