Opinion ID: 6109717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Ultra Vires Claims

Text: Both Honors and AYW complain of ultra vires conduct in the Commissioner's decision to revoke their charters. Although governmental entities and officers are generally immune from liability absent the government's waiver or consent, such immunity does not prohibit suit against a state official if the official's actions are ultra vires. See City of El Paso v. Heinrich , 284 S.W.3d 366 , 372 (Tex. 2009). To state an ultra vires claim, the plaintiff must allege and prove that the named officials acted without legal authority or failed to perform a ministerial act. Hall v. McRaven , 508 S.W.3d 232 , 238 (Tex. 2017). The fact that the official has some limited discretion to act under the applicable law does not preclude an ultra vires claim if the claimant alleges that the official exceeded the bounds of that authority, or the conduct conflicts with the law itself. Hous. Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Hous. , 487 S.W.3d 154 , 163 (Tex. 2016). Ultra vires claims depend on the scope of the state official's authority, not the quality of the official's decisions. Hall , 508 S.W.3d at 234 . Thus, it is not an ultra vires act for an official to make an erroneous decision within the authority granted. Id. at 242 . AYW complains that the Commissioner relied on the wrong financial accountability ratings to revoke its charter under Education Code § 12.115(c). As previously mentioned, that provision requires the Commissioner to revoke an open-enrollment charter after three unsatisfactory performance ratings. TEX. EDUC CODE § 12.115(c). AYW identifies the ultra vires act to be the Commissioner's misinterpretation of Education Code § 12.115(c-1) to refer to financial accountability ratings other than those identified by the Legislature. Honors similarly complains about the Commissioner's ultra vires conduct in using academic performance data that Honors believes Education Code § 12.115(c-1) expressly prohibited him from using.

The Education Code requires the Commissioner to set academic and financial accountability standards for all school districts and charter schools. Id. §§ 39.053, .082. The Code also generally describes the information the Commissioner must consider when setting those standards. Id. For example, when determining whether a school district or charter school meets academic performance standards, the Commissioner must take into account student performance on standardized tests, student improvement on those tests, the performance of students from different racial and ethnic backgrounds, and dropout and graduation rates, among other things. Id. § 39.053(c). As part of the academic accountability standard, the Commissioner is required to assess dropout rates, including dropout  rates and district completion rates for grade levels 9 through 12, computed in accordance with standards and definitions adopted by the National Center for Education Statistics of the United States Department of Education .... Id. § 39.053(c)(4)(A)(i). This requires consideration of data from previous school years. Texas law has used federal standards for dropout rates since 2003. Act of May 28, 2003, 78th Leg. R.S., ch. 805, § 1, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 2356 , 2356-57 (originally codified in TEX. EDUC. CODE § 39.051 ). In 2009, the Legislature required the TEA to substantially revise the academic accountability regime with the State of Texas Assessments of Academic Readiness (STAAR) testing program. Act of June 1, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 895, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 2357 . Although the Legislature amended many of the accountability standards, it did not alter the requirement that the Commissioner consider dropout rates in accordance with federal standards. Id. § 59, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 2381 , 2382. Because of the substantial changes to the academic ratings system, the Legislature gave the Commissioner the option to suspend assignment of accreditation statutes and performance ratings for the 2011-2012 school year. Id. § 59, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 2401 -02. The Commissioner took that option, leaving school districts and charter schools without academic ratings for 2011-2012. The new academic accountability system was first used in the 2012-2013 school year. Charter schools and school districts must also meet certain financial accountability standards. A school's financial rating is often referred to as its FIRST rating, an acronym for Financial Integrity Rating System of Texas. The financial rating for any given fiscal year is based on data from the prior fiscal year. At the time of the relevant events here, the Texas Administrative Code made that explicit: The financial accountability rating for a particular year will always be based on complete and audited financial data from the previous fiscal year given the availability of the data. For example, the final 2010 School FIRST rating issued in August 2010 is based on complete and audited financial data for the 2008-2009 fiscal year and is the financial accountability rating for the 2009-1010 school year for the purposes of § 97.1055 of this title (relating to Accreditation Status). 36 Tex. Reg. 6941 , 6946 (2011) (formerly 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 109.1002 (i) ). The current rule similarly provides: The TEA will base the financial accountability rating for a rating year on the data from the fiscal year preceding the rating year. 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 109.1001 (k).
