Opinion ID: 6110099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: mr. grado was an adult at the time of the index offense and at the time of his svp commitment proceeding

Text: Mr. Grado also alleges his commitment violates his rights to due process, equal protection and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. In support, he alleges a person committed as an SVP in effect receives a sentence of life without parole because that person never can be unconditionally released. Analogizing to the bar on life without parole sentences for juveniles in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) , and on the recognition in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) , that juveniles are not fully mature, he argues that because he was only 18 at the time of his index offense and younger than that during some of the behavior relied on, under an extension of the reasoning set out in Roper and Graham , his commitment to the Department of Mental Health constitutes an unconstitutional life sentence without parole. Because Mr. Grado failed to preserve this constitutional claim, it is reviewed for plain error. Appellate review for plain error is a two-step process: The first step requires a determination of whether the claim of error facially establishes substantial grounds for believing that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted. All prejudicial error, however, is not plain error, and plain errors are those which are evident, obvious, and clear. If plain error  is found, the court then must proceed to the second step and determine whether the claimed error resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. State v. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d 600 , 607-08 (Mo. banc 2009) (internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted). In Kirk v. State, 520 S.W.3d 443 , 450 (Mo. banc 2017) , and Nelson v. State, 521 S.W.3d 229 , 232 (Mo. banc 2017) , this Court rejected a nearly identical argument that commitment as an SVP constitutes a life sentence under the Act. Kirk held it was premature to determine whether the lack of unconditional release under the current statute is constitutional, stating Whether the release provisions of the statute are constitutionally sufficient is not before this Court in this case, as this case involves only the issue of whether Kirk's commitment is constitutionally permitted. 520 S.W.3d at 450 . Nelson similarly rejected a claim the Act is unconstitutional due to its release provisions and found those circumstances not now before the Court. 521 S.W.3d at 232 . As in Kirk and Nelson , Mr. Grado is now challenging the constitutionality of his commitment. He cannot do so by arguing that should he ever be otherwise eligible for release, the statute's release provisions are inadequate. Such an argument is not ripe. Even if the issue were ripe, and even assuming Graham and Roper were applicable to involuntary civil commitments, this Court recently reaffirmed in McFadden, 553 S.W.3d at 312-13 , that the rationale of Graham and Roper does not apply to persons who were 18 or older at the time of the offense. This is consistent with Graham and Roper , which held the age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. Graham, 560 U.S. at 74 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , citing, Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 (alteration omitted). While certainly Mr. Grado's youthfulness was relevant to determine whether he truly was an SVP, his age of 18 at the time of his offenses does not bar him from being committed as an SVP.