Opinion ID: 2264839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Lack of Prejudice to Defendant

Text: It does not follow, however, that a trial judge's setting of parameters on allocution similar to this one would not be reversible error in a proper case where objection to the limitation was preserved, where there was plain error or where there was a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel and resulting prejudice to the defendant. In our view, Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(a)(1)(C) and 11 Del. C. § 4209(c)(2) provide a defendant in the penalty phase of a capital case the opportunity to argue in allocution from the facts already in evidence in the guilt phase or the penalty phase why those facts should not result in the death penalty. This is true whether the argument is to assert diminished responsibility, reduced culpability in comparison to other defendants, mistaken identity, mistake by the jury in finding guilt or any other reason. That is not the case here. Had he wanted to do so, Shelton could have discussed in allocution the facts in evidence in the guilt phase in order to argue whatever he could to avoid the death penalty. The entire record shows, however, that Shelton and his counsel did not, as part of their considered strategy, desire to review before the jury the facts already in evidence from the guilt phase. In response to the trial court's statement that he cannot discuss the events of January 11 and 12, 1992 his stand-by counsel said, [y]our Honor, he understands that. He can't talk about any factual evidence. [149] Later that day, in addressing Shelton as a pro se defendant, the court said, you can't argue about the facts .... You just can't talk about the facts surrounding the murder, to which Shelton said he understood. [150] To have talk[ed] about the facts surrounding the murder would have been inconsistent with his strategy of not arguing the facts and not presenting mitigating evidence for fear it would offend the jury and seal his fate. The record of the penalty phase shows that both Shelton and his lawyer hoped that the guilt-phase evidence, which may have tended to place less culpability on Shelton than the other defendants, would rescue him from the death penalty in the eyes of the jury. [151] There is nothing in the record to show that Shelton had any intention of arguing to the jury in allocution the facts of that tragic night in order to remind them that the guilt-phase evidence showed he was less culpable than the others. Shelton is unable to show that he was prejudiced by the court's limitation on allocution. He argues that the court's instruction limiting allocution had a chilling effect on his ability to express his feelings to the jury and that his right to allocute was prejudiced by counsel's failure to object to the court's limiting instruction. [152] We are not persuaded by this argument. The record reflects that Shelton was given three options by the Superior Court during the penalty phase: (1) to remain silent; (2) to testify broadly under oath subject to cross-examination; and (3) to allocute within the limited parameters of that right. Shelton and his counsel chose the latter course and knowingly acquiesced in the limitation. Initially, Shelton planned to produce no witnesses at the penalty hearing. [153] Shelton told his lawyer that the killing was so horrible, nothing he could tell the jury would create enough mercy to recommend life over death. [154] Shelton also told counsel that begging for mercy would have an adverse effect on the jury and ultimately would make it more likely that they would recommend death. [155] Counsel expressed this to the court and Shelton attested to its accuracy. [156] Additionally, Shelton did not want to put his family or Mannon's family through the trauma of testifying at the penalty hearing. [157] Shelton later altered his strategy, and produced three witnesses to speak on his behalf at the penalty hearing. [158] During allocution, however, Shelton did not plead for his life or argue the facts of the night of the murder. [159] Shelton cannot show a reasonable probability that, but for the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel during allocution, the result of the penalty phase would have been different. [160] This is because the record is clear that his strategy was to curtail the mitigating evidence he would present at the penalty hearing in order to protect his family, the victim's family, and for his own tactical reasons. While discussing his request to represent himself, the following colloquy occurred between Shelton and the Court: Shelton: I feel that I was convicted wrongly from the evidence that was presented against me. The evidence against me, I would like for it to be presented to the jury without any mitigating evidence in my behalf, and have them come back with the guilt  with either a verdict either death or life in prison.     The Court: Why is it that you think that not presenting mitigating evidence will be helpful to you? Shelton: As I stated earlier, the day before yesterday, I don't want to drag my family through this anymore. I have talked to my family, and we have all agreed that I am a competent adult and I know what I am doing, and this is my decision. [161] Shelton's counsel, addressing the court on the same issue, stated: Counsel: Steve said to me at one point, my feeling is that this was such a grievous, horrible murder, that there is nothing I could put in front of this jury that would make them have enough mercy on me to give me life rather than death, and in fact, begging for mercy in front of this jury may have an adverse effect. They may feel that because, after being found guilty of this crime, if I come in here and plead for mercy, that may turn them off, and make them want to give me death. [162] After a recess, Shelton informed the court that he had changed his mind and would present mitigating witnesses in support of his defense, but that he wanted to