Opinion ID: 4156909
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Resulting Arrest Injuries

Text: Because of the extent of the injuries he sustained during his arrest, Stephens contends on appeal, as in district court, Deputy DeGiovanni used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Based on Stephens and Greenwood’s affidavits, there was no need for Deputy DeGiovanni to have used any force on Stephens, who had answered all of his questions, had produced his identification Deputy DeGiovanni had requested, and was not resisting or attempting to evade arrest. Stephens had done nothing to give Deputy DeGiovanni cause to detain him until the next morning and to take him to jail, requiring Stephens to post a $100 bond to be released for misdemeanor charges. “[A]n investigative detention must be . . . no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983). While “the typical arrest involves some force and injury,” Reese, 527 F.3d at 1272 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), the amount of force used by an officer in seizing and arresting a suspect “must be reasonably proportionate to 35 Case: 15-10206 Date Filed: 03/30/2017 Page: 36 of 46 the need for that force,” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198.27 See Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 528 (4th Cir. 2003) (recognizing a court considering an excessive-force case should “view the evidence in full context, with an eye toward the proportionality of the force in light of all the circumstances” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)). In applying the Graham objective-reasonableness standard, our circuit has identified three factors to evaluate for determining if the force used by an officer in making an arrest was objectively reasonable: “(1) the need for the application of force, (2) the relationship between the need and amount of force used, and (3) the extent of the injury inflicted.” Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1347 (citing Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198; Leslie v. Ingram, 786 F.2d 1533, 1536 (11th Cir. 1986)). 28 While the first two of these factors were subsumed in our discussion of the Graham factors, this case specifically requires us to focus on the physical 27 “Officers may consider a suspect’s refusal to comply with instructions during a traffic stop in assessing whether physical force is needed to effectuate the suspect’s compliance. However, officers must assess not only the need for force, but also the relationship between the need and the amount of force used. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, a jury could reasonably find that the degree of force the officers used in this case was not justifiable under the circumstances.” Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167-68 (5th Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (first emphasis added). 28 We have noted our former four-part test from Leslie, 786 F.2d at 1536, for assessing the need and amount of force, as well as resulting injuries, included a fourth subjective element, involving malicious application of force, which was “invalidated” following Graham. Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000); Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198 n.7. “The other three elements of the Leslie test are still valid after Graham” and continue to be applied. Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198 n.7. We evaluate the reasonableness of the force used in an investigatory stop or arrest under the Graham objective-reasonableness test and determine whether an officer’s actions were reasonable “in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [the officer], without regard to his underlying intent or motivation.” Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2004). 36 Case: 15-10206 Date Filed: 03/30/2017 Page: 37 of 46 evidence of the force Deputy DeGiovanni used in arresting Stephens, measured by the extent of his injuries caused by Deputy DeGiovanni during Stephens’s seizure and arrest. In analyzing the injury factor, we distinguish the Fourth Amendment, excessive-force cognizable injuries suffered by Stephens resulting from the force Deputy DeGiovanni inflicted upon him from de minimis injuries. Determining whether an injury occurring during an arrest resulted from excessive force by the officer depends on the particular circumstances of the arrest. 29 When qualified immunity has been pled in a Fourth Amendment, excessive-force case, the review centers on whether the force used was objectively reasonable from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S. Ct. at 1872. The nature and extent of physical injuries sustained by a plaintiff are relevant in determining whether the amount and type of force used by the arresting officer were excessive. See West, 767 F.3d at 1066-67 (reversing summary judgment based on qualified immunity in a § 1983 case for courthouse security officer, who grabbed an entering attorney’s cell phone she was holding to her ear, jerked her hand and arm from her face toward him while he “squeezed her hand and fingers hard and twisted her wrist back and forth, causing 29 “[W]e do require a plaintiff asserting an excessive force claim to have suffered at least some form of injury. . . . In determining whether an injury caused by excessive force is more than de minimis, we look to the context in which that force was deployed. The amount of injury necessary to satisfy our requirement of ‘some injury’ and establish a constitutional violation is directly related to the amount of force that is constitutionally permissible under the circumstances.” Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703-04 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted). 37 Case: 15-10206 Date Filed: 03/30/2017 Page: 38 of 46 her severe pain,” which resulted in her going to a hospital emergency room for “medication and a splint for her wrist,” seeing “a hand specialist and [having] a carpal tunnel release procedure on the wrist that [the security officer] had grabbed and twisted”); Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2014) (reversing dismissal of plaintiff’s case on qualified immunity in a § 1983 case, where handcuffed arrestee, holding his face up to keep from being burned by the hot pavement on which he was lying, was slammed down by one of the officers “with extreme force,” causing “lacerations, injuries to his teeth and jaw, damage to his left eardrum, and emotional distress due to his head striking the pavement”); Galvez, 552 F.3d at 1244, 1245 (vacating summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 case, because of force used in arrest by the officer’s “repeatedly slamming” plaintiff doctor, charged with misdemeanors, “into the corner of a concrete wall with force sufficient to break his ribs and cause a leaking aneurysm” as well as psychological harm to be unconstitutional excessive force); Davis, 451 F.3d at 764 (reversing summary judgment on qualified immunity in a § 1983 case and finding force used to effectuate arrest was not de minimis, where in arresting plaintiff, canine-unit officer “threw [plaintiff] very hard into the dog cage causing him to hit his head on the top of the car as he entered” and from the officer’s pushing on his shoulder plaintiff had told the officer was injured, plaintiff sustained “a torn rotator cuff in his right shoulder, for which he underwent a 38 Case: 15-10206 Date Filed: 03/30/2017 Page: 39 of 46 surgical repair”); Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 923-24, 928 (11th Cir. 2000) (reinstating jury verdict of excessive force and awards of compensatory and punitive damages in a § 1983 case for officers’ releasing a police dog on plaintiff lying down as instructed, which resulted in fourteen puncture wounds on both legs from dog bites); Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416, 1419-20 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming denial of qualified immunity in a § 1983 case, where unlawful force in arrest was “readily apparent even without clarifying caselaw” when the officer was on plaintiff’s back and, in handcuffing him, broke plaintiff’s arm requiring surgery for multiple fractures, although plaintiff was not resisting). 30 The extent of Stephens’s injuries is the most telling factor in revealing the unprovoked force exerted on him by Deputy DeGiovanni. The medical evidence establishes Stephens’s substantial bodily injuries from Deputy DeGiovanni’s 30 On appeal, Stephens’s counsel argues, in addition to Deputy DeGiovanni’s “battering Stephens, . . . leaving Stephens handcuffed for almost three hours in handcuffs that were too tight” caused Stephens “physical injuries, pain and suffering including, among other things headaches, back pain, and loss of sensation in [his] right hand.” Appellant’s Initial Br. at 9. To the extent Stephens has raised the handcuff issue on appeal, our circuit “has established the principle that the application of de minimis force, without more, will not support a claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1257 (emphasis added), and specifically applied this principle to handcuffing in arrest situations. See Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1352 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Painful handcuffing, without more, is not excessive force in cases where the resulting injuries are minimal.”); Gold v. City of Miami, 121 F.3d 1442, 1444 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding handcuffs applied too tight and for too long was de minimis force). Compared to Stephens’s severe right-hand injury from Deputy DeGiovanni’s lifting his full body weight with three fingers of his right hand twisted backward to his forearm, his experience with the handcuffs applied by Deputy DeGiovanni probably did not result in severe or permanent harm and was inconsequential. 39 Case: 15-10206 Date Filed: 03/30/2017 Page: 40 of 46 forceful chest blows and throwing him against the car-door jamb were unnecessary for a compliant, nonaggressive arrestee. Orthopedic physician Dr. Schapiro diagnosed Stephens with a cervical sprain with multilevel-disc herniations, resultant foraminal stenosis, a left-shoulder, rotator-cuff tear involving the infraspinatus tendon, and sprain of the right wrist, all caused by the assault on Stephens on February 16, 2009. He further recommended an electrodiagnostic assessment to evaluate Stephens’s radiating pain and little-finger numbness. Stephens has alleged the injuries from the unnecessarily excessive force used by Deputy DeGiovanni in his arrest are severe and permanent. He has attested his pain and ailments from the excessive force exerted upon him by Deputy DeGiovanni are onging and resulted in the loss of his livelihood as an automobile mechanic, leaving him indigent. Under Stephens’s version of the events at the time of his encounter with Deputy DeGiovanni, he had complied with all Deputy DeGiovanni’s investigation questions and was not resisting or attempting to flee. Deputy DeGiovanni had no reason to use the force he did on Stephens that resulted in severe and permanent physical injuries as well as psychological trauma. Under the objectivereasonableness standard of Graham, “[a]n officer will be entitled to qualified immunity if his actions were objectively reasonable—that is, if a reasonable officer in the same situation would have believed that the force used was not excessive.” 40 Case: 15-10206 Date Filed: 03/30/2017 Page: 41 of 46 Thornton v. City of Macon, 132 F.3d 1395, 1400 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “No reasonable police officer could believe that” the force Deputy DeGiovanni exerted on compliant, non-resisting Stephens, evidenced by his severe, permanent injuries, “was permissible given these straightforward circumstances.” Priester, 208 F.3d at 927. The district judge, however, concluded “that any force used by Defendant DeGiovanni was de minimis.” Order Granting Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 13. She based her conclusion on the “highly similar” facts in Woodruff v. City of Trussville, 434 F. App’x 852 (11th Cir. 2011),31 and Jones v. City of Dothan, 121 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997). Order Granting Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 13. But “the actual force used and the injury inflicted were both minor in nature” in each of these cases. Jones, 121 F.3d at 1460. In stark contrast are the medically documented severe, permanent injuries sustained by Stephens from Deputy DeGiovanni’s unprovoked and completely unnecessary frontal-body blows to Stephens’s chest and throwing him against the car-door jamb in the course of arresting him. Deputy DeGiovanni has argued on appeal Stephens’s arrest injuries were de minimis. But the amount of force used by Deputy DeGiovanni in arresting Stephens, which caused his severe and 31 Woodruff is an unpublished opinion. In our circuit, “unpublished decisions, with or without opinion, are not precedential and they bind no one. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (‘Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent . . . .’).” Ray v. McCullough Payne & Haan, LLC, 838 F.3d 1107, 1109 (11th Cir. 2016) (ellipsis in original). 41 Case: 15-10206 Date Filed: 03/30/2017 Page: 42 of 46 permanent injuries, documented by treating physicians, forecloses any de minimis argument by Deputy DeGiovanni. Cf. Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1258 n.4 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Appellee had minor bruising which quickly disappeared without treatment.”). Notably, the permanent injuries incurred by Stephens resulted in the loss of his ability to continue his employment as an automobile mechanic and rendered him indigent. Stephens’s arrest injuries are particularly compelling, because, as eyewitness Greenwood averred, Stephens was cooperating by responding to all Deputy DeGiovanni’s inquiries and not resisting whatsoever, not even raising his voice. Instead of the similar-case method for resolving Fourth Amendment, excessive-force cases, this case requires the obvious-clarity-method analysis, based on Deputy DeGiovanni’s objectively unreasonable, excessive force in arresting Stephens on misdemeanor charges. 32 32 In addition to her conclusion the force used in arresting Stephens by Deputy DeGiovanni was de minimis, the district judge alternatively decided, even if a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred, it would not qualify as a clearly established right: “There is no doubt, of course, that the use of excessive force in the context of an arrest constitutes the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. The question, however, is whether [Deputy DeGiovanni’s] use of force under these circumstances was clearly established as excessive by controlling and factually similar case law.” Order Granting Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 14 n.8 (emphasis added). Based on cases where the alleged excessive force was not to the injury-causing proportion Deputy DeGiovanni exerted on