Opinion ID: 3002806
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Kingcade argues that because the magistrate judge discussed his pro se suppression motions at the hearing on March 21, the district court judge erred in failing to address the motions de novo. Before we may reach Kingcade’s argument, however, we must determine whether he has preserved the right to appeal the issues raised in his pro se motions. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that he has not. With the consent of the government and approval of the court, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, “reserving in writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial motion.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2); see also United States v. Cain, 155 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 1998). This is a narrow exception to the ordinary rule that a defendant who pleads guilty cannot appeal his conviction. United States v. Dimitrov, 546 F.3d 409, 416 (7th Cir. 2008). To 6 No. 08-2447 preserve an issue for appeal, a conditional plea must “precisely identify which pretrial issues the defendant wishes to preserve for review.” United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309, 1313 (7th Cir. 1993). All non-jurisdictional issues not specifically preserved in the conditional plea agreement are waived. See, e.g., Dimitrov, 546 F.3d at 416 (holding that although the defendant had preserved his objection to the constitutionality of a “mental state” requirement, he had not preserved another constitutional objection); United States v. Doherty, 17 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that although the plea agreement reserved the right to challenge the indictment’s failure to state a violation of a statute, the defendant “did not reserve the right to challenge ‘the sufficiency of the indictment’ in other respects”); see also Cain, 155 F.3d at 842 (“[A] guilty plea constitutes a waiver of non-jurisdictional defects occurring prior to the plea.”). We have held that Rule 11’s requirement that a conditional plea be in writing is not jurisdictional and that a conditional plea may be found in the limited circumstance where the parties to the agreement clearly intended that the defendant’s right to appeal an issue would be preserved. See United States v. Elizalde-Adame, 262 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2001); Markling, 7 F.3d at 1313. The cases examining the intent to preserve the right to appeal typically lack a written plea agreement, however, which is a significant difference from the case now before us. Written plea agreements are contracts, and we interpret them according to general principles of contract law. United States v. Hernandez, 544 F.3d 743, 750 (7th Cir. 2008). No. 08-2447 7 Thus, unlike those cases involving verbal agreements, we look to extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intentions—possibly found, for example, in a plea colloquy—only when the written contract is ambiguous. Cf. United States v. Given, 164 F.3d 389, 396 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court properly declined to consider extrinsic evidence where the plea agreement was unambiguous). In this context, we have the power to review issues clearly preserved in the written agreement, or, if that agreement is ambiguous, issues the parties clearly intended to preserve for appeal. We find no ambiguity in the language of Kingcade’s agreement. The agreement explicitly gave Kingcade the right to appeal adverse determinations regarding his motions to suppress evidence seized during the execution of search warrants. Kingcade’s pro se motions, on the other hand, challenged the consensual search of Robinson’s apartment and warrantless seizure of the safe. Kingcade’s pro se motions challenged neither the warrant to search the safe nor the one issued for Kingcade’s apartment. The October 3, 2007, warrant covered only Kingcade’s apartment. Police searched Robinson’s apartment pursuant to his consent, and they seized the safe without a warrant. The next day, police obtained a search warrant for the safe. In other words, both the search of Robinson’s apartment and the seizure of the safe, the actions that Kingcade challenged in his pro se motions, were done without a warrant. In fact, Kingcade explicitly challenged the absence of a warrant to search Robinson’s apartment or seize the safe, arguing that 8 No. 08-2447 Robinson’s consent was not valid and that there was no excuse for the police’s failure to obtain a warrant prior to the search. The plain language of the plea agreement does not cover these issues, because they do not concern the “execution of search warrants.” Furthermore, even if the language of the plea agreement were ambiguous, nothing in the plea colloquy or anywhere else in the record indicates that the government and Kingcade clearly intended for the language in the plea agreement to cover the pro se motions. The only mention of the agreement was when the Assistant United States Attorney read Paragraph Twelve to the court and stated that if Kingcade were to prevail on the pending motions, he could withdraw his plea. Kingcade clearly intended to preserve his right to appeal some motions to suppress, and we would be faced with a different situation if the plea agreement would leave Kingcade with no issues to appeal. But that is not the case. The motions filed by Attorney Mandell, both entitled “Motion to Suppress Search Warrant,” challenged the validity of the search warrants and therefore fell within the language of the plea agreement. Thus, because we find no evidence that the language of the plea agreement was intended to cover Kingcade’s pro se motions, we lack jurisdiction to review the merits of his claim.