Opinion ID: 1058275
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: We disagree with the Commonwealth. In the first place, if the Commonwealth is correct in its argument that certification and authentication should be given the same construction, the word authentication is useless baggage and serves no [useful] purpose. Gallagher v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 666, 669, 139 S.E.2d 37, 39 (1964). Also, [s]uch a construction would run counter to the principle that `every provision in or part of a statute shall be given effect if possible.' Id. (quoting Tilton v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 774, 784, 85 S.E.2d 368, 374 (1955)). The records of a judicial proceeding may be received as prima facie evidence under Code § 8.01-389(A) provided they are authenticated by the clerk of the court where they are preserved. And with respect to orders of circuit courts, we must look to Code § 17.1-123(A) to determine how such orders should be authenticated. Furthermore, during oral argument, the Commonwealth conceded that Code § 8.01-389(A), standing alone, is not sufficient to make the orders in question admissible into evidence, that to make the orders admissible it is necessary to add the presumption of official regularity. This addition, the Commonwealth states on brief, would give a reasonable basis for inferring that the order book included a judge's signature or a signed term order in compliance with Code § 17.1-123(A)(ii) or (iii). We know, of course, from our examination of the six orders contained in the record, that they were not signed by the judge in conformity with Code § 17.1-123(A)(i), and the Commonwealth concedes on brief that the copies teste did not bear any indicia that a judge had ever signed the order[s] or anywhere in the order book[]. Yet the Commonwealth would have us infer that the orders did bear indicia that the judge had signed the order book in compliance with Code § 17.1-123(A)(ii) or (iii). In short, what the Commonwealth invites us to infer is something it concedes may not be correct. We decline the invitation. Finally, we take note of the Commonwealth's assertion that whether the six orders in question were admissible into evidence raises issues regarding the interaction between Virginia Code § 8.01-389 (judicial records exception to the hearsay rule) and Virginia Code § 17.1-123 (addressing authentication of orders from circuit court order books). It is undoubtedly true that there is an interaction between the two statutes, but the question remains: what is the result of the interaction? If the Commonwealth is correct in its construction of Code § 8.01-389(A), the result is a conflict between the two statutes, one permitting the admission into evidence of the orders in question and the other denying admission. `It is a well-settled principle of law that where two statutes are in apparent conflict they should be so construed, if reasonably possible, so as to allow both to stand and to give force and effect to each.' Mahoney v. Commonwealth, 162 Va. 846, 853, 174 S.E. 817, 819 (1934) (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Board of Supervisors of Arlington County, 146 Va. 113, 125, 136 S.E. 186, 190 (1926)). It is the object of the courts to construe all statutes in pari materia in such manner as to reconcile, if possible, any discordant feature which may exist, and make the body of the laws harmonious and just in their operation. Lucy v. County of Albemarle, 258 Va. 118, 129-130, 516 S.E.2d 480, 485 (1999)(quoting Tyson v. Scott, 116 Va. 243, 253, 81 S.E. 57, 61 (1914)). The question then becomes whether the two statutes can be reconciled in light of the foregoing principles and if so, in what manner. In our opinion, the answer is plain and simple. Under Code § 8.01-389(A), the records of all judicial proceedings except orders of circuit courts shall be received as prima facie evidence while circuit court orders shall be received only when authenticated pursuant to Code § 17.1-123(A). This solution allows both statutes to stand and gives force and effect to both. Because the six orders in question were admitted in error, we must vacate the judgment convicting the defendant of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a violent felony. The case does not end here, however. While the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a violent felony, it was sufficient to convict him of the lesser offense of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a non-violent felony. Code § 18.2-308.2(A), under which the defendant was indicted, covers both an offense committed by a person previously convicted of a violent felony and an offense committed by a person previously convicted of any other felony. The defendant confessed to Deputy Jones that he had been previously convicted of a felony. While this confession would have been ineffective without corroboration, Magruder v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 283, 307, 657 S.E.2d 113, 126 (2008), it was corroborated by the judicial confession to the same effect the defendant made while under oath on the witness stand, a confession effective standing alone, without any corroboration. See Watkins v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 341, 348, 385 S.E.2d 50, 54 (1989) (corroboration requirement applies to extra-judicial admission or confession); accord Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 344, 468 S.E.2d 98, 110 (1996); Moore v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 741, 744-45, 111 S.E. 128, 129 (1922). Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacate the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a violent felony. We will remand the case to the Court of Appeals with direction to remand the case to the circuit court for a new sentencing hearing on the lesser offense of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a non-violent felony. This disposition is consistent with Code § 19.2-285, which provides in pertinent part as follows: If a person indicted of a felony be by the jury acquitted of part of the offense charged, he shall be sentenced for such part as he is so convicted of, if the same be substantially charged in the indictment, whether it be felony or misdemeanor. Reversed and remanded.