Opinion ID: 2320924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Muhammad's Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation

Text: In his supplemental memorandum, Muhammad argues that the redaction of Riley's and Marks' confessions was inadequate. It is utter fantasy, he asserts, to suggest that the jury in this case, having heard directly from witnesses . . . that the co-defendants were present together and acted together . . . failed to detect the fictional revision of each defendant's confession turning each `we' to `I.' This is essentially the same argument made by Riley, which we have already held to be deficient. Improper inferences from a confession are those which a jury can immediately draw even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial. Gray, 523 U.S. at 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151. Inferences of guilt that arise when the statement is linked with other evidence presented at trial, however, are not the type of inferences with which Bruton and its progeny are concerned. See Plater, 745 A.2d at 960. In this case the record makes clear that the statements of Riley and Marks were properly redacted and, standing alone, did not implicate Muhammad; thus those statements as admitted did not violate Muhammad's Sixth Amendment rights. [26]