Opinion ID: 3016665
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Municipal Defendant

Text: The unconstitutional acts of a municipality’s employees cannot be imputed to the principal on a theory of respondeat superior. Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). In 11 order to hold a municipality liable under section 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that any violation of Fourth Amendment rights that occurred was caused by a policy or custom of the municipality. Berg, 219 F.3d at 275. “Once a [section] 1983 plaintiff identifies a municipal policy or custom, he must demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” Id. at 276 (quotation omitted). In limited circumstances, the failure to adequately train municipal employees may establish liability under section 1983. As a general rule, the plaintiff must provide evidence of a pattern of constitutional violations in order to premise municipal liability on a failure-to-train theory. See id. The Supreme Court, however, has created a limited exception to this principle. In circumstances where “a violation of federal rights [is] a highly predictable consequence of a failure to equip law enforcement officers with specific tools to handle recurring situations,” a section 1983 plaintiff may assert a failureto-train claim without establishing a pattern of violations. Bd. of the County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997). Must takes the position that the WHPD is liable on a failure-to-train theory. We disagree. The only incident which arguably involved a constitutional violation – March 2, 1997 – was problematic for the sole reason that, because we must view the facts in light most favorable to Must, the Officers mistakenly advised Tomera that Must had agreed to be transported to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation. Until that point, the 12 Officers were prepared to wait for Tomera to arrive at Must’s residence for the purpose of determining whether a section 7302 warrant should issue. The record indicates that on every other occasion the Officers followed a policy of contacting workers from Crisis Intervention and awaiting their assessment of Must’s mental health. In our view, the “moving force” behind any constitutional violation which may have occurred on March 2, 1997 was the individual Officers’ miscommunication concerning Must’s willingness to agree to a transport and not any shortcoming in the training provided by the WHPD. See Berg, 219 F.3d at 276. We, therefore, conclude that the District Court properly granted summary judgment to the municipal defendant, the WHPD.