Opinion ID: 1239150
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motions to quash and traverse the August 16, 1984, search warrant and to suppress evidence

Text: (9a) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to quash and traverse the search warrant issued on August 16. Defendant contends that several of the statements in the affidavit were false and misleading and that, if such statements were considered excised or corrected, the remaining contents of the affidavit were insufficient to justify a finding of probable cause to support issuance of the warrant. (10) In Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 [98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667], the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant may challenge the veracity of statements contained in an affidavit of probable cause made in support of the issuance of a search warrant. When presented with such a challenge, the lower courts must conduct an evidentiary hearing if a defendant makes a substantial showing that: (1) the affidavit contains statements that are deliberately false or were made in reckless disregard of the truth and (2) the affidavit's remaining contents, after the false statements are excised, are insufficient to justify a finding of probable cause. At the evidentiary hearing, if the statements are proved by a preponderance of the evidence to be false or reckless, they must be considered excised. If the remaining contents of the affidavit are insufficient to establish probable cause, the warrant must be voided and any evidence seized pursuant to that warrant must be suppressed. ( Id. at pp. 155-156 [98 S.Ct. at pp. 2676-2677].) A defendant who challenges a search warrant based upon an affidavit containing omissions bears the burden of showing that the omissions were material to the determination of probable cause. (See People v. Luttenberger (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1, 14-15 & fn. 4 [265 Cal. Rptr. 690, 784 P.2d 633].) Pursuant to [California Constitution, article I,] section 28[, subdivision] (d), materiality is evaluated by the test of Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213 ..., which looks to the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a warrant affidavit establishes good cause for a search. [Citation.] ( People v. Luttenberger, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1, 23.) (9b) In moving to quash and traverse the August 16 search warrant, defendant contended that the affiant, Detective St. John, made statements in the affidavit that were false and misleading. The prosecution eventually conceded that an evidentiary hearing was necessary. Following the hearing, at which Detective St. John testified at length, the trial court denied the motion, ultimately permitting the prosecution to introduce into evidence items seized pursuant to the warrant, including the double-bladed knife and sheath, the wristwatch flecked with yellow paint, the leather shoelace-type thong, and the section of white rope.
Detective St. John stated in the affidavit that the last person whom Shari was known to have intended to visit was a photographer, identified as defendant through the telephone calls that Shari had made from her mother's residence on June 30. Detective St. John also stated in the affidavit that he had interviewed Danny Collins, who informed me that he had last seen Ms. Miller on July 1st ... and that she was going to meet a photographer. At the evidentiary hearing, Detective St. John testified as follows. He had intended the magistrate to infer that it was possible that Shari Miller had not been seen after June 30th. Prior to August 16, however, Detective St. John had interviewed four of Shari's associates, who indicated they believed that they had seen Shari between July 1 and July 4, and Detective St. John knew that Shari had not been killed prior to July 4. Detective St. John also had learned that employees of a camera store had seen defendant and Shari in the store approximately on July 1. In addition, Detective St. John had observed a drawing of a rose, bearing Shari's signature and dated July 1, discovered during the search of Shari Miller's vehicle. Detective St. John did not include this information in the affidavit. The trial court determined that Detective St. John had been selective in providing information to the magistrate, with the intention of conveying a particular impression regarding defendant's role in Shari's death. The court found that Detective St. John demonstrated an intentional or reckless disregard of the truth in failing to mention his interviews with Shari's associates, who had told him they had seen her after July 1. The court also found, however, that the affidavit, considered as amended to include this information, was sufficient to establish probable cause supporting issuance of the warrant. The court observed that, even in light of this information, Detective St. John remained justified in making a conclusion to the magistrate that after June 30, 1984, that Shari Miller intended to see a photographer named Bill, that she saw Mr. Bradford during this time  during the time between June 30 and the point at which she died, and that she met with foul play. It does not appear that the magistrate would have been misled by the affidavit. Although defendant has not acknowledged the fact in his brief, the affidavit itself, after indicating there had been contact between defendant and Shari on June 30, stated that Danny Collins had seen Shari on July 1, suggesting that the time frame of Shari's disappearance was not exact. As the Attorney General has observed, the affidavit described the discovery of Jane Doe No. 60 on July 6 and noted the coroner's estimate of her death as having occurred between 36 to 48 hours previously  information that also suggested Shari had been alive for a day or so after June 30. Moreover, even assuming the omitted statements did mislead the magistrate to believe Shari last had been seen alive on June 30, those omissions clearly were not material in light of the totality of the circumstances. The affidavit stated that the police had discovered through the photographs recovered in the previous search and through fingerprint records that Shari was Jane Doe No. 60, and also had discovered through defendant's own statements that he was acquainted with Shari and had taken photographs of her within several days of her disappearance. The affidavit explained that the police had determined that defendant had lied about the date and location at which the photographs were taken, that Shari's photographs had been taken at approximately the same location in the Mojave desert where Julianne P. had been raped and where Tracey's body had been discovered, and that both murder victims were killed in a similar manner. The trial court did not err in finding that, considered as amended to include the above described information, the affidavit established probable cause.
