Opinion ID: 47133
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Williams I

Text: Regarding Williams I, Williams first argues that the district court erred when it considered his prior arrests when deciding to upwardly depart from the otherwise applicable guideline range. He asserts that in considering his arrest record in addition to his prior convictions, the court violated his Sixth Amendment right because it imposed a sentence that was not based solely on facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by him. Additionally, Williams asserts that the court abused its discretion in granting the upward departure because the court was 3 prohibited from considering his arrest record under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. Williams did not object to the use of his arrest record in determining his sentence before the district court. As a result, we review this claim for plain error. United States v. Maurice, 69 F.3d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1995). Plain error occurs when there is (1) an error; (2) that is plain or obvious; (3) that affects the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993). Section 4A1.3 of the guidelines provides for an upward departure if a defendant’s criminal history category substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or likelihood for recidivism. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1). In determining the basis for an upward departure, a court may consider, among other things, “prior similar adult criminal conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(2)(E). The court, however, cannot consider “a prior arrest record itself.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(3). We have indicated that this prohibition implies that “an arrest record standing alone is not sufficiently reliable to support a departure.” United States v. Williams, 989 F.2d 1137, 1142 (11th Cir. 1993). A court can rely on a presentence investigation report (“PSI”) that lists arrests if the PSI provides the facts that 4 prompted the arrests. United States v. Hernandez, 160 F.3d 661, 670 (11th Cir. 1998). After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court did not commit an error, plain or otherwise, when it relied on Williams’s prior arrest history in deciding to impose an upward departure. The district court did not rely on Williams’s arrest record itself as the PSI provided information regarding eleven of Williams’s prior arrests, nine of which involved conduct similar to that for which Williams was convicted in the cases before the district court. Additionally, the district court’s decision to depart was not based solely on Williams’s arrest record. The court also considered that Williams had been convicted of 50 felonies and 25 misdemeanors, and that he committed the instant offense almost immediately after he was released from federal custody in a different case, and had state charges pending. Moreover, the district court did not violate Williams’s Sixth Amendment right by relying on his criminal history to impose the upward departure because Williams raised no objections to the PSI’s recitation of his criminal history. Williams’s failure to dispute the facts contained in the PSI operates as an admission of those facts and, since he admitted the facts underlying the upward departure, there is no Sixth Amendment violation. See United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2005) (factual statements in PSI were 5 deemed admitted as true because defendant raised no objections to them); United States v. Petho, 409 F.3d 1277, 1280 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Because Petho admitted to the facts underlying these enhancements, there is no Sixth Amendment error.”). Second, Williams contends that the extent of the district court’s upward departure was unreasonable because the court did not give him notice as to the particular prior convictions it was considering in evaluating the upward departure and the court improperly relied on his prior arrest record when upwardly departing. Williams argues that the court’s departure was also unreasonable because it used an improper method for determining the degree of the departure when it failed to move incrementally down the sentencing table. Because Williams failed to object to the reasonableness of the upward departure imposed by the district court on the grounds he asserts in this claim, we review this claim for plain error. Maurice, 69 F.3d at 1557. Section 4A1.3 of the guidelines instructs that in upwardly departing from a category VI, “the court should structure the departure by moving incrementally down the sentencing table to the next higher offense level in Criminal History Category VI until it finds a guideline range appropriate to the case.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(4)(B). We have held that district courts do not have to “explicitly discuss their reasons for 6 bypassing incremental offense level sentencing ranges” when imposing a criminal history departure above a category VI. United States v. Dixon, 71 F.3d 380, 383 (11th Cir. 1995). In Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 135-139, 111 S. Ct. 2182, 2186-2187, 115 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1991), the Supreme Court held that a district court must give notice that it is contemplating an upward departure before it imposes a departure on a ground not identified in the PSI or in a pre-hearing submission by the government. Id. We conclude from the record that the district court did not plainly err in imposing a 13-level upward departure based on Williams’s criminal history. The court did not use an improper method for determining the degree of the departure in this case as it acknowledged that it had to move incrementally down the sentencing table to determine the applicable guideline range. The court considered Williams’s criminal history and the factors set out in § 3553(a), and, based on these considerations, determined that an offense level of 23 yielded an appropriate guideline range of 92 to 115 months imprisonment. After again considering the factors in § 3553(a), the court imposed a 92-month sentence. The court did not have to discuss each offense level it bypassed in imposing the departure. Additionally, as