Opinion ID: 391779
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the fcc's substantive findings

Text: 99 We now reach the ultimate issue in this appeal: whether the decision of the FCC to grant construction and operating authority to SBS comports with the public convenience and necessity standard of Section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1976). The scope of our review in this type of case was exhaustively described by this court in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-853 (D.C.Cir.1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923, 91 S.Ct. 2229, 29 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971). In summary, we cannot interfere with the agency's latitude not merely to find facts and make judgments, but also to select the policies deemed in the public interest. Id. at 851. Our substantive review is satisfied if we find that the agency has really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has    genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making. Id. (footnote omitted). As we have noted, 110 the absence of evidentiary hearings requires that we examine the supporting findings and assumptions with especial care, but we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the agency. 100
101 The FCC has concluded that the entry of the SBS venture would not be anticompetitive in its effect. This conclusion rests on specific technical conclusions regarding relevant markets and submarkets, the effect of the joint entry, the possible entrenchment of SBS in the market, and the potential for predatory competitive behavior by SBS. We will consider the agency's analysis of each of these points in turn. But first, we note that the general conditions of the domestic satellite communications industry are such that the FCC's ultimate conclusions are highly plausible. The overriding fact about the SBS entry is that it introduces a strong new competitor into a concentrated industry dominated by a giant firm, AT&T. Entrenchment and predatory conduct theories aside, the essential objection to the SBS entry is not that it is anticompetitive, but that it is not as pro-competitive as some other entry might be. 102 Even that argument is difficult to believe in light of the posture of the parties to this case: AT&T, Western Union, and American Satellite have a natural interest in inhibiting future competition and delaying future competitive entry. Their protestations in favor of vigorous competition ring hollow, especially considering that the immediate result of their victory would be to block the entry into the industry of a strong and technologically innovative competitor. Of course, these corporate giants have the right to pursue whatever litigious strategies the law may sanction, and this court has an obligation to ensure that the FCC seriously considers their arguments and reaches a reasoned conclusion. But we observe at the outset that there is great commonsense merit in the FCC's decision to permit one strong competitive entry now, rather than to hope for two such entries in the future. 103 1. Definition of relevant market. The FCC concluded that the major market to be considered is the entire private line voice/data/image domestic telecommunications market. The market includes both satellite and terrestrial specialized communication services. SBS Decision, 62 FCC2d at 1075 P 223, JA 1598. In reaching that conclusion the FCC recognized that (t)hat market is composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced price, use and qualities considered. 111 The FCC found that as a technical matter that is, considering the channel bandwidth, noise potential, speed, need for related equipment, error rate, and cost virtually all channels of point to point communication are substitutable between those points. SBS Decision, 62 FCC2d at 1077 P 228, JA 1600. 104 The FCC reviewed two purported differences between satellite and terrestrial communications that might indicate that they are not reasonably interchangeable. It rejected both. First, it noted that the end-to-end time interval for satellite communications is fixed, and longer than the typical end-to-end interval in ground communications. The FCC did not, however, consider this difference very important, because it primarily affects only the efficiency of certain high-speed bidirectional data communications, and because it might be possible to offset the difference by using the higher bandwidth channels available on satellites. The second purported difference is the greater facility of satellites to generate simultaneous transmissions to multiple receivers. Even this service, however, is provided by terrestrial systems as well. 112 105 The FCC observed that present satellite carriers are able to shift customers from terrestrial to satellite channels, and that competition between the two media is already under way. 113 From this, and from its technical analysis, the Commission concluded: 106 Users will, in the final analysis, choose the facility or mix of facilities which is most efficient for their individual purposes. In any event, satellite channels present no clearcut advantage which would create a separate relevant domestic satellite market for purposes of our analysis. 107 SBS Decision, 62 FCC2d at 1080 P 236, JA 1603. 