Opinion ID: 2375316
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Usurping the Jury's RoleCRE 704

Text: The court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Dr. Sirotnak's testimony regarding his medical diagnosis of child physical abuse to T.D. without instructing the jury on the different definitions of medical and legal child abuse. Again we disagree. Because Rector made no contemporaneous objection to Dr. Sirotnak's testimony pursuant to CRE 704 or to the jury instructions, she did not preserve the issue for appeal. The general rule is that failure to make a timely and sufficient objection during the trial constitutes a waiver of that ground on appeal. People v. Kruse, 839 P.2d 1, 3 (Colo. 1992) (citations omitted). Rector waived appellate review of whether Dr. Sirotnak's testimony usurped the jury's role by failing to object to the testimony pursuant to CRE 704. Moreover, Rector did not request a jury instruction on the different definitions of medical and legal child abuse. Thus, whether Dr. Sirotnak's medical child abuse testimony usurped the jury's role should not have been addressed by the court of appeals under an abuse of discretion standard. Nevertheless, an appellate court may address issues not raised below where plain error requires consideration of the issues. Id. at 3 (citations omitted). Plain error occurs when, after reviewing the entire record, the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the error so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction. Id. While the court of appeals did not analyze the issue under the plain error standard, we do so here. We examine whether Dr. Sirotnak's testimony usurped the role of the jury and conclude that it did not. The court of appeals held that, when Dr. Sirotnak testified that he diagnosed T.D. with child physical abuse, he opined on the ultimate legal issue and thereby usurped the jury's role as a fact finder. An expert may, however, offer testimony that embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. CRE 704. We examine a number of factors when determining whether expert testimony usurped the function of the jury, including but not limited to, whether the testimony was clarified on cross-examination, People v. Prendergast, 87 P.3d 175, 183 (Colo.App.2003) (considering the fact that an expert's statements were clarified on cross-examination in holding that the expert's testimony did not usurp the jury's role in determining any factual issue), and whether the expert's testimony expressed an opinion of the applicable law or legal standards thereby usurping the function of the court, Quintana v. City of Westminster, 8 P.3d 527, 530 (Colo. App.2000) (Although opinion testimony is not objectionable merely because it embraces an ultimate issue of fact, CRE 704, an expert may not usurp the function of the court by expressing an opinion of the applicable law or legal standards.). We also consider whether a jury was properly instructed on the law and that it may accept or reject the expert's opinion. People v. Fasy, 829 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo.1992) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony when the jury was properly instructed that it was the jury's decision to determine the weight that the jury should give to the expert's testimony); People v. Destro, 215 P.3d 1147, 1152 (Colo.App.2008) (holding that the jury retained its function when properly instructed). An additional factor is whether an expert opined that the defendant committed the crime or that there was a particular likelihood that the defendant committed the crime. See Masters v. People, 58 P.3d 979, 992 (Colo.2002). Here, concern that Dr. Sirotnak's testimony usurped the jury's function is unfounded. The record shows that the distinction between medical and legal child abuse was highlighted by Rector's counsel both during cross-examination and during closing arguments. Dr. Sirotnak declined to state the law on child abuse when asked to do so by Rector's counsel and instead stated that there was a difference between the legal standard for child abuse and the medical diagnosis. Also, the jury was properly instructed on the law and its ability to accept or reject the expert witness testimony. The primary issue for the jury was whether Rector caused an injury to T.D.'s life or health, or permitted him to be unreasonably placed in a situation that posed a threat of injury to his life or health; whether she acted knowingly or recklessly; and whether the abuse resulted in serious bodily injury. See § 18-6-401(1)(a), (7)(a). Dr. Sirotnak did not testify as to the primary issue. He did not testify that Rector inflicted T.D.'s injuries nor did he testify that Rector committed the abuse. Also, Dr. Sirotnak declined to speculate about intent when asked by Rector's counsel to do so. Accordingly, we conclude that, considering the record as a whole, the admission of Dr. Sirotnak's testimony did not rise to the level of plain error.