Opinion ID: 1335241
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Justification for Closure

Text: Appellants argue the trial court closed the suppression hearing without sufficient justification. We agree. The rights of the public and the press to attend criminal trials are guaranteed by the South Carolina Constitution and the United States Constitution. Because the majority of closed courtroom cases focus largely on the federal constitutional analysis and jurisprudence, we begin there. United Stated Supreme Court has interpreted the guarantees of free speech and freedom of the press found in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution to include a constitutional guarantee of open and public courts. Richmond Newpapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980). Because the court views the rights of the public and press as constitutionally guaranteed, the First Amendment analysis applies a strong presumption favoring open criminal proceedings. In re Charlotte Observer, 882 F.2d 850, 852 (4th Cir.1989); In re Knight Publishing Co., 743 F.2d 231, 234 (4th Cir.1984). This presumption may only be overcome by an overriding interest based on specific findings that closure is necessary to preserve higher values, and the closure must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. In re Charlotte Observer, 882 F.2d at 852-53 (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1, 13-14, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) ( Press Enterprise II )); In re Knight Publishing Co., 743 F.2d at 234 (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984) ( Press Enterprise I )). When the alleged higher value justifying closure is protecting the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury, the courtroom may be closed only if specific findings are made that (1) there is a substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity, (2) there is a substantial probability that closure would prevent that prejudice, and (3) reasonable alternatives to closure could not adequately protect the defendant's rights. In re S.C. Press Ass'n, 946 F.2d at 1041; In re Charlotte Observer, 882 F.2d at 853. Additionally, the trial court must list specific findings justifying closure so an appellate court may review the decision and determine its correctness. In re Knight Publishing Co., 743 F.2d at 234. Courts have generally interpreted this requirement as establishing a de novo standard of review. In re Charlotte Observer, 882 F.2d at 853 (citing In re Washington Post, 807 F.2d 383, 381 (4th Cir. 1986)). Although South Carolina, like the federal courts, has a rich jurisprudential history in the area of courtroom closure, the origins of the state and federal guarantees of open courtrooms are quite different. Our Constitution parallels the United States Constitution in numerous ways. For example, article I, § 2 of the South Carolina Constitution is strikingly similar to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Also, article I, § 14 of the South Carolina Constitution provides the equivalent of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy and public trial to a criminal defendant. Arguably, the difficulty the federal courts experienced in the early stages of closed courtroom jurisprudence involved finding a constitutional basis for the guarantee of open courtrooms. [3] As we have explained, the federal courts eventually interpreted the First Amendment in such a manner as to provide this guarantee, and the federal law in this area has largely become well-settled. In South Carolina, however, our Constitution contains a particular provision that has no parallel at the federal level. Specifically, our Constitution provides [a]ll courts shall be public, and every person shall have speedy remedy therein for wrongs sustained. S.C. Const. art. I, § 9. [4] While federal case law was still in considerable flux, our jurisprudence recognized article I, § 9's independent constitutional guarantee of open courts and held [e]xclusion of the press and public from judicial proceedings is a drastic measure calling for a careful weighing of interests affected. Steinle v. Lollis, 279 S.C. 375, 376-77, 307 S.E.2d 230, 231 (1983). As both federal and state law evolved, we clarified that a judge's decision to close any proceeding must be supported by specific findings explaining the balancing of the interests at stake and the need for closure. Ex parte Island Packet, 308 S.C. 198, 201, 417 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1992) (explicitly adopting Press Enterprise II's test); Ex parte Columbia Newspapers, 286 S.C. at 118-19, 333 S.E.2d at 338 (relying on Steinle and article I, § 9 of the South Carolina Constitution, as well as Gannett ). Although the state and federal constitutional origins of these rights are substantially different, we now hold that the test for reviewing the propriety of closing a courtroom under the South Carolina Constitution is identical to the First Amendment analysis of the issue. This holding is grounded in the fact that this Court's earliest precedent closely mirrors the current First Amendment analysis of this issue, and in the fact that this Court has continually relied on both state and federal precedent in analyzing these cases. [5] In the instant case, the trial court relied on concerns about racial issues and the hot button issue of domestic violence in closing the pre-trial suppression hearing. Though these concerns were no doubt genuine, closing the courtroom could not possibly have alleviated either of them. As the record demonstrates, closing the courtroom had no effect on Appellants' abilities to publish or disseminate news about Defendant's case. Though the trial court had the ability to prevent the press from attending the suppression hearing, the court did not have the ability to prevent the press from speaking on the subject matter. Indeed, preventing the press from attending the suppression hearing had no impact on the press' ability to further publicize Defendant's race, crime, or any issue related to his case. Thus, assuming there was a substantial probability that pre-trial publicity would prejudice Defendant, closing the courtroom could not have prevented that prejudice. Additionally, it is helpful to discuss another of the trial court's concerns involving the media's presence at the suppression hearing, though it was not specifically articulated in the court's justifications for its decision. In this case, the trial court was concerned that details of Defendant's confession to the psychiatrist might be revealed in the hearing and subsequently published by the media. Similar, however, to the justifications offered above, this concern would also fail to support closure. We believe the trial court's original suggestion to limit the hearing to legal arguments addressing suppression would be sufficient to alleviate this fear. Additionally, we take this opportunity to reiterate that jury voir dire is the preferred and generally accepted tool that protects a defendant from the prejudicial effects of pre-trial publicity. In re Charlotte Observer, 882 F.2d at 855. Because closing the courtroom had no effect on preventing additional publicity regarding Defendant's case, the case as it related to the issue of domestic violence in South Carolina, or any racial issues involved in the trial, we reverse the trial court's decision closing the pre-trial suppression hearing. [6]