Opinion ID: 2758259
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Evidence Obtained After the Arrest

Text: The prosecution’s case included not only Facebook messages, text messages, and undercover testimony, but also evidence found after Mr. Brinson’s arrest. Mr. Brinson moved to suppress that evidence, but the court denied the motion. We uphold the ruling. According to Mr. Brinson, police lacked probable cause for an arrest, so any evidence obtained afterward should have been suppressed. The prosecution counters that Mr. Brinson waived this argument by failing to raise it before trial. Mr. Brinson has not waived this argument. But because probable cause existed, the district court did not err by denying the suppression motion.
We first address whether this argument was waived. The prosecution asserts that Mr. Brinson cannot raise the “probable cause” argument on appeal because he did not present it before trial. Mr. Brinson raised the suppression motion after the trial was underway. IV Aplt. App. at 518. But the district court allowed Mr. Brinson to argue his motion to suppress at trial, and the government withdrew its initial objection to the court’s consideration of the motion: 17 Government: Your Honor . . . defense counsel could have filed [the motion to suppress] prior [to trial] if he wanted to object to the seizure of this evidence. . . . . Court: Of course, the fact that he didn’t raise it before [trial] doesn’t preclude him from raising it now. Government: Surely not. Court: Anything further? Government: Not on this matter, Your Honor. IV Aplt. App. at 518-19. Even if Mr. Brinson had waived his suppression claim before trial, the district court considered it. In these circumstances, we will address the merits of Mr. Brinson’s argument. See United States v. Jones, 530 F.3d 1292, 1298 (10th Cir. 2008) (reviewing a misjoinder claim on appeal even though the defendant failed to raise the issue before trial).
We conclude that probable cause existed for an arrest; thus, the district court did not erroneously deny the motion to suppress.
Probable cause to arrest exists “when the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of 18 reasonable caution [to believe] that an offense has been or is being committed.” United States v. Zamudio-Carrillo, 499 F.3d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 2007). When reviewing for probable cause, we accept the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Baker, 30 F.3d 1278, 1280 (10th Cir. 1994). In deciding whether the findings were clearly erroneous, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Id.
Mr. Brinson was arrested based on his connection with C.H.’s prostitution activity. We must ask: Did arresting officers have a sufficient basis on which to arrest Mr. Brinson for his involvement with C.H.’s prostitution? Based on the record, we conclude that probable cause existed. When Mr. Brinson was arrested, arresting officers knew five facts: 1. While C.H. was in Room 123 with Officer Osterdyk, someone was warning her via text message: “Don’t do nothing. That’s the police.” 2. While providing back-up to Officer Osterdyk, officers observed a black SUV, bearing a “Jani-King” logo on its side, moving slowly near Room 123. 3. Room 123 was rented that evening by Tarran Brinson. 4. When officers saw Mr. Brinson, he matched the motel clerk’s description of the person who had rented Room 123 and the 19 photo identification of “Tarran Brinson” included in the registration form for that room. 5. Mr. Brinson admitted that he had rented Room 123 that evening, drove a black SUV with a “Jani-King” logo on its side, and had driven the SUV past Room 123 that evening. 7 IV Aplt. App. at 503-505, 512, 657-59. Based on this evidence, authorities had probable cause to believe Mr. Brinson had directed C.H.’s prostitution. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Mr. Brinson’s motion to suppress.