Opinion ID: 167116
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Second confession.

Text: 38 The Government argues that, even if Lopez's first confession is inadmissible, his second confession should not be suppressed, notwithstanding the coercion that produced the first confession. We cannot agree. 39 [T]he appropriate inquiry in determining the admissibility of Lopez's second confession is whether the coercion surrounding the first [confession] had been sufficiently dissipated so as to make the second statement voluntary. 4 Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1467 (quotation omitted). 40 The government must show intervening circumstances which indicate that the second confession was insulated from the effect of all that went before. The later confession will be admissible while the first confession will not only if such a distinction is justified by a sufficiently isolating break in the stream of events. 41 Id. at 1467-68 (quotation, citations, alterations omitted). This depends on the inferences as to the continuing effect of the coercive practices which may fairly be drawn from the surrounding circumstances. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 602, 64 S.Ct. 1208, 88 L.Ed. 1481 (1944). In making this determination, we again consider the totality of the circumstances. See Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 349, 88 S.Ct. 1488, 20 L.Ed.2d 630 (1968). 42 In this case, although Lopez's second confession came after a night's sleep and a meal, and almost twelve hours elapsed between confessions, the coercion producing the first confession had not been dissipated. See Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 710-12, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967) (holding third confession suspect gave, nine days after being arrested, was involuntary because there was no break in the stream of events beginning when police first arrested the suspect); cf. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 539-41, 67 S.Ct. 1394, 91 L.Ed. 1654 (1947) (holding second confession made six months after coerced confession was voluntary and admissible). The first confession was coerced primarily by Agent Hopper's improper promise of leniency to Lopez and Agents Hopper and Wallace misrepresenting the evidence they had against Lopez. Agent Hopper was again the primary interrogator during the third interview, which took place in the same place as the earlier interrogation. Cf. Lyons, 322 U.S. at 604-05, 64 S.Ct. 1208 (holding second confession, given twelve hours after coerced confession, was voluntary where suspect had been transferred to another location and interrogated by different questioners in non-coercive environment); Leon v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 770, 773 (11th Cir.1984) (holding second confession was voluntary where first confession was coerced by threats and physical abuse occurring at time of arrest but suspect gave second confession several hours later at the police station, after receiving Miranda warnings and being questioned by different interrogators), cited in Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1467-68. And Lopez had not spoken to an attorney or family member during the twenty-four hours since he had been arrested. Cf. Darwin, 391 U.S. at 349, 88 S.Ct. 1488 (holding second confession was not voluntary where suspect was held incommunicado for thirty to forty hours). In addition, there is no indication that Agent Hopper or any other police officer made any statements to Lopez that might have dissipated the coercive effect of Agent Hopper's promises of leniency and his misrepresentation of the evidence against Lopez. In light of these circumstances, the district court in this case did not err in suppressing that confession as well.