Opinion ID: 529751
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction to Hear Motion

Text: 54 A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within two years after final judgment. F.R.Crim.P. 33. Because Rule 33's time limitations are jurisdictional, a district court is powerless to consider an untimely motion for a new trial. United States v. Cook, 705 F.2d 350, 351 (9th Cir.1983). 55 The government concedes that Walgren filed his motion for a new trial within the two-year time limit. The district court, however, decided that its jurisdiction had lapsed because of the delay between the filing of the motion and when the motion was finally heard. 56 Neither side has cited any case law directly on point. The government analogizes to the time limit set forth in (former) F.R.Crim.P. 35(b), motion to reduce a sentence. Rule 35(b) was amended in 1985 expressly to provide that The court shall determine the motion within a reasonable time. The Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules to the 1985 amendment explain the meaning of the amendment: 57 As for the reasonable time limitation, reasonableness in this context must be evaluated in light of the policies supporting the time limitations and the reasons for the delay in each case. United States v. Smith, supra [650 F.2d 206 (9th Cir.1981) ] at 209. The time runs at least so long as the judge reasonably needs time to consider and act upon the motion. United States v. Stollings, supra [516 F.2d 1287 (4th Cir.1975) ] at 1288. 58 Even assuming that the same kind of reasonable time limitation applies under Rule 33, it was unreasonable for the trial court to grant the defendant an open-ended extension until further order of the court, only arbitrarily to impose an unstated earlier deadline after the fact. Nothing suggests that Walgren did not pursue his FOIA requests diligently; he did not know until July 1987 that he would receive no additional documents from the government. Nothing in the record indicates that determination of the motion took more time than either the magistrate or the judge reasonably needed. Moreover, the Advisory Committee Notes state that another purpose of the 1985 amendment was to remove any doubt arising from dicta in some cases that determination of the motion within any given period was jurisdictional. The time consumed in determination of the motion is not jurisdictional. 59 Here, given the court's open-ended extension, the delay was not unreasonable and does not undermine the district court's jurisdiction. The district court erred when it dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction.