Opinion ID: 1688713
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Homicide Conviction

Text: Sufficient evidence supports the verdict that Mills committed the murder. It was within the province of the jury to believe Ashley, who was at the scene, and Mills' roommate, to whom Mills made an admission of guilt. Moreover, a significant amount of corroboration, including expert firearms examination evidence, existed. The specific argument Mills makes, however, is that the trial court should have granted him a new trial on the ground that the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. This argument is without merit. With regard to his conflict-of-interest argument, Mills relies on Foster v. State, 387 So.2d 344 (Fla. 1980), in which we held the defendant's sixth amendment right had been violated where defense counsel also represented an accomplice who testified at the trial. The present case is entirely different. Here, the public defender represented Ashley in connection with unrelated charges. As soon as Ashley's involvement in the crimes of which Mills was suspected became evident, the public defender withdrew from representation of Ashley because of the possibility of a conflict of interest. Therefore, Mills' contention of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit. Mills argues that the court abridged his right to cross-examine the witnesses against him by refusing to allow the defense to impeach Ashley with statements he had made to a public defender's investigator. When the defense attempted to impeach by using the statements, the state objected, Ashley's own attorney was summoned, and on advice of counsel Ashley invoked the attorney-client privilege. Mills contends this violated his sixth amendment cross-examination right, relying on Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). In Davis a statute requiring confidentiality in juvenile delinquency records prevented the defendant from bringing out the juvenile record and probationary status of a key state's witness for the purpose of showing possible bias. The Supreme Court held the sixth amendment had been violated and reversed the conviction. The Court reasoned that the right to confront an adverse witness outweighed the state's interest in preserving the confidentiality of adjudications of juvenile delinquency. Davis does not require the result for which Mills argues. The Court here did not hold that the right to cross-examination always outweighs considerations of confidentiality. Id. at 321, 94 S.Ct. at 1112 (Stewart, J., concurring); see Note, Defendant v. Witness: Measuring Confrontation and Compulsory Process Rights Against Statutory Communications Privileges, 30 Stan.L.Rev. 935 (1978). Moreover, the attorney-client privilege is of broader and deeper significance than a statute relating to the confidentiality of juvenile records. The attorney-client privilege preserves the confidentiality of private communications. The privilege in question in Davis, on the other hand, was based on a policy, enacted as a statute, in favor of confidentiality for certain officially recorded adjudications. The attorney-client privilege arises in the context of a relationship having great significance for the protection of fundamental personal rights. For example, the ability to speak freely to one's attorney helps to preserve rights protected by the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to legal representation. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege; Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 Harv. L.Rev. 464 (1977). Therefore, the attorney-Client privilege weighs much more heavily against a defendant's cross-examination right than did the statutory exclusion at issue in Davis. Furthermore, this case does not involve a total preclusion of the opportunity to show possible bias on the part of the witnesses as Davis did. Here the disallowed impeachment was an attempt to bring out a prior inconsistent statement Ashley made to his former counsel's investigator. However, Mills' counsel was able to confront Ashley with several prior inconsistent statements he made to police officers. Defense counsel also cross-examined Ashley about the bargain he made with the authorities whereby Ashley gained immunity not only for the crimes Mills now stands convicted of but also other, unrelated crimes. We therefore hold that the court did not abridge Mills' right to confront the witnesses against him. Over defense objection the state presented evidence on rebuttal of the gunshot residue tests that had been performed on Mills and Ashley the morning of the murder. The tests were performed about two hours after the estimated time of the shooting, by which time, according to the state's expert, approximately 99% of the residues the test detects would have been dissipated. Ashley's test result was negative. Mills' test was positive in that it revealed the presence of antimony in an amount not to be expected on a person who had not fired a gun, although it was not enough to prove conclusively that he had done so. Mills contends that the gunshot residue test results should not have been admitted into evidence because such tests are not scientifically accepted in general and because the tests used in this case were inconclusive and unreliable. The test in question was a neutron activation analysis which is designed to detect and measure the presence of barium and antimony on the subject's hands. Barium and antimony are rare chemical elements which are released in a cloud when a firearm is discharged. The test has attained sufficient standing among scientists to be accepted as reliable evidence in the courts. Chatom v. State, 348 So.2d 838 (Ala. 1977). A majority of American jurisdictions has held the results of such tests to be admissible evidence in criminal proceedings. E.g., Keith v. State, 612 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1980); State v. Warden, 100 Idaho 21, 592 P.2d 836 (1979); State v. Ulrich, 187 Mont. 347, 609 P.2d 1218 (1980); State v. Journey, 201 Neb. 607, 271 N.W.2d 320 (1978); Commonwealth v. Sangricco, 475 Pa. 179, 379 A.2d 1342 (1977). The neutron activation analysis does not conclusively establish whether the subject has recently fired a gun. The test result is admissible in evidence despite this inherent inconclusiveness. State v. Spencer, 298 Minn. 456, 216 N.W.2d 131 (1974). It is relevant because it shows a probability that the subject did or did not fire a gun, and its probative value is for the jury to determine. Therefore, Mills' contention is without merit.