Opinion ID: 6320161
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: New Sexual Assault Allegations

Text: On October 5, 2018, the Yale Daily News reported new sexual assault accusations against Khan by a man—not a Yale student—who https://uwc.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/UWC%20Procedures.pdf (now listing “concurrent criminal investigation” among “good causes” for extending disciplinary proceeding timelines). Because no party to this appeal relies on this provision in their arguments to this court, we do not consider it further. 4 Khan does not sue Doe for statements made at trial, conceding that such testimony is shielded by absolute judicial immunity. See, e.g., Bruno v. Travelers Cos., 172 Conn. App. 717, 727-29, 161 A.3d 630 (App. Ct. 2017) (affirming application of absolute immunity to testimony of witness in Superior Court hearing); Doe v. Roe, No. CV165037281, 2017 WL 3248167, at -2 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 3, 2017) (dismissing complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on absolute immunity, where plaintiff claimed defamation in defendants’ testimony in legal proceeding). 7 claimed Khan had assaulted him on a number of occasions at locations outside Connecticut. 5 The day the article was published, Yale police and administrators contacted Khan to see if he was unduly distressed so as to require professional help. Khan assured them that he was not distressed but agreed to a mental health consultation at the Yale infirmary. Khan asserts that the consultation indicated no cause for concern. Two days later, however, on Sunday morning, October 7, 2018, Yale administrators requested a meeting with Khan. When Khan refused, a letter from a Yale dean (defendant Marvin Chun) was hand-delivered to Khan advising him that his immediate suspension from the university and exclusion from campus were “necessary for your physical and emotional safety and well-being and/or the safety and well-being of the university community.” Compl. ¶ 64. Thereafter, Khan was not permitted to return to Yale’s campus until November 2018, when Yale resumed its sexual misconduct disciplinary proceeding against Khan based on Doe’s 2015 complaint. IV. Yale Disciplinary Proceeding on Doe’s Sexual Assault Claim Yale’s Sexual Misconduct Policy Yale’s disciplinary proceeding against Khan was conducted pursuant to the university’s formal Sexual Misconduct Policy, adopted in or about 2011. Because Khan asserts that this policy was prompted by communications that Yale received from the United 5 Khan asserts that these accusations did not prompt any criminal charges or university disciplinary proceedings against him. 8 States Department of Education Office for Civil Rights (“DOE”), we briefly summarize those communications at the outset.
In a communication dated April 4, 2011, DOE advised colleges and universities generally that their continued receipt of federal funding under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1861 et seq., required them to take more rigorous action against sexual misconduct on their campuses. This communication, which came widely to be known as the “Dear Colleague Letter,” told schools that to avoid themselves being charged with sexual harassment in violation of Title IX, they were obliged “to take immediate action” to address, prevent, and eliminate peer sexual misconduct about which they “know[] or reasonably should know.” App’x at 90. 6 Toward that end, the letter instructed schools, inter alia, “to adopt and publish grievance procedures,” and to provide employee training with respect to “report[ing]” and “respond[ing] properly” to sexual misconduct. Id. In so instructing, the letter emphasized that a school’s investigation of sexual misconduct “is different from any law enforcement investigation.” Id. Thus, while stating that parties should be afforded “the opportunity . . . to present witnesses and other evidence,” id. at 95, the letter made 6 The “Dear Colleague Letter” was not promulgated through the formal rulemaking process. See 5 U.S.C. § 553; see also Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Overreach and Innovation in Equality Regulation, 66 DUKE L.J. 1771, 1779-81 (2017) (noting criticism of DOE’s avoidance of formal rulemaking in issuing “Dear Colleague Letter”). Thus, the letter is properly understood simply to provide “guidance.” See App’x at 87 (“This letter does not add requirements to applicable law, but provides information and examples to inform recipients about how OCR evaluates whether covered entities are complying with their legal obligations.”). 9 no mention of such presentation needing to be under oath, subject to confrontation, or consistent with any particular evidentiary standards of reliability. Indeed, the letter “strongly discourage[d] schools from allowing the parties personally to question or cross-examine each other during the hearing” and advised schools that they did not have to permit parties to be represented by attorneys. Id. at 98. The letter also instructed schools to use “a preponderance of the evidence standard to evaluate [sexual misconduct] complaints,” rejecting the higher “‘clear and convincing’ standard” then being “used by some schools.” Id. at 96-97. 7 7 Several provisions in the “Dear Colleague Letter” prompted controversy, such that the letter, issued during the Obama administration, was rescinded by the Trump administration in 2017 (i.e., before Khan’s 2018 disciplinary hearing). See Letter from Candice Jackson, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Colleagues (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf. In 2020 (i.e., after Khan’s disciplinary hearing and expulsion), DOE issued final Title IX regulations for how public and private educational institutions receiving federal funds should respond to sexual harassment. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b) (stating that “recipient’s grievance process must comply with the requirements of this section”). Among other things, these regulations require colleges and universities (1) to provide for a live hearing to resolve sexual misconduct complaints, though parties may appear either in person or, at the institution’s discretion, “virtually, with technology enabling participants simultaneously to see and hear each other,” id. § 106.45(b)(6)(i); (2) at the request of either party, to locate the parties “in separate rooms” during a hearing so long as technology permits them “simultaneously [to] see and hear the party or witness answering questions,” id.; (3) to afford respondents a presumption of innocence, see id. § 106.45(b)(1)(iv); (4) to afford complainants and respondents the opportunity for direct crossexamination of witnesses by party advisors (who can be attorneys), see id. § 106.45(b)(6)(i); (5) to provide advisors for parties who do not have one, id.; and (6) to state in writing “[c]onclusions regarding the application of the [school’s] code of conduct to the facts,” id. § 106.45(b)(7)(ii)(D). The Biden administration is 10 In another 2011 communication, this one prompted by a student complaint, DOE advised Yale that it had been deficient in responding to student reports of sexual misconduct. The Complaint does not indicate whether DOE pursued the matter further after Yale adopted its Sexual Misconduct Policy.
