Opinion ID: 2293324
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Weber's Right to a Fair Trial.

Text: Weber first claims that the conduct, actions and rulings of the trial judge violated his right to a fair trial. Specifically, Weber argues that the trial judge: denied his request for an instruction on a lesser included offense; engaged in ex parte communications with the jury on several occasions; made improper statements to him and to his counsel; and allowed the jury access to the prosecutor's laptop. We review de novo claims alleging the infringement of a constitutionally protected right. [3]
Weber first claims that the trial judge erred by denying his request for a jury instruction on Offensive Touching [4] as a lesser included offense of First Degree Robbery [5] . The trial judge concluded that Offensive Touching is not a lesser included offense of First Degree Robbery, and that in any event, there was no rational basis to convict Weber on Offensive Touching. Because the trial judge did not give the requested instruction, we review Weber's claim de novo to determine: (i) whether the instruction was available as a matter of law; and, if so, (ii) whether the evidence presented at trial supported a conviction on the lesser included offense. [6] As we noted in Herring v. State, Appendix B of the 1973 Delaware Criminal Code with Commentary sets forth the following as illustrative of included offenses of Robbery in the First Degree . . . § 601 Offensive Touching. . . . [7] Therefore, the trial judge erred by concluding that Offensive Touching is not a lesser included offense of First Degree Robbery. The trial judge, however, was not obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting the defendant of the included offense. [8] This standard applies even where the defendant denies any involvement in the charged offense. [9] A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if there is any evidence fairly tending to bear upon the lesser included offense, however weak that evidence may be. [10] At trial, the State argued that the record did not support a conviction on Offensive Touching because that offense would require the victim to have testified that it caused some annoyance or alarm to him. The trial judge agreed with the State's interpretation of the record and the law. We conclude, however, that a conviction for Offensive Touching does not require proof that the victim actually felt offended or alarmed. In relevant part, 11 Del. C. § 601 defines Offensive Touching as a person intentionally touch[ing] another person either with a member of his or her body or with any instrument . . . knowing that the person is thereby likely to cause offense or alarm to such other person. This definition focuses on the actor's intent and knowledge before touching another person, not on that other person's resultant mental state. After carefully reviewing the record, we find sufficient evidence to support an acquittal of the First Degree Robbery charge and a conviction of the lesser included offense of Offensive Touching. Although Weber primarily argued at trial that he was not the person identified on the surveillance video accosting Naspo, Weber also questioned the State's evidence that the person in the video actually attempted to steal Naspo's car. Weber's defense counsel attempted to impeach Naspo by demonstrating that his trial testimony did not entirely match his original statement to the police. [11] The surveillance video shows a brief struggle between Naspo and another man but does not conclusively establish that the man attempted to steal Naspo's car. If the jury did not find Naspo's testimony entirely credible, they could have concluded that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Weber attempted first degree robbery. [12] Therefore, we find that the record supports Weber's request for a lesser included offense instruction on Offensive Touching. Lesser included offense instructions `provide the jury with a less dramatic alternative than the sharp choice between conviction of the offense charged and acquittal[,]' [13] and ensures that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable-doubt standard [14] . The trial judge here failed to accord Weber this full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard by refusing Weber's request for a lesser included offense instruction on Offensive Touching. A trial judge's failure to properly instruct the jury regarding a lesser offense is not reversible error per se.  [15] For example, in cases involving offenses on a ladder, if the trial court wrongfully refuses to charge the offense at the bottom rung, that error is harmless provided the jury returns a guilty verdict for an offense higher up rather than for an intermediate offense which was also charged. [16] This exception does not apply to the case at bar because the trial judge only instructed the jury on the highest offense (First Degree Robbery). Nor can the fact that the jury convicted Weber on Attempted First Degree Carjacking render the trial judge's error harmless. It is possible to find a defendant guilty of carjacking and not guilty of theft (an element of First Degree Robbery), if the jury finds that the defendant did not intend to permanently deprive the owner of his vehicle. A reasonable jury could have convicted Weber on Attempted First Degree Carjacking and Offensive Touching. For these reasons, we must reverse Weber's conviction of First Degree Robbery.
