Opinion ID: 4535063
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deferred Judgments

Text: ¶11 A deferred judgment and sentence is a unique dispositional alternative to the traditional guilty plea. Finney v. People, 2014 CO 38, ¶ 14, 325 P.3d 1044, 1050. Under the deferred sentencing statute, a court accepting a defendant’s guilty plea may (with the consent of the defendant, his counsel, and the district attorney) postpone entry of judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence for up to four years. § 18-1.3-102(1)(a); Finney, ¶ 14, 325 P.3d at 1050; Kazadi v. People, 2012 CO 73, ¶ 12, 291 P.3d 16, 20. As a condition of continuing the case, the court is empowered to implement probation-like conditions of supervision. § 18-1.3-102(2); Kazadi, ¶ 12, 291 P.3d at 20. ¶12 If the defendant fully complies with the conditions of the deferred judgment and sentencing agreement, “the plea of guilty previously entered shall be withdrawn and the charge upon which the judgment and sentence of the court was deferred shall be dismissed with prejudice.” § 18-1.3-102(2). But if the defendant violates the conditions of the agreement, the court may “revoke the deferral and enter judgment and sentence upon his guilty plea.” Kazadi, ¶ 13, 291 P.3d at 20 (citing § 18-1.3-102(2)). In short, “a deferred judgment is a privilege, 7 where the defendant is the primary beneficiary of a procedure that ultimately may result in dismissal of the charges against him or her.” People v. Manzanares, 85 P.3d 604, 607 (Colo. App. 2003). ¶13 We have held that in a deferred judgment and sentence agreement, the court’s acceptance of the defendant’s guilty plea “yields a conviction.” M.T. v. People, 2012 CO 11, ¶ 11, 269 P.3d 1219, 1221; see also § 16-7-206(3), C.R.S. (2019) (“The acceptance by the court of a plea of guilty . . . acts as a conviction for the offense.”). In other words, during the pendency of the deferred judgment and sentence period, a defendant may be treated for some purposes as “convicted,” even though no judgment of conviction has entered. See, e.g., Hafelfinger v. Dist. Court, 674 P.2d 375, 377 (Colo. 1984) (holding that a defendant whose deferred judgment and sentence had not yet been completed had a conviction for purposes of a statute governing personal recognizance bonds). ¶14 But as noted, upon the successful completion of the conditions of the deferred judgment and sentence agreement, the defendant’s previously entered guilty plea “shall be withdrawn” and the charge “shall be dismissed with prejudice.” § 18-1.3-102(2); see also M.T., ¶ 11, 269 P.3d at 1221. Accordingly, a defendant in this situation generally is no longer “convicted.” Hafelfinger, 674 P.2d at 377 n.3. But see M.T., ¶ 1, 269 P.3d at 1220 (concluding that a successfully completed and dismissed deferred judgment constitutes a “conviction” for 8 purposes of section 24-72-308(3)(c), C.R.S. (2019), which prohibits the sealing of records “pertaining to a conviction” involving unlawful sexual behavior).