Opinion ID: 1133126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Asserted Error in Admission of Evidence

Text: [7] Ross Wilson was permitted to testify, over objection, that during a conversation with defendant while they were confined in jail after having been charged with the murder, defendant freely and voluntarily made certain incriminating statements concerning the killing of Officer Owings. [6] Although Wilson admitted that he pointed out defendant's residences to the police before the conversation and that he ultimately testified for the prosecution at defendant's trials, he maintained that at the time of the conversation he was not in any way working with or for police officers in an attempt to secure evidence from Mr. Terry. Since defendant's statements were not elicited by the police and the evidence supports the trial court's implied finding that Wilson was not acting as a government agent at the time, Wilson's testimony was not inadmissible under Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758], People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361], and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 [12 L.Ed.2d 246, 84 S.Ct. 1199]. ( People v. Teale, 63 Cal.2d 178, 184-185, 196 [45 Cal. Rptr. 729, 404 P.2d 209 [revd. on other grounds in 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824]]; cf. People v. Boulad, 235 Cal. App.2d 118, 124 et seq. [45 Cal. Rptr. 104]. [cert. den. 383 U.S. 915 [15 L.Ed.2d 669, 86 S.Ct. 905]].) Nor will Wilson's testimony be inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974], at defendant's fifth penalty trial if the evidence and finding are the same. [7] [8] To support its theory that the murder was committed intentionally to avoid arrest, the prosecution introduced, among other things, evidence regarding a robbery of a branch office of the Bank of America on March 13, 1959. A bank teller testified that defendant robbed him, and Ross Wilson testified as to conversations with defendant pertaining to the robbery and observations of the loot. [8] Defendant unsuccessfully objected to the evidence on several grounds now asserted here. Defendant points out that he was never formally charged with or convicted of the offense. However, there is no requirement that a defendant must have been charged or convicted in order to introduce at a penalty trial relevant evidence of other prior criminal conduct. ( People v. Griffin, 66 Cal.2d 459, 464 [58 Cal. Rptr. 107, 426 P.2d 507]; People v. Tahl, 65 Cal.2d 719, 734 [56 Cal. Rptr. 318, 423 P.2d 246]; People v. Mitchell, 63 Cal.2d 805, 815-816 [48 Cal. Rptr. 371, 409 P.2d 211]; People v. Jones, 52 Cal.2d 636, 647-648 [343 P.2d 577].) [9] Defendant further asserts that the statute of limitations had run as to the robbery. (Pen. Code, § 800.) [9] He suggests that section 800 embodies a policy judgment by the Legislature that penal sanctions should not be imposed as a result of a finding of guilt of robbery for which prosecution was not commenced within three years after its commission. He points out that as a result of the lapse of time it may be difficult for defendants to prove the facts or make a fair presentation of the case (see Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv.L.Rev. 1177, 1185, 1186), and he argues that [T]he jury may conceivably rest the death penalty upon any piece of introduced data.... ( People v. Hines, 61 Cal.2d 164, 169 [37 Cal. Rptr. 622, 390 P.2d 398]) and that the introduction of evidence of the robbery would allow the jury to violate indirectly a policy that cannot be directly violated. The language of section 800, however, does not prohibit the introduction of evidence of prior criminal acts for which prosecution would be barred by the statute of limitations. Such evidence is not introduced in order to impose a penalty for those prior acts, but rather as evidence of the circumstances surrounding the crime [of murder], of the defendant's background and history, and of any facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty [for murder] as authorized by Penal Code section 190.1. The fact that the prosecution for the robbery may have been barred by the statute of limitations is immaterial here. In an analogous case, where the prosecution intended to establish at the guilt trial that the murder was of the first degree because committed during an attempt to perpetrate robbery, the defendant claimed that, since the statute of limitations had run on the attempted robbery, the court erred in allowing the prosecution to question veniremen on voir dire as to whether they would follow an instruction regarding the felony-murder rule. We rejected the claim, stating that it was immaterial at the murder trial that a prosecution for the attempted robbery might be barred. ( People v. Risenhoover, ante, p. 39 [73 