Opinion ID: 2517881
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Challenged Provisions and Standard of Review

Text: ¶ 8 Article VI, section 3 of the Washington Constitution disqualifies from the franchise, or the right to vote, [a]ll persons convicted of infamous crimes unless restored to their civil rights. The Washington Legislature has defined `infamous crime' as a crime punishable by death in the state penitentiary or imprisonment in a state correctional facility, or in other words, any felony offense. RCW 29A.04.079. Once disenfranchised, felons may seek to restore their civil rights through a governor's pardon. RCW 9.96.010. Additionally, felons may also seek to restore their civil rights through the issuance of a certificate of discharge. RCW 9.94A.637. A court may issue a certificate of discharge only when the felon has completed all requirements of the sentence, including any and all legal financial obligations. RCW 9.94A.637(1)(a). In order to register to vote, a felon must take an oath that states that he or she is not presently denied [his or her] civil rights as a result of being convicted of a felony. RCW 29A.08.230. [3] ¶ 9 The trial court held that this disenfranchisement scheme, and in particular RCW 9.94A.637, violates article I, section 12, and article I, section 19 of the Washington Constitution [4] and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution because it discriminates on the basis of a felon's ability to pay his or her LFOs. We review summary judgment motions and issues of constitutional interpretation de novo. Berrocal v. Fernandez, 155 Wash.2d 585, 590, 121 P.3d 82 (2005); In re Parentage of C.A.M.A., 154 Wash.2d 52, 57, ¶ 9, 109 P.3d 405 (2005). In general, `[a] statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the party challenging its constitutionality bears the burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.' State v. Hughes, 154 Wash.2d 118, 132, ¶ 25, 110 P.3d 192 (2005) (quoting State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 769-70, 921 P.2d 514 (1996)), overruled in part on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006). Thus, the respondents bear the responsibility of proving that Washington's disenfranchisement scheme is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. When presented with arguments under both the Washington and federal constitutions, we review the state constitutional arguments first. State v. Reece, 110 Wash.2d 766, 770, 757 P.2d 947 (1988).
¶ 10 The State argues that respondents do not assert a valid claim under the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution. Article I, section 12 provides that [n]o law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations. Respondents argue that this court must conduct a separate and independent inquiry into the constitutionality of [Washington's disenfranchisement scheme] under Washington's Constitution. Br. of Resp'ts/Cross-Appellants (Br. of Resp'ts) at 32. To that end, respondents engage in an analysis of the factors laid out in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), to determine whether the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution is more protective of the right to vote than is the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. ¶ 11 This court engages in a two step inquiry when considering a claim that a provision of the Washington Constitution provides additional protection than is provided under a provision of the United States Constitution. [5] First, we determine whether a provision of the state constitution should be given an interpretation independent from that given to the corresponding federal constitutional provision. State v. McKinney, 148 Wash.2d 20, 26, 60 P.3d 46 (2002). This first analysis considers the six nonexclusive, neutral Gunwall factors: (1) the textual language of the state constitution, (2) differences in the texts of parallel provisions of the federal and state constitutions, (3) state constitutional and common law history, (4) preexisting state law, (5) structural differences between the federal and state constitutions, and (6) matters of particular state or local concern. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d at 58, 720 P.2d 808. ¶ 12 If we determine that an independent analysis is warranted, we then analyze whether the provision in question extends greater protections for the citizens of this state. McKinney, 148 Wash.2d at 26, 60 P.3d 46. This second analysis focuses on whether our state constitution provision is more protective of the claimed right in the particular context than is the federal constitution provision, and the scope of that protection. Such an analysis involves, among other things, an examination of the language of the provision, its relationship to other constitutional provisions, the existing and preceding statutory and common law at the time it was adopted, and other historical context. Concurrence (Madsen, J.) at 773. The six Gunwall factors parallel interpretive inquiries made when determining whether the state constitution ultimately provides greater protection than its corresponding federal provision. Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 132 Wash.2d 103, 115, 937 P.2d 154, 943 P.2d 1358 (1997) (citing State v. Boland, 115 Wash.2d 571, 575, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990)). ¶ 13 This court previously determined that the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution requires an independent constitutional analysis from the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. [6] Grant County Fire Prot. Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 150 Wash.2d 791, 811, 83 P.3d 419 (2004) (Grant County II). Once this court has established that a state constitutional provision warrants an analysis independent of a particular federal provision, it is unnecessary to engage repeatedly in further Gunwall analysis simply to rejustify performing that separate and independent constitutional analysis. State v. White, 135 Wash.2d 761, 769, 958 P.2d 982 (1998). Thus, Grant County II's determination satisfies the first step of our inquiry. ¶ 14 In considering the respondents' privileges and immunities claim we must initially address whether the right to vote is a privilege or immunity that is protected by article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution. For a violation of article I, section 12 to occur, the law, or its application, must confer a privilege to a class of citizens. Grant County II, 150 Wash.2d at 812, 83 P.3d 419. Although the precise confines of what constitutes a privilege remains unclear, this court has stated that for the purposes of article I, section 12, privileges are `those fundamental rights which belong to the citizens of the state by reason of [their state] citizenship.' Id. at 813, 83 P.3d 419 (quoting State v. Vance, 29 Wash. 435, 458, 70 P. 34 (1902)). This court has previously recognized that the right to vote is a fundamental right afforded to the citizens of Washington State. [7] See, e.g., Foster v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 102 Wash.2d 395, 404, 687 P.2d 841 (1984). Article I, section 19 of the Washington Constitution prohibits interference with the free exercise of the right of suffrage. Therefore, we conclude that the right to vote is a privilege of state citizenship, implicating the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution. ¶ 15 Having determined that the privileges and immunities clause warrants an independent state constitutional analysis and that the right to vote is a privilege implicating the clause, we now focus on the second step of our inquiry: whether and to what extent the clause provides greater protection in the context of felon voting. As previously mentioned, the Gunwall factors parallel inquiries made when interpreting a state constitutional provision to determine the extent of the protection it provides in a particular context. Boland, 115 Wash.2d at 575, 800 P.2d 1112. Here an analysis of preexisting state law (Gunwall factor four) is especially useful. ¶ 16 With respect to preexisting state law, respondents argue that article I, section 19, which confers the right to free and equal elections, indicates that the Washington Constitution provides greater protection of the right to vote under the privileges and immunities clause than does the federal constitution. Respondents also cite the provisions of article VI, sections 4-7, which provide for residency contingencies, prevent arrest during attendance at elections, and require secret ballots and voter registration laws, as proof of the requirement of affirmative state action to protect the right to vote against state interference. Br. of Resp'ts at 37. This court has recognized that the Washington Constitution goes further to safeguard the right to vote than does the federal constitution. See, e.g., Foster, 102 Wash.2d at 404, 687 P.2d 841 (Because we find that the Washington Constitution goes further to safeguard this right than does the federal constitution, we base our decision here upon the Washington Constitution.). ¶ 17 However, this court has recognized that increased protection only in relation to individuals who currently possess the fundamental right to vote, not felons whose voting rights have been stripped. While article I, section 19 explicitly grants the right to free and equal elections, article VI, section 3 explicitly mandates the disenfranchisement of felons. Reading the mandate to disenfranchise felons in article VI, section 3 in conjunction with article I, section 12, we conclude that article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution does not provide greater protection of voting rights for felons than does the equal protection clause of the federal constitution. ¶ 18 Finally, the respondents fail to assert a privileges and immunities clause violation because Washington's disenfranchisement scheme does not involve a grant of favoritism. In Grant County II, we explained that the text of the federal constitution is concerned with majoritarian threats of invidious discrimination against nonmajorities, while the state constitution protects as well against laws serving the interest of special classes of citizens to the detriment of the interests of all citizens. 