Opinion ID: 175055
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The City's Ban as a Time, Place, or Manner Restriction

Text: Having determined that tattooing is protected by the First Amendment, our next inquiry is whether the City's total ban on tattooing is a constitutional restriction on free expression. A regulation that restricts protected expression based on the content of the speech is constitutional only if it withstands strict scrutiny, see United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000), meaning that it is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end, Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). However, Anderson does not contend that Hermosa Beach Municipal Code § 17.06.070 is a content-based restriction on speech. See supra n. 4. Rather, he argues that the City's regulation is an unconstitutional restriction on a means of expression. Accordingly, we must determine not whether the City's regulation survives strict scrutiny but whether the City's regulation is a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction on protected speech. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (Our cases make clear . . . that . . . the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech. . . .). This determination requires an inquiry into whether the restriction: (1) is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech; (2) is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; and (3) leave[s] open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984). Before turning to this inquiry, we first emphasize that the Supreme Court ha[s] voiced particular concern with laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression, because the danger they pose to the freedom of speech is readily apparentby eliminating a common means of speaking, such measures can suppress too much speech. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994). A long line of Supreme Court cases indicates that such laws are almost never reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions. See, e.g., id. at 54-55, 114 S.Ct. 2038 (invalidating an ordinance forbidding the display of signs on private property); Schad, 452 U.S. at 75-76, 101 S.Ct. 2176 (ban on all live entertainment); Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141, 145-49, 63 S.Ct. 862, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943) (ban on door-to-door distribution of literature); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416, 63 S.Ct. 669, 87 L.Ed. 869 (1943) (ban on distributing handbills on the public streets); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938) (ban on distribution of pamphlets within the municipality); but see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949) (upholding a ban on sound trucks). The interplay between the Court's often rigid statements about total bans on modes of expression and its traditional time, place, or manner test is not entirely clear. However, we need not determine whether the City's regulation is per se unconstitutional as a total ban of a means of expression or whether it is subject to a particularly stringent test, because we hold that it fails under even the traditional time, place, or manner test. We proceed now to that test.
Anderson does not dispute that the City's regulation may be justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, Clark, 468 U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065. The City's regulation bans all tattoo parlors, not just those conveying a particular kind of message or subject matter, and is purportedly justified based on health and safety concerns.
A reasonable time, place, or manner restriction must also be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. Id. In Ward, the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of this requirement: [A] regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests but . . . it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so. . . . So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest, . . . the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government's interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative. 491 U.S. at 798, 800, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (emphasis added). Anderson does not dispute that the City has a significant interest in regulating tattooing because of the health and safety concerns implicated by this process. Rather, Anderson argues that the regulation is substantially broader than necessary to achieve this interest because the interest could be achieved by regulations ensuring that tattooing is performed in a sanitary manner rather than outright prohibition of tattooing. The City disagrees, pointing out that Los Angeles County has only one health inspector for nearly 300 tattoo establishments and over 850 tattooists, and that there are no statewide regulations relating to sterilization, sanitation, and standards for tattooists. Put simply, the City argues, there are insufficient resources to monitor the 8[5]0 tattooists operating in Los Angeles County, including the many who, like Plaintiff, are self-taught and operating in backrooms and basements. As other courts have found, tattooing is a safe procedure if performed under appropriate sterilized conditions. Yurkew, 495 F.Supp. at 1252; see also Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra. Tattooing is now permitted (subject to regulation) in all fifty states, with Oklahoma becoming the last to lift its ban as of November 1, 2006. Janice Francis-Smith, OK Governor Henry Signs Tattoo Legalization into Law, OKLA. CITY J. REC. (May 11, 2006), available at http:// findarticles.com/p/ar ticles/mi_qn4182/is_20060511/ai_n16412421 (last visited May 30, 2010). The City has presented no evidence that tattooing in the City could not be regulated in such a way that addresses the City's legitimate public health concerns. Rather, it simply argues that currently, there are insufficient resources in place to address these concerns. But the provision vel non of such resources is a matter within the City's control. Without more, we cannot approve a total ban on protected First Amendment activity simply because of the government's failure to provide the resources it thinks are necessary to regulate it. In sum, although a total ban on tattooing might be the most convenient way of addressing the City's health concerns, the City has given us no reason to conclude that these concerns cannot be adequately addressed through regulation of tattooing rather than a total ban on tattoo parlors. Thus, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's historical concern with laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression, City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 55, 114 S.Ct. 2038, we have little difficulty concluding that the City's ban is substantially broader than necessary to achieve the [City's] interest, Ward, 491 U.S. at 800, 109 S.Ct. 2746.
