Opinion ID: 1600242
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: District Attorney's Comment During Closing on Defendant's Failure to Testify

Text: The following took place during the state's rebuttal in closing arguments in this case: DISTRICT ATTORNEY: ... I can't tell you what that woman went through during that night, because there is only one eyewitness, and he ain't going to tell you. I wish I could tell you all of that. I can give you this evidence that these officers have worked meticulously to gather up ... DEFENSE COUNSEL: I am sorry; may we approach the bench? THE COURT: Yes, sir. DEFENSE COUNSEL: I move for a mistrial. He just said that this defendant would not tell. That is the equivalent of saying that this defendant has not testified. DISTRICT ATTORNEY: It is reasonable inference from the evidence on the tape, Your Honor. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Afterwards on the record I think he ought to be instructed about that, Judge. THE COURT: I overrule. DISTRICT ATTORNEY [resuming closing argument]: When I say that, I mean this defendant didn't tell you on that tape recording that he gave Alvin Kidd as to what she went through; but all we can do is bring in here these hundred and something exhibits and show you most of it microscopically, because the rest of it has been done away with. And I think you know why it was done away with, because it tells further parts of the story. But let me take you back to that night.... The district attorney continued with the remainder of his closing argument, which consists of over 9 typed transcript pages, and was made over at least the next 25 minutes, as calculated by this Court's reading of the closing argument. After the closing argument was completed, the trial court proceeded with an instruction just before the formal oral instructions given to the jury. This curative instruction is found in the record as follows: THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the defendant has a right to testify or not testify in this case by law. This statute is to the effect that the defendant may elect not to testify; and if he does so elect, his failure to testify in his own behalf shall not create any presumption against him, and gives the defendant a substantive right, which you gentlemen and ladies, under your oath, are bound to respect and uphold. This statute means exactly what it says, and it would be highly improper and unjust for you to disregard this statute in arriving at your verdict. One of the fundamental principles of our democracy is that a person shall not be deprived of his life or liberty except by due process of law, and, for a jury to convict the defendant and disregard this statute, when it would not otherwise convict him, would be contrary to all of our democratic concepts of justice and fair play, in addition to being a violation of the solemn obligation of the jury voluntarily assumed when they entered upon the trial of this case. I instruct you that remark is improper, and you are to disregard it. I further instruct you that statements of counsel are not evidence in the case. I further instruct you that under the law the defendant has the privilege not to testify in his own behalf, or not [sic], that he cannot be compelled to testify against himself, and there is no presumption of guilt, or innocence of any kind [that] can be drawn from failure to testify. Satisfied? DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, sir. Wilson contends that the district attorney's comments constituted a remark or comment on Wilson's failure to testify on his own behalf; specifically, he points to the following statement: I can't tell you what that woman went through during that night, because there is only one eyewitness, and he ain't going to tell you.  (Emphasis added.) As shown above, the defense made an objection to this argument, moved for a mistrial, and requested an instruction. We note that the trial court overruled defense counsel's request for a mistrial and for a curative instruction, although, after the closing arguments had been completed, it gave an instruction on the defendant's right not to take the stand. The defendant asserts, however, that the curative instruction did not specifically address the comment in question and therefore did nothing to address the prosecutorial error. The defendant contends that under Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), any comment by a prosecutor on a defendant's failure to testify is reversible error. He also directs our attention to Ex parte Williams, 461 So.2d 852 (Ala.1984), and Stain v. State, 494 So.2d 816 (Ala.Crim.App.1986). The State argues that the district attorney's comment was not on the defendant's failure to testify, and that his explanatory sentence made it clear to the jury that he was referring to the defendant's sketchy incriminating statements, which had been admitted into evidence. The State further contends that where the argument would reasonably have been understood by the jury to be a comment on a defendant's statement that is in evidence, rather than on a defendant's failure to testify, there is no Fifth Amendment violation. United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131, 139 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 569, 88 L.Ed.2d 554 (1985); see Grady v. State, 391 So.2d 1095, 1102 (Ala.Crim.App. 1980). The State asserts that because the prosecutor stated to the jury that he was referring to the defendant's taped statement, the jury could not have thought he was speaking regarding a lack of testimony. Finally, the State contends that any error was corrected by the trial court's very strong charge on the defendant's right not to testify, to which the defendant's attorney stated that he was satisfied.