Opinion ID: 151935
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scott's First Amendment Claim Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits.

Text: Scott argues that the excess spending subsidy is unconstitutional because it severely burdens his right to spend in support of his candidacy and is thus subject to strict scrutiny, which it cannot survive. He argues that Davis compels this conclusion. The Secretary and McCollum respond that the subsidy does not substantially burden Scott's right to spend in support of his candidacy and is not subject to strict scrutiny. They argue that Davis is inapposite, but even if it applies, they argue that the subsidy survives strict scrutiny because it furthers the legitimate interest of Florida in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption in politics. They contend that the subsidy encourages participation in the public campaign financing system and the public financing system prevents corruption and the appearance of corruption. We agree with Scott that Davis requires us to subject the excess spending subsidy to strict scrutiny. We conclude that, even if the subsidy encourages participation in the public financing system and indirectly prevents corruption or the appearance of corruption, the excess spending subsidy is not the least restrictive means of doing so. Like the district court, we think it is obvious that the subsidy imposes a burden on nonparticipating candidates, like Scott, who spend large sums of money in support of their candidacies. When a nonparticipant vying for public office in Florida spends more than $2 for each registered voter in support of his candidacy, Florida provides direct financial support to his opponents. These participating opponents use this money to further their own candidacies and attempt to defeat the candidacy of the nonparticipant. When the participating candidates speak in support of their own candidacies, they raise the cost of their nonparticipating opponent's speech in support of his candidacy. Neither McCollum nor Scott disagrees with this fact. Indeed, that is why Scott is seeking to invalidate the subsidy and McCollum is defending it. Moreover, we know of no court that doubts that a subsidy like the one at issue here burdens nonparticipants, apart from whether it is a substantial burden under the First Amendment. See Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 09-3760-cv(L), 09-3941-cv(CON), 2010 WL 2737153, slip op. 1, at 49 (2d Cir. July 13, 2010); McComish, 611 F.3d at 524, (acknowledging but not finding constitutionally significant the loss of competitive advantage in elections); N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 437 (4th Cir.2008) (same); Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 464-65 (1st Cir.2000) (same). We agree with Scott and the district court that, under Davis, the burden of Scott's right of free speech is substantial. Davis, a candidate for the United States House of Representatives, sued to enjoin enforcement of section 319(a) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, otherwise known as the Millionaire's Amendment. 128 S.Ct. at 2766-67. Section 319(a) provided that, if Davis spent enough of his own personal funds in support of his candidacy so that he could be described as self-financing, his opponent could accept campaign contributions of up to $6,900. Id. at 2766 & n. 5. Davis would still have been limited to accepting campaign contributions of $2,300 or less. Id. at 2766. Davis alleged that the asymmetrical contribution limits that applied when he self-funded his campaign unconstitutionally burdened his right to make unlimited expenditures in support of his campaign because making expenditures that create the imbalance has the effect of enabling his opponent to raise more money and to use that money to finance speech that counteracts and thus diminishes the effectiveness of his own speech. Id. at 2770. The Supreme Court agreed with this argument and invalidated the Millionaire's Amendment because it did not satisfy a compelling government interest. Id. at 2772-74. Davis described as an unprecedented penalty, a special and potentially significant burden, a drag, an abridgment, and a substantial burden the grant of the right to an opponent to raise funds under a relaxed contribution cap. Id. at 2771-72. That is, a candidate exercising his right to spend without restriction his personal funds on his campaign is burdened substantially when his opponent is permitted the opportunity to raise more money than he otherwise would have been permitted to raise. Like both the district court and the Second Circuit, we conclude that the burden that an excess spending subsidy imposes on nonparticipating candidates is harsher than the penalty in Davis, as it leaves no doubt that the nonparticipants' opponents will receive additional money. Green Party, ___ F.3d at ___, slip op. at 49 (emphasis omitted). Although Davis concerned a discriminatory contribution system that burdened a self-funding candidate, what triggered strict scrutiny was the grant of a competitive advantagean increase in the ability of Davis's opponent to speak. 128 S.Ct. at 2772 ([T]he vigorous exercise of the right to use personal funds to finance campaign speech produces fundraising advantages for opponents in the competitive context of electoral politics.). Davis also cited Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1359-60 (8th Cir.1994), which involved a subsidy to publicly financed candidates that was tied to independent expenditures against those candidates, for the proposition that the Millionaire's Amendment imposed a special and potentially significant burden. 128 S.Ct. at 2772. That is, the Supreme Court equated the Millionaire's Amendment with a statute that enabled the opponent of a complaining candidate. Moreover, we doubt that the Court would describe as such a significant burden the relaxation of a contribution limit that only ever applies to candidates who, by definition, are mostly not relying on contributions. Finally, the majority opinion in Davis, after establishing that the Millionaire's Amendment warranted strict scrutiny, all but stated that it was not thinking about the law in terms of contribution limits. See id. at 2772 n. 7 (Even if § 319(a) were characterized as a limit on contributions rather than expenditures, it is doubtful whether it would survive.). Although under Davis the subsidy must be justified by a compelling state interest, id. at 2772 (internal quotation marks omitted), the Secretary and McCollum insist that the subsidy satisfies that test. They argue that the excess spending subsidy furthers the interest of the state in fighting corruption and the appearance of corruption, which the Supreme Court has suggested is probably the only compelling interest that can justify a substantial burden on expenditures. See id. at 2773 (citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 428, 120 S.Ct. 897, 926, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ([P]reventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances. (internal quotation marks omitted))). The Secretary and McCollum contend that the subsidy furthers the anticorruption interest by encouraging participation in the public campaign financing system of Florida, which in turn prevents corruption or the appearance of corruption. This argument is not novel. See Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940, 947 (6th Cir.1998); cf. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 514-18, 105 S.Ct. 1459, 1477-79, 84 L.Ed.2d 455 (1985) (White, J., dissenting). We are willing to assume, for the sake of argument, that the subsidy encourages participation in the public financing system of Florida. See Gable, 142 F.3d at 950. The parties have not sufficiently explained how the Florida public financing system furthers the anticorruption interest. As we understand the system, it enables candidates who are willing to accept limits on personal expenditures and campaign expenditures, and it grants participating candidates public money. In all other respects, the system enables candidates who run campaigns that are indistinguishable from the campaigns of nonparticipants like Scott. At this early stage, we outline our concerns as follows. The limit that the public campaign financing system imposes on the personal expenditures of participating candidates does not appear to reduce corruption or the appearance of corruption. The Supreme Court has explained that the use of personal funds reduces the candidate's dependence on outside contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of abuse of campaign contributions. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 53, 96 S.Ct. at 651. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in Davis when it held that discouraging the use of personal funds by wealthy candidates for federal office disserves the anticorruption interest. 128 S.Ct. at 2773. Thus, by encouraging individuals to accept a limit on personal expenditures, the subsidy does not appear to reduce corruption. The limit on general campaign expenditures also does not appear to enable candidates who are, or may be perceived as being, less corrupt than their nonparticipating peers. As we have explained, in Florida, every candidate for public office, whether participating or not, is subject to a $500 limit on campaign contributions. Fla. Stat. § 106.08(1)(a). And when contributions are so limited, the Supreme Court has told us that a limit on general campaign expenditures does not serve the anticorruption interest. The major evil associated with rapidly increasing campaign expenditures is the danger of candidate dependence on large contributions. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55, 96 S.Ct. at 652. And [t]he interest in alleviating the corrupting influence of large contributions is served by ... contribution limitations. Id. Indeed, in a state like Florida that aggressively limits campaign contributions, general campaign expenditures, excepting those of self-funding candidates, reflect the size and intensity of the candidate's support. Id. at 56, 96 S.Ct. at 652. At bottom, the Florida public campaign financing system appears primarily to advantage candidates with little money or who exercise restraint in fundraising. That is, the system levels the electoral playing field, and that purpose is constitutionally problematic. Id. at 56-57, 96 S.Ct. at 652-53. The Supreme Court explained in Davis, [d]ifferent candidates have different strengths and [l]eveling electoral opportunities means making and implementing judgments about which strengths should be permitted to contribute to the outcome of an election. 128 S.Ct. at 2773-74; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 56-57, 96 S.Ct. at 653 ([T]he equalization of permissible campaign expenditures might serve not to equalize the opportunities of all candidates, but to handicap a candidate who lacked substantial name recognition or exposure of his views before the start of the campaign.). The Supreme Court has explained that a state cannot burden a candidate's First Amendment rights for the reason that, in Scott's words, he is a newcomer to the political scene who has the financial resources to mount a credible challenge to entrenched career politicians. None of this is to say that the public financing system of Florida does not benefit the people of Florida or that public financing generally is not a system worthy of public resources. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 92-93, 96 S.Ct. at 670 (explaining that a federal system of public financing of election campaigns represents a legislative effort not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people and thereby furthers ... pertinent First Amendment values). In some circumstances, public financing may serve an anticorruption interest by eliminating the improper influence of large private contributions. Id. at 96, 96 S.Ct. at 671. It is only to say that Florida, in the light of the election laws it has adopted, cannot impose a special and potentially significant burden, Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 2772, on the First Amendment rights of nonparticipating candidates who do not wish, for whatever reason, to accept public money and its attendant limitations on the theory that its public financing system reduces actual or apparent corruption. Perhaps the parties, under the supervision of the district court, may want to develop the record more about this matter. Even if we were certain that the public financing system of Florida furthers an anticorruption interest, we agree that Scott has proved a likelihood that the excess spending subsidy is not the least restrictive means of encouraging that participation. Scott argues that Florida can effectively encourage participation in innumerable ways. Scott contends that Florida could provide a larger initial grant of public funds to participating candidates, increase the amount of its matching contributions on qualifying fundraising, or institute progressively higher matching ratios for participating candidates who prove able to raise money from contributors. Scott also does not object to the provision that releases McCollum from the expenditure ceiling that applies to publicly funded candidates after Scott exceeds that same ceiling. Although at some point even enticements not tied to protected speech might render a voluntary public financing system that includes expenditure limits compulsory in violation of the First Amendment, e.g., N.C. Right to Life Comm., 524 F.3d at 436, we accept for purposes of this appeal Scott's concession that Florida could implement these rules. We agree with Scott that Florida could encourage participation to virtually the same degree that it maintains it currently does by doing no more than releasing participating candidates from the expenditure ceiling. This release would place participating and nonparticipating candidates on equal footing, except that participating candidates could not spend as much of their own personal resources in support of their campaigns. So the only prospective candidates who would resist participating under this system would be the wealthy, who already have less incentive to join. Consequently, this system would be no less effective than the system currently in place, but would burden nonparticipating candidates to a lesser degree. Florida has given us no reason to think that this system would be less effective, which is its burden when one of its laws is subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. E.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816-17, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 1887-88, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000). In sum, Davis requires that Florida justify the excess spending subsidy by establishing that it furthers a compelling state interest. Florida has stated that the excess spending subsidy furthers its anticorruption interest by encouraging participation in its public financing system. Florida has not, however, proved that the excess spending subsidy furthers the anticorruption interest in the least restrictive manner. Scott is likely to prevail on the merits of his claim.