Opinion ID: 1118488
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the superior court err by denying Van Huff's motion for a new trial based upon alleged juror misconduct?

Text: Van Huff argues that the superior court abused its discretion by denying Van Huff's motion for a new trial based upon alleged juror misconduct. He apparently believes that Butts' statements that he did not want the jury deliberations to continue past Saturday, and that his wife was going to work the following week for Sohio or ARCO, indicated Butts' bias and also prejudiced the other jurors. The standard of review applicable to a superior court's denial of a motion for a new trial based upon alleged juror misconduct is the abuse of discretion standard. West v. State, 409 P.2d 847, 852 (Alaska 1966). This court will not disturb a trial court's decision on [a motion for a new trial] except in exceptional circumstances to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Buoy v. Era Helicopters, Inc., 771 P.2d 439, 442 (Alaska 1989). In West v. State , we explained under what circumstances juror misconduct should result in a new trial. [5] Chief Justice Nesbett wrote: It is the overwhelming weight of authority that a juror generally cannot impeach the jury's verdict by his testimony or affidavit. Public policy supporting this rule is well expressed in McDonald v. Pless [238 U.S. 264, 267, 35 S.Ct. 783, 784, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915)] where the United States Supreme Court refused to permit jurors to testify that they had arrived at their verdict arbitrarily and unjustly by using the quotient formula... . The court observed that any detriment to a party resulting from the rule is outweighed by the benefit realized by preventing the tampering with or harassment of juries. Exceptions to the general rule have been made and it has been held that the type of misconduct which may impeach a verdict is fraud, bribery, forcible coercion or any other obstruction of justice. Whether the verdict should be set aside and a new trial ordered rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge, but generally the verdict should stand unless the evidence clearly establishes a serious violation of the juror's duty and deprives a party of a fair trial. West v. State, 409 P.2d at 852 (footnotes omitted). In Fickes v. Petrolane-Alaska Gas Serv., Inc., 628 P.2d 908 (Alaska 1981), we identified three factors to be considered in determining whether a party was deprived of a fair trial: First, if the party asserting prejudice had known the true facts, is it probable that it would have challenged the juror? Second, did the improper comment merely go toward a collateral matter, e.g., the general credibility of a witness, or did it go to the essence of a claim or defense? Third, viewed objectively, was the probable effect of the comment prejudicial? Id. at 911 (citations and footnotes omitted). Butts' alleged bias and the alleged impact of his statements upon the other jurors do not warrant impeaching the verdict, because Butts' actions do not constitute severe juror misconduct and Van Huff was not deprived of a fair trial. There is no evidence in the record to support an allegation of fraud, bribery, forcible coercion or obstruction of justice, the types of misconduct with which West was concerned. As such, the threshold test of West was not met by Van Huff. In addition, our consideration of the Fickes factors strongly suggests that the juror misconduct alleged by Van Huff did not deprive him of a fair trial. We therefore find that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying Van Huff's motion for a new trial.