Cal. Rptr. 533, 447 P.2d 925].) Moreover, in the instant case evidence with respect to the robbery was introduced at defendant's first trial which was within three years of the robbery, and at his most recent penalty trial he was in no worse position than any defendant properly charged with a crime within the period set by the statute of limitations, but not brought to trial until some later time because of a series of successful appeals. (Cf. In re McCartney, 64 Cal.2d 830, 832 [51 Cal. Rptr. 894, 415 P.2d 782].) [10] Defendant contends that the bank teller's identification testimony was inadmissible because he had first identified defendant at a lineup, conducted after defendant was charged with murder and while he was deprived of the assistance of counsel. However, the rules announced in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 [18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87 S.Ct. 1926], and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 [18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 87 S.Ct. 1951]  requiring the exclusion of identification evidence which is tainted by exhibiting the accused to identifying witnesses before trial in the absence of counsel  affect only those cases involving showups conducted after June 12, 1967. ( Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 [18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 87 S.Ct. 1967]; People v. Feggans, 67 Cal.2d 444, 448 [62 Cal. Rptr. 419, 432 P.2d 21]. The lineup here was long before that date. A further question is whether the lineup was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that [defendant] was denied due process. ( Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293, 302 [18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1206]; see also People v. Feggans, supra, 67 Cal.2d 444, 448-449.) The only evidence regarding the lineup was the bank teller's testimony that when he described the robber to the police on the day of the robbery he stated that the robber was in his early thirties. The persons in the lineup, other than defendant and Wilson, were in their teens or early twenties. This alone is not sufficient to show a denial of due process. [11] Defendant attacks as products of an illegal search the introduction of the murder weapon, a bullet taken from the gun, and a picture comparing the bullet with the bullet recovered from Officer Owings' body. Officer Cloud, who recovered the weapon from a car, testified that he received over the police radio a broadcast with respect to the slaying, that the killer's car was described in the broadcast, that the officer was dispatched to the area to search for the vehicle and its occupant, and that the officer was warned that the killer was believed to be armed and should be considered dangerous. Approximately 20 minutes later he found the automobile parked on a street and could see that no one was in the auto. He had no warrant and did not check in by radio to determine if the suspect had been captured. He opened a door of the car and observed the revolver lying on the floor. Approximately five minutes later he observed defendant in the custody of a fellow officer; to his knowledge defendant had not been arrested in or about the automobile. Defendant's contention that under the circumstances Officer Cloud should have obtained a warrant before searching the automobile cannot be sustained. The law recognizes that fresh pursuit of a fleeing suspect who has committed a grave offense and remains dangerous to life and limb may constitute `exceptional circumstances' sufficient to justify a search without a warrant. ( People v. Smith, 63 Cal.2d 779, 797 [48 Cal. Rptr. 382, 409 P.2d 222] [cert.den. 388 U.S. 913 [18 L.Ed.2d 1353, 87 S.Ct. 2119]; rehg. den. 389 U.S. 893 [19 L.Ed.2d 211, 88 S.Ct. 13]].) A search of the car, abandoned by an individual suspected of killing a police officer within the last 20 minutes and presumably armed and in flight, would help ascertain whether its former occupant was armed and where he might be located. The pressing urgency of such determinations amply justified the search. Since the search of the car was legal, the fruits of that search were properly admitted. Over defendant's objections, the prosecution introduced extensive evidence with respect to an incident that occurred at his Garfield Place apartment some five months before the homicide. Two police officers testified that they were on duty in Hollywood when they responded to a call to investigate a complaint by two youths, aged 17 and 18. The youths told them that they had met defendant outside the U.S.O. in Hollywood and that he had invited them to his apartment. Accepting the invitation, the boys had accompanied defendant to his car, where they had seen a marijuana cigarette in a clip on the dashboard. At