Opinion ID: 2631032
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Determining Legislative Intent to Punish

Text: {51} Even if two charges are the same offense under the Double Jeopardy Clause, a defendant is not protected against multiple punishments for those charges if the legislature has specifically authorized such punishment. In determining legislative intent in this context, the Blockburger testthe same test used for determining whether two offenses are the sameis the starting point. See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981). The outcome of the Blockburger test provides a presumptive lens through which to view any statutory language. {52} Supreme Court precedent makes clear that if one of the two charges is determined to be a lesser-included offense of the other and if both were part of the same act or transaction, multiple punishments are unconstitutional unless the legislature has clearly provided for them. See Whalen, 445 U.S. at 692, 100 S.Ct. 1432 ([W]here two statutory provisions proscribe the `same offense,' they are construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in the absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.). If the offenses are the same for purposes of double jeopardy and the legislative intent regarding multiple punishments is ambiguous in such situations, the rule of lenity is to be used. See id. at 695 n. 10, 100 S.Ct. 1432. {53} On the other hand, when two charges are not the same offense, multiple punishments are presumed permissible unless contrary to legislative intent. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 367, 103 S.Ct. 673; see Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340, 101 S.Ct. 1137. Likewise, when the Blockburger test reveals that the charges are not the same for purposes of double jeopardy, the rule of lenity in construing ambiguous statutes serves no purpose. This is because it is presumed that the legislature was attempting to eradicate separate evils with the different statutes. See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 342-43, 101 S.Ct. 1137. {54} Most instructive are Whalen and Hunter. In Whalen, the defendant was convicted of rape and felony murder predicated on rape. Similar to the instant case, the defendant argued that imposition of multiple punishments violated the United States Constitution. 445 U.S. at 685-86, 100 S.Ct. 1432. The Supreme Court first determined that rape was a lesser-included offense of felony murder because rape [was] a necessary element of proof of the felony murder. Id. at 694, 100 S.Ct. 1432. Next, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant's rape conviction because Congress was, at best, ambiguous as to whether it intended multiple punishments for felony murder and its predicates. See id. at 695, 100 S.Ct. 1432. {55} In contrast is Hunter. In that case, the defendant complained of his multiple convictions of armed criminal action and the lesser-included offense of robbery in the first degree. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 361-62, 103 S.Ct. 673. The statute proscribing armed criminal action, however, provided that any punishment for that crime was to be in addition to any punishment provided by law for the [lesser-included offense]. Id. at 362, 103 S.Ct. 673. The Supreme Court upheld both convictions because the legislature's intent in providing for multiple punishments was crystal clear. Id. at 368, 103 S.Ct. 673.