Opinion ID: 2398592
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Heading: The Express Negligence Doctrine

Text: Stated generally, the express negligence doctrine provides that contracts will not be construed so as to indemnify a person against his own negligence unless such intention is expressed in specific terms. It is Ohio's contention that this doctrine has been rejected by the courts of this state. The Court of Civil Appeals drew a distinction between cases involving the rental or lease of real or personal property wherein the express negligence doctrine has been rejected in Texas, and cases involving agreements between owners and contractors. Ohio takes the position that this distinction is untenable, but if the doctrine does apply in owner-contractor situations, then it nonetheless does not apply in instances where only the passive negligence of the owner is involved. Smith contends that the Court of Civil Appeals properly applied the doctrine in this case. The text authorities are almost unanimous in agreeing that a contract of indemnity will not be construed to indemnify the indemnitee against losses resulting to him through his own negligent acts, where such intention is not established in express terms. See generally: 27 Am.Jur., Indemnity, § 15; Anno. 175 A.L.R. 1, §§ 17 and 18. One authority states that [t]here are literally hundreds of cases supporting this proposition. 175 A.L.R. 1, § 17, n. 11. Indeed, it has been stated that the majority of the states hold agreements to indemnify against the negligence of the indemnitee to be void. See: 27 Am.Jur., Indemnity § 9. This has never been the rule in Texas. In this state, contracts written or construed so as to allow indemnity for liability arising out of the indemnitee's own negligence have long been held not to be violative of the public policy. Northern Texas Traction Co. v. City of Polytechnic, Tex.Com.App. (1922), 236 S.W. 73; James Stewart & Co. v. Mobley, Tex.Civ.App. (1955), 282 S.W.2d 290, wr. ref. While there is a majority and a minority rule on the subject, the jurisprudence of this state commits us to the proposition that while the intent to indemnify against the results of the indemnitee's negligence must be clear, it need not be expressed. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Diamond Press Brick Co., 111 Tex. 18, 222 S.W. 204, 226 S.W. 140; Northern Texas Traction Co. v. City of Polytechnic, supra; James Stewart & Co. v. Mobley, supra; Mitchell's v. Friedman, 157 Tex. 424, 303 S.W.2d 775. In the Friedman case, supra, this court stated: It is not necessary, therefore, for the parties to say in so many words that they intend to protect the indemnitee against liability for negligence. An obligation to hold harmless from claims, liability or damage resulting from a specified operation or instrumentality will be enforced in accordance with its terms even though the indemnitee may thereby be relieved of the consequences of his own negligence. Smith would have us interpret this statement to mean that general words of indemnity can only be used to exonerate the indemnitee for liability for his own negligence when the parties have contracted as to some specific operation or instrumentality. Smith argues that the phrase operations of the Contractor hereunder found in Sec. 15 of the contract is not a specific operation. Consequently, it is urged that since no specific operation has been set out, then this court should refuse to give effect to that paragraph. We disagree. The general rule in this state has not been so restricted by the Friedman case. In the Friedman case, the owner of a building entered into a 10-year lease contract, and the indemnity clause provided:    Lessor shall not be liable to Lessee or to Lessee's    patrons, or visitors, for any damage to person    due to the building on said premises or any appurtenances thereof being improperly constructed, or being or becoming out of repair, nor for any damages from any defects or want of repair of    the building of which the leased premises form a part   . The plaintiff was injured by falling plaster and lathing, and in his suit against the owner-lessor, original lessee, and sublessee it was alleged that the air conditioning ducts, the plaster and lathing surrounding same and the ceiling were negligently constructed. The owner-lessor filed a cross action against the original lessee for indemnification. This court held that the original lessee was obligated to indemnify the owner-lessor under the terms of the contract even though general words of indemnity were used. The holding of the Friedman case was based on the decisions in James Stewart & Co. v. H. B. Mobley, supra; and Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Diamond Press Brick Co. supra, and the language of the Friedman case must be analyzed in the light of these decisions. In the Stewart case the plaintiff was injured when a hoist upon which he was riding fell. Part of the indemnity provisions of the contract did expressly pertain to the operations of the hoist, and the subcontractor did agree to hold the contractor harmless from any and all suits brought against the contractor for any injury that resulted from the use of hoists. The court rejected the contention of the indemnitor subcontractor that the express negligence doctrine should be applied, and held that the subcontractor must indemnify the indemnitee contractor for the liability that resulted to the contractor from the contractor's negligent operation of a hoist. Though the