Opinion ID: 170677
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contrary to or unreasonable application of clearly established federal law

Text: After Musladin, only if we answer affirmatively the threshold question as to the existence of clearly established federal law, may we ask whether the state court decision is either contrary to or an unreasonable application of such law. A state-court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if: (a) the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases; or (b) the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent. Maynard, 468 F.3d at 669 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495). The word `contrary' is commonly understood to mean `diametrically different,' `opposite in character or nature,' or `mutually opposed.' Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (citation omitted). A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law when it identifies the correct governing legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but unreasonably applies it to the facts. Id. at 407-08, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Additionally, we have recognized that an unreasonable application may occur if the state court either unreasonably extends, or unreasonably refuses to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context where it should apply. Carter, 347 F.3d at 864 (quoting Valdez, 219 F.3d at 1229-30). [6] We refer to these two analytic strands, respectively, as the application of legal principle, and the extension of legal principle, Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09, 120 S.Ct. 1495, components of the unreasonable application prong of § 2254(d)(1). [7] As to this prong, the ultimate focus of the inquiry is whether the state court's application of the clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). Consequently, the Supreme Court has concluded that although this standard does not require all reasonable jurists to agree that the state court was unreasonable, an unreasonable application constitutes more than an incorrect application of federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 377, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166 (It is not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal question, is left with a firm conviction that the state court was erroneous. (internal quotation marks omitted)). In addressing the objective unreasonableness standard, we have determined that the AEDPA's conception of objective unreasonableness lies somewhere between clearly erroneous and unreasonable to all reasonable jurists. Maynard, 468 F.3d at 670. Thus, only the most serious misapplications of Supreme Court precedent will be a basis for relief under § 2254. Id. at 671.