Opinion ID: 4266372
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The basics of next-friend standing.

Text: The Supreme Court considers next-friend standing an “alternative basis” for standing in federal courts. Id. at 161. Specifically, it has “long been an accepted basis for jurisdiction in certain circumstances.” Id. at 162. These “certain circumstances” are deeply rooted in history and narrowly limited to: (1) habeas corpus actions; and (2) “infants, other minors, and adult mental incompetents.” Id. at 163, 163 n.4. Next-friend standing allows a third-party to singularly advance a cause of action on another’s behalf. “A ‘next friend’ does not himself become a party to the . . . action in which he participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf person in the litigant’s position will have a right of action on the claim.”) (quoting Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721 n. (1990))). In this case, PETA does not (nor could it) allege either individual or thirdparty standing. It does not have any cognizable Article III injury for the alleged Copyright Act violations against Naruto. Hence, I do not further address either of these bases for standing. NARUTO V. SLATER 25 of the . . . real party in interest.” Id. at 163. To invoke nextfriend standing, the purported next friend must establish: (1) “an adequate explanation—such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability—why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action”; and (2) “the ‘next friend’ must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate, and it has been further suggested that a ‘next friend’ must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest.” Id. at 163–64 (internal citations omitted). I agree with the Majority that there is no question PETA did not allege—in any way—sufficient facts to establish it could be Naruto’s next friend.