Opinion ID: 196037
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ravelo

Text: 22 Ravelo was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. On July 21, 1994, the district court sentenced him to 188 months' imprisonment. The court determined that Ravelo's base offense level was 34, based on a drug quantity finding of 198.1 grams of cocaine base, also known as crack. No upward or downward adjustments were made. With no prior criminal record, Ravelo's total offense level yielded a guideline sentencing range of 151 to 188 months, and the court sentenced him at the top of the range. 23 As with Bouthot, Webster was the primary witness at Ravelo's sentencing hearing. Webster testified that Ravelo was his New York source for cocaine and that he purchased on average 6 to 8 ounces twice per month from 1990 to 1993. Consistent with his testimony at Bouthot's sentencing hearing, Webster said that at times the amounts were upwards of 11 to 13 ounces and that once he purchased a half kilogram from Ravelo. Webster also testified that in the summer of 1993 he purchased from Ravelo seven ounces of crack made in Ravelo's kitchen. 24 At sentencing the district court accepted Webster's testimony and found that Ravelo had sold Webster seven ounces (198.1 grams) of crack in the summer of 1993. The crack finding alone placed Ravelo at a base offense level of 34. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1(c)(5). Ravelo, like Bouthot, claims that Webster's testimony was unreliable. But Webster was very clear about the crack transaction--how much was involved, who was there, and how it was made. This testimony was also consistent with what Webster had told law enforcement agents during his debriefing. For the reasons already set forth with respect to Bouthot, the district court was free to conclude that Webster's testimony was credible and sufficiently reliable. 25 Ravelo next claims that he should have been held accountable for no more than 1.26 kilograms of cocaine, because this was the amount for which Webster was sentenced, and both participated in the same transactions. Webster's sentence was based on 1.26 kilograms of cocaine, an amount computed by a probation officer and stipulated to by the parties at sentencing. The crack transaction is excluded from the stipulated amount but the discrepancy is easily explained. 26 Evidence of the crack transaction apparently first surfaced during Webster's debriefing by law enforcement agents. But before he spoke, Webster obtained a written promise from the government that none of the information he provided would be used against him (with exceptions not here relevant). Under the guidelines, this promise immunized Webster from having the crack transaction count towards his sentence. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.8(a). 27 We see no problem with holding Ravelo responsible for the greater drug quantity actually proved at his sentencing hearing. First and foremost, he did not cooperate with the government and thereby receive immunity for the crack transaction. Although the guidelines generally seek uniformity in sentencing, they also encourage divergent treatment for those who cooperate, in order to promote greater cooperation with law enforcement. Given Ravelo's decision not to cooperate, he has no basis for complaining about leniency to someone who did cooperate. 28 Ravelo's final challenge to his sentence relates to comments made by the district court at the time of sentencing pertaining to Ravelo's alien status. Ravelo, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, claims that the court's comments indicate that he was sentenced more harshly because, of his alienage and that a constitutional violation resulted. Compare United States v. Gomez, 797 F.2d 417, 418-21 (7th Cir.1986) with United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 585-87 (2d Cir.1994) and United States v. Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d 1349, 1353-56 (9th Cir.1989). 29 The district court made clear that it was sentencing Ravelo to the high end of the guideline range because of his continued dishonesty and defiance. Ravelo's alien status was raised by Ravelo's counsel who requested a lighter sentence because as an alien, Ravelo would be subject to deportation upon his release from prison. The sentencing judge said, in substance, that Ravelo was not entitled to leniency simply because he faced deportation, for this would undermine the deterrent value of Ravelo's sentence. It is thus clear that the district court did not punish Ravelo more severely because of his alien status.