Opinion ID: 476349
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: retaliatory discharge: mcrc visit

Text: 34 The jury found that plaintiff had been discharged in retaliation for her visit to the MCRC. The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (Elliott-Larsen Act or Act), Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. Sec. 37.2101 et seq., prohibits discrimination or retaliation against a person because the person has opposed a violation of this act, or because the person has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this act. Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. Sec. 37.2701(a). Plaintiff visited the Michigan Department of Civil Rights on May 8, 1979. On May 9, 1979, Evans remarked to her, I know you went down to the Civil Rights office. (Tr. 11/16, at 100.) Plaintiff was fired on May 10, 1979. Waterbury admitted that he knew of plaintiff's visit to the Civil Rights office, though he was uncertain whether he learned of it before or after her discharge. 35 We find that these facts raise a sufficient question to require a jury determination as to whether plaintiff's discharge was in retaliation for her assertion of her rights under the Elliott-Larsen Act. However, the relief granted to plaintiff on this issue was not segregated from her claim of retaliatory discharge for requesting to see her personnel file and her claim of unjust discharge. In addition, we find that the District Court instructed the jury incorrectly as to the burden of proof applicable in cases where an employee claims she was discharged in retaliation for pursuing her rights under the Elliott-Larsen Act. Therefore, we remand this issue to the District Court for a new trial to determine whether plaintiff's visit to the MCRC was a significant factor in defendant's decision to discharge her, and to determine the relief due plaintiff, if any. 36 Defendant alleged two errors in the jury instructions on this claim. Although it appears that defendant may not have adequately preserved those issues for appeal, we nonetheless address them to ensure that the proper instructions are given on remand. 37 First, the District Court's instruction stated that the jury should find for plaintiff if they found that there was a causal link between the participation in protected activities and the discharge. (Tr. 11/23, at 24.) Plaintiff claims that this jury instruction was correct. We disagree. The causal link language comes from a recent Michigan Court of Appeals case. See Kocenda v. Detroit Edison Co., 139 Mich.App. 721, 363 N.W.2d 20 (1984). The troublesome language in Kocenda states: 38 Finally, we decline defendant's invitation to make proof of actual knowledge of plaintiff's having filed a civil rights complaint an element of a retaliation action. Plaintiffs [sic] need only establish a causal link between participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment treatment complained of. 39 139 Mich.App. at 726, 363 N.W.2d 20. A fair reading of the case reveals that the Court refused to require proof of actual knowledge of the protected activity as an element of a prima facie claim of retaliatory discharge. The Kocenda Court was not addressing the relationship between the plaintiff's participation in protected activity and the retaliatory discharge. Thus, we find this authority to be inapplicable to the issue at hand. 40 Defendant argues that the proper standard is a but for test; i.e., that the plaintiff must show that she would not have been discharged but for her participation in protected conduct. Michigan courts have not adopted this standard. We find that a plaintiff claiming retaliatory discharge under the Elliott-Larsen Act must show that her participation in protected activity was a significant factor in her employer's decision to discharge her. 41 We start our analysis by noting that Michigan courts have never ruled on the burden of proof applicable in cases involving employees claiming that they were discharged in retaliation for their participation in activity protected under the Elliott-Larsen Act. The courts have imposed standards in analogous cases, however, and we find those cases to be relevant here. In Goins v. Ford Motor Co., 131 Mich.App. 185, 347 N.W.2d 184 (1983), the Michigan Court of Appeals, faced with an employee claiming that he had been unlawfully discharged because he had filed a previous workers' compensation claim with a former employer, stated: 42 While there is no Michigan case law dispositive on this issue, we find cases involving wrongful discharges in other contexts helpful. In Gallaway v Chrysler Corp, 105 Mich App 1, 5-6 [306 N.W.2d 368]; lv den 413 Mich 853 (1982), an age discrimination suit, this Court held that a plaintiff need only show that the plaintiff's age was one significant factor in plaintiff's discharge; plaintiff need not prove that age was the sole, critical factor causing discharge. See also Adama v Doehler-Jarvis Div of NL Industries, Inc, 115 Mich App 82, 89-90; 320 NW2d 298 (1982). 43 Also providing some guidance is Smith v Atlas Off-Shore Boat Service, Inc, 653 F2d 1057 (CA 5, 1981). That case involved a seaman's exercise of his legal right to file a personal injury suit against his employer and his claimed retaliatory discharge for doing so. The court in Smith adopted a substantial factor test as plaintiff's burden of proof. Id., p 1063. 