Opinion ID: 1953672
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The trial judge's decision to bar pretrial discovery deposition testimony

Text: The Barrows allege that the trial judge erred when he ruled that they could not introduce Dr. Krasnow's pretrial deposition testimony on causation  an issue that went to the very heart of their case. When the excluded evidence goes to `the very heart' of plaintiffs' case and `might well have affected the outcome' of the trial, the exclusion of the evidence warrants a new trial. [6] We review a trial judge's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. [7] If we find the trial judge abused his discretion, we must then determine whether the mistake constituted `significant prejudice so as to have denied the appellant a fair trial.' [8] Here, Dr. Krasnow's medical opinion on the location of Barrow's primary tumor focused on the most important disputed causation issue in the case. In order to determine causation, the jury needed to decide whether the radiographic abnormalities in Barrow's left upper lobe were benign. If they were, the follow up diagnostic testing required by the standard of care, which included the surgical removal of the abnormal tissue in the left upper lobe, would not have revealed Barrow's cancer. Any negligence on Dr. Abramowicz's part, therefore, could not have proximately caused Barrow's death. Dr. Krasnow's opinion was relevant, highly probative evidence that contradicted the testimony of Dr. Abramowicz's expert, Dr. Creech. Indeed, the jury's finding of negligence but no proximate cause strongly suggests that the exclusion of this evidence had a bearing on the trial's outcome. As a result, we find that Dr. Krasnow's pretrial deposition testimony on causation issues went to the very heart of the Barrows' case. Dr. Abramowicz argues, and we agree, that Dr. Krasnow's causation testimony echoed the opinions of the Barrows' other medical experts, Dr. Konerding, Dr. DeNittis, and Dr. Martin, and, thus, was cumulative. But, the fact that evidence may be cumulative does not render it inadmissible. The Barrows cite to Green's proposition that a trial judge should only sparingly limit a party's presentation of evidence on the ground that it is cumulative. [9] Indeed, Green dictates that the exclusion of important evidence warrants a new trial, even if there was other evidence `of the same general character' or `the rejected evidence was cumulative.' [10] Furthermore, it is clear to us that a medical opinion favorable to the Barrows' case from the lips of one of Dr. Abramowicz's experts is potentially more persuasive to a jury than the testimony of an additional plaintiff's expert. Underlying our ruling in Green is the principle that a litigant has the right to introduce all relevant evidence, even if generated by an adverse party, which goes to the very heart of a case and could affect the outcome of the trial. [11] We next consider whether the Barrows properly reserved their right to introduce Dr. Krasnow's pretrial deposition testimony at trial. The Barrows posit that, on February 1, 2006, Dr. Abramowicz's counsel signed, and the trial judge approved, a pretrial order in which the Barrows expressly reserved the right to call Dr. Abramowicz's witnesses, including Dr. Krasnow. [12] Under Superior Court Civil Rule 16, the trial judge enters a trial scheduling order which governs pretrial conferences, scheduling, and trial management. [13] Rule 16 mandates that parties follow the trial judge's scheduling order, thus assuring that the parties conduct predictable discovery. [14] Parties must be mindful that scheduling orders are not merely guidelines but have full force and effect as any other order of the [Superior] Court. [15] The Barrows claim that the trial judge disregarded the agreed upon terms of the pretrial order, and, thus, abused his discretion when he prohibited them from introducing Dr. Krasnow's pretrial deposition testimony. The Barrows allege that Green v. A.I. duPont controls. [16] In Green, we found that the trial judge abused his discretion when he precluded the plaintiff, who properly reserved her right in the pretrial order, from introducing relevant portions of the trial deposition testimony of a defense expert who the defendants decided not to call as a trial witness. Attempting to distinguish Green, Dr. Abramowicz argues that the witness testimony at issue in Green was trial deposition testimony, as opposed to the pretrial discovery deposition testimony, and points to how this distinction affected the parties' expectations