Opinion ID: 1611371
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: did the trial court err in denying the motion to quash the jury panel because of the prejudicial effect of the state's opening statement before voir dire examination of the jury?

Text: After voir dire by the court as to the death penalty, the court stood in recess. Early on the second day of voir dire, the court told the prospective jury panel that the attorneys were always afforded an opportunity to make a brief opening statement prior to their engaging in voir dire examination. Such opening statements did not preclude opening statements on beginning their cases in chief. After the State's voir dire examination, Woodward moved the court to quash the entire jury panel because of the district attorney's statements of what expected proof would be offered of the three crimes against this defendant. At least three or four jurors, possibly more, indicated that they had changed their position on capital punishment, as two of them phrased it, from the evidence they had heard today. Both the court and district attorney had admonished the venirepersons several times that the district attorney's remarks were not evidence and that the State has the burden of proof. The appellant argues that the court departed from established procedure in allowing the State to make an alleged inflammatory opening statement prior to voir dire. The defendant asserts that the departure from standard procedure caused the jury panel to be biased, prejudiced and unfair to the appellant and, therefore, constituted reversible error. Opening statements prior to voir dire were a regular practice of this trial court, and Woodward made no objection to the practice when it was announced. Most of those questioned indicated that their opinion had not actually changed, but only that they more clearly understood the proceedings and could vote for the death penalty if warranted. The court noted and overruled the motion to quash the jury panel. Two rules of procedure in trying criminal cases supply guidance in this area. The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement to the jury, confining the statement to the facts he expects to prove. Unif.Crim.R.Cir.Ct.Prac. 5.11. Attorneys will direct remarks to the jury panel only during voir dire, opening and closing statements. Unif.Crim.R.Cir.Ct.Prac. 5.05. Woodward argues that the word jury means the jury which has been impanelled and selected to try the case and not the prospective jury. Even so, the rule does not exclude some type of opening statement during voir dire. The crucial point is that the prosecuting attorney must confine his statement to the facts he expects to prove. Finally, the voir dire examination is largely a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge... . Murphy v. State, 246 So.2d 920, 922 (Miss. 1971). The appellant admits that there was no departure from statutory procedure, and it is this Court's opinion that the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice were not violated by the opening statement. The opening statement was confined to the facts which the prosecuting attorney expected to prove, and the prosecuting attorney's remarks were within the permissible range of voir dire examination. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in permitting such opening statement. This Court has admonished the trial judge [to] conduct his own independent examination of the jurors to determine whether they can follow the testimony, the instructions, and their juror's oath and return a verdict of guilty even though such a verdict could result in the imposition of the death penalty... . Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 881 (Miss. 1987). See Gray v. State, 472 So.2d 409, 421 (Miss. 1985), rev'd Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987). In the instant case, the trial judge did conduct his own independent examination and kept control of the voir dire examinations of the State and the defendant. It is this Court's opinion that the trial court should be affirmed on this issue.