Opinion ID: 2346553
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Request Expansive Voir Dire.

Text: Zebroski argues initially that trial counsel failed to meet constitutional standards because he did not request a more expansive jury voir dire. Zebroski cites jury expert Dr. Valerie P. Hans' evidentiary hearing testimony to support his claim. Dr. Hans testified that she reviewed the voir dire and reached several conclusions. First, the jurors failed to understand the important concepts of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as well as the definition of what constitutes first degree murder. Second, the context material provided by the Superior Court was at best confusing and at worst misleading. Finally, the Court's wording of the death and life qualifying questions rarely reveal the true feelings of the potential jurors because the questions are close ended and suggest a socially desirable answer. The primary purpose of voir dire examination is to elicit prospective jurors' bias or prejudice. [11] The goal is to secure for the defendant and the State impartial jury members who will be able to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented at trial and who will follow the court's instructions on the law. [12] The standard for excluding a juror because of the juror's views on capital punishment is whether the views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties in accordance with the jury instructions and oath. [13] A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do and is not qualified to sit on the jury. [14] Although open-ended voir dire questions may be preferable, they are not constitutionally required. [15] Here, the trial judge first addressed the venire as a whole and then conducted an individualized voir dire with each prospective juror. The trial judge also took into account information contained on the jury questionnaires. In addition, the trial judge asked specific death and life qualifying questions: Do you believe that anyone convicted of murder in the first degree should automatically be given the death penalty regardless of the presence of any mitigating circumstances and regardless of the Court's instructions on the law? If you found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, would you automatically vote in favor of a sentence of death, irrespective of the facts or Court's instructions of law? [16] Counsel for each party observed the process, and out of the presence of the particular juror being interviewed, was permitted to suggest additional lines of inquiry. The trial judge noted: Careful review of the entire jury selection shows considerable back-and-forth between the court and counsel and between the court and the prospective jurors. Overall, the process was unhurried and almost collaborative. Time and again, prospective jurors asked questions and voiced concerns. In several instances, several jurors spoke up after they were seated. This highlights the fact that prospective jurors understood that they were involved in something complicated and important. [17] Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the jury selection voir dire was adequate for the trial judge to determine whether each prospective juror would be impartial. In addition, this Court has consistently held that although open-ended questions may be preferable, they are not constitutionally required. This case does require that we readdress that issue because here we do not face a situation where the trial judge refused counsel's request for an open-ended voir dire. Rather, Zebroski asserts his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not requesting an open-ended voir dire. If our precedent has specifically stated that open-ended voir dire is not constitutionally required, we cannot reasonably find Zebroski's counsel ineffective for not requesting an open-ended voir dire examination.