Opinion ID: 223076
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prudential Concerns

Text: Having concluded that we have jurisdiction to review the BIA's order, we nonetheless decline to exercise that jurisdiction for prudential reasons, in light of the recent amendment to the voluntary departure regulation that took effect on January 20, 2009. [7] It provides in relevant part that: [i]f, prior to departing the United States, the alien files a petition for review pursuant to section 242 of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1252) or any other judicial challenge to the administratively final order, any grant of voluntary departure shall terminate automatically upon the filing of the petition or other judicial challenge and the alternate order of removal entered pursuant to paragraph (d) of this section shall immediately take effect. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i) (emphasis added). [8] See also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f) (dealing with [e]xtensions of time to depart; stating that the filing of a petition for review has the effect of automatically terminating the grant of voluntary departure, and accordingly also does not toll, stay, or extend the period allowed for voluntary departure). Thus, under the amended regulation, a grant of voluntary departure on or after January 20, 2009, automatically terminates with the filing of a petition for review. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i). On its face, the current voluntary departure regulation reflects the Attorney General's intention to limit a petitioner's eligibility for voluntary departure where the petition has sought judicial review, and to ensure uniformity in the administration of the immigration laws. Hakim v. Holder, 611 F.3d 73, 79 (1st Cir.2010). It has thus altered the decision-making process for a petitioner interested in seeking judicial review because now she must elect either voluntary departure or judicial review of her petition. Id.; see also Patel v. Att'y Gen., 619 F.3d 230 (3rd Cir.2010) (holding that under the new voluntary departure guideline, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(h), the alien's voluntary departure terminated upon her filing of a petition for review). Hakim dealt with a situation similar to this case. There, as here, the petitioner filed a petition for judicial review before the IJ determined his eligibility for voluntary departure. Hakim, 611 F.3d at 79. As the Hakim court observed, the new voluntary departure regulation does not directly address this scenario because [t]he automatic termination provision of the current regulation assumes a chronological order, i.e., that the grant of voluntary departure precedes the filing of a petition for judicial review. Hakim, 611 F.3d at 79. Noting that a number of its sister circuits have held that a BIA order denying relief from removal and remanding for consideration of voluntary departure is a final order of removal, id. at 77-78, 79 n. 4, the Hakim court assumed jurisdiction for the sake of argument, but declined to exercise it for prudential reasons. By exercising jurisdiction in this case, we would be permitting Hakim to circumvent the regulation by allowing him to seek both voluntary departure and judicial review, thus hindering judicial economy and denying the government the benefit of `a prompt and costless departure.' Id. at 79. To prevent such a result, the court thought it wiser, for prudential reasons, to remand the case to the IJ to allow the IJ to decide whether to grant Hakim voluntary departure. Id. It therefore dismissed, without prejudice, the petition seeking review of the BIA's determination that he was not eligible for asylum or withholding of removal. Id. We likewise think it more prudent to decline to exercise jurisdiction at this time. If Petitioners are granted voluntary departure, they can at that point decide whether to comply with the relevant departure provisions, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b), or else to file a petition for judicial review of their application for withholding of removal. See id.