Opinion ID: 1718491
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Heading: The Texas Volenti Decisions

Text: The volenti decisions developed in Texas before the no duty cases, and they sprang from cases on assumed risk. Since the concepts of assumed risk and volenti are virtually the same, we may look to the early assumed risk cases in the development of volenti. In Missouri, K. & T. Ry. of Texas v. Hannig, 91 Tex. 347, 43 S.W. 508 (1897), the defendant requested a charge to the jury that plaintiff could not recover if the method of performing the particular operation was open and patent to the common observer, and [if] the plaintiff could have known these facts by use of ordinary care... he assumed the risk incident to his employment, and cannot recover. . . It was held that the requested instruction was improper: the plaintiff, employee, was not required to use ordinary care to see whether the work was being properly done. He does not assume the risks ... unless he knows of the failure and the attendant risks, or, in the ordinary discharge of his duty, must necessarily have acquired the knowledge. 43 S.W. at 510. So the rule was established that in assumed risk (volenti) that the plaintiff must know or be charged with knowledge. Assumed risk was not raised by submitting should have known by the exercise of ordinary care. The volenti doctrine was brought to prominence in Texas in Levlon v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co., 117 S.W.2d 876, Tex. Civ.App.1938, writ refused. There the plaintiff's automobile stalled on the defendant's streetcar tracks. The plaintiff got out of his car with the ignition keys on. His wife, who could not drive, remained in the car. Plaintiff requested defendant's motorman to give his car a push. He did, its motor started, and it took off uncontrolled down the street and crashed into a brick wall. It was held that plaintiff was barred by the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria. The pushing was at plaintiff's request, and he consented thereto. While the opinion quotes from Corpus Juris about knowledge and appreciation of the danger, the Court actually held that the law charged plaintiff with such knowledge. The Levlon case just discussed was enlarged upon in Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, 150 Tex. 191, 238 S.W.2d 172 (1951). In the Wood case, this Court clearly said that for the volenti defense to control, it must be shown that the plaintiff actually knew and appreciated the danger and encountered the risk as the result of an intelligent choice. No such showing was made; and the facts were such that the Court said the law would not charge the plaintiff with knowledge: under those circumstances, it could not be said that Wood had either actual or implied knowledge of the specific defect, so we are unwilling to hold that he, of his own free will and as a result of an intelligent choice appreciated the danger . . .. 238 S.W.2d at 178. This concept of actual knowledge of facts and being charged in law with appreciation and realization of the danger is the basis for Schiller v. Rice, 151 Tex. 116, 246 S.W.2d 607 (1952). There the lady plaintiff sought damages for injuries received while a passenger in defendant's car. The jury found that she knew and realized that the defendant-driver was drunk, but that she did not act with knowledge of the danger; and her failure to leave the car, when she had the opportunity to do so, was not in reckless disregard of her own safety. While it was held that knowledge and appreciation of the danger is the basis for volenti, it was held that plaintiff was chargeable in law with appreciation of the danger; she knew facts which charged her with appreciation. Having knowledge that she was riding with a drunken driver, she could not be heard to say that she did not realize the danger of doing so. This actual knowledge and intelligent choice concept of volenti was followed in Dee v. Parish, 160 Tex. 171, 327 S.W.2d 449 (1959), and Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 344 S.W.2d 863 (1961). In Dee v. Parish we said, This [volenti] doctrine is based on knowledge and appreciation of the dangers and voluntary assent thereto. 327 S.W.2d at 452. And in Brown v. Lundell we said, The doctrine of `volenti non fit injuria' presupposes a knowledge of the facts so that the actor makes a choice [citing Schiller v. Rice]. In this case it cannot be said that the lessor assumed a known and appreciated risk. [citing Triangle Motors of Dallas v. Richmond]. 344 S.W.2d at 870. On the basis of Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, and cases following it, therefore, for volenti to be applicable, there must be actual knowledge and appreciation; or the danger must be so open and obvious that the plaintiff is charged in law with knowledge and appreciation thereof. So the plaintiff must know (an issue of fact, usually) or be charged in law with knowledge and appreciation. That being so, the should have known of the danger, and should have appreciated the extent of the danger, if any, in opening the valves, as issues of fact, in this Halepeska case were properly disregarded by the trial court, in so far as the defense of volenti is concerned. It is said that there is dictum in McKee v. Patterson that should have known and should have appreciated are defenses in a volenti case. The words do appear in the opinion, though based upon his own testimony, the plaintiff actually knew and fully appreciated the danger. But a careful reading of McKee will reveal that the opinion nowhere says should have known in the exercise of ordinary care. The intent and purpose of the opinion was to say that while a person may not actually know of a danger, he may not close his eyes to obvious dangers. That he should know is a defense in law if he has knowledge of facts which would charge him in law with knowledge and appreciation. As so read, McKee is harmonious with this opinion.