Opinion ID: 2556859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The 120-Day Time Limit

Text: We review the decision of the PERB as if it had come to this court directly, rather than through the Superior Court. E.g., Gibson v. District of Columbia Public Employee Relations Board, 785 A.2d 1238, 1241 (D.C.2001). We look to see if the factual findings in PERB decisions are supported by substantial evidence and if the legal conclusions are reasonable. Public Employee Relations Board v. Washington Teachers' Union Local 6, 556 A.2d 206, 207 (D.C.1989). Those decisions will not be overturned unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence or are clearly erroneous as a matter of law. Super. Ct. Agency Review Rule 1(g). The District of Columbia Code provides that decisions made by the PERB shall be rendered within a reasonable period of time, and in no event later than 120 days after the matter is submitted or referred to it for a decision. D.C.Code § 1-617.14 (2001). The last two decisions by the PERB in this case were both made well beyond the 120-day limitation imposed by the statute. For that reason, appellant argues that the PERB lost jurisdiction over his case and therefore could not remand it to the arbitrator for consideration under the proper standard of proof. The PERB argues, to the contrary, that the statute's time limitation is intended to be directory, not mandatory, and therefore that the passage of more than 120 days does not deprive it of jurisdiction. Further, the PERB maintains that the jurisdictional issue was waived in this particular instance because appellant failed to object to its jurisdiction during the arbitration proceedings. While the word shall usually denotes a mandatory duty, this court has held that when it is used in a statute, the word is sometimes found to be merely directory for obvious reasons founded in fairness and justice. JBG Properties, Inc. v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 364 A.2d 1183, 1185 (D.C. 1976) (holding that instruction for the Office of Human Rights to take action on complaints within a specified time was directory and that failure to meet that deadline did not require dismissal of the complaint). Thus we concluded in JBG Properties that the dismissal of actions based on a slight delay on the part of a public officer would prejudice private rights and public interest. Id. Consequently, when a statute says that an agency shall make a decision within a set period of time, that limit is generally considered directory rather than mandatory. Spicer v. District of Columbia Real Estate Comm'n, 636 A.2d 415, 418 (D.C. 1993). The limitation will be construed as mandatory, however, when the statute goes further by providing a sanction if the agency fails to act within the prescribed period. Id. This general rule means that a statutory time limit for agency action which is not accompanied by attendant sanctions raises a rebuttable presumption that the time limitation is intended to be merely directory. Teamsters Local 1714 v. District of Columbia Public Employee Relations Board, 579 A.2d 706, 710 (D.C. 1990). Invoking this general rule, the PERB relies on the lack of a sanction in the statute imposing a 120-day limit on its decisions to support its position that this time limit is directory, not mandatory. We have also held, however, that the presumption that a statutory time limitation is directory may be overcome after considering the nature of the act to be performed and the phraseology of the statute to see whether it should be considered a limitation of the power of the [public] officer. Id. (citations omitted). To this end, appellant argues that the language requiring the agency to issue a decision in no event later than the 120-day limit is precisely the kind of phraseology that signals a limitation on the agency's power. He points to several state court decisions which have held language requiring that an act be done not later than or in no event later than a specified time to be mandatory. See Ursino v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. App.3d 611, 619, 114 Cal.Rptr. 404, 410 (1974) (when an ordinance provided that the Board of Permit Appeals was required to act not later than 40 days after the filing of an appeal, [t]he use of the word `shall' in conjunction with the phrase `not later than' [was] clearly indicative of a mandatory declaration (citations omitted)); Kurr v. Town of Cicero, 235 Ill. App.3d 528, 535, 176 Ill.Dec. 535, 545, 601 N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (1992) (holding that statutory requirement that town building commissioner shall provide applicant with list of violations to be corrected in no event later than 30 days following such inspection must be construed as mandatory); City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 531 Pa. 489, 614 A.2d 213, 214 (1992) (holding that the statutory phrase in no event later than imposed a mandatory time limit for a budget submission, after which the labor board could no longer appoint fact-finders in a negotiation). In cases such as these, the courts have noted a particular need to ensure expeditious action and to avoid arbitrary and capricious delay on the part of the agency. See Foley v. Civil Service Comm'n, 89 Ill.App.3d 871, 873, 45 Ill.Dec. 261, 262, 412 N.E.2d 612, 613 (1980). However, while appellant's cited cases support the possibility that the language may be read as mandatory, we have generally not reached the same conclusion when interpreting similar phrases in the District of Columbia Code as applied to other public officials. For example, when we considered the requirement that an official make a decision regarding an undertaker's license as soon as practicable, but