The Commissioner revoked the charters of AYW and Honors under the authority provided in Education Code § 12.115. That authority was changed by the Legislature in 2013. Before that, the Commissioner's decision to revoke an open-enrollment was discretionary. Act of May 28, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1504, § 12, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 5344 , 5350 (stating that the Commissioner may revoke a charter). The previous legislation listed multiple conditions that might warrant revocation but the duration and severity of those conditions was left undefined. Id. (allowing revocation for commit[ing] a material violation of the charter, fail[ing] to satisfy accountability provisions, and fail[ing] to comply with the law). After the 2013 amendments, what had been discretionary with the Commissioner became mandatory. The 2013 amendments also added a new mandatory revocation ground, which is the  focus of this appeal. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 12.115(c). Section 12.115(c) directs the Commissioner to revoke a charter when a charter school's academic or financial performance, or any combination of the two, fall below acceptable standards for the three preceding school years. See Id. § 12.115(c)(1) (pertaining to unacceptable academic performance rating), (c)(2) (pertaining to unsatisfactory financial accountability performance rating), (c)(3) (pertaining to any combination of these ratings). Another new provision described the initial three-year period the Commissioner was to consider when determining a school's academic and financial performance for purposes of the § 12.115(c)'s mandatory revocation. See Id. § 12.115(c-1).

Because the 2011-2012 school term was a transition year for new state-mandated tests and other academic standards, the statute directed the Commissioner not to use a charter school's academic performance during the 2011-12 school year when determining whether to revoke a charter school's charter under subsection (c)(1) for unacceptable academics: For purposes of revocation under Subsection (c)(1), performance during the 2011-2012 school year may not be considered. For purposes of revocation under Subsection (c)(1), the initial three school years for which performance ratings under Subchapter C, Chapter 39 [academic accreditation], shall be considered are the 2009-2010, 2010-2011, and 2012-2013 school years. Id. The Commissioner revoked Honors's charter because of its poor academic performance over the three-year period identified in § 12.115(c-1). Honors received an academic performance rating of Academically Unacceptable for 2009-2010 and 2010-2011. Honors appealed its 2009-2010 rating, but the appeal was denied. Under the revamped ratings system in 2012-2013, Honors received an academic performance rating of Improvement Required. The poor rating was due to its failure in Index 4, which is based, in part, on a school's dropout rate and includes data from prior years. Undisputed is that 2011-2012 data was used in calculating that index, which was part of the 2012-2013 academic accountability rating and the portion that caused Honors's poor academic rating. The Commissioner's revocation decision was forwarded to the SOAH where an administrative law judge upheld the Commissioner's decision. The judge recognized that Honors's appeal depended on the meaning of the § 12.115(c-1)'s first sentence: For purposes of revocation under Subsection (c)(1), performance during the 2011-2012 school year may not be considered. Honors argued that the prohibition on considering performance during the 2011-2012 school year meant that the Commissioner could not consider data from the 2011-2012 school year. Honors maintained that eliminating the 2011-2012 data from Index 4 of its 2012-2013 academic ratings would result in an acceptable rating that would save its charter. The Commissioner, on the other hand, contended that the prohibition on using 2011-2012 performance referred to performance ratings from 2011-2012. The administrative law judge agreed with the Commissioner's reading of the statute and ultimately concluded that the Commissioner's revocation of Honors's charter was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor clearly erroneous:  TEA's interpretation of the disputed sentence is consistent with the context of the rest of Texas Education Code § 12.115. The disputed sentence specifically refers to revocation under Subsection(c)(1) of § 12.115, which concerns academic performance ratings under Subchapter C