Opinion ID: 2630926
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Motions to Sever Defendants' Trials at the Guilt Phase (Letner, Tobin)

Text: (11) Each defendant filed a pretrial motion to sever his trial at the guilt phase from that of the other defendant, arguing that their defenses would be antagonistic and that their constitutional rights to confrontation would be violated by the admission of their statements incriminating each other. (See Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [20 L.Ed.2d 476, 88 S.Ct. 1620] [a nontestifying codefendant's extrajudicial statement that incriminates both himself or herself and the other defendant is inadmissible]; People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 [47 Cal.Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265].) As defendants observed, Tobin made statements to his mother and Jeanette Mayberry admitting he was at Pontbriant's house on the night of the murder, but asserting he left before Letner and at a time when Pontbriant was unharmed, whereas Letner asserted in the letters written to inmate Danny Payne, and in statements made to investigator Johnson, Robert Hernandez, and Leo Pike, that Letner was present when Tobin killed Pontbriant. The trial court denied the severance motions, with the understanding the prosecutor would not be permitted to introduce statements that posed an Aranda/Bruton problem. Defendants contend on appeal that the denial of their motions was an abuse of discretion that violated their statutory rights, as well as their state and federal constitutional rights. [10] (12) Section 1098 provides in pertinent part: `When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any public offense, whether felony or misdemeanor, they must be tried jointly, unless the court order[s] separate trials.' Our Legislature has thus `expressed a preference for joint trials.' [Citation.] But the court may, in its discretion, order separate trials `in the face of an incriminating confession, prejudicial association with codefendants, likely confusion resulting from evidence on multiple counts, conflicting defenses, or the possibility that at a separate trial a codefendant would give exonerating testimony.' [Citations.] [¶] We review a trial court's denial of a severance motion for abuse of discretion based on the facts as they appeared at the time the court ruled on the motion. [Citation.] If the court's joinder ruling was proper at the time it was made, a reviewing court may reverse a judgment only on a showing that joinder `resulted in `gross unfairness' amounting to a denial of due process.' ( People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 574-575 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076] ( Avila ).) (13) To the extent defendants contend the trial court abused its discretion by finding the defense cases were not so conflicting as to require a severance, they are incorrect. Initially, it must be observed that this was a `classic case' for a joint trial, because defendants mutually were charged with the same crimes arising from the same events. ( People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 40 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30] ( Coffman ).) The circumstance that Letner and Tobin might attempt to fix blame on each other did not by itself require separate trials. [11] If the fact of conflicting or antagonistic defenses alone required separate trials, it would negate the legislative preference for joint trials and separate trials `would appear to be mandatory in almost every case.' ( People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 168 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781].) Accordingly, we have concluded that a trial court, in denying severance, abuses its discretion only when the conflict between the defendants alone will demonstrate to the jury that they are guilty. If, instead, there exists sufficient independent evidence against the moving defendant, it is not the conflict alone that demonstrates his or her guilt, and antagonistic defenses do not compel severance. ( Coffman, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 41; see also People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1297-1298 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 190 P.3d 616] [a joint trial is prohibited only where `the conflict is so prejudicial that [the] defenses are irreconcilable, and the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both [defendants] are guilty']; Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 575-576.) When the trial court ruled in the present case on the motions to sever, the evidence before itthe testimony presented at the preliminary hearing demonstrated that the conflict between the potential defenses alone was not likely to lead the jury to reach guilty verdicts. The evidence established that both defendants knew Pontbriant was alone at her house and possessed a car and cash for the rent. Both defendants were found traveling out of town in the victim's car on the night of the murder, and their belongings were found in the trunk. They both provided conflicting accounts of where they were going. They subsequently abandoned the car, leaving their possessions inside, and fled. Moreover, forensic evidence discovered at the scene and in the victim's car pointed toward each defendant's involvement in the murder. Finally, both defendants made statements that were self-incriminating (apart from the excluded portions of the statements that incriminated the other defendant). As in People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 313 [208 Cal.Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669], in which we found no abuse of discretion in permitting a joint trial of the defendants, when the trial court ruled on the motions to sever in the present case, the court was faced with two men charged with [a] murder[] under circumstances in which all the events surrounding the crimes and ultimate arrests involved them jointly. For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying their motions to sever. To the extent defendants assert that additional grounds not presented to the trial court demonstrate the joint trial resulted in gross unfairness amounting to a denial of due process of law, we are not persuaded. Both defendants urge that severance was required because the prosecution employed the joint trial to join a strong case with a weak one, and to take advantage of a prejudicial association between the two defendants. We disagree. Notably, each defendant asserts the evidence against him was weak compared to the stronger evidence against his codefendant. We conclude, however, that the evidence presented