Opinion ID: 2521459
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard of Review for Yurko Error

Text: For nearly two decades after our decision in In re Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d 857, 112 Cal.Rptr. 513, 519 P.2d 561, lack of express advisement, and waiver, of all three Boykin-Tahl rights was viewed as error requiring automatic reversal. (See People v. Wright (1987) 43 Cal.3d 487, 493-495, 233 Cal.Rptr. 69, 729 P.2d 260; In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 283, fn. 1, 193 Cal.Rptr. 538, 666 P.2d 980; In re Ronald E. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 315, 320-321, 137 Cal.Rptr. 781, 562 P.2d 684.) Then, in our 1992 decision in Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315, we revisited the issue and came to a different conclusion. The pertinent inquiry, we said, was whether the record affirmatively shows that [the admission] is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances  ( id. at p. 1175, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315, italics added), applying the test used to determine the validity of guilty pleas under the federal Constitution. ( Ibid. ) Howard explained: [T]he weight of authority today makes it abundantly clear that `the California interpretation of Boykin announced in Tahl is not required by the federal Constitution....' ( United States v. Pricepaul (9th Cir.1976) 540 F.2d 417, 424-425; [citation].) ( Id. at pp. 1177-1178, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) We also said that the United States Supreme Court has never read Boykin as requiring explicit admonitions on each of the three constitutional rights, but instead looks to the test set out in North Carolina v. Alford, supra, 400 U.S. at page 32, 91 S.Ct. 160, which asks `whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent course among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.' ( Howard, supra, at p. 1177, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) By adopting in Howard the federal constitutional test of whether under the totality of circumstances the defendant's admission is intelligent and voluntary, we rejected the rule that the absence of express admonitions and waivers requires reversal regardless of prejudice. ( Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1178, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) In replacing the old rule, the focus was shifted from whether the defendant received express rights advisements, and expressly waived them, to whether the defendant's admission was intelligent and voluntary because it was given with an understanding of the rights waived. After our Howard decision, an appellate court must go beyond the courtroom colloquy to assess a claim of Yurko error. (See People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 424, 438, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 981 P.2d 525.) Now, if the transcript does not reveal complete advisements and waivers, the reviewing court must examine the record of the entire proceeding to assess whether the defendant's admission of the prior conviction was intelligent and voluntary in light of the totality of circumstances. ( Ibid. ) That approach  reviewing the whole record, instead of just the record of the plea colloquy  was recently endorsed by the United States Supreme Court in a case where a federal court failed, before accepting the defendant's guilty plea, to advise the defendant of his right to counsel as required by rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. ( United States v. Vonn (2002) 535 U.S. 55, 76, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 1055, 152 L.Ed.2d 90; Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., rule 11(b)(1), 18 U.S.C.)