Opinion ID: 506212
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attacks by prosecutor on integrity of defense counsel

Text: 55 Appellants Barrington, Drewes, and Goff contend that in closing argument, the prosecutor improperly engaged in personal attacks on their attorneys. They urge that these attacks went beyond merely rehabilitating government witnesses against challenges by defense counsel. They complain that by inviting the jury to disbelieve and distrust everything defense counsel told them the government seriously hampered their ability to provide a defense and exercise their right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Appellants cite the following statements by the prosecutor, among others, as examples of this kind of misconduct: 56 Every lawyer that has spoken to you from the defense side has taken things out of context. They have ... cut off what they want[ed] to cut off and told you what they wanted [you] to hear and in some cases flat out misstated what the evidence was. 57 I thought most of the questions [counsel for Goff] asked in some way were a trick question ... 58 I will suggest to you the--their job is to represent their clients. My job is to represent the United States. I'm not going to tell you what oaths I take and what obligations I have ... 59 Appellants timely objected to the prosecutor's personal attacks on counsel and moved for mistrial. The court overruled the objection and denied the motion for mistrial. 60 These attacks on defense counsel fall well short of those that required reversal in United States v. McDonald, 620 F.2d 559 (5th Cir.1980) (prosecutor implied that defendant's lawyer helped destroy evidence) or Bruno v. Rushen, 721 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied sub nom. McCarthy v. Bruno, 469 U.S. 920, 105 S.Ct. 302, 83 L.Ed.2d 236 (1984) (prosecutor suggested that defendant's hiring counsel proved his guilt and that all criminal defense counsel lie and distort facts). 17 They are roughly comparable to statements by the prosecutor in Livingston, 816 F.2d 184, to the effect that defendants' counsel had tried to 'disguise' the truth and create doubt where none existed. Id. at 195. Defense counsel in Livingston failed to object, and we declined to find plain error. Here, counsel did object, and the court overruled the objection. We defer considering whether these attacks on counsel were harmless until we have considered appellants' remaining points of error regarding possible prosecutorial misconduct. 61 (c) Prosecutor's bolstering case by emphasizing his official position and the asserted views of other branches of government involved 62 Appellants Barrington, Drewes, and Goff make three closely related claims with respect to another statement by the prosecutor in closing argument. He improperly invoked his official status as government prosecutor to bolster the government's case. He strongly implied that he knew that appellants' guilt was known to other branches of government outside the judicial process. And he invoked the authority of other branches of government as a basis for convicting appellants. The statement is as follows: 63 I will suggest to your the--their job is to represent their clients. My job is to represent the United States. I'm not going to tell you what oaths I take and what obligations I have; but I'll tell you one thing, if you believe what these lawyers have suggested to you and some of them have out and out said then you've got to believe that there is a conspiracy but the conspiracy started apparently in Las Vegas and involves the Internal Revenue Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the F.B.I., the Texas Department of Public Safety, the United States Attorneys Office, at least in this district and maybe even a judge or two and has [sic ] just not the case and they know it. 64 Appellants did not object to this statement at trial. 18 We have previously held that it is particularly improper, indeed, pernicious, for a prosecutor to seek to invoke his personal status as the government's attorney or the sanction of the government itself as a basis for convicting a criminal defendant. United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659, 663 (5th Cir.1979). We have also held that the prosecutor may not suggest that evidence which was not presented at trial provides additional grounds for finding a defendant guilty. Id. In Garza we found plain error and reversed. Here the prosecutor's recitation of government agencies and entities which, he clearly implies, knew appellants to be guilty is improper in the light of what we said in Hall v. United States, 419 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.1969). 65 In considering the impact of what is said the court also must be concerned with the great potential for jury persuasion which arises because the prosecutor's personal status and his role as a spokesman for the government tend to give what he says the ring of authenticity. The power and force of the government tend to impart an implicit stamp of believability to what the prosecutor says. That same power and force allow him, with a minimum of words, to impress on the jury that the government's vast investigatory network, apart from the orderly machinery of the trial, knows that the accused is guilty or has non-judicially reached conclusions on relevant facts which tend to show he is guilty. 66 Id. at 583-84. If such guidance were not enough, prosecutors should be fully in compliance with the often-repeated, staunch words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Berger v. United States, 29 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935): 67 The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.... 68 It is fair to say that the average jury ... has confidence that these obligations, which so plainly rest upon the prosecuting attorney, will be faithfully observed. Consequently, improper suggestions, insinuations, and, especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they should properly carry none. 69 Id. See also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1048, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). 