Opinion ID: 765858
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pretrial and Trial Challenges

Text: 157 After a pre-trial hearing, the District Court denied El-Gabrowny's motion to suppress the forged passports on the ground, inter alia, that their seizure was justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See United States v. El-Gabrowny, 876 F. Supp. 495, 498-500 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). El-Gabrowny contends the passports should not have been admitted in evidence at trial because their seizure violated prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment. 158 Under Terry, to determine whether police officers were justified in frisking a temporarily detained person to see if he is carrying weapons, we apply an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant [an officer] of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate? Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. Before carrying out a stop and frisk for weapons, [t]he officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent [officer] in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. Id. at 27. 159 Several specific and articulable facts available to the officers at the time of the seizure amply justified their conduct. See id. at 21. The FBI had learned, upon searching the debris at the site of the explosion at the World Trade Center, that the exploded vehicle had been rented by Mohammad Salameh, whose New York driver's license showed as his residence the address of El-Gabrowny's apartment in Brooklyn. On March 4, 1993, agents obtained a warrant to search the apartment for explosives and related devices. Also on that day, news of Salameh's arrest was widely broadcast. See El-Gabrowny, 876 F. Supp. at 497. Before agents entered El-Gabrowny's apartment, two officers waited outside in vehicles and watched El-Gabrowny, who had left his building and was walking down the street. As agents entered the building to conduct the search, El-Gabrowny, whose identity was known to the agents, turned and started to walk back toward the building at an accelerated pace, his hands thrust in the pockets of his jacket. Id. at 497. Upon observing this, the officers approached El-Gabrowny, identified themselves as police officers, removed his hands from his pockets, and tried to place his hands against a wall to frisk him. El-Gabrowny resisted. One officer felt a firm rectangular object in El-Gabrowny's pocket that he believed might be a plastic explosive. El-Gabrowny then struck both agents and was arrested for assaulting the agents. The officers removed the object from El-Gabrowny's pocket, and found that it was an envelope containing the fraudulent passports. Id. at 498. 160 In light of these facts, the agents were justified under Terry in stopping El-Gabrowny and frisking him for weapons to protect their own safety and that of the agents conducting the search. It was reasonable for the officers to suspect that the firm rectangular object in El-Gabrowny's pocket might be an explosive device, given the use of explosives at the World Trade Center bombing and the fact that the warrant for the apartment covered explosives. 161 In any event, the officers were authorized to arrest El-Gabrowny for his assaults on them. His arrest for the assault would inevitably have led to the discovery and seizure of the passports that were in his pocket upon a search of his person incident to that arrest. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 229 (1973); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440, 448 (1984) (inevitable discovery). 12
162 Abdel Rahman, joined by his co-defendants, argues that the District Court's voir dire of prospective jurors was inadequate and deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. He claims that the Court's questioning of the jurors was insufficient with respect to (1) their prior knowledge of the case from reports they may have heard in the media, and (2) ethnic and/or religious bias that might have prejudiced them against the defendants. Because it is clear that the District Court thoroughly screened the prospective jurors for bias in both respects, this claim is unpersuasive. 163 [J]udges have been accorded ample discretion in determining how best to conduct the voir dire. Rosalez-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189; see also United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 137 (2d Cir. 1979). Thus, while counsel may suggest that particular questions be put to the panel of prospective jurors, the Court's refusal to ask those questions will not be grounds for reversal, provided the voir dire cover[s] the subject[s] that may arise in the case to ensure that jurors will be impartial. See Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 311; United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir. 1996); Barnes, 604 F.2d at 137. With respect to pretrial publicity, the Supreme Court has held that, while questioning prospective jurors individually about the specific contents of any news reports they may have seen might assist counsel in exercising peremptory challenges, the Constitution requires only that the Court determine whether they have formed an opinion about the case. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 425 (1991). 164 It is clear that Judge Mukasey's thorough selection procedures went far beyond the minimum constitutional requirements. Over 500 prospective jurors went through the Court's three-week-long screening process. After providing groups of prospective jurors with preliminary instructions, the Court gave each venireperson a nineteen-page questionnaire to fill out. This questionnaire did far more than cover the topic[s] of pretrial publicity and ethnic bias. Jurors were asked not only whether they had heard anything about the case, but also about the source of that information and whether they could nonetheless render a fair and impartial verdict based only on the evidence presented in court. They were also asked more subtle, detailed questions about their personal experiences that might have prejudiced them against the defendants: whether they or their loved ones regularly use the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels and the George Washington Bridge, and whether they were at or near the World Trade Center when it was bombed, for example. 165 The Court's inquiry into ethnic and religious prejudice was even more comprehensive. All prospective jurors were asked, Is there anything about a case where all the defendants are Muslims (which means they practice Islam) that would make it hard for you to serve as a juror? They were told that all the defendants were of Arab descent, and asked, Is there any reason you could not be fair and impartial to any defendant in this case? and asked to explain if the answer was yes. Moreover, all prospective jurors were then required to answer yes or no to the following questions: 166 Do you know anything about, or have any opinion about, the teachings or doctrines of Islam? 167 If yes, please explain. 168 Do/have you worked with people of Arab descent? 169 Do you socialize with people of Arab descent? 170 Have you ever had a negative experience with a person of Arab descent? 171 If yes, please explain. 172 Do you have any negative or positive feelings or opinions about people of Arab descent? 173 If yes, please explain. 174 The answers to the questionnaires were provided to counsel for both sides. Subsequently, after a number of the prospective jurors were excused for cause, the Court conducted individual voir dire with each remaining pool member. The Court's inquiry included various follow-up questions suggested by counsel; at one point, the Court adopted defense counsel's suggestion that it rephrase certain questions about persons of Arabic and African descent in order to allow prospective jurors to give more detailed and honest responses. 175 Judge Mukasey's voir dire skillfully balanced the difficult task of questioning such a large jury pool with the defendants' right to inquire into the sensitive issues that might arise in the case. The defendants' constitutional challenge to the fairness of the procedures is therefore without merit.
