Opinion ID: 882832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: restraint of trade claim

Text: The Plaintiffs allege that Video Lottery has violated § 30-14-205(2)(c), MCA, which provides: It is unlawful for a person or group of persons, directly or indirectly: ... (2) for the purpose of creating or carrying out any restriction in trade, to: ... (c) prevent competition in the distribution or sale of merchandise or commodities. Although this section is modeled after § 1 of the Sherman Act, it differs in one critical respect. The Sherman Act requires two or more persons to be involved in the unlawful trade restraint; in effect, a conspiracy must exist. 15 U.S.C. § 1; Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. (1984), 467 U.S. 752, 767-68, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 2739-40, 81 L.Ed.2d 628, 641. However, the Montana counterpart states that a person may violate this section. Thus, the Montana statute on restraint of trade facially appears to be broader than the Sherman Act, as one person acting alone may violate the Montana statute. We note that there is minimal Montana law interpreting the Unfair Trade Practices Act, and no cases interpreting § 30-14-205(2)(c), MCA. We also recognize that cutting litigation short at the initial pleading stage is not favored. Willson, 634 P.2d at 1183. This is especially true when the cause of action is based upon a statute that has not been previously interpreted and where no underlying factual record has been developed. Therefore, because Montana's restraint of trade statute differs in some respects from the Sherman Act, and because we have not heretofore interpreted § 30-14-205(2)(c), MCA, on appeal and in the context of a factual record developed on the basis of the granting of a motion for summary judgment or on the basis of a trial, we hold that dismissing the complaint on Count One was premature and thus error. While not ruling on the merits of their claim, we cannot say that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proven in support of their claim. We believe that the Plaintiffs' allegations should be more fully developed through discovery. See Willson, 634 P.2d at 1183. If the Plaintiffs cannot develop a sustainable action through discovery, their claim under § 30-14-205(2)(c), MCA, may be properly disposed of through summary judgment. As to the Plaintiffs' request for an injunction under § 30-14-222, MCA, we hold that, if the Plaintiffs are able to develop and maintain an action under § 30-14-205(2)(c), MCA, they may then be entitled to injunctive relief. However, if the Plaintiffs cannot factually develop and maintain an action under this section, then an injunction will not properly issue. Accordingly, we reverse the District Court's dismissal of Counts One and Four, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.