Opinion ID: 716728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State Law Contract Claims

Text: 36 We turn now to Nowak's contract claims under New York law. Nowak contends that the district court erred in determining that the provisions of the 1973 Plan were unambiguous as a matter of law with respect to the requirements for receiving a disability retirement pension, thereby rendering him ineligible for such benefits. 37 We have repeatedly held that, in a contract dispute, summary judgment may be granted only where the language of the contract is unambiguous. See, e.g., Sayers v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 7 F.3d 1091, 1094 (2d Cir.1993). Under New York law, whether a written contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the trial court whose determinations will be reviewed de novo. W.W.W. Assoc., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 163, 565 N.Y.S.2d 440, 443, 566 N.E.2d 639 (1990). Contract terms are ambiguous if they are 38 capable of more than one meaning when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined the context of the entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of the customs, practices, usages and terminology as generally understood in the particular trade or business. 39 Sayers, 7 F.3d at 1095 (internal quotation marks omitted). When the relevant language has a definite and precise meaning, unattended by danger of misconception in the purport of the [contract] itself, and concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion, no ambiguity exists. Breed v. Ins. Co. of North America, 46 N.Y.2d 351, 355, 413 N.Y.S.2d 352, 355, 385 N.E.2d 1280 (1978). On a motion for summary judgment, any ambiguity must be construed against the moving parties, which in this case are the defendants-appellants. Seiden Assoc. Inc. v. ANC Holdings, Inc., 959 F.2d 425, 429 (2d Cir.1992). 40 Upon de novo review, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The 1973 Plan clearly and unambiguously renders Nowak ineligible for a disability retirement pension. Under p 3.4 of the Plan, which establishes the criteria for receiving a Total Disability Retirement Pension, the plaintiff must have become Totally Disabled on or after June 1, 1966, and ... [have] completed at least 15 years of Credited Service. Paragraph 2.1 of the Plan states that Credited Service must be calculated in accordance with this Section 2. (Emphasis added.) Specifically, under p 2.5, an employee who suffers a Break in Service before he has completed the age, service and other requirements for retirement ... shall lose all Credited Service under the Plan for employment prior to such Break in Service. (Emphasis added.) 41 Nowak concedes that he suffered a break in service in 1973 and that he became disabled in 1993. Because his break in service occurred before he fulfilled the requirements for obtaining a Total Disability Retirement Pension under p 3.4--that is, before he became disabled--Nowak, pursuant to p 2.5, lost all credited service accumulated before 1973. Accordingly, he was unable to accrue the fifteen years of credited service needed to obtain a disability pension under p 3.4. 42 Nowak argues that the break-in-service provision of p 2.5 is ambiguous insofar as the term other requirements in p 2.5 does not specifically incorporate p 3.4's requirement that he be Totally Disabled. Contrary to Nowak's contention, when read in conjunction with the rest of the Plan, the phrase other requirements for retirement clearly includes the criteria for receiving any of the retirement pensions defined in Section 3, including the Total Disability Retirement Pension. Because the criteria for qualification varies depending on the individual retirement pension sought by the applicant, the drafters reasonably employed the term other requirements in order to reach all of the different requirements of the various retirement pensions. Our view is further supported by the fact that Nowak offers no viable alternative interpretation of the phrase. 43 Because we find the terms of the 1973 Plan to be unambiguous, we need not reach Nowak's arguments urging us to apply contra proferentum and other rules of construction to resolve the alleged ambiguity against the defendants. Based on the clear, unambiguous terms of the 1973 Plan, Nowak is ineligible for the disability retirement pension, and the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.