Opinion ID: 282925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Ill Rev.Stat. ch. 34 429.16 (1967), ch. 91 1/2 100-10 (1961).

Text: Ind.Ann.Stat. 22-1501-1513 (1957). Iowa Code 123A.1-.8 (1961). Kan.Stat.Ann. 74-4401-4413 (1953). Ky.Rev.Stat. 222.020-.195 (1960). La.Rev.Stat. 40-2008-8.3 (1958). Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. Tit. 22 1351-1355 (1954). Md.Ann.Code art. 2C 1-4 (1960). Mass.Gen.Laws 123.80 (1962). Mich.Stat.Ann. 330.18 (1949), 436.47a (1951). Minn.Stat. 144.81-.84 (1957), 144.831-.834 (1967), 253A.03, .07 (1967). Neb.Rev.Stat. 83-157-169 (1967), 83-307.01-03 (1951). Nev.Rev.Stat. 433.250-.290 (1967). N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. 172.1-.14 (1947, 1967). N.J.Rev.Stat. 26:2B-1-6 (1948). N.M.Stat.Ann. 46-12-1-13 (1949), 46-12.7 (1967). N.Y.Mental Hygiene Law 301-309 (1965). N.C.Gen.Stat. 122.7.1 (1961), 122.35.13-.17 (1967), 122.65.6-.9 (1967). N.D.Cent.Code 23-17.1-01-07 (1965), 54-01-19, subd. 4 (1953), 54-38-01-09 (1965). Ohio Rev.Code 3701.141 (1959). Okla.Stat. Tit. 630 2101-2108 (1968). Ore.Rev.Stat. 430.020, .080-.100 (1961). Pa.Stat.Tit. 50 2101-2113 (1953). R.I.Gen.Laws Ann. 11-45-1 (1962), 40-12-1-23 (1951). S.C.Code Ann. 32-895-904 (1967). S.D.Sess.Laws 1967, ch. 127, 281 (March 14, 1967). Tenn.Code Ann. 33-801-811 (1963). Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 5561c (1953, 1967). Utah Code Ann. 55-13-1-7 (1957, 1967). Vt.Stat.Ann. Tit. 18 8401-8462 (1967). Va.Code Ann. 18.1-200.1 (1966), 32.378.1-.4 (1966). Wash.Rev.Code 70.96.010-.900 (1957, 1965). W.Va.Code Ann. 27-6-1-5 (1965). Wis.Stat. 51.09 (1935, 1963), 51.25 (1963). 47 MD.CODE Article 2C 1 (1960) 48 These states are: Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. For code cites, see Note 37 In addition, three other states provide for the commitment of alcoholics: Miss. Code Ann. 436-01-12 (1950); Mont. Rev.Code Ann. 38-701-711 (1911); and Wyo.Stat.Ann. 25-32 (1899). Hawaii is not included in the compilations of state laws in Notes 37 and 39; the Hawaii code was unavailable at the time this was written. 49 Quoted in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra Note 33, 22 50 Durham v. United States, supra Note 5, 94 U.S.App.D.C. at 240, 214 F.2d at 874 51 Those cases do, however, shed light on this area in their discussions of disease as negating criminal responsibility. Driver, 356 F.2d at 764: 'Although his misdoing objectively comprises the physical elements of a crime, nevertheless no crime has been perpetrated because the conduct was neither actuated by an evil intent nor accompanied with a consciousness of wrongdoing, indispensable ingredients of a crime.    Nor can his misbehavior be penalized as a transgression of a police regulation-- malum prohabitum-- necessitating no intent to do what it punishes. The alcoholic's presence in public is not his act, for he did not will it. It may be likened to the movements of an imbecile or a person in a delirium of a fever.   ' Easter, 124 U.S.App.D.C. at 35, 361 F.2d at 52: '   An essential element of criminal responsibility is the ability to avoid the conduct specified in the definition of the crime. Action within the definition is not enough. To be guilty of the crime a person must engage responsibly in the action. Thus, an insane person who does the act is not guilty of th crime. The law, in such a case based on morals, absolves him of criminal responsibility. So, too, in case of an infant.   ' 52 Under the civil commitment statute, 21 D.C.CODE 501-591 (1967), persons suffering from mental illness can be committed. Mental illness is defined as 'a psychosis or other disease which substantially impairs the mental health of a person.' 21 D.C.CODE 501. Under this definition, for purposes of commitment, I think that an alcoholic would come within the statute and could be civilly committed if dangerous to himself or others Commitment of alcoholics under this statute is separate from the provisions of 24 D.C.CODE 501 et seq., as amended in August 1968 (Alcoholic Rehabilitation Act of 1967, Public Law 90-452, 90th Congress). Those sections provide for civil commitment of alcoholics for a period of up to 30 days, or in repeated cases up to 90 days. In addition that Act provides for commitment in lieu of prosecution for misdemeanants who prior to trial choose to be committed to a treatment center. This commitment cannot exceed the maximum term of imprisonment for the misdemeanor charged. This opinion is intended to cover only those situations where the Alcoholic Rehabilitation Act does not apply. Thus the opinion is intended to apply to defendants charged with committing a felony. However, I note that under 7(b) (2) of that Act, the Act does not apply to misdemeanants unless there are available 'adequate