Opinion ID: 1918826
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Severity of the Sanction Imposed

Text: ¶ 55. The Complaint Tribunal found that Lumumba's conduct before Judge Gordon as well as the statements made during the Clarion-Ledger interview violated Rules 3.5(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(d) of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct. Even after finding that three (3) separate provisions were violated, the Tribunal determined that a public reprimand was an appropriate punishment considering the circumstances. Today, the majority finds that Lumumba's violation of the rules warrants a suspension of 6 months from the practice of law and a fine of $1,000 plus costs. The majority imposes a harsher sanction than did the Tribunal while the majority finds the same number of violations as did the Tribunal. This result seems patently unfair considering that Lumumba has already served 1 and ½ days in jail and paid a fine. ¶ 56. While it is true that this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to attorney discipline and this Court is free to impose sanctions either more or less severe than those imposed by the Complaint Tribunal, deference is afforded to the Tribunal's findings because of its opportunity to observe the demeanor and attitude of the witnesses, including the attorney, which is vital in weighing evidence. Parrish v. Miss. Bar, 691 So.2d 904, 906 (Miss.1996), Broome v. Miss. Bar, 603 So.2d 349, 353 (Miss.1992) (citing Miss. State Bar Ass'n v. Strickland, 492 So.2d 567 (Miss.1986)). Also, when assessing the sanction to be imposed against an attorney in a disciplinary action, this Court applies the following nine criteria: (1) the nature of the misconduct involved; (2) the need to deter similar misconduct; (3) the preservation of the dignity and reputation of the profession; (4) the protection of the public; (5) the sanctions imposed in similar cases; (6) the duty violated; (7) the lawyer's mental state; (8) the actual or potential injury resulting from the misconduct; and (9) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Miss. Bar v. Inserra, 855 So.2d 447, 450 (Miss.2003). The only reasoning that the majority gives for ignoring the Tribunal's recommendation of a public reprimand is that Lumumba received a public reprimand once before for engaging in very similar conduct and now repeats the offense. [4] This reasoning is flawed in that the majority bases its holding on one or two of the above enumerated factors and fails to consider them holistically. In assessing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we are free to contemplate the performance of a lawyer in our deliberations. See Miss. Bar v. Coleman, 849 So.2d 867, 876 (Miss.2002) (examining conduct of attorney). We can also consider prior infractions by attorneys in imposing disciplinary measures. Byrd v. Miss. Bar, 826 So.2d 1249, 1255 (Miss.2002) (examining that attorney had been given one public reprimand, one private reprimand, and three informal admonitions in ten years when considering disbarment). However, when considering sanctions for attorney misconduct, this Court's focus should not be solely upon prior attorney misconduct, but rather, upon the factors in toto. Thus, the majority seemingly holds that a suspension of six months from the practice of law is warranted because of Lumumba's prior public reprimand. Essentially, there is no need to have a multi-factored approach to assessing sanctions for attorney misconduct if we are not going to consider each factor. ¶ 57. In considering the nature of Lumumba's misconduct, the majority states that during the exchange between Lumumba and the trial judge, Lumumba abandoned the interest of his client to pursue his own in waging a verbal battle with the trial court over whether or not the trial court had been fair. On this point, it is important to note that during the post-trial hearing, there were no other parties, attorneys, or witnesses present in the courtroom waiting to be heard by the trial court. The record reflects that the only individuals present during the hearing were the trial judge, the judge's staff, Lumumba, Lumumba's client, and opposing counsel. While it is clear that the words Lumumba used to express himself were inexcusable and at best truculent, the effect of Lumumba's words, however lasting and/or damaging, was limited to only those individuals present in the courtroom at the time the exchange took place. Clearly, Lumumba's comments were wrong and completely inappropriate. However, because such comments did not result in actual or potential injury to the tribunal, it cannot be established that they were so grossly egregious as to warrant a six month suspension. ¶ 58. Today, the majority holds that Lumumba's statements to the trial judge regarding paying off judges were intended to disrupt, and in fact did disrupt, the court proceedings in violation of Rule 3.5(c). The majority does not address an extremely important issue regarding the rationale behind Lumumba's sanction. Prior to publishing the words for which Lumumba is being sanctioned, Judge Gordon said, I want you to know this hearing is now over with and Lumumba said, Can I ask Judge Gordon said, And there will be