Opinion ID: 2520536
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rick's Rights over Diane Were Properly Terminated.

Text: Rick also challenges Judge Brown's findings that Diane was a child in need of aid and that Rick failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that harmed Diane.
Judge Brown found that Diane was a child in need of aid based on abandonment, AS 47.10.011(1), and based on neglect, AS 47.10.011(9). We conclude that Judge Brown did not err in finding that Rick abandoned Diane, which makes it unnecessary to consider Rick's challenges to the neglect finding. Alaska Statute 47.10.011(1) authorizes an adjudication where a parent or guardian has abandoned the child as described in AS 47.10.013, and the other parent is absent or has committed conduct or created conditions that cause the child to be a child in need of aid under this chapter. The mother relinquished her parental rights to Diane and seriously neglected her, so the prerequisite related to the other parent is met. The remaining requirement is in AS 47.10.013(a), which provides: For purposes of this chapter, the court may find abandonment of a child if a parent or guardian has shown a conscious disregard of parental responsibilities toward the child by failing to provide reasonable support, maintain regular contact, or provide normal supervision, considering the child's age and need for care by an adult. The statute goes on to list certain instances that are also included within the definition of abandonment; among these is where the parent has without justifiable cause ... made only minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child. [9] In G.C. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Division of Family & Youth Services, we interpreted section .013 to impose a two-part test: (1) there must be parental conduct evidencing a willful disregard for parental obligations, leading to (2) the destruction of the parent-child relationship. [10] Rick does not challenge the destruction of any parent-child relationship, presumably because of the uncontested evidence that Diane was unfamiliar with Rick and overtly rejected his affection; this contrasted with her attachment to her foster mother and was obviously based at least partially on Rick's absences from her life. Instead, Rick's arguments focus on whether his conduct evidenced a willful disregard for his parental obligations. Judge Brown found that Rick abandoned Diane by failing to maintain contact in the periods before and after the supervised visits of early 2003. But Rick argues that it was unreasonable to expect him to visit or care for Diane during much of this time, because his paternity was not confirmed until January 2002, and because he was incarcerated between March 2003 and February 2004. We reject Rick's arguments because there is undisputed evidence that he had good reason to believe Diane was his daughter dating back at least to May 2001, well before he went to prison. It was at that time that Rick referred to Diane as my child in court papers; he also sought custody on this basis on several occasions before January 2002. This does not show that Rick was sure of his paternity before the January 2002 paternity test, but it does indicate he thought his paternity was at least a likely possibility; in fact, OCS thought the likelihood was high enough to give Rick a case plan to visit Diane in August 2001. This means that Rick knew Diane might well be his child, was growing up without him, potentially in the same conditions of neglect that led to his petition for a protective order after the birthday party. Under these circumstances, we think it is fair to say that Rick's failure to visit Diane during this period constitutes a conscious disregard of parental obligations, and a lack of effort to communicate with Diane without justifiable cause. [11] We therefore think Rick's conduct in the period before his incarceration was sufficient to sustain the abandonment finding, but we note that the evidence also shows Rick's willful disregard of his parental obligations in the period during and after his prison sentence. Rick failed to contact OCS in the month after he was released from prison in February 2004, and he reacted negatively to OCS's case plan while in prison. Although a parent may insist that OCS communicate through the parent's lawyer, the tone of Rick's response (I think you and your office has caused me enough stress and abuse by kidnaping my son.) makes it clear that Rick was not interested in participating in the case plan, and by extension, not interested in visiting his daughter. Finally, we reject an argument Rick makes based on AS 47.10.080( o ). This statute authorizes courts to terminate parental rights where the parent is scheduled to be incarcerated for significant periods of time and the parent has not provided for any other caregiver. Rick points out that this statute requires findings that were not made here, such as whether Rick's period of incarceration was significant. But the statute is merely an additional, independent authority OCS may rely on to terminate rights in cases where the parent's incarceration itself is likely to injure the child in the future; it does not supplant AS 47.10.088(a)(1)(A) and 47.10.011(1) (abandonment) as grounds for terminating the rights of a parent who has been previously incarcerated, and who has willfully disregard parental obligations either before, during, or after that incarceration. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that termination of Rick's rights to Diane was properly based on abandonment under AS 47.10.011(1).
Judge Brown found that Rick failed to remedy his abandonment of Diane based on the child's rejection and fear of her father which the child demonstrated during visits. Rick argues that this finding was erroneous, because Diane's rejection of Rick may well have been based on unrelated problems that had occurred in her mother's household. It is plausible to assume that Diane's abuse at the hands of her mother may have contributed to her distrust of Rick, but it defies common sense to suppose that the rejection was not also based in major part on Rick's absence from her life. For example, Diane seems to have bonded quite well with her foster mother. Rick's argument is speculative, and does not establish that Judge Brown clearly erred in his determination that Rick was to blame for Diane's rejection. An additional issue, not raised by Rick, is whether Judge Brown's findings constitute a finding that Rick has failed, within a reasonable time, to remedy the conduct or conditions in the home that place the child in substantial risk so that returning the child to the parent would place the child at substantial risk of physical or mental injury within the meaning of the failure-to-remedy provision. [12] Specifically, the question is whether Judge Brown's findings establish that reuniting Diane with Rick would place the child at substantial risk of a mental injury. Our cases indicate that a parent's willingness to resume parental duties does not remedy abandonment if this change of heart comes too late for the parent to bond with the child during the critical early phase of the child's life. [13] In M.W. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, the father said he was ready to resume a role in his daughter's life, and argued that under these circumstances there was no failure to remedy the conduct that put the child at risk of harm. [14] We rejected this argument. We noted expert testimony in the record in that case that it was important for a child to bond with its parent in the early months of its life; we also noted legislative findings indicating the importance of expediting the placement process for children under six years of age. [15] On this basis, we concluded that the parent's attempt to resolve abandonment by reappearing does not remedy the conduct unless the attempt occurs within a reasonable amount of time. [16] We believe the assumption underlying this decision is that, where a young child has lived without the parent for a significant period of time, that in and of itself may be sufficient evidence to establish that reunification would put the child at substantial risk of ... mental injury within the meaning of AS 47.10.088(a)(1)(B)(ii). Here, there is no expert testimony about the importance of early bonding, but it was clear that Rick spent almost no time with Diane in the five years of her life preceding the termination trial. There was also compelling evidence of Diane's rejection and fear of her father during the brief supervised visits that did occur We believe this rejecting behavior indicates the mental injury clearly enough to establish Rick's failure within a reasonable time to remedy the conduct that led to Diane's mental injury, even assuming Rick were ready to assume custody or visitation of Diane today. We therefore find no error in Judge Brown's failure-to-remedy finding.