discussed above, the district court did not err in relying, in part, on Williams’s arrest record in departing. Furthermore, contrary to Williams’s 7 assertion, the court was not required to give him notice of the upward departure because the PSI identified the departure. In any event, the court gave Williams notice that it was contemplating an upward departure at all of his sentencing hearings. To the extent Williams asserts that the court should have notified him of the specific convictions it considered in evaluating the departure, the court’s decision was not based on particular convictions, but was based on Williams’s overall criminal history in general, and the court informed Williams of such. As a result, the 13-level departure imposed by the court was not plainly erroneous. Next, Williams argues that he was not put on notice as to the extent of any potential departure because no viable basis for an upward departure existed as a result of the nature of his offense and related conduct. He contends that the degree and extent of the upward departure violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because the sentence imposed by the district court was higher than realistically imagined at the time he committed the offenses. Because the crimes were committed pre-Booker, the Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory and Williams contends it was not imaginable that he would receive the sentence he received based on an advisory guideline scheme which resulted from a decision announced after he committed the offenses. Moreover, Williams argues that his sentence also violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because the court considered a prohibited factor in determining his 8 sentence. We generally review claims that a sentence was imposed in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause de novo. United States v. Abraham, 386 F.3d 1033, 1037 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 417 (2005). However, because Williams did not raise this claim before the district court, we review for plain error. Id. “The ex post facto clause prohibits the enactment of statutes which . . . make more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission . . .” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). Two elements are needed to find an ex post facto violation: (1) the law must be retrospective, meaning it applies to events occurring before its enactment; and (2) the offender must be disadvantaged by it. Id. At the time Williams committed his offense, the U.S. Code provided for a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 513 (2002). Furthermore, the guidelines provided that a district court could upwardly depart from the otherwise applicable guideline range if a defendant’s criminal history category significantly under-represented the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that he would commit further crimes. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (Nov. 1, 2001). The guidelines also provided that in making its departure decision, the court could consider prior similar conduct that did not result in a conviction. Id. The retroactive application of Booker in this case does not violate ex post 9 facto principles. Williams had fair warning that he faced up to ten years imprisonment for the offense he committed, that the court had the discretion under the guidelines to increase his sentence based on his criminal history, and that the court could consider his arrest record in deciding whether to depart. Accordingly, we hold that his 92-month sentence does not violate ex post facto principles. Finally, Williams asserts that the government breached the plea agreement in the instant case when it pursued the charges in Williams II. He contends that he was induced into entering into the plea agreement by the “No Further Charges” clause because he believed it limited the government’s ability to assert new charges based on the investigation that occurred before he entered into the plea agreement, and he believed that the government would have asserted any charges from that investigation in the instant case. He contends that the government also breached the plea agreement because it suggested that the court sentence him above the applicable guideline range. He asserts that the government denied him the benefit of his bargain because it was not only an unpersuasive advocate for the plea agreement, but effectually argued against it. Although Williams filed a motion for specific performance in Williams II requesting that the court dismiss the indictment in that case based on the plea agreement in the instant case, Williams did not assert in either case that the 10 government breached the plea agreement. For this reason, we review his claim for plain error. United States v. Thayer, 204 F.3d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 2000). Williams fails to show that the government’s alleged breach of the plea agreement constitutes plain error because he fails to establish that it affected his substantial rights. The record reflects that the institution of Williams II did not affect the court’s decision to depart. During Williams’s first sentencing hearing, only the instant case was before the court, and the court stated at that time that it was considering an upward departure because of Williams’s extensive criminal history. Further, although the government may have potentially breached the plea agreement when it suggested that the court sentence Williams within a range higher than that otherwise applicable, the record reflects that the court did not understand the government’s comments to be a motion for an upward departure, and, in any event, the court found that the sentence recommended by the government was nevertheless “dramatically inadequate.” The court’s statements during the sentencing hearings make it apparent that from the outset the court did not consider any of the guideline ranges discussed to be appropriate. In fact, the court indicated that it had considered imposing the statutory maximum sentence, which greatly exceeded the sentencing range recommended by the government. As a result, Williams cannot show that any potential breach of the plea agreement by 11 the government affected his substantial rights.