Opinion ID: 2813360
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of Counsel Inquiry

Text: Both the Hawaiʻi Constitution and the United States Constitution guarantee a person accused of a crime the right to be represented by counsel “at every critical stage of the prosecution.” Reponte v. State, 57 Haw. 354, 361, 556 P.2d 577, 582 (1976) (citing United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973)). A “critical stage” of the prosecution includes “any stage where 10 HRAP 28(b)(4) states that any point of error not presented on appeal in accordance with Rule 28 “will be disregarded, except that the appellate court, at its option, may notice a plain error not presented.” - 18 - potential substantial prejudice to [a] defendant’s rights inheres,” and it has long been settled that this includes sentencing. State v. Pitts, 131 Hawaiʻi 537, 544, 319 P.3d 456, 460-61 463 (2014) (quoting State v. Masaniai, 63 Haw. 354, 359, 628 P.2d 1018, 1022 (1981)). The assistance of counsel at sentencing is of paramount importance because it is an “oftentimes complicated part of the criminal process that contains subtleties which may be beyond the appreciation of the average layperson seeking to represent him/herself.” D’Ambrosio v. State, 112 Hawaiʻi 446, 464, 146 P.3d 606, 624 (2006) (quoting United States v. Salemo, 61 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 1995)). When a defendant elects to proceed pro se, the record must indicate that the defendant was offered counsel, but he or she “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently rejected the offer and waived that right.” State v. Dickson, 4 Haw. App. 614, 619, 673 P.2d 1036, 1041 (1983).11 The trial court must 11 The minority quotes a portion from Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004), for the proposition that Miranda warnings “adequately inform[] the defendant of his [or her] Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” See minority at 3 (alterations in original) (quoting Tovar, 541 U.S. at 90). In doing so, the minority misapplies Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Tovar. The passage cited by the minority was addressing Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988), and stated as follows: Patterson concerned postindictment questioning by police and prosecutor. At that stage of the case, we held, the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), adequately informed the defendant not only of his Fifth Amendment rights, but of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel as well. Miranda warnings, we said, effectively (. . .continued) - 19 - ensure two requirements are met: first, the waiver of counsel is “knowingly and intelligently” made, and second, “the record is complete so as to reflect that waiver.” Id. The latter requirement arises because appellate courts are charged with determining from the record whether there was an unequivocal waiver, which was voluntarily and freely made. Id. at 621, 673 P.2d at 1042. Dickson set forth three areas of “specific waiver inquiry” factors to assist trial courts: (1) the particular facts and circumstances relating to the defendant that indicate the defendant’s level of comprehension; (2) the defendant’s awareness of the risks of self-representation; and (3) the defendant’s awareness of the disadvantages of selfrepresentation. Id. at 619-20, 673 P.2d at 1041-42. Under (. . .continued) convey to a defendant his right to have counsel present during questioning. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 89. Thus, the Court in Tovar noted that Miranda warnings were adequate to inform a defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the stage of postindictment questioning by police and prosecutor. 541 U.S. at 89. This case involves a defendant waiving the right to counsel during a sentencing proceeding. We apply Article 1 section 14 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution, which guarantees the assistance of counsel for an accused’s defense in criminal prosecutions and court-appointed counsel for an indigent defendant. See Haw. Const. art. I, § 14; State v. Merino, 81 Haw. 198, 219, 915 P.2d 672, 693 (1996). “In an appeal involving the question of whether one has been deprived of the right to counsel,” our task is to determine whether the record reflects that “there was an unequivocal waiver, which was voluntarily and freely made, and based upon an intelligent awareness of the benefits associated with representation by counsel and the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” 4 Haw. App. at 622, 673 P.2d at 1042. - 20 - Dickson, the first factor dictates the level and depth of the court’s inquiry regarding the second and third factors. Id. at, 619, 673 P.2d at 1041. Thus, Dickson indicates that a “trial court should first examine” the facts and circumstances particular to the defendant that will assist the court in assessing the defendant’s level of comprehension. Id. Once this initial inquiry is complete, the trial court may tailor its colloquy with the defendant to ensure that the court adequately conveys the risks and disadvantages of self-representation in a manner that the defendant will be able to understand. While courts are not required to strictly adhere to Dickson’s analytical framework, it provides an important tool to ensure waivers are made knowingly and intelligently in addition to establishing a complete record for appellate review.
