Opinion ID: 2510618
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Objective Witness Test

Text: Even though the child's statements were not the product of police interrogation and therefore are not clearly testimonial according to Crawford, we must also determine whether the child's statements fall into one of the three formulations of the core class of testimonial statements at which the Confrontation Clause was directed and are therefore testimonial. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). In this regard, Vigil argues that these statements are testimonial because the child made the statements to the doctor under circumstances which would have led an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statements would be available for use at a later trial. Id. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354. In addition, Vigil argues that the phrase objective witness must be defined as an objectively reasonable adult observer educated in the law. The People disagree with this construction and argue that the phrase objective witness should be defined as an objectively reasonable person in the position of the declarant. Based on our reading of Crawford and our review of other courts deciding this issue, we hold that the objective witness language in Crawford refers to an objectively reasonable person in the declarant's position. Applying this test to the instant case, we determine that an objectively reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have believed that his statements to the doctor would be available for use at a later trial. We first discuss our holding that the term reasonable, objective witness refers to an objectively reasonable person in the declarant's position. This holding is consistent with the Crawford majority's reference identifying a hearsay statement from Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970), as non-testimonial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58, 124 S.Ct. 1354. In Dutton, the declarant was the defendant's co-conspirator, and he made a statement to his cell mate blaming the defendant for his predicament. 400 U.S. at 87-89, 91 S.Ct. 210. The Supreme Court characterized this statement as spontaneous and against penal interest. Id. at 89, 91 S.Ct. 210. If the Crawford Court had intended the objective witness test to be applied from the perspective of an objectively reasonable observer educated in the law, [6] the Crawford Court would have labeled the co-conspirator's statement testimonial. However, by labeling the statement non-testimonial, Crawford directs us to apply the objective witness test from the perspective of an objectively reasonable person in the declarant's position. [7] In addition, we are mindful of the concern expressed in Crawford to safeguard an accused's confrontation right. Like the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir.2005), however, we believe that an objective test focusing on the reasonable expectations of a person in the declarant's position under the circumstances of the case most adequately safeguards the accused's confrontation right and most closely reflects the concerns underpinning the Sixth Amendment. Summers, 414 F.3d at 1302; See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 Geo. L.J. 1011, 1040-43 (1998). This is because the common nucleus shared by the Supreme Court's three formulations of testimonial evidence, Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354, centers upon the declarant's reasonable expectations. Summers, 414 F.3d at 1302. Thus, as noted by the Tenth Circuit, it is the reasonable expectation that a statement may be later used at trial that distinguishes the flippant remark, proffered to a casual acquaintance, from the true testimonial statement. Id. (citing Crawford 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354). Accordingly, we find the holding in Summers namely that a statement is testimonial if a reasonable person in the position of the declarant would objectively foresee that his statement might be used in the investigation or prosecution of a crimepersuasive. Id. We also find persuasive the numerous other courts which have held likewise. See United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir.2004) ( Crawford at least suggests that the determinative factor in determining whether a declarant bears testimony is the declarant's awareness or expectation that his or her statements may later be used at trial.); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir.2004) (The proper inquiry, then, is whether the declarant intends to bear testimony against the accused. That intent, in turn, may be determined by querying whether a reasonable person in the declarant's position would anticipate his statement being used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting the crime.); State v. Hembertt, 269 Neb. 840, 696 N.W.2d 473, 482 (2005) ([T]he determinative factor in determining whether a declarant bears testimony is the declarant's awareness or expectation that his or her statements may later be used at a trial.); State v. Davis, 364 S.C. 364, 613 S.E.2d 760, 779 (Ct.App.2005) (inquiring whether a reasonable speaker in the declarant's position would believe the statements would be available for use at a later trial). Further, we note with approval the formulation of the objective witness test that our court of appeals stated in People v. Sharp, ___ P.3d ___, 2005 WL 2877807, at  (Colo. App. Nov.3, 2005) ([T]he test in determining whether the child's statement is testimonial depends on whether an objective person in the child's position would believe her statements would lead to punishment of defendant.). Based upon our review of these cases, an assessment of whether or not a reasonable person in the position of the declarant would believe a statement would be available for use at a later trial involves an analysis of the expectations of a reasonable person in the position of the declarant. Expectations derive from circumstances, and, among other circumstances, a person's age is a pertinent characteristic for analysis. See Lagunas v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2005 WL 2043678 (Tex.App. Aug.26, 2005) (considering child declarant's age as a circumstance relevant to the inquiry of whether the child's statement constituted testimonial evidence); State v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d 393 (Minn.Ct.App. 2005) (holding that admission of a three-year-old victim's out-of-court statements made to an examining physician did not violate the defendant's right of confrontation where the circumstances surrounding the statements would not lead a reasonable child of her age to have that expectation) cert. granted (Minn. March 29, 2005). Other factors for consideration may include whether an objectively reasonable child would be aware of government involvement and whether an objectively reasonable child would be aware that the defendant faces the possibility of criminal punishment. Turning now to the application of the objective witness test to the statements the child made to the doctor, we analyze the circumstances surrounding the statements to determine whether an objective witness in the position of the child would believe that his statements would be used at trial. We hold that no objective witness in the position of the child would believe that his statements to the doctor would be used at trial. Rather, an objective seven-year-old child would reasonably be interested in feeling better and would intend his statements to describe the source of his pain and his symptoms. In addition, an objectively reasonable seven-year-old child would expect that a doctor would use his statements to make him feel better and to formulate a medical diagnosis. He would not foresee the statements being used in a later trial. Thus, from the perspective of an objective witness in the child's position, it would be reasonable to assume that this examination was only for the purpose of medical diagnosis, and not related to the criminal prosecution. No police officer was present at the time of the examination, nor was the examination conducted at the police department. The child, the doctor, and the child's mother were present in the examination room. [8] Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and conclude that the child's statements to the doctor were not testimonial.