Opinion ID: 516947
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: claim for future rent

Text: 69 The district court properly denied Chapman's claim for future rent for the unexpired term of the Itel lease, the period covering May 1, 1987, through January 31, 1991. The district court held that Chapman failed to offset against the value of the alleged future unpaid rent either the fair market value of the unexpired term of the lease or the amount of payments to be received by Chapman from subsequent tenants. Chapman's failure precluded under Texas law recovery of any amount for future rent. The court reached this decision by finding that Chapman chose to treat Itel's abandonment as an anticipatory breach under common law. This finding was not clearly erroneous. 18 70 With the conclusion that Chapman treated the default as an anticipatory breach, the issue becomes the measure of damages. Chapman admitted at trial the applicability of Crabtree v. Southmark Commercial Management, 704 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), to the facts of the case. 665 F.Supp. at 1293. This assertion led both Itel and the court to conclude that Chapman was seeking common law damages under section 13(c) of the lease. Crabtree sets out the common law measure of damages available to a landlord for anticipatory breach. The plaintiff must prove the present value of future rents less the present value of actual rents received or the cash market value of the property for the remainder of the lease. Id. Chapman now attempts to assert Crabtree is inapplicable. 71 In its petition, Chapman sued for loss of rents. At trial, Chapman relied solely on the testimony of Howard Chapman to establish the amount of lost future rent. Chapman initially calculated these future damages based on the total amount due under the lease from July 1, 1981, to January 31, 1991. From that amount, Chapman subtracted the actual rents that had been received from subsequent tenants and discounted that sum to its present value. During cross-examination, Chapman admitted that the figure as calculated did not take into account the reasonable cash market value of the unexpired lease or the rental amounts to be received by subsequent tenants. 19 72 Chapman argues that it was electing recovery of damages under Section 13(a) of the contract and not Section 13(c) as the trial court held. Chapman argues that it was entitled to do that under Section 16.11 of the contract. It asserts that while Section 13(c) incorporated the common law for breach by the tenant, Section 13(a) displaced and superseded the ordinary common law measures of damages. Under Section 13(a), the contract language suggests that the burden of proof on the future cash market value of the property was on Itel. Thus, Chapman argues that it did not have to reduce future rent by any amount and that it was up to Itel to produce reduction evidence. The district court, however, correctly held that under Crabtree, the burden of proof was on Chapman to prove the amount of future losses. 73 Further, even if Chapman were right in its assertion, Chapman still cannot prevail. Itel correctly relied on the unrefuted valuation of the unexpired term as derived from the admitted evidence of the CMS lease and subsequent leases on the property 20 for proof that the future cash market value of the property exceeded the amount due under the remainder of the lease, allowing no recovery for future rents even under Section 13(a) of the lease. 21 See Cameron v. Calhoun-Smith Distributing Co., 442 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1969, no writ) (a tenant is entitled to a credit for all the rent a subsequent tenant agrees to pay for the period the subsequent tenant occupies the premises after a tenant's abandonment, regardless of whether those payments are collected or uncollected). It follows that even if Itel had the burden of proof, Itel carried that burden. Thus, we conclude that the decision of the district court on the damages awarded was without error. 74