Opinion ID: 768122
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of the Second Claim: S 1983

Text: 29 DeGrassi's second claim alleges, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983, that the defendants violated her free speech rights under the First Amendment. Under S 1983, any person may bring a claim against a government official who acts under color of state law to deprive that person of constitutional rights. Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). The district court dismissed this claim because the statute of limitations barred claims for acts occurring prior to September 24, 1996, and the claims for acts falling within the limitations period were not supported by facts showing a deprivation of DeGrassi's civil rights. 30 We review de novo a dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim. See Kruso v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1989). When reviewing dismissal of a complaint, we accept the allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1990). Dismissal of a complaint is improper unless `it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief.'  Id. (quoting Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir. 1986)). 31
32 DeGrassi contends that the district court erred when it dismissed those of her S 1983 claims based on acts occurring more than one year before the filing of the action on September 23, 1997, as barred by the one-year statute of limitations. We apply California's personal injury statute of limitations to S 1983 actions. See Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that in California the one-year statute applies to a S 1983 action). Federal law determines when a civil rights cause of action accrues. See id. 33 DeGrassi argues that her S 1983 claims are saved by the continuing violation doctrine under which `a systematic policy of discrimination is actionable even if some or all of the events evidencing its inception occurred prior to the limitations period.'  Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 1982)). She maintains that defendants engaged in continuous improper activities both before and after September 23, 1996, and that these activities were part of the chain of events in a continuing campaign of intimidation and harassment. 34 She alleges that the City Manager, Arthur Cook, threatened her on three occasions in 1994 concerning statements and questions during City Council meetings, telling her to keep quiet and do as she was told. She alleges that another Council member, Sue Bauer, also threatened her in 1994, telling DeGrassi to vote for her. She charges that Cook and other Council members excluded her from participating in assessments of City commission and board member applications in June of 1994, preventing her from obtaining information about appointments; that they adopted a resolution in 1994 that required all City Council members to obtain Cook's approval before making requests of the City Attorney or department heads, but applied the resolution exclusively to her; that in December 1994, they excluded her from a City Council meeting concerning an unrelated pending lawsuit due to an alleged conflict of interest; and that Cook deniedher information about police cadets and threatened to sue her. DeGrassi further alleges that several actions taken by defendants two years later, immediately before and during the Andrews action, also constitute part of this campaign. On August 27, 1996, the Glendora Chief of Police, Paul Butler, allegedly refused to provide DeGrassi with reports relating to the alleged molestations occurring in the Andrews' building because the record was sealed. All of this conduct antedated the filing of the complaint in this action by more than one year. 35 On September 24, 1996, DeGrassi received a phone call from a Council member informing her that other Council members, Cook, and Butler knew the Andrews family intended to file suit against her. In October of 1996, defendants excluded DeGrassi from Council meetings in which the Council members allegedly discussed her defense, and refused to disclose to her what took place during these meetings. She claims other Council members and personnel were permitted to attend such meetings in the past. In December of 1997, the City's lawyers directed Council members not to listen to DeGrassi, and to ignore her questions during a Council meeting. Finally, she alleges that the City's offer of a conditional defense was also part of the defendants' campaign of intimidation and harassment. 36 Plaintiff relies principally on Sosa v. Hiraoka , which held that a pattern of racially discriminatory acts that denied Sosa a promotion established a continuing violation. See 920 F.2d at 1456. As the court put it: [A]ll the acts Sosa alleged are plausibly related as acts of discrimination against Sosa because of his identification as a Mexican-American. Id. Similarly, in Gutowsky v. County of Placer, 108 F.3d 256 (9th Cir. 1997), the court found a continuing violation where a female employee alleged that her employer maintained a discriminatory policy and practice in its hiring and promotion of women: Gutowsky contends that the widespread policy and practices of discrimination of which she complains continued every day of her employment, including days that fall within the limitation period. Id. at 260; see also Reed v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 613 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding allegations included sweeping attack on defendant's systems of promotion, compensation, and training that discriminated against women). 37 Because this is not a case involving a discriminatory system, DeGrassi must state facts sufficient . .. [to] support[ ] a determination that the `alleged discriminatory acts are related closely enough to constitute a continuing violation,'  and that one or more of the acts falls within the limitation period. See Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent of Schs., 883 F.2d 1472, 1480 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). DeGrassi's allegations do not meet this test. What she claims is that defendants engaged in a campaign of harassment and intimidation but her allegation that there is a continuing wrong is conclusory. DeGrassi's allegations may show a long-standing state of animosity and hostility, marked by incidents of personal conflict between her and other City officials, but they do not establish a series of related wrongful acts. Accordingly, the one-year statute bars her claims for conduct prior to September 23, 1996. 38
39 DeGrassi asserts that her exclusion from Council meetings in October 1996 violated her free speech rights under the First Amendment. According to DeGrassi, these were closed meetings in which the claims and defenses in the Andrews action were discussed. She claims she was excluded on advice of the City's counsel. 40 In Madison Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976), the Court stated: Plainly, public bodies may confine theirmeetings to specified subject matter and may hold nonpublic sessions to transact business. Id. at 175 n.8. In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), the Court observed that the State may reserve [a nonpublic] forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speakers's view. Id. at 46. In Kindt v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 67 F.3d 266 (9th Cir. 1995), we applied the forum analysis to city council and board meetings. We said that [c]itizens are not entitled to exercise their First Amendment rights whenever and wherever they wish, id. at 269, and concluded that such meetings fit more neatly into the nonpublic forum niche, id. at 270. We acknowledged, however, that limitations on speech at those meetings must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral, but that is all they need to be. Id. at 271. 41 DeGrassi was excluded from the October meetings because of her status as a party, not because of her viewpoint. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 49 (denial of access to nonpublic forum based on status is not viewpoint discrimination). Because of the potential conflict between DeGrassi's role as a Council member and her personal interest, it was reasonable for the Council to exclude her from its discussions concerning her request for a defense. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570 (1968) (finding a sufficiently great interest in confidentiality may override a public employee's First Amendment rights). Moreover, her exclusion caused only a minor intrusion on her right to speak; she was not precluded from speaking out in public or directly with other Council members. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 824 (1974) (alternative means of communication are a relevant factor in First Amendment analysis). Because exclusion of DeGrassi was both viewpoint neutral and reasonable, defendants did not violate her First Amendment rights as a private citizen. 42 DeGrassi also asserts that as a member of the Council she has First Amendment rights independent of those of a citizen. Restrictions on a council member's ability to attend council meetings and address matters of public concern may infringe the member's First Amendment rights. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 137 (1966) (Georgia legislature's disqualification of elected representative on account of statements about the Vietnam war violated representative's right of free expression under First Amendment). As the Court stated in Bond, [t]he manifest function of the First Amendment in a representative government requires that legislators be given the widest latitude to express their views on issues of policy. Id. at 135-36. But [t]he central commitment of the First Amendment . . . is that `debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open' . . . . [S]tatements criticizing public policy and the implementation of it must be . . . protected. Id. at 136 (emphasis added) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). With respect to public employees generally, while their speech on matters of public concern merits the highest degree of First Amendment protection . . . if the communication is essentially self-interested, with no public import, then it is not of public concern. Roe v. City and County of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 584-85 (9th Cir. 1997). As the Supreme Court stated in Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983): 43 When employee expression cannot be fairly consid ered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government offi cials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversightby the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment. 44 Id. at 146; see also McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983) (Speech by public employees may be characterized as not of `public concern' when it is clear that such speech deals with individual personnel disputes and grievances and that the information would be of no relevance to the public's evaluation of the performance of governmental agencies.). 45 While the free speech rights of elected officials may well be entitled to broader protection than those of public employees generally, the underlying rationale remains the same. Legislators are given the widest latitude to express their views on issues of policy. Bond, 385 U.S. at 136. DeGrassi's allegations do not relate to issues of policy or to any matter of political, social or other concern to the community. They concern her grievance with the Council over the terms on which the City would provide her a defense in the Andrews action. Because her exclusion from the closed meetings did not interfere with DeGrassi's ability to speak out in public or to represent her constituents, it did not offend the First Amendment. 46
47 DeGrassi claims that the Andrewses and Council members conspired to file the slander action in retaliation for her opposition to the designation of the Andrewses' building as an historic landmark. Under S 1983, a claim may lie against a private party who is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents. Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are acting `under color' of law for purposes of S 1983 actions. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980). However, a bare allegation of such joint action will not overcome a motion to dismiss; the plaintiff must allege facts tending to show that [the Andrewses] acted `under color of state law or authority.'  Sykes v. State of Cal. (Dep't of Motor Vehicles), 497 F.2d 197, 202 (9th Cir. 1974). 48 Here, DeGrassi alleges that Cook had threatened to file lawsuits against her on other, unrelated occasions. She also claims that the City defendants knew of the lawsuit before she did. She concludes that Cook's threats became a reality upon the filing of the Andrews action. These conclusory allegations do not set forth facts supporting a claim that the Andrewses acted under color of law. And because she alleges no facts indicating that the City defendants had any involvement in the Andrewses' decision to file that action, her allegations do not support a claim that the filing of the action is attributable to the City defendants. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) ([A] State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.). 49
50 The principal claim against the firm seems to be that during a December 1997 Council meeting, it instructed the Council to ignore DeGrassi's questions. DeGrassi's argument that this was a First Amendment violation is frivolous, since the First Amendment does not guarantee that citizens' speech will be heard. See Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 464-65 (1979); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 821-22 (1974). 51