Opinion ID: 739903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The district court's limitation of Mulinelli's cross-examination of Lpez and Exposito

Text: 9 At trial, Mulinelli's counsel cross-examined Lpez regarding the benefits and conditions of his plea agreement. Mulinelli entered into evidence the information by which Lpez was charged and the plea agreement under which he pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud. Mulinelli elicited testimony from Lpez that he was not and would not be charged with bank fraud, in addition to his conspiracy charge, as Mulinelli had been charged. Lpez also testified that, as part of his plea bargain agreement, the United States Attorney would make a recommendation for a reduction in his sentence. The district court, however, cut off Mulinelli's counsel when on several occasions he tried to elicit testimony from Lpez regarding the possible sentence he faced. The district court noted that matters of sentencing were in the sound discretion of the district court judge who was scheduled to sentence Lpez. 10 Mulinelli elicited similar testimony from Exposito regarding the substance of the plea agreement--that he expected the United States Attorney to make a recommendation for the district court's consideration in his sentencing, that he was not charged with bank fraud, but only with conspiracy and making a false statement to a financial institution, and that he would not be charged with any other crimes. Again, the district court barred Mulinelli from eliciting testimony regarding the nature of the sentence Exposito expected to receive. 11 Mulinelli argues on appeal that the district court's limitation on her cross-examination regarding the potential sentence that both accomplices faced before and after entering into the plea agreements so interfered with her ability to effectively cross-examine the witnesses that it violated her Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 12 The Sixth Amendment guarantees that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI. [T]he right of a defendant in a criminal case to establish the bias of witnesses against him through cross-examination is an important component of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. United States v. Jarabek, 726 F.2d 889, 902 (1st Cir.1984) (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1109-10, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974)). A defendant has the right to cross-examine an accomplice regarding the nature of and benefits, including unprosecuted crimes, afforded under the plea agreement. United States v. Barrett, 766 F.2d 609, 614 (1st Cir.1985). Although this right is extensive, it is not absolute or unlimited. Once the defendant has been afforded the constitutional minimum of an opportunity for effective cross-examination, the trial court retain[s] wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness's safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). An abuse of discretion has occurred only if the jury is left without 'sufficient information concerning formative events to make a discriminating appraisal of a witness's motives and bias.'  United States v. Twomey, 806 F.2d 1136, 1140 (1st Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Campbell, 426 F.2d 547, 550 (2d Cir.1970)). 13 We find no such abuse here. During direct and cross-examination of both Lpez and Exposito, the jury was apprised that they were not charged with bank fraud, one of the charges Mulinelli faced. On cross-examination, Mulinelli was able to elicit information regarding their plea agreements, including that the accomplices expected the government to make a beneficial recommendation to the sentencing judge based on their cooperation, and that they were granted immunity from prosecution for any other crimes related to their testimony. The jury could infer from the circumstances that the accomplices had avoided being charged with offenses carrying greater sentences by testifying in the government's case. Mulinelli was able, through her cross-examination, to expose the biases and motivations of the accomplices to favor the government and, once this threshold was met, the district court's limitation was not improper. As we find that the jury had before it sufficient information on which to make a discriminating appraisal of the accomplices' motives and biases, we find no abuse of discretion. 14 Additionally, Mulinelli's counsel sought to elicit sentencing information regarding the charges the accomplices faced and avoided by pleading guilty to conspiracy. Had Mulinelli successfully elicited this information, the potential punishment she faced, should the jury find her guilty, would have been before the jury. The actions taken by the district court to prevent this information, which could confuse the issues presented to the jury, from reaching the jury were thus entirely proper. See United States v. Alvarez, 987 F.2d 77, 82 (1st Cir.1993) (finding the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence of the penalty to be imposed on an accomplice as such information might mislead or confuse the jury, particularly where, as here, the witness sought to testify to the same penalties faced by the defendants). 15