Opinion ID: 1981146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Remand for Sentencing

Text: On October 30, 1998, the trial court sentenced Mr. Dockery to life without parole (LWOP) for his first-degree murder conviction, pursuant to D.C.Code § 22-2404.1(b)(2) and (11). On January 14, 2002, in denying Mr. Dockery's § 23-110 motion for ineffective assistance of counsel and a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the court stated: In light of the holding in William Keels v. United States, [785 A.2d 672 (D.C.2001),] and the fact that the aggravating factors (D.C.Code § 22-2404.1(b)(2) and (11)), which caused this Court to impose life without parole, had not been the subject of a special verdict form, this Court will reduce Defendant's sentence for first-degree murder to thirty years to life imprisonment when the record is remanded from the Court of Appeals. In Keels, supra : [W]e h[e]ld that in order to sentence an individual to LWOP, any court finding or consideration that a statutory aggravating factor exists beyond a reasonable doubt under D.C.Code § 22-2404.1 must be predicated upon a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt of, or coextensive with, that same factor. This does not mean that the trial court is foreclosed from exercising its discretion to impose LWOP. Rather, in order to trigger that discretion, the trial court's consideration of the existence of an aggravating factor, or finding thereof, must be based on a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt on that specific factor. Id. at 685-86 (footnote omitted). [13] We remanded the case for resentencing. Id. at 686-87, n. 11 (resentencing was a sufficient remedy since jury convicted Mr. Keels of the crimes charged). Here, the verdict for first-degree premeditated murder while armed did not include a finding of the aggravating factors of § 22-2104.01(b)(2) and (11)(2001)(previously codified at D.C.Code section 22.2404.1(b)(2)and (11)(1996). As the trial court noted, a special verdict form would have been appropriate; see Keels, supra, 785 A.2d at 686 n. 10 (recognizing that in some instances, ... the trial judge [may] utilize special interrogatories or a special verdict form). No set of facts presented by the government during trial indicates the reasoning or findings behind the jury's verdict. [14] As in Keels, supra, remand for resentencing is sufficient on this record since the jury convicted Mr. Dockery of the crimes charged. Id. at 687, n. 11. We agree with the government that the trial court should have the opportunity to resentence on all charges, as the structure of the entire sentence may have been affected by the LWOP sentence for first-degree murder. See Thorne v. United States, 471 A.2d 247, 249 (D.C.1983). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but consistent with the trial court's ruling, remand the case for resentencing. So ordered.