Opinion ID: 1145492
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Juror Concealment on Voir Dire

Text: (2) We begin with the general proposition that one accused of a crime has a constitutional right to a trial by impartial jurors. (U.S. Const., 6th and 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 265 [148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748]; Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1971) 5 Cal.3d 98, 110 [95 Cal. Rptr. 516, 485 P.2d 1132].) `The right to unbiased and unprejudiced jurors is an inseparable and inalienable part of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Constitution.' ( Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, at p. 110, quoting People v. Galloway (1927) 202 Cal. 81, 92 [259 P. 332] [hereafter Galloway ].) The impartiality of prospective jurors is explored at the preliminary proceeding known as voir dire.  Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored. Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge's responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court's instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled. [Citation.] Similarly, lack of adequate voir dire impairs the defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges where provided by statute or rule.... ( Rosales-Lopez v. United States (1981) 451 U.S. 182, 188 [68 L.Ed.2d 22, 28-29, 101 S.Ct. 1629].) The ability of a defendant, either personally, through counsel, or by the court, to examine the prospective jurors during voir dire is thus significant in protecting the defendant's right to an impartial jury. (3) Of course, the efficacy of voir dire is dependent on prospective jurors answering truthfully when questioned. As the United States Supreme Court has stated,  Voir dire examination serves to protect [a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial] by exposing possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors. Demonstrated bias in the responses to questions on voir dire may result in a juror's being excused for cause; hints of bias not sufficient to warrant challenge for cause may assist parties in exercising their peremptory challenges. The necessity of truthful answers by prospective jurors if this process is to serve its purpose is obvious. ( McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood (1984) 464 U.S. 548, 554 [78 L.Ed.2d 663, 670, 104 S.Ct. 845] (plur. opn. of Rehnquist, J.).) [2] A juror who conceals relevant facts or gives false answers during the voir dire examination thus undermines the jury selection process and commits misconduct. ( People v. Castaldia (1959) 51 Cal.2d 569, 572 [335 P.2d 104] [hereafter Castaldia ]; Galloway, supra, 202 Cal. at pp. 92-93; People v. Blackwell (1987) 191 Cal. App.3d 925, 929 [236 Cal. Rptr. 803] [hereafter Blackwell ]; People v. Diaz (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 926, 932 [200 Cal. Rptr. 77] [hereafter Diaz ].) Without truthful answers on voir dire, the unquestioned right to challenge a prospective juror for cause is rendered nugatory. Just as a trial court's improper restriction of voir dire can undermine a party's ability to determine whether a prospective juror falls within one of the statutory categories permitting a challenge for cause (see People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 419 [276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221]; People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1083-1084 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659]), a prospective juror's false answers on voir dire can also prevent the parties from intelligently exercising their statutory right to challenge a prospective juror for cause. Such false answers or concealment on voir dire also eviscerate a party's statutory right to exercise a peremptory challenge and remove a prospective juror the party believes cannot be fair and impartial. We have recognized that the peremptory challenge is a critical safeguard of the right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. ( People v. Williams (1981) 29 Cal.3d 392, 405 [174 Cal. Rptr. 317, 628 P.2d 869].) As explained by the Court of Appeal, [j]uror concealment, regardless whether intentional, to questions bearing a substantial likelihood of uncovering a strong potential of juror bias, undermines the peremptory challenge process just as effectively as improper judicial restrictions upon the exercise of voir dire by trial counsel seeking knowledge to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges. ( Diaz, supra, 152 Cal. App.3d at p. 932; see also Blackwell, supra, 191 Cal. App.3d at p. 931.) The denial of the right to reasonably exercise a peremptory challenge, be it by either the trial court or a juror through concealing material facts, is not a mere matter of procedure, but the deprivation of an absolute