Opinion ID: 2162639
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant argues trial court should have sustained its motion for a new trial because the award, resulting from passion and prejudice, is excessive.

Text: Dealing with that subject in Shover v. Iowa Lutheran Hospital, 252 Iowa 706, 718, 107 N.W.2d 85, 92, this court said: In considering the contention the verdict is so excessive as to shock the conscience and show it is the result of passion and prejudice we must take the evidence in the aspect most favorable to plaintiff which it will reasonably bear. We must also give weight to the fact the trial court, with the benefit of seeing and hearing the witnesses, observing the jury and having before it all the incidents of the trial, did not see fit to interfere. Fredrickson v. Heline, 1960, 252 Iowa 92, 106 N.W.2d 74, and citations. The allowance of damages is primarily for the jury and we will not interfere therewith unless it clearly appears the verdict is unconscionable, the result of passion and prejudice, or not warranted by the evidence. Von Tersch v. Ahrendsen, 251 Iowa 115, 123, 99 N.W.2d 287, 292 [79 A. L.R.2d 267]; Hamdorf v. Corrie, 251 Iowa 896, 907, 101 N.W.2d 836, 843; Mallinger v. Brussow, supra, 252 Iowa 54, 57, 105 N. W.2d 626, 628; Fredrickson v. Heline, supra. See also Knudsen v. Merle Hay Plaza, Inc., Iowa, 160 N.W.2d 279, 286-287, and Beyer v. City of Dubuque, 258 Iowa 476, 489, 139 N.W.2d 428, 18 A.L.R.3d 416. In this regard plaintiffs offered testimony to the effect there existed no comparable sales by which to determine fair market value, requiring resort to actual or intrinsic value of the land immediately before and after the taking. On that premise, as heretofore disclosed, plaintiffs' witnesses fixed the damage at a low of $90,000, a high of $127,000. On the other hand, defendant sought determination of damage on a fair market value basis. And, as revealed supra, its witnesses accordingly found no damage resulted from the taking. Trial court, in effect, instructed the jury the difference in fair market value immediately before and after taking is ordinarily the proper measure of damages, but if it be found no such standard exists, then the difference between actual or intrinsic value before and after taking would be the proper basis upon which to evaluate damages. Understandably defendant did not challenge this instruction. As we said in Nedrow v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 245 Iowa 763, 768-769, 61 N.W. 2d 687, 690: The foundation finding for the damage award in condemnation is the value of the property before condemnation. If it can be established that there is a market for the property, by evidence of a general buying and selling of that kind of property, the first finding will be the market value. But if the nature of the property be such that no market for that kind of property can be ascertained or established, the primary finding will be intrinsic or actual value of the property. Once the value is found before condemnation, either market or actual as the case may be, the next question is the value after condemnation. If the whole of the property is taken the first finding of value is the measure of recovery. If part of the property is taken the measure of recovery is the difference between the finding of value of the whole property before condemnation and the finding of value of the remaining property after condemnation. These general principles are all firmly established by all of the authorities. 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, §§ 136-139; 18 Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, Sec. 242. Having heard evidence ranging from no loss in market value, to an actual value loss from a low of $90,000 to a high of $127,000, the jury, as aforesaid, returned a $75,000 verdict. It is to us evident, as trial court found in denying defendant's motion for new trial, the verdict is supported by ample and adequate evidence. Being within the testimonial range, we cannot say it is excessive. II. But defendant asserts its objections to the opinion evidence of valuation experts called by plaintiffs should have been sustained, in that an erroneous standard for measurement of damages was used by them. More specifically it is urged, these witnesses were permitted to multiply a royalty figure by amount of limestone in arriving at before and after taking values. It is argued this violates the rule set forth in Nedrow v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 245 Iowa 763, 61 N.W.2d 687, prohibiting use of the unit rule. We there said, 245 Iowa loc. cit. 776, 61 N.W. 2d loc. cit. 694:    value cannot be established by finding the amount of rock in place and measuring the recovery by the amount rendered unquarriable by the taking, multiplied by the royalty figure. However, it is also well established, the presence of mineral deposits in land is a proper element to consider in valuing property. That is clearly spelled out by this statement in Nedrow, supra, 245 Iowa at 770-771, 61 N.W.2d at 691: `With remarkable unanimity the courts hold that in determining the compensation in eminent domain proceedings for the land to be condemned, the existence of valuable mineral deposits in the land taken constitutes an element which may be taken into consideration if and in so far as it influences the market [or actual] value of the land.