44 ... Where, as here, the plaintiff claims that he or she was unlawfully discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim, plaintiff has the burden of proving that the filing of the workers' compensation claim was a significant factor in defendant's decision to discharge the plaintiff. 45 131 Mich.App. at 197-98, 347 N.W.2d 184. 46 We find the Goins Court's analysis persuasive and adopt its significant factor standard in this case. Our conclusion that this is the appropriate standard in retaliatory discharge cases such as the one presented here is further buttressed by Michigan Standard Jury Instruction 2d 105.02, which recites the burden of proof applicable in disparate treatment cases under the Elliott-Larsen Act. The instruction states: 47 The plaintiff must prove that [s]he was discriminated against because of [race]. 48 The discrimination must have been intentional. It cannot have occurred by accident. Intentional discrimination means that one of the motives or reasons for plaintiff's [discharge] was [race]. [Race] does not have to be the only reason, or even the main reason, but it does have to be one of the reasons which made a difference in determining whether or not to [discharge] the plaintiff. 49 Although Michigan does not have a standard jury instruction for retaliatory discharges for engaging in activity protected under the Elliott-Larsen Act, we find the above instruction sufficiently analogous to support our holding. 50 Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs seeking to show that they were discharged in retaliation for their opposition to violations of the Elliott-Larsen Act or for their participation in activities protected under the Act must show that their opposition or participation was a significant factor leading to their discharge. We note that the significant factor standard imposes a more lenient standard than the but for test urged by defendant, but that it requires a showing of more than a causal link. A factor can be a cause without being significant. Only the latter is sufficient to show retaliatory discharge. 51 Next, we address defendant's contention that the jury instructions did not adequately define protected activity for the purposes of the Elliott-Larsen Act. The instructions stated: 52 In Michigan, the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Law provides that it is illegal for an employer to retaliate or discriminate against a person because a person had opposed a violation of this Act, or because the person has made a charge, filed a complaint, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. 53 (Tr. 11/23, at 24.) 54 Defendant argues that plaintiff's visit was protected only if it was a manifestation of her actual intent to engage in protected activity, i.e., to file a charge. Plaintiff did not file a charge with the MCRC until after she was discharged, nor did she indicate to anyone before her discharge that she intended to file a charge. Although defendant concedes that certain activity can be protected under the Act even though it is not specifically described in the Act, it argues that that activity must manifest plaintiff's actual intent to engage in protected activity. Thus, defendant argues that an element of plaintiff's claim of retaliatory discharge is a showing that she intended to file a charge when she visited the MCRC. We disagree. 55 The Michigan courts have not discussed whether a visit to an MCRC office can be a protected activity. When construing claims under the Elliott-Larsen Act, however, Michigan courts often look to federal decisions construing parallel provisions of federal legislation, i.e., the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2000e et seq. (Title VII). See Melchi v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 597 F.Supp. 575, 581 (E.D.Mich.1984). In construing 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2000e-3(a), which is virtually identical to the language of the Elliott-Larsen Act, 8 the Ninth Circuit found no legal distinction ... between the filing of a charge which is clearly protected ... and threatening to file a charge. Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 685 F.2d 1149, 1156 n. 3 (9th Cir.1982). 56 We see no reason to distinguish between a visit to a government agency to inquire about filing a charge and a threat to file a charge. In both instances, the focus is not on whether the employee intends to follow through with filing the charge, but rather on whether the employer's decision to discharge was motivated by an improper desire to retaliate against an employee for pursuing rights granted by the Act. Thus, we find that a visit to the MCRC to inquire about rights granted under the Act is a protected activity. The question to be answered on remand is whether defendant did in fact retaliate against plaintiff because of her visit by discharging her and, if so, whether that retaliation was a significant factor in defendant's decision to discharge plaintiff. 57 We remand for a new trial on this issue consistent with our findings above. 9