Opinion ID: 700653
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Admission of Expert Testimony

Text: 25 Mr. Willis submits that Timothy Brunholtz, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency for twenty-three years, should not have been permitted to testify concerning the defendant's knowledge of the presence of marijuana in the hidden compartments of the trailer. The specific testimony to which Mr. Willis objected is: 26 Q. Based upon your experience in investigating these type of cases, does the person who is transporting the narcotics, the marijuana, know what's in the vehicles or in the trailers? 27 A. (Brunholtz): I have not had a case yet where I have arrested or participated in a transportation case where the courier didn't know what he was carrying. 28 Tr.III at 128-29. The defendant asserts that this statement was an improper comment concerning Mr. Willis' mental state, one that went to the ultimate issue whether Mr. Willis knew there was marijuana in the trailer. As such, he submits, the statement should have been excluded under Rule 704(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, for it impermissibly state[d] an opinion as to the defendant's knowledge or willfulness, a mental state which constitutes an element of the crime charged. United States v. Windfelder, 790 F.2d 576, 582 (7th Cir.1986). 29 Federal Rule of Evidence 704 generally permits otherwise admissible testimony, offered in the form of an opinion or inference, to include comment on the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. Subsection (b) contains the exception to that rule: 30 (b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone. 31 We review evidentiary rulings of the district court under a deferential standard. We shall reverse a ruling concerning admission of expert testimony only upon a showing that the district court clearly abused its discretion. United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir.1993). Our court has recently reviewed the underlying purpose of Rule 704(b) in United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236 (7th Cir.1994), and has concluded that the rule was intended to limit expert testimony based on medical or psychological analysis of a defendant's mental processes, but not law enforcement testimony that does not depend on such analysis. Id. at 1241-42. 32 [W]e conclude that when a law enforcement official states an opinion about the criminal nature of a defendant's activities, such testimony should not be excluded under Rule 704(b) as long as it is made clear, either by the court expressly or in the nature of the examination, that the opinion is based on the expert's knowledge of common criminal practices, and not on some special knowledge of the defendant's mental processes. 33 Id. at 1242. 34 In this case, Agent Brunholtz's professional expertise was not challenged. The agent was called solely as an expert witness, knowledgeable in drug trade practices. His testimony did not include any special knowledge of Mr. Willis or of the investigation in his case. He offered no opinion concerning Mr. Willis' knowledge or intentions; nor did he even suggest that his opinion was based on some special knowledge of Mr. Willis' mental processes. See Lipscomb, 14 F.3d at 1242-43 (describing such a suggestion as improper). We conclude that there was no violation of Rule 704(b) in this case, and that the district court's admission of the agent's expert testimony was not an abuse of its discretion. 8