Opinion ID: 2589745
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Animals Ferae Naturae

Text: Longshore contends clams in naturally occurring beds are animals ferae naturae and therefore constitute property of the general public until reduced to possession and confined by an owner of private tidelands. But the law of our state does not support Longshore's argument. The general rule is clams and oysters cannot be the subject of theft or larceny unless artificially planted or cultivated in the beds from which they were taken: The difference between the locomotive powers of swimming fish and shellfish, such as oysters and clams, justifies the law in making a distinction as to their ownership. In their natural state, clams and oysters are classified as ferae naturae, and their ownership is vested in the state in its sovereign capacity, but where planted where they do not naturally grow, in locations marked by posts or otherwise, they are classified as domestic animals and are the subjects of private ownership, although their owner has no greater actual possession than is evidenced by their planting and staking. In the latter case, they may be the subject of larceny, and if one injures or converts such shellfish, he is liable to respond in damages. 35 Am.Jur.2d Fish and Game § 5, at 649 (1967) (footnotes omitted). However Washington common law does not adhere to this general rule, instead holding naturally occurring clams on private tidelands are the exclusive property of the tideland owner. Our earliest decision on point is Sequim Bay Canning Co. v. Bugge, 49 Wash. 127, 94 P. 922 (1908). There, the Sequim Bay Canning Company leased tidelands from the state for the purpose of cultivating and harvesting clams. To increase the productiveness of the naturally occurring clam beds, the company periodically planted Eastern clams. Sequim Bay, 49 Wash. at 129, 94 P. 922. Sequim Bay sought an injunction to prevent repeated trespassing by employees of a competing clam company. Making no distinction between naturally occurring and planted clams, the court held sedentary shell-fish constitute part of the real property and are subject to the ownership and control of the property owner or lessee: Clams ordinarily live in the soil under the waters, and not within the waters.... They therefore, in a very material sense, belong with the land. When taken they must be wrenched from their beds, made well down in the soil itself. It must follow therefore that, if the state has authority to invest one with the private ownership of the tide lands, such investiture must carry with it the right to exercise dominion and ownership over what is upon the land, and especially over things so closely related to the soil as clams. Sequim Bay, 49 Wash. at 131, 94 P. 922. Reasoning Sequim Bay was entitled to the exclusive possession and control of the leased property and the clams therein, we held the company had stated grounds for injunctive relief. In State v. Van Vlack, 101 Wash. 503, 172 P. 563 (1918), a case involving privately owned tidelands, this court reaffirmed and further clarified Sequim Bay. After Harry Van Vlack was convicted of unlawfully possessing clams harvested during the closed season, he challenged the application of the law to him because the clams were taken by the private owner of the tidelands. [5] We observed: At the outset it may be conceded that, because of the peculiar characteristics of the clamits fixed habitation when imbedded in the soilclam beds may become the subject of private ownership which passes to the grantee by a conveyance from the state of tide lands in which the beds are located. Such is the effect of the decisions of this court in Sequim Bay Canning Co. v. Bugge ... and Palmer v. Peterson, 56 Wash. 74, 105 P. 179 [(1909)]. In this respect clams differ from fish, game birds and game animals in their wild or natural state. Van Vlack, 101 Wash. at 505-06, 172 P. 563. Although the statute restricted the rights of the landowner in the use and enjoyment of his property, the court concluded it was nevertheless a valid exercise of the state's police power: Let it be remembered that property in clams is not the result of human effort or industry; such property is acquired by the uncontrolled forces of nature. It cannot be said, therefore, to be unreasonable to so regulate the use and enjoyment of this manna-like possession by a private owner as to conserve the interest, not only of the public, but of the private owner as well. Id. at 509, 172 P. 563. In Wiegardt v. Brennan, 192 Wash. 529, 73 P.2d 1330 (1937), a private tideland owner sought an injunction preventing the state director of fisheries from enforcing provisions of a statute establishing a closed season within which harvesting razor clams for commercial purposes was unlawful. The court held Van Vlack, 101 Wash. 503, 172 P. 563, controlled: It is true that