Opinion ID: 1401350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of Settlement Agreement

Text: Tom maintains that the district court erred by granting James an implied easement across his land because the settlement agreement precluded such a grant. James argues that the district court's decision was correct. We agree with James. Wyoming law recognizes that, under certain circumstances, one person may be entitled to have an implied easement across another person's property. Beaudoin v. Kibbie, 905 P.2d 939, 941-42 (Wyo.1995); Corbett v. Whitney, 603 P.2d 1291, 1293 (Wyo.1979). The elements which must be satisfied in order to establish an implied easement are: (1) Common ownership followed by a conveyance separating the unified ownership; (2) before severance, the common owner used part of the property for the benefit of the other part, a use that was apparent, obvious, and continuous; and (3) the claimed easement is necessary and beneficial to the enjoyment of the parcel previously benefitted. Beaudoin, 905 P.2d at 941-42. Tom maintains that the terms of the settlement agreement precluded the implication of an easement in favor of James. The settlement agreement stated in pertinent part: 1. The parties hereby stipulate and agree that there have been differences by and between them as respects the division of certain lands of the estate, as well as division of a Farm Loan Board Mortgage, cattle, grazing permits and personal property. 2. It is the intention of the parties hereto to resolve each and every one of those differences and to release, quitclaim and forever discharge from each to the other any claim that they might have against assets received under the estate by the other. .... 13. The parties hereby stipulate and agree to divide the parcel of real estate specifically identified as follows: Township 49 North, Range 87 West, 6th P.M. Section 23: E½NW¼, E½SW¼ Excepting therefrom lands described in right-of-way deed to the United States of America for a road and recorded in Book 167 Page 8 of the Big Horn County Records. The parties hereto stipulate and agree that James D. Shirran shall receive the south one-third of the above described parcel and that George T. Shirran shall receive the north two-thirds of the above described parcel. Said lands will be transferred to the individual ownership of each party as set forth above and will be properly fenced with each party bearing one-half of the cost of said fencing. Should a survey be necessary to properly delineate the boundary line between the two properties, both parties agree to be responsible for one-half of the cost of such survey. . . . . 15. This Agreement shall constitute the entire understanding of the parties as respects the distribution of assets under the above estate and incorporates herein all prior memoranda, understandings, negotiations and agreements by and between them as respects the assets set forth herein. The settlement agreement did not address the means by which James would access his portion of the mountain property. Tom argues that the settlement agreement clearly and unambiguously stated that it was meant to settle all the parties' differences concerning the estate assets. He claims, therefore, that, if the parties intended for James to have an easement across his property, they would have expressly provided for an easement in the settlement agreement. We agree that the language of the settlement agreement clearly reflects the parties' shared intention to resolve their differences concerning the estate assets. Nevertheless, the very notion of an implied easement recognizes the failure of the parties to a property transfer to address the issue of access to a severed parcel. [C]reation of easements by implication is an attempt to infer the intention of the parties to a conveyance of land and the `inference drawn represents an attempt to ascribe an intention to parties who had not thought or had not bothered to put the intention into words, or perhaps more often, to parties who actually had formed no intention conscious to themselves.' [ United States v. O'Connell, 496 F.2d 1329,] 1332 [(2d Cir.1974)], citing Restatement of Property, § 476, comment A, at 2978 (1944). Corbett, 603 P.2d at 1293. In recognizing implied easements, courts often presume that the parties contracted [for the transfer of the property] with a view to the condition of the property as it actually was at the time of the transaction. 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 29, at 600 (1996); see also Lutz v. Krauter, 553 N.W.2d 749, 752-53 (N.D.1996). The condition of the property at the time of the transaction may include an obvious preexisting use of one part of the property to benefit another part. See Lutz, 553 N.W.2d at 753. The parties to a conveyance can, however, prevent the implication of an easement upon severance of the property by entering into an agreement which clearly states that an easement will not pass when the property is transferred. 25 Am.Jur.2d, supra, at § 29; see also Cox v. Trustmark National Bank, 733 So.2d 353, 357 (Miss.Ct.App.1999) (addressing easements by necessity). In a decision approving the trial court's grant of an implied easement, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated: [I]f the parties intended to except or exclude the implied easement from the grant, that exception or exclusion should have been clearly stated so as to leave no room for doubt. Roll v. Keller, 336 N.W.2d 648, 651 (N.D.1983); see also Lutz, 553 N.W.2d at 753. We conclude, therefore, that, if Tom intended to preclude James from claiming an implied easement across his property, that intent should have been made explicit in the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement did not address the issue of access, and, consequently, it cannot be read as excepting an implied easement. The settlement agreement did not prevent James from claiming an implied easement over Tom's property. This conclusion does not, however, end our inquiry; we must determine whether the elements necessary for the implication of an easement were satisfied in this case.