Opinion ID: 582495
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Surplus Language in the Jury Instructions.

Text: 25 Burrows also contends that there was a constructive amendment of the information which violated his due process rights. The information charged that Burrows did ... feed, lodge, clothe, harbor, aid, assist and conceal whereas the jury instruction stated that he could be found guilty for feeding, arming, equipping in whole or in part, harboring, aiding, assisting, or concealing in any manner .... Burrows argues that by adding arming and equipping as a means of harboring a fugitive, the trial court constructively amended the information in violation of his rights to due process. The district court found that a new charge was not added to the instruction by the surplus language and that, in light of the evidence against Burrows, his due process rights were not violated. Burrows relies on Hunter v. State of New Mexico, 916 F.2d 595 (10th Cir.1990) (habeas relief granted where court instructed jury that petitioner could be found guilty of sexual assault if he engaged in sexual intercourse or digital penetration when the information charged him only with sexual assault by means of sexual intercourse); and United States v. Sloan, 811 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir.1987) (defendant's Fifth Amendment rights violated where jury was instructed that [w]hoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, or carries away ... any person is guilty of offense, when indictment charged him with effecting the kidnapping by force by seizing and abducting the victim). Burrows asserts that his due process rights were violated because the trial testimony of Sheriff Able, that his officers assumed Little to be armed and dangerous, provided circumstantial evidence from which the jury could have concluded that Burrows armed Little. 26 We do not find Hunter or Sloan persuasive in this case. In Sloan, the court held that the addition of the words inveigles and decoys was prejudicial because the victim's testimony was equivocal regarding the use of force. That is not the situation present in this case. There was no evidence presented at trial that Burrows armed Little. Similarly, in Hunter, the jury was allowed to convict upon a factual basis that modified an element of the charged offense.  'An indictment is constructively amended if the evidence presented at trial, together with the jury instructions, raises the possibility that the defendant was convicted of an offense other than that charged in the indictment.'  Hunter v. State of New Mexico, 916 F.2d 595, 599 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 428 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932 (1988)). In the instant case there was no viable evidence presented at trial that Burrows armed Little. Therefore, there was not the possibility that Burrows was convicted of an offense other than the one charged in the information. In light of other evidence of Burrows' guilt, the deviation between the jury instruction and the information was not so prejudicial that it denied defendant a fair trial in the constitutional sense. Linebarger v. Oklahoma, 404 F.2d 1092 (10th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 938 (1969); Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839 (10th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047 (1980); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). We find no error in the district court's conclusion that Burrows' due process rights were not violated. 2. 27 Burrows next claims that testimony offered by Undersheriff McMunn constituted an impermissible comment on his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Undersheriff McMunn, in response to a question regarding whether he had given Burrows his Miranda warning, testified at trial, in relevant part, as follows: 28 Now, when we got back to the office, whether the sheriff talked to him before I did, I'm really not certain of that. But I did attempt to question him further when we got to the sheriff's office. And at that time he advised me that he wasn't really familiar with what the charge of Harboring a Fugitive was. And at that point in time, he didn't wish to make any more statements until he had talked to an attorney. 29 The district court found that the comment referred to the fact that Burrows had voluntarily talked with officers when he was arrested and that any error was harmless. 30 Reference to an accused's failure to testify is a constitutional violation if  'the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment' on the defendant's right to remain silent. United States v. Morales-Quinones, 812 F.2d 604, 613 (10th Cir.1987) (quoting United States v. Barton, 731 F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir.1984). We are of the opinion that the Undersheriff's comment was not manifestly intended or of the character to draw the jury's attention to the fact that Burrows wished to exercise his right to remain silent. In any event, given the other evidence in the case, we concur with the district court that error, if any, was harmless. 3. 31 Burrows next argues that the admission of a tape recording which included Undersheriff McMunn's opinion regarding the evidence and Burrows' guilt rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of his right to due process. 32 At trial, a tape recording was admitted of a conversation between Undersheriff McMunn and Little in which Undersheriff McMunn expressed his opinion regarding the probable culpability of Burrows. Burrows claims that this situation is analogous to those cases 1 which have held that due process prohibits a prosecutor from expressing his personal opinion regarding the evidence or the guilt of the accused. The distinction here, of course, is that the comments were made by a sheriff's officer rather than the prosecutor. The tape was introduced, after Little testified, for purposes of impeachment. 33 Burrows asserts that the jury had a right to determine his guilt or innocence based upon their assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the strength of the government's case rather than the opinions of the sheriff and prosecutor. 34 We find that admission of the tape recording, although it contained material that was irrelevant, in light of the other evidence against Burrows, was not so egregious that it denied him due process. Habeas relief is thus not appropriate. Chavez v. Kerby, 848 F.2d 1101, 1102 (10th Cir.1988); Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839, 850 (10th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047 (1980). 4. 35 Finally, Burrows contends that the district court erred by failing to grant him an evidentiary hearing on his Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and by concluding that he was barred from federal habeas review of this claim due to procedural default. 36 Burrows asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to litigate Burrows' Fourth Amendment claims. Specifically, Burrows asserts that his trial counsel failed to file a pretrial motion to suppress statements made by him when he was arrested at his home without a warrant and without probable cause. 37 The district court ruled that Burrows had failed to comply with Oklahoma's procedural rules regarding preservation of issues. It then concluded that Burrows failed to set forth any reason for not raising the claim on direct appeal in state court, or show any prejudice and, therefore, denied relief. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (petitioner must show cause for his default and resulting prejudice). There was no factual dispute and therefore no need for a hearing. 38 Burrows urges that before a state procedural rule bars federal review it must be independent and adequate, and it is not adequate unless strictly or regularly followed. Here Burrows asserts that the state procedural bar is not applied uniformly in Oklahoma and, therefore, the bar does not apply. However, the state has cited cases 2 which indicate the Oklahoma courts' commitment to the procedural bar rule in post-conviction claims. 39 In order to prevail on this issue, Burrows had to convince the district court that he had cause for his default in not raising this issue in his direct appeal in state court, and how he suffered prejudice therefrom. Engle v. ISAAC, 456 U.S. 107 (1982). We find Burrows' argument, that the rule is not uniformly applied in Oklahoma, unpersuasive. Although unnecessary, the lower court went on to examine the underlying claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, i.e., that trial counsel should have filed a motion to suppress. It concluded that there were exigent circumstances sufficient to justify Burrows' warrantless arrest and that the filing of a motion to suppress would not have altered the outcome of the trial. We agree.