Opinion ID: 1945998
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether Schadendorf is Entitled to Penalty Benefits on the Interest Due on Her Benefits if the Payment of This Interest has Been Unreasonably Delayed.

Text: To decide this issue we must interpret section 86.13. Thus, we will not give the commissioner's interpretation of the law deference and are free to substitute our own judgment as to the interpretation of the statute. Lakeside Casino, 743 N.W.2d at 173; see also Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)( c ). The Code provides for a penalty benefit to be assessed against the employer if the commencement or termination of benefits occurs without reasonable or probable cause or excuse. Iowa Code § 86.13. To resolve whether Schadendorf is entitled to penalty benefits for an unreasonable delay in the payment of the interest due on her benefits, we must determine whether the word benefits in section 86.13 includes interest due on the benefits awarded. When confronted with the task of determining the meaning of a statute, we have stated: The goal of statutory construction is to determine legislative intent. We determine legislative intent from the words chosen by the legislature, not what it should or might have said. Absent a statutory definition or an established meaning in the law, words in the statute are given their ordinary and common meaning by considering the context within which they are used. Under the guise of construction, an interpreting body may not extend, enlarge or otherwise change the meaning of a statute. Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004) (citations omitted). The interpretation of a statute requires an assessment of the statute in its entirety, not just isolated words or phrases. State v. Young, 686 N.W.2d 182, 184-85 (Iowa 2004). Indeed, we avoid interpreting a statute in such a way that portions of it become redundant or irrelevant. T & K Roofing Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Educ., 593 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Iowa 1999) (citation omitted). We look for a reasonable interpretation that best achieves the statute's purpose and avoids absurd results. Harden v. State, 434 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Iowa 1989). The first indication that the legislature did not intend the word benefits in section 86.13 to include the interest due on an award of compensation can be seen from the plain meaning of the words benefit and interest. A benefit is defined as [f]inancial assistance that is received from an employer, insurance, or a public program (such as social security) in time of sickness, disability, or unemployment. Black's Law Dictionary 151 (7th ed. 1999). Interest is defined as [t]he compensation fixed by agreement or allowed by law for the use or detention of money, or for the loss of money by one who is entitled to its use.... Id. at 816. Under these definitions, the benefits awarded in this case were for temporary partial permanent disability, healing period compensation, and permanent partial disability. The amount of these benefits total $72,166.32. Any additional sums due and owing Schadendorf were for the loss of use of these benefits or interest on the benefits. A benefit is distinct and separate from interest due on a benefit. Therefore, the plain meaning of the terms benefit and interest leads us to believe compensation due for loss of use of a benefit due by the employer is not a benefit under section 86.13. The second indication that the legislature did not intend the word benefits in section 86.13 to include the interest due on an award of compensation is the statutory scheme of the workers' compensation statutes. Chapter 85 lists the various benefits due to an injured worker. See, e.g., Iowa Code §§ 85.27 (providing medical benefits); 85.28 (providing burial expenses); 85.31 (providing benefits in death cases); 85.33 (providing temporary total and temporary partial disability benefits); and 85.34 (providing permanent disability benefits). On the other hand, chapter 85 has a separate provision for interest. Id. § 85.30. Section 85.30 provides if [compensation payments are] not paid when due, there shall be added to the weekly compensation payments, interest at the rate provided in section 535.3 for court judgments and decrees. Id. This separate treatment of benefits and interest by the legislature indicates that it did not intend the word benefits in section 86.13 to include the interest due on an award of compensation. Finally, the legislative history of a statute is instructive of legislative intent. State v. Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d 428, 431-32 (Iowa 2006). The legislative history of section 86.13 indicates the legislature did not intend the word benefits in section 86.13 to include the interest due on an award of compensation. In the explanation to the bill enacting section 86.13, the committee on labor and industrial relations of the senate stated section [86.13] gives the commissioner the authority to award penalty benefits if regular benefits were unreasonably delayed or denied. S.F. 539 Explanation, 77th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 1982). The explanation does not include any provision for penalty benefits on interest due on regular benefits. Based on the plain meaning of the word benefit, the statutory scheme used by the legislature to award benefits and interest on those benefits, and the legislative history of section 86.13, we find the legislature did not intend the word benefits in section 86.13 to include the interest due on an award of compensation. Consequently, the commissioner was correct in not awarding a penalty benefit on the interest due on the benefits he awarded Schadendorf in his July 26, 1999, decision.