Opinion ID: 56
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: BIA's Standard of Review of IJ's Factual Findings

Text: Since September 25, 2002, the BIA has been bound to review the factual findings of immigration judges only for clear error. See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289 (2d Cir.2006). The Board will not engage in de novo review of findings of fact determined by an immigration judge. Facts determined by the immigration judge, including findings as to the credibility of testimony, shall be reviewed only to determine whether the findings of the immigration judge are clearly erroneous. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). The BIA did not comply with this regulatory command in reviewing the IJ's factual findings, but rather applied a standard that substantially deviated from clear error and may have been de novo. Whatever the precise level of review undertaken by the BIA with respect to the IJ's factual findings in De La Rosa's case, it constituted error. In its May 22, 2008, decision reversing the IJ's determination of De La Rosa's CAT claim, the BIA articulated its standard of review as that of determining the weight of the evidence. In exercising this review, the BIA appears to have made its own factual findings based on all evidence. In doing so, the BIA's characterization of facts deriving from the evidentiary record is demonstratively at odds with factual findings made by the IJ, including several directly inconsistent findings. For example, the BIA deviated from the IJ's factual findings when it determined that De La Rosa failed to establish that Brito's family would be able to identify De La Rosa or that such persons would even seek him out in the Dominican Republic. Id. Other than concluding that the IJ erroneously granted the respondent's application for deferral, the BIA did not indicate or explain how the IJ may have committed clear error. The standard of review entailed by weight of the evidence cannot be squared with review for clear error in this Circuit. See Ceraso v. Motiva Enterp., LLC, 326 F.3d 303, 316-17 (2d Cir.2003) (distinguishing clearly erroneous findings, which is a ground for reversal, from weight of the evidence, which cannot be such a ground). Indeed, weight of the evidence is often equated across circuits with a de novo inquiry into the preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Nutraceutical Corp. v. Von Eschenbach, 459 F.3d 1033, 1040 (10th Cir.2006) (The preponderance of the evidence standard requires the party with the burden of proof to support its position with the greater weight of the evidence.); Jazz Photo Corp. v. United States, 439 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed.Cir.2006) (stating that we have defined preponderance of the evidence in civil actions to mean `the greater weight of evidence, evidence which is more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it.') (citation omitted); United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d 511, 523 n. 9 (9th Cir.1998) (A preponderance of the evidence means the greater weight of the evidence.); Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1209 (11th Cir.2007) (same). But see MBH Commodity Advisors, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 250 F.3d 1052, 1060-1061 (7th Cir.2001) (distinguishing weight of the evidence review from a de novo review involving new factual findings and the possibility of new evidence in the context of the Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 21). While the Court does not review the factual findings of the IJ and the BIA, it is apparent that, as a matter of law, the BIA's weight of the evidence review of the IJ's findings does not conform to the dictates of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). The improper standard of review used by the BIA is the type of error that requires remand. We have said that [i]t is precisely because factfinding in both the asylum and withholding contexts is expressly committed to the discretion of the Executive Office of Immigration Review (`EOIR') that, when those findings rely upon legal errors, the appropriate remedy is generally to vacate those finding and remand to the BIA for reconsideration of an applicant's claim. Li Hua Lin v. United States Dep't of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir.2006). Minor errors, however, do not require remand. See Cao He Lin v. United States Dep't of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 401 (2d Cir.2005). Remand is unnecessary if it would be pointless or futile, such as where there is an alternative and sufficient basis for the result, the error is tangential to non-erroneous reasoning, or the overwhelming evidence makes the same decision inevitable. See also Xiao Ji Chen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 161 (2d Cir.2006). The general rule is that the Court must be confident that the agency would reach the same result upon a reconsideration cleansed of errors. Li Hua Lin, 453 F.3d at 107. Absent an alternative and sufficient ground for the BIA's decision, the error in the standard of review requires remand. In view of the IJ's factual findings which may support a decision in De La Rosa's favor, as well as the new evidence submitted by De La Rosa to the BIA on appeal, [2] the Court finds that the BIA, applying the proper standard of review for clear error, could conclude that it is more likely than not that De La Rosa would be tortured upon removal to the Dominican Republic within the meaning of the CAT. However, our review of the BIA decisions reveals that the BIA may have an alternative basis for its reversal of the June 22, 2006, IJ decision and dismissal of De La Rosa's appeal. Accordingly, we must proceed to review this possible alternative ground, which if sufficient to support the BIA's decision, would insulate the BIA's error. Cao He Lin, 428 F.3d at 401.