Opinion ID: 1625947
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Traveling At Reduced Speed

Text: Byrd contends that it was error for the trial court to grant Instruction No. D-5 [3] which allowed the jury to find that it was not negligence on the part of Smith to be traveling at less than 30 miles an hour on Highway 49 if such reduced speed was out of necessity as provided in Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-509(1) (1972): No motor vehicle shall be driven at a speed less than thirty miles per hour on federal designated highways where no hazard exists. An exception to this requirement shall be recognized when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation, or when a vehicle or combination of vehicles is necessarily, or in compliance with law or police direction, proceeding at a reduced speed. Byrd essentially contends that the physical limitation on the rate of acceleration of a tractor trailer does not fall under the necessary exception to the minimum speed. Byrd is contending that either by the time a vehicle would enter the highway, or at least by the time such a vehicle would be overtaken by other traffic, such an entering vehicle must have attained the minimum speed of 30 miles per hour. If this were the law, it is obvious that large trucks would be unable to enter these federal highways at many  if not most  stop sign intersections. The reason for this is that it takes somewhere in the neighborhood of half a minute for even a moderately loaded tractor trailer on a straightaway to reach a speed of 30 miles per hour. With oncoming traffic traveling at approximately 55 miles per hour, this would require the driver of the entering truck to be able to see clearly approximately one-half mile back down the road he was entering. It would appear to be within everyone's common knowledge that there are numerous intersections where such visibility does not exist. Byrd contends that Instruction No. D-5 conflicts with Instruction No. P-19 which attempts to define necessity as proceeding by legally posted speed limit signs, proceeding by escort authorized by law, or by police escort. These two instructions would only be in conflict if it is assumed that P-19  which somewhat defines necessity  is meant as an exclusive definition rather than as a partial one. In contradistinction, D-5 essentially echoes the statute (when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation) and leaves the determination of what is necessary to a jury determination of reasonableness. Once again, there are no cases deciding this issue, but it would appear from a common sense viewpoint that Smith's approach to the construction of this statute is correct. Cf. Stong, 456 So.2d at 710 (reasonable promptness is a jury issue). Even when we give Byrd the benefit of the doubt, we do not read Instruction D-5 as being erroneous, only incomplete at worst. Indeed the primary function of Instruction P-19 is that it cures any problem with D-5. The assignment of error is denied.