108 Appellants have called this major market analysis superficial and arbitrary, 114 but do not seriously attempt to argue that satellite and terrestrial systems do not compete. On the record, and judging by this lack of analysis by appellants, we are inclined to agree that the existence of such competition is inarguable. 115 Appellants' more serious point is, not that the FCC misconstrued the major relevant market, but that it failed to recognize certain relevant submarkets. 109 A shift in the focus from the major market to the relevant submarkets is vital to appellants' argument, because the terrestrial communications field is so dominated by one supplier, AT&T, 116 that even the Department of Justice was constrained to admit: 110 The entry of IBM into the domestic communications field could inject an aggressive, well-financed new entrant into a market too long dominated by a monopoly supplier.    111 Reply Comments of the Department of Justice, JA 1509. Only when focusing on smaller submarkets where AT&T is not (yet) dominant does one gain the luxury of exchanging immediate and obvious pro-competitive entry for the potential advantages of multiple entry in the future. 112 The FCC carefully considered a number of possible submarkets, and rejected each as a basis for competitive analysis. 113 (a) Satellite Communications. As discussed above, 117 the FCC considered the purported differences between satellite and terrestrial communications systems, and concluded that the two media are reasonably interchangeable, and thus that satellite communications do not comprise a distinct submarket. 114 (b) Data communications. Technical differences between data and facsimile transmissions, which generally employ digital signals, and voice transmissions, which generally employ analog signals, might serve to divide the communications market into two distinct submarkets. Appellants suggest that SBS, concentrating in data and facsimile transmission, and AT&T, concentrating in voice transmission, might effectively divide the market and create a duopoly. 115 The FCC considered this possibility in its order. SBS Decision, 62 FCC2d at 1080-1082 PP 237-245, JA 1603-1605. It first noted that, as a technical matter, analog channels of communication and digital channels can be rendered compatible. The proposed SBS system offers an integrated service, transmitting data, facsimile, and voice signals. Similarly, terrestrial systems offer both analog and digital channels for data transmission purposes. The FCC observed that virtually every communications common carrier that we regulate, both terrestrial and satellite, serves the data transmission market, but that AT&T has by far the largest number of channels open for such purposes. 118 Thus the FCC concluded reasonably, in our view that the data communications market is not separate from the overall communications market, and that even if it were, the entry of SBS would serve to mitigate the dominant and growing position of AT&T. 116 (c) Large users. The FCC found (s)ome historical support for the argument that large users, such as the federal government and certain large corporations, have special communications needs, and may constitute a separate submarket. 119 Recent developments have, however, blurred the distinction between large and small users. In particular, the Resale Decision, 60 FCC2d 261 (1976), amended on reconsideration, 62 FCC2d 588 (1977), aff'd sub nom. AT& T v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875, 99 S.Ct. 213, 58 L.Ed.2d 190 (1978), permitted smaller users to reach private sharing agreements that would make available to them the advantages of aggregate communications offerings formerly attractive only to large users. 120 Of course, as the Department of Justice has pointed out, this shared user decision does not eliminate all differences between large and small users: not all small users will choose to join a sharing agreement. 121 But as the FCC observed, the main difference between the two classes of users is not technical, but economic. They use essentially the same type of services, but the greater bulk of demand gives large users an economic advantage. 122 Under the shared user decision, that advantage is lessened, if not eliminated. 117 (d) New, emerging uses. The principal objection by the Department of Justice to the FCC's relevant submarket analysis was that the Commission failed to consider the possibility that there may well be new, emerging uses for satellites for which, as a practical matter, terrestrial channels do not offer a realistic alternative. Dep't of Justice brief at 28. We cannot agree. 118 It would be anomalous to hold that SBS could be guilty of lessening competition in a submarket which it will create. As the FCC observed, its mandate does not require it to penalize innovation and ignore the public interest benefits resulting from such innovation by declaring each new and innovative service offering or operating mode a discrete submarket subject to unique regulatory and/or antitrust treatment. SBS Decision, 62 FCC2d at 1086 P 258, JA 1609. Nevertheless, the FCC in its order analyzed no fewer than six characteristics of the proposed SBS system that might tend to create distinct submarkets. 