176 Based on claims of prejudicial spillover, Fadil Abdelgani, Amir Abdelgani, El-Gabrowny, Rahman, and perhaps Saleh and Kalafallah 13 contend that the District Court committed reversible error in denying their severance motions. See United States v. Rahman, 854 F. Supp. 254, 261-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 177 District courts exercise a considerable degree of discretion in determining whether, on balance, the fair administration of justice will be better served by one aggregate trial of all indicted defendants or by two or more trials of groups of defendants. United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1151 (2d Cir. 1989). [W]hen defendants properly have been joined under Rule 8(b), a district court should grant a severance under Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993). 178 Because no defendant has convincingly shown prejudice resulting from the District Court's denial of the severance motions, we find there was no abuse of discretion.
179 The following defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on the following charges: Rahman challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on all counts of conviction; El-Gabrowny, Hampton-El, and Fadil Abdelgani challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their seditious conspiracy convictions; Hampton-El and Alvarez contend that the proof supporting their attempted bombing convictions was insufficient; and Nosair attacks the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his three convictions for racketeering (the murder of Meir Kahane and the shootings of Irving Franklin and Carlos Acosta).
180 This Court reviews claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. See United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093, 1100 (2d Cir. 1997). In reviewing such a claim we must consider the evidence as a whole, and not as individual pieces, see United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 673 (2d Cir. 1996), and remember that the jury is entitled to base its decision on reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Klausner, 80 F.3d 795, 802 (2d Cir. 1996). Based on these principles, we must uphold a jury's verdict on appeal if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Jackson, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 181 Additionally, as a matter of substantive law, one may be proven guilty of conspiracy even if one does not know all the other members or all the details of the conspiracy's operation. See United States v. Sureff, 15 F.3d 225, 230 (2d Cir. 1994). Once an unlawful agreement is shown, to show membership, the Government need provide only some evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred that the person charged with conspiracy knew of the existence of the scheme alleged in the indictment and knowingly joined and participated in it. United States v. Sanchez Solis, 882 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1989).
182 Rahman argues that the evidence presented by the Government was insufficient to support a conviction for any of the counts with which he was charged. Rahman asserts that he had limited contact with most of the other defendants, that he was physically incapable, due to his blindness, of participating in the operational aspects of the conspiracies, and that there was little direct evidence of his knowledge of many of the events in question. We find Rahman's claims unavailing. 183 a. Seditious Conspiracy and Bombing Conspiracy. To support a conviction for seditious conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 2384, the Government must demonstrate that: (1) in a State, or Territory, or place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, (2) two or more persons conspired to levy war against or oppose by force the authority of the United States government, and (3) that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy. 18 U.S.C. § 2384. 184 First, we find ample evidence in the record to support the jury's finding that there was indeed a conspiracy to levy war against the United States. Over the course of the trial, the jury was presented with considerable evidence of a conspiracy. The evidence included the fact that many of the defendants in this case, as well as many the World Trade Center defendants, participated in military training exercises the purpose of which was to train members to carry out jihad operations. Tr. 6496-97. Appellant Nosair murdered Kahane in 1990, assisted by Salameh (who had been present at the training sessions). Among Nosair's possessions, the Government found notebooks describing war on the enemies of Islam and the manner of prosecuting such, including exploding . . . their high world buildings, as well as manuals on guerilla warfare tactics and explosives. Tr. 3963. 185 Salameh, Yousef, and Abouhalima, the bombers of the World Trade Center, had considerable phone contact and/or direct contact with El-Gabrowny, Nosair, and Rahman in the weeks leading up to the bombing. Siddig Ali assisted Abouhalima's flight from the United States following the bombing. Rahman also encouraged Salem to murder Mubarak and issued a fatwa calling for the murder. In accordance with this call to duty, Siddig Ali plotted to assassinate Mubarak in March of 1993. The Abdelganis, Saleh, Elhassan, Hampton-El, and Alvarez engaged in a plot to bomb the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels and the United Nations. They purchased fuel, fertilizers, and timers and actively sought detonators. They had begun construction of the explosives when they were arrested. Each of these acts was connected by myriad contacts between the defendants. These illustrative acts, coupled with other evidence presented at trial, convince us that there is ample evidence to support the jury's conclusion that there was a conspiracy to levy war on the United States, and that the conspiracy contemplated the use of force. 186 As to Abdel Rahman's individual claim, there is also sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that he was in fact a member of the conspiracy. While there is no evidence that Rahman personally participated in the performance of the conspiracy, when conspiracy is charged, the Government is not required to show that the defendant personally performed acts in its furtherance: it is sufficient for the defendant to join in the illegal agreement. The evidence showed that Rahman was in constant contact with other members of the conspiracy, that he was looked to as a leader, and that he accepted that role and encouraged his co-conspirators to engage in violent acts against the United States. 187 Rahman discussed the results of the paramilitary training with Abouhalima and Nosair, and encouraged his followers to conduct jihad, including acts of violence, against the United States. During a visit to Nosair at Attica, Nosair instructed Shinawy to seek a fatwa from Rahman regarding a plan to bomb various targets. Siddig Ali reported to Rahman concerning the resumed paramilitary training. Rahman encouraged Salem to conduct jihad by killing Mubarak and issued a fatwa for Mubarek's death. Rahman made numerous calls overseas, including calls to a number in Pakistan that was inscribed in a bombing manual carried by convicted World Trade Center bomber Yousef. Rahman also had frequent contact with other members of the conspiracy including El-Gabrowny, Abouhalima, and Salameh in the weeks leading up to the World Trade Center bombing. 188 Siddig Ali told Salem that Rahman had referred to the Spring 1993 bombing campaign as a must and a duty. Siddig Ali also told Salem that he was free to discuss the plot with Rahman, but to do so in general terms so as to keep Rahman insulated. Although Rahman did advise against making the United Nations a bombing target because that would be bad for Muslims, he advised Salem to seek a different target (U.S. military installations) for the bombings, and to plan for them carefully. In that same conversation, he also warned Salem to be careful around Siddig Ali, who he suspected was a traitor. Rahman then sought out the traitor in his group, having a long discussion with Salem and Siddig Ali over who was the traitor. This evidence shows that a reasonable trier of fact could have found that Rahman was a member of the conspiracy and that he was in fact its leader. 189 As to the bombing conspiracy count, the Government must prove: (1) that Rahman was a member of a conspiracy to destroy, by means of fire or explosives, any building, vehicle or other real or personal property in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 844(i); and (2) that one or more of the conspirators did any act to effect the object of the conspiracy. 18 U.S.C. § 371. Even if we assume that this count is limited to the Spring 1993 plot 14 , there is clear evidence to support a reasonable conclusion that there was a conspiracy of which Rahman was a member, and that the conspirators had taken overt acts to effect the object thereof. The conspirators had, among other things: (1) scouted the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels; (2) contributed rent for a place to make the bombs; (3) purchased fuel oil, fertilizer, and timers from which to make the bombs; and (4) begun mixing the fuel and fertilizer. 