Opinion ID: 2630897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Count IVAggravated Indecent Liberties

Text: Colston argues that the State presented evidence at trial of multiple acts that would constitute aggravated indecent liberties with a child. This evidence includes: (1) the sexual intercourse (by penetration with Colston's penis or finger), (2) the oral sex, (3) Colston putting B.N. between his legs while they were at the pool, (4) Colston removing B.N.'s clothes prior to sexual intercourse, and (5) Colston fondling B.N.'s breast. The State argues that it relied on only one act to support the charge of aggravated indecent liberties with a childthe touching and licking of B.N.'s breast. K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3) defines [a]ggravated indecent liberties with a child as engaging in any of the following acts with a child who is under 14 years of age: (A) any lewd fondling or touching of the person of either the child or the offender, done or submitted to with the intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the offender, or both. See State v. Wells, 223 Kan. 94, 98, 573 P.2d 580 (1977). The trial court defined lewd fondling and touching in jury Instruction No. 11 for Count IV regarding aggravated indecent liberties with a child as follows: [T]he term `lewd fondling or touching' means a fondling or touching in a manner which tends to undermine the morals of the victim, which is so clearly offensive as to outrage the moral senses of a reasonable person, and which is done with the specific intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the victim or the offender or both. Lewd fondling or touching does not require contact with the sex organ of one or the other. Colston first argues that evidence of the acts of sexual intercourse or oral sex constituted multiple acts that could have supported the conviction of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Under the strict statutory definition of the terms, the acts of sexual intercourse and oral sex could support a conviction of aggravated indecent liberties with a child because these acts constitute lewd fondling or touching. Had Colston been charged only with aggravated indecent liberties with a child, the evidence of the acts of sexual intercourse and oral sex would have created a multiple acts situation requiring jury unanimity of the underlying criminal act. But Colston was charged with separate counts of rape and aggravated criminal sodomy in addition to the aggravated indecent liberties charge. A multiple acts situation occurs only when the State presents evidence of two or more acts that could support a single count. Based on the theory of the crimes as argued by the State, the evidence of sexual intercourse supported the rape charges against Colston, and the evidence of oral sex supported the aggravated criminal sodomy charge. The jury was instructed on the definition of sexual intercourse in connection with the rape charges and the definition of sodomy in connection with the aggravated criminal sodomy charge. Also, the jury was instructed that aggravated indecent liberties with a child required Colston's specific intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either Colston or B.N. or both. The rape and aggravated criminal sodomy charges did not include this element. As we have stated, there is no single test for determining whether conduct constitutes multiple acts and courts must look to the facts and the theory of the crime as argued to determine whether a jury verdict implicates unanimity issues. Allen, 290 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 2, 232 P.3d 861. Based on the separate charges filed against Colston, the evidence presented at trial, the theory of the crimes as argued by the State, and the instructions the jury received, we conclude there is no possibility the jury could have based the aggravated indecent liberties conviction on the acts of sexual intercourse or oral sex. Colston also asserts that the evidence of his putting B.N. between his legs while they were at the pool could be an act supporting a conviction of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. The State responds that it did not present evidence that Colston engaged in lewd fondling or touching with B.N. when she was on his lap. B.N. testified at trial that Colston pulled her between his legs, which made her feel uncomfortable, so she moved to his knees. Considering the definition of lewd fondling or touching which the jury received at trial, Colston's act of placing B.N. on his lap would not be so clearly offensive as to outrage the moral senses of a reasonable person. Without some other evidence of lewdness, this act, by itself, would not support a charge of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Colston also claims that his act of removing B.N.'s clothes prior to sexual intercourse would constitute aggravated indecent liberties with a child. B.N. testified that Colston removed her clothes and initially stated he would not do anything to her. Colston paused for a moment and looked at B.N. Then he removed his clothes and had sexual intercourse with her. Applying the four Schoonover factors of unitary conduct to these facts, we conclude that Colston's act of removing B.N.'s clothes was incidental to the sex offenses for which he was charged and did not constitute a separate act supporting aggravated indecent liberties. Colston's act of removing B.N.'s clothes and his act of sexual intercourse with B.N. occurred at or near the same time and location without an intervening event between the two acts. Although Colston paused for a moment after removing B.N.'s clothes, there was no evidence of a fresh impulse which motivated his act of sexual intercourse with her. In fact, Colston had already told B.N. he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her before he removed her clothes. This leaves Colston's act of touching and licking B.N.'s breast as the only act supporting the conviction of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. As with the aggravated criminal sodomy count, B.N. initially stated at Sunflower House that this act occurred on August 12, but in her trial testimony she stated that the touching of her breast occurred on August 11. Although there was some confusion as to the date, B.N. described only one act involving the touching of her breast. The trial court initially instructed the jury that the aggravated indecent liberties count occurred on or about August 12. In response to a question from the jury, the district court clarified that with respect to the aggravated indecent liberties count, on or about could refer to either August 11 or 12, but the jury must be unanimous as to the date the offense occurred. As such, regarding Count IV, there is no multiple acts issue, and Colston's argument fails to survive the threshold question under the Voyles analysis.