Opinion ID: 203801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: We review the district court's grant of a summary judgment de novo. See Collazo v. Nicholson, 535 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir.2008). Nevertheless, `[w]e may affirm the district court's decision on any grounds supported by the record.' Id. (quoting Estades-Negroni v. Assocs. Corp. of N. Am., 377 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir.2004)). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court constru[es] the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolv[es] all reasonable inferences in the party's favor. Rochester Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 287 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir.2002). Summary judgment is appropriate only if, viewing all factual disputes in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact that would prevent judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Montfort-Rodriguez v. Rey-Hernandez, 504 F.3d 221, 224 (1st Cir.2007). A genuine issue exists where a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party. Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.2000). Once the moving party avers an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the non-moving party must offer definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion. Mesnick v. General Electric Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991). However, `[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.' Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)); see also Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554-55, 110 S.Ct. 1331, 108 L.Ed.2d 504 (1990); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 696 n. 6, 82 S.Ct. 1404, 8 L.Ed.2d 777 (1962). Even in cases where elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, summary judgment may be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation. Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990)(citing Rossy v. Roche Prods., Inc., 880 F.2d 621, 624 (1st Cir.1989); Oliver v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 109-10 (1st Cir. 1988)); see also Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 935 (1st Cir.2008) (Although we give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, a party cannot rest on `conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, [or] unsupported speculation' to defeat a motion for summary judgment.)(quoting McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir. 1995)). Furthermore, the non-moving party's burden cannot be satisfied with a declaration that without proper explanation contradicts his/her prior deposition testimony. See Torrech-Hernandez, 519 F.3d at 47.
We agree with the district court's dismissal of Appellant's claim under the MCRA, since there is no evidence in the record to show that FedEx violated the MCRA by interfering with Appellant's rights secured by the Constitution or laws of either the United States or the Commonwealth, by threats, intimidation or coercion. Appellant alleges that summary judgment was improperly entered as to Count I of the Complaint, since the evidence presented demonstrated issues of material fact. We disagree and explain. The Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, requires a Plaintiff to demonstrate that (1) his exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of either the United States or the Commonwealth, (2) has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, and (3) that the interference or attempted interference was by `threats, intimidation or coercion.' Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. 713, 532 N.E.2d 49, 51-52 (1989)(quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, § 11H); see also Andresen v. Diorio, 349 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir.2003); Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.2002)(The MCRA provides a cause of action for any person whose rights under the Constitution, federal law, or state law have been interfered with by threats, intimidation, or coercion of another.); Ayasli v. Armstrong, 56 Mass.App.Ct. 740, 780 N.E.2d 926, 934 (2002); Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 51 Mass.App.Ct. 573, 747 N.E.2d 729, 745 (2001)(The MCRA creates no substantive civil rights; rather, it provides a mechanism for obtaining relief from the interference, or attempted interference, with rights conferred by Federal or Massachusetts law.) The Supreme Judicial Court has held that the interference or attempted interference must be by threat, intimidation or coercion, defined as follows: [t]hreat in this context involves the intentional exertion of pressure to make another fearful or apprehensive of injury or harm. See Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 399 Mass. 93, 502 N.E.2d 1375, 1381 (Mass.1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Delaney v. Chief of Police of