Opinion ID: 799998
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Blood Spatter Evidence

Text: Petitioner makes three sub-arguments under this claim: (a) counsel failed to obtain a true blood spatter expert to undertake a hands-on examination of the blood-stained sheet and clothing, - 15 - No. 11-1193 Duyst v. Rapelje (b) counsel ignored the advice of consultants to present the results of an experiment that could have impeached the State’s expert, and (c) counsel failed to adequately investigate the State expert’s background. Dr. Herbert MacDonnell testified as a blood spatter expert for Petitioner at his evidentiary hearing below. Petitioner’s first point is grounded on assertions that Toby Wolson, an expert the defense consulted for a preliminary review, was not a true blood spatter expert and that sending him photos rather than arranging for an in-person examination was inadequate. We fail to see how Wolson was insufficiently qualified. Wolson possessed a bachelor’s degree in science and a master’s in serology from Michigan State University and had worked in the Miami-Dade Police Department’s Forensic Biology section for nearly twenty years. Petitioner seizes on Dodge’s characterization of Wolson having a “sub-expertise” in blood spatter work without explaining why that is insufficient or otherwise casting doubt on Wolson’s credentials.5 Essentially, Petitioner argues that Wolson was not the best expert, an argument this Court has previously found to fall short of the Strickland hurdles. Reynolds v. Bagley, 498 F.3d 549, 557 (6th Cir. 2007) (“At bottom, [petitioner] is claiming [defense experts] were not the ‘best’ experts. While this may or may not be true, it is not enough to clear the Strickland prejudice hurdle, let alone the Strickland performance hurdle.”). As the Supreme Court has said, “Strickland does not enact Newton’s third 5 Petitioner’s own proffered expert, Dr. MacDonnell, has testified as an expert in everything from fingerprint identification to breathalyzers to autoerotic masochism to footwear and tire wear patterns, in addition to blood spatter evidence. R. 31, Evidentiary Hearing Vol. 2, at 43-44. As his own expert demonstrates that one might have many areas of expertise or sub-expertise, Petitioner’s argument on this point falls particularly flat. - 16 - No. 11-1193 Duyst v. Rapelje law for the presentation of evidence, requiring for every prosecution expert an equal and opposite expert from the defense.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 791. The fact that counsel sent only photos to Wolson, rather than arranging for an in-person examination, also fails to rise to the level of ineffective assistance. Dodge sent Wolson photos of the clothing, bedding, and autopsy to review and asked for his opinion on the State’s blood spatter evidence. Wolson concluded that he believed the State’s expert, Rod Englert, was correct in this case. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. MacDonnell, acknowledged that it is common for experts to receive and review photographs when rendering a preliminary opinion. MacDonnell testified, “[I]t’s not unusual for me to only receive photographs, write a report based on it and never hear anything more about the case because I don’t necessarily agree with the people that sent it to me.” R. 31, Evidentiary Hearing Vol. 2, at 50. Dr. MacDonnell’s own preliminary review at the request of Petitioner was also based solely on photos, and he noticed an inconsistent marking of the “void” area as well as a discrepancy that caused him to believe the sheet had been contaminated. He then suggested that he see the actual evidence. That Wolson did not notice such discrepancies and did not suggest that he would be able to give a more accurate opinion if he examined the articles in person does not indicate that Dodge was incompetent but merely that “the defense strategy did not work out as well as counsel had hoped.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 790. Of course, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations, to a point where he or she is able to make a reasoned judgment to continue or stop investigating a particular aspect of a case. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 (“[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations - 17 - No. 11-1193 Duyst v. Rapelje on investigation.”). Counsel cannot, for example, insulate his or her decision by simply consulting an expert “and then either willfully or negligently keep[ing] himself in the dark about what that expert is doing, and what the basis for the expert’s opinion is.” Richey v. Bradshaw, 498 F.3d 344, 363 (6th Cir. 2007). This is not what happened here. Dodge did not contact Wolson and review his opinion in a vacuum. Nor did he leave his experts to their own devices and rely blindly on their conclusions. Before contacting Wolson, Dodge consulted with Leonard Speckin for expert advice on crime scene reconstruction. He considered Speckin to have an excellent reputation in his field. Speckin examined the physical evidence from the crime scene at both the sheriff’s department and in his laboratory but was ultimately not supportive as a witness. Speckin, however, assisted Dodge in preparing for cross-examination. Because Speckin was not specifically a blood spatter expert, Dodge and Speckin attempted to locate a blood spatter expert who was a critic of