Opinion ID: 75739
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Eleventh Circuit Precedents

Text: 32 This Court recently examined the import of Gomez and Peretz in Thomas v. Whitworth, 136 F.3d 756 (11th Cir. 1998), United States v. Maragh, 174 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Desir, 257 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2001). In Thomas, we joined other circuits in holding that [s]ection 636 does not permit magistrate judges, under the guise of the 'additional duties' clause, to conduct the jury selection portion of a civil trial unless the parties have given their consent. 136 F.3d at 759 (citing and discussing Stockler v. Garratt, 974 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1992), and Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson Wax Dev. Corp., 908 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1990)). Even in a civil case, we emphasized in Thomas that where consent is lacking, courts should be reluctant 'to construe the additional duties clause to include responsibilities of far greater importance than the specified duties assigned to magistrates.' Id. (quoting Peretz, 501 U.S. at 933). 33 Our Maragh decision involved a criminal case but the dispute was mainly over whether the defendant actually had consented to the magistrate judge's presiding over jury selection. 174 F.3d at 1203. In discussing the additional duties clause, we stated that [t]he Supreme Court's interpretation of section 636(b)(3) establishes the presence or absence of consent as the crucial factor in determining what duties the section encompasses. 12 Id. at 1204 (citing Peretz, 501 U.S. at 934-36). 34 This Court likewise emphasized the importance of consent in Desir and reversed a felony conviction because the magistrate judge responded to a jury question without the defendant's express consent. 257 F.3d at 1238. The magistrate judge denied the jury's request for a read back of certain trial testimony and instructed the jury to rely on their collective memories. Id. at 1235. The jury trial was before the district court, the jury question was handled solely by the magistrate judge, and the district court judge was not present and in fact was not informed that a question was even asked by the jurors, let alone the content of the question. Id. at 1238. Thus, in Desir, this Court concluded that [w]hen a matter conducted solely by a magistrate judge constitutes a critical stage of the criminal proceeding, such as instructing the jury, the absence of express consent from all parties, particularly the defendant, mandates reversal. Id. We pointed out that according to Gomez the authority granted to magistrate judges under [§ 636] is to be construed narrowly. Id. at 1236. In Desir, we further opined that the Supreme Court and this court [have] established a bright line rule that a magistrate judge exceeds his or her jurisdiction by presiding at a felony trial during a critical stage of the proceeding without the defendant's consent. Id. Therefore, we concluded that the magistrate judge inappropriately exercised the authority of an Article III judge at a critical stage of the proceeding by responding to a jury's question that went beyond the simple performance of a ministerial task. Id. at 1238. 35 We now turn to the defendants' claims that their sentences must be vacated because the district court improperly delegated a critical portion of their sentencing hearing to the magistrate judge.