Opinion ID: 1218078
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: resolution of the commission's appeal

Text: On appeal to this court, the Commission claims that the superior court applied the incorrect standard of review, and that, under the appropriate test, the Commission should have been affirmed. The Commission's position is that the only possible question of law that could have been involved was the interpretation and application of the Commission's own regulations. This, it is urged is certainly a matter involving the Commission's expertise on the complex specialized matter of fishermen's qualifications for entry permits and formation of basic policy concerning allocation of permits. If the Commission is correct in its analysis of the proceedings before it, then Judge Stewart erred in substituting his judgment for that of the Commission. See Swindel v. Kelly, 499 P.2d 291, 298 (Alaska 1972). [4] Tested, however, on the basis of what the Commission actually did, rather than on some post hoc rationalization, its argument fails. The Commission's assertion that there is no question of interpretation of a statutory ... provision is belied by the facts. It is clear from a most cursory reading of the Commission's decision in this case that at its nucleus was the Commission's interpretation of the statutory scheme. The decision states: The Legislature's concern about relative hardship among those to be excluded from the fishery was directed at gearlicense operators, i.e., at units of gear that would be excluded... . It is for that reason that relative past participation and relative income dependence are measured by relationship to holding a gear license. The hardship related to exclusion has no reference to any other category, for neither exclusion nor hardship as those terms are used in the act occur[s] with respect to any other category. Thus, the Commission interpreted the legislative intent of the Limited Entry Act, and on that interpretation, based its interpretive ruling that 20 AAC 05.630(b)(2) applies only to gear license holders. There is no indication in the Commission's decision that its interpretation of the statutes and regulations involved formulation of fundamental policy or the particularized expertise and experience of administrative personnel. Judge Stewart was free to substitute his own judgment as to the proper interpretation of the Act. Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906, 916 (Alaska 1971). [5] Insofar as its interpretation of the regulation is based solely on the interpretation of the Act, no additional deference is due the Commission. In a nutshell, the Commission did not use its expertise to define hardship, but rather made a judgment regarding [t]he Legislature's concern about relative hardship. Judge Stewart was in just as good a position to make that judgment as the Commission. Similarly, since a question of statutory interpretation is involved, this court will independently evaluate the trial court's interpretation. [6]
The Commission claims that the superior court erred in its interpretation of the regulations. We agree with Judge Stewart's interpretation. Like him, we are persuaded by the reasoning of the hearing officer that Templeton's participation in 1971 and 1972 was that of an owner and operator of gear, rather than that of a crew member, that 20 AAC 630(b)(2) is designed to govern all situations not specifically covered by the regulations proper, and that Templeton qualifies for serious consideration under section 630(b)(2). Moreover, the regulations must be read so as to be consistent with the Act. AS 16.43.010(a) sets forth the purpose of the Act: It is the purpose of this chapter to promote the conservation and the sustained yield management of Alaska's fishery resource and the economic health and stability of commercial fishing in Alaska by regulating and controlling entry into the commercial fisheries in the public interest and without unjust discrimination. [emphasis added] While a gear license may be a good general indicator of ownership and operation of gear for the purpose of weighing relative hardship, [7] to foreclose automatically consideration of special circumstances under 20 AAC 05.630(b)(2) in the absence of a gear license would result, in many cases, such as the one at bar, in unjust discrimination. The Commission was properly concerned with the problem of proliferation of gear operating in the fisheries. Unfortunately, allocating one permit between two partners [8] solely on the fortuitous circumstances of which one held the gear license in two given years does not realistically weigh the relative hardship which each partner would suffer by denial of a permit. In this case, the construction of the statutes and the regulations that the Commission suggests works at cross-purposes with the Legislature's stated intent to avoid unjust discrimination. AS 16.43.010(a). The judgment and order of the superior court are AFFIRMED. MATTHEWS, J., not participating.