Opinion ID: 3061485
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: DVR’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: DVR moved for summary judgment, arguing that Rance’s cause of action for review was time barred.5 In support of this motion, DVR submitted copies of the Final Order and the Recommended Order. The district court notified Rance of DVR’s summary judgment motion and advised Rance that he should respond to the motion. Further, the district court noted that “it appears that summary judgment could be entered on the merits of this case in favor of one party” and DVR “ha[d] raised arguments on the merits.”6 5 The DVR based its argument on the fact that there is no statute of limitations in 29 U.S.C. § 722(c)(5)(J)(i) and that Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(c) only allows thirty days for filing an appeal for review of administrative orders. Rance argued that the four-year catchall provision under 28 U.S.C. § 1658 applied. 6 Contrary to the district court’s interpretation, we read DVR’s summary judgment motion not to raise an argument on the merits, but rather an argument on a procedural issue: the statute of limitations. Nonetheless, the district court did advise Rance that he must address the merits 9 The district court expressly notified Rance that “a party must go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” The district court also encouraged Rance to file any “necessary sworn affidavits and other material along with his response” to DVR’s summary judgment motion. Rance filed an opposition to DVR’s summary judgment motion, arguing that his action was not time barred. In support of his motion, he attached DVR’s Final Order. Rance also moved for partial summary judgment, on the ground that DVR violated federal law by failing to provide a written IPE as required under 34 C.F.R. § 361.45 and 29 U.S.C. § 722(2)(a). Further, Rance argued that the law did not require the IPE to be approved by a supervisor and thus DVR’s Sapperstein abused his discretion by not providing a written IPE. Rance attached to his motion portions of the U.S. Code, his request for admissions to DVR, copies of his IPE’s case notes, and letters from DVR informing Rance of his case’s closure. In opposition, DVR argued that summary judgment should not be granted on Rance’s behalf because Florida law required DVR to assess Rance’s educational and other abilities as part of the process for developing an IPE. and establish a genuine issue for trial. 10 Without the assessment, the IPE could not be approved. DVR’s proposed assessment—the TABE and the psychological evaluation—was reasonable given that Rance’s requested computer course was rigorous and costly and that Rance displayed volatile behavior. Because Rance refused to cooperate, DVR lacked the information necessary to approve the IPE. Based on DVR’s established procedure, DVR lawfully closed Rance’s case because of his protracted failure to comply with DVR’s reasonable requests for diagnostic assessments. Along with its opposition to Rance’s motion, DVR filed a statement of undisputed material facts and supporting documents. The documents included Sapperstein’s affidavit, which reiterated his administrative hearing testimony; a printout of Rance’s IPE, which stated in bold typeface that the IPE was “pending approval”; copies of DVR’s case notes for Rance’s case, which indicated that the IPE was pending approval and described some of Rance’s interactions with DVR; and copies of Chapters 18 and 4 of DVR’s Operating Procedures manual. DVR also submitted the administrative-hearing transcript. The district court notified Rance that DVR raised arguments on the merits in its response to Rance’s summary judgment motion and gave Rance fourteen days to respond. In the notice, the district court specifically referenced Rance’s partial summary judgment motion, DVR’s opposition to Rance’s motion, and DVR’s 11 statement of undisputed material facts. The notice informed Rance that it appeared summary judgment “could be entered on the merits of this case in favor of one party” and gave Rance the opportunity to respond to the arguments on the merits raised by DVR. Rance filed a response to DVR’s opposition. Rance argued that he had moved for summary judgment on only one issue, and if the entire case was adjudicated, there would be unanswered issues. After considering both parties’ summary judgment motions, the district court granted summary judgment to DVR. As an initial matter, the district court concluded that Rance’s action was not time barred and that DVR was not entitled to summary judgment on that basis. The district court then examined the merits of Rance’s claims. As to Count I (failure to allow additional evidence), the district court reviewed Rance’s additional evidence that he had sought to file with DVR. The court determined that even if DVR had considered the evidence, it did not support Rance’s claim and would not have changed the Final Order’s outcome. As to Count II (failure to provide vocational rehabilitation benefits), the district court concluded that Rance failed to demonstrate DVR should have approved the proposed IPE prior to receiving the TABE results and psychological 12 evaluation. Both exams would have helped determine whether the proposed IPE was consistent with Rance’s “unique strengths, priorities, concerns, abilities, and capabilities.” Further, based on the record, both assessments were reasonable. DVR thus did not violate the law in closing Rance’s case without approving the proposed IPE because it acted consistently with its written policy found in Chapter 18 of DVR’s Operating Procedures manual. Accordingly, the district court denied Rance’s partial summary judgment motion and granted summary judgment on DVR’s behalf. After the district court entered final judgment, Rance filed a motion to reconsider and reopen the case, but did not submit any new evidence. The district court denied his motion, and this appeal followed.