Even if the City's regulation were narrowly tailored to serve its health and safety interests, a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction on protected speech must also leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065. The City argues that, although its regulation restricts tattooists' ability to apply images to human skin via the injection of ink, there are alternative means available for applying the exact same words, images, and symbols to skin, such as airbrushing or the use of natural henna paste to create temporary tattoos. The City also points out that the tattooist could render his designs on a traditional canvas or other media, such as a T-shirt. In other words, the City believes that [t]here is nothing inherently or distinctly expressive about rendering . . . designs on the skin using the ink-injection method. We disagree. In City of Ladue, the defendant city made an argument similar to the one the City makes here. The City argued that its ban on signs on private property was a mere regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech because residents remain free to convey their desired messages by other means, such as hand-held signs, letters, handbills, flyers, telephone calls, newspaper advertisements, bumper stickers, speeches, and neighborhood or community meetings. 512 U.S. at 56, 114 S.Ct. 2038 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted). The Supreme Court was not persuaded that adequate substitutes exist for the important medium of speech that Ladue has closed off. . . . Displaying a sign from one's own residence often carries a message quite distinct from placing the same sign someplace else, or conveying the same text or picture by other means. Precisely because of their location, such signs provide information about the identity of the `speaker[,]' . . . [which] is an important component of many attempts to persuade. Id. (emphasis added). The Court held the ordinance unconstitutional because the city had completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both unique and important. Id. at 54, 114 S.Ct. 2038. As in City of Ladue, the City of Hermosa Beach has completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both unique and important. Id. at 54, 114 S.Ct. 2038. Like music, tattooing is one of the oldest forms of human expression, Ward, 491 U.S. at 790, 109 S.Ct. 2746, as well as one of the world's most universally practiced forms of artwork. See Jane Caplan, Introduction, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY, supra, at xi (Physical evidence for the practice [of tattooing] survives from the late fourth millennium BC in Europe and from about 2000 BC in Egypt, and tattooing can be found in virtually all parts of the world at some time.). And it has increased in prevalence and sophistication in recent years. See Juliet Fleming, The Renaissance Tattoo, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY, supra, at 61 ([F]or the last quarter-century the West has been enjoying a `tattoo renaissance'; a movement characterized by refinements of conception . . .; by technical developments . . .; and by the refinement of procedure and equipment.. . .); Susan Benson, Inscriptions of the Self: Reflections on Tattooing and Piercing in Contemporary Euro-America, in WRITTEN ON THE BODY, supra, at 240 (discussing how the tattoo community has bec[o]me more visible and more organized, and noting that over the past 30 years the number of tattoo establishments has grown rapidly in absolute terms, both in Europe and America). According to a 2006 survey by the Pew Research Center, 36 percent of people from ages 18-25, 40 percent of people from ages 26-40, and 10 percent of people from ages 41-64, had or once had at least one tattoo. The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, How Young People View Their Lives, Futures and Politics: A Portrait of Generation Next 21 (Jan. 9, 2007), available at http://people-press.org/ reports/pdf/300.pdf (last visited May 30, 2010). Most importantly, a permanent tattoo often carries a message quite distinct from displaying the same words or picture through some other medium, and provide[s] information about the identity of the `speaker.' City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 56, 114 S.Ct. 2038. A tattoo suggests that the bearer of the tattoo is highly committed to the message he is displaying: by permanently engrafting a phrase or image onto his skin, the bearer of the tattoo suggests that the phrase or image is so important to him that he has chosen to display the phrase or image every day for the remainder of his life. The relative permanence of the tattoo can also make a statement of autonomy and self-fashioningof ownership over the flesh and a defen[se of] the embodied self against external impositions. Benson, supra, at 251-52 (quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 251 ([T]he permanence of the tattoo establishes . . . an instantiation of the will in defiance of process and time: `you can never get it off.'); id. at 250-251 (discussing how the idea of the permanence of the tattoo is critical in that it is linked to ideas of the body as property and possession. . . indeed as the only possession of the self in a world characterized by accelerating commodification and unpredictability). Finally, the pain involved in producing a permanent tattoo is significant to its bearer as well: Pain, like the tattoo itself, is something that cannot be appropriated; it is yours alone; it stands outside the system of signification and exchange that threatens the autonomy of the self. Id. at 251. These elements are not presentor, at least, not nearly to the same degreein the case of a temporary tattoo, a traditional canvas, or a T-shirt. Thus, we disagree with the City that [t]here is nothing inherently or distinctly expressive about rendering. . . designs on the skin using the ink-injection method. The City analogizes this case to Kovacs, the only case in which the Supreme Court has upheld a total ban on a medium of communication. In Kovacs, the Court upheld a Trenton, New Jersey, ordinance banning sound trucksvehicles with attached sound amplifierson public streets. 336 U.S. at 89, 69 S.Ct. 448. The Court emphasized Trenton's interest in preventing distractions . . . dangerous to traffic and preserving the quiet and tranquility of the residential areas. Id. at 87, 69 S.Ct. 448. The Court also reasoned that the fact [t]hat more people may be more easily and cheaply reached by sound trucks. . . is not enough to call forth constitutional protection. Id. at 88-89, 69 S.Ct. 448. The City argues that tattooing is just like a sound truckit might be a more effective means to disseminate a message to the public, but the same message may be transmitted by other means. Cf. Hold Fast Tattoo, 580 F.Supp.2d at 660 (The act of tattooing is one step removed from actual expressive conduct, which is similar to a sound truck, which enables each customer to express a particularized message, but the sound truck vehicle itself is not expressive.). The analogy to sound trucks is flawed. As discussed above, a tattoo is not merely a more effective means of communicating a message; rather, the tattoo often carries a message quite distinct  from other media. City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 56, 114 S.Ct. 2038 (emphasis added). In light of the long line of cases in which the Supreme Court has invalidated total bans on a medium of communication, it cannot be true that any medium of communication may be banned based on the reasoning that it is merely a more effective means of communicating a message; by this logic, after all, a canvas could be considered merely a more effective means of displaying a painting than lined paper. Seeming to recognize that its reasoning was in some tension with its earlier cases, the Kovacs Court explained that its judgment also rested on the fact that no one within range of the sound truck could avoid the broadcast: While this Court . . . has invalidated an ordinance forbidding a distributor of pamphlets or handbills from summoning householders to their doors to receive the distributor's writings, this was on the ground that the home owner could protect himself from such intrusion by an appropriate sign that he is unwilling to be disturbed. . . . The unwilling listener is not like the passer-by who may be offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot be made to take it. In his home or on the street he is practically helpless to escape this interference with his privacy by loud speakers except through the protection of the municipality. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 86-87, 69 S.Ct. 448 (quotation marks and footnote omitted) (citing Martin, 319 U.S. at 143, 148, 63 S.Ct. 862). In this sense, the case at hand is easily distinguishable from Kovacs and indistinguishable from the Court's other cases involving total bans on modes of expression. A tattoo does not force unwilling listener[s] to heed its message any more than the expletive-laden jacket at issue in Cohen. A tattoo is displayed passively on the person's body, such that a member of the general public can simply avert his eyes if he does not wish to view the tattoo (assuming the tattoo is visible to the public at all). In other words, a tattoo effects no additional intrusion of privacy on members of the public beyond other types of expression clearly protected by the First Amendment. Thus, the City's tattoo regulation is subject to the principle in Martin, Schad, and City of Ladue, which, read alongside Kovacs, indicate that if a unique and important mode of expression does not force unwilling listeners to heed its message in an intrusive manner, the government may not ban it regardless of the availability of alternative (and less distinctive) means of communicating a similar message.