Opinion ID: 2600070
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Manner of conducting voir dire

Text: As previously noted, the trial court impaneled two juries in this case. The first convicted defendant as charged and found true the three special circumstance allegations, but deadlocked on penalty. The second, which the trial court impaneled for retrial of the penalty phase, returned a verdict of death. Below, we address defendant's claims regarding the first jury's selection. In a later section (see post, pt. II.D.2.), we will consider defendant's challenge to selection of the jury that decided penalty.
Defense counsel filed several pretrial motions concerning the voir dire of prospective jurors. In one, counsel asked that voir dire be done either individually and sequestered or in small groups of 15 to 20 prospective jurors. Counsel argued that individual voir dire was necessary to probe the strong biases the circumstances of the casea young African-American man accused of committing sexual assaults that caused the death of an elderly White womanwere likely to evoke. After hearing, the trial court denied defendant's request, finding no need to deviate from its customary practice of questioning prospective jurors in open court. The trial court rejected the argument that jury selection done in a large group is tainted by an inherent herd instinct, in which potential jurors feel pressured to answer questions about their biases neutrally, rather than truthfully. In the trial court's view, [a]ttitudes within the community are fairly fixed on the subject of the death penalty and if people are against it, they say so and if they aren't[,] they say so. The trial court also noted that potential jurors would have several days to complete a questionnaire in which they could privately express their feelings about the death penalty, and would be questioned based on their written responses. The trial court also indicated that although it planned to conduct the group voir dire itself, it would allow the attorneys to ask questions directly in the event a prospective juror wanted to be questioned in chambers, outside the presence of other jurors. Defendant contends the trial court violated his constitutional rights by refusing to conduct individual, sequestered voir dire. Initially, we disagree with respondent's assertion that defendant has forfeited his claim because he did not challenge any juror for cause or exercise all of his peremptory challenges at trial. A defendant's failure to raise a for-cause challenge or to exhaust all peremptory challenges is relevant to the question whether he has preserved a claim on appeal that members of his jury were unacceptable to him. ( People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 904 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 162 P.3d 528]; People v. Hart, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 589.) But a defendant who has made a timely objection to group voir dire and proposed that the trial court question prospective jurors individually has done all that is necessary. ( People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 513, fn. 6.) Thus, defendant's claim that the trial court erred in refusing his request is properly before us. However, the claim fails on the merits. As we have repeatedly observed, there is no federal constitutional requirement that a trial court conduct individualized, sequestered voir dire in a capital case. ( People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 494; People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 511-513.) Nor did the trial court's denial of the motion for individual, sequestered voir dire violate any of defendant's rights under the state Constitution or state law. ( People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 494; People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 713-714 [denial of motion for individual, sequestered voir dire reviewed for abuse of discretion].) Section 223 provides in relevant part that [v]oir dire of any prospective jurors shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other jurors . . . . Group voir dire may be impracticable when it has resulted in actual, rather than merely potential, bias. ( People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 288 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990].) Here, however, defendant does not suggest that either the trial court's comments or the responses of other prospective jurors to the trial court's questioning influenced any prospective juror, and we find nothing in the record to indicate that group voir dire resulted in actual bias. (Cf. People v. Lewis, supra, at pp. 494-495 [evidence that 16 jurors changed their questionnaire answers after being educated during the voir dire process did not establish actual bias]; People v. Vieira, supra, at p. 289 [the possibility that prospective jurors may have answered questions to please the trial court shows at most potential, not actual, bias].) Furthermore, the trial court acted well within its discretion in determining that group voir dire was practicable in this case. Though aware it had discretion to order individual, sequestered voir dire, the trial court, for the reasons it stated, reasonably rejected the argument that a herd instinct required a departure from its usual practice of questioning prospective jurors in large groups. Moreover, prospective jurors received lengthy questionnaires to complete on their own time, and the trial court, aided by counsel, conducted individualized voir dire when further inquiry into a questionnaire response was required or requested by any prospective juror who wished to discuss sensitive issues privately in chambers. The trial court's approach to voir dire was reasonable on this record. (Cf. People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 514 [group voir dire was practicable where the trial court used juror questionnaires and allowed counsel privately to question certain prospective jurors].) Accordingly, we find that in denying defendant's motion for individualized voir dire of all prospective jurors, the trial court neither abused its discretion nor violated defendant's constitutional rights.
