Opinion ID: 450777
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: 20 I. Whether and to what extent Owens-Corning had property rights that were affected by the CCO. 21 II. Whether Owens-Corning's Rule 60(b)(4) motion was timely. 22 III. Whether Center's notice of the hearing to approve the CCO satisfied due process. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 23 In Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982), the Supreme Court invalidated the trial court jurisdiction accorded bankruptcy judges by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 7 To prevent undue disruption, the Court held that the Marathon decision would not apply to judgments entered by bankruptcy judges before October 4, 1982. Id. at 88, 102 S.Ct. at 2880. The Court later extended this stay to December 24, 1982. 459 U.S. 813, 103 S.Ct. 200, 74 L.Ed.2d 60 (1982). In light of Marathon, we have held that a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) may decide only those bankruptcy appeals involving judgments entered before the stay expired on December 24, 1982. In re Burley, 738 F.2d 981, 984 (9th Cir.1984). 8 Judgments and orders entered by bankruptcy judges after that date under the Emergency Rule 9 are not appealable to the BAP. 10 Id. 24 Burley 's significance on the standard of review is its effect on prior Ninth Circuit cases discussing this court's review of BAP decisions. Because the district court replaced the BAP as the intermediate court in this case, 11 our determinations as to the appropriate standards for reviewing BAP decisions should apply when we review the district court's decision as well. 12 25 We have consistently held that because this court is in as good a position as the BAP to review the findings of a bankruptcy judge, we independently review the bankruptcy judge's decision without deferring to the BAP's decision. See, e.g., In re Mellor, 734 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir.1984); In re Comer, 723 F.2d 737, 739 (9th Cir.1984); In re Bialac, 712 F.2d 426, 429 (9th Cir.1983). Similarly, because we are in as good a position as was the district court to review Judge King's denial of Owens-Corning's Rule 60(b) motion, we review that decision de novo. 26 Whether Owens-Corning had property rights and to what extent those rights were affected by the CCO involve questions of fact that we review under the clearly erroneous standard. See id. However, because Judge King never made these crucial findings, we must remand to permit him to adopt Judge Rainville's findings, if any, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, 13 or make the findings himself. 27 The remaining issues--whether Owens-Corning can avail itself of the doctrine of marshaling to create or enlarge its property rights, whether Owens-Corning's Rule 60(b) motion was timely, and whether the mailgram notice satisfied due process--involve questions of law that we review de novo. See id.