Opinion ID: 3159812
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Indictment Challenges

Text: We reject Holden’s other challenges to the indictment. First, Holden contends that revised Count 41 impermissibly broadened the charges against him by including facts substantially different from those alleged in the original Counts 41–56. If a district court dismisses an indictment, or a portion of an indictment, the savings clause of 18 U.S.C. § 3288 permits the government to return a new indictment after the statute of limitations has expired, so long as it is done within six months of the dismissal. United States v. W.R. Grace, 504 F.3d 745, 753 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 354 (9th Cir. 1976)). Specifically, Holden argues that the new charge exposed him to liability for any patient seen at the nursing home for up to fourteen months, the time period alleged in revised Count 41. But his claims are based on a misreading of the superseding indictment. “An indictment must be read in its entirety and construed in accord with common sense and practicality.” United States v. Alber, 56 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 1995). In the Second Superseding Indictment, the government simply included the start and end dates of Holden’s alleged fraudulent scheme, which began on the date of service—January 6, 2006—and ended on the final date that Advanced Podiatry received payment for a fraudulent claim—February 27, 2007. “The test for sufficiency of the indictment is ‘not whether it could have been framed in a UNITED STATES V. HOLDEN 11 more satisfactory manner, but whether it conforms to minimal constitutional standards.’” Awad, 551 F.3d at 935 (quoting United States v. Hinton, 222 F.3d 664, 672 (9th Cir. 2000)). And here, Holden had sufficient notice of the charges brought against him. The government did exactly what the district court said would be permissible when the district court dismissed Counts 41 and 43–56 without prejudice—combine the seventeen fraudulent billings as a single count. We conclude that revised Count 41 was based on “the same factual allegations as the original indictment,” United States v. Hickey, 580 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2009), and did not substantially broaden the charges against him. Second, for the first time on appeal, Holden argues that revised Count 41 did not allege an execution of a fraudulent scheme. The indictment must be “liberally construed in favor of validity,” United States v. James, 980 F.3d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1992), and “it is only required that ‘the necessary facts appear in any form or by fair construction can be found within the terms of the indictment,’” id. at 1317 (quoting Kaneshiro v. United States, 445 F.2d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir. 1971)). Here, the Second Superseding Indictment alleged an execution of a scheme, as it stated that Holden “submi[tted] or caus[ed] to be submitted claims for payment from Medicare which falsely represented the service of an ‘Evaluation and Management’ office visit for patients seen at Garden Village, a skilled nursing facility, when, in fact, an Evaluation and Management visit was not the service provided.” Moreover, given the context of revised Count 41, discussed above, Holden also had notice of the charges against him. Finally, Holden contends that the Second Superseding Indictment “improperly expanded” the original indictment by 12 UNITED STATES V. HOLDEN including Counts 42–44, which alleged illegal conduct in 2010. However, as the government notes, there is no dispute that Counts 42–44 were returned by the grand jury, and the evidence presented in support of those counts does not vary or expand the indictment in any material way.