Opinion ID: 1283097
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: An Equitable Solution

Text: I am in agreement with the following commentator who says that, in the context of criminal prosecutions, there is nothing harmless about the admission of other bad acts evidence. Despite its name, the harmless error doctrine, at least in the context of Rule 404(b) errors, is not harmless to anyone. First, the harmless error doctrine wastes judicial resources. The purported justification of this doctrine is that it conserves judicial resources by preserving convictions infected by Rule 404(b) errors in cases in which the other, admissible evidence of the defendant's guilt is overwhelming. This justification is dubious at best. If the remaining evidence indicating the defendant's guilt is otherwise so overwhelming, then why admit other acts evidence in the first place? The alleged need for the other acts evidence should be evaluated in light of the issues and other evidence available to the prosecution. If overwhelming proof is truly available, then there is no need for admission of the erroneous other acts evidence. This unnecessary evidence serves to distract and mislead the jury. In fact, inadmissible other acts evidence ensures there will be an ultimately futile appeal, which merely wastes the resources of the appellate courts, if not those of the litigants and their advocates. Moreover, in the case of clearly erroneous admissions of other acts evidence, the overwhelming evidence argument is circular. It places an inexorable temptation before the prosecution to offer, and the district judge to admit, all evidence, even that of questionable value, to create an overwhelming case against the defendant. This, in turn, encourages the admission of additional weak evidence because the more overwhelming the indication (or implication) of guilt, the greater the available protection under the harmless error doctrine. Second, the harmless error doctrine ... is intellectually indefensible. The harmless error cases were frequently factually indistinguishable from those cases in which Rule 404(b) errors required reversal. But reversals must be grounded on discernible law, not luck. When Rule 404(b) error is clear, no meaningful distinction between abusive and harmless error is possible.... Third, application of the harmless error doctrine to Rule 404(b) errors is unfair to the defendant. The broad discretion and the great deference granted to trial judges in the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence, together with the long list of acceptable purposes under which other acts evidence may be admitted, already tilts the Rule 404(b) playing field sharply in the government's favor. The Rule is applied in such an inclusionary manner that propensity is the only purpose for which the evidence may not be admitted. Without a countervailing policy of reversing clear Rule 404(b) errors, the defendant's right not to be convicted for being a bad person, rather than for the crime charged, is meaningless. It is not too much to require both that district judges exercise greater care in excluding clearly erroneous other acts evidence... Moreover, in the interest of fairness to the accused, what little territory these Rules still protect should be carefully guarded. An individual's personal freedom is at stake in the criminal setting; thus greater, not lesser, adherence by district courts to the Federal Rules should be required. Stephanie Yost, supra, 23 S.W.U.L.Rev. at 684-86. I realize that I will never convince our Court to revert back to the correct rule set out in State v. Miller, supra, in 1915. I therefore propose that Rule 404(b) be amended, either directly or through this Court's jurisprudence, to eliminate the harmless error safety net that prosecutors, trial courts, and this Court have relied upon to uphold convictions based upon the admission of uncharged misconduct. I am not advocating for the abrogation of the harmless error rule, only its elimination from our Rule 404(b) jurisprudence. When a trial court has abused its discretion and admitted irrelevant or prejudicial bad acts evidence, I would hold that reversal and remand for a proper trial should be automatic, no matter how much evidence is otherwise presented. Removing Rule 404(b) errors from the protection of the harmless error rule would force prosecutors and trial judges to limit the evidence to relevant evidence pertaining to the specific charge in the indictment. It would force prosecutors and trial judges to make more careful, consistent and hopefully more equitable decisions about the admission of uncharged misconduct in criminal trials. I otherwise respectfully concur with the majority's decision.