Opinion ID: 3009746
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Late Service of the Complaint.

Text: When the district court denied Teleconcepts' motion to dismiss for failure to timely serve the complaint, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j) read in pertinent part: Summons: Time Limit for Service. If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after 16 the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice upon the court's own initiative with notice to such party or upon motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j).0 The district court was thus required to dismiss MCI's action if process was not served within 120 days of the filing of the complaint unless MCI could show good cause for the delinquency. See Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 1304 (3d Cir. 1995). MCI filed its initial summons and complaint on January 15, 1992. The papers were returned unserved by the Mercer County Sheriff's Department marked unable to locate, unknown at address given on February 25, 1992. MCI requested an alias summons on or about March 12, 1992, after it discovered another address for service. The alias summons was returned on an unknown date and forwarded for service on or about May 29, 1992. Service of process was eventually achieved at this alternate address on June 25, 1992, well over a month after the 120 days prescribed by Rule 4(j) had lapsed. MCI never made a request for an extension of time. The district court found that good cause excused the late service, and denied Teleconcepts' motion to dismiss the complaint. Our review of the district court's finding of good 0 As of December 1, 1993, Rule 4(j) was amended and redesignated Rule 4(m). We discuss the significance of this amendment infra. 17 cause is for an abuse of discretion. See Lovelace v. Acme Markets, Inc., 820 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965, 108 S.Ct. 455 (1987); Braxton v. United States, 817 F.2d 238, 242 (3d Cir. 1987). The district court did not articulate the factor(s) it believed constituted good cause. The court initially orally denied Teleconcepts' motion to dismiss during the following exchange in a telephone conference: THE COURT: All right. Now, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 4(j), which provides for dismissal unless good cause be shown. I would like to hear from the defendant before I rule. MR. REILLY: Your Honor, after I received the response from the plaintiff regarding my client's address as 51 Everett Street in Princeton, he informed me that that's been his address. I understand that he may not have been there at the time when the Sheriff initially went out. The problem I have with the argument is that they did serve him eventually at another -- at his residence. THE COURT: Yes. MR. REILLY: And that was some four months after the initial issuance of the summons and complaint, which I still feel is an inordinate amount of time -- THE COURT: Well, I've seen no prejudice. The remedy if good cause were not shown would be dismissal without prejudice and re-service. Under the circumstances, I certainly find good cause has been shown. Motion is denied. The defendant will answer, move or otherwise plead. Subsequently, the district court memorialized this decision in the written order of September 15, 1992. In that order, the 18 court stated merely that good cause had been shown and that the motion to dismiss was denied for the reasons set forth on the record. Although the district court felt that Teleconcepts had not been prejudiced by the late service, absence of prejudice alone can never constitute good cause to excuse late service. See United States v. Nuttall, 122 F.R.D. 163, 166-67 (D. Del. 1988) (courts have considered three factors in determining the existence of good cause: (1) reasonableness of plaintiff's efforts to serve (2) prejudice to the defendant by lack of timely service and (3) whether plaintiff moved for an enlargement of time to serve). We have equated good cause with the concept of excusable neglect of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2), which requires a demonstration of good faith on the part of the party seeking an enlargement and some reasonable basis for noncompliance within the time specified in the rules. See Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1312 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).0 Thus, while the prejudice may tip the 0 Fed. R. Civ. P 6(b) provides in pertinent part: Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be dome where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect . . . . 19 good cause scale, the primary focus is on the plaintiff's reasons for not complying with the time limit in the first place. Such justifications are conspicuously absent in the district court's oral decision and its subsequent written order. Moreover, the briefs to this court are silent on this issue and the parties have therefore not assisted in divining the good cause that the district court found. In addition, our review of the entire record has uncovered only one reference to the good cause which the court may have felt supported late service. In MCI's brief in opposition to Teleconcepts' motion to dismiss MCI states: good cause is shown because service could not be made at the address given as the registered address for service of process at the time the complaint was filed. It was necessary to make additional attempts at service by locating another address and requesting an alias summons. App. at 35. Even if we were to speculate and conclude that this was the basis for the district court's finding of good cause, we would have to conclude that it was an abuse of discretion. The summons was returned unserved on February 28, 1992. MCI learned of Teleconcepts' alternative address as early as March 12, 1992, and requested an alias summons on or about that same date. Inexplicably, the summons was not forwarded for service until on or about May 29, 1992, and not served at this alternate address until June 25, 1992, well beyond the time limit prescribed by Rule 4(j). MCI never moved for an extension of time. 20 Nothing on this record explains why it took MCI over three months after it learned of Teleconcepts' alternate address to serve Teleconcepts. Moreover, the record does not explain why MCI never filed a motion to enlarge the time to serve. See Lovelace, 820 F.2d at 85 (alternative means of service and the ability to extend the time indicate a lack of diligence and weigh against a finding of good cause). Since we are presented with no explanations as to what, if any, circumstances constitute sufficient good cause to excuse MCI's apparent lack of diligence, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in finding that good cause existed to excuse the late service. See Braxton, 817 F.2d at 242 (good cause does not exist when there is an unexplained delinquency on the part of the process server and lack of oversight by counsel). Reversal of a district court's finding that good cause existed to excuse late service results in the dismissal of an action, but such dismissal is without prejudice to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the party can refile the complaint and receive a new 120 day period to serve process. See Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1304 n.6. However, as of December 1, 1993, Rule 4(j) was amended and redesignated Rule 4(m). Rule 4(m) provides, in part, that: If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion, or on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant or direct that service be effectuated within a specified time; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, 21 the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). We recently addressed the significance of this amendment in Petrucelli v. Bohringer, supra. There, we read Rule 4(m) to require a court to extend time if good cause is shown and to allow a court discretion to dismiss or extend time absent a showing of good cause. Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1305. Here the statute of limitations is in issue. In Petrucelli, we emphasized that the expiration of the statute of limitations does not require the court to extend the time for service, as the court has discretion to dismiss the case even if the refiling of the action is barred. See id. at 1306. We also noted that Rule 4(m) should apply retroactively, to all matters pending at the time it became effective insofar as just and practicable. Id. at 1305 (quoting The Order of the United States Supreme Court Adopting and Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (April 22, 1993)). Here, such retroactive application is both just and practicable as the district court has already made a determination that there is some basis to excuse MCI's lack of diligence. As a result, the district court would have discretion to allow MCI's action to proceed upon remand under Rule 4(m) even though we have determined that no good cause was shown under Rule 4(j). [A]s a result of the rule change which led to Rule 4(m), when entertaining a motion to extend time for service, the district court must proceed in the following manner. First, the district court should 22 determine whether good cause exists for an extension of time. If good cause is present, the district court must extend time for service and the inquiry is ended. If, however, good cause does not exist, the court may in its discretion decide whether to dismiss the case without prejudice or extend time for service. Id. at 1305. Moreover, the expiration of the statute of limitations does not prohibit the district court from extending the time for service. See id. at 1305-06. The parties here apparently do not consider the substantive changes to Rule 4(j) significant to our analysis as neither has mentioned the amendment of Rule 4(j) or cited Petrucelli. However, we find Petrucelli's interpretation of the amendment to Rule 4(j) and its retroactive impact dispositive to the issues before us. Accordingly, even though we have determined that the district court abused its discretion in inexplicably finding good cause for MCI's lack of diligence, the retroactive effect of Rule 4(m) means that the district court had the discretion to allow this action to proceed even in the absence of good cause. We view the district court's decision to extend time as an exercise of its discretion under that Rule, and therefore, we affirm the district court's denial of Teleconcepts' motion to dismiss.