Opinion ID: 1463389
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: DISCUSSION Cynthia Shank

Text: Shank appeals the district court's admission of evidence relating to the 1998 currency seizure as plain error. She argues that the district court's actions of admitting evidence of the 1998 currency seizure at trial amounted to a constructive amendment of the indictment because the seizure occurred approximately eleven months before the indictment's in or about 1999 to at least May 9, 2002 time frame. However, the introduction of the 1998 currency evidence did not result in a constructive amendment. [W]here no specific objection is raised regarding a constructive amendment or a variance before the district court, we are limited to `plain error' review on appeal. United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 682 (6th Cir.2008) (citations omitted). We have held that a constructive amendment results when the terms of an indictment are in effect altered by the presentation of evidence and jury instructions which so modify essential elements of the offense charged that there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant may have been convicted of an offense other than the one charged in the indictment. United States v. Budd, 496 F.3d 517, 521 (6th Cir.2007) (citing United States v. Smith, 320 F.3d 647, 656 (6th Cir.2003)). A constructive amendment is considered per se prejudicial and reversible error. Budd, 496 F.3d at 521 (citing United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 757 (6th Cir.2000)). An indictment need not allege that criminal activity occurred on the exact date proven at trial. See Ledbetter v. United States, 170 U.S. 606, 612, 18 S.Ct. 774, 42 L.Ed. 1162 (1898). When an indictment uses the language on or about, a constructive amendment does not exist when the proof offered regards a date `reasonably near' the date alleged in the indictment. United States v. Hettinger, 242 Fed.Appx. 287, 295 (6th Cir.2007) (citing United States v. Ford, 872 F.2d 1231, 1236 (6th Cir.1989)). Shank contends that the difference of eleven months in time between the currency seizure and the beginning date of the indictment implies that the two events did not occur reasonably near one another. In Ford, we held that a similar eleven-month difference exceeded the bounds of reasonableness. 872 F.2d at 1236-37. However, there the grand jury had, by indictment, charged the defendant with possession of a handgun on or about September 28, 1987. Id. at 1233. We held that the district court, through its instructions, allowed the jury to convict the defendant of possession of the handgun, a one time criminal action, on any of three dates within an eleven-month period. Id. at 1236. The instant case is distinguished from Ford, because here the jury convicted Shank based on her role in an ongoing conspiracy for which the grand jury had already returned an indictment which covered more than three years. We have previously deemed a difference of more than a month reasonable for a one-time conspiracy with an indictment establishing a seven-day time span. See United States v. Manning, 142 F.3d 336, 339-40 (6th Cir.1998). Given the large time period covered by the indictment in the instant case, the currency seizure occurred reasonably near the dates of the indictment. Therefore, any reference at trial to the 1998 currency seizure did not constructively amend the indictment. Likewise, Shank's argument that allowing evidence of the currency seizure in Dearborn when the indictment only discussed Shank's actions in Lansing also fails as she has presented no authority to support this argument. Thus, the district court did not commit plain error. Even assuming Shank could show that the currency seizure was not reasonably near the indictment's time period or that the district court delivered erroneous jury instructions, she has failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood that [she] may have been convicted of an offense other than the one charged in the indictment. See Budd, 496 F.3d at 521. The body of evidence linking Shank to the conspiracy-including her own testimony-implies that, even if the district court admitted evidence of the currency seizure erroneously, the jury could convict her based on the events occurring between 1999 and Humphry's death alone. As such, any error by the district court does not rise to the level of a constructive amendment. Lastly, evidence of the 1998 currency seizure is inextricably intertwined with the charged offense ... the telling of which is necessary to complete the story of the charged offense. United States v. Hardy, 228 F.3d 745, 748 (6th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). Therefore, even if introducing the evidence is considered a constructive amendment of the indictment, the evidence was properly admitted as relevant background evidence, which is not excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Id.
Shank argues the district court's limiting instruction with regard to her co-defendants' testimony of their guilty pleas constituted plain error. She also claims that the prosecutor improperly referenced the guilty pleas in closing argument. Because the court gave an adequate limiting instruction and the prosecutor's remarks were not prejudicial, the district court did not commit plain error.
Shank argues that the limiting instruction given at the end of trial concerning her codefendants' guilty pleas was insufficient, and specific curative instructions should have been given at the time each co-defendant testified at trial. Since Shank failed to raise any objections concerning her co-defendants' guilty pleas, we can reverse only for plain error affecting substantial rights. See United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 213-14 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b)). Co-defendant or co-conspirator guilty pleas are not admissible as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt. United States v. Sanders, 95 F.3d 449, 454 (6th Cir.1996) (citing United States v. Blandford, 33 F.3d 685, 709 (6th Cir.1994)). However, guilty pleas may be introduced into evidence if the co-defendant or co-conspirator testifies at trial, for purposes of assessing the witness's credibility. Id. In these instances, the district court must give a cautionary instruction to the jury informing them of the limited scope in which they may consider the evidence of a guilty plea. Id. Here, the co-defendants' guilty pleas were properly admitted during trial, without objection, for credibility purposes. The district court gave an adequate jury instruction at the end of trial regarding the credibility of the witnesses and the use of the guilty pleas. Shank has pointed to no authority requiring the limiting instruction to be given at the time her codefendants testified. Therefore, the district court did not commit plain error in giving an adequate limiting instruction at the close of trial.
Shank alleges that the prosecutor improperly referenced the guilty pleas during closing arguments. We evaluate prosecutorial misconduct through a two-step test. United States v. Carter, 236 F.3d 777, 783 (6th Cir.2001) (citing United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1385-87 (6th Cir.1994)). We first review whether the prosecutor's statements were improper. Id. (citations omitted). If the statements were improper, we then determine whether the statements were flagrant, thus warranting reversal, using a four-factor flagrancy weighing test. Id. Since Shank made no objections to the prosecutor's statements at trial, we review for plain error. United States v. Carson, 560 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir.2009) (citing United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 459 (6th Cir.2006)). Even if the prosecutor's statements were improper, they did not amount to reversible error and, therefore, did not affect Shank's substantial rights. Here, in closing argument, the prosecutor stated, you heard that a number of the co-conspirators who testified in this case have already pled guilty to this conspiracy, which would certainly further support the fact that the conspiracy existed. The prosecutor also stated in closing, And [Lonnie Zrubek] says, no, those weren't his drugs, those were Alex Humphry's drugs, but since he participated in that activity, he was guilty as an aider and abettor. And if Lonnie Zubrek was guilty of being an aider and abettor in the possession of those drugs, then certainly Ms. Valdez, who owned the house, who participated in all this other activity to help Alex Humphry, at a minimum she was also an aider and abettor in the possession of those drugs. Although guilty pleas may be elicited by the prosecutor on direct examination so that the jury may assess the credibility of the witness, a legitimate introduction of a plea may rise to the level of prejudicial error if the prosecutor suggests in closing argument that the jury use the plea for a prohibited purpose. Carson, 560 F.3d at 575. As stated above, introduction of guilty pleas may only be used for credibility purposes and is not substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt. Sanders, 95 F.3d at 454. When reviewing challenges to a prosecutor's remarks at trial, we examine the prosecutor's comments within the context of the trial to determine whether they amounted to plain error. Carter, 236 F.3d at 783 (citations omitted). Although the statements may have been improper, they did not affect Shank's substantial rights. The following four factors are weighed in making this determination, (1) whether the conduct and remarks of the prosecutor tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; (2) whether the conduct or remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) whether the remarks were deliberately or accidentally made; and (4) whether the evidence against the defendant was strong. Carson, 560 F.3d at 575-76 (citing Carter, 236 F.3d at 783). The guilty pleas were mentioned by both parties throughout the trial for the purpose of providing the jury with credibility evidence. In fact, Shank's counsel introduced the fact of Zrubek's conviction. The references in the government's closing may be interpreted as referring to credibility and thus could not have misled the jury. See id. at 576. These two comments were certainly isolated. Shank does not contend that any other instance of misconduct occurred. We have held that three instances during the prosecutor's initial closing argument, in fast succession, constituted harmless error. Id. These remarks were not extensive and thus not prejudicial. The prosecutor did not repeat either of his remarks, indicating that they were not intentional. See id. Furthermore, `there was no indication that they stemmed from a deliberate plan to inflame the jury as opposed to unduly-zealous advocacy.' Id. at 577 (quoting United States v. Shalash, 108 Fed.Appx. 269, 281 (6th Cir.2004)). Finally, the totality of the evidence weighs against any prejudice. Shank's own testimony established her participation in the conspiracy; that fact is uncontroverted. Furthermore, the evidence against her duress claim is strong as well. She never reported an abusive relationship to the authorities, even when questioned after knowing that Humphry had died. She lied to police officers about the drug conspiracy even after she knew of Humphry's death. She also accepted approximately $130,000 of drug profits after Humphry's death. Additionally, the district court provided a limiting instruction to the jury which cured or minimized any prejudice. Id. As such, Shank's substantial rights were not affected. Therefore, the prosecutor's remarks, even if improper, were not plain error.
Shank argues that her sentence was unreasonable based upon her criminal history, her changed circumstances, and the quantity of drugs attributed to her at sentencing. Since the district court properly utilized the correct procedures, took into account all of the mitigating factors, and eventually sentenced Shank to 112 months below her recommended Guidelines range, the district court did not abuse its discretion. [W]e review the sentence imposed by a district court for reasonableness utilizing the `familiar abuse of discretion standard.' United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 539 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 594, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)). The reasonableness review is split into two parts: procedural reasonableness and substantive reasonableness. United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 808 (6th Cir.2006). Sentences that are properly calculated and within the applicable Guidelines range are presumptively reasonable. United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006). A sentence may be considered substantively unreasonable when the district court `select[s] the sentence arbitrarily, bas[es] the sentence on impermissible factors, fail[s] to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors or giv[es] an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.' Collington, 461 F.3d at 808 (quoting United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 385 (6th Cir.2005)) (alterations in original). Shank does not question the procedural reasonableness of her sentence. The district court did not base Shank's sentence on impermissible factors or give an unreasonable amount of weight to any factor. It weighed Shank's short criminal history and her circumstances of becoming a mother of three against the huge quantities and the intimate details she knew and engaged in the Humphry organization. The district court unquestionably did not focus on the quantity exclusively. If that had been the case, Shank would have faced a Guidelines range of 235-293 months' imprisonment. Here, the sentence of 180 months represents a 55-month downward variance from a quantity alone consideration. The district court granted lenience compared to a quantity alone assessment. Any argument by Shank that the quantity alone determined her sentence is baseless. Furthermore, Shank has not presented an argument explaining why the 112-month downward variance in her sentencing did not represent an adequate consideration of the reduced deterrence her situation demands. Since the district court utilized the correct sentencing procedures and did not place an unreasonable amount of weight on impermissible factors, Shank's sentence was reasonable.