Opinion ID: 1449914
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Order's Validity Under Ex parte Young

Text: Although the Eleventh Amendment expressly prohibits suits against states in both law and equity, a plaintiff may nonetheless maintain a federal action to compel a state official's prospective compliance with the plaintiffs federal rights. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 156, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908); id. at 160, 28 S.Ct. 441 (The State has no power to impart to [its officer] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.); see also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979) (citing Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714). The court may order such an injunction even if the state's compliance will have an ancillary effect on the state treasury. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667-68, 94 S.Ct. 1347 (citing Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714). This exception applies only to prospective relief; it does not permit retroactive injunctive relief. Id. at 668, 94 S.Ct. 1347. In this case, the August 18 order constituted retroactive relief under our controlling precedent. In Native Village of Noatak v. Blatchford, we held that, [i]n requesting an order requiring the Commissioner to perform his `legal duty' to disburse ... funds to him, the plaintiff essentially seeks an injunction directing the state to pay damages. 38 F.3d 1505, 1512 (9th Cir.1994). What the plaintiff sought, we held, was precisely the type of retroactive relief that the Supreme Court refused to allow in Edelman, and therefore his attempt to characterize its claim as one for prospective relief fail[ed] to avoid the bar of the Eleventh Amendment. Id. In this matter, the August 18 order provided retroactive relief that required the State to pay monetary compensation to affected providers. [19] Therefore, under Native Village of Noatak, the retroactive portion of that order does not fall under the Ex parte Young exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine. As a result, the order violated the State's sovereign immunity unless the Director waived that immunityimpliedly through removal, explicitly through consent to suit in state court, or through some combination thereofan issue we now consider.