Opinion ID: 2608844
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substitution of Counsel/Competence to Stand Trial

Text: Defendant contends the trial court lacked authority to grant a motion for substitution of counsel and subsequently failed to provide a meaningful competency hearing pursuant to the requirements of section 1368. [3] For the reasons that follow, we conclude the contentions lack merit. An understanding of defendant's claims requires some review of the unique factual and legal circumstances in which they arose. In Stankewitz I, supra, 32 Cal.3d 80, we reversed the judgment from defendant's first trial on the ground the trial court erroneously failed to hold a competency hearing pursuant to section 1368. The underlying facts in Stankewitz I were as follows: Prior to trial, defendant's appointed counsel, a deputy public defender, informed the court that a fundamental dispute as to how the trial should proceed had developed between himself and defendant. Counsel indicated that he believed his client's position was irrational. The court, in response, appointed a psychiatrist, Dr. Glenn, to examine defendant for purposes of making a preliminary determination as to whether a full-scale competency hearing was required. After examining defendant, Dr. Glenn testified defendant appeared to harbor paranoid delusions that his public defender was in collusion with the prosecutor. Defendant's problem apparently stemmed in part from a fundamental dispute with the public defender over whether the defense should contest defendant's culpability as the perpetrator of the killing, or present a diminished capacity defense. Dr. Glenn stated that defendant appeared to be capable of cooperating in his own defense with an attorney who was not a public defender. (32 Cal.3d at pp. 87-88.) Following Dr. Glenn's testimony, both defendant and the deputy public defender confirmed the fundamental nature of their dispute; defendant believed that the evidence was insufficient to prove he committed the offenses, and was unwilling to acquiesce in the public defender's diminished capacity defense. Defendant moved for a substitution of attorneys. The public defender did not join in the motion, but confirmed that he and defendant had reached an impasse and renewed his request for a full competency hearing. The trial court denied defendant's motion for substitution of attorneys and declined to order a hearing on the issue of defendant's competency. ( Stankewitz I, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 89.) Defendant reiterated his dissatisfaction with counsel and renewed his motion for substitution of attorneys on several occasions thereafter. On one occasion he even struck the public defender. Each request, however, was denied. ( Id. at pp. 90-91.) The trial proceeded without further incident; defendant was convicted of all counts and sentenced to death. As noted earlier, we reversed the judgment on the ground the trial court improperly failed to afford defendant a competency hearing after substantial evidence had been adduced that defendant could not rationally assist his public defender. ( Stankewitz I, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 93.) In light of the peculiar interdependence of the competency and substitution of attorneys issues, however, we observed that a timely substitution of attorneys might well have obviated the need for a competency hearing. In the particular circumstances of this case, a substitution of counsel might have avoided altogether the necessity for ordering a full competency hearing. ( Ibid. ) The trial court had to take some action to unravel the fundamental dispute [between defendant and the deputy public defender] presented to it. The court may not have been required to hold a full competency hearing if the problem could have been resolved by a substitution of counsel. But the court should not have chosen to do nothing at all. ( Id. at p. 94, italics added.) Since the court took no action in either direction, we were constrained to reverse. ( Ibid. ) Thereafter, defendant was returned to Fresno County for retrial. The public defender was again appointed to represent him. Citing the same reasons voiced by counsel at the first trial, the assigned defender again expressed doubts as to defendant's competence to stand trial and the court, once again, suspended proceedings and pursuant to section 1368 appointed two psychiatrists, Drs. Glenn and Davis, to examine defendant. As he had done at his first trial, defendant immediately interposed a motion for substitution of counsel, citing a fundamental conflict of interest between himself and the public defender. The trial judge stated that he would deal with the motion after receiving the psychiatrists' reports and set both matters for a hearing three weeks hence. The subsequent hearing commenced with the trial court explaining that defendant had refused to communicate with either of the two psychiatrists appointed to examine him. The deputy public defender nevertheless requested that the competency issue be set for trial. Defendant again objected, insisting that the public defender did not represent him and requesting a substitution of attorneys. The prosecutor then suggested that a Marsden hearing would be appropriate to examine the nature of the conflict between defendant and the public defender. (See People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118.) The trial court agreed, observing that this court in Stankewitz I, supra, 32 Cal.3d 80, had stated that a substitution of counsel might have avoided altogether the necessity of ordering a full competency hearing. ( Id. at p. 93.). The hearing on defendant's motion for substitution of counsel commenced. Defendant restated his belief that the public defender was in collusion with the district attorney, that the public defender's insistence on presenting a diminished capacity defense was in direct conflict with defendant's position that he did not commit the crimes, and that defendant could not properly cooperate with and assist counsel in his own defense. The deputy public defender argued that the decision to present a diminished capacity defense was a tactical one for the attorney to make. Following this exchange, the trial court ordered an in camera hearing to examine the matter further. After doing so, the trial court made a finding of an irreconcilable conflict between the public defender and defendant, ordered the public defender relieved, and appointed private counsel (who was present in the courtroom) to represent defendant. At counsel's request, the court continued for two weeks the hearing on defendant's competence to stand trial. At the outset of the continued competency hearing the court inquired of counsel whether he had decided to reschedule appointments with the court-appointed psychiatrists or whether he intended to proceed with the hearing on the existing evidence. Counsel thereupon objected to the hearing itself, insisting that no evidence had been adduced that defendant was incompetent. The court overruled the objection and again inquired of counsel whether he wished to submit the matter on the psychiatric reports of Drs. Glenn and Davis. Counsel noted that