Opinion ID: 853267
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appointed Counsel Must Be Compensated

Text: Section 34-10-1-2 speaks of appointed attorneys doing their duty. It therefore seems to assume that attorneys may be required to work without compensation. This view of the statute is reflected by the dissent, which relies on Bd. of Comm'rs v. Pollard, 153 Ind. 371, 55 N.E. 87 (1899). In Pollard, this Court attempted to answer the following questions: Did the appointment of [an attorney] by the Howard circuit court create a charge against the county, and was the order of the court allowing [the attorney] compensation for professional services rendered by him to a poor person in a civil action authorized by law? The Howard County circuit court appointed an attorney to represent an indigent plaintiff, based on a statute almost identical to today's sections 34-10-1-1 and 34-10-1-2. After rendering his services, the appointed attorney presented the circuit court's compensation order to the Howard County treasurer, who refused to pay. Although this Court had the opportunity to hold that attorneys may be required to provide free services, it clearly decided otherwise: An attorney at law cannot, in this state, be compelled by an order of a court to render professional services without compensation. Id. While the Court approved holding the county responsible for paying for an appointed attorney for indigent criminal defendants, it reached a different conclusion for civil attorneys. The Court took the view that, in civil cases, not only did the statute contemplate no compensation, courts also had no power to order it. Id. at 374, 55 N.E. at 88. Notably, the Court did not address the issue of what to do when no lawyer is available to provide free service in a civil case. Instead, it expressed its confidence that [t]he eager desire of young practitioners to take part in the exciting contests of the bar would result in enough volunteers stepping forward to accept appointments under the statute. Id. Although Pollard refused to hold that the statute required payment in civil cases, it also refused to press attorneys into uncompensated service. Twice in Pollard, this Court clearly stated that attorneys may not be forced to work without compensation. No doubt is left by the Court's admonition that the attorney cannot be compelled to perform the services ... and, if he does render them at the request of the court, he does so voluntarily. Id. at 375, 55 N.E. at 88. An attorney may of course choose to accept an appointment without compensation. But if no volunteer attorney is available, Article I, Section 21 of the Indiana Constitution provides that [n]o person's particular services shall be demanded, without just compensation. We find no support for the proposition that attorneys' services were historically viewed as somehow outside the ban on conscripting particular services. Shortly after the 1851 Constitution was adopted, this Court held a statute requiring appointment of counsel unconstitutional to the extent it required the services of an attorney at law to prosecute or defend without fee. Blythe v. State, 4 Ind. 525, 525 (1853). Similarly, in Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 18 (1854), this Court stated, An attorney of the Court is under no obligation, honorary or otherwise, to volunteer his services. The reasoning in Webb rested in large part on the notion that the legal profession, under the 1851 Constitution, was reduced to ... a common level with all other provisions and pursuits. Id. at 16. This presumably referred to the populist provision inserted into Article VII, Section 21, that [e]very person of good moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admission to practice law in all courts of justice. After repeated assaults by the legal profession, that provision was finally repealed in 1932, and the modern system of judicial supervision and licensing of the bar was instituted. See In re Todd, 208 Ind. 168, 193 N.E. 865 (1935) (holding Article VII, Section 21 was stricken from the Indiana Constitution in the 1932 general election). [4] Even today, several sources suggest an attorney's duty to assist the poor. For example, the Indiana Oath of Attorneys requires every attorney to undertake that I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed. Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 6.1 provides, A lawyer should render public interest legal service ... by providing professional service at no fee or a reduced fee to persons of limited means. And the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct Preamble recites, A lawyer should be mindful ... of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance, and should therefore devote professional time ... in their behalf. Over a century ago, Pollard expressed this Court's confidence in the bar's willingness to supply service on a voluntary basis. We continue to share the hope that a number of attorneys will voluntarily accept the appointments required by section 34-10-1-2, but we do not adhere to the view that volunteer resources are sufficient to the task. Pro bono commissions and pro bono service providers are now in place to address this need, but every indication is that they cannot realistically be expected to provide counsel for every litigant. As amicus Indiana Civil Liberties Union put it, [T]here is no doubt that even including the possibility of pro bono representation,... existing providers cannot come close to meeting the need for civil legal assistance for indigent litigants. Nor can we rely solely on the philanthropic spirit of the bar to guarantee the proper implementation of the legislature's mandate. Finally, requiring attorneys to serve involuntarily and without compensation is an impermissible resolution of this impasse. Because one must be licensed to engage in the practice of law, the privilege of a license arguably brings with it an obligation to provide free legal services under section 34-10-1-2. However, notwithstanding the dissent's claims to historical practice, this Court in Blythe (1853), Webb (1854) and Pollard (1899) has consistently rejected the notion that an attorney may be compelled to serve without compensation. [5] Moreover, even after the legal profession became a highly regulated institution, this Court reiterated its view that attorneys cannot be involuntarily impressed into public service. In Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 509-10, 29 N.E.2d 405, 412 (1940), this Court explicitly addressed the dissent's licensed profession argument: It is true that members of the bar feel it to be their ethical duty not to withhold their counsel ... to those who are not able to adequately pay, but such ethical obligations are voluntary and cannot be required.... In these modern times practitioners of the professions and of many arts, sciences, trades, and businesses are required to be licensed.... If a law should be enacted requiring every person licensed by the state to render services ... to paupers gratuitously, much difficulty would be found in justifying a decision holding the law unconstitutional as depriving the green grocer or the restaurant operator of his goods, or as depriving the physician, or the barber, or the plumber, or the electrician, or the mechanical engineer of his services, without compensation, while adhering to a rule that licensed attorneys' services may be taken without compensation. We adhere to this view and hold that the Constitution prevents requiring a specific lawyer to accept employment without compensation in a specific case. [6] The obligation to provide pro bono service is one of the profession as a whole and Article I, Section 21 prevents a court from imposing it disproportionately on any single attorney.