Opinion ID: 2678958
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wellons’s Eighth Amendment Challenge

Text: Wellons argues that the Eighth Amendment entitles him to the information required to determine whether Georgia’s lethal injection procedure is cruel and unusual. Specifically, the use of pentobarbital from a compounding pharmacy can add an unacceptable risk of pain, suffering, and harm because compounding pharmacies are not subject to the FDA regulation. Wellons maintains that the lack of oversight can lead compounding pharmacies, even those operating in good faith, to make critical mistakes in the production of drugs. Wellons also argues that he has not been permitted to learn about the qualifications of the individuals who will carry out his execution and has presented evidence that if pentobarbital is injected improperly, it can cause serious chemical burns. Wellons argues that the Supreme Court has not hesitated to recognize a due process right to the information necessary to determine whether an Eighth Amendment violation exists. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417–18, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986) (holding that Florida’s procedures for determining sanity of a 8 Case: 14-12663 Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Page: 9 of 17 death row prisoner were inadequate to afford a full and fair hearing on the issue and that the petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of his competence to be executed). In short, Wellons insists that Defendants are denying the information necessary to determine whether his Eighth Amendment rights are being violated—while claiming not to implicate his rights at all. Defendants insist, however, that Wellons’s claim is speculative because he is arguing that the compounded pentobarbital could be imperfect, or that something could go wrong with the administration of the drug by prison personnel. Defendants argue that just because an execution may inadvertently result in pain, this does not establish the “objectively intolerable risk of harm” necessary to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Baze, 553 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (internal quotation marks omitted). In order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment challenge, Wellons must demonstrate that the State is being deliberately indifferent to a condition that poses a substantial risk of serious harm to him. Indeed, where an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim alleges the risk of future harm, “the conditions presenting the risk must be ‘sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering,’ and give rise to ‘sufficiently imminent dangers.’” Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 34-35 (1993)). “In the lethal injection context, this standard requires an inmate to show an objectively 9 Case: 14-12663 Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Page: 10 of 17 intolerable risk of harm that prevents prison officials from pleading that they were subjectively blameless for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.” DeYoung, 646 F.3d at 1325 (internal quotations and citation omitted). A plaintiff must also show that the risk of severe pain is “substantial when compared to the known and available alternatives.” Baze, 553 U.S. at 61. The district court concluded that Wellons failed to establish a claim that the state has prevented him from asserting an Eighth Amendment claim, noting that state government officials are presumed to carry out their duties in a good-faith manner and in compliance with federal laws, citing Alas. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. E.P.A., 540 U.S. 461, 507, 124 S. Ct. 983, 1013 (2004). The district court presumes that Defendants will act in good faith in selecting the pentobarbital and appointing the team that will carry out Wellons’s execution. Accordingly, the district court concluded that Wellons’s arguments were mere speculation which “cannot substitute for evidence that the use of the drug is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering.” Landrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 445 (internal quotation marks omitted). Upon independent review, Wellons has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the stay of his execution. We have held that speculation that a drug that has not been approved will lead to severe pain or suffering “cannot substitute for evidence that the use of the drug is sure or very 10 Case: 14-12663 Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Page: 11 of 17 likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering.” Mann, 713 F.3d at 1315. Here, Wellons’s argument that the compounded pentobarbital may be defective or the personnel administering the execution may be untrained is insufficient to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim. See, e.g., Chavez, 742 F.3d at 1272; see also Mann, 713 F.3d at 1315 (“The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that the absence of approval by the Administration is sufficient to establish a substantial risk of severe pain.”); Sells v. Livingston, No. 14-70014, 2014 WL 1316339 (5th Cir. Apr. 2, 2014) (“Plaintiff argues that because the State has transitioned to a new source for the compounded pentobarbital, there are unknowns because of the possibility of improper compounding or contamination. But plaintiff cannot rely on speculation alone. Plaintiffs must point to facts or evidence based on science and fact showing the likelihood of severe pain.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787, 188 L. Ed. 2d 612 (2014); In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d 888, 896-97 (8th Cir. Jan. 24, 2014) (“Without a plausible allegation of a feasible and more humane alternative method of execution, or a purposeful design by the State to inflict unnecessary pain, the plaintiffs have not stated an Eighth Amendment claim based on the use of compounded pentobarbital. . . . As to the other claims raised by the plaintiffs, the identities of the prescribing physician, pharmacist, and laboratory are plainly not relevant.