Opinion ID: 6496731
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: spencer has failed to meet his burden of

Text: PERSUASION ON APPEAL 412 Spencer argues that the district court erred when it denied his rule 60(b)(6) motion as untimely. Spencer’s opening brief tracks, almost verbatim, his original rule 60(b)(6) motion. Specifically, Spencer’s brief argues that OPC Counsel committed fraud on the court—and violated the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct — when she (1) knowingly made false statements concerning Spencer’s connection to TSWF, (2) knowingly elicited false testimony from Carr concerning Spencer’s connection to TSWF and the nature of the fraud allegation in the Malpractice Action, and (3) failed to disclose controlling case law contrary to her position at closing arguments. Spencer’s brief diverges from his rule 60(b)(6) motion, though not substantively, when it “invites” us, under separate heading, “to utilize [State v. Boyden, 2019 UT 11, 441 P.3d 737] to set forth guidelines for cases involving fraud upon the court ... discovered after the . . . [time periods] provided in Rule 60(b).” 413 The OPC argues, among other things, that Spencer has failed to meet his burden of persuasion on appeal because he has failed to marshal the evidence that supported the district court's conclusion. The OPC also claims that Spencer’s brief merely “recite|s] the same arguments in his appeal that he made in [his rule 60(b)(6) motion]” and “offers nothing by the way of analysis or evidence to show how the [district] court abused its discretion in denying his [m]Jotion.” We agree with the OPC. q14 Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure “prescribe[s] standards for the form, organization, and content of a brief on appeal.” State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, { 33, 326 P.3d 645. As to Spencer v. OPC Opinion of the Court content, rule 24 requires an appellant’s brief to “explain, with reasoned analysis supported by citations to legal authority and the record, why [it] should prevail on appeal.” UTAH R. App. P. 24(a)(8). An appellant “will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on appeal if it fails to marshal and respond to evidence or authority that could sustain the decision under review.” In re Discipline of LaJeunesse, 2018 UT 6, § 28, 416 P.3d 1122 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 915 We addressed the marshaling requirement in LaJeunesse. There, the OPC appealed the district court’s decision to dismiss its complaint against attorney Richard LaJeunesse. Id. 4 21-22. Although we ultimately affirmed the district court on the merits, id. { 48, we recognized that we could have affirmed solely on the OPC’s “fail[ure] to carry its burden as the appellant,” id. 26. We concluded that the OPC had failed to marshal the evidence because its brief had “fail[ed] to append or recite the findings and conclusions entered by the district court,” id. § 29, and “ignore[d] crucial elements” of the district court’s ruling and analysis, id. {| 3031. And we said that when “the appellant fails to acknowledge the lower court’s decision—or to identify specific grounds for challenging it—we may affirm without reaching the merits of the question presented.” Id. { 32. 4116 Spencer’s statement of the factual and _ procedural background of the case, like the OPC’s in LaJeunesse, “makes only the barest mention of the district court’s [decision].” Id. | 29. Spencer devotes just a single sentence to the two-page order he now appeals. And that sentence merely informs us that the district court denied his rule 60(b)(6) motion. He simply makes no attempt to address the facts that the district court relied on to conclude that his motion was untimely. 417 The argument section of Spencer’s brief fares no better. The great bulk of Spencer’s argument is dedicated to rehashing the merits of his rule 60(b)(6) motion. Only three sentences are given to the district court’s actual decision: [T]he Trial Court improperly concluded that [Spencer]’s Rule 60(b)(6) Motion was untimely, as it was not until ... Carr made statements ... in the [Malpractice Action] ... that [Spencer] learned that the testimony provided by [Carr] in the underlying [Disciplinary Action] was false and/or misleading. It was the realization that [Carr] provided false and/or Cite as: 2022 UT 28 Opinion of the Court misleading testimony in the underlying [Disciplinary Action] that caused [Spencer] to review the documents—available from the Utah Department of Commerce —in the context of [Carr]’s testimony. From these documents, [Spencer] came to understand that [OPC Counsel] had made false statements in the [Disciplinary Action]. 