Opinion ID: 1573093
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Heading: Interpretation of Article 6701d, Section 24(e)

Text: The court of appeals is not alone in struggling to understand section 24(e). The Legislature adopted section 24(e) from the Uniform Vehicle Code. Many other states have drafted statutes from the same model, and their courts have also struggled to understand what it means to say that an emergency vehicle driver should exercise due regard for others while responding to an emergency, but must face the consequences of reckless disregard for others. Several courts have agreed with the court of appeals that provisions such as section 24(e) impose liability for mere negligence. See Doran v. City of Madison, 519 So.2d 1308, 1312-13 (Ala.1988); Estate of Aten v. City of Tucson, 169 Ariz. 147, 817 P.2d 951, 955 (1991); City of Little Rock v. Weber, 298 Ark. 382, 767 S.W.2d 529, 533 (1989); Barnes v. Toppin, 482 A.2d 749, 755 (Del.1984); City of Baltimore v. Fire Ins. Salvage Corps, 219 Md. 75, 148 A.2d 444, 447 (1959); City of Kalamazoo v. Priest, 331 Mich. 43, 49 N.W.2d 52, 54 (1951); Cairl v. City of St. Paul, 268 N.W.2d 908, 912 (Minn.1978); Wright v. City of Knoxville, 898 S.W.2d 177, 179-80 (Tenn.1995); Estate of Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 202 Wis.2d 290, 550 N.W.2d 103, 114-15 (1996). Many other courts also have imposed liability for mere negligence, but placed great emphasis on the circumstances of emergency action. See Rutherford v. Alaska, 605 P.2d 16, 18-19 & n. 5 (Alaska 1979); Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 58 Cal.2d 35, 22 Cal. Rptr. 866, 372 P.2d 906, 916 (1962); Bouhl v. Smith, 130 Ill.App.3d 1067, 86 Ill.Dec. 247, 475 N.E.2d 244, 246-47 (1985); Belding v. Town of New Whiteland, 622 N.E.2d 1291, 1293 (Ind.1993); Thornton v. Shore, 233 Kan. 737, 666 P.2d 655, 661 (1983); Stenberg v. Neel, 188 Mont. 333, 613 P.2d 1007, 1010 (1980); Lee v. City of Omaha, 209 Neb. 345, 307 N.W.2d 800, 803 (1981); Fielder v. Jenkins, 274 N.J.Super. 485, 644 A.2d 666, 668 (Ct.App.Div.1994); Siburg v. Johnson, 249 Or. 556, 439 P.2d 865, 870 (1968); Brown v. Spokane County Fire Protection Dist. No. 1, 100 Wash.2d 188, 668 P.2d 571, 574-76 (1983). Of course, a negligence inquiry always considers what a reasonably prudent person would do under the same or similar circumstances. See, e.g., St. John v. Pope, 901 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex.1995). Therefore, the emphasis these cases place on the emergency circumstances seems to indicate an intent to create a modified, heightened negligence threshold. But, courts in Iowa, Louisiana, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont have held that provisions such as section 24(e) only waive immunity for recklessness. See Schatz v. Cutler, 395 F.Supp. 271, 274 (D.Vt.1975) (interpreting the Vermont statute as imposing a recklessness, or aggravated negligence, standard); Morris v. Leaf, 534 N.W.2d 388, 390 (Iowa 1995) (equating due regard with negligence generally, but concluding that it means recklessness in this context); Smith v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 609 So.2d 1024, 1027 (La.Ct.App.1992) (The driver of an emergency vehicle can only be held liable for negligence to the degree that it constitutes reckless disregard for the safety of others.); Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494, 620 N.Y.S.2d 297, 644 N.E.2d 988, 989 (1994); Roberts v. Kettelle, 116 R.I. 283, 356 A.2d 207, 213-14 (1976). From our inquiry, it is evident that most courts have interpreted provisions such as section 24(e) to impose liability for negligence. However, as noted above, many of the courts simultaneously established a negligence standard, but went to great lengths to explain that negligence for emergency vehicle operators is not at all comparable to negligence for civilian drivers. See, e.g., Thornton, 666 P.2d at 661 (noting that one of the circumstances to be considered in the negligence inquiry is the emergency vehicle operator's right to assume that other drivers will yield). Ultimately, we fail to see how this modified-negligence inquiry is meaningfully different from the recklessness standard that we adopt today. More particularly, we believe that a recklessness standard provides a better-defined standard than heightened negligence. Furthermore, emergency vehicle operators and their governmental employers, in most states, are immune from suits based on negligence because the employees' official immunity is waived only for more culpable conduct, such as gross negligence, bad faith, or willful or wanton conduct. See, e.g., Logue v. Wright, 260 Ga. 206, 392 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1990); Cooper v. Wade, 218 Mich.App. 649, 554 N.W.2d 