Opinion ID: 1418047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fostering Parental Contact

Text: It saddens this Court that Appellant, as a result of the filing of the underlying domestic violence petition on the facts of this case, has lost valuable contact with both of her sons. [20] With the exception of Appellee, almost everyone else involved in this matter recognizes the role that John P.W. has played with regards to the deteriorating relationship Appellant has experienced with her two sons. [21] The first counselor who treated the children, Dr. Moses, validated Appellant's concerns [22] with his finding after the very first session that something was happening that was making it difficult for the boys to trust their mother. After examining Appellee in October of 2001, Dr. O'Keefe included in his findings that [h]e should encourage his children to visit with their mother and should be reminded not to say or do anything in front of the children that may have a negative impact on the relationship of the boys and their mother. The trial court acknowledged that Adam should listen to his mother. He's not doing so. And, as discussed above, the trial court clearly acknowledged that Adam was fully aware that his father would be supportive of his actions in pulling away from his mother and in being disrespectful of her request that he talk to her during the altercation that is at the center of this matter. [23] While this Court is to a great extent powerless to alter the attitudes of recalcitrant adults on the all important issue of encouraging children to maintain a relationship with their non-custodial parent, we would be remiss if we failed to acknowledge the potential harm that will result from a parental relationship that is effectively allowed or encouraged to be extinguished. Children need the support, love, and encouragement of both parents when those parents are available, as any child psychologist will readily attest. The parent who has physical custody of children in a divorce setting has the best opportunity and indeed has an obligation as a parent who is supposed to be acting in the best interests of his child to encourage contact and foster visitation with the non-custodial parent, barring reasonable cause to believe that such visitation will put the child in jeopardy of harm. To act otherwise, is clearly to deny that child a critical part of his development and to deny the non-custodial parent her liberty interest in guiding the child to adulthood. The United States Supreme Court recognized in Parham that [t]he law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. 442 U.S. at 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493 (citing 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries  447, 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law  190). While parents are accorded great deference in child rearing matters, their right to raise their children without intervention of the state is clearly linked to this recognition that in most instances a parent will act in the best interests of their children. See Syl. Pt. 4, Lindsie D.L. v. Richard W.S., 214 W.Va. 750, 591 S.E.2d 308, 2003 WL 22871730, No. 31562 (Dec. 4, 2003) (holding that [t]here is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children). When one parent discourages a child from maintaining a relationship with the other parent where there are no legitimate concerns regarding the child's physical or mental welfare, that parent is undeniably failing to act in the child's best interests and disregarding the high duty of preparing their child for life's additional obligations. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493 (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925)). Through our ruling in this case we are not asked to, nor do we seek to, disturb the modified parenting plan that the parties entered into on April 10, 2003. Pursuant to that plan, which included the participation of a guardian ad litem, Appellee is the primary residential parent of the parties' children and Appellant is permitted parenting time with either child as the child desires and requests and/or as recommended by the children's counselor, Nancy Rush. Counseling was to occur with Ms. Rush during the initial six month period of this plan, and at the end of such time period, Ms. Rush was to file a report with the family court regarding the participation of the parties in counseling and her recommendations as far as visitation. While we are certainly pleased to see that the parenting plan instructs, [b]oth parties... [to] encourage parenting time and contact between the children and mother, the realities suggest that the mandated encouragement may not be forthcoming. See supra note 20. Admittedly, issues of visitation are not before us today. We simply wish to encourage the fostering of a positive relationship between these boys and their mother.