Opinion ID: 1929377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Preference to Warrants

Text: The instant matter is not a clear cut case and, obviously, it would have been much more helpful had the affidavit contained more detail. The issue of the validity of this search has been examined since 1992 in two separate cases, at three levels of court, with the result that seven judges have concluded that there was probable cause and six judges have concluded that there was not. Seemingly the instant matter is a classic illustration of the doubtful or marginal cases referred to by the Supreme Court in United States v. Ventresca, the resolution of which should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants. 380 U.S. at 109, 85 S.Ct. at 746, 13 L.Ed.2d at 689. See also Mills v. State, 278 Md. at 280, 363 A.2d at 501. For all the foregoing reasons the search warrant in the instant case was valid. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR THE ENTRY OF A JUDGMENT AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT, GARY R. WARD. BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE and WILNER, JJ., dissent. BELL, Chief Judge, dissenting. The majority today holds that the issuance of search warrants to search a person's home is valid when there [is] probable cause to believe that a crime of violence, involving the use of a weapon, had been committed, that the defendant was the criminal agent, and that the defendant resided at the place to be searched. State v. Ward, 350 Md. 380, 712 A.2d 537 (1997). Applying this standard to the instant case, it concludes that the judge who issued the warrant properly found probable cause to search the residence of, and the car belonging to, Gary R. Ward (Ward or the respondent) even though the affidavit accompanying the warrant application contained no facts from which the issuing judge could reasonably have inferred that the instrumentality of the crime could be found in either place. This holding, I believe, significantly undermines the fundamental purpose of the constitutional protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment, as it abrogates the requirement that, prior to issuance of a search warrant, the affiant establish a reasonable nexus between the items sought by the warrant and the premises or places to be searched. Moreover, it essentially creates a standardless test for probable cause. The natural and certain consequence of this decision is that probable cause automatically will exist sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant for both the residence and vehicle of a suspect in a criminal investigation, whenever the instrumentality of the crime or key evidence relating to it is not found on that suspect when he or she is questioned or arrested. [1] I dissent.