Opinion ID: 2621432
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Admission of DNA Evidence Acquired By Rape Case Blood Draws

Text: ś 94 The trial court entered orders on two different occasions in the R.S. rape case permitting collection of the defendant's blood. The State first made a motion for a blood draw at the defendant's arraignment. The motion incorporated by reference the declaration for determination of probable cause. At the defense's request, the motion was set over. In September 1998, the trial court entered an order authorizing the first blood draw. The order was signed by the defendant's attorney, and the words [a]pproved as to [f]orm appear just above the attorney's signature. RCP 6-7. Gregory's blood was drawn in September 1998 pursuant to that order. ś 95 Counsel later withdrew as the result of a conflict. A new attorney was appointed to defend Gregory in the rape case, and he moved to suppress the results of the September 1998 blood draw, arguing that (1) the order had not been authorized by the defendant and (2) the order was not supported by probable cause. In response, the State moved for a second blood draw. The State presented an affidavit using only the information known to the State at the time of the first blood draw. The court found that probable cause supported the second blood draw and granted that motion. Gregory's blood was drawn pursuant to the second order in January 2000. [32] ś 96 In the murder case, Gregory brought a motion to suppress information gained from the two blood draws taken in the rape case, making the same arguments. MRP 699. The court determined that collateral estoppel compelled the conclusion that the September 1998 blood draw was the result of a proper agreed order and that the January 2000 order was supported by probable cause. MRP at 700. The court refused to suppress evidence resulting from the blood draws in the rape case. [33] ś 97 In this court, the defendant argues that the September 1998 blood draw was improper because he did not consent and the record is insufficient to conclude that he waived a substantive right. He also argues that the information presented to the trial court in the rape case did not establish probable cause and that it is irrelevant whether other information available to the State at that time would have established probable cause. Gregory contends that the January 2000 blood draw should have been suppressed because it was the fruit of the first unlawful blood draw and it was not supported by probable cause. Finally, Gregory asserts that evidence obtained from both blood draws should have been suppressed in the murder case because he maintained an expectation of privacy in his DNA profile under both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution such that a DNA profile obtained in the rape case could not be used in the murder prosecution. ś 98 Validity of the Blood Draw: Criminal Rule (CrR) 4.7(b)(2)(vi) allows the court, on a motion from the prosecuting attorney, to order the taking of a blood sample from the defendant. CrR 4.7(b)(2) is subject to constitutional limitations. Generally, a trial court's decisions regarding discovery under CrR 4.7 will not be disturbed absent manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Yates, 111 Wash.2d 793, 797, 765 P.2d 291 (1988). Yet while the determination of historical facts relevant to the establishment of probable cause is subject to the abuse of discretion standard, the legal determination of whether qualifying information as a whole amounts to probable cause is subject to de novo review. In re Det. of Petersen, 145 Wash.2d 789, 799-801, 42 P.3d 952 (2002). ś 99 In order to comply with the Fourth Amendment, an order for a blood draw pursuant to CrR 4.7(b)(2)(vi) must be supported by probable cause. See United States v. Wright, 215 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 969, 121 S.Ct. 406, 148 L.Ed.2d 313 (2000). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that three requirements must be met to establish the reasonableness of a blood draw. State v. Judge, 100 Wash.2d 706, 711-12, 675 P.2d 219 (1984) (discussing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966)). First, there must be a `clear indication' that in fact the desired evidence will be found. Id. at 711-12, 675 P.2d 219 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71, 86 S.Ct. 1826). The chosen test must also be reasonable and it must be performed in a reasonable manner. Id. at 712. In this case, Gregory does not challenge the reasonableness of the blood test or the manner in which the blood draws were performed. ś 100 The January 2000 Blood Draw: The prosecutor explained that after the September 1998 blood draw was challenged, the January 2000 blood draw was requested to eliminate any potential problems with the September 1998 blood draw. [34] The court granted the State's motion for the January 2000 draw before ruling on the admissibility of the September 1998 draw. ś 101 Gregory first argues that the January 2000 blood draw is fruit of the arguably unlawful September 1998 blood draw. Gregory was first definitively connected to the G.H. murder through the comparison of his September 1998 