Opinion ID: 19777
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether matthew's claim is teague-barred

Text: 14 This court has not yet resolved whether a nolo contendere or guilty plea waives a subsequent Brady-based challenge. See Barnes v. Lynaugh, 817 F.2d 336, 338 (1987). 5 As Matthew points out, a number of our sister circuits have had occasion to address the issue he raises, and have generally held that a defendant pleading guilty may challenge his conviction on the ground that the State failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence prior to entry of the plea. See Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491 (10th Cir. 1994); Tate v. Wood, 963 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1992); White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1029 (1989); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom., Campbell v. Morris, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986). But see Smith v. United States, 876 F.2d 655 (8th Cir.) (holding that a Brady claim did not survive entry of a guilty plea), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869 (1989); United States v. Ayala, 690 F. Supp. 1014, 1016 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (stating that a Brady violation does not affect the consensual nature of the plea thereby impairing its validity); United States v. Wolczik, 480 F. Supp. 1205 (W.D. Pa. 1979) ([A] defendant cannot expect to obtain Brady material for use in a pretrial decision to plead guilty.). However, beforewe may address the merits of Matthew's claim, we must determine whether we are barred from providing the relief Matthew seeks by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 15 A threshold question in every habeas case . . . is whether the court is obligated to apply the Teague rule to the defendant's claim. Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994). In the instant case, the respondent did not raise in its initial briefs the issue of whether Matthew's claim is Teague-barred. We may, however, exercise our discretion and consider a Teague defense even though the State has implicitly waived it. See Caspari, 510 U.S. at 389 ([A] federal court may, but need not, decline to apply Teague if the State does not argue it.); Fisher v. State, 169 F.3d 295, 304-05 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying Teague despite State's implicit waiver). We decide to do so here. 6 16 The Teague rule precludes us from applying new constitutional rules of criminal procedure . . . to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court has directed that we apply Teague by proceeding in three steps. See Caspari, 510 U.S. at 390. First, we must determine the date on which Matthew's conviction and sentence became final. Next, we must [s]urve[y] the legal landscape as it then existed and determine whether a state court considering [the defendant's] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; alterations in original). We reach the third step only if we find that Matthew's claim necessitates a new rule. Under those circumstances, we must determine that the new rule falls within either of two narrow exceptions before we may announce it, and apply it to Matthew's case. See id.; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989). 17 Matthew entered his plea on January 26, 1994. Although he attempted to appeal his conviction, his direct appeal was dismissed on July 18, 1994 because Matthew failed to acquire the court's permission before appealing. See Lyon v. State, 872 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). 7 Matthew's conviction therefore became final for purposes of Teague on October 17, 1994 - 91 days (the 90th day falling on a Sunday), after his appeal was dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. 2101; Caspari, 510 U.S. at 390-91; Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987); SUP. CT. R. 13.1, & 30.1. We next turn to the task of surveying the legal landscape as it existed in October 1994. 18
19 An assessment of whether a new rule would be required in order for Matthew to prevail necessitates an understanding of the propositions Matthew must establish in order to be successful. Cf. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 167 (1996) (identifying propositions that needed to be proved as part of a Teague analysis). Matthew was charged with sexually assaulting his step-daughter, and faced a possible prison term of ninety-nine years if convicted. His attorneys, so the district court found, directed their efforts at obtaining the best possible plea bargain. Matthew now seeks federal habeas review of his conviction based on hisnolo contendere plea, and argues that the State's failure to disclose statements obtained by CPS from his step-daughter prior to entry of his plea constitutes a Brady violation that rendered his plea invalid. To prevail, he would need to establish that (1) failure to disclose the material at issue prior to entry of his plea constitutes a Brady violation; and (2) the antecedent constitutional violation rendered his guilty plea invalid, and thus his claim is not waived by his plea. 8 We next assess whether a new rule would be required in order to establish either of these propositions. See id. 20
21 Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), a prosecutor has a duty to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant when that evidence is material to either guilt or punishment. See 373 U.S. at 87. The Supreme Court has not as yet ruled on whether a prosecutor's failure to disclose material exculpatory information prior to entry of a guilty plea 9 violates the U.S. Constitution. A review of the Court's Brady v. Maryland line of cases, however, tends to counter, rather than support, the proposition Matthew would need to establish in order to prevail. 22 The prosecutor's duty to disclose material exculpatory information is based in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and exists to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial, i.e., that an impartial party's assessment of the defendant's guilt is based on all the available evidence. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (describing the due process requirement as a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied . . . if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured). As the Brady Court noted, [t]he principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. . . . A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on defendant. