Opinion ID: 4536248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: To determine whether the district court properly held that Sheriff Gay was a county actor not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, we apply the four factors from Steadfast.10 For each factor, we also compare the Kansas sheriff to the Alabama sheriff that the McMillian Court deemed a state official. Mt. Healthy and Steadfast Factors a. Factor 1 – How state law characterizes the sheriff Under the first Steadfast factor, “we assess the character ascribed to the [defendant] under state law.” Id. at 1253. This factor supports finding that Kansas sheriffs are county actors. The Kansas Constitution does not mention the sheriff’s office. See, e.g., Kan. Const. art. I, § 1 (listing the governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, and attorney general as “[t]he constitutional officers of the executive department”). It authorizes the Kansas Legislature to “provide for such county and township officers as may be 10 The Eleventh Circuit also addressed each arm-of-the-state factor in determining whether a Florida sheriff was a county actor. See Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1309, 1319-28 (11th Cir. 2003) (addressing the “four factors to determine whether an entity is an ‘arm of the State’ in carrying out a particular function”). 13 necessary.” Id. art. IX § 2.11 The statute that recognizes county officers includes the sheriff. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 19-801a et seq.12 Alabama law treats sheriffs differently. As the McMillian Court observed, the Alabama Constitution “explicitly listed [sheriffs] as members of the state ‘executive department.’” 520 U.S. at 787 (“The executive department shall consist of . . . a sheriff for each county.” (quoting Ala. Const. of 1901, art. V, § 112)). The Kansas Constitution lacks a similar provision.13 See Kan. Const. art. I, § 1. Kansas and Alabama law characterize sheriffs differently in other ways. For example, the Alabama Constitution makes sheriffs impeachable for neglecting their duties under the same procedures applicable to state legal officers and judges. 11 Determining “[w]hat officers would be considered as county officers” turns on understanding “the purposes and functions of the counties.” Wall v. Harrison, 443 P.2d 266, 270 (Kan. 1968). The Kansas Supreme Court explained the state constitution “recognized a need for separate geographical units of local government,” and “[t]he term county officer is generally applied to officers whose territorial jurisdiction is the county and by whom the county performs its usual and necessary political functions.” Id. at 270-71 (quotations omitted). 12 County attorneys are also listed in the same chapter of the Kansas statutes. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 19-701 et seq. Sheriff Gay points out this court recognized Kansas county attorneys as arms of the state in Nielander v. County of Republic, 582 F.3d 1155, 1164 (10th Cir. 2009). See Aplt. Br. at 16-17. But as we explain below, it does not follow that Kansas sheriffs are state actors. 13 The Eighth Circuit also reasoned that “Nebraska sheriffs make policy on behalf of their counties,” partially because “[n]either the Nebraska constitution nor its statutes list sheriffs as members of its executive branch.” Dean v. Cty. of Gage, 807 F.3d 931, 942 (8th Cir. 2015). 14 McMillian, 520 U.S. at 788-89. By contrast, the Kansas Constitution does not provide for the impeachment of sheriffs. It instead states generally that “[a]ll county . . . officers may be removed from office . . . as shall be prescribed by law.” Kan. Const. art. IX, § 5; see State ex rel. Ralston v. Blain, 370 P.2d 415, 417 (Kan. 1962) (explaining “the remedy of impeachment lay only against a state constitutional officer”).14 McMillian also noted the Alabama Supreme Court had held that tort claims based on Alabama sheriffs’ official acts were suits against the state, not the county. 520 U.S. at 789 (citing Parker v. Amerson, 519 So. 2d 442, 443-45 (Ala. 1987). “Thus, Alabama counties are not liable under a theory of respondeat superior for a sheriff’s official acts that are tortious.” Id. By contrast, a Kansas county bears respondeat superior liability for its sheriff’s tortious acts under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (“KTCA”). Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-6103; see Cansler v. State, 675 P.2d 57, 66-68 (Kan. 1984) (recognizing Leavenworth County could bear legal liability for the Leavenworth sheriff’s failure to warn a third-party of escaped prisoners); Estate of Belden v. Brown Cty., 261 P.3d 943, 974 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining that “for purposes of the KTCA, sheriff’s department personnel are employees of the county”).