Opinion ID: 519240
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Claims and Defenses

Text: 20 Plaintiffs set forth ten claims in their amended complaint, but these can essentially be reduced to two major claims. First, plaintiffs claim that defendants' implementation of the sibling rule violates the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, and the Food Stamp Act. Jurisdiction for the claim against the Secretary is premised upon 5 U.S.C. Secs. 702-706 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. 5 Second, plaintiffs claim that the Commonwealth defendants' third party verification requirements, as applied in cases where an applicant for AFDC, food stamps, or MA cannot readily obtain the prompt cooperation of the third party, violates, inter alia, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, and several other federal statutes and regulations. 21 Plaintiffs primarily sought to enjoin defendants from: (1) denying or reducing food stamps to plaintiffs based upon their residence in the same building with their siblings, unless they actually live together; (2) denying plaintiffs' application for food stamps based upon the non-cooperation of a sibling or member of a sibling's household; and (3) delaying or denying AFDC, food stamp, and MA benefits due to applicants' or recipients' failure to promptly provide third party verification where the applicant or recipient cannot obtain prompt third party cooperation. Plaintiffs also sought declaratory relief and restored benefits for the named plaintiffs.
22 Eligibility and benefit levels for food stamps are determined by the United States Department of Agriculture, acting through state agencies such as DPW, and are based upon need. See 7 U.S.C. Secs. 2017(a), 2020(e). Benefits are allocated per household, rather than per individual. The statute defines a food stamp household as (1) an individual who lives alone or who, while living with others, customarily purchases food and prepares meals for home consumption separate and apart from the others, [or] (2) a group of individuals who live together and customarily purchase food and prepare meals together for home consumption. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2012(i). However, through amendments in 1981 and 1982, Congress amended the Food Stamp Act to provide that parents and children, or siblings, who live together shall be treated as a group of individuals who customarily purchase and prepare meals together for home consumption even if they do not do so, unless one of the parents, or siblings, is an elderly or disabled member. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2012(i)(3) (emphasis added). The legislative history to the 1982 amendment notes that the Committee expected that caseworkers could effectively question claims and that the burden of proof for establishing 'separateness' would be placed on the household, not on the administering agency. Pub.L. No. 97-253, 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1641, 1664. 23 Pursuant to authority granted in the statute, 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2013(c), the Secretary promulgated the following regulation, which was in effect at the time the claims that are the subject of the present litigation arose: 24 Household definition. (1) A household may be composed of ... (iii) A group of individuals who live together and customarily purchase food and prepare meals together for home consumption ... (3) In no event shall nonhousehold member status ... or separate household status be granted to ... (iv) Siblings (natural, adopted, half or step brothers and sisters), unless at least one sibling is elderly or disabled. 25 7 C.F.R. Sec. 273.1(a) (1983) (emphasis added). 6 The DPW has adopted nearly identical regulations. 26 The gravamen of plaintiffs' claim is that while the Food Stamp Act confines the sibling rule to siblings who live together, neither the federal nor state regulations included the live together test in their regulations implementing the sibling rule. While the Food Stamp Act creates an evidentiary issue as to whether siblings are living together, the regulations implementing the sibling rule appear to eliminate this evidentiary issue, and instead create an irrebuttable presumption that siblings live together, thus constituting one household. More precisely, as plaintiffs clarified their position at oral argument, their claim is that the local DPW offices were and still are applying a same address test to determine whether siblings lived together. In response to a hypothetical question posed by the Court, plaintiffs provided an example of the same address test: if one sibling lived on the first floor of a building, and the other sibling lived on the 23rd floor of that building, the siblings, because of the same address test, would be considered to be living together. Although we do not suggest that the type of fact situation described in the hypothetical is at work here, the hypothetical does help to frame the issue. See discussion infra at 212-14. 