Opinion ID: 1476684
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: IAC Claims: Guilt Phase

Text: We consider first the several claims of ineffective assistance defendant asserts regarding the guilt phase of his trial. To the extent possible, related claims are combined.
Defendant argues that his counsel should have moved to suppress a letter that he had written to Gloria Dunn while he was in prison. He presents a two-fold argument. First, he contends that Detective Golden violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by urging Dunn to elicit a letter from him after an attorney from the Public Defender's Office already had consulted with him in connection with a weapons possession charge. Second, he argues that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated because he was not given Miranda warnings prior to his writing to Dunn. He contends that such warning was necessary because he was in custody when he wrote the letter, and the detective's elicitation of it constituted interrogation.
Ten days after Huggins disappeared, defendant was arrested on an unrelated weapons possession charge. At the time defendant was charged, and during Dunn's conversations with Golden, the police did not know that the weapon defendant was charged with possessing was the one used in Huggins's murder. After he was arraigned, the Public Defender's Office assigned Amira Rahman, Esq., to represent him on the weapons charge. According to defendant, during a January 15, 1993 visit with him in prison, Rahman informed him that he had become a suspect in Huggins's disappearance. We turn to the eliciting of the letter and defendant's Sixth Amendment claim. As noted earlier, Detective Golden, a part-time security guard at Dunn's apartment complex, conversed with Dunn when she arrived at and left her building. In late December 1992, after Dunn mentioned defendant, Golden sought to learn something about Harris, or about Huggins's disappearance. Sometime between December 30, 1992 and January 21, 1993, Golden asked Dunn directly if she had heard from Harris and reminded her of the reward for information about Huggins's whereabouts. On January 21, 1993, when Harris was already a suspect, Golden and another detective went to the apartment complex to talk with Dunn. She indicated a preference to speak with them at the police station and so their discussion took place there. Dunn told them that she knew about Huggins's disappearance only through the newspapers, but she later volunteered that her sister was a psychic and had a map that showed the location of Huggins's body. Later, Golden drove Dunn home and, that evening, Dunn approached Golden with a letter that she had written, addressed to Abu, which she said referred to defendant. In it, Dunn stated that she supported him and that the police would not find the white girl. Golden became convinced that Dunn had been in communication with Harris and had useful information. He suggested that she revise the letter because he thought its wording was too specific and he was concerned that it might be perceived by Harris as a warning. A week later, Dunn approached Golden with a revised letter, more general in tone. According to Golden, when Dunn asked if she should send it, he said that she should if she felt like it. Apparently, she did, and it provoked a response. On February 17, 1993, Dunn brought Golden the response written by defendant. The letter, dated 2-12-93, is significant from defendant's perspective because jurors could tell from it that he was incarcerated. And, although it does not contain a confession, he contends it prejudiced him because it bolstered the testimony of Dunn who was not a credible witness. The letter includes the following passages: Peace and Power Baby Sis. I am still staying strong and fighting on the front line. I am presently in receipt of your missive (with no date). I was very glad to hear from you. But before I get into this kite, my mom told me to tell you to call her sometimes ... I need you to team-up with my cousin Yvone Pinkey from the Miller Homes, do you understand? Mom will clue you in on what you need to know. As well as Yvone. Watch yourself whenever you talk to anyone over the telephone, because there wired for sound. Listen up, whenever you write to me in the future, never use your name and/or address. Use a fake return name and address. Never refer to yourself in any of your letters by name. Just pick out a name and fake address. By the way, I am mailing you my letters under other inmates name. Because pigs be certainly reading mail that I receive and/or send under my name. Pigs haven't anything on me with that white female that's been in all the newspapers. So, they're trying to frame me up on fake rape charges. I'll get back with you on this after you talk to my mom & Yvone. Maintaining Order Abu At the PCR hearing Call testified that he did not believe there was a sufficient factual or legal basis upon which to make [a Sixth or Fifth Amendment suppression] motion[ ]. Defense counsel did move, however, to exclude the letter from evidence, arguing that jurors would be able to discern that Harris was incarcerated when he wrote it, and that its potential prejudicial harm outweighed its probative value. Nonetheless, the trial court admitted the letter and it was read to the jury. Moreover, the prosecutor referred during summation to Harris's instruction to Dunn to never use your name and address in any correspondences.
