Opinion ID: 1810649
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Injecting admissible, highly prejudicial evidence

Text: ¶ 74. Crawford alleges ineffective assistance in the injection of prior bad acts into the case. In response to Crawford's assertion that the injection of prior bad acts during Dr. Russell's testimony and during voir dire, the Court reminds Crawford that his was an insanity defense. The discussion of such acts were necessary to Dr. Russell's testimony in order to try to show insanity. In regards to the issue of voir dire, the Court finds that counsel was prevented from injecting prior bad acts by the prosecution. [10] Notwithstanding, such acts would eventually have come out and we hold, strictly under the facts of this case, that Crawford was not prejudiced by this near slip-up. ¶ 75. Crawford also cries foul over an exchange his counsel had with F.B.I. agent Jackson wherein he asks agent Jackson what facts Crawford was confronted with during his interrogation that linked him to the alleged crime. Jackson responded with a number of things, some of which were prior bad acts/ crimes attributed to Crawford. While Crawford claims this as error, context shows that this was an intentional move by counsel to show involuntariness in the confession. Given the latitude given in regards to strategic moves, we cannot hold that counsel was deficient for eliciting this testimony. See Woodward, 843 So.2d at 7. However, because we find that counsel either did not inject bad acts in some instances and was not deficient for doing so in others, Crawford has failed to meet his burden and this claim fails. Id.
¶ 76. Crawford next claim rests on a line of questioning which elicited testimony concerning a first ransom note that was found at his parent's home. Crawford alleges that this not only was improper, but that it opened the door to further questioning concerning the note. ¶ 77. First, counsel's actions did not open the door in this case. We again repeat the rule that use of the insanity defense makes relevant and admissible, that evidence which could rebut such a defense. See McLeod v. State, 317 So.2d at 391. As Crawford concedes in his petition, this evidence was relevant to the issue of insanity. ¶ 78. The important question here is whether calling the witness, itself, was so improper that it rendered counsels' assistance ineffective. We think not. It is clear from a reading of the record that counsel was attempting to attack Crawford's confession as illegally obtained. To do so, it was necessary for counsel to call the witness to the stand and show that certain records were obtained under false pretenses. Crawford has provided this Court with no case law that would hold counsel ineffective for merely calling a witness. Because Crawford has failed to show counsel was deficient, his claim fails. See Woodward, 843 So.2d at 7.
¶ 79. Crawford asserts that counsel was ineffective because of the failure to secure the attendance of witnesses at a pretrial hearing and at trial. However, in the only instance noted by Crawford, the record shows quite clearly the court's willingness to reopen the specific motion when the proper witnesses were in attendance and that the issue was indeed later addressed at trial by the necessary witnesses. This issue is without merit.
¶ 80. Crawford next claims that counsel's closing argument was so inadequate as to become ineffective. However, counsel's fourteen page closing sits well with this court given its purposeto make one last effort to argue that Crawford was not guilty by reason of insanity. Counsel's aim was to portray Crawford as a monster in order for the jury to find him not guilty by reason of insanity. Crawford does not direct this Court's attention to any case law that stands for the proposition that counsel must describe his client in a pleasant manner at closing argument. This portion of the issue is without merit. ¶ 81. In addition, and despite Crawford's assertion, counsel never conceded guilt in this case, just underlying facts. However, counsel steadfastly maintained throughout trial that his client was not guilty due to insanity. This issue has already been addressed under a similar heading. Crawford has failed to show that counsel was deficient in his closing and, therefore, this portion of the claim also fails. See Woodward, 843 So.2d at 7.