Opinion ID: 694395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: continuity in the united states

Text: 314 The reports of English patent cases do not manifest the turmoil in preserving the jury right in England, the imprisonment of jurors before 1670, and attempts to limit the jury right in England as well as in the American colonies. Reflecting this experience, there was in the new United States a reverence for the place of the jury as, in the words of Thomas Jefferson, the only anchor yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 n. 10, 99 S.Ct. 645, 658 n. 10, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 3 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 71 (Washington ed. 1861)). 315 The Supreme Court summarized a long history in the statement: 316 The trial by jury is justly dear to the American people. It has always been an object of deep interest and solicitude, and every encroachment upon it has been watched with great jealousy. 317 Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 445, 7 L.Ed. 732 (1830). Justice Story made clear that the right was not limited to the precise causes of action that existed in the law courts of England. Id., 28 U.S. at 446-47. See generally James Fleming, Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 Yale L.J. 655 (1963). In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974) the Court wrote: 318 Although the thrust of the Amendment was to preserve the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791, it has long been settled that the right extends beyond the common-law forms of action recognized at that time. 319 415 U.S. at 193, 94 S.Ct. at 1007. In Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 1835, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) the Court reiterated that the right to jury trial extends to causes of action created by Congress which are similar to common law forms of action. As a recent example, in Chauffeurs, Teamsters, and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 110 S.Ct. 1339, 108 L.Ed.2d 519 (1990), the Court considered whether a suit in which an employee sought back pay, for breach of a union's duty of fair representation, carried the right to a jury trial. The Court stated: 320 To determine whether a particular action will resolve legal rights, we examine both the nature of the issues involved and the remedy sought. First, we compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature. Tull, supra [481 U.S.], at 417-18 [107 S.Ct. at 1835] (citations omitted). The second inquiry is the more important in our analysis. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 [109 S.Ct. 2782, 2790, 106 L.Ed.2d 26] (1989). 321 494 U.S. at 565, 110 S.Ct. at 1345 (footnote omitted). Observing that the cause of action of a union's duty was unknown in eighteenth-century England, the Court looked to analogous actions, including an action to set aside an arbitration award, an action of a beneficiary against a trustee, and an attorney malpractice action. Id. at 565-66, 110 S.Ct. at 1344-45. The Court held that the respondents were entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, despite the equitable nature of the underlying action, since the relief sought was legal in nature. See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959): 322 As this Court said in Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 109-110 [11 S.Ct. 712, 714, 35 L.Ed. 358 (1891) ]: In the Federal courts this [jury] right cannot be dispensed with, except by the assent of the parties entitled to it, nor can it be impaired by any blending with a claim, properly cognizable at law, of a demand for equitable relief in aid of the legal action or during its pendency. 323 359 U.S. at 510, 79 S.Ct. at 956-57 (footnote omitted). See also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 51 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977). 324 On this history, it is jarring to come upon the majority's argument that the Seventh Amendment no longer applies because there are now claims in United States patents, whereas the old English patents did not have claims as we know them. The removal of the jury right is not so casually achieved: 325 [T]he Constitution is concerned, not with form, but with substance. All of vital significance in trial by jury is that issues of fact be submitted for determination with such instructions and guidance by the court as will afford opportunity for that consideration by the jury which was secured by the rules governing trials at common law. 326 Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498, 51 S.Ct. 513, 514, 75 L.Ed. 1188 (1931). 327 However, the argument about claims does bring out a point of curiosity, for the law of eighteenth-century England required specificity in particularly describing what was patented, and the patent grant ended with a concise summary of the subject matter, with details annexed in the specification; patent claims, in turn, are concise summaries of the subject matter, with details annexed in the specification. Following is a portion of a representative letters patent dated March 28, 1764: 328 To all to whom these presents shall come, John Morris, of the town of Nottingham, hosier, sendeth greeting.-- 329 Whereas, the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by letters patent under the Great Seal of Great Britain, bearing the date at Westminster, [gave and granted to the inventors] sole privilege ... to make, use, exercise, and vend their invention ... in which said letters patent is contained a proviso that if the said Thomas and John Morris, and John and William Betts, or any one of them should not particularly describe the nature of the said invention and in what manner the same is to be performed by an instrument, in writing under their hands and seals, or the hand and seal of one of them, and cause the same to be enrolled in the High Court of Chancery ... 330 [The specification ending with:] Now know ye, that I, the said John Morris, in pursuance of the said proviso in the said letters patent contained, do hereby declare that the said invention of an engine or machine, on which is fixed a set of working needles, which engine or machine is fixed to a stocking-frame for the making of oilet-holes or net-work in silk, thread, cotton, or worsted, as mitts, gloves, hoods, aprons, handkerchiefs, and other goods usually manufactured upon stocking-frames by a method entirely new, is particularly described in the plans hereunderto annexed. 331 Morris v. Bramson, 1 Carp. P.C. at 31-32 n.  (emphasis added). The requirement that the inventor particularly describe the invention was carried into the United States Patent Act of 1790:Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That the grantee or grantees of each patent shall, at the time of granting the same, deliver to the Secretary of State a specification in writing, containing a description, accompanied with drafts or models, and explanations and models (if the nature of the invention or discovery will admit of a model) of the thing or things, by him or them invented or discovered, and described as aforesaid, in the said patents; which specification shall be so particular, and said models so exact, as not only to distinguish the invention or discovery from other things before known and used, but also to enable a workman or other person skilled in the art or manufacture, whereof it is a branch, or wherewith it may be nearest connected, to make, construct, or use the same.... 332 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, Sec. 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790) (emphasis added). 333 This requirement was continued in all subsequent revisions, which were successively more explicit. In 1836 the Patent Act required that the inventor particularly specify the part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his own invention. Ch. 357, Sec. 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119. Again revised in 1870, the statute required that the inventor particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or discovery. Ch. 230, Sec. 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201. The present statute, enacted in 1952, states that the specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. 35 U.S.C. Sec. 112, p 2. This evolution in statutory directive, requiring the inventor to be more specific as to what had been invented, did not remove the jury from trial of patent infringement cases. 334 The majority's other response to the Constitution is to call a patent a statute, arguing that statutory interpretation is not for the jury. Designating a patent a statute in order to avoid the Seventh Amendment simply denies history and our heritage. Our judicial responsibility is to uphold the Constitution, not devise ways to circumvent it.