Opinion ID: 1192309
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alternative Basis for Jurisdiction

Text: As an alternative basis for jurisdiction, it might be argued that the district court's authority to modify or revoke the protective order postjudgment is premised upon its inherent power. A district court's dismissal of a lawsuit by stipulation under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally limits the power of the court to issue further orders, see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994), but the Supreme Court has recognized that a court can take certain postdismissal action in furtherance of its ancillary jurisdiction, a doctrine which recognizes federal courts' jurisdiction over some matters (otherwise beyond their competence) that are incidental to other matters properly before them. Id. at 378, 114 S.Ct. 1673. A sua sponte postjudgment modification of a protective order does not fall within the court's ancillary jurisdiction; it is not a matter incidental to another matter that is properly before the court. Kokkonen held that after a lawsuit has been dismissed, the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction  which has alternatively been called pendent jurisdiction, supplemental jurisdiction, or ancillary-enforcement jurisdiction, 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3523.2, at 212-13 (3d ed.2008)  will empower the court to act only where necessary to enable the court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380, 114 S.Ct. 1673. More specifically, the Court held in Kokkonen that to support an exercise of ancillary jurisdiction postjudgment, there must be an express reservation of jurisdiction in the judgment. Kokkonen involved the question of a federal court's jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement following dismissal. The Court said that ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement would exist only if the parties' obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement had been made part of the order of dismissal  either by separate provision (such as a provision `retaining jurisdiction' over the settlement agreement) or by incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order. Id. at 381, 114 S.Ct. 1673. In that situation, the Court said, a breach of the agreement would be a violation of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would therefore exist. Id. But where the dismissal order neither incorporated the parties' settlement agreement nor expressly retained jurisdiction over it, the court lacked ancillary jurisdiction to enforce it and any action for breach of the agreement belonged in state court. Id. As applied here, these principles foreclose the possibility that the district court had inherent authority to revisit and rescind the protective order. We note again that the protective order did not operate to shield the court's own records from public view; although a court may have inherent authority to modify a protective order sealing documents maintained in the court file, see Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 ([e]very court has supervisory power over its own records and files), that's not what's at issue here. And although Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure might have provided a basis for a postjudgment motion for relief from the protective order by Bond or the City, that's obviously not at issue here, either. [11] There was no breach of the protective order nor fraud in connection with its entry  either of these might have supported an exercise of ancillary jurisdiction to enable the court to vindicate its authority. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380, 114 S.Ct. 1673. And finally, although the docket notation recording the entry of the agreed order of dismissal said the case remained open for the purpose of the Court retaining jurisdiction over Kalven's petition to intervene to unseal public documents, this is an insufficient basis upon which to rest ancillary jurisdiction. First of all, there were no sealed public documents in the court's file that the judge might have been prevailed upon to unseal. Second, neither the parties' stipulation to dismiss nor the agreed dismissal order incorporated a retention of jurisdiction; the docket entry alone cannot supply ancillary jurisdiction. Once the case was dismissed with prejudice, Kalven's third-party attack on the protective order simply cannot be considered ancillary or incidental to any matter properly before the court. We have found no case suggesting that a district court may sua sponte raise and rebalance the equities that led to the entry of a protective order after the dispute that created the need for it has ended. The district court's order dissolving the protective order therefore cannot be justified as an exercise of its inherent authority. For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court's order granting Kalven's petition to intervene and lifting the protective order and REMAND with instructions to dismiss the petition for lack of standing. Because the aldermen also lack standing, we VACATE our prior order granting their motion to intervene in this appeal; that motion is now DENIED and they are DISMISSED from the appeal.