Opinion ID: 441753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 17 Although they tend to merge the first two, the parties identify three issues on appeal: (1) whether this court has jurisdiction to review the MSPB's decision; (2) whether the NTEU has standing to seek that review; and (3) whether the MSPB correctly decided that 5 C.F.R. Sec. 752.401(c)(10) is valid on its face. We take up the matters of jurisdiction and standing first, since a negative conclusion on either of those issues would preclude any consideration of the regulation's validity.
18 The OPM and the MSPB assert that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the NTEU's appeal because neither former section 2342 nor former section 7703 provides a jurisdictional basis for an appeal from a decision by the MSPB upholding the facial validity of an OPM regulation under Sec. 1205(e). They argue that judicial review of MSPB orders under Sec. 1205(e) is limited to orders dealing with specific personnel actions that have already adversely affected particular employees. The government concedes, first, that Sec. 1205(e)(2)(B) orders, which involve the validity of OPM regulations as implemented through individual personnel actions, could be challenged initially in the courts of appeals under former section 7703, see MSPB Brief at 23 n. 24, and, second, that former section 7703(d) permits the Director of the OPM to seek review of MSPB orders in this court if he determines that the MSPB misinterpreted a civil service law, rule, or regulation affecting personnel management and that [its] decision will have a substantial impact on a civil service law, rule, regulations, or policy directive. 10 It urges, however, that under the CSRA as originally enacted, Congress did not intend to place review of the facial validity of civil service regulations in the courts of appeals. Section 1205(e) was added to the CSRA, it asserts, as an internal management audit to alleviate congressional concern that the Act's assignment of the adjudicatory and personnel management responsibilities formerly exercised by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to OPM, an office headed by a single political appointee, would unduly decrease the protection against abuses of the merit system the bipartisan CSC had previously provided. The addition of Sec. 1205(e) to the CSRA cannot, the government contends, be taken as evidence of any congressional intent to extend jurisdiction to the courts of appeals to review Sec. 1205(e)(2)(A) orders determining the facial validity of OPM regulations. Instead, the government concludes, since the relief sought in such cases is entirely prospective in nature and no regulation is being challenged as invalidly implemented, initial judicial review of the facial validity of OPM regulations was placed in the district courts, not in the courts of appeals, just as it would have been if the MSPB declined to review the regulation at all. 19 For several reasons, we are not convinced by this argument. First of all, the plain language of the CSRA review provisions as originally enacted granted the courts of appeals jurisdiction to review all final orders of the MSPB, 11 except those that could instead be filed in the Court of Claims or involved discrimination. Nothing in the text of former section 2342 or former section 7703 even hints at the government's suggested distinction between MSPB orders determining the facial validity of a civil service regulation and all other MSPB final orders. Thus, the statute on its face grants jurisdiction to this court to hear the NTEU's appeal. 20 Second, nothing in the legislative history of the CSRA contradicts its plain language by indicating either that these particular MSPB orders should be unreviewable or that the courts of appeals are improper forums for that review. The administration-sponsored bill that initiated congressional efforts at major civil service reform in 1977 contained no provision for MSPB review of OPM rules or regulations, nor any provision, as a result, for judicial review from any such MSPB action. See 1 CSRA Legislative History at 1-64. Section 205 of the bill did, however, provide that any employee or applicant for employment adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order or decision of the MSPB could obtain judicial review of the order or decision in the Court of Claims or a court of appeals. Id. at 23. Section 206 amended 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2342, the code provision dealing with court of appeals jurisdiction, to conform with Sec. 205. Id. at 24. 21 As reported from the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service on July 31, 1978, the House bill (H.R.11280) still contained no provisions for MSPB review of OPM rules and regulations or for judicial review of resulting MSPB orders. But Sec. 205 of the House bill now provided that employees adversely affected or aggrieved by MSPB final orders or decisions were to seek judicial review in the Court of Claims or in federal district court rather than in the courts of appeals. 1 CSRA Legislative History at 534. 22 The committee report accompanying H.R.11280 did not explain why the committee had substituted the federal district courts for the court of appeals. It stated only that [t]he new section 7702(a) provides for judicial review by the Court of Claims or any United States district court of decisions of the Board appealed by an employee or applicant for employment. H.R.Rep. No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1978), reprinted in 1 CSRA Legislative History at 636, 660. 