Opinion ID: 1386055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Federal Confrontation Clause

Text: (5a) The Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution recites in pertinent part that In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.... The foregoing confrontation clause is not an absolute bar to all hearsay evidence or other procedures which may limit or preclude a direct face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser. Thus far, at least, the clause has operated to exclude admission at trial of some otherwise admissible hearsay evidence, although many exceptions exist to that bar. (See Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 [111 L.Ed.2d 638, 110 S.Ct. 3139] [admissibility at trial of hearsay statements by child victims of sexual abuse]; Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at pp. 63-65 [65 L.Ed.2d 605-607] [admissibility at trial of hearsay statements if elements of reliability of testimony and unavailability of declarant are shown]; Bourjaily v. United States (1987) 483 U.S. 171, 182-184 [97 L.Ed.2d 144, 156-158, 107 S.Ct. 2775] [requirement of reliability of testimony satisfied by firmly rooted coconspirator exception to hearsay rule]; United States v. Inadi (1986) 475 U.S. 387, 394-400 [89 L.Ed.2d 390, 397-402, 106 S.Ct. 1121] [requirement of unavailability of declarant inapplicable to statements made by nontestifying coconspirator]; see also Maryland v. Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836 [111 L.Ed.2d 666, 110 S.Ct. 3157] [invalidity of one-way closed circuit television procedure to elicit testimony at trial of child abuse victim]; Coy v. Idaho (1988) 487 U.S. 1012 [101 L.Ed.2d 857, 108 S.Ct. 2798] [propriety of placing screen between defendant and child victim at trial ]; Kentucky v. Stincer (1987) 482 U.S. 730, 737-740 [96 L.Ed.2d 631, 642-644, 107 S.Ct. 2658] [excluding defendant from child victims' competency hearing was not confrontation clause violation because victims were available for cross-examination at trial ]; Herbert v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 661, 667 [172 Cal. Rptr. 850, 19 A.L.R.4th 1276].) Petitioner, focusing on the foregoing reliability element for evaluating hearsay evidence, contends that new Penal Code section 872, subdivision (b), has no provision for guaranteeing the reliability of the hearsay. As we construe the section, however, it does not permit hearsay testimony by a noninvestigating officer lacking any personal knowledge of the circumstances under which the out-of-court statement, declaration or report was made. Additionally, the experience and training requirements of the section help assure that the hearsay testimony of the investigating officer will indeed be as reliable as appropriate in light of the limited purpose of the preliminary hearing, as discussed in greater detail below. (See Manson v. Brathwaite (1977) 432 U.S. 98, 115 [53 L.Ed.2d 140, 154-155, 97 S.Ct. 2243] [reliability of trained, experienced police officers].) Although the underlying reliability of the victim or witness may remain untested until trial, we think the evaluation and cross-examination of the testimony of the qualified investigating officer provides sufficient basis for a pretrial probable cause determination. Finally, under new Penal Code section 866, subdivision (a), the magistrate has authority to permit the defendant to call any witness whose proposed testimony would be reasonably likely to establish an affirmative defense, negate a crime element, or impeach prosecution evidence. Based on the foregoing safeguards or limitations, the new provisions appear to satisfy petitioner's reliability objections. Moreover, aside from questions of reliability, it is doubtful that the federal confrontation clause operates to bar hearsay evidence offered at a preliminary hearing held to determine whether probable cause exists to hold the defendant for trial. Several California appellate cases have assumed that either the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution guarantees a right of confrontation and cross-examination at preliminary hearings. (E.g., People v. Harris (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 1246, 1256 [212 Cal. Rptr. 216], and cases cited; Herbert v. Superior Court, supra, 117 Cal. App.3d 661, 665-666, & fn. 3; Gallaher v. Superior Court (1980) 103 Cal. App.3d 666, 671 [162 Cal. Rptr. 389]; see also Jennings v. Superior Court (1967) 66 Cal.2d 867, 875 [59 Cal. Rptr. 440, 428 P.2d 304]; but see Herbert v. Superior Court, supra, 117 Cal. App.3d at pp. 671-672 [conc. opn. by Puglia, P.J.].) As petitioner acknowledges, however, the United States Supreme Court has never so held. Indeed, as we will explain, there are indications in prior high court cases