Opinion ID: 706827
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Various Approaches to the Admissibility Question

Text: 36 The state and federal courts that have been faced with the admissibility of hypnotically-refreshed testimony have followed four different approaches. Some courts treat all such testimony as per se admissible under the theory that hypnosis does not render the witness incompetent, but goes to the question of credibility. See, e.g., Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir.1975) (That [a witness's] present memory depends upon refreshment claimed to have been induced under hypnosis goes to the credibility of her testimony not to her competence as a witness.); United States v. Waksal, 539 F.Supp. 834, 838 (S.D.Fla.1982), rev'd on other grounds, 709 F.2d 653 (11th Cir.1983); Pearson, 441 N.E.2d at 473; Federal Practice, supra, Sec. 6011, at 123-24. This position depends in considerable part on one's faith in the jury's ability to evaluate the testimony accurately in light of cross-examination, expert testimony relating to hypnosis, and jury instructions. Federal Practice, supra, Sec. 6011, at 124. Such an approach was particularly favored when courts were just beginning to address the admissibility of hypnotically-refreshed testimony, see Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1208, but it has sparsely been followed since 1980, Zayas, 137 Ill.Dec. at 571, 546 N.E.2d at 516. 37 Courts at the other end of the spectrum have found that post-hypnotic testimony is per se inadmissible because the witness is incompetent to testify regarding such matters. See, e.g., Zayas, 137 Ill.Dec. at 573, 546 N.E.2d at 518; Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1211; People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.3d 18, 181 Cal.Rptr. 243, 273, 723 P.2d 1354, 1384 cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860, 103 S.Ct. 133, 74 L.Ed.2d 114 (1982). The common thread running through these cases is that the possible distorting effects of hypnosis on memory are impossible to circumvent and are so substantial that the game is not worth the candle. Shirley, 181 Cal.Rptr. at 256, 723 P.2d at 1366. Worse yet, hypnotism aggravates the unreliability of normal memory. Valdez, 722 F.2d at 1200 (referring to finding of California Supreme Court). Reasoning that no safeguard can adequately ensure reliability, these courts deem the evidence inadmissible. 3 See Shirley, at 181 Cal.Rptr. at 273, 723 P.2d at 1384. A number of courts apply a modified version of the rule by confirming the witness's testimony to matters recalled before undergoing hypnosis. See, e.g., Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1211; Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 545, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 266, 453 N.E.2d at 495. 38 In Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987), the Supreme Court reviewed Arkansas's rule that a criminal defendant's hypnotically-refreshed testimony was per se inadmissible. While the Court recognized the problems with hypnosis, it concluded that certain procedural safeguards could reduce the potential inaccuracies of post-hypnotic testimony. Id. at 59-60, 107 S.Ct. at 2713. Focusing on the due process right of criminal defendants to testify in their own defense, id. at 51, 107 S.Ct. at 2708, the Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses in the defendant's favor, id. at 52, 107 S.Ct. at 2709, and the Fifth Amendment guarantee against compelled testimony, id. at 52-53, 107 S.Ct. at 2709-10, the Court concluded that the rule of per se inadmissibility was an arbitrary restriction on the [criminal defendant's] right to testify in the absence of clear evidence by the State repudiating the validity of all posthypnosis recollections, id. at 61, 107 S.Ct. at 2714. Consequently, the Court deemed Arkansas's prohibition unconstitutional. The Court, however, explicitly limited the reach of its holding by refusing to express an opinion as to the appropriate rule of admissibility of testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses other than criminal defendants. Id. at 58 n. 15, 107 S.Ct. at 2712 n. 15. 39 The third and fourth approaches occupy a middle ground. These attempt to balance the competing concerns that animate the per se positions. The third approach, articulated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the oft-cited State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981), requires adherence to a list of prescribed safeguards intended to ensure the reliability of hypnotically-refreshed testimony. The court concluded that a rule of per se inadmissibility is unnecessarily broad and will result in the exclusion of evidence that is as trustworthy as other eyewitness testimony. Id., 432 A.2d at 94. 40 In light of recommendations offered by a frequent expert witness, Dr. Martin Orne, the court adopted the following procedural requirements: 41 First, a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in the use of hypnosis must conduct the session. This professional should also be able to qualify as an expert in order to aid the court in evaluating the procedures followed.... 42 Second, the professional conducting the hypnotic session should be independent of and not regularly employed by the prosecutor, investigator or defense.... 43 Third, any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement personnel or the defense prior to the hypnotic session must be recorded, either in writing or another suitable form.... 44 Fourth, before inducing hypnosis the hypnotist should obtain from the subject a detailed description of the facts as the subject remembers them [without] ... asking structured questions or adding new details. 45 Fifth, all contacts between the hypnotist and the subject must be recorded.... 46 Sixth, only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during any phase of the hypnotic session, including the pre-hypnotic testing and the post-hypnotic interview. 47 Id., 432 A.2d at 96-97 (footnote omitted). 48 The presence of these safeguards, however, was not sufficient in Hurd for the admissibility of post-hypnotic testimony. The trial court was also directed to assess the reliability and the admissibility of the testimony in light of the following non-exclusive list of considerations, id., 432 A.2d at 96: the kind of memory loss that hypnosis was used to restore and the specific technique employed, id., 432 A.2d at 95, whether the memory loss in question is likely to yield normal recall if hypnosis is properly administered, and whether the witness has any discernible motivation for not remembering or for 'recalling' a particular version of the events, id., 432 A.2d at 96. Finally, the court held that the party attempting to admit the hypnotically-enhanced testimony bears the burden of demonstrating that the testimony is reliable based on the standards described. Id., 432 A.2d at 97. 49 Several courts have followed the Hurd guidelines or adopted similar ones. See State v. Weston, 16 Ohio App.3d 279, 16 O.B.R. 309, 475 N.E.2d 805, 813 (1984); House v. State, 445 So.2d 815, 826-27 (Miss.1984); see also Federal Practice, supra, Sec. 6011, at 168. 50 Finally, the approach most frequently taken by the federal courts, Federal Practice, supra, Sec. 6011, at 173, is a so-called case-by-case or totality-of-the-circumstances approach, see, e.g., McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951, 958 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 944, 108 S.Ct. 332, 98 L.Ed.2d 359 (1987); Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487, 492-93 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3310, 92 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986); Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112, 1123 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046, 106 S.Ct. 1263, 89 L.Ed.2d 572 (1986). While recognizing the benefits of the Hurd guidelines, these courts conclude that the district court should be given discretion to balance all of the factors to determine the reliability of the evidence and the probative versus prejudicial effect of the testimony. They note that even though the safeguards required by other courtsrepresent[ ] the type of general reliability inquiry that must be made[,] ... a court cannot necessarily rest solely on the reliability vel non of the hypnosis procedures in ruling on the admissibility of the proffered testimony. Even though all of the Hurd safeguards might be employed, the defendant may still be able to demonstrate by expert testimony that a witness' memory has been irreparably distorted by hypnosis. On the other hand, even if the hypnosis procedures are flawed, a trial or appellate court might discern that a witness' testimony was nonetheless independent of the dangers associated with hypnosis. 51 McQueen, 814 F.2d at 958 (citations omitted). As the foregoing summary indicates, the law continues to be in a state of flux regarding the reception of hypnotically-enhanced testimony. See Federal Practice, supra, Sec. 6011, at 123.