of Chapter 39. This suggests that the Legislature used the word performance in the disputed sentence as shorthand for the phrase performance rating. The Legislature similarly used shorthand elsewhere in the section. Subsection (c)(3) uses only the word ratings when unambiguously referring to performance ratings described in Subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2). For purposes of revocation, the second sentence of Texas Education Code § 12.115(c-1) requires consideration of academic performance ratings for the 2009-2010, 2010-2011, and 2012-2013 school years. The statutory directive to consider the 2012-2013, ratings could not be executed and would be ineffective if Honors's interpretation of the disputed sentence is correct. That is because 2012-2013 ratings were based on 2011-2012 performance data. In contrast, if TEA's interpretation is correct the directive to consider 2012-2013 ratings would be effective and could be executed. Further, TEA's interpretation of the disputed sentence is consistent with the broader context of the Texas Education Code into which it was enacted. That included former Texas Education Code § 39.116, which authorized the Commissioner to suspend assignment of performance ratings for the 2011-2012 school year during the period of transition to the accreditation system implemented in August 2013. Exercising his authority, the Commissioner did not issue accountability ratings for any school during the 2011-2012 school year. Apparently because the Commissioner was not required to rate academic performance during the 2011-2012 school year, § 39.116 prohibited revocation based on academic ratings for that year. TEA v. Honors Academy , SOAH Docket No. 701-14-1906 (May 20, 2014). Honors contends here again that the Commissioner has misinterpreted his authority under the statute, urging that the use of performance data from the 2011-2012 school year represents a  'manifest, conspicuous and irreconcilable conflict'  with the prohibition found in Education Code § 12.115(c-1). See Morath v. Sterling City Indep. Sch. Dist. , 499 S.W.3d 407 , 413 (Tex. 2016) (plurality op.) (quoting Klumb , 458 S.W.3d at 10-11 ). The Commissioner responds that interpreting the statute is within his authority. Moreover, even if the statute is ambiguous, the Commissioner submits that his interpretation must prevail, not only because it is more reasonable, but also because the enabling statute makes his determination in the matter final. Certainly, the Commissioner concludes, his interpretation is not inherently, patently, or manifest[ly] contrary to the statute-the standard Honors must meet to avoid the finality the statute prescribes. See Klumb , 458 S.W.3d at 10 . We agree that the Commissioner's interpretation of the statute is not ultra vires. Over the past decade, the Legislature has sought to keep the Commissioner's decisions regarding academic and financial accountability ratings and charter revocations out of the courts. In 2009, the Legislature required the Commissioner, by rule, to provide a process for a school district or charter school to challenge its academic and financial accountability ratings. Act of June 1, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 895, § 59, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 2357 , 2402 (codified  at TEX. EDUC. CODE § 39.151 ); see also 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 97.1001 (a)(4) (providing that the TEA will publish a manual that includes the procedures for submitting a rating appeal). The statute mandated that the Commissioner appoint a committee to make recommendations to the Commissioner regarding appeals. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 39.151(b). The statute further provided that the Commissioner's ultimate decision was final and not subject to further appeal. Id. § 39.151(d). Similarly, the Legislature has insulated the Commissioner's revocation decisions from judicial review. Id. §§ 12.115-.116. An appeal is permitted to the SOAH, but the appeal is not a contested-case hearing nor is it subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. § 12.116(b). Instead, an administrative law judge reviews the Commissioner's revocation decision under an arbitrary and capricious or clearly erroneous standard, and the judge's determination is final; it is not subject to judicial review. Id. § 12.116(c). The finality accorded the Commissioner's determinations here thus implicates our recent decision in Morath v. Sterling City Independent School District , another