Opinion ID: 1856116
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Claims Against Lloyd Wood

Text: The plaintiffs' complaints were based, in part, on allegations that Lloyd Wood had breached a duty to maintain a safe workplace for the employees of its subcontractors. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Lloyd Wood had failed to adequately warn Bush and Gibbs of the danger posed by the power line or to protect them from that danger. The trial court entered a partial summary judgment for Lloyd Wood, stating: With respect to the `Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment On Behalf of Defendant, Lloyd Wood Construction Co., Inc.,' the Court had reviewed prior to said hearing all submissions in support of, and in opposition to, the same. At the hearing, the Court heard extensive argument from [the plaintiffs' attorney] and [from Lloyd Wood's attorney]. The Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact relevant to the general claims and theories of liability asserted against Lloyd Wood Construction Co., Inc., by the Plaintiffs in these cases and that said Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to said general theories and claims. However, the Court does not find that all genuine issues of material fact have been eliminated with respect to the respective Plaintiffs' claims and theories of liability predicated on the duties and obligations which might legally be deemed to arise out of the `Projects Northport, Alabama Area Accident Prevention & Safety Plan' promulgated by Lloyd Wood Construction Co., Inc. At this point, the Court is unable to state with precision exactly what the cleavage will be between the precluded causes of action and theories of liability, with respect to which it is granting summary judgment at this time, and the independently existing causes of action and theories of liability which might be legally cognizable as emanating from the duties and responsibilities committed to and assumed by Lloyd Wood Construction Co., Inc., by said `Plan' and the posting and other publication of the same. Further, the Court is not committing that any causes of action or theories of liability predicated on the commitments and undertakings contained in said document would survive a motion for a judgment as a matter of law made at an appropriate point during trial. Rather, the Court is simply stating that, at this summary judgment stage, the Court considers that genuine issues of material fact remain with respect to causes of action and theories of liability which might be premised on said document and its involvement in the relationships and circumstances underlying these cases. In conclusion, what the Court is now saying is that any cause of action or theory of liability upon which the Plaintiffs are allowed to proceed at trial will have to be legally premised and predicated on, and legally arise out of, the undertakings of Lloyd Wood Construction Co., Inc., established by said `ProjectsNorthport, Alabama Area Accident Prevention & Safety Plan.' The case proceeded to trial on the theories of liability predicated on the duties and obligations which might legally be deemed to arise out of the `Projects Northport, Alabama Area Accident Prevention & Safety Plan' (the safety plan) promulgated by Lloyd Wood. The jury was instructed to determine whether Lloyd Wood was liable for negligence (the trial court had dismissed the wantonness claim) in its performance of a duty assumed under the safety plan. The jury was also instructed to determine whether negligence on Gibbs's part had contributed to his death. The jury returned a verdict for Lloyd Wood; the trial court entered a judgment on that verdict. Three issues are presented in regard to the claims against Lloyd Wood: 1) Whether the trial court erred in entering the partial summary judgment; 2) Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the plaintiffs waived their objection to the composition of the jury, an objection based on the holding in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); and, 3) Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on Ala.Code 1975, § 37-8-52. With respect to the first issue, we note that the duty generally owed by a general contractor to warn a subcontractor of dangers in the workplace was discussed in Breeden v. Hardy Corp., 562 So.2d 159 (Ala.1990): `As invitor, ... the general contractor[] was under a duty to have the premises free from danger, or if they were dangerous, to give its invitee [the employee of the subcontractor], sufficient warning to enable him, through the exercise of reasonable care, to avoid the danger. This duty includes the duty to warn the invitee of danger