Opinion ID: 793280
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 10 May appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to Franklin County on her § 1983 claim as well as the district court's remand of her state-law claim. 11

12 We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. Plant v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 933 (6th Cir.2000). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [her] favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Nevertheless, [t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. We are not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
13 May argues that the appellees' actions on the night of August 13, 1998 increased the risk of harm to Deborah Kirk, thereby depriving her of her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to life and liberty. Appellant Br. at 37. May argues that the district court erred in its application of the test for state liability for private-actor violence that we established in Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir.1998). May also argues that the district court failed to credit the testimony of May's expert witness that the appellees' conduct on that night increased the likelihood that Moss would seriously harm Kirk. In order to prevail in her § 1983 claim against appellees, May must succeed on two separate issues. First, she must establish that Kirk's harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and second, she must establish that appellees are responsible for that violation. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992). 14
15 The purpose of the Due Process Clause is to protect the people from the [s]tate, not to ensure that the [s]tate protect[s] them from each other, and therefore the Due Process Clause cannot generally be used to hold the state liable for harms inflicted by private actors. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). DeShaney made clear, however, that its conclusion that there was no due process violation in that case did not reach circumstances where a person suffered injuries while in state custody or when state action made the person more vulnerable to private violence. Id. at 201, 109 S.Ct. 998. Therefore while the state generally does not shoulder an affirmative duty to protect its citizens from private acts of violence, it may not cause or greatly increase the risk of harm to its citizens without due process of law through its own affirmative acts. Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1066. We refer to this exception to DeShaney 's no-liability rule for private action as the state-created-danger theory. This is the theory upon which May relies in alleging a constitutional violation. 16 Interpreting DeShaney, we determined in Kallstrom that state liability for a state-created danger in violation of the Due Process Clause can be established if the plaintiff can show the three following factors: (1) affirmative acts by the state which either create or increase the risk that an individual will be exposed to private acts of violence; (2) the victim faces special danger, in that the state's actions place the victim specifically at risk, as distinguished from a risk that affects the public at large; and (3) [t]he state must have known or clearly should have known that its actions specifically endangered an individual. Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1066. As we have stated, state officials may violate the Due Process Clause when their affirmative actions directly increase the vulnerability of citizens to danger or otherwise place citizens in harm's way. Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 509 (6th Cir.2002). 17
18 In order to prevail on her § 1983 substantive due process claim, May must satisfy Kallstrom 's first factor by showing that Franklin County took affirmative steps that either created or increased the risk of harm to Kirk. May argues here, as she did before the district court, that two County actions created or increased the risk that Moss would harm Kirk. First, May argues that Franklin County's act of dispatching Franklin Township Officer Ratliff to the scene of the altercation created or increased the risk of harm to Kirk. Second, May claims that the County's subsequent clearing of the police call at the scene without intervening in the dispute heightened the risk of harm to Kirk. Upon review we conclude that the district court properly rejected both of these purported affirmative acts. 19
20 The district court found that dispatching the officer did not create the risk of harm to Kirk because the transcript of the 911 call indicates that Kirk and Moss were engaged in a physical confrontation before an officer was dispatched. Plaintiff's expert Dr. John Reid Meloy (Meloy) agreed that even before the 911 call, Kirk was at a high risk of being killed by Mr. Moss, primarily due to the fact that she was attempting to leave the relationship. J.A. at 1084 (Meloy Rep. at 4). Given this evidence, we agree with the district court's conclusion that the dispatch did not create the risk of harm to Kirk. 21 Whether the appellees' actions increased the risk of harm that Kirk faced from Moss requires more extensive analysis. The district court determined that no reasonable jury could find that the act of dispatching Officer Ratliff to the scene increased the risk of danger to Kirk. May argues that the district court erred because she claims that Dr. Meloy's report and deposition provide evidence that the police actions increased the risk of harm to Kirk. Meloy's theory is that the arrival and departure of the police without intervening emboldened Moss, thereby increasing the likelihood that he would kill Kirk. Meloy expressed his opinion that [t]he police arrival at the scene of the violence, and the subsequent leaving without intervention, gave permission to Mr. Moss to escalate his violence against Kirk. J.A. at 1082 (Meloy Rep. at 2). 22 In response, appellees argue that Meloy did not in fact provide evidence that the actions of Franklin County on the night in question increased the risk of harm to Kirk. Appellees suggest that May is being imprecise about Meloy's emboldenment theory and its relevance to May's allegation that the County's act of dispatching an officer to the scene increased the risk of harm to Kirk. For although May argues that the County's act of dispatching is an affirmative action under Kallstrom, her expert witness  did not opine that the act of dispatching increased the risk of harm. Appellees Br. at 24. We agree with appellees' precise analysis on this point. 