Opinion ID: 2419906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: substantial change of condition

Text: Rodriguez's pleadings also allege that her original impairment rating was erroneous because after it was assigned there had been a substantial change in her medical condition. Rodriguez argues that she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her substantial change of condition in the district court under section 410.307(a) of the Labor Code. See TEX. LAB.CODE § 410.307(a). We recently considered section 410.307 in Lumbermens Mutual Cas. Co. v. Manasco, 971 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.1998). There we held that section 410.307 was merely a rule of evidence that applied only in properly perfected district court appeals of impairment ratings. See Manasco, 971 S.W.2d at 64. We rejected any notion that this section created an independent, substantive right to reopen the impairment issue after the claimant had failed to timely appeal. See Manasco, 971 S.W.2d at 64. Lloyds argues that Manasco is virtually identical to the present cause and should control our decision here. Lloyds argues that, like Manasco, Rodriguez seeks to use section 410.307 to avoid the consequences of not exhausting her administrative remedies. We do not agree that Rodriguez failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as Manasco did. In Manasco, a hearing officer determined Manasco's impairment rating at a contested case hearing. Manasco did not pursue an administrative appeal, but appealed directly to the district court. See TEX. LAB.CODE § 410.169. We held that Manasco did not exhaust his administrative remedies. See Manasco, 971 S.W.2d at 64. Rodriguez, on the other hand, completed the administrative process by appealing the contested case hearing order on her impairment rating's finality to the appeals panel and then to district court. Thus, unlike Manasco, Rodriguez exhausted her administrative remedies. Nevertheless, Rodriguez is not entitled to use section 410.307 to plead substantial change of condition. Again, section 410.307 is a rule of evidence that applies to modified de novo judicial review; it is not an independent cause of action. See Manasco, 971 S.W.2d at 64. In the district court, extent of impairment evidence is limited to evidence that was presented to the Commission, [e]xcept as provided in Section 410.307. TEX. LAB. CODE § 410.306. Under section 410.307, if the court, after a hearing, finds a substantial change of condition, then extent of impairment evidence is not limited to that presented to the Commission. See TEX. LAB.CODE § 410.307. Thus, section 410.307 is not an exception to the 90-day Rule, as Rodriguez argues. We conclude that Rodriguez is entitled to challenge only whether she disputed her impairment rating within ninety days. If the trial court finds that she disputed her impairment rating within ninety days, then Rodriguez is entitled to a contested case hearing to determine a new impairment rating. If Rodriguez then properly appeals the contested case order to the appeals panel and then to district court, she may be entitled to present substantial change of condition evidence. See TEX. LAB.CODE § 410.307.