Opinion ID: 2525532
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: New Broker Extinguishes Newman's Claims

Text: [¶ 48] Grommet contends that his hiring of Brockman extinguished any right Newman had to earn a commission because Section IV D 4 of their contract protected Grommet from paying dual commissions. Continuing, he contends that because he paid Brockman a commission he cannot be held to owe a commission to Newman as well. Furthering this argument, Grommet contends we must limit our analysis of this issue to what this Court had to say in the Havens case and may not apply law that enlarges upon or changes in any way the law set out by the majority in Havens. This applies in particular, Grommet claims, to our holding in Scherer, ¶¶ 19-24, 18 P.3d at 653-55. Grommet asserts, citing, Whitlock Construction, Inc. v. JPB, 2002 WY 36, 41 P.3d 1261 (2002), that [t]he implied covenant is never breached `where the parties' actions are in conformity with the clear language of the contract.' However, that opinion says much more than that: Whitlock claims that the JPB breached an implied duty which existed in the contract to use good faith efforts to obtain the concurrence of the funding agencies. In Scherer Constr., LLC v. Hedquist Constr., Inc., 2001 WY 23, ¶ 24, 18 P.3d 645, ¶ 24 (2001), we adopted § 205 of the Restatement, Second, Contracts and held that parties to a commercial contract may bring a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based upon a contract theory. Because we have said that a valid contract existed between Whitlock and the JPB, it follows that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in the contract. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that a party's actions be consistent with the agreed common purpose and justified expectations of the other party.... The purpose, intentions and expectations of the parties should be determined by considering the contract language and the course of dealings between and conduct of the parties. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing may not, however, be construed to establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties. In other words, the concept of good faith and fair dealing is not a limitless one. The implied obligation must arise from the language used or it must be indispensable to effectuate the intention of the parties. In the absence of evidence of self-dealing or breach of community standards of decency, fairness and reasonableness, the exercise of contractual rights alone will not be considered a breach of the covenant. Scherer, at 653-54 (internal quotes and citations omitted). Although many claims for breach of good faith involve questions of fact making summary judgment inappropriate, summary judgment may be appropriate where, under the facts in the record, the party's actions were in conformity with the clear language of the contract. Scherer, at 654, fn. 2. [Emphasis added.] Whitlock Const., ¶¶ 23-24, 41 P.3d at 1267. [¶ 49] Our examination of the record on appeal, and of the district court's findings based upon that record, leads us to the conclusion that the district court's findings in this regard are not clearly erroneous. Indeed, its findings that Grommet breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing are roundly supported by the record.