Opinion ID: 1969068
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The June 25, 1995 Arrest

Text: Zimmerman argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion in the non-jury trial of the June 25, 1995 DUI charge by permitting the arresting officer, Sawyer, to testify about the results of the HGN test administered to Zimmerman, without requiring a proper foundation. This Court reviews a trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. [2] At trial, the defense objection was: I object, unless the State can establish this as an accepted test, that this test has been accepted in the State of Delaware as a proper test for the detection of intoxication. [3] The trial judge stated: I will listen to the officer's testimony concerning it and determine whether or not it has relevance. There is no list of tests that need to be accepted. We are attempting to determine what the defendant's condition was at the time of the incident and whether this has relevance to the trier of fact depends on an explanation of the officer administering it. [4] Zimmerman argues that the Superior Court erroneously disregarded the evidentiary requirement that the proponent of scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge must demonstrate its general acceptance in the scientific community. [5] At the conclusion of all of the evidence, including Zimmerman's own testimony in which he admitted drinking one or two beers the afternoon of June 25, 1995 and driving that evening, the trial judge found the defendant guilty of driving under the influence. [6] Because there were no chemical tests performed to determine Zimmerman's blood alcohol content, the trial judge was required to evaluate critically the arresting officer's observations of Zimmerman. Regarding the HGN test, the judge stated: ... and finally, the test ..., I have to admit I can understand the standard by which the officer applied it. I am not exactly sure of its significance, and it would seem to me a purely objective test, although with perhaps some additional evidence, I might see it as subjective. In any case, the officer, having administered a test in which he had been instructed was informative, found that this defendant failed it in every conceivable way. I certainly would not base a conviction on that test alone, but then, again, it becomes one of the numerous factors involved here. [7] In Ruthardt, decided after the case sub judice, the Superior Court recognized the scientific validity of HGN test evidence both for the purposes of establishing probable cause and as substantive evidence of intoxication. [8] The Superior Court's opinion in Ruthardt is well reasoned. Accordingly, we adopt its scientific analysis and expert qualification portions as the appropriate standard for accepting HGN evidence. [9] Because the HGN test is scientific, a proper foundation for testimony about it must be laid. [10] Therefore, prior to the admission of HGN evidence the State must provide [a] proper foundation ... by presenting testimony from an expert with specialized knowledge and training in HGN testing and its underlying principles.... [A] Delaware police officer with specialized training in HGN will suffice. [11] This foundation is necessary to balance the testimony of the arresting officer, whose bias toward supporting his arrest could cause an inappropriate advocation of the reliability of the test that is unsupported by his training or experience. [12] Because there are problems with the physical application of the HGN test and a risk of misdiagnosis because of other causes of nystagmus, this foundation is necessary to allow the jury to give the evidence its proper weight. [13] But even after a proper foundation is laid, HGN testing is not admissible to independently and conclusively establish that a defendant's blood alcohol content equaled or exceeded a specific concentration.... [14] At trial, Officer Sawyer did not testify as to the underlying principles supporting HGN. He testified merely that he was trained to administer the test. Sawyer did not testify about the standards set forth in the NHTSA training manual or that he followed those standards, including the standards for scoring. [15] Although the Superior Court indicated that it understood the standard by which the officer applied the test, it also indicated that it was unsure of its significance. Because the Superior Court admitted the evidence without a proper foundation, it was an abuse of discretion to admit the HGN results into evidence to establish guilt. Even if the court found that the evidence was otherwise relevant and probative, the prejudice to Zimmerman, caused by the trier of fact potentially according the evidence too much weight, outweighed its probative value. An error in admitting evidence may be deemed `harmless' when `the evidence exclusive of the improperly admitted evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction.' [16] Even when the evidentiary error is of a constitutional magnitude, the convictions may be sustained if the error is `harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' [17] In addition to the HGN test, the Court noted that Zimmerman: was uncooperative, imprecise in his answers, unsteady on his feet, dropped the phone book twice, and redialed a number that had already proven unsatisfactory. Using the HGN test as one of the numerous factors involved, the court found that Zimmerman was guilty of driving under the influence. Based on the above findings, it is not possible to conclude from the record that the court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [18] This is especially true in light of the fact that the trial court made particular mention in its ruling that Zimmerman failed the HGN test in every conceivable way. [19]