Opinion ID: 1369513
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container.

Text: Harrison did not own the meth trailer. The meth trailer was padlocked front and back, and Harrison was not found to possess a key to either lock. He was nowhere near the trailer when Hudson and Moutardier arrived at the Hayes farm, but was assisting Hayes in the repair of a garbage truck. There was no evidence that he had ever been inside the trailer, e.g., no evidence that his fingerprints or any personal belongings were found in the trailer. No anhydrous ammonia or any other chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine were otherwise found in his personal or constructive possession. While Harrison also contends there was no evidence that he even resided on the Hayes farm, the presence in the John Paul trailer of his personal effects, pill bottles with his name on the labels, and a partially eaten sandwich sufficed to circumstantially prove that he at least occupied that trailer. Nevertheless, no anhydrous ammonia or other chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine were found in the trailer; and the meth trailer, the burn piles, and the buried barrel were all found on top of a hill, at least 300 to 400 feet distant from and not visible from the John Paul trailer. Harrison correctly asserts that his mere presence on the property where the meth trailer was found is insufficient to support his convictions of manufacturing the methamphetamine and possession of the anhydrous ammonia found in the meth trailer. Houston v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Ky.1998) ([O]ne's mere presence at the scene of a crime is not evidence that such one committed it or aided in its commission.) (quoting Rose v. Commonwealth, 385 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Ky. 1964)). See also Moore v. Commonwealth, 282 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Ky.1955); Allen v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 783, 199 S.W.2d 453, 454 (1947); English v. Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 446, 42 S.W.2d 706, 707 (1931). Likewise, mere knowledge that a crime is occurring is insufficient to support a conviction of that crime, Dowdle v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ky.App. 1977), as is mere association with the persons involved at the time of its commission. Moore, 282 S.W.2d at 614. Even mere ownership of the property on which contraband is found is insufficient to sustain a conviction. Franklin v. Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 148, 149-50 (Ky.1972). A true criminal must be distinguished from a mere ordinary bystander. United States v. Windom, 19 F.3d 1190, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994). See also Arellanes v. United States, 302 F.2d 603, 606 (9th Cir.1962) (mere proximity to the drug[s], mere presence on the property where [they are] located, or mere association, without more, with the person who does control the drug[s] or the property on which [they are] found, is insufficient to support a finding of possession.). Applying these principles, it was clearly unreasonable for the jurors to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Harrison either manufactured the methamphetamine or possessed the anhydrous ammonia in the meth trailer. Cf. Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky.1991). The Commonwealth's primary argument at trial was that the evidence sufficed to convict Harrison as an accomplice with respect to the methamphetamine and anhydrous ammonia offenses, and the trial court's instructions permitted the jury to find him guilty either as principal or accomplice with respect to both offenses. The verdict form did not require the jury to identify under which theory guilt was found and the verdict did not so state. [7] The accomplice theory was premised upon a pyramid of inferences, i.e., the jury could infer (1) that Harrison occupied the John Paul trailer and possessed the property found therein from the presence of his personal effects and the pill bottles with his name on the labels; (2) that Harrison used the head lamp and night-vision goggles to steal the anhydrous ammonia found in the meth trailer; (3) that the nicotinamide found in one of the pill bottles in the John Paul trailer was used to cut the methamphetamine manufactured by Hayes for purpose of sale; and (4) that the $324.00 found in Harrison's pocket represented proceeds of such a sale. We agree that the presence of Harrison's personal effects and the pill boxes with his name on the labels created a reasonable inference that Harrison occupied the John Paul trailer and possessed its contents. However, to support an inference that Harrison used the head lamp and night-vision goggles to steal the anhydrous ammonia found in the meth trailer, the Commonwealth was required to prove by direct or circumstantial evidence that the anhydrous ammonia found in the meth trailer had, in fact, been stolen. There was no direct evidence to prove that fact. The corpus delicti may be shown by circumstantial evidence but the circumstances must be more consistent with guilt than with innocence. Dolan v. Commonwealth, 468 S.W.2d 277, 282 (Ky.1971). The evidence must constitute more than mere suspicion. Matthews v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.2d 647, 648-49 (Ky.1972); Hodges v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Ky.1971). Sheriff Hudson testified that a farmer can legally purchase anhydrous ammonia from a farm supply store by producing a farm card authorizing such a purchase. It is unknown whether Hayes owned a farm card; however, it is known that he owned a farm. The fact that the anhydrous ammonia was in a modified LP gas tank