Opinion ID: 2641010
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Liability

Text: This case presents an unusual circumstance where we must first determine under which constitutional amendment the right asserted was clearly established. Section 1983 does not confer substantive rights; rather, it is only a means to vindicate rights already conferred by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989). Excessive force claims, however, can be raised under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Which amendment should be applied depends on the status of the plaintiff at the time of the incident; that is, whether the plaintiff was a free citizen, convicted prisoner, or fit in some gray area in between the two. Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 680–81 (6th Cir. 2008); Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 299 (6th Cir. 2002). The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures bars excessive force against free citizens, see Graham, 490 U.S. at 388, while the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment bars excessive force against convicted persons. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318–22 (1986). When a citizen does not fall clearly within either category—e.g., pretrial detainees—the Fourteenth Amendment’s more generally applicable Due Process Clause governs to bar a governmental official’s excessive use of force. See Lanman, 529 F.3d at 680–81; Phelps, 286 F.3d at 300. A plaintiff has a substantially higher hurdle to overcome to make a showing of excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment as opposed to under the Fourth Amendment. Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301, 306 (6th Cir. 2001). Under the Fourth Amendment, we apply an objective reasonableness test, looking to the No. 12-4191 Burgess, et al. v. Fischer, et al. Page 8 reasonableness of the force in light of the totality of the circumstances confronting the defendants, and not to the underlying intent or motivation of the defendants. Dunigan v. Noble, 390 F.3d 486, 493 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. We balance “the nature and quality of the intrusion on [a plaintiff’s] Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 466–67 (6th Cir. 2006). In doing so, three factors guide our analysis: “‘[(1)] the severity of the crime at issue, [(2)] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and [(3)] whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 958 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). These factors are assessed from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene making a split-second judgment under tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving circumstances without the advantage of 20/20 hindsight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. In contrast, with a Fourteenth Amendment claim, we consider whether the defendant’s conduct “shocks the conscience” so as to amount to an arbitrary exercise of governmental power. Darrah, 255 F.3d at 306 (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46, 851–53 (1998)). This standard differs depending on the factual circumstances. See id. Where defendants are “afforded a reasonable opportunity to deliberate . . . their actions will be deemed conscience-shocking if they were taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ towards the plaintiff’s federally protected rights.” Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 359 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851–52). If, however, the incident was a “rapidly evolving, fluid, and dangerous predicament,” the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted “‘maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm’ rather than ‘in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.’” Id. (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853). Notwithstanding the Due Process Clause’s broader applicability, we remain cognizant of the fact that “if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive No. 12-4191 Burgess, et al. v. Fischer, et al. Page 9 due process.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 394).