Opinion ID: 1672196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sufficiency of Expert Affidavit

Text: Although our decision rests on the preceding issue, we wish to clarify an additional issue that was considered and decided by the Court of Appeals. The trial court found that the affidavit tendered by Dr. Robert Gordon failed to satisfy the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115(a). The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that the affidavit was sufficient. As we consider whether the affidavit complied with the statute, we note that the claimant in a medical malpractice case must establish several requirements by expert medical testimony: (1) The recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in the profession and the specialty thereof, if any, that the defendant practices in the community in which the defendant practices or in a similar community at the time the alleged injury or wrongful action occurred; (2) That the defendant acted with less than or failed to act with ordinary and reasonable care in accordance with such standard; and (3) As a proximate result of the defendant's negligent act or omission, the plaintiff suffered injuries which would not otherwise have occurred. Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-26-115(a)(1)-(3) (Supp.2005). With regard to section 115(a)(1), a medical expert relied upon by the plaintiff must have knowledge of the standard of professional care in the defendant's applicable community or knowledge of the standard of professional care in a community that is shown to be similar to the defendant's community. Robinson v. LeCorps, 83 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tenn.2002). Expert witnesses may not simply assert their familiarity with the standard of professional care in the defendant's community without indicating the basis for their familiarity. Id.; see also Stovall v. Clarke, 113 S.W.3d 715, 723 (Tenn.2003); Kenyon, 122 S.W.3d at 760, 762. A trial court's consideration of issues under section 115(a)(1) is affected by the timing in which the defendant objects to the plaintiff's expert witness. For instance, in determining whether the standard has been met in summary judgment proceedings, the trial court must examine the expert's affidavit and any deposition testimony that has been offered by the plaintiff. [4] In Robinson, we held that the plaintiff's expert witness failed to establish the professional standard of care applicable in Nashville, Tennessee, where the expert's deposition stated only that the standard of care in Nashville was the same as a national standard and that [t]here is no differentiation recognized in our profession of one locality as opposed to the other. . . . 83 S.W.3d at 721. We emphasized that the expert did not relate the basis for his knowledge of the standard of care . . . or indicate why the Nashville medical community was similar to, and thus had the same standard of professional care as, the community with which [he] was familiar. Id. at 725; compare Stovall, 113 S.W.3d at 723 (section 115(a)(1) satisfied where affidavit and deposition revealed that the expert had reviewed twenty medical charts in Tennessee, had testified in three malpractice cases in Tennessee, and had reviewed information about the medical community in which the defendant practiced). Likewise the Court of Appeals has upheld a trial court's finding that an affidavit was insufficient where the expert stated only that the standard of care . . . is identical in the State of Georgia as in the State of Tennessee. Kenyon, 122 S.W.3d at 760. In affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants, the court stated that the expert must present facts demonstrating how he or she has knowledge of the applicable standard of professional care either in the community in which the defendant physician practices or in a similar community. Id. at 762. The court explained: The fatal shortcoming in . . . [the] affidavit is that it does not contain sufficient facts to demonstrate that [the expert's] opinion regarding the applicable standard of professional practice is based either on his familiarity with the applicable standard of professional practice [in the community in which the defendant practiced] or on his knowledge of the applicable standard of professional practice in a community similar to [that in which the defendant practiced]. Nothing in [the] affidavit indicates that [the expert] has any personal knowledge of the practice [in the community in which the defendant practiced]. Id. at 762. Here, the plaintiffs relied on the affidavit of Dr. Robert Gordon. Dr. Gordon, a board-certified anesthesiologist who practiced in Winchester, Tennessee, stated that he was familiar with the recognized standard of acceptable professional medical care in the metropolitan areas of Tennessee and specifically in Memphis, Tennessee and similar communities. . . . The affidavit contains no information regarding the basis for Dr. Gordon's familiarity with the standard of care in Memphis, Tennessee, nor does it contain a basis for finding that the standard of care in Memphis is similar to that in the community in which Dr. Gordon practices. In short, Dr. Gordon's affidavit simply asserts that he is familiar with the applicable standard of care. As we have explained in prior cases, a bare assertion of familiarity is insufficient under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115(a)(1). Accordingly, we conclude that the affidavit was legally insufficient.