Weber next complains of four allegedly improper communications between the trial judge and the jury, which occurred at various points throughout the four day trial. As we must, we discuss each of these communications individually on its merits. We are constrained to point out that there should never be occasion for a judge to engage in any ex parte communications with the jury. Any administrative or ministerial information imported to the jury should be in writing or on the record in open court or proposed in chambers with counsel present and available to comment on the record. While to some judges the urge to be folksy and familiar to the jury may be appealing, those desires when fulfilled create less appealing, appealable issues for counsel and the Supreme Court. Pages and pages of briefs, time and resources have been ill spent in this case as a result. At the end of the first trial day and after the jury left the courtroom, the trial judge stated: All right, we'll stand in recess. I'll take the court reporter to the jury room. Weber claims that [he] requested the whole trial be transcribed but this was missing from the transcript and attempts to locate this portion of the transcript were not successful; therefore we have no record of what was said to the jury on this occasion. Weber asserts that the lack of a transcript of this apparent communication between the trial judge and the jury is grounds for reversal. Weber relies on the following language from U.S. v. Novaton: We previously have considered what to do when a incomplete record is supplied to us, and have stated that [i]f the defendant is represented by the same attorney at trial and on appeal, a new trial may be granted only if the defendant can show that the failure to record and preserve a specific portion of the trial visits a hardship on him and prejudices his appeal. A criminal defendant's entitlement to a new trial based on the incompleteness of the record, however, is premised upon the district court's inability to reconstruct the record. [17] Unlike the defendant in Novaton, Weber cannot show that the failure to record and preserve a specific portion of the trial visits a hardship on him and prejudices his appeal. [18] Weber does not explain how this first ex parte communication prejudiced him or affected his right to a fair trial, and the transcript suggests that if the trial judge said anything to the jury it most likely concerned scheduling issues. The transcript reflects the following conversation between the trial judge and a witness: Trial Judge: Sir, do you understand you can't talk about the substance of your testimony or what it has been or what it might be? Do you understand? Witness: Yes. Trial Judge: And you have to come back tomorrow, but, again, so do I, so we'll both be here together. Witness: Ok, that's fine. [. . .] Trial Judge: All right, we'll stand in recess. I'll take the court reporter in the jury room. (Jury Dismissed to March 18, 2005 at 9 a.m.). The transcript states: Jury dismissed to March 18, 2005 at 9 a.m. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that if the judge said anything to the jury, it was only that they should return at 0900 the next morning. The next allegedly improper communication occurred on the second trial day. Weber cites (in its entirety) the following exchange regarding a witness's availability: Trial Judge: Well, ladies and gentlemen, I finally do have something to blame on somebody else. Prosecutor: A sick man. Your Honor. Trial Judge: Okay, that's better than what I did yesterday and in this life, you've got to take what you can get, do you know what I mean? It happens and the officer is unavailable until Monday. And if he's not available Monday, he'd better be dead, [Prosecutor]. Prosecutor: I'll convey that message. Trial Judge: Unfortunately, as some of you probably known, this is the flu season and we've been touched by it in a number of ways. It's  we have  I anticipate at most we will have two more witnesses, the officer and perhaps maybe another witness possibly, maybe not, but I'm, convinced now that the evidence and the case will be put before you Monday afternoon. You will not have to come in until two o'clock on Monday and the reason for that  I know I have, again, no one to blame it on but me  I have civil motions from 9 to 10, I have a pretrial conference, and then I have case reviews from 10 to 12 and Re-Entry Court calendar from 1 to 2 and then I meet with you guys. So I seem to have a reverse amenability hearing at 4, but that won't go. I'll move that. So at least I'm not lonely. So if you'll pardon me, I didn't think we were going to be quite this quick, but it happens. And  now, that's the bad news. Well, I don't know if you consider that bad news or not, that you're free at 10:30, that you don't have to come in until two o'clock on Monday. Maybe I'll become a member of the jury. To the extent I need to, I apologize for that. And if we had two good clear days, we could have done it, maybe one and a half, but it happens, and if you're