Opinion ID: 753270
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Accounting for Partial Success

Text: 6 A reasonable attorney's fee award is determined in two steps. First, the court determines a lodestar amount by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation 3 by a reasonable hourly rate. See Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 484 (9th Cir.1988) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1035, 110 S.Ct. 757, 107 L.Ed.2d 773 (1990). Second, the court determines, whether the lodestar amount must be adjusted to accurately reflect a reasonable fee. There is a strong presumption that the lodestar figure is a reasonable fee. See Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir.1992). The presumptively reasonable lodestar figure may be adjusted downward or upward only on the basis of those factors not already subsumed in the lodestar calculation. See Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir.1996), amended on other grounds, 108 F.3d 981 (1997). 7 In determining a reasonable fee, a district court is required to consider the results obtained. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. The Supreme Court set forth a two-step inquiry to be followed when determining whether some reduction in the lodestar is necessary to account for a plaintiff's partial success. Id. First, the district court must identify unsuccessful claims that are wholly unrelated to the successful claims and then exclude the hours spent on unsuccessful claims from the fee application. See Hensley 461 U.S. at 434-435. Second, if the unsuccessful and successful claims are related, then the court must evaluate the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation. If the plaintiff obtained excellent results, full compensation may be appropriate, but if only partial or limited success was obtained, full compensation may be excessive. See Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 111, 141 (9th Cir.1986) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-435). 8
9 The district court reduced Plaintiff's initial fee request by an additional 50 percent because the court concluded that Plaintiff's race/national origin discrimination claims were unrelated to his ADEA claim. Plaintiff asserts that the district court abused its discretion in finding that his unsuccessful race and national origin discrimination claims under Title VII were unrelated to his successful ADEA claim. Plaintiff contends that all except one of the elements necessary to prove Title VII and ADEA claims overlap. 4 Plaintiff states that for this reason his claims are related, rather than distinctly different. 10 Despite these shared elements, Plaintiff's race/national origin and age discrimination claims did not arise from the same events or the same course of conduct. It was within the district court's discretion to find that Plaintiff's Title VII claims were based on distinctly different facts and legal theories from his successful ADEA claim. Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that Plaintiff's unsuccessful Title VII claims were not related to his successful ADEA claim. 11
12 Plaintiff also contends that regardless of whether the race/national origin and age discrimination claims were related the 50 percent reduction was unwarranted because he ultimately obtained substantial relief from the jury. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the remedies available under Title VII and the ADEA are identical. In other words, Plaintiff believes that he would have gained nothing more had he also prevailed on his Title VII claims. 13 In reducing the initial fee request, the district court considered both the unrelatedness of the claims and Plaintiff's limited success on the age discrimination claim. Plaintiff ultimately obtained full compensatory damages in the amount of $326,800 in backpay and frontpay. Plaintiff asserts that this award of compensatory damages for his ADEA claim constitutes excellent results which entitle him to full compensation. See Thorne, 802 F.2d at 141. Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, however, the award of compensatory damages for plaintiff's successful ADEA claim does not completely offset the fact that he lost on his Title VII claim. Accordingly, although Plaintiff achieved a significant victory, the district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the fee application by 50 percent to account for Plaintiff's partial success.