and appropriate treatment' facilities. In a case where the Act is held inapplicable for such a reason, this opinion would apply. I wish to make clear that declaring alcoholism a mental illness within the terms of the commitment statute in no way indicates that it is a mental illness within the terms of the insanity defense. Indeed, this opinion has stressed that alcoholics should be relieved of criminal responsibility where their actions were produced by their disease, not because the disease is a mental illness, but simply because, mental or physical or both, it is a disease. Commitment would not be automatic; as with mental illness, there would need to be an independent hearing. See Bolton v. Harris, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 395 F.2d 642 (1968). 53 As noted above, there is no medical agreement on an exact definition of alcoholism. Some definitions emphasize the excessive drinking and the socially debilitating aspects of the disease, others the compulsive nature of the drinking. In this area, as with mental illness: '   Since the question of whether the defendant has a disease or defect is ultimately for the triers of fact, obviously its resolution cannot be controlled by expert opinion.   ' McDonald v. United States, supra Note 5, 114 U.S.App.D.C. at 124, 312 F.2d at 851. In McDonald the court gave a legal definition of insanity which the jury was to apply. In this area as well, a McDonald approach should be our guide. However, that case was not decided until the courts had had eight years of experience with the Durham rule. At this juncture it seems best to wait until the trial courts and juries have some experience with expert testimony on the nature of alcoholism before fashioning a judicial definition of the disease. 54 The test for 'product' in the insanity area was stated in Carter v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 236, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (1957): '   The facts concerning the disease and the facts concerning the act are such as to justify reasonably the conclusion that 'But for this disease the act would not have been committed. The dissenters in Powell v. State of Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968), who would have held it unconstitutional to punish public drunkenness, assumed that such a showing would not arise for other acts: 'It is not foreseeable that findings such as those which are decisive here-- namely that the defendant's being intoxicated in public was a part of the pattern of his disease and due to a compulsion symptomatic of that disease-- could or would be made in the case of offenses such as driving a car while intoxicated, assault, theft, or robbery. Such offenses require independent acts or conduct and do not typically flow from and are not part of the syndrome of the disease of chronic alcoholism. If an alcoholic should be convicted for criminal conduct which is not a characteristic and involuntary part of the pattern of the disease as it afflicts him, nothing herein would prevent his punishment.' 392 U.S. at 559 n. 2, 88 S.Ct. at 2167 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Fortas). These Justices would seem to be open, however, to a showing that some act was a 'characteristic and involuntary part of the pattern of the disease as it afflicts' the defendant. The Powell dissenters' assumption, however, may not be so clear. For a discussion of the relationship between alcohol and criminal behavior, see Slovenko, supra Note 33; Pittman, Public Intoxication and the Alcoholic Offender in American Society, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra Note 33, 13. 55 District of Columbia v. Phillips, Criminal Nos. DC 854-55-67 (unreported), reprinted in 113 CONG.REC. H5584 (May 16, 1968, daily ed.), at H5587 56 D.C.CODE 22-2901 (1967) 57 This adjudication occurred in August, 1966, the same month in which the robbery was committed 58 See note 17, infra, and accompanying text 59 See note 22, infra, and accompanying text 60 Not his counsel on this appeal 61 Voluntary drunkenness, see note 11, infra, is not of itself an excuse for crime. King v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 318, 323, 372 F.2d 383, 388 (1966); Bishop v. United States, 71 App.D.C. 132, 136, 107 F.2d 297, 301-302 (1939). It is, however, relevant to and may negate specific intent. Heideman v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 128, 131, 259 F.2d 943, 946 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 959, 79 S.Ct. 800, 3 L.Ed.2d 767 (1959); Proctor v. United States, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 341, 177 F.2d 656 (1949); Sabens v. United States, 40 App.D.C. 440, 443 (1913). Compare Parker v. United States, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 