Opinion ID: 169696
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant Garner

Text: After executing the search warrant on Dopp’s property, the State Defendants had a number of vehicles towed from Dopp’s property to Bob Garner 5 The State Defendants’ brief does not contain any record citations and their arguments are essentially limited to asserting the district court was correct. Such a conclusory brief is not helpful to our review of the case. -4- Garage and W recker Service. Among those vehicles was a 1965 Ford pickup truck, VIN No. 10DK641079, which is the subject of this lawsuit. On M ay 24, 1996, Defendant Loring filed an “A uthorization to Release Property” in D opp’s state criminal action which authorized the release of certain property, including the 1965 Ford pickup truck, to Dopp. Over the next couple of days, Dopp paid Defendant Garner the towing and storage fees for six vehicles seized from his residence and obtained their release. 6 How ever, Dopp did not secure the release of the 1965 Ford truck, stating he ran out of money to pay its towing and storage fees. 7 He also learned he was not legally required to pay the towing and storage fees. Approximately two years later (M ay 1998), Garner sold the 1965 Ford truck for storage fees owed against it. On April 11, 2001, Dopp wrote Garner a letter inquiring about the truck. Because Garner had sold it, he did not respond to the letter. On April 21, 2001, Dopp discovered Garner had sold the truck. In his complaint, Dopp alleged Garner, acting under color of state law, disposed of the truck without providing him notice or a pre-deprivation hearing in violation of due process. 6 Dopp was out on bond from M ay 12, 1996, through M ay 1, 1998. 7 According to Garner’s affidavit, Dopp “retrieved all of the vehicles except [the 1965 Ford truck], stating he wasn’t very concerned about it, even though he still had a large wad of cash after having paid for the release of the other vehicles. He did tell me he might be back later to get that vehicle. He never returned.” (R. Vol. I, Doc. 41 at 90.) However, because Dopp’s claim against Garner was dismissed on the pleadings, we treat Dopp’s allegations as true. Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999). -5- The district court dismissed without prejudice Dopp’s claim against Garner for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Specifically, it found Garner’s sale of the truck was not state action and therefore Dopp could not state a due process claim against Garner under § 1983. 8 Dopp argues the court erred in dismissing his claim against Garner. Relying on Coleman v. Turpen, he contends the truck’s sale constituted state action because Garner towed and stored the truck at the direction of state officers and sold the truck for storage fees owed against it pursuant to Oklahoma statute. 697 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 1983). W e review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Perkins, 165 F.3d at 806. Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend. In determining whether dismissal is proper, we must accept the allegations of the complaint as true and we must construe those allegations, and any reasonable inferences that might be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. (citation omitted). Under § 1983, liability attaches only to conduct occurring under color of state law; conduct constituting state action under the Fourteenth Amendment satisfies this requirement. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 8 The district court also concluded Dopp’s claim against Garner was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Given that the truck’s sale did not constitute state action, we need not address the timeliness of Dopp’s complaint. -6- (1982). Private conduct constitutes state action if it is “fairly attributable to the State.” Id. at 937; see Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 906 (10th Cir. 2000). This requirement is satisfied if two conditions are met: (1) “the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and (2) the private party charged with the deprivation “must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. It is undisputed Garner is not a state officer or employee and therefore the district court properly considered him a private individual. Applying Lugar, w e conclude Garner’s sale of the truck was not state action. Garner presumably sold the truck pursuant to O KLA . S TAT . tit. 12A, § 7-210 (allowing a w arehouseman’s lien for storage fees to be enforced by public or private sale of the goods after notice to all persons known to claim an interest in the goods). Therefore, Garner’s sale of the truck satisfies the first prong of the Lugar test. See Coleman, 697 F.2d at 1345 (concluding first part of Lugar test was met where defendant wrecker service sold property pursuant to O KLA . S TAT . tit. 12A, § 7-210). However, the truck’s sale fails to satisfy the second part of Lugar. Although Garner was acting for the State when he towed the truck, there is absolutely no -7- evidence the State Defendants or any other state official assisted Garner in selling the truck or otherwise encouraged or authorized him to do so. Indeed, at the time Garner sold the truck, the State Defendants had released it to Dopp. Thus, Garner was holding the truck for D opp, not the State, at the time of the sale. Consequently, the sale of the truck is not “chargeable to the State.” Coleman is clearly distinguishable. There, the police seized Coleman’s camper and hired Kiefer to tow and store it. Later, Kiefer sold the camper to satisfy its storage fees without providing notice to Coleman. Coleman sued Kiefer under § 1983 alleging he deprived him of his property without due process. The district court dismissed the claim concluding Kiefer was not acting under color of law and therefore was not susceptible to suit under § 1983. W e disagreed, finding Kiefer’s sale of the camper satisfied both prongs of Lugar. W ith regard to the second prong, we stated: Kiefer jointly participated in seizing the [camper] by towing it away. Since the State has asserted a right to maintain possession of the camper, Kiefer held the truck for the State, not for M r. Coleman. In allowing Kiefer to sell the camper, the State thus deprived M r. Coleman of his property in joint participation with Kiefer. W e hold that Kiefer’s sale of the camper was state action under the fourteenth amendment and was therefore under color of state law for purposes of section 1983. Id. (emphasis added). Unlike in Coleman, Garner was holding the truck for Dopp, not the State, at the time of its sale. This case is more akin to W einrauch v. Park City, 751 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1984). There, a police officer had Speers tow W einrauch’s vehicle to an impound -8- lot. Later, the police officer informed W einrauch she could recover her car by paying Speers a towing fee. W hen W einrauch arrived at the impound lot, no attendant was present. Therefore, she took her vehicle without paying the fee. Shortly thereafter, the vehicle was reported stolen. Two police officers responded to the call and began pursuing W einrauch’s vehicle. Speers also heard the police report. Concluding that the car was from the impound lot, Speers also began pursuing W einrauch’s vehicle. In the end, W einrauch was stopped by the police and she paid Speers his fee. W einrauch brought suit against Speers under § 1983 based on his pursuit of her vehicle. The district court dismissed, concluding Speers was not acting under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983. W e agreed: It is clear that Speers was acting for the state when he initially towed the car. Coleman v. Turpen, 697 F.2d 1341, 1345 (10th Cir. 1983). However, the evidence is undisputed that Speers was not performing City towing services when he tried to stop W einrauch’s car and that the police had not requested or authorized his assistance. Id. at 360-61. Similarly, the State Defendants did not request or authorize Garner to sell the truck. Because G arner’s sale of the truck was not state action, the district court properly concluded Dopp had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Garner. This deficiency could not have been cured by amendment of the complaint.