Opinion ID: 290587
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: conclusion

Text: Petitioner states is concluding, that his confinement as it is now being carried out under the present circumstances, constitutes 'Cruel and unusual and or unjust punishment.' Petitioner request(s) relief, due to the herein stated, in the kind and form of immediate release. 2 Although the hospital did not expressly so state, it appears from the records of the District Court that both previous applications were heard and dismissed on the merits. No appeal was taken in either case 3 With formal matter omitted, the response reads in full as follows: 1 The petitioner, Dennis Allen Dixon (Dennis A. Dixon), alleges in effect that he is illegally detained in Saint Elizabeths Hospital, Washington, D.C. The respondent admits that the petitioner is confined in Saint Elizabeths Hospital, but denies that such detention is illegal The petitioner, Dennis Allen Dixon (Dennis A. Dixon), was admitted to Saint Elizabeths Hospital December 11, 1964, by order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in accordance with the provisions of Title 24, Section 301(d), of the District of Columbia Code, as amended, after having been found not guilty by reason of insanity on charges of Assault With Intent To Commit Carnal Knowledge and Murder In The First Degree, Violation of Title 22, Sections 501 and 2401, of the District of Columbia Code in Criminal Number 705-63. Copies of his commitment paper are attached hereto, marked Exhibit 'A', and prayed to be read as a part of this return. 2 The petitioner, Dennis Allen Dixon (Dennis A. Dixon), does not allege that the respondent is acting arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to certify him for release 3 For the information of the Honorable Court, the respondent respectfully invites attention to the fact that the petitioner, Dennis Allen Dixon (Dennis A. Dixon), has had previous appearances in Court on a writs of habeas corpus, viz., H.C. 399-66, heard on or about October 10, 1966, and H.C. 135-68, heard on or about July 8, 1968. In each instance, the Presiding Judge discharged the writ, dismissed the petition and remanded the petitioner to the custody of the respondent for further care and treatment 4 The respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, including the right to periodic examination by the Hospital staff and the right to be examined by an outside psychiatrist, pursuant to 21 D.C.Code, Section 546. The Hospital records reveal that the petitioner has not submitted a written request to the Chief of Service for a current medical examination within the last six months. In Bolton versus Harris (130 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 395 F.2d 642 (1968)), the Court of Appeals expressly held that subsection (d) patients must exhaust these administrative remedies before applying for a writ of habeas corpus. (130 U.S.App.D.C. at 12 n. 59, 395 F.2d at 653 n. 59) 5 During petitioner's period of confinement in Saint Elizabeths Hospital, he has been under the care and observation of members of the medical staff of Saint Elizabeths Hospital, skilled in the care, diagnosis and treatment of nervous and mental disorders, who are of the opinion that he is mentally ill, suffering from Sexual Deviation, and that because of such illness is likely to injure himself or others if allowed to go at liberty WHEREFORE, the premises considered, the respondent prays that the writ of habeas corpus should not issue. The return was signed by the Superintendent of Saint Elizabeths Hospital, and approved by the Assistant United States Attorney responsible for such matters. 4 Almost ten years ago, we pointed out that it is 'imperative that denial (of the writ of habeas corpus) be accompanied by an expression of the reasons for the denial either by informal memorandum, by recitals in an order, or by findings.' Tatem v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 230, 232, 275 F.2d 894, 896 (1960) (Burger, J.) 5 Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258-259, 62 S.Ct. 510, 86 L.Ed. 832 (1942); United States v. Washington, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 135, 413 F.2d 409 (1969) 6 See Cross v. Harris, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 269 n. 64, 418 F.2d 1095, 1105 n. 64 (1969) 7 Compare Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 531-532, 80 S.Ct. 450, 4 L.Ed.2d 490 (1960) (Warren, C.J., concurring) 8 E.g., Allen v. Jacobs, H.C. No. 162-169; Walker v. Jacobs, H.C. No. 188069. Compare People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 270 N.Y.S.2d 573, 217 N.E.2d 636 (1966) 9 The government's motion was filed in this court on December 11, 1969. That same day, the hospital filed in the District Court motions to dismiss petitions for habeas corpus on the grounds that petitioners had failed to exhaust precisely the administrative remedies involved in this case. Bullock v. Jacobs, H.C. No. 247-69; Beard v. Jacobs, H.C. No. 243-69 10 E.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969) (challenge to manner rather than fact of confinement); Cox v. McConnell, 80 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1935) (expiration of sentence) 11 Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962) 12 21 D.C.Code 546, 548 (1967); 24 D.C.Code 301(e) (1967); see Bolton v. Harris, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 11-13, 395 F.2d 642, 652-654 (1968) 13 Overholser v. Boddie, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 186, 184 F.2d 240 (1950) (en banc) 14 21 D.C.Code 546 (1967); see Bolton v. Harris, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 12, 395 F.2d 642, 653 (1968) 15 Lake v. Cameron, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 364 F.2d 657 (1966) (en banc) 16 'Petitions drawn by the inexpert hand of a layman in confinement are not scrutinized for the formal standard we properly require of practicing attorneys.' Whittaker v. Overholser, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 66, 67, 299 F.2d 447, 448 (1962) 17 We have often pointed out, in similar contexts, the critical but limited role of the expert witnesses in helping the court (or, in appropriate cases, the jury) to determine these issues. Briefly stated, a