the apartment, defendant had offered them some marijuana and performed an indecent act as to one of the boys. They became frightened and fled the apartment. The officers further testified that they returned to the apartment house around midnight with the two boys and two plainclothes officers. Upon arrival, the police officers and one of the boys went to the subterranean garage, where the boy pointed out defendant's automobile. Through the window of the locked car the police officers observed an object lying across the top of an open ashtray that appeared to be a partially smoked marijuana cigarette. Meanwhile, the two plainclothes officers and the other boy went to the door of the apartment. The plainclothes officers placed themselves out of sight and the boy knocked on the door. When the door was opened, the officers came out of hiding and entered the apartment. The plainclothes officers had no warrant. They did not identify themselves or their purpose before entering. [10] They neither asked for nor received permission to enter. They ignored defendant's protests and demands that they leave, and proceeded to make a cursory visual search of the apartment, including the bedroom and the clothes closet, for narcotics or weapons. They discovered neither, but did note the presence of Ross Wilson in the bedroom. Defendant phoned his attorney, but the officers refused to speak to the attorney. As prearranged, the plainclothes officers summoned the police officers from the garage after the former entered the apartment, and then left the premises. When the police officers entered the apartment, defendant was still on the telephone and Ross Wilson was in the bedroom. One police officer returned to the garage to look at the car and attempt to unlock it. The other police officer was in the apartment for five or ten minutes when defendant took the phone into the bedroom and closed the door. When he entered the bedroom a minute or a minute and a half later, he found the window open and no one present. He notified his companions and a fruitless search was conducted. Approximately thirty minutes later a plainclothes officer reentered the apartment with the manager and made a further visual search without a warrant. A day or two later the manager again accompanied police into the apartment; she did not recall if they produced a warrant. The police impounded the automobile and its contents; analysis of the cigarette indicated that it contained marijuana. The manager testified that she later repossessed the apartment, but that defendant never returned to reclaim his personal possessions. As a result of a police investigation of the incident, a complaint was filed charging defendant with molesting minors (Pen. Code, § 647a, subd. (1)), furnishing narcotics to a minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11532), and possession of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11530). Defendant's picture and the warrant were publicized on local television stations. At the time of the killing, the warrant for defendant's arrest was still outstanding. [12a] All the above evidence was introduced for the purpose of establishing that defendant's state of mind at the time of the homicide was one of flight from the police. The jury was instructed that the evidence was admitted only for that limited purpose and not as evidence of criminal conduct on the part of defendant. Motions to suppress the evidence, made before trial and during trial before the introduction of evidence, were denied; various objections during the introduction of the evidence were likewise overruled. Defendant first contends that the entry into the garage was an illegal trespass, and that the search of the car and seizure of the marijuana cigarette were illegal. We held in our review of his second penalty trial that Apparently the apartment garage was a common area; the officers did not commit a trespass by entering it. Nor did the officers conduct an unreasonable search by looking in the window of the car. ( People v. Martin (1955) 45 Cal.2d 755, 762 [290 P.2d 855].) ( People v. Terry, supra, 61 Cal.2d 137, 152.) In an effort to avoid our prior holding defendant on cross-examination of the apartment house manager at the present trial elicited testimony that the garage was not a common area open to the public but rather a private area not open to the public, that [i]n other words, the ... garage ... was not an enclosed piece of land that had been set aside for public or municipal use, and that there were no spaces in the garage for parking by guests. The manager also testified that the garage was a common parking area for tenants of the apartment building. One of the officers who entered the garage testified that there was no indication that the garage was a common area or public parking. His partner