Opinion ID: 203172
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alien

Text: In addition to the admissibility issues discussed above, Diaz advances several objections to the evidence submitted by the government to prove his alienage. He takes issue with the government's reliance on warrants and orders of removal and deportation, which he argues do not prove alienage beyond a reasonable doubt because of the different burden of proof applicable to civil deportation proceedings. Diaz also claims that the entry into evidence of the purportedly unauthenticated and untranslated Dominican Republic passport and travel document, and of the deportation/removal orders without any limiting instructions, in tandem with the government's heavy emphasis on those documents in its opening and closing statements, denied him a fair trial and due process of law in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. We find the totality of the evidence sufficient to permit a rational jury to find Diaz to be an alien beyond a reasonable doubt, let alone meet the lower bar posed by plain error review. See United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.2000)([J]uries need not evaluate pieces of evidence in isolation, but may draw conclusions from the sum of an evidentiary presentation.). The government presented, inter alia, fingerprint and photographic evidence linking Diaz to his various aliases and to a DHS Alien Registration file showing that he had been ordered removed from the country twice before. That the warrants and orders of deportation/removal stem from civil rather than criminal proceedings is not fatal to their inclusion into the total calculus of evidence here, where other evidence strongly supports the inference of alienage. See, e.g., Contreras Palacios, 492 F.3d at 43-44 (evidence, which included warrant of deportation, sufficient to prove defendant was an alien). Because Diaz failed to raise his constitutional arguments at trial, we review his Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims for plain error only. United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92, 102 (1st Cir. 2003). As noted above, the Dominican Republic passport and travel document were admissible for the limited purpose delineated by the district court. If the government unreasonably harped on these documents in its opening and closing statementsan objection which again, Diaz did not raise at trialdoing so nevertheless did not result in a clear and gross injustice. See id. at 105 (Where, as here, the defendant made no objection to the government's closing argument at trial, the standard of review is plain error. . . . [Defendant] faces a high hurdle because it is established that plain error review is ordinarily limited to blockbusters. . . . (internal quotations omitted)). Diaz cannot clear this hurdle, especially considering defense counsel's repeated assertions during his own closing argument that the government had adduced sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Diaz was an illegal alien. Finally, at trial Diaz never requested a limiting instruction with regard to the warrants and orders of deportation/removal, and thus he is not entitled to argue here that the district court's failure to provide a limiting instruction constitutes reversible error. United States v. Walter, 434 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir.2006).