Opinion ID: 2796318
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Harvey/Watkins Calls

Text: 10 See, e.g., Gethers v. United States, 684 A.2d 1266, 1271 (D.C. 1996) (“[T]he defense must establish a reasonable possibility that an actual person other than the defendant committed the crime or was otherwise responsible for it, not just a hypothetical, unidentified person who may have had a motive.”). 20 As related at the outset, insider Davenport gave important testimony for the prosecution describing the existence and motives of the Todd Place Crew including appellants at the relevant times, in particular their angry reaction to Foster’s murder and plan to retaliate against those held responsible, the TSC. The government sought to corroborate Davenport’s testimony partly by recorded conversations between unindicted co-conspirator Andre Harvey, in jail at the time, and Ismail Watkins, also a member of the TPC, that discussed the Foster shooting, Gary English’s resulting murder, additional actions Harvey might take inside jail as further retaliation, and generally the current “score” of violence between the rival crews stemming from the Foster killing and other “beefs.” The trial judge examined transcripts of the proffered recordings and admitted some conversations as statements by co-conspirators in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. The statements, she explained, involved “members of the conspiracy talking about the events on the outside, the violent events that . . . are the charged events in this case” – i.e., the “events comprising [Foster’s] death and other[s] . . . that are the beef between Todd Place and T Street” – “and plotting revenge, plotting acts against other T Street members both in jail and outside and keeping each other abreast of the events going on, both inside and outside the jail.” 21 Appellants Jenkins and Bates dispute the admissibility of the statements, contending that “a lot of” what Watkins reported to Harvey, and vice-versa, was “simple gossip” reporting events of which neither speaker had “direct knowledge,” so that much of their conversations was “double hearsay” with no foundation laid for the first “level” – the unwitnessed accounts, for example, of “the April 18 bailout [near the cemetery], including who ran and who got away” (Brief for Jenkins at 39).11 These appellants rightly do not dispute the general principle that statements by co-conspirators among themselves during and in furtherance of a conspiracy are admissible as non-hearsay. See Butler v. United States, 481 A.2d 431, 439 (D.C. 1984) (adopting Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d)(2)(E)). Nor do they question the evidence of Watkins’ and Harvey’s involvement in the alleged TPC conspiracy. Although appellants are right that the “in furtherance of” requirement is intended to “exclu[de] . . . statements that were casual conversation, idle gossip, or mere narratives of past events,” (Brian) Williams v. United States, 655 A.2d 310, 313 11 It might be thought unnecessary to consider this issue given the jury’s acquittal of appellants of conspiracy and rejection of vicarious liability, but appellants argue that the conversations were also prejudicial on the issue of retaliatory motive to commit the substantive crimes. 22 (D.C. 1995), ample authority supports the admission of statements “made [inter se] to keep conspirators abreast of an ongoing conspiracy’s activities . . . .” United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1535-36 (9th Cir. 1988); see United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1412-13 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (statements by conspirator detailing drug transactions and profits to participant in conspiracy were not “mere narrations” of remote events but rather statements close in time to the transactions that helped keep co-participant current on status of the conspiracy, hence were in furtherance of it).12 So long as statements further the conspiracy’s goals in this sense, courts considering the issue have rejected “double hearsay” or lack-of-personalknowledge objections to their admission. See United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1105-06 (6th Cir. 1984) (“Rule 801 (d)(2)(E) . . . exempts co-conspirator’s statements from the hearsay rule. The requirement that the declarant have personal knowledge of his statements in such a case is waived.”); United States v. Ammar, 12 And see United States v. McKay, 431 F.3d 1085, 1094 (8th Cir. 2005) (statement that was made to keep co-conspirator abreast of changes in the conspiracy that had taken place while he was in prison was a statement in furtherance of the conspiracy); United States v. Roberts, 14 F.3d 502, 515 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Statements made . . . to keep co-conspirators abreast of an ongoing conspiracy’s activities satisfy the ‘in furtherance’. . . requirement [under Rule 801 (d)(2)(E).”] (internal citation omitted)). 23 714 F.2d 238, 254 (3d Cir. 1983) (the drafters of the federal co-conspirator rule did not intend “the personal knowledge foundation requirement of Rule 602” to apply to “admissions (including co-conspirator statements) admissible under Rule 801 (d)(2)”); United States v. Cogwell, 486 F.2d 823, 832 n.5 (7th Cir. 1973). Having satisfied herself as a preliminary matter of the existence of the conspiracy and the participation of Watkins and Harvey in it, the trial judge properly exercised her discretion in admitting their statements keeping one another abreast of the TPC’s completed or planned retaliatory acts as well as efforts (such as the April 18 jettisoning of the guns) designed to cover the crew’s tracks.