Opinion ID: 155993
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Departure for Substantial Assistance to Authorities

Text: 36 A district court's discretionary decision not to depart downward from the Sentencing Guidelines is unreviewable. See United States v. Munoz, 946 F.2d 729, 730 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 1529-30 (10th Cir.1990). However, we do have jurisdiction to review a sentence if the district court erroneously concluded that it lacked the authority to depart, see United States v. Rowen, 73 F.3d 1061, 1063 (10th Cir.1996); United States v. Maldonado-Campos, 920 F.2d 714, 718 (10th Cir.1990), or if the district court imposed a sentence which violates the law or incorrectly applies the guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a); 1 United States v. Belt, 89 F.3d 710, 714 (10th Cir.1996). 37 Mr. Florez claims that the district court improperly considered the government's agreement with defendant to not indict him for using or carrying a gun in denying the downward departure and that it thereby incorrectly applied the guidelines. While we have previously rejected an appellant's attempt to evade the jurisdictional bar by characterizing the district court's refusal to depart [under § 5K1.1] as a misapplication of the guidelines rather than as an exercise of discretion, United States v. Fitzherbert, 13 F.3d 340, 344 (10th Cir.1993), we believe Mr. Florez's appeal is not such an attempt. We therefore have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and we review de novo the court's application of the guidelines. See United States v. LeRoy, 984 F.2d 1095, 1096 (10th Cir.1993). 38 We find the action of the district court somewhat troubling. The district court spent the vast majority of the two sessions of sentencing hearings focusing on the possible § 924(c) violation and discussing the pre-indictment agreement between defendant and the government as to that violation. While the court was justified in ensuring that correct procedure had been followed, we do not believe it should have held the defendant responsible for any mistakes made by the government in the indictment and plea process. 39 Defendant urges us to reverse and remand to a different district judge for reconsideration of the substantial assistance motion and for resentencing thereon as the Seventh Circuit did in United States v. Lee, 46 F.3d 674 (7th Cir.1995). In Lee, the Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing based on a Rule 35(b) motion because: 40 Lee's rights were not adequately considered by the district judge who conducted a wide-ranging criticism and dialogue on the misconduct of government counsel in the [related cases] and seemed to charge Lee with complicity because he, as a witness in those cases, accepted favors from the government. 41 We do not doubt the concern and sincerity of [the district judge's] ire at government counsel whose conduct required setting aside many [related cases'] defendants' convictions. We doubt, however, that such blame should extend to Lee. What is eminently clear in this proceeding is that Lee, a cooperating witness, has received a very heavy sentence as compared to [related cases'] defendants whose crimes were similar but who have not cooperated. Lee has placed himself in considerable risk and danger in so doing and, as we understand it, is or was under witness protection. 42 Lee, 46 F.3d at 681. 43 While we have many of the same concerns the Seventh Circuit had with respect to the sentencing of the defendant, the sentence in Mr. Florez's case reflects a less severe situation than that in Lee. We are no doubt concerned that the district court focused much attention on the prosecutor's discretion not to indict Mr. Florez for the possible § 924(c) violation and that it was less concerned with making specific findings as to the factors set forth in § 5K1.1(a), p.s.: the significance and usefulness of the assistance; the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of the defendant's aid; the nature and extent of the assistance; any injury or risk of injury to defendant that may have resulted from his cooperation; and the timeliness of the assistance. 44 However, the factors listed in § 5K1.1(a), p.s., are not exclusive or exhaustive. That section dictates that the appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to  the factors listed above. Id. (emphasis added). 18 U.S.C. § 3553 provides other relevant factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, including: the history and characteristics of the defendant; the seriousness of the offense; the need for just punishment; deterrence; protection of the public; correctional treatment; guideline patterns and policy statements; sentencing disparity; and the need to provide restitution. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Viewing the sentencing hearing as a whole, we conclude that the court considered many factors in making its sentencing decision and that to the extent it considered the possible § 924(c) indictment and the pre-indictment agreement, it did so in determining whether a reduced sentence would be appropriate in light of all of the defendant's actions. In the end, Mr. Florez was not harmed by the court's inquiry into the side issues. 45 In no way do we suggest that it is appropriate for a district court to weigh against a defendant the procedural mistakes that the government may have made or the questionable discretionary decisions made by the prosecutor. 46