Opinion ID: 2257617
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Murder Convictions

Text: First-degree premeditated murder is murder committed with the specific intent to kill after premeditation and deliberation. Williams v. United States, 858 A.2d 984, 1001 (D.C.2004). Premeditation means that the defendant formed the specific intent to kill the victim for some length of time, however short, before the murderous act. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Deliberation, which is separate from premeditation, requires that there was the reflection and turning over in the mind of the accused concerning his existing design and purpose to kill. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, in order for a charge of first-degree premeditated murder to be sustained, the evidence must demonstrate that the accused did not kill impulsively, in the heat of passion, or in an orgy of frenzied activity. Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 371 (D.C.1979). Kitt's argument that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation, deliberation or even a specific intent to kill on his part is well-taken. As a general rule, the requisite mens rea may be inferable from the facts and circumstances surrounding a murder, Ruffin v. United States, 642 A.2d 1288, 1291 (D.C.1994), but it is difficult to draw that inference in this case because the circumstances of Baker's killing remain shrouded in mystery. The only eyewitness account of the shooting presented at trial was Kitt's version as reported by Catlett. According to that truncated account, Kitt neither anticipated nor intended the shooting. While the jury was free to disregard Kitt's account as self-serving and unreliable, it had no other direct evidence of exactly what occurred when Baker was killed. Arguably, as the government contends, there was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation (and more than sufficient evidence of a specific intent to kill) on the part of the shooter, given that he brought the murder weapon to the scene, had ample time in which to contemplate and plan the shooting, fired more than one shot, and had a motive to eliminate Baker as a witness. [5] Cf. Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988, 1008 (D.C.2005); Busey v. United States, 747 A.2d 1153, 1161-62 (D.C.2000). But there was no proof that Kitt was carrying a handgun or that he was the shooter; the only evidence was that it was Crockett. [6] That Kitt carried out a preconceived plan to rob and abduct Baker certainly supported Kitt's conviction for felony murder, but it did not establish that Kitt also premeditated and deliberated Baker's slaying. Kitt was prosecuted on the theory that he would be guilty of Baker's premeditated murder as an aider and abettor even if he did not intend it, so long as it was a natural and probable consequence of the other crimes (robbery, kidnapping, carjacking) he did intend to commit. Over Kitt's objection, the jury was instructed in accordance with that theory, [7] which did have support in our case law at the time of Kitt's trial. See, e.g., Morriss v. United States, 554 A.2d 784, 789 (D.C.1989). More recently, however, in Wilson-Bey, supra, this court sitting en banc disavowed both the natural and probable consequence theory of aiding and abetting liability for premeditated murder and the jury instruction embodying that theory. We explained that the natural and probable consequence theory and instruction are erroneous and, indeed, unconstitutional, precisely because they purport to authorize a jury to find a defendant guilty as an accomplice to a crime without proof required by both that crime and the aiding and abetting statutethat the defendant himself had the essential mens rea to commit that crime. The correct rule with respect to premeditated murder, we held, is that the prosecution must prove that the defendant personally had the requisite mental state to commit the offense i.e., that the defendant acted with a specific intent to kill after premeditation and deliberationwhether the defendant is charged as the principal actor or as an aider and abettor. Accordingly, because the government failed to present and the jury instruction failed to require the necessary proof of specific intent to kill, premeditation and deliberation by Kitt, we reverse his first-degree premeditated murder conviction for insufficiency of the evidence. [8]
The first-degree murder statute, D.C.Code § 22-2101, defines two types of felony murder, with differing mens rea requirements, depending on whether the underlying felony is specifically enumerated in the statute or not. If a lethal injury is inflicted in the perpetration (or attempted perpetration) of an enumerated felony, it is first-degree felony murder even if the perpetrator did not intend to kill the victim. The only intent required to be guilty of the offense is the intent to commit the underlying felony. Lee v. United States, 699 A.2d 373, 385 (D.C. 1997). On the other hand, if the lethal act was in furtherance of an unenumerated felony, it is not first-degree felony murder unless the perpetrator actually did intend to kill the victim (though the perpetrator need not have acted after premeditation and deliberation). See Comber, 584 A.2d at 39 & 39 n.14; Goodall v. United States, 86 U.S.App. D.C.148, 150, 180 F.2d 397, 399 (1950). See also CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Instruction 4.23(I)(B). Kitt was convicted of three counts of felony murder, one each for the robbery, kidnapping and carjacking of which he was found guilty. While robbery and kidnapping are enumerated felonies, carjacking is not an enumerated felony. This difference is important in view of the lack of sufficient evidence of a specific intent to kill on Kitt's part. Kitt's convictions as an aider and abettor of felony murder based on the robbery and the kidnapping stand even if he had no such intent. As our opinion in Wilson-Bey explains, it is not error to give the natural and probable consequence instruction with respect to a felony murder charge based on an enumerated felony, because an intent to kill does not need to be proved for a defendant to be convicted on such a charge, either as a principal actor or as an aider and abettor. See id., at 354. Thus, Kitt could be found guilty of felony murder (robbery) and felony murder (kidnapping) based solely on his culpable participation in the enumerated felonies. See Lee, 699 A.2d at 385. [9] It is otherwise with regard to the felony murder count based on the carjacking. Although Wilson-Bey addressed accomplice liability for first-degree premeditated murder, its reasoning and holding apply to other aiding and abetting situations in which an accomplice is charged with an offense requiring proof of specific intent. In all such situations, the rule is exactly the same: where a specific mens rea is an element of a criminal offense, a defendant must have had that mens rea himself to be guilty of that offense, whether he is charged as the principal actor or as an aider and abettor. [10] Thus, to be guilty as an aider and abettor of a felony murder based on an unenumerated felony, a defendant must be shown to have specifically intended the killing. To hold otherwise would be to obliterate, for accomplices only, the material difference between the two types of felony murder. Accordingly, Kitt's conviction on the felony murder (carjacking) count must be reversed, both because the natural and probable consequence instruction was improper with respect to that count, and because the evidence that Kitt had the specific intent to kill Baker was lacking.