Opinion ID: 1656619
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Tallahatchie County may be held liable for the Tallahatchie County Sheriff's Departments failure to arrest Robert Collins.

Text: ¶ 6. Although Essie concedes that no arrest warrant was issued, she claims that probable cause existed for a warrantless arrest and/or, in the alternative, that a warrantless arrest was specifically authorized by Miss.Code Ann. § 99-3-7(3). The County rebuts this assertion by arguing that TCSD is immune from liability for its failure to arrest based on Miss.Code Ann. § 99-3-7(7) [6] and, in the alternative, that § 99-3-7(3) did not authorize a warrantless arrest. The County also asserts that immunity extends to the actions of TCSD based upon Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(c), which provides immunity for actions or failures regarding police protection: (1) A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim: (c) Arising out of any act or omission of an employee of a governmental entity engaged in the performance or execution of duties or activities relating to police or fire protection unless the employee acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(c) (emphasis added). ¶ 7. Essie does not argue that Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(c) is in applicable to the conduct complained of as to this issue, but she does argue the County is not entitled to immunity under the section because there was more than sufficient probable cause to merit his arrest despite the absence of a warrant. Apparently, Essie's argument is that, because there was probable cause, TCSD is not entitled to immunity because it acted in reckless disregard for her safety and well-being. [7] ¶ 8. Essie cites no authority for the proposition that the failure to arrest despite the presence of probable cause automatically rises to a level of reckless disregard. As Tallahatchie County points out, reckless disregard is a higher standard than gross negligence and embraces willful or wanton conduct which requires knowingly and intentionally doing a thing or wrongful act. Turner v. City of Ruleville, 735 So.2d 226, 230 (Miss.1999). ¶ 9. In her rebuttal brief, however, Essie directs the Court's attention to Miss.Code Ann. 99-3-7(3), which states: Any law enforcement officer shall arrest a person with or without a warrant when he has probable cause to believe that the person has, within twenty-four (24) hours of such arrest, knowingly committed a misdemeanor which is an act of domestic violence. (emphasis added). Subsection (5) provides a list of crimes which constitute a misdemeanor which is an act of domestic violence when committed among family members. Among the list is Miss.Code Ann. § 97-35-15. ¶ 10. Though not cited by any of the parties, Miss.Code Ann. § 97-35-15 states. (1) Any person who disturbs the public peace, or the peace of others, by violent, or loud, or insulting, or profane, or indecent, or offensive, or boisterous conduct or language, or by intimidation, or seeking to intimidate any other person or persons, or by conduct either calculated to provoke a breach of the peace, or by conduct which may lead to a breach of the peace, or by any other act, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500.00), or by imprisonment in the county jail not more than six (6) months, or both. ¶ 11. Through Essie's previous filing with TCSD and her latest complaint, there was ample probable cause to arrest through § 99-3-7(3) based upon § 97-35-15. However, as stated above, reckless disregard requires that the person knowingly or intentionally commit a wrongful act. Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Essie, she has shown no evidence that TCSD knew that it could and/or was required to arrest Robert. TCSD's conduct, even if negligent, can not be said to have risen to the level of reckless disregard based upon the facts in this record. Therefore, § 11-46-9(c) did provide immunity based upon TCSD's conduct, and summary judgment was proper as to TCSD.