stated that the garage was big  that it would definitely hold 5 cars but that he could not recall whether it would accommodate 105 cars. Even if it were assumed in the light of this additional evidence that the officers' entry into the garage was a technical trespass, their observations therein, as we shall see, did not constitute an unreasonable search. [13] The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.... This amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment ( Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-657 [66 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1089-1091, 81 S.Ct. 1684]) protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, although its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all. ( Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 [19 L.Ed.2d 576, 581, 88 S.Ct. 507].) [11] The prohibition in the amendment is against unreasonable searches and seizures, not trespasses. [14] Police officers in the performance of their duties may, without violating the Constitution, peaceably enter upon the common hallway of an apartment building without a warrant or express permission to do so. ( United States v. St. Clair, 240 F. Supp. 338, 340; United States v. Buchner, 164 F. Supp. 836 [affd. per curiam 268 F.2d 891; cert. den. 359 U.S. 908 (3 L.Ed.2d 573, 79 S.Ct. 584)]; People v. Seals, 263 Cal. App.2d 575, 576 et seq. [69 Cal. Rptr. 861]; cf. United States v. Miguel, 340 F.2d 812 [cert. den. 382 U.S. 859 (15 L.Ed.2d 97, 86 S.Ct. 116)]; United States v. Lewis, 227 F. Supp. 433, 436-437.) Even if such an entry constitutes a trespass, a simple trespass without more does not invalidate a subsequent search and seizure. ( United States v. Buchner, supra, 164 F. Supp. 836, 839; People v. Seals, 263 Cal. App.2d 575, 576 et seq.; see Teasley v. United States, 292 F.2d 460, 464; see also People v. Willard, 238 Cal. App.2d 292, 298 et seq. [47 Cal. Rptr. 734]; and Giacona v. United States, 257 F.2d 450, 456, [cert. den. 358 U.S. 873 (3 L.Ed.2d 104, 79 S.Ct. 113)], [minor trespass, not involving entry of building, does not render observations an unreasonable search]. [15] In the instant case the garage, used in common by the tenants of the apartment building, is similar in nature to a common hallway of an apartment building. The officers apparently entered the garage without force. As we have seen, defendant's car was parked in the garage and the marijuana was in plain sight on an open ashtray inside the car. Any expectation by defendant of privacy as to objects in plain sight in the car would have been unreasonable, and no constitutionally protected right of privacy was violated when the officers looked through the window of the car. [16] In our review of defendant's second penalty trial we further held that If a police officer has probable cause to believe that an automobile contains contraband he need not obtain a search warrant in order to search it. ( People v. Gale (1956) 46 Cal.2d 253, 255 [294 P.2d 14]; People v. Brajevich (1959) 174 Cal. App.2d 438, 444 [344 P.2d 815].) In this case the officers had heard the youths' story, had corroborated it by observing through the locked window of the automobile an object that appeared to be a marijuana cigarette, and had witnessed defendant's flight under suspicious circumstances. These facts adequately establish probable cause for suspecting that the automobile contained marijuana. ( People v. Terry, supra, 61 Cal.2d 137, 152.) Probable cause to search the automobile existed even before the police officers were summoned from the garage to the apartment and defendant fled. Therefore the fact that the initial entry into the apartment by the plainclothes officers might have been illegal would not transform the marijuana cigarette into the fruit of an illegal search. (Cf. People v. Ditson, 57 Cal.2d 415, 443-445 [20 Cal. Rptr. 165, 369 P.2d 714].) [17a] Defendant contends that the plainclothes officers' initial entry into the apartment was illegal, and that evidence of the searches of the apartment, his flight therefrom, his failure to return, and the issuance of the warrant and subsequent publicity was inadmissible as the fruit of that illegal entry. However, even assuming that the plainclothes officers did not have probable cause to arrest defendant based upon the untested story of the two unfamiliar youths, and therefore could not legally search his apartment without a warrant, the police officers who entered from the garage did have independent probable cause to make an arrest. The latter had not only heard the boys' complaint but had made the corroborating observation of a marijuana cigarette in defendant's automobile. [18] When probable cause to arrest exists at the outset, a search preceding the formality of a substantially contemporaneous arrest may be