blood sample against the semen left at the G.H. murder scene. Gregory argues that the sole reason for conducting the January 2000 blood draw was to establish an independent, untainted connection between Gregory and the G.H. crime scene. He claims that if the September 1998 draw was unlawful, then the January 2000 blood draw is the fruit[] of the poisonous tree. Appellant's Opening Br. at 114. ś 102 Gregory's assertion that the sole reason for conducting the January 2000 blood draw was to connect him to the G.H. murder is simply incorrect. Assuming for the sake of argument that the September 1998 blood draw was unlawful, Gregory's argument ignores the fact that the motion to compel the January 2000 blood draw occurred in the context of the rape case. The evidence presented to support the January 2000 blood draw consisted only of evidence and arguments relevant to the rape case that were available to the State in September 1998. ś 103 There were valid reasons, arising only from the rape case, for drawing Gregory's blood in 2000. It was the State's burden to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520-21, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). Initially, Gregory denied having had sexual intercourse with R.S., asserting an alibi defense, but then switched to a consent defense before trial. Given Gregory's inconsistent story, it made sense that the State would feel it necessary to establish that the swabs taken from R.S. contained Gregory's DNA. The trial judge also suggested there was a difference between the question of whether there was probable cause to draw Gregory's blood and whether the resulting evidence should be suppressed. Gregory could later move for suppression of the DNA results in the rape case based on relevance if he indeed decided to present the defense of consent. ś 104 Gregory also argues that the January 2000 blood draw was an unreasonable search and seizure because it became unnecessary when the trial court eventually held that the September 1998 blood draw was valid. Gregory's arguments on this point are circular. On the one hand he argues that the 1998 blood draw was invalid. On the other he argues that because the 1998 blood draw was valid, the 2000 blood draw was unnecessary. Under the circumstances, the trial court acted reasonably in allowing the 2000 blood draw. ś 105 De novo review of the evidence available to the trial court in September 1998 shows that there was sufficient evidence to support probable cause to draw Gregory's blood in January 2000. The facts presented in the declaration in support of probable cause are unchallenged. The declaration established R.S.'s account of the events of August 21, 1998, including her allegations that she was raped by a man matching Gregory's description and who drove a car registered to Gregory. R.S. reported that the condom used by the rapist had broken and he had ejaculated several times. Police transported R.S. to the hospital where swabs were collected, some of which contained semen. Finally, Gregory told police he was at a friend's home at the time of the rape, but Gregory's friends could not confirm his whereabouts all evening. This information established probable cause to draw Gregory's blood in order to determine whether he deposited the semen collected during R.S.'s hospital visit. We conclude that the January 2000 blood draw was supported by probable cause and was valid. ś 106 September 1998 Blood Draw: Gregory's DNA remained constant between the September 1998 and January 2000 blood draws and any tests performed on one blood sample could have been performed on both samples. Russell, 125 Wash.2d at 38, 882 P.2d 747 ([A] given person's DNA . . . remains the same throughout life.). We have found that the January 2000 blood draw was valid, and all of Gregory's DNA profile results could have been obtained from that untainted source. See State v. Warner, 125 Wash.2d 876, 889, 889 P.2d 479 (1995) (Absolute inevitability of discovery is not required but simply a reasonable probability that evidence in question would have been discovered other than from the tainted source.); see also Wilson v. State, 132 Md. App. 510, 752 A.2d 1250, 1269 (2000) (explaining that the defendant's DNA signature is the common denominator, regardless of which blood sample is used to read that signature). Thus, all DNA results would have been inevitably discovered and no evaluation of the September 1998 blood draw is necessary. ś 107 September 1998 Blood Draw: Comparison of DNA with Evidence from an Unrelated Crime: Gregory contends that even if his blood was validly collected, it violates either the Fourth Amendment or article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution to use DNA evidence in the State's possession in the rape case, to prove that Gregory committed an entirely separate crime. Essentially, Gregory argues that he has an expectation of privacy in the information contained in his blood, namely his DNA profile, and a separate probable cause determination was required to support its comparison with the semen collected from the G.H. crime scene. Because there was no such independent probable cause determination, he contends that the DNA evidence should have been suppressed in the murder trial. ś 108 Fourth Amendment: The Fourth Amendment guarantees [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The application of the Fourth Amendment depends upon whether the person invoking its protection can claim a legitimate, objectively justifiable expectation of privacy that has been invaded by the State. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979). Gregory asserts that he has an ongoing privacy interest in the characteristics of his DNA such that the State must obtain a warrant to compare his DNA profile with material collected in connection with an unrelated crime. ś 109 While this court has not directly addressed this question, we recently held that once a suspect's property is lawfully in the State's control, the State may perform forensic tests and use the resulting information to further unrelated criminal investigations, without violating the owner's Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Cheatam, 150 Wash.2d 626, 638, 81 P.3d 830 (2003). In Cheatam, the defendant asserted that police violated the federal and state constitutions when, acting without a warrant, they retrieved Cheatam's tennis shoes from a jail property bag several days after Cheatam had been arrested on an unrelated charge. Id. at 633-34, 81 P.3d 830. We recognized that most courts have determined that once an inmate's property is taken from him or her and inventoried and placed in a property room, the inmate's expectation of privacy is substantially or entirely reduced to the point that no constitutionally protectable interest remains. Thus, a second look at an inmate's inventoried property in connection with investigation of a crime unrelated to the one for which the defendant is arrested does not violate the constitution. Id. at 636, 81 P.3d 830 (listing cases). Accordingly, we held that once an inmate's personal effects have been exposed to police view in a lawful inventory search and stored in the continuous custody of the police, the inmate no longer has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the items free of further governmental intrusion. Id. at 638, 81 P.3d 830. ś 110 While unique requirements must be met to support a blood draw, Gregory has failed to adequately explain why, after the blood draw is complete, a DNA profile that is lawfully in the State's possession should be treated differently from other items of a defendant's property with regard to subsequent criminal investigations. [35] Gregory's blood was drawn for the very purpose of conducting DNA analyses and the resulting DNA profile was lawfully in the possession of police, regardless of which evidence that DNA profile was being compared against, swabs from R.S.'s rape kit or samples from the G.H. crime scene. Gregory does not point to any court that has concluded that DNA evidence, lawfully in the possession of the State for the purposes of one criminal investigation, cannot be compared with evidence collected for the purposes of an unrelated criminal investigation. We conclude that once the suspect's DNA profile is lawfully in the State's possession, the State need not obtain an independent warrant to compare that profile with new crime scene evidence. [36] ś 111 Article I, Section 7: Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides that [n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs . . . without authority of law. `If no search occurs, then article I, section 7 is not implicated.' Cheatam, 150 Wash.2d at 642, 81 P.3d 830 (quoting State v. Young, 123 Wash.2d 173, 181, 867 P.2d 593 (1994)). Whether a search has occurred depends upon `whether the State has unreasonably intruded into a person's private affairs.' Id. (quoting State v. Boland, 115 Wash.2d 571, 577, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990)). The inquiry is broader under the state constitution than under the Fourth Amendment. Id. ś 112 The Cheatam court held that once police have lawful possession of a piece of a suspect's property, the inmate has lost any privacy interest in those items that have already lawfully been exposed to police view. He or she is no longer entitled to hold a privacy interest in the already searched items free from further governmental searches Id. The Cheatam court explained that one's privacy interest does not change depending on which crime is under investigation once lawful exposure has already occurred. Id. Because Cheatam's shoes were lawfully searched when booking occurred, Cheatam had no ongoing privacy interest in them, even under the Washington Constitution. See id. at 642-43, 81 P.3d 830. ś 113 We follow the reasoning of Cheatam and conclude that article I, section 7 is not implicated here because no additional search occurs when a defendant's DNA profile already in the State's possession is compared against evidence taken from a new crime scene. Gregory's DNA profile had already been lawfully exposed to the police; thus, its comparison against evidence from a new crime scene did not constitute a search under article I, section 7. [37] Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution does not require a different result than our Fourth Amendment analysis in this case.