Opinion ID: 6500514
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Post-Honeycutt: Pelullo

Text: Pelullo argues that, like John Maxwell, he too should not have been held jointly and severally liable. Pelullo’s arguments, however, fail under prong two of plain-error review: even assuming Honeycutt applies, see supra notes 9596, there was no “clear” or “obvious” error. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. Unlike the defendant in Honeycutt, Pelullo was a primary leader and organizer of the FirstPlus scheme, “call[ing] all the shots.” 97 (JAD at 1552.) He exercised dominion and control over the entirety of the proceeds reaped “traceable to” an offense, and 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3), which covers proceeds “obtained … from” unlawful conduct. United States v. Gjeli, 867 F.3d 418, 427-28 & n.16 (3d Cir. 2017). Section 982(a)(1), one of the bases for the forfeiture order here, permits forfeiture of “property … involved in” an offense. We need not opine on whether Honeycutt prohibits joint and several liability under § 982(a)(1), see supra note 95, since the government has conceded error as to John Maxwell. United States v. Senke, 986 F.3d 300, 306 (3d Cir. 2021) (accepting the government’s concession of plain error and remanding for further proceedings). 97 Relying on extensive evidence introduced at trial, the government characterizes Pelullo as sitting at the “pinnacle of [the] criminal enterprise and ma[king] all the decisions about disbursing its proceeds, including to himself.” (Answering Br. at 274; see also Answering Br. at 14-16, 19-20.) 142 from the scheme. He gave definitive commands to employees, directed the disbursement of company funds, and issued instructions to FirstPlus’s lawyers, accountants, and other consultants, all of which evidenced his control over the criminal operation. The Supreme Court in Honeycutt emphasized the importance of having an “ownership interest” in or “personal benefit” from the proceeds of a crime. 137 S. Ct. at 1635. It is not plainly wrong to interpret Pelullo’s leadership of the FirstPlus looting, coupled with his supervision of the individuals who were distributing the stolen funds, as demonstrating his ownership of or benefit from the proceeds of the criminal enterprise. It follows that it was not plainly wrong to interpret Honeycutt as allowing Pelullo to be held jointly and severally liable. Pelullo contends that he should only be liable for the money that ended up in his pocket. But even after Honeycutt, multiple people can “obtain” the same proceeds over the course of a crime where they jointly controlled the enterprise. See United States v. Cingari, 952 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that imposition of joint and several liability on “spouses who jointly operated their fraudulent business” for the full proceeds of their scheme was not plainly erroneous). Thus, as someone who controlled the criminal enterprise, Pelullo can be held jointly and severally liable for funds that he did not walk away with. That others may have also benefited from the proceeds in question does not mean the District Court plainly erred in holding Pelullo liable for the entire amount. Again, he personally benefited from and exerted control over those funds, 143 which is the type of conduct that the Supreme Court indicated can give rise to forfeiture liability. While we decline to make here any definite statement about who is subject to joint and several liability for the entirety of the proceeds of a criminal scheme under Honeycutt, any error in Pelullo’s sentence in this regard was not plain, and he is therefore not entitled to relief from the forfeiture order.