Opinion ID: 835001
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpreters for Jurors (Assignment of Error Number 1)

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erred in excusing sua sponte two prospective jurors who lacked proficiency in the English language and who needed an interpreter. During voir dire, the trial court invited prospective jurors to indicate any reasons for which they should be excused. One prospective juror, Lamloc, stated that his English was not good enough and that he had memory problems. Lamloc indicated that it would be difficult for him to concentrate through a lengthy trial and to understand and process the evidence adduced at trial. Defense counsel inquired whether an interpreter could be provided, to which the trial court responded that it was not allowed to provide one for jurors. Over defendant's objections, the trial court released Lamloc, explaining that it was doing so both because of the language issue and because of Lamloc's admittedly limited cognitive abilities. The trial court also clarified its position with respect to translators by noting that the Judicial Department would not provide funds for the use of translators for jurors. Several days later, defense counsel raised concerns that another prospective juror, Montesinos, lacked sufficient proficiency in English to serve as a juror. In response, the trial court indicated that it would obtain an interpreter to assist with voir dire. During voir dire, defense counsel tried questioning Montesinos without using an interpreter. Listening to the responses, the trial court was concerned that Montesinos did not understand the questions. Montesinos then indicated that he would need an interpreter to understand the testimony at trial. The trial court explained that the Judicial Department would provide an interpreter for voir dire, but not for trial. As a result, the trial court excused Montesinos over defense objections. Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling on the grounds that it violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Oregon statutory law. In accordance with our ordinary practice of considering state law issues before federal law issues, see State v. Langley, 314 Or. 247, 252, 839 P.2d 692 (1992), adh'd to on recons, 318 Or. 28, 861 P.2d 1012 (1993) (describing practice), we turn first to defendant's argument that the trial court violated Oregon statutes by refusing to provide interpreters that would enable prospective jurors who were not proficient in English to serve on the jury.
The parties agree that the trial court excused at least one prospective juror, Montesinos, because his proficiency in English was insufficient for him serve as a juror without an interpreter, and the court had declined to appoint an interpreter for him. [6] Defendant argues that Oregon lawspecifically, ORS 45.275 and ORS 45.273requires the state to provide interpreters for prospective jurors who could serve but for their lack of proficiency in English. For the reasons that follow, we disagree with defendant's interpretation of those provisions. ORS 45.275 provides, in part: The court shall appoint a qualified interpreter in a civil or criminal proceeding, and a hearing officer or the designee of a hearing officer shall appoint a qualified interpreter in an adjudicatory proceeding, whenever it is necessary: (a) To interpret the proceedings to a non-English-speaking party; (b) To interpret the testimony of a non-English-speaking party or witness; or (c) To assist the court, agency or hearing officer in performing the duties and responsibilities of the court, agency or hearing officer. Defendant also relies on ORS 45.273, which sets out the legislature's policy for creating procedures for the qualification and use of court interpreters. ORS 45.273(1) provides: It is declared to be the policy of this state to secure the constitutional rights and other rights of persons who are unable to readily understand or communicate in the English language because of a non-English-speaking cultural background or a disability, and who as a result cannot be fully protected in administrative and court proceedings unless qualified interpreters are available to provide assistance. Nothing in the text of ORS 45.273 either authorizes or requires the provision of interpreters for non-English speakers. Rather, that statute is a general statement of a policy to protect the constitutional and other rights of persons who are not proficient in English in administrative and court proceedings. That general statement is implemented by the specific provisions in ORS 45.275 and ORS 45.285 for the appointment of an interpreter for a non-English-speaking party in a civil or criminal case, a non-English-speaking witness, or a witness who cannot communicate because of a physical hearing or speaking impairment. See ORS 45.275(1)(a), (b); ORS 45.285(1)(c), (2) (so providing). Apparently recognizing the absence of any specific statute regarding non-English-speaking jurors or prospective jurors, defendant argues that ORS 45.275(1)(c) requires the appointment of an interpreter for such a person. Paragraph (c), however, provides for the appointment of an interpreter to assist the court, agency or hearing officer in performing their official duties. It does not mention the appointment of an interpreter to assist prospective jurors. Even assuming, without deciding, that ORS 45.275(1)(c) would authorize a trial court to appoint an interpreter for a non-English-speaking juror because that appointment would assist the court, the statute nevertheless does not require the trial court to make such an appointment. Nothing in the statutes cited by defendant suggests that the trial court may not respond to the potential difficulties of seating a non-English-speaking juror by excusing that juror. Indeed, ORS 10.050(2) specifically provides that the trial court may excuse a juror whose presence on the jury would substantially impair the progress of the action on trial   . We conclude that the trial court's decision not to provide an interpreter for a non-English-speaking prospective juror, and its subsequent decision to exclude the prospective juror because he was unable to participate at trial without an interpreter, did not violate Oregon statutes.
