Opinion ID: 2812643
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Limitations on Jury Selection

Text: Defendant claims his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair and impartial jury were violated because the court refused to examine jurors‘ attitudes about capital punishment for multiple murder and the mitigating effect of childhood abuse.7 While the voir dire itself was brief, it was not so inadequate as 7 ―With regard to this claim and virtually every other claim raised on appeal, defendant asserts that the error violated his rights to a fair trial and reliable penalty determination under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 11 to violate due process. The topics defendant sought to explore were adequately covered by questions presented both orally and in the jury questionnaire, and the court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting defendant‘s proposed additions.
All prospective jurors were asked to complete a 25-page jury questionnaire. It explored many aspects of jurors‘ backgrounds, education, job, family, place of residence, and past experience with the legal system. Jurors were also asked about their sources of news and entertainment, exposure to high-profile criminal cases, views on the criminal justice system, and feelings about those charged with crime. They were asked whether they could keep an open mind while listening to the evidence, be fair to both sides, and follow instructions on the law. A separate section explored attitudes about capital punishment. It asked about ―general feelings‖ on the death penalty, whether it is used too much or too little, and whether jurors belonged to any group advocating either increased use or abolition of the death penalty. After explaining that the guilt phase of a capital trial is followed by a penalty phase if special circumstances are found true, the questionnaire presented a series of questions based on Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 (Witherspoon) and Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 (Witt). Specifically, it asked whether jurors would refuse to find a defendant United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of the California Constitution. In most instances, defendant failed to make these constitutional arguments in the trial court. Nevertheless, unless otherwise indicated, we consider the merits of these newly raised arguments because either (1) the appellate claim is of a kind that required no objection to preserve it, or (2) the claim invokes no facts or legal standards different from those before the trial court, but merely asserts that an error . . . [also] violat[ed] the Constitution. (See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 17.) In those circumstances, defendant‘s new constitutional arguments are not forfeited on appeal. (Ibid.; see People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-439.) Where rejection of a claim of error on the merits necessarily leads to a rejection of the newly asserted constitutional objection, no separate constitutional analysis is required . . . . (See Boyer, at p. 441, fn. 17.)‖ (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1233-1234, fn. 4.) 12 guilty of first degree murder, or find a special circumstance true, in order to avoid reaching a penalty phase, and whether jurors would automatically vote for either possible penalty without considering the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented. If they said they would return an ―automatic‖ vote, they were asked whether they could weigh the evidence and consider aggravating and mitigating factors if instructed to do so by the court. Finally, jurors were asked whether they could set aside their personal feelings about the death penalty and follow the law. Defendant sought to add five questions: (1) Would jurors always vote for or against the death penalty if a defendant was convicted of two murders with special circumstances of multiple murder and robbery murder? (2) Would jurors ignore mitigation evidence about the defendant‘s background as an ―abuse excuse‖? (3) Did jurors believe that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole means the person will remain in prison until they die? (4) Would jurors consider the cost of life imprisonment in deciding penalty? (5) Could jurors follow instructions to decide penalty based on aggravating and mitigating evidence alone, without regard to costs? Although the court allowed some other additions to the questionnaire, it rejected these questions. The court reasoned it was not necessary to repeat the Witherspoon/Witt questions in the context of multiple murder because jurors would learn of the charges, including the particular special circumstances, before they answered the questionnaire. The court was not persuaded that an ―abuse excuse‖ question was necessary although the widely publicized Menendez brothers trial had allegedly soured community attitudes about mitigation evidence based on a defendant‘s background. It rejected defendant‘s remaining three proposed questions as sufficiently covered elsewhere in the questionnaire. Defendant now claims these rulings deprived him of a fair and impartial jury. Because his briefing addresses only the first two proposed questions, we consider any challenge to the remaining questions waived. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) 13 Death-qualification voir dire must avoid two extremes. It must not be so abstract that it fails to identify jurors whose death penalty views would prevent or substantially impair their performance as jurors. Likewise, it must not be so specific as to require prejudgment based on a summary of potential evidence. (People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 721-722 (Cash).) The court may not categorically prohibit inquiry into a subject ―likely to be of great significance to prospective jurors‖ in deciding penalty. (Id. at p. 721; see People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 286 (Vieira).) However, the court ―has considerable discretion in determining the scope of voir dire‖ (People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287, 307), and this discretion extends to the wording of the questionnaire. Where the court exercises its discretion to exclude certain questions from the questionnaire, we will affirm unless the voir dire was so inadequate that the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair. (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1250.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendant‘s proposed question about an ―abuse excuse.‖ Other questions explored whether jurors could base their penalty verdicts on aggravating and mitigating evidence ―regarding the facts of the crime and the background and character of the defendant‖ (italics added). The court could reasonably conclude an additional question on this subject was unnecessary. Defendant theorizes that, when his jury was selected, public sentiment disfavored mitigation based on childhood abuse because such evidence had recently featured in a highly publicized Los Angeles murder trial. The trial court was in the best position to determine the likely effect of that trial on local jurors. We will not second-guess that judgment 20 years after the fact. It was also within the court‘s discretion to exclude questions about multiple murder. Our previous decisions have addressed the need for voir dire on this topic. In Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at page 719, the trial court mistakenly believed voir dire could encompass only those circumstances alleged in the charging document. It therefore prohibited all inquiry into whether jurors‘ penalty verdicts 14 would be influenced by proof that the defendant had previously committed murder. (Id. at p. 721.) To disallow any inquiry about this potential source of bias was ruled an abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 720-722.) When a defendant does have the opportunity to inquire on the subject, however, refusal to include a particular question is not error. In Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at page 286, as here, the trial court conducted voir dire itself and generally did not allow counsel to question the prospective jurors. Even so, Vieira‘s defense counsel did not ask that the court question on attitudes toward multiple murder, or attempt to pose that question himself. Accordingly, there was no viable error claim. (Id. at pp. 286287.) People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263 (Carasi) is instructive. In Carasi, the trial court declined to expand the jury questionnaire to address particular special circumstances, including multiple murder. (Id. at pp. 1282-1283.) Instead, the court orally instructed on the murder and special circumstance charges before prospective jurors completed the questionnaire, so that jurors would have these case-specific charges in mind when answering the questions. (Id. at pp. 1283-1284.) This procedure was acceptable, we concluded, because it did not deprive the defendant of all opportunity to ascertain jurors‘ views on case-specific facts. (Id. at p. 1286.) ―The gravamen of Cash and Vieira . . . is that the defense cannot be categorically denied the opportunity to inform prospective jurors of case-specific factors that could invariably cause them to vote for death at the time they answer questions about their views on capital punishment. By definition, such an opportunity arises where the trial court instructs all prospective jurors on such case-specific factors before any death qualification begins. It is logical to assume that when prospective jurors are thereafter asked (orally or in writing) whether they would automatically vote for life or death regardless of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, they have answered the question with those case-specific factors in mind, and are aware of the factual context in which the exchange occurs.‖ (Id. at p. 1287, italics added.) 15 The trial court here followed the same procedure. Immediately before the questionnaires were distributed, the court told prospective jurors that defendant stood charged with two counts of murder, with special circumstances of murder in the course of a robbery and multiple murder. The court described all other charges, as well, and noted that the People were seeking the death penalty. Prospective jurors not claiming hardship were then asked to complete the questionnaire. As in Carasi, it is reasonable to believe the jurors had these charges and special circumstances in mind when they completed the questionnaire. They were not giving their views on the death penalty in the abstract. Having been told the case involved multiple murders committed in the course of robberies, jurors would logically have reflected on their predisposition to vote for life imprisonment without parole, or death, in the context of this case.
