Opinion ID: 1927643
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instruction on Apparent Authority

Text: Question No. 5 on the special verdict form asked the jury: Did Hugh Winchester have apparent authority to make a contract with plaintiff on behalf of his wife Catherine? The jury by an 8-to-0 vote answered in the affirmative. Defendant now argues that the presiding justice erred in instructing the jury on the law governing whether Hugh Winchester had apparent authority to contract for his wife for work on her farm. She concedes that the presiding justice, who gave the instruction that defendant herself requested, correctly stated the basic law of apparent authority. That portion of the charge reads: Apparent authority can arise if the principal knowingly or negligently holds someone out as possessing authority to act for him or her, even though no actual authority has been given.... It's important to keep in mind that it is the conduct of the principal and not of the agent and the effect of that conduct on others who are led to believe that someone is acting for the principal that provides the legal basis for holding the principal responsible for the acts and contracts of an apparent agent. That instruction is clearly consistent with our rulings and the legal doctrine of apparent authority. See Ocean National Bank of Kennebunk v. Diment, 462 A.2d 35, 38 (Me.1983); Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 8, 27, 159, 292 (1958). See generally 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 84 (1962); 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 33, at 133 (1963). It faithfully follows our ruling in Libby v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 452 A.2d 979, 982 (Me.1982), that [A]pparent authority is that which, though not actually granted, the principal knowingly permits the agent to exercise or which he holds him out as possessing. Stevens [v. Frost, 140 Me. 1, 7, 32 A.2d 164, 167-68 (1943)]. Apparent authority exists only when the conduct of the principal leads a third person to believe that a given party is his agent. Brown v. Manchester, 384 A.2d 449, 453 n. 4 (Me.1978) (emphasis in original) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 8 (1958)). We can find no error whatever, let alone obvious error, in the quoted instruction. The presiding justice went on to charge the jury that there was another ground, alternative to the apparent authority theory, on which it could find Catherine Winchester personally liable in contract to plaintiff. That alternative basis for her contractual liability was raised by Question No. 6 on the special verdict form, reading: Did Catherine Winchester contract with the plaintiff for the work in question by being present when the work was being done and remaining silent? Pertinent to that later question, the presiding justice instructed the jury that Catherine Winchester could be held personally liable if they found that in all the circumstances of the case she had the opportunity to order plaintiff to stop its work but chose to remain silent. On appeal defendant argues that that instruction was error. We, however, need not decide whether the presiding justice was right or wrong because in any event the jury found unanimously that Hugh Winchester had apparent authority to act as his wife's agent. That finding of fact, standing alone, justifies the court's entry of judgment against Catherine Winchester personally for contract damages. We reject defendant's argument that the jury in deciding Question No. 5 on apparent authority might have been confused by the instruction relating to Question No. 6 on an implied contract arising from silence. No one reading the extensive record evidence of apparent authority would conclude that any possible error or confusion would rise to the level of seriously affect[ing] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of this proceeding.