Opinion ID: 87940
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: She was ascertained and certain.

Text: 3. The estate was limited, to take effect in her absolutely, upon the death of her father. 4. That was an event which must unavoidably happen by the efflux of time. 5. Nothing but her death, before the death of her father, would defeat the remainder limited to her. 6. She had a fixed right of property on the death of the devisor. The period of enjoyment only was deferred and uncertain. 7. The time of enjoyment in possession depended upon the death of her mother. The right was in nowise dependent on that event. 8. Upon the death of her father, she surviving him, her estate, before defeasible, became indefeasible and absolute. We are thus brought to the conclusion, upon technical as well as untechnical grounds, that Mary Jane Barr had, at the time of her death, an indefeasible estate of remainder in fee in the premises in controversy. In the view we have taken of this case, the doctrine of shifting uses can have no application; we therefore forbear to advert to the rules of law relating to that subject. IV. Mary Jane Barr having died unmarried and intestate, it remains to inquire to whom her estate passed. The descent cast was governed by the statute of December 30th, 1815. The first section only applies to the subject. The first part of the fourth clause of that section is as follows: 4. If there be neither brother nor sister of the intestate of the blood of the ancestor from whom the estate came, or their legal representatives, and if the ancestor from whom the estate came be deceased, the estate shall pass to the brothers and sisters of the ancestor from whom the estate came, or their legal representatives. This gave the property to the brothers and sisters of the testator, or their legal representatives. The language of this clause is plain and unambiguous. There is nothing in the context, rightly considered, which qualifies, or affects it. There is, we think, no room for construction. [] We concur entirely in the views of the eminent counsel, whose professional opinions, long since written, have been submitted to us. We think the point hardly admits of discussion. If there could be any doubt on the subject, it is removed by the act of 1835, which substitutes for the rule of descent here under consideration, the one which we are asked to apply. Were we to adopt the construction claimed by the plaintiff's counsel, instead of adjudicating we should legislate. That we have no power to do. Our function is to execute the law, not to make it. The instructions given by the court to the jury were in accordance with the views we have expressed. We find no error in the record, and the judgment is AFFIRMED.