Opinion ID: 2169792
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Criminal Solicitation

Text: The defendant argues that the trial justice erred by denying his pretrial motion to dismiss, his motion for judgment of acquittal, and his motion for a new trial, by ruling that the crime of solicitation in Rhode Island does not require, as an element of the offense, that the communication actually be received by the intended recipient. On appeal, defendant urges this Court to find the statute ambiguousspecifically the word anotherand that this ambiguity should have inured to his benefit at trial according to the rule of lenity. Not surprisingly, the state advances the contrary position. Because the issue presented is one of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. State v. Menard, 888 A.2d 57, 60 (R.I.2005); State v. Oliveira, 882 A.2d 1097, 1110 (R.I.2005). When called upon to review a statute, `our ultimate goal is to give effect to the General Assembly's intent.    The best evidence of such intent can be found in the plain language used in the statute.' Menard, 888 A.2d at 60. `When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we must enforce the statute as written by giving the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning.' Gem Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Rossi, 867 A.2d 796, 811 (R.I.2005). [W]hen we examine an unambiguous statute, `there is no room for statutory construction and we must apply the statute as written.' Menard, 888 A.2d at 60 (quoting State v. Santos, 870 A.2d 1029, 1032 (R.I.2005)). Furthermore, it is axiomatic that `this Court will not broaden statutory provisions by judicial interpretation unless such interpretation is necessary and appropriate in carrying out the clear intent or defining the terms of the statute.' Id. (quoting Santos, 870 A.2d at 1032). Section 11-1-9 provides as follows: Every person who solicits another to commit or join in the commission of a felony under the laws of this state shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be subject to the same fine and imprisonment as pertain to the offense which the person did solicit another to commit, provided that imprisonment for the solicitation shall not exceed ten (10) years. State v. Rossi, 520 A.2d 582 (R.I.1987), represents the only opportunity this Court has had to construe Rhode Island's criminal solicitation statute. In that case, the defendant was convicted of soliciting an eight-year-old girl to commit perjury by coaching her to identify the defendant's landlord as her sexual assailant rather than the defendant himself. Id. at 583. The defendant challenged his conviction, arguing that since the young girl could not have been guilty of perjury because of her status as a minor, he could not be guilty of soliciting her to commit that crime. Id. We disagreed and concluded that [f]or the crime of solicitation to be completed, it is only necessary that the person solicit another to commit a crime. Id. However, Rossi did not give us occasion to entertain the question now before the Court, namely whether an illicit solicitation must be received by the intended recipient to qualify as a punishable offense. To support his interpretation, defendant cites several cases from other jurisdictions that purportedly have adopted his position on uncommunicated solicitations. The first of these are State v. Cotton, 109 N.M. 769, 790 P.2d 1050 (Ct.App.1990), and State v. Lee, 105 Or.App. 329, 804 P.2d 1208 (1991). Contrary to defendant's urging, however, we think that the logic employed in both Cotton and Lee makes each of these cases immaterial to our opinion in the case at bar. The New Mexico Court of Appeals in Cotton and the Oregon Court of Appeals in Lee each began by recognizing that its state's solicitation statute was motivated, at least in part, by the Model Penal Code. [5] Cotton, 790 P.2d at 1052-53; Lee, 804 P.2d at 1210. Each court found that because its state's legislature had opted not to adopt the second section of the pertinent Model Penal Code provision  the section that renders irrelevant whether or not a solicitation is actually communicatedthere existed an implicit legislative intent to make receipt of the communication an element of criminal solicitation. Cotton, 790 P.2d at 1053; Lee, 804 P.2d at 1210. As an initial matter, the disparity in language between G.L.1956 § 11-1-9 and the Model Penal Code § 5.02 (Official Draft 1962) (MPC) convinces us that the Rhode Island criminal solicitation statute is not modeled after the MPC provision. In addition, there is no indication that our General Assembly specifically rejectedor even consideredsubsection (2) of § 5.02 of the MPC's criminal solicitation definition. In the absence of such evidence, we cannot see how Cotton and Lee are instructive here. The defendant next offers a California case in support of his argument. In People v. Saephanh, 80 Cal.App.4th 451, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 910 (2000), the California Court of Appeals for the Fifth District was presented with a factual scenario that is nearly identical to the matter now before us. While in prison, the defendant in Saephanh was informed by a lady friend that she was pregnant with his child. Soon after, prison officials intercepted a letter authored by the defendant and addressed to an acquaintance requesting that the friend, with the assistance of others, cause the death of his unborn child by physically assaulting the pregnant woman. The defendant was charged with solicitation of murder, [6] and he was subsequently found guilty following a jury trial. The defendant claimed on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of solicitation since it was uncontested that his acquaintance never received the letter. Id. at 911-12. The California Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant. First, the court disposed of both Cotton and Lee, citing the same reasons we set forth above: Section 653f, enacted in 1929, is not based on the [MPC].    Thus, we disagree    that Cotton and Lee examined `solicitation statutes similar to California's Penal Code section 653f,' at least in terms of legislative history and intent. We find Cotton and Lee unpersuasive on the issue of whether section 653f criminalizes the making of soliciting communications not received by the intended recipient. Saephanh, 94 Cal. Rptr.2d at 914. Instead, the Saephanh court relied upon the express language of the California statute to hold that solicitation necessarily requires that the intended recipient actually receive the communication: The plain language of section 653f, in particular the phrase `solicits another,' demonstrates that proof the defendant's soliciting message was received by an intended recipient is required for liability to attach.    