Opinion ID: 150812
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: count 7retaliatory prosecution

Text: In Count 7, Rehberg alleges Hodges and Paulk violated his First Amendment free speech rights by retaliating against him for his criticism of the hospital in his faxes. Rehberg alleges Hodges's and Paulk's decisions to investigate him, issue subpoenas, provide his information to paid civilians, and procure wrongful indictments were in retaliation for his faxes and criticism of the hospital and were all made without probable cause. [18] We first review Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006), which addresses retaliatory-prosecution claims.
In Hartman, plaintiff Moore brought a Bivens [19] action against postal inspectors and a federal prosecutor for retaliatory prosecution. [20] Because of Moore's criticism of and lobbying to the U.S. Postal Service, postal inspectors launched criminal investigations against Moore and pressured the United States Attorney's Office to indict him, [n]otwithstanding very limited evidence. Id. at 253-54, 126 S.Ct. at 1699-1700. Although they did not testify, the postal inspectors drafted witness statements for other witnesses and provided them to the prosecutor, who presented them to the grand jury. Moore v. United States, 213 F.3d 705, 707 (D.C.Cir. 2000). The district court dismissed the criminal charges against Moore for a complete lack of direct evidence. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 254, 126 S.Ct. at 1700. In Moore's subsequent Bivens action for retaliatory prosecution, the district court granted absolute immunity to the prosecutor but denied qualified immunity to the postal inspectors. Id. at 255, 126 S.Ct. at 1701. As to the prosecutor, the D.C. Circuit affirmed absolute immunity for the retaliatory decision to prosecute Moore and the prosecutor's concealment of exculpatory evidence from the grand jury, manipulation of evidence before the grand jury, and failure to disclose exculpatory material before trial. Moore, 213 F.3d at 708. As to the postal inspectors, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity and allowed Moore's retaliatory-prosecution claim to proceed against them, even though Moore had not shown an absence of probable cause for the criminal charges against him. In reversing the D.C. Circuit's denial of qualified immunity to the postal inspectors, the Supreme Court in Hartman concluded that to bring a retaliatory-prosecution claim, the plaintiff must show an absence of probable cause for the prosecution. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 252, 126 S.Ct. at 1699. The Supreme Court first noted, as a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions, including criminal prosecutions, for speaking out. Id. at 256, 126 S.Ct. at 1701 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court, however, explained that a retaliatory-prosecution suit cannot be brought against the prosecutor, but only against the non-prosecuting official who successfully induced the prosecutor to bring charges that would not otherwise have been brought, as follows: A Bivens (or § 1983) action for retaliatory prosecution will not be brought against the prosecutor, who is absolutely immune from liability for the decision to prosecute. Instead, the defendant will be a nonprosecutor, an official, like an inspector here, who may have influenced the prosecutorial decision but did not himself make it, and the cause of action will not be strictly for retaliatory prosecution, but for successful retaliatory inducement to prosecute. The consequence is that a plaintiff like Moore must show that the nonprosecuting official acted in retaliation, and must also show that he induced the prosecutor to bring charges that would not have been initiated without his urging. Id. at 261-62, 126 S.Ct. at 1704-05 (emphasis added). To sue for retaliatory prosecution, a plaintiff must establish a but-for causal connection between the retaliatory animus of the non-prosecutor and the prosecutor's decision to prosecute. See id. at 256, 261, 126 S.Ct. at 1701, 1704 (discussing but-for cause and but-for basis for the prosecutor's decision to prosecute). [21] And Hartman indicates that to establish a prima facie case of this but-for causal connection, a plaintiff must plead and prove both (1) a retaliatory motive on the part of the non-prosecutor official, and (2) the absence of probable cause supporting the prosecutor's decision. Id. at 265, 126 S.Ct. at 1706; see also Wood, 323 F.3d at 883 (First Amendment retaliatory-prosecution claim is defeated by the existence of probable cause). A retaliatory motive on the part of a non-prosecuting official combined with an absence of probable cause will create a prima facie inference that the unconstitutionally motivated inducement infected the prosecutor's decision to bring the charge. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265, 126 S.Ct. at 1706. Importantly, the absence of probable cause is not necessarily dispositive of whether the unconstitutionally motivated inducement succeeded, but will create a prima facie inference that it did. Id. The burden then shifts to the defendant official to show that the action would have been taken anyway, independently of any retaliatory animus. Id. at 261, 126 S.Ct. at 1704. In other words, the defendant official will not be liable if he can show the prosecutor would have taken the action complained of anyway. Id.
