Opinion ID: 1540179
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Instruction Prong of the Getz Test.

Text: The third Getz factor Campbell quarrels with is the jury instructions. The trial judge left it up to defense counsel to fashion an instruction. Getz requires a trial judge to instruct the jury about the specific purpose for which they can use the bad acts evidence. [20] The jury instruction, submitted by Campbell, states: You have heard evidence in this trial alleges [sic] that the defendant was involved in acts subsequent to the offense charged. You may not use that evidence as proof that the defendant is a bad person and, therefore, probably committed the offenses charged in the indictment. You may only consider subsequent acts evidence to help you in deciding whether the defendant possessed the requisite intent to commit the acts for which he is now on trial. Again, you are not to consider the alleged subsequent bad acts as proof that the defendant is a person of bad character. Campbell argues that the use of the word intent instead of plan or scheme was reversible error. Neither party nor the trial judge objected to the instruction. Jury instructions are not grounds for reversal if they are reasonably informative and not misleading. [21] Some inaccuracies in jury instructions are permissible. [22] A jury instruction is grounds for reversal only when the deficiency undermined the ability of the jury `to intelligently perform its duty in returning a verdict.' [23] All jury instructions will be reviewed as a whole. [24] Campbell argues that we should find his case analogous to Milligan v. State, [25] in which we found the trial court's cryptic reference to another proper purpose in the jury instructions was, as a matter of law, reversible error. [26] In Milligan, we found the jury instructions were not specific enough to limit the jury's consideration to the proper purpose for which the evidence had been admitted. [27] Campbell argues that the trial judge admitted the bad acts evidence for plan or scheme, and therefore, it was improper to instruct the jury to consider the bad acts for intent. Campbell emphasizes that intent is an element of the charged offenses unlike plan or scheme. Campbell contends that intent focuses prospectively on the acts to show evidence of a defendant's specific intent to do the bad act, which in this case was the future November 3rd weekend deal. Campbell distinguishes plan or scheme by claiming that those terms focus retrospectively to show evidence of a defendant's ongoing plan to do bad acts like the charged offense. His concern is that the jury found him guilty of the one offense that occurred only a few days before the alleged later bad act because the jury was allowed to infer that he had a specific intent to engage in that later bad act. Whereas, if the jury was instructed to determine if he had plan[ned] or scheme to engage in the later bad act, then Campbell might not have been found guilty on the one charge because the jury acquitted him on all the similar charges and having done so could not have believed that he engaged in an ongoing plan or scheme. Campbell's reliance on Milligan is misplaced because his jury instructions stated specifically that the jury should limit their consideration of the alleged bad acts to whether the defendant possessed the requisite intent to commit the acts for which he is now on trial. The evidence of later bad acts was admitted as evidence of a plan or scheme. We fail to comprehend Campbell's distinction between whether he intended to or planned to arrange a future drug deal. The jury instructions were specific enough to limit the jury's consideration of the evidence to the purpose for which it was admitted. In the context of jury instructions as a whole, the trial judge's use of defense counsel's wording did not constitute error.