Defendant's arguments of ineffective assistance of counsel in respect of his letter lack merit because there were neither Sixth nor Fifth Amendment grounds for counsel to have moved for suppression of the document. Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific in its attachment. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 164, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 1338, 149, L.Ed. 2d 321, 326 (2001); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2207, 115 L.Ed. 2d 158, 166 (1991). Notwithstanding that Rahman had commenced her representation of defendant for the weapons charge against him, the police could have questioned defendant directly about Huggins's disappearance at the time that Dunn and Golden consulted about Dunn writing a letter to him. Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach to the murder charge merely because he was charged with possessing the weapon used to murder Huggins. As previously noted, at that time, the police did not know that Harris's gun was the murder weapon; the weapons charge was unrelated to the Huggins murder. With respect to Miranda warnings, defendant acknowledges that he had no present right to such warnings in light of Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed. 2d 243 (1990). In that case, the defendant, who was incarcerated on unrelated charges, admitted to an undercover officer that he committed murder. Id. at 294, 110 S.Ct. at 2396, 110 L.Ed. 2d at 249. In rejecting an argument similar to defendant's, the United States Supreme Court stated that Miranda warnings aim to protect defendants from possible compulsion associated with a police-dominated atmosphere. Id. at 296, 110 S.Ct. at 2397, 110 L.Ed. 2d at 250. Coercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect, and when a suspect considers himself speaking to cellmatesor to a friendthere is no concern about coercion that prompts the need to give Miranda warnings. Ibid. Nonetheless, conceding Perkins, defendant contends that we should hold that he is entitled to greater protection under our State Constitution or the common law. Essentially, defendant asks that we find trial counsel ineffective for not anticipating a change in lawa change which this Court has not indicated that it will adopt. Defendant's posture validates the State's argument that there cannot be a cognizable ineffective assistance claim when there is not yet a recognizable legal basis for the motion that defendant says should have been made. Defendant is not helped by his reliance on In re J.D.H., 171 N.J. 475, 795 A. 2d 851 (2002). Our decision in J.D.H. does not imply that being incarcerated and aware of one's status as a suspect is sufficient to trigger Miranda warnings. Rather, we stated that one factor to consider in determining when a suspect is in custody is whether the suspect knew that he was the focus of a police investigation. Id. at 480, 795 A. 2d 851. That guidance is irrelevant here. Harris was unquestionably in custody when he wrote the letter. He was in jail. The important question is whether, from defendant's perspective, there was a threat of coercion arising from the inherent pressures associated with custodial interrogations. We have no doubt that the letter sent to him by Dunn did not cause any such threat of coercion. Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance in respect of the Dunn letter is denied.
Defendant argues that counsel should have moved to suppress statements that he made to a probation officer during a presentence interview concerning an unrelated robbery conviction. As in the prior claim, he contends that the officer violated his rights to counsel and against self-incrimination, and further, that the possibility of those statements being used against him during cross-examination prevented him from testifying at trial. Had those statements been suppressed, he claims he would have testified that Dunn actually killed Huggins. To support his claimed intention to testify, defendant points to his pre-trial affidavit, in which he cited that desire as grounds for bifurcating the trial phases.
According to a presentence report, on December 20, 1992, three days after Huggins's murder, defendant approached a woman on the street, jumped in front of her, pulled out a gun, and placed it against her forehead. The victim fell in fear, and Harris threatened to kill her. An acquaintance of the victim approached in a car and yelled out, Are you alright? Harris responded that she was, and he took her purse and walked away. On January 6, 1993, the police, conducting an investigation into an unrelated sexual assault, executed a search warrant for the personal property of Harris. At that time, Harris was in a corrections facility being held on weapons charges. During their search, the police found property belonging to the December 20th robbery victim. In May, 1994, Harris was convicted of first-degree robbery and other crimes related to that incident. To prepare a presentence report (PSR), Probation Officer Douglas Meckel interviewed defendant. Harris's attorneys at the time, Abatemarco and Hamilton, have submitted affidavits in this PCR stating that they do not recollect advising Mr. Harris that he could, and ought to, decline any effort by the Probation Department to interview him. They also attest that they were not present during the interview and did not learn of the Probation Department's intention to interview Harris. According to the PSR, defendant stated to Meckel that he could never be `normal' because he was `a descendant of slaves,' and is now the victim of a racist society and slavery. He described himself as a real man, and a real black man, emphasizing that he took and tak[es] what [he] want[s]. When asked if he had children, defendant responded that he may have a couple out there, stating that he lets the women take care of them and likening himself, in that way, to a wolf or a bear. [4]
If defendant cannot show that his statements prejudiced him, then his IAC claim fails. He cites this Court's comment in Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 160, 716 A. 2d 458, that there may have been a reason he did not testify besides his criminal record, and now asserts that the looming presence of the PSR constituted that reason. However, we have no basis to suppose that Harris would have testified but for the PSR. Indeed, although many of his prior crimes would have been sanitized under State v. Brunson, 132 N.J. 377, 625 A. 2d 1085 (1993), the jury still would have learned of the number of his convictions and the degrees of those offenses. Id. at 391, 625 A. 2d 1085. We know that among defendant's convictions were possession of stolen property, larceny, burglary, robbery, attempt to commit robbery, and unlawful possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes. Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 157, 716 A. 2d 458. As the State contends, that prior record, along with Harris's conduct during trial, support Scully's testimony describing the Meckel statements as, perhaps, a minor impediment to Harris testifying when considered with the extraordinary mountain of impediments that existed. Scully's testimony reveals a reasonable strategy, is uncontradicted, and amply supports the conclusion that there was no appreciable prejudice from the PSR in view of the other obstacles to Harris testifying. It was ... so abundantly clear I believe to both counsel that it would be an error of immeasurable proportion to put Mr. Harris on the stand based on his ongoing behavior during the course of the trial, based on that would possibly open the door to Mr. Meckel's report. That presentence report pales in comparison to the other concerns I had with respect to impediments placing Mr. Harris on the stand. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant cannot satisfy the prejudice prong necessary for his ineffective assistance claim. Although we have addressed the prejudice prong first because it so readily disposes of this claim, we add that counsel's performance was not deficient in this respectit simply is unnecessary to engage in any lengthy discussion on the point. We note only that, in respect of defendant's right to Fifth Amendment protections, Miranda aims to protect suspects from the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogations. State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 113, 703 A. 2d 901 (1997). Because a presentence interview, which is conducted by a court officer for sentencing purposes, is not considered inherently coercive, the majority of courts that have addressed this issue under the federal constitution have held that Miranda warnings are not required. See State v. Cyr, 169 Vt. 50, 726 A.2d 488, 492 (1999) (citing numerous federal circuit courts decisions). Furthermore, even if Meckel violated defendant's Fifth Amendment rights by not administering Miranda warnings to him, the State still could have used the PSI statements for impeachment purposes. Statements taken in violation of Miranda may be used for impeachment when they were given freely and voluntarily. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed. 2d 1 (1971); State v. Burris, 145 N.J. 509, 525, 679 A. 2d 121 (1996). It is doubtful that Harris's will was overborne in likening himself to a wolf or a bear, or in giving his other statements, to Meckel. Finally, as to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, that right is triggered at critical stage[s] of those [adversarial] proceedings where counsel's absence, or lack of advice, might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial. Baumann v. United States, 692 F. 2d 565, 577-78 (9th Cir.1982); see Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1408-09, 89 L.Ed. 2d 631, 639-40 (1986). Although we do not reach the question, we note that courts that have considered whether the right attaches during presentence interviews have determined that such interviews do not represent a critical stage in adversarial proceedings. See e.g., United States v. Hicks, 948 F.2d 877, 885 (4th Cir.1991); United States v. Jackson, 886 F. 2d 838, 843-45 (7th Cir.1989); Brown v. Butler, 811 F. 2d 938, 941 (5th Cir.1987); Baumann, supra, 692 F. 2d at 578. Thus, pursuant to that case law, although defendant had a right to have counsel present if he wished during the interview, the Sixth Amendment does not compel that counsel be present. In light of that existing case law, we do not regard counsel's failure to move to suppress, based on the argument defendant now asserts, to constitute deficient assistance.
Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to cross-examine Tariq on his statement to defense investigators that police coerced him into implicating defendant.
Defendant's fourteen-year-old nephew, Tariq, gave a statement to police on January 13, 1993. His mother, Beverly Ayers (Beverly), accompanied him. Tariq told the police that he saw Harris on December 17, 1992, hanging out, in a red, two-door sports car. Tariq approached Harris, who was alone, and the two went for a ride. Tariq also told the police that later, on December 26, 1992, he asked Harris how he had obtained the car, and defendant said he hijacked the car from West State Street ... from some white girl. More importantly, Tariq also told the police, [Harris] told me he `knocked off some white girl.' Both Tariq and his mother signed the police statement, agreeing that it was true, free, and voluntary. According to the FBI records submitted in the PCR proceeding, on February 5, 1993, Tariq reviewed and reaffirmed the statement he gave the [Trenton Police Department] on Wednesday, January 13, 1993. Additionally, Tariq told the FBI that he had given Harris a twenty-two caliber magnum pistol three months earlier, and that on the evening of Huggins's disappearance, Harris and two others went through Huggins's wallet in search of credit cards. The transcript of that February 5th interview also reveals that Tariq admitted to regular use of cocaine and to having used it during the previous evening and until 5:00 a.m. that morning. By the interview's conclusion, Tariq was crying and asking for his mother, who had been waiting in another room. Upon her entry into the interview room, Beverly observed that Tariq's nose was bleeding. She asked him if anyone had hit him, to which he replied, No, No one hit me. When outside her son's presence, Beverly said to the FBI special agent, I don't understand why this happens [referring to her son's nosebleed], but it has happened before. On March 31, 1994fourteen months after his initial police interview and twenty months before his trial testimonyTariq told Alan Goldstein, an assistant chief investigator for the Public Defender, that his January 1992 statement was the result of beatings given to him by the police, in particular by an African American officer he knows as `Rev.' That same day, Beverly told Goldstein that [w]hen she got [her son] after the interview he was bumped and bruised. Another investigator and one of defendant's attorneys (Hamilton) also were present at the interviews with Goldstein. Goldstein interviewed Beverly again two weeks later. She repeated that Tariq told her that Rev had beaten him and that she observed bruises on her son. She said she complained to the detective at the time, who implied to her that Tariq was being untruthful. She added that she was not present during the earlier part of the interview when the beating allegedly took place. At defendant's trial, Tariq's testimony was consistent with his original 1993 statements to the police. He stated that he bought a gun in exchange for cash and crack in November 1992 because he was afraid of being a target for violence in the projects where he lived. When his sister, with whom he lived, made him get rid of it, he gave the .22 Magnum and three bullets to Harris. Tariq also testified that during the evening of December 17, 1992, he encountered Harris alone in a two-seat, red car. At that time, Harris told him that he had hijacked it. Nine days later, on December 26th, Harris came to Tariq's sister's apartment and showed Tariq the .22 Magnum that Tariq had given to him. According to Tariq, Harris told him that he had knocked off some white girl. In his PCR petition Harris contends that trial counsel should have used Tariq's statement to Investigator Goldstein during cross-examination and that counsel should have called Beverly to the stand to confirm that the police had beaten Tariq. Defendant states that trial counsel (Scully) failed to provide a credible reason for his ineffective cross-examination and for not calling Goldstein, who was available to testify.
