Opinion ID: 2597343
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Compliance with NRS 193.165(1)

Text: Having concluded that the district courts must fulfill the mandates contained in NRS 193.165(1), we next consider whether the district court did so here. Mendoza-Lobos contends that the district court failed to comply with NRS 193.165(1) when imposing his sentences for the deadly weapon enhancements because it failed to make sufficient findings on the record. In so contending, Mendoza-Lobos necessarily argues that NRS 193.165(1) requires the district court to make findings prior to imposing a sentence for a deadly weapon enhancement. We agree. The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law and is subject to de novo review. Firestone v. State, 120 Nev. 13, 16, 83 P.3d 279, 281 (2004). This court will attribute the plain meaning to a statute that is not ambiguous. Id. If a statute is ambiguous, however, the Legislature's intent is controlling, and we `interpret the statute's language in accordance with reason and public policy.' Sheriff v. Witzenburg, 122 Nev. 1056, 1061, 145 P.3d 1002, 1005 (2006) (quoting Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 687, 120 P.3d 1164, 1167 (2005)). A statute is ambiguous when its language lends itself to two or more reasonable interpretations. State v. Catanio, 120 Nev. 1030, 1033, 102 P.3d 588, 590 (2004). Pursuant to the rule of lenity, criminal statutes are interpreted liberally and any ambiguities or inconsistencies are construed in favor of the defendant. Washington v. State, 117 Nev. 735, 739, 30 P.3d 1134, 1136 (2001). Mendoza-Lobos asserts that NRS 193.165(1) requires the district court to articulate findings, on the record, as to each factor listed therein. The State contends that the district court is not required to make findings, but merely to state that it has considered the factors set forth in the statute. We conclude that the statute is reasonably subject to either interpretation; thus, we look to its legislative history to determine its meaning. See Haney v. State, 124 Nev. ___, ___, 185 P.3d 350, 353-54 (2008). Prior to its amendment in 2007, NRS 193.165(1) mandated that a defendant convicted of using a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime be sentenced to a term equal and consecutive to the sentence imposed for the underlying crime. 1995 Nev. Stat., ch. 455, § 1, at 1431. As amended, the statute still requires that any sentence for a deadly weapon enhancement be consecutive, but it now grants district courts discretion to impose a sentence for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a maximum term of not more than 20 years in prison, so long as the additional sentence does not exceed the sentence for the underlying crime. NRS 193.165(1), (2). In exercising this discretion, district courts are required to consider five enumerated factors and state on the record that it has considered those factors. NRS 193.165(1). The return to discretionary sentencing was based, in large part, on the need to reduce the prison population. See, e.g., Hearing on A.B. 63 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 74th Leg. (Nev., May 10, 2007). However, it appears that legislators were concerned that certain members of the public would feel that discretionary sentencing was arbitrary or unfair. See, e.g., id. Accordingly, during hearings on the proposed amendment, legislators expressed that the purpose of the language requiring district courts to state on the record that they had considered the enumerated factors was to require[ ] sentencing judges to be more communicative regarding their discretion. Hearing on A.B. 63 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 74th Leg. (Nev., May 31, 2007). Towards this end, it is evident that the Legislature envisioned that the district court would make findings on the record. For example, Senator Mark Amodei stated: In the context of this bill, when a judge uses discretion, there should be special findings with respect to the context in which the weapon was used. The Senator went on to assert that [w]hen a judge sentences a person for using a weapon ... there should be findings to ascertain why the person received the sentence in the context of whether a weapon was used. Hearing on A.B. 63 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm, 74th Leg. (Nev., May 10, 2007). Based on this legislative history, we construe NRS 193.165(1) as requiring district courts to articulate factual findings, on the record, regarding each of the factors enumerated therein. Further, we conclude that the plain language of the statute requires the district court to make separate findings for each deadly weapon enhancement. NRS 193.165(1)-(3) refer to the crime, the additional penalty, and the sentence. This language indicates that the requirements of the statute must be applied to each crime individually, i.e. that the district court must consider each factor as it specifically relates to each enhancement. Moreover, it would be patently unreasonable for a district court to consider the facts and circumstances of only one crime, or the impact on only one of multiple victims, when imposing sentences for multiple counts carrying enhancements. Having determined that NRS 193.165(1) requires district courts to articulate findings on the record, we must now consider whether the district court articulated sufficient findings in the instant matter. Because Mendoza-Lobos did not object to the sufficiency of the district court's findings during sentencing, we will grant relief only if he demonstrates plain error. NRS 178.602; Grey v. State, 124 Nev. ___, ___, 178 P.3d 154, 163 (2008); see also Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (holding that plain-error review applies to a claim that the government breached a plea agreement when the defendant failed to object in the district court). Under plain-error analysis, an error that is plain from the record requires reversal if a defendant demonstrates that the error affected his or her substantial rights, by causing `actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.' Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 97, ___, 196 P.3d 465, 477 (2008) (quoting Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003)). Here, although the district court made some findings, it failed to make any findings regarding the facts and circumstances of the robbery and the attempted sexual assault or the context in which the weapon was used in those two crimes, which would be relevant under NRS 193.165(l)(a) and (e). Thus, the district court failed to articulate findings regarding each of the enumerated factors for each deadly weapon enhancement. However, nothing in the record indicates that the district court's failure to make certain findings on the record had any bearing on the district court's sentencing decision. Accordingly, the district court's omission did not cause any prejudice or a miscarriage of justice and thus does not warrant relief.