Opinion ID: 2234743
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Effect of Living Will Act

Text: Contrary to the views of AUL and of the circuit court, the Illinois Living Will Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110 1/2, par. 701 et seq. ) does not bar the relief sought by the public guardian. First, as noted in Longeway (133 Ill.2d at 53-54), the Act does not apply directly to the situation of one such as Mr. Greenspan, because he has not executed a living will  even though the Act, like other statutes, may be relevant in ascertaining public policy and even though in Longeway (133 Ill.2d at 47) this court looked to the Act's definition of a terminal condition. Second, a subsequent statute  the Powers of Attorney for Health Care Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110 1/2, par. 804-1 et seq. ), enacted more than three years after the Illinois Living Will Act became effective  enunciated a public policy that withdrawal or withholding of food and water or fluids is within the powers conferrable through a health care agency (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110 1/2, pars. 804-10(a), (b)(1)); that the subsequent statute prevails over all inconsistent acts (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110 1/2, par. 804-11); and that if the principal under a health care power also has a living will, the living will shall not be operative so long as the agent under the power is available to act (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110 1/2, par. 804-11). See Longeway, 133 Ill.2d at 54. As AUL points out, it is true that, with a more recent effective date than that of the Powers of Attorney for Health Care Law, the legislature has expressed itself by amending the Illinois Living Will Act to provide, in the present section 2(d) thereof, that a qualified patient shall not be deprived of artificial nutrition and hydration if the deprivation alone would be the cause of death. See Pub. Act 85-860, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1988 (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110 1/2, par. 702(c), now Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110 1/2, par. 702(d)). However, a qualified patient merely means one who is terminally ill and has executed a living will. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110 1/2, par. 702(g).) The principal in a health care power of attorney will not necessarily have executed a living will, and, even if such a will has been executed, its operation is suspended so long as the health care agent is available to act. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110 1/2, par. 804-11; Longeway, 133 Ill.2d at 54.) Accordingly, there is no conflict between the Powers of Attorney for Health Care Law and the amended Illinois Living Will Act that could be held to result in implied amendment of the Law. (Moreover, section 9(d) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110 1/2, par. 709(d)) provides that the Act shall not impair or supersede any person's legal right or responsibility to withhold or withdraw death-delaying procedures in any lawful manner and that, in such respect, the Act's provisions are cumulative. Though AUL argues to the contrary, the latter provision possibly adds support to our decision in the present cause; but we need not rely on it here.) Since there is no conflict between the Illinois Living Will Act and the Powers of Attorney for Health Care Law by virtue of the Act's amendment, AUL can extract no public policy from section 2(d) of the Act that outweighs the public policy expressed in the Law. Both statutes are relevant guides to public policy (as in Longeway, 133 Ill.2d at 53-54) when we consider the case of Mr. Greenspan, who has executed neither a living will nor a health care power. As in Longeway (133 Ill.2d at 55), we find no statute or legislative expression of public policy that prohibits court authorization for the public guardian to order withdrawal of Mr. Greenspan's artificial nutrition and hydration. Accordingly, the circuit court erred to the extent that its denial of the public guardian's amended petition relied on the Illinois Living Will Act.