Opinion ID: 1195160
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Basis for the Trial Court's Exceptional Disposition

Text: While we could conclude our opinion with the analysis of the breach of the plea agreement, we are compelled to address the issue of the calculation of the exceptional disposition because the Court of Appeals opinion is published and the trial court may need guidance on remand. Sledge argues the trial court improperly took into account the possibility of early release in determining the length of his sentence: The length of the disposition was based solely on the court's determination that Nick should be confined until his 18th birthday. Supplemental Br. of Pet'r at 6. Indeed, there is little question that Mary June Curtis, in calculating the 103-week recommendation upon which the trial court based its disposition, assumed Sledge would earn early release time. Moreover, there is little doubt of the trial court's intent to confine Sledge until the age of 18: Now, there's been some comment in this courtroom that no period of confinement would be sufficient, and that Mr. Sledge's behavior is not affectable, and I am simply refusing to believe that. I think that someone who is as young as 16 years old cannot simply be discarded as unretrievable or irretrievable. I think that it's important that we make every effort to see to it that this type of behavior is addressed before Mr. Sledge turns 18. Report of Proceedings at 60. The trial court was sincerely concerned with providing Sledge an opportunity to receive whatever counseling and rehabilitation were available in juvenile detention, while at the same time isolating him from the public. [8] A trial court may enter an exceptional disposition beyond the standard range only if it finds a manifest injustice by clear and convincing evidence. RCW 13.40.160(4)(c). The trial court's determination is reviewed for manifest abuse of discretion. State v. B.E.W., 65 Wash.App. 370, 375, 828 P.2d 87 (1992). The issue here is whether the disposition was clearly excessive. RCW 13.40.230(2). Sledge argues the trial court improperly took into consideration the possibility of early release by imposing the 103-week disposition. This Court has held in the context of adult sentencing, [I]t would be inappropriate to impose a sentence outside the presumptive range based on an entirely speculative prediction of the likely behavior of an offender while in confinement. State v. Wakefield, 130 Wash.2d 464, 478, 925 P.2d 183 (1996), citing State v. Fisher, 108 Wash.2d 419, 429 n. 6, 739 P.2d 683 (1987). [E]arned early time release is to be considered only after the offender has begun serving his sentence. Fisher, 108 Wash.2d at 429 n. 6, 739 P.2d 683. In numerous cases, the Court of Appeals followed the same rule in the juvenile court setting. In State v. Bourgeois, 72 Wash.App. 650, 660, 866 P.2d 43 (1994), the court said the Fisher reasoning applies with equal force in the juvenile context .... when a juvenile court considers the possibility of an administrative early release decision, it usurps the Department [of Social and Health Services'] statutory authority. In State v. S.H., 75 Wash.App. 1, 15-16, 877 P.2d 205 (1994), review denied, 125 Wash.2d 1016, 890 P.2d 20 (1995), the court relied on Bourgeois in holding the trial court had erred by increasing a disposition recommendation based on the possibility of early release. See also State v. Ross, 71 Wash.App. 556, 861 P.2d 473, 483 (1993), review denied, 123 Wash.2d 1019, 875 P.2d 636 (1994); State v. Vaughn, 83 Wash.App. 669, 924 P.2d 27 (1996), review denied, 131 Wash.2d 1018, 936 P.2d 417 (1997). We see no reason to depart from the principles expressed in Wakefield, Fisher, or their juvenile counterparts in the absence of facts documenting a need for confinement for a specific treatment program requiring a set duration to successfully complete. To assume a juvenile offender will earn a discretionary early release invites too much speculation by the sentencing court. The facts in Sledge's case confirm the speculative nature of this undertaking. The trial court wanted to confine Sledge until he was 18 and assumed a 103-week disposition would achieve this result when a 20 percent earned early release time factor was made part of the calculation. First, as previously noted, the court calculated the sentence incorrectly. See n. 4, supra. Second, given Sledge's record of incorrigible behavior both in and out of juvenile institutions, it is difficult to believe he would be an outstanding candidate for early release. The greater likelihood is that Sledge would serve all or nearly all of his sentence, pushing his release date past his 18th birthday. Finally, the trial court failed to consider Sledge's entitlement to mandatory release pending his appeal of an exceptional sentence based on a manifest injustice finding. RCW 13.40.230(5). Under the facts of this case, the trial court erred in utilizing a speculative entitlement to earned early release time in calculating the exceptional disposition.