there was nothing in the reports, since defendant had refused to see the psychiatrists. The court acknowledged this but observed that it appeared to be of little moment, since the substitution of attorneys had essentially mooted the competency issue. Counsel thereupon agreed to submit the matter; defendant indicated that he concurred in counsel's decision. The court then ruled that defendant was competent and ordered the criminal proceedings reinstated. (1) Defendant now contends the trial court improperly granted his motion for substitution of attorneys before resolving the competency issue. We disagree. While it is true that section 1368 mandates the suspension of all proceedings in the criminal prosecution once the court has ordered a hearing into the mental competence of the defendant (§ 1368, subd. (c); see People v. Marks (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335, 1340 [248 Cal. Rptr. 874, 756 P.2d 260]; People v. Hale (1988) 44 Cal.3d 531, 541 [104 Cal. Rptr. 705, 502 P.2d 513]), it is equally true that the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation virtually compels a hearing and an order granting a motion for substitution of counsel when there is a sufficient showing that the defendant's right to the assistance of counsel would be substantially impaired if [the defendant's] request was denied. ( People v. Carr (1972) 8 Cal.3d 287, 299 [104 Cal. Rptr. 705, 502 P.2d 513]; accord People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 855 [258 Cal. Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270]; People v. Moore (1988) 47 Cal.3d 63, 76 [252 Cal. Rptr. 494, 762 P.2d 1218]; People v. Smith (1985) 38 Cal.3d 945, 956 [216 Cal. Rptr. 98, 702 P.2d 180]; People v. Walker (1976) 18 Cal.3d 232, 238 [133 Cal. Rptr. 520, 555 P.2d 306].) Relying on People v. Hale, supra, 44 Cal.3d 531, and People v. Marks, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1335, defendant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to act on his motion for substitution of counsel before it resolved the competency issue. In both of those cases, however, the trial court had expressed doubts as to the defendant's competence yet failed to hold a competency hearing and resolve the issue on the record. The omission required reversal in each case. ( Hale, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 541-542; Marks, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1340-1344.) As we explained in Hale : [O]nce a doubt has arisen as to the competence of the defendant to stand trial, the trial court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the case against the defendant without first determining his competence in a section 1368 hearing, and the matter cannot be waived by defendant or his counsel. (44 Cal.3d at p. 541, italics added.) The situation here is distinguishable. In the first place, the trial court did not reinstitute the case against defendant in merely entertaining defendant's substitution motion. ( People v. Hale, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 541.) Furthermore, the court's response was amply justified if not indeed legally compelled. The trial court suspended the proceedings pursuant to section 1368 based on the evidence from the first trial that defendant harbored delusions of a conspiracy between the district attorney and the public defender. Immediately thereafter, the trial court was confronted with a motion for substitution of counsel by defendant based on an asserted fundamental conflict with the public defender. Relying on our statement in Stankewitz I, supra, 32 Cal.3d 80, that a substitution of counsel might have avoided altogether the necessity for ordering a full competency hearing ( id. at p. 93), the trial court thereupon commenced a Marsden hearing to inquire into the nature of the asserted conflict. As the trial court correctly perceived, implicit in our holding in Stankewitz I was the assumption that while the trial court may not proceed with the case against the defendant before it determines his competence in a section 1368 hearing ( People v. Hale, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 541), it may and indeed must promptly consider a motion for substitution of counsel when the right to effective assistance would be substantially impaired if his request were ignored. ( People v. Carr, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 299.) We thus conclude that the trial court properly considered defendant's motion for substitution of counsel before proceeding with the competency hearing. We also reject defendant's claim that he was denied a meaningful review at the subsequent competency hearing because the matter was submitted on the basis of the two appointed psychiatrists' reports indicating that defendant had refused to see them. The only evidence that defendant could not cooperate and assist in his defense was his delusion that the public defender was in collusion with the prosecutor. [4] This problem did not extend to other appointed counsel. Having resolved the substitution-of-attorney issue by appointing private counsel, the competency issue was essentially moot. The trial court cannot be faulted for choosing, out of an apparent abundance of caution, to proceed with the competency hearing, allowing the matter to be submitted and finding defendant competent for the record. Contrary to defendant's contention, moreover, permitting the matter to be submitted on the record of defendant's refusal to communicate with the court-appointed psychiatrists is not tantamount to the absence of a hearing or a waiver by counsel. (See People v. Maxwell (1981) 115 Cal. App.3d 807, 812 [171 Cal. Rptr. 579] [The fact that neither party chose to present evidence on the [competency] issue does not point to the absence of a hearing.]; accord People v. Marks, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1342-1343; see also § 1369, subd. (b)(2) [If the defense declines to offer any evidence in support of the allegation of mental incompetence, the prosecution may do so.].) [5] Nor, obviously, did counsel's decision to submit an essentially moot question deprive defendant of the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant's final contention in this regard is that he was denied his constitutional right to due process under section 1369, subdivision (f), which states that it shall be presumed that the defendant is mentally competent unless it is proved by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant is mentally incompetent. Once the defendant has offered some evidence of incompetence, he argues, the burden of proving competence should shift to the prosecution. Defendant overlooks the fact, however, that once the trial court ordered the substitution of counsel, whatever scintilla of evidence there was of incompetency became irrelevant; there was no evidence that defendant was delusional with respect to any attorney other than the public defender. Accordingly, we need not and therefore expressly decline to address defendant's constitutional claim. ( Estate of Johnson (1903) 139 Cal. 532, 534 [73 P. 424]; accord People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 667 [128 Cal. Rptr. 888, 547 P.2d 1000].)