Opinion ID: 1161683
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conspiracy as a Continuing Offense

Text: The State's complaint alleged that from the 16th of September 1993 through December 1994, Willie, David, Janet, Adam, and Frederick entered into an agreement to commit theft from various insurance companies by staging a series of accidents and making claims against the companies for damages. The complaint claimed that the defendants committed 12 separate acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. The defendants objected in pretrial motions and at trial, contending that the complaint was jurisdictionally defective for alleging separate acts of theft and charging a single conspiracy. Defendants asserted that each accident and the resulting insurance claims constituted separate crimes of theft by deception, and the statutory crime of theft by deception is not a continuing crime. The defendants also argue that by charging the crime as a continuing offense and trying all the defendants to one jury, they were prejudiced because consolidating the trials allowed the State to present evidence not relevant to each of the defendants and to introduce evidence of acts of other defendants not relevant to all defendants under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. K.S.A. 60-460(i). The sufficiency of the charging document is measured by whether it contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he or she must be prepared to meet, and is specific enough to make a subsequent plea of double jeopardy possible. The charging document is sufficient if it substantially follows the language of the statute or charges the offense in equivalent words or words of the same import. K.S.A. 22-3201; State v. Micheaux, 242 Kan. 192, 197, 747 P.2d 784 (1987). We note that all criminal offenses, except those considered continuing offenses, are committed when every act which is an element of the offense has occurred. Continuing offenses are committed when the course of the prohibited conduct, or the accused's complicity in the crime, has terminated. State v. Gainer, 227 Kan. 670, Syl. ¶ 1, 608 P.2d 968 (1980). The defendants erroneously rely on Gainer to support their argument that the complaint is defective for alleging the offense was a continuing crime. Gainer involved the question of whether concealing the property taken in a theft constitutes concealment, thus tolling the statute of limitations. The Gainer court observed that the continuing offense doctrine arises in statute of limitations questions and has only limited application therein. The Gainer court held that the crime of theft by obtaining or exerting unauthorized control over property with intent to deprive the owner permanently of the possession, use, or benefit of his or her property as proscribed in K.S.A. 21-3701(a) was not a continuing offense. 227 Kan. 670, Syl. ¶ 2; see State v. Martinez, 255 Kan. 464, 472, 874 P.2d 617 (1994); State v. Freitag, 247 Kan. 499, 502, 802 P.2d 502 (1990). Here the defendants are not raising a statute of limitations claim, therefore, the continuing offense doctrine as discussed in Gainer has no application. The defendants next contend that the complaint was jurisdictionally defective because each accident and the resulting fraudulent insurance claims constituted separate crimes, and under these circumstances, the State must charge separate acts of thefts. This contention fails to recognize that the State did not charge the crime of theft. Rather than charging separate conspiracies or acts of theft, the State charged the crime of conspiracy to commit theft and alleged separate acts of deception that comprised the conspiracy. We note that conspiracy as defined by K.S.A. 21-3302 consists of two essential elements: (1) an agreement between two or more persons to commit or assist in committing a crime and (2) the commission by one or more of the conspirators of an overt act in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy. State v. Hill, 252 Kan. 637, 641, 847 P.2d 1267 (1993). To prove the defendants entered into a conspiracy, the State must establish that the conspirators had a mutual understanding or tacit agreementa meeting of the mindsor the accomplishment of a common purpose. This meeting of the minds may be expressed or implied from the acts of the parties. 252 Kan. at 641. Under such circumstances, the agreement is the prohibited conspiracy, and however diverse its objects, it violates but a single statute. State v. Mincey, 265 Kan. 257, 268, 963 P.2d 403 (1998). In Mincey this court addressed the question of whether Mincey's convictions for both conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery were multiplicitous. The Mincey court determined that a single continuing conspiracy cannot be broken down into component sub-agreements for the purpose of multiple punishments or multiple prosecutions. Where separate conspiracies are alleged and both are founded on a general conspiracy statute, the relevant inquiry is whether there existed more than one agreement to perform an illegal act or acts. 265 Kan. at 268. The Mincey court found that the convictions for the two conspiracies arose from a single agreement to commit two distinct crimes. The conviction for conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery was reversed. Even more recently, this court in State v. Wilkins, 267 Kan. 355, 985 P.2d 690 (1999), reversed a conviction of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. In Wilkins, there was one agreement between Wilkins and another to murder the victim and take his necklace as proof of the killing. The killing of the victim formed the basis for a first-degree murder charge, and the taking of the necklace was the basis for an aggravated robbery charge. Wilkins was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and a separate conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. Wilkins appealed, claiming there was a single conspiracy. The Wilkins court agreed and held that the single conspiracy could not be broken down into component sub-agreements for the purpose of multiple prosecutions or punishments. 267 Kan. 355, Syl. ¶ 6. The State's theory was that the different crimes of theft committed by the defendants were the result of an agreement to commit a series of crimes to obtain money by deception. Although the acts alleged in the complaint involved multiple transactions and deceptions by the various defendants spanning a period of time and overlapping facts, there was only one agreement between the defendants to cooperate in fraudulently collecting insurance claims. For instance, each accident involved one or more of a core group of conspirators and some of the successful claims included a false statement for medical treatment provided by Dr. Loeb and/ or wage losses verified by Smith Industries. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the medical treatment and wage loss claims were central to the agreement and that the individual defendants conspired to play their parts in pursuing such claims. The complaint is consistent with the State's theory, and the complaint is not defective for failing to charge individual theft crimes in addition to or instead of the crime of conspiracy to commit theft by deception.