Opinion ID: 2397396
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Speech or Debate Clause of the State Constitution

Text: The defendant next claims, pursuant to the speech or debate clause of our state constitution; Conn. Const., art. III, § 15; see footnote 5 of this opinion; that the constitutional validity of its issuance of the subpoena to the governor is immune from judicial review. We disagree with the defendant and conclude that our speech or debate clause does not immunize from judicial review a colorable constitutional claim, made in good faith, that the legislature has violated the separation of powers by exceeding the bounds of its impeachment authority and, therefore, has conducted itself outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. Our appellate courts previously have not had occasion to consider the meaning of our state constitution's speech or debate clause. We are not without guidance, however, as to the contours of that clause because this provision closely resembles the speech or debate clause contained in article one, § 6, of the constitution of the United States, which has been interpreted on several occasions by the federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court. We therefore seek guidance, as we often do in the interpretation of provisions of our state constitution, from the interpretation afforded the federal speech or debate clause by the federal courts. See, e.g., State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171, 206, 833 A.2d 363 (2003); State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992). The federal speech or debate clause finds its origins in a textually similar provision within the English Bill of Rights of 1689. [12] Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951). As the United States Supreme Court has indicated, the design of the federal speech or debate clause is to ensure that the legislative branch will be able to discharge its duties free from undue external interference. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502, 95 S.Ct. 1813, 44 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975). A member of the constitutional convention, James Wilson, explained: In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 3 C. Antieau & W. Rich, Modern Constitutional Law: The States and the Federal Government (2d Ed. 1997) § 46.04, p. 384, quoting II Works of James Wilson (Andrews ed., 1896) p. 38. Accordingly, the federal speech or debate clause has been viewed as a grant of immunity upon Congress in order to prevent intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181, 86 S.Ct. 749, 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966). The clause operates to protect legislative independence, thereby buttressing the principle of the separation of powers and preserving the structural integrity of our constitutional government. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1972); United States v. Johnson, supra, at 178, 86 S.Ct. 749. In order to effectuate the important considerations underlying the federal speech or debate clause, the United States Supreme Court has voiced a willingness to interpret the immunity afforded by the clause generously, on the basis of a practical rather than a strictly literal reading of the provision. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 124, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979). The clause has been construed to provide protection against civil as well as criminal actions, and against actions brought by private individuals as well as those initiated by the Executive Branch. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, supra, 421 U.S. at 502-503, 95 S.Ct. 1813. Moreover, the immunity conferred by the federal speech or debate clause has been held to consist of not just immunity from liability, but immunity from suit. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85, 87 S.Ct. 1425, 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967) (per curiam). Although, as the text of the provision demonstrates, the core protection afforded by the federal speech or debate clause regards speech or debate exchanged on the floor of the legislative body; Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972) ([t]he heart of the [c]lause is speech or debate in either House); the clause has been extended to cover a wide variety of legislative conduct, for instance: to protect voting; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 202, 204, 26 L.Ed. 377 (1880); the circulation of information to other legislators; see Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312, 93 S.Ct. 2018, 36 L.Ed.2d 912 (1973); and participation in the work of legislative committees. Gravel v. United States, supra, at 624, 92 S.Ct. 2614. The federal speech or debate clause has not been construed, however, as a limitless conferral of absolute immunity. It has been held to immunize congressional aides; see id., at 618, 92 S.Ct. 2614 (congressional aides are protected by clause insofar as [their] conduct ... would be a protected legislative act if performed by the [m]ember himself); but not to provide protection for legislative employees carrying out legislative orders, even if the clause would protect the congresspersons who had issued the directive. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505-506, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969); Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, 103 U.S. at 196-200. In addition, the United States Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between legislative activities protected by the clause, and certain other political activities left unprotected by the clause. United States v. Brewster, supra, 408 U.S. at 512, 92 S.Ct. 2531 (concluding that activities related to functioning of legislative process are protected although essentially political activities, even if legitimate, are unprotected). As the United States Supreme Court explained in Gravel v. United States, supra, 408 U.S. at 625, 92 S.Ct. 2614, [l]egislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart of the [c]lause is speech or debate in either House. Insofar as the [c]lause is construed to reach other matters, they must be an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which [m]embers participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the [c]onstitution places within the jurisdiction of either House. One commentator has explained: Unprotected political matters include providing constituent services, aiding individuals seeking government contracts and arranging appointments with government agencies, as well as communicating directly with the public through such media as constituent newsletters, press releases, speeches delivered outside of Congress, and book publishing ... even if the material published was previously communicated in the course of protected legislative activity. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d Ed. 1988) § 5-18, pp. 371-72. Moreover, even for conduct within the penumbra of legislative activities, the immunity conferred by the federal speech or debate clause is limited to conduct occurring within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gravel v. United States, supra, at 624, 92 S.Ct. 2614; see Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, supra, 421 U.S. at 503, 95 S.Ct. 1813 ([w]e reaffirm that once it is determined that [m]embers [of Congress] are acting within the `legitimate legislative sphere' the ... [c]lause is an absolute bar to interference); see also Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, 341 U.S. at 376-77, 71 S.Ct. 783. In determining whether particular activities other than literal speech or debate fall within the legitimate legislative sphere we look to see whether the activities took place in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it.... More specifically, we must determine whether the activities are an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which [m]embers participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the [c]onstitution places within the jurisdiction of either House. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, supra, at 503-504, 95 S.Ct. 1813. With that backdrop in mind, just as in the case of justiciability under Kinsella, we must determine whether the plaintiff has raised a good faith, colorable claim that the defendant's issuance of the subpoena was outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activity such that the defendant is not shielded from suit by the speech or debate clause. As we discuss more fully in part II A of this opinion, an investigative power, encompassing the subpoenaing of persons and documents and the taking of testimony under oath, is a necessary and proper authority implicitly conferred by our state constitution in granting the legislature its jurisdiction over impeachments. The impeachment authority would mean little if it did not include the power to investigate. We conclude that the immunity conferred by the speech or debate clause, however, does not extend to a colorable claim, brought in good faith, that the legislature has conducted itself in violation of the principle of the separation of powers during the exercise of its impeachment authority. We reach this conclusion for the following reasons. First, it is important to note that the speech or debate clause is itself part of article third of our constitution, governing the powers of the legislative branch. It cannot be viewed, therefore, as categorically trumping the separation of powers provision, which forms the very structure of our constitutional order and which governs, therefore, all three coordinate branches of government. Second, as discussed with relation to the federal speech or debate clause, the primary purpose of the speech or debate clause, whether on a federal or state constitutional level, is to protect legislative independence, thereby furthering the principle of the separation of powers. It would be paradoxical to allow the clause to be used in a manner that categorically forecloses judicial inquiry into whether the legislature itself violated the separation of powers. Permitting the shield to extend that far would allow the clause to swallow the very principle that it seeks to advance. The clause is designed to protect legislative independence, not to install legislative supremacy. Third, this construction is in harmony with our decision in Kinsella, and with several decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the federal speech or debate clause. These cases collectively recognize that, however broad the legislative prerogative regarding impeachments may be, there are limits, and judicial review must be available in instances in which the impeaching authority has been exceeded. As we stated in Kinsella, [i]f the legislature [should] attempt to encroach upon constitutional restrictions, it will become the solemn duty of the court to declare such an attempt illegal and the act void. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kinsella v. Jaekle, supra, 192 Conn. at 727, 475 A.2d 243; see also United States v. Brewster, supra, 408 U.S. at 515, 92 S.Ct. 2531 ([i]n no case has this [c]ourt ever treated the [c]lause as protecting all conduct relating to the legislative process [emphasis in original]); Powell v. McCormack, supra, 395 U.S. at 503, 89 S.Ct. 1944 ([l]egislative immunity does not, of course, bar all judicial review of legislative acts). We are not persuaded by the defendant's reliance on Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, supra, 421 U.S. 491, 95 S.Ct. 1813, 44 L.Ed.2d 324. [13] In that case, the United States Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security issued a subpoena duces tecum to a bank where the United States Servicemen's Fund (servicemen fund), a nonprofit membership corporation with a declared purpose of furthering the welfare of United States military personnel, had an account. Id., at 493, 95 S.Ct. 1813. The servicemen fund, and two of its members, brought an action to enjoin implementation of the subpoena, claiming that it exceeded the legislative power of inquiry and, insofar as the records sought contained the servicemen fund's membership list and its sources of contributions related to a controversial cause, the subpoena violated the first amendment to the constitution of the United States. Id., at 494-96, 95 S.Ct. 1813. The United States Supreme Court concluded that, because the subpoena at issue fell within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity, as an investigative tool designed to elicit information related to a matter of congressional concern, the speech or debate clause required the dismissal of the complaint of the servicemen fund. Id., at 505-507, 95 S.Ct. 1813. In determining that the subpoena was a legitimate legislative activity, the court expressed that the power to investigate and to do so through compulsory process plainly falls within [the] definition of legitimate legislative activity because the [i]ssuance of subpoenas such as the one in question here has long been held to be a legitimate use by Congress of its power to investigate. Id., at 504, 95 S.Ct. 1813. Responding to the servicemen fund's claim that the subpoena would result in a violation of the first amendment, the court recognized that, in other contexts, first amendment rights had been balanced against public interests but, in the context of the speech or debate clause, [w]here we are presented with an attempt to interfere with an ongoing activity by Congress, and that activity is found to be within the legitimate legislative sphere, balancing plays no part. The speech or debate protection provides an absolute immunity from judicial interference. Collateral harm which may occur in the course of a legitimate legislative inquiry does not allow us to force the inquiry to grind to a halt. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 509-10 n. 16, 95 S.Ct. 1813. Put another way, because the legislative subpoena was legitimate, the broad nature of the immunity conferred by the speech or debate clause rendered inconsequential the collateral constitutional concerns. Id., at 510-11, 95 S.Ct. 1813. Eastland is inapposite to the present case. Of course, Eastland and the present case share a similarity in that both involve the legislative issuance of a subpoena for investigative purposes; the claims raised, however, are poles apart. In Eastland, the gravamen of the servicemen fund's claim was not that the legislative subpoena was an illegitimate exercise of the congressional investigatory power, but rather that the subpoena was improper because of its adverse collateral consequences on the constitutional rights of the servicemen fund's members. Id., at 503-504, 95 S.Ct. 1813. In the present case, the plaintiff's claim is not that the subpoena should be quashed because its collateral constitutional consequences render it improper; rather, the plaintiff claims that the subpoena should be quashed because the legislative authority to investigate in aid of the impeachment power does not extend to the compulsion of testimony from the sitting chief executive and the subpoena, therefore, is outside the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. Furthermore, Eastland is distinguishable because it involved a claim raised by a private party, not, as here, a challenge to legislative conduct brought by a coequal branch of government. Indeed, we are unaware of any speech or debate case in which the clause was held to insulate a legislative impeachment subpoena that had been challenged on the basis of the separation of powers. Because the speech or debate clause confers immunity from suit, at this stage we must, without considering the merits of the claim, view the plaintiff's challenge through the lens of whether, if successful, it would pierce the immunity conferred by that clause. Given that the plaintiff's claim raises a colorable claim that the conduct of the defendant was not within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity, we conclude that the speech or debate clause does not categorically bar the plaintiff's action, nor does that clause preclude our consideration of the plaintiff's claims on the merits. 3