Opinion ID: 1133622
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Instruction on the Consequences of Reversal of a Death Sentence on Appeal

Text: During its deliberations at the penalty phase, the jury sent a note to the court stating: If the death penalty is overthrown  would [defendant] get life or life without parole. The court had the jurors return to the courtroom, and asked the foreperson to elaborate upon the question. The foreperson responded: What we were concerned with, that in the event that we found the defendant death [ sic ], that if it went to the higher court, if the death penalty was overthrown, would it be life in prison, or would it be just life with possibility of parole? In a conference with the court in chambers, defense counsel requested that the jury be informed that defendant would be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole if a death sentence were overturned on appeal, and that he never would be released from prison. The court refused to give such an instruction, instead telling the jury: I'm not going to answer your question as you put it.... [¶] You are not to speculate or be influenced in making your decision as to what may possibly happen or occur in the future as to any sentence that you impose, [¶] You are ... to determine what you consider to be the proper penalty based upon consideration of all the evidence presented and the instructions given you by the Court. [¶] And it is to be made on the basis that your decision will stand. Approximately 20 minutes later, the jurors sent a note to the court indicating that the jury was unable to arrive at a penalty verdict. The court Rinquired how many jurors would wish to continue deliberations further if the court answered their previous question more fully. One juror responded affirmatively. The court then asked the foreperson whether answering the question more fully would be helpful. The foreperson replied: It's a little more involved than that, your Honor. The people are dictating by their conscience, and it's hard to persuade somebody who is set on the decision. The court excused the jurors for lunch and asked them to consider whether they desired a further answer to their question. Upon resuming their deliberations, the foreperson sent a note to the court that stated: Yes! We would like you to go over our last question[.] Higher court over rules [ sic ] death sentence? The court then read the jurors the following instruction proposed by defense counsel but modified by the court: First of all, you should vote on the assumption that your decision will not be overturned. However, if the Supreme Court should overturn or reverse the death penalty finding, the case would be sent back to the Court for a potential retrial of the penalty phase only. [¶] By the terms of your question, the conviction of guilt would stand. The District Attorney would have the option or decision as to whether to retry the penalty phase, [¶] If the district attorney chose not to retry the penalty phase, the penalty of life imprisonment without parole would stand, [¶] If the District Attorney chooses to retry the penalty phase, the new jury would decide on the penalty only; that is, of the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole. The court then reread to the jury its previous instruction that the jury was not to speculate or be influenced by what may happen in the future regarding any penalty it imposed, and that it should choose the penalty on the basis that its decision would stand. Two minutes after resuming deliberations, the jury informed the court that it had reached a verdict. Defendant contends that the trial court's instruction did not eliminate the jury's confusion regarding the meaning of the term life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He contends the court should have granted defense counsel's request that the jury be informed that under no circumstances could [defendant] get life with parole, and that defendant would never get out of prison. Defendant relies upon Simmons v. South Carolina (1994) 512 U.S. 154, 168-171, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133, in which the high court held that when the prosecution urges a capital jury to sentence a defendant to death because of a potential for future dangerousness, the trial court cannot prevent the jury from learning that the defendant is not eligible for parole. Thus, when the jury in Simmons was required to choose between a death sentence and life imprisonment, prohibiting the defendant from informing the jury that life imprisonment meant life in prison without the possibility of parole resulted in a violation of his right to due process of law. Defendant also asserts that the trial court's failure to define the term life imprisonment without the possibility of parole precluded a reliable sentencing determination, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The prosecutor in the present case urged the jury to return a verdict of death, in part because of the potential that defendant would be dangerous in prison or to society if he escaped. Therefore, under Simmons, defendant was entitled to advise the jury that he was ineligible for parole. On several occasions, however, we have distinguished Simmons on the ground that under California's statutory scheme, the jury expressly is informed of the defendant's ineligibility for parole by the instruction that it must choose between death or confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole; an instruction that such a sentence will inexorably be carried out would be incorrect. ( People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1271, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475 [no error in refusing defense instruction that a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole meant that the defendant never would be paroled]; People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th 619, 687-689, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213 [no sua sponte duty to give such an instruction]; People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th 119, 189-190, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960 [no error in refusing a similar instruction requested by the defendant]; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 715-716, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640 [same]; People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th 92, 172-173, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980 [same]; People v. Padilla, supra, 11 Cal.4th 891, 971-972, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388 [no sua sponte duty to instruct on the meaning of the term].) Defendant contends that our post-Simmons decisions are inapposite because none considered a situation, like the one in the present case, in which the jury expressed confusion regarding the meaning of the term life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. According to defendant, the court had a duty to eliminate the jurors' uncertainty by instructing that such a sentence signified that he never would be released from prison. As explained previously (pt. II.A.11., ante), the court has an obligation to rectify any confusion expressed by the jury regarding instructions, but has discretion to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury's request for information. (§ 1138; People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 522, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119.) In past cases we have rejected the claim that the term life without the possibility of parole confuses jurors or has a technical meaning that requires a sua sponte definitional instruction. ( People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 457, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442; People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 688-689, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213; People v. Padilla, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 971, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388.) In the event the jury does express misunderstanding or concerns regarding the consequences of its choice of penalty, the court properly may address such confusion by instructing the jury to assume that whatever penalty it selects will be carried out. ( People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 378-379, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) The court did so in the present case Immby instructing the jury it should vote on the assumption that [its] decision will not be overturned, and on the basis that [its] decision will stand. The court also correctly informed the jury regarding the consequences of a reversal of a death sentence on appeal, indicating that the most lenient penalty that could result after such a reversal would be life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Indeed, the confusion reflected in the jury's note appears to concern the consequences of a reversal of a death sentence on appeal  not the meaning of life without the possibility of parole. In any event, it would have been error for the court to instruct the jury, as requested by defendant, that the penalty of life without the possibility of parole necessarily would be carried out and that defendant never would be released from prison. ( People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 524, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521; People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1271, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475.) We conclude that the court's instructions regarding the jury's sentencing alternatives were sufficient and correct, and that the instructions did not violate defendant's due process or Eighth Amendment rights. [22] For similar reasons, we reject defendant's contention that the court erroneously refused his proposed instruction, described below, regarding other convicted murderers who became eligible for parole after their death sentences were reversed. Defendant observes that during voir dire, several jurors expressed concern regarding well-known murderers such as Sirhan Sirhan who now are eligible for parole after the death penalty statute under which they were convicted was held invalid. (See People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 717, 102 Cal.Rptr. 385, 497 P.2d 1121.) According to defendant, the trial court had a duty to instruct the jury that defendant was tried under a statute different from the one previously held unconstitutional, that the jury was to disregard previous cases, and that the jury could not speculate how the outcome of defendant's case might be affected by the subsequent actions of other authorities. As established above, however, the trial court did instruct the jurors not to speculate regarding events following the trial, and to assume that their penalty determination would stand. Any confusion the jurors may have had regarding a potential reversal of the penalty on appeal was addressed adequately by the court's explanation that the most lenient sentence possible after such a reversal would be life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant's requested instruction unnecessarily would have highlighted matters irrelevant to the jury's penalty determination.