Opinion ID: 417702
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issues To Be Raised by Appellant

Text: 1 Defendant-intervenor appellant appeals from paragraph 4 of the District Court's Order of March 25, 1982 on the grounds that: a. The remedy of ordering the City to hire up to 45 women from among class members found to be qualified for the job of firefighters, by means of a special qualifying procedure to be agreed upon by the parties or determined by the Court, constitutes affirmative relief rather than compliance relief. b. The Court should have ordered the City either to give a special qualifying test to all men and women who failed Exam 3040 and to hire them on a rank order basis or to allow the women who failed Exam 3040 to take the next entry-level exam for firefighter and to be hired on a competitive basis with all other candidates for the position. c. The Court erred in ordering the City to hire up to 45 qualified women because the number 45 is based on a calculation that included all women who took and passed the written test for Exam 3040, regardless of whether or not they took the physical exam. 2 Appellant appeals from the District Court's Order of August 3, 1982 on the grounds that: a. The maximum qualifying time of 4 minutes 9 seconds was based on testing a group of firefighters that included persons over the age of 29, which is the maximum age for applying for the job. b. The qualifying exam does not test for upper body strength in the manner or the extent to which the record shows it is required for the job. c. The qualifying test sets lower physical standards than the physical test of Exam 3040. Although the City was party to the stipulation embodied in this order, it has elected not to participate in the appeal either by brief or by oral argument. 2 Notwithstanding the stipulation and order limiting this appeal to issues regarding relief, see note 1 supra, UFA appears to press in its briefs on appeal certain challenges to the district court's decision as to the merits of Berkman's claims. In light of the parties' limiting stipulation, we do not address UFA's arguments of the merits except to note in passing that perhaps its challenges on the merits were well foregone. Its major such challenge appears to be essentially that Title VII analysis is inapplicable to physical examinations. Thus, UFA states: A physical examination is an unbiased examination. An individual is either strong enough to pass the examination or he is not strong enough. (UFA brief on appeal at 10.) UFA's premise ignores the law. If a physical test or criterion is not job-related and its application in employment decisions has a disparate impact on persons protected by Title VII, Title VII is violated. E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1374-75 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928, 100 S.Ct. 1865, 64 L.Ed.2d 281 (1980); Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Commission, 395 F.Supp. 378, 382 & n. 1 (N.D.Cal.1975). 3 Prior to administering Exam 3040, the City had attempted to recruit women to take the test and offered a booklet to familiarize candidates with each component of the physical test and with preparatory exercises. City firemen conducted informal training sessions privately for a fee. 536 F.Supp. at 200. One result of these training programs was publicity predicting that no woman could pass the physical test. For example, the lead sentence of one New York Daily News article reported that [a] practice test by two dozen would-be women firefighters through the Fire Department's training course ... showed that the physical test seems to rule out women. New York Daily News, Dec. 11, 1977, at 4. There was trial testimony from several members of the plaintiff class as to the discouraging effect of the publicity 4 As of the date of the court's decision, 2,666 men, or 16% of the 16,925 who completed the physical exam, had been called up for appointment. See note 13 infra. Subsequently the City obtained permission from the court to appoint additional firefighters from Eligibility List 3040, and the number of places to be reserved for women was also increased 5 The description of the interim test devised by the City was as follows: Part I--Engine Simulation Subtest A. Hose Stretch: Candidate holds one length of 3 1/2' hose weighing 80 pounds and stretches it 145 feet. B. Hose Carry: Candidate picks up a folded 2 1/2' hose weighing 46 pounds and carries it from the building entrance to the fifth floor by way of the stairs. --Five Minute Rest--[see note 6 infra ] Part II--Ladder Simulation Subtest C. Ladder Raise: Candidate raises a 20 foot ladder that weighs 58 pounds and is lying on the ground from the horizontal to the vertical position. D. Ladder and Stair Climb: Candidate climbs a pre-set supported ladder up to the second story and then enters the building through an open window, picks up an 8 pound mallet and a halligan tool, and runs up to the fifth floor. E. Forcible Entry: On the fifth floor, candidate hits a rolled 3 1/2 hose weighing 80 pounds that is placed at one end of a table and drives it 12 1/2 feet to the other end of the table. F. Rescue Drag: Candidate drags a 145 pound articulated dummy from a position on the fifth floor to a door leading to the stairs. In performing all tasks, candidates were to wear a 24-pound Scott Pak and full firefighter uniform. 6 A preliminary group of eight firefighters was tested on May 11, 1982. After the first four had completed the test, the officer-observers recommended that the rest period between parts I and II be shortened from one hour to five minutes, and the recommendation was adopted immediately. The remaining four firefighters who took the test on May 11, and the main group of 29 firefighters who took the test on May 14, performed the various subtests on the revised schedule. The performances of the first four tryouts were not considered in the computation of the recommended cutoff score 7 The court expressed its concerns with respect to validation and the need for expedition as follows: I certainly do not propose to approve this proposed qualifying physical examination that has been presented to me by the City without an opportunity for [plaintiff] to be heard, and also an opportunity for [plaintiff] to find out more about circumstances under which it was prepared, administered, and what its impact, validity and fairness may be, but I am also impressed, as I was at the time I asked you to proceed expeditiously to come to some resolution of this qualifying exam, with the need to get started in some direction, and I have been presented with a quite concrete proposal for a qualifying physical examination which is along the lines which during the trial of the matter seemed to be the kind of work based examination, which the plaintiff thought most appropriate .... .... ... [I]f this examination has been administered to people of substantial experience as incumbents in the Fire Department, there is a real question in my mind as to the degree that their times are a factor of their skill and training, and I am also concerned that the examination appears to, from the papers that have been presented to me, appears to have been prepared and administered with little attention as far as I can see to equally available alternatives with a less adverse impact on women, and without any effort to determine how serious, if it's serious at all, the adverse impact on women of this examination might be .... (June 3, 1982 Tr. at 4-5, 6.) 