Opinion ID: 444550
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Award to Brent

Text: 39 Brent's physical injuries consisted of the loss of his left arm; injuries to the posterior shoulder scapula and in the chest area, including fractures of two ribs; a collapsed lung which had been punctured by one of the broken ribs; and contusions and hematoma of the left back and chest areas. The evidence indicated that Brent did not suffer exceptional pain as a result of his injuries. He testified that he felt no real pain at the time of the accident; his father testified that Brent did not begin to complain of pain until well into the ambulance trip to the hospital. Brent was in Glens Falls Hospital for nine days, in intensive care for four. He suffered intense pain for the four days in which he was in intensive care, thereafter suffered some phantom pain relating to the severed portion of his arm, and suffered some pain after his discharge from the hospital. He required little medical treatment after his release from the hospital. By the time of trial, Brent had completely recovered from his physical injuries, with the obvious exception of the loss of his arm. 40 Plaintiff presented evidence that there was a long list of activities Brent could not undertake with one hand, such as tie his shoelaces, cut steak, peel an orange, play golf, drive a manual shift car, and push a wheelbarrow. (Some of the listed tasks would likely have been performable had Brent not refused to wear the prosthetic arm with which he had been fitted.) Nonetheless, the evidence was that after the accident Brent had been able to resume many of his former activities. He returned to school less than three weeks after the accident. He maintained the close friendships he had had prior to the accident. He skied, taught skiing, and competed in ski races; he played squash on a school team and played center on his high school's varsity football team; he sailed in competition; and he made sketches and painted a mural. For the summer after the accident he had a job on a lake patrol rescue unit and apparently performed very well. 41 There was also evidence that Brent had experienced some psychological problems as a result of the amputation. His parents testified that, although his relationships with others seemed to proceed well after the accident, Brent became morose, rebellious, and uncommunicative toward his parents, with anger directed principally toward his mother. 5 Plaintiff presented the testimony of one psychiatrist, Dr. Camperlengo, and one clinical psychologist, Dr. Marrazo, neither of whom had seen Brent prior to the commencement of the lawsuit. They had been contacted by plaintiff's attorney, who was concerned, as Dr. Camperlengo put it, that Brent 42 did not want to visit with doctors, and seemingly having no complaints after he had had a terrible traumatic amputation of the arm, and that he was rather, if not uncooperative, as I said, noncompliant. He was not meeting his doctors' appointments and he seemed to convey this impression that everything was all right. 43 Dr. Camperlengo testified that he had a single two-hour session with Brent in April 1981, during which he found Brent to be cooperative, chatty, open, and practically lighthearted. Brent said that he may have felt temporarily depressed when he was in the hospital, but had suffered no depression thereafter. He presented a demeanor of saying that this has never happened and this has not made any impression on me, and I won't let it. Brent stated that he had not had psychiatric care prior to seeing Dr. Camperlengo because he felt he had not needed it. 44 Dr. Camperlengo concluded that Brent felt good about his life, but that he felt too good; that he was too carefree. He was too unconcerned. He was too free of depression, and when this occurs what you are looking at is depression turned inside out. He opined that Brent had a repressed posttraumatic stress disorder, or repressed depression; and that eventually Brent's facade of gaiety would wear thin and his depression would emerge. Dr. Camperlengo had recommended that Brent be given psychiatric treatment. 