Opinion ID: 183101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: We review for abuse of discretion the District Court‟s denial of Kelly‟s Rule 33 motion. With respect to that motion, the District Court “exercises its own judgment in assessing the Government‟s case” and does not read the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, but the Court may order a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 “only if it believes that there is a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has occurred 1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 4 – that is, that an innocent person has been convicted.” United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1004-05 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Kelly contends that at trial there was “no reliable evidence that [he] actually „possessed‟ the firearm” because he did not “„control‟” it. (Appellant‟s Br. at 13.) Stewart testified, however, that she saw Kelly hunched over with his hands in his lap and then saw a gun drop from his lap when she asked him to stand up. The jury clearly found Stewart to be credible, and the District Court reasonably concluded that any inconsistencies in Stewart‟s testimony did not “constitute the type of exceptional circumstances that would warrant a new trial in Kelly‟s case.” (R. at 25.) The Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 33 motion, as the jury could have reasonably found from Stewart‟s testimony that Kelly “possessed” the gun. Stewart‟s testimony was not, moreover, clearly incredible or physically impossible, see United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2001), and there is not a “serious danger” that Kelly is innocent.2
Kelly next argues that the District Court erred when it “preliminarily ruled” that he could not elicit evidence at trial of his statement as he was being arrested that someone threw the gun at him. (Appellant‟s Br. at 18.) Before trial, the government moved to 2 Kelly maintains that we should take into account Jones‟ post-trial revelation regarding the origin of the gun, but the government argues that that would be improper given that we previously rejected Kelly‟s motion for a new trial based on that evidence. 5 exclude the statement as hearsay, and Kelly argued that the Court should nonetheless admit it as a present sense impression or excited utterance. At that point, however, there was no evidence in the record regarding the period of time that passed between the inciting incident – the gun falling from Kelly‟s lap and his apparently immediate arrest – and Kelly‟s statement. Because timing is critical to both exceptions that Kelly raised, the Court “defer[red] ruling” on the motion and said it would “see how the facts play[ed] out.” (R. at 87-88.) The Court “put[] the burden on” defense counsel to “address the issue as [he saw] fit.” (Id. at 89.) As Kelly admits, defense counsel did not raise this issue again during the trial, and the District Court denied the government‟s motion in limine as moot after the close of testimony. We review that decision for plain error. Walden v. GeorgiaPacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 519-20 (3d Cir. 1997). Kelly maintains that the Court “abused its discretion[3] by constraining [him] from eliciting the statement,” but that argument misses the mark. (Appellant‟s Br. at 19.) The Court did not actually exclude Kelly‟s statement but rather waited to resolve the issue and denied it as moot only after the trial testimony had concluded and the issue had not been pressed. Kelly claims that his trial counsel “[o]bviously . . . felt constrained by the District Court‟s preliminary ruling.” (Id.) There is nothing to support that claim, and the Court did not commit plain error when it delayed ruling on the government‟s motion and then We need not resolve this dispute because consideration of Jones‟ testimony would not alter our conclusion that the District Court did not abuse its discretion on this issue. 3 Under Walden, we review for plain error. We would, however, reach the same conclusion even if abuse of discretion was the appropriate standard. 6 denied the motion as moot after defense counsel failed to raise the issue at any time during the trial.
Kelly also argues that the District Court erred when it did not give the Third Circuit Model Jury Instruction that “„[m]ere proximity to the firearm or mere presence on the property where it is located or mere association with the person who does control the firearm or [the] property is insufficient to support a finding of possession.‟” (Appellant‟s Br. at 23 (quoting an optional portion of Third Circuit Model Jury Instruction No. 6.18.922G-4, with the second alteration in the Model Instruction).) Kelly argues that “[g]iven the evidence presented at trial, this instruction was clearly appropriate.” (Appellant‟s Br. at 23.) We do not, however, review the instruction for whether it was appropriate. Rather, because Kelly did not raise this issue in the District Court, we review the instruction for plain error. In evaluating whether the District Court committed plain error, we determine “„whether, in light of the evidence presented at trial, the failure to instruct had a prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations, so that it produced a miscarriage of justice.‟” United States v. Haywood, 363 F.3d 200, 207 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1287 (3d Cir.1993)). There is no suggestion in the record that the fact that the Court did not give the “mere proximity” instruction had any impact, much less a prejudicial one, on the jury‟s deliberations. The Court gave the jury lengthy 7 instructions as to the definition of knowing possession of a firearm and that “[t]o possess means to have something within a person‟s control” and that “[t]o act knowingly, a defendant must be conscious and aware of his actions . . . he must realize what he is doing and not act because of ignorance, mistake or accident.” (R. at 535-36.) Assuming, as we do, that the jury followed these instructions, it could not have found Kelly guilty if he was only in “mere proximity” to the firearm. There is no miscarriage of justice here, and the District Court did not commit plain error when it did not give the jury the “mere proximity” instruction.