Opinion ID: 382688
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the meeting of the minds in the january 16 agreement

Text: 39 Hugh Hunt contends that there was no meeting of the minds in the January 16 conference, and that the transcript of that meeting therefore cannot represent a final binding contract under applicable state law. Most of this argument consists of challenges to factual findings of the district court. These findings include: (1) that Hugh Hunt did intend to bind himself by his signature to the January 16 transcript; and (2) that he understood the January 16 agreement to be a complete statement of the terms of the settlement. 483 F.Supp. at 835. Insofar as material facts are disputed in the course of a proceeding to enforce a settlement agreement, the district court should hold a hearing to obtain evidence on the factual matters in dispute. Massachusetts Casualty Insurance Co. v. Forman, 469 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1972). The trial judge did hold a full hearing on this petition and heard testimony from Hugh Hunt and from his mother, Mrs. Lee. Factual findings pursuant to such a hearing must be accepted unless they are clearly erroneous within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Skydell v. Ecological Science Corp., 425 U.S. 912, 96 S.Ct. 1508, 47 L.Ed.2d 762 (1976). On the basis of the record, and in particular the transcript of the January 16 meeting, we cannot say that these findings were clearly erroneous. 40 Hugh Hunt also argues that it was his understanding that counsel for the Hunt Estate would require the signature of his wife and of his descendants, while in fact the Estate did not insist on these signatures. The district court incorrectly relied on Louisiana law in holding that this misunderstanding did not negate the meeting of the minds in the January 16 agreement. 483 F.Supp. at 834-35. But the result is no different under Texas law. Whether these signatures would be required is not relevant to Hugh Hunt's obligations. They were purely for the benefit of the Hunt Estate, as they served only to waive rights against the Estate and those claiming under it. The Estate therefore has the right to waive the requirement without forfeiting any other right under the agreement; under Texas law, a party to a contract may waive the performance of any contractual provision that is to his benefit. E. g., Gulf Production Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 164 S.W.2d 448 (Tex.1942). Nevertheless, Hugh Hunt maintains that he believed that he would not be bound until his wife and descendants signed, and that consequently he signed the transcript under a mistake of law. In the first place, mistake generally does not excuse contractual obligations unless it is mutual (or is induced by the other party). E. g., Anderson Brothers Corp. v. O'Meara, 306 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1962). There is no suggestion in the record that any other party to the agreement was under the same misimpression of Texas law, or that any party induced Hugh Hunt's misunderstanding. In the second place, a pure mistake of law generally cannot excuse contractual obligations. E. g., Hall v. Hays, 441 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1969, no writ history); Ussery v. Hollebeke, 391 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1965, writ ref. n. r. e.); Harris v. Sanderson, 178 S.W.2d 315 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1944, writ ref. w. o. m.). Therefore, the fact that Hugh Hunt may have mistakenly understood the applicable law to exempt him from the binding force of his signature cannot excuse him from the settlement agreement. 41