case involving an administratively final decision by the Commissioner of Education. That case concerned Education Code § 42.2516, which at the time required the Commissioner to reduce state aid to school districts that experience an increase of local revenue from three specified sources. Sterling City , 499 S.W.3d at 410 . The statute also provided that the Commissioner's determination was final and could not be appealed. Id. For two years, the Commissioner reduced state aid to three school districts because of local-revenue increases from sources not listed in § 42.2516. Id. at 410-11 . The school districts filed an ultra vires suit, alleging that the Commissioner exceeded his authority in making the reductions. Id. at 411 . The trial court granted the school districts declaratory relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. Williams v. Sterling City Indep. Sch. Dist. , 447 S.W.3d 505 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2014, pet. granted). 8 This Court, in a divided decision, reversed the court of appeals' judgment and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction. Sterling City , 499 S.W.3d at 408 . A plurality of the Court concluded that the statute's finality provision precluded judicial review. Id. at 414 . The plurality observed that the Texas Constitution specifically allows the Legislature to shape the judiciary's jurisdiction and that, absent a violation of constitutional or vested property rights, the Legislature has the authority to limit judicial review of an executive official's action. Id. at 412 (citing TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8 ). The plurality also recognized that the Court in Klumb had assumed, but not decided, that an ultra vires claim could arise despite a finality provision, if an official's actions produced a conspicuous or irreconcilable conflict with the enabling statute, while also noting that the Court had yet to see such a case. See Id. at 413 (The Court has never allowed a challenge to an executive decision made final by statute.). A fifth member of the Court concurred in the judgment, concluding that the standard for pleading a cognizable ultra vires claim is necessarily higher when a finality provision shields an official's decision from judicial review and that the Commissioner's decision here did not present an irreconcilable conflict as hypothesized in Klumb , 499 S.W.3d 414 -16 (Brown, J. concurring).  The Court said in Klumb that a pension statute's textual breadth, combined with its textual bar on judicial review, gave the pension board virtually unlimited discretion in interpreting and applying pension law absent a conspicuous and irreconcilable conflict. Klumb , 458 S.W.3d at 11 . In Sterling City , the plurality stated that the effect of a finality provision was to broaden the executive's discretion, indicating the intention to make the official's determination virtually absolute. Sterling City , 499 S.W.3d at 413. Under either formulation, Honors's complaint regarding the Commissioner's interpretation of his authority under § 12.115 is insufficient to support judicial intervention in derogation of the finality provision.
The Commissioner also revoked AYW's charter under the authority of § 12.115(c). AYW's charter revocation, however, was not because of its academics, as was the case with Honors's revocation, but rather because of its financials. AYW received a financial rating of Substandard Achievement for school years 2010-2011, 2011-2012, and 2012-2013. 9 And although § 12.115(c-1) excluded the 2011-2012 school year when considering revocation for unacceptable academics under § 12.115(c)(1), it did not also exclude that school year when considering revocation for unacceptable financial performance under § 12.115(c)(2). TEX. EDUC. CODE § 12.115(c)(1)-(2), (c-1). The new academic standards that made the 2011-2012 school term a transition year for rating academic performance did not significantly affect financial performance ratings and thus § 12.115(c-1) stated that the initial three school years for which financial accountability performance ratings under Subchapter D, Chapter 39, shall be considered are the 2010-2011, 2011-2012, and 2012-2013 school years. Id. § 12.115(c-1). As already noted, the Commissioner notified AYW of his intention to revoke AYW's charter based on its unacceptable financial ratings and advised AYW of its right to an informal review by written request. AYW appealed the revocation decision through the informal procedure, but the Commissioner