Opinion ID: 3065756
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preemption of Section 2(B)

Text: As the Supreme Court recently instructed, every preemption analysis “must be guided by two cornerstones.” Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194. The first is that “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.” Id. The second is that a presumption against preemption applies when “Congress has legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied.” Id. The states have not traditionally occupied the field of identifying immigration violations so we apply no presumption against preemption for Section 2(B). We begin with “the purpose of Congress” by examining the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). In this section of the INA, titled “Performance of immigration officer functions by State officers and employees,” Congress has instructed under what conditions state officials are permitted to assist the Executive in the enforcement of immigration laws. Congress has provided that the Attorney General “may enter into a written agreement with a State . . . pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State . . . who is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or 7 The dissent claims that Section 2(B) “merely requires Arizona officers to inquire into the immigration status of suspected” undocumented immigrants; that “simply informing federal authorities of the presence of an [undocumented immigrant]. . . represents the full extent of Section 2(B)’s limited scope.” Dissent at 4873-74. Section 2(B) requires much more than mere inquires—it requires that people be detained until those inquiries are settled, and in the event of an arrest, the person may not be released until the arresting agency obtains verification of the person’s immigration status. Detention, whether intended or not, is an unavoidable consequence of Section 2(B)’s mandate. Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 12 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA 4819 detention of aliens in the United States . . . may carry out such function.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1). Subsection (g)(3) provides that “[i]n performing a function under this subsection, an officer . . . of a State . . . shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3). Subsection (g)(5) requires that the written agreement must specify “the specific powers and duties that may be, or are required to be, exercised or performed by the individual, the duration of the authority of the individual, and the position of the agency of the Attorney General who is required to supervise and direct the individual.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(5). These provisions demonstrate that Congress intended for states to be involved in the enforcement of immigration laws under the Attorney General’s close supervision. Not only must the Attorney General approve of each individual state officer, he or she must delineate which functions each individual officer is permitted to perform, as evidenced by the disjunctive “or” in subsection (g)(1)’s list of “investigation, apprehension, or detention,” and by subsection (g)(5). An officer might be permitted to help with investigation, apprehension and detention; or, an officer might be permitted to help only with one or two of these functions. Subsection (g)(5) also evidences Congress’ intent for the Attorney General to have the discretion to make a state officer’s help with a certain function permissive or mandatory. In subsection (g)(3), Congress explicitly required that in enforcing federal immigration law, state and local officers “shall” be directed by the Attorney General. This mandate forecloses any argument that state or local officers can enforce federal immigration law as directed by a mandatory state law. We note that in subsection (g)(10), Congress qualified its other § 1357(g) directives: Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require an agreement . . . in order for any officer or employee of a State . . . (A) to communicate with the Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 13 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 4820 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA Attorney General regarding the immigration status of any individual . . . or (B) otherwise to cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10). Although this language, read alone, is broad, we must interpret Congress’ intent in adopting subsection (g)(10) in light of the rest of § 1357(g). Giving subsection (g)(10) the breadth of its isolated meaning would completely nullify the rest of § 1357(g), which demonstrates that Congress intended for state officers to aid in federal immigration enforcement only under particular conditions, including the Attorney General’s supervision. Subsection (g)(10) does not operate as a broad alternative grant of authority for state officers to systematically enforce the INA outside of the restrictions set forth in subsections (g)(1)-(9). The inclusion of the word “removal” in subsection (g)(10)(B) supports our narrow interpretation of subsection (g)(10). Even state and local officers authorized under § 1357(g) to investigate, apprehend, or detain immigrants do not have the authority to remove immigrants; removal is exclusively the purview of the federal government. By including “removal” in § 1357(g)(10)(B), we do not believe that Congress intended to grant states the authority to remove immigrants. Therefore, the inclusion of “removal” in the list of ways that a state may “otherwise [ ] cooperate with the Attorney General,” indicates that subsection (g)(10) does not permit states to opt out of subsections (g)(1)-(9) and systematically enforce the INA in a manner dictated by state law, rather than by the Attorney General. We therefore interpret subsection (g)(10)(B) to mean that when the Attorney General calls upon state and local law enforcement officers—or such officers are confronted with the necessity—to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement on an incidental and as needed basis, state and local officers are permitted to provide this cooperative help without the written agreements that are Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 14 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA 4821 required for systematic and routine cooperation.8 Similarly, we interpret subsection (g)(10)(A) to mean that state officers can communicate with the Attorney General about immigration status information that they