Opinion ID: 1059244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Joint Venture

Text: We have previously stated that [a] joint venture exists where two or more parties enter into a special combination for the purpose of a specific business undertaking, jointly seeking a profit, gain, or other benefit, without any actual partnership or corporate designation. Roark v. Hicks, 234 Va. 470, 475, 362 S.E.2d 711, 714 (1987). A joint adventure exists when two or more persons combine a joint business enterprise for their mutual benefit, with an express or implied understanding or agreement that they are to share in the profits or losses of the enterprise, and that each is to have a voice in its control and management. Smith v. Grenadier, 203 Va. 740, 744, 127 S.E.2d 107, 110 (1962) (quoting 10 Michie's Jurisprudence, Joint Adventures § 2, p. 695). The trial court properly instructed the jury concerning the evidence necessary to find a joint venture between PGI and Rathe. On the theory of conversion, the jury had to find that a joint venture existed in order to reach its verdict in favor of PGI. As we have recently stated, the trial court's authority to set aside a jury verdict can only be exercised where the verdict is plainly wrong or without credible evidence to support it. If there is a conflict in the testimony on a material point, or if reasonable [persons] may differ in their conclusions of fact to be drawn from the evidence, or if the conclusion is dependent on the weight to be given the testimony, the trial judge cannot substitute his conclusion for that of the jury merely because he would have voted for a different verdict if he had been on the jury. Shalimar Dev., Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 257 Va. 565, 569-70, 515 S.E.2d 120, 123 (1999) (quoting Lane v. Scott, 220 Va. 578, 581, 260 S.E.2d 238, 240 (1979)). The record is more than adequate to support the jury's finding, and the trial court erred by substituting its own view of the evidence. In a letter from the Smithsonian dated May 12, 1997 to PGI and Rathe, referred to as a Notice to Proceed, the following understandings are evident: [T]he Smithsonian is confident that Rathe/PGI, together with its proposed team, will provide the management and production expertise needed to bring new levels of success to [America's Smithsonian Exposition] and to launch a similar and even more successful international exhibition. This letter serves to formally notify Rathe/PGI that it has been chosen as the exclusive contractor of the [Smithsonian] for management and production of the remainder of [the America's Smithsonian Exposition]. . . . This letter also authorizes Rathe/PGI . . . as the exclusive producer of a similar international tour . . . . The Notice to Proceed letter is replete with references to PGI and Rathe in a joint capacity, namely PGI/Rathe, for a limited purpose. The letter is signed ACCEPTED AND AGREED by representatives of PGI and Rathe. The exhibits introduced at trial include a Proposed International Tour Feasibility Study submitted to the Smithsonian as A Joint Venture Report by Rathe/PGI. Finally, the testimony overwhelmingly supports the finding of a joint venture and includes the testimony of Cynthia Engel, President and Chief Operating Officer of PGI, that the relationship with Rathe was a joint venture and that all expenses would be paid and if there was a profit, it would be split. The evidence reveals that Rathe and PGI created a joint venture with shared management responsibilities and the expectation of shared profits. The trial court erred in holding otherwise.