27 The Secretary, however, stated at oral argument that he does not apply a same address test, i.e., an irrebuttable presumption that siblings who reside at the same address in fact live together and therefore constitute one household. The Secretary maintains on appeal that despite the difference in wording between the statute and the regulation, nothing in the Secretary's regulation precludes a claimant from asserting that he or she does not live with a sibling. Plaintiffs respond, however, that the DPW has not changed its regulations to reflect the live together component of the statute, and that under the current regulations caseworkers would not accept--indeed, would be precluded from accepting--siblings' claims that they do not live together. At the conclusion of oral argument the Court, sensing that the parties were within reach of agreement, requested each party to submit proposed language of the regulation implementing the sibling rule which would be consistent with the statute. Responding to the plaintiffs' submission, the Secretary stated that he was willing to stipulate to the following, which, he maintained, was based on current law and policy: 7 28 (1) In implementing the live together test for siblings, the defendants are required to apply the sibling rule to siblings who are found to live together in light of all the circumstances; 29 (2) defendants are required to offer siblings a reasonable opportunity to present evidence bearing on whether they in fact live together; and 30 (3) defendants are required to make any necessary adjustments in the allotment of food stamps, including providing retroactive benefits under 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2023(b), and to refrain from alleging overissuances of food stamps to siblings who can show that they do not or did not live together. 31 Although the plaintiffs sought a more exacting statement, we view the Secretary's proffer as sharply narrowing the scope of the dispute between the parties over the sibling rule issue. In stating that the sibling rule may only be applied to siblings who are found to live together in light of all the circumstances, the Secretary and the DPW are conceding that a same address test is an impermissible way to implement the sibling rule and that to apply such a test would be to disregard all the circumstances that must be considered in order to determine whether siblings live together. Unfortunately, however, the defendants' proffer has not obviated the need for this opinion, because the plaintiffs are unwilling to accept it without more detailed protocols for its application. Moreover, there may indeed be situations in which siblings living together, as did the Robinsons and Alvins, could be found not to live together after considering all the circumstances. Indicia of not living together might include, inter alia, separate entrances and locks, separate finances, utility bills and telephones, and essentially separate living quarters. Of course, determining what constitutes living together remains with DPW. The proffer does, however, form much of the basis for our result.
32 The Food Stamp Act provides that a household's application for food stamps will be subject to verification by Federal, State, and local officials to determine if such information is factual. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2020(e)(2). Households seeking eligibility for food stamps must cooperate with the State agency, and certain information provided in the food stamp application must be verified through, inter alia the use of third-party information or documentation to establish the accuracy of statements on the application. 7 C.F.R. 273.2(f). Pennsylvania's regulations conform substantially with the federal regulations. See 55 Pa.Code Sec. 505.4 (1986). Although federal regulations for AFDC and MA benefits do not specify eligibility verification requirements in the same detail as the federal and state food stamp regulations, common applications for all three types of benefits are contemplated. Compare 42 U.S.C. Secs. 602(a)(10), 604, 1396a(a)(8), 1396c with 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2020(e)(2). 33 The core of plaintiffs' third party verification claim is set forth in their amended complaint: 34 When applicants and recipients appear at application, redetermination, or recertification interviews without verification [that DPW] consider[s] adequate, [DPW will] deny or delay assistance to these applicants and recipients whether or not the nature of the verification demanded was clearly identified on the PA 253 or other notice given to the applicant or recipient, whether or not alternative verification would be available on a particular issue, and whether or not the applicant or recipient was unable to produce the verification because of the refusal or failure of a third party to cooperate. Amended Complaint p 47 at 14. 8 35 Plaintiffs' claim regarding third party verification can be thus encapsulated into two broad allegations: (1) DPW engages in a pattern and practice of repeatedly demanding from applicants and recipients information not clearly specified in the benefit application; and (2) DPW denies plaintiffs benefits without offering them alternative means of proving their eligibility when a third party refuses to cooperate, violating the Due Process Clause, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, and other federal statutes and regulations. 36 On appeal, defendants have not responded directly to plaintiffs' claim of DPW's pattern and practices regarding third party verification. Instead, the defendants assert: (1) that plaintiff Robinson does not present a case or controversy because she has left Pennsylvania and because she never suffered an injury as a result of the third party verification requirements; and (2) that proposed plaintiffs Alvin and Pope lack standing. We address these contentions in the margin. 9