Opinion ID: 2632314
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Oshins' statements to Denise St. James

Text: Fink first challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment regarding Oshins' statements to Denise. As evidence of Oshins' alleged defamation, Fink points to the affidavit in which Denise asserted, Mr. Oshins told me that Don Fink had told him that he was hiding some of Tim's assets offshore in order to conceal them from me. The district court concluded that Oshins' statements were absolutely privileged and granted summary judgment to Oshins accordingly. On appeal, Fink contends that the district court erred in applying the absolute privilege. In Circus Circus Hotels v. Witherspoon , this court recognized the long-standing common law rule that communications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. [5] The policy behind the absolute privilege, as it applies to attorneys participating in judicial proceedings, is to grant them as officers of the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to obtain justice for their clients. [6] This privilege, as its name indicates, is absolute: it precludes liability even where the defamatory statements are published with knowledge of their falsity and personal ill will toward the plaintiff. [7] The absolute privilege is for the court to apply. [8] The scope of the absolute privilege is quite broad. The defamatory communication need not be strictly relevant to any issue involved in the proposed or pending litigation, [9] it only need be in some way pertinent to the subject of controversy. [10] Further, the privilege applies not only to communications made during actual judicial proceedings, but also to communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding. [11] The scope of the privilege does, however, have limits. When the defamatory communication is made before a judicial proceeding is initiated, it will be cloaked with immunity only if the communication is made in contemplation of initiation of the proceeding. [12] In other words, at the time the defamatory communication is made, the proceeding must be `contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration.' [13] Within these limits, courts should apply the absolute privilege liberally, resolving any doubt in favor of its relevancy or pertinency. [14] Fink contends that Oshins' statements to Denise provided the impetus for her to begin considering removing Fink as independent trustee and, therefore, Oshins' statements fall beyond the scope of the absolute privilege. In the context of the applicable law, the question before the district court was whether Oshins' statements to Denise were made after Denise began serious consideration of undertaking proceedings to remove Fink. We conclude that the district court's decision to apply the privilege under these circumstances was correct. In particular, we note that Denise stated that she began losing faith in Fink shortly after her husband's funeral when Fink informed her that as trustees, they could draw as much or as little in fees from the trust as they wished. This conversation, which, according to the record, took place before Oshins' conversation with Denise that provided the basis for Fink's defamation claim, gave the district court sufficient ground to conclude that Denise had begun serious consideration of the proceedings necessary to remove Fink well before Oshins spoke with her. Fink argues that the uncertainty regarding Denise's subjective state of mind, namely, precisely when she decided to remove him, created a fact question for the jury. We disagreethe absolute privilege is for the court to apply. [15] In reaching its decision, the district court simply resolved any doubt in favor of a broad application of the absolute privilege, just as it should have. Fink next contends that Oshins cannot claim absolute privilege because Denise republished the statement in her affidavit, a court document that was available to the public. The argument is premised on the assumption that the defamatory communication must not be published beyond the sphere of attorney/client communications, or else the absolute privilege will be deemed waived. But this is incorrect. The fact that the defamatory statements are published beyond the attorney/client relationship has no bearing on the attorney's ability to assert the absolute privilege to defamation. [16] It appears that Fink has simply confused two basic legal doctrines, the evidentiary privilege protecting the confidential communications between clients and their attorneys, a privilege that the client holds and can waive through publication, [17] and the privilege shield of defamation law, a defense that is not waived through publication. Fink also argues that Oshins was not, in fact, representing Denise, but rather Oshins was really representing Fink in his capacity as independent trustee. Fink does not explain the objective of this argument. But insofar as he raises it to counter what he perceived to be the district court's application of the attorney-client privilege, we again point out his confusion between the evidentiary privilege and the defamation defense. And insofar as Fink advances the argument to defeat the district court's application of the defamation defense altogether, we reject it. In order to claim the absolute privilege, the attorney must indeed have been involved in the anticipated or actual judicial proceeding. [18] But we conclude that the district court properly applied the absolute privilege here because Oshins, acting in his role as the trust attorney, represented Denise in her capacity as the family trustee and primary beneficiary, at least to a degree sufficient to bring him within the scope of the absolute privilege under the circumstances presented here. In particular, the record demonstrates that Oshins played a role in Fink's removal as the independent trustee, even though another attorney was later brought in to effectuate the removal. [19]