190 Particularly relevant to the finding of Rahman's membership are the statements of Siddig Ali to Salem that Rahman had issued a fatwa for the Spring 1993 bombing plot, and had called it a must and a duty. Although Rahman wavered on the target of the bombing during his conversation with Salem, he nonetheless approved bombing as the method and suggested alternative targets. Rahman and Siddig Ali met together several times during the bombing preparations. On June 17, 1993, less than two weeks before the anticipated bombing, Rahman held a press conference (using Siddig Ali as his translator) during which he warned that the United States would pay a terrible price for supporting Mubarak. 191 This evidence, taken together, was sufficient to support a reasonable conclusion that Rahman was guilty of the bombing conspiracy. 192 b. Conspiracy and Solicitation to Murder Mubarak. Rahman also claims that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions for soliciting Salem, Siddig Ali, and Haggag, to murder Mubarak, and for being a member of a conspiracy to do such. 193 To support a conviction on the conspiracy to murder count, for which Rahman received a life sentence, the Government was required to prove: (1) that Rahman was a member of a conspiracy to kill a foreign official, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1116(a), 1117; and (2) that one of the conspirators took an overt act to effect such. See 18 U.S.C. § 1117. Again, there is sufficient evidence of the existence of the conspiracy, that Rahman was a member of it, and of the overt act. Specifically, in 1991 on the Detroit trip, Rahman told Salem that Mubarak should be killed. Siddig Ali told Salem that Mubarak's planned March 1993 visit provided an opportunity for the group to execute the desire of Rahman, namely, to assassinate Mubarak. Rahman had made clear to Siddig Ali that he wanted Mubarak killed, and had already issued a fatwa regarding such. Rahman told Haggag that killing Mubarak did not require an additional fatwa, and that Haggag and the people with training should carry out the assassination. Tr. 10108. 194 In furtherance of this conspiracy, Siddig Ali made contacts with an individual at the Sudanese mission to the U.N. seeking to get information regarding Mubarak's itinerary, and made plans for the assassination. Siddig Ali contacted a source in the United Arab Emirates seeking financing for the plan, stating that Rahman would vouch for him. In May 1993, both Haggag and Siddig Ali sought to take credit for proposing the plan when Rahman was questioning them over who was the traitor in the group. Based on the above, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the Government presented sufficient evidence to support Rahman's conviction on this count. 195 To convict Rahman of soliciting Mubarak's murder, the Government must prove by 'strongly corroborative circumstances' that the defendant had the intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a crime described in Title 18 . . . and that the defendant actually commanded, induced or otherwise endeavored to persuade the other person to commit the felony. United States v. McNeill, 887 F.2d 448, 450 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Gabriel, 810 F.2d 627, 635-36 (7th Cir. 1987)). Whether such corroborative circumstances exist is a question of fact for the jury, see Gabriel, 810 F.2d at 635, and otherwise endeavors to persuade means any situation where a person seriously seeks to persuade another. McNeill, 887 F.2d at 450. 196 We conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the Government proved such. First, Rahman explicitly suggested to Salem that he could make up for his service in the Egyptian army by killing Mubarak. Siddig Ali made it clear that Rahman adamantly wanted Mubarak dead. Rahman also told Haggag to kill Mubarak. These facts, taken together with the fact that the Government also provided evidence that Rahman was the leader of the group, who decided whether certain causes were pursued, and who picked targets and approved all plans, justifies a conclusion that Rahman solicited Salem, Siddig Ali, and Haggag to murder Mubarak. 197 c. Solicitation to Bomb a Military Installation. With regard to the conviction for solicitation to bomb a military installation, the Government must also meet the McNeill test. Here, that test is met again based on Rahman's status as leader of the group, combined with the fact that he specifically told Salem to target military bases. Thus a reasonable trier of fact could find Rahman guilty of such solicitation.
198 Nosair argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that the murder of Kahane (or any of the specific charges levied under the RICO statute, including the attempted murder of Acosta and Franklin) was done with the statutorily required motive--to maintain or increase his position within a racketeering enterprise. See 18 U.S.C. § 1959. 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) states: 199 Whoever . . . for the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, murders, . . . assaults with a dangerous weapon, commits assault resulting in serious bodily injury upon, . . . or attempts ... so to do, shall be punished . . . . 200 To be convicted of this crime, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: 201 (1) that the organization was a RICO enterprise, (2) that the enterprise was engaged in racketeering activity as defined in RICO, (3) that the defendant in question had a position in the enterprise, (4) that the defendant committed the alleged crime of violence, and (5) that his general purpose in so doing was to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise. 202 United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 381 (2d Cir. 1992). Here, Nosair concedes that the Government presented sufficient evidence on the first four elements, and contests only the fifth. 203 Nosair bases his claim on a narrow construction of the term Jihad Organization, which the indictment defined as being equivalent to the charged seditious conspiracy. Thus, Nosair claims that the murder of Kahane, a private Israeli citizen, could not further the goals of an organization whose primary purpose was to levy war on the United States. We find this reading of the indictment flawed. According to the indictment, the Jihad Organization, the RICO enterprise in question, was opposed to nations, governments, institutions and individuals that did not share the group's particular radical interpretation of Islamic law, Indictment ¶ 1 (emphasis added), and an objective of this group was to carry out, and conspire to carry out, acts of terrorism--including bombings, murders, and the taking of hostages--against various governments and government officials, including the United States government and its officials. Id. ¶ 3. Thus, the murder of Kahane did not stray from the purposes of the Jihad organization, and in fact was entirely consonant therewith. 204 Nosair asserts that the Government also failed to show that the murder furthered his position in the organization. Under Concepcion, to prove the motive element the Government must present sufficient evidence so a jury could properly infer that the defendant committed his violent crime because he knew it was expected of him by reason of his membership in the enterprise or that he committed it in furtherance of that membership. Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 381. Further, such motive need not be the sole and principal motive for the act, and maintaining or increasing position should be construed liberally. Id. 205 United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785 (2d Cir. 1994), much relied on by Nosair, is not availing. In Thai, we overturned a section 1959 conviction on sufficiency grounds. See id. at 818. In so doing, we applied the above principles, noting that the crime was strictly pecuniary in motive and that, even though the Government asserted that the motive of the enterprise was pecuniary, tying the crime to the group without any other direct evidence of such a connection was speculative. Id. 206 This case is easily distinguished from Thai because there is sufficient evidence from which to infer that the murder of Kahane, as well as the related violent crimes, were committed in furtherance of Nosair's membership in the jihad group. See Concepcion, 934 F.2d at 381. Specifically, we point to the fact that Nosair's notebook found during the search of his apartment stated that one of the goals of the jihad group was to allow Muslims to repossess their sacred lands in the hands of the enemies of God, Tr. 3963--a clear reference to Israel. In a conversations with Rahman, Nosair lamented the Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe to Israel. Killing Kahane is related to the fulfillment of these goals. 207 There was also evidence to suggest that the murder of Kahane involved other members of the organization, namely, Salameh and Ayyad, both of whom were convicted of the World Trade Center bombing. Rahman, the leader of the organization, remarked that he would have been honored to issue a fatwa regarding the murder of Kahane. Nosair, in a message taped from Rikers Island, stated God the Almighty enabled His extremely brave people, with His great power, to destroy one of the top infidels. Govt. Ex. 163R at 1. Nosair told his physician, in response to a question about the murder, I had no choice, it was my duty. Tr. 9244-45. Nosair sought to use the murder to inspire his compatriots to take other action, thus using it to increase his position in the organization. 208 Thus, a reasonable inference that the murder was in furtherance of his membership can be made, and his statement that it was his duty to murder Kahane leads to an inference that the murder was motivated by a desire to maintain or elevate his position in the organization.
