Opinion ID: 2982502
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The In-Flight Statements

Text: March challenges the introduction of statements he made during his post-arrest flight from Los Angeles to Nashville on August 12, 2005. March argues that the introduction of this evidence violates both his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, as per Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). In light of the significant evidence of guilt adduced against March at trial, we assume without deciding that the admission of these statements was constitutional error. 3 We find the following statements by Detective Postiglione to be the most troubling: a) “[S]ometimes things happen that some people may perceive one way when, in fact, it is something totally different. I used as an example—a moment of anger instantly regretted. I gave the scenario of someone killing someone else by accident compared to walking up behind someone and shooting them in the back of the head—and said that there is a stark difference between the two”; and b) in response to March’s statement that he intensely loved Janet, “sometimes people hurt people they love in a moment of anger.” However, because we hold that any error was harmless, we need not determine whether the statements constituted functional interrogation. 8 March v. McAllister, 13-5870 Under Brecht v. Abramhamson, error is not harmless in a habeas case when it had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); see Fry v. Filler, 551 U.S. 112, 120 (2007) (adopting Brecht standard and eschewing the “harmless beyond reasonable doubt” standard). “Under this standard, habeas petitioners may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in actual prejudice.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (internal quotations omitted). The burden for showing an error to be harmless is on the government. See O’Neai v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995); Ruelas v. Wolfenbarger, 580 F.3d 403, 413 (6th Cir. 2009). Thus, we must decide whether the admission of the disputed statements subjected March to actual prejudice in his second-degree murder conviction. In Tennessee, second degree murder is defined as a “knowing killing of another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39—13—210(a)(1). Knowingly “means that a person acts with an awareness that his. . . conduct is reasonably certain to cause the death of the alleged victim.” State v. Page, 81 S.W.3d 781, 788 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002); see also T.P.I.-Crim. 7.05(a) (7th ed. 2002). Significant evidence exists which would support a conviction of second-degree murder as defined by the Tennessee statute. We emphasize that a) March’s statement that the victim died in an “accident” after an argument; b) Arthur March’s destruction of the computer hard-drive at his son’s request; c) Arthur March’s disposal of the victim’s remains; 4 d) March’s admission that Arthur March testified via deposition that he saw some of the victim’s bones in the leaf bag and that the bag weighed approximately fifty or sixty pounds. At trial, the government’s expert testified that, under the circumstances in this case, the victim’s skeletal remains would weigh approximately fifteen pounds. March asserts that Arthur March’s testimony violates the “physical facts rule,” which states that the testimony of a witness that is opposed to the laws of nature or which clearly conflicts with principles of science cannot be given any probative value by a jury. See Harris v. General Motors Corp., 201 F.3d 800, 803 (6th Cir. 2000). “In examining a claim of insufficiency of evidence in habeas corpus, a federal court must presume that the jury’s findings in evaluating the 9 March v. McAllister, 13-58 70 he murdered the victim to Reno Martin, Cornelius King, and Jose Pulido; and e) March’s statement to the Mexican businessmen that he would “do away with them the way he did with his wife,” concretely support a finding that the trial evidence supported a murder conviction against March. The significant and extensive background evidence illustrating discontent between March and the victim, particularly the evidence establishing that the victim had unearthed information about his sexual harassment against Leigh Reames, as well as evidence of the victim’s laundry list of reasons in which March had mistreated her, establishes that the act was not an accident. In reaching this conclusion, we also rely on the numerous inconsistencies and abnormalities in the victim’s disappearance and March’s behavior following the crime, the sheer multitudes of which preclude an exhaustive list. Statements such as “Fucking Janet ruined my life,” and the hypothetical question posed to the victim’s long-time friend—whether could she believe a scenario in which he would put the victim in the back of his vehicle, leave the children home credibility of the witnesses is correct and may ignore the testimony only when it finds it to be ‘inherently incredible.” Malcum v. Burt, 276 F.Supp.2d 664, 686 (E.D. Mich. 2003). We first observe that at trial, March did not move to strike Arthur March’s testimony when it became apparent that it was purportedly factually impossible. To preserve a claim of error in the admission of evidence, a party must timely object to or move to strike the evidence. Fed. Rule Evid. 103(a)(1). Accordingly, we review the admission of Arthur March’s testimony for plain error only. To establish plain error, Harris must show that an error (1) occurred, (2) was plain, i.e. obvious or clear, (3) affected his substantial rights, and (4) seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Harris, 200 F. App’x 472, 490 (6th Cir. 2006). Although Arthur March’s approximation of the weight of the bag is belied by the expert witness, it is entirely plausible that the skeletal remains were not the only tangible materials in the bag. Indeed, evidence was established at trial which would tend to support a theory that the victim’s body was rolled into a rug or carpet, thrown into the victim’s Jeep, and then discarded: 1) the day after the incident, Friday, August 16, 1996, March’s son was seen was jumping on a rolled up oriental rug in the entry hall; 2) Ella Goldshmid, the March’s part-time babysitter, testified that she had never seen the rug before, but saw it that morning blocking the path to the kitchen, and never saw the rug again; and 3) Detectives found both carpet fibers and the victim’s hair samples inside the Jeep’s trunk area. Any multitude of possibilities exists for the jury to conclude that the victim’s remains were not the only tangible items in the bag. Thus, we do not find Arthur March’s statements to be “inherently incredible,” Malcum, 276 F. Supp.2d at 686, nor do we find that the admission of his testimony was plainly erroneous. 10 March v. McAllister, 13-5870 alone while they were sleeping and the return and pretend “like nothing ever happened,” are especially indicative of guilt. March’s bizarre and apprehensive behavior when confronted by the victim’s family members and authorities further support the jury’s verdict. Another relevant consideration in Brecht was the infrequency or relative brevity of the disputed testimony in relation to the length of the testimony in toto. 507 U.S. at 639. In Brecht, “the State’s references to petitioner’s post-Miranda silence were infrequent, comprising less than two pages of the 900—page trial transcript in this case.” Id. Here, Postiglione’s testimony on direct examination regarding the petitioner’s statements comprised about three pages of an approximately 2,500-page trial transcript over the course of a nine-day trial. Postiglione was but one of dozens of witness to testify against March. We are firmly convinced that the relatively brief testimony from Postiglione, amongst the great depths of incriminating evidence against March, led to no actual prejudice against March. Indeed, this is not the case in which we are “in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error,” 551 U.S. at 121 (quoting 0 ‘Neal, 513 U.S. at 435 (1995)), but rather where, in reviewing habeas corpus matters, “we do not close our eyes to the reality of overwhelming evidence of guilt.” Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). Accordingly, we hold that any constitutional error would have been harmless in light of the extensive evidence establishing March’s guilt. 3