here, we'll get it done. We'll get it to you. We'll get it to you on Monday. Now, it could take you two days, two hours, two minutes. However long it takes, I don't know. Never been able to call that one right. But when I say we'll get it to you Monday, that's when you'll have it to decide. You'll have a copy of the charge and so on and so forth. Anybody need anything for employment purposes or  Juror: I have to have a note. Trial Judge: Today or when do you need it? Juror: Yes. Trial Judge: All right, the bailiff will take you. You can go downstairs and they'll give it to you. If you need anything else, either call directly or on Monday and I'll give you a note. Again, they can't tell if you were here for two months on jury duty and that might be a problem. All right, anybody else have any other questions? Need anything? All right. It's a beautiful day. So when you go home or go to your boss or spouse or significant other, you say, I really had a hard time today, we were sweating all day, you're out in the park having a picnic lunch, I'm not going to tell. And did you go in at five o'clock? Juror: Yeah, I have to go back. Trial Judge: I'm not ordering that. If you go back or not go back, you're on your own. As long as you're back here on Monday at two, I don't care. But it is going to be a nice day. So if you're going to get kicked out somewhere earlier, I think this is the time to do it. Do you want me to issue an order closing your business down? Juror: No, I want my bonus at the end of the year. Trial Judge: Oh, I can't help you there. Remember my admonitions I gave you. I'll see you Monday at two o'clock. I'll keep my fingers crossed nothing else happens, but with my luck, we never know. See you then. This exchange occurred in open court, with counsel present. Weber offers no reason why this communication prejudiced his right to a fair trial, and we perceive none. Weber then cites the following recorded exchange, which occurred in the jury room without Weber or his counsel present, as the third allegedly improper ex parte communication: Trial Judge: I have good news and bad news. I can think of good news. I thought I would tell you that anyway. We could finish today, but let me tell you what the lineup is, I have about an hour and 15 minutes to an hour and a half of closing between the two attorneys. I have 25 to 30 minutes charge could be a little less than that. So that puts us about six o'clock before you get it. I can't avoid that. Now, I cannot bring you  I can continue it until tomorrow at ten. I don't know what that does to you. I kind of thought honestly that we would be done today. The charge  I was working on the charge. I have the charge, instructions on the law to you. I have to offer you the opportunity to stay. Now, I must confess that it is up to you, it has to be unanimous. Stay later now, but it is up to you. I have another hearing following this one. I won't die if I don't get that one. I am going to be here with someone this evening one way or the other. I will step out, you can throw things. Is there a human cry for staying until six o'clock? How many people are willing to stay until six o'clock? How many people are not willing to? Juror: I have to start at six. Trial Judge: Can everyone show up at ten o'clock tomorrow? Is there anybody who can't show up at ten o'clock? Then I will instruct you to remember the admonitions I gave you and I will let you go no until ten o'clock tomorrow. We will start with instructions and closings and  Juror: What does tomorrow consist of? Trial Judge: That's all. When you come in, because I am such a nice person, we are going to order lunch from that great gastronomical establishment Leo and Jimmy's. You get the finest sandwich and best ginger ale and Coke and Dr. Pepper you can get. Herr's potato chips. Juror: You said it takes about maybe two and a half hours. Trial Judge: I am estimating, State has opening and rebuttal  closing. Defense has the response. So then I have to charge, which is in two parts. Before they close to do one part of it, then I do the balance of it when they finish. It is given to you. I mean, I never like to estimate how long lawyers will be. I don't oppose  I don't stop them in State Court when you see jurors rolling their eyes or falling off, I think it is time to stop. In 15 years I have not had that problem. I have had some long arguments. They are in very long cases, usually if it is going to be that long you break up hour and a half, let people stretch because at no point lawyersno point if you are arguing if when your eyes are open if your mind is in West Texas, but this won't be that way. I usually can tell. Juror: I am supposed to be at work at one so I can call into my boss. Trial Judge: Are you doing inventory? Juror: My time to close. I am closing manager tomorrow night. Trial Judge: Up on 202? Juror: Guys will play with me as long as I am there by five o'clock. Trial Judge: They can play with you or play with someone  be in the big house when I lock them up? He had been real good. A