Defendant's ineffective assistance claim must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2055, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 694, and the high deference that reviewing courts give to attorney performance. Ibid. With that in mind, we note that, during the guilt phase of defendant's trial, the prosecutor tried to anticipate the defense's cross-examination of Tariq and to weaken that sting by exposing Tariq's pending charges for trespass, resisting arrest, and marijuana possession. He also was charged with receipt of stolen property for riding in Huggins's car. Ultimately he received probation for all of his pending charges. In addition, as a result of other behavior, he was placed in a juvenile facility. Thus, on direct examination the prosecution had Tariq admit that he had not been completely honest at first with police interrogators. He affirmed that during his initial two interviews, including the one on January 13, 1993, he did not reveal that he had given Harris a gun. Indeed, because he was afraid of being locked up, he also denied giving Harris the gun that the police interviewers showed to him. Consequently, cross-examination was not lengthy, but it was devastating. Harris I, supra, 156 N.J at 183, 716 A. 2d 458. Scully had Tariq confirm that during January 1993, he still was waiting to see how his pending charges would be resolved, and that after he spoke to the police in 1993, he got into additional difficulties with law enforcement that resulted in the situation he was in then (presumably, his confinement to a juvenile facility). Furthermore, Tariq admitted on cross that he smoked marijuana everyday, including on December 17, 1992, and December 26, 1992. Instead of attending school, he would sell and smoke drugs. Defense counsel Scully also attempted to throw doubt on Tariq's identification of the gun. After Tariq stated that he never had seen a gun in his life before that one, Scully questioned his ability to distinguish it from other guns, let alone from other twenty-two caliber Magnums. During the PCR hearing, Scully testified that he believed he had accomplished his cross-examination goal of damaging Tariq's credibility. Before Tariq took the stand, Scully had planned not to use the beating allegations on cross, and, at the PCR hearing, Scully testified that as direct examination of Tariq unfolded, he decided to stay with his plan. Scully further testified that he did investigate Tariq's 1994 claims of being beaten by police. He discussed them with Goldstein and considered whether to use them. In evaluating their potential usefulness, he looked at them in the overall context of Tariq's statements: the different explanations for his nose-bleeding at the end of the first interview, the more-than-one-year delay before the allegation was made, and that the allegation was made only once throughout Tariq's statements to investigators. When asked directly why he did not cross-examine Tariq about the beating allegation, Scully pointed to the lack of corroborating evidence. He expected the State to ask Tariq on redirect whether he had filed any complaints with the police department or in court. Without corroborating evidence, Scully believed that the State would be able to discredit Tariq's single recantation. In Scully's view, it would have been an error of immeasurable proportion to bring [those statements] up. As the PCR attorneys contend before us, Scully's explanation is not immune from criticism: If Scully wanted to paint Tariq as a liar, why should it matter if the State, on redirect, sought to show that he lied about being beaten by a police officer? Why not let the State expose Tariq as untruthful? Notwithstanding that criticism, Scully's decision fell within the wide range of strategy available to counsel. Scully wanted to highlight Tariq's motive to gain favor with the police (his pending charges) to explain why he implicated Harris. Had Scully raised the allegations of a police beating, that would have pitted Tariq's interests against the police, a tactic to be avoided, as Scully confirmed. Further, Scully reasonably had to worry that jurors would have seen two options: either believe that Tariq was beaten into implicating Harris, or believe that Tariq lied about getting beaten. The jurors could have perceived Scully as attempting to have Tariq admit that he was beaten, and that strategy would overshadow his other efforts to portray Tariq as a cocaine-using, crack-dealing, delinquent, seeking to protect himself. The jurors might conclude that Tariq was a liar, but the defense's fear was that jurors would think Tariq's real lie was the beating allegation. Scully reasonably concluded that the better strategy was to attack Tariq's credibility with facts about his character and his pending charges. Scully's strategic decision is apparent from the impeaching information that the State points out it could have used on redirect. Tariq waited sixteen months to complain of a police beating, his direct testimony matched his 1993 statement, and Tariq and his mother attested to the voluntariness of his 1993 statement. If defense counsel had asked his mother about her claims that Tariq was bumped and bruised, the State could have confronted her with her previous statements about Tariq's frequent nose bleeds, highlighting his cocaine use. Finally, the State's questioning would have informed jurors that no formal complaint had been made by the Ayers, and that the only evidence of the alleged police beating was contained in Goldstein's brief, two-sentence report. Applying the standard of review that we must, we conclude that Scully's decision was within the range of professional competence and was based on a satisfactory investigation. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant has not established that trial counsel performed deficiently in respect of Tariq's cross-examination.
Defendant argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by calling two witnesses who testified to seeing defendant in Huggins's car within two hours of her disappearance. Defendant emphasizes the significance of that testimony because the only direct evidence that defendant was involved in Ms. Huggins's killing was the testimony of Dunn (quoting Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 136, 716 A. 2d 458). The other evidence establishing defendant's possession of Huggins's car and ATM card came through testimony of several youths who had criminal records. The defense's theme was that any of those youths, or Dunn herself, could have been the killer. Defendant now contends that trial counsel deviated from that strategy by calling two independent witnesses to testify that defendant was in Huggins's car two hours after her disappearance, and that the supposed benefit of disrupting the State's timeline was far outweighed by the prejudice he suffered from the women's testimonies. They were the only witnesses without a motive to fabricate, he claims, and they established defendant's possession of Huggins's car at a time earlier than had testimony of any State witness other than Dunn. Indeed, defendant argues, in one respect Carmen Castellano's testimony was consistent with Dunn's testimony that she and defendant drove to Cortlandt Street in Trenton to obtain shovels to bury Huggins. Had counsel consulted with him, defendant says he would have objected to calling Mary Jo Ranfone and Castellano.
