Opinion ID: 169207
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness of Mr. Hildreth's Sentence

Text: 10 The Government appeals the District Court's decision to sentence Mr. Hildreth to three years' probation, a sentence below the applicable range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines or U.S.S.G.). The court determined that, under the advisory Guidelines, the applicable sentencing range was 27 to 33 months' imprisonment, based on an offense level 18 and a criminal history category I. After recognizing the applicable Guidelines range, the court exercised its discretion under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), to deviate from the Guidelines and impose a sentence of three years' probation. 11 We review the District Court's sentencing determination under a reasonableness standard, which is guided by the statutory factors delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053 (10th Cir.2006). Reasonableness review has both procedural and substantive components. United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d 1099, 1102 (10th Cir. 2007). In other words, the reasonableness standard of review set forth in Booker necessarily encompasses both the reasonableness of the length of the sentence, as well as the method by which the sentence was calculated. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1055. To impose a procedurally reasonable sentence, a district court must calculate the proper advisory Guidelines range and apply the factors set forth in § 3553(a). Atencio, 476 F.3d at 1102. 2 A substantively reasonable sentence ultimately reflects the gravity of the crime and the § 3553(a) factors as applied to the case. Id. (citing United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 594 (10th Cir.2006)). The Government does not challenge the sentence on procedural grounds, but argues instead that Mr. Hildreth's sentence is substantively unreasonable under our decision in United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585. In Cage, we explained that, when a district court imposes a sentence outside the Guidelines, the level of scrutiny we apply in reviewing the sentence depends on the comparative difference between the applicable range under the advisory Guidelines and the actual sentence imposed. Id. at 594; see also United States v. Bishop, 469 F.3d 896, 907 (10th Cir.2006) (In considering the discrepancy between the advisory guidelines range and the actual sentence, the comparative difference should guide our review. (quotation omitted)). In other words, the more a district court diverges from the advisory Guidelines range, the more compelling its reasons must be for that divergence. United States v. Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d 1235, 1240 (10th Cir.2006). The Government argues that the divergence in this case is analogous to the extreme divergence in Cage, in which the defendant received a sentence of six days' imprisonment, despite an applicable Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months. 451 F.3d at 594. We held that this kind of extreme divergence is reasonable only under dramatic facts. Id. 12 Since our decision in Cage, we have recognized that there is no formula into which we input the degree of divergence in order to generate precisely how compelling the district court's reasons need be, although comparison with other cases is a useful tool. Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d at 1240. In addition to the divergence in Cage, we have held that a 471% upward deviation from a Guidelines maximum of 21 months to a sentence of 120 months' imprisonment is an extreme divergence. United States v. Mateo, 471 F.3d 1162, 1170 (10th Cir.2006). By comparison to the divergence in Cage, we have held that a 33-month variance from a Guidelines maximum of 27 months to a sentence of 60 months (a 122% increase) is substantial, rather than extreme, and therefore requires compelling reasons, although they need not be as `dramatic' as the reasons supporting an extreme divergence. Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d at 1240. And we have described a 37% increase from a Guidelines maximum of 57 months to a sentence of 78 months as a significant increase that requires sufficient explanation and justification. Bishop, 469 F.3d at 908. 13 Even though the actual sentence of probation in this case resembles the six-day prison sentence in Cage, the District Court deviated from a Guidelines minimum of 27 months, whereas the bottom of the applicable range in Cage was 46 months. Mindful that we look not only to the percentage of divergence, but also to the absolute number of months above or below the Guidelines range, Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d at 1240, we conclude that the divergence in this case is not extreme, but is nevertheless substantial. See id. (holding that a 33-month divergence was substantial rather than extreme even though it constituted a 122% increase from the high end of the applicable Guidelines range). But see United States v. Likens, 464 F.3d 823, 825 (8th Cir.2006) (holding that a divergence from a Guidelines range of 15 to 21 months to a sentence of three years' probation was an extraordinary reduction requiring extraordinary circumstances); United States v. Ture, 450 F.3d 352, 357 (8th Cir.2006) (holding that a divergence from a Guidelines range of 12 to 18 months to two years' probation was an extraordinary variance). Because the variance in the case before us is substantial, the District Court's decision must be supported by compelling reasons. Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d at 1240. 14 In this case, the District Court justified the substantial variance on three grounds: (1) Mr. Hildreth was not involved in the ongoing conduct of buying, selling, or possessing machine guns; (2) he has a record of long-term employment enabling him to support himself and his family; and (3) he poses a low risk of danger to the public because he does not have a history of aggressive, violent, or non-compliant behavior. Although these are proper considerations under § 3553(a), see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A), (2)(C) (requiring the court to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the characteristics of the defendant, the seriousness of the offense, and the protection of the public), the Government argues that they are not enough to justify the court's decision and that, if the court had properly weighed other § 3553(a) factors, it would not have imposed a sentence below the applicable range. As we explain below, we agree that the court failed to justify its substantial divergence from the advisory Guidelines. 