Opinion ID: 1537892
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Objectives of Restitution

Text: We also consider the objectives of restitution as it may affect our interpretation of Crim. Proc., § 11-604(b). Contrary to Robey's assertion, the principal objective of restitution in the adult and juvenile justice systems is differently nuanced in each. It is clear that restitution is significantly rehabilitative in nature in the adult system, see Grey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 363 Md. 445, 460, 769 A.2d 891, 900 (2001) (citing Coles v. State, 290 Md. 296, 305, 429 A.2d 1029, 1034 (1981) and Lee v. State, 307 Md. 74, 78, 512 A.2d 372, 374 (1986)), but especially so in the juvenile system. In re Don Mc., 344 Md. 194, 203, 686 A.2d 269, 273 (1996); see Cts. & Jud. Proc., § 3-8A-02(a)(4). As restitution relates to the child alone, its sole purpose is rehabilitative. Lopez-Sanchez v. State, 388 Md. 214, 247, 879 A.2d 695, 714 (2005). Robey's contention that restitution is penal in nature, as applied to the child defendant or respondent, is misplaced. Robey relies on language from In re John M., 129 Md.App. 165, 174, 741 A.2d 503, 508 (1999) (quoting In re Zephrin D., 69 Md.App. 755, 761, 519 A.2d 806, 809 (1987) (Zephrin D.)) as support for his position, but neglects to discuss fully from whence this retributive or penal quality was ascribed to the restitution statute. The Court of Special Appeals in Zephrin D. drew the penal in nature language it used to describe restitution in the juvenile system from an earlier case, In re Appeal No. 321, 24 Md.App. 82, 85, 329 A.2d 113, 114 (1974), which, importantly, discussed the retributive element of restitution as applied to the parents of child offenders. The In re Appeal No. 321 court justified the imposition of restitution on parents by reasoning that vicarious liability is imposed as a consequence of a presumed neglect of parental responsibilities. 24 Md.App. at 85, 329 A.2d at 114. Thus, in the context of child restitution orders, the only retributive consideration is directed towards the parents of child offenders. Lopez-Sanchez, 388 Md. at 247 n. 7, 879 A.2d at 714 n. 7; see also Cts. & Jud. Proc., § 3-8A-02(a)(2), (3). Because rehabilitation is the main objective of the juvenile justice system and its dispositional consequences, such as restitution, it is consistent with that objective to limit the amount of restitution to which a child may be obligated to pay. Placing an insurmountable debt on a child offender necessarily defeats the rehabilitative purpose of imposing restitution in the first instance because the child may endeavor forever to satisfy the obligation without success. Such futility frustrates the goal of rehabilitation, which aims at the successful completion of a disposition. Conversely, there is no policy rationale for imposing a limit on the amount of restitution which an adult defendant may be obligated to pay. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WICOMICO COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.