45 Brent received treatment from Dr. Marrazo in six sessions at four-to-six-week intervals beginning in January 1983. Dr. Marrazo agreed that Brent was suffering from chronic depression and chronic dysphoria and that he was angry and had low self-esteem. In Dr. Marrazo's view, Brent had been denying his true feelings and had not been able to face up to the fact that he was now a person with only one arm and that he was going to be very limited in his ability. Dr. Marrazo asked Brent to make a list of all the things he could no longer do, and Brent supplied him with such a list, which Dr. Marrazo read to the jury. He felt that Brent had been very unrealistic in his aspirations, for example, to go out and play football again. (He was unaware until trial that by 1981 Brent had indeed been playing football again, and well enough to make his high school varsity team.) Dr. Marrazo stated that toward the last of his sessions with Brent, Brent had been making improvement and was moving in the right direction. The only testimony on the subject of further psychological treatment for Brent was Dr. Marrazo's answer to the question [D]o you plan on seeing him from time to time in the future? Dr. Marrazo's response was, I hope so, sure. 46 The only diagnosis in the trial record by a psychologist who saw Brent before the lawsuit was started was the evaluation of a clinical psychologist associated with Glens Falls Hospital, who had talked with him in September 1979, less than two weeks after the accident. The hospital psychologist was not called as a witness, but his notes were read to the jury by Dr. Marrazo in response to questioning by plaintiff's attorney. The notes stated that Brent ventilated feelings about the accident, the loss of his arm, and his fears as to the future and how others would react to his amputation. Brent evinced anger and sadness, but the psychologist did not believe he was clinically depressed. Brent discussed his phantom pains and his desire to continue to play football, and expressed determination to keep the loss of his arm from interfering with his life. The notes concluded, I would say he is making satisfactory emotional adjustment. 47 The evidence was that at the time of trial, September 1983, Brent was faring quite well. He was enrolled in a junior college and, according to his parents, had a very positive attitude and was studying hard. He had a girl friend. His mother testified that Brent's behavior was now very good and had been since the springtime. Harry concluded, His mother and I are both happy. 48 Plaintiff presented no evidence that the accident had interfered with Brent's career plans or any evidence that the loss of his arm had any impact on Brent's earnings or his future earning ability. 49 In sum, plaintiff showed that Brent lost his left--non-dominant--arm, suffered other relatively minor injuries, and suffered some psychological problems. The evidence did not show, however, any diminution of Brent's earning power, did not show extreme pain and suffering, did not show enduring emotional or physical pain; it did show Brent's reasonable return to an active, athletic life. 50 In light of the evidence, the award to Brent of $2,000,000 appears to be extremely high. This impression is enhanced when we compare that award with awards for similar injuries condoned by New York state courts. See, e.g., Novell v. Carney Electric Construction Corp., 123 Misc.2d 1089, ---, 476 N.Y.S.2d 241, 244, 247-48 (Sup.Ct.N.Y. County 1984) (apparently reducing award for pain and suffering for loss of leg from $7,000,000 to approximately $630,000); Le Bel v. Airlines Limousine Service, Inc., 92 A.D.2d 996, 461 N.Y.S.2d 474 (3d Dep't 1983) (upholding award of $800,000--which included compensation for substantial economic loss--for crushing of leg that would require amputation, had caused and would continue to cause pain, and had required five extensive hospitalizations); Terry v. State, 79 A.D.2d 1069, 1069, 435 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (3d Dep't 1981) (increasing to $400,000 an award to 18-year-old boy whose left arm was rendered useless and who had suffered and was expected to suffer excruciating pain in the future); Prata v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 70 A.D.2d 114, 420 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1st Dep't) (reducing award for loss of hand from $1,250,000 to $700,000), appeals dismissed, 48 N.Y.2d 975, 425 N.Y.S.2d 1029, 401 N.E.2d 433 (1979); Dubicki v. Maresco, 64 A.D.2d 645, 407 N.Y.S.2d 66 (2d Dep't 1978) (upholding award of $810,000 for deeply lacerated groin and injury resulting in complete disuse of right leg with threat of amputation); Kraft v. Carborundum Co., 57 A.D.2d 697, 395 N.Y.S.2d 542 (4th Dep't 1977) (upholding award of $325,000--which included compensation for 17.2 years of lost future income--for loss of left leg); Kusisto v. McLean, 52 A.D.2d 674, 675, 382 N.Y.S.2d 146, 147 (3d Dep't 1976) (reducing from $510,000 to $400,000 an award that included future earnings for an 18-year-old boy whose left leg was amputated at mid-thigh who was completely disabled from pursuing his chosen endeavor and, in fact, from performing any activity which requires mobility). 