Opinion ID: 3022246
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994), guides us as to the burdens that an employee and an employer bear when the employer moves for summary judgment on a McDonnell Douglas claim. Because Tomasso, as Boeing concedes, has made out a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to Boeing, which must articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory rationale for his layoff. Id. at 763.4 This burden is “relatively 3 The District Court had jurisdiction over Tomasso’s federal and state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361 and 1367, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment against Tomasso de novo, and we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to him, as he is the nonmoving party. See S & H Hardware & Supply Co. v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 432 F.3d 550, 554 (3d Cir. 2005). 4 Ordinarily, to make out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, “the plaintiff must show (1) that he was at least forty years old, (2) that he was fired, (3) that he was qualified for the job from which he was fired, and (4) that he ‘was replaced by a sufficiently younger person to create an inference of age discrimination.’” Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 338 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). However, where an employee is terminated during a RIF, the fourth element of the prima facie case becomes whether the employer retained employees who do not belong to the protected class. Showalter v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, 190 F.3d 231, 234-235 (3d Cir. 1999). 7 light,” and the employer need only “introduc[e] evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the unfavorable employment decision.” Id. Once Boeing articulates a nondiscriminatory reason, Tomasso must respond by citing evidence that the rationale is pretextual. Id. As we have noted, low evaluation scores may be a pretext for discrimination, especially where, as here, an employer uses subjective criteria such as “attitude” and “teamwork” to rate its employees. See Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 320 (3d Cir. 2000) (“‘Subjective evaluations are more susceptible of abuse and more likely to mask pretext.’”) (quoting Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 798 (3d Cir. 1990)); see also Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Where termination decisions rely on subjective evaluations, careful analysis of possible impermissible motivations is warranted . . . .”). In order to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the proffered reasons are pretextual, Tomasso must “point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. Tomasso must do more than show that Boeing was “wrong or mistaken” in deciding to lay him off. Id. at 765. He must “present evidence contradicting the core facts put forward by the employer as the legitimate reason for its decision.” Kautz v. Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 467 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). In other words, Tomasso must “demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 8 contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence,’ and hence infer ‘that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.’” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citing Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531, 533 (3d Cir.1992); Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir.1993); Chauhan v. M. Alfieri Co., Inc., 897 F.2d 123, 128 (3d Cir.1990)). We agree with the dissent that a decision to lay off an employee in a RIF differs from a decision to fire an employee during ordinary circumstances. In either situation, however, we apply the McDonnell Douglas framework. In ordinary times, employees are fired for poor performance; in a RIF, even qualified employees are laid off in order to reduce personnel. In fact, Wood testified that the individuals selected for layoff were not bad employees. But even in a genuine RIF (one that is motivated on a programmatic level by economic concerns), individuals may be selected for layoff on the basis of age. For this reason, even in a RIF, we use the McDonnell Douglas framework to expose such discrimination. The employer must have age-neutral reasons for deciding to lay off certain employees, and the employee can challenge these reasons as pretextual. See, e.g., Showalter v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 190 F.3d 231, 236-38 (3d Cir. 1999) (considering whether the employer’s rationales for terminating an employee during a RIF were pretextual). As we stated in Fuentes, the employee need not always offer evidence sufficient to discredit all of the rationales advanced by the employer. “If the defendant proffers a bagful of legitimate reasons, and the plaintiff manages to cast 9 substantial doubt on a fair number of them, the plaintiff may not need to discredit the remainder.” 