Opinion ID: 2998005
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statute of Limitations on Count 1

Text: The statute of limitations for wire fraud is five years and begins to run on the date the illegal communication is sent. 18 U.S.C. § 3282; United States v. Tadros, 310 F.3d 999, 1006 (7th Cir. 2002) (each wire is a separate offense). Count 1 of Baldwin’s indictment was based on Baldwin’s October 20, 1993, wire transmission of the $2 million he fraudulently induced Piscopo to transfer to the Daric Corporation account. As noted earlier, Acting Chief Judge Kocoras ordered a suspension of the statute of limitations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3292 for a period of approximately seven months. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3292(c)(2), however, when foreign authorities take final action on the United States’ request for evidence before the untolled statute of limitations would have expired, the judicial suspension cannot exceed six months. The Spanish authorities took final action on the government’s request before the statute of limitations would otherwise have expired, so the limitations period on Baldwin’s wire fraud of October 20, 1993, was suspended for six months. As the government now concedes, the $2 million wire transfer that Piscopo sent on October 20, 1993, occurred five years, six months and one day before the grand jury returned its indictment on April 21, 1999.1 Expiration of the 1 Baldwin also contends that the statute of limitations expired on Count 2 of the indictment, but he has apparently miscalculated. Count 2 charged wire fraud in connection with a letter sent by Baldwin to Piscopo on April 14, 1994. The indictment was re- (continued...) No. 03-3721 7 statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, not a bar to jurisdiction, United States v. Meeker, 701 F.2d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 1983), so Baldwin’s failure to raise the issue before trial means that he is at best entitled only to plain-error review.2 See United States v. Ross, 77 F.3d 1525, 1537 (7th Cir. 1996) (according plain-error review to an unraised statute of limitations objection but finding no error in case before the court). As we have noted, Baldwin was originally sentenced to four concurrent 78-month terms of imprisonment, an 1 (...continued) turned five years and one week later, well within the statute of limitations as lengthened by virtue of Acting Chief Judge Kocoras’ order. 2 We say “at best” because there is an argument, not made by the government, that under FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3) Baldwin has waived and not merely forfeited his statute of limitations defense. Rule 12(b)(3) specifies motions that must be made before trial; the rule includes motions “alleging a defect in instituting the prosecution” or “a defect in the indictment or information.” Rule 12(e) provides that matters covered by Rule 12(b)(3) that are not raised by the pretrial motion deadline set by the court are waived, subject to the district court’s authority to grant relief from the waiver “[f]or good cause.” Other circuits apply Rule 12(b)(3) and the waiver rule of (e) to statute of limitations arguments. United States v. Ramirez, 324 F.3d 1225, 1228-29 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Gallup, 812 F.2d 1271, 1280 (10th Cir. 1987). In this circuit, statute of limitations arguments not timely raised in the district court are considered forfeited, not waived, and are accorded plain-error review. United States v. Ross, 77 F.3d 1525, 1536 (7th Cir. 1996). The holding in Ross is premised upon certain language in the advisory committee note to Rule 12(b) suggesting that a statute of limitations defense is among those matters that may, not must, be raised by pretrial motion. Id. The government has not argued that Ross should be revisited in light of the clear text of the rule and the apparent conflict with other circuits; the government cited Ross for the proposition that Baldwin’s statute of limitations argument should be considered forfeited and reviewed for plain error. 8 No. 03-3721 illegal sentence because each count was subject to a fiveyear statutory maximum. The district court later corrected the error, but (as we will discuss in a moment) the order correcting the sentence came too late and the district court lacked authority to enter it. See Part B.1., infra. Accordingly, we have before us the original concurrent sentences; under this court’s recent decision in McCarter, 406 F.3d at 464, an error that results only in a concurrent sentence does not warrant correction as a plain error. We acknowledged in McCarter that “because a defendant must pay a separate $100 ‘special assessment’ (paid into the Crime Victims Fund) for each felony, concurrent prison sentences do now result in additional punishment.” Id. (citations omitted). But we held that the assessment is “a trivial fee,” the erroneous imposition of which “is not a serious enough error to be described as a miscarriage of justice and thus constitute plain error.” Id. Baldwin argues that allowing a tardy prosecution under the circumstances of this case raises concerns about the witnesses’ memories and only serves to encourage dilatory investigations by law enforcement, thereby implicating the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceeding within the meaning of the plain-error test of United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993). These arguments are unpersuasive given that the indictment was only one day late. McCarter applies here, and the statute of limitations violation does not qualify as plain error warranting correction under the circumstances of this case.