Opinion ID: 2451442
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Failure to advise of plea withdrawal option before sentencing

Text: Bricker briefly argues that [c]ompounding Furney's failure to inform Mr. Bricker that he was presumptively ineligible for LCCC prior to entering the plea agreement is the fact that upon learning of LCCC's rejection, Furney failed to inform Bricker of two more points before sentencing. First, he could move to withdraw the plea. Second, he would be more likely to prevail in filing such a motion before sentencing, rather than after, because of the resultant change in the standard from good cause to manifest injustice. In short, Bricker argues these two failures could impact our earlier Strickland analysis of Furney's performance regarding the LCCC admission criteria. More specifically, Bricker contends Furney caused him to lose the opportunity to have that particular performance judged on the lesser good cause standard. See Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506, 231 P.3d 563 (presentence motion to withdraw plea for ineffective assistance of counsel merely requires good cause, while postsentence requirement of manifest injustice requires meeting 6th Amendment standards). Bricker also appears to suggest these two failures are additional Furney performance episodes to be analyzed under Strickland to demonstrate manifest injusticeeither aggregated with Furney's LCCC-related performance, or at least independently. We begin by analyzing the two failures independently under Strickland to determine whether Bricker has met his burden to demonstrate manifest injustice. Under this analysis, Bricker must show that Furney's performance fell below the objective standard of reasonableness. If so, he must then show there is a reasonable probability that but for Furney's errors the result of the proceeding would have been different: Bricker would have then filed a motion to withdraw his no contest plea and would have insisted on proceeding to bench trial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052; State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. at 644, 88 P.3d 218; State v. Muriithi, 273 Kan. at 955-56, 46 P.3d 1145. Unlike the factual admission criteria for LCCC, the right to seek plea withdrawal, and the applicable legal standards, are statutory. See K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 22-3210(d); Wilkinson v. State, 40 Kan.App.2d at 746, 195 P.3d 278 (if counsel indeed failed to advise client of statutory manifest injustice requirement for court to order concurrent sentences, then the attorney's performance fell below the standard of reasonableness). Moreover, with the disappearance of one of the factual premises upon which the plea bargain is based, it is reasonable to expect that a defendant would be advised of alternatives, e.g., the right to seek plea withdrawal. Bricker's testimony is uncontroverted: Furney never so advised him. The State argues it was nevertheless reasonable for Furney to believe he could convince the judge at sentencing to grant Bricker probation. For example, we have held: `A court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.' Gleason, 277 Kan. at 644, 88 P.3d 218 (citing Chamberlain, 236 Kan. at 657, 694 P.2d 468). We observe, however, that only one sentence of Furney's affidavit, and not the affidavit itself, is included in the record on appeal. Accordingly, there is nothing to suggest Furney even considered anything besides arguing probation, i.e., that there was a strategic choice to be made from various options, including the filing of a plea withdrawal motion. Moreover, the failure to advise a defendant of such an important right is difficult to consider as a deliberately chosen strategy. State v. Carter, 270 Kan. 426, 441, 14 P.3d 1138 (2000) (decision to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty to a criminal charge is a fundamental constitutional right guaranteed to a defendant and lies solely with the defendant). See also Rowland v. State, 289 Kan. 1076, 1086, 219 P.3d 1212 (2009) (only criminal defendant can make choice of plea). Accordingly, under these circumstances, Bricker has met his burden to demonstrate the deficiencies were not the result of Furney's strategic choices. See Gleason, 277 Kan. at 644, 88 P.3d 218. As we stated there, Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable, and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. 277 Kan. at 644, 88 P.3d 218. As a result, we conclude Furney's performance was constitutionally deficient when he failed to advise Bricker of this important option and its accompanying good cause standard. The prejudice prong of the Strickland test requires Bricker to show a reasonable probability that he would have filed a presentence motion to withdraw his plea and insisted on proceeding to bench trial had Furney advised him of this option. Based upon our reading of the record on appeal, we conclude Bricker has not made this showing. First, Bricker never testified that had Furney advised him of this option to file a presentence withdrawal motion he would certainly, or even probably, have done so. Indeed, the evidence strongly points the other way. In lieu of prison, the plea bargain provided for joint recommendation of LCCC. See K.S.A. 21-4603d(5) (6 months in LCCC residence while on probation plus 6 months additional probation upon release). It also required payment of restitution for all bills not paid for by any available insurance. In the alternative, the plea bargain recommended a sentence at the middle number on the grid box for the level 5 felony of aggravated battery (36 months) and a sentence of 90 days in jail and a $500 fine on the DUI, with all sentences to run concurrently. It does not specify the sentence for the insurance misdemeanor. If Bricker had attempted to withdraw his plea, and been successful, he would have faced considerably worse with his criminal history score of H. Technically, he could