Opinion ID: 164972
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Beltz and Goupil

Text: 25 This court need not resolve the question whether Beltz had initial standing to sue for prospective relief because it concludes, infra, that his claims for prospective relief have been mooted by his death. 26 Goupil's claim for prospective relief, on the other hand, is not moot. As explained above, disabled riders who intend to ride Wichita Transit's fixed-route buses several times per year are under a realistic threat of experiencing a lift malfunction. 27 Unlike Allen, however, Goupil does not intend to use Wichita Transit's fixed-route buses for personal transportation. Instead, he averred that he will test Wichita Transit's fixed-route bus system several times per year starting in May 2002. The question whether testers have standing to sue under the Rehabilitation Act and under Title II of the ADA is an issue of first impression. 28 The Supreme Court has held that the Fair Housing Act (FHA) supports `tester' standing. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 374-75, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982). In Havens Realty, the Supreme Court held that an African-American tester who was given misinformation about the availability of a rental property had alleged sufficient injury in fact to support standing to sue under the FHA. 455 U.S. at 374, 102 S.Ct. 1114. The Havens Realty tester never intended to rent the apartment. Id. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 1114. The tester's sole purpose was, like the testers in this case, to determine whether defendant engaged in unlawful practices. Id. 29 The Havens Realty Court held that congressional intention cannot be overlooked in determining whether testers have standing to sue under a particular statutory scheme. Id. The Court reasoned that the actual or threatened injury required by Article III may exist solely by virtue of a congressional statute creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing. Id. (quotation omitted). Thus, the injury underlying tester standing stems from the denial of the tester's statutory rights. Id. at 374-75, 102 S.Ct. 1114. Critical to the Havens Realty Court's conclusion that the statutory provisions at bar supported tester standing was the language of those provisions. Id. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 1114. FHA § 804(d), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d), which is enforceable through § 812, id. § 3612(a), makes it unlawful for a firm covered by the act to misrepresent the availability of a dwelling to any person because of race. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 1114 (emphasis in the original). The Court reasoned that this broad statutory language, alongside the FHA's purpose of eliminating racial discrimination in housing, evinced a congressional intent to confer standing to the full limits of Article III, which includes tester standing. Id. at 372-74, 102 S.Ct. 1114. 30 Circuit courts have followed the Supreme Court's reasoning in Havens Realty to hold that tester standing exists under other anti-discrimination statutory provisions. See, e.g., Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir.2004) (relying on Havens Realty to conclude that disabled testers who sue under § 3604(f)(2) of the FHA and who have experienced the dignitary harm of observing discriminatory conditions have standing); Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 298 (7th Cir.2000) (relying on Havens Realty to conclude that employment discrimination testers who were discriminated against had standing to sue under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Watts v. Boyd Props., Inc., 758 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir.1985) (relying on Havens Realty to conclude that fair housing testers had standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1982). Each of these circuits relied upon the statutory provision's broad language and anti-discriminatory purpose in concluding that testers had standing to sue. See Smith, 358 F.3d at 1103-04; Kyles, 222 F.3d at 297-99; Watts, 758 F.2d 1482, 1484-85. 31 Consistent with Havens Realty and other circuits' application of that holding to similarly broad language in other anti-discrimination statutes, this court holds that tester standing exists under Title II of the ADA. The Havens Realty Court emphasized FHA § 804(d)'s use of the phrase any person in concluding that this statutory language created legal rights, the invasion of which constitutes the actual or threatened injury required by Article III. 455 U.S. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 1114. The language of Title II of the ADA parallels in all important respects the language of FHA § 804(d). Title II of the ADA states that  no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in ... the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (emphasis added). The plain language of Title II evinces Congress' intent to confer upon a qualified individual with a disability a legal right not to be excluded from participation in the services of a public entity by reason of her or his disability. Title II's words no and shall function like § 804(d)'s phrase any person because, read in context, these words clearly proscribe discrimination against any person who is a qualified individual with a disability. 32 The propriety of our construction of Title II's language is reinforced by Title II's enforcement provision. The enforcement provision extends the remedies, procedures, and rights under the statute to  any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of [Title II]. 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (emphasis added). Moreover, the ADA, like the FHA provisions at issue in Havens Realty, embodies a congressional intent to eradicate discrimination. See H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304 (The purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities....). Thus, the totality of Title II's plain language, the plain language of its enforcement provision, and the statutory scheme's anti-discriminatory purpose lead this court to conclude that Congress intended Title II to confer standing to the full limits of Article III. Cf. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 372-74, 102 S.Ct. 1114. Therefore, we hold that testers have standing to sue under Title II of the ADA. 33 Likewise, tester standing exists under the Rehabilitation Act. The language of the Rehabilitation Act also evinces Congress' intent to confer standing to the outer limits of Article III. Like Title II of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act states that [n]o ... qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from [] participation in ... or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.... 29 U.S.C. § 794 (emphasis added). This language, which parallels the language of Title II of the ADA, shows Congress' intent to confer upon a qualified individual with a disability a legal right not to be excluded from participation in any program receiving federal funds. The Rehabilitation Act, like Title II of the ADA, uses the words no and shall to proscribe discrimination against any person who is a qualified individual with a disability. This creates a legal right, the invasion of which confers standing. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 1114. Thus, tester standing exists under the Rehabilitation Act. 14 34 The parties stipulated that Goupil and all appellants and cross-appellees in this case are qualified individuals with a disability within the meaning of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Therefore, all appellants would have standing as testers if they satisfy the constitutional requirements of Article III. See id. . 35 Goupil has tester standing to seek prospective relief. He established the requisite injury in fact because he is under a real and immediate threat of experiencing a lift malfunction. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660. Goupil averred that he intends to test Wichita Transit's fixed-route services several times per year, starting in May 2002. The record shows that historically, a frequent Wichita Transit fixed-route bus rider experienced lift malfunctions twenty to thirty percent of the time. At the time this case was filed, the expected arrival of Wichita Transit's new bus fleet in April 2002 had no impact on the likelihood or frequency of continuing lift malfunctions. Thus, Goupil has established that, as a tester, he is under a real and immediate threat of experiencing lift malfunctions in at least twenty percent of his several yearly attempts to use Wichita Transit's fixed-route buses. 36 This injury in fact is traceable to Wichita Transit's allegedly wrongful failure to maintain its lifts in operable condition. It is redressable by a declaratory judgment stating the wrongfulness of lift malfunctions or an injunction requiring fully functioning lifts. Therefore, Goupil has standing to seek prospective relief.