Opinion ID: 2828145
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unconstitutional Rebuttable Presumption

Text: The city next asserts the circuit court erred in finding 66868 is invalid for containing a rebuttable presumption that the owner of the motor vehicle was operating the vehicle at the time of the violation. The city maintains that the rebuttable presumption is lawful in that it is a reasonable and proper means of shifting the burden of production for prosecutions of red light camera ordinance violations. Because the term “presumption” is used to describe different types of evidentiary devices used in criminal and civil cases, it is necessary to determine the nature of the presumption to assess it its validity. See Cnty. Court. of Ulster Cnty., New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979). On one end of the spectrum is a permissive inference, “which allows – but does not require – the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and which places no burden of any kind on the defendant.” Id. On the other end is a conclusory, or irrebuttable, presumption that establishes a fact such that it cannot be overcome by additional evidence or argument. Black’s Law Dictionary 1377 (10th ed. 2014). In between the extremes is a mandatory but rebuttable presumption. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 n.2 (1985). The amount of evidence that must be presented by the defendant to rebut the presumption 13 affects whether the presumption shifts only the burden of production or shifts the ultimate burden of persuasion. 9 See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 518 (1979). The presumption in this case is found in section four of ordinance 66868, which states, in pertinent part: A. If the City proves: 1) that a motor vehicle was being operated or used; 2) that the operation or use of the motor vehicle was in violation of the Traffic Code Ordinance as codified [in] Section 17 et seq. of the Revised Code and 3) that the defendant is the Owner of the motor vehicle in question, then: B. A rebuttable presumption exists that such Owner of the motor vehicle operated or used in violation of the Traffic Code Ordinance as codified in Section 17 et seq. of the Revised Code was the operator of the vehicle at the time and place the violation was captured by the Automated Traffic Control System Record. The rules governing interpretation of a statute are employed when interpreting an ordinance. State ex rel. Teefey v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment of Kansas City, 24 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Mo. banc 2000). Accordingly, the Court will “ascertain and give effect to the intent of the enacting legislative body” as reflected in the plain and ordinary meaning of the ordinance’s language absent a definition in the ordinance. Id. Municipal ordinances are presumed valid, McCollum v. Dir. of Revenue, 906 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Mo. banc 1995), and will be construed in light of the presumption of validity, see Reprod. Health Servs. of Planned Parenthood of St. Louis Region, Inc. v. Nixon, 185 S.W.3d 685, 688 (Mo. banc 2006). Ordinance 66868 does not define “rebuttable presumption.” When an ordinance does not define a term but “uses words that have a definite and well-known meaning at 9 The burden of proof is composed of the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. White v. Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 304 (Mo. banc 2010). 14 common law, it will be presumed that the terms are used in the sense in which they were understood at common law, and the words will be so construed unless it clearly appears that such a construction was not so intended.” Belcher v. State, 299 S.W.3d 294, 296 (Mo. banc 2009). The term “rebuttable presumption” is understood at common law to be a mandatory presumption, rather than permissive inference, that requires the other party to produce sufficient evidence to rebut. See Deck v. Teasley, 322 S.W.3d 536, 549-50 (Mo. banc 2010); State ex rel. Cook v. Saynes, 713 S.W.2d 258, 261-62 (Mo. banc 1986); Stafford v. Great S. Bank, 417 S.W.3d 370, 376-77 (Mo. App. 2014); Berra v. Danter, 299 S.W.3d 690, 697 (Mo. App. 2009); State ex rel. Heidelberg v. Holden, 98 S.W.3d 116, 119 (Mo. App. 2003). Rebuttable presumptions in civil cases are generally permitted. See Deck, 322 S.W.3d at 549-50; 2 Kenneth S. Broun, McCormicks on Evidence section 345 (7th ed. 2013). Prosecutions for municipal ordinance violations are civil proceedings with quasicriminal aspects. State ex rel. Kansas City v. Meyers, 513 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Mo. banc 1974). The quasi-criminal aspect is apparent in the way Rule 37, which governs ordinance violations, mirrors the rules governing criminal proceedings. For example, the rules use the terms commonly associated with criminal cases, such as “prosecutor,” “arraignment,” and “plea.” Rules 37.34, 37.48 and 37.58. The notice of violation must state facts supporting a finding of probable cause to believe the accused violated the ordinance. Rule 37.33. The accused has a right to counsel and, in some circumstances, the right to be appointed counsel. Rule 37.50. Moreover, because of the quasi-criminal nature of ordinance violations, the burden is on the city “to produce evidence of such a 15 convincing nature as to convince the trier of facts that defendant was guilty of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” City of Kansas City v. Oxley, 579 S.W.2d 113, 114 (Mo. banc 1979) (internal quotations omitted); City of Kansas City v. Tyson, 169 S.W.3d 927, 928 (Mo. App. 2005). This Court is further guided by its previous analysis of a parking ordinance in City of Kansas City v. Hertz Corp., 499 S.W.2d 449 (Mo. 1973). In deciding whether a parking ordinance imposing strict liability on the owner violated due process, 10 this Court considered relevant that the maximum penalty was a “relatively small fine,” that there was no potential incarceration, and that the penalty had no effect on the owner’s driver’s license or insurance cost. Id. at 453. Such factors are also relevant in determining whether criminal law regarding presumptions applies to a municipal ordinance. Specifically, the penalty for violating ordinance 66868 is $100. While the Court in Hertz did not identify what it considered a “relatively small fine,” it relied on a case involving a $20 fine. For many, a $100 fine is not considered small. Further, a violation of ordinance 66868 will affect the owner’s driver’s license because running a red light is a moving violation that requires the assessment of two points. See Roeder v. City of St. Peters, __ S.W.3d __ (slip op. at 13). These factors, as well as the quasi-criminal nature 10 The Court distinguished the parking ordinance from one like ordinance 66868 that imposes liability on the driver and contains a rebuttable presumption that the owner was the driver. Hertz, 499 S.W.2d 449 at 452. 16 of municipal ordinance proceedings, lead this Court to apply the law regarding presumptions in criminal cases. 11 The rules regarding presumptions in criminal cases are more restrictive because an evidentiary device such as a presumption or inference “must not undermine the factfinder’s responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt.” Allen, 442 U.S. at 156. Specifically, in Sandstrom v. Montana, the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional mandatory rebuttable presumptions that have the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant on an element of the crime charged because it violates the accused’s due process right to have the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. 442 U.S. at 517-18. In its brief, the city characterizes the rebuttable presumption in ordinance 66868 as shifting the burden of production, rather than the burden of persuasion. The Supreme Court has not expressly ruled whether a presumption shifting only the burden of 11 In City of St. Louis v. Cook, this Court interpreted a parking ordinance under which the presence of a motor vehicle in a prohibited zone would constitute “prima facie evidence” that the registered owner of the vehicle parked the vehicle and found the ordinance merely shifted the burden of production onto the defendant. 221 S.W.2d 468, 468-69 (Mo. 1949). The Court found such a presumption was permissible so long as there was a rational connection between the fact proven and ultimate fact presumed. Id. at 470. In doing so, the Court relied on criminal and civil cases applying that standard. Id. (citing Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910), and Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925)). Because this Court ultimately finds ordinance 66868 shifts the burden of persuasion, Cook does not control, and it not necessary to determine whether criminal law regarding presumptions applies to a parking ordinance. Like in Hertz, however, the Court in Cook emphasized that the fee for the parking violation was nominal, whereas the fee imposed by ordinance 66868 is not. See id. at 468-69. 17 production is constitutional. In Sandstrom, however, the Supreme Court noted that the burden of production “is significantly different for the defendant and prosecution.” Id. at 516 n.5. “When the prosecution fails to meet [the burden], a directed verdict in favor of the defense results. Such a consequence is not possible upon a defendant's failure, however, as verdicts may not be directed against defendants in criminal cases.” Id. In any event, the Court disagrees with the city’s contention that the rebuttable presumption in ordinance 66868 operates to shift only the burden of production. The language of the provision containing the rebuttable presumption does not indicate what is sufficient to overcome the presumption, but this Court will consider other provisions in the ordinance to ascertain the meaning of the rebuttable presumption. See Union Elec. Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 425 S.W.3d 118, 122 (Mo. banc 2014). Ordinance 66868 requires that a summons and violation notice be sent to the owner of the motor vehicle without any attempt to determine if the owner was the driver. The ordinance further dictates that the notice shall state: [I]f at the time and place of the violation, the motor vehicle was being operated by a person other than the Owner, or the vehicle or the license plate captured by the Automated Traffic Control System Record was stolen, the Owner may submit information to that effect by affidavit, on a form provided by the City, prior to the municipal court proceeding, or under oath at the municipal court proceeding. If an Owner furnishes satisfactory evidence pursuant to this paragraph, the City Court or City Counselor’s office may terminate the prosecution of the citation issued to the Owner. . .. (Emphasis added). This provision of ordinance 66868 contemplates that the municipal division of the circuit court would terminate proceedings if the owner of the motor vehicle proves that 18 the owner was not the driver. It demonstrates the city’s intent to enact an ordinance creating a rebuttable presumption that shifts the burden of persuasion, requiring the owner to prove to the factfinder – the municipal division in this case – that he or she was not operating the vehicle at the time of the violation. The presumption relieves the prosecution from proving an element of the violation charged beyond a reasonable doubt and is impermissible under Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 517-18. Therefore, this Court finds ordinance 66868 is unconstitutional because it creates a mandatory rebuttable presumption that shifts the burden of persuasion onto the defendant. 12 See also State v. Kuhlman, 729 N.W.2d 577, 583-84 (Minn. 2007) (finding red light camera ordinance requiring owner to rebut presumption that he or she was the driver was unconstitutional). Because this Court affirms the circuit court’s judgment on this basis, it need not consider the city’s other points on appeal. Ms. Tupper and Ms. Thurmond’s Appeal Ms. Tupper and Ms. Thurmond appeal the circuit court’s judgment, asserting the court erred in overruling their motion for attorney’s fees. “Where the award of attorneys’ fees is not mandatory, the granting or refusal to grant attorneys’ fees by the trial judge is primarily discretionary and will not be disturbed absent the showing of an abuse of discretion.” Lapponese v. Carts of Colorado, Inc., 422 S.W.3d 396, 401 (Mo. App. 2013) (internal quotations omitted). 12 A rebuttable presumption like the one in ordinance 66868 is not required to enforce a red light camera ordinance. For instance, if the red light camera system took photographs of the driver, like the one at issue in Roeder, __S.W.3d__, the city could use the photographs to prove the identity of the driver. 19 Missouri follows the “American Rule” regarding attorney’s fees, which provides that, absent statutory authorization or contractual agreement, each party bears the expense of his or her own attorney’s fees. David Ranken, Jr. Technical Institute v. Boykins, 816 S.W.2d 189, 193 (Mo. banc 1991), overruled on other grounds by Alumax Foils, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 939 S.W.2d 907 (Mo. banc 1997). An exception to this rule exists in cases involving “special circumstances,” such as “[w]here the natural and proximate result of a wrong . . . is to involve the wronged party in collateral ligation.” Essex Contracting, Inc. v. Jefferson Cnty., 277 S.W.3d 647, 657 (Mo. banc 2009). Ms. Tupper and Ms. Thurmond assert that they had to incur reasonable attorney’s fees in this declaratory judgment action to challenge the city’s wrongful continued enforcement of ordinance 66868. To the contrary, Ms. Tupper and Ms. Thurmond filed their petition in this case while the municipal division proceedings on the ordinance violation were pending. They could have raised these claims as defenses in that action, see Roeder, __S.W.3d__, without having to incur attorney’s fees in a separate action. Ms. Tupper and Ms. Thurmond also contend the city’s continued enforcement of ordinance 66868 after decisions from the court of appeals invalidated similar ordinances constituted intentional misconduct. Intentional misconduct is a “special circumstance” that may justify an award of attorney’s fees. O’Riley v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 412 S.W.3d 400, 419 (Mo. App. 2013). Ms. Tupper and Ms. Thurmond, however, fail to show the city engaged in intentional misconduct to justify an award of attorney’s fees. 20 By the time Ms. Tupper and Ms. Thurmond filed their petition in this case, the court of appeals had considered the validity of similar red light ordinances in Smith, 409 S.W.3d 404; Unverferth v. City of Florissant, 419 S.W.3d 76 (Mo. App. 2013); Ballard v. City of Creve Coeur, 419 S.W.3d 109 (Mo. App. 2013); and Edwards v. City of Ellisville. 