Opinion ID: 2982871
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: A Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal “is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Jones, 102 F.3d 804, 807 (6th Cir. 1996). This Court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo to determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime.” Id. On review, this Court “may not reweigh the evidence, reevaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the jury.” United States v. Mathis, 738 F.3d 719, 735 (6th Cir. 2013).
Defendant was convicted of two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). That statute provides, in pertinent part, that “[w]hoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, . . . with intent to . . . hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense,” shall be fined or imprisoned, or both. § 1512(b)(3). In order to obtain a conviction under this subsection, the government must prove that the defendant (1) knowingly and willfully used intimidation, threatened, or corruptly persuaded another person, (2) with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a federal official, (3) of information “relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense.” Id.; United States v. Carson, 560 F.3d 566, 580 (6th Cir. 2009). The trial record in this case contained abundant evidence that supported a finding that Defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of witness tampering based on his efforts to procure false reports from Deputy Runyon and Deputy Minor. Both Runyon and Minor testified No. 13-6125 United States v. Eaton Page 7 that Defendant pressured them to write false reports about the incident to be delivered to the FBI, using his position of authority to obtain compliance. Both men testified that they were not presented with a choice; rather, that Defendant instructed them on the precise false information they had to include in the report, that he read and approved their reports, and that they feared they would be fired if they did not make the statements he requested. Runyon described to the jury “closed-door” one-on-one meetings where Defendant threatened his job and Runyon begged to be allowed to stay until he reached retirement. This evidence was more than enough to support the verdict. The principal thrust of Defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal is that both Runyon and Minor gave inconsistent testimony over time and that there was countervailing evidence in the record that could have allowed a jury to doubt the veracity of their statements. He asserts that the testimony of two “admitted perjurers” cannot support his conviction for witness tampering. This argument is without merit. The jury was entitled to believe the trial testimony of the two officers. It is not this Court’s role to reweigh the evidence or to reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. Mathis, 738 F.3d at 735; see also United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, 532 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[D]etermining the credibility of witnesses is a task for the jury, not this [C]ourt.”). And the fact that Runyon and Minor acknowledged perjuring themselves at Defendant’s request can hardly be said to weigh objectively in Defendant’s favor. Defendant also argues that whether Stinnett had a knife in his hand when Defendant approached him is not “material to the federal offense” that was being investigated. Defendant contends that the witness tampering statute incorporates a materiality requirement by specifying that the crime involves hindering the communication of “information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense.” § 1512(b)(3) (emphasis added). Defendant’s theory is that the federal offense in question was alleged excessive force used against Stinnett after he was in handcuffs, and that the statements made by Minor and Runyon related to the knife could only be relevant to Defendant’s use of force against Stinnett before he was handcuffed. Finding no precedent to support his interpretation of the statute, Defendant terms this a “novel” issue. No. 13-6125 United States v. Eaton Page 8 Defendant mistakes both the facts and the law. First, as the district court found, the federal investigation was not limited to allegations of excessive force after Stinnett was taken into custody. Agent Brown sought information from Defendant about the level of force that was used in effectuating the arrest, the reasons for the use of force, and the injuries Stinnett suffered—without any restriction to events occurring after Stinnett was handcuffed. Even at trial, the government presented evidence of excessive force prior to arrest, including Stinnett’s testimony that Defendant attacked Stinnett as he was attempting to surrender by placing his hands behind his head and dropping to his knees. The government’s precise theory of excessive force during the investigation or prosecution, however, is beside the point. We decline Defendant’s invitation to read a materiality requirement into § 1512(b)(3). The plain language of the statute applies to efforts to hinder the communication of information “relating to” the commission or possible commission of a federal crime.2 Abstractly speaking, it is possible that some information may be so very attenuated from an alleged or suspected crime that efforts to prevent its communication would not support a conviction under § 1512(b)(3). For our purposes, it is plain that information “relates to” the commission or possible commission of a federal crime if it concerns the incident or occurrence in connection with which the crime may have occurred.3 This interpretation is consistent with the purpose of § 1512(b)(3) to protect “the integrity” of even “potential federal investigations by ensuring that transfers of information to federal law enforcement officers and judges relating to the possible commission of federal offenses be truthful and unimpeded.” Carson, 560 F.3d at 581 (quoting United States v. Ronda, 455 F.3d 1273, 1286 (11th Cir. 2006)). We would undercut that purpose if we required an inquiry into the legal significance of the information at issue in relation to the theory of criminal liability eventually developed in the course of an investigation. 