Opinion ID: 2112494
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instruction as to Conformity to Custom.

Text: Defendant asserts that, even if the court of appeals was incorrect in finding that he was entitled to a favorable judgment as a matter of law, he is nevertheless entitled to a new trial as a result of erroneous jury instructions. Specifically, defendant contends that the district court erred in giving Instruction No. 13 concerning conformity to custom over his objection. The challenged instruction reads as follows: INSTRUCTION NO. 13 Evidence has been introduced concerning a practice of use of design criteria in the design of bridges including standards and regulations of professional associations and governmental agencies. Such governmental standards and regulations are directly applicable only to public bridges, and therefore a failure, if any, of the Defendant to comply with governmental standards and regulations does not necessarily constitute negligence. You are instructed, however, that you may consider evidence of the use of design criteria, standards and regulations in the design of bridges as evidence of custom generally. Conformity to a custom is evidence of ordinary care, and noncomformity is evidence of negligence. We conclude that the giving of this instruction was reversible error. Our cases recognize that conformity to custom or the lack thereof may, in some situations, be evidence of negligence. See, e.g., McCrady v. Sino, 254 Iowa 856, 861, 118 N.W.2d 592, 594 (1962); Langner v. Caviness, 238 Iowa 774, 778, 28 N.W.2d 421, 423 (1947). We are not persuaded, however, that the present facts justify the giving of the challenged instruction. In order for custom to be evidence of negligence, it must be shown that the custom in question extends to the type of conduct at issue in the litigation. Jackson v. Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 238 Iowa 1253, 1263, 30 N.W.2d 97, 103 (1948). In the present case, there was no showing made that the design criteria applicable to bridges on public highways constitute a custom that is generally followed in designing bridges on privately owned roadways. In the absence of proof of similar anticipated traffic patterns, the seemingly great difference in amounts and types of traffic negates any suggestion of comparability. We have considered all issues presented and conclude that the judgment of the district court must be reversed for the reasons we have indicated. [3] The case is remanded to the district court for a new trial of all issues. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED.