Opinion ID: 2451259
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Calvert Received A Fair Hearing.

Text: Calvert makes a number of arguments relating to the procedural adequacy of her administrative hearing. We review these arguments de novo. [58] We note at the outset that Calvert has waived a number of her due process arguments by not raising them earlier in the appeals process. For example, she argues that the Hearing Officer [n]eglected the fair hearing principle of discovery to claimant by employer and declined to obtain discovery from the employer, disregarding claimant's request for it. She also contends that [d]ue [p]rocess requires notice of evidence to be used against claimant and an appropriate amount of time to develop a challenge and answer to any information from any source and claims that she did not have sufficient notice of the evidence to be presented at the Appeal Tribunal hearing. Because these arguments were raised for the first time in Calvert's appeal to the superior court, rather than in her initial post hearing appeal to the Commissioner, we consider them waived. [59] Similarly, Calvert's argument that the Hearing Officer improperly admitted hearsay evidence is waived because she raised it for the first time on appeal to the superior court.
Calvert alleges that the hearing was biased, claiming that [t]he hearing officer picked what she wanted out of the evidence and used it to try to prove her point and that [t]he reasonings and conclusions of the Tribunal were not fairly and impartially supported by the record. But as the Department notes in its brief, administrative officers are presumed to be honest and impartial until a party shows actual bias or prejudgment. [60] To show the bias of a hearing officer, a party must demonstrate that the hearing officer had a predisposition to find against a party or that the hearing officer interfered with the orderly presentation of the evidence. [61] This is a demanding standard. The United States Supreme Court has found a probability of actual bias. . . too high to be constitutionally tolerable in cases where the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome or has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him, [62] but not where a decisionmaker merely performs combined investigative and adjudicative functions. [63] Similarly, we have held that a hearing officer's failure to disclose his position as an AFL-CIO president during a worker's compensation hearing was insufficient to show actual or probable bias. [64] Calvert has not presented any evidence that the Hearing Officer was predisposed to find against her. The assertion that the Hearing Officer selected evidence to support her findings is insufficient to show actual bias. Nor does the hearing transcript suggest that the Hearing Officer interfered in any way with the presentation of evidence. The Hearing Officer's questions were thorough and objective; the only evidence she excluded was related to Calvert's efforts to find work after quitting at Snug Harbor, an issue irrelevant to the question of whether Calvert quit suitable work with good cause. Calvert failed to demonstrate bias sufficient to overcome the presumption of the Hearing Officer's impartiality.
In applying the substantial evidence test to review an administrative determination, a reviewing court may not reweigh evidence. [65] Calvert argues that [t]he Superior Court erred when it improperly reweighed evidence concerning transportation: Transportation problems DID present insurmountable difficulties. . . . This would affect the issue of suitable work. Though the meaning of this argument is somewhat unclear, Calvert seems to be referring to the superior court's conclusion that, notwithstanding Calvert's expressed concerns regarding transportation (among other issues), the record does not support a finding that the work at Snug was unsuitable. But this statement does not suggest that the superior court reweighed evidence. The superior court clearly indicated that its conclusion regarding suitability was based on the record created by the Hearing Officer. And although the Hearing Officer did not explicitly address the question of suitability, her factual findings provide sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Calvert's work was suitable. The superior court presumably relied on the Hearing Officer's findings for its conclusion that there is no evidence that the work was inconsistent with Calvert's physical capability, training, experience, earning capacity, or skill and that the work was therefore suitable; this did not constitute a reweighing of the evidence.