Opinion ID: 627939
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Thurgood and Bartel's Claim for Attorney's Fees and

Text: Costs 19 Following the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Thurgood and Bartel, a decision that the Debrys do not appeal, Thurgood and Bartel petitioned for pro se attorney's fees and costs. The district court denied Thurgood and Bartel's request for fees and concluded that they were entitled to only $138.60 in costs. Thurgood and Bartel contend on appeal that the district court erred both by denying any attorney's fees for the time they spent preparing their case and by refusing to reimburse them for more than $138.60 in costs and expenses. We will consider each contention in turn. A district court's award of fees and costs is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, although the legal analysis that provides the basis for the court's decision is reviewable de novo. Aguinaga v. United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, No. 92-3211, 1993 U.S.App. LEXIS 11478, at 3 (10th Cir. May 19, 1993); Anthony v. United States, 987 F.2d 670, 674 (10th Cir.1993). 9
20 The traditional rule in American courts is that litigants must pay their own attorney's fees. Aleyska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975). An exception to this rule exists, however, where payment of attorney's fees is provided for either by statute or contract, or where the losing party has acted in bad faith. Id. at 257, 258-59. In the instant case, Thurgood and Bartel argue that they have both a statutory right to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988(b) and a contractual right to attorney's fees under the Trust Deed executed by the Debrys. Additionally, they argue that they are entitled to attorney's fees because the Debrys' suit was filed in bad faith. 21 Section 1988(b) permits a court, in its discretion, to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party in an action under Sec. 1983. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988(b). 10 However, in Kay v. Ehrler, 111 S.Ct. 1435 (1991), the Supreme Court held that pro se litigants, whether or not they are members of the bar, are not entitled to attorney's fees under Sec. 1988. See also Turman v. Tuttle, 711 F.2d 148 (10th Cir.1983) (denying attorney's fees under Sec. 1988 to pro se litigants who are not members of the bar). The Court reasoned that the term attorney's fees assumes the existence of a paying relationship between an attorney and a client, and that restricting awards to litigants engaged in such a relationship would encourage litigants to hire independent counsel and thereby increase the quality of litigation. See 111 S.Ct. at 1436-38. In light of Kay, it is clear that Thurgood and Bartel are not entitled to receive attorney's fees under Sec. 1988. 22 Similarly, we conclude that Thurgood and Bartel are not entitled to receive attorney's fees under the doctrine permitting an award of fees where the losing party has acted in bad faith. Consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Kay, we conclude that the right to recover attorney's fees under the bad faith doctrine does not extend to pro se litigants. The primary purpose of awarding attorney's fees where the losing party has acted in bad faith is to alleviate the opposing party from the legal expenses incurred in defending against a groundless suit. Gordon v. Heimann, 715 F.2d 531, 539 (11th Cir.1983); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 704 F.2d 652, 654 (2d Cir.1983); cf. Turman, 711 F.2d at 149 (concluding that a pro se litigant is not entitled to attorney's fees under Sec. 1988 because the purpose of this provision is to compensate litigants for the costs of bringing suit). 11 In the instant case, Thurgood and Bartel represented themselves and thus did not expend any money for legal representation. Accordingly, we find no justification for awarding Thurgood and Bartel attorney's fees under the bad faith doctrine. 23 Finally, we conclude that Thurgood and Bartel are not entitled to receive attorney's fees under the Trust Deed. Under Utah law, the Trust Deed, like any contract, must be interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning, absent any attendant ambiguity. See Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). Paragraphs Four, Six, and Sixteen of the Deed provide that the Debrys are liable to Thurgood and Bartel for costs and expenses, including attorney's fees. 12 However, the Debrys' liability under these provisions is expressly limited to those proceedings affecting the title of the property, the security of the Trust Deed, or Thurgood and Bartel's rights and powers as beneficiaries under the Trust Deed and Promissory Note. The instant action does not fall within any of these categories. The Debrys' complaint did not seek to invalidate either the Trust Deed or Promissory Note or their obligations under these instruments. Rather, it merely sought damages against Thurgood and Bartel for fraudulently and unconstitutionally conspiring with Noble to obtain a temporary certificate of occupancy. Under the plain and unambiguous terms of the Trust Deed, therefore, the instant action clearly falls outside the scope of Thurgood and Bartel's right to receive attorney's fees under this instrument. Furthermore, as noted above, Thurgood and Bartel did not, in fact, incur any attorney's fees nor did they employ counsel.
24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) provides that costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court directs otherwise. The costs that a court may award under Rule 54(d), however, are limited to those which are specified either by statute or by contract. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 439, 445 (1987); Miller v. Cudahy Co., 858 F.2d 1449, 1461 (10th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 926 (1989). In the instant case, the district court, adopting the clerk of court's decision, concluded that statutory authorization existed under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1920 for awarding Thurgood and Bartel $138.60 for copying costs, but that there was no statutory basis for awarding any of the other costs requested by these defendants. 13 25 We agree with the district court that no statutory authority exists for taxing the remaining costs requested by Thurgood and Bartel, and the defendants do not quarrel with this conclusion. Rather, they assert that they are entitled to reimbursement for their remaining costs on the basis of the Trust Deed. Once again, however, Thurgood and Bartel rely on Paragraphs Four, Six, and Sixteen of the Trust Deed in support of their argument. For the same reason we hold that the Trust Deed does not entitle them to attorney's fees in the instant action, we conclude that this instrument does not support their request for costs and expenses. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's refusal to award Thurgood and Bartel more than $138.60 in costs. 14 26 The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.