Opinion ID: 2687595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Confrontation Clauses.

Text: Kennedy challenges the introduction of the fifteen-page exhibit as a violation of the Confrontation Clauses under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution. The Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution states the accused has the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Identically, the confrontation clause of the Iowa Constitution states the accused has the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 10. “[W]e jealously protect this court’s authority to follow an independent approach under our state constitution” for provisions of the Iowa Constitution that are the same or nearly identical to provisions in the United States Constitution. State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Iowa 2011). However, in his appellate brief, Kennedy does not propose a 7 specific test we should apply under article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution. Rather he only cites caselaw analyzing the Confrontation Clause under the United States Constitution. Thus, under the facts of this case, we choose not to interpret the Iowa Constitution any differently from the United States Constitution. See Shipley, 757 N.W.2d at 234 (“Because Shipley has not contended that the Iowa Constitution should be interpreted differently than the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we construe the provisions identically.”). The Supreme Court interpreted the Confrontation Clause in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). There, the Supreme Court recognized the Confrontation Clause was intended to protect against the principal evil of testimonial statements in the absence of the declarant. See id. at 50, 124 S. Ct. at 1363, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 192. Courts can only admit these testimonial statements in subsequent proceedings if the declarant is unavailable and there has been a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 59, 124 S. Ct. at 1369, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 197. Thus, the first inquiry in Confrontation Clause analysis is whether the evidence is testimonial. Though the Supreme Court did not specifically identify a comprehensive definition of “testimonial,” it provided some guidance in determining which evidence is testimonial. First, the Supreme Court held grand jury testimony, preliminary hearing testimony, former trial testimony, and statements resulting from police interrogation are testimonial. Id. at 68, 124 S. Ct. at 1374, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 203. Next, the Supreme Court identified several formulations for courts to use to identify testimonial evidence. Id. at 51–52, 124 S. Ct. at 1364, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 193. The relevant formulation here is whether the evidence 8 contains statements made in circumstances that would lead witnesses to objectively believe the statements might be used at trial. See id. at 51– 52, 124 S. Ct. at 1364, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 193. For our analysis, we will divide the fifteen-page exhibit into two types of documents. The first two pages of the exhibit are the certified abstract of Kennedy’s driving record. We will consider these two pages separately from the last thirteen pages, which consist of three notices of revocation and an affidavit of mailing and certificate of bulk mailing attached to each notice. For clarity, we will identify the last thirteen pages as the affidavits of mailing. A. Certified Abstract of Kennedy’s Driving Record. We previously determined a certified abstract of a driving record was nontestimonial. Shipley, 757 N.W.2d at 238. Kennedy argues we should revisit the Shipley decision and overrule Shipley based on two subsequent Supreme Court decisions. In Shipley, the defendant challenged the admission of a certified abstract of his driving record as violating the Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions. Id. at 234. The defendant argued the district court could only admit the certified abstract of driving record if the custodian of his driving records was available for crossexamination. Id. In determining otherwise, we identified two different confrontation issues with the certified abstract of driving record. Id. at 234–35. The first issue was whether the underlying public record required a live witness, and the second issue was whether the record could be authenticated without the custodian’s testimony. Id. We first recognized the underlying public record was not testimonial when we considered the purpose of the right of crossexamination. Id. at 237. The IDOT created the driving record prior to 9 the criminal prosecution and it would have existed even if there was not a subsequent criminal prosecution. Id. Thus, the primary evil Crawford sought to avoid, namely information gathered by an inquisitory investigation, did not exist. Id. at 238. We came to this conclusion based on a particularized analysis of the purpose of the Confrontation Clause and the nature of the information in the public record, rather than a broad view that all public records would be admissible. Id. at 237. We next recognized the certification of authenticity of the public record was not testimonial. Id. at 239. In Shipley, we specifically compared a certification of a driving record to a certification of other forensics, and determined these certifications were sufficiently distinct. Id. Unlike forensic certificates, the driving record certification merely certified the authenticity of a copy of a preexisting document. Id. at 238– 39. Further, access to a driving-record certification is not limited to governmental interrogation, but is available to anyone. Id. at 239. We concluded the certificate of authenticity did not violate the Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions. Id. Kennedy argues Shipley is no longer good law because of two subsequent Supreme Court decisions: Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2009), and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 180 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2011). Both of these cases consider whether forensic certificates of analysis violate the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. In Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court determined certificates of analysis stating several seized bags contained cocaine were testimonial and thus subject to the Confrontation Clause. 