Opinion ID: 218928
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sacco's Attorney's Motion To Withdraw

Text: Kelly E. Fischer Esq. had been appointed by the court to represent Sacco in this case in February 2008. On March 20, the court scheduled the trial to begin on Monday, April 28, 2008. On Thursday April 24, Fischer asked the court to allow him to withdraw from the case. His motion, accompanied by his affirmation, was filed ex parte and under seal. In a hearing in open court on April 25, Fischer directed the court's attention to the contents of his sealed affirmation and stated generally that the intensity of his personal feelings with regard to the case against Sacco might affect his ability to effectively represent his client. Citing an Ethical Consideration (EC) set out in the New York Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code), reprinted in N.Y. Jud. Law App. (McKinney 2008), which was applicable at the time of Sacco's trial (but which has since been superseded by N.Y. Rules of Professional Conduct), Fischer stated as follows: Basically, your Honor, I would cite the ethical consideration under Professional Code of Professional Responsibility EC2-30 which basically says that if the intensity of an attorney's personal feelings might affect  may affect that attorney's ability to effectively represent his client, then the attorney should seek to withdraw. Based on the paperwork that I submitted which basically sets out my position personally, that raises a real concern for me in this case. THE COURT: All right. MR. FISCHER: Particularly with respect to the primary witness, almost the exclusive witness against Mr. Sacco, [S.O.]. (Transcript of Proceedings as to Dean Sacco, April 25, 2008 (Sacco April 25 Tr.), at 3.) Fischer's affirmation  which is hereby deemed unsealed to the extent that it is described in this opinion (and we leave it to the district court to decide whether the motion should be unsealed in toto )  specified that in preparation for trial, Fischer had performed hours of research, had spoken with a variety of investigators and other sources, and had reviewed every page of the approximately 100 pounds of discovery materials that had been supplied by the government or obtained from other sources. However, Fischer stated that in the past two weeks he had received materials from the government that included the evidence as to Sacco's possession of the used condom bearing S.O.'s DNA. Fischer stated that until that time, he had been confident that he could vigorously defend Sacco's position at trial; but that single bit of evidence caused an immediate, involuntary, and substantial shift in his moral and technical perspective on this case. Stating that his past successes in defending criminal cases were largely due to the strength of my moral conviction[] and my ability to convey that moral conviction to juries, Fischer stated that while I could probably go through the motions to defend Mr. Sacco, my conviction would not be behind that representation. Fischer's affirmation did not cite any provision of the Code that imposed an Ethical Consideration or a Disciplinary Rule (DR). The government opposed Fischer's motion to withdraw. It noted that a substitution of counsel would substantially delay the start of trial. It stated that it had been preparing [S.O.] to testify now for the last month, in addition to preparing all the other witnesses, and S.O. was ready to walk into this Court and testify about everything that happened to her. (Sacco April 25 Tr. at 6.) O'Connor's attorney (who had stated in her severance motion that the defense positions of O'Connor and Sacco were irreconcilable) supported Fischer's motion to withdraw on the ground that it would hurt O'Connor's case if [Fischer] cannot effectively represent Mr. Sacco ( id. at 8). Expressing her doubt as to Fischer's ability to represent Sacco zealously, she stated that it's only fair for both defendants that they have attorneys that can be zealous advocates on their behalf and I think that's what the law requires, your Honor. ( Id. at 9.) As to the latter point, the court stated, I don't think the law requires zealousness on [the] part of the attorney. I think it requires adequacy on [the] part of the attorney. I know Mr. Fischer is more than adequate. ( Id. ) Sacco himself took no firm position on Fischer's motion to withdraw. He expressed both admiration for and frustration with Fischer, saying he had found Mr. Fischer to be sincere, genuine, intelligent, articulate, but had been disappointed that our communication has not been continual in the last eight weeks. ( Id. at 3.) However, Sacco also said he had an interest [] in going to trial as quickly as possible.... I want to get it behind me but I have no indication whatsoever that Mr. Fischer is actually ready at this time. I