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1790 (2014) and reh’g denied, 741 F.3d 903 11 Case: 14-12663 Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Page: 12 of 17 (8th Cir. 2014). Moreover, Wellons has “failed to show that any . . . alternative procedure or drug is ‘feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain.’” Mann, 713 F.3d at 1315 (alteration in original) (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 52). C. Wellons’s First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment Challenges Wellons maintains that due process entitles a person whose constitutional rights will be affected by state actions to, at minimum, both notice of those actions and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1994 (1972) (“Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Additionally, Wellons argues that Defendants’ refusal to provide him with information regarding his execution denies him his First Amendment right of access to governmental proceedings. Wellons maintains that the Supreme Court has guaranteed a qualified right of access to governmental proceedings, in order to “ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-government.” Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 604, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2619 (1982). When determining whether the public has a First Amendment right of access to a particular governmental proceeding, reviewing courts must inquire into two “complementary 12 Case: 14-12663 Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Page: 13 of 17 considerations”: (1) “whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public” and (2) “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.” PressEnterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8–9, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 2740 (1986). Wellons argues that both criteria are met. First, executions have historically been open events. Indeed, prior to Georgia’s adoption of the Lethal Injection Secrecy Act, Wellons insists that Defendants would, in response to Open Records Act requests, provide prisoners and the public with detailed information about the drugs used in executions. Second, public access to information certainly plays a positive role in the functioning of capital punishment. Wellons insists that an informed public debate is critical in determining “‘whether execution by lethal injection comports with the evolving standards of decency which mark the progress of a maturing society.’” Cal. First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S. Ct. 590 (1958)). The district court concluded, however, that Wellons’s due process claim was merely a restatement of his Eighth Amendment claims, and was too speculative to succeed on the merits. With respect to Wellons’s First Amendment claim, the district court agreed with Defendants that while there may be First Amendment implications involved in the openness of government operations, the cases Wellons 13 Case: 14-12663 Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Page: 14 of 17 relies upon turn on the public’s, rather than the individual’s, need to be informed so as to foster debate. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 831, 94 S. Ct. 2800, 2808 (1974). The district court determined that Wellons did not have a First Amendment right to access this information from Defendants. 2 We agree with the judgment of the district court. Neither the Fifth, Fourteenth, or First Amendments afford Wellons the broad right “to know where, how, and by whom the lethal injection drugs will be manufactured,” as well as “the qualifications of the person or persons who will manufacture the drugs, and who will place the catheters.” See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996) (“[S]tatements [in Bounds] appear to suggest that the State must enable the prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate effectively once in court. . . .These elaborations upon the right of access to the courts have no antecedent in our preBounds cases, and we now disclaim them.” (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977)); Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2013) (“There is no violation of the Due Process Clause from the uncertainty that Louisiana has imposed on Sepulvado by withholding the details of its execution protocol.”); Williams v. Hobbs, 658 F.3d 842, 852 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that the prisoners, who argued that the Arkansas Method of Execution Act violated the due process 2 Although the district court did not explicitly cite Wellons’s burden for achieving the injunctive relief he seeks, see Chavez, 742 F.3d at 1271, we interpret its conclusion as a finding that Wellons did not establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his due process or First Amendment claims. 14 Case: 14-12663 Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Page: 15 of 17 clause because its secrecy denied them “an opportunity to litigate” their claim that the execution protocol violated the Eighth Amendment, failed to state a plausible due process access-to-the-courts claim). Wellons has not established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that the dearth of information regarding the nature of the pentobarbital that will be used in his execution and the expertise of those who will carry it out violates the First Amendment or his right to due process. This ground is also a sufficient basis to conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Wellons is not entitled to injunctive relief on these claims.