Opinion ID: 553906
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Counts Three and Eight of Complaint

Text: 15 Counts three and eight of the plaintiffs' complaint allege that the Board's actions were arbitrary and capricious. This Court has stated that the reapplication requirement of MacDonald has no bearing on as applied arbitrary and capricious due process claims. Eide, at 725 n. 16. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' as applied arbitrary and capricious due process claims (counts three and eight) are not barred by MacDonald. 16 The test in this Circuit as to whether there has been a violation of due process in the context of section 1983 has two prongs. First, the court must determine whether there has been a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest. Second, the court must determine whether the deprivation was the result of an abuse of governmental power sufficient to raise an ordinary tort to the stature of a constitutional violation. Greenbriar Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir.1989). A deprivation is of constitutional stature if it is undertaken for improper motive and by means that were pretextual, arbitrary and capricious, and without rational basis. Id. In the zoning context, the issue is whether the Board's action bore any substantial relation to the public welfare. Id. 17 On the first prong, the plaintiffs allege that the value of their property has been diminished significantly by the Board's actions in denying their requests for rezoning. They also allege harm including the denial to the Plaintiff[s] of the opportunity otherwise available to [them] to sell [their] property for industrial use. If the plaintiffs prove that this diminution was more than a simple fluctuation in value incident to governmental decisionmaking, which is a noncompensable hazard of ownership, see First Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 320, 107 S.Ct. at 2388; Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 198-99, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3122-23, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985) (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922)), then they will have shown a deprivation of a property right. On the second prong, the plaintiffs allege that the Board's actions were unrelated to the public welfare because their land is not suitable for its present zoning status. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' complaint states as applied arbitrary and capricious due process claims. These counts (three and eight) should proceed.