Opinion ID: 2034518
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The public interest served by prehearing revocation.

Text: The third and final factor from Montrym for determining the constitutionality of prehearing implied consent revocations is the public interest at stake. The Montrym court considered two public interests: the public interest in keeping roads and highways safe, and the public interest in avoiding fiscal and administrative burdens which are disproportionate to the nature of the private interest being revoked and to the risk of erroneous revocation. The public interest in preserving the safety of our roadways is of great importance. As the court in Montrym noted: We have traditionally accorded the states great leeway in adopting summary procedures to protect public health and safety. States surely have at least as much interest in removing drunken drivers from their highways as in summarily seizing mislabeled drugs or destroying spoiled foodstuffs. [Citations omitted.] The Commonwealth's interest in public safety is substantially served in several ways by the summary suspension of those who refuse to take a breath-analysis test upon arrest. First, the very existence of the summary sanction of the statute serves as a deterrent to drunken driving. Second, it provides strong inducement to take the breath-analysis test and thus effectuates the Commonwealth's interest in obtaining reliable and relevant evidence for use in subsequent criminal proceedings. Third, in promptly removing such drivers from the road, the summary sanction of the statute contributes to the safety of public highways. 443 U.S. at 17-18, 99 S.Ct. at 2620-2621. Statistics linking drunken driving with the tragedy of death and injury on our nation's highways abound. Forst Lowry, the Safety Program Coordinator for the Minnesota Department of Public Safety, testified that in 1981 52% of the drivers killed in Minnesota had a blood alcohol concentration of .10 or more and 62% of drivers killed had some measurable alcohol concentration. It is estimated that in 1980 over 400 persons were killed in Minnesota because of drunken drivers and direct economic loss amounted to approximately $114 million. The Montrym court determined that the summary and automatic character of the suspension sanction available under the Massachusetts statute is critical to deterring drunken drivers and making the state's highways safer. 443 U.S. at 18, 99 S.Ct. at 2621. The prehearing revocation system also helps to ease fiscal and administrative burdens, a second area of public interest. As the Montrym court stated: A presuspension hearing would substantially undermine the state interest in public safety by giving drivers significant incentive to refuse the breath-analysis test and demand a presuspension hearing as a dilatory tactic. Moreover, the incentive to delay arising from the availability of a presuspension hearing would generate a sharp increase in the number of hearings sought and therefore impose a substantial fiscal and administrative burden on the Commonwealth. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S., at 114 [97 S.Ct. at 1728]. 443 U.S. at 18, 99 S.Ct. at 2621. Attorney General Warren Spannaus testified at trial that his office had estimated for the legislature overall annual savings of approximately $320,000 under the new system of prehearing revocation. As the statistics cited above point out, drunken drivers pose a severe threat to the health and safety of the citizens of Minnesota. The compelling interest in highway safety justifies the State of Minnesota in making a revocation effective pending the outcome of the prompt post-suspension hearing. 2. Appellants next contend that Minn.Stat. § 169.123 (1982) imposes a penalty on them for exercising their privilege against self-incrimination, and thereby violates the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7, of the Minnesota Constitution. The trial court determined that the availability of expeditious administrative and timely judicial review under the system devised by the Commissioner of Public Safety does not result in a violation of a plaintiff's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In any DWI case, the defendant faces two types of penalties in two separate proceedings: (1) criminal penalties under Minn. Stat. § 169.121 and (2) civil license revocation under Minn.Stat. § 169.123. Under Minn.Stat. § 169.123 the driver's license is revoked prior to a hearing. The driver may then request administrative or judicial review of the revocation. The driver has a high incentive to request review immediately since his or her license has already been revoked. Meanwhile, if the driver pleads not guilty to the criminal charges, he will be seeking license revocation review while the criminal charges are pending. Statements made to the administrator in the administrative review or to the court in judicial review are not immunized by law, and thus may be used against the driver in the later criminal case. In fact, the form which a driver must submit in order to attain administrative review states that the information given in the form may be used in any related court action. Appellants contend that this puts the driver in an untenable position where he must choose between testifying during the license revocation hearing and risking the later use of the testimony in the criminal case, or refusing to testify and thus forgoing the right to fully litigate the license revocation. There is no doubt that appellants have the right to assert their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in either the administrative or judicial hearing if it can be reasonably apprehend[ed] that the statements could be used against them in a criminal prosecution. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 94, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1611, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964). That is not the question before us, however. Appellants contend that the handicap which they would be placed under if they assert the privilege is a constitutional violation. The question before this court is, therefore, whether the procedure under Minn.Stat. § 169.123 impermissibly burdens appellants' exercise of their Fifth Amendment rights. In South Dakota v. Neville, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), the United States Supreme Court recently held that the admission into evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test does not offend his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. [1] The court held that the refusal was not compelled and, therefore, not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. In discussing the requirement that the defendant must be compelled to testify against himself in order to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege, the Neville court stated: As we stated in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 [96 S.Ct. 1569, 1574, 48 L.Ed.2d 39] (1976), [T]he Court has held repeatedly that the Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of `physical or moral compulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege. This coercion requirement comes directly from the constitutional language directing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. U.S. Const., Amdt. 5 (emphasis added). And as Professor Levy concluded in his history of the privilege, [t]he element of compulsion or involuntariness was always an ingredient of the right and, before the right existed, of protests against incriminating interrogatories. W. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment 328 (1968). Here, the state did not directly compel respondent to refuse the test, for it gave him the choice of submitting to the test or refusing. Of course, the fact the government gives a defendant or suspect a choice does not always resolve the compulsion inquiry. The classic Fifth Amendment violation  telling a defendant at trial to testify  does not, under an extreme view, compel the defendant to incriminate himself. He could submit to self accusation, or testify falsely (risking perjury) or decline to testify (risking contempt). But the Court has long recognized that the Fifth Amendment prevents the state from forcing the choice of this cruel trilemma on the defendant. See Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55 [84 S.Ct. 1594, 1596, 12 L.Ed.2d 678] (1964). See also New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 [99 S.Ct. 1292, 1297, 59 L.Ed.2d 501] (1979) (telling a witness under a grant of legislative immunity to testify or face contempt sanctions is the essence of coerced testimony.). Similarly, Schmerber cautioned that the Fifth Amendment may bar the use of testimony obtained when the proferred alternative was to submit to a test so painful, dangerous, or severe, or so violative of religious beliefs, that almost inevitably a person would prefer confession. Schmerber [ v. California ], 384 U.S. [757] at 765, n. 9 [86 S.Ct. 1826, at 1833, n. 9, 16 L.Ed.2d 908]. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 1619, 16 L.Ed.2d 694] (1966) (unless compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings is dispelled, no statement is truly a product of free choice). ___ U.S. at ___, 103 S.Ct. at 922 (footnote omitted). The court concluded that: We recognize, of course, that the choice to submit or refuse to take a blood-alcohol test will not be an easy or pleasant one for a suspect to make. But the criminal process often requires suspects and defendants to make difficult choices. See, e.g., Crampton v. Ohio, decided with McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213-217 [91 S.Ct. 1454, 1470-1472, 28 L.Ed.2d 711] (1971). ___ U.S. at ___, 103 S.Ct. at 923. Although the appellants in the case at bar were faced with such a difficult choice, that choice does not rise to the level of compulsion necessary in order to constitute a Fifth Amendment violation. Appellants' contention that Minn.Stat. § 169.123 violates their privilege against self-incrimination is primarily based upon their claim that a person seeking administrative review must complete and sign the form distributed by the Department of Public Safety entitled Request for Administrative Review of Implied Consent Revocation. Completion of the form is not required by statute. See Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 5b. The Department of Public Safety does not require that its form be completed in order to obtain administrative review. None of the parties to this action completed or signed the Department of Public Safety form and each had an administrative review of his license revocation. In fact, appellant Miller's driving privileges were reinstated as a result of his administrative review hearing. Furthermore, the state has the burden of proving each element of the implied consent violation in order to sustain the license revocation. This factor has been considered significant in determining whether a person is compelled to testify. See United States v. U.S. Currency, 626 F.2d 11 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993, 101 S.Ct. 529, 66 L.Ed.2d 290 (1980). The record in this case is devoid of any evidence of appellants' being compelled to give incriminating evidence in order to obtain review of their license revocations. Appellants need merely request review and indicate a basis for reversal. They need provide no other information to have their challenge heard. The trial court was correct in its determination that Minn.Stat. § 169.123 does not compel persons to incriminate themselves in violation of their federal and state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Finally, appellants have failed to satisfy 42 U.S.C. § 1983's threshold requirement that the plaintiff be deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws, and therefore they have no cognizable claims under § 1983. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). Affirmed.