70 The prosecutor further suggested that in order to find appellants not guilty, the jury would have to believe that several governmental agencies and even perhaps federal judges had engaged in a malevolent and illegal conspiracy to convict them. This also was improper argument. See United States v. Dorr, 636 F.2d 117, 119-21 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Herrera, 531 F.2d 788, 790 (5th Cir.1976). Confronted with such argument, jurors could be expected to feel that in order to find appellants innocent they would have to abandon confidence in the integrity of government. The role of the prosecutor in closing argument is to assist the jury in analyzing, evaluating, and applying the evidence. Garza, 608 F.2d at 662. It is not to invoke jurors' loyalty to their country or its government as a reason for convicting the accused. Herrera, 531 F.2d at 789-90. 71 (d) Expressions of opinion as to appellants' guilt 72 Finally, appellants contend that the district court erred by overruling their objection and denying their motion for mistrial based on the prosecutor's repeated impermissible comments on their guilt during closing argument. These comments included the following: 73 [Government agents] were able to make those two seizures of marijuana without the crooks figuring out how that happened. 74 [I]f you believe the kind of things that these lawyers have suggested that you should believe so that their guilty clients in the face of tremendous evidence can go free then the first thing you ought to do is to find them not guilty and the second thing you ought to do is go up and talk to the United States Attorney and maybe even go higher than that, [to the] head of [the] Drug Enforcement Administration, [and the] head of the Internal Revenue Service. 19 75 We have held that characterizing a defendant as a hoodlum was prejudicial error that the trial court on its own motion should have instructed the jury to disregard. Hall, 419 F.2d at 587. The prosecutor's characterization of appellants here as crooks is not distinguishably less prejudicial or improper. Further, the prosecutor should not have characterized appellants as their attorneys' guilty clients. This statement poses appellants' guilt as a pre-determined fact. The remark was, moreover, another effort to lead jury members to believe that the whole governmental establishment had already determined appellants to be guilty on evidence not before them. Garza, 608 F.2d at 665; Hall, 419 F.2d at 587. These remarks are the sort of foul blows that the Supreme Court and this Court have long held improper. Berger, 55 S.Ct. at 633; Hall, 419 F.2d at 588. 76 By themselves, the prosecutor's comments implying his personal belief in appellants' guilt constitute prejudicial error. In addition, on separate occasions the prosecutor attempted to bolster the credibility of a key government witness by assuring the jury that the witness was telling the truth. His insinuation that appellants should be found guilty because their attorneys were trying to deceive the jury was clearly an improper tactic. The prosecutor implied that extra-judicial governmental agencies and personnel had knowledge of appellants' guilt, and he invoked the dignity of his oaths and office as well as the sanctity of state and federal governmental agencies in order to persuade the jury that they should find appellants guilty. These statements were impermissible. 77 We do not reach the question whether these other instances of misconduct, taken separately or in the aggregate, also rise to the level of error. Their cumulative effect only adds to the prosecutor's misconduct. Garza, 608 F.2d at 665-66; Herrera, 531 F.2d at 790. 20 We do summarize, however, by stating that the record reveals overzealous and flamboyant argument by the prosecutor which clearly went beyond the prosecutorial propriety defined by the Supreme Court in Berger and by this Court in Hall, supra. 78 Reversal and remand for a new trial is the traditional remedy for prosecutorial conduct. It is not, however, automatic. The weight of the evidence in the particular case is also to be considered. United States v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041, 1049 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Weddell, 800 F.2d 1404, 1410-11 (5th Cir.1986). The crucial question on review is whether the prosecutor's remarks cast serious doubt upon the correctness of the jury's verdict. Where a reviewing court can find that the record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the interest in fairness has been satisfied and the judgment should be affirmed. Jones, at 1049. 79 The basic question, then, is whether the jury would have found appellants guilty had it not been for the prosecutor's improper argument. We consider the following factors in carrying out such a review: (1) the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the statements, (2) the efficacy of any cautionary instructions, and (3) the strength of the evidence of appellants' guilt. Jones, at 1050; United States v. Cardenas, 778 F.2d 1127, 1131 (5th Cir.1985); United States v. McPhee, 731 F.2d 1150, 1152 (5th Cir.1984). We have already concluded that the prosecutor's statements were prejudicial. We note that the court did not issue any special cautionary or curative instructions. It is doubtful that its general instructions were sufficient to counter the effect of at least some of the prejudicial statements. 21 We must therefore consider the strength of the evidence as to appellants' guilt. 22 A conviction should not be set aside if the prosecutor's conduct did not in fact contribute to the guilty verdict and was, therefore, legally harmless. Cardenas, 778 F.2d at 1130; United States v. Beckett, 706 F.2d 519, 520 (5th Cir.1983). Here, there are five appellants charged on multiple counts, so we confront, in effect, forty different verdicts with the role of prosecutorial misconduct in mind. 80 Before turning to the points of error, including the sufficiency of the evidence, raised by individual appellants, we consider one final set of contentions affecting them all.