Opinion ID: 1882935
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the chancellor used the correct standard of review.

Text: ¶ 16. The chancellor stated in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: The state courts of Mississippi provide great weight and deference to the decisions of the State Tax Commission. 3300 Corp. v. Marx, 633 So.2d 1028, 1031 (Miss.1994); State Tax Comm'n v. Edmondson, 196 So.2d 873, 877 (Miss. 1967); L.H. Conrad Furniture Co. v. Miss. State Tax Comm'n, 133 So.2d[So.] 652, 655 (Miss.1931). There is a rebuttable presumption in favor of the agency decision and the burden of proof is on the party challenging that decision. Montavalo v. Miss. Bd. of Medical Licensure, 671 So.2d 53, 55 (Miss.1996) (quoting Bd. of Ed. of Alcorn County v. Parents & Custodians of Students at Rienzi Sch. Attendance Ctr., [251 Miss. 195,] 168 So.2d 814, 818 (Miss.1964)). The taxpayer bears the burden of proving it is entitled to relief. Miss.Code Ann. § 27-67-27. ¶ 17. Pursue argues that the chancellor should have applied a de novo standard of review, rather than giving great weight and deference to the Commission, pursuant to statute: At trial of any action brought under this section, the chancery court shall give deference to the decision and interpretation of law and regulations by the commission as it does with the decisions and interpretation of any administrative agency, but it shall try the case de novo and conduct a full evidentiary judicial hearing on the issues raised. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the chancery court shall determine whether the taxpayer has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence or a higher standard if required by the issues raised, that he is entitled to any or all of the relief he has requested. Miss.Code Ann. § 27-77-7(4) (Rev. 2006). [8] Pursue states in its brief that [w]hile not specifically applicable to the present case. . . . this codification did not mark a change in the law but simply formally expressed it in the Mississippi Code. While Pursue argues to this Court that it did not receive an evidentiary hearing, Pursue misses the fact that it filed its own motion for summary judgment. In fact, the chancellor, at the conclusion of the hearing on the Commission's motion for summary judgment, invited Pursue to schedule its own hearing. MR. KNIGHT: [9] Your honor, we did file a motion for summary judgment for Pursue, and we would like that to be considered by the Court. But the rule, of course, requires ten days' notice, which we haven't met at this point. Would the Court like to schedule another hearing for us to present that motion? THE COURT: That would be totally up to you. If you want to do it, just get with my administrator and set it up for a hearing. You're certainly entitled to a hearing. Thus, Pursue could have had a hearing on its motion for summary judgment; however, Pursue apparently chose not to have its motion for summary judgment set for a hearing, as there is no documentation in the record concerning it. We will not hold the chancellor in error based on the record before us. ¶ 18. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.