determined that he would proceed with the revocation. AYW's appeal was then forwarded to the SOAH, which issued a hearing notice. Rather than pursue the SOAH hearing, 10 AYW filed suit in district court, where it obtained the temporary injunction, which is the subject of this appeal. AYW's ultra vires complaint is similar to Honors's in that it complains that the Commissioner used the wrong data when revoking its charter. The disagreement here is over whether a school's financial accountability performance rating (or FIRST rating) for any particular school year refers to the school year in which the financial data is collected or the year in which the data is compiled and a rating announced. By rule, a school's financial rating for any given fiscal year is based on data from the prior fiscal year. See 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 109.1001 (k) ; see also 36 Tex. Reg. 6941 , 6946 (2011) (formerly 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 109.1002 (i) ). AYW argues that, despite this regulation, the TEA's website indicated something different. For example, according to AYW, the financial accountability rating based on performance during the 2011-2012 year was called the '2011-2012 Charter School Status Detail' and accessed by  selecting the '2011-2012' year in the TEA dropdown menu. From this, AYW concludes the financial accountability rating for any particular school year should be based on performance data from that year rather than from the preceding school year. AYW further submits that, by identifying the initial three school years that could be considered for a charter revocation under § 12.115(c)(2), the Legislature prohibited the use of financial data collected before the 2010-2011 school term, the earliest identified school term. See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 12.115(c-1). AYW then concludes that the Commissioner acted beyond his authority by basing AYW's 2010-2011 financial performance rating on data collected during the preceding 2009-2010 school year, rather than during the year of performance. According to AYW, if the Commissioner had used the correct data from the performance year, its charter school would not have had three consecutive years of unacceptable financial ratings because data collected during the 2012-2013 school year produced a sufficient financial performance rating. And if AYW did not have three consecutive unacceptable financial ratings, its charter would not have been subject to mandatory revocation under § 12.115(c)(2). The Commissioner responds that he used the appropriate financial ratings for the school years identified in section 12.115(c-1) and that his actions were not ultra vires, but rather required by law. See id. § 12.115(c)(2). True, the annual financial ratings were based on prior-year data, but that was known to all because of the rule. See Acker v. Tex. Water Comm'n , 790 S.W.2d 299 , 301 (Tex. 1990) (noting the presumption that Legislature knows the existing law when it enacts a statute). Thus, when the Legislature referred to financial ratings for certain years in § 12.115(c-1), it knew that those ratings were based on data from the prior year. Finally, the Commissioner submits that, under applicable law, his authority in the matter is broad and his decisions insulated from de novo review. See id. § 12.116(c)(1) (stating that an administrative law judge shall uphold the Commissioner's decision unless it is arbitrary and capricious or clearly erroneous); see also id. § 12.116(c)(2) (providing that the administrative law judge's decision is final and may not be appealed). As already discussed, when the Legislature makes an executive decision final and unappealable, a plaintiff may not obtain reversal of that decision through an ultra vires action unless the decision presents a manifest conflict with express statutory terms. Klumb , 458 S.W.3d at 10 . Absent a conspicuous and irreconcilable conflict with the statute, any review of the Commissioner's revocation decision encroaches on the Commissioner's authority and the finality the statute accords his decisions. See Id. at 11 ; see also Sterling City , 499 S.W.3d at 413. The disagreement here regarding the interpretation of § 12.115(c-1) suggests the existence of an ambiguity rather than the conspicuous and irreconcilable conflict assumed to be the standard in our prior decisions. We therefore conclude that the Commissioner's interpretation was within his authority and that his application of § 12.115(c) was not an ultra vires act.
