Opinion ID: 1879528
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: intent was a material issue and titus' prior burglary conviction was admissible

Text: State moved to admit Titus' 1978 burglary conviction as a prior bad act under SDCL 19-12-5. The trial court ruled that evidence of the fact of the prior burglary conviction was admissible because Titus' defense was lack of specific intent and/or diminished capacity and that the evidence was relevant and highly probative. On appeal, Titus claims that the prior bad act evidence was irrelevant and the probative value did not substantially outweigh the prejudice. Initially, State erroneously argues that SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule 404(b)) is an inclusionary rule which permits the use of relevant prior crimes or acts for all purposes other than to prove character and conformity thereto. Titus argues that a conviction in 1978, eight years prior to the crime now charged, is too remote to be probative on the issue of intent. Titus cites several cases holding crimes committed five to thirteen years prior to the crime at issue are too remote. State v. Iron Shell, 336 N.W.2d 372 (S.D.1983); United States v. Heater, 689 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Davis, 657 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.1981); United States v. Corey, 566 F.2d 429 (2d Cir.1977). State argues that remoteness is a determination based on the totality of the circumstances. As demonstrated by the decisions noted above, a crime committed eight years before the crime charged may be too remote to be probative on issues raised at trial. However, remoteness must be considered with other factors, such as reliability and necessity, in determining probative value. The trial court must consider the nature of the offenses, the similarity of occasions and locations as well as the time elapsed between incidents. Davis, supra at 639. State correctly points out that this evidence related to a disputed material issue in this case  intent. Titus did not deny the entry or the acts, only the intent to commit the acts. Titus claimed he was suffering from an alcohol-induced blackout on the evening of December 18th and was incapable of forming the specific intent necessary to commit burglary. Intent is one of the specific exceptions to the general rule against admissibility of prior bad acts. Titus raised the issue of intent. It was clearly a material issue at trial and the trial court so found. Titus also claims that State failed to demonstrate a sufficient factual similarity between the 1978 crime and the current charge. In 1978, Titus entered an occupied house and took a CB radio from a closet. He was caught in the act. State argues that there are even stronger similarities between the two incidents: Titus knew the victims and had been in their homes; the two burglaries took place within the same general area of Rapid City  the area where Titus lived; in both cases, entry was gained through a back door facing the alley between Haines and Wood Avenues; Titus was aware of periods of time when the victims were away from their homes; electronic equipment was stolen in both incidents; and both crimes were committed shortly before midnight. In reviewing these arguments, we believe the trial court was correct in determining that the prior burglary conviction was relevant evidence. Although eight years is a considerable period of time, the prior conviction was not too remote to be probative when the factual similarities between the crimes, the reliability of the evidence, and the relevancy and necessity of the evidence are considered. Titus next argues that even if the 1978 burglary conviction was relevant, its probative value did not substantially outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice. The unfair prejudice, according to Titus, is the belief or inference that the jury convicted him because they perceived him as a bad person with the propensity to commit crimes. State counters that any prejudice resulting from the admission of the prior burglary was that which resulted from the legitimate probative force of the evidence. See, Iron Shell, supra at 375. State also points to the fact that the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction as to the proper use to be made of the admitted evidence. We agree that the admission of a prior conviction will usually result in some prejudice to the defendant. However, here the prejudice was not unfair. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the 1978 burglary conviction and in instructing the jury on the limited purpose for which the evidence was to be considered. This was a proper case and use of prior bad acts evidence.