Opinion ID: 761232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Breach of Governing Documents Claim

Text: 17 Appellants contend that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the Union defendants on plaintiffs' claim that the Union defendants breached the Union's constitution and bylaws. Plaintiffs alleged that the Union defendants breached the Union's constitution and bylaws by (1) submitting the Agreement to a re-vote on October 31, 1996, (2) failing timely to elect a chapel representative, and (3) failing to call a chapel meeting six months prior to the date of the wage reopener negotiations for the purpose of eliciting proposals from the membership. Plaintiffs also contend for the first time on appeal that the Union breached the bylaws of its International by failing to submit the contract proposal to the International Union for review and approval. This last issue is waived because plaintiffs failed to raise it in the district court and we shall not consider it. See Greene v. United States, 13 F.3d 577, 585-86 (2d Cir.1994).
18 After briefing was completed in this case, but before oral argument, we decided Spellacy v. Airline Pilots Ass'n-Int'l, 156 F.3d 120 (2d Cir.1998). Spellacy involved a claim by eighty-eight former pilots of Pan American Airlines (Pan Am) that the Airline Pilots Association-International (ALPA) had breached its duty of fair representation by failing to fight for the pilots' rights under a collective bargaining agreement and by acting in bad faith. The Pan Am pilots alleged bad faith by the ALPA in failing to follow its own constitution and bylaws when it adopted a certain Pan Am pilot training plan in the absence of a written agreement with Pan Am. In evaluating a union's interpretation of its own CBA, we announced the following standard: 19 [t]o uphold the union's action in interpreting the contract as it did it is not necessary that we find on the merits that such an interpretation was correct. Rather, our inquiry is limited to whether the union took a position on the basis of an informed, reasoned judgment regarding the merits of the pilots' claim in light of the language contained in the collective bargaining agreement. 20 Id. at 127 (quoting Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 533 F.2d 952, 957 (5th Cir.1976)). 21 We went on to reject the pilots' claim that the ALPA breached its constitution and bylaws. In so doing, we afforded great deference to the ALPA's interpretation of its governing documents, holding that [s]ince 'ALPA's interpretation of its governing documents is not unreasonable[,] by following its own interpretation ALPA did not breach its [duty of fair representation] in bad faith.'  Id. at 128 (alteration in original) (quoting O'Neill v. Air Lines Pilots Ass'n Intern., 939 F.2d 1199, 1207 (5th Cir.1991)). 22 Given the standard we used in Spellacy, we believe that Judge Baer accurately reflected the law of this circuit when he stated below that [a] Union's interpretation of its own constitution is entitled to great deference[ ] in order to avoid interference with internal union affairs .... and [t]herefore, the interpretation of bylaw provisions by Union officials will be upheld unless patently unreasonable. Sim, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3513, at  7-8, 1998 WL 35058 at  4 (citing Newell v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 789 F.2d 1186, 1189 (5th Cir.1986)). Thus, while appellants correctly point out that courts will ignore interpretations made by union officials which run adverse to the plain meaning of contract language, they wrongly assert that the Union's interpretation of its constitution and bylaws is not entitled to special weight. We will defer to the Union's interpretation of its governing documents unless that interpretation is  'patently unreasonable.'  Newell, 789 F.2d at 1189 (quoting Stelling v. IBEW, 587 F.2d 1379, 1389 (9th Cir.1978)).
23 Appellants claim that the Union breached its constitution and bylaws by submitting the Agreement to a second vote on October 31, 1998. Specifically, they contend that the Union violated Article XVI, § 20 of its bylaws, which states: Any member who voted with the majority may, at the same or next meeting, move for a reconsideration of any vote, except one by ballot; but, if once negatived, it shall not again be renewed. The Union Defendants respond that this provision was inapplicable because (1) the Union's bylaws and constitution did not require a ratification vote at all, and (2) the Union reasonably interpreted the clause except one by ballot to mean that when a vote was by secret ballot anyone could seek reconsideration, not just a member who voted in the majority, because it would not be known from a secret ballot who was in the majority. 24 We agree with appellees' second contention and therefore do not consider their argument that the provision was inapplicable because there was no requirement that Union members ratify the Agreement in the first place. It is reasonable to read Article XVI, § 20 as providing a non-exclusive method by which a member who votes with the majority may call for a re-vote. Because a secret ballot does not reveal which members voted with the majority, however, it is at least reasonable for the Union to interpret the provision as permitting any member who participates in the vote to call for a re-vote. Accordingly, we hold that the re-vote did not violate Article XVI, § 20 of the Union bylaws. 25
26 Appellants' second contention that the Union violated its bylaws by failing timely to elect a chapel representative other than a chapel officer 2 is meritless for the reasons stated by the district court. See Sim, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3513, at  9, 1998 WL 132793. First, Robert Smith, a chapel member and Union Vice President--but not a chapel officer--was elected to serve on the Wage and Scale Committee in 1987, and remained, unchallenged, as a Committee member through the duration of the wage reopener negotiations. It was reasonable for the Union to interpret Smith's continuing service on the Committee as fulfilling the bylaw requirement. 27 In any event, Ralph Tuttle was elected as a chapel representative to the Wage and Scale Committee before the last bargaining session with the Times, thereby curing any possible defect in Smith's service on the Wage and Scale Committee.
28 Finally, appellants argue that by not calling a chapel meeting six months prior to the wage reopener negotiations, the Union violated Article XV, § 22 of the bylaws. Section 22 provides: 29 [The Chairman] shall call a Chapel Meeting six months prior to the expiration of the present contract for the purpose of introducing propositions for the new contract. The propositions must be presented in writing and signed by the Chairman before the next Union Meeting. 30 The Union responds that this provision was inapplicable to the wage reopener, since, according to its interpretation, the Agreement was not a new contract but a mid-term modification of the CBA. 31 Again, we believe that the Union's interpretation of this provision as only requiring a chapel meeting prior to the expiration of the CBA in the year 2000 was not patently unreasonable, given the ambiguity of the phrase new contract in this context. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of appellants' breach of governing documents claim against the Union defendants.