Opinion ID: 3012321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Burden of Proof in S 1955(d) Civil Forfeiture

Text: Proceedings. The government bears the initial burden in a forfeiture proceeding under S 1955. See United States v. On Leong Chinese Merchants Ass’ n Bldg., 918 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1990). The government’s burden in a [S 1955(d)] civil forfeiture is merely to establish probable cause to believe that the defendant property is subject to forfeiture. Probable cause is defined as reasonable ground for the belief of guilt supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion. Of course, probable cause must be demonstrated with respect to every essential element of the alleged violation. Once the government demonstrates probable cause . . . the ultimate burden shifts to the claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is not subject to forfeiture. Id. at 1292 (citations and internal quotations omitted). This is identical to the burdens imposed for civil in rem forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. S 881(a)(6). Thus, in relying upon On Leong, we are merely applying our understanding of the burden-shifting procedure described in 19 U.S.C. S 1615 to this civil forfeiture action brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 1955(d). See United States v. $10,700.00, 258 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2001). If the government satisfies its burden of proof, and the party opposing forfeiture fails to establish that the property is not subject to forfeiture, forfeiture will be ordered regardless of the culpability of the claimant. [T]he presence or involvement of the claimant is simply immaterial to the government’s right to seek forfeiture. Id. at 1293.7 _________________________________________________________________ 7. Forfeitures under S 1955 therefore differ from forfeitures under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. S 881 8 The language of [S 1955(d)] does not condition forfeiture on any suggestions that the claimant itself directed or managed the illegal gambling operation. [Rather,] [i]t authorizes the forfeiture of ‘any property . . . used in violation of the provisions of this section.’ Though one of the preceding subsections does make it illegal to ‘conduct, finance, supervise, direct, or own all or part of an illegal gambling business’ . . . the forfeiture subsection is not limited . . . to property owned by those who themselves conduct or oversee illegal gambling businesses. Id. at 1293 (citations omitted)(emphasis in original). This disjuncture between criminal culpability and exposure to forfeiture arises from a legal fiction.  ‘Traditionally, forfeiture actions have proceeded upon the fiction that inanimate objects themselves can be guilty of wrongdoing.’  Id. (quoting United States v. U. S. Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719 (1971)). Therefore, the object itself is the formal defendant. Id. Thus, forfeiture can be ordered even in the absence of any wrongdoing on the claimant’s part. Id; see also United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 1987) (Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding. The property is the defendant in the case. . . . The innocence of the owner is irrelevant -- it is enough that the property was involved in a violation to which forfeiture attaches.).8