Opinion ID: 3174592
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appropriate Baseline Sanction

Text: With regard to the Horn-Brichetto matter, the Panel found that Mr. Vogel revealed confidential information regarding his representation of Ms. Horn-Brichetto without her informed consent and without authority under RPC 1.6(b)(5) and that Mr. Vogel‘s disclosure of confidential information prejudiced Ms. Horn-Brichetto. ABA Standard 4.2 suggests baseline sanctions for an attorney‘s improper revelation of information relating to representation of a client: 4.21 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, knowingly reveals information relating to [the] representation of a client not otherwise lawfully permitted to be disclosed, and this disclosure causes injury or potential injury to a client. 4.22 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly reveals information relating to the representation of a client not otherwise lawfully permitted to be disclosed, and this disclosure causes injury or potential injury to a client. 4.23 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently reveals information relating to [the] representation of a client not otherwise lawfully permitted to be disclosed[,] and this disclosure causes injury or potential injury to a client. 4.24 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently reveals information relating to [the] representation of a client not otherwise lawfully permitted to be disclosed[,] and this disclosure causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client. -17- The Panel applied ABA Standard 4.22 in determining that Mr. Vogel should be suspended from the practice of law for his misconduct with regard to the Horn-Brichetto matter. Mr. Vogel contends that there was no proof presented to the Panel demonstrating that his disclosure was anything other than negligent.16 He states that, at the time he sent his letter to Ms. Horn-Brichetto and Judge Eblen, he was under personal stress because he had begun the rehabilitation process on account of his conduct in the Alford matter. In Mr. Vogel‘s motion to withdraw as counsel, he maintained that a conflict of interest existed between Ms. Horn-Brichetto and him. He also asserted that he could not disclose the specific nature of the conflict of interest without revealing confidential information and that RPC 1.6 prohibited him from revealing such information. Despite noting this in his original motion, Mr. Vogel then provided Judge Eblen a copy of his response to Ms. Horn-Brichetto‘s letters, in which he spelled out the very reasons for withdrawing from the representation that he indicated in his motion that he could not disclose. Thus, it is evident that Mr. Vogel was fully aware that sending a copy of the letter to Judge Eblen would result in revealing information related to his representation of Ms. Horn-Brichetto. The Panel also found that Mr. Vogel‘s disclosure of confidential information caused Ms. Horn-Brichetto injury,17 as it resulted in Judge Eblen‘s recusal and a delay in the disposition of Ms. Horn-Brichetto‘s criminal case. Mr. Vogel contends that there was no proof presented to the Panel evidencing that his revelation of confidential information caused harm to Ms. Horn-Brichetto. Specifically, he asserts that ―Judge Eblen is no longer in a position of authority over [Ms. Horn-Brichetto‘s] case; [Ms. Horn-Brichetto] remained free on bond; and the new judge is presumably unfamiliar with anything surrounding this disciplinary complaint or the prior representation by Mr. Vogel.‖ He also notes that successor counsel for Ms. Horn-Brichetto did not file the motion to recuse Judge Eblen for nearly one year after Mr. Vogel‘s disclosure of confidential information. The record supports a finding that Mr. Vogel‘s misconduct caused Ms. HornBrichetto injury. As the Panel found, Mr. Vogel‘s revelation of confidential information directly resulted in Judge Eblen‘s recusal, which delayed the ultimate disposition of Ms. 16 Under the ABA Standards, ―knowledge‖ is defined as ―the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.‖ The ABA Standards define ―negligence‖ as ―the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation.‖ 17 The ABA Standards define ―injury‖ as ―harm to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession which results from a lawyer‘s misconduct. The level of injury can range from ‗serious‘ injury to ‗little or no‘ injury.‖ ―Potential injury‖ is defined as ―harm to a client, the public, the legal system or the profession that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the lawyer‘s misconduct, and which, but for some intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the lawyer‘s misconduct.‖ -18- Horn-Brichetto‘s criminal proceedings. While the fact that Ms. Horn-Brichetto remained free on bond during her criminal proceedings may render her injury less severe, it does not prove that Ms. Horn-Brichetto did not suffer any harm at all. Additionally, we note that the Panel could have concluded that Mr. Vogel‘s revelation of confidential information caused potential injury to Ms. Horn-Brichetto, as it was reasonably foreseeable at the time of Mr. Vogel‘s revelation that, but for Judge Eblen‘s recusal, his disclosure of confidential information likely would have compromised the integrity of Ms. Horn-Brichetto‘s criminal case. Because Mr. Vogel knowingly disclosed confidential information to Judge Eblen causing injury to Ms. Horn-Brichetto, his conduct meets the requirements of ABA Standard 4.22. Thus, we agree with the Panel that a suspension is the appropriate baseline sanction for Mr. Vogel‘s conduct with regard to the Horn-Brichetto matter. With regard to the Alford matter, the Panel found that Mr. Vogel violated RPC 1.7 by engaging in conduct that created a concurrent conflict of interest and a significant risk that his representation of Ms. Alford would be materially limited by his personal interests. ABA Standard 4.3 suggests baseline sanctions for cases involving conflicts of interest: 4.31 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, without the informed consent of client(s): (a) engages in representation of a client knowing that the lawyer‘s interests are adverse to the client‘s with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to the client; or (b) simultaneously represents clients that the lawyer knows have adverse interests with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or (c) represents a client in a matter substantially related to a matter in which the interests of a present or former client are materially adverse, and knowingly uses information relating to the representation of a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client. 