Once the defendant expresses an interest in proceeding pro se, Dickson recommends that the court first explore facts and circumstances pertaining to the defendant that will allow the court to determine the defendant’s level of comprehension. Such circumstances include age, education, English language skills, mental capacity, employment background, and prior experience with the criminal justice system. This examination - 21 - of the “particular facts and circumstances relating to the defendant . . . is necessary to allow the trial court to determine the level and depth to which its explanation and inquiry must extend.” Dickson, 4 Haw. App. at 619, 673 P.2d at 1041. In this case, the district court’s inquiry into Phua’s particular circumstances was limited. The court questioned Phua about his age and whether he attended high school. However, there was other information before the court that suggested a further inquiry into Phua’s background was necessary. As to his education, Phua’s mother testified at trial that he was considered a “special education” student, he did not pass any elementary grade levels after the first grade, and he repeated the sixth grade three times. The court’s inquiry did not address these matters and further inquiry as to where Phua was educated and whether he received a high school diploma may have benefited the court’s analysis. Additionally, the court did not inquire into Phua’s English language skills even though the court was on notice that English was Phua’s second language. A “language barrier” between the defendant and the court is a “salient fact” that puts the trial court on notice that a defendant’s waiver may be “less than knowing and intelligent.” State v. Gomez-Lobato, 130 - 22 - Hawaiʻi 465, 471, 312 P.3d 897, 903 (2013) (quoting United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1997)). In this case, the court ruled at trial that Phua’s language ability was adequate to proceed without an interpreter. However, when the court made this ruling, Phua had the assistance of counsel to help him in understanding legal terms and the nature of the proceedings. In fact, the court specifically mentioned that if Phua had trouble understanding any issue, the court would provide Phua an opportunity to speak with his attorney for clarification. Given the potential language barrier, the district court should have further questioned Phua in this regard. Another important circumstance that should have been addressed by the trial court is Phua’s prior experience or familiarity with criminal trials. A defendant’s experience, or knowledge of, the court system may be a factor in determining that a valid waiver was made. See Dickson, 4 Haw. App. at 62223, 673 P.2d at 1040, 1043 (finding that the record did not indicate a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel where there was nothing to show that the defendant had previously represented himself, that he was familiar with a felony jury trial situation, or that he was aware of the pitfalls of proceeding pro se, even though the record indicated the - 23 - defendant had “many contacts with the legal system”). While Phua was involved in two prior civil cases,12 Phua’s counsel indicated in his Declaration that Phua had no prior criminal record. It is questionable whether Phua perceived the distinction between criminal and civil actions. When given an opportunity to make a statement regarding his sentence, Phua instead expressed his desire to have the case removed to federal court and consolidated with his civil cases. Phua further expressed that a federal court “might be able to fit [his] needs” and that “Chief Justice Susan Mollway stamped approval for [his] case to be removed to the federal court.” Phua did not address the State’s recommended sentence, nor did he make any suggestion of what an appropriate sentence would be. The district court’s inquiry into Phua’s background and understanding not only was lacking in depth, but it came at the end of the court’s colloquy with Phua. The court questioned Phua concerning his age and education only at the end of the waiver colloquy after briefly informing him of the pitfalls of 12 The district court took judicial notice of its judgments in two cases involving possession of the land over which the dispute in this case arose. Phua was a defendant in one of those civil cases, in which he appeared pro se. The minutes reflect that Phua appeared at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment with an interpreter. In the second case, in which Phua was not a party, Phua was present with an interpreter at the hearing on the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. - 24 - self-representation. Dickson indicates that the first area of inquiry is “necessary to allow the trial court to determine the level and depth to which its explanation and inquiry must extend.” Id. at 619, 673 P.2d at 1041. Without this initial examination, the trial court may lack the requisite information to determine the defendant’s level of comprehension necessary in order to ascertain whether the defendant understood the risks and disadvantages of self-representation. Here, given Phua’s limited education, his potential language barrier with the court, and his unfamiliarity with the criminal justice system, further