Opinion ID: 1194180
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Custom of Inaction

Text: Plaintiff claims that his transfer out of Ward 828 and Lieutenant Cox's criticism of his accident reports were both conducted pursuant to a municipal policy or custom because Major Cooper[] reveled in the discriminatory acts of Lt. Cox against Mr. Arendale based upon his acquiescence of same. (Plaintiff's Br. at 26) Liberally construed, Plaintiff seems to be arguing that the City may be held liable under § 1983 for its custom of inaction in failing to respond to Lieutenant Cox's alleged discrimination. To state a municipal liability claim under an inaction theory, Plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of a clear and persistent pattern of discrimination by municipal employees; (2) notice or constructive notice on the part of the City; (3) the City's tacit approval of the unconstitutional conduct, such that its deliberate indifference in its failure to act can be said to amount to an official policy of inaction; and (4) that the City's custom was the moving force or direct causal link in the constitutional deprivation. Powers v. Hamilton County Pub. Defender Comm'n, 501 F.3d 592, 607 (6th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir.1996). In addition to his own allegations against Lieutenant Cox, Plaintiff cites two instances which he believes establish that the City deliberately ignored Cox's alleged discrimination. First, Plaintiff points to an affidavit by his white partner, Officer Chaudoin, who claims that Lieutenant Cox once denied Chaudoin a day off on the same day that he granted an African-American officer's request. Second, Plaintiff notes that another white officer, Joe Giannini, once filed a charge of discrimination against Lieutenant Cox with the EEOC. Even assuming that these incidents prove impermissible bias on the part of Lieutenant Cox, and even assuming that they are sufficient to establish a clear and persistent pattern of discrimination by Lieutenant Cox, they are insufficient to demonstrate a custom of inaction on the part of the City. In order to establish that the City's failure to act can be said to amount to an official policy of inaction, the evidence must demonstrate more than just a collection of sloppy, or even reckless, oversights. . . . Doe, 103 F.3d at 508. Rather, the record must show that the City consciously never acted when confronted with its employees' egregious and obviously unconstitutional conduct. Id. Given this standard, none of the incidents Plaintiff cites are sufficient to establish a custom of inaction on the part of the City. Officer Chaudoin's accusation against Lieutenant Cox is easily disposed of. In order to prove that the City consciously never acted when confronted with its employees' . . . conduct, the record must show that the City was actually confronted with Lieutenant Cox's conduct. Id. Plaintiff cites no evidence, however, indicating that Chaudoin reported Cox's alleged discrimination in granting time off requests, nor does he argue that the City was constructively aware of Cox's alleged discrimination in granting leave. Similarly, the allegations of Officer Giannini are also insufficient to demonstrate that the City failed to act when confronted with evidence of unconstitutional conduct. When a reliable government agency, tasked with the investigation of alleged constitutional violations, concludes after a thorough investigation that no violation has occurred, a municipality is permitted to rely on the results of that investigation. See id. In deposition testimony, Lieutenant Cox testified that he was cleared of any charges after a substantial investigation by an EEOC attorney. Although Cox does not have personal knowledge of the full extent of this investigation, he testified that he was required to attend several interviews each lasting anywhere from 30 minutes to an hour. Plaintiff does not deny that this investigation took place, or that Lieutenant Cox was cleared of the allegations leveled against him by Officer Giannini. Furthermore, the record does not support Plaintiff's claim that Lieutenant Cox engaged in egregious and obviously unconstitutional conduct when he transferred Plaintiff out of Ward 828, or when he criticized Plaintiff for his accident reports. Id. With respect to the transfers, Major Cooper testified that he  not Lieutenant Cox  made the decision to transfer Plaintiff to a different ward on account of the large volume of complaints he had received from residents of Ward 828 about officer responsiveness. Plaintiff presents no evidence to refute this testimony, and indeed Plaintiff himself testified that he was informed at the time of the transfer that the decision was made at a meeting of senior management. [11] The City has introduced substantial evidence that Major Cooper, a white supervisor, made the decision to transfer Plaintiff. Plaintiff has raised no allegations that Cooper was motivated by animus against white people, and indeed his own statements corroborate Major Cooper's testimony. Faced with this record, the City cannot be held to have ignored egregious and obviously unconstitutional conduct when Plaintiff was transferred out of Ward 828. Nor does the record support Plaintiff's claim that the City may be held liable for Lieutenant Cox's criticism of his accident reports. Once again, Plaintiff relies entirely on conclusory statements to support his claim that Cox's criticism was motivated by racial animus. As his only evidence that Cox acted impermissibly in criticizing the reports, Plaintiff cites to his own deposition testimony that [T]here was no reason . . . to call me in and berate me about a report that was done correct . . . it couldn't have been any other reason than race. (J.A. 312) Plaintiff has presented nothing more than his own subjective opinion to justify his allegations that the City discriminated against him by allowing Lieutenant Cox to criticize his accident reports. Such conclusory statements are not sufficient to survive any motion for summary judgment, much less to allow a municipality to be held liable for the acts of its employees. See Lewis v. Philip Morris Inc., 355 F.3d 515, 533 (6th Cir. 2004) (In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must be able to show sufficient probative evidence [that] would permit a finding in [his] favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy. (internal quotations omitted)).