Opinion ID: 812566
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interference Theory

Text: The FMLA makes it unlawful for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise or attempt to exercise any right provided under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). To succeed on an interference claim, an employee must show that (1) he was entitled to FMLA leave, (2) an adverse action by his employer interfered with his right to take FMLA leave, and (3) this adverse action was related to the exercise or attempted exercise of the employee’s FMLA rights. Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1180 (10th Cir. 2006). A deprivation of these rights is a violation regardless of the employer’s -7- intent, and the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis does not apply. Id. (citing Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 960, 963 (10th Cir. 2002)). An employer can defend against the claim, however, by showing that the employee would have been terminated anyway, i.e. regardless of the request for FMLA leave. Id. The district court concluded that Mr. Brown provided sufficient evidence by which a reasonable jury could find (1) that he was entitled to FMLA leave and (2) that ScriptPro interfered with his FMLA rights. Brown, 2011 WL 3880855, at –9. ScriptPro disputes that Mr. Brown established these elements. Aplee. Br. 28–40. We proceed directly to the third element—the cause of Mr. Brown’s termination—and ScriptPro’s affirmative defense that Mr. Brown would have been terminated anyway. Mr. Brown is correct in that timing can be particularly suggestive in determining whether termination relates to the exercise of FMLA rights. Aplt. Br. 18 (citing DeFreitas v. Horizon Inv. Mgmt. Corp., 577 F.3d 1151, 1160 (10th Cir. 2009)). Mr. Brown was, in fact, fired only two days after his emails and meeting with Ms. Becker and Mr. Somers about taking time off to care for his wife and new baby. Id. This may be enough to prove the third element of an interference claim, especially because the employer’s intent is irrelevant. See Smith, 298 F.3d at 960. ScriptPro in defense, however, provided undisputed evidence that Mr. Brown would have been terminated regardless of this or any -8- other FMLA-protected request. For an employer to demonstrate that it would have terminated the employee anyway, it must provide evidence of alternative reasons for termination. See Metzler, 464 F.3d at 1180. However, summary judgment for the employer is warranted only when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the grounds for termination. See DeFreitas, 577 F.3d at 1161–62. The question here is not whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of ScriptPro, but rather whether the evidence is so one-sided that submission to a jury is not required. Upon reviewing the record even in the light most favorable to Mr. Brown, the employer has made that showing. First, Mr. Brown received unfavorable feedback in his only performance review, particularly in regard to his relationships with co-workers. Aplt. App. 100. Although it is true that he met or exceeded the job requirements for two categories—“Quality of Work—Customer Service” and “Attendance”—he received marginal scores that required improvement in two other categories—“Planning and Organization of Work” and “Work Relationships.” Id. He also received written comments that pointed out very specific deficiencies in his work. Id. For example: “There is a concern regarding excessive internet use during working hours” and “Frank needs to be more aware of his personal boundaries at work. . . . Has a tendency to be argumentative and abrasive with other co-workers.” Id. Although Mr. Brown provided a written response to some -9- of the criticism, id. at 235–36, it is uncontroverted that management identified and detailed specific performance issues. See, e.g., Sanders v. Sw. Bell Tel., L.P., 544 F.3d 1101, 1107 (10th Cir. 2008) (employer’s view is relevant notwithstanding employee’s perception). Second, there is uncontroverted evidence of continued problems after the annual written evaluation. For example, in September 2008, co-workers Dave Hoelting and Kristin Medley made complaints to Mr. Eaker about Mr. Brown acting belligerently to customers on the phone. Aplee. App. 101–02. Ms. Becker also expressed concerns about the untimely completion of a Pentium III Project. Id. at 63. Mr. Brown disputes ScriptPro’s assertion that he did not complete the Pentium III Project in October 2008. Aplt. Br. 17–18. Reading, as we must, Ms. Becker’s email as a mere request for a status update, it is clear that there were at least concerns of some kind expressed about his work. Mr. Brown admitted in his deposition testimony that Ms. Becker approached him about not completing the project on time. Aplt. App. 256–57. Finally, there were various problems with his implementation of ScriptPro’s new customer service scoring system, although Mr. Brown reminds us that it had only been in use for two weeks. Id. at 103; Aplt. Br. 5. Of course, we are not here to judge the wisdom of management’s responses, but rather only to determine whether ScriptPro has come forward with evidence suggesting it would have terminated Mr. Brown regardless of his FMLA activities. In the aggregate, ScriptPro has come forward with strong evidence of -10- its dissatisfaction with Mr. Brown. Mr. Brown argues that there are additional facts that show that ScriptPro’s proffered reason for terminating him—namely for unresolved, previously discussed performance issues—is pretextual. Aplt. Br. 19–21. We recognize, however, that intent is not necessary for FMLA interference claims and that there is no burden-shifting McDonnell Douglas analysis. Metzler, 464 F.3d at 1180 (citation omitted). In other words, no pretext analysis is necessary. We therefore analyze this as an argument that Mr. Brown believes that these facts create a genuine dispute regarding ScriptPro’s affirmative defense demonstration. In particular, Mr. Brown points to the fact that Mr. Eaker wrote him an email when he was leaving ScriptPro stating that he thought Mr. Brown was “safe.” Aplt. App. 220, 243. He also points to the fact that he only had one written performance review and it included positive feedback. He additionally relies on the fact that he disputed one of the negative comments. He finally argues that Mr. Eaker’s failure to sit down with Mr. Brown at any point to draft a list of goals, although he testified that such a meeting often occurs after an unsatisfactory evaluation, creates a triable issue. We disagree. These facts do not create genuine issues of material fact. An issue of fact is genuine only if “there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way.” Lundstrom v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108, 1118 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). These facts are -11- immaterial in light of the overwhelming evidence of the performance issues identified above. Moreover, no evidence suggests that the stated reasons for termination (which do not include FMLA requests) were not the real ones. First, Mr. Eaker’s email to Mr. Brown about being “safe” does not establish a genuine issue of fact because Mr. Eaker was not involved in the termination decision and testified to not working very closely with Mr. Brown. See also Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that differences in the evaluation of an employee’s performance do not establish a genuine issue of pretext because “[d]ifferent supervisors may impose different standards of behavior, and a new supervisor may decide to enforce policies that a previous supervisor did not consider important”). Second, in regard to the lone written performance evaluation, there is no requirement that employees receive any particular amount of written feedback. In fact, ScriptPro followed its standard formal evaluation process with Mr. Brown. See Aplt. App. 97. There is simply no reasonable adverse inference a jury could draw from the lack of additional written feedback. Further, the inclusion of positive comments does not change the fact that ScriptPro expressed significant concerns regarding various other categories of performance. Additionally, Mr. Brown’s own evaluation of his performance is not enough to give rise to a material factual dispute. See Sanders, 544 F.3d at 1107. Mr. Brown certainly was entitled to dispute his negative evaluation, but on this -12- record, the dispute alone does not create a triable issue of fact. Finally, Mr. Brown has not raised any genuine issue regarding a company policy of post-review goal setting. He has put forth no evidence that could create an inference that there was a company policy requiring an additional informal process of goal setting following the required formal review. See Brown, 2011 WL 3880855, at  (observing that “there is no evidence that was company policy, the evidence was merely that Eaker followed that practice”). Similarly, he has provided no evidence that ScriptPro deviated from its usual evaluation process in any way. We conclude that there is overwhelming, uncontroverted evidence that ScriptPro terminated Mr. Brown due to the reasons it identified.