Opinion ID: 2746597
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Interpretive Testimony

Text: Moving on, Etienne argues the trial judge erred in permitting Mercer and Bruce to offer specific instances of what he dubs interpretive testimony. He complains both were permitted to testify to their interpretations of the recorded conversations. By this he means that the law enforcement officers told the jury what they thought the conversations were about. They also interpreted the meaning of words they said had to do with drug sales, and testified that an exchange of drugs took place during certain conversations. 6 We also note that Etienne may have waived the objection to overview testimony entirely because the lack of evidentiary challenges throughout trial appears to be the result of his conscious litigation tactics. See United States v. Washington, 434 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding waiver where counsel made a deliberate strategic choice to admit certain evidence). Etienne's counsel filed a pre-trial motion in limine seeking to preclude overview testimony and was clearly sensitive to the pitfalls of improper overview testimony. During the hearing on his motion, defense counsel explicitly agreed with the trial judge's statements that [s]ome general context is appropriate, and that Mercer's testimony is something we have to police as we go along. Mercer's actual testimony, in defense counsel's eyes, apparently never crossed that line. This provides yet another basis for our refusal to fault the trial judge. -18- Etienne argues this testimony, which we will discuss in more detail momentarily, went hand-in-hand with Mercer's improperly admitted overview testimony and was especially prejudicial because Smith offered his own interpretation (which parroted Mercer's) as to what transpired during those conversations. In Etienne's view, this can only mean the law enforcement officers' testimony unfairly bolstered Smith's testimony and served to shore up his shaky credibility. Taking a contrary viewpoint, the government says the testimony constituted permissible lay opinion based upon the officers' personal knowledge of the drug trade, and particularly, its parlance. [W]e have long held that government witnesses with experience in drug investigations may explain the drug trade and translate coded language for juries, either through lay or, if qualified, expert testimony. Rosado-Pérez, 605 F.3d at 56. Interpretive testimony, we have made clear, is not overview testimony and is properly admitted. Id. Although Etienne raises the issue of interpretive testimony, he cites little authority in support of his belief that the specific testimony at issue here was improper. He has not come forward with a single case in which we have reversed a conviction on plain error review due to erroneously admitted interpretive testimony. To his credit, Etienne forthrightly acknowledges that in the case he highlights most we actually upheld the admission of -19- the challenged interpretive testimony. See United States v. Albertelli, 687 F.3d 439, 446-50 (1st Cir. 2012). We have reviewed the specific testimony challenged as interpretive, and only a few portions can be fairly described as such. First is Mercer's testimony regarding the July 30 deal and several related conversations, all of which he monitored in realtime. Mercer told the jury Smith and Jean-Francois had a telephone conversation in which Jean-Francois used the word cake to mean money. When Smith met with Etienne later, the two men used the number 13 to mean the price of the drugs, $1300. Mercer also testified that while Smith and Etienne were discussing the price, [y]ou could hear [over the recording] what appeared to be the sound of money being handed over, counted out, cash. We are satisfied the district court did not plainly err in admitting this testimony based upon Mercer's twenty-two years of experience as an ATF agent and his contemporaneous monitoring of the conversations as they occurred. Next is Bruce's testimony in which he told the jury that he monitored Smith's body wire on July 30 and heard what sounded like a deal being consummated after initial greetings between Smith and Etienne. At the time of trial, Bruce had been a state trooper for almost twenty years, with more than a decade of experience as a drug detective. He had been actively involved in the ATF's investigation of Etienne and Jean-Francois, and he -20- monitored these particular conversations in realtime. The nature of Bruce's testimony differed little from Mercer's. Accordingly, we cannot say the allowance of his interpretive testimony was error, plain or otherwise.