Opinion ID: 2386467
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scott's Position

Text: Scott views what occurred at the motel as a dual violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. He contends first that the very act of the police knocking on one's door late at night, without probable cause or articulable suspicion, constitutes a seizure within the meaning of those provisions. That conclusion, he avers, stems from the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991), namely, that, when a person is confronted by the police in a confined place where his or her freedom of movement is restricted for reasons independent of police conduct, the appropriate inquiry in determining whether the confrontation constitutes a seizure of the person is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officer's request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Relying on cases such as United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684 (7th Cir.1997), he urges that no reasonable person would have felt at liberty to ignore the presence of three or four officers pounding on his motel room door at 11:37 p.m., and that such conduct by the police necessarily constituted a warrantless seizure bereft of probable cause. His position is that, absent probable cause or other legal justification, the police had no right to pound on his door in that manner and seek entry into his room. That argument, as articulated by Scott, focuses principally on whether the police had a legitimate reason for seeking the entry. Scott also contends that, even if it is permissible for the police to engage in this kind of knock and talk operation and that their doing so does not constitute a seizure, there was no valid consent to their entering and searching the room. Relying largely on State v. Ferrier, 136 Wash.2d 103, 960 P.2d 927 (1998), decided under Washington State law, he believes that a consent, even if actually given, cannot be regarded as voluntary unless the person is informed by the police that the person may lawfully refuse to consent to the search, may revoke any consent given, and may limit the scope of any consent. As no such advice was given to him, he asserts that any express or implied consent given to the police in this case was involuntary and therefore invalid.