Opinion ID: 1138905
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the zoning ordinance

Text: What purports to be a copy of the official zoning ordinance of Leflore County adopted March 3, 1982, is in the record. We do not know if it is the complete ordinance or not. The ordinance never mentions the word railroad, or common carrier. Section 400 of the ordinance provides: SECTION 400. USES PERMITTED IN ALL DISTRICTS 1. Any use or facility necessary for the operation of any political subdivision of local, state or Federal Government, including public and private utilities. Locations for electrical transformers, gas regulator stations, sewage treatment facilities and similar uses shall be approved by the Planning Commission and the Board of Supervisors prior to installation. 2. Public and Semi-Public uses are permitted in all district[s]; provided however, that the locations for such facilities are approved by the Planning Commission prior to construction. Such facilities shall include, but not be limited to, public and private schools, churches, public parks and playgrounds. 3. Agricultural uses. C & G argues that this section authorizes it to construct the extra tracks unaffected by the ordinances. The plaintiffs argue that the railroad is not a public or private utility, and therefore does not come under the provisions of the section. Both make plausible arguments supporting their own interpretation. From this record it appears that neither the local zoning commission (if one exists) nor the board of supervisors of Leflore County has taken any official position regarding these additional tracks. Zoning ordinances are essentially legislative functions with limited judicial review. Luter v. Hammon, 529 So.2d 625, 628 (Miss. 1988); Robinson Industries v. City of Pearl, 335 So.2d 892, 895 (Miss. 1976); City of Jackson v. Ridgway, 261 So.2d 458, 460 (Miss. 1972). This is not a case where the meaning, intent and purpose of the zoning ordinance is clear and unequivocal. Robinson v. Indianola Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 467 So.2d 911, 914 (Miss. 1985); Ullrich v. State, 186 Md. 353, 358, 46 A.2d 637, 640, or its violation beyond dispute. To the contrary, credible arguments can be made for either side's position. Yet no official position has ever been taken by the local zoning authority. The cardinal rule in construction of zoning ordinances is to give effect to the intent of the lawmaking body. Hutchinson v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Stratford, 100 A.2d 839, 841 (Conn. 1953); City of Rome v. Shadyside Memorial Gardens, Inc., 93 Ga. App. 759, 92 S.E.2d 734, 736 (1956); City of Buffalo v. Roadway Transit Co., 303 N.Y. 453, 104 N.E.2d 96, 98 (1952). In construing a zoning ordinance, unless manifestly unreasonable, great weight should be given to the construction placed upon the words by the local authorities. Drennen v. Mason, 133 So. 689, 691 (Ala. 1931); Kordick Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Sarcone, 190 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Iowa 1971). Daniel D. Rappa, Inc. v. Engelhardt, 256 A.2d 744, 746 (Del. 1969). Insofar as this record shows, the board of supervisors of Leflore County has never been called upon to interpret this zoning ordinance and officially declare whether or not it applies to railroads. There is enough uncertainty and ambiguity about this ordinance that if the board of supervisors by resolution declared it never intended it to affect railroads any court would be hard put indeed to disregard that interpretation as unreasonable. In Napa Valley Electric Co. v. Calistoga Electric Co., 38 Cal. App. 477, 176 P. 699, 700 (1918), that court held: A court of equity will never assume jurisdiction to prepare a decree dependent for its efficacy on the approval or rejection of some other co-ordinate or inferior board or tribunal, but only when the court can enforce its decree. Since the plaintiffs contended the C & G had violated the zoning ordinance, they should first have called upon the local commission or board of supervisors, or both, to enforce it. The county is under a duty to enforce its own ordinance. 101 C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning, § 334. Failing in that, they could have sought by mandamus to force the county to enforce the ordinance. 101A C.J.S., § 335. And, at the very least the board of supervisors of Leflore County is an indispensable party to resolution of this action in chancery court. Rule 19, M.R.C.P. Any attempt to interpret and then enforce this zoning ordinance in the absence of any official positions by the board of supervisors of Leflore County is putting the cart before the horse. We therefore eschew this endeavor as should the chancery court. Upon remand the board of supervisors should be made a party to this action. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS and McRAE, JJ., concur. PRATHER, J., not participating.