Opinion ID: 2533183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: Enmund And Tison

Text: ¶ 188. Pitchford's final assignment of error on this issue is that the verdict returned against him violates the holding in Enmund v. Florida [130] and Tison v. Arizona. [131] These cases hold that the death penalty may not be imposed on a defendant who aids and abets, but who did not commit the murder, unless the defendant attempted to commit the murder, intended that the murder take place, or understood that lethal force would, or might, be used in the commission of the underlying felony. ¶ 189. The jury unanimously found that Pitchford actually killed Reuben Britt, attempted to kill Reuben Britt, intended the killing of Reuben Britt, and contemplated that lethal force would be employed. Pitchford argues that the testimony showing he personally killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill Reuben Britt was admitted in error, namely the testimony discussed in Issues V and IX, supra. As previously discussed, however, we found no error with respect to those issues and so this argument has no merit.
¶ 190. This Court is required by statute to perform a proportionality review when reviewing the imposition of a death sentence. Mississippi Code Section 99-19-105(3) states: (3) With regard to the sentence, the court shall determine: (a) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; (b) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in Section 99-19-101; (c) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. . . . [132] ¶ 191. Pitchford submits neither argument nor evidence that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. After reviewing the record in this appeal, we cannot say the record establishes that Pitchford's death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. [133] ¶ 192. Furthermore, we find there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of the statutory aggravating circumstance enumerated by Mississippi Code Section 99-19-101(d) (The capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery . . .). ¶ 193. Pitchford argues that the death penalty would be disproportionate in this case. He argues that, under the evidence to support the conviction, the admissible proof shows that Mr. Pitchford was a willing participant in a robbery, but that his co-defendant initiated the fatal conduct in an act of panic when he saw the decedent with a gun and Mr. Pitchford only inflicted separate, non-lethal injuries. He also argues that the death penalty would be disproportionate in this case because Pitchford's accomplice, Eric Bullins, who was sixteen years old at the time of the crime, accepted a plea of manslaughter and is serving a sentence of forty years. ¶ 194. Taking at face value Pitchford's claim that he fired the .38 weapon loaded with rat shot at Reuben Britt only after Bullins fired the lethal shots from the .22 weapon, we nevertheless find Pitchford's argument without merit. After comparing the facts of this case with factually similar cases in which the death penalty has been imposed, we find the death sentence in this case is neither excessive nor disproportionate. This Court has upheld the sentence of death for murder committed in the course of a robbery. [134] In Bishop v. State, [135] this Court found: The record shows that, after Gentry had been hit in the head with the hammer for the first time, Bishop chased after him and brought him back. When Bishop saw Gentry hit with the hammer he knew deadly force was being used. When he ran Gentry down and held Gentry as he was being struck by Jessie, he became more of a principal in the crime. A jury could have easily found that Bishop killed, intended to kill, or at least contemplated that deadly force would be used. This case is not like a robbery where someone is killed on impulse. Bishop took an active role in the killing. [136] ¶ 195. This Court further found that Bishop's involvement was enough to justify the death penalty, even if the actual killer did not receive it. [137] Similarly, even accepting as true Pitchford's version of the robbery, he took an active role in the killing when he shot Reuben Britt with the.38 pistol. Bullins's successful plea negotiation does not make the death penalty in this case constitutionally or statutorily disproportionate.
¶ 196. Pitchford argues that the cumulative effect of errors mandates reversal. This Court may reverse a conviction and/or sentence based upon the cumulative effect of errors that independently would not require reversal. [138] After a thorough review of the record and briefs, we do not find the cumulative effect of the individual errors denied Pitchford a fundamentally fair trial, so this issue has no merit.