Opinion ID: 1308602
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hearsay Testimony Regarding Age of the Complainant.

Text: Mitchell next complains that the district court improperly admitted testimony regarding R.C.S.'s age. Both R.C.S. and her adoptive mother testified that R.C.S's birthday was May 1, 1979. R.C.S.'s true date of birth is critical to the charge against Mitchell. At the time of the alleged abuse, R.C.S. was two months short of sixteen, the age beyond which the statute would unquestionably not apply. The adoptive mother testified that [w]e found out about [R.C.S.] when she was eight days old and we picked her up when she was eleven days old. Had R.C.S. been born more than two months before May 1, 1979, the statute, of course, would not apply. In admitting this evidence, the district court relied on Iowa Rule of Evidence 803(19), which provides: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: .... (19) Reputation Concerning Personal or Family History. Reputation among members of his family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among his associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adoption ... or other similar fact of his personal or family history. Exceptions to the general rule against hearsay are permitted with respect to pedigree where the declaration is by a relative or one in a position that he or she would likely know the facts. In re Estate of Conner, 240 Iowa 479, 484, 36 N.W.2d 833, 836 (1949). It is enough that the declarant had such opportunity for acquiring knowledge concerning the pedigree information as leads to a reasonable inference that the declarant possessed such knowledge. In re Frey's Estate, 207 Iowa 1229, 1234, 224 N.W. 597, 598-99 (1929); 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 301, at 563 (1996). Although R.C.S. was adopted, the declarantthe adoptive motherwas certainly in a position to know when R.C.S. was born. At the very least, the adoptive mother had the opportunity to acquire such knowledge, and that opportunity would permit a reasonable inference by the jury that she possessed such knowledge. The adoptive mother's testimony about R.C.S.'s birthday was therefore admissible under rule 803(19). R.C.S.'s testimony about her birthday was also admissible under rule 803(19). Concededly, such testimony is hearsay; however, evidence as to a witness' birth is a fact of which he may be said to have knowledge based on family tradition. Such testimony has been regarded as original, direct, and primary evidence. It is admissible without regard to other or better evidence which has been introduced or which is available, and it is immaterial that the witness' parents are alive and available, or that they actually testify. 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 300(b), at 561-62 (1996). The rationale for the admission of such testimony is obvious: Strictly speaking, one cannot know his exact age except upon hearsay information; for he is not capable of knowing this, or anything, until an appreciable time after birth. But practically a person's belief on this point has a satisfactory basis. Courts have commonly preferred to accept this practical certainty rather than to insist on academic nicety. See State v. Tetrault, 78 N.H. 14, 15, 95 A. 669, 670 (1915) (citation omitted). The adoptive mother's presumptive knowledge of R.C.S.'s birthday constituted the family tradition and reputation supporting R.C.S.'s belief as to her age. Rule 803(19) is not limited to blood relatives but expressly includes members of the family by adoption.