209 Fadil Abdelgani concedes that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict him of the conspiracy to bomb and attempted bombing charges. However, he alleges that there was not sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict for seditious conspiracy for which he received twenty years' imprisonment. We disagree. 210 The Government persuasively counters that a jury could reasonably infer that Fadil knew of the group's overriding purpose of forcibly opposing the United States based on his participation in the 1992 training camp and on the time he spent with Amir and other group members in the safehouse on June 23 while the plot was discussed. Fadil's participation in the attempted bombing itself also justifies an inference that he agreed to forcibly oppose the United States; the bombing plan was to disable major commercial activity of the United States (by disabling the tunnels) and to hit at the Government itself by bombing the United Nations. See United States v. Sanchez Solis, 882 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1989). Fadil's alleged lack of knowledge of Nosair or Rahman and the details of some of the other overt acts of the conspiracy is not fatal to the Government's position. The case law of this Court holds that to be guilty of conspiracy a defendant need not know every detail of the conspiracy or know of the identities of all of the other conspirators. See United States v. Labat, 905 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1990). 211 In light of Fadil's sometimes false and often strained testimony during the trial, the jury could also have concluded that he gave such testimony because he was conscious of his guilt. See United States v. Friedman, 998 F.2d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 1993). For example, Fadil testified that he never told the other safehouse defendants that he needed to pray before deciding whether or not to join in the conspiracy even though this comment was verified by the tape recording. Fadil also claimed that he had absolutely no idea what the others were doing mixing fuel and fertilizer, but he just joined in because he was standing around with nothing to do. 212 In sum, a reasonable jury could have concluded based on the evidence presented that Fadil was guilty of both the bombing conspiracy and the broader seditious conspiracy.
213 El-Gabrowny claims there was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict him of seditious conspiracy. El-Gabrowny claims that the jury's verdict was based on circumstantial evidence and that he was simply found guilty by association. The claim is unavailing. In his brief on appeal, El-Gabrowny focuses on the evidence that was not presented at trial and the acts in which he was not involved. El-Gabrowny notes that no tapes were produced in which he discusses plans to bomb buildings or any violent acts. He argues that he had nothing to do with the Kahane murder or the Spring 1993 bombing plots (during which time he was in prison). 214 In so arguing, El-Gabrowny attempts to minimize the real evidence presented against him. That evidence, we find, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of his participation in the seditious conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. El-Gabrowny routinely engaged in discussions with Salem about building bombs, and in June 1992 offered to attempt to obtain detonators from Afghanistan. He also indicated he would try to acquire a safehouse for the construction of bombs, and that he was in touch with underground people who could assist in a bombing. Tr. 4908-09, 4912. 215 He was in constant contact with Nosair, and evidence seized from his house indicated that he shared Nosair's views on the duty to perform jihad. El-Gabrowny encouraged Salem and others to visit Nosair in prison at which time Nosair advocated that they begin jihad and plan to bomb buildings. El-Gabrowny frequently communicated with the World Trade Center bombers during the months, weeks, and days prior to the bombing. Salameh used El-Gabrowny's address on the driver's license that he used to rent the van that was used in the bombing. Upon his arrest, El-Gabrowny was carrying forged passports for Nosair and his family which were apparently meant to be used as part of the planned jailbreak of Nosair. 216 In light of his discussions about bomb building with Salem and his subsequent close interaction with the World Trade Center bombers and Nosair, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Amato, 15 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasis omitted).
217 Alvarez claims that there was insufficient evidence to show a substantial step to support the attempted bombing charge. In support of this argument, Alvarez relies primarily on United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983) (Friendly, J.). In Ivic, this court looked to the Model Penal Code (MPC) definition of attempt to determine if the evidence was sufficient to support the charge. Id. at 66-67. Section 5.01(1)(c) of the MPC provides that: 218 A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the crime, he purposely does . . . anything that, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act . . . constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime. 219 Section 5.01(d) provides a list of factual circumstances which, if strongly corroborative of his criminal purpose, shall not be held insufficient as a matter of law. These factors include: 220 (c) reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission of the crime; 221 (f) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, where such possession, collection or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances. 222 Ivic upheld the conviction of an attempted bombing where the evidence showed that: (1) the defendants discussed the bomb site and the best means of planting a bomb there; (2) the defendants had acquired and had readily available the explosives needed to carry out the bombing; (3) one of the defendants had reconnoitered the bomb site and another authorized the operation. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 67. This Court noted, however, in dicta that the evidence was barely sufficient. See id. 223 In this case, given the large number of steps taken by the defendants in preparation for the bombing, we find that they had moved beyond mere preparation. The defendants had: recruited sufficient participants to carry out the plan; contributed money to rent a safehouse in which to build the bombs; reconnoitered the potential targets of the bombs, by driving through and videotaping the tunnels and discussing the structure of the tunnels with an engineer; purchased, or attempted to purchase, what they believed to be the necessary components for the bombs, including actually purchasing oil, fertilizer, timers, and barrels in which to mix the explosives; attempted to find stolen cars in which to carry the bombs; and obtained a submachine gun to assist in carrying out the plan. Given the nature and scope of the proposed plan, namely, that it was to be a coordinated explosion of massive bombs designed to destroy large targets, we believe that the defendants had moved beyond mere preparation, and had in fact taken numerous substantial steps which were strongly corroborative of their criminal purpose. We therefore reject Alvarez's claim.