8 The court declined to adopt Berkman's proposal for qualification solely by means of a training program, stating that that proposal would be more appropriate for a situation in which affirmative action on the part of the City was required because of intentional discrimination in the past. (June 3, 1982 Tr. at 9.) In its ruling on the merits the court had declined to find intentional discrimination. 536 F.Supp. at 217 9 UFA had previously appealed from the March Order; that appeal had been withdrawn, without prejudice, by stipulation dated June 7, 1982 10 The interim test agreed to by plaintiff and the City was as follows: The candidate will wear full turnout gear, including a turnout coat, gloves, boots, Scott Air Pak and helmet. PART I --Engine Simulation 1 Hose stretch. Candidate holds one length of 3 1/2' hose weighing 80 pounds and stretches it 145 feet 2 Hose carry. Candidate transfers one folded length of 2 1/2' hose, weighing 46 pounds, from shoulder-height stand to shoulder, and carries it from the entrance of Building 1 to the fifth floor Seven and one-half minute rest PART II--Ladder Simulation (Rescue) 3 Ladder raise. Candidate raises a 20-foot ladder that weighs 58 pounds from the ground to a vertical position 4 Ladder and stair climb. Candidate climbs a pre-set supported ladder up to the second story and enters the building through an open window; picks up a bar weigh ing [sic ] 16 pounds; and climbs to the fifth floor 5 Forcible entry. On the fifth floor, candidate, using a sledge type hammer weighing 8 pounds, hits a rolled 3 1/2' hose, not to exceed 60 pounds in weight, the length of a 12'6' table; the resistance factor of the hose on the table shall be no greater than nine kilograms of horizontal force as measured on a device to be supplied by Dr. William McArdle 6 Simulated rescue. Candidate drags a 145-pound articulated dummy along a marked path on the fifth floor SCORING All tasks are performed in sequence. Maximum satisfactory time for performance of the test, not counting the rest period, shall be four minutes, nine seconds. 11 On August 5, 1982, UFA withdrew, without prejudice, its appeal from the June 9 Order and on August 27 filed its present appeal, which seeks review of both the August Order and the March Order. See note 9 supra 12 The affidavit of UFA's president stated that [t]he thrust of [UFA's] appeal is that the bulwark of this department has been built on esprit de corps (Affidavit of Nicholas Mancuso, sworn to Sept. 1, 1982, at 5), and was filled with predictions of the erosion of firefighter morale and public confidence: Lowering the standards to allow the members of the class in will cause irreparable harm in opening the floodgates and enable future candidates of both sexes to enter the department with substandard qualifications. The high caliber of the men who have been members of this department and have epitomized to the world at large that the members of the New York City Fire Department are the best there is [sic ], will hereinafter be undermined. This will have a direct effect on the conceptions of the public and will shake the faith of the community at large. No longer will the Fire Department symbolize unflinching devotion to duty and the ideal of putting ones [sic ] life before that of the publics [sic ] will fade in the light of this decision. The unit as an entity will be weakened and discipline thrown to the wind. Firefighters will have the seeds of doubt sown in their minds and fear will gnaw at their beings, wondering if those behind them will have the strength and fortitude to shoulder the burdens and responsibility for the lives of each-other [sic ]. (Id. at 2-3.) 13 In setting the interim number at 45, the court did not purport to find the exact number of women who would have been called up for appointment absent discrimination, but found only that 45 was close to that number. In chart form, the statistics discussed in Part I.A. above are as follows: Men Women % of Prior % of Prior Number Category Number Category 24,252 98% Passed Written 389 95% 18,060 74% Took Physical 88 23% 16,925 94% Completed Physical 79 90% 7,847 46% Passed Physical 0 0% The court's own calculation of the number of women who would have been called up, see text accompanying note 4 supra, would have yielded a total of 46 (74% of 389 = 288; 16% of 288 = 46). We find one slight flaw in the district court's calculation, which we regard as harmless. The court arrived at its 16% figure by dividing 2,666, the number of men by then called up for appointment from Eligibility List 3040, by 16,925, which the court mistakenly stated was the number of men who presented themselves to take the physical exam. 536 F.Supp. at 217. The actual number of men who so presented themselves was 18,060, and 16,925 represented the number of men who completed the exam. Id. at 204. Thus, the court's calculation did not take into account the likelihood that even without the test's sex-discriminatory impact, a certain number of women would normally be expected not to complete the exam, and hence not qualify for appointment. The more appropriate calculation would have reduced the number 288 (i.e., 74% of women who passed written test) to 94% of that figure (percentage of men taking but not completing physical test), to reach 271 as the number of women who could have been predicted to complete a sex-neutral exam. Applying the 16% call-up figure to 271, one would arrive at 43 as the number of women to be called up. Given the fact that the court was not striving for a precise quantification, as discussed in the first paragraph of this footnote, we regard this slight variance as immaterial. 14 The interim hiring provision has compensatory features as well since victims who are able to pass the interim test will be hired, and the City has agreed to pay them backpay and benefits with respect to a period prior to their actual appointments 15 We find no merit in UFA's contention that the provision for an interim test for interested members of the plaintiff class should be set aside unless it also is extended to men who failed the physical portion of Exam 3040. The provision was designed to remedy discrimination in violation of Title VII. There was no showing that the test had had any disparate impact on any group of men on the basis of their gender. Accordingly, there was no basis for awarding men, as well as women, this interim Title VII relief. See, e.g., Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767, 772-73 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 3198, 49 L.Ed.2d 1203 (1976)