Opinion ID: 508924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Doe's Claims for Money Damages

Text: 10 We turn first to Doe's claims for money damages under the FTCA. That act makes the United States government liable for damages caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b). Unless the government action in question falls within one of the exceptions enumerated by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680, the government is liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2674. 11 In this case, Doe bases his FTCA claims upon alleged violations of the physician-patient privilege and the District of Columbia Mental Health Information Act, and upon the VA's alleged abuse of process, tortious invasion of privacy by intrusion, and breach of a confidential relationship. The district court, however, found distinct flaws in each of these five claims. Moreover, it found that even if the disclosure of Doe's records had been unlawful under any of these theories, liability based upon the VA's actions would be barred by the FTCA exclusion contained in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(a). See District Court Opinion at 632-33. That provision excludes from FTCA coverage [a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation [is] valid. 12 Like the district court, we find that the 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(a) exclusion squarely blocks appellant's claim for damages based upon the actions of the VA. Doe's argument for damages from the VA boils down to his assertion that the release of his medical records was unlawful. See Brief for Appellant at 39. Yet although it is true, as Doe II establishes, that the VA was unauthorized to release Doe's records in response to the grand jury subpoena, the mere fact of governmental illegality does not of itself establish absence of due care so as to entitle one to damages under the FTCA. Quite the contrary: Sec. 2680(a) specifically states that the mere invalidity of a statutory or regulatory stricture relied upon by a government employee is not tantamount to the absence of due care. See id. (due care exclusion for acts based upon statute or regulation applies whether or not such statute or regulation [is] valid). 13 In this case, the VA has asserted, and Doe does not contend otherwise, that it based its decision to release Doe's records in response to the grand jury subpoena upon regulations promulgated under the Veterans' Records Statute. See supra. That statute exempts from ordinary confidentiality norms those records required by process of a United States court to be produced in any suit or proceeding therein pending, 38 U.S.C. Sec. 3301(b)(2), or required by a department or any other agency of the United States Government, 38 U.S.C. Sec. 3301(b)(3). The regulations issued thereunder state (1) that records or documents required for official purposes by any department or agency ... shall be furnished in response to an official request, and (2) that where the process of a United States court requires the production of documents ... contained in the [VA] file, such documents ... will be made available to the court. See note 3, supra. As Doe II observed, these regulations certainly seem, on their faces to authorize the disclosure of Doe's records, Doe II, 779 F.2d at 88 n. 26. Thus, the VA's action would seem to fit comfortably within the Sec. 2680(a) exclusion of governmental actions based upon even invalid regulations. Compare Powell v. United States, 233 F.2d 851 (10th Cir.1956) (FTCA held to bar sheep-owner's damages claim based upon application to him of allegedly irregular [and] ineffective land-use regulation). 14 Nor can Doe credibly argue that in hewing to the regulations in question the VA exhibited an absence of due care so as to render the Sec. 2680(a) exclusion inapplicable. In determining the VA regulations to have been superceded by the more privacy-protective strictures of the Privacy Act incorporated into the Veterans Records Act by amendments adopted in 1976, Doe II relied upon an interpretive analysis that was not necessarily foreseeable to even a careful student of the enactment. The Privacy Act's language is hardly self-explanatory: in pertinent part it permits disclosure of documents only pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(b)(11). Doe II accordingly was required to engage in a close precedential analysis of the nature of a federal grand jury subpoena to determine if it indeed qualified as an order of a court within the meaning of that Privacy Act term. Even that inquiry proved unavailing: the court concluded that the legislative history of the Act is subject to conflicting interpretations. Ultimately, the court reached the interpretation it did--and invalidated the VA regulations--by relying upon interpretations of the term order as understood in other statutes, and upon the broad privacy-protective purposes of the Privacy Act. 15 We cannot, in short, fairly predicate negligence liability on the basis of the VA's failure to predict the precise statutory interpretation that led this court in Doe II to reject the agency's reliance on the Veterans Records Act as authorization for its adherence to the grand jury subpoena. Doe does not credibly allege any other acts evincing lack of due care. See Dupree v. United States, 247 F.2d 819 (3d Cir.1957) (absence of due care unproven where plaintiff did no more than allege the invalidity of the regulations applied against him). This case thus fits within the FTCA's exclusion in Sec. 2680(a) for cases of agency illegality that nevertheless give rise to no damage exposure. 16 Doe also asks in this appeal for damages based upon AUSA Stanley's decision to subpoena his records. We have previously interpreted his amended complaint not to request monetary relief based upon the AUSA's actions, see Doe II, 779 F.2d at 77 n. 6, but we address this damages claim here because on reappraisal we find that the complaint can plausibly be read to seek such relief. Our conclusion is that this claim for damages is defeated by the second exclusion of FTCA Sec. 2680(a), which bars damage claims based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. The Supreme Court has recently held that this discretionary function exclusion applies only to conduct that involves the permissible exercise of policy judgment and does not bar claims based upon a governmental departure from clear regulatory standards. See Berkovitz v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 1960, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988). In this case, however, appellant cites no regulations violated here that meaningfully cabin the U.S. Attorney's ordinarily discretionary authority to issue a subpoena. 5 We therefore find that the 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(a) bar shelters the government from damage liability based upon the issuance of the subpoena. 17 Given this fundamental conclusion of nonliability, we need not address each of the specific tort doctrines Doe has invoked as a basis for damages under the FTCA. 6