Opinion ID: 2974181
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Alleged Hearsay Statement

Text: As mentioned briefly earlier, the third count of the indictment, which charged defendant with money laundering, was premised upon his purchase of a 2000 Chevrolet Tahoe from Auto Trend, Inc., of Nashville with proceeds derived from drug trafficking. Mohsen Ghiassi, who testified for the government, sold the vehicle in question to defendant. Naji Saleem worked at a nearby dealer named U.S. Auto and testified that he knew both Ghiassi and defendant. - 12 - No. 05-5257 United States v. Gomez Saleem began by explaining that he worked in a neighboring car lot and came to know defendant when he purchased a car from him for $7,500 in cash. He went on to state that defendant bought several cars from Ghiassi. In the course of his testimony, the following exchange occurred: AUSA: During the course of these purchases [by defendant from Ghiassi], did Mr. Ghiassi ever tell you anything about how he’s feeling about the defendant? Defense Counsel: Your Honor, object to what Mr. Ghiassi said. AUSA: Prior consistent statement. [Ghiassi’s] credibility has been attacked. Court: Overruled. Saleem: Toward the last vehicle, toward the end of it, the last vehicle that he was purchasing . . . Mr. Ghiassi wasn’t feeling comfortable, and he mentioned to me that he doesn’t want to buy any of those vehicles anymore. .... At the beginning, he told me that he wasn’t feeling comfortable. Then later on he told me that [defendant] mentioned to something to him about, you know, having to purchase the car for him or something bad might happen to the business or . . . to him, or something like that. Defendant contends that Saleem’s testimony was offered for the truth of the matter asserted and therefore constitutes improper hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). However, Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) provides in part that a statement is not hearsay if “[t]he declarant testifies at the trial . . . and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive . . . .” Like the majority of the circuits, we permit the introduction of prior consistent statements by a third party so long as the - 13 - No. 05-5257 United States v. Gomez other requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) are satisfied. See United States v. Hebeka, 25 F.3d 287, 292 (6th Cir. 1994). In this case, Ghiassi testified and was subject to cross-examination. Among other things, he acknowledged that he had not been entirely truthful when speaking to government officials in his initial interview and had agreed to plead guilty to failure to file reports of cash received in trade. He attributed his deception to concern for his family: “I [was] scared if I say something they are going to hurt my family.” He went on to mention that defendant threatened another man’s family in his presence and that these threats, though not directed at him, scared him. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Ghiassi if he would avoid jail time by pleading guilty and whether he lied to the FBI. Counsel also asked, “Are you saying . . . that between the first interview and the second interview you somehow began to change the truth because you were somehow scared for your family. Is that correct?” In our view, the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) have been satisfied. First, both Ghiassi and Saleem were subject to cross-examination. Second, defense counsel implied that Ghiassi’s testimony was recently fabricated to avoid prison. Third, Saleem’s statement about being “scared” was consistent with Ghiassi’s testimony. And, fourth, the statement Saleem attributed to Ghiassi was made before his contact with the FBI, which defense counsel implied provided the motivation to lie. F. Disputed Testimony Regarding the Taped Conversations Defendant also takes issue with the fact that the district court permitted the government to play portions of the taped conversations between Richardson and himself a second time. As already - 14 - No. 05-5257 United States v. Gomez mentioned, the tapes were originally introduced and played during the testimony of Officer Burchwell, who prefaced their playing by summarizing their content. Later, Thomas Richardson was called to testify as the government’s final witness. Noticing that audio equipment had been brought into the courtroom, defense counsel objected to any replaying of the tapes. When asked, the AUSA explained that he wanted to play portions of the tapes so that Richardson “could talk about what he is talking about there.” Richardson proceeded to testify and, after discussing other matters, he was given transcripts of the recorded calls and asked about them. Portions of the recordings were then played and Richardson was asked to identify the voices and explain the gist of certain conversations. In United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1990), we provided the following guidance concerning testimony about audiotapes: First, the conversation on the tape was between the defendant and a testifying witness and was introduced while the witness was on direct examination. Under such circumstances the witness, if the prosecutor asks, is free to first describe the conversation in his own words and indicate what was said and what occurred. The tape may then be played as corroboration. If the tape is played first, however, it does not mean that a party to that conversation is thereby prohibited from testifying relative to the event. Id. at 397 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). We begin by noting that Richardson’s testimony helped to explain specific portions of the conversations that contained terms of art with respect to drug-trafficking. For instance, Richardson testified that the words “birds” and “bricks” referred to kilograms of cocaine; that his “uncle” was, in fact, the trucker transporting the drugs; and that defendant’s comment, “the best way not to catch a case is to pop him inside,” meant that Franco should be killed while incarcerated. Furthermore, - 15 - No. 05-5257 United States v. Gomez because it was different in scope and focus than Officer Burchwell’s testimony, which merely gave a general sense of the setting in which the tapes were recorded, their use during Richardson’s appearance was not merely cumulative. The district court expressed its awareness of the potential danger of cumulative evidence and instructed the government to play