Opinion ID: 2551730
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court Failed to Apply the Proper Standard of Review

Text: The trial court claimed that the authority to conduct a de novo hearing arose from the expressed intention of the [] Council in enacting the [Act] and also from opinions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals that [t]he Act is to be read expansively. In particular, the trial court relied on In re Bicksler, 501 A.2d 1 (D.C.1985), [1] in which we construed the Act's definition of admission in a manner that brought it into conformity with a substantive section of the Act in order to ensure that voluntary entrance for habilitation in an institution or residential facility would be available for all mentally retarded persons, instead of limited to those who were moderately or severely mentally retarded. The trial court's reliance on Bicksler was misplaced. In that case, we analyzed and interpreted the provisions of the Act to correct a drafting oversight. Bicksler, 501 A.2d at 7. We did not hold that a trial court has the authority to make an initial determination of mental retardation in the voluntary admissions process. The Act specifically provides the court with a role only after an individual has been admitted to a facility. See D.C.Code §§ 7-1303.02(b), (c). The initial admission decision (which necessarily includes determining whether the applicant is mentally retarded) rests squarely with the director of the facility to which the applicant has applied. See § 7-1303.02(a). An applicant who is unhappy with a director's decision may petition the Superior Court for review. See Rones v. District of Columbia Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., 500 A.2d 998, 1001 n. 5 (D.C. 1985). D.C.Code § 2-510(a) (2006 Repl.) distinguishes between contested and non-contested cases for purposes of judicial review of an agency decision. A matter is contested where it involves a trial-type hearing which is required either by statute or by constitutional right. Rones, 500 A.2d at 1000 (quotation marks omitted). Because A.T. did not have a constitutional or statutory right to a trial-type hearing before DDS, hers was a non-contested case, and therefore was properly before the Superior Court. See id. at 1001 & n. 5 (noting that a party aggrieved by an agency decision in a non-contested case may seek redress in the Superior Court). The Superior Court must apply the same level of review that this court uses when reviewing contested cases, which prohibits the substitution of our judgment for that of the agency, and dictates that we review the administrative record alone and not duplicate agency proceedings or hear additional evidence. Kegley v. District of Columbia, 440 A.2d 1013, 1018 (D.C.1982). In this instance, the trial court should have examined the administrative record for procedural error, for substantial evidence in the record to support DDS's action, and to determine if the action [was] in some manner otherwise arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion or contrary to law. Barry v. Wilson, 448 A.2d 244, 246 (D.C. 1982) (citing Kegley, 440 A.2d at 1019). The trial court failed to apply the proper standard of review to DDS's decision, and we therefore reverse the court's January 4, 2010, Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Order of Admission (including, of course, its incorporation by reference of the December 15, 2009, Finding Regarding Mental Retardation). Because we apply the same standard of review as would the trial court if we remanded the case to it, for the sake of efficiency we decline to remand and will instead resolve the matter by applying the correct standard ourselves. See Barry, 448 A.2d at 246 (where the trial court erred by conducting a trial de novo,  the error did not preclude our independent review of the record); see also Kegley, 440 A.2d at 1019 ([T]he trial court, uncertain of its role as a reviewing court ... heard additional evidence in the case and did not confine itself to reviewing the evidence in the administrative record.... The fact that the trial court clearly erred, however, does not preclude our independent review of the record.).