Opinion ID: 2976216
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Against Officer Cook

Text: The doctrine of qualified immunity provides that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In determining whether qualified immunity is warranted, we employ a three-part test: The first inquiry is whether the Plaintiff has shown a violation of a constitutionally protected right; the second inquiry is whether that right was clearly established at the time such that a reasonable official would have understood that his behavior violated that right; and the third inquiry is whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts, and supported the allegations by sufficient evidence, to indicate that what the official allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established rights. Tucker v. City of Richmond, 388 F.3d 216, 219 (6th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted); see -9- Simon v. Cook, et al. No. 06-6514 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). The existence of qualified immunity is a legal question for the court unless there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the defendant actually committed acts that would violate a clearly established right. Black v. Parke, 4 F.3d 442, 446-49 (6th Cir. 1993). In this case, we hold that Officer Cook did not violate Simon’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, Cook is immune from suit.
The Fourth Amendment grants citizens the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. U.S. CONST . amend. IV; Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 312-13 (6th Cir. 2000). There is no question that Officer Cook “seized” Simon within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he handcuffed Simon and took him to ESH. In Monday v. Oullette, we joined several other circuits in holding that the “Fourth Amendment requires an official seizing and detaining a person for a psychiatric evaluation to have probable cause to believe that the person is dangerous to himself or others.” Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1997); accord Ahern v. O’Donnell, 109 F.3d 809, 817 (1st Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Sherman v. Four County Counseling Ctr., 987 F.2d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 1993); Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1993); Gooden v. Howard County, Md., 954 F.2d 960, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc); Maag v. Wessler, 960 F.2d 773, 776 (9th Cir. 1991). We have reiterated the probable cause standard each time the question has been presented to this court. See Ziegler v. Aukerman, ___ F.3d ___, No. 06-2618, 2008 WL 114855, at - (6th Cir. Jan. 14, 2008); Fisher v. Harden, 398 F.3d 837, 842-43 (6th Cir. 2005); Roberts v. Anderson, 213 F. App’x 420, 427 (6th Cir. 2007) - 10 - Simon v. Cook, et al. No. 06-6514 In the Monday case, we analogized a dangerous mental condition to the role of criminal activity in traditional Fourth Amendment analysis and concluded that “a showing of probable cause in the mental health seizure context requires only a ‘probability or substantial chance’ of dangerous behavior, not an actual showing of such behavior.” 118 F.3d at 1102 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 n.13 (1983)). Moreover, we stated that “because ‘probable cause is a fluid concept[,] turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts,’ courts evaluate the existence of probable cause from the perspective of a reasonable and objective person in the position of the seizing official.” Ibid. (internal citation omitted). In Monday, officers responded to a call of a potential suicide after the plaintiff had called a psychological counseling hotline and stated that he was mixing alcohol with his prescription medication. 118 F.3d at 1101. After being admitted to plaintiff’s living room, Officer Oullette observed that plaintiff was intoxicated and depressed. Ibid. Oullette asked the plaintiff if he had any pills, and the plaintiff produced a vial of Xanax pills from his shirt pocket. Ibid. Officer Oullette determined that at least twenty pills were missing, even though the prescription had been renewed just the day before. Ibid. Plaintiff refused to go to the hospital, told Oullette his ex-wife had the missing pills, and continued drinking his beer. Ibid. Reviewing those facts, we held that officers had probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was suicidal and might hurt himself if not taken to a hospital. By contrast, in Fisher, we held that officers lacked probable cause to believe that an elderly man, who had been hunting while sitting on railroad tracks, was suicidal or a danger when he had obeyed their commands to drop his rifle and had approached them in a normal manner. 