Opinion ID: 2045497
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Discretion to Deny Intervention.

Text: The State argues the trial court merely exercised its discretion to deny intervention in a proper case. See DeVoss, 474 N.W.2d at 541. As noted above, the district court may exercise discretion in evaluating the sufficiency of the interest asserted by the intervenor. In a situation somewhat analogous to the present case, our court of appeals acknowledged the district court's discretion to determine who is a suitable person under section 232.117(3)(c), the statute allowing the court to consider a relative or other suitable person as a possible guardian and custodian of a child in a termination proceeding. In re C.L.C., 479 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Iowa App.1991). We think a district court may also exercise its discretion in deciding who is a relative within the contemplation of section 232.102(1)(a). The term relative could conceivably be so broadly defined that any person with any genealogical connection to the child could intervene. Thus, a district court must consider the degree of the biological connection together with all other circumstances in deciding whether the person seeking to intervene is a relative and therefore, has a sufficient interest under rule 75. Although we agree that there is room for discretion in deciding who is a relative under section 232.102(1)(a), we cannot defer to the juvenile court's exercise of discretion in the present case. We find no support for the conclusion A.G.'s grandmother does not qualify as a relative under section 232.102(1)(a). Grandparent status signifies such a close biological relationship with a child that it alone qualifies a person as a relative within the meaning of section 232.102(1)(a). Therefore, we hold A.G.'s grandmother should have been allowed to intervene in the dispositional phase of this CINA proceeding. The juvenile court erred in not permitting intervention. In reaching this conclusion, we have considered the State's argument that grandparents should not be allowed to intervene in a CINA dispositional hearing until the parent-child relationship is severed, because a grandparent's rights to the child are derivative of the parent's rights. See In re A.C., 428 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Iowa 1988) (grandparent visitation pursuant to now-repealed visitation statute terminates upon child's adoption); In re Adoption of Gardiner, 287 N.W.2d 555, 557-58 (Iowa 1980) (relationship of a grandparent to a child arises by virtue of the child's relationship to its parent). The State argues the grandmother's rights to A.G. cannot be affected by the CINA proceeding, presumably because, in the State's view, she has no rights of her own. Additionally the State contends because the grandmother's rights are derivative of the parents' rights, the parents can adequately represent those rights in the CINA proceeding, making intervention by the grandmother unnecessary. We disagree. While it may be true that a grandparent's rights to his or her grandchild are derivative of the parent's rights to his or her child, this grandparent/parent relationship must be distinguished from the grandparent's rights to the grandchild vis a vis the state. The grandparent's statutory right to be considered for custody of a grandchild upon a CINA disposition exists independently of a parent's relationship to the child. Therefore, we find the State's arguments unpersuasive.