Opinion ID: 2604379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: May Crops Be Taken Separately From Land?

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in letting the jury consider the immature growing crops as an entity separate from the real property on which they were growing and that no compensation is due plaintiffs for the separate loss of the growing crops. We hold that the destroyed crops, although growing from the land, are a separate entity, capable of being separately damaged and are not subject to limiting rules applicable to real property. Courts have supported separate consideration of growing crops in two ways: by the fiction of constructive severance; or, by recognizing a statutory classification of the growing entity as goods under the sales portion of the commercial code and treating them accordingly. Oregon applies its statutes, recognizing that growing crops are goods, i.e., personal property. In Paullus v. Yarbrough, 219 Or. 611, 623, 637, 347 P.2d 620 (1960), the court stated: Since, under the contract before us, the timber was `agreed to be severed' we must decide whether timber is included in the definition of `goods' under ORS 75.760.      On the basis of our previous cases it is reasonable to conclude that we have recognized that a contract for the sale of timber requiring severance by the purchaser brings the transaction within the Sales Act. After that case was decided, the portion of the Sales Act referred to was replaced by ORS 72.1070(2), which provides: A contract for the sale apart from the land of growing crops or other things attached to realty and capable of severance without material harm thereto but not described in subsection (1) of this section or of timber to be cut is a contract for the sale of goods within ORS 72.1010 to 72.7250 whether the subject matter is to be severed by the buyer or by the seller even though it forms part of the realty at the time of contracting, and the parties can by identification effect a present sale before severance. Other states, including our neighboring state of Washington, achieve the result by the fiction. Examples are Rudy-Patrick v. Dela Costa Farming, 16 Wash.App. 911, 557 P.2d 869, 871 (1976) (where there is constructive severance of crops, conveyance of real property without reservation does not always transfer ownership of the growing crops because [c]rops are considered realty in some transactions and personalty in others. [Citations omitted.]) and Paik v. Chung, 123 Wash. 37, 211 P. 729, 731 (1923) (statutory labor lien of agricultural worker helping with growing crops does not attach to the land or to any interest in the land. It attaches to the crop only.). As we have said in Smith v. Howell, 91 Or. 279, 293, 176 P. 805 (1919), a growing crop    becomes upon severance from the realty personalty. The court has also said that an Oregon statute produces the same result. Hostetler v. Eccles, 112 Or. 572, 580-81, 230 P. 549 (1924) (the emblements statute [now ORS 91.230] permits an action in tort for conversion of the crop). The trial court erred in directing a jury verdict in defendant's favor and in removing the taking question related to destroyed personalty from the jury. Where uncompensated condemnation occurs, attorney fees are due. ORS 20.085 promises: In a proceeding brought under section 18, Article I    by an owner of property    if the owner    prevails, the owner    shall be entitled to    reasonable attorney fees at trial and on appeal. Attorney fees are claimed in specific ways under our rules of procedure. ORCP 68 C(2) provides: A party seeking attorney fees shall allege the facts, statute, or rule which provides a basis for the award of such fees in a pleading filed by that party. Attorney fees may be sought before the substantive right to recover such fees accrues. No attorney fees shall be awarded unless a right to recover such fee is alleged as provided in this subsection. Plaintiffs did allege their right to attorney fees. In the usual case, after the legal threshold of evidence to show substantial interference is met, whether there was substantial interference to constitute a taking in fact becomes a jury question. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, supra, 233 Or. at 192, 376 P.2d 100 (continuing substantial interference). But, where, as here, the only proof is that the property was destroyed, plaintiff is entitled to a verdict on that point as a matter of law. However, in this case, the inverse condemnation theory was never submitted to the jury. Normally, we do not require remand where the error is not harmful. Although the trial court erred when it prevented the jury from considering plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim, that error does not require a new trial in this case because the jury has already assessed the amount of plaintiffs' damages for the crops and livestock killed and thus taken. Here, the personal property involved was destroyed. The jury assigned all liability for that destruction to defendant city, an allocation of fault that is presently binding. The damage amounts found by the jury are binding against defendant in the inverse condemnation context, through the application of the principles of issue preclusion, in that defendant has had full opportunity and motivation to litigate the amount of damages that plaintiffs may recover for the crops and livestock. [7] Of course, only one recovery of that amount of damages will be permitted but, under ORS 20.085, defendant is also liable to plaintiffs for reasonable attorney fees under the inverse condemnation theory. Therefore, we remand the case to the trial court to establish the reasonable fees due plaintiffs. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part. This case is remanded to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.