Opinion ID: 2820141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Swanson’s ADA Claim

Text: As best we can tell, Swanson premises his ADA claim on the Village’s failure to offer him either “light duty” 3 At oral argument, Swanson’s counsel at one point contended that the Village did cause him financial loss, suggesting that the accrued medical leave that Swanson used to arrange his part-time schedule would have been paid to him at the time of his resignation, had he not been forced to use it. But, when pressed (in light of the absence of this claim in his briefs), Swanson’s lawyer abandoned this contention. No. 14-3309 13 (again, desk duty) or “part-time” work (which we assume means “part-day” work since, as mentioned, the Village allowed him to use his medical leave to work a three-day-a-week part-time schedule) in the six-week period between his return to work after his first stroke (August 19, 2009) and the date on which he suffered his second stroke (September 30, 2009). Swanson makes much of the fact that when he requested “light duty” work, Pulec told him (as Swanson recalls it) that the Village “had no such policy.” Swanson discredits Pulec’s alleged representation by highlighting that, in fact, the Village’s Personnel Manual expressly lists “light duty” work as an option that the Village will consider for employees who become temporarily disabled. Swanson also notes that the ADA requires an employer of a disabled employee to engage in an “interactive process”—a “flexible give-andtake with the disabled employee … [to] determine what accommodation would enable the employee to continue working.” EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 805 (7th Cir. 2005). He argues that Pulec’s refusal to consider (let alone acknowledge) a “light duty” option constituted a failure to engage Swanson in a sufficiently interactive process under the ADA. There are a few shortcomings with Swanson’s line of reasoning. First, the Village Personnel Manual makes clear that the decision to offer an employee “light duty” work is at the discretion of the department in which the disabled employee works. It also expressly states that a request for “light duty” work will only be considered when an employee submits an “acceptable” “physician’s report,” specifying the employee’s limitations so that the department head can assess whether a suitable “light du14 No. 14-3309 ty” arrangement can be made. Yet, as the Village emphasizes, Swanson’s doctor’s note did not recommend “light duty”; it suggested that he work “part-time.” And Swanson did just that. Moreover, even if “light duty” would have been Swanson’s preferred accommodation, the ADA does not entitle a disabled employee to the accommodation of his choice. Rather, the law entitles him to a reasonable accommodation in view of his limitations and his employer’s needs. Accordingly, permitting an employee to use paid leave can constitute a reasonable accommodation. See Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544– 45 (7th Cir. 1995); Taylor v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 196 F.3d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1999); Hankins v. The Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 801–02 (6th Cir. 1996); cf. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 § 1630.2(o)(2) (“Reasonable accommodation may include but is not limited to: … (ii) Job restructuring; part-time or modified work schedules; reassignment to a vacant position; … and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.”). And the Village’s accommodation (and, frankly, its general treatment of Swanson in the wake of his medical issues) seems quite reasonable here. In addition to permitting him to work a part-time schedule after his first stroke, the Village granted Swanson’s requests to extend his leave following his second stroke to ensure that he would remain on the Village’s health plan during his medically difficult time. Swanson’s briefs leave entirely unclear why in retrospect he deems these accommodations unacceptable. In his reply brief, Swanson complains that after his second stroke “Chief Miller never wrote about the possiNo. 14-3309 15 bility of light and/or part-time duty work.” To the extent Swanson seeks to pin an ADA violation on the Village’s failure to reasonably accommodate him after his second stroke, that claim founders. The ADA only requires employers to reasonably accommodate a disabled employee who can “perform the essential functions of the job, with or without a reasonable accommodation.” Basith v. Cook Cnty., 241 F.3d 919, 931 (7th Cir. 2001). And Swanson made clear in his resignation letter, in his disability application, and in his deposition testimony that his second stroke rendered him completely unable to resume the responsibilities of a Village police officer. Accordingly, Swanson’s ADA claim has no merit.