Opinion ID: 2602047
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instructions Regarding Felony Murder

Text: Defendant claims the trial court violated state law and the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when it failed to properly instruct the jury on first degree felony murder. Specifically, defendant contends the court failed to instruct the jury that, to find him guilty of first degree felony murder, it must find a concurrence of act and intent. Defendant also argues the instructions failed to properly limit the first degree felony-murder doctrine. We disagree. The prosecutor's theory was that defendant was guilty of first degree murder both because he had committed premeditated and deliberate murder and because he had murdered Evans during the course of the felony of rape or burglary. The prosecutor's theory for the burglary was that defendant entered Evans's condominium with the intent to steal from her and/or rape her. After the closing arguments, the jury was instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.21 that [t]he unlawful killing of a human being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs during the commission or attempted commission of rape or burglary is murder of the first degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit such crime. The specific intent to commit rape or burglary and the commission or attempted commission of such crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was also instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 3.30 that, for the crimes of forced oral copulation and rape, there must exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct and general criminal intent. The jury was instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 3.31, that, for the crimes of burglary and robbery and the special circumstance allegations of murder during the commission of burglary and murder during the commission or attempted commission of rape, there must be a union or joint operation of act or conduct and a certain specific intent in the mind of the perpetrator. (8) Defendant contends these instructions failed to convey that, in order to find him guilty of first degree murder, the jury needed to find a concurrence of act and intentnamely, that defendant formed the intent to commit rape or burglary before or during, rather than after, the application of force to the victim. We disagree. We have previously rejected an identical attack on similar instructions. In People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153 [13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353], the defendant was charged with first degree felony murder and, like defendant here, claimed the trial court had erroneously failed to instruct the jury on the concurrence of act and specific intent required for first degree felony murder . . . . ( Id. at p. 1175.) The Pollock trial court gave the jury the same standard instructions given here, namely CALJIC Nos. 3.31 and 8.21. (32 Cal.4th at pp. 1175-1176.) We concluded that the instructions given were sufficient. ( Id. at p. 1176.) More specific instructions on this issue are considered pinpoint instructions that the trial court is required to give only upon request [citation] . . . . ( Ibid. ) As in Pollock, defendant did not request more specific instructions, nor did he object to the instructions given by the court. Moreover, even assuming the trial court erred, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as any defect clearly did not affect the verdict. ( People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1300 [78 Cal.Rptr.3d 295, 185 P.3d 727].) In addition to finding defendant guilty of first degree felony murder, the jury returned a true finding on the charged special circumstances. In order to find true the special circumstance allegations of murder during the commission of burglary and murder during the commission or attempted commission of rape, which it ultimately did, the jury was instructed it had to find there was a union or joint operation of act or conduct and a certain specific intent in the mind of the perpetrator. Defendant also argues the instructions did not convey that the felony cannot be incidental to the murder. However, we concluded in Pollock that the standard instructions adequately inform the jury that the defendant must apply the force for the purpose of accomplishing the taking. ( People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1176, italics added.) Defendant contends the instructions failed to inform the jury that the murder and the felony must be part of a continuous transaction. To the contrary, the instructions properly informed the jury that, to find defendant guilty of first degree murder, it had to find the killing occur[red] during the commission or attempted commission of rape or burglary.... (Italics added.) Finally, defendant argues the instructions did not adequately convey that the intent to steal must have been formed before or during the application of force to the victim. We rejected this very argument in Pollock. ( Ibid. ) We accordingly conclude the trial court adequately instructed the jury on first degree felony murder.