Opinion ID: 1454621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Admission of Electrophoresis Test Evidence to Identify Bloodstains

Text: (33a) Defendant challenges the trial court's decision to admit the results of electrophoretic testing of bloodstains found at the site of Van Zandt's murder and on the clothes seized when defendant and his two companions were arrested. He asserts the prosecution did not establish the scientific reliability of the test under the Kelly/Frye rule. ( People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 30 [130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240]; Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir.1923) 293 Fed. 1013, 1014 [54 App.D.C. 46, 34 A.L.R. 145].) (34) The rule requires the proponent of expert testimony based on the application of a new scientific technique to establish three things: (1) the technique or method is sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in its field; (2) testimony with respect to the technique and its application is offered by a properly qualified expert; and (3) correct scientific procedures have been used in the particular case. ( Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30.) (33b) Citing our decision in People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 530-533 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440], reversed on other grounds in California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837], in which we found that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of establishing the scientific acceptability of electrophoresis, defendant maintains that a similar failure occurred here. His argument is unpersuasive. Electrophoresis allows typing of individual blood proteins and enzymes found in a blood sample by a method that separates electrically charged molecules. A few months after defendant's trial, the Court of Appeal found that it had gained general acceptance in the scientific community. Reviewing a record containing extensive expert testimony on the subject, the Court of Appeal observed that the only dissenting voice on the issue of general acceptance, Dr. Benjamin Grunbaum, emphasized only remediable defects in the knowledge and ability of the analyst rather than in the technique itself. ( People v. Reilly (1987) 196 Cal. App.3d 1127, 1137-1144 [242 Cal. Rptr. 496].) Reilly has been followed by two other panels of the Court of Appeal. ( People v. Yorba (1989) 209 Cal. App.3d 1017, 1023 [257 Cal. Rptr. 641]; People v. Morris (1988) 199 Cal. App.3d 377, 383 [245 Cal. Rptr. 52].) We, too, have endorsed Reilly, although in dictum. ( Coleman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 779, fn. 23.) Electrophoresis has been found acceptable in at least 19 appellate decisions from 11 states. (Annot., Admissibility, in Criminal Cases, of Evidence of Electrophoresis of Dried Evidentiary Bloodstains (1989) 66 A.L.R. 4th 588, 593-602, and cases cited; State v. Fenney (Minn. 1989) 448 N.W.2d 54.) Most of these cases were decided after Reilly. Only Michigan has refused admission of electrophoresis testing, as shown by People v. Young (1986) 425 Mich. 270 [391 N.W.2d 270]. [8] But, since Young, Dr. Grunbaum, who was also the chief defense expert witness there, has apparently abandoned his attack on the testing method to focus on the prospect of analyst error rather than inherent defects. He and other scientists now concede the reliability of the method if it is properly carried out. (See Reilly, supra, 196 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1148-1150.) Moreover, the Young decision has been criticized in two jurisdictions and no jurisdiction, other than Michigan, appears to follow it. (E.g., State v. Fenney, supra, 448 N.W.2d at p. 60; State v. Surface (S.D. 1988) 440 N.W.2d 746, 750; Annot., supra, 66 A.L.R.4th at pp. 593-602.) Based on the virtually unanimous appellate authority upholding the admission of evidence from electrophoresis testing, we hold that such testing was sufficiently accepted in the scientific community at the time of defendant's trial. [9] Significantly, defendant does not allege any specific defect in the technique either in general or as applied in his case. The prosecution expert was specially trained in the use of the technique; his qualifications were accepted by defendant's trial counsel. He testifed to his procedures in this case and his belief as to their reliability. Defendant does not establish a failure to use correct scientific procedure or any other act or omission that affected the reliability of the testing or analysis in this case. There was no violation of the Kelly/Frye rule.