Opinion ID: 1286575
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: seizures

Text: Three categories of items were seized in the initial search: drugs and paraphernalia; unrelated items; and the hotly disputed microwave oven. In addition, contraband items were seized pursuant to the second and third warrants.
The drugs and paraphernalia seized were adequately described in the warrant, or were so closely related to described items, that no comment is required. The trial court's denial of the motion to suppress as to those items was clearly correct.
The trial court's suppression of the unrelated items seized during the course of the search pursuant to the initial warrant was also clearly correct. No effort was made in the trial court, nor on this appeal, to justify the seizure of those unrelated items and the trial court found that none of the officers involved had any reason to believe that any of the[se] items seized were contraband, stolen, evidence of a crime, or used in the commission of crime. See Rule 41(b), N.D.R.Crim.P. [7] These wrongful seizures present the most troublesome aspect of this case because they tend to support the trial court's determination that the officers were engaging in a general exploratory search. In some cases, a general exploratory search may invalidate the entire search and seizure, even though done pursuant to an otherwise valid warrant. [8] The findings do not disclose whether these unrelated items were seized before or after identification of the microwave oven, the key item which is the focus of this case. Furthermore, it is clear from the trial court's findings that it was the microwave oven, and not these unrelated items, that was used to connect with other information which led to the issuance of the second and third warrants. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the seizure of these miscellaneous unrelated and unwarranted items should not alone invalidate the seizure of the microwave oven where suppression of the rest of the evidence seized by warrants turns on the propriety of the seizure of the microwave.
One well-established exception to the basic warrant requirement is the plain view doctrine, followed by this Court in State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465, 471 (N.D.1982): A seizure of evidence of a crime found in plain view is legitimate even though the items seized are not listed in the search warrant or, if the search is a warrantless search, the items are not items for which the searching officer had probable cause to believe were in the area being searched. To fall within the plain view doctrine, the initial intrusion must be supported either by a warrant or by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Additionally, the discovery must be inadvertent and within the proper scope of the search. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2037, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). The State argues that the microwave oven was in plain view and in a suspicious place and that the officer had the right to radio in the serial number. To support its argument, the State relies upon the recent decision and plurality opinion in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) applying the plain view doctrine to uphold a seizure of an object whose incriminating nature was apparent only because of the officer's expertise. The State also cites several decisions upholding the seizure of tape recordings under plain view doctrine, although the incriminating nature of the tapes could not be identified without playing them: United States v. Bonfiglio, 713 F.2d 932 (2d Cir.1983); United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir.1983); and additionally relies on a series of cases holding that minimal intrusions to check serial numbers is either not a search or is authorized during the course of an otherwise valid search: United States v. Ware, 457 F.2d 828 (7th Cir.1972); People v. Wolf, 60 Ill.2d 230, 326 N.E.2d 766 (1975); Commonwealth v. Navarro, 2 Mass.App. 214, 310 N.E.2d 372 (1974) (opening a car door to check vehicle identification numbers); Klenke v. State, 581 P.2d 1119 (Alaska 1978); State v. Streitz, 258 N.W.2d 768 (Minn.1977) (in the course of an otherwise valid search); and United States v. Gunn, 428 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir.1970) (crawling under a vehicle to copy serial numbers of tires). The defendants take the position that not only must the object be immediately apparent, but also its incriminating character must be immediately apparent; that is, where there is no relationship between objects named in the search warrant and an observed object, such as the microwave oven, a standard of probable cause should apply, so that the officer would not be justified in seizing the object, or even in looking more closely at it, unless he had more than a mere suspicion that it was incriminating. The defendants rely upon United States v. Clark, 531 F.2d 928 (8th Cir.1976), where the police copied down the serial number from what turned out to be a stolen pistol while executing a warrant for drugs, and the Court held: The third requirement, however, was not met in the instant case. There is no adequate foundation in the record to support the conclusion that the incriminating nature of the pistol was `immediately apparent.'    In actuality, it was necessary for Agent Gromer to turn over the pistol's serial number to the federal agent and for the federal agent to trace the origin of the pistol before its incriminating nature could be said to be immediately apparent. 531 F.2d at 932. The defendants also cite, in support of their position, United States v. Gray, 484 F.2d 352 (6th Cir.1973); United States v. Sokolow, 450 F.2d 324 (5th Cir.1971); and State v. Wilson, 279 Md. 1223, 367 A.2d 1223 (1977), all holding that the copying of a serial number, from an item unrelated to the warrant upon which the search was being conducted, was a wrongful seizure justifying suppression. Defendants concede that the first Coolidge requirement, that the police officers were in a lawful position to view the article, was met since the officers were on the premises pursuant to a valid search warrant. We would go further and observe that the authorized intrusion, to search for drugs and money, necessitated a thorough and intense search. The fact that the money was not found emphasizes this. Defendants contend, however, that the discovery of the microwave oven was not inadvertent since the officers candidly admitted that they were on the lookout for goods they might identify as stolen, and therefore the second requirement of Coolidge was not met and a plain view seizure was not justified. However, our observation in State v. Gelvin, supra, 318 N.W.2d at 307, that mere suspicion that contraband or evidence will be found will not invalidate an otherwise valid ... search..., applies as well to the officers' conduct here. While reasonably suspecting the possibility of stolen property, the officers did not know in advance of the actual existence or location of the microwave oven. Thus, its discovery was inadvertent. It is the immediately apparent requirement which presents the most difficulty in this case. Both the defendants and the State make strong arguments on that point. In Texas v. Brown, supra , all nine justices concurred in holding that seizure of a balloon, which was observed in a car during a routine license check, and which turned out to contain heroin, was justified under the plain view doctrine. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a four judge plurality, held that the officer's reasonable suspicions that such a balloon often contained drugs was sufficient probable cause, stating that the fact that the officer could not see through the opaque fabric of the balloon is all but irrelevant: the distinctive character of the balloon itself spoke volumes as to its contentsparticularly to the trained eye of the officer. Justice Powell, with Justice Blackmun, held that a law enforcement officer may rely on his training and experience to draw inferences and make deductions that might well elude an untrained person, to conclude that there was probable cause to seize the balloon since the officer knew of cases where narcotics were carried in tied-off balloons. Justice Stevens, with two others, concurred, holding that contraband need not be visible in order for a plain view seizure to be justified, and went on to say: For the reasons stated by Justices POWELL and REHNQUIST, I agree that the police officer invaded no privacy interest in order to see the balloon, and that when he saw it he had probable cause to believe it contained drugs. Paraphrasing those parallel views from Texas v. Brown, supra , and applying them to this case, we hold that the officer carrying out this intensive drug and money search invaded no privacy interest in order to see the microwave oven and its serial number. If contraband need not be visible in order for a plain view seizure to be justified, then the fact that the serial number was examined to further the officer's reasonable suspicions that the microwave oven was stolen goods is irrelevant. The distinctive location of the oven, not in use and placed on a cooler in a basement area, was significant to the trained eye of the officer. Moving the oven to examine the inside of the cooler beneath it was certainly within the scope of the valid warrant search. Examination of the serial number on it involved no significant privacy expectations of the defendants. Justice Powell's observation that a law enforcement officer may rely on his training and experience to draw inferences and make deductions that might well elude an untrained person, seems particularly pertinent to this case. And finally, Justice Rehnquist's elaboration about bending and peering underscores that picking up the oven to check its serial number is not significant in this case: Likewise, the fact that [the officer] `changed [his] position' and `bent down at an angle so [he] could see what was inside' Brown's car ... is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis. 103 S.Ct. at 1542. Under these slightly differing rationales of plain view doctrine, which combined to produce the unanimous result in Texas v. Brown, supra , we believe that the officer's reasonable suspicions that the oven was stolen goods justified the very minimal intrusion on privacy to check the serial number. Upon verification of its stolen character via radio, it was immediately apparent that there was probable cause to justify its seizure as stolen property contraband. In addition to reasoning from the views expressed in Texas v. Brown, supra , we are aided in reaching our conclusion in this case by several other decisions: [9] In Shaw v. Georgia, 253 Ga. 382, 320 S.E.2d 371 (1984), cert. denied, ___ U.S.____, 105 S.Ct. 1183, 84 L.Ed.2d 331 (1985), the Georgia Supreme Court held that peering through a windshield for identification numbers was justified under the plain view doctrine. In United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir.1985), the court held that the evidentiary value of bills, invoices, bills of lading, and yellow pads with handwritten notes about orders would be apparent once they were observed in open boxes and a glass cabinet during the execution of a warrant for merchandise fraudulently obtained. Similarly, in United States v. Minor, 756 F.2d 731, 736 (9th Cir.1985), the court held that records were properly seized in the course of a valid warrant search, where the records were not named but were in plain view, and were immediately identifiable as probable contraband or evidence of illegal activity, based either on his own experience or the expertise of ... experts present during the search. We see no difference between the use of radio communication in this case to identify the microwave as stolen, and the use of experts present at the scene of the search in Minor, to confirm the probable cause of the executing officer's own experienced judgment and observation. See also, United States v. Murray, 751 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir.1985) where the officers executing a search warrant for other items telephoned the prosecuting attorney to verify that merchandise discovered was evidence relevant to a crime. We conclude that the microwave oven was in plain view and the officers had probable cause to seize it as contraband in the course of the search on the first warrant. Accordingly, we hold that it was properly seized and its suppression was error.
Since we hold that the microwave oven was properly seized as contraband in the course of the initial warrant search, it follows that the evidence seized pursuant to the second and third warrants, which were based upon information connected to the microwave oven, were also properly seized. The use of warrants is the preferred procedure, and the products of valid search warrants should not be suppressed except for clear and compelling reasons. Therefore, we hold that it was error to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the second and third warrants. [10]