Opinion ID: 2302783
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The UIA Claim

Text: The UIA provides that [a]ny person unjustly convicted of and subsequently imprisoned for a criminal offense contained in the District of Columbia Code may present a claim for damages against the District of Columbia. D.C.Code § 2-421. It further specifies that: Any person bringing suit under § 2-421, must allege and prove: (1) That his conviction has been reversed or set aside on the ground that he is not guilty of the offense of which he was convicted, or on new trial or rehearing was found not guilty of such offense, as appears from the record or certificate of the court setting aside or reversing such conviction, or that he has been pardoned upon the stated ground of innocence and unjust conviction; and (2) That, based upon clear and convincing evidence, he did not commit any of the acts charged or his acts or omissions in connection with such charge constituted no offense against the United States or the District of Columbia the maximum penalty for which would equal or exceed the imprisonment served and he did not, by his misconduct, cause or bring about his own prosecution. D.C.Code § 2-422. By contrast, the IPA provides that [a] person convicted of a criminal offense in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia may move the court to vacate the conviction or to grant a new trial on grounds of actual innocence based on new evidence. D.C.Code § 22-4135(a). Unless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief, the movant shall be entitled to invoke the processes of discovery available under Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure or Civil Procedure, or elsewhere in the usages and principles of law if, and to the extent that, the judge, in the exercise of the judge's discretion and for good cause shown, grants leave to do so[.] Id. § 22-4135(e)(1), (4). At the conclusion of a hearing on the motion, if the court concludes that it is more likely than not that the movant is actually innocent of the crime, the court shall grant a new trial. Id. § 22-4135(g)(2). If, however, the court concludes by clear and convincing evidence that the movant is actually innocent of the crime, the court shall vacate the conviction and dismiss the relevant count with prejudice. Id. § 22-4135(g)(3). DeWitt contends that he satisfied the first prong of the UIA because Judge Burgess's finding, pursuant to the IPA, that it was more likely than not that he was actually innocent, and the resultant reversal of his conviction, meant that his conviction has been reversed or set aside on the ground that he is not guilty of the offense of which he was convicted within the meaning of § 2-422(1) of the UIA. In his summary judgment order, Judge Richter found that proposition debatable, but ruled that even if it were correct, DeWitt could not satisfy the requirements of § 2-422(2) of the UIA, which required him to allege and prove that, based upon clear and convincing evidence, he did not commit any of the acts charged. Judge Richter reasoned that Judge Burgess's explicit decision[] that there was not clear and convincing evidence of [DeWitt's] innocence precluded DeWitt from seeking to prove the contrary in this case. More specifically, Judge Richter found that DeWitt was collaterally estopped from re-litigating the issue of his innocence. The question whether Judge Burgess's finding by a preponderance of the evidence that DeWitt did not murder Ridley satisfied § 2-422(1) does not admit of an easy answer. We note, on the one hand, that this first prong of the UIA is identical to the comparable provision in the [counterpart] federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2513. See D.C. Council, Report on Bill 3-251 at 6 (July 9, 1980) (Committee Report). [12] Interpreting that identical federal provision, at least one appellate court has reasoned that a conviction [that] was set aside . . . on a ground that leaves room for the possibility that the petitioner in fact committed the offense with which he was charged and thus for the possibility of a retrial (as Judge Burgess's ruling under the IPA left open for DeWitt) would not satisfy the requirements of the statute. Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1284 (7th Cir.1993) (applying 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1)); see also Jones v. United States, 2011 WL 2516600, at -2, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51029, at  (E.D.Mo. May 12, 2011) (holding that the first prong of 28 U.S.C. § 2513 was satisfied where the defendant's guilt could not have been established beyond a reasonable doubt (such that a retrial would not have been appropriate)). On the other hand, it makes sense to say that DeWitt's conviction was set aside on the ground that he was not guilty of the offense with which he was charged since Judge Burgess found by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not guilty. We conclude that, like the trial court, we need not decide definitively whether the first prong of the UIA is satisfied by reversal of a conviction and remand for a new trial on the basis of a finding that a defendant more likely than not is innocent. We can assume without deciding that the first prong was satisfied because we agree with Judge Richter's determination that, on the facts of this case, DeWitt was estopped from attempting to prove that he satisfied the requirements of the second prong of the UIA. [13] Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, bars the re-litigation of issues determined in a prior action where (1) the issue was actually litigated; (2) was determined