Opinion ID: 1959870
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: credit on kentucky sentence for missouri incarceration

Text: As the central question in any habeas corpus case is whether the inmate has shown probable cause that he is being detained without lawful authority, [6] the dispositive issue in this case is whether Appellee was entitled to custody credit on her Kentucky sentence for the time she spent incarcerated in Missouri under a sentence ordered to run concurrently with her Kentucky sentence. Appellant disputes Appellee's entitlement to such credit, and, in so doing, primarily relies upon Rosenberg v. Defew , [7] in which the Court of Appeals held that KRS 533.060(2), which prohibits a parolee from receiving the benefit of concurrent sentencing if he or she commits a new felony offense while on parole, [8] prohibits KDOC from crediting a former parolee's sentence with time served for a felony committed in another jurisdiction during the term of parole. [9] As neither party in Rosenberg v. Defew sought discretionary review, the issue is largely one of first impression for this Court. And, in light of previous Kentucky precedent interpreting the KRS 533.060(2) prohibition against concurrent sentences as applicable not to the conviction from which a defendant has been paroled, probated, or conditionally released, but to the new conviction committed during the term of release, [10] and our conclusion that KRS 533.060(2)'s prohibition against concurrency applies only to a subsequent sentence imposed in Kentucky, we find that KRS 533.060(2) is not germane to this inquiry, and, as such, we disagree with the previous analysis of this issue by the Court of Appeals in Rosenberg v. Defew . Although we find no support for Appellant's position in KRS 533.060(2), we hold that, under KRS 439.344, KDOC properly denied custody credit to Appellee for the time she spent incarcerated in Missouri. KRS 439.344 states that [t]he period of time spent on parole shall not count as part of a prisoner's maximum sentence except in determining parolee's eligibility for a final discharge from parole as set out in KRS 439.354. [11] Our predecessor applied this provision as written [12] and, in an opinion addressing a statutory predecessor to KRS 439.344 that granted the Parole Board discretion as to whether the period of time spent on parole was to be credited towards the underlying sentence, the Court was persuaded by the view that time served by the appellant in a federal prison while technically on parole from the state penitentiary ... should not be considered as creditable parole time. [13] As Appellee's parole was not revoked until after she was returned to Kentucky, [14] the time she spent incarcerated in Missouri under her Missouri sentence, but on parole, did not count towards her Kentucky sentence. Appellee maintains that the trial court correctly credited her with the time she served in Missouri, and argues that the distinguishing and dispositive feature of this case is that the Missouri trial court ordered its five (5) year sentence to run concurrently with Appellee's Kentucky sentence. Of course, although a second judgment which provides that its sentence shall run concurrently accords the convicted defendant the right to have the time served on the first sentence count credited against the second sentence, [15] there is no dispute in this case as to whether Appellee should have received, or was receiving, credit on her second sentence (Missouri's) for the time served on her first sentence (Kentucky's) because every day Appellee served in Kentucky was also credited against her Missouri sentence. Instead, Appellee's argument turns the concept of concurrent sentences  not to mention the Missouri trial court's order itself [16]  on its head by claiming entitlement to credit on her first sentence for the time served on her second sentence. However, the only way that the Missouri trial court's order for a concurrent sentence could have been given its intended effect was if Missouri tendered, and Kentucky accepted, custody of Appellee. [17] Kentucky and Missouri are separate sovereigns, and Kentucky is not required to extend any full faith and credit to Missouri's decision to run its sentence concurrently [18]  i.e., Kentucky could render the sentences de facto consecutive by refusing to accept transfer of custody [19]  and, accordingly, Kentucky cannot be required to give full faith and credit to Missouri's order by applying Appellee's custody credit from Missouri against her Kentucky sentence. [20] Even the primary authority upon which Appellee bases her argument for credit recognizes that one sovereign's order for a concurrent sentence cannot bind another sovereign. [21] Courts have rejected the argument that due process requires a jurisdiction to grant custody credit for time an inmate served under a concurrent sentence both imposed by and served in a separate jurisdiction [22] and have determined that they lack the authority to order such custody credit. [23] Although Appellee argues, and the trial court concluded, that