Opinion ID: 2230283
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Leaving Your Kids With Meth Addicts Can Constitute Criminal Neglect

Text: Iowa's neglect statute makes it a crime for [a] person . . . having custody of a child. . . who knowingly or recklessly exposes [the child] to a hazard or danger against which such person cannot reasonably be expected to protect [herself]. . . . Iowa Code § 726.3. It is not disputed that Petithory had custody of K.C. from November 1, 2002 to February 13, 2003. Only two elements of the neglect charge are at issue in this case: whether, on account of his and Champoux's meth abuse, during that same time frame Petithory (1) knowingly or recklessly (2) exposed K.C. to a hazard or danger against which she could not reasonably be expected to protect herself. We conclude there is substantial evidence in the record to support the district court's findings that Petithory knowingly (or at least recklessly) exposed K.C. to a hazard or danger against which she could not reasonably be expected to protect herself. We consider the scienter and hazard/danger elements of the statute simultaneously because, as is often the case, a finder of fact may impute scienter to a defendant from the normal consequences of his actions. See State v. Evans, 672 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Iowa 2003); State v. Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 462 (Iowa 1998). It is not disputed that Petithory used meth on a daily basis during the period alleged in the trial information. Petithory also regularly left himself alone with the children after Champoux left for work. When Champoux was home, she often used meth, too  as much as twice a week by her own account. These admissions are corroborated by methamphetamine residue and paraphernalia found in the house. It is abundantly clear from the record that during the alleged time frame Petithory repeatedly left his daughter, K.C., in the custody of meth addicts  whether in the person of himself or Champoux. This clearly posed an ongoing danger or hazard to the children. Petithory stresses that there is no evidence K.C. had any meth in her system and disputes whether the girls ever had access to the drug. He maintains he was a careful drug abuser, smoking it only in the basement, where the children were not allowed. It remains, however, that both parents handled and consumed the illegal drug in the very house wherein the girls resided. The hazards the girls faced were not limited to the possibility of accidentally ingesting methamphetamine residue. Champoux testified Petithory became mean and frustrated when coming down from methamphetamine. Importantly, the State presented expert testimony which detailed  in intricate and comprehensive fashion  the dangers a parent's meth use poses to his custodial children. The State's expert witness testified: Parents who are addicted to methamphetamine are not available . . . to their children because under the influence of methamphetamine there is an initial high that an individual perceives and very soon after that high comes a downfall or a depression, which is much more severe with methamphetamine than other drugs of abuse. . . . When that happens, many meth-using adults will fall asleep, and that period can last for hours at a time. In that period of time they're not capable of providing supervision and care for young children around the household. Methamphetamine is a drug that . . . stimulates the sensory nervous system and it also blocks the higher centers . . . that are responsible for checks and balance of impulses. Perception of danger [and] reasoning ability . . . are hindered from ongoing methamphetamine use. So that over a period of time an adult using methamphetamine loses [his] capacity to function on a daily basis because of lack of comprehension of what are the risks in the environment, what are children's needs on a day-to-day basis because they don't have the energy level to provide those needs. And also, because of the poor impulse control and increased risk of losing their temper and anger, the children in an environment where parents use meth are at increased risk of physical abuse. K.C. faced these dangers every day while her parents used meth in the family home. The district court found: As described by [the State's expert], the methamphetamine user is removed physically and emotionally from the household. Such detachment may not always result in sufficient hazards or risks to older children. However, in this court's opinion it is almost inevitable when coupled with the ongoing responsibility to care for children the ages of Brooklin and [K.C.]. . . . . [Children] rely entirely on the care of responsible adults to protect them from the dangers the world has to offer. To his credit, it appears that the defendant did not directly expose the children to the direct toxic effects of his methamphetamine use. However, he exposed them on a daily basis to the more subtle and more destructive effects of the drug. . . . [T]he changes in [Petithory's] behavior brought about from his methamphetamine use . . . exposed them to a significantly greater risk of injury or death. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the district court explicitly found Petithory knowingly or at least recklessly exposed K.C. to this danger. The court wrote: The defendant is a chronic abuser of methamphetamine. He has learned through his years of use and treatment of the deleterious effects of methamphetamine. He was aware of how the drug changed him behaviorally and of the cycles of highs and lows described by the expert witnesses. He had specific discussion with Champoux regarding how the effects of methamphetamine were potentially harmful to their family. . . . His actions, both in continuing to use methamphetamine on a daily basis while in the household . . . [was] clearly knowing for purposes of . . . [the] neglect charges. This conduct also satisfies the recklessness requirement of the neglect charges. Children of such tender years require a level of vigilance in those entrusted with their care that is simply not attainable in a person using methamphetamine to the degree that the defendant was over the time period in question in this case. We conclude there is substantial evidence in the record to support the district court's findings. We have long recognized the dangers and hazards of leaving one's children in the custody of chronic drug abusers. See, e.g., In re J.K., 495 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Iowa 1993) (finding that parents [who] have severe chronic substance abuse problems clearly presented a danger to their children). This danger is recognized daily in our juvenile courts, which are often forced to terminate the parental rights of those who are addicts precisely because their continued drug abuse poses a danger to their children. See, e.g., id. The danger is not any less or qualitatively different if the allegation is made in a criminal case. Meth affects a person even after the drug has left the person's body. The after-effects are pervasive and staggering  much more so than with other drugs such as alcohol or marijuana. To rule otherwise in this case would countenance absurd results and be contrary to the common-sense manner in which we ought to interpret a statute. See generally State v. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26, 35 (Iowa 2001) (stating court interprets statutes to avoid an absurd result); accord Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 520 (Iowa 2003) (interpreting statute consistent with common sense). The dangers of leaving one's children in the custody of actively using methamphetamine addicts cannot be denied. No parent should leave his small children in the care of a meth addict  the hazards are too great. Experience sadly teaches us that any hope that no parent would leave his children in the care of a meth addict is misplaced; the law, however, sets a standard of conduct for parents and rightly mandates that no parent should do so. Petithory rejoins that his conviction was based on mere speculation and conjecture, insofar as generalized risks are attributed to him without an affirmative showing such factors occurred in this case. [3] He also points to testimony of his friends and family members that he was a loving father. Whether he loved his children we are not called upon to decide; he exposed them to dangers and hazards, which is the statutory standard. Dangers and hazards need not be realized; dangers and hazards are by their very nature risks, not certainties. Cf. Clinkscales v. Nelson Sec., Inc., 697 N.W.2d 836, 845 (Iowa 2005) (noting that [d]anger invites rescue not only when the victim is actually injured, but where there is imminent risk of peril). Russian roulette is dangerous each time it is played, not just when someone has his head blown off. Although in this case danger was not realized until December 13, danger was present throughout the foregoing months, as well. Tragedy was waiting to happen. As the trial court pointed out, the dangers posed to the children in the months prior to Brooklin's drowning were real. Neither the district court nor we need speculate to arrive at this conclusion. The particular constellation of facts present in this case is important. There is no question the defendant used meth on a daily basis; there is no debate about the pernicious effects of meth; there is specific testimony regarding Petithory's irate behavior whenever he crashed from a meth-induced high; and the children in Petithory's care were clearly of such a tender age that they could not be expected to protect themselves from the dangers and hazards to which he exposed them. This is not a case in which a parent is accused of using a less-potent drug once or twice and then caring for his teenage children; this is a parent of two very young children who left his children in the exclusive care of meth addicts for a period of months. What parent among us would entrust a three-year old to a meth addict? No right thinking parent would do so, because of the dangers and hazards. The law recognizes this common-sense notion and criminalizes those who subject their children to such peril. Nor is Petithory's conviction based purely upon his status as an illegal drug user. A status crime is [a] crime of which a person is guilty by being in a certain condition or of a specific character. Black's Law Dictionary 400 (8th ed. 2004). Petithory's conviction does not rest solely upon the fact that he is a drug abuser; it is that fact, plus his additional act of placing his children in his and Champoux's care while consuming and consumed by the drug, that is sufficient to support his conviction. It is one crime to possess methamphetamine; it is another crime to use methamphetamine and then try to supervise one's children or leave one's children in the care of an addict. The defense would have it that only when the child has meth in her system does a parent expose the child to a danger or a hazard. The particular circumstances of this case, buttressed by expert testimony regarding the affects of meth addiction and its concomitant dangers, also fit within the statute's prohibitions. The effects of meth are felt long after the last hit has left the body. The trail of danger left by meth is often profound. See State v. Bulington, 802 N.E.2d 435, 440 (Ind.2004) (recognizing the dangers methamphetamine use poses  including neglect by adults on a long, cheap high (citation omitted)). A parent in this state is a danger, to which it is a crime to expose a defenseless child. It does not matter that part of the danger to which Petithory exposed the children was himself. The statute forbids a parent from exposing a child to a danger; it does not distinguish among the sources of the dangers. For example, it is no different than a parent being charged with neglect for driving down the road, asleep, at a high rate of speed with a child. A parent who works seventy-two straight hours and then starts driving his children on the highways  sound asleep as he drives his trusting little treasures to their destruction  knowingly exposes a child to danger. As in the case at bar, the parent is the source of the danger. Even if the statute implicitly barred prosecutions of self-imposed dangers, however, this would not help Petithory. Here Petithory was charged in part for exposing K.C. to another danger, Champoux. In sum, we conclude Petithory's sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is without merit because substantial evidence supports his conviction. Petithory knowingly or at least recklessly exposed both girls to a danger against which they could not protect themselves  caretakers suffering from the effects and after-effects of drug abuse.