However, [no intended recipient] ever received the soliciting message. Thus, appellant did not solicit [any intended recipient]. Saephanh, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d at 915. The state does not attempt to distinguish Saephanh. Instead, the state suggests that this Court adopt the reasoning of the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Lubow, 29 N.Y.2d 58, 323 N.Y.S.2d 829, 272 N.E.2d 331, 332 (1971), which held that the New York criminal solicitation statute encompassed uncommunicated solicitations. [7] A comparison of the New York solicitation statute at play in Lubow with Rhode Island's law, however, quickly dispatches the state's argument. According to the Lubow court's opinion, the New York statute provided, in pertinent part: that with intent that another person shall `engage in conduct constituting a crime' the accused `solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct.  Id. 323 N.Y.S.2d 829, 272 N.E.2d at 332 (emphasis added). In fact, the Lubow court specifically relied upon this attempt provision in concluding that criminal solicitation in New York proscribed even an uncommunicated solicitation. Id. The Rhode Island statute, on the other hand, contains no attempt language. See § 11-1-9. Thus, Lubow is simply unhelpful as to whether uncommunicated solicitations are illegal under statutes that do not expressly criminalize attempted solicitations. [8] We think that, in accord with the California Court of Appeals in Saephanh, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d at 915, the plain language of § 11-1-9 clearly indicates that actual receipt of a criminal solicitation by an intended solicitee is required for liability to attach. Specifically, the phrase solicits another commands this result. [9] In the present case, defendant sought to solicit his brother to kill a woman whose testimony might have landed defendant in prison for a lengthy stay. But his brother never received the message; therefore, no solicitation was made. The state insists, however, that the crime of solicitation is complete when the request is made, regardless of whether the intended solicitee is ever actually in receipt of the communication. For support, the state points us to the MPC § 5.02 and commentaries. The state suggests that since we already have cited the MPC when previously construing § 11-1-9 in Rossi, 520 A.2d at 583-84, we are now constrained to interpret this same statute in accord with the MPC yet again. We disagree. Our reference in Rossi to MPC § 5.04(1)(b) was nothing more than a note that the Court's holding was a view also supported by the drafters of the MPC. Rossi, 520 A.2d at 583-84. It certainly was not a wholesale adoption of the MPC's interpretation of what constitutes criminal solicitation. Indeed, it would be inappropriate for this Court to eschew the plain meaning of our own statute for that of another without the General Assembly's having enacted a provision akin to MPC § 5.02(2). We point out that our decision herein concurs with the great weight of authority on this precise point. LaFave posits that if the solicitor's message never reaches the person intended to be solicited,    [t]he act is nonetheless criminal, although it may be that the solicitor must be prosecuted for an attempt to solicit on such facts. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 11.1(c) at 198 (2d ed.2003) (emphasis added). In fact, the only support LaFave cites for an uncommunicated solicitation not being prosecuted as an attempt is MPC § 5.02, and a handful of state statutes promulgated pursuant to that provision. 2 LaFave, § 11.1(c) at 198 & n. 94; see also Haw.Rev.Stat. § 705-510 (1993); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3303 (1995); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-203, 76-4-204 (2003). Even the commentary to MPC § 5.02 admits that at common law liability attached even though the communication failed to reach the party intended to be solicited, although generally in [this] instance the solicitor had to be prosecuted for an attempt to solicit. MPC § 5.02, Comment at 380-81; see also 21 Am. Jur.2d Criminal Law § 182 (1998) (Completed communication between the actor and the person to be solicited must be proven to find the actor guilty of the crime of solicitation.). Furthermore, the policies that motivate the proscription of solicitation support our interpretation. Criminal solicitation statutes such as § 11-1-9 have the twofold purpose of protecting the inhabitants of [a state] from being exposed to inducement to commit or join in the commission of crimes and preventing solicitations from resulting in the commission of the crimes solicited. Saephanh, 94 Cal. Rptr.2d at 915. However, the threat of exposure to criminal inducements and the resulting danger of the actuation of criminal offenses become realized only upon receipt by an intended recipient. Because in the present case it is undisputed that Henriquez never received defendant's letter, there was no real threat that he would be induced to commit a criminal offense. The state cites authority for the proposition that there is, in fact, another policy at play here. According to MPC § 5.02, Comment at 381, [t]he crucial manifestation of dangerousness lies in the endeavor to communicate the incriminating message to another person, it being wholly fortuitous whether the message was actually received. Liability should attach, therefore, even though the message is not received by the contemplated recipient   . The state suggests, then, that defendant's conduct was culpable enough to warrant prosecution. We agree, but a prosecution for solicitation is not the proper vehicle. As mentioned above, cases involving uncommunicated solicitations are typically prosecuted as attempts to solicit. See 2 LaFave, § 11.1(c); MPC § 5.02, Comment at 380-81; see also 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law at § 182. And this makes sense: If we are to preserve the distinction between attempts and their choate counterparts, we simply cannot adopt the state's reasoning, which essentially would raze the line between solicitation and attempted solicitation. The General Assembly has given no indication that this is its intent. Instead, the mere existence of G.L.1956 § 12-17-14 [10] indicates a clear legislative desire to maintain the inchoate/choate divide. This statute also provides the proper vehicle by which the defendant in this case could be prosecuted. The plain language of both § 11-1-9 and § 12-17-14 clearly proscribe attempted solicitation. The evidence presented in this case would tend to prove that defendant authored a letter soliciting another to commit murder and proceeded to post that communication, which, in our opinion, represented the last proximate act to effect communication with the party whom the actor [intended] to solicit   . MPC § 5.02, Comment at 381. Accordingly, we direct the entry of a judgment of acquittal for the crime of solicitation and remand this case for a new trial on the crime of attempted solicitation pursuant to § 11-1-9 and § 12-17-14.