Opinion ID: 1894141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the allegedly defamatory statements constitute slander per quod or slander per se?

Text: The Liberty National defendants argue that the trial court erred when it denied their motions for a judgment as a matter of law because, according to the Liberty National defendants, Daugherty failed to state a claim that alleged slander per quod or slander per se. The Liberty National defendants contend that the trial court applied the wrong test to determine whether Hartley's statements constituted slander per se. Relying upon Ledbetter v. United Insurance Co., 845 F.Supp. 844 (M.D.Ala.1994), the trial court held that slander per se is committed when a `defendant ascribes conduct to the plaintiff which is incompatible with the proper conduct of his lawful business, trade, profession....' See also Jenelle Mims Marsh and Charles W. Gamble, Alabama Law of Damages § 36-27 (4th ed.1999). Applying the Ledbetter test, the trial court concluded that the Liberty National defendants had made statements accusing Daugherty of taking money that did not belong to him, i.e., stealing, and that those statements constituted slander per se. The Liberty National defendants argue that the indictable-offense test is the proper test in Alabama to determine whether a communication is slanderous per se. However, it is unnecessary to reach the question whether the basis of the trial court's ruling is correct because this Court may affirm a trial court's judgment if it is supported on any valid legal ground. Mutual Assurance, Inc. v. Wilson, 716 So.2d 1160, 1165 (Ala.1998). Ceravolo v. Brown, 364 So.2d 1155 (Ala. 1978), decided significantly after the authorities cited in Gamble's Alabama Law of Damages § 36-27 n. 4, restated the test for determining whether an allegedly defamatory statement constitutes slander per se: `The foundation of an action for libel or slander is a malicious injury to reputation, and any false and malicious imputation of crime or moral delinquency by one published of and concerning another, which subjects the person to disgrace, ridicule, odium, or contempt in the estimation of his friends and acquaintances, or the public, with resulting damage to his reputation, is actionable either per se or per quod.... `There is a distinction between actions of libel predicated on written or printed malicious aspersions of character, and actions of slander resting on oral defamation.... This distinction, however, is merely in respect to the question as to whether the imputed language or words are actionable per se. `In cases of libel, if the language used exposes the plaintiff to public ridicule or contempt, though it does not embody an accusation of crime, the law presumes damage to the reputation, and pronounces it actionable per se. While to constitute slander actionable per se, there must be an imputation of an indictable offense involving infamy or moral turpitude. ... `This distinction, however, does not deny the right to maintain an action for slander founded on oral malicious defamation subjecting the plaintiff to disgrace, ridicule, odium, or contempt, though it falls short of imputing the commission of such crime or misdemeanor. In such case the law pronounces the words actionable per quod only, and the plaintiff must allege and prove special damages as an element of the cause of action.' 364 So.2d at 1156-57, quoting Marion v. Davis, 217 Ala. 16, 18, 114 So. 357, 358-59 (1927) (emphasis added). However, [d]amage is implied by law when spoken words are found to be slander per se. Anderton v. Gentry, 577 So.2d 1261, 1263 (Ala.1991), see also Sunshine Invs., Inc. v. Brooks, 642 So.2d 408, 410 (Ala.1994). Words found to be slander per se relieve the plaintiff of the requirement of proving `actual harm to reputation or any other damage' in order to recover nominal or compensatory damages. Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So.2d 1085, 1092 (Ala.1988), quoting W. Prosser and W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 112, at 788 (5th ed.1984). When determining whether a statement is actionable as slander per se, a court must give the language used that meaning that would be ascribed to the language by a reader or listener of `average or ordinary intelligence, or by a common mind.' Camp v. Yeager, 601 So.2d 924, 927 (Ala.1992), quoting Loveless v. Graddick, 295 Ala. 142, 148, 325 So.2d 137, 142 (1975). Moreover, this Court has stated: `When words from their general import appear to have been spoken with a view to defame a party, the court ought not to be industrious in putting a construction upon them different from what they bear in the common acceptation and meaning of them.' Johnston v. Turner, 159 Ala. 356, 358, 47 So. 570, 571 (1908), quoting Wofford v. Meeks, 129 Ala. 349, 357, 30 So. 625, 627 (1901). Stated differently, the courts will not apply a forced construction in order to render the statement nondefamatory and thereby to relieve the defendant of liability. Marion v. Davis, 217 Ala. at 19, 114 So. at 359. Finally, the alleged slanderous statement must be construed in connection with the other parts of the conversation, in order to determine the context in which the statement was made. Marion, supra. Daugherty contends that the statements that he alleges in count one of his complaint were made by the Liberty National defendants are slanderous per se because, he argues, the statements impute to him the offense of larceny. If we assume the statements alleged in count one are true, Hartley told one of Daugherty's customers that Daugherty had sold cancer policies to people he knew had cancer; that Daugherty knew that those policies were worthless; and that he was pocketing the premiums from the sale of those policies. At the time Hartley made the allegedly defamatory statements, Alabama's Criminal Code provided a criminal penalty for the misappropriation of funds collected by an insurance agent. Section 27-8-28(b), Ala.Code 1975, provided: [1] (b) Any agent or broker who, not being lawfully entitled thereto, diverts or appropriates such funds, or any