Opinion ID: 548727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Involuntariness of Plea

Text: 15 Liss' second claim on appeal is that counsel's alleged ineffective assistance rendered his plea involuntary. For reasons discussed in the previous section, the advice of counsel defense was meritless, and a failure to raise this defense does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 349 (5th Cir.1984). 16 Liss also alleges that his plea was involuntary because his attorney told him that the prosecutor wanted the charges reduced to a misdemeanor. Liss' allegations in his brief on appeal are at best confusing, but we decipher that he is somehow arguing that the prosecutor induced his guilty plea with a promise of reducing the charges to misdemeanors and then denied the promise in court after obtaining the plea. 17 It is clear from the record that Liss' plea of guilty was accepted after full compliance with the requirements of Rule 11. The record reveals that Liss stated in response to the district court's questions that he understood the charges against him and had discussed them with his attorney, that he understood the maximum possible penalty he faced, that he was satisfied with his attorney's efforts and advice, and that there were no promises, threats or agreements made to induce him to plead guilty other than what was set forth in the written plea agreement. During the plea proceedings no mention was made of any promise or attempt by the prosecutor to have the charges reduced to misdemeanors. However, at the sentencing hearing, Liss asked the district court in determining his sentence to consider that he had been told by his attorney that the prosecutor ... asked that the felony charges be reduced to a misdemeanor, but she was refused by her supervisor. The Assistant United States Attorney denied the same and responded that this was an incorrect statement. No further statements were made concerning Liss' allegations. 18 We have previously held that [t]he record that is created by these [Rule 11] questions is accorded ... a 'presumption of verity.'  United States v. Ellison, 835 F.2d 687, 693 (7th Cir.1987) (quoting Key v. United States, 806 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir.1988)). Further, this Court had held that a defendant who simply files a motion to withdraw his plea on the ground that his plea was not voluntary, contrary to his assertions at the Rule 11 proceeding, faces a heavy burden of persuasion. United States v. Ellison, 835 F.2d 687, 693 (7th Cir.1987). Liss' allegation that he pled guilty in reliance on the charge being reduced to a misdemeanor is lacking in credibility. Counsel told him (assuming for purposes of arguendo that counsel did in fact tell him) that the prosecutor was unsuccessful in her attempt to have the charges reduced to misdemeanors prior to his change of plea. Therefore, Liss cannot claim any reliance on what the prosecutor told counsel because Liss knew prior to the time of his appearance in court and his subsequent change of plea that the charges would not be reduced to misdemeanors. Moreover, when Liss raised the subject at sentencing, he simply asked the district court to consider, in determining his sentence, that the prosecutor had attempted but failed in her effort to have the charges reduced to misdemeanors. Liss never expressed any belief nor stated that the charges against him had been or were in fact going to be reduced. Therefore, Liss' allegation that he pled guilty in reliance on the charges being reduced falls far short of overcoming the presumption of verity accorded to his own testimony at the plea proceedings. 19