of which the invitor knows or ought to know, and of which the invitee does not know. Secrist v. Mark IV Constructors, Inc., 472 So.2d 1015 (Ala.1985); Southern Minerals Co. v. Barrett, 281 Ala. 76, 199 So.2d 87 (1967); McLeod v. McBro Construction Co., 525 So.2d 1353 (Ala.1988). `A general contractor is not responsible to a subcontractor for injury from defects or dangers which the subcontractor knows of, or ought to know of. If the defect or danger is hidden and known to the owner, and neither known to the [sub]contractor, nor such as he ought to know, it is the duty of the owner [general contractor] to warn the [sub]contractor and if he does not do this, of course, he is liable for resultant injury. Veal v. Phillips, 285 Ala. 655, 657-58, 235 So.2d 799, 802 (1970). `The duty to keep an area safe for invitees is limited to hidden defects which are not known to the invitee and would not be discovered by him in the exercise of ordinary care. All ordinary risks present are assumed by the invitee, and the general contractor or owner is under no duty to alter the premises so as to [alleviate] known and obvious dangers. The general contractor is not liable to an invitee for an injury resulting from a danger that was obvious or that should have been observed in the exercise of reasonable care. Beck v. Olin Co., 437 So.2d 1236 (Ala.1983); Quillen v. Quillen, 388 So.2d 985 (Ala.1980). The entire basis of an invitor's liability rests upon his superior knowledge of the danger that causes the invitee's injuries. Secrist, supra ; Gray v. Mobile Greyhound Park Ltd., 370 So.2d 1384 (Ala. 1979). If that superior knowledge is lacking, as when the danger is obvious, the invitor cannot be held liable. Secrist, supra . ' 562 So.2d at 160, quoting Heath v. Sims Bros. Constr. Co., 529 So.2d 994, 995 (Ala. 1988). In Armstrong v. Georgia Marble Co., 575 So.2d 1051, 1053 (Ala.1991), this Court stated: In Crawford Johnson & Co. v. Duffner, 279 Ala. 678, 189 So.2d 474 (1966), this Court held that any duty on the part of the defendant to warn of dangers in the workplace would ordinarily be discharged by giving notice of the dangers to all supervisory personnel of the plaintiff. In that case, the plaintiffs employer had contracted with the defendant to repair a boiler. The plaintiffs employer knew of the defective switch on the boiler but failed to warn the plaintiff. This Court held that the defendant could not be held liable to the plaintiff because it had discharged its duty by warning the plaintiffs employer of the danger. Once a third party discharges its duty by warning the employer, the duty of warning each of the employer's individual employees falls to the employer. `[T]he owner or occupier of particular property has a duty to warn the employees of an independent contractor who has undertaken to do work on the property, of dangers that are hidden on or inhere in that property, and ... this duty is discharged if those in charge of the work for the independent contractor are given warning or have knowledge of the danger.' Gulf Oil Corp. v. Bivins, 276 F.2d 753, 758 (5th Cir.1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835, 81 S.Ct. 70, 5 L.Ed.2d 61 (1960); see, also, Cook v. Branick Manufacturing, Inc., 736 F.2d 1442 (11th Cir.1984). After carefully examining the record and the briefs, we conclude that Lloyd Wood had no duty to warn either Gibbs or Bush about the danger posed by the power line. The undisputed evidence indicates that the power line constituted an open and obvious danger and that the Harpole crew, including the crew's on-site supervisor, Joseph Howard, was aware of, and appreciated, that danger. Howard testified: Q. Now, had you noticed those power lines? A. Yes, I had. Q. Before? A. Yes. Q. Had you said anything to anybody about them? A. There were justno. Q. Had you warned your crew about them, to stay away from them? A. Yes, I did. Q. So, you had told Mr. Payne [Carson Payne, a member of the Harpole crew] and Mr. Gibbs and the other man on the job that `There are power lines up there and we've got to be careful'? A. Right. Q. Had you worked around power lines before? A. Yes. Q. And you know they're dangerous? A. Yes, I do. Q. And do you think Mr. Gibbs understood they were dangerous too? A. Yes, he did. Q. Had you and he talked about the power lines on this specific job? A. Not specifically; no more than `Don't build the scaffold up around that wall, you know, the two sections, in case it falls over, we want to miss it.' Q. When the crane was moved to the location that it was in when the accident happened, had you said anything about the vicinity of the power lines? A. No. Q. Why? A. The truck was sitting plenty far