On August 7, Detective St. John led a search of Shari's automobile, containing her clothing and other personal belongings. The police removed and inventoried the items, which included a silver spoon ring, five pierced earrings, two silver bracelets, two pairs of cutoff jeans, a black wrist strap, and a pair of brown thongs. Despite the prior recovery of similar items, Detective St. John sought authorization in the warrant to search for a silver spoon ring, women's pierced earrings, a gold bracelet, blue cut off shorts, a female watch with black band, and any female clothing as shown in [a] series of 9 photographs of Shari Miller attached as exhibits to the affidavit, depicting her wearing a pair of cutoff blue jeans, a pair of brown thongs, a wrist band, and jewelry. The affidavit of probable cause did not state that Shari's vehicle earlier had been inventoried, nor that similar articles already were in police custody. The trial court determined that Detective St. John failed to exercise due care in seeking authorization to search for the silver spoon ring that already was in police custody. The court also found Detective St. John negligent in not more fully and explicitly revealing which items were already in police custody and for expressing his reasons for requesting permission to search for additional sets of those items. Defendant contends that Detective St. John knew or should have known that the silver spoon ring already was in police custody, and that his request to search for this article demonstrated an intentional or reckless disregard of the truth. Detective St. John testified that on August 7, he personally directed the taking of the inventory and photographs of the articles, as well as the preparation of the property report. The silver spoon ring and many of Shari's belongings were included within one item, one red duffle bag containing miscellaneous objects, the contents of which Detective St. John did not examine or record. The evidence does not establish that at the time he prepared the affidavit of probable cause, Detective St. John had personal knowledge of the prior seizure of the spoon ring. Defendant further contends that even if Detective St. John personally did not know the spoon ring was in police custody, other police officers investigating Shari's death had personal knowledge that this item had been seized, and should have so informed Detective St. John. (11), (9c) Although it is the rule that the police [cannot] insulate one officer's deliberate misstatement merely by relaying it through an officer-affiant personally ignorant of its falsity ( Franks v. Delaware, supra, 438 U.S. 154, 163-164, fn. 6 [98 S.Ct. 2674, 2680]; U.S. v. DeLeon (9th Cir.1992) 979 F.2d 761, 764), nothing in the record indicates that the police officers who searched Shari's vehicle deliberately withheld from Detective St. John information that the spoon ring had been seized earlier. The trial court did not err in determining that Detective St. John merely was negligent. Defendant also contends that additional items sought by Detective St. John  pierced earrings, a gold bracelet, cutoff jeans, a woman's watch with black band, and a pair of brown thongs  already were in police custody, and the inclusion of them in the affidavit demonstrated an intentional or reckless disregard of the truth. Detective St. John testified he had observed that Shari had pierced ears, and he knew she occasionally wore pierced earrings. Although Detective St. John was aware that pierced earrings had been recovered from Shari's vehicle, he certainly was not unreasonable in seeking their seizure based upon the surmise that she owned additional pierced earrings. The gold bracelet appearing in the photographs and listed in the affidavit clearly was distinct from the two silver bracelets that the police already held in custody. Detective St. John testified that Doreen Music, a criminalist working with Detective St. John, compared the pair of cutoff jeans in the photographs with the two pairs of cutoff jeans recovered from Shari's vehicle, and was unable positively to identify either pair as those Shari wore in the photographs. Detective St. John observed that the pair of thongs depicted in the photographs was the same color as the pair already in police custody, and he did not know whether Shari owned any additional pairs. Detective St. John was unable to determine from an examination of the photographs whether the black wrist strap worn by Shari included a watch, or whether it matched the black wrist strap found inside her vehicle. We have reviewed this evidence, and it does not appear that the items recovered from the vehicle matched those in the photographs. Although the pair of thongs depicted in the photographs resembled the pair already in police custody, the thongs were fungible in nature and it was not unreasonable to conclude that Shari may have owned additional pairs. In addition, the officer who seized the watch with yellow paint flecks was aware of Shari's recent activity as a painter, a circumstance that supplied independent probable cause for seizure of that item. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that although Detective St. John should have disclosed in his affidavit that items similar to those in the photographs already were in police custody, his failure to do so merely was negligent and was not intentional or reckless.