Hartman dictates the outcome of Rehberg's retaliatory-prosecution claim in Count 7. First, as to Hodges, Rehberg alleges Hodges was in communication with Burke about the decision to prosecute, even after Hodges recused. Hodges's alleged decision to prosecute Rehberg, even if made without probable cause and even if caused solely by Paulk's and his unconstitutional retaliatory animus, is protected by absolute immunity. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 261-62, 126 S.Ct. at 1704-05. As to Paulk, Rehberg must show investigator Paulk's retaliation against Rehberg successfully induced the prosecution and was the but-for cause of the prosecution. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265, 126 S.Ct. at 1701. Accordingly, Rehberg must show that prosecutor Burke (himself or with Hodges's influence) would not have prosecuted Rehberg but for Paulk's retaliatory motive and conduct. [22] The very detailed allegations in Rehberg's complaint satisfy the two requirements for a prima facie case of retaliatory prosecution: non-prosecutor Paulk's retaliatory motive, and the absence of probable cause for prosecutor Burke to bring charges. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265, 126 S.Ct. at 1706. For example, Rehberg alleges [t]here was no probable cause for the underlying criminal charges against Mr. Rehberg and such charges would not have been brought if there was no retaliatory motive. Rehberg supports this alleged lack of probable cause by alleging Paulk admitted that he never interviewed any witnesses or gathered any evidence indicating that Mr. Rehberg committed any aggravated assault or burglary, and Paulk's false testimony was the only evidence Burke presented in support of the first indictment. Without Paulk's allegedly false testimony, Burke could not have procured the first indictment because there was no other evidence. Rehberg also alleges Hodges and Paulk acted in retaliation for Rehberg's criticisms of the activities and financial management of a public hospital to which they had close political connections and personal relationships and that chilling Rehberg's speech was a motivating factor in all of Hodges's and Paulk's conduct in investigating and prosecuting him. In sum, Rehberg sufficiently has alleged the requisite retaliatory motive, absence of probable cause, and but-for causation (i.e., that Burke would not have prosecuted Rehberg but for Paulk's false testimony). Therefore, at this pleading juncture, the district court did not err in denying absolute and qualified immunity to Defendant Paulk on Rehberg's retaliatory-prosecution claim.
Rehberg's complaint also alleges a retaliatory investigation claim against Hodges and Paulk. For example, Rehberg's complaint alleges Hodges and Paulk together decided to investigate Rehberg and took several steps during the investigation because each of them had retaliatory animus. These allegations of coordinated and joint actions are replete throughout the complaint. E.g., Compl. ¶¶ 99 (Mr. Paulk and Mr. Hodges instituted an investigation...), 124 (Chilling his political speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the wrongful conduct of Mr. Paulk and Mr. Hodges in investigating Mr. Rehberg...), 157-61 (conspiracy claim). Hartman does not help us with this claim because the Supreme Court pointedly did not decide whether simply conducting retaliatory investigation with a view to promote prosecution is a constitutional tort. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 262 n. 9, 126 S.Ct. at 1705 n. 9 (Whether the expense or other adverse consequences of a retaliatory investigation would ever justify recognizing such an investigation as a distinct constitutional violation is not before us). [23] As noted above, only qualified immunity, not absolute immunity, applies to conduct taken in an investigatory capacity as opposed to a prosecutorial capacity. As we explain above, it was not clearly established that the subpoenas to Rehberg's phone and email providers violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We also are inclined to agree with the government that Hodges and Paulk's retaliatory animus does not create a distinct constitutional tort. [24] But even if we assume Rehberg has stated a constitutional violation by alleging that Hodges and Paulk initiated an investigation and issued subpoenas in retaliation for Rehberg's exercise of First Amendment rights, Hodges and Paulk still receive qualified immunity because Rehberg's right to be free from a retaliatory investigation is not clearly established. The Supreme Court has never defined retaliatory investigation, standing alone, as a constitutional tort, Hartman, 547 U.S. at 262 n. 9, 126 S.Ct. at 1705 n. 9, and neither has this Court. Without this sort of precedent, Rehberg cannot show that the retaliatory investigation alleged here violated his First Amendment rights. See Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 907 (11th Cir.2009) (In order to determine whether a right is clearly established, we look to the precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States, this Court's precedent, and the pertinent state's supreme court precedent, interpreting and applying the law in similar circumstances). Hodges and Paulk accordingly are entitled to qualified immunity for Rehberg's retaliatory investigation claims in Count 7.