Wareham, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 398, 539 N.E.2d 65, 71-72 (Mass.App.Ct. 1989) (acts or language by which another is placed in fear of injury or damage). Cf. Commonwealth v. Ditsch, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 1005, 475 N.E.2d 1235 (Mass.App.Ct.1985) (reasonable apprehension on the part of the recipient of a criminal threat). Intimidation involves putting in fear for the purpose of compelling or deterring conduct. See Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., supra; Delaney v. Chief of Police of Wareham, supra (creation of fear to compel conduct). In Deas v. Dempsey, 403 Mass. 468, 530 N.E.2d 1239, 1241 (Mass.1988), we quoted a definition of coercion from Webster's New International Dictionary at 519 (2d ed.1959): the application to another of such force, either physical or moral, as to constrain him to do against his will something he would not otherwise have done. See Delaney v. Chief of Police of Wareham, supra (the active domination of another's will). Planned Parenthood League v. Blake, 417 Mass. 467, 631 N.E.2d 985, 990 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868, 115 S.Ct. 188, 130 L.Ed.2d 122 (1994)(internal citations modified); see also Davignon v. Hodgson, 524 F.3d 91, 112 (1st Cir.2008); Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86 (1st Cir.2001); Haufler v. Zotos, 446 Mass. 489, 845 N.E.2d 322, 335 (2006). Appellant argues that the district court mischaracterized the incidents as a collection of minor, possibly harassing incidents [which] cannot be sufficient to satisfy the definition of threatening or coercive conduct under MCRA, especially where there is little evidence of any intent by [Appellant's] superiors to intimidate him. Meuser v. Federal Express Corporation, 524 F.Supp.2d 142, 148 (D.Mass.2007). The facts, considered in the light most favorable to Appellant based on the record before us, are the following: Appellant alleges that his employment's environment began to deteriorate after he filed the two OSHA complaints relating to the fumes he detected in his truck (October 21, 2002) and requested the MSDS sheets (January 17, 2003). [5] For example, in mid-January 2003, Meuser called Marotta, during his morning route, to ask him about the MSDS sheets. Marotta was allegedly abrupt with Meuser and told him that he did not have enough work if he had time to call about the MSDS sheets during his working route hours. Marotta further insinuated that Meuser had created the whole toxic fumes incident of October 2002, in order to lay the foundation for a later suit against FedEx. Furthermore, Meuser contends that the January 2003 OSHA inspection, which resulted in a citation by OSHA for not having the required MSDS sheets on site, fueled Marotta's retaliatory behavior as evidenced by Marotta's comment that he [Marotta] did not like to lose. [6] On January 24, 2003, the same day Meuser was provided with the MSDS sheets, Meuser contends that he was subjected to an unscheduled check ride by Langone. [7] In April 2003, although all of the couriers' work days were shortened to eight hours, Meuser's route was the only one that was altered to cover a larger area. Meuser alleges that the enlargement of his route caused service failures, delayed deliveries and rolled delivery (freight not delivered) as evidenced by Mrs. Robertson's delayed delivery. Meuser was not given any help notwithstanding his reiterated requests for assistance and despite the fact that it is a known FedEx policy to assist couriers when possible. [8] On April 16, 2003, due to Meuser's use of the dispatch system to make serious accusations against Deb Dahlgren, a female courier, Meuser was suspended with pay pending an investigation of the incident by his Manager, James Langone. On April 17, 2003 after completion of Langone's investigation, Meuser received a documented counseling for his behavior towards Deb Dahlgren and was sent a copy of FedEx's Acceptable Conduct policy, Section 2-5 in The People Manual. [9] On April 18, 2003, during a meeting with Marotta and Langone, Marotta told Meuser, regarding his request for a less dusty vehicle, that everything [he] was doing was bullshit,' App. 499. Furthermore, Marotta made a comment during the meeting that Meuser had somehow made up his February illness. [10] On August 4, 2003 Meuser filed a request for tuition reimbursement that was not approved until December 5, 2003. [11] On September 11, 2003, Meuser received a routine non-disciplining attendance memorandum from Jim Langone, informing Meuser that over the past twelve (12) months his attendance had been marginal and that his absence the day before, had put him below the company's acceptable rate of 96.9%. It was further recommended that necessary steps should be taken in order to avoid this type of situation and that any further violations would result in the issuance of a written Performance Reminder. [12] In September 