Opinion ID: 1060418
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: procedural analysis under the

Text: POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT Although largely overlooked by the majority, this case presents several significant procedural issues concerning the ability to reopen a post-conviction petition under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-217(a). Despite the fact that the petitioner filed his claim solely pursuant to subsection (a)(2), the majority does not address this issue on its merits. Invoking the doctrine of fundamental fairness, the majority instead concludes that the petitioner may reopen his petition under subsection (a)(1). Because the petitioner is not constitutionally entitled to reopen his post-conviction petition, but may do so only when the statute permits its reopening, I would deny his petition for failing to satisfy any of the statutory requirements for reopening his post-conviction petition. A. TENNESSEE CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 40-30-217(a)(1) Today, the majority has decided that the petitioner may file a new motion to reopen pursuant to subsection (a)(1). In so deciding, the majority has fashioned a unique procedure to provide the petitioner this avenue for relief. First, the Court has improperly addressed a constitutional issue that has been waived because the petitioner failed to raise it in his original post-conviction petition. Nevertheless, by ordering the parties to supply supplemental briefing on this constitutional issue, the Court has excused the waiver, addressed the substantive issue, and created a “final appellate ruling establishing a constitutional right.” The petitioner is now being allowed to refile his motion to reopen pursuant to subsection (a)(1), basing his claim on the majority’s decision today. However, the majority overlooks a fundamental procedural flaw in its analysis: according to our unanimous holding in State v. West, 19 S.W.3d 753 (Tenn. 2000), once an issue has been waived by a petitioner, the Court lacks the authority to excuse that waiver, see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 4030-206(g); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 3(B). The unanimous order previously entered cannot be held to have placed the constitutional issue properly before this Court. For the reasons that follow, the constitutional issue should be dismissed, and the petitioner must seek to reopen his post-conviction petition on other grounds. In 1995, Van Tran filed his petition for post-conviction relief. He raised numerous and various claims, including an allegation that he was mentally retarded and therefore statutorily ineligible for the death penalty under section 39-13-203. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing in 1997, and the petitioner was provided with a full, fair, and meaningful “opportunity to present proof and argument on the petition for post-conviction relief.” Cf. House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705, 714 (Tenn. 1995); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206(h). Based on all the evidence presented, the trial court found the petitioner’s claims of mental retardation to be without merit and subsequently dismissed his petition. Despite having a full, fair, and meaningful opportunity to be heard in 1997, the petitioner never raised the issue of whether execution of mentally retarded persons violates Article I, section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. In fact, he did not even assert this issue in the current proceeding -5- to reopen until he applied for permission to appeal to this Court. Where a petitioner fails to raise an issue, despite having had the opportunity to do so, that issue is deemed waived under the PostConviction Procedure Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206(g) (1997). Because the petitioner has previously waived the substantive constitutional issue before us now, the Post-Conviction Procedure Act does not permit him, outside of the exceptions listed in the statute, to assert that issue in any subsequent proceeding. The majority today appears to overlook the fact that petitioner’s previous waiver of the substantive constitutional issue renders this Court without statutory authority to grant relief to the petitioner based on this issue under the postconviction statutes. Consequently, because the substantive constitutional issue is not properly before the Court, the majority has inappropriately used subsection (a)(1) to give the petitioner an opportunity to avoid his capital sentence. Importantly, I do not find that our previous order requesting additional briefing on this issue has effectively excused the petitioner’s previous waiver. Once an issue has been waived by a defendant in the post-conviction context, this Court possesses no authority, whether by statute, rule, or the plain error doctrine, to excuse that waiver in order to reach the merits of a claim. See West, 19 S.W.3d at 756-57.3 Consequently, to the extent that our previous order requesting additional briefing could be construed as excusing the petitioner’s waiver of that issue, the order was beyond the scope of our authority under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Under no set of circumstances can our previous order be construed to place the substantive constitutional issue properly before the Court for resolution on its merits. Therefore, in accordance with the Post-Conviction Procedure Act and our previous holding in West, I find that the constitutional issue presently addressed by the Court has been previously waived by the petitioner and is beyond the authority of this Court to review. Because we also lack the authority to excuse the petitioner’s waiver, we are likewise without authority to address the petitioner’s constitutional claim on its merits as