Opinion ID: 2220012
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Substitute Counsel at Sentencing.

Text: Boggs claims the district court erred by failing to grant the motion to withdraw filed by his counsel prior to the sentencing. He claims a complete breakdown of the attorney-client relationship took place that justified substitution of counsel prior to the sentencing hearing after his attorney informed the trial court that he was unable to zealously represent him and speak on his behalf at the time of sentencing. Boggs further claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel at sentencing when his attorney actually declined to speak on his behalf after the court denied the motion to withdraw. Thus, Boggs not only claims the district court erred by denying the motion to withdraw and failing to appoint substitute counsel, but that his rights to effective counsel guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution were denied when his attorney failed to speak on his behalf at sentencing. Boggs does not claim the denial of the motion to withdraw and the failure to appoint substitute counsel implicated any form of waiver of his right of self-representation or that the court failed to adequately inquire into the need for substitute counsel. See State v. Martin, 608 N.W.2d 445, 449-50 (Iowa 2000); Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d at 749. Instead, Boggs asserts the record justified the appointment of substitute counsel. A defendant has a right to counsel [a]t all critical stages of the criminal process. State v. Majeres, 722 N.W.2d 179, 182 (Iowa 2006). This right extends to sentencing. The grounds to justify the appointment of substitute counsel include a conflict of interest, irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in communication between the defendant and counsel. Martin, 608 N.W.2d at 449. The defendant must show the grounds to justify substitute counsel. Id. The court has considerable discretion whether to grant substitute counsel, and eleventh-hour requests for substitute counsel are generally disfavored. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d at 749. A complete breakdown in communication supports the appointment of substitute counsel because it deprives counsel of a critical component to an adequate defenseattorney-client communication. See U.S. v. Barrow, 287 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir.2002) (focusing inquiry on the adequacy of counsel in the adversarial process). Yet, general frustration and dissatisfaction with defense counsel expressed by a defendant does not alone render counsel unable to perform as a zealous and effective advocate. The focus of the inquiry is not on the defendant's relationship with his or her attorney, but the adequacy of counsel in the adversarial process. Id. In reality, a person accused of a crime is often genuinely unhappy with an appointed counsel who is nevertheless doing a good job. Id. Thus, not all criticism lodged by a defendant against defense counsel requires new counsel. Nevertheless, counsel for Boggs took the position in this case that the criticism leveled by Boggs rendered him unable to be a zealous advocate and prevented him from speaking on his behalf at sentencing. Thus, two questions are presented. The first question is whether counsel's declaration of intent to remain silent at sentencing justified the appointment of substitute counsel. The second question is whether Boggs was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to speak on his behalf in mitigation of the sentence. Before considering these questions, we turn to the element of prejudice. In the context of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must establish that prejudice resulted from the ineffective assistance. See State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264, 276 (Iowa 2006) (stating prejudice exists when it is reasonably probable the result would have been different without counsel's unprofessional error). Similarly, a defendant must generally establish prejudice when denied substitute counsel unless the defendant was completely denied counsel or counsel had a conflict of interest. State v. Lopez, 633 N.W.2d 774, 779 (Iowa 2001). Similar to a complete denial of counsel, a third exception to the rule of prejudice governing the denial of substitute counsel is recognized when `counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing.' [3] Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1851, 152 L.Ed.2d 914, 928 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2047, 80 L.Ed.2d 657, 668 (1984)). Importantly, this exception recognized in Cronic requires a complete failure by counsel. Bell, 535 U.S. at 697, 122 S.Ct. at 1851, 152 L.Ed.2d at 928. If none of the three exceptions apply in this case, prejudice is required to be established. Thus, we must decide if Boggs' claim falls within one of the three exceptions. Boggs does not claim he was denied counsel or his counsel had an irreconcilable conflict. Moreover, he does not claim his counsel failed to represent him at the sentencing hearing as a whole, but only in failing to address the court on his behalf in mitigation of punishment. See id. Consequently, the specific failure of counsel to speak on behalf of Boggs in mitigation of punishment at the sentencing does not fall within the third exception. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 185-86, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2473-74, 91 L.Ed.2d 144, 160-61 (1986) (holding failure of counsel to offer any mitigation evidence at sentencing did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 788, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3122, 97 L.Ed.2d 638, 653 (1987) (same). Accordingly, Boggs must show he suffered prejudice in his claim that the trial court erred in failing to appoint substitute counsel at sentencing, as well as with his claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The existence of prejudice is evaluated under the same standard as a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. See Bell, 535 U.S. at 697-98, 122 S.Ct. at 1851-52, 152 L.Ed.2d at 929. Boggs has failed to explain how he was prejudiced, and our review of the record fails to support prejudice. After the district court denied the motion to withdraw, Boggs' counsel acknowledged he had reviewed the presentence investigation report and found no errors. He also informed the district court that he gave Boggs a copy of the presentence investigation report prior to the sentencing. Additionally, he told the district court he knew of no reason why the court could not pronounce the sentence. Counsel for Boggs did fail to speak on behalf of Boggs in mitigation of punishment at the sentencing hearing. However, Boggs submitted a written statement of mitigation together with other documents in mitigation of punishment. He was also given his right of allocution. Boggs makes no claim that the sentence imposed by the district court was illegal or that any evidence in mitigation existed that was not presented to the court. The court was fully apprised of Boggs' background and other matters pertinent to the imposition of sentence by the presentence investigation report. Under all the circumstances, Boggs has failed to establish prejudice.