Opinion ID: 724637
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: civil forfeiture and double jeopardy

Text: 6 Appellant first appeals his conviction on Double Jeopardy grounds. On February 11, 1994, Appellant and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) entered into a Settlement Agreement whereby Appellant consented to the administrative forfeiture of his Daihatsu jeep. Appellant contends that because this forfeiture punished him for the same conduct on which his later conviction was based, his conviction violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. 7 However, in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Ursery, --- U.S. ----, --- S.Ct. ----, 1996 WL 340815, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7384 (No. 95-345) (June 24, 1996), reversing United States v. $405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.1994), amended by, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir.1995) and United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir.1995), Appellant's argument has little merit. In Ursery, the Supreme Court held that in rem civil forfeitures performed pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881 do not constitute punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Ursery, 1996 WL 34085,  3. 8 Therefore, because the forfeiture of Appellant's Daihatsu did not constitute punishment, his subsequent criminal conviction cannot be considered subsequent punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Accordingly, Appellant's conviction is affirmed on this ground. 3