Opinion ID: 2999254
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutor’s Misleading Statements During

Text: Closing Arguments The prosecution had the burden of proving the substances Anderson and Parsons dealt were crack. The parties stipulated that the government’s expert would testify that the evidentiary substances he tested were cocaine base. But at closing, the prosecutor mischaracterized the stipulation, telling the jury no less than four times that Anderson and Parsons stipulated that the substances they dealt were crack. Since not all cocaine base is crack, see United States v. Edwards, 397 F.3d 570, 571 (7th Cir. 2005), Anderson and Parsons now claim that the prosecutor’s closing argument misled the jury into believing it did not need to determine drug type. That, they say, violated their due process rights. Anderson makes the additional argument that even if the mischaracterization is not grounds for a new trial, his 8 Nos. 04-4113 & 04-4173 sentence was adversely influenced by this error. Because of his criminal history, Anderson was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years for dealing crack. Without the finding that the drug was crack, his sentence would have been lower. Again, Anderson and Parsons raise this issue for the first time on appeal, so our review is for plain error. Again, the government concedes error. Anderson and Parsons must show the outcome would have been different without the prosecutor’s misstatements during closing argument. United States v. Bowman, 353 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 2003). Improper statements during closing argument are rarely reversible error. Id. To determine whether the prosecutor’s improper comments deprived Anderson and Parsons of a fair trial, we consider the following factors, in the context of the entire record: (1) the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, (2) the extent to which the defense invited the comments, (3) the defendants’ opportunity to counter the prejudice, (4) the extent to which a jury instruction cured the prejudice, and (5) the weight of the evidence supporting the conviction. Id. In light of the record as a whole, we conclude that the prosecutor’s misstatements during closing argument did not prejudice Anderson and Parsons. This is not to say the mischaracterization of the stipulation was not a serious error; it is never appropriate for a prosecutor to tell jurors that an open factual question is no longer at issue, unless it is true. It was not true here and the prosecutor’s statements were entirely improper. There is also no doubt that the defense did not invite the prosecutor’s comments. On the other hand, Anderson and Parsons had a clear opportunity to counter the prejudice. For starters, they could have objected to any one (or all) of the prosecutor’s mischaracterizations of the stipulation. They also could have straightened the matter out in their own closing Nos. 04-4113 & 04-4173 9 arguments. They could have asked the judge to give a curative instruction. They took none of these steps. In any event, the judge instructed the jury that it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the substances in question were crack cocaine. The special verdict form also made it clear that jurors were to decide whether the substances in question were crack. The judge gave the standard instruction that the prosecutor’s closing argument was argument, not evidence. Moreover, the stipulation itself was read into evidence, so jurors knew its actual terms; they were instructed that if the prosecutor’s argument contradicted the evidence, the evidence controlled. Beyond that, the evidence convincingly established that Anderson and Parsons dealt crack, so the result of this case would have been no different without the prosecutor’s misstatements. We have repeatedly held that the government can prove a substance is crack by offering testimony from people familiar with the drug, including those who sell or use crack, since they are the real experts. E.g., United States v. Booker, 260 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Linton, 235 F.3d 328, 329-30 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bradley, 165 F.3d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1999). Here, four admitted crack users or dealers testified that they bought crack from Anderson and Parsons. Also, Mendell Campbell’s wife, Lakina, who was familiar with crack, testified that she saw the substance her husband was getting from Anderson and Parsons and it was crack. Finally, DEA Agent Bolf testified that the drugs in question were crack. Given the substantial weight of this evidence, the mischaracterization of the stipulation during closing argument cannot have affected the outcome; the government satisfied its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Anderson and Parsons were dealing crack. See Bradley, 165 F.3d at 596 (noting that by itself the testimony of those experienced with crack is enough to establish that the substance was crack). 10 Nos. 04-4113 & 04-4173