Opinion ID: 4518919
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim Precluded by Collateral Estoppel

Text: We first consider whether Brown’s NYCHRL claim is barred by collateral estoppel. In doing so, we apply state law. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). Under New York law, the doctrine bars the relitigation of an issue that was clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding, material and essential to the decision rendered, and decided against the party raising the issue again. Burkybile v. Bd. of Educ. of Hastings-On-Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 411 F.3d 306, 313 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Ryan v. N.Y. Telephone Co., 467 N.E.2d 487, 490 (N.Y. 1984)). This rule applies to § 3020-b administrative hearings when there has been a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues, c.f., id. at 311, and judicial review of the findings, Solimino v. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 901 F.2d 1148, 1150 (2d Cir. 1990). In the § 3020-b proceeding, Brown’s attorney argued that Brown was fired because of her disability: “her pattern of ineffective teaching was the result of ‘extraordinary circumstances.’ . . . ‘Let’s be clear here. Administration is trying to fire Ms. Brown not because she’s an incompetent teacher, but because she is sick.’” App’x at 223 (quoting the closing statement by Brown’s 4  counsel). After reviewing the entire record, including the teacher evaluations, the hearing officer concluded that there was just cause for Brown’s termination and that Brown’s disability played no part in her termination: I find no support for the claim that Respondent’s illness prevented her from providing effective instruction on the days she appeared for work. It was not because of her illness that Respondent failed to engage her students, failed to manage student behavior, failed to utilize effective discussion techniques, failed to assess her students, and failed to differentiate her instruction. It was not because of her illness that Respondent failed to implement the suggestions and strategies conveyed to her by the administration. And it was not because of her illness that Respondent failed to meet the goals of her Teacher Improvement Plan. Those failures are clearly and consistently documented throughout the written record and were credibly supported by the testimony of the Literacy Coach, the Principal, and the Peer Validator. App’x at 224. In reviewing the hearing officer’s decision, the New York County Supreme Court concluded that, “[g]iven the record of repeated ‘ineffective’ ratings documented by multiple people and petitioner’s failure to follow through with the remediation provided to her, . . . the penalty of termination does not shock one’s sense of fairness.” Brown, 52 N.Y.S.3d 245, at . Brown does not challenge the district court’s determination that her ADA and NYSHRL discrimination claims are collaterally estopped by her New York state proceedings. On appeal, Brown argues only that her NYCHRL claim is not subject to collateral estoppel because under that claim she need only prove that discrimination was a motivating factor in her termination and the hearing officer made no finding that it was not. See Velazco v. Columbus Citizens Found., 778 F.3d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“It is not uncommon for covered entities to have multiple or mixed motives for their action, and the [NYCHRL] proscribes such ‘partial’ discrimination . . . .” (quoting Bennett v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 92 A.D.3d 29 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)). We disagree. The hearing officer found that Brown was terminated because of her ineffectiveness and that her ineffectiveness was unrelated to her illnesses. It follows that Brown’s 5  disability was not a motivating factor in her termination. Further, the hearing officer stated that Brown’s absences played no part in his analysis. The district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Brown’s claims of discrimination under the NYCHRL was therefore proper.