Opinion ID: 4509604
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: LPLA Products-Liability Claim

Text: We now proceed to the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the merits of the products-liability claim. As previously discussed, Plaintiffs were required to show that (1) a characteristic of Axon’s parts proximately caused the damage; (2) the damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the parts; and (3) the parts at issue were unreasonably dangerous. See La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.54(A). The district court granted Axon summary judgment because it concluded that Plaintiffs failed to show that a question of material fact existed regarding causation and the unreasonably dangerous nature of the equipment. Axon urges affirmance on these grounds and asserts that the “reasonably anticipated use” prong provides an alternative ground for affirmance. We address each of these elements in turn.
To establish causation, Plaintiffs were required to establish that the equipment Axon worked on proximately caused the blowout. In Louisiana, “[a] proximate cause is generally defined as any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which the result would not have occurred.” Hutto v. McNeil-PPC, Inc., 79 So. 3d 1199, 1213 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Sutton v. Duplessis, 584 So. 2d 362, 365 (La. Ct. App. 1991)). In granting Axon summary judgment, the district court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to meet this burden. It based its decision “for the most part[] 18 The district court’s summary judgment order on causation discusses the exclusion of expert evidence. This order suffers from the same lack-of-reasoned-explanation flaw as the two orders discussed. To the extent this order operates to exclude the expert evidence discussed, it must be vacated as well. 32 Case: 18-20453 Document: 00515318964 Page: 33 Date Filed: 02/21/2020 No. 18-20453 on the SEMS and BSEE Reports and the testimony of Walter’s on[-]site personnel.” The court specifically concluded that “the SEMS Report of findings is unimpeached.” Though not entirely clear, it appears that the district court believed that the SEMS and BSEE reports were dispositive on the issue of causation, and that summary judgment for Axon was therefore appropriate. We disagree. Our de novo review of the evidence finds disputes of material fact regarding causation. First, Plaintiffs produced evidence that the BSRs did not seal the drill pipe as they should have. Defense expert Bill Abel testified that flow from the well through the BOP would have stopped had the BSRs sealed properly. Another witness, Wilson, concurred. And a third witness, Bradley Pitts, testified that after the BSRs had been activated, gas continued to flow up through the rig floor and drill pipe. In fact, Pitts testified that the flow was not coming from the still-open choke line but was “all coming up the annulus . . . [a]nd the drill pipe.” A jury could conclude, based on this evidence, that the BSRs did not seal the drill pipe as they should have. Next, there is evidence that the continued flow from the annulus and drill pipe prevented the crew from successfully shutting in the well. Wilson testified that the crew had been unable to undertake “normal well control procedures” because the flow continued. Abel testified that, after activating the BSRs, the crew’s next step would have been to close the choke line by whatever means necessary. Wilson testified that after the BSRs had been remotely activated, three workers attempted to return to the rig floor, but were unable to because the well started blowing out again. And one of the expert witnesses, Terry Brittenham, stated that it is likely that the crew may have been trying to access the rig floor to manually close the choke valve, and that if they had been able to do so, that would have been enough to stop the blowout had the BOP parts worked as intended. 33 Case: 18-20453 Document: 00515318964 Page: 34 Date Filed: 02/21/2020 No. 18-20453 This evidence creates a material fact dispute that precludes summary judgment. A fact-finder could reasonably conclude, based on this evidence, that the alleged defect in the BSRs prevented the flow from stopping after the BSRs had been activated. The fact-finder could also conclude that the continued flow prevented the rig crew from being able to manually close the choke flow path. In other words, a fact-finder could conclude that the alleged BSR defect was a “cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause,” produced the blowout and that without the BSR defect the blowout would have been contained. Hutto, 79 So. 3d at 1213. While other evidence also suggests that crew error may have been an additional cause of the blowout, a reasonable fact-finder still could conclude that a non-defective BOP would have, under the circumstances, allowed the crew to prevent the blowout. See Stewart v. Capital Safety USA, 867 F.3d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 2017) (“To find injury causation here, a jury would at least have to conclude that a different lifeline cable or a different warning would have, under the circumstances of this accident, prevented [the accident].”). A jury could have returned a verdict in Plaintiffs’ favor on this issue, see Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, and we therefore hold that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in Axon’s favor on the issue of causation.
