Opinion ID: 697293
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of Federal Regulations

Text: 10 The Department of Transportation does provide for waivers of its regulatory requirements. There were disputes here as to whether a waiver is possible given Daugherty's medical condition, 3 and the extent to which the city pursued a waiver. Our decision, however, does not turn on these factual issues. 11 Instead, we believe we are bound by Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir.1993). In Chandler, the City of Dallas adopted requirements for primary drivers whose positions require frequent driving. As in our case, the city followed Department of Transportation regulations which provide that an insulin-dependent diabetic is not a qualified driver. Plaintiff Chandler was deemed unqualified for his primary driver position as an electrical repairman. The district court entered relief in his favor. We reversed and rendered. 12 In Chandler, the claim was brought under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 701-797b, which prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities in programs that receive federal financial assistance. The elements of a cause of action at issue in our case, however, are virtually the same under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. As explained above, the ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability, and discrimination includes not making a reasonable accommodation for an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. 42 U.S.C. Secs. 12112(a), 12112(b)(5)(A). Similarly, the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against an individual with a disability 4 who is otherwise qualified. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794. We also noted in Chandler that the two Acts define a disability in substantially the same terms. 2 F.3d at 1391. 13 In Chandler, we reasoned as follows. The definition of a qualified handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act includes a personal safety requirement: 14 [A]n otherwise qualified handicapped individual is defined as one who can perform the essential functions of the position in question without endangering the health and safety of the individual or others. [U]nder section 504, an individual is not qualified for a job if there is a genuine substantial risk that he or she could be injured or could injure others, and the employer cannot modify the job to eliminate that risk. 15 Id. at 1393 (quoting Chiari v. City of League City, 920 F.2d 311, 317 (5th Cir.1991)). Again, the ADA by its terms recognizes the same safety requirement. It allows qualification standards that include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace, and defines a direct threat as a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. Secs. 12113(b), 12111(3). 16 Pursuing this inquiry further, we held as a matter of law that a driver with insulin-dependent diabetes is not otherwise qualified because his medical condition presents a genuine substantial risk that he could injure himself or others: 17 The issue whether an insulin dependent diabetic is otherwise qualified for positions involving driving or other high risk activities has been addressed by several federal courts. Those courts have uniformly held that insulin dependent diabetics present an unacceptable risk, and are thus not otherwise qualified, to be employed as, inter alia, sanitation truck drivers or special agents with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We are aware of no cases holding that insulin dependent diabetes does not present a significant risk in connection with the operation of motor vehicles on public highways. 18 We hold that, as a matter of law, a driver with insulin dependent diabetes ... presents a genuine substantial risk that he could injure himself or others. We echo the sentiment expressed by this court in Collier [v. City of Dallas, 798 F.2d 1410 (1986) ]: Woe unto the employer who put such an employee behind the wheel of a vehicle owned by the employer which was involved in a vehicular accident. 19 2 F.3d at 1395 (citations, footnotes omitted). 20 A waiver of Department of Transportation regulations would in no way address the concern stated in Chandler; it might avoid the legal impediment to Daugherty's desire to continue to drive a bus, but it would not alter his medical condition. In our circuit, such a condition, as a matter of law, makes him not otherwise qualified to drive a bus under the Rehabilitation Act. For the reasons explained above, this holding likewise compels us to hold that under the ADA Daugherty is not a qualified individual with a disability for the position of bus driver. This essential element of his claim is lacking even if the city could have accommodated him by obtaining a waiver.