Opinion ID: 2543721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Pabst's Prior Trial Testimony

Text: Pabst did not testify at his second trial. He argues that the district court erred in admitting his Pabst I testimony. We disagree. The admission or exclusion of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the district court. On appellate review, we examine whether the district court abused its discretion. State v. Hooker, 271 Kan. at 63. We have held that the voluntary testimony of a defendant given at a prior trial is admissible at retrial. There is an exception to this rule when the prior testimony was compelled by the introduction of illegally obtained evidence. State v. Willcox, 240 Kan. 310, 313-14, 729 P.2d 451 (1986). The exception does not apply here. Pabst contends that the testimony from his first trial was not voluntarily given. He reasons that he would not have needed to testify had the district court admitted his former wife's testimony. His contention is not persuasive. First, he did not argue in the district court that his prior trial testimony was involuntary or that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated. Where constitutional grounds are raised for the first time on appeal, they are not properly before us. State v. Mason, 268 Kan. 37, 39, 986 P.2d 387 (1999). The exceptions to our general rule recognized in State v. Conley, 270 Kan. 18, 30-31, 11 P.3d 1147 (2000), do not apply here. Second, this case does not fall within the exception to the rule for admitting prior testimony in a retrial. There was no illegally obtained evidence introduced by the State in the first trial. See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222, 20 L. Ed.2d 1047, 88 S. Ct. 2008 (1968) (establishing an exception where the defendant's testimony is compelled as result of introduction of illegally obtained evidence). Third, in this retrial, Pabst withdrew his motion to allow the testimony of his former wife. The State pointed out to the district court after interviewing the former wife that she will not testify to what the defense first proffered in this trial the first time around .... So the proffer is different, or the actual testimony is going to be different from the proffer. Dauge did not testify at the second trial. We find no abuse of discretion in allowing Pabst's prior testimony to be admitted into evidence.