Opinion ID: 6345528
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Applicable Standard in This Case

Text: Upon consideration of Maryland Rule 5-901 and relevant authorities, we conclude that the “reasonable juror” test applies to authentication of the eBay samples, i.e., items purchased on the internet, and we hold that the samples purchased on eBay were authenticated under Maryland Rule 5-901(a) because there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for a reasonable juror to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the powder within the containers was Strait-Line marking chalk. Just as we have previously applied the “reasonable juror” test to the authentication of social media evidence, our case law leads to the conclusion that the test applies with equal force to the authentication of exemplar or sample evidence purchased on the internet on websites such as eBay. Evidence is authenticated where a reasonable juror could find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence is what the proponent claims. See Sample, 468 Md. at 597-98, 228 A.3d at 194-95. Further, circumstantial evidence that the offered evidence is what it is claimed to be may be sufficient for authentication, including authentication of sample or exemplar evidence. See Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4). As explained above, in Sublet, we joined other state and federal courts that have utilized the reasonable juror standard for authentication of social media evidence as set - 24 - forth by the Second Circuit in Vayner. See Sublet, 442 Md. at 671, 113 A.3d at 718. In Sublet, we noted that, in Vayner, the Second Circuit stated that the requirement to authenticate evidence “is satisfied if sufficient proof has been introduced so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or identification.” Id. at 666, 113 A.3d at 715 (quoting Vayner, 769 F.3d at 129-30) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Vayner, in making this statement, the Second Circuit quoted United States v. Pluta, 176 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 1999). See Sublet, 442 Md. at 666, 113 A.3d at 715. In Pluta, 176 F.3d at 49, in 1999, the authentication of passports was at issue, not social media evidence. The use of the “reasonable juror” test in Pluta predated the widespread use of social media and indicates that the test was not developed to apply solely to evidence derived from social media.7 We see no valid reason to cabin the application of the “reasonable juror” test to social media evidence and to require a heightened or different standard of authentication 7 Although Six Degrees, which “is widely considered to be the very first social networking site[,]” was launched in 1997, social networks were limited at the time and “[i]t would be a few years before the Internet’s infrastructure could catch up with the concept of social networks.” Chenda Ngak, Then and now: a history of social networking sites, CBS News (July 6, 2011), https://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/then-and-now-a-history-ofsocial-networking-sites/ [https://perma.cc/JVV8-B5RS]. It was not until the early 2000s that many social media sites began springing up, including LinkedIn in May 2003, MySpace in August 2003, and Facebook in February 2004. See id. According to MerriamWebster, the first known use of the term “social media” occurred in 2004. See Social Media, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20media [https://perma.cc/K7GT-GYGH]. According to the Pew Research Center, the Center “began systematically tracking social media usage in 2005.” Andrew Perrin, Social Media Usage: 2005-2015, Pew Research Center (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/10/08/social-networking-usage-2005-2015/ [https://perma.cc/36UJ-UEAK]. In 2005, only 7% of American adults reported using social networking sites. See id. By October 2015, that percentage drastically rose, with 65% of American adults surveyed reporting that they used social networking sites. See id. - 25 - for goods purchased over the internet.8 As to the method or amount of proof required to satisfy the standard for authentication if evidence is susceptible to tampering, contrary to Irwin’s contention, in Griffin, this Court did not require direct testimony of a witness with knowledge for authentication of social media evidence where there was an allegation that the evidence was susceptible to tampering. In Griffin, 419 Md. at 363-64, 19 A.3d at 427-28, where the State’s attempt to authenticate social media evidence through circumstantial evidence failed, we explained that social media evidence could be authenticated in different ways, including through the testimony of a witness with knowledge, but we in no way imposed such a requirement. Similarly, direct testimony is not a prerequisite for authentication of sample evidence purchased on the internet. Indeed, imposing such a requirement would be inconsistent with the plain language of Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4), which provides that evidence may be authenticated through the use of circumstantial evidence. Further, our holding in Sample demonstrates that there is no basis for applying a heightened standard of proof where a party seeks to authenticate social media evidence 8 This conclusion is consistent with our discussion of authentication in Jackson v. State, 460 Md. 107, 110, 188 A.3d 975, 977 (2018), in which we held that bank statements and a compact disc with recordings from surveillance cameras were authenticated. In summarizing relevant law, we stated that, “[a]lthough ‘any authenticity determination is context-specific,’ a trial judge need only ‘determine that there is proof from which a reasonable juror could find that the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be.’” Id. at 122, 188 A.3d at 984 (quoting Sublet, 442 Md. at 678, 113 A.3d at 722) (brackets omitted). Although we were not called upon to apply the “reasonable juror” test in Jackson, our observation concerning the applicability of the standard, made in a case not involving social media evidence, is yet another indication that the “reasonable juror” test is not limited to authentication of social media evidence. - 26 - through circumstantial evidence under Maryland Rule 5-901(b)(4). In Sample, 468 Md. at 567-68, 228 A.3d at 176, we held that the preponderance of the evidence is the applicable standard of proof for authenticating social media evidence. Just as a heightened standard of proof does not apply to authentication of social media evidence, a heightened standard is not applicable to authenticating goods bought online.9 Irwin raises a red herring in contending that a heightened standard of authentication is warranted because the samples purchased were susceptible to the risk of alteration or tampering. Irwin alleges that it is possible that the containers could have been opened and the contents altered at some point after the containers left its factory and makes much of the circumstance that there is no information about the eBay sellers. Irwin argues that it is possible that the eBay sellers, knowingly or not, provided goods that had been altered or tampered with. From our perspective, although eBay is a relatively new potential source of evidence, buying products secondhand from unknown individuals to offer in court as exemplars is not novel. Apart from the use of the internet, a plaintiff in a case similar to this one could seek to purchase products by placing advertisements in newspapers, putting up posters in neighborhoods, or otherwise soliciting members of the general public to sell products. Under such circumstances, although the plaintiff would not necessarily be able 9 We do not wish, of course, to discourage litigants in future cases from gathering information about online sellers and their products. Information from online sellers concerning where or how a product was acquired, what was known about the product before it came into the seller’s possession, and how a product was stored or maintained could be considered by a trial court in making a determination as to authentication. That said, such information is not an indispensable prerequisite to authentication. - 27 - to vouch for the sellers of the product or identify the origin of the item prior to it coming into the seller’s possession, Maryland Rule 5-901 and the reasonable juror test would nonetheless apply for authentication. See Jackson v. State, 460 Md. 107, 122, 188 A.3d 975, 984 (2018) (“Although any authenticity determination is context-specific, a trial judge need only determine that there is proof from which a reasonable juror could find that the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be.” (Cleaned up)).