224 Hampton-El challenges the sufficiency of evidence against him on the seditious conspiracy and attempted bombing charges. As to both charges, he argues that he did not have the requisite intent. He asserts that the Government did not prove that he intended to join Siddig Ali and his minions to oppose the authority of the U.S. by force or to levy war against the U.S. nor did the Government prove that he specifically intended to bring about the bombing by aiding and abetting in the safehouse operation. 15 225 a. Seditious Conspiracy. At trial Hampton-El testified that he did not know any specifics of the operations of Siddig Ali, Salem, or the others, and that he did not mean it, Tr. 16000, when he agreed to try to find detonators and weapons for them. Relying on United States v. Martinez, 54 F.3d 1040 (2d Cir. 1995), Hampton-El claims that the Government's case impermissibly relied on inferences, and not on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, to show that he intended to join the seditious conspiracy. In Martinez, this Court made clear that where a fact to be proved is also an element of the offense . . . it is not enough that the inferences in the government's favor are permissible. [T]he reviewing court must also be satisfied that the inferences are sufficiently supported to permit a rational juror to find that the element . . . is established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1043. Hampton-El asserts that his only intent was to conduct jihad in Bosnia, and that is why he was engaged in training exercise in the United States. 226 We find sufficient evidence to support a finding of intent to join the conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt based on the following evidence: Hampton-El co-led the shooting training in 1989 and the paramilitary training in 1992 of jihad group members, some of whom were involved in the World Trade Center bombing, and some of whom were involved in the spring 1993 bombing attempt; from 1989 to 1993, he was closely aligned with Nosair, El-Gabrowny, Rahman, Shinawy, and Abouhalima, whom the evidence showed to be planning urban terrorism against the United States; Shinawy (and Salem) went to him for help in obtaining detonators in June 1992 for bombs they told him they were constructing, and one can reasonably infer they went to him because he was a trusted member of the conspiracy; he requested detonators and weapons from Garrett Wilson in December 1992, just months before the World Trade Center bombing; Siddig Ali went to him in March 1993, a month after the World Trade Center bombing, to obtain weapons, and he warned Siddig Ali that members of the group should not have contact; on May 30, 1993, he discussed the spring 1993 bombing plot with Siddig Ali and Salem, said the attack takes a lot of courage, and agreed to try to find detonators for them; and he contacted Mustafa Assad after meeting with Siddig Ali and Salem, met with Assad who is known to have been a bomb builder, and then told Siddig Ali that his source was working on the request. 227 The jury was not obliged to accept Hampton-El's claim that after the May 30, 1993, meeting with Siddig Ali and Salem, he deliberately distanced himself from the bombing plan because he did not want to be involved in violence against the United States. In numerous phone calls to Siddig Ali after the meeting, several of which Hampton-El initiated, he assured Siddig Ali that he was continuing to look for detonators and that he expected to obtain them soon. Hampton-El also frequently called his source for the detonators, Assad, during this time period. 228 The evidence was sufficient to permit a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Hampton-El was continuously involved with group members throughout the life of the conspiracy, that he actively sought out detonators for Siddig Ali and Salem, and that he joined in the seditious conspiracy to make war on the United States. 229 b. Attempted Bombing. The evidence was also sufficient to show that Hampton-El aided and abetted the attempt to bomb by his efforts to find detonators. To be found guilty as an aider and abettor, a defendant must know of the criminal venture, have joined the criminal venture, shared in it, and contributed to it by some act. See United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1995). Hampton-El asserts that he did not know of the criminal venture and he did not even know that the safehouse existed or that the co-defendants were attempting to construct bombs there. However, a reasonable trier of fact could have found that Hampton-El did know of the scheme after the May 30, 1993, meeting at his apartment with Siddig Ali and Salem. At that time, Salem testified, and the intelligible portions of the tape corroborate, that Hampton-El was informed that they planned to bomb the United Nations and the tunnels, and that Hampton-El agreed to help find detonators. He then sought out the detonators. Thus, the jury's verdict finding Hampton-El guilty of attempted bombing was reasonable and supported by sufficient evidence.
230 Defendants Khallafalla and Saleh argue that their conviction violated the Due Process Clause by reason of the Government's overinvolvement in the conspiracy. According to defendants, the Government impermissibly lent direction, technical expertise, and critical resources to the bombing plot through Salem, an informant. We reject this claim because the Government's conduct was within acceptable bounds. 231 The Supreme Court has suggested that in an extreme case, Government involvement in criminal activity might be so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the Government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973); see also United States v. Alexander, 675 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1982). Such an argument might in principle prevail even where, as here, the defendants were not entrapped by the Government. 16 See United States v. Chervil, 949 F.2d 559, 565 (2d Cir. 1991). However, only Government conduct that 'shocks the conscience' can violate due process. United States v. Chin, 934 F.2d 393, 398 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Rochon v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1717 & n.8 (1998) (holding that substantive due process bars executive conduct that shocks the conscience). The paradigm examples of conscience-shocking conduct are egregious invasions of individual rights. See, e.g., Rochon, 342 U.S. at 172 (breaking into suspect's bedroom, forcibly attempting to pull capsules from his throat, and pumping his stomach without his consent). Especially in view of the courts' well-established deference to the Government's choice of investigatory methods, see United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 843 (2d Cir. 1982), the burden of establishing outrageous investigatory conduct is very heavy, see United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 1997). 232 The Government's behavior, and in particular the role of Salem, does not shock the conscience. Undercover work, in which a Government agent pretends to be engaged in criminal activity, is often necessary to detect criminal conspiracies. If such work is to succeed, the undercover agent must have something of value to offer the conspirators. Russell, 411 U.S. at 432. Supplying such a resource can hardly be said to violate due process. Id. In Schmidt, we found that United States Marshals did not violate due process when they posed as hit men, accepted a prisoner's solicitation to murder two guards during an escape, and then conducted a controlled breakout. See Schmidt, 105 F.3d at 85, 92. In this case, Salem's contribution to the criminal conduct was proportionately far smaller: the defendants were already actively advancing a conspiracy, and they already had substantial resources and technical expertise. There is no evidence that the criminal conspiracy would have foundered without the Government's entry. The jihad organization had, after all, already bombed the World Trade Center without Salem's help. Moreover, as in Schmidt, the entry of the Government informant was intended not only to gather evidence, but also to prevent further death and destruction. See id. at 92. Such conduct is not outrageous, and it does not violate due process.