portion thereof, to his own use shall, upon conviction, be guilty of larceny by embezzlement and shall be punished as provided by law as if he had stolen such funds. (Emphasis added.) This Court has firmly held that larceny falls within the definition of an indictable criminal offense involving infamy or moral turpitude and that, therefore, words that impute the offense of larceny are slanderous per se. Sunshine Investments, 642 So.2d at 410; Nelson, 534 So.2d at 1091-92; Phillips v. Bradshaw, 167 Ala. 199, 52 So. 662 (1910). An insurance agent who knowingly sells worthless insurance policies and appropriates the premiums paid on those policies to his own use is also guilty of the crime of theft by deception. § 13A-8-2(2), Ala. Code 1975. The prior offenses of larceny and embezzlement and the offense of theft by deception are unified into the single offense of theft of property. See Ala.Code 1975, §§ 13A-8-2 through 13A-8-5 Commentary. A person commits the crime of theft of property if he: (1) Knowingly obtains or exerts unauthorized control over the property of another, with the intent to deprive the owner of his property; or (2) Knowingly obtains by deception control over the property of another, with intent to deprive the owner of his property. § 13A-8-2, Ala.Code 1975. The Liberty National defendants argue that Hartley's statements did not impute to Daugherty the crime of theft. According to the Liberty National defendants, the verb pocketing has several harmless meanings, any or all of which could have been implied by Hartley's statements. The Liberty National defendants argue that the word pocket implied at best that Daugherty had done something dishonest, but that the use of that word did not clearly impute to Daugherty the offense of theft. As support for their position that Hartley did not intend to imply that Daugherty had committed theft, the Liberty National defendants cite Blevins v. W.F. Barnes Corp., 768 So.2d 386, 391 (Ala.Civ.App. 1999), in which the Court of Civil Appeals held that a statement accusing the plaintiff of extort[ing] money did not amount to slander per se. The plaintiff in Blevins sued the defendant after the defendant told a newspaper reporter that the plaintiff tried to extort money out of [the defendant] because [the defendant] refused to pay [the plaintiff's] demands. After considering the various definitions of the word extort and the context in which the word extort was used in the allegedly defamatory statement, the Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the word extort was merely rhetorical hyperbole, and that the defendant's statement did not constitute slander per se. 768 So.2d at 391. The Liberty National defendants contend in their brief to this Court that The American Heritage Dictionary (4th ed.2000) contains several meanings of the word pocketing that are harmless. Just as the Court of Civil Appeals held in Blevins that the word extort has several meanings that do not suggest the crime of extortionthe Liberty National defendants argue that the word pocketing has several meanings that do not suggest the offense of theft. Blevins, however, was a decision by a lower appellate court; although under appropriate circumstances such a decision may be persuasive authority, it is not binding. Moreover, based upon the context in which the word extort was used, the Court of Civil Appeals could have reasonably concluded that the word extort was rhetorical hyperbole rather than an accusation that the plaintiff had committed an indictable offense. According to the Liberty National defendants, The American Heritage Dictionary defines the verb form of the word pocket as follows: 1. To place in or as if in a pocket. 2. To take possession of for oneself, especially dishonestly: pocketed the receipts from the charity dance. 3.a. To accept or tolerate (an insult, for example). b. To conceal or suppress: I pocketed my pride and asked for a raise. Of these definitions of the word pocket, the definition [t]o take possession of for oneself, especially dishonestly more closely describes the action that Hartley imputed to Daugherty. Several other dictionaries contain similar definitions of the word pocket. Among the verb forms of the definition of pocket in The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed.1987) is to take possession of as one's own, often dishonestly: to pocket public funds. The Oxford English Reference Dictionary (2d ed.1996) includes in its definitions of the verb form of the word pocket appropriate, esp. dishonestly. The usage of the word pocket shown in The American Heritage Dictionary pocketed the receipts from the charity danceThe Random House Dictionary of the English Languageto pocket public funds  indicating the context in which those definitions apply, implies that one pocketing has taken something that does not belong to him or her, i.e., that he or she has committed theft. Indeed, according to Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed.1999), pocket may also mean to appropriate to one's own use: steal. Hartley's statements did not suggest that Daugherty had pocketed the commission from his insurance salesincome to which Daugherty may have been entitled. The commonly understood meaning of Hartley's statement was that Daugherty had sold worthless goods in a transaction that did not entitle him to keep the proceeds of the sale but that obligated him to pass them on to Liberty National Insurance Company in order for the purchaser to receive any benefit. We decline Liberty National's invitation `to be industrious in putting a construction upon [the words used in Hartley's statement] different from what they bear in the common acceptation and meaning of them.' Johnston, 159 Ala. at 358, 47 So. at 571, quoting Wofford, 129 Ala. at 357, 30 So. at 627. Thus, we conclude that Hartley's statements implied that Daugherty had committed the crime of theft. Having imputed to Daugherty the offense of theft, Hartley's statements were slander per se, and relieved Daugherty of the requirement of proving actual harm to reputation or any other damages. See Nelson, 534 So.2d at 1092.