Opinion ID: 3037057
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Visa Waiver Program

Text: [1] The Visa Waiver Program authorizes the government to waive visa requirements for citizens of certain favored countries. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187.6 Under the terms of the VWP, as a condition of entering the United States without a visa, Mrs. Freeman had to leave within 90 days and, under the nocontest clause, agree to waive any right:
gration officer’s determination as to the admissibility of the alien at the port of entry into the United States, or (2) to contest, other than on the basis of an application for asylum, any action for removal of the alien. 5 Throughout this opinion we refer to the citizen spouse as the husband and the alien spouse as the wife/widow. However, neither the immigration laws we review nor our holdings make any distinction between the sexes. 6 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory citations herein are to Chapter 8 of the United States Code. FREEMAN v. GONZALES 4515 § 1187(b). We have described the no-contest clause as “the linchpin of the [Visa Waiver] program,” which “assures that a person who comes here with a VWP visa will leave on time and will not raise a host of legal and factual claims to impede [her] removal if [s]he overstays.” Handa v. Clark, 401 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2005). Notwithstanding that the nocontest clause severely restricts an alien’s ability to seek review of a removal decision, the alien may still claim that she is not subject to the VWP procedures at all or that the law requires that she be brought before an immigration judge (IJ) prior to removal. See id. at 1133. [2] Although the no-contest clause was designed generally to limit the rights of alien visitors and prevent them from challenging their removal, the INA does not entirely preclude such visitors from seeking to extend their stay. Specifically, § 1255(c)(4) provides that a VWP visitor may seek to adjust her status to that of a permanent resident through an immediate relative petition, the procedure invoked by the Freemans. See Faruqi v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 360 F.3d 985, 98687 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that VWP visitors are eligible “for adjustment of status . . . on the basis of either (1) an immediate relative petition or (2) an application for asylum.”); see also 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(b)(8). Once an adjustment of status application is filed, certain procedural safeguards are in place to ensure fair adjudication of the application. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 245. Mrs. Freeman argues that once she (and her husband) initiated the adjustment of status process by filing the necessary forms, her right to remain in the United States and to challenge any adverse decision became subject to the procedural protections governing adjustment of status applications. Accordingly, the district director erred in applying the VWP no-contest proviso to her in denying her adjustment of status application. The government, however, insists that the VWP no-contest proviso remains in force and precludes Mrs. Freeman from challenging her removal order and the district 4516 FREEMAN v. GONZALES director’s determination that she is no longer a qualifying spouse. It argues that only asylum seekers are exempted from the no-contest clause under the express terms of § 1187(b)(2), and Mrs. Freeman is not seeking asylum.7 We think the government’s position ignores the interplay between the adjustment of status regime and the visa waiver program, which explicitly allows VWP visitors to file an adjustment of status application pursuant to an immediate relative petition. See § 1255(c)(4). As we shall explain, the text and purpose of this complex statute, along with DHS’s action in Mrs. Freeman’s case, persuade us that once a VWP visitor properly files an adjustment of status application, the VWP no-contest clause does not deprive the visitor-applicant of the procedural guarantees afforded any applicant seeking adjustment of status. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.2.
