Opinion ID: 2032067
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: application of the structural work act to union electric

Text: Union Electric first argues that the Act was improperly invoked. Section 9 of the Act provides: Any owner, contractor, sub-contractor, foreman or other person having charge of the erection, construction, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any building, bridge, viaduct or other structure within the provisions of this act, shall comply with all the terms thereof   .    For any injury to person or property, occasioned by any wilful violations of this Act, or wilful failure to comply with any of its provisions, a right of action shall accrue to the party injured   . (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 69.) Union Electric contends that it did not have charge of the plaintiff's work, the work performed was not on a structure and no wilful violation occurred, and therefore both the circuit and appellate courts erred when they held that Union Electric had violated the Act. To hold a party accountable under the Act, the court must find that the party had charge of the work in question. Union Electric contends that it had no direct connection with the repair operations and, relying on McGovern v. Standish (1976), 65 Ill.2d 54, it argues that the totality of circumstances in this case is insufficient to find that it had control of the plaintiff's work. The term having charge of is primarily a factual question. ( McGovern v. Standish (1976), 65 Ill.2d 54, 66; see also Voss v. Kingdon & Naven, Inc. (1975), 60 Ill.2d 520, 525.) The factual inquiry involves numerous factors, including those enunciated in Chance v. City of Collinsville (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 6, 11. The fact that all work performed by Sachs was subject to inspection and final acceptance by Union Electric, that Union Electric employees visited the plant regularly while the plant was closed, and that Sachs' employees only entered the Cahokia plant at the request of Union Electric supports the determinations of the circuit and appellate courts that, for the purposes of the Act, Union Electric was one of the parties in charge of the work at the time of the accident. Norton v. Wilbur Waggoner Equipment Rental and Excavating Co. (1979), 76 Ill.2d 481, 490-91. Union Electric next argues that the plaintiff was not injured while working on a structure. It emphasizes that at the time he was injured Simmons was attempting to reach a temporary sump pump. Union Electric concludes that a structure was not under repair and that the Act therefore did not apply. The circuit and appellate courts correctly determined that Simmons was working on a structure at the time of the injury. Navlyt v. Kalinich (1972), 53 Ill.2d 137, suggests the flexibility of the term structure as used in the Act. In that case, a trench was held to be a structure within the meaning of the Act. That trench was used to install sewer tiles for townhouses. In this case, the structure was the ash pit which housed the sump pumps Simmons was instructed to repair. In order to reach the pumps, Simmons descended on the ladder which, for the purposes of the Act, was a scaffold. Following this court's test in Navlyt, the ash pit where Simmons was injured was a `structure' under the Act, either considered by itself or as an integral part of the repairs at the Cahokia plant. Navlyt v. Kalinich (1972), 53 Ill.2d 137, 138-39. Finally, Union Electric contends that any violation of the Act was not wilful. The appellate court correctly followed the applicable standard that a wilful violation of the Act occurs when one having charge of the work knows that a dangerous condition exists on a support device or, by the exercise of reasonable care, could have discovered the existence of the condition. [Citation.] (121 Ill. App.3d 743, 754; see also Davis v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1975), 61 Ill.2d 494, 501-02.) The conclusion that Union Electric knew or should have known that the ladder on which Simmons slipped was unsafe at the time of his injury because it was covered with an oily substance was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence that Union Electric knew that the waters which flooded the Cahokia plant were oily, and could leave an oily substance on the ladder leading to the ash pit, was sufficient to justify the conclusion that Union Electric wilfully violated the statute.