Opinion ID: 2585204
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The district court's interference in Rhyne's relationship with his attorneys

Text: During the guilt phase of the trial Rhyne and his attorneys reached a point of disagreement over whether a witness, Chris Brodhecker, should be called to testify. Rhyne wanted Brodhecker called as a defense witness, while Rhyne's counsel felt Brodhecker was unreliable and would potentially cause the defense case more harm than good. Brodhecker was incarcerated with Mendenhall prior to the trial and proposed to testify that Mendenhall had essentially confessed to him to acting alone in killing Donny Brown. On March 28, 2000, the district court held an ex parte hearing with Rhyne and his counsel to discuss the dispute. At the hearing, the district court inquired extensively into Rhyne's reasons for wanting to call Brodhecker and into counsel's reasons for not wanting to call him. The district court canvassed Rhyne thoroughly on the risks that counsel felt were associated with calling Brodhecker and determined that Rhyne fully understood that Brodhecker's testimony could backfire on the defense. The district court then directed counsel to call Brodhecker. On appeal, Rhyne claims the district court should not have allowed him to direct the actions of his counsel or should have canvassed him regarding his right to represent himself. We conclude that the district court erred by interjecting itself into the attorney-client relationship. And we take this opportunity to recognize the well-established rule that while the client may make decisions regarding the ultimate objectives of representation, the trial lawyer alone is entrusted with decisions regarding legal tactics such as deciding what witnesses to call: Once counsel is appointed, the day-to-day conduct of the defense rests with the attorney. He, not the client, has the immediateand ultimateresponsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop. [3] Indeed, Justice Harlan has also suggested that a lawyer may properly make a tactical determination of how to run a trial even in the face of his client's incomprehension or even explicit disapproval. [4] Only the defendant, of course, can make certain fundamental decisions regarding the objectives of representation, such as whether to present a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. [5] However, with few exceptions, the means of representation, i.e., trial tactics, remain within counsel's control. [6] In a case apposite to this one, the California Supreme Court upheld a trial court's denial of a defendant's request, not joined in by counsel, to present certain evidence at a capital trial. [7] The court explained that except for the defendant's exercise of fundamental rights, like the right to testify, an attorney representing a criminal defendant has the authority to control the presentation of the defense. [8] In another pertinent case, the California court approved a trial court's denial of a defendant's request, opposed by counsel, to act as co-counsel. [9] The court stated that generally an attorney should not be compelled over his objection to undertake the defense of an accused on terms which undermine the powers normally ascribed to counsel. [10] Appointed counsel should not be required to `surrender any of the substantial prerogatives traditionally or by statute attached to his office.' [11] Thus, the district court should not have attempted to resolve the dispute between Rhyne and his counsel. Defense counsel was entitled to decide whether or not to call Brodhecker. The district court error notwithstanding, we also conclude that under the facts of this case, Rhyne is now estopped from raising this claim on appeal because he invited the error by asking the district court to allow him to call the witness. [12] The district court thoroughly canvassed Rhyne regarding the attendant risks of calling Brodhecker, Rhyne clearly sought to call Brodhecker notwithstanding those risks, and Rhyne cannot now be heard to complain that he received exactly what he asked for. Rhyne also challenges the district court's interference during the penalty phase. At Rhyne's insistence, and over defense counsel's objections, the district court prohibited defense counsel from presenting the testimony of three doctors and Rhyne's mother. Again, the record reflects that, while the court should not have intervened, Rhyne was aware of his counsel's concerns, and we conclude that Rhyne is estopped from raising the issue now. Finally, we note that at no time did Rhyne ask to represent himself; therefore, the district court did not err in failing to conduct a Faretta canvass. [13]