Opinion ID: 1270103
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Were the search and seizure of the machines lawful?

Text: Appellant argues the circuit court erred in concluding the machines were seized pursuant to lawful search warrants. Appellant does not challenge the facial sufficiency of the warrants. Rather, appellant argues the warrants are not based on probable cause because the affidavit supporting the December warrants provides no information concerning the informant's reliability, veracity, or basis of knowledge. More-over, appellant argues, these deficiencies cannot be cured by police corroboration because the corroboration was itself an illegal, warrantless search. [2] We disagree.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate's `determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.' Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Gates established a totality of the circumstances test for determining whether there is probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is located in a particular place. Id. at 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317. [S]o long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more. Id. at 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (internal quotations omitted). Appellant correctly asserts that a warrant based solely on information provided by a confidential informant must contain information supporting the credibility of the informant and the basis of his knowledge. However, independent verification by law enforcement officers cures any defect. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 241, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (Our decisions applying the totality of circumstances analysis ... have consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent police work.); see also State v. Viard, 276 S.C. 147, 150, 276 S.E.2d 531, 532 (1981) (upholding a warrant based on the independent verification by the affiant of an informant's tip). Here, the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding a search would uncover illegal gambling machines. The information provided by the confidential informant was independently corroborated by undercover SLED agents. This verification established probable cause under the totality of the circumstances. As an additional ground for invalidating the seizure, appellant argues the information contained in the affidavit for the December warrants was stale, and therefore could not have been the basis of a finding of probable cause. We disagree. In order for an affidavit to support probable cause, it must state facts so closely related to the time of the issuance of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time. State v. Winborne, 273 S.C. 62, 64, 254 S.E.2d 297, 298 (1979) (internal quotation omitted). An affidavit which fails altogether to state the time of the occurrence of the facts alleged is insufficient. Id. Here, appellant argues the affidavit does not support a finding of probable cause because (1) it does not state the date the confidential informant saw the machines, only that he informed SLED agents sometime around November 1997, and (2) it does not state the date SLED agents corroborated the machines' presence. The date on which the informant saw the illegal machines is irrelevant because SLED's corroboration was the basis of the magistrate's probable cause finding, not the informant's tip. Furthermore, the lack of a date the SLED agents corroborated the tip does not defeat probable cause in this case. The affidavit does not fail altogether to state the time of the occurrence, as in Winborne. It merely fails to state when in the two-month period between November 1 and December 22, 1997, the agents corroborated the tip. The longest possible period between the corroboration and the issuance of the warrant is 52 days. We have never addressed what length of time is acceptable between the establishment of probable cause and the execution of a warrant. However, the Court of Appeals has held that a 60-day lapse did not create a staleness problem where the items sought were not such that one would expect to be removed or consumed in the interim: While the lapse of time involved is an important consideration and may in some cases be controlling, it is not necessarily so. There are other factors to be considered, including the nature of the criminal activity involved, and the kind of property for which authority to search is sought. State v. Corns, 310 S.C. 546, 550-51, 426 S.E.2d 324, 326 (Ct.App.1992) (quoting United States v. Steeves, 525 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.1975)). There was very little risk the property at issue here would be removed between the time the undercover agents visited the warehouses, which was at the very earliest sometime in November, and the time the agents obtained and executed the warrants on December 22 and 23. While it may have been preferable for the affiant to include the date of the undercover investigation in the affidavit, the United States Supreme Court has warned against the danger of hypertechnical, rather than ... commonsense interpretation of affidavits when reviewing for probable cause. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (internal citation omitted). The substantial basis for the magistrate's finding of probable cause was not defeated by the affiant's failure to state the precise date of the investigation.
Appellant asserts the circuit court's analysis was faulty because the verification of the informant's tip by undercover agents was itself an illegal, warrantless search. Moreover, appellant asserts the additional 23 machines were not in plain view and must also have been discovered by a warrantless search while SLED agents were supposed to be guarding and inventorying the machines already seized. The United States Supreme Court has defined the boundaries of an undercover investigation without a warrant. In Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 87 S.Ct. 424, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966), relied upon by respondents, an undercover officer was invited into the petitioner's home on two occasions to purchase marijuana. The Court found the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment: During neither of his visits to petitioner's home did the agent see, hear, or take anything that was not contemplated, and in fact intended, by petitioner as a necessary part of his illegal business. Id. at 210, 87 S.Ct. 424. In Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647 (1921), overruled on other grounds, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967), relied upon by appellant, a business acquaintance of the petitioner, acting under orders of federal officers, entered the petitioner's office on pretenses of making a social visit. In the petitioner's absence, he ransacked the office and seized private, incriminating papers. The Court found the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The record does not reveal the SLED officers' actions within appellant's warehouse. Without more, it cannot be determined whether the officers conducted a warrantless search. See Germain v. Nichol, 278 S.C. 508, 299 S.E.2d 335 (1983) (appellant has burden of providing the Court with a sufficient record upon which Court can make a decision). Furthermore, there is a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). Unless appellant tenders facts showing the officers conducted a warrantless search, there is no basis on which this Court can look behind a facially valid warrant. As to the January warrant, the supporting affidavit states the additional 23 machines were seen in plain view while the officers were executing the December warrant. Although the December warrant had expired by the date the January warrant was issued, that does not imply it had expired at the time the officers viewed the additional 23 machines. Accepting the veracity of the affidavit, as the magistrate was entitled to do, probable cause existed for the issuance of the January warrant.
Finally, even if the searches were illegaland we conclude they were notappellant has no remedy. The usual remedy for an unlawful search is suppression of the evidence in a criminal trial against the possessor. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to the states). Here, no criminal charges have been filed against appellant. The exclusionary rule applies in civil forfeiture actions to suppress evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment where the property sought to be forfeited is derivative contraband. [3] One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965). Here, however, there was no jury from which to suppress the evidence. Furthermore, because the machines are contraband per se, the State certainly cannot return them to appellant, which is presumably the remedy sought. See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 92 L.Ed. 1663 (1948), overruled on other grounds, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950) ([S]ince this property was contraband, they have no right to have it returned to them.); see also State v. Four Bell Fruit Gum Slot Machines, 196 Okla. 44, 162 P.2d 539 (1945) (slot machines seized without a warrant were contraband and must be destroyed regardless of legality of seizure).