Opinion ID: 2423913
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Special Relationships for a Negligent Supervision Claim

Text: [¶ 19] A fiduciary relationship exists where the law will recognize both the disparate positions of the parties and a reasonable basis for the placement of trust and confidence in the superior party in the context of specific events at issue. DeCambra v. Carson, 2008 ME 127, ¶ 13, 953 A.2d 1163, 1166 (quotation marks omitted). But not all fiduciary relationships are special relationships; only those where there is a great disparity of position and influence between the parties will suffice. Dragomir, 2009 ME 51, ¶ 19, 970 A.2d at 316 (quotation marks omitted). We make this determination on a case-by-case basis, unless the nature of a given relationship is such that there is always certain to be a great disparity of position and influence. Id. [¶ 20] In two instances we have found that, in light of the circumstances, a plaintiff's relationship to the defendant was marked by a great disparity of position and influence between the parties. See id. ¶ 21, 970 A.2d at 316; Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 34, 871 A.2d at 1220. In Fortin, the plaintiff, who had been sexually assaulted by his childhood priest, alleged that the Diocese was liable for negligent supervision. 2005 ME 57, ¶¶ 3, 16, 31, 871 A.2d at 1212, 1215, 1219. When the abuse began, Fortin was a parochial school student and altar boy under the daily supervision, control, and authority of the Diocese. Id. ¶ 34, 871 A.2d at 1220. We distinguished Fortin's relationship with the Diocese from that of an individual who could assert only a general membership in an organization and concluded that the established and close connection between Fortin and the organization signaled a special relationship. Id. ¶¶ 32, 34, 37, 871 A.2d at 1219-20, 1222. [¶ 21] Similarly, a patient with a serious mental condition and the hospital providing him with treatment may have a fiduciary relationship marked by a great disparity of position and influence. Dragomir, 2009 ME 51, ¶ 21, 970 A.2d at 316 (quotation marks omitted). In Dragomir, while the plaintiff was receiving treatment from a hospital for schizophrenia and substance abuse, he and his social worker began a sexual relationship. Id. ¶¶ 2, 3, 21, 970 A.2d at 312, 316. As a vulnerable and impaired patient receiving intensive treatment from the hospital, Dragomir was able to allege facts sufficient to establish a special relationship. Id. ¶ 21, 970 A.2d at 316. [¶ 22] In the instant case, the Camp did not have a fiduciary relationship with Gniadek that amounts to a special relationship as we have defined it. Dating back to 2001, Gniadek spent one week each year at Camp Sunshine. Outside of this contact, she elected to participate in, at most, three fundraising events to benefit the Camp. Gniadek also maintained a social relationship with some campers, volunteers, and staff. Ultimately, her relationship with the Camp was indistinguishable from that of other campers. [¶ 23] Further, although the Camp provided Gniadek with a distinct and beneficial service, it did not exercise influence over her as the Diocese did in Fortin or as the hospital did in Dragomir. Gniadek's chronic illness and use of anti-depressants, and Cooper-Moon's head injury establish that Gniadek was vulnerable. But the Camp had a limited presence in Gniadek's life, one that was not marked by a great disparity of position and influence between the parties. Dragomir, 2009 ME 51, ¶ 19, 970 A.2d at 316 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 24] A custodial relationship exists between those who are required by law to take physical custody of another or who voluntarily do so, `such as to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for protection.' Id. ¶ 18, 970 A.2d at 316 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965)). Ordinarily a child who is in school or at camp is deprived of the protection of his parents or guardian. Therefore, the actor who takes custody ... of a child is properly required to give him the protection which the custody or manner in which it is taken has deprived him. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 320 cmt. b (1965). [¶ 25] The scope of the duty arising from a custodial relationship is circumscribed by temporal and geographic limitations. See id. § 314A cmt. c. A duty exists only where the special relationship is intact and the risk of harm, or further harm, arises in the course of that relation. Id. Thus, [a] carrier is under no duty to one who has left the vehicle and ceased to be a passenger, nor is an innkeeper under a duty to a guest who is injured or endangered while he is away from the premises. Nor is a possessor of land under any such duty to one who has ceased to be an invitee. Id.; see also Mastriano v. Blyer, 2001 ME 134, ¶ 17, 779 A.2d 951, 955 (explaining that a cab driver had no duty to a passenger after the passenger made a safe exit in a safe place); Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 662 A.2d 272, 281 (1995) (stating that school officials' duties based on special relationships with students will not ordinarily extend beyond graduation); Young v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 52 P.3d 1230, 1231, 1233-35 (Utah 2002) (holding that a school owed no duty to an elementary school student hit by a car while riding his bicycle to a mandatory school conference). [¶ 26] Gniadek attended Camp Sunshine with her mother and was not deprived of her mother's protection while at Camp. Even overlooking this fact, there was no custodial relationship at the time of the assault. Gniadek and Cooper-Morin left Camp Sunshine over two months before Newton sexually assaulted Gniadek. [¶ 27] Because Gniadek has failed to establish that she had a special relationship with the Camp, we do not go on to consider the other requirements for negligent supervision liability. See Dragomir, 2009 ME 51, ¶ 16, 970 A.2d at 315.