Opinion ID: 1262445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the REAL ID Act to the Petitions Before Us

Text: A. Ruiz-Martinez v. Mukasey, No. 05-2903-ag Given the foregoing, we afford Petitioner Ruiz-Martinez, 05-2903, judicial review of his final order of removal by operation of the 30-day grace period. In this case, as in Ross, the adoption of the Act removed the option of an unlimited period for filing a petition for the writ of habeas corpus and resulted in a greatly abbreviated period during which a petitioner may now seek judicial review. Because Ruiz-Martinez filed his § 2241 petition only two days after the enactment of the REAL ID Act, he benefits from a 30-day grace period based on the statutory limitations period now applicable  to wit, the 30-day period prescribed in § 1252(b)(2). Accordingly, we hold that we have jurisdiction of Ruiz-Martinez's petition for review, deny the Government's motion to dismiss the petition for review, and proceed hereafter to consider the merits of Ruiz-Martinez's claims. B. Flynn Sean Williamson v. Mukasey, et al., No. 05-3662-ag In this case, amicus counsel correctly argues that, prior to the enactment of the REAL ID. Act, a Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to review an order of removal where, as is the case here, that order was entered against, an alien by reason of his conviction for an aggravated felony where the convicted alien did not challenge that categorization of his crime. See INA § 242(a)(2)(c) (as amended by Pub.L. 104-208 (Sept. 30, 1996)). Accordingly, prior to May 11, 2005, the date of the enactment of the REAL ID Act, Williamson had no reason to file a petition for review. However, Williamson failed to file his § 2241 petition within 30 days of the enactment of the REAL ID Act and therefore cannot benefit from the grace period we have allowed. Wang, 484 F.3d at 616, 617-18 (holding that a habeas petition filed more than 30 days after the effective date of the REAL ID Act cannot be transferred to the Court of Appeals as a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction). As such, we conclude that we have no jurisdiction to entertain Williamson's petition for review, and application of the jurisdictional time limitation of § 1252(b)(1) for denying Williamson's petition for review as untimely results in no constitutional violation. We grant the Government's motion and dismiss the petition as untimely filed. Because we lack jurisdiction to review Williamson's petition for review, the merits of Williamson's underlying claims for relief are not properly before us. C. Elias Seoud v. Board of Immigration Appeals, No. 06-3605-ag We grant the Government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction Seoud's petition for review as untimely. Seoud filed his petition for review on or about July 13, 2006, and, thus, failed to file his petition for review within the applicable jurisdictional 30-day statutory limitations period or the grace period allowed.