346-347, 359 F.2d 1009, 1012-1013 (1966) 62 124 U.S.App.D.C. 33, 361 F.2d 50 (en banc 1966) 63 61 Stat. 744 (1947), D.C.CODE 24-501 to 24-514 (1967). But see District of Columbia Alcoholic Rehabilitation Act of 1967, 82 Stat. 618 (1968) 64 124 U.S.App.D.C. at 35, 361 F.2d at 52. Compare Powell v. State of Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 S.Ct. 2154, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968) 65 Our Easter decision, supra note 7, did not touch issues of that character. See 124 U.S.App.D.C. at 35-36, 44, 361 F.2d at 52-53, 61 66 Even the common law recognizes the distinction between voluntary and involuntary intoxication-- the former as a defense only if it precludes a specific intent which is an essential element of the crime, and the latter as a defense if present in a degree sufficient to destroy cognition. See generally W. Burdick, The Law of Crime 213, 216-21 (1946); R. Perkins, Criminal Law 777, 781-95 (1957); 1 Wharton, Criminal Law & Procedure 102-04 (R. Anderson ed.1957). See also People v. Koch, 250 App.Div. 623, 294 N.Y.S. 987 (1937) (conviction for operating motor vehicle while intoxicated reversed because intoxicating substance was taken for medicinal purposes); State v. Brown, 38 Kan. 390, 16 P. 259 (1888) (public drunkenness excused by ignorance of intoxicating potentiality of beverage) 67 See, e.g., Durham v. United States, 94 U.S.App.d,.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862 (1954); McDonald v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 120, 312 F.2d 847 (en banc 1962) 68 See Easter v. district of Columbia, supra note 7, 124 U.S.App.D.C. at 35, 36, 361 F.2d at 52, 53 69 See the cases cited supra note 12 70 See Easter v. District of Columbia, supra note 7, 124 U.S.App.D.C. at 35, 361 F.2d at 52 71 See Powell v. State of Texas, supra note 9, 392 U.S. at 517-531, 88 S.Ct 2145 72 Government witnesses expressed only their opinions on Salzman's state of sobriety at the time of the offense. Salzman himself, after testifying to his drinking prior to the robbery and his many arrests for intoxication, said only that 'sometimes you are high and sometimes you are higher and sometimes you just don't know what you are doing.' 73 See the cases cited supra note 6 74 Defense counsel's opening statement to the jury alluded to specific intent to steal as an essential element of the robbery with which Salzman was charged, and stated that Salzman would show that at the time of the offense he was under the influence of slcohol and that he had previously been adjudged a chronic alcoholic 75 Salzman's counsel in closing argument called the jury's attention to the necessity of proof of specific intent in robbery cases, and urged the jury 'to find the defendant not guilty of the crime of robbery by reason of the fact that he did not have the specific mental intent to do these acts on the day in question.' Continuing, he said that Salzman had been 'adjudicated a chronic alcoholic    who does drink without control and gets to a stage where his mind gets numb with alcohol;' hence, it was urged, 'he had no specific intent to do these acts.' 76 The Government requested, and the trial court informed counsel that it would give, an instruction to the effect that chronic alcoholism, standing alone, is not a defense to robbery, but that Salzman's condition should be taken into consideration on the question whether he was too intoxicated to form the necessary specific intent. Salzman's counsel requested only 'the intoxication instruction' and that the jury be told that Salzman's adjudication as a chronic alcoholic should be considered in the determination as to whether there was specific intent 77 No objection was registered to the court's proposed instruction on this point. See note 21, supra. In response to the court's inquiry, after the court had instructed the jury precisely as it had stated that it would, Salzman's counsel said that he was 'satisfied.' 78 Compare Powell v. Texas, supra note 9, 392 U.S. at 517-531, 88 S.Ct. 2145. Powell dealt with chronic alcoholism in the context of a constitutional claim, but its rationale, perhaps in somewhat smaller degree, is applicable to judicial resolution of nonconstitutional questions as well 79 F.R.Crim.P. 52(b) 80 See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 332 n. 11, 87 S.Ct. 429, 17 L.Ed.2d 394 (1966); Gaskins v. United States, U.S.App.D.C. (No. 20,252, Dec. 20, 1967) at 9 n. 30; Robertson v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 309, 310, 364 F.2d 702, 703 (1966); Kelly v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 44, 361 F.2d 61 (1966); Smith v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 300, 305, 353 F.2d 838, 843 (1965). See also F.R.Crim.P. 30