Opinion ID: 160399
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nature of the crime

Text: 14 Chapter 109A, entitled Sexual Abuse, reads: Aggravated sexual Abuse 15 (a) By force or threat.--Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison, knowingly causes another person to engage in a sexual act-- 16
17 (2) by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping; 18 or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both. 19 ... 20 (c) With children.--Whoever crosses a State line with intent to engage in a sexual act with a person who has not attained the age of 12 years, or in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison, knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who has not attained the age of 12 years, or knowingly engages in a sexual act under the circumstances described in subsections (a) and (b) with another person who has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years (and is at least 4 years younger than the person so engaging), or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both. 21 18 U.S.C. 2241(a), (c) (emphasis added). The legislative history indicates that the nature of the offense to be criminalized is the performance or attempted performance of sexual acts with children, and not the crossing of state lines: This legislation would establish new Federal jurisdiction over sexual offenses against children when a person commits a crime after crossing state lines with the intent of committing a sex offense. 142 Cong. Rec. S8636-03, at S8639 (daily ed. July 24, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hutchinson). 22 We often examine the verbs used in an ambiguous or incomplete statute in order to define the offense. See Medina-Ramos, 834 F.2d at 876 (interpreting 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), which has no venue provision, and noting that [c]ourts usually examine the verbs employed in the statute to define the offense). The defendant argues that utilization of the so-called verb test suggests that the act of one who crosses, that is, the crossing, is the overt act which Congress intended to criminalize. But, as the Supreme Court has made clear, the verb test is merely an interpretive device, and is not to be given primacy over other interpretive methods. See United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 279-80. As in Rodriguez-Moreno, the application of the verb test here would unduly limit[] the inquiry into the nature of the offense, and thereby creates a danger that certain conduct prohibited by the statute will be missed. See also 142 Cong. Rec. at S8639; cf. Medina-Ramos, 834 F.2d at 876. 23 To prove the charged violation in this case, the government was required to show that Mr. Cryar crossed stated lines with the intent to engage in a sexual act with a child under twelve, and that he attempted to do so. As the Supreme Court determined in Rodriguez-Moreno, the positioning of the intent and attempt elements of the statute as part of prepositional phrases and not as stand alone verbs does not dissuade us from concluding that [Mr. Cryar's intent and attempt] were essential conduct elements. 526 U.S. at 280. In sum, we interpret 2241(c) to contain distinct conduct elements that are relevant here: the crossing of state lines, the intent to engage in the sexual act and the attempt to do so. 24