Opinion ID: 2091215
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Evidence of Uncharged Sexual Misconduct with R.S.

Text: We next address the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of the defendant's uncharged sexual misconduct with R.S. to establish a common scheme or plan in the cases of N.R. and P.L. The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this claim. At the defendant's trial, the state moved, outside the presence of the jury, to introduce evidence of the defendant's uncharged sexual misconduct with R.S. to establish a common scheme or plan. As an offer of proof, the state represented that R.S. was a student enrolled in Career School during the 2000-2001 academic year, and that, during this time period, the defendant had embraced R.S. in a sexual manner on multiple occasions and had made statements to R.S. that were sexual in nature. The defendant objected to the admission of this evidence, claiming that it did not establish a common scheme or plan and that its prejudicial effect exceeded its probative value. The trial court concluded that the evidence was relevant to establish a common plan or scheme on the part of the defendant to have inappropriate sexual conduct [and] conversations with female students, high school-aged students and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. Thereafter, R.S. testified that she was a student enrolled in her junior year at Career School during the 2000-2001 academic year. In the third semester of her junior year, she and her best friend, P.L., had a conversation with the defendant in the library of Career School in which the defendant told them that since [they] were virgins [they] should have sex with someone around his age because, I guess, because they are more experienced at his age. The defendant also said maybe a while later, that if [R.S. and P.L.] were to say anything about any of the conversations that [they] had, he wouldn't get in trouble because he has money, and . . . he was going to school, he has degrees and everything, so it wouldn't affect him. R.S. also testified that, on several occasions, the defendant had embraced her in a sexual manner when she encountered him in the hallways of Career School. For example, on one occasion, the defendant had wrapped his arms around R.S. and then picked [her] up off the ground by holding [her] butt, behind. R.S. testified that it was not a normal hug that you would give to somebody, that she didn't like it at all. On at least four other occasions, the defendant had given R.S. hugs that she described as kind of tight, in which he pressed his chest against her breasts, and his penis against her vagina. Although R.S. informed her mother and brother about the defendant's conduct, she did not notify officials at Career School. Prior to the admission of R.S.'s testimony, the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction. The court instructed the jury that it only could consider R.S.'s testimony to the extent that it found her testimony to be believable, and that it logically, rationally and conclusively supported the issues for which it [had been offered], namely, the defendant's alleged common plan or scheme to sexually abuse high school-aged girls. [20] The trial court reiterated this limiting instruction in its final charge to the jury. [21] As previously explained, although evidence of prior misconduct generally is inadmissible to prove that a criminal defendant is guilty of the crime of which the defendant is accused, it is admissible only if it is so connected with the principal crime by circumstance, motive, design, or innate peculiarity, that the commission of the collateral crime tends directly to prove the commission of the principal crime. . . . We have developed a two part test to determine the admissibility of such evidence. First, the evidence must be relevant and material to at least one of the circumstances encompassed by the exceptions. . . . Second, the probative value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect. . . . When evidence of other offenses is offered to show a common plan or design the marks which the uncharged and the charged offenses have in common must be such that it may be logically inferred that if the defendant is guilty of one he must be guilty of the other. . . . To guide this analysis, we have held that [e]vidence of prior sex offenses committed with persons other than the prosecuting witness is admissible to show a common design or plan where the prior offenses (1) are not too remote in time; (2) are similar to the offense charged; and (3) are committed upon persons similar to the prosecuting witness. . . . We are more liberal in admitting evidence of other criminal acts to show a common scheme or pattern in sex related crimes than other crimes. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Aaron L., supra, 272 Conn. at 820-21, 865 A.2d 1135. The defendant claims that his uncharged sexual misconduct with R.S. does not satisfy the second or third factors because it was less severe than his sexual misconduct with N.R. and P.L., and his relationship with R.S. was vastly different than [his] alleged intimate and confidential relationships with N.R. and P.L. [22] We are not persuaded. R.S., like both N.R. and P.L., was a female student enrolled in her junior year at Career School when the defendant's sexual misconduct took place. Thus, the defendant had unique access to, and was in a position of authority and control over, all three victims. See, e.g., State v. Hauck, supra, 172 Conn. at 146, 374 A.2d 150 (student victims similarly situated because defendant teacher used his position of authority to obtain or to seek to obtain sex-related favors in return for a passing grade in his science course); State v. Johnson, 76 Conn.App. 410, 418, 819 A.2d 871 (victims similarly situated because defendant was in position of professional authority over them), cert. denied, 264 Conn. 912, 826 A.2d 1156 (2003). Moreover, the defendant's sexual misconduct with R.S. was similar to the initial stages of his sexual misconduct with both N.R. and P.L. At first, the defendant had intimate personal conversations with N.R. and P.L. in the library of Career School. Later, he began to embrace both victims more frequently, intimately and tightly when he encountered them in the hallways of Career School. Although the defendant's sexual misconduct with R.S. did not progress beyond this initial stage, the jury reasonably could have inferred from R.S.'s testimony that his misconduct ceased only after she rebuffed his sexual advances and reported his behavior to her mother and brother. Accordingly, contrary to the defendant's claim, the fact that R.S. suffered less severe sexual misconduct than N.R. and P.L. does not illustrate a behavioral distinction of any significance. State v. James G., supra, 268 Conn. at 394, 844 A.2d 810 (common scheme or plan testimony by witness admissible when defendant's early abuse of witness was similar to abuse of victim); see also State v. Kulmac, 230 Conn. 43, 62-63, 644 A.2d 887 (1994) (same). We next address whether the trial court improperly concluded that the probative value of R.S.'s testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect. We consistently have indicated that [t]he primary responsibility for . . . determin[ing] whether [prior misconduct] evidence is more probative than prejudicial rests with the trial court, and its conclusion will be disturbed only for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . Moreover, [w]hen the trial court has heard a lengthy offer of proof and arguments of counsel before performing the required balancing test, has specifically found that the evidence was highly probative and material, and that its probative value significantly outweighed the prejudicial effect, and has instructed the jury on the limited use of the evidence in order to safeguard against misuse and to minimize the prejudicial impact . . . we have found no abuse of discretion. . . . (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Romero, 269 Conn. 481, 502, 849 A.2d 760 (2004). In the present case, the state presented an offer of proof as to the anticipated testimony of R.S., and the trial court heard lengthy oral arguments from both the state and the defendant with respect to the probative value versus the prejudicial effect of this testimony. The court concluded that the probative value . . . does exceed its prejudicial effect, principally on the basis of the fact that we're talking about alleged victims that are essentially identical to each other and in close time frame. Moreover, prior to the admission of R.S.'s testimony and again during its final charge, the trial court instructed the jury as to the limited purpose for which it could consider the evidence of the defendant's uncharged sexual misconduct with R.S. See footnotes 20 and 21 of this opinion. Although this evidence certainly carried with it some degree of prejudice, we are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the defendant's uncharged sexual misconduct with R.S. to establish a common scheme or plan.