does not prove that it was stolen. Hayes could have purchased the anhydrous ammonia, then transferred it to the smaller tank for easier handling during the manufacturing process. See generally Fulcher, 149 S.W.3d at 368-69 (describing one method of manufacturing methamphetamine: Anhydrous ammonia is then funneled into the mixture from, typically, a propane tank through a plastic tube or rubber hose.). The three unmodified propane tanks found in the junk room of the John Paul trailer contribute nothing to this theory of complicity liability. None of these tanks was capable of being used as a container for anhydrous ammonia. One, in fact, contained propane, a gas commonly used for a number of purposes on farms. [8] Even if a jury believed that Harrison intended to modify those tanks at some future time, such would not prove present complicity in the manufacturing process then occurring in the meth trailer, or even create an inference that he modified the LP tank being used in the meth trailer. The presence of the syringe, needles, tourniquet, etc., in the John Paul trailer created an inference that Harrison was a user of some type of intravenously injectable drug, perhaps methamphetamine (no controlled substance was found in the trailer and the paraphernalia found in the box on the floor was not tested for the presence of drugs). The chemist who identified the white powder as a cutting agent explained that if one gram of methamphetamine is mixed with one gram of nicotinamide, the result is two grams of methamphetamine. If that assertion is true (and the jury received no other definition of a cutting agent), possession of the small amount of nicotinamide found in the pill box with Harrison's name on the label would be more consistent with possession for personal consumption than possession for purpose of sale. See United States v. Martinez, 44 F.3d 148, 150 (2d Cir.1995) (cutting agent possessed by defendant was . . . not shown by any evidence to be more consistent with distribution than with purchase and use.), vacated and superseded on other grounds by United States v. Martinez, 54 F.3d 1040, 1044 (2d Cir.1995). With respect to the $340.00 found on Harrison's person at the time of his arrest, we agree that possession of cash can be relevant to prove that a defendant is a drug trafficker. United States v. Caraza, 843 F.2d 432, 436 (11th Cir.1988) (The combination of the currency, cocaine, and cocaine wrappers tends to demonstrate that [a defendant] was involved in a conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.); United States v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1056 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1105 (2d Cir.1975) (possession of unexplained $967,450 in cash coupled with evidence of narcotics trafficking on a large scale is similar to the possession of special means, such as tools or apparatus, which is admissible to show the doing of an act requiring those means.). However, possession of cash alone is insufficient to indicate criminality. Clay v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Ky. App.1993) ([I]t is clear that possession of a large amount of unexplained cash by itself is not an indicia of criminality. . . .). Even when other indicia of criminality exist, i.e., possession of tools of the trade, United States v. Clay, 346 F.3d 173, 179 (6th Cir.2003), the presence of the cash is generally relevant only when unexplained. United States v. Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 215 (3d Cir.2003) (evidence of large cash purchases coupled with tax evidence that tended to show the defendant had no legitimate source of income relevant to prove participation in conspiracy to distribute drugs); United States v. Jackskion, 102 F.2d 683, 684 (2d Cir.1939) (evidence of defendant's bank balance admissible only upon showing that it was normally between $500.00 and $1,000.00, and in a year it had increased to $8,000.00 without any explanation except criminal activity). When an alleged drug trafficker is shown to be unemployed, evidence of that person's possession of a large amount of money is naturally relevant. Justice Holmes, in the oft-cited case of Commonwealth v. Mulrey, 170 Mass. 103, 49 N.E. 91 (1898), held that evidence of deposits of money could help prove criminal conduct where the amount deposited was much too large to be accounted for by [the defendant's] salary. Id. at 94. If, however, as Hudson testified, Harrison was employed by Hayes, $340.00 could just as well have been a week's pay as proceeds from a drug transaction. The circumstantial evidence relied upon to prove Harrison's complicity to manufacture methamphetamine and possess the anhydrous ammonia found in the meth trailer was so tenuous and speculative that it was clearly unreasonable for the jury to have found guilt. Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky.1991). His convictions of those offenses must be reversed. Moore v. Commonwealth, 282 S.W.2d at 614-15 (Mere acquiescence in, or approval of, the criminal act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate in its commission, is not sufficient to constitute one an aider and abettor.); see also United States v. Estrada-Macias, 218 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir.2000) (evidence that defendant associated with members of drug conspiracy, that defendant lived in trailer near residence used by conspirators to manufacture methamphetamine, that evidence of conspiracy was present in defendant's trailer, that defendant's first name was written in one conspirator's address book, and that defendant initially did not admit that he lived in trailer held insufficient to sustain conviction for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine).