Opinion ID: 200225
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the claim for tortious interference with prospective contractual rights

Text: 37 The district court held that Moss failed to state a claim for tortious interference with prospective contractual rights. To successfully state a claim for tortious interference with prospective contractual rights, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant `induce[d] or otherwise purposely cause[d] a third person not to... enter into or continue a business relation with [the plaintiff].' Baker v. Dennis Brown Realty, 121 N.H. 640, 433 A.2d 1271, 1274 (1981) (quoting Bricker v. Crane, 118 N.H. 249, 387 A.2d 321, 323 (1978)). Here, Moss only points to Grabill's statements to Donovan, who was in no position to make decisions regarding Moss's future employment at the Camp. Furthermore, Moss fails even to allege that these statements caused Moss to lose his position or prospective position. In the absence of such an allegation, his claim cannot possibly succeed. See Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 534 A.2d 706, 709 (1987) (stating that a central element of a tortious interference claim is that the plaintiff was damaged by defendant's actions). Therefore, the district court properly dismissed this element.