Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: whether the trial court failed to prohibit prosecutorial misconduct.

Text: ś 240. Evans next argues that several comments by the prosecuting attorney constituted misconduct. Evans challenges these comments on four bases: (1) improper personal opinion; (2) improper bolstering of expert testimony; (3) improper argument asking the jury to send a message; and (4) improper reference to victim characteristics. ś 241. Evans first argues that the prosecutor improperly injected personal opinion into closing argument by using the pronoun I. In Nixon v. State, 533 So.2d 1078, 1100 (Miss.1987), this Court held: Prosecutors should refrain from interjecting personal beliefs into the presentation of their cases. U.S. v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 8, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1043, 84 L.Ed.2d 1, 8 (1985). A prosecutor may strike hard blows, but he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314, 1321 (1935). A review of the record below reveals that defense objected to only one of the comments now presented for review on appeal. In Johnson v. State, 477 So.2d 196, 209-10 (Miss.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1109, 106 S.Ct. 1958, 90 L.Ed.2d 366 (1986), reh'g denied, 476 U.S. 1189, 106 S.Ct. 2930, 91 L.Ed.2d 557 (1986), this Court held: We next observe it is the duty of a trial counsel, if he deems opposing counsel overstepping the wide range of authorized argument, to promptly make objections and insist upon a ruling by the trial court. The trial judge first determines if the objection should be sustained or overruled. If the argument is improper, and the objection is sustained, it is the further duty of trial counsel to move for a mistrial. The circuit judge is in the best position to weigh the consequences of the objectionable argument, and unless serious and irreparable damage has been done, admonish the jury then and there to disregard the improper comment. ś 242. The contemporaneous objection rule remains applicable in death penalty cases. Williams, 684 So.2d at 1203. Alternatively, without waiving the procedural bar, this Court may address the merits of an assignment of error. The language claimed by Evans to be improper is italicized. ś 243. (i) During closing argument at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, the prosecutor made the following statements: (a) Now I don't know what the defense was doing in this case when they called, what was his name, Brad Necaise. Brad Necaise had nothing to say as far as I'm concerned. All he did was confirm what every else has already said, that on that occasion Donald Leroy Evans was in fact in Jones Park, and that the victim in this case was in fact in the jeep and talked to somebody. In Davis v. State, 684 So.2d 643, 655 (Miss.1996), this Court held: [The prosecutor] may comment upon any facts introduced into evidence. He may draw whatever deductions seem to him proper from these facts, so long as he does not use violent and abusive language, and even in many cases incentives may be justified and even called for, as pointed out by Chief Justice Whitfield in Gray v. State, 90 Miss. 235, 43 So. 289 [1907]. (citations omitted). Here, the prosecutor was simply commenting on facts introduced into evidence and reasonable deductions from that evidence. There was no impermissible argument. (b) Now, they continue to admit on one and two so I'm not going to spend a lot of time on those either. I really feel like you could go right now but I have a duty, folks, and so let me feel like I do my part, I think Mr. Martin has taken care of our job and I didn't hear anything from the other side that appealed to me. But remember when we went through all that questions on voir dire and we took a little bit longer than some of you wanted us to because we were going down through and trying to talk to everybody. So let me just make sure that my obvious is your obvious before we get into this. In Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1208 (Miss.1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 588, 136 L.Ed.2d 517 (1996), this Court held that it is error to argue statements of fact which are not in evidence or not necessarily inferable to it, and which are prejudicial to the defense. Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 855 (Miss.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 2279, 132 L.Ed.2d 282 (1995), reh'g denied, 515 U.S. 1179, 116 S.Ct. 20, 132 L.Ed.2d 903 (1995); Nixon v. State, 533 So.2d 1078, 1100 (Miss. 1987), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1102, 109 S.Ct. 2458, 104 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1989), reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 932, 110 S.Ct. 13, 106 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). This comment did not refer to facts in evidence or inferences from the evidence, but rather was clearly one expressing personal opinion regarding the strength of Evans' defense. However, when the entire line of closing argument is read in context, it is clear that the prosecutor was making introductory remarks prior to reviewing the testimony of the witnesses at trial and arguing inferences and conclusions from that testimony. The prosecutor made it clear that the conclusions he was making could be drawn from the evidence. (c) Now whatever piece of skin that Dr. Riddick found an anus in may be of some interests at a pathologists convention, but to this jury it doesn't raise reasonable doubt, does it? I don't think so. As in Blue, it would have been more appropriate for the prosecutor to draw inferences without stating his personal opinion. However, as this Court stated in Blue, the very purpose of an advocate is to help the jury draw conclusions from the evidence and to make suggestions as to a proper conclusion. Blue, 674 So.2d at 1208 ( quoting Peyton v. State, 286 So.2d 817, 819 (Miss. 1973)). (d) Now that's what we had in there. We're at a very important part of this case. We all seem that we're focusing on count three right now, but we still heard from some of these witnesses that only talked about count one and two, and what was that? The two women. There the defense is reaching for reasonable doubt. They want to pull something out of this for their client. They have a hard job, and you know I told you that these fellows and the State are not enemies, the defense counsel, but we have met our burden on all three counts, and the skill of those lawyers to try to raise reasonable doubt when none exist[s] cannot appeal to you. You can't reward the lawyers for excellent work that they have done in a hard, hard case by giving them a bone. We have earned a verdict on all three counts, and that's what we ask you to return at this time so that we can get on with the important part of this case. Although in the nature of personal opinion, this line of argument did not express a belief in the guilt or innocence of Evans, but rather merely indicated to the jury that this was a difficult case. Surely, there was no dispute about the level of difficulty surrounding the prosecution or defense. Moreover, the prosecutor correctly stated that the jurors could not by their verdict reward defense attorneys for a job well done, but rather were required to rely on the evidence. The prosecutor simply argued to the jury that it must consider the evidence and not be swayed by their like or dislike of the attorneys. There is no misstatement of law. This line of argument was not improper. ś 244. (ii) During closing argument at the sentencing phase the prosecutor made the following statements: (a) May it please the court, counsel opposite, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. I almost feel like I'm at a loss for words right now because I feel that we have proven beyond a reasonable doubt so many aggravating circumstances, the weight of which is just so totally overwhelmed that even if you thought that everything that the defense submitted to you was mitigating circumstances they wouldn't even move the scale at all. That our aggravating circumstances weigh so much that no matter what they put on the other side of that scale it's going to stay there on the floor. That it's not going to move. This comment is quite similar to that challenged in Nixon, 533 So.2d 1078 (Miss.1987), where the prosecutor argued: We believe that once we have adduced our evidence that you will see that the aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances that might be presented and that he ought to be given a penalty of a death sentence on account of his crime. There, this Court held that the blows struck by the prosecutor were neither hard nor foul. Likewise, the language does not even approach the threshold of reversibility. Nixon, 533 So.2d at 1100. (b) Then they tell you, and this one I mean I'mâ I just can't believe it to tell you the truth, I just can't believe it. They want you to consider the fact as a mitigating circumstance that Tammy Jean Giles received a sentence of two years. Again the prosecutor was clearly commenting on facts introduced into evidence by Evans. Although language other than that expressing his belief may have been more appropriate, this line of argument does not constitute reversible error. (c) And you also have the