Opinion ID: 187321
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The FAA's Statutory Authority

Text: Next, Gorman asserts that if (contrary to his view) FAR section 119.23 requires that he obtain a Part 135 certificate, the regulation exceeds the FAA's authority in two respects. We reject this argument as well. First, Gorman contends that FAR section 119.23 is ultra vires because the FAA's authority to issue operating certificates is statutorily limited by 49 U.S.C. § 44702 to issuing operating certificates to air carriers and airportsand Gorman is neither one. Section 44702(a) provides in relevant part: The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration may issue airman certificates, type certificates, production certificates, airworthiness certificates, air carrier operating certificates, airport operating certificates, air agency certificates, and air navigation facility certificates under this chapter. 49 U.S.C. § 44702 (emphasis added). It is true that this provision does not specifically authorize the FAA to issue an operating certificate to Gorman as he operates neither as an airport nor as an air carrier, the latter being defined as a citizen of the United States undertaking ... to provide... foreign air transportation, interstate air transportation, or the transportation of mail by aircraft, none of which is a part of Gorman's operations. Id. § 40102(a)(2)(5). Nor, however, does it prohibit the FAA from issuing operating certificates in other circumstances under the authority of a different statute. [6] In this case, as the NTSB asserts, such certification authority is found in 49 U.S.C. § 44701. Section 44701 provides in relevant part: The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall promote safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing ... (5) regulations and minimum standards for other practices, methods, and procedure the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national security. 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(5). This statute grants the FAA broad authority to regulate civil aviation. Ass'n of Flight AttendantsCWA v. Chao, 493 F.3d 155, 157 (D.C.Cir.2007) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44701). The broad statutory language directing that the FAA promulgate regulations as necessary for safety in air commerce easily encompasses the authority to require operating certificates for commercial aircraft operations be they common carriage or private. See FAA v. Landy, 705 F.2d 624, 629 n. 6 (2d Cir.1983) (The appellants contend that the FAA may not... require operating certificates that are `other than ... air carrier' or airport operating certificates.... But the statute is plainly broad enough to empower the FAA to regulate commercial operators.). This interpretation is consistent withif not required by49 U.S.C. § 44711(a)(5), which provides: A person may not... operate aircraft in air commerce in violation of a regulation prescribed or certificate issued under section 44701(a) or (b) or any of sections 44702-44716 of [Title 49] (emphasis added). The quoted language recognizes that both regulations and certificates may be prescribed or issued under either section 44701(a) or (b) or sections 44702-44716. [7] Second, Gorman argues the FAA lacked statutory authority to require Gorman to hold an operating certificate because the FAA has itself limited its certificating authority under Part 119 to operations in air commerce. See 14 C.F.R. § 119.1(a)(1) (This part applies to each person operating or intending to operate civil aircraft(1) As an air carrier or commercial operator, or both, in air commerce;....). In particular, Gorman contends he does not operate aircraft as a commercial operator which involves air commercedefined by regulation to include interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce, 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (emphasis added) [8] because his flights are wholly intrastate, involving transportation of cargo between Long Beach, California and Montgomery Field in San Diego. Pet'r Br. at 40. Gorman acknowledges, however, that air commerce includes not only interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce but also  any operation or navigation of aircraft ... which may endanger safety in, interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce, 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (emphasis added), and he does not deny that operations such as his could pose such a danger so as to require certification and the consequent regulatory compliance. See Hill v. NTSB, 886 F.2d 1275, 1280 (10th Cir.1989) (The statutory definition of `air commerce' is therefore clearly not restricted to interstate flights occurring in controlled or navigable airspace. The face of the statute expressly provides that `air commerce' includes ` any operation or navigation of aircraft which directly affects, or which may endanger safety in, interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce.') (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1301(4)) (emphasis by Hill court); Ickes v. FAA, 299 F.3d 260, 263 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to regulation of purely recreational and intrastate flights on grounds that Congress's power over interstate commerce includes the power to regulate use of the nation's navigable airspace, which is a channel of interstate commerce and because airplanes constitute instrumentalities of interstate commerce, any threat to them ... is properly subjected to regulation even if the threat comes from a purely intrastate activity) (internal citations omitted). The language may endanger also makes clear that to come within the regulation, it is not necessary that an airplane actually pose a demonstrable threat, as Gorman suggests. See Hill, 886 F.2d at 1280 (The fact that the pilot's unsafe conduct in a particular instance did not actually endanger interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce does not exempt such conduct from FAA jurisdiction.).