not later than ninety days, we held that the language was directory, not mandatory. Vann v. District of Columbia Board of Funeral Directors, 441 A.2d 246, 247-248 (D.C.1982). This holding is in line with other cases cited by the PERB to illustrate our reluctance to disturb the rulings of public agencies even when extensive delays have occurred. See, e.g., Anjuwan v. District of Columbia Dep't of Public Works, 729 A.2d 883 (D.C.1998) (upholding a decision of the Office of Employee Appeals made two and a half years after the expiration of a 120-day statutory time limit); Harris v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human Rights, 562 A.2d 625 (D.C.1989) (rejecting argument that delay of more than ten years required reversal based on prejudice allegedly resulting from agency's inaction). Appellant strives to distinguish these cases by arguing that the time limits, such as those for the Commission on Human Rights in the Harris case, applied to distinct steps in the review process but not to the final decision of the Commission. We do not read those prior decisions as turning on such a distinction. Nor has appellant, apart from citing cases in other jurisdictions, given us any reason why we should not conclude that the time limit in this case is directory, as we have held in other cases upholding actions exceeding the statutory time limit when there was no sanction attached to any failure to meet the time limit. Having determined that the time limit was directory, we would normally conduct a balancing test, as we did in Vann, to determine whether the agency's delay caused sufficient prejudice to appellant to outweigh the normally prevailing interest in allowing the agency to act after the expiration of the time limit. See Vann, 441 A.2d at 248. When the statute applicable in a particular case is directory, the balancing test set forth in JBG Properties must be applied. See JBG Properties, 364 A.2d at 1187 (establishing a balancing test for such cases to determine (1) potential and actual prejudice to the losing party and (2) public and private interests in allowing the agency to proceed after the time limit). But before proceeding to that step, we must first consider whether such an inquiry should be conducted at all, since appellant did not object to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator after the PERB remanded the case for reconsideration after the 120-day time limit had expired. The PERB contends that the entire issue of jurisdiction has been waived because Brown participated in the arbitration process without raising the issue at all prior to the final arbitration decision. See Howard University v. Metropolitan Campus Police Officer's Union, 379 U.S.App. D.C. 282, 286, 512 F.3d 716, 720 (2008) (noting that the federal circuits are in agreement that objections to jurisdiction must be made at the arbitration proceeding in order to be presented to a reviewing court, and citing cases from five other circuits). In this case the trial court agreed with the PERB that the lack of objection during the arbitration waived the issue and precluded further review. Appellant does not present us with any new argument to the contrary on appeal; instead, he states only that he is incorporating the arguments he made before the trial court. There he asserted that no objection could be made because there was no participation in the proceedings once they were remanded. In support of this contention, he relied on International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 545 v. Hope Electrical Corp., 380 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir.2004). We agree with the trial court that appellant's reliance on Hope Electrical, which successfully challenged an arbitrator's substantive jurisdiction but not his procedural jurisdiction, is misplaced. As the Eighth Circuit made clear in its decision, procedural jurisdictional challenges involve the question of whether procedural safeguards established by the collective bargaining process were followed, whereas substantive jurisdictional challenges turn on the dual issues of whether the parties have a valid contract to resolve their dispute by arbitration and whether that contract authorizes arbitrators to decide the substantive issue submitted for resolution. Id. at 1098. After making this distinction clear, the court in Hope Electrical held that procedural challenges to the arbitrator's jurisdiction could not be addressed when the party opposed to arbitration failed to raise the issues of procedural arbitrability with the arbitrators. Id. at 1099 (holding further that substantive challenges to the arbitration could go forward when a motion to vacate the arbitration award was timely made). Appellant asserted below that neither party had the opportunity to raise this issue with the arbitrator on remand. This assertion is not supported by the record. Although appellant was fully aware of the remand order, he has not made any showing, either to the trial court or to this court, that he took steps to notify the arbitrator of his objection to jurisdiction on remand. Nor has appellant arguednor could hethat the objection could have been anything but a procedural challenge to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, since it was predicated solely on the lapse of time before the decision to remand was issued. Therefore, following the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Howard, we hold that appellant has waived his right to challenge the arbitrator's jurisdiction on this appeal. Consequently, we need not conduct any further Vann -type inquiry into the balance of equities under the directory time limit of 120 days which the statute places on the PERB for rendering decisions.