Opinion ID: 789199
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination

Text: 19 Wipf next argues that the district court erred in admitting his incriminating statement made to police after Wipf requested an attorney. After being taken into custody at the police station, Wipf asked Englehoff, Do I get a lawyer? Englehoff advised Wipf that he would receive counsel, but Englehoff first wanted to advise Wipf of his Miranda rights, tell him the situation, and explain the charges against him. Englehoff then told Wipf that he had been arrested for possession of child pornography based on a number of tapes that had been seized from inside his home. At that point, and without provocation, Wipf made the incriminating statement you got me, or you caught me. 20 The United States Supreme Court has held that, [if an] individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). Interrogation, properly understood, involves either express questioning or its functional equivalent. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Accordingly, interrogation encompasses any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Id. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682. 21 The First Circuit has stated that a law enforcement officer's mere description of the evidence and of potential charges against a suspect, in direct response to the suspect's importuning, hardly can be classified as interrogatory. United States v. Conley, 156 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Trimble, 986 F.2d 394, 401 (10th Cir.1993); United States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199, 203 (4th Cir.1992); United States v. Jackson, 863 F.2d 1168, 1172 (4th Cir.1989)). Furthermore, an inculpatory statement is not considered the product of custodial interrogation merely because it is made after the suspect has been told the charges against him. See People v. Rivas, 13 P.3d 315, 319 (Colo.2000); Conley, 156 F.3d at 83. 22 Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Englehoff's statement that he wanted to tell Wipf the situation, and explain the charges against him, amounts to custodial interrogation. Accordingly, the district court did not err in allowing Wipf's statements into evidence.