Opinion ID: 2683357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim Construction: preamble

Text: We review claim construction de novo. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1276–77 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc). Claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meanings to one of skill in the art when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “There are only two exceptions to this general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Prosecution disclaimer or disavowal must be clear and unmistakable. Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In construing the term preamble in the ’267 and the ’427 patents, the district court agreed with the construction “from the Texas [L]itigation,” concluding that it was “still applicable insofar as [it] include[s] spreading prior to transmission.” Claim Construction Order, at 497. It 6 GOLDEN BRIDGE TECHNOLOGY v. APPLE INC. construed preamble as “a signal for communicating with the base station that is spread before transmission and that is without message data.” Id. at 500. GBT disputes the portion of the district court’s construction requiring that the preamble be spread prior to transmission. It argues that the district court’s construction departs from the plain meaning of preamble, and that there is no lexicography or disclaimer that would merit this departure. GBT also contends that it is not bound by its stipulated construction of preamble in the Texas Litigation. It argues that its submission of its stipulated construction to the PTO in an IDS does not constitute a disclaimer of the broader claim scope. GBT contends that, under PTO rules, submissions in an IDS are not admissions that the cited information is material. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.56(b)(2), 1.97(h); see also Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[W]ith the mere listing of references in an IDS, the applicant has admitted no more than that references in the disclosure may be material . . . .”). Therefore, GBT argues that its stipulated construction of preamble in the Texas Litigation does not control the meaning of preamble in the reexamined ’267 patent and new ’427 patent. We conclude that GBT’s submissions during prosecution of its stipulated construction for the term preamble constitute disclaimer. Although we generally construe terms according to their plain and ordinary meanings to one of ordinary skill in the art, we depart from that meaning where there is disclaimer. Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. Here, GBT clearly and unmistakably limited the term preamble to “a signal used for communicating with the base station that is spread before transmission.” J.A. 2127, 3228–30, 3255–56, 3245. During reexamination of the ’267 patent and prosecution of the ’427 patent, GBT submitted and requested that the PTO “expressly consider[]” its stipulated construction of preamble from the Texas Litigation. J.A. 1674, 1680, 1808–10, 2007–08, GOLDEN BRIDGE TECHNOLOGY v. APPLE INC. 7 2127, 2639, 2641, 2679. The stipulation required the preamble to be spread before transmission. Id. It would have been natural for both the PTO and the public to rely upon the stipulation in determining the scope of the claimed invention. It is correct that “mere disclosure of potentially material prior art to the [PTO] does not automatically limit the claimed invention.” Abbott Labs., 334 F.3d at 1279. However, this is not a typical IDS, and GBT did more than simply disclose potentially material prior art. It submitted its own stipulated construction of a claim term in the context of the particular patents being reexamined (’267 patent) and prosecuted (’427 patent). This is a clear and unmistakable assertion by the patentee to the PTO of the meaning and scope of the term preamble. The fact that the stipulation was contained in documents accompanying an IDS does not change this result. We have held that “an applicant’s remarks submitted with an [IDS] can be the basis for limiting claim scope.” Uship Intellectual Props., LLC v. United States, 714 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also Ekchian v. Home Depot, Inc., 104 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“An IDS is part of the prosecution history on which the examiner, the courts, and the public are entitled to rely.”). On the facts of this case, we see no meaningful difference between limiting claim scope based on an applicant’s stipulations contained in IDS documents and an applicant’s remarks contained in the IDS itself. GBT’s stipulation tells the PTO how preamble should be construed, and we conclude that GBT is bound by this representation. We construe preamble in accordance with the stipulation as “a signal used for communication with the base station that is 8 GOLDEN BRIDGE TECHNOLOGY v. APPLE INC. spread before transmission and that is without message data.” 2 Although our precedent allows applicants to rescind a disclaimer during prosecution, GBT did not avail itself of this route and never notified the PTO that it sought a meaning of preamble that was different from its stipulated construction. See, e.g., Hakim v. Cannon Avent Grp., 479 F.3d 1313, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Spring Window Fashions L.P. v. Novo Indus., L.P., 323 F.3d 989, 995 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding the applicant to the “restrictive claim construction that was argued during prosecution” where he “never retracted any of his statements”). Indeed, there is no dispute that GBT did not rescind or retract its stipulated construction of preamble during prosecution of the patents-in-suit. We hold that GBT’s submission of its stipulation to the PTO thus constitutes a clear and unmistakable disclaimer of the broader claim scope that GBT now seeks.