Opinion ID: 902003
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether Ernest Died Without Leaving an Estate to Mildred

Text: [¶ 5.] To recover the costs of providing resident care to a veteran, the Home may file a claim against the deceased veteran's estate pursuant to SDCL 33-18-15 and SDCL 33-18-16. These statutes allow the Home to file a claim against the estate of the deceased resident; or, if the deceased resident's estate was payable to the spouse, the Home can delay its claim and file a claim against the estate of the deceased spouse. The statutes at issue provide: SDCL 33-18-15: If an estate is left by a deceased member of the State Veterans' Home leaving no surviving spouse or dependent, the state home shall file a claim against the estate of the deceased member in the amount of the full maintenance charge for each month the member was in the home, retroactive from the date of admission with proper credits allowed to the estate of the deceased member for any payments made by the member. However, the credits may not include any allowances of the state government. Any such money received from the deceased member shall go to a capital fund of the state home for repairs, equipment, improvements, or construction. SDCL 33-18-16: If a deceased member of the State Veterans' Home leaves a spouse, or other dependent, the member's estate is payable to the spouse, or other dependent. Upon the death of the spouse or other dependent, the state home shall file a claim against the estate of the deceased spouse or other dependent for any claim against the estate of both the deceased husband and wife as provided in § 33-18-15. The claim is a preferred claim against the estates. [¶ 6.] The issue here is whether Ernest left an estate payable to his spouse against which the Home could make a claim. The Home argues that the term estate used by the statutes should be broadly construed to include Ernest's jointly-owned property and the life insurance proceeds paid to Mildred upon Ernest's death. In contrast, Personal Representative argues that the use of the word estate in the statutes refers only to property that is subject to probate. Personal Representative contends Ernest's joint tenancy and life insurance proceeds were not subject to probate, and therefore, were not affected by SDCL 33-18-15 and SDCL 33-18-16. [¶ 7.] The Home maintains that Ernest left his estate to Mildred. To support its position, the Home contends that the definition of estate incorporates more than the property subject to probate. The Home relies on the definition of estate from the South Dakota Uniform Probate Code. See SDCL 29A-1-201(14). Estate is defined by this statute as includ[ing] the property of the decedent, trust, or other person whose affairs are subject to this code as originally constituted and as it exists from time to time during administration. Id. Under this definition, the Home suggests that all property of the decedent, not just testate or intestate property, is subject to the provisions of SDCL 33-18-15 and SDCL 33-18-16. [¶ 8.] Personal Representative, however, argues that the Home's use of the Probate Code's definition of estate is inappropriate because the language of SDCL 29A-1-201(14) limits its definition to this code, meaning the Probate Code. On this basis, Personal Representative argues that because probate was not required for Ernest's property, the Probate Code, and its definition of estate, is inapplicable. [¶ 9.] Even if applicable, the definition of estate in the Probate Code does not create an estate for Ernest under the circumstances. SDCL 29A-1-201(14) defines estate as includ[ing] the property of the decedent, trust, or other person whose affairs are subject to this code as originally constituted and as it exists from time to time during administration. The Home asserts the definition of property includes both the real and personal property or any interest therein. ... See SDCL 29A-1-201(38). These statutes, however, do not suggest that a joint tenancy or life insurance policy is an interest therein. In fact, any property interest Ernest had in the joint tenancy was extinguished at the moment of his death. See In re Estate of Steed, 521 N.W.2d 675, 682 (S.D.1994) (The death of a joint tenant terminates [his] interest[.] ...) (quoting Hyland v. Standiford, 253 Iowa 294, 111 N.W.2d 260, 266 (1961)) (citation omitted). Therefore Ernest could not have passed an estate through the Probate Code because his interest in the joint tenancy effectively ceased at the moment of his death. See S.D. State Veterans' Home v. Nat'l Bank of S.D., 89 S.D. 549, 552-53, 235 N.W.2d 406, 407-08 (1975). The same principle applies to Ernest's life insurance policy. Ernest had no tangible interest in the policy when he was alive, and the policy was not subject to probate; therefore, it was not part of his estate because the benefits were payable to Mildred at his death. See Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 1.1 cmt.b (1999). Thus, even under the Probate Code's definition of estate, Ernest had no estate to probate or make a claim against. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court on this issue.