nothing else to be made of record. At that very moment, the hearing had adjourned, and the proceedings were concluded. Rule 3.5(c) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal. It is problematic to sanction Lumumba for disrupting a tribunal, when the tribunal had already adjourned the proceeding. Before the exchange which resulted in the Rule 3.5(c) violation, the trial judge had already ruled on Lumumba's motions. In addition to the numerous and rigorous demands placed upon trial court judges, they never relinquish the tantamount responsibility of ensuring order and control in their courtrooms, even among lawyers. Because the hearing had concluded or, at least, so nearly concluded Lumumba's statements concerning paying off judges were at most, minimally disruptive. Thus, I conclude that a Rule 3.5(c) violation under the present circumstances warrants no more than a public reprimand. ¶ 59. The majority correctly points out that this case is one of first impression. Prior to this, the only violations of Rule 3.5 of the Professional Rules addressed by this Court dealt with sub-parts (a) and (b). See Miss. Bar v. Logan, 726 So.2d 170, 178 (Miss.1998) (an attorney's ex parte communication with a magistrate for purposes of obtaining procedural advice was not a violation of Rule 3.5(a) prohibiting ex parte communication with judge or other official, in light of the fact that it appeared to be a common and accepted practice at the time the attorney did so); Attorney L.S. v. Miss. Bar, 649 So.2d 810, 813 (Miss.1994) (an attorney's contact with jurors post-verdict when such conduct, is prohibited by court order, and misrepresenting his authority to talk to jurors violated Rule 3.5(b) and warranted a private reprimand). ¶ 60. Without any guiding precedent, we look to case law from our sister jurisdictions. The facts in the instant case are most similar to those in Prucker v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 1995 WL 356758 (Conn.Super.Ct.1995). In Prucker, an attorney appealed a decision from the statewide grievance committee which recommended that the attorney be reprimanded. Id. During a workers' compensation hearing, Prucker became frustrated at what he considered to be a lack of progress on his client's claim. Id. As the hearing drew to a close, Prucker walked out of the room, saying Bullshit or This is bullshit. Id. The commissioner admonished the attorney to refrain from using profanity, but Prucker did not respond and walked out. Id. The Commissioner stated in her written complaint that Prucker shouted expletives at her, and that the hearing had not concluded when Prucker walked out. Id. The reviewing committee concluded that Prucker's conduct constituted a violation of Rule 3.5(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and recommended that Prucker be reprimanded. Id. On appeal, the Superior Court of Connecticut affirmed the ruling of the reviewing committee. Id. Prucker is very similar to the facts in the instant action. Lumumba's comments to Judge Gordon, while not profane, bear the same degree of inappropriateness as those used by the attorney in Prucker. In Prucker, the commissioner stated that the proceeding had not concluded, and therefore, the attorney's comments were held to have violated Rule 3.5(c). In the case sub judice, assuming that the hearing had not adjourned, Lumumba's resulting violation of Rule 3.5(c) cannot be said to warrant anything more than a public reprimand. ¶ 61. While we review disciplinary matters de novo, we are permitted to defer to the findings of the Tribunal. Today, the majority chooses to ignore the recommendation of the Tribunal. The Tribunal considered all of the evidence in this case, including its personal observation of the witnesses as well as Lumumba's testimony and determined that a public reprimand was appropriate under these facts. It is illogical for the majority to hold that Lumumba violated the same rules determined by the Complaint Tribunal but should receive a harsher sanction. In my opinion, the paramount issue for this Court to consider while taking all the factors of Inserra into account when assessing the gravity of a sanction is whether or not the sanction is proportional to the rule(s) violated. A disciplinary sanction must reflect the serious nature of the harm inflicted on the orderly administration of justice by the attorney's behavior. In the instant action, I am of the opinion that a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction under the present circumstances. ¶ 62. The Preamble to the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct reads, A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold [the] legal process. This theme is reiterated in the comment to Rule 3.5 which states, Refraining from abusive or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's right to speak on behalf of litigants. Unquestionably, Lumumba's conduct on the record fell short of these honorable standards. However, I wholly conclude that Lumumba's comments did not result in any injury to the tribunal, the administration of justice or the legal process. To this end, I respectfully dissent from the majority's holding to suspend Lumumba from the practice of law for a period of six months.