Opinion ID: 168353
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Evidence from State Officials

Text: 94 Great American next asserts the district court improperly limited the jury's consideration of evidence offered to refute the breach of contract claim: (1) the medical examiner's report, (2) the death certificate, (3) the accident report, and (4) statements made by the investigating officer concerning Sims's manner of death. 15 The court erred, Great American argues, in applying Oklahoma law rather than the Federal Rules of Evidence. As with the seat belt evidence, this claim requires us to determine whether the evidence is of consequence under Rule 401, or stated differently, whether the Oklahoma law at issue reflects substantive state policy. 95
96 We begin with an examination of the two expert reports: the medical examiner's report and the death certificate. Pursuant to Oklahoma law, such reports generally are excluded either as hearsay or improper opinion testimony. See Travelers Protective Ass'n v. Mansell, 540 P.2d 1178, 1180 (Okla.1975) (excluding death certificate as hearsay); Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Maples, 204 Okla. 195, 228 P.2d 363 (1951) (excluding proof of death as hearsay and conclusion); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 176 Okla. 535, 56 P.2d 1179, 1180 (1936) (excluding verdict of coroner's jury as hearsay); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Plunkett, 129 Okla. 292, 264 P. 827, 828 (1928) (excluding statement by attending physician in proof of death and death certificate as hearsay); Okla. Aid Ass'n v. Thomas, 125 Okla. 190, 256 P. 719, 721-22 (1927) (excluding death certificate as hearsay). 97 In holding these types of records inadmissible for the purpose of showing suicide, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated, 98 It is our opinion that the Legislature provided for the keeping of vital statistics ... for the purpose of keeping an accurate record of births and deaths and of the diseases causing death, and so that the health authorities may be better enabled to combat diseases. The attending physician or coroner might be able to state the cause of death, just as was stated here, gunshot wound. But to go further and state by whom inflicted would change all the rules of evidence in cases in which this certificate could be admitted. 99 Thomas, 256 P. at 721-22 (emphasis added). The court was clearly troubled that a jury in such circumstances could be influenced by hearsay testimony. See id. at 721 (noting that admitting such testimony would permit hearsay evidence). Indeed, the court later reiterated: To know ... how the deceased received the injury that caused his death would require the testimony of an eyewitness, because the injury was of the type which could have been incurred either accidentally or intentionally. Maples, 228 P.2d at 367. Therefore, evidence as to cause of death is inadmissible for the reason that they [are] based on hearsay and conclusion. Id. 100 Based on this precedent, we are persuaded that Oklahoma law barring such testimony reflects a procedural rule. The court's objective in precluding such evidence is to promote accuracy in its courtrooms. See Thomas, 256 P. at 721 (noting that the case illustrates the danger of permitting [a] death certificate to be introduced to make out a prima facie case of suicide.). Therefore, because the state rules are procedural under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, the district court should not have relied on state law in conducting its admissibility determination. 101 Nevertheless, we find no error in the exclusion of these reports. Under Rule 702, reports from experts, such as a medical examiner, are admissible only if necessary to aid in the interpretation of scientific, technical, or other specialized facts. Although any witness may offer an opinion as to an ultimate issue to be decided by a jury, this opinion should not unduly invade the province of the jury when the assistance of the witness is unnecessary. See United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1172 (10th Cir.2005); see Fed.R.Evid. 704 advisory committee's notes (Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence which wastes time. These provisions afford ample assurances against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach, somewhat in the manner of the oath-helpers of an earlier day.). 102 Here, the jury was fully capable of assessing the facts to determine causation. The experts did not offer any opinion that was based on scientific or technical facts outside the jurors' common knowledge or experience. To the contrary, this is the very type of fact determination a jury is equipped to make. Accordingly, although the district court incorrectly applied state law, the court's analysis nonetheless conforms to the appropriate analysis under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which would have limited the admissibility of the medical examiner's report and the death certificate. 103
104 The district court also limited the investigating officer's accident report as well as his testimony relating to Sims's cause of death. 16 The court relied on Gabus v. Harvey, 678 P.2d 253, 257 (Okla.1984), to exclude this evidence. In that case, the court emphasized the capability of the jury in assessing certain facts: 105 [The evidence] concerned facts that could be readily appreciated by any person who drives an automobile or crosses streets. No special skill or knowledge was needed to understand these facts and draw a conclusion from them. In such a case as this, where the normal experiences and qualifications of laymen jurors permit them to draw proper conclusions from the facts and circumstances, expert conclusions or opinions are inadmissible. The expert conclusion here was not helpful and should not have been admitted.... It was not useful since the jury was just as capable of drawing a proper conclusion from those facts as was the officer. 106 Id. at 256-57; see Maben v. Lee, 260 P.2d 1064 (Okla.1953) (holding that an investigating officer without personal knowledge cannot offer an opinion as to causation at trial when the jury is as capable of doing so as is the officer); see also Diaz v. State, 728 P.2d 503, 514 (Okla.Crim.App.1986) (It is only where the fact of death and its cause is beyond the understanding of the average layman that expert testimony may be necessary.) (quotation omitted). 107 Based on this language, we believe that the Oklahoma rule precluding a police officer's opinion about causation is a procedural rule concerned solely with accuracy and economy in the courtroom. Therefore, the district court should not have grounded its conclusion in Oklahoma procedural law, but instead should have relied exclusively on the appropriate Federal Rule of Evidence to guide its admissibility determination. 108 Nonetheless, we find no error in the exclusion of this evidence. The holding from the Gabus court relied extensively on Oklahoma Rules of Evidence § 2403 and § 2702. Gabus, 678 P.2d at 254-55; see Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2403 (Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, needless presentation of cumulative evidence, or unfair and harmful surprise.); id. § 2702 (If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise.). These rules are identical to Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 702. Under the Federal Rules, statements by investigating officers as to accident causation are generally not admitted unless (1) perceived by the witness and helpful to a determination of a fact in issue, see Fed.R.Evid. 701, or (2) in the case of an expert, necessary to aid the jury in the interpretation of scientific, technical, or other specialized facts, see id. 702. Neither of these conditions are met here. As we stated earlier, the jury was fully capable of concluding whether or not Sims committed suicide. See Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1172. The investigating officer's opinion on this matter was no more than speculation based on the same facts that the jury had before it. We therefore find that had the district court properly applied the Federal Rules, it would have excluded the officer's testimony concerning causation. In short, there was no error in the court's exclusion of the testimony under state law.