Opinion ID: 1832691
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sustain defendant's objection to improper cross-examination based on collateral matter and to the improper use of grand jury subpoena power.

Text: ¶ 44. Kircher next argues that the evidentiary rulings of the trial court with regard to the misuse of the grand jury subpoena power and the use of the records obtained thereby was an abuse of discretion requiring reversal. Specifically, Kircher contends that the trial judge erred in allowing the State to use documents obtained by grand jury subpoena to impeach defense witness Dr. William Owen, who was accepted by the court as an expert in the field of forensic psychiatry. Dr. Owen testified to the effects of drugs administered to Kircher which ultimately, in his opinion, rendered Kircher's confession allegedly involuntary. ¶ 45. The exchange objected to by Kircher concerned disciplinary proceedings before the Mississippi State Board of Medical Licensure regarding a restriction on Dr. Owen's medical license which prohibits Dr. Owen from performing surgical procedures. The order issued by the Board, found as State's exhibit 5, states that Dr. Owen falsified his application for medical privileges at Mississippi hospitals. Specifically, in an application for staff privileges at the Methodist Hospital in Marion County, Mississippi, Dr. Owen falsely stated that he had no limitations on his license to practice medicine. Notably, Dr. Owen also made the same false assertion in his application for medical staff privileges at Leake Memorial Hospital in Carthage, Mississippi. The Board's order states: This board finds that the Licensee is not a trustworthy and honest provider. ¶ 46. Kircher argues that the questioning was improper because it involved a collateral matter. Kircher argues Dr. Owen's skill as a surgeon was not properly before the court because Dr. Owen had neither been offered, tendered, nor accepted as a surgeon. Additionally, Kircher contends that Dr. Owen's skill as a surgeon is irrelevant to the opinions expressed regarding Kircher's mental condition and the effects of the medications which had been ingested by him. ¶ 47. Prior to promulgating the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, cross-examination of a witness about specific instances of past conduct for the purpose of impeaching the witness's character was considered irrelevant and impermissible when the conduct inquired into was not connected with the case. Brent v. State, 632 So.2d 936, 943 (Miss.1994) (citations omitted). However, as this Court stated in Brent, 632 So.2d at 943, Rule 608(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence provides a small window of opportunity: Specific instances of conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for the truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified. M.R.E. 608(b) (emphasis added). The comment to the rule notes that this exception goes further than pre-rule Mississippi practice and allows impeachment by specific acts which are something other than criminal convictions when the character trait of truthfulness of the witness being examined is under attack. M.R.E. 608(b).cmt. The trial judge has discretion in deciding to permit such inquiry. Brent, 632 So.2d at 943. ¶ 48. Dr. Owen's medical reputation and his propensity for untruthfulness are highly relevant to his credibility in offering a medical opinion as to whether Kircher was involuntarily intoxicated, and thus they are highly relevant to the question of Kircher's confession and guilt. Falsifying applications for medical privileges is clearly relevant to a witness's propensity for veracity or lack thereof. The trial judge had discretion under M.R.E. 608(b) to allow the evidence, and his decision to do so was clearly not an abuse of discretion. ¶ 49. Kircher also argues that the documents inquired into by the State on cross were improperly obtained by the district attorney's use of a grand jury subpoena duces tecum issued to the Mississippi State Board of Medical Licensure. Kircher contends that the subpoena power of the grand jury under Miss.Code Ann. § 13-7-21 (Supp.1999) is reserved exclusively unto the grand jury, solely for the business of the grand jury. Kircher argues that the State's use of the grand jury subpoena duces tecum to obtain records from a governmental agency was abusive and led to the presentation of highly prejudicial evidence to the jury. ¶ 50. The State incorrectly asserts that no contemporaneous objection was made to the trial judge that the documents used to question Dr. Owen were obtained through grand jury procedures. The trial judge met in chambers with counsel for the State and for Kircher at which time Kircher's counsel objected to the use of the documents regarding the proceedings before the Mississippi State Board of Medical Licensure. Though this objection was not on-the-record, Kircher's counsel followed the procedure found in M.R.A.P. 10(c) to supplement the record. ¶ 51. Kircher submits that the trial judge's permitting the State to use documents improperly obtained sanctioned an abuse of power by the State. The standard of review, however, for evidentiary rulings by the trial court is whether the trial judge's ruling was an abuse of discretion, not whether the trial judge's decision allowed an abuse of power by the State. Furthermore, any error of the trial judge in allowing the use of the records was harmless in that the Medical Licensure documents are public documents as provided by Miss.Code Ann. § 25-61-3(b)(Supp.1999). ¶ 52. The trial judge correctly allowed cross-examination into the matters regarding Dr. Owen's falsifying applications for medical privileges. Therefore, the ruling of the trial judge is affirmed.