haven't discussed anything. I haven't seen any motions that he's put forth. I haven't received any replies from any of the letters that I sent him in the last eight weeks. When I read in the newspaper that a trial was taking place on the 28 of April, I was  it couldn't be true. I hadn't spoken to Mr. Fischer so I think there is a little bit of an issue that he may not be ready, although I'd like to go, you know. ( Id. at 17.) In a written order entered later on April 25, the court denied Fischer's motion to withdraw: Based upon the information contained in Defense counsel's ex parte motion, and the information obtained at the hearing held on April 25, 2008, the Court finds that there are insufficient grounds to warrant granting the application to withdraw. No actual conflict has been identified and the Court is confident, and expects, that Attorney Fischer will continue to provide Defendant Sacco with appropriate representation. Moreover, aside from some concerns about Attorney Fischer's preparation for trial, Defendant Sacco articulated that he was satisfied with Attorney Fischer's abilities. Without more, the information before the Court is insufficient to demonstrate an actual conflict warranting withdrawal. The motion to withdraw is, therefore, DENIED. Order dated April 25, 2008 (Order Denying Withdrawal), at 1 (emphases added). The court gave the parties an extra week to prepare for trial, scheduling jury selection for May 5, 2008. ( See id. at 1-2.) On April 30, O'Connor, who previously had moved unsuccessfully for severance of her trial from that of Sacco ( see Part II.D. below), renewed her motion for severance, stating that Fischer had an internal conflict with representing his client, which would cause him to provide ineffective assistance to Sacco at trial (O'Connor Memorandum of Law dated April 30, 2008, at 2) and thereby prejudice O'Connor's case ( see id. at 5). O'Connor also argued, based on statements by Sacco at the April 25 hearing, that Fischer's assistance thus far [has] been objectively unreasonable; that Fischer ha[d], by his own admission, stated that his assistance w[ould] continue to be inadequate; and that Fischer ha[d] expressed an unequivocal unwillingness and inability to conduct a cross-examination of the alleged victim. ( Id. ) O'Connor stated that it would appear that Mr. Fischer has done almost nothing to prepare for trial, that he was guilty of an utter failure to prepare, and that it was highly unlikely that Fischer would be prepared for trial on May 5. ( Id. ) Fischer, in response to O'Connor's motion, did not take a position on severance but disputed all of her characterizations of his preparedness and his willingness to represent Sacco properly. With respect to preparedness, Fischer stated that except for three specified tasks, I believe we are prepared to go to trial in this matter. (Letter from Kelly E. Fischer to Judge McAvoy dated April 30, 2008 (April 30 Letter), at 2.) With respect to O'Connor's ethics challenge, Fischer stated: I wish to make it clear that, while my personal, moral and religious beliefs do create some issues for me in the defense of this action, I do not now believe, and do not recall ever[] expressing, in words or substance, an unequivocal unwillingness and inability to conduct a cross-examination of the alleged victim. ( Id. at 1.) On this appeal, Sacco, represented by new counsel, contends that the district court's denial of Fischer's motion to withdraw was necessarily colored by its view, expressed during the conference on the motion to withdraw, that the law does not require an attorney to act as a zealous advocate for his client, and was thus improper. (Sacco brief on appeal at 46.) He argues that Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7, entitled A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law, contains Ethical Consideration 7-1, stating the duty of a lawyer, both to the client and to the legal system, is to represent the client zealously within the bounds of the law, which includes Disciplinary Rules and enforceable professional regulations, id., and Disciplinary Rule 7-101, expressly governing Representing a Client Zealously. Id. (Sacco brief on appeal at 47.) We see no basis for reversal  either in the arguments made by Fischer in the district court or in the arguments made by Sacco's new attorney on this appeal. A ruling denying a motion to withdraw is reviewable for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Oberoi, 331 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir.2003). We must grant considerable deference to the district court's decision especially when the prosecution of the suit is likely to be disrupted by the withdrawal of counsel. However, if forcing an attorney to continue representation will cause a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and