Opinion ID: 3063429
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hobbs Act Offenses

Text: The government’s evidence was also sufficient to support Counts 3 and 4, the Hobbs Act offenses. The Hobbs Act prohibits attempts, and conspiracies, to obstruct, delay or affect commerce by robbery or extortion. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). To prove the underlying substantive Hobbs Act offense, the government must show: (1) a robbery, and (2) an effect on interstate commerce. See United States v. Taylor, 480 F.3d 1025, 1027 (11th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. To, 144 F.3d 737, 747-48 (11th Cir. 1998). Where a defendant is charged with attempt or conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act, “the interstate nexus may be demonstrated by evidence of potential impact on interstate commerce or by evidence of actual, de minimis impact.” United States v. Le, 256 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted). Blanco’s argument that the interstate commerce nexus, required under the Hobbs Act, was not met because the “commerce” here – the cocaine shipment from Puerto Rico – was fictional is foreclosed by United States v. Taylor, 480 F.3d 1025, 1027 (11th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the argument that because the object of the 9 Hobbs Act offenses was part of a government sting operation and entirely fictitious, there was no impact on interstate commerce).3 Although Blanco argues that Taylor was wrongly decided, we are bound by our precedent unless and until it is overruled by this Court sitting en banc or the Supreme Court. See United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). There was also sufficient evidence that Blanco knew the fictitious cocaine shipment would be traveling in interstate commerce. Codefendant Mejias and confidential informant Gamez both testified that it was understood that the cocaine shipment was coming from Puerto Rico and would be arriving at a Miami area airport. The jury heard Blanco’s impeachment evidence at trial and nonetheless chose to believe these witnesses. Their testimony was not “unbelievable on its face,” and the jury’s credibility findings will not disturbed on appeal. See United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1325 (11th Cir. 1997). And there was ample evidence Blanco took a “substantial step” toward the commission of the cocaine robbery. Blanco worked with Mejias and Gamez to plan the robbery, recruited others to help carry it out, flew to Miami and rented a vehicle to use during the robbery and met with the other co-conspirators to review the final details of the robbery plan to ensure that it was carried out effectively. 3 For the same reason, Blanco’s argument that he could never take a “substantial step” toward attempting to affect commerce via a robbery of a fictitious cocaine shipment also fails. 10 Contrary to Blanco’s argument, these objective acts “strongly corroborate the required culpability” and are not equivocal. See United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 2002).