Opinion ID: 235778
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper Argument To Jury

Text: 21 The third point raised by the defense is that the counsel for the plaintiff so misbehaved himself in his summation that the defendant did not receive a fair trial. As would be expected, Robinson v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 3 Cir., 1954, 214 F.2d 798, is relied upon by the appellant. We decided that case thoughtfully with a full knowledge of what had occurred in the trial court. We have no inclination to cut the Robinson case down or get away from it by confining it to its exact facts. On the other hand, we are not going to order a new trial every time one lawyer makes remarks about an opposing party in a law suit which that party's lawyer does not like. Plaintiff's counsel suggested to the jury that the defendant was unfair in certain respects. But the charge of unfairness rose out of controversial matters which had come up in the course of the trial. The matters were proper subjects of comment by counsel. We have read the argument complained of. We think it really rather mild as those things go and a long way from the kind of court room brawl involved in the Robinson case. 22 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has properly set out the rule to be applied in such cases. In Narcisco v. Mauch Chunk Tp., 1952, 369 Pa. 549, 551-552, 87 A.2d 233, 234-235, that Court stated: 23 'It is well established that any statements by counsel, not based on evidence, which tend to influence the jury in resolving the issues before them solely by an appeal to passion and prejudice is improper and will not be countenanced. As we have stated on many occasions: '   a verdict obtained by incorrect statements or unfair argument or by an appeal to passion or prejudice stands on but little higher ground than one obtained by false testimony.'    24 'This Court is, of course, well aware that occasionally, in the heat of trial, counsel may make a statement which is not justified by the record but which may or may not have had a prejudicial effect on the jury. For that reason the granting of a new trial rests largely in the discretion of the trial judge. If he feels that an admonition to the jury to disregard the remark is sufficient we are reluctant to reverse since the trial judge is in a better position to see and understand the atmosphere of the trial and the effect the statement had on the jury.    But this Court is quick to act when there has been an abuse of discretion and that is determined by an examination of the remark made, the circumstances under which it was made and the precautions taken by court and counsel to remove its prejudicial effects.   ' 4 25 The trial court in this case reviewed this argument in the motion for a new trial and found that: 'If the summation was in some respects improper, the impropriety was a mere isolated lapse, which    amounted to very little when viewed and compared with the evidence as a whole.' We agree with this opinion of the trial court and find no such abuse of discretion as to justify reversal on this ground. 26 The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.