Opinion ID: 773573
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jefferson's Sentence

Text: 14 Jefferson raises two challenges to the sentence imposed by the district court. First, Jefferson contends the district court erred in increasing his offense level by two levels for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. sec. 3C1.1 based on a finding that Jefferson committed perjury when he testified at trial. Jefferson further asserts that the district court erred in sentencing him to the highest possible sentence within the applicable range. With respect to the sec. 3C1.1 enhancement, Jefferson argues that the district court erred in applying the enhancement without first making specific findings of perjury. We review for clear error. United States v. Webster, 125 F.3d 1024, 1037 (7th Cir. 1997). An enhancement under sec. 3C1.1 is appropriate when [a] witness testifying under oath or affirmation . . . gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). If a defendant objects to a sec. 3C1.1 enhancement resulting from his testimony at trial, the district court must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to, or obstruction of, justice, or an attempt to do the same, under the perjury definition as set forth above. Id. at 95. [N]ot every accused who testifies at trial and is convicted will incur an enhanced sentence under sec. 3C1.1 for committing perjury. Id. A simple denial of guilt . . . is not a basis for an obstruction-of-justice enhancement. United States v. Godinez, 110 F.3d 448, 456 (7th Cir. 1997). 15 Jefferson filed a timely objection to the presentence report's recommended two- level enhancement under sec. 3C1.1. At the sentencing hearing, the district court, after citing to several portions of the record in which Jefferson denied selling crack cocaine, made the following finding: 16 It's the Court's finding that in light of all the testimony in this case that the denial of selling crack is a complete and utter falsehood that amounts to perjury, because quite clearly, as well, it's willful. I have no recollection, make no finding that Mr. Jefferson was at all confused or had any sort of bad memory in light of that testimony, particularly when we think about the testimony about the statement immediately after the arrest. 17 So, he clearly was willful in his presenting false testimony to the jury. 18 Clearly, Jefferson's contention that the district court did not find he willfully intended to provide false testimony fails. Furthermore, the district court found that the testimony concerned a material matter, stating 19 this type of falsehoods, and in this particular case, goes directly to issues of Relevant Conduct, which is central to his sentence. And I believe that in light of Mr. Jefferson's obvious effort to impact the sentencing in this case, that the finding of the probation officer on this issue and the enhancement of two levels for obstruction of justice is appropriate. 20 These findings are sufficient to satisfy the standards set out in Dunnigan, and the district court's two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under sec. 3C1.1 is affirmed. 21 We lack jurisdiction to examine Jefferson's second sentencing challenge. Jefferson concedes his sentence was within the applicable range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Absent an error of law or a misapplication of the guidelines, this court lacks jurisdiction to review sentences within the applicable guidelines range. United States v. Solis, 923 F.2d 548, 551 (7th Cir. 1991). In the present case, there was no such error or misapplication.