Opinion ID: 4417118
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Monell Basics

Text: The legal issues are undisputed until this point: Bradley had a protected property interest, which he lost without any due process. And since Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), a municipal corporation may be held liable under § 1983 in such circumstances. As we recently explained, “[t]he critical question under Monell, reaffirmed in Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29 (2010), is whether a municipal (or corporate) policy or custom gave rise to the harm (that is, caused it), or if instead the harm resulted from the acts of the entity’s agents.” Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of Corrections, 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Determining what caused the violation is crucial because Monell held that “municipalities are not liable for the torts of their No. 16-3456 13 employees under the strict-liability doctrine of respondeat superior, as private employers are.” Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 747 (7th Cir. 2011). Local governments are liable for damages under § 1983 only for violations of federal rights that occur “pursuant to oﬃcial municipal policy of some nature.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. The “oﬃcial policy” requirement for Monell claims is “intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality” and to limit liability to “action for which the municipality is actually responsible.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479–80 (1986). A plaintiﬀ might prove this essential element by showing that (1) “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision oﬃcially adopted and promulgated by that body’s oﬃcers,” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; or (2) the “constitutional deprivations [were] visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s oﬃcial decisionmaking channels,” id. at 690–91; or (3) the deprivation was “made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent oﬃcial policy,” id. at 694. See also Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S. at 36; Board of County Com’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997). The Monell requirement can be satisfied by “a single decision attributable to a municipality.” Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 405. “[I]t is plain that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers” to adopt “a course of action tailored to a particular situation … whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480–81, 485 (municipality was liable 14 No. 16-3456 under § 1983 when county prosecutor acting as county’s final decisionmaker directed subordinates to engage in actions that violated plaintiﬀ’s rights); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 252,268 (1981) (municipal liability for compensatory—but not punitive—damages was appropriate under § 1983 when city council canceled performer’s concert license without due process). Contrary to defendants’ position here, such an unconstitutional act of municipal decisionmakers can result in municipal liability even if their act also violated state law. For example, in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), the Supreme Court made clear that both a city and its manager could be held liable under § 1983 for firing the city police chief without due process, even if the defendants’ actions also violated state law. Id. at 627 n.4 & 633 (holding qualified immunity does not apply to damage claims against municipal government itself). If a plaintiﬀ cannot prove, however, that a policy is attributable to the municipality itself—i.e., that the deprivation was due to “[e]ither the content of an oﬃcial policy, a decision by a final decisionmaker, or evidence of custom”—then there is no municipal liability. Glisson, 849 F.3d at 379. Any inquiry into whether the actions of a municipal employee may be attributed to the municipality can be answered by applying the Monell test for liability. In Bradley’s case, this component is also undisputed. The mayor and the board concede that they had sole discretion and authority to fire Bradley. “[P]roof that a municipality’s legislative body or authorized decisionmaker has intentionally deprived a plaintiﬀ of a federally protected right necessarily establishes that the municipality acted culpably.” Bryan No. 16-3456 15 County, 520 U.S. at 405. Under Monell, the actions of the mayor and village board in firing Bradley are, by virtue of the defendants’ authority as policymakers, automatically considered actions of the municipality itself under § 1983. Their decision to deprive Bradley of due process is the municipal policy that forms the basis for defendants’ liability.