Opinion ID: 1758769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reference to Unborn Fetus by Name

Text: Bullock was charged with capital murder in the death of an unborn fetus under the Arkansas Fetal Protection Act, which defined person, for purposes of the state's homicide statutes, to include a fetus beyond twelve weeks of development. See Ark.Code Ann. § 5-1-102(13)(B)(i)(b) (Supp.1999). The information filed by the State identified the fetus as Heaven Pace. On the morning of trial, Bullock moved in limine to prohibit any reference to the unborn fetus by name, arguing that the child has never been legally named Heaven, and that it's prejudicial. The prosecutor responded that the fetus's mother, Shiwona Pace, had decided to name her baby Heaven Pace long before the assault happened. Because the State had to be able to identify the victim to the jury, the prosecutor intended to refer to the unborn fetus as Heaven Pace. The circuit court denied Bullock's motion in limine, thereby allowing the State to refer to the unborn fetus by name. On appeal, Bullock challenges the propriety of the State referring to the unborn fetus as Heaven Pace under Ark. R. Evid. 403 (2003). Bullock argues that referring to the unborn fetus by name had no probative value and in no way provided the jury a better understanding of the evidence. In addition, he contends that the name was used to invoke sympathy, thus increasing the prejudice against him. Moreover, Bullock maintains that the fetus could have been referred to in other ways, such as the person, the victim, or the baby. Rule 403 makes otherwise relevant evidence inadmissable if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We start by noting that Bullock's reliance upon Smith v. State, 19 Ark.App. 188, 718 S.W.2d 475 (1986) (en banc), and Golden v. State, 10 Ark.App. 362, 664 S.W.2d 496 (1984), for the proposition that the probative value of evidence correlates inversely to the availability of other means of proving the issue for which the prejudicial evidence is offered, is misplaced. We overruled the Golden decision in Bledsoe v. State, 344 Ark. 86, 39 S.W.3d 760 (2001), and in doing so effectively overruled Smith . In evidentiary determinations, a trial court has wide discretion, and we do not reverse a ruling on the admission of evidence absent an abuse of discretion. Davis v. State, 350 Ark. 22, 86 S.W.3d 872 (2002). We cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Bullock's motion in limine. The fetus was at term at the time of death, the fetus had been named, and the name was included in the criminal information. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court on this point.