Opinion ID: 1702101
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Timeliness of the Motion to Compel Arbitration

Text: More problematic, however, is the plaintiff's contention that § 15 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure bars submission to arbitration of the dispute, claim or controversy regarding Paragraph 11 ... due to the fact that more than six years have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the claim. [4] That section provides: No dispute, claim, or controversy shall be eligible for submission to arbitration under this Code where six (6) years have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the act or dispute, claim, or controversy. This section shall not extend applicable statutes of limitations, nor shall it apply to any case which is directed to arbitration by a court of competent jurisdiction. Id. She insists that the occurrence or event giving rise to the dispute is the execution, on August 12, 1982, of the Agreement containing the arbitration clause. The defendants, however, contend that the events of which § 15 speaks are the alleged instances of churning, unauthorized trading, and similar acts of the defendants as set forth in the plaintiff's complaints. It cannot seriously be maintained that the plaintiff would have averred a cause of action for relief from the effects of the arbitration clause in the absence of the overriding substantive claims succinctly set forth in her complaintsclaims that arose well within the period prescribed by § 15. For example, the plaintiff's complaints allege that beginning on or about September 29, 1983, and continuing until on or about July 27, 1988, [the defendants] wrongfully, intentionally, fraudulently, maliciously, and deceptively manipulated Plaintiff's accounts, and `churned' Plaintiff's accounts. (Emphasis added.) As we have already determined, based on our discussion of the issue of fraud, supra, this case is not about the arbitration clause. Therefore, on the strength of the plain language of § 15, the arbitration request does not appear to be time-barred. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the NASD did not refuse to take jurisdiction of the dispute when, on November 3, 1989, Mrs. Jones submitted a statement of claims to the NASD. Instead, the NASD responded on January 3, 1990, with a memorandum requesting a properly executed copy of the Uniform Submission Agreement. Only when the plaintiff refused to submit the Uniform Submission Agreement did the NASD notify her that it was closing the case. Finally, we consider whether the trial judge erred in granting the defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with Court Orders and for Want of Prosecution. Ala.R.Civ.P. 41(b) provides for the involuntary dismissal of an action upon failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with [the Rules of Civil Procedure] or any order of [the] court. Although dismissal for failure to comply with a court order is a harsh sanction, it is warranted where there is a clear record of delay, willful default or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff. Selby v. Money, 403 So.2d 218, 220 (Ala.1981). Because the trial judge is in the best position to assess the conduct of the plaintiff and the degree of noncompliance, his decision to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute will be accorded considerable weight by a reviewing court. Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943, 947 (9th Cir.1976); Von Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling Comm'n, 442 F.2d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039, 92 S.Ct. 715, 30 L.Ed.2d 731 (1972). Therefore we will reverse that decision only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Selby, at 220; Smith v. Wilcox County Bd. of Educ., 365 So.2d 659 (Ala.1978). Under the facts of this case, we are unable to say that the trial judge abused his discretion in dismissing the plaintiff's case with prejudice. On June 16, 1989, the trial judge granted the defendants' motion to compel arbitration and for stay pending arbitration. The plaintiff never properly sought a review of that decision, [5] nor did she take the necessary steps to comply with the order. Instead, five months later, after she had submitted a statement of claims to the NASD, she refused to sign the Uniform Submission Agreement, a prerequisite for compliance with the order to arbitrate. After another four months had elapsed, during which the NASD gave notice that it was closing the case for failure properly to begin the arbitration process, Merrill Lynch filed its motion to dismiss for failure to comply with court orders and for want of prosecution. In response, the plaintiff began a new round of litigation in the trial court by filing another complaint, a motion to stay arbitration, a brief, and affidavits all directed at an issue that had been adjudicated in the trial court nine months earlier. On June 19, 1990, a year after the original order to arbitrate, the judge dismissed the case with prejudice. Considering the issues presented, the conduct of the plaintiff, the patience of the trial judge, the strain on the court docket, and the cost to the defendants of prolonging the litigation, we conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. Our holding is specifically conditioned, however, upon the willingness of the NASD to take jurisdiction of the plaintiff's claims and to reopen her case. Otherwise, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for trial on the plaintiff's claims. AFFIRMED CONDITIONALLY. HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, STEAGALL and INGRAM, JJ., concur.