Opinion ID: 1768101
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The CDs

Text: The Chancellor's order stated that § 23-32-1005(2)(C) and the Hall case precluded him from considering, with respect to the certificates of deposit, the evidence presented by witnesses who testified that Ms. Sisco intended her three daughters to share equally in her estate. His order states: As regards the joint accounts, there is no evidence of fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation or any other abuse of the familial trust which existed between the mother and the defendant [Ms. Wray], nor proof of a request from the defendant that the money be given to her. The daughter [Ms. Wray] is a natural object of the deceased's bounty and a person who had, for many years, lived next door and taken care of the deceased's needs to a greater extent than the other children, who lived elsewhere. The order does not address the request that the certificates of deposit be reformed. The burden of obtaining a ruling upon that requested remedy was upon Ms. Nichols and Ms. Bell. As the Chancellor did not address it, and no objection was made to his failure to address it, we cannot say he erred in not reforming the instruments. Barnes v. Pearson Termite and Pest Control, Inc., 266 Ark. 635, 587 S.W.2d 823 (1979). We note in passing that the mistake urged as a basis for reformation was allegedly between the bank and Ms. Sisco as to whether a local person had to be named joint tenant. We have not seen a case in which a person who is not a party to a contract has been allowed to obtain reformation of it. It has been held that one who is not a party may not obtain reformation. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. LittleJim, 927 F.2d 1132 (10th Cir.1991). Cf. Hunt v. Century Indem. Co., 58 R.I. 336, 192 A. 799 (1937). Section 23-32-1005(1)(A) addresses instances in which a deposit has been made or a certificate of deposit purchased in the names of two (2) or more persons and in form to be paid to any of the persons so named, or the survivors of them. It is followed by subsection (2)(A) which states the account or certificate of deposit ... shall be the property of those persons as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and then subsection (2)(C) which provides, in pertinent part: (C) The opening of the account or the purchase of the certificate of deposit in this form shall be conclusive evidence in any action or proceeding to which ... the surviving party is a party of the intention of all of the parties to the account or certificate of deposit to vest title to the account or certificate of deposit, and the additions thereto, in such survivor. In the Hall case we were confronted with a dispute over joint accounts held by a decedent and survivor in a bank and in a brokerage firm. There was strong evidence that the survivor's name was on the accounts only to assist the decedent and that she recognized her obligation to hold the proceeds for the beneficiaries named in the decedent's will. After pointing out that We have not previously addressed the underlying question of whether in the absence of fraud, extrinsic evidence will be allowed to reflect the intent of the parties in establishing joint accounts with right of survivorship, we interpreted the statute as follows: We find that the language of Ark.Code Ann. § 23-32-1005(2)(A) and (C) is clear; the opening of the account in the name of two or more persons designated as joint tenants or as joint tenants with right of survivorship shall be conclusive evidence in any action or proceeding to which... the surviving party is a party of the intention of all of the parties to the account... to vest title to the account ... in such survivor. (Our emphasis.) The first rule to be applied in statutory construction is to give the words in the statute their usual and ordinary meaning. If there is no ambiguity we give a statute effect just as it reads. Pledger v. Ethyl Corp., 299 Ark. 100, 771 S.W.2d 24 (1989). The statute declares that the establishment of the account as joint tenants provides conclusive evidence of the intention of all parties. The signature card for the Superior Federal account provided that Dorothy Edwards and Virginia Hall held the account as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Moreover, the signature card suffices to provide written designation to the bank that the account is held in joint tenancy. Therefore, the trial court erred in considering extrinsic evidence as to Dorothy Edwards' intent, and the funds in the account belong to the appellant as surviving joint tenant. We held the statute did not apply to the account with the brokerage firm because it is not a bank. The evidence of intent was admissible to show it was not the intention of the decedent to make a gift of that account to the survivor, thus we upheld the decision that the survivor was not the owner of the brokerage account. The Chancellor's decision with respect to the certificates of deposit is completely consistent with our decision in the Hall case. Ms. Nichols and Ms. Bell argue intent is irrelevant to the question whether a constructive trust should be imposed, and that is what we said in Edwards v. Edwards, 311 Ark. 339, 843 S.W.2d 846 (1992), the implication being that statement is inconsistent with the Hall rationale. We note, however, that our opinion in the Hall case observed there had been no fraud. We note also that the Chancellor in this case found no evidence of fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation or any other abuse of the familial trust. In other words, he found no evidence that the intent of Ms. Sisco as conclusively determined by the nature of the certificates of deposit was induced by any impropriety on the part of Ms. Wray. Intent may indeed not matter when the issue is whether there has been unjust enrichment and a constructive trust is sought, but if there is no basis for establishment of that restitutionary remedy, other than intent, then the statute controls. We decline to overrule the Hall case. Absent a constitutional challenge to the statute, which we have not entertained as yet, we are hardly in a position to change the language of the statute the clear meaning of which we applied in the Hall case. As Ms. Wray points out, were it not for the statute, as interpreted, the issue of whether a constructive trust should be imposed would arise almost any time a person decided to make a gift of a bank account to one of several siblings, simply on the basis of an argument that no parent could intend to favor one over another. We have cited the Hall decision with approval several times, most notably in Nall v. Duff, 305 Ark. 5, 805 S.W.2d 63 (1991), and the General Assembly has met twice without taking any action with respect to the statute since our decision in 1990 interpreting it to mean what it says. In these circumstances overruling would not be appropriate.