Opinion ID: 1058323
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Concealment of Stolen Property

Text: Whitehead next argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the evidence was sufficient to convict her based upon aiding in the concealment of the stolen property. After reviewing the trial record, the Court of Appeals held that in addition to proving Whitehead's receipt of the property, the evidence introduced at trial further supports the trial court's finding of guilt because it demonstrated that Whitehead, who lived in an apartment filled with items she knew did not belong to Walden, was helping to conceal property that she knew was stolen. Whitehead, Record No. 1699-06-3, 2008 WL 762189, at . Proving that a defendant helped to conceal stolen property is an alternate means of establishing guilt under Code § 18.2-108. To prove the offense by this method, the Commonwealth must show beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the property was previously stolen and (2) the defendant aided in concealing it (3) with knowledge that it was stolen and (4) with a dishonest intent. Starks v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 48, 54, 301 S.E.2d 152, 156 (1983). However, the record reveals that the Commonwealth failed to make any argument as to concealment at trial or before the Court of Appeals. The first appearance of the concealment theory in the record is in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Because this argument was not made at trial, the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the evidence provided this additional rationale to support Whitehead's convictions. Brown, 270 Va. at 421 n. 2, 620 S.E.2d at 764 n. 2, Eason, 204 Va. at 352, 131 S.E.2d at 283; see also Commonwealth v. Shifflett, 257 Va. 34, 44, 510 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1999) (Court of Appeals may not recast the evidence to support an argument not made at trial). The Court of Appeals has previously observed that: An appellate court may affirm the judgment of a trial court when it has reached the right result for the wrong reason. However, [t]he rule does not always apply. ... [T]he proper application of this rule does not include those cases where, because the trial court has rejected the right reason or confined its decision to a specific ground, further factual resolution is needed before the right reason may be assigned to support the trial court's decision. Harris v. Commonwealth, 39 Va.App. 670, 675-676, 576 S.E.2d 228, 231 (2003), Blackman v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 633, 642-643, 613 S.E.2d 460, 465 (2005) (an appellee may argue for the first time on appeal any legal ground in support of a judgment so long as it does not require new factual determinations.) We agree with these holdings by the Court of Appeals. In this case, the offense of receiving stolen property may be proven in a number of different ways. However, the proof requirements of each method are different. A conviction based upon actual possession or constructive possession or aiding in concealment is predicated upon presentation of different facts that support the elements of the offense according to the method of proof selected by the Commonwealth. The method of proof selected by the Commonwealth in this case was a theory of constructive receipt based upon benefit received  in this case, the proceeds from Walden's sale of the stolen property. Such a method of proof is not available under Code § 18.2-108. No other method of proof was the subject of argument or presentation of evidence at trial. Both the constructive possession and concealment methods of proof require presentation of facts that would not be necessary under other methods of proof supporting conviction for receipt of stolen property. The Commonwealth clearly articulated its case for prosecuting Whitehead  constructive receipt. Because the Commonwealth limited its method of proof at trial, Whitehead was not on notice to present evidence to rebut any other method of proof possible. The Constitution of Virginia provides in pertinent part: in criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, and to call for evidence in his favor. VA. CONST, art. I, § 8. To allow the Commonwealth to advance alternative methods of proof and conviction never argued in the trial court and requiring different elements of proof for the first time on appeal would deny Whitehead these rights. Because the evidence was insufficient to support Whitehead's convictions under Code § 18.2-108, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming her convictions.