Opinion ID: 1268291
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Railey's Judicial-Bias Claim Under Clearly Established Federal Law

Text: Having determined that the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in evaluating Railey's judicial-bias claim for prejudice, applied a rule and employed reasoning contrary to clearly established federal law, I now turn to analyzing Railey's claim de novo. Because I conclude that Railey's judicial-bias claim satisfies the Supreme Court's standard, I would grant Railey's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955), the Supreme Court held that [a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process and explained that our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. Although the probability of unfairness or the level at which a judge's interest in a case becomes constitutionally improper cannot be defined with precision, the Supreme Court explained that [c]ircumstances and relationships must be considered and that ` Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the State and the accused denies the latter due process of law.' Id. (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927)) (emphasis added). Most importantly, the Supreme Court then observed that its standard for analyzing whether a judge faced a possible temptation was a stringent rule [that] may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to perform its high function in the best way, `justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.' Id. (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954)) (emphases added). In Murchison, the Supreme Court thus applied the possible-temptation testa test that it originally set forth in Tumey, which involved a system in which the mayor of an Ohio village received no payment for presiding over a criminal case unless the case resulted in a conviction, Tumey, 273 U.S. at 520, 47 S.Ct. 437; see also Maj. Op. at 401-03 to determine when the Due Process Clause bars a judge from participating in a given case. Under the possible-temptation test, a judge's participation is unconstitutional when, considering [c]ircumstances and relationships, there exists a possible temptation to the average. . . judge . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the State and the accused. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136, 75 S.Ct. 623 (quotation omitted). After setting forth this standard, the Court then examined the factual situation in Murchison involving Michigan's system in which a judge could act at the same time [as] the complainant, indicter and prosecutor on a charge of contemptand held that Michigan's system violated the Court's possible temptation standard because a judge cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those accused when the same judge served as the single-person grand jury that accused the defendant. Id. at 135, 137, 75 S.Ct. 623. Although the Supreme Court has considered judicial-bias claims on several occasions, see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 nn. 14 & 15, 95 S.Ct. 1456 (1975) (citing cases), two further cases provide useful illustrations of the Court's application of the possible-temptation standard. In Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964), and Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974), the Supreme Court again analyzed judicial-bias claims in the context of contempt proceedings. In both cases, the Court's analysis employed the possible-temptation principle and considered whether the circumstances were such that the judge was capable of hold[ing] the balance nice, clear, and true between the State and the accused. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136, 75 S.Ct. 623 (quotation omitted). In Ungar, the Court characterized the right at issue as the right to be tried by an unbiased judge without a direct personal interest in the outcome of the hearing. Ungar, 376 U.S. at 584, 84 S.Ct. 841. The Court concluded that no due process violation occurred because, in contrast to the facts in Murchison and other prior cases, the trial judge gave notice and afforded an opportunity for a hearing which was conducted dispassionately such that there was not an appearance of bias that the judge was unable to hold the balance between vindicating the interests of the court and the interests of the accused. Id. at 588, 84 S.Ct. 841. In Taylor, the Supreme Court explained that contemptuous conduct, though short of personal attack, may still provoke a trial judge and so embroil him in controversy that he cannot `hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the state and the accused.' Taylor, 418 U.S. at 501, 94 S.Ct. 2697 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532, 47 S.Ct. 437). The Court further observed that [i]n making this ultimate judgment, the inquiry must be not only whether there was actual bias on [the judge's] part, but also whether there was `such a likelihood of bias or an appearance of bias.' Id. (quoting Ungar, 376 U.S. at 588, 84 S.Ct. 841). The Court concluded that a due process violation had occurred in the case before it because the record disclosed an appearance that the judge did become embroiled in a running controversy with the person convicted of contempt. Id. In light of such cases, the majority thus recognizes that the Supreme Court has held that something less than actual bias violates constitutional due process. Maj. Op. at 400. Nonetheless, the majority asserts that the Court has limited those occasions to two circumstances, cases in which the judge has a personal, substantial pecuniary interest and certain contempt cases, such as those in which the `judge becomes personally embroiled with the contemnor.' Maj. Op. at 400 (quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at 141, 75 S.Ct. 623 (Reed, J., dissenting)). In doing so, the majority's crucial contention is that there is no support for . . . the proposition that the possible-temptation test applies to likelihood- or appearance-of-bias issues generally, rather than to only pecuniary interest. Maj. Op. at 405. The Supreme Court's decisions in Murchison, Ungar, and Taylor contradict the majority's attempt to cabin the possible-temptation standard to cases involving only pecuniary interests. [3] Indeed, the majority does acknowledge that Murchison extend[ed] the possible-temptation test to the first (and, as of yet, only) type of circumstances other than pecuniary remuneration. Maj. Op. at 402. But pecuniary interests were not at issue in Murchison, Ungar, or Taylor, yet in each case the Court analyzed whether the circumstances were such that they might present a possible temptation