Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 28

Heading: whether the trial court erred in overruling objections to sentencing instruction s-1a.

Text: ś 369. Evans alleges that sentencing instruction S-1A was erroneous for three reasons. First, Evans argues that the catch-all language utilized in the instruction would allow reasonable jurors to conclude that they had discretion to ignore non-statutory mitigating circumstances when deciding Evans' fate. The language Evans complains of is as follows: (j) Any other matter, any other aspect of the defendant's character or record, and any other circumstance of the offense brought to you during the trial on this cause which you, the Jury, deem to be mitigating on behalf of the defendant, (emphasis added). Evans relies on Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104[, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1] (1982), appeal after remand, 688 P.2d 342 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051[, 105 S.Ct. 1750, 84 L.Ed.2d 814] (1985), in arguing that sentencers in a capital case `may not give [mitigating circumstances] no weight by excluding such evidence from their deliberations.' ś 370. The record reveals that all objections made by Evans to Instruction S-1 were incorporated into S-1A. However, during the colloquy among defense counsel, the prosecution, and the court, no objection was made to this particular language in Instruction S-1. Because Evans failed to object to the inclusion of the catch-all language, this assignment of error is barred. However, without waiving the bar, we will alternatively consider the merits of this assignment. ś 371. Contrary to Evans' argument, this language does not authorize the jury to ignore nonstatutory elements of mitigation but rather, instructs the jury that they may consider additional mitigating evidence and therefore is in conformity with Eddings and Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(1), which states that any relevant mitigating evidence introduced on behalf of the defendant may be considered by the jury. ś 372. Moreover, this Court has approved instructions containing this language in Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824, 855 (Miss.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1076, 116 S.Ct. 782, 133 L.Ed.2d 733 (1996); Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743, 761 (Miss.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1015, 112 S.Ct. 663, 116 L.Ed.2d 754 (1991); Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657, 668 (Miss.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 910, 111 S.Ct. 1695, 114 L.Ed.2d 89 (1991), and expressly held in Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 761 (Miss.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1098, 105 S.Ct. 607, 83 L.Ed.2d 716 (1984), that catch-all language regarding mitigating factors should be employed in every case. This issue is without merit. ś 373. Evans next argues that language contained within S-1A could have instructed the jury that they must find mitigating factors unanimously. Evans argues that the reference to the jury using the pronoun you, the Jury implies that the jury must act as a collective body and thus must act unanimously when considering the existence of mitigating factors. Evans cites the following language as erroneous: Any other matter, any other aspect of the defendant's character or record, and any other circumstance of the offense brought to you during the trial on this cause which you, the Jury, deem to be mitigating on behalf of the defendant. If you find from the evidence that one or more of the preceding elements of mitigation exists, then you must consider whether it (or they) outweigh(s) or overcome(s) the aggravating circumstance(s) you previously found. In the event that you find the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh or overcome the aggravating circumstance(s), you may impose the death sentence. Should you find that the mitigating circumstance(s) outweigh or overcome the aggravating circumstance(s), you shall not impose the death sentence. C. The verdict you return must be written on a separate sheet of paper signed by the foreman. You (sic) verdict should be written in one of the following forms.... (emphasis added). ś 374. This Court has addressed instructions either identical or similar to that with which we are presented today. See Williams v. State, 684 So.2d 1179, 1200 (Miss.1996); Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 859-60 (Miss. 1995); cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 2279, 132 L.Ed.2d 282 (1995), reh'g denied, 515 U.S. 1179, 116 S.Ct. 20, 132 L.Ed.2d 903 (1995); Thorson v. State, 653 So.2d 876, 894 (Miss.1994); Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 149-50 (Miss.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 921, 112 S.Ct. 1970, 118 L.Ed.2d 570 (1992); reh'g denied, 505 U.S. 1231, 112 S.Ct. 3060, 120 L.Ed.2d 924 (1992); Shell v. State, 554 So.2d 887, 905 (Miss.1989), cert. granted, rev'd in part, 498 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 313, 112 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). Each time we held that the instruction[s] did not violate the holding in McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990), McNeil v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 1050, 110 S.Ct. 1516, 108 L.Ed.2d 756 (1990), or Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988). ś 375. Once again, this Court is confronted with an instruction where: [t]he mitigating circumstances portion of the instruction does not contain unanimous or unanimously. Only the aggravating circumstances part contains these words. No instruction says, implies or intimates to any reasonably literate juror that he or she should await unanimity before considering a mitigating circumstance. Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 150 (Miss. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 921, 112 S.Ct. 1970, 118 L.Ed.2d 570 (1992); reh'g denied, 505 U.S. 1231, 112 S.Ct. 3060, 120 L.Ed.2d 924 (1992). See also Williams v. State, 684 So.2d 1179, 1200; Davis v. State, 684 So.2d 643, 664 (Miss.1996)( citing Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743, 760 (Miss.1991); Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 681 (Miss.1991); Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657, 668 (Miss.1990); and Shell v. State, 554 So.2d 887 (Miss.1989), reversed on other grounds, 498 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 313, 112 L.Ed.2d 1(1990)). This issue is without merit. ś 376. The third ground of contention with regard to Sentencing Instruction S-1A is that reasonable jurors couldâ andâ would have taken the instruction to mean that, once the jury found at least one aggravating circumstance, both the burden of production and the burden of proof shifted to the defendant to demonstrate that a death sentence should not be imposed. Evans objects to the following language: If one or more of the above aggravating circumstances is found to exist, then you must consider whether there are mitigating circumstances which outweigh the aggravating circumstance(s). Consider the following elements of mitigation in determining whether the death penalty should not be imposed;       If you find from the evidence that one or more of the preceding elements of mitigation exists, then you must consider whether it (or they) outweigh(s) or overcome(s) the aggravating circumstance(s) you previously found. In the event that you find that the mitigating circumstance(s) do not outweigh or overcome the aggravating circumstance(s), you may impose the death sentence. Should you find that the mitigating circumstance(s) outweigh or overcome the aggravating circumstance(s), you shall not impose the death sentence. (emphasis added). ś 377. Evans' argument is as familiar as is the language of the instruction. Identical language was before this Court in Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1222-23 (Miss.1996); Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1278 (Miss. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 927, 115 S.Ct. 314, 130 L.Ed.2d 276 (1994); Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 944 (Miss.1986); Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657 (Miss.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 910, 111 S.Ct. 1695, 114 L.Ed.2d 89 (1991). In each case, the appellant, like Evans, argued that this language impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. After review, this Court has consistently held that this argument is without merit. See also Shell v. State, 554 So.2d 887, 904 (Miss.1989), rev'd on other grounds, 498 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 313, 112 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990); Jordan v. State, 365 So.2d 1198, 1206 (Miss.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S.Ct. 175, 62 L.Ed.2d 114 (1979). ś 378. Evans, however, expands the argument somewhat by challenging the language included in the initial paragraph wherein the jury was instructed to consider the following elements of mitigation in determining whether the death penalty should not be imposed. In Williams v. State, 684 So.2d 1179, 1202 (Miss.1996), we were confronted with identical language. There we held: One of the criteria that jurors must find exists to impose the sentence of death is the presence of one or more of the aggravating circumstances. What the defendant is citing to in S-2 is language instructing jurors to consider the following mitigators after the jury has unanimously determined that one or more of the enumerated aggravators exist. When taken in context, we find that this issue, as in Shell, lacks merit. ś 379. Lastly, Evans argues that Sentencing Instruction S-1A failed to require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the death penalty was the appropriate penalty. Specifically, Evans argues that the instruction unconstitutionally relieved the State of its obligation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the aggravating circumstances were sufficient to impose the death penalty; (2) there were insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh any aggravating circumstances; or (3) the Defendant should suffer death. ś 380. In essence, Evans argues that the jury should utilize the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances during the sentencing phase of a capital trial. To require such would exceed what is required by statute or by case law. In Wiley v. State, 484 So.2d 339, 352 (Miss.1986), overruled on other grounds, Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 681 (Miss.1991), this Court was confronted with the same argument and held that [t]he majority rule of this Court is that the jurors are required to find the existence of each aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, but the jury is not required to find that the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt outweigh the mitigating circumstances following the statute. The instruction given by the lower court clearly complied with Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101 and the precedent of this Court. This issue is without merit.