Opinion ID: 2394898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the safety appliance act

Text: Relying on Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 189, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 1034, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949), Santa Fe argues that an SAA violation is negligence per se encompassed by the indemnity agreement's express reference to negligence. HL & P, however, contends that a violation of the SAA creates strict liability not contemplated by the parties' agreement. Because of the confusion among courts as to the effect of a violation of the SAA, there is authority to support both arguments. [2] Some courts hold the view that SAA violations result in strict liability. E.g., Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. Int'l Paper Co., 824 F.2d 403, 405 (5th Cir.1987) (A railroad is strictly liable under the FELA for injury caused by a violation of the SAA.); Colorado Milling & Elevator Co. v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 350 F.2d 273, 275 (8th Cir.1965) (rejecting the argument that SAA violations are negligence per se and holding that the SAA imposes an absolute duty in no way dependent upon negligence), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 989, 86 S.Ct. 563, 15 L.Ed.2d 476 (1966). Other courts have held that a violation of the SAA is negligence per se. E.g., Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R. v. Alva Coal Corp., 365 F.2d 49, 54 (7th Cir.1966) (holding that violations of the SAA constitute negligence per se); Dougall v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry., 207 F.2d 843, 848 (9th Cir.1953) (holding that a violation of the SAA is negligence), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 904, 74 S.Ct. 429, 98 L.Ed. 1063 (1954). This Court also has noted in passing that a violation of the SAA is negligence per se. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. Evans, 151 Tex. 340, 250 S.W.2d 385, 392 (1952). However, we believe the better view is that a SAA-based FELA claim is a strict liability claim. This approach best comports with the United States Supreme Court rulings on this issue which early swept all issues of negligence out of cases under the Safety Appliance Act. O'Donnell, 338 U.S. at 390, 70 S.Ct. at 204. The SAA imposes an absolute duty on carriers which is in no way dependent upon negligence and for the proximate results of which there is liabilitya liability that cannot be escaped by proof of care or diligence. Id.; see also Crane, 395 U.S. at 166, 89 S.Ct. at 1708 (holding that an injured employee is required to prove only the statutory violation and thus is relieved of the burden of proving negligence); Carter v. Atlanta & St. A.B. Ry., 338 U.S. 430, 434, 70 S.Ct. 226, 229, 94 L.Ed. 236 (1949) (holding that the SAA imposes an absolute duty unrelated to negligence). Thus, we hold that a railroad is strictly liable under the FELA for violations of the SAA. We overrule Evans to the extent it holds otherwise.