Opinion ID: 885426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Did the District Court err in the dividing of the property of the parties, thus requiring a remand?

Text: ¶ 33 Virgil argues that this case should be remanded so that further competent evidence may be submitted to determine the values of property which remain in dispute. Virgil offers an extensive list of determinations made by the District Court which he argues do not serve the court's stated purpose of achieving an equitable division of the marital estate. In turn, these contentions can be logically channeled into two categories: 1) determinations that the court made; and 2) those determinations which the court failed to make. Largely, his contentions regarding the former of these two categories are without merit.
¶ 34 Under this category of alleged errors, Virgil has essentially requested that we remand so that the District Court can do again that which it has already done. We are acutely mindful of the governing rule that a presumption exists in favor of a district court's judgment in such matters, which is accorded a great amount of deference upon review. See In re Marriage of Johnson (1987), 225 Mont. 404, 405-06, 732 P.2d 1345, 1346; In re Marriage of Garner (1989), 239 Mont. 485, 487-88, 781 P.2d 1125, 1127. Resorting to a summary approachwhich these particular issues clearly deservewe conclude that the evidence was not clearly erroneous, the court did not abuse its discretion, and any conclusion of law made was correct regarding the following: ¶ 35 Barbara's medical bills. It was well within the court's discretion to determine that these medical costs were marital debt that should be equally shared. This finding and conclusion is affirmed. ¶ 36 The equitable division of the ranch operation. Virgil states he is disabled and suffers from several physical ailments, including a bad shoulder, a bad back, a bad knee, and a heart condition. He further claims that the ranch is small and for his recreation, and that it is not a money-making concern. He then claims that Barbara could not have possibly contributed an equal share of labor to what he characterizes as a hobby because she worked until 3:00 p.m. each weekday. ¶ 37 We conclude that the District Court relied on substantial evidenceparticularly the testimony of friends and neighborsin concluding that the ranch operation was sustained by an equal contribution of both labor and resources by the parties. The evidence clearly shows that Barbara's partnership interest, of 8.44 percent, was for tax purposes only. The evidence further shows that her nursing income covered much of their living costs. Finally, aside from the period where her physical condition was weakened by her cancer treatment, she routinely contributed her share of labor to the ongoing operation of the ranch. Thus, the findings and conclusions pertaining to the equal division of the ranch are affirmed. ¶ 38 The home on Warren Street. There is substantial evidence that the home belonged to Virgil and not his father, and that it was properly included in the marital estate. Whatever motive prompted Virgil's transfer of this property to his father is immaterial. Although incorrectly stating that Virgil placed property in the name of his parents in order to protect it from his ex-wife and from Petitioner  (the record adequately demonstrates that Virgil's acts of deception were targeted at his first ex-wife only, and not Barbara, his second wife), the District Court's findings and conclusion, that the value of the home is part of the marital estate and should be equitably divided, are affirmed. ¶ 39 The $8,000 payment for Barbara's interest in Highway 48 property. The evidence indicates that Virgil paid Barbara $8,000 for her interest in the Highway 48 property that was valued at between $68,000 and $78,000virtually at the moment Barbara separated from him and left the ranch. The District Court concluded that this sum resulted from coercion, in that Virgil exploited Barbara's financial and emotional duress to his advantage. The court relied on this Court's decision in Best v. Best (1982), 202 Mont. 109, 656 P.2d 201, in determining that the transaction was unconscionable. We agree with the court's determination and affirm. ¶ 40 The record clearly shows that Virgil maneuvered Barbara into an untenable economic crisis, and then took advantage of her by making the proverbial offer that she could not refuse. Although not as severe as the circumstances described in Best, it was equally opportunistic. True, Barbara came to him requesting moneybut not in exchange for her interest in marital property. Further, her decision was not made with the advice of counsel. See also Stanley v. Holms, 1999 MT 41, ¶ ¶ 39-42, 293 Mont. 343, ¶ ¶ 39-42, 975 P.2d 1242, ¶ ¶ 39-42 (discussing Litten v. Jonathan Logan, Inc. (1971), 220 Pa.Super. 274, 286 A.2d 913, and noting that party must contribute to financial crises where unconscionability due to financial duress is alleged). ¶ 41 Barbara's PERS retirement account and the house in Opportunity. Why Virgil has chosen to quibble over these distributions is difficult to ascertain. The District Court, in its discretion, allowed each party to keep their respective sources of retirement. Additionally, Virgil's ranch account, which steadily increased in value, and which provides him with more than $3,000 in annual interest, was left undisturbed. Further, although Barbara was awarded her house in Opportunity, she was also awarded the privilege of paying off the mortgage. The foregoing determinations are, accordingly, affirmed.
¶ 42 The lone meritorious assertion Virgil offers in the midst of his eight issues on appeal is whether the District Court erred by not assigning a value to certain identifiable marital assets. This Court has held that it is an abuse of discretion for a district court to fail to identify or describe the assets acquired during the marriage, or assign values to them, and [fail] to consider the contingent liabilities associated with those assets. In re Marriage of Smith (1994), 264 Mont. 306, 310-11, 871 P.2d 884, 887 (citing In re Marriage of Dirnberger (1989), 237 Mont. 398, 401-402, 773 P.2d 330, 332). In Dirnberger, this Court stated: Only after a finding of net worth can the trial court make an equitable apportionment. The District Court must make complete findings of fact, including assets and liabilities, from which can be established a net worth of the parties. . . . Additionally, [i]f the District Court's findings and conclusions do not reflect the net worth of the parties' marital assets at the time of their divorce, this Court on appeal cannot determine if the property was equitably divided. Dirnberger, 237 Mont. at 401, 773 P.2d at 332 (citations omitted). ¶ 43 Here, the District Court, in its conclusions of law, stated: [I]t is the intent of this Court to divide the marital estate equally. However, neither Petitioner or Respondent have supplied this Court with sufficient information in order to arrive at a value for the marital estate. The court then provided examples of this insufficiency which included the value of the Highway 48 property, other land acquisitions, and a precise figure for the medical bills and expenses associated with Barbara's cancer treatment. The court then suggested that Virgil and Barbara should have these marital assets and debts appraised, and divide the resulting value equally. The court then warned that: If the parties can not agree, the Court will order the appraisal with the costs of the appraisal to be divided equally between the parties. The Court would then divide the value of the marital estate equally. Finally, the court decreed that the parties are specifically ordered to follow the terms of this Decree of Dissolution of Marriage and to execute whatever documents are necessary to effectuate the terms of this Decree. ¶ 44 We conclude, therefore, that while the court did not determine a specific dollar amount in its final decree, the parties here, namely Virgil, simply did not follow the court's explicit instructions. Rather, Virgil chose to bring this appeal without first pursuing the court-recommended appraisals. Finding no errors thus far in the court's determinations, we remand this matter so that court can fulfill its promise: to do that which the parties are apparently incapable of doing themselves. ¶ 45 Affirmed and remanded. WILLIAM E. HUNT, Sr., W. WILLIAM LEAPHART, JIM REGNIER, and TERRY N. TRIEWEILER, JJ., concur.