Opinion ID: 2362028
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Parameters of the Municipal Model

Text: [¶ 38] Because the Tribes agreed to be treated as municipalities for purposes of defining their relationship with the State of Maine, state laws that apply to municipalities also routinely apply to the Tribes. For example, similar to any municipality, the Tribes do not have absolute sovereign immunity against law suits. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 1725(d)(1) (West 1983). As with other cities and towns, however, the Tribes are entitled to qualified immunity from suits in state and federal courts. See 30 M.R.S.A. § 6206(2) (establishing a Tribe's qualified immunity when acting in its governmental capacity to the same extent as any municipality); Couturier v. Penobscot Indian Nation, 544 A.2d 306, 307 (Me.1988). The Implementing Act provided the Tribes broad ordinance powers pursuant to a municipality's home rule authority. See 30 M.R.S.A. § 6206(1). Properties used by Tribes for governmental purposes are exempt from taxation by the state to the same extent provided for any such properties owned by municipalities. Id. § 6208(2) (1996). Regarding financial aid, not only are the Tribes eligible to receive all of the financial benefits which the United States provides to Indians, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1725(i) (West 1983 & Supp.2000), but they are also eligible to receive financial assistance from the state as a municipality of the state, 30 M.R.S.A. § 6211(1) (1996). [¶ 39] At the same time, however, exceptions to the municipal model were clearly anticipated by both parties. Some exceptions are set out without ambiguity. For example, in contrast to municipalities, the Tribes have retained exclusive jurisdiction over certain juvenile, civil, criminal, and domestic relations matters. 30 M.R.S.A. §§ 6209-A, 6209-B (1996 & Supp.2000); 25 U.S.C.A. § 1727 (West 1983) (granting tribal courts exclusive jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings pursuant to Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978). Judgments from those proceedings are granted full faith and credit, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1725(g) (West 1983), and are not subject to principles of double jeopardy in state courts. See State v. Mitchell, 1998 ME 128, ¶ 6, 712 A.2d 1033, 1034. The Tribes have the exclusive power to regulate certain aspects of the fishing and wildlife resources within their territories, 30 M.R.S.A. § 6207(1) (1996), a power not delegated to municipalities. The Tribes also have the power to create tribal school committees, distinct from the committees established by the laws of Maine, 30 M.R.S.A. § 6214 (1996), but regulated in a similar fashion. [¶ 40] Other exceptions to the municipal model recognize that the Tribes may take on roles that are distinct from municipal or governmental roles. In courts, the Tribes may generally sue and be sued to the same extent as any other entity or person. 30 M.R.S.A. § 6206(2). When a Tribe acts in its business capacity, rather than in its governmental capacity, it is deemed to be a business corporation organized under the laws of the State. Id. § 6208(3) (1996). When acting in its business capacity as distinguished from its governmental capacity, a Tribe is taxed to the same extent as any other corporation. Id.; cf. Couturier, 544 A.2d at 309 n. 6 (explaining that the Maine Tort Claims Act, which ordinarily applies to municipalities, does not apply to the Tribes when acting in their business capacities). With regard to the federal government, the Tribes are recognized as sovereign Indian Tribes entitled to receive federal funding available to other such tribes, but not subject to the full measure of control Congress has generally exercised over similar Indian tribes. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 1725; cf. Akins, 130 F.3d at 489-90; Passamaquoddy Tribe, 75 F.3d at 794. [¶ 41] Thus, depending on the circumstances and activity engaged in by a Tribe, it may be recognized as a sovereign nation, a person or other entity, a business corporation, or a municipal government. See, e.g., 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2802(19) (1998 & Supp.2000) (defining a Tribe as a sovereign state for purposes of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act); 17 M.R.S.A. § 314-A (Supp.2000) (granting the Tribes the right to obtain licenses to operate high-stakes beano). Designation of the capacity in which the Tribes act is, therefore, a necessary first step in the determination of the laws applicable to those actions. [¶ 42] Accordingly, when it is asserted that a state law is applicable to the Tribes, our analysis proceeds as follows: (1) to what entities does the statute at issue apply; (2) are the Tribes acting in the capacity of such entities; (3) if so, does the Maine Implementing Act expressly prohibit the application of the statute to the Tribes generally; (4) if not, does the Maine Implementing Act prohibit or limit the application of the statute in the circumstances before the court. Here, the paper companies have asserted that the Freedom of Access Act is fully applicable to the Tribes. We turn then to our first enquiry: to what entities does the Freedom of Access apply.