Opinion ID: 2293442
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stamenkovic's Alleged Illegal Gambling Operation

Text: Appellants also contend that the trial court erred in not allowing them to introduce evidence regarding Stamenkovic's illegal bookmaking operation as an alternative source of stress. Campbell claimed that after the close of discovery, an expert performed a forensic examination of the computers in the Campbell-Crane offices that revealed Stamenkovic's extensive bookmaking activities while on the job. Subsequently, on October 3, 2007, appellants sought leave to file a Rule 26(b)(4) statement to identify an expert witness to testify about the examination, claiming that evidence of the gambling operation ought to be allowed under the after acquired evidence doctrine. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995). This doctrine allows for the introduction of evidence of an employee's wrongdoing that has been found subsequent to termination of the employment in order to calculate and reduce damages. The Supreme Court in McKennon stated that [o]nce an employer learns about employee wrongdoing that would lead to a legitimate discharge, we cannot require the employer to ignore the information, even if it is acquired during the course of discovery in a suit against the employer and even if the information might have gone undiscovered absent the suit. Id. The consequence is that the employer is not liable for reinstatement or front pay from the time that the employee could have been lawfully terminated. Id. Appellants claimed pre-trial, in their motion to file a Rule 26(b)(4) statement, that, had Campbell known about Stamenkovic's alleged gambling operation while on the job when it occurred (before his employment was terminated), she would have been justified in terminating his employment and his final damages for lost wages would have been reduced. This argument was rejected by the trial court, reasoning that by the time Campbell found out about the gambling operation, Stamenkovic had already mitigated his damages by securing other employment, thereby eviscerating the only basis of relevance offered. We need not address the merits of the trial court's reasons for excluding the evidence because, on appeal, appellants do not reiterate the claim made at trial concerning damages, but rather contend only that the trial court should have allowed evidence of the gambling operations as an alternative stressor that might have caused Stamenkovic emotional distress. This argument, however, was only raised post-trial, in appellants' motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, and thus must be reviewed for plain error. See, e.g., Cox v. United States, 898 A.2d 376, 382 n. 6 (D.C.2006). On this record, where there is ample evidence that Stamenkovic was subjected to egregious sexual harassment, and the jury did hear about Stamenkovic's financial worries related to his real estate investments, the trial court did not commit plain error in failing, sua sponte, to admit the new evidence of Stamenkovic's gambling activities as another potential source of emotional distress.