Opinion ID: 2334492
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Voluntary Execution

Text: In addressing the element of voluntariness, the Family Court justice explicitly adopted the California definition of voluntary execution as applied to the UPAA. She declared: [A] Court will presume that a [premarital agreement] was executed involuntarily unless the Court finds, among other things, that the party against whom enforceability is sought, in this case Mrs. Marsocci, if unrepresented, as she was, was fully informed of the terms and basic effects of the agreement, as well as the rights and obligations he or she is giving up. (Emphasis added.) This definition impermissibly creates a presumption of involuntariness, a concept that this Court has never embraced in construing our statute. We are satisfied that § 15-17-6(b) unambiguously provides that: [t]he burden of proof as to each of the elements required in order to have a premarital agreement held to be unenforceable shall be on the party seeking to have the agreement declared unenforceable   . (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, the act does not require the presence of independent counsel as a condition for    enforceability[;] Penhallow, 649 A.2d at 1022, nor has this Court ever required parties to a premarital agreement to be represented by counsel. [3] The trial justice found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the agreement was involuntary and unconscionable due to the failure of the agreement to fully disclose the value of Mr. Marsocci's assets and the lack of any waiver of said information and that Mrs. Marsocci, unrepresented, effectively gives up any interest in any assets obtained during the marriage, but for the marital domicile which now stands in joint names. To the extent that the Family Court justice based her finding of involuntariness on the fact that David failed to fully disclose the value of his assets and that Debra did not waive that disclosure, we deem this error. Whether the agreement was voluntarily executed and whether there was adequate disclosure of the value of David's assets are separate factors that must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Proof of one factor does not establish the other. Section 15-17-6(b) is clear in its mandate that the party challenging a premarital agreement must prove  each of the [required] elements by clear and convincing evidence. (Emphasis added.) Proof that the agreement was not executed voluntarily, as required by § 15-17-6(a)(1) is separate from a finding of unconscionability pursuant to § 15-17-6(a)(2) and the § 15-17-6(a)(2)(i) requirement of disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party. Thus, unconscionability and nondisclosure of assets (or waiver) does not mean that the agreement was not executed voluntarily. By its terms, § 15-17-6 clearly requires proof that the party challenging the agreement did not execute the agreement voluntarily[.] This fact cannot be determined solely from a review of the agreement, because proof of the circumstances under which the agreement was signed is required. We discern no evidence in the record that suggests that Debra did not execute this agreement voluntarily. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the trial justice's finding that Debra did not execute the agreement voluntarily is clearly wrong.