In a related point, defendant complains that the voir dire process as a whole was ―improperly truncated‖ and so inadequate as to deny him a fair and impartial jury. Defendant moved for attorney-conducted, sequestered voir dire on issues pertaining to the death penalty, substantive crimes, and race. In the alternative, he proposed several questions for the court to ask. The motion was denied. Instead, as was its custom, the trial court conducted all voir dire without followup questions from the attorneys.8 The voir dire process, from hardship qualifications through the final selection of the jury, lasted three court days. Jurors not claiming a hardship were 8 At the time of defendant‘s trial, there was no right to attorney-conducted, sequestered voir dire. Code of Civil Procedure former section 223 directed the court to conduct voir dire, with supplemental questioning from the parties allowed upon a showing of good cause. (Code Civ. Proc., former § 223 (added June 5, 1990, repealed eff. Dec. 31, 2000).) On appeal, defendant does not argue the court should have held sequestered or attorney-conducted voir dire, nor does he attempt to show good cause. Accordingly, any such claim has been waived. (See People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793.) 16 given from one to three hours to complete the 25-page jury questionnaire and asked to return the following week. The court then questioned the jurors individually about particular questionnaire responses. With the exception of cause challenges and occasional questioning at sidebar on sensitive matters, the proceedings were conducted in open court. To explore attitudes about the death penalty, the court asked each potential juror the same four pattern questions in the questionnaire. These questions, based on Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. 510, and Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, were: (1) ―Do you have such conscientious objections to the death penalty that, regardless of the evidence in this case, you would refuse to vote for murder in the first degree merely to avoid reaching the death penalty issue?‖ (2) ―Do you have such conscientious objections to the death penalty that, regardless of the evidence in this case, you would automatically vote for a verdict of not true as to any special circumstance charged merely to avoid the death penalty issue?‖ (3) ―Do you have such conscientious objections to the death penalty that, should we get to the penalty phase of this trial, and regardless of the evidence in this case, you would automatically vote for a verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and never vote for a verdict of death?‖ (4) ―Do you have such conscientious opinions regarding the death penalty that, should we get to the penalty phase of this trial, and regardless of the evidence in this case, you would automatically, and in every case, vote for a verdict of death and never vote for a verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole?‖ With very few exceptions, the court asked no additional questions and permitted no followup by the attorneys. Such parsimony in death qualification voir dire is not commendable. ―Recent decisions of this court have emphasized the importance of meaningful death-qualifying voir dire. We have reminded trial courts of their duty to know and follow proper procedure, and to devote sufficient time and effort to the process. [Citations.]‖ (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 539.) The 17 expenditure of a few minutes per juror is generally not unduly burdensome in a capital trial that will consume several weeks. (See People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 968.) Nevertheless, the ―trial court has considerable discretion to place reasonable limits on voir dire [citation], and to determine the number and nature of questions on the death penalty.‖ (Carasi, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1286.) This means the court has wide latitude to determine what questions will be asked and what format the questioning will follow. (People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 143.) ―Unless the voir dire ‗is so inadequate that the reviewing court can say that the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair, the manner in which voir dire is conducted is not a basis for reversal.‘ [Citations.]‖ (Ibid.) The voir dire here was not so cursory as to render defendant‘s trial fundamentally unfair. All prospective jurors were asked individually whether they had feelings about the death penalty that would interfere with their ability to render fair verdicts in the guilt and penalty phases. They were not invited to elaborate on their views, but all jurors had an opportunity to describe difficulties they might have sitting on a death penalty case. Although the oral questioning was more brief than is often the case, this questioning, combined with the jury questionnaire, gave defendant adequate information to make informed decisions on peremptory challenges and challenges for cause. In previous cases, ―[w]e have rejected complaints about ‗hasty‘ (People v. Navarette [(2003)] 30 Cal.4th 458, 487-488) or ‗perfunctory‘ voir dire. (People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 855.) We also have found no error where the court relied heavily on three, four, or five general questions tracking language from Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. 510, and Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424.‖ (People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 540.) While those cases may have involved more followup questions than were asked here, the manner of voir dire was not so unfair or unreasonable as to violate the constitution. (See People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 856-858.) 18