Opinion ID: 1159635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: application of rcw 42.17.680(3) to labor organizations

Text: In this case, certain claims of Appellants against Respondent Education Association were dismissed under Court Rule (CR) 12(b)(6) and summary judgment was granted in favor of Respondent School Districts. Dismissal of a claim under CR 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo and is appropriate only if `it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that no facts exist that would justify recovery.' [55] This Court reviews an order of summary judgment de novo and engages in the same inquiry as the trial court. [56] In doing this, the Court will affirm a summary judgment order only if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file demonstrate there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [57] Appellants claim the WEA, in its capacity as a labor organization, is an other person or entity responsible for the disbursement of funds in payment of wages or salaries under RCW 42.17.680(3). They claim the terms person [58] and entity [59] are broadly defined and should be interpreted to include labor organizations. [60] The WEA concedes it is a person or entity but argues it is not responsible for the disbursement of funds in payment of wages or salaries to its members. [61] Appellants respond that the statute should be broadly construed to effectuate its purposes, which they claim were to limit the taking of salaries or wages for political purposes opposed by an employee-member and to prevent the consolidation of political power in large organizations such as labor organizations. [62] The WEA counters that the statute is not ambiguous, and thus an inquiry into legislative intent is not necessary. But this case does require interpretation of RCW 42.17.680(3) as a matter of law. [63] It has not previously been interpreted by this Court. [64] The basic rules of statutory construction applicable to legislative enactments also apply to initiatives. [65] The objective of statutory interpretation is to execute the intent of the Legislature, which must be primarily determined from the language of the statute itself. [66] When words in a statute are plain and unambiguous, this Court is required to assume the Legislature meant what it said and apply the statute as written. [67] Section 8 of Initiative 134 was adopted by popular vote and later codified in identical language as RCW 42.17.680(3). Subsection (3) prohibits those responsible for disbursement of funds in payment of employee wages from withholding or diverting a portion of those funds for political contributions. The prohibition of subsection (3) is directed to an employer or other person or entity responsible for the disbursement of funds in payment of wages or salaries. The language of subsection (3) does include the words labor organization, but does not characterize the organization as an employer or other person or entity paying the wages or salaries of employees. A review of the entire statute indicates several specific references to labor organizations. In particular, the phrase employer or labor organizations appears in both subsections (1) and (2), but the same words employer or labor organizations do not appear in subsection (3), although subsection (3) does refer to employer or labor organizations discrimination. [68] In this State general membership dues of a labor organization may be used as a source for political contributions. [69] The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, [70] 2 U.S.C. § 441b, to the contrary, prohibits use of corporate funds and labor organization funds for direct political contributions to federal election campaigns. The federal statute is clear and unequivocal in its language. Appellants' argument that subsection (3) of the Washington statute, RCW 42.17.680, was intended to achieve a similar result is not supported by citation to any authority. Appellants have not identified any ambiguity in RCW 42.17.680 as it relates to labor organizations. Where there is no ambiguity, the meaning of a statute is derived from its language alone. [71] Where a statute is not ambiguous, it is not necessary to resort to legislative history to interpret it. [72] General rules of statutory construction require avoidance of unlikely, absurd, or strained results. [73] This Court does not ignore clear statutory language and will not strain to find an ambiguity where the language of the statute is clear. [74] The plain words in RCW 42.17.680(3), an employer or other person or entity responsible for the disbursement of funds in payment of wages or salaries, does not include labor organizations. Nor are they included in the identical wording of Initiative 134, section 8(3).