Although Khan does not plead Connecticut law’s effect on Yale’s Sexual Misconduct Policy, we take judicial notice that in 2012— i.e., within months of Yale adopting its policy, and almost six years before the university’s 2018 hearing on Doe’s claims against Khan— Connecticut enacted General Statute § 10a-55m. See Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1086 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that court may take judicial notice of law). That law requires all institutions of higher education within the state—private as well as public—to adopt programs for the awareness, prevention, and investigation of sexual assaults. 8 Each covered institution must file with a committee of the Connecticut General Assembly copies of its policies regarding campus sexual misconduct and the materials used presently reconsidering these rules. See Exec. Order No. 14021, 86 Fed. Reg. 13803 (Mar. 8, 2021); Letter from Suzanne B. Goldberg, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ., to Students, Educators, and other Stakeholders (Apr. 6, 2021), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/ correspondence/stakeholders/20210406-titleix-eo-14021.pdf. We need not discuss these policy changes further. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note this history and to credit Khan’s allegation that the “Dear Colleague Letter” informed the formulation of Yale’s Sexual Misconduct Policy. 8 Connecticut’s definition of an “institution of higher education” encompasses both public and private universities. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 10a-55, 10a-173(3). 11 to implement them, and advise as to the number and outcome of any sexual assault, stalking, or intimate partner violence reports made to the institution. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10a-55m(f). 9 In addition to reporting requirements, Connecticut law mandates, among other things, that covered institutions employ an “affirmative consent” standard in reviewing sexual assault claims. Id. § 10a-55m(b)(1)(A). The law defines “affirmative consent” as “an active, clear and voluntary agreement by a person to engage in sexual activity with another,” id. § 10a-55m(a)(1); 10 and precludes finding affirmative consent by a person who was intoxicated or otherwise incapacitated at the time of a sexual encounter, see id. § 10a55m(b)(1)(D). 11 While the law affords parties the right to present 9 Some twenty years earlier, in 1990, Congress had enacted the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092, which requires federally funded colleges and universities publicly to report campus crime and the policies promulgated to ensure safety. That law was amended in 2013 by the Campus Sexual Violence Elimination Act, or Campus SaVE Act (part of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013). See Pub. L. 113-4 § 304, 127 Stat. 54, 89-92 (Mar. 7, 2013). As neither party cites this legislation to this court, we do not here consider how, if at all, it may have informed Yale’s 2011 promulgation of its Sexual Misconduct Policy or the 2018 disciplinary proceeding pursuant to that policy conducted against Khan. Instead, we focus on Connecticut law because of further requirements that we now discuss in text. Connecticut does not require a covered institution to adopt this statutory 10 definition in haec verba as long as it uses a definition with a “substantially similar” meaning. Id. § 10a-55m(h). 11 The provisions regarding affirmative consent were added to the law in 2016, see An Act Concerning Affirmative Consent, 2016 Conn. Legis. Serv. 16-106 (West), i.e., after Doe’s 2015 sexual assault complaint but before Khan’s 2018 disciplinary hearing. Because we have no record of the hearing before us, see infra n. 13, we do 12 witnesses and evidence at any disciplinary hearing and to be accompanied by an advisor, see id. § 10a-55m(b)(6)(C)(i)-(ii), it says nothing about whether the advisor may question witnesses or otherwise speak at the proceedings. Nor does the law impose any oath, confrontation, cross-examination, or other evidentiaryreliability requirements for such hearings. Also, it does not prescribe particular punishments for sexual misconduct established at disciplinary hearings.