jury instructions that will tell you that it is not an accounting procedure, just like I've explained it to you. I think one aggravating circumstance outweighs anything that they have. We've got five of them, five. Count them. Again this comment is similar to that made in Nixon where this Court concluded that the comment did not constitute reversible error. ś 245. (iii) During rebuttal closing argument at the sentencing phase, the prosecutor made the following statements: (a) ... No one is mad at them, but they also don't deserve because you like them to get their client off. Just like your feeling about us plus or minus, remember what we discussed in voir direâ BY MR. SMITH: If the Court please, we'll object to the characterization of get their client off. BY THE COURT: Rephrase it, Mr. Caranna. Get their client, in my view an inappropriate sentence to be specific. Let him go back up there to know change in Marion. In Nixon, 533 So.2d at 1100, the prosecutor argued: We believe ... he ought to be given a penalty of a death sentence on account of his crime. Here, the prosecutor, as in Nixon, was arguing Evans ought to receive the appropriate sentence. As in Nixon, this language does not approach to threshold of reversibility. (b) I am against child abuse and I hope you are. I am against every bad thing that ever happened to Donald Leroy Evans and his siblings, but the rest of them overcame those problems, and for a lot of his life so has he. And when does he mess up? When he voluntarily drinks himself or cocaines himself, however it is ingested, into his problems. During the sentencing phase, Evans called several witnesses to testify as to the abuse that he endured as a child as mitigating circumstances. This Court has held that a prosecutor may comment on any facts introduced into evidence. Davis, 684 So.2d at 656. (c) There was proof that like everybody else, when a psychiatrist talks to you he is going to give you a diagnosis. Does it prevent him from acting logically? Does it prevent him from making rational choices? Does it prevent himâ no, and their doctor didn't even see that even he did see delusional [sic], and remember I wanted to know how many Donald Leroy Evans' there were because I haven't seen these delusions. I've seen the grandiosity that Dr. Maggio imagine [sic] talked about. I've seen those other kind of things, but that's the weighing process that you're going to have to make; and make your decision, final decision. While the prosecutor admittedly indicated to the jury that he had not seen Evans' delusional behavior, this statement, when placed in proper context, reveals that the prosecutor was commenting on the evidence as testified to by Dr. Maggio. A prosecutor may comment upon any facts introduced into evidence. Davis, 684 So.2d at 656. Moreover, the prosecutor immediately explained to the jury that it was their duty to weigh the evidence. ś 246. Evans next argues that the prosecutor bolstered the testimony of State expert witnesses and misstated the evidence. Evans first argues that the prosecutor bolstered the testimony of Dr. Paul McGarry. Evans argues that the following argument was improper: Then we had Dr. McGarry testify. Now Dr. McGarry has first of all determined the cause of death to be strangulation and then he determined that she was vaginally penetrated. This all before Donald has admitted to any sex whatsoever. And they bring in two doctors, who, first of all, can't determine anything, don't see anything and can't confirm anything. The only they do know is that it's a homicide. Dr. McGarry had 15,000 autopsies, they had maybe 10, 000 together. Put both of them together and you might have one Dr. McGarry. That's why we have Dr. McGarry and they had Dr. Zimmerman and Dr. Hayne. ś 247. Although the record reveals a factual objection to the mistake in the doctor's name [6] , there is no objection on the basis that the prosecutor was bolstering the credibility of Dr. McGarry. Therefore, this issue is waived for appellate purposes. Additionally, this Court has repeatedly held that an objection at trial on one or more specific grounds constitutes a waiver of all other grounds. ś 248. Without waiving the procedural bar, this Court may consider the alleged errors on the merits. Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 2279, 132 L.Ed.2d 282, reh'g denied, 515 U.S. 1179, 116 S.Ct. 20, 132 L.Ed.2d 903 (1995); Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1270 (Miss. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1019, 115 S.Ct. 1365, 131 L.Ed.2d 221 (1995), reh'g denied, 514 U.S. 1123. 