Opinion ID: 1360499
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Babcock v. State

Text: Finally, the majority's assessment of our cases, and in particular its heavy reliance upon Babcock, is unwarranted. Our cases do not support the majority opinion, which is why the majority finds it necessary to distinguish or disapprove every one of them except Babcock. Despite the majority's heavy reliance, even Babcock is poor support for the majority's position. In Babcock, the court based its refusal to extend the qualified immunity of caseworkers to DSHS on three grounds. First, the court noted that while caseworkers had statutory immunity for taking children into seventy-two-hour protective custody, the Legislature made it clear in RCW 26.44.060(3) that it did not intend to supersede or abridge remedies in RCW 4.92 (actions against the State). The court applied the statute by analogy to the common-law immunity it adopted, and concluded the individual's immunity should not be extended to the State. There is no similar statutory provision at issue in this case, i.e., no indication that the Legislature intended that the Creelman rationale not be applied to support extension of individual employee immunity to the governmental employer. Second, Babcock cited the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217, but expressly distinguished cases where the basis of asserted state liability was respondeat superior. As explained, § 217 does not compel the majority's result in this case. Third, Babcock also emphasized public policy considerations. As explained above, public policy considerations weigh in favor of extending the qualified immunity of the parole officer to the State in this case. Moreover, this court has recently recognized that the public policy considerations concerning caseworkers involved in placing children are different from those involved in parole supervision. In Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 216, the court declined to require that the parole officer's actions be reasonable as a prerequisite for the qualified immunity. In contrast, a showing of reasonableness was required for the DSHS caseworkers to invoke the qualified immunity. See Babcock, 116 Wn.2d at 618. The court in Taggart explained: The standard we announced in Babcock was appropriate because of the unique circumstances inherent in the foster care placement of children. Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 216. In Lutheran Day Care, we noted that the Babcock decision somewhat limited Creelman, because the State did not get the benefit of the qualified or absolute immunity of the caseworkers (as had been true in every other case where the question of extending individual immunity to the State had been addressed). Lutheran Day Care, 119 Wn.2d at 102. Lutheran Day Care thus frankly recognized what the majority fails to: Babcock is the only case where such immunity was not extended. As the court expressly recognized in Taggart, the policy concerns at issue in Babcock are not the same in the case of parole supervision. Lastly, the majority says that Babcock impliedly overruled Guffey. Majority at 439 n. 3. Having expressly distinguished Guffey, Babcock cannot be said to have overruled that case. However, unlike the result in Babcock, the majority opinion in this case does impliedly overrule Guffey, and Frost as well. See Majority at 443-44. Thus, there will be a notable consequence of the majority opinion  it is likely that state and local governmental employers no longer possess the qualified immunity recognized in those opinions. [8] I would hold that the qualified immunity of a parole officer does extend to the State. Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals' holding that the trial court erred by refusing to give the State's proffered instruction on availability of that immunity if the requirements set forth in Taggart are satisfied. DURHAM, C.J., and GUY, J., concur with MADSEN, J. Reconsideration denied January 3, 1996.