Opinion ID: 172537
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refusal to Accept Plea

Text: Lechner first contends the district court erred in refusing to accept her plea. She argues the district court refused her plea after she stated she did not intentionally insult Cockerham. Because an intent to insult the victim is not an -6- element of knowing assault, Lechner argues the district court had no basis to reject her plea. When the government and a defendant reach an agreement whereby the government dismisses one charge in exchange for a plea of guilty to another charge, the district court may accept or reject the agreement. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3)(A). Before accepting a plea of guilty, the district court must ensure the plea is voluntary and that there is a factual basis for the plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), (3). The district court’s decision to accept or reject a plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405, 1414 (10th Cir. 1995). The district court’s questions of Lechner were intended to establish a factual basis for the plea and confirm the plea was voluntary. When the district court asked Lechner if she committed the assault knowingly, Lechner responded, “Well, I guess I should say yes.” The district court then instructed her to tell the truth, and she denied having the requisite mens rea: “I didn’t know at the time that I hit her.” The district court asked her a third time whether she intentionally assaulted Cockerham, and Lechner’s reply was, “I did not intentionally insult [] her, no.” In light of the previous questions, it is clear Lechner intended to give a responsive answer to the question posed by the district court. The only reasonable interpretation of her statement was that she did not intend to assault Cockerham. It was certainly not an abuse of discretion for the district -7- court, which actually heard Lechner’s answer and observed her demeanor while she spoke, to interpret the comment as a refusal to admit to intentional assault. In addition, Lechner had twice previously denied she had the required state of mind, further supporting the district court’s decision to reject the plea based on an insufficient factual basis. Lechner notes the signed plea agreement contained a factual recitation with all of the required elements of the crime. Because she signed the agreement and admitted to the truth of the factual recitation, Lechner argues the district court erred in finding there was no factual basis for the plea. This argument, if accepted, would prohibit a district court from inquiring further into the factual basis for a plea agreement if the written agreement contained admissions as to all the elements of the crime. Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3), however, the district court has a duty to “determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.” As part of that duty, the district court may choose to verify, in open court, the assertions made in the written plea agreement. Here, the district court did exactly that, and Lechner refused, after repeated questioning, to admit to all the elements of the crime. Lechner’s position is also inconsistent with our precedent permitting a “district court, once it has accepted a plea, to reject it after the discovery of facts inconsistent with the plea.” United States v. Moran, 452 F.3d 1167, 1171 (10th Cir. 2006). Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept Lechner’s plea. -8-