[3] Section 1255 explains that certain classes of nonimmigrants may petition the Attorney General for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident, provided that “(1) the alien makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to [her] at the time [her] application is filed.” § 1255(a). Included in the class of non-immigrants who may petition for LPR status are VWP entrants, but only those who seek adjustment pursuant to an immediate relative petition. § 1255(c)(4).8 Under the regula- 7 The government does not argue that its understanding of the scope of the VWP no-contest clause is entitled to Chevron deference. Cf. NRDC v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 421 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2005). 8 This express right given to VWP entrants is more specific than the broad no-contest language used in the VWP governing statute. See NLRB v. A-Plus Roofing, Inc., 39 F.3d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1994) (“It is a wellsettled canon of statutory interpretation that specific provisions prevail over general provisions.”) FREEMAN v. GONZALES 4517 tory regime associated with adjustment of status, alien applicants are afforded various procedural benefits. Among these benefits, an applicant “retains the right to renew his or her application” if it has been denied. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(5). If the adjustment of status application is renewed after removal proceedings have been initiated, as would have been the procedure in Mrs. Freeman’s situation, an IJ rather than the district director would review and rule upon the application. See Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2002); 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(1). [4] With respect to these renewal and review procedures, there is no exception in the statute or regulations for aliens who are in the United States under any particular status; the procedures apply to any applicant for adjustment of status. Nor does the VWP no-contest clause on its face clearly exempt VWP visitors from these procedures. See Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005) (“We do not lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply . . . .”). Indeed, having granted VWP visitors the right to seek an adjustment of status, it makes no sense for Congress to have intended that these preferred visitors — by definition, citizens of certain favored countries — should have second-class status once they enter into the adjustment of status process. See Crandal v. Ball, Ball & Brosamer, 99 F.3d 907, 910 (9th Cir. 1996) (“A statute should be read in a manner which attribute[s] a rational purpose to the legislature.”). We decline the government’s invitation to read the VWP no-contest restriction into the adjustment of status procedural regime, effectively denying VWP applicants the procedural due process all other applicants enjoy, when Congress has not done so explicitly. Had Congress intended such a result, it could have withheld the adjustment of status right from VWP entrants or specified, within the adjustment of status regime, that they constitute a special class of applicants without the normal rights of appeal and review. See United States v. 4518 FREEMAN v. GONZALES Jones, 204 F.2d 745, 754 (7th Cir. 1953) (“[A] statutory grant of power carries with it, by implication, everything necessary to carry out the power and make it effectual and complete.”); Blue Cross Ass’n v. Harris, 622 F.2d 972, 978 (8th Cir. 1980) (“It is a commonplace of statutory construction that a legislative grant of power carries with it the right to use the means and instrumentalities necessary to the beneficial exercise of that power.”). Accordingly, alleged errors in DHS’s adjudication of Mrs. Freeman’s application for LPR status should be subject to review as part of the adjustment of status process, and not foreclosed by the VWP no-contest clause. Moreover, the purpose of the adjustment of status procedures is best served by allowing VWP entrants — like Mrs. Freeman — the right to contest their summary denial without having to leave the United States first.9 “The adjustment procedure of section 245 was specifically designed to obviate the need for departure and reentry in the cases of aliens temporarily in the United States. . . . It seems clear that section 245 was intended to . . . permit nonimmigrants to attain permanent resident status without leaving the United States.” Matter of S—, 9 I. & N. Dec. 548, 553-54 (BIA 1962) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Finally, the agency’s own actions are relevant to and consistent with our interpretation of the scope of the VWP nocontest clause. Cf. Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136, 1146 n.11 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Nor do we owe deference 9 We are not persuaded by the government’s argument that allowing Mrs. Freeman to escape the no-contest clause (even if only to renew or review her adjustment of status application prior to being removed) would counter the purpose of the VWP, which was to avoid the potentially onerous and numerous proceedings that would otherwise occur when DHS attempts to remove those who have overstayed their 90-day visas. Not only will there likely be a small percentage of VWP entrants in Mrs. Freeman’s position, but Congress itself granted the adjustment of status right to these aliens. There is no reason to suspect that Congress failed to appreciate the consequences of its act. FREEMAN v. GONZALES 4519 to the interpretation of the statute now advocated by the Secretary’s counsel — newly minted, it seems, for this lawsuit, and inconsistent with prior agency actions — as we ordinarily will not defer to agency litigating positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) After filing her adjustment of status application, Mrs. Freeman received work authorization, suggesting that the immigration authorities no longer considered her a VWP entrant, but instead treated her like any other adjustment of status applicant, including no longer being subject to a 90-day stay limit. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(1) (describing a VWP entrant as a “tourist”); § 1101(a)(15)(B) (describing a VWP entrant as “an alien (other than one coming for the purpose of study or of performing skilled or unskilled labor . . .) having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning and who is visiting the United States temporarily for business or temporarily for pleasure.”). [5] Based on § 1255(c)(4)’s grant of the right to VWP entrants to adjust their status, reinforced by the statute’s purpose and the agency’s granting of her work permit, we conclude that upon the proper filing of an adjustment of status application, Mrs. Freeman was assimilated into the adjustment of status procedural regime. Her rights to review of her application — including review of the DHS director’s determination of her status as a spouse — were not subject to the Visa Waiver Program’s no-contest clause.