Opinion ID: 451608
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Violation of the National Environmental Policy Act

Text: 51 The purpose of NEPA is to assure that federal agencies are fully aware of the impact of their decisions on the environment. Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585 (9th Cir.1981). Thus, section 102(2) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4332(2)(C) (1982), requires that all agencies of the Federal Government 52 include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-- 53 (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 54 (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, 55 (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 56 (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 57 (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 58 Appellant argues that the Service violated NEPA in several ways: (A) in failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement, (B) in issuing an EIR/EA which failed to discuss all reasonable alternatives; and (C) in failing to prepare a worst-case scenario based on new information. Appellant's attempt to raise an issue of material fact with regard to the Service's compliance with the requirements of NEPA is without merit. 59
60 We review the Service's actions concerning the NEPA provisions at issue in this case under a reasonableness standard. See Foundation for North American Wild Sheep v. United States Department of Agriculture, 681 F.2d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir.1982); California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767 (9th Cir.1982). 61 B. Issuance of the Permit did not require preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement in addition to the EIR/EA. 62 NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for all major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4332(2)(C) (1982). An Environmental Impact Statement must be prepared when substantial questions are raised on whether a project may cause significant degradation of the environment. City and County of San Francisco, 615 F.2d at 500 (quoting City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673 (9th Cir.1975) ). All parties agree that the project at issue involves major federal action. The question is whether the Service properly determined that the project would not significantly degrade the environment. An agency's decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement should be upheld if reasonable. Foundation for North American Wild Sheep, 681 F.2d at 1177. City and County of San Francisco, 615 F.2d at 500. A court should not substitute its judgment for that of an agency if the agency's decision was fully informed and well-considered. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 1219, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978). Our review of the administrative record leads us to conclude that the Service's determination that the project would not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and that, therefore, no Environmental Impact Statement was required, was reasonable. 63 Appellant relies primarily on its methodological criticisms of the Biological Study in arguing that the Service's failure to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement was unreasonable. Essentially, Appellant argues that because the data base upon which the Service relied was faulty, its EIR/EA does not satisfy NEPA's requirement that information sufficient to enable the Service to make a rational decision must be disclosed in the EIR/EA. We conclude that appellant's contention is without merit. 64 NEPA does not require that we decide whether an EIR is based on the best scientific methodology available, nor does NEPA require us to resolve disagreements among various scientists as to methodology. See Hart and Miller Islands Area Environmental Group, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the U.S. Army, 505 F.Supp. 732, 755 (D.Md.1980); Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 510 F.Supp. 1186, 1190-91 (D.D.C.), affirmed 685 F.2d 678 (D.C.Cir.1982). Our task is simply to ensure that the procedure followed by the Service resulted in a reasoned analysis of the evidence before it, and that the Service made the evidence available to all concerned. Save Lake Washington v. Frank, 641 F.2d 1330, 1337 (9th Cir.1981); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 472 (9th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961, 94 S.Ct. 1979, 40 L.Ed.2d 312 (1974). 65 The Service, in the present case, sought out and considered extensive comments on the Biological Study during the public comment period and afterward, and incorporated these comments into its Permit Findings and final Plan. Because the Service was unaware of appellant's specific field study criticisms before making its decision, we certainly cannot fault the Service for failing to address these criticisms. 66 Appellant next contends that an immense controversy surrounded the Permit's issuance and compares this case to Foundation for North American Wild Sheep, 681 F.2d at 1182, in which we found that the action involved was precisely the type of controversial action that required an Environmental Impact Statement. These two cases are not analogous, however. In Foundation for North American Wild Sheep, the court referred to the numerous responses from conservationists, biologists, and other knowledgeable individuals, all highly critical of the EA and all disputing the EA's conclusion.... Id. 67 In the present case, quite to the contrary, virtual agreement exists among local, state, and federal government officials, private parties, and local environmentalists on the development of the Mountain and on the content of the EIR/EA. Only appellant and its two experts are critical of the Biological Study on which the development plans and the EIR/EA are based. In fact, the extensive coordination and agreement between the state and federal government is a factor supporting the Service's decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement. As we stated in Goodman Group, Inc. v. Dishroom, 679 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.1982): 68 While the foregoing discussion suffices to demonstrate that the agency did not err in its interpretation of NEPA, a further significant factor in support of the agency's action should be noted. HUD worked in concert with local officials and acted consistently with local policies on land use. We have specifically recognized such compliance is a factor pointing toward the validity of a conclusion and that there is no significant impact on the environment. Where a federal project conforms to existing land use patterns, zoning, or local plans, such conformity is evidence supporting a finding of no significant impact. Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d at 861. 69 Id. at 186 (emphasis added). 70 Finally, courts have permitted the effect of mitigation measures to be considered in determining whether preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement is necessary. Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 860 (9th Cir.1982); City and County of San Francisco, 615 F.2d at 501. Contrary to appellant's assertions, therefore, the mitigation measures at the heart of the Plan seem to comply with the strict standard set forth in Cabinet Mountains Wilderness, 685 F.2d at 682. In that case, the D.C. Circuit held that an Environmental Impact Statement is not required when specific mitigation measures ... completely compensate for any possible adverse environmental impacts stemming from the original proposal.... 685 F.2d at 682 (emphasis added). As previously discussed, the Plan's mitigation measures include extensive land dedications, a permanent habitat conservation and enhancement program, highly restrictive development and construction controls, interim and permanent funding for the habitat protection program, and measures to ensure the cooperation of all government agencies having jurisdiction of the area. The Service concluded from these mitigation measures that the Permit and the Plan would be likely to enhance, not reduce, the chances for survival of the endangered species including the Mission Blue butterfly. 71 Even if the mitigation measures in the present case would not completely compensate for all adverse environmental impacts, this shortcoming would not be detrimental. In this circuit, so long as significant measures are undertaken to mitigate the project's effects, they need not completely compensate for adverse environmental impacts. See Preservation Coalition, 667 F.2d at 860. 72 In light of the foregoing, we find that the Service acted reasonably in not issuing an Environmental Impact Statement in the present case. The Service conducted a thorough analysis of the proposed action and imposed specific mitigation measures. For us to overturn the Service's decision would present an unjustifiable intrusion into the administrative process. See Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears, 685 F.2d at 684 (citation omitted). 73 C. The Environmental Impact Report/Environmental Assessment adequately discusses reasonable alternatives to the proposed action. 74 NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare a detailed statement ... on ... alternatives to the proposed action.... 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4332(2)(C)(iii) (1982). In addition, section 4332(2)(E) directs agencies specifically to study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources. Appellant contends that because the Service did not conduct a full environmental disclosure through preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement, the Service failed to completely discuss the role of alternatives to the Project. 75 An agency need only set forth those alternatives necessary to permit a reasoned choice. California v. Block, 690 F.2d at 767; Life of the Land, 485 F.2d at 472. The EIR/EA listed various alternatives to issuance of the Permit, including those of no development, more limited development, and public acquisition of all private land on the Mountain. 76 Appellant's primary argument concerning alternatives is that the EIR/EA did not adequately consider the alternative of developing the Saddle Area which lacks the biological value of certain of the other areas now proposed for development. 77 The EIR/EA did contain a brief discussion on the alternate development of the Saddle Area, and rejected it. The Saddle Area contains significant environmental resources which the County apparently wishes to preserve. The County considered and rejected Visitacion's development of the Saddle in 1976, which resulted in Visitacion's donation of its Saddle lands to the County and the State. Moreover, the Saddle Area allegedly contains unique wetlands and endangered plants, and its development could meet with stiff environmental opposition. NEPA does not demand a full discussion of land use alternatives whose implementation is deemed remote and speculative. Life of the Land, 485 F.2d at 472. See also Maryland Wildlife Federation v. Dole, 747 F.2d 229, 241 (4th Cir.1984) (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 551, 98 S.Ct. at 1215) (A detailed statement of alternatives will not 'be found wanting simply because the agency failed to include every alternative device and thought conceivable by the mind of man.' ). 78 D. A worst-case scenario is not warranted in the present case. 79 Appellant contends that NEPA requires the EIR/EA to contain a worst case analysis. 80 A worst-case analysis entails weighing the need for a proposed action against the worst possible consequences of such action. NEPA requires a worst case analysis when the information relevant to adverse impacts is essential ... and is not known and the overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant or ... the information ... is important and the means to obtain it are not known.... Save our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir.1984); 40 C.F.R. Sec. 1502.22 (1982). 81 We have interpreted this regulation as follows: 82 The purpose of the analysis is to carry out NEPA's mandate for full disclosure to the public of the potential consequences of agency decisions, and to cause agencies to consider those potential consequences when acting on the basis of scientific uncertainties or gaps in available information. The analysis is formulated on the basis of available information, using reasonable projections of the worst possible consequences of a proposed action. 83 Save our Ecosystems, 747 F.2d at 1244-45 (quoting 46 Fed.Reg. 18032 (Monday, March 3, 1981) ). 84 In the present case, the Service obtained the impact information it needed from the Biological Study and Plan, and included it in the EIR/EA. This information helped to inform the Service and fostered extensive public participation. 85 Moreover, the fact that the staged development of the Mountain calls for corresponding staged reconsideration of environmental impacts under the Plan, as well as for possible revocation or suspension of the Permit, further supports our conclusion that the Service acted reasonably in determining that a worst case analysis was not necessary in the present case. See Village of False Pass, 733 F.2d at 614-616.