Opinion ID: 70876
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Long Waived His Right to Self-Representation

Text: Even if Long had clearly and unequivocally asserted his right to self-representation, that right may be waived by his actions. Faretta recognized that the trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct. Faretta, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 & n. 46. After Faretta, at least two circuits have held that obstructionist behavior may waive the right to self-representation. E.g., United States v. Brock, 159 F.3d 1077, 1079 (7th Cir.1998). [2] For example, the Seventh Circuit held that the disruptive defendant may lose his right to pro se status in Brock. 159 F.3d at 1079. Like Long, Mr. Brock filed motions asserting that neither his attorney nor any other attorney, was authorized to act on his behalf. Id. at 1078. The district court attempted to conduct a Faretta hearing. Id. Brock repeatedly demanded a Bill of Particulars and challenged the district court's authority. Id. Brock refused to answer the court's questions or cooperate in any way. Id. The trial judge appointed Brock stand-by counsel and directed the magistrate judge to inform Brock of the pitfalls of self-representation. Id. at 1079. Before the magistrate judge, Brock repeated his demands and refused to answer any questions. Id. After holding Brock in contempt multiple times, the trial court decided to revoke his pro se status. Id. Not unlike Brock, Long's conduct in the instant case suggested disruptive and obstructionist behavior. After the second time the defendant attempted to fire the public defender, Magistrate Judge Koenig entered an order for a Faretta hearing for August 25th, 2008. The Faretta hearing began as scheduled, but Long refused to answer the judge's questions, instead merely replying with the same nonsensical statement your offer of contract is accepted for value and returned with consideration for discharge, settlement and closure. After the court was understandably frustrated, Long asked for a sidebar conference with the judge. The judge refused and required all communication be made on the record, but offered to let Long speak to an individual from pre-trial services. Long declined to do so, but asked if the court could resume the hearing in two days. The court explained to him exactly what the hearing would cover when they reconvened. As scheduled, the court reconvened two days later on August 27, 2008. Long once again stated that he wanted to fire his counsel. In response, the magistrate judge understood that, but stated Long would need to cooperate and allow the pretrial services officer to question him so the court may get the information it needed for the Faretta hearing. Instead of cooperating, Long made the identical above quoted nonsensical statement about accepting an offer of contract from the judge. After repeatedly warning Long not to carry on with these ridiculous statements that carry no meaning in this court or any court of law, the magistrate judge ended the hearing. The magistrate judge held the next hearing on September 3, 2008. Again, Long began this hearing by stating that he would like to fire the public defender. From that point onwards, Long responded to every question Judge Koenig asked by simply repeating the above quoted nonsensical statement about accepting an offer of contract from the judge. Judge Koenig decided to release Long on personal recognizance, and let the district court judge conduct a Faretta hearing. Each time a magistrate judge had attempted to conduct a Faretta hearing, Long was extremely uncooperative. Long's actions led to the court pushing back the hearings until October 6. On October 6, Long denied wanting to represent himself. Like Brock, these facts tend to suggest that Long's behavior of itself may well have resulted in the waiver of his right to self-representation. Long also argues, alternatively, that if he waived his right to self-representation, he reasserted it at the sentencing stage. Courts have held that the pro se request may be untimely and, therefore, waived. E.g., Wood v. Quarterman, 491 F.3d 196, 202 (5th Cir.2007) (Wood did not move to proceed pro se until after the jury had already returned a guilty verdict against him, immediately before the sentencing phase of his trial, and the trial court therefore had the discretion to deny the motion.); United States v. Edelmann, 458 F.3d 791, 808-09 (8th Cir.2006) (request made four days before trial); Howze v. Roe, 92 Fed.Appx. 515, 516 (9th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (request made two days before trial). Long relies on United States v. Cano , in which this court remanded for re-sentencing when the district court failed conduct a Faretta hearing after the defendant requested to represent himself eighteen days before sentencing. Cano, 519 F.3d at 515, 517. Unlike Cano, Long requested to proceed pro se the day of the sentencing hearing. Given Long's previous disruptive and uncooperative conduct, the trial court may have seen this as another delay tactic. Throughout trial, the district court was concerned with Long's Republic of Texas `psychobabble,' which, according to the district court, was intended to intimidate the court and frustrate the administration of justice. Like Wood, we find that Long's assertion at sentencing was untimely. Long also argues, alternatively, that he represented himself all along, and counsel was appointed from the beginning by Judge Bleil in Fort Worth as stand-by counsel without any Faretta hearing. [3] Long argues that while the trial court may not have conducted a formal Faretta hearing, he was made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. After Magistrate Judge Koenig set a Faretta hearing, Long requested to delay it for two days. When granting this request, the magistrate judge informed Long of what could be expected at the Faretta hearing. Long characterizes this preview as being fully briefed on the dangers of self-representation. However, Faretta clearly requires more than the defendant received. Assuming a defendant clearly and unequivocally requests to represent himself, the trial court still must make a finding that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and asserts his right to self-representation. United States v. Cano, 519 F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir.2008). But even assuming Long was briefed properly under Faretta and had been representing himself, Long waived his right to self-representation. [4] Long expressly told the trial judge before trial that he did not want to represent himself. The public defender acted as counsel for the remainder of the trial. This court's opinion in Lefevre v. Cain is on point: [A] defendant can waive his Faretta rights, either by expressly requesting standby counsel's participation on a matter or by acquiescing in certain types of participation by counsel, even if the defendant insists that he is not waiving his Faretta rights . . . . [O]nce a pro se defendant invites or agrees to any substantial participation by counsel, subsequent appearances by counsel must be presumed to be with the defendant's acquiescence, at least until the defendant expressly and unambiguously renews his request that standby counsel be silenced . . . . [S]tandby counsel's participation [must] be `over the defendant's objection' in order to erode the defendant's Faretta rights. Lefevre v. Cain, 586 F.3d 349, 355-56 (5th Cir.2009) (internal citations omitted). In Lefevre, this court found waiver after the defendant acquiesced to stand-by counsel participation, but never objected or provided a reason for his failure to object to that help. Id. at 356, 357. We believe that Long's obstructionist behavior, coupled with Long, just before trial began, having told the district court that he did not wish to represent himself, warrant similar reasoning and a similar waiver result here.