Opinion ID: 450443
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rulings of the Trial Court

Text: 22 Coleman argues that two rulings of the trial court were erroneous, that it was prejudiced by these rulings, and, therefore, that it is entitled to a new trial. The court ruled that statements in a patent that was issued in 1871 were admissible under Rule 803(8)(C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (public record and report exception to the hearsay rule). The court also ruled that Coleman could not introduce evidence to prove or argue that the supervening cause of the accident was an act of a third party rather than a product defect. We have examined these rulings and find that Coleman is not entitled to a new trial. 23 We express no opinion as to the admission into evidence under Rule 803(8)(C) of statements from the century-old patent. Coleman challenges this evidence because of its relation to the award of punitive damages in this case. 6 See Brief of Appellant at 23, 25; Reply Brief of Appellant at 13. Any discussion of this evidentiary ruling is unnecessary in light of our reversal of the punitive damage award on other grounds. 24 We are equally unpersuaded by Coleman's argument that the trial court's ruling on the supervening cause issue necessitates a new trial. Coleman characterizes as negligence and as a supervening cause of the accident in this case the failure of Scott McCarter's parents to comply with the warning on the fuel can to keep the can out of the reach of children. Coleman was told it could not argue this theory to the jury and cross-examination of plaintiffs' expert along these lines was not permitted. An offer of proof made out of the jury's hearing demonstrated that such cross-examination would have elicited from the witness a statement that the accident would not have occurred if the warning had been followed. 25 In a strict products liability case, where design defect and product misuse both contribute to cause an accident, the misuse cannot constitute a supervening cause if the misuse was foreseeable. See Vanskike, 665 F.2d at 195 (citing Griggs v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, 513 F.2d 851 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865, 96 S.Ct. 124, 46 L.Ed.2d 93 (1975) (negligent failure to warn case)); Jarrell, 666 S.W.2d at 836. This is true even if the act alleged to be a supervening cause is the negligence of a third party. See Griggs, 513 F.2d at 861 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 447(b)). Thus, under the applicable law, failure of the McCarters to keep the fuel can out of the reach of children--the misuse claimed by Coleman to have been the supervening cause of this accident--must have been unforeseeable in order for Coleman to prevail on its supervening cause theory. 26 We see no reason for the trial court to have prohibited Coleman from arguing supervening cause to the jury. However, even if it was error for the trial court to do so, the error was harmless. The crucial evidence pertaining to Coleman's supervening cause theory was presented to the jury anyway, albeit in the context of the anticipated use/foreseeability issue which we have discussed supra at pp. 1302 - 1303. 7 In fact, Coleman argued to the jury that the guard to prevent [injury due to use of its fuel cans by children near sources of heat] is the instruction that tells you to keep [the can] out of the hands of children so that presumably parents will do that. Tr. at VII:45. Thus the jury considered the warning and the fact that the McCarters apparently failed to follow it before concluding that fuel cans foreseeably would be used by children near sources of heat. The jury's conclusion, which we have determined to be supported by the evidence, easily can be restated: it was foreseeable that fuel cans would not be kept out of the reach of children. Such foreseeable misuse cannot be a supervening cause. 27 The trial court's ruling on the supervening cause issue did not erroneously [spare plaintiffs] the task of proving the causation element of their case. Reply Brief of Appellant at 10. Nor did it cause the jury to believe that the causation issue would be subsumed in a finding of product defect. Id. at n. 4. The jury was instructed by the trial court that it had to find that the design defect was the direct cause of plaintiffs' injuries in order to award plaintiffs actual damages. See Tr. at VII:86. Thus the jury was charged with determining causation in this case and a determination that the product defect caused plaintiffs' injuries is supported by the evidence.