Opinion ID: 3004143
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The ALJ’s Credibility Finding

Text: Mrs. Overstreet also argues that the ALJ failed to comply with Social Security Ruling 96‐ 7p by improperly discrediting her testimony without analyzing her pain in light of the medical evidence. In particular, she points to a review of her medical records by Dr. George Kudirka and Dr. Francis Vincent, state‐agency doctors who opined that Mrs. Overstreet’s complaints — that she could not sit or stand for long periods, or walk more than half a block, because of pain in her neck, back and legs — were consistent with her colitis, degenerative disc disease, and fibromyalgia. In evaluating the credibility of Mrs. Overstreet’s statements about her impairments and their effect on her ability to work, the ALJ had to consider all of the evidence in the record, including medical signs and laboratory findings, opinions provided by treating and examining physicians and psychologists, and statements or reports by Mrs. Overstreet and those who treated or examined her about her medical history, treatment, work history, daily activities, and ability to work. SSR 96‐7p. A reviewing court may reverse an ALJ’s credibility determination only if it is so lacking in explanation or support that it is “patently wrong.” Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 517 (7th Cir. 2009); Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 678 (7th Cir. 2008). There is more than adequate support for the ALJ’s credibility determination in this case. Although he noted that Mrs. Overstreet claimed that she felt pain after walking less than half a block, or standing or sitting for less than two minutes, the ALJ also observed — as he was permitted to do — that she was able to sit for the length of the hearing, which lasted about an hour. See SSR 96‐7p (“In instances where the individual attends an administrative proceeding conducted by the adjudicator, the adjudicator may also consider his or her own recorded observations of the individual as part of the overall evaluation of the credibility of the individual’s statements.”). The ALJ further noted that treatment records did not corroborate the pain and restrictions that Mrs. Overstreet alleged. Despite her statement in October 2005 that she had seen countless doctors with no relief for her pain, the record did not contain records from numerous healthcare providers. According to the physician she saw in November 2002 for her headaches, she did not follow through on the physician’s recommendations of pain clinics and an epidural injection. Even more important, no physician had opined that she was totally disabled or recommended treatment suggesting it. The ALJ’s assessment of Mrs. Overstreet’s capacity and limitations tracks that of Dr. Kudirka and Dr. Vincent, which belies her argument that the ALJ ignored their opinions. The doctors affirmed an assessment of Mrs. Overstreet’s residual functional capacity in July 2003 concluding — in contrast to Mrs. Overstreet’s testimony that she could lift less than two or four pounds — that she could frequently lift less than 10 pounds and could occasionally lift 10 No. 09‐1742 Page 6 pounds. The ALJ made a similar assessment. The doctors agreed that with normal breaks, Mrs. Overstreet could stand or walk for at least two hours and sit for about six hours in an eight‐ hour workday. The ALJ made the same assessment. And the doctors agreed that the evidence supported a residual functional capacity that included sedentary work. IV. The ALJ’s Residual Functional Capacity Assessment Finally, Mrs. Overstreet argues that the ALJ’s assessment of her residual functional capacity was flawed because the ALJ: (1) “played doctor” and arbitrarily found that she needed to alternate sitting and standing every hour; (2) relied on her part‐time work at the airport to find that she could work full‐time; (3) did not include limitations from her headaches and limited range of motion in her neck in his assessment; and (4) did not properly consider her pain from the combined effect of all of her impairments. The ALJ did not play doctor; his findings were consistent with testimony and medical evidence, as required. See Hopgood v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 696, 702 (7th Cir. 2009). As explained, the ALJ’s finding that Mrs. Overstreet needed “to alternate sitting and standing at one hour intervals” referred to hourly breaks from sitting or standing — not to a need to alternate each hour between sitting and standing — and came after the ALJ observed her sitting for approximately an hour. Although medical reports noted that pain prevented Mrs. Overstreet from sitting or standing for long periods of time, no doctor suggested that she needed breaks more frequently than once an hour. And the ALJ found that she could stand or walk for only two hours in an eight‐hour workday and needed to sit for at least six hours. Dr. Kudirka and Dr. Vincent drew the same conclusion. The ALJ also properly considered Mrs. Overstreet’s part‐time work in his assessment. Although a claimant with a job may still be found disabled, see Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2005), an ALJ’s assessment of residual functional capacity must be based on the relevant evidence in the record, which includes “reports of daily activities” and “evidence from attempts to work,” see SSR 96‐8p. It was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that Mrs. Overstreet’s job at the airport — transporting passengers in a golf cart, and sometimes pushing them in wheelchairs, six hours a day, four days a week — suggested that her impairments did not limit her as much as she claimed, and that she could perform sedentary work as a data‐ entry clerk or administrative assistant. The vocational expert said that Mrs. Overstreet’s airport job required “medium” exertion. A person who can do such work is ordinarily also considered physically able to do sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c). Mrs. Overstreet’s argument that the ALJ’s assessment of residual functional capacity failed to include her limitations due to headaches and the limited range of motion in her neck No. 09‐1742 Page 7 is also not persuasive. It was Mrs. Overstreet’s burden to bring to the ALJ’s attention everything that showed she was disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512; see Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 1994). She has not pointed to anything in the record suggesting that her headaches or her range of motion in her neck limited her at work. Finally, Mrs. Overstreet’s contention that the ALJ did not properly consider her complaints of pain caused by the aggregate effects of all her impairments fails because the ALJ ensured that the vocational expert took all of her impairments into account when answering the hypothetical question. The ALJ was required to consider the combined effects of Mrs. Overstreet’s impairments because he found them to be severe in combination. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523; Golembiewski v. Barnhart, 322 F.3d 912, 918 (7th Cir. 2003). Although he did not specifically address the combined effect in his ruling, he complied with § 404.1523 by including all of her impairments in his hypothetical question to the vocational expert. See Sims v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 424, 432 (7th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment affirming the Commissioner’s denial of benefits.