Opinion ID: 614073
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: General CAT Principles

Text: To qualify for CAT relief, a petitioner must establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). In other words, Cole must show only a chance greater than fifty percent that he will be tortured if removed to Honduras. Hamoui v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir.2004). In determining whether an individual will more likely than not be tortured, all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture shall be considered. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). Importantly, an application for CAT relief need not show that he will be tortured on account of any particular ground. See Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.2001). Moreover, where torture is sufficiently likely, CAT `does not permit any discretion or provide for any exceptions.' Edu, 624 F.3d at 1145 (quoting 64 Fed.Reg. 8478, 8481 (Feb. 19, 1999)). Instead, the provision for deferral of removal under CAT applies to all applicants, even those who, like Cole, are former gang members convicted of an aggravated felony. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(a); Lemus-Galvan v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir.2008) (holding that even if an alien has been convicted of a `particularly serious crime,' and is ineligible for withholding of removal under the CAT, an IJ is required to grant deferral of removal if the alien can establish the likelihood of torture upon return). As we explained in Edu, the words of CAT ... reach out to protect even the most vile of actors against state vileness. 624 F.3d at 1146. Indeed, in adopting the [CAT] regulations, the agencies themselves recognized that even those who assisted in Nazi persecutions, or engaged in genocide, or pose a danger to our own security are not excluded from the protections of CAT. Id. at 1145. Further, [a foreign] government cannot exempt torturous acts from CAT's prohibition merely by authorizing them as permissible forms of punishment, Nuru, 404 F.3d at 1221, nor do other circumstances provide a justification for denying deferral of removal where torture is sufficiently likely. In other words, the policy against providing sanctuary for universal outlaws that led this court to conclude that gang members or former gang members are not a social group for the purposes of asylum and withholding of removal, see Arteaga, 511 F.3d at 946, does not preclude deferral of removal under CAT. Both the governing regulations and the case law of this circuit dictate that even gang members, both current and former, cannot be returned to a country in which they will more likely than not be tortured. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(a); Arteaga, 511 F.3d at 949. Acts constituting torture under CAT are varied, and include beatings and killings. Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir.2008). The implementing regulations define torture as: any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a confession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). Acquiescence by government officials requires only that [they] were aware of the torture but `remained willfully blind to it, or simply stood by because of their inability or unwillingness to oppose it.' Bromfield, 543 F.3d at 1079 (quoting Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir.2006)). The torturer, whether a public official or a private party acting with the government's consent or acquiescence, must have the specific intent to inflict severe harm. See Villegas v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir.2008).