32 F.3d at 764 n.7; see also Kautz, 412 F.3d at 467; Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of New Jersey, 260 F.3d 265, 283 (3d Cir. 2001). In Fuentes, we explained that the rejection of some explanations may so undermine the employer’s credibility as to enable a rational factfinder to disbelieve the remaining rationales, even where the employee fails to produce evidence particular to those rationales. 32 F.3d at 764 n.7. Boeing offers several age-neutral explanations for Tomasso’s low score and the consequent decision to lay him off. We will consider these rationales in turn, applying the standard described above. A. Lack of Interest in Process Validation Assessments Boeing’s foremost explanation of Tomasso’s layoff is that he seemed uninterested in Process Validation Assessments (“PVAs”), a type of inspection that Boeing used to monitor its subcontractors. Under the traditional system of standard source inspections, a Boeing employee would simply inspect the products ready for delivery to Boeing. In contrast, a PVA does not involve actual product inspections but instead predicts a supplier’s ability to produce satisfactory products based on a review of the supplier’s production capacity. The Supplier Quality Department was increasing its use of PVAs, and Wood characterized this shift as “the primary focus and goal of our organization.” Wood testified in his deposition that he gave Tomasso low scores in at least four categories because he thought that Tomasso lacked interest in performing PVAs. According to Wood, Tomasso said that “he wasn’t really an advocate to the PVA process and was not comfortable working with it.” In his 10 affidavit, however, Tomasso denies making such a statement: “At no time did I express to Mr. Wood that I was not interested in PVA, and I never told him that I would not participate in PVA or the transfer to the PVA method, or that I was not willing to accept new changes.” Wood further stated that Tomasso failed to attend a PVA planning session. Tomasso, however, claims that he did not attend the session because it was not mandatory, and because he was having health problems that would have made it difficult to travel to the session, which was held in New Orleans. Wood also testified that Tomasso did not initially list developing PVA skills as a goal in a performance development partnership plan.5 Additionally, Wood stated that procurement quality specialists were expected to identify, out of the suppliers with which they worked, those that were ready for the transition from standard source inspections to PVAs, even if management had not already designated the suppliers as candidates for PVAs. According to Wood, Tomasso did not engage in “transition PVA activities” for suppliers that management had not already designated. Tomasso’s affidavit paints a very different picture. Tomasso states that he was one of only three employees selected to participate in PVA activities for a large supplier located in Middle River, Maryland. Tomasso worked on this PVA in 2001, the year in which Boeing laid him off. Wood characterizes the Middle River project as a PVA training, and 5 Performance development partnership plans appear to be forms that employees first fill out themselves and then discuss and revise with their managers. 11 claims that Tomasso did not participate as avidly as other employees. However, Wood conceded that the Middle River team did a good job and that as far as he knew, Tomasso was an integral part of the team. Tomasso also claims that during reviews in August and December 2001, Wood did not state that Tomasso’s performance, including his work on PVAs, was deficient in any respect. In fact, Wood wrote on Tomasso’s evaluation for January through December 2001: “Joe—goals and objectives achieved to acceptable levels for this year. Initial PVA process started with supply base.” Wood also marked on the evaluation that Tomasso had met expectations relating to planning PVA audits on his selected suppliers. Finally, Tomasso states that he began to transition his primary supplier to PVAs, and completed the transition in December of 2001 (after he was selected for layoff). This supplier accounted for a full 75 percent of Tomasso’s workload. In short, Tomasso and Wood tell radically different stories about Tomasso’s interest in PVAs. A factfinder who credited Tomasso’s testimony could conclude that Wood gave him acceptable evaluations for his PVA work and never told him that he needed to improve or increase his PVA work, that Tomasso began to transition his primary supplier to PVAs, and that he was selected to participate in an important PVA project soon before he was laid off. The factfinder could further conclude that Tomasso never expressed disinterest in PVAs, and that he missed a PVA transition meeting solely for health reasons. Since Tomasso’s evidence relates directly to his interest in and aptitude for PVAs, it involves “core facts” relevant to Boeing’s explanation for Tomasso’s dismissal. See Kautz, 412 12 F.3d at 467. Tomasso’s evidence, if believed, does not merely suggest that the low score assigned by Wood was “wrong or mistaken,” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765, or that Wood innocently