Opinion ID: 362254
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Instructions on Obscenity

Text: 90 Wedelstedt's objections to the instructions explaining community standards and how community standards should be applied under the Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973) test, are completely without merit. The court's thorough instructions on obscenity (instructions 14-18) clearly convey to the jury that the determination of obscenity, which the jury must analyze under the three-part test set out in Miller, is not a matter of individual taste, but must be judged according to the community standard. 91 Nor did the court commit reversible error in refusing to admit Chapter 725 of the Iowa Code into evidence. That chapter, entitled Obscenity and Indecency, defines obscene material for the purposes of that chapter, and regulates, Inter alia, certain aspects of the distribution of such material, such as distribution to minors. Appellant argues that the Iowa Code is admissible testimony and has relevance as to what the 'community standards' in Iowa are. 92 The statutory law in Iowa is not controlling on the question of community standards. Under section 1465, which prohibits the interstate transportation of obscene materials: 93 We deal with a federal law which neither incorporates nor depends upon the laws of the states. United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1974). Rather, the federal law depends for its constitutionality upon definitions incorporating community standards. Community standards are aggregates of the attitudes of average people people who are neither particularly susceptible or sensitive . . . or indeed . . . totally insensitive. Miller v. California, supra, 413 U.S. at 33, 93 S.Ct. at 2620. The fact that a law of a state permits a given kind of conduct does not necessarily mean that the people within that state approve of the permitted conduct. Whether they do is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court (this case was tried to the court), and in this case the trial court did resolve it. 94 United States v. Danley, 523 F.2d 369, 370 (9th Cir. 1975), Cert. denied, 424 U.S. 929, 96 S.Ct. 1143, 47 L.Ed.2d 338 (1976). 95 The Supreme Court cited the Danley holding with approval in Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 52 L.Ed.2d 324 (1977), a case from this court which the Supreme Court affirmed: 96 We hold only that the Iowa statute is not conclusive as to the issue of contemporary community standards for appeal to the prurient interest and patent offensiveness. Those are questions for the jury to decide, in its traditional role as factfinder. 97 Id. at 308, 97 S.Ct. at 1767. 98 The Court also indicated, however, that the admission of state statutory law was permissible, and may have indicated that a defendant was entitled to have a jury consider the same. See Smith v. United States, supra, 431 U.S. at 309, 97 S.Ct. 1756. 99 In this case, while the statute itself was not given to the jury to interpret, the court specifically instructed the jury on it. 100 As a matter of Law, the court told the jury: 101 In addition, (in determining community standards) you may consider the fact that the Iowa Supreme Court held the Iowa obscenity statutes unconstitutional in 1973 and that the Iowa State legislature repealed Iowa's obscenity laws with respect to consenting adults in 1974. (Emphasis added.) 102 This is a correct statement of the law at that time. See Smith v. United States, supra, 431 U.S. at 295, 97 S.Ct. 1756. (At the time petitioner engaged in the conduct at issue here, Iowa law placed no limits on the distribution of obscene material to adults. Id. at 309, 97 S.Ct. at 1768 (Powell, J. concurring).) 12 See also Chelsea Theater Corp. v. City of Burlington, 258 N.W.2d 372 (Iowa 1977). 103 We think the court's instruction to the jury on Iowa law, which was favorable to defendant's position, obviates any error in not admitting the statute into evidence.