Opinion ID: 1057722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Possession of a Firearm

Text: Code § 18.2-308.2 prohibits the possession of firearms by convicted felons. Subsection (A) states that [i]t shall be unlawful for (i) any person who has been convicted of a felony ... to knowingly and intentionally possess or transport any firearm or ammunition for a firearm, any stun weapon as defined by § 18.2-308.1, or any explosive material, or to knowingly and intentionally carry about his person, hidden from common observation, any weapon described in subsection A of § 18.2- 308. Code § 18.2-308.2 provides no express definition of the term firearm. However, in Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573, 562 S.E.2d 139 (2002), we held that the term firearm under Code § 18.2-308.2 means any instrument designed, made, and intended to fire or expel a projectile by means of an explosion. Id. at 583, 562 S.E.2d at 145. We explicitly 4 rejected within that definition any element of present capacity or operability. Id. at 583-84, 562 S.E.2d at 145. In Startin, we further clarified that definition by explaining that a replica gun and a BB gun would not be sufficient to convict a person under Code § 18.2-308.2 for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because those items were not designed, made, and intended to fire or expel a projectile by means of an explosion. 281 Va. at 382, 706 S.E.2d at 878 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Redd v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 256, 511 S.E.2d 436 (1999), the defendant entered a convenience store and placed what appeared to be a long, black gun on the counter, and ordered the clerk to give her all the money from the register. Id. at 258, 511 S.E.2d at 437. Redd stated that she would kill the clerk if an alarm were activated. Id. In Redd, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant's threat to kill the clerk was an implied assertion that the object she held was a firearm. When coupled with the clerk's description of the object, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Id. at 259, 511 S.E.2d at 438. We confirm that the holding in Redd is still the law of this Commonwealth. In Redd, the defendant's threat to kill the clerk was an implied assertion that the object was a firearm. 5 In the case before us, Jordan did not verbally threaten to kill Arrowood, however, the acts of pointing the gun at Arrowood while directing him to get out of the car, most assuredly communicated the message that if Arrowood did not comply, Jordan would shoot him. Arrowood specifically identified the object as a Raven. A Raven is a well-known, compact, .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol that is commonly referred to as a Saturday Night Special, and can easily be concealed. See United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1993); Burks v. State, 876 S.W.2d 877, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). The reference to a Raven indicates a specific weapon that was designed, made, and intended to fire or expel a projectile by means of an explosion. A Raven pistol clearly meets the definition of a firearm as set out in Armstrong. Arrowood's ability to identify a Raven pistol was subject to cross-examination. The determination of how much weight to give to his identification of the object as a Raven pistol was a matter for the trier of fact. We are mindful of the precise question we are required to address when considering an appeal alleging insufficiency of the evidence. When analyzing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at trial and considers 6 any reasonable inferences from the facts proved. The judgment of the trial court will only be reversed upon a showing that it “is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 19, 27, 630 S.E.2d 326, 330 (2006) (quoting Code § 8.01-680) (citation omitted). In this case the jury found Arrowood’s testimony to be competent and believable. The trier of fact was entitled to consider the totality of the evidence including Arrowood’s direct testimony identifying the weapon and Jordan’s conduct which included pointing that weapon to Arrowood’s head and demanding that Arrowood get out of the truck. It was within the province of the jury to conclude that Jordan’s conduct was an implied assertion that the object he held was a firearm. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury unless no reasonable juror could have come to this conclusion.