Opinion ID: 1930910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Inability to Bring a Specific Claim Due to Repressed Recollection

Text: The parties disagreed on the definition of unsound mind under § 9-1-19 and the effect, if any, of our decision in Kelly v. Marcantonio, supra , on that definition. The defendants argued that the motion justice applied the appropriate definition of unsound mind  namely, the inability to manage the day-to-day affairs of life  whereas Roe argued that, for purposes of § 9-1-19, the term should apply not only to a general inability to manage one's affairs, but also should include the inability to bring a specific claim. The plaintiff asserted that his inability to recall or to deal with his abuse and his concomitant inability to file suit for these specific claims are conditions that should be included within the ambit of the term unsound mind, an inclusion that he asserted our opinion in Kelly allowed. But, neither our holding in Kelly nor the record of this case permits what Roe has proposed. As we discuss later in this opinion, the term unsound mind historically has meant a general incapacity to protect one's legal rights and manage one's affairs. We did hold in Kelly that the inability to bring a particular claim may be included in the purview of the term unsound mind for purposes of the tolling statute in one particular context, namely, that of repressed recollection. Including, as plaintiff has proposed, any adverse mental condition that prevented a potential plaintiff from seeking redress within the definition of unsound mind, could entirely supplant the statute of limitations and the policies behind it. Roe essentially has attempted to create a certain remedy without having recourse to the laws of this state. See R.I. Const. art. 1, sec. 5. Specifically, we held in Kelly that a trial justice may decide that repressed recollection constitutes a scientifically accepted and valid theory and that upon the facts of the specific case, the repressed recollections alleged do in fact collectively qualify as an unsound mind disability under § 9-1-19. Kelly, 678 A.2d at 880. We also stated that the trial justice could find that the disabling condition does not in and of itself qualify as a tolling feature under § 9-1-19 or that a particular plaintiff has failed to prove sufficient facts establishing the existence of repressed recollections in his or her particular case. Id. We went on to hold that it is the [motion] justice who, in the first instance, must determine    whether repressed recollection is included within the tolling condition of `unsound mind' in a particular case. Id. at 879. Under the standard set forth in Kelly, a trial justice is required to hold a hearing to consider scientific evidence and other data in assessing whether repressed recollection has been established. Id. at 879-80; see also DiPetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co., 729 A.2d 677, 685-86 (R.I.1999) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (holding that an evidentiary hearing to ascertain the validity of a proffered scientific theory may be required before scientific evidence is admitted)). An evidentiary hearing, however, is not automatically mandated in every case. Only when a party squarely alerts the trial justice that scientific or medical evidence is at issue and makes a threshold showing, by affidavit or offer of proof, that the evidence is derived from a valid scientific theory will the need for a DiPetrillo or Daubert hearing be triggered. DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 683-84. Here, the November 22, 1999 hearing on defendants' motions to dismiss did not require an evidentiary hearing because Roe had failed to provide evidence that his alleged repressed recollection in a particular case [was] sufficiently relevant, reliable, and scientifically and/or medically established so as to constitute `unsound mind,' thereby tolling the action limitation period. Kelly, 678 A.2d at 879. In addition, for the reasons we discuss post, Roe's evidence was insufficient to trigger an evidentiary hearing to ascertain whether his alleged memory problems could toll the limitations period. See DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 683. Accordingly, the justice did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. The plaintiff supported his argument that he was of unsound mind for purposes of § 9-1-19 by submitting an affidavit from Barry Plummer, Ph.D. (Plummer), a licensed psychologist who treated Roeat Bradley Hospital. Plummer stated that plaintiff had briefly mentioned abuse at St. Aloysius, but it was never something he was able to focus on or process in therapy because it was too difficult for him to deal with. Plummer framed his affidavit in general terms that only by inference applied to plaintiff by stating, for example, that memory problems and trauma issues can affect one's ability to bring a claim; but Plummer failed to provide a diagnosis of plaintiff's specific condition, much less did he opine that plaintiff had repressed the recollection of his abuse during a particular period. Throughout the Superior Court proceedings, plaintiff did not directly assert that he suffered from repressed memory. At the November 22, 1999 hearing, when the motion justice asked, Where in this case in your pleadings have you referred to repressed recollection?, plaintiff's counsel replied, I don't believe the pleading uses the term repressed memory. When the justice later asked, Where is [repressed] recollection of the events medically shown? All I know is somebody says he can't deal with it, not that he can't recall it, plaintiff's counsel responded, No, that's not the case, Your Honor. The deposition testimony certainly is replete with instances of the man saying there were periods of time that he did not recall these events, and counsel later added, [I]t is our understanding that this child did not recall this within three years at the time the suit was filed. In State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d 879, 881 (R.I.1996), we stated that an issue of repressed recollection could arise in circumstances when recollections have been repressed for many years and then released in the course of psychological treatment or psychiatric therapy. Repressed recollection, then, can be considered as the absence of conscious awareness of an event, followed by sudden revelation, recognition, or recovery of the memory. But such is not the case here. In fact, the evidence presented to the motion justice directly contradicted plaintiff's assertion that he was unable to recall the alleged abuse, given that he appears to have discussed the alleged abuse with at least four people on atleast five occasions when he was between the ages of thirteen and twenty-two. Moreover, unlike the classic repressed-memory scenario, plaintiff could not ascribe a date certain when his alleged impediment ceased, nor was he able to specifically articulate any rationale to explain why his condition prevented him from filing suit in this case. Rather, plaintiff argued that he blocked out the abuse and could not deal with it well enough to file a lawsuit. In our opinion, the evidence Roe presented did not demonstrate as a threshold matter that he suffered from the type of repressed recollection discussed in Kelly and Quattrocchi. Therefore, plaintiff did not trigger Kelly's procedural mechanism, requiring an evidentiary hearing on whether his alleged repressed recollection constituted an unsound mind for tolling purposes. See DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 683-84 (holding that no evidentiary hearing was required, because the defendant failed to substantiate sufficiently that the plaintiff's scientific theory was not valid). Thus, we are constrained to conclude that the motion justice did not err in finding that, to the extent that plaintiff alleged that he was unable to bring a specific claim based on memory lapses and the inability to deal with his abuse in therapy, his condition did not constitute a tolling disability under § 9-1-19. Professed inability to recall certain events is not the same phenomenon, psychologically, as repressed recollection.