short man with a bad attitude. Juror: He told me time for you to go today. Trial Judge: We will let you go now. We will see you tomorrow. The trial judge presumably returned afterwards to the courtroom to inform counsel that the trial would be continued until the next morning. The transcript does not include this apparent communication between the trial judge and counsel. Weber claims that the trial judge informed counsel that the jury wanted to go home and proceeded to tell counsel what [the trial judge] told the jury which was not the same as the record shows. Weber fails to identify, however, any difference between what the judge told counsel about his communication with the jury and what the transcript of that communication shows. [19] The fourth allegedly inappropriate ex parte communication occurred on the fourth trial day. Weber cites the following exchange, which began in the jury room and continued in the courtroom: Trial Judge: Ladies and gentlemen, it is Mel's fault, how about it's John's fault. We are about to start. I have no great excuses, I do because I was in a conference with 6 attorneys on another case. Story of my life. We are ready to go. I thought I would tell you myself, but that once again it was his fault. I have been doing work. I have not been having fun haven't had any coffee or doughnuts. I am going to shop at your store. I am going to get you out of here. Thank you for your patience, assuming I survive to go in and charge the jury, we will get started right now. I swear I get you out of here within two hours. (The Judge and court reporter returned to the courtroom) Trial Judge: I went to the jury and made a couple of jokes, told them I attempted to make a couple of jokes. Told them that I gotten tied up. And one of the jurors said it is getting close to that two year point. One other juror who has worked in the retail outlet I said you don't have any weapons do you? She said not yet. I think they are okay. Mr. Kilgore said they are in pretty decent humor. In his briefs to this Court, Weber does not explain why he believes this fourth ex parte communication affected his right to a fair trial. At oral argument, however, Weber asserted that the trial judge's joke about whether a juror had any weapons prejudiced his rights because, in the case at bar, Naspo claimed his assailant threatened him with a gun. All of our precedents addressing a trial judge's ex parte communications with a jury involve a deliberating jury. [20] In those cases, we held that it is improper for a trial judge to communicate with the jury without notice to, or in the absence of, counsel. [21] It is clear, however, that ex parte communications between a trial judge and the jury are improper at all stages of criminal proceedings. The ABA Standard for Criminal Justice 15-4.3 (Judicial communication with jurors) provides: (a) All communications between the judge and members of the jury panel, from the time of reporting to the court-room for voir dire until dismissal, should be in writing or on the record in open court. Counsel for each party should be informed of such communication and given the opportunity to be heard. [22] We conclude that all ex parte communications between a trial judge and jury ( i.e., not just contact with a deliberating jury) are pregnant with possibilities for error, and that even an experienced trial judge cannot be certain to avoid all the pitfalls inherent in such an enterprise. [23] The United States Supreme Court's summary of the problems inherent in ex parte communications with a deliberating jury applies equally at all stages of criminal proceedings: First, it is difficult to contain, much less to anticipate, the direction the conversation will take at such a meeting. Unexpected questions or comments can generate unintended and misleading impressions of the judge's subjective personal views. . . . Second, any occasion which leads to communication with the whole jury panel through one juror inevitably risks innocent misstatements of the law and misinterpretations despite the undisputed good faith of the participants.. . . Finally, the absence of counsel from the meeting and the unavailability of a transcript or full report of the meeting aggravate the problems of having one juror serve as a conduit for communicating instructions to the whole panel. [24] By simply entering the jury room, with or without a court reporter, the trial judge risks overhearing jurors' comments that may taint that judge's impartiality, particularly that judge's ability to rule on post trial motions. Ex parte communications between the trial judge and jury, however, do not constitute reversible error per se and are subject to a harmless error analysis. [25] According to the United States Supreme Court, A defendant has a due process right to be present at a proceeding whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge. . . . [T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only. [26] The dispositive factor in determining whether a trial judge's improper communication with