Opinion ID: 756728
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Riceland's Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Text: 22 Riceland claims that the district court erred in denying its motions for judgment as a matter of law on the Appellees' retaliation claims. It contends that both Smith and Thomas failed to establish the third element of their prima facie cases of retaliation--a causal connection between their statutorily protected activity and their termination--and that both failed to produce evidence that Riceland's legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for their discharges were pretextual. 23 This Court reviews a district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. Coffman v. Tracker Marine, 141 F.3d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir.1998). We must determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict. Id. A jury's verdict must be affirmed unless, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, we conclude that a reasonable jury could not have found for that party. Cross v. Cleaver, 142 F.3d 1059, 1066 (8th Cir.1998). If, however, reasonable persons could differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence, the motion must be denied. Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 844 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2510, 138 L.Ed.2d 1013 (1997). 24 Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who file charges of discrimination or who assist others in opposing discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The legal framework for analyzing retaliation claims under Title VII is the familiar three-stage, burden-shifting test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See, e.g., Stevens v. St. Louis Univ. Med. Ctr., 97 F.3d 268, 270 (8th Cir.1996). 25 Under this analysis, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Coffman, 141 F.3d at 1245. To do this, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the adverse employment action and the protected activity. Stevens, 97 F.3d at 270. A defendant must then rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case by presenting evidence of a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the action it took against the plaintiff. Coffman, 141 F.3d at 1245. If the defendant makes this showing, the plaintiff must then show that the defendant's proffered reason was a pretext and that illegal retaliation was a motivating reason for the defendant's decision. Id. The fundamental issue is whether the Appellees produced sufficient evidence to allow a jury reasonably to find that Riceland intentionally retaliated against them because of their statutorily protected conduct. See Ryther, 108 F.3d at 838.
26 Riceland contends that Thomas failed to produce sufficient evidence to support the third element of his prima facie case--that there was a causal connection between his statutorily protected activity and his termination. It argues that there was no evidence presented at trial upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that anyone at Riceland knew that Thomas had helped Smith file her charge of discrimination, and that without such knowledge, a causal connection between Thomas' assistance of Smith and his termination cannot exist. 27 In order to establish the third element of his prima facie case of retaliation, Thomas needed to present evidence that Riceland knew that he had engaged in statutorily protected activity. See Simon v. Simmons Foods, Inc., 49 F.3d 386, 389 (8th Cir.1995) (stating that a plaintiff must show that the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the protected conduct in order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation); Wolff v. Berkley, Inc., 938 F.2d 100, 103 (8th Cir.1991) (stating that a causal link between statutorily protected activity and an adverse employment action does not exist if the employer is not aware of the employee's statutorily protected activity). We find that, based upon the evidence at trial, no reasonable jury could have found that Riceland knew that Thomas had helped Smith in filing her charge of discrimination, and therefore, no reasonable jury could have found that a causal connection existed between Thomas' assistance of Smith and his termination. 28 Thomas acknowledges that there was no direct evidence at trial that anyone at Riceland knew that he had helped Smith file her charge of discrimination. Despite this, he contends that because Riceland knew that he and Smith were living together and had treated them as a married couple in the past, and because Riceland knew that Smith had filed a charge of discrimination, the jury could reasonably have concluded that Riceland must have known that Thomas aided Smith in filing her charge. We conclude that this evidence is insufficient to support a reasonable finding that Riceland knew that Thomas had engaged in statutorily protected activity. Instead, the jury's verdict was based upon complete speculation, rather than any reasonable inferences created by the evidence, that Riceland knew that Thomas had helped Smith file her charge. Riceland, therefore, was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Thomas' retaliation claim. 29 In the alternative, Thomas argues that he is not required to show that he engaged in statutorily protected activity about which Riceland had knowledge in order to establish his prima facie case. Instead, he asks this Court to expand the protection given by Title VII's anti-retaliation provision to prohibit employers from taking adverse action against employees whose spouses or significant others have engaged in statutorily protected activity against the employer. 