2003 Meuser's route was changed due to the incident with Mrs. Robertson. On September 25, 2003, Meuser was issued a second warning letter for contacting a number of FedEx customers, whom he knew personally, and divulging to them confidential information by asking them to write to FedEx complaining about FedEx's determination to assign Meuser to another route. Finally, on November 17, 2003, Meuser met with James Langone and the new Senior Manager, Lisa Patterson, who had minimal knowledge of Meuser's history and no knowledge of his OSHA complaints. Patterson told Meuser that the letter, allegedly requesting a tuition reimbursement, was disrespectful in tone. During the same meeting, Patterson slammed her hands on the table and screamed that this would not be tolerated. Appellant alleges that since he was terrified at Patterson's reaction, he withdrew the letter. Meuser resigned from his position on November 24, 2003, effective December 5, 2003, after it had been represented by Langone that he was eligible for positive rehire status. However, after learning that having two warning letters in his record made him ineligible for positive rehire status, Meuser attempted to rescind his resignation. [13] Nevertheless, FedEx declined to accept the rescission. After reviewing the aforementioned incidents and the evidence of record, in the light most favorable to the Appellant, we find that Meuser failed to establish that FedEx's actions, considered individually or together, constituted threats, intimidation or coercion within the meaning of the MCRA. Furthermore, we find that the incidents attested to by Appellant do not rise to the level of a threat, defined as intentional exertion[s] of pressure [that would] make another fearful or apprehensive of injury or harm, nor can they be considered to rise to the level of intimidation defined as putting in fear for the purpose of compelling or deterring conduct, or coercion defined as such force, either physical or moral, as to constrain [him] to do against his will something he would not otherwise have done. Planned Parenthood League, 631 N.E.2d at 990; see also Haufler, 845 N.E.2d at 335. Furthermore, even if we disagree with FedEx's personnel or business decisions, a matter on which we take no view, [c]ourts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits  or even the rationality  of employers' ... business decisions. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 825. Moreover, we find that the district court correctly determined that the record is entirely devoid of anything resembling the sort of physical, moral, or economic pressure that courts have found sufficient to support a claim under this statute ... [especially when] ... the exception for claims based on non-physical coercion remains a narrow one. Meuser, 524 F.Supp.2d at 147 (citing Horne, 509 F.Supp.2d at 115); see also Kennie v. Natural Res. Dep't of Dennis, 69 Mass.App. Ct. 158, 866 N.E.2d 983 (2007); Buster v. George W. Moore, Inc., 438 Mass. 635, 783 N.E.2d 399, 411 (2003). Nevertheless, we shall proceed to examine the only incident that the district court found worthy of extended scrutiny. As aforementioned, Appellant claims that during his meeting with Patterson he was threatened, intimidated, and coerced by her behavior and comments towards him when she slammed her hands on the table and shouted at Meuser. Furthermore, Patterson suggested that his letter had been written by a lawyer, and that if that was the case, he should reflect on it, because his appeal would not be considered. She further explained that if he had acquired an attorney, any further complaints he might have had with FedEx would then have to be dealt between his attorney and FedEx's legal department. Consequently, Appellant alleges that since he was terrified at Patterson's reaction, he withdrew his letter requesting his Personnel File. Appellant's Br. 18. [14] Applying the objective standard of a reasonable person to determine whether [Patterson's] conduct constituted threats, intimidation, or coercion under the act, Haufler, 845 N.E.2d at 335, we agree with the district court's finding that this type of behavior, though it approaches the line, fails to constitute the kind of threatening or intimidating behavior the MCRA requires. Meuser, 524 F.Supp.2d at 148. As aforementioned, the fact that Meuser might have found Patterson's conduct intimidating or threatening in some way, is irrelevant. Cignetti, 89 F.Supp.2d at 125. [T]he state of mind of the person threatened is not controlling, it is whether a reasonable person in Appellant's circumstance would feel threatened, intimidated or coerced by Ms. Patterson's conduct. Commonwealth v. DeVincent, 358 Mass. 592, 266 N.E.2d 314, 316 (1971); see also Planned Parenthood League, 631 N.E.2d at 990 (citing DeVincent, 266 N.E.2d at 316). The Legislature explicitly limited the [act's] remedy to situations where the derogation of secured rights occurs by