Opinion ID: 1500978
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Medical Director.

Text: Appellants urge error in the admission of testimony by Dr. Baker, appellee's medical director, to the effect that he would have declined the risk had he known of assured's treatment at the Mayo Clinic. The contention is that this was the expression of an opinion on an issue which was for the determination of the jury. Appellee argues that the admissibility of this testimony is not the issue, but whether the statements made in the application were intentionally fraudulent. As to the inadmissibility of the testimony, appellants rely upon Mack v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 Minn. 53, 208 N. W. 410, and Domico v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 215, 253 N. W. 538. These two cases do not rule the point. In the Mack Case the answers in the application, which were urged by the insurer as being intentionally fraudulent and material, were as to trivial ailments, and in that situation the court held that the intent to deceive was a question for the jury. In that connection the court stated (167 Minn. 53, 208 N. W. 410, page 412): The proper practice in the trial of the question, as to whether the insurer would have issued the policy had it known the true facts, is to permit the witnesses to disclose the facts, and the trier of fact will decide. In this case some of the witnesses were asked whether, if they had known the true facts, a policy would have been issued. Such question calls for an answer which is the ultimate question of fact to be determined by the jury. This practice is not commendable. This quoted statement hardly goes to the length of holding that it is reversible error to permit testimony of this character. The Domico Case did not involve this point, although it cited the Mack Case upon another issue. Opposed to this statement in the Mack Case, is that by the same court (delivered less than a year before the Mack Case) wherein such testimony was received and acted upon by the Supreme Court without unfavorable comment. In that case (Flikeid v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 163 Minn. 127, 203 N. W. 598, 599) the court said: There is testimony in the record, given by officers at the home office, to the effect that, had the questions been answered in accordance with the foregoing testimony as to the conditions of the insured, and his actions with reference thereto, such as Dr. Andrews related, the policy would never have been issued. The same character of testimony was regarded as proper and material by this court in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co., 260 F. 641, 645. Although the admissibility of this testimony has been considered, the admission of it would not constitute reversible error even if it were error because the issue here is not one of fact but one of law. That issue of law is whether the evidence conclusively established the intentional fraud of the insured in the false statements contained in the application. That these statements were false, were material, and were intentionally false is clearly and indisputably established by this record. The insured was a man of relatively large business affairs and must have known that the only purpose of the insurer in acquiring information concerning his history, health, and habits was to enable it to determine whether it would issue a policy. It is impossible to think that he could forget these treatments which took him away from his home and to a clinic, and all of which occurred within a few months and one of which the day before the application, and which were continued, even to a visit made between the signing of his first application and the medical examination  the latter containing one of the false statements. He could not have regarded a diabetic ailment as so trivial that an insurer would not want to know about it. The only possible rational explanation of his conduct is that he willfully made the false statements for the purposes of concealing the facts and of deceiving the insurer so that he might procure a policy which, if this truth were known, might be refused. In this situation of fact the only question is one of law and that is easy of solution. The law is that where the insured, in his application, intentionally makes a false statement about a material matter, the policy may be avoided. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hilton-Green, 241 U. S. 613, 622, 36 S. Ct. 676, 60 L. Ed. 1202; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co., 260 F. 641 (C. C. A. 8); Domico v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 215, 253 N. W. 538, 541; Mack v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 Minn. 53, 208 N. W. 410, 412; Flikeid v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 163 Minn. 127, 203 N. W. 598, 599. Also, even if this evidence be regarded as merely the expression of an opinion and not the recital of facts and even if the admission thereof was erroneous, it would not constitute reversible error, since the case was never submitted to the jury for its independent decision but the verdict was directed. IV. Another contention of appellants is that the original and the photographic copy of the application were inadmissible because the copy attached to the policy was not readily readable by a man fifty-one years of age, of normal eyesight, under normal conditions, with reasonable ease. The argument is that the state statute requires a copy of the application to be attached to the policy and that this means a copy which is readily readable by a person with normal eyesight, under normal conditions. In some states there exist statutory requirements as to legibility of all portions of the contract of insurance, but there is no such statute in Minnesota. Under the clear facts here, however, it is not necessary to determine whether the absence of such a readable copy would be a compliance with the statute since the copy attached to this policy was of that readable character. A companion contention is that the court improperly excluded an offer to prove by an optometrist that this copy was not readily readable by a man fifty-one years of age, of normal eyesight, under normal conditions, with reasonable ease. In sustaining the objection to this line of inquiry, the court (who was much older than the insured) stated: It seems to me that the question of whether this is readable or not is not a question for an expert to say. I think that the normal eye can read it; I can read it very plainly and I think any member of the jury can. The trial court was entirely right in determining that this was not a matter for expert testimony. There was nothing which an optometrist could properly add to the information as to the legibility of this application which the court and jury would not acquire by inspection thereof. V. A last matter which is argued by appellants is that the case should have gone to the jury to determine whether insured made the statements in the application because the evidence as to his having made them rests entirely upon the testimony of the survivor to a transaction with a decedent. It is true that there are situations where even uncontradicted evidence by a party, the only other witness being dead, may require submission to a jury; but the situation here is not of that character. These statements were contained in different parts of an application, both parts being signed by the insured and attached to the policy delivered to him and upon which this action is based. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hilton-Green, 241 U. S. 613, 36 S. Ct. 676, 60 L. Ed. 1202. The judgment below must be, and is, affirmed.