Opinion ID: 4561262
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Laskar Received a Favorable Termination.

Text: The officials argue that Laskar did not receive a favorable termination. They explain that several of our sister circuits define favorable terminations as those that “indicate the innocence of the accused.” Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, 816 F.3d 645, 651 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Jordan v. Town of Waldoboro, 943 F.3d 532, 545–46 (1st Cir. 2019); Lanning v. City of Glens Falls, 908 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 2018); Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 383 (3d Cir. 2002)); Salley v. Myers, No. 19-6374, 2020 WL 4664808, at –4 (4th Cir. Aug. 10, 2020); Jones v. Clark Cnty., 959 F.3d 748, 763–64 (6th Cir. 2020); Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004). But cf. Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding that the favorable-termination requirement does not apply to a claim for unconstitutional pretrial detention). Laskar cannot satisfy the favorable-termination element, they contend, because the 9 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 10 of 62 trial court dismissed the prosecution against him as untimely, which does not suggest that he was innocent of the charges facing him. This argument requires us to decide whether a termination must contain evidence of a plaintiff’s innocence to be favorable. We have held that a claim of malicious prosecution accrues when the prosecution against the plaintiff terminates in his favor. See Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 585–86 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389–90 (2007). We have also held that a prosecutor’s unilateral dismissal of charges against a plaintiff constitutes a favorable termination. See Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1005–06 (11th Cir. 1998). But the details of the favorable-termination requirement, including whether a termination must suggest a plaintiff’s innocence, otherwise remain unsettled. This question implicates our “two-step approach to ‘defining the contours and prerequisites of a § 1983 claim.’” Williams, 965 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 920 (2017)). We must first look to the commonlaw principles that were “well settled” when Congress enacted section 1983. Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1726 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 920. “After identifying the relevant common-law rule, we must consider whether that rule is compatible with the constitutional provision at issue.” Williams, 965 F.3d 1159–60. 10 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 11 of 62 Because the tort of malicious prosecution is the common-law analogue to the constitutional violation that Laskar alleges, see id., we examine the favorabletermination element of malicious prosecution as it existed when Congress enacted section 1983 in 1871. We then consider whether the relevant common-law rule is compatible with the Fourth Amendment. At common law, the favorable-termination requirement ensured that plaintiffs could not “recover in the [civil] action, and yet be afterwards convicted on the original prosecution.” Fisher v. Bristow (1779) 99 Eng. Rep. 140, 140; 1 Dougl. 215, 215. Although the predecessor to malicious prosecution, the writ of conspiracy, required the plaintiff to prove that a petit jury had acquitted him, see Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 143 (6th ed. 1680); Hurlestone v. Glaseour (1587) 75 Eng. Rep. 988, 988; Gould. 51, 51 (Star Chamber), English courts relaxed this requirement for the common-law tort of malicious prosecution. For example, they held that the favorable-termination element did not apply when the relevant proceedings against the plaintiff were ex parte because the plaintiff had no opportunity to secure a favorable termination. See Steward v. Gromett (1859) 141 Eng. Rep. 788, 793–95; 7 Com. B.R. 191, 203–07. Additionally, the meaning of “favorable termination” encompassed more than jury acquittals. See 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries  (“[A]n action for a malicious prosecution may be founded on such an indictment whereon no 11 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 12 of 62 acquittal can be; as if it be rejected by the grand jury, or be coram non judice, or be insufficiently drawn.”); see also, e.g., Chambers v. Robinson (1725) 93 Eng. Rep. 787, 787; 2 Strange 691, 691–92. Indeed, plaintiffs could satisfy the requirement with terminations that did not support their innocence. Dowell v. Beningfield (1841) 174 Eng. Rep. 384, 384–85, 388; Carr. & Marsh. 8, 8–9, 15 (conviction by a court that lacked jurisdiction); Pierce v. Street (1832) 110 Eng. Rep. 142, 143; 3 B. & Ad. 397, 399 (dismissal for want of prosecution). American courts likewise used the favorable-termination requirement to prevent plaintiffs from attacking criminal proceedings that either were ongoing or had vindicated the defendant’s accusations. See Martin L. Newell, A Treatise on the Law of Malicious Prosecution, False Imprisonment, and the Abuse of Legal Process 331 (Chi., Callaghan & Co. 1892). Accordingly, plaintiffs could not prevail when the prosecutions against them remained pending, see, e.g., Bacon v. Waters, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 400, 401–02 (1861); Bacon v. Townsend, 6 Barb. 426, 428–29 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1849), juries convicted them, see, e.g., Griffis v. Sellars, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 315, 315 (1838), or they compromised with their accusers and admitted guilt to end the prosecution, see, e.g., Clark v. Everett, 2 Grant 416, 417 (Pa. 1853). But like their English counterparts, American plaintiffs could prevail without a favorable termination when the relevant proceedings against them were ex parte. See, e.g., Swensgaard v. Davis, 23 N.W. 543, 543 12 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 13 of 62 (Minn. 1885); see also Fortman v. Rottier, 8 Ohio St. 548, 552–53 (1858) (applying this rule in the context of a civil prosecution). The clear majority of American courts did not limit favorable terminations to those that suggested the accused’s innocence. Only the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the favorable-termination requirement turned on evidence of a plaintiff’s innocence. Rounds v. Humes, 7 R.I. 535, 537 (1863) (requiring, “with reluctance,” that the termination “furnish prima facie evidence that the action was without foundation”) (quoting Wilkinson v. Howel (1830) 173 Eng. Rep. 1236, 1236; 1 M. & M. 495, 496 (dicta)). Elsewhere, plaintiffs could prevail even when the termination of the prosecutions against them did not bear on the merits, including when a court dismissed the prosecution after the accuser failed to appear, see, e.g., Fay v. O’Neill, 36 N.Y. 11, 13 (1867), failed to file an indictment, see, e.g., Murray v. Lackey, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 368, 368–69 (1818), or abandoned the prosecution, see, e.g., Driggs v. Burton, 44 Vt. 124, 143–44 (1871); Brown v. Randall, 36 Conn. 56, 61–63 (1869); Page v. Cushing, 38 Me. 523, 527 (1854); Chapman v. Woods, 6 Blackf. 