Opinion ID: 628038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of Post-Trial Motions

Text: Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 provides: 20 (b) Time for Motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 21 .... 22 (e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 23 Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) likewise requires that a motion for judgment as a matter of law be made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b) makes these ten-day time limitations jurisdictional so that the failure to make a timely motion divests the district court of power to modify the trial verdict. Lapiczak v. Zaist, 451 F.2d 79, 80 (2d Cir.1971). Rule 6(b) also denies to district courts the power to enlarge the ten-day limit under either rule. Id.; see also Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 262 n. 5, 98 S.Ct. 556, 559 n. 5, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (Rule 6(b) prohibits enlargement of the time period prescribed in all of these Rules.). As we recently noted: 24 [T]he rule against the discretionary enlargement of certain time periods is mandatory and jurisdictional and ... cannot be circumvented regardless of excuse. ... A request for an extension of time to file a motion seeking j.n.o.v. [Rule 50(b) ] or a new trial [Rule 59] is ineffective even if it is received without objection and granted by the court.... The question, then, is whether [counsel's] statements [during the 10-day period] constituted an oral motion or an expression of desire to file a subsequent (and tardy) written motion. 25 Meriwether v. Coughlin, 879 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir.1989) (citations omitted). 26 In Meriwether, we concluded that counsel's statement that I would, your Honor, like to at this time note that defendants wish to move for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, although inartful, did constitute a motion under Rule 50(b), and was not a mere request for an extension of time to make the motion. Id. at 1040. In reaching that conclusion, we distinguished Hulson v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 289 F.2d 726 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 835, 82 S.Ct. 61, 7 L.Ed.2d 36 (1961), where the Seventh Circuit construed the statement, I am merely asking for an extension of time in which to file my motion as an impermissible motion for an extension. Id. at 727, 729. We found that [t]he language in Hulson was much clearer, and the trial court in [Hulson ], unlike [Meriwether ], had rejected the ... interpretation that the language was the motion itself. 879 F.2d at 1041. 27 Here, defense counsel spoke of the motion prospectively; he requested an extension of time so that the district court could have the record in front of it when the motion is being made, and stated that I would move at this point to move the 10 day period somewhat so that we can have additional time to make the motion. The district court responded that it is appropriate to move during the original 10 day period to expand the time and the Court will grant a period of 40 days, in addition to the 10 days, to serve and file the motions. Under these circumstances, we reject the district court's conclusion that defense counsel's post-verdict statement was closer to Meriwether than to Hulson. Counsel's language in making the motion, and the district court's language in granting it, clearly indicate that they regarded the request as (an impermissible) one for an extension of time to make the motion. 28 The defendants also contend that because they relied on the district court's representation that the time frame in which to make the post-trial motions had been extended, such reliance constituted an adequate excuse for their failure to comply with the time limits. The reliance argument is flawed, however, because it fails to recognize that the Rule 50(b) and 59 time limitations are jurisdictional and that excuses are therefore unavailing. See Lapiczak, 451 F.2d at 80 (the rules against enlargement of time frames are mandatory and jurisdictional and cannot be circumvented regardless of excuse). 29 The defendants' final argument is that even if the district court erred in concluding that their motions were made within the 10-day limit, and even if their reliance on the court's ruling is beside the point, we should nevertheless consider the questions raised in those motions under our discretionary power. See Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati & Mazzotta P.C., 818 F.2d 278, 281 (2d Cir.1987); Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 137 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008, 105 S.Ct. 2702, 86 L.Ed.2d 718 (1985). We largely reject this argument. While we do indeed have the power to consider arguments not properly raised below, we exercise that power only when necessary to prevent a manifest injustice. Reichman, 818 F.2d at 281; see also Rebaldo, 749 F.2d at 137 (exception to rule that this Court will not consider an issue not passed upon below was appropriate where the district court examined the issue ... in some detail and the court's decision ha[d] broad legal ramifications and concern[ed] the validity of a State statute). 30 Judging the issues raised here against the manifest injustice standard, we conclude that, except for the malicious prosecution damages of $770,000, none of them warrants such extraordinary consideration. Accordingly, we: (1) do not consider the argument made by all defendants that the malicious prosecution claim should never have reached the jury as a matter of law or the officers' argument that the deliberate indifference to medical needs claim should likewise have been dismissed as a matter of law; (2) reverse the order vacating the jury's determination of liability for false arrest because the motion was untimely; (3) and vacate the remittitur regarding damages for indifference to medical needs because the motion was untimely.