represent himself with his attorney acting only as stand-by counsel. Thereafter, the following colloquy occurred between Shelton and the court: The Court: If I permit you to represent yourself and you choose on your own not to present any mitigating evidence, do you understand that decision, my decision and your decision are ones that you may be stuck with on appeal, on any post-conviction remedy or at any other time? Shelton: Yes, I do. The Court: When I say stuck with it, you may not be able to come back  you will not be able to come back or may not be able to come back and say the Judge shouldn't have allowed me to do that. Do you understand? Shelton: Yes. [163] Thus, it is clear from the record in this case that Shelton was not prejudiced by the court's instruction on allocution. Shelton's failure to show prejudice is fatal to his appeal. As for Shelton's argument in this appeal that the instructions had a chilling effect on his ability to plea for his life, the trial court found that Shelton had indicated to his trial counsel and the Court that this would be his approach prior to the Court indicating the parameters of allocution. Thus, those parameters in no way affected his talk to the jury. [164] In fact, Shelton had a strategic reason to refuse to beg for mercy: he believed that doing so would impair his chances of receiving a life sentence. [165] Shelton expressed to counsel, [the jury] may feel that because, after being found guilty of this crime, if I come in here and plead for mercy, that may turn them off, and make them want to give me death. [166] Indeed, in keeping with this strategy, Shelton twice stated in allocution that he was not pleading for his life. [167] Therefore, since speaking about the facts of the murder would have been a means of expressing remorse, and Shelton did not wish to express remorse, Shelton was not prejudiced by the court's limitation on allocution. Accordingly, we find no ineffective assistance of counsel or plain error sufficient to overturn Shelton's sentence of death.
Shelton contends that the prosecutor's closing remarks in the penalty hearing regarding Shelton's lack of remorse violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. According to Shelton, the prosecutor's comment on his lack of remorse was an indirect statement on his failure to testify and focused the jury on an improper consideration  whether he had a duty to express remorse in order to avoid the death sentence. Shelton argues that commenting on his failure to express remorse violated his right against self-incrimination and infected the integrity and fairness of the process. Furthermore, he argues that the court's failure to issue a curative instruction on the prosecutor's improper comment was error. Shelton failed to make this argument at trial or on direct appeal. Therefore, under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3), he must show cause for his procedural default and prove resulting prejudice. In an attempt to do so, Shelton couches this argument in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The issue arose out of the following circumstances. Exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent, Shelton did not testify during the guilt phase of the trial. During the penalty phase, Shelton made to the jury the following statement in allocution: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I stand before you not to plead for my life. I feel that's wrong and improper and basically disrespectful to the victim's family and to mine. The State has painted a picture, and that picture is not very pretty, pertaining to me and my co-defendants. And I would just like to present to the jury a different side or a different meaning to Steven Shelton. The State has pictured me as being a monster, as being a rapist, as being a violent individual, but as you heard from my family, that's not so. The State only presents one side of the picture. There's two sides to every story. And the State just presents a negative side. The jury has found me guilty of these allegations, and now it's the jury's turn to render a verdict. And that verdict is either life in jail or death. Again, I'm not here to plead for my life, but just ask the jury to be fair in their decisions. That's all I have to say. [168] In his summation to the jury during the penalty hearing, the prosecutor said the following: Another thing that judges, for me, the importance of what you do and what this all means is the remorse that has been shown in this case in the words of Jack Outten in allocution and also Steven Shelton in allocution. And they told you or paid lip service that they had concerns for the families of the victim, but what did you hear about their remorse for their acts? What did you hear about that concern for the families of the victim whose life was taken innocently, without any wrong that he caused any of these individuals? [169] Shelton argues that since he did not testify at trial, it was improper for the prosecutor to comment on his lack of remorse, because it was also an impermissible comment on his failure to testify. We disagree. The Fifth Amendment prohibition against self-incrimination bars a prosecutor from commenting on the defendant's failure to testify at trial or the penalty phase. [170] This rule is applicable in both the guilt and penalty phases of a death penalty trial. [171] A defendant does not waive his rights by testifying at the penalty hearing solely on mitigating factors that are wholly collateral to the merits of the charges against him. [172] But when a defendant allocutes at the penalty hearing, [c]learly, then, he could not claim a Fifth Amendment privilege against cross-examination or prosecutorial comment on matters reasonably related to his credibility or the subject matter of his testimony. [173] It has been held that a prosecutor or the court may advise the jury that it may draw an adverse inference from the defendant's silence when the defendant has testified as to some facts