Opinion ID: 1143715
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issue iv: error to exclude the past arrest history of the victim

Text: This defendant sought to pursue the Rule 404(a)(2), W.R.E., exception  pertinent trait of the decedent  by introducing his past arrest history to place a perspective on defendant's reaction in the context of his perception of a threat to his wife. As Rule 404(a)(2) specifically allows evidence of a pertinent trait of the victim, the question arises whether evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be used to establish for the jury in this case that pertinent trait. The plain language in Rule 404(b), W.R.E. reveals no barrier in applying Rule 404(b) to the decedent as well as the defendant when arguing pertinent trait. Several courts take this approach. In United States v. Greschner, 647 F.2d 740, 742 (7th Cir.1981), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a lower court for excluding proof of the victim's violent character by application of Rule 404, F.R.E., which creates a specific exception to offer evidence of a pertinent character trait. As in that case approved, it is in this case precisely what the defendant attempted. In articulating the reasoning, that court said:    The reason that prior convictions are disfavored, however, is not that they are irrelevant, but that they may be extremely prejudicial. In the instant case, there was no issue of prejudice since [the victim] was neither a defendant nor a witness. 647 F.2d at 742, n. 1, with which the Virginia courts agree: It is well settled in Virginia that where an accused adduces evidence that he acted in self-defense, evidence of specific acts is admissible to show the character of the victim for turbulence and violence, even if the accused is unaware of such character. Jordan v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 852, 252 S.E.2d 323, 325 (1979). See also State v. Basque, 66 Hawaii 510, 666 P.2d 599, 602 (1983):    [W]e treated general character evidence and specific prior acts (including those reflected in the victim's criminal record) the same for purposes of corroborating a defendant's self-defense claim as to who was the aggressor. The reasoning concludes: `   [P]roof of the deceased's violent and turbulent character in this situation is circumstantial evidence of the likelihood of his being the aggressor.' Id. 666 P.2d at 602, quoting from State v. Lui, 61 Hawaii 328, 603 P.2d 151, 154 (1979). The orbit of the majority's analysis fails to encompass the defendant's argument. The defendant wished to introduce, during trial, evidence of a pertinent trait of the victim by introducing the victim's past arrest history. The majority discusses how Rule 404(b) is quite often used subversively by both prosecutors and defendants against victims to establish that the person acted in conformity with his or her character. I agree fully that in the absence of an offer to prove pertinent trait, it is indeed a subversion of Rule 404(a) to use adverse character evidence for substantive-fact evidence. This subversion is seen most clearly when a Rule 404(b) exception is allowed to eclipse Rule 404(a). It is precisely this subversion I argued against where motive eclipsed propensity, Brown v. State, supra, when no mention of pertinent trait was made and yet this court willingly allowed propensity evidence, thinly veiled as motive, where that evidence was used to convict. This defendant attempted to demonstrate pertinent trait and was inappropriately denied that opportunity on the basis of a need to prevent Rule 404(b) abuse. While Rule 404(a)(2) is subject to a Rule 403, W.R.E. prejudice balancing, Rule 404(b) cannot fairly stand as a barrier to Rule 404(a)(2). Apprehended is that evidence of alleged past sexual abuse with someone other than the victim is admitted to help convict, Brown v. State, supra, despite the enormous presence of prejudice, but evidence of an arrest record of the deceased is excluded on the basis of possible prejudice. One cannot help but be confronted by a strange vacuum when an attempt is made to articulate the logic necessary to accommodate such different results. The court makes note that the victim's arrest record began at age 13. Presumably, such an alert is tangential to the issue of remoteness. A pertinent trait not extended through time cannot reliably be called a trait. The question then for this court is, at what point does the pertinent trait become acknowledged as pertinent but yet not remote? Remoteness may have little force on an argument concerning pertinent trait. Where it does have some force, the analysis necessary to give that force some place in the argument must be more rigorous than this court has provided. The majority also ascribe that only one arrest concerned violence, which occurred at a police booking desk, before defining the exclusion of the past arrest record to have been proper. Occasioned by a set of circumstances not dissimilar to this case, a defendant arguing self-defense sought to introduce a prior conviction of the victim for assault and battery upon a police officer. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in dismissing the argument of the prosecution, said: The prosecution argues that punching a police officer in a police station presents a `less serious' and entirely different situation than the one at issue here. When the prior conviction is for assault and battery, there is no need to compare the facts. Any difference is irrelevant. A conviction for assault and battery necessarily implies a character involving aggressive propensities. Commonwealth v. Beck, 485 Pa. 475, 402 A.2d 1371, 1373 (1979). Our court concedes: Arguably, the bits and pieces of the record might support appellant's theory that the victim was the aggressor. (Emphasis added.) Yes, they might. That is the point in issue. Nothing in the Braley story disproves an aggressive characterization of decedent. In United States v. Greschner, supra, 647 F.2d at 741, the court said:    [T]he `violent character' line of proof is relevant to the defendant's theory of self-defense in that it makes his version that the victim attacked him `more probable.' For this defendant, the offered and refused character evidence of the decedent was equally relevant. Given the predictive value granted to Michael Evans' status as a criminal during appellant's jury-tampering issue, why then is the criminal record of decedent of 13 offenses, whether or not matured by act or accident to the level of a felony, not singularly significant? Specifically, we would find included in 1973, shoplifting; 1976, disturbance of property, removing tires from a car; 1977, failure to appear for a traffic citation; 1977, disturbance, yelling and cussing, refused to leave property on request by owner; 1978, drinking and driving, extremely belligerent and threatening, obscene language, made threats against the family of arresting officer; 1978, disturbance and destruction of property, made threats against officer, attempted physical assault on officer at booking, including kicking and use of obscene language; 1979, drinking and driving; 1980, car prowl; 1980, open container in automobile; 1981, drinking and driving; 1983, drinking and driving; and 1984, drinking and driving, uncooperative. Then, in 1985, this event occurred which involved drinking, driving, parking and the disturbance. Unfortunately, it was final. [4] The course of events at the scene, detailed to have lasted nearly an hour, gives no pause for the characterization of heroism by any of the participants. The recognition of the friend of the decedent that [when the Braleys return] we're going to get into a fight, gives some substance to conjecture that the parking place chosen after the first incident was deliberately arranged with a fair likelihood of provocation. While the admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and absent a clear abuse of discretion will not be disturbed, Taylor v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 1294, 1295 (1982), and [t]hat party must establish that the ruling of the trial court was erroneous and that it did affect substantial rights of the party, Jahnke v. State, supra, 682 P.2d at 1005, when facing the same problem, the federal court in United States v. Greschner, supra, has said    The trial court's improper exclusion of the character and motive evidence was seriously prejudicial to that theory. Therefore, the improper evidentiary rulings require reversal of the defendant's assault conviction and a new trial. 647 F.2d at 743. I cannot conclude that due process and fairness as constitutionally and procedurally required to avoid unapprovable trial prejudice to defendant will be found or does exist from denial to the jury of the complete story from the victim's past arrest record and evidence of rejection of defendant's expert-witness testimony. Viewing this trial-evidence denial as an improvident abuse of discretion, I would reverse the conviction and remand for retrial.