the majority has done today. Accordingly, I would hold that the substantive constitutional issue should be dismissed, thereby prohibiting the petitioner from filing a future motion to reopen under subsection (a)(1). B. TENNESSEE CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 40-30-217(a)(2) Without any explanation, the majority asserts that a motion to reopen may be based on a claim involving either a “new legal issue” or new scientific evidence establishing that the petitioner 3 The majority seems to assert that because this Court has never addressed the applicability of these doctrines in the context of a motion to reopen, the holding in State v. W est applies only to issues raised for the first time on postconviction appeal. Nevertheless, this interpretation is contrary to our specific language in W est applying our holding to all proceedings falling within the Post-Conviction Procedure Act in effect at the time West filed his petition, as well as to “proceedings brought under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act currently in force.” W est, 19 S.W.3d at 757 (emphasis added). -6- is actually innocent of the offense for which he or she was convicted.4 Presumably, the majority has used the language “new legal issue” as a paraphrase for the precise statutory language of section 4030-217(a)(1), which allows a petitioner to base a claim in a motion to reopen based upon a “final ruling of an appellate court establishing a constitutional right that was not recognized as existing at the time of trial.” Alternatively, as the majority has recognized, the petitioner may file a motion to reopen based on a claim of new scientific evidence establishing actual innocence of the offense or offenses for which the petitioner was convicted, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-217(a)(2). Instead, the petitioner in this case has filed his motion to reopen presumably pursuant to subsection (a)(2), alleging that the WAIS-III provides new scientific evidence establishing his mental retardation, thereby rendering him actually innocent of his capital sentence. The majority never discusses the propriety of the petitioner’s claim, specifically whether the petitioner has indeed satisfied the strict requirements for reopening a post-conviction petition under section 40-30-217(a)(2). Because this Court has never before considered the proper standard governing the admissibility of “new scientific evidence,” further inquiry is necessary to determine whether the petitioner has at all satisfied the strict requirements for reopening a post-conviction petition under section 40-30-217(a)(2). More importantly, I cannot accept the petitioner’s expanded definition of the phrase “actual innocence of the offenses for which he was convicted” to include innocence of or ineligibility for the death penalty. This interpretation not only neglects the plain, unambiguous language of the statute, but, if relying on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992), also ignores that the General Assembly has adopted a more narrow definition of the “actual innocence” exception in section 40-30-217(a)(2) than was adopted by the Sawyer Court. Consequently, for the reasons that follow, I would deny the petitioner’s motion to reopen for failing to satisfy any of the procedural requirements.
The Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1995 does not define “new scientific evidence” as used in Section 40-30-217(a)(2). It seems to me that two reasonable constructions of the phrase are possible. First, the language could be narrowly construed to mean only scientific evidence which either was not developed or was not in existence at the time of the petitioner’s original postconviction proceeding. Alternatively, the language could be given a broader construction by including scientific evidence which, although in existence, was not available to the petitioner at the time of his original post-conviction proceeding by the exercise of due diligence. I would give the statutory language the broader construction because I believe that it more nearly effectuates the intent of the General Assembly. While this legislation was being considered by that body, Chairman Frank Buck of the House Judiciary Committee remarked, “When some 4 Moreover, although not applicable to this case, a petitioner may also assert a claim in a motion to reopen “seeking relief from a sentence that was enhanced because of a previous conviction . . . and the previous conviction has subsequently been held to be invalid.” Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-30-217(a)(3). -7- scientific test comes back and proves people to be innocent, there always ought to be some method by which that wrong is corrected. Always.” 99th General Assembly, 1st Sess., House, Tape #2, H.B. 0001 (Mar. 29, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Buck). Regardless of the construction given the phrase, such evidence must be admissible under the applicable Tennessee Rules of Evidence as required in Section 40-30-217(b) (“The factual information set out in the affidavit shall be limited to information which, if offered at an evidentiary hearing, would be admissible through the testimony of the affiant under the rules of evidence.”) (emphasis added). The specific rules of evidence that govern the issue of admissibility of scientific proof in Tennessee are rules 7025 and 703.6 See, e.g., McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 264 (Tenn. 1997). The rules together necessarily require a determination as to the scientific validity or reliability of the evidence. See id. at 265. In short, evidence will be admissible if it is scientifically reliable or valid. Id. Several non-exclusive factors with which courts can determine reliability include the following: (1) whether scientific evidence has been tested and the methodology with which it has been tested; (2) whether the evidence has been subjected to peer review or publication; (3) whether a potential rate of error is known; (4) whether . . . the evidence is generally accepted in the scientific community; and (5) whether the expert’s research in the field has been conducted independent of litigation. Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). In my view, Van Tran’s latest I.Q. scores may not be presumed “new scientific evidence” without consideration of the validity or reliability of the test as required by our evidentiary rules and procedures. Although I am of the opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition for the reasons contained in this dissent, if a hearing is to be held, then it is clear that the petitioner will be required to show by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the WAIS-III test was not reasonably available to him at the time of his original post-conviction petition; (2) the updated version of the I.Q. test is qualitatively different from its predecessor such that this updated version is able to provide a more accurate measurement 5 Rule 702 provides: “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness q ualified as an expert b y know ledge , skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or o therwise.” 6 Rule 7 03 p rovid es: “The facts o r data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made know n to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by exp erts in the p articular field in form ing op inions o r inferences up on the subject, the facts or data need not be adm issible in evidence. The court shall disallow testimony in the form of an opinion or inference if the underlying facts or data indicate lack of trustworthine ss.” -8- of the petitioner’s true intellectual abilities;7 and (3) the WAIS-III test provides a valid or reliable measurement of the petitioner’s I.Q. 2. The Meaning of “Actually Innocent of the Offense” Assuming arguendo that the test results from the WAIS-III do constitute “new scientific evidence,” the petitioner must nevertheless demonstrate that these results establish his actual innocence “of the offense or offenses for which [he] was convicted.” The petitioner does not argue that his alleged mental retardation proves his innocence of his underlying crime of murder; rather, he urges this Court to adopt an expanded meaning of this phrase to include “actual innocence of or ineligibility for the death penalty.” As support, the petitioner cites the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992), where the Court held that a prisoner could establish his actual sentencing innocence if the prisoner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, absent a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state law. Id. at 336. The Proper Interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-30-217(a)(2) If the petitioner’s broad definition of “actually innocent of the offense or offenses for which the petitioner was convicted” were adopted to include “innocent of capital punishment,” such a judicial construction would clearly and unduly expand the statute’s coverage beyond its intended scope. A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that courts should seek to ascertain and give effect to the intention and purpose of the General Assembly. The General Assembly has explicitly qualified the term “actually innocent” in subsection (a)(2) with the clause, “of the offense or offenses for which the petitioner was convicted,” (emphasis added), leaving little doubt as to what the prisoner must demonstrate. The legislature is presumed to use each word in a statute deliberately, and the use of each word conveys some intent and has a specific meaning and purpose. Browder v. Morris, 975 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tenn. 1998). Indeed, there seems little question that the legislature applied subsection (a)(2) to mean that the prisoner must demonstrate actual innocence of the crime or crimes for which he was convicted and not merely his sentence. If the legislature had intended the petitioner’s broader definition, it would have included the language used in subsection (a)(3), which explicitly allows a prisoner to seek relief “from a sentence that was enhanced.” (emphasis added). This interpretation is consistent with the repeated usage within the Post-Conviction Procedure Act of the terms “offense,” “sentence,” and “conviction.” It is a general rule of statutory construction that where the same language is used repeatedly in the same context, it is presumed to contain the same meaning throughout the statute. Cf. Madison Suburban Util. Dist. v. Carson, 191 7 Dr. A dler testified in his affidavit that the WAIS-III “retains the same format as its predecessor” but has “developed new norms.” -9- Tenn. 300, 305, 232 S.W.2d 277, 279 (1950). Significantly, these terms are used according to their ordinary and well-known meanings, as evidenced both by clarifying language in the statute and by their use both in the disjunctive and in the conjunctive. A prime example of our legislature using the terms “offense” and “sentence” according to their separate and distinct meanings is found in section 39-13-203(c), which requires the court to determine whether a defendant is mentally retarded “at the time of the offense of first degree murder.” (emphasis added). Moreover, in subsection (d) of this same provision, if a defendant found guilty of first degree murder is also found to have been mentally retarded at the time of the offense, then the jury “shall fix the punishment in a separate sentencing proceeding.” See also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-220(a) (requiring this Court to set an execution date upon affirming a conviction and sentence of death on direct appeal) (emphasis added); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-203 (“Relief under this part shall be granted when the conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgement of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee . . . .”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, it is clear that the General Assembly intended the term “offense” to mean nothing more than the underlying crimes for which the petitioner was convicted. See, e.g., Hodge v. State, No. 03C01-9708-CR-00332, 1998 WL 283100, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. June 3, 1998) (rejecting defendant’s attempts to prove mental incompetency by introducing mental health records dating back to 1966 but only first discovered in 1996 as failing to establish “actual innocence” of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted). This interpretation fits most logically within the Act as a whole. It is difficult to conceive that the legislature would distort the ordinary definition of the term in one subsection of the statute but to clearly apply its plain meaning in all other provisions. Consequently, to prevent such an anomalous interpretation, subsection (a)(2) must be construed to require the petitioner to prove his actual innocence of the crimes for which he was convicted. Sawyer v. Whitley and “Actual Innocence” The petitioner urges this Court to adopt the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338 (1992), thereby expanding the definition of “actually innocent of the offense” in section 40-30-217(a)(2) to include “innocent of the death penalty.” Although we may look to federal interpretation of similar federal laws for guidance in enforcing our own statutes, we are neither bound by nor limited by federal law when interpreting our Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Indeed, even assuming that the United States Supreme Court’s application of federal habeas law is even remotely persuasive to this Court’s interpretation of the Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure statute, it is important to note at the outset that our General Assembly adopted a more narrow definition of the “actual innocence” exception in section 40-30-217(a)(2) than was relied on by the Sawyer Court. In Sawyer, the defendant alleged that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would occur absent federal review of his abusive and successive federal habeas corpus claims on the merits. He argued that as a result of the ineffective assistance of counsel, certain evidence was withheld from the jury during the sentencing phase of his trial. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 338. The defendant asserted -10- that because this evidence was unconstitutionally kept from the jury, he was ineligible for the death penalty and therefore actually innocent of his capital sentence. Addressing the meaning of “actual innocence,”8 the Court concluded that “actual innocence” means “innocent of death” and is a “very narrow exception . . . subject to determination by relatively objective standards.” Id. at 341. Nevertheless, the Court found the “actually innocent” exception inapplicable because the psychological evidence allegedly withheld from the jury did not relate to his guilt or innocence of the crime or to the aggravating factors found by the jury that made him eligible for capital punishment. Id. at 348-49. However, under our General Assembly’s more narrow definition of the phrase “actually innocent,” a petitioner who files a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition based on new scientific evidence is required to demonstrate actual innocence of the underlying crimes for which he was convicted. Courts interpreting similarly worded statutes have also declined to expand the plain meaning of the language to allow a petitioner relief from a capital sentence. For example, federal habeas corpus law has been recently amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 105, 110 Stat. 1214 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 22559), to allow a prisoner to file a second habeas petition only if “newly discovered evidence . . . would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense.” Relying upon this Congressional amendment, the Seventh Circuit has denied a prisoner’s attempt to file a successive section 2255 motion for merely asserting his actual sentencing innocence rather than his innocence of his underlying crime. As the court explained, The “actual innocence” exception of the prior law was judge-made, and so its contours were appropriately judge-fashioned and permissibly judge-expanded. The exception in the new law is graven in statutory language that could not be any clearer. . . . [T]he absence of any indication in the legislative history that “offense” was being used in some special sense different from its ordinary meaning [makes it] highly unlikely that Congress intended the word to bear a special meaning. Hope v. United States, 108 F.3d 119, 120 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1287, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 1997). 8 The term “actual innocence” as used in federal jurisprudence has its origins in a trio of 1986 United States Supreme Court cases addressing the exceptions unde r which a habeas petitioner could have the merits of a procedurally barred claim heard. Specifically, the Court held in Murray v. Carrier, the seco nd ca se in the trilogy, that to p revent a “miscarriage of justice,” “where a constitutional violation has proba bly resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the [petitioner’s abusive, successive, or defaulted habeas corp us writ] even in the ab sence of a sho wing of cause for the p rocedural default.” 477 U.S. 478 , 496 (1986) (emp hasis ad ded ). 9 Prior to the amendme nts, section 2255 o riginally provided in pertinent part, “The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motio n for similar relief on behalf of the same p risoner.” 