Opinion ID: 2785371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Quantity of Drugs Attributable to Eversole

Text: Eversole argues that her sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the court did not properly calculate the amount of methamphetamine that should be attributed to her under the Guidelines and so miscalculated her sentence. Her argument is also unpersuasive. A sentence would be procedurally unreasonable if the court “fail[ed] to calculate (or improperly calculat[ed]) the Guidelines range” or “select[ed] a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A district court’s factual finding of drug quantity is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Jeross, 521 F.3d 562, 570 (6th Cir. 2008). Where a defendant is part of a “jointly undertaken criminal activity” involving drugs, “the defendant is accountable for all quantities of contraband with which [s]he was directly involved and . . . all -6- Nos. 13-6431/6454/6478/14-5685, United States v. Begley, et al. reasonably foreseeable quantities of contraband that were within the scope of the criminal activity that [she] jointly undertook.” USSG § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2. When a defendant obtains drugs from a supplier for personal use as well as distribution in the context of a conspiracy, those drugs are “properly included . . . in determining the quantity of drugs that the defendant knew were distributed by the conspiracy.” United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 542 (6th Cir. 2000). Where the exact amount of drugs cannot be determined, “an estimate will suffice, but . . . a preponderance of the evidence must support the estimate.” Jeross, 521 F.3d at 570 (quoting United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1302 (6th Cir. 1990)). In making its estimate, the court must “conclude that the defendant is more likely than not actually responsible for a quantity greater than or equal to the quantity for which the defendant is being held responsible.” Id. (quoting Walton, 908 F.2d at 1302). An estimate “may be based upon physical evidence (such as seized drugs) or testimonial evidence.” Id.; United States v. Swanberg, 370 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir. 2004) (relying on testimonial evidence). “[T]he evidence supporting the [sentencing court’s] estimate must have a minimal level of reliability beyond mere allegation, and the court should err on the side of caution in making its estimate.” United States v. Russell, 595 F.3d 633, 646 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). There is no reason to conclude that the court erred in calculating the quantity of methamphetamine attributable to Eversole. At her sentencing hearing, Eversole did not initially object to the information in the presentence investigation report, and the court adopted its findings and guidelines calculations. Shortly thereafter, however, Eversole’s attorney did object to the quantity of methamphetamine used to determine Eversole’s guidelines, arguing that Eversole was under the influence of methamphetamine when she made her previous statement to law enforcement personnel that she was receiving approximately two ounces a week of the drug. -7- Nos. 13-6431/6454/6478/14-5685, United States v. Begley, et al. Counsel argued that such an amount “doubles what she was actually getting,” and that if the court subtracted the “large amount of methamphetamine that Ms. Eversole was using for herself, that would take her down under 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine,” and reduce her base offense level from 32 to 34. R. 268, Page ID 1044-45. The court then heard testimony from the probation officer, who credited Eversole’s initial statement to police, which was corroborated by Carson and Vaughn, to the effect that Eversole received two ounces of methamphetamine from Begley approximately every four days. As calculated in the presentence report, two ounces, or 56 grams, was multiplied by 35, the approximate number of occasions on which Eversole received drugs from Begley during the course of the conspiracy, resulting in a total of 1.960 kilograms. This amount falls within the 1.5 to 5 kilogram range, which had a base level of 34 under the version of USSG § 2D1.1(c) in effect in 2012. After considering this information, the court credited the probation officer’s corroborated testimony, overruled the objection, and found the calculations to be accurate and the base offense level of 34 to be appropriate. The amount of methamphetamine attributed to Eversole was not inappropriate and her sentence is procedurally reasonable. C. The Procedural and Substantive Reasonableness of Branstetter’s Sentence Branstetter argues on appeal that her sentence of 145 months is procedurally and substantively unreasonable because the court failed to consider all of the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), such as her personal characteristics—in particular her drug addiction—as well as her relatively minor role in the conspiracy, resulting in a sentence that was greater than necessary to satisfy the goals of the statute. She argues that proposed amendments to the sentencing guidelines as well as policies introduced by Attorney General Holder in August 2013 should have been considered in calculating her sentence, and that the safety valve reduction could have -8- Nos. 13-6431/6454/6478/14-5685, United States v. Begley, et al. been applied, despite her substantial criminal history. She also points to disparities between her sentence and those of her co-defendants, as well as a disparity between her sentence and that of other drug offenders with similar criminal histories. We find these arguments to be unavailing. In sentencing a defendant, the district court calculates the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, uses it as a benchmark, and then considers all of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, making an individualized assessment based on the facts presented and without presuming the reasonableness of the Guidelines range. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258-59 (2005) (holding that the Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory, standards). The court should “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In doing so, the sentencing