have received (1) the upper number in the aggravated battery grid box: 38 months imprisonment; (2) per statute, a maximum of 180 days in jail for the DUI plus $1000 fine; and (3) per statute, a maximum of 180 days in jail for the lack of insurance, or fine of $300-$1000. The sentences could have been served consecutively, resulting in a maximum of 38 months in prison, followed by 360 days in jail, or total consecutive incarceration of slightly more than 4 years. Moreover, the evidence of Bricker's guilt was overwhelming. His blood alcohol level was .22, almost three times the minimum needed for proving DUI. See K.S.A. 8-1567(a)(1) (legal limit for blood alcohol concentration is .08). His urine revealed a mixture of three different drugs in his system, at least two of which were illegal. He drove a highway speed in the city of Lenexa and eventually broadsided the victim's car at an intersection. He was belligerent and combative: an officer and firefighter were forced to hold him down at the scene. Bricker's victim, Cunningham, sustained a broken pelvis, a broken bone in her low back, a bruised heart, and a punctured lung. She also sustained damage to her liver, spleen, and kidneys. Cunningham has scars on her abdomen, right leg, and neck and a metal rod inserted in her right arm. She additionally suffered memory loss and depression. Given her injuries and his conduct, we conclude the elements of a level 5 aggravated battery offense are easily met: recklessly causing great bodily harm to another person or disfigurement of another person. K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(2)(A) and (b). Second, once Furney advised Bricker of his LCCC ineligibility, that same day he filed a motion for interpretation of plea to argue for probation because it was within the spirit of the plea agreement. It states in relevant part: On March 3, 2006, the State and the accused entered into a plea agreement. Line 3 of that agreement states: Parties make joint recommendation for Labette Bootcamp Probation. At the bottom of the agreement under the sub-head `AGREED DISPOSITION', the `Probation' box is checked. Because Mr. Bricker is taking certain medications, he is medically un-qualified for the Labette bootcamp. The accused believes the plea agreement clearly contemplated probation, and that it would be within the spirit of the plea agreement for the defendant to ask the court to consider other non-prison sentence alternatives in light of his disqualification from Labette for medical reasons. However, the defendant does not want to be accused of breaking the plea agreement, and for that reason, the accused asks for the Court's guidance in interpretation on this issue. (Emphasis added.) Consistent with the written motion, at sentencing Furney did ask for the plea agreement to be interpreted in the spirit of the plea bargain to allow for even lesser sanctions than LCCC: probation in this border box case and/or 6 months in a drug treatment center, the same time period as Bricker's required residence in LCCC. Furney also provided an Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program evaluation strongly suggesting Bricker receive treatment providing that the evaluation was consistent with the plea agreement condition that the parties follow ADSAP recommendations. He further noted that everyone at the hearing had testified they would like to see Bricker receive treatment. Furney additionally argued they had bargained for probation, and screening for the therapeutic community was necessary in order to live up to the terms of the plea agreement. Bricker was present for the hearing, and in his later testimony at the plea withdrawal hearing, acknowledged hearing these Furney arguments. As mentioned, Bricker also later testified that had Furney successfully obtained probation, or some type of drug and alcohol treatment program, Bricker would not be attempting to withdraw his plea. Although not dispositive of the Strickland prejudice prong, Bricker's admission undermines his argument that once he learned he was ineligible for the plea-bargained LCCC, he would have moved to withdraw his plea to face trialand probable incarceration. Under these circumstances, we conclude there was no reasonable probability Bricker would have moved to withdraw his plea based upon his LCCC ineligibility and insisted on proceeding to trial had Furney actually advised him of this option. Instead, Bricker more likely would have approved of Furney's argument in the spirit of the plea bargain for treatment and probation without the accompanying harshness of LCCC. We finally turn to the additional failures' impact on, or aggregation with, Furney's LCCC-related conduct. As noted, we held this conduct had not independently risen to a constitutional deficiency under Strickland. We agree with Bricker's implication that Furney's presentence failure to advise him of the option of filing a motion to withdraw with its resultant heightened burden of proving manifest injusticecan itself be considered in the determination of whether manifest injustice now exists to warrant plea withdrawal. After all, the failures clearly increased the difficulty of Bricker's task. However, this new mixed claim has the same problem as the claim based upon Furney's presentence failure to advise Bricker of the ability to file a motion to withdraw plea. As explained previously, under the circumstances of this case, there simply is no reasonable probability Bricker would have requested his plea to be withdrawn before the prison sentence was pronounced. As a result, Bricker has not proven the need to correct manifest injusticestill his statutory requirement, given the timing of his plea withdrawal motioneven when influenced by Furney's failure to advise him of the ability to file such a motion presentence. See State v. Sanchez-Cazares, 276 Kan. 451, 454, 78 P.3d 55 (2003). The judgment of the district court is affirmed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.