Opinion ID: 6983251
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unreasonable Entry

Text: The Fourth Amendment, which applies to the states through incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment, protects “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. As the Supreme Court has observed, the zone of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment is most clearly defined “when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). Indeed, the Fourth Amendment “has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house,” a threshold which police officers generally may not cross without a warrant. Id. at 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371. Moreover, in some circumstances, the Fourth Amendment deems unreasonable and thus unconstitutional an officer’s unannounced entry into a dwelling. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995). In claiming that Defendants’ entry into their house was “unreasonable” and deprived them of their Fourth Amendment rights, Plaintiffs point to Defendants’ failure to first obtain a warrant as well as Defendants’ failure to first knock and announce their entry.
Under the Fourth Amendment, absent exigent circumstances, police officers may not make a warrantless and non-consensual entry into a private dwelling to make a routine felony arrest. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 576, 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371. This Court has traditionally found the presence of “exigent circumstances” excusing the warrant requirement for entry into a home where (1) the officers involved were in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect; (2) the suspect posed an immediate threat to arresting officers or to the public; and (3) immediate police action was necessary to prevent the destruction of vital evidence or to prevent the escape of a known criminal. See Jones v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 1125, 1130 (6th Cir.1989). We have further observed that “in a civil damage suit, whether exigent circumstances existed to excuse a warrantless arrest is a question for the jury provided that, given the evidence on the matter, there is room for a difference of opinion.” O’Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 998 (6th Cir.1994). In the present case, the officers were pursuing a fleeing suspect at the time that they entered 395 Stoddart. Plaintiffs do not dispute this fact. Instead they argue that the “exigent circumstances” inquiry must involve a balancing of interests, and that because Carroll’s offense was minor, the government’s interest in apprehending him was minimal. Indeed, “because the government’s interest is necessarily less compelling in cases involving minor offenses, the gravity of the underlying offense is ‘an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists.’ ” United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1517 (6th Cir.1996) (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750-53, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984)). Under Welsh, courts must look to the state’s penalty scheme to determine the seriousness of a state law offense; if the suspect has committed an offense “for which no imprisonment is possible,” the offense is “minor.” See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754, 104 S.Ct. 2091. Plaintiffs assert that Carroll committed a minor offense in that he did no more than rob a police officer of twenty dollars. Under Ohio law, attempting drug trafficking can constitute a misdemeanor of the first degree. See Ohio Rev.Code Ann. §§ 2923.02, 2925.03 (Banks-Baldwin 1995); State v. Cola, 76 Ohio App.3d 840, 603 N.E.2d 405 (Ohio Ct.App.1992); In re Carver, 91 Ohio Misc.2d 178, 698 N.E.2d 151, 153 (Ohio Ct.Cl.1997). However, under Ohio law, the government may convict one who offers to sell a controlled substance for aggravated drug trafficking, a felony offense which carries a presumption for a term of imprisonment. See Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2925.03 (Banks-Baldwin 1995). Given the facts of this case, we conclude that when the officers set out to pursue Carroll, they had probable cause to believe that he had offered to sell crack cocaine and had thereby committed a drug offense constituting a felony. Carroll offered to sell crack to Sgt. Dunlap and then disappeared for a while before returning. Moreover, Carroll fled when confronted by Sgt. Dunlap. That a suspect engages in a sequence of events typical of a drug transaction and that he flees after being confronted by police are factors relevant to a “totality of the circumstances” review of whether the police had probable cause to believe a drug trafficking offense has taken place. See United States v. Hughes, 898 F.2d 63, 64 (6th Cir.1990). Because these facts gave rise to probable cause on the part of Defendant officers to believe that Carroll had engaged in a felony warranting imprisonment, their interest in pursuing Carroll was strong. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754, 104 S.Ct. 2091. Accordingly, we reject Plaintiffs’ argument that the officers had cause to believe that the offense committed by Carroll was only a “minor” one and conclude that the district court did not err in holding, as a matter of law, that “exigent circumstances” justified the officers’ warrantless entry into Plaintiffs’ home.
