Opinion ID: 864456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: whether the state's evidence was legally

Text: SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE CAPITAL MURDER OF WILLIAM HATCHER IN COUNT TWO OF THE INDICTMENT. ¶73. Moody argues that the State did not prove Hatcher was murdered while in commission of a sexual battery on Bond. The State counters by citing Benson v. State, 551 So.2d 188 44 (Miss. 1989), wherein this Court illustrated the well-established standard as to legal sufficiency of the evidence: When on appeal one convicted of a criminal offense challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence, our authority to interfere with the jury's verdict is quite limited. We proceed by considering all of the evidence - not just that supporting the prosecution - in the light most consistent with the verdict. We give the prosecution the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. If the facts and the inferences so considered point in favor of the accused with sufficient force that reasonable men could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the was guilty, reversal and discharge are required. On the other hand, if there is in the record such substantial evidence of such quality and weight that, having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable and fairminded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions, the verdict of guilty is thus placed beyond our authority to disturb. See e.g., Gavin v. State, 473 So.2d 952, 956 (Miss. 1985); May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 781 (Miss. 1984). Benson v. State, 551 So.2d 188, 192-93 (Miss. 1989) (citing McFee v. State, 511 So.2d130, 133-34 (Miss. 1987). ¶74. Moody argues that Hatcher was already dead when the sexual battery was committed upon Bond; therefore, according to Moody, Hatcher's murder could not have been capital murder because Moody's intent to sexually batter Bond was not formed at the time he murdered Hatcher. Moody points to the testimony of Dr. Steven Hayne, who testified that based on the blows received by Hatcher, he would expect that Hatcher was rendered immediately unconscious with death occurring in “a non prolonged period of time” after that. 45 ¶75. As the State points out, intent to sexually batter Bond could be inferred from the actions of Moody, who had to first incapacitate Hatcher in order to get to Bond. This is a reasonable inference which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. The jury by its verdict obviously found that this was Moody's purpose. ¶76. Moody would have us believe that the intent to sexually batter Bond was not formed until after the death of Hatcher - that there was a break in the chain of events whereby Hatcher had been dead before it ever entered Moody's mind to sexually batter Bond. As the State argued in its brief, the crimes against Hatcher and Bond were so intertwined that they constituted a continuous act. There was certainly more than sufficient evidence in the case sub judice for the jury to find that Moody possessed the requisite intent to sexually batter Bond before the murder of Hatcher and, according, the guilty verdict is beyond our ability or authority to disturb. ¶77. Moody cites Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581 (Miss. 1995), which involved proof of a definite intent by the defendant to sexually batter the murder victim, as evidenced by a statement made by the defendant that he had always wanted to do that. Id. at 595. Moody argues that there is only circumstantial evidence in the case sub judice to demonstrate Moody's intent, and, being such, it falls outside the dictates of Walker. We disagree and also cite from Walker: This Court said in Shanklin v. State, 290 So.2d 625 (Miss. 1974): 46 Intent to do an act or commit a crime is also a question of fact to be gleaned by the jury from the facts shown in each case. The intent to commit a crime or to do an act by a free agent can be determined only by the act itself, surrounding circumstances, and expressions made by the actor with reference to his intent. Id. at 627 (emphasis added). The Court further stated in Thompson v. State, 258 So.2d 448 (Miss. 1972): Unless one expresses his intent, the only method by which intent may be proven is by showing the acts of the person involved at the time in question, and by showing the circumstances surrounding the incident. 671 So.2d at 595. ¶78. While Moody may not have expressed his intent, there is no doubt that his intent to sexually assault and batter Robbie Bond was proven by his actions and the surrounding circumstances. ¶79. This issue is without merit.