Opinion ID: 1043937
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bailment Claim

Text: We now turn to the issue of whether the trial court erred in granting Mr. Marsh a JNOV and dismissing the bailment claim. The Akerses alleged that their delivery of Deceased’s body to the funeral home “for the specific purpose of providing crematory services in a respectful and dignified manner” created a bailment relationship. This Court has defined a bailment as “a delivery of personalty for a particular purpose or on mere deposit, on a contract express or implied; that after the purpose has been fulfilled, it shall be redelivered to the person who delivered it, or otherwise dealt with according to his direction or kept until he reclaims it.” Dispeker v. New S. Hotel Co., 373 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Tenn. 1963) (citing Breeden v. Elliot Bros., 118 S.W.2d 219, 219 (Tenn. 1937)). Although bailments typically involve contractual agreements, an agreement is not always an indispensable element of a bailment relationship. A bailment 13 Dr. Akers testified that Buckner-Rush funeral home ultimately did not charge the Akerses for the costs of Deceased’s funeral and cremation. -16- relationship is generally founded on a contractual relation; however, “an actual contract or one implied in fact is not always necessary to create a bailment.” Aegis Investigative Grp. v. Metro. Gov’t. of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 98 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). The Aegis court recognized a type of constructive or involuntary bailment, which arises by operation of law where (1) the person who has possession of a chattel holds it under such circumstances that the law imposes on him or her the obligation of delivering it to another; (2) a person has lawfully obtained possession of another’s personal property by means other than a mutual contract of bailment; or (3) a person has lawfully acquired the possession of another person’s chattel and holds it under circumstances whereby he or she should, on principles of justice, keep it safely and restore it or deliver it to the owner. Id.; see also Campbell v. State, 450 S.W.2d 795, 801 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969) (holding that an actual contract or one implied in fact is not necessary to create a bailment when a person has lawfully acquired the personal property of another and holds it under circumstances whereby principles of justice dictate that the possessor keep it safe and restore it to the owner). The Court of Appeals ruled that the Akerses’ bailment claim failed because the Akerses’ agreement “was with the Funeral Home, not with Marsh or Tri-State.” Akers, 2011 WL 4908396, at . We disagree with this reasoning. Although there was no express agreement between the Akerses and Mr. Marsh, there existed a constructive or involuntary bailment on which a bailment claim could be made. The bailment claim fails, however, because a corpse is not “personalty” for bailment purposes. See generally Tinsley v. Dudley, 915 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (observing that while there is “no property right in the body of a deceased” at common law, courts “have recognized that a quasi-property right in dead bodies vests in the nearest relatives, and arises from their duty to bury their dead”)14 ; 22A Am. Jur. 2d 14 In Crawford v. J. Avery Bryan Funeral Home, Inc., 253 S.W.3d 149, 158 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) the Court of Appeals cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 869 cmt. a (1965), which states: One who is entitled to the disposition of the body of a deceased person has a cause of action in tort against one who intentionally, recklessly or negligently mistreats or improperly deals with the body, or prevents its proper burial or cremation. The technical basis of the cause of action is the interference with the exclusive right of control of the body, which frequently has been called by the courts a “property” or a “quasi-property” right. This does not, however, fit very well into the category of property, since the body ordinarily cannot be sold or transferred, has no utility and can be used only for the one purpose of interment or cremation. In practice the technical right has served as a mere peg upon which to hang damages for the mental distress inflicted upon the survivor; and in reality the cause of action has been exclusively one for the mental distress. (continued...) -17- Dead Bodies § 3 (2012) (noting that “[a]t common law, there is no property right in the body of a deceased person”); see also Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877, 882 (Colo. 1994) (rejecting “the fictional theory that a property right exists in a dead body that would support an action for conversion” because the plaintiffs’ claims are “more properly addressed through a tort action related to the infliction of emotional distress”); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 25 (Ga. 1905) (“It is not surprising that the law relating to this mystery of what death leaves behind cannot be precisely brought within the letter of all the rules regarding corn, lumber and pig iron.”); Bauer v. N. Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc., 527 S.E.2d 240, 244 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming dismissal of bailment claim arising from alleged removal of eye tissue from corpse without permission); Edwards v. State, 286 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1955) (holding that the taking of custody of a body by a funeral home for the purpose of preparing it for burial does not create a bailment). We affirm the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for JNOV and dismissing the bailment claim.