Opinion ID: 884746
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Are Maronick and McGregor entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial immunity?

Text: ¶ 12 Steele contends on appeal that the District Court erred in dismissing his complaint because the complaint alleged the violation by Maronick and McGregor of three federally protected rightsdue process, equal protection and free speechand, therefore, properly stated claims under § 1983. The Named Defendants contend, on the other hand, that the District Court's dismissal should be affirmed without regard to whether Steele's complaint sufficiently alleges the violation of a federally protected right because they are entitled to absolute judicial or quasi-judicial immunity. They advanced these immunities in the District Court but that court dismissed on the grounds set forth above and did not reach the immunity issues. ¶ 13 For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Maronick and McGregor are entitled to absolute judicial and quasi-judicial immunity, respectively, from Steele's § 1983 action for damages. Since absolute immunity is a complete bar to Steele's action, this issue is dispositive without regard to the technical sufficiency of Steele's allegations to state a § 1983 claim. As a result, because the issue was timely raised in the District Court and provides a proper basis for affirming the result reached by the District Court ( see State v. Parker, 1998 MT 6, ¶ 20, ___ Mont. ___, ___, 953 P.2d 692, 696, 55 St.Rep. 16, 19, ¶ 20 (citation omitted)), we need not address Steele's assertions of error. ¶ 14 We begin by observing that federal immunity principles apply in § 1983 actions. In analyzing immunity in the context of a violation of federal constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has stated that [t]o create a system in which the Bill of Rights monitors more closely the conduct of state officials than it does that of federal officials is to stand the constitutional design on its head. Butz v. Economou (1978), 438 U.S. 478, 504, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2909, 57 L.Ed.2d 895, 914. Therefore, no distinction should be made for immunity purposes between a suit brought against a state official under § 1983 and a suit against a federal official brought directly under the Constitution. Butz, 438 U.S. at 504, 98 S.Ct. at 2909. ¶ 15 In addressing immunity questions, the Supreme Court applies a functional approach. Forrester v. White (1988), 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S.Ct. 538, 542, 98 L.Ed.2d 555, 563. This approach examines the nature of the functions with which a particular official or class of officials has been lawfully entrusted, seeking to evaluate the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224, 108 S.Ct. at 542.