Defendant contends the trial court violated his right to an impartial jury because its voir dire was inadequate to discover racial bias in the prospective jurors. The trial court gave prospective jurors at the first trial a questionnaire containing 98 questions, four of which concerned racial attitudes. One asked generally whether the prospective juror had any racial or ethnic prejudices. Another asked whether the prospective juror had any bias for or against the defendant based upon his race. A third explained that the defendant in the case is African American and asked the prospective juror whether this fact [would] affect you as a juror at all. The fourth asked whether the prospective juror could be impartial . . . in the case where an African American male is accused of committing crimes against a [C]aucasian female. The questions called for yes-or-no or multiple-choice answers, and further directed, If `Yes,' Please describe or Please explain, followed by three or four lines for additional comment. Defendant complains generally that during voir dire the trial court conducted no inquiry into the racial views of any juror who served on the first jury. More specifically, he asserts that the written responses of three jurors contained contradictions or ambiguities that required followup questions on the issue of race. In support of his complaint, he cites the trial court's failure to ask followup questions of two jurors who indicated they had no racial or ethnic prejudices, had no bias for or against defendant based on his race, and would not be affected by the fact that defendant is African-American, but who also answered No when asked if they could be impartial jurors in a case where an African-American man is accused of committing crimes against a Caucasian female. Defendant also cites the trial court's failure to ask followup questions of another juror who, when asked whether she had any racial or ethnic prejudices, marked both mild and none, and explained: On occasion I find myself fearful around large numbers of [B]lacks, Hispanicsor even [W]hitesif it is an unsafe area. Given the cross-racial nature of the crimes, defendant argues, the trial court had to conduct searching voir dire of the sort designed to reveal subtle racial biases that might affect the prospective jurors' view of the evidence, and its failure to do so violated his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. Defendant has forfeited this claim of error because his counsel failed to suggest followup questions the trial court could have asked the prospective jurors or otherwise complain about the adequacy of the trial court's voir dire. At the time the trial court denied counsel's motion for attorney-conducted voir dire, it expressly offered counsel an opportunity to suggest supplemental questions while voir dire was in progress, and stated it would permit counsel to ask questions directly when voir dire was being conducted in chambers. The record suggests defense counsel found no need to take the court up on its offer. Defendant, therefore, has not preserved for appeal his claim of inadequate voir dire. ( People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 620.) (6) But even were defendant's claim properly before us, it would fail on its merits. [A]dequate inquiry into possible racial bias is . . . essential in a case in which an African-American defendant is charged with commission of a capital crime against a White victim. ( People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 660 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213]; see also Mu'min v. Virginia (1991) 500 U.S. 415, 424 [114 L.Ed.2d 493, 111 S.Gt. 1899] [the 14th Amend. requires inquiry into racial prejudice in cases involving a Black defendant accused of violent crimes against a White victim].) However, because the trial court is in the best position to assess the amount of voir dire required to ferret out latent prejudice, and to judge the responses ( People v. Taylor (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1314 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 676]), it has wide discretion in conducting voir dire in areas of inquiry that might disclose juror bias and `in deciding what questions should be asked on voir dire.' ( People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 737 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302].) It abuses that discretion if its failure to ask questions renders the defendant's trial `fundamentally unfair' or `if the questioning is not reasonably sufficient to test the jury for bias or partiality.' [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 737.) Having reviewed the questionnaire, the written responses, and the voir dire of the jurors who served on the first trial, we conclude the trial court's inquiry into possible racial bias provides no basis for reversing. The questionnaire included four questions that elicited from prospective jurors whether they held any racial biases and whether the circumstance defendant was an African-American man accused of committing crimes against a White woman would affect their impartiality. (Cf. People v. Taylor, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 1316 [in prosecution where the potential for racial bias against the defendant exists, the trial court's inquiry should elicit from prospective jurors their