Opinion ID: 2994698
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Felony Conviction

Text: Under Massachusetts law, simple assault and battery is a misdemeanor punishable by up to 2 years’ imprisonment. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, sec. 13A; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 274, sec. 1. Jones argues that because his offense of conviction is a misdemeanor under Massachusetts law, it should not be considered a felony under the career offender guideline. The problem for Jones is that the Sentencing Guidelines adopt an independent felony/misdemeanor classification system for purposes of that guideline. The Guidelines define prior felony conviction, as that term is used in USSG sec. 4B1.1, to mean a prior adult federal or state conviction for an offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, regardless of whether such offense is specifically designated as a felony and regardless of the actual sentence imposed. USSG sec. 4B1.2, comment. (n.1). And, all of the courts that have considered the question have concluded that the only relevant consideration in determining whether a prior conviction is a felony conviction is whether the offense of conviction is punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year. United States v. Dorsey, 174 F.3d 331, 332 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Baker, 961 F.2d 1390, 1392 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 763 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Pinckney, 938 F.2d 519, 521-22 (4th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Belanger, 936 F.2d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1991) (suggesting in dicta such a conclusion). It simply does not matter whether state law classifies the offense as a misdemeanor or a felony. Jones offers a different reading of the Guidelines’ definition of prior felony conviction. He contends that the definition is simply a default rule applicable only to crimes that are not specifically designated as felonies or misdemeanors--that is, crimes defined by so-called wobbler statutes, which provide that a crime may be a felony or a misdemeanor depending on the length of the sentence imposed, see United States v. Hester, 917 F.2d 1083, 1086- 87 (8th Cir. 1990) (dissenting opinion) (discussing a wobbler statute). Under his view, federal courts must, in all other situations, respect the felony/misdemeanor designation state law gives the crime in question. We cannot accept Jones’s reading of the definition of prior felony conviction. To begin with, his reading disregards the significance of the first clause of the definition, a prior adult federal or state conviction for an offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, a clause that is not limited or qualified in any way by the remaining portions of the definition. To the contrary, the regardless clauses that follow emphasize that the definition is as broad as it reads. Jones’s reading also ignores the fact that the provision at issue is a definition, not a default rule. It purports to establish, for all cases, what qualifies as a prior felony conviction under the career offender guideline. Put simply, Jones’s reading of the definition of prior felony conviction takes the specifically designated clause out of context and then overemphasizes its importance. Beyond being more textually sound, our reading of the definition of prior felony conviction also makes considerable sense. By ignoring how crimes in different jurisdictions are classified and looking instead to what punishment is authorized, a court can avoid the vagaries of sentencing defendants on the basis of idiosyncratic or unusual felony/misdemeanor classifications. It seems likely to us that the punishment chosen for a crime will more accurately and equitably reflect, for cross- jurisdictional purposes, the seriousness of that crime than will the crime’s felony/misdemeanor classification. As such, looking to the punishment authorized is more consistent with the goal of the Sentencing Guidelines to treat similarly situated defendants similarly. Cf. United States v. Shannon, 110 F.3d 382, 386 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citing the Guidelines’ goal of bringing about a reasonable uniformity in federal sentencing as a reason for rejecting mechanical reliance on state law in determining whether statutory rape is a crime of violence); United States v. Unthank, 109 F.3d 1205, 1211 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that, in order to maintain uniformity in the application of the Guidelines, this court has rejected attempts to sidestep the career offender provisions of the Guidelines based on minor, non-substantive differences in the way that a particular crime is designated or labeled by a state). Finally, we must also reject Jones’s alternative argument on this issue, that the definition of prior felony conviction is ambiguous and therefore, pursuant to the rule of lenity, must be read in favor of defendants. Any ambiguity created by the specifically designated clause is definitively resolved by placing that clause in context. As we have already explained, the rest of the definition and the broader purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines both indicate that the definition of prior felony conviction should be read to require courts to look only to the punishment authorized for a crime in determining whether that crime is a felony. Because the only thing that matters in determining whether a conviction is a felony conviction for purposes of the career offender guideline is whether the offense of conviction is punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, and because Massachusetts law authorizes a sentence of up to 2 years’ imprisonment for assault and battery, the district court did not err in holding that Jones’s assault and battery conviction is a felony conviction.