Opinion ID: 1160402
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Right to a Continuance

Text: From the time that this Court first considered the matter in Robinson v. State, 18 Wyo. 216, 106 P. 24 (1910), until now this Court has followed the rule that a motion for continuance based upon the necessity for additional trial preparation is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, the exercise of which is subject to review but only for abuse of discretion. Adger v. State, supra; Ash v. State, supra; and authorities cited therein. The determination as to whether there has been an abuse of discretion is going to depend upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case, as we have recognized in Ash v. State, supra, and Adger v. State, supra, by our reliance upon Unger v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964), reh. den., 377 U.S. 925, 84 S.Ct. 1218, 12 L.Ed.2d 217 (1964). The court is justified in refusing to permit a defendant to manipulate or subvert the orderly procedure of the court in connection with the exercise of his right to counsel. United States v. Casey, 480 F.2d 151 (5th Cir.1973), cert. den., 414 U.S. 1045, 94 S.Ct. 550, 38 L.Ed.2d 336 (1973). An extensive compilation of cases dealing generally with the right to counsel and the manner in which courts have disposed of situations in which a defendant wishes to change counsel can be found in Annot., 73 A.L.R.3d 725 (1976). In those instances in which a defendant chooses to represent himself the general rule still is applied that the matter of a continuance is a discretionary matter with the trial court, and the refusal to grant the continuance is not error unless an abuse of discretion is demonstrated. People v. Bourland, 247 Cal.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Cal. App. 1967), cert. den., 388 U.S. 920, 87 S.Ct. 2142, 18 L.Ed.2d 1367 (1967); People v. Murphy, 3 Ill. App.3d 345, 277 N.E.2d 721 (1972); Walker v. State, 85 Nev. 337, 455 P.2d 34 (1969); Robertson v. State, Okl.Crim., 503 P.2d 896 (1972). Whether the discharge of counsel is supported by sufficient reasons or not is one of the factors which courts have regarded as significant in considering a motion for continuance. See, e.g., Arellanes v. United States, 302 F.2d 603 (9th Cir.1962), cert. den., 371 U.S. 930, 83 S.Ct. 294, 9 L.Ed.2d 238 (1962); Baca v. People, 139 Colo. 111, 336 P.2d 712 (1959); People v. Washington, 41 Ill.2d 16, 241 N.E.2d 425 (1968); Walter v. State, 4 Md. App. 373, 243 A.2d 626 (1968); State v. Pflieger, 15 Or. App. 383, 515 P.2d 1348 (1973); State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 272 P.2d 195 (1954). In the instant case there was no justification for discharge of counsel. Irvin was advised by the public defender that the court would not take him off Irvin's case. Irvin expresses a lack of confidence in, and perhaps dislike for the public defender, but still there is no evidence showing any reason for discharge. The case was not being tried initially, and Irvin had been present at the previous trial. The court pointed out that Irvin knew who the witnesses had been before and would be again, and inquired as to the reasons behind the request for a continuance. Irvin responded that he needed to have legal material to go ahead and perform his job, and mentioned specifically a bill of particulars together with things like this. Irvin further indicated that he needed more time to prepare his case because he had not gone through the transcript or anything, and in response to a particular inquiry as to those things he would do if a continuance were granted, Irvin responded only that he would prepare a defense in his behalf. Pursuing that the court asked whether prepare a defense meant legally or factually, and again pointed out to Irvin that he had heard all of the evidence and all the testimony of the witnesses the first time the case was tried. Irvin's response was that this was a different trial, and he suggested that there were other witnesses that the State intended to call. The county attorney indicated he did not think the State would call any new witnesses other than those used in the initial trial except possibly for rebuttal, but the praecipe for a subpoena does show an additional witness, Larry Wall, in the second trial. Larry Wall, in fact, did not testify, and the record discloses that Irvin was arrested in Wall's apartment, and that Wall was present at the scene of the robbery and participated in some of the events of the robbery. After the jury was selected Irvin renewed his request for a continuance stating that he needed a bill of exceptions. There was further dialogue about additional witnesses, but Irvin was vague as to which witnesses he wanted to know about and why it was improper for the State to call them as he was contending. The court ultimately ruled that it still would refuse to grant a continuance because prepared counsel was present who stated that he was ready for trial. The trial judge further stated that the information available to him persuaded him that Irvin had been dilatory in presenting his request to act as his own counsel, and in his request for a continuance. The court refused to permit Irvin to postpone the trial simply by discharging the public defender who was going to remain and act as standby counsel. If such a tactic were permissible it certainly would represent one way of playing a cat and mouse game with the court. Ash v. State, supra. The record shows that counsel who previously had been appointed was present during the course of the trial, assisted at various stages of the trial, and in fact, made a motion for a mistrial, the denial of which Irvin complains as his third point of error. When Irvin elected to testify he was examined by the public defender. A comparison of the two trial records reveals that they are substantially identical with the exception of those tactical mistakes Irvin made in acting as his own attorney in the second case. Examining all of the facts and circumstances, we are not persuaded that Irvin was denied a fair trial because of the refusal of the district court to grant a continuance. The record is barren of any showing by Irvin of the particular need for additional time, and in this respect the case is different from Adger v. State, supra, but quite similar to the case of Ash v. State, supra. We therefore conclude there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the district judge in refusing to grant Irvin's motion for a continuance in this case. State v. Powell, 277 N.C. 672, 178 S.E.2d 417 (1971).