2 Defendant cites to a passage in Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) that he believes supports his reading of the statute by its use, in passing, of the term “material.” In context, it is clear that the Court was addressing the mens rea requirement, applicable to a different statutory provision at issue there, that the defendant have knowledge of the relevance of the document to a foreseeable official proceeding; the case did not purport to impose a materiality requirement on the document itself. See id. at 708. Defendant’s citation is even less persuasive in light of this Court’s previous holding that the provision at issue in this case, § 1512(b)(3), does not require proof of a nexus with a particular federal investigation. United States v. Carson, 560 F.3d 566, 581-82 (6th Cir. 2009). 3 We do not mean to limit application of the phrase “relating to” to these factual circumstances. Whatever the extent of the reach of § 1512(b)(3), it is clear that the information at issue in this case falls within it. No. 13-6125 United States v. Eaton Page 9 Here, Defendant sought to present to the FBI a false “story line” about the physical confrontation with Stinnett by requiring Minor to report untruthfully that Stinnett threatened Defendant with a knife, resisted arrest, and refused to obey verbal orders, and by requiring Runyon to corroborate that story by reporting that they found a knife on the ground at the scene of the arrest. Defendant’s efforts prevented the officers from communicating to the FBI the manner in which the incident actually occurred, including the fact that the knife was found, closed, in Stinnett’s pocket well after he was handcuffed. Plainly, this was information “relating to” the commission or possible commission of a federal crime in that it pertained to the incident involving the alleged excessive use of force in violation of Stinnett’s civil rights. In sum, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction. This Court will neither reevaluate the witnesses’ credibility nor graft a heightened materiality requirement onto § 1512(b)(3). B. Failure to Instruct the Jury on the Affirmative Defense in § 1512(e) Defendant next argues that, although he did not request such an instruction, the district court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense provided in § 1512(e) that precludes criminal liability where the alleged conduct is otherwise lawful and the defendant’s “sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully.” We disagree. 1. Standard of Review In a typical challenge to a district court’s jury instructions, this Court applies an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. United States v. Williams, 612 F.3d 500, 506 (6th Cir. 2010). Under this standard, we “review the instructions as a whole, in order to determine whether they adequately informed the jury of the relevant considerations and provided a basis in law for aiding the jury in reaching its decision.” United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 679 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Frederick, 406 F.3d 754, 761 (6th Cir. 2005)). When a defendant fails to request a particular jury instruction, “we review the district court’s jury instructions, as a whole, for plain error.” United States v. Stewart, 729 F.3d 517, 530 (6th Cir. 2013). This standard poses the inquiry of “whether the instructions, when taken as a whole, were so clearly wrong as No. 13-6125 United States v. Eaton Page 10 to produce a grave miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Miller, 734 F.3d 530, 538 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2. Analysis Defendant raised the issue of a § 1512(e) defense for the first time in his post-trial brief. Under that subsection, in a prosecution for witness tampering, [I]t is an affirmative defense, as to which the defendant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, that the conduct consisted solely of lawful conduct and that the defendant’s sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully. § 1512(e). Defendant argues that the jury’s acquittal on the excessive force charges “strongly suggests, in retrospect, that the jury believed that if Eaton made any comment to the deputies about information to be included in their reports then he must be guilty of witness tampering.” Def.’s Br. at 40. Yet the district court’s instructions on the elements of witness tampering already served to prevent any confusion on that score by explaining that to return a guilty verdict on the charge the jury must find that he “hindered, delayed, or prevented” the communication of information to a relevant law enforcement officer. Nor are the verdicts necessarily inconsistent. The jury may have entertained doubts about whether the force used was excessive and nonetheless credited the testimony of Minor and Runyon as establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant required them to write false reports in order to bolster his case that force was necessary. Moreover, as the district court found, Defendant presented no evidence at trial that would support the affirmative defense, nor did he direct the district court to evidence that would substantiate the claim. See Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 714, 720 (2013) (a criminal defendant may support an affirmative defense by submitting evidence or testimony of the underlying facts or by “direct[ing] the court to other evidence substantiating his claim.”). On appeal, Defendant identifies two sources of evidence he contends support a finding that he merely sought to encourage Minor and Runyon to give truthful statements: the fact that none of the other officers testified that Eaton tried to improperly influence their reports; and the fact that Minor and Runyon were “admitted perjurers.” At best, this evidence only weakly supports a conclusion that Defendant was merely encouraging the two officers to tell the truth about the No. 13-6125 United States v. Eaton Page 11 knife. Such weak evidence cannot compel a conclusion that by failing to sua sponte instruct the jurors on an affirmative defense that Defendant had not previously raised, the district court’s instructions constituted an abuse of discretion, much less a “miscarriage of justice.” Miller, 734 F.3d at 538. C. Failure to Provide a Special Unanimity Instruction as to Count 5 Defendant also faults the district court for not providing a “special unanimity instruction” with regard to Count 5; that is, he argues that the court should have instructed the jury that its decision must be unanimous as to what information Defendant directed Minor to suppress. Under Count 5, the jury could have convicted Defendant on finding either (1) that he sought to require Minor to conceal the unreasonable force used against Stinnett; or (2) that Defendant sought to require Minor to provide false information about the knife. Because Defendant did not raise this objection at trial, we review the district court’s instructions in this regard for plain error under the standard described above. See also United States v. Kakos, 483 F.3d 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2007) (plain error review applies to failure to provide special unanimity instruction where the defendant did not object at trial) (collecting cases). A special unanimity instruction is a means of clarifying a so-called “duplicitous” charge, or one that “‘sets forth separate and distinct crimes in one count.’” Kakos, 483 F.3d at 443 (quoting United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 415 (6th Cir. 2002)). A duplicitous charge carries the risk that a criminal defendant “may be deprived of his right to a unanimous jury verdict” if individual jurors find him guilty of different crimes.4 Id. However, a charge that permits more than one factual basis for conviction “‘does not automatically require a unanimity instruction.’” United States v. Algee, 599 F.3d 506, 514 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Krimsky, 230 F.3d 855, 860 (6th Cir. 2000)). The Supreme Court has explained that while “a jury in a federal criminal case cannot convict unless it unanimously finds that the Government has proved each element,” nonetheless the jury “need not always decide unanimously which of several possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular element.” Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999). 4 Duplicitous charges may also prejudice defendants in other ways not at issue on this appeal. See generally Kakos, 483 F.3d at 443-44. No. 13-6125 United States v. Eaton Page 12 The pivotal distinction made by the Court differentiated between elements, which the jury must unanimously agree to have been proven, and the “means” or “brute facts” constituting an element, as to which unanimity is typically not required. Id. at 817-19; see also United States v. DeJohn, 368 F.3d 533, 540-41 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussing Richardson). The Court cautioned, however, that the Constitution itself may limit instances in which a crime could be defined “in ways that would permit juries to convict while disagreeing about means, at least where that definition risks serious unfairness and lacks support in history or tradition.” 526 U.S. at 820. Under Richardson, in determining whether unanimity is required, we look to “the language of the statute, tradition, and the breadth of the statute (which ‘aggravates the dangers of unfairness’ . . . ), and to the desirability of avoiding having to decide the constitutional questions surrounding a definition of a crime that allows significant jury disagreement as to means.” DeJohn, 368 F.3d at 540 (citing Richardson, 526 U.S. at 819). In this case, Defendant’s argument relates to the character of the information that was concealed by Minor. He asserts because there are two factual issues—the force used against Stinnett, and whether Stinnett pulled a knife on Defendant—the charge must be duplicitous. We think it clear that this distinction goes to the “brute facts” underlying the third element of witness tampering under § 1512(b)(3), i.e., the “information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense.” The statute makes no distinction between discrete factual assertions or statements constituting the information at issue. Indeed, the term “information” in its natural use often encompasses multiple facts or items of knowledge. Similarly, in a case concerning the analogous crime of obstructing a federal investigation by falsifying records in violation of § 1519, this Court held that multiple alleged false statements in a report about use of force against a prisoner did not create a concern of unconstitutional duplicity because the charge that the defendant “falsified a document” addressed the document as a whole rather than portions of the document. United States v. Schmeltz, 667 F.3d 685, 687-88 (6th Cir. 2011). The same analysis applies here—the charge of hindering the communication of information about the incident to a federal law enforcement officer encompassed both the issue of the knife and the details about the extent of force used against Stinnett. Jurors could vote to convict Defendant based on his efforts to prevent the communication of either piece of information, or both. No. 13-6125 United States v. Eaton Page 13 Defendant does not raise any concern of constitutional magnitude about a risk of “serious unfairness” arising from the nature of his charge. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 820. Although the term “information” in § 1512(b)(3) renders the provision somewhat broad, both the conduct and information at issue in Defendant’s charge are sufficiently related and specific that we need not be concerned that fundamental fairness was put at risk in this case. See id. (citing Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1991) (plurality opinion) and 501 U.S. at 651 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“We would not permit . . . an indictment charging that the defendant assaulted either X on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday[.]”)). D. Prosecutorial Misconduct 1. Standard of Review Whether certain comments made by a prosecutor amount to prosecutorial misconduct and whether those comments rendered the trial fundamentally unfair are mixed questions of law and fact, which this Court considers de novo. United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 459 (6th Cir. 2006). 