Opinion ID: 806090
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dr. McCarthy

Text: Dr. McCarthy met with Parsons August 26 shortly after Parsons’s meeting with Heebsh. Parsons argues that Dr. McCarthy was deliberately indifferent by failing to immediately secure Dilantin for Parsons. There is insufficient evidence to support this claim. Unlike Heebsh, Dr. McCarthy concedes that he was aware that Parsons arrived at Standish without his medication and that this created a “rather urgent” or “somewhat urgent situation.” Dr. McCarthy contends that he was aware that Parsons had already met with Heebsh that morning and that Heebsh had prescribed Dilantin because the “order was already present in the [prison computer system] when [he] saw Mr. Parsons.” He also testified that, under his work program, he is “forbidden to treat medical problems” and could not have written a prescription for or obtained Dilantin for Parsons. On the other hand, Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Walsh, stated in an affidavit that a psychiatrist in Dr. McCarthy’s position is not forbidden to secure Dilantin for a patient in Parsons’s condition. 4 Like Pausits, Heebsh also argues that her failure to immediately provide Dilantin cannot be considered the proximate cause of Parsons’s death. As explained above, Parsons need only demonstrate that Heebsh’s indifference was a “substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation.” See Trollinger, 370 F.3d at 620 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, contrary to Heebsh’s assertions, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that Parsons’s Dilantin would have arrived sooner had Heebsh instructed the nurses to order Dilantin from the local pharmacy–the psychotropic medications, ordered locally by Dr. McCarthy, arrived the same day. Given the risk associated with the delay in receiving anti-seizure medication, Heebsh’s failure to provide Dilantin could be considered a proximate cause in this case. - 17 - No. 10-1584 and 11-1992 Parsons v. Caruso Even assuming that Dr. McCarthy could have obtained Dilantin for Parsons, he did not act with deliberate indifference to Parsons’s medical needs. As a mental health professional, it was reasonable for Dr. McCarthy to treat Parsons’s mental health issues and defer to the medical provider (Heebsh), who had already ordered Dilantin for Parsons, for his medical issues. “[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Even if Dr. McCarthy should have, in hindsight, expended more effort to ensure that Parsons received his Dilantin right away, his failure to do so does not amount to recklessness or deliberate indifference. “Medical malpractice” or negligence “does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976) (“Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess the medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.”). Dr. McCarthy is entitled to summary judgment because he did not act with deliberate indifference to Parsons’s medical needs.