Opinion ID: 1155832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: when is a city criminal ordinance compatible with state law?

Text: Defendant challenges the City's authority to enact an ordinance defining and prohibiting prostitution which is identical in all material respects to the state criminal code provisions defining and prohibiting the same conduct. The City questions whether state criminal penalties for prostitution displace local criminal punishment which differs from that prescribed by state law. The answers to these questions are found in the analysis of Article XI, section 2, of the Oregon Constitution. In 1906, Oregon voters adopted by initiative process two amendments to the Oregon Constitution which together provide home rule for cities and towns. Art. XI, § 2; Art. IV, § 1a (now 1(5)). Article XI, section 2 provides, in relevant part: The legal voters of every city and town are hereby granted power to enact and amend their municipal charter, subject to the Constitution and criminal laws of the State of Oregon   . (Emphasis supplied.) This sentence in Article XI, section 2 contains a grant of power to the citizens of local communities, but it also contains a limitation. Defendant's supplemental memorandum contains a comprehensive review of the subject to clauses in state home rule provisions. We note that Oregon is the only state which limits municipal home rule in this particular way. The vast majority of states with such provisions have made municipal home rule subject to the state's laws or general laws. The meager history of Article XI, section 2 indicates that its proponents, the People's Power League, used the following language in their informational circular promoting the adoption of Article XI, section 2:    cities or towns    shall be subject to and controlled by general laws. Any city shall be permitted to frame and enact a charter for its own government consistent with and subject to the constitution and laws of this state.  Introductory Statements, Arguments and Suggested Amendments to the Constitution of Oregon and an Anti-Pass Law for Public Officials at 5. (Emphasis supplied.) Nevertheless, the initiative petition successfully circulated by the People's Power League both entitled and phrased the proposed amendment in the terms that now appear in the constitution:  subject to the Constitution and criminal laws of the State of Oregon. (Emphasis supplied.) We have been unable to discern an explanation for the change from subject to laws and general laws to subject to the criminal laws. We are left, however, with the inescapable conclusion that the voters who adopted Article XI, section 2 envisioned a stricter limitation on the law-making power of cities in respect of criminal laws than with regard to civil or regulatory measures. Thus, the same interpretation and assumptions of compatibility found in civil and regulatory areas cannot be applied in evaluating the relationship between state and municipal criminal laws. Since 1906, only a few reported cases have addressed the validity of local criminal provisions alleged to have been in conflict with state law, wherein the meaning of Article XI, section 2 has been raised and analyzed. The City cites Portland v. Parker, 69 Or. 271, 138 Pac. 852 (1914), which we do not find particularly helpful because this court relied, in part, upon the fact that the city vagrancy ordinance at issue in that case was enacted in 1904, prior to the adoption of the home rule amendments in 1906. This court said that, because the ordinance had not been amended or changed since 1904, the home rule amendment did not impliedly repeal it. This court also found no legislative intent to repeal local vagrancy ordinances in the state vagrancy law enacted in 1911. Defendant has contended throughout this proceeding that Article XI, section 2, of the Oregon Constitution and the Oregon Criminal Code of 1971 prohibit the enactment by cities of any ordinance that duplicates, contradicts or amends in any way the provisions of a state criminal statute. Defendant's exhaustive briefs and supplemental memorandum show nothing in the history of the home rule amendments or in the cases decided close in time to the adoption of Article XI, section 2 to indicate that the voters then contemplated that the legislature, by enacting a criminal statute, would occupy the whole field of legislation upon that subject. Nothing we find evinces the intent to exclude, for example, identical local ordinances which punish the same conduct in municipal courts that is punished by state criminal law. See, e.g., Portland v. Parker, supra ; Harlow v. Clow, 110 Or. 257, 223 Pac. 541 (1924), overruled on other grounds, Landreth v. Gladden, 213 Or. 205, 324 P.2d 475 (1958). The issue of compatibility between state and city criminal laws was addressed in Harlow v. Clow, supra , where the trial court held a City of Klamath Falls vagrancy ordinance invalid under Article XI, section 2 because it conflicted with the state statute defining and punishing vagrancy. This court analyzed Article XI, section 2 and reversed the trial court, stating: The constitutional provision [Article XI, section 2] prohibits a municipality from enacting legislation making that lawful which the state has denounced as a crime. The amendment strikes at conflicting laws, not at acts that are in harmony. 110 Or. at 263, 223 Pac. 541. The court compared the statute and ordinance and found them not in conflict, but in perfect harmony, stating: Every act constituting vagrancy under the city ordinance is likewise deemed vagrancy by the state statute, and vice versa. The city ordinance is a duplicate of the state statute, except that the penalty prescribed by the ordinance is smaller than that prescribed by statute. 110 Or. at 263, 223 Pac. 541. The court quoted Portland v. Parker, supra , for the following observation: There is nothing in the city ordinance that conflicts with the state law except that the punishment upon conviction in the municipal court may be somewhat lighter than upon conviction in the state court. But, from the very earliest judicial history of the state, the law has provided that persons convicted in justices' courts of assaults and other like offenses may be punished by a fine, or by a small fine and imprisonment, while, if convicted of a like affair in the circuit courts, the punishment is much greater. 110 Or. at 265, 223 Pac. 541, quoting 69 Or. at 275, 138 Pac. 852. Although Harlow was specifically concerned with the defining elements of the crime of vagrancy, language in that case suggests that Article XI, section 2 does not require local criminal punishment of the same conduct to be identical to the punishment prescribed by state law. A fair reading of Harlow is that some latitude exists for differences, but not for incompatibility, between local and state criminal penalties. Harlow and Parker both suggest that local ordinances may punish the same criminal conduct more leniently than state law. However, nothing in these cases suggests that local punishment can exceed the penalties prescribed by state law. Although there are several other cases wherein the validity of a city criminal ordinance was tested against state law, under Article XI, section 2, we have found none where the relative severity of the penalty provisions was a material factor the court considered in analyzing the compatibility of the ordinance with state law. [7] Defendant contends that the criminal law revision of 1971 indicated a clear legislative intent exclusively to occupy the field of criminal law. [8] There is some support for defendant's position in ORS 161.035(2), which by its terms states that the Oregon Criminal Code of 1971 governs the construction of and punishment for any offense defined outside [the Code]. We have reviewed the text and legislative history of the Oregon Criminal Code of 1971, however, and do not believe that ORS 161.035(2) was intended to apply to offenses defined by cities. The Oregon Criminal Code contains at least one textual reference to municipal criminal ordinances. ORS 161.505 specifically defines offense as conduct for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine is provided    by any law or ordinance of a political subdivision of this state.  (Emphasis supplied.) ORS 46.047, which is outside the criminal code but was enacted subsequent to it (Or. Laws 1975, ch. 611, § 15), also contemplates municipal criminal ordinances. It provides: When an offense defined by municipal ordinance is tried in district court, it shall be subject to the same statutes and procedures that govern the trial and appeal of a like offense defined by a statute of this state. (Emphasis supplied.) See also ORS 221.349, 221.350, 221.360 and 221.390, which have been amended since 1971 and discuss prosecutions for crimes or offenses defined and made punishable by city charter or ordinance. Thus, we are not persuaded that the legislature in 1971 intended totally to exclude cities from enacting ordinances in the area of criminal law. In LaGrande/Astoria v. PERB, 281 Or. 137, 576 P.2d 1204, adhered to on rehearing, 284 Or. 173, 586 P.2d 765 (1978), we considered at some length the historical reasons for the adoption of the home rule amendments. In that case we said: Outside the context of laws prescribing the modes of local government, both municipalities and the state legislature in many cases have enacted laws in pursuit of substantive objectives, each well within its respective authority, that were arguably inconsistent with one another. In such cases, the first inquiry must be whether the local rule in truth is incompatible with the legislative policy, either because both cannot operate concurrently or because the legislature meant its law to be exclusive. It is reasonable to interpret local enactments, if possible, to be intended to function consistently with state laws, and equally reasonable to assume that the legislature does not mean to displace local civil or administrative regulation[18] of local conditions by a statewide law unless that intention is apparent.    