Opinion ID: 2083424
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Breimhorst

Text: Finally, the majority notes that [t]he administrative procedures created to implement workers' compensation laws survived constitutional separation of powers concerns, in part, because the agency's awards and determinations were subject to review by this court. ( citing Breimhorst, 227 Minn. at 433, 35 N.W.2d at 734 ). While this proposition is correct in the abstract, it has no application here because it only applies to legislative action that precludes judicial review of decisions of an executive agency. It does not apply to the agreements of private parties that waive the right to a broader form of judicial review of decisions made by a private arbitrator. The legislative authorization for private parties to adopt an ADR system does not vest quasi-judicial powers in any executive agency. Instead, it allows private parties to avoid the quasi-judicial powers of the agency, submit their disputes to an ADR process and waive the right they would otherwise have to obtain a broader form of judicial review of any award. Moreover, the legislative authorization is purely permissive. Workers and their unions are not required to adopt any ADR system, but can continue to use the formal claims process. Thus, the authorization and approval of private agreements that create ADR systems does not constitute state action, and does not provide a basis for a separation of powers' claim. Further, as noted earlier, judicial review of the arbitrator's award is available under the MUAA. Section 176.1812 does not preclude that judicial review; it only authorizes the parties to agree to waive a second form of judicial review by limiting direct appellate review to the WCCA.