504, 505–06 (Ind. 1843); Sayles v. Briggs, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 421, 425–26 (1842); Yocum v. Polly, 40 Ky. (1 B. Mon.) 358, 359 (1841); Burhans v. Sanford, 19 Wend. 417, 418 (N.Y. 1838); Cotton v. Wilson, Minor 203, 203 (Ala. 1824). 13 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 14 of 62 Many States also defined the favorable-termination element without regard to a plaintiff’s innocence. For example, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the dismissal of a prosecution at an accuser’s request was a favorable termination even though “the want of probable cause [was] not spread upon the record.” Chapman, 6 Blackf. at 505. The only requirement, the court reasoned, was that “the original prosecution, wherever instituted, is at an end.” Id. at 506. New York’s highest court agreed and concluded that “the technical prerequisite” of a favorable termination “is only that the particular prosecution be disposed of in such a manner that [it] cannot be revived, and the prosecutor must be put to a new one.” Clark v. Cleveland, 6 Hill 344, 347 (N.Y. 1844); see also Fay, 36 N.Y. at 13. And when one accuser contended that the underlying prosecution must end with a judicial finding that probable cause did not exist, the Iowa Supreme Court held that “nothing” about the favorable-termination element required the court in the underlying prosecution to find “any precise matter in a certain form.” Paukett v. Livermore, 5 Iowa 277, 282 (1857). Other courts of last resort endorsed similar standards. See Thomas v. De Graffenreid, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 143, 145 (1819) (“[A] person may have his action after a bill rejected by the grand jury, or even where no bill has been preferred, if there is a final end of the prosecution and the party discharged.”); Murray, 6 N.C. at 369 (holding that a plaintiff could proceed when he established that “proceedings are at end and cannot be revived”). 14 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 15 of 62 The number of States that defined the favorable-termination requirement in a similar manner grew in the years soon after Congress enacted section 1983. Decrying the “great injustice” of “refus[ing] a remedy for such a wanton injury . . . on a ground which is purely technical,” the Michigan Supreme Court held that an action for malicious prosecution could continue “whenever the particular proceeding has come to an end, so that the prisoner can be no further pursued upon it.” Stanton v. Hart, 27 Mich. 539, 540 (1873). The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that “[e]xcept to confer on the accused the capacity to sue, the manner in which the prosecution terminated is irrelevant.” Apgar v. Woolston, 43 N.J.L. 57, 59 (1881). The Supreme Courts of New Hampshire and Kansas agreed. See Woodman v. Prescott, 22 A. 456, 456–57 (N.H. 1891) (“The law requires only that the particular prosecution complained of shall have been terminated, and not that the liability of the plaintiff to prosecution for the same offense shall have been extinguished . . . .”); Marbourg v. Smith, 11 Kan. 554, 562 (1873) (“[I]t is not necessary that there should have been a trial upon the merits of the alleged malicious prosecution. If the action has been dismissed . . . that is sufficient, if the action has not been commenced again.”); see also Kennedy v. Holladay, 25 Mo. App. 503, 517 (1887) (“The essential thing is, that the prosecution, on which the civil action is predicated, should have come to an end. How it came to an end can 15 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 16 of 62 make no difference to the rights of the person injured thereby.”). The Supreme Court of Nebraska captured the dominant view of its sister States: [T]he weight of authority, as well as of reason, is in favor of the position that the right of action is complete whenever the particular prosecution be disposed of in such a manner that [it] cannot be revived, and the prosecutor, if he proceeds further, will be put to a new one. Casebeer v. Drahoble, 14 N.W. 397, 397 (Neb. 1882) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even Hawai‘i, which was then an independent kingdom and not a state or even a territory, followed the same rule, despite the dissent’s suggestion to the contrary. McCrosson v. Cummings, 5 Haw. 391, 392 (1885) (“The action for malicious prosecution lies whenever the proceeding has come to an end, whatever may be the form of its termination.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). To be sure, States did not adopt “perfectly reconcilable” approaches to the favorable-termination requirement, see 1 Francis Hilliard, The Law of Torts or Private Wrongs 475 (Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 4th ed. 1874), but their disputes reflected concerns of finality, not whether evidence of innocence existed. For example, courts split over whether a plaintiff received a favorable termination when a grand jury returned a no bill but the trial court did not dismiss the indictment. Some courts refused to allow the plaintiff to proceed because the plaintiff did not receive “a legal discharge” and “a subsequent grand jury might . . . find a bill upon the same complaint.” Knott v. Sargent, 125 Mass. 95, 98 (1878); accord, e.g., Thomas, 11 S.C.L. at 146. Other courts held that the plaintiff 16 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 17 of 62 received a favorable termination when the prosecution had functionally ended even though a grand jury might still issue an indictment on the same complaint. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Woodruff, 22 Ga. 237, 245 (1857). These competing conceptions of an “end” to prosecution created similar splits over whether a nolle prosequi—a prosecutor’s record notice that he was ending the prosecution—was a favorable termination, see Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts 186 & nn.6–7 (Chi., Callaghan & Co. 1880) (collecting decisions), and over whether a discharge pursuant to writ of habeas corpus was a favorable termination, compare Walker v. Martin, 43 Ill. 508, 512–13 (1867) (holding that a plaintiff who was discharged on a habeas writ did not receive a favorable termination because he did not prove that the prosecution itself had ended), with Zebley v. Storey, 12 A. 569, 571–72 (Pa. 1888) (holding that a habeas writ “effectually puts an end to the prosecution . . . although a new charge may be afterwards made” (internal quotation marks omitted)). States instead channeled questions about the effect of the termination of underlying proceedings into other elements of the tort—ordinarily the probablecause requirement. Some terminations—convictions or settlements in which the defendant admitted guilt—were fatal to a plaintiff’s ability to establish the absence of probable cause. See, e.g., Griffis, 20 N.C. at 315 (holding that a conviction creates conclusive evidence of probable cause); Morton v. Young, 55 Me. 24, 27 17 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 18 of 62 (1867) (holding that a plaintiff who settled a prosecution by paying part of the amount his accuser demanded was estopped from contesting the absence of probable cause). Courts also debated the evidentiary effect, if any, that other terminations had on the plaintiff’s burden to prove the absence of probable cause. See Newell, supra, at 289–303; see also Annotation, Acquittal, Discharge, or Discontinuance as Evidence of Want of Probable Cause in Action for Malicious Prosecution, 24 A.L.R. 261 (1923) (collecting decisions contemporary to the enactment of section 1983). For example, some states held that a decision by a grand-jury to issue an indictment was evidence of probable cause. See Cooley, supra, at 186. In addition to probable cause, the nature of a prior termination could affect whether a plaintiff established damages. See Sears v. Hathaway, 12 Cal. 277, 278–79 (1859) (holding that a plaintiff who secured an acquittal in the underlying suit on technical grounds but was “moral[ly] guilt[y]” of the conduct alleged could not establish reputation damages). In the light of this history, we have no trouble discerning a well-settled principle of law to guide our analysis. Although States disputed whether a prosecution could terminate without a court order, every State to reach the issue other than Rhode Island agreed that a prosecution terminated when a court formally dismissed the prosecution and discharged the plaintiff. And the vast majority of courts to consider the favorable-termination requirement either adopted 18 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 19 of 62 standards that excluded considering the merits of the underlying prosecution or held that particular terminations that did not evidence plaintiffs’ innocence could satisfy the requirement. Indeed, outside of Rhode Island, the only final terminations that would bar a plaintiff’s suit were those that were inconsistent with a plaintiff’s innocence—that is, if a jury convicted the plaintiff or if the plaintiff compromised with his accuser to end the prosecution in a way that conceded his guilt. So we can readily discern from that consensus the following principle: a formal end to a prosecution in a manner not inconsistent with a plaintiff’s innocence is a favorable termination. The dissent does not dispute that only Rhode Island required evidence of a plaintiff’s innocence to satisfy the favorable-termination element. It instead stresses that courts did not agree on all aspects of the element and that no court expressly endorsed the consensus rule we endorse. According to the dissent, courts adopted three approaches to the favorable-termination element—“(1) those accepting any termination that discharged the plaintiff . . . (2) those requiring that the termination be such that the claimant could not be prosecuted further on the same criminal charge . . . and (3) those requiring a verdict on the merits.” Dissenting Op. at 44. And this disagreement, the dissent concludes, precludes us from concluding that any well-settled consensus existed. 19 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 20 of 62 We are not persuaded. The dissent overstates the scope and nature of disagreements over the favorable-termination requirement. Although States disputed whether a formal termination to proceedings was necessary, they did not split in the manner the dissent suggests—indeed, the dissent’s three “approaches” bear no resemblance to the decisions it cites. See id. at 45–50. Accordingly, we first correct the dissent’s misunderstanding of the common law before addressing its remaining arguments. The dissent incorrectly asserts that multiple states—Kentucky, Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York—required a termination to bar any future prosecution against the plaintiff for the same crime. Id. at 46. Each of these States, like many States that the dissent places in other categories, required only that the particular prosecution against a plaintiff formally ended, not that the termination bar all future prosecutions for the same crime. See Apgar, 43 N.J.L. at 66 (holding that a termination is sufficient if it requires the prosecutor to “institute proceedings de novo” to “proceed further” against the plaintiff); Marbourg, 11 Kan. at 562 (holding that a dismissal is sufficient if “the action has not been commenced again”); Stanton, 27 Mich. at 540 (explaining that the favorable-termination element requires only that a “particular proceeding . . . come to an end, so that the [plaintiff] can be no further pursued upon it”); Clark, 6 Hill at 347 (concluding that the favorable-termination element is satisfied if the prosecution “cannot be revived, 20 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 21 of 62 