557 U.S. at 308–11, 129 S. Ct. at 2531–32, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 320–22. The certificates showed the 10 results of the forensic analysis, reported the weight of the bags, and indicated the bags contained cocaine. Id. at 308, 129 S. Ct. at 2531, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 320. The Supreme Court determined the certificates were testimonial for three reasons. First, the description of testimonial statements from Crawford included affidavits. Id. at 310, 129 S. Ct. at 2532, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 321. These certificates were affidavits because they were “ ‘declaration[s] of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths.’ ” Id. at 310, 129 S. Ct. at 2532, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 321 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 62 (8th ed. 2004)). Second, the court noted these documents were “functionally identical to live, in-court testimony.” Id. at 310–11, 129 S. Ct. at 2532, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 321. Third, the sole purpose of the affidavits under state law was to provide evidence of the net weight, quality, and composition of the substances being tested, and the analysts were aware of the evidentiary purpose of the affidavits. Id. at 311, 129 S. Ct. at 2532, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 321. The Supreme Court addressed whether the analysts themselves were witnesses providing testimony against the defendant. Id. at 313, 129 S. Ct. at 2533, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 323. The Supreme Court determined the analysts were witnesses because they provided testimony against the defendant that the substance he possessed was cocaine, and this fact was necessary for his conviction. Id. at 313, 129 S. Ct. at 2533, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 323. The Supreme Court specifically differentiated between the affidavits in that case and a clerk’s certificate authenticating an official record for use as evidence. Id. at 322–23, 129 S. Ct. at 2538–39, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 328–29. The Supreme Court stated “[a] clerk could by affidavit authenticate or provide a copy of an otherwise admissible record, but 11 could not do what the analysts did here: create a record for the sole purpose of providing evidence against a defendant.” Id. at 322–23, 129 S. Ct. at 2539, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 329. In Bullcoming, the Supreme Court determined a forensic laboratory report certifying the defendant’s blood alcohol content violated the Confrontation Clause when an analyst who had not prepared the report testified. 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2709–10, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 616. The Supreme Court considered whether a substitute analyst who did not prepare the report could give proper testimony under the Confrontation Clause when the report itself was testimonial. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2710, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 616. The Supreme Court reasoned the analyst could not be a proper substitute because this testimony could not convey what the actual analyst knew about the particular testing process employed. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2715, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 622. We hold the rulings in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming do not overrule or undermine our decision in Shipley. A certified abstract of a driving record is significantly different from a forensic report analyzing drugs or blood alcohol content. A certified abstract of a driving record encompasses the information contained in the IDOT records. That information existed well before the alleged criminal act. The compiling of the record does not require a scientist or technician to do any tests in order to report what already exists in the IDOT records. In other words, the certified abstract of a driving record is nothing more than a historical report of what is contained in the records of the IDOT. Accordingly, the certified abstract of Kennedy’s driving record, the first two pages of the exhibit, is not testimonial and the admission of these two pages did not violate the Confrontation Clauses of the United States or Iowa Constitutions. 12 B. Affidavits of Mailing. These documents require us to do a different analysis. We have not previously considered whether an affidavit of mailing and its attachments are testimonial. In Shipley, we recognized our task in that case was “limited to the consideration of the admissibility of a copy of an existing driving record kept by the custodian of records.” 757 N.W.2d at 237 n.2. The last thirteen pages of the exhibit contained three affidavits of mailing with attachments. Each affidavit addressed a separate revocation of Kennedy’s driving privileges. The first affidavit addressed a notice of revocation mailed on May 21, 2010. The notice revoked Kennedy’s license for refusing OWI chemical testing. It stated the effective date of the revocation was June 3, 2010. The notice also provided the revocation would last until June 2, 2012. The second affidavit addressed a notice of revocation mailed on June 16, 2010. The notice revoked Kennedy’s license for failing OWI chemical testing. It stated the effective date of the revocation was June 29, 2010. The notice also provided the revocation would last until June 28, 2011. The third affidavit addressed a notice of revocation mailed on August 30, 2010. The notice revoked Kennedy’s license for his OWI conviction. It stated the effective date of the revocation was July 30, 2010. The notice also provided the revocation would last until July 29, 2016. Each affidavit of mailing contained the following language: I, Kathy McLear, being first duly sworn on oath, state as follows: That I am a Manager for the Office of Driver Services, Iowa Department of Transportation, an agency of the State