Opinion ID: 1903080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hearing on Motion to Amend

Text: [¶ 14] Nichols further argues that the court violated the statutory mandate by delaying the hearing on her motion to amend or for relief from the court's temporary order. Nichols contends that in scheduling the full testimonial hearing in the matter for April 16, 2004, more than sixty days after the entry of the temporary order on February 10, 2004, the court violated the forty-day statutory mandate of 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-310-A(b), which provides, in pertinent part: If the court has exercised temporary guardianship powers or has issued an ex parte order under subsection (a), and if it comes to the court's attention, through the report of the visitor or guardian ad litem or otherwise, . . . that an issue exists with respect to whether the temporary guardianship is in the allegedly incapacitated person's best interest, the court shall hold an expedited hearing within 40 days of the entry of the ex parte order under subsection (a). 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-310-A(b) (1998) (emphasis added). [¶ 15] Nichols's motion to amend or for relief from judgment did raise the issue of whether Regan's guardianship of Florence was in Florence's best interest. The court was authorized to conduct the hearing when it did, however, because of the exception provided in 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-408-A(b) (1998), that a continuance may be granted when the petitioner and the attorney for the protected person, or, if none, the visitor or guardian ad litem, agree to such a continuance. The continuance provision in section 5-408-A(b) may be invoked in the absence of knowledge or consent of interested parties like Nichols. The court's scheduling of the full hearing in this matter was within its discretion and did not violate the statute.