Opinion ID: 2975372
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Leadership roles

Text: Burley and Clark contend that the district court clearly erred in finding that they were leaders or organizers in the check-cashing scheme. Under the Guidelines, a sentencing court must increase a defendant’s offense level by four levels “[i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). “An upward departure may be warranted . . . in the case of a defendant who did not organize [or] lead . . . another participant, but who nevertheless exercised management responsibility over the property, assets, or activities of a criminal organization.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2. The government bears the burden of establishing the factors supporting the enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Barton, 455 F.3d 649, 658 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that Booker did not change the burden of proof for enhancements). Under the caselaw of this circuit, the standard of review for a district court’s application of § 3B1.1(a) is unsettled. See, e.g., United States v. Milan, No. 05-6209, 2007 WL 627870, at  (6th Cir. Mar. 2, 2007) (upholding the application of a § 3B1.1(a) enhancement under both deferential and de novo review); see also United States v. McDaniel, 398 F.3d 540, 551 & n.10 (6th Cir. 2005) (declining to resolve the question of the applicable standard of review). This court has traditionally “reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” McDaniel, 398 F.3d at 551 n.10. In Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59, 66 (2001), however, the - 10 - Nos. 06-1333, 06-1494 U.S. v. Burley, U.S. v. Clark Supreme Court ruled that “in light of the fact-bound nature of the legal decision,” an appellate court should review deferentially a district court’s application of § 4B1.2 (the crime-of-violence enhancement). This court has thus “reserve[d] judgment as to whether the district court’s application of § 3B1.1 . . . should be reviewed deferentially or de novo.” United States v. Henley, 360 F.3d 509, 516 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Milan, No. 05-6209, 2007 WL 627870, at  (same). For the reasons set forth below, we again have no need to resolve this issue in the present case. Burley and Clark both objected in the district court to the application of the leadership enhancement. In applying the § 3B1.1(a) enhancement to the defendants, however, the district court found that the evidence was more than sufficient to identify Burley and Clark as leaders in the check-cashing scheme under the preponderance standard. With reference to Clark, the district court noted “the large amount of money, the number of people” involved in the scheme, “the planning that had to take place” in organizing the scheme, “and the history of similar kinds of offenses committed by Mr. Clark over the years” as support for applying the § 3B1.1(a) enhancement. It also characterized Clark as “the real brains obviously behind the operation.” With reference to Burley, the district court stated that although “it might not be fair to characterize Mr. Burley as the brains behind the operation, . . . he did a lot of heavy lifting.” The court found that “the main distinction . . . between the activities of Mr. Clark and Mr. Burley compared to some of the others who have been prosecuted . . . is just that the level of activity in relation to this fraud was so much greater.” Specifically, Burley “participated in the recruitment obviously of a number of people including Mr. Lawson,” “leased the premises for Mr. Clark where - 11 - Nos. 06-1333, 06-1494 U.S. v. Burley, U.S. v. Clark the equipment was maintained,” “participated in the operation of the equipment,” and “had his own group of runners.” Burley disputes the credibility of the witnesses, including Hughes, Jones, and Smith, who identified him as having between five and seven people working in his check-cashing “crew.” But even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that the district court erred in relying on the testimony of Hughes, Jones, and Smith, there was still sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that Burley “exercised management responsibility over the property, assets, or activities” of the scheme, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), cmt. 2, because Burley does not dispute that he rented space from Washington for the computer equipment or that he made and printed counterfeit checks. Based on the evidence considered by the district court in both its written opinion and at the February 27, 2006 sentencing hearing, the district court concluded that the defendants were organizers or leaders under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). We find no error in that determination even under the de novo standard of review, and would obviously reach the same conclusion under a more deferential standard.