Opinion ID: 1257176
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legality of Commission's Order

Text: The principal contention of appellant on appeal, as we understand it, is that the decision of the Public Service Commission was contrary to law because § 37-31, W.S. 1957, clearly contemplates that only one public utility will be granted a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the furnishing of telephone service within a certificated area; and that the effect of the Commission's order is to give Mountain States the right to furnish telephone service within appellant's certificated area. It is spelled out clearly in appellant's brief that Dubois has not requested any change in the point of interconnection of presently existing toll circuits utilized on the Lander-Jackson overland toll line. It is requested that the Commission require Mountain States to provide such additional toll lines or connections as are necessary to adequately service the needs of the Dubois exchange; and that such additional lines be connected at the boundary line of complainant's area, with toll charges being adjusted accordingly. The original certificate of public convenience and necessity under which Dubois Telephone Exchange claims was dated June 21, 1950. It was amended May 26, 1961 as a result of Dubois having applied to have its territorial limits expanded. Mountain States operated as a telephone utility prior to the enactment of legislation in Wyoming for the certification of such utilities. As a prior existent utility, it had the right to continue its operations. See § 37-31, W.S. 1957. However, by order dated August 5, 1960, the Wyoming Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Mountain States, delineating certain of its territory and rights. Such order encompassed the territory and rights here involved. The rights asserted and claimed by Dubois in the present controversy are predicated on the May 26, 1961 order of the Commission, which amended Dubois' certificate of public convenience and necessity by expanding its territorial limits and authorizing the Burris-Crowheart line. However, we find no language in that order which can be construed as expressly or impliedly granting to Dubois an exclusive right for both local and toll telephone service with respect to the area described in the new order. On the contrary, the order specified that Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company has a toll line running through the area; and that Mountain States should be authorized to construct, operate and maintain toll routes and related facilities through such area. Authorization to construct facilities through the area tends to refute the idea that future activities of Mountain States would be limited to the bringing of future facilities only to the boundary line of the area. Another paragraph of the order specifically stated: That this Order shall be without prejudice to the right of the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company to construct, operate and maintain toll routes and related plant facilities through the territory involved in this proceeding   . Although counsel for Dubois states § 37-31, W.S. 1957, clearly contemplates that only one public utility will be granted a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the furnishing of telephone service within a certificated area, we fail to find language in this statute justifying such a statement; and appellant has not called our attention to any words or language in the statute which would indicate such a contemplation. In essence we held to the contrary in Big Horn Rural Electric Company v. Pacific Power & Light Company, Wyo., 397 P.2d 455, 457-458. Perhaps the power of the Commission to do what it did, when it denied the request of Dubois in the instant matter, is best reflected in the following language contained in § 37-31:    and provided, further, that if any public utility, in constructing or extending its line, plant or system shall interfere or be about to interfere with the operation of the line, plant or system of any other public utility, already authorized or constructed, the commission on complaint of the public utility claiming to be injuriously affected, may, after hearing, make such order and prescribe such terms and conditions for the location of the lines, plants or systems affected, as to it may seem just and reasonable   . Not only does the language just quoted indicate that two similar utilities may have rights in the same territory, but it authorizes the Commission in the event of a conflict between the two utilities to make such order and prescribe such conditions as to it may seem just and reasonable. That of course is what the Commission did when it refused to order what Dubois was requesting. We see no reason to say its action was without authority or contrary to law. Of interest is the Nebraska case of Northwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Consolidated Telephone Company of Dunning, 180 Neb. 268, 142 N.W.2d 324, 327, which was a case similar to the one we are dealing with. There the Nebraska supreme court held a local telephone company, with a certificate of public convenience and necessity for a limited area, did not have the right to unilaterally change the point at which it exchanges long-distance messages with a toll company. The court stated that where the problem had been considered in other states, it seems to have been uniformly held that duplication of the toll telephone lines and service is contrary to law and sound public regulatory policy. If the Commission would have had power, as an administrative agency, to grant the relief requested by Dubois, it follows a fortiori that it had the power to deny such relief, in the absence of the denial being arbitrary, capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion which is not here claimed. Having asked for administrative action, which it received, Dubois cannot now be heard to say the administrative agency involved was without power to act  either for or against the relief requested. If Dubois wanted a judicial determination of its rights under § 37-31 and under its May 26, 1961 certificate of public convenience and necessity, it should have sought its relief in the courts and not before an administrative agency. Section 37-17, W.S. 1957, provides that a public utility may complain to the Public Service Commission of anything done or omitted to be done in violation of public utility laws. Section 37-45, W.S. 1957, provides for an appeal to the district court of Laramie County and specifies that the court's review is limited to a determination whether or not: (1) The Commission acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the order was procured by fraud; (3) the order is in conformity with law; (4) the finding of facts in issue was supported by any substantial evidence. [1] The only questions raised on judicial review in this case are whether the agency acted within its powers and whether the findings of fact in issue are supported by substantial evidence. We have already sufficiently shown that the Commission did not lack power to deny the relief sought by complainant Dubois, and moreover its power to act was recognized and accepted by Dubois in the bringing of its complaint. The only remaining question to be dealt with is the sufficiency of evidence.