Opinion ID: 2554388
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Ministerial/Discretionary Distinction

Text: Our cases on governmental tort liability have long distinguished between discretionary and ministerial acts of government officials. In Tango v Tulevech (61 NY2d 34, 40 [1983]), we made clear that discretionary acts may not be a basis of liability: [W]hen official action involves the exercise of discretion, the officer is not liable for the injurious consequences of that action even if resulting from negligence or malice. We added that when the action is exclusively ministerial, the officer will be liable if it is otherwise tortious and not justifiable pursuant to statutory command. ( Id. ) In Lauer (95 NY2d at 99-100), we elaborated on Tango, repeating that a public employee's discretionary acts may not result in the municipality's liability even when the conduct is negligent, but adding that even negligent ministerial acts are not otherwise tortious where a plaintiff cannot show a duty running directly to the injured person. Even where an act is ministerial, we said, [t]o sustain liability against a municipality, the duty breached must be more than that owed the public generally ( id. at 100). Thus Tango and Lauer hold that discretionary municipal acts may never be a basis for liability, while ministerial acts may support liability only where a special duty is found. These cases contradict Ms. McLean's argument that, because the acts for which she sues are ministerial, no special duty or special relationship need be established. Ms. McLean relies, however, on admittedly confusing language in two more recent cases. In Pelaez, we said: As a rule, municipalities are immune from tort liability when their employees perform discretionary acts . . . . In a narrow exception to the rule, we have upheld tort claims when plaintiffs have established a `special relationship' with the municipality (2 NY3d at 193). And in Kovit v Estate of Hallums (4 NY3d 499, 505 [2005]), we said, citing Pelaez : municipalities generally enjoy immunity from liability for discretionary activities they undertake through their agents, except when plaintiffs establish a `special relationship' with the municipality. If these comments are taken to mean that the special duty/special relationship rule applies to discretionary rather than ministerial acts, then Tango and Lauer on the one hand, and Pelaez and Kovit on the other, seem inconsistent. If there is an inconsistency, we resolve it now: Tango and Lauer are right, and any contrary inference that may be drawn from the quoted language in Pelaez and Kovit is wrong. Government action, if discretionary, may not be a basis for liability, while ministerial actions may be, but only if they violate a special duty owed to the plaintiff, apart from any duty to the public in general. The holdings of Pelaez and Kovit are consistent with this principle. In each of those cases we found no special relationship or special duty. Thus there could be no liability, whether the actions at issue were characterized as ministerial or discretionary. Here, we assume, in Ms. McLean's favor, that the conduct she complains of was ministerial. Because, for the reasons we have explained, she has shown no special duty, there can be no liability.