Opinion ID: 4533276
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Medlin’s Due Process Claim

Text: Medlin argues that he did not voluntarily resign from his position, but “was constructively discharged” because he “had no choice but to resign and reap some financial benefit from his situation.” Medlin Br. at 16–18. “A constructive discharge may constitute a deprivation of property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Nunn v. Lynch, 113 F. App’x 55, 59 (6th Cir. 2004). Employee resignations, however, are presumed to be voluntary. Spangler v. Lucas County, 477 F. App’x 301, 303 (6th Cir. 2012); Nunn, 113 F. App’x at 59. “A constructive discharge exists if working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.” Ford v. Gen. Motors Corp., 305 F.3d 545, 554 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636–37 (6th Cir. 1987)). The plaintiff must demonstrate “that 1) ‘the employer . . . deliberately create[d] intolerable working conditions, as perceived by a reasonable person,’ and 2) the employer did so ‘with the intention of forcing the employee to quit . . . .’” Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 568–69 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Moore v. KUKA Welding Sys., 171 F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1999)). In Cleveland v. Southern Disposal Waste Connections, 491 F. App’x 698, 701 (6th Cir. 2012), Patty Cleveland was suspended from her customer service position after she was unable to explain a customer payment discrepancy. Shortly thereafter, Cleveland met with a supervisor who offered her a voluntary severance package, which Cleveland refused. Id. at 701–02. Two months later, another supervisor issued Cleveland a written warning for an unexcused absence. Id. After meeting with the supervisor, Cleveland “experienced shortness of breath and chest pains and she also began crying.” Id. at 702. Cleveland resigned several days later. Id. This court reasoned that Cleveland was offered “a voluntary severance package, which suggests that she had the option -10- Nos. 19-5862/5866, Medlin, et al. v. City of Algood, et al. to accept the package and was not compelled to resign,” and that she did not receive “any pressure from management to accept the package.” Id. at 708. This court concluded that Cleveland failed to establish a constructive discharge. Id. at 708–09. Here, the City scheduled a termination hearing for Medlin, offering him an opportunity to testify, present evidence, and confront witnesses. Furthermore, Medlin testified that the City permitted him to resign so that he could receive a payout for sick days, vacation days, and comp time. The facts here indicate that Medlin had a choice—to resign with the guarantee of additional compensation or to proceed with the hearing. As in Cleveland, there is no indication here that Medlin was pressured to resign, and Medlin is unable to show that the City intended to force him to quit. And, although Medlin asserts that the official who would preside over the hearing had already concluded Medlin should be terminated, the record contains no evidence that a hearing officer had been selected at the time Medlin resigned. Because Medlin resigned “of his own free will, even though prompted to do so by some action of his employer, he . . . cannot contend that he was deprived of his due process rights.” Nunn, 113 F. App’x at 59 (quoting Leheny v. City of Pittsburgh, 183 F.3d 220, 227 (3d Cir. 1999)).