Opinion ID: 2581736
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inadmissibility Of Evidence Adduced By The Movant Precluded Summary Judgment.

Text: The Kekas argue that the evidence set forth in or attached to Paranial's affidavit, by which the Credit Union sought to establish the Kekas' default and the amounts due on their loan, constituted inadmissible hearsay and, therefore, that there was no factual basis upon which the circuit court could legitimately enter summary judgment in favor of the Credit Union. We agree. [T]he rule in Hawaii is that `[a]n affidavit consisting of inadmissible hearsay cannot serve as a basis for awarding or denying summary judgment.' GE Capital Hawaii, Inc. v. Miguel, 92 Hawaii 236, 242, 990 P.2d 134, 140 (App.1999) (quoting Nakato v. Macharg, 89 Hawaii 79, 89, 969 P.2d 824, 834 (App.1998)) (some brackets added and some in original); Rodriguez v. Nishiki, 65 Haw. 430, 434 n. 3, 653 P.2d 1145, 1148 n. 3 (1982); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Haw. 522, 539, 543 P.2d 1356, 1367 (1975) (To the extent that the affidavits [do] not comply with [HRCP Rule 56(e),] they should be disregarded.). The facts of GE Capital are remarkably similar to those in the present matter. In an action by a mortgagee to foreclose on a loan secured by the debtor's residence, the defendants-mortgagors asserted a counterclaim for rescission, pursuant to TILA, based upon alleged nondisclosure and misrepresentation. The mortgagee's motion for summary judgment was supported by an affidavit of one of its officers, who asserted, on the basis of personal knowledge, that the mortgagors had failed, neglected, and refused to pay in accordance with their loan agreement and recited the amounts allegedly due. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reversed the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of the mortgagee on the ground that, by failing to attach sworn or certified copies of documents to which the affiant referred in his affidavit, the mortgagee had not met its initial burden of production as movant for summary judgment. The GE Capital court, in turn, relied on this court's decision in Pacific Concrete Federal Credit Union v. Kauanoe, 62 Haw. 334, 614 P.2d 936 (1980), in which we similarly reversed a summary judgment in favor of a creditor because the facts regarding the defendant-debtor's payment history, as set forth in an affidavit in support of the creditor's motion for summary judgment, were not properly before the court, inasmuch as the affidavit merely referred to a ledger and certain checks and vouchers without attaching certified or sworn copies of them to the affidavit. We held that HRCP Rule 56(e), see supra note 5, required that facts set forth in ... affidavits [supporting motions for summary judgment] be admissible in evidence. All papers referred to in the affidavits must also be attached and sworn to or certified. These requirements are mandatory.... [M]ere statements in affidavits do not authenticate exhibits referred to unless these exhibits are sworn to or certified. Pacific Concrete, 62 Haw. at 336-37, 614 P.2d at 938 (citation omitted). The only distinction between the affidavits deemed insufficient by the GE Capital and Pacific Concrete courts, on the one hand, and the Paranial affidavit in the present matter, on the other, is that Paranial did not even bother to identify the Credit Union's records on which he was relying, but merely asserted that he was personally familiar with the [Kekas'] payment history. Pursuant to HRCP Rule 56(c), however, affidavits in support of a motion for summary judgment shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Consequently, affidavits which state ultimate or conclusory facts or conclusions of law cannot be utilized in support of a motion for summary judgment. GECC Financial Corp. v. Jaffarian, 79 Hawai`i 516, 524-25, 904 P.2d 530, 538-39 (App.) (citing Miller v. Manuel, 9 Haw.App. 56, 66, 828 P.2d 286, 292 (App.1991)), modified on other grounds, 80 Hawaii 118, 905 P.2d 624 (1995); see also Miller, 9 Haw.App. at 66, 828 P.2d at 292 (Affidavits in support of a summary judgment motion are scrutinized to determine whether the facts they aver are admissible at trial and are made on the personal knowledge of the affiant.). Paranial's bald allegation that he was familiar with the Kekas' payment history does not satisfy the foregoing foundational requirement. Obviously, an affiant does not comply with the imperative of HRCP Rule 56(e) to produce and authenticate the records upon which he or she is relying merely by omitting any reference to them in the affidavit. See Cole Taylor Bank v. Corrigan, 230 Ill.App.3d 122, 172 Ill.Dec. 114, 595 N.E.2d 177, 181-82 (1992) (holding that, where bank officer's affidavit essentially consisted of a summary of unnamed records at the bank, unaccompanied by records themselves and unsupported by facts establishing basis of officer's knowledge, foundation was lacking for admission of officer's opinion regarding amount due on loan); cf. Kam Fui Trust v. Brandhorst, 77 Hawaii 320, 327-28, 884 P.2d 383, 390-91 (App.1994) (ruling summary of contents of voluminous writing to be admissible, pursuant to Hawaii Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 1006 (1993), only when underlying documents are themselves admissible, and failure to make underlying documents available to objecting party for examination renders summary inadmissible). Absent the requisite foundation, Paranial's statements regarding the Kekas' default and the amount of their indebtedness were inadmissible, and the circuit court erred in relying upon them in granting summary judgment in the Credit Union's favor. [6]