Opinion ID: 4470161
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial justice erred in dismissing the claims brought on behalf of the Guardianship.3 The plaintiff proffers a rather novel argument, contending that Joyce should have been allowed to represent herself pro se through plaintiff as her guardian (and son). In other words, plaintiff contends that he “should have been allowed to stand in Joyce’s shoes and, in effect, exercise her right to self-representation.” Thus, plaintiff contends, Joyce was deprived of her right to represent herself pro se, in violation of her constitutional right to due process. The plaintiff also argues, in the alternative, that the trial justice erred in denying plaintiff’s request to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent Joyce under Rule 17(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.4 The plaintiff’s arguments are without merit. We acknowledge that litigants have the right to represent themselves pro se. Jacksonbay Builders, Inc. v. Azarmi, 869 A.2d 580, 585 (R.I. 2005). But pro se litigants “are not entitled to greater rights than those represented by counsel.” Id. (quoting Gray v. Stillman White Co., Inc., 522 A.2d 737, 741 (R.I. 1987)). Accordingly, pro se litigants have no right to be represented by an individual who is not authorized to practice law. 3 The plaintiff indicated at oral argument that he was not appealing the trial justice’s dismissal of the claims brought in his individual capacity. Therefore, our review is confined to the claims brought on behalf of the Guardianship. 4 Rule 17(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides: “Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such as a general guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. If an infant or incompetent person does not have a duly appointed representative, the infant or incompetent person may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such other order as the court deems proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent person.” -5- See Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corporation, 780 F.2d 124, 140 (1st Cir. 1985) (“The right of self-representation is not ‘a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.’”) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46 (1975)). In this case, although Joyce had the right to represent herself pro se, she could not exercise that right through plaintiff, as her guardian (and son), because plaintiff is not authorized to practice law in Rhode Island, and his motion to appear on behalf of the Guardianship pro hac vice had been denied.5 Regardless, even if plaintiff had been authorized to practice law in Rhode Island, he could not represent the interests of Joyce as her counsel while also serving in his fiduciary capacity as her guardian, as a matter of law. See In re Estate of Ross, 131 A.3d 158, 167 (R.I. 2016) (explaining that a fiduciary relationship arises from the appointment of a guardian). Furthermore, plaintiff could not appear on behalf of the Guardianship, because he was a key fact witness in the case. We therefore conclude that the trial justice did not err in dismissing the claims alleged by plaintiff on behalf of the Guardianship, because Joyce had no right to be represented by an individual who is not authorized to practice law—i.e., plaintiff. We also reject plaintiff’s argument that the trial justice erred in denying plaintiff’s request to appoint a guardian ad litem. The plain language of Rule 17(c) indicates that a court has the authority to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent an incompetent person who is not otherwise represented in a case. Specifically, Rule 17(c) states, in part: “The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such other order as the court deems proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent person.” (Emphasis added.) 5 We pause to suggest that plaintiff could have stood in his mother’s shoes and retained counsel for her. -6- Here, the record reveals that the plaintiff became Joyce’s guardian in 2014 and that Joyce was represented by the plaintiff, as her guardian (and son), for the duration of the litigation in this case. Rule 17(c), therefore, does not apply. Thus, we conclude that the trial justice did not err in denying the plaintiff’s request to appoint a guardian ad litem.