Opinion ID: 853802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Exception Four: Probability of Injury Absent Due Precaution

Text: As the Court of Appeals majority noted, the due precaution exception [3] makes an employer liable for the negligence of an independent contractor `where the act to be performed will probably cause injury to others unless due precaution is taken.' Carie, 694 N.E.2d at 735 (quoting Bagley, 658 N.E.2d at 586). [4] This Court explained the exception in Bagley: The essence of this exception is the foreseeability of the peculiar risk involved in the work and of the need for special precautions. The exception applies where, at the time of the making of the contract, a principal should have foreseen that the performance of the work or the conditions under which it was to be performed would, absent precautionary measures, probably cause injury. Application of this fourth exception to the plaintiff's claim thus requires an examination of whether, at the time [a party] was employed as an independent contractor, there existed a peculiar risk which was reasonably foreseeable and which recognizably called for precautionary measures. 658 N.E.2d at 588 (citations omitted); see also Cummings v. Hoosier Marine Properties, Inc., 173 Ind.App. 372, 387, 363 N.E.2d 1266, 1275 (1977) (an action would fail absent a showing by the plaintiff that in view of the nature of the work and the conditions under which it was to be executed, the defendant should have foreseen that the actual catastrophe which occurred was likely to happen). Rather than focussing on the permutations of peculiar, [5] we believe the proper inquiry in this case rests on foreseeability. Foreseeability is an essential element in the due precaution exception. Denneau v. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 150 Ind.App. 615, 621, 277 N.E.2d 8, 12 (1971). The policy underlying the foreseeability requirement has been explained: It is apparent that virtual abrogation of the general doctrine of an employer's non-liability for acts of an independent contractor of the latter's servants would result if the law were to predicate, under all circumstances, the existence of an absolute duty on the employer's part to guard against all accidents probable as well as improbable, that might happen, to the damage of third persons, while stipulated work is being performed by an independent contractor. If, therefore, recovery is sought on the ground that an employer should have adopted certain precautionary measures for the purpose of preventing the injury complained of, the action must fail unless the plaintiff can at least show that in view of the nature of the work and the conditions under which it was to be executed, the defendant should have foreseen that the actual catastrophe which occurred was likely to happen if those precautionary measures were omitted. Jones v. Indianapolis Power and Light Co., 158 Ind.App. 676, 691, 304 N.E.2d 337, 346 (1973) (quoting 41 Am.Jur.2d Independent Contractors § 35) (now § 31 at 430 (1995)) (emphasis supplied in Jones ). With these standards in mind, and with the relevant facts undisputed, the inquiry here becomes whether, as a matter of law, PSI should have foreseen that the performance of maintenance work on the exhausters would probably result in this type of incident unless due precaution was taken. That determination hinges on the degree of factual specificity which the law should require the employer to foresee. The Court of Appeals majority decided that the due precaution exception applied because PSI should have foreseen the general risk which caused Carie and Harper's injuries, saying: The question ... is whether the use of the non-self-supporting fixture to remove an exhauster cover would make injury likely to happen unless precautionary measures were taken. The answer is yes.... [I]t was foreseeable to PSI at the time of contracting that if the fixture was left unsupported, it would fall and likely cause injury. Carie, 694 N.E.2d at 736-37. In dissent, Judge Friedlander asserted that the exception should apply only if there was some relatively more peculiar or special foreseeable risk, phrasing the dispositive issue as: At the time of the signing of the contract, could PSI have foreseen that a forklift would fail while it was supporting a jig and front cover, and that a Blount employee would move the forklift, leaving the front cover unsupported, which would then fall and injure someone? ... [T]his question must be answered in the negative. Id. at 739. We agree with Judge Friedlander that the danger that the contractee must foresee in order to fit within the fourth exception must be substantially similar to the accident that produced the complained-of injury. Id. at 737. This policy was apparent when the Jones court recited the facts of the incident with particular specificity when affirming the summary judgment in favor of the defendant: There was no evidence that, at the time [the employer] contracted with [the independent contractor], [the employer] could foresee or should have foreseen that the limit control switch atop a man and materials hoist operated by an independent contractor for exclusive use of its employees would become clogged with ice and snow causing the hoist to stickand that employees of such independent contractor would undertake to manipulate the hoist circuitry so as to cause death or injury. Jones, 158 Ind.App. at 690-91, 304 N.E.2d at 346. We implicitly required a similar level of factual specificity in Bagley. In that case, Bagley, an employee of an independent contractor, was injured as he was hammering a rod into the ground near the ladder on which [the independent contractor] was working. The ladder slipped on snow and ice, and [the independent contractor] landed on Bagley, driving Bagley's head down onto the protruding rod. Bagley, 658 N.E.2d at 588. Upholding summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the Court stated: At the time the contracts were made, the delegated work did not present the peculiar probability that an injury such as Bagley's would result unless precautionary measures were taken, and the employers could not have been expected to foresee the sort of injury which actually occurred. Id. In the present case, Judge Friedlander was correct to call for a more precise factual congruence between that which was foreseeable and that which ultimately occurred. [6] We are satisfied that PSI could not have foreseen the sequence of events leading to plaintiffs' injuries when it hired Blount to perform maintenance at Cayuga, and as such, the due precaution exception does not apply. Cf. Red Roof Inns, 691 N.E.2d at 1346 ([W]e are not persuaded that the nature of the work and the conditions under which it was performed were such that, at the time of contracting, a reasonable employer should have foreseen that injury ... was likely to occur.). Accordingly, the general rule of non-liability for the torts of independent contractors applies and the plaintiffs' claims must fail.