Opinion ID: 2077850
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant's Attorney Malpractice Claim

Text: The second claim in the complaint against Sollitto alleged negligence or attorney malpractice. To be successful in an action for attorney malpractice, a plaintiff must prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence not only a defendant's duty of care, but also a breach thereof and the damages actually or proximately resulting therefrom to the plaintiff. Macera Brothers of Cranston, Inc. v. Gelfuso & Lachut, Inc., 740 A.2d 1262, 1264 (R.I.1999). Further, we have stated that [f]ailure to prove all three of those required elements, acts as a matter of law, to bar relief or recovery. Id. (quoting Vallinoto v. DeSandro, 688 A.2d 830, 836 (R.I.1997)). As noted, plaintiff's conviction for first degree murder has yet to become final; a judgment of conviction is not final as long as the case is pending on appeal. State v. Macarelli, 118 R.I. 693, 696, 375 A.2d 944, 946 (1977). In Heck, supra, the District Court dismissed the action without prejudice while petitioners' appeal to the Seventh Circuit was pending. Although this is clearly the appropriate remedy when a case is not ripe for suit, it is not the sole dispositive factor in the instant controversy. Other jurisdictions have held that a criminal defendant may not proceed in a legal malpractice action until and unless he can prove that he is innocent of the underlying charge and prove that, but for the attorney's negligence, plaintiff could not have been convicted of the crimes in question. [3] Clearly, the first step in making such a showing is at least an assertion in the pleading stage. Without such a claim, the plaintiff fails to properly assert the causation requirement for legal malpractice. Here, the failure of plaintiff's complaint to assert this causation requirement is fatal to his malpractice claim. In Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783, 788 (Mass. 1991), the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts held that in order to justify a right to recover, a plaintiff asserting an error of the type Glenn asserts in this case [failure to object to a faulty jury instruction] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, not only that the negligence of the attorney defendant caused his harm, but also that he is innocent of the crime charged. The defendant urges us to adopt this heightened standard for malpractice claims against the criminal defense bar. However, because Laurence has failed to plead one of the basic requirements for a legal malpractice action and has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we need not reach the issue of whether a defendant must prove his innocence in cases alleging malpractice committed in the course of his criminal defense. Furthermore, we are not satisfied that the complaint sets forth even a threshold showing of negligence on the part of this well-respected attorney. The defendant's representation of the plaintiff was brief and was limited to a hearing on a pretrial motion to suppress. During the trial on the central question of Laurence's guilt or innocence, the defendant represented himself. We are hard-pressed to conclude that the defendant's conviction rested solely on the purported negligence of an attorney whose engagement was limited to a pretrial suppression hearing held months before the jury trial began. The Superior Court justice, therefore, properly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a justiciable claim.