Defense counsel explained that Ranfone and Castellano were called to undermine Gloria Dunn's credibility and her account of the December 17th timeline. Defense counsel wanted the jury to believe that Huggins was seen alive in her car on Cortlandt Street with Harris around 11:15 a.m. that morning. According to Dunn's account, Huggins was never in the cabin of the car on Cortlandt Street, indeed she would not have been alive that late in the morning of December 17th. Ranfone testified that between December 10th and 18th, 1992, she saw a black man driving with a white woman in a red shiny car sometime between 11:15 and 11:30 a.m., tying the time of day to a job-related task. On direct, she described the black male as having a mustache, with fairly medium to dark complexion, with a long nose. She described the white female as looking sad or angry, pale. On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited through questioning that Ranfone had very little time to look closely at the car's passengers, and that many of the details she remembered about features and clothing worn by the people in the red car were really images she perceived through the media and police photographs. Castellano testified that on December 17, 1992, around 11:00 a.m., she saw her neighbor's sonAmbrose Harrisdriving a small red car with a white female passenger. She stated that Harris parked near his mother's house on Cortlandt Street, argued with his passenger, and then exited the car. On direct and on cross, Castellano could not confirm precisely why she knew that December 17 was the date of her observations. She recalled that her father went to Puerto Rico around the 12th or 13th of that December, but alternately stated that her observations were made either before or after her father left. On redirect, she acknowledged that she did not know whether Huggins was the white woman she saw in the car.
This claim does not require extensive discussion because there is no basis to conclude that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness by calling Ranfone and Castellano. Not only did their testimony conflict with the timeline provided by Dunn, the content of what they purportedly saw conflicted with her testimony. Dunn never placed Huggins in the car alone with Harris, let alone driving down Cortlandt Street with him. Dunn testified that when Huggins was in the cabin of the car, she was sitting on Dunn's lap. Neither Ranfone nor Castellano observed a blond woman on anyone's lap. Furthermore, Dunn testified that Huggins was in the car's cabin only from the time she was abducted until their first visit to the deserted area under the Southard Street Bridge early that morning, well before 11 a.m. The prosecutor's arguments to the jury concerning Ranfone and Castellano underscore our determination that defense counsel was not unreasonable in calling them. The prosecutor found their testimony troublesome to the State's case and argued that jurors should question the reliability of their testimony. In her summation, she asked the jurors not to believe that Ranfone and Castellano saw Huggins. She said these witness were [n]ot sure of what date they made their observations, and their descriptions were not matching. Thus, the prosecutor argued that they conjured their descriptions after they read of Kristin being missing, saw her photograph and of her car, [and] read this in the newspaper. Defendant's PCR arguments do not overcome the strong presumption of reasonableness to be accorded to counsel's performance. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2055, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 694. Indeed, PCR counsel did not question defense counsel about this trial decision at all. Moreover, defendant cannot show prejudice. The State, in fact, argued that the testimony of Ranfone and Castellano conflicted with its theory, and that the jury should discredit their accounts. We conclude, therefore, that this ineffective assistance claim lacks merit.
Defendant next argues that counsel's cross-examination of Gloria Dunn failed to confront Dunn with his claim that Dunn was the trigger-person. Harris also argues that counsel failed to use effective impeachment material at their disposal in respect of inconsistencies among Dunn's multiple descriptions of the relevant events. For example, defendant contends that Dunn once reported that he kept his gun in his waistband the entire time, but on another occasion, she stated that defendant placed the gun on the car.
As the State argues in its counter to this allegation of ineffective assistance, review of Dunn's testimony and of Scully's guilt-phase summation reveals the weakness of defendant's claim. Scully launched a cross-examination attack on Dunn's credibility and the reliability of her testimony. He had Dunn repeat that she testified to and reported many critical facts that she never told the police in her initial statements. Most notably, she did not mention until September 1994 that a rape had occurred. She also did not repeat Harris's alleged stated intention to kill a white victim, but to spare a black victim, until January 1996. Scully's examination strongly suggested that Dunn was motivated to conjure those and other facts in order to gain a favorable plea bargain with the prosecution. Despite not helping Huggins when she had opportunities to do so, Dunn testified that she cared about Kristin. Scully's cross-examination mocked the suggestion that she was testifying for any such reason. Moreover, Scully's cross-examination attempted to expose inconsistencies throughout Dunn's evolving narrative about December 17, 1992. For example, he had Dunn tell the jury that she had lied about certain details when she finally did tell police of the rape. (She first reported falsely that she was inside the car at the time). She admitted that she signed her February 1993 statement even though it contained false information about the location of a passerby, with a baby, who heard Huggins banging from inside the trunk. And, Scully's questioning emphasized that one of Dunn's professed reasons for not letting Huggins out of the trunk when Harris was temporarily out of sight, was because the trunk was jammed, despite Harris's subsequent ability to open it to get Huggins out. Scully also succeeded in making Dunn waver on whether she ever abandoned her robbery intentions. At one point, she testified that she changed her mind on seeing Harris's gun, but later admitted that she was still in on the robbery even after Huggins was forced into the trunk. Despite saying she still planned to commit the robbery, she nonetheless depicted herself as Harris's second kidnapping victim. Scully also attacked Dunn's character. He had her repeat that she was a drug dealer, that she intended to commit robbery in order to buy more drugs to resell, that she had been convicted of welfare fraud, and that she had minor children who did not live with her, but to whom she owed court-ordered support. Even the cold trial transcript reveals how difficult a person Dunn could be. When Scully asked her to look at a prior police statement, she responded, No, I don't want to read it. Dunn also demanded that Scully not say that they went  back to Cortlandt Street to get shovels because she had never been to Cortlandt Street, and she instructed Scully at one juncture to [g]et to the point, which drew comment from the trial court. Thus, in