Opinion ID: 3011078
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Allegedly Inconsistent Claims

Text: We conclude that this set of facts was insufficient to support a directed verdict for the defendant. The District Court concluded that Taylor was proffering both a theory that he was disabled and a theory that he was wrongly regarded as disabled, which theories undercut one another. However, a plaintiff may plead in the alternative, and our caselaw finds no difficulty with pairing the two claims in one complaint. In Olson v. General Electric Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947 (3d Cir. 1996), we expressed no discomfort in denying summary judgment on a regarded as claim where the plaintiff had also alleged actual disability, although the evidence that was apparently offered to demonstrate [his] fitness as an employee ironically establishes that he was not substantially limited in a major life activity. Id. at 953. Similarly, in Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 860, 862 (1st Cir. 1998), the court held that there is no conflict in bringing an actual disability and a regarded as claim together. See also Koblosh v. Adelsick, No. 95C5209, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17254, at  (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 1996) (same). The possibility that a plaintiff will bring both an actual disability and a regarded as claim is simply one allowed by the law; its possible abuse must be checked by the standard measures for deterring frivolous or bad-faith complaints. Nor is Taylor's position intrinsically contradictory, as he could have an impairment (whether or not it rose to the level of a disability) that could actually be accommodated, despite Pathmark's perception that his disability was too severe to accommodate. At all events, we disagree with the District Court's description of Taylor's claims. Taylor did not claim that he was not disabled with respect to the frozen food manager job, as the court suggested; he claimed that the job's requirements did not interact with his disability in a way 14 that prevented him from doing the job or that required accommodation (beyond allowing him to rest his leg on a milk crate from time to time, a measure that may not even technically be an accommodation and that we discuss further infra). The distinction is highlighted by the example of a deaf person who claims that he is qualified for a job that involves converting handwritten notes into word processing files: He would not be not disabled with respect to the job, because disability is not a job-specific determination, but the job would not be affected by his disability. The District Court also believed that Taylor was putting Pathmark in an impossible situation because Pathmark would be potentially liable if it accommodated Taylor or if it refused to accommodate him. However, Pathmark would not be liable for accommodating Taylor. It is only liable if it wrongly regarded him as so disabled that he could not work and therefore denied him a job. The accommodations that Pathmark provided or might have provided are not part of Taylor's regarded as claim. Taylor does not attempt to rely on Pathmark's pre-April 1994 accommodations of his condition to prove his regarded as claim, nor should he. An employer may decide to accommodate people who are not disabled under the ADA. If the District Court is concerned about the possibility of jury confusion on this issue, it might be appropriate to instruct the jury that Pathmark's voluntary accommodations, which are apparently formalized and routinized in Pathmark's employment manuals, are not evidence of a perception of disability.