Opinion ID: 1125205
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Federal Ex Post Facto

Text: Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution forbids states from passing any ex post facto law. [18] Although the language of the federal constitution does not define the term, the seminal case of Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798) interpreted that term and that holding has been applied ever since. The Calder Court outlined four categories of ex post facto laws: (1) a law making criminal, and subject to punishment, an activity which was innocent when originally done; (2) a law aggravating a crime or making it a greater crime than it was when originally committed; (3) a law aggravating a crime's punishment; and (4) a law altering the rules of evidence to require less or different testimony than was required at the time of the commission of the crime so as to make easier the conviction of the offender. Id. at 390. [19] In Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), the Supreme Court recognized two purposes which form the basis for the prohibition against ex post facto legislation. First, the prohibition assures that legislative acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed. Id. Secondly, it restricts government power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation. Id.; see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Collins, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990), the Court had provided that a change which injuriously affects a substantial right to which the accused was entitled at the time of his offense is an ex post facto violation if applied retroactively. See Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (holding that the former law afforded jointly indicted defendants separate trials as a matter of right, but the new law only afforded separate trials subject to the trial judge's discretion; held, no ex post facto violation because the law did not affect a substantial right of the accused); Kring, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883) (holding that a law in effect at the time of the offense provided that on a charge of first-degree murder a guilty plea of second-degree murder acquitted the defendant of first-degree murder even if the plea was later set aside; a law passed after the offense was committed provided that if plea to second-degree murder is set aside, defendant may be tried for first-degree murder; held, the ex post facto change deprived the defendant of a substantial right). In 1990, the United States Supreme Court held in Collins that the retroactive application of a statute allowing the appellate courts to reform an unauthorized verdict without remanding the case for a new trial was not violative of the ex post facto clause. At that time, the Court overruled Kring, supra, and Thompson, 170 U.S. at 351, 18 S.Ct. 620 (1898) (a case which held that a change in Utah law which reduced the size of criminal juries from twelve to eight persons deprived the defendant of a substantial right involved in his liberty and violated the ex post facto clause, stating that the test is whether the retroactive application alters the situation to [the defendant's] disadvantage.). In reaching this conclusion, the Court concluded that cases such as these, which had broadened the scope of the definition of ex post facto law, were inconsistent with the term ex post facto law as it was understood at the time the Constitution was adopted. After the Collins decision, a statute which involves the first three Calder categories passes ex post facto examination if it: [D]oes not punish as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; nor make more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; nor deprive one charged with crime any defense available according to law at the time the act was committed. Id. at 2721. [20] In California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995), the Supreme Court followed Collins, and further explained: Our opinions in Lindsey, Weaver, and Miller suggested that enhancements to the measure of criminal punishment fall within the ex post facto prohibition because they operate to the disadvantage of covered offenders. See Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401, 57 S.Ct. 797, 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981); Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 433, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987). But that language was unnecessary to the results of those cases and is inconsistent with the framework developed in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990). After Collins, the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of disadvantage, nor, as the dissent seems to suggest, on whether an amendment affects a prisoner's opportunity to take advantage of provisions for early release,... but on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which the crime is punishable. Morales, 514 U.S. at 506, 115 S.Ct. 1597. This review clearly indicates that the Collins/Morales line of jurisprudence established a return to Calder and shows that the operative factor in determining whether a law falls within the ambit of the ex post facto clause is whether the law can be considered punishment or altered the definition of criminal conduct. See also Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. at 522 (holding that it was a mistake in Kring and Thompson to stray beyond Calder's four categories).