Opinion ID: 566371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: EPA Retaliation Claim

Text: 33 Ms. Soto contends that Adams should have been barred from seeking JNOV on this issue because its motion for a directed verdict did not indicate the specific legal grounds later raised in the JNOV motion (that damages other than lost wages are unavailable under the Act). See Appellee's Br. at 39 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a), (b)). In an oral directed verdict motion, Adams' counsel had argued that Ms. Soto failed to prove that Adams took adverse action against her because of her filing this lawsuit. Tr. of June 2, 1989 at 732. Counsel further argued that [t]he kinds of things that she has talked about have been minutia, not really regarded as adverse employment action under the law. Id. at 733. In this appeal, Adams contends that its succinct argument sufficiently set forth the Company's position that Plaintiff had shown neither retaliatory animus nor actionable injury. Appellant's Reply Br. at 10. 34 We find it difficult to read Adams' factually oriented directed verdict motion as foreshadowing the legal argument that damages other than lost wages are not available for a claim of retaliation under the EPA. There thus is some force to Ms. Soto's procedural point. We need not, however, rest our decision on this ground. The district court's conclusion that the EPA's retaliation provisions do not authorize damages other than lost wages and liquidated damages preceded this court's contrary holding in Travis v. Gary Community Mental Health Center, Inc., 921 F.2d 108, 112 (7th Cir.1990). The plaintiff in Travis had alleged retaliation in violation of section 215(a)(3). 12 A jury awarded her $45,500 in punitive damages and $35,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress and other injuries. Id. at 111. The court in Travis upheld the damages award as authorized by the 1977 amendment that had added the second sentence of section 216(b): 13 This amendment authorizes 'legal' relief, a term commonly understood to include compensatory and punitive damages. Id. (citing Pub.L. No. 95-151, 91 Stat. 1252 (1977)). Moreover, the court noted, the amendment's language permitting certain specified remedies  'without limitation'  meant that Congress has authorized other measures of relief as well. Id. The court therefore concluded that section 216(b) was sufficiently broad to support an award of compensatory and punitive damages for retaliation: Compensation for emotional distress, and punitive damages, are appropriate for intentional torts such as retaliatory discharge. Id. at 112. 35 There is sufficient evidence in this record to support the jury's verdict that Adams retaliated against Ms. Soto for initiating this lawsuit and that the retaliation caused her injury meriting compensation. 14 For example, Ms. Soto testified that, in her February 1989 conversation with Roy Lee concerning her evaluation, Lee indicated that she was listed on the evaluation as a Buyer rather than a Senior Buyer because of the lawsuit--that she had done this to [her]self. This remark could be interpreted as suggesting that she had been demoted from Senior Buyer to Buyer because of the lawsuit--as Ms. Soto claimed in her second amended complaint. Furthermore, the jury could have interpreted her testimony about her post-suit treatment around the firm (especially on the part of supervisors such as Lee) as evidence of Adams' retaliatory inclinations. The jury may have believed that Adams was trying to freeze her out of the firm. Finally, Adams has pointed to no evidence that would contradict Ms. Soto's testimony that she suffered sleeplessness and a significant weight loss because of her unhappiness about the way she was being treated after she brought suit. In light of this evidence and the holding in Travis, the district court's grant of JNOV on the retaliation claim must be reversed and the jury's verdict reinstated. See Kolb v. Chrysler Corp., 661 F.2d 1137, 1140 (7th Cir.1981) (if the trial court erroneously grants judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the appellate court may reverse and order reinstatement of the verdict of the jury).