Opinion ID: 853669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Propriety of the In-Court Identification

Text: Emerson next asserts that Garrett's in-court identification was impermissibly suggestive. He contends that Garrett never selected him from a group of men. Instead, Garrett's identification was from the stand nearly two years after Mason's death. The State responds by asserting that Garret had a sufficient basis for his identification and was thoroughly cross-examined by defense counsel concerning it. A degree of suggestiveness is inherent in all in-court identifications; the practical necessity of having the appellant sit at the defendant's table with defense counsel naturally sets him apart from everyone else in the courtroom. Griffin v. State, 493 N.E.2d 439, 442 (Ind.1986). Whether a particular identification procedure rises to a level of suggestiveness that constitutes reversible error must be determined from the context of the case. Id. Suggestiveness is proscribed only when, under the circumstances, it can reasonably be avoided. Because of a criminal defendant's right to be present and confront his accusers, the suggestiveness in this case could not be avoided. Here, no extraordinary effort was made to single out Emerson at trial, and the witness professed no doubt as to the identity of his assailant. (R. at 180-81, 257-59.) That Garrett had made no previous identification of the defendant in the two years since the shooting and yet was able to identify him at trial was a matter of weight and credibility for the jury to consider. Harris v. State, 619 N.E.2d 577 (Ind.1993). An in-court identification does not become invalid merely because an extended time passes between the time of the crime and the initial identification. See, e.g., Wolfe v. State 562 N.E.2d 414, 416 (Ind.1990). Appellant contends that because some of the State's witnesses were present during a pre-trial proceeding that Emerson attended, Garrett's identification was unduly suggestive. We find this claim unavailing. On the stand, Garrett testified that he had not been present at any previous proceeding where Emerson was also present. (R. at 181.) Garrett's testimony need not have been prohibited because of a former impermissible confrontation. See Goudy v. State, 689 N.E.2d 686, 694-95 (Ind.1997). The primary element of suggestiveness was Emerson's position at the defense table when Garrett identified him. Due process does not require that a victim identify his assailant from a courtroom containing people of similar physical characteristics. Griffin, 493 N.E.2d at 442. It was the jury's function to reconcile Garrett's ability to identify Emerson with the time-span between the crime and trial. Moreover, Garrett's testimony was not the only evidence linking Emerson to Watkins Park. Robinson had identified Emerson from a photographic array soon after the shooting, and he also testified that Emerson was Porter's accomplice the night Mason was murdered. (R. at 224-27.) A single eyewitness' testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Anderson v. State, 469 N.E.2d 1166, 1169 (Ind.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1226, 105 S.Ct. 1220, 84 L.Ed.2d 361 (1985). Because Garrett's testimony was not unduly suggestive and other evidence linked Emerson to the scene, there was no error in the trial court's admission of Garrett's identification.