Opinion ID: 59634
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hearing to Suppress Statements

Text: 17 No. 06-70021 Martinez contends that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call him as a witness during the pretrial hearing on the motion to suppress his statements.3 Counsel had filed a motion to suppress the confessions, arguing that they were involuntary because Martinez was intoxicated. During the hearing on Martinez’s motion to suppress, two of the arresting officers testified. Officer Derrickson testified that Martinez did not smell of alcohol. Officer Caldwell testified that he did not smell marijuana or see any liquor bottles or beer at the house where Martinez was arrested. The officers testified that Martinez indicated that he understood his Miranda4 rights. The trial court subsequently denied the motion to suppress, finding that “the statement was made freely, voluntarily, made without any compulsion or persuasion.” The confessions were admitted against Martinez at trial. During his state writ proceedings, Martinez raised the instant claim, and the court held an evidentiary hearing. On cross-examination by the State, Martinez testified that he was in an “intoxicated state” when he was arrested. Martinez also testified that because he was intoxicated, he “was not cognizant of what [he] was writing” in his statements. The state habeas court denied relief. In Colorado v. Connelly, the Supreme Court explained that “a defendant’s mental condition, by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion” is not determinative of whether the statement is voluntary. 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986). The Court held that “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 167; accord Perry v. 3 In his state writ proceedings and in his federal habeas petition, Martinez also asserted that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call two other witnesses in support of his claim of intoxication. Martinez does not make this assertion in his motion for a COA. 4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 18 No. 06-70021 State, 158 S.W.3d 438, 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (explaining that “evidence of appellant’s intoxication and injury does not raise any constitutional voluntariness issues because this evidence does not involve any police coercion or other official over-reaching”). Additionally, in United States v. Garcia Abrego, the defendant argued that the injections of valium he received while in the custody of Mexican officials, “coupled with the solicitousness of U.S. law enforcement officials, rendered his custodial statement involuntary.” 141 F.3d 142, 170 (5th Cir. 1998). The district court found that the drugs had not impaired the defendant’s mental capacity. Id. More importantly, this Court explained that the defendant had failed to demonstrate overreaching on the part of law enforcement, which “is a prerequisite to a determination that a confession is involuntary.” Id. Accordingly, we affirmed the district court’s finding that his statement was admissible. Here, during cross-examination at the state writ evidentiary hearing, the State’s attorney inquired whether the police officer had “threaten[ed] you, in any fashion, to get you to sign this document?” Martinez responded: “Quite the contrary.” Martinez explained that he had not been threatened and that the officer had “tried to sugar-coat it,” by offering to attempt to have an out-of-state charge “dropped.” We will assume arguendo that counsel’s failure to call Martinez to testify during the suppression hearing constituted deficient performance. With respect to the prejudice prong, even assuming the trial judge would have credited Martinez’s testimony that he was intoxicated, Martinez fails to show any overreaching or coercive treatment by the police. Indeed, he admitted that he was not threatened. The record is devoid of any evidence even suggesting overreaching on the part of law enforcement. Thus, there is no showing that his statements were involuntary and would have been suppressed but for counsel’s deficient performance. Under these circumstances, Martinez has failed to make 19 No. 06-70021 a substantial showing that counsel rendered ineffective assistance with respect to this claim.