Opinion ID: 2175047
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The power of the Wage Board to include regulatory-type provisions in the Wage Order

Text: The thrust of petitioners' argument is that parts of the Wage Order were beyond the power of the Wage Board to adopt because the authority under the regulation-making provision, D.C.Code 1967, § 36-408, has been reserved to the Commissioners by virtue of Section 2 of District of Columbia Minimum Wage Amendments Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 970 (1966). [12] Virtually the entire wage order is challenged because, in petitioners' view, it is, with the exception of the hourly wage rate provision, a compilation of regulations specifically provided for under § 36-408, supra. We think, however, that petitioners misconceive the function of regulations in the scheme set out by the Act. Regulations are to apply generally to all industries and related governmental functions while wage orders zero-in on a specific trade or industry to deal with the unique problems of each. Some overlapping between wage orders and regulations was clearly contemplated when §§ 36-403 (c), 36-407(c), and 36-408, supra, are read together. Indeed, if petitioners were correct a wage order could only set minimum wages. This, of course, would be contrary to what Congress intended in § 36-403, supra, where it specifically approved and directed that previous wage orders be amended so that provisions like some of those here challenged would conform to a new congressionally determined minimum. Pursuant to § 36-406(a), supra, the Wage Board preliminarily determined that a general increase in wages and related matter was needed. It convened an ad hoc advisory committee [13] to assist in making the necessary inquiry and determinations relating to minimum income. The committee deliberated and returned its recommendation within the 60-day limitation. [14] Thereafter, the Wage Board published a copy of the recommendations in the form of a proposed wage order. [15] Accompanying the proposed order was a notice of a public hearing [16] which allowed the interested public to present data and testimony in support of or in opposition to the order. [17] This, along with the recommendations of the committee, was considered by the Board. [18] It thereafter published a final wage order, effective July 6, 1969, containing the new amendments and additions, and repealed the previous order. The current order contained sections covering definitions, minimum wage and overtime compensation, employees compensated by commissions, workers under the age of 18, handicapped workers, apprentices, adult learners, minimum daily wages, split shifts, uniforms, travel expenses, deductions, allowances for meals and lodging, basis of payment, time of payment, required records, and issuance of wage statements. With the exception of wage rates, these are the portions challenged as being regulations and not within the ambit of the Wage Board's power because such matters are specifically the subject matter for regulations under § 36-408 (b) and (c). A careful reading of the Act, consistent with its expressed purpose, clearly reveals that Congress made a dual delegation of legislative rule-making authority. Both § 36-407(b), authorizing wage orders, and § 36-408(a), authorizing regulations, contain broad grants of power to effectuate or carry out the purposes of this Act. Moreover, §§ 36-407(c) and 36-408 (a) permit both wage orders and regulations to be drafted so as to prevent circumvention or evasion of wage rates and overtime minimums. The specific expression of matter for regulations in § 36-408 (b) and (c) cannot be taken as an indication by Congress that such cannot also be the subject of a wage order. The test is whether those provisions are necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act or to carry out the purposes of [a wage order],    to prevent the circumvention or evasion of it, and    to safeguard the minimum wage rates and overtime compensation established in [such wage order]. Indeed, when the Act was adopted, wage orders contained such provisions. In the entire context of this minimum wage structure, we think that the Congress may fairly be taken to have intended the form of a wage order issued here. The distinguishing characteristic between these sections lies in their purpose. An order is used to establish the basic minimum level of income for an occupation and classification (§ 36-407(c)), with additional provisions to ensure its compliance. [19] Regulations, on the other hand, are placed under no such restriction. They are used to make certain that there is coordination between all other Government agencies, and [that] there is [no] duplication, [20] or to secure inter-occupational uniformity if that is essential. These sections read in this light are indeed harmonious and well written. We hold that the Wage Board did not exceed its authority in issuing the current wage order and that the challenged sections of the order are not regulations.