Opinion ID: 2221902
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Hartlein preliminarily contends that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Specifically, Hartlein argues that the petition for leave to appeal is time-barred under Supreme Court Rule 315(b), having been filed more than 35 days after the judgment appealed from. (134 Ill.2d R. 315(b).) Hartlein further contends that the question presented by this appeal is now moot. We disagree with both contentions. Supreme Court Rule 315(b) provides that if an affidavit of intent to file a petition for leave to appeal is filed in the appellate court, the petition is to be filed in the Supreme Court within 35 days of the judgment from which the appeal is taken. (134 Ill.2d R. 315(b).) In this case, the appellate court entered its judgment on March 11, 1991, and Illinois Power filed its affidavit of intent on March 29. On April 15, Illinois Power filed a notice in the circuit court, removing the case to Federal district court. On July 23, 1991, the Federal district court remanded the case to the circuit court. We take judicial notice (see May Department Stores Co. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 743 (1976), 64 Ill.2d 153, 159, 355 N.E.2d 7) that a certified copy of that order was filed in the circuit court on July 24, 1991. (See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c) (1988) (A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereupon proceed with such case).) Illinois Power then filed its petition for leave to appeal in this court on July 25, 1991, 136 days after entry of the judgment, but only 35 days after entry, excluding the time period during which the case was removed. When a petition for removal has been filed in Federal district court and other requirements of section 1446(e) of the Federal Judicial Procedures code (28 U.S.C. § 1446 (e) (1988)) have been met, the State court loses jurisdiction to proceed further until the case is remanded. (See Eastern v. Canty (1979), 75 Ill.2d 566, 571, 27 Ill. Dec. 752, 389 N.E.2d 1160.) Furthermore, when a case is removed from State to Federal court, the entire action, including all of the parties and their claims, is transferred to the Federal court. (See Moore v. Interstate Fire Insurance Co. (S.D.Miss.1989), 717 F.Supp. 1193, 1195; accord Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. (1988), 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410.) While we have not had occasion to decide the effect of removal upon the time limitations of Supreme Court Rule 315(b), other courts have held that removal tolls similar statutory limitations for the filing of an appeal. (See Strasser v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (C.D.Cal.1986), 631 F.Supp. 1254, 1257 (holding that removal to Federal court tolled statutory 60-day limitation period for filing State appeal); General Electric Credit Corp. v. Smith (Fla.App.1986), 484 So.2d 75, 77 (holding that time period for filing State appeal was tolled during removal); Brogdon v. Ruddell (Tex.Ct. App.1986), 717 S.W.2d 675, 676 (holding State jurisdictional timetable within which appellants would have been required to perfect their interlocutory appeal was suspended by removal and resumed upon remand).) We consider these authorities to be persuasive. Given our lack of jurisdiction to consider a petition for leave to appeal during removal, it logically follows that the 35-day limitation period of Rule 315(b) was tolled by removal. Thus, the petition for leave to appeal was filed within the time limits of Rule 315(b). Accordingly, we deem that jurisdiction is properly vested in this court. Turning to Hartlein's second preliminary contention, we conclude that the question before us is not moot. The preliminary injunction enjoined Illinois Power from, inter alia, discharging Hartlein, changing the status quo, or discontinuing any rights or benefits or privileges of his employment. Hartlein advises that he has returned to work and is now employed by Illinois Power as a warehouseman. Citing Harris v. Education Officers Electoral Board of Community Consolidated School District 110 (1990), 203 Ill.App.3d 917, 148 Ill.Dec. 898, 561 N.E.2d 204, Hartlein argues that these subsequent developments mean that any ruling by this court would be advisory, having no practical effect upon the controversy. We disagree. Illinois Power remains restrained from discharging Hartlein or discontinuing any of his employment rights, privileges or benefits, regardless of any reason for doing so. To that extent, it is not impossible for this court to grant Illinois Power effectual relief. (See In re A Minor (1989), 127 Ill.2d 247, 255, 130 Ill.Dec. 225, 537 N.E.2d 292.) A judgment in Illinois Power's favor would allow it to discharge Hartlein, if it so chooses, or modify Hartlein's employment benefits. A judgment in Hartlein's favor could allow him permanent employment with Illinois Power without any change in his existing benefits. (See In re A Minor, 127 Ill.2d at 257, 130 Ill.Dec. 225, 537 N.E.2d 292.) Accordingly, the question before us is not moot. Having resolved the preliminaries, we now consider the substance of this appeal.