Opinion ID: 1368717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the defense of entrapment

Text: The sole issue is whether as a matter of law these facts constitute entrapment. We answer in the affirmative. In reaching this conclusion, we rely on State v. Fiechter, 89 N.M. 74, 547 P.2d 557 (1976), the foundational authority in New Mexico on the defense of entrapment. In State v. Fiechter , we held that the key issue for the trier of fact where the defense of entrapment is asserted is the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime. We thus opted entirely for the  subjective standard approach, and ignored the  objective standard in which the trier of fact, in determining whether there was entrapment, considers any misconduct of the police. In adopting the former approach, we stated, [U]nder the subjective standards we approve today, it is rare indeed when entrapment may correctly be held to exist as a matter of law. Id. at 77, 547 P.2d at 560. We feel that our opinion in Fiechter is correct insofar as it focuses upon a defendant's predisposition to commit a crime, but Fiechter needs to be expanded to make allowance for an objective standard. The objective/subjective debate has continued unchecked since the first entrapment case was decided by the United States Supreme Court in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932). In that case the court held, [T]he Government cannot be permitted to contend that [a defendant] is guilty of a crime where government officials are the instigators of his conduct, id. at 452, 53 S.Ct. at 216, a rule which gave rise to the objective criterion for defining entrapment. Yet, because it referred to the defendant's predisposition, id. at 451, 53 S.Ct. at 216, the Supreme Court suggested that entrapment was to some extent also based on a subjective standard. As a result, Sorrells v. United States set the courts of this country off in an often confusing search for the perfect definition of entrapment  one which would balance the objective prong of Sorrells (misconduct of the police) against the subjective prong of that decision (predisposition of defendant). In Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958), the Supreme Court stayed with the rationale established in Sorrells, but failed to establish any criteria for determining what conduct would establish the defendant's predisposition. In United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973), after concluding that there was no police misconduct, the court held that a finding of predisposition is fatal to [a] claim of entrapment, id. at 436, 93 S.Ct. at 1645. In Fiechter, we relied on United States v. Russell , overruling State v. Sainz, 84 N.M. 259, 501 P.2d 1247 (Ct.App. 1972), which in turn had relied on the Ninth Circuit decision overruled in Russell. In Russell the trial court had not been presented with the question of whether entrapment existed as a matter of law, but with a factual dispute which had to be decided by the jury, and the jury found that the idea for the commission of the crime originated with the defendant and not with the police. Thus, reading the decision in Russell in light of the court's previous decisions, Russell merely stands for the proposition that police misconduct is not the sole determinant in defining entrapment. The Supreme Court's latest ruling on entrapment is Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976), a decision which has not clarified the law. The defendant in Hampton v. United States did not contest his predisposition to commit the crime. Instead, he argued that police misconduct leading to his arrest violated constitutional due process, an argument rejected by a plurality of the court, who concluded that predisposition is a more crucial element in the definition of entrapment than alleged police misconduct. Because of the split among the justices, Hampton added little to the debate over objective versus subjective standards. As a result, the leading authority for the objective-standard definition of entrapment remains United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir.1971) reh'g denied, cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949, 93 S.Ct. 1931, 36 L.Ed.2d 411 (1973). In that case, one government agent supplied the illicit drug and another induced the defendant to act as a go-between, giving the defendant the money to be delivered to the first agent. By the subjective standard adopted in Fiechter, this factual situation would not lead to a reversal of conviction unless the defendant could negate his predisposition to commit the crime. We feel that the Fiechter rule as thus defined is too narrow, and should be expanded to include a factual situation similar to that in United States v. Bueno , i.e., a situation which, as the court in Bueno stated, takes on the element of the government buying [narcotics] from itself, through an intermediary, the defendant, and then charging him with the crime. Id. at 905. A number of states have adopted a rule similar to the Bueno rule. See People v. Martin, 124 Ill. App.3d 590, 79 Ill.Dec. 933, 464 N.E.2d 837 (1984); State v. Branam, 161 N.J. Super. 53, 390 A.2d 1186 (1978) aff'd per curiam, 79 N.J. 301, 399 A.2d 299 (1979); Sylar v. State, 340 So.2d 10 (Miss. 1976); People v. Stanley, 68 Mich. App. 559, 243 N.W.2d 684 (1976). The case before us presents a perfect illustration of why something more than a subjective standard is needed to define entrapment. It was the police informant Granger who procurred the cocaine, and it was he who arranged for the purported sale between Baca and Work. Baca acted as nothing more than a conduit, conveying cocaine from a police informant to a policeman. Such detailed involvement on the part of the police in the cocaine transaction exceeds proper investigative procedure, and puts the police into the category of instigators of the criminal conduct, as defined by the Supreme Court in United States v. Sorrells: It is not [the duty of the police] to incite to and create crime for the sole purpose of prosecuting and punishing it. Id. 287 U.S. at 444, 53 S.Ct. at 213 (quoting Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35, 38 (8th Cir.1921)). Under the objective standard adopted in this opinion we hold that Baca was improperly induced by the police into such criminal conduct as he was found to have committed, and that, as a matter of law, he was entrapped. In expanding the rule adopted in Fiechter, we thus hold that a criminal defendant may successfully assert the defense of entrapment, either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime for which he is charged, or, that the police exceeded the standards of proper investigation, as here where the government was both the supplier and the purchaser of the contraband and defendant was recruited as a mere conduit. Our adoption of the objective standard is to be given modified prospective application, so that only defendants who have asserted the defense of entrapment before their case has proceeded to trial may rely on our decision, and then only so long as their case has not proceeded to trial before the date that this decision has been filed with the clerk of this court. The court of appeals opinion affirming the trial court is reversed. IT IS SO ORDERED. WALTERS and RANSOM, JJ., concur. SCARBOROUGH, C.J., and STOWERS, J., dissent.