Opinion ID: 6104581
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: “Packing” and “signaling”

Text: ¶55 Thompson argues, without apparent objection to the trial court or elaboration here, that “the State was allowed to pack the jury with pro-death jurors” through its questioning. From our review of the record, the State acted properly by asking prospective jurors whether they would commit to following the law regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the court acted within its broad discretion by striking jurors for cause who showed a predetermination not to impose the death penalty. As we have noted, a trial judge may “strike a juror whose views about capital punishment ‘would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’” State v. Prince, 226 Ariz. 516, 528 ¶ 27 (2011) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 433 (1985)); see also id. at 528–29 ¶¶ 26–34 (finding that the trial court acted within its discretion when it struck jurors based on responses to the questionnaire that indicated they would not be willing to impose the death penalty, noting jurors’ views do not need to “be proven with ‘unmistakable clarity’” (quoting State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 137 ¶ 89 (2006))). ¶56 Thompson relatedly argues the jury pool was “contaminated” because group voir dire permitted the prosecutor to “signal” what kinds of 16 STATE V. THOMPSON Opinion of the Court answers would result in a prospective juror’s dismissal. But defense counsel, when asked by the court, consented to group voir dire. Regardless, the parties moved to strike jurors for cause outside the prospective jurors’ presence. As the court explained, “I certainly don’t want to excuse them in the course of questioning so we don’t signal what is an appropriate response to be released.” There is no error here.