Opinion ID: 766472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The District Court's Jury Charge

Text: 69 A jury instruction is erroneous if it misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard or does not adequately inform the jury on the law. United States v. Bok, 156 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will reverse only if the instructions, taken as a whole, caused the defendant prejudice. See id. Walsh contends that the jury instructions given by the court were erroneous in three respects. While we agree that the District Court erred in one regard, we find no grounds for reversal. 70 Walsh asserts that the court essentially told the jury that it could convict [him] under 242 if it found merely that [he] was a correction[s] officer and that he was working in that capacity. This is not what the District Court instructed. Rather, the District Judge charged the jury that it could find that Walsh had acted under color of law if the care, supervision and discipline of inmates, performed by the defendant at the time he assaulted Fowlks, was an official duty of the defendant. Further, the District Court instructed the jury that if the abusive act was an act performed beyond the defendant's authority as a corrections officer, you may find that [the] defendant acted under . . . color of law. . . . Both statements are accurate summations of the plurality opinion in Screws, under which the defendant must be acting within his official duties, but the act of abuse need not be authorized by the system within which he works to be acting under color of law. 325 U.S. at 111. 9 71 Walsh also argues that the willfulness charge was erroneous because the District Court stated at one point: Now, that doesn't mean to say that the defendant knew there was a 14th amendment to the Constitution, but simply that he did the act as charged in the indictment. The District Court's charge on willfulness is accurate and based on the definition of willfulness in the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Screws, 325 U.S. at 103-04. The jury was properly instructed that Fowlks had a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from having a corrections officer inflict physical pain upon him unnecessarily or wantonly, and, while it did not have to find that the defendant acted with knowledge of the particular provision of the Constitution at issue, it had to find that the defendant intended to invade [an] interest protected by the Constitution. See id. at 103, 106 (asserting that willfulness within the meaning of a precursor to 242 requires proof of a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right but this does not require proof that the defendant was thinking in constitutional terms). 72 Next, Walsh takes issue with the District Court's treatment of the constitutional rights involved. As explained above, the charges against Walsh encompassed a time during which Fowlks was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and when he was incarcerated post-conviction as an inmate, protected by the Eighth Amendment. Walsh first complains that the District Court did not mention the words Eighth Amendment in its charge. This absence is irrelevant because the charge defined the right protected by the Eighth Amendment-namely the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. See United States v. Munoz, 143 F.3d 632, 636 (2d Cir. 1998) (The critical issue is whether the concept the district court conveyed to the jury, regardless of what it was called, accurately defined grounds upon which the jury could convict [the defendant] . . . .) 73 Second, Walsh argues that the District Court should have instructed the jury on the shocks the conscience standard applicable to due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973), and mentioned the term due process. Instead, the District Judge instructed the jury exclusively on the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain standard associated with Eighth Amendment claims. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). While the failure to articulate the correct standard for claims brought by pretrial detainees was technically error, cf. Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 1981) (claims regarding conditions of confinement brought by pretrial detainees must be evaluated separately from those brought by sentenced inmates because the constitutional standard differs), Walsh cannot demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the error. 74 The factors used to evaluate the shocks the conscience and the unnecessary and wanton standards in the context of excessive force claims in the prison context are identical-specifically, the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and amount of force that was used, the extent of the injury inflicted, and whether the force was applied in a good-faith effort to restore discipline or sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033. Therefore, while the terms used to articulate the standard are different, in substance they are the same with respect to excessive force claims in the prison context, and the jury could not have been misled or confused by the failure to articulate the proper terminology. 75 Finally, Walsh argues that the District Court should have given instructions to guide [the jury's] determination of whether any acts proved at trial violated Mr. Fowlks's Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment rights. In other words, Walsh now argues that the District Court should have listed the factors enunciated in Hudson and Johnson to evaluate whether the force used amounted to a constitutional violation. As the government points out, this objection was not voiced at trial, and Walsh did not request an instruction of this sort. Accordingly, this alleged error is reviewed only for plain error, United States v. Ballistrea, 101 F.3d 827, 834 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1150 (1997), which is a very stringent standard requiring a serious injustice or a conviction in a manner inconsistent with fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings, United States v. Ramirez, 973 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard is not met here. 76 First, the failure to list the Hudsonfactors in evaluating wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain does not render the charge incorrect, only possibly incomplete. The phrase, however, is not so esoteric or complex that the jury could not evaluate it without reference to the Hudson factors. Second, as the government points out, even if such a charge was required, Walsh suffered no prejudice or injustice from its absence. His defense at trial was not that the amount of force used did not amount to a constitutional violation, but that the acts alleged did not occur. The medical evidence was offered only to show the implausibility of the testimony offered by the government's witnesses. 77 Viewing the charge as a whole, see United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550, 1555 (2d Cir. 1989), we find no reversible error.