Opinion ID: 1707014
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: affirmative defenses raised by dr. muse

Text: ¶ 23. Dr. Muse asserts that § 25-4-105(1) is a general statute governing ethics in government and that a separate statute specifically governs nepotism, § 25-1-53, thereby pre-empting application of § 25-1-105(1) to his situation. He cites Lenoir v. Madison County, 641 So.2d 1124 (Miss.1994), for the proposition that when a particular statute deals with a special and particular subject, that statute's terms govern that precise subject over the general statute dealing with the subject generally. Lenoir, 641 So.2d at 1129. Muse argues that § 25-1-53 is a more specific statute because it specifically prohibits the Board of Trustees from employing a relative, and he claims that it does not speak to the president of a college employing a relative. Section 25-1-53 states: It shall be unlawful for any person elected, appointed or selected in any manner whatsoever to any state, county district or municipal office, or for any board of trustees of any state institution to appoint or employ, as an officer, clerk, stenographer, deputy or assistant who is to be paid out of the public funds, any person related by blood or marriage within the third degree, computed by the rule of the civil law, to the person or any member of the board of trustees having the authority to make such appointment, or contract such employment as employer. This section shall not apply to any employee who shall have been in said department or institution prior to the time his or her kinsman, within the third degree, became the head of said department or institution or member of board of trustees.... Miss.Code Ann. § 25-1-53. (emphasis added)(Supp.1997). This statute does not shield the Muses because it does not include the employment of teachers. However, should we interpret the statute to include teachers as assistants, then the statute would prohibit presidents of institutions, as well as members of Boards of Trustees, from employing their relatives as teachers. The nepotism shield is not a proper defense to this action. ¶ 24. We further note that Moore v. McCullough, 633 So.2d 421 (Miss.1993) is inapplicable to this case. McCullough dealt with a violation of § 25-4-105(3)(a), the personal contracting subsection of the statute. Muse is charged with violating § 25-4-105(1) which prohibits use of his official position to benefit a relative. McCullough was not a member of the Chickasaw County Board of Supervisors under § 25-4-105(3)(a) nor was he married to any of the supervisors. Muse is a public servant employed by Hinds Community College as contemplated by § 25-4-105(1). He used his position to obtain a pecuniary benefit for a relative, his spouse. ¶ 25. Dr. Muse also maintains that § 37-29-63 gives the Board of Trustees the sole discretion to hire and employ teachers. He claims that § 25-1-53 read in correlation with § 37-29-63 indicates that the legislature intended for the Board of Trustees to have responsibility of employing teachers and that it is the Board of Trustees who are prohibited from hiring relatives. We interpret the statutes otherwise. Section 37-29-63 dictates that the president of a community college shall have broad powers: ... to recommend to the board of trustees all teachers to be employed in the district. He may remove or suspend any member of the faculty subject to the approval of the trustees. He shall be the general manager of all fiscal and administrative affairs of the district with full authority to select, direct, employ and discharge any and all employees other than teachers; ... Miss.Code Ann. § 37-29-63(1996). Clearly, the president of a community college plays a significant role in a teacher's employment. Not only does he develop the curriculum and appoint department heads, but without the president's recommendation, the Board of Trustees is unable to hire a teacher. Thus, the president of the institution as well as the members of the Board of Trustees are prohibited from employing relatives under § 25-4-105(1).
¶ 26. Next, Dr. Muse argues that he never made any effort to realize unlawful personal gain through his official conduct. As stated supra, § 37-29-63 assigns the president of a community college a significant role in hiring teachers. A teacher cannot be employed at a community college without a recommendation from its president. Miss.Code Ann. § 37-29-63(1996). Further, it was Dr. Muse himself who entered into the contract with his wife each and every year of her employment. In Towner v. Moore ex rel. Quitman County School District, 604 So.2d 1093 (Miss. 1992) we found that Mrs. Towner violated the conflict of interest laws even though she abstained when the school board voted on whether or not to hire her husband. The nodding and winking governmental cronyism forbidden in Towner is indistinguishable from the Muse facts. The bottom line is Dr. Clyde Muse was president of Hinds Community College. As president, he played a significant, and likely determinative, role in employing teachers. He was the only individual empowered to arrange courses of study and to recommend teachers for employment at the college. Since he was in a position to effect the employment of teachers, and since both he and his wife obtained pecuniary benefit through her employment as a teacher, their actions constitute a clear violation of § 25-4-105(1). ¶ 27. After this suit was brought, there was an attempt to pass a bill in the legislature that would allow someone other than a community college president to recommend two teachers each year to the Board of Trustees for employment at that institution. If the Muse Amendment had passed, someone other than Dr. Muse would have been able to recommend Vashti for employment and he would have been shielded from her future employment activity with the community college. The legislature rejected this attempt to create an exception to our conflict of interest laws. We follow the legislature's lead, and decline to create a Muse exception.
¶ 28. Finally, Dr. Muse asserts that prosecutions under § 25-4-105(1) are quasi-criminal proceedings and, as such, any ambiguity in the statute must be construed in his favor. Therefore, according to Dr. Muse, the Ethics Commission has over-broadly interpreted the statutes against him. He notes that when statutes are criminal they must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. State v. Burnham, 546 So.2d 690, 692 (Miss. 1989). Dr. Muse asserts that this Court dubbed prosecutions under Chapter 25-4 as quasi-criminal in Towner v. Moore ex rel. Quitman County School Dist., 604 So.2d 1093 (Miss.1992). To the contrary, in Towner we rejected Mary Towner's assertion that the charges against her under § 25-4-105(2) were quasi-criminal in nature therefore entitling her to a trial by jury. Towner, 604 So.2d at 1098-99. In fact, we stated that although we sometimes label civil penalty or forfeiture prosecutions as quasi-criminal, such analysis does not alter their civil status. Id. Dr. Muse's assertion that this proceeding is quasi-criminal ... swims upstream against the well-chewed over distinction between criminal prosecutions ... and civil penalty or forfeitures processes. Id. at 1098-99. This issue is without merit.