115 S.Ct. 1992, 131 L.Ed.2d 878 (1995). ś 249. In Foster, this Court held: A prosecutor is forbidden from interjecting his personal beliefs regarding the veracity of witnesses during closing argument. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 5, 18-22, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1041, 1048-49, 84 L.Ed.2d 1, 6, 15 (1985); Dunaway v. State, 551 So.2d 162, 164 (Miss.1989) (prosecutor who referred to defense expert as a whore committed error, but not reversible error); Tubb v. State, 217 Miss. 741, 743-45, 64 So.2d 911, 912-13 (1953)(prosecutor who tells jury during closing argument he knew the State's witnesses were telling the truth commits error which may be reversible.). By the same token, it is incumbent on defense counsel to raise a proper objection when the offense language is uttered or waive appellate review of the issue. Marks v. State, 532 So.2d 976, 984 (Miss. 1988); Johnson v. State, 477 So.2d 196, 209-10 (Miss.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1109, 106 S.Ct.1958, 90 L.Ed.2d 366 (1986). This rule provides the trial court with the opportunity to sustain an objection and admonish the jury to disregard moments after the erroneous language is uttered. Monk v. State, 532 So.2d 592, 600-01 (Miss.1988); Baker v. State, 327 So.2d 288, 292-93 (Miss.1976). Id. at 1288. ś 250. Here, however, the prosecutor did not improperly interject personal beliefs as to the veracity of Dr. McGarry. Rather, the record demonstrates that the prosecutor was simply commenting on the credentials of the experts which were clearly in evidence at trial. There was no improper comment. ś 251. Evans also argues that the following comment by the prosecutor in rebuttal closing was improper bolstering. Now Dr. McGarry didn't trot from Louisiana. He's not a hired-gun. I think you saw him. Did he look like the kind of guy that would make up his mind based on what Cono Caranna or William Martin or the State of Mississippi asked him to do? He makes up his mind based on what he sees in a body. ś 252. When read in context, it is clear that the prosecutor was arguing that Dr. McGarry was not a hired gun as argued by defense counsel. The prosecutor argued that Dr. McGarry examined the body at the scene and drew his conclusions from that examination. As in Davis, it was perfectly proper for the prosecution to rebut a defense counsel argument. Davis, 684 So.2d at 655. There was no improper comment. ś 253. Evans next argues that the following comment by the prosecutor was improper personal opinion and bolstering: And equally, even though I think Dr. Maggio got the best of that argument, remember he said if you're bad schizophrenicâ a lot of people are schizophrenic. ś 254. A review of this statement in the context of the entire line of argument reveals that the prosecutor was rebutting evidence that Evans suffered from schizophrenia. The prosecutor first reviewed the testimony of Dr. Zimmerman, the defense expert. After which he began to compare the testimony of Zimmerman and Dr. Maggio, the State's expert. Throughout this argument the prosecutor repeatedly stated to the jury that they were required to make the final decision. Specifically, the prosecutor stated, Y'all heard the evidence, y'all are the final deciders of that fact. I'll leave that with you. ś 255. Evans next argues that the prosecutor sought to bolster his case when making the following statement: We allege that this all occurred on August 1, 1991. In order to prove this case the State is going to call numerous witnesses. Now we may not call every witness there is, and the witnesses may be called out of turn, that is the purpose of opening statement, to let you know how we want our evidence to come, but it doesn't always flow that way. With schedules and things being disoriented sometimes we have to call witnesses out of turn. ś 256. The prosecutor was simply explaining the trial process to the jury. Following this statement, the prosecutor told the jury what the State expected to prove through each witness. This, of course, is the very purpose of an opening statement. When read in context, there was no improper bolstering. ś 257. Evans also argues that the prosecutor misstated the evidence when making the following statements: They cross-examined our witnesses about did anybody have any conversations about sex but they haven't tied that up and I objected at that time and the court said, Well, if they don't tie it up you can come back later and object and we'll strike it from the record. And I didn't even go into that. It wasn't necessary because they didn't tie it up. The only words of sex that you heard in this trial have come out of the mouth of these two defense attorneys. ś 258. Specifically, Evans argues that in his confession, he stated that Tammy Giles had offered Beatrice to him for sexual purposes. A review of the confession does in fact reveal that Evans made those statements. However, at trial, Evans did not object on the grounds that the prosecution was misstating the evidence. Moreover, when the prosecutor resumed argument after Evans' objection, he repeated, This is the only time you heard about it is out of the mouth of the attorneys. Again, there was no objection by Evans on the grounds that this line of argument misstated the evidence. ś 259. Arguing facts not in evidence is impermissible closing argument. Cabello v. State, 471 So.2d 332, 346 (Miss. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 106 S.Ct. 2291, 90 L.Ed.2d 732 (1986). However, here, when closing argument is viewed in its entirety, the brief reference coupled with the lack of an objection by Evans does not appear to rise to the level of statements condemned by this Court. ś 260. Evans next argues that several comments by the prosecution were the equivalent of asking the jury to send a message. Specifically, Evans argues that the following comments were improper: Remember how you thought we were crazy that day up in Natchez when we said, Look, we're going to bring you down to Gulfport, Mississippi. And you said, You don't understand we're from Adams County. What is the idea? And slowly we explained that concept to you. Well our two communities have come together on this because we are a community of interest. But look at all the other communities who were involved in this. Maybe we are straightening out some things for some other folks.       BY MR. CARANNA: You are a part of the criminal justice system, the final step, and it is by your vote that this decision will be made. ś 261. Evans argues that these comments were the equivalent of asking the jury to send a message. Evans objected to the first statement and was sustained by the trial court. Therefore, any error which occurred was cured. Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1282 (Miss.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1019, 115 S.Ct. 1365, 131 L.Ed.2d 221 (1995), reh'g denied, 514 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 1992, 131 L.Ed.2d 878 (1995). However, after the prosecutor continued and remarked that the jury was the final step, Evans did not raise further objection. As to the latter statement, Evans argument is barred. ś 262. Without waiving the procedural bar, this Court may address the assignment of error on the merits. Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 2279, 132 L.Ed.2d 282, reh'g denied, 515 U.S. 1179, 116 S.Ct. 20, 132 L.Ed.2d 903 (1995); Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1270 (Miss.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1019, 115 S.Ct. 1365, 131 L.Ed.2d 221 (1995), reh'g denied, 514 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 1992, 131 L.Ed.2d 878 (1995). ś 263. This Court has repeatedly cautioned prosecutors against using the send a message argument. Hunter v. State, 684 So.2d 625, 637 (Miss.1996); Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 854 (Miss.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 2279, 132 L.Ed.2d 282 (1995), reh'g denied, 515 U.S. 1179, 116 S.Ct. 20, 132 L.Ed.2d 903 (1995); Williams v. State, 522 So.2d 201, 209 (Miss.1988); Carleton v. State, 425 So.2d 1036, 1039 (Miss.1983). ś 264. Here, however, the prosecution did not ask the jurors to send a message, rather the present commentary is similar to that discussed in Williams v. State, 522 So.2d 201, 209 (Miss.1988). In Carleton v. State, 425 So.2d 1036 (Miss. 1983), a similar argument had been made by the prosecutor, You know, we have got to let people know what the people of Harrison County stand for. Carleton, 425 So.2d at 1039. There we cautioned that each case must stand on its own facts, but we found nothing improper about the statement and held that the trial court properly overruled the appellant's objection to the statement. Carleton, 425 So.2d at 1039. In Ramseur v. State, 368 So.2d 842 (Miss. 1979), we held that the trial judge properly sustained an objection to an argument that the jurors were representatives of the people of the State of Mississippi and this community. Ramseur, 368 So.2d at 844. In Ramseur, we stated that if the remarks were improper, no prejudice resulted since an objection to the argument was sustained. Ramseur, 368 So.2d at 845. In Fulgham v. State, 386 So.2d 1099 (Miss. 1980), we considered a longer argument in which the jury was depicted as a final link in the chain of law enforcement. Fulgham, 386 So.2d at 