233 El-Gabrowny, joined by the other defendants, contends that the District Court erred in preventing defense counsel from cross-examining Emad Salem about racial bias he allegedly harbored against Black Muslims while working as an informant in the FBI's investigations, and from examining various agents as to whether Salem exhibited such bias. 234 [Trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). Only when this broad discretion is abused will we reverse a trial court's decision to restrict cross-examination. United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 956 (2d Cir. 1990). There was no abuse of discretion here. 235 Considering the very weak foundation for the allegation of racial bias on Salem's part and the even weaker basis for allegations affecting his credibility on this account, we find the District Judge was well within his discretion in so limiting the cross-examination. 236 El-Gabrowny contends that our decision in United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 810 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 505 U.S. 317 (1992), requires reversal here. In Salerno, we held that the District Court exceeded its discretion when it refused to allow a defendant to cross-examine FBI agents about their alleged bias against the defendant himself, where the agents allegedly tape recorded and transcribed his conversations so as to reflect unfavorably on him. 937 F.2d at 809. The circumstances in Salerno were significantly different. For example, here the alleged bias was against third parties, not against the defendant or other members of the defendant's racial or ethnic group. There was no substantial showing how the purported bias might have altered the evidence. Moreover, the District Court in Salerno had initially agreed with the defendant that he should be permitted to examine the agents about the alleged bias and instructed his counsel that he could do so as part of the defense case. When the time for the defense case arrived, the court denied him the promised opportunity to examine the agents. See id. at 810. 237 The circumstances in Salerno were far different from those present here; it does not suggest that Judge Mukasey abused his discretion in curtailing the cross-examination of Salem. 238
239 Nosair challenges his convictions on Counts 9 and 10, which relate to the shooting of Postal Officer Carlos Acosta during Nosair's flight after the assassination of Meir Kahane, on grounds of double jeopardy. On June 28, 1995, at the close of the Government's case-in-chief, Nosair moved under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a) for judgment of acquittal of all counts against him, including the attempted murder charges in Counts 9 and 10. The Court denied the motion, but expressed serious questions regarding the sufficiency of the Government's evidence to sustain these counts and indicated that it would reflect further on the issue. See Tr. 13092-93, 12152, 13170. The defense case began on July 5. 240 After further discussion of Nosair's motion to dismiss Counts 9 and 10 under Rule 29(a) at the end of the day on July 12, the Government argued that the issue was precisely the same as considered by the Supreme Court in Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991), in which the defendant's conviction was upheld. Judge Mukasey responded, Same issue, different result. The colloquy continued as follows: Nosair's counsel: Has your Honor ruled? 241 The Court: I have. Understand, it applies only to that part of Count 9 that charges attempted murder. 242 Nosair's counsel: And it applies to Count 10, your Honor. 243 The Court: It applies to all of Count 10. The jury would have nothing other than speculation to determine that kind of intent in this case. 244 Nosair's counsel: Thank you, your Honor. 245 The Court: Anything else? Good night. [Court is adjourned.] 246 Tr. 14269-70. Before the trial resumed on July 17 (the next trial day), the Government submitted a further memorandum on the issue. See Tr. 14276. Before the close of the trial day, the Court made note that the facts in Yates were remarkably similar to those here, and gave rise to a jury question. Judge Mukasey said he would reread the cases and asked counsel to do the same. See Tr. 14440. After considering arguments from counsel the next trial day (July 19), the Judge expressed the view that The close bounce goes to the government in this situation, and this is a close bounce. Tr. 14536. Nosair's counsel then raised the issue of double jeopardy, asserting [Y]our Honor ordered on July 13 a judgment of acquittal with regard to Count 10. The Judge answered I said I was going to dismiss, I said I was dismissing that portion of Count 9, the charge of attempted murder, and all of Count 10. Tr. 14537. In response to defense counsel's argument that if your Honor has ordered a judgment of acquittal ..., jeopardy has attached, the Court responded, That depends, I suppose, on whether my statement in open court is self-executing. Tr. 15538. Following a further exchange of memoranda, the District Court explicitly denied the Rule 29(a) motion on August 9. See Tr. 16091. The Court observed in rejecting the double jeopardy claim that judgment had not been entered and that the defendant had suffered no prejudice as the result of what the Court described as its vacillation. All discussions and rulings regarding the motion to dismiss occurred outside the presence of the jury. 247 Nosair now argues, as he did in the District Court, that the oral ruling operated to acquit him on Counts 9 and 10, and that the reversal of this ruling resulted in the submission of these counts to the jury, subjecting him to jeopardy a second time on the same charges. 248 The general rule is that a judgment of acquittal [on a charge], whether based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court[,] terminates the proceeding on that charge and bars any subsequent prosecution for the same offense. United States v. LoRusso, 695 F.2d 45, 54 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978). Where no judgment has been entered, however, and there has been no dismissal of the jury (nor any indication to the jury of a ruling that could prejudice the defendant on such counts as are eventually submitted), there appears to be no constitutional impediment to the court's modification of its oral decision to dismiss . . . . LoRusso, 695 F.2d at 54. We have further indicated that the timeliness of a district court's decision to reconsider is an important factor in evaluating whether a reversal of an oral grant of acquittal subjects a defendant to a successive prosecution within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See United States v. Washington, 48 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 1995). 249 Under the circumstances presented by this appeal, we find that the District Court acted within its power. The event that the defendant claims constituted an acquittal occurred at the very end of a trial week, out of the jury's presence. Before the proceedings reopened on Monday morning, the Government had moved for reconsideration, and the District Court promptly signaled its openness to reconsider the matter of the defendant's motion for acquittal. 250 None of these proceedings involving the defendant's motion took place in the presence of the jury. The jury was never instructed to the effect that trial had terminated on the charges in question. Nosair suffered no prejudice of any kind; he did not lose any opportunity to offer evidence, or commit himself to any course of defense that needed reassessment in light of the changed ruling. Indeed Nosair's trial counsel appears to have acknowledged that Nosair's objection to reconsideration was not based on a claim of prejudice. See Tr. at 14539. This is therefore not a case like United States v. Blount, 34 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 1994), where the district court reinstated the dismissed counts after the defendant had presented his defense, and after the court announced to the jury that the dismissed counts were no longer in the case. Id. at 867, 868. 251 In view of these considerations, we reject Nosair's contention that he was twice put in jeopardy. As in LoRusso, 695 F.2d at 45, we conclude that the trial judge could rescind his oral ruling granting a motion to dismiss a count and permit the count to continue before the jury without violating the defendant's right under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
