Opinion ID: 2516153
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State-APEA Collective Bargaining Agreement Required Objective Grounds to Terminate Cassel as a Probationary Employee.

Text: In furtherance of the constitutionally mandated merit principle in public employment, [9] the legislature has required a probationary period for state employees prior to attaining permanent status. [10] This probationary period is an integral part of the examination process which is to be used to evaluate the employee's work and to reject any employee whose performance is not acceptable. [11] This court has previously addressed the question of whether language in an employment contract required objective grounds for terminating a probationary employee. In University of Alaska v. Tovsen , we addressed whether the University of Alaska's personnel regulations required an objective basis for the dismissal of a probationary employee. [12] The University argued that the regulation at issue [13] was analogous to a satisfaction contract that permits the dismissal of the probationary employee upon the employer's subjective, good faith dissatisfaction with the employee's performance. [14] We rejected this argument, determining that the regulation more clearly resembles an agreement permitting termination only when objective standards of performance are not satisfied. [15] We defined objective standards broadly in this context as standards that exist by reference to external sources such as employee rules and regulations or standards that a reasonable person would use in evaluating an employee's performance. [16] The University regulation referred to objective standards and thus did not resemble a satisfaction contract, under which the employer may terminate an employee as long as the employer, in good faith, is actually dissatisfied with the employee's performance. [17] We concluded that the wording of the University regulation suggest[ed] a process involving objective standards rather than mere personal beliefs. [18] In the instant case, Judge Souter determined that the State-APEA collective bargaining agreement and the Rater's Guide to Performance Appraisals set forth uniform standards ... [for the] rating of a probationary employee. [19] Because of these uniform standards, Judge Souter reasoned that Tovsen applied and that Cassel was subject to termination only for good cause. In its cross-appeal, the State argues that probationary employees, like at-will employees, may properly be dismissed under the State-APEA agreement upon a supervisor's good faith, personal dissatisfaction with employee performance. As a matter of contract interpretation, we reject the State's argument and conclude that the State-APEA agreement, like the regulations discussed in Tovsen, permits termination only when a probationary employee has failed to satisfy objective standards of performance. First, the State-APEA agreement explicitly requires written performance evaluations of probationary employees. [20] Section 18.17(A) provides that probationary employees shall receive written performance evaluations. Furthermore, negative performance evaluations are explicitly linked to nonretention; raters may recommend personnel actions on the performance evaluations. More importantly, the State-APEA agreement creates an objective standard for dismissing probationary employees: the unsatisfactory completion of the probationary period with reference to the uniform Rater's Guide standards. [21] Under Section 18.17(D), the State has the responsibility to provide the uniformity of the application of standards by different rating officers by providing training and a `Rater's Guide' to supervisors who have the responsibility of evaluating employees. These factors indicate that the State may not terminate probationary employees on a whim under the State-APEA collective bargaining agreement; termination must be based on a failure to meet objective standards either set forth in employee regulations or that a reasonable person would use in evaluating an employee's performance. [22] In sum, after analyzing the State-APEA agreement in light of Tovsen, we conclude that, as a matter of contract interpretation, the superior court did not err in rejecting the State's argument on cross-appeal that it could terminate Cassel, as a probationary employee, merely because of a supervisor's personal dissatisfaction with his performance without regard to objective standards. [23]