426 S.W.3d 644 (Mo. App. 2013). In Smith, the court of appeals held the ordinance was invalid as applied because the notice of violation did not inform the recipient that he or she could respond by pleading not guilty and appearing at trial. 409 S.W.3d at 413. After Smith was decided, the city revised its notice of violation form to add language stating that the recipient may enter a plea of not guilty and request a trial, and the city dismissed all pending prosecutions for violations of ordinance 66868 involving the notice of violation at issue in Smith. The city again revised its notice of violation form to add a court date in the initial notice, rather than the supplemental notice. In Unverferth, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in dismissing a claim that Florissant’s red light camera ordinance was not enacted with proper authority because the ordinance was part of a revenue-generating scheme and erred in dismissing due process claims regarding the notice. 419 S.W.3d at 84. While the court of appeals found the plaintiffs had pleaded sufficient facts to overcome a motion to dismiss on those two claims, it remanded the case for further discovery and fact-finding on those issues. Id. Similarly, the court of appeals in Ballard found sufficient facts pleaded to overcome a motion to dismiss a claim that Creve Coeur’s red light camera ordinance was not properly enacted pursuant to its police power and remanded the case for further 21 proceedings. 419 S.W.3d at 113. Neither Unverferth nor Ballard held that the respective red light camera ordinances at issue were actually invalid. Lastly, in Edwards, the court of appeals found the plaintiffs would be entitled to further discovery on their claim that Ellisville’s red light camera ordinance was part of a revenue-generating scheme but did not remand for further discovery because it found the ordinance invalid for imposing strict liability on owners of motor vehicles when state law prohibiting running red lights regulates the conduct of only drivers and pedestrians. 426 S.W.3d at 650, 662-63. Without deciding whether Edwards was correctly decided, this Court finds the city could have properly distinguished ordinance 66868 from the one found to be invalid in Edwards because the ordinance in Edwards imposes strict liability on the owner of the motor vehicle, while ordinance 66868 places liability on the driver and contains a rebuttable presumption that the owner was the driver. By revising its notice-of-violation form after Smith, the city did not engage in intentional misconduct, notwithstanding decisions of the court of appeals. Ms. Tupper and Ms. Thurmond fail to show they fall within an exception to the rule requiring each party pay his or her own attorney’s fees, and the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Ms. Tupper and Ms. Thurmond’s motion for attorney’s fees. Director of Revenue’s Appeal Lastly, the director of revenue appeals the circuit court’s judgment, asserting the court erred in overruling the director of revenue’s motion to dismiss on the basis that Ms. Tupper and Ms. Thurmond did not seek relief from or allege remediable injury caused by the director. “The right to appeal is purely statutory and, where a statute does 22 not give a right to appeal, no right exists.” Buemi v. Kerckhoff, 359 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Mo. banc 2011) (internal quotations omitted). Section 512.020, RSMo Supp. 2013, provides a right to appeal a final judgment to “[a]ny party to a suit aggrieved by any judgment of any trial court in any civil cause from which an appeal is not prohibited by the constitution, nor clearly limited in special statutory proceedings.” A party is aggrieved by a judgment when the judgment appealed will “operate directly and prejudicially on the party's personal or property rights or interests with immediate effect.” Lane v. Lensmeyer, 158 S.W.3d 218, 224 n.10 (Mo. banc 2005) (internal quotations omitted). In its initial judgment, the circuit court prohibited the city from enforcing ordinance 66868. The court subsequently amended its judgment to state that “the relief requested in the Petition, as amended, with respect to all named Respondents other than the City of St. Louis is hereby DENIED.” While the circuit court overruled the director of revenue’s motion to dismiss, it denied Ms. Tupper and Ms. Thurmond’s claims against him. The director of revenue fails to show that he was aggrieved by the circuit court’s judgment. Moreover, the director of revenue’s argument that the Ms. Tupper and Ms. Thurmond sought no relief from the director of revenue seems to acknowledge that it is not adversely affected by the circuit court’s judgment. Accordingly, the director of revenue does not have a right to appeal.