regarding the depositions' use at trial. Arguing that the parties in Green anticipated the use of the expert's deposition, and here, did not, Dr. Abramowicz cites to the Green court's reasoning that the pretrial order reflected an understanding, shared by the parties as well as the expert, that the deposition was to be shown to a jury who would give it the same weight as live testimony. [17] Dr. Abramowicz also cites to Hambleton v. Christina Care Health Services, Inc., [18] a Superior Court case with similar facts that diverged from Green's precedent. Distinguishing Hambleton's facts from those of Green, the Hambleton court focused on the designated purpose of the deposition at the time it was taken and whether the parties had sufficient notice of the parties' intent to use the content at trial. The Hambleton court concluded that the deposition was a discovery deposition and neither party intended or contemplated when taking it that it would be used at trial. [19] Indeed, the trial judge here relied on Hambleton's distinction between a trial deposition and a discovery deposition when he prohibited the Barrows from using Dr. Krasnow's pretrial deposition testimony. [20] Dr. Abramowicz here touts that the parties did not agree to use the discovery deposition at trial, did not notice it as a deposition for use at trial and, therefore, created no expectation it would be used at trial. We agree with the Barrows that Green controls and find the distinction between a trial deposition and a discovery deposition superfluous on the facts here. While Dr. Abramowicz's argument makes practical sense in the abstract, given that the pretrial order is tantamount to a contract between the parties for conducting pretrial preparation, we find that rationale inapplicable here. [21] Dr. Abramowicz clearly intended to use Dr. Krasnow's pretrial deposition testimony at trial and had notice of the Barrows' intention to do the same. On February 1, 2006, Dr. Abramowicz's counsel signed, and the trial judge approved, a pretrial order in which he expressly reserved the right to call Dr. Krasnow and specifically identified [d]eposition and interrogatory answers as exhibits he intended to use at trial. [22] The Barrows similarly expressed their intent to use the same material and witnesses when they reserve[d] the right to introduce any exhibit identified by the defendants which, by Dr. Abramowicz's own denotation, included Dr. Krasnow's pretrial deposition testimony. While he objected to other evidence proffered, Dr. Abramowicz did not object to the Barrows' proposal to introduce the witness' pretrial deposition testimony and he also reserved the right to call the Barrows' trial witnesses. Indeed, it appears to be common practice for parties to designate each other's witnesses for use at trial and inconceivable that Dr. Abramowicz would think that the Barrows would not affirmatively elicit opinions from Dr. Krasnow on favorable matters, particularly on the important issue of causation. Moreover, the Barrows informed Dr. Abramowicz that they intended to introduce portions of Dr. Krasnow's testimony at trial promptly after Dr. Abramowicz confirmed that he no longer intended to call Dr. Krasnow. Similarly, those portions of Dr. Krasnow's deposition testimony were part of the very causation opinion upon which Dr. Abramowicz designated Dr. Krasnow to opine. Thus, we conclude that the pretrial order and the Barrows' later indication that they intended to introduce pretrial discovery deposition testimony of witnesses at trial gave Dr. Abramowicz full and fair notice of their intentions. The Barrows had a right to rely on the pretrial order to govern the course of trial, unless modified . . . to prevent manifest injustice. [23] The trial judge never modified the pretrial order. Therefore, we hold that the trial judge erred when he chose not to give effect to the pretrial order of February 1, 2006, thereby preventing the Barrows from presenting important evidence that went to the very heart of their case at trial. Dr. Abramowicz cannot now be heard to complain about living with the record [he] had a hand in creating. [24] Dr. Krasnow's opinion was relevant, highly probative evidence that went to the very heart of the Barrows' case, and all parties had reason to believe and were on notice that the pretrial depositions of expert witnesses may be introduced at trial. For those reasons we hold that the trial judge erred when he prevented the jury from considering Dr. Krasnow's opinion testimony in order to resolve an issue central to the trial's outcome. [25]