from the power lines. Q. Okay. As long as the boom stayed up? A. Right. Q. But if the boom came down, it got closer A. It extended further out, yes. By being straight up, it made it away from it. And as the pole sank, it took up to it. Q. It got closer and closer as it started to leak down? A. Right. Q. And what do you try to stay? What kind of clearance do you tell your men to stay from power lines? A. I recommend 15 feet. Q. Okay. You want them to stay 15 feet from any power line? A. (Witness nods head affirmatively.) Q. And when he first parked there, he was okay? A. Right. Q. And did you notice that? Did you notice the power line and where he was? A. I did. Q. And you thought A. I was guiding the scaffold there, yes, sir. Q. So, you were guiding the scaffold into place? A. Right. Q. And you thought, `We're okay. We're more than 15 feet away'? A. Correct. Q. You would have been okay if it hadn't leaked down? A. Yes. Q. But you didn't need for anybody to tell you that there were power lines there and warn you to look out for them? You knew that yourself? A. I knew this and I was told this too. Q. But I mean, on this particular day, you were actually conscious of them being there? A. Yes. Q. And conscious that Gibbs was far enough away from them to work safely? A. That's the reason I had it up to the scaffold, yes. Q. You had it up to the scaffold so it would be A. So it was propping it up, yes. Q. And Mr. Gibbs was familiar with where the lines were too, wasn't he? A. Right. . . . . Q. Did you ever have any discussion with Mr. Harpole about that power line? A. I had mentioned it to him. We had talked about it was sitting farther away from the building safely, a safe distance away from the building. And if I didn't build the scaffold too high, everything would be fine. . . . . Q. So, you had mentioned it to Mr. Bunk Harpole? A. Right. Q. And you and he decided that it would be fine? A. It would be safe, be fine, yes. Q. So, you looked at the power line and you thought you could safely work around it; is that correct? A. We had until that moment. Q. You've been on a job where they, in fact, have shut it down because of a power line being too close? A. Yes. Q. And when that happened, did you bring the power line to the people's attention and say, `We can't work safely around this one'? A. The salesman that usually sells the building [has] all of this done before we get there. Q. But there had been jobs where you have said basically, `We're not going to work because the power line is too close'? A. That's correct. Q. And you didn't work until they shut it down? A. Yes. Q. And you had the authority to do that. If you thought it was too close you could shut the job down? A. Right. Q. Okay. And I am sure you knew that was a high-voltage line and, if you hit it, you would be in trouble? A. Yes. Q. And your men appreciated that too? A. Correct. Q. And they all understood that, if they hit it, it was bad? A. (Witness nods head affirmatively.) Q. It was something you could see that was fairly open and obvious? A. Yes. . . . . Q. Before the accident, did you know whether it was insulated or uninsulated? A. You could tell by standing there looking at it that it wasn't insulated. Q. What was it about the line that let you know that? A. It was just plain chrome wire. Another member of the Harpole crew, Carson Payne, also testified with respect to the crew's knowledge of the danger posed by the power line: Q. You said that you had seen the power line there at the job site? A. Yes. Q. There was nothing obstructing your view of it, was there? A. No, nothing obstructing the view. I mean, when we got on that corner? Q. Yes. A. Yes, we saw the power line. Q. But just in general too, it's an open and obvious power line, isn't it? A. Yes. Q. And you can see it running down along the edge of the building? A. Yes. Q. When y'all were moving that scaffolding in place that morning, didn't you say something to [Gibbs] about being careful about the power line as y'all were moving the boom over? A. You're talking about on this corner? Q. Yes. A. Well, yes, you always say something about power lines. But we wasn't close enough to that power line. Q. You were watching it and you were telling him to keep an eye on it? A. Yes. Q. And you all had talked about the power lines at the job site either at safety meetings or just when you were sitting around talking about the job? A. Well, when we was talking about the job, we wasn't really around that power line. Now, we had been doing the job all the way around the whole building. Q. Had y'all ever talked about that power line at any meetings? A. Well, we had safety meetings on Monday. I don't know what that safety