Defendant next argues that the exclusion of a non-English-speaking person from the jury pool violated his Sixth Amendment right to have his jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. [7] Under the Sixth Amendment, a person who has been charged with a serious offense has a fundamental right to a trial by jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), which includes the right to trial by a jury that is drawn from a fair cross section of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). This court identified the elements of a fair cross-section claim in State v. Rogers, 334 Or. 633, 642, 55 P.3d 488 (2002): [T]he elements of a prima facie case, with regard to the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement, require a criminal defendant to show: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of that group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that the underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. Id. at 642, 55 P.3d 488 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)). [8] Defendant advances a similar argument under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [9] See Rogers, 334 Or. at 642 n. 8, 55 P.3d 488 (summarizing requirements) (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977)). There are four requirements for proving that the selection of the jury panel violates the Equal Protection Clause. Rogers, 334 Or. at 642 n. 8, 55 P.3d 488. First, the defendant must establish that the group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the law, as written or as applied. Second, the defendant must show the degree of under representation by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as grand jurors, over a significant period of time. Third, the defendant must demonstrate that the state's selection procedure is susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral in order to support the presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical showing. Finally, to make out an equal-protection challenge, the defendant must show that the exclusion of a cognizable group is purposeful, which requires the party to establish a clear pattern that emerges from the effect of the state's action, inexplicable on grounds other than race, even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face. Id. Defendant argues that prospective jurors who lack fluency in English are a distinctive group, as that term is used in the fair cross-section cases and a recognizable, distinct class, as that term is used in the equal protection cases. For example, he points out that the legislature has declared that individuals whose communication skills in the English language are deficientbecause of a non-English-speaking cultural backgroundare such a distinctive and sufficiently cognizable class that they need to be protected in administrative and court proceedings. [10] That declaration, defendant asserts, shows that the legislature has recognized non-English-speaking persons as a distinctive and recognizable group. Defendant argues that it is the very lack of this group's English-language proficiency that `defines' and `limits' it, consistent with the concerns expressed in the legislative policy statement. Defendant continues: [E]xcluding those lacking English-language proficiency from jury pools in indigent criminal cases would not serve those purposes [of the fair-cross-section requirement outlined in Lockhart ], but instead would erode the confidence of such citizens in the criminal justice system, as well as their belief that they have a civic responsibility to share in the administration of justice. In addition to characterizing the issue as one of civic participation and legislative concern, defendant suggests, more significantly, that language is a measure of race and ethnicity. In analyzing some ethnic groups or communities for purposes of an equal protection claim, proficiency in a particular language may be treated as a surrogate for race or ethnicity. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion) (so stating). In Hernandez, the plurality observed that eliminating persons who speak a particular language from a jury pool, without regard to the particular circumstances of the trial or the individual responses of the jurors, may be found by the trial judge to be a pretext for racial discrimination. Id. at 371-72, 111 S.Ct. 1859. Accordingly, defendant argues that the state's failure to provide funding for jurors who lack proficiency in English effectively excludes potential jurors from the jury pool on the grounds of language, which, in effect, excludes them on the impermissible basis of race or ethnicity. Defendant faces a difficult hurdle in claiming that the exclusion of non-English-speaking jurors violates the United States Constitution. A federal statute provides that the ability to speak and understand English is a requirement for service on a federal jury, 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(2), (3), and every court that has considered the issue has upheld that requirement against constitutional challenge. E.g., United States v. Angulo-Hernandez, 565 F.3d 2, 12 (1st Cir.2009), cert den, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 776, 175 L.Ed.2d 540 (2009) (28 U.S.C. § 1865 does not violate fair cross-section requirement of Sixth Amendment); United States v. Aponte-Suarez, 905 F.2d 483, 492 (1st Cir.1990) (English proficiency requirement for jury service is constitutional and serves overwhelming national interest.). Moreover, every state court that has considered whether a requirement that jurors be proficient in English violates the Sixth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause has concluded that it does not. See, e.g., State v. Gibbs, 254 Conn. 578, 597-98, 758 A.2d 327, 340-41 (2000) (citing cases). Defendant does not assert that those cases were wrongly decided, nor does he explain why, if statutes that exclude those without English proficiency from juries are constitutional, then a state's administrative decision not to provide interpreters for jurors without English proficiency would be unconstitutional. Simply put, no case supports defendant's