Opinion ID: 4518276
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: AEDPA and Equitable Tolling

Text: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) subjects federal habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners to a one-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As relevant here, the time provided by the statute of limitations begins to run on “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 1 The statute does provide that 1 In other circumstances the limitations period could be restarted on: (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 10 SMITH V. DAVIS while “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is pending,” the time period of the statute of limitations does not run. Id. § 2244(d)(2). 2 In addition to this statutory tolling provision, the oneyear statute of limitations is also subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 634 (2010). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 649 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). The parties disagree about how these elements of equitable tolling should be applied. Smith argues that the only diligence required of one seeking equitable tolling is diligence in remedying the impediment to filing caused by the extraordinary circumstance. He reads Holland’s first element, “that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,” to require no more than he pursue his rights diligently up to a point: the point at which the impediment to filing caused by the extraordinary circumstances has been abated. As applied to his case, Smith argues that because he was diligent in attempting to contact his attorney to obtain his appellate record after he learned about the denial of his appeal, it is irrelevant whether he used his time diligently after he (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)–(D). 2 Smith did not file a habeas petition or otherwise seek collateral review in the state court. SMITH V. DAVIS 11 received that record, and he is entitled to 66 days of equitable tolling so that he may have a full 365 days, free of any impediment to filing caused by an extraordinary circumstance, in which to file his habeas petition. California, arguing on behalf of the warden, takes an opposite position. The State argues that because Smith seeks the extraordinary remedy of equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, he must prove he was diligent throughout the time from when the state conviction became final to the filing of the habeas petition in federal court. Specifically, here, Smith would need to show that he was diligent in using the time available to him after he received his file from his attorney until he filed his habeas petition. The parties also disagree about what it means for an extraordinary circumstance to prevent timely filing. Smith argues the relevant question is whether the extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing only while the circumstance existed. Applied to his case, he argues that his attorney’s failure to return his appellate record was an extraordinary circumstance and that he could not prepare his habeas petition without this record, thereby satisfying the element. California, again, takes the broader view and argues the question whether an extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing requires a fact-specific analysis to determine whether the extraordinary circumstance prevented a petitioner acting with reasonable diligence from filing within the one-year period. Our cases applying the elements of equitable tolling, and specifically as it applies to habeas petitions brought under AEDPA, have not been particularly clear and point in opposite directions. In 2001, a three-judge panel declined to apply the stop-clock approach sought by Smith to tolling the AEDPA statute of limitations, but when an en banc court decided the case on rehearing, that issue was not addressed. See Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d 12 SMITH V. DAVIS en banc, 295 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding habeas petition timely filed even absent tolling). Then, later in 2001, in an immigration case heard by an en banc court, we took the approach advocated by Smith and held that equitable tolling in that case applied in a stop-clock manner so that “the days during a tolled period simply are not counted against the limitations period,” without evaluating whether the petitioner had used his available time diligently. SocopGonzalez v. I.N.S., 272 F.3d 1176, 1195 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). We chose this method over an alternative which would have required us to take a case-specific approach and evaluate whether a petitioner exercising ordinary diligence “reasonably could have been expected to bring a claim within the remainder of the limitations period” after the extraordinary circumstances ended. Id. at 1194. We found the stop-clock method easier to administer, more in line with Supreme Court precedent on equitable tolling, and consistent with the policy objectives of statutes of limitations. Id. at 1195. In later cases, however, and especially after the Supreme Court decisions in Pace and Holland, habeas petitioners who sought to have AEDPA’s statute of limitations equitably tolled have been required to demonstrate not only extraordinary circumstances that prevented timely filing while those circumstances existed but also that the petitioners, (1) had been diligent in using the time given to them before and after the extraordinary circumstances were dispelled, and (2) that the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of an untimely filing. See, e.g., Fue, 842 F.3d at 656–57; Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2014); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 802 (9th Cir. 2003); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 924–25 (9th Cir. 2002). Our principal effort to combine these holdings failed to provide the desired clarity. In Gibbs we declared the applicability of SMITH V. DAVIS 13 the stop-clock approach to equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations. 767 F.3d at 892. However, we simultaneously acknowledged that “[c]ourts take a flexible, fact-specific approach to equitable tolling” and required an evaluation of a petitioner’s diligence before, during, and after the extraordinary circumstance existed before granting relief to address the “causation question.” See id. at 885, 892. It is because our cases issued in the last two decades on the proper application of equitable tolling point in opposite directions that we granted rehearing en banc. To determine which line of cases controls Smith’s eligibility for equitable tolling (and therefore which party is correct), we need look no further than the decisions issued by the Supreme Court in Pace and Holland. But because it also directs our decision, we first consider how and why courts have historically provided equitable relief.