23 The bill reported from the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on July 10, 1978 (S. 2640), likewise contained no provisions for MSPB review of OPM rules or regulations or for appeal to the courts from the MSPB decision. Unlike the House bill, however, Sec. 205 of the Senate bill designated the Court of Claims and the courts of appeals as the forums for review of MSPB final orders. 2 CSRA Legislative History at 1395. 24 The committee report accompanying S. 2640 explained in some detail its reasons for placing jurisdiction in the courts of appeals to review MSPB orders and decisions. In particular, the committee wanted to limit any variation in the outcome of appeals by aggrieved employees from adverse action decisions by restricting the number of forums in which such appeals could be heard. It created an exception for cases involving discrimination, however, reasoning that additional factfinding might be required, that district courts were the existing forums for discrimination cases not involving the government, and that uniformity would be better furthered by continuing jurisdiction in the district courts over such claims. S.Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 62-63 (1978), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, p. 2723, reprinted in 2 CSRA Legislative History at 1461, 1526-27. 25 Section 1205(e), which allows MSPB review of OPM rules and regulations, was introduced by Senator Mathias on the Senate floor on August 24, 1978, as an amendment to Sec. 202 (Sec. 1205). Senator Mathias explained that the amendment was intended to correct deficiencies in the reported bill, which did not provide sufficient checks on the policymaking powers of the Director of the Office of Personnel Management. Without some restrictions, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, as a political appointee of the President, could issue rules which would politicize the civil service in violation of merit system principles. 124 Cong.Rec. 27,561 (1978), reprinted in 2 CSRA Legislative History at 1659. Senator Percy added that the purpose of the amendment was to address concerns ... in the Federal bureaucracy. Id. at 27,563, reprinted in 2 CSRA Legislative History at 1662. The amendment was intended, the Senator stated, to address 26 these fears while retaining the essential structure and thrust of the overall legislation. For instance, the Merit System Protection Board review procedure is drafted so as not to allow MSPB a role in policymaking, this area being reserved for OPM. It is simply a way to assure that OPM in implementing policy through regulations does not step over the line and commit prohibitive [sic] personnel actions which is the sole standard of review for striking regulations down. 27 Id. 28 Representative Fisher introduced the same amendment on the floor of the House on September 11, 1978. Id. at 28,720, reprinted in 1 CSRA Legislative History at 884. He stated that the amendment would add a small bit to the protection of Government employees throughout the Merit System Board.... This amendment simply says that the Merit System Protection Board can review any OPM regulation and if it violates a prohibited personnel practice, then it can overrule that regulation and prevent its going into operation. Id. After he pointed out that the same provision was in the Senate bill and Representative Udall added that the administration was willing to accept it, the House agreed to the amendment. Id. 29 The bill passed by the House on September 13, 1978, therefore, allowed the MSPB to review OPM rules and regulations and granted jurisdiction to the Court of Claims and the federal district courts for review of final MSPB orders. S. 2640, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. Secs. 202(a), 205, 124 Cong.Rec. 29,221, 29,225, 29,229, reprinted in 1 CSRA Legislative History at 1142, 1155-56, 1174-75. The Senate bill, passed on August 4, 1978, 124 Cong.Rec. 27,593 (1978), also provided for MSPB review of OPM rules and regulations, but placed jurisdiction to review MSPB orders in the Court of Claims and the courts of appeals. 2 CSRA Legislative History at 1743, 1763. A compromise version of S. 2640 passed the Senate on October 4, 124 Cong.Rec. 33,390 (1978), and the House on October 6, id. at 34,105. The bill adopted the Senate provision placing jurisdiction in the court of appeals because, according to the conference report, it incorporated the traditional appellate mechanism for reviewing final decisions and orders of Federal administrative agencies. H.R.Rep. No. 1717 (Conf.Rep.) 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 143 (1978), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 2723, 2876, reprinted in 2 CSRA Legislative History at 1843, 1985. 30 It is clear from the legislative history that former sections 2342 and 7703 were originally drafted when individual employee adjudications were the only OPM actions reviewable by the MSPB. Section 1205(e), allowing MSPB review of OPM rulemaking, was added near the end of the legislative process. So far as appears, Congress never thought specifically about the reviewability of Sec. 1205(e) orders. Thus, there is no support in the legislative history for the distinction the government seeks to draw between unreviewable Sec. 1205(e)(2)(A) orders challenging the facial validity of OPM rules and regulations and reviewable Sec. 1205(e)(2)(B) orders challenging the validity of such rules and regulations as implemented. Far less is there the clear expression of legislative intent that would be needed to overcome the plain language of former sections 2342 and 7703. Indeed, the one clue we have suggests that Congress would have wanted to provide for judicial review of those orders in the courts of appeals. The Conference Committee had the opportunity to exempt Sec. 1205(e) orders from the provisions of former sections 2342 and 7703 when it reconsidered the differing House and Senate versions of these two sections of the statute after Sec. 1205(e) was made part of the bill, and did not do so. 31 Congress' failure explicitly to preclude judicial review is especially telling in light of the settled doctrine that [o]nly upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the court restrict access to judicial review. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 380, 82 S.Ct. 787, 794, 7 L.Ed.2d 809 (1962). See also Carter v. Cleland, 643 F.2d 1, 3-4 (D.C.Cir.1980); Hayes International Corp. v. McLucas, 509 F.2d 247 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864, 96 S.Ct. 123, 46 L.Ed.2d 92 (1975). This strong presumption in favor of judicial review suggests that these particular MSPB orders should be reviewable in some forum. 12 Placing jurisdiction in the district courts to review the MSPB's Sec. 1205(e)(2)(A) orders, however, would not only make for an odd rulemaking review, since the district court would typically be considering several challenges to the same rule, only one of which would have to be considered within the constraints of a prior MSPB decision, it would also require us to ignore the plain language of former sections 2342 and 7703 granting review of final MSPB orders to the courts of appeals. 13 32 We therefore conclude that we have jurisdiction to review all final MSPB orders, including those determining the facial validity of OPM rules and regulations. Admittedly, the original statutory scheme as we have interpreted it would result in the possibility that actions challenging the same OPM rule or regulation on different grounds might be split between two different forums. Review of Sec. 1205(e)(2)(A) orders would take place in the courts of appeals, which could not take account of other aspects of the rule or regulation that might render it invalid. Other challenges to a particular rule or regulation, including whether its issuance observed legally required procedures or was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, would still have to be brought in the district courts. Such a division of labor holds a potential for some duplication of judicial efforts. 33 We point out, however, that even under the government's proposal, review of OPM rules and regulations would still be fragmented. Section 7703 would allow the Director of the OPM and individual employees to seek review of MSPB orders determining the validity of implemented OPM rules and regulations in the courts of appeals. All other challenges to OPM rules and regulations, however, would have to be brought initially in the district courts. 34 We acknowledge other problems as well. Congress did not require, and the MSPB did not promulgate, fixed procedures for MSPB review of Sec. 1205(e) orders. Unlike the elaborate standards of proof and procedural requirements Congress provided in the CSRA for Sec. 7701 adverse action proceedings before the MSPB, the Act does not allocate the burden of proof, provide the right to a hearing and representation by counsel, or set out any other procedural requirements for Sec. 1205(e) reviews. According to the MSPB's own rules, it may determine the facial validity of a rule or regulation on the basis of the pleadings alone, call for written or oral submissions, issue interrogatories or requests for supplementary information, or hold evidentiary hearings. See 5 C.F.R. Sec. 1203.16. In addition, the Director of OPM may, but need not, participate in the proceedings. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7703(d). Thus, the nature of the administrative record on which the MSPB renders its Sec. 1205(e) decisions is neither set out in the statute nor will it necessarily be uniform from case to case. 35 Finally, Sec. 1205(e)(1)(B) provides that the MSPB has the sole discretion to grant review of OPM rules and regulations when the moving party is an interested person. Unless the MSPB chooses to grant review, such interested parties will have to seek initial judicial review of OPM rules and regulations in the district court under regular APA procedures. The MSPB will, therefore, theoretically be able to control whether the district courts or the courts of appeals will review challenges to the facial invalidity of OPM rules and regulations through its own unreviewable power to grant or deny administrative review. 36 Despite all these complications, we can find no authority that would allow us to refuse jurisdiction to review the final MSPB order at issue in this case. We do not think that the possibility of a sparse record in some cases is cause to preclude all judicial review. In addition, parties challenging OPM regulations before the MSPB are on notice that its discretion to decide whether to accept the appeal will determine the forum of judicial review. 37 While Congress did not provide a particularly coherent plan for judicial review of OPM regulations, the general congressional scheme in the CSRA was for cases challenging MSPB decisions to go from the MSPB to the courts of appeals, thereby achieving more consistent judicial decisions on review and eliminating an unnecessary layer of judicial review. S.Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1978), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, p. 2774, reprinted in 2 CSRA Legislative History at 1516. The statute is plain, its natural interpretation is generally supported and certainly not contradicted by the legislative history, and the resulting legislative scheme, though imperfect, is not totally unreasonable. We have no authority, under these circumstances, to ignore the statute's plain meaning. As a result, we find that we have jurisdiction to hear this case and turn to the question of standing.
