Opinion ID: 2080618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Governing Law

Text: We first recognized a journalist's privilege in nonconfidential news in O'Neill v Oakgrove Constr., Inc. (71 NY2d 521 [1988]), where we determined that our state constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press requires the protection of a qualified privilege when a party to a civil lawsuit seeks nonconfidential information from a news organization ( see NY Const, art I, § 8). Explaining that a party's request for a journalist's nonconfidential material calls for a balancing of competing interests (71 NY2d at 529), we established a three-pronged test that a litigant must satisfy to obtain such materials. At the same time, however, we noted without deciding that different factors might be involved in criminal cases ( see 71 NY2d at 528 n 2). In 1990, the Legislature enacted Civil Rights Law § 79-h (c) to codify our three-pronged test, applying it to both civil and criminal proceedings ( see L 1990, ch 33, § 2). Under the statute, a news organization may not be required to disclose any unpublished news obtained or prepared by a journalist or newscaster in the course of gathering or obtaining news . . . , or the source of any such news, where such news was not obtained or received in confidence, unless the party seeking such news has made a clear and specific showing that the news: (i) is highly material and relevant; (ii) is critical or necessary to the maintenance of a party's claim, defense or proof of an issue material thereto; and (iii) is not obtainable from any alternative source. Defendant contends that the Shield Law is unconstitutional as applied to criminal cases, arguing that a criminal defendant is entitled to obtain nonconfidential material possessed by a news organization even when he or she cannot meet the three-pronged showing required by the statute. He maintains that his due process rights to a fair trial, presentation of a defense, compulsory process and confrontation entitled him to obtain the nonconfidential videotapes of his own statements that were recorded by Hybrid. As made clear in O'Neill, when faced with a litigant's request for information in the possession of the media, competing interests must be balanced ( see 71 NY2d at 529). In a criminal case, defendant's interest in nonconfidential material weighs heavy. Of course, in any case, the interest in refusing to share nonconfidential information is significantly lower than when confidential material is at issue. When confidential material is at issue, the media may have real reason to fear that their ability to find sources willing to provide information will soon evaporate if their guarantees of confidentiality will not be honored. While we do not question the importance of nonconfidential news gathering, whose significance we recognized in O'Neill, defendant argues that this case involves no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or restriction on what the press may publish, and no express or implied command that the press publish what it prefers to withhold. No exaction or tax for the privilege of publishing, and no penalty, civil or criminal, related to the content of published material is at issue here. The use of confidential sources by the press is not forbidden or restricted; reporters remain free to seek news from any source by means within the law. No attempt is made to require the press to publish its sources of information or indiscriminately to disclose them on request ( Branzburg v Hayes, 408 US 665, 681-682 [1972]). Thus, he contends, a reporter's privilege in nonconfidential materials does not easily overcome a criminal defendant's fair trial rights. [3] Because in this case we conclude that defendant met his burden under the Shield Law, we need not decide what standard is constitutionally required in order to overcome a criminal defendant's substantial right to obtain relevant evidence.