actual biases].) The record discloses several instances in which the trial court did inquire further into the subject of racial prejudice when warranted. [8] Moreover, as to all but three of the seated jurors, nothing in the questionnaire responses suggests that further inquiry into possible racial bias was necessary. Regarding the three seated jurors whose questionnaire responses defendant now claims warranted further questioning regarding racial bias, it is unclear from the record why the trial court did not conduct additional questioning. (See People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 448 [the juror's ambiguous answers on the questionnaire prompted a need for clarification on oral voir dire].) But even were the trial court's questioning of these prospective jurors deficient as defendant claims, the voir dire, when viewed as a whole ( People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 661), was not so inadequate as to render his trial fundamentally unfair. In People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at page 620, we found that the assertedly flawed voir dire examination of a prospective juror did not result in a fundamentally unfair trial, noting that defense counsel had an opportunity to suggest additional questions to be put to specific individuals but apparently saw no need to do so. We found, moreover, that defense counsel's failure to exhaust the entire allotment of peremptory challenges and the fact the first jury deadlocked on penalty were `strong indication[s] `that the jurors were fair, and that the defense itself so concluded.'' ( Id. at p. 619.) These factors dictate a similar result here. We reject defendant's assertion, which he bases on People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th 425, that the trial court relied too heavily on the questionnaires and asked too few questions during voir dire. In Stewart, we concluded the trial court committed reversible error in excusing five prospective jurors for cause based solely on their questionnaire responses without any followup questioning regarding their views on the death penalty. ( Id. at pp. 441-455.) Here, the juror questionnaire gave the prospective jurors a clear opportunity to disclose views about racial bias that would warrant their excusal from the jury. ( People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 531 [the trial court properly excused jurors for cause based solely on their questionnaire responses where the questionnaire was expansive and detailed, and the jurors' answers were unambiguous].) Furthermore, the trial court questioned every juror who served on defendant's first jury, observing their responses and demeanor and thereby gleaning valuable information about their states of mind. ( People v. Stewart, supra, at p. 451.) Under these circumstances, the trial court's conclusions regarding the jurors' impartiality are entitled to deference. ( Id. at pp. 450-451.) Nor, contrary to defendant's suggestion, was the examination into possible racial bias in this case akin to the inadequate voir dire that led to reversal of the defendant's conviction in People v. Wilborn (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 339 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 583]. In Wilborn, the African-American defendant's trial strategy was to challenge the credibility of the White officers who stopped and then arrested him for a drug offense. ( Id. at pp. 342-343.) Both orally and by written motion, defense counsel asked that the prospective jurors be questioned about racial bias, but the trial court refused to inquire into the subject, saying it `would rather not get into race.' ( Id. at p. 343.) The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that under the circumstances of the case, the trial court had an obligation to make  some inquiry into racial bias. ( Id. at p. 348.) Because none was made, the appellate court concluded, the defendant was deprived of his right to an impartial jury. ( Ibid. ) Here, by contrast, the prospective jurors' responses to four questions likely to elicit racial biases, coupled with the trial court's observation of their demeanor during questioning, provided the trial court with an ample basis for ferreting out prospective jurors whose racial bias would interfere with their ability to be impartial. Furthermore, defense counsel did not ask for additional inquiry on the subject of racial bias and the record contains nothing to suggest the trial court would have refused such a request. Defendant's reliance on Wilborn is, therefore, misplaced. For similar reasons, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in State v. Williams (1988) 113 N.J. 393 [550 A.2d 1172], which reversed an African-American defendant's conviction and death sentence, does not assist defendant. Noting that the trial court's voir dire consisted of only one question on racial bias, the Williams court observed, When the defendant is a member of a cognizable minority group, a more searching voir dire should be conducted, if requested. (Id., 550 A.2d at p. 1190, second italics added; see also People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 539 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931] [in a case involving an interracial killing, the trial court must question prospective jurors about racial prejudice  on request ].)