Opinion ID: 799033
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Robbins's testimony was inadmissible for other reasons

Text: Qualifying an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education is only the first hurdle to clear under Rule 702. An expert's proposed testimony must meet two additional requirements to be admissible: it must be (1) relevant, meaning that the testimony will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, and (2) reliable. Fed.R.Evid. 702; see also In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 529 (6th Cir.2008). In making these dual determinations, the district court acts in the role of `gatekeeper' and must evaluat[e] the relevance and reliability of proffered expert testimony with heightened care. Surles, 474 F.3d at 295. The court below evaluated the relevance and reliability of Robbins's testimony and concluded that the testimony was in some places irrelevant, in some places unreliable, and in some places both. This conclusion provides an adequate basis for excluding the testimony and was not an abuse of discretion. To begin with, Robbins's proposed testimony was rooted in the belief that the state-court lawsuit was settled as a quasi-class action. That belief was in direct conflict with the district court's legal conclusion that the case was settled as an aggregate settlement, and thus Robbins's opinions relating to class actionsincluding how they are usually settled, the frequency of cy pres distributions in class-action settlements, and the rights of class memberswould have been both irrelevant and confusing to the jury. Moreover, Robbins's testimony from the first trial contained numerous misstatements of the law. He took the position, for example, that even if Kentucky's aggregate-settlement rule applied to the settlement, the defendants did not have to comply with the rule because, [i]n my opinion, it would have been extremely risky for these lawyers to disclose the entire settlement amount to these claimants. And in my opinion, I think it has little, if no relevance to the claimants. Robbins also explained that the defendants did not need to provide notice to the class prior to the dismissal of the class action. Both of these statements are in conflict with Kentucky law. See Ky. Sup.Ct. R. 3.130(1.8)(g) (the aggregate-settlement rule); Ky. R. Civ. P. 23.05 (requiring notice prior to the dismissal of a class action). Robbins's report contained additional legal misstatements. To take just one example, he believed that the defendants were justified in retaining certain payments above and beyond the percentages set forth in the settlement agreements, in part because he read the side letter's indemnity provision as placing no limitation on the amount of potential indemnification. But this is not a correct interpretation of the side letter. The last sentence of the side letter makes clear that the Settling Attorney and Settling Claimants shall not be obligated to indemnify AHP for attorneys fees and expenses nor for any amount in excess of $7,500,000.  (Emphasis added.) This sentence places a hard cap on any indemnification amount and, properly understood, did not give the defendants license to set aside more than $7,500,000 of the settlement amount to cover potential indemnification. Gallion testified that he somehow misread or misunderstood the side letter's final sentence. But Robbins did not seek to testify as to Gallion's understanding of the side letter at the time that it was signed (about which Robbins was in no position to know). Robbins instead sought to testify as to the legal effect of the document. On this point, he was simply wrong. And the district judgethe only person in the courtroom vested with the authority to definitively interpret the lawdid not abuse his discretion by excluding this and other legal misstatements under Rule 702. Finally, in his report, Robbins offered his opinion that the defendants lacked the requisite criminal intent to defraud. The district court properly refused to admit this opinion and others like it on the ground that they were impermissible under Rule 704(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Fed.R.Evid. 704(b) (In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.). Despite all these problems with Robbins's testimony, the defendants nevertheless lodge three objections to the district court's decision to exclude the same. The first concerns the timing of the district court's memorandum opinion, which was released a few minutes after the Daubert hearing had concluded. According to the defendants, the district court erred by arriving at the hearing with a written opinion already in hand, particularly because there was no expectation that the judge would immediately issue a ruling at the end of the hearing. But even if, under such circumstances, the better practice is for judges to prepare their written opinions after having had the benefit of hearing the parties orally argue their positions, this does not mean that the district court erred by not doing so here. The defendants cite no authority for the proposition that a district court's decision to prepare an opinion in advance of a hearing is grounds to set aside that opinion on appeal. This proposition seems especially dubious in the context of a Daubert hearing, a hearing that this court has held is not even required where the record on the expert testimony was extensive, and the Daubert issue was fully briefed. In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 532 (6th Cir.2008). The district judge here presumably used the Daubert hearing as a final opportunity for the defendants to dissuade him from the analysis set forth in the tentative opinion, an endeavor in which they were obviously unsuccessful. Their lack of success, however, provides them with no basis to set aside the ruling. We therefore reject the defendants' first argument. The defendants' second argument is that, even if Robbins's testimony contained incorrect statements of the law and other inadmissible opinions, the district court should have simply limited Robbins's testimony on those particular areas rather than reject his opinions wholesale. But we find this argument equally unpersuasive. The court undertook a thorough analysis of nearly every sentence of Robbins's report and provided adequate reasons for excluding all of his major points. Had Robbins's testimony been limited to what the court concluded was permissible, he would have been left with nothing useful to tell the jury. The district court did not abuse its discretion by preventing this pointless exercise. This leads to the last of the defendants's objectionsthat the jury should have been allowed to hear Mr. Robbins' testimony on the actual practice of attorneys, as opposed to merely [the] `ivory tower' ideals of the government's expert witness, Professor Howard M. Erichson. Professor Erichson testified that, based on his review of the documents related to the state-court action and on his expertise as a law professor specializing in complex litigation and legal ethics, he was of the opinion that the case was settled not as a class action but as an aggregate settlement. He further testified regarding the ethical obligations that arose as a consequence of this determination, including the defendants' duty to comply with Kentucky's aggregate-settlement rule. The district court allowed Professor Erichson's testimony because the court concluded that he had accurately stated the law and that his testimony would be helpful to the jury. Although the defendants may see this as expressing a preference for ivory tower ideals, the district judge was under no obligation to allow into evidence irrelevant, unreliable, and potentially confusing testimony for the sole purpose of leveling the playing field. The judge had the authority to agree with one side and not the other on a particular interpretation of the law. In sum, the court did not abuse its considerable discretion in prohibiting Robbins from testifying as an expert witness.