Opinion ID: 2959641
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Renewed Damages Discovery

Text: The parties disagreed about how the new trial on the issue of damages should proceed, so the district court ordered the parties to provide briefing about whether they would need additional discovery. R. 315 at 1 (D. Ct. Order Re Damages Disc.) (Page ID #8081). On April 5, 2011, the district court set the jury trial for July 18, 2011, and reopened discovery to be Nos. 13-4172/13-4268/14-3352 Howe, et al. v. City of Akron Page 12 completed by June 17, 2011. R. 326 at 1 (Pretrial Order) (Page ID #8173). The renewed discovery period was intended to provide Akron with an opportunity to explore issues related to the Plaintiffs’ calculation of damages. R. 322 at 4–5 (Def.’s Position Statement Re: New Trial on Damages) (Page ID #8159–60). On June 23, 2011, the district court ordered the Plaintiffs to disclose “their damage calculation and how they arrive at those numbers.” R. 357 at 24–25 (Tr. Telephone Conference) (Page ID #8298–99). Plaintiffs’ counsel assured the court that the formula involved “basically multiplication, division, addition and subtraction and that’s all it is.” Id. at 24 (Page ID #8298). Akron had not provided the Plaintiffs with the payroll documents needed to perform the necessary calculations, however, and so the district court ordered Akron to produce those documents. Id. at 27–28 (Page ID #8301–02). Akron redeposed all twenty-three Plaintiffs, who revealed that they had calculated their back pay3 using a formula created by Plaintiff Gregory Snyder, who had been the employeebenefits officer in the Akron Fire Department. Snyder used the average salaries of officers promoted in 2005 beginning with the date of the first promotions from the eligibility lists to produce back-pay calculations for each plaintiff. R. 370-2 at 16–17, 40–44 (Snyder Dep. at 15– 16, 39–43) (Page ID #8902–03, 8926–30). During these depositions, the Plaintiffs claim that they became aware of some errors in their computations of back pay and notified the district court and Akron’s attorneys that they intended to adjust the calculations. Specifically, Plaintiff Carr reviewed Snyder’s calculations to determine whether the issues that Akron raised during the depositions warranted adjustments. R. 469 at 60 (Tr. Carr Testimony) (Page ID #12852). On June 16, 2011, one day before the close of discovery, Akron disclosed the identity of its witness who would testify about the Plaintiffs’ back pay. Pls.’ Br. at 5 n.3. After that disclosure, Carr recalculated the back pay based on the Plaintiffs’ real pay. R. 469 at 60 (Tr. 3 Back pay and compensatory damages are different. Back pay includes “[t]he wages or salary that an employee should have received but did not because of an employer’s unlawful action . . . .” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 166 (10th ed. 2014). “Compensatory damages may include future pecuniary losses, emotional damages, suffering, inconvenience, mental distress, hedonic losses, and other nonpecuniary losses.” Reeb v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehabilitation & Corr., 435 F.3d 639, 646 (6th Cir. 2006). Nos. 13-4172/13-4268/14-3352 Howe, et al. v. City of Akron Page 13 Trial Vol. 3 at 383) (Page ID #12852). The Plaintiffs produced Carr’s new calculations on June 17, 2011, which was the final day of discovery. Pls.’ Br. at 6. G. The District Court Sets a Start Date for Back Pay and Promotes the Plaintiffs On July 7, 2011, approximately one week before the retrial, the district court entered an order holding that the Plaintiffs had forfeited the right to a trial by jury on the issue of back pay. R. 403 at 1 (D. Ct. Order Re Bench Trial and Mot. for Promotion) (Page ID #10937). The district court further held that the promotions ordered by July 18, 2011, made the question of front pay no longer one for the jury. Id. The district court based the decision about the start date for calculating back pay on the Plaintiffs’ failure to request a jury instruction on the issue of back pay during the first trial, id. at 2 (Page ID #10938), and because the Plaintiffs had not timely requested a jury trial in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 38, id. at 4 (Page ID #10940). Moreover, the district court found that the Plaintiffs “ha[d] treated the calculation of back pay damages as a matter to be decided by” the district court because they had filed motions to alter or amend the judgment in which they had asked the court to add the back pay calculations to the total award of damages. Id. at 3 (Page ID #10939). The court further noted that it had similarly prohibited Akron from arguing lost opportunities during the retrial for the same reason. Id. at 4 (Page ID #10940). In addition, the district court “revisited” the Plaintiffs’ earlier motion for