obtain or need in the performance of their regular state duties. But subsection (g)(10)(A) does not permit states to adopt laws dictating how and when state and local officers must communicate with the Attorney General regarding the immigration status of an individual. Subsection (g)(10) does not exist in a vacuum; Congress enacted it alongside subsections (g)(1)-(9) and we therefore interpret subsection (g)(10) as part of a whole, not as an isolated provision with a meaning that is unencumbered by the other constituent parts of § 1357(g).9 [5] In sum, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) demonstrates that Congress intended for state officers to systematically aid in immigration enforcement only under the close supervision of the Attorney 8 In a footnote, the dissent constructs an imaginary scenario where officers in the Pima County Sheriff’s Office are confused by our holding that they must have a § 1357(g) agreement to cooperate with federal officials in immigration enforcement on a systematic and routine basis. Dissent at 4866, n.9. We trust that law enforcement officers will make good faith efforts to comply with our interpretation of federal law and will carry out their duties accordingly. 9 Our interpretation of subsection (g)(10) is also supported by 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10), which states that “[i]n the event the Attorney General determines that an actual or imminent mass influx of aliens arriving off the coast of the United States, or near a land border, presents urgent circumstances requiring an immediate Federal response, the Attorney General may authorize any State or local law enforcement officer, with the consent of the head of the department, agency, or establishment under whose jurisdiction the individual is serving, to perform or exercise any of the powers, privileges, or duties conferred or imposed by this chapter or regulations issued thereunder upon officers or employees of the Service.” If subsection (g)(10) meant that state and local officers could routinely perform the functions of DHS officers outside the supervision of the Attorney General, there would be no need for Congress to give the Attorney General the ability, in § 1103(a)(10), to declare an “actual or imminent mass influx of aliens,” and to authorize “any State or local law enforcement officer” to perform the functions of a DHS officer. Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 15 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 4822 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA General—to whom Congress granted discretion in determining the precise conditions and direction of each state officer’s assistance. We find it particularly significant for the purposes of the present case that this discretion includes the Attorney General’s ability to make an individual officer’s immigrationenforcement duties permissive or mandatory. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(5). Section 2(B) sidesteps Congress’ scheme for permitting the states to assist the federal government with immigration enforcement. Through Section 2(B), Arizona has enacted a mandatory and systematic scheme that conflicts with Congress’ explicit requirement that in the “[p]erformance of immigration officer functions by State officers and employees,” such officers “shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3). Section 2(B) therefore interferes with Congress’ scheme because Arizona has assumed a role in directing its officers how to enforce the INA. We are not aware of any INA provision demonstrating that Congress intended to permit states to usurp the Attorney General’s role in directing state enforcement of federal immigration laws. Arizona argues that in another INA provision, “Congress has expressed a clear intent to encourage the assistance from state and local law enforcement officers,” citing 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). Section 1373(c) creates an obligation, on the part of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), to “respond to an inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any individual . . . for any purpose authorized by law.” We agree that § 1373(c) demonstrates that Congress contemplated state assistance in the identification of undocumented immigrants.10 We add, however, that Congress 10 We also agree with the dissent that “Congress envisioned, intended, and encouraged inter-governmental cooperation between state and federal agencies, at least as to information regarding a person’s immigration sta- Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 16 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA 4823 contemplated this assistance within the boundaries established in § 1357(g), not in a manner dictated by a state law that furthers a state immigration policy. Congress passed § 1373(c) at the same time that it added subsection (g) to § 1357. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub.L. 104208, §§ 133, 642 (1996). Thus, Congress directed the appropriate federal agency to respond to state inquiries about immigration status at the same time that it authorized the Attorney General to enter into § 1357(g) agreements with states. Arizona and the dissent urge a very broad interpretation of § 1373(c): because DHS is obligated to respond to identity inquiries from state and local officers, they argue, Arizona must be permitted to direct its officers how and when to enforce federal immigration law in furtherance of the state’s own immigration policy of attrition. This interpretation would result in one provision swallowing all ten subsections of § 1357(g), among other INA sections. Our task, however, is not to identify one INA provision and conclude that its text alone holds the answer to the question before us. Rather, we must determine how the many provisions of a vastly complex statutory scheme function together. Because our task is to interpret the meaning of many INA provisions as a whole, not § 1373(c) and § 1357(g)(10) at the expense of all others, we are not persuaded by the dissent’s argument, which considers these provisions in stark isolation from the rest of the statute.11 tus.” Dissent at 4879. We are convinced, however, that this cooperation is to occur on the federal government’s terms, not on those mandated by Arizona. In light of the dissent’s extensive discussion of the word “cooperate,” we note what would seem to be fairly obvious: given that the United States has had to sue the State of Arizona to stop it from enforcing S.B. 1070, it is quite clear that Arizona is not “cooperating” with the federal government in any sense of the word. Arizona does not seek intergovernmental cooperation—it seeks to pursue its own policy of “attrition through enforcement.” S.B. 1070 § 1. 