Opinion ID: 2640468
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Background Necessary to Understand the Legislative Analysis

Text: The underlying inquiry in this case requires us to determine the legislative intent of the governing statutes. We begin by briefly examining the role of the Commission. We next discuss the writ of quo warranto and analyze our jurisdiction to issue such a writ in this matter. Finally, we apply the relevant statutory authority and case law to determine which of the four appointments are legally valid.
In 1966, the people of Colorado voted to amend the Colorado Constitution to require the appointment of state judges and justices according to a merit-based system. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 24. This scheme replaced what has been called a disastrous system in which judges and justices were elected on a political ticket. Hearing on HB 88-1079 Before the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 1988 Leg., 56th Sess. (Colo.1988) (statement of Frank Plaut, President, Colo. Bar Ass'n). This constitutional amendment mandates, among other directives, that judges and justices who wish to retain their offices must be approved by voters in a retention election. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 25. However, after the experience of various retention elections, the General Assembly became aware that the electorate did not always have access to sufficient information to allow them to assess judges and justices who were on the ballot for retention. Hearing on HB 88-1079 Before the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 1988 Leg., 56th Sess. (Colo.1988) (statement of Rep. Bath, Member, H. Comm. on Judiciary). In order to fill this informational void, the General Assembly enacted legislation in 1988 to evaluate judicial performance statewide by district, using uniform criteria, through the creation of Commissions on Judicial Performance for each district. § 13-5.5-101, C.R.S. (2005). In addition to the district Commissions on Judicial Performance, this legislation established a State Commission on Judicial Performance, the entity involved in this action. The State Commission oversees the district Commissions, ensures that district retention evaluations are appropriate, and evaluates performance of all statewide appellate judgesnamely, the judges of the Colorado Court of Appeals and the justices of the Colorado Supreme Court. See §§ 13-5.5-103, 106, C.R.S. (2005). The State Commission comprises ten members who are appointed by officials from all three branches of government. Id. § 102. In addition to the four appointments by the Speaker and President of the Senate, the Governor and Chief Justice of the supreme court each appoint three members, one attorney and two nonattorneys. Id. The legislative intent behind the tri-branch appointment structure was to create a nonpolitical Commission. Hearing on HB 88-1079 Before the Conference Comm., 1988 Leg., 56th Sess. (Colo.1988) (statement of Sen. Claire Traylor, Member, Sen. Comm. on Judiciary and bill sponsor). The Commission must start its work early in an election year in order to fulfill its statutory and constitutional timeframes so that its completed evaluations are accessible to the public and mailed statewide to electors thirty days before the election. This year's general election is set for November 7. See § 1-1-104(17), C.R.S. (2005). Thus, the Commission must finalize its draft evaluation and draft narrative profile of each appellate judge by approximately June 22, no later than forty-five days prior to the last day available for the appellate justice or judge to declare ... [her] intent to stand for retention. § 13-5.5-106(1)(a), C.R.S. (2005). This date, the last date available for the judge to declare an intent to stand for retention, must be no later than three months before the date of the general election, according to the Colorado Constitution article VI, section 25. In this case, that date is approximately August 7. The Commission must make the final narrative profile and recommendations available to the public by approximately September 22, no later than forty-five days before the retention election. § 13-5.5-106(1)(c), C.R.S. (2005). A summary of this narrative profile and recommendation is then printed in the ballot information booklet, which must be mailed to electors by approximately October 7, thirty days before the election. See id.; §§ 1-40-124.5, 125, C.R.S. (2005). However, in order to meet these mandatory statutory and constitutional deadlines, the Commission must begin its work well before June 22. Jane Howell, the current Staff Director of the Commission, reports by affidavit attached to the petition that five judges of the court of appeals are standing for retention in November 2006. She summarizes the work the Commission must do to perform its statutory duties in this election year to evaluate the five appellate judges. In March, the commissioners and the judges will receive the results of an independent, professional survey of each appellate judge. The surveys are confidential and solely for the benefit of the Commission. The commissioners then will meet with the Chief Judge of the court of appeals, make one unannounced visit to the courtroom, and conduct confidential interviews with the judges standing for retention. Within ten days of these interviews, the Commission will provide a draft narrative profile to the judge and/or a draft recommendation concerning retention. The evaluated judge must have an opportunity to meet with the Commission within ten days of the judge's receipt of these drafts. § 13-5.5-106(1)(a), C.R.S. (2005). Having provided a brief overview of the State Commission on Judicial Performance and its duties, we turn to an examination of the relief requested and the court's power to grant it.