Detective St. John did not describe in the affidavit the two prior searches that had been conducted of defendant's apartment and vehicle on July 16 and July 31. These searches consisted of a consensual and cursory search conducted by a single police officer on July 16, and the more extensive search (discussed, ante, pp. 1285-1297) conducted pursuant to a warrant by several officers on July 31. The trial court found that the August 16 affidavit referred several times to the July 31 search, that the attachments to the later affidavit included a copy of the earlier warrant and the related property return, and that the magistrate had sufficient time to read the contents of the August 16 affidavit as well as portions of the attachments, including the prior warrant and return, and reasonably would have understood there had been a prior search on July 31 before issuing the August 16 warrant. [10] Defendant contends that pursuant to U.S. v. Whitworth (9th Cir.1988) 856 F.2d 1268, 1281-1282 ( Whitworth ), it was not proper for law enforcement officials to withhold information regarding prior searches of the same premises for magistrates considering warrant applications. That decision and others have observed that prior case authority has declined to establish a per se rule against consecutive searches, presuming, `in the absence of some showing to the contrary, that officers perform their duties and properly execute the processes placed in their hands.' ( Id. at p. 1282; Filippelli v. United States (9th Cir.1925) 6 F.2d 121, 125.) In Whitworth, a warrantless but consensual search was conducted of the defendant's residence, and a second search pursuant to a warrant was conducted 11 days later. (856 F.2d 1268, 1278-1279.) The court found the government's intentional failure to mention the initial search in the subsequent affidavit to be problematic. It concluded, however, that the consent-based search had not been performed as thoroughly as a warrant-based search would have been, and that probable cause still existed for the subsequent search. ( Id. at p. 1282.) In the present case, similarly, the July 16 consensual search of defendant's apartment and vehicle was extremely cursory in nature and did not negate probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence would be found during a subsequent search based upon a warrant. Moreover, with regard to the subsequent warrant-based searches, the present case is factually distinct from Whitworth in two important respects. First, the August 16 affidavit expressly referred to a previous search conducted pursuant to a warrant; the affidavit's attachments specified that it occurred on July 31 and provided documentation of the objects of that search as well as its results. Second, the issuance of the second search warrant was based upon a showing of additional criminal activity. The probable cause supporting the July 31 search warrant was predicated upon defendant's connection with two incidents arising in the westside of Los Angeles  the disappearance of Tracey Campbell on July 12 and the murder of Mischa Stewart in October 1982. Following the July 31 search of defendant's apartment and vehicle, but prior to the application for a search warrant made on August 16, the police had made several major discoveries. Tracey's body, found in the desert area near Lancaster, provided specifics as to the location and manner of her death. Shari's body had been identified in part through defendant's possession of her photographs, and he had admitted his personal acquaintance and contacts with her just prior to her disappearance  circumstances that, combined with information provided by others, connected defendant with her death as well. Further, as Detective St. John testified, during the period following defendant's release from police custody on August 3 until his re-arrest on August 16, defendant had the opportunity to conceal small items on his person  jewelry or human parts  and transfer them to his apartment. Even had it been emphasized in the affidavit of August 16 that two prior separate searches had been conducted within a one-month period, the magistrate reasonably could have concluded that additional probable cause existed to conduct a third search.
