Opinion ID: 1165326
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: private-attorney-general theory

Text: Common-fund and substantial-benefit rest squarely on the principle of avoiding unjust enrichment. The private-attorney-general theory rests on the policy of encouraging private actions to vindicate important rights affecting the public interest, without regard to material gain. ( Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 44; Woodland Hills II, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 933.) A central function is to call public officials to account and to insist that they enforce the law.... ( Alyeska, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 267 [44 L.Ed.2d at p. 159].) [13] Implicit is the recognition that without some mechanism authorizing the award of attorney fees, private actions to enforce ... important public policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible. ( Woodland Hills II, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 933.) Thus the doctrine will often be frustrated, sometimes nullified, if awards are diluted or dissipated by lengthy, uncompensated proceedings to fix or defend a rightful fee claim. The rule in federal courts of appeals when they construe statutes like section 1021.5, embodying the private-attorney-general doctrine, [14] is that, absent facts rendering the award unjust, parties who qualify for a fee should recover for all hours reasonably spent, including those on fee-related matters. [15] The rule that Federal fee statutes ordinarily require a full fee award unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust first was stated in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, supra, 390 U.S. 400, which construed the fee provision under title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. (P. 402 [19 L.Ed.2d, p. 1266].) [16] The Newman formula was invoked again for substantially identical provisions under title VII of that act ( Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody (1975) 422 U.S. 405, 415 [45 L.Ed.2d 280, 295, 95 S.Ct. 2362]; cf., Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412, 419 [54 L.Ed.2d 648, 655, 98 S.Ct. 694] [standard applies to prevailing plaintiffs but not prevailing defendants]) and under the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972 ( Northcross v. Memphis Board of Education (1973) 412 U.S. 427, 428 [37 L.Ed.2d 48, 50-51, 93 S.Ct. 2201]). It is the Newman standard  sometimes referred to as the Newman-Northcross rule  that Congress apparently intended to control the interpretation of its 1976 Fees Act. [17] Framing the private-attorney-general theory in California, both this court and the Legislature relied on federal precedent. (See Woodland Hills II, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 934.) Yet even were that not the case the unanimity of the federal rule  reflecting as it does time-tested workability  would merit our deference. Federal courts have reasoned that [i]f an attorney is required to expend time litigating his fee claim, yet may not be compensated for that time, the attorney's effective rate for all the hours expended on the case will be correspondingly decreased. Recognizing this fact, attorneys may become wary about taking Title VII cases, civil right cases, or other cases for which attorneys' fees are statutorily authorized. Such a result would not comport with the purpose behind most statutory fee authorizations, viz., the encouragement of attorneys to represent indigent clients and to act as private attorneys general in vindicating congressional policies. ( Prandini, supra, 585 F.2d 47, 53.) The contrary rule that defendants urge would permit a deep pocket losing party to dissipate the incentive provided by an award through recalcitrance and automatic appeals. ( Souza, supra, 564 F.2d 609, 614; accord, Bond, supra, 630 F.2d 1231, 1235-1236; Stanford Daily v. Zurcher (N.D.Cal. 1974) 64 F.R.D. 680, 683-684, affd. (9th Cir.1977) 550 F.2d 464, revd. on other grounds (1978) 436 U.S. 547 [56 L.Ed.2d 525, 98 S.Ct. 1970].) [18] It could permit fees to be determined by the litigiousness of losing parties. We should not distort our rule by restricting it to (1) persons with means sufficient to finance lawsuits without the assistance of court-awarded fees, and (2) indigents who qualify for legal aid. The showing required under section 1021.5 is substantial. (See fn. 1, ante. ) In cases where entitlement is vigorously contested, as here, [19] the hours demanded could dwarf those spent to establish the claim on the merits. Citizens of ordinary means are unlikely to file, and competent private practioners are unlikely to accept, public interest litigation, however meritorious, without some assurance of compensation that fairly covers the legal services required. [20] Nonetheless the federal rule does not license prevailing parties to force their opponents to a Hobson's choice of acceding to exorbitant fee demands or incurring further expense by voicing legitimate objections. Prevailing parties are compensated for hours reasonably spent on fee-related issues. A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether. [21] If ... the Court were required to award a reasonable fee when an outrageously unreasonable one has been asked for, claimants would be encouraged to make unreasonable demands, knowing that the only unfavorable consequence of such misconduct would be reduction of their fee to what they should have asked in the first place. To discourage such greed, a severer reaction is needful.... ( Brown v. Stackler (7th Cir.1980) 612 F.2d 1057, 1059.) We conclude that defendant's first argument is without merit. Principles governing an award under the common-fund or substantial-benefit theory do not control when it is made under the private-attorney-general doctrine.