Opinion ID: 2448565
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timeliness of Unruh's Claim under the Statute of Repose

Text: ¶ 37 Cacchiotti argues that, even if Unruh filed her claim within the statute of limitations, it is barred by the statute of repose. RCW 4.16.350(3) sets a maximum eight-year period for filing a medical malpractice lawsuit. The statute provides that in no event shall an action be commenced more than eight years after [the] act or omission. RCW 4.16.350(3). ¶ 38 In DeYoung, this court struck down a prior iteration of the medical malpractice statute of repose, holding that it violated the privileges and immunities clause of article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution. DeYoung, 136 Wash.2d at 150, 960 P.2d 919. The legislature reenacted the statute on June 7, 2006. LAWS OF 2006, ch. 8, §§ 301-02. ¶ 39 Cacchiotti argues that the statute of repose applies retroactively to Unruh's claim such that the eight-year period began running in August 1999, on the last date of the alleged act or omission. [13] In Cacchiotti's view, then, the statute of repose expired in August 2007, one month before Unruh commenced her lawsuit. Unruh responds that the statute of repose began running on the date it was enacted, June 7, 2006, which means the repose period does not expire until June 2014. ¶ 40 As explained previously, when a claim accrues before a new statute of limitations goes into effect, the new limitations period begins to run on that claim from the effective date of the statute's enactment. Hanford, 112 Wash. at 662, 192 P. 1013. This rule applies equally to statutes of limitation and statutes of repose. See 1000 Virginia Ltd. P'ship, 158 Wash.2d at 583-84, 146 P.3d 423 (Regardless of how the statute is characterized [i.e., as a statute of limitation or a statute of repose], it is presumed to run prospectively, as are all statutes.). Running the new limitations period from the date of enactment ensures that the full time allowed by the new statute is available to the [plaintiff]. Hanford, 112 Wash. at 662, 192 P. 1013. [14] ¶ 41 We assume Unruh's claim accrued with the removal of her braces in August 1999. At that time, no statute of repose existed, as this court's 1998 decision in DeYoung struck down the prior version of the statute of repose. While the legislature reenacted the statute of repose in June 2006, we cannot agree with Cacchiotti that the new repose period began running seven years before the statute was enacted. Rather, the statute of repose applies to Unruh's claim prospectively from the date of its enactment on June 7, 2006, meaning the eight-year repose period began running on that date. Because the repose period will not expire until June 2014, the newly reenacted statute of repose does not bar Unruh's claim. ¶ 42 Amicus WSMA et al. contends that the general rule of prospective application should not govern here because the legislature intended the statute of repose to apply retroactively. WSMA et al. relies on a statement of legislative intent contained in the 2006 reenactment to the statute of repose: The legislature ... intends that the eight-year statute of repose reenacted by section 302 of this act be applied to actions commenced on or after [June 7, 2006]. LAWS OF 2006, ch. 8, § 301. Though no other evidence of legislative intent is provided, WSMA et al. believes that this statement alone indicates clear intent that the statute of repose apply retroactively. ¶ 43 A limitations provision will not be given retroactive effect unless it appears that such was clearly the legislative intention. Hanford, 112 Wash. at 661, 192 P. 1013 (emphasis added); see also Densley v. Dep't of Ret. Sys., 162 Wash.2d 210, 223, 173 P.3d 885 (2007) (recognizing that the presumption of prospective application can only `be overcome if [] the Legislature explicitly provides for retroactivity' (quoting State v. T.K., 139 Wash.2d 320, 329, 987 P.2d 63 (1999))). The legislative statement here does not evince a clear intent that the statute of repose apply retroactively. The quoted statement indicates that the statute of repose should apply to actions commenced on or after [June 7, 2006], but it does not specify whether the statute should apply prospectively or retroactively to such actions. LAWS OF 2006, ch. 8, § 301. At best, the statement is ambiguous. Under the general rule discussed above, we presume the new limitations period applies prospectively. And if the claim accrued before the date of enactment, the limitations period begins to run from the date of enactment. The legislature's ambiguous statement of intent with regard to the newly reenacted statute of repose is not enough to overcome this presumption. ¶ 44 Even if we agreed with Cacchiotti that the statute of repose began to run in August 1999, Unruh's claim would still survive. Under former RCW 4.16.190, a statute of repose is tolled during a plaintiff's minority. Gilbert, 127 Wash.2d at 376, 900 P.2d 552 (citing Merrigan, 112 Wash.2d at 716, 773 P.2d 78). Because the 2006 nontolling amendment has no effect on the tolling that occurred during Unruh's minority, the statute of repose could not begin to run until Unruh turned 18 on January 3, 2004. Thus, even under Cacchiotti's theory, the earliest the repose period could expire on Unruh's claim is January 2012. [15]