Opinion ID: 2506556
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Irbys' Claim Was Timely.

Text: Per AS 23.30.105(a), the statute of limitations for filing a claim for death benefits in a workers' compensation case is one year after the death. [9] The workers' compensation statute and its implementing regulations do not specify the evidence a deceased worker's beneficiaries can use to prove death. [10] In addition, no regulation discusses proof of death in a case like this one, where no body has been recovered and the employer continues to assert that the employee is not in fact dead. Fairbanks Gold argues that the one-year statute of limitations on the Irbys' death benefits claim ran out on either April 13, 1998one year after the accidentor April 13, 2003one year after expiration of the five-year presumptive death period specified in AS 13.06.035(5). Fairbanks Gold asserts that the board could determine that Irby was dead independently of a jury verdict. The Irbys maintain that their claim was timely because they filed it within one year of the date the second jury found that Irby was presumed to have died in the industrial accident. We hold that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies and that the Irbys' claim was timely. Use of equitable tolling should come as no surprise in the context of an administrative proceeding. [11] We can affirm a judgment on any appropriate basis, including grounds not relied on or raised in the lower tribunal. [12] The principle that we can affirm on alternative grounds applies only to issues of law that find support in settled facts and does not extend to new theories that would normally be resolved by discretionary powers traditionally reserved for trial courtspowers relying on case-specific consideration of disputed or disputable issues of fact. [13] After briefing in this court was completed, the Irbys filed a citation of supplemental authority per Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 212(c)(12) to further support equitable arguments they presented to both the board and the superior court. The citations raised equitable tolling as an alternative basis for affirming the board's decision. Although neither the board nor the superior court considered equitable tolling in evaluating the Irbys' claim, the elements of equitable tolling parallel the elements of issues directly raised by the parties and considered below. The Irbys argued estoppel in the alternative before the board and the superior court; Fairbanks Gold raised the issue of prejudice in its defense of laches and in responding to the Irbys' equitable arguments. The employer had an opportunity to dispute the Irbys' diligence in bringing their claim and the reasonableness of the Irbys' procedural choices. Additionally, the employer litigated the issue of prejudice. The board made factual findings that serve as the foundation of a legal ruling on equitable tolling. The board found that Fairbanks Gold had ample, timely opportunity to investigate and defend against any possible claims by the [Irbys]. Given the certainty that the doctrine of equitable tolling is satisfied