Opinion ID: 777109
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficient description of premises to be searched

Text: 15 Landero first contends that the warrant was deficient under the Fourth Amendment because neither the warrant nor the supporting affidavit accurately described the place to be searched. The warrant specified that the place to be searched was 1418 Mae Collins Road. Landero argues that the trailer with the number 954 under the window air conditioner was in all likelihood 1412 Mae Collins Road, Lot #3. In the alternative, he argues that the trailer that was searched was not even on Mae Collins Road. Either way, Landero contends that the warrant failed to adequately describe the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity. 16 In denying the motion to suppress, the district court held that the search was proper because: 17 All the trailers are within clear view of Mae Collins Road; indeed, the subject trailer is no more than fifty to seventy-five yards from Mae Collins Road. Thus, it was accurate to state that the subject trailer was on Mae Collins Road, since Mae Collins Road was the only public road by which one could travel to the trailer. A reasonable person would conclude that this trailer park was on Mae Collins Road. . . .[T]he trailer was described as a white mobile home with pale green trim, with a wooden deck on the front. The subject trailer matched this description perfectly. Second, the warrant noted that the numbers 954 appeared on the right end of the trailer. Those numbers were present and the description was accurate. .... Anyone, given a copy of this description, would have found and identified the subject trailer with ease. .... The description in this search warrant thoroughly satisfies th[e particularity] requirement..... [T]here were other circumstances, apart from the description in the search warrant itself, that completely eliminated the possibility that the wrong trailer would be searched. Specifically, these officers had observed this trailer for days, and had surveilled and electronically monitored a drug transaction that occurred within. 18 We agree with the district court that the Fourth Amendment was not violated and the motion to suppress should be denied. 19 The Fourth Amendment protects [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.....[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485-86, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965). To determine whether such a description is constitutionally valid, a judge must ask whether the place to be searched is described with sufficient particularity to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the premises with reasonable effort, and whether there is any reasonable probability that another premise might be mistakenly searched. United States v. Durk, 149 F.3d 464, 465 (6th Cir.1998). An error in description does not, however, automatically invalidate a search warrant. See United States v. Prout, 526 F.2d 380, 387 (5th Cir.1976); see also United States v. Bedford, 519 F.2d 650, 655 (3d Cir.1975) (stating that the standard for determining sufficient particularity of a description in a search warrant is one of practical accuracy rather than technical nicety) (citation omitted). The test for determining whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity is not whether the description is technically accurate in every detail, Prout, 526 F.2d at 387-88, but rather whether the description is sufficient to enable the executing officer to locate and identify the premises with reasonable effort, and whether there is any reasonable probability that another premises might be mistakenly searched. United States v. Gahagan, 865 F.2d 1490, 1496 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 918, 109 S.Ct. 3242, 106 L.Ed.2d 590 (1989) (quoting United States v. Gitcho, 601 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir.1979)); see also United States v. Dorrough, 927 F.2d 498, 500 (10th Cir.1991) (noting that the requisite specificity of the description... depends heavily on the facts of each case). 20 The present case is factually similar to the facts before this court in Durk. In Durk, the defendant was a tenant boarding in another person's home. In that case, a search warrant specified that the officers were to search a single family red brick ranch home located at 4612 Fulton that was approximately 3 houses to the east of Grandview. Durk, 149 F.3d at 465. However, upon execution of the warrant, the officers searched the home at 4216 Fulton which was three houses to the west of Grandview. During their search of the defendant's bedroom, the officers seized pipe bombs, bomb making materials, chemicals, a silencer, and a pen gun. 21 Based upon this evidence, the defendant was indicted for possession of unregistered firearms. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized in the search on the grounds that the warrant did not describe with particularity the place to be searched. Specifically, the defendant argued the that the house numbers had been transposed from 4216 to 4612 and that the description of the house was three houses to the east of Grandview when in fact the house was three houses to the west of Grandview. Id. The defendant also argued that the good faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), did not apply because no reasonable officer would believe that the description in the affidavit described 4216 Fulton. Durk, 149 F.3d at 466. 22 The Durk court held that the warrant was valid. Specifically, the court found that the warrant provided a reason for, and a limitation of, the search. Durk, 149 F.3d at 466. The court determined that the warrant did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment because it sufficiently described the homeowner's residence despite the two inaccuracies. Id. The court further reasoned: 23 The warrant correctly identifies the house as a single-family red brick ranch home on the north side of Fulton street. Although brick, ranch style homes may be common in Shaw's neighborhood, the warrant also describes a more unusual feature: a ten by fifteen foot metal storage shed, the entrance of which is secured by a plastic tie. 24 Id. Furthermore, the court found that there were additional circumstances available to clarify any inaccuracies in the warrant that could not lead to a mistaken search of other premises. Id. (search warrant with wrong address is valid where warrant lacking physical description of particular apartment specifies the name of the occupant of the apartment against which it is directed, the same officer applies for and executes the warrant, and agents executing the warrant personally knew which premises were intended to be searched). The Durk court acknowledged that courts routinely uphold warrants like the one at issue where one part of the description might be inaccurate but the description has other accurate information to identify the place to be searched with particularity. 149 F.3d at 466. Additionally, the court found that the affidavit incorporated into the search warrant specified that the defendant was a tenant of the homeowner. The court also noted that the executing officer had just come from the house and he was also the affiant on the warrant. Based upon these findings, the Court upheld the warrant. Id. Under Durk, the particularity requirement eliminates the ability to provide a general description of the premises. Moreover, the requirement necessitates a reason for the search and places limitations on it. Id. 25 In the present case, Landero does not argue that there is an inaccuracy in the description of the mobile home. Rather, he suggests its address is in all likelihood 1412 Mae Collins Road, Lot # 3. However, this descriptive language is not included in the warrant, nor is it necessary. Here, the particularity requirement is met as the description includes specific directions from an identifiable point to the mobile home park at 1418 Mae Collins Road in Hamblen County, Tennessee. Once inside the park, the warrant describes the particular trailer by color, by a certain exterior trim, and by a wooden deck. In addition, the warrant include an unusual feature of the trailer, the number 954 displayed under a window air conditioner on the right end of the trailer. Moreover, Agent Hannon had attached a photograph of the trailer to the affidavit incorporated into the search warrant. Thus, even if Landero's speculation on the actual address is accurate, such conjecture is immaterial to the officers identifying the mobile home with reasonable effort. 26 In the present case, as in Durk, additional circumstances indicate that there would not have been a mistaken search of other premises. Agent Hannon was the team leader at the search. He had prepared the affidavit incorporated into the warrant, which specified that Jessie was the occupant of the trailer. He had also previously conducted undercover transactions with Jessie, and had monitored the informant's recent marijuana purchase from Jessie at the location just days before the application for the warrant. It appears that all reasonable steps were taken to ensure that there could not be a mistaken search of other premises here. 27 The Magistrate evaluated the credibility of the witnesses and the facts at the suppression hearing. The court found that the postal address, if incorrect, and the specification that the trailer was the fourth mobile home on the left were inconsequential parts of the description. Relying on Durk, the Magistrate correctly held that the description was sufficiently particular and accurate and that there was virtually no chance that the wrong premises would be searched pursuant to this search warrant. Accordingly, the district court properly adopted the magistrate's conclusion because the warrant included a sufficient description of the premises to be searched.