Opinion ID: 1349673
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Before the Amendment of 1981

Text: The worker's compensation act was initially enacted in 1912 by the Legislature. See Sobotka v. Chrysler Corp. (After Remand), 447 Mich. 1, 17, 523 N.W.2d 454 (1994) (Boyle, J., lead opinion). Before the amendment of 1981, disability was not defined in chapter 3 of the act. The following definition appeared in chapter 4: As used in this act: (a) Disability means the state of being disabled from earning full wages at the work in which the employee was last subject to the conditions resulting in disability.[ [11] ] In 1979, two years before the Legislature amended the act to create a new statutory definition of disability, this Court explained that disability was defined as the `inability to perform the work claimant was doing when injured.' Powell v. Casco Nelmor Corp., 406 Mich. 332, 350, 279 N.W.2d 769 (1979), quoting 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law,  57.53, p. 10-129, and citing Allen v. Nat'l Twist Drill & Tool Co., 324 Mich. 660, 663, 37 N.W.2d 664 (1949) (quoting the definition of disability from  417.1, the precursor of subsection 401[a]). Before 1981, the Court developed a distinction between skilled and unskilled labor, see Hutsko v. Chrysler Corp., 381 Mich. 99, 103, 158 N.W.2d 874 (1968), [12] even though the statute did not provide for it. In Leitz v. Labadie Ice Co., 211 Mich. 565, 572, 179 N.W. 291 (1920), the Court explained the difference between these two kinds of work: [W]e think it may safely be said that, as generally used and understood, [common labor] signifies that kind of unskilled manual labor with or without simple tools, which is commonly done by the masses of working people in lines of employment necessitating no special trade or previous training before engaging in them beyond what can be quickly learned and effectually performed by the laborer while employed at regular wage under direction of those in charge; as distinguished from that class of skilled and less common manual labor to perform which previous experience, apprenticeship, study, practice or manual training in some special calling, handicraft or trade is required. This distinction between skilled and unskilled labor was important for determining whether there was a partial or total disability under this chapter of the act. See Welch, Worker's Compensation in Michigan: Law & Practice (3d ed.),  8.8, p. 8-8. Although Michigan case law does not clearly define total and partial disability, see, e.g., 33 Michigan Digest 2d, Workers' Compensation,  846, pp. 119-120,  856, pp. 123-124, through our holdings we established the general rules governing the meaning of disability in the context of skilled and unskilled labor. [13] A skilled employee was totally disabled if he was unable to perform his skilled position as a result of his injury, even if he was able to earn wages at another kind of employment. See MacDonald v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 268 Mich. 591, 593, 256 N.W. 558 (1934). [14] In contrast, an unskilled employee, or, in other words, an employee working at common labor, was only partially disabled when he was unable to perform his previous job but still able to perform other work within his employment of common labor. See Miller v. S. Fair & Sons, 206 Mich. 360, 364-366, 171 N.W. 380 (1919). In order to prove total disability, the unskilled employee had to be unable to perform all the jobs within his employment of common labor. See Leitz v. Labadie Ice Co., 229 Mich. 381, 385-386, 201 N.W. 485 (1924). [15] Thus, the general rule from case law regarding total and partial disabilities was that an employee is totally disabled if he cannot perform all jobs within his field of employment and is partially disabled if he can still perform some jobs within his field of employment. See Welch, Worker's Compensation (3d ed.), supra,  8.8, p. 8-8. [16]