Opinion ID: 1669798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: admissibility of earned income

Text: At the trial on February 6 and 7, 1978, Mims proved his monthly salary of $2,088. per month. At the conference held on November 20, 1980, the court refused to re-open the proceedings to consider the evidence of actual wages earned, giving as a reason therefor the failure of CAA to affirmatively plead mitigation of damages. The court did allow CAA to make a bill of exceptions to set out the request and refusal. We are dealing with a time span of almost three years from the date of the initial proceeding appointing the receiver and the conference held on November 20, 1980. In light of the informality of this conference, the length of time which had passed since the initial proceeding and the admissibility of the evidence, we find it was an abuse of discretion by the trial court not to consider the evidence of actual wages earned by Mims during the last three years in computing the damages. The general rule as to the correct measure of damages for wrongful discharge of an employee is the present cash value of the contract to the employee ... if it had not been breached, less any amounts that he should in the exercise of reasonable diligence be able to earn through other employment. Dixie Glass v. Pollak, 341 S.W.2d 530, 538 (Tex.Civ.App.Houston), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 162 Tex. 440, 347 S.W.2d 596 (1961). It is the burden of one seeking damages to prove them. The trial court heard no evidence concerning damages incurred by Mims from February 7, 1978, to November 11, 1980, and refused CAA's request to introduce evidence of income actually earned by Mims during that time. Mims was required to prove his actual damages and any income actually earned during the period in question was properly admissible as rebuttal evidence. Since this was evidence in the nature of rebuttal, no pleadings were necessary to support it. Professional Services, Inc. v. Amaitis, 592 S.W.2d 396 (Tex.Civ.App.Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Evidence supporting mitigation of damages in cases such as this is not admissible as an independent ground which would defeat the cause of action, rather it is admissible to rebut the measure of damages arising from the cause of action. Such evidence is admissible under a general denial. Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Service, Inc., 414 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.1967), W. L. Moody & Co. v. Rowland, 100 Tex. 363, 99 S.W. 1112 (1907). Mims contends that evidence in mitigation of damages is also inadmissible because CAA did not file a general denial. The posture of the case precludes the necessity of a general denial by CAA. CAA filed a suit for a temporary injunction and Mims filed a general denial and counterclaimed for his salary from the time he was enjoined from coming about the premises of CAA until this matter was settled. If the plaintiff contesting the counterclaim does not intend to urge any defensive theory which must be verified or any affirmative defense under Rule 94, he is not required to answer the defendant's counterclaim. Pure Milk & Ice Cream Co. v. Tomlinson, 529 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex.Civ.App.Austin, 1975, writ dism'd). We have considered all other points presented to us and overrule them. The judgments of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals are reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for a retrial of the issue of damages incurred by Mims subsequent to February 7, 1978, in conformance with this opinion.