Opinion ID: 1364902
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: use of evidence about one rape/robbery/murder to prove identity in the other rape/robbery/murder

Text: Before trial, the State moved that evidence of the crimes against Ms. Hoist be admitted and that the jury be allowed to consider it in reaching a verdict about the crimes against Ms. Moore and vice versa. The State argued that such evidence was admissible under K.S.A. 60-455 because it was relevant to prove identity, intent, preparation, plan, and motive. The court initially deferred ruling on the motion, properly nothing that because it had denied defendant's motion to sever the charges, the evidence would be admissible at trial, leaving only the issue of the purposes for which the jury could consider it. The jury instructions would address the purposes for which the jury could consider the evidence. The court ultimately granted the State's motion, but only to the extent it allowed the jury to use the evidence for purposes of proving identity. Instruction No. 17 instructed the jury to decide each charge separately on the evidence and law applicable to it. It also instructed that the jury could consider evidence tending to prove the defendant committed the crimes charged in the Hoist case, in the Isabell Moore case and vice versa, but solely for the purpose of proving the defendant's identity. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of earlier crimes to be used for even the limited purpose of proving identity in the later crimes. He claims that 60-455 does not apply to this case because it applies only to prior convictions. He also claims that the instruction was enormously prejudicial because identity was the only real issue in the Moore case, where the State did not have the DNA evidence to specifically link defendant to the crime. Defendant claims the instruction basically told the jury to ignore evidence in one incident if it found enough evidence in the other, even if in reality the State had not sustained its burden of proving the charges in that one incident beyond a reasonable doubt. The admissibility of the evidence under K.S.A. 60-455 is not an issue in this case. Because the cases were tried together, the questioned evidence was admissible independent of 60-455. The only issue is whether the court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider evidence that defendant committed one set of crimes to prove identity in the other set of crimes. In general, when evidence is admissible independent of 60-455, a limiting instruction is not required. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 247 Kan. 87, 97, 795 P.2d 336 (1990). Accordingly, the limiting portion of Instruction No. 17 was unnecessary, and the instruction given was not error. Instruction No. 17 advised the jury that it could consider the evidence on the issue of identity. As the cases involving 60-455 instruct, evidence that a defendant had committed similar offenses may be relevant to the issue of identity. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 234 Kan. 233, 234, 670 P.2d 1348 (1983); State v. Lomax & Williams, 227 Kan. 651, 653, 608 P.2d 959 (1980); State v. Henson, 221 Kan. 635, 644, 562 P.2d 51 (1977); State v. Johnson, 210 Kan. 288, Syl. ¶ 4, 502 P.2d 802 (1972). The crimes here were strikingly similar. Defendant also claims that the instruction basically told the jury to ignore the burden of proof and that it could convict defendant of one crime if it found enough evidence that he committed the other. On the contrary, Instruction No. 17 specifically told the jury to consider each crime separately and to decide each charge separately on the evidence and law applicable to it, uninfluenced by your decision as to any other charge. Instruction No. 17 permitted the jury to consider evidence that defendant committed one of the homicides in considering the other homicide, solely for the purpose of proving the defendant's identity. In addition, Instruction No. 14 properly instructed the jury on the State's burden of proof. The jury is presumed to follow the instructions as a whole. State v. Logan, 236 Kan. 79, 84, 689 P.2d 778 (1984). The evidence was admissible because the charges were tried together. Because the evidence was admissible independent of 60-455, a limiting instruction was not necessary. The trial court nevertheless gave a limiting instruction that limited the purposes for which the jury was to consider the evidence and placed the burden of proof for each separate crime upon the State. The instruction was not erroneous. SEVERANCE Before trial, defendant moved to sever the charges so that the Hoist and Moore incidents could be tried separately. The trial court denied the motion because the charges were of the same or similar character. See K.S.A. 22-3202(1). Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the Moore and Hoist incidents to be tried together because they were not sufficiently similar and because the potential for prejudice was too great where the jury heard evidence of both crimes. K.S.A. 22-3202(1) provides in pertinent part: Two or more crimes may be charged against a defendant in the same complaint, information or indictment in a separate count for each crime if the crimes charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character.... Whether a defendant will be tried on all separate charges in a single trial is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Woods, 250 Kan. 109, 116, 825 P.2d 514, cert. denied 121 L.Ed.2d 100 (1992); State v. Adams, 218 Kan. 495, 506, 545 P.2d 1134 (1976). If reasonable people could differ about the propriety of the trial court's decision, this court will not find that the trial court abused its discretion. Woods, 250 Kan. at 117. Defendant claims that the difference in ages of the victims, the lapse of four years between the crimes, and the application of the hard 40 sentence to one, but not the other, renders the events sufficiently dissimilar to require that they be tried separately. The State argues, and we agree, that the differences are not material and that the similarities far outweigh the differences. Although the victims were different ages, they both were mature women who lived alone and knew the defendant. The lapse of four years does not make the crimes