Opinion ID: 1896099
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Belsha's Continued Possession of the Cell Phone

Text: ¶ 26 After Belsha seized the phone with the marijuana image displayed, he continued to maintain possession of the phone after he had placed Carroll in the squad car. We conclude that that continued possession was justified, again following the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Place. The Court in Place addressed the ability of law enforcement agents to seize and detain a person's luggage based on reasonable suspicion that the luggage contained narcotics and under circumstances where that owner was not in custody or under arrest. The Court went on to hold that the agents had narrow authority to detain temporarily a container in such circumstances though the agents in that case exceeded their authority to do so. However, in reaching its conclusion, the Court explained, Where law enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe that a container holds contraband or evidence of a crime, but have not secured a warrant, the Court has interpreted the [Fourth] Amendment to permit seizure of the property, pending issuance of a warrant to examine its contents, if the exigencies of the circumstances demand it or some other recognized exception to the warrant requirement is present. Place, 462 U.S. at 701, 103 S.Ct. 2637. In other words, law enforcement agents are justified in seizing and continuing to hold a container if (1) there is probable cause to believe that it contains evidence of a crime, and (2) if exigencies of the circumstances demand it. ¶ 27 As an initial matter, although the containers discussed in Place were pieces of luggage, it is reasonable to analogize the cell phone in this case to the luggage in Place. The underlying concern with the agents' detention of the luggage in Place was that Place had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his bags. So, too, here, the concern is protecting a person's reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his or her cell phone. Other courts, in assessing the validity of a search without a warrant, have likened a person's privacy expectations in cell phones and electronic devices to that of closed containers in his or her possession. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir.2007) (holding that the defendant had a sufficient privacy interest in his cell phone call records to challenge the search therein); United States v. Ortiz, 84 F.3d 977, 984 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that the owner of a pager has the same reasonable expectation of privacy in its data as if it were a closed container); United States v. Wurie, 612 F.Supp.2d 104, 109 (D.Mass.2009) (It seems indisputable that a person has a subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of his or her cell phone.). Accordingly, in this situation, the analogy to a closed container appears to be appropriate. [6] ¶ 28 As to the question of whether Belsha had probable cause to believe that the phone contained evidence of illegal drug activity, Carroll argues that, having viewed the marijuana image, Belsha had probable cause only to believe that Carroll had possessed illegal drugs, not to believe that he was a trafficker or that the phone contained evidence of trafficking. We disagree. To establish probable cause to search, the evidence must indicate a fair probability that the particular place contains evidence of a crime. State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶ 21, 233 Wis.2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). An officer's knowledge, training, and experience are germane to the court's assessment of probable cause. Wurie, 612 F.Supp.2d at 108. Cf. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 270-71, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (considering an officer's subjective interpretation of facts as part of the totality of circumstances in assessing reasonable suspicion, a determination that is closely akin to a probable cause assessment). ¶ 29 Here, Belsha legally viewed the marijuana image; we consider that fact along with his testimony that he knew, based on his training and experience, that drug traffickers frequently personalize their cell phones with images of themselves with items acquired through drug activity. Furthermore, it is those personalized cell phones on which drug traffickers commonly make many of their transactions. Carroll did not introduce evidence suggesting that Belsha's testimony in that regard was inaccurate or not credible, and we see no reason to discount it. We are satisfied, under all of the circumstances here, that that information, taken as a whole, gave Belsha probable cause to believe that the phone contained evidence of illegal drug activity. ¶ 30 Two additional points are worth noting. First, to clarify, our assessment goes to the totality of the circumstances that, taken as a whole give rise to probable cause. We recognize that cell phones can be common tools used not only in illegal activities but also in legal activities. Here, Belsha's testimony, taken in context with the plain view of the marijuana image and how it appeared on the phone, provides sufficient evidence of probable cause. ¶ 31 Second, the State argues that the fact that Belsha observed Carroll leaving a location that police suspected to contain evidence of an armed robbery also adds significant weight supporting probable cause in this situation. We note that the record here does not clearly establish a nexus between the crimes of armed robbery and drug trafficking. ¶ 32 Given that Belsha had probable cause to believe that a search of the phone would produce evidence of illegal drug activity, his continued possession of the phone while he sought a warrant was permissible. The same reasons that permitted Belsha to seize the phone in the first instance permitted him to continue to possess it in the short time after Carroll was secured. Exigent circumstances further justify that continued possession. Had Belsha returned the phone to Carroll and released him, Carroll could have deleted incriminating images and data, such as phone numbers and calling records stored in the phone. Hence, Belsha's continued possession of the phone was permissible.