Opinion ID: 3004473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: Pakovich initially filed suit under ERISA § 502(a) against Broadspire, seeking long-term disability benefits from the ERISA Plan after Broadspire determined that she was no longer entitled to them (“Pakovich I”). The district court concluded that Broadspire’s decision to terminate Pakovich’s long-term disability benefits under the “own occupation” standard (under which Pakovich must have been unable to perform the essential functions of Nos. 10-1889 & 10-3083 3 her sales position with Verizon to receive benefits) was arbitrary and capricious, and thus that Pakovich was entitled to disability benefits for the first twenty-four months. It further found that she was not entitled to disability benefits beyond twenty-four months because she did not qualify under the “any occupation” standard (under which benefits were available only if Pakovich was disabled from all occupations). It thus awarded Pakovich benefits from May 14, 2004, through July 16, 2004, but denied benefits beyond July 16. On appeal, we reversed the district court’s decision that Pakovich was ineligible for benefits beyond twenty-four months and remanded to the Plan Administrator to determine her eligibility for benefits during that time period. Pakovich v. Broadspire Servs., Inc., 535 F.3d 601, 607 (7th Cir. 2008). We also denied her request for attorney fees, costs, and expenses incurred on appeal. Id. We issued our opinion on July 24, 2008, and the district court remanded Pakovich’s claim to the Plan Administrator on September 4, 2008. Having not heard whether the Plan would pay “any occupation” benefits for almost five months, Pakovich filed a second suit (“Pakovich II”) on January 30, 2009, under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), this time against the Plan,1 claiming that the Plan’s failure to determine her benefits between September 4, 2008, and January 29, 2009, con- 1 The suit was originally filed against Broadspire, Verizon Communications, Inc., and AETNA Insurance Company, but the Plan was later substituted as the proper defendant. 4 Nos. 10-1889 & 10-3083 stituted a “deemed denial” of her benefits claim. She sought all the benefits to which she was entitled under the terms of the Plan, interest on all unpaid amounts, and legal fees, costs, and expenses incurred in pursuing the case. On March 6, 2009, a little over a month after filing Pakovich II, Pakovich’s counsel learned from the Plan’s claim handler that the Plan had agreed to pay her “any occupation” benefits from July 15, 2004. On April 7, 2009, Pakovich was sent a letter with a check that paid back benefits and past due interest owed since 2004. The letter also indicated that Pakovich would continue to receive benefits from the Plan as long as she remained qualified. The payments compensated Pakovich for the entire amount she sought for her benefit claim in Pakovich II. On April 14, 2009, the defendants in Pakovich II filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the case was moot because the Plan had paid the benefits Pakovich sought in her complaint and agreed to continue paying them in the future as long as she remained eligible. After the district court denied the motion, Pakovich filed a motion for summary judgment that sought monthly benefits in the amount the Plan was already paying her and attorney fees. The Plan cross-moved for summary judgment. On March 24, 2010, the district court granted summary judgment for Pakovich, concluding that she was disabled under the “any occupation” standard and ordering the Plan to pay Pakovich disability benefits on a monthly Nos. 10-1889 & 10-3083 5 basis until she turned sixty-five years old or Verizon, consistent with the terms of the Plan and ERISA, determined that Pakovich was no longer entitled to the benefits. The district court denied Pakovich’s request for attorney fees in a separate opinion and later rejected her Rule 60 motion to reconsider that decision. The Plan appeals the district court’s decision that Pakovich’s benefit claim was not moot, and Pakovich appeals the district court’s denial of her request for fees. After briefly discussing jurisdiction, we review each argument in turn.