Opinion ID: 169696
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State D efendants

Text: -9- Dopp argues the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the State Defendants concerning the (1) 1965 Ford pickup truck, VIN No. 10DK641079, (2) $33,725 cash, (3) $139 cash, (4) 400 Channel Realistic Scanner, (5) miscellaneous bullets, (6) miscellaneous papers, (7) U.S. passport and (8) thirteen photographs. We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, applying the same legal standard used by the district court under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rohrbaugh v. Celotex Corp., 53 F.3d 1181, 1182 (10th Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answ ers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(c).
In his complaint, Dopp alleged Defendants Loring and W yant disposed of his 1965 Ford pickup truck without providing him notice or a pre-deprivation hearing in violation of due process. The district court concluded Loring law fully released any claim to the truck in M ay 1996 and Dopp had failed to provide any facts connecting W yant, or any of the other State D efendants, to the truck’s disposal. Dopp contends the court improperly granted summary judgment to Loring and W yant based on their release of the truck to him in M ay 1996. He claims Loring and W yant never raised this defense and therefore waived it. Dopp also -10- argues Loring and W yant did not effect the release of his truck because the release was conditioned upon him paying all towing and storage fees, contrary to Oklahoma statute. 9 He alleges Garner refused to release the truck to him without payment of storage fees pursuant to Loring and W yant’s instructions. There is absolutely no evidence that Loring and W yant were involved in the truck’s sale. In fact, they had released the truck to D opp in M ay 1996, two years prior to its sale. 10 Although Dopp asserts Loring and W yant conditioned such release on the payment of storage fees, there is no evidence to support this assertion. M ore importantly, the failure to release the truck in M ay 1996 without 9 See O KLA . S TAT . tit. 63, § 2-506 (O), (Q) (stating a bona fide owner who recovers property seized under this statute shall not be liable for storage fees unless the owner fails to recover the property within thirty days of receiving written notice from the seizing agency). 10 Dopp correctly states the State D efendants did not move for sum mary judgment based on the M ay 1996 release. Nevertheless, “[e]ven if a ground is not urged by a party, where the requirements of Rule 56 are met, the court is not barred from any consideration of that ground. It can grant summary judgment on grounds other than those raised . . . if the facts are fully developed showing entitlement . . . to judgment as a matter of law [and it] is satisfied there is no procedural prejudice to the [other] party.” Wilder v. Prokop, 846 F.2d 613, 626 (10th Cir. 1988); see also Howell Petroleum Corp. v. Leben Oil Corp., 976 F.2d 614, 620 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating “a district court in appropriate circumstances may grant summary judgment on a ground not formally raised in a summary judgment motion”). In this case, M artinez report stated the truck was released to Dopp in M ay 1996 and the release was attached to the report. Additionally, in his response to the State Defendants’ motion to dismiss (construed as a motion for summary judgment), Dopp argued the release could not be considered because it was conditioned on him paying the truck’s towing and storage fees. Consequently, the Rule 56 requirements were satisfied and Dopp was not prejudiced. -11- the payment of storage fees is not the conduct Dopp alleges deprived him of his constitutional rights. Rather, Dopp’s claim has always been that the State Defendants wrongfully disposed of his truck in violation of his constitutional rights. Indeed, any claim that he was improperly required to pay storage fees to obtain the release of his truck is untimely because Dopp learned in M ay-June 1996 that requiring payment of storage fees was contrary to Oklahoma law. The court properly granted summary judgment to the State Defendants as to the pickup truck.
The cash seized from Dopp’s residence was placed in the evidence room at the District Attorney’s Drug Task Force office. In April 2001, the office was burglarized and several items from the evidence room, including the cash seized from Dopp’s residence, were stolen. A full investigation was conducted, resulting in a suspect. However, no charges were filed because there was insufficient admissible evidence to establish probable cause. In his complaint, Dopp argued the State Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by disposing of this cash without notice or a pre-deprivation hearing. Relying on Hudson v. Palmer, the district court concluded the State Defendants were entitled to summary judgment because in cases like this, where the property’s disposal was random and unauthorized, due process is violated only if a state’s postdeprivation remedies are unavailable, unresponsive or inadequate. 468 U.S. 517 -12- (1984). It concluded the Oklahoma G overnmental Tort Claims Act provided a remedy for unlaw ful deprivation of property and Dopp had failed to allege this remedy was unavailable, unresponsive or inadequate. Although we agree with the district court that the State D efendants are entitled to summary judgment as to the cash, we do so on a different basis. United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 n.6 (10th Cir. 1994) (“W e are free to affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the district court.”). In D aniels v. Williams, the Supreme Court held: “[T]he Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.” 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). Because Dopp alleges he was deprived of his money by the State Defendants’ negligence (i.e., not taking adequate measures to safeguard his money), the Fourteenth Amendment does not afford him a remedy.
According to the M artinez report, the scanner, miscellaneous bullets and m iscellaneous papers remain in the possession of Defendant M orris at the Ottaw a County, Oklahoma, District Court’s Office. As to Dopp’s U.S. passport and the thirteen photographs, D efendant M orris delivered them to Kathryn Depew, Assistant United States A ttorney for the Northern District of Oklahoma, in -13- connection with a federal forfeiture hearing in Case No. 96-CV-924, and they remain in her possession. Because the items are still in law enforcement’s possession and have not been disposed of, the district court concluded the facts did not support Dopp’s wrongful disposal claim and the State D efendants were entitled to judgment as to these items. Dopp does not appear to contest the court’s conclusion. Rather, he argues the State Defendants’ retention of these items, despite being ordered by the judge presiding over his state criminal case to return them to him, constitutes conversion and the court erred in not addressing this claim. The record reveals that in Dopp’s state court criminal case, the court ordered the State to release these items to Dopp or show cause why they should not be returned to him. In the M artinez report, the State D efendants alleged “[n]o one has made any attempt to pick up or otherwise contact the State about picking up [these items.] It would be illegal for the State to deliver [these items] to [D opp] while he is incarcerated.” (R. Vol. I, Doc. 41 at 3.) Therefore, it appears the State Defendants are willing to release the property, just not to Dopp personally due to his incarceration. In any event, while it is true Dopp alleged a state law conversion claim in his complaint, the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction over it, as well as Dopp’s other state law claims, because the federal claims had been dismissed. It did not abuse its discretion in doing so. Robey v. Shapiro, M arianos & Cejda, L.L.C., 434 F.3d 1208, 1213 -14- (10th Cir. 2006). “The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [state law] claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Dopp has provided no argument as to how the court abused this discretion; he merely asserts federal claims still exist. This argument is foreclosed by our affirmance of the dismissal of his federal claims.