Opinion ID: 790924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Principles of Preemption

Text: 83 The question of whether federal law preempts state law is fundamentally a matter of Congress's intent. See, e.g., English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990); Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). Since the existence of preemption turns on Congress's intent, we are to begin as we do in any exercise of statutory construction[,] with the text of the provision in question, and move on, as need be, to the structure and purpose of the Act in which it occurs. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995) ( Travelers ); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983). 84 It is well established that state law is preempted under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, in any of several circumstances. 85 First, when acting within constitutional limits, Congress is empowered to pre-empt state law by so stating in express terms. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). In the absence of express pre-emptive language, Congress' intent to pre-empt all state law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for supplementary state regulation. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 S.Ct. 2396 (1947). Pre-emption of a whole field also will be inferred where the field is one in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. Ibid.; see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). 86 Even where Congress has not completely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or when state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress, Hines v. Davidowitz, supra, at 67. See generally Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-699, 104 S.Ct. 2694, 81 L.Ed.2d 580 (1984). 87 Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371. 88 If the statute contains an express pre-emption clause, the task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress' pre-emptive intent. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993) ( Easterwood ). Where the language of the statute plainly indicates that Congress intended preemption, [w]e must give effect to th[e] plain language unless there is good reason to believe Congress intended the language to have some more restrictive meaning. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97, 103 S.Ct. 2890. If the text of the statute is ambiguous, either as to Congress's intent to preempt at all or as to the extent of an intended preemption, the meaning of the statute may be gleaned from its context and from the statutory scheme as a whole, or by resort to the normal canons of construction and legislative history. See id. at 100, 103 S.Ct. 2890 (finding that federal statute preempted state law based on the statute's plain language ..., [its] structure ..., and its legislative history); see generally K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988); Canada Life Assurance Co. v. Converium Ruckversicherung (Deutschland) AG, 335 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir.2003) ( Canada Life ); Auburn Housing Authority v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 138, 143-44 (2d Cir.2002). 89 When the federal statute completely pre-empts the state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law. Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003); see, e.g., Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-66, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987) ( Metropolitan ). Thus, although [f]ederal pre-emption is ordinarily a federal defense to the plaintiff's suit, and as such does not authorize removal, id. at 63, 107 S.Ct. 1542, complete[ ] preemption warrants removal because claims within the preempted area are necessarily federal in character, id. at 63-64, 107 S.Ct. 1542. See, e.g., Spielman, 332 F.3d at 123 n. 5 (Newman, J., concurring) (Complete preemption permits removal of a lawsuit to federal court based upon the concept that where there is complete preemption, only a federal claim exists.). Where Congress has clearly manifested an intent to make causes of action ... removable to federal court, the federal courts must honor that intent. Metropolitan, 481 U.S. at 66, 107 S.Ct. 1542. 90