Opinion ID: 777205
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: United States v. Barnes

Text: 17 In Barnes, we remanded for resentencing because of precisely the same sentencing error. 158 F.3d at 674. There the defendant was charged with one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin and marijuana, Schedule I controlled substances, and cocaine and cocaine base, or crack, Schedule II controlled substances. Id. at 664. The jury returned a guilty verdict on the conspiracy count, and the district court imposed a sentence of twenty years, the statutory mandatory minimum for a conspiracy to possess more than fifty grams of crack. Id. at 667. The defendant argued that under Orozco-Prada he could only have been sentenced as though convicted of a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana. Id. at 667-68. We rejected Barnes's specific argument that he could only be sentenced under the statutory provision governing marijuana conspiracies but agreed that the district court's sentence was improper. Id. at 674. 18 We determined that the marijuana provision was not the appropriate sentencing provision because our review of the record persuade[d] us that it [was] inconceivable that the jury could have convicted the defendant of conspiracy to possess marijuana because the evidence relating to marijuana was not only legally insufficient, it was negligible. Id. at 668. Moreover, although the government had argued in summation that there was sufficient evidence to find that the defendant conspired to possess any of the four controlled substances named in the indictment, on appeal the government conceded that there was insufficient evidence from which a jury could have concluded that he conspired to possess marijuana. 4 Id. We found instead that there was sufficient evidence for conviction of conspiracies involving heroin, cocaine, and crack. Accordingly, we again withheld judgment, allowing the government to either consent to resentencing under the provision applicable to a conspiracy involving heroin — the controlled substance for which there was no statutory minimum sentence — or to retry the defendant. 5 Id. at 674. 19 In Barnes, the government cited numerous cases in support of its contention that Orozco-Prada had since been undermined, if not overruled. Id. at 668-72. In setting forth its argument, the government relied heavily on the Seventh Circuit case of United States v. Edwards, 105 F.3d 1179 (7th Cir.1997). 20 In Edwards, the defendants were charged with conspiring to distribute cocaine and crack. Id. at 1180. The jury returned a general guilty verdict. At sentencing the district court found that the conspiracy involved both cocaine and crack and imposed sentences based on that finding. Id. On appeal, the defendants argued that their sentences were improper under the Guidelines, the drug statutes, and the Constitution, because, in light of the ambiguity resulting from the general verdict, the district court was required to sentence them as though convicted of a conspiracy involving only cocaine, which the defendants argued would have resulted in a more lenient sentence. Id. Writing for the panel, Judge Easterbrook affirmed the sentences imposed and took issue with our ruling in Orozco-Prada, as well as decisions of four other circuits that reached the same conclusion. Id. 21 The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision in Edwards because the petitioners' sentences did not exceed the statutory maximum permitted for a cocaine-only conspiracy. In other words, the district court's finding that the conspiracy involved crack made no difference in the petitioners' sentences. The Court noted, however, that 22 [o]f course, petitioners' statutory and constitutional claims would make a difference if it were possible to argue, say, that the sentences imposed exceeded the maximum that the statutes permit for a cocaine-only conspiracy. That is because a maximum sentence set by the statute trumps a higher sentence set forth in the Guidelines. 23 Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 515, 118 S.Ct. 1475, 140 L.Ed.2d 703 (1998). This hypothetical describes exactly the constitutional problem of the sentence imposed on Zillgitt. Zillgitt's 109-month sentence under the Guidelines exceeds the statutory maximum sixty-month sentence permitted for a marijuana-only conspiracy. In Edwards, the Supreme Court rejected the petitioners' argument, stating that 24 the sentences imposed ... were within the statutory limits applicable to a cocaine-only conspiracy. Cf. United States v. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076, 1083-84 (2d Cir.1984) (court may not sentence defendant under statutory penalties for cocaine conspiracy when jury may have found only marijuana conspiracy). 25 Id. (additional citations omitted). Thus, the Supreme Court, citing with approval Orozco-Prada, recognized the critical distinction that where a sentencing court makes its own factual findings regarding the drugs that are the objects of a conspiracy, it may not impose a sentence, based on those findings, that exceeds the statutory maximum sentence permissible for the other drug that is the object of the conspiracy. It is this distinction that guides our holding here. Additionally, apart from the Seventh Circuit's decision in Edwards, 6 of the seven other circuits that have directly addressed this issue, all seven have reached the same conclusion that we did in Orozco-Prada. 7 Thus, in Barnes we rejected the government's efforts to find inapplicable our prior holding, stating instead that we follow Orozco-Prada and assume that the conviction is for conspiracy to possess the controlled substance that carries the most lenient statutorily prescribed sentence. Barnes, 158 F.3d at 668. 26 If we determine that there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate Zillgitt's involvement in a marijuana conspiracy, we find nothing in either Barnes or Orozco-Prada to support a different holding here. 27