Opinion ID: 12484
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Interpretive Principles

Text: Aside from the guidance from the plain language of the statute and the legislative history, the Supreme Court has dictated that the VRRA is to be given as liberal a construction for the benefit of the veteran as a harmonious interplay of the separate provisions permits. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285, 66 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 90 L.Ed. 1230 (1946). Accordingly, Sykes contends that, although VRRA reemployment rights can be an ungainly perquisite of military service ... provisions for benefits to members of the Armed Services are to be construed 15 in the beneficiaries' favor. King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 218-20, 221 n. 9, 112 S.Ct. 570, 573, 574 n. 9, 116 L.Ed.2d 578 (1991); see also Lee v. City of Pensacola, 634 F.2d 886, 889 (5th Cir.1981); Bell v. Aerodex, Inc., 473 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir.1973). We agree. To the extent that section 2024(a) is capable of multiple interpretations, Sykes is quite correct that ambiguities should be resolved in his favor. Given the purpose of the VRRA—and the purpose of the limitation period to limit the time an employer must permit the exercise of reemployment rights—the canon of favorable construction supports Sykes' reading of the section 2024(a) limitations period as including solely post-employment military service.