Opinion ID: 1858107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 33

Heading: Assignments of Error 24(A), (B), (C) & (D), & 23

Text: Defendant alleges the trial court erred in failing to draw a distinction for the jury between the killing of more than one as an element at the guilt phase and as an aggravating circumstance at the penalty phase. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 905.4(A)(4) provides that whether [t]he offender knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person is an aggravating circumstance to be considered by the jury in the penalty phase of a first degree murder case. Revised Statute 14:30(A)(3), on the other hand, provides [f]irst degree murder is the killing of a human being, inter alia, [w]hen the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person. Defendant asserts the jury should have been instructed during the penalty phase it was required to find he specifically intended to kill more than one person to constitute the more than one aggravating circumstance. It was not necessary for the court to instruct the jury it had to find defendant had the specific intent to kill more than one person, the definition of a first degree murder, in order to find the existence of the more than one aggravating circumstance. This court in State v. Johnson, 541 So.2d 818, 826 (La.1989), held that satisfying Art. 905.4(A)(4) need not always be under circumstances where there is specific intent to kill or inflict bodily harm on more than one person, because Art. 905.4(A)(4) encompasses a broader range of conduct than the first degree murder definition ... in La. R.S. 14:30(A)(3). Additionally, defendant asserts the trial court should have instructed the jury that the aggravating circumstance exists only when a single consecutive course of conduct by the offender contemplates and actually causes the death of one person and the death or great bodily harm of another. It was not necessary for the court to give this latter instruction, however, because it is simply a restatement of the aggravating circumstance that defendant knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person. This assignment of error lacks merit. Defendant additionally alleges the court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the definition of heinous, atrocious, and cruel, in violation of Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). Defendant did not request such an instruction or object to its omission. In Maynard, the Supreme Court reiterated that unchanneled juror discretion leading to unreliable capital sentencing decisions will not be tolerated. To insure against arbitrary and capricious outcomes in cases where the heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravating circumstance is urged by the State, this court has narrowly construed the provision and upholds a jury's finding only upon proof of torture or pitiless infliction of unnecessary pain and suffering. State v. Brogdon, 457 So.2d 616, 629-30 (La.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111, 105 S.Ct. 2345, 85 L.Ed.2d 862 (1985); State v. Sonnier, 402 So.2d 650, 659, 660 (La.1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229, 103 S.Ct. 3571, 77 L.Ed.2d 1412 (1983); State v. Tassin, 536 So.2d 402, 411 (La.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 205, 107 L.Ed.2d 159 (La.1989). While, ideally, the jury should be instructed on the proper narrow construction of this aggravating circumstance, Brogdon, 457 So.2d at 630, this court has held in State v. Hamilton, 92-1919, p. 15-16 (La.9/5/96), 681 So.2d 1217, 1227, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 117 S.Ct. 1705, 137 L.Ed.2d 830 (1997), that the fact the jury was unaware of the narrow construction to be given the `especially heinous' aggravating circumstance [does] not result in any prejudice to defendant's substantial rights or deprive him of a reliable sentencing determination, where there is ample evidence of torture and pitiless infliction of pain and suffering. Without reiterating the previously explained injuries inflicted by defendant on Morris Prestenback, suffice it to say that Dr. Alfredo Suarez, the pathologist, testified that in 29 years as a pathologist, he had only seen one other stabbing as brutal, bloody, or violent as the instant crime. [14] More importantly, however, where one aggravating circumstance is upheld on review, the failure of another aggravating circumstance will not invalidate the death penalty, unless it can be shown the evidence of the unproven circumstance injected an arbitrary factor into the proceedings. Taylor, 93-2201 at p. 35-36, 669 So.2d at 382. As explained in this opinion, infra, the three remaining aggravating circumstances are more than amply supported by the record. It is therefore unnecessary for us to consider whether there was any error related to the trial judge's jury instruction on the heinous, atrocious and cruel circumstance. In a related vein, defendant argues the court erred when it allowed the State to refer to the heinous nature of the crime during the penalty phase. As previously explained, there was no error in the trial court's failure to give a specific definition of heinous, atrocious, and cruel. The State's references to the heinous nature of the crime in argument were proper. It had urged the circumstance with respect to Morris Prestenback's murder and had introduced medical evidence in support thereof. The State was entitled to allege and make the argument that the crime was heinous. This claim lacks merit. Defendant additionally asserts the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on intoxication of defendant as a mitigating circumstance when there was ample evidence of defendant's impairment at the time of the crime. This assignment lacks merit, however. The trial court charged the jury that impairment, as a result of a mental disease or defect or intoxication, of an offender's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform to the requirements of the law at the commission of the crime was a mitigating factor. The trial court also instructed the jury it could consider mitigating circumstances other than those specifically enumerated by the court. The defense put on ample evidence of defendant's cocaine addiction. Defendant did not object to the charge given nor request an alternative charge. The jury was adequately informed of, and given the opportunity to, recommend life based on this mitigating circumstance but declined to do so. Defendant further alleges the trial court erred when it did not re-advise or refer the jury back to its previous definition of beyond a reasonable doubt during its penalty phase instructions, thus leaving the jury with some confusion over what level of proof the State must show to justify the existence of an aggravating circumstance. The trial judge properly informed the jury during instructions in the penalty phase that if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance existed, you may consider imposing a sentence of death. The actual definition of reasonable doubt was given the jury during the guilt phase instructions. [15] During voir dire, each seated juror was extensively instructed and questioned regarding the concept of reasonable doubt and the burden the State would have to meet in both phases of trial. This assignment lacks merit.