Opinion ID: 75997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Qualifications and Elections Clauses

Text: 18 We recognize that Jenness was premised on the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, not the Qualifications Clause, which is the focus of Appellants' challenge. See id. at 434, 91 S.Ct. 1970. Thus, we now turn our attention to the Supreme Court's decisions involving the Qualifications Clause in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) and U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995). 19 The Qualifications Clause provides that [n]o Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. States may not impose additional qualifications for election to the House of Representatives beyond those contained in the Qualifications Clause. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 827, 115 S.Ct. 1842. 20 At the same time, under the Elections Clause, States have the authority to regulate [t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. States may enact numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 834, 115 S.Ct. 1842 (citation omitted). The requirement that candidates demonstrate some measure of support before their names appear on the ballot generally is viewed as a legitimate exercise of a state's authority to regulate the manner in which elections are held. Storer, 415 U.S. at 746 n. 16, 94 S.Ct. 1274 (1974). 4 The power to create procedural regulations does not, however, provide States with license to exclude classes of candidates from federal office. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 832-33, 115 S.Ct. 1842. 21 The Supreme Court discussed the Qualifications and Elections Clauses at length in Term Limits, where it invalidated Arkansas's term-limits amendment, which barred three-term Representatives from having their names placed on the ballot. In that case, the petitioners cited Storer in defining a qualification as a legal bar to service. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 828, 115 S.Ct. 1842. The petitioners then argued that the Arkansas term limits amendment was not a legal bar to service because the amendment only prohibited a three-term incumbent from appearing on the ballot, but did not preclude such an incumbent from running as a write-in candidate, or serving, if elected. Id. 22 In Term Limits, the Supreme Court did not fashion a precise definition of qualification in answering the petitioners' argument. The Supreme Court struck down the term-limits amendment using the petitioners' narrow definition of qualification. See id. at 829, 115 S.Ct. 1842 (We need not decide whether petitioners' narrow understanding of qualifications is correct because, even if it is, [the term-limits amendment] may not stand.). The Supreme Court reasoned that an indirect denial of constitutional rights was equivalent to a direct denial of those rights. Id. at 829, 115 S.Ct. 1842. While the term limits amendment was not a legal bar per se, the amendment was an indirect attempt to accomplish what the Constitution prohibits Arkansas from accomplishing directly. Id. The Supreme Court held that an amendment with the avowed purpose and obvious effect of evading the requirements of the Qualifications Clauses by handicapping a class of candidates cannot stand. Id. at 831, 115 S.Ct. 1842. 23 When the district court dismissed the Appellants' challenge to Georgia's 5% requirement, it applied a two-part test in evaluating whether the 5% requirement violates the Qualifications Clause. The district court first inquired whether the statute creates an absolute bar to candidates who otherwise would qualify for office. After concluding that it did not, the district court then quoted from Term Limits and analyzed whether the statute has the likely effect of handicapping an otherwise qualified class of candidates and has the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 835-36, 115 S.Ct. 1842; Schaefer v. Townsend, 215 F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir.2000) (applying the same two-part test for evaluating Qualifications Clause challenges), cert. denied sub nom Jones v. Schaefer, 532 U.S. 904, 121 S.Ct. 1225, 149 L.Ed.2d 136 (2001). As discussed above, however, the Supreme Court rejected the Arkansas term-limits amendment without decid[ing] whether petitioners' narrow understanding of qualifications is correct. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 829, 115 S.Ct. 1842. Because Term Limits leaves open the possibility that the definition of qualification may be broader than presented by the petitioners, it is conceivable that an election provision may not violate the district court's two-part test yet still constitute a qualification prohibited by the Constitution. 24 We need not decide whether Term Limits provides an exhaustive definition of qualification applicable to all Qualifications Clauses challenges. Instead, Storer and Term Limits identify certain types of ballot access restrictions that are election procedures and not substantive qualifications, and we conclude that Georgia's 5% requirement is likewise an election procedure and not a substantive qualification. 25 For example, in Storer, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a California Elections Code requirement that independent candidates not be affiliated with a political party one year prior to the preceding primary. 415 U.S. at 746 n. 16, 94 S.Ct. 1274. The nonaffiliation requirement was expressive of a general state policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot. Id. at 733, 734-35, 94 S.Ct. 1274 (A candidate in one party primary may not now run in that of another; if he loses in the primary he may not run as an independent.). The Supreme Court in Storer found that the argument that the California Elections Code provision was a qualification was wholly without merit. Id. at 746 n. 16, 94 S.Ct. 1274. The Supreme Court went on to say that a nonaffiliation requirement was no more an additional requirement for office than the requirement that the candidate win the primary to secure a place on the general ballot or otherwise demonstrate substantial community support.  Id. (emphasis added). 26 Similarly, in Term Limits, the Supreme Court observed that the California Elections Code provision in Storer was constitutional because it regulated election procedure [] and did not even arguably impose any substantive qualification. 514 U.S. at 835, 115 S.Ct. 1842; see Libertarian Party of Illinois v. Rednour, 108 F.3d 768, 777 (7th Cir.1997) ([W]here requirements are procedural in nature and do not add substantive qualifications, they do not violate the Qualifications Clause.) (citing Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 835, 115 S.Ct. 1842). In Term Limits, the Supreme Court also pointed out that other Elections Clause cases recognized that States, under the Elections Clause, are entitled to adopt generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself. Id. at 834, 115 S.Ct. 1842 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983)). Georgia's 5% requirement is such a provision, and does not even arguably impose any substantive qualification. Instead, it requires that a candidate demonstrate substantial community support before obtaining a place on the ballot, an interest that the Supreme Court recognized over thirty years ago when it upheld Georgia's 5% requirement. See Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442, 91 S.Ct. 1970 (There is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization's candidate on the ballot....); see Libertarian Party, 108 F.3d at 777 (upholding a similar Illinois provision that a new political party meet a 5% petitioning requirement to place congressional candidate on general election ballot because the requirement merely assure[s] that candidates meet a minimum threshold of voter support in order to maintain the integrity and regularity of the electoral process). Therefore, we conclude that Georgia's 5% requirement is not a qualification, but a permissible procedural regulation of the manner in which candidates may obtain ballot placement. 27 For these reasons, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Appellants' complaint. 28 AFFIRMED.