Opinion ID: 1153608
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Deviation Issue

Text: More troublesome is appellants' other contention that, assuming the dual purpose formula permitted characterizing the overall trip as one for a business purpose, the identifiable deviation in scanning the area around Lake Tustumena for purely personal reasons removed Mr. Gonzales from the course of his employment during the period of deviation. Deviation cases are legion. Both parties cite a number of such cases in support of their respective positions. These are of only limited help, however, both because of the infinite variety of factual patterns, which vary in the degree of deviation from a minor detour to a complete temporary abandonment of an employer's business, and because the results often appear to have been dictated by judicial attitudes toward workmen's compensation acts. In measuring the legal effect of a departure from a normal business route, the guideposts are the materiality of the deviation and its purpose. Professor Larson states the following general rule: An identifiable deviation from a business trip for personal reasons takes the employee out of the course of his employment until he returns to the route of the business trip, unless the deviation is so small as to be disregarded as insubstantial. 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 19.00 at 294.57 (1972). Appellants ask for a holding by this court that, as a matter of law based on the evidence before the Board, Mr. Gonzales had temporarily abandoned his employment to pursue a purely personal endeavor and that the deviation was substantial. Some older cases from other jurisdictions denied compensation unless the employee was, at the time of injury or death, performing his normal work to the direct benefit of his employer. [13] However, today it is generally held, utilizing the rubric of various doctrines, [14] that an employee is entitled to compensation so long as the activity is reasonably foreseeable and incidental to his employment. [15] Either of two doctrines provide a legal base to uphold the finding of compensability below. First, under the authorization doctrine, the Board found that Mr. Gonzales considered the deviation from the direct route a privilege of employment ... in accordance with company practice... . [16] There are many cases holding that an otherwise personal deviation is compensable where authorized, expressly or by implication, and of some incidental benefit to the employer, at least where the deviation does not introduce substantial additional hazards. [17] We prefer, however, not to rest our decision on such a base in view of the peculiar nature of the business herein and the near identity of claimant and company. For all practical purposes, it would be impossible to disprove such a claim in any small family owned corporation. We prefer to await a proper factual presentation to the Board before deciding such a question. The second doctrine which could be applied is characterized as the minor deviation rule. Appellants quote from Larson's discussion of the minor (or insubstantial) deviation rule [18] in arguing that the Board's characterization of the scanning operations as insubstantial is both contrary to law and unsupported by substantial evidence. As to the first contention, appellants quote from 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 19.63 at 294.99 (1972), in arguing that the characterization of a deviation as insubstantial should be limited to the kind of minor interludes which now most courts would treat as immaterial under the personal comfort doctrine. [19] While Professor Larson does analogize certain insubstantiality cases to personal comfort cases in the cited section, he does not intimate that the two categories are identical. Indeed, in the two preceding sections he discusses two additional considerations which courts have also utilized in assessing the significance of a deviation: added risk (§ 19.61) and nature of employment [20] (§ 19.62). Appellants also assert that the Board's conclusion (that the deviation was insubstantial) is unsupported by substantial evidence. Although the accident occurred only three miles off the normal route, appellants argue that the materiality of the deviation is established by the facts that one-third of the one-way flying time was allotted to the detour and that a substantial number of miles were therefore to be covered in the low-speed, low-altitude scanning operations. An encompassing substantiality test has not emerged from either the case law or from Professor Larson. Rather, there is the need, in close cases, to balance a variety of factors such as the geographic and durational magnitude of the deviation in relation to the overall trip, past authorization or toleration of similar deviations, the general latitude afforded the employee in carrying out his job, and any risks created by the deviation which are causally related to the accident. [21] The first three factors noted above would appear to weigh in favor of compensability. As to the added risk factor, the superior court, in affirming the Board's finding of compensability, emphasized that no substantial evidence has been introduced at the hearing to support a conclusion that the deviation introduced any added risks to the flight. Appellants cite the following statement from Larson (§ 19.61 at 294.94): If the incidents of the deviation itself are operative in producing the accident, this in itself will weigh heavily on the side of non-compensability.... and argue that the presence of a causal relationship between risks incident to the deviation and the accident is a factor which weighs against compensability but that the absence of added risk cannot be weighed in favor of compensability. It is strictly a negative, and not a positive, factor to be considered. This argument is logically inconsistent and the case decisions make no such distinction. [22] Appellants also argue that evidence presented to the Board conclusively established added risks. However, the only support given for this proposition is the bald conclusion that [t]he likelihood of injuries resulting from either [engine failure or a downdraft] was substantially increased when [Mr. Gonzales] deviated from the cruising altitude to a scanning altitude of 400 to 500 feet, and when the airspeed was reduced to 50 or 60 mph from 145 mph... . The Claimant was simply not in a position to regain control of the aircraft. No evidence before the Board supports this conclusion. [23] Appellants finally argue that the superior court, by emphasizing the lack of substantial evidence to support a conclusion of added risk, in effect improperly placed upon them the burden of producing evidence on this issue. We find the superior court acted properly. If appellants wished to rely on the defense of increased risk because of the changed method of flight, they had the burden of going forward with appropriate evidence indicating such an increase in risk. By failing to do so, they simply did not establish the defense claimed. While this case appears to be a close one, there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Board. The decision of the superior court is affirmed, this case is remanded to the superior court with instructions to remand it to the Alaska Workmen's Compensation Board for further proceedings on the question of compensation.