Opinion ID: 2829735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Marrero's Claims

Text: Marrero makes three arguments particular to his appeal. First, he challenges the constitutionality of the conspiracy statutes as applied to him. Second, he contends that a Petrozziello error resulted in the improper admission of hearsay - 24 - evidence and gave rise to a prejudicial variance. Finally, he argues that the district court should have granted his Rule 29 motion for cumulative error. We address these arguments in turn. A. As Applied Challenge to the Conspiracy Statutes Marrero argues that the conspiracy statutes, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 963, are unconstitutional as applied to him because those provisions did not give him fair notice of what constitutes participation in a conspiracy. In other words, he asserts that he did not have fair notice that, by knowingly building secret compartments to smuggle drugs for a drug conspiracy, he could be held accountable as a co-conspirator.14 Marrero is correct that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause gives him a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977). In claiming a violation of that right, Marrero relies in particular on the vagueness doctrine, the aspect of the fair warning requirement that bars enforcement of 'a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in 14Since Marrero raises his constitutional argument for the first time on appeal, our review is for plain error. United States v. Diaz, 519 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2008). Marrero must show (1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected the defendant's substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding. United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92, 102 (1st Cir. 2003). - 25 - terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (Souter, J.) (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).15 Judicial interpretations may clarify an otherwise imprecise statute. Id. As Marrero concedes, the parameters of the conspiracy statutes are articulated in our case law. See, e.g., Burgos, 703 F.3d at 11 (explicating the third element of conspiracy, knowing and voluntary participation). Marrero nevertheless asserts that there is no clear line between lawful work on a vessel -- such as installing a GPS, fixing engines, or building cabinets -- and conduct that make[s] me a member of a conspiracy by mere knowledge of the improper intended use of the vessel and/or my services. Marrero's argument, however, is flawed because he was not convicted for mere knowledge of the drug conspiracy and the conspirators' intent to use his services for unlawful ends. Rather, he was convicted because he was a knowing participant in the conspiracy. Marrero's attempt to characterize his conviction 15There are three related manifestations of the fair warning requirement, namely, the vagueness doctrine, the rule of lenity, and the principle that a court's novel construction of a criminal statute cannot be applied to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope. Lanier, 520 U.S. at 266 (discussing fair warning in the context of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process). - 26 - as an arbitrary distinction between otherwise lawful activities therefore misses the mark. In the ancillary functions he identifies, it is not the nature of the defendant's services but the intent with which they are provided that distinguishes the innocent vendor from the co-conspirator. Hence, Marrero's constitutional challenge fails. The statutes, in conjunction with our case law, gave him fair warning that knowingly participating in a drug conspiracy with the requisite intent could expose him to criminal penalties.16 B. Prejudicial Variance Marrero contends that the district court erroneously admitted into evidence hearsay about unrelated conspiracies and this amounts to prejudicial variance. We will untangle Marrero's argument and take the hearsay objection first. We will then address the multiple conspiracy and prejudicial variance arguments. 16 To the extent his constitutional argument is really a mislabeled challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, his challenge fails. A reasonable jury could have found that he was not indifferent to the conspiracy but was, rather, a member of it. See Burgos, 703 F.3d at 11. The jury could have determined that Marrero ma[d]e it his own, id., by building secret compartments that he knew would advance the conspiracy's objectives of smuggling cocaine for distribution while avoiding police detection. Marrero further demonstrated his intent to join the conspiracy by agreeing to join Retamar on the drug run. Although he later changed his mind and did not go on the drug run, his initial agreement would nevertheless support a reasonable jury's conclusion that he was a member of the conspiracy. - 27 - 1. Hearsay Marrero challenges the district court's decision to admit the hearsay testimony of his co-conspirator, Paz. Although hearsay testimony generally is not admissible, an out-of-court statement made by a defendant's co-conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy is not hearsay and may be introduced into evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), 802. To admit such evidence, the district court must determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the declarant and the defendant were members of the same conspiracy and that the statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Ciresi, 697 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2012) (articulating the preponderance standard); United States v. Goldberg, 105 F.3d 770, 775-76 (1st Cir. 1997) (explaining that, following United States v. Baines, 812 F.2d 41, 42 (1st Cir. 1987), statements of a co-conspirator made before the defendant joined the conspiracy are also admissible). In this circuit, the district court's decision to allow testimony under the co-conspirator exception is called a Petrozziello ruling, after United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977). A court may provisionally admit a statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and defer its final Petrozziello ruling until the close of evidence. Ciresi, 697 F.3d at 25. To preserve a challenge to a district court's Petrozziello ruling, a defendant must object on hearsay grounds when his or her co[-]conspirator's - 28 - statement is provisionally admitted and must renew the objection at the close of evidence. Id. at 25-26. Preserved challenges are reviewed for clear error; unpreserved challenges, for plain error. Id. at 26. Marrero has specifically identified only one hearsay statement that he contends should not have been admitted: Retamar's testimony that, at their first meeting, Paz told him it would be done, meaning, the clavo would be built. Marrero objected when that statement was admitted into evidence, citing Petrozziello, and renewed his objection at the close of evidence. Hence, our review is for clear error. The preponderance of the evidence easily supports the district court's assessment that Paz and Marrero were coconspirators, just as it supports the court's conclusion that Paz's statement, it would be done, was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. First, Retamar's testimony made clear that Paz and Marrero were co-conspirators. Retamar testified that Paz and Marrero attended multiple planning meetings with him to discuss building clavos, and that, working together, Paz and Marrero built clavos in both the Sheymarie and the Such Is Life. Second, it is more likely than not that Paz's statement, it would be done, was made in furtherance of the conspiracy because it could easily be construed as a promise that he and his assistant, Marrero, would construct secret compartments to aid Retamar in smuggling hundreds - 29 - of kilograms of cocaine into Puerto Rico. Therefore, the court did not err, much less clearly err, in admitting Paz's statement into evidence. 