meeting was that Monday. We have a safety meeting about different things on Q. Every Monday morning? A. Yes. I don't know what it was, but I know we have a meeting every Monday. But we have talked about the power lines. Q. Okay. A. Yes. Q. And [Gibbs] and [Bush] knew about the power lines there too? A. Yes, they knew about them. Although there is evidence indicating that Howard and his crew believed they were using the crane a safe distance from the power line, there is no evidence from which a jury could find that Howard was unaware of, or did not appreciate, the danger posed by the power line. Therefore, based on established caselaw, we hold that the trial court properly entered the partial summary judgment for Lloyd Wood. See Ex parte Brislin, 719 So.2d 185 (Ala.1998) (a summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law). As to the second issue, we note that a Batson challenge to the composition of the jury is untimely if it is made after the venire has been dismissed. See K.S. v. Carr, 618 So.2d 707 (Ala.1993); McGruder v. State, 560 So.2d 1137 (Ala.Crim.App. 1989); White v. State, 549 So.2d 524 (Ala. Crim.App.1989); Brooks v. Winn-Dixie of Montgomery, Inc., 716 So.2d 1203 (Ala. Civ.App.1997), citing United States v. Erwin, 793 F.2d 656 (5th Cir.1986). The record contains the following colloquy between the trial court and the plaintiffs' attorney: The Court: Ladies and gentlemen, we have completed the jury-selection process. We have the names of 13 of you because we will have an alternate on this jury as a safeguard against any possible illness or other problem that might arise for some member of the jury forcing his or her excuse. So, as the clerk, Ms. Rice, calls the names of the 13 of you who have been selected to serve on the jury, would you please come forward and have a seat in the jury box. [The clerk called the names of the jurors.] The Court: All right, ladies and gentlemen, the remainder of you, I have been requested to, in turn, request that you go to Judge Wilson's courtroom on the second floor to participate in the same process they will be conducting with respect to a trial in that courtroom. Judge Wilson's courtroom is the one directly beneath this one. Their courtroom is on the second floor. Either take the stairs, the second door to your right as you go out of the courtroom doors, and go down the stairwells and, of course, you can take the elevator. I assume Judge Wilson wants them in the jury assembly room. The same sort of layout is on the second floor. There is a jury assembly room right outside of his courtroom. We appreciate your patience and cooperation in the jury-selection process. [The plaintiffs' attorney]: Judge, may we approach? (The following was held at the bench sotto voce: ) [The plaintiffs' attorney]: We have [an objection based on] Batson. The Court: I'm going to take the position it is untimely. I see three or four of them [jurors] left. I met with you in chambers. You had a preliminary opportunity to bring this up. No one mentioned a Batson [objection]. I have released the jury. [The plaintiffs' attorney]: I'm sorry. The Court: I deny it. No one said anything, and by the time you said you were coming up here, five or six of them were still remaining. They have been released and gone. [The plaintiffs' attorney]: May I put the challenge on the record? The Court: I will let you do that when we have a break to relate to this point in time. . . . . The Court: We're going to allow [the plaintiffs' attorney] to place on the record her motion. [The plaintiffs' attorney]: I would like to start off on the status thing. Maybe it was my error. I didn't realize we were at the point where we make a decision of whether we were satisfied with the jury or not until they got up and walked out. The Court: Well, of course, our jury is sworn at the beginning. We don't individually swear seated jurors in this circuit. They are all sworn at the threshold. So, when they were sworn at the organizational session and then the jury was seated, I gave instructions as to where they were to go next. They basically had all filed out except for a trailing few, and they only have to walk down one floor. I knew at that point [most] of them would already be in Judge Wilson's court or the next courtroom they would go to. I will say for the record, I did not mean to indicate when we had our chambers meeting that I was calling upon you to make a Batson motion as such then because that was a chambers meeting. I invited you all in because the defendant had filed a motion in limine and I needed to address that before you went into opening statements. Nonetheless, having you back there and the jury having already