Opinion ID: 2611883
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Development of Asportation Standards

Text: In People v. Knowles, supra, 35 Cal.2d 175, we held that the holds and detains language of former section 209 was a deliberate abandonment of the requirement of movement of the victim traditionally present in kidnapping. (35 Cal.2d at p. 180.) Thus, detention without asportation of a robbery victim was sufficient. ( Id. at pp. 179-181.) In 1951, section 209 was amended to provide that the holds or detains language applied only to kidnapping for ransom or extortion. That remains the law today, and hence kidnapping under section 209(a) has no asportation requirement. ( People v. Macinnes, supra, 30 Cal. App.3d at pp. 842-844.) However, section 209(b) kidnapping for robbery is committed only where the defendant kidnaps or carries away the victim. In People v. Chessman (1951) 38 Cal.2d 166 [238 P.2d 1001], we upheld the defendant's conviction for kidnapping for the purpose of robbery, with infliction of bodily harm, for which he had received the death penalty. ( Id. at pp. 172, 192-193.) The defendant had forced one victim to walk 22 feet at gunpoint from the car she was in to his car, and there committed sex crimes. ( Id. at p. 192.) We stated, It is the fact, not the distance, of forcible removal which constitutes kidnaping in this state. ( Id. at p. 192.) In People v. Wein (1958) 50 Cal.2d 383 [326 P.2d 457], we applied Chessman to uphold the defendant's convictions of kidnapping for robbery, with infliction of bodily harm, for which he also had received the death penalty. ( Id. at pp. 391, 399-400.) The defendant, in the course of raping and robbing several women within the confines of their homes, forced each to move either from one room to another or across a single room, for distances ranging from a few feet to more than 50 feet. ( Id. at pp. 391-393, 399-400.) We observed that the Legislature has been in session several times since the Chessman case was decided, and it has not seen fit to amend the kidnaping law to limit the rule we announced. If the section, as interpreted by this court, is regarded as too harsh, the remedy is for the Legislature to redefine kidnaping, and not for this court to engraft some uncertain distance limitation onto the plain language of the section. ( Id. at p. 400.) In Cotton v. Superior Court, supra, 56 Cal.2d 459, we implicitly declined to extend the Chessman/Wein rule to section 207 simple kidnapping. In Cotton, the AFL-CIO picketed a labor camp which housed certain farm workers. (56 Cal.2d at p. 461.) The picketers attempted to verbally persuade the farm workers to join their cause. ( Ibid. ) Fighting ensued during which one man was dragged 15 feet. ( Id. at pp. 461, 463-464.) We stated that the only movements that occurred [here] were those natural in a riot or assault.... All `asportation' ... would appear to be only incidental to the assault and rioting. ( Id. at p. 464.) We concluded that the Legislature could not have intended that every assault could also be prosecuted as kidnapping, so long as the slightest movement was involved. ( Id. at p. 465.) Where the movement is incidental to the alleged assault, section 207 should not apply. (56 Cal.2d at p. 465.) We issued a peremptory writ ordering the trial court to dismiss the charges of conspiracy to commit kidnapping, and kidnapping. ( Id. at pp. 460-461, 465.) In People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d 1119, we abrogated the Chessman/Wein rule for kidnapping for robbery, relying in part on Cotton v. Superior Court, supra, 56 Cal.2d 459. (71 Cal.2d at pp. 1129-1131, 1139.) As noted earlier, in Daniels, the defendants in the course of robbing and raping three women in their own homes, forced them to move about their rooms for distances of 18 feet, 5 or 6 feet, and 30 feet respectively. ( Id. at p. 1126.) The jury fixed the penalty at death on the kidnapping counts. ( Id. at p. 1122.) We reversed the kidnapping convictions, observing that under the Chessman/Wein rule, `The criminologically nonsignificant circumstance that the victim was ... moved incident to the crime determines whether the offender lives or dies.' ( People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1138.) We held that the asportation required for kidnapping for robbery consisted of a movement of the victim that is not merely incidental to the commission of the robbery, and which substantially increases the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself. ( Id. at p. 1139.) In People v. Williams, supra, 2 Cal.3d 894, we stated, Although Daniels was directed toward a construction of the statute defining aggravated kidnaping (Pen. Code, § 209), it is clear that the considerations therein enunciated are applicable as well to simple kidnaping (Pen. Code, § 207). (2 Cal.3d at p. 901.) In People v. Stanworth, supra, 11 Cal.3d 588, however, we retreated from this position, and held that the Daniels test was not applicable to [simple] kidnaping charged as a violation of section 207 but only to charges of kidnaping for robbery bottomed on section 209, commonly referred to as aggravated kidnaping. ( Id. at p. 598.) We distinguished People v. Williams, supra , on the ground that  Williams involved a conviction of aggravated kidnaping under section 209 which was reduced by the court to simple kidnaping under section 207 in order to avoid the harsher penalty imposed by the former section.... Under these circumstances, we evaluated the conviction in the light of Daniels.  (11 Cal.3d at p. 599, fn. 11.) In Stanworth, supra, we observed that the `movement' factor of the Daniels rule is uniquely suited to section 209 and not to section 207, because section 209 kidnapping, by definition, involves the underlying offense of robbery. In contrast, kidnaping, as defined by section 207, may occur in the absence of another crime. Thus where only simple kidnaping is involved, it is clear that the victim's movements cannot be evaluated in the light of a standard which makes reference to the commission of another crime. ( People v. Stanworth, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 600, fn. omitted.) Rather, the determining factor in the crime of [simple] kidnaping is the actual distance of the victim's movements; and further, that the minimum movements necessary for the commission of the crime are present where the victim is forcibly taken `into another part of the same county'.... Finally, because the victim's movements must be more than slight ... or `trivial' ..., they must be substantial in character to constitute kidnaping under section 207. ( People v. Stanworth, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 601, italics in Stanworth; see People v. Brown (1974) 11 Cal.3d 784, 