Opinion ID: 2999185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timely Contact with an EEO Counselor

Text: On appeal, Smith initially asserts that the district court erred in determining that her contact with an EEO counselor was not timely within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). Specifically, Smith argues that she satisfied the 45-day limitations period of § 1614.105(a)(1) when she telephoned the EEO in October of 1998. We disagree. As stated above, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105 sets forth that federal employees “who believe they have been discriminated against on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or handicap must . . . initiate contact with a Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date of the action.”15 Failure to do so equates to the violation of a statute of limitations and, notwithstanding extenuating circumstances, would bar a federal employee from pursuing any 15 The purpose of this section is to allow the government and the employee involved an opportunity to “informally resolve the matter,” before formal action is taken, either through the EEOC or in the courts. See § 1614.105(a). 12 No. 04-3531 action against the government for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See supra p. 10 n.14; Rennie, 896 F.2d at 1062. The Supreme Court has consistently instructed that, in determining when such an action accrues, the “proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful.” Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980); see Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (per curiam). This court has expanded on that framework, essentially creating a two-prong test to determine the date of an unlawful employment practice: (1) “there must be a final, ultimate, non-tenative decision to terminate the employee”; and (2) “the employer must give the employee ‘unequivocal’ notice of its final termination decision.” Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of America, 354 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Dvorak v. Mostardi Platt Assocs., Inc., 289 F.3d 479, 486 (7th Cir. 2002)) (internal citations omitted). Applying the Flannery factors to Smith’s cause of action, it is clear that she was both subject to a “final, ultimate, non-tenative [employment] decision” and that she was unequivocally notified of that decision. The first sentence of the letter that was sent to Smith on October 22, 1998,16 conspicuously states: “You are hereby notified that you will be removed from the Postal Service on November 27, 1998.” The letter goes on to explain the rationale for that action, informing Smith that she has been “charged with: Unacceptable Conduct—Vandalizing Employee’s Vehicle Parked on Postal Property.” It is unlikely that a reasonable person in Smith’s position could possibly draw any conclusion from that language, except that the Postal Service had made a “final, ultimate, non-tenative [employment] decision,” and that the effective date of that action was Novem- 16 Approximately two-and-a-half weeks after her attack on Hill’s vehicle and well into her suspension which became effective on that date, October 4, 1998. No. 04-3531 13 ber 27, 1998. See Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258. Also, Smith does not, and cannot, contend that she was not given prompt and “unequivocal” notification of her dismissal.17 See Flannery, 354 F.3d at 637; Dvorak, 289 F.3d at 486. Accordingly, Smith’s cause of action accrued on November 27, 1998, and without more, her failure to file an EEO complaint until more than 60 days later on February 3, 1999,18 see supra p. 5 n.5, barred her from bringing suit in federal court.19 17 Being that her employer was the Postal Service, it not only makes sense that she was informed of her dismissal via Certified Mail, foredooming at least this portion of her claim, it is also a bit ironic. 18 This is the date that Smith filed an official informal complaint with the USPS’s EEO office. See 39 C.F.R. § 255.6(d) (requiring that employees that feels they have been discriminated against “first exhaust informal administrative procedures before filing a formal complaint”). 19 In a tag-along argument, Smith claims that instead of considering her effective date of dismissal, November 27, 1998, the court should have referred to the date that her union grievance process was concluded, June 6, 2001, in order to calculate the 45-day time limit under § 1614.105. However, Smith does not, and cannot, offer any precedential support for this conclusion. As the Supreme Court held in Ricks, the “pendency of a grievance, or some other method of collateral review of an employment decision does not toll the running of the limitations period.” Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258. (emphasis in original). Accordingly, in Smith’s case the limitations period began to run on the effective date of her termination, and her participation in the union grievance process would not toll the running of the statute of limitations—regardless of whether she was kept on the USPS payroll according to her collective bargaining agreement or not. See Lucas v. Chicago Transit Authority, 367 F.3d 714, 723 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that: “As we have explained, ‘[a]n employer’s refusal to undo a discriminatory decision is not a fresh act of discrimination.’ ”); Librizzi v. Children’s Memorial Med. Center, 134 F.3d 1302, 1306 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Ricks, (continued...) 14 No. 04-3531 Johnson, 47 F.3d at 917. Smith attempts to overcome this fact, arguing that although she did not officially file a complaint until February of 1999, she did in fact “contact” the EEO within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105 in October of 199820 when 19 (...continued) 449 U.S. at 257 (holding that “continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination.”); Chardon, 454 U.S. at 9; Fairchild v. Forma Scientific, Inc., 147 F.3d 567, 574 (7th Cir. 1998). 20 We note that neither this court nor the Postal Service has addressed the precise contours of the term “contact” within the context of § 1614.105(a). However, in Bailey v. United States Postal Serv., the Eight Circuit encountered a similar situation in which a Postal Service employee argued that the telephone call she allegedly placed to the USPS’s EEO office within the 45-day limit of § 1614.105(a) should constitute “contact” within the meaning of that regulation. 208 F.3d 652, 654-55 (8th Cir. 2000). The Eighth Circuit disagreed concluding that, in that instance, a telephone call alone would not suffice. In doing so the court noted that Bailey had failed to offer any evidence to support her contention that during the phone call at issue, EEO counselors had “led her to believe that she had taken all the steps necessary to preserve her right to bring a claim in federal court.” Id. at 654. To the contrary, the record included affidavits from the operators who had spoke with Bailey stating that they had “informed Bailey that her conversations with them would not be considered requests for counseling and that such requests needed to be submitted in writing within 45 days of the alleged discriminatory incident.” Id. In addition, the court also concluded that Bailey’s claim was belied by the fact that the “Postal Service . . . appears to have a regular policy of requiring employees who allege harassment to submit their EEO counseling requests in writing.” Id. at 654 n.2. The EEOC, on the other hand, has consistently held that “[t]o establish EEO contact, complainant[s] must contact an official logically connected to the EEO process, and exhibit an (continued...) No. 04-3531 15 she allegedly telephoned the USPS’s EEO office and was told that she was required to conclude the union grievance process before filing an action.21 See supra pp. 6-7. To support this contention, Smith cites her own affidavit dated June 14, 2003 in which she states that “[s]hortly after [she] was suspended, [she] telephoned the EEO office located at the USPS regarding [her] removal which [she] believed to be unfair and discriminatory.” However, a declaration of this nature alone is insufficient to resist summary judgment; for it is well settled that “self-serving statements 20 (...continued) intent to file a discrimination claim.” Dehaan v. Chao, 2001 WL 1103726, , EEOC DOC 01A10009 (August 2, 2001) (citing Allen v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05950933 (July 9, 1996)). There seems to be an inherent conflict between the Eight Circuit’s decision in Bailey, which suggests that telephone contact is insufficient to constitute “contact” within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a), and the EEOC’s statement that only “intent” to file a claim is needed to satisfy the regulation. We normally defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359, 104 L. Ed. 2d 351, 109 S. Ct. 1835 (1989) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). Nevertheless, because we need not resolve this issue to dispose of Smith’s appeal, we reserve judgment on this issue until required to do so in the future with a more complete record. 21 The Postal Service argues that Smith did not present this argument to the district court, thus, constituting a waiver of the argument. See, e.g., Harper v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 521, 528 (7th Cir. 2005). However, a cursory review of Smith’s reply to the Postal Service’s motion to dismiss establishes that this is not the case. In that document, Smith specifically takes issue with the Postal Service’s assertion that February 12, 1999 was the first time she had “contact” with the USPS’s EEO office by stating that: “This was not Kathy’s first contact with the EEO office located at the USPS . . . .” 