Opinion ID: 199486
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Damages: Jury Instructions and Evidence

Text: 33 Interstate argues that the court erred in rejecting its proposed jury instruction on damages and that the evidence was too speculative to support the jury's damage award. Interstate requests a new trial or a remititur.
The trial court instructed the jury that: 34 If you find that . . . [Brown and Integra] are entitled to recover, recover under the counterclaim, then you are to award as damages a sum of money that will fully and fairly compensate Mr. Brown for what he would have received in income if the contract had not been breached. 35 Interstate asked for a specific instruction that the jury should not speculate and that the loss should be foreseeable and calculated with reasonable certainty. 10 The trial court said its instruction essentially amounted to the same thing. At that point, Interstate neither disagreed with the judge that the essence of the instruction had in fact not been given nor pressed its objection. We are doubtful that Interstate adequately gave the trial judge notice and preserved its objection. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51; see also Elgabri v. Lekas, 964 F.2d 1255, 1258-59 (1st Cir. 1992). Moreover, the issue with respect to lost profits in this case, as explained more fully below, was not whether the jury would improperly speculate in awarding a sum based on its projections from data in evidence, but rather whether it believed Brown had agreements in place for commissions on the deal, ultimately a credibility question not open to any such speculation. A trial judge, who possesses particular insight into the main issues in a case, does not have an obligation to instruct a jury on every nuance of a party's claim or defense. 11 Given that the wording of instructions is within the trial judge's discretion, and given that here the trial judge could reasonably have understood that Interstate agreed that his instruction covered the lost profits issue, we find no error.
36 Interstate argues that the damage award is inconsistent with the evidence and must have been based on pure conjecture. On this basis, Interstate argues, the district court erred in failing to grant a new trial or remititur. 37 A motion for a new trial requires a finding that the verdict is so seriously mistaken, so clearly against the law or the evidence, as to constitute a miscarriage of justice. Transamerica Premier Ins. v. Ober, 107 F.3d 925, 929 (1st Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the district court's denial of a new trial motion for abuse of discretion. See FHS Props., 175 F.3d at 87. 38 Interstate argues, inter alia, that Brown's testimony as to acquisition costs and mark-up on the two presses was not supported by the evidence and also did not make allowance for the costs of transporting the presses. There was also no evidence, Interstate contends, that Brown had the ability to procure the four color press from Malaysia, as there was no signed agreement for the purchase of this press. However, the jury was entitled, on the evidence, to find to the contrary. Correspondence with the owner of the four color press as to pricing, shipping, and other basic contractual provisions was in evidence. Two other witnesses supported Brown's testimony that he had made the necessary arrangements and that the deal foundered on Interstate's failure to pay. 39 Brown testified as to the compensation he expected to receive: ten percent of E.R. Smith's $1.7 million price to refurbish the two presses ($170,000), plus half of the mark-up cost of $225,000 for acquisition of the two presses ($112,500), for a total of $282,500. From this Brown subtracted the $10,000 he had retained from the $75,000 deposit and requested a total of $272,500. The jury awarded him $187,500. 12 Interstate presented no reason not to credit Brown's testimony, and that testimony supplied an adequate basis for the jury's damage award. Cf. Knightsbridge Marketing Servs. v. Promociones y Proyectos, S.A., 728 F.2d 572, 575 (1st Cir. 1984) (The prospective profits need not be proved with mathematical accuracy; the plaintiff need only show by reasonable proof that he has lost profits.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 13 40 Interstate also argues that it cannot be held liable for payments Brown would have received from others, but that argument finds no support in the law. A seller may recover lost profits that he would have made had the buyer performed under the contract. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106, §§ 2-708(2); Cesco Mfg. Corp. v. Norcross, Inc., 391 N.E.2d 270, 274 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979). Where a middleman broker is involved, and the buyer is in breach, the broker's damages may be measured by his lost profits. See 67A Am. Jur. 2d, Sales §§ 1129 (2d ed. 1985 and Supp. 2000) (The Uniform Commercial Code follows the view that a . . . middleman should have as a measure of damages his lost profits where the buyer has breached.); see also TCP Indus., Inc. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 661 F.2d 542, 552 (6th Cir. 1981) (explaining the rationale for the rule under Michigan law). The jury's damage award stands. 41