Opinion ID: 408041
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Section 504 Claim Against the Local Defendants

Text: 11 Section 504 provides that (n)o otherwise qualified handicapped individual ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). While conceding that current interpretations of section 504 hold that it supports a private right of action, see, e.g., Baker v. Bell, 630 F.2d 1046, 1055 (5th Cir. 1980); Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1977) (per curiam ); United Handicapped Federation v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413, 415 (8th Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority, 548 F.2d 1277, 1284-87 (7th Cir. 1977), defendants argued, and the District Court held, that section 504 does not permit the relief plaintiffs seek here. 12 Judge Weinfeld based his decision primarily on a consideration of two cases. In the first, Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979), the Supreme Court held that section 504 does not impose an affirmative-action obligation on a state educational institution, id. at 411, 99 S.Ct. at 2369, requiring it to make substantial modifications in (its) programs, id. at 405, 99 S.Ct. at 2366, or to incur undue financial and administrative burdens, id. at 412, 99 S.Ct. at 2370, in an effort to accommodate handicapped persons whose disabilities render them not otherwise qualified for such programs. The Court ruled against the plaintiff, who suffered from a severe hearing disability that prevented her from participating in the normal training for nurses, because enrolling her would have required a fundamental alteration in the nature of the defendant college's registered nursing program. Id. at 410, 99 S.Ct. at 2369. In the second case, APTA, supra, the District of Columbia Circuit applied Davis in the mass transportation context and held that the extensive modifications of existing systems required by the 1979 accessibility regulations, and the extremely heavy financial burdens on local transit authorities that implementing them would impose, were equivalent to the fundamental program alterations held in Davis to be beyond the scope of section 504. 655 F.2d at 1278. The Court therefore held that the 1979 regulations were an invalid implementation of that section. 13 In the present case, the District Court concluded that dismissal was warranted because the plaintiffs were seeking massive relief involving extra-ordinary expenditures, 518 F.Supp. at 1175, which would amount to the  'kind of burdensome modifications that the Davis Court held to be beyond the scope of section 504,'  id. at 1176 (quoting APTA, supra, 655 F.2d at 1278). The extreme result of dismissing the claim would be proper only if plaintiffs would not be entitled to any relief, even if they were to prevail on the merits. We do not believe that conclusion can be reached at this preliminary stage of the lawsuit. The complaint does not necessarily seek, nor would a remedy necessarily entail, either massive relief of the sort APTA feared would be required to achieve accessibility under the 1979 regulations, or affirmative action of the sort that Davis held was not required by section 504.A. Massive Relief  14 Judge Weinfeld summarized the central meaning of Davis for mass transportation programs to be that section 504 does not require massive expenditures. 518 F.Supp. at 1176. He then concluded that granting relief for plaintiffs would necessarily entail such a remedy: 15 Plaintiffs, if they were to prevail, would compel the local defendants to expend huge resources over the next several decades which would fundamentally alter many transportation services. There is no escaping the fact that plaintiffs in this law suit seek a major overhauling of the transit system in their purpose to compel implementation of programs for the handicapped. 16 Ibid. Even if that view characterizes what plaintiffs seek, it does not necessarily describe less ambitious relief to which they may be entitled. 17 In the first place, if plaintiffs can prove a violation of section 504, the District Court has inherent power to fashion relief appropriate to the situation. That power is not limited by the fact that plaintiffs may have asked for too much in seeking relief based on the 1979 regulations, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c), particularly since other regulations offer guidance in developing a less ambitious solution. Moreover, unlike the Supreme Court in Davis, we are not faced with an all-or-nothing choice of remedies. In Davis nothing short of fundamental modifications in a professional training curriculum would accomplish the only relief that the plaintiff sought-admission to the nursing program. Here, by contrast, a whole range of prospective relief is imaginable to meet at least some of plaintiffs' concerns, should they be able to prove their allegations. If ordering relief based on the 1979 regulations would exceed the mandate of section 504, then more modest relief must be fashioned within the limits of Davis. 18 It is significant that plaintiffs are not seeking a remedy that would require federal, state, or local authorities to appropriate funds. The large federal subsidies to mass transit that the local defendants already enjoy, which cover from 50% to 85% of total project costs, see 23 U.S.C. § 120(a); 49 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a), 1604(e), are extended on the condition that some portion of the money be used for projects that benefit the handicapped. The 1976 special efforts regulations suggest, for example, that adequate efforts would consist of allocating an annual average of 5% of a locality's grant under section 5 of the UMT Act to projects for wheelchair users. 