Opinion ID: 1924529
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the trial court improperly allowed expert testimony about loss of income damage calculations.

Text: ¶ 20. CMF argues that the trial court improperly allowed expert testimony regarding loss of income damage calculations. During closing arguments Hailey asked the jury to return a verdict of $1,220,511.50 for lost earnings. The jury complied with Hailey's request. ¶ 21. CMF asserts the amount was based upon the expert testimony of Carroll David Channell. Over CMF's objections, Channell was permitted to testify about three different options for calculating lost wage damages: (1) the present value of Hailey's salary at the time of his death; (2) the present value of the average college graduate's salary which was substantially more than Hailey was earning; and (3) the present value of a job at Farm Bureau. ¶ 22. CMF finds the proper measure for determining lost income damage to be the salary at the time of death. According to CMF, any information about what the average college graduate earns or what Hailey might have earned at Farm Bureau is speculative and improper, especially since the only step taken to get the Farm Bureau job was the completion of an application. CMF believes that the jury awarded $889,912.50 more than the present value of his earnings at the time of death. ¶ 23. CMF contends that evidence as to a decedent's intention to enter an occupation other than the one engaged in at the time of death was improper. Clary v. Breyer, 194 Miss. 612, 13 So.2d 633 (1943); Gulf & S.I.R. Co. v. Boone, 120 Miss. 632, 82 So. 335 (1919). CMF argues that these cases make it clear that testimony about the possibility of future jobs is not appropriate in Mississippi courtrooms and allowing such testimony was error. Hailey avers that the figures testified to by Channell were simply guidelines that the jury could utilize in determining the loss of income damage. It is also noted that Channell suggested the jury start with the college graduate figure, since Hailey was a college graduate. ¶ 24. This Court has held that there is no exact yardstick for [determining] such damages. Bush Constr. Co. v. Walters, 250 Miss. 384, 394, 164 So.2d 900, 903 (1964). [N]umerous cases have held that in assessing the beneficiaries' loss, the trier of fact may consider the decedent's financial condition, and station in life. Among matters whose consideration by the trier of fact has been approved are the occupation of the decedent at the time of his death, and other occupations he was qualified to fulfill, or intended, eventually, to fulfill. Also taken into consideration is the decedent's ability to earn money in general, his disposition to earn, and the amount he was earning at the time of his death and, under some circumstances, at a considerable period of time prior to his death. 22 Am.Jur.2d Death § 284 at 337-38 (1988) (footnotes omitted). Hailey argues it was, therefore, within the discretion of the court to permit this type of evidence. ¶ 25. The cases cited by CMF are clearly distinguishable. Clary is inapplicable to the case at bar, because it addresses the issue of someone who had been trained in a field and who had not worked in that field at least four years prior to her death. Likewise, Gulf & S.I.R. Co. v. Boone is not applicable to this case because it dealt with a decedent who had not made any plans regarding his profession after he left the Army. Here, Hailey had been trained, received a college degree, was working and was absolutely qualified to be a typical college graduate and to receive the earnings commiserate therewith. ¶ 26. We see no error in allowing this testimony.