(12) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress all evidence seized in the August 16 search on the ground that the search was general and exploratory. The search warrant issued on that date authorized the police to search defendant's apartment and all facilities within the structure, garages or storage units, basements, attics, and all containers located either inside the premises or on the grounds of premises designated for their use, a 1965 Dodge, a 1984 Dodge Daytona, a 1977 Datsun, and a Marina Del Rey storage area rented to Olga Talbot. The warrant specified numerous items of property, the majority of which consisted of clothing and jewelry worn by Tracey or Shari, camera equipment and film, cigarettes, maps of Los Angeles, human specimens, such as hair, blood, and body fluids, defendant's bank books, credit cards and receipts, mail order catalogues, as well as knives and sharp cutting instruments. The return to the search warrant reveals that a number of additional items, including an additional vehicle, medicines, toiletries, magazines, and miscellaneous papers, were seized. A hearing was conducted at which the officers conducting the search testified for the prosecution and Olga Talbot testified for the defense. The trial court determined that the search exceeded the scope authorized by the warrant and encompassed the search of a vehicle and several storage lockers not named in the warrant. Accordingly, it ruled that evidence seized during the unauthorized portions of the search could not be introduced at trial and ordered suppressed numerous items, including a belt buckle with a motorcycle logo that the prosecution had sought to admit at trial. The trial court rejected, however, defendant's motion to suppress all evidence seized during the search, including that lawfully seized  a motion premised upon the theory that the conduct of the police was in flagrant disregard of the authorized scope of the search and must be punished by a total suppression of evidence. Although remarking that portions of the search did possess exploratory qualities, and that the seizure of numerous items of property was overly broad, the trial court found that the officers had not acted in bad faith, and that the majority of the items seized were seized lawfully. The court concluded that whatever criticism may be directed toward the conduct of this particular search it does not appear to rise to the level of the egregious misconduct which justifies the imposition of the ultimate sanction of total suppression of items seized during the course of this search.
Defendant contends, as he did with respect to the July 31 search, that the trial court improperly limited the scope of the hearing by declining to permit defendant to introduce all of the individual items seized by the police. The record reflects that defendant's motion catalogued each item seized. The police officers who testified were examined extensively concerning numerous items seized. The defense motion as well as the return to the warrant recorded the number and variety of items seized and the areas searched. The entire record of the proceedings reflects that the trial court, in ruling on the motion, was cognizant of the areas searched that were not clearly designated in the warrant and the nature and number of items seized that did not pertain directly to the subject investigations, and therefore could evaluate properly whether the search was exploratory in nature. The trial court did not err in declining to permit the introduction into evidence of every single item seized.
Defendant contends that the executing officers' failure to peruse the contents of the warrant prior to or during the search, their failure to limit the area of the search to those areas described in the warrant, and their failure to confine their seizures to those items designated in the warrant demonstrate that the officers' conduct was in flagrant disregard of the scope of their prior authorization. According to defendant, the improper police conduct necessitated total suppression of the fruits of the seizure, including those items seized within the scope of the warrant. As noted above, in a footnote, the high court in Waller v. Georgia, supra, 467 U.S. 39, discussed and rejected the defendants' contention that the police so flagrant[ly] disregard[ed] the scope of the warrants in conducting the seizures that they turned the warrants into impermissible general warrants, requiring suppression of the entire fruit of the search, rather than merely suppression of those items as to which there was no probable cause to support seizure. ( Id. at pp. 43-44, fn. 3 [104 S.Ct. at p. 2214].) The court noted that the defendants did not assert that the officers exceeded the scope of the warrant in the places searched but only that the police unlawfully seized and took away items unconnected to the prosecution. Because all items that were unlawfully seized were suppressed, [i]n these circumstances, there is certainly no requirement that lawfully seized evidence be suppressed as well. [Citations.] ( Ibid.; Andresen v. Maryland, supra, 427 U.S. 463, 482, fn. 11 [96 S.Ct. 2737, 2749].) Subsequent to Waller v. Georgia, supra, 467 U.S. 39, a number of decisions of the lower federal courts  decisions that, as earlier observed, provide persuasive rather than binding authority ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 120, fn. 3)  have addressed the foregoing issue. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the footnote in Waller to mean that when the police seize items in flagrant disregard of the limitations imposed by a search warrant, a blanket suppression both of items seized pursuant to the warrant and those seized outside the scope of the warrant is mandated. ( U.S. v. Mittelman (9th Cir.1993) 999 F.2d 440, 444; U.S. v. Chen (9th Cir.1992) 979 F.2d 714, 716-720; United States v. Crozier (9th Cir.1985) 777 F.2d 1376, 1381; see United States v. Tamura (9th Cir.1982) 694 F.2d 591, 597; United States v. Rettig (9th Cir.1978) 589 F.2d 418, 423.) The majority of other circuits also have concluded that police conduct in flagrant disregard of the scope of the warrant may justify total suppression of the evidence seized. ( U.S. v. Young (1st Cir.1989) 877 F.2d 1099, 1105; U.S. v. Matias (2d Cir.1988) 836 F.2d 744, 747-748; U.S. v. Jones (4th Cir.1994) 31 F.3d 1304, 1314; U.S. v. Henson (6th Cir.1988) 848 F.2d 1374, 1383-1384; U.S. v. Decker (8th Cir.1992) 956 F.2d 773, 779; Marvin v. United States (8th Cir.1984) 732 F.2d 669, 674-675; United States v. Medlin (10th Cir.1986) 798 F.2d 407, 410-411; U.S. v. $149,442.43 in U.S. Currency (10th Cir.1992) 965 F.2d 868, 875; U.S. v. Lambert (11th Cir.1989) 887 F.2d 1568, 1572-1573; United States v. Wuagneux (11th Cir.1982) 683 F.2d 1343, 1354; U.S. v. Nicely (D.C. Cir.1991) 922 F.2d 850, 858 [287 App.D.C. 322]; United States v. Heldt (D.C. Cir.1981) 668 F.2d 1238, 1259-1260 [215 App.D.C. 206].) Only one circuit expressly has declined to adopt the flagrant disregard standard requiring blanket suppression. ( U.S. v. Willey (5th Cir.1995) 57 F.3d 1374, 1390.) In U.S. v. Chen, supra, 979 F.2d 714, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained that the suppression of all evidence is an extraordinary remedy, used only when the violations of the warrant's requirements are so extreme that the search essentially is transformed into an impermissible general search. ( Id. at p. 717.) The courts rarely have actually concluded that police conduct was so extreme as to warrant total suppression. The remedy has been justified when the police exceeded the scope of the warrant in the places searched ( Waller v. Georgia, supra, 467 U.S. 39, 44, fn. 3 [104 S.Ct. 2210, 2214]; U.S. v. Decker, supra, 956 F.2d 773, 779), the police used the warrant as a pretext to search for evidence of unrelated crimes ( United States v. Rettig, supra, 589 F.2d 418, 423), or the police were motivated `by a desire to engage in indiscriminate fishing' rather than by considerations of practicality ( U.S. v. Chen, supra, 979 F.2d 714, 717; U.S. v. Medlin (10th Cir.1988) 842 F.2d 1194, 1199). [11] The mere magnitude of the seizures does not establish a violation of the federal Constitution. U.S. v. Lambert, supra, 887 F.2d 1568, 1572-1573; United States v. Wuagneux, supra, 683 F.2d 1343, 1352.) Assuming that the remedy of total suppression is required when police conduct is in flagrant disregard of the limits of the warrant, we conclude that in the present case the trial court properly found that the application of that extreme remedy was not warranted and suppressed only items not covered by the warrant. Although the record indicates that the officers searched a vehicle and several storage locker areas that were not clearly named in the warrant, it also establishes that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the vehicle and certain of the locker areas. It is also apparent that other locker areas in which he had such a reasonable expectation of privacy were within close proximity to the vehicles as well as to the lockers identified at the scene as being used by the inhabitants of defendant's residence. Although the officers seized a number of items that clearly fell outside the scope of the warrant, the record reveals that the bulk of these items might have had some bearing upon the current offenses. ( United States v. Tamura, supra, 694 F.2d 591, 597.) The several remarks by police witnesses indicative of a broader purpose do not establish a flagrant disregard of the limits of the warrant when considered in the context of the total testimony. The officers may have entertained the hope that evidence pertaining to unrelated crimes also would be discovered, but it is very apparent that the search was not simply a pretext for a general search for evidence of unrelated crimes. The record does not demonstrate that the officers had not been briefed or prepared as to the objects of the search (see United States v. Heldt, supra, 668 F.2d 1238, 1259-1262), or that their search amounted to a fishing expedition. (Cf. U.S. v. Medlin, supra, 842 F.2d 1194, 1199-1200.) Nor was the behavior of the officers so unconscionable as to amount to a due process violation. ( United States v. Tamura, supra, 694 F.2d 591, 597.) Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in declining to order the extraordinary remedy of total suppression of all items seized.