Opinion ID: 1980664
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Ms. Soininen's suspension by the Immigration Court.

Text: On November 20, 2001, the Immigration Court suspended Ms. Soininen for one year from practice before the various immigration agencies. This suspension was to continue until Ms. Soininen was licensed to practice in the District of Columbia or some other jurisdiction. But Ms. Soininen was not suspended from practice by this court on the basis of the Immigration Court's action, for the Immigration Court is not a tribunal on whose action reciprocal discipline may be based. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(a) (defining a disciplining court, in relevant part, as a federal court or the highest court of any state, territory, or possession of the United States, and any other agency or tribunal with authority to disbar or suspend an attorney from the practice of law in any state, territory, or possession of the United States). Although the Immigration Court's suspension order prohibited Ms. Soininen from practicing before immigration tribunals, it did not preclude her from practicing law in the District. [25] In other words, once her interim suspension in Soininen I had expired, Ms. Soininen was free to write wills, [26] to represent litigants in civil and criminal cases, and generally to engage in the practice of law. To be sure, immigration law was Ms. Soininen's principal area of practice, and her suspension by the Immigration Court, though undoubtedly justified, could properly be included in the Board's calculus when the Board was considering the discipline that it should propose to this court. In our view, however, that suspension, and its consequences for Ms. Soininen's ability to practice in her specialty, did not qualify as a unique or compelling circumstance as these terms were used in McLain.