Opinion ID: 150007
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Quality and Extent of Experience v. Specific Experience

Text: Moss first claims that he was clearly better qualified than Lim for the Staff Legal Counsel job based on the higher quality and extent of his legal experience with IT licensing and commercial transactions. BMC responds that despite Moss's excellent qualifications and greater length of experience, Lim's work experience was better suited to the specific needs of BMCparticularly with respect to the OEM transactions for which the Staff Legal Counsel would be responsible. [A]n `attempt to equate years served with superior qualifications . . . [is] unpersuasive.' Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 42 (5th Cir.1996) (quoting Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., 5 F.3d 955, 959 (5th Cir.1993)). Obviously, work experience is one component of defining who is more qualified, but greater experience alone will not suffice to raise a fact question as to whether one person is clearly more qualified than another. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). In EEOC v. Louisiana Office of Community Services, this court recognized that the fact that a candidate's experience is recent and specialized in relation to the job at issue is a consideration relevant to qualification, in addition to simple length of experience. 47 F.3d at 1444-45; see also Odom v. Frank, 3 F.3d 839, 846 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that the hired candidate had significant recent experience in several of the . . . areas that were most relevant to the new position . . . . Most of the work for which [plaintiff] had been primarily responsible during the several years preceding [] the application process simply was not relevant to the new position.). As the district court noted, both Moss and Lim met the basic skills and education requirements for the job. Both had a J.D. from an accredited law school, had five or more years of experience in a transactional IP practice, had a record of advanced legal drafting and negotiating skills in an IP licensing practice, and had demonstrated advanced communication, leadership, and project management skills. A review of the two resumes demonstrates that Moss undoubtedly has more experience and higher-level experience generally. But Moss' undisputedly lengthier tenure of experience fourteen years practicing IT law compared with Lim's five yearsdoes not necessarily demonstrate superior qualifications. Nichols, 81 F.3d at 42. BMC asserts that handling OEM agreements was a critical responsibility of the position. Consequently, BMC claims, because Lim's experience with OEM software transactions was directly on point for the specific needs of the Staff Legal Counsel position, and Moss simply lacked experience with the type of OEM software agreements for which the attorney hired would be responsible, he cannot show that he was clearly better qualified for the position than Lim. Moss argues that, contrary to BMC's assertions, he has extensive experience working on OEM transactions or similar OEM-type transactions. Beyond his own conclusory assertions, Moss advances no evidence that he has experience with OEM transactions. OEM refers to Original Equipment Manufacturer; in the software context an OEM agreement refers to an agreement under which a party licenses software from another company and resells that software as its own or as part of a larger software product it owns or licenses. Moss described his areas of principal expertise as IT outsourcing and systems integration. Although Moss claims that his areas of experience dealt with identical issues which BMC was required to address in handling the transactions that they labeled as `OEM agreements,' his deposition testimony regarding his OEM-type work experience was vague: he discussed his work in broad terms of contract, he had trouble with software-specific technical terminology, and he could not detail how his prior deals involved OEM-type work. He revealed his lack of familiarity with OEM transactions in the software context when he frankly admitted that in order to prepare for his deposition he pulled an OEM license agreement . . . just to see whatin a conventional setting, where the licensee was somebody situated similarly to BMC what they would consider the issues to be. . . I just looked it up on Google. I looked up OEM software licenses. [1] Moreover, Moss forthrightly stated in his deposition testimony that during his interview with Stallworth, [o]nce she went into the business about how the OEM was really the key to the deal, I made it very clear to her that OEM was not an area of specialty for me . . . . [2] He further stated that I [] hadn't spent time with the sole transaction being a deal that you could identify as a self-contained OEM licensing deal. [3] BMC's employment requisition form and job announcement also stated that, in addition to OEM agreements, the Staff Legal Counsel would be responsible for Alliance and Development Outsourcing agreements. Regarding the term alliance in the job announcement, Moss stated that: I didn't know what the heck it meant. . . . they use jargon all the time in the IT industryI wasn't sure what alliance meant. But to the extent it seemed to suggest [] more than one party on the same side of a transaction, where their interests are more or less aligned, yeah, I have done that many times. In the software development industry, according to Stallworth, alliance work is when you use a peer or a similar company's technology for testing and development, [or] compatibility testing. Sometimes it also has a marketing connotation. With respect to Development Outsourcing, Moss stated I don't know that there is such a concept, at least in my lexicon, as development outsourcing. Maybe it means something at BMC. But to me . . . development and outsourcing are two different concepts. . . . I took those not to be a combined term because, to me, that was almost gibberish. At BMC, Stallworth explained, a development outsourcing agreement is an agreement where you engage somebody else to take over your development function . . . the creation of software products. The fact that Moss's experience, however extensive, did not entail familiarity with OEM, Alliance, and Development Outsourcing agreements in the software contextthe specific transactions for which the Staff Legal Counsel would be responsiblewas relevant to the hiring decision. Odom, 3 F.3d at 846. Because Moss lacked experience with the three specific types of transactions that comprised the primary responsibilities of the Staff Legal Counsel, whereas Lim had been performing precisely those types of transactions in her prior job, Moss cannot show that he was clearly better qualified than Lim for the position. Although Moss' accomplishments and qualifications are unquestionably impressive, as this court has stated on numerous occasions: The ADEA was not intended to be a vehicle for judicial second-guessing of employment decisions nor was it intended to transform the courts into personnel managers. The ADEA cannot protect older employees from erroneous or even arbitrary personnel decisions, but only from decisions which are unlawfully motivated. Bienkowski v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1507-08 (5th Cir.1988).