However, when a local enactment is found incompatible with a state law in an area of substantive policy, the state law will displace the local rule. [18] The reservation in article XI, section 2, supra, regarding state criminal law reverses this assumption with respect to such laws.  281 Or. at 148, 576 P.2d 1204. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.) The essential test for displacement of local ordinances (civil or criminal) by state law is whether the local rule is incompatible with the legislative policy, either because both cannot operate concurrently or because the legislature meant its law to be exclusive. 281 Or. at 148, 576 P.2d 1204. In the area of civil or administrative ordinances regulating local conditions, it is reasonable to assume that the legislature did not mean to displace local ordinances, unless that intention is apparent. See, e.g., State ex rel. Haley v. City of Troutdale, 281 Or. 203, 576 P.2d 1238 (1978) (finding no manifest legislative intent to exclude local provisions which supplemented the state building code). The reservation in Article XI, section 2, however, reverses this assumption with respect to state criminal law. The analysis of compatibility begins then with the assumption that state criminal law displaces conflicting local ordinances which prohibit and punish the same conduct, absent an apparent legislative intent to the contrary. The parties have cited nothing in the text or legislative history of the state laws regarding prostitution, nor have we found anything, to indicate that the state intended cities to be authorizesd to enact inconsistent local laws in this area. The inquiry does not end here, of course, because we have yet to decide how much symmetry between state and city criminal laws is required by Article XI, section 2, so as not to be in conflict. Harlow v. Clow, supra , a case decided relatively close in time to the adoption of Article XI, section 2, suggests that, in order that the defining elements of a city's crime not conflict with state law, they must virtually duplicate the state law elements. We state the rule that in determining whether the defining and prohibiting provisions of a city criminal ordinance conflict with a state criminal statute, the test is whether the ordinance prohibits an act which the statute permits, or permits an act which the statute prohibits. [9] See, e.g., Harlow v. Clow, supra, 110 Or. at 263, 223 Pac. 541. This test has been met by the city ordinance here at issue defining and prohibiting prostitution. As to the requisite symmetry of state and city criminal penalty provisions, we again turn to Harlow v. Clow, supra , for the proposition that, until the legislature intends otherwise and so indicates, city punishment of the same conduct made criminal by state law may be lighter than that prescribed by state statute. However, a city penalty that is greater than the state prescribed penalty (minimum or maximum) for the same criminal conduct is incompatible with that state penalty and must fall. Nothing in the text or legislative history of the Oregon Criminal Code of 1971 contradicts this. Thus, under Article XI, section 2, while a city has some leeway between the state prescribed minimum and maximum criminal penalties, without evidence of legislative acquiescence, a city ordinance cannot increase either the minimum or the maximum penalty that is authorized by state law for the same criminal conduct. The punishment for a conviction of prostitution under state law is established as a range between a minimum sentence of discharge (ORS 137.010(5)(d)) and a maximum sentence of one year imprisonment and a $2,500 fine (ORS 161.615, 161.635). The City argues that its mandatory minimum penalty scheme is not significantly different from the state law penalty, because the mandatory minimum penalties are within the range prescribed by state law. The difference between a law that authorizes a range of sentences and a law that mandates a particular one is significant. The City's mandatory minimums for prostitution are harsher than the state's minimum penalty for the same offense. Thus, we hold the City's mandatory minimum penalty provision, as applied to the crime of prostitution, is invalid. Article XI, section 2, as here interpreted, does not deny cities the power to regulate conduct otherwise within the reach of local authority. The present decision limits only the cities' use of criminal laws within the meaning of Article XI, section 2. As long as a city ordinance employs civil or administrative procedures and sanctions lacking punitive significance, see Brown v. Multnomah County Dist. Ct., 280 Or. 95, 105, 570 P.2d 52 (1977), the validity of the ordinance must meet only the tests stated in LaGrande/Astoria v. PERB, supra , for substantive city policies generally, rather than the more stringent constraints of the phrase in Article XI, section 2, that expresses the dominance of state criminal laws over the creation and punishment of local criminal offenses. [10]