Opinion ID: 2535545
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ministerial acts, discretionary acts, and other acts

Text: ¶ 10. Governmental acts can be ministerial, discretionary, or neither. Ministerial acts are not listed in the twenty-five categories discussed above, so they do not enjoy complete sovereign immunity. An example of a ministerial act is an action taken by a governmental entity or its employees in order to comply with a statutory mandate. [8] ¶ 11. But discretionary acts do enjoy immunity. Just because a governmental act was not ministerial does not mean it was discretionary. In determining whether an act qualifies as an immune discretionary act, this Court adopted the United States Supreme Court's public policy approach. [9] Simply put, discretionary acts which enjoy immunity are those acts which promote some social, economic, or political policy. The Jones Court put it this way: Section 11-46-9 appears to be patterned after 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the majority of acts in the day-to-day operations of governmental activities involve the exercise of some form of discretion[;] however, not all of these acts are protected under the exception. In determining the scope of the acts protected under the exception, the Supreme Court held that only those functions which by nature are policy decisions, whether made at the operational or planning level, are protected. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991). The purpose of the exception is to prevent judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort. Id. at 323, 111 S.Ct. 1267 ( quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984)). [10] ¶ 12. In further explaining the proper analysis of discretionary-act immunity, this Court has said: In determining whether governmental conduct is discretionary the Court must answer two questions: (1) whether the activity involved an element of choice or judgment; and if so, (2) whether the choice or judgment in supervision involves social, economic or political policy alternatives. [11] ¶ 13. So we must now apply our precedent to the facts of the case before us to determine whether the promotion of Camp Fear qualifies for discretionary-act immunity. In doing so, it is important to note that immunity under the MTCA applies even in cases where the agency is found to have abused its discretion. [12] While this may seem harsh, the MTCA's intent is to promote efficient and timely decision-making [by government officials] without fear of liability. This . . . works to encourage free participation and hinder fear that goes with risk-taking situations and the exercise of sound judgment. [13]