Opinion ID: 6226738
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clear legal right/clear legal duty

Text: {¶ 20} The issue here is whether Judge Shanahan improperly restricted access to M.R.’s affidavit under Sup.R. 45(E). If the judge erred, M.R.’s unredacted affidavit is a case document under Sup.R. 44(C)(1). And if the affidavit is a case document, then the Enquirer and Volokh have a clear legal right to access it and Judge Shanahan has a clear legal duty to allow access. See Sup.R. 44(B) and 45(A). {¶ 21} Sup.R. 45(E)(2) authorizes a court to restrict public access to a document only “if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the presumption of allowing public access is outweighed by a higher interest.” Judge Shanahan acknowledges that the party promoting the restriction has the burden of proof. So, for the Enquirer and Volokh to prevail, they need to show only that the judge’s findings were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. {¶ 22} As noted above, Sup.R. 45(E)(2) provides a nonexhaustive list of factors a court must consider when deciding whether to restrict public access to a document. In her second sealing order, Judge Shanahan found that “risk of injury to persons, individual privacy rights and interests, and public safety” supported restricting public access to M.R.’s affidavit. In the judge’s view, identifying M.R. would increase the risk of physical harm to M.R. and his family, particularly “[i]n the current climate, with the uptick in violent acts being perpetrated against law enforcement.” The judge noted that one of the defendants had “threatened, in writing, to publish [M.R.’s] personal identifying information and other information for the purpose of ‘doxing’ [M.R.].” 8 January Term, 2022 {¶ 23} The Enquirer and Volokh argue that these findings were not supported by evidence, much less the clear and convincing evidence required under Sup.R. 45(E)(2). They contend that M.R. did not present any evidence showing that he has been threatened and that Judge Shanahan merely speculated about the general risks police officers face. The Enquirer and Volokh also note that although M.R. testified in his affidavit that his work as a police officer causes him to be concerned for his personal safety and the safety of his family, he failed to tie those concerns to his lawsuit or the incident at city hall. {¶ 24} For her part, Judge Shanahan argues that there is evidence that one of the defendants “claimed to be in possession of M.R.’s address, with the clear intent of eventually publishing it to his followers.” The judge adds, without elaboration, that “M.R.’s complaint makes numerous allegations of social media postings that certainly could be considered threatening in nature.” At bottom, the judge attempts to justify her orders by arguing that “at least one defendant has threatened to publish M.R.’s personal identifying information for the purpose of ‘doxing’ the officer.” {¶ 25} Judge Shanahan has not shown that the evidence clearly and convincingly justified restricting access to M.R.’s affidavit. To start, the socialmedia post the judge refers to did not express a clear intent to publicize M.R.’s name, address, and phone numbers. The poster posed a question about whether it would be legal for him to release information about M.R. Although the poster left open the possibility that he might release M.R.’s information, he suggested that he would not do so unless he was told that it was legal. Moreover, making M.R.’s affidavit publicly available would not increase the risk that the poster would publish M.R.’s name, address, and phone numbers, because the poster already has that information. {¶ 26} And even if the poster’s statement constituted a genuine threat to publicize M.R.’s information, Judge Shanahan has not shown that the publication would create a risk of injury to M.R. or his family within the meaning of Sup.R. 45(E)(2). See United States v. Cook, 472 F.Supp.3d 326, 335 (N.D.Miss.2020) 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO (discussing “doxing” and concluding that “sharing public information, while potentially offensive and disagreeable, does not rise to the level of a true threat”). Although in her order restricting public access to M.R.’s affidavit Judge Shanahan cited real risks that police officers face, M.R. had not presented any evidence of a threat of physical harm directed at him or his family. {¶ 27} As a final matter, Judge Shanahan argues that the Enquirer and Volokh have not been harmed by the partial sealing of M.R.’s affidavit, because her courtroom remains open to the public and the Enquirer has published the name of the person it believes to be M.R. The issue, however, is not whether the Enquirer and Volokh have knowledge of M.R.’s identity or whether they can publish his name. The issue is whether documents filed in M.R.’s case are court records that must be accessible to the public. The Enquirer and Volokh do not need to prove that they have been injured to be entitled to relief in mandamus in these cases. {¶ 28} The Enquirer and Volokh have a clear legal right of public access to M.R.’s affidavit, and Judge Shanahan has a clear legal duty to provide that access. Accordingly, we grant a writ of mandamus in both cases ordering Judge Shanahan to make the affidavit fully accessible to the public.