Opinion ID: 1787540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: detective smith's presence in courtroom

Text: Knight next contends that the trial judge erred in granting the State's motion to allow Detective Smith to remain in the courtroom throughout the proceeding. The purpose of the rule of sequestration is to avoid a witness coloring his or her testimony by hearing the testimony of another, thereby discouraging fabrication, inaccuracy and collusion. Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 616.1, at 506 (1998 ed.). Section 90.616(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), allows an exception to the rule of sequestration for [a] person whose presence is shown by the party's attorney to be essential to the presentation of the party's cause. This exception is applied most commonly to expert witnesses because experts are testifying to their opinions rather than to factual matters. Ehrhardt, supra § 616.1, at 510. However, as Professor Ehrhardt has noted, in applying this exception to the rule of sequestration, the trial court has wide discretion in determining which witnesses are essential. Id. at 509. While recognizing that Detective Smith was a fact witness, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the theory underlying exceptions to the rule is equally applicable to the unique facts of this case. Smith was testifying as to what others had testified to two decades earlier, or as to what others had stated in sworn statements. Therefore, he was, in a sense, a reporter of what other individuals had long since said under oath in a recorded statement. His testimony was subject to being carefully checked by comparison to the transcripts of the trial testimony. Obviously, the prior statements of the individuals he was standing in for could not change based upon his presence during the testimony of the witnesses who preceded him. See Randolph v. State, 463 So.2d 186, 191 (Fla.1984) (noting that [t]his is not a situation where the witness who was excluded from the sequestration rule was a principal actor in the crime, nor is this a case where the testimony of the witness was actually suggested by what he heard in the courtroom). [9] Accordingly, Smith's ongoing courtroom presence did not implicate any of the dangers normally implicit when a witness hears other testimony prior to testifying. As such, we conclude that the trial judge acted within his discretion on this issue.