Opinion ID: 3016985
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Liability of Graziani.

Text: Woloszyn’s wife argues that, considering HartmanSwanson’s affidavit and Shaftic’s unsworn statement, it is clear that Woloszyn was assigned to unit HB where . . . Graziani was the assigned corrections officer. At the time of Woloszyn’s transfer, he was the subject of an order requiring five minute suicide checks. After arriving at unit HB, Woloszyn requested a counselor. Thereafter, Woloszyn engaged in behavior which would have alerted any reasonable person to a problem including yelling, screaming, and punching which . . . Shaftic described as Woloszyn going “nuts.” In spite of all of this, . . . Graziani, by his own admission to . . . [Hartman-Swanson] “was supposed to do five minute checks but did not go up to check until he was found.” Mrs. Woloszyn argues that Graziani was therefore aware of Woloszyn’s vulnerability to suicide because he was ordered to perform 5 minute checks, and his failure to do so establishes the requisite reckless indifference to Woloszyn’s vulnerability. However, her argument reads too much into this record. Woloszyn was not subject to five minute suicide checks. In fact, he was not under five minute checks at all. Adamo did tell 16 Hartman-Swanson that he would put Woloszyn on five minute checks, but Hartman-Swanson also affirmed that Adamo thereafter stated he would follow the nurse’s advice. Nurse Houck testified that W oloszyn was polite, cooperative and alert, and oriented in place and time. Woloszyn did not request a counselor or psychiatrist and, absent Shaftic’s “statement,” there was no indication that Woloszyn needed one or that he intended to harm himself. Therefore, Houck did not place Woloszyn on a suicide watch or order five minute checks on his cell. Instead, she merely placed him on one hour checks for signs of alcohol withdrawal. Accordingly, Adamo placed Woloszyn on one hour checks as the nurse suggested or ordered, but he was to be observed for signs of withdrawal; he was not on a suicide watch as Mrs. Woloszyn now argues. Furthermore, Mrs. Woloszyn has not shown that there are any genuine issues of material fact as to Woloszyn’s particular vulnerability to suicide. As we explained in Colburn II, “the requirement of a ‘particular vulnerability to suicide’ speaks to the degree of risk inherent in the detainees condition. . . . [T]here must be ‘a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility, that self-inflicted harm will occur.’” 946 F.3d at 1024. Officer List testified that when he, Lt. Gilchrist and Woloszyn arrived at the LCCF, Woloszyn appeared to be in good spirits and was talking and joking with them. HartmanSwanson affirmed that Woloszyn specifically denied being suicidal. Additionally, Hartman-Swanson indicated in the Booking Questionnaire that there was nothing in Woloszyn’s conduct or actions that suggested that Woloszyn was suicidal. As we have just noted, Nurse Houck did not recommend a suicide watch because Woloszyn’s medical assessment did not 17 suggest that was necessary or appropriate. Graziani and Sainato both testified that Woloszyn’s behavior upon arrival at the HB unit was unremarkable. Finally, Graziani testified that Woloszyn spelled his name to him and told Graziani that he wanted a glass of juice in the morning. Mrs. Woloszyn argues that statements in Hartman- Swanson’s affidavit demonstrate that Woloszyn had a particular vulnerability to suicide. As noted above, Hartman-Swanson said that Woloszyn was remorseful and distant, was not answering her questions, was talking about having failed as a father; and he admitted having been on a 24 hour drug and alcohol binge. However, we do not think such statements, without more, are sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding knowledge of Woloszyn’s vulnerability to suicide. They do not show that there was “a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility, that self-inflicted harm will occur.” We also must disagree with Mrs. Woloszyn’s interpretation of another reference in the Hartman-Swanson affidavit. In her affidavit, Hartman-Swanson stated: Matthew Graziani told me he was supposed to do five minute checks but did not go up to check until [Woloszyn] was found. He was remorseful at the time and said “but Linda I did not go up and check on him.” More recently Matthew Graziani said it was no big thing, it was just another druggy. This was a couple of days later. That statement would allow a reasonable juror to conclude that 18 Graziani should have been checking on Woloszyn every five minutes and that he failed to do so. It would also allow the fact finder to conclude that Graziani was callous and unsympathetic. However, it would still not establish a particular vulnerability that would create a strong likelihood of suicide. That reference to Graziani does not, therefore, advance the appropriate inquiry under Colburn I and II. The only evidence that could raise a genuine issue of material fact on this record is Shaftic’s unsworn statement. The district court did not consider that statement. The court reasoned that since the statement was not in affidavit form, it was not “sufficient . . . to rely upon . . . in disposing of the pending motion for summary judgment.” We believe the court’s handling of that unsworn statement was appropriate. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158 n.17 (1970) (noting that an unsworn statement does not satisfy the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Woloszyn’s wife did file an appropriate motion to prevent the entry of summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). That Rule, captioned “When Affidavits are Unavailable,” provides: Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot, for reasons stated, present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had 19 or may make such other order as is just. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). Shaftic’s unsworn statement was dated March 28, 2000. In an affidavit attached to the Rule 56(f) motion, counsel for Mrs. Woloszyn affirmed that he was unable to obtain a sworn affidavit from Shaftic because he was a fugitive. However, counsel also intimated that Shaftic had been incarcerated at the LCCF, but that prison officials had informed counsel that Shaftic had been released. In any event, Woloszyn’s wife asked the district court to deny the defendants’ motion for summary judgment because she could not then locate Shaftic to obtain his sworn statement or depose him. In denying Mrs. Woloszyn’s Rule 56(f) motion, the court wrote: It is further noted, that nearly 3 years after the “statement” was provided, and only after briefing and conferences with this Court occurred with respect to summary judgment, that [Mrs. Woloszyn] moved this Court pursuant to F.R.C.P. 56(f) to deny summary judgment. That Motion was denied based upon the fact that the [she] had previously responded in substance to the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. Mrs. Woloszyn does not now argue that the district court abused 20 its discretion in denying her Rule 56(f) motion.6 Rather, she contends that the court should have granted it without giving reason or authority for that contention. Moreover, she does not now claim that she would have been able to obtain an affidavit from Shaftic or depose him had she been afforded that opportunity. Finally, Mrs. Woloszyn argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Graziani because Graziani failed “to maintain a breathing mask in a proper location.” However, that argument borders on frivolity. Earlier, we noted that Stiles and Graziani performed CPR while another corrections officer went to look for a protective breathing mask. In Mrs. Woloszyn’s view, “Graziani’s failure to maintain a breathing mask in its designated location is an independent basis for denial of summary judgment” because it shows his deliberate indifference. However, she points to nothing in the record that suggests that Graziani was responsible for ensuring that a protective breathing mask would always be present in HB Unit. More importantly, Stiles and Graziani immediately initiated CPR on Woloszyn without waiting for a protective mask to arrive. They continued administering CPR, apparently in disregard for their own safety and hygiene, until Corrections Officer Piatt returned with a protective breathing mask. Aside from suggesting that Graziani’s deposition is self-serving, Mrs. Woloszyn offers nothing to contradict Graziani’s testimony that 6 We review the district court’s denial of a Rule 56(f) motion for discovery under an abuse of discretion standard. Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2002). 21 he started CPR immediately. Moreover, Mrs. Woloszyn does not claim that immediate use of a protective breathing mask would somehow have prevented Woloszyn’s death. Thus, even assuming arguendo that Graziani was responsible for ensuring that a protective mask was available in the HB Unit, its unavailability has no bearing on the issues here. Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 1024.