threats, intimidation or coercion. The Legislature intended that even a direct deprivation of a plaintiff's secured rights would not be actionable under the act unless it were accomplished by means of one of these three constraining elements. Buster, 783 N.E.2d at 409 (internal citations omitted). Consequently, we find using an objective standard, that Patterson's conduct of slamming her hands on the desk and allegedly shouting at Meuser cannot be considered in any way within the context of the act as either a threat, intimidation or coercion. See Haufler, 845 N.E.2d at 335; see also Cignetti, 89 F.Supp.2d at 125. Moreover, we emphasize that Patterson had replaced Mr. Marotta as the senior manager of Hatfield, only two weeks prior to the incident. It is uncontested that Patterson had minimal knowledge of Meuser's employment history at FedEx and no knowledge of the fumes-related OSHA incident. Consequently, there is no evidence that she was tainted by Appellant's OSHA complaints, which is the motivating factor alleged by Meuser under the MCRA. Hence, the short-lived incident of slamming her hands on the desk, cannot be linked with Meuser's exercise of other statutory rights. See Carmack v. Amtrak, 486 F.Supp.2d 58, 92 (D.Mass.2007)(Nothing in the record indicates that Amtrak's true motivation was to punish Mr. Carmack for communicating with his union representative or for exercising his right to free speech.); Fletcher v. Szostkiewicz, 190 F.Supp.2d 217, 232 (D.Mass.2002) (criticizing a pattern of harassment as a possible basis for a finding of threatening behavior). Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Appellant's claim under MCRA.
We agree with the district court's dismissal of Appellant's common law claim for discharge in violation of public policy. Appellant alleges that the district court improperly entered summary judgment on Count III since the record shows that he was subjected to a sustained campaign of harassment and retaliation from October 2002 until his resignation on November 24, 2003. Appellant further alleges that although he requested to return to work at FedEx, his amenability was predicated upon a future change in management. Moreover, Meuser avers that his resignation was submitted with the assumption that he was eligible for re-hire. Massachusetts courts recognize an exception to the general at-will employment rule `when employment is terminated contrary to a well-defined public policy.' Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 59 (1st Cir.2009)(quoting Wright v. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children, 412 Mass. 469, 589 N.E.2d 1241, 1244 (1992)); see also GTE Products Corp. v. Stewart, 421 Mass. 22, 653 N.E.2d 161, 168-69 (1995). For example: Redress is available for employees who are terminated for asserting a legally guaranteed right (e.g., filing workers' compensation claim), for doing what the law requires (e.g., serving on a jury), or for refusing to do that which the law forbids (e.g., committing perjury). Hinchey v. NYNEX Corp., 144 F.3d 134, 145 (1st Cir.1998)(citing Smith-Pfeffer v. Superintendent of the Walter E. Fernald State Sch., 404 Mass. 145, 533 N.E.2d 1368, 1371 (1989)). Nevertheless, [t]his public policy exception is construed narrowly. Day, 555 F.3d at 59 (citing King v. Driscoll, 418 Mass. 576, 638 N.E.2d 488, 492 (1994)). [T]o do otherwise would `convert the general rule ... into a rule that requires just cause to terminate an at  will employee.' King, 638 N.E.2d at 492 (quoting Smith-Pfeffer, 533 N.E.2d at 1371). As aforementioned, Appellant contends that he was constructively discharged due to a sustained campaign of harassment and retaliation from October 2002 until his resignation on November 24, 2003. Nevertheless, it has been well established in this Circuit that [t]o prove constructive discharge, a plaintiff must usually show that [his] working conditions were so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in [his] shoes would have felt compelled to resign. It is not enough that the plaintiff suffered the ordinary slings and arrows that workers routinely encounter in a hard, cold world. In order to establish constructive discharge, [Plaintiff] must show that conditions were so intolerable that they rendered a seemingly voluntary resignation a termination. In such cases, [t]he question is not whether working conditions at the facility were difficult or unpleasant, but rather, an employee must show that, at the time of his resignation, his employer did not allow him the opportunity to make a free choice regarding his employment relationship. Thus, in order for a resignation to constitute a constructive discharge, it effectively must be void of choice or free will. Torrech-Hernandez, 519 F.3d at 50 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (quoting De La Vega v. San Juan Star, Inc., 377 F.3d 111, 117 (1st Cir.2004); see also GTE Products Corp., 653 N.E.2d at 168-69 (`[T]he trier of fact must be satisfied that the new working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign.' The test is met if, based on an objective assessment of the conditions under which the employee has asserted he was expected to work, it could be found they were so difficult as to be intolerable. (quoting Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir.1977))); Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 3 F.3d 476, 481 (1st Cir.1993); Aviles-Martinez v. Monroig, 963 F.2d 2, 6 (1st Cir.1992); Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir.1983)). We briefly explain our analysis as to why Plaintiff's allegations regarding his FedEx working conditions do not rise to the level of intolerableness which would compel a reasonable person in his position to resign. Plaintiff was in fact able to file his two OSHA related complaints and he did not have any further related OSHA complaints. Meuser admits that he applied and was granted leave pursuant to the FMLA. Therefore, the fact that one day of his FMLA leave was erroneously counted in a non-disciplinary letter, recognized by the employer as an error, was not `so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in [his] shoes would have felt compelled to resign.' GTE Products Corp., 653 N.E.2d at 168-69 (quoting Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir.1977)). The dusty truck incident resulted in a documented counseling without any suspension; it was not unreasonable for the employer to opine that he used the dusty truck to camouflage a failure in his services (leaving a package behind). The DADS usage by Meuser to send an offensive message to a female courier co-worker, regarding an issue that occurred a year earlier, resulted in a documented counseling for using an employment related communication instrument that could not be used for that purpose. Furthermore, Meuser admitted that he had a grudge against the female worker and that he lost his cool. Hence, Meuser could not be affected to the point of intolerable work environment. Moreover, the tuition reimbursement was in fact a fringe benefit which was alerted to him by management, Mr. Langone, during a routine check ride. Meuser had not stated in the request that the reimbursement was for a graduate course. He modified the request and the reimbursement was granted after the company verified that economics was related to his employment. Even if there was fault in initially denying the reimbursement, it is not a matter compelling resignation. The change of Meuser's route, and of all the other couriers', was a business decision determined in November 2002, prior to other work-related incidents, and implemented after he returned from FMLA leave, during April 2003. Meuser alleged that the order was a reprisal for Meuser requesting the MSDS sheets in January 17, 2003, while he was delivering packages. Nevertheless, it is uncontested on the record that the decision to change the routes as to all the couriers was made on November 2002 and postponed for a later date at the request of the couriers. The alleged check ride reprisal resulted in no disciplinary action whatsoever, it constituted a valid traditional manner to check courier performance, and resulted in a positive evaluation for Meuser. Hence, Meuser cannot seriously allege that the check ride was so unpleasant to the point of compelling him to resign. Finally, the most significant disciplinary action, wherein Meuser was suspended, was caused by Meuser's own conduct. Appellant recruited and involved FedEx customers relating to the disciplinary action taken by FedEx against Meuser due to the incident with Mrs. Robertson, a FedEx client. The customers were recruited by Meuser in an effort to persuade FedEx to rescind the disciplinary action of changing his route. The communication of Meuser with FedEx customers was thus not authorized and further revealed inside information to clients. After a thorough review of the record, we are in agreement with the district court's finding that [n]othing in the record of this case would justify a jury in reasonably concluding that Plaintiff's working conditions reached anything approaching the level of [intolerableness] required to provide a basis for a claim of wrongful discharge. Meuser, 524 F.Supp.2d at 149. Furthermore, we find that the fact that Meuser attempted to rescind his resignation, after he learned that he was not eligible for positive rehire status as he originally thought, is clear evidence that Meuser's working conditions were not so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in [his] shoes would have felt compelled to resign,' GTE Products Corp., 653 N.E.2d at 169 (quoting Alicea Rosado, 562 F.2d at 119), and that he had the opportunity to make a free choice regarding his employment relationship. Torrech-Hernandez, 519 F.3d at 50. In other words, his resignation was not effectively ... void of choice or free will. Id.