Opinion ID: 2723715
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d 485, 491 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). Moreover,

Text: Pennsylvania’s child endangerment statute even prohibits 8 omissions to act. See Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 515 A.2d 311, 315 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (“We conclude that a parent’s duty to protect his or her child requires affirmative performance to prevent harm and that failure to act may mean that the parent ‘knowingly endangers the welfare of the child.’” (quoting § 4304(a)(1)). There are countless examples of non-turpitudinous conduct that could be criminalized under § 4304(a)(1). Hernandez-Cruz poses two examples of such conduct. In the first, an individual exceeds the speed limit by 5 mph while transporting a child passenger to whom he owes a duty of care. See Reply Br. 5. In the second, an individual slows down, but fails to stop completely at a stop sign, while transporting a child passenger to whom he owes a duty of care. See id. at 5-6. In both examples, if the individual acts with a knowing mens rea, the conduct is punishable under § 4304(a)(1) because the individual has knowingly endangered a child’s welfare by violating a duty of care. However, neither example involves conduct that is “inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the accepted rules of morality.” See Knapik, 384 F.3d at 89. Similarly, a father could knowingly endanger his son’s welfare and violate his duty of care by leaving his son alone in the car for five minutes. A mother also could knowingly endanger her 10-year-old daughter’s welfare and violate her duty of care by leaving her daughter unattended in the swimming pool for ten minutes. Leaving a child alone in the car or unattended in the swimming pool for a few minutes might be poorly advised, but it is not “inherently base, vile, or depraved.” Contra Totimeh, 666 F.3d at 116 (“Sexual assault, child abuse, and spousal abuse are no doubt inherently vile and elicit strong outrage.”). 9 When making a CIMT determination, “proof of actual application of the statute of conviction to the conduct asserted is unnecessary.”Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 471. Nevertheless, it is instructive to consider cases in which Pennsylvania courts have upheld convictions under § 4304(a)(1) in the absence of morally turpitudinous conduct. In Coppedge, for example, the Pennsylvania Superior Court sustained a § 4304 conviction based on evidence that a mother scalded her three-year-old daughter in hot bath water, causing the girl to suffer secondand third-degree burns. 984 A.2d at 562. The court in Coppedge held that a parent’s failure to check the water temperature before placing her child in a bathtub is punishable under § 4304(a)(1), reasoning that “[i]t is impossible to place one’s own child in scalding hot bath water . . . without knowingly violating a duty of care by not checking the water before placing the child in the tub.” Id. at 563. In another case, the Superior Court upheld a § 4304 conviction based on evidence that the defendant allowed his children to live with filth and vermin in a dilapidated home with no working furnace for heat and with water running into the electrical box, thereby creating a fire hazard. See Wallace, 817 A.2d at 492. In affirming the conviction, the court explained that the defendant’s “inaction clearly endangered his children’s welfare.” Id. Clearly, there is nothing “inherently base, vile, or depraved” about failing to check bath water before placing a child in a tub nor is there anything “inherently base, vile, or depraved” about exposing children to filthy living conditions. See Knapik, 384 F.3d at 89. Because the least culpable conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under § 4304(a)(1) does not implicate moral turpitude, Hernandez-Cruz’s child endangerment conviction 10 does not qualify as a CIMT. The BIA went “beyond the bounds of reasonableness” in concluding otherwise. See Knapik, 384 F.3d at 90 (quoting Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 573 (8th Cir. 1995)). Therefore, we grant Hernandez-Cruz’s petition for review and reverse the BIA’s CIMT determination. Our grant of the petition directly affects the BIA’s ruling with respect to Hernandez-Cruz’s eligibility for cancellation of removal, since the BIA held that he was statutorily ineligible for cancellation based on his conviction for a CIMT. Accordingly, we remand the case to the BIA for further proceedings because the Board still needs to address whether Hernandez-Cruz satisfies the other criteria required for cancellation of removal. See INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (eligibility requirements for nonpermanent residents).