Opinion ID: 4509604
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Expert Evidence

Text: To begin, we consider the district court’s evidentiary rulings that could have affected the summary judgments awarded. See Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, Inc., 174 F.3d 661, 667–68 (5th Cir. 1999) (“We must first review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings . . . . Then, with the record defined, we must review de novo the order granting judgment as a matter of law.” (citation omitted)).
We first examine the district court’s decision to grant Axon’s motion to exclude “any expert testimony offered by Simon Bellemare relating to Plaintiffs’ products liability claims.” We vacate the district court’s order excluding Bellemare’s evidence because it failed to explain its decision. 27 Case: 18-20453 Document: 00515318964 Page: 28 Date Filed: 02/21/2020 No. 18-20453 Plaintiffs proffered evidence from Bellemare regarding the allegedly dangerous condition of Axon’s products, the third prong of Plaintiffs’ LPLA claim. See La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.54(A). Axon moved to exclude his testimony, arguing that Bellemare was unqualified and that his analysis was unreliable. The district court, in a document styled “Plenary Order,” stated: “Axon’s motion to exclude testimony of Simon Bellemare – GRANTED.” It offered no reasons for its decision. Axon believes this was not reversible error because the district court’s decision was clearly correct based on the record, and a remand would simply waste time and resources. It relies on our decision in North Cypress Medical Center Operating Co. v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 898 F.3d 461 (5th Cir. 2018), to argue that even if the district court abused its discretion by not providing reasons for a decision, we may examine the issue on our own to decide whether the district court’s ultimate decision was correct. In North Cypress, we concluded that even though the district court abused its discretion by failing to explain why it denied leave to amend, remand was not the appropriate remedy because it “would likely ‘be an exercise in futility.’” Id. at 479 (quoting Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 819 (5th Cir. 2004)). We reached that determination after observing that our precedent did not require reversal and remand, and that we have statutory authority to “affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and [we] may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment . . . or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2106). We then considered several factors and concluded after our own review of the record that the district court’s decision was ultimately correct. Id. at 479–80. We decline to extend North Cypress to this context. Here, the district court was tasked with determining the reliability of expert evidence. District 28 Case: 18-20453 Document: 00515318964 Page: 29 Date Filed: 02/21/2020 No. 18-20453 courts serve as gatekeepers and are responsible for ensuring the reliability and relevance of all expert evidence. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). The court must ensure that the expert “employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” Id. When a district court fails to give reasons for its decision to exclude expert testimony, a reviewing court has no way of knowing whether that gatekeeping responsibility has been adequately performed. “A statement of reasons is one of the handmaidens of judging.” Schwarz v. Folloder, 767 F.2d 125, 133 (5th Cir. 1985). “Where a district court fails to explain its decision . . . we do not know whether the decision was within the bounds of its discretion or was based on an erroneous legal theory.” Id. As North Cypress acknowledges, generally, “[r]emanding to provide the district court with an opportunity to explain its [decision] is preferred.” 898 F.3d at 479. Here, the need for the district court to explain its decision was particularly high given the stakes—the exclusion of Bellemare’s testimony could devastate Plaintiffs’ case. His testimony forms much of the evidentiary basis on which Plaintiffs opposed summary judgment on the “unreasonably dangerous condition” issue under the LPLA. See La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.54(A). While we do not hold that all instances in which a district court fails to give reasons for excluding expert evidence constitute reversible error, we do hold that, in this circumstance, the district court abused its discretion in failing to do so. On remand, the district court should examine afresh the admissibility of Bellemare’s expert testimony and give reasons for its decision.
We next examine the court’s two orders striking evidence from various other experts. Axon moved to exclude supplemental expert reports from Sones, Bourgoyne, Williams, Rusnak, Bellemare, and Adair, arguing that the reports 29 Case: 18-20453 Document: 00515318964 Page: 30 Date Filed: 02/21/2020 No. 18-20453 were untimely and therefore violated the court’s scheduling order. It later moved to strike summary judgment affidavits from Sones and Bourgoyne on timeliness grounds, arguing that the affidavits disclosed new opinions beyond the district court’s deadline for such disclosures. The district court appeared to grant both motions. In an order dated January 8, 2018, the district court declined to strike the expert reports. The court then cryptically stated, “However, affidavits as opposed to reports that were filed are STRICKEN. The Court will not admit into evidence expert reports or affidavits, and reserves the right to strike, deny, or exclude part or all of any expert’s testimony.” No further explanation of the court’s decision was given, and so the precise grounds for the decision are unclear. For purposes of our analysis, we assume the district court struck the affidavits on the grounds urged by Axon—timeliness. District courts consider four factors when determining whether to exclude expert evidence as a sanction for the violation of a scheduling order. In re Complaint of C.F. Bean L.L.C., 841 F.3d 365, 372 (5th Cir. 2016). Those factors are: “(1) the explanation for the failure to identify the witness; (2) the importance of the testimony; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the testimony; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice.” Id. (quoting Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 791 (5th Cir. 1990)). The district court failed to examine (or even acknowledge) these factors when it excluded the expert reports as untimely. In fact, it gave no reasons for its decision at all. We are tasked with determining whether the district court “base[d] its decision on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” CenterPoint Energy, 436 F.3d at 550 (quoting Ross, 426 F.3d at 763). But “[w]here a district court fails to explain its decision . . . we do not know whether the decision was within the bounds of its discretion or was based on an erroneous legal theory.” Schwarz, 767 F.2d at 133. We 30 Case: 18-20453 Document: 00515318964 Page: 31 Date Filed: 02/21/2020 No. 18-20453 therefore hold that to the extent the district court’s order excluded the expert reports of Sones, Bourgoyne, Williams, Rusnak, Bellemare, and Adair on timeliness grounds, the order must be vacated and remanded to allow the district court to explain its decision after considering the proper factors. In an order dated February 14, 2018, the district court granted Axon’s motion to exclude the Sones and Bourgoyne summary judgment affidavits and offered a brief explanation. It concluded that both experts’ affidavits “merely distort issues already resolved by the same affiants’ report (SEMS) to the federal government.” It further explained that, in its view, the affidavits failed to scientifically establish that the BSRs were defective. Finally, the court noted that “[e]qually important to this decision, no dispute exists concerning the nature of the well blowout or the factors that caused[] or contributed to it.” Like the first order, this second order also failed to examine the required factors. See In re C.F. Bean, 841 F.3d at 372. And the brief reasoning the district court did give is questionable. The district court concluded that the affidavits contradicted issues in the SEMS Report. It then perplexingly concluded that—even though it had just recognized a conflict in the evidence— “no dispute exists concerning the nature of the well blowout or the factors that caused[] or contributed to it.” But expert testimony is not subject to exclusion just because it contradicts other evidence in the record—to the contrary, at summary judgment that is the main point of expert evidence. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact . . . .”). The district court’s explanation therefore did not justify the exclusion. We do not decide here, however, what the result of the proper legal analysis should be. Rather, because the district court failed to examine the required factors, and the brief explanation it did offer is dubious, we vacate the 31 Case: 18-20453 Document: 00515318964 Page: 32 Date Filed: 02/21/2020 No. 18-20453 order denying the Sones and Bourgoyne affidavits and remand to allow the court to undertake the proper analysis in the first instance. 18