Opinion ID: 1697230
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper prosecutorial statements during closing argument at the penalty phase.

Text: ¶ 79. Smith claims that the prosecutor improperly argued during the penalty phase that the death sentence was important to the victim's relatives and that the attorneys were ineffective in failing to object to the argument. Smith erroneously claims that victim impact evidence to the jury is not admissible in Mississippi, citing Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1325 (Miss.1994). The type of evidence proscribed in Mack is simply not what was put before the jury in the present case. This Court found on direct appeal that the argument made was within the permissible latitude given to prosecutors in closing argument, and further, that it was not preserved for appeal. Smith, 729 So.2d at 1215. As that issue has been heard by this Court on direct appeal and found to be without merit, the post-conviction claim on that statement is barred by res judicata. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(2). Smith provides nothing new for this Court to consider. ¶ 80. Smith also claims that the prosecutor incorrectly stated the law on the aggravating factors during the penalty phase. In his closing argument, the assistant district attorney discussed the required findings that the defendant actually killed the victim, intended that the killing take place, or have contemplated that deadly force would be used. He stated that the jury had already made a finding as to at least one of those factors by returning its verdict of guilty on the capital murder charge. Actually, by its verdict, the jury had found, pursuant to Instruction C-3, that the defendants either individually or acting in concert with one another or others, did unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously kill and murder Johnny B. Smith, a human being, at a time when Jerome Pete Smith was engaged in the commission of the crime of Armed Robbery.... Technically, they had not found that Clyde Smith had actually killed, intended the killing, or contemplated that lethal force would be employed. However, the jury was correctly instructed that they had to find that Clyde Smith actually killed, intended the killing, or contemplated that the deadly weapon would be used. The jury found in the affirmative on all three. [3] It is presumed that the jury followed the instructions and decided that those criteria were met. ¶ 81. It appears that the prosecutor simply mis-spoke here. Later in his argument, the assistant district attorney stated that the jury had already made the finding that the murder was committed in the commission of an armed robbery and that aggravating factor had already been established and decided by the jury. He was correct on that point, but he mistakenly applied that same analysis to the question about whether the defendant actually killed, intended that the killing happen, or contemplated the use of a deadly weapon. ¶ 82. It is also possible that the defense attorneys made a decision not to emphasize the question about whether each defendant actually killed the victim but rather chose to focus on the mitigating factors in the penalty phase, which would have been an acceptable strategy. In sum, there is no prejudicially deficient conduct in the failure to object to this portion of the State's closing argument. ¶ 83. Smith also claims that the prosecutor improperly discussed Smith's prior crimes which constituted the basis for one of the State's aggravating factors. Both Jerome and Smith had been convicted of two counts of aggravated assault, and Smith had also been convicted of kidnaping. In his closing argument, Jerome's attorney argued that one of the aggravated assault convictions was not that serious in that the Smiths had assaulted a street person with brass knuckles. In response, the assistant district attorney stated that [t]his is not a pair of brass knuckles, some street person. I tried the case and it wasn't a street person. ¶ 84. Smith claims that the argument was based on facts outside the record and that his attorneys should have objected. Perhaps they should have objected. Those facts were not in the record. But the prosecutor's argument here was in response to the defense's claim that the crime somehow wasn't so bad because it involved a street person. Additionally, this was a fairly inconsequential remark, taking only a few seconds of the many minutes spent in closing argument. In that same context, Smith argues that the prosecutor improperly argued that the murder here was especially heinous even though the circuit judge had determined that this was not a suitable case for the use of the especially heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance. In his closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the sequence of shots that resulted in Johnny Smith's death. He argued that the victim had been shot twice and then as he turned to flee for his life, it was ended by a bullet in the back. No, this is a bad murder. This argument was within the acceptable bounds of closing argument and did not violate the heinous, atrocious, or cruel proscription. The argument was a fairly brief description of the three shots including some speculation on the prosecutor's part as to the order of the shots. He concluded with the statement that this is a bad murder. This was within the latitude allowed in closing arguments.