Opinion ID: 2314474
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 1A Variance

Text: We reject the defendant's argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal on count I of the indictment. His articulated reason for such relief pointed out to the court below that Taylor Rental Co., the alleged owner of the wood splitter, did not have a property interest in the stolen goods, since the wood splitter belonged to one David Adams who did business as Taylor Rental Center. As a matter of evidentiary fact, the Taylor Rental Corporation is a franchisor located in Massachusetts, which had no property interest in Taylor Rental Center of Brewer, nor in its wood splitters. Whatever may have been the style given to the defendant's objection for which he asserted the right to have an acquittal of the particular charge, in essence it consisted of a claim that there existed a fatal variance between the allegation in the indictment of the theft of the property of Taylor Rental Co., and the proof at trial, since in fact the State's proof was theft of the property of Adams, doing business as Taylor Rental Center. We find no merit in the defendant's argument. An indictment, in our Anglo-Saxon criminal jurisprudence, implies the finding of a grand jury (see Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 192, 23 S.Ct. 98, 103, 47 L.Ed. 130 (1902)); it is the sworn accusation in writing, presented by the grand jury to a court of competent jurisdiction, charging the accused person with a particular crime. See Salvail v. Sharkey, 108 R.I. 63, 271 A.2d 814, 817 (1970). As mandated by Rule 7(c) of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure, the indictment shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. (Emphasis provided) The purported object of an indictment in satisfying the constitutional requirements respecting the rights of persons accused of crime provided by our State Constitution in Article I, Sections 6 and 8, must be to fairly apprise the defendant of the exact offense of which he is accused so that he may properly prepare his defense to the charge and, if convicted or acquitted, may make use of the judgment as a basis for a plea of former jeopardy. State v. Hebert, Me., 448 A.2d 322 (1982); State v. Pierce, Me., 438 A.2d 247, 250 (1981); State v. Charette, 159 Me. 124, 126, 188 A.2d 898, 900 (1963). Brasslett does not contend that the indictment was not sufficiently specific so as to enable him to prepare his defense. He claims, rather, that the inaccurate allegation of ownership in the indictment, i.e. Taylor Rental Co. instead of Taylor Rental Center, let alone David Adams doing business as Taylor Rental Center, exposes him in the future to double jeopardy, since there are franchises which do business under the name of Taylor Rental Company. The name of the owner of stolen property does not constitute an essential factual element of the offense of theft; it is the fact that the stolen property is the property of one other than the defendant which is a necessary ingredient of this charge. One cannot steal from one's self. The owner's name must necessarily be stated in an indictment primarily as a description for the purpose of identification of the property stolen and to show ownership in a person or persons other than the accused. State v. Kimball, Me., 359 A.2d 305, 307 (1976); State v. Small, 156 Me. 10, 13, 157 A.2d 874, 876 (1960). The primary purposes of the requirement that ownership be alleged in larceny indictments are to inform the accused of the exact offense charged, to enable him to prepare for trial and to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. State v. Small, supra, 156 Me. at 13, 157 A.2d at 876. When allegation and proof of ownership are so interrelated as to allow those purposes to be protected and realized, a harmless variance will not vitiate the indictment, nor defeat a conviction thereunder. See People v. Harden, 42 Ill.2d 301, 247 N.E.2d 404, 406 (1969). Neither the indictment nor the testimony left any reasonable doubt, nor was the defendant misled in any way by the fact, that the particular wood splitter involved in this accusation of theft belonged to the mercantile establishment in Brewer operated by David Adams under the business name of Taylor Rental Center, though the indictment was imprecise in alleging the owner's name as Taylor Rental Co. It is true that the term company, identified by the contraction Co., in common parlance may be interpreted as referring to a corporate entity, but it is also commonly used in the commercial world to designate the business of an individual or partnership doing business under an assumed trade name. As a general rule, in the absence of statute, an individual or partnership may adopt any name it sees fit under which to transact a legitimate business. Lipman v. Thomas, 143 Me. 270, 272, 61 A.2d 130, 131 (1948). See 31 M.R.S.A. § 2. Furthermore, we said in State v. Hebert, supra , that the scope of jeopardy created by an indictment is as broad as that indictment may be fairly read. If the allegations in a subsequent prosecution describe an offense which comes within the scope of the charging document of a prior prosecution, then the defendant may successfully raise the defense of former jeopardy in the subsequent proceedings. Here, the marginal variance in the trade name of the alleged owner of the wood splitter would in no way impair the defendant's constitutional privilege of immunity from double jeopardy. The indictment was sufficiently specific as to its allegation of ownership of the stolen property to enable the defendant to adequately prepare his defense and to protect him from subsequent prosecution for the same offense. State v. Smith, Me., 435 A.2d 408, 409 (1981).