Opinion ID: 2638169
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Public-Disclosure-of-Private-Facts Action

Text: In this court's decision in Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 214, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469, we set forth the elements of the public-disclosure-of-private-facts tort as follows: `(1) public disclosure, (2) of a private fact, (3) which would be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person, and (4) which is not of legitimate public concern.' In discussing the fourth element, we explained in Shulman that lack of newsworthiness is an element of the `private facts' tort, making newsworthiness a complete bar to common law liability. ( Id. at p. 215, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469.) [14] Considering the relevant facts revealed by the record in light of the elements of the public-disclosure-of-private-facts tort, we disagree with the Court of Appeal's conclusion that plaintiff established a prima facie case with regard to this tort. To begin with, we have very serious doubts whether either of the statements in questionthat Jane Doe engaged in destructive behavior that I cannot reveal on advice of my attorney, or that Jane Doe is in the Navyconstitutes disclosure of the kind of sufficiently sensitive or intimate private fact which would be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person so as to support a cause of action under the public-disclosure-of-private-facts tort. (See, e.g., Coverstone v. Dairies (1952) 38 Cal.2d 315, 323, 239 P.2d 876 [public-disclosure-of-private-facts tort applies to the unwarranted publication by defendant of intimate details of plaintiffs' lives (italics added)].) [15] We need not decide that question here, however, because unlike the Court of Appeal we conclude that the facts disclosedrelating generally to how the experiences described in the case study may have affected Jane Doe's subsequent conduct and career as an adultclearly are newsworthy, and for that reason cannot properly be the basis of such a tort action. Our decision in Shulman discussed the newsworthiness standard at some length, and it is useful to review that discussion here. We explained that courts have generally protected the privacy of otherwise private individuals involved in events of public interest `by requiring that a logical nexus exist between the complaining individual and the matter of ... public interest.' [Citation.] The contents of the publication or broadcast are protected only if they have `some substantial relevance to a matter of legitimate public interest' [Citation.] Thus, recent decisions have generally tested newsworthiness with regard to such individuals by assessing the logical relationship or nexus, or the lack thereof, between the events or activities that brought the person into the public eye and the particular facts disclosed.... This approach accords with our own prior decisions, in that it balances the public's right to know against the plaintiffs privacy interest by drawing a protective line at the point the material revealed ceases to have any substantial connection to the subject matter of the newsworthy report. [Citation.] This approach also echoes the Restatement commentators' widely quoted and cited view that legitimate public interest does not include `a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake ....' ( Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 223-224, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469.) Shulman also makes it clear that [a]n analysis measuring newsworthiness of facts about an otherwise private person involuntarily involved in an event of public interest by their relevance to a newsworthy subject matter incorporates considerable deference to reporters and editors.... In general, it is not for a court or jury to say how a particular story is best covered. ( Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 224-225, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469, fn. omitted.) By confining our interference to extreme cases, the courts `avoid[] unduly limiting ... the exercise of effective editorial judgment. ( Id. at p. 225, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469.) Defendants claim that plaintiff in this case, unlike the plaintiff in Shulman, should not be viewed as an otherwise private person involuntarily involved in an event of public interest, because plaintiff voluntarily consented to have the videotapes of her sessions with Corwin used for educational purposes and set forth in a published article. Plaintiff challenges this view, contending that she gave only limited consent and that the consent should not be treated as having broadly opened her life to intensive scrutiny. We need not resolve that question because, even if we assume, as plaintiff contends, that plaintiff should be considered an otherwise private person involuntarily involved in an event of public interest within the meaning of the Shulman decision ( Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 224, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469), we conclude that under the standard set forth in Shulman it is nonetheless clear that the statements here at issue were newsworthy. As discussed above, a number of the commentators whose articles about the Jane Doe case study were published with the Child Maltreatment article itself remarked that it would be important and of interest from an academic standpoint to learn the effects of the events described in the case study upon Jane's future development. In light of the prominence of the Jane Doe case study in the repressed memory field, we find that the disclosure of such facts was newsworthy. This is particularly true because the particular revelations at issuethat Jane Doe engaged in unspecified destructive behavior and is now in the Navywere not of an [intensely personal or intimate nature. (Cf. Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 226, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 955 P.2d 469 [the balance of free press and privacy interests may require a different conclusion when the intrusiveness of the revelation is greatly disproportionate to its relevance. Intensely personal or intimate revelations might not, in a given case, be considered newsworthy, especially where they bear only slight relevance to a topic of legitimate public concern].) Under these circumstances, we conclude that the record does not support a determination that plaintiff has established a prima facie case of improper disclosure of private facts based upon Loftus's alleged statement at the October 2002 professional conference.