Opinion ID: 1393876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Langley v. State

Text: The second motion to withdraw filed in the case of Langley v. State, CR 00-1275, presents us with similar issues and is justiciable. Robert C. Marquette, a full-time, state-salaried public defender, was appointed by the Crawford County Circuit Court to represent William Eugene Langley in his Rule 37 proceeding. The circuit court conducted a hearing and denied the petition. Mr. Marquette timely filed a notice of appeal from the denial of postconviction relief. The record was lodged with our clerk on November 6, 2000. On November 13, 2000, Mr. Marquette filed a motion to withdraw as attorney for Mr. Langley. The question before this court is whether Mr. Marquette should be allowed to withdraw from representing Mr. Langley in the appeal from the trial court's denial of his request for postconviction relief. Arkansas case law indicates that, once an attorney represents an appellant in a matter of postconviction relief, the attorney is obligated to continue representing the appellant until relieved by the appropriate court. See Sanders v. State, 329 Ark. 363, 952 S.W.2d 133 (1997) (per curiam); Miller v. State, 299 Ark. 548, 775 S.W.2d 79 (1989) (per curiam). After the notice of appeal has been filed, this court has exclusive jurisdiction to relieve counsel. Rule 16 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure-Criminal states: Trial counsel, whether retained or court appointed, shall continue to represent a convicted defendant throughout any appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, unless permitted by the trial court or the Arkansas Supreme Court to withdraw in the interest of justice or for other sufficient cause. After the notice of appeal of a judgment of conviction has been filed, the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to relieve counsel and appoint new counsel. If court appointed counsel is permitted by the trial court or the Arkansas Supreme Court to withdraw in the interest of justice or for other sufficient cause, new counsel shall be appointed promptly by the court exercising jurisdiction over the matter of counsel's withdrawal. Ark. R.App. P.-Crim. 16 (2001). Pursuant to Rule 16, we will allow withdrawal of counsel in the interest of justice or for other sufficient cause. Mr. Marquette requests withdrawal on the basis that he is a full-time, state-salaried public defender appointed to represent Mr. Langley. He points out that this court has held that full-time, state-salaried public defenders are not entitled to receive additional compensation from the state for their services throughout any appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court. Rushing v. State, 340 Ark. 84, 8 S.W.3d 489 (2000). We have also allowed a public defender to withdraw from representation of a criminal defendant on direct appeal where the attorney was ineligible for compensation by this court pursuant to Rushing. Tester v. State, 341 Ark. 281, 16 S.W.3d 227 (2000). The attorneys in both Rushing and Tester were allowed to withdraw on direct appeal, and new attorneys were appointed to represent the defendants. Mr. Marquette seeks to withdraw in an appeal from the denial of postconviction relief. It is clear in Rushing and Tester that we considered the fact that the attorneys would not be paid for their services on direct appeal as sufficient cause to entitle them to withdraw. The same justification should apply to appeals from orders denying petitions for postconviction relief under Rule 37. As Mr. Marquette is acting in his capacity as a full-time, state-salaried public defender, he is prohibited from receiving any funds ... or other thing of monetary value, directly or indirectly, for the representation of an indigent person pursuant to court appointment, except the compensation authorized by law. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-87-214 (Supp.2001). The legislature expressly subjected the Public Defender Commission to the Regular Salary Procedures and Restrictions Act. See Act 1379 of 1999, § 1; Ark.Code Ann. §§ 19-4-1601-1615 (Repl. 1998 and Supp.2001). [1] As of November 13, 2000, when Mr. Marquette filed his motion to withdraw, this Act, in essence, prohibit[ed] the public defender from receiving compensation from the State in an amount greater than that established by the General Assembly as the maximum annual salary for the employee. Rushing v. State, 340 Ark. at 86, 8 S.W.3d at 490. Thus, Mr. Marquette could not be compensated by this court for any work on the appeal. Under Rule 16, Mr. Marquette must continue to represent Mr. Langley on appeal of the denial of his request for postconviction relief until this court has relieved him as counsel. Pursuant to our precedent in Rushing and Tester , Mr. Marquette has shown sufficient cause to be relieved from representation of Mr. Langley. His motion to withdraw is hereby granted. Mr. Langley has now filed a pro se motion for appointment of counsel and motion for extension of time to file his brief. The question then becomes whether this court must appoint new counsel to replace Mr. Marquette. Both the United States Supreme Court and this court have held that there is no constitutional right to an attorney in state postconviction proceedings. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); O'Brien v. State, 339 Ark. 138, 3 S.W.3d 332 (1999) (per curiam); McCuen v. State, 328 Ark. 46, 941 S.W.2d 397 (1997). Similarly, this court has held that the right to counsel ends in Arkansas after the direct appeal of the original criminal trial is completed, and the State is not obligated to provide counsel in postconviction proceedings. Fretwell v. State, 290 Ark. 221, 718 S.W.2d 109 (1986) (per curiam). See also Gipson v. State, 343 Ark. 44, 31 S.W.3d 834 (2000) (per curiam). Our reasoning has been that a postconviction proceeding is civil in nature and, thus, there is no constitutional right to appointment of counsel as part of a criminal proceeding. Fretwell v. State, supra . Though the last sentence of Rule 16 requires new counsel to be appointed promptly by the court when court-appointed counsel is permitted to withdraw, that language was not added to the rule until January 13, 2000. [2] Prior to our adoption of the additional language, this court held that Rule 16 applied to postconviction appeals as well as direct appeals from judgments of conviction. Thomas v. State, 335 Ark. 262, 983 S.W.2d 122 (1998) (per curiam); Sanders v. State, 329 Ark. 363, 952 S.W.2d 133 (1997) (per curiam); Miller v. State, 299 Ark. 548, 775 S.W.2d 79 (1989) (per curiam). However, we have never held that the new language adopted by this court in the 2000 amendment to Rule 16 applies to postconviction appeals. While we clearly have exclusive jurisdiction under Rule 16 to relieve counsel after the notice of appeal in a postconviction proceeding has been filed, the amendment to Rule 16 requiring the prompt appointment of new counsel applies only to direct appeals and not to postconviction proceedings, as there is no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings. Nonetheless, we have the discretion to appoint attorneys for indigent appellants in Rule 37 cases. Rule 37.3(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure states: If the original petition, or a motion for appointment of counsel should allege that the petitioner is unable to pay the cost of the proceedings and to employ counsel, and if the court is satisfied that the allegation is true, the court may at its discretion appoint counsel for the petitioner for any hearing held in the circuit court. If a petition on which the petitioner was represented by counsel is denied, counsel shall continue to represent the petitioner for an appeal to the Supreme Court, unless relieved as counsel by the circuit court or the Supreme Court. If no hearing was held or the petitioner proceeded pro se at the hearing, the circuit court may at its discretion appoint counsel for an appeal upon proper motion by the petitioner. Ark. R.Crim. P. 37.3(b)(emphasis added). [3] Likewise, this court may exercise its discretion and appoint counsel upon proper motion by the petitioner. Mr. Langley has made such a motion to this court. Pursuant to Act 169 of 2001, the General Assembly appropriated funds to the Arkansas Supreme Court for the payment of Court Appointed Attorneys. As funds are available to compensate an attorney appointed by this court to represent Mr. Langley, we hereby appoint Mr. Charles Kester to represent Mr. Langley in his appeal of the order denying him postconviction relief. We grant Mr. Langley an extension of 60 days in which to file his brief, making his brief due on or before March 25, 2002.