Opinion ID: 158785
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inconsistent regulation

Text: 75 The third ground upon which the district court held section 30-37-3.2(A) violates the Commerce Clause is that it subjects the use of the Internet to inconsistent regulations. As we observed, supra, certain types of commerce have been recognized as requiring national regulation. See, e.g., Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 118 U.S. at 574-75 (noting that [c]ommerce with foreign countries and among the states requires only one system of rules, applicable alike to the whole country). The Internet is surely such a medium. We agree with the court in Pataki, when it observed, [t]he Internet, like . . . rail and highway traffic . . ., requires a cohesive national scheme of regulation so that users are reasonably able to determine their obligations. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 182; see also Kenneth D. Bassinger, Dormant Commerce Clause Limits on State Regulation of the Internet: The Transportation Analogy, 32 Ga. L. Rev. 889, 904 (Spring 1998) (The structure of the Internet bears a striking resemblance to a railroad, highway, or other means of interstate transportation.). 10 76 Plaintiffs have accordingly met their burden of demonstrating a likelihood that they will prevail on their claims that section 30-37-3.2(A) violates both the First Amendment and the Commerce Clause. We turn now to the remaining requirements for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.