Opinion ID: 2176972
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Equal-Protection Claim

Text: The Governor claims that § 36-14-5, subsections (n) and ( o ), and Ethics Commission Regulations XX-XX-XXXX and XX-XX-XXXX (revolving-door legislation) violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and the Rhode Island Constitutions by creating an unconstitutional classification of individuals who may not be considered for public office. The Governor asserts that the revolving-door legislation mandates that those parties who have been employed by the state within the past year cannot be considered for certain public offices. The Governor, relying on Cummings v. Godin, 119 R.I. 325, 377 A.2d 1071 (1977), and Dwyer v. Conflict of Interest Commission, 646 F. Supp. 707 (D.R.I. 1986), contends that the revolving-door legislation restricts a public official's right to hold a successive public office and, accordingly, should be subject to a high level of judicial scrutiny. [T]he constitutional amendment that became art. 1, sec. 2, was passed to bring Rhode Island equal-protection law on par with federal equal-protection law. Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, Inc., 612 A.2d 734, 738 (R.I. 1992). Therefore, by applying the federal analysis in the equal-protection area, we shall answer the Governor's question under both the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions. Our analysis pursuant to an equal-protection claim commences with a consideration of the level of judicial scrutiny that the challenged legislation or action requires. A rational-basis scrutiny is applied to social or economic legislation, presuming it to be valid if the classification drawn is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313, 320 (1985). Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy receive an intermediate standard of review and will survive such scrutiny if they are substantially related to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 440-41, 105 S.Ct. at 3254-55, 87 L.Ed.2d at 320-21. Classifications based on race, alienage or national origin, or classifications that impinge upon fundamental rights, are subject to strict scrutiny and will survive an equal-protection claim only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Id. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d at 320; see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 1914, 100 L.Ed.2d 465, 471 (1988). The Governor asserts that the revolving-door legislation restricts a public official's right to hold a successive public office. The Governor relies on Cummings for the proposition that the holding of public office is a significant form of political expression and thus is one of the rights included within the ambit of the First Amendment. Cummings, 119 R.I. at 335-36, 377 A.2d at 1076. Consequently, the Governor avers, a high level of scrutiny must be applied. The Cummings court analyzed a municipal ordinance under the First Amendment and did not consider an equal-protection argument. Id. at 329-36, 377 A.2d at 1073-76. To the extent that the Cummings decision mandated that all barriers to a person's right to hold public office demand a high level of judicial scrutiny, or to the extent that Cummings identified candidacy for public office as a fundamental right, those beliefs must be revisited in light of Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982).  Far from recognizing candidacy as a `fundamental right,' we have held that the existence of barriers to a candidate's access to the ballot `does not of itself compel close scrutiny.' (Emphasis added.) Id. at 963, 102 S.Ct. at 2843, 73 L.Ed.2d at 516. Since candidacy for public office is not a fundamental right, then neither can the right to be appointed to a public office be a fundamental right. There is no per se fundamental right to government employment. See Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d 520, 524 (1976). The Supreme Court has departed from traditional equal-protection analysis in two lines of ballot-access cases. Clements, 457 U.S. at 964-66, 102 S.Ct. at 2844-45, 73 L.Ed.2d at 516-17. The Court has applied something more than the traditional rational-relationship test in ballot-access cases involving classifications based upon wealth and those classifications that burden small political parties or independent candidates. Id. Neither type of classification is implicated by the revolving-door legislation. Because this is an advisory opinion, we indulge in a digression suggested by the Attorney General and in fact struggle to identify the instant situation as one that involves access to the ballot or as a ballot-access question. Subsections (n) and ( o ) of § 36-14-5 have a specific exclusion for seeking election to state constitutional office. Regulation 36-14-5007 has been interpreted by the commission as also allowing a public official to seek elective office. ( See part II E of this opinion.) Our primary concern is with the tendency of ballot access restrictions `to limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose.' Therefore `[i]n approaching candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic light the extent and nature of their impact on voters.' Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1569, 75 L.Ed.2d 547, 556 (1983). Our ballot access cases    focus on the degree to which the challenged restrictions operate as a mechanism to exclude certain classes of candidates from the electoral process. The inquiry is whether the challenged restriction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the `availability of political opportunity.' Clements, 457 U.S. at 964, 102 S.Ct. at 2844, 73 L.Ed.2d at 516. The public positions to which the revolving-door legislation applies are appointed positions or are positions elected from a state or a municipal governing body. They are not positions that are elected by the general electorate. Therefore, the voters' interest or influence is extremely diluted and attenuated at best. The unrestricted vote they cast is for the person or the body exercising the power to appoint or elect. The revolving-door legislation does not unfairly burden those with political opportunities or aspirations. See id. We do not view the revolving-door legislation as per se restricting an individual's access to the electoral ballot since the general electorate has a de minimis impact on the person appointed or elected. Even if this were a narrower ballot-access restriction, the one-year waiting period dictated by the revolving-door legislation places a  de minimis burden on the political aspirations of a current office holder.    A `waiting period' is hardly a significant barrier to candidacy. (Emphasis added.) Clements, 457 U.S. at 967, 102 S.Ct. at 2846, 73 L.Ed.2d at 518 (holding that a two-year waiting period was insignificant and required only a rational predicate to survive an equal-protection challenge). The revolving-door legislation does not directly interfere with an individual's right to be a candidate for public office. The revolving-door legislation simply limits one employment option, for a one-year period, available to the covered class of individuals. Consequently any suggestion by Cummings that a higher level of scrutiny applies has been replaced by the implications of the Clements decision. Because the challenged legislation does not fall within a category that would require heightened scrutiny and since we view the legislation as social, the rational-relationship test is applicable. In order for the revolving-door legislation to pass constitutional equal-protection muster, it must be shown that the legislation is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The mere fact that the legislation could have been drawn more precisely will not invalidate the statute.    `The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective.' In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (DEPCO), 593 A.2d 943, 950 (R.I. 1991). A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 (1961). The revolving-door legislation addresses the imbroglio of public officials who use their present positions and contacts as unfair bargaining tactics in gaining future employment with the state or a municipality. [A] democracy is effective only if the people have faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered when high officials and their appointees engage in activities which arouse suspicions   . United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562, 81 S.Ct. 294, 315, 5 L.Ed.2d 268, 295 (1961). The legislative aim of the revolving-door provisions is to ensure that public officials adhere to the highest standards of conduct, avoid the appearance of impropriety, and do not use their positions for private gain or advantage. See R.I. Const., art. 3, sec. 7. The integrity of our government officials is quintessential to our system of representation. In general the purpose of revolving-door provisions is to prevent government employees from unfairly profiting from or otherwise trading upon the contacts, associations and special knowledge that they acquired   . Forti v. New York State Ethics Commission, 75 N.Y.2d 596, 605, 554 N.E.2d 876, 878, 555 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (1990). The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men [or women] who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.  (Emphasis added.) The Federalist No. 57, at 383 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961). We believe that the revolving-door legislation is an effective device by which the public trust may be enhanced. There is a legitimate purpose in abridging the abuse of public office. The drafters of the revolving-door legislation could have reasonably concluded that the possibility of one's unjustly entrenching oneself in a public position, by moving from one state or municipal position to another, could be greatest for those positions to which the one-year waiting period was made applicable. This court imposes similar one-year waiting periods on former law clerks wishing to practice before this court (with a complete ban on any consultation and assistance on any case that was pending during the clerk's position) and on any former government attorney wishing to represent a private client before the agency in which he or she was once employed. ( See R.I. Supreme Court Rules Article II, Rule 11, and R.I. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.11(b).) The drafters may have concluded that the risk of undue influence is great in the positions that it identified. Their actions, taken as a whole, were a result of the difficult task of reaching an acceptable compromise among the important competing concerns, most notably the need to impose stricter controls while, at the same time, ensuring that government service does not become so unattractive that talented individuals are deterred from entering government service. Forti, 75 N.Y.2d at 604-05, 554 N.E.2d at 878, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 237. No government branch is immune from influence peddling, and we believe that there was an adequate basis for the ethical restraints imposed. See id. at 613, 554 N.E.2d at 883, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 242. The [drafters are] certainly entitled to consider that `[e]vils in the    field may be of different dimensions and proportions' so that different remedies are required. Id. The revolving-door legislation rests on a rational predicate and promotes integrity and public confidence in government.