Opinion ID: 169066
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tw o-Level Enhancement

Text: M r. Richardson argues that the district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement based on his role as an organizer and leader of a crime. Specifically, he contends that M r. Browne did not have the requisite m ens rea to qualify as a criminal participant. He supports this contention by pointing to a statement in the PSR, obtained through an FBI investigation, recounting that M r. Brow ne “‘didn’t believe anything untow ard was happening.’” A ppellant’s Opening Br. 10–11 (quoting R. Vol. IV, at 7). B ecause M r. R ichardson failed to challenge the adjustment below, we review the district court’s two-level enhancement for plain error. United States v. Brown, 316 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2003); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Under plain error review, M r. Richardson must show (1) the district court erred, (2) the error was plain, (3) the error affects substantial rights, and (4) the error “‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial -4- proceedings.’” Brown, 316 F.3d at 1155 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). The commentary to Guidelines § 3B1.1 indicates that in order for a defendant to qualify for a leadership adjustment “the defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants” in a crime. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines M anual, §3B1.1 cmt. n.2 (2005). “Participant” is defined as “a person who is criminally responsible for the comm ission of the offense.” Id. at n.1. Because mens rea is an essential element of criminal culpability, an individual must have the requisite mens rea for the comm ission of a crime in order to qualify as a participant under the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Glinsey, 209 F.3d 386, 396 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that in order for an individual to qualify as a “participant” under §3B 1.1, he must have participated “knowingly in some part of the criminal enterprise”). W e thus face a factual dispute regarding whether M r. Browne had the criminal intent necessary to qualify as a participant in criminal activity. Because M r. Richardson failed to raise the issue below, the government did not have an opportunity to present evidence on the question and we have no way, on this record, of shedding further light upon it. W e can, however, dispose of M r. Richardson’s claim. This Court has clearly stated that “‘factual disputes not brought to the attention of the court do not rise to the level of plain error.’” United States v. Castorena-Jaime, 285 F.3d -5- 916, 926–27 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Svacina, 137 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 1998)). In C astorena-Jaime, the defendant argued that the trial court had erred by not suppressing statements she had made to police officers after her arrest. Id. at 926. Even though she had failed to raise the issue at trial, on appeal the defendant argued that because she did not understand her M iranda rights, the trial court should have suppressed statements made to police officers sua sponte. Id. The court concluded “[w]e cannot say the district court plainly erred by not sua sponte suppressing [the] statements where the factual dispute . . . was never brought to the district court’s attention for resolution.” Id. at 927. As in C astorena-Jaim e, we cannot say that the district court committed plain error by failing to reject, sua sponte, a recommended two-level organizer or leader enhancement when the factual dispute over M r. Browne’s criminal intent was never brought to the attention of the district court for resolution.