Opinion ID: 2604170
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Alaska Equal Protection Clause.

Text: We have explained the equal protection analysis that we apply under the Alaska Constitution in Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984). There we said: Alaska's own equal protection analysis was engendered in Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359 (Alaska 1976), and State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978). Erickson articulated an adjustable uniform-balancing test which placed a greater or lesser burden on the state to justify a classification depending on the importance of the individual right involved. Id. at 12. In effect, Erickson created a continuum of available levels of scrutiny, beginning with the rational basis test described in Isakson, 550 P.2d at 362-63, and ending with the functional equivalent of the federal compelling state interest test at the highest level of review. In Erickson we looked first to the legitimacy of the state purposes behind challenged legislation, second to the relationship between the chosen means and the asserted goals of the statute, and third to the state's interest in the means chosen as balanced against the nature of the constitutional right infringed. 574 P.2d at 12. Our recent opinion in State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983), formally revised the order of the analytic stages of Erickson. First, it must be determined at the outset what weight should be afforded the constitutional interest impaired by the challenged enactment. The nature of this interest is the most important variable in fixing the appropriate level of review. Thus, the initial inquiry under article I, section 1 of Alaska's constitution goes to the level of scrutiny. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d at 1192-93 & n. 14. Depending upon the primacy of the interest involved, the state will have a greater or lesser burden in justifying its legislation. Second, an examination must be undertaken of the purposes served by a challenged statute. Depending on the level of review determined, the state may be required to show only that its objectives were legitimate, at the low end of the continuum, or, at the high end of the scale, that the legislation was motivated by a compelling state interest. Third, an evaluation of the state's interest in the particular means employed to further its goals must be undertake. Once again, the state's burden will differ in accordance with the determination of the level of scrutiny under the first stage of analysis. At the low end of the sliding scale we have held that a substantial relationship between means and ends is constitutionally adequate. At the higher end of the scale, the fit between means and ends must be much closer. If the purpose can be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative, the classification will be invalidated. Id. at 269-70 (footnote omitted). On several occasions we have further explained that where there is no fundamental right at stake, the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution imposes a stricter standard than its federal counterpart. [35] While the applicable federal equal protection standard in reapportionment cases has not been clearly established, see L. Tribe, supra § 13-6 at 748, we will continue to use our stricter equal protection standard when assessing the constitutionality of a reapportionment plan. Because we conclude that the effect of the Board's intentional geographic discrimination in creating Senate District E tends toward disproportionality of representation and its purpose is therefore illegitimate, we hold the district unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution.
While it is clear that the right to vote is fundamental, Vogler v. Miller, 651 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1982), the constitutional interest allegedly impaired here is not the right to vote per se, but the interest of individual members of a geographic group or community in having their votes protected from disproportionate dilution by the votes of another geographic group or community. That is, the interest asserted is the right to an equally powerful and geographically effective vote in the state legislature. In this connection we note that it is implicit in our constitutional structure that similarly situated communities be treated in a similar manner. See, e.g., Alaska Const. art. II, § 19 (prohibiting local or special acts if a general act can be made applicable); Abrams v. State, 534 P.2d 91, 94 (Alaska 1975) (act is local or special if not reasonably related to a matter of common interest to the whole state). We consider a voter's right to an equally geographically effective or powerful vote, while not a fundamental right, to represent a significant constitutional interest.
