Opinion ID: 2071276
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Driving, Operating, Actual Physical Control

Text: 21 Del. C. § 4177(a)(1) provides that No person shall drive a vehicle: When the person is under the influence of alcohol. 21 Del. C. § 4177(c)(3) defines the term drive as including ... driving, operating, or having actual physical control of a vehicle. The three terms (drive, operate, and actual physical control) are not synonymous, but define different physical actions. [4] This Court has described the distinction between drive and operate, as follows: The words operating and driving are not synonymous; they have well-recognized statutory distinctions. Of the two terms, the latter is generally accorded a more limited meaning. The term driving is generally used to mean ... steering and controlling a vehicle while in motion; the term operating ... is generally given a broader meaning to include starting the engine or manipulating the mechanical or electrical devices of a standing vehicle. [5] In Purcell, for the first time, this Court discussed the term actual physical control that had recently been added to then Section 4176. We noted that by adding this language, the General Assembly expanded the scope of the statute to include more than just driving. [6] We cited, with approval, the Superior Court's use of a jury instruction that defined actual physical control as meaning exclusive physical power and present ability to operate, move, park or direct whatever use or nonuse was to be made of the motor vehicle at the moment. [7] At trial, Bodner argued that she was not in actual physical control of the automobile because she had no present ability to move the vehicle from the railroad tracks. Bodner requested the Superior Court to give a jury instruction that defined actual physical control as it was described by this Court in Purcell. [8] The Superior Court denied Bodner's request to instruct the jury by using the entire definition of actual physical control that this Court had cited with approval in Purcell. Instead, the Superior Court offered to define actual physical control for the jury as the exclusive physical power and present ability to operate a motor vehicle. Bodner declined to have the jury instructed with the abbreviated definition of actual physical control proposed by the Superior Court. Bodner's objection was preserved on the record. Thereafter, the jury was instructed that to convict Bodner of driving under the influence, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that: First, that the defendant drove, operated, or had actual physical control of the motor vehicle at or about the time and place charged in the information. And, secondly, the defendant was under the influence of alcohol while she drove, operated, and/or had actual physical control of the motor vehicle.