Opinion ID: 2811247
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Availability of Federal Habeas Relief

Text: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) sets a high bar for granting federal habeas relief on a claim that the state court has adjudicated on the merits. See White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (noting the difficulty of obtaining habeas relief under AEDPA); Harrington v. 6 Case: 13-15223 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 Page: 7 of 13 Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (“If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.”). Under AEDPA, a federal court may only grant habeas relief on such a claim if the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established [f]ederal law” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As discussed below, neither requirement is met in this case. 1. The Florida court’s decision that Petitioner failed to show prejudice is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. To prevail on this prong of § 2254(d), a petitioner must do more than convince the federal habeas court that it would have made a different factual determination than the state court. Landers v. Warden, Att’y Gen. of Ala., 776 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2015). Instead, the petitioner must satisfy the “substantially higher threshold” of showing that the state court’s factual determination was “objectively unreasonable” based on the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Id. (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) and Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has found that this standard was satisfied when “the direction of the evidence, viewed cumulatively, was ‘too powerful to conclude anything but’” a petitioner’s factual claim. Id. (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 7 Case: 13-15223 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 Page: 8 of 13 U.S. 231, 265 (2005)). We have further explained that a state court’s factual finding is unreasonable if “no ‘fairminded jurist’ could agree” with it. Id. (quoting Holsey v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 694 F.3d 1230, 1257 (11th Cir. 2012)). Petitioner contends that the Florida court’s prejudice ruling was based on an unreasonable determination that Petitioner was aware that his exposure on the one second-degree robbery charge that he took to trial was 85 to 120 years in prison. However, read in context, it is clear that what the Florida court actually found was that Petitioner rejected the 15-year plea offer knowing that his maximum exposure on all of his pending charges, including the four robberies and the burglary and drug possession charges, was 85 to 120 years. That finding was reasonable, as it was directly supported by Pavlidis’s testimony that she advised Petitioner during the plea negotiations that he faced a maximum unenhanced sentence of 85 years on all of his cases, and an enhanced sentence of 30 years on each robbery that, if imposed consecutively, would amount to 120 years. Petitioner alternatively suggests that it was unreasonable for the Florida court to consider his knowledge about the maximum sentence that could be imposed if convicted in all of his cases to determine whether he was prejudiced in this case. We disagree. To establish prejudice, Petitioner had to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea if he had been advised about the maximum 40-year sentence and the 30-year mandatory minimum 8 Case: 13-15223 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 Page: 9 of 13 applicable under the VCC statute. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012) (holding that to show prejudice in the context of a foregone guilty plea, a petitioner must show, inter alia, that, but for the ineffective assistance of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer); Osley v. United States, 751 F.3d 1214, 1223 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming the denial of a § 2255 motion to vacate on the ground that the movant failed to establish a reasonable probability that he would have accepted a plea offer because he had already refused to accept a deal that proposed a significantly lower sentence). The fact that Petitioner rejected a 15-year plea offer to dispose of numerous cases that he knew potentially carried a 120-year combined sentence is unquestionably relevant to this inquiry. 2 See Osley, 751 F.3d at 1224 (finding that the movant’s claim that he would have accepted a plea offer had he known that he faced a guideline range of up to 262 months, instead of 121 months, and included a 15-year mandatory minimum, was undermined by the fact that he turned down a plea of 70-87 months knowing his maximum exposure at trial was life imprisonment); cf. Smith v. United States, 348 F.3d 545, 552 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Other panels in this and other circuits have pointed to the disparity between the plea offer and the potential sentence exposure as strong evidence of a reasonable 2 Petitioner notes that one of his robbery charges was dismissed before trial. Assuming that is true, and that the 15-year plea deal was still an offer to resolve the remaining cases, Petitioner still decided to forego the offer knowing that he faced 90 years on the remaining three robbery charges. 