of Iowa which generates and maintains all the official records of the 13 lowa Department of Transportation relating to driver licenses, license suspensions, revocations, cancellations, denials, disqualifications and barrment matters, and the mailing of sanction notices concerning the same. As part of my job duties with the Department, I know the process the Department uses to mail sanction notices to drivers. That as a part of the regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities of the Office of Driver Services of the lowa Department of Transportation, the Department caused to be mailed by first class mail on or about [date of mailing notice], at the United States Postal Service, 1165 2nd Avenue, Des Moines, Iowa, and to driver(s) at each driver’s last known address as shown in the records of the Department, the following sanction notices: Sanction Notices Number(s): [identifying number on notice] Proof of said mailing is set out in the attached United States Postal Service Certificate of Bulk Mailing, certified to by a knowledgeable employee of the United States Postal Service and prepared in the regular course of its business at its location at 1165 2nd Avenue, Des Moines, Iowa at the time of said mailing. To determine whether these thirteen pages are testimonial, we must determine whether either the underlying public record or the certificate of authenticity contain statements made in circumstances that would lead a witness to objectively believe the statements might be used at trial. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52, 124 S. Ct. at 1364, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 193. At least two other states’ highest courts have addressed this issue. In Michigan, the Michigan Department of State (DOS) is responsible for mailing notices of revocation to drivers. People v. Nunley, 821 N.W.2d 642, 643 (Mich. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 667 (2012). In June 2009, the DOS sent a notice of revocation to the defendant. Id. at 643–44. Contemporaneous with sending the notice, the DOS prepared a certificate of mailing and maintained the certificate in its official records. Id. at 644. In September 2009, the police stopped the 14 defendant and charged him with driving while his license was revoked. Id. At trial, the court would not admit the certificate of mailing due to a Confrontation Clause objection under the United States Constitution. Id. The case reached the Supreme Court of Michigan. See id. at 647. The Michigan court determined a certificate of mailing was not testimonial because the certificate of mailing was a business record created for administrative reasons. Id. at 653. The court recognized the certificate was an objective cataloging intended to show the agency performed its statutory responsibilities. Id. Further, the court pointed out the DOS created the certificate of mailing before any crime, and the mailing was contemporaneous with the notice. Id. Thus, the certificate did not violate the Confrontation Clause because “it was not made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that it would be available for use at a later trial.” Id. at 654 (emphasis omitted). In Massachusetts, the supreme judicial court considered whether a certificate of mailing violated the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution when the certificate was created exclusively for trial. Commonwealth v. Parenteau, 948 N.E.2d 883, 885–86, 891 (Mass. 2011). On May 30, 2009, an officer stopped the defendant’s vehicle, and he arrested the defendant for operating a motor vehicle after his license had been revoked. Id. at 886–87. In the subsequent jury trial, the commonwealth introduced the certificate attesting a notice of license suspension or revocation was mailed to the defendant on May 2, 2007. Id. at 887. The registry prepared and dated the certificate on July 24, 2009. Id. at 887. The district court admitted the certificate into evidence. Id. The case reached the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Id. at 885–86. 15 The Massachusetts court noted the certificate was dated two months after the criminal complaint was issued and clearly was made for use at the defendant’s trial. Id. at 890. Further, the certificate did not merely authenticate and attest to the existence of a record, but made a factual representation that the agency mailed notice on a particular date. Id. Nor could the agency show it mailed the notice by proving the existence of a copy of the notice in the agency’s filing system. Id. The Michigan and Massachusetts cases contain the proper analysis under the Confrontation Clause. The Michigan court found the DOS made and kept the certificate of mailing well before any prosecution of the criminal charges. Thus, an affidavit of mailing prepared prior to criminal charges kept in the regular course of business as an administrative record does not violate the Confrontation Clause. On the other hand, the Massachusetts court found the registry prepared the certificate of mailing after the complaint and the commonwealth was using the factual representations in the certificate as testimony to prove when the mailing occurred. Thus, the Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of an affidavit of mailing when the affidavit is both prepared after the criminal charges and the affidavit makes a factual representation intended as testimony. We find the last thirteen pages contained in the exhibit at issue, the affidavits of mailing and attachments, squarely fit under the reasoning of the Massachusetts court. The affidavits of mailing were prepared after the State filed the complaint against Kennedy. All three affidavits are dated December 10, 2010, after Kennedy’s traffic stop on November 30. The affidavits did not merely authenticate and attest to the existence of a record in the IDOT’s possession, but made factual representations the IDOT mailed the notices on particular dates. 16 Applying the Crawford test, we find the IDOT created the affidavits under circumstances that would lead an objective witness to reasonably believe the affidavits would be available for use at a later trial. Therefore, the affidavits of mailing and attachments violated the Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions and were not admissible.