Opinion ID: 561158
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sentencing Guideline Increase

Text: 27 The presentence report found that Garcia-Gil attempted to escape from the Law Enforcement Center in Pecos, Texas on July 11, 1989 while awaiting [trial] for the instant offense. It recommended that Garcia-Gil's offense level be increased by two levels pursuant to Sec. 3C1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, because he had attempted to impede the administration of justice during the prosecution of the instant offense. The district court accepted this recommendation. On appeal, Garcia-Gil challenges this increase, arguing only that [a]n escape attempt based on the paltry facts known below can hardly be said to come under the aegis of Sec. 3C1.1. Garcia-Gil has put forward nothing to convince us that the district court was clearly erroneous in finding that he attempted to escape from jail. Furthermore, we conclude that attempted or actual escapes do come under the aegis of Sec. 3C1.1. 28 At the time of Garcia-Gil's offenses, Sec. 3C1.1 covered defendants who willfully impeded or obstructed, or attempted to impede or obstruct, the administration of justice during the investigation or prosecution of their offenses. Does this definition include attempted escape pending trial? For offenses committed after November 1, 1990, the answer is yes. Application Note 3(e) provides that Sec. 3C1.1 applies to attempting to escape from custody before trial or sentencing. Prior to amendment, the commentary did not list attempted escape as an example of covered conduct, but it specifically noted that the examples listed were not exclusive. Application Note 1 (replaced 1990). This non-exclusivity contemplates that the courts will scrutinize conduct for inclusion within Sec. 3C1.1 as situations arise. Having considered the situation in this case, we conclude that an escape or an attempted escape may constitute the willful obstruction of justice for sentencing offenses committed before November 1, 1990. That the Sentencing Commission now explicitly agrees with this conclusion provides more, not less, support for our holding. 29 If the administration of justice includes the ability of the government to produce for scheduled judicial proceedings those persons lawfully in its custody, then the administration of justice is practically obstructed or impeded when such persons escape from custody, presumably never to appear in court. It follows that an attempt to escape is an attempt to obstruct or impede. Other circuits have reached similar conclusions. See United States v. Teta, 918 F.2d 1329, 1334-35 (7th Cir.1990) (defendant's willful failure to appear); United States v. Perry, 908 F.2d 56, 59 (6th Cir.) (defendant who jumped bond before sentencing), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 565, 112 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990); United States v. Avila, 905 F.2d 295, 297 (9th Cir.1990) (defendant who absconded from supervised [pretrial] release and remained a fugitive for five months). If failing to appear, jumping bond, and absconding from pretrial release are obstructions of justice, so is escaping or attempting to escape from actual custody. The district court correctly applied Sec. 3C1.1 and increased Garcia-Gil's sentence. 30 Finding no errors in the proceedings below, we sustain both the convictions and the sentences of defendants Rugerio Valdiosera-Godinez and Alejandro Garcia-Gil. 31 AFFIRMED.