for the judge not to hold the balance between vindicating the interests of the court and the interests of the accused. Ungar, 376 U.S. at 588, 84 S.Ct. 841. Indeed, in Ungar the Court's analysis specifically explained that the circumstances involved an unbiased and impartial judge without a direct personal interest in the outcome of the hearing, omitting any reference to a pecuniary interest. Ungar, 376 U.S. at 584, 84 S.Ct. 841 (emphasis added). The majority limits the possible-temptation test to cases involving pecuniary interests (and, apparently, to cases involving a variety of different contempt proceedings) solely on the basis of a questionable reading of the Supreme Court's opinion in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986). In Lavoie, the Supreme Court held that a due-process violation occurred because a Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court participated in a case when he had a pending lawsuit raising a claim against an insurance company similar to that raised in the case before the Alabama Supreme Court. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 821-825, 106 S.Ct. 1580. As the majority notes, the Supreme Court considered the insurance company's various arguments in different sections of the opinion. In section III.A, the Supreme Court devoted approximately two pages to dispatching the insurance company's argument that the Alabama Supreme Court Justice's general hostility towards insurance companies was sufficient to state a violation of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 820, 106 S.Ct. 1580. In rejecting this claim in short order, the Court began by quoting language from Tumey stating that not `[a]ll questions of judicial qualification. . . involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion.' Id. at 820, 106 S.Ct. 1580 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523, 47 S.Ct. 437) (alteration and omission in original). The Court stated that [w]e need not decide whether allegations of bias or prejudice by a judge of the type we have here would ever be sufficient under the Due Process Clause to force recusal. Certainly only in the most extreme of cases would disqualification on this basis be constitutionally required, and [the insurance company's] arguments here fall well below that level. Id. at 821, 106 S.Ct. 1580. Noting the insurance company's suggestions that the Alabama Supreme Court Justice's general frustration with insurance companies reveals a disqualifying bias, the Court simply concluded that the insurance company's allegations of bias and prejudice on this general basis . . . are insufficient to establish any constitutional violation. Id. Based on the Court's cursory analysis of the insurance company's mere allegations regarding the Alabama Supreme Court Justice's general frustration with insurance companies, the majority here declares that [i]t is noteworthy that the Court referenced kinship in this portion of the analysis, but it is far more significant that the Court omitted from this portion of its analysis any reference to the possible-temptation test. Maj. Op. at 404. As the majority notes, in the following section the Court did quote and apply the possible-temptation test in analyzing the insurance company's (ultimately meritorious) argument that the Alabama Supreme Court Justice's own pending lawsuit raising a similar insurance claim required his recusal. As a result, the majority contends that reading these two sections of Lavoie in concert . . . offer[s] no support for and even appear[s] to refutethe proposition that the possible-temptation test applies to likelihood- or appearance-of-bias issues generally, rather than to only pecuniary interest. Maj. Op. at 405. As I have already stated, this conclusion fails to account for the Supreme Court's consistent use of the possible-temptation analysis in multiple other cases such as Murchison, Ungar, and Taylor, which involved a variety of different contempt proceedings. Further, the majority attaches far too much significance to a purported omission from the Court's abbreviated analysis in section III.A of Lavoie, in which the Court simply rejected the clearly meritless argument that general frustration with insurance companies amounted to a constitutional basis for disqualifying a judge from hearing a case involving an insurance company. The crux of the matter is that the Supreme Court has applied the possible-temptation analysis in a wide variety of cases. See Tumey, 273 U.S. at 520, 47 S.Ct. 437 (violation when [t]here is . . . no way by which the mayor may be paid for his service as a judge, if he does not convict those who are brought before him); Murchison, 349 U.S. at 135, 75 S.Ct. 623 (violation when judge acts at the same time [as] the complainant, indicter and prosecutor in contempt proceeding); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (violation because a possible temptation exists when the revenue produced from a mayor's court provides a substantial portion of a municipality's funds) (quotation omitted); Taylor, 418 U.S. at 501, 94 S.Ct. 2697 (violation when contemptuous conduct so embroil[s the judge] in controversy that [the judge] cannot hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the state and the accused) (quotation omitted); Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 821-825, 106 S.Ct. 1580 (violation when a judge ruled on case involving an issue similar to that raised in the judge's own pending lawsuit). As the Court explained the possible-temptation test in Murchison, a judge's participation in a case violates due process when, considering [c]ircumstances and relationships, there exists a possible temptation to the average . . . judge . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the State and the accused. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136, 75 S.Ct. 623 (quotation omitted). Although the possible-temptation analysis is a general standard and not a precise rule, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (AEDPA), does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied. Panetti v. Quarterman, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 2858, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007) (quotation omitted). Before applying this standard to Railey's claim, I must briefly address the majority's contention that describing the possible-temptation analysis as clearly established is best characterized as arguable.  Maj. Op. at 413. The Supreme Court has repeatedly employed the possible-temptation analysis and, on several occasions, held that the mere appearance of bias violated due process. See, e.g., Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 825, 106 S.Ct. 1580 (mak[ing] clear that we are not required to decide whether in fact Justice Embry was influenced, but only whether sitting on the case then before the Supreme Court of Alabama would offer a possible temptation to the average . . . judge to. . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true) (quotation omitted and omissions in original) (emphasis added). Nonetheless, in reviewing various decisions from our sister circuits, the majority has uncovered some decisions that have asserted, erroneously, that `the Supreme Court's case law has not held, not even in dicta, . . . that the mere appearance of bias on the part of a state trial judge, without more, violates the Due Process Clause.' Maj. Op. at 412 (quoting Johnson v. Carroll, 369 F.3d 253, 263 (3d Cir. 2004)); see also Maj. Op. at 412-13 (discussing Davis v. Jones, 506 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir.2007)). [4] The majority then makes the astonishing claim that, even assuming the possible-temptation test is clearly established, the mere existence of these cases . . . means that a similar outcome (even if similarly wrong), is not objectively unreasonable, it is instead presumptively reasonable.  Maj. Op. at 414. The majority concludes with the declaration that unless we are willing to condemn the entire concept of persuasive precedent . . . we cannot conclude that the Kentucky court's decision was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Maj. Op. at 415. Leaving aside my conclusion that the contrary to prong of AEDPA provides the appropriate analysis for this case, the majority's view of the unreasonable application analysis is flawed and, in fact, is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court explicitly rejected the Fourth Circuit's very similar view of the unreasonable application analysis. In Williams, the Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's prior holding that a state-court decision involves an `unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law' only if the state court has applied federal law `in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable.' Williams, 529 U.S. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (quoting Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (1998)). The Court further explained that a federal habeas court should not transform the [unreasonable application] inquiry into a subjective one by resting its determination instead on the simple fact that at least one of the Nation's jurists has applied the relevant federal law in the same manner the state court did in the habeas petitioner's case. Id. at 409-10, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (emphasis added). Rather, a federal habeas court making the `unreasonable application' inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable. Id. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Finally, the Supreme Court noted that, as with respect to the `reasonable jurist' standard in the Teague [v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989),] context, `[e]ven though we have characterized the new rule inquiry as whether reasonable jurists could disagree as to whether a result is dictated by precedent, the standard for determining when a case establishes a new rule is objective, and the mere existence of conflicting authority does not necessarily mean a rule is new.' Williams, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 304, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992)) (alteration in original, emphasis added). Similarly, the mere existence of cases similar to a state court's opinion does not make the state court's opinion presumptively reasonable. The majority's discussion here of the fundamental theory of persuasive precedent essentially repeats the very error that the Supreme Court clearly and soundly rejected over eight years ago. Indeed, the majority's adoption of this view of persuasive precedent, given the Supreme Court's rejection in Williams of a materially indistinguishable position, is a startling dereliction of our duty as an intermediate appellate court to follow the precedent of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375, 102 S.Ct. 703, 70 L.Ed.2d 556 (1982) (stating that a precedent of [the Supreme] Court must be followed by the lower federal courts). Finally, having analyzed the Kentucky Court of Appeals's adjudication of Railey's claim and the nature of the Supreme Court's precedent regarding judicial-bias claims, I apply the possible-temptation standard to Railey's case. I conclude that Railey's Due Process Clause rights were violated when Judge Bertram presided over Railey's case, in which Prosecutor Bertram attended crucial hearings and personally contested Railey's motions. Although the Supreme Court has stated that matters of kinship . . . would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion, Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 820, 106 S.Ct. 1580, the Supreme Court has also acknowledged that disqualification is constitutionally required in the most extreme of cases, id. at 821, 106 S.Ct. 1580. The situation of an uncle prosecuting a criminal case before his nephew judge is precisely such an extreme case. Further, I emphasize that, as in Lavoie, holding that a violation of due process occurred here does not require [] decid[ing] whether in fact [Judge Bertram] was influenced, but only whether sitting on the case . . . would offer a possible temptation to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true. Id. at 825, 106 S.Ct. 1580 (quotation omitted and final two omissions in original). Considering [c]ircumstances and relationships, the task of hearing and deciding upon legal arguments advanced by one's uncle offers more than a possible temptation to hold a balance that is not nice, clear and true between the State and the accused. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136, 75 S.Ct. 623. This violation of Railey's due-process rights cannot be harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n. 8, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (stating that the right to an impartial judge is a constitutional right[ ] so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be treated as harmless error) (footnote omitted). Thus, the `appearance of justice' will best be served by vacating the decision and remanding for further proceedings.' Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 828, 106 S.Ct. 1580. For the reasons stated above, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case with instructions to issue the writ of habeas corpus. I respectfully dissent.