Opinion ID: 1448445
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Seizure as investigative detention versus arrest

Text: The Supreme Court has been careful to maintain [the] narrow scope of Terry's exception to the probable cause requirement, and has referred to Terry stops as a  sui generis `rubric of police conduct.' Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 209-10, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868). Thus, in describing the types of stops authorized by Terry, the Court has noted their brief and minimal[ly] intrusi[ve] nature. Id. at 211 n. 13, 99 S.Ct. 2248; see also Arizona v. Johnson, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 781, 786, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009) (noting that Terry authorizes a brief detention). Beyond this general consideration, two specific, objectively based inquiries typically are used to determine whether a particular seizure fits within the investigative detention framework: one inquiry is undertaken from the perspective of the person being detained, the other from the perspective of law enforcement. These inquiries frequently are fused into one analysis. Bravo, 295 F.3d at 1011-12 n. 8. First, it is well-established that intrusive measures may convert a stop into an arrest if the measures would cause a reasonable person to feel that he or she will not be free to leave after brief questioning  i.e., that indefinite custodial detention is inevitable. Kraus v. Pierce County, 793 F.2d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir.1986) ([W]here force is used such that the innocent person could reasonably have believed he was not free to go and that he was being taken into custody indefinitely, an arrest has occurred. (emphasis added)); accord Bravo, 295 F.3d at 1009(The standard for determining whether a person is under arrest is not simply whether a person believes that he is free to leave, but rather whether a reasonable person would believe that he is being subjected to more than [a] `temporary detention....') (quoting Butler, 249 F.3d at 1100)); United States v. Miles, 247 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir.2001) (There has been an arrest if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude that he was not free to leave after brief questioning.  (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Del Vizo, 918 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir.1990)). Of course, the reasonable person test presupposes an innocent person. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). Second, because [t]he purpose of a Terry stop is to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence, United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 708(9th Cir.1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), we allow intrusive and aggressive police conduct without deeming it an arrest ... when it is a reasonable response to legitimate safety concerns on the part of the investigating officers. Miles, 247 F.3d at 1012-13(quoting Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1186 (9th Cir.1996)); see also Alexander v. County of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir.1995) (It is well settled that when an officer reasonably believes force is necessary to protect his own safety or the safety of the public, measures used to restrain individuals, such as stopping them at gunpoint and handcuffing them, are reasonable in the course of a Terry stop). As a result, officers with a particularized basis to believe that a situation may pose safety risks may handcuff or point a gun at an individual without converting an investigative detention into an arrest. See Miles, 247 F.3d at 1013; Alexander, 64 F.3d at 1320(holding that officers could order individuals from car at gunpoint and handcuff them in the course of a Terry stop). The second inquiry frequently proves determinative. As the First Circuit recognized in United States v. Acosta-Colon, while [i]t is often said that an investigatory stop constitutes a de facto arrest when a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation ... to be tantamount to [an] arrest[,] .... in a typical borderline case, e.g., one in which the detention at issue has one or two arrest-like features but otherwise is arguably consistent with a Terry stop, it will not be obvious just how the detention at issue ought reasonably to have been perceived; indeed, this will be the central point of contention. Thus, in ... a case ... where the detention is distinguishable from, yet has some features normally associated with, an arrest[,]... the analysis must revert to an examination of whether the particular arrest-like measures implemented can nevertheless be reconciled with the limited nature of a Terry -type stop. This assessment requires a fact-specific inquiry into whether the measures used were reasonable in light of the circumstances that prompted the stop or that developed during its course. 157 F.3d 9, 14-15 (1st Cir.1998) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Our analysis in Miles implicitly adopts this logic: while the officers' conduct in Miles  approaching the suspect with drawn weapons, ordering him to his knees, and handcuffing him without any explanation that the detention was temporary  may or may not have caused a reasonable person to believe that he was under arrest, we focused exclusively on whether the use of force was justified under the circumstances. See Miles, 247 F.3d at 1012-13. Concluding that it was, we held that the use of force did not transform the detention into an arrest. Id.