The district court also granted Axon summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to create a question of material fact on the “unreasonably dangerous condition” prong of the LPLA test. Because the court gave no reasons for doing so, however, we cannot know the basis for its ruling. When ruling on a summary judgment motion, “[t]he court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). This court has “many times emphasized the importance of a detailed discussion by the trial judge.” McIncrow v. Harris County, 878 F.2d 835, 835– 34 Case: 18-20453 Document: 00515318964 Page: 35 Date Filed: 02/21/2020 No. 18-20453 36 (5th Cir. 1989). When district courts have failed to do so, we have on occasion vacated and remanded. See D’Onofrio v. Vacation Publ’ns, Inc., 888 F.3d 197, 210 n.13 (5th Cir. 2018) (district court erred by “failing to state the reasons for granting summary judgment . . . as is required by Rule 56(a)”); Baker v. TDCJ-CID, 774 F. App’x 198, 199 (5th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (same). However, because our review here is de novo, we need not vacate and remand if we can ourselves determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Vacatur and remand is appropriate here for two reasons. First, the district court’s opinion is “pithy to the point of being incomplete.” Myers v. Gulf Oil Corp., 731 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir. 1984). The entire ruling consists of a single sentence. Second, vacatur here is appropriate because of our decision to vacate the exclusion of Bellemare’s testimony. Cf. 103 Inv’rs I, L.P. v. Square D Co., 372 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Because the decision to grant summary judgment was premised upon its exclusion of the expert reports, we REVERSE the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment . . . .”). As we previously noted, Bellemare’s testimony forms much of Plaintiffs’ case on this issue. Thus the district court’s decision regarding Bellemare’s testimony will have a substantial impact on the appropriateness of summary judgment. We express no view on the outcome of the issue, but vacate so that the district court, having reviewed anew the admissibility of Bellemare’s testimony, can then explain its decision on this issue. 35 Case: 18-20453 Document: 00515318964 Page: 36 Date Filed: 02/21/2020 No. 18-20453
Axon next offers the LPLA’s “reasonably anticipated use” prong as an alternate ground for affirmance. We hold that questions of fact exist on this issue as well and that summary judgment is therefore inappropriate. 19 Axon makes two primary contentions. First, it asserts that the BOP and BSRs are blowout preventers, but not blowout stoppers. Thus, the argument goes, using the BSRs to stop a blowout already in progress is not a reasonably anticipated use. Second, it asserts that it was not reasonably anticipated that the BSRs would be used in a situation where a rig crew attempted to close the BSRs but not the HCR valve. 20 Fact questions exist on both issues. Louisiana defines “reasonably anticipated use” as “a use or handling of a product that the product’s manufacturer should reasonably expect of an ordinary person in the same or similar circumstances.” La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.53(7). Obviously dangerous uses and uses contrary to industry practice are not reasonably anticipated. Kampen v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 157 F.3d 306, 312 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 19 Axon believes Underwriters has waived its arguments on this issue because Underwriters’ opening brief did not spend much time on it. We disagree. The district court’s summary judgment decision did not rest on the reasonably anticipated use prong, and so Underwriters had no occasion to address it in its opening brief. After Axon raised the issue as an alternative ground for affirmance, Underwriters sufficiently addressed the issue in its reply. That distinguishes this case from the case Axon cites, MM Steel, L.P. v. JSW Steel (USA) Inc., 771 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2014). There, the petitioner “d[id] not brief [the waived] argument beyond [a] conclusory statement” and a citation to an unpublished district court order containing no reasoning on the point. Id. at 303 n.2. That is not the case here. 20 Axon also asserts that it was not reasonably anticipated that the crew would use the BSRs in a situation in which the accumulator—the device that operated the BSRs— malfunctioned. But Axon never made that argument in the district court. Its summary judgment motion on the “reasonably anticipated use” prong did not make arguments regarding the accumulator. “Arguments not raised in the district court cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal.” Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 669 (5th Cir. 2004). We therefore do not consider this argument. 36 Case: 18-20453 Document: 00515318964 Page: 37 Date Filed: 02/21/2020 No. 18-20453 Courts do not define a product’s “use” at a high level of generality and may consider the user’s negligent conduct. Id. Plaintiffs produced evidence that would allow a fact-finder to conclude that the rig crew’s attempt to use the BSRs to stop the in-progress blowout was reasonably anticipated. Axon contends that “the evidence shows that no one expects BOPs to be operated during a blowout.” But the report of one of Plaintiffs’ experts, Sones, 21 stated that BOPs are regularly used in the industry to prevent blowouts in progress. In fact, the report states that “situations involving the decision to activate blind shear rams are even more likely to occur when a well is already flowing, possibly even flowing onto the rig floor, as this closure is considered a last resort. . . . There is little if any reason to use the shear/blind rams if a well is not flowing.” For that reason, the report opines that it is often expected that the well will be flowing when the BSRs are activated. The expert thus testified that the crew’s actions were “reasonable and consistent with industry standards.” Regarding Axon’s second contention—i.e., that it was not anticipated that the crew would try to close the BSRs while leaving the HCR valve open— Plaintiffs’ expert testified that the rig crew’s actions were “normal in the industry.” The testimony was that during a “soft shut in” procedure, the crew would have closed the annular first, followed by the other rams, and then the HCR valve would have been closed last. This procedure, the expert testified, is “normal” and “a reasonable method for controlling a kick.” A jury could conclude, based on this expert evidence, that the rig crew’s use of the BOP and BSRs in an attempt to stop an in-progress blowout was 21 Although Axon moved to strike deposition testimony from Sones that it argued constituted new opinions not found in his original report, it never moved to strike his original expert report, the source of this testimony. 37 Case: 18-20453 Document: 00515318964 Page: 38 Date Filed: 02/21/2020 No. 18-20453 reasonably anticipated. Summary judgment is thus inappropriate on this element of Plaintiffs’ LPLA claim. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248.