Opinion ID: 105305
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: direction to answer.

Text: The Court advances a second ground in the Quinn and Emspak cases for its direction that the District Court enter a judgment of acquittal. This is that a deliberate intent to refuse to answer the Committee's questions is required for the judgment of contempt. The Court explains, Quinn case, p. 166, that intent may be implied only when the witness is clearly apprised that the committee demands his answer notwithstanding his objections, and, Emspak case, p. 202, without such apprisal there is lacking the element of deliberateness necessary for a conviction under § 192 for a refusal to answer. The Court concludes that the witness was not specifically directed to answer, or otherwise informed as to the disposition of his objections. The Court must admit, as it does, Quinn opinion, p. 162, that no particular form of words is required. On the other hand, I must admit that a witness must be clearly apprised that his claim of the freedom from an obligation to answer is not accepted by the interrogator. [12] I agree that the offense punishable under the statute is a deliberate, intentional refusalnot an inadvertence, accident or misunderstanding. [13] Good faith in refusing to answer, however, is no defense so long as the refusal is intentional, deliberate. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, 299, points out that: The gist of the offense is refusal to answer pertinent questions. . . . Intentional violation is sufficient to constitute guilt. United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141, involved a statute very similar to the one here involved. In that case, Murdock had been called to testify before an Internal Revenue Agent and refused to answer certain questions on the ground that he might be incriminated under state law. We said in that case: While undoubtedly the right of a witness to refuse to answer lest he incriminate himself may be tested in proceedings to compel answer, there is no support for the contention that there must be such a determination of that question before prosecution for the willful failure so denounced. By the very terms of the definition the offense is complete at the time of such failure. 284 U. S., at 148. There was no direction to answer in either case. While the point was not raised, their holding as to what establishes the offense does not include a specific direction to answer as one of the elements. While the Court held in Sinclair that deliberate refusal was all that was required to consummate the offense under 2 U. S. C. § 192, at the same time we were at pains to point out There was no misapprehension on the part of the witness as to what was called for. P. 299. It is because the refusal must be intentional, that the witness must know that his excuses for not answering have not been accepted by the Committee. When a witness interposes objections to testifying which are not frivolous, it is difficult to say he intentionally refused to answer when the interrogation continues without pause to some other question. I agree that the Committee cannot, in fairness to the witness, lull him into thinking that his refusal to answer is acceptable and then cite him for contempt. Refusal under such circumstances would not be deliberate. However, specific direction to answer is not necessary; only intentional refusal is. The Court suggests, n. 36, Quinn case, that congressional committees follow the practice of other legislative bodies and determine first the validity of the witness' reason for failure to answer and then direct him to answer. The defect in that analogy is that the Court seems to assume in its note a formal vote and a specific direction to answer. I think such a specific direction is inconsistent with its page 170 admission that no ritualistic formula is required. No provision of the statute, nor of any rule of Congress is cited by the Court to support a requirement of specific direction. The Court of Appeals held direction to answer unnecessary so long as the witness knew that the Committee had not acceded to his refusal. [14] As I stated above, in my view it is sufficient if the witness knows his excuses are not acceptable to the Committee and that he is required to answer. Whether or not the witnesses knew this in these two cases is the question on this second point. The Court holds that the witnesses did plead the privilege and were not advised that the Committee refused to accept their pleas. I disagree. After Mr. Quinn had adopted Mr. Fitzpatrick's words as his own method of refusing to answer the question as heretofore discussed, it will be seen that Mr. Wood, a Committee member, said to Mr. Quinn: Mr. Wood. You have stated your position. Having enunciated your sentiments and your position, will you now answer the question whether you are now or ever have been a member of the Communist Party, or do you decline to answer? Mr. Quinn. I decline to discuss with the committee questions of that nature. This, I think, advised Mr. Quinn that the Committee refused to accept his reply as a satisfactory excuse and required him to proceed. I think, too, that Mr. Emspak was advised his answer was not accepted and that he was required to proceed. When he was asked repeatedly as to whether he was acquainted with Joseph Persily, he said again: Mr. Emspak. For the reasons I stated before, I answered it. Mr. Moulder. Then you refuse to answer the question? Mr. Emspak. No. I answered it. Mr. Tavenner. Are you or are you not acquainted with Joseph Persily? Mr. Emspak. I answered the question. Mr. Tavenner. Your replies are a refusal to comply with the request to answer it? (Witness confers with his counsel.) Mr. Moulder. The record will reveal that you have not answered the question. Mr. Emspak. I have answered it to the best of my ability under the circumstances. On continued questioning as to Mr. Persily, he continued, I will give the same answer. I cannot but conclude, as did the lower courts, that the witness Emspak was adequately informed that his objections were refused and that he must answer. The Court directs acquittal of both petitioners on the grounds of claim of privilege and failure to specifically overrule their objections or direct them to answer. I disagree with both grounds. Confining expression of my views to those issues, I dissent. MR. JUSTICE MINTON joins in so much of this opinion as applies to Emspak v. United States , post, p. 190.