Opinion ID: 39988
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cantu’s Impeachment

Text: Summers asserts that the state trial court’s refusal to admit Cantu’s purportedly impeaching statement deprived Summers of the ability to attack Cantu’s credibility. This, according to Summers, violated his right to confront witnesses against him. In retort, the Director contends that Summers present ed this claim, not as a constitutional claim, but as a violation of state evidentiary law. The Director is part ially correct. On direct appeal, the issue was decided exclusively on the basis of state law. Ho wever, Summers resists this argument and urges this court to recognize his citations to Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), and Smith v. Fairman, 862 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1988), as stating a constitutional claim. Because of the gravity of the matter, we will assume a constitutional claim was raised. Of the cases Summers cites, only Smith pronounces a rule that supports his claim. See Smith, - 19 - 862 F.2d at 638 (“[P]rior inconsistent statements of a hearsay declarant . . . were analogous to ‘otherwise appropriate cross-examination. . . .’”). Under AEDPA, reliance on Smith is not enough. Because it is derived from a circuit court, not the Supreme Court, the rule in Smith is irrelevant for the purposes of our habeas review. The only question is whether or not the state trial court’s exclusion of Cantu’s statement was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established constitutional law, as announced by the Supreme Court. We hold it did not. No doubt a hearsay declarant may be subjected to impeachment, in the same manner as a live witness. See United States v. Moody, 903 F.2d 321, 328 (5th Cir. 1990). However, the confrontation clause “does not guarantee ‘cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’” United States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1081, 1088 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam)). The rules of evidence, to the extent they do not violate the Constitution, bind the prosecution and defense alike. Moreover, trial judges “’retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits’ on cross-examination.” Id. (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679). The state trial court determined that the impeachment evidence was inadmissible. The limitation imposed by the state trial court in this instance was not unreasonable. Summers also invokes Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), where the Supreme Court established “a categorical rule barring the admission of out-of-court testimonial statements against the accused absent opportunity for cross-examination.” United States v. Holmes, 406 F.3d 337, 347 (5th Cir. 2005) (di scussing Crawford). The Director counters by pointing out that Crawford is of no use to Summers because it is not retroactive. Whether retroactive or not, an issue unresolved in this circuit, see Lave v. Dretke, 416 F.3d 372, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2005) (granting COA - 20 - on the issue), and which we decline to reach, Crawford does not control here. The rule in Crawford addressed only testimonial evidence, see id. at 68, and “[t]here is nothing in Crawford to suggest that ‘testimonial evidence’ includes spontaneous out-of-court statements made outside any arguably judicial or investigatory context.” Ramirez v. Dretke, 398 F.3d 691, 965 n.3 (5th Cir. 2005). As an example of “statements that by their nature were not testimonial,” the Supreme Court specifically listed “statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55. See also id. at 74 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d 678, 680 (5th Cir. 2005). With respect to the statements at issue here—nontestimonial out-of-court statements in furtherance of a conspiracy—it is clear that Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), continues to control. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; Holmes, 406 F.3d at 348. The state courts’ treatment of Summers’s confrontation clause rights was not unreasonable. (2) The Brady Claims As detailed above: the Supreme Court framed “the three components or essential elements of a Brady prosecutorial misconduct claim: ‘The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’” Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 280–81 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004))). “Evidence is ‘material’ if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result at the trial would have been different; a reasonable probability is one that undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Duncan v. Cain, 278 F.3d 537, 539–40 (5th Cir. - 21 - 2002) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 685 (1985)). Whether evidence is material under Brady is a mixed question of law and fact. Trevino v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 173, 185 (5th Cir. 1999). a. Keenan Wilcox—Rewards for Testimony Summers claims that Wilcox received a reward for his testimony and, while testifying on the state’s behalf, was a drug addict and dealer.8 Further, Summers says that the state failed to disclose these facts to the defendant in violation of Brady. The Director counters by referring to Wilcox’s trial testimony and the state habeas court’s findings. We deny habeas relief on this claim. At Summers’s trial, Wilcox testified that he was not expecting a reward for his testimony and that he was not promised anything to cooperate with the prosecution. In response to this testimony, Summers offers an affidavit, sworn to by Summers’s attorney, regarding a conversation with Wilcox in 1997. The affidavit contains contentions that (1) Wilcox “sought, received, [sic] a reward for the information he provided to the prosecution” and (2) Wilcox “had been treated very well by the District Attorney’s office,” i.e., “he had not been charged with any drug offenses.” With respect to this affidavit, the state habeas court specifically found that the affidavit “does not show that Keenan Wilcox gave false testimony at [Summers]’s trial, nor that deals were made between the State and Mr. Wilcox in exchange for his testimony.” The state habeas court went on to find “insufficient evidence” for both of the contentions in the affidavit. Under AEDPA, the state habeas court’s resolution is entitled to a presumption of correctness, 8 Summers proposes that Wilcox was t he beneficiary of some quid pro quo for his testimony. To the extent that Summers argues that the drug involvement was relevant to Wilcox’s credibility, we also deny relief. Both the Director and the district court identified several references to drug use and culture during Wilcox’s testimony. Therefore, the jury members were aware of this aspect of his character when they determined Wilcox’s credibility. - 22 - unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. See Brown v. Dretke, 419 F.3d 365, 371 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). However, this affidavit stands alone, and Summers offers no corroboration for it. Further, the evidence offered is less reliable than the recanting 1997 affidavit discussed above.9 As we did then, we view recanting affidavits with “extreme suspicion.” Baldree v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 659, 663 (5th Cir. 1996). See also Graves v. Cockrell, 351 F.3d 143, 153 (5th Cir. 2003); Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 1003 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Adi, 759 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1985). The allegations in the affidavit, even if true, prove too little to carry Summers’s burden. Absent is any contention that a reward came before Wilcox’s testimony or that Wilcox was actually promised any special treatment. Under AEDPA, this affidavit fails to upset the factual findings of the state habeas court. Because the state habeas court concluded that Wilcox’s testimony did not involve a quid pro quo, there was nothing for the prosecution to disclose and, ultimately, no Brady violation. The state habeas court’s conclusion that “[t]he affidavit does not undermine confidence in Mr. Wilcox’s testimony, nor the verdict” is not unreasonable. b. William Spaulding According to Summers, the prosecution withheld two pieces of information, pertaining to Spaulding, in violation of Brady. Summers claims: (1) that law enforcement officials had threatened Spaulding and caused him to reverse his testimony and (2) that the prosecution withheld Spaulding’s prison records, which indicate he had been involved with acts of deceit in prison. The district court denied habeas relief. We agree. 9 We note that Wilcox did not make the declaration on which Summers relies. The affidavit is that of Summers’s attorney recounting a conversation with Wilcox. The additional link in the chain makes the affidavit even less reliable. - 23 - (i) Spaulding’s “Relationship” with the Prosecution Summers supports his claim that law enfo rcement officials forced Spaulding to change his story and testify for the prosecution by reference to the 1997 affidavit discussed above. See supra Part III.A.3. In Summers’s view, the involvement between law enforcement and the witness should have been disclosed to the defense. The same deficiencies with the 1997 affidavit that undermined Summers’s earlier claim are fatal to this Brady claim. As discussed above, the state habeas court concluded that “Spaulding’s testimony at trial was not false, misleading, or incomplete,” and that there was “insufficient evidence to support a finding that Mr. Spaulding was coerced or threatened or otherwise made or improperly caused to give testimony at trial against [Summers].” Under AEDPA, we must accept as true all reasonable fact findings of the state courts unless the petitioner disproves them by clear and convincing evidence. See Ramirez v. Dretke, 398 F.3d 691, 965 (5th Cir. 2005); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). As before, the 1997 affidavit fails to carry this burden. As a result, we must presume that the prosecution did not coerce Spaulding, leaving nothing for the prosecution to disclose under Brady. (ii) Spaulding’s Prison Records Summers contends that the State withheld Spaulding’s prison records, which purportedly contain impeachment evidence of prison discipline for forgery. The Director responds by asserting a procedural bar to this claim. According to the Director, because the claim was not properly presented to the state court on direct appeal or on collateral review, Summers cannot assert it in a federal habeas proceeding. The Director is correct. Because of “the principles of comity, finality, and federalism” imbued in AEDPA, a federal habeas court must be “careful to limit the scope of federal intrusion into state criminal adjudications - 24 - and to safeguard the States’ interest in the integrity of their criminal and collateral proceedings.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Accordingly, a federal habeas court, considering the claims of a state prisoner, cannot grant relief on a claim unless it has been fairly presented to or diligently pursued before the state courts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 437 (“For state courts to have their rightful opportunity to adjudicate federal rights, the prisoner must be diligent in developing the record and presenting, if possible, all claims of constitutional error.”). See also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (“[E]xhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners fairly presen[t] federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners federal rights. . . .” (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971))) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). The Director identifies a claim in the state habeas proceeding wherein Summers posited that “it is possible that, upon disclosure, further instances of the failure to disclose exculpatory information might be found.” Our review of the record does not reveal any other claims before the state courts that fit the issue now presented. For his part, Summers identifies no portion of the record wherein he presented this claim to the various st ate courts that