that a constitutional challenge to the hearsay procedures now permitted by Proposition 115 would fail. Moreover, the scope and purpose of California preliminary hearings were considerably broader when the foregoing appellate cases were decided, thus calling in question the continued validity of their conclusion. First, as petitioner acknowledges, other than the probable cause hearing held to justify continued detention of the accused (discussed below), there exists no federal constitutional right to a preliminary hearing to determine whether a case should proceed to trial. Instead, in the federal system, most felonies and capital offenses are prosecuted by indictment. (U.S. Const., Fifth Amend.; see Smith v. United States (1959) 360 U.S. 1, 6-7 [3 L.Ed.2d 1041, 1046-1047, 79 S.Ct. 991]; United States v. Luxenberg (6th Cir.1967) 374 F.2d 241, 248, and cases cited.) Moreover, it is well established that hearsay is admissible in indictment proceedings before federal grand juries. ( Costello v. United States (1956) 350 U.S. 359, 363-364 [100 L.Ed. 397, 402-403, 76 S.Ct. 406].) Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. ( Barber v. Page (1968) 390 U.S. 719, 725 [20 L.Ed.2d 255, 260, 88 S.Ct. 1318], italics added; accord Kentucky v. Stincer, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 737 [96 L.Ed.2d at p. 642]; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39, 52 [94 L.Ed.2d 40, 54, 107 S.Ct. 989]; California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149, 156-157 [26 L.Ed.2d 489, 495-497, 90 S.Ct. 1930] [federal confrontation clause was aimed at eliminating practice of trying defendants on basis of witnesses' out-of-court statements and declarations].) As Barber explained (in the context of contrasting the utility of confrontation at a preliminary hearing), the confrontation right includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness. A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function is the more limited one of determining whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial. (390 U.S. at p. 725 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 260].) A few years later, the high court squarely held that the federal confrontation clause does not require that full adversarial safeguards, such as presentation of witnesses and cross-examination of their testimony, be made available for every pretrial probable cause hearing. ( Gerstein v. Pugh (1975) 420 U.S. 103, 119-124 [43 L.Ed.2d 54, 68-71, 95 S.Ct. 854], hereafter Gerstein. ) Gerstein explained that, for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis in determining whether probable cause exists to detain an arrestee for a significant time pending trial, a full adversarial hearing, together with confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, need not be afforded so long as a timely judicial determination of probable cause is made as a prerequisite to continued detention. ( Id. at p. 126 [43 L.Ed.2d at p. 72].) The court in Gerstein contrasted Fourth Amendment detention hearings with the more formal preliminary hearings used in many states to determine whether the evidence justifies going to trial. (420 U.S. at pp. 119-120 [43 L.Ed.2d at pp. 68-69].) The court observed that adversary procedures are customarily employed during such formal hearings ( id. at p. 120 [43 L.Ed.2d at p. 69]), but it avoided suggesting that such procedures are constitutionally mandated. Instead, Gerstein simply noted that state systems of criminal procedure vary widely, encouraged such experimentation, and concluded that There is no single preferred pretrial procedure, and the nature of the probable cause determination usually will be shaped to accord with a State's pretrial procedure viewed as a whole. ( Id. at p. 123 [43 L.Ed.2d at p. 71].) Significantly, Gerstein observed that, by their very nature, probable cause determinations do not involve the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt. [Citation.] This is not to say that confrontation and cross-examination might not enhance the reliability of probable cause determinations in some cases. In most cases, however, their value would be too slight to justify holding, as a matter of constitutional principle, that these formalities and safeguards designed for trial must also be employed in making the Fourth Amendment determination of probable cause. (420 U.S. at pp. 121-122 [43 L.Ed.2d at pp. 69-70], fn. omitted.) The Gerstein court acknowledged that a prior decision ( Coleman v. Alabama (1970) 399 U.S. 1 [26 L.Ed.2d 387, 90 S.Ct. 1999]) had held an Alabama preliminary hearing was a critical stage of the prosecution for which the presence of counsel was required. But the court noted that under the Alabama law involved in Coleman, not only was the purpose