Opinion ID: 2508415
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process Requirements for Civil Commitment

Text: The high court has repeatedly recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection. ( Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323.) Moreover, it is indisputable that involuntary commitment to a [psychiatric] hospital after a finding of probable dangerousness to self or others can engender adverse social consequences to the individual. Whether we label this phenomena `stigma' or choose to call it something else is less important than that we recognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the individual. ( Id. at pp. 425-426, 99 S.Ct. 1804.) Nevertheless, [s]tates have in certain narrow circumstances provided for the forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety. ( Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 357, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 ( Hendricks ).) The high court has consistently upheld such involuntary commitment statutes provided the confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards. [Citations.] It thus cannot be said that the involuntary civil confinement of a limited subclass of dangerous persons is contrary to our understanding of ordered liberty. ( Ibid. ) A recent series of cases both in the United State Supreme Court and in this court has clarified that to be involuntarily civilly committed as a sexually violent predator, the person must, as a result of mental illness, have serious difficulty controlling his dangerous behavior. ( Kansas v. Crane (2002) 534 U.S. 407, 412-413, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 ( Crane ); Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at pp. 358, 360, 117 S.Ct. 2072; People v. Williams (2003) 31 Cal.4th 757, 759, 772, 774, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779 ( Williams ); Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 1156, 1158, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584.) Thus, in Hendricks, the high court stated, A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment. We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a `mental illness' or `mental abnormality.' See, e.g., Heller [ v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312,] 314-315, [113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257] (Kentucky statute permitting commitment of `mentally retarded' or `mentally ill' and dangerous individual); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 366, [106 S.Ct. 2988, 92 L.Ed.2d 296] (1986) (Illinois statute permitting commitment of `mentally ill' and dangerous individual); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey Cty., 309 U.S. 270, 271-272, [60 S.Ct. 523, 84 L.Ed. 744] (1940) (Minnesota statute permitting commitment of dangerous individual with `psychopathic personality'). These added statutory requirements serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control. The Kansas Act is plainly of a kind with these other civil commitment statutes: It requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a `mental abnormality' or `personality disorder' that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior. [Citation.] The precommitment requirement of a `mental abnormality' or `personality disorder' is consistent with the requirements of these other statutes that we have upheld in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness. ( Hendricks, at p. 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) To the extent that the civil commitment statutes we have considered set forth criteria relating to an individual's inability to control his dangerousness, the Kansas Act sets forth comparable criteria and Hendricks' condition doubtless satisfies those criteria.... [His] admitted lack of volitional control, coupled with a prediction of future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes Hendricks from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings. ( Id. at p. 360, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) In Crane, supra, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856, the high court revisited the Kansas Act, noting that Hendricks did not set forth any requirement of total or complete lack of control. ( Id. at p. 411, 122 S.Ct. 867.) The court also noted, We do not agree with the State, however, insofar as it seeks to claim that the Constitution permits commitment of the type of dangerous sexual offender considered in Hendricks without any lack-of-control determination. [Citation.] Hendricks underscored the constitutional importance of distinguishing a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment `from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.' [Citation.] That distinction is necessary lest `civil commitment' become a `mechanism for retribution or general deterrence'functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment. [Citations.] The presence of what the `psychiatric profession itself classifie[d] ... as a serious mental disorder' helped to make that distinction in Hendricks. And a critical distinguishing feature of that `serious ... disorder' there consisted of a special and serious lack of ability to control behavior. [¶] In recognizing that fact, we did not give to the phrase `lack of control' a particularly narrow or technical meaning. And we recognize that in cases where lack of control is at issue, `inability to control behavior' will not be demonstrable with mathematical precision. It is enough to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior. And this, when viewed in light of such features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case. ( Crane, supra, 534 U.S. at pp. 412-413, 122 S.Ct. 867.) In Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th 1138, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584, we relied on Hendricks extensively in rejecting the defendant's constitutional challenges to the California SVPA. As relevant here, we stated, Much like the Kansas law at issue in Hendricks, our statute defines an SVP as a person who has committed sexually violent crimes and who currently suffers from `a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.' (§ 6600, subd. (a).) Through this language, the SVPA plainly requires a finding of dangerousness. The statute then `links that finding' to a currently diagnosed mental disorder characterized by the inability to control dangerous sexual behavior. [Citation.] This formula permissibly circumscribes the class of persons eligible for commitment under the Act. ( Hubbart, at p. 1158, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584, fn. omitted; see ibid. [due process requires an inability to control dangerous conduct].) We again addressed the California SVPA in Williams, supra, 31 Cal.4th 757, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, which was decided after Crane. While the SVPA did not use Crane's precise language in defining who is eligible for involuntary civil commitment as a sexually violent predator, i.e., `proof [that they have] serious difficulty in controlling [their dangerous] behavior,' we nonetheless concluded the SVPA inherently encompasses and conveys to a fact finder the requirement of a mental disorder that causes serious difficulty in controlling one's criminal sexual behavior. ( Williams, at p. 759, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779.) In so doing, we observed that to be committed as a sexually violent predator under the SVPA, one must, among other things, have a `diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.' (§ 6600, subd. (a)(1).) A `[d]iagnosed mental disorder includes a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting the person a menace to the health and safety of others.' ( Id., subd. (c).) ( Williams, at p. 764, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779.) Based on this language, we concluded that a jury instructed in the language of [the SVPA] must necessarily understand the need for serious difficulty in controlling behavior. ( Williams, at p. 774, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779; id. at p. 776, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779.) The SVPA's plain words ... `distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.' [Citation.] ( Williams, at pp. 759-760, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779.) Accordingly, separate instructions or findings on that issue are not constitutionally required, and no error arose from the court's failure to give such instructions in defendant's trial. ( Id. at p. 777, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 684, 74 P.3d 779, fn. omitted.)