Opinion ID: 1918798
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Blood Spatter and the Execution-style theory

Text: ¶ 10. Jordan raises ten claims that are included under this heading. Broadly stated, Jordan objects to the way in which the State presented its theory that Edwina Marter was killed execution-style. Jordan's position has always been that he shot Edwina when she suddenly ran away from him. The State refuted Jordan's defense with Officer David Melton who testified that blood spatter patterns at the scene demonstrated Edwina was in a stationary position, standing or kneeling in front of Jordan when she was shot. The State also presented the testimony of forensic pathologist, Dr. William D. Atchison, who opined that Edwina was not running away from Jordan and was, in fact, probably kneeling in front of him. ¶ 11. As he has in past pleadings, Jordan once again objects to the testimony of Officer David Melton and to Melton's qualifications as an expert witness. Melton testified for the first time in Jordan's 1983 trial and in every subsequent trial. The State correctly points out that the Court has now twice considered David Melton as an expert witness and the evidence regarding blood spatter patterns. In both instances, the Court has denied Jordan relief. In the 1985 direct appeal opinion, we held that Melton was properly qualified to express an opinion regarding blood spatter. See Jordan v. State, 464 So.2d 475, 484 (Miss.1985). Again, in the most recent appeal, we held that the trial court properly admitted Melton's testimony. Jordan v. State, 786 So.2d at 1017. The State argues that this claim cannot be re-litigated under the provisions of Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3). Furthermore, the State points out that any attempt to litigate this claim on a different legal or factual theory than that previously forwarded is barred by the provisions of Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(2). ¶ 12. We agree that this issue has already been litigated and is now procedurally barred. Jordan is attempting to rephrase the issue as a knowing presentation of false or misleading evidence, but the underlying claim is the same one that has already been addressed and found to have no merit. ¶ 13. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, we will examine the merits of the claim. David Melton had received training in the interpretation of blood stains and could opine with authority about the blood found at the scene. Melton testified that he was employed by the Gulf-port Police Department from 1966-1969 and by the Harrison County Sheriff's Department from 1972-1977. He attended the Mississippi State Law Enforcement Training Academy and received training in fingerprints and blood stains. As this Court has already determined, the trial court did not err in allowing Melton's testimony. ¶ 14. We now also consider the standard to be applied to Jordan's claim that the State knowingly presented false testimony. Jordan asserts that if there is any reasonable likelihood that the allegedly false evidence affected the judgment of the jury, then the defendant is entitled to a new trial. We find that Jordan has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that David Melton's testimony on blood spatter evidence resulted in a death sentence where it is undisputed that Jordan was twice convicted and sentenced to death in previous trials in which David Melton did not testify on the issue of blood spatters. We find that the issue is without merit. ¶ 15. Jordan's next argument is that it is a violation of the law of the case doctrine and the doctrines of collateral and judicial estoppel to allow the State to present evidence that Edwina was killed execution-style. [2] He argues that at the first two trials, the State acquiesced to his account that he shot Edwina when she tried to run away from him. He argues it was error then for the State, in subsequent proceedings, to argue instead that Edwina was kneeling in front of Jordan when she was shot. Jordan cites a number of federal cases for the proposition that pursuing inconsistent theories is cause for reversal. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974); Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.2000); Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449, 1470-79 (11th Cir.1985). [3] ¶ 16. The State argues the evidence that Edwina Marter was killed execution-style was not a new theory. The State attempted to introduce this evidence at the sentencing trial in 1977 and the State used this theory in its re-sentencing of Jordan in 1983. ¶ 17. We agree with the State and also now find that no objection was raised on this claim at trial or on appeal. Furthermore, Jordan could have and yet failed to raise this issue in previous post-conviction pleadings. Therefore, Jordan's claim that it was a violation of the law of the case doctrine and the doctrines of collateral and equitable estoppel to allow the State to present evidence that Edwina was killed execution-style is now procedurally barred by Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21. ¶ 18. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, we find this issue has no merit. In the trials prior to 1983, the trial court never held Melton's testimony inadmissible with regard to the substantive content of blood spatter testimony. Therefore, there was no law of the case as to Melton's testimony established in the 1977 trial. This Court previously held Melton's blood spatter testimony and Dr. Atchison's testimony as to the position of the victim's body to be admissible. Furthermore, the State was not attempting to relitigate Jordan's conviction, but was introducing evidence of aggravating factors with regard to re-sentencing. ¶ 19. Next, Jordan asserts that misconduct by the special prosecutor hampered defense counsel's ability to raise an objection to the State's inconsistent theories and hampered his ability to cross-examine the State's experts about their qualifications and conclusions on the issue of blood spatter evidence. Jordan asserts that the special prosecutor led defense counsel, Tom Sumrall, to believe that transcripts of prior trials were unavailable for review. Having failed to review the transcripts of prior trials, it was impossible for the defense attorney to realize that the State was pursuing inconsistent theories in the 1998 re-sentencing trial. Jordan argues that the State's misleading statements about the availability of the transcripts was a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). ¶ 20. The State correctly points out that all of the transcripts of the earlier proceedings are public records and, as such, were equally available to the State and the defense. Also the State argues that what Jordan describes would not be a Brady violation. ¶ 21. In King v. State, 656 So.2d 1168 (Miss.1995), this Court noted: United States v. Spagnoulo sets forth a four-prong test to determine whether a Brady violation has occurred mandating a new trial. To establish a Brady violation a defendant must prove the following: (1) that the government possessed evidence favorable to the defendant (including impeachment evidence); (2) that the defendant does not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and, (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Spagnoulo, 960 F.2d 990, 994 (11th Cir.1992), citing United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.1989), (cert.denied). 656 So.2d at 1174. It is well settled that exculpatory evidence in the possession of the prosecution must be turned over to the accused in a criminal proceeding. However, as this Court has held, the prosecution is under no duty to turn over its entire file to the defense. Boches v. State, 506 So.2d 254, 263 (Miss.1987) (citing Scott v. State, 359 So.2d 1355, 1361 (Miss.1978)). ¶ 22. Furthermore, the affidavit of defense counsel Tom Sumrall filed with Jordan's petition for post-conviction relief does not support the claim that Sumrall was somehow misled as to the existence of transcripts. Sumrall stated he knew that the transcripts generated in previous proceedings were voluminous. He stated he received a box full of transcripts, but then discovered that some were incomplete. He explained he had generous access to the special prosecutor's files and transcripts and was provided with any copies that he wanted. We find this claim is without merit. ¶ 23. While much time and argument has been expended on the blood spatter evidence, that evidence is only one portion of a larger context of evidence upon which the jury could have sentenced Jordan to death. After a defendant is convicted of a capital offense, the trial court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment, with or without parole. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(1). Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101 provides in pertinent part: (3) For the jury to impose a sentence of death, it must unanimously find in writing the following: (b) That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5) of this section; and (c) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances, as enumerated in subsection (6), to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101 further provides, in pertinent part: (5) Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: (d) The capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, sexual battery, unnatural intercourse with any child under the age of twelve (12), or nonconsensual unnatural intercourse with mankind, or felonious abuse and/or battery of a child in violation of subsection (2) of Section 97-5-39, Mississippi Code of 1972, or the unlawful use or detonation of a bomb or explosive device. (f) The capital offense was committed for pecuniary gain. (h) The capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. Jordan was convicted of capital murder. In the bifurcated sentencing proceeding and the re-sentencing proceedings, the jury has found sufficient aggravating circumstances to impose the death penalty. The jury's finding in the most recent trial clearly indicates it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Jordan murdered Edwina; the murder was committed in the commission of a kidnaping; the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; and, it was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel, supported by the fact that she was subjected to the mental torture caused by her abduction from her home where she was forced to leave her three-year old son alone. ¶ 24. Even if the testimony on the subject of blood spatter patterns were excluded, there were still sufficient proof of aggravating circumstances to support Jordan's death sentence. See McGilberry v. State, 843 So.2d 21, 29 (Miss.2003) (where this Court addressed the aggravating circumstance of whether McGilberry created a great risk of death to many persons and held that [i]f one aggravator is found to be invalid, we are authorized to re-weigh the remaining aggravators against the mitigating circumstances and affirm, hold the error to be harmless, or remand for a new sentencing hearing.) Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-105(5)(b) (Rev.2000).