Stephens, the judge concluded “it seems clear that [Deputy DeGiovanni’s] conduct was not so outrageous that every reasonable officer in [his] position would inevitably conclude that the force used was unlawful.” Id. at 16. Reviewing the specific facts of this case, especially Stephens’s answering all Deputy DeGiovanni’s questions and not resisting or attempting to flee, the responsive force used by Deputy DeGiovanni was objectively unreasonable, gratuitous, excessive and unwarranted on a common-sense level any reasonable officer should know is wrong. “If [Stephens’s] allegations are true, and we must assume that they are at this stage of the case, [Deputy DeGiovanni’s] force was unnecessary, 42 Case: 15-10206 Date Filed: 03/30/2017 Page: 43 of 46 “[G]ratuitous use of force when a criminal suspect is not resisting arrest constitutes excessive force.” Hadley, 526 F.3d at 1330 (noting circuit examples of Lee, 284 F.3d 1188, and Slicker, 215 F.3d 1225). “We have repeatedly ruled that a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment, and is denied qualified immunity, if he or she uses gratuitous and excessive force against a suspect who is under control, not resisting, and obeying commands,” as Stephens says he was doing at the time of his arrest by Deputy DeGiovanni. Saunders, 766 F.3d at 1265 (citing cases).33 On these obvious-clarity facts, “no particularized preexisting case law was necessary for it to be clearly established that what [Deputy DeGiovanni] did violated [Stephens’s] constitutional right to be free from the excessive use of force” in his arrest. Priester, 208 F.3d at 927. We vacate the judge’s order disproportionate, and constitutionally excessive.” Saunders, 766 F.3d at 1268. This is an obvious-clarity case. 33 In the context of an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim, the Supreme Court noted the “core judicial inquiry” for an excessive-force claim under the Eighth Amendment is not based on the extent of the plaintiff’s injury, but rather on “the nature of the force” used. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 39, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1179 (2010). The Court explained a plaintiff “who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” Id. at 38, 130 S. Ct. at 117879. Our court has adopted the Wilkins reasoning in the Fourth Amendment context, determining an officer’s punching a non-resisting, handcuffed suspect in the stomach was excessive force violating the Fourth Amendment. Saunders, 766 F.3d at 1270 (citing Hadley, 526 F.3d at 1330, and Slicker, 215 F.3d at 1231-32). While these cases involve plaintiffs who were handcuffed after their arrest before excessive force was used by the officer, the same rationale applies to the use of gratuitous force when the excessive force is applied prior to the handcuffing but in the course of the investigation and arrest, all part of the arrest procedure, as was the situation for Stephens. But injury and force “are only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38, 130 S. Ct. at 1178. 43 Case: 15-10206 Date Filed: 03/30/2017 Page: 44 of 46 granting summary judgment to Deputy DeGiovanni on Stephens’s excessive-force claim and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because the judge granted summary judgment to Deputy DeGiovanni on Stephens’s federal claim of excessive force, she declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims of assault and battery against the Broward Sheriff’s Office (Count I) and Deputy DeGiovanni (Count VI) and dismissed them without prejudice. Order Granting Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 23. “The constitutional ‘case or controversy’ standard confers supplemental jurisdiction over all state claims which arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact with a substantial federal claim.” Lucero v. Trosch, 121 F.3d 591, 597 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724-25, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 1138 (1966)). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a federal court has “power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction,” and “discretion not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 34 Id. By vacating the grant of summary judgment for Deputy 34 “(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) . . ., in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. . . . .... (c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if— .... (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), (c)(3). 44 Case: 15-10206 Date Filed: 03/30/2017 Page: 45 of 46 DeGiovanni on Stephens’s federal excessive-force claim, we reinstate the district judge’s original federal jurisdiction over Stephens’s excessive-force claim and remand for further proceedings on that claim. We also vacate the judge’s dismissal without prejudice of Stephens’s state-law claim of assault and battery against Deputy DeGiovanni and leave to the discretion of the judge how to handle the state-law claim of assault and battery on remand. 35