Opinion ID: 1894922
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the lower court erred in its refusal to hear and consider additional evidence and testimony at the hearing on appellant's motion for a new trial

Text: During the subsequent hearing on the Motions for New Trial, the chancellor refused to permit the Murphys to submit additional testimony and evidence stating that the previous orders rendered the issue of fitness res judicata: You can't open cases. You can appeal them or you can have modifications on change of circumstances, and that is not what you relied on. You are trying to go back and add more to it. I wish I had some proof on this before. I wish it were there. It wasn't. It is too late... . There is a Final Order in this case, not immediately following the Opinion, but there is a Final Order here... . You will not find any authority that will let you come in when you desire ... and present new proof for me to consider that new proof and recharge and change that Order. That kind of authority does not exist in this State. While it is possible that the Chancellor was correct in rendering all parties seeking custody unfit, he was incorrect in rendering the issue of the parties' fitness res judicata. In child custody cases, the chancellor's duty is to determine what is in the best interest of the child. As such, chancellors should consider any and all evidence which aids them in reaching the ultimate custody decision. The present case had not yet proceeded to final judgment, and therefore additional testimony and evidence was admissable pursuant to Rule 54(b) and Rule 59(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. In the case sub judice, the chancellor would not have trampled upon the laws of this State by hearing the additional testimony and considering the expert reports submitted by the social workers. When the best interest of a minor child is at issue, the ability to hear and consider additional evidence is at all times within a chancellor's authority. See Bell v. Bell, 572 So.2d 841, 845 (Miss. 1990). We further suggest that a chancellor go to great lengths in order to find a suitable home for a minor child before institutionalizing that child. We realize that the chancellor attempted to accomplish the best for the child in this case, however, he should have heard and considered all the relevant testimony and evidence which contribute to determining which party (if any) is best suited to assert permanent care, custody and control over the minor child. In matters concerning child custody, it is never too late for additional evidence and testimony to be considered. The polestar consideration is what is in the best interest of that child. Westbrooke v. Oglesbee, 606 So.2d 1142, 1146-47 (Miss. 1992); Polk v. Polk, 589 So.2d 123, 129 (Miss. 1991); Bell v. Bell, 572 So.2d 841, 846 (Miss. 1990); Carr v. Carr, 480 So.2d 1120, 1123 (Miss. 1985); Tucker v. Tucker, 453 So.2d 1294, 1297 (Miss. 1984); Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983). Further, we are compelled to note that prior to the hearing at which alternatives to custody were examined, Alan Murphy moved the court to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent his son's interests. The court held this motion in abeyance and no guardian served to represent the minor child at the hearing. Because the lower court is directed to revisit and reconsider the issue of fitness, we suggest that a guardian ad litem be appointed before the final custody determination is made.