Opinion ID: 671803
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Questions about Sauer's Blackmail Defense

Text: 4 Sauer was charged by the State of Alaska with the molestation of four girls who lived in his neighborhood. At trial, Sauer claimed that the charges of molestation had been fabricated by one girl, C.L.M., who he claimed coerced the other three girls into fabricating their own stories. He stated that C.L.M. had been blackmailing him for several months prior to his arrest, threatening to tell people that he molested her unless he gave her money. The prosecutor asked Sauer several questions about his blackmail defense on cross-examination, including why he had not told the police about the threatened blackmail when they questioned him prior to his arrest. The prosecutor also commented during the closing arguments on Sauer's earlier silence about the blackmail. 5 Sauer argues that the prosecutor violated his constitutional rights by asking him on cross-examination the reasons for his failure to tell police about the alleged blackmailing by C.L.M. and by stressing in closing arguments Sauer's silence about the blackmail. 6 Sauer objected at trial to the line of questioning, but did not raise this issue on direct appeal. He did, however, raise the issue in his application for post-conviction relief in Alaska state court. That court held that the issue was waived because it was not raised on direct appeal, and alternatively that Sauer's claim failed on the merits. The Alaska court of appeals affirmed, apparently on the ground that Sauer's claim failed on the merits. It is not clear whether the court also considered the issue waived. 7 The state argues to us that Sauer waived review of this claim, and asserts that Sauer can only raise the propriety of the questioning as part of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which he raised on direct appeal. Because we find that Sauer's constitutional claim fails even if reviewed on the merits, we need not decide whether our review should be limited in the manner suggested by the state. In any event, it follows from our holding that Sauer's state court appellate counsel's failure to appeal the line of questioning did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 8 Under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), a defendant's post-Miranda silence cannot be used to impeach an explanation subsequently given at trial. To allow such impeachment would be fundamentally unfair because a defendant is impliedly assured by the Miranda warnings that silence carries no penalty. 426 U.S. at 618-20. However, Doyle does not apply to cross-examination that merely inquires into prior inconsistent statements. Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408 (1980) (per curiam). Thus, it is not improper to ask a defendant on cross-examination at trial why he told the jury a different story at trial than he had told police officers following his arrest. Id. at 408-09. 9 This circuit has interpreted Anderson broadly. In United States v. Makhlouta, 790 F.2d 1400, 1404 (9th Cir.1986), we held that if a defendant makes post-arrest statements that ' may arguably be inconsistent with the trial story, ' he has raised a question of credibility. (quoting United States v. Ochoa-Sanchez, 676 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 911 (1982)). The government, to provide all relevant evidence bearing on credibility, 'may probe all post-arrest statements and the surrounding circumstances under which they were made, including defendant's failure to provide critical details.'  Makhlouta, 790 F.2d at 1404 (quoting Ochoa-Sanchez, 676 F.2d at 1286). 10 The inquiry into the defendant's credibility should not, however, stray into questions that imply that the silence at the time of arrest is substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt. See Alo v. Olim, 639 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir.1980) (prior silence cannot be used for impeachment where silence is not probative of a defendant's credibility and where prejudice to the defendant might result) (quotations omitted); Ochoa-Sanchez, 676 F.2d at 1286 (citing Greico v. Hall, 641 F.2d 1029, 1034 (1st Cir.1981)). 11 Here, after being given the Miranda warnings, Sauer made several statements to the police. The officers advised him that ... some ... kids had brought it to [their] attention that he had possibly been having sexual contact with some of the kids in the neighborhood. [Sauer] said he didn't have anything to do with that, and didn't know what they were talking about. Sauer made no mention of any child's attempts to blackmail him by threatening to tell people he molested her. 12 Sauer's claim that he did not know what the police were talking about and that he did not have anything to do with any child's allegations of molestation is arguably inconsistent with his later claim of blackmail. A person who has been blackmailed with threats to report molestation knows something about allegations of molestation, even if what he knows is simply that they are false reports. Thus, the prosecutor was entitled to probe the inconsistency in order to impeach Sauer's credibility. 13 In addition, the prosecutor did not improperly attempt to lead the jury to infer Sauer's guilt from his silence as to the story; the inquiry instead appears to have been designed to show that Sauer's exculpatory story was fabricated. This is evidenced by the prosecutor's closing argument, where she asserted that the reason Sauer told neither the police nor any acquaintances about the blackmail was because the blackmail story was totally made up, totally a fabrication. 14 The inquiry into his failure to mention blackmail did not violate Sauer's Miranda right to remain silent.