Opinion ID: 2544415
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Collateral Crime Evidence in Closing Argument

Text: In this issue, Hodges challenges the trial court's ruling on a motion in limine. During its initial closing argument, the State highlighted much of the evidence indicating that Hodges was the person who killed Belanger but did not mention the collateral crime evidence. Before beginning its closing, the defense made an oral motion in limine, requesting that if it refrained from discussing the collateral crime evidence, the State be precluded from mentioning the collateral crime evidence during its rebuttal argument. In the alternative, the defense requested an opportunity to respond to the State's rebuttal in the event that the State discussed the collateral crime evidence. The State contended that were the defense to argue that Hodges was not the perpetrator of the Belanger homicide, the State should be permitted to discuss the collateral crime evidence to the extent that it rebutted the identity defense. The trial court was persuaded by the State's argument and denied the motion. This Court has explained that the role of counsel in closing argument is to assist the jury in analyzing [the] evidence presented at trial. Ruiz v. State, 743 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1999). Attorneys are permitted wide latitude in closing arguments but are not permitted to make improper argument. Gore v. State, 719 So.2d 1197, 1200 (Fla.1998). Generally, rebuttal argument is an opportunity to respond to the opposing party, not an opportunity to raise new matters. See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Rentz, 60 Fla. 449, 54 So. 20, 23 (1910); Collins Fruit Co. v. Giglio, 184 So.2d 447, 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). A trial court has discretion in controlling opening and closing statements, and its decisions will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Merck v. State, 975 So.2d 1054, 1061 (Fla.2007) (citing Dufour v. State, 905 So.2d 42, 64 (Fla.2005)). In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defense's motion in limine. The parties do not dispute that the collateral crime evidence was relevant to the issue of identity and admissible on that basis, and when arguing its motion in limine, the defense never asserted willingness to refrain from raising the issue of identity in its closing. In fact, during its closing, the defense repeatedly asserted that the pivotal issue in Hodges' case was the identity of the perpetrator. The trial court properly ruled thatregardless of whether the defense commented directly on the collateral crime evidencethe State could argue from the collateral crime evidence in an effort to rebut the defense theory that Hodges did not perpetrate the Belanger homicide. Because the collateral crime evidence was properly admitted into evidence and was relevant to rebutting the defense's expressly argued theory, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the State could argue from the collateral crime evidence during rebuttal. Moreover, contrary to Hodges' argument, the instant case is not analogous to Heddendorf v. Joyce, 178 So.2d 126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). In that case, the plaintiff's counsel produced a chart outlining his mathematical calculations supporting a damage award of $61,035.96which included a calculation of per diem pain and suffering damagesduring his rebuttal closing argument. In his initial closing, counsel had discussed only $3,301.70 in hospital bills and out-of-pocket expenses and alluded to pain and suffering without assigning a dollar figure. The Second District Court of Appeal determined that the per diem argument was raised for the first time in the trial during rebuttal and that exploring this method of calculation for the first time after the defendant had no opportunity to respond was unfair and prejudicial. 178 So.2d at 128, 130. Heddendorf held that the trial judge erred in permitting plaintiff to utilize the per diem argument and demonstrative charts for the first time in that part of the closing argument which may be termed as `final summation,' `rebuttal argument' or `concluding argument.' Id. at 131. The instant case is distinguishable because the collateral crime evidence was not raised for the first time in the trial during rebuttal. Id. at 128. In Hodges' case, the defense and the jury were well aware of the evidence of the collateral homicide and the State's position that the collateral crime evidence was probative of whether Hodges committed the Belanger homicide. Before each collateral crime witness testified, the trial court instructed the jury that the evidence was to be considered for the limited purpose of proving motive, intent, preparation, plan, identity, the absence of mistake or accident. Because the State's argument based on the collateral crime evidence was not raised for the first time during rebuttal, the instant case does not raise the same fairness considerations as were present in Heddendorf.