Opinion ID: 783949
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proof of a conspiratorial agreement

Text: 9 Robles was convicted of conspiracy to engage in insider trading under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the general federal conspiracy statute, which provides that 10 [i]f two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 11 18 U.S.C. § 371. A conspiracy conviction under § 371 requires proof of three essential elements: (1) an agreement among two or more persons, the object of which is an offense against the United States; (2) the defendant's knowing and willful joinder in that conspiracy; and (3) commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy by at least one of the alleged co-conspirators. See, e.g., United States v. Pinckney, 85 F.3d 4, 8 (2d Cir.1996) (citing United States v. Montour, 944 F.2d 1019, 1024 (2d Cir.1991)); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 12.2 (2d ed.2003); 1 L. Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions 19-3 (that the defendant knowingly and willfully became a member of the conspiracy). 6 12 The gist of conspiracy is, of course, agreement. United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1191 (2d Cir.1989); see Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975) (Conspiracy is an inchoate offense, the essence of which is an agreement to commit an unlawful act.) (citations omitted). `A conspiracy need not be shown by proof of an explicit agreement but can be established by showing that the parties have a tacit understanding to carry out the prohibited conduct.' United States v. Samaria, 239 F.3d 228, 234 (2d Cir.2001) (quotation omitted). In either case, the evidence must be sufficient to permit the jury to infer that the defendant and other alleged coconspirators entered into a joint enterprise with consciousness of its general nature and extent. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d at 1191 (citing United States v. Alessi, 638 F.2d 466, 473 (2d Cir.1980)). 13 Conspiracies are secretive by their very nature, and it is thus well-settled that the elements of a conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence. See Samaria, 239 F.3d at 234 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Desena, 260 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir.2001) (The elements of a conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence.) (citation omitted). 14 In certain conspiracy prosecutions, the Government often seeks to prove that a particular defendant joined a preexisting conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 302 F.3d 48, 53 (2d Cir.2002); United States v. Ciambrone, 787 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir.1986). In other cases, the question is whether a conspiracy existed at all and, if so, whether a particular defendant was a party to the alleged conspiratorial agreement. See, e.g., Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d at 1191-93 (discussing evidence of single versus multiple conspiracies); United States v. Gaviria, 740 F.2d 174, 183 (2d Cir.1984). Of course, the nature of the evidence used to establish the existence of a conspiratorial agreement may vary slightly, depending on the circumstances of the case. In the case of a preexisting conspiracy, the critical evidentiary question is often whether the defendant joined in the charged conspiracy (1) with some knowledge of the conspiracy's unlawful aims and (2) with the intent of helping the scheme succeed. See Reyes, 302 F.3d at 53 (citations omitted). In other cases, the evidentiary question is frequently whether there is proof that the defendant (1) had knowledge of the unlawful aims of the charged scheme and (2) evinced, by his actions, an intention to further or promote its unlawful aims. See Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d at 1191 (a conspiratorial agreement may be inferred where there is `some indication that the defendant knew of and intended to further the illegal venture') (quoting United States v. Zambrano, 776 F.2d 1091, 1095 (2d Cir.1985)). The difference is not one of legal substance but only of evidentiary emphasis depending on the circumstances of the case. In either case, the fundamental legal question is the same: whether the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular defendant entered into an agreement with others with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the scheme and with the specific intent to aid in the accomplishment of those unlawful ends.