2. Analysis In the Sixth Circuit, we apply a two-step analysis to determine if alleged prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal. First, we determine whether prosecutorial statements allegedly constituting misconduct were improper. Kuehne, 547 F.3d at 687. Next, if we find impropriety, we “then determine whether the improprieties were flagrant such that a reversal is warranted.” Id. at 687-88. Under this second prong of the analysis, we consider four factors: “‘1) whether the conduct and remarks of the prosecutor tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; 2) whether the conduct or remarks were isolated or extensive; 3) whether the remarks were deliberately or accidentally made; and 4) whether the evidence against the defendant was strong.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Modena, 302 F.3d 626, 635 (6th Cir. 2002)). This analysis examines challenged statements by the prosecutor “within the context of the trial to determine whether such comments amounted to prejudicial error.” United States v. Carter, 236 F.3d 777, 783 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985)). No. 13-6125 United States v. Eaton Page 14 Defendant argues that remarks by the prosecutor in closing constituted a comment on his decision not to testify. The remarks at issue were made during the rebuttal in reference to the testimony of defense expert Alex Payne, who testified to the kinds of force that might be appropriate if Stinnett was resisting arrest. The prosecutor argued, But you got to ask yourself why are the defendants asking him if the force defendants used was justified if none of the defendants said they used any force on him? They asked him several questions about whether or not they could use knee strikes to knee him in the sides and in the legs, whether or not they can apply pressure to the back of his head to drive his head into the ground and whether or not those types of strikes, which would be justified, would cause injuries consistent with what the pictures showed Stinnett suffered. But you got to ask yourself why are they asking him those questions if none of them came forward and said that's what they actually did? There's been no evidence that they were delivering knee strikes to him to get him to comply so they could put handcuffs on him. There's been no evidence that they that were driving their hands or their fingers into the back of his head so that they could press his head to the ground so that they could get handcuffs on him, there's been no evidence of that so why are they asking their use of force expert these questions? (R. 254, Transcript, PGID 3163 (emphasis added).) Defense counsel objected and a bench conference was held. The prosecutor clarified that he was referring to the defendants’ “statements that came in through their reports.” (Id. at 3164.) The district court accepted this explanation and overruled the objection, though warning the prosecutor that “it was really close.” (Id.) When the prosecutor returned to his argument he clarified for the jury that the statements he was referring to were “what they reported in their reports” because “all we know what the defendants have said about what happened to the victim comes through their written reports.” (Id. at 3165.) Defense counsel again objected, and the district court overruled the objection on the basis that the comment was a useful clarification of the earlier statement. (Id. at 3165-66.) Defendant raised the issue in post-trial briefing. The district court assumed arguendo that the comments were improper, but determined that they did not meet the standard for flagrancy. In context, it appears that the prosecutor was commenting on defendants’ version of the incident as stated in their reports. Assuming arguendo that the jury would nonetheless have construed the remarks as reflecting on Defendant’s failure to testify, see United States v. Wells, 623 F.3d 332, 339 (6th Cir. 2010), we agree with the district court that reversal is not warranted under the four factor test for flagrancy. The evidence against Defendant on the witness No. 13-6125 United States v. Eaton Page 15 tampering charges was very strong. Any prejudice or misleading effect from the remarks was limited both by the prosecutor’s clarification that his comments pertained only to the statements made in the reports, which were part of the record, and by the district court’s instructions that Defendant had an absolute right to remain silent and that his silence could not be used against him. We decline to reverse on these grounds. E. Cumulative Error A cumulative error claim alleges a violation of a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial. United States v. Blackwell, 459 F.3d 739, 770 (6th Cir. 2006). Defendant argues that even if reversal is not required by any single trial error, he is entitled to a new trial because the cumulative effect of the alleged errors constitutes a due process violation. To succeed under such a theory, Defendant “‘must show that the combined effect of individually harmless errors was so prejudicial as to render [the] trial fundamentally unfair.” United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 832 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593, 614 (6th Cir. 2004)). Because we find no error with respect to the jury instructions, the only potential error remaining is the possibility that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper. As discussed above, we conclude that those comments do not warrant reversal. Because Defendant does not establish any additional error that could compound the prejudice, he cannot succeed on his cumulative error claim.