Opinion ID: 2054337
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Limit of Proximate Cause is a Matter of Public Policy

Text: Proximate causation is not determined by application of some rule-of-thumb. Perkins & Boyce, supra at 779. [S]olutions dependent upon purely mechanical rules would produce absurd results.... [13] Id. Perkins & Boyce explain the difficult task of determining the boundaries of legally recognized causation: Whether the term used is proximate cause, legal cause, jural cause, or some equivalent, the idea sought to be expressed is legally-recognized cause, which should be promptly tested by the question,legally recognized for what purpose? The matters of policy which determine just where the limitations of juridical recognition shall be placed upon the broad field of actual cause, are grounded partly upon expediency and partly upon notions of fairness and justice, although even proximate cause must be distinguished from the concept of responsibility. Since the boundary lines of proximate cause are governed by these considerations they may, and in fact do, vary according to the jural consequences of the particular kind of case involved. The line of demarcation between causes which will be recognized as proximate and those which will be disregarded as remote is really a flexible line. Legal causation reaches further in some types of cases than it does in others. It reaches further in tort actions based upon intentional harm than in those resulting from negligence, and neither of the boundaries so established is necessarily controlling in other types of cases, such as actions for breach of contract, those under Workmens' Compensation Acts, or criminal prosecutions. [ Id. at 776.] Thus, the limit of proximate cause is a question of public policy, [14] and its boundaries depend on the type of case in which the Court is asked to determine those boundaries.