Opinion ID: 624915
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The three post-summary judgment orders

Text: In addition to appealing the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs, defendants also attempt to appeal the Dec. 18, 2009 order amending the judgment to include damages, the June 17, 2010 order granting Cruz attorney's fees, and the Feb. 8, 2011 order permitting the substitution of Leonides Lorenzo Cruz for Herminia Lorenzo Cruz as plaintiff. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) 3 and 4 state that a party wishing to appeal from the district court to the court of appeals must file a notice of appeal with the district court within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered. [6] If there has been no timely notice of appeal from an order, a circuit court of appeal has no jurisdiction to review that order. Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 265, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978). It is the filing of a notice of appeal that invokes our jurisdiction and establishes the issues to be addressed. A timely notice of appeal from the judgment or order complained of is mandatory and jurisdictional. Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 585 (9th Cir.2007). Even if neither party objects to an untimely notice of appeal, we must raise the issue sua sponte. See Hostler v. Groves, 912 F.2d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir.1990). Because of the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of notices of appeal, Whitaker, 486 F.3d at 585, the doctrine of relation back that may apply to complaints does not apply to an amended notice of appeal. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1) provides that amendments to a complaint may relate back to the date of the original pleading if the amended pleading arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set outor attempted to be set outin the original pleading. However, the failure to file a notice of appeal differs from the expiration of many statutes of limitations: the former necessarily deprives this court of jurisdiction, while the latter does not always deprive this court of jurisdiction. [7] For example, this court has recognized the Supreme Court's holding that AEDPA's statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), is not jurisdictional. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir.2011). In contrast, as discussed above, the lack of a timely filed (or timely amended) notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction. Whitaker, 486 F.3d at 585. This difference is reflected in the respective Federal Rules of Procedure governing complaints and notices of appeal. Unlike Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 15, which creates a standard based on whether the amendment arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence, FRAP 3 and 4 establish a hard rule based on the number of days that pass: a prospective appellant has 30 days to file a notice of appeal. Nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil or Appellate Procedure establishes any exception for notices of appeal comparable to the doctrine of relation back for complaints. In this case, the debt collectors did not file their amended notice of appeal adding any of these orders to the original notice of appeal until March 14, 2011. This was 461 days after the Dec. 18, 2009 order, 280 days after the June 17, 2010 order, and 34 days after the Feb. 8, 2011 order. Thus, the amended notice of appeal was not a timely notice of appeal for any of those three orders as it was more than 30 days after each order. Because there was no timely notice of appeal for these orders, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals of the orders. Though the debt collectors agree that it is a mandatory requirement that the original notice of appeal be timely, they argue that subsequent appeals are not subject to this mandatory requirement. The debt collectors argue that FRAP 4(a)(3) provides additional time for filing cross or other separate appeals. This argument lacks merit. FRAP 4(a)(3) applies to appeals by any other party (emphasis added), allowing other parties 14 days to file a notice of appeal after a first party files a notice of appeal. See Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir.1981) (holding that FRAP 4 did not prevent this court from considering a protective appeal by the prevailing party below once this court had jurisdiction based on a properly filed notice of appeal by the losing party). Nothing in the rule allows one party to file a second notice of appeal late merely because that party had previously filed a first notice of appeal. Even if the rule did permit a party to bootstrap its own second notice of appeal, it would not apply to this case. The debt collectors submitted the amended notice of appeal 511 days after their first notice of appeal substantially more than the 14 days discussed in the rule. Therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the Dec. 18 order, the June 17 order, and the Feb. 8 order and the portions of the appeal relating to those orders is dismissed.