252 Rahman contends the trial court violated his right to due process by denying him the opportunity to present his defense. He contends his defense depended on his ability to prove the essentially religious nature of his intent. He sought to advance his defense by offering expert witnesses on Islamic religious traditions and international human rights. Upon the Government's objection, the District Court excluded their testimony. 253 Under Fed. R. Evid. 702, expert testimony may be admitted if the court finds that it will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Even relevant testimony, however, is properly excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. District court rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Valdez, 16 F.3d 1324, 1332 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Cruz, 797 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1986); see also General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 519 (1997) (same, for District Court rulings on expert scientific testimony). 254 Rahman submitted lengthy offers of proof on the subjects to be covered by the proposed testimony. These offers, from which we quote extensively below, were submitted in a letter from one of Rahman's lawyers. Counsel argued that this testimony would help the jury to understand Rahman's ministerial relationship with his co-defendants, and would show that his conversations with them amounted only to legitimate and well-recognized religious practice rather than a criminal conspiracy. The points to be covered by the proposed expert testimony fell into several different categories. Most of the material provided general information about Islam and suggested that Rahman's actions and statements were governed by Islamic law. These included the following statements: 255 Islam means submission to the will of God. 256 [A] strict monotheism is at the heart of Islamic theology. 257 [P]olytheism (shirk) is the concept of worshiping more than one god and is anathema to the strict monotheism of Moslems. 258 Muslim clerics' sermons are frequently combined with Quranic references ... . 259 [T]he Arabic word sharia refers to the corpus of Islamic law which is derived from two main sources, the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet as well as analogical reasoning and the consensus of scholars ... . 260 Islam ... started in the 7th Century A.D. and now claims one billion adherents in the world. 261 [T]he five pillars or basic precepts of Islam [are] Faith, Prayer, Alms, Pilgrimage, and Fasting. 262 Muslim clerics and scholars have preached about ... a Muslim's necessity to engage in jihad ... . 263 [J]ihad [had its] origins in Islam after Prophet Mohammed began preaching in the 7th Century .... 264 [J]ihad is cast in the mold of a legal doctrine ... . 265 Jihad has come to mean ... the combatting of oppression ... . 266 [T]he Muslim community as a whole has a collective duty or obligation to engage in armed struggle in the path of God [, which] must be organized and announced by a Caliph or Sultan. It is only when the enemy attacks Muslim territory that jihad becomes an individual duty ... . 267 [I]t is an individual obligation for able-bodied Muslims from all over to come to the aid of their brethren [and] that jihad is governed by a very clear set of rules such as an invitation to embrace Islam, treatment of prisoners and division of spoils. 268 [A] person who provides a fatwa is called a Mufti. 269 [A]ccording to Islamic law a leadership cannot be conferred on a blind person. 270 [A]n Imam ... leads communal prayer and that a sheik is ... an elder who is accorded respect and deference. 271 [A] sheik may also be a scholar in which case he has ... certain duties [including] to lead the Muslims in prayer and deliver a Friday sermon, ... provide lessons and religious instruction, ... to provide advice, counsel and mediation in situations of dispute, and ... where he is questioned on a matter involving the interpretation of Islamic law, to provide ... a nonbinding advisory opinion ... . 272 [W]hen a scholar is being asked to render an opinion about a subject matter for which he knows the answer he may not simply dismiss the questioner and that to do so would erode his authority ... . 273 Letter from Abdeen Jabara, counsel for Rahman, to Andrew C. McCarthy, Asst. U.S. Atty. (July 7, 1995) (hereinafter Jabara Letter). 274 We find no abuse of discretion in Judge Mukasey's rejection of this testimony. The vast majority of what was proffered was not relevant to the issues before the jury. If the evidence showed that Rahman conspired to levy war against the United States or solicited others to commit crimes of violence--including mass killing and destruction through the blowing up of buildings and tunnels--it would not constitute a defense that he was justified in doing so within a framework of Islamic law. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990), reaffirmed in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980) (no duress where defendant had reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law); United States v. Bakhitiari, 913 F.2d 1053, 1057 (2d Cir. 1990) (defense of duress or coercion requires threat that induces a well-founded fear of impending death or serious bodily harm, from which unlawful act was only reasonable means of escape); 1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 5-3 at 618-19 (1986). 275 One of the issues stressed by defense counsel in the argument on the admissibility of the testimony was the fact that an Islamic scholar, when asked to render an opinion, may not simply dismiss the questioner . . .[without] erod[ing] his authority, stature and position as a scholar. Jabara Letter at 2-3. We agree with the District Judge that such details of Islamic tradition were irrelevant to the issues before the jury. As a matter of United States law, the fact that a Mufti or scholar must render an opinion when asked would neither explain nor excuse solicitation to commit acts of terrorism and violence when rendering that opinion. Id. 276 Other passages of the proffer seemed designed to suggest to the jury that Rahman could not have conspired in or solicited acts of terrorism against the United States because this would have been contrary to the teachings of Islam. Among these items were statements: 277 that a security pledge ensues between a Muslim who enters the country of the non-Muslims with the permission and acceptance of that country and [that] . . . the Muslim is legally required to remain at peace with his host country and may not violate that pledge by undertaking or engaging in acts that would breach the security and safety of its citizens and inhabitants. 