123 However, in each instance the FCC identified terrestrial systems with similar, albeit not identical, characteristics, and concluded: 119 (W)hile SBS' package of characteristics may, in the aggregate, be different in degree from competitive offerings today, in our judgment, it is not so different in degree as to lose its reasonable interchangeability with alternatives, and therefore establish a separate relevant market and/or submarket.    120 SBS Decision, 62 FCC2d at 1086 P 258, JA 1609 (emphasis in original). Significantly, appellants do not attempt to refute the FCC's judgment on this score, or to prove that what appears to be reasoned decisionmaking for some reason falls short. Appellants' response is to ignore the FCC analysis, to assert that the Commission fail(ed) to evaluate a new demand for which SBS-type technology would be, for a short time, the only supplier, 124 and to ask us to reverse for this arbitrary failure. 121 This court lacks the technical and economic background to second-guess the FCC's conclusions on relevant submarkets. The Commission has apparently taken a hard look at the possibilities and has explained its reasons for rejecting them. Appellants have complained that the FCC's analysis is insufficient, but have offered no competing reasoning for us to evaluate. Perhaps relevant submarkets will emerge in the future, but the Commission's responsibility today under Section 7 of the Clayton Act is to deal with  'probabilities,' not 'ephemeral possibilities.'  United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 623, 94 S.Ct. 2856, 2870, 41 L.Ed.2d 978 (1974) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 1522, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962)). Accordingly, we decline to interfere with the Commission's judgment. 122 2. Potential competition. The FCC considered the possibility of a diminution in potential competition under the doctrine of United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., supra, 378 U.S. 158, 84 S.Ct. 1710, 12 L.Ed.2d 775. Under that theory the SBS venture might be thought to be anticompetitive because it would preclude the separate entry of both Comsat and IBM into the industry. In the alternative, it might reduce competition even if only one of the parent firms entered alone, because the other would remain in the wings exerting a pro-competitive influence. The Commission concluded that IBM and Comsat were unlikely to enter the industry alone, and that little pro-competitive effect would result from a firm remaining in the wings. 125 123 (a) Double entry. The Commission supplied two major reasons for its belief that IBM and Comsat would not enter the market alone. First, the barriers to entry are unusually steep. The technology is new and risky, fixed development and start-up costs are high, and it is likely to be years before the entrants will begin to earn a profit. This situation, in the FCC's view, makes the likelihood of entry by any given firm quite low. Second, IBM and Comsat would begin at a decided disadvantage in the industry. By the time they would be able to enter the industry the other firms will already have established a position. Moreover, each of those firms is also a terrestrial communications carrier, capable of switching traffic from ground lines to satellite channels and thereby lowering its per unit costs of satellite service. 126 124 Neither IBM nor Comsat has such an advantage. Their sole source of traffic would be new customers won over from the current satellite or terrestrial carriers. Needless to say, this substantially increases the risks Comsat or IBM would face, and decreases the prospects of eventual gain. Therefore, the Commission concluded that it would be most difficult for either IBM or Comsat General to enter into providing domestic satellite services alone. SBS Decision, 62 FCC2d at 1091 P 278, JA 1614. In the FCC's view, these disadvantages are offset by the combination of IBM and Comsat in a single joint venture: their unique capabilities and resources may well enable them to overcome their other disabilities. 127 125 We are by no means certain that the FCC was correct in this conclusion. In a dynamic field such as satellite communications, it seems to us that the technological resources of IBM might well be sufficient, even without Comsat's contribution, to make entry attractive to IBM. 128 And Comsat has in the past sought approval for satellite ventures with partners other than IBM. If we were making the decision de novo, we would think the likelihood of separate entry a close question. Nevertheless, we affirm. Our task is not to judge whether the opponents of the joint venture have stated a prima facie case under the antitrust laws; rather, we are reviewing the agency's decision that the SBS license conforms to the public convenience and necessity. In that role, we could not overturn the FCC's findings, even if we preferred another conclusion. The FCC has here considered all of the evidence and reasoning presented by the interested parties, has recognized the necessarily speculative nature of its inquiry, and has concluded that it is not likely that IBM and Comsat would enter the field alone. 129 Under the applicable standard of review, we cannot reverse. 