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87-88, 83 S.Ct 1194. 23 The subsequent inclusion of impeachment evidence under the Brady rule, see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), was also based on the potential effect of undisclosed information on a jury's determination of guilt. See id. (citing in support Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)(The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence . . . .)). Thus, as was the case in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87-88, the Court's concern focused on ensuring that jury or judge determinations of guilt beyonda reasonable doubt were not contrived through a prosecutor's withholding of material information favorable to the defendant. 24 The Court's definition of material information also reflects the Brady rule's purpose of ensuring a fair trial. The state's obligation to disclose favorable information extends only to information that is material. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 674-75. [T]he prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial . . . . Id. at 675 (footnote omitted). 10 An earlier argument that the materiality test should be defined in terms of the defendant's ability to prepare for trial (rather than in terms of factfinders' assessments of guilt) was explicitly rejected by the Court in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). As the Court explained, to base the materiality requirement on the effect of the undisclosed information on the defendant's ability to prepare for trial would be unacceptable in part because such a standard would necessarily encompass incriminating evidence as well as exculpatory evidence, since knowledge of the prosecutor's entire case would always be useful in planning the defense. Id. at 112 n.20. 11 Because the state's duty extended only to exculpatory information, defining the materiality requirement in terms of defense strategies would be at odds with the scope and purpose of the Brady rule. 25 The Brady rule's focus on protecting the integrity of trials suggests that where no trial is to occur, there may be no constitutional violation. While describing the purpose of the Brady rule and of the rule's materiality requirement, the Bagley Court noted that 26 unless the omission deprived the defendant of a fair trial, there was no constitutional violation requiring that the verdict be set aside; and absent a constitutional violation, there was no breach of the prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose. . . . 27 . . . But to reiterate a critical point, the prosecutor will not have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial. 28 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675-76 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976)); see also id. at 678 ([S]uppression of evidence amounts to a constitutional violation only if it deprives the defendant of a fair trial.). 12 Becausea Brady violation is defined in terms of the potential effects of undisclosed information on a judge's or jury's assessment of guilt, it follows that the failure of a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory information to an individual waiving his right to trial is not a constitutional violation. 13 In waiving his or her right to trial, the defendant eliminates the opportunity for a prosecutor to contrive[] a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury . . . . Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112. Instead, conviction is supported by the defendant's plea. 29 In light of the Court's Brady v. Maryland line of cases, it is apparent to us that, at a minimum, a state court would not have felt compelled to hold that the prosecutor's failure to supply Matthew with the CPS documents prior to entry of his plea constituted a Brady violation. Matthew, in order to establish that a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory information prior to entry of a guilty plea is a Brady violation, would require adoption of a new rule - one that seeks to protect a defendant's own decision making regarding the costs and benefits of pleading and of going to trial. 30 Our conclusion that Matthew seeks a new rule is not at odds with cases he cites in support of his arguments. By October 1994, a number of court opinions had suggested that pleas could be collaterally attacked on grounds that the state failed to disclose material exculpatory information. See, e.g., Tate v. Wood, 963 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1992); White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416 (8th Cir. 1988); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir. 1988); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1985); Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 565 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1977). The Sixth Circuit assumed for purposesof its opinion that a Brady violation had occurred, see Campbell, 769 F.2d at 315, but subsequently noted that there is no authority within our knowledge holding that suppression of Brady material prior to trial amounts to a deprivation of due process. Id. at 322. The Eighth Circuit followed Campbell's approach. See White, 858 F.2d at 422. Thus, neither court found that a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory information prior to entry of a plea was a violation of the U.S. Constitution. 31 The Second Circuit's approach in Miller and Tate links directly nondisclosure and the Due Process Clause. However, in light of the Court's holdings, the Second Circuit's approach would appear to adopt a new rule. The Miller court adapted the Supreme Court's materiality test in order for it to be applicable to the plea context. See 848 F.2d at 1322. Under Miller's objective test, information is material if there is a reasonable probability that but for the withholding of the information the accused would not have entered [counsel's] recommended plea but would have insisted on going to full trial. Id. The emphasis in this test is not on the influence the undisclosed information possibly would have had on the fairness of a trial - the focus of Brady rule's materiality test - but instead on the accused's decision making process. 14 The Miller court's test, in defining material information in a manner separated from both trial outcomes and counsel's recommendation, arguably creates a due process right where none previously existed. 