15 Although the sentencing Guidelines are now advisory, district courts must consider them in reaching sentencing decisions. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264, 125 S.Ct. 738 (The district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.). As we have previously explained, the Guidelines are an expression of Congress's intentions in passing the sentencing laws. Cage, 451 F.3d at 593. Consequently, a district court may not determine `reasonableness' under § 3553(a) without reference to the fact that the Guidelines represent a critical advisory aspect of the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 594. Moreover, a properly calculated Guidelines sentence will typically reflect an accurate application of the factors listed in § 3553(a), id. (quotation omitted), including the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities under § 3553(a)(6), which we have noted is the purpose of the Guidelines, see Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054 ([T]he purpose of the Guidelines [is] to promote uniformity in sentencing so as to prevent vastly divergent sentences for offenders with similar criminal histories and offenses. (alteration in original) (quotation omitted)). Indeed, in recognizing the Guidelines' role in promoting uniformity in sentencing, we have held that a sentence within a properly calculated Guidelines range is entitled to a presumption of reasonableness. See id. 16 Here, the District Court essentially ignored the recommendation of the sentencing Guidelines. After determining that the facts of this case do not warrant a departure from the applicable sentencing range, the court concluded that a non-Guidelines sentence of three years' probation sufficiently satisfies the § 3553(a) criteria. But none of the court's reasons supports such a substantial divergence because the reasons do not distinguish Mr. Hildreth or his offense from the ordinary defendant upon which the Guidelines sentence is calculated. Mr. Hildreth's criminal history category under the Guidelines already accounts for the District Court's finding that he poses a low risk of danger to the public due to his lack of an aggressive or violent history. Likewise, the fact that Mr. Hildreth does not seem to be engaged in ongoing criminal activity is already accounted for by the Guidelines. Under the Guidelines, uncharged conduct may serve as a basis for increasing the base level of a sentence, see U.S.S.G. § 5K2.21, but the absence of such conduct is not listed as grounds for a departure. This is because the base level for the offense under the Guidelines already reflects Congress's assessment of the seriousness of the offense absent unusual circumstances. Similarly, the fact that Mr. Hildreth is gainfully employed and supports his family financially is not out of the ordinary; indeed, as a matter of policy, the Guidelines discourage courts from considering family ties and responsibilities in sentencing decisions. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6; see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (The Commission shall assure that the guidelines and policy statements . . . reflect the general inappropriateness of considering the education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant.); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5) (requiring a sentencing court to consider policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission). 17 In short, the court did not distinguish Mr. Hildreth from defendants with similar histories convicted of the same crime. See Mateo, 471 F.3d at 1169 (interpreting Cage to require a determination of whether the particular characteristics of the defendant . . . are commonplace—and therefore presumably are already part of the Guidelines calculation—or are sufficiently uncommon to justify a divergence from the presumptively reasonable Guidelines sentence); see also, e.g., Bishop, 469 F.3d at 908 (holding that a significant divergence was reasonable when the district court analyzed the defendant's individualized circumstances using the § 3553 factors and link[ed] the variance to the Guidelines themselves); Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d at 1242 (holding that an upward variance based in part on defendant's extensive history of alcohol abuse was reasonable because the Guidelines calculation did not adequately account for particular behavior). The District Court therefore impermissibly abandon[ed] the tools provided by the advisory Guidelines and import[ed] its own philosophy of sentencing. Bishop, 469 F.3d at 909-10 (quotation and alterations omitted). 18 Moreover, although the court's reasons reflect a limited consideration of certain § 3553(a) factors, namely § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A), and (2)(C), the court's express disregard for one factor, § 3553(a)(6), renders its application of § 3553(a) unreasonable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (requiring a sentencing court to consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among [similar] defendants); see also Cage, 451 F.3d at 595 (explaining that the district court's application of particular § 3553(a) factors was unreasonable because of the weight the district court placed on them). As noted above, one of the primary purposes of the Guidelines is to promote uniformity in sentencing. See Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054. Although the court recognized this purpose, it nonetheless refused to consider § 3553(a)(6), stating that the problem with uniform[ity] in sentencing is we don't have uniform defendants. While this may be true, a substantial divergence from the Guidelines requires compelling reasons that distinguish the particular defendant and conduct at issue from the ordinary defendant contemplated by the advisory Guidelines range. In this case, Mr. Hildreth's criminal history and characteristics, as well as the nature of the offense, were already part of the calculation of the sentence under the Guidelines. See United States v. Shaw, 471 F.3d 1136, 1141 (10th Cir.2006) (noting that an adjustment based on a factor that was already built into the guideline calculation may challenge the overall uniformity of sentences). Hence, the court's substantial variance threatens to undermine uniformity in sentencing and does not accord adequate weight to the statutory factors under § 3553(a). We therefore conclude that Mr. Hildreth's sentence is unreasonable.