Opinion ID: 2354276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timeliness and Laches

Text: Bannum next claims that the BZA never had jurisdiction to consider the ANC's appeal because it was untimely filed. All parties agree that the appeal of ANC 5-B to the BZA from the DCRA's issuance of the building permits was filed on January 24, 2003, well within sixty days from the date of issuance of both the original building permit (December 12, 2002) and the revised building permit (January 17, 2003). [8] However, Bannum argues that because ANC 5-B failed to appeal within sixty days from the issuance of the DCRA concurrence letters, its claims should not have been heard. The BZA first considered whether such letters were appealable at all. It ruled that they were, concluding that they qualified as other administrative decisions under D.C.Code § 6-641.07(f). [9] We need not decide whether the concurrence letters were separately appealable (there are arguments to be made on both sides of that issue) because we agree with the BZA's further conclusion that the ANC's failure to appeal from a concurrence letter, even after notice, [10] does not bar a subsequent appeal of the related building permit. Because the issuance of a building permit requires the DCRA to comply with the public notice and other requirements set forth in the zoning regulations, we hold that a party such as ANC 5-B may wait to appeal until the DCRA takes official action by issuing the permit, regardless of whether or not that party has appealed (or tried to appeal) from any earlier interlocutory administrative decision. As the BZA explained, section 6-641.07(f) of the Code recognizes three types of appealable zoning-related decisions: (1) those granting or refusing building permits; (2) those granting or withholding certificates of occupancy; and (3) other administrative decisions. We agree with the BZA that each type of decision is separately appealable. Bannum also contends that, as a result of the ANC's nine-month delay in bringing an appeal, it incurred substantial costs in renovating the warehouse, and therefore the BZA should have dismissed the ANC's appeal on the ground of laches. [11] Laches has two elements: the party asserting a claim of laches must show both (1) that it has been prejudiced by the delay and (2) that the delay was unreasonable. Beins v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 572 A.2d 122, 126 (D.C.1990). Because it was not improper for the ANC to wait until after the issuance of the building permits before appealing to the BZA, and because it seasonably did so, the BZA properly held that ANC 5-B did not unreasonably delay in filing its appeal until seven days after the issuance of the revised building permit. Nor can Bannum show that it suffered prejudice as a result of the delay of which it now complains. Since most of Bannum's expenses were incurred immediately after it obtained the permit in December 2002, it could not have been prejudiced by any delay on the part of the ANC before that date. Moreover, because it knew or should have known that other parties could appeal from the issuance of the permit within sixty days (as ANC 5-B did), Bannum cannot validly blame the ANC for these expenditures. As the BZA said, Bannum could not assume that its permit was valid until after the 60-day jurisdictional window for appeals had expired, [and therefore] any expenditures before that date were made at its own risk. Thus we hold that Bannum has not met either requirement of the two-part test for laches.