Opinion ID: 171289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Deviation from the Handbook

Text: Ms. Maston contends that her actions could not have constituted insubordination, because they do not fit the definition of insubordination contained in St. John’s employee handbook. The handbook contains a nonexclusive list of “circumstances/behaviors [that] may result in immediate termination.” Aplt. App. at 131. The term insubordination appears in one of the -8- listed items: “Willful refusal to follow direct orders (insubordination).” Id. at 132. Ms. Maston contends that her actions did not fit the handbook definition because she did not willfully refuse to follow a direct order. Therefore, she argues, RML’s justification for her termination, that she was insubordinate, is unworthy of belief. An employer’s deviation from a binding company policy stated in an employee handbook can in certain circumstances be evidence of pretext. See Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1230; Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523 F.3d 1187, 1197 (10th Cir. 2008); Riggs v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 1108, 1119 (10th Cir. 2007). Here, however, any inconsistency between the insubordination relied upon by Wear and the handbook “definition” is not evidence of pretext. The handbook definition is preceded by a caveat that “[t]he following list is a guideline and does not include all possible offenses.” Aplt. App. at 131. Although the term insubordination on the itemized list in the handbook refers to a willful refusal to follow direct orders, St. John made no representation in the handbook that it does not also fire employees for other forms of insubordination. These could reasonably include being evasive during an interview, expressing defiance during an investigation, or swearing at an investigator. See, e.g., McClellon v. Gage, 770 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (listing “a defiant attitude” among recognized forms of insubordination). In short, the evidence -9- does not support a claim that St. John deviated from its policies in terminating Ms. Maston. C. Evidence of Insubordination and Failure to Cooperate Thomas stated in his deposition that during the interviews about the ABC orders, Ms. Maston kept cursing and “kept saying she wouldn’t answer my questions.” Aplt. App. at 123. Ms. Maston disputes this. In an affidavit she stated that she wasn’t uncooperative or evasive and that she continued to answer questions, even though she was asked the same questions over and over and was feeling harassed. But during her earlier deposition testimony she stated that at one point she had just stopped saying anything at all, because she was tired of answering the same questions over and over again. This silence at “one point,” which is not inconsistent with her testimony that in general she continued to answer questions, fits St. John’s contention that she did refuse to answer questions and thereby to cooperate with the investigation. Ms. Maston also admitted that she may have sworn once during the interviews. She presents no evidence to rebut St. John’s contention that she was the only employee who swore during the investigation. Ms. Maston contends, however, that her termination based on “failure to cooperate” was pretextual because Thomas expressed an equivocal opinion of her behavior. When asked during his deposition whether he felt she had been uncooperative during the interview, Thomas stated: “I don’t know if she was or -10- not. I really don’t know.” Aplt. App. at 124. But Thomas was a security officer, not the decision-maker in Ms. Maston’s case. It is the decision-maker’s perception that counts in these circumstances. See Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1231. Ms. Maston also relies on the apologetic tone that Wear took after the interviews. She testified that Wear said, “I’m sorry he [Thomas] talked to you that way, and I know that wasn’t right.” Aplt. App. at 97. 2 We fail to see, however, how this apology supports Ms. Maston’s claim. The apology was by the key person in Ms. Maston’s termination. Wear was the supervisor present during Ms. Maston’s interview. She was the one who wrote Ms. Maston’s termination statement. And she was the one who sought reinstatement of two of Ms. Maston’s coworkers but not reinstatement of Ms. Maston. The apology can only be viewed as an indication that Wear bore no personal hostility toward Ms. Maston. Indeed, Wear had promoted her three times, and Ms. Maston admitted that she had a good working relationship with Wear and that Wear had given her good performance reviews. In light of Wear’s prior behavior toward Ms. Maston, we do not believe that a reasonable jury could infer that Wear’s (and hence St. John’s) explanation of Ms. Maston’s termination was unworthy of belief. 2 St. John contends that this testimony is inadmissible hearsay. We do not agree. The statement is a nonhearsay admission by a party opponent. See Thomas v. Int’l Bus. Mach., 48 F.3d 478, 485 (10th Cir. 1995) (“If [Ms. Maston] is testifying to what an authorized agent for [St. John] told her, the statements would constitute an admission by a party-opponent and therefore be admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)”). -11- 2. Did RML Treat “Similarly Situated” Employees Differently? In her other pretext argument, Ms. Maston contends that she was similarly situated to white RML employees in her department, who were rehired, while she was not. “[A] plaintiff may show pretext by providing evidence that [s]he was treated differently from other similarly situated, nonprotected employees who violated work rules of comparable seriousness.” Green v. New Mexico, 420 F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). RML concedes that Ms. Maston was similarly situated to Taylor and Welker. The remaining issue is whether she demonstrated a genuine factual dispute concerning her violation of a work rule of comparable seriousness. Ms. Maston contends that the offenses committed by Taylor and Welker were of comparable seriousness to hers because the employee handbook identifies the following offense that could result in immediate termination: “falsification of records or reports dealing with St. John business.” Aplt. App. at 132. She argues that because she was also fired for grounds contained in the handbook, the firings were for offenses of comparable seriousness. But as RML points out, nowhere in the termination statements for Taylor and Welker is this ground mentioned as the reason for discharging them. Nor is it clear that Ms. Maston was discharged based on a comparable offense listed in the handbook. Moreover, the handbook does not specify the conditions under which employees may be reinstated after termination. -12- The evidence shows that Taylor and Welker cooperated in the investigation, admitting their participation in the ABC scheme. An employer is entitled to consider a candid admission of guilt when weighing how severely to discipline an employee. There is no evidence that Ms. Maston attempted to apologize for her conduct. Ms. Maston also argues that Georgia Bevenue, the other employee fired but not rehired, was not similarly situated to herself. Even if this is true, it has little relevance to the pretext question. Although a showing that RML retained a similarly situated white employee who committed the same misconduct might tend to establish pretext, it is of much less relevance that RML happened to fire a white employee. That the fired white employee’s misconduct was worse than Ms. Maston’s would hardly show that Ms. Maston’s misconduct did not justify firing. In sum, Ms. Maston has failed to show a genuine factual issue regarding whether Welker or Taylor violated work rules of comparable seriousness. For this reason, the district court properly concluded that she failed to show pretext by demonstrating that a similarly situated white employee was treated differently than she was.