28 U.S.C. § 225 5 (1994 ). -11- Consequently, I reject the petitioner’s submission for a broader interpretation of the “actually innocent” exception as used by the General Assembly in section 40-30-217(a)(2). Because the petitioner has not met the standard demonstrating that the WAIS-III test results establish his actual innocence of the crime of first degree murder, I would deny his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition on procedural grounds alone. C. CONSIDERATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS The majority holds that considerations of “fundamental fairness” dictate that the petitioner have a meaningful opportunity to raise his substantive constitutional claim. Declining to be bound by what it feels are the “technical” mandates of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act and Supreme Court Rule 28 governing waiver of issues, the majority has now given the petitioner an evidentiary hearing, even though the petitioner has never been statutorily entitled to receive this hearing in the first instance. Nevertheless, the majority grants the petitioner an evidentiary hearing so as to provide him “due process of law.” I disagree because in my view, the petitioner has already been fully afforded due process of law. Until today’s unfortunate change in the law, no defendant has previously possessed a federal or state constitutional right to collaterally attack his or her conviction in state court. Instead, as this Court has often recognized, the “state may erect reasonable procedural requirements for triggering the right to [such] an adjudication.” See Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 207-08 (Tenn. 1992). Indeed, the state may even “terminate a [post-conviction] claim for failure to comply with a reasonable procedural rule without violating due process rights.” Id. at 208 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 (1982)). The only due process protection afforded a defendant in the post-conviction context is that a procedural rule cannot deny the defendant an “‘opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” See House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705, 711 (Tenn. 1995) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)) (emphasis in original). So long as the policies reflected in a procedural requirement afford the defendant a fair and reasonable opportunity to present a claim, then the defendant may not assert that his due process rights have been violated. See Burford, 845 S.W.2d at 208. I cannot agree that considerations of fundamental fairness dictate that we bypass the statutory requirements for obtaining a hearing under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. First, the petitioner cannot establish his substantive eligibility for a hearing under any subsection of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-217(a), and I know of no authority that permits a court to reopen a postconviction petition when the defendant does not meet any of the statutory criteria necessary for reopening. Indeed, I find it somewhat anomalous to conclude, as the majority apparently does today, that due process of law somehow entitles the petitioner an opportunity to reopen his post-conviction petition, even though he is not entitled to such a hearing under the statute, and even though due process would not compel the legislature to provide for such a hearing in the first instance. Given the sweeping nature of the majority’s new “fundamental fairness” doctrine, I am concerned whether the statutory requirements to receive a post-conviction hearing retain any meaning at all. -12- But even if due process were to allow a hearing when the petitioner did not meet the statutory requirements for obtaining a hearing, I disagree that considerations of fundamental fairness are applicable. First, the petitioner has not been denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard on his substantive constitutional claim. Significantly, at his 1997 post-conviction hearing, the petitioner was not restricted by the trial court from raising the substantive constitutional issue, and the record contains no indication that he tried to raise this issue but was inappropriately limited in his ability to present evidence to support his claims for relief. Indeed, though not constitutionally required, the petitioner was also afforded the assistance of counsel in asserting and litigating his claims. As such, the petitioner received everything that “fundamental fairness” requires him to receive: the opportunity to be heard on his claim. The majority’s holding to the contrary notwithstanding, the petitioner’s own failure to present the claim as a basis for relief is not tantamount to his being denied the opportunity to present the claim. Second, unlike all of our previous cases invoking the “fundamental fairness” doctrine in the post-conviction context, the petitioner’s failure to raise the substantive constitutional claim was not due to circumstances beyond his own control. In previous cases where this Court has granted a postconviction hearing based upon due process grounds, the defendant was confronted with circumstances beyond his control that prevented him from asserting a claim. See Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Nix, 40 S.W.3d 459 (Tenn. 2001); Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000); Watkins v. State, 903 S.W.2d 302 (Tenn. 1995); Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1992). In this case, however, the ability to present and litigate the substantive constitutional issue was entirely within the petitioner’s own control. Consequently, I disagree with the majority that “fundamental fairness” now requires that the petitioner be given a second bite at this constitutional apple.