38 We have concluded that former sections 2342 and 7703(b) conferred jurisdiction on the courts of appeals to review all Sec. 1205(e) orders, and that those sections, unaffected by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, govern this case. Each of these sections, however, had its own specific standing requirement. Section 2342, part of the Administrative Orders Review (Hobbs) Act, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 2341-2351, provides that jurisdiction to review MSPB orders is invoked by filing a petition as provided by section 2344 of this title. Section 2344, in turn, broadly permits [a]ny party aggrieved by [a final order reviewable under this chapter to] ... file a petition to review the order of the court of appeals wherein venue lies. Section 7703's grant of standing is, however, more limited. Section 7703(a) provides that any employee or applicant for employment adversely affected or aggrieved by final MSPB decisions and orders may obtain such review. 39 The government argues that Sec. 7703(a) permits only individual employees or applicants aggrieved by MSPB orders to appeal to the courts and that the NTEU, because it is not an individual employee but instead a collection of employees, is therefore precluded from obtaining such review. 14 Although it does not specifically discuss Sec. 2344, the government would presumably argue that Sec. 2342 was amended merely to conform to Sec. 7703, and that the specific standing provision in Sec. 7703 controls the general provision in Sec. 2344. 40 Congress, it is true, amended Sec. 2342 primarily to conform to Sec. 7703, and did not specifically refer to Sec. 2344 when it did so. 15 On the other hand, nothing in the text of Sec. 2342, Sec. 7703, or the legislative history of the CSRA indicates that Congress did not want the aggrieved party standing provision of Sec. 2344 to apply to review of MSPB orders under Sec. 2342 just as it applies to review of orders of the other five agencies already listed in Sec. 2342. Indeed, Sec. 7703(b)(1) itself says that a petition to review a final order of the Board shall be filed in ... a United States court of appeals as provided in chapter[ ] ... 158 [the Hobbs Act, of which both Secs. 2342 and 2344 are part]. 41 We recognize that a specific statutory provision normally controls a more general provision. But, at least in the circumstances of this case, we do not think Sec. 2344's broad grant of standing for appeal of MSPB orders should be limited by Sec. 7703(a)(1)'s apparently narrower grant of standing to employees and applicants for employment. 16 Unlike the case here, the vast majority of appeals from the MSPB involve adjudications of individual employee appeals from alleged agency adverse actions. When Sec. 7703 was drafted, these were the only appeals the MSPB could hear. 17 For such cases, Sec. 7703(a)'s language in no way conflicts with the aggrieved-party standard of Sec. 2344. 42 Standing to seek judicial review of an MSPB order requiring an OPM rule or regulation, however, is a separate issue. Congress did not specifically consider who should have standing to appeal Sec. 1205(e) orders. Had it done so, it seems plausible that it would have wanted the expansive aggrieved-party standard of Sec. 2344 to apply. First, although Sec. 7703(a) refers only to employees and applicants for employment, the legislative history suggests that Congress was not trying to restrict standing. On the contrary, it frequently indicated that it was modeling standing in the CSRA on the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 702, 18 and Sec. 2344's language (any party aggrieved) is quite similar to Sec. 702's broad grant of standing for persons challenging agency rulemaking in the district courts (persons adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action). 19 It also seems unlikely to us that Congress would have wanted to rule out the most likely challenger to Sec. 1205(e) orders, the employees' union, since it granted broad standing to all interested persons in Sec. 1205(e)(1)(B) to appeal OPM rules and regulations to the MSPB. It would make little sense to permit the union to appeal to the MSPB and then deny it the right to seek judicial review of the MSPB decision. Such a distinction would serve no useful purpose. It would merely force the NTEU to bring its appeal in the names of one or more of its members instead of in its own name. We conclude, therefore, that Sec. 7703(a)(1) does not restrict standing to individual employees so far as judicial review of MSPB review of OPM rules is concerned. 