Opinion ID: 2637685
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter

Text: Next, Northcutt argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of premeditated first-degree murder. The court did instruct on second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter as lesser offenses but refused Northcutt's request to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction. The legislature has established the parameters for when jury instructions on lesser included offenses should be given. K.S.A. 22-3414(3) provides in relevant part: In cases where there is some evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime as provided in subsection (2) of K.S.A. 21-3107 and amendments thereto, the judge shall instruct the jury as to the crime charged and any such lesser included crime. Thus, we must examine the record to see if there is some evidence of each of the elements of voluntary manslaughter and, if so, if that evidence would reasonably justify a conviction for voluntary manslaughter. See State v. Houston, 289 Kan. 252, 276, 213 P.3d 728 (2009). In arguing that the facts of the case meet this standard, Northcutt admits that a voluntary manslaughter instruction does not completely fit with either party's theory of the case. Yet he argues the jury could have believed that the victim provoked a sudden quarrel when he stood up from the computer and entangled Northcutt in the computer cords, causing a drunken fight to ensue. See K.S.A. 21-3403(a) (voluntary manslaughter defined to include intentional killing on a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion); State v. Arteaga, 257 Kan. 874, 890, 896 P.2d 1035 (1995). This argument ignores Kansas precedent that requires severe provocation to justify giving a voluntary manslaughter instruction. E.g., State v. Vasquez, 287 Kan. 40, 55-56, 194 P.3d 563 (2008); State v. Gallegos, 286 Kan. 869, 874, 190 P.3d 226 (2008); State v. Drennan, 278 Kan. 704, 713, 101 P.3d 1218 (2004); State v. Horn, 278 Kan. 24, 40-41, 91 P.3d 517 (2004). Under our precedent, mere evidence of an altercation between parties does not alone support finding sufficient provocation. State v. Mitchell, 269 Kan. 349, 353, 7 P.3d 1135 (2000); see Gallegos, 286 Kan. at 874-75, 190 P.3d 226 (holding evidence of argument between victim and defendant fails to demonstrate legally sufficient provocation for shooting victim). In Horn, 278 Kan. 24, 91 P.3d 517, we reiterated these and other basic principles regarding the elements of voluntary manslaughter, stating in part that `[a] provocation is adequate if it is calculated to deprive a reasonable man of self-control and to cause him to act out of passion rather than reason.' [Citation omitted.] Horn, 278 Kan. at 40, 91 P.3d 517. The Horn court further explained that `[t]he test of the sufficiency of the provocation is objective, not subjective. The provocation, whether it be sudden quarrel or some other form of provocation, must be sufficient to cause an ordinary man to lose control of his actions and his reason.' Horn, 278 Kan. at 40, 91 P.3d 517 (quoting State v. Guebara, 236 Kan. 791, 796-97, 696 P.2d 381 [1985]). Considering these rules, we conclude that even if the jury accepted that Mason stood up and became tangled in the computer cords and Northcutt's impelling rope, such an action is not severe provocation; it is not an action that would cause an ordinary person to lose control of his or her actions and reason. Moreover, one consistency in all of Northcutt's various renditions of events was that Northcutt was the first one to push, shove, kick, lift, or hit. Even before the jury, Northcutt testified that he went into Mason's home, came up behind Mason, and kicked him in the butt. Only then did Mason rise and become tangled in the cords. In other words, Northcutt provoked Mason's actions, not the other way around. Because there is no evidence of provocation by Mason, much less severe provocation, the trial court was not required to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. See Vasquez, 287 Kan. at 55-56, 194 P.3d 563 (stating that facts did not `meet the provocation thresholdthat which is calculated to deprive a reasonable [person] of self-control and to cause [the defendant] to act out of passion rather than reason'); Gallegos, 286 Kan. at 874-75, 190 P.3d 226 (holding evidence of argument between victim and defendant fails to demonstrate legally sufficient provocation for shooting victim); Drennan, 278 Kan. at 711-13, 101 P.3d 1218 (hitting someone's back during verbal argument not sufficient provocation). Affirmed.