16 No. 04-3531 contained in an affidavit will not defeat a motion for summary judgment when those statements are without factual support in the record.” Evans v. City of Chicago, 434 F.3d 916, 933 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Buie v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 504 (7th Cir. 2004)) (internal citations omitted). In a rather transparent, albeit clever, attempt to overcome this unfavorable precedent, Smith proceeded to introduce into evidence the affidavits of three other persons, whom she claims to have told about her alleged October telephone call to the EEO office, to corroborate her affidavit. The affiants all state that in the week following her suspension in October of 1998, Smith told them that she had contacted the USPS’s EEO office and had been told that she must conclude the union grievance process prior to filing an EEO complaint. For example, Damon D. Jermmott, a 19year-old who claims to have been acquainted with Smith since 1997, conveniently states that: “The week following her suspension, Kathy Smith told me that she contacted the EEO office located at the United States Postal Service to complain about the circumstances leading to her removal.”22 22 The other affidavits are very similar to that of Jermmott in content. The only difference is that the other affiants are not 19 year-olds; they are in fact current or former postal workers. Boyd G. “Butch” Stevens, Jr. states that he has “worked as a mail handler for the [USPS] for 20 years” and has “known Kathy Smith for 11 years.” Stevens further states that he “did not trust the EEO office located at the USPS to give Kathy Smith good advice.” Accordingly, Stevens told her to call another EEO office but she was directed back to the USPS EEO office and “was told the EEO could not help her until the union grievance process was complete.” Similarly, Tammy Herwehe Zemke, who claims in her affidavit to have been “wrongfully removed in 2001 from my position with the USPS” states that “Kathy Smith told me that she contacted the EEO office located at the USPS, but was told the EEO could not help her until the union grievance process was (continued...) No. 04-3531 17 According to Smith, the affida-vits of Jermmott, Stevens and Zemke corroborate her affidavit and thus are sufficient to, at the very least, present a question of material fact. Evans, 434 F.3d at 933. We disagree. The affidavits are clearly offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and thus constitute inadmissible hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 801.23 As such, they may not be relied upon to resist a 22 (...continued) complete.” Zemke also corroborated Smith’s claim by stating that after she was dismissed from her job at the USPS in 2001, she “contacted the EEO office at the USPS, and was told I would have to complete the union grievance process before the EEO office would process [her] claim.” 23 On appeal, Smith mistakenly argues that “the affidavits fall within the exception of the hearsay rule under Fed.R.Ev. [sic] 801(d)(1)(B) as prior consistent statements of a witness.” This couldn’t be further from the truth, for a number of reasons. For one thing, the Supreme Court has made clear that: “Prior consistent statements may not be admitted to counter all forms of impeachment or to bolster the witness merely because she has been discredited . . . . The Rule speaks of a party rebutting an alleged motive, not bolstering the veracity of the story told.” Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 166-67 (1995); United States v. Stoecker, 215 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2000). That is precisely what Smith is trying to achieve by submitting the affidavits at issue here—she is attempting to bolster the veracity of her story that she called the EEO office in October of 1998—and, as such, they will not be considered for purposes resisting summary judgment. See Davis, 396 F.3d at 874 n.3; Galdikas, 342 F.3d 684 at 695. What’s more, Smith seems to overlook the fact that, even if a statement is submitted for a proper purpose such as to rebut a claim of recent fabrication, such statements must have been “made before the declarant had a motive to fabricate.” United States v. Anderson, 303 F.3d 847, 858 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2001). Two of the affidavits Smith submitted are dated June 11th and the other (continued...) 18 No. 04-3531 motion for summary judgment. See Davis v. G.N. Mortgage, 396 F.3d 869, 874 n.3 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (1996)); Galdikas v. Fagan, 342 F.3d 684, 695 (7th Cir. 2003). Ultimately, Smith has failed to present this court with evidence sufficient to create a question of material fact as to whether she complied with the 45-day period of limitations set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). That being the case, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that Smith’s claim was time-barred and conclude that the grant of summary judgment on that portion of Smith’s claim was proper.