Opinion ID: 2444891
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: New Jersey tort law governs whether Patterson is legally entitled to recover damages from Armstrong.

Text: The majority assert that tort law is the appropriate decisional law to apply in this case. We agree. Although a claim for UM or underinsured benefits arises out of contract, this Court has previously used tort law to assess the underlying damages. [32] Tort law is particularly appropriate in a case where, as here, the parties dispute the first step condition precedent of the UM benefit claim analysis. This approach makes sense, since the relevant parties to consider at this first step are not Patterson and State Farm, but Patterson and Armstrong. [33] Because Patterson and Armstrong have no contract between them, contract law principles have no place in determining their rights and liabilities vis-à-vis each other. Instead, their relationship arose out of a car accident. It is therefore governed by tort law, which must govern the determination of the threshold issue whether Patterson is legally entitled to recover damages from Armstrong. We differ from our colleagues on the issue of determining whether New Jersey's tort law or Delaware's tort law applies. This Court no longer adheres to the lex loci delicti choice of law standard in tort cases. [34] Instead, we follow the most significant relationship test from the Second Restatement of Conflicts. [35] According to Section 145 of the Second Restatement, the law of the state which has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6 [of the Second Restatement] governs tort suits. [36] Specifically, these Section 6 principles are: (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. [37] Also, when applying the most significant relationship test, Section 145 requires that we account for the following contacts: (1) the location where the injury occurred, (2) the location where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (4) the location where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. [38] Perhaps most importantly, for personal injury claims, [39] Section 146 requires application of the law of the state where the injury occurred unless some other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, in which case the law of that other state should apply. [40] When applying this most significant relationship test, the structure of Section 3902(a) and the posture of this case at step one of the UM benefit claim analysis make Patterson and Armstrong not Patterson and State Farmthe relevant parties, even though there is no ongoing case between them. This is the case because at this stage the operative question is whether Patterson is legally entitled to recover damages from Armstrong, the operator[] of [the] uninsured [] vehicle[]. [41] Applied to the facts of this case, Section 146 creates the functional equivalent of a rebuttable presumption that New Jersey tort law applies unless, applying the principles of Section 6 in light of the Section 145 contacts, Delaware, in fact, has the most significant relationship with the Patterson-Armstrong tort based relationship. Applying the Section 6 principles in light of the Section 145 contacts, however, New Jersey has the most significant relationship to Patterson's relationship with Armstrong, and New Jersey tort law should apply to determine whether Patterson is legally entitled to recover damages from Armstrong. First, considering the Section 145 contacts: (1) Patterson's injury occurred in New Jersey, (2) Armstrong rear ended Patterson in New Jersey, causing her injury, (3) Patterson is from Delaware, but Armstrong is from New Jersey, and (4) the Patterson-Armstrong relationship is centered in New Jersey because Patterson voluntarily chose to drive on New Jersey's roadways and her alleged injuries arose out of the car accident with a New Jersey driver that occurred on a New Jersey roadway. These contacts quite clearly favor the application of New Jersey tort law, but they do not end the inquiry. Applying each of the Section 6 principles in light of these Section 145 contacts: (a) The satisfactory functioning of our interstate system of government is largely premised on the self restraint of states to respect the limits of their spheres of sovereignty and jurisdiction and the corresponding obligation of other states to exercise their sovereignty and jurisdiction to the extent of their respective spheres. (b) The relevant policy of Delaware involves no limit on tort recoveries to any verbal threshold and no need to prove permanent injury in order to recover money damages. (c) The relevant policy of New Jersey involves limiting tort recovery to those plaintiffs who can successfully pierce the verbal threshold. [42] Considering these Section 6 principles in light of the Section 145 contacts, as the Second Restatement requires, New Jersey's policy interest becomes significant in this case. After all, the injury happened in New Jersey as a result of the conduct of a New Jersey resident on roads governed by New Jersey traffic and other laws. Also, New Jersey authorities are in the best position to manage and resolve issues related to the accident itself. (d) In terms of protecting justified expectations, Patterson voluntarily chose to operate her car on New Jersey roads. Therefore, she should expect to be able to assert those legal rights and to be subject to those legal responsibilities created and defined by New Jersey laws that pertain to her operation of her car in that state. (e) The basic policy underlying UM benefits is to provide  only supplemental coverage to protect Delaware drivers from uninsured motorists. [43] The term supplemental means something distinctly different than the term alternative. Moreover, as explained above, the policy of Section 3902 is to permit[] a Delaware motorist to `mirror' his own liability coverage and take to the roads knowing `that a certain amount of protection will always be available.' [44] The word mirror is significant in this context. UM benefits are supposed to provide supplemental coverage to insured drivers to the extent that the driver would otherwise be able to recover directly from the tortfeasor, were that tortfeasor insured. The General Assembly did not design UM benefits to allow a plaintiff to sidestep applicable law and recover according to a more favorable legal regime. (f) Neither New Jersey nor Delaware law will necessarily yield disproportionately uncertain, unpredictable, or chaotic results. (g) Neither New Jersey nor Delaware law will necessarily be more difficult to ascertain or apply. This principle, along with Principle (f), neither favors applying New Jersey nor Delaware law. Considering these Section 6 principles in light of the Section 145 contacts and against the background of the Section 146 rebuttable presumption, in this case we would hold that New Jersey tort law governs whether Patterson is legally entitled to recover damages from Armstrong.