32 State courts' decisions, see Caspari, 510 U.S. at 395 ([I]n the Teague analysis the reasonable views of state courts are entitled to consideration along with those of federal courts.), were also not such that a state court reviewing Matthew's claim would have felt compelled to decide that the rule he seeks is required by the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Simons, 731 P.2d 797 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (finding failure to disclose material exculpatory information could render counsel ineffective); Lee v. State, 573 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (holding, based on the absence of contrary law, that failure to disclose material exculpatory information entitled defendant to a withdrawal of his plea); Ex parte Lewis, 587 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (holding that a prosecutor's duty to disclose favorable information extends to defendants pleading guilty). But see Schmidt v. State, 647 P.2d 796 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982) (holding defendant who pleads guilty waives his right to disclosure of evidence by the prosecutor). For example, although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' 2-1 decision in Lewis would appearto dictate at least a portion of the result that Matthew seeks, it is not clear from the opinion whether the duty-to-disclose holding was based in the U.S. Constitution, or in Article 2.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 2.01 sets forth the duties of district attorneys. The last sentence of the article, added in 1965, states that [t]hey shall not suppress facts or secrete witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused. The absence in Lewis of any materiality-based limitation on the duty to disclose suggests that the U.S. Constitution was not the basis for the opinion. 33 On the basis of our review of the legal landscape existing in October 1994, we cannot conclude that a state court would have felt compelled to decide that a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory information prior to entry of a guilty or nolo contendere plea was a Brady violation, or otherwise a violation of the Due Process Clause. We turn next to a consideration of whether a state court would have seen the nondisclosure of which Matthew complains as rendering his plea invalid. 15 34
35 It has long been the case that a valid guilty plea bars habeas review of most non-jurisdictional claims alleging antecedent violations of constitutional rights. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); Barnes v. Lynaugh, 817 F.2d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 1987). Among claims not barred are those that challenge the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge against him, Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974), and those that challenge the validity of the guilty plea itself. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985); Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 320 (1983); Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267; Barnes, 817 F.2d at 338. A plea not voluntarily and intelligently made has been obtained in violation of due process and is void. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). 36 Matthew's claim does not challenge the power of the State to bring him into court. Thus, the only means available for challenging his conviction is to claim that his plea is invalid, i.e., it was not knowingly and voluntarily entered into. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984) (It is well-settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.). We must therefore determine whether a state court in October 1994 would have felt compelled to rule that Matthew's due process rights were violated because of the failure to disclose the CPS documents, whether or not that failure amounts to a Brady violation. We again find that, given the legal landscape in existence at the time of Matthew's conviction, a state court would not have felt compelled to hold in Matthew's favor, and thus that a new rule would be required. 37 The test for determining a guilty plea's validity is 'whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.' Hill, 474 U.S. at 56 (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)). Courts assessing whether a defendant's plea is valid look to all of the relevant circumstancessurrounding it, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 749, and may consider such factors as whether there is evidence of factual guilt. 16 38 Although the Court's opinions have often used both voluntary and intelligent to describe various characteristics of constitutionally valid guilty pleas, 17 several conditions appear necessary. The defendant pleading guilty must be competent, see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 756, and must have notice of the nature of the charges against him, see Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941). The plea must be entered voluntarily, i.e., not be the product of actual or threatened physical harm, or . . . mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant or of state-induced emotions so intense that the defendant was rendered unable to weigh rationally his options with the help of counsel. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 750; Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962) (A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is void.); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988). The defendant must also understand the consequences of his plea, including the nature of the constitutional protection he is waiving. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 645 n.13; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 755; Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 493 (Out of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences.) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320. Finally, the defendant must have available the advice of competent counsel. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267-68; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 756; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 & n.14 (1970). The advice of competent counsel exists as a safeguard to ensure that pleas are voluntarily and intelligently made. Cf. Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647 ([I]t may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit.); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 754 (suggesting that coercive actions on the part of the state could be dissipated by counsel). 39 Matthew's claim is not that the state threatened him, or that the state made and then broke promises made to him. He does not allege that he was incompetent. 18 He does not suggest that he did not understand the nature of the charges against him or of the constitutional protection he was waiving. Matthew does not challenge the factual basis for his plea. 19 He no longer has a claim of ineffective counsel. In short, Matthew does not suggest that his plea lacks any of the characteristics that the Court has held make up a voluntary and intelligent plea. 40 On this alone, a state court reviewing Matthew's conviction could determine that his plea was valid. Moreover, it would be supported in this conclusion by the fact that Matthew stated at his hearing that his plea was freely and voluntarily made, and that he understood the nature of the charges against him and the nature of the constitutional rights he was waiving. These statements act to create a presumption that in fact the plea is valid. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977)(These cases do not in the least reduce the force of the original plea hearing. For the representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at such a hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.). 41 Matthew's argument reduces to one based on the assessment that had he had the undisclosed information, he would have made a different decision, i.e., had he known of the documents and their contents, he would, as he stated in his evidentiary hearing, have rolled the dice and risked going to jail for ninety-nine years instead of pleading nolo to a sixteen-year plea bargain. The question, therefore, is whether a state court would have felt compelled by existing law to hold that this made Matthew's plea invalid. 42 We conclude that the answer to this question is no. A state court reviewing Brady v. United States, one of the more important cases setting forth the requirements of valid guilty pleas, would find that the Court rejected an argument very similar to Matthew's. See 397 U.S. at 750 ([T]h[e] assumption [that the accused would not have pleaded guilty except for the death penalty provision] merely identifies the penalty provision as a but for cause of his plea. That the statute caused the plea in this sense does not necessarily prove that the plea was coerced and invalid as an involuntary act.). From this language, it would seem that Matthew must do more than claim that the nondisclosure was the but for cause of his plea. 43 To gain an understanding of what more may be required to show the plea is invalid as an involuntary act, the state court would undoubtedly turn to cases holding that a plea does not preclude collateral attack on grounds that the state failed to disclose favorable information. See, e.g., Tate v. Wood, 963 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1992); White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416 (8th Cir. 1988); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir. 1988); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1985); Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 565 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1977). 20 These opinions,however, would provide little guidance. In most instances, the state court would find language noting that the undisclosed information must be the but for cause of the plea, see, e.g., Tate, 963 F.2d at 24 (The test of materiality in the context of a plea is whether there is a reasonable probability that but for the failure to produce such information the defendant would not have entered the plea but instead would have insisted on going to trial. (citing Miller, 848 F.2d at 1322)); Campbell, 769 F.2d at 324 (Certainly the knowledge of [the undisclosed information] was important to Campbell and his attorney, but we cannot say it would have been controlling in the decision whether to plead.), but little suggesting what a defendant must show in addition to demonstrate involuntariness. Several courts' opinions seem to acknowledge that their analysis required extension of the definition of a valid plea. See Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320 ([E]ven a guilty plea that was 'knowing' and 'intelligent' may be vulnerable to challenge if it was entered without knowledge of material evidence withheld by the prosecution.); Campbell, 769 F.2d at 318 (The question then becomes whether this nondisclosure renders involuntary Campbell's otherwise voluntary plea, given without knowledge of this evidence.); id. at 321 (We believe that in Tollett and the Brady Trilogy the Supreme Court did not intend to insulate all misconduct of constitutional proportions from judicial scrutiny solely because that misconduct was followed by a plea which otherwise passes constitutional muster as knowing and intelligent.). 21 Thus, rather that indicating how a defendant may show his plea was made involuntary by the undisclosed information, courts have simply added to the requirements of a valid plea by suggesting that such a plea must be made with all material exculpatory evidence held by the prosecution. 44 The state court reviewing these cases also would be confronted with reasoning supporting their holdings that is at odds with Supreme Court opinions. For example, one reason given for holding that a defendant pleading guilty may attack the plea claiming nondisclosure is that courts cannot satisfy themselves that pleas of guilty are voluntarily and intelligently made by competent defendants with adequate advice of counsel and that there is nothing to question the accuracy and reliability of the defendants' admissions that they committed the crimes with which they are charged, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 758, without material exculpatory evidence before them. See Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590, 599 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). That courts may be benefitted by a review of exculpatory information in discharging their duties would be relevant only if those duties included ascertaining the nature of the information on which the guilty plea was based, and weighing available evidence to determine whether there was a factual basis to support the plea. 22 On these points, theCourt's description of the allegations in Hill is illuminating: 45 Here petitioner does not contend that his plea was involuntary or unintelligent simply because the State through its officials failed to supply him with information about his parole eligibility date. We have never held that the United States Constitution requires the State to furnish a defendant with information about parole eligibility in order for the defendant's plea of guilty to be voluntary, and indeed such a constitutional requirement would be inconsistent with the current rules of procedure governing the entry of guilty pleas in the federal courts. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c). 46 474 U.S. at 56. Rule 11(c) also says nothing about the court needing to ascertain whether the state provided the defendant with access to material exculpatory information, or on what information the defendant's guilty plea was based. Rule 11(f) also does not require a weighing of the evidence. 23 In general, state courts are not required by the Constitution to ensure that a factual basis for a guilty plea even exists. See, e.g., Higgason v. Clark, 984 F.2d 203, 207-08 (7th Cir. 1993); Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1986) (State courts are under no constitutional duty to establish a factual basis for the guilty plea prior to its acceptance . . . .); Wallace v. Turner, 695 F.2d 545, 548 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not impose a constitutional duty on state trial judges to ascertain a factual basis before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere that is not accompanied by a claim of innocence); Wabasha v. Solem, 694 F.2d 155, 157 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that factual basis requirement comes from the Federal Rules, not the Constitution); cf. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969) (noting that the Rule 11 procedure has not been held to be constitutionally mandated). 47 Even more problematic is reasoning based on the Court's observation in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 756, that the decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by a defendant's appraisal of the prosecutor's case. See, e.g., Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320. This observation, although undoubtedly applicable to a large number of defendants, may be seen as rather weak support for holdings that allow defendants to challenge their pleas on grounds that the prosecution failed to provide them with exculpatory information it held. The Court has explicitly recognized that the decision whether to plead guilty or go to trial is one made under circumstances of incomplete, and often inaccurate, information. See, e.g., McMann, 397 U.S. at 769 ([T]he decision to plead guilty before the evidence is in frequently involves the making of difficult judgments. All the pertinent facts normally cannot be known unless witnesses are examined and cross-examined in court. Even then the truth will often bein dispute.). Mistakes in calculating the strength of the state's case have been declared insufficient to render the plea unintelligent or involuntary. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 757 (A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State's case . . . .). State action leading a counseled defendant to perceive he has a weak case has been held insufficient to render a resultant guilty plea invalid. See, e.g., McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 (holding that a defendant alleging that he pleaded guilty solely because of a prior coerced confession was not entitled to habeas review). 48 The state court would also be faced with a basic problem: If it were the case that defendants assessing whether to plead guilty must be given an opportunity to weigh the state's case in order to make a voluntary and intelligent decision, requiring that material exculpatory information be provided prior to entry of a guilty plea would not achieve the objective. As the Court noted in Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112, Brady information would provide only part of the picture. Without all of the state's inculpatory evidence, the defendant could not realistically assess the state's case against him. Thus, the rule Matthew seeks may be seen as falling short in achieving its intended results. 49 In light of our survey of the legal landscape, we again find that Matthew requires a new rule in order to prevail. 24 As a result, we turn next to an assessment of whether the new rules fall into either of the exceptions recognized by the Court. If they do, we may announce them, and apply them to Matthew's case. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989). 50
51 The Teague Court identified two exceptions to the nonretroactivity principle. Under the first exception, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.' Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). This exception, as Matthew notes, is not applicable to his case. 52 Under the second exception, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it is a 'watershed rule[] of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990). The Teague Court limited the scope of the second exception to those new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished, noting that it was unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge. Teague, 489 U.S. at 313, 109 S.Ct. 1060. 53 Matthew argues strenuously that, if we were to find that new rules would be required, those rules would fall under the second exception. Although we in no waycondone the purposeful withholding of information in order to elicit a guilty plea from a defendant, we cannot agree that the rules Matthew seeks to have applied to his case fall within Teague's second exception. In light of the existing protections afforded individuals pleading guilty or nolo contendere, we doubt that new rules allowing individuals to challenge the validity of their pleas on grounds that the state failed to supply them with exculpatory information prior to entry of their plea will seriously enhance the accuracy of convictions. Moreover, we do not see the new rules as on par with a defendant's right to be represented by counsel in all criminal trials for serious offenses, which the Court in Saffle v. Parks viewed as the paradigmatic example of a rule falling within the second exception. See 494 U.S. at 495.