Opinion ID: 1708152
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Challenge for Cause Issue.

Text: We have stated the test to be applied in ruling on challenges for cause under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(5)(k) is whether the juror holds such a fixed opinion on the merits of the case that he or she cannot judge impartially the guilt or innocence of the defendant. State v. Gavin, 360 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Iowa 1985). The State agrees that this is the proper test but seeks to uphold the district court's ruling on the basis that the court has an extremely broad discretion in applying that test. It suggests that this case is similar to State v. Simmons, 454 N.W.2d 866 (Iowa 1990), in which we found no abuse of a trial court's broad discretion with respect to denial of a challenge for cause in a criminal proceeding. We find that the present case differs substantially from Simmons. There, the jurors challenged for cause had affirmatively indicated in response to inquiries made to them that, although they were troubled about what they knew about the case, they would withhold judgment and presume the defendant innocent until the evidence proved otherwise. Id. at 868. We are unable to find any similar statement in the record of the examination of Juror Brandt. She indicated in response to questions from the county attorney that she believed the jury's finding in Oltrogge's case caused her to believe that the defendant probably [was] equally as guilty. Also in answer to the county attorney's question, she indicated that although she would try to be fair she honestly believed that this would be hard to do. We are unable to conclude that her responses to the court's questioning indicated that she had overcome that belief as to her partiality. The best case that the State can make from Juror Brandt's responses to the court's questions is that she would try her best to overcome her prejudices. She had already told the county attorney as much but qualified this by adding that it would be difficult to overcome her views as to the significance of the guilty verdict in Oltrogge's case. As the record was left, it suggests that this juror would begin the case with a prejudice that the defendant would have to overcome. We are thus unable to say that the court of appeals was wrong in concluding that the challenge for cause should have been sustained. Having agreed with the court of appeals as to the validity of the challenge for cause, we are nevertheless unable to conclude that a reversal of defendant's conviction is warranted. The court of appeals' conclusion in this regard was based on the view expressed over forty years ago in State v. Beckwith, 242 Iowa 228, 46 N.W.2d 20 (1951), that error in denying a challenge for cause is not obviated by the fact that the juror in question is otherwise removed by exercise of a peremptory challenge. We believe the time has come to abandon that rule. Whatever Juror Brandt's prejudices were, she did not serve on defendant's jury. The search for legal prejudice must therefore focus on the potential for prejudice that flowed from forcing defendant to use a peremptory challenge on Juror Brandt that might have been used to remove another juror. In the absence of some factual showing that this circumstance resulted in a juror being seated who was not impartial, the existence of prejudice is entirely speculative. We believe it is too speculative to justify overturning the verdict of the jury on that basis alone. Our abandonment of the Beckwith automatic reversal rule does not run afoul of a defendant's right to an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. The Supreme Court in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988), determined that the proper focus when the impartiality of a jury is questioned is the jury that ultimately sat. Id. at 86, 108 S.Ct. at 2277, 101 L.Ed.2d at 88. The Court in Ross determined that in order for there to be a Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment violation it must be shown that, after the complaining party's peremptory challenges have been exercised, the jury that remains was not impartial. Id. Since the Ross decision disposed of the constitutional aspects of this issue, at least nineteen states have refused to apply an automatic reversal rule of the type that we previously recognized in Beckwith. Those states have concluded that in order to obtain relief under a legal theory that a juror is not impartial it must be shown that that juror actually served in the case. When that juror did not serve in the case, it must be shown that the jury that did serve was not impartial. See Pickens v. State, 301 Ark. 244, 783 S.W.2d 341, cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1011, 110 S.Ct. 3257, 111 L.Ed.2d 766 (1990); People v. Pride, 3 Cal. 4th 195, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643 (1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1323, 122 L.Ed.2d 709 (1993); Dawson v. State, 581 A.2d 1078 (Del.1990); Trotter v. State, 576 So.2d 691 (Fla.1990); State v. Graham, 70 Haw. 627, 780 P.2d 1103 (1989); State v. Ramos, 119 Idaho 568, 808 P.2d 1313 (1991); People v. Harris, 231 Ill. App.3d 876, 173 Ill.Dec. 484, 596 N.E.2d 1363 (1992); Vaughn v. State, 559 N.E.2d 610 (Ind.1990); State v. Mayberry, 248 Kan. 369, 807 P.2d 86 (1991); Williams v. Commonwealth, 829 S.W.2d 942 (Ky.App.1992); Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 583 A.2d 218 (1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 117, 116 L.Ed.2d 86 (1991); Mettetal v. State, 602 So.2d 864 (Miss.1992); State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 550 A.2d 1172 (1988); State v. Tranby, 437 N.W.2d 817 (N.D.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 841, 110 S.Ct. 128, 107 L.Ed.2d 88 (1989); State v. Broom, 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 533 N.E.2d 682 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1075, 109 S.Ct. 2089, 104 L.Ed.2d 653 (1989); Commonwealth v. Ingram, 404 Pa.Super. 560, 591 A.2d 734 (1991); State v. Green, 301 S.C. 347, 392 S.E.2d 157, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 229, 112 L.Ed.2d 183 (1990); State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn.1992); State v. Traylor, 170 Wis.2d 393, 489 N.W.2d 626 (Wis.App.1992). We now choose to follow the pattern established in this very substantial number of jurisdictions. We hold that partiality of a juror may not be made the basis for reversal in instances in which that juror has been removed through exercise of a peremptory challenge. Any claim that the jury that did serve in the case was not impartial must be based on matters that appear of record. Prejudice will no longer be presumed from the fact that the defendant has been forced to waste a peremptory challenge. Based on the standard that we now adopt, the showing made by defendant is insufficient to warrant a reversal based on juror prejudice. Only one other juror in addition to Bonnie Brandt was shown in the voir dire examination to believe that her impartiality might be difficult as a result of reading newspaper accounts. That juror also was removed by exercise of a peremptory challenge.