Opinion ID: 1918473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Election statutes should be interpreted to avoid absurd results.

Text: Applying our rules of statutory construction, we construe statutes to avoid absurd results. State v. Clark, 755 N.W.2d 241, 249 (Minn.2008); Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (2008). Minnesota Statutes § 204.30 (1961), the precursor to Minn. Stat. § 204C.39 (2008), was passed by the legislature to avoid the necessity of election contests when possible. Andersen, 264 Minn. at 262, 119 N.W.2d at 5. At the time of the election that generated the Andersen litigation, section 204.30 provided that county canvassing boards could, on the agreement of four out of five county canvassing board members, unilaterally correct any obvious errors. Id. After Andersen, the statute was amended to implement procedures similar to those found in Minn.Stat. §§ 204C.38 and .39 today. Act of Mar. 15, 1965, 1965 Minn. Laws 116, 117-18 (codified as Minn.Stat. § 204.30 (1967)). There is nothing to suggest that the amendment was intended to alter the legislative purpose of avoiding election contests when possible. Limiting obvious error in counting to errors in the computation and recording of numbers contravenes the statute's purpose by making election contests all but guaranteed in close elections. Moreover, it is unreasonable to think that the legislature would have put in place the elaborate procedures set out in sections 204C.38 and .39 solely for the correction of errors involving the computation and recording of numbers. Requiring a court order to correct such errors would result in a significant waste of judicial resources. The court counters that the legislature could have implemented the process as a safeguard to ensure that the most vocal candidate could not exert undue political pressure on local county canvassing boards to amend their returns. I do not disagree that the legislature may have adopted the procedures set out in sections 204C .38 and.39 to prevent undue political pressure on local canvassing boards. In fact, I suspect, at least in part, that was the legislature's purpose. In Andersen, while both candidates, Andersen and Rolvaag, initially agreed to re-open a county canvassing board even though it had already completed its returns, Rolvaag subsequently took the position that such re-opening was illegal. Stinnett & Backstrom, Recount, supra, at 71. Andersen then moved to re-open as many counties favorable to him as he could. Id. After Andersen pulled ahead in the vote count, Rolvaag decided that he would have to try to recanvass precincts with obvious error[s] that favored him. Id. at 73. But when Rolvaag was not successful in getting any canvassing boards to reopen, his political party accused Andersen of applying pressure on county boards to disregard election laws and procedures to search for [Andersen] votes while at the same time attempting to prevent canvass recounts which appear to favor [Rolvaag]. Id. at 74. Thus, while I agree that the rationale for the legislative changes was partly intended to limit undue influence on county canvassing boards, that fact has no bearing on this case. Before Andersen, the statute permitted county canvassing boards to unilaterally correct any obvious error when four of five canvassing board members so chose. After Andersen, the legislature amended the procedures to be followed when correcting obvious errors. But while the legislature changed the procedures to be followed, the legislature did not change or otherwise limit the scope of counting and reporting errors that could be corrected. Absent an express change in scope, our rules of construction lead inescapably to the conclusion that, as was the case before the amendments, the scope of correctable obvious errors goes beyond computation and recording of numbers and includes any and all obvious errors in counting and recording. [1]