278 Jabara Letter at 3. 279 Judge Mukasey was within his discretion in excluding the expert testimony in this category because it was of marginal relevance and was likely to cause confusion among jurors. The issue was whether the evidence showed that Rahman, with the requisite criminal intent, conspired to wage war on the United States through acts of terrorism or solicited others to commit crimes of violence. The question whether such acts on his part would have been condoned or forbidden by Islamic law could lead to an evidentiary dispute about Islamic law that would have little likelihood of illuminating whether he committed the forbidden acts of terrorism. 280 A third category of proffer was of expert testimony purporting to explain what Rahman's thoughts and intentions were. The expert would have testified 281 that Dr. Abdel Rahman subscribes first and foremost to the concept of jihad to, as he sees it, cleanse or purify nominally Muslim countries . . . . and that Dr. Abdel Rahman has concentrated on urging jihad to overthrow the secular government in Egypt and in defending Muslims in what Dr. Rahman calls the fields of jihad, Bosnia, Palestine, the Philippines, Somalia, southern Sudan, and formerly in Afghanistan. 282 Id. at 2. 283 It was not an abuse of discretion for Judge Mukasey to conclude that this proffer, rather than providing evidence of Rahman's past behavior or activities, constituted an effort to tell the jury the defendant's intentions through the mouths of witnesses other than himself. As Judge Mukasey explained, the defendant's experts were not competent to testify to Rahman's intentions or beliefs. 284 We conclude that Judge Mukasey was well within his discretion in excluding all of the proffered expert testimony, of which examples are given above, that fell into the categories described. 285 It is true that the proffer included a few items of relevant matter--in particular, the meanings of the words jihad and fatwa. The proffer asserted, for example: 286 The Arabic word jihad is the verbal noun of the Arabic verb jahada, which means to endeavor, to strive, to struggle and that in a Muslim religious context it can have several different meanings . . . [including] the personal struggle against one's evil inclinations or efforts toward the moral uplift of society or towards the spread of Islam . . ., the combatting of oppression or obstruction in the exercise of the faith of Muslims . . . always in the path of God to underscore the religious character of the struggle. 287 [A] fatwa is merely a non-binding opinion by an Islamic scholar as to what [is] the position of Islamic law .... 288 Id. at 1-2. 289 The Government's evidence showed that Rahman had exhorted his followers to jihad, and on various occasions had delivered a fatwa. Government witnesses spoke of jihad organizations as terrorist organizations. Tr. 1994-2005. These portions of the proffer were relevant to tell the jury that the word jihad could have various meanings and did not necessarily connote terrorist violence, and that a fatwa is not a command, but merely an opinion. 290 Had Rahman offered to call an expert on the Arabic language or on the Muslim religion simply to prove that jihad can have a nonviolent meaning, and that fatwa means opinion, we have no reason to doubt that Judge Mukasey would have permitted this testimony. In fact, the Judge said so: 291 Rahman's counsel: They have one conversation where Emad Salem asks for a religious opinion, a fatwa--not a command, a religious opinion. And we have the right to show that that is all that is. 292 The Court: Nobody is denying you this right to show that or to argue that. 293 Tr. 14053. 294 Indeed, shortly thereafter, the defense elicited from Siraq Wahhaj, a witness called by the defendant El-Gabrowny, the following testimony on the meaning of the term jihad. 295 It's a struggle. That's what the word jihad means, it means struggle. It could take on another meaning for instance in Afghanistan, Muslims fighting for their liberation against the Russians. That's jihad also. But for us, in the context of our environment, jihad is, [A] cleaning up our community of drugs, [B] getting our family, our men, strong, getting them jobs, taking care of their family. That's a kind of jihad or struggle. 296 Tr. 14136-37. 297 Subsequently, Rahman elicited through another witness, Mona Ahmed, the meaning of the word fatwa. The witness testified to the effect that a fatwa was an opinion. When asked, Are you commanded to follow that opinion? Ahmed responded, 298 No, he does not command us anything. There is something I would like to know, and I ask him what is right and what is wrong, and he would answer, and its all up to me what I see. Tr. 14583-84 299 Thus, Judge Mukasey made clear that the defendants were permitted to offer expert evidence of the meaning of words shown by the Government's evidence to have been used by the defendants, and they did so. As to the excluded expert testimony on Islamic traditions, we agree with the District Judge's assessment that the experts' proffered testimony would have imported more confusion than clarification to the trial. It was properly excluded. 300 Rahman also challenges Judge Mukasey's exclusion of two additional experts. One, the director of a group that monitors human rights in the Middle East, would have testified about human rights abuses committed by the Egyptian government, including the detention, arrest, and execution of dissidents. The other, identified as an expert in international terrorism and security, Letter from Lynne F. Stewart, counsel for Rahman, to Andrew C. McCarthy, Asst. U.S. Atty. (June 16, 1995), would have testified that Rahman has been solely focused on bringing an Islamic government to Egypt by any means necessary, that the United States government which gives more than three billion dollars annually to the Mubarak regime, . . . is adamantly opposed to such change, and that any attack on the U.S. government would be contrary to and dilute Dr. Abdel Rahman's Egyptian agenda, id. (July 6, 1995). 301 Both experts were properly barred from testifying. Egypt's human rights record was not in dispute, nor was it relevant to these proceedings. The alleged human rights record of Egypt, combined with whatever relationship between the governments of the United States and Egypt which Rahman believes to exist, would not entitle Rahman to wage terrorist activity against the United States or to plot to murder the President of Egypt. To allow the jurors to hear such evidence would distract them from the issues on which they needed to pass. The same is true of the proposed testimony of the international security expert. Rahman's commitment to end what he perceived to be the U.S. government's opposition to establishing Islamic rule in Egypt could not justify a terrorist campaign against either Egypt or the United States. The expert's testimony that taking terrorist action against the United States was contrary to Rahman's agenda was speculation by a person who was not competent to testify to Rahman's intentions. His further proposed testimony--that the trial defendants did not have the necessary funding or expertise to have undertaken the World Trade Center bombing--was again speculation without legal competence. The witness was not in a position to know what funding or expertise the defendants possessed. The proposed testimony as to what were Rahman's intentions and purposes was again an effort to tell the jury Rahman's thoughts through a witness who was not competent to testify to them.