Opinion ID: 1124985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consideration of Prior Bad Acts

Text: Porter contends that the district court erred during the sentencing proceeding when the court took judicial notice of the testimony given at trial by three of Porter's former girlfriends. Porter correctly notes that hearsay cannot be introduced at a formal sentencing hearing. See I.C.R. 32(e)(1); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 148-49, 774 P.2d 299, 318-19, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 922, 110 S.Ct. 287, 107 L.Ed.2d 267 (1989), overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991). However, he erroneously characterizes the three women's testimony as inadmissible hearsay, further arguing that the district court particularly should not have taken judicial notice of the testimony given during offers of proof. Idaho Code § 19-2515(e) specifically allows the sentencing judge to consider [e]vidence admitted at trial and directs the judge that such evidence need not be repeated at the sentencing hearing. I.C. § 19-2515(e). The Code additionally provides that [e]vidence offered at trial but not admitted may be repeated or amplified if necessary to complete the record. I.C. § 19-2515(e) (emphasis added). Contrary to Porter's argument, the three witnesses' testimony was not hearsay that is analogous to the letter at issue in Charboneau, 116 Idaho at 148, 774 P.2d at 318. In Charboneau, the letter was hearsay, even at trial, because it was an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the material contained in the letter. Id., 774 P.2d at 318. In the present case, however, the testimony never fell within the definition of hearsay. See I.R.E. 801. Thus, we conclude that there was no due process violation.