of the hearing to determine probable cause to charge an offense, but the suspect was specifically allowed to confront and cross-examine prosecution witnesses at such hearings, thus making it essential that the defendant have counsel's assistance. The Gerstein court continued by stating that This consideration [need for counsel's assistance] does not apply when the prosecution is not required to produce witnesses for cross-examination. (420 U.S. at p. 123 [43 L.Ed.2d at pp. 70-71].) Gerstein's implication seems to be that state limitations on the purpose and scope of the preliminary hearing may reduce the necessity for adversarial procedural safeguards such as right to counsel. Assuming, based on the foregoing language in Gerstein, supra, 420 U.S. 103, and Coleman v. Alabama, supra, 399 U.S. 1, that the confines of the federal confrontation clause may vary depending on the purpose and scope of the hearing provided by state law, it seems reasonable to conclude that the federal clause is not violated by allowing hearsay testimony at post-Proposition 115 preliminary hearings in this state. Under that measure, the very purpose of the hearing has been considerably narrowed: It is the purpose of a preliminary examination to establish whether there exists probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed a felony. The examination shall not be used for purposes of discovery. (Pen. Code, § 866, subd. (b), italics added.) The foregoing statutory pronouncement marks a sharp contrast to this court's previous expansive concept of the preliminary hearing as a discovery and trial preparation device, allowing counsel the opportunity to fashion their impeachment tools for use in cross-examination at trial, to preserve testimony favorable to the defense, and to provide the defense with valuable information about the case against the accused, enhancing its ability to evaluate the desirability of entering a plea or to prepare for trial. ( Hawkins v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 584, 588 [150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 586 P.2d 916].) Significantly, the utility of the preliminary hearing as a discovery tool has been cited in support of the minority position that the use of hearsay at such hearings violates the defendant's confrontation rights. (See, e.g., State v. Anderson (Utah 1980) 612 P.2d 778, 784-786 [relying on confrontation clause of Utah Const.].) (6) As Justice Puglia explained in his concurring opinion in Herbert v. Superior Court, supra, 117 Cal. App.3d at pages 671-672, The constitutional right of confrontation is `basically a trial right' [citations]. Although the federal Constitution requires a probable cause hearing to justify significant pretrial detention of defendant, that hearing need not include traditional adversary safeguards such as the right of confrontation [citing Gerstein, supra, 420 U.S. 103]. Moreover, the federal Constitution does not require a judicial hearing at all as a prerequisite to prosecution by information. [Citation.] A fortiori, when state procedure nevertheless provides for such a hearing, it would logically follow that the federal Constitution does not require the entire panoply of procedural rights available at trial to be observed in the pretrial hearing [citation]. We agree with Justice Puglia's analysis. We note that, under the express language of rule 5.1(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (18 U.S.C.), as approved by the United States Supreme Court, a magistrate at a federal preliminary examination may base his or her finding of probable cause in whole, or in part, on hearsay evidence. (See Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure (2d ed. 1982) Criminal, § 85, pp. 183-184.) We think it would be anomalous to hold that the admission of such evidence at a comparable state proceeding violates federal confrontation clause principles. The wide majority of sister state courts agree. (See Note, Confrontation Rights and Preliminary Hearings, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 75, 83, fn. 54, and cases cited [criticizing State v. Anderson, supra, 612 P.2d 778].) As stated in one of the cases representing the majority rule, to impose the same rules of evidence at the preliminary hearing as at the trial stage would amount to the granting of a second trial and this would be judicial waste and delay. A preliminary hearing is not designed to be a dress rehearsal for the trial. ( Wilson v. State (Wyo. 1982) 655 P.2d 1246, 1251.) (5b) We conclude that the new, limited form of preliminary hearing in this state sufficiently resembles the Fourth Amendment probable cause hearing examined in Gerstein, supra, 420 U.S. 103, to meet federal confrontation clause standards despite reliance on hearsay evidence.