Opinion ID: 2982116
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural Background of the Bivens Action

Text: In this Bivens action, the district court initially dismissed Burns’s complaint against defendants Lappin, Watts, Franklund and Cabanero pursuant to §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The district court also dismissed all claims based on events occurring before February 14, 2010, as outside of the one-year statute of limitations applicable to Bivens actions in Tennessee.1 1 Doc. No. 5, W.D. Tenn. Case No. 2:11-cv-02152. 2 Subsequently, the remaining defendants in this Bivens action, Juan Castillo and Nahem Naimey, moved to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c). The district court granted defendants’ motion as to defendant Castillo, but denied defendants’ motion as to defendant Naimey.2 After the district court in this Bivens action ruled that defendant Naimey was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the district court in the FTCA action (W.D. Tenn. Case No. 2:12-cv02287) granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the case against all defendants with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), including defendant United States. As a consequence of the dismissal of the FTCA action, the remaining defendant, Naimey, in this Bivens action moved for dismissal on the grounds that the claims against him were prohibited by 28 U.S.C. § 2676 after Burns’s FTCA action (W.D. Tenn. Case No. 2:12-cv-02287) was dismissed against the United States.3 The district court in this Bivens action granted defendant Naimey’s motion to dismiss on that basis.4 The instant appeal arises from the district court’s dismissal of the Bivens action based on the dismissal of the FTCA action. 2 Doc. No. 24, W.D. Tenn. Case No. 2:11-cv-02152. 3 28 U.S.C. § 2676 provides that “The judgment in an action under section 1346(b) of this title shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) gives district courts “exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act of omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of . . . employment . . . .” 4 “[T]he judgment on the FTCA claims [requires] dismissal of the Bivens action.” (Doc. No. 44, W.D. Tenn. Case No. 2:11-cv-02152). 3