43 The question remains whether the NTEU is an aggrieved party within the meaning of Sec. 2344. In general, an association has standing to sue on behalf of its injured members when they would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose, and neither the claim asserted, nor the relief requested, requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977); Committee for Auto Responsibility v. Solomon, 603 F.2d 992, 998 n. 13 (D.C.Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915, 100 S.Ct. 1274, 63 L.Ed.2d 599 (1980). More specifically, the Seventh Circuit has held that an organization may have standing under Secs. 2342 and 2344 derivative of its members' standing. See Rockford League of Women Voters v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 679 F.2d 1218, 1221 (7th Cir.1982). Trade associations have also been allowed to sue on behalf of their injured members under the APA's standing section, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 702. See, e.g., National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d 689 (D.C.Cir.1971) (trade association has standing to seek judicial review of agency's interpretative action to vindicate the rights of its members); Independent Meat Packers Association v. Butz, 395 F.Supp. 923 (D.Neb.) (trade associations had standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief from promulgation and enforcement of Department of Agriculture rules revising grading standards for beef), injunction dissolved and case remanded with instructions, 526 F.2d 228 (8th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966, 96 S.Ct. 1461, 47 L.Ed.2d 733 (1976). See also National Treasury Employees Union v. Campbell, 589 F.2d 669, 672 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1978) (NTEU has standing to bring suit on behalf of its injured members for declaratory and injunctive relief and for damages challenging rates negotiated by the Civil Service Commission for federal employees' health insurance). 44 Certainly the interests the NTEU seeks to protect here--the rights of its seasonal workers to the CSRA's adverse action protections when they are laid off for less than thirty days--are germane to its purposes as exclusive representative of those workers. One of the primary purposes of a union is to represent the interests of its members in challenging employer action believed to be arbitrary or contrary to law. In addition, neither the claim asserted--that an OPM regulation is invalid on its face--nor the relief requested--that the regulation be declared invalid--requires the participation of individual NTEU members in the suit. All that remains, therefore, is to determine whether an individual seasonal worker would have standing to challenge the validity of the MSPB order as an aggrieved party. 45 The courts that have considered the scope of Sec. 2344's aggrieved party language have engaged in traditional standing doctrine analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Federal Maritime Commission, 694 F.2d 793, 799-809 (D.C.Cir.1982) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting); United States v. Federal Maritime Commission, 655 F.2d 247, 251-52 (D.C.Cir.1980). This circuit uses a three-part test to determine whether a party has standing to obtain review of agency action: (1) the complainant must allege injury in fact; (2) the complainant must assert that arbitrary or capricious agency action injured an interest arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question; and (3) there must be no clear and convincing indication of a legislative intent to withhold judicial review. Control Data Corp. v. Baldrige, 655 F.2d 283, 288-89 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 881, 102 S.Ct. 363, 70 L.Ed.2d 190 (1981). See also Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1924, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976); Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 829, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970). 46 Applying the Control Data test to this case, we conclude that an individual seasonal worker would have had aggrieved-party standing to sue under Secs. 2342 and 2344. The seasonal workers the NTEU represents have suffered injury in fact from the MSPB order in question since it upheld an OPM regulation that denies them the protections of the CSRA's adverse action procedures when they are laid off from their jobs for less than thirty days. This injury would certainly be redressed if we were to hold the regulation invalid on appeal. The workers' interests in having access to the adverse action procedures of the CSRA are clearly within the zone of interests to be protected by the Act. Congress expressly provided for judicial review of MSPB orders in Sec. 2342. Because the individual employees represented by the NTEU would therefore have been permitted to bring this suit, the union also has standing to sue the MSPB and OPM.
