Opinion ID: 222780
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Preliminary Injunction Obtained by KJR, Hart, and Rumsey

Text: In light of the principles set forth above, we have no trouble concluding that KJR, Hart, and Rumsey are prevailing parties in this case. First, the district court's preliminary injunction provided relief on the merits of Appellants' claims. Regarding the first prong of the relief-on-the-merits requirement, the preliminary injunction afforded Appellants relief that they specifically requested in their complaint. Appellants sought two basic types of relief in their complaint: (1) a declaration that the Pledges, Commits, and Solicitation clauses were unconstitutional; and (2) preliminary and permanent injunctions that would prohibit the Commission from enforcing the canons against judicial candidates who responded to KJR's questionnaire. The preliminary injunction issued by the district court provided the second form of relief as long as it was in effect. That is, the preliminary injunction prohibited enforcement of the challenged canons and allowed Appellants to engage in their speech activities without fear of a disciplinary action during the pendency of the case. Furthermore, the district court was clear about Appellants' ultimate likelihood of success on the merits. After carefully analyzing the Pledges, Commits, and Solicitation clauses under the First Amendment, the court expressly concluded that those clauses were unconstitutional and that Appellants were substantially likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to the clauses. Stout I, 440 F.Supp.2d at 1240 (The Court finds that plaintiffs are substantially likely to succeed on the merits of their claims concerning the pledges..., commits, and solicitation clauses under Republican Party of Minnesota v. White. ); id. (This Court follows the Supreme Court's opinion in White and finds certain Kansas judicial canons unconstitutional.). We find it difficult to imagine a more unambiguous indication of probable success on the merits. Dahlem, 901 F.2d at 1511 (internal quotation marks omitted). To borrow the words of the D.C. Circuit, this is not a case in which a preliminary injunction was based less on the trial court's view of the merits than on a perceived hardship to the plaintiff. Rather, [Appellants] secured a preliminary injunction in this case largely because their likelihood of success on the merits was never seriously in doubt. Select Milk Producers, Inc. v. Johanns, 400 F.3d 939, 948 (D.C.Cir.2005) (citation omitted). Second, this Court dissolved the preliminary injunction only after the Kansas Supreme Court amended the challenged canons and rendered Appellants' claims against the Commission moot. Significantly, no court ever ruled against Appellants on the merits. Accordingly, the preliminary injunction was sufficient to confer prevailing-party status on Appellants, notwithstanding the fact that the case bec[a]me[] moot, through no acquiescence by the [Commission], while the order [was] on appeal. Dahlem, 901 F.2d at 1512; see also, e.g., Dupuy v. Samuels, 423 F.3d 714, 723 & n. 4 (7th Cir.2005); Select Milk Producers, 400 F.3d at 947-48; Watson, 300 F.3d at 1096. The district court determined that Appellants were not prevailing parties because they never obtained the primary relief sought. Specifically, the court reasoned that [t]he primary relief sought by plaintiffs was declaratory relief.... Plaintiffs did not merely seek an injunction.... They sought declarations that the judicial canons at issue were unconstitutional.... Under these circumstances, the Court does not find that the legal relationship between the parties was materially altered by the preliminary injunction. We cannot agree with the district court's analysis, as it conflicts with the Supreme Court's directives in TSTA. In that case, the Court made clear that the prevailing-party determination does not turn on whether the plaintiff has prevailed on the central issue or obtained the primary relief sought. 489 U.S. at 790-92, 109 S.Ct. 1486. [T]he search for the `central' and `tangential' issues in the lawsuit, or for the `primary,' as opposed to the `secondary,' relief sought, much like the search for the golden fleece, distracts the district court from the primary purposes behind § 1988 and is essentially unhelpful in defining the term `prevailing party.' Id. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 1486. Instead, the critical inquiry is whether the plaintiff has succeeded on any significant issue in litigation which achieved some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit. Id. at 791-92, 109 S.Ct. 1486 (emphases added) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also McQueary v. Conway, 614 F.3d 591, 603 (6th Cir.2010) (A plaintiff crosses the threshold to `prevailing party' status by succeeding on a single claim, even if he loses on several others and even if that limited success does not grant him the `primary relief' he sought.). Where, as in this case, that standard has been met, the degree of the plaintiff's overall success goes to the reasonableness of the award ..., not to the availability of a fee award vel non.  TSTA, 489 U.S. at 793, 109 S.Ct. 1486; see also McQueary, 614 F.3d at 603 (The significance of the relief obtained goes only to the amount of fees.). In its brief, the Commission raises one ground for affirmance that was not relied on by the district court. Specifically, the Commission contends that the preliminary injunction cannot serve as the basis for prevailing-party status because it was ultimately vacated, leaving Appellants without an enforceable judgment. This argument ignores our holding in Dahlem and the critical distinction between preliminary injunctions vacated on mootness grounds and preliminary injunctions vacated as a result of an adverse decision on the merits. [4] Appellants secured a preliminary injunction that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties by providing relief on the merits of Appellants' claims. This injunction continued in effect until the Kansas Supreme Court took actions that mooted the case. Neither this Court nor the district court ever issued an order undermining the district court's assessment of the merits of Appellants' claims or Appellants' legal entitlement to relief. Accordingly, the fact that the preliminary injunction was vacated does not deprive Appellants of their status as prevailing parties.