Opinion ID: 6109557
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: additional penalty phase claims

Text: Mr. McFadden also argues the motion court clearly erred in failing to find defense counsel were ineffective for not sending him to have a PET (positron emission tomography ) scan of his brain in 2003 and for failing to call Dr. Gur, a clinical psychologist and professor, to testify about the scan's results. 10 But defense counsel  testified at the postconviction hearing that when preparing for trial they were unaware of any experts who forensically interpreted PET scans, and they knew Washington University in St. Louis refused to analyze scans for use in criminal cases. While Mr. McFadden put on contrary evidence, this Court defers to the motion court's superior opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses. Barton, 432 S.W.3d at 760 . Even if they identified a place to have a PET scan performed, counsel testified at the postconviction hearing they did not want the exam because, If we could have done [the PET scan ] without the State automatically getting the results, I'm sure we would have done it. But counsel believed the State would have seen the results and were worried because: ... if you do a scan and it shows it's-there is no structural damage or the scan doesn't show any damage, the neuro psych testing can still be valid, but it makes it very easy for the prosecutor to argue that, it's just mumbo-jumbo. You should just not pay attention to that neuro psych testing because here we have a picture of his brain and it's fine, so we [defense counsel] tended to proceeded cautiously with imaging for that reason. Forrest v. State, 290 S.W.3d 704 , 709 (Mo. banc 2009) , held counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain a PET scan based on similar fears an ex parte order would not be granted and the results might have undermined the mitigating evidence. Against these risks counsel balanced what they believed to be minimal potential benefit from PET scan evidence because it would show only structural problems, and, as this Court noted in Zink, for this reason the mitigating value of the PET scan evidence is limited because ... there is no generally accepted scientific link between [a movant's] brain abnormalities and his diagnosed personality disorders. 278 S.W.3d at 182 . The reasonableness of counsel's belief in the limited value of a PET scan became evident during Dr. Gur's postconviction testimony. He said that when he performed a PET scan in 2012, some 12 years after the murder, he found abnormalities that might have resulted in Mr. McFadden misinterpreting danger signals and being unable to exercise impulse control. But Dr. Gur acknowledged brain imaging results have limited application in determining intent, neither he nor Dr. Preston interviewed Mr. McFadden and could not directly link any of his abnormalities to his crimes, experts should avoid drawing conclusions about specific behaviors based on imagining data alone, and he could not definitely say Mr. McFadden's PET scan results would have been the same at the time of the murder or even at the time of trial. Moreover, on cross-examination Dr. Gur testified Mr. McFadden's actions before and after the murder reflected planning, exercise of judgment, and an intent to kill. Counsel has limited time and resources, and if there is a strategy that does not look promising, he may 'cho[o]se not to expend his limited resources to that end.'  Zink, 278 S.W.3d at 182 , citing, State v. Brown, 902 S.W.2d 278 , 298 (Mo. banc 1995) (alteration in original). Here, defense counsel strategically decided not to get a PET scan with full knowledge of the possible results, and the motion court did not  commit clear error in finding it to be reasonable. McLaughlin, 378 S.W.3d at 337 .
Next, Mr. McFadden asserts the motion court clearly erred in finding defense counsel were not ineffective for failing to object to certain portions of certified copies of two criminal convictions admitted into evidence and provided to the jury. These exhibits included Mr. McFadden's guilty plea to felony possession of cocaine base and unlawful use of a weapon and his guilty plea to a misdemeanor charge of third-degree assault. Mr. McFadden concedes it was not error to admit evidence of these prior convictions, see State v. Ervin, 835 S.W.2d 905 , 925 (Mo. 1992) , but contends effective counsel would have objected to admitting the portion of the exhibit mentioning the pistol he was charged with unlawfully carrying was loaded with live rounds. He also alleges counsel were ineffective in allowing admission of the portion of the exhibit showing he was certified as an adult because of the seriousness of the offense, which originally had been charged as a felony rather than the misdemeanor to which he pleaded guilty. Counsel testified they strategically chose not to object to these exhibits because, in the absence of these certified copies of prior convictions, the State may have been permitted to prove the prior convictions with live witnesses. Counsel concluded the brief mention of these facts in the dry paper evidence was so minimally prejudicial it was outweighed by the risk of allowing witnesses to testify about these crimes. The motion court found this reasonable. Moreover, to be entitled to relief, Mr. McFadden would have had to show there is a reasonable probability, had counsel objected to the failure to redact these exhibits, he would not have received a death sentence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . He has not met this burden. The properly admitted evidence showed Mr. McFadden was certified as an adult and the jury knew pistols usually are loaded. He also had prior convictions for first-degree murder, armed criminal action, and assault, and there was substantial testimony about his reputation for violence. There is no reasonable likelihood the minimal prejudice from introduction of the exhibits would have affected the sentence.
