Opinion ID: 686466
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Malice

Text: 17 As noted above, federal procedural rules require the entry of summary judgment against the nonmoving party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 321, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. Texas law places the burden of proof at trial with respect to malice on the plaintiff. Dun and Bradstreet, 456 S.W.2d at 898. Unlike the Texas courts in summary judgment cases, therefore, we require that Duffy prove malice, rather than that Leading Edge establish absence of malice, to survive Leading Edge's proper summary judgment motion. Compare Lesbrookton, Inc. v. Jackson, 796 S.W.2d 276, 286 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1990, writ denied) (refusing to adopt the Celotex standard because under the Texas summary judgment scheme, the non-movant has no burden to produce proof of an element of his cause of action until that element has been conclusively negated by movant). 18 Duffy has not met his burden in this regard. Under the actual malice standard, a determinative factor is whether the defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the communication; the privilege is not lost if the defendant actually believed the defamatory statement to be true. Schauer, 856 S.W.2d at 449. See also Halbert v. City of Sherman, Texas, 33 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir.1994) (falsity of allegedly defamatory statement is by itself insufficient to show actual malice). Nothing in the record would support a finding that DiStefano did not actually believe Morse and DiVirgillio to be telling the truth. To the contrary, her report reflects that she believed both women to be sincere. Although Duffy presents a fuller account of what transpired, he has not shown that when DiStefano wrote her report she had a high degree of awareness that the underlying facts as reported to her were probably false. 19 Of course, [p]rofessions of good faith will be unlikely to prove persuasive ... where a story is fabricated, St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1326, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968), but we find no evidence of fabrication here. The record amply supports the conclusion that DiStefano reported, without any substantial or material inaccuracy, what she was told during the investigation. There is no evidence which would support a contrary finding. The facts as described by Morse in her deposition 7 and DiVirgillio in her affidavit 8 support the version of events DiStefano recounts in her report of the investigation. 9 20 Duffy complains that the investigation was inadequate, but this by itself is clearly not sufficient to show actual malice. El Paso Times, Inc. v. Trexler, 447 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex.1969); Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 806 S.W.2d at 924; Marathon Oil Co., 682 S.W.2d at 631; Mayfield, 484 S.W.2d at 627. Arguably, we might be more persuaded by his insistence that the investigation was a mere pretext for a decision that had already been made to terminate him if there were some evidence of ulterior motive. 10 The record, however, is devoid of any evidence that Leading Edge fabricated these charges or that the decision was based on anything other than these two incidents as reported to DiStefano. 11 Duffy himself admitted in his deposition that he did not believe that Leading Edge had any undisclosed motivation in firing him. 12 21 Duffy also claims that actual malice is shown from the fact that neither of these two incidents, either alone or together, would constitute sexual harassment under current Supreme Court interpretations of Title VII. Duffy's interpretation of Title VII may well be correct; we are nevertheless not persuaded by his argument. Although sexual harassment has a particular meaning in Title VII litigation, it also has a vernacular meaning that encompasses a far broader range of misconduct than would be actionable under Title VII. 13 There is no basis to conclude that Leading Edge did not believe that Duffy had engaged in sexual harassment in this vernacular sense. Leading Edge did not tell Duffy that he was being fired for violating Title VII or that retaining him would be a violation of Title VII. Moreover, Title VII does not protect employees from being discharged for misconduct that would not be actionable under Title VII. Nor does it restrict employers in the types of actions they can take to remedy behavior that, while it may not create a legal cause of action under Title VII, in their opinion creates an undesirable working environment. 22 Thus, although Leading Edge may well have been hasty or ultimately mistaken in its decision, we do not think that the evidence suffices to allow a finding that it acted with actual malice when it accused Duffy of sexual harassment. Because Duffy failed to meet his burden of proof with respect to this element of his claim, the district court was correct in granting summary judgment for Leading Edge.