Opinion ID: 477760
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Standard Generally.

Text: 24 In Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 677-79, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2090-91, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982), the Supreme Court enunciated the standard for measuring allegations that prosecutorial misconduct compelled a defendant's mistrial motion. Because appellants here assert claims of both prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, we must decide whether the same test should be applied to both allegations. Since we conclude that under the Kennedy standard appellants have no claim with respect to the conduct of the AUSA, the decisive inquiries on this appeal are whether a different standard should be applied to assess a judge's conduct, and, under whatever standard does apply, whether the trial judge's conduct precludes a retrial here. The Kennedy decision provides: 25 We do not by this opinion lay down a flat rule that where a defendant in a criminal trial successfully moves for a mistrial, he may not thereafter invoke the bar of double jeopardy against a second trial. But we do hold that the circumstances under which such a defendant may invoke the bar of double jeopardy in a second effort to try him are limited to those cases in which the conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. 26 Id. at 679, 102 S.Ct. at 2091 (emphasis added). In so holding, the Court disavowed earlier precedent that arguably afforded the double-jeopardy bar to defendants compelled to move for a mistrial, not as the result of any intent to provoke a mistrial, but due merely to prosecutorial or judicial over-reaching or prejudicial conduct. See id. (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1081, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485, 91 S.Ct. 547, 557, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (plurality opinion)). 27 By quoting prior Supreme Court authority discussing prosecutorial and judicial misconduct as one unit, the Kennedy Court, the government argues, indicated that the conduct of judges and prosecutors should be similarly reviewed. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 678, 102 S.Ct. at 2090 (quoting Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485, 91 S.Ct. at 557); cf. United States v. Singer, 785 F.2d 228, 240 (8th Cir.1986) (Kennedy Court referred to prosecutorial and judicial misconduct as if in one breath). Indeed, Justice Stevens's separate opinion in Kennedy noted that although that case dealt with allegations of only prosecutorial error, the exception to the general rule on defendant-requested mistrials also encompasses comparable judicial misconduct. 456 U.S. at 683 n. 12, 102 S.Ct. at 2093, n. 12 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Moreover, the ninth and eleventh circuits have since addressed allegations of judicially provoked mistrials under the Kennedy standard, albeit without extensive analysis. See United States v. Mitchell, 736 F.2d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 94, 88 L.Ed.2d 77 (1985); United States v. Miller, 742 F.2d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1216, 105 S.Ct. 1194, 84 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985). 28 Appellants, on the other hand, urge that a judge should be held to a more exacting standard than a prosecutor, because the judge's function is to ensure a fair trial, while a prosecutor is acting as the defendant's adversary. Cf. Singer, 785 F.2d at 240. Thus, appellants contend that judges should be held to the alternative overreaching standard found in Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611, 96 S.Ct. at 1081, and Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485, 91 S.Ct. at 557, and applied by this court in Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir.1979). 29 We reject appellants' invitation to declare a separate standard for judges from that enunciated in Kennedy. First, no Supreme Court authority suggests that a different measure should be employed to test judges' conduct; in fact, as we noted earlier, a long line of cases indicates that judges and prosecutors should be similarly treated in evaluating double jeopardy claims following a defendant-requested mistrial. See, e.g., Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 677-79, 102 S.Ct. at 2090-91 (quoting cases referring to prosecutors and judges); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 33-34, 97 S.Ct. 2141, 2147, 53 L.Ed.2d 80 (1977) (examining judge's and prosecutor's conduct under the same standard); Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 608, 96 S.Ct. at 1080 (referring to judicial or prosecutorial error); Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485 & n. 12, 91 S.Ct. at 557 & n. 12 (discussing a mistrial motion necessitated by judicial or prosecutorial impropriety). 30 Second, a less exacting test for judges would not necessarily serve the interests of criminal defendants in general. Inevitably some errors will be made during every criminal trial, and trial judges should feel free to grant a mistrial when they conclude that a given error is incurably prejudicial. Since there is no way, under the amorphous overreaching standard, to decide accurately when such a trial error would cross the line, trial judges would frequently be left to consider the potential bar of double jeopardy before granting a mistrial at the defendant's request. In doubtful cases, judges would likely be less willing to grant otherwise meritorious mistrial requests. Thus, by discouraging trial judges from granting mistrials, the less exacting test for judges now urged by appellants would tend to erode the very protections the double jeopardy clause was meant to provide, a consequence the Supreme Court has cautioned against: 31 If a mistrial were in fact warranted under the applicable law, of course, the defendant could in many instances successfully appeal a judgment of conviction on the same grounds that he urged a mistrial, and the Double Jeopardy Clause would present no bar to retrial. But some of the advantages secured to him by the Double Jeopardy Clause--the freedom from extended anxiety, and the necessity to confront the government's case only once--would be to a large extent lost in the process of trial to verdict, reversal on appeal, and subsequent retrial. 32 Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676-77, 102 S.Ct. at 2089-90. 33 Applying Kennedy's intentional misconduct test to judges as well as prosecutors will maximize the protections afforded criminal defendants by leaving judges free to grant a mistrial in the event of perceived prejudicial trial error, while at the same time guarding against the rare judge who, sensing an acquittal, might overstep his authority and seek to provoke a defendant's mistrial motion. Reprosecution after such intentional misconduct the double jeopardy clause will not tolerate, for the system breaks down when a judge intercedes to manipulate the process and deprive a defendant of his right to go before his first trier of the facts. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 468 n. 3, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 1590 n. 3, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964). 34 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the intentional misconduct standard, which in Kennedy was held to govern evaluation of the conduct of prosecutors under the double jeopardy clause following a defendant's request for a mistrial, should also apply to reviewing a trial judge's actions. In so deciding, we note that any inconsistency between this holding and our earlier decision in Drayton, 589 F.2d at 121-22, is mandated by the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Kennedy, since the broader language in Drayton had relied on earlier Supreme Court authority that referred to both judges and prosecutors, authority which was expressly limited in Kennedy, id. at 121; see Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 677-79 & n. 8, 102 S.Ct. at 2090-91 & n. 8. 35