51 Sums of the magnitude of that awarded to Brent have been approved by New York courts only in cases that involved injuries much more severe than that suffered by Brent. For example, in Rush v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 92 A.D.2d 1072, 461 N.Y.S.2d 559 (3d Dep't 1983), the appellate court reduced a $4,000,000 award to a teenage girl who had suffered second and third degree burns over 42% of her body, resulting in long and painful periods of hospitalization and treatment, skin grafting, debridement, permanently disfiguring scars and excruciating pain and suffering, to $1,500,000. The court pointed out that notwithstanding the nature of the injuries and her terrible pain and suffering, plaintiff had been 52 able to return to school in September following the fire and was a student at the State University at Brockport studying computer science and math at the time of trial. She sings in her college choir and with several area dance bands. She was employed at Sherman's Amusement Park on Caroga Lake during the summer before trial. She is not bedridden, shut in, or in need of constant custodial care, or helpless. She is able to attend to her own needs and her mental faculties remain unimpaired. She is an active member of society and will be able to pursue gainful employment when she completes her education. 53 Id. at 1073, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 561. In reducing this award to $1,500,000, the court noted that in Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 71 A.D.2d 515, 524, 423 N.Y.S.2d 694, 699 (3d Dep't 1979), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 114, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 417 N.E.2d 545 (1981), it had reduced an award for pain and future earnings from $3,600,000 to $2,000,000 for a plaintiff rendered a quadriplegic who was expected to suffer a lifetime of pain and helplessness. See also Poulos v. City of New York, 99 A.D.2d 709, 472 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1st Dep't 1984) (reducing to $1,000,000 an award for pain and suffering to 16-year-old rendered a paraplegic); Tabone v. New York, 116 Misc.2d 864, 869-72, 456 N.Y.S.2d 950, 955-57 (Ct.Cl.1982) (awarding approximately $2,000,000, including lost earnings, to severely burned and grotesquely scarred plaintiff whose appearance could not be improved by plastic surgery, and who, inter alia, lost 2/3 of the use of each hand, was initially hospitalized for 72 days and later hospitalized an additional 18 times). 54 Thus, the guidance we receive from the recent New York cases is that the awards condoned for the loss of a single limb have ranged from $325,000 to $810,000. The award to Brent of $2,000,000, if designed principally to compensate him for the loss of his arm and his other physical injuries must be considered to be at least twice as high as what is permissible. 55 Nor can the award be justified on the theory that the jury sought to compensate Brent principally for the psychological damage suffered for the loss of his arm, for the evidence does not come close to supporting such an extravagant award. The only psychiatric evaluation of Brent prior to the start of this lawsuit was a positive one. It noted normal fears, anger, and sadness; Brent's determination to keep the loss of his arm from interfering with his life; and his desire to continue to play football. And it concluded that Brent was making satisfactory emotional adjustment. Brent did thereafter resume many of his prior physical activities and by the time of trial his parents testified that he was doing very well. The evidence in no way suggested that Brent's mental faculties were impaired or that he was helpless. Rather, he has been an active member of society, and there was no indication that he will be unable to pursue gainful employment when he completes his education. 56 The jury may have accepted both the views of Brent's parents that the teenager's rebelliousness toward them resulted from the accident and the opinions of Drs. Camperlengo and Marrazo that Brent's self-possessed and upbeat exterior with others had masked repressed angry feelings and low self-esteem as a result of his amputation. But even if the jury entirely accepted those contentions, there was no evidence of any more serious psychological problem or of any enduring injury. Such evidence as there was was woefully insufficient to support any substantial portion of an award of $2,000,000. 57 We do not regard the New York cases as setting a maximum on the plaintiff's permissible recovery, but only as providing guidance as to levels of recovery that are realistic rather than fanciful. In light of the guidance provided, we conclude that the evidence in this case cannot justify an award to Brent in excess of $1,200,000. Since Brent was found to have been at fault to the extent of one-third of his injuries, judgment in his favor should not have been entered in an amount in excess of $800,000.