919, 923 (1996); Creighton v. Conway, 937 S.W.2d 247, 250-51 (Mo.Ct.App. 1996); Canico v. Hurtado, 144 N.J. 361, 676 A.2d 1083, 1085 (1996); Fahnbulleh v. Strahan, 73 Ohio St.3d 666, 653 N.E.2d 1186, 1188 (1995). Therefore, a substantial majority of states provide some form of immunity barring suit against governmental employers or employees based on negligent operation of emergency vehicles. Whatever form such immunity takes, the underlying policy is the same: to balance the safety of the public with the need for prompt responses to police, fire, and medical emergencies. In light of that need, and the privileges granted to emergency vehicles, we hold that section 24(e) of article 6701d imposes liability for reckless operation of an emergency vehicle in an emergency situation. To recover damages resulting from the emergency operation of an emergency vehicle, a plaintiff must show that the operator has committed an act that the operator knew or should have known posed a high degree of risk of serious injury. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander, 868 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tex.1993); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 213-14 (5th ed.1984) (defining the usual meaning assigned to recklessness). Basic principles of statutory construction disfavor the court of appeals' holding that the duty of due regard imposes liability for mere negligence. First, the court of appeals erred in focusing on the due regard phrase to the almost total exclusion of the reckless disregard phrase in the same sentence. Section 24(e) of article 6701d states that the privileges granted in that section do not relieve an emergency vehicle operator of the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others. TEX.REV.CIV. STAT. art. 6701d, § 24(e). Any construction of this section to impose a standard of care of less than recklessness would make the reckless disregard clause ineffectual surplusage. [2] Of course, we will give effect to all the words of a statute and not treat any statutory language as surplusage if possible. See Chevron Corp. v. Redmon, 745 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex.1987); Perkins v. State, 367 S.W.2d 140, 146 (Tex.1963). It is entirely reasonable to read section 24(e) as containing both a cautionary warning to emergency vehicle operators to drive with due regard for others, considering the privileges they are granted, but also a statement that these operators will answer in damages for the consequences of their reckless conduct. Second, the Legislature specifically excluded operation of emergency vehicles in emergency situations from the general waiver of immunity for negligent operation of governmental vehicles. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.021, 101.055(2). Were we to construe article 6701d to impose liability generally on emergency vehicle operators for mere negligence, we would render meaningless the portion of section 101.055 that specifically excludes emergency vehicle operators from the waiver of immunity for negligence. Third, having liability predicated on reckless conduct better serves the public's interest in minimizing emergency response delays. We agree with the concerns expressed by the New York Court of Appeals in declining to interpret a provision similar to section 24(e) to impose liability for mere negligence: As a practical matter, use of the undemanding ordinary negligence testor even the more flexible common-law negligence test that is applied in emergency situations would lead to judicial second-guessing of the many split-second decisions that are made in the field under highly pressured conditions. Further, the possibility of incurring civil liability for what amounts to a mere failure of judgment could deter emergency personnel from acting decisively and taking calculated risks in order to save life or property or to apprehend miscreants. The reckless disregard test, which requires a showing of more than a momentary judgment lapse, is better suited to the legislative goal of encouraging emergency personnel to act swiftly and resolutely while at the same time protecting the public's safety to the extent practicable. Saarinen, 620 N.Y.S.2d 297, 644 N.E.2d at 992 (citations omitted). Using recklessness as the threshold for imposing liability is likewise consistent with the policy we announced in Chambers, to balance: (1) the injustice ... of subjecting to liability [an emergency vehicle operator] who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion; [and] (2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good [with] the rights of bystanders or other innocent parties if [the emergency vehicle operator] acts in gross disregard of public safety. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)) (emphasis added). We note that this Court has twice cited section 24(e) and discussed only its due regard prong, equating it with a negligence standard. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 653; Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 98-99 (Tex.1992). Our opinion today is consistent with both Chambers and Travis. We agree that section 24(e) imposes a duty to drive with due regard for others by avoiding negligent behavior, but it only imposes liability for reckless conduct. [3] The dissent does not disagree with our conclusion that article 6701d, section 24(e) imposes liability only for reckless conduct. At 432. However, the dissent insists that recklessness is not a requisite for liability unless the conduct is specifically enumerated as a privilege in section 24. At 433. For all other conduct, the dissent would impose liability for mere negligence. The facts of this case show why the dissent's position is flawed. Clark, in fact, was proceeding through a red light when the accident occurred. Proceeding through a red light is a specifically enumerated privilege of emergency vehicles in emergency situations. See TEX.REV.CIV. STAT. art. 6701d, § 24(c)(2) (repealed 1995) (current version at TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 546.001(2)). Therefore, the dissent should conclude that Clark is insulated from liability for any conduct short of recklessness. However, the dissent does not so conclude because Martin simply pleaded that Clark failed to keep a proper lookout rather than that he failed to stop at a red light. Surely, the Legislature did not intend for the availability of the statute's protection to turn on which words a litigant chooses. Furthermore, we think that our reading of section 24 better comports with the Legislature's understanding of the emergency vehicle statute. Courts in other states have looked at the due regard clause that was taken from the same model act as section 24 and perfunctorily equated it with negligence. See, e.g., Wright, 898 S.W.2d at 180. In 1995, when the Legislature codified section 24 as section 546.005 of the new Transportation Code, it replaced the phrase due regard: This chapter does not relieve the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle from: (1) the duty to operate the vehicle with appropriate regard for the safety of all persons; or (2) the consequences of reckless disregard for the safety of others. TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 546.005 (emphasis added). The Legislature's substitution of appropriate regard for due regard lends credence to our view that the Legislature intended for emergency vehicle operators in emergency situations to be cognizant of public safety, but only intended to impose liability for reckless conduct. By imposing a double standard for liability, one for emergency vehicle operators in emergency situations and one for civilian drivers, the Legislature has placed a heavier burden on the civilian drivers. Several policy considerations support this heavier burden. First, emergency vehicle operators typically face more exigent circumstances than do civilian drivers. Emergency vehicle operators are charged with protecting the public's health, safety, and property, and a few minutes or even seconds can make the difference between life and death. Second, civilian drivers generally have an advantage when it comes to anticipating and preventing a collision. Under most circumstances, the lights, sirens, and distinctive coloring of an emergency vehicle make it stand out from the others; by contrast, the vehicle with which the emergency vehicle is on course to collide too easily blends in with the other traffic. We are aware of statistical data showing the frequency with which emergency vehicles, particularly police cars in hot pursuit of criminal suspects, are associated with injurious or fatal traffic accidents. See Travis v. City of Mesquite, 764 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex.App.Dallas 1989) (Thomas, J., dissenting), rev'd, 830 S.W.2d 94 (Tex.1992). Some judges are influenced by such statistics, see id., and perhaps they are, or should be, part of the legislative mix. But once the Legislature has made its policy choice by enacting the statute, this Court is constrained to interpret the statutory language, not to decide upon and implement its own policy choices based on legislative facts. Third, emergency vehicle operators must routinely make risky judgment calls in emergency situations. It is unfortunate that some civilian drivers are less than vigilant in abiding by their duties to keep a lookout for and to yield to emergency vehicles, but emergency vehicle operators are entitled to presume that other drivers will respect emergency priorities.