Opinion ID: 2325741
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Commissioner have statutory authority to issue the Cease-and-Desist Order to the PFC's?

Text: Respondents argue that the Commissioner has no statutory authority to issue cease-and-desist orders against the PFCs. They point to express grants of authority to issue cease-and-desist orders in other sections of the Insurance Article [16] as an indication that the absence of a similar enumerated power in the Premium Financing Title means that the Legislature intended that the Commissioner have no authority to issue the present Cease-and-Desist Order to the PFCs. This argument implicates the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative. Breslin v. Powell, 421 Md. 266, 286, 26 A.3d 878, 891 (2011) (citing Kirkwood v. Provident Sav. Bank of Balt., 205 Md. 48, 55, 106 A.2d 103, 107 (1957)); see also Black's Law Dictionary 661 (9th ed.2009). We have cautioned against the too easy use of this statutory construction tool to override the clear intent of the Legislature, and in this case we are not persuaded by Respondents to ignore our advice in that regard. See Kirkwood, 205 Md. at 55, 106 A.2d at 107. A broad grant of power is given to the Commissioner to enforce the Insurance Article. Section 2-108 of the Insurance Article sets forth the general powers and duties of the Commissioner: In addition to any powers and duties set forth elsewhere by the laws of the State, the Commissioner: (1) has the powers and authority expressly conferred on the Commissioner by or reasonably implied from this article; (2) shall enforce this article; (3) shall perform the duties imposed on the Commissioner by this article; and (4) in addition to examinations and investigations expressly authorized, may conduct examinations and investigations of insurance matters as necessary to fulfill the purposes of this article. (Emphasis added.) Respondents imagine that the Commissioner's powers to enforce the Insurance Article are limited to bringing an action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enforce this article or an order issued by the Commissioner under this article and, therefore, he/she may not issue a cease-and-desist order unless that power is enumerated specifically in a particular title. See Ins. Art., § 2-201(a). We rejected the same argument, and upheld the Commissioner's power to enforce the provisions of the Insurance Article, in Insurance Commissioner v. Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Corp., 313 Md. 518, 546 A.2d 458 (1988). There, we affirmed the Commissioner's authority to order Property Casualty Insurance Guarantee Corporation (PCIGC) to pay personal injury protection claims, on behalf of insolvent insurers, despite that [n]owhere in the Insurance Code is the power to order PCIGC to pay claims expressly conferred upon the Commissioner, and the particular section addressing the powers of the Commissioner with respect to PCIGC, contains no express authorization. Ins. Comm'r, 313 Md. at 526-28, 546 A.2d at 463. We agree with the MIA that enforcement orders, including the initial Cease-and-Desist Order and the Final Order issued as a result of the administrative hearing here, are basic elements in a regulator's toolkit. Section 2-108 of the Insurance Article requires that the Commissioner  shall enforce the Insurance Article. (Emphasis added.) In the Premium Financing Title, the Commissioner is given the authority to investigate and examine the books, records, and accounts of the PFCs. Ins. Art., § 23-103(a). After an investigation, the Commissioner is required to issue a report of his/her findings under Ins. Art., § 2-209. Ins. Art., § 23-103(c). These reports provide the explanation and required grounds on which an order must be based. [17] Ins. Art., § 2-204(b)(1)(iii). The Premium Financing Title authorizes the Commissioner to suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew the registration of a registered PFC if it fails to comply with a lawful requirement of the Commissioner, or if it violates a provision of the Title. Ins. Art., § 23-208(a)(1), (a)(2). Further, the Commissioner is authorized to impose civil monetary penalties or restitution. [18] Ins. Art., § 23-208(b)(1)(i), (b)(1)(ii). In the cases of Respondents Insurance Billing Services and U.S. Capital Associates, the Commissioner was authorized specifically by § 23-208 to order these PFCs to provide restitution (in the form of a refund, plus pre-judgment interest) to consumers whose underlying insurance policies were declared ultimately void ab initio, after the Cease-and-Desist Order was issued. In the case of the remaining PFCs, the authority to issue the Cease-and-Desist Order against them, compelling compliance with Ins. Art. § 23-304, may be implied reasonably from the overall regulatory scheme revealed in the Insurance Article. The Commissioner is charged with enforcing the provisions of the Insurance Article, including the Premium Financing Title. It does not stand to reason that the Commissioner would be authorized only to suspend altogether a PFC from the business of premium financing, or impose civil penalties, but not authorized to order registered PFCs to comply with the provisions of the Premium Financing Title. We decline to interpret the regulatory scheme to limit the Commissioner to instituting actions in circuit courts or banning a PFC from the business of premium financing in order to compel compliance with a discreet requirement of the Insurance Article. As in Insurance Commissioner, despite the absence of an express authorization or power, we conclude that the statute reasonably implies that the Commissioner is empowered to issue enforcement orders seeking to compel compliance with Ins. Art. § 23-304.