Opinion ID: 1604539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: CUMULATIVE ERROR UNDER STATE v. GUNSBY, 670 So.2d 920 (Fla.1996)

Text: In Sweet's third claim on appeal, he asserts that this Court must consider the evidence concerning Sweet's innocence disclosed during the evidentiary hearing in conjunction with Sweet's allegations of ineffective assistance. Specifically, Sweet asserts that because Solomon Hansbury, a witness at trial who claimed that Sweet confessed to the murder while they were in jail together, recanted his testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the trial court erred in failing to consider the cumulative effect of all the evidence not presented at Sweet's trial. In making this claim, Sweet relies upon this Court's decision in State v. Gunsby, 670 So.2d 920 (Fla.1996). In Gunsby the Court explained: [W]hen we consider the cumulative effect of the testimony presented at the rule 3.850 hearing and the admitted Brady violations on the part of the State, we are compelled to find, under the unique circumstances of this case, that confidence in the outcome of Gunsby's original trial has been undermined and that a reasonable probability exists of a different outcome. Id. at 924. However, before we engage in a cumulative error analysis under Gunsby, we must first consider Hansbury's testimony. The trial court expressly rejected Hansbury's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, in which he recanted his earlier statement, as incredible. As this Court explained in Armstrong v. State, 642 So.2d 730, 735 (Fla.1994), in rejecting a new trial based upon recanted testimony: Recantation by a witness called on behalf of the prosecution does not necessarily entitle a defendant to a new trial. In determining whether a new trial is warranted due to recantation of a witness's testimony, a trial judge is to examine all the circumstances of the case, including the testimony of the witnesses submitted on the motion for the new trial. Moreover, recanting testimony is exceedingly unreliable, and it is the duty of the court to deny a new trial where it is not satisfied that such testimony is true. Especially is this true where the recantation involves a confession of perjury. Only when it appears that, on a new trial, the witness's testimony will change to such an extent as to render probable a different verdict will a new trial be granted. (Citations omitted.) Certainly, the testimony of Hansbury standing alone would not rise to the level of requiring the granting of a new trial, and Sweet does not contend that he was entitled to a new trial based solely on Hansbury's recantation. Considering all of the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing in this case, we reject Sweet's claim under Gunsby. As noted above, Sweet has failed to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim with regard to the guilt-phase proceedings. Therefore, we deny relief on this claim.