Opinion ID: 694171
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: dismissal of trans-rim's lost profit damages

Text: 3 Trans-Rim argues that the district court erred in granting the pretrial motion in limine filed by Coors Brewing Company, Golden Technologies Company, Inc., and Graphic Packaging Corporation (collectively Coors) for an order excluding evidence of lost profit damages at trial. We review a district court's decision to grant a motion in limine excluding evidence for abuse of discretion. FDIC v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 20 F.3d 1070, 1081 (10th Cir.1994). 4 Approximately one-and-a-half years prior to trial, Coors moved for partial summary judgment regarding Trans-Rim's allegation that it was entitled to damages in the form of lost profits. On January 29, 1993, the district court denied Coors' motion for partial summary judgment. The district court reasoned that the absence of prior profits does not create a 'per se' exclusion of loss of profits as an item of damages if sufficient competent evidence is proffered. The court also set forth the standard of causation Trans-Rim would have to meet to establish lost profits: 5 Under Colorado law, a plaintiff who seeks lost profits as a measure of damages must prove by competent evidence that such profits would have been received but for the injury caused by defendant. Republic National Life Insurance Co. v. Red Lion Homes, Inc., 704 F.2d 484, 489 (10th Cir.1983). The fact of damages must be reasonably certain. Tull v. Gundersons, Inc. 709 P.2d 940, 943 (Colo.1985). The reasonable certainty standard has been interpreted as imposing on a plaintiff the burden of proving the fact of damages by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Once the fact of damages is proved by a preponderence of the evidence, however, uncertainty as to the amount of damages will not bar recovery. Miami International Realty Co. v. Paynter, 841 F.2d 348, 350 (10th Cir.1988) (quoting Tull, 709 P.2d at 943.). 6 The district court determined that Trans-Rim raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether it had suffered lost profits. 7 Subsequently, on November 1, 1993, Coors moved for partial summary judgment on Trans-Rim's cause of action for breach of an implied-in-fact contract for joint venture to build the project. Coors contended that it was entitled to summary judgment because there was no meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the proposal to enter into a joint venture to construct a recycled paper mill and box plant code-named Project Alaska (Project Alaska). Under Colorado law, [i]mplied contracts arise from conduct of the parties which evidences a mutual intention to contract with each other; however, there must be a meeting of the minds before any contract will be implied. A.R.A. Mfg. Co. v. Cohen, 654 P.2d 857, 859 (Colo.Ct.App.1982). 8 Trans-Rim argued, in opposition, that the parties formed an implied in fact contract to enter into the Project Alaska joint venture on or about March 7, 1990 through their acts, conduct, oral statements, and writings. On January 27, 1994, the district court granted Coors' motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss Trans-Rim's claim for breach of implied in fact contract. After a careful review of all the evidence before it, the district court concluded: 9 [The] evidence constitutes a mere scintilla of evidence of an implied-in-fact contract and no reasonable juror could find that the parties reached a meeting of the minds or intended to form a binding contract on March 7, 1990.... The evidence overwhelmingly supports Coors' position that the parties' negotiations continued concerning the essential terms of a joint venture agreement and that they never reached a meeting of the minds on its essential terms. No reasonable jury could find otherwise. 10 Shortly thereafter, on February 25, 1994, Coors filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of lost profits. Coors asserted that the district court should reconsider its January 29, 1993 ruling allowing the issue of lost profits to go to the jury, in light of the court's January 27, 1994 order dismissing Trans-Rim's claim for breach of an implied in fact contract to enter into the Project Alaska joint venture. The district court granted Coors' motion in limine to exclude evidence of lost profits on March 17, 1994. The district court held that, because Coors was not contractually obligated to participate in the joint venture, it was not liable for damages for lost profits. The district court reasoned: 11 Trans-Rim's implied-in-fact contract claim, which I dismissed in January 1994, was the only claim alleging conduct which could be construed to proximately cause Trans-Rim's alleged loss of profits from the joint venture project. Trans-Rim's claims for misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract and confidentiality agreements, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of duty not to disclose confidential information, do not allege a legal duty by Coors to joint venture the project. Rather, these claims are based upon the proposition that Coors disclosed confidential information or trade secrets to third-parties. Thus, even if these claims are meritorious, Trans-Rim cannot meet the causation test and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for Coors' wrongdoing the project would have come to fruition. In short, the predicate in this case for such damages--the terms of an agreement to joint venture the project--has dropped out of this case. 1 12 Trans-Rim contends in this appeal that it was entitled to present evidence to the jury of lost profits as damages for breach of a written confidentiality agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, and misappropriation of trade secrets. Trans-Rim reasons that the alleged disclosures of confidential information by Coors allowed Coors to obtain long-term price concessions from another paper supplier. According to Trans-Rim, these concessions served as the impetus for Coors to abandon the Project Alaska joint venture. Thus, Trans-Rim argues that it is entitled to a share of the profits Project Alaska would have generated if Coors had not violated the confidentiality agreement, breached its fiduciary duty, and disclosed trade secrets. 13 Trans-Rim's argument overlooks the fact that liability must be established before damages may be awarded. In this case, Trans-Rim failed to convince the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that Coors violated the confidentiality agreement, breached its fiduciary duty, or disclosed trade secrets. Rather, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Coors and against Trans-Rim on each of Trans-Rim's theories of liability. 2 Absent a determination that Coors was liable, Trans-Rim's contention that lost profits were a proper measure of damages is moot. Because we conclude that the jury verdict in favor of Coors and against Trans-Rim on all theories of liability is dispositive, we need not reach the question whether lost profits are a proper measure of damages on the theories of liability presented by Trans-Rim to the jury.