788-789 [114 Cal. Rptr. 426, 523 P.2d 226] [concluding that where a victim was taken throughout her house and then at most 75 feet outside the house, the asportation was trivial] & fn. 6 [Arbitrary boundaries established by buildings or other enclosures, ownership of property, fences, and other points of reference will themselves vary in size and distance. Thus the character of the victim's movements cannot be determined simply on the basis that the victim remained inside or was taken outside a particular area. (Italics added)].) We reiterated that to define the phrase into another part of the same county `in terms of a specific number of inches or feet or miles would be open to a charge of arbitrariness.' ( People v. Stanworth, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 600-601, quoting People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1128; see People v. Daniels, supra, 18 Cal. App.4th at p. 1052 [error to instruct jury that as a matter of law 500 feet is a substantial distance].) [9] Thus, Stanworth relied on the absence of an associated crime to explain why Daniels was inapplicable to simple kidnapping. However, it noted that Cotton v. Superior Court, supra, 56 Cal.2d 459, which had invoked the simple kidnapping standard, had involved the associated crime of assault. ( People v. Stanworth, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 599-600.) Stanworth itself went on to apply the simple kidnapping standard to asportations resulting in the associated crimes of rape and murder. ( Id. at pp. 602-603.) We subsequently offered an alternative reason why the Daniels test was inapplicable to section 207 kidnapping. We explained, `both Daniels, involving section 209 kidnaping, and Cotton ..., involving section 207 kidnaping, construe the term `kidnaping' to mean movements which are not merely incidental to associated crimes.' ... However, in view of the fact that ... `section 209 prescribes increased punishment when the kidnaping is for the purpose of ransom or robbery' ..., violation of section 209 requires not only that the asportation be not merely incidental to the associated crime of robbery (i.e., that there be a kidnaping) but also that it `substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself.' ( In re Earley, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 129, italics in original, fn. omitted.) Thus, in Earley, we relied on the punishment assigned by the Legislature to determine what the substantive element of asportation entailed. In People v. Caudillo, supra, 21 Cal.3d 562, overruled on other grounds in People v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 749-751 [12 Cal. Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100], this court, while reiterating Stanworth 's language that the movement must be substantial in character, rejected consideration of certain factors other than actual distance in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation for simple kidnapping. In Caudillo, defendant forcibly moved a rape victim, Maria, for an  unspecified distance from the elevator to the storage room, and from the storage room to her apartment. ( People v. Caudillo, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 572, italics in original.) We concluded that this was not substantial movement within the meaning of Penal Code section 207. ( Ibid. ) We observed: The People seek to introduce considerations  other than actual distance  as determinative of what constitutes `sufficient movement' of the victim to constitute the offense of section 207 kidnapping. ( People v. Caudillo, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 574.) The People claimed we should consider Maria's movement substantial because defendant moved Maria to the storage room to avoid detection, thereby increasing her danger, and then waited 20 minutes before he moved her to her apartment. ( Ibid. ) We rejected this argument stating, Neither the incidental nature of the movement, the defendant's motivation to escape detection, nor the possible enhancement of danger to the victim resulting from the movement is a factor to be considered in the determination of substantiality of movement for the offense of [simple] kidnaping. ( Ibid. ) We concluded that the judgment of conviction of simple kidnaping must fall for lack of evidentiary support. ( Id. at p. 575.) (5) The issue we address in this case is whether the asportation standard for section 208(d) kidnapping is derived from that used for simple or aggravated kidnapping. Only one Court of Appeal opinion has significantly explored this issue. In People v. Bradley, supra, 15 Cal. App.4th 1144, a case relied on by the Court of Appeal in this case, the victim was moved 50 to 60 feet from the open street, and forcibly led around a building to the inside of a separate structure, an enclosed dumpster area. ( Id. at p. 1154.) The court first determined that the standard of asportation for section 208(d) was that for simple kidnapping. (15 Cal. App.4th at p. 1153.) It based this conclusion on the difference in severity in punishment under section 208(d) as opposed to the life sentence prescribed by section 209(b). (15 Cal. App.4th at pp. 1152-1153.) The court stated, Evidently, the more serious penalty of life imprisonment imposed in aggravated kidnapping is in large part responsible for the impetus to use the Daniels risk-related movement test. Therefore, since the Legislature added kidnapping with the intent to commit rape to section 208, and not section 209, and since the penalty is determinate and not life as found in aggravated kidnapping, we conclude kidnapping with intent to commit rape warrants the same test for movement as ... simple kidnapping. ( Id. at p. 1153.) Applying the section 207 simple kidnapping asportation test, the court then stated, distance, in and of itself, is not the only factor probative of asportation under sections 207 and 208(d). (15 Cal. App.4th at p. 1153.) Consideration must be given to the change in surroundings between the point of capture and destination. ( Ibid. ) A distance of 50 feet in the open desert is of far less importance to fulfilling the goal of a sexual perpetrator than 50 feet in the city where characteristics of location change much more quickly. ( Id. at p. 1154.) The court concluded that the 50-to-60-foot movement was not a trivial or inconsequential movement, in light of the boundaries which were traversed over this distance and the unlit and secluded nature of the destination providing the necessary environment to commit the targeted crime without interruption or detection.... [T]he inherent danger from sexual attack in the secluded dumpster area was considerably more than the public phone area. ( People v. Bradley, supra, 15 Cal. App.4th at p. 1154.) [10]