Opinion ID: 2087006
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Fifth and Sixth Amendment Claims.

Text: 1. Supreme Court Precedent. The defendant argues that Dr. Dietz's testimony, recounting the November, 1984 interview with Re, violated his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, since the interview was conducted without advising Re of his Miranda rights or of his right to counsel. The United States Supreme Court has previously considered the use of evidence obtained through psychological examinations and its relation to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant who was subjected to a court-ordered pre-trial psychological examination without being advised of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The results of that examination had been used against the defendant in sentencing him to death. The Court found that the State violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment right, because he was not given Miranda warnings, and his statements about the underlying crime were used against him at sentencing. The Court noted that the pre-trial examination was, under the circumstances, more than a routine competency examination restricted to ensuring that respondent understood the charges against him and was capable of assisting in his defense. Smith, 451 U.S. at 465, 101 S.Ct. at 1874. However, the Court was careful to limit its holding in Smith to the distinct circumstances of that case, Id. at 466, 101 S.Ct. at 1875, and acknowledged that the State should be allowed under other circumstances to use psychiatric evidence to rebut a defendant's psychiatric claim: When a defendant asserts the insanity defense and introduces supporting psychiatric testimony, his silence may deprive the State of the only effective means it has of controverting his proof on an issue that he interjected into the case. Accordingly, several Courts of Appeals have held that, under such circumstances, a defendant can be required to submit to a sanity examination conducted by the prosecution psychiatrist. Id. at 465, 101 S.Ct. at 1874. Finally, the Court stated that as a general rule: A criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him at a capital sentencing proceeding. Id. at 468, 101 S.Ct. at 1876. Because Smith's appointed counsel had not been informed of the psychiatric examination or its scope, the Court also found a violation of Smith's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Although it was unclear whether Smith's counsel had received notice of the examination, counsel was nevertheless unaware of the scope of the examination or the uses to which the information obtained might be put. Thus, the Court held, the defendant had no opportunity to effectively discuss the examination with his attorney. Recently, the Supreme Court reexamined Estelle v. Smith in Buchanan v. Kentucky, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987). The Court held that the conviction of a defendant whose pre-trial psychiatric evaluation was used at trial to rebut the defendant's mental status defense did not violate the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Unlike Smith, the psychological examination was performed at the request of both the prosecution and the defense. It later was used at trial to rebut evidence which the defendant introduced to support a claim of extreme emotional disturbance. The defendant did not take the stand, leaving the prosecution unable to respond to the defense except by introducing evidence of the pre-trial examination. The Court, relying on Estelle v. Smith , held that a defendant who requests an evaluation or presents psychiatric evidence is subject to the reality that the prosecutor may rebut his presentation with evidence from the requested examination. 107 S.Ct. 2917-18. The prosecution did not violate Buchanan's Fifth Amendment right because the psychiatric report was used for the narrow purpose of rebutting the mental status defense, and because the report did not describe any statements dealing with the crime for which Buchanan was charged. Id. at 2918. The Court also held that Buchanan's Sixth Amendment right was not violated because the defendant's counsel had requested the examination, and therefore, presumably had the opportunity to discuss the examination and its scope with his client. The Fifth Circuit recently characterized the Buchanan holding in terms of a waiver of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. In Schneider v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 570, No. 86-1495 (5th Cir.1988) the defendant proffered the testimony of counselors and chaplains that he was capable of rehabilitation. The court found that this testimony was sufficient to put Schneider's mental state at issue, and that Buchanan should therefore apply. In interpreting Buchanan the court identified two policy reasons behind the holding of that case: (1) the rule promotes a fair state-individual balance; and (2) the rule prevents fraudulent mental defenses. Schneider, At 575. The court characterized the introduction of mental status evidence as a waiver of both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights: In Williams v. Lynaugh [809 F.2d 1063], we treated both Fifth and Sixth Amendment objections as waived when the prosecution's psychiatric evidence was properly limited to rebuttal of the defendant's mental status evidence. Nothing in Buchanan undercuts this treatment. Schneider cannot complain of the mere fact that the examination extended beyond the subject of competency. He can only object to the use of that broadened examination against him; and he is held, as a matter of policy if not of knowing and intelligent waiver, to have invited that use of introducing mental status testimony of his own. If maintenance of a fair state-individual balance requires this conclusion under the Fifth Amendment, Schneider may not circumvent this policy through the Sixth Amendment. Id., At 578. Under Smith and Buchanan, then, a defendant who either initiates a psychiatric examination or attempts to introduce psychiatric evidence may not challenge on either Fifth or Sixth Amendment grounds the prosecution's use of psychiatric evidence in rebuttal. 