126 (b) The in the wings effect. As the Supreme Court said in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, supra, 418 U.S. at 624, 94 S.Ct. at 2871: 127 Unequivocal proof that an acquiring firm actually would have entered de novo but for a merger is rarely available. Thus    the principal focus of the (potential competition) doctrine is on the likely effects of the premerger position of the acquiring firm on the fringe of the target market.    128 Here, where there is certainly no unequivocal evidence about the separate entry of Comsat and IBM, it is particularly important to analyze the possibility that their joint venture may have eliminated the competitive pressure that one of the firms would have exerted on the domestic satellite industry by its continuing threat to enter. 130 129 In this analysis, we are reminded by the Supreme Court that ease of entry on the part of the acquiring firm is a central premise of the potential-competition doctrine, id. at 628, 94 S.Ct. at 2873, and that we must accord full weight to    federal and state regulatory barriers to entry   . Id. This focus on ease of entry is vital because the pro-competitive effect from a firm in the wings is entirely produced by the perceptions of the current competitors. Only if they perceive the fringe company as a likely entrant will they respond in a competitive fashion. 130 In the domestic satellite communications industry, we have observed that barriers to entry are steep. If Comsat or IBM took over full operation of the SBS venture, the remaining firm would have to obtain large amounts of capital, either in the capital markets or from a replacement joint venturer, in order to enter the field. The new entrant would have to begin development of a system anew, and would take a minimum of three to five years, in the FCC's estimation, to become an actual competitor. 131 131 Thus the current satellite firms will have distant advance notice that a new entry is forthcoming, and more than enough time to alter their competitive behavior to meet that threat. In the meantime, they have little to fear from the firm in the wings. Moreover, the regulatory hurdles in the face of IBM or Comsat entering are high. Comsat first proposed entering the field in 1972, and has only now received authority to do so. IBM's entry, even alone, will be staunchly opposed by many parties, just as its entry has been opposed in the present order. Ironically, if the SBS Decision is reversed, then entry by IBM, Comsat, or any other major competitor would be much less likely; potential entrants would have to overcome more stringent regulatory obstacles before being granted a license. Reversing the SBS Decision might well decrease the potential competition now resulting from other fringe firms that might take advantage of the present open entry policy. 132 132 We thus believe that the FCC reasonably concluded that it is unlikely that the non-entrant would ever enter, or realistically ever be perceived as a threatening potential competitor. SBS Decision, 62 FCC2d at 1091 P 280, JA 1614. 133 3. The Entrenchment Theory. The FCC also considered the argument that the SBS venture would be anticompetitive under the entrenchment theory as expounded in FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 87 S.Ct. 1224, 18 L.Ed.2d 303 (1967). Under this theory SBS might be thought to have advantages from its connection to IBM that would enable it to dominate the relevant market 133 and to drive out actual or potential competitors. As explained by Western Union in its reply comments, Data processing customers are the likely principal users of domestic satellite service, and IBM's well-established and loyal data processing customer base inevitably will provide extraordinary competitive advantages to any satellite carrier affiliated with IBM. JA 1475-1476 (footnote omitted). Acceptance of this argument would lead to the conclusion that IBM should not be permitted to enter the domestic satellite communications field, with or without Comsat. 134 Any advantage IBM may have it can exploit as easily alone as in a joint venture. Unlike the potential competition theory, therefore, the entrenchment argument is not predicated on the joint venture character of SBS, but on the identity of one of the SBS partners. 134 We consider below 135 the related argument 136 that IBM may engage in predatory practices such as cross-subsidization. Here we consider the theory that IBM's expertise, aggressiveness, size, or efficiency may overwhelm Western Union, RCA, American Satellite, and their fellows in the domestic satellite communications market. In this we are reminded of the Supreme Court's warning that the antitrust laws exist to protect competition, not competitors   . Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra, 370 U.S. at 320, 82 S.Ct. at 1521 (emphasis in original). 