Opinion ID: 556527
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issuance of the Warrants

Text: 47 An affidavit in support of the warrant must enable the magistrate to conclude that it would be reasonable to seek the evidence in the place indicated by the affidavit. U.S. v. Hendershot, 614 F.2d 648, 654 (9th Cir.1980) (citations omitted). Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a warrant may issue to seize 48 (1) property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense; or (2) contraband, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed; or (3) property designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as the means for committing a criminal offense. 49 The Supreme Court has said that search warrants should be read in a common sense fashion. United States v. Cardwell, 680 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir.1982) (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965)). A certain deference should be given searches where the law enforcement officers have sought and obtained judicial approval of their actions. This is to avoid a grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants [which] will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 746, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965). [I]n a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustained where without one it would fail. Id. at 106, 85 S.Ct. at 744. 50 We review the district court's probable cause determination to ensure that the magistrate had 'a substantial basis ... for conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed. United States v. Rodriguez, 869 F.2d 479, 484 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 736, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960))). This standard of review is less probing than de novo review and shows deference to the issuing magistrate's determination. United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir.1986). 51 Appellants assert that, because of the potential for disclosure of privileged communications, searches of attorneys' offices should be subjected to a heightened degree of scrutiny. They first note that we have recognized that clients have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their attorney's office. DeMassa v. Nunez, 770 F.2d 1505, 1506 (9th Cir.1985). They then argue that we should adopt the position taken by the Second Circuit in National City Trading Corp. v. United States, 635 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir.1980). There, the Second Circuit stated that a law office search should be executed with special care to avoid unnecessary intrusion on attorney-client communications. Id. at 1026. 52 The Government agrees that special care should be taken when a search of an attorney's office is involved. The Government argues that the record demonstrates that special care was exercised in the search of Doe Four's offices. 53 The original warrants listed twenty-one individuals or entities, in addition to Doe One, that were the subjects of the search. The district court later struck nine of the names from the list because there was no probable cause that they were involved in the money laundering or drug trafficking schemes. Neither Doe Two nor Doe Four was listed in the warrants as a subject of the search. Thus, the issue is simply whether there was probable cause to believe that the evidence the Government sought would be found in Doe Two's offices at the Doe Four law firm. 54 The supporting affidavit in this case is sufficient to support the finding of probable cause. It states that a confederate of Doe One had confessed to the development of a money laundering scheme involving certain corporations. At the time he was arrested, he possessed $100,000 in cash, a plane ticket to Switzerland, documents relating to several corporations, and correspondence linking Doe One to those corporations. The correspondence was directed to Doe Two's attention at Doe Four's offices. A search of public records linked Doe One with various corporations and individuals. Doe Two was also associated with several of these corporations. Doe Two had told Doe One's wife that files regarding the Liechtenstein corporation were at the law firm. The affidavit also states that Doe One's wife asserted that Doe Two knew of, and assisted in, Doe One's money laundering scheme. 55 It is clear that the district court had a substantial basis in fact upon which to reach a reasonable conclusion that the evidence the Government sought would be found at Doe Two's offices in the Doe Four law firm.