49 C.F.R. § 613.204 App. (1980). In 1980, that would have amounted to some $6 million of New York City's total federal capital and operating subsidy for mass transit of $490 million. While this is a considerable sum of money, it is not massive either in absolute terms or relative to the City's total receipt of mass transportation assistance, particularly since the very receipt of the money was conditioned on such an expenditure. Among plaintiffs' claims on the merits is that money designated for projects for the handicapped was misspent or not spent at all; if that occurred, it would hardly seem excessive to order that at least some of the money be spent as intended. Relief might also include the earmaking of subsequently appropriated mass transit funds for new projects to aid the handicapped, to whatever extent federal regulations require. 19 Judge Weinfeld's focus on the massive restructuring necessary to comply with the 1979 accessibility regulations obscures the fact that plaintiffs charged violations of the 1976 special efforts regulations as well. The latter requirements form a distinct basis for plaintiffs' complaint; 5 they also stand as an independent source of legal obligation during the relevant time period, regardless of the validity of the more extensive 1979 requirements. The 1979 regulations were in force from 1979 to 1981, only the last two of the years covered by plaintiffs' complaint; there is no dispute that the 1976 regulations applied before that. In addition, the 1976 regulations remained in the Code of Federal Regulations throughout the brief life of the 1979 regulations. See 46 Fed.Reg. 17,488 (1981). The earlier requirements were eclipsed-superseded only in the sense of being rendered superfluous for the time being-but were not withdrawn or voided. 20 Moreover, since the two sets of regulations differ in important respects, the result in APTA does not impair the validity of a cause of action predicated on the 1976 regulations. While the 1979 regulations imposed a requirement that every existing mode of federally funded public mass transportation be made accessible to the handicapped, the 1976 regulations permitted the institution of separate transit services for such persons as an alternative to accessible bus and rail systems. As the APTA opinion noted, the 1976 regulations allowed each local authority to choose a plan responsive to local needs. For example, a community could provide door-to-door 'special services,' rather than make fixed-route transportation modes accessible. 655 F.2d at 1275. To be sure, the special efforts regulations are subject to the same restriction that proved fatal to those issued in 1979: they may not require more than the statute authorizes. Unlike the ill-fated 1979 requirements, however, the special efforts regulations have never been questioned by a court as going beyond the substantive authorization of section 504. Compare APTA v. Lewis, supra (invalidating 1979 regulations as exceeding authority of section 504), with Leary v. Crapsey, supra (upholding right of action based on section 504 and 1976 regulations) (by implication), United Handicapped Federation v. Andre, supra (same), and Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority, supra (same). Even APTA, while attacking the 1979 requirements, seemed to regard the earlier regulations with approval. 21 In short, these plaintiffs do not necessarily seek the complete overhaul of the New York City transit system that the 1979 accessibility regulations seemed to contemplate. Even if they did, those regulations would not be the sole and unalterable measure of the possible relief for the wrongs they allege. While the 1979 regulations may be unenforceable after APTA, the fact that they exceeded the scope of section 504 as interpreted in Davis does not, as the District Court concluded, appl(y) with equal force to the case at bar, 518 F.Supp. at 1175, and justify dismissing this complaint. APTA only sketches the outer limits in the mass transportation context of the limitations laid down by the Supreme Court in Davis. The key issue, therefore, is whether Davis not only proscribed forcing massive restructuring of transportation programs, but in fact prohibits any possible prospective relief in this setting. 22 B. Affirmative Action  23 Davis concluded that Congress had understood the distinction between the evenhanded treatment of qualified handicapped persons and affirmative efforts to overcome the disabilities caused by handicaps, 442 U.S. at 410, 99 S.Ct. at 2369, and plainly had not intended to impose an affirmative-action obligation on all recipients of federal funds when it enacted section 504, id. at 411, 99 S.Ct. at 2369. The Court acknowledged, however, that the distinction is not always easily drawn: It is possible to envision situations where an insistence on continuing past requirements and practices might arbitrarily deprive genuinely qualified handicapped persons of the opportunity to participate in a covered program. Id. at 412, 99 S.Ct. at 2370. Similarly, APTA recognized that its holding that the 1979 regulations went beyond the scope of the statute would not necessarily apply to less extensive remedial measures. (A)t some point a transit system's refusal to take modest, affirmative steps to accommodate handicapped persons might well violate section 504. 655 F.2d at 1278. 24 We believe that section 504 does require at least modest, affirmative steps to accommodate the handicapped in public transportation. Every court that has considered the question has concluded as much. See Leary v. Crapsey, supra; United Handicapped Federation v. Andre, supra; Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority, supra; Vanko v. Finley, 440 F.Supp. 656 (N.D.Ohio 1977); Bartels v. Biernat, 427 F.Supp. 226 (E.D.Wis.1977). Even the APTA case, decided in the aftermath of Davis, acknowledged the need to take action. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine what Congress could have had in mind in including mass transportation within the sweep of section 504 and, more generally, in authorizing programs to develop solutions to existing architectural and transportation barriers impeding handicapped individuals, 29 U.S.C. § 701(11), if not that some affirmative efforts must be undertaken. 