Opinion ID: 195625
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exemption for Off Market SFHs

Text: 36 Suarez proposes to exclude the Guarico Residence under Provisos 1 and 3 because it was neither for rent nor sale at the time he refused to sell the Los Llanos Property to HAVED. See Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F.Supp. 282, 285 (E.D.Ky.1976). The theory is that the term such [SFHs] in Provisos 1 and 3 unambiguously relates back to the complete phrase--single-family house sold or rented by an owner--in the section 3603(b)(1) prefatory clause. The language of the statute is not dispositive on this issue, and the interpretation proposed by Suarez is at least plausible. 37 Although it is conceivable that Congress's choice of the indeterminate modifier such was intended only to require the counting of residences qua residences under Provisos 1 and 3--in direct contrast to the more constricted scope of the term SFH under Proviso 2--Provisos 1 and 3 reasonably might be read to impose the additional, distinct requirement that any SFH, regardless whether it is the defendant's residence, be counted under Provisos 1 and 3 only if it is a single-family house sold or rented by an owner. Indeed, Congress's choice of words--sold or rented--in the section 3603(b)(1) prefatory clause is a most curious usage. In order for liability to attach under FHA Sec. 3604, a defendant need never have consummated the discriminatory rental or sale of the SFH to which the section 3603(b)(1) prefatory clause adverts. Rather, FHA liability attaches as soon as the defendant refuses to sell or rent after [the plaintiff makes] a bona fide offer, see supra note 1, without regard to whether the SFH is ever sold or rented to anyone. With these linguistic difficulties in mind, it seems arguable at least, in keeping with the structure and language of the statute, that the term such, as used in Provisos 1 and 3, imports the same on the market qualification necessarily implicit in the section 3603(b)(1) prefatory clause. 38 As noted earlier, however, normally latent ambiguity in a statutory modifier like such should be construed in furtherance of the statute's remedial goals. See Cia. Petrolera, 754 F.2d at 428. (When Congress uses broad generalized language in a remedial statute, and that language is not contravened by authoritative legislative history, a court should interpret the provision generously so as to effectuate the important congressional goals.) Not only does the authoritative legislative history not contravene the HAVED interpretation, see supra Section II.B.1, it contradicts the Suarez contention. Most importantly, neither hypothetical advanced by Senator Byrd assumed or intimated that the seller's residence was on the market at the time the discriminatory sale of the second house took place, yet Senator Byrd included both these SFHs under Provisos 1 and 3. Notwithstanding a conceivable vestige of literal ambiguity, therefore, we are persuaded to the view that the Guarico Residence must be included in the four-SFH calculus under section 3603(b)(1) consistent with the FHA's legislative history and its broad remedial design. 9 III