Opinion ID: 6216486
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The City’s Motion for Directed Verdict

Text: The Allens’ first point on cross-appeal asserts the circuit court erred in sustaining the City’s motion for directed verdict because the City was a co-owner of the Courthouse. “A case may not be submitted unless legal and substantial evidence supports each fact essential to liability.” Tharp, 587 S.W.3d at 652. The Allens contend the circuit court’s ruling was erroneous because the Courthouse was the City’s property under the meaning of “public entity’s property” as used in section 537.600. The City counters it lacked “exclusive possession and control” over the basement stairway; thus, sovereign immunity was not waived under section 537.600.1(2) despite the City’s undivided one-half ownership interest in the Courthouse. This Court agrees with the Allens. The phrase “public entity’s property” as used in section 537.600.1(2) applies to public entities that legally own the property where the accident occurred or that lack legal ownership but have exclusive possession and control over the property. The circuit court’s stated reason for sustaining the City’s motion for directed verdict was that the City lacked “exclusive control and possession” over the basement stairway. 21 This finding is clearly erroneous. The Allens introduced evidence of an agreement between the City and the County showing each held an undivided one-half interest in ownership of the Courthouse. For purposes of establishing that a building is a “public entity’s property,” the analysis stops upon a showing of actual or legal ownership by a public entity. A plaintiff seeking to establish injury on a “public entity’s property” under section 537.600 need only introduce evidence the public entity had “exclusive possession and control” of the property when the public entity does not have actual or legal ownership of the property. Because the Allens produced evidence showing the City was a legal owner of the Courthouse, the circuit court erroneously entered directed verdict as to the City. To the extent the judgment was entered in the City’s favor, it is vacated. 15