and the prosecutor must be put to a new one” to continue); Yocum, 40 Ky. at 359 (concluding that an abandonment of the prosecution satisfied the requirement); see also Westerstorn v. Dunleavy, 9 Ky. Op. 635, 636 (1877) (stating that a plaintiff needed to establish “at least a discharge from custody” to satisfy the requirement). The treatise that the dissent cites for this proposition accords with these decisions. See 2 Charles T. Boone, Forms of Pleadings Under the Codes 273 (S.F., BancroftWhitney Co. 1886) (explaining that a claim of malicious prosecution accrues when the prosecution terminates “in such a manner that it cannot be revived, and the prosecutor if he proceeds further will be put to a new one” (emphasis added)). No disagreement existed at common law about whether a termination needed to bar all future prosecutions. Nor did any State require an acquittal. With the exception of one decision that does not support its argument, the dissent’s conclusion otherwise relies entirely on decisions that suggested in passing dicta that a plaintiff needed an acquittal to prevail. See Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 65 U.S. 544, 549 (1860) (dicta); Stone v. Hutchinson, 4 Haw. 117, 123 (1878) (dicta), overruled by McCrosson, 5 Haw. at 392; Fortman, 8 Ohio St. at 550 (dicta); Bacon v. Towne, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 217, 235 (1849) (dicta); Jones v. Kirksey, 10 Ala. 839, 840–41 (1846) (dicta); see also Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick, 39 Pa. 288, 291 (1861) (syllabus of court reporter) (reporting that the trial judge had stated in dicta that an acquittal was necessary 21 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 22 of 62 when a prosecution had proceeded to trial). These decisions, which uncritically echoed the conspiracy writ, did not reflect the common law. When actually faced with a dispute over the favorable-termination requirement, every State the dissent cites held that a plaintiff could proceed without an acquittal. See, e.g., Zebley, 12 A. at 571–72; McCrosson, 5 Haw. at 392–93; Fortman, 8 Ohio St. at 550 (allowing a plaintiff to proceed without a jury acquittal in the underlying civil prosecution and concluding that the favorable-termination requirement “is the same” when a claim of malicious prosecution concerns a criminal prosecution); Long v. Rogers, 17 Ala. 540, 546–47 (1850); Sayles, 45 Mass. at 425–26; Cotton, Minor at 203; see also Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 195 (1878) (stating in dicta that a plaintiff must allege that “the proceeding . . . has failed”); Cardival v. Smith, 109 Mass. 158, 159 (1872) (listing several terminations other than an acquittal that could support a suit for malicious prosecution). Indeed, other than an abrogated decision from New York, no State required an acquittal. See M’Cormick v. Sisson, 7 Cow. 715, 716–17 (N.Y. 1827), abrogated by Fay, 36 N.Y. at 13, Clark, 6 Hill at 346–47, and Burhans, 19 Wend. at 418; see also Ragsdale v. Bowles, 16 Ala. 62, 64 (1849) (stating in dicta that the favorable-termination element required a court judgment or a discharge following judicial investigation), overruled by S. Car & Foundry Co. v. Adams, 32 So. 503, 506 (Ala. 1902). Even treatises that appeared sympathetic to the acquittal rule, 22 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 23 of 62 including the treatise the dissent cites, conceded that the favorable-termination requirement encompassed more than acquittals. See, e.g., Cooley, supra, at 186 (stating that the termination must “in general” be an acquittal but acknowledging several exceptions); 2 Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence § 452, at 414–15 (John Wilder May ed., Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 13th ed. 1876) (adopting a similar conclusion); 1 Morris M. Estee, Estee’s Pleadings, Practice and Forms § 1791, at 653 (Carter P. Pomeroy ed., S.F., Bancroft-Whitney Co. 3d ed. 1886) (“An action for malicious prosecution can not be maintained until the plaintiff has been acquitted, or the prosecution is finally terminated in his favor.” (emphasis added)). Under an accurate understanding of the common law, the dissent is left with three reasons to depart from our position: that some courts opined in dicta that the favorable-termination element required an acquittal, that no court explicitly advanced the standard we endorsed, and that courts disagreed over some aspects of the favorable-termination element. None of these arguments has merit. Although we agree that dicta can inform whether a well-settled rule of law existed when Congress enacted section 1983, the dicta supporting the acquittal rule does not offer meaningful guidance. To start, one of the states the dissent cites never suggested that an acquittal was an element of malicious prosecution, see Kirkpatrick, 39 Pa. at 298–99, and the Kingdom of Hawai‘i did so only in short- 23 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 24 of 62 lived dicta after Congress enacted section 1983, see Stone, 4 Haw. at 123, overruled by McCrosson, 5 Haw. at 392. More importantly, no decision to actually opine that an acquittal was necessary justified its dicta, much less reasoned that an acquittal was necessary because it provided evidence of a plaintiff’s innocence. And as discussed, every State to reach the issue, including each State the dissent cites, held that plaintiffs could proceed without an acquittal. See generally Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent § 4, at 69 (2016) (“Dictum should never be taken as determining an issue of law when it conflicts with a holding on point . . . .”); id. § 18, at 176 (explaining that the persuasiveness of an ancient decision “depends on the degree to which its underlying principles have been buttressed or weakened by later cases and events”). When weighed against the mountain of caselaw to the contrary, the unreasoned dicta that the dissent marshals does not change our view. We also see no problem with deriving a common-law principle from multiple bodies of well-established decisions. That common-law courts did not explicitly reject the indication-of-innocence approach hardly indicts our conclusion—courts outside of Rhode Island did not resolve the issue because no defendant asked them to do so, which strongly suggests that the approach was