Opinion ID: 735703
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mertie Hamilton

Text: 16 Hamilton was employed as Gillem's receptionist. She answered the phone, greeted guests, typed, and did general office work. The district court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether Hamilton would have been rehired had she not been associated with Gillem, using the same analysis used with Patton and Castle. That is, Hamilton was employed in the same office in which Patton and Castle worked, and Meade's admission that he only wanted people he could trust working in that office created a genuine issue of material fact as to his motivation for declining to rehire employees in that office. However, the court dismissed Hamilton's claim because the court found that Hamilton, as a receptionist, was an employee who served at the judge/executive's pleasure pursuant to K.R.S. § 67.711(1) 1 ; the court reasoned that even though Meade may have discharged Hamilton because of [Hamilton's] political association with Gillem, she was subject to such a discharge under K.R.S. § 67.711(11). This was error. Courts may not rely exclusively on the legislative designation of a position as political or nonpolitical. 17 Judges Norris and Dowd are satisfied, however, that the district court properly awarded summary judgment for the defendants on Hamilton's claim. 18 This court has recognized that the duties of a mayor's secretary are such that political affiliation represents an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the position. Faughender, 927 F.2d at 913-14. This is so because the duties involve functions in relation to the flow of information, whether by writing, speech, or personal visit, to and from the mayor's office, that the mayor wants the secretary to perform. Id. We have recently reiterated our view that a public employee who controls the lines of communication between policy makers with discretionary authority is subject to political patronage hiring. McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d at 1536, 1557 (6th Cir.1996). 19 Although Hamilton did not serve as the private secretary of Gillem, we nonetheless conclude that her position fell within the category of an employee who controlled the lines of communication. As noted earlier, this court has already held that the positions filled by Castle and Patton were subject to political considerations because they involved discretionary authority delegated by the county judge executive. Blair, 76 F.3d at 100-01; see McCloud, 97 F.3d at 1557. Hamilton's testimony indicates that she served as the initial contact between the public and defendant, answering telephones and greeting people off the street. Moreover, her position required her to convey information between individuals within the office, including Castle, which would inevitably involve communications regarding policy. In our view, the combination of interaction with the public and access, however limited, to policy determinations leads us to conclude that Hamilton's role as receptionist falls within the confidential employee category as defined by McCloud. Accordingly, we hold that defendant is entitled to summary judgment with respect to her claim. 20 Judge Ryan disagrees and would vacate the summary judgment dismissing Hamilton's claim and remand to the district court for a determination whether political affiliation was an appropriate requirement for Hamilton's job, given the nature of her duties and the duties Meade intended her to perform during his administration.