Opinion ID: 3039060
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Motion to Suppress Was Properly Denied

Text: Because Tammi Putnam Voluntarily Consented to the Search of Apartment 36 “We review de novo the district court’s denial of a suppression motion. The district court’s underlying factual finding that a person voluntarily consented to a search is reviewed for clear error.” United States v. Pang, 362 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). [1] “It is well settled that a search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is constitutionally permissible.” United States v. Soriano, 361 F.3d 494, 501 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Whether consent to search was voluntarily given is to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. It is the government’s burden to prove that the consent was freely and voluntarily given. On appeal, evidence regarding the question of consent must be viewed in the light most favorable to the fact-finder’s decision.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). [2] “Our cases have identified five factors to be considered in determining the voluntariness of consent to a search. They are: (1) whether defendant was in custody; (2) whether the arresting officers had their guns drawn; (3) whether Miranda warnings were given; (4) whether the defendant was notified UNITED STATES v. RODRIQUEZ 17301 that she had a right not to consent; and (5) whether the defendant had been told a search warrant could be obtained.” Id. at 502 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “No one factor is determinative in the equation. It is not necessary to check off all five factors, but many of this court’s decisions upholding consent as voluntary are supported by at least several of the factors. Nevertheless, these factors are only guideposts, not a mechanized formula to resolve the voluntariness inquiry.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). [3] Based on the totality of the circumstances and after considering the applicable factors, we conclude that Tammi voluntarily consented to the search. As to the first factor, the district court concluded, and Rodriquez conceded in his brief, that Tammi was not in custody when she consented to the search. Second, the court determined that there was no “indication that firearms were exhibited or drawn,” a conclusion with which Rodriquez also agreed. Third, because Tammi was not in custody, “Miranda warnings were inapposite . . .” Id. at 504 (citation omitted). Fourth, the court found, and Rodriquez acknowledged, that Tammi knew she had the right to refuse consent. “Knowledge of the right to refuse consent is highly relevant in determining whether a consent is valid.” Id. (alteration and citations omitted). Moreover, where, as here, “the officers themselves informed [Tammi] that she was free to withhold her consent,” “the probability that their conduct could reasonably have appeared to her to be coercive” is “substantially lessened.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 559 (1980) (emphasis added). [4] Fifth, Deputy Thompson told Tammi that, if she chose not to consent, he could apply for a search warrant and secure her apartment. A “statement indicating that a search warrant would likely be sought and the [apartment] secured could not have, by itself, rendered [Tammi’s] consent involuntary as a matter of law.” United States v. Whitworth, 856 F.2d 1268, 1279 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Rather, application of this factor “hinges on whether [Tammi was] informed 17302 UNITED STATES v. RODRIQUEZ about the possibility of a search warrant in a threatening manner.” Soriano, 361 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). “Even assuming, however, that [Deputy Thompson’s statements] were made in a threatening manner so as to imply the futility of withholding consent, when probable cause to justify a warrant exists, the weight of the fifth factor is significantly diminished.” Id. at 504-05 (citations omitted). [5] Probable cause to justify a warrant existed in this case. “Probable cause exists when there is a fair probability or substantial chance of criminal activity. It is well-settled that the determination of probable cause is based upon the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time of the search.” Id. at 505 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). [6] Prior to the search, the officers knew the following: Rodriquez had absconded from his supervision, and there were four outstanding warrants for his arrest; he was found standing right outside an open door to an apartment eating a bowl of cereal; he denied residing at the apartment, but two people independently confirmed that he resided there; he provided an implausible explanation for how he arrived at the apartment; he attempted to distance himself from the apartment; and he was in possession of “a considerable size chunk of heroin” and approximately $900 dollars in cash. This collection of facts implies a fair probability of criminal activity resulting in probable cause, thereby significantly diminishing the weight of the fifth factor. See id. The voluntary consent analysis does not automatically end here, however, because the five factors articulated in Soriano are not exhaustive. Id. at 502. In addition to the five factors, “execution of a consent form is one factor that indicates that consent was voluntary.” United States v. Childs, 944 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1991) (alteration and citation omitted). In this case, Tammi executed a consent form, reinforcing the conclusion that she voluntarily consented. UNITED STATES v. RODRIQUEZ 17303 [7] In sum, the totality of the circumstances in this case leads us to conclude that the district court’s finding that Tammi voluntarily consented to the search was not clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Rodriquez’s motion to suppress.