Opinion ID: 2508491
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: effect of garner's first appeal on his second appeal

Text: ¶8 The court of appeals relied in its opinion on the principle of stare decisis to dismiss Garner's second appeal. Stating that [p]revious decisions of this court on identical issues are binding, the court concluded that because it had previously determined that modifications made to the July 26, 2001 judgment were immaterial, the second appeal, like the first, was untimely. Garner, 2003 UT App 72. The court therefore dismissed the second appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id. Although we agree that the court of appeals properly dismissed Garner's second appeal for the reasons described more fully herein, we believe it important to clarify that the doctrine of res judicata, rather than stare decisis, properly applies in a situation such as this one. [S]tare decisis applies [in contrast to res judicata] even where different parties are involved in the later case, in which a prior decision is invoked as a precedent . . . Also, stare decisis is based on the legal principle or rule involved in a prior case, not on the judgment which resulted from that case. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 148. In contrast, the doctrine of res judicata, 'precludes the relitigation of all issues [and claims] that could have been litigated as well as those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior action.' Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, ¶ 12, ___ P.3d ___ (quoting Macris & Assoc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ¶ 19, 16 P.3d 1214 (citation omitted)). ¶9 Claim preclusion, [3] has three requirements: First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, ¶ 34, 73 P.3d 325 (internal quotations omitted). ¶10 The present case satisfies the first prong of claim preclusion because the two appeals involved the same parties, specifically Garner and the State. The second requirement was also met because the claim in question in the second appeal, the materiality of the May 14, 2002 modifications, had been decided in the first appeal. [4] Finally, the court of appeals' decision to dismiss Garner's first appeal was final, decided on the merits of the materiality of the modifications. Therefore, claim preclusion properly applies here. The next issue, which we address below, is whether Garner's second appeal was timely. We find that it was not.