Opinion ID: 1288471
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Express Preemption Analysis

Text: [3] The doctrine of preemption derives from the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution: [T]he laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme law of the land ... any thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; see Berger v. Personal Prods., Inc., 115 Wn.2d 267, 270, 797 P.2d 1148 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991). Federal regulations possess an equally preemptive effect as federal statutes. Hillsborough County., Fla. v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 85 L.Ed.2d 714, 105 S.Ct. 2371 (1985). [4, 5] Controlling any preemption analysis is a presumption against preemption: the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by ... Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress'. Cipollone, 112 S.Ct. at 2617 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 91 L.Ed. 1447, 67 S.Ct. 1146 (1947)). The goal in preemption analysis is the determination of congressional purpose, the ultimate touchstone of the analytic endeavor. Cipollone, 112 S.Ct. at 2617 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504, 55 L.Ed.2d 443, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 1189 (1978)). Congress' intent may be explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose. In the absence of an express congressional command, state law is pre-empted if that law actually conflicts with federal law, or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field `as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.' (Citations omitted.) Cipollone, 112 S.Ct. at 2617. Unquestionably, FIFRA section 136v(b) expressly preempts state labeling requirements. Indeed, in Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, supra , the United States Supreme Court acknowledged in dicta this preemption, holding FIFRA did not preempt local use regulations: As we have also made plain, local use permit regulations  unlike labeling or certification  do not fall within an area that FIFRA's program pre-empts or even plainly addresses.... Mortier, 501 U.S. at 615. [6] The United States Supreme Court recently clarified in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra , the application of the preemption doctrine to a statute containing an express preemption clause similar to that in FIFRA: When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority, there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions.... (Citations omitted.) Cipollone, 112 S.Ct. at 2618. In Cipollone, a majority of the Justices specifically rejected the implied preemption analysis of the lower court. The Court instead employed an express preemption analysis to hold certain common-law tort claims based on failure to warn and inadequate labeling were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act section 5(b), as amended by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Cipollone, 112 S.Ct. at 2618. The trial court in the present case denied Defendant's motion on the issue of preemption on the basis of the implied preemption analysis of pre- Cipollone cases now of questionable authority. Prior to Cipollone, courts generally analyzed FIFRA preemption of failure to warn claims under implied preemption theories and were split in holding such claims preempted, see, e.g., Worm v. American Cyanamid Co . (Worm I), 970 F.2d 1301 (4th Cir.1992); or not preempted, see, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984). The Supreme Court has indicated its disapproval of the use of implied preemption analysis in the FIFRA context; the Court vacated two lower court judgments holding FIFRA impliedly preempted state common-law failure to warn claims and remanded for reconsideration in light of Cipollone. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, vacated and remanded sub nom. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co., 1992 U.S. LEXIS, at , 121 L.Ed.2d 235, 113 S.Ct. 314 (1992); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019 (11th Cir.1991), cert. granted, vacated and remanded sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 1992 U.S. LEXIS, at , 120 L.Ed.2d 892, 112 S.Ct. 3020 (1992). Notably, on remand both courts held FIFRA expressly preempts state failure to warn claims. Arkansas-Platte II, 981 F.2d at 1179; Papas II, 985 F.2d at 520. Of the federal and state courts examining FIFRA preemption of failure to warn claims since Cipollone, only two have continued to utilize implied preemption analysis. Davidson v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 108 Nev. 591, 834 P.2d 931 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1944 (1993); Yowell v. Chevron Chem. Co., 836 S.W.2d 62, 66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (finding no express preemption but holding FIFRA impliedly preempts failure to warn claims). We proceed according to Cipollone's express preemption analysis. Cipollone dictates that where Congress has spoken on the issue of preemption, the court need simply determine the extent of preemption; a court may only resort to implied preemption analysis where Congress has remained silent on the issue. Cipollone, 112 S.Ct. at 2625-26 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Given the express preemption clause in FIFRA, the role of the court is to determine the extent of that preemption according to a two-step inquiry: (1) whether a court may fairly interpret the scope of requirement to encompass common-law claims, or just positive law; and (2) if so, whether a failure to warn claim specifically imposes a labeling requirement. See Cipollone, 112 S.Ct. at 2621.