a deliberating jury constitutes harmless error is often whether the communication was ministerial or substantive in nature. If ... [it] is only ministerial, it may be harmless error. If ... [it] is of a substantive nature ... it is more likely that an appellate court will conclude that the error requires a new trial. [27] In either case, the defendant does not have the burden of proving that actual prejudice resulted from the trial judge's improper communication, but must show that actual prejudice is manifest on the record or at least conceivable. [28] Here, the ex parte communications between the trial judge and the jury occurred before the jury deliberations. From our review of the record, we conclude that the trial judge engaged the jury to resolve purely ministerial matters ( e.g., scheduling and jurors' need for employment notes). [29] These exchanges did not address any substantive issues of law. Either the court reporter recorded these communications or the trial judge informed counsel of the nature and the content of the exchanges. In his Opening Brief to this Court, which consisted primarily of haphazard and lengthy transcript excerpts with no explanation of their relevance, Weber failed to articulate any coherent reason how these communications affected his right to a fair trial. At oral argument, however, Weber's defense counsel finally managed to articulate why at least one of these ex parte contacts might have prejudiced him. Weber asserts that the trial judge's apparent joke about whether a juror had any weapons requires that we reverse his convictions because, here, the victim alleged that his assailant threatened him with a gun. Despite Weber's failure to state the merits of this argument within his Opening Brief, as mandated by Supreme Court Rule 14(b)(vi)(A)(3), the interests of justice mandate that we address this argument. Oddly enough, it is not clear whether the trial judge actually made a comment about weapons in the jury room. Unlike the trial judge's own description of his conversation with the jurors, the transcript does not include any jokes about weapons. [30] That transcript includes the trial judge's other attempts at humor, but does not include any reference to weapons. Given the trial judge's own account of that conversation, we will assume that he actually asked a juror: You don't have any weapons do you? Although we also assume that a valid reason exists for why the transcript does not match the trial judge's recollection, we must make it clear that it would be entirely inappropriate for a court reporter to select which statements to record. Assuming that the trial judge made the inappropriate weapons comment, we conclude that this ex parte communication constituted harmless error. The trial judge entered the jury room to apologize for delaying that day's proceedings, a purely ministerial matter. In doing so, the trial judge apparently made an offhand joke about whether a juror had any weapons (the speculative joke being that that a juror might use a weapon to get revenge for the trial judge's tardiness). While in the jury room, the trial judge did not discuss any legal issues and made no reference to Weber or to the particular facts of the case. Given the context, the trial judge's inopportune reference to weapons did not unfairly prejudice Weber. For these reasons, we conclude that the ex parte communications between the trial judge and the jury, although lengthy and unnecessary, nevertheless constituted harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. These communications did not, separately or cumulatively, violate Weber's right to a fair trial.
Weber next claims that the trial judge made several improper statements to his defense counsel that, individually or cumulatively, violated Weber's right to a fair trial. Weber cites three exchanges between the trial judge and his defense counsel, but provides little or no explanation of how those exchanges unfairly prejudiced his rights. [31] Because Weber did not request a curative instruction to obviate the prejudice that he now asserts, we review Weber's claim for plain error. [32] Weber first cites the following exchange at sidebar: Trial Judge: As an aside, I think the officer identified [Weber's defense counsel] as the person he picked up. Prosecutor: Identified who? Trial Judge: [Weber's defense counsel] as the person that they picked up. I figure there's no miscarriage of justice there. Prosecutor: They wouldn't have let him go. Trial Judge: Good point. Weber fails to provide any analysis regarding how this exchange affected his right to a fair trial. Although the trial judge was apparently attempting to make a joke at the expense of Weber's defense counsel, we find no plain error. Weber next cites the following exchange from the same sidebar as the above comment: Trial Judge: Let [Weber's defense counsel] finish. Defense counsel: I mean Trial Judge: That unnerves me. I don't need those things in the courtroom, the phone. Defense counsel: It's off. It's silent. Trial Judge: Just take