Opinion ID: 149531
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction to Revoke Supervised Release for Pre-Transfer Violations

Text: King first argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release for violations he committed before the transfer of jurisdiction from the Eastern District of Michigana question of first impression in our circuit. King's argument fails in light of the statutory text and structure, the absurd results it would yield, and the unanimous opinions of our sister circuits. The text and structure of the statute authorizing transfer of jurisdiction over individuals on supervised release indicates that a transferee court has jurisdiction to revoke supervised release for violations committed before transfer. That statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3605, provides that [a] court to which jurisdiction is transferred under this section is authorized to exercise all powers over the probationer or releasee that are permitted by this subchapter or subchapter B or D of chapter 227which includes the power to revoke a term of supervised release . . . if the court . . . finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release, id. § 3583(e)(3) (part of ch. 227, subchapter D). Under this statutory structure, the transferee court steps into the shoes of the transferor courtwhich, per § 3583(e), had jurisdiction to revoke supervised release for pre-transfer violations. Section § 3605's language does not limit the transferee court's power to violations that occur after transfer. If we were to adopt the contrary position (as King urges), two incongruous consequences would follow. First, the contrary rule would create a twilight zone of immunity for violations committedbut not discoveredbefore transfer. Second, the logic of King's argument is not limited to the transferee court's jurisdiction to revoke supervised release; it applies with equal force to the transferee court's jurisdiction to terminate or reduce the conditions of supervised release. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (power to revoke a term of supervised release) with id. § 3583(e)(1) (power to terminate a term of supervised release) and id. § 3583(e)(2) (power to modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release). Thus, for example, under King's reading of the statute, a transferee court would be powerless to terminate or modify a supervised release term on the basis of the supervisee's good behavior before transferforcing the supervisee to start at square one after each transfer. Cf. United States v. Miller, 205 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir.2000) (`Occasionally, changed circumstancesfor instance, exceptionally good behavior by the defendant . . .will render a previously imposed term or condition of release either too harsh or inappropriately tailored to serve the general punishment goals of section 3553(a).') (citation omitted). As a result, even if § 3605 were ambiguous, we would construe it to avoid these absurd results. See, e.g., United States v. Middleton, 231 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir.2000) (courts should avoid, if possible, a [statutory] interpretation that would produce `an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended') (quoting Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429, 118 S.Ct. 2091, 141 L.Ed.2d 393 (1998)). Moreover, two other circuits have rejectedand none have adoptedKing's position. See United States v. Bailey, 257 Fed.Appx. 210, 212 (11th Cir.2007) (unpublished) ([B]ased on the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3605, the district court for the Northern District of Georgia had the power to revoke Bailey's supervised release as to the case transferred from Alabama, regardless of whether the conduct underlying the revocation was pre-transfer or post-transfer. . . .); United States v. Fernandez, 379 F.3d 270, 275-76 (5th Cir. 2004) (rejecting argument that Congress intended only that after a valid transfer of jurisdiction has taken place, the defendant's subsequent commission of a crime in the transferee district would allow the transferee court to address the original supervised release along with the sentence for the new crime; instead concluding that [§ 3605's] legislative history clearly indicates that the statute allows the transferor court . . . to transfer jurisdiction after charges have been filed against the releasee for a new offense committed . . . before any transfer of jurisdiction) (emphasis in original). King's reliance on United States v. Miller, 547 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir.2008), is misplaced. There, we held only that a defendant's release under a pre-release program does not trigger the start of his term of supervised release (and thus the applicability of his supervised release conditions). Id. at 1212-13. Here, by contrast, there is no dispute that King's violations occurred during his term of supervised release. We thus hold that a transferee court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3605 to revoke a term of supervised release for violations committed before the transfer of jurisdiction.