Opinion ID: 3000513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Attorney MacKelvie’s Testimony

Text: Shelia argues that Attorney MacKelvie’s testimony as to the complexity of Medicare regulations and other related topics should have been allowed in order to show that the defendant’s conduct could have been an innocent mistake. Although Shelia’s counsel might have originally planned to call Attorney MacKelvie as an expert witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 701 or as a lay witness offering opinion testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, that motion was effectively withdrawn as is evident from the following exchange with the district court: THE COURT: I have the defendant’s motion in limine to admit expert testimony. Mr. Bourgeois, what exactly is it that you want Mr. MacKelvie to testify about? 12 No. 06-1417 MR. BOURGEOIS: Well, actually, your Honor, I don’t know that it falls into the category of an expert. ... THE COURT: Okay. So your motion is denied as moot. Is it moot? MR. BOURGEOIS: I’m not suggesting—it may come up later. If it comes up that we need to qualify him for something or other, then I will ask you to reawaken the motion, so to speak. THE COURT: . . . Are you going to try to elicit opinions from him? MR. BOURGEOIS: No. No opinions. THE COURT: Okay. MR. BOURGEOIS: I don’t think. THE COURT: Because if you are asking him to talk about Medicare regulations—I need more. MR. BOURGEOIS: I’m not going to ask [him for] opinions, no. ... THE COURT: All right. I do not expect you are going to ask him any expert questions, then. (R. 75-3 at 390-92.) Moreover, there was no effort on the part of the defendant to introduce Attorney MacKelvie as an expert witness during direct examination or to “reawaken the motion.” The defendant certainly forfeited this argument. Regardless, the district court’s decision to limit the testimony of Attorney MacKelvie to his firsthand knowledge of this case does not constitute error, plain or otherwise. No. 06-1417 13 III. Motion for a New Trial or for Judgment of Acquittal Denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Reed, 875 F.2d 107, 113 (7th Cir. 1989). The court should grant a motion for a new trial only if the evidence “preponderate[s] heavily against the verdict, such that it would be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand.” Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 1985)). In a motion for judgment of acquittal, we ask “whether the record contained sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Theodospoulos, 48 F.3d 1438, 1444 (7th Cir. 1995). “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, recognizing that it is the exclusive function of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses and draw reasonable inferences.” Id. The defendant argues that the evidence fails to establish criminal intent. The crux of the defendant’s argument is that payments made to the three family members are not “inherently illegal.” The defendant, however, disregards that she and her husband did not simply pay a “salary” to family members, but rather, sought reimbursement from Medicare for those payments. The jury could have reasonably found criminal intent from the defendant’s requests for reimbursements from Medicare for “salaries” of close family members who were not employees of A-1. At the very least, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.