9 Case: 13-15223 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 Page: 10 of 13 probability that a properly advised defendant would have accepted a guilty plea offer.”). Finally, Petitioner argues that the Florida court’s credibility finding was unreasonable because his testimony that he would have accepted the plea offer if he had been advised about his sentencing exposure as a VCC was “uncontested.” This argument mischaracterizes the evidence presented at the state post-conviction hearing. Although Petitioner did testify that he would have accepted the plea if he had been aware of the 40-year maximum/30-year mandatory minimum sentence that could be imposed under the VCC statute, his credibility on that point was called into question by Pavlidis’s testimony that: (1) Petitioner rejected the State’s 15-year plea offer in spite of her advice (a) that he could potentially be sentenced to 120 years if convicted in all of the cases that the plea would resolve and (b) that the trial court might well impose maximum, consecutive sentences in each case, given Petitioner’s lengthy prior record (which included 20 robberies); (2) Petitioner stated unequivocally that he would not accept any sentence that required more than five years in prison; and (3) Petitioner’s steadfast refusal to accept more than five years in prison ended plea negotiations. Based on Pavlidis’s testimony, the Florida court reasonably found that Petitioner’s claim that he would have accepted the 15-year plea offer if he had been aware of the potential VCC enhancement was not credible. See Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 10 Case: 13-15223 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 Page: 11 of 13 1259 (11th Cir. 2013) (concluding that, absent clear and convincing evidence, this Court has no power to revisit the state court’s credibility determinations). 2. The Florida court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law. A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing Supreme Court precedent or arrives at a different result than the Supreme Court in the face of materially indistinguishable facts. Burton v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 700 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 2012). An “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law occurs if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from Supreme Court precedent but “unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case.” Id. (quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)) (quotation marks omitted). Relief is not available under this prong of § 2254(d) if the state court’s application of federal law is “merely wrong.” Woodall, 134 S. Ct. at 1702. Rather, the application must be “objectively unreasonable” to warrant relief. Id. (the state court’s error must be “well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement”). The Florida court’s decision clearly was not “contrary” to federal law, as it correctly identified the governing legal principles from the relevant Supreme Court authority. In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate that (1) 11 Case: 13-15223 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 Page: 12 of 13 counsel’s performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of the deficient performance. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). The Supreme Court later clarified that, to show prejudice in the context of a foregone guilty plea, the petitioner must show that he would have accepted the plea offer but for the ineffective advice of counsel. Lafler, 566 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1385. While the Florida court did not cite to either Strickland or Lafler, 3 it determined that Petitioner had to show prejudice in order to prevail on his claim, as required by Strickland. The Florida court further determined that in order to establish prejudice, Petitioner had to show a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea, as required by Lafler. Accordingly, the court correctly identified the governing legal principles, and thus, its decision was not contrary to federal law. Petitioner does not cite any materially indistinguishable Supreme Court cases that arrive at a different result. Neither was the Florida court’s prejudice determination an “unreasonable application” of federal law. In denying Petitioner’s Rule 3.850 motion, the Florida 3 In fact, the Florida court could not have cited to Lafler as that case was decided in March 2012, and the Florida court issued its decision in January 2011. However, the Florida court nevertheless applied the principle set forth in Lafler, as the decision in Lafler confirmed this Court’s approach to prejudice in previous cases examining the question of prejudice in a guilty plea context. See Coulter v. Herring, 60 F.3d 1499, 1503-04 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a foregone guilty plea, a petitioner must show that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would have pleaded guilty and not insisted on going to trial). 12 Case: 13-15223 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 Page: 13 of 13 court did not consider whether counsel’s performance was deficient, but instead denied Petitioner’s claim based solely on Strickland’s prejudice prong. Such an approach does not make the determination unreasonable, as we have held that if the petitioner makes an insufficient showing on the prejudice prong, the court need not address the performance prong, and vice-versa. See Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000). Finally, and as discussed above, the Florida court reasonably found, based on the evidence presented, that Petitioner could not show that he would have accepted the plea offer had he known of the 40-year maximum/30-year mandatory minimum sentences applicable under the VCC. Such a showing is required by Lafler. Accordingly, Petitioner cannot prevail on the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d).