Opinion ID: 1771982
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: did the trial court commit reversible error in overruling the motion for a directed verdict on the charge of capital murder and for submission of the case to the jury on the lesser included offense of murder and was the verdict of the jury finding williams guilty of capital murder against the overwhelming weight of the evidence?

Text: The thrust of this entire assignment of error is that the state failed to prove the underlying felony of kidnapping. In ruling on the motion for a directed verdict, the trial court said: All right. Let me say that I have heard the testimony here. It is the opinion of the court that there is sufficient evidence to present the question of kidnapping to the jury. Of course, it started with the testimony of Terrell Evans who indicated that, while in the Scoreboard Lounge, he and the defendant observed the victim in this case, who was obviously intoxicated, under the influence of drugs or diminished capacity of some kind, and they hatched a plan that they were going to wait until the other people had their fun, and then they would take her off, and I think it started at that point. And the other matters alluded to by the district attorney, of course, I believe all furnished sufficient evidence for the jury issue. The motion will be overruled. Kidnapping is defined by Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-3-53 (Supp. 1985) as follows: § 97-3-53 Kidnapping; capital punishment authorized. Any person who shall without lawful authority forcibly seize and confine any other person, or shall inveigle or kidnap any other person with intent to cause such person to be secretly confined or imprisoned against his or her will, or shall without lawful authority forcibly seize, inveigle or kidnap any child under the age of ten (10) years and secretly confine such child against the will of the parents or guardian or person having the lawful custody of such child, shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned for life in the state penitentiary if the punishment is so fixed by the jury in its verdict. If the jury fails to agree on fixing the penalty at imprisonment for life the court shall fix the penalty at not less than one (1) year nor more than thirty (30) years in the state penitentiary. In Hughes v. State, 401 So.2d 1100 (Miss. 1981), this Court explained: In order to clearly set forth the different elements which may constitute kidnapping under the statute, we restate the statute as follows: Every person who shall, without lawful authority (1) forcibly seize and confine any other, (2) or shall inveigle or kidnap any other (3) with intent (a) to cause such person to be secretly confined or imprisoned in the state against his will, (b) or to cause such other person to be sent out of this state against his will, (c) or to cause such other person (1) to be deprived of his liberty, (2) or in any way held to service against his will ... Under the statute the state must prove that a person, without lawful authority, either (1) forcibly seized and confined another person, or (2) inveigled or kidnapped another person, intending to subject such person to either (a), (b), or (c) above. 401 So.2d at 1105, Cited with approval in Brewer v. State, 459 So.2d 293, 296 (Miss. 1984). In order for this conviction to stand, the prosecutor is required to prove every element of the kidnapping offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Patterson v. York, 432 U.S. 197, 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2327, 53 L.Ed.2d 281, 292 (1977); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2791, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 576-77 (1979); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 757 (Miss. 1984). In Neal, we held that circumstantial evidence such as the victim's dress, location of the body, and bruised condition of the body were sufficient to show involuntary accompaniment and service against one's will. 451 So.2d at 758. The victim in Neal was thirteen, as opposed to eighteen, the age of the victim in this case. See also Fisher v. State, 481 So.2d 203, 212-14 (Miss. 1985). The record contains certain circumstantial evidence which supports the verdict finding a kidnapping: Dr. Paul McGarry testified to the abused condition of the body; Photographs of the wounds were admitted into evidence; Jenny Cummings testified Miss Pierce appeared to be on drugs, and she saw Terrell Evans place Karon Pierce in the truck; Terrell Evans testified that he and Williams had agreed to take Karon off and have sex with her; Terrell Evans testified that Karon wanted to go back to the Scoreboard to get her purse and sandals but they didn't take her; The toxicologist testified that Karon's blood alcohol sample was .07 and that stomach contents, bile, and blood tests revealed traces of PCP and quaaludes. We note further that the jury also had access to the following: Karon refused to leave the Scoreboard when her date was forced to leave, saying that someone else would take her home; Karon's mother's statement that Karon had pulled these stunts before; Once Karon had been put in the truck by Evans she let herself out and voluntarily went back into the Scoreboard Lounge of her own free will; Karon voluntarily engaged in foreplay, she voluntarily smoked marijuana and drank beer with Evans, Norwood and Williams, she voluntarily had sex with Norwood and Williams; After protesting sex with Williams for the second time she again smoked marijuana, drank, laughed and joked with all three men; Karon was able to get out of the truck and go to the bathroom three times under her own power and voluntarily returned to the truck each time; The testimony further suggested that she was beaten and possibly sexually abused at the Scoreboard Lounge before she left with the three men. Under the prosecutor's theory of the case, several kidnappings took place: the first, when Karon was taken from the Scoreboard Lounge in the truck; the second, when she requested to get her shoes and was not returned to the Scoreboard Lounge; the third because of her intoxicated condition; and the fourth when she was dragged or carried into the woods from the truck. Unlike the victim in Haymond v. State, 478 So.2d 297 (Miss. 1985), Karon Pierce was never comandeered against her will in the truck. She apparently was a willing participant until the fourth attempted sex act, at which point she began her protest. When we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, it is conceivable that a reasonable juror could have found that Karon Pierce was inveigled, i.e., enticed or tricked, with intent to secretly confine her against her will. As kidnapping is not a specific intent crime, it is sufficient that the circumstances resulted in such a manner as to effect a kidnapping as opposed to an actual intent to kidnap, i.e., it is not necessary to establish the mental state of intent by direct evidence. Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798, 809 (Miss. 1984); Voyles v. State, 362 So.2d 1236, 1243 (Miss. 1978). The fact that the confinement is minor is of no consequence so long as it is present: If forcible detention or movement is merely incidental to a lesser crime than kidnapping, such confinement or movement is insufficient to be molded into the greater crime of kidnapping. An illustration might well be a strong-armed robbery where the victim is detained and perhaps moved a few feet while being relieved of his wallet. The detention and movement would not support kidnapping albeit with force and unlawful. On the other hand, if the confinement or asportation be not merely incidental to a lesser crime, but a constitutent part of the greater crime, the fact of confinement or asportation is sufficient to support kidnapping without regard to distance moved or time of confinement. Cuevas v. State, 338 So.2d 1236, 1238 (Miss. 1976). There is no merit to this assignment of error.