Opinion ID: 1784669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pecuniary Gain Aggravating Circumstance

Text: In his third claim, Jones argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately contest the trial court's application of the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance. He claims that trial counsel did not argue other theories or motives to the jury  for example, that the murder was the result of anger, or that Jones's taking of the paperwork was an afterthought. Where an `afterthought' argument is raised, the defendant's theory is carefully analyzed in light of the entire circumstances of the incident. Bowles v. State, 804 So.2d 1173, 1179 (Fla.2001) (finding that sufficient evidence supported the pecuniary gain aggravator) (quoting Beasley v. State, 774 So.2d 649, 662 (Fla. 2000)). Trial counsel raised this afterthought argument during the charge conference, but did not mention it to the jury during his closing argument. In addition, he alluded to an alternative theory at the beginning of his closing argument but never elaborated further. [11] At the evidentiary hearing, he testified that he overlooked this other theory. In denying this claim, the circuit court found as follows: [Trial counsel] . . . did argue that pecuniary gain was not a motive. He argued that ample independent records existed to prove Defendant's debt to Pablo Motors so that Jones's taking the records from Mr. Stow[]'s office would not allow him to avoid the obligation. Moreover, [trial counsel] noted that Jones left behind money found on Mr. Stow[] and in Ms. Stow[]'s wallet, demonstrating that Jones was not motivated by financial considerations. [Trial counsel] was faced with a record that included his own client's testimony regarding a financial dispute with. . . Stow. In his penalty phase argument, [trial counsel] appropriately and understandably emphasized Defendant's lack of any prior criminal record, his family history and the value of his past and future life. The Court finds that [trial counsel's] penalty phase argument was within the . . . range of reasonable professional assistance and that Defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel. (Citations omitted.) Trial counsel argued against the application of this aggravator by focusing on those facts that were favorable to his case. He contested the application of this aggravator to the extent he could in light of the overriding financial dispute between Jones and Stow. Accordingly, Jones cannot demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient. Even if counsel erred by failing to raise an afterthought argument, Jones cannot demonstrate prejudice. On direct appeal, we held that Jones committed the murder for pecuniary gain: [T]here is no reasonable hypothesis other than that Jones murdered Monique Stow and attempted to murder Ezra Stow in order to obtain ownership of the car and to resolve the problem over the dishonored check. The fact that the car papers were missing from Ezra Stow's desk after the murder and attempted murder support this finding as does the fact that after committing the crimes Jones disposed of the car papers and the gun and hid the car. Jones, 690 So.2d at 570. In addition, Jones had been unemployed for more than a year and knew that he only had five dollars in his bank account. He had previously bounced six other checks. The check he used to pay Stow bounced. He appeared at San Pablo Motors on March 3 only because Stow requested that he make good on the check. The evidence in favor of the pecuniary gain aggravator was overwhelming and would have refuted any additional theories trial counsel could have used to explain the murder. There is no reasonable probability  one sufficient to undermine our confidence in the outcome  that these alternative theories would have changed the jury's recommendation of death or the trial court's imposition of the death penalty. Jones has not established either prong of the Strickland test. Accordingly, we deny this claim.