Opinion ID: 492376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Hearing Request

Text: 9 Romano's principal claim is that Judge Carter erred in denying him an opportunity to contest the evidence of his involvement in the heroin conspiracy. This evidence was presented at the conspiracy trial itself and was contained in the pre-sentence report. According to Romano, the evidence was inherently unreliable because he was not present at the earlier trial and thus did not have an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses or otherwise participate in the trial. Romano, therefore, claims that the sentencing procedures utilized by Judge Carter in this case violated procedural due process. We disagree. 10 As a general rule, a district judge has discretion to consider a wide range of information concerning a defendant's background in arriving at an appropriate sentence. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972); United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. Pugliese, 805 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir.1986). Thus, a district judge may consider hearsay statements, evidence of uncharged crimes, dropped counts of an indictment and criminal activity resulting in an acquittal in determining sentence. See Pugliese, 805 F.2d at 1122 (citing cases). Evidence of Romano's participation in the conspiracy ring was directly relevant to Judge Carter's sentencing determination. Consideration of such evidence does not in and of itself offend a defendant's due process rights. Lee, 818 F.2d at 1055. 11 However, a defendant does have a due process right to question the procedure leading to the imposition of his sentence. United States v. Pugliese, 805 F.2d at 1122 (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977)). Due process requires that a defendant be given an opportunity to assure the accurate presentation of reliable sentencing information to the district court. A defendant, therefore, may not be sentenced on the basis of materially untrue statements or misinformation. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 1255, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948). Congress, for example, has provided in Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(A) that a defendant and his counsel must be given an opportunity to review a pre-sentence report and provide comment to ensure that the report [is] completely accurate in every material respect. H.R.Rep. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in 1975 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 674, 690. Thus, to the extent that Judge Carter relied on information presented at the trial of Abbamonte and Paradiso and other information contained in the pre-sentence report, Romano was entitled to contest the accuracy of that information under the Due Process Clause. 12 The question of what process is due in sentencing is separate and distinct from the question of whether due process is required. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). Due process does not require the observance of rigid procedures in every case where a defendant seeks to challenge pre-sentence information. See Pugliese, 805 F.2d at 1123. It is well established, for instance, that a defendant has no right to a full-blown evidentiary hearing at sentencing, see id.; United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 657-58 (2d Cir.1973), even though when a defendant challenges the veracity of hearsay evidence in a pre-sentence report the government is required to introduce corroborating proof to insure the reliability of the evidence. See Pugliese, 805 F.2d at 1123 (citing and quoting United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir.1978) (Fatico I )). A district judge, in his discretion, may direct that a trial-type evidentiary hearing take place. Short of this, however, a defendant may challenge pre-sentence information by offering written submissions, directing argument to the court or cross-examining witnesses. United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d at 1056. Which of these procedures is the most appropriate in a particular case can be determined by applying the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Four factors should be considered: (1) the nature of the individual interest, (2) the risk of error associated with the present procedures, (3) the value of additional procedural safeguards, and (4) the government's interest in avoiding undue fiscal or administrative burdens. Id. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903. 13 Applying the first factor to this case, it is clear that Romano's interest in sentencing could not be stronger because his future liberty will be determined by the sentence imposed. See, e.g., Lee, 818 F.2d at 1055-56; Pugliese, 805 F.2d at 1122. Against this interest, however, we must balance the government's competing interest in avoiding undue fiscal burdens, the risk of error inherent in present procedures and the incremental value of additional safeguards. These remaining factors cut heavily against Romano's claimed right to a hearing. 14 The risk of error in the proceedings below was minimal. Judge Carter relied on pre-sentence information developed in the context of an adversarial proceeding subject to the rules of evidence. Such evidence is at least as reliable as other kind[s] and source[s] of information, the reliance on which we have consistently upheld. See generally Pugliese, 805 F.2d at 1122-23. Moreover, the bulk of the government's evidence was presented at trial in the form of tape recorded telephone conversations between Romano and his co-conspirators. Because these recordings were fully authenticated, the risk of error associated with their use was de minimis. 15 Romano did challenge the accuracy of three specific items in the pre-sentence report. These items related to Romano's attempted assault on Angelo Amen and the hijacking and extortion activities carried on by Romano and Paradiso. First, for the reasons discussed in Part B, infra, it is evident from the transcript that Judge Carter did not rely on this evidence in sentencing Romano. Second, as mentioned above, the government's evidence against Romano produced at the conspiracy trial was based primarily on authenticated wiretap recordings. Third, the hijacking and extortion evidence was first presented by DEA agent George Hanna at Romano's bail hearing. At that time, Romano cross-examined Agent Hanna and explored inaccuracies in his testimony. Even if Judge Carter relied on this evidence, therefore, little risk of error was presented by its consideration. 16 The third factor in the Mathews balancing test, the incremental value of additional procedural safeguards, similarly cuts against Romano's claimed right to a hearing. Aside from Agent Hanna's testimony concerning the hijacking and extortion incidents, the bulk of the government's case was based on recorded telephone conversations emanating from Lewisburg. Cross-examination of Agent Hanna would have been repetitive. Cross-examination of the tapes would have been impossible. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Stincer, --- U.S. ----, ----, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2667, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987) (defendant's claimed right to attend competency hearing rejected where defendant's attendance at hearing would serve no purpose). 17 Finally, the administrative and fiscal burdens of the hearing request are obvious. Multiple and duplicative trials would result if a defendant were permitted in every case to challenge information that was properly authenticated and tested in a prior proceeding. Despite the strength of Romano's liberty interest, we think it is clear that the government's resources should not be more heavily taxed where, as here, the advantages to be gained from the procedures are far outweighed by the fiscal and administrative burdens faced by the government in implementing them. 18 Although Romano was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in this case, some process was due by which he could challenge the accuracy of pre-sentence information presented to the district court. Fatico I, 579 F.2d at 711-14. Judge Carter provided Romano with an appropriate opportunity. At the sentencing hearing, Romano was permitted to direct argument to the court concerning the alleged inaccuracies in the pre-sentence information. App. at 88-93. Judge Carter considered these arguments and rejected them. Moreover, the government provided Romano with the transcripts and tape recordings of the prison telephone conversations prior to the conspiracy trial. The pre-sentence report also contained the evidence established against Romano at that trial. Prior to sentencing, therefore, Romano was on notice of all relevant information that could be used in determining his sentence and had an opportunity to make appropriate objections. No more is required by the Due Process Clause or by Rule 32. Judge Carter, therefore, committed no error in denying Romano's request for a hearing.