Opinion ID: 1587246
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Death qualification question.

Text: During individual voir dire, the trial judge death qualified the jury panel by making the following inquiry of each prospective juror: This is a capital murder case. If you find the defendant guilty of murder, there are five ranges of penalty you'll be instructed to considernot less than twenty nor more than fifty years, life, life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years, life without the possibility of parole, and death. If you determine under the facts of this case, and the instructions of the Court, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of murder, can you consider the entire range of penalties provided by the statutes of the Commonwealth of Kentucky as I have just outlined them to you? [Emphasis added.] Appellants assert that the emphasized language should have been guilty of aggravated murder, not guilty of murder, because death, life without parole, and life without parole for twenty-five years, are available penalties only if the jury also finds beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an aggravating circumstance. KRS 532.025(3). Appellants do not assert that this fact caused some jurors to disclaim an ability to consider death as a penalty for mere murder and, thus, to be excused for cause as not death qualified. Murder is a capital offense, KRS 507.020(2), and the range of penalties for a capital offense are those recited in the trial judge's inquiry. KRS 532.030(1). Rather, Appellants assert that jurors who would state that they could consider the minimum penalty for a mere murder might not be able to consider that penalty for an aggravated murder. Either way, no error occurred. The leading United States Supreme Court cases on death qualification, i.e., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980), Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), and Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986), all address the circumstances under which a potential juror may be excused for cause because of the juror's bias against imposition of the death penalty. Witherspoon held that strikes for cause could not be employed to empanel a jury predisposed to return a verdict of death, 391 U.S. at 521-23, 88 S.Ct. at 1776-77; and that, [u]nless a venireman states unambiguously that he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment no matter what the trial might reveal, id. at 515 n. 9, 88 S.Ct. at 1773 n. 9, it cannot be assumed that such is that person's position simply because the juror expressed reservations or scruples about the death penalty. Id. Although Witherspoon also states [t]hat the most that can be demanded of a venireman in this regard is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law, id. at 522 n. 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1777 n. 21 (emphasis in original), Adams, supra , explained that  Witherspoon is not a ground for challenging any prospective juror. It is rather a limitation on the State's power to exclude. 448 U.S. at 47-48, 100 S.Ct. at 2528. [T]he proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment ... is whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Witt, supra, at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852, quoting Adams, supra, at 45, 100 S.Ct. at 2526. If so, the removal of so-called ` Witherspoon -excludables' serves the State's entirely proper interest in obtaining a single jury that could impartially decide all the issues in [a death penalty] case. McCree, supra, at 180, 106 S.Ct. at 1768. In Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), the Court expanded this principle to require that a jury be life qualified by excluding those jurors who would automatically impose death upon a finding of guilt. A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do. Indeed, because such a juror has already formed an opinion on the merits, the presence or absence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances is entirely irrelevant to such a juror. Id. at 729, 112 S.Ct. at 2229. No jurisdiction other than Kentucky has ever held that a juror is disqualified simply because he or she cannot consider imposition of the minimum authorized sentence for conviction of an offense for which death is an authorized penalty. That proposition first entered our jurisprudence via obiter dictum in Grooms v. Commonwealth, Ky., 756 S.W.2d 131, 137 (1988). Grooms anticipated the holding in Morgan, supra , by holding that it was reversible error not to excuse for cause a juror who favors the death penalty to the exclusion of all other penalties as punishment for intentional murder. 756 S.W.2d at 137. However, Grooms went on to say that a juror should be excused for cause if he would be unable in any case, no matter how extenuating the circumstances may be, to consider the imposition of the minimum penalty prescribed by law. Id. Giving corporeality to the Grooms dictum, Morris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 766 S.W.2d 58 (1989), held that: [T]he lower court should have informed the jury there are four penalties for the capital offense of intentional murderviz, death, life without parole or probation for 25 years, life, or a term of not less than 20 years. KRS 532.030. The jury should be asked the simple question If you determine under the instructions of the court beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of intentional murder, could you consider the entire range of penalties provided by statutes of this Commonwealth as outlined to you? Id. at 60. Of course, that is almost verbatim the question asked by the trial judge in this case, except that the range of penalties for a capital offense now includes life without parole. KRS 532.030(1). Although Morris also held that [b]oth the Commonwealth and the defendant are entitled to a panel of jurors who will consider the entire range of punishment, id. at 60, Davis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 795 S.W.2d 942 (1990), explained that while [i]t would be a better practice for a trial judge conducting death penalty voir dire pursuant to RCr 9.38 [1] to inquire about a juror's ability to consider the full range of penalties in capital cases, the requirement is satisfied if defense counsel is afforded the opportunity to do so. Id. at 952. That is in accord with Witt, supra , that [a]s with any other trial situation where an adversary wishes to exclude a juror because of bias, then, it is the adversary seeking exclusion who must demonstrate, through questioning, that the potential juror lacks impartiality. 469 U.S. at 423, 105 S.Ct. at 852. Here, neither defense counsel was precluded from questioning any potential juror with respect to that juror's ability to consider imposition of the minimum penalty for aggravated murder. Indeed, counsel asked the following question of several prospective jurors: Assume in this case that we get to the sentencing phase. That means that you've already found the defendant guilty of murder and an aggravating circumstance, like a burglary or a robbery or a rape or something like that. If that's the case, can you give a serious and honest consideration to a minimum sentence of twenty years? (In fact, if a defendant is found guilty of murder and burglary, robbery or rape, the minimum sentence would be thirty years, not twenty years (twenty years for murder, KRS 532.030(1), plus ten years for the class B felony, KRS 532.060(2)(b)). Regardless, the trial judge's death penalty inquiry did not misstate the law or mislead the jury. Any perceived deficiency was cured by permitting defense counsel to further clarify the inquiry).