inquiry into Phua’s background should have been conducted by the district court before proceeding to the court’s warning of the risks and disadvantages of waiving counsel.13 2. Defendant’s Level of Understanding of the Risks and Disadvantages of Self-Representation Dickson directs that once the court completes its examination of the defendant’s background and level of comprehension, the court may then move onto the second and third areas of inquiry, which involve warning the defendant of the 13 We do not, as the minority indicates, find that the trial court was constitutionally required to conduct further inquiry into Phua’s background. See minority at 4. Rather, we adopt the recommendations of Dickson, which suggests areas of inquiry to assist courts in obtaining a valid waiver and has been the governing law in Hawai#i courts for over thirty years. Given the record in this case, Phua’s proficiency in English may be relevant to the court’s inquiry on remand. - 25 - risks particular to the defendant in proceeding without counsel, and then explaining to the defendant the inherent disadvantages of self-representation. See 4 Haw. App. at 619-20, 673 P.2d at 1041; Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.5(c). The record must reflect that the defendant understands what he or she is doing and that the decision is made “with eyes open.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)). Although the trial court “is not required to give the defendant a short course in criminal law and procedure,” the judge’s warnings must reflect more than “vague, general admonishments, without reference to specific” risks or disadvantages. Dickson, 4 Haw. App. at 620, 673 P.2d at 1042. The extent and depth of the court’s inquiry and explanation of the second and third factors should respond to the court’s perception of the defendant’s level of understanding. The purpose of the trial court in this regard is not simply to mechanically provide the defendant with the information, but rather, the court should engage the defendant to ensure that the waiver is intelligently and voluntarily made. In some circumstances, it may be necessary for a trial court to ask follow up questions to confirm the defendant’s understanding of the court’s warnings of the risks of waiving - 26 - counsel and the disadvantages of self-representation.14 This is particularly true in cases where there is a potential language barrier between the defendant and the court--as there was in this case.15 See Gomez-Lobato, 130 Hawaiʻi at 472, 312 P.3d at 904. In Gomez-Lobato, this court found that a language barrier between the court and the defendant “should have prompted the . . . court to ask additional questions to verify that [the defendant] understood the right he was waiving.” Id. at 479, 312 P.3d at 912.
The second area of inquiry set forth in Dickson is designed to “fully assure that the defendant is informed of the risks of self-representation.” 4 Haw. App. at 619-20, 673 P.2d at 1041. The court should therefore make the defendant aware of “the nature of the charge, the elements of the offense, the pleas and defenses available, the punishments which may be imposed, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.” Id. (citations omitted). This information is essential to a defendant’s understanding of the personal risks of self-representation. Id. 14 LaFave et al., supra note 11, § 11.5(c) suggests that trial court follow up any reference to a risk or disadvantage with an inquiry designed to reveal whether the defendant understands the court’s warning. 15 See supra Part III.A. - 27 - In this case, the district court did not address the potential risks of self-representation with Phua. Most significantly, the court did not inform Phua of the potential punishment that could be imposed at the sentencing proceeding.16 It is unlikely that a record could reflect a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel at sentencing without the defendant being apprised of such basic information as the maximum or range of punishment that may be imposed. See State v. Hartman, 349 A.2d 223, 225 (Vt. 1975) (“If a defendant . . . is unaware of the nature of the charges and the range of the allowable punishment at the time of his decision to represent himself, the waiver of his rights . . . is not made knowingly and intelligently.”). This is particularly true in this case where the record reflects that Phua had limited or no familiarity with the criminal justice system. Since information regarding the potential sentence is fundamental to an understanding of the risks of waiving counsel, trial courts should take care to ask questions that inform a defendant of this critical information. The record shows no 16 The ICA misapprehended the record in this case: “Phua articulates no reason why the District Court’s inquiry about his education, work history, and experience after warning him of the possible punishment and advising him of the risks of self-representation was prejudicial.” (Emphasis added). No such warning regarding the possible punishment occurred in this case. - 28 - indication that Phua was informed of or understood the maximum penalty that could be imposed at sentencing; consequently we cannot find that his waiver of counsel was knowingly and voluntarily made.