AYW's remaining ultra vires claims concern the Commissioner's rule-making authority and parts of former rule 109.1002. See 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 109.1002 (2013). As discussed, the Legislature has required the Commissioner to provide an informal process for school districts and charter schools to challenge academic and financial ratings. See  TEX. EDUC. CODE § 39.151(a). The Legislature further requires the process to include the appointment of a committee to review appeals and allows the Commissioner to limit challenges to written submissions. Id. § 39.151(b), (c). AYW asserts that the Commissioner acted beyond this authority in promulgating rule 109.1002 because the rule restricts the informal review process for accountability ratings to a greater extent than the enabling statute. For example, when describing the informal process, the Education Code states that the commissioner may limit a challenge under this section to a written submission of any issue identified by the ... open-enrollment charter school challenging the agency decision. Id. § 39.151(c). AYW complains that the Commissioner's rule is far more limiting because it does not provide for a written submission of any issue. Id. The rule instead states: A district or open-enrollment charter school may submit a written appeal requesting that the TEA review a preliminary rating if the preliminary rating was based on a data error solely attributable to the TEA's review of the data for any of the indicators. 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 109.1002 (i)(2). Because the Education Code contemplates a written appeals process for all financial accountability ratings, and the administrative rule restricts such appeals to errors solely attributable to TEA's financial data, AYW complains that the Commissioner has placed an unauthorized limitation on ratings appeals in conflict with the enabling statute. The unauthorized limitation did not prevent AYW from raising this same issue in the informal appeal of its 2013 Charter FIRST rating, however. In its written appeal, AYW also raised several data entry errors attributable to TEA as well as a reporting mistake on its part. AYW further criticized the inherent shortcoming in the Current FIRST rating methodology which does not correctly measure the School's financial oversight and provide meaningful information to enable the Commissioner of Education and the School to improve financial operations, concluding that [a]ll FIRST indicators constitute data errors attributable to TEA. As required by rule, an external independent appeals panel reviewed AYW's written appeal and advised the Commissioner on the ratings-appeal decision. See 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 109.1002 (i)(2)(A) (2013) ; see also TEX. EDUC. CODE § 39.151(b) (requiring such review). The record does not include the panel's conclusions or recommendations, but after receiving the panel's advice, the Commissioner denied AYW's appeal. In this collateral attack on the Commissioner's decision, AYW frames the rule limiting the rating appeal's content as an ultra vires act. AYW further submits that the finality accorded the Commissioner's decision, see TEX. EDUC. CODE § 39.151(d), is not a limitation here because the ultra vires rule denied AYW an opportunity to challenge the decision under this section, see Id. § 39.151(e). The court of appeals, however, viewed the data-error-entry rule as logical given that the ratings result from a score that is based on the answers supplied in response to multiple objective questions, which in turn, reflect 'financial measurements, ratios, other indicators established by the commissioner.'  496 S.W.3d at 263 . Moreover, the court noted that AYW had two opportunities to contest a financial rating, first at the time the rating issued and again after notice of the Commissioner's intent to revoke its charter. Id. at 262-63 . As regards the latter opportunity, the Education Code provided at the time that the Commissioner was to adopt an informal  procedure to be used for revoking the charter of an open-enrollment school. Act of May 26, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 1140, § 26, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 2760 , 2772. 11 The Commissioner's letter, notifying AYW of his intent to revoke, identified the three unacceptable financial performance ratings and the one unacceptable academic performance rating, which formed the basis for his decision to revoke under § 12.115(c). The letter also notified the charter school of its right to request an informal review and hearing regarding the Commissioner's decision but that the request had to be in writing with answers to the findings in the notice. AYW pursued the informal review, submitting a written response that in many respects tracks its briefing in this Court. For example, AYW asserted that the Commissioner and TEA had misinterpreted and misapplied the relevant rating years identified in § 12.115(c-1), had engaged in arbitrary rule making and enforced arbitrary rules, and arbitrarily neglected to consider certain extenuating circumstances relevant to AYW's poor performance ratings. As examples of these extenuating circumstances, AYW complained about the Texas Education Agency • causing one of its campuses to acquire an unacceptable academic rating by requiring its merger