418 These three sentences ignore “crucial elements of [the district court]’s ruling.” See LaJeunesse, 2018 UT 6, § 30. Specifically, Spencer’s brief does not address the district court’s observation that “py asserting that [OPC Counsel] misrepresented the information that was available through the Utah Department of Commerce in [the Disciplinary Action], [Spencer] is implicitly admitting that he was able to determine whether [OPC Counsel]’s representations were correct [at the time they were made].”4 Nor does it address the district court’s assertion that Spencer has “fail[ed] to credibly explain why he was unable—before, during, or shortly after the [Disciplinary Action]—to challenge the veracity of ([Carr]’s testimony,” particularly when Spencer had access to the complaint Carr filed in the Malpractice Action at the time Carr testified in the Disciplinary Action, or why he was unable to “bring the controlling authority in question to the [district court]’s attention.” Spencer cannot meet his burden of demonstrating that the district court erred without addressing these crucial aspects of the district court’s ruling. 419 Instead of addressing the district court’s analysis, Spencer argues that his motion is timely under the logic of a footnote in State v. Boyden, 2019 UT 11, § 37 n.8. As Spencer sees it, Boyden grants a party leave to file a rule 60(b)(6) motion alleging fraud on the court outside of the time constraints rule 60 establishes. In other words, Spencer reads Boyden to provide a way around the time restrictions applicable to a rule 60(b)(6) motion when that motion alleges fraud on the court. But the footnote on which Spencer hangs his hat 4 Spencer made this admission explicit at oral argument. There he admitted that “[he] knew [OPC Counsel’s statements] were false at the time [of the Disciplinary Action],” and that his decision to file a rule 60(b)(6) motion over a year after those statements were uttered was simply “a judgment call” on his part. Oral Argument at 18:33, 19:09, Spencer v. OPC, 2022 UT 29 (No. 20210458), https:// www.utcourts.gov/opinions/streams/index.php?court=sup. Spencer v. OPC Opinion of the Court addressed a very specific factual scenario and was not intended to be a de facto rewrite of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60. (20 In Boyden, the State filed a rule 60(b)(3) motion to vacate the conviction of a defendant because the defendant had misrepresented his identity. Id. 8. The district court denied the State’s motion, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction, and even if it had it, the PostConviction Remedies Act (PCRA) was the State’s “sole remedy.” Id. {| 10. In reversing the district court, we concluded that “[t]he State could seek relief under rule 60(b) because neither the PCRA nor any other statute or rule govern[ed].” Id. ¢ 24. And the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure — specifically, rule 60(b) —“fill[ed] the gaps.” Id. | 25. 21 We also dropped a footnote where we noted that the State’s rule 60(b)(3) motion was timely, and we made clear that we did not reach the question of whether the State could utilize rule 60(b)(3) had it discovered the alleged fraud more than three months after the entry of judgment. Id. 937 n.8. While we left that question unanswered, we made two additional observations. First, we explained that “rule 60 ‘does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.” Id. (quoting UTAH R. Civ. P. 60(d)). We also stated that “courts have inherent authority to set aside judgments obtained through fraud on the court.” Id. 22 Spencer contends this footnote opened the door for a party to raise fraud on the court claims at any time. This was not Boyden’s intent. Boyden arose in a specific—and unique—context. The State was attempting to correct a serious error in a criminal conviction over the defendant’s objection. Yet neither the Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the PCRA gave the State an avenue for relief. Using the Rules of Civil Procedure as a gap-filler, we concluded that the State could use Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to correct the error. The State, moreover, had brought its rule 60(b)(3) motion within the applicable ninety-day time limit imposed by rule 60(c). See UTAH R. Civ. P. 60(c). But, recognizing that we were using a civil rule to gapfill the criminal rules, and further recognizing that filing an independent action in a criminal context might raise double jeopardy concerns,° we noted that the State would not have been without a 5 The Boyden footnote concluded with a string of citations to various cases in other jurisdictions. Most of these cases deal with the (continued . . .) Cite as: 2022 UT 28 Opinion of the Court remedy had it discovered the fraud on the court after the ninety days had expired. We did not mean to suggest, however, that rule 60(d) could be routinely used to circumvent rule 60(c)’s other timelines. Nor did we intend to suggest that a party for whom an independent action might be a viable path to raise its claims could take advantage of the observation that the State would not be without a remedy when double jeopardy concerns prevent it from filing an independent action. To the extent that others read the footnote the way Spencer does here, we disavow that interpretation and stress that the footnote must be read in the context in which it arose. 23 In any event, even if Boyden applied here, Spencer would still need to address and attack the district court’s conclusion that his motion was not brought within a reasonable time. See UTAH R. Clv. P. 60(c) (requiring all rule 60(b) motions “be filed within a reasonable time”). And as we explained above, Spencer has failed to do just that. We affirm.