Opinion ID: 2315538
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was there sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the issue of defendants' negligence?

Text: Defendants argue that even if Mrs. Maher is not to be held contributorily negligent as a matter of law yet the judgment below must be affirmed, since the evidence was insufficient to establish negligence. Its alleged insufficiency is especially urged as to Dr. Voss. We do not reach this question in the breadth in which it is presented, because it was not raised below. At the conclusion of plaintiffs' case defendants' counsel moved for a directed verdict in favor of the defendants. Apparently referring to a memorandum which he was about to hand to the court he stated the principal reasons in support of this motion as follows: First, Your Honor will be cognizant of the fact that there is no claim, no claim has been advanced that there was any defect in the premises of any kind. Secondly, the only possible grounds upon which negligence could be claimed or could be sustained was on the theory of a trap. The authorities here are all to the effect that a situation, that an ordinary cellar door which I submit to Your Honor it is not at all unusual for people to hang clothes inside a cellar door. The third or the last and principal reasons  there are some others here  is that the plaintiff, Anne Maher, was obviously guilty of contributory negligence. The second reason is the only one which might be said to raise any question of the insufficiency of plaintiffs' evidence. It is clear, however, that it could raise nothing more than the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' evidence to establish a trap or dangerous condition upon the defendants' premises  only one of the elements of the negligence charged. As to this, the motion was not phrased with technical precision, but that is not required. 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Fed. Prac. & Proc., § 1073. That one narrow issue, i. e., whether there was evidence tending to show a dangerous condition, was sufficiently raised by defendants and we accordingly review the record for the purpose of determining it. To that end we state first the general principles of law applicable to the case. The first question to be resolved is the status of Mrs. Maher upon the defendants' premises, since the law makes a distinction, in respect of the measure of liability of an occupant of land, between business visitors and gratuitous licensees. Restatement, Torts, Ch. 13, §§ 331-332. On the motion to dismiss the complaints the court below held that Mrs. Maher was simply a social guest, and as such, a gratuitous licensee. 84 A.2d 527, 528. We approve this finding. Indeed it is not seriously challenged by plaintiffs. The next question to consider is the extent of liability of the possessor of premises to a social guest. By the great weight of authority a gratuitous licensee must take the premises as he finds them, and the owner or occupant of land owes him no duty except (a) not to injure him willfully or wantonly and (b) not knowingly to expose him to traps or hidden dangers. 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 104. Cf. Reardon v. Exchange Furniture Stores, 7 W.W.Harr. 332, 37 Del. 332, 188 A. 704. If there is negligence in the instant case it must fall within the latter exception. The applicable principles are set forth in the Restatement, Torts, Ch. 13, § 342, as follows: A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to gratuitous licensees by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he (a) knows of the condition and realizes that it involves an unreasonable risk to them and has reason to believe that they will not discover the condition or realize the risk, and (b) invites or permits them to enter or remain upon the land, without exercising reasonable care (i) to make the condition reasonably safe, or (ii) to warn them of the condition and the risk involved therein. Comment f. of the Restatement says:    In determining whether the possessor should realize that a known condition involves not only a risk but an unreasonable risk, the character of the invitation or permission is important. A condition, no matter how dangerous to those who come in contact with it, can involve risk to a particular licensee only if he may be expected to encounter it in the exercise of his license.    So too, a possessor has no reason to expect the licensee's presence at any point other than that within which the licensee gives him the privilege to enter. He is, therefore, under no duty to warn licensees of conditions which exist outside of the area covered by the license. Applying these principles, we inquire: Was there evidence of a dangerous condition upon the premises of Dr. and Mrs. Voss? We think that in the circumstances of this case a jury question was presented on the issue of a dangerous condition. The hanging of wraps immediately above a short platform leading to an unlighted cellar stairway presents some evidence of a condition involving serious risk to any visitor who, without knowledge of the condition, may be expected to go to such a place to retrieve his hat or coat. We think the jury might have found from the evidence adduced that a dangerous condition existed, hazardous to a guest who was invited to go to the place, apparently a coat closet, for the purpose of retrieving his wraps. It follows that the second reason in support of defendants' motion for a directed verdict was not well taken. But as above indicated this finding does not dispose of the case, since there remains the question whether there was evidence from which could be found a duty on the part of the defendants, or of either of them, to warn the guests of the condition. This question was not raised by the motion. The failure to do so is of importance. Rule 50(a) of the Rules of the Superior Court, like the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., from which it is derived, provides: A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor. The purpose of the rule is stated in 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Fed.Prac. & Proc., § 1073, as follows: Before Rule 50 was adopted, the federal decisions were in conflict as to the necessity for stating specific grounds in a motion for a directed verdict. Subdivision (a) of this rule settles that conflict. The motion for a directed verdict must now state the `specific grounds therefor'. The requirement is important. If the rule were otherwise a judgment notwithstanding the verdict might be entered under Rule 50(b) on motion after the close of the trial, on a ground which could have met with proof if it had been suggested on the motion. (Emphasis supplied.) The pertinency of the italicized language to this case will appear from the following considerations: There can be no liability of the possessor of the premises to a social guest if the danger is not on the portion of the premises to which he has been invited. The alleged duty to warn must therefore depend upon the existence of an invitation. In this case it must depend on an invitation implied from circumstances, since no express invitation was extended. Whether or not a guest expressly invited to a part of the premises may be said to have been implied invited to another part must depend on the circumstances of the case. The rules of social conduct are to some extent uncertain and varying. Moreover, there are different degrees of acquaintanceship or friendship, so that what might be normal and proper conduct for a guest in one case might seem unusual and unwarranted in another case. Whether or not the possessor of the premises has extended to any guest an implied invitation to visit another part of the house would seem to turn upon the question whether or not the circumstances, and the relation between the parties, would justify the guest in assuming that such an implied invitation was extended. If so, it is reasonable to say that the possessor of the premises should have foreseen the likelihood of such a visit. In the light of these principles the failure of defendants to raise the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to establish a duty to warn was an omission of real consequence. If the question now presented to us had been properly raised below, the trial judge would have been required to review the sufficiency of the evidence to establish negligence. But it was not raised as Rule 50 requires, so that we do not have to resolve it. Nor would it be useful to discuss the problem in the present state of the record. Since we have found error in the ruling on contributory negligence, the judgment below must be reversed. The cause is remanded to the Superior Court of New Castle County, with instructions to vacate the judgment and to grant a new trial.