Opinion ID: 2103548
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Same Jury Requirement

Text: Our capital sentencing statute provides that if the defendant was convicted of murder in a jury trial, the jury shall reconvene for the sentencing hearing. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(d) (1993). In both Brewer v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 338, 417 N.E.2d 889, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122, 102 S.Ct. 3510, 73 L.Ed.2d 1384 (1982), reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1132, 103 S.Ct. 18, 73 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1982), and Schiro v. State (1983), 451 N.E.2d 1047, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003, 104 S.Ct. 510, 78 L.Ed.2d 699 (1983), this court explicitly and unambiguously said that Indiana law requires that when the guilt issue was tried by jury, the sentencing hearing must be before the same jury. Brewer, 275 Ind. at 354, 417 N.E.2d at 898; Schiro at 1052. [2] In this case, this court holds that there was no requirement that Gary Burris be sentenced by the same jury following remand or even a requirement that the state make an attempt to reconvene the same jury. Thus, we graft a judicial exception to the plain language of the statute in holding that the same jury requirement does not apply where a case has been remanded for resentencing only and many years have expired since the original trial: Common sense and judicial economy dictate that the trial judge should have the latitude to assemble a new jury in such a situation. While it is certainly an unusual assertion of judicial power to suggest that such considerations authorize an exception to the plain language of a statute, I do think that such a reading of the statute is proper here. The statute does not contemplate the special case of re-sentencing following judicial remand. This court must fill in rules for proceeding in death penalty cases in those circumstances where the legislature has not provided explicit guidance. Furthermore, Burris has not shown prejudice as a result of this process. And, as noted above, a number of Indiana capital defendants have argued to this court that having the same jury was to their detriment because that jury had already made the determination of guilt and that there was a great probability that the jury had already determined to recommend the death penalty without considering the evidence of mitigating circumstances. Bieghler, 481 N.E.2d at 95. This is a more plausible argument than contending that the same jury that convicted the appellant (and, in this case, initially recommended death) is more likely to recommend mercy than an entirely new jury.