Opinion ID: 1592017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: Anthony Parker

Text: The defendant argues that the defense cause challenge lodged against prospective juror, Anthony Parker, should have been granted because his voir dire responses showed that he would automatically vote for the death penalty if the defendant were found guilty of first-degree murder and an aggravating circumstance existed. Like Ms. Raymond, Mr. Parker was questioned in the ninth pre-qualification panel. Mr. Parker's initial responses to the prosecutor's questions regarding his death penalty views were as follows: Prosecutor: Do you think it's the proper function for the State of Louisiana to have a death penalty in certain types of cases? Mr. Parker: Yes. Prosecutor: Do you have any problem with the State seeking a death penalty in a first degree murder case? Mr. Parker: No, I don't. Prosecutor: Do you understand generally now the procedure that Louisiana has set up for the imposition or the potential imposition of the death penalty? Mr. Parker: Yes, I do. Prosecutor: Do you believe that you could consider both a life or a death sentence Mr. Parker: Yes, I can. Prosecutor:  in a particular case? Now, you indicate on your death penalty question on your form  I think the question that's posed to you on your form is:  Do you generally favor or oppose?  And I think you answered yes, which kinda leaves us bunch of lawyers reading this, we don't really know what you mean. Could you explain your position-let me ask you this question: On a scale from one to ten, ten being the strongest; one being the weakest, what is your position with regards to the death penalty? Mr. Parker: Ten. [146] As with Ms. Raymond, trial defense counsel posed only one question to Mr. Parker:  . . . Would you automatically vote for the death penalty? [147] When Mr. Parker responded, Yes, trial defense counsel made no further inquiry. [148] After asking Ms. Raymond further questions, the prosecutor did the same with Mr. Parker: Prosecutor: Mr. Parker, a similar question to you. You recall the procedures that we talked about? Mr. Parker: Yes, sir. Prosecutor: And I believe in your questions to [defense counsel], she indicated to you that if the State would prove an aggravating circumstance, then you would have an automatic outcome. You understand that's not Louisiana law? Mr. Parker: Yes. Prosecutor: The State has the burden of proving the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance. You remember we talked about that? Mr. Parker: Yes. Prosecutor: And you remember we talked about there's no situation where a sentence is automatic under Louisiana law in this type of case. You understand that? Mr. Parker: (NO RESPONSE) Prosecutor: My question to you is, even if the State proves the existence of an aggravating circumstance, could you consider the two possible sentences, a life sentence or a death sentence? Mr. Parker: Yes, I can. Prosecutor: So you could consider a life sentence regardless of what's presented at the sentencing hearing? Mr. Parker: Yes. [149] Following the completion of this pre-qualification, the defense sought to exercise a cause challenge against Mr. Parker: Your Honor, we would challenge on the same basis [as Ms. Raymond]. When we questioned him, he said he was a ten in favor of the death penalty and would automatically vote for death. [150] The trial court responded, I would indicate that he appears to have been successfully rehabilitated by the State and the challenge is denied. [151] Like Ms. Raymond, Mr. Parker was predisposed in favor of the death penalty. Yet, this court has held that [n]ot every predisposition or leaning in any direction rises to the level of substantial impairment. Lucky, XXXX-XXXX p. 7, 755 So.2d at 850. After reviewing the totality of Mr. Parker's voir dire responses, we find that he was successfully rehabilitated by the state and understood there was no automatic life sentence or sentence of death upon the affirmative finding of an aggravating circumstance. Thereafter, his views on capital punishment would not prevent or substantially impair his performance as an impartial juror. There was no abuse in the trial court's denial of the defense's cause challenge for this prospective juror.