Opinion ID: 1521791
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: ruffin: physical evidence

Text: Once Ruffin had given his inculpatory oral statement, it became clear that he was not free to leave. The police said they wanted a second, written statement and, therefore, obtained a written waiver of Miranda rights, implying their own belief that Ruffin was now in custody. This time, too, Ruffin had been more attentive to the Miranda warnings, asking whether he needed a lawyer. He thereby implied his own belief he was not free to leave. Accordingly, we have concluded that at least by the time Detective Muse began to take Ruffin's written statement, Ruffin was in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes. All seizures claimed to violate the Fourth Amendment must be evaluated to determine whether a seizure was reasonable considering the opposing interests of the defendant's right to privacy and the police officer's duty to detect and prevent crime. [20] See Michigan v. Summers, supra, 452 U.S. at 697-98, 101 S.Ct. at 2591-92; Allen, supra, 436 A.2d at 1307. Even though the police took Ruffin's pants and shoes after they violated his Miranda rights in obtaining his written statement, we conclude that the seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. [21] After the police had taken Ruffin's written statement, they took his trousers and shoes, apparently to check for blood samples. The trial court apparently denied the motion to suppress on the ground that Ruffin's surrender of the clothing, like his making of statements, was altogether voluntary, not the result of a seizure. We reject that premise. Once Ruffin was in custody, for Fifth Amendment purposes, he had been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Gayden, 492 A.2d at 872 n. 8; supra Part III. B. Ruffin's oral statement, in which he admitted striking and stomp-kicking the decedent, provided independent evidence to establish the probable cause necessary to justify the seizure. [22] See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 183, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); Derrington, supra note 21, 488 A.2d at 1330. Where probable cause already exists, a carefully tailored search and seizure to prevent the destruction of readily destroyed evidence is deemed incident to a lawful arrest, even if the suspect has not been formally arrested. [23] Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2564, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 2004, 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973); Bailey v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 357, 389 F.2d 305, 308 (1967); see Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904-05, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). The police took Ruffin's pants and shoes to examine them for traces of the decedent's blood, skin and hair. They reasonably could anticipate that Ruffin would destroy this evidence if allowed to leave the homicide office with his clothing. [24] Compare Rawlings v. Kentucky, supra, 448 U.S. at 110-111, 100 S.Ct. at 2564-65 (money and knife); Cupp v. Murphy, supra, 412 U.S. at 296, 93 S.Ct. at 2004 (highly evanescent evidence of fingernail samples); Sibron v. New York, supra, 392 U.S. at 49, 66, 88 S.Ct. at 1895, 1904 (in course of limited weapons' search, burglary tools seized as potential instrument of crime of burglary); Bailey, supra, 128 U.S.App.D.C. at 357, 389 F.2d at 308 (wallet on floor in car stopped by police).