Opinion ID: 736288
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Amount of the Restitution Order

Text: 17 Ordinarily, we review a district court's imposition of restitution for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Soderling, 970 F.2d 529, 534 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2446, 124 L.Ed.2d 663 (1993). When a defendant fails to object to an issue before the district court, however, we review only for plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). The plain error doctrine does not authorize review unless: 1) an unwaived error was committed; 2) the error was plain (i.e., clear or obvious); and 3) the error affected the defendant's substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776-78, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Even if these conditions are met, we grant relief only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 736, 113 S.Ct. at 1778-79. 18 The Victim Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664, gives courts the ability to order restitution and grants the district court broad discretion in the kind and amount of evidence required to order restitution. United States v. Ramilo, 986 F.2d 333, 335 (9th Cir.1993). The VWPA does not prohibit a sentencing court from imposing a restitutionary sentence upon a defendant who is indigent at the time of sentencing. United States v. Smith, 944 F.2d 618, 623 (9th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Keith, 754 F.2d 1388, 1393 (9th Cir.1985)), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 951, 112 S.Ct. 1515, 117 L.Ed.2d 651 (1992). But at the time restitution is ordered[,] the record must reflect some evidence [that] the defendant may be able to pay restitution in the amount ordered in the future. 1 Ramilo, 986 F.2d at 336. 19 At the time of Zink's sentencing, he had total assets of $1,342.29. He had a net worth of negative $47,636.94. Zink had filed for bankruptcy in January 1994, and he had negative adjusted gross incomes on his 1991, 1992, and 1993 tax returns. Zink was 60 years old at the time of sentencing. 20 The government presented evidence which showed that Zink used to earn consulting fees of $50,000 to $60,000 per year, and that Zink planned to continue consulting. The government also presented evidence that Zink once had a portfolio of income properties worth three to four million dollars. This portfolio, however, was acquired over a twenty-five year period, and these properties were all lost after the collapse of the Southern California real estate market. Under these circumstances, it is questionable whether the record reflects some evidence that Zink may be able to pay $5.8 million in restitution. 21 Notwithstanding the above, Zink specifically agreed in his plea agreement to pay the full amount of restitution to be determined by the court at the time of sentencing. He also acknowledged this agreement in his Rule 11 colloquy knowing full well that the amount of proposed restitution was $5.8 million. In discussing the restitution amount, the following exchange occurred: 22 The Court: What agreement, if any--I know this is covered--but what agreement of restitution has been discussed? 23 Prosecutor: The defendant is obligated, under the plea agreement, to pay restitution as ordered by the Court at the time of sentencing. 24 The Court: How much would that be? 25 Prosecutor: It ... would be the $5.8 million. 26 The Court: What are the realistic chances of getting it? 27 Prosecutor: I would say the chances are fairly unrealistic in cases such as this. This is a matter for sentence. On the other hand, this defendant is obviously a sophisticated businessman. If he's able to turn his energies to legitimate enterprises upon his release from custody in this case, there might be some possibility of restitution of the banks. 28 Zink did not object. 29 At Zink's sentencing hearing, the district court imposed the $5.8 million restitution order. The court did not explain its reasons for imposing such a large award, nor did it comment on Zink's ability to pay. The court merely took the amount of the banks' losses, $5.8 million, and made that figure the restitution amount. Once again, Zink did not object. 30 Given Zink's agreement to pay full restitution and his failure to object to either the proposed restitution amount or the actual restitution ordered, we conclude that the district court did not commit plain error in ordering the $5.8 million in restitution. Although it is questionable whether the record suggests that Zink may be able to pay the amount of restitution ordered, Zink's clear acquiescence in the restitution order relieved the district court of any independent obligation to further determine Zink's ability to pay restitution. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the restitution order seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of Zink's proceedings, such that the order amounts to plain error. See United States v. Osborn, 58 F.3d 387, 389 (8th Cir.1995) (affirming restitution order when defendant agreed in his plea agreement to pay restitution amount ordered by the court and defendant made no objection at sentencing to the imposition of a restitution order....). We therefore affirm the district court's $5.8 million restitution order. 31 AFFIRMED.