Opinion ID: 2101773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retroactivity of Reddick

Text: In Reddick, we held that the then-existing Illinois pattern jury instructions for murder and voluntary manslaughter, when given together, suffered from two related defects. The instructions incorrectly informed the jury that the State was required to prove the mental conditions that reduce murder to manslaughter when properly the State should have been required to disprove those circumstances. ( Reddick, 123 Ill.2d at 193-97, 122 Ill.Dec. 1, 526 N.E.2d 141.) Because of the defects in the jury instructions, the Reddick court reversed the defendants' murder convictions and remanded the consolidated causes for new trials. Reddick, 123 Ill.2d at 199, 122 Ill.Dec. 1, 526 N.E.2d 141. We must first determine whether the Reddick decision is of constitutional dimension, requiring its retroactive application to cases pending on direct review at the time Reddick was decided. The State argues that the proper test for determining the retroactivity of Reddick is found in People v. Laws (1981), 84 Ill.2d 493, 50 Ill.Dec. 701, 419 N.E.2d 1150. The State contends that the Reddick holding does not implicate constitutional rights and therefore, under Laws, Reddick does not apply retroactively. This court has held that retroactivity is triggered when two factors are present: (1) the case to which the new rule is to be applied was not final or was pending on direct review when the rule was declared and (2) the rule to be applied retroactively is of constitutional dimension. ( People v. Erickson (1987), 117 Ill.2d 271, 290, 111 Ill.Dec. 924, 513 N.E.2d 367 (adopting the retroactivity standard announced in Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649).) Each of the cases before us was pending on direct review when this court decided Reddick. Therefore, if the Reddick decision is of constitutional dimension, it applies retroactively to these defendants. The State contends that the Reddick decision implicates only statutory rights because the holding in that case was based in part on statutory construction. We acknowledge that in allocating the burdens of proof for the offenses of murder and voluntary manslaughter, the Reddick court relied on the affirmative defense provisions of section 3-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 3-2). However, we determined that the jury instructions were erroneous because, not only did they misstate the provisions of section 3-2, but also, as given, the instructions could deny a defendant a fair trial. ( People v. Flowers (1990), 138 Ill.2d 218, 240, 149 Ill.Dec. 304, 561 N.E.2d 674; see Reddick, 123 Ill.2d at 198, 122 Ill.Dec. 1, 526 N.E.2d 141.) Indeed, the court in Flowers, which declined to apply Reddick to cases pending on collateral review when Reddick was decided, expressly acknowledged that Reddick implicated constitutional rights. Flowers, 138 Ill.2d at 240, 149 Ill.Dec. 304, 561 N.E.2d 674. A review of the errors identified in Reddick demonstrates that those defects may deny a defendant the constitutional right to due process. First, the murder and voluntary manslaughter instructions, when given together, misallocated the appropriate burdens of proof. Under the statutes in effect at that time, a defendant was guilty of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder if the defendant's actions were provoked by a sudden, intense passion due to serious provocation, or if the defendant believed, although unreasonably, that the use of force was justified to protect himself. (See Ill.Rev.Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(a), 9-2.) The voluntary manslaughter instructions at issue in Reddick required the State to prove the existence of the extenuating mental states that reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter. (See IPI Criminal 2d Nos. 7.04, 7.06.) The court noted that the prosecution would normally have little incentive to introduce proof of that nature and that the evidence would most likely have come from the defense, rather than the prosecution. In that event, a jury that literally followed the instructions would not be able to give effect to its finding. See Reddick, 123 Ill.2d at 194-95, 122 Ill.Dec. 1, 526 N.E.2d 141. The second defect identified in Reddick was that the murder instruction, when given with the voluntary manslaughter instruction, failed to require the State to disprove the circumstances that reduce murder to manslaughter. These mitigating factors are properly treated as affirmative defenses for purposes of allocating burdens of proof. ( Reddick, 123 Ill.2d at 195, 122 Ill.Dec. 1, 526 N.E.2d 141.) Illinois law requires the State to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the defendant's sufficiently raised affirmative defenses other than insanity. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 3-2.) Because the instructions failed to inform the jury that the State was required to disprove the existence of those mitigating mental states, the jury may have believed that it could convict the defendant of murder even if it found that the defendant was provoked by sudden and intense passion or that the defendant unreasonably believed that his actions were justified. Reddick, 123 Ill.2d at 197, 122 Ill.Dec. 1, 526 N.E.2d 141; see also United States ex rel. Fleming v. Huch (7th Cir. 1991), 924 F.2d 679; Falconer v. Lane (7th Cir.1990), 905 F.2d 1129, 1136 (discussing Reddick defects; also noting that because the murder instruction is given first, it may take on special prominence in minds of jurors, encouraging them to consider voluntary manslaughter only if murder requirements have not been met). Based on the deficiencies described above, we conclude that the use of the erroneous instructions may violate a defendant's due process right to a fair trial. See Reddick, 123 Ill.2d at 198, 122 Ill.Dec. 1, 526 N.E.2d 141; Rose v. Lane (7th Cir. 1990), 910 F.2d 400, 402; Falconer, 905 F.2d at 1137; see also Fleming, 924 F.2d at 682 (At oral argument, the State basically (and wisely) conceded that, after Falconer and Rose, it cannot be disputed that the errors in these jury instructions constitute a violation of due process). The State does not dispute that our decision in People v. Erickson (1987), 117 Ill.2d 271, 111 Ill.Dec. 924, 513 N.E.2d 367, requires that a constitutional holding be applied retroactively to cases pending on direct review at the time the decision was announced. Because the holding in Reddick is of constitutional dimension, and because the appeals now before us were pending on direct review when Reddick was decided, the Reddick decision applies retroactively to the defendants in these cases. Erickson, 117 Ill.2d at 289, 111 Ill.Dec. 924, 513 N.E.2d 367.)