Opinion ID: 2832466
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Individualized relief

Text: The fact that the plaintiffs might require individualized relief or not share all questions in common does not preclude certification of a class. Chicago Teachers Union, 2015 WL 4667904, at ; In re IKO Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 757 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2014) (commonality of damages is not required in class action suit); Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010) (the need for individual proof alone does not necessarily preclude class certification); Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 801 (7th Cir. 2008); Allen v. Int’l Truck and Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 471–72 (7th Cir. 2004). Rule 23(b) requires only common evidence and common methodology, not common results. Messner, 669 F.3d 802. “Neither Rule 23 nor any gloss that decided cases have added to it requires that every question be common. It is routine in class actions to have a final phase in which individualized proof must be submitted.” Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 756. See also Johnson v. Meriter Health Servs. Employee Ret. Plan, 702 F.3d 364, 369 (7th Cir. 2012) (In a 23(b)(2) class action, “a declaration is a permissible prelude to a claim for damages.”). No. 14-3018 33 If the class prevails in demonstrating that PNC had an unofficial policy or practice that required employees classwide to work off-the-clock overtime hours, scores of separate trials might be necessary to determine which class members were actually adversely affected by the policy and if they were, what loss each class member sustained. At least it will not be necessary in each of those trials to determine whether PNC had an illegal policy of denying pay for offthe-clock work. This is precisely parallel to our conclusion in McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 491 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[S]hould the claim of disparate impact prevail in the class-wide proceeding, hundreds of separate trials may be necessary to determine which class members were actually adversely affected by one or both of the practices and if so what loss each class member sustained … But at least it wouldn’t be necessary in each of those trials to determine whether the challenged practices were unlawful.”) See also Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 505–06 (7th Cir. 2012) (Rovner, J. dissenting) (describing a second step process in class action litigation in which adversarial proceedings were held to determine which potential class members had been harmed by an illegal employment rule). If the district court finds that PNC has an official policy of denying overtime pay, it is likely that a certain number of class members were not harmed by the policy because they never worked beyond their forty-hour week. This alone does not preclude class certification. Plaintiffs need not prove that every member of the proposed class has been harmed before the class can be certified. Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 757. A class will often include persons who have not been injured by the defendant's conduct, but this possibility or, indeed inevita34 No. 14-3018 bility, does not preclude class certification. Kohen, 571 F.3d at 677 (7th Cir. 2009). “If very few members of the class were harmed, that is an argument not for refusing to certify the class but for certifying it and then entering a judgment that would largely exonerate” the defendant. Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 757–58 (internal citations omitted). “If, however, a class is defined so broadly as to include a great number of members who for some reason could not have been harmed by the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct, the class is defined too broadly to permit certification.” Messner, 669 F.3d at 824. The important distinction then is “between class members who were not harmed and those who could not have been harmed.” Id. at 825. For example, in this case, managerial employees who are exempt from overtime hour laws could not have been harmed by the policy. Those employees who could have been harmed by the policy, but were, in fact, not harmed, can be excluded during a later determination on the merits. For example, as described in Jamie S., after this court declared that United Airlines “no married female flight attendant” rule violated Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination, any woman who had lost her position because of the rule became entitled to relief. But these class members were difficult to identify. Many had silently resigned their positions in contemplation of the rule rather than formally protesting or waiting for the airline to discharge them, so there was no record as to why any particular female flight attendant left. Consequently, adversarial hearings were held before special masters in order to establish whether each claimant in fact left her position because of the illegal rule. See Jamie S., 668 F.3d at 505–06 (Rovner, J. dissenting) (describing facts and processes from McDonald v. United Air Lines, Inc., 587 No. 14-3018 35 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1978) and Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971)). PNC assumes that Rule 23 requires every class action to resolve all liability issues for every class member. “Rule 23(b)(3), however, does not require a plaintiff seeking class certification to prove that each element of her claim is susceptible to classwide proof.” Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1196. And our cases demonstrate that commonality as to every issue is not required for class certification. In Suchanek, we determined that the question as to whether coffee packaging misled consumers was common despite the fact that individual consumers saw different packaging and may have been harmed to varying extents or not at all. Suchanek, 764 F.3d at 757. In IKO, we upheld certification of a class despite the fact that different plaintiffs had different experiences with the sub-standard roofing tiles. IKO, 757 F.3d at 601–02. And in Pella, we certified a class despite the fact that plaintiffs’ experiences with defective Pella windows may have been caused by many individual variances such as specific conditions and installation, noting that the fact that class members still must prove individual issues of causation and damages would not prevent class certification. Pella Corp., 606 F.3d at 394. It is true that some employees have been made whole as a result of the PNC investigation. It is entirely possible, however, that these employees were still injured and could collect damages beyond their actual wages. Under both Illinois law and the Fair Labor Standards Act, a good faith violation does not absolve the employer of liability. 820 ILCS 105/12; 29 U.S.C. §§216, 260. Nor does an agreement between the employee and the employer to work for less than the re36 No. 14-3018 quired wage. 820 ILCS 105/12(a). Both Illinois law and the Fair Labor Standards Act distinguish between willful violations and violations made in good faith for purposes of determining the extent of an employer’s liability. 820 ILCS 105/12; 29 U.S.C. §§216, 260. Whether or not PNC had an unlawful policy denying required compensation is relevant to whether PNC willfully denied overtime pay to its employees, or whether such denials occurred despite a good faith attempt to comply with the statute. These questions are, in turn, relevant to the extent of damages under Illinois law and the Fair Labor Standards Act. See 820 ILCS 105/12; 29 U.S.C. §§216, 260. In short, many issues remain unanswered and the district court was correct to conclude that a class action would be an appropriate and efficient pathway to resolution. The district court properly considered each of the issues and did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class. The decision of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.