only selected portions of the tapes, which it did. Accordingly, the danger of unfair prejudice was minimized. We affirm the district court on this point for those reasons. G. Sufficiency of the Evidence Defendant contends that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support his conviction on Count II of the indictment, which charged him with violating 18 U.S.C. § 373. Specifically, the second superseding indictment reads as follows: On or about June 18, 2003, in the Middle District of Tennessee, the defendant, ROEL GOMEZ, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another in violation of the laws of the United States, and under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent, did solicit, command, induce, and endeavor to persuade another person to engage in such conduct, that is to unlawfully kill and murder . . . Santiago Franco, a human being, with malice aforethought, with intent to prevent the communication by such person to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a federal offense, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1512(a)(1)(C). In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 373 and 2. The statute of conviction makes it a crime to recruit another person to “engage in conduct constituting a felony that has as an element the . . . threatened use of physical force . . . against the person of another in violation of the laws of the United States, and under circumstances strongly - 16 - No. 05-5257 United States v. Gomez corroborative of that intent, solicits . . . or otherwise endeavors to persuade such another person to engage in such conduct . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 373(a). For its part, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) makes it a crime to “attempt to kill another person, with intent to . . . prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense . . . .” This court “reviews a sufficiency of the evidence claim de novo, considering ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Ostrander, 411 F.3d 684, 690-91 (6th Cir.), petition for cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 469 (2005) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Defendant takes the position that the government failed to produce evidence that he believed Franco might communicate with federal authorities or that he knew of an ongoing federal investigation when he solicited Richardson to murder Franco. The government counters that the conversation taped on June 18, 2003 includes defendant telling Richardson, “Five Gs, I offer whoever takes his life.” Defendant repeated this wish several times, telling Richardson “for us not to catch a case is to pop him inside. . . . Just offer those 5 Gs whoever’s inside.” With respect to the requirement of § 1512(a)(1)(C) that the killing be with the intent to “prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer . . . of the United States of information relating to the commission . . . of a Federal offense,” in one of their recorded conversations defendant told Richardson that he knew of a list maintained by the federal Drug Enforcement Agency that - 17 - No. 05-5257 United States v. Gomez contained Franco’s name. In short, defendant knew that a federal drug investigation was afoot that involved the very man he sought to kill. A defendant raising a sufficiency of the evidence challenge “bears a heavy burden, as we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” United States v. Jefferson, 149 F.3d 444, 445 (6th Cir. 1998) (rejecting such a challenge in a § 1512(a)(1)(C) prosecution). Defendant’s comments to Richardson about eliminating Franco were repeated on more than one occasion and defendant admitted that he had discussed the subject with his mother, who agreed that Franco must be killed. He also went so far as to spell out Franco’s name for Richardson to avoid mistakes. The jury apparently took these statements at face value and, given that the charge was soliciting a murder, this finding, coupled with defendant’s knowledge that a DEA investigation was afoot, is constitutionally sufficient to support his conviction. H. Lesser Included Offense Defendant mounts a second challenge to his § 373 conviction, arguing that the district court should have instructed the jury to consider whether he violated 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) rather than 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) as the underlying predicate felony offense.2 “A criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included-offense if: (1) a proper request is made; (2) the elements of the lesser offense are identical to part of the elements of the greater offense; (3) the evidence would support a conviction on the lesser offense; and (4) the proof on the element or elements differentiating the two crimes is sufficiently disputed so that a jury could consistently 2 The § 373 count appears in full in the previous section of this opinion. - 18 - No. 05-5257 United States v. Gomez acquit on the greater offense and convict on the lesser.” United States v. Colon, 268 F.3d 367, 373 (6th Cir. 2001). Here, the two statutory provisions read in part as follows: Whoever kills or attempts to kill another person with intent to . . . prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer . . . of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) (emphasis added). Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct towards another person, with intent to . . . hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer . . . of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense . . . 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) (emphasis added). Because the offense of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 373, requires “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against . . . the person of another,” § 1512(b)(3) can only serve as a predicate offense if we conclude that using intimidation, threats, or corrupt persuasion falls within that definition. We conclude that it does not because § 1512(b)(3) does not require the use of physical force. It is not surprising, therefore, that defense counsel failed to produce a single case in support of his proposed lesser included offense instruction, nor has our own independent research revealed any instance in which § 1512(b)(3) was charged as the predicate in a § 373 count. Under the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury with respect to § 1512(b)(3).