4.32 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a client. -19- 4.33 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in determining whether the representation of a client may be materially affected by the lawyer‘s own interests, or whether the representation will adversely affect another client, and causes injury or potential injury to a client. 4.34 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in determining whether the representation of a client may be materially affected by the lawyer‘s own interests, or whether the representation will adversely affect another client, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client. The Panel applied ABA Standard 4.32 in determining that Mr. Vogel should be suspended from the practice of law for his misconduct with regard to the Alford matter. Mr. Vogel acknowledges that a suspension could be applicable under the facts of his case, but he maintains that the Panel appropriately considered and imposed the length of his suspension. He submits that the evidence shows a negligent determination of a conflict of interest rather than a knowing determination. See ABA Standards, Definitions (defining ―knowledge‖ and ―negligence‖). In support of his argument, Mr. Vogel cites his ―mental illness struggles in conjunction with rehabilitation efforts as well as the comments to [RPC 1.7] wherein sex with clients is not specifically prohibited.‖18 Mr. 18 The comments to RPC 1.7 discuss sexual relations between an attorney and client: [12] The relationship between lawyer and client is a fiduciary one in which the lawyer occupies the highest position of trust and confidence. Because of this fiduciary duty to clients, combining a professional relationship with any intimate personal relationship may raise concerns about conflict of interest, impairment of the judgment of both lawyer and client, and preservation of attorney-client privilege. These concerns may be particularly acute when a lawyer has a sexual relationship with a client. Such a relationship may create a conflict of interest under paragraph (a)(2) or violate other disciplinary rules, and it generally is imprudent even in the absence of an actual violation of these Rules. [12a] Especially when the client is an individual, the client‘s dependence on the lawyer‘s knowledge of the law is likely to make the relationship between the lawyer and client unequal. A sexual relationship between lawyer and client can involve unfair exploitation of the lawyer‘s fiduciary role and thereby violate the lawyer‘s basic obligation not to use the trust of the client to the client‘s disadvantage. In addition, such a relationship presents a significant risk that the lawyer‘s emotional involvement will impair the lawyer‘s independent professional judgment. Moreover, a blurred line between the professional and personal relationships may make it difficult to predict the extent to which communications will be protected by the attorney-client privilege, because communications are protected by privilege only when they are imparted in the context of the client-lawyer relationship. The client‘s own emotional involvement may make it impossible for the client to give informed consent to these risks. -20- Vogel states that he insufficiently attempted to inform Ms. Alford of his feelings for her and that no proof of actual harm to Ms. Alford was presented to the Panel. See ABA Standards, Definitions (defining ―injury‖ and ―potential injury‖). We agree with the Panel that Mr. Vogel knew that a conflict of interest existed between Ms. Alford and him and that Mr. Vogel did not fully disclose the possible effect of that conflict to Ms. Alford. The record shows that, during the course of Mr. Vogel‘s representation of Ms. Alford in her federal criminal case, Mr. Vogel made sexual advances towards her and engaged in sexual intercourse with her on three occasions. Further, on at least one occasion, Ms. Alford expressed reluctance to engage in further sexual intercourse, but she agreed to do so only after Mr. Vogel persisted in asking her to engage in sexual activity. It is true that Ms. Alford testified that Mr. Vogel told her not to ―let his feelings towards [her] interfere with him being [her] lawyer because he was just a man and stuff.‖ Additionally, Mr. Vogel explained that he attempted to speak to Ms. Alford about a consensual relationship and his role as her attorney but that he did not do so formally. He also stated that he told Ms. Alford several times that his role as her attorney and his feelings for her had nothing to do with one another. However, as we previously have mentioned, the record does not demonstrate that Mr. Vogel ever made Ms. Alford aware of the ―relevant circumstances and of the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse effects‖ on her interests. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.7 cmt. [18]; see also Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.0(e). Additionally, the evidence indicates that Mr. Vogel‘s actions caused injury to Ms. Alford. As the Panel found, Mr. Vogel‘s misconduct involved the unfair exploitation of his fiduciary role. By exploiting his fiduciary role, Mr. Vogel violated his duty not to use the trust of Ms. Alford to her disadvantage. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.7 cmt. [12a] (―A sexual relationship between lawyer and client can involve unfair exploitation of the lawyer‘s fiduciary role and thereby violate the lawyer‘s basic obligation not to use the trust of the client to the client‘s disadvantage.‖). We conclude that the use of Ms. Alford‘s trust to her disadvantage constitutes injury as defined in the ABA Standards. The evidence also indicates that Mr. Vogel‘s misconduct caused potential injury to Ms. Alford, as it could have harmed her criminal case. If Mr. Vogel had not been relieved as counsel, his sexual interest in Ms. Alford could have affected the quality of his representation significantly. Thus, Mr. Vogel‘s conduct meets the requirements of ABA Standard 4.32. Accordingly, we agree with the Panel that a suspension is the appropriate baseline sanction for Mr. Vogel‘s conduct with regard to the Alford matter. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.7 cmt. [12], [12a]. Comment [12b] discusses sexual relations between an attorney and the representative of an organizational client, which is not applicable to this case. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.7 cmt. [12b]. -21-