Mr. McFadden admits the circuit court did not err in admitting certified records showing he was convicted of two counts each of first-degree assault and armed criminal action for attacking Daryl Bryant and Jermaine Burns. But he alleges counsel were ineffective in their cross-examination of a State's witness as to how the assaults occurred and in failing to offer rebuttal evidence. In particular, Shonte Addison testified she saw Mr. McFadden threaten the victims with a gun and saw one victim had a big hole in his side, a lot of blood, and I dragged him in the hospital. On cross-examination, counsel got Shonte to admit she did not witness the shooting and did not know who fired the first shot. Mr. McFadden now argues defense counsel should have offered rebuttal evidence that the crime did not occur as Shonte claimed and that the injury to the victim's side was not nearly as bad as she testified. But there was no question the wound was substantial and required hospital treatment; whether the witness exaggerated its size was of minimal probative value. Further, the motion court found the investigator who Mr. McFadden said should have been called was not certified in ballistics or in crime scene interpretation and has never qualified as an expert  witness in Missouri. The motion court did not find his alternative version of the facts credible. This Court defers to the motion court's superior opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses. Barton, 432 S.W.3d at 760 . Even were the testimony sufficiently credible, counsel testified as a matter of strategy they wanted to limit evidence of the prior assault convictions. The State could have put on even more prejudicial and inflammatory evidence supporting the convictions. The motion court did not clearly err in finding defense counsel were reasonable in not highlighting these convictions. 11 McLaughlin, 378 S.W.3d at 337 .
Lastly, Mr. McFadden argues the motion court clearly erred by failing to find defense counsel were ineffective for not objecting to two statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument. The prosecutor stated: Ladies and gentlemen, I leave you with Leslie and Todd. Hold them. Hug them. Tell them you love them. But most of all, don't let them down. This verdict is for Leslie and Todd. The prosecutor also stated: And on that day that [Mr. McFadden] killed Todd, on the following May, there was one juror in Pine Lawn. That juror was the foreperson. Had no instructions of law. There was no trial. There were no jury instructions. There was no evidence. There were no witnesses. And that foreperson and that juror decided that the death penalty was appropriate then and that Todd and Leslie should not get a fair trial. Because if there's one person in this courtroom that believes in the death penalty, it's that man right there. Mr. McFadden did not object to these arguments but argued they were plain error on direct appeal. This Court held that while the first statement was emotionally charged, so were the facts of this case, McFadden, 391 S.W.3d at 425 , and [a]rguments likely to inflame and excite prejudices of the jury are not improper if they help the jury understand and appreciate evidence that is likely to cause an emotional response. Id. at 425-26 (citations and quotations omitted). This Court similarly found no plain error in the second statement, noting, Even though vividly framed, the argument was not erroneous because it assisted the jury in understanding both the evidence and legal process in this case. Id. at 425 . Therefore, the circuit court did not plainly err in allowing this argument. Id. at 426 . Mr. McFadden now argues there is a reasonable probability counsel's failure to object to these two statements during trial affected the verdict and requires a new trial under Strickland , citing , Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418 (Mo. banc 2002). Deck did recognize that when the appellate court finds error occurred, but affirms because it did not rise to the level of plain error, denial of a plain error claim on direct appeal is not dispositive of the question whether counsel was ineffective in failing to preserve the issue as to which plain error was not found. Id. at 428 . Deck does not apply when, as here, the appeal concluded there was no error, plain or otherwise, because the prosecutor's closing arguments helped the jury understand and appreciate evidence that is likely to cause an emotional response and assisted the jury in understanding both the evidence and legal process in this case.  McFadden, 391 S.W.3d at 425-26 ; see Ringo v. State, 120 S.W.3d 743 (Mo. banc 2003). The failure to make meritless objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Tisius, 519 S.W.3d at 429 . The motion court did not commit clear error by finding counsel were not ineffective for failing to object to an argument not in error.