Opinion ID: 2973753
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Johnson’s Right to a Fair Trial

Text: Johnson claims that the district court was biased against him, as evidenced by the following four events during the trial, and that the bias denied him his right to a fair trial. First, Johnson asserts that the following exchange exhibited the court’s hostility toward Johnson’s attorney: Q. After this bank robbery were you very depressed? A. Yes. Q. Were you talking of committing suicide? A. No, I had thoughts of it. MS. CARLSON: Objection as to relevance as to his state of mind after the bank robbery. THE COURT: I don’t see how it’s relevant unless you’ve got something else. MR. BERGER: Well, okay. His observations after the bankruptcy (sic). He’s told us about alleged statements made after the bankruptcy and his state of mind at that time. No. 04-2371 13 THE COURT; Bankruptcy? MR. BERGER: Bank robbery. Same thing. THE COURT: Well, I – MR. BERGER: I’m going no further in this area, okay. THE COURT: Okay. MR. BERGER: Okay. THE COURT: Listen, you don’t say okay to me. MR. BERGER: I’m sorry, sir. THE COURT: I tell you – MR. BERGER: Okay. THE COURT: – When it’s okay with me. You don’t respond that way unless you want some sanctions talked about. MR. BERGER: I meant no disrespect. THE COURT: You’ve done it two or three times today. Don’t do it again. MR. BERGER: Okay. I meant no disrespect. THE COURT: Good. MR. BERGER: I have nothing further, your Honor. Second, Johnson claims that the district court “threatened” that he would have to testify. The court’s statements took place after defense counsel received permission to have Johnson try on shoes that were used in the robbery and were found at his residence. The district court warned: No. 04-2371 14 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. If Mr. Johnson says anything, however, he’s going to testify. MR. BERGER: I’m aware of that. Mr. Johnson, would you come up here and sit down. Mr. Johnson, do not say a word, but take off your shoes, the black shoes you’re wearing now. THE COURT: I’m a little uncertain, I’m not trying to stop you, but I’m a little uncertain how we’re going to tell what the fit is if Mr. Johnson doesn’t say anything, but go ahead, if you think you can. Third, Johnson contends that the district court improperly cut off his cross-examination of Gibson regarding Gibson’s plea agreement: Q. Mr. Gibson, I wanted to ask you a few questions about your plea agreement, the one that you entered into. Are you familiar with that? A. Yes. Q. The plea agreement that you entered into resulted in your getting how many months? A. 87. Q. But the sentence that was imposed was imposed by this Judge; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Did the plea agreement specify what the maximum or minium would be as to the sentence? A. I’m not sure. Q. Do you have a copy of it with you? A. No, I do not. Q. When is the last time you saw it? No. 04-2371 15 A. Probably September 2003 at my sentencing. Q. Did the plea agreement result in any charges being dropped? A. Yes. Q. And was that the felony firearm? A. Yes, it was. Q. And what did that save you? A. I’m not sure. I believe seven years to be ran consecutively. Q. So it saved you seven years – your impression is that it saved you seven years? A. That would probably been up to Judge O’Meara. I don’t know. Q. Well, you do know that the Count 2, dealing with a firearm, was dismissed, do you not? A. Yes, I know that. Q. And if it was dismissed Judge O’Meara could not sentence you on that firearm charge, could he? A. No. Q. And therefore when you negotiated a dismissal of the firearm charge, do you feel that that saved you seven years? A. No, not necessarily. I feel that it caused the prosecution not to charge me with that, given the facts that surrounding the case after their investigation. Q. Did you say on direct examination that it saved you seven consecutive years? A. No, I said on direct examination that I could have been charged up to according to what I’ve been told. I don’t know for sure. I’m not good at that with the law, up to additional seven years. No. 04-2371 16 I would have to study the law before I could answer you correctly as far as exactly how much time it carries, I’m not sure. THE COURT: What are we doing this for, I mean, this is a very complicated area for lawyers and for judges. What are we trying to get this kind of information from the witness for? MR. BERGER: I’m trying to indicate motivation for testifying like he is now. THE COURT: Well, that’s there. You don’t have – if you want to argue it, you don’t have to find out whether it’s 57 or 58 months. MR. BERGER: No, and I also feel his credibility is involved. Can I just ask a few more questions in this area? THE COURT: You just asked a few more questions. Go on to something else. Fourth, Johnson claims that the district court denigrated the testimony of defensewitness Sykes during the government’s cross examination by stating: THE COURT: All right. Unless you have something important further to get out of this witness who is uncooperative and -- MS. CARLSON: I do, your Honor. THE COURT: -- not doing himself or anybody else any good, I think we should conclude this testimony very quickly, Johnson moved for a mistrial because of this statement, but the district court denied the motion. We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Anderson, 353 F.3d 490, 502 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1068 (2004). We also review a district court’s conduct during a trial under an abuse of discretion standard. No. 04-2371 17 McMillan v. Castro, 405 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2005). Since Johnson only raised an objection before the district court as to the comment about Sykes, we review the other allegations of bias for plain error. Plain error is “limited to those harmful ones that are so rank that they should have been apparent to the trial judge without objection, or that strike at the fundamental fairness, honesty, or public reputation of the trial.” United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1277, 1281 (6th Cir. 1987). In Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994), the Supreme Court provided guidance as to when a district court’s remarks or rulings amount to a level of bias that denies a defendant a fair trial. [O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deepseated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so if they reveal on opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible. . . . Not establishing bias or partiality, however, are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display. A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—remain immune. Id. at 555-56. The first three of Johnson’s examples of alleged bias fit squarely within the Liteky Court’s definition of what is not the sort of judicial bias that deprives a defendant of a fair trial. The “okay” exchange merely exhibited the district court’s annoyance at defense counsel’s disrespectful behavior. The warning that Johnson’s comments while trying on No. 04-2371 18 shoes would be considered testimony was the district court’s effort to protect Johnson’s right not to testify. The district judge went out of his way to point out a potential pitfall to defense counsel if counsel pursued the shoe-fitting, and by so doing assisted defense counsel in making a more informed decision as to whether he should ask his client to try on the shoes in front of the jury. The district court’s ruling cutting off defense counsel’s questioning of Gibson regarding his plea agreement was an example of the court managing the trial by restricting repetitive questioning and the asking of questions that the witness was unable to answer. The court’s comment about the unhelpfulness of Sykes’s testimony is the most serious of Johnson’s allegations of bias. In United States v. Slone, 833 F.2d 595, 597 (6th Cir. 1987), we held that a trial court does have some discretion to inject itself into a trial and specifically into witness testimony, and that it may be difficult to determine when a court has exceeded its proper bounds. We identified the following relevant factors when determining whether a court’s intrusion was improper: “if a witness is difficult, if a witness’ testimony is unbelievable and counsel fails to adequately probe, or if the witness becomes inadvertently confused, judicial intervention may be needed.” Id., citing United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931, 933 (6th Cir. 1979). In other cases where we have held that judicial comments or interference in witness examination deprived a defendant of a fair trial, judicial actions far more intrusive were involved. For example, in Hickman the district court interrupted defense counsel numerous times, made numerous sua sponte objections that benefitted the prosecution, and interjected itself several times during witness testimony by asking extensive questions that either No. 04-2371 19 rehabilitated the prosecution’s witnesses or undermined the defendant’s. We concluded that the court’s frequent and one-sided intrusions deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Id. at 934. We also found in Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 F.3d 801, 805-08 (6th Cir. 1999), that a district court’s demeanor deprived the plaintiff of a fair trial by interrupting the plaintiff’s opening statement six times, interrupting the plaintiff’s witnesses, questioning the plaintiff’s witnesses about matters unrelated to the scope of direct examination, admonishing plaintiff’s witnesses for not being short enough in answering questions, repeatedly suggesting to defense counsel that he ought to register objections to certain testimony, pointing at defense counsel prompting him to object, and negatively commenting on plaintiff’s theory of the case. In this case, the district court’s interruption of the government’s cross-examination of Sykes did not “so clearly cross[] the line to reach that area of impermissible and prejudicial behavior which would warrant reversal.” United States v. Tilton, 714 F.2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1983); see also McMillan, 405 F.3d at 412. Any negative impact on the jury was mitigated by several jury instructions informing them that any comments made by the district court should not influence their determination of guilt or innocence. The court instructed the jury: Another part of your job as jurors is to decide how credible or believable each witness was. This is your job, not mine. It’s up to you to decide if a witness’ testimony is believable and how much weight you think it deserves. You are free to believe everything a witness said or only part of it or none of it at all, but you should act reasonably and carefully in making these decisions. ... .... Do not interpret my rulings on [the lawyers’] objections as any indication how I think the case should be decided. My rulings were based on No. 04-2371 20 the Rules of Evidence, not on how I feel about the case. Remember that your decision must be based only on the evidence that you saw and heard here in court. .... Let me finish up by repeating something I’ve said to you earlier: Nothing that I have said or done during this trial was meant to influence your decision in any way. You decide for yourselves if the Government has proved the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. These instructions—combined with the fact that the court’s statement was an isolated remark and an interruption of the prosecutor, not defense counsel—leads us to conclude that there was no error in the district court’s conduct of Johnson’s trial sufficient to warrant reversal. See United States v. Smith, 831 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir. 1987) (stressing the importance of a district court’s instruction to the jury that it was not to infer the district court’s opinion from any of its actions in finding that the district court’s questioning of a witness did not warrant reversal); McMillan, 405 F.3d at 412 (finding that instructions similar to the ones issued in this case were a factor in the court’s conclusion that limited intrusions by the district court did not warrant reversal).