and substantial right historically designed as one of the chief safeguards of a defendant against an unlawful conviction. ( Diaz, supra, 152 Cal. App.3d at p. 933, italics added; see also Rosales-Lopez v. United States, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 188 [68 L.Ed.2d at pp. 28-29].) [3] Thus, `[w]here a party has examined the jurors concerning their qualifications, and they do not answer truly, it is manifest that he is deprived of his right of challenge for cause, and is deceived into foregoing [ sic ] his right of peremptory challenge.' ( Galloway, supra, 202 Cal. at p. 94.) The prosecution, the defense and the trial court rely on the voir dire responses in making their respective decisions, and if potential jurors do not respond candidly the jury selection process is rendered meaningless. Falsehood, or deliberate concealment or nondisclosure of facts and attitudes deprives both sides of the right to select an unbiased jury and erodes the basic integrity of the jury trial process. ( Blackwell, supra, 191 Cal. App.3d at p. 929.) (4a) In the present case, the referee found Nordstrom had greater knowledge of the case than she revealed on voir dire, and that she  at least overheard conversations regarding the double homicide while employed at [the bank]. (Italics added.) We agree with this assessment; the evidence clearly shows this minimal amount of knowledge on Nordstrom's part. We thus adopt the referee's finding as to our first question. Moreover, the record contains substantial evidence showing Nordstrom not only passively overheard such conversations, but actually participated in pretrial conversations about the crime, expressing an opinion about it as well. (5) In answering our second question, however, the referee found that [a]lthough [Nordstrom] had knowledge regarding the case, no credible testimony was received indicating that she expressed any opinion regarding the defendant's guilt or regarding the double homicide at all prior to her selection as a trial juror. Petitioner formally excepts to the referee's ruling on this point. In support, he argues the referee ignored the contrary evidence provided by Robinson and defense attorney Will Kay. During the questioning of Robinson, for example, the following exchange occurred: Q: Did you have  this is prior to Cathy being picked as a juror  did you have discussions about the case with Cathy? A: Yes, I did. Q: And were most  how would you characterize those discussions as to feelings about Keith Hitchings? A: Um, I think that the things that we heard about Keith Hitchings were very negative. Q: And do you know if  if Cathy Nordstrom, prior to the trial, was making negative comments about Keith Hitchings ? A: Yes.  (Italics added.) Later, a similar exchange occurred: Q: ... Before [Nordstrom] was picked as a juror, did she ever indicate her feelings about the guilt or innocence of Mr. Hitchings? A: This is before she was picked as a juror? Q: Yes. A: Yes. Q: What did she indicate? A: We all talked about it, as employees together, and from the information we had gathered from... other employees ... I think we all felt that he was guilty. Q: Okay. Do you remember Cathy expressing that belief ? A: Yes.  (Italics added.) Thus, contrary to Nordstrom's claim of no prior knowledge of the case, Robinson expressly declared that the subject of the killings was raised at the bank before trial, that Nordstrom was a part of those conversations, and that Nordstrom expressed the opinion that petitioner was guilty. (Will Kay's testimony on the topic consisted mainly of his recitation of what Robinson told him. It is thus of lesser probative value.) In his summary of the evidence adduced at the hearing, the referee failed to include references to these passages. Petitioner infers from this omission that the referee improperly failed to consider this evidence. The inference is a weak one at best. The inference, standing alone, is not sufficient to overcome the referee's explicit finding that Nordstrom did not discuss the case prior to trial. That is not to say, however, that the referee's finding on this point was supported by ample evidence. Indeed, there was much evidence supporting Robinson's credibility, and not much supporting Nordstrom's version of events. For example, Robinson described the circumstances surrounding Nordstrom's conduct in some detail, including: (i) the employee conversations at the bank, (ii) the renewal of such conversations when petitioner's relatives transacted business at the bank, and (iii) the renewal of discussions when newspaper articles on the subject were published. Moreover, her account was largely corroborated by Larry Whitford, one of the People's witnesses, by Paula Wyman-Tomlin, another employee at the bank, and Andrea Taylor, petitioner's cousin. Finally, there was evidence that Nordstrom was generally not a trustworthy person, and some evidence that testifying for the defense was against Robinson's self-interest. [4] In contrast to this evidence, the referee found Nordstrom was not believable on certain points, finding she knew more about the case than she had previously claimed, and that she violated her oath by discussing the case with Robinson after trial sessions. Although the evidence supporting the referee's finding on this point is not overwhelming, the proper inquiry is whether there was substantial evidence to support his decision. ( People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 219.) The referee was able to view the demeanor of the witnesses and evaluate their veracity. This ability is of vital importance when, as here, the critical decision turns on the credibility of the witnesses. Although the referee clearly did not believe Nordstrom in many particulars, he was entitled to conclude she spoke the truth as to some points. On balance, we uphold the referee's finding that there was no credible evidence showing Nordstrom discussed petitioner's case prior to his trial, and therefore overrule petitioner's exception to the referee's finding in this regard. (4b) Even after finding Nordstrom did not discuss the case prior to trial, however, we are still left with her concealment  found by the referee  of her knowledge of the case. Respondent argues that even if such concealment occurred, it was not serious enough to constitute grounds for relief. Specifically, he contends Diaz, supra, 152 Cal. App.3d 926, and Blackwell, supra, 191 Cal. App.3d 925, which granted relief for similar juror misconduct based on concealment during voir dire, were incorrectly decided. Instead, respondent argues that to constitute misconduct, a venireperson's failure to accurately respond to a question on voir dire must be (i) intentional and not merely inadvertent, and (ii) involve a material point. (See People v. Kelly (1986) 185 Cal. App.3d 118, 125-128 [229 Cal. Rptr. 584] [disagreeing with Diaz ]; People v. Jackson (1985) 168 Cal. App.3d 700, 704-706 [214 Cal. Rptr. 346] [same].) Requiring an intentional concealment, respondent argues, properly balances the People's interest in the finality of criminal judgments with the defendant's right to a fair trial. [5] As in Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, supra, 5 Cal.3d 98, we need not resolve whether juror concealment must be intentional before it constitutes misconduct ( id. at p. 110, fn. 5), because the record clearly reveals that Nordstrom's concealment was intentional. In her jury questionnaire, Nordstrom disavowed any knowledge about petitioner's case. At the evidentiary hearing before the referee, she continued to assert she had had no knowledge of petitioner's case. These protestations of ignorance were strongly contradicted by the witnesses who testified before the referee. The referee clearly credited this latter testimony, finding that Nordstrom had greater knowledge of this case than she revealed on voir dire [and that she] at least overheard conversations regarding the double homicide ... prior to her selection as a juror. There is substantial evidence to support this factual finding. Significantly, Nordstrom did not claim, either on voir dire or at the evidentiary hearing, that she in good faith could not remember anything about petitioner's trial, or that she gave an unintentionally incorrect answer. (See MacColl v. L.A. Met. Transit Auth. (1966) 239 Cal. App.2d 302, 306 [48 Cal. Rptr. 662].) Moreover, the questions on voir dire clearly and fairly asked her to reveal the extent of her knowledge about the case. (See People ex rel. Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Curtis (1967) 255 Cal. App.2d 378, 389 [63 Cal. Rptr. 138] [The questions propounded ... fairly called for such disclosure.].) Under these circumstances, it may reasonably be inferred that Nordstrom's failure to reveal the depth of her knowledge about petitioner's case was not inadvertent, but was instead intentional. Although respondent contested the materiality of Nordstrom's omission in his informal opposition to the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he does not raise that challenge in his brief on the merits. In any event, Nordstrom's concealment of her knowledge of the case was unquestionably a material issue on voir dire. Indeed, the record shows the prospective jurors' prior knowledge of the case was of critical importance to defense counsel. We thus conclude the information concealed by Nordstrom was sufficiently material and presents no obstacle to finding misconduct which, if the presumption of prejudice is unrebutted, will result in reversal. In sum, because the evidence reveals Nordstrom intentionally concealed material information on voir dire, we conclude she committed misconduct.