2. Multiple Conspiracies and Prejudicial Variance Marrero argues that the district court admitted evidence of multiple uncharged conspiracies, giving rise to a variance and prejudicial spillover. A variance occurs when the evidence at trial proves different facts than those alleged in the indictment, such as when the indictment charges one conspiracy but the evidence supports multiple conspiracies. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 116 (internal quotation marks omitted). Three factors guide our assessment of whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that a set of criminal activities comprised a single conspiracy: (1) the existence of a common goal, (2) overlap among the activities' participants, and (3) interdependence among the participants. Ciresi, 697 F.3d at 26. A single conspiracy may exist even if the participants or their respective roles change over time. Id. Even if a defendant proves a variance, he must also prove that it was prejudicial. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 116. Prejudice may result from evidentiary spillover: the transference of guilt to a defendant involved in one conspiracy from evidence incriminating defendants in another conspiracy in which the particular defendant was not involved. United States v. Wihbey, - 30 - 75 F.3d 761, 774 (1st Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). To prevail on an evidentiary spillover claim, the defendant must prove prejudice so pervasive that a miscarriage of justice looms. United States v. Levy-Cordero, 67 F.3d 1002, 1008 (1st Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Marrero attempts to prove a variance by dividing the facts temporally into six sequential conspiracies corresponding to changes in personnel and discrete drug runs.17 The evidence, however, points to a single conspiracy involving multiple transactions and players.18 First, Marrero concedes that all six of the conspiracies he attempts to distill from the fact pattern share a common goal, namely, to sell drugs for profit. Second, there is a clear overlap among participants: either Retamar or Irizarry was involved in every aspect of the conspiracy, often 17The six conspiracies Marrero identifies are: (1) Retamar and Irizarry's drug smuggling work for their former employer; (2) Retamar's work (independent of Irizarry) for their former employer; (3) Retamar and Irizarry's importation of twenty kilograms of cocaine using one of their former employer's boats; (4) the conspiracy charged in the indictment, namely, to import and distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine using the Sheymarie and the Such Is Life; (5) the conspiracy Retamar ran in the time between his split with Irizarry and his arrest; and (6) the sting operation. 18 The government contends that Marrero forfeited his multiple conspiracies argument for, among other reasons, failing to request a multiple conspiracy jury instruction. Since Marrero's argument cannot succeed on the merits, we need not decide whether he forfeited it. - 31 - working in tandem. Finally, the participants worked interdependently. For example, Marrero provided the secret compartments that Retamar and Irizarry then used to smuggle drugs. Looking to the totality of the evidence to see if it supports a finding of a single conspiracy, Ciresi, 697 F.3d at 26 (internal quotation marks omitted), we think the evidence at trial proved only one ongoing conspiracy that began when Retamar and Irizarry met and ran until the Such Is Life was confiscated. Hence, there was no variance.19 C. Cumulative Error In his final argument, for cumulative error, Marrero identifies six motions he submitted to the district court and seeks to incorporate them by reference.20 The substantive argument for 19Marrero's best case for a variance is the evidence pertaining to Retamar and Irizarry's work for their former employer. However, the evidence presented on those facts -- the so-called conspiracies #1 and #2 -- comprised no more than a handful of pages of the transcript at the very beginning of Retamar's two-day testimony. Furthermore, that portion of the testimony was aimed at establishing nothing more than how Retamar and Irizarry met and how each knew that the other was involved in drug trafficking. Marrero has not proved that the prejudice resulting from that testimony was so pervasive that a miscarriage of justice looms. Levy-Cordero, 67 F.3d at 1008 (internal quotation marks omitted). 20The six motions are: a motion for judgment of acquittal and/or for new trial (DE 250); two motions to dismiss the indictment (DE 244, 246); two motions in limine regarding the alleged improper use of transcripts (DE 231, 247); and a motion for a sentence below the statutory minimum (DE 363). - 32 - cumulative error is limited to the following in his opening brief: We adopt said documents by reference and request this Honorable Court to evaluate the arguments presented therein, both de novo as well as non harmless cumulative error. As the government asserts, incorporation by reference is an ineffective method of preserving arguments for appeal. See United States v. Orrego-Martinez, 575 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2009) (stating that incorporation of arguments by reference has been consistently and roundly condemned (internal quotation marks omitted)). Marrero attempts to elaborate in his reply brief, but he does not sufficiently develop an argument in support of any of the six motions.21 Hence, his cumulative error argument, like the arguments in the motions he seeks to incorporate by reference, is waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ([I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.). 21In support of one of the motions Marrero seeks to incorporate by reference -- a motion to dismiss Count One of the indictment because it allegedly used language permitting the jury to convict him for guilt by association -- he does include a footnote quoting, but not discussing, Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 178-79 (1951), and United States v. Allen, 670 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2012). He notes in his reply brief on appeal, We understand that the nature of the defect in the Indictment is patent and requires no major argumentation. We reject this attempt to bypass our well-established waiver rules. - 33 -