Opinion ID: 783682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 1976 virginia burglary conviction

Text: 12 Under Taylor, we first determine the fact of conviction under a particular statute. Where the conviction is under a state burglary statute, we compare the elements listed in that statute with those of burglary as defined by the ACCA. Mindful that the definition of burglary may vary from state to state, the Supreme Court has held that the term burglary, as used in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), refers to generic burglary, meaning any offense that has the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143. If a state statute defines burglary more broadly than this generic definition and would allow a defendant to be convicted without all of the above elements being met, then the conviction fails to qualify categorically as an ACCA predicate. See United States v. Bonat, 106 F.3d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir.1997). 13 Had the district court been presented with Melton's statute of conviction, a certified judgement of conviction, or some other documentary evidence that clearly establishes the burglary statute under which Melton was convicted, United States v. Matthews, 278 F.3d 880, 884 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted), the analysis under the first step of Taylor would be straightforward. But no such documentation was offered. The record before the sentencing court consisted only of an indictment and a PSR, and the PSR did not list the statute under which Melton was ultimately convicted. Instead, the PSR relied directly on the indictment, which charged Melton with break[ing] and enter[ing], in the nighttime, the shop and storehouse of the Temple View Garage ... with the intent to commit larceny, in violation of Va.Code § 18.1-89. This information, although establishing the crime for which Melton was charged, is insufficient to establish that Melton was actually convicted of any particular crime or under any specific statute. See United States v. Sandoval-Venegas, 292 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir.2002) (The charging papers are inadequate unless they are combined with documents that demonstrate the conviction was for the offense as charged.). 14 The Government contends that the fact of conviction under § 18.1-89 is self-evident because Melton mentioned in his sentencing memorandum to the district court that he was convicted in 1976 under Va.Code § 18.1-89. This argument ignores that a lone reference in a defendant's sentencing memorandum, without more, does not qualify as the type of documentary evidence that clearly establishes the fact of conviction under a particular statute. See Sandoval-Venegas, 292 F.3d at 1106 (listing a certified judgment of conviction or a clear, uncontested PSR as examples of permissible sources). 15 Further, even if the documentation were sufficient, the statutes cited by the Government do not contain elements that demonstrate Melton was convicted of generic burglary. The version of § 18.1-89 relied upon by the Government is a penalty provision for certain violations of § 18.1-88 and does not contain any elements of an offense at all. Section 18.1-88, now codified at § 18.2-90, is entitled Entering dwelling house, etc. with intent to commit murder, rape or robbery 1 and does contain substantive elements. However, § 18.1-88 is broadly defined, prohibiting breaking and entering not only into certain specified structures, but into ships, vessels, river crafts, and railroad cars, as well as automobiles used for human habitation. This definition exceeds the Supreme Court's definition of generic burglary. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (limiting generic burglary to include only buildings or structures). 16 The record contains no qualifying statute under which Melton was convicted. Nor does the record contain any judicially noticeable qualifying facts that would, under the second step of the Taylor analysis, establish that Melton's conviction is a predicate conviction for enhancement purposes. The only documents in the record were a charging instrument stating that Melton burglarized the shop and storehouse of the Temple View Garage, and a PSR that reiterates the same information. The district court erroneously relied solely on the charging instrument's description of the crime in concluding that Melton was convicted for a violent felony. We have consistently held that such documentation is insufficient to establish that a defendant pled guilty to the elements of the generic definition of a crime. See, e.g., United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1212-13 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc); United States v. Franklin, 235 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir.2000). The Virginia burglary conviction should not have been counted as a predicate offense for enhancement purposes.