misperceived Tomasso’s interest in PVAs. Rather, one who believed Tomasso’s affidavit could find “such weaknesses, im plausibilities, inconsiste nc ie s, inc ohe re nc ie s, or contradictions” in Boeing’s explanation as to deem it “‘unworthy of credence.’” Id. at 765 (citation omitted). To be sure, Tomasso discredits Boeing’s rationale in part by pointing to external evidence, such as earlier evaluations and his participation in the Middle River Project. But such evidence can be used to show pretext. See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1073-74 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (stating that an employee could show pretext in part by adducing “affirmative evidence of her own accomplishments,” including awards, a promotion, and a salary increase). In sum, Tomasso’s alleged lack of interest in PVAs does not provide a sufficient basis for summary judgment. B. Refusal To Share Technical Knowledge Wood also stated that Tomasso received a low score on his evaluation because he was unwilling to share his technical knowledge with other Boeing employees. Wood testified: “I can almost quote [Tomasso] — ‘I want to be left alone to do and handle my part of the supply base. I’m not interested in training people or providing working relationships with some of my other peers in those areas.’” Tomasso, however, denies that such an exchange occurred: “I never told Mr. Wood that I wanted to be alone or left alone, and I never told Mr. Wood that I was not interested in training people or being involved in working relationships with my peers.” Tomasso’s affidavit flatly contradicts Wood’s 13 deposition on this point. Tomasso denies having made the very statement that apparently convinced Wood that he was unwilling to share his technical knowledge. Thus, our decision in Fuentes precludes summary judgment on this basis. C. Boeing’s Remaining Rationales Boeing offers additional rationales, but they do not appear sufficient to explain Tomasso’s layoff. Even if a rational factfinder would have to conclude that these rationales played some role in Tomasso’s layoff, the factfinder would not have to conclude that they provide a sufficient explanation. See White v. Columbus Met. Hous. Auth., 429 F.3d 232, 245 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that a plaintiff may show pretext “by showing that the proffered reason was insufficient to warrant the challenged conduct.”); Holmes v. Potter, 384 F.3d 356, 361 (7th Cir. 2004) ([P]retext . . . may be proved by showing . . . that the stated reason is insufficient to warrant the adverse action.”) (citation omitted). As Boeing appears to concede, two of the remaining rationales may explain two of Tomasso’s low scores, but not the other seven. First, Wood testified in his deposition that Tomasso received a score of two for “organizational skills” because Tomasso did not maintain complete folders on his suppliers.6 Second, Wood stated that Tomasso received a score of one for “communications” in part because he was difficult to 6 Wood stated that he informed Tomasso of the problem and that Tomasso corrected it at some point. Tomasso, however, claims that Wood never mentioned any problems with his supplier folders. 14 reach while working onsite at his primary supplier and because of poor attendance at weekly meetings.7 Even if we assume that these rationales adequately explain Tomasso’s low scores for “organizational skills” and “communications,” a rational factfinder could conclude that they are insufficient to explain Tomasso’s low overall score. Although Tomasso received a perfect score of five in “technical competence,” he received a score of two in “quality of work,” “quantity of work,” “leadership,” and “attitude.” These low scores remain unexplained. If Tomasso had received higher scores in these or other areas, he would have been ranked high enough to avoid being laid off. Because Tomasso need not demonstrate that Boeing’s entire “bagful” of reasons is pretextual, Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 n.7, especially where a rational factfinder could conclude that the reasons in question are insufficient, Wood’s concerns about Tomasso’s supplier folders and meeting attendance do not provide an adequate basis for a grant of summary judgment. Wood also stated in his deposition that Tomasso had become less involved with suppliers who provided dynamic components to Boeing, even though Tomasso’s greatest expertise lay in this area. However, Wood raised this issue in response to a deposition question about whether Tomasso’s high level of technical competence might outweigh his alleged deficiencies in other areas. Thus, Wood did not appear to cite 7 Tomasso represents that he missed meetings because he was working onsite and was never told that he should attend more meetings. He also states that he participated in every meeting that he was told was mandatory. 15 Tomasso’s decreased involvement in his area of expertise as an independent reason for his low score. A rational factfinder could conclude that this reason did not sufficiently explain Tomasso’s layoff.8