Opinion ID: 165798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jury-Wheel Composition

Text: 46 Westcott contends that the Northern District of Oklahoma's jury-selection scheme, see N.D. Okla. Civ. R. 47.1, which includes in the jury pool nonvoter licensed drivers in only one (the most urban) of the district's 11 counties, violated his right to trial by a jury chosen from a fair cross-section of the community. This right, Westcott contends, is guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment and the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968(FJA), 28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. The district court ruled that Westcott's motion asserting his fair-cross-section right was time-barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a), which provides: 47 In criminal cases, before the voir dire examination begins, or within seven days after the defendant discovered or could have discovered, by the exercise of diligence, the grounds therefor, whichever is earlier, the defendant may move to dismiss the indictment or stay the proceedings against him on the ground of substantial failure to comply with the provisions of this title in selecting the grand or petit jury. 48 The motion was filed on July 30, 2003, four days before trial. The Government says it should have been filed within seven days of appointment of counsel, the previous January 10. 49 Westcott has presented two arguments why his motion was timely. First, in response to a suggestion from the bench at oral argument, Westcott contended that his motion asserting a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section right was not subject to the statutory time bar, which, in his view, applies only to statutory challenges. Perhaps § 1867(e) 1 should be so read. Compare United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1366 (10th Cir.1984) (It has been held that 28 U.S.C. § 1867(e) provides the exclusive means for a party charged with a federal crime to challenge a jury.), and United States v. Green, 742 F.2d 609, 612 (11th Cir.1984) (applying prerequisites of § 1867 to constitutional claim) with United States v. Alba-Conrado, 481 F.2d 1266, 1270 n. 5 (5th Cir.1973) (§ 1867 does not apply to constitutional challenge), and United States v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1265, 1269 (8th Cir.1982) (same). See also United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18, 22 n. 3 (1st Cir.1994) (discussing but not resolving the issue). But we need not decide the matter, because Westcott did not argue in district court, or even in his briefs on appeal, that § 1867 does not govern his Sixth Amendment challenge, see In re Walker, 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir.1992) (in general we will not consider an argument not raised below), and he does not argue on appeal that any special circumstance requires us to address this contention despite lack of preservation below. 50 Westcott's second response to the Government's time-bar contention is that his fair-cross-section motion was timely under the statute. The statute permits filing within seven days after the defendant discovered or could have discovered [the factual basis for his motion] by the exercise of diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a). He claims that his attorney discovered the local rule concerning jury selection only the day before he filed the motion. We are not persuaded. 51 The allegedly illegal jury-selection procedures appear in a local civil rule referenced by a local criminal rule. Westcott points out that his attorney was a criminal-law specialist and hence not familiar with the jury-selection procedures in the local civil rules. The district court, however, found that Westcott's attorney should have known about the jury-selection procedures because they apply to all criminal cases and are referenced by the local criminal rules, and that consequently Westcott had seven days from the appointment of his attorney to make his motion. 52 We are basically in agreement with the district court. Westcott's attorney was charged with knowledge of the local criminal rules in their entirety, including those parts of the local civil rules incorporated by reference. See United States v. Rourke, 984 F.2d 1063, 1066 n. 3 (10th Cir.1992) (charging criminal defendant with knowledge that illegal sentence can be corrected under Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 35); Jetton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 121 F.3d 423, 426 (8th Cir.1997) (charging party with knowledge of local rules). That a party may be harmed by its attorney's neglect of a local rule is an accepted consequence of our system of representative litigation. See United States v. Torres, 372 F.3d 1159, 1163 (10th Cir.2004) (criminal defendant lost opportunity to appeal because counsel confused civil and criminal appeal deadlines). We hold that Westcott could have discovered, by the exercise of diligence the ground of his fair-cross-section claim long before his motion was filed. Accordingly, it was time-barred. 53 Westcott also contends that he was entitled to certain jury-pool records. His pretrial motion sought the records to determine the number of potential jurors taken from voter lists and/or Driver's license lists. R. vol. IV, doc. 371 at 10. But because his motion on the merits was time-barred, any error in denying him access to the records that might have supported his motion was harmless.