Opinion ID: 717546
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Award of Fees to Prevailing Defendants

Text: 53 Under § 1988, a district court may award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant upon a finding that plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). For a claim to be frivolous under § 1988, it must be frivolous when originally raised in the district court. See id. at 421-22, 98 S.Ct. at 700-01; Casa Marie Hogar Geriatrico, Inc. v. Rivera-Santos, 38 F.3d 615, 619-20 (1st Cir.1994). Andrade challenges the magistrate's award of attorney's fees to Self-Help, Jackson, Holland, Anthony, Hillier, and Tiexiera, arguing that her § 1985(3) claim and common law tort claims were colorable and therefore the district court erred in granting attorney's fees to the prevailing defendants. 54 Noting that Andrade failed to allege in her complaint that her discharge was based on some racial or otherwise class-based invidiously discriminatory animus, Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971), a crucial element of § 1985(3), and Andrade conceded that the claim was facially defective, the magistrate concluded that Andrade's § 1985(3) claim was frivolous when brought. The magistrate also found the tort claims of Count IV to be frivolous for essentially the same reasons that the district court granted the Rule 50(a) motion on Count IV. We consider each count separately in assessing the magistrate's frivolity findings. 55 A cause of action under § 1985(3) has four elements: (1) two or more persons must conspire, (2) to deprive, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, (3) one or more of the conspirators must have done or caused to be done an act in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy, and (4) the plaintiff must have suffered either an injury to person or property or a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right or privilege as a result of the conspiracy. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102, 91 S.Ct. at 1798; Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 34 (1st Cir.1996). The Supreme Court has construed the second element to require that there must be some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102, 91 S.Ct. at 1798. 56 As to racial animus, Andrade's complaint is devoid of any allegations that the Commissioners together with Gross conspired to terminate her because she had testified, on behalf of African-Americans, that Commissioner Eaton exhibited racial bias. Nor did Andrade present any evidence that could be viewed as supporting a racial animus claim. Andrade argues that she does not have to be a member of the black race to maintain an action under § 1985(3) and therefore her claim was not frivolous. While that is an accurate statement of the law, see Cutting v. Muzzey, 724 F.2d 259, 260 (1st Cir.1984) (finding that members of a conspiracy to deprive minorities of equal rights are liable under § 1985(3) to persons who are injured in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy, whether they be Caucasian or a member of the minority group), it does not address Andrade's failure to allege such a racial animus in her complaint or to present any such evidence at trial. 57 Without a charge of racial animus, Andrade needed to allege discriminatory class-based animus. See Romero-Barcelo, 75 F.3d at 34. In particular, Andrade would had to have alleged facts showing that the defendants conspired against her because of her  'membership in a class and that the criteria defining the class were invidious.'  Id. (quoting Harrison v. Brooks, 519 F.2d 1358, 1359 (1st Cir.1975)). Neither Andrade's complaint nor the evidence she presented at trial, however, identifies any class of which she was a member, let alone describes the invidious criteria defining the class. Accordingly, we find that the magistrate was correct in finding that the § 1985(3) claim was frivolous when first brought. 58 Although we are mindful that the granting of a motion for a directed verdict is not tantamount to a finding that a claim was frivolous under § 1988, see Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22, 98 S.Ct. at 700-01 (cautioning district courts to resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation), we nevertheless affirm the district court's finding of frivolity so far as the wrongful discharge and interference with contract claims are concerned for the same reasons that we affirmed the grant of the Rule 50(a) motion on these claims. 9 59 Because we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Count III and the majority of Count IV were frivolous when brought, we affirm the district court's grant of an award of attorney's fees to Self-Help, Jackson, Holland, Anthony, Hillier, and Tiexiera.