Opinion ID: 2
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of videotapes

Text: Dowdell's second evidentiary challenge, that the court erred in admitting White's videotaped comments to Monteiro, implicates another carve-out from the prohibition on hearsay. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides that any statement of a coconspirator acting during the course and in furtherance of a conspiracy is non-hearsay and, therefore, admissible for the truth of the matter asserted. In order to determine whether the factual predicates for this exception exist, the trial court must make a so-called Petrozziello ruling. See United States v. Petrozziello, 547 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977). A Petrozziello ruling has two stages. First, following a timely objection, the court makes a provisional finding as to whether the evidence is admissible. If so, that finding is then subject to a second and final review at the close of all the evidence. United States v. Famania-Roche, 537 F.3d 71, 75 (1st Cir. 2008). At both stages, the court applies a preponderance of the evidence standard, namely, whether it is more likely than not that the declarant and the defendant were members of a conspiracy when the hearsay statement 129 F.3d 663, 670 (1st Cir. 1997), which in this case is the government. Regardless, even if the government were to bear the burden here, neither the booking sheet itself nor the known facts surrouding its preparation suggest untrustworthiness by a preponderance of the evidence. The government's burden [of proof] . . . does not mean . . . that it must disprove all of the defendant's alternative theories, no matter how speculative or implausible. United States v. Ribeiro, 397 F.3d 43, 53 (1st Cir. 2005). -51- was made, and that the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. Finding such a preponderance here, the district court admitted White's statements. Dowdell now argues that the prosecution's evidence established nothing more than friendship and proximity with the declarant, rather than a joint venture to sell controlled substances. Assuming this argument was properly preserved, we must still accept the district court's findings of fact unless they were clearly erroneous.19 See United States v. Thompson, 449 F.3d 267, 273 (1st Cir. 2006). This heavy burden is 19 There may be some uncertainty as to the proper standard of review for Petrozziello rulings, due to recent cases that employ the abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., United States v. Vazquez-Botet, 532 F.3d 37, 65 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Colon Diaz, 521 F.3d 29, 36 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Rivera-Hernandez, 497 F.3d 71, 82 (1st Cir. 2007). But we long ago said in United States v. Patterson, 644 F.2d 890, 894 (1st Cir. 1981), and have endorsed on countless subsequent occasions, that we review a trial court's Petrozziello determination for clear error. Every other circuit has long been in accord. See United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Gessa, 971 F.2d 1257, 1260–61 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1081 n.11 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Bouck, 877 F.2d 828, 831 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Jackson, 863 F.2d 1168, 1172 (4th Cir. 1989). United States v. Kaden, 819 F.2d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Silverman, 771 F.2d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Harshaw, 705 F.2d 317, 320 (8th Cir. 1983; United States v. Bulman, 667 F.2d 1374, 1379 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Perry, 624 F.2d 29, 30 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 8:62 (3d ed. 2007) (referring to almost universal agreement throughout the federal judiciary on use of clear error review). In the Petrozziello context, it is likely that review for abuse of discretion applies only to the district court's ultimate decision whether to admit or exclude the statement, and not to the underlying factual findings. -52- carried only when although there is evidence to support [the finding], the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Where the evidence is susceptible of two plausible interpretations, the trier of fact's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. United States v. Newton, 326 F.3d 253, 257 (1st Cir. 2003). A heavier burden still awaits those attempting unpreserved challenges, which are reviewed only for plain error. United States v. Aviles-Colon, 536 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2008). Though the parties disagree as to whether Dowdell successfully preserved his challenge by renewing his objection at the close of all the evidence, the dispute is ultimately irrelevant. Even adopting the less deferential standard, we would still affirm the district court's ruling. It is well established that the preponderance of evidence required for the introduction of an out-of-court statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) must necessarily comprise more than the weight of the statement itself. United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1181 (1st Cir. 1993). An alleged coconspirator's declarations are thus insufficient in isolation. At the same time, however, the court may consider the hearsay statements themselves in the context of other extrinsic, corroborating evidence. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 180–81 (1987); United States v. Mangual-Garcia, 505 F.3d 1, 8 n.5 (1st Cir. 2007). Such -53- corroboration was amply available here. When Monteiro first saw White on July 6, White was counting cash with Dowdell. Moments later, when White agreed to make the initial sale to Monteiro, his first action was to walk over to Dowdell and consult with him. Then, on July 16, Dowdell sold drugs to Monteiro when White was unavailable. These facts, coupled with White's statements themselves, adequately supported a finding of a conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in its Petrozziello ruling. Dowdell further maintains that even if the statements themselves were admissible, introducing them on video nevertheless violated Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which provides that otherwise admissible evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Specifically, he argues that a printed transcript would have been less prejudicial because it would not have allowed the jury to see White, who, according to Dowdell, looks like an obvious drug addict and just makes a very bad impression. But the mere fact that Dowdell might have fared better without the video is not in itself cause for exclusion. By design, all evidence is meant to be prejudicial; it is only unfair prejudice which must be avoided. United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 156 (1st Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original). The trial court has wide latitude in determining when the amount of unfair prejudice has -54- tipped the scale too far. Only rarely -- and in extraordinarily compelling circumstances -- will we, from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a district court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative value and unfair effect. United States v. Shinderman, 515 F.3d 5, 17 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1340 (1st Cir. 1988)). In this case, in which the reliability of Monteiro's identification of Dowdell as Smoke was hotly contested, any contextual inferences available from a visual record would be highly probative. Whatever minimal unfair prejudice might have resulted from seeing White's physical appearance, it did not overcome this probative value. In any event, it was Dowdell, not the government, who chose to associate himself with White. We discern no abuse of discretion.