Opinion ID: 1831617
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Standard Jury Instruction

Text: Finally, we note that the interpretation we affirm today comports with the accepted judicial construction of damages under section 768.21(3), as reflected by the standard jury instructions published by this Court. Standard jury instructions are not binding precedent; however, the instructions are published under this Court's authority and are presumed to be correct. Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1071 (Fla.2000). The standard jury instruction for section 768.21(3) indicates that damages are to be based on the life expectancies of the minor child and deceased parent. In re Standard Jury Instructions Civil Cases, 522 So.2d 364, 368 (Fla.1988) (instruction 6.6g). [3] We find no case that has directly addressed the appropriate measure of damages under this section. In the absence of a definitive case, instruction 6.6g provides a useful indication of the prevailing judicial understanding regarding a surviving minor child's damages in a wrongful death action. In the present case, we find no persuasive reason to depart from this understanding of the Legislature's intended measure of damages under section 768.21(3). We therefore hold that the damages recoverable by a minor child under section 768.21(3) are not limited to the period of minority, but should be calculated based on the joint life expectancies of the minor child and the deceased parent. We decline to address BellSouth's collateral argument that BellSouth had transferred its responsibility for the utility pole to Florida Power & Light before Herbert Meeks' accident in 1997, because this issue is outside the scope of the certified question. See Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So.2d 1071, 1080 n. 26 (Fla.2001) (stating that this Court generally declines to address a claim that is outside the scope of the certified question and that has not passed jurisdictional muster).