Opinion ID: 835155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issues of Oregon Law

Text: On review, the parties focus their arguments on the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. However, we will address arguments based on the laws of our state before reaching a claim that those laws fall short of a federal constitutional requirement. Otherwise, we risk wast[ing] a good deal of time and effort of several courts and counsel and needlessly spur[ring] pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court on constitutional issues of national importance in a case to whose decision these may be irrelevant. State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 264-65, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983). We will not allow parties, by the manner in which they frame the issues on review, to force the court into a position to decide that the state's government has fallen below a nationwide constitutional standard, when in fact the state's law, when properly invoked, meets or exceeds that standard. Id. at 266-67, 666 P.2d 1316. Accordingly, we begin by addressing youth's argument that N's statements to CARES constituted inadmissible hearsay, and that those statements were not admissible under OEC 803(18a)(b) and Campbell. The thrust of youth's argument is that, under Campbell, the trial court was obligated to make an independent determination that N was unavailable as a witness, rather than accepting youth's own stipulation to that fact. [4] Campbell presented a set of facts similar to those at issue here. Before the defendant's trial for first-degree sodomy, the defendant and the state stipulated that the three-year-old-victim lacked competency to testify as a witness. The state then introduced hearsay statements that the victim had made to her mother, implicating the defendant. On review, this court held that those statements were admissible under the existing version of OEC 803(18a), as complaints of sexual misconduct. Campbell, 299 Or. at 646, 705 P.2d 694. The defendant then argued that admission of the child's statements violated his right to confrontation under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. To analyze that question, this court adopted the since-rejected reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980): In Ohio v. Roberts, supra , the United States Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining whether admission of out-of-court statements of a witness who does not testify at trial satisfies the defendant's right to confrontation. First, the declarant must be unavailable and, second, the declarant's out-of-court statements must have `adequate indicia of reliability.' Justice [Blackmun] stated with apparent concurrence of the entire court that `[r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.' He added that in other cases the evidence `must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' Campbell, 299 Or. at 648, 705 P.2d 694 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531). [5] Using that test, this court determined that complaints of sexual misconduct fell within an ancient and firmly rooted hearsay exception, and, therefore, had adequate indicia of reliability. Id. at 650, 705 P.2d 694. That left the question of whether the declarant was unavailable. As mentioned above, the parties had stipulated to the fact that the victim was incompetent to testify. The defendant, however, insisted that he had not stipulated to the victim's unavailability, and accordingly, he had not waived any right to confront her. This court determined that the defendant's stipulation had no effect, because it was the trial court's responsibility to ensure that the witness was unavailable: We believe that the question of unavailability of a hearsay declarant supposedly due to incompetency should not be left to the advocates in a criminal trial. The prosecution would be relieved from calling the witness and the defense relieved from having the witness appear for trial. If the court is going to admit hearsay statements against a defendant to satisfy the confrontation rights of an accused, the court must ensure the declarant is in fact unavailable.      We hold, therefore, that before any out-of-court declaration of any available living witness may be offered against a defendant in a criminal trial, the witness must be produced and declared incompetent by the court to satisfy either Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, or the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This ruling on competency was not undertaken in this case and, therefore, the case must be reversed and remanded to the trial court for such a determination. Id. at 651-52, 705 P.2d 694 (omitted). In this case, youth argued to the Court of Appeals that, even though he had stipulated to N's unavailability as a witness in the juvenile court, Campbell required the juvenile court to evaluate N and determine whether he was competent to testify. Youth insisted that, because the juvenile court had failed to do so, the Court of Appeals had to remand the case for a new trial. The state responded that, for a variety of reasons, youth failed to preserve that argument and that it was not reviewable as error apparent on the face of the record. The Court of Appeals came to a similar conclusion. First, the Court of Appeals stated that youth's argument primarily relied on OEC 803(18a)(b), rather than on the Confrontation Clause of Article I, section 11, as the argument in Campbell had. The court also noted that Campbell did not address the question of whether the defendant had preserved or invited the trial court's error. Finally, the court observed that subsequent decisions of this court appeared to contradict an implicit premise of Campbell in holding that criminal defendants routinely waive trial-related constitutional rights for a variety of tactical and strategic reasons. S.P., 218 Or.App. at 140-41, 178 P.3d 318. For those reasons, the court concluded that the juvenile court had not made an error that was apparent on the face of the record, because the proper application of Campbell was not obvious and was reasonably in dispute. Furthermore, the court held, in light of the manifest potential that youth had made a strategic decision to stipulate to N's unavailability, the court held that it would not exercise discretion to review such a claim of error. Id. at 142, 178 P.3d 318. [6] The state's argument requires that we examine Campbell to determine whether the court reached a holding  that is, a legal determination that carries precedential effect  on the question whether a party asserting on appeal a violation of the state and federal confrontation clauses must have preserved that argument below. Campbell held that the state and federal confrontation clauses required a trial court, before admitting out-of-court declarations of any potentially available living witness in a criminal trial, to examine the witness and declare the witness incompetent and, therefore, unavailable. Campbell also held that the trial court was bound by that requirement even though the defendant had stipulated to the incompetence of the witness. The court reasoned that reversal was necessary solely because the trial court had not determined whether, on the basis of an examination by the trial court, the witness was incompetent to testify: This ruling on competency was not undertaken in this case and, therefore, the case must be reversed and remanded to the trial court for such a determination. Id. at 652, 705 P.2d 694. It is clear that, in Campbell, this court provided guidance to trial courts regarding the correct administration of the confrontation right. It is equally clear that Campbell does not address expressly the question whether a party asserting on appeal that a trial court failed to follow the directives in Campbell first must demonstrate that the claim of error was preserved in the trial court. The Campbell court's disposition  reversing and remanding the case for a trial court determination on witness competency notwithstanding the parties' stipulation that the witness lacked competency  creates an implication that the court did not require preservation of the asserted error. But, despite that permissible inference, we are reluctant to ascribe the precedential effect of a holding to what is at most an ambiguity that the Campbell opinion does not address or otherwise resolve. Instead, in our view, the state's objection to youth's failure to preserve the question below, and youth's response that Campbell describes trial court obligations that require no demand or objection by youth, together pose an open question to this court. This court will determine, sua sponte, whether the issues before it were preserved at trial. See State v. Wyatt, 331 Or. 335, 345-47, 15 P.3d 22 (2000) (holding that the Court of Appeals should not have considered an unpreserved claim of error, even though the parties had stipulated that the claim was preserved). We take on that responsibility to serve two policy goals. First, the preservation requirement is important to judicial efficiency. If a party objects to an action or decision of the trial court, the party must permit the trial judge a chance to consider the legal contention or to correct an error already made. Shields v. Campbell, 277 Or. 71, 77, 559 P.2d 1275 (1977). Second, the preservation requirement promotes fairness to the adversary parties. State v. Hitz, 307 Or. 183, 188, 766 P.2d 373 (1988). Ignoring the preservation of error requirement in this context, in our view, would frustrate both of those goals. Youth did not notify the trial court, through an objection or otherwise, that, in his view, the court's administration of his confrontation right, including acceptance of the parties' stipulation, fell short of the requirements stated in Campbell. Likewise, youth did not alert the state regarding his claim that the trial court had to make an independent determination of N's competence until he filed his appellate brief. Had youth raised his objection in the trial court, it is likely that the state would have made a different record on the question. Those facts support the Court of Appeals' view that the preservation principle applies to a claim on appeal that a trial court's administration of the confrontation right fell short of the requirements stated in Campbell. Finally, we recently have held that, under other circumstances, a defendant may forfeit the right of confrontation by affirmatively establishing that a decision of the trial court is not objectionable: There is nothing unlawful about the admission of hearsay evidence, even in a criminal case where the constitution affords a right of confrontation. A lawyer's deliberate decision not to require that a witness testify in person at trial may benefit the defendant in many circumstances. For instance, an adverse declarant's testimony may have a more persuasive effect in person than it would when relayed by a third party. Or, a defendant may not contest the testimony of the declarant, and, in that circumstance, defense counsel may wish to avoid the time and attention that in-person testimony would entail. When the record discloses, as it does here, that a lawyer for a defendant has made an explicit decision not to make an evidentiary objection that otherwise could have been asserted, reviewing courts will not provide refuge from that deliberate choice on direct appeal. State v. Steen, 346 Or. 143, 155, 206 P.3d 614 (2009) (footnote omitted). We cannot reconcile that passage from Steen with a rule that would allow a party, after making an explicit decision to stipulate to the incompetence of a witness at trial, to argue that the trial court's decision, in consequence of the stipulation, to declare that a witness lacks capacity and is unavailable as a witness is a basis for reversal on appeal. In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that youth's Campbell -based objection was unpreserved. The Court of Appeals also concluded that youth's objection is not reviewable as error apparent on the face of the record. See ORAP 5.45(1), which provides, in part: No matter claimed as error will be considered on appeal unless the claimed error was preserved in the lower court and is assigned as error in the opening brief in accordance with this rule, provided that the appellate court may consider an error of law apparent on the face of the record. This court has determined that it will not exercise its discretion to review an asserted plain error if the party seeking review encouraged commission of the error in question or made a strategic choice not to object. State v. Fults, 343 Or. 515, 523, 173 P.3d 822 (2007). In Clay/Luttrell v. Pay Less Drug Stores, 276 Or. 673, 677, 556 P.2d 125 (1976), this court said that invited error is not a basis for reversal. In view of those authorities, the Court of Appeals correctly declined to review youth's objection under Campbell as error apparent on the face of the record. To paraphrase Steen, youth made an explicit decision to stipulate to N's unavailability at trial, and he may not seek refuge from that deliberate choice on appeal. To summarize, the trial court held that N's hearsay statements to both his parents and to CARES were admissible as statements concerning sexual abuse under OEC 803(18a)(b). Because youth failed to preserve his challenge to that ruling, we do not disturb it on review. Accordingly, we need not consider youth's alternative argument that N's statements to CARES were not admissible under OEC 803(4). [7] As part of the first things first methodology, we also consider state constitutional issues before we consider federal claims. Campbell, 299 Or. at 647, 705 P.2d 694. Here, however, Campbell forecloses any such claim. As mentioned earlier, Campbell held that under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, a child's complaints about another's sexual misconduct have adequate indicia of reliability, because those complaints fall within an ancient and firmly rooted hearsay exception. Id. at 650-51, 705 P.2d 694. Such complaints are admissible at trial if the declarant is unavailable as a witness. Id. at 648, 705 P.2d 694. Youth stipulated to N's unavailability at trial, and is precluded from challenging that stipulation on appeal. Therefore, Campbell appears to allow for the admission of N's statements under Article I, section 11, and neither youth nor the state argues that Campbell was wrongly decided. [8] Accordingly, we turn to the question of whether the admission of N's statements violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.