Expressing its concern that a single-member senate district composed of House Districts 6 and 7 would result in the district's domination by the South Anchorage area and the creation of an additional Anchorage senate seat, the Board deliberately fashioned Senate District E to retain the balance between regional and Anchorage senate representation. The legitimacy of this purpose hinges on whether the Board intentionally sought to dilute the voting power of Anchorage voters disproportionately. Thus, if the Board sought to denigrate the voting power of Anchorage voters systematically by reducing their senate representation below their relative strength in the state's population, then such a purpose would be illegitimate. We are of the view that a neutral factors test, similar to that proposed by Justice Powell in Bandemer, ___ U.S. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2832, 92 L.Ed.2d at 131-32 (Powell, J., dissenting), should be employed to assess the legitimacy of the Board's purpose in designing Senate District E. [36] Under such a test we look both to the process followed by the Board in formulating its decision and to the substance of the Board's decision in order to ascertain whether the Board intentionally discriminated against a particular geographic area. Wholesale exclusion of any geographic area from the reapportionment process and the use of any secretive procedures suggest an illegitimate purpose. District boundaries which meander and selectively ignore political subdivisions and communities of interest, and evidence of regional partisanship are also suggestive. The presentation of evidence that indicates, when considered with the totality of the circumstances, that the Board acted intentionally to discriminate against the voters of a geographic area will serve to compel the Board to demonstrate that its acts aimed to effectuate proportional representation. That is, the Board will have the burden of proving that any intentional discrimination against voters of a particular area will lead to more proportional representation. Because our equal protection clause is more stringent than the federal equal protection clause, a showing of a consistent degradation of voting power in more than one election will not be required; rather once the Board's discriminatory intent is evident, its purpose in redistricting will be held illegitimate unless that redistricting effects a greater proportionality of representation. Moreover, because of our stricter constitutional standard, we will not consider any effect of disproportionality de minimus when determining the legitimacy of the Board's purpose. A totality of the circumstances assessment of the Board's reapportionment process is unnecessary here because the Board's intent was discriminatory on its face. Cf. Bandemer, at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2833-35, 92 L.Ed.2d at 133-36. It is evident that the Board sought to prevent another Anchorage senate seat in the state legislature, and normally the Board would thus be required to demonstrate that this intentional discrimination resulted in increased proportionality of geographic representation in the state legislature. We will not remand this aspect of the case, however, since we are able to decide the issue based on the statistical evidence of disproportionality developed in the record below. As noted above, Anchorage has a population for apportionment purposes of 42.6% of the state's total population and has received 40% of the state's senate seats; with an additional senate seat, it would have approximately 45% of the senate seats. [37] Thus, Anchorage will either remain underrepresented by 2.6% or become overrepresented by 2.4%, depending on whether Anchorage voters can in fact win the additional seat. Put another way, strict proportionality would give Anchorage voters 8.51 senate seats, and a redistricting toward proportionality would allow them the potential to win a ninth senate seat. Because it is clear that the Board intended to discriminate against the voters of Anchorage, [38] the Board has the burden of proving that it intentionally discriminated in order to increase the proportionality of geographic representation in the legislature. Since the record demonstrates that the action of the Board tends toward disproportionality  2.6% or .51 senate seat underrepresentation is more disproportionate than 2.4% or .49 senate seat overrepresentation  we conclude that the Board's purpose in creating Senate District E was illegitimate. [39] We therefore hold the district unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution. [40] Nevertheless, although we will not consider any effect of disproportionality de minimus in determining whether the Board's purpose is illegitimate, the degree of disproportionality will be considered in determining the appropriate relief to be granted. Here the effect of the Board's discriminatory intent is de minimus. Given this circumstance we conclude that a declaration that the Board's purpose in fashioning Senate District E was illegitimate under Alaska's equal protection clause is an adequate remedy, and we will not require the Board to redraw Senate District E. In contrast with federal apportionment decisions which have not held unconstitutional an insubstantial disadvantagement of groups of voters, e.g., Bandemer, at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2810, 92 L.Ed.2d at 106, or a minor deviation from ideal district size, e.g., Brown, 462 U.S. at 842-43, 103 S.Ct. at 2695-96, 77 L.Ed.2d at 221-22, we are of the view that declaratory relief in this instance promotes scrupulous observance of the law and at the same time adheres to the principle that the relief fashioned remedies the actual injury. [41] The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part. MOORE, J., not participating. COMPTON, J., dissents.