Opinion ID: 2212618
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: statements made to the grand jury

Text: We believe the above rule applies to statements made by the witness to the grand jury as well as statements made to law enforcement agents of the State. Such statements have as much possibility of being useful in cross examining and impeaching the credibility of the witness as any other type of pre-trial statement and there is no good reason to treat them differently unless the prosecution shows a paramount interest in non-disclosure. For examples of other jurisdictions adopting this rule see: Dennis v. U.S. (1966), 384 U.S. 855, 16 L.Ed.2d 973, 86 S.Ct. 1840 (where the United States Supreme Court affirmed the rule for the federal judiciary); People v. Johnson (1964), 31 Ill.2d 602, 203 N.E.2d 399; State v. DiModica (1963), 40 N.J. 404, 192 A.2d 825; People v. Agron (1961), 10 N.Y.2d 130, 176 N.E.2d 556. In Indiana, Thrawley v. State (1898), 153 Ind. 375, 55 N.E. 95, is the basic case adhering to the rule of non-disclosure of such statements and the reasoning there was recently adopted in Mahoney v. State (1964), 245 Ind. 581, 201 N.E.2d 271. Several reasons were offered to support the rule of non-disclosure but the only one which carries any weight at all is that the defendant had a statutory right to call a grand juror to testify concerning the testimony of witnesses before the grand jury but he failed to pursue his statutory remedy. The statute referred to is now Burns' § 9-817, Ind. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 103, which says in part: A member of the grand jury may, however, be required by any court to disclose the testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is consistent with that given by the witness before the court.... First, we note that reliance by the court on this statute removes from consideration any claim that a rule of non-disclosure is based on a requirement of secrecy of the testimony of witnesses before the grand jury. The Thrawley and Mahoney cases explicitly relied on the defendant's statutory right to have such testimony revealed through a member of the grand jury. Thus, the issue is not one of overturning a secrecy requirement but of choosing which technique for revealing the contents of statements made to the grand jury by the prosecution witness is more practical. The method of calling in a member of the grand jury is a clumsy, expensive, time-consuming, unreliable method for discovering such pre-trial statements of the witness. The grand juror would have to be subpoenaed and then testify from memory concerning the witness' testimony before the grand jury given months, sometimes years, before the trial. The availability of this statutory procedure is not a reason to deny the use of the much simpler, cheaper, more reliable technique of requiring the prosecutor to produce the transcript of the prosecuting witness' testimony before the grand jury for use by the defendant in cross-examination and impeachment of the witness. In addition, the prosecutor has not been required to pursue that awkward statutory procedure but has been permitted to use a stenographer's transcript of the witness' testimony before the grand jury for the purpose of cross examining and impeaching the witness at trial. Kidwell v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 585, 251 N.E.2d 119; Coppenhaver v. State (1902), 160 Ind. 540, 67 N.E. 453; Higgins v. State (1901), 157 Ind. 57, 60 N.E. 685. We see absolutely no justification for treating a defendant differently in this respect. The court in Thrawley was apparently offering other reasons in support of its holding when it said: The State is the plaintiff. The indictment is the complaint. It is no more proof than is a complaint in a civil action. The clerk of the grand jury takes minutes of the evidence given before them. They may or may not, be taken correctly by the clerk. These minutes are prereserved for the use of the prosecuting attorney on the trial as a memorandum of what the State's witnesses may be expected to testify to. The defendant is no more entitled to the use of these minutes than is a defendant in a civil case to his adversary's trial brief of the evidence. 153 Ind. at 386. We see no merit in any of these arguments. The fact that the indictment is not proof of the allegations in it is irrelevant and does not alter the fact that the testimony of witnesses given to the grand jury that returned the indictment may be useful to the defendant in cross-examining and impeaching the witness at the trial. The possibility that the clerk may not transcribe the testimony correctly is present in every case where a witness makes an oral statement which is taken down or put in writing by someone else and thus does not support a general rule against grand jury transcripts as such. Of course, if the witness' statement is not in writing or taken down substantially verbatim, then there is no statement for the prosecution to produce and the State may so allege and prove. The fact that the prosecution may use the statement of the witness to the grand jury as a memorandum at the trial in no way justifies refusing to allow the defendant to obtain it also and determine for himself its use for cross-examination and impeachment. Since 1899 the methods of copying documents have changed radically and permit the prosecution to have the use of the statement as well as the defendant. To the extent that this Court was relying on an analogy to the practice in civil procedure the progress of the right of discovery in civil cases renders it completely unpersuasive. We now look to see whether the appellants laid the proper foundation for their motion to produce Schoolcraft's statement made to the grand jury about this case. On re-direct examination of the witness the prosecutor asked the following questions of the witness: Q. Now, you did testify before the grand jury, did you not? A. That's correct sir. Q. Did you tell the same story there you did today? A. Yes, sir. Q. And you also gave one or more statements to the police in the spring of 1967 on this subject, did you not? A. That's correct, sir. MR. ORR: Now, at this time, Your Honor, the defendants Codalata and Antrobus move for copies of the statements referred to by the prosecution before the grand jury and given to the detectives in this case since the State has voluntarily brought those matters before the Court. I think they are now an issue in the case. Applying the foundation requirements set out above it is obvious that a substantially verbatim transcription of the witness' grand jury testimony concerning this case was shown to probably be within the control of the prosecution. This fully met the foundation requirements set out above. The fact that the questions were asked by the prosecution in bolstering the witness' credibility does not alter that fact. If anything, it makes it even more untenable to deny production of the statement to the defendant.