Opinion ID: 624999
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Vagueness and Overbreadth Challenge

Text: Ghane asserts that the chemical weapon statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutionally vague in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process. The void-for-vagueness doctrine protects persons by providing `fair notice' of a statute's applicability and by preventing `arbitrary and discriminatory prosecutions' of a statute's enforcement. United States v. Mabie, 663 F.3d 322, 333 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting Skilling v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 2933, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010)). The vagueness doctrine recognizes that `[a] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.' United States v. Birbragher, 603 F.3d 478, 484 (8th Cir.2010) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir.2002)). `Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed.' Washam, 312 F.3d at 929 (quoting United States v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 83 S.Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963)). This court reviews de novo a district court's determination whether a penal statute is void for vagueness under the Fifth Amendment. Birbragher, 603 F.3d at 484. The government charged Ghane with knowingly stockpil[ing], retain[ing], and possess[ing], a chemical weapon, that is, potassium cyanide, which is a toxic chemical not intended by the defendant to be used for a peaceful purpose as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 229F(7)(A). As contemplated by the statute, [c]hemical weapon means [a] toxic chemical and its precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under this chapter.  18 U.S.C. § 229F(1)(A) (emphasis added). Toxic chemical is defined by the statute as any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. Id. at § 229F(8)(A). And, as relevant here, [p]urposes not prohibited by this chapter encompasses peaceful purposes, which the statute defines as [a]ny peaceful purpose related to an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity. Id. at § 229F(7)(A). Ghane first argues that the terms chemical weapon, toxic chemical, and peaceful purpose are all defined in section 229F(1)(A), 7(A), and (8)(A), in terms so imprecise that they (1) fail to provide citizens with fair notice of prohibited conduct, and (2) encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by government officials. Additionally, Ghane claims that the statutory definition of the term toxic chemical is so broad that it could include prescription drugs, household products with potentially harmful side effects, and even nicotine and alcohol products. Vagueness challenges like the one here, that do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand. Washam, 312 F.3d at 929. A two-pronged analysis is conducted in determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague: (1) the statute must define the offense with sufficient definiteness to provide fair warning or adequate notice as to what conduct is prohibited, and (2) it must also define the offense in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Id. As to overbreadth, a statute is considered overbroad if it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct in addition to the conduct the statute seeks to proscribe. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). The district court rejected Ghane's argument that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The court recognized that while this statute could have been more artfully drafted, any alleged vagueness did not make the definitions meaningless. It determined that section 229F(7)(A) conveys sufficient warning regarding the activities in which an individual may or may not engage and that common understanding dictates that peaceful purposes are those that are not intended to cause harm. Too, the district court held that the statute modifies the definition of toxic chemicals by prohibiting only chemicals that are intended for a prohibited purpose and are consistent in type and quantity with such purpose, which sufficiently narrows the category of possession for which an individual can face criminal penalties. While our review is de novo, we agree with the district court. We begin, as we are proscribed, with the presumptive validity of the statute. Arguments such as those made by Ghane in this action often swim[] against ... case law's current, which requires [courts], if we can, to construe, not condemn, Congress' enactments. Skilling, 130 S.Ct. at 2928. While the terms highlighted by Ghane in this statute are certainly broad, we conclude they are neither unconstitutionally vague as applied to Ghane's actions nor overbroad in their relation to constitutionally protected behavior. Likewise, the plain language of the statute gives adequate notice. We do not doubt the government and the public can discern purposes that are peaceful and those that are not. A person of ordinary intelligence could reasonably understand that stealing and possessing potassium cyanide (a highly dangerous and regulated substance) to effect a possible suicide might result in criminal culpability. [4] In support of his vagueness argument, Ghane points to the jury's confusion at both of his trials regarding whether suicide is considered a peaceful purpose under the statute. It is true that at each trial the jury submitted questions [5] to the judge during deliberations indicating confusion, for example, as to what constituted other activity, or whether, according to law, suicide could be considered a peaceful purpose under the statute. [6] In each instance the court, although it struggled with how much information to provide the jury, left the determination to the jury, providing limited statutory definitions in response to questions. While the first jury hung, the second arrived at a conviction. Even though the issue of whether use of a chemical weapon for suicide is a purpose exempted by the statute seems to make this a close case, the existence of a close case in the application of a statute does not render it unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008). What renders a statute vague is not the possibility that it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether the incriminating fact it establishes has been proved; but rather the indeterminacy of precisely what that fact is. Id. Here, in its definition of peaceful purposes, the statute provides a narrowing context, [7] providing that peaceful purposes is [a]ny peaceful purpose related to an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity. 18 U.S.C. § 299F(7)(A). Given this context, any reasonable jury is equipped to determine whether a particular set of facts suffices as an exempted use of a chemical weapon or not. Specifically here, the jury looked at the discrete facts of committing suicide in this particular manner in light of the context set out by the statute. That this might be a close call for the jury does not mean the statute provides insufficient notice or warning as to what conduct is prohibited. Ghane also points out that the Chemical Weapons Convention, the basis on which the statute was drafted, was not drafted using the model penal code as nearly all criminal statutes are, but rather was designed to act as a treaty among participating sovereign nations that undertook the task to eradicate the existence and future use and development of chemical weapons in warfare. Accordingly, argues Ghane, the drafters purposefully defined the three terms he highlights as broadly as possible so that nations could eradicate any and all chemical weapons, including ones they might not have been able to contemplate at the time. He claims that because of this, the government can hand pick only certain instances of contemplated suicide, for example, that it deems appropriate to label use of a chemical weapon, thus resulting in discriminatory or arbitrary prosecutions, with no fair warning of prohibited conduct. However, on these facts, we find this argument unpersuasive. Our task is to look at the resulting statute drafted and determine whether it provides adequate notice of prohibited conduct and whether it encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, neither of which poses a problem in this case. As to Ghane's claim that this statute is overbroad, even though various toxic chemicals might be contemplated by the statute, the statute sufficiently narrows the category of possession for which an individual can face criminal penalties by prohibiting only chemicals that are intended for a prohibited purpose and are consistent in type and quantity with such purpose. Accordingly, the statute does not criminalize protected activities outside the permissible bounds of congressional regulation and is therefore not unconstitutionally overbroad.