Opinion ID: 2625328
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: WACDL's Arguments

Text: Amicus curiae, Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (WACDL), argues that Lough should be reversed. WACDL argues that Lough fails to give due consideration to the prejudice inherent in prior sex crimes, which leads to their unavoidable use as propensity evidence. WACDL argues that the trial court should focus on the defendant's state of mind instead of focusing on the similarity of the prior acts when determining whether to admit prior acts as evidence of a common scheme or plan. Quoting from our opinion in State v. Saltarelli , WACDL maintains that: [w]hen deciding the issue of guilt or innocence in sex cases, where prejudice has reached its loftiest peak, ... courts have been most liberal in announcing and fostering a nebulous exception, offering scant attention to inherent possibilities of prejudice. Just when protection is most needed, the rules collapse. Br. of WACDL at 9 (quoting State v. Saltarelli, 98 Wash.2d 358, 364, 655 P.2d 697 (1982) (quoting M.C. Slough & J. William Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IOWA L.REV. 325, 334 (1956))). WACDL asserts that focusing on mental state, rather than similarity, will somehow protect against this danger. Saltarelli emphasized the importance of a trial court determining relevance and balancing the prejudicial value against probative effect of any prior bad act evidence brought in under ER 404(b). Saltarelli, 98 Wash.2d at 362, 655 P.2d 697. Weighing the prejudicial effect is especially important for cases involving sexual crimes, as the above quotation explains. Saltarelli, 98 Wash.2d at 363, 655 P.2d 697. In Lough, however, we emphasized a common sense approach for the use of prior bad acts to show a plan, especially in cases of sexual crimes, because the doing of the act is often difficult to prove. We quoted with approval another section of Wigmore's treatise on evidence: The committing of a single previous rape, or rape attempt, upon another woman may not in itself indicate such a design.... Nevertheless, a single previous act, even upon another woman, may, with other circumstances, give strong indication of a design (not a disposition) to rape.... Courts have shown altogether too much hesitation in receiving such evidence. Even when rigorously excluded from any bearing it may have upon character ..., it may carry with it great significance as to a specific design or plan of rape.... There is room for much more common sense than appears in the majority of the rulings. Lough, 125 Wash.2d at 858-59, 889 P.2d 487 (quoting Wigmore § 357, at 335-42.) Our reliance on this passage reflects our concern that trial courts give special consideration to the probative value of such evidence when balancing against the prejudicial effect of such evidence, especially when corroborating evidence is not available. Saltarelli is consistent with both Lough and the Court of Appeals in the present case. In Saltarelli, we concluded that the evidence was improperly admitted because the trial court did not adequately balance probative value against prejudicial effect. Saltarelli, 98 Wash.2d at 363, 655 P.2d 697. In contrast, the trial court in the present case both articulated the correct standard for admitting common scheme or plan evidence and conducted a meticulous balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect, mindful of our reasoning in Lough. We decline to overrule Lough.