Opinion ID: 2979846
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fourth Amendment Reasonableness of the Search

Text: Next, Evans argues that the stick test constituted an unreasonable search in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Although drug tests constitute searches within the ambit of Fourth Amendment protection, see Pendleton v. Vance, No. 94-6468, 1995 WL 592048, at  (6th Cir. Oct. 5, 1995) (unpublished disposition) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617-20 (1989)), drug tests conducted under a prison policy of randomized testing pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny because they are rationally related to legitimate government interests, see Gibbs v. Johnson, No. 95-1339, 1995 WL 739470, at  (6th Cir. Dec. 12, 1995) (unpublished disposition) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-91 (1987)); accord Lucero v. Gunter, 52 F.3d 874, 877 (10th Cir. 1995). Non-random searches are constitutional if they are reasonable. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). -9- No. 09-6283 William Evans v. Harry Vinson, et al. Evans argues that he was not searched pursuant to the random-testing policy, pointing to the evidence that, although he was on the randomly generated list of inmates who might be subject to a drug test in May, the report from Aegis listed “Reasonable Cause” as the basis for his test. This evidence, along with the evidence referenced in section II.C.5, is sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact concerning whether Evans was tested in accordance with the policy authorizing randomized drug tests. The district court pushed this factual dispute to the side, stating: While Plaintiff makes much of the reasons for testing listed on the Aegis lab reports, Plaintiff, nonetheless, concedes that he was on the random computer-generated lists. That KSP officers may have some leeway in choosing 84 inmates from the list of 126 to account for those transferred or released prisoners or that Plaintiff was tested on three occasions in 2005 does not cause the Court to find that the testing process is unreasonable or otherwise allows for repeated harassment by KSP personnel. (Mem. Op. & Order, Dist. Ct. Docket No. 71, at 14.) The pertinent question, however, is not whether the testing process in general was reasonable, but whether the drug test administered to Evans on May 19, 2005 was reasonable. The district court seems to rely on a theory akin to inevitable discovery—that is, that the drug test would have been administered to Evans because he was on the random list. But testing was not inevitable under the circumstances—only two-thirds of prisoners on the random list are actually tested in a given month. So while it was likely that Evans would have been tested, it was not a foregone conclusion. Moreover, inevitable discovery is a doctrine relating to the exclusionary rule; it does not speak to the legality of the search itself and is thus inapplicable to the § 1983 context. Cf. Nix v. United States, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984). Finally, the Supreme Court has indicated that, although the subjective motivation and reasoning of the officer undertaking the search is not relevant where the search is otherwise supported by probable - 10 - No. 09-6283 William Evans v. Harry Vinson, et al. cause, the true purpose of the search does matter when the only support for the search is administrative. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811 (1996). For that reason, the random policy can justify the search only if it was actually undertaken pursuant to that policy. Because there is a genuine question of material fact on that issue, and because Defendants have not asserted that the search was reasonable on some other basis, we find that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Evans’s Fourth Amendment claim.