Opinion ID: 1841380
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Appeal the Denial of the Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized at Grim's Residence

Text: We summarized the test for reviewing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims in Nixon v. State, 932 So.2d 1009 (Fla.2006): Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are properly raised in a habeas petition before the court that heard the defendant's direct appeal. The standard to be applied to these claims parallels the standard applied to claims involving the effectiveness of trial counsel as set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668[, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674] (1984). Thus, a defendant must demonstrate that appellate counsel's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Prejudice is demonstrated by showing that the appellate process was compromised to the degree that confidence in the correctness of the appellate result is undermined. Moreover, the appellate court must presume that counsel's performance falls within that wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 1023 (citations omitted). When considering whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal a trial court's evidentiary ruling, this Court reviews the prejudice prong first: With regard to evidentiary objections which trial counsel made during the trial and which appellate counsel did not raise on direct appeal, this Court evaluates the prejudice or second prong of the Strickland test first. . . . If we conclude that the trial court's ruling was not erroneous, then it naturally follows that habeas petitioner was not prejudiced on account of appellate counsel's failure to raise that issue. Peterka v. State, 890 So.2d 219, 242 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Jones v. Moore, 794 So.2d 579, 583-84 (Fla.2001)). Therefore, if we determine that the trial court's denial of Grim's motion to suppress was not erroneous, then Grim's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim fails. Both a magistrate's probable cause determination and a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress are accorded a presumption of correctness. State v. Panzino, 583 So.2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). In his motion to suppress, Grim argued that officers omitted two facts from the search warrant affidavit that would have made a finding of probable cause impossible: (1) that two officers looked through Grim's house briefly and noticed some old stains but found no clear indications of blood, and (2) that Grim was not under arrest when he left his house and eluded the officer following him. As the Fifth District explained in Panzino, When a fact is omitted from an affidavit filed in support of an application for a search warrant the reviewing court must determine whether the omission constitutes a material omission. A fact constitutes a material omission if a substantial possibility exists that knowledge of the omission would have altered a reasonable magistrate's probable cause determination. In determining whether a material omitted fact should invalidate the search warrant, the reviewing court must view the affidavit as if it had included the omitted fact and then determine whether the affidavit provides sufficient probable cause. Id. at 1062. A review of the affidavit in this case supports the trial court's ruling. The order denying Grim's motion to suppress states: Having reviewed the Affidavit as if it included the omitted facts, this court finds that the Affidavit still provides sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a warrant to search the Defendant's residence. There is no substantial probability that had the magistrate been apprised of these omissions . . . that he would not have found probable cause. This analysis comports with the requirements stated in Panzino, and is supported by the totality of the facts alleged in the search warrant affidavit. Even if the omitted facts were included, there was still evidence that Grim was the last person seen with the victim; that he did not report to work that morning; that he appeared to have dried blood on his shoulder, elbow and shorts; and that a piece of green carpet matching that in which the victim was wrapped was seen at Grim's home. These included facts support the trial court's conclusion that the omitted facts would not have led the magistrate to alter his probable cause determination. Grim's motion to suppress also stated that his home was left unguarded for several hours between the time officers left the scene and when they returned with a search warrant. The motion argues that this left the scene open to tampering, tainting, or planting of evidence. As the trial court noted, Grim offers no evidence that any of this activity occurred. Thus the trial court properly denied this claim. We hold that the trial court's denial of Grim's motion to suppress was not erroneous. Therefore, Grim could not have been prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to appeal the trial court's denial. Accordingly, we reject Grim's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.