his summation, Scully was able to ask the jurors to consider whether anybody in the world tells Gloria Dunn what to do or what not to do. Finally, despite defendant's claim that counsel did not accuse Dunn of being the trigger-person, Scully did make that suggestion through a line of questioning, at the end of which, Scully asked Dunn, You didn't kill anybody, right? Q: And you were interested in them finding KristinKristin, because this was bothering you so bad over these three months thatbut you weren't interested in any reward, were you? A: I don't want no money, no, I just wanted her to get out of the ground. Q: Mr. Zarling said to you at the conclusion of your direct testimony, you entered into an agreement with the Prosecutor's Office to tell  to tell the truth, correct? A: It's only right that I tell the truth. No. I didn't enter into an agreement through anything. I'm just here to tell the truth what happened. Q: So if you never had been involved in this plea agreement, you'd still be here telling us the truth today? A: Of course I would tell the truth. Q: And A: I'm in jail. I didn't do anything to hurt her. Why wouldn't I tell the truth? The person who did it ain't going to tell. Because he told me he ain't going to talk. He told me, I'll tell them people all nothing. Q: Everything that you've told us here today is the truth, because you were concerned about Kristin and you wanted the truth to be known, correct? A: Course, it's the truth. Why wouldn't I be concerned about somebody getting killed in front of my face? I don't have the heart to shoot nobody. I never killed nobody before. I never experienced nothing like I experienced ever before. Why wouldn't I? Q: You didn't kill anybody, right? A: I never killed nobody. Q: You're here today to help Kristin, not to help A: I'm here today to tell the truth. I'll leave it like that. Scully: Nothing further. Scully's questions were laden with sarcasm. Instead of asking her point blank if she killed Huggins, as defendant now argues legally was required, Scully chose to confront Dunn in a different manner. His approach was not objectively unreasonable. Further, Scully argued in summation that perhaps Dunn was the killer, and that she suspiciously had protested too much to the police suggestion that she pulled the trigger. Scully's theme in summation was to show that the only evidence of a rape and of Harris being the triggerman came from Dunn, and that (i) Dunn was a liar and (ii) none of the other evidence corroborated her testimony. Counsel recounted her inconsistencies, failure to report crucial details, her reason to please the prosecution, and her involvement with drugs. We previously found that defense counsel attacked Dunn's credibility ... thoroughly and undermined [it] at almost every stage of the guilt-phase trial. Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 180, 716 A. 2d 458. We reiterate here what we observed in our previous decisions: Defendant's impeachment of Gloria Dunn was extensive. Id. at 182, 716 A. 2d 458.
The accusations of deficiency in trial counsel's cross-examination of Dunn are negligible in light of Scully's effective attacks on Dunn's credibility. Not pressing Dunn on other minor inconsistenciessuch as exactly where defendant's gun and pants were positioned during the rapedoes not push Scully's cross-examination performance below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his mental competence at the time of the offense and of trial. Specifically, defendant argues that a competent defendant is able to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense, citing N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4b(g). Defendant says that his long psychiatric history, his irrational behavior at trial, and the hostile relationship that developed between him and counsel cast doubt on whether he met that criterion. Furthermore, he contends that his waiver of his rights to testify and to allocute are suspect because of [his] dubious competence. Defendant cites numerous instances of his in-court behavior to show his irrationality: · On March 14, 1994, during a pre-trial hearing, defendant was spitting all over the place: At the wall in front of him, at chairs behind him and next to him, on the floor in front of him. · He said to the pre-trial judge, Judge Schroth, Now, go on over there, cracker, you white racist bigot. You know what you is. You're just doing the devil's work. You tell me why I spit. You have no laws that I'm honored to respect. My forefathers, you understand, and my ancestors did not sit down and decide any laws. You understand that, you racist? · On July 13, 1995, Harris refused to come to court, and instead crawled back in bed and covered up, supposedly afraid that a corrections officer would harm him. · During trial, Harris spit on Judge Delehey's desk, and tried to tweak the Judge a little bit during voir dire by exhibiting his middle finger. · On February 13, 1996, right after entering the courtroom, the court told Harris to sit down and be quiet. Harris responded, I got it off already. And my [penis] hurt too. You know, you can see if you can get me a doctor for that. · While the victim's father testified, Harris mocked his sympathy by dabbing under his own eyes with his handkerchief. Defendant points out that despite counsel's repeated warnings that his conduct would affect the jury's deliberations, he continued to engage in disruptive behavior. In addition, defendant relies on his long psychiatric history. As a youth, defendant was diagnosed as schizophrenic and psychotic. He was committed at age thirteen to the State Psychiatric Hospital as insane. Dr. Edward Dougherty, retained by trial counsel, examined Harris and concluded that there was a possibility of an organic impairment of his thought processes. Despite those facts, defense counsel failed to ask for additional testing regarding his competence. Finally, defendant argues that trial counsels' attitude toward him affected the decision not to order further examinations. Defendant claims that Call despised [him] and doubted that his behavior was the result of some pathology with legal significance. The State disputes the characterization of defendant's behavior as bizarre in the sense that would call into question his competency. According to the State, defendant's behavior was intentional, and served to express his disdain for the court, the prosecutors, and the Huggins family. Furthermore, neither trial counsel nor Dr. Dougherty provided any indication that defendant was incompetent. See State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 73-74, 152 A.2d 50 (1959) (stating that defense counsel are in a better position than trial court to gauge their client's competency). Finally, the State distinguishes defendant's behavior from other behavior that raised legitimate questions about a defendant's competency. For example, in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed. 2d 103 (1975), the defendant attempted suicide during trial; in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed. 2d 815 (1966), the defendant heard voices. In State v. Spivey, 65 N.J. 21, 319 A. 2d 461 (1974), the defendant brayed like a donkey and grunted like a pig in court. Here, the State argues, Harris understood the role of the judge and the nature of the charges. He was able to assist Call and Scully, and, albeit offensive in his conduct, he was competent.
