Opinion ID: 779969
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cases of Signatory States

Text: 40 We are cognizant that the opinions of our sister signatories [are] entitled to considerable weight, Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404, 105 S.Ct. 1338, 84 L.Ed.2d 289 (1985), and that one of the purposes of the Convention is to create a uniform body of international law among foreign courts. 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(3)(B). Because no clear consensus emerges from decisions of foreign Hague Convention cases, however, we are unable to derive any guiding principle from them. As the Second Circuit has observed, the cases of other signatory states on this question are few, scattered, conflicting, and sometimes, conclusory and unreasoned. Croll, 229 F.3d at 143. 41 Two cases illustrate the divergent views on the characterization of ne exeat orders under the Convention. In Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 119 D.L.R. (4th) 253, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a ne exeat clause pursuant to an interim custody order did constitute rights of custody as understood under the Convention. In reaching this conclusion, however, Justice La Forest, writing for the Court, carefully limited the Court's decision: 42 I would not wish to be understood as saying the approach should be the same in a situation where a court inserts a non-removal clause in a permanent order of custody. Such a clause raises quite different issues. It is usually intended to ensure permanent access to the non-custodial parent. The right of access is, of course, important but, as we have seen, it was not intended to be given the same level of protection by the Convention as custody. The return of a child in the care of a person having permanent custody will ordinarily be far more disruptive to the child since the child may be removed from its habitual place of residence long after the custody order was made. The situation also has serious implications for the mobility rights of the custodian. 43 Id at ¶ 69. With respect to cases in which interim custody orders have been issued, rights of custody, reasoned the Court, accrue to the court that issued the non-removal order, in order to enable it to preserve its jurisdiction over the pending custody dispute. Id. at ¶ 68. See also D.S. v. V.W., [1996] 134 D.L.R. (4th) 481 ¶ 43 (suggesting that insufficient distinction between access and custody rights would incorrectly provide parents with access rights a remedy not authorized under the Convention). 44 By contrast, in C v. C, 1 W.L.R. 654, 2 All E.R. 465 (1989), an English court of appeal held that a mother who moved out of Australia in violation of a ne exeat order violated the father's custody rights under the Convention. Specifically, the court reasoned that since the father could determine whether the child could live outside of Australia, he possessed the right to determine the child's place of residence under article 5. C v. C, however, is distinguishable from the case before us, because there the parents held rights of joint guardianship before the allegedly wrongful removal. Some cases from foreign jurisdictions have recognized rights of custody in situations where the non-custodial parent possessed access rights and nothing further. See, e.g., In re B (a minor), 2 F.L.R. 249, Fam. 606 (1994)(English court holding that father who lacked formal custodial rights yet physically cared for child possessed rights of custody); Dellabarca v. Christie, [1999] N.Z.F.L.R. 97 (holding that father with access rights held rights of custody). To the extent that these cases equate access rights with custody rights for purposes of ordering removal, we find them unpersuasive: the cases simply fail to recognize the distinction explicitly set forth in the pertinent articles of the Convention. 17 45