Opinion ID: 187321
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: FAR section 119.23(b)

Text: Gorman argues that the NTSB erred in two respects when it concluded that the language of FAR section 119.23(b) requires Gorman to obtain an operating certificate and operations specifications and to comply with Part 135. We find neither argument persuasive. First, Gorman contends the regulation's language unambiguously excludes Gorman's two aircraft from its requirements for the reason he argued before the NTSB, namely, that, because all of the seats have been removed from each aircraft, neither can be described as having a passenger-seat configuration of less than 20 seats. Instead, he maintains that his airplanes now have no seating configuration whatsoever. We conclude that the regulation is ambiguous regarding its applicability to aircraft like Gorman's and that the FAA reasonably determined that it does apply. In common parlance, the phrase airplanes having a passenger-seat configuration of less than 20 seats may be reasonably understood to include aircraft having no passenger seats at all, as the FAA interpreted it. As the ALJ explained: Zero is, in fact, a number and [i]f you have zero seats, you do have less than 20. Hearing Tr. at 117. Any doubt that this is a permissible interpretation is dispelled by the language of the regulation's heading which reads: Operators engaged in passenger-carrying operations, cargo operations, or both with airplanes when common carriage is not involved, 14 C.F.R. § 119.23 (emphasis added). This language plainly includes an aircraft that carries cargo onlyand therefore has zero passenger seatsas well as one that carries passengers only or a combination of passengers and cargo, both of which, by contrast, would necessarily have at least one passenger seat. [5] Second, Gorman contends that even if the regulation is ambiguous, the NTSB erred in deferring to the FAA's interpretation for two reasons: (1) the NTSB itself acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to consider and address the arguments that Mr. Gorman raised against such deference and (2) the NTSB erred in failing to recognize that the FAA's interpretation of its regulations was arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise not entitled to any deference. Pet'r Br. at 28. Both arguments misapprehendand limitthe nature of our review. With regard to the meaning of the FAA's regulation, our review does not, as Gorman suggests, involve two distinct levels of deferenceours to the NTSB and the NTSB's to the FAA. The NTSB does indeed owe deference to the FAA's interpretation of the regulation: When conducting a hearing under [49 U.S.C. § 449(d)], the Board ... is bound by all validly adopted interpretations of laws and regulations the Administrator carries out and of written agency policy guidance available to the public related to sanctions to be imposed under this section unless the Board finds an interpretation is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not according to law. 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d). Nonetheless, while we review the NTSB's decision to determine whether it is `arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,' when we construe the regulation, like the NTSB, we must defer to the FAA's interpretations of its own aviation regulations. Garvey v. NTSB, 190 F.3d 571, 577 (D.C.Cir.1999) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)) (citing Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 147, 150-57, 111 S.Ct. 1171, 113 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991)). Thus, we will reject a Board decision as not in accordance with law if it does not properly defer to the FAA's interpretation. See id. at 586. As we have already explained, the FAA's interpretation of the ambiguous phrase in FAR section 119.23 (having a passenger-seat configuration of less than 20 seats) is reasonable. Deferring to the FAA, we must therefore uphold its interpretationwhether or not the Board may have erred, as Gorman claims, in failing to respond to all of his arguments. Gorman also challenges the FAA's interpretation on three grounds: (1) the regulation unambiguously excludes Gorman's aircraft from its scope, Pet'r Br. at 32; (2) the FAA changed course without reasoned analysis when Balton revised his opinion, id. at 34 (citing N. Mun. Distribs. Group v. FERC, 165 F.3d 935, 941 (D.C.Cir.1999)); and (3) the court should not defer to an agency interpretation developed for the first time in connection with litigation or enforcement proceedings, Pet'r Br. at 35 (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988)). We have addressed and rejected the first argument because the regulation's language does not bear the unambiguous meaning that Gorman ascribes to it. As for the second, Balton did not change his interpretation of FAR section 119.23his initial advice was based on the advisory circular and not the regulation, which Balton acknowledged he had not consulted. In any event, the precedent Gorman cites requires that an agency explain a deviation from its precedent and previous practices, N. Mun. Distribs., 165 F.3d at 941, and not from a position adopted by an agency official early in the course of the same proceeding. Gorman's third argument ignores our own precedent which holds that [t]he FAA is not required to promulgate interpretations through rulemaking or the issuance of policy guidances, but may instead do so through litigation before the NTSB. Garvey, 190 F.3d at 577 (rejecting NTSB argument that FAA offered `no evidence of any policy guidance written by the FAA, validly adopted or otherwise' but merely offered the `litigation statements' of FAA counsel, as well as citations to the Board's own case law, former of which NTSB believed ... insufficient to qualify for Board deference under section 44709(d)(3)) (emphasis in original).