Opinion ID: 4546294
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Firm-Resettlement Bar

Text: A firm-resettlement bar was first incorporated into United States law in the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. See Pub. L. No. 80–774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948); Rosenberg v. Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 53–54 (1971). The bar was carried over into the Refugee Relief Act of 1953. See Pub. L. No. 83–203, 67 Stat. 400 (1953). The firm resettlement language was dropped from the Refugee Relief Act of 1957, see Pub. L. No. 85–316, 71 Stat. 639 (1957), but the concept of firm resettlement remained in refugee admissions even without an explicit statutory reference. See Rosenberg, 402 U.S. at 53–58. The Refugee Act of 1980 again codified the firm-resettlement bar. Pub. L. No. 96–212, § 207(c)(1), 94 Stat. 102, 103. In 1996, Congress included the firm-resettlement bar in IIRIRA. The current statutory language provides: Paragraph [b](1) [authorizing discretionary grants of asylum] shall not apply to an alien if the Attorney General determines that— ... (vi) the alien was firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in the United States. EAST BAY SANCTUARY COVENANT V. BARR 19 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A). The current implementing regulation provides: An alien is considered to be firmly resettled if, prior to arrival in the United States, he or she entered into another country with, or while in that country received, an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement unless he or she establishes:
country was a necessary consequence of his or her flight from persecution, that he or she remained in that country only as long as was necessary to arrange onward travel, and that he or she did not establish significant ties in that country; or
residence in that country were so substantially and consciously restricted by the authority of the country of refuge that he or she was not in fact resettled. In making his or her determination, the asylum officer or immigration judge shall consider the conditions under which other residents of the country live; the type of housing, whether permanent or temporary, made available to the refugee; the types and extent of employment available to the refugee; and the extent to which the refugee received permission to hold property and to enjoy other rights and 20 EAST BAY SANCTUARY COVENANT V. BARR privileges, such as travel documentation that includes a right of entry or reentry, education, public relief, or naturalization, ordinarily available to others resident in the country. 8 C.F.R. § 208.15. A determination whether the firm-resettlement bar applies entails a two-step process. First, the government has the “initial burden of showing that the government of the third country issued to the alien a formal offer of some type of official status permitting the alien to reside in that country indefinitely.” Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 976 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). Second, if the government has carried its initial burden, “the burden shifts to the applicant to show that the nature of his stay and ties was too tenuous, or the conditions of his residence too restricted, for him to be firmly resettled.” Id. at 976–77. See also Arrey v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 2019) (reciting the two-step process outlined in Maharaj).