The Supreme Court has held that “the method of an officer’s entry into a dwelling [is] among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or a seizure.” Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934, 115 S.Ct. 1914. Under the Fourth Amendment, officers must knock and announce their presence and authority before entering a private residence. Id. at 929, 115 S.Ct. 1914; United States v. Francis, 646 F.2d 251 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082, 102 S.Ct. 637, 70 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981). In some cases, officers may satisfy the knock and announce requirement by identifying themselves as police, even where they do not give their purpose in demanding entry. See United States v. Finch, 998 F.2d 349, 354 (6th Cir.1993). Although particular “exigent circumstances” may excuse the warrant requirement, “exigent circumstances” for purposes of knock and announce analysis are somewhat different than those applied in warrant exception analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Bates, 84 F.3d 790, 795 (6th Cir.1996). In order to justify an unannounced entry into an individual’s home, the police must reasonably suspect that, under the circumstances, knocking and announcing their presence would (1) be dangerous or futile, or (2) inhibit effective investigation of the crime. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997). Thus, while a certain set of circumstances may excuse the warrant requirement, the law allows for the possibility that those same circumstances might not excuse the knock and announce requirement and requires courts to conduct an independent, case-by-case analysis to determine whether noncompliance with the knock and announce rule is excusable. 6 See id. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants in fact did not knock and announce their presence and did not identify themselves as officers, and Defendants do not deny this assertion. Defendants have not articulated reasons why knocking and announcing or identifying themselves would have been dangerous or futile; nor does the record before this Court disclose facts giving rise to a reasonable belief that Carroll was armed and dangerous or that he had a criminal record reflecting violent tendencies. 7 See Bates, 84 F.3d at 795. Instead, Defendants offer as justification for their actions in entering Plaintiffs’ home that (1) they suspected Carroll had engaged in drug trafficking, and (2) they were in “hot pursuit” of Carroll. The mere fact that Defendants believed Carroll had engaged in a drug transaction did not excuse the knock and announce requirement. See Richards, 520 U.S. at 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion of a “blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investigations,” holding that “in each case it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the ‘knock-and-announce’ requirement.” Id. Accordingly, “the mere possibility or suspicion that a party is likely to dispose of evidence ... is not sufficient to create an exigency” for purposes of the knock-and-announce requirement. See Bates, 84 F.3d at 796. In the present case, Defendants do not even argue that they wished to prevent Carroll from destroying evidence, much less identify a specific concern that he actually possessed drugs that he could easily destroy. Indeed, Defendants never witnessed Carroll possess illegal drugs. Similarly, the fact that Defendants were in “hot pursuit” of Carroll does not, without further justification, prove that knocking and announcing would have been dangerous or futile, or would have prevented effective investigation of the crime. 8 Moreover, we decline Defendants’ implicit invitation to ignore these clearly delineated exceptions to the knock and announce rule and to adopt the “hot pursuit” justification as a per se exception to the knock and announce requirement. 9 Our faithful application of knock and announce principles discloses that Defendants had no reason to believe Carroll was dangerous, and that Defendants do not assert that they believed Carroll would destroy evidence or escape, or that they believed announcing their presence or identifying themselves would be futile. Even if the concern that a suspect might escape counts as inhibiting the “effective investigation of the crime,” Richards requires a lower court, before excusing the knock and announce requirement, to find that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that announcing their presence would have allowed their suspect to escape. See 520 U.S. at 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416. Although “this showing is not high, ... the police should be required to make it whenever the reasonableness of a no-knock entry is challenged.” Id. at 394-95, 117 S.Ct. 1416. Here, Defendants have failed to explain whether they had a reasonable suspicion that announcing their presence and entry into 395 Stoddart would have allowed Carroll to escape out another side of the home. Finally, knocking and announcing in this case would not have been mere “senseless ceremony,” see Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936, 115 S.Ct. 1914, excusing the requirement. 10 While Defendants may have had reason to believe that Carroll was expecting their arrival, the knock and announce rule addresses the interests of all inhabitants of a private dwelling, innocent citizens and criminal suspects alike. See Finch, 998 F.2d at 353 (describing the right as one belonging to the “occupants of private residences”). As “[t]he possibility is very real that the police may be misinformed as to the name or address of a suspect, or as to other material information” and “[i]nnocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright or embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced police intrusion,” courts should hesitate to approve unannounced police entries into private residences. Ker, 374 U.S. at 57, 83 S.Ct. 1623 (Brennan, J., concurring). Moreover, courts should carefully scrutinize the justification that the occupants of a home were aware of police pursuit; caution in assuming that the parties within a home are aware of the officers’ presence and purpose serves to protect officers themselves from property owners who might otherwise mistake them for unlawful trespassers. See id. In this case, where no other justification for an unannounced entry exists and where Defendants did not know whether the home they entered was only the home of the suspect they pursued or had no reason to believe the occupants of 395 Stoddart were prepared for Defendants’ entrance or were aware of their presence, we believe knocking and announcing would have been more than a superfluous act. 11 Cf. Ker, 374 U.S. at 60, 83 S.Ct. 1623 (Brennan, J., concurring). If Defendants had taken only a few seconds to properly announce themselves, for example, they might have obtained Plaintiffs’ cooperation and might have arrested their suspect instead of an innocent man. While we recognize that officers who are in “hot pursuit” may demonstrate exigent circumstances that excuse the knock and announce requirement, we conclude that, under the unique circumstances of this particular case, Defendants have failed to show facts excusing their failure to knock and announce their entry into Plaintiffs’ home. 12 By incorrectly presuming that “hot pursuit” provides a per se exception to the knock and announce rule, the district court failed to determine whether the officers had a reasonable suspicion that announcing their presence would have been dangerous or futile or would have inhibited the effectiveness of their investigation, see Richards, 520 U.S. at 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416, and erroneously dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendants’ entry into their home violated the Fourth Amendment. Since the district court applied the incorrect legal standard to this case, we observe that Defendants may raise the issue again on remand after further development of the facts, and that the district court may then conduct a proper inquiry on the issue of whether Defendants reasonably believed, under the Richards analysis set forth in this opinion, that it would be dangerous or futile to knock and announce before entering 395 Stoddart.