Opinion ID: 1778117
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: statute of limitations and laches

Text: The statute of limitations on a party's right to bring an action to have a deed reformed does not begin to run until the party's right of possession or title is questioned. Ammons v. Ammons, 253 Ala. 82, 42 So.2d 776 (1949). Under the deed in question, and at the time of its original execution, Plaintiffs retained only a remainder interest in the real estate. As such, their rights to possession did not arise until the death of Leila Dirickson, the life tenant, on June 5, 1980. Plaintiffs instituted this cause seeking reformation within three months thereafter, on August 29, 1980. It is undisputed that both Plaintiffs learned for the first time in 1972 that the deed in question contained a misdescription, such knowledge coming from their grandmother, Leila Dirickson. In 1978, Mary D. Davis and Doris D. Stanford suggested to Plaintiffs that they reconvey their property holdings to their grandmother so that the land might thereafter be sold and the proceeds used for her care and well-being. This action, contra to showing that Plaintiffs' title was questioned, shows that, in fact, it was recognized in 1978. Applying the rule in Ammons, supra, to these facts, we are unable to accept Defendants' suggestion that the statute of limitations should act as a bar to Plaintiffs' cause of action. Defendants next assert that should their statute of limitations defense not succeed, then Plaintiffs' action was barred by the doctrine of laches. We disagree. Lapse of time alone does not establish laches. Ellis v. Stickney, 253 Ala. 86, 42 So.2d 779 (1949). To be affected by laches, the delay should have been with notice of the existence of the right, resulting in disadvantage to another, or should have operated to bring about changes of conditions and circumstances of which there can no longer be a safe determination of the controversy. Merrill v. Merrill, 260 Ala. 408, 71 So.2d 44 (1954). While it may be open to speculation as to why Plaintiffs first prosecuted their claim in 1980, this eight-year delay, after their knowledge of the error, does not bar the claim for laches under the instant facts. As Plaintiffs were not entitled to actual possession of the property until the death of the life tenant, we are unpersuaded that it was incumbent upon them to initiate earlier proceedings seeking to reform alleged errors in the deed's legal description. (Indeed, in the absence of a challenge to Plaintiffs' title, the only delay was between June 5, 1980the date of the life tenant's deathand August 29, 1980the date of the filing of the suit.) See Merrill, supra, in which a lapse of almost twenty years in filing suit to reform a deed, standing alone, was held not to establish laches. See, also, Duncan v. Johnson, 338 So.2d 1243 (Ala. 1976).