Opinion ID: 2219129
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Heading: Bailable by Sufficient Sureties.

Text: Briggs argues that the intersection of two provisions of the Iowa Constitution prevents the imposition of cash only bail. Primary of these two is article I, section 12, which provides: No person shall after acquittal, be tried for the same offence. All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable, by sufficient sureties, except for capital offences where the proof is evident, or the presumption great. Iowa Const. art. I, § 12 (emphasis added). In Briggs' estimation, the sufficient sureties clause of section 12 precludes any bail option that prevents unfettered access to a surety. Thus, she argues, the sufficient sureties clause, combined with the excessive bail clause of article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution, bars the imposition of cash only bail. Iowa Const. art. I, § 17 ( Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed, and cruel and unusual punishment shall not be inflicted. (Emphasis added.)). Briggs asserts that this interpretation is consistent with and commanded by the language of the Iowa Constitution, especially in light of that language's meaning at the time of our constitution's drafting. It is necessary to note at the outset the full context in which the district court's decisions related to bail were made. Although Briggs correctly cites the two constitutional provisions on bail, she pays little heed to the statutory provisions of the Iowa Code, which also play an important role in any bail analysis. As the State indicates, the district court acted in accordance with the provisions of chapter 811 of the Iowa Codewhich describe the operation of the bail processin setting Briggs' bail. See Iowa Code §§ 811.1-.12. Most importantly, Briggs' bail was apparently considered and reconsidered in light of the provisions of Iowa Code section 811.2. [2] The presence and operation of these statutory bail provisions forces us to reframe the argument Briggs presents. Although her challenge is focused on the district court's decision denying her application for bond review, the bail questions before the court arose in the context of the Iowa Constitution and Iowa Code section 811.2. Because Briggs challenges a bail determination resting on a statutory provision, she carries the heavy burden of rebutting the presumption that the statute is constitutional. State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 200 (Iowa 2002). Accordingly, she must negate every reasonable basis upon which the court could hold the statute constitutional and show beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] statute violates the constitution. Id. To determine whether Iowa Code section 811.2 and, in turn, the decisions of the district court violate the constitution, we must first determine the actual meaning of the sufficient sureties clause. Our polestar in this analysis is the intent of the framers of our constitution. Howard v. Schildberg Constr. Co., 528 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 1995); see also Edge v. Brice, 253 Iowa 710, 718, 113 N.W.2d 755, 759 (1962) (noting the framers' intent that constitutional provisions endure for an extended future period). First and foremost, [w]e give the words used by the framers their natural and commonly-understood meaning. Howard, 528 N.W.2d at 553. However, we may also examine the constitutional history and consider `the object to be attained or the evil to be remedied as disclosed by the circumstances at the time of adoption.'  Id. (quoting Redmond v. Ray, 268 N.W.2d 849, 853 (Iowa 1978)). As both parties indicate, any attempt to give the words of the sufficient sureties clause their natural and commonly-understood meaning is impeded by the changing understanding of this terminology from the time of our constitution's drafting to the present. Id. Although an interpretation that incorporates modern understandings of the terms is possible, we believe it is necessary to examine our constitutional history to properly gauge the intent of the framers in including this clause. See id. This requires an abbreviated review of the history of bail, the role of sureties in the bail system, and our constitution. At the intersection of these histories, the meaning and purpose of the sufficient sureties clause is revealed.