Opinion ID: 2268037
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Exclusion of Prior Convictions of Certain State's Witnesses

Text: Before the trial began, counsel for the state moved in limine to preclude the introduction of the criminal records of prospective witnesses for the state, Loran Stoddard, Michael McGonigle, Kenneth Gammon and Frank Burton for the purpose of impeaching their credibility. The trial justice granted the motion. On appeal, defendant cites as prejudicial error the granting of the motion in respect to Kenneth Gammon and Loran Stoddard. The specific records in regard to these prospective witnesses were as follows: KENNETH GAMMON (1) 1983 reckless driving: $100 fine; (2) 1982 malicious damage: plea of guilty, 6 mos. probation plus restitution; (3) 1982 possession of marijuana: $75 fine imposed; (4) 1982 drug possession: 3 years suspended and probation; LORAN STODDARD (1) 1988 disorderly conduct: $25 fine plus court costs; (2) 1987 driving under the influence: minimum penalty; (3) 1987 operating on a suspended license: $500 fine plus costs; (4) 1983 resisting arrest: $50 fine plus costs; (5) 1983 disorderly conduct: $25 fine plus costs; (6) 1981 larceny under $500: $25 fine plus costs; (7) 1979 filing false police report: $50 fine plus costs. The trial justice found that Stoddard's record was stale and that the jury probably would consider the disorderly conduct and driving-under-the-influence charges as evidence of bad character rather than an attack upon his credibility. He commented as follows: I really feel if I allow this minor record to go before the jury, even with the usual and appropriate explanation regarding credibility, that it would serve no other useful explanation than to poison the mind of the jury with regard to Mr. Stoddard because of the nature of these offenses, and they would not use it for assessing their credibility whatsoever but would be more likely to assess his propensity for either alcohol consumption or aggressive behavior and that is simply not on trial here   . In respect to Kenneth Gammon, the trial justice found as a fact that each of the prior convictions was stale and not probative, relevant and material to his credibility. For these reasons, the trial justice granted the motion in limine. The defendant cites many cases in which we have upheld trial justices' rulings that admitted evidence of prior convictions for impeachment purposes over defense objections that such convictions were remote in time. See, e.g., State v. Simpson, 606 A.2d 677, 680 (R.I.1992); State v. Taylor, 581 A.2d 1037, 1040 (R.I.1990); State v. Pope, 414 A.2d 781, 784 (R.I.1980). In each of these cases, the trial justice advanced reasons for his ruling that this Court believed to be sufficient to overcome an argument that the admission of such evidence constituted an abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, the trial justice determined that the prejudice that would result from the admission of these prior convictions outweighed the probative value of the evidence in respect to the credibility of the testimony of the witness. There is no question that the standard used by this Court in reviewing a trial justice's ruling to admit or exclude such evidence is one of abuse of discretion. In construing Rule 609 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, the trial justice has broad discretion. State v. Maxie, 554 A.2d 1028, 1032 (R.I.1989). We also have held that the trial justice has an obligation to weigh the potential for prejudice against the probative value of such evidence on the issue of credibility. Simpson, 606 A.2d at 680. We also have held that weighing the element of remoteness in time in respect to determining prejudice lies within the discretion of the trial justice. State v. Camirand, 572 A.2d 290, 295 (R.I.1990). Indeed Rule 609(b) provides in part as follows:  Discretion. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if the court determines that its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs the probative value of the conviction. The rule also notes that if the conviction is for a misdemeanor not involving dishonesty or false statement, the evidence may be challenged. Id. Such evidence also may be challenged for remoteness in time. Id. There is no question that this Court has upheld the rulings of trial justices allowing evidence of prior convictions to be introduced using the abuse of discretion standard. The standard of abuse of discretion is one that gives extreme deference to the trial justice's determination. Upholding a trial court's discretionary ruling does not imply that the appellate court necessarily would have ruled in the same manner as the original determination. In the case at bar, the trial justice may well not have committed an abuse of discretion if he admitted the challenged convictions. By the same token, we conclude in this case that considering the nature of the convictions and the dates of the convictions in relation to the time of the trial, we cannot say that the trial justice committed an abuse of discretion in ruling as he did for the reasons advanced in support of said ruling. Therefore, we hold that the trial justice did not commit an abuse of discretion or reversible error in granting the state's motion in limine to exclude the evidence of prior convictions in respect to witnesses Stoddard and Gammon.