position. Turning to the first element that is required to make out a violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross section requirementthe existence of a distinctive group defendant again encounters the problem that, although numerous courts have considered the issue, no court has concluded that non-English-speaking persons constitute a distinctive group for Sixth Amendment purposes. See Commonwealth v. Acen, 396 Mass. 472, 479, 487 N.E.2d 189, 194 (1986), appeal dismissed, 476 U.S. 1155, 106 S.Ct. 2269, 90 L.Ed.2d 714 (1986) (so stating). Although defendant cites Hernandez for the proposition that a trial judge could find that excluding jurors because they spoke a particular language was a pretext for racial discrimination, that case involved proficiency in Spanish, rather than lack of proficiency in English, and here, of course, the trial court made no finding of racial discrimination, pretextual or otherwise. Even assuming, without deciding, that non-English-speaking prospective jurors constitute a distinctive groupand also assuming that the group is under-represented in jury pools due to systematic exclusionthe United States Supreme Court has consistently held that states may exclude individuals who are members of such groups from juries if the exclusion is required to advance significant state interests and is no broader than necessary to serve those interests. E.g., Duren, 439 U.S. at 367-68, 99 S.Ct. 664 (so holding for purposes of Sixth Amendment right to jury trial). The state argues that its interests in excluding prospective jurors who are not proficient in Englishincluding ensuring that jurors understand the proceedings at trial and are able to participate in deliberations, avoiding the disruption of having interpreters in the jury room, and not incurring the costs of providing interpretersare compelling. We agree that the interests articulated by the state are sufficient to justify excluding non-English-speaking persons from the jury pool. It is critical for jurors to be able to follow the proceedings in the courtroom and to be able to participate meaningfully in deliberations. The state may also reasonably conclude that the cost of providing interpreters for one or more non-English-speaking jurors is an expense that the state should not incur. Those justifications are similar to the reasons that have led every state and federal court that has considered the issue to conclude that a state permissibly may decline to provide interpreters for non-English-speaking jurors. See Gibbs, 254 Conn at 598-99, 758 A.2d at 341; Acen, 396 Mass. at 480, 487 N.E.2d at 194; Aponte-Suarez, 905 F.2d at 492 (all so holding). For similar reasons, defendant's equal protection argument also is unavailing. Even assuming, without deciding, that persons lacking proficiency in English constitute a distinct, recognizable class for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, the state's strong interest in the integrity and efficiency of jury trials justifies its decision not to provide interpreters for those persons. Again, every court that has considered the issue has concluded that the exclusion of such prospective jurors does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, just as it does not violate the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., Gibbs, 254 Conn. at 598-99, 758 A.2d at 341 (assuming non-English speakers are cognizable group for equal protection purposes, no constitutional violation because state's interests in having jurors understand proceedings and avoiding jury disruption and costs associated with interpreters are compelling); State v. Garza, 241 Neb. 934, 958, 492 N.W.2d 32, 49 (2007) (rejecting Sixth Amendment and equal protection challenges because excluding non-English speakers from juries promotes the interests of the state's judicial process by assuring that jurors can understand the proceedings); State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542, 552, 798 P.2d 1, 11 (1990), cert den, 501 U.S. 1259, 111 S.Ct. 2911, 115 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1991) (rejecting Sixth Amendment and equal protection challenges because state has a significant interest in the integrity of the jury system    [which] is manifestly and primarily advanced by limiting jurors to those who are capable of understanding the proceedings). Defendant, recognizing the absence of case law supporting his position, argues that Oregon statutes should lead to a different resolution of the federal constitutional issues. He notes that, in contrast to the federal statute and statutes in some other states requiring English proficiency to serve on a jury, Oregon does not explicitly bar non-English-speaking jurors from serving. On the contrary, defendant points to ORS 45.273(1), quoted above, as establishing a state policy to secure the constitutional rights and other rights of those who cannot understand English and whose rights cannot be protected unless qualified interpreters are available to provide assistance. Defendant argues that, even if it is permissible to exclude non-English-speaking jurors by statute, Oregon has declined to enact such a law and instead has adopted a policy in favor of interpreters that is intended to secure the rights of its non-English-speaking citizens. Therefore, the state violates a defendant's fair trial and equal protection rights by failing to provide interpreters for potential jurors who lack proficiency in English. We disagree. As discussed above, see 349 Or. at 181-83, 243 P.3d at 36-38, no Oregon statute articulates a policy in favor of, much less requires, interpreters for non-English-speaking jurors, as opposed to parties to a legal proceeding or witnesses in such a proceeding. Moreover, we fail to see how an administrative or judicial decision not to fund interpretersas long as it is applied in a nondiscriminatory mannerwould violate a defendant's constitutional rights, when a statute excluding non-English-speaking jurors does not. We conclude that the state's decision not to provide funding for interpreters for jurors who are not proficient in English does not violate the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.