clams grown on beds in private ownership are the property of the owner; yet, as was said in State v. Van Vlack, supra , it is to be remembered that the property in clams is not the result of human effort or industry, but of uncontrollable forces of nature. Wiegardt, 192 Wash. at 537, 73 P.2d 1330. Accordingly, when an individual privately owns tidelands, he or she also owns any naturally occurring clams imbedded in the soil. Longshore erroneously contends State v. Johnson, 80 Wash. 522, 141 P. 1040 (1914), stands for the proposition [s]hellfish in a natural bed retain their nature as being in a state of nature and therefore wild. Br. of Appellant Longshore at 21. But in Johnson we held larceny charges could not be sustained against an individual who took oysters from their natural beds in the state's reserve oyster lands at a time prohibited by statute for such taking. Unquestionably, we think, oysters, in common with other shell-fish, found on the tide lands belonging to the state, are so far wild by nature that any one finding them may, in the absence of a statute prohibiting the act, take them and convert them to his own use without violating any of the general criminal statutes of the state; and we think, also, that the statutes creating the oyster reserve lands did not, by the mere act of declaring that such lands were reserve oyster lands, change the rule. Johnson, 80 Wash. at 524, 141 P. 1040 (emphasis added). [6] Although Johnson clearly holds the taking of shellfish from public tidelands does not constitute larceny, [7] the opinion does not disturb the holdings of Sequim Bay, Van Vlack, and Wiegardt, which affirm ownership of private tidelands invests one with ownership of natural beds of sedentary shellfish. In apparent recognition of Washington common law, the Legislature has specifically exempted shellfish from wildlife designation. RCW 77.12.010 states [w]ildlife is the property of the state. The department shall preserve, protect, and perpetuate wildlife. However, RCW 77.08.010(16) exempts shell-fish from this designation: Wildlife means all species of the animal kingdom whose members exist in Washington in a wild state. This includes but is not limited to mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, fish, and invertebrates. The term wildlife does not include feral domestic mammals, the family Muridae of the order Rodentia (old world rats and mice), or those fish, shellfish, and marine invertebrates classified as food fish or shellfish by the director.... (Emphasis added.) Thus, this statute further undercuts Longshore's contention that clams are animals ferae naturae and thus constitute property of the general public in Washington. The United States Supreme Court has also rejected the argument that naturally occurring shellfish on private property constitute animals ferae naturae. In McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 43 S.Ct. 16, 67 L.Ed. 167 (1922), the Court observed: [T]here is a plain distinction between [mussels] and game birds or freely moving fish, that may shift to another jurisdiction without regard to the will of land owner or State.... On the other hand it seems not unreasonable to say that mussels having a practically fixed habitat and little ability to move are as truly in the possession of the owner of the land in which they are sunk as would be a prehistoric boat discovered under ground or unknown property at the bottom of a canal. Id. at 135, 43 S.Ct. 16 (citations omitted). Although the Court did not hold shellfish constitute part of the realty for purposes of the state statute at issue, id., the Court nevertheless concluded possession of mussels via ownership of the real property entitled the owner to damages for conversion by a trespasser. We are slow to believe that there were public rights extending to the removal of mussels against the land owner's will. Id. at 136, 43 S.Ct. 16. Therefore naturally occurring shellfish are the property of the land owner. Shellfish are not animals ferae naturae. Although Washington precedent suggests sedentary shellfish constitute part of the realty, Sequim Bay, 49 Wash. at 131, 94 P. 922, we need not decide whether naturally occurring shellfish constitute real or personal property to affirm Longshore's conviction. [8] As we have previously held a private property owner has the right to exercise dominion and ownership over shellfish upon his land, Sequim Bay, 49 Wash. at 131, 94 P. 922, removing shellfish from the land of a private property owner clearly constitutes deprivation of a legally recognized interest in the property. RCW 9A.56.010(6)(a). We therefore reject Longshore's contention that naturally occurring clams on private property are animals ferae naturae and reaffirm the proposition that shellfish embedded upon private property are property subject to the ownership, possession, and control of the owner of the beach.