incident thereto ( People v. Cockrell, 63 Cal.2d 659, 666-667 [47 Cal. Rptr. 788, 408 P.2d 116] [cert.den. 389 U.S. 1006 [19 L.Ed.2d 604, 88 S.Ct. 568]]); the fact that defendant's flight prevented an arrest does not alter the legality of the police officers' entry and search. [12b] In addition, an examination of the record indicates that the initial search by the plainclothes officers did not turn up narcotics, weapons, or other incriminating evidence; their testimony at the trial could not have prejudiced defendant's case. [19] Furthermore, even assuming that the plainclothes officers did not comply with the announcement requirements of Penal Code section 844 before entering the apartment, [12] and that this illegality affected the legality of the subsequent method of entry of the police officers from the garage, evidence of the defendant's flight from the apartment was not obtained by exploitation of that illegality.... ( Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 [9 L.Ed.2d 441, 455, 83 S.Ct. 407].) Defendant fled through a bedroom window five or ten minutes after the police officers exercised their legal right to enter, as discussed above, by employing an allegedly illegal method of entry. Prior to their entry he had conversed with the plainclothes officers regarding their right to be present and had called and consulted with his lawyer. After their entry he continued to talk to his lawyer, and was allowed to walk into the bedroom and shut the door. Under the circumstances, any connection between the evidence of defendant's flight and the allegedly illegal method of entry has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. ( People v. Bilderbach, 62 Cal.2d 757, 766 [44 Cal. Rptr. 313, 401 P.2d 921]. Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, supra, 371 U.S. 471, 487-488 [9 L.Ed.2d 441, 455-456]; Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 269, 273 [294 P.2d 23]; Gascon v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. App.2d 356, 358 [337 P.2d 201].) [17b] Evidence of the issuance of the warrant and the subsequent television publicity was properly admitted. The warrant was based on lawfully acquired evidence of the youths' complaint and recovery of the marijuana cigarette from defendant's automobile. There is no indication in the record that it was based on defendant's flight, evidence discovered in later searches of the apartment, or the later investigation of the incident by police authorities. [13] [20a] Defendant contends that evidence of his departure from the apartment should have been excluded because he was not advised of his rights in accordance with Escobedo v. Illinois, supra, 378 U.S. 478; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436; and People v. Dorado, supra, 62 Cal.2d 338. [21] However, The right to counsel during police interrogation established in Escobedo v. Illinois, supra , is designed to prevent the use of coercive practices to extort confessions or other incriminating statements. ( In re Lopez, 62 Cal.2d 368, 372-373 [42 Cal. Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380].) It does not protect a defendant from revealing evidence against himself in other ways. It applies only when `the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, ...' ( Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 986, 84 S.Ct. 1758].) ( People v. Graves, 64 Cal.2d 208, 210-211 [49 Cal. Rptr. 386, 411 P.2d 114] [cert. den. 385 U.S. 883 [17 L.Ed.2d 111, 87 S.Ct. 175]].) [22] Miranda likewise was designed to afford protection against coercion during in-custody interrogation. [20b] The police did not question or coerce defendant, and the danger against which the Escobedo-Dorado-Miranda rules were meant to guard was not present. [12c] Defendant contends that for the purpose of establishing that his state of mind at the time of the killing was one of flight from the police, only his knowledge of the outstanding warrant charging him with felonies was admissible. He argues that the facts leading to the issuance of the warrant were not relevant or material to his state of mind, and that those facts were used to imply consciousness of guilt of the offenses charged in the warrant as a matter in aggravation of the killing of which he stood convicted. However, evidence of defendant's flight from the Garfield Place apartment was relevant to the proposition that his state of mind at the time of the killing was one of avoidance of the police, and it could not be meaningfully presented without some explanation of the presence of police in the apartment. Under the circumstances, it would have been far more prejudicial merely to introduce evidence of the offenses charged in the warrant without explaining that they were based solely on the story of two youths and the discovery of a single marijuana cigarette.