Opinion ID: 2281982
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Juror V.S.

Text: Appellant next argues that the trial court erred by not striking juror V.S. on two separate occasions: first, when V.S. notified the court that her sister had beat her when the two were around the age of fifteen to seventeen; and, second, when V.S. notified the court that she was related to someone allegedly murdered by followers of Charles Manson. The Commonwealth asserts that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because V.S. stated that the two incidents would not affect her judgment in this case. Under RCr 9.36(1) a motion to strike for cause must be granted where there is reasonable ground to believe that a prospective juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence. This Court will not disturb a trial court's ruling on this issue unless that court abuses its discretion. Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258, 265 (Ky.2006). In determining whether a court abuses its discretion we consider whether that court's decision is arbitrary or capricious under the circumstances. Kentucky Nat'l Park Com'n v. Russell, 301 Ky. 187, 191 S.W.2d 214 (1945). And where a trial court makes findings of facts regarding a juror, that decision is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. See Shane, 243 S.W.3d at 338. Applying these rules, we have held that the mere fact that a potential juror has been the victim of a similar crime alone is insufficient to warrant removal for cause. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 293, 299 (Ky.1997); Richardson v. Commonwealth, 161 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Ky. 2005). Here, Appellant argues that V.S. was not qualified to sit as a juror because she did not unequivocally state that she would not be affected by the fight with her sister. Relying on our holding in Richardson, Appellant argues that an unequivocal statement is required before a trial court can determine that a victim who has suffered a similar crime [7] may serve as a juror. The Commonwealth responds by arguing that the trial court's decision was not an abuse of discretion where V.S. testified that neither the fight nor the murder of her relative would affect how V.S. would evaluate the evidence or how she would judge this case. We agree. Appellant's reliance on Richardson is misplaced. In Richardson, we dealt with the issue of whether a juror could sit in a case where the defendant is charged with a crime similar to that previously suffered by the subject juror. In answering the question in the affirmative, we noted that the subject juror never made [any] statements indicating that she had any bias or preconceived opinions of Appellant's case. Id. at 331-332. And while it is true that we were influenced by the fact that the juror in that case unequivocally stated that she could impartially decide the case, we also reiterated the long-standing rule that the trial court is in the best position to evaluate a juror's demeanor and answers during voir dire. Bowling, 942 S.W.2d at 300; see also Whalen v. Commonwealth, 891 S.W.2d 86 (Ky.App. 1995) overruled on other grounds by Moore v. Commonwealth, 990 S.W.2d 618 (Ky.1999). Thus, even though we found the unequivocal statement influential in Richardson, we never concluded it to control as determinative. We did not mean there, nor do we hold here that a juror must utter magic words before a trial court can determine the probability of bias or prejudice. Richardson, 161 S.W.3d at 330. We reiterate that [i]t is the probability of bias or prejudice that is determinative in a ruling on a challenge for cause, and we will not disturb a trial court's ruling on this issue absent an abuse of its discretion. Id. (emphasis added). Turning to the case at bar, we observe that V.S. never made any statements indicating that she had any bias or preconceived opinions about this case. She in fact stated that neither the altercation she had with her sister nor the fact that her relative was allegedly killed by a member of the Manson family would influence her ability to serve. And even if we were to take V.S.'s statement that she didn't think she would be affected by her previous altercation with her sister in a vacuum, the trial court's ultimate interpretation of that statement controls unless clearly erroneous. See Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336, 338 (Ky.2007) (issues of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard). Here, having the best view of V.S.'s demeanor, the trial court found that the two subject instances would not affect V.S.'s ability to serve distinguishing the altercation with her sister and the murder of her relative from the case being tried. We cannot say under the facts of this case that the trial court abused its discretion.