Opinion ID: 2391925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Videotape Properly Redacted

Text: Banther's next argument on appeal is that the trial judge improperly admitted a redacted version of his July 30, 1997 videotaped statement made at the crime scene. Banther argues that under D.R.E. 106 and D.R.E. 403, the entire videotaped statement, including his statement that the codefendant, Schmitz, had allegedly confessed to his attorney, should have been admitted to show Banther's state of mind with regard to why he had lied to the police in previous statements. In the alternative, Banther argues that the entire videotape should have been excluded because it was incurably prejudicial for the jury to see Banther wearing leg shackles. The trial judge rejected Banther's argument that fairness required the entire videotaped statement to be admitted under D.R.E. 106. The trial judge ruled that Rule 403 supercedes 106, if the circumstances warrant. We agree. D.R.E. 106 does not make otherwise inadmissible evidence admissible. [41] The trial judge properly exercised his discretion in ruling that these are self-serving statements which will not be subject to cross-examination. The probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403 and Williamson analysis. [42] In Williamson v. State, [43] this Court held that a redacted statement's probative value was outweighed by potential prejudice to the State under Delaware Rule of Evidence 403, where the defendant had refused to testify thereby foreclosing any opportunity for cross-examination. In the event that Banther testifies at his next trial, the Superior Court can reconsider its ruling if a proper motion is made by Banther. Banther argues that he should have been permitted to admit his claim that Schmitz had confessed to Schmitz's attorney in order to explain to the jury why he had lied in prior statements to the police. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the State's redaction request and denying Banther's D.R.E. 106 claim because Banther had already explained the changes in his story in an earlier statement to the police, rendering any additional explanation cumulative. During his March 14, 1998 statement, after having incriminated Schmitz, Banther stated, And the reason I've been lying on the previous tapes, I was trying to protect John and my girlfriend, and I guess myself too. After the trial judge granted the State's motion to redact Banther's statement that Schmitz had confessed, the State agreed to redact the immediately preceding question that had elicited Banther's response. At trial, and on appeal, Banther contends that the redaction should have gone further by eliminating the detective's remark that there were inconsistencies in Banther's statements. The trial judge, as the gatekeeper to admission or exclusion of evidence, is in the best position to weigh the probative value of the July 30 videotape against the risk of unfair prejudice under D.R.E. 403. The record reflects that ordering the redaction of Banther's answer and the immediately preceding question was not an abuse of discretion. [44] After the trial judge's rejection of Banther's D.R.E. 106 argument to admit his entire videotaped statement, Banther moved to exclude any use of his videotaped statement at the crime scene as highly prejudicial in its content. The basis of Banther's objection was that the videotape depicted Banther in leg shackles, and accompanied by armed police detectives. According to Banther, the admission of the July 30, 1997 videotaped statement made at the crime scene was so prejudicial that even with the curative instruction given by the trial judge, the videotape compromised his presumption of innocence. The trial judge ruled as follows: The evidence in this case already indicates that the defendant was in custody and was being transported from North Carolina to Delaware through an extradition process. The jury is aware that he was in custody at the time. With a curative instruction which I will give, I am convinced that the probative value of the tape is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Delaware has a long honored practice, recognized in the common law as long ago as 1678, of exhibiting a defendant to the jury only while out of handcuffs. [45] Generally, however, there is no reversible error if members of the jury view a defendant in handcuffs when he is in custody outside of the courtroom itself .... [46] Moreover, this Court has held that, in the absence of actual prejudice, briefly exposing a handcuffed defendant in transit to the jury does not constitute reversible error. [47] Here, the jury knew that the defendant had been arrested in Maryland and transported to Delaware pursuant to a process of extradition. The Superior Court recognized that [t]he jury is aware that he was in custody at the time [the video was made], and the video was clearly recorded outside the purview of the courtroom, even though viewed in the courtroom. Thus, the trial judge ruled that [w]ith a curative instruction which I will give, I am convinced that the probative value of the tape is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The record reflects that the trial judge's ruling was a proper exercise of discretion.