Opinion ID: 766993
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court's Application of the Legal Standard

Text: 30 Of course, under the contemporary navigability standard for purposes of determining admiralty jurisdiction, that we adopt today, it is immaterial that, prior to 1951 and before the construction of many of the nine dams, logs were floated down the Hudson near the accident site. Nonetheless, appellants contend that even under the contemporary navigability standard, the district court had before it sufficient evidence of present-day navigability to support a finding of jurisdiction. But in the face of the district court's unchallenged factual findings, this argument necessarily fails. 31 As noted at the outset, the district court found that the Hudson River downstream of Fort Edward is capable of supporting interstate commerce. The court also found that the presence of natural obstructions such as white water and falls as well as the presence of more recent man-made dams absolutely prevent continuous travel by any type of boat from the place of the accident to the waters below Fort Edward. Finally, the district court determined that the presence of dams between Fort Edward and the accident site would now impede any attempt to float timber on this stretch of the Hudson absent extraordinary river conditions. Appellants do not take issue with any of these findings on appeal. 1 Nor could they: Each enjoys substantial support in the record and is not clearly erroneous. 32 Instead, appellants contend only that the Hudson is navigable at the accident site because kayakers can portage around the dams separating the site from Fort Edward. But this argument lacks any legal support. Appellants cite, and we have found, no published decision holding that the possibility of recreational use assisted by multiple portages is, by itself, sufficient to render a waterway navigable for admiralty jurisdiction purposes. Navigability requires that the body of water be capable of supporting commercial maritime activity. It is irrelevant that the body of water is capable of supporting non-commercial maritime activity. A waterway is navigable provided that it is used or susceptible of being used as an artery of commerce. Neither non-commercial fishing nor pleasure boating . . . constitutes commerce. Commerce for the purpose of admiralty jurisdiction means activities related to shipping. Adams, 528 F.2d at 437; see also Foremost, 457 U.S. at 675 (pleasure boating is noncommercial maritime activity). The possibility that the waterway is capable of supporting non-commercial maritime activity of the type suggested by appellants does not render the waterway capable of supporting commercial trade or travel in the customary modes of travel on water, as our holding today requires. As a result, the court did not err in finding that it lacked jurisdiction over appellants' claims.