Opinion ID: 1261143
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Constitutionality Of the Plant Nursery Ordinance

Text: The Cupps contend that the October 22, 1979 amendment to the zoning ordinance which attempted to draw a distinction between Plant Nurseries and Garden Centers was unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The trial court agreed with the Cupps' position and ruled in their favor. Upon our review of the ordinance, we reject the proposition that it is unconstitutional on its face. We perceive nothing inherently wrong in the County's effort to limit commercial encroachments into residential areas. No fundamental rights are affected, no suspect categories are impinged upon, no impermissible classifications appear to be created. We find nothing in the ordinance which makes it unreasonable in itself without regard to any particular property. See Rowe, 216 Va. at 133, 216 S.E.2d at 205, n. 4 (citing 2 A. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning at 35-7 to 35-10 (1972)). The Cupps' attack on the ordinance must be limited to its legality, as applied. In that regard, it is important to consider the burden of proof that rests upon a party who claims that an ordinance is unconstitutional. We stated the principle in Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 660, 107 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1959): The general principles applicable to a judicial review of the validity of zoning ordinances are well settled. The legislative branch of a local government in the exercise of its police power has wide discretion in the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances. Its action is presumed to be valid so long as it is not unreasonable and arbitrary. The burden of proof is on him who assails it to prove that it is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that it bears no reasonable or substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. The court will not substitute its judgment for that of a legislative body, and if the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is fairly debatable it must be sustained. (Citations omitted.) In Fairfax County v. Jackson, 221 Va. 328, 334, 269 S.E.2d 381, 385 (1980), we quoted from Loudoun County v. Lerner, 221 Va. 30, 34-35, 267 S.E.2d 100, 103 (1980), in describing how this Court accommodates the presumption of correctness of a trial court finding in light of the presumption of constitutionality of a legislative enactment: Upon review of a trial court's finding that the denial of a rezoning request is unreasonable, we accord the court's finding, as with the usual case, a presumption of correctness, but we also give full credit to the presumption of validity of the legislative action involved in the denial and then, assimilating the two presumptions, we examine the record to determine whether the evidence sustains the court's finding. See Fairfax County v. Williams, 216 Va. [49] at 52, 58, 216 S.E.2d [33] at 36, 40. In other words, the presumption of validity of legislative action does not disappear when a trial court finds that the action is unreasonable; the presumption accompanies the legislative action when the latter is brought to this court for review, and it is viable until this court holds with the trial court that the legislative action is unreasonable. (Emphasis added.) On the facts of this case, we do not hold with the trial court that the legislative action was unreasonable. The Board's evidence disclosed that the amendment to the ordinance was adopted in response to the problem of ever increasing commercialism of plant nurseries located in residential sections of the county. The county had held public hearings in June and July 1979 concerning the problem. In addition, there was evidence that the Staff met with various citizens' groups to discuss the problem of commercialism in residential areas. The amendment was discussed again at a Board of Supervisors meeting on October 10, 1979. Several of the witnesses acknowledged that a problem existed with regard to commercialism rearing its head in residential areas. One witness, the president of the Northern Virginia Nurserymen, said he was impressed with the thoughtfulness that has gone into coming up with this definition. Another nurseryman argued that the ordinance should be drafted so as not to destroy the small nurseries. Significantly, this witness suggested that where a nursery is small, low volume, and  where they don't sell anything but the material they grow and give advice,  they should be allowed to continue. (Emphasis added.) In essence, the Board's evidence established that a problem existed that required the attention of the Board through the zoning laws and that procedures were adopted to ensure public input on combatting the problem of commercialism. The Cupps' evidence of unreasonableness is as follows: the ordinance would prevent them from selling items such as sprayers, hand tools, books, and pots which they had traditionally sold. Sale of the items prohibited under the plant nursery definition accounted for 4.5% of sales in 1978, 2.68% of sales in 1979, and 3.06% of sales in the first 6 months of 1980. The remainder of their sales in 1978, 1979, and 1980 was made up of plants, landscaping work, or chemicals  all permissible items. Mr. Cupp also testified that he thought if he were not allowed to sell accessories he would lose many of his customers. He offered no evidence in support of this conclusion. On all the evidence, we think the Cupps failed to prove either the unreasonableness of the ordinance or the reasonableness of the approach they suggested. They would argue that because they might lose approximately 4.5% of their sales, the County should not be allowed to apply an ordinance to them that has the overall aim of maintaining the noncommercial character of residential sections of the county. It is manifest to us that the reasonableness of the ordinance, as applied to the Cupps, is fairly debatable. Therefore, it must be upheld.