Opinion ID: 1262335
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Nuisance Count

Text: In Count II of the motion for judgment, the Taylors allege that the City negligently created and maintained a dangerous condition. The Taylors contend that the dangerous condition constitutes a public nuisance and that, therefore, the immunity doctrine does not apply. [2] The City first contends that the alleged dangerous condition is not a public nuisance because the condition is neither located within a public place nor adjacent thereto. A public nuisance is a condition that is a danger to the public. White v. Town of Culpeper, 172 Va. 630, 636, 1 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1939). The essential characteristic of a public nuisance as it relates to highways is that the condition imperils the safety of a public highway and is dangerous and hazardous in itself. Price v. Travis, 149 Va. 536, 547, 140 S.E. 644, 647 (1927). The dangerous condition need not exist within the street itself. Burson v. City of Bristol, 176 Va. 53, 64, 10 S.E.2d 541, 545 (1940). As we said in Burson: [I]t is said here that the hazardous situation arose not from any condition in the streets themselves, but from a danger outside the streets. We do not think the rule is so limited as to exclude all danger arising beyond the limits of a street. The purpose of the rule is to provide safety to persons lawfully using the streets. The rule, indeed, would be but half discharged were it not held to make the municipality liable for dangers known to exist outside the street's limit, but so near thereto as to endanger public travel thereon. It is as much the duty of a city to take steps to ward off and to prevent the known probability of injury to users of its streets as it is its duty to remove dangerous defects and obstructions within the streets themselves. Injuries caused by defective instrumentalities immediately adjacent to a street may be as grievous as those which result from defects within the street itself. Weakened walls which overhang a street and dangerous unguarded ditches and excavations which may adjoin a street render the street no less perilous than obstructions or depressions negligently permitted within the street itself. Id. at 64, 10 S.E.2d at 545. (Citations omitted.) A dangerous condition may be adjacent to a street without adjoining it. See State Highway Commissioner v. Creative Displays, 236 Va. 352, 355, 374 S.E.2d 30, 32 (1988). In the present case, the alleged condition at the terminus of Michie Drive is dangerous and hazardous in itself and imperils the safety of the City's street. Furthermore, the dangerous condition is located adjacent to the street. Thus, we conclude that the motion for judgment effectively alleges a public nuisance. The City next asserts that, because it is immune from liability for the alleged negligent acts, it likewise is immune from liability for the same negligence associated with the alleged nuisance. We do not agree. We long have recognized that a municipal corporation may not be immune from liability for creating or maintaining a nuisance. City of Portsmouth v. Weiss, 145 Va. 94, 109, 133 S.E. 781, 786 (1926); see Chalkley v. City of Richmond, 88 Va. 402, 14 S.E. 339 (1891). This also is the majority view nationwide. See generally Annotation, Rule of municipal immunity from liability for acts in performance of governmental functions as applicable to personal injury or death as result of a nuisance, 56 A.L.R.2d 1415 (1957). We stated a more precise rule in Virginia Beach v. Steel Fishing Pier, 212 Va. 425, 184 S.E.2d 749 (1971). In that case, we said that if a municipal corporation creates or maintains a nuisance, it is not protected by the immunity doctrine unless (1) the condition claimed to be a nuisance is authorized by law, and (2) the act creating or maintaining the nuisance is performed without negligence. Id. at 427, 184 S.E.2d at 750-51. In sustaining the City's demurrer to the Taylors' nuisance count, the trial court relied upon Kellam v. School Board, 202 Va. 252, 117 S.E.2d 96 (1960). The City contends that Kellam requires an affirmance of the trial court's ruling. In Kellam, the plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell in an aisle of a school auditorium. She sued the school board on two counts, viz, (1) that the board was negligent in maintaining the aisle in an unsafe condition, and (2) that the board maintained a nuisance. Id. at 253, 117 S.E.2d at 97. We affirmed the trial court's judgment sustaining the board's demurrer to each count. With respect to the negligence count, we held that the board had acted in a governmental capacity and, therefore, was immune from liability. Id. at 257-58, 117 S.E.2d at 99-100. We likewise held that governmental immunity applied to the nuisance claim. Id. at 258, 117 S.E.2d at 100. In doing so, we emphasized that school boards are agents or instrumentalities of the state and partake of the state's sovereignty with respect to tort liability. Id. at 258-59, 117 S.E.2d at 100. Further, we emphasized that school boards, being state agencies, differed from true municipal corporations. Id. at 258, 117 S.E.2d at 100. Certain kinds of governmental units are sometimes considered as quasi corporations, rather than true municipal corporations. In several cases involving school districts and counties so considered, it has been held or recognized that no liability can be imposed on such corporations for personal injuries, even though resulting from nuisances, on the ground that they exercise functions merely as agents of the state, this position having been taken even in some jurisdictions recognizing the applicability of the nuisance exception to true municipal corporations. Id. (quoting 56 A.L.R.2d 1415, 1424 (1957)). The trial court's reliance upon Kellam was misplaced. Kellam involved a state agency, not a true municipal corporation. Steel Fishing Pier, on the other hand, expressly states the rule applicable to a municipal corporation. We hold, therefore, that the Taylors' nuisance claim is not barred by governmental immunity. Consequently, the trial court erred in sustaining the City's demurrer to the nuisance count.