concerning the crime charged, but has refused to testify as to other facts within his knowledge. [174] Thus, a defendant does not waive completely the Fifth Amendment privilege by testifying solely on collateral or preliminary matters. [175] In determining whether the prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant's right to remain silent, the test is whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. [176] In making this determination, we must examine the comments in their trial context. [177] Since Shelton did not testify under oath during the penalty phase, he was not subject to cross-examination by the prosecutor. In allocution, Shelton stated that he had another side, one that was not violent and included the love from his family. He stated that the State had distorted the image of the true Steven Shelton by depicting him as being a monster, ... a rapist, ... and a violent individual. [178] He asked that the jury be fair in determining his sentence and refused to plead for mercy because it would be disrespectful to his family and Mannon's family. During closing arguments, the prosecutor responded by directing the jury's attention to Shelton's allocution and indicated that he failed to express any remorse for his actions. We agree with the Superior Court that Shelton's comments in allocution open[ed] the door for the prosecutor to comment on his lack of remorse. [179] The prosecutor's comments did not touch upon the charges against Shelton, nor his failure to testify at trial. [180] Taken in their context, the prosecutor's remarks followed after Shelton's statement in allocution. It is noteworthy that the prosecutor did not make these comments at the guilt phase of the trial, where the comments could be viewed as direct attacks on his right to silence. [181] Rather, the prosecutor's comments pertained directly to the statement Shelton proffered in allocution and reflected solely on his character  that is, his failure to express remorse for his actions. Unlike Lesko v. Lehman , where the prosecutor commented on collateral issues that the defendant had not mentioned during the penalty phase, the prosecutor's comments in this case were not tangential to what Shelton had said in allocution. Because the prosecutor's comments were made on matters reasonably related to [Shelton's] credibility or the subject matter of his testimony, we affirm the trial court's decision. [182] We agree that the natural inference the jury would draw from the prosecutor's statement in this case would be that Shelton was an unfeeling man, not that he failed to testify. [183] Because the prosecutor merely commented on the statements made by Shelton in allocution, Shelton retained his right to be free from prosecutorial comment about his failure to testify about the merits of the prosecution's case. [184] In addition, the prosecutor's comment on the element of remorse was brief and can not be read fairly as having undermined the fundamental fairness of the penalty hearing. [185] Thus, the prosecutor did not infringe upon Shelton's Fifth Amendment right to silence by commenting on Shelton's lack of remorse in allocution. As a result, defense counsel was not deficient in failing to object to the prosecutor's statement during closing arguments. [186] In any event, Shelton has failed to prove that, but for counsel's alleged error, the result of the penalty hearing would have been different. Shelton argues that [t]he prejudice from counsel's ineffectiveness is that the jury was left with the impression that Shelton was not remorseful for the death of the victim, thereby increasing the probability that he would receive the death sentence. [187] We are not persuaded by this conclusory argument. The prosecutor's comment was but a few lines of 27 pages of transcript. Shelton has failed to show how an objection from counsel would have changed the jury's recommendation of death.
Shelton contends that counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the penalty phase by failing adequately to prepare and investigate mitigating evidence. He argues that counsel failed to investigate evidence of his family history, social background, and psychiatric condition. According to Shelton, had counsel thoroughly prepared and investigated, counsel would have discovered useful mitigating evidence that would have supported a life sentence instead of death. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. [188] In evaluating Shelton's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, we must take care to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. [189] In making this determination, we recognize that counsel is presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and that counsel has exercised the duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. [190] Defense counsel has a general duty to investigate potentially mitigating evidence for use at the penalty stage. [191] This duty does not demand that counsel pursue all lines of investigation, nor does it require the presentation of all potentially mitigating evidence, or even all mitigating evidence uncovered. [192] That other witnesses might have been available, alone, is insufficient to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. [193] This Court will not speculate on what testimony these other witnesses might have presented. [194] Counsel can make reasonable choices and focus his or her investigation on what might best convince a jury not to impose the death penalty. [195] In light of our standard, we conclude that Shelton's claims are without merit. Defense counsel did investigate and prepare mitigating evidence, interviewing Shelton's family and intending to present evidence of his family history. [196] But from early on in the penalty phase, Shelton made a deliberate strategic decision to limit the mitigating evidence that he would present. Shelton cannot now claim counsel acted unreasonably when Shelton clearly had proscribed the parameters of his defense. [197]