Opinion ID: 1035458
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limits of Discretion

Text: This discretion, however, is not unlimited. Despite their potential usefulness, demonstrative exhibits also carry the potential to prejudice the party against whom such exhibits are used. If used improperly, demonstrative exhibits can distract the jury from considering all of the evidence presented, causing them instead to unfairly emphasize only portions of the evidence.57 If all parties to a case do not submit demonstrative exhibits, the jury may be tempted to focus more heavily on the 51 Erickson v. U-Haul Internat., 278 Neb. 18, 767 N.W.2d 765 (2009). 52 See Childers v. Phelps County, 252 Neb. 945, 568 N.W.2d 463 (1997). 53 See Steele v. Sedlacek, 267 Neb. 1, 673 N.W.2d 1 (2003). 54 See American Central City v. Joint Antelope Valley Auth., supra note 3. 55 See State v. Dixon, 259 Neb. 976, 614 N.W.2d 288 (2000). 56 State v. Pischel, 277 Neb. 412, 427, 762 N.W.2d 595, 607 (2009). 57 See, e.g., United States v. Abbas, 504 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1974); State v. Lord, supra note 14. Nebraska Advance Sheets 378 286 NEBRASKA REPORTS evidence to which it has “easy reference.”58 Because they are often prepared specifically for use in litigation, demonstrative exhibits can be tempting vehicles for conveying prejudicial language and assumptions59 or inadmissible evidence60 to the jury. Furthermore, if not instructed on the limited purposes of demonstrative exhibits, the jury may assume that demonstrative exhibits constitute primary proof of the information contained therein, leading the jury to shirk its duty to determine the truth and accuracy of the evidence.61 The jury may attribute undue weight or credibility to evidence summarized or illustrated in demonstrative exhibits.62 Or a jury may find the simplicity with which demonstrative exhibits present complex or technical information to be compelling and persuasive.63 On the other hand, demonstrative exhibits that are not properly explained may ultimately confuse or mislead the jury.64 58 See, e.g., U.S. v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 916 (3d Cir. 1991). Accord, United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1957); Steele v. United States, 222 F.2d 628 (5th Cir. 1955); Thomas v. State, 259 Ind. 537, 289 N.E.2d 508 (1972) (superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in Litherland v. McDonnell, 796 N.E.2d 1237 (Ind. App. 2003)). 59 See, e.g., U.S. v. Irvin, supra note 21; U.S. v. Taylor, supra note 21; United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in U.S. v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 941 F. Supp. 1262 (D.D.C. 1996)); U.S. v. Gazie, Nos. 83-1851, 83-1852, 83-1860, 1986 WL 16498 (6th Cir. Feb. 26, 1986) (unpublished disposition listed in table of “Decisions Without Published Opinions” at 786 F.2d 1166 (6th Cir. 1986)); Vanlandingham v. Gartman, 236 Ark. 504, 367 S.W.2d 111 (1963). 60 See, e.g., United States v. Lemire, supra note 59. 61 See, e.g., U.S. v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds, U.S. v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Scales, supra note 18; Baines v. United States, 426 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Ellenbogen, 365 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1966). 62 See, e.g., Sanchez v. United States, 293 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1961); Smith v. Ohio Oil Co., supra note 14. 63 See, e.g., U.S. v. Irvin, supra note 21; Elder v. United States, 213 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1954). 64 See, e.g., United States v. Citron, 783 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1986); U.S. v. Gazie, supra note 59. Nebraska Advance Sheets STATE v. PANGBORN 379 Cite as 286 Neb. 363 [8] Given the possibility for such forms of prejudice, a trial judge must carefully consider the potential prejudice that may arise from the use of demonstrative exhibits during jury deliberations. Each demonstrative exhibit must be considered individually, because both the usefulness of a demonstrative exhibit and the potential prejudice arising from its use will depend on the form and substance of each particular exhibit. We note that a trial court is already required to weigh these considerations before allowing the use of demonstrative exhibits in trial.65 We now hold that the trial judge must do so again before allowing the jury to use a demonstrative exhibit during deliberations. It is an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to send a demonstrative exhibit to the jury for use in deliberations without first weighing the potential prejudice in allowing such use against the usefulness of the exhibit and employing adequate safeguards to prevent prejudice.