Opinion ID: 1159199
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Probable Cause To Search Snedeker Home.

Text: A further requirement for a valid search warrant is that the warrant be based on a showing of probable cause that the items to be seized are located at the place to be searched. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, supra . We find that the magistrate had probable cause to believe that Snedeker lived in the house to be searched under the proposed warrant. However, Allred did not state specific reasons to indicate why he considered that the property was located in that house. This is not fatal to the validity of the warrant. The circumstances and the reasonable inferences therefrom may be called upon to support the magistrate's decision. In United States v. Mulligan, 488 F.2d 732, 736 (9th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 930, 94 S.Ct. 2640, 41 L.Ed.2d 233 (1974), the court considered a similar problem and stated: Although there was no direct evidence that any evidence from the burglary was inside Dinsio's residence, there was sufficient evidence from which the magistrate could use his common sense to infer that the loot and tools, if not buried, were probably in the house. [Citation omitted.] In United States v. Lucarz, supra , thirty-six envelopes containing $29,000 in cash were stolen from the post office. The court held that the value and bulk of the stolen items would sustain an inference that they were at the defendant's home. The court in Lucarz, supra, at 1055, said: The situation here does not differ markedly from other cases wherein this court and others, albeit usually without discussion, have upheld searches although the nexus between the items to be seized and the place to be searched rested not on direct observation, as in the normal search-and-seizure case, but on the type of crime, the nature of the missing items, the extent of the suspect's opportunity for concealment, and normal inferences as to where a criminal would be likely to hide stolen property. United States v. Teller, 412 F.2d 374 (7th Cir.1969); Aron v. United States, 382 F.2d 965 (8th Cir.1967); Anderson v. United States, 344 F.2d 792 (10th Cir.1965); Porter v. United States, 335 F.2d 602 (9th Cir.1964). In the instant case, the affidavit gave probable cause to believe that defendant still possessed a large amount of valuable ammunition and supplies. It was a reasonable inference that the valuable property would be kept at his house. United States v. Rahn, 511 F.2d 290 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825, 96 S.Ct. 41, 46 L.Ed.2d 42 (1975); United States v. Samson, 533 F.2d 721 (1st Cir.1976). If stolen property is not inherently incriminating and there is probable cause to believe a suspect has committed the theft, the magistrate can assume that the property will be found at the suspect's residence. Rosillo v. State, 278 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1979). See also United States v. Rahn, supra . We must always remember that we are considering the probable thought processes of the magistrate as he examined the affidavit for search warrant. He must have thought Snedeker had the property. Would he keep it at his home, as suggested in the affidavit? If not, what other inferences were available? Would Snedeker bury the valuable munitions, place them in a bank vault, or leave them with someone else? The existence of more than one inference does not ipso facto deny the magistrate a choice. He may choose a reasonable inference from among them and his choice is to be sustained on appeal unless it is otherwise proved to be suspect. United States v. Lucarz, supra . See Spinelli v. United States, supra . In our case the magistrate had probable cause to think that Snedeker would have this material in his house because of its value and bulk and because the presence of the property there would not be incriminatory. Considering the facts and reasonable inferences drawn from them, we find that the affidavit did establish probable cause for issuance of the warrant. In this respect, we reverse the Court of Appeals and the trial court. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that the evidence seized during the second search was inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Nardone v. United States, supra . The first search was constitutionally sound. We reverse the Court of Appeals and the trial court concerning suppression of evidence seized in the second search. The State did not take issue with the holding of the Court of Appeals concerning evidence seized in the third search. On this point we do not disturb the ruling of the Court of Appeals. This cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. IT IS SO ORDERED. PAYNE, FEDERICI and RIORDAN, JJ., concur.