Finally, Dickson provides that a trial court must also inform the defendant of the inherent disadvantages of selfrepresentation before a waiver of the right to counsel is obtained. 4 Haw. App. at 620, 673 P.2d at 1042-43. An essential obligation in this regard is to meaningfully inform the defendant of his or her right to the assistance of counsel. LaFave et al., supra, § 11.3(a). Such information may be conveyed by the following questions: Because of the seriousness of the offense and the serious consequences of being found guilty, do you understand that you have a Constitutional right to be represented by an attorney at a sentencing hearing? Do you understand that if you cannot afford an attorney, you have the right to have free legal representation through the public defender’s office or a court appointed lawyer?[17] The record demonstrates that Phua was not fully aware of his right to court-appointed counsel. When asked whether he understood his right to a court appointed attorney if he could 17 Under HRS § 802-2, “[i]n every criminal case or proceeding in which a person entitled by law to representation by counsel appears without counsel, the judge shall advise the person of the person’s right to representation by counsel and also that if the person is financially unable to obtain counsel, the court may appoint one at the cost to the State.” - 29 - not afford one, Phua responded, “No, I was not aware of that . . . .” The court did not further discuss the right to courtappointed counsel with Phua but instead asked him whether he still wished to proceed without an attorney. We find that Phua’s response that he was not aware of the right to a courtappointed attorney required further explanation and inquiry. See State v. Young, 73 Haw. 217, 220-21, 830 P.2d 512, 514 (1992) (noting that “waiver of a fundamental right is never presumed” and finding that where record is unclear as to whether defendant is waiving his right to jury trial, the court should conclude the defendant is not waiving the right); see also State v. Gomez-Lobato, 130 Hawaiʻi 465, 469, 312 P.3d 897, 901 (2013) (“[T]he court should also engage in an oral colloquy with the defendant to establish that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”); State v. Ibuos, 75 Haw. 118, 122, 857 P.2d 576, 578 (1993) (“The necessity for colloquy between the court and a defendant is especially apparent in light of the importance we place on the personal nature of a defendant's right to a jury trial.”).18 18 In finding this exchange sufficient under Miranda (“No, I was not aware of that . . . .”), the minority reduces the judge’s role to merely notifying a defendant of his constitutional rights, without responsibility to clarify when the defendant expresses confusion or lack of understanding regarding the right that is being advised. See minority at 3-6. (. . .continued) - 30 - Once informed of the right to counsel or court- appointed counsel, the “defendant’s relinquishment of that right must be clear and unequivocal.” LaFave et al., supra, § 11.3(a); see also Young, 73 Haw. at 220, 830 P.2d at 514. Dickson summarizes the information that a trial court should inform a defendant regarding the disadvantages of selfrepresentation: [T]he trial court should inform the defendant: of his right to counsel, whether private or appointed; that self-representation is detrimental to himself; that he will be required to follow all technical rules and substantive, procedural, and evidentiary law; that the prosecution will be represented by able counsel; that a disruption of the trial could lead to vacation of the right to self-representation; and that if voluntary self-representation occurs, the defendant may not afterward claim that he had inadequate selfrepresentation. Dickson, 4 Haw. App. at 620, 673 P.2d at 1041-42 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). (. . .continued) Additionally, the minority’s conclusion, which is premised on the Miranda doctrine, is misplaced. “Miranda protects against the coercive pressures of custodial interrogation.” Wayne R. LaFave et al., 2 Criminal Procedure § 6.4(h) (3d ed.). On the other hand, the Sixth Amendment secures the right to counsel in judicial proceedings. See State v. Luton, 83 Hawaiʻi 443, 448, 927 P.2d 844, 849 (1996) (“An individual has a right to counsel under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Hawaiʻi State Constitution which guarantees an accused the right to assistance of counsel for his or her defense. This right “attaches at critical stages of the criminal prosecution.” (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting State v. Liulama, 9 Haw. App. 447, 453 n.5, 845 P.2d 1194, 1199 n.5 (1992); State v. Masaniai, 63 Haw. 354, 358, 628 P.2d 1018, 1022 (1981))). The distinction between these two constitutional amendments does not render our decision “unprecedented.” See minority at 5. - 31 - Although the district court informed Phua of some of the disadvantages of self-representation, the record does not indicate clearly whether Phua understood the seriousness of his decision to waive his right to counsel. The court might also have warned Phua in simple terms that “self-representation is detrimental to himself” and urged him to reconsider. Id. In this case, the district court’s inquiry into the disadvantages of self-representation is a series of yes or no questions with little opportunity for Phua to express confusion or ask questions. Additional questions, or varying the form of the questions, may have assisted the district court to verify that Phua understood the right he was waiving. See GomezLobato, 130 Hawaiʻi at 479, 312 P.3d at 912. Further, a trial court may find it beneficial to conclude the inquiry with a question seeking an affirmation of the defendant’s desire to waive the right to counsel--e.g., “Understanding all that I have explained to you, do you still wish to waive your right to be represented by a lawyer and to represent yourself at trial?” Had the court concluded its inquiry by asking Phua if he still desired to waive his right to counsel, Phua would have had an opportunity to confirm or change his mind in light of the court’s warnings. - 32 - 3. Validity of Phua’s Waiver The record in this case is critically deficient to support a finding that Phua’s waiver of his right to counsel was intelligently and knowingly made. There were circumstances in this case necessitating further inquiry into Phua’s background, and the record does not reflect that Phua understood the risks and disadvantages of waiving counsel. The fact that the trial court did not warn Phua of the range of allowable punishment in this case is alone sufficient grounds for vacating the sentence.19 Accordingly, this case must be remanded to the district court for a new sentencing proceeding.