Opinion ID: 1520503
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: failure to excuse calhoun from the courtroom

Text: Calhoun argues that the trial court denied him due process when it refused to allow him to excuse himself from the courtroom during the testimony of Douglas Cummins, the only eyewitness to the crime, because it resulted in his view in an unreliable and suggestive courtroom identification. The facts reveal that no line-up was ever held. However, on April 6 Cummins was shown a group of seven photographs. We said in Calhoun: At first he said he could not identify anyone. Later he touched the photograph of Calhoun and said that the shape of the head was very similar to that of the taller of his assailants but that he would be better able to tell if he had a full view of the person. Subsequently, he tapped Calhoun's photograph and said that of the seven, `that's who I'd put my money on.' 297 Md. at 575, 468 A.2d at 50. A hypnotic interview of Cummins was conducted by the police on April 13. We pointed out in Calhoun, where there was an attack upon Cummins' testimony on the basis of hypnosis, that [h]is posthypnotic testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress was consistent with the interviews. 297 Md. at 575, 468 A.2d at 50. We said: It was clearly demonstrated that the Cummins and Adcock testimony did not depend upon hypnosis. Cummins identified Calhoun's photograph prior to hypnosis. Even if he had made no courtroom identification of Calhoun his extra-judicial identification would have been admissible in evidence. Bedford v. State, 293 Md. 172, 177, 443 A.2d 78 (1982); Johnson v. State, 237 Md. 283, 291, 206 A.2d 138 (1965). 297 Md. at 578, 468 A.2d at 51. At trial the judge overruled Calhoun's request to absent himself from the courtroom during Cummins' testimony. The prosecution initially said there would be no in-court identification. However, Cummins identified Calhoun at the express request of the court at trial. The post-conviction judge said: It is the petitioner's contention that the trial court erred in denying his `right' to remove himself from the courtroom to avoid an in-court identification. The short answer to this contention is that the petitioner had no such `right.' While other procedures short of petitioner leaving the courtroom were available to avoid or reduce the suggestive nature of an in-court identification, the petitioner made no such requests. In McKnight vs. State, 33 Md. App. 280, 286-287 [364 A.2d 116] (1976) reversed on other grounds, 280 Md. 604 [375 A.2d 551] (1977) the Court of Special Appeals stated: `Appellant next urges that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to be seated in the audience for the in-court identification. He contends that in order to insure due process, it is incumbent on the state to produce evidence of a reliable and untainted identification prior to trial or that the court where no such evidence is forthcoming insure the defendant a fair and impartial in-court identification free from the suggestive effect of the defendant's being seated at the trial table next to defense counsel. We know of no such duty on the part of either the state or the court, and appellant cites no authority to support his position. `This court has held that an accused has no constitutional right to be placed in a lineup. Bowen v. State, 5 Md. App. 713, 149 [249] A.2d 499 (1969). It has also been held that the conduct and direction of a trial is always within the sound discretion of the presiding judge. Cummings v. State, 7 Md. App. 687, 256 A.2d 894 (1969). In Alston v. State, 11 Md. App. 624, 629, 276 A.2d 225, 228 (1971), this court considered a similar request. The court at 629-630 [276 A.2d 225] said: Although such practices as seating an accused in the audience at his trial for purposes of identification are widely used and approved, the propriety, however, of various in-court identification techniques are still tied to the rule that the overall conduct of a trial is subject to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Moreover this court will not interfere with that discretion unless the trial judge clearly abuses it and, as a result the accused is prejudiced. Turner v. State, 7 Md. App. 74 [253 A.2d 777]. `In denying appellant's motion, the trial court called attention to the fact that there were only two or three other individuals in the courtroom at the time of trial and that they were individuals closely resembling the defendant and were apparently brought there for the purpose of misleading the jury. Under questioning, defense counsel admitted having requested their presence, to see if the complaining witness could identify the defendant if he was not seated at the counsel's table. `We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and acted fully within its judicial prerogative in not permitting the in-court identification to become a game of judicial Russian roulette. See White v. State, 23 Md. App. 151, 158, 216 [326] A.2d 219 (1974).' The matter of in-court identification and the procedure therein utilized was within the sound discretion of the trial court. The record here fails to reveal an abuse of discretion. Petitioner's request to absent himself from the trial was made by counsel on the record. It was available for review by appellate counsel who read the entire record. The failure to raise the claim on appeal results in this claim being waived. The post-conviction judge did not err in finding waiver and no abuse of discretion.