Opinion ID: 894985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did H.V. Invoke His Right to Counsel?

Text: Miranda v. Arizona requires that suspects in custody be informed before questioning begins of their right to consult with an attorney. [32] If a suspect invokes that right, there can be no further interrogation unless the accused initiates it. [33] If Miranda warnings are not given or a request for counsel is ignored, any subsequent statements by the suspect cannot be introduced at trial during the prosecution's case-in-chief. [34] These rights apply to juveniles just as they do to adults. [35] Thus, the State concedes in this case that if H.V. properly invoked his right to counsel, the second statement he made thereafter should be suppressed. The only dispute is whether he invoked that right. In Davis v. United States , the United States Supreme Court established a bright line between suspects who might be asking for a lawyer and those who actually do ask for one, holding that only the latter have invoked their right to counsel: To avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations, this is an objective inquiry. Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney. But if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning. Rather, the suspect must unambiguously request counsel. As we have observed, a statement either is such an assertion of the right to counsel or it is not. Although a suspect need not speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don, he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. [36] Applying this standard, courts have held that it is not enough for a suspect to say:  Maybe I should talk to a lawyer; [37]  I might want to talk to an attorney; [38]  I think I need a lawyer; [39]  Do you think I need an attorney here?; [40] or  I can't afford a lawyer but is there anyway I can get one? [41] Nor is it enough for a suspect to ask to see someone other than a lawyer, such as a probation officer, [42] or a parent. [43] At the same time, a suspect does not have to use the precise words I want a lawyer. [44] Courts have held the right to counsel was invoked when a suspect said:  he did not want to make a statement at this time without a lawyer; [45]  Uh, yeah. I'd like to do that in response to a question whether he understood his right to counsel; [46]  Maybe I should talk to an attorney by the name of William Evans and proffering that attorney's business card; [47]  Can I get an attorney right now, man?; [48] or  I'd just as soon have an attorney `cause, you know  ya'll say there's been a shooting. [49] While police often carry printed cards to ensure precise Miranda warnings, [50] the public is not required to carry similar cards so they can give similarly precise responses. The parties here disagree whether Davis requires us to consider H.V.'s circumstances  his youth, Bosnian extraction, and lack of previous experience with police. On this issue, the Court's opinion in Davis gives somewhat mixed signals. On the one hand, the Court said a statement must be sufficiently clear[] that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. [51] But the Court also said invocation should not turn on the suspect's personal characteristics: We recognize that requiring a clear assertion of the right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects who  because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons  will not clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present. [52] There appear to be no cases answering whether a juvenile's age is among the variety of other reasons courts cannot consider when deciding whether an accused has requested counsel. Long before Davis , the Supreme Court held that a juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and . . . capacity to understand the warnings must be considered when deciding whether a juvenile waived Miranda rights. [53] As the question here is not whether H.V. waived his right to counsel but whether he invoked it, it is not entirely clear which rule applies. But we need not decide in this case whether the court of appeals erred in considering H.V.'s age, as we agree with its ultimate conclusion. It is hard to construe H.V.'s statement that he wanted his mother to ask for an attorney as anything other than an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney. [54] This is not a case in which H.V. simply wanted to see his mother; the only reason he said he wanted her was for the purpose of getting him an attorney. If he wanted private counsel, his request would have been technically correct, as his age at least hindered if it did not prevent him from doing so himself. [55] This case is a close one because, when the magistrate followed up by instructing H.V. that only he could ask for an appointed attorney, H.V. never did. But while ambiguous requests for counsel may be clarified by further questioning, [56] unambiguous ones cannot: No authority, and no logic, permits the interrogator to proceed . . . on his own terms and as if the defendant had requested nothing, in the hope that the defendant might be induced to say something casting retrospective doubt on his initial statement that he wished to speak through an attorney or not at all. [57] As the objective circumstances surrounding H.V.'s statement rendered it an unambiguous request for an attorney, further clarification could not change it. Accordingly, we agree with the courts below that H.V.'s second statement to the police was properly suppressed.