person is mentally ill if he suffers from an abnormal condition of the mind that substantially affects mental or emotional processes, and substantially impairs behavioral controls. The presence of an abnormal mental condition, and the extent to which it impairs these processes and controls, are questions of fact; how 'substantial' such an impairment must be to be considered a mental illness is a matter of law. The question of 'dangerousness' is similarly mixed. The likelihood of future misconduct, the type of misconduct to be expected, and its probable frequency, are questions of fact; whether the expected harm, and its apparent likelihood, are sufficiently great to warrant coercive intervention under our statutes, are questions of law. See Cross v. Harris, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 263-265, 418 F.2d 1095, 1099-1101 (1969); cf. Washington v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 29, 36-43, 390 F.2d 444, 451-458 (1967); In re Alexander, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 352, 372 F.2d 925 (1967) 18 See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) 19 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-440, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963); see Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963); 28 U.S.C. 2244(a) (Supp. IV, 1969) 20 Appellant has made no claim that the previous hearings were in any way inadequate. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313-318, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963) 21 In In re Rosier, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 133 F.2d 316 (1942), this court held that a fifteen-week delay entitled the appellant to a hearing on his present sanity. Each member of the court, which included Justices Stephens, Vinson, and Rutledge, wrote separately; Justice Rutledge, dissenting, suggested that perhaps one adjudication a year would be sufficient. Id. at 236, 133 F.2d at 338. Three years later, in a case challenging commitment pursuant to a criminal conviction, Rosier was overruled on other grounds. Dorsey v. Gill, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 9, 148 F.2d 857, cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890, 65 S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed. 2003 (1945). Dorsey in turn was overruled and Rosier revived in Overholser v. Boddie, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 186, 184 F.2d 240 (1950) (en banc); but neither Dorsey nor Boddie dealt with the question at issue here. In Stewart v. Overholser, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 402, 186 F.2d 339 (1950) (en banc), a lapse of twenty months was held sufficient to require a new hearing; in dictum, a one-month lapse was stated to be insufficient. Finally, in Tatem v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 230, 275 F.2d 894 (1960), we required a hearing on the question of present sanity in the case of a petition filed two months after initial commitment; it should be noted, however, that in Tatem the initial commitment had been without a hearing on the question of present sanity. Perhaps in part because of the length of time normally required to bring a case here for decision, cf. In re Rosier, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 237, 133 F.2d 316, 339 (1942) (Rutledge, J., dissenting), we never appear to have upheld dismissal of a petition for release as repetitive 22 Of course, even if a previous application for release on the same grounds was heard and determined within the last six months, the District Court has full power to hold a plenary hearing on the issue if it believes that the interests of justice would thereby be served. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18-19, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963). We need not and do not here reach the question in what, if any, circumstances the Constitution may require a new hearing on present status in less than six months' time. Finally, we note that if a petition for release is based solely on grounds relating not to present status but rather to specific events in the past (for example, the legality of the initial commitment), the question whether a new hearing is required is essentially equivalent to that in the case of a prisoner seeking release under habeas corpus or equivalent process. See, for guidelines in such cases, Sanders v. United States, supra 23 21 D.C.Code 562 (1967) provides, inter alia: The administrator of each public hospital shall keep records detailing all medical and psychiatric care and treatment received by a person hospitalized for a mental illness and the records shall be made available, upon that person's written authorization, to his attorney or personal physician. 24 In Covington v. Harris, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 44, 45, 419 F.2d 617, 626-627 (1969), we pointed out that by articulating a plan of treatment and explaining the basis for important decisions affecting the patient, (such records) would fully inform the court at a glance. Incidentally, they would also enhance the integrity, reliability, and thoroughness of the hospital's own decision-making procedures. The bothersome incidental paperwork is a small price to pay for so many blessings. Besides, such paperwork is often bothersome precisely because the process of formal articulation forces busy administrators to confront problems and considerations their intuitive reactions might have overlooked. 25 Tribby v. Cameron, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 327, 379 F.2d 104 (1969); Millard v. Cameron, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 383, 373 F.2d 468 (1966); Rouse v. Cameron, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 366, 373 F.2d 451 (1966) 26 Covington v. Harris, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 35, 419 F.2d 617 (1969); Stultz v. Cameron, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 324, 383 F.2d 519 (1967) (en banc). Of course, if the patient's challenge is not that his mental condition does not require the particular restraints of the ward where he is confined, but rather that the ward is unfit for confinement of anyone, judicial review is plenary. Miller v. Overholser, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 110, 206 F.2d 415 (1953) 27 See Lake v. Cameron, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 364 F.2d 657 (1966) (en banc) 28 See note 17 supra 29 Since, as we have regularly pointed out, such proceedings are not strictly adversary in nature, conventional rules regarding the burden of coming forward with the evidence do not apply. The District Court and the parties bear an equal responsibility to see that decision is had upon all the relevant evidence. Bolton v. Harris, supra at 11 n. 64, 395 F.2d at 653 n. 64 30 21 D.C.Code 546 (1967) provides, in part: A patient hospitalized pursuant to a court order obtained under section 21-545    may, upon the expiration of 90 days following the order and not more frequently than every 6 months thereafter, request, in writing, the chief of service of the hospital in which the patient is hospitalized, to have a current examination of his mental condition made by one or more physicians. If the request is timely it shall be granted.    The provisions of 546 were made applicable to patients committed under 24 D.C.Code 301 (1967) by Bolton v. Harris, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 11-13, 395 F.2d 642, 652-654 (1968). 31 21 D.C.Code 548 (1967) provides: The chief of service of a public or private hospital shall, as often as practicable, but not less often than every six months, examine or cause to be examined each patient admitted to a hospital pursuant to this subchapter and if he determines on the basis of the examination that the conditions which justified the involuntary hospitalization of the patient no longer exist, the chief of service shall immediately release the patient. Except for the provision regarding release without judicial supervision, this section applies to 301(d) patients as well. See Bolton v. Harris, supra note 30 at 11, 395 F.2d at 652. 32 In some circumstances, the hospital may desire to re-examine the patient after the petition has been filed even though less than six months have elapsed since the last previous examination. On an appropriate showing, the District Court may in such cases defer action on the petition pending completion of this new examination 33 Although the hospital's return gave no indication of the fact, appellant has filed as an appendix to his brief a portion of the hospital records which indicates that he was actually examined on June 2, 1969-- four days after he had filed his petition, and eight days before the hospital's return was filed. With some regret, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the hospital was less than candid in this respect with the court below. See note 29 supra 34 From what we have already said, it should be apparent that lack of the required examination would never serve to justify dismissal, as opposed to postponement, of the petition 35 21 D.C.Code 546 (1967) 36 See United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, 384 U.S. 424, 429-430, 86 S.Ct. 1539, 16 L.Ed.2d 662 (1965); Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U.S. 587, 46 S.Ct. 408, 70 L.Ed. 747 (1926) 37 United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 65 S.Ct. 1120, 89 L.Ed. 1554 (1945) 38 Cf. Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 698 n. 11, 89 S.Ct. 1876, 23 L.Ed.2d 631 (1969) 39 Appellant has filed, as an appendix to his brief, correspondence between one patient who requested an outside examination and the hospital staff. The request was made on December 3, 1968. After two further requests, on December 30 and January 1, 1969, the patient received a letter from the hospital dated January 28, 1969, suggesting that he write the Department of Public Health. The Department, on March 28, informed the patient that no funds were available for such examinations. On October 7, 1969, the Department wrote appellant's counsel to confirm his understanding that not only were no funds available for these examinations, but also psychiatric personnel were not available to allow the Department to perform such examinations even if funds could be found. This letter is filed as part of the appendix to appellant's opposition to the government's motion for an extension of time in which to file its brief 40 Of course, as in the case of examinations by the hospital staff, if adequate internal remedies are in process the proper procedure is to delay action on the petition rather than to dismiss it. It may well be that, when internal review is complete, the patient will be satisfied with the results and no longer desire judicial intervention. If so, the petition may be dismissed. But we do not think it justifiable to require a mentally ill patient whose claim has not been considered by the court because internal procedures have not been completed to file a new petition when those procedures have run their course 1 21 D.C.Code 546 2 While there is a problem in terms of its literal wording, the intent of 301(d) does not seem to me to require detention of someone affirmatively determined as unlikely to be dangerous merely because he has a mental disease or defect that could come within the definition of insanity 3 130 U.S.App.D.C. at 10, 395 F.2d at 651, 653 4 130 U.S.App.D.C. at 12, 395 F.2d at 653 5 383 U.S. 107, 86 S.Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620 (1966) 6 The New York court's extension of this provision to persons acquitted of crime by reason of insanity must be read in light of the provision, New York Mental Hygiene Law, McKinney's Consol.Laws, c. 27, 74, that civilly committed persons could obtain release by jury trial only if the jury affirmatively found the defendant 'to be sane' (see 383 U.S. at 111, 86 S.Ct. 760) In People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654, 244 N.E.2d 87, 91 (1966) defendant challenged the validity of confinement 'by alleging and showing that he is not in fact insane.' There was no provision for release because of the existence of doubt-- or the failure to find a likelihood of danger. 7 As a realistic matter the standard should be the same when the person has been confined (in the hospital) for a period equal to the sentence generally meted for such offenses, even though less than the maximum 8 ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures 48 (1968)