Opinion ID: 2271216
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: faretta/hill hearing.

Text: To trigger a Faretta/Hill hearing, one must at least ask to represent one's self or to act as one's own co-counsel and then proceed unequivocally. A disdainful filing of pro se motions in violation of the trial court's order, even against advice of counselall the while professing that you do not want to represent yourselfdoes not trigger the trial court's advisory obligations, absent an unequivocal expression of one's desire to waive, at least in part, one's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Section Eleven of the Kentucky Constitution. See Matthews v. Commonwealth, 168 S.W.3d 14, 23 (Ky.2005) (Under the circumstances presented here, Faretta [and] Hill, supra, have no application.). It is, however, a cunning way to try and set up reversible error. Thus, as we noted in Matthews, [u]nlike the defendants in Hill, Faretta, and similar cases, Matthews did not participate as counsel at trial in front of the jury. He did not ask questions of the witnesses nor did he make opening or closing statements. His only participation upon being made cocounsel was to file pro se motions [outside the presence of the jury] and, like other defendants, confer with his counsel. Matthews never waived his right to counsel in any manner. [Thus, no] Faretta [or Hill] hearing was required in this circumstance. 168 S.W.3d at 23. Absent the recognition of such a prerequisite, this case could easily turn into St. Clair V (Ky.) or VI (Ky.), rather than St. Clair IV (Ky.)which it is. [2] In December 2004, prior to the sentencing phase retrial ordered by this Court in St. Clair II (Ky.), St. Clair began filing a series of approximately seventeen (17) pro se pre-trial motions, the first of which included a handwritten check-the-box notation designating himself as Lead Counsel. Thereafter, at the hearing, as the trial judge started to inquire as to this designation, St. Clair interrupted and unequivocally stated, I have changed my mind and withdraw that motion. [3] In fact, the order entered following this hearing on January 12, 2005, reflects: It was agreed by counsel for the Commonwealth and counsel for the Defendant, along with the Defendant personally, that no further Pro Se motions would be filed by the Defendant or considered by the Court and, that if any Pro Se motions are filed, they should be directed to counsel for the Defendant. St. Clair, however, continued to file pro se motions with the court. Thereafter, in response to his continuing pro se filings and, in particular, a subsequent motion to fire his attorney, the Commonwealth, at the August 10, 2005 pre-trial hearing, stated that [i]n his Pro Se Motion St. Clair does not make clear whether he's wanting new counsel, whether he wants to proceed pro se, whether he wants hybrid counsel. . . [I] don't know whether he's going to withdraw [this motion] today. But if he's going to press this motion then we need to find out what exactly it is he wants other than a complaint in general about his lawyers. In response, St. Clair again stated that he did not want to represent himself but that he wanted new attorneys. [4] Following the hearing, his motion to discharge counsel was denied. Moreover, St. Clair makes no allegation that he acted as his own counsel or co-counsel in front of the jury during the penalty phase retrialclaiming only, that [s]ince both the trial court and the defense attorneys acquiesced in St. Clair's hybrid representation, it was incumbent upon the court to hold a hearing. This, however, avoids any assertion that St. Clair acted as such during the trial in front of the jury. It also avoids the essential precursor for a Faretta/Hill hearingthe unequivocal request, coupled with the necessary intent to make the required waiver. In Winstead v. Commonwealth, we noted: Because the assistance of counsel is generally regarded as a crucial component of a fair trial, the right to that assistance has been characterized as a fundamental constitutional right. For the same reason, courts indulge `every reasonable presumption against a waiver of counsel.' To overcome that presumption and conduct his own defense, a defendant must clearly and unequivocally seek to represent himself. It is not enough to express dissatisfaction with counsel or to request different counsel; the defendant, rather, must unequivocally ask to proceed pro se. If a defendant unequivocally invokes his right to defend himself, the trial court is then obliged to conduct a hearing to ensure that the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is both knowing and voluntary. The court's obligation does not arise, however, unless and until the defendant clearly invokes his pro se right. Because that right does not implicate constitutional fair-trial considerations, moreover, the trial court has no sua sponte duty to inform the defendant of his right to proceed pro se. We are not persuaded that Winstead's pro se motions in his letter to the trial court overcame his presumed reliance on counsel. 283 S.W.3d 678, 683 (Ky.2009) (internal citations omitted). Both Faretta and Hill hinge on the proposition that in order to proceed pro se, or with hybrid counsel, one must be willing and able to waive the full benefit of representative counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Section Eleven of the Kentucky Constitution. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (Faretta clearly and unequivocally declared to the trial judge that he wanted to represent himself and did not want counsel.); Hill, 125 S.W.3d at 224 ([O]nce counsel was appointed, Appellant requested only to serve as co-counsel ... so that he could perform the direct and cross-examination of some of the witnesses.). Here, in both instances when the subject matter was addressed, St. Clair reiterated that he did not want to represent himself. Thus, like Matthews, there is no assertion that St. Clair participated as counsel or co-counsel at trial in front of a jury, nor did he ever unequivocally offer to waive his right to counsel. 168 S.W.2d at 23 (His only participation . . . was to file pro se motions and, like other defendants, confer with counsel.). Thus, there is nothing in this record that gives rise to a violation of Faretta/Hill.