Opinion ID: 772735
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The majority opinion's interpretation of Albright

Text: 34 The majority asserts that this case involves a scenario which is substantively identical to Albright. See Maj. Op. at 875. I disagree. In Albright, the plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his action for malicious prosecution brought under 42U.S.C. § 1983. He had based that claim on the alleged violation of his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. As such, the Albright court was faced with the discrete question of whether there exists a substantive right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause. Albright, 510 U.S. at 268. The Court answered, albeit through a plurality opinion, that it is the Fourth Amendment, and not substantive due process, under which [petitioner's § 1983 malicious prosecution] claim must be judged. Id. at 271. 35 In contrast, Frantz has specifically sued for malicious prosecution under § 1983 on the basis of the Fourth Amendment, even though he relies on our circuit's pre-Albright case of McMaster v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 824 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1987), for the proposition that the elements of a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983 must derive from the state-law tort of the same name. His reliance on the wrong standard is perhaps understandable in light of this circuit's unpublished opinions that have inconsistently articulated the elements of a § 1983 malicious prosecution cause of action in the wake of Albright. See Maj. Op. at 874-75. But the majority's assertion that neither [Frantz's] Fourth Amendment claims nor any challenges to them are before this court, Maj. Op. at 875, is simply incorrect. 36 I agree with the conclusion in Section II.B. of the majority's opinion that the elements of malicious prosecution under §1983 cannot depend on the varying state laws within our circuit. This result is consistent with the Supreme Court's directive to peg a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution on the Fourth Amendment. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 & n.4. I believe, however, that the majority has gone too far in Section II.C. of its opinion to conclude that a cause of action for malicious prosecution under § 1983 is a non-existent claim. Maj. Op. at 876. 37 The effect of Albright was to eliminate reliance on substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 275. But it did not eliminate the cause of action altogether. See id. (We express no view as to whether petitioner's claim would succeed under the Fourth Amendment, since he has not presented that question in his petition for certiorari.). Consequently, I read Albright to say that until the Supreme Court decides otherwise, the cause of action for malicious prosecution under § 1983 remains viable. See id. at 271. (We hold that it is the Fourth Amendment, and not substantive due process, under which petitioner Albright's claim must be judged.). 38 Despite the considerable uncertainty about the contours of a § 1983 malicious prosecution cause of action, no other circuit has found Albright to be a bar to a malicious prosecution claim under §1983. The only circuit that does not recognize malicious prosecution as an actionable claim under § 1983 is the Eighth. See Gordon v. Hansen, 168 F.3d 1109, 1114 (8th Cir. 1999). But the Eighth Circuit reached this conclusion well before Albright, holding that common-law claims for malicious prosecution do not state a constitutional injury under § 1983. See Gunderson v. Schlueter, 904 F.2d 407, 409 (8th Cir. 1990). In contrast, nine of our sister circuits recognize the claim, despite their struggle to identify the elements of the cause of action in light of Albright. See Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 261-62 (4th Cir. 2000) (surveying circuit caselaw on this topic after Albright). Because I would join our nine sister circuits thatcontinue to recognize the § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, I disagree with the majority's decision to the contrary. 39