Opinion ID: 1278912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Real Party in Interest, The Idaho Court of Appeals

Text: The majority states that the Court of Appeals erroneously failed to consider Tisdale to have been overruled by this Court in State v. Osborn ... . The Court of Appeals did not err, however. Rather, the majority today errs in making the statement. Axiomatic in this appellate business is that (in Idaho) three beats two. But an opinion of two justices is indeed the plurality opinion which any opinion by two justices is. Apparently three justices of the Court are this day adopting as their own  without explicitly saying so  the language in Osborn from which today Justice Huntley retreats. This they can do, but a strange vehicle has been used to get there. At stake here is the integrity of the Court of Appeals, wholly unrepresented except for the commendable effort of Mr. Nield's attorney  neither Mr. Nield nor his attorney having any real reason to resist the attorney general's effort to relegate the Court of Appeals to its perceived proper place in the judicial system. Out of respect for Mr. Box, who clearly devoted his own time in defense of the Court of Appeals, I submit the following portions of an extremely well-written brief: The conclusion that the State is an aggrieved party is suspect from the beginning, in that it was Nield's prison term that was affirmed. This Court's `overruling' language in Osborn, in conjunction with its accepting review upon the petition of one who is technically not an aggrieved party sends out a curious invitation. Is the Court looking for an opportunity to rebuke the Court of Appeals, or is it looking for a chance to lend meaningful guidance to the bench and bar in sentencing procedure and review? The tenor of the State's petition is that this Court should rebuke the Court of Appeals for not acknowledging that Tisdale has been overruled. In doing so, appellant submits that the State is attempting to bootstrap the Osborn decision into something more than it really is. If the Court accepts the State's invitation, the progress that has been made by this Court, as well as the Appellate Court, in the development of meaningful appellate review of sentences will be jeopardized. The State cast the issue as one involving a conflict over rulemaking authority, and failure to respect this Court's pronouncements. It is respectfully submitted that there is far more to be gained by addressing the issues of sentencing procedure and appellate review thereof than there is by embroiling this case in jealousy over rule-making authority. Through the following analysis, it is quite clear that the Appellate Court has accurately interpreted the language of Osborn and appropriately applied the views expressed therein in the Nield decision. The Appellate Court is not in defiance of this Court's decisions, nor has there been any encroachment upon the rule-making power of this Court. ... . In Tisdale, the District Judge gave no reasons for his sentencing decision. 103 Idaho at 837, 654 P.2d 1389. It was Tisdale's contention that `the [district] court erred by failing to state reasons for the sentence and that the sentence was excessive'. According to the Court: `These contentions, taken together, frame the dispositive question in this appeal  whether we should undertake to review a sentence for excessiveness when no reasons for the sentence have been stated of record.' 103 Idaho at 837, 654 P.2d 1389. The Appellate Court thus came face to face with the issue of the necessity for specification of reasons by the sentencing judge. It vacated Toohill's sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that the District Court: ` shall indicate of record his reasons for the sentence then imposed.' 103 Idaho at 838, 654 P.2d 1389. (Emphasis added). The Tisdale ruling was limited in retrospective application to cases pending on appeal which had specified the absence of reasons underlying a sentencing decision as an issue on appeal. Implications of the decision were further limited in application to only felony cases. Thus, Idaho law fell in line with the American Bar Association's Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures (§ 5.6). Idaho law also fell in line with the progressive notion that sentencing review involves a reason-oriented analysis. The approach advanced by the Appellate Court has considerable support in developing case law and judicial commentaries. In People v. Watkins [200 Colo. 163], 613 P.2d 633 (1980), the Colorado Court noted that: `If appellate review of felony sentences is to satisfy its stated objectives, it requires that the sentencing judge state on the record the basic reasons for imposing sentence'. In People v. Horne, 619 P.2d 53 (Colo. 1980), the Colorado Court further held that `where a sentence of extended duration is imposed, the record must establish a clear justification for the trial judge's actions'. In that case the sentence was vacated and sent back for resentencing due to an inadequate record. Also in Colorado, the Supreme Court held: `Since the record fails to support the trial court's apparent conclusion that the defendant is beyond hope of rehabilitation, and fails to set out any facts justifying imposition of a consecutive sentence, we hold that that aspect of the sentence constituted an abuse of discretion.' People v. Edwards, 598 P.2d 126 (Colo. 1979). The Montana Supreme Court has adopted a rule requiring specification of reasons for all prison sentences, stating: `We see no reason why a defendant sentenced to prison is not also entitled to know precisely why the sentencing judge chose the particular sentence involved.' State v. Stumpf, 609 P.2d 298 (Mont. 1980). The Montana Court also noted that: `... Several jurisdictions require sentencing courts to state on the record the reasons for selecting a particular sentence. Some of these are controlled by statutes requiring the sentencing courts to disclose its reasons for sentencing (e.g. Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Oregon). Others require it under the criminal procedure rules of the respective states (e.g. Pennsylvania, Iowa, and New Jersey)... .' 609 P.2d at 298, 299. In addition, an Arizona statute requires specification of reasons for imposing consecutive sentences, ARS § 13-708, State v. Sanchez, 635 P.2d 1217 (Ariz. App. 1981), and California apparently requires a statement of reasons for granting or denying probation, People v. Arceo, (1979), 3d Dist.), 95 Cal. App.3d 117, 157 Cal. Rptr. 10, as quoted in Campbell, Law of Sentencing, 1978, supra. Several instances may be found where cases have been remanded for lack of an adequate record to facilitate appellate review. See e.g. United States v. Latimer, (1969 CA 6 Ohio), 415 F.2d at 1288; United States v. Ramos, (1978 CA 2 NY), 572 F.2d 360, and People v. Horne, supra. Appellant's Brief, pp. 4-6, 14-16.