it off. Defense counsel: That's fine. I didn't know where to put it. Trial Judge: I was going to  I was ready to give you a suggestion, but that would be both rude, inappropriate, and highly improper. Weber's defense counsel explains: The Trial Court was referring to my cell phone which was off but apparently the Court did not like it that it was clipped to my waist. The phone did not go off since it was turned off but the Trial Court made an issue out of it in front of the jury that they knew what was occurring. Contrary to Weber's assertion that the trial judge made an issue out of [defense counsel's cell phone] in front of the jury, the record reflects that the exchange occurred during a sidebar conference. The trial judge deemed the cellular phone clipped to defense counsel's waist distracting and instructed him to remove it. Despite the trial judge's surprising comment following that request, the trial judge, nonetheless, properly exercised his authority to maintain courtroom decorum. [33] We find no plain error. Finally, Weber cites the following exchange: Trial Judge: What are you getting ready to ask? Defense counsel: I was going to ask him  Prosecutor: Can we do this at sidebar? Trial Judge: If you are going to ask him a question that I already ruled on, the answer is no. You did not look at driver's license DMV information. Unless you have something else that we did not discuss at sidebar, if you have something else that I did not rule on, come on over we will talk about it. Defense counsel: That's fine. [At sidebar] Defense counsel: I was going to ask him was that when you take pedigree, do you confirm the information from pedigree from the motor vehicle license; weight, height  Prosecutor: Then the next he is trying to get into the glasses thing, Your Honor, that is where he is going with this. He is trying to backdoor it. I don't have a problem if he  Trial Judge: You are cutting me off. Now, if you ask him does he confirm it, but he said he did not see the driver's license, he did not look at it, there is nothing  no other reason once he said that. Defense counsel: I believe he said I don't remember. I don't recall. Trial Judge: He said he didn't recall, that is kind of the end of it. There is nothing else if he says he did not see it, he didn't recall, didn't recall looking at it, then you are going ask him was he wearing glasses or something he did not see. So unless you can get him to say I saw something, he already said no. I think we are kind of stuck with that answer. Even if he did see the driver's license, at that point in time, he said he wasn't wearing glasses at the time that he was arrested, so, you know, comes a little more of a demur, so what. I don't know what else to do. Prosecutor: I will avoid a situation where [defense counsel] blurts out glasses in his question. Then that puts me in a position. Trial Judge: If he does that, I will do it twice. You will get sanctioned. Defense counsel: I don't intend to do that, not trying to do that. Trial Judge: This is a strict liability situation, if you do it, then you pay a penalty for it. I don't see  you don't have anything else. He did not see the license, did not compare it, and the fact that he may be required to wear glasses when he legally drives, of course he wasn't driving, legally driving a car at the time, the State's case is to be believed. So let's go ahead get on everything else through in that regard, then move on. Defense counsel: Fine. Again, Weber does not explain how this exchange affected his right to a fair trial, and we discern no plain error. In his Reply Brief, Weber makes a general allegation (unaccompanied by precise and pertinent references to the record) that the trial judge's hostility towards his attorney throughout the trial deprived him of his right to an unbiased judge. [34] Weber specifically claims that: When one looks at the whole trial and the number of statements and comments made about the undersign [ i.e., Weber's counsel], it is clear that the Trial Judge had an issue with the undersign. That issue clearly made its way to the jury and denied [Weber] his Constitutional Right to a fair and impartial trial. The conflict between the undersign and the Trial Judge continued to the point that the Trial Court has excused himself from the undersigns' case after the trial in this case. Because Weber did not fully and fairly present that argument, either below (in the form of an objection to the trial judge's allegedly improper conduct) or in his Opening Brief, we review it for plain error. [35] Our review of the transcript reveals that the trial judge occasionally made inappropriate statements and, at times, a cold record suggests a less than friendly attitude towards Weber's defense counsel. The record, however, does not support Weber's contention that the trial judge was biased or hostile towards Weber's defense counsel. We therefore conclude that the trial judge's statements and arguable attitude toward Weber's defense counsel did not violate Weber's right to a fair trial.