135 The purpose of the entrenchment doctrine as it has developed in the courts is not to exclude strong or even potentially dominant firms from entering a new market, but instead to require them to do so by internal expansion or toe-hold acquisition rather than by merger with firms already established in the market. For example, in FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., supra, 386 U.S. 568, 87 S.Ct. 1224, 18 L.Ed.2d 303, the leading case on entrenchment, the doctrine was applied to prevent Proctor & Gamble from entering the household bleach market through acquisition of the leading bleach firm, Clorox; the FTC would have welcomed independent entry by Proctor & Gamble. Appellants have cited no precedent for their remarkable attempt to extend this doctrine to prohibit a strong firm such as IBM from entering a promising new market out of a fear that it might come to dominate the field. Their suggestion turns the purpose of the antitrust laws on its head. 136 For reasons already discussed, the Commission concluded that SBS will be at a substantial competitive disadvantage when it enters the field. 137 We see no reason to dispute the FCC's conclusion that SBS will not be in a position to dominate the domestic satellite communications field or to raise entry barriers within the foreseeable future. 137 4. Predatory Practices. More troublesome is appellants' objection that IBM may be able to use its dominant position in the computer and data processing field to gain unfair advantage in the domestic satellite communications market. We observe that each of the entrants into the domestic satellite industry has presented some possibility of similar competitive abuse. For example, similar concerns about AT&T were responsible for the FCC's decision to place major restrictions on AT&T's satellite venture. 138 The FCC does not deny that IBM's participation presents prospects for predatory behavior that must be obviated. The dispute in this case is over the adequacy of the FCC's response to the problem as perceived. 138 To prevent IBM from using its position in the computer industry as a lever to gain control of the satellite communications field, the FCC placed certain restrictions on IBM's and SBS's operations. It prohibited advertising or promotional assistance by IBM to SBS, 139 joint or cooperative sales presentations between SBS and IBM, 140 packaged end-to-end data communications services, 141 and price discrimination by SBS in favor of users of IBM equipment. 142 It required that all financial or procurement dealings between IBM and SBS be conducted at arm's length, 143 and that IBM remain a minority and noncontrolling partner in SBS. 144 It also promises to impose additional restrictions or take other action if these do not suffice. 145 139 Appellants have not attempted a precise refutation of the adequacy of the FCC's restrictions. The Department of Justice does not challenge the FCC on this point at all. Western Union merely says that the FCC's conclusion was without the aid of factual analysis, and that certain of the Commission's restrictions had been thought unworkable by SBS. 146 American Satellite argues that it cannot be determined how effective, if at all, the FCC's restrictions may be. 147 140 After considering the FCC's analysis and response to the problem, and the arguments of appellants, we conclude that the Commission's disposition of the predatory practices argument was acceptable for the purpose of this review. 141
142 In reviewing the FCC's conclusion that the public benefits from the SBS venture outweigh any possible anticompetitive effects from it even assuming that those effects could be established we bear in mind that the Commission's overriding responsibility is not to foster the maximum level of competition in the industry it oversees, but to promote the public interest. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., supra, 346 U.S. 86, 73 S.Ct. 998, 97 L.Ed. 1470; Hawaiian Telephone Co. v. FCC, supra, 498 F.2d 771. The principal advantages to be gained from competition in this heavily regulated industry are two. First, the presence of a large number of competitors and a large capacity may prevent supracompetitive price pressures that the Commission might not be able to perceive or control. Second, the increased competition may spur firms in the industry to greater technological advances and more efficient operations. 143 Given the rapid increase in the number and size of the satellite systems, 148 supracompetitive price pressures are unlikely to occur, since such pressures are caused by an artificial restriction in the supply of the service. Moreover, under the circumstances, the entry of an innovative force such as SBS is as likely to spur as to stifle technological competition. This suggests that a mere incantation of the words anticompetitive consequences in this case may not suffice to prove damage to the public interest. 144 1. Service benefits. We have already reviewed the technological advances that the SBS proposal embodies: small earth stations at the premises of customers, integrated voice/data/image transmission service in a largely digital format, new demand assignment formulas to promote more efficient use of the spectrum, and use of the 12 and 14 GHz bands. 149 These developments have touched off other technological advances on the part of SBS's competitors. The public is the beneficiary of these advances; new services will enable communications users to transmit messages, data, and images with greater ease and flexibility, and the increased efficiencies will lower cost. 145 Significantly, none of the parties to this appeal save AT&T 150 denies that the SBS proposal will provide the public valuable new services. We observe, moreover, that partially as a result of the FCC's decision not to undertake time-consuming evidentiary hearings on the antitrust issues in this case, the public will enjoy the benefits of the SBS system in early 1981. As the Department of Justice has admitted: 146 The Commission has already approved the joint venture's technological approach, finding it to be a technologically innovative approach with the potential to afford significant benefits to the public. We have no reason to doubt that assessment and believe that the public should be afforded the option to utilize that service without undue delay.    