Opinion ID: 820394
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Irreconcilability

Text: FM urges that the verdicts of non-infringement and invalidity are irreconcilable. For example, it argues the prior art references published ads directly to buyers, as opposed to publishing them to the internet media venues as required by the claims, and Google did not attempt to reconcile this problem below despite arguing it did not infringe because its technology also delivers ads straight to the buyers. In other words, FM argues the jury had to rely on differing claim constructions for infringement and invalidity to reach its invalidity and noninfringement decisions because Google’s technology works the same way as the prior art. Google argues FM has waived any argument on the basis of irreconcilability because FM did not object to the jury’s verdict before the jury was dismissed. We apply the law of the regional circuit to determine whether an argument that the verdict is irreconcilable has been waived. See Mycogen Plant Sci. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that this court applies the law of the regional circuit to the issue of inconsistent verdicts because the issue is not unique to patent law). In the Fifth Circuit, a party need not object to the jury’s inconsistent verdict before the jury is dismissed in order to avoid waiver when the verdict is special and falls under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 49(a). Mercer v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc., 671 F.2d 946, 947-48 (5th Cir. 1982) (“We know of no case in this Circuit holding that inconsistencies in special verdicts pursuant 28 FUNCTION MEDIA v. GOOGLE to Rule 49(a) are waived if not raised prior to release of the jury.”); see also id. at 948 n.1 (explaining waiver does not apply to verdicts under Rule 49(a), but it does apply to verdicts under Rule 49(b)). If the verdict falls under Rule 49(b), which covers general verdicts and general verdicts “with written questions on one or more issues of fact,” waiver applies if no objection is raised before the jury is dismissed. Stancill v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 497 F.2d 529, 533-35 (5th Cir. 1974) (“By failing to object to the form of the verdict and answers at the time they were announced by the jury, both parties waived any objection to inconsistencies under Rule 49(b).”). Because FM failed to object to the verdict’s irreconcilability at the time the jury returned the verdict, FM can only avoid waiver if the verdict form is considered special. FM argues that the verdict was special because the verdict form asked the jury specific questions about validity and infringement. FM emphasizes that we have found similar forms to be “special” in Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) and L&W, Inc. v. Shertech, Inc., 471 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Google urges that this verdict was general because it consisted of simple yes or no questions on infringement, anticipation, and obviousness. It says we have said such forms are general in i4i, 589 F.3d at 1265 and O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1358. It distinguishes the form in Comaper, which was labeled as a special verdict and included “special questions” such as whether the prior art was in public use before the critical date. None of the cases cited by either party are helpful. Google’s reliance on i4i and O2 Micro is unhelpful because neither of those cases squarely addressed what is or is not a special verdict. See i4i, 589 F.3d at 1265; O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1358. Similarly, the cases cited by FM provide little guidance. In L&W, we held that the appellant had waived its claim of inconsistency in the verdict by not asserting it prior to the discharge of the jury. Because FUNCTION MEDIA v. GOOGLE 29 Sixth Circuit law supported waiver regardless of whether the verdict was general or special, we did not question the parties’ assertions that the verdict was special. See 471 F.3d at 1314, 1318-19. Similarly, in Comaper, we accepted without analysis that the “Special Verdict Form” was a special verdict. See 596 F.3d at 1350. This court’s analysis in those cases therefore does not compel the conclusion that the simple verdict form used in this case must be regarded as a special verdict. “The theoretical distinction between general and special verdicts is that general verdicts require the jury to apply the law to facts, and therefore require legal instruction, whereas special verdicts compel the jury to focus exclusively on its fact finding role.” Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 9B Federal Practice and Procedure § 2503 n.1 (3d ed. 2008). Under the special verdict, the jury finds the facts while the court applies the law, and it is typically unnecessary to even instruct the jury on the law. Id. § 2503. “The special verdict is thought to bring the jury determination into the open, so that all can see what has been done.” Id. In contrast, “[i]n a general verdict, the jury announces only the prevailing party on a particular claim, and may announce damages.” Id. § 2503 n.1. “[T]he general verdict accompanied by special interrogatories gives the jury an opportunity to express itself broadly through the general verdict—the historic medium—while at the same time turning the jury’s attention to important issues that should be resolved by responding to particular questions before a general verdict is reached.” Id. § 2503; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b). In this case, the portion of the verdict in which the jury applied facts to law on the question of obviousness was clearly a general verdict because it is a legal question resting on underlying factual questions. See Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that “a trial court may, with proper instructions, . . . ask for a general answer on one or 30 FUNCTION MEDIA v. GOOGLE more specific legal issues, such as obviousness, a practice not specifically provided for in the Federal Rules”); Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Because the ultimate conclusion of obviousness is a legal question, there is strength to the argument that by including that question on its verdict form the court chose to employ a general verdict with answers to written questions governed by Rule 49(b).”). The closer question is on the verdicts regarding anticipation and invalidity, in which the jury answered yes or no questions on each asserted claim. For example, the jury was asked, “Do you find that Google has proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that any of the following claims of the ’025 patent are invalid for the following reasons? [Yes or No?] A. Because it was anticipated by the prior art?” J. A. 17371. The form then listed each claim with a line for the answer. Because anticipation and infringement are questions of fact, the question is whether the jury returned special findings of fact on each claim. We have previously set forth examples of what should and should not be considered a special verdict. In RailRoad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the jury was asked ten yes or no questions, two of which are very similar to those asked in this case. The jury was asked, “Do you find that the plaintiff has proved by clear and convincing evidence that [the patent] is invalid on the ground of obviousness?” Id. app. A question 1. It was also asked about anticipation: “Do you find that plaintiff has proved by clear and convincing evidence that [the patent] is invalid on the ground that the invention claimed was known, in public use or on sale more than one year prior to the effective date of the patent application?” Id. question 3A. We explained that although the verdicts did not state only the prevailing party, the ten verdicts should properly be considered a general verdict: FUNCTION MEDIA v. GOOGLE 31 The jury’s responses were not special verdicts, because they were not simply “written finding[s] upon each issue of fact”. Rule 49(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. Nor was there a single general verdict, per se, ac- companied by “written answers” to “one or more issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict”. Rule 49(b) Fed. R. Civ. P. Nonetheless, as above indicated, the parties have correctly viewed the jury’s ten responses as the equal of a general verdict . . . . Id. at 1516. We hold similarly here. It would be impossible for lay juries to determine whether a claim is anticipated or infringed without some legal instruction, as evidenced by our ample case law addressing the correctness of jury instructions. See, e.g., Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 641-42 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (rejecting an argument that a jury instruction on anticipation contained legal errors). Although the jury was technically finding only “facts,” we hold that the verdict is a general verdict because like the questions in Railroad Dynamics, the questions on anticipation and validity require legal instruction, the application of legal principles, and are more than “simply ‘written finding[s] upon each issue of fact.’” See id.; Wright & Miller, § 2503 n.1 (“[G]eneral verdicts require the jury to apply the law to facts, and therefore require legal instruction.”). Indeed, the questions are so general that they do not bring the jury process into the open so that “all can see what has been done” as expected in a special verdict, which is what makes reviewing a general verdict for consistency so difficult. FM, therefore, waived its argument in favor of irreconcilability by failing to object to the verdict before the jury was dismissed. Stancill, 497 F.2d at 535. While it may seem harsh, requiring objections to be made before the jury is dismissed is the only way to 32 FUNCTION MEDIA v. GOOGLE efficiently cure potential inconsistencies when there is not a detailed special verdict to review: [To] allow a new trial after the objecting party failed to seek a proper remedy at the only possible time would undermine the incentives for efficient trial procedure and would allow the possible mis- use of [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] . . . to implant a ground for appeal should the jury’s opinion prove distasteful. Howard v. Antilla, 294 F.3d 244, 250 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Skillin v. Kimball, 643 F.2d 19, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1981)). It would be improper to allow FM to now argue inconsistencies require an entirely new trial when it failed to object at the only time when an inconsistency could have been cured.