2. Application of Smith and Buchanan. Although Re did not request the examination by Dr. Dietz, he specifically placed his mental status at issue. He was first examined just days after the killing pursuant to an order of the trial court. Thereafter, Re was examined several times by Dr. Galliani of the Delaware State Hospital regarding his competence to stand trial. Re was twice found competent primarily due to Dr. Galliani's testimony. After the second competency hearing, on June 16, 1978, Re declared his intention to plead insanity. This was an affirmative step by Re and his attorney to raise the issue of the defendant's mental status. Later, Re was found incompetent after several more examinations by Dr. Galliani and others. The trial court continued to hold competency hearings intermittently, and finally, in 1984, the Attorney General ordered a complete investigation of Re and his activities, including his extraordinary privileges, at the State Hospital. The State secured the services of Dr. Dietz, who concluded that Re was malingering, and he so testified at the final competency hearing in 1985. Dr. Dietz's examination was conducted solely for the purpose of determining Re's mental status. He did not speak to Re about the crime, and asked only general questions designed to determine if Re was actually insane. Even when Re was found competent, based upon Dr. Dietz's testimony, the defendant continued to assert a mental status defense of extreme emotional distress. Thus, that issue has been in the forefront of this case since the day that Re was arrested. The defendant's argument that the State may not use Dr. Dietz's examination against him, because Re did not initiate the interview, ignores half of the Smith/Buchanan test. In Smith the court held: A criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric examination nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist.... 451 U.S. at 468 (emphasis added). Similarly in Buchanan the court held: if a defendant requests such an evaluation or presents psychiatric evidence, then, at the very least, the prosecution may rebut this presentation with evidence from the reports of the examination that the defendant requested. 107 S.Ct. at 2918 (emphasis added). Both by malingering and asserting the mental status defenses of insanity and extreme emotional distress, Re subjected himself to the possibility that the prosecution would examine him and use the results of the examination to rebut his defenses. Re initiated the psychiatric examinations by his actions, and cannot be heard to challenge the use to which they were put in this case. The prosecution properly used the testimony of Dr. Dietz for rebuttal purposes. The scope of Dr. Dietz's examination had been limited to determining Re's mental status. Thus, the examination was the routine competency examination mentioned in Smith. 451 U.S. at 465, 101 S.Ct. at 1874. At trial, Dr. Dietz testified only to his observations of Re's behavior and not to any statements Re may have made about the crime. (In fact Re claimed to remember nothing of the crime.) Therefore, when Re presented psychiatric evidence on his own behalf, the prosecution properly limited the use of its own psychiatric evidence to rebuttal. No Fifth Amendment right to silence was violated here. Re attempts to distinguish this case from Buchanan because he, unlike Buchanan, testified in his own defense. In Buchanan, the court, relying on Estelle, found that the prosecution was unable to challenge Buchanan's mental status defense, except by using the pre-trial psychiatric examination, because Buchanan did not take the witness stand. We do not believe that a defendant may escape the holding of Smith and Buchanan simply by testifying at trial. Here, the State was powerless to challenge Re's defense without the introduction of the evidence obtained in Dr. Dietz's November 1984 examination. Although Re took the stand in his own behalf, he claims to have forgotten everything from the time just before the killing until only days before trial. Thus, Re was silent about the only period relevant to the success or failure of his defense. This deprived the State of the only effective means it [had] of controverting [the defendant's] proof on an issue that he interjected into the case. Smith, 451 U.S. at 465, 101 S.Ct. at 1874. Re's Sixth Amendment rights also were not violated. Although Re's attorney did not initiate the psychiatric examination, he was aware that Re was under investigation by the Attorney General's Office at the time of Dr. Dietz's examination. It is unclear whether Re's attorney had actual notice of Dr. Dietz's examination, but having asserted a mental status defense all along, he should have expected that Re would be examined periodically. Had Re's attorney had actual notice, it is unlikely that he could have discussed the examination or its scope in any intelligent fashion with Re, since Re was wholly non-communicative at that time. To the extent possible, Re's attorney had the opportunity to advise Re that he would be examined in connection with his mental status. [7] More importantly Re's attorney was on notice that by asserting a mental status defense, the defendant would face the use of psychological evidence by the prosecution in rebuttal. Buchanan, 107 S.Ct. 2919. Given these facts, Re waived his Sixth Amendment rights by putting his mental status at issue. Schneider v. Lynaugh , At 578.