25 Davis 's specific conclusion that section 504 imposes no affirmative action obligation in the area of requirements for admission to higher education programs is not to the contrary. As Judge Edwards, concurring in APTA, noted, Davis 's roots in the educational context limit the literal transferability of the rule: 26 (T)he application of section 504 to public transportation systems raises some questions that are significantly different from those considered by the Supreme Court in the higher education setting in (Davis ). In considering the accessibility of public transportation to otherwise qualified handicapped persons, it is much more difficult to avoid discrimination without taking some kind of affirmative action. 27 655 F.2d at 1281 (Edwards, J., concurring). In the context of public transportation and the handicapped, denial of access cannot be lessened simply by eliminating discriminatory selection criteria; because the barriers to equal participation are physical rather than abstract, some sort of action must be taken to remove them, if only in the area of new construction or purchasing. As plaintiffs pointedly observe, It is not enough to open the door for the handicapped ...; a ramp must be built so the door can be reached. Brief for Appellants at 20-21. 28 In fact, the very use of the phrase affirmative action in this context is unfortunate, making it difficult to talk about any kind of affirmative efforts without importing the special legal and social connotations of that term. The vocabulary of remedies for past discrimination that require or at least set goals for hiring or enrollment of compensatory numbers of a disadvantaged class is inappropriate in a case of this sort. Here there is no program that selects participants. These plaintiffs do not, for example, demand that decisions selecting bus drivers or motormen from the pool of those qualified be weighted in favor of handicapped applicants. Here there is a public service that plaintiffs are entitled to use but that is not practically available to them. 29 Davis used the term affirmative action to refer to alteration of the standards or qualifications by which applicants to a program are selected, if those standards unfairly exclude a certain group. Even that use of the term is not in issue in this case. In Davis, a ruling in the plaintiff's favor would have required a change in the nature of the program, a reconstruction of the college's entire professional training process; in effect, it would have changed the accepted meaning of saying that a person had undergone training as a registered nurse. The central issue in Davis, to which questions of expenditures and effort were secondary, was whether an educational institution (is required) to lower or to effect substantial modifications of (its) standards to accommodate a handicapped person, 442 U.S. at 413, 99 S.Ct. at 2370. The Court's decision that such changes were not required was virtually compelled by its earlier conclusion that the statutory phrase otherwise qualified means one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap. 442 U.S. at 406, 99 S.Ct. at 2367. With the issue so defined, the only question was whether the ability to hear spoken words was an integral requirement of the nursing program. Concluding that it was, the Court used the phrases affirmative action and substantial modifications in rejecting a requirement that the college must reconstitute its training program to render unnecessary a nursing student's ability to hear. 6 30 Here, plaintiffs do not seek fundamental changes in the nature of a program by means of alterations in its standards. They do not, to adapt the example used above, demand that the physical qualifications for the job of bus driver or motorman be altered so that the handicapped are not excluded. The existing barriers to the participation of the wheelchair-bound are incidental to the design of facilities and the allocation of services, rather than being integral to the nature of public transportation itself, just as a flight of stairs is incidental to a law school's construction but has no bearing on the ability of an otherwise qualified handicapped student to study law. 31 The present controversy, then, is free of two of the more vexing public policy aspects of debates over affirmative action: the problem of reverse discrimination and the associated problem of changes in selection criteria necessary to widen the pool of qualified applicants. The issue here is purely economic and administrative-how much accommodation is called for by regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act. This issue, though difficult, involves a set of questions different from those involved in affirmative action cases, for it turns more on considerations of practicality than on matters of entitlement, merit, and restitution. And while it is bounded, after Davis, by a general proscription against massive expenditures, the question is one of the degree of effort necessary rather than whether any effort at all is required. When Congress legislates to require accommodating federally funded mass transportation systems to the needs of the handicapped, and regulations specify that fund recipients must use their available funds to make some special efforts toward the national policy that Congress has established, courts are obliged to adjudicate claims that the law is not being observed. While we recognize that fashioning relief in this area will be difficult, that difficulty does not justify abandoning the task. We therefore reverse that part of the District Court's ruling that dismissed the complaint under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and remand for consideration of the merits of plaintiffs' claims and for the fashioning of whatever appropriate relief to which they may be entitled. 32