Opinion ID: 565106
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: March 12, 1990 Decision

Text: 9 Idaho does not challenge the Commission's ability to employ notational voting, 2 but rather argues that the Commission erred in counting a departing Commissioner's notational vote. Specifically, Idaho contends that former Chairman Gradison's vote should not have been counted because she had been replaced on the Commission when the last necessary vote was cast--the time when, according to Idaho, the case was decided. Without Gradison's vote, the other Commissioners were evenly split on whether to reopen the Commission's earlier decision and whether to reverse that decision if revisited. This tie vote would have left the earlier decision intact, and UP would not be authorized to abandon the branch. 10 Idaho relies on the quorum requirement, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10306(a), to establish that the Commission may not count the vote of departing Commissioners. This reliance is misplaced. Section 10306(a) states that a majority of Commissioners is a quorum for the transaction of business. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10306(a). But this statute is silent as to what point in time, or over what period of time, the quorum requirement may be satisfied. Moreover, Idaho's argument that 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10322(h), which states that a final decision is effective on the date served on the parties, does not help us in our analysis of the issue before us today. Counting the vote of a departing Commissioner does not affect the time in which a decision is final. We find no statutory prohibition against the Commission's procedure of counting the vote of a departing Commissioner. 11 In the absence of Congress' explicit direction, the Commission is empowered to prescribe regulations and procedures to carry out the Interstate Commerce Act. See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10321(a). 3 We need only satisfy ourselves that the Commission set forth a rational basis for its notational vote counting policy. 4 The Commission in its April 13th decision reviewed its policy of counting the votes of departing Commissioners. The decision explains the reasons the Commission has adopted this policy and outlines the limitations on the policy. The decision states: As long as all Commissioners have voted on the same decision and a consensus is reached, our practice has been to count the vote of the departing Commissioner as a matter of administrative efficiency, practicality and fairness to the decisional process. United Pac. R.R. Co.--Abandonment in Fremont and Teton Counties, Idaho, 6 I.C.C.2d 641, 644 (1990). 12 In fact, the Commission has employed the procedure of counting departing Commissioners' votes consistently. See Antitrust and Competitive Factors in Motor Carrier Finance Cases, 127 M.C.C. 657 (Decided Jan. 11, 1980) (Former Chairman O'Neal shown as voting on a case bearing a January 11, 1980, decision date even though his term expired on December 31, 1979); Regulation Governing Minimum Amounts of Cargo Insurance, 132 M.C.C. 711 (Decided August 5, 1981) (Commissioner Trantum's term expired July 31, 1981); Lease & Interchange of Vehicles, 132 M.C.C. 822 (Decided June 22, 1982) (Commissioner Gresham's term expired on June 18, 1982); Annual Volume Rates on Coal--Wyoming To Flint Creek, Ark., 364 I.C.C. 753 (Decided February 2, 1981). This is not a case where an agency has altered its normal procedures to reach a desired result. The Commission has consistently applied the same policy. Moreover, it was within the sound discretion of the Commission to adopt that policy. We decline to substitute our judgment for that of the Commission.
13 Idaho further contends that the Commission abused its discretion in reopening its November decision, which denied UP's petition to abandon the branch. We disagree. It is well settled that the decision whether to reopen is committed to the Commission's discretion and that decision should not be overturned except in the most extraordinary circumstances, Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 296, 95 S.Ct. 438, 447, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974), upon a showing of the clearest abuse of discretion. United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327 U.S. 515, 535, 66 S.Ct. 687, 697, 90 L.Ed. 821 (1946). 14 Section 10327(g)(1) provides that [t]he Commission may, at any time on its own initiative because of material error, new evidence, or substantially changed circumstances (A) reopen a proceeding ... and (C) change an action of the Commission. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10327(g)(1). Both Idaho and the Commission agree that the Commission's actions rest on the material error clause. Idaho contends, however, that the Commission did not explicitly find and identify a material error in its November decision. Idaho argues that the only reason the Commission reviewed and set aside its November decision was that a new Commissioner disagreed with the vote of his predecessor. But the Commission's March decision did find a number of material errors and discussed each of these in some detail. 5 Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in reopening the case because of material error in the earlier decision.
15 Having found the procedures employed in this case to be adequate, we now turn to Idaho's attacks on the Commission's decision as arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, and contrary to the evidence. Our review of the Commission's decision on a petition to abandon is very narrow. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. I.C.C., 871 F.2d 838, 841 (9th Cir.1989) (citing Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 319-20, 101 S.Ct. 1124, 1131-32, 67 L.Ed.2d 258 (1981). 16 Idaho contends that the March 12th decision was arbitrary and capricious in two of its findings. First, Idaho argues that the carload projection of 292 was not based on substantial evidence. Although the Commission's determination of carload projection may not be the only one obtainable from the evidence, its determination should stand if supported by substantial evidence. Consolo v. F.M.C., 383 U.S. 607, 620-21, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026-27, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966). The Commission fully explained its reasoning in arriving at the 292 figure and explained how any other figure would be inconsistent with its finding of no deliberate downgrading. Substantial evidence supports the Commission's reasoning. This court will not undertake the task of determining the traffic level which will move over a line in the forecast year; this type of determination is best left to the Commission, which has expertise and broad authority in the abandonment area. See e.g., Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 319-23, 101 S.Ct. 1124, 1131-33, 67 L.Ed.2d 258 (1981). 17 Idaho's second claim of arbitrary and capricious actions by the Commission focuses on the weight the Commission chose to give to the testimony of the farmers potentially affected by the abandonment. The Commission did not totally ignore the impact on the farmers, as Idaho suggests, but found that the impact was outweighed by the burden on UP of keeping the branch open. Thus, the Commission complied with 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10903(a), which directs it to consider whether abandonment will have a serious adverse impact on rural and community development. Idaho argues that the Commission must afford the farmers' testimony the same weight it afforded that of the grain elevator operator. But the weight to be accorded various items of evidence as well as the inferences to be drawn therefrom are not for us to reweigh. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 385 U.S. 57, 69, 87 S.Ct. 255, 262, 17 L.Ed.2d 162 (1966). 18 The Commission's findings concerning the adverse effect on the community are supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the Commission's abandonment decision.