Opinion ID: 2252960
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Evidence Concerning Change in Prosecution Theory

Text: Dugan's Nicarico statements indicated that he murdered the victim on the Prairie Path, near where the body was found. The State attempted to persuade the jury that Dugan's statements were not credible and so advanced the position that the murder did not occur on the Prairie Path. Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by preventing him from introducing evidence showing that the State had taken the opposite position at his earlier trial. (See People v. Hernandez (1988), 121 Ill.2d 293, 306, 117 Ill.Dec. 914, 521 N.E.2d 25 (According to the State,    the victim was murdered where she was found).) Defendant sought to examine the previously assigned assistant State's Attorney concerning his opening statement at defendant's first trial that substantial quantities of blood on the Prairie Path indicated the victim was killed there. Relevant admissions of a party, whether consisting of a statement or conduct, are admissible when offered by the opponent as an exception to the hearsay rule. ( Gillson v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co. (1969), 42 Ill.2d 193, 197, 246 N.E.2d 269.) Traditional agency principles govern whether the statement of an agent is an admission of the principal. (M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 802.9 (5th ed. 1990).) An attorney may act as an agent and as such make admissions against his or her principal. ( Haskell v. Siegmund (1960), 28 Ill.App.2d 1, 170 N.E.2d 393; see also United States v. McKeon (1984), 738 F.2d 26, 30.) And Illinois courts have implicitly stated that an attorney's statements during trial argument may constitute admissions. (See Standard Management Realty Co. v. Johnson (1987), 157 Ill.App.3d 919, 924, 109 Ill. Dec. 918, 510 N.E.2d 986; Drell v. American National Bank & Trust Co. (1965), 57 Ill. App.2d 129, 207 N.E.2d 101 (same); cf. McKeon, 738 F.2d at 30.) What constitutes an admission, however, is a matter of case-by-case analysis. See People v. Morrison (1988), 178 Ill.App.3d 76, 127 Ill.Dec. 248, 532 N.E.2d 1077; Schall v. Forrest (1977), 51 Ill.App.3d 613, 9 Ill.Dec. 600, 366 N.E.2d 1111. Clearly, according to these authorities, the statements at issue here constituted evidentiary admissions. There can be no question regarding the assistant State's Attorney's authority, and the statements were not merely conjectural as to where the murder occurred. As such, the statements' general admissibility is accepted. However, we have found no Illinois case on point concerning whether counsel's admissions during argument at an earlier trial are admissible as evidence at a subsequent trial of the same matter. Defendant cites to several authorities. With the exception of McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, and United States v. Salerno (2d Cir.1991), 937 F.2d 797, we find them to be either unpersuasive or distinguishable. See Finley v. Kesling (1982), 105 Ill.App.3d 1, 60 Ill.Dec. 874, 433 N.E.2d 1112; United States v. GAF Corp. (2d Cir.1991), 928 F.2d 1253, 1260. In McKeon, defense counsel represented in opening statement at a prior trial that the defendant's wife had not used her employer's Xerox machine. At the subsequent trial, defense counsel depicted the wife quite differently. The trial court ruled that the defense counsel's opening statement at the first trial was admissible as an admission under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). The McKeon court concluded that there existed no per se rule against the admission of the defense counsel's inconsistent opening statements. McKeon held, however, that the evidentiary use of such statements must be closely circumscribed to avoid conflict with important policies. See McKeon, 738 F.2d at 32 (discussing considerations of diversion from issues, marginality, prejudicial inference, chilling effect on vigorous advocacy, exposure of work product, trial tactics or legal theory, etc.). We share these concerns and, no doubt, so did the trial court here. While McKeon developed a rather elaborate series of rules to test admission of the evidence, we cannot say the trial court here abused its discretion in refusing to admit this evidence, given the significance of the apparent concerns as well as the lack of binding authority on the issue.