Opinion ID: 202688
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 17 García-Carrasquillo and Claudio-García both appeal their convictions on the ground that there was insufficient evidence linking them to the drugs and paraphernalia found in the house from which they fled before being arrested. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 ([T]he court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.). We review sufficiency of the evidence challenges de novo, affirming the conviction if, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and indulging all reasonable inferences in the government's favor, a rational factfinder could conclude that the prosecution proved all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Boulerice, 325 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir.2003). 18 In order to prove possession with intent to distribute, the government must show that the defendants knowingly and intentionally possessed, either actually or constructively, a controlled substance with the specific intent to distribute. United States v. López-López, 282 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir.2002). Constructive possession exists when a person knowingly has the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object either directly or through others. United States v. McLean, 409 F.3d 492, 501 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). While mere presence on the property, proximity to the drugs, or association with the possessor is not sufficient, United States v. Barnes, 890 F.2d 545, 549 (1st Cir.1989), the government may rely entirely on circumstantial evidence to show constructive possession. United States v. Echeverri, 982 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir.1993) (The attendant circumstances tell the tale[,] and the culpability of a defendant's presence hinges upon whether the circumstances fairly imply participatory involvement.). 19 In order to prove aiding and abetting, the government must first establish the commission of the offense by the principal, and then prove that the defendant consciously shared the principal's knowledge of the underlying criminal act, and intended to help the principal. United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92, 109 (1st Cir.2003); see also United States v. Rodríguez Alvarado, 985 F.2d 15, 17-18 (1st Cir.1993) (requiring that the government show that the defendant associated himself with the commission of the offense, participated in it as something that he wished to bring about, and sought by his actions to make it succeed). Again, mere association with the principal or presence at the scene of the crime is insufficient, even with knowledge that the crime is to be committed. United States v. Hyson, 721 F.2d 856, 862 (1st Cir.1983). 20 We can quickly dispose of García-Carrasquillo's claim that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for possession. The day after the defendants were arrested, they were taken before a state magistrate judge for a probable cause hearing. Although there was no written record of that hearing, Agent Valentín testified at trial that after the magistrate advised the defendants of their right to remain silent, García-Carrasquillo voluntarily admitted that all the weapons and drugs seized from the house were his. 11 His admission is unquestionably sufficient to support his conviction. 12 21 The sufficiency of the evidence against Claudio-García is a much closer question. He argues that there was insufficient evidence of his constructive possession because there was no evidence that he had dominion or control over the drugs. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of aiding and abetting, arguing that there was no evidence that he willfully intended to help García-Carrasquillo in the crime of possession with intent to distribute. Claudio-García asserts that the evidence proves, at most, that he was merely present at the scene. 22 Having affirmed the sufficiency of the evidence that García-Carrasquillo was the principal, we need only satisfy ourselves that there was evidence presented from which a rational juror could infer that Claudio-García intended to aid García-Carrasquillo in his crime of possession with intent to distribute. If the government successfully proves aiding and abetting, it does not need to prove that Claudio-García himself actually or constructively possessed the drugs, since either theory of guilt alone would sustain his conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.); see also United States v. Fuller, 768 F.2d 343, 346 (1st Cir.1985) ([W]e find the evidence presented was more than sufficient to support the jury's verdict based on either theory, aiding and abetting or constructive possession.). 23 The evidence fairly demonstrates that Claudio-García was in hiding with his uncle, García-Carrasquillo, and traveled with him in a stolen car to the house where García-Carrasquillo kept a large quantity of individually packaged drugs; that he remained in the apartment with his uncle and the drugs for a couple of hours before the SWAT team arrived; 13 and that he then attempted to flee from the police, exchanging gunfire with them when they pursued. From this evidence, a rational juror could reasonably infer that Claudio-García accompanied his uncle to the house filled with drugs because García-Carrasquillo trusted his nephew enough to enlist his help in committing the crime charged. Cf. United States v. Rincón, 180 Fed.Appx. 376, 379 (3d Cir.2006) (allowing inference that drug dealer trusted defendant based on evidence that dealer left drugs with defendant, in part to support conviction for aiding and abetting in drug sale). The jury could further infer that Claudio-García was in fact so aiding his uncle, especially given that he knowingly ran from and shot at the police when they attempted to apprehend them. See López-López, 282 F.3d at 21 ([The defendant] ran when he saw the police and hid in a field, which suggests awareness of guilt.). 24 Claudio-García correctly points out that there is another, more plausible explanation for his presence at the scene and his attempt to flee: He was an armed fugitive in hiding with a wanted family member, and he ran in order to avoid capture by the police. While this could be true, the government need not exclude every possible explanation. See United States v. Ortiz, 447 F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir.2006) ([T]he possibility of innocuous explanations for [a defendant's] behavior does not foreclose the jury's contrary inferences.). Hence, there was sufficient—albeit circumstantial and not particularly strong—evidence that Claudio-García's presence at the scene and association with his uncle were not just mere presence and association, see Echeverri, 982 F.2d at 678 ([A] defendant's `mere presence' argument will fail in situations where the `mere' is lacking.), but rather that he was a culpable participant in García-Carrasquillo's crime of possession with intent to distribute, see United States v. Lema, 909 F.2d 561, 570 (1st Cir.1990) ([P]resence on a single occasion may support a conviction for aiding and abetting if the surrounding circumstances lead to a reasonable inference that the defendant must have been a knowing participant.). Therefore, we must affirm Claudio-García's conviction as well.