Opinion ID: 1920844
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the second attempted amendment of the indictment during trial flawed?

Text: ¶ 12. Mixon's indictment for motor vehicle theft initially included the word feloniously, in spite of the fact that the term is absent from the motor vehicle theft statute. [2] Mixon contends that while the State's second motion to amend the indictment [3] to remove the word feloniously was granted by the trial judge over Mixon's objection, no actual order allowing this amendment was entered as required by Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-15. [4] ¶ 13. The purpose of an indictment is to furnish the accused [with] such a description of the charges against him as will enable him to adequately prepare his defense. King v. State, 580 So.2d 1182, 1185 (Miss.1991) (quoting Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798, 804 (Miss.1984)). Rule 7.06 of the Uniform Circuit and County Court Rules, [5] comports with the notice requirements of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article 3, Sections 14 and 26 of the Mississippi Constitution, and thus provides the starting point for consideration of the sufficiency of an indictment. See Richmond v. State, 751 So.2d 1038, 1045 (Miss.1999). Essentially, nothing more than a concise and clear statement of the elements of the crime charged is required. King, 580 So.2d at 1185 (quoting Williams, 445 So.2d at 804). ¶ 14. Here there was an oral motion to amend the indictment during trial because the word feloniously was included in the indictment due to a scrivener's error. Mixon was clearly charged with motor vehicle theft under § 97-17-42. The trial court overruled Mixon's challenge to this alleged amendment of substance as this was clearly a motor vehicle theft case, not a grand larceny case (which requires the State to establish feloniously). [6] The heading on the original indictment stated motor vehicle theft, cited code section 97-17-42, and, but for the word feloniously, tracked the language of Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-42(1) for motor vehicle theft. [M]erely formal or technical words, shall not be necessary in an indictment if, without them, the offense be certainly and substantially described. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-7-3. This Court has held that an indictment containing the word feloniously when it did not appear in the statute still properly charged the defendant with simple assault. See Reining v. State, 606 So.2d 1098, 1103 (Miss.1992). As the indictment provided the accused with actual notice and complied with thenexisting Rule 2.05 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice, [7] it was found sufficient to charge the defendant with the crime. Id. ¶ 15. The court for any formal defect, may, if it be thought necessary, cause the indictment to be forthwith amended, and thereupon the trial shall proceed as if such defect had not appeared. Miss.Code Arm. § 99-7-21. Such amendments, however, may pertain to matters of form only, not matters of substance. See Shive v. State, 507 So.2d 898, 900 (Miss.1987) (citing Copeland v. State, 423 So.2d 1333, 1336 (Miss.1982)). Amendments of substance include those which change the charge made in the indictment to another crime. Shive, 507 So.2d at 900. Fundamentally, [e]very material fact and essential ingredient of the offense  every essential element of the offense  must be alleged with precision and certainty, or, as has been stated, every fact which is an element in a prima facie case of guilt must be stated in the indictment. Copeland, 423 So.2d at 1336 (quoting Love v. State, 211 Miss. 606, 611, 52 So.2d 470, 472 (1951); Brewer v. State, 351 So.2d 535, 536 (Miss.1977)). The amendment complained of is of no consequence here because it merely amounted to a permissible change of form. The purpose of an indictment is to inform the accused of the charges against him. See King, 580 So.2d at 1185. Here, the indictment explicitly stated that Mixon was being charged with motor vehicle theft under Miss.Code Ann. § 97-17-42. Additionally, there was no evidence presented that Mixon was surprised or that he did not know, to his prejudice, that he was being prosecuted under Miss.Code Ann. § 97-17-42 for motor vehicle theft. There being no prejudice or surprise, this Court finds the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in permitting an on-the-record amendment of the indictment. This issue is without merit.