Opinion ID: 23709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the lyondell defendants

Text: In ruling on the Lyondell Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the district court found that they adduced competent summary judgment evidence showing that there was no release of phosgene at the Lyondell facility on September 2, 1998. The court concluded that, instead, the evidence demonstrated that there was a bromine release at the adjacent Bio-Labs plant, which was not owned, managed, or operated by the Lyondell Defendants. Moreover, the court recognized the Lyondell Defendants’ argument that the release at Bio-Labs was a “Code I” release, meaning that it was contained within the relevant Bio-Labs operating unit and did not spread to adjacent properties, such as Lyondell’s. Finding that Bourque “failed to submit competent summary judgment evidence that there was a release at the Lyondell plant or that any release on an adjoining plant affected [the Lyondell 6 Defendants’] employees,” the court concluded that the Lyondell Defendants owed no duty to Bourque. Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Lyondell Defendants. On appeal, Bourque contends that the Lyondell Defendants owed a duty to him to warn of the “dangerous condition at [the Lyondell] facility.” Bourque maintains that the Lyondell Defendants knew of the bromine release at the Bio-Labs facility and failed to warn him of the danger. Accordingly, Bourque argues that the district court erred in finding that the Lyondell Defendants had no duty to warn him of the danger. We disagree. Louisiana courts3 have adopted a duty/risk analysis for determining whether a party is liable for negligence. See Peterson v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan, 98-1601, p.6 (La. 5/18/99), 733 So. 2d 1198, 1203. Under Louisiana’s duty/risk framework, in evaluating whether a party is at fault, Louisiana courts consider: (1) Was the defendant’s conduct a cause-in-fact of the harm? (2) Was a duty imposed on the defendant by a general rule of law to protect this plaintiff from this type of harm arising in this manner? (3) Was the duty breached? 3 Because our jurisdiction is based upon diversity, we sit as an Erie court. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also C.P. Interests, Inc. v. Cal. Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 2001). 7 Dupre v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 20 F.3d 154, 156-57 (5th Cir. 1994). In Louisiana, the existence of a duty and its scope are questions of law. See id. at 157; see also Peterson, 98-1601 at p.7, 733 So. 2d at 1204; Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 94-0952, p.5 (La. 11/30/94), 646 So. 2d 318, 322. The general rule is that “the owner or operator of a facility has the duty of exercising reasonable care for the safety of persons on his premises and the duty of not exposing such persons to unreasonable risks of injury or harm.” Peterson, 98-1601 at p.7, 733 So. 2d at 1204; see also Dupre, 20 F.3d at 157. The question whether a duty exists depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and the scope of that duty is “limited by the particular risk, harm, and plaintiff involved.” Dupre, 20 F.3d at 157.4 Because the scope of the Lyondell Defendants’ duty to warn was defined by the particular risk of harm caused by a Code I bromine release, we conclude that the district court did not 4 In 1976, the Louisiana Supreme Court eliminated the common-law classifications of invitee, licensee, and trespasser. Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., Inc., 328 So. 2d 367, 370 (La. 1976). These classifications were replaced by the current duty/risk analysis. See Shelton v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 334 So. 2d 406, 410 (La. 1976); see also Kramer v. Continental Cas. Co., 92-1131, p.14 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/22/94), 641 So. 2d 557, 566 (“Thus, in the present case, we do not find it necessary to classify [the plaintiff] as an invitee or licensee, and instead examine the question of legal duty owed in light of the duty/risk formulation.”). As such, which classification best fits Bourque’s purpose for being on Lyondell’s property is irrelevant to this analysis. 8 err in finding that the Lyondell Defendants owed no duty to Bourque. In the instant case, the summary judgment evidence reveals that on September 2, 1998, at 12:23 p.m., employees at the Lyondell facility were informed that the adjacent Bio-Labs facility issued a Code I bromine release notice. Five minutes later, at 12:28 p.m., Bio-Labs issued an “all clear” on the Code I bromine release. Kathy Kiestler, the Senior Industrial Hygienist at Lyondell, testified in an affidavit that a “Code I release” is a “release contained inside the . . . operating unit.” As such, at the time of the incident, the Lyondell employees were aware that there was a release of bromine at the Bio-Labs plant and that it was contained within the TCCA unit located on Bio-Labs’ property. Accordingly, the Lyondell Defendants argue that there was no risk of exposure to individuals within Lyondell’s separate production facility. After our review of the record, we conclude that Bourque has created no genuine issue of material fact for trial. Bourque has adduced no summary judgment evidence to show that a Code I bromine release notice would have alerted Lyondell to a risk at the Lyondell facility, nor does Bourque argue in his brief to this court that the Lyondell Defendants were aware of a possible risk of exposure to individuals at the Lyondell facility, such as would have triggered the Lyondell Defendants’ duty to warn. Therefore, because the scope of the Lyondell Defendants’ duty to 9 warn was limited to the particular risk of a Code I bromine release at another plant’s facility, see Dupre, 20 F.3d at 157, and because there is no dispute that a Code I release means that such release is contained within that facility, we find that the summary judgment evidence shows that the Lyondell Defendants were not aware of a risk on their property. As such, the district court did not err in finding that the Lyondell Defendants had no duty to warn Bourque of the Code I bromine release at a separate and distinct facility. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Lyondell Defendants was proper.