30 Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). This Court's decisions on retaliation claims have consistently held that, in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the employee must have engaged in statutorily protected activity. See, e.g., Smith v. St. Louis Univ., 109 F.3d 1261, 1265-66 (8th Cir.1997); Stevens, 97 F.3d at 270. We believe that the rule advocated by Thomas--that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim need not have personally engaged in statutorily protected activity if his or her spouse or significant other, who works for the same employer, has done so--is neither supported by the plain language of Title VII nor necessary to protect third parties, such as spouses or significant others, from retaliation. See Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1226-27 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1821, 137 L.Ed.2d 1029 (1997). Title VII already offers broad protection to such individuals by prohibiting employers from retaliating against employees for assist[ing] or participat[ing] in any mannerin a proceeding under Title VII. Accordingly, we hold that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim under Title VII must establish that she personally engaged in the protected conduct. 31 Because we conclude that the district court erred in denying Riceland's motion for judgment as a matter with respect to Thomas' retaliation claim, we reverse the decision of the district court on Thomas' retaliation claim. 4
32 Riceland argues that Smith failed to establish the third element of her prima facie case--that there was a causal connection between the filing of her charge of discrimination and her termination. Riceland contends that the timing between Smith's charge of discrimination and her discharge is insufficient, as a matter of law, to create an inference of a causal connection between the two. 33 We find that Riceland's position is not supported by Eighth Circuit precedent. This Court has noted that a plaintiff can establish a causal connection between statutorily protected activity and an adverse employment action through circumstantial evidence, such as the timing between the two events. 5 See Reich v. Hoy Shoe Co., Inc., 32 F.3d 361, 365 n. 4 (8th Cir.1994). Moreover, this Court has found that periods of time between statutorily protected activity and adverse employment actions longer than the three-month period in the instant case were sufficient to create an inference of the requisite causal connection. See, e.g., Smith, 109 F.3d at 1266. Finally, we believe that Smith has presented evidence, in addition to the timing between the filing of her charge and her termination, that creates a causal connection between the two events. She presented evidence that management at Riceland confronted her about filing her charge and that other employees who had not filed charges of discrimination were not investigated as closely or punished as severely as she was, even though they had been paid for time spent in the Case Center on days when they had no lesson time. Based upon this evidence, we find that Smith has presented sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that a causal connection existed between the filing of her charge of discrimination and her termination. 34 Riceland also argues that Smith failed to present evidence that its legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for her termination--that computer records and other employees demonstrated that she had abused the Case Center--was a pretext for illegal retaliation. After having reviewed the record carefully, we find that Smith presented sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that Riceland intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of having filed a charge of discrimination against Riceland. 35 In addition to the evidence establishing her prima facie case of retaliation, Smith presented evidence at trial showing that Riceland's explanation for her termination was a fabrication. McNeil testified that, at the time she reported Smith to Gingras, three employees had given her oral statements implicating Smith for getting paid for time in the Case Center when she was not present. In addition, Gingras testified that he decided to fire Smith because the company had numerous statements from other employees implicating her in Case Center abuse. The evidence at trial, however, indicated that at the time of Smith's termination, McNeil had received only one such oral complaint implicating Smith. Moreover, this complaint came from an individual who had been paid for time spent in the Case Center when he had no registered lesson time, but he was not investigated further. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Gingras' stated reason for firing Smith was not true. In addition, the testimony revealed that other employees who had not filed charges of discrimination but had been paid for time spent in the Case Center on days when they had no lesson time were not investigated as closely or punished as harshly as Smith and that their explanations for the discrepancies in their time were accepted by Riceland. This evidence is sufficient to support the jury's verdict in favor of Smith on her retaliation claim. We conclude, therefore, that the district court properly denied Riceland's motions for judgment as a matter of law.