Opinion ID: 883657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Use of Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence.

Text: Parties have generally sought to introduce evidence concerning the battered woman syndrome for two purposes: (1) as an affirmative defense of justifiable use of force in a criminal trial, See State v. Kelly (N.J. 1984), 478 A.2d 364; or (2) to provide a possible explanation for the abuse victim's recantation and to impeach her subsequent testimony that she had lied in her original statement. See State v. Borrelli (Conn. 1993), 629 A.2d 1105. This Court has never directly ruled on whether evidence of the syndrome can be used as an affirmative defense, but we have recognized that this evidence has been used in other jurisdictions. State v. Hess (1992), 252 Mont. 205, 828 P.2d 382. In addition, while we have never directly ruled on whether it is permissible to allow expert testimony to explain why an abused woman might recant earlier statements at a criminal trial against her abuser, we have held that it was impermissible to offer testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome to bolster a female defendant's credibility. State v. Dannels (1987), 226 Mont. 80, 734 P.2d 188. In Dannels, we also acknowledged that battered woman syndrome evidence can be used to prove that a criminal defendant did not have the requisite state of mind to commit the crime. Dannels, 734 P.2d at 192. Therefore, this case presents the first opportunity for us to decide whether battered woman syndrome evidence can be used by the prosecution in a criminal trial to impeach the complaining witness' trial testimony, and to explain why a witness recants earlier statements at trial.