1101. Fulgham was reversed on other grounds and we stated, We do not think that this assignment of error standing alone would require reversal. Fulgham, 386 So.2d at 1101. ś 265. In Williams, this Court, noting the lack of an appropriate record for appellate review, refused to reverse the appellant's conviction due to the following remark by the prosecutor: By your vote, you can make the statement clearly, steadfastly, and unequivocally that law or order exists for everyone in Harrison County. However, this Court clearly indicated that the remark was improper. Williams, 522 So.2d at 209. ś 266. In light of the foregoing, the remarks by the prosecutor were extremely close to those considered by this Court to be improper. However, as in Williams and Fulgham, these comments alone do not appear to require reversal. ś 267. Evans' final challenge involves the alleged improper reference to the characteristics of the victim. During the sentencing phase the prosecutor made the following remarks: Now we're told that Donald never had a chance. I didn't see that Beatrice Louise Routh ever had a chance. ś 268. Again, the record reveals no objection. This assignment of error is barred. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, this Court has held that it is proper for the prosecution to rebut a defense argument that certain evidence should be considered as mitigating. Davis, 684 So.2d at 655. Here, the prosecutor was clearly rebutting the defense suggestion that due to his childhood circumstances, Evans never had a chance. ś 269. However, Evans argues that this argument was improper victim impact evidence. This Court addressed a similar argument in Davis v. State, 684 So.2d 643, 655 (Miss.1996). In Davis, the prosecution, during closing argument in the sentencing phase, attempted to recreate the victim's last moments by arguing: I wonder what the victim was thinking. Then she makes it out. There's blood, two spots in the corner sitting down on the floor, on the right side. She is on the corner sitting down on the floor, her right side, right where this blood is on the floor. I wonder what she thought while she was there. Did she beg for mercy? Did she beg for mercy, as we have heard from Mr. Shaddock [defense counsel]. Did she beg this man for mercy at that point? Please, Jeffrey, don't. ś 270. In Davis, this Court reviewed Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 146 (Miss.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 921, 112 S.Ct. 1970, 118 L.Ed.2d 570 (1992), reh'g denied, 505 U.S. 1231, 112 S.Ct. 3060, 120 L.Ed.2d 924 (1992), wherein we adopted Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990), and stated: A state may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. Conner, 632 So.2d at 1276, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 927, 115 S.Ct. 314, 130 L.Ed.2d 276 (1994) ( quoting Hansen, 592 So.2d at 146). In Conner, this Court concluded that the statements of the prosecutor were properly drawn inferences from the evidence of how and when Hillman was shot and stabbed. Id. As in Conner, the statements by the prosecutor in the case sub judice were properly drawn inferences from the evidence. Evans described in his confession that Beatrice was confined in the jeep, bound with duct tape, and crying for her mother. From that evidence, one may clearly infer and argue that Beatrice never had a chance. ś 271. In Monk v. State, 532 So.2d 592, 601 (Miss.1988), this Court stated: The right to argument contemplates liberal freedom of speech and range of discussion confined only to bounds of logic and reason; and if counsel's argument is within limits of proper debate, it is immaterial whether it is sound or unsound or whether he employs wit, invective, and illustration therein. Moreover, figurative speech is legitimate if there is evidence on which it may be founded. Exaggerated statements and hasty observations are often made in the heat of the day, which, although not legitimate, are generally disregarded by the court, because in its opinion, they are harmless. There are, however, certain well established limits beyond which counsel is forbidden to go. He must confine himself to the facts introduced in evidence and to the fair and reasonable deduction and conclusions to be drawn therefrom and to the application of the law, as given by the court, to the facts. ś 272. Absent impermissible factors such as commenting on the failure of the defendant to testify, a prosecuting attorney is entitled to great latitude in closing argument. Dunaway v. State, 551 So.2d 162, 163 (Miss. 1989). Having addressed each comment alleged by Evans to be improper, this issue is without merit.