47 On the merits, the NTEU urges this court to reverse the MSPB's order holding that 5 C.F.R. Sec. 752.401(c)(10) (1983) properly excludes seasonal workers laid off for thirty days or less from the adverse action procedures of 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7513(b). Specifically, the MSPB decided that laying off seasonal employees in accordance with the conditions under which they are employed is not a furlough within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7511(a)(5) and so may be exempted from Sec. 7513's adverse action procedures by regulation. The NTEU argues that this decision must be reversed because the CSRA on its face includes the short-time layoff of such employees within its definition of adverse actions, Congress' expressed intent is consistent with the statute's plain language, and applying the Sec. 7513 procedures to seasonal layoffs is both reasonable and consistent with the statutory purposes. 48 In contrast, the MSPB and the OPM argue that Congress intended to exclude short-term layoffs of seasonal workers in accordance with the terms of their employment from the definition of the term furlough. They urge that furlough has historically been construed in civil service parlance and practice to exclude such layoffs and that Congress endorsed that accepted definition. In addition, they contend, the MSPB's decision is consistent with the CSRA's legislative policy favoring employee protections against arbitrary treatment because seasonal workers still have the right to appeal any layoffs not undertaken in accordance with the terms of their employment.
49 The MSPB acknowledged that the plain language of the CSRA includes layoffs of seasonal workers for thirty days or less within the definition of adverse actions. It nevertheless upheld the validity of the regulation excluding such layoffs, primarily on the ground that under preexisting civil service regulations and policy, seasonal-worker layoffs were not considered adverse action furloughs and that Congress intended to follow those previous CSC definitions when it enacted the CSRA. It rejected the NTEU's contention that if Congress had wanted to carry forward the exclusion of seasonal-worker layoffs in pre-CSRA civil service regulations, it would have listed it along with the other exceptions to adverse actions specifically set out in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7512(A)-(E). 20 Congress did not do so, the MSPB reasoned, because Sec. 7512(A)-(E) were designed to exclude only certain personnel actions that otherwise qualified as adverse actions. Since laying off seasonal employees in accordance with the terms of their employment had never been considered to constitute an adverse action furlough any more than the expiration of a temporary appointment had been considered to constitute a removal or the termination of a temporary appointment to constitute a reduction in grade or pay, Congress did not need, the MSPB concluded, specifically to exempt such layoffs in Sec. 7512. Joint Appendix at 181-83. 50 The MSPB also relied on the fundamental policy of the CSRA that [t]he Federal work force ... be used efficiently and effectively. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2301(b)(5). Encouraging the use of seasonal workers furthers this principle, the MSPB stated, by permitting agencies to hire employees for peak work periods when they do not need those employees on a year-round basis. Applying Sec. 7513's adverse action procedures, in particular the thirty-day advance notice provision, to all temporary layoffs of seasonal workers would probably result in the phasing out of seasonals and reliance on temporary employees instead. 21 These temporaries would have to be rehired and retrained each time needed. Alternatively, requiring adverse action procedures for short layoffs might force agencies to keep seasonal workers on the payroll when they had no work to do. Joint Appendix at 180-81. 51 In addition, the MSPB pointed out that even under the OPM's regulation, seasonal workers are not completely precluded from challenging their layoffs of thirty days or less since they can invoke Sec. 7513's adverse action procedures if the layoffs are not in accordance with the terms of their appointment. Finally, it stated that it was giving substantial deference in interpreting the CSRA to the OPM because it is the agency charged with administration of the personnel provisions of the Act. Joint Appendix at 184.
52 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7703(c) directs the courts of appeals to set aside agency action, findings, or conclusions that are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, not in accordance with law, procedurally incorrect, or unsupported by substantial evidence. In determining whether an agency's reading of a statute meets this standard, we generally accord deference to its interpretation. 22 See, e.g., Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 31-32, 102 S.Ct. 38, 42, 70 L.Ed.2d 23 (1981) (as a general rule, the interpretation put on the statute by the agency charged with administering it is entitled to deference). 23 The courts, however, are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction [and] must reject administrative constructions of [a] statute ... that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement. Id. at 32, 102 S.Ct. at 42. In light of these guidelines, we affirm the order of the MSPB for the reasons stated in Part II.C.3 of the opinion of the Court.