Opinion ID: 1057944
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Recusal of Judge Bellows

Text: On January 29, 2010, Prieto filed a motion for recusal of Judge Bellows on the grounds that Judge Bellows presided over all stages of the [second of the two trials encompassed by Prieto I], which resulted in a capital murder conviction and death sentence and his involvement in – and statements made during – that trial and sentencing create a reasonable appearance of bias against the defendant. Judge Bellows denied this motion. Prieto alleges that this denial was in error. Under Canon 3E(1) of the Canons of Judicial Conduct, A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in 11 which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where . . . [t]he judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. We have stated that in making the recusal decision, the judge must be guided not only by the true state of his impartiality, but also by the public perception of his fairness, in order that public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary may be maintained. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 19, 28, 630 S.E.2d 326, 331 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The burden of proving a judge's bias or prejudice lies with the party seeking recusal. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 267 Va. 226, 229, 590 S.E.2d 518, 519-20 (2004). We employ an abuse-ofdiscretion standard to review recusal decisions. Wilson, 272 Va. at 28, 630 S.E.2d at 331. Prieto alleges that Judge Bellows' statements and demeanor at the previous sentencing provide a reasonable appearance of bias. Specifically, he states that Judge Bellows was overly emotional in explaining his reasoning for entering the death sentences in Prieto's prior sentencing, at times appear[ing] to become so over-wrought that he was forced to pause and regain composure before continuing. Prieto quotes Judge Bellows' highly emotional description of the victims and the crime: On the night you murdered — you executed these children and that is what they were, children. They were just coming out of college with the brightest of 12 prospects. They are in love with each [other] and with their lives. They had barely begun to experience and enjoy the pleasures and satisfactions of life. On the night you executed them, you turned the final moments of their lives on this earth into what can only be described as a living hell. It is simply beyond the powers of human comprehension to imagine the desperation, horror and sheer terror that you inflicted on Ms. Raver and Mr. Fulton in the very last moments of their young lives. As to the impact of your crimes on the survivors of the children you slaughtered, the families they left behind, one does not need to imagine what your killings did to them for they have borne witness in this courtroom to the devastation you've left in your wake. Finally, Prieto alleges that Judge Bellows entirely discounted Prieto's mitigating evidence. Prieto argues that these factors combine to permit a reasonable perception of bias against him in resentencing. Judge Bellows outlined his reasons for declining to recuse himself in what can only be described as a thoughtful and thorough 35-page memorandum decision. He emphasized holdings by this Court clarifying instances that are not legitimate grounds for recusal, including the previous imposition of the death penalty against a given defendant, Justus v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 667, 673, 283 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983 (1982), and the formation or expression of an opinion as to the guilt of the accused based on information acquired during 13 judicial proceedings. Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 371, 376, 38 S.E.2d 485, 488 (1946). Additionally, Judge Bellows' written discussion of these issues notes that, in examining the question of whether a trial judge has exhibited personal bias or prejudice, courts almost always require proof that the judge was influenced by . . . an extrajudicial source. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966). When, however, the recusal motion is based on comments occurring in the record, Judge Bellows correctly recognized that those comments must be taken in the context of the record as a whole. Thus, a judge should recuse himself or herself whenever a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts of the case, would question the judge's impartiality. United States v. Mikalajunas, No. 91-5119, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 21054, at  (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988)). Judge Bellows accurately characterized the prevailing law in his memorandum decision, and it is clear that his refusal to recuse himself was not an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620, 685 S.E.2d 634, 644 (2009) (stating that a review for abuse of discretion includes review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions, and finding no abuse of discretion where the trial judge's decision reflected proper application of 14 governing legal principles). Prieto offered no evidence or even allegation of extrajudicial influence that would suggest bias. In the course of his judicial duty to evaluate the jury's death sentences, Judge Bellows was required by the laws of this Commonwealth to consider the vileness of the crime. Given the task set before him, it is neither surprising nor inappropriate that the record contains emotional language. It is not required nor desired that judges of the Commonwealth possess the ability to utterly set aside all human emotion while discharging their duties. Finally, the record does not support Prieto's allegation that Judge Bellows entirely discounted Prieto's mitigating evidence as being of no value in the analysis. To the contrary, the record states that Judge Bellows carefully considered that evidence but found that it did not warrant a reduction in penalty. Judge Bellows discussed each of these issues exhaustively in his memorandum decision, which represents a fair construction of the law of the Commonwealth and interpretation of the facts. We accordingly conclude that he did not abuse his discretion in refusing to recuse himself. See, e.g., Grattan, 278 Va. at 620, 685 S.E.2d at 644. 15