dissimilar. There was evidence that the defendant was out of the state between 1987 and mid-1990. The application of the hard 40 sentence to the Moore crime but not to the Hoist crime is not material. The legislature did not consider differences in sentences to be dispositive because K.S.A. 22-3202(1) speaks of the similarities of the crimes, not the sentences, and contemplates potential trial of felonies and misdemeanors together. Moreover, while the consideration of aggravating factors may distinguish the hard 40 from other sentences, the jury considers whether to impose the hard 40 in a separate proceeding after the guilt phase of the trial is complete. Thus, evidence of and argument about aggravating factors need not taint the guilt phase of the trial. Defendant's claim that the jury was encouraged to infer guilt in one incident based on guilt in the other is not supported in the record. The trial court instructed the jury to consider separately the evidence and law applicable to each crime and to limit the purposes for which the jury might consider evidence of one incident in reaching a verdict in the other. Even if tried separately, the similarity of the crimes would make the evidence of one admissible under K.S.A. 60-455 to prove identity in the other. See Williams, 234 Kan. at 234; Lomax & Williams, 227 Kan. at 653; Henson, 221 Kan. at 644-45; State v. Johnson, 210 Kan. at 292-93. We have declined to find error when a trial court refused to sever charges that were sufficiently similar such that evidence of one would be admissible under 60-455 in the trial of the other and no prejudice would result to the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Breazeale, 238 Kan. 714, 729-30, 714 P.2d 1356, cert. denied 479 U.S. 846 (1986); State v. Howell, 223 Kan. 282, 285-86, 573 P.2d 1003 (1977). The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to sever the Hoist and Moore charges. HARD 40 Defendant finally contends that there was not sufficient evidence to support the court's decision to accept the jury's recommendation of a mandatory 40-year sentence. K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-4624 permits the imposition of a mandatory 40-year sentence when the jury finds evidence of certain aggravating factors and the court finds that the jury's recommendation was supported by the evidence. The trial court instructed the jury that it could recommend the hard 40 if it found one of three aggravating factors: 1. Defendant committed the crime for defendant's own self for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value; 2. Defendant committed the crime in order to avoid or prevent lawful arrest or prosecution; 3. Defendant committed the crime in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. The jury found all three factors. See K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-4625(3), (5), and (6). Defendant claims on appeal that it is not proper to impose the hard 40 based on the first factor unless receiving monetary value is the sole purpose for the murder. Defendant claims that the second factor does not justify the hard 40 unless the victim was about to apprehend him. Finally, defendant claims that the third factor is unconstitutionally vague. Most of the cases on which defendant relies with respect to the first two factors are death penalty cases. See Ex Parte Johnson, 399 So.2d 873 (Ala. 1979); State v. Bigelow, 37 Cal.3d 731, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994 (1984); Menendez v. State, 368 So.2d 1278 (Fla. 1979). We have held that such cases are of limited precedential value in evaluating the propriety of factors in hard 40 sentence enhancement cases. State v. Bailey, 251 Kan. 156, 171, 834 P.2d 342 (1992). Defendant also cites Boutwell v. State, 659 P.2d 322, 328 (Okla. 1983), which involved a murder for remuneration factor that the court found, by definition, meant murder for hire. Defendant's argument that allowing the hard 40 sentence in such cases would make most murders subject to the hard 40 does not invalidate such an interpretation of the statute. The legislature has said that it is particularly egregious to take the life of another to obtain property or to avoid being held accountable for a crime. The legislature has allowed courts and juries to impose particularly hard sentences for such conduct. The language of the statute is not expressly limited to cases involving murder for hire or those in which the victim was about to apprehend the defendant. Moreover, this court has implicitly rejected the notion that K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-4625(5), applies only in cases where the victim is about to apprehend the defendant. In Bailey, 251 Kan. at 173-74, the court affirmed the trial court's acceptance of the hard 40 sentence recommendation based on K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-4625(5), where the victim was not about to apprehend the defendant. There was evidence that defendant committed the murder for the purpose of obtaining money or other items of value. Moore's purse was not found, and Hoist's billfold and checkbook were missing from her apartment. Indeed, defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery in both instances. There also was evidence that defendant committed the murders to avoid arrest or prosecution. Both victims knew defendant and would have been able to identify him as the person who raped and robbed them. Finally, defendant argues that the third factor, K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-4625(6), is unconstitutionally vague. The district court included the following definitions in its sentencing instructions to the jury: `heinous' means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; `atrocious' means outrageously wicked and vile; `cruel' means pitiless, or designed to inflict a high degree of pain, utter indifference to, or enjoyment of the sufferings of others. This court has twice rejected the argument that 21-4625(6) is unconstitutionally vague, and has indicated that such an argument is particularly meritless when definitions identical, or nearly identical, to those used here are included. See State v. Walker, 252 Kan. 279, 300-01, 845 P.2d 1 (1993); Bailey, 251 Kan. at 173. The trial court did not err in accepting the jury's recommendation. Affirmed.