Opinion ID: 1450386
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of the Board members

Text: Dr. Edwards contends that the circuit court erred in granting the Board members' motion to dismiss on the basis of common law quasi-judicial immunity. He argues that section 331.100.5 [1] supersedes quasi-judicial immunity by expressly allowing the members of the Missouri Board of Chiropractic Examiners to be held liable for gross negligence. The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to the intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning. Nelson v. Crane, 187 S.W.3d 868, 869-870 (Mo. banc 2006). When interpreting statutes, courts do not presume that the legislature has enacted a meaningless provision. State v. Winsor, 110 S.W.3d 882, 887 (Mo.App. W.D.2003). Section 331.100.5 provides that [m]embers of the [Missouri Board of Chiropractic Examiners] shall not be personally liable either jointly or separately for any act or acts committed in the performance of their official duties as board members except gross negligence.  (Emphasis added). The plain language of the statute establishes that the Board members are generally immune from suit, with the qualification that immunity is inapplicable if a Board member is grossly negligent in performing his or her duties. The Board members' argument that they have absolute immunity renders meaningless the phrase except for gross negligence. Therefore, in order to give full effect to the plain language of section 331.100.5, the statute must be interpreted as superseding the Board's common law immunity if Board members engage in gross negligence in the performance of their official duties. The foregoing analysis is consistent with State ex rel. Golden v. Crawford, 165 S.W.3d 147 (Mo. banc 2005). In Golden, a wrongful death action was filed against several defendants, including a 911 dispatcher. The issue in the case was whether section 190.307 superseded common law official immunity. The statute eliminated civil liability for employees of an emergency system for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission except willful and wanton misconduct or gross negligence. . . . Because [i]t is clear from the express language in this section that the legislature intended for this statutory immunity to supersede the common law official immunity doctrine for the enumerated individuals and agencies, this Court held that section 190.307 provides the shielded entities with a qualified immunity allowing civil liability only in instances where gross negligence can be established. Id. at 148. Like the statute at issue in Golden, the statute at issue in this case supersedes absolute common law immunities and establishes qualified statutory immunity from liability except in cases of gross negligence. Although Golden dealt only with official immunity and this case involves quasi-judicial immunity, the distinction is without difference because both are common law immunities subject to legislative modification. The circuit court erred in sustaining the Board's motion to dismiss.