Appellee was entitled to credit for her Missouri prison time under the holding under Chitwood v. Dowd , [24] we find the holding of that case, and the other authority upon which Appellee relies, inapplicable. Although we observe some factual similarity between Chitwood and the case at bar, [25] the relief sought by the prisoner, and more important, the relief granted by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, distinguishes Chitwood from today's case. In Chitwood , the federal district court had granted habeas corpus relief by ordering Chitwood transferred to the Oklahoma department of corrections within thirty days ... [and] unconditionally releas[ing] Chitwood from serving any remaining time on ... his Missouri sentences. [26] The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals left in effect the district court's order requiring Missouri to transfer Chitwood to Oklahoma, but remanded for factual findings as to whether Chitwood would have remaining time to serve in Missouri after he completed his Oklahoma sentence. [27] We wish to emphasize that, although Appellee's entire argument rests on the premise that the due process rights recognized in Chitwood create obligations on the part of the jurisdiction whose sentence was first imposed, Chitwood did not purport to make any order as to the Oklahoma sentence. [28] In fact, the court recognized in its directions upon remand that Chitwood will complete his sentence in Oklahoma once he is actually transferred to Oklahoma. [29] And, as such, even if an application of the Chitwood holding suggests that Missouri violated Appellee's due process rights by failing to promptly tender her to the Kentucky authorities, [30] it requires a questionable leap in logic  and one that is not just unsupported, but actually contradicted by caselaw [31]  to suggest that Kentucky must release Appellee before she serves the entirety of her Kentucky sentence in order to make good for Missouri's wrong. Alternatively, Appellee argues that she is entitled to credit for the time she served in Missouri under principles of equity and comity, and, in so doing, Appellee relies primarily upon Chalifoux v. Commissioner of Correction. [32] In Chalifoux , the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ordered credit on a Massachusetts sentence for time a defendant served in connection with a concurrent sentence imposed by California after the defendant escaped from custody in Massachusetts before his term expired. Massachusetts declined to accept transfer of custody from California, but cited prison overcrowding in Massachusetts as the reason for its decision, and never advised Chalifoux of its decision not to credit him with time served in California. [33] In holding that Chalifoux was entitled to credit on his Massachusetts sentence from the date that Massachusetts was notified by California of Chalifoux's availability for return to Massachusetts, the Chalifoux Court specifically disclaimed that its holding was compelled by any federal or state constitutional provision or by any statutory provision, and instead, the result was dictated by the court's ad hoc considerations of fairness and a proper sense of justice. [34] In our view, Chalifoux provides no support for the relief granted in the case at bar. The trial court's findings of fact address KDOC's actions in connection with the transfer of custody from Missouri to Kentucky only in passing in stating that [d]espite petitioner's requests, Kentucky took no affirmative action in effectuating the transfer during the 1 1/2 years. Although this finding appears to impugn KDOC in some manner, [35] it falls far short of establishing a basis for granting custody credit in this case even under Massachusetts notions of fairness. Notwithstanding the assertions in Appellee's brief as to how offensive it is that KDOC failed to go get Appellee earlier than it did, Appellee fails to make any specific allegation of what she believes KDOC failed to do to effectuate a transfer of custody from Missouri. We agree with Appellant that, until April 7, 1998, when Missouri officials wrote their Kentucky counterparts to inform them that Appellee was available for transfer, Kentucky had no lawful means of assuming custody of Appellee, [36] and we thus perceive no unfairness from KDOC's calculation of Appellee's sentence in accordance with Kentucky law. In any event, however, we observe that Appellee received the same credit awarded to Chalifoux because KDOC credited Appellee with P.V. Time Credit from April 7, 1998 for the period of time after Missouri informed Kentucky that Appellee was available for transfer (and thus when Appellee was detained in Missouri under Kentucky parole violation warrant). Accordingly, we hold that Appellee was not entitled to custody credit upon her Kentucky sentence for the time she spent incarcerated on her concurrent Missouri sentence, and, as such, the trial court erred when it applied custody credit from Missouri, concluded that Appellee had satisfied service of her Kentucky sentence, and released Appellee from custody.