promotion and ordered that Akron promote all of the Plaintiffs no later than July 18, 2011, the date on which the trial would commence. Id. at 1 (Page ID #10937). The district court cited drastic changes to Akron’s fire department as one of the motivating reasons for the injunction promoting the Plaintiffs and noted that there “are over 25 vacancies in the lieutenant position and five vacancies at the captain position.” R. 416 at 2 (D. Ct. Order Re Mot. for Promotion) (Page ID #11105). The court noted that “[o]ver half of the Plaintiffs have retired or are no longer seeking promotion” or are “currently acting in the capacities for which they seek promotion.” Id. Although the district court’s opinion addressed the Plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent injunction, the district court did not mention whether the promotions were intended to be temporary or permanent. See id. at 1–3 (Page ID #11104–06). Nos. 13-4172/13-4268/14-3352 Howe, et al. v. City of Akron Page 14 On July 14, 2011, Akron filed a notice of appeal of the district court’s July 7 oral order and July 13 supplemental order to promote the Plaintiffs effective July 18, 2011. R. 419 at 1 (Page ID #11115). The Sixth Circuit issued a temporary stay to allow time for the Plaintiffs to respond to the motion for an emergency stay. In the meantime, Akron moved to suspend the promotions pending the appeal of the injunction. R. 423 at 1 (Def.’s Mot. to Suspend Inj.) (Page ID #11187). The district court granted a continuance of the retrial, R. 434 (Marginal Order) (Page ID #11342), and denied Akron’s request for a stay, finding that Akron was not likely to succeed in showing that the district court abused its discretion to promote the Plaintiffs after they had obtained a judgment in their favor, R. 435 at 1–11 (D. Ct. Order Re Stay) (Page ID #11343–53). On July 21, 2011, the Sixth Circuit dissolved the temporary stay and denied Akron’s motion to stay the promotions pending the resolution of the interlocutory appeal. R. 443 at 2–3 (6th Cir. Order). During the status conference before the retrial, the district court altered the injunction to make the Plaintiffs’ promotions effective July 22, 2011. R. 444 at 1 (D. Ct. Order Re Alteration of Inj.) (Page ID #11415). Akron had requested to treat the promotions as “provisional” promotions. Id. at 1–2 (Page ID #11415–16). The district court initially granted that request, noting that if the “‘provisional’ promotion process somehow provides less than the relief ordered,” then the district court reserved the ability to “take any other steps necessary to ensure compliance with its prior orders.” Id. at 2. The Plaintiffs objected to provisional promotions to the extent that they were not permanent promotions. R. 446 at 2 (Pls.’ Objection as to “Provisional” Appointments and Supplemental to Pls.’ Mot. to Enforce) (Page ID #11466). The district court acknowledged that the “provisional promotions” would rely upon informal agreements and therefore were not the type of promotion the court had envisioned. R. 454 at 3 (D. Ct. Order Re Objection to “Provisional” Appointment) (Page ID #11523). Despite Akron’s assertions that “provisional promotions” were necessary to ensure that it would not have to “demote” the Plaintiffs in the event that the Sixth Circuit reversed judgment or the injunction, the district court sustained the Plainitffs’ objections and ordered Akron to “FORMALLY PROMOTE each Plaintiff to the appropriate rank” permanently. Id. at 3–4 (Page ID #11523–24). Nos. 13-4172/13-4268/14-3352 Howe, et al. v. City of Akron Page 15 H. The District Court’s Order Regarding Back-Pay Start Dates On July 13, 2011, after the district court had ordered Akron to promote all of the Plaintiffs, the district court issued an order stating that the back-pay calculations would commence on April 5, 2007, the date the eligibility list expired and the Plaintiffs could no longer be promoted based on the 2004 promotional exam. R. 416 at 3 (D. Ct. Order Re Back Pay Start Date) (Page ID #11106). The district court noted that the Plaintiffs had previously argued that the statute of limitations did not bar their claims because the claims did not accrue until “the completion of the ‘total selection process.’” Id. (quoting R. 290 at 23 (Pls.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for JMOL) (Page ID #7965)). Accordingly, the district court found that “[t]he promotional process was not completed until the expiration of the list generated by the test,” and therefore the Plaintiffs were not harmed until the list expired. Id. at 4 (Page ID #11107). The Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration regarding the dates for back pay. R. 441 at 1–7 (Mot. for Recons.) (Page ID #11399–494). The district court summarily denied the motion for reconsideration. R. 449 at 1 (D. Ct. Order) (Page ID #11486).