150 Wash.2d at 806-07, 83 P.3d 419. Respondents argue that Washington's disenfranchisement scheme confers the privilege of vote restoration only on a minority of felons with financial resources and that Washington's privileges and immunities clause protects against such favoritism toward the wealthy. ¶ 19 The privileges and immunities clause does reflect, in part, our framers' concerns with undue political influence exercised by those with large concentrations of wealth and avoiding favoritism toward the wealthy. Grant County II, 150 Wash.2d at 808, 83 P.3d 419. However, such concerns are not triggered by Washington's felon disenfranchisement scheme because it grants the privilege of restoration of voting rights upon the same terms . . . equally . . . to all citizens. Const. art. I, § 12. The Washington Constitution grants the right to vote to all Washington citizens on equal terms. Additionally, the Washington Constitution disqualifies voters on equal termsthat is, when individuals have been convicted of committing a felony. Finally, Washington's statutory disenfranchisement scheme provides for the restoration of voting rights to felons on equal termsthat is, only after individuals have satisfied all of the terms of their sentences. If those terms include payment of LFOs, then the full payment of LFOs is one of the prerequisites to restoration of voting rights. The system of only restoring voting rights to felons who have satisfied all of the terms of their sentences, including fully paying their LFOs, does not constitute a grant of favoritism or a granting of a privilege on unequal terms, in violation of article I, section 12, because the same standard is applied evenly to all felons seeking restoration of their voting rights. ¶ 20 Therefore, we hold that the Washington Constitution is not more protective of the right to vote in this context, and that the respondents have failed to assert an article I, section 12 violation. The restoration of voting rights to felons who have fully paid their LFOs does not constitute a grant of favoritism in violation of the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution. Thus, we consider respondents' claims under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
¶ 21 The trial court held that Washington's disenfranchisement scheme violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution because it unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of wealth. The court concluded that the State failed to prove a rational relationship between a felon's ability to immediately pay LFOs and a denial of the right to vote. CP at 445. In this court, respondents renew their argument that Washington's felon disenfranchisement scheme is subject to strict scrutiny because it denies individuals the fundamental right to vote. Thus, we must first consider whether felons possess a constitutionally protected right to vote, the denial of which is subject to strict scrutiny.
¶ 22 As the trial court noted, [r]emarkably little is said in the Federal Constitution regarding the right to vote and [i]t is mentioned almost in passing in Article I, Sections 2 and 4. CP at 438. However, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the right to vote is fundamental for all citizens. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). Moreover, article I, section 19 of the Washington Constitution declares that no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage. Thus, because the right to vote has been recognized as fundamental for all citizens, restrictions on that right generally are subject to strict scrutiny, meaning they must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. Id. at 562, 84 S.Ct. 1362; City of Seattle v. State, 103 Wash.2d 663, 670, 694 P.2d 641 (1985). ¶ 23 However, the State disputes that felons have a constitutionally protected right to vote. Although respondents' equal protection claim is based on section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, [8] section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that when the right to vote at any election . . . is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state . . . or in any way abridges, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced. (Emphasis added.) The State asserts that section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly condones the disenfranchisement of criminals and, as a result, that any restriction on felons' right to vote does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. ¶ 24 The State asserts that the United States Supreme Court reached the conclusion that felons do not possess a constitutionally protected right to vote in Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 94 S.Ct. 2655, 41 L.Ed.2d 551 (1974), based on section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Richardson, three felons challenged the constitutionality of California's felon disenfranchisement scheme, which provided that felons' voting rights could be restored by court order after the completion of probation, or, if a prison term was served, by executive pardon after completion of rehabilitation proceedings. Id. at 30, 94 S.Ct. 2655 (footnote omitted). In response to the felons' arguments that the State must show a compelling state interest to justify denial of the right to vote to felons, the Court cited the provisions of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. We hold that the understanding of those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, as reflected in the express language of § 2 and in the historical and judicial interpretation of the Amendment's applicability to state laws disenfranchising felons, is of controlling significance in distinguishing such laws from those other state limitations on the franchise which have been held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause by this Court. . . . [W]e may rest on the demonstrably sound proposition that § 1, in dealing with voting rights as it does, could not have been meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from the less drastic sanction of reduced representation which § 2 imposed for other forms of disenfranchisement. Id. at 54-55, 94 S.Ct. 2655. Thus, the Court rejected the felons' argument that the State must demonstrate a compelling interest in order to disenfranchise felons and held that felons' right to vote is not constitutionally protected. ¶ 25 Amicus curiae League of Women Voters of Washington asserts that Richardson does not stand for the proposition that the right to vote is not fundamental for felons. However, Richardson clearly distinguished the right that is at stake for felons from the Court's previous holdings that citizens possess a fundamental right to vote. As we have seen, however, the exclusion of felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a sanction which was not present in the case of the other restrictions on the franchise which were invalidated in the cases on which respondents rely. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54, 94 S.Ct. 2655. ¶ 26 Furthermore, other courts have read Richardson as holding that felon disenfranchisement schemes are not subject to strict scrutiny because felons' right to vote is not constitutionally protected. For example, in Williams v. Taylor, 677 F.2d 510, 514 (5th Cir.1982), which challenged Mississippi's disenfranchisement scheme as violating a felon's due process rights, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that a felon's interest in retaining his right to vote is constitutionally distinguishable from the `right to vote' claims of individuals who are not felons. As a result, the Williams court concluded that the disenfranchisement statute need withstand only rational basis review and noted that the Supreme Court had upheld a fundamentally identical system in Richardson. Id. Similarly, in Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir.1983), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that [i]t follows [from Richardson] that the standard of equal protection scrutiny to be applied when the state makes classifications relating to disenfranchisement of felons is the traditional rational basis standard. Thus, we conclude that Richardson dictates that we hold that the right to vote is not fundamental for convicted felons. [9] ¶ 27 Without reconciling Richardson, the dissent insists that voting remains a fundamental right of which felons cannot be deprived for failure to pay their financial obligations. Dissent at 779-80. However, the dissent's reasoning is unsound because it relies on an overstatement of the precedent governing the right of freedom and indigent felons' imposed financial obligations and an unpersuasive analogy between the rights of freedom and voting. ¶ 28 The dissent cites Williams v. Illinois and Bearden v. Georgia for the proposition that once all of the assigned punishment has been imposed, except for the payment of financial obligations, failure to pay those financial obligations cannot be used to continue depriving felons of their freedom. Dissent at 779-80 (citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983)). However, contrary to the dissent's assertion, Williams and Bearden do not stand for such a broad principle. The Williams court held only that a State may not constitutionally imprison beyond the maximum duration fixed by statute a defendant who is financially unable to pay a fine. 399 U.S. at 243, 90 S.Ct. 2018 (emphasis added). The Bearden court merely held it unconstitutional to revoke automatically an indigent defendant's probation for failure to pay a fine, without evaluating whether the defendant had made bona fide efforts or what alternative punishments might exist. 461 U.S. at 672-73, 103 S.Ct. 2064. Neither case supports the dissent's blanket assertion that failure to pay . . . financial obligations cannot be used to continue depriving felons of their freedom. Dissent at 779-80. ¶ 29 The dissent relies on its overstatement of Williams and Bearden to reason as follows: (1) freedom is a fundamental right that can be taken away as punishment for a felony, (2) felons cannot continue to be deprived of their freedom for failure to pay a fine, (3) therefore freedom remains a fundamental right. Dissent at 780. The dissent then claims that what is true of freedom is likewise true of voting because voting is also a fundamental right that can be taken away as punishment for a felony. Id. ¶ 30 The analogy the dissent draws between the two rights is flawed. We agree that both the right to vote and the right to be free from incarceration are protected by the equal protection clause of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the dissent fails to grapple with the impact of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment upon the right to vote for felons. Section 2 contains no parallel language restricting felons' right to be free from incarceration. Thus the dissent's analogy is of limited value. The dissent's conclusion that, like freedom from incarceration, voting remains a fundamental right, and when all other conditions of a sentence have been fulfilled, felons cannot be deprived further of their right to vote for failure to pay LFOs, is unsupported. Id.
¶ 31 Because no fundamental right is at stake in this case and respondents do not allege that they constitute a suspect class, we do not apply strict scrutiny in analyzing Washington's disenfranchisement scheme. We next consider whether to apply intermediate scrutiny or rational basis review. Intermediate scrutiny is not appropriate in this case because this court has held that intermediate scrutiny will be applied only if the statute implicates both an important right and a semi-suspect class not accountable for its status. In re Pers. Restraint of Runyan, 121 Wash.2d 432, 448, 853 P.2d 424 (1993). Respondents have failed to establish that felons' right to vote qualifies as an important right under federal case law. Additionally, even though low-income felons may not be accountable for their wealth status, they have been adjudicated responsible for their status as felons, which is the classification at issue. Therefore, we do not apply intermediate scrutiny, and we examine Washington's disenfranchisement scheme using rational basis review. Under rational basis review, this court must uphold a law establishing classifications unless the `classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of legitimate state objectives.' Habitat Watch v. Skagit County, 155 Wash.2d 397, 414, 120 P.3d 56 (2005) (quoting State v. Harner, 153 Wash.2d 228, 235-36, 103 P.3d 738 (2004)). ¶ 32 In considering respondents' equal protection claim, we must determine what classification Washington's disenfranchisement scheme establishes. The State asserts that the scheme does not establish a wealth-based classification because [t]he only classification drawn by Washington law is between those who have completed all of the terms of their sentences and those who have not. Br. of Appellants at 19. Although it is clear that the requirement that felons pay their LFOs in full may impact felons disparately based on their differing income statuses, this alone does not establish an equal protection violation. `[T]he equal protection clause does not require a state to eliminate all inequalities between the rich and the poor.' Runyan, 121 Wash.2d at 449, 853 P.2d 424 (quoting Riggins v. Rhay, 75 Wash.2d 271, 283, 450 P.2d 806 (1969)). ¶ 33 In Runyan, prisoners challenged the constitutionality of a time-bar statute, arguing that the statute violated the equal protection rights of indigent prisoners because they are unable to acquire legal representation quickly enough to collaterally attack their convictions. 121 Wash.2d at 448, 853 P.2d 424. We upheld the statute because it made no distinction among rich or poor prisoners and applie[d] equally to both. Id. at 449, 853 P.2d 424. Similarly, in this case, Washington's disenfranchisement scheme does not distinguish between rich or poor felons but instead requires all felons to complete all of the terms of their sentences before they may seek reinstatement of their civil rights. Thus, we conclude that Washington's disenfranchisement scheme does not classify based on wealth. [10] ¶ 34 Respondents assert that even if Washington's disenfranchisement scheme may appear facially neutral, the scheme discriminates in operation. Respondents cite Williams, 399 U.S. at 242, 90 S.Ct. 2018 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 n. 11, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956)), in which the Court noted that `a law nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation.' In Williams, the Court held that an Illinois statute that allowed for the continued incarceration of prisoners beyond the statutory maximum sentence because the prisoners had failed to pay their fines violated the equal protection rights of those indigent prisoners. 399 U.S. at 241, 90 S.Ct. 2018. However, as the State notes, Williams is distinguishable from this case because it involved an individual's fundamental right to be free from involuntary confinement, whereas this case concerns the right of felons to vote, which is not constitutionally protected. ¶ 35 In another case cited by respondents, Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672-73, 103 S.Ct. 2064, the Court held that the state violated the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment by revoking probation for failure to pay fines without inquiring into the reasons for the failure to pay. Bearden, like Williams, also involves a deprivation of conditional freedom and has the effect of turning a fine into a prison sentence. Id. at 672, 674, 103 S.Ct. 2064. Additionally, both Williams and Bearden involve additional punishments imposed on individuals for failure to pay their fines. Here, no additional punishment is imposedall felons simply cannot seek restoration of their civil rights until they have completed all of the terms of their sentences. ¶ 36 Respondents also argue that the requirement that felons complete all the terms of their sentences, including full payment of their LFOs, constitutes an unconstitutional poll tax. Respondents rely largely on Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966), in which the United States Supreme Court invalidated a Virginia poll tax because it violated the equal protection clause. However, the poll tax in Harper applied to all Virginia citizens, individuals who possessed a fundamental right to vote under the United States Constitution. Convicted felons, on the other hand, no longer possess that fundamental right as a direct result of their decisions to commit a felony. Additionally, while Harper holds that wealth is not germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process, that is not the inquiry in this case. Id. at 668, 86 S.Ct. 1079. The correct inquiry is whether a felon's completion of the terms of his or her sentence is germane to one's participation in the electoral process. Thus, Harper is distinguishable on the basis that it involved a fundamental right, whereas this case does not. As a result, we need consider only whether there is a rational relationship between requiring felons to satisfy all of the terms of their sentences, including full payment of their LFOs, and any legitimate governmental interests, such as punishment, before a felon may receive reinstatement of his or her voting rights. [11] ¶ 37 The parties also dispute how the issue in this case should be framed and whether the correct inquiry is if Washington's disenfranchisement scheme is constitutional or if Washington's scheme to restore voting rights to felons is constitutional. The respondents argue that although the State has the right to disenfranchise felons, it may not condition the restoration of their voting rights on the payment of LFOs. [12] The State, on the other hand, argues that the respondents reframing of the issue creates a fiction because [t]he so-called conditions for reinstatement that Respondents claim to challenge are nothing more than a description of the period of disenfranchisement  a description of its duration. Br. of Appellants at 10. As the State argues, the provisions in the state and federal constitutions allowing for disenfranchisement of felons do not state a time limit. In fact, a state may permanently disenfranchise a felon without violating his or her constitutional rights. ¶ 38 Moreover, it is not Washington's reenfranchisement statute that denies felons the right to vote but rather the continuing applicability of its disenfranchisement scheme. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted in Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1022 (9th Cir.2003), when considering the constitutionality of Washington's felon disenfranchisement scheme under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, that the felon plaintiffs in that case had not been denied the right to vote because of the restoration process, but rather due to the disenfranchisement provision . . . and because they ha[d] not satisfied all the requirements of their sentences to become statutorily eligible for discharge of their convictions. Additionally, we conclude that the requirement that felons pay their LFOs should not be divorced from the context in which that requirement arose, which was as a result of the individual's commission of a felony. Thus, the requirement that felons must pay their LFOs is not merely a condition for reinstatement of voting rights, it is a requirement that felons must satisfy to complete the terms of their sentences. ¶ 39 Even if the correct inquiry in this case were whether Washington's re-enfranchisement scheme passes constitutional muster, we would hold that it does. Richardson involved three individual felons who had completed their sentences and paroles. 418 U.S. at 26, 94 S.Ct. 2655. The Court noted that when it had previously considered exclusions of some or all felons from the franchise, it had indicated approval of such exclusions on a number of occasions. Id. at 53, 94 S.Ct. 2655. Additionally, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed about the Richardson decision, although the analysis engaged in by the Court focuses on a state's power to disenfranchise persons convicted of a felony generally, the specific holding of the Court was that a state may deny the franchise to that group of `convicted felons who have completed their sentences and paroles.' Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir.1978) (quoting Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56, 94 S.Ct. 2655). The Shepherd court, in upholding the constitutionality of a Texas re-enfranchisement scheme, concluded that the [Richardson] Court clearly envisioned that a state could grant the right to vote to some persons convicted of a felony while denying it to others. Id. at 1114. Thus, we conclude that Washington's re-enfranchisement statute is constitutional so long as the classification drawn is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. ¶ 40 Respondents also argue that the State's asserted interests in requiring felons to pay their LFOs before having their voting rights restored are not legitimate state interests that provide a rational basis for Washington's disenfranchisement scheme. Respondents challenge the State's asserted interests in limiting political participation of those unwilling to abide by laws and in requiring the completion of all sentence elements before the right to vote is restored. [13] Respondents argue that a felon's ability to pay his or her LFOs immediately does not indicate whether he or she is law-abiding. Additionally, respondents argue that the State may not justify otherwise unconstitutional laws simply by asserting its interest in having its laws followed and that such an argument is circular. Br. of Resp'ts at 21. ¶ 41 However, in Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir.1967), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized the legitimate interest in denying the right to vote to those who have committed felonies. [I]t can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part in electing the legislators who make the laws, the executives who enforce these, the prosecutors who must try them for further violations, or the judges who are to consider their cases. Id. Respondents' argument that the State's asserted interest in having its laws followed is circular is not persuasive. The State clearly has an interest in ensuring that felons complete all of the terms of their sentence, and there is no requirement that the State restore voting rights to felons until they do so. ¶ 42 As a result, respondents fail to establish that the requirement that felons complete all of the terms of their sentence, including full payment of any LFOs, is wholly irrelevant to any legitimate state objective. Therefore, we hold that Washington's disenfranchisement scheme does not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution because it is rationally related to legitimate state interests. We reverse the trial court and uphold Washington's statutes and constitution as written. [14]
¶ 43 On cross-appeal, respondents challenge the limitation of the trial court's order invalidating Washington's disenfranchisement scheme only for felons who have satisfied the terms of their sentences except for paying legal financial obligations, and who, due to their financial status, are unable to pay their legal financial obligations immediately. CP at 433. Respondents assert that all felons who have satisfied the terms of their sentences, except for full payment of their LFOs, should be allowed to vote, regardless of their financial statuses. We note initially that respondents likely lack standing to bring this cross-appeal because they are not an aggrieved party under RAP 3.1, which states that [o]nly an aggrieved party may seek review by the appellate court. All of the respondents were covered by the trial court's order holding that the respondents were entitled to register to vote. Thus, the respondents were prevailing parties, not aggrieved parties. ¶ 44 Respondents also argue that, as the United States argued in its amicus brief in Harper, merely prohibiting a poll tax in relation to indigents would create an ongoing hardship because `it would be necessary to require evidence of poverty, and the furnishing of such evidence would itself constitute a burden on the exercise of the franchise.' Reply Br. of Resp'ts/Cross-Appellants at 11 (quoting Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169, 1965 WL 130114, ). However, the court in Harper did not explicitly adopt that reasoning. Moreover, the respondents cannot argue that they are so burdened because the trial court already ordered that they be allowed to register to vote without any further qualification. Thus, respondents have failed to prove that they are aggrieved parties for the purpose of bringing a cross-appeal. ¶ 45 Furthermore, even if we assume that the respondents have standing, we hold that respondents' cross-appeal lacks merit. Because we have determined that Washington's disenfranchisement scheme does not violate the constitutional rights of felons who are unable to pay their LFOs, we must necessarily hold that the scheme does not violate the constitutional rights of those who are able to pay their LFOs.
¶ 46 Respondents claim that they are entitled to attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. However, because we reverse the trial court and enforce Washington's disenfranchisement scheme as written, the respondents are not a prevailing party entitled to attorney fees.