Opinion ID: 203237
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Validity and Scope of Jones's Consent

Text: It is axiomatic that officers must ordinarily procure a warrant before searching a locale to which Fourth Amendment protections apply. See Groh v. Ramírez, 540 U.S. 551, 558-59 (2004). Several exceptions to this requirement exist, however, one of which is valid consent to search by someone having authority to give consent. See United States v. Pérez-Montañez, 202 F.3d 434, 438 (1st Cir. 2000). In order for consent to be valid, the Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the consenting party gave it freely and voluntarily. United States v. Marshall, 348 F.3d 281, 285-86 (1st Cir. 2003). The assessment of whether consent is free and voluntary is a question of fact that requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the relevant transaction between law-enforcement authorities and the consenting party. Pérez-Montañez, 202 F.3d at 438. The district court's factual findings relating to the validity of the consent are reviewed for clear error. See Marshall, 348 F.3d at 284. -11- Although the officers in this case had a valid warrant to arrest Jones, they did not have a warrant to search Room 318 when they decided to enter the suite. The district court found the search of Room 318 constitutionally permissible nonetheless, because Jones had given his consent freely and voluntarily. Agent Boucher testified that he advised Jones of his Miranda rights, and that Jones acknowledged that he understood them. See United States v. Kimball, 741 F.2d 471, 474 (1st Cir. 1984) (giving of Miranda rights a factor to consider in totality of circumstances). Agent Boucher also testified that Jones did not appear to be intoxicated, that he seemed to understand what was going on, and that neither Agent Boucher nor any other officer extracted Jones's consent through threats or promises.4 See Pérez-Montañez, 202 F.3d at 438 (threats, intimidation, and coercion are factors to consider in an analysis of the totality of the circumstances). The district court found this testimony to be a credible account of what actually happened. We see no reason to disagree. Jones argues, however, that three additional factors should lead us to overturn the district court's finding that his 4 Agent Wolf, who took over the questioning after Agent Boucher, also testified that Jones was calm and did not seem to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. We give no weight to Jones's halfhearted intimation that he may have been under the influence of marijuana since the officers, upon entering Room 318, discovered evidence of marijuana having recently been smoked by at least one of the suite's several occupants. See United States v. Luciano, 329 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2003). -12- consent was free and voluntary. First, he claims his consent could not have been free or voluntary because neither Agent Boucher nor any other officer advised him of his right not to cooperate. This argument is unavailing. We have repeatedly held that the failure to advise a defendant of his right to refuse consent does not automatically render such consent invalid. See id. at 438 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 234 (1973)); United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d 546, 555 (1st Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206-07 (2002) (no presumption of invalidity where person consents without explicit notification of right to refuse). In the relatively calm environment of the bedroom in which Jones had been placed, Agent Boucher read Jones his Miranda rights, and Jones acknowledged that he understood each of them, agreed to cooperate, and was not apparently under the influence. The district court did not clearly err in finding that Jones appreciated the significance of giving consent despite the officers' failure to advise him of his right to withhold such consent. Second, Jones contends that, while none of the officers applied overt coercion on him to induce his consent, the circumstances should be regarded as inherently coercive: some ten to fifteen government agents, guns drawn, entered his hotel suite without knocking, handcuffed him, placed him in a separate room, and proceeded to interrogate him. See Barnett, 989 F.2d at 555 -13- (one factor to be considered in totality of circumstances is whether permission to search was obtained by coercive means or under inherently coercive circumstances). This argument also fails. As we have observed, [a]lthough sensitivity to the heightened possibility of coercion is appropriate when a defendant's consent is obtained during custody, 'custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate . . . coerced . . . consent to search.' Id. (citation omitted) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976)). Upon the officers' entry, Jones and his associates surrendered to them without a struggle and no shots were fired. Jones was then handcuffed and made to sit on the edge of a bed. There is no indication in the record that Jones was mistreated or placed in an uncomfortable position, or that Agent Boucher, Agent Bunch, or anyone else brandished a weapon, made threatening gestures, or spoke threatening words during the interrogation. Considering the several countervailing factors outlined above, we find that the circumstances here were not so inherently coercive as to render Jones's consent unknowing or involuntary, even when considered together with the officers' failure to advise Jones of his right to refuse consent. Third, Jones claims that any valid consent he may have given was confined to the bedroom in which he had been placed, and did not extend to the kitchenette or the other rooms of the hotel -14- suite. A search justified by consent will be deemed reasonable as long as it does not exceed the scope of the consent given. See United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84, 87 (1st Cir. 1999). When determining the scope of consent, we apply a test of objective reasonableness: '[W]hat would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the subject?' United States v. Meléndez, 301 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)). This inquiry requires an examination of the overall context, including contemporaneous police statements and actions. Turner, 169 F.3d at 87. As in past cases, we state no view on whether the scope of a given instance of consent is reviewed de novo or merely for clear error, as in the circumstances of the present case we would affirm under either standard. See Marshall, 348 F.3d at 286 (citing Meléndez, 301 F.3d at 32 (noting the split in our sister circuits on this question)); Turner, 169 F.3d at 87 n.4 (same). Agent Boucher testified that he asked Jones for consent to search the motel room. Jones responded with a simple yes. As noted above, Room 318 was actually a suite with two bedrooms, a kitchenette, a living room, and a bathroom. Although Agent Boucher did not specify which of these rooms he was seeking consent to search, Jones did not expressly confine his consent to the bedroom. The district court found that Agent Boucher had made it reasonably clear that he sought consent to search the entire suite, not just -15- the bedroom. Jones, 2006 WL 763124, at  n.11. We agree. An objective observer of the transaction between Agent Boucher and Jones would have understood the term motel room to encompass the whole of Room 318, and not just the bedroom. This is especially true considering that the officers had already viewed marijuana on the living room table, in close proximity to the couch on which Jones was sitting when they entered, and smelled marijuana smoke in the air; it is reasonable to expect that Jones was aware that the officers noticed this evidence of recent drug use. In this context, a reasonable person in Jones's position would have regarded Agent Boucher as requesting consent to search the whole suite for additional drugs. As such, the district court did not err in concluding that Jones's consent extended to the entire suite, and it was not unreasonable for Agent Boucher and the other officers to conduct a search of the other rooms for drugs, including the kitchen cabinet. Cf. Meléndez, 301 F.3d at 33 (dismantling and looking inside a speaker did not exceed the scope of consent to search a room, as [t]he speaker was located in the area that [the consenting party] had allowed the officers to search, and was a place in which the officers could have reasonably suspected drugs to be hidden). Having dismissed Jones's challenge to his consent to search, we turn to his third and final assignment of error with respect to the denial of his suppression motion. -16-