Opinion ID: 3032640
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Any other circumstance which extenuates the

Text: gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.14 14 To remain consistent with the text of the statute and the Supreme Court’s terminology in Boyde, we will refer to this factor as “factor (k)” or “unadorned factor (k).” BELMONTES v. BROWN 8335 The judge also gave the jury half of a supplemental instruc- tion requested by the defense. The part that was given read: [T]he mitigating circumstances which I have read for your consideration are given to you merely as examples of some of the factors that you may take into account as reasons for deciding not to impose a death penalty or a death sentence upon Mr. Bel- montes. You should pay careful attention to each of these factors. Any one of them standing alone may support a decision that death is not the appropriate punishment in this case. The other half of the instruction, which the trial judge refused to give, stated: “[Y]ou should not limit your consideration of mitigating circumstances to these specific factors. You may also consider any other circumstances . . . as reasons for not imposing the death sentence.” After several hours of deliberations, the jury sent the judge a note asking, “What happens if we cannot reach a verdict?” and “Can the majority rule on life imprisonment?” The jury was brought back to the courtroom, and the judge reread a portion of the jury instructions, emphasizing that “all 12 jurors must agree, if you can.” The jurors asked again what would happen if they could not agree, but the court refused to tell them. The judge asked the jury: “Do you think if I allow you to continue to discuss the matter and for you to go over the instructions again with one another, that the possibility of making a decision is there?” The jurors agreed that they needed more time to deliberate. They then asked the following series of questions: JUROR HERN: The statement about the aggravation and mitigation of the circumstances, now, that was the listing? 8336 BELMONTES v. BROWN THE COURT: That was the listing, yes, ma’am. JUROR HERN: Of those certain factors we were to decide one or the other and then balance the sheet? THE COURT: That is right. It is a balancing pro- cess. Mr. Meyer? JUROR MEYER: A specific question, would this be an either/or situation, not a one, if you cannot the other [sic]? THE COURT: No. It is not that. JUROR MEYER: It is an either/or situation? THE COURT: Exactly. If you can make that either/ or decision. If you cannot, I will discharge you. JUROR HAILSTONE: Could I ask a question? I don’t know if it is permissible. Is it possible that he could have psychiatric treatment during this time? THE COURT: That is something you cannot con- sider in making your decision.