Opinion ID: 1057572
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tennessee Consumer Protection Act

Text: Mr. McGuigan also moves for summary judgment on the Davises’ Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim. The Tennessee Consumer Protection Act creates a cause of action for “[a]ny person who suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property . . . as a result of the use or employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive act or practice declared to be unlawful by” the Consumer Protection Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-109(a)(1) (2001). In their complaint, the Davises do not allege that Mr. McGuigan engaged in any specific act or practice declared unlawful by the Tennessee General Assembly in Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-18-104(b) (2001 & Supp. 2009). As such, to establish their Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim at trial, the Davises must prove that they suffered “an ascertainable loss of money or property . . . as a result” of Mr. McGuigan’s “engaging in any . . . act or practice which is deceptive to the consumer or to any other person.” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-18-104(b)(27), -109(a). Mr. McGuigan contends that his actions were neither deceptive nor unfair. “[A] ‘deceptive act or practice’ is a material representation, practice or omission likely to mislead -14- a reasonable consumer.” Ganzevoort v. Russell, 949 S.W.2d 293, 299 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Bisson v. Ward, 628 A.2d 1256, 1261 (Vt. 1993)); see Fayne, 301 S.W.3d at 177. An act is unfair if it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.” Tucker v. Sierra Builders, 180 S.W.3d 109, 116-17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(n) (1977)). We need not decide whether Mr. McGuigan satisfied his burden of production for summary judgment because the Davises have identified a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment on this claim. Mills, 300 S.W.3d at 634-35. The Davises point to the appraisal report’s use of the sale of homes only from the LaurelBrooke subdivision for the sales comparison approach. The Davises also point to the deposition of Mr. Turner, who opined that Mr. McGuigan deviated from the standard of care for appraisers in failing to include a home from the Horseshoe Bend subdivision as a comparison. We have held that negligent misrepresentations may be found to be a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, see Fayne, 301 S.W.3d at 177, and that “[w]hether a particular act is unfair or deceptive is a question of fact,” id. at 170. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Davises, drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor, and discarding all countervailing facts, a reasonable person could reach different conclusions as to whether Mr. McGuigan’s appraisal was unfair or deceptive. See Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 88-89. Summary judgment therefore is not warranted based on this claim.7