Opinion ID: 2163453
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Summary of MERC Pre-Arbitral Deferral Policy

Text: Mirroring the Collyer doctrine, MERC has outlined its pre-arbitral deferral policy in the following succinct statement: Under Collyer, deferral of a charge presumes satisfaction of three requirements: 1) a stable bargaining relationship between the parties; [ [32] ] 2) intent on Respondent's part to exhaust [ [33] ] the contract grievance procedure culminating in final and binding arbitration; [ [34] ] and 3) the underlying dispute centers on the interpretation or application of the contract. [ [35] ] The touchstone of deferral is that the dispute does not require a determination or clarification of statutory obligations and is susceptible of resolution under the provisions and language of the contract. Pre-award deferral thus involves a preliminary review of the history and quality of the bargaining relationship, the amenability of Respondent to arbitrate,[ [36] ] the absence of anti-union animus, and the scope of the arbitration clause. Detroit Fire Dep't, 1977 MERC Lab Op 267, 276. (Emphasis supplied.) Beyond MERC's clear reliance on the Federal sphere's development of the pre-arbitral deferral doctrine, the commission has justified its acceptance of that doctrine tempered by Spielberg post-award deferral notions: The question of whether an employer violated his duty to bargain in making unilateral changes in a collective bargaining agreement depends, quite obviously, on what the agreement provides, and this in turn may involve questions of interpretation and application. A solution which leaves all of these questions to MERC seems highly undesirable, since in many situations it would subject the parties to unnecessary costs and delay. In contrast, a solution which makes a private adjudicator the final and binding interpreter of the external law is improper and unattainable, even if it were desirable. The third alternative, which would say that questions under the agreement are to be resolved by arbitrators, but that the results of arbitration, insofar as they involve the interpretation and application of the agreement itself, are to be taken as binding in subsequent litigation under the external law if they were satisfactorily considered there [per Spielberg], is conceptually proper and meets the best interests of the parties in the vast majority of disputes. Id., 274. (Emphasis supplied.) VI. HAS MERC PROPERLY FOUND DISCRETIONARY DEFERRAL AUTHORITY IN PERA, § 16? The foregoing analysis demonstrates the significant comparability in doctrinal development of the NLRB's and MERC's pre-arbitral deferral postures. While it is patent that MERC's City of Flint doctrine has closely paralleled the federally-sanctioned Collyer doctrine in substantive respects, the question remains whether MERC, like the NLRB pursuant to NLRA, § 10, may exercise discretionary deferral authority pursuant to the procedural outline of PERA, § 16 subject to proper post-award review. We resolve this inquiry in the affirmative. Indeed, we find the propriety of PERA, § 16 discretionary deferral authority to be more ineluctable than the federally approved exercise of NLRA, § 10 deferral authority to which we look for guidance.