Opinion ID: 315809
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence to Raise the Defense

Text: 23 In United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973), the Supreme Court recently reconsidered the basis of the entrapment defense and reaffirmed the majority opinions of Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932), and Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958). The Court restated that 24 The entrapment defense prohibits law enforcement officers from instigating criminal acts by persons 'otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish them.' . . . Thus, the thrust of the entrapment defense was held to focus on the intent or predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime. 25 411 U.S. at 428-429, 93 S.Ct. at 1641. As this court has stated in United States v. Catanzaro, 407 F.2d 998, 1001 26 The basic question in an alleged entrapment The basic question in alleged entrapment case is whether the accused was ready and willing to commit the crime if any opportunity should be presented, or whether a person not otherwise disposed to wrongdoing was corrupted by some overreaching or special inducement, often amounting to reprehensible conduct. 27 We of course are not confronted with the question of whether Watson was entrapped as a matter of law, but rather with the question of whether he presented enough evidence of entrapment to be entitled to have the jury consider the defense. While this Circuit has not articulated a test to determine when a defendant becomes entitled to an entrapment charge, the Second Circuit has applied a workable test which we adopt. The charge must be given, however unreasonable the judge would consider a verdict in favor of the defendant to be, when the accused shows (1) evidence that the Government initiated the crime, regardless of the amount of pressure applied to the defendant, and (2) any evidence negating the defendant's propensity to commit the crime. United States v. Riley, 363 F.2d 955, 958-959 (2d Cir. 1966). See also United States v. Cohen, 431 F.2d 830, 832 (2d Cir. 1970). 28 It is clear that, at least absent Watson's admission that he arranged the March 21 sale because he needed money, Watson would have been entitled to the entrapment charge on all the counts involving March events. Abrams mentioned narcotics dealings to Watson before Watson had discussed the subject, and Abrams persisted in taking the initiative over three months in calling and meeting Watson. Watson's considerable resistance over that period, and his rejection of each opportunity to sell to Abrams for three months, entitled Watson to have the jury consider under proper instructions whether he was entrapped. 6 29 The Government urges, however, that Watson's admitted monetary motive for eventually agreeing to connect Abrams with a supplier establishes a predisposition to commit the crime and an absence of entrapment as a matter of law. We reject this contention. We believe that Watson's statement of his reason for succumbing should be weighed by a jury in the light of the evidence of considerable and persistent importunities by Abrams. The jury would be justified in finding, assuming it believed Watson's entire story, that Watson would not have agreed to arrange the sale, despite his need for money, were it not for Abrams' persistent solicitations. 7