Opinion ID: 2330512
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Laffey Matrix.

Text: Ms. Lively claims that the trial court committed reversible error in declining to award attorneys' fees based upon the rates for attorneys at the experience level attained when the petition for attorneys' fees was filed, rather than their experience level at the time the work was actually done. As noted above, this ruling resulted in a reduction of her request for attorneys' fees by $149,941. We are unpersuaded that the approach taken by the trial court constituted an abuse of discretion. Certainly, the trial court did not err in looking to the Laffey Matrix as a beginning point for calculating these fees, nor does any party so claim. [4] The Laffey Matrix, which has its origins in the case of Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F.Supp. 354 (D.D.C.1983), rev'd in part on other grounds, 241 U.S.App. D.C. 11, 746 F.2d 4 (1984), is a chart compiled yearly by the Civil Division of the United States Attorney's Office in the District of Columbia. It provides a schedule of hourly rates prevailing in the Washington, D.C. area in each year going back to 1981 for attorneys at various levels of experience. [5] Piper v. United States Dep't of Justice, 339 F.Supp.2d 13, 24 n. 8 (D.D.C. 2004). It is regularly used in the federal courts of this jurisdiction to determine attorneys' fees where, as here, there is a statutory entitlement. [6] Smith v. District of Columbia, 466 F.Supp.2d 151, 156 (D.D.C.2006) (In the District of Columbia, it has been traditional to apply the so-called Laffey Matrix. . . .); accord, e.g., Coleman v. District of Columbia, 2007 WL 1307834 at -4, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32743 at -18 (D.D.C. May 3, 2007); Piper, supra, 339 F.Supp.2d at 24 n. 8; Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides v. Browner, 965 F.Supp. 59, 65 (D.D.C.1997). Specifically, for each year going back to 1981-82, the Matrix sets out six different hourly rates for five different levels of attorney experience. As explained on the U.S. Attorney's Office web site: The column headed Experience refers to the years following the attorney's graduation from law school. The various brackets are intended to correspond to junior associates (1-3 years after law school graduation), senior associates (4-7 years), experienced federal court litigators (8-10 and 11-19 years) and very experienced federal court litigators (20 years or more). Matrices, supra note 5 at n. 2 (citing Laffey, supra, 572 F.Supp. at 371). Thus, the experience level of an attorney is an integral part of the calculation of attorneys' fees under the Laffey Matrix. In requesting an award of attorneys' fees, a prevailing litigant can determine the number of hours that an attorney spent on the case, determine the attorney's experience level for each of the hours, and then go to the chart applicable to the year in which the party petitions for an award of attorneys' fees  here indisputably the 2004-2005 category [7]  and calculate what is owed by multiplying the number of hours for each experience level by the hourly rate for that experience level. Ms. Lively argues that this procedure does not take into account the substantial delay in the payment of the fees. But there is no doubt that the Matrix has a built-in adjustment for inflation to compensate for that delay. The original rates for the Matrix were determined by the Laffey trial court for work performed in 1981-82. With respect to the yearly increase in the market hourly rates for each level of experience, the U.S. Attorney's Office represents on the website showing the Matrix that the rates for subsequent yearly periods have been determined by adding the change in the cost of living for the Washington, D.C. area to the applicable rate for the prior year and then rounding to the nearest $5. Matrices, supra, note 5 at n. 3. It further represents that [c]hanges in the cost of living are measured by the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) for Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV, as announced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for May of each year. Id. The use of the CPI-U is intended to adjust the figures for inflation. As the U.S. Department of Labor explains on its website, The CPI is generally the best measure for adjusting payment to consumers when the intent is to allow consumers to purchase, at today's prices, a market basket of goods and services equivalent to one that they could purchase in an earlier period [and is] also the best measure to use to translate retail sales and hourly or weekly earnings into real or inflation-free dollars. [8] Indeed, the adjustment for inflation by the use of current hourly rates, rather than the historic rates of the relevant legal community, has been recognized as a means of approximat[ing] the value today of the historic rates charged at the time when the legal services actually were rendered. Murray v. Weinberger, 239 U.S.App. D.C. 264, 274, 741 F.2d 1423, 1433 (1984). While there appears to be no case law from our court discussing application of the Laffey Matrix, we accept it as one legitimate means of calculating attorneys' fees in those cases, such as this, where a prevailing party is statutorily entitled to attorney's fees. In any event, the Laffey Matrix is merely a starting point, and an automatic application of its formula will not be appropriate in many cases and could result in an injustice to attorneys who had willingly taken on important public issues. The parties agree that the column of the Laffey Matrix for the year of 2004-05 provides the appropriate billing rates to be applied for the calculation of the attorneys' fees to be awarded in this case. The dispute, however, arises from the issue of whether the experience level for each of Ms. Lively's attorneys should have been determined by the year when the work was actually performed, or the year that the petition for fees was filed, that is, 2005. [9] Since the Laffey Matrix is designed to take account of inflation by providing attorneys with compensation based on their experience level at the time the work was done, but adjusted for the current market rate for an attorney of that experience level, it appears that to award fees based on current experience levels would provide the attorneys with a windfall-unless there are other factors that would justify such a windfall. Ms. Lively directs us to a number of cases that she asserts support her position, but none address the issue she raises here, that is, whether it is an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to use the current hourly market rates for an attorney's experience level at the time the work was done, instead of the attorney's current experience level in calculating the fees to be paid. For example, King v. Palmer, 285 U.S.App. D.C. 68, 906 F.2d 762 (1990), rev'd in part on other grounds, 292 U.S.App. D.C. 362, 950 F.2d 771 (1991) (en Banc), cited by Ms. Lively, addressed the issue of providing an enhancement to attorneys who take civil rights cases on a contingency fee basis and thereby risk the possibility of never being paid. The court ruled that in such cases an enhancement payment may be appropriate. The District of Columbia argued that the enhancement awarded was excessive because it was calculated by using the attorney's then current, as opposed to historic billing rates. The court nonetheless upheld the use of current billing rates, ruling that it saw no reason why counsel should not be compensated for the delay in receiving the enhancement award as well as the regular award of attorneys' fees. It addressed, however, neither the issue of using the attorney's current experience level for work done when the attorney was less experienced, nor the Laffey Matrix, which has a built-in adjustment for inflation that recognizes its impact on the value of the fees obtained. The other cases relied upon by Ms. Lively to support her position are equally distinguishable. [10] Thus, we cannot accept her argument that the trial court abused its discretion in using the current rates applicable to each level of experience the individual lawyers had attained when the work for which compensation is sought was performed. Laffey, supra, 572 F.Supp. at 371 n. 31.