Opinion ID: 1972105
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Government's Brady Obligation to Make Timely Disclosure.

Text: The prosecutor explicitly conceded in the trial court, and the government continues to acknowledge on appeal, that Jones' statement to the police, which cast doubt as to whether Curry committed the murder, cf. Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842, 844 (4th Cir.1964), was exculpatory and subject to disclosure pursuant to Brady's command. Brady is not a discovery rule but a rule of fairness and minimum prosecutorial obligation. United States v. Beasley, 576 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947, 99 S.Ct. 1426, 59 L.Ed.2d 636 (1979). Effective compliance with the prosecution's responsibilities under Brady is necessary to ensure the effective administration of the criminal justice system. United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 n. 6 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1048, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984). The government also concedes in its brief, and we agree, that it should have disclosed Jones' statement earlier than [it] did. [I]t is now well settled that the prosecution must disclose exculpatory material at such a time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case.... Edelen v. United States, 627 A.2d 968, 970 (D.C.1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As the court stated in United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256 (3d Cir.1984), a prosecutor's timely disclosure obligation with respect to Brady material cannot be overemphasized, and the practice of delayed production must be disapproved and discouraged. Id. at 261 (citations omitted). In the present case, the material which the prosecutor failed to disclose involved the identity of an apparent eyewitness to an armed murder. It is surely a matter of common knowledge that people move. A person who has witnessed a murder and may believe himself to be subject to possible reprisal is, if anything, more likely to move than the average citizen. Delay in apprising the defense of the existence of such a witness may therefore render an eventual belated disclosure ineffectual. Here, given the time that elapsed between June 14, 1991 (when Ms. Sparrow told the police the Noochie had killed Spriggs) and Curry's indictment eight months later, and in light of the detective's discovery during the period between Curry's arrest and indictment that Jones was no longer living at his former address, the government was on notice that Jones could well prove difficult to find and that the trail might quickly turn cold if it were not promptly and energetically pursued. The trial judge thus apparently assumed that Jones' statement should have been turned over to the defense soon after the return of Curry's indictment. [8] Here, almost a year elapsed between that indictment and the disclosure of Jones' statement. Such delay may imperil a defendant's right to a fair trial, and a conscientious prosecutor will not countenance it.