Opinion ID: 450428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Defendant Heckens' Motion for Severance

Text: 74 At trial, defendant Heckens moved for a mistrial or, alternatively, for a severance of his trial from the trial of his codefendants. Specifically, Heckens objected to a portion of defendant Gironda's opening statement in which he stated: 75 Mr. Gironda is here because he was in the wrong place at the wrong time.... He had nothing to do whatsoever with the [conspiracy]. That is why he is here. There is the problem when you have a conspiracy. You have what is called guilt by association, but that is not the law. We ask you not to convict someone where there is guilt by association. He is not guilty. He never conspired. 76 On the following day, defendant Heckens moved for a mistrial or a severance on the ground that Gironda's opening statement, to exonerate himself, implied that Heckens was guilty. The district judge rejected defendant Heckens' contention that he and defendant Gironda were presenting inconsistent defenses and denied Heckens' motion. 77 Defendant Heckens concedes that a reviewing court rarely will reverse a lower court's denial of a motion for severance. United States v. Moschiano, 695 F.2d 236, 245-46 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 110, 78 L.Ed.2d 111 (1983). In United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892 (7th Cir.1965), this court explained the preference for joint trials in conspiracy cases: [T]he general rule has evolved that persons jointly indicted should be tried together, ... particularly so where the indictment charges a conspiracy or a crime which may be proved against all the defendants by the same evidence and which results from the same or similar series of acts. Id. at 896. Accord United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 836 (7th Cir.1977). The district court is in the best position to balance this preference against the concern that a joint trial may be confusing to the jury and result in prejudice to one or all of the defendants. United States v. Shively, 715 F.2d 260, 267 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1001, 79 L.Ed.2d 233 (1984). For this reason, the decision whether to grant a motion for severance is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court clearly abused its discretion. United States v. Oxford, 735 F.2d 276, 279 (7th Cir.1984). 78 Severance should be granted only if defenses are so mutually antagonistic that the acceptance of one defendant's defense will preclude the acquittal of the other defendant. United States v. Hendrix, 752 F.2d 1226, 1232 (7th Cir.1985); United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031, 100 S.Ct. 701, 62 L.Ed.2d 667 (1980). In this case, defendant Gironda argued in his defense that he was innocent of any conspiracy that might have occurred. Defendant Heckens argued in his defense that the Government failed to prove its case against him. In United States v. Petullo, 709 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir.1983), this court rejected the contention that a defense based on non-participation is mutually antagonistic to a defense based on the Government's failure to prove its case. Id. at 1181-82. Similarly, the jury here could have accepted both Gironda's defense that he did not participate in the scheme and Heckens' defense that the Government failed to prove all of the elements of the crime of conspiracy. Therefore, even if this court were to agree with defendant Heckens that defendant Gironda's opening statement implied both the existence of a conspiracy and Heckens' involvement in it, this court still finds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Heckens' motion for a severance or a mistrial.