Opinion ID: 703628
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: special condition of probation

Text: 16 The district court required, as a condition of Dr. Obermeyer's probation, that she not harass, abuse or personally contact without permission of the probation officer any of the participants, parties or attorneys to this litigation. Dr. Obermeyer does not challenge the restriction on harassment and abuse; she only challenges the restriction on personal contact with the parties and participants to the litigation. She argues that this restriction unreasonably and unnecessarily restricts her First Amendment rights to speech and association. We disagree. 17 The district court has broad discretion in setting probation conditions, including restricting fundamental rights. United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir.1991). In this circuit, a probation condition is valid if it is imposed for permissible purposes and if it is reasonably related to the twin goals of probation, rehabilitation and protection of the public. United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir.1988). 18 The district court clearly imposed the personal contact restriction for permissible purposes. The judge wanted to assure that similar disturbances did not recur. See id. at 374 (Trial courts frequently impose restrictions on speech when a criminal conviction is for crimes committed during the course of expressive activity.... [in order] to protect the public from a situation that might lead to a repetition of the same crime.). Moreover, the district court carefully limited the restriction on Dr. Obermeyer to specific types of contact with specific people regarding specific matters. Cf. id. at 374 (if [probation] conditions are drawn so broadly that they unnecessarily restrict otherwise lawful activities they are impermissible). 19 The personal contact restriction on Dr. Obermeyer was also reasonably related to rehabilitation and protection of the public. The condition is clearly related to protecting the relevant members of the public from additional episodes of disruptive conduct by Dr. Obermeyer. 2 It is also related to the rehabilitative goal of encouraging Dr. Obermeyer to limit her expressive conduct to permissible methods and fora. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the personal contact restriction on Dr. Obermeyer.