Opinion ID: 2537376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: On appeal, Spinks argues, without specific citation to any legal authority, that the trial court was without jurisdiction to issue the preliminary injunction. Specifically, Spinks argues that the arbitration agreement requires that all disputes arising out of her employment with APS must be submitted to binding arbitration; that neither the employment agreement nor the arbitration agreement carve out an exception for injunctive relief or provide the circuit court any authority to provide emergency injunctive relief, Spinks's brief, p. 16; and that the American Arbitration Association Rules governing employment disputes provide th[at] interim relief may be awarded by the arbitrator. Id. Accordingly, Spinks contends, the trial court was without jurisdiction to issue the preliminary injunction, and, thus, Spinks says, the injunction must be dissolved. Id. Conversely, APS, citing Holiday Isle, LLC v. Adkins, 12 So.3d 1173 (Ala.2008), argues that, despite the existence of an enforceable arbitration agreement, APS's brief, p. 24, the trial court nonetheless had jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction in this case to preserve the status quo between the parties. Specifically, APS argues: In this case, `status quo' means that APS should be allowed to continue to operate its business without interference from Spinks. Spinks should not be allowed to alter the original status quo, i.e., that APS can operate its business without Spinks trying to steal its clients or employees, or otherwise compete against APS with the benefits of proprietary and confidential information obtained during her employment with APS. That is the status which, in the absence of an injunction, cannot be otherwise protected. Should APS be forced to await a resolution of the dispute by arbitration, with Spinks continuing to solicit business from current clients of APS and to entice away APS employees, then irreparable damage would be done to APS's business. APS's brief, p. 26. In Adkins, this Court noted that the `majority of federal courts . . . have concluded that in limited situations a binding arbitration clause does not bar a plaintiff from seeking emergency injunctive relief or other provisional remedies in court.' 12 So.3d at 1177 (quoting Drago v. Holiday Isle, L.L.C., 537 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1221 (S.D.Ala.2007)). This Court also noted that [t]he court in Drago specifically adopted the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048, 1052 (4th Cir. 1985), as a basis for concluding that it may order equitable relief `where an arbitral award could not return the parties substantially to the status quo.' Adkins, 12 So.3d at 1177 (quoting Drago, 537 F.Supp.2d at 1222). The status quo is the last uncontested status of the parties preceding the commencement of the controversy. See Yeargin Constr. Co. v. Parsons & Whittemore Alabama Mach. & Servs. Corp., 609 F.2d 829, 831 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472, 476 (9th Cir. 1969)). As the federal district court in Drago noted: The analysis of whether an arbitral award could return the parties substantially to the status quo would appear to be identical or at least very similar to the analysis of irreparable harm . . . . 537 F.Supp.2d at 1222. In this case, if the trial court's preliminary injunction was appropriately issued, an arbitral award likely could not return the parties to the status quo because, as the Fourth Circuit stated in Bradley: When [a former employee] breaches h[er] employment contract by soliciting h[er] former employer's customers, a nonsolicitation clause requires immediate application to have any effect. An injunction even a few days after solicitation has begun is unsatisfactory because the damage is done. The customers cannot be `unsolicited.' It may be impossible for the arbitral award to return the parties substantially to the status quo ante because the prevailing party's damages may be too speculative. 756 F.2d at 1054. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo pending completion of the arbitration proceeding.