with another poorly performing campus instead of accepting AYW's request to merely close the underperforming campus; • arbitrarily assigning AYW an unacceptable financial rating for one year merely because AYW's auditors were late in submitting their audit; • failing to consider the vast improvements experienced at the charter school because the TEA's FIRST measuring tool lacked flexibility; • failing to consider that AYW's assets appeared to be significantly less than they actually were because of its board's decision to create a 501(c)(2) tax-exempt entity to hold property and support the charter school and the 501(c)(3) entity that held the charter; • failing to reconsider AYW's high staff-to-student ratio by discounting those staff members who were in contact with students but not supported or paid with charter school funds; • failing to consider the endowment held by AYW's supporting 501(c)(2) entity even though the 501(c)(3) entity that controlled AYW had instant access to $600,000 of that endowment; and • failing to consider the significant amounts of interest earned by the endowment held by the 501(c)(2) and paid to support AYW. AYW asserted that reconsideration of one or more of these extenuating circumstances would affect its performance ratings and remove its charter from jeopardy under § 12.115(c). AYW's written response to the revocation notice also raised its constitutional claims and concluded by reserving its right to supplement and modify this response and to avail itself of all avenues of appeal and opposition to this revocation and closure effort including but not limited to an informal review. The Commissioner conducted an informal review of AYW's response and determined  that revocation would proceed, subject to AYW's right to appeal his decision to the SOAH. A SOAH hearing was scheduled, but the hearing was postponed after AYW filed suit in district court. The two administrative appeals regarding AYW's financial rating and subsequent charter revocation indicate that AYW had the opportunity to raise these issues. In neither appeal did the Commissioner reject AYW's written submissions or refuse to consider the issues raised in them. AYW's complaint is not about the rule's application but about what the Commissioner considers most important in these appeals. When reviewing one of his decisions, the Commissioner apparently focuses on mistakes made by his agency in compiling the data used to support his decision. The process may not be as transparent as the charter school would like, 12 but it is not ultra vires. The Legislature requires the Commissioner to set the academic and financial accountability standards that all districts and charter schools must meet. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 39.053, .082. The Legislature has also generally described the information the Commissioner must consider when setting those standards. Id. The Legislature further requires the Commissioner, by rule, to provide a process for a district or charter school to challenge its academic and financial ratings. Id. § 39.151. The Commissioner must appoint a committee to make recommendations to him on challenges to agency decisions. Id. § 39.151(b). The ultimate decision, however, belongs to the Commissioner, and his decision is final and cannot be appealed. Id. § 39.151(d). At the time AYW received the financial ratings at issue, the administrative rules provided that an open-enrollment charter school may submit a written appeal requesting that the TEA review a preliminary rating if the preliminary rating was based on a data error solely attributable to the TEA's review of the data for any of the indicators. 36 Tex. Reg. 6946 (formerly rule 109.1002(i)(2) ). Under the current rule, an open-enrollment charter may appeal any adverse issue it identifies in the preliminary [financial] rating. 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 109.1001 (l)(3). The current rule cautions, however, that the financial accountability rating system is required to apply the rules uniformly and that [a] request for an exception to the rules ... is disfavored and likely to be denied. Id. The Commissioner also has authority to revoke open-enrollment charters and must do so under certain circumstances. See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 12.115. The Legislature has required the Commissioner to adopt an informal procedure for the review of his revocation decisions. Id. § 12.116(a). These decisions are also reviewed by the SOAH and may be reversed if the Commissioner's decision is arbitrary and capricious or clearly erroneous. Id. § 12.116(c). Once the Commissioner revokes the charter, the school may not continue to operate or receive state funds. Id. § 12.1161. The Commissioner thus has broad authority over the creation and regulation of open-enrollment charters. His authority to revoke existing charters may be more circumscribed, but this is primarily because under current law his actions here are frequently mandated. We conclude that the authority exercised by the Commissioner over AYW's charter complies with that granted to him by the Legislature and was therefore not ultra vires. Whether the Commissioner's  decision to revoke AYW's charter was arbitrary, capricious or clearly erroneous is not for us to decide. That appeal lies with the SOAH and its decision is made final by law. Id. § 12.116(c).