Opinion ID: 1205070
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discharge of Performance Duty.

Text: In the Brief of the Cross-Appellants, Bell Lavalin urges this court to overturn the jury verdict which found that Conam's nonperformance of the contract was excused because of Bell Lavalin's breach of its mutual agreement to grant a time extension. [22] The thrust of its argument is that although a promise of a time extension and a winter shutdown was made and breached, public policy underlying construction subcontracts requires that the promise not be recognized as enforceable. [23] Conam replies that the grant of the time extension was not a modification but rather part of the existing contract. [24] It further argues that it had fulfilled all of the requirements for receiving an extension and that Bell Lavalin had conceded that Conam was entitled to one. In its reply brief, Bell Lavalin apparently abandons many of its earlier arguments and concedes that an enforceable promise to grant a time extension with a winter shutdown existed and was repudiated. Instead, Bell Lavalin argues that the breach was only a partial breach and that it was not sufficient justification for walking off the job. It cites the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 237, 241 (1979) as authority that only a material or total breach of a contract relieves a party of its duty of performance. It then sets out that the breach was not in fact material. According to Alaska Appellate Rule 212(c)(3), a reply brief may not raise contentions not previously raised in either the appellant's or appellee's briefs. Alaska R.App.P. 212(c)(3). Although, Bell Lavalin argues in its opening brief that generally the breach of this promise should not justify termination, [25] it raises the theory of partial and nonmaterial breach for the first time in its reply. [26] Thus, this court need not even consider the issue. Even if the argument is considered, it is unpersuasive. The jury was instructed on materiality and it is undisputed that the instruction was proper. The jury was instructed that termination is justified only in the event of a total breach. A total breach was defined for them as one which so substantially impairs the value of the contract to the injured party at the time of the breach, that material inconvenience or injuries will result if the injured party is forced to complete its performance and make a claim for damages. The jury was then given the same set of factors for determining totality which Bell Lavalin set out in its reply brief. Bell Lavalin has not put forward any evidence which indicates that the fair minded jurors could not differ on this issue. We thus have no reason to overturn the jury's verdict.