Opinion ID: 418146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: denial of surrebuttal

Text: 53 Appellant's third specification of error is that the district court committed prejudicial error in refusing to allow the defendant the opportunity to find and present good character witnesses in surrebuttal to counter the character testimony of two listed government witnesses presented in rebuttal. 54 Appellant had taken the witness stand to deny the allegations of his involvement in the loan scheme. The government called two witnesses in rebuttal, Herbert Kanning, a Jacksonville attorney who had known the appellant for ten years, and Thomas D. Treece, a Jacksonville attorney who had previously been a law partner of the appellant. Both witnesses testified adversely to the appellant's reputation in the community for truth and veracity and as to their own opinion regarding the appellant's credibility. 55 After the government closed, there was a side bar conference regarding procedural matters unrelated to this appeal. The district judge then informed the jury that the presentation of testimony and evidence had concluded, and dismissed them until the next morning. The defendant's attorney then stated that he would like to have some time to locate at the most two witnesses to testify regarding the defendant's credibility. The district court agreed with the prosecution that surrebuttal was within the discretion of the court, and denied the request, further noting that the Court having announced that the testimony and evidence had been concluded would perhaps attach undue significance to that presentation. 56 Although a criminal defendant cannot be compelled to take the stand in his own defense, once he chooses to testify 'he places his credibility in issue as does any other witness.'  United States v. Lollar, 606 F.2d 587, 588 (5th Cir.1979) (citations omitted). Thus, the district court correctly allowed the government to call witnesses to testify that the defendant's reputation for truth and veracity were bad and as to their own opinion regarding the defendant's credibility. Id. at 588, 589. 57 Whether or not to allow evidence in surrebuttal is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court; the district court's decision not to allow surrebuttal may not be disturbed unless such discretion was abused. See, e.g., United States v. Sadler, 488 F.2d 434, 435 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931, 94 S.Ct. 2642, 41 L.Ed.2d 234 (1974). In the present case, the trial court properly limited the rebuttal witnesses' testimony to the defendant's reputation and the witnesses' opinions regarding his truth and veracity. This prevented the government from introducing new matters that may have prompted the need for surrebuttal on behalf of the defense. See id. Because the issue of the defendant's truthfulness was placed in issue upon his testimony, the government injected no new issue, and there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny surrebuttal.