by a valid, final judgment on the merits; (3) after a full and fair opportunity for litigation by the party; (4) under circumstances where the determination was essential to the judgment. Wilson v. Hart, 829 A.2d 511, 514 (D.C. 2003). Each of those conditions for applying the doctrine is present here. First, the issue presented by DeWitt's UIA complaint was whether DeWitt, based upon. . . clear and convincing evidence . . . did not commit any of the acts for which he was convicted. (Complaint, ¶ 43) That is the same issue Judge Burgess decided under the IPA: he ruled that he could not find by clear and convincing evidence that DeWitt is actually innocent of the crime. D.C.Code § 22-4135(g)(3). Second, Judge Burgess's ruling was a final judgment, which DeWitt did not appeal (as he was entitled to do under § 22-4135(i)), and the validity of which (as distinguished from the correctness of its conclusions) DeWitt does not dispute. To skip to the fourth condition, Judge Burgess's ruling that he could not find DeWitt's innocence by clear and convincing evidence was essential to his judgment reversing the conviction but granting a new trial. Id. § 22-4135(g)(2). DeWitt does not dispute that these conditions were satisfied. That leaves the third conditionwhether, during the IPA hearing, DeWitt was denied a full and fair opportunity for litigation. It is uncontroverted that the hearing on DeWitt's motion under the IPA involved several weeks of testimony and voluminous documentary evidence. DeWitt contends, however, that he was denied a full opportunity to litigate the issue of his actual innocence because he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine crucial witnesses (including Greene, who DeWitt asserts was a biased witness, and Pace) whose grand jury testimony and FBI interviews were introduced into evidence by the Government over [DeWitt's] objection. There are a number of reasons why we cannot agree that DeWitt was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of his innocence. The first is, again, that DeWitt did not appeal Judge Burgess's order, thereby forgoing the opportunity to challenge Judge Burgess's rulings that the government would be permitted to introduce into evidence at the IPA hearing certain grand jury transcripts and FBI interview narratives to which DeWitt's counsel objected. In addition, as defendants/appellees point out, in DeWitt's opposition to their motion for summary judgment, DeWitt acknowledged that the grand jury testimony was admissible since both Greene (who cannot be located) and Pace (who is dead) were unavailable to testify. Further, during the IPA proceedings, DeWitt's counsel told the court that [h]aving now been allowed to read the Rufus Pace [FBI] interview, . . . I don't object. Counsel also withdrew her objection to the Greene FBI interview, which she view[ed] . . . as a wash. Because we will not permit DeWitt to take a position in this appeal that is contrary to the position he took in the IPA proceeding, we reject his argument that his lack of opportunity to cross-examine Pace and Greene as to their grand jury testimony and FBI interviews means that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of his actual innocence during the IPA hearing. [14] DeWitt also argues that he was unfairly restricted to limited discovery during the IPA hearing. However, as the defendants/appellees have argued, DeWitt does not assert that he made a request to Judge Burgess for leave to utilize the processes of discovery available under Superior Court Rules of . . . Civil Procedure, a request the court would have had discretion to grant under D.C.Code § 22-4135(e)(4). DeWitt asserted in the trial court that it was unrealistic to think that Judge Burgess would have entertained, much less granted, a request for a civil deposition of [the] witnesses DeWitt wished to question, but we are unpersuaded by that seemingly unfounded contention. We note, moreover, that (according to DeWitt's brief and as reflected in the trial court record), DeWitt's counsel took nine depositions (including those of the defendant detectives) before discovery closed in this case. Yet, we do not see in the record anything to indicate that after the close of discovery, DeWitt ever supplemented his response to the defendants' interrogatories (which he initially answered in September 2008), in which he stated that he ha[d] not learned any information through the civil discovery process in this case that was not previously available (or made available) or not known to him during his Innocence Protection Act proceedings. [15] In addition, witnesses who were unavailable during the IPA proceedings because they were dead by that time (including Pace, the victim Ridley, Kyle Knight and Stevie Ellington) are, of course, still unavailable. As to other witnesses who DeWitt has acknowledged were in witness protection programs or had relocated, he has not explained how he would obtain their presence at trial against the District defendants, [16] or what he would expect the witnesses to add to the evidence that Judge Burgess heard. We highlight these points to note that DeWitt has not explained what opportunity, that he did not have during the IPA proceeding, a trial in this UIA case would give him to litigate successfully the issue of his innocence. We conclude that the trial court correctly ruled that DeWitt was collaterally estopped from re-litigating the issue of his innocence by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the court did not err in granting summary judgment to the District on DeWitt's UIA claim. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is Affirmed.