23 Meloy did testify at his deposition that it is his opinion that Kirk's decision to seek help by calling 911 increased her risk of harm by escalating the situation. Meloy also testified that the act of the police officer knocking on the door and then departing may have increased Kirk's risk of harm because it encouraged Moss to believe that he could harm Kirk without any consequences or outside intervention. Meloy stated, the overt behavior that introduces the aversive consequence initially appears to be the knock. J.A. at 991 (Meloy Dep. at 97). Meloy continued, There was permission given with the police arrival and their lack of an intervention and then their withdrawal. J.A. at 992 (Meloy Dep. at 98). Upon review of Meloy's deposition testimony and report, we conclude that appellees are correct that May did not present any evidence that appellees' decision to dispatch a police cruiser to the scene emboldened Moss, thereby exposing Kirk to greater harm. On the contrary, Meloy admitted during his deposition that, under his emboldenment theory, it was not the arrival of police that communicated permission to Moss, but rather the withdrawal of police that may have emboldened him. J.A. at 1014 (Meloy Dep. at 120) ([T]he withdrawal is key to understanding the escalating dynamics in this case.). Thus even when we accept the testimony of plaintiff's expert, which we must do at the summary judgment stage, May has not produced any evidence that the appellees' act of dispatching an officer to the scene increased the risk of harm to Kirk. 24 May's request that we find state liability from Franklin County's dispatch of the officer also raises the unavoidable liability problem that is present in many state-created-danger cases involving imperfect or incomplete police rescues. In both Cartwright v. City of Marine City and Bukowski v. City of Akron, we discussed the Catch-22 that these sorts of scenarios can create for police officers, where they face a danger of potential liability whether they take action to attempt a rescue or they fail to do so. See Cartwright v. City of Marine City, 336 F.3d 487, 494 (6th Cir.2003); Bukowski v. City of Akron, 326 F.3d 702, 711-12 (6th Cir. 2003). Franklin County would undoubtedly face legal and moral objections, and rightly so, if its Comm Center personnel had failed to dispatch an officer to Kirk's apartment after her repeated calls to 911. May's proposition that appellees violated Kirk's constitutional rights by sending a police cruiser in response to her 911 calls for help is unsettling, and we decline to interpret the Due Process Clause in such a manner as to discourage law enforcement officers from responding to requests for assistance. 25 May has not produced any evidence that Franklin County's dispatch of police to Kirk's apartment created or increased the risk that Moss would harm Kirk. We therefore affirm the district court's conclusion that the dispatch is not an affirmative act under Kallstrom. 26
27 The district court also rejected May's claim that the clearing of the call was an affirmative act that created or increased the risk of harm to Kirk, reasoning that it was Officer Ratliff's decision, not appellees' decision, to clear the call. Officer Ratliff is an employee of Franklin Township, not of appellees Franklin County. On appeal, May has not explained why Franklin County should be held liable for Officer Ratliff's decision to clear the call, nor does she dispute that it was Ratliff's decision to clear the call. Moreover, we previously granted Ratliff qualified immunity for his actions in this matter, May, 59 Fed.Appx. at 794, and plaintiff has settled her claims against the Franklin Township defendants. We therefore affirm the district court's conclusion that the clearing of the call did not constitute a state action by appellees Franklin County under Kallstrom. 28 The inability of the Franklin County authorities to prevent Kirk's murder despite her numerous 911 calls to their emergency call center is deeply troubling. May has produced persuasive evidence that appellees failed to follow their established procedure for domestic violence calls when fielding Kirk's first 911 call, and that appellees may also have underestimated the urgency of Kirk's situation during the second 911 call. Had appellees attempted to obtain more information from Kirk during her phone calls to 911, it is possible that their attempt to intervene would have been more aggressive, and the tragic events of that night might have unfolded differently. While appellees' actions in response to Kirk's calls for assistance may not be faultless, none of appellees' actions directly increased Kirk's vulnerability to danger or placed her in harm's way. Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 509. May has been unable to show that any of appellees' actions constitute affirmative acts as Kallstrom requires to sustain her state-created-danger claim. 29 Because May has failed to establish a constitutional violation under Kallstrom, we need not address May's argument that the inadequacies of the Franklin County's Comm Center training policies constituted deliberate indifference. May has not shown that the appellees' conduct violated Kirk's constitutional rights, and therefore there can be no § 1983 liability on the part of [Franklin County for a failure to train] as a matter of law. Weeks v. Portage County Executive Offices, 235 F.3d 275, 279 (6th Cir.2000). We affirm the district court's judgment that Franklin County did not violate Kirk's substantive due process rights.
30 May argues that the district court erred in remanding her state-law wrongful death claim. We review a trial court's decision to remand state claims to state court for abuse of discretion. Loftis v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 342 F.3d 509, 513 (6th Cir.2003). District courts have the discretion to dismiss pendent state law claims if all federal claims have been dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). We have held that when we do not remand any federal claims for further consideration, there is no utility in sending back to the district court a single issue that turns upon state law and which would be better resolved by the courts of the state in question. DePiero v. City of Macedonia, 180 F.3d 770, 790 (6th Cir.1999). The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in declining to hear May's wrongful death claim, and we affirm its decision to remand the state-law claim.