Opinion ID: 773521
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reduction for Role in the Offense

Text: 14 Section 3B1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a four-level downward adjustment if the defendant was a minimal participant in criminal activity, and a two-level downward adjustment where the defendant was a minor participant. The commentary to the Guidelines provides that a minimal role adjustment applies to a defendant who is plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.1). Under this provision, the defendant's lack of knowledge or understanding of the scope and structure of the enterprise and of the activities of others is indicative of a role as minimal participant. Id. The Guidelines make clear that the minimal role adjustment should be used infrequently. Id. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.2); see also United States v. Lopez, 937 F.2d 716, 727 (2d Cir. 1991). 15 In comparison, a minor role adjustment applies to any participant who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.3). The Guidelines further provide that a mitigating role adjustment is appropriate if the defendant is substantially less culpable than the average participant. Id. § 3B1.2, comment. (background) (emphasis added); cf. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) ([C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.). If the defendant falls in between being classified as a `minimal participant' and a `minor participant,' he is entitled to a three-level downward adjustment. United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1127 (2d Cir. 1992); see also U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. 16 On numerous occasions we have reiterated that [a] reduction [pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2] will not be available simply because the defendant played a lesser role than his co- conspirators; to be eligible for a reduction, the defendant's conduct must be `minor' or `minimal' as compared to the average participant in such a crime. United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 159 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1094 (2000); see also Castano, 234 F.3d at 113; United States v. Neils, 156 F.3d 382, 383 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, the district court is required to gauge the appellant's culpability relative to the elements of the offense of conviction as well as in relation to the co-conspirators.); United States v. Ajmal, 67 F.3d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Pena, 33 F.3d 2, 3 (2d Cir. 1994); Lopez, 937 F.2d at 728. Accordingly, the fact that a defendant played a minimal or minor role in his offense vis-a-vis the role of his co-conspirators is insufficient, in and of itself, to justify a [mitigating role] reduction. Ajmal, 67 F.3d at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Martin, 78 F.3d 808, 814 (2d Cir. 1996). 17 The rationale for such a rule is self-evident. As we stated in Neils, [i]f participation in the offense were measured solely in relation to the co-defendants, the anomaly would arise that a deeply involved participant would be rewarded with a downward adjustment, just because his co-defendants were even more culpable. 156 F.3d at 383; see also Pena, 33 F.3d at 3 (Permitting the culpability of co-perpetrators alone to determine the adjustment for role in the offense for all members of a criminal undertaking would... subject[] defendants who had engaged in identical criminal conduct to different sentences.); Lopez, 937 F.2d at 728. Further, such a result runs contrary to the statutory purposes of sentencing, which are aimed at reduc[ing] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct. United States v. Sentamu, 212 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 18 The government argues that the district court's decision to grant Carpenter a three-level mitigating role adjustment was in conflict with established Second Circuit precedent. Our resolution of the government's appeal requires us to analyze the basis of the district court's determination. 19 In ruling that Carpenter's base offense level should be reduced by three levels pursuant to section 3B1.2 for his role in the conspiracy, the district court found that 20 [Carpenter's] role in the offense is much less culpable than that of Marty Wise, the co-defendant. It's clear from the record that Wise initiated the offense and recruited [Carpenter] to take part in the thefts and that he was the one that had unlimited access to the guns, decided which guns would be stolen, when the thefts would take place, et cetera. Wise used [Carpenter] and four other individuals to accomplish these thefts and reaped the most from the crimes. In addition, although it's not a consideration to make as [an] adjustment, the Court also notes that [Carpenter] has been forthright and has accepted responsibility and has assisted the Government to the best of his ability in the investigation [of] this offense. 21 Our review of the totality of the district court's statements indicate that its decision to grant Carpenter a three-level mitigating role adjustment was based solely upon the relative culpability of [Carpenter] and his co-conspirator[]. Ajmal, 67 F.3d at 18. Under our well-settled precedent, a finding that Carpenter was less culpable than Wise, his co-conspirator, is an impermissible basis, in and of itself, for granting a downward departure under section 3B1.2. See Neils, 156 F.3d at 383 (To the extent that appellant argues that he is entitled to a reduction in the offense base level under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 solely upon a finding that he is less culpable than the co-defendants, he is wrong.); Martin, 78 F.3d at 814; Ajmal, 67 F.3d at 18 (To the extent that the district court based its determination solely upon the relative culpability of [the defendant] and his co-conspirators, it misconstrued the law.); Pena, 33 F.3d at 3. Because the district court compared Carpenter's role to that of Wise, rather than to the average participant in a similar firearm theft conspiracy, the sentence imposed by the district court must be vacated. 22 The government next argues that Carpenter's role in the conspiracy and his knowledge of the scope and structure of the conspiracy render him ineligible as a matter of law for a mitigating role adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Thus, the government asks that we decide this question in the first instance. In response, Carpenter concedes that the district court seemingly employed the wrong legal standard, but asks that we remand the matter to the district court for additional factfinding because [t]here are sufficient record facts that support the same [mitigating role] adjustment with the application of the correct standard. We disagree. Because the relevant facts on this issue are clear from the record, we choose to decide the question of Carpenter's entitlement to a mitigating role adjustment in the first instance, rather than remand that determination to the district court for additional factfinding. See, e.g., Compagnie Financiere de CIC et de L'Union Europeenne v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 232 F.3d 153, 161 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 93 F.3d 1064, 1072 (2d Cir. 1996) (An appellate court has the power to decide cases on appeal if the facts in the record adequately support the proper result or if the record as a whole presents no genuine issue as to any material fact. Thus, if we find that a party must prevail as a matter of law, a remand is unnecessary.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Reid v. Senkowski, 961 F.2d 374, 377 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam). 23 Carpenter's active involvement in stealing the firearms from Dick's and reselling them to various third parties confirms that he played an important and significant part in the conspiracy to violate federal firearms laws to which he pleaded guilty. Martin, 78 F.3d at 814; see also United States v. Gomez, 103 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the record amply support[s] a finding that [the defendant] was central to both gun transactions). Indeed, at sentencing Carpenter conceded that there's no question that he had a very significant role in the conspiracy. As a partner in a business that was a federally licensed dealer, Carpenter was able to regularly purchase and transfer firearms without drawing suspicion. This fact was critical to the success of the conspiracy. See, e.g., Martin, 78 F.3d at 814 (defendant's status as a federally licensed firearms dealer facilitated the transfer and sale of firearms). Further, Carpenter falsely executed the ATF forms that were designed to conceal the thefts of the firearms. Given these facts, we conclude that Carpenter possessed an intimate knowledge or understanding of the scope and structure of the enterprise for which he pleaded guilty. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.1); see also United States v. LaValley, 999 F.2d 663, 665 (2d Cir. 1993) ([A] lack of knowledge or understanding is essential to a finding of minimal role and is a relevant factor to be considered in reaching a finding of minor role.) (internal citation omitted). 24 The fact that Wise recruited Carpenter for the first of fifty firearm thefts does not render Carpenter an unwitting participant in the two and one-half year conspiracy during which he actively and systematically stole firearms and illegally resold them for personal profit. This is not a situation involving the isolated theft of a single firearm; instead, this case involved a scheme designed to deal in stolen firearms. The continuing nature of the conspiracy, coupled with Carpenter's repeated involvement in the firearm thefts and resales, further render Carpenter ineligible for a mitigating role adjustment. See Gaston, 68 F.3d at 1468. 25 The contested facts cited by Carpenter -- which relate principally to Carpenter's role in the conspiracy relative to Wise and the other co-conspirators -- are not relevant and, thus, do not alter the outcome of the present appeal. Further, even if we accept as true the facts alleged by Carpenter in his brief, Carpenter still would not be entitled to a mitigating role adjustment based on the reasons we previously explained. 26 Finally, Carpenter argues, as he did at sentencing, that he is entitled to a mitigating role adjustment because the firearms were not used for unlawful purposes. Specifically, Carpenter contends that 27 the firearms [Carpenter] obtained were used primarily by him for hunting and target shooting. [Carpenter] did not sell the guns simply to make money. Rather, he sold guns when he need[ed] to buy a new gun for his collection. Unlike many, if not most[] people involved in gun thefts, Carpenter did not knowingly act as a conduit for supplying weapons in reckless disregard of whether they were to be used in the commission of other illegal acts. 28 Even accepting Carpenter's facts as true, they are irrelevant to our determination of whether Carpenter is entitled to a mitigating role adjustment and, specifically, to the issue of Carpenter's knowledge of the scope and structure of the conspiracy and the scope of his role within that conspiracy. We note that Carpenter raised this argument at sentencing, and the district court did not refer to this factor in its decision to award Carpenter a mitigating role adjustment. As such, it is reasonable to infer that the district court rejected this argument as a permissible basis for granting Carpenter a mitigating role adjustment. Accordingly, Carpenter's version of his motives in engaging in the firearm thefts does not modify our previous conclusion that Carpenter played a central role in both the theft and resale of the firearms from Dick's sufficient to preclude a mitigating role adjustment under section 3B1.2.