Opinion ID: 534912
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Sentencing of Smith

Text: 51 Ms. Smith contends that the trial court improperly accepted the findings in the pre-sentence report (PSI) which resulted in an increase of three levels under guideline 3B1.1(b). Appellant recognizes that this is a finding of fact that is reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard. U.S. v. Davis, 868 F.2d 1390 (5th Cir.1989). 52 The PSI paragraph to which Smith objected read as follows: 53 Adjustment for Role in the Offense: While Smith was subordinate to codefendant Rush in the overall conspiracy and transaction of February 10, 1988, she did maintain a position of management or supervision in that she supervised the marijuana cultivation crew, received and paid for supplies of methamphetamine, distributed methamphetamine, provided armed backup during the February 10, 1988 transactions and helped in the coverup of the 1985 Bell farm bust. Consequently, an increase of 3 levels is warranted. 54 The commentary to Section 3B1.1(b) includes the following statement: 55 Factors the court should consider include the exercise of decision-making authority, the degree of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the planning or organization of the offense, the scope of the illegal activity, the nature and seriousness of the criminal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others. 56 It will be noted that each of these elements mentioned is to be considered together with other facts, one of which, of course, is the opportunity of the trial court to observe all witnesses and judge their credibility. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(d). 57 Because much of the fact-finding by the trial court as to the PSI is based on its interpretation of the terms of the commentary, the court was required to determine what it considered to be an exercise of decision-making authority and the degree of participation in the commission of the offense; also, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, when appellant Smith was married to appellant Rush, who all conceded was the principal organizer and manager of the acts charged in the conspiracy. Because the trial court must exercise its best judgment as to the application of the facts to these standards, its decision is entitled to one of deference on appeal. In fact, the statute dealing with appeal from sentences was amended effective on November 18, 1988 to include the following as part of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e): The court of appeals ... shall give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e). Moreover, it is clear that as to some of the substantive acts, such as the sale of amphetamines and the weighing of several batches of marijuana, appellant Smith actually participated directly in the transaction. 58 Considering all of these facts, and the permissible inference that Ms. Smith was serving as an armed guard for the attempted sale in 1988, we cannot conclude that the trial court was clearly erroneous in accepting the facts stated in the PSI, which resulted in the enhancement.