Opinion ID: 2791245
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: mandamus relief and jurisdiction

Text: Mandamus relief is an “extraordinary remedy,” Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967), that is only available if three criteria are met: (1) First, the party seeking issuance of the writ [must] have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires—a condition designed to ensure that the writ will not be used as a substitute for the regular appeals process. (2) Second, the petitioner must satisfy the burden of showing that [his] right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable. (3) Third, even if the first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be 4 Case: 14-20734 Document: 00512991621 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/02/2015 No. 14-20734 satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “These hurdles, however demanding, are not insuperable.” In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 311 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381). The first criterion presents a threshold question whether mandamus relief is inappropriate here because 2920 had other means to attain relief— namely, an ordinary interlocutory appeal. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 8 n.6 (1983) (“[A] court of appeals has no occasion to engage in extraordinary review by mandamus . . . when it can exercise the same review by a contemporaneous ordinary appeal.”). As noted above, the district court denied Petitioner’s request for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); however, that does not indicate whether there was interlocutory appellate jurisdiction under § 1292(a). In response to 2920’s petition for writ of mandamus, Aetna argues that the district court’s “order freezing assets is an appealable interlocutory order” under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), apparently presuming that the district court “grant[ed] [an] injunction[],” since that is what § 1292(a)(1) exclusively refers to. We agree. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) interlocutory injunctions are immediately appealable. “That the district court here did not label its order an injunction is not dispositive. In determining whether an order is appealable under section 1292(a)(1), we consider the substantial effect of the order.” Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 137 F.3d 1420, 1421 (9th Cir. 1998) (Kozinski, J.); accord 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2962 & n.11 (3d ed. 2014) [hereinafter Wright & Miller] (collecting cases that “make it clear that the court will look at the actual effect of the order that is 5 Case: 14-20734 Document: 00512991621 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/02/2015 No. 14-20734 issued by the district court when determining whether an appeal should be allowed.” (collecting cases)); see also McCoy v. La. State Bd. of Educ., 345 F.2d 720, 721 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (“In determining what is an appealable order under 28 U.S.C. [§] 1292(a)(1), courts look not to terminology, but to ‘the substantial effect of the order made.’”). As discussed below, the substantial effect of the district court’s order here was the same as a preliminary injunction—it essentially froze 2920’s assets before the entry of final judgment. See Rosen v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 21 F.3d 1520, 1526 (11th Cir. 1994) (treating an asset freeze as a preliminary injunction). Thus, because 2920 “could have obtained review of the district court’s order through an ordinary [interlocutory] appeal, mandamus is not available,” Calderon, 137 F.3d at 1422. Therefore, the petition for writ of mandamus must be denied. This does not end the matter, however. “A petition for mandamus filed in this court . . . may also satisfy the notice of appeal requirement,” provided that it is filed within thirty days of the order to be appealed from. Yates v. Mobile Cnty. Pers. Bd., 658 F.2d 298, 299 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (noting that this is “especially” important “when the appellant is proceeding pro se . . . and is thus generally ignorant of procedural rules”); see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1); see also Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 508 n.4 (1979) (suggesting that a “petition for a writ of mandamus [could be] treated as an appeal” if it was filed on time); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1974) (“Other courts have held that the requirement of notice of appeal is satisfied by[, inter alia,] a petition for mandamus filed in the Court of Appeals . . . . These cases teach that the notice of appeal requirement may be satisfied by any statement, made either to the district court or to the Court of Appeals, that clearly evinces the party’s intent to appeal.” (citations omitted)); In re Clark, No. 11-10407, 2011 WL 3861616, at  (5th Cir. July 8, 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“We 6 Case: 14-20734 Document: 00512991621 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/02/2015 No. 14-20734 construe Clark’s mandamus petition . . . as a notice of appeal from those orders.” (citing Yates, 658 F.2d at 299)). Here, we think it is appropriate to construe 2920’s mandamus petition— which was filed within thirty days of the challenged interlocutory orders—as a notice of appeal from those orders. Though 2920 is not proceeding pro se, cf. Yates, 658 F.2d at 299, we note that 2920 specifically requested permission from the district court to appeal the court’s interlocutory orders, which were not labeled preliminary injunctions, and the district court denied its requests. The petition clearly evinces 2920’s intent to appeal. See Cobb, 488 F.2d at 45. We further note that, “when the petition was filed, it was not unreasonable for the petitioner to believe that the district court’s order was reviewable only by mandamus, not by direct appeal,” in light of the district court’s orders denying interlocutory appeal, see Compania Mexicana De Aviacion, S.A. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 859 F.2d 1354, 1357–58 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (citing Clorox Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 779 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1985)). Moreover, we note that in this case, as in Compania Mexicana De Aviacion, the time for notice of an interlocutory appeal has now expired, so 2920 lost its right to interlocutory appeal during the pendency of its mandamus petition and a “harsh result . . . would obtain if [its] mandamus petition were simply denied.” Id. Therefore, we conclude that 2920’s petition for writ of mandamus has provided adequate notice to the parties and the court of its intent to appeal, see Cobb, 488 F.2d at 45, and we accordingly treat the petition as a notice of appeal. Thus, this Court has appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).