case does involve a specific instrumentality, the Court did not place its holding on the ground that the express negligence doctrine was avoided because the part of the contract upon which the indemnity was predicated related to a specific instrumentality. The landmark case in this area is Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Diamond Press Brick Co., supra. In that case the indemnitee Railroad agreed to construct, maintain and operate a spur track for the indemnitor Brick Company. In the contract the Brick Company agreed:    to save the (Railroad) harmless from any and all claims for damages arising from any cause whatsoever growing out of the construction, maintenance, and operation of said spur track   . The Railroad was found liable in a suit by a person who was injured due to the Railroad's negligence in maintaining the track at a public crossing. Indemnity was allowed the negligent indemnitee Railroad under the generally worded indemnity provisions of the contract even though no specific operation or instrumentality, i. e., the public crossing, was set out in the indemnity clause. Smith cites the case of Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Childs-Bellows, Tex.Civ. App. (1961), 352 S.W.2d 806, wr. ref., in support of his contention that general words of indemnity will not free the indemnitee from liability from his own negligence unless such intent is clear, and the indemnity clause relates expressly to some specific operation or instrumentality. In the Childs-Bellows case, supra, the indemnitor, Westinghouse, had a subcontract to install elevators in an office building being constructed by the indemnitee, Childs-Bellows. In two separate accidents two Westinghouse employees were injured, and suit was brought against Childs-Bellows. A settlement was reached, and Childs-Bellows sought and was denied indemnity from Westingthouse. Westinghouse had agreed only to indemnify for    personal injury, growing out of, or incident to or resulting from the performance    [of] the Work    of installing elevators. Indemnity was denied because the injuries resulted from causes which had absolutely no connection with the work undertaken by Westinghouse. The Court concluded that the indemnity provision in question    does not show an intent by the parties to indemnify Childs-Bellows for injuries to persons resulting from work which was under the exclusive jurisdiction of Childs-Bellows as general contractor. This case is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. Here, Smith agreed to indemnify Ohio for all claims for injury to any person arising directly or indirectly from the workover operations, and the injuries did result from the work undertaken by Smith. In our opinion the intent of the parties as expressed in unambiguous words of indemnity, controls the determination of whether the indemnitee is to be relieved from liability for his own negligence. It cannot be said that this rule is limited to instances wherein the parties specify one or more operations or instrumentalities to be used in carrying out their obligations under a contract. In such cases indemnity may be awarded. James Stewart v. H. B. Mobley, supra, Mitchell's v. Friedman, supra. However, it may also be awarded in cases such as this where the intent is clear that such result is to be had as to any injury or damage that arises in the course of the effectuation of the object or objectives of the contract. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Diamond Press Brick Co., supra. See also: Smoke v. Turner Construction Co., D.C., 54 F.Supp. 369; Russell, for use of Continental Cas. Co. v. Shell, 339 Ill.App. 168, 89 N.E.2d 415; Buffa v. General Motors Corporation, D.C., 131 F.Supp. 478; Turner Construction Co. v. Belmont Iron Works, D.C., 158 F.Supp. 309; Stern v. Larocca, 49 N.J.Super. 496, 140 A.2d 403; Metropolitan Paving Co. v. Gordon Herkenhoff & Associates, 66 N.M. 41, 341 P.2d 460; Northern States Co. v. A. Finkle & Sons Co., 8 Ill.App.2d 419, 132 N.E.2d 59; Bounougious v. Republic Steel Corporation, 7 Cir., 277 F.2d 726. In the case at bar the distinction drawn by the Court of Civil Appeals in regard to the propriety of the application of the express negligence doctrine in cases involving indemnity agreements between owners and contractors was based on the observation that in such instances [t]he work to be performed seldom consists of a single `specified instrumentality' or of a single `specified operation.' Based on this distinction the court concluded that in cases involving owner-contractor agreements, where the specific operations or instrumentalities are not set out in the indemnity clause, the express negligence doctrine is to be applied. The express negligence doctrine has, in effect, been rejected in this state not only in instances involving the rental or leasing of property, but also in cases where an owner-contractor relationship exists. See: Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Diamond Press Brick Co., supra. In regard to the distinction drawn, we can see no reason why the Courts should not apply the same rules of law and construction to written contracts between owners and contractor as are applied to any other business contract when intent is just as clearly expressed. In owner-contractor situations judicial construction of indemnity clauses to cover the indemnitee's negligence notwithstanding absence of an express provision to that effect in the contract has been said to be common. See: Stern v. Larocca, supra.