Opinion ID: 1948051
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Open Fields Doctrine

Text: The State contends, finally, that (1) the suppression court justice clearly erred in applying the  Katz expectation of privacy analysis to this case because the case is governed by the `open fields' doctrine analysis developed in Hester . . .; and (2) the justice clearly erred in questioning the viability of the doctrine of Hester, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898. In his order, the justice did observe, parenthetically, that [t]he extent to which the open fields doctrine is still viable after Katz ... is open to considerable doubt. This observation was preceded, however, by the finding that neither the plain view or open fields exception to the warrant requirement is applicable. We have recently noted that after Katz, the  Hester doctrine remains entirely intact in Maine and elsewhere. Dow, 392 A.2d at 536. Regardless of his estimations of the doctrine's viability, the suppression justice applied the law of the State and found inapplicable the open fields exception to the warrant requirement. His conclusion concerning the availability of this exception under these circumstances was correct. In Maine, for the open fields doctrine to apply, two factual aspects of the circumstances must be considered: (1) the openness with which the activity is pursued, Peakes, 440 A.2d at 353 (the officers observed something which was `open and patent' to the Defendant's neighbors and their invitees); Dow, 392 A.2d at 535 (open, obvious criminal activity conducted in public place not constitutionally protected); and (2) the lawfulness of the officers' presence during their observations of what is open and patent. Dow, 392 A.2d at 535 ([t]he warden, who apparently had as much right to be in the parking lot as the defendants, merely observed that which was completely open to public view . . .); Peakes, 440 A.2d at 353 (the Waldoboro officers had permission to be where they were when they saw the marijuana plants); Stone, 294 A.2d at 689 (without any unlawful initial intrusion into the interior of the automobile, Trooper Smith saw, as knowingly exposed to public view (even though inside the automobile) a 30 calibre carbine rifle . . .). Although an activity may be observed, because, for example, it is conducted outside, the participants may still have, as in this case, an expectation of privacy. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52, 88 S.Ct. at 511, 19 L.Ed.2d at 582. Under such circumstances, the State must demonstrate the legitimacy of the officers' position of observation and the openness of the conduct in order to prove that the expectation of privacy is not objectively reasonable and that, therefore, police observations do not constitute a search. In the circumstances of this case, the State can demonstrate neither requirement for the application of the open fields doctrine. The defendant made every effort to conceal his activity; nothing about his enterprise was open, patent, or knowingly exposed to the public. Secondly, the officers were never legitimately on the defendant's property; they entered the defendant's land without a warrant, and within no exception to the warrant requirement, for the specific purpose of verifying information to be used, ultimately, against him. Further, we note that the State's erroneous assumption that the fact that the scene of the criminal activity occurred in an area akin to an open field precludes the need for further fourth amendment analysis. The determination of a lawful search and seizure under fourth amendment analysis does not involve plugging in one of several mutually exclusive theories or doctrines, such as the open fields doctrine, depending on the particular facts. Surely a determination of fourth amendment protection involves a more cohesive and reasoned approach. Although separated by forty-three years, the Hester doctrine and the Katz doctrine can be reconciled; indeed, such reconciliation is required. Dow, 392 A.2d at 536; State v. Brady, 379 So.2d 1294, 1295 (Fla. 1980) ( Katz did not rule out the open fields of Hester altogether). Under both analyses, the reasonableness of any subjective expectation of privacy would be questioned: the question of the reasonable right of privacy may well still depend in part on whether the field is truly open or whether it is fenced with the obvious purpose of keeping people out. Brady, 379 So.2d at 1295. There is little doubt that the Katz majority would have agreed that Hester had no reasonable expectation of privacy in distributing moonshine whiskey in an open field on his father's land. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516, 19 L.Ed.2d at 588 (Harlan, J., concurring). The point is not that the area of the marijuana patches was accessible to the public, Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516, 19 L.Ed.2d at 588 (Harlan, J., concurring), or that, under different circumstances, the defendant's land might have been open woods. The dispositive point is that by his actions the defendant indicated that he expected his land to be a private place. Under these facts, we think that that expectation was reasonable. Trooper Crandall figured the marijuana was on the defendant's land. The two officers walked directly to the chicken-wire enclosures; it was not possible to observe the patches except from such close proximity. The officers were checking the property, without permission or authority, to ensure enough information. This conduct was a search; the State has not proved the reasonableness of this search. Linscott, 416 A.2d at 259. An unreasonable search, under every doctrine and theory, is proscribed by the fourth amendment. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. All concurring.