Opinion ID: 2636899
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inquiry about psychiatric examination.

Text: During his cross-examination of Dr. Satten, a defense witness, the prosecutor asked the witness who had asked Drs. Bittle and Kaldor to see appellant, to which the witness replied that he did not know and it was either the Court or yourself, the prosecuting attorney. The prosecutor followed up by asking the doctor if he thought a prosecutor had the right to have a defendant examined; the doctor responded that he believed this was possible in some circumstances. The prosecutor then asked if the witness had cases for that proposition. Defense counsel objected on relevancy grounds, but the court ruled that the question was appropriate since the witness had been offered as a forensic expert in psychiatry. The witness said that this was possible only with the consent of the defense. When the prosecutor then asked if these gentlemen (defense counsel) had agreed it could have taken place, and the witness responded that he thought the court had appointed the doctors, defense counsel again objected to the inappropriate line of inquiry and renewed his earlier objection on the ground that the witness had been asked for a legal opinion. The court ordered the jury to disregard the answer that the examination could take place if defense counsel agreed. The judge expressed doubt that allowing the jury to know that the prosecutor may not have a defendant examined was inappropriate, and ruled that asking if there were any cases asked for historical fact, not a legal opinion. Appellant contends that the prosecutor's comment, that the People had no right to have the defendant examined and the insinuation that appellant had refused to consent, denied due process. To the extent that this is a claim that the prosecutor's line of questions was misconduct, we agree. What the witness thought about who ordered the examinations by Drs. Bittle and Kaldor was irrelevant, as was the witness's understanding of the law. His expertise was in the field of psychiatry. As a forensic expert, he dealt with psychiatric questions that arise in judicial and administrative proceedings, but that did not qualify him as an expert who may offer an opinion on the law. While the prosecutor did not directly state that he had no right to have the examination performed, the questions and the answers he elicited conveyed that impression and thereby conveyed an erroneous impression of the law. When a defense of insanity has been offered, the defendant waives the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to the extent necessary to permit the prosecution to obtain an examination of the defendant's condition. The defendant may preserve his rights by refusing to cooperate, but comment on that refusal is permissible. ( People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1190, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) Thus, the prosecutor could have requested that the defendant submit to an examination. To the extent that this is a claim that the court erred in admitting irrelevant evidence, we also agree. We do not agree that either the questions or the testimony elicited from Dr. Satten caused any prejudice to the defense, however. Even assuming the jury believed that the prosecution did not have the right to seek an examination of defendant, there is no basis for assuming that they believed that additional evidence about appellant's mental condition would have been more effective in impeaching the defense experts than was the testimony of Drs. Bittle and Kaldor, who were called as prosecution witnesses. And, if the jury believed that the prosecution did have such a right if appellant agreed, but that he had refused to submit to examination, the fact that he had submitted to examination by the two psychiatrists appointed by the court would dispel any inference that the refusal was because appellant had something to hide. The jury was aware that appellant had been examined by the five psychiatrists who testified and had given generally consistent information to each. Thus, there is no likelihood that the jury would assume that appellant feared that one selected by the prosecution might elicit different, damaging information.