Opinion ID: 2519799
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: control in the child abuse statute

Text: ¶ 61 Bluff argues that she is not guilty of child abuse because the language of the child abuse statute implies that she must have the ability to control the person inflicting injury, as indicated by the word permits in the statute. We have not previously addressed the meaning of permits as used in the child abuse statute. The statute provides that [a]ny person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, having the care or custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a child is guilty of an offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2)(2001) (emphasis added). When faced with a question of statutory construction, `we seek to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.' State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ¶ 7, 31 P.3d 528. We do not look beyond the plain language of the statute unless we find ambiguity in the statute. Id. ¶ 62 We do not believe that the notion of ability to control another can properly be read into the statute. The purpose of the statute is to prevent child abuse both by prohibiting the direct infliction of injury on a child and by affirmatively requiring the child's caregiver to take steps to prevent another person from abusing the child. The statute does not require the caregiver to control the perpetrator, but requires the caregiver to take action to prevent the abuse, whether by direct intervention, seeking emergency assistance, notifying authorities, or flight, to name a few options. The State has no obligation to prove that the caregiver can control the perpetrator in order to establish the permits element of the offense. Showing the impossibility of intervention by the caregiver is the burden of the defense.