Opinion ID: 1253182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 26 Did the District Court err when it denied Osborne's request to exclude a material witness from the courtroom during the presentation of other testimony? ¶ 27 The record shows three separate occasions on which Osborne requested that witnesses be excluded from the courtroom. Twice the District Court ordered that all witnesses be excluded. On a third occasion, Osborne objected to Deputy Owen's continued presence in the courtroom in violation of the Court's order. The Court concluded that at this late stage there was no point to excluding Deputy Owen. ¶ 28 Rule 615, M.R.Evid., provides that [a]t the request of a party, the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion. (Emphasis added.) The rule is not permissive; it mandates that witnesses be excluded. Prior to this Court's adoption of the Montana Rules of Evidence in 1977, the statute which provided for the exclusion of witnesses was permissive and, therefore, several of our prior decisions review the trial court's decision to exclude witnesses for an abuse of discretion. Because the current Rule 615, M.R.Evid., is not permissive, we will review a district court's application of the rule as we would a conclusion of law. We review a district court's conclusions of law for correctness. See Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co. (1995), 271 Mont. 459, 469, 898 P.2d 680, 686. ¶ 29 There is an exception to Rule 615, M.R.Evid., which provides that an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney may remain. The State argues on appeal that this exception permitted Owen to remain in the courtroom; however, the County Attorney did not designate Owen as the State's representative at trial and the District Court did not recognize Owen as such a representative at any time. Moreover, Owen was called as a witness by the defense, not the State. ¶ 30 We conclude that the District Court erred when it allowed a witness to remain in the courtroom after a request from one of the parties that witnesses be excluded. However, we further conclude that the error was harmless, because Osborne failed to demonstrate that his defense was prejudiced by the error. ¶ 31 Osborne contends that he was prejudiced by being unable to effectively cross-examine Owen because Owen had the opportunity to hear the testimony of the other witnesses. Specifically, he contends that Owen had the opportunity to learn for the first time during Heen's testimony that Cassie referred to Heen, rather than Osborne, as Papa. This knowledge, Osborne argues, enabled Owen to successfully withstand cross-examination about Cassie's identification of her attacker. ¶ 32 The State contends that the error was not prejudicial because Heen testified to being called Papa prior to the point at which Osborne brought Owen's presence in the courtroom in violation of the court order, to the Court's attention. ¶ 33 Owen testified that Cassie referred to Heen as Papa, and that she used the words Papa's rubber duck. However, Owen also acknowledged that Cassie had not indicated to him that Osborne did anything to her. He further testified that Cassie told him Daddy is yucky, and that she told him that Heen had a rubber duck. From this testimony and the remainder of the record we are unable to conclude that Osborne was prejudiced by Owen's knowledge that Heen was Papa. Accordingly, we hold that Osborne was not prejudiced by the District Court's error.