have considered his case. Rather he merely states that he “did allege the claim and ask[ed] the state court for the opportunity to further develop” the issue. This is not enough. “To exhaust, the applicant must fairly present the substance of his claims to the state court.” Neville v. Dretke, 423 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Picard, 404 U.S. at 275). The only passage identified in the state proceedings that may have been related to this claim fails in this regard. We find no argument to the state court that can be said to have presented this claim, and - 25 - Summers identifies none. Because Summers failed to exhaust this alleged constitutional violation before the state courts, we cannot reach it now.10 c. Darrell Shirlls—Additional Pending Charges During the penalty phase, Shirlls testified on behalf of the state that Summers had threatened to have another witness killed if that witness testified against Summers. Summers brings a Brady challenge claiming that the state withheld information of pending charges against Shirlls. According to Summers, this evidence co uld have been used to impeach Shirlls and would have resulted in a different outcome in the penalty phase. Brady requires that the prosecution disclose evidence even if its only use is to impeach prosecution witnesses. See Felder v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676). The Director contends that the evidence o f pending charges, which the state purportedly suppressed, is inadmissible even as impeachment evidence and, therefore, cannot be material under Brady. In support of this contention, the Director cites Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995), where the Supreme Court found that the suppression of polygraph evidence was “not ‘evidence’ at all” because it was “inadmissible under state law, even for impeachment purposes.” In sum, the Court concluded that “[d]isclosure of the polygraph results, then, could have had no direct effect on 10 Even if Summers’s version of events is believed, he failed to exercise diligence in pursuing his claim. He contends that he asked the prosecutor’s office for Spaulding’s prison records, but, when denied, Summers failed to enforce his perceived rights and obtain a court order. See, e.g., Williams, 529 U.S. at 436 (finding that petitioner did not pursue a Brady claim with due diligence where “it appear[ed] counsel made no further efforts to find the specific report” after the prosecutor refused to produce it). In addition, in Summers’s motion to reconsider the denial of his habeas corpus application and request for evidentiary hearing, Summers failed to mention this claim or the need for an evidentiary hearing to advance or resolve it. He cannot do so now. Moreover, were we to reach the merits of this claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), we would deny the claim for the reasons stated by the district court. - 26 - the outcome of trial, because respondent could have made no mention of them either during argument or while questioning witnesses.” Id. We need not decide whether Wood controls here11 because on “the general question whether the disclosure of the evidence would have created a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different,” Felder, 180 F.3d at 212, the answer is clear. It would not. The burden falls on Summers to convince this court “that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different if the suppressed documents had been disclosed to the defense.” Strickler v.Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289 (1999) (internal quotations omitted). See also Martin v. Cain, 246 F.3d 471, 477 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). As the district court observed, the state presented a wealt h of evidence regarding future dangerousness during the penalty phase. Moreover, the jury and the parties were aware both that Shirlls was in prison during the time the events about which he testified took place and that he faced criminal prosecut ion during the time of his testimony. Whatever the effect of any nondisclosure about additional pending charges on the jury and the trial, “there [was] never a real ‘Brady violation’” because any nondisclosure was not “so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281. The state habeas court’s rejection of this claim was not unreasonable. (3) Jury Instructions Summers contends that the jury instructions used in the penalty phase of his trial failed to 11 We also do not reach the issue of whether inadmissible evidence is material for Brady purposes in light of Wood. Accord Felder, 180 F.3d at 212. - 27 - meet the constitutional requirements of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.12 Texas’s use of special issues as a vehicle for giving effect to mitigating evidence is well established. See Coble v. Dretke, 417 F.3d 508, 523 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (plurality opinion) for the proposition that “the Supreme Court expressly upheld the constitutionality of the manner in which mitigating evidence is considered under the ‘special issues’ submitted to juries in Texas capital cases”). Summers’s specific argument is that the jury instructions used in his trial fail because they did not give the jury a mechanism to give effect to the mitigating evidence offered by the defense in the penalty phase. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (“Penry I”); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) (“Penry II”) (“[T]he key under Penry I is that the jury be able to ‘consider and give effect to [a defendant’s mitigating] evidence in imposing sentence.’”) (alteration in original). Regarding the mitigating evidence, the instructions provided: “[Y]ou may consider in answering the special issues, facts and circumstances, if any, presented in evidence in aggravation, extenuation or mitigation thereof.” These instructions direct the effect of any mitigation evidence 12 Summers also referenced a series of claims brought before the district court with respect to his sentence of death. However, Summers only briefed the solitary issue of whether or not the jury instructions allowed the jury to give effect to evidence presented in mitigation during the penalty phase of his trial. Summers abandoned his other claims by failing t brief t hem. See, e.g., Yohey o v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that appellant who sought to incorporate previously filed arguments by reference “has abandoned these arguments by failing to argue them in the body of his brief”). Appellants are required under Rule 28(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to include “the reasons he deserves the requested rel ief with citation to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on.” Weaver v. Puckett, 896 F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir. 1990) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(4)(B). See also Hughes, 412 F.3d at 597; Lookingbill, 293 F.3d at 263 & n.11. - 28 - back into the special issues deliberations.13 As a result, the constitutionality of these jury instructions may be det ermined by answering the question of whether or not the special issues provided the jury with a vehicle to consider and give effect to Summers’s mitigating evidence. See Penry II, 532 U.S. at 797. If the special issues fail to adequately encompass the mitigating evidence, the instructions are unconstitutional. Id. Summers did not present the type of evidence that gave rise to the Penry cases (child abuse and mental retardation), Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 277 (2004) (low IQ), or Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, —, 125 S. Ct. 400, 403 (2004) (low IQ and parental issues). Unlike the evidence in these cases, which could no t be given effect under the special issues, the evidence Summers presented during the penalty phase was self-styled as “evidence of good character and good conduct.” Summers’s evidence in mitigation included testimony describing, inter alia, his nonviolent nature and general good character, his grief for his parents’ death, and his ability to conform to prison life. The district court denied Summers’s claim citing both Boyd v. Johnson, 167 F.3d 907, 912 (5th Cir. 1999), and Barnard v. Collins, 958 F.2d 634, 640 (5th Cir. 1992), for the proposition that, in this circuit, the special issues do allow the jury to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence of a defendant’s good character. Summers’s contention is plain: he asserts that those cases were overruled by both Penry II and Smith. However, since the Supreme Court handed down Penry II and Smith, our circuit has continued to look to Boyd and Barnard as support for the holding that we 13 Because these instructions do not require the jury to change otherwise “yes” answers to “no,” they are not nullification instructions as that term is used. As a result, they do not give rise to the additional issues relating to nullification instructions discussed in Penry II, 532 U.S. at 798–804. - 29 - rely on here. In Coble v. Dretke, we held: “Evidence of good character tends to show that the crime was an aberration, which may support a negative answer to the special issue regarding the future dangerousness of the defendant.” Therefore, as this court has previously held, “[go od character] evidence can find adequate expression under [the] second special issue.” 417 F.3d at 525 (quoting both Boyd, 167 F.3d at 912, and Barnard, 958 F.2d at 640, post-Smith and post-Penry II) (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original). See also Newton v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 250, 256-57 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that mitigating evidence relating to good character may be adequately considered under the special issues post-Penry II) (citing cases). To the extent that they hold that the Texas special issues allow juries to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence of good character, Boyd and Barnard remain sound. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s analysis of this issue compels our present jurisprudence: [W]e are not convinced that Penry could be extended to cover the sorts of mitigating evidence [Petitioner] suggests without a wholesale abandonment of Jurek and perhaps also of Franklin v. Lynaugh[,487 U.S. 164 (1988) (plurality opinion)]. As we have noted, Jurek is reasonably read as holding that the circumstance of youth is given constitutionally adequate consideration in deciding the special issues. We see no reason to regard the circumstances of [Petitioner]’s family background and positive character traits in a different light. [Petitioner]’s evidence of transient upbringing and otherwise nonviolent character more closely resembles Jurek’s evidence of age, employment history, and familial ties than it does Penry’s evidence of mental retardation and harsh physical abuse. As the dissent in Franklin made clear, virtually any mitigating evidence is capable of being viewed as having some bearing on the defendant’s “moral culpability” apart from its relevance to the particular concerns embodied in the Texas special issues. It seems to us, however, that reading Penry as petitioner urges—and thereby holding that a defendant is entitled to special instructions whenever he can offer mitigating evidence that has some arguable relevance beyond the special issues—would be to require in all cases that a fourth “special issue” be put to the jury: “‘Does any mitigating evidence before you, whether or not relevant to the above [three] questions, lead you to - 30 - believe that the death penalty should not be imposed?’” The Franklin plurality rejected precisely this contention, finding it irreconcilable with the Court’s holding in Jurek, and we affirm that conclusion today. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 476-77 (1993) (internal citations omitted). Summers o nly contends that his evidence of good character could not be considered and given effect under the jury instructions used in his penalty phase. His position is foreclosed under our precedent in both Boyd and Barnard, which remain sound, and Coble, which relies on those cases. In light of this authority, habeas relief is denied.