Opinion ID: 2341603
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Former RCW 71.09.020(10) Provides an Ascertainable Standard To Protect against Arbitrary Enforcement

Text: ¶ 34 The due process clause forbids statutes that contain no standards and allow police officers, judges, and juries to subjectively decide what conduct the statute proscribes or what conduct will comply with a statute in any given case. State v. Maciolek, 101 Wash.2d 259, 267, 676 P.2d 996 (1984). The statute must instead provide `minimal guidelines ... to guide law enforcement.' Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 181, 795 P.2d 693 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Worrell, 111 Wash.2d 537, 544, 761 P.2d 56 (1988)). These determinations are not made in a vacuum, but rather, the question is whether [t]he terms are not inherently subjective in the context in which they are used. Worrell, 111 Wash.2d at 544, 761 P.2d 56 (emphasis added). Additionally, the mere fact that a statute may require some degree of subjective evaluation by a police officer to determine whether the statute applies does not mean the statute is unconstitutionally vague. Am. Dog Owners Ass'n v. City of Yakima, 113 Wash.2d 213, 216, 777 P.2d 1046 (1989). Under the due process clause, the enactment is unconstitutional only if it invites an inordinate amount of police discretion. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 181, 795 P.2d 693. ¶ 35 Former RCW 71.09.020(10) requires a person to consider an offender's acts and threats objectively in the context of his or her history and mental condition. It also requires that the acts and threats have either caused harm of a sexually violent nature or have created a reasonable apprehension of such harm in the mind of an objective person who knows of the offender's history and mental condition. Former RCW 71.09.020(10) thus provides guidelines to the prosecuting attorney and attorney general, who may file petitions for civil commitment, and does not allow them to consider threats in a vacuum. Although petitioning for civil commitment under RCW 71.09.030 is discretionary, former RCW 71.09.020(10) provides an ascertainable standard to protect against arbitrary enforcement of the involuntary civil commitment statute. ¶ 36 Finally, we again recognize that involuntary civil commitment is a substantial curtailment of individual liberty and therefore requires a showing that the offender is presently dangerous to justify commitment. In re Det. of Lewis, 163 Wash.2d 188, 193, 177 P.3d 708 (2008). We have already held that proof of a recent overt act satisfies this inquiry. Id. at 194, 177 P.3d 708 (citing In re Det. of Albrecht, 147 Wash.2d 1, 8, 51 P.3d 73 (2002); In re Pers. Restraint of Young, 122 Wash.2d 1, 41, 857 P.2d 989 (1993); In re Det. of Harris, 98 Wash.2d 276, 284, 654 P.2d 109 (1982)). The consideration of acts and threats that have either caused harm of a sexually violent nature or have created a reasonable apprehension of such harm in the mind of an objective person who knows of the history and mental condition of the person engaging in the act is consistent with our requirement that the State show the offender is presently dangerous and comports with due process. Cf. Lewis, 163 Wash.2d at 203, 177 P.3d 708 (Sanders, J., concurring).