Opinion ID: 712148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Search of Shabazz's Legal Papers.

Text: 17 Shabazz contends that Garland violated his constitutional rights by refusing to allow Shabazz to be present while his cell, including his legal materials, was searched. An inmate ordinarily has no reasonable expectation of privacy as to his jail cell or his possessions within it. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3199-3200, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). Thus, even a pretrial detainee has no Fourth Amendment right to be present during a search of his cell. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 555-57, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1882-83, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). Shabazz relies, however, on the proposition that a jail regulation may create a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1747, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983). 18 The Jail's published policy on cell searches provides that 19 For the security and safety of inmates and staff, we will, on occasion, find it necessary to conduct an unannounced inspection of your pod and assigned cell.... Inmates do not have the right to be present during an inspection of any item except bona fide legal papers. 20 (emphasis added). Shabazz alleged that the above policy created a protected liberty interest in his being present during any search of his legal papers. The district court agreed, and granted summary judgment against Garland on the issue of liability. We now reverse. 21 Our prior cases held that a state prison regulation created a liberty interest only when it contain[ed] 'substantive predicates' governing an official's decision regarding a matter directly related to the individual, and when it used  'explicitly mandatory language' specifying the outcome that must be reached upon a finding that the substantive predicates have been met. Dix v. County of Shasta, 963 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-63, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1909-10, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989)). It was on this approach that the parties based their arguments during the appeal of this issue. 22 The Supreme Court has since adopted a new approach to determining when prison regulations create a liberty interest. In Sandin v. Conner, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), the court criticized the substantive predicates approach, noting that by using it, courts had ceased to examine the 'nature' of the interest purported to be created by the State, in favor of a mechanical exercise in parsing individual prison regulations to look for magic words: 23 By shifting the focus of the liberty interest inquiry to one based on the language of a particular regulation, and not on the nature of the deprivation, the Court encouraged prisoners to comb regulations in search of mandatory language on which to base entitlements to various state-conferred privileges. Courts have, in response, and not altogether illogically, drawn negative inferences from mandatory language in the text of prison regulations ... [W]e believe that the search for a negative implication from mandatory language in prisoner regulations has strayed from the real concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. 24 Id. at ---- - ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2299-2300; see also Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir.1995) (outlining the substantive predicates approach and recognizing its rejection by Sandin ). 25 Sandin consequently refocused the test for determining the existence of a liberty interest away from the wording of prison regulations and toward an examination of the hardship caused by the prison's challenged action relative to the basic conditions of life as a prisoner. See id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2301. The Court reformulated the working definition of a liberty interest in the present context to include only freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2300. 26 As we point out below in connection with Shabazz's claims relating to the imposition of disciplinary segregation, the Sandin reference to ordinary incidents of prison life refers to the ordinary incidents of imprisonment under a sentence after conviction. Shabazz was a pretrial detainee. In the context of the search of Shabazz's cell, however, we conclude that this fact makes no material difference. The cell search is not imposed as punishment and does not involve a more restrictive level of incarceration to which a sentence is relevant; it is a general security measure of the kind that the Supreme Court has said pretrial detainees may be subjected. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 546-47 & n. 28, 99 S.Ct. at 1877-78 & n. 28. Thus we conclude that it is appropriate to apply Sandin to Shabazz's cell-search claim. 27 Under Sandin, there is little to Shabazz's claim. It is true that Garland violated a Jail regulation that provides for inmates to be present when their legal papers are searched. Shabazz, his cell and all of his other possessions, however, were already subject to inspection at any time and for any or no reason. The failure to permit Shabazz to be present adds no unconstitutional dimension to the practice under Sandin's test. The Supreme Court has previously held that a pretrial detainee has no Fourth Amendment right to be present when his cell and belongings in it are searched. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 555-57, 99 S.Ct. at 1882-83. Thus the inspection of Shabazz's legal papers in his absence is simply not a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of his incarceration, even in his status as a pretrial detainee. We hold that the violation of this regulation does not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest. Sandin, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2301. We therefore reverse the district court's judgment against Garland. 28