almost entirely unknown when Congress enacted section 1983. And as explained, the principle we discern from the common law—that a formal end to a prosecution 24 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 25 of 62 in a manner not inconsistent with a plaintiff’s innocence is a favorable termination—closely tracks the dominant approaches to the favorable-termination requirement. Finally, we cannot agree that “there was no well-settled principle of law to glean from the time § 1983 was enacted” because States did not agree about every aspect of the favorable-termination requirement. Dissenting Op. at 50. The dissent asks far too much of precedent when determining whether a “well-settled principle” existed at common law. For example, the Supreme Court had no trouble concluding that the probable-cause element of malicious prosecution was well settled at common law, Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1726, even though States disputed the evidentiary effect that certain favorable terminations had on this element, see Newell, supra, at 289–303. Similarly, we are satisfied that the principle we discern from the common law reflects an area of consensus between nearly every State, even if some States held that plaintiffs satisfied the favorable-termination requirement in additional circumstances. In sum, whether a particular termination affirmatively supported a plaintiff’s innocence was not material to the favorable-termination element in the vast majority of States. As common-law courts on both sides of the Atlantic stressed, a termination on technical grounds did not cure the harm that malicious prosecution caused. See, e.g., Stanton, 27 Mich. at 540 (“The mischief is done by the arrest and 25 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 26 of 62 disgrace caused by a charge of crime, and by the expense and annoyance attending the proceeding. A discharge without a trial does not destroy the effect of the mischief . . . .”); Wicks v. Fentham (1791) 100 Eng. Rep. 1000, 1000; 4 T.R. 247, 248 (“[A] bad indictment serve[s] all the purposes of malice, by putting the party to expense and exposing him . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Instead, the favorable-termination requirement prevented plaintiffs from using the tort to collaterally attack ongoing criminal proceedings or unfavorable terminations. See Newell, supra, at 331. And under prevailing standards, a plaintiff could satisfy the favorable-termination element of malicious prosecution by proving that a court formally ended the prosecution in a manner that was not inconsistent with his innocence. Because section 1983 is not merely “a federalized amalgamation of preexisting common-law claims,” Rehberg, 566 U.S. at 366, we must determine whether this common-law understanding comports with relevant constitutional principles, Williams, 965 F.3d at 1159–60. Here, nothing in the Fourth Amendment supports departing from the weight of the common law. A claim of malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment is only “shorthand” for a claim of deprivation of liberty pursuant to legal process, so the validity of these claims depends on whether the seizure was justified, not whether the prosecution itself was justified, see Williams, 965 F.3d at 1157–59 (internal quotation marks 26 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 27 of 62 omitted). That question almost always turns on whether the judicial officer who authorized the seizure had sufficient information before him to support the seizure. See Williams, 965 F.3d at 1162–65. Conversely, limiting favorable terminations to those that affirmatively support a plaintiff’s innocence redirects the focus to whether the entire prosecution was justified. In other words, the “indication-ofinnocence” approach to favorable terminations considers the wrong body of information. Cf. Garmon v. Lumpkin Cnty., 878 F.2d 1406, 1409 (11th Cir. 1989) (“A subsequent indictment does not retroactively provide probable cause for an arrest that has already taken place.”). The Fourth Amendment does not require plaintiffs to support their innocence with such a narrow, inapposite source of evidence. Because “the Fourth Amendment protects against ‘searches’ and ‘seizures’ (and not ‘prosecutions’),” Whiting, 585 F.3d at 584, the favorable-termination requirement functions as a rule of accrual, not as a criterion for determining whether a constitutional violation occurred. Indeed, we have never considered the requirement outside of the accrual context. See Uboh, 141 F.3d at 1006 (holding that the plaintiff’s claim was timely because the plaintiff had pleaded that he received a favorable-termination within the statute of limitations); Whiting, 85 F.3d at 585–86 (holding that the plaintiff’s claim was timely because it accrued when the court dismissed the remaining charges against the plaintiff). In the light of this 27 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 28 of 62 limited role, the favorable-termination requirement will bar a suit for malicious prosecution only when the prosecution remains ongoing or terminates in a way that precludes any finding that the plaintiff was innocent of the charges that justified his seizure—that is, when the prosecution ends in the plaintiff’s conviction on or admission of guilt to each charge that justified his seizure. See Uboh, 141 F.3d at 1005 (holding that a plaintiff received a favorable termination even though the plaintiff was convicted on some charges because the prosecutor’s dismissal of the other charges was “consistent with . . . a finding of innocence on these specific counts”); see also Williams, 965 F.3d at 1165 (holding that a plaintiff “need only prove that probable cause was absent for at least one of the . . . charges that justified his seizure”). In other words, a plaintiff can satisfy the favorabletermination requirement by proving that the prosecution against him formally ended in a manner not inconsistent with his innocence on at least one charge that authorized his confinement. The officials and dissent contend that our decision in Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, forecloses this conclusion, see Dissenting Op. at 52–53, but they misread that opinion. To be sure, Uboh prevents us from adopting the common-law exception to the favorable-termination requirement for ex parte proceedings, see id. at 1005–06 (holding that the favorable-termination requirement is an element of claims of malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment), which might 28 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 29 of 62 otherwise apply to warrant hearings, see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975) (holding that an adversary hearing is not required to justify a pretrial detention). But Uboh does not otherwise restrict the favorable-termination element. As part of its survey of approaches to the favorable-termination requirement, Uboh explained that other courts had required terminations to provide evidence of the accused’s innocence and mentioned in passing dicta that the dismissal before it would meet that standard, but it did not endorse that or any particular approach. 141 F.3d at 1004–05. Indeed, Uboh suggested in dicta that a dismissal as untimely would be a favorable termination. Id. at 1005. We acknowledge that our conclusion departs from the consensus of our sister circuits, but we do not agree with the dissent that these decisions should alter our conclusion. To start, the dissent miscounts the circuits that have adopted the indication-of-innocence approach to claims of malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. Although seven circuits have done so, see Jordan, 943 F.3d at 545–46; Lanning, 908 F.3d at 26; Donahue, 280 F.3d at 383; Salley, 2020 WL 4664808, at –4; Jones, 959 F.3d at 763–64; Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1068; Cordova, 816 F.3d at 651, the dissent erroneously relies on decisions applying state or local tort law to conclude that the Fifth, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits followed suit. See Lemoine v. Wolfe, 812 F.3d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 2016) (applying Louisiana tort law); Logan v. Caterpillar, Inc., 246 F.3d 912, 925 (7th Cir. 2001) 29 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 30 of 62 (applying Illinois tort law); Whelan v. Abell, 953 F.2d 663, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (applying D.C. tort law). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has held that a Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful pretrial detention does not require any favorable termination. See Manuel, 903 F.3d at 670. More importantly, when considering the decisions of our sister circuits, “[w]e are not merely to count noses. The parties are entitled to our independent judgment.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d 764, 785 (7th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). And the justification that our sister circuits offered for the consensus view is unpersuasive. Each circuit to embrace the indication-of-innocence approach grounded its decision in a comment in the Restatement (Second) of Torts or the modern decisions of States that adopted that comment. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 660 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1977) (“Proceedings are ‘terminated in favor of the accused’ . . . only when their final disposition is such as to indicate the innocence of the accused.”); see also Restatement (First) of Torts § 660 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1938) (stating the same). It is far from clear that the Second Restatement reflects even a modern consensus. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm § 23 cmt. a & n.a (Am. L. Inst. 2020) (acknowledging a split in authority, rejecting the indication-of-innocence requirement, and endorsing a “notinconsistent-with-innocence” approach). Indeed, two of the three states in this 30 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 31 of 62 Circuit, including the one in which Laskar’s seizure and prosecution occurred, do not require an indication of innocence. Compare Vadner v. Dickerson, 441 S.E.2d 527, 528 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds is a favorable termination if the prosecutor does not recommence the prosecution), and Kroger Co. v. Puckett, 351 So. 2d 582, 585–86 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977) (rejecting the approach in the Second Restatement (citing Adams, 32 So. 503)), with Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352, 1356 (Fla. 1994) (requiring a termination “that indicates the innocence of the accused”). Setting this issue aside, modern common law is not the touchstone when defining a claim under section 1983. “[T]he Supreme Court has clarified that the relevant common-law principles are those that were ‘well settled at the time of section 1983’s enactment.’” Williams, 965 F.3d at 1159 (alteration adopted) (quoting Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1726); see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997) (explaining that section 1983 must be “construed in the light of commonlaw principles that were well settled at the time of its enactment”). Although the Restatements and modern treatises often reflect ancient legal principles, the indication-of-innocence approach to favorable terminations has no such pedigree. And we cannot base our decision on common-law doctrines that developed long after Congress enacted section 1983. 31 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 32 of 62 The dissent next faults us for attempting to “square the tort of malicious prosecution with the Fourth Amendment,” Dissenting Op. at 58, and we readily plead guilty to that charge. Although the dissent acknowledges that the Fourth Amendment does not neatly overlap with the tort of malicious prosecution, it nonetheless contends that we must adhere to the common law. Id. at 57–59. This argument turns our approach to malicious prosecution on its head. Our oldest decisions on the subject explained that “malicious prosecution” is only a “shorthand way of describing” certain claims for unlawful seizure, not an “independent Fourth Amendment right . . . to be free from a malicious prosecution.” Whiting, 85 F.3d at 584; see also Kelly, 21 F.3d at 1553–55 (reversing a summary judgment against the plaintiff on a claim of malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment without considering whether the plaintiff satisfied the common-law elements). More recently, the Supreme Court has explained that “[c]ommon-law principles are meant to guide rather than to control the definition of § 1983 claims” and that we must “closely attend” to the “constitutional right at issue” when defining these claims. Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 921. To give priority to the common law over the Fourth Amendment, we would need to depart from both our earliest decisions on the subject and the decisions of the Supreme Court. Of course, we cannot do so. 32 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 33 of 62 Finally, the dissent highlights the ostensible policy benefits of the indicationof-innocence approach, such as the “additional opportunity” it could create “for courts to stop false claims” at the pleading stage instead of at summary judgment, Dissenting Op. at 61, but we fail to see how the operation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is relevant to our analysis of the Fourth Amendment. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390–95 (holding that a Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful seizure without process does not require a favorable termination). We must adhere to the clear commands of the law instead of favoring an alternative policy of judicial economy. See Sorenson v. Sec’y of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 865 (1986) (“The ordering of competing social policies is a quintessentially legislative function.”). We need not redefine the favorable-termination requirement to provide extra protection for defendants accused of malicious prosecution. The probable-cause requirement already limits meritless claims by placing the burden on the plaintiff to establish “(1) that the legal process justifying his seizure was constitutionally infirm and (2) that his seizure would not otherwise be justified without legal process.” Williams, 965 F.3d at 1165. On top of that, the plaintiff must overcome qualified immunity by proving that the absence of probable cause was clearly established. Id. at 1168–70. And a plaintiff seized without probable cause must prove he suffered an injury to recover compensatory damages for the specific charges he says were unfounded. See id. at 1161–62, 1168. 33 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 34 of 62 After considering both the common law and Fourth Amendment, we hold that the favorable-termination element of malicious prosecution is not limited to terminations that affirmatively support the plaintiff’s innocence. Instead, the favorable-termination element requires only that the criminal proceedings against the plaintiff formally end in a manner not inconsistent with his innocence on at least one charge that authorized his confinement. A formal end to criminal proceedings will satisfy this standard unless it precludes any finding that the plaintiff was innocent of the charges that justified his seizure, which occurs only when the prosecution ends in the plaintiff’s conviction on or admission of guilt to each charge that justified his seizure. Because Laskar’s complaint alleges that the prosecution against Laskar formally terminated and does not allege that he was convicted or that he admitted his guilt to each charge that justified his seizure, Laskar has alleged that he received a favorable termination. B. Laskar Alleged that Hurd and Jenkins, but Not Allen and Garton, Initiated the Warrant Proceedings Without Probable Cause and with Malice. The officials contend that Laskar failed to allege that they initiated criminal proceedings against him “with malice and without probable cause” under the common-law elements of our standard. Paez, 915 F.3d at 1285 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although some of our precedents were inconsistent on the standards of probable cause and subjective intent that apply to a claim of malicious 34 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 35 of 62 prosecution, compare, e.g., Kjellsen, 517 F.3d at 1238, and Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1234–35 (dicta), with, e.g., Kelly, 21 F.3d at 1554–55, we recently reconciled them, see Williams, 965 F.3d at 1162–65. Because a claim of malicious prosecution concerns seizures pursuant to legal process, we consider whether the judicial officer who issued the legal process had sufficient truthful information to conclude that probable cause existed. Id. at 1162–65. In the context of an arrest warrant, the plaintiff must establish either “that the officer who applied for the warrant should have known that his application failed to establish probable cause” or “that an official, including an individual who did not apply for the warrant, intentionally or recklessly made misstatements or omissions necessary to support the warrant.” Id. at 1165. This standard governs whether a defendant initiated criminal process “with malice and without probable cause” under the common-law elements of our standard for malicious prosecution. Id. at 1157 (internal quotation marks omitted). Regardless of common-law analogues, a challenge to “pretrial detention unsupported by probable cause . . . lies in the Fourth Amendment.” Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 919. And Williams clarified the standards for probable cause and subjective intent that the Fourth Amendment requires for the seizures involved in claims of malicious prosecution. See 965 F.3d at 1165. Even setting Williams aside, adopting multiple standards of probable cause and subjective intent would demand more of 35 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 36 of 62 plaintiffs than the Constitution requires. We cannot do so. See Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 921 (“Common-law principles are meant to guide rather than to control the definition of § 1983 claims . . . .”). Our standard produces mixed results for Laskar. To establish that the officials initiated criminal proceedings against him without probable cause, he must allege that each official made false statements or omitted information “either intentionally or in reckless disregard for the truth” and that “after deleting the misstatement[s], the [warrant] affidavit is insufficient to establish probable cause.” Williams, 965 F.3d at 1165 (internal quotation marks omitted). Laskar has met this burden as applied to Hurd and Jenkins, but he has not done so for Allen and Garton. We take each pair of officials in turn. Laskar easily satisfies his burden to allege that