Opinion ID: 865371
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Accomplice Mitigating Factor

Text: 18 This admission in King’s statement, which was read at his resentencing trial, is located in the original record. Further, this is not disputed by either party. See also King v. State, 421 So. 2d 1009, 1010-1011 (Miss. 1982). 19 However, King did not admit to pulling the wires. 50 ¶67. King submits that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the potential mitigating circumstance that he was only “an accomplice in the capital offense committed by another person,” based on his assertion that his uncle, Willie Porter, played a role in the crime. King argues that this refusal was clearly erroneous as this circumstance is a statutory mitigator under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(6)(d) (Rev. 2000). ¶68. Section 99-19-101(6)(d) lists one mitigating circumstance as: “[t]he defendant was an accomplice in the capital offense committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor.” However, as we discussed earlier in this opinion, King was not entitled to an instruction on residual doubt as to his guilt at his resentencing trial. See supra Issue VII. Therefore, as this case was before the trial court for the sole purpose of sentencing, the trial court properly refused this instruction which pertained to the question of King’s guilt in a killing for which he had already been convicted. Additionally, Part 2 (j) of Instruction SSP-4A lists “[a]ny other circumstances which you deem mitigating” as one of the mitigating circumstances that the jury could have found to exist. Further, King’s statement was read at trial, in which he implicated Willie Porter in the burglary and stated that he saw Porter go into Patterson’s house as he was leaving. As the jury was allowed to hear this evidence, if they so determined, they could have found this to be a mitigating circumstance under (j). Accordingly, we find no merit in this issue.