The Colorado Constitution vests the Colorado Supreme Court with jurisdiction to issue writs in the nature of quo warranto: The supreme court shall have power to issue writs of ... quo warranto. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 3. A proceeding in quo warranto lies to determine whether a person is illegally holding a public office or to test the validity of the legal existence of a governmental body. Leonard P. Plank & Anne Whalen Gill, Colorado Appellate Law and Practice § 15.9, at 224 (1999). The writ protects the interest of the public, but does not promote private rights. Id. We will issue quo warranto writs only rarely because of the availability of relief in the district courts under C.R.C.P. 106. Id.; see also William H. ReMine, Original Proceedings in the Colorado Supreme Court, 12 The Colorado Lawyer 413, 418 (March 1983). Rule 21 sets forth procedures for the exercise of our original jurisdiction. C.A.R. 21. It encompasses all forms of writs cognizable under the common law, including quo warranto. C.A.R. 21(a)(2). Relief under this rule is extraordinary in nature and is a matter wholly within our discretion. C.A.R. 21(a)(1). We do not grant this relief except in important circumstances when no other adequate remedy exists. Id. A person whose official duties under law include appointments to a public office has standing to petition for C.A.R 21 relief in the nature of quo warranto. People ex rel. Lamm v. Banta, 189 Colo. 474, 542 P.2d 377, 378 (1975) (recognizing that the Governor of the State of Colorado, as appointing authority for members of the Colorado Highway Commission, has standing to bring C.A.R. 21 petition in quo warranto). The issue in Banta was whether the persons the Governor appointed to the office of highway commissioner were entitled to take their seats in place of certain incumbent commissioners. Id. After their terms had expired, those incumbent commissioners were continuing to act in office pursuant to provisions of the Colorado Constitution that require office holders to exercise their official duties until their successors become qualified to hold office. Id. at 379. The relevant provision of the Colorado Constitution states that [e]very person holding any civil office under the state ... shall, unless removed according to law, exercise the duties of such office until his successor is duly qualified. Colo. Const. art. XII, § 1. Like Banta, the case before us involves conflicting appointments made by appointing authorities to the same Commission seats. By virtue of their offices, Romanoff, as Speaker of the Colorado House of Representatives, and Fitz-Gerald, as President of the Senate, hold the authority under section 13-5.5-102(1)(a) to appoint members of the State Commission on Judicial Performance when a vacancy in that office exists. By means of affidavits of Jane Howell, Staff Director of the Commission, and Jean Dubofsky, current member of the Commission, attached to the C.A.R. 21 petition, the Commission informs that: (1) it is unable to determine who of these four persons validly holds the two seats on the Commission; and (2) the Commission's statutory duties to evaluate the performance of appellate judges and to supervise the operation of the twenty-two district commissions require the immediate resolution of this controversy in this election year. The dispute involving which two of these four respondents hold the office of commissioner is a matter of immediate and important public concern. The work of the Commission is critical to the operation of the retention systemespecially now, at the onset of an election year. To fulfill its statutory duties, the Commission needs ten working members. [5] If the Commission does not operate with its ten lawful commissioners, then its operation will be ineffective at best, paralyzed at worst. Necessity calls for us to resolve this controversy as quickly as possible. We find there is no other adequate remedy available here because relief under C.R.C.P. 106 would not be timely and our resolution of this controversy involves no factual disputes. Validly seated members of the Commission have critical statutory responsibilities to discharge in a timely manner during this general election year of 2006, and accordingly, we find it proper for two of the appointing authorities to the Commission to request the supreme court to address this issue under the auspices of a writ in the nature of quo warranto under C.A.R. 21. We therefore proceed to determine which of the conflicting appointments made by two successive holders of the office of Speaker of the House of Representatives and two successive holders of the office of President of the Senate are legally valid.