Opinion ID: 1058524
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cause of Action for Inverse Condemnation

Text: We have described the nature of an inverse condemnation claim as follows: [A]n inverse condemnation action is a specific type of proceeding based on a constitutionally created right connected to the taking or damaging of property by the government. To take or damage property in the constitutional sense does not require that the sovereign actually invade or disturb the property. Taking or damaging property in the constitutional sense means that the governmental action adversely affects the landowner's ability to exercise a right connected to the property. Prince William County v. Omni Homes, 253 Va. 59, 72, 481 S.E.2d 460, 467 (1997); City of Lynchburg v. Peters, 156 Va. 40, 48-49, 157 S.E. 769, 772 (1931); Lambert v. City of Norfolk, 108 Va. 259, 265, 61 S.E. 776, 778 (1908). Thus, an action for inverse condemnation is an action seeking redress for the government's action in limiting property rights the landowner holds. In that regard, the act giving rise to the [claim] is not an act aimed at the property, but rather an act that limits the landowner's ability to exercise his property rights without paying the landowner for that limitation. Richmeade, L.P. v. City of Richmond, 267 Va. 598, 602-03, 594 S.E.2d 606, 609 (2004); see also Burns v. Board of Supervisors, 218 Va. 625, 627, 238 S.E.2d 823, 825 (1977). Kitchen avers that the circuit court erred in holding, as a matter of law, that a single occurrence of temporary flooding cannot support a cause of action for inverse condemnation. However, even if it were assumed that the circuit court was correct, Kitchen contends that the motion for judgment contained more than sufficient allegations of regularly recurring flooding to have survived demurrer even on that point. Kitchen contends that Counts I, II and III sufficiently state a cause of action for inverse condemnation because sixty-eight (68) separate paragraphs of allegations . . . covering some nineteen (19) pages of text in the motion for judgment are far more particularized and specific than the threshold pleading requirements for a sufficient complaint in Virginia (citing Burns, 218 Va. at 629, 238 S.E.2d at 826; and Bell Atlantic-Virginia, Inc. v. Arlington County, 254 Va. 60, 486 S.E.2d 297 (1997)). Kitchen argues that the circuit court, by requiring specific allegations of when, how, and to what extent the flooding occurred, imposed an exceptionally heightened and highly specific burden of pleading. In response, the City, contends it is clear that the First Amended Motion for Judgment failed to state a claim notwithstanding its conclusory allegation that flooding of some unspecified magnitude occurred in the vicinity of the three [S]ubdivisions on a regular basis. The City asserts that Kitchen was -required to allege either permanent flooding or regularly recurring flooding on the property to state a legally cognizable claim. The City further argues that Kitchen's motion for judgment does not involve a locality's failure to accept responsibility or to maintain drainage and is based on damages from an act of God. The City contends no liability can be imposed in that circumstance [6] We agree with Kitchen. To survive a demurrer, Kitchen was required to plead sufficient facts to constitute a foundation in law for the judgment sought, and not merely conclusions of law, Hubbard, 271 Va. at 122, 624 S.E.2d at 4, which alleged government[ ] action in limiting property rights the landowner`holds. Richmeade, 267 Va. at 603, 594 S.E.2d at 609. Counts I, II and`III of the motion for judgment plainly allege such facts sufficiently to survive the City's demurrer. In his motion for judgment, Kitchen alleged the City's actions and conduct . . . created and caused the Subdivisions to be the contingent retention or detention pond areas for water overflowing from the Jones Run and Jones Pond areas. In particular, Kitchen pled in paragraph 9 of the motion for judgment that as a direct result of prior governmental action the Subdivisions had been subjected to a series of frequent and regularly recurring flooding, inundations and/or overflows of water from the Jones Run watercourse. Continuing, paragraph 10 pled that earlier actions of the Defendant City of Newport News caused such frequent and regularly recurring flooding of and overflow culminated in the catastrophic flooding on September 15-16, 1999; and have continued to cause regularly recurring flooding of and overflows in and about the aforesaid lands and premises on occasions since and after September 15-16, 1999. (Emphasis in original.) As a consequence of these actions, Kitchen pled the City did effect a taking of Plaintiffs' private real and personal property for public use. (Emphasis in original.) By this taking the City did permanently deprive plaintiffs of their property. The circuit court's conclusion that, as a matter of law, a single occurrence of temporary flooding fails to state a cause of action for inverse condemnation is not before us in this appeal. That conclusion is not relevant to the sustaining of the demurrer because the circuit court recognized the motion for judgment contains allegations of regularly recurring flooding. Coupled with Kitchen's other allegations, as noted above, the circuit court's analysis should have ended there and resulted in the overruling of the City's demurrer. The circuit court's stated reasons for sustaining the demurrer, because the motion for judgment failed to plead flooding in the same place and to the same extent as the flooding that occurred in September, 1999 and whether all or only some of the same parcels of real estate were affected are not relevant to whether the inverse condemnation cause of action was pled. While those items may be items of evidentiary proof at trial, none was necessary for purposes of the cause of action being sufficient to survive demurrer. [7] Richmeade, 267 Va. at 602-03, 594 S.E.2d at 609; Burns, 218 Va. at 627, 238 S.E.2d at 825; Bell Atlantic-Virginia, 254 Va. at 61-63, 486 S.E.2d at 298-99. As the foregoing illustrates, Kitchen did not plead conclusions of law, but alleged specific, factual actions of the City which resulted in a taking of property. Such pleading meets the requirements for stating a cause of action for inverse condemnation as we recognized in Riehmeade. 267 Va. at. 602-03, 594 S.E.2d at 609; See also Burns, 218 Va. at 627, 238 S.E.2d at 825; Bell Atlantic-Virginia, 254 Va. at 61-63, 486 S.E.2d at 298-99. Therefore, the circuit court's judgment concluding that Counts I, II and III fail[ ] to state facts upon which the relief demanded can be granted and sustaining the demurrer was error.