Opinion ID: 2231122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Representation Caused Pecuniary Loss

Text: ¶ 34 As mentioned above, one of the other elements K & S needed to prove was that Perfection's misrepresentation in its quotation for the two 1000-ton presses caused it to sustain a pecuniary loss. Perfection argues that the jury erred in finding that its quotation caused K & S pecuniary loss because there was a lack of sufficient evidence to support such a verdict. ¶ 35 Wisconsin Stat. § 100.18(11)(b)2. provides that [a]ny person suffering pecuniary loss because of a violation of this section by any other person may sue in any court of competent jurisdiction and shall recover such pecuniary loss. This section requires a causal connection between the untrue, deceptive, or misleading representation and the pecuniary loss. Tim Torres Enters., Inc. v. Linscott, 142 Wis.2d 56, 70, 416 N.W.2d 670 (Ct.App.1987). Because the purpose of the DTPA includes protecting Wisconsin residents from untrue, deceptive, or misleading representation made to induce action, see § 100.18(1); Kailin, 252 Wis.2d 676, ¶ 44, 643 N.W.2d 132 (citing Bonn, 123 Wis.2d at 173 n. 4, 366 N.W.2d 503), proving causation in the context of § 100.18(1) requires a showing of material inducement. See Wis JI-Civil 2418. ¶ 36 A plaintiff does not have the burden of proving reasonable reliance. Unlike common law causes of action for misrepresentations, reasonable reliance is not the standard for a DTPA claim because the legislature created a distinct cause of action. Kailin, 252 Wis.2d at 708, 643 N.W.2d 132. There is no indication in [§§ 100.18(1), 100.18(11)(b)2., and 100.18(11)(b)3.], or any of the other many and detailed subsections that make up § 100.18, that the legislature intended to add a remedy for common law misrepresentation claims rather than to create a distinct statutory cause of action. Id. Although the reasonableness of a plaintiff's reliance may be relevant in considering whether the representation materially induced the plaintiff's pecuniary loss, the plaintiff does not have the burden of proving reasonable reliance. See Malzewski v. Rapkin, 2006 WI App 183, ¶ 24, 296 Wis.2d 98, 723 N.W.2d 156 (citing K & S Tool & Die Corp. v. Perfection Mach. Sales, Inc., 2006 WI App 148, ¶¶ 39-45, 295 Wis.2d 298, 720 N.W.2d 507). ¶ 37 In this case the jury heard the following instruction related to what K & S needed to prove pertaining to the causation element: To constitute an untrue, deceptive, or misleading representation in this case, there are three elements which must be proved by K & S Tool & Die Corporation. . . . . Third, K & S Tool & Die Corporation sustained a monetary loss as a result of the representation. In determining whether K & S Tool & Die Corporation's loss was caused by the representation, the test is whether K & S Tool & Die Corporation would have acted in its absence. Although the representation need not be the sole or only motivation for K & S Tool & Die Corporation's decision to buy the press, it must have been a material inducement. That is, the representation must have been a significant factor contributing to K & S Tool & Die Corporation's decision. This jury instruction tracks the language provided in Wis JI-Civil 2418. [7] ¶ 38 Appellate courts do not upset a jury verdict if there is any credible evidence to support it. Meurer v. ITT Gen. Controls, 90 Wis.2d 438, 450, 280 N.W.2d 156 (1979); Tim Torres Enters., 142 Wis.2d at 67, 416 N.W.2d 670. Weighing testimony and evaluating credibility of witnesses are matters for the jury. Id. In reviewing a jury verdict, evidence will be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict and courts search for credible evidence that will sustain the verdict, not for evidence to sustain a verdict the jury could have but did not reach. Meurer, 90 Wis.2d at 450-51, 280 N.W.2d 156. ¶ 39 Based on our review of the record, credible evidence supports the jury's finding that Perfection's misrepresentation in the quotation caused K & S pecuniary loss. For instance, during the direct examination of Klusken, done by counsel for K & S, the following exchange took place: Q: Mr. Klusken, now turning to [the quotation], if you had received a promotional quotation from Perfection Machinery that said they were offering two 800-ton Clearing straight-sided presses, would you have made further inquiry about those presses? A: No. I wouldn't have. I would have wanted to-I would have just said we don't want to inquire on an 800-ton; we want a thousand ton. Viewing this testimony in a light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict, we conclude that Klusken's testimony indicated the quotation was a material inducement: in its absence, K & S would not have purchased the 800-ton press. Accordingly, the jury did not err in finding that Perfection's quotation caused K & S pecuniary loss. ¶ 40 Perfection argues that Klusken's testimony was merely self-serving. It also directs this court to evidence that supports findings other than the jury's. The findings include the following: K & S really relied on the expert advice of Industrial Rebuilding, rather than Perfection's quotation; K & S knew that Perfection had not inspected the press, making its reliance unreasonable; and Perfection's quotation's as is clause, and statement about specifications being approximate, prevented K & S from reasonably relying on the quotation. However, we search for credible evidence that will sustain the verdict, not for evidence to sustain a verdict the jury could have but did not reach. Meurer, 90 Wis.2d at 451, 280 N.W.2d 156. ¶ 41 We hold that the jury did not err in finding that Perfection's quotation caused K & S pecuniary loss because sufficient evidence supports its finding.