Opinion ID: 2065798
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Review by the Board.

Text: BPR Rule 13.7 provides, in pertinent part, that [w]hen reviewing the findings of a Hearing Committee, the Board shall employ [a] `substantial evidence on the record as a whole' test. This court must accept a finding that is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, even though there may also be substantial evidence in the record to support a contrary finding. Baumgartner v. Police & Firemen's Ret. & Relief Bd., 527 A.2d 313, 316 (D.C.1987). Because the Board is an appellate body vis-a-vis the Hearing Committee, it must likewise defer to the Committee's factual findings and view the record in the light most favorable to those findings. Cf. Peay v. United States, 597 A.2d 1318, 1320 (D.C.1991) (en banc). In In re Temple, 629 A.2d 1203 (D.C.1993), we explained the principles applicable to the Board's review of findings by the Hearing Committee: The Board must accept the hearing committee's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Although the Board must defer to the hearing committee's findings of basic facts, it is not obligated to defer to the committee's determination of ultimate facts or conclusions of law. Id. at 1208 (citations omitted). The question whether Godette deliberately evaded service is one of basic, or evidentiary, fact; it is not a conclusion of law. It is true that in this case, in finding that Godette deliberately evaded service, the Hearing Committee had before it the process server's affidavit, rather than his live testimony. The Board was thus reviewing a finding based on documentary evidence rather than on oral evidence. An appellate body's duty to defer to the findings of the trier of fact is obviously at its zenith where that trier of fact had the opportunity to hear the testimony and observe the demeanor of the witness. See In re Shillaire, 549 A.2d 336, 343 (D.C.1988); see also In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 774-75 (D.C.1990). Nevertheless, in the context of appellate court review of a trial court's findings, [f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, Super. Ct. Civ. R. 52(a), and the Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed the precept that the `clearly erroneous' standard applies to review of all factual findings, whether they are based on oral or on documentary evidence. Am. Sec. Bank v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 538 A.2d 736, 739-40 (D.C.1988) (citing, inter alia, Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574-75, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)). We conclude that the same principle applies, by analogy, to the Board's review of the Hearing Committee's determination that Godette purposely evaded service. We caution, however, that the Board's review should not focus exclusively on the question of purposeful evasion of service. Rather, the Board should consider the totality of the circumstances, including not only the process server's affidavit, but also the entire history of Godette's non-cooperation and failure to respond.