against each defendant at trial was, in general, of similar weight. The strengths and weaknesses of the prosecution's caseconsidering its circumstantial nature, the credibility of the witnesses, and the force of the physical evidencefor the most part were the same for both defendants. We cannot say that the quantity and quality of the evidence implicating one defendant compared to the other was so dissimilar that the jury likely convicted both defendants based upon the strength of the evidence against only one of them. Similarly, we do not discern any inappropriate reliance upon the prejudicial nature of the association between the two defendants. Defendants observe that the prosecutor acknowledged to the jury it was difficult to point to evidence that definitively established the role of each defendant in the crimes committed against Pontbriant, but the prosecutor nonetheless argued that the evidence, including defendants' history of close friendship, demonstrated they were equally culpable. We reject defendants' contention that this argument improperly appealed to the jury to consider guilt by associationan improper consideration that could have been avoided by severance of defendants' trials. [12] A prejudicial association justifying severance will involve circumstances in which the evidence regarding one defendant might make it likely the jury would convict that defendant of the charges and, further, more likely find a codefendant guilty based upon the relationship between the two rather than upon the evidence separately implicating the codefendant. (See People v. Chambers (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 23, 29 [41 Cal.Rptr. 551] [concluding that the defendant was probably fastened with vicarious responsibility for the long-continued brutality of [the codefendant], and that the jury likely convicted the defendant based upon a notion of joint moral responsibility rather than personal guilt]; People v. Massie (1967) 66 Cal.2d 899, 917 & fn. 19 [59 Cal.Rptr. 733, 428 P.2d 869] [citing Chambers concerning prejudicial association with codefendants warranting severance]; People v. Biehler (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 290, 298 [17 Cal.Rptr. 862] [the vices inherent in a mass trial such as was had in the instant case are the danger that the jury will find one or more defendants guilty as charged because of his association with evil men . . .]; see also People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1286 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1] [Since defendants were crime partners in several of the robberies and in the murder, prejudicial association with a codefendant is not a factor.].) The prosecution's argument in the present casethat it was probable Letner and Tobin acted in concert, because they had a history of doing sowas not an appeal to find guilt by association, but rather was a proper argument based upon reasonable inferences the jury could draw from the evidence it had heard. (Cf. People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 921 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93] [the prosecution's introduction of evidence of defendants' membership in a criminal street gang was not an attempt to prove guilt by association; evidence of gang membership formed a significant evidentiary link in the chain of proof tying them to the crimes].) Moreover, the jury repeatedly was instructed at the conclusion of the guilt phase that it must consider separately the evidence against each defendant and reach a verdict as to each based solely upon the evidence admitted against him. Although Letner asserts the reality of trial practice is that such instructions are ineffective, we presume the jury followed these instructions. ( Coffman, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 43-44.) The prosecutor's argument did not result in gross unfairness that would warrant setting aside the verdict rendered following the joint trial. Letner also asserts that severance was required because Tobin acted as a second prosecutor, thereby reducing the prosecution's burden to prove its case against Letner, as well as adversely affecting Letner's ability to present his own defense. For the most part, this claim appears to be a variation of the claim we already have rejected, concerning the necessity for severance because of defendants' allegedly conflicting defenses. Tobin's presentation of evidence tending to incriminate Letner did not lessen the prosecution's burden, or result in gross unfairness amounting to a denial of due process. As we have explained, because there was sufficient independent evidence of guilt, the conflict between defendants did not lead by itself to Letner's conviction, and therefore severance was not required. (14) Further, the record does not confirm Letner's contention on appeal that he chose not to testify at the guilt phase because of a concern related to his joint trial; Letner and his attorney offered ambiguous explanations for this decision. [13] In addition, the assertion that Letner chose not to testify because he was jointly tried with Tobin is contradicted by Letner's penalty phase testimony that the reason he did not testify at the guilt phase was that he did not want to have a rat jacket in prison. Even if the record established that Letner chose not to testify because of some concern related to his joint trial with Tobin, Letner does not offer any authority supporting his claim that, despite proper joinder of the trial, the strategic decision he was required to make between testifying and remaining silent resulted in a gross unfairness amounting to a denial of due process and in other respects denied him his constitutional rights. As we have observed, `[T]he criminal process . . . is replete with situations requiring the making of difficult judgments as to which course to follow. [Citation.] Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose.' ( People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1056 [251 Cal.Rptr. 757, 761 P.2d 680] [quoting McGautha v. California (1971) 402 U.S. 183, 213 [28 L.Ed.2d 711, 91 S.Ct. 1454]].) Similarly, Letner's contention that the jury held against him his failure to testify at the guilt phase, even though the trial court instructed the jury not to do so, lacks any support in the record. In sum, defendants have failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motions to sever their joint trial on the issue of guilt. Nor have they shown that any aspects of the joint trial, when considered separately or cumulatively, resulted in gross unfairness amounting to a denial of due process or a violation of their constitutional rights to a reliable and individualized verdict.