147 Department of Justice supplemental brief at 61. 148 2. Competitive benefits. Even assuming that the identified anticompetitive consequences of the SBS venture will occur, the FCC concluded that the SBS entry would promote the public interest by enhancing competition in communications. 151 In particular, the Commission observed that SBS would challenge AT&T's hegemony in the specialized communications market, and would impede the achievement by the AT&T/GTE venture of a dominant position in the satellite segment of that market. 152 The Commission further concluded that this competition would be enhanced by the participation of both Comsat and IBM in the joint venture, because of their combined technical and financial resources, 153 and also because of their joint control, which will promote more vigorous competition with AT&T. 154 Finally, the FCC opined that even an additional entry by IBM alone would be of little additional practical value in promoting competition because such an entry would take many years to develop. 155 149 These conclusions are sharply challenged by appellants, who assert that SBS and AT&T will not compete with each other, but will rather create a duopoly, with AT&T controlling voice service and SBS controlling data service. Western Union reasoned as follows: 150 This result (duopolization) was predicted for several reasons: First, because satellite service offers particular promise for high speed data communications   , a field of great importance to IBM because of its predominant position in the data processing industry; second, because of AT&T's present dominance in voice communications; and third, because IBM and AT&T have a history of deferring to each other in fields in which only one company has an established position.    151 Western Union brief at 52-53 (citation to record omitted). Appellants' reasoning is not persuasive. Admittedly, IBM has a great interest in the data communications field, and may be expected to compete vigorously in it; but, as Western Union has itself pointed out, 156 AT&T has heretofore dominated that market. Thus, even if IBM were to confine itself to data transmission, it would enhance competition. AT&T is not expected to withdraw from this lucrative segment of the market after having invested, with GTE, in a satellite venture that should improve its position. 157 In the voice segment of the industry, any contribution SBS might make to the market would help to break AT& T's predominant control; SBS proposes to provide full satellite communications services, including voice transmission. 158 152 Finally, a history of cooperation between IBM and AT&T (and appellants have also suggested such a history with respect to Comsat and AT&T) may provide cause for concern; but we do not understand how excluding IBM, or Comsat, or the SBS joint venture, from the domestic satellite communications industry will stimulate competition. Surely, SBS will compete more vigorously against AT&T if it is granted a license than it will if that license is denied. 153 In its CML Decision the FCC carefully considered the problem of cooperation between AT&T, Comsat, and IBM, and designed the balanced CML option to obviate the problem by denying both Comsat and IBM a controlling interest in SBS. In the Commission's judgment, the presence of a third partner and the minority status of Comsat and IBM would make it difficult for either of the latter to curry favor with AT&T at the expense of vigorous competition by SBS. 159 Appellants may not consider this solution to be adequate, but they have not carried their burden in this court of showing that the Commission's decision was wanting in reason or care. 154 3. The FCC's continuing oversight. Finally, the FCC has explicitly declared itself prepared to exercise its continuing authority under Section 214 of the Communications Act to prevent anticompetitive behavior as it may occur. 160 Although the provisions of Section 7 of the Clayton Act are intended to stop anticompetitive arrangements in their incipiency, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra, 370 U.S. at 317-318 & n.32, 82 S.Ct. at 1520 & n.32, this court has recognized that continuing supervision by a regulatory agency may accomplish the same end, where (t)he serious anticompetitive effects, if they arise at all, will do so only after full implementation begins. Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 638 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992, 96 S.Ct. 2203, 48 L.Ed.2d 816 (1976). 161 The power of the FCC to employ a full range of remedies, including restrictions, conditions, nonrenewal of licenses, or divestiture, makes the antitrust problems in this case less immediate, and more controllable, than appellants would suggest.