398 F.3d at 843. The Fisher court emphasized that the officers had “never questioned Fisher to determine if - 11 - Simon v. Cook, et al. No. 06-6514 he might be depressed and attempting to commit suicide” before placing him face down and handcuffing him. Ibid. Fisher had not done anything “that the officers considered to be suspicious or threatening,” “he was never verbally threatening, abusive, or irrational,” and “he did not make any statements about hurting himself or anyone else.” Ibid. Although the instant case presents a closer question than either Fisher or Monday, we hold that the undisputed facts indicate that Cook had probable cause to believe that Simon was a danger to himself or others. Officer Cook was aware of the “signal 10” officer safety alert. Unlike the officers in Fisher, Officer Cook questioned and observed Simon at length. Simon’s allegations that the coroner was following him; that men in black, whom he speculated may have been police, had attacked him; that unknown persons had backed a car’s tailpipe up to a phone booth Simon had been using in an effort to poison him with carbon monoxide; and that multiple government agencies were complicit in these actions were bizarre and improbable. Although we credit Simon, and Haynes’s favorable statements, that Simon did not initially seem dangerous, even Simon admits that the situation escalated during his conversation with Cook. Crediting Simon’s version of events, he pointed a finger within a foot of Officer Cook’s face and asked rhetorically, “how would you like it if I followed you around?” Thus, Simon intimated that he intended to follow police officers to see why they were allegedly following him. Officer Haynes testified that Simon’s finger-pointing was threatening. Officer Cook flinched to avoid Simon’s finger, grabbed Simon’s wrist, and handcuffed him. Taken together, the undisputed facts indicate that Simon demonstrated a high level of irrationality and a relatively low level of dangerousness. That is, his undisputed statements indicated - 12 - Simon v. Cook, et al. No. 06-6514 that he believed that various government officials were harassing him and that the police had attacked him in the past. At the same time, mere finger-pointing presents a very low level of dangerousness. We understand that there is a difference between facts indicating mental illness and merely obstreperous behavior, and we are reluctant to set the bar for probable cause so low that the merely obnoxious are detained for mental evaluation. Cf. Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 240-41 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing grant of summary judgment for police officers where police stated that the plaintiff had been ranting and acting unstable, but where police had deliberately ignored an opportunity to consult the plaintiff’s own doctor before detaining him for mental evaluation). However, that said, probable cause requires only a “probability or substantial chance” of dangerous behavior based on the circumstances of each case. Even if Simon did not present a substantial chance of immediate danger to Cook, his stated intent to follow the police and get to the bottom of the alleged attacks against him indicated a substantial chance of irrational and dangerous behavior in the near future. While such a statement might not suffice on its own, we must view the statement in the context of Simon’s apparently paranoid statements about the police. Thus, taken together, Simon’s words and actions created probable cause to believe that Simon was mentally ill and dangerous. Moreover, the fact that Dr. Goldstein’s conclusions dovetail with Officer Cook’s conclusions is further evidence that Cook’s judgment was objectively reasonable.4 Given the 4 Of course, Monday admonishes that “courts evaluate the existence of probable cause from the perspective of a reasonable and objective person in the position of the seizing official.” 118 F.3d at 1102 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). Accordingly, it is important to note that even if Goldstein had concluded that Simon was mentally healthy, that would not necessarily show a lack of probable cause. See ibid. (“a mental health seizure can rest upon probable cause even when the person seized does not actually suffer from a dangerous mental condition” (emphasis added)). - 13 - Simon v. Cook, et al. No. 06-6514 existence of probable cause, Officer Cook’s decision to detain Simon for a mental evaluation was not a constitutional violation.
Simon also claims that Officer Cook made false statements to the staff at ESH and that such conduct violated Simon’s right to substantive due process. According to Simon, Dr. Goldstein showed Cook’s handwritten statement to Simon, and the “statement falsely asserted that Simon had been a patient at ESH, had been diagnosed as mentally ill[,] and was not taking his prescribed medication.” Simon acknowledges in his brief that he must show conduct that “shocks the conscience” in order to prevail on his substantive due process claim. See United States v. Budd, 496 F.3d 517, 529 (6th Cir. 2007). To shock the conscience, conduct must have been “so brutal and offensive that it did not comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency.” Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957) (quoted in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998)). In this case, Simon cannot demonstrate any “conscience-shocking” conduct. Dr. Goldstein noted in Simon’s admission history that the written citation indicated that Simon had stated that he had been to ESH once before but that he didn’t have mental problems. Goldstein also noted that Simon had told ESH staff that he had been to ESH one time before. Simon offered no evidence that Officer Cook made false statements regarding his mental illness or failure to take medications. Goldstein’s report indicates that Simon himself may have said he previously had been treated at ESH. Even if Officer Cook had made false statements as Simon alleges, Dr. Goldstein made her - 14 - Simon v. Cook, et al. No. 06-6514 own independent evaluation of Simon. Morever, the alleged false statements in this case are not so egregious as to “shock the conscience.” Since Officer Cook did not violate Simon’s constitutional rights, our inquiry is at an end. We hold that Cook is entitled to qualified immunity.