Opinion ID: 1395040
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sixth Amendment argument

Text: Because Johnson exercised peremptory challenges to prevent all the challenged jurors except juror 600 from sitting on her jury, juror 600 is the only juror about whom she can raise a Sixth Amendment objection. See United States v. Nelson, 347 F.3d 701, 710 (8th Cir.2003) (claim that district court erred by not excluding four penalty-phase jurors for cause lacked merit because the defendant had used peremptory challenges to prevent the challenged jurors from sitting on the jury); United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1004 (8th Cir.2000) (noting that the defendant's claim on appeal concerning district court's denial of challenge for cause was unavailing because, inter alia, the three challenged jurors did not sit on the jury). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson's motion to strike juror 600. A venireperson may be properly excluded from sitting in a capital case if the venireperson's views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). Because the trial judge is in the best position to analyze the demeanor and credibility of a venireman, we will not reverse a court's rulings absent an abuse of discretion. United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 888 (8th Cir.2002); see also Uttecht v. Brown, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 2223-25, 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007) (concluding that a trial judge's determinations regarding substantial impairment should be accorded deference). Johnson contends that juror 600 should have been struck because he stated that his empathy for the victim's family and the fact that the crime involved children could affect his judgments about the case. She also asserts that juror 600 would not consider any deals that a prisoner may have received or might hope for in weighing the prisoner's testimony. Although the juror gave some equivocal answers and acknowledged the possibility that his judgment could be affected by some aspects of the case, the district court concluded that juror 600 could be fair and impartial and that his statements reflected the reasonable self doubts of a conscientious and reflective person. Moreover, although he initially indicated little interest in whether witnesses hoped for sentencing reductions in exchange for their testimony, juror 600 stated that he would consider the motivations of witnesses in testifying and acknowledged the real possibility that some witnesses might lie to obtain some sort of benefit. We therefore cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying Johnson's for-cause challenge to this juror.