Weber next argues that the trial judge improperly threatened to hold him in contempt when Weber struggled to answer a question regarding the substance of a potential witness's testimony. Weber asserts that this threat had a chilling effect on his ability to present a defense. Weber previously requested a continuance because of illness, and later unavailability, of one of his witnesses. A different judge than the trial judge denied that request. The trial judge did know of this previous request, which led to the following: Trial Judge: Mr. Weber, have you made a decision whether or not to testify? Weber: Yes, Your Honor. Just for the record I would like to state that it has been my intention to testify at this trial, but due to the Court's decision not to grant me a continuance because one of my witnesses was sick and was unavailable to appear in court, I was unable to lay a foundation for my defense, which case, I have no choice but not testify at this point. Trial Judge: I have no idea what you are talking about. I did not deny any continuance. Defense counsel: It was in front of [a judge other than the trial judge]. Prosecutor: I don't believe that was on the record either. [. . .] Weber: I would like to state for the record  Trial Judge: I am trying to figure out what we are talking about. [. . .] Trial Judge: What was Ms. Blake Tracy going to testify to  Weber: I had eight witnesses that were going to testify in my defense. I had planned to put on a very spirited defense. I  without getting into any facts of the case, I want to state factually I am legally innocent of those charges. Trial Judge: Mr. Weber, it's been a real long day, it is going to be longer afternoon. I don't feel like playing Weber: Well, Your Honor Trial Judge: Don't ever interrupt, too, in this particular time. Weber: I apologize Your Honor. Trial Judge: I ask a simple question. I don't know anything about any continuance. I don't know anything about any witness. I don't know anything about a spirited defense. I don't care what success or failures you had with the criminal justice system at this point in time I just don't care. So, let's not waste my time and your time for you trying to set a record that may help you at some other point in time other than which is in the normal course of business. I don't think we really want that. That are that kind of disruption that leaves me or leads me to Penal Section 1271, which is Contempt. That is summary disposition of a situation. So why don't we go there today. Why don't we not play with me today because it wouldn't be a favorable outcome. I just asked you a simple question. I don't know who Ann Blake Tracy, PHD, you said there was a problem. I asked you about testifying. You said there was a witness that was unavailable. Tell me what Ms. Tracy was going to testify and how that impacts upon your ability to testify? Prosecutor: Can this be done through [defense counsel], he is counsel, and it was submitted under counsel's request? Weber: I guess my problem is  Prosecutor: Excuse me, I made a request to the Court. Trial Judge: Fellows. I asked him a question. He made a representation about some spirited defense. Prosecutor: That was not the reason submitted by [defense counsel] at the call. Trial Judge: Who is Ann Blake Tracy and what does she have to do with this case? Weber: My problem is, Your Honor, if I was to answer that question without at this point in time I feel like I might incriminate myself. Weber's claim lacks merit, for two reasons. First, under 11 Del. C. § 1271, [a] person is guilty of criminal contempt when the person engages in . . . [d]isorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior, committed during the sitting of a court [. . .]. [36] Here, Weber interrupted the trial judge twice with statements wholly unrelated to the judge's question. The trial judge acted within his discretion by threatening to invoke § 1271. [37] Second, the record does not support Weber's contention that the trial judge's threat of criminal contempt had a chilling effect on [his] ability to present a defense. At the time of this colloquy, Weber's defense counsel already made the strategic decision not to call the other witnesses or to present the defense in question. The trial judge's threat to sanction Weber did not violate his right to a fair trial.
Lastly, Weber argues that the trial judge denied his right to a fair trial by giving the jury access, during deliberations, to the [prosecutor's] laptop and everything on the laptop which was not admitted into evidence. When the jury retired from the courtroom to deliberate, the prosecutor left his laptop in the courtroom in case the jury wanted to review a CD copy of the gas station surveillance video. [38] The prosecutor already used this same laptop during the trial to play the video for the jury. It is unclear from the record whether the jury could have played the CD by other means, had the prosecutor removed his laptop from the courtroom and left only the CD. The prosecutor asserted that, to the extent the jury deemed it necessary to review the CD, he preferred that they watch it on the laptop rather than project it onto the screen. [39] He argued that watching the CD on the laptop would allow the jurors to see the assailant's face more clearly. [40] The prosecutor also represented that the laptop belonged to his son and did not contain any other materials related to the case. [41] Because the record does not rebut those assertions, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing the jury access to the laptop.