Opinion ID: 848685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The Role of State Law

Text: The Michigan Constitution requires that All legislation shall be by bill and may originate in either house. Const. 1963, art. 4, § 22. It further provides that, No bill shall become a law without the concurrence of a majority of the members elected to and serving in each house. Const. 1963, art. 4, § 26. According to the Legislature's internal rules, concurrent resolutions need be approved only by a majority of those present at the time they are voted on. See Mason's Manual of Legislative Procedure, § 510(1) p. 338. If only a concurrent resolution is required, the tribal-state gaming compacts were properly approved and are valid. However, if the compacts are legislation, they were not properly approved by the Legislature, because a majority of those elected and serving did not approve them. While the Michigan Constitution requires that all legislation be passed by bill, it does not define legislation. The dictionary defines legislation as the act of making or enacting laws. Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2000). Law is defined as the principles and regulations established by a government or other authority and applicable to a people, whether by legislation or by custom enforced by judicial decision. Id. A similar definition is found in Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed), which describes legislation as [t]he act of giving or enacting laws.... Formulation of rule for the future. Law is further defined as  [t]hat which must be obeyed and followed by citizens subject to sanctions or legal consequences.... Id. These definitions suggest that legislation involves the Legislature's power to formulate rules applicable to its people. The central characteristic of legislation is the ability of the Legislature to act unilaterally in creating rules applicable to those subject to its power. In Westervelt, [17] a plurality of this Court stated, [T]he concept of `legislation', in its essential sense, is the power to speak on any subject without any specified limitations. (Emphasis in original). Where Indian gaming is concerned, the Legislature has no such power. According to IGRA, the Legislature must obtain tribal consent before the tribe will be bound by state law. The compacts are not legislation. They place no restrictions or duties on the people of the state of Michigan. They create no duty to enforce state laws on tribal lands. Sale of liquor to Indian casinos is subject to the same requirements as sales to other Michigan businesses. The compacts do not impose duties, responsibilities, and costs on the state. They do not force the state to assume the obligation to oversee and implement the unemployment and worker's compensation statutes. The compacts merely obligate the tribes to provide the same benefits to their employees as those employees would be entitled to if they worked for an off-reservation business. A representative provision reads: The tribe shall provide to any employee who is employed in conjunction with the operation of any gaming establishment at which Class III gaming activities are operated pursuant to this Compact, such benefits to which the employee would be entitled by virtue of the Michigan Employment Security Act, and the Worker's Disability Compensation Act of 1969, if his or her employment services were provided to an employer engaged in a business enterprise which is subject to, and covered by, the respective Public Acts. [Compact with Little Traverse Band Bands of Odawa Indians, § 5. (internal citations omitted)]. There is no requirement in that representative provision that the tribe fulfill this obligation through state agencies. It is entirely possible that the tribe has its own system for providing such benefits. Justice Weaver claims that the tribes have the authority to tax gaming activity under the IGRA. Opinion of Weaver, J., post at 246. We find the claim to be of no consequence in this case. That tribes may have relinquished certain rights as part of the bargaining process has no effect on the proper characterization of the compacts during review of the Legislature's actions. A higher tax is not placed on Indian gaming proceeds. There is no restriction on advertising related to Indian casinos. The compacts do not give special treatment to Indian casino suppliers. No burden is placed on the people of the state of Michigan through the negotiated compacts. Plaintiffs argue that the compacts mandate the creation of local revenue sharing boards. However, local governments are not obliged to create these boards unless they wish to take advantage of the monetary contribution the tribes have voluntarily agreed to provide. The compacts essentially assign third-party beneficiary status to local governments. In order to accept the benefits of a compact, a local government must comply with the conditions set out in the compact. The compact, however, does not force a local government either to share in the benefits of the compact or to create a local board. The compacts essentially advise local governments that, to exercise local control over the payments that the compacts obligate the tribes to disburse to them, they must establish a board. The board must be given the authority to accept the payments. The fact that local governments may exhibit rational self-interest and proceed to set up such boards does not render the compacts legislation. Nor does the fact that new businesses will be located on reservations near these communities render the subject of the compacts legislative. Any large business that locates a branch near a small community might increase local governmental expenses due to the enhanced economic activity that the branch occasions. The compacts are applicable only to the tribes. The tribes are generally not subject to the legislative power of the state. To the extent that the compacts delineate rules of conduct applicable to tribal gaming, they do not do it through the use of the Legislature's unrestricted power. They do it through the affirmative choice of the tribes. The compacts are government-to-government agreements. Black's, supra at 6. Each explicitly acknowledges that it is between two sovereigns. Accordingly, the compacts are not legislation. They are more closely analogous to contracts and have been so treated by other states. The Washington Supreme Court has held that Tribal-state gaming compacts are agreements, not legislation, and are interpreted as contracts. See Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation v. Johnson, 135 Wash.2d 734, 750, 958 P.2d 260 (1998). See also Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon v. Oregon, 143 F.3d 481 (C.A.9, 1998); Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque, 132 N.M. 207, 218, 46 P.3d 668 (2002). As explained previously, the state does not possess the power to apply its law unilaterally to gaming on tribal land. The state and a tribe must negotiate a mutual agreement describing the regulations that may be applied to class III gaming on Indian lands. The power to legislate is distinct from the power to contract. Whereas, normally, legislation requires only the agreement of a majority of the lawmakers, a contract must have the agreement of all its parties to all its terms. Boerth v. Detroit City Gas Co., 152 Mich. 654, 659, 116 N.W. 628 (1908). The compacts explicitly provide that they do not take effect unless all parties, the state and the tribes, agree to them. The compacts are not a product of the unilateral action or unrestricted power of the Legislature, but, instead, result from negotiations between sovereign entities, the state and the tribes. Because the compacts are not legislation, the Legislature was not required to approve them by bill. In Michigan, the legislative authority of the State can do anything which it is not prohibited from doing by the people through the Constitution of the State or of the United States. Huron-Clinton Metro. Auth. v. Bds. of Supervisors of Five Cos., 300 Mich. 1, 12, 1 N.W.2d 430 (1942), quoting Attorney General v. Montgomery, 275 Mich. 504, 538, 267 N.W. 550 (1936). Nothing in the federal or state constitutions prohibits the Legislature from approving intergovernmental agreements by concurrent resolution. The Legislature's internal rules allow for this form of approval. Negotiated compacts might involve legislation, for example, where they require the state to create a new agency or extend state jurisdictional authority to tribal land. However, the compacts at issue do not involve these concerns. The Legislature was not restricted in its approval process by IGRA or by the state constitution. Contrary to Justice Markman's position, [18] our state constitution is unlike the federal constitution in this respect: whereas the power of the federal government is provided for and limited by the United States Constitution, the power of state government is inherent in the state. This distinction is well-recognized: The government of the United States is one of enumerated powers; the national Constitution being the instrument which specifies them, and in which authority should be found to the exercise of any power which the national government assumes to possess. In this respect, it differs from the constitutions of the several States, which are not grants of powers to the States, but which apportion and impose restrictions upon the powers which the States inherently possess. [Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, vol. I, p. 12.] There is no provision in the state constitution indicating how the Legislature should address an executive agreement negotiated by the Governor and presented to the Legislature for its approval. Because there was no restriction on its ability to act, the Legislature followed its internal procedure, one that it used when approving compacts that the Governor negotiated in 1993. We conclude that, given the unique nature of tribal-state gaming compacts and the content of the particular compacts at issue, this form of legislative approval was appropriate.