Opinion ID: 1363755
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The monetary sanctions

Text: Having found that the appellant was in contempt of court for disobeying willfully the orders compelling discovery entered on August 12, 1983 and December 12, 1983, the trial court, on March 6, 1984, entered an order, pursuant to its order of December 12, 1983, imposing monetary sanctions against the appellant in the amount of $7,400.00. The monetary sanctions were calculated at the rate of $100.00 per day for each of the 74 days in which the appellant was in contempt (commencing on the day after December 12, 1983 and ending on the date of the last hearing on the appellee's motions to dismiss or for other sanctions, that is, on February 24, 1984). While the March 6, 1984 order stated that the monetary sanctions were to be paid to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia, the December 12, 1983 order stated that these monetary sanctions were to be paid to the appellee. Both of these orders refer to the appellant's willful disobedience of prior orders compelling discovery. Furthermore, the transcripts of the hearings on the appellee's motions for sanctions indicate that the predominant purpose of the monetary sanctions imposed by the trial court was to punish the appellant for his disrespect for the court's authority. On the face of the orders a collateral purpose apparently was to reimburse the appellee for an undetermined portion of his expenses in seeking sanctions for continuing violation of orders compelling discovery. On the other hand, the prospective, per diem method of computing the monetary sanctions indicates that one of the purposes of the trial court was to obtain for the appellee the matters sought by him to be discovered. In fact, both of these orders set new deadlines for discovery to be furnished. The distinction between criminal and civil contempt and the type of sanction appropriate for each type of contempt is summarized in syllabus points 1 through 5 of State ex rel. Robinson v. Michael, ___ W.Va. ___ 276 S.E.2d 812 (1981): 1. Whether a contempt is classified as civil or criminal does not depend upon the act constituting such contempt because such act may provide the basis for either a civil or criminal contempt action. Instead, whether a contempt is civil or criminal depends upon the purpose to be served by imposing a sanction for the contempt and such purpose also determines the type of sanction which is appropriate. 2. Where the purpose to be served by imposing a sanction for contempt is to compel compliance with a court order by the contemner so as to benefit the party bringing the contempt action by enforcing, protecting, or assuring the right of that party under the order, the contempt is civil. 3. The appropriate sanction in a civil contempt case is an order that incarcerates a contemner for an indefinite term and that also specifies a reasonable manner in which the contempt may be purged thereby securing the immediate release of the contemner, or an order requiring the payment of a fine in the nature of compensation or damages to the party aggrieved by the failure of the contemner to comply with the order. 4. Where the purpose to be served by imposing a sanction for contempt is to punish the contemner for an affront to the dignity or authority of the court, or to preserve or restore order in the court or respect for the court, the contempt is criminal. 5. The appropriate sanction in a criminal contempt case is an order sentencing the contemner to a definite term of imprisonment or an order requiring the contemner to pay a fine in a determined amount. Robinson, supra, also observes: That an act is punished as neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal reflects an impermissible confusion or combination of purpose on the part of the sanctioning court. 276 S.E.2d at 818. In the case presently before this Court the sanctions were imposed, apparently, to punish the contemner [the appellant] for an affront to the dignity or authority of the court, and, at the same time, were imposed, apparently, to compel compliance with a court order by the contemner so as to benefit the party bringing the contempt action by enforcing ... the right of that party under the order[.] Consequently, there was an impermissible confusion or combination of purpose on the part of the sanctioning court in treating the noncompliance with discovery orders as partially criminal contempt and partially civil contempt. Moreover, the type of sanction imposed, that is, a prospective, per diem fine, was inappropriate for either type of contempt. The fines imposed were not in a determined amount, as required for a criminal contempt; they were not in the nature of compensation or damages to the party aggrieved, as required for a civil contempt. Two recent cases decided by this Court on prospective fines for contempt of court note the invalidity of this type of monetary sanction. In syllabus point 4 of Gant v. Gant, ___ W.Va. ___ 329 S.E.2d 106 (1985), we held: A circuit court does not have authority to place a one-percent-per-day penalty, payable to the injured party, for unpaid, pendente lite support. Instead, the circuit court should incarcerate the contemner indefinitely until he purges himself of the civil contempt by paying the accrued support arrearages. 329 S.E.2d at 117. In syllabus point 5 of State ex rel. UMWA International Union v. Maynard, No. 16682 (W.Va. Oct. 16, 1985), this Court held: A circuit court has no authority to impose a prospective penalty in an indirect criminal contempt proceeding whereby a specific fine was imposed payable to the State for [each] subsequent violation of the court's order. The principal defect with such a prospective fine is the rigid and arbitrary character of the amount selected, which is fixed in advance of hearing any evidence on the character or severity of the violations occurring subsequent to the circumstances which brought the original fine into being. Slip op. no. 208-85 at 11. [10] The prospective fines in Gant were payable to the injured party, while the prospective fines in UMWA were payable to the State. Here, the prospective fines, according to the order entered on December 12, 1983, were payable to the appellee as the injured party. On the other hand, they were to be paid to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia, according to the order entered on March 6, 1984. This inconsistency further obscures the trial court's purpose in imposing the fines. In any event, Gant or UMWA invalidates these fines. [11] In syllabus point 1 of Bell v. Inland Mutual Insurance Co., ___ W.Va. ___ 332 S.E.2d 127 (1985), this Court held: The imposition of sanctions by a circuit court under W.Va.R.Civ.P. 37(b) for the failure of a party to obey the court's order to provide or permit discovery is within the sound discretion of the court and will not be disturbed upon appeal unless there has been an abuse of that discretion. Not having any authority to impose the prospective, per diem fines, the trial court clearly abused or exceeded its discretion as a matter of law in this case. [12]