Opinion ID: 47511
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonable suspicion to stop Fields

Text: Fields asserts his detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion, as his facts are synonymous with the facts of Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000). He contends the officers acted solely on an anonymous tip, in which the tipster provided the officers with a physical description of two vehicles, but provided no predictive information as to future conduct. Fields further notes the caller failed to provide a description of the occupants of either vehicle, and there were discrepancies between the vehicle described by the tipster and his car. Fields also contends presence in a high crime area and walking away from police are insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a stop. Lastly, Fields asserts the court’s finding he was in a known drug-trafficking area was erroneous because there was no support for this finding, other than Deputy Bruster’s allegations at the suppression hearing, allegedly based on previous anonymous calls. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment's “protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles.” United States v. Arvizu, 122 S. Ct. 744, 750 (2002). For brief investigatory stops, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the 3 police officer has reasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity may be afoot. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85 (1968)). When evaluating whether reasonable suspicion exists to make such a seizure, the district court must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the arresting officer had a “‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.’” United States v. Hunter, 291 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Arvizu, 122 S. Ct. at 750). “[A] reviewing court must give due weight to the officer’s experience.” United States v. Briggman, 931 F.2d 705, 709 (11th Cir. 1991). We have found a defendant’s presence in a high crime area and his nervous or evasive behavior are relevant factors in determining reasonable suspicion. Hunter, 291 F.3d at 1306-07 (finding reasonable suspicion where defendant was located in an area with a reputation for high crime and walked away from illegal activity upon arrival of police); United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 755-56 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding reasonable suspicion where defendant was in an area known for drug sales and walked toward his car upon the arrival of police); Briggman, 931 F.2d at 709 (finding reasonable suspicion where defendant was parked in a high crime area and then attempted to evade an officer by driving away). 4 Reasonable suspicion need not be based on an officer’s personal observations, but rather may be based on information supplied by another person, so long as the information bears sufficient indicia of reliability. Adams v. Williams, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1924 (1972) (habeas context). An anonymous tip alone lacks sufficient indicia of reliability where the tip merely provides an accurate description of a subject’s readily observable location, but provides no predictive information that would provide the police with the means to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility. J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1379. “[A] suspect’s adverse reaction to police may independently corroborate information provided by an anonymous informant.” United States v. Heard, 367 F.3d 1275, 1280 (11th Cir.) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 235 (2004). In light of the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Bruster had reasonable suspicion to stop Fields. Although the tip alone may have been insufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion, the tip, along with Fields’ presence at a house known by officers in the area for high drug activity, a short distance from the intersection described by the informant, and Fields’ evasive behavior in first driving away in an accelerated manner from three marked patrol cars and then later walking away and ignoring Deputy Bruster’s attempts to get his attention, are sufficient for a finding of reasonable suspicion. These facts are analogous to 5 Hunter, Gordon and Briggman, which found a defendant’s presence in a high crime area and attempts to evade police sufficient for a finding of reasonable suspicion. See Hunter, 291 F.3d at 1306-07; Gordon, 231 F.3d at 755-56; Briggman, 931 F.2d at 709. The district court did not clearly err in finding the house where Fields was discovered and the surrounding area had a reputation for drug-trafficking. The court, in making this finding, found Deputy Bruster credible on the reputation of the area. Credibility determinations are within the province of the finder of fact. United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002). Fields contends Deputy Bruster had no basis for this testimony other than previous anonymous calls. Nothing from the record indicates, however, the previous calls were in fact anonymous, and Deputy Bruster, with about three and one half years on the force, was aware of the areas in the community prone to criminal activity. Additionally, J.L. differs from this case in important respects; J.L. did not involve a defendant located in a high crime area, and there was no indication the defendant engaged in any behavior to evade the police. 120 S. Ct. at 1377. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding Deputy Bruster had reasonable suspicion to stop Fields.