Opinion ID: 727331
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Garcia's Motion to Reopen

Text: 14 Upon the conclusion of Garcia's case at trial, the Hospital moved for judgment under Rule 50. The court held a hearing on the motion and stated the following: 15 Well, let me just say, I think the motion is appropriate under the evidence. I think that the problem is this, if an individual--there were testimony that no doctor permitted his client, once confirmed pregnant, to ever lift more than 150 pounds, not do that, then we have got something that is unique and specific to pregnant women. I don't know if that makes a difference or not. But it seems to me that it would make a difference because there is not a pregnant woman working at the hospital who would be permitted, at least, to pick up 150 pounds according to a doctor.... 16 Record, vol. IV, pgs. 107-08. At this point, Garcia moved the court to allow her to reopen her case to obtain the testimony of Dr. Gunn, who had been subpoenaed but failed to appear. The district court denied this motion and granted the Hospital's motion to dismiss under Rule 50. 17 We review for abuse of discretion a district court's ruling on a party's motion to reopen its case for the presentation of additional evidence. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 331, 91 S.Ct. 795, 802, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971). The court's decision will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing that it has worked an injustice in the cause. Gas Ridge, Inc. v. Suburban Agric. Properties, Inc., 150 F.2d 363, 366 (5th Cir.1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 796, 66 S.Ct. 487, 90 L.Ed. 485 (1946). Among the factors the trial court should examine in deciding whether to allow a reopening are the importance and probative value of the evidence, the reason for the moving party's failure to introduce the evidence earlier, and the possibility of prejudice to the non-moving party. See Rivera-Flores v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 64 F.3d 742, 746 (1st Cir.1995); Hibiscus Assocs. v. Board of Trustees of Policemen and Firemen Retirement Sys., 50 F.3d 908, 917-918 (11th Cir.1995); Joseph v. Terminix Int'l Co., 17 F.3d 1282, 1285 (10th Cir.1994). While we are reluctant to disturb the decision of the district court in an area peculiarly within its scope of expertise, we believe that its decision here has worked an injustice and therefore must be reversed. We come to this decision by applying the factors listed above. 18 Trial courts as a rule act within their discretion in refusing to reopen a case where the proffered 'new' evidence is insufficiently probative to offset the procedural disruption caused by reopening. Rivera-Flores, 64 F.3d at 746. The evidence here could not be more probative or essential for Garcia's case. This is especially true given that the district court suggested that its judgment might be based on the lack of that evidence. As we mention above in our discussion of disparate impact claims, Garcia needed to establish the element of causation. Had Dr. Gunn testified that no pregnant woman would be advised by her doctor to lift 150 pounds, this would have been sufficient to establish that element and, as a result, Garcia's prima facie case under the Act. We find, therefore, that the probity factor counsels the reopening of her case. 19 We also determine that Garcia's reason for failing to introduce the doctor's testimony at trial was bona fide. Should a district court conclude that a litigant is engaging in any form of chicanery, it properly denies the motion. The same result obtains where the litigant was negligent in failing to introduce the evidence. Here, Garcia's subpoenaed witness did not show up to testify. She was in Atlanta, due back in Houston two days later. Garcia made a motion at the beginning of trial to be permitted to present Dr. Gunn's testimony sometime after the conclusion of her own case in chief; the record reveals that this motion was not ruled upon. Nevertheless, it shows that Garcia was aware of the problem and sought to correct it. Further, Garcia offered to call her subpoena server to testify that Dr. Gunn had in fact been served. We find that this factor weighs in Garcia's favor. 20 Finally, we do not see where the defendant would have been unduly prejudiced by allowing Garcia to reopen her case for the sole purpose of providing this testimony. While there is always the possibility of some prejudice in that additional testimony is being introduced against the non-moving party, our concern is with undue prejudice. Here, Garcia made her motion to reopen after concluding her case but before the Hospital had begun its presentation of evidence. Had the court granted the motion, Garcia stated that she could put Dr. Gunn on the stand the following morning, delaying the presentation of the Hospital's case by about a day. Garcia's satisfaction of this factor is less clear than the others, but we find that the Hospital would incur no undue prejudice from the reopening. Weighing these factors, we find an abuse of discretion in denying the motion.