Yale’s Sexual Misconduct Policy proscribes its faculty, employees, and students from engaging in sexual misconduct. The policy defines sexual misconduct [to] incorporate[] a range of behaviors including sexual assault (which includes rape, groping and any other nonconsensual sexual contact), sexual harassment, intimate partner violence, stalking, and any other conduct of a sexual nature that is non-consensual, or has the purpose or effect of threatening or intimidating a person or persons. App’x at 75. Otherwise, the policy focuses mainly on procedures for reporting and investigating such misconduct. The policy provides, among other things, for a University-Wide Committee on Sexual Misconduct (“UWC”), consisting of approximately thirty members appointed by Yale’s provost from across the university’s faculty, student body, and managerial or not know what role, if any, the affirmative consent standard (or, indeed, any portion of Connecticut law) played in the hearing. 13 professional employees. 12 Upon the filing of a formal sexual misconduct complaint, the policy calls for the tenured faculty member chairing the UWC to appoint “an impartial fact-finder” to investigate the allegations, as well as five UWC members to constitute a hearing panel (the “UWC hearing panel”) to determine if university policy was violated, and if so, to recommend appropriate discipline. Id. at 79-80. Yale’s policy empowers the appointed fact-finder to “gather documents and conduct interviews as necessary to reach a thorough understanding of the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations of the complaint,” which are then described in a “report” that may also address the credibility of witnesses, but not reach conclusions as to any violation of University policy. Id. at 80. While there is no requirement that statements made or evidence submitted to the fact-finder (or, later, to the UWC hearing panel) be sworn or otherwise satisfy any rules of reliability, Yale policy does state that a “[f]ailure to provide truthful information or any attempt to impede the UWC process may result in a recommendation for a more severe penalty or a referral for discipline.” Id. at 77. 12 All UWC members must participate in training pertaining to University resources for redress of sexual misconduct; sexual misconduct and equal employment, educational, and professional opportunity; methods of informal resolution; the interaction between University disciplinary processes and criminal processes; responding to retaliation; and other topics suggested by experts from within and outside the University. App’x at 77. 14 The fact-finder’s report is transmitted to the UWC hearing panel and to the complainant and respondent (“the parties”), whereupon the panel conducts a hearing “intended primarily” to allow its members “to interview the complainant and the respondent with respect to the fact-finder’s report.” Id. at 80. The parties do “not appear jointly before the panel” unless they expressly agree to do so. Id. Rather, when one is being interviewed by the panel, the other must remain in a separate room with only “audio access to the proceedings.” Id. Preliminary to any panel interview, each party may make a 10-minute preliminary statement, a written copy of which is provided to the other party. The panel alone then poses questions to the party. And while parties may propose questions to the panel, the panel, “at its sole discretion,” decides what questions to ask. Id. The policy appears to afford no opportunity for parties to offer closing statements. Further, while the policy permits parties to be accompanied by an advisor (who may be an attorney) at any step in the disciplinary process, it specifically prohibits an advisor from speaking for a party or offering evidence on his or her behalf. Within 10 days of the final hearing session, the UWC hearing panel must set out its findings of fact and its violation conclusion in a written report to the relevant final Yale decisionmaker who, in the case of an accused student, is “the dean of the respondent’s school.” Id. at 81. Copies of this report are furnished to the parties, who have three days to submit a written response. The decisionmaker then determines whether any further hearings are necessary and, if not, renders a written decision setting forth the decisionmaker’s conclusions as to any violation of Yale’s Sexual Misconduct Policy and any penalties to be imposed. Student parties can appeal a 15 decisionmaker’s determination to Yale’s provost, but only on two grounds: (1) procedural error preventing a fair adjudication, and (2) new evidence not reasonably available at the time of the hearing. Yale’s UWC Proceeding Against Khan In November 2018, a UWC hearing panel convened to consider Doe’s complaint that Khan had sexually assaulted her on campus three years earlier. 13 Both Doe and Khan appeared at the hearing: Khan in person; Doe (who had by this time graduated from Yale) by teleconference from a remote location. Despite the fact that Doe was not physically present, neither Khan nor his attorney-advisor was permitted to be in the hearing room when Doe made her preliminary statement and answered panel questions. Rather, Khan and his attorney were required to remain in another room, provided with only an audio feed of Doe’s appearance. 14 Nor was Khan’s attorney permitted to speak on his client’s behalf or to voice objections to panel questions that Khan now asserts were compound or assumed facts not in evidence. The final UWC hearing panel report is not before this court. Khan, however, asserts that the panel found him to have violated 13We rely on Khan’s complaint in describing the UWC hearing as no transcript of that proceeding is before the court. While Yale policy calls for retention of the “minutes from each UWC hearing session,” App’x at 83, Khan asserts that his request for a transcript or recording at the conclusion of his hearing was denied. 14 Excluding Khan and his attorney from the hearing room during Doe’s appearance is perplexing not only because Doe was not physically present but also because the parties had already testified in each other’s presence at Khan’s criminal trial. 16 Yale’s Sexual Misconduct Policy in his 2015 encounter with Jane Doe, as a result of which Yale expelled him.