Opinion ID: 3173555
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Relocation to Portable Classroom

Text: Ms. Unal next argues she engaged in protected activity by filing a formal grievance with the district and Defendants retaliated against her by barging into her classroom unannounced, telling her Ms. Vandenkieboom would remain her 25 supervisor, and announcing her class would be immediately relocated to a portable classroom outside the building. The district court agreed Ms. Unal’s formal grievance was a protected activity and Ms. Unal had shown a causal nexus. But the court concluded Defendants’ conduct did not constitute a materially adverse employment action. The Supreme Court in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White defined a materially adverse action as one that might “dissuade[] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). The Court intentionally “phrase[d] the standard in general terms because the significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances.” Id. at 69. The Court stressed the importance of context. Id. By way of example, the Court explained that although a “change in an employee’s work schedule may make little difference to many workers,” it could “matter enormously to a young mother with school-age children.” Id. Likewise, “[a] supervisor’s refusal to invite an employee to lunch is normally trivial, a nonactionable petty slight. But to retaliate by excluding an employee from a weekly training lunch that contributes significantly to the employee’s professional advancement might well deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination.” Id. Notwithstanding this context-specific approach, a plaintiff must nonetheless demonstrate the adverse action was material. Id. at 69–70. The materiality requirement reinforces the antiretaliation statutes’ focus on “prevent[ing] employer interference with unfettered access to [the statutes’] remedial mechanisms,” and does 26 so by “prohibiting employer actions that are likely to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC, the courts, and their employers.” Id. at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” will generally not be material. Id. Returning to the facts before us, we consider whether a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants’ conduct in interrupting Ms. Unal’s classroom unannounced, reneging on their commitment to provide her a new supervisor, and ordering her to relocate to the portable classroom could deter a reasonable employee from engaging in protected conduct. We have yet to address whether a workspace relocation may support a retaliation claim in light of the relaxed adverse-action standard set forth in Burlington Northern; at the very least the parties have not directed us to such a case and our research has found none.6 We did, however, confront such a situation in a case that predates Burlington Northern. In Stover v. Martinez, we ruled that an employer’s decision to move plaintiff to an isolated office 6 We have, however, addressed whether an office relocation constituted a materially adverse action in the context of a discrimination claim and concluded that it did not. Nettle v. Cent. Okla. Am. Indian Health Council, Inc., 334 F. App’x 914, 926 (10th Cir. 2009). But because Burlington Northern did not alter the adverseaction standard for discrimination claims, see Piercy v. Maketa, 480 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that although Burlington Northern relaxed the standard for proving adverse action in the retaliation context, “it had no similar effect on our discrimination jurisprudence”), Nettle provides little guidance for our decision in this case. Indeed, unlike adverse actions in the retaliation context, which broadly include all conduct that would deter a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activities, adverse actions in the discrimination context are limited to actions “that affect employment or alter the conditions of the workplace,” including “hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Id. 27 did not constitute a materially adverse action for purposes of retaliation, even when that conduct was aggregated with other negative actions, including plaintiff’s receipt of low-level work and lower-than-normal employment reviews and defendant’s failure to promote plaintiff or award her anticipated recognition. Stover, 382 F.3d at 1075. Other circuits have addressed workspace relocations since Burlington Northern, and most have ruled that such changes were not materially adverse in the given context. See, e.g., Roncallo v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 447 F. App’x 243, 245–46 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[A] temporary move from an office to a cubicle, consistent with [defendant’s] office allocation policy . . . does not constitute a materially adverse employment action.”); Fercello v. Cty. of Ramsey, 612 F.3d 1069, 1079 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[Plaintiff] has offered no evidence that the relocation of her office rendered her unable to complete her duties or that it otherwise interfered with her employment to an extent that would deter a reasonable person from making a harassment claim.”); see also Lockridge v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 597 F.3d 464, 473 (1st Cir. 2010) (ruling that denial of request for better office space was not a materially adverse action because it “left her in no worse a position than that held by similarly situated faculty members”). We acknowledge that in some cases, both pre- and post-Burlington Northern, courts have held that a workspace relocation was materially adverse. See, e.g., Novak v. England, 316 F. App’x 671, 673 (9th Cir. 2009) (reversing summary judgment where there was “a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [plaintiff] suffered an 28 adverse employment action when he was . . . reassigned to perform menial work that fell below his job classification and relocated to an isolated overflow area” (citation omitted)); Signer v. Tuffey, 66 F. App’x 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding that relocating plaintiff’s office to “an out-of-the-way office next to the building’s garbage collection area,” together with evidence of a reduction in plaintiff’s work responsibilities “was an adverse change in [plaintiff’s] employment conditions”); Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Tr., 225 F.3d 1115, 1125 (9th Cir. 2000) (ruling that “the relocation of [plaintiffs’] laboratory space unquestionably qualifies as an adverse employment action” where the relocation disrupted plaintiffs’ research, caused them to lose experimental subjects and grants, and resulted in broken equipment). But in each of these cases, either the relocation itself or other adverse conduct done in concert with the relocation negatively altered the employees’ work conditions or interfered with their ability to complete employment duties. In this case, Ms. Unal has failed to come forward with evidence showing her relocation to the portable classroom had such a disruptive effect. Although Defendants made the decision to move her classroom shortly before the end of the school year, the record demonstrates that Ms. Unal did not, in fact, move until the school year ended. Thus, the move did not interfere with her teaching responsibilities. Ms. Unal has likewise failed to show that, apart from its location, the portable classroom was in any way inferior to a regular classroom or that teaching in the detached location would undermine her ability to perform her work duties. Nor 29 has she shown that the move was contrary to school policy or that Defendants did not similarly relocate other teachers. Although Ms. Unal has demonstrated that Defendants announced their decision to relocate her classroom in concert with other allegedly retaliatory conduct—i.e., entering her classroom unannounced and reneging on the agreement to assign her a new supervisor—we are not convinced this conduct constituted anything more than “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners.” Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68; see A Soc’y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2011) (rejecting a retaliation claim based on a reneged promise because “retracting a gratuitous promise does not amount to a discriminatory act or an adverse action”); Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding that plaintiff’s reassignment to a new supervisor was not a materially adverse action because “[h]er duties were unchanged, and there is no evidence that she suffered a diminution in prestige or change in standing among her co-workers”). Because Ms. Unal has not shown Defendants’ conduct would result in any negative consequences beyond mere inconveniences, we cannot say this conduct would deter a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim. 3. Failure to Accept Ms. Unal’s Response to Notice of Intent to Rehire Finally, Ms. Unal challenges the district court’s summary judgment on her claim that Defendants retaliated against her for filing the EEOC charge of discrimination by initially rejecting her response to the notice of intent to rehire. The 30 district court concluded that although Ms. Unal’s EEOC charge was a protected activity and Defendants’ withdrawal of the offer to renew Ms. Unal’s teaching contract was a materially adverse action, Ms. Unal failed to prove causation. Because Ms. Unal filed her EEOC action six months before Defendants rejected her response to the notice of intent to rehire, the district court ruled Ms. Unal could not rely on temporal proximity alone to show causation. See Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[U]nless the termination is very closely connected in time to the protected activity, the plaintiff must rely on additional evidence beyond temporal proximity to establish causation.”); Richmond v. ONEOK, Inc., 120 F.3d 205, 209 (10th Cir. 1997) (ruling that a three month period is too long to infer causation from temporal proximity). And because Ms. Unal provided no other evidence of causation, the district court ruled she failed to satisfy her prima facie burden as to this claim. On appeal, Ms. Unal contends the clear discrepancy between the date reflected on the notice of intent and the postmark date would have made it obvious to Defendants that she timely responded to the notice. Thus, she reasons their timeliness excuse is fabricated and demonstrates a causal connection. But even if the belated postmark date is sufficient to show causation, Defendants have provided a nonretaliatory justification for the adverse action, and Ms. Unal has not proven that justification is mere pretext. Specifically, Defendants argue that when they made the initial decision to reject Ms. Unal’s response, they determined the response was untimely based solely on the date listed on the notice of intent to rehire itself and 31 were not aware it had been mailed days later. As soon as Ms. Unal informed Defendants of the late postmark date, they rescinded the termination and renewed her contract. Defendants thus argue that they did not fabricate the timeliness issue; instead, they argue it was based on an honest mistake. Ms. Unal has not produced evidence rebutting Defendants’ assertion that they were unaware of the late postmark date; nor has she shown that Defendants’ proffered rationale was otherwise “so inconsistent, implausible, incoherent, or contradictory that it is unworthy of belief.” Stover, 382 F.3d at 1071. Ms. Unal has therefore failed to show that the decision to reject her acceptance letter was caused by anything other than a clerical error. Accordingly, because Ms. Unal has not shown Defendants’ justification was mere pretext, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue.