Opinion ID: 6337960
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant’s Fourth Amendment Claim

Text: Appellant’s first argument is that the police violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures when they stopped the vehicle he was traveling in. Specifically, appellant contends that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation when the car in which appellant was traveling twice touched the lines dividing one lane from another. 11 In this case, Officer Mundt waited to initiate a traffic stop until he saw the vehicle in which appellant was a passenger twice “veer” on top of the painted, dashed lines separating one lane from another. 18 D.C.M.R § 2201.6 provides: Whenever any roadway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, the following rules, in addition to all other rules consistent with this subtitle shall apply: (a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety. (Emphasis added.) The regulation does not define what it means to stay “within a single lane,” and there appears to be no case law from this jurisdiction interpreting the requirement. Appellant argues that Officer Mundt possessed “a mistaken understanding of the scope of a legal prohibition” in believing that touching, but not crossing, the painted line dividing two lanes violates 18 D.C.M.R. § 2201.6. Courts in other jurisdictions, when interpreting similar regulations, have reached divergent results about whether driving on top of but not crossing the painted white line constitutes a violation. We agree with those courts that have found it to be a violation.4 4 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 945 F. Supp. 2d 665, 671-72 (E.D. Va. 2013), in which the court ruled that “a driver who drives his vehicle on the boundary lines violates” the Virginia statute requiring that vehicles be driven “as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane,” “regardless of whether the driver actually crosses over the boundary lines.” See also United States v. Bassols, 775 F. Supp. 2d 12 “Statutory interpretation is a holistic endeavor, and, at a minimum, must account for a statute’s full text, language as well as punctuation, structure and subject matter.” Baltimore v. District of Columbia, 10 A.3d 1141, 1146 (D.C. 2011) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). With those considerations in mind, and reading the District’s provision in the context of the purpose and subject matter of the D.C.M.R. traffic regulations as a whole, we are satisfied that the analyses of the Williams and Bassols courts are correct. First, as the court in Williams observed, “the Ninth Circuit in Colin began its analysis of the issue by noting that neither the California statute nor state case law defines ‘drive as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane.’” Williams, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 673 n.5; see also Colin, 314 F.3d at 443. In contrast, as in Williams, the D.C.M.R. provides relevant definitions which guide our interpretation. 18 D.C.M.R. § 2201.6 requires a vehicle to “be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a 1293, 1301 (D.N.M. 2011) (see infra). Compare United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439, 444-45 (9th Cir. 2002), holding that a vehicle observed drifting onto the solid white fog line on the far side of the right lane of a highway and traveling along the fog line for approximately ten seconds, and thereafter drifting to the left side of the left lane where its left wheels traveled along the solid yellow line for approximately ten seconds, did not violate §21658(a) of the California Vehicle Code, which required that a vehicle be driven “as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane” and “not be moved from the lane until such movement can be made with reasonable safety.” 13 single lane” whenever upon a “roadway” that has been divided into lanes. Under 18 D.C.M.R. § 9901.1, a roadway is “that portion of a highway which is improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel.” A highway is defined as “the entire width between the boundary lines of every publicly maintained way.” Id. After considering identically worded definitions under Virginia law, the court in Williams concluded that, because “a lane of travel by definition constitutes the area between the boundary lines . . . on each side of the lane” as per the definition of a highway, driving on top of the line violates the statute “regardless of whether the driver actually crosses over the boundary lines.” Williams, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 672 (emphasis in original). Finally, in resolving this issue in favor of appellee here, we find most compelling the reasoning of the District Court in United States v. Bassols. There, the Court expressly declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation in Colin, noting that it would “lead[] to an absurd result” if the statute was interpreted to allow for touching the line, because it would mean that “two vehicles could legally occupy the same physical space at the same time despite the fact that the vehicles would collide,” clearly contrary to the safety purposes of the statute. Id. at 1300-01. Moreover, 14 a vehicle that is driving with its tire on a lane marker even poses a risk to other vehicles that are not also driving on, but are close to, the lane marker. Thus, the only way to construe [the statute] without reaching a result that permits two vehicles to occupy the same physical space is to conclude that the “single lane” contemplated by [the legislature] encompasses only that portion of the roadway that is between the lines of stripes that demarcate the “single lane.” Because the lane ends at the point that the lane marker begins, a driver who drives on a lane marker has necessarily failed to drive entirely within a single lane. Id. at 1301. 5 In sum, the relevant definitions in the D.C.M.R. and the practical and safety concerns that would result from a different interpretation, persuade us that driving on the dividing line, even if not crossing it, is a violation of 18 D.C.M.R. § 2201.6. Accordingly, Officer Mundt’s stop of the sedan was reasonable, and no constitutional violation occurred.