Opinion ID: 1802099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Evidence of Alcoholism and Seizure Condition.

Text: Duncan's use and abuse of alcohol was introduced into evidence in two ways. In its cross-examination of the two police officers who investigated the accident, the City elicited testimony that the police had had contact with Duncan over the years due to his drinking and disturbances that resulted. One officer testified he had arrested Duncan for such disturbances; he characterized these arrests as small minor arrests. Duncan's history of alcoholism and seizures was also established by the introduction of Duncan's prior medical records which showed that he had presented himself at the emergency room 108 times in the five years prior to the accident for treatment of convulsions, seizures, intoxication and associated conditions and injuries. The estate objected to this testimony and these exhibits on the basis that (1) this evidence was irrelevant, and (2) any relevancy was outweighed by the prejudicial effect of the evidence. See Iowa Rs. Evid. 402 (Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.), 403 (relevant evidence may be excluded if probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice). We review the trial court's admission of this evidence for a clear abuse of discretion. Shawhan v. Polk County, 420 N.W.2d 808, 809 (Iowa 1988). The estate relies on our decision in Shawhan as support for its position that the trial court abused its discretion. In Shawhan, the plaintiff sued the county for severe injuries she sustained in an automobile accident on a rural county road. Id. The trial court admitted evidence of the plaintiff's past drug usage even though there was no evidence suggesting that the plaintiff had used drugs at the time of the accident or that her past drug use contributed to the accident. Id. The county claimed the evidence was relevant to the plaintiff's life expectancy. Id. On appeal, we held that even if the plaintiff's drug usage was relevant, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence because it had a high potential for unfair prejudice. Id. at 810. We observed the jury would likely conclude from this evidence that the plaintiff was a bad person and thus entitled to recover less damages. Id. Nevertheless, we did not reverse because any error in admitting this evidence did not prejudice the plaintiff's substantial rights. Id. We reasoned that because the jury had found the county was not negligent and because the erroneously-admitted evidence went to the issue of damages, no prejudice resulted. Id. at 810-11. The present case differs from Shawhan in that the alcoholism/seizure evidence was offered on the issue of liability as well as damages. Therefore, the City cannot rely on our conclusion in Shawhan that any prejudice from admission of evidence bearing only on damages is not reversible error when the jury finds against the plaintiff on liability and, consequently, never considers damages. Notwithstanding this distinction, we find no reversible error here. The relevancy of the evidence introduced in the present case was much greater than in Shawhan. The City's theory was the accident happened when Duncan fell into the path of the bus due to his intoxication or a possible seizure. At least one witness testified that Duncan fell into the bus. In addition, the blood test results showed a high level of alcohol and sub-therapeutic levels of seizure medication. Consequently, any evidence tending to prove Duncan was intoxicated or suffered a seizure at the time of the accident was relevant to liability. Ordinarily, evidence of other instances of intoxication or seizures would not be admissible, however, to prove Duncan was intoxicated or had a seizure at the time of the accident. See Iowa R. Evid. 404(b) (Evidence of other... acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.); State v. Roth, 403 N.W.2d 762, 765 (Iowa 1987) (evidence of prior murder conviction inadmissible under rule 404(b)). If this were the only purpose for the City's evidence, we would reverse. But the challenged evidence was relevant for another reason. The estate attacked the most direct evidence of Duncan's condition at the time of the accident the blood tests done by the hospital. By questioning the reliability and accuracy of those test results, the estate opened the door to corroborative evidence that the results of those tests were consistent with Duncan's customary state of inebriation and consequent loss of control and with his history of failing to properly take his seizure medication. See Iowa R. Evid. 404(b) (evidence of other acts may be admissible to prove absence of mistake); Clarey v. K-Prods., Inc., 514 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Iowa 1994) (allowing evidence of prior instances of harassment in wrongful termination case under exception contained in rule 404(b) because the evidence tended to show a pattern of conduct); State v. Taylor, 490 N.W.2d 536, 538 (Iowa 1992) (allowing evidence that defendant had not filed returns in prior years at trial on willful-failure-to-file-income-tax-returns charge because the evidence showed intent, knowledge, and an absence of mistake and so was admissible under rule 404(b) exception); cf. State v. Storrs, 351 N.W.2d 520, 521 (Iowa 1984) (finding no abuse of discretion under common law for allowing evidence of prior overdrafts by defendant in theft-based-on-bad-check case, because evidence showed knowledge, intent, and absence of mistake). Thus, the probative value of this evidence was sufficient to outweigh any unfair prejudice. Under these unique circumstances, we think the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Duncan's prior abuse of alcohol and his seizure condition.