Opinion ID: 2118159
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Adoption Statute

Text: The adoption statute creates a statutory proceeding unknown at common law. Because it is in derogation of the common law, we long ago held it must be strictly construed in favor of the rights of the natural parents. Emmons v. Dinelli (1956), 235 Ind. 249, 133 N.E.2d 56. That is, it must be strictly followed in all essential particulars. In re Adoption of Subzda (1990), Ind. App., 562 N.E.2d 745, 748. Today, it seems apparent that careful administration of the statute serves purposes beyond protecting the rights of natural parents to be with their children. It also serves to protect the children and to shield all involved parties from unnecessary instability and uncertainty. The portion of the statute at issue in this case provides in pertinent part: [A] petition to adopt a child under eighteen (18) years of age may be granted only if written consent to adoption has been executed by the mother of a child born out of wedlock and the father of such a child whose paternity has been established by a court proceeding other than the adoption proceeding.  Ind. Code Ann. § 31-3-1-6(a)(2) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). The General Assembly emphasizes its seriousness about the paternity determination by reiterating this requirement in the same section. See Ind. Code Ann. § 31-3-1-6(g)(2)(A) (consent to adoption not required from natural father of child born out of wedlock whose paternity has not been established by court proceeding other than adoption proceeding). The parties agree that Wilkens' paternity has not been established in a court proceeding other than the adoption proceedings. See Agreed Statement of Matters. The only proceedings that occurred were the termination of parental rights hearing and the adoption proceedings. The termination hearing was held only as a part of the adoption proceedings. The order terminating parental rights notes and approves Wilkens' consent to the adoption. Vierra and Wilkens executed their consents to termination and adoption on the same day. The fact that the termination hearing was held a month before the adoption petitions were filed does not turn the termination hearing into a separate proceeding. Because Wilkens was not a father whose paternity was established by a separate court proceeding, his consent was not necessary for the adoption. Ind. Code Ann. § 31-3-1-6(a)(2). See In re M.B.H. (1991), Ind. App., 571 N.E.2d 1283 (putative father must clearly establish paternity in another action before intervening in adoption proceedings); Matter of Adoption of Baby Boy Dzurovcak (1990), Ind. App., 556 N.E.2d 951 (putative father must demonstrate he established paternity in separate proceeding prior to having power to veto adoption); M.R. by Ratliff v. Meltzer (1986), Ind. App., 487 N.E.2d 836, (putative father's consent to adoption unnecessary because his paternity had not been established in court). Only the mother's consent was needed; there is no dispute about the validity of the mother's consent. She is not a party to this action. Wilkens had ample time to establish his paternity, and it would not have been a difficult process. The putative father may unilaterally petition to establish paternity. Ind. Code Ann. § 31-6-6.1-2 (West Supp. 1991). [2] From the record before us, it appears that Wilkens would have been the presumed biological father of the children. See Ind. Code Ann. § 31-6-6.1-9 (West Supp. 1991). Because he did not establish paternity in a separate proceeding, however, Wilkens' consent was not needed for the adoption and he cannot now contest it.