Opinion ID: 2033411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Expert's opinion regarding manner of death

Text: [T]he admission of an expert's opinion generally rests within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an apparent error. State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609 (Minn. 1984). With regard to expert testimony, the Minnesota Rules of Evidence provide that [i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Minn. R. Evid. 702. We have generally permitted expert testimony under this rule if it is helpful. See State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 1980). An expert opinion is helpful if the members of the jury, having the knowledge and general experience common to every member of the community, would be aided in the consideration of the issues by the offered testimony. Clark v. Rental Equip. Co., Inc., 300 Minn. 420, 428, 220 N.W.2d 507, 512 (1974). In State v. Chambers, we held that a pathologist properly testified to the number and nature of a domestic abuse murder victim's stab wounds, but improperly offered an opinion regarding the defendant's intent. 507 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn. 1993). Bradford relies on Chambers to argue that the district court improperly allowed the medical examiner to testify that he believed Overall's death was a homicide. Bradford's argument is not persuasive. We stated in Chambers that an opinion otherwise admissible `is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.' Id. at 238 (quoting Minn. R. Evid. 704). The expert in Chambers was permitted to testify regarding the cause of deathstabbing, but was not permitted to offer an opinion regarding intent. See id. at 239. Here, the medical examiner properly testified that he believed Overall's manner of death was homicidethe killing of one person by another. The examiner's testimony was helpful to the jury because a lay juror may not be able to differentiate between a self-inflicted intraoral gunshot wound and one inflicted by another. The examiner's specialized knowledge assisted the jurythe trier of factto understand the evidence submitted with respect to the circumstances surrounding Overall's death. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not commit error by allowing the examiner to testify regarding his opinion that Overall's death was a homicide.
Bradford also argues that the district court erred by admitting hearsay evidence when it allowed the medical examiner to testify that two other nontestifying experts agreed with his opinion that Overall's death was a homicide. Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Minn. R. Evid. 801. Such statements are generally inadmissible, but the state argues that the statements of the nontestifying experts are admissible because Minn. R. Evid. 703(a) permits testifying experts to base their opinion on reliable hearsay. However, the comments to Rule 703(a) state that [a]lthough an expert may rely on inadmissible facts    in forming an opinion, the inadmissible foundation should not be admitted into evidence simply because it forms the basis for an expert opinion. We conclude that the district court erred by admitting the medical examiner's testimony regarding statements by the two nontestifying experts. Here, the statements were hearsay that did not fall into any applicable exception to the hearsay rule. If the opinions of the nontestifying experts were to be admitted, the experts should have appeared and testified. We hold that the examiner's testimony regarding the opinions of the nontestifying experts was inadmissible hearsay. See generally Minn. R. Evid. 802 (stating that hearsay is inadmissible absent an exception). However, not every judicial error warrants reversal. An error is harmless [i]f the verdict actually rendered was surely unattributable to the error,   . State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903, 910 (Minn. 1996). Here, the examiner's testimony regarding the opinions of the nontestifying experts was insignificant and cumulative compared to the weight of the other evidence of Bradford's guilt offered at trial. See, e.g., State v. Bauer, 598 N.W.2d 352, 367 (Minn.1999) (holding that when evidence was erroneously admitted, such error was harmless when the evidence was insignificant and cumulative). Therefore, we hold that the admission of the hearsay evidence from nontestifying experts was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there is no reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence could have affected the jury's verdict.