Opinion ID: 2371662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adverse Possession: Lot A-21-1

Text: The trial court found that, according to the pertinent deeds, the boundary between Lots A-22 and A-21-1 is a straight course running between two granite bounds, one located on the northern side of the Burton Highway and the other located on the southern side of the so-called `Old Peterborough Road.' Neither side challenges this finding. Accordingly, we assume its correctness and use it as a reference point for our consideration of Blagbrough's adverse possession claim. The foundation of a small boathouse is slightly to the west of the boundary line. Crediting the testimony of Corinne Blagbrough, Kenton Blagbrough (Corinne Blagbrough's son), and Howard Preston, the trial court found that the Blagbrough family engaged in activities in an area immediately around the boathouse and that these activities were sufficient to satisfy the criteria for adverse possession. However, the trial court also ruled that the extent to which the Blagbroughs engaged in activity on land to the west of the boathouse was unclear and could not satisfy the criteria for adverse possession. It therefore concluded that Blagbrough had acquired title by adverse possession to a portion of Lot A-21-1 which was east ( i.e., in the direction of Lot A-22) of the western-most point of the boathouse. On appeal, Blagbrough argues that the trial court's ruling is inconsistent with the evidence because the evidence demonstrated that Blagbrough acquired title by adverse possession to a significantly broader swath of Lot A-21-1, extending all the way to a stone wall located approximately 150 feet west of the boathouse. A & T cross-appeals, arguing that the evidence does not support a conclusion that Blagbrough acquired title by adverse possession to any portion of Lot A-21-1. We review a trial court's application of law to facts de novo. Tech-Built 153 v. Va. Surety Co., 153 N.H. 371, 373, 898 A.2d 1007 (2006). We accord deference to a trial court's findings of historical fact, where those findings are supported by evidence in the record. Elwood v. Bolte, 119 N.H. 508, 510, 403 A.2d 869 (1979). In order to obtain title by adverse possession, the adverse possessor must prove, by a balance of probabilities, twenty years of adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted use of the land claimed so as to give notice to the owner that an adverse claim is being made. Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 571-72, 644 A.2d 51 (1994). In addition, adverse use is trespassory in nature, and the adverse possessor's use of the land must be exclusive. See Kellison v. McIsaac, 131 N.H. 675, 679, 559 A.2d 834 (1989); Seward v. Loranger, 130 N.H. 570, 576-77, 547 A.2d 207 (1988). The success or failure of a party claiming adverse possession is not determined by the subjective intent or the motives of the adverse possessor. Kellison, 131 N.H. at 680, 559 A.2d 834. Rather the acts of the adverse possessor's entry onto and possession of the land should, regardless of the basis of the occupancy, alert the true owner of the cause of action. Id. In evaluating the merits of an adverse possession claim, courts are to construe [e]vidence of adverse possession of land . . . strictly. Bellows v. Jewell, 60 N.H. 420, 422 (1880) (citations omitted). The trial court found that members of the Blagbrough family: (1) tore down the boathouse in approximately 1964 or 1965 because it was dilapidated; (2) routinely entered the parcel for walks and other recreational activities; (3) permitted their children to play on the parcel; (4) used the parcel as a source of Christmas trees; and (5) cut grass, removed trees, and planted some flowers on the parcel. Accordingly, the question here is whether these activities are sufficient to support a conclusion that Blagbrough obtained title by adverse possession to a portion of Lot A-21-1. We hold that they are not. The law requires more than occasional, trespassory maintenance in order to perfect adverse title; the use must be sufficiently notorious to justify a presumption that the owner was notified of it. Pease v. Whitney, 78 N.H. 201, 204, 98 A. 62 (1916). The act of tearing down the boathouse, although not insignificant, was a one-time occurrence that the trial court found took place one or two years after the Blagbroughs acquired the parcel. That act, alone, therefore cannot be considered more than an occasional trespass. See id. Apparently recognizing this point, both the trial court and the parties properly focused more upon the Blagbroughs' other activities on the subject parcel in considering the adverse possession claim. With respect to these activities, although testimony did indicate that the Blagbrough family engaged in some of them routinely, those activities are not sufficiently notorious or exclusive to satisfy the criteria for adverse possession. Compare Alukonis v. Kashulines, 97 N.H. 298, 299, 86 A.2d 327 (1952) (stating that forty years of continuous and uninterrupted use of disputed strip to cut hay, garden, and grow crops, combined with fact that strip visually blended in with possessor's lot due to rudimentary boundary monuments in his favor, constituted adverse possession), with Flanagan, 138 N.H. at 572, 644 A.2d 51 (noting occasional playing of children on tract constituted minimal use not exclusive or sufficiently adverse); Hemon v. Rowe Chevrolet Co., 108 N.H. 11, 16-17, 226 A.2d 792 (1967) (stating that plaintiff's setting off disputed boundary strip with row of spruce trees, which grew from small to large over the twenty-year prescriptive period, was not open and notorious use giving notice of adverse claim); Cushing v. Miller, 62 N.H. 517, 525 (1883) (stating that occasional cutting of timber on wild lot not sufficiently adverse), overruled on other grounds by Dame v. Fernald, 86 N.H. 468, 471, 171 A. 369 (1934). Accordingly, even accepting the facts as found by the trial court, we conclude that Blagbrough has not met its burden of establishing that it acquired title to any portion of Lot A-21-1 by adverse possession. The trial court's conclusion to the contrary is therefore reversed.