Opinion ID: 44626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The RPT Failed to Meet the Standards of the Ineligibility Statute

Text: 37 Apart from the federal constitutional questions, this case presents a state-law statutory question. For the purposes of this section, we assume arguendo that it would be constitutional for a state actor to make pre-election, prospective judgments about residency and that Benkiser in fact made such a judgment. Even granting those assumptions, the RPT's declaration of ineligibility would violate Texas law because DeLay's future residency was not conclusively established by public record.
38 The governing standard, conclusively established, bears emphasis. Something is conclusive when, by virtue of reason, it put[s] an end to debate or question, usually because of its irrefutability. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED (2002). 16 Accordingly, Texas courts have explained that public records must leave no factual dispute concerning the conclusiveness of ineligibility. See In re Jackson, 14 S.W.3d 843, 848-49 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, orig. pet.) (holding that a state actor under § 145.003 has no fact-finding authority; instead, she may administratively declare that a candidate is ineligible only when the record conclusively establishes the candidate's ineligibility) (emphasis in original); Culberson v. Palm, 451 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, orig. pet.) (holding that ineligibility was not conclusively established where there remained a fact question). Thus refined, the issue is whether, based on the evidence properly before Benkiser on June 7, 2006, there remained a fact question as to whether DeLay would reside in Texas on election day, November 7, 2006. Palm, 451 S.W.2d at 929. 39 The intersection of § 145.003, which requires that proof of ineligibility be conclusive, and the Qualifications Clause, which requires inhabitancy only when elected, presents an extraordinary burden to declaring a candidate ineligible on residency grounds prior to the election. This is because it is almost always possible for a person to change their residency: to move to the state in question before the election, thereby satisfying the Qualifications Clause. 17 40
41 Although the public records relied on by Benkiser may have conclusively established DeLay's present residency in Virginia, they did not conclusively establish whether he will inhabit Texas on election day. Proof of DeLay's present residency may suggest where he will be in the future; however, it does not put the matter beyond dispute or question. 42 Benkiser relied on three public records to declare DeLay ineligible: 43 1) DeLay's Virginia driver's license; 44 2) DeLay's Virginia voter registration; and 45 3) An employment withholding form reflecting DeLay's Virginia residence. 46 Dist. Ct. Op. at . These documents do not conclusively establish whether DeLay will be an inhabitant of Texas on November 7, 2006. DeLay could be a current resident of Virginia, as the documents above provide, and nonetheless move back to Texas before November 7. Indeed, Benkiser admitted in her testimony that the public records could not prove DeLay's residency on election day and that DeLay could move back to Texas before election day. 47 Information that was before Benkiser showing DeLay's eligibility supports this conclusion. Benkiser had before her DeLay's original candidacy application, in which he swore that he was eligible for office. In terms of the Qualifications Clause, such a declaration necessarily contained an implicit promise that DeLay would be an inhabitant of Texas on election day. It is also likely that Benkiser knew—because the RPT confirmed his eligibility in prior elections—that DeLay had been an inhabitant of Texas for decades. Under these circumstances, the public records provided by DeLay could not have conclusively established his future residency. Predicting DeLay's future inhabitancy would have required a finding of fact, which the RPT had no authority to make. See, e.g., In re Jackson, 14 S.W.3d at 848-49. 48 The RPT argues against this analysis on several grounds, none of which is persuasive. First, relying on the language of the statute ( another public record), the RPT contends that one ... public record is sufficient for a declaration of ineligibility. If this is true, the RPT contends, surely three public records are sufficient. This argument ignores § 145.003's second requirement: that ineligibility must be conclusively established. Put another way, any number of public records may be sufficient only if they meet the conclusively established burden. Such is not the case here. 49 Second, the RPT relies on Nixon v. Slagle, 885 S.W.2d 658, 659 (Tex App.-Tyler 1994, orig. pet.), for the proposition that a prospective candidate's voter registration form showing residence outside the jurisdiction in question is sufficient to conclusively establish ineligibility. The RPT's argument ignores a key difference between Nixon and the case at bar. Nixon involved Texas's state residency qualification for a state senate seat, which required a candidate to be a resident of the relevant district for a year preceding the election. See Tex. Const. art. III, § 6. Therefore, the question in Nixon was the location of the candidate's current residence for state constitutional purposes, 885 S.W.2d. at 662, not (as here) DeLay's future inhabitancy for federal constitutional purposes. The latter issue is speculative and cannot be proven conclusively by a voter-registration form showing current residence. 50 Third, the RPT cites Jones v. Bush, 122 F.Supp.2d 713 (N.D.Tex.2000). Its reliance on that case ignores that Jones did not involve Texas's state-law conclusively established standard. In addition, the RPT's use of Jones obscures that Jones 's discussion of inhabitancy was in reference to present, not future, inhabitancy. Jones 's definition of the term inhabitant cannot make the RPT's effort to predict DeLay's future any more definitive. Contrary to the RPT's suggestion, this Court cannot presume that DeLay will remain an inhabitant of Virginia; rather, the fact must be conclusively established by public record under Texas law. It is not. 18 51 In conclusion, DeLay's future inhabitancy could not be determined conclusively without a finding of fact. His election-day inhabitancy outside Texas was not beyond dispute or question. Thus, Benkiser violated § 145.003 by declaring DeLay ineligible.