been selected and we were just about to come out here, I guess I would have thought if there was going to be a Batson motion, I might have been alerted to it. And that is all the more reason, as I say, why when the jury was seated and we then instructed them and released the jury and they filed out and then you approached the bench and said you had a Batson motionit is my understanding that once the venire has been released that is the cutoff for a Batson motion. [The plaintiffs' attorney]: I guess my other thoughtI have run across this once before. I can't remember what the law says about making a Batson [objection] in front of the whole panel.... The Court: I think what they have saidyou used to have to make your Batson motion before the jury was sworn, and then they have had cases where when they are all sworn up front, you need to make your Batson motion before the venire is released. That is the cutoff. Again, had I been alerted to the fact there was a possible Batson motion, I would certainly not expect you to do it in the presence of the venire. The trial court did not err in denying, as untimely, the plaintiffs' Batson objection to the composition of the jury. [2] With respect to the third issue, the trial court, immediately after instructing the jury on the law of contributory negligence, instructed the jury as follows: I further charge you that the law of the State of Alabama as set forth in the Code of Alabama in [§ 37-8-52(a) ] provides as follows: `No person shall either personally or through an employee or agent, or as an employee or agent of another, use, operate, place, erect or move any tools, machine [sic, machinery], equipment, apparatus or material, or move any building or other structure or any part thereof within six feet of a high voltage overhead conductor of electricity except where such person has arranged effectively to safeguard against danger of accidental contact with such high voltage overhead conductor of electricity by either: [(1)] The erection of mechanical barriers to [sic, which shall] prevent physical contact from [sic, with] such high voltage overhead conductor; [(2)] or deenergize [sic, deenergizing] such high voltage... conductor and grounding the same; or [(3)] Temporary or permanent relocation of such high voltage overhead conductor.' That completes the portion of my charge that relates to the liability issue, that is, the legal principles that you would apply in determining whether or not there had been established a right of the plaintiffs to recover or for either of the plaintiffs to recover in either of the two cases, that is, whether or not the defendant was liable for any damages. A party is entitled to have the jury correctly instructed on the law, provided the requested instruction is relevant to the case and is not confusing or misleading. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Marinelli, 628 So.2d 378 (Ala.1993); American National Fire Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 624 So.2d 1362 (Ala.1993). Because the trial court read § 37-8-52 to the jury, there is no question that the jury was correctly instructed on the law. Instead, the plaintiffs objected to the instruction on the ground that it was confusing to the jury because, the plaintiffs said, there was no evidence material and relevant to that law. However, after examining the instruction as a whole, we find no error. Lloyd Wood alleged that in regard to the accident that caused his death Gibbs had been contributorily negligent, and the jury was instructed on the affirmative defense of contributory negligence. The plaintiffs do not argue that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on contributory negligence. In Murray v. Alabama Power Co., 413 So.2d 1109, 1114 (Ala.1982), this Court stated: We hold that a safety statute or ordinance... can be considered by a jury as going to the standard of care for the self-protection of the plaintiff. A violation of such statute or ordinance can, therefore, be evidence of negligence under certain circumstances. The decision of whether a violation occurred, whether such violation was negligence, and whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries complained of will ... be left entirely to the jury. Although the trial court could have elaborated on the applicability of § 37-8-52, we think the jury could have reasonably understood that it was to consider that aspect of the law declared by that statute to be one of a number of factors it should consider in determining whether Gibbs had been negligent and, if so, whether his negligence had contributed to cause his death. See, also, Sparks v. Alabama Power Co., 679 So.2d 678 (Ala.1996).