Opinion ID: 1145252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: factual considerations

Text: In this case, the defendant argues that an unequal procedure was used in the district attorney's charging method which prohibited him from being treated upon the same terms as similarly situated defendants. By so claiming, he hopes to leap the factual moat that Clark and Edmonson were unable to bridge. Clark and Edmonson focused their challenge on the coexistence of alternative charging methods seeking support for their argument from Hawkins. This court rejected that argument. The two methods are capable of valid administration, if the `terms' on which one or the other method is used are defensible under the constitutional guarantees of equal treatment. State v. Edmonson, 291 Or. at 253, 630 P.2d 822. In dicta, the Clark majority suggested that it would be possible to achieve substantially greater equality by the development of uniform policies. Id. 291 Or. at 239-40, 630 P.2d 810. Defendant herein claims the district attorney's selection of the charging method is the result of haphazard or standardless administration. This, defendant argues, demonstrates the state's policies are not being applied neutrally to similarly situated individuals. [10] What the defendant is really criticizing, I believe, is the fact that the prosecutor in this case effectively mooted [11] the preliminary hearing by seeking a grand jury indictment. This practice is certainly not unique to Oregon, see Buchanan v. State, 561 P.2d 1197 (Alaska 1977) (if the prosecutor desires to avoid a preliminary hearing, he could refuse to introduce evidence at the hearing, resulting in a dismissal of the complaint, and then obtain an indictment shortly thereafter). Professors Kamisar, LaFave and Israel have discussed this practice and find no grounds for condemnation: [12]    In most information states, where the prosecutor uses the indictment process, his basic objective is not to avoid the preliminary hearing, but to utilize some other feature of that process. The mooting of the preliminary hearing is simply an incidental by-product of an unrelated objective that required a pre-arrest indictment. But prosecutors in other information jurisdictions have been known to use the indictment alternative in certain cases mainly because they wanted to avoid the preliminary hearing. Grounds typically advanced for avoiding the hearing in those cases, notwithstanding the prosecutor's usual preference for prosecution by information, include: (1) the desire to save time where the preliminary hearing would be protracted due to the number of exhibits or witnesses or the number of separate hearings that would have to be held for separate defendants (the grand jury could save time in such situations due to the absence of cross-examination, less stringent application of evidentiary rules, and its capacity to consider a series of related cases in a single presentation); (2) the desire to preclude the defense discovery inherent in a preliminary hearing, particularly where a key witness is an informer whose identity should be shielded until trial; and (3) the desire to limit the number of times that a particular complainant (e.g., a victim of a sex offense) will be required to give testimony in public.    I do not reject the defendant's contention that preliminary hearings are, or may be, advantageous to an accused. There can be little argument that the defendant has an opportunity, albeit remote, to gain a dismissal of unsubstantiated charges at the preliminary hearing. The defendant also may acquire information about the state's case and the identity of the witnesses. However, these advantages, if any there be, are entirely incidental to the purpose of the preliminary hearing, namely and exclusively the determination of probable cause. Accord, State v. Jefferson, 79 Wash.2d 345, 349, 485 P.2d 77 (1971). The defendant's main contention is that the prosecutor's decision to proceed by indictment violated equal protection principles because he was denied individually (as opposed to a member of a protected class), the equal privilege of a preliminary hearing that other similarly situated defendants enjoyed. The guarantee of equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1070, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense    it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942). In the present case, the record is devoid of evidence to indicate that the prosecutor selected the defendant for indictment on the basis of some discriminatory motive such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification. The record indicates a proper exercise of discretion. See, Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962) (the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation).