Opinion ID: 1867187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: wfea

Text: ¶ 56. I interpret Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) and (2)(a) in order to determine what is an accommodation. When we interpret or apply a statute, we attempt to ascertain its meaning in order to give the statute its full intended effect. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. We begin with the words chosen by the legislature, giving them their plain and ordinary meanings. Id., ¶ 45. This is our initial focus, because as we have explained, [w]e assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory language. Id., ¶ 44. We are aided in ascertaining the meaning of a statute by the context in which words are placed. Id., ¶ 46. If the statute's meaning is clear on its face, we need go no further; we simply apply it. Id., ¶ 45. However, if the statutory language is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more ways, then it is ambiguous. Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, ¶ 19, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656. A statute may also be ambiguous due to its interactions with other statutes. State v. White, 97 Wis. 2d 193, 198, 295 N.W.2d 346 (1980). If the statutory language is ambiguous, we may consult extrinsic sources to ascertain legislative intent. Stockbridge Sch. Dist. v. Department of Pub. Instruction Sch. Dist. Boundary Appeal Bd., 202 Wis. 2d 214, 223, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996). I conclude that the term accommodation is ambiguous because it reasonably could be understood in two ways: (1) as the majority does, by looking solely to § 111.34(1)(b) and concluding it is a plan that would have allowed [Roytek] to continue her employment with HTI, majority op., ¶ 1; or (2) as I have, by reading § 111.34(1)(b) and (2)(a) together and concluding it is a plan that will permit Roytek to assist HTI in implementing its valid business decision to utilize its equipment 24 hours per day. ¶ 57. In order to accurately assess whether Roytek has stated a claim for a WFEA violation based on a disability, it is necessary to understand the interaction between two provisions of WFEA, § 111.34(1)(b) and (2)(a). Subsection (1)(b) provides that an employer must reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's disability unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a hardship to its business. Subsection (2)(a) affects the meaning of accommodation in subsection (1)(b) when it provides that it is not employment discrimination because of disability to refuse to hire [or] employ if the disability is reasonably related to the individual's ability to adequately undertake the job-related responsibilities of that individual's employment[.] These two provisions are related in that an accommodation under subsection (1)(b) must be such that it also satisfies (2)(a), by permitting the job-related responsibilities of that individual's employment to be met. Our understanding of the interaction between these two provisions is facilitated by a review of when and why the legislature created them. ¶ 58. WFEA did not protect disabled persons from discrimination until 1965. Ch. 230, Laws of 1965. A provision substantially similar to Wis. Stat. § 111.34(2)(a), explaining that it is not discrimination contrary to WFEA to refuse to provide the employee or prospective employee with work if the disability of that person is related to the individual's inability to do the job, was a part of those initial provisions. Id. at § 3. ¶ 59. In the 1981-82 legislative session, WFEA was revised, in part due to our decision in American Motors Corp. v. DILHR, 101 Wis. 2d 337, 305 N.W.2d 62 (1981), which addressed a religious discrimination claim. Those revisions included what is now Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b), requiring an employer to make a reasonable accommodation for the individual's disability, unless to do so would pose a hardship on the employer. § 17, ch. 334, Laws of 1981; Wis. Legis. Council, Information Memorandum 82-17, at 7 (1982) [6] Subsection 111.34(1)(b) did not remove the protection for the employer found in § 111.34(2)(a). Subsection (2)(a) remained unchanged during the amendments. Giving each section an independent, yet related, function permits an employer lawfully to refuse to employ an individual who does not have an accommodation to the disability that will permit the adequate undertaking of the job-related responsibilities of the individual's employment.