Englert. Together, they identified Wolson as a possible expert witness. Considering that Speckin had personally examined the evidence in his laboratory, under high lights, and was unable to give favorable testimony, Dodge was in a position to accept Wolson’s opinion and to make the decision that continued efforts to find an expert to counter the State’s expert were not necessary. See id. at 363 (“The point is not that [counsel] had a duty to shop around for another expert who would refute the conclusions of . . . the State’s experts. The point is that [counsel] had a duty to know enough to make a reasoned determination about whether he should abandon a possible defense based on his expert’s opinion.”). - 18 - No. 11-1193 Duyst v. Rapelje Far from being ineffective, Dodge diligently investigated possible defenses and searched for favorable experts. His decision to discontinue further investigation was carefully informed. That he was ultimately unsuccessful in his efforts does not accrue to a finding of ineffectiveness. Petitioner’s latter two contentions on the blood spatter claim also do not constitute ineffective assistance. Defense counsel’s retained experts, Speckin and David Townshend (who was consulted as a ballistics expert), conducted an experiment in which they shot an anesthetized, terminally ill sheep with the same type of gun and bullets that were involved in Mrs. Duyst’s death. The experiment resulted in no high velocity impact blood spatter on the shooter’s hands or clothing. Speckin opined that the experiment would be valuable in impeaching Englert. Dodge ultimately did not introduce the experiment at trial, in order to prevent the prosecution from drawing out unfavorable testimony from Townshend and Speckin regarding their conclusions on the ballistics and blood evidence. Petitioner contends, however, that it was unreasonable for counsel not to replicate the experiment with different experts who could then testify. We disagree. It was eminently reasonable for Dodge to conclude that the extra time and expense required to reenact the experiment with other experts was not worthwhile, especially considering the experiment’s limited probative value. The sheep experiment merely demonstrated that it would have been possible for a shooter not to get high impact blood spatter on himself and would have added nothing to the suicide theory put forth at trial. Further, new experts may have been asked from where the idea for the experiment came and why the original experimenters, Townshend and Speckin, did not testify. And, ultimately, even assuming the failure to reenact the experiment was deficient, Petitioner has not shown any prejudice flowing - 19 - No. 11-1193 Duyst v. Rapelje from it. The experiment would not have successfully impeached Englert, as Speckin suggested, because Englert admitted the possibility of a gunshot incident without back spatter. We find the most merit in Petitioner’s last contention. While Dodge put forth a reasonable strategic explanation for failing to impeach Englert’s background and qualifications (his read of Englert was that Englert was more an “advocate” than a mere witness and would have further authenticated himself to the jury if questioned on his background), Dodge admitted that he did not verify Englert’s credentials or research his testimony at previous trials. Thus, his decision not to question Englert’s background was not an informed one. We have previously found that “a lawyer cannot make a protected strategic decision without investigating the potential bases for it.” Couch v. Booker, 632 F.3d 241, 246 (6th Cir. 2011). However, Dodge did research Englert’s background to the extent that he found Englert had detractors. And the trial record reveals a prepared advocate who adequately cross-examined Englert on the substantive portions of his testimony. While we note that “it is difficult to establish ineffective assistance when counsel’s overall performance indicates active and capable advocacy,” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 791, we find the issue definitively resolved by the lack of any resulting prejudice. In assessing the prejudice prong of Strickland, “[t]he likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Id. at 792. Petitioner did cast some doubt on Englert’s credentials and expertise. Some of Englert’s post-graduate work turned out to be audited courses. Englert claimed to have discovered blood where the FBI and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory had not. He demonstrated unfamiliarity with hard sciences, math, and physics and insisted that he could recognize blood spatter patterns based on experience. However, Englert also persuasively testified regarding his substantial - 20 - No. 11-1193 Duyst v. Rapelje experience and mentioned a study published by Dr. MacDonnell, Petitoner’s own expert, in which a forensics test was given to two groups—one group of academics and one group of experienced police officers—and the degree-less but experienced group scored higher. And while Petitioner argued that Englert’s testimony at Petitioner’s trial was inconsistent with testimony Englert had given at other trials, the allegedly inconsistent testimony was consistent when read in context. We agree with the district court that any impeachment would not have caused the jury to seriously question Englert’s credibility, much less affect the outcome at trial.