Opinion ID: 4521869
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Withdrawal from Conspiracy

Text: On the charge of conspiracy to commit murder, the trial court instructed the jury on seven overt acts allegedly committed for the purpose of furthering the object of Pamela’s murder, including defendant’s act of paying Moya $25,000 to arrange the murder of Pamela. At defendant’s request, the court instructed the jury on CALJIC No. 6.20 (Withdrawal from 39 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. Conspiracy), which provides in pertinent part: “In order to effectively withdraw from a conspiracy, there must be an affirmative and good-faith rejection or repudiation of the conspiracy which must be communicated to the other conspirators of whom he has knowledge. [¶] If a member of a conspiracy has effectively withdrawn from the conspiracy, he is not thereafter liable for any act of the co-conspirators committed after his withdrawal from the conspiracy, but he is not relieved of responsibility for the acts of his co-conspirators committed while he was a member.” On appeal, relying on People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124 (Russo), defendant argues that the trial court erroneously failed to instruct the jury that it had to unanimously decide which specific overt act was committed before defendant could no longer withdraw from the conspiracy. As relevant here, a “jury need not agree on a specific overt act as long as it unanimously finds beyond a reasonable doubt that some conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” (Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1128.) In Russo, we raised the possibility that “some form of a unanimity instruction” may be necessary if there was evidence that a defendant had withdrawn from the conspiracy. (Id. at p. 1136, fn. 2.) In that instance, “the court might have to require the jury to agree an overt act was committed before the withdrawal.” (Ibid.) We declined to address the question because no such circumstance existed in the case. (Ibid.) Defendant’s reliance on Russo is misplaced. There is no dispute that defendant’s alleged withdrawal from the conspiracy occurred after the first overt act took place. By demanding that Moya return the $25,000 defendant had already paid him to kill 40 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. Pamela—which defendant asserts supports his claim that he withdrew from the conspiracy—defendant effectively concedes that he committed the first overt act, i.e., payment to Moya in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit murder. “[O]nce an overt act has been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy the crime of conspiracy has been completed and no subsequent action by the conspirator can change that.” (People v. Sconce (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 693, 702.);