Opinion ID: 2613958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Alleged Erroneous Foreclosure of Defense Counsel's Argument

Text: After the prosecutor presented his closing argument, defense counsel Edward Thirkell followed with his summation. Near the conclusion of his argument, Thirkell rhetorically asked the jurors if any of them was so comfortable with the prosecution's case and arguments that you have no concern about another witness coming up, about a lack of compassion, about taking from God the decision of when Mr. Rodrigues dies? Thirkell further asked the jurors: What did the Pope do seven years ago when he was shot? He forgave, prayed for the man's soul. Are we less than him? Are we different than him? Thereafter, the prosecutor made a short rebuttal argument, in which he angrily criticized Thirkell for incredibl[y] asking the jurors to act as the Pope and to make a decision in this case that's in no way related to the evidence. He characterized Thirkell's argument not to take away from God as nothing but a shoddy and emotional attempt to get you to abandon your sworn duties as jurors and not to make your decision in this case based on the evidence and on the law. The prosecutor implored the jurors to be influenced only by the law and the evidence, and to do justice, which means making a tough decision but one that's warranted by what the law is for everyone in the state of California. Defense counsel Geoffrey Carr then began what he described as a very brief argument in surrebuttal. After some introductory remarks, Carr told the jurors that, contrary to what the prosecutor argued, it was not inappropriate under the law for them to consider sympathy in making their decision. Thereafter, as Carr was arguing about the injustice of a person having to defend against an eight-year-old allegation when no witnesses to the incident could be produced other than the accuser, the prosecutor interrupted with an objection that the argument was clearly beyond the scope of rebuttal. Carr responded that his argument simply went to the meaning of justice and asserted that the case law supported a broad scope of surrebuttal. Although the court appeared to overrule the objection, it told Carr that to the extent that you've made the statement I will allow it in, but that if it gets close to going beyond, I won't allow it. Carr continued his argument by emphasizing the injustice of using, as aggravating factors, stale incidents which had not resulted in convictions and as to which there had been failures of proof. When the prosecutor again objected that counsel was going beyond the scope of rebuttal, Carr again responded that the final statement to a jury in a capital case was not so limited. The court made no specific ruling on the prosecutor's objection, but stated it had discretion as to whether that other argument is given. After stating its belief that defense counsel Thirkell had already adequately covered the area Carr was arguing, the court nonetheless allowed Carr's remark to remain. Carr then resumed his argument, stating that the last thing with which he would leave the jurors was asking them to consider how they might feel about their decision 10 or 15 years later. The prosecutor objected that the argument went way beyond the scope of rebuttal. This time the court sustained the prosecutor's objection. Carr then stated: And the last thing I'll ask you is that it's the sort of decision that any one of you can stop. You shouldn't hide behind other folks and say: [¶] `Well, we all made this decision and therefore I can hide behind it like someone would in an execution.' The court sustained the prosecutor's objection on the same grounds as before. When Carr asked whether he was being foreclosed from saying anything that was not directly related to the prosecutor's rebuttal, the court stated: Mr. Carr, if you had been foreclosed from that you would have been sitting down now. [¶] You may proceed. Carr immediately concluded by stating: Don't do it. After the jurors were excused, defense counsel Carr stated on the record that he had further argument to make, that he felt he had been unnecessarily foreclosed, and that he felt constrained by the court's ruling. The court responded: Mr. Carr, the court is not responsible for your feeling of constraint. The court, in the language, made it clear that you were clear, fully capable, free to make any appropriate argument that you chose to make. (61a) Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erroneously foreclosed his surrebuttal argument, thereby constructively denying his constitutional right to counsel and depriving him of other constitutional protections. We cannot agree. (62) It is firmly established that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to have counsel present closing argument to the trier of fact. ( Herring v. New York (1975) 422 U.S. 853, 856-862 [45 L.Ed.2d 593, 597-601, 95 S.Ct. 2550]; People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 694 [250 Cal. Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217] ( Bonin ); People v. Cory (1984) 157 Cal. App.3d 1094, 1105 [204 Cal. Rptr. 117].) Nonetheless, it is equally settled that a judge in a criminal case must be and is given great latitude in controlling the duration and limiting the scope of closing summations. ( Herring v. New York, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 862 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 600]; see People v. Cory, supra, 157 Cal. App.3d at p. 1105.) The trial judge has broad discretion to limit counsel to a reasonable time and to terminate argument when continuation would be repetitive or redundant. ( Herring v. New York, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 862 [45 L.Ed.2d at pp. 600-601].) (61b) Under the above authorities, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting defense counsel Carr's argument. First, contrary to defendant's assertions, the court did not improperly foreclose arguments attempting to dissuade the jury from using old, unreliable and inadequately proved incidents as a basis for deciding to end [defendant's] life. Since defense counsel Thirkell had adequately covered this area (in emphasizing that the passage of time and its effect on witnesses in the Espinoza killing and in the Jill M. rape incident, and in arguing that for three of the aggravating circumstances, the prosecutor either relied on witnesses who never came forward until the original incidents had been concluded or had not interviewed all the available witnesses), the court acted well within its discretion in attempting to limit the redundancy of arguments presented by Carr. ( Herring v. New York, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 862 [45 L.Ed.2d at pp. 600-601].) Second, the defense was not improperly foreclosed from appealing to the jurors' consciences and their sense of compassion and abiding justice. Not only was Carr able to make several such appeals before the court finally sustained the prosecutor's objections, but defense counsel Thirkell had been permitted earlier to argue the concepts of compassion, conscience and mercy without limitation. Under these circumstances, no constitutional error or violation appears. The situation here is analogous to that in Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d 659. In that case, the trial court refused to allow the defendant's second counsel to argue on surrebuttal after the prosecution waived its rebuttal argument. There we held that the trial court's ruling did not deny or infringe upon the defendant's constitutional right to assistance of counsel because his first counsel had in fact presented a full and unrestricted argument on his behalf. (46 Cal.3d at pp. 694-695.) We observed that the defense's opportunity to participate fully and fairly in the adversary fact-finding process was not significantly limited, despite the omission of second counsel's argument, since defendant's first counsel apparently considered further argument by second counsel to be dispensable. ( Id., at p. 695) Here, as in Bonin, defendant's right to assistance of counsel was neither denied nor significantly limited since defense counsel Thirkell presented a full and unrestricted closing argument, in addition to which defense counsel Carr presented surrebuttal argument. To be sure, the court sought to limit Carr to matters raised on rebuttal upon determining that Carr was essentially arguing in areas already covered by Thirkell. But, as noted previously, Carr's arguments regarding the issues of sympathy and compassion, and of staleness and failure of proof, were allowed to stand despite the prosecutor's early objections. [84] (63) Defendant next argues that the trial court's rulings violated section 1095, which provides in pertinent part: If the offense charged is punishable with death, two counsel on each side may argue the cause. He contends that under this section, it was error for the court to restrict the scope of Carr's argument to the content of the prosecutor's immediately preceding second argument. In support of this contention, defendant points out that in Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at page 693, we held that under section 1095 the trial court should have allowed second defense counsel to argue even though the prosecutor waived rebuttal argument altogether. Defendant claims that the error here was prejudicial, and that it violated his constitutional rights to assistance of counsel, due process and a fair penalty determination. No basis for reversal appears. First, there was no violation of section 1095 here because both of defendant's counsel were in fact permitted to argue. Second, even if Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at page 693, supports the conclusion that section 1095 does not limit the scope of permissible surrebuttal by second counsel to matters raised in the prosecutor's rebuttal, that case did not suggest that section 1095 deprives a trial court of its discretionary power to limit excessively repetitive arguments made by counsel. Nor do we so hold in this case. Since the effect of the trial court's rulings was to foreclose Carr from making further duplicative arguments after others had already been allowed, we find no statutory violation and no abuse of discretion. [85]