Opinion ID: 2021581
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statements of Coconspirators

Text: Defendant's first claim of error relates to the three statements of Garcia and Torres, as testified to by Castro  Garcia's March 18 I'll do it and Torres's offer to provide Garcia with a gun, and Torres's June 1 It's time. Defendant argues that hearsay statements of coconspirators are admissible only when a prima facie case of conspiracy is established independent of the statements, and maintains that the People failed to establish such a case here. We reject that claim. A declaration by a coconspirator during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy is admissible against another coconspirator as an exception to the hearsay rule ( People v Bac Tran, 80 NY2d 170, 179 [1992]). The theory underlying the coconspirator's exception is that all participants in a conspiracy are deemed responsible for each of the acts and declarations of the others ( see e.g. People v Rastelli, 37 NY2d 240, 244 [1975]; Martin, Capra and Rossi, New York Evidence Handbook § 8.3.2.4, at 720 [2d ed]). The exception is not limited to permitting introduction of a conspirator's declaration to prove that a coconspirator committed the crime of conspiracy, but, rather, may be invoked to support introduction of such declaration to prove a coconspirator's commission of a substantive crime for which the conspiracy was formed ( People v Salko, 47 NY2d 230, 237 [1979], rearg denied 47 NY2d 1010 [1979]). However, as defendant points out, such declarations may be admitted only when a prima facie case of conspiracy has been established. While the prima facie case of conspiracy must be made without recourse to the declarations sought to be introduced ( Salko, 47 NY2d at 238), the testimony of other witnesses or participants may establish a prima facie case ( People v Wolf, 98 NY2d 105, 118 [2002]).
At the outset, we note that the same evidence may be admissible under different theories when offered for different purposes. Here, some of the statements at issue were relevant for different purposes with respect to the different charges for which defendant was tried. Specifically, although the March 18 declarations of Garcia and Torres were hearsay when offered to prove the murder and related charges of which defendant was acquitted, they were nonhearsay when offered to prove the only charge now before us  conspiracy. A conspiracy consists of an agreement to commit an underlying substantive crime (here, murder), coupled with an overt act committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy ( see Penal Law §§ 105.15, 105.20). Thus, with respect to the conspiracy charge, Garcia's acceptance of defendant's solicitation to murder Ortiz was relevant not for its truth, but rather as evidence of an agreement to commit the underlying crime  itself an essential element of the crime of conspiracy. In other words, whether or not Garcia in fact killed Ortiz, his acceptance of defendant's invitation to do so was a verbal act which rendered defendant and his coconspirators culpable for the inchoate crime of conspiracy, even if the planned substantive crime never came to fruition. Indeed, even if Garcia had no genuine intent ever to commit the murder, defendant would be guilty of conspiracy if he believed he had entered into such an agreement. [T]he `act' of agreeing is concrete and unambiguous as an expression of each actor's intent to violate the law. . . . The fact of agreement serves only to unequivocally establish a particular actor's intent to commit the object crime by acting with others. The identity and degree of participation by the other persons are wholly irrelevant. Also irrelevant are the niceties of contract law concerning when an agreement is consummated (e.g., meeting of the minds). It is the individual who is prosecuted [for conspiracy] and necessarily it is the individual who must have the prescribed mens rea. The requisite intent is to join with others to commit a substantive crime. If an individual believes he has so joined, it is sufficient to establish complicity, regardless of the actual fact of agreement. . . . This is particularly so. . . where . . . it appears that the individual defendant is the originator of the criminal plan and the one most anxious to see the successful completion of the criminal objective ( People v Schwimmer, 66 AD2d 91, 95-96 [2d Dept 1978], affd for reasons stated in op below 47 NY2d 1004, 1005 [1979]). Similarly, Torres's statement that he would provide the gun for a later homicide  even if ultimately untrue  was admissible for the fact that it was said, inasmuch as its utterance provided evidence of Torres's unlawful agreement with defendant and Garcia. Thus, because the March 18 statements were nonhearsay with respect to the conspiracy charge, the People had no obligation to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy in order for the statements to be admissible. The analysis differs respecting the admissibility of these declarations as relevant proof of the substantive crimes. Garcia's inculpatory offer to do it, if introduced as evidence that he had in fact committed the June 1 homicide, would  although proffered in that event for its truth  nevertheless be admissible at defendant's trial under the coconspirator's exception to the hearsay rule as evidence of defendant's complicity in the murder. In that event, however, a prima facie case would need to be established independent of the hearsay statement. The same rule applies to Torres's offer to provide the gun, if used to establish the conspirators' collective guilt of murder and weapon possession. Thus, the same declarations  relevant both to conspiracy and to the substantive crimes whose commission formed the basis of the conspiratorial enterprise  were admissible at defendant's trial under different theories and different rules, depending on which crimes they were offered to prove. Since the statements were nonhearsay with respect to the conspiracy charge  the only charge before us  defendant's challenge to their admissibility concerning that charge is without merit.
The third challenged statement  Torres's June 1 It's time remark to Castro  was offered for its truth, and therefore hearsay, whether as to the conspiracy charge or the substantive crimes. In the context of Castro's account, Torres's statement in effect meant, The time has come to kill Ortiz. Nevertheless, this statement was properly admissible against defendant as a declaration made by a coconspirator in the course or in furtherance of the conspiracy, so long as the People established a prima facie case independent of any hearsay statements. The Appellate Division majority, in affirming defendant's conspiracy conviction, correctly concluded that the People had met this burden. The prosecution introduced, through Castro, defendant's statements at the March 18 meeting that he would pay $5,000 to have Ortiz murdered, [] along with evidence of Garcia's acceptance of defendant's proposal and Torres's offer to procure the murder weapon. Castro further testified that both the shooter and the person allegedly responsible for securing the gun and entering defendant's stash house to notify the shooter that the intended victim was in the playground were present at the March 18 meeting. That these individuals worked as drug dealers for defendant, whose motive for killing Ortiz arose from a desire to eliminate competition, provides further circumstantial proof that the participants in the June 1 shooting were acting on behalf of defendant to protect the economic interests of the drug business from which they all benefitted. In this regard, Castro testified that Garcia argued with Ortiz about defendant's drug spot just before he shot him.
We further note that the trial court did not err in conditionally admitting any hearsay statements of coconspirators subject to connection  that is, subject to later proof of a prima facie case of conspiracy. Although any statements admitted pursuant to the coconspirator's exception must have been made after the formation of the conspiracy  that is, in the course and in furtherance of it  testimony establishing the prima facie case need not precede testimony about the hearsay statements. Inasmuch as the order of proof at trial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court ( see e.g. People v Olsen, 34 NY2d 349, 353 [1974]), a coconspirator's statements are admissible as long as the People independently establish a conspiracy by the close of their case ( see e.g. People v McKane, 143 NY 455, 473 [1894] [even if the coconspirator's statements were objectionable at the time they were introduced, they were subsequently made competent by proof of the defendant's admissions that the coconspirator was acting under his orders]; People v Becker, 215 NY 126, 148-149 [1915]).