Opinion ID: 1942097
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: September 24th and 25th Deeds

Text: First, plaintiff maintains that the September 24, 1992 deed, in which plaintiff allegedly conveyed, by warranty deed, his one-third interest in the Atwells Avenue Property to Edith, is invalid because the signature is not proper and the deed is not notarized. In examining the validity of a conveyance of real property, we look to G.L. 1956 § 34-11-1, which sets forth the requirements for every land conveyance. Section 34-11-1 states that a conveyance shall be void unless made in writing duly signed, acknowledged as hereinafter provided, delivered, and recorded in the records of land evidence in the town or city where the lands    are situated   . This section specifically provides that the writing must be duly signed. The plaintiff maintains that there was no signature in the area where the title grantor is listed; rather, his name was in print elsewhere on the deed. However, [a] signature is nothing more than a special mark that clearly identifies the person signing the document. 14 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 81A.04[1][e] at 81A-55 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., Matthew Bender 2007). See also Abbott v. Zoning Board of Review of Warwick, 78 R.I. 84, 87, 79 A.2d 620, 622 (1951) (holding that there is no provision by statute or otherwise requiring that a signature by mark, especially if it is duly witnessed as it was in the present petition, be supported by affidavit   ). Black's Law Dictionary defines the term signature as A person's name or mark written by that person or at that person's direction. Black's Law Dictionary 1415 (8th ed. 2004). We are further persuaded by the more explicit entry in the dictionary's sixth edition, in which the term signature was defined quite broadly. A signature may be written by hand, printed, stamped, typewritten, engraved, photographed, or cut from one instrument and attached to another   . Black's Law Dictionary 1381 (6th ed. 1990). The validity of a signature, therefore, does not turn on the form of the mark; indeed any mark will suffice, as long as that mark is adopted as one's own. The plaintiff's argument, that his signature was invalid because it was printed on the document in separate block letters, rather than in cursive adjoining letters, must fail. Moreover, plaintiff admitted, in his deposition, that it was indeed his signature on the deed and that he intended to convey his interest in the property to Edith by deed. Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact about whether plaintiff conveyed his interest in the Atwells Avenue Property to Edith. The plaintiff also attacks the September 24, 1992 deed by alleging that because the deed was not notarized, it was not acknowledged, in accordance with one of the requirements set forth in § 34-11-1. However, this provision provides for an exception to the acknowledgement requirement. Section 34-11-1 dictates that the conveyance, if delivered, as between the parties and their heirs, and as against those taking by gift or devise, or those having notice thereof, shall be valid and binding though not acknowledged or recorded. (Emphasis added.) Evidently, the General Assembly has anticipated the tendency of land transfers among family members to observe fewer formalities and thus has sought to maintain the validity of these less formal transfers nevertheless. Indeed, in Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Boiteau, 119 R.I. 64, 69, 376 A.2d 323, 326 (1977), this Court held that [a] deed, if delivered, is valid and binding against those who have knowledge of it even if not acknowledged or recorded. To adopt plaintiff's argument would be to exalt form over substance, which this Court is not inclined to do under this set of facts. Although plaintiff failed to have his conveyance to Edith notarized, the fact that the deed was not acknowledged does not affect its validity. Accordingly, we conclude that the September 24, 1992 deed is valid. To contest the validity of the September 25, 1992 deed, plaintiff makes a similar argumentbecause Edith printed her signature on the document rather than sign her signature where the grantor's signature should be located, the deed is invalid. For the above-stated reasons, this argument also fails. The September 25, 1992 deed is valid; therefore Edith properly transferred her one-third interest in the Atwells Avenue Property to her grandson Frederick Jr.