N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4a prohibits the trying, convicting, and sentencing of a defendant who lacks [the] capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense ... so long as such incapacity endures. See also State v. Sinclair, 49 N.J. 525, 549, 231 A. 2d 565 (1967) (competency requires understanding of one's position and ability to consult intelligently with counsel). N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4b states that a defendant is fit to stand trial if the proofs establish: (1) That the defendant has the mental capacity to appreciate his presence in relation to time, place and things; and (2) That his elementary mental processes are such that he comprehends: (a) That he is in a court of justice charged with a criminal offense; (b) That there is a judge on the bench; (c) That there is a prosecutor present who will try to convict him of a criminal charge; (d) That he has a lawyer who will undertake to defend him against that charge; (e) That he will be expected to tell to the best of his mental ability the facts surrounding him at the time and place where the alleged violation was committed if he chooses to testify and understands the right not to testify; (f) That there is or may be a jury present to pass upon evidence adduced as to guilt or innocence of such charge or, that if he should choose to enter into plea negotiations or to plead guilty, that he comprehend the consequences of a guilty plea and that he be able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights which are waived upon such entry of a guilty plea; and (g) That he has the ability to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense. Defendant's statement to the trial court, before being sentenced on the non-capital convictions, demonstrates that he met each of the criteria outlined in subsections 4b(1) through 4b(2)(f), which pertain to a defendant's awareness of where he is and the nature of the proceedings against him. Specifically, the record reveals that: · Harris addressed his comments to the judge. (Number one, Judge, I find your presence as a judge here a disgrace to the bench.); see N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4b(2)(b) (defendant must know there is a judge on the bench). · He disputed the reliability of the evidence against him. He argued, Who is to say, you know, that [Dunn] wasn't the person that did it?; that if Huggins saw him coming, she would have locked her car door; that the evidence of a rape was untrustworthy; and that the evidence did not show he shot Huggins; see N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4b(1), -4b(2)(a), -4b(2)(f) (requiring that a defendant know where he is and that there are charges against him). · He understood that a jury was deciding his fate (arguing that this here jury system ... is not fair); see N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4b(2)(f) (defendant must know role of jury). · Defendant knew the prosecutor's goal was to have him convicted (arguing that the Huggins family is naïve to believe the prosecution; and that the prosecutor just want[ed] to make a name for his f____g self); see N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4b(2)(c) (defendant must know prosecutor is there to convict him). · In fact, in claiming that the death penalty is administered arbitrarily, he compared the moral blameworthiness of the acts attributed to him to those of Gloria Dunn, Jeffrey Dahmer, and others. The remaining requirement for competency is that a defendant must be able to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4b(2)(g). At the PCR hearing, when asked whether Harris knew how Tariq would be cross-examined, Scully stated that defendant saw the entire file. The direct examination of Scully continued: Q: Did you ever discuss with [defendant] your decision prior to the cross-examination not to ask A: I discussed every decision that we made during the course of the trial at length with both Mr. Harris and with Mr. Call, and with many other individuals in the public defender's office. Q: Judge Scully, what was your purpose in discussing Tariq Ayers' statement with Mr. Harris? A: I discussed everything. I discussed the entire discovery packet with Mr. Harris. Q: And I'm asking you with respect to those particular statements, what was your purpose in discussing them with Mr. Harris? A: Discussing what we could expect to be the proffered testimony during the state's case, and the manner in which we would approach our, our cross-examination as to each witness. Q: Because we're talking about the defendant's nephew now, right? A: Correct. Although in this exchange Scully was not being asked about the issue of Harris's competency specifically, it is apparent that Harris communicated with his attorneys and answered questions about the kind of testimony to expect from State witnesses. Cf. Spivey, supra, 65 N.J. at 43, 319 A. 2d 461 (describing incompetent as totally uncommunicative; even though he was aware of what was going on, ... such knowledge is not necessarily conclusive on the question of one's ability to ... assist in his own defense). That evidence of intelligent communication between Harris and his attorneys supports Scully's and Call's assertion that there was no reason to doubt defendant's competency. Moreover, Scully affirmed that he, in fact, did ask Dr. Dougherty to examine Harris to make sure that, that were no competency issues that needed to be addressed. [5] Scully said he asked, not because anything about Harris raised that specter of incompetency, but because in any type of major prosecution, it is prudent ... to have the client ... examined to make sure there aren't any issues as to competency or any other issues, mental-health-related issues. As noted, Dr. Dougherty mentioned the possibility of a neurologic impairment or organic problem, but, after consultation with their appellate counsel, Call and Scully decided it was unnecessary to request further competency assessment. Call's PCR testimony, like Scully's, indicated that he really did not have any doubt about Harris's competency. [6] Call stated that he formed that opinion based on his meetings and conversations with Harris, on the information he read about Harris's entire life, and on defendant's correspondence, including communications to his previous attorneys. He added that Harris's letters to his prior counsel showed certainly insight into the nature of his problems. When asked again whether he had questions about Harris's competency, Call stated: No, I did not. Mr. Harris, based on our initial meeting with Mr. Harris [on January 11, 1995)], I felt that he was certainly legally competent, and that is not necessarily a high hurdle in the State of New Jersey, but Mr. Harris was clearly legally competent as to his mental status, based upon the information that I had received to date concerning his past criminal history. Call added that he received letters from Harris that showed his abilities. Two were marked into evidence at the PCR hearing. In one, Harris asked his attorneys to file an injunction against a Trentonian columnist, stating that the relevant columns prejudiced potential jurors. In the same letter, defendant mentioned that he requested that prison officials provide a skilled paralegal for him. Last, we have defendant's contentions in respect of his childhood diagnoses of schizophrenia and psychosis. However, both defense experts who testified during the penalty phase agreed that those diagnoses were wrong. Neither Dr. Gruen nor Dr. Greenfield saw evidence that defendant was psychotic; each diagnosed him with a conduct disorder as a child, based on the records they reviewed. And, even if the diagnoses had been correct, the issue is whether Harris was competent as an adult.
The record supports trial counsels' conviction that Harris was competent. His soliloquy to the court before being sentenced on the non-capital counts demonstrates that Harris knew his whereabouts, the nature of the proceedings and of the charges, and the role of the different actors. All statutory factors were demonstrated. Therefore, we reject defendant's argument that counsels' performance fell below an objective reasonableness standard because they did not investigate further into defendant's competency.
Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred by failing to order a competency hearing on its own motion. Although not technically an IAC claim, for the same reasons that defendant argues defense counsel should have investigated his competency to stand trial, he makes the ancillary argument that the trial court was required to order a competency hearing on its own motion. Defendant notes, in fact, that before the penalty phase commenced and on learning of defendant's prior civil commitments, the trial court speculated that one might infer that defendant was mentally ill at the time of trial.
N.J.S.A. 2C:4-5a authorizes a court, on its own motion, to appoint at least one qualified psychiatrist to examine and report upon the mental condition of the defendant whenever a defendant's fitness to proceed appears questionable. See also Spivey, supra, 65 N.J. at 37, 319 A. 2d 461 (noting that trial court has power to order a competency hearing sua sponte ). The standard for reviewing a court's decision not to order such a hearing is a strict one. Ibid. (citing Lucas, supra, 30 N.J. at 37, 152 A. 2d 50). [W]hile the court has the power to order an inquiry in the defendant's mental qualifications to stand trial, failure to exercise the powers will not be reviewed on appeal, unless it clearly and convincingly appears that the defendant was incapable of standing trial. [ Lucas, supra, 30 N.J. at 73-74, 152 A. 2d 50 (emphasis added).] To meet the clear and convincing standard on appeal, a defendant must show a `bona fide doubt' as to [his] competence to stand trial. Spivey, supra, 65 N.J. at 37, 319 A. 2d 461 (citing Pate, supra, 383 U.S. at 385, 86 S.Ct. at 842, 15 L.Ed. 2d at 822). The clear and convincing standard for reviewing a court's failure to order a competency hearing is consistent with the view that defense attorneys are in a better position to assess a defendant's competency; it is they who should bring such matters to the court's attention. It is to be ordinarily expected that defense counsel, who is in a far better position than the trial judge to assay the salient facts concerning the defendant's ability to stand trial and assist in his own defense, would originate the request that such an inquiry be conducted. [ Lucas, supra, 30 N.J. at 74, 152 A. 2d 50.] The United States Supreme Court approaches the question similarly, stating that judges must depend to some extent on counsel to bring [these] issues into focus. Drope, supra, 420 U.S. at 176-77, 95 S.Ct. at 906, 43 L.Ed. 2d at 116. Thus, because defense attorneys are in a better position than the trial court to question a defendant's competency, Spivey, supra, 65 N.J. at 37, 319 A. 2d 461 (citing Lucas, supra, 30 N.J. at 73-73, 152 A. 2d 50), the fact that Call and Scully found no reason to question Harris's competency must be given substantial weight here. Moreover, we agree with the State when it says that the trial court never questioned defendant's competency. The trial court merely asked defense counsel if the childhood mitigating circumstances implicated Harris's current mental status, and defense counsel replied that they did not. At the time, the court was deciding whether to allow the State's psychiatric expert to conduct an examination of defendant's current mental status in order to assess the defense's childhood mitigating factor. The court found no reason to allow the State to examine Harris because there was no nexus between the childhood mitigating factor and his current mental status. Defendant does not provide clear and convincing evidence that raises a bona fide doubt that he failed to meet the competency standards set forth by N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4a. PCR counsel never stated specifically how Harris failed to meet any of the statutory criteria for competency and we view Harris's written correspondence and pre-sentencing soliloquy to the court as undermining defendant's claim. We reject, therefore, the argument that there was error in the trial court's failure to sua sponte order a competency hearing.