Opinion ID: 2638563
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defining Conduct Sufficiently to Preclude Arbitrary and Discriminatory Enforcement

Text: ¶ 29 In addition to providing adequate notice about what conduct is proscribed, the void for vagueness doctrine requires the legislature to define the criminal offense ... in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (citations omitted). In other words, the legislature must `establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.' Id. at 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974)). ¶ 30 Here, defendant contends that [t]he Legislature's failure to clearly and specifically define the term `unborn child' not only encourages but facilitates arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement because the prosecutor is left to speculate at what point an unborn child becomes a person for enforcement purposes. Additionally, defendant contends that enforcement decisions will be made at least in part, by the prosecutor's own thoughts or beliefs concerning fetal rights, because the statute fails to provide adequate guidance. ¶ 31 This argument fails for the same reason that defendant's argument concerning adequacy of notice fails. Defendant's argument is premised on the notion that the legislature had to define the term unborn child in order for the term to have a definite meaning. The void for vagueness doctrine does not, however, require a legislature to define terms that are readily ascertainable. Because the term unborn child has a straightforward definition, as we have discussed above, a prosecutor is not left to speculate as to the statute's meaning. Thus, the legislature adequately established minimal guidelines for the enforcement of the statute. We therefore conclude that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague either facially or as applied because it does not encourage or facilitate arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. ¶ 32 In sum, we conclude that the term unborn child is not unconstitutionally vague because, absent modifying language to the contrary, it clearly encompasses a human being at any stage of development in utero. The statute thus provides adequate notice to an ordinary person about what conduct is proscribed. Moreover, because the meaning of the term is readily ascertainable, its inclusion does not encourage or facilitate arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Hence, the criminal homicide and aggravated murder statutes are sufficiently clear as applied to the defendant and cannot be considered impermissibly vague in all [their] applications. Indeed, given our plain, commonsense reading of the term unborn child, it is difficult to imagine any circumstance in which the meaning would be unclear. Thus, defendant's vagueness challenges fail, both facially and as applied, and we affirm the decision of the district court on this issue.