possibly subject the attorney to sanctions, it will be an abuse of discretion not to grant the motion to withdraw. Id. at 47-48 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In the present case, Fischer did not argue, either in his sealed affirmation or in his statements in open court, that there was any Disciplinary Rule that would be violated if he continued to represent Sacco or that his continued representation of Sacco might possibly expose him to sanctions. As noted above, Fischer cited at the hearing former EC 2-30, which he characterized as dealing with whether an attorney should seek to withdraw because of the intensity of [his] personal feelings. (Sacco April 25 Tr. at 3.) That statement actually conflated EC 2-30, which concerned whether an attorney should accept an appointment, with former EC 2-29, which dealt with whether an attorney, having accepted an appointment, should seek to withdraw. The provision most relevant to Fischer's motion to withdraw was EC 2-29, which provided in pertinent part as follows: When a lawyer is appointed by a court ... to undertake representation of a person unable to obtain counsel, whether for financial or other reasons, the lawyer should not seek to be excused from undertaking the representation except for compelling reasons. Compelling reasons do not include such factors as the repugnance of the subject matter of the proceeding[ or] ... the belief of the lawyer that the defendant in a criminal proceeding is guilty.... Code, EC 2-29 (emphases added). See also Fiumara v. United States, 727 F.2d 209, 212 (2d Cir.) (A trial counsel worthy of the name should be capable of subordinating his personal predilections to his professional duty. (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951, 104 S.Ct. 2154, 80 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984). Fischer's affirmation made clear that he had accepted appointment by the court to defend Sacco knowing the nature of the charges. He stated that he had proceeded industriously to prepare for trial, conducting interviews, doing research, and examining 100 pounds of documents. The affirmation quite plainly stated that Fischer wished to withdraw because of his abhorrence of a single bit of evidence in the case. Ethical Consideration 2-29 provided that he should not seek to withdraw except for compelling reasons; and if, as EC 2-29 specified, repugnance of the subject matter of the case does not fit into that category, Fischer's revulsion at a single item of evidence in the case surely did not constitute a compelling reason. Finally, Fischer's affirmation's reference to the change in his  technical perspective (emphasis added) suggests that the condom evidence caused Fischer to believe that his client was guilty. Under the express terms of EC 2-29, such a belief is not a sufficient reason to withdraw. We thus see no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Fischer's motion based on the presentations to the district court. Implicit in the court's statement that it expect[ed] that Attorney Fischer w[ould] continue to provide Defendant Sacco with appropriate representation, Order Denying Withdrawal at 1 (emphasis added), was the expectation that Fischer would represent Sacco as vigorously as required by the Code. That expectation was entirely reasonable in light of the absence of any suggestion by Fischer in his motion that he would be unable to comply with any of the Code's Disciplinary Rules or any suggestion that his continued representation of Sacco might possibly expose him to a sanction. Further, Fischer made clear in the motion itself that he had done most of the work necessary to prepare for trial. And he indicated in his April 30 Letter that he was ready, able, and willing to proceed to trial and to cross-examine S.O. on Sacco's behalf. Nor does Sacco's brief on appeal provide any basis for concluding that the district court should have granted Fischer's motion. Although it cites the title of DR 7-101 (Representing a Client Zealously), it does not quote or describe any provision of that Rule and does not suggest that Fischer failed to comply with any of the Rule's commands. Further, while Sacco's brief quotes EC 7-1's provision that an attorney should represent the client zealously, it provides no basis for a conclusion that Fischer did not represent Sacco zealously. His objections to Fischer's performance are to strategic decisions such as the timing of Fischer's objection to the admission of Sacco's self-styled autobiography and the timing of a request for a bench trial. The record makes plain that Fischer competently cross-examined S.O. at trial, and Sacco's brief on appeal does not contend to the contrary. In sum, the record provides no basis for a conclusion that the denial of Fischer's motion to withdraw deprived Sacco of a fair trial.