Hurd and Jenkins initiated criminal proceedings against him without probable cause. Laskar’s complaint alleges that the affidavit that secured the arrest warrant against him relied entirely on Hurd and the audit report that Hurd and Jenkins produced. The complaint also alleges that the accusations in the affidavit were not only false, but knowingly or recklessly so. For example, the affidavit accused Laskar of using funds from Georgia Tech to pay for fully functional microchips that he then sold to financially benefit Sayana, even though Hurd and his audit team knew that Sayana had never sold microchips and had no evidence that Laskar had ever taken or used 36 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 37 of 62 microchips. Finally, Laskar does not allege that the warrant contained any true accusations—his complaint mentions only false or materially incomplete allegations. So after excluding the alleged misstatements, we must conclude that the warrant affidavit lacked any factual basis to support probable cause. See St. George v. Pinellas Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002) (reiterating that our analysis is “limited to the four corners of the complaint” and that we must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor). “Of course, an affidavit does not support probable cause if it lacks any facts that suggest a crime occurred.” Williams, 965 F.3d at 1166–67. Conversely, Laskar has failed to allege that Garton and Allen initiated the warrant proceedings against him without probable cause. Laskar’s complaint does not allege that either official intentionally or recklessly made false statements to support the warrant for his seizure. Indeed, his complaint disclaims that possibility. According to the complaint, the warrant affidavit qualified that “[u]nless otherwise indicated, all facts presented herein are derived from [the submitting agent’s] conversations and communications with Mr. Hurd.” The only other source of information the affidavit cited was Hurd and Jenkins’s audit report. Although Laskar’s complaint alleges that he later faced a second form of legal process—the indictment four years after his initial seizure—he disclaimed at oral argument that he was seized pursuant to that process. Oral Argument at 12:07–:16 (July 29, 37 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 38 of 62 2020). And in any event, Laskar’s complaint does not allege that either Allen or Garton made false statements to support the indictment. Without alleging that Allen or Garton intentionally or recklessly made false statements to support the legal process justifying his seizure, Laskar’s claims against them fail. In short, Laskar has alleged that Hurd and Jenkins, but not Allen and Garton, initiated criminal process against him without probable cause and with malice. Because Laskar’s claims against Allen and Garton cannot proceed, we do not consider their other arguments. We instead turn to Hurd and Jenkins’s remaining arguments for affirmance. C. Laskar Alleged that Hurd and Jenkins Caused His Seizure. Hurd and Jenkins next argue that Laskar has not alleged causation because his indictment was too attenuated from their accusations, but Williams v. Aguirre forecloses this argument. In Williams, we held that “the relevant injury” for a claim of malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, “is the seizure that followed the arrest warrant, not the broader prosecution.” 965 F.3d at 1167. Further, we held that a plaintiff establishes causation if he proves that a defendant’s false statements were material to his seizure pursuant to legal process. Id. Laskar has satisfied this burden, so he has established causation. 38 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 39 of 62 D. Laskar Alleged that Hurd and Jenkins Violated His Clearly Established Right To Not Be Seized Based on Intentional and Material Misstatements in a Warrant Application. Because Hurd and Jenkins invoked qualified immunity, Laskar must also establish that they violated a constitutional right of his that was “clearly established” when they caused his seizure. Kjellsen, 517 F.3d at 1237 (internal quotation marks omitted). “‘Clearly established’ means that, at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A constitutional right is clearly established only if ‘every reasonable official would interpret controlling precedent to establish the particular right the plaintiff seeks to apply’ and ‘the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct follows immediately from the conclusion that the right was firmly established.’” Williams, 965 F.3d at 1168 (alterations adopted) (quoting Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590). Laskar has alleged that Jenkins and Hurd violated clearly established law. This Court has long held that officials violate the Fourth Amendment if they knowingly or recklessly make “false statements in an arrest affidavit about the probable cause for an arrest in order to detain a citizen . . . if such false statements were necessary to the probable cause.” Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1285 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978). And 39 Case: 19-11719 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 Page: 40 of 62 if we accept Laskar’s allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor, Hurd’s and Jenkins’s liability “follow[s] immediately from the conclusion that [the right] was firmly established.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (internal quotation marks omitted). Laskar alleges that they knowingly or recklessly made the false accusations against him that formed the basis of the warrant affidavit. And because Laskar’s complaint does not allege that any statements in the warrant affidavit were both truthful and materially complete, we must assume that the affidavit contained no other facts that could support probable cause. So Hurd’s and Jenkins’s accusations were also “necessary to the probable cause.” Jones, 174 F.3d at 1285; see also Garmon, 878 F.2d at 1410 (holding that a warrant affidavit that “contained no facts whatever” cannot form a reasonable basis for probable cause). Because Laskar has alleged that Hurd and Jenkins violated his clearly established rights under the Fourth Amendment, they are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the suit.