11 Arizona also cites 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373(a) and 1644 in support of its argument that “Congress has expressed a clear intent to encourage the assistance from state and local law enforcement officers.” These sections are anti-sanctuary provisions. That the federal government prohibits States from impeding the enforcement of federal immigration laws does not constitute an invitation for states to affirmatively enforce immigration laws outside Congress’ carefully constructed § 1357(g) system. Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 17 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 4824 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA In addition to providing the Attorney General wide discretion in the contents of each § 1357(g) agreement with a state, Congress provided the Executive with a fair amount of discretion to determine how federal officers enforce immigration law. The majority of § 1357 grants powers to DHS officers and employees to be exercised within the confines of the Attorney General’s regulations; this section contains few mandatory directives from Congress to the Attorney General or DHS. The Executive Associate Director for Management and Administration at U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement within DHS has explained the purpose of this Congressionally-granted discretion: “DHS exercises a large degree of discretion in determining how best to carry out its enforcement responsibilities” which “necessitates prioritization to ensure ICE expends resources most efficiently to advance the goals of protecting national security, protecting public safety, and securing the border.” [6] By imposing mandatory obligations on state and local officers, Arizona interferes with the federal government’s authority to implement its priorities and strategies in law enforcement, turning Arizona officers into state-directed DHS agents. As a result, Section 2(B) interferes with Congress’ delegation of discretion to the Executive branch in enforcing the INA. To assess the impact of this interference in our preemption analysis, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Crosby, 530 U.S. 363, and Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001). In Crosby, where the Court found that a state law was preempted because it posed an obstacle to Congress’ intent, the Court observed that “Congress clearly intended the federal Act to provide the President with flexible and effective authority,” and that the state law’s “unyielding application undermines the President’s intended statutory authority.” 530 U.S. at 374, 377. In Buckman, the Court found that state fraud-on-the-Food And Drug Administration claims conflicted with the relevant federal statute and were preempted, in part because “flexibility is a critical component of the statutory and regulatory framework” of the fed- Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 18 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA 4825 eral law, and the preempted state claims would have disrupted that flexibility. 531 U.S. at 349. The Court observed that “[t]his flexibility is a critical component of the statutory and regulatory framework under which the FDA pursues difficult (and often competing) objectives.” Id. [7] In light of this guidance, Section 2(B)’s interference with Congressionally-granted Executive discretion weighs in favor of preemption. Section 2(B)’s ‘unyielding” mandatory directives to Arizona law enforcement officers “undermine[ ] the President’s intended statutory authority” to establish immigration enforcement priorities and strategies. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 377. Furthermore, “flexibility is a critical component of the statutory and regulatory framework under which the” Executive “pursues [the] difficult (and often competing) objectives,” Buckman, 531 U.S. at 349, of—according to ICE —”advanc[ing] the goals of protecting national security, protecting public safety, and securing the border.” Through Section 2(B), Arizona has attempted to hijack a discretionary role that Congress delegated to the Executive. In light of the above, S.B. 1070 Section 2(B) “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” as expressed in the aforementioned INA provisions. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. The law subverts Congress’ intent that systematic state immigration enforcement will occur under the direction and close supervision of the Attorney General. Furthermore, the mandatory nature of Section 2(B)’s immigration status checks is inconsistent with the discretion Congress vested in the Attorney General to supervise and direct State officers in their immigration work according to federally-determined priorities. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3). [8] In addition to Section 2(B) standing as an obstacle to Congress’ statutorily expressed intent, the record unmistakably demonstrates that S.B. 1070 has had a deleterious effect on the United States’ foreign relations, which weighs in favor Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 19 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 4826 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA of preemption. See generally Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (finding obstacle preemption where a State law impinged on the Executive’s authority to singularly control foreign affairs); Crosby, 530 U.S. 363 (same). In Garamendi, the Court stated that “even . . . the likelihood that state legislation will produce something more than incidental effect in conflict with express foreign policy of the National Government would require preemption of the state law.” 539 U.S. at 420 (emphasis added).12 [9] The record before this court demonstrates that S.B. 1070 does not threaten a “likelihood . . . [of] produc[ing] something more than incidental effect;” rather, Arizona’s law has created actual foreign policy problems of a magnitude far greater than incidental. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 (emphasis added). Thus far, the following foreign leaders and bodies have publicly criticized Arizona’s law: The Presidents of Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Guatemala; the governments of Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, and Nicaragua; the national assemblies in Ecuador and Nicaragua and the Central American Parliament; six human rights experts at the United Nations; the Secretary General and many permanent representatives of the Organization of American States; the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; and the Union of South American Nations. In addition to criticizing S.B. 1070, Mexico has taken affirmative steps to protest it. As a direct result of the Arizona law, at least five of the six Mexican Governors invited to travel to Phoenix to participate in the September 8-10, 2010 12 The Court’s decision in Hines, 312 U.S. 52, demonstrates that the Court has long been wary of state statutes which may interfere with foreign relations. In Hines, the Court considered whether Pennsylvania’s 1939 Alien Registration Act survived the 1940 passage of the federal Alien Registration Act. Id. at 59-60. The Court found that the Pennsylvania Act could not stand because Congress “plainly manifested a purpose . . . to leave [law-abiding immigrants] free from the possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance that might . . . affect our international relations.” Id. at 74. Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 20 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA 4827 U.S.-Mexico Border Governors’ Conference declined the invitation. The Mexican Senate has postponed review of a U.S.-Mexico agreement on emergency management cooperation to deal with natural disasters. In Crosby, the Supreme Court gave weight to the fact that the Assistant Secretary of State said that the state law at issue “has complicated its dealings with foreign sovereigns.” 530 U.S. at 383-84. Similarly, the current Deputy Secretary of State, James B. Steinberg, has attested that S.B. 1070 “threatens at least three different serious harms to U.S. foreign relations.”13 In addition, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Policy and Acting Assistant Secretary for International Affairs at DHS has attested that Arizona’s immigration law “is affecting DHS’s ongoing efforts to secure international cooperation in carrying out its mission to safeguard America’s people, borders, and infrastructure.” The Supreme Court’s direction about the proper use of such evidence is unambiguous: “statements of foreign powers necessarily involved[,] . . . indications of concrete disputes with those powers, and opinions of senior National Government officials are competent and direct evidence of the frustration of congressional objectives by the state Act.” Crosby, 530 U.S. at 385.14 Here, we are presented with statements attribut13 Arizona submitted a declaration from Otto Reich, who served in previous Administrations as, among other things, the U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, former Assistant Administrator of USAID, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs. Mr. Reich currently works in the private sector, and as a result, the district court could properly give little weight to his rebuttal of Mr. Steinberg’s assertions about the impact of S.B. 1070 on current foreign affairs. 14 Thus, Arizona’s extensive criticism of this court for permitting foreign governments to file Amicus Curiae briefs is misguided. These briefs are relevant to our decision-making in this case insofar as they demonstrate the factual effects of Arizona’s law on U.S. foreign affairs, an issue that the Supreme Court has directed us to consider in preemption cases. Similarly, the dissent asserts that our reasoning grants a “heckler’s veto” to foreign ministries and argues that a “foreign nation may not cause Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 21 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 4828 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA able to foreign governments necessarily involved and opinions of senior United States’ officials: together, these factors persuade us that Section 2(B) thwarts the Executive’s ability to singularly manage the spillover effects of the nation’s immigration laws on foreign affairs. [10] Finally, the threat of 50 states layering their own immigration enforcement rules on top of the INA also weighs in favor of preemption. In Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 288 (1986), where the Court found conflict preemption, the Court explained that “[e]ach additional [state] statute incrementally diminishes the [agency’s] control over enforcement of the [federal statute] and thus further detracts from the integrated scheme of regulation created by Congress.” (internal citations a state law to be preempted simply by complaining about the law’s effects on foreign relations generally.” Dissent at 4880. As a preliminary matter, we disagree with the dissent’s characterization of our opinion, as we do not conclude that a foreign government’s complaints alone require preemption. Our consideration of this evidence is consistent with the Supreme Court’s concern that we not disregard or minimize the importance of such evidence. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419; Crosby, 530 U.S. at 385-86. Moreover, the dissent implies that S.B. 1070 is merely an internal affair, which is contrary to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hines. In striking down the Pennsylvania 1939 Alien Registration Act, the Court stated that: The Federal Government, representing as it does the collective interests of the forty-eight states, is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties. “For local interests the several states of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.” Our system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference. Hines, 312 U.S. at 62 (quoting The Chinese Exclusion Cases (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889)). Case: 10-16645 04/11/2011 Page: 22 of 87 ID: 7711547 DktEntry: 199-1 UNITED STATES v. STATE OF ARIZONA 4829 omitted). See also Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350 (“[a]s a practical matter, complying with the [federal law’s] detailed regulatory regime in the shadow of 50 States’ tort regimes will dramatically increase the burdens facing potential applicants-burdens not contemplated by Congress in enacting the [federal laws]”). [11] In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the United States has met its burden to show that there is likely no set of circumstances under which S.B. 1070 Section 2(B) would be valid, and it is likely to succeed on the merits of its challenge. The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding the same.