Opinion ID: 2621432
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 43

Heading: Closing Argument Misconduct â Comment on Prison Conditions

Text: ś 305 The majority also wrongly holds that the prosecutor's reference to prison conditions in closing arguments of the murder trial's penalty phase requires reversal of Gregory's death sentence. For reasons that follow, I disagree with the majority. ś 306 To demonstrate improper prosecutorial argument, a defendant must show both the impropriety of the attorney's comments and their prejudicial effect. State v. Russell, 125 Wash.2d 24, 85, 882 P.2d 747 (1994). To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must establish a substantial likelihood that the misconduct affected the jury's verdict. State v. Dhaliwal, 150 Wash.2d 559, 578, 79 P.3d 432 (2003). The majority wrongly concludes that Gregory satisfies these burdens. ś 307 Improper arguments of counsel should be objected to at trial so the judges can cure by stopping the objected-to arguments and instructing the jury. Where, as here, the defense fails to object to an improper comment at trial, any claim of error is deemed waived unless the prosecutor's remarks were so flagrant and ill-intended that any resulting prejudice could not have been neutralized by a curative instruction to the jury. State v. Brown, 132 Wash.2d 529, 561, 940 P.2d 546 (1997). ś 308 The majority concedes the defense counsel did not object to statements regarding prison life made by the prosecution during closing argument. Majority at 1256. Rather, Gregory's counsel made several pages of similar remarks in defendant's closing argument. MRP at 7753 (Common sense will tell you a number of things about prison life). See majority at 1256. Ironically, the majority overlooks the conceded fact that juries embody the commonsense judgment of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). ś 309 The majority also overstates the surprise or significance of arguments about prison life to this jury's deliberations. See majority at 1256 (The characterization of prison life is central to the question of which sentence is appropriate. . . .). Characterizations of life in prison are matters of common knowledge, as defense counsel conceded in his argument before the jury. MRP at 7753. ś 310 The majority posits that images of prison life bias the jury. I disagree. Here, during closing argument the prosecutor described prison life as another form of society. MRP at 7721-22. Defense counsel had ample opportunity to object to the prosecutor's statement, but failed to do so and instead chose to make a similar contrasting argument. The defense simply made a tactical decision that similar arguments would help his client. ś 311 This court recently found absence of an objection by defense counsel `strongly suggests to a court that the argument or event in question did not appear critically prejudicial to an appellant in the context of the trial.' State v. McKenzie, 157 Wash.2d 44, 53 n. 2, 134 P.3d 221 (2006) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Swan, 114 Wash.2d 613, 661, 790 P.2d 610 (1990)). In analyzing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, this court concluded the deputy prosecutor went too far in references to McKenzie's theft of C.T.'s innocence. Id. at 61, 134 P.3d 221. Nonetheless, we held that these comments made in closing arguments in another rape case, which prompted no objection from defense counsel, did not rise to the level of misconduct warranting a new trial. Id. This court concluded that, with objection, [a]ny prejudicial effect could have been mitigated by a timely instruction to the jury. Id. ś 312 The question in this case does not significantly differ from the issue in McKenzie. That case should control. See also Loeffelholz v. C.L.E.A.N., 119 Wash.App. 665, 709-10, 82 P.3d 1199 (comments by prosecutor during closing argument not objected to were not preserved for appeal), review denied, 152 Wash.2d 1023, 101 P.3d 107 (2004). ś 313 Appellate courts will not sanction a party's failure to object at trial to identify error which the trial court might correct. State v. Scott, 110 Wash.2d 682, 685, 757 P.2d 492 (1988). Failure to object deprives the trial court of this opportunity to prevent or cure the error. Such decisions at trial are often tactical â the defense chooses to argue the same issue. Gregory's counsel did so here. ś 314 The jury was instructed by the trial court to [d]isregard any remark, statement or argument that is not supported by the evidence. MCP at 2975 (Court's Instruction to the Jury (Penalty Phase), Instruction No. 1, at 2). Juries are presumed to have followed the trial court's instructions, absent evidence proving the contrary. State v. Davenport, 100 Wash.2d 757, 763, 675 P.2d 1213 (1984); State v. Cerny, 78 Wash.2d 845, 850, 480 P.2d 199 (1971), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 939, 92 S.Ct. 2873, 33 L.Ed.2d 761 (1972). The constitutional role of the jury requires court respect for the jury and its deliberations. See Wash. Const. art. I, §§ 21, 22. ś 315 Defense counsel's rebuttal argument may also be seen as a waiver of the earlier motion in limine. Surely the defense's failure to object to the prosecutor's remarks amounted to a waiver, where defense went forward â at length â to argue the same issue. ś 316 Here, the prosecutor's remarks â and those of defense counsel â were neither flagrant nor ill-intentioned. Gregory failed to demonstrate that the remarks prejudiced him. Even in the absence of the counsel's remarks, the jurors were free to consider the living conditions of prisoners serving life sentences without parole versus prisoners serving time on death row before facing execution. ś 317 The majority acknowledges that if it is to find reversible error on this matter, it must conclude that a curative instruction would not have been effective, a very difficult standard to meet. Majority at 1257. The majority admits that this matter truly presents a close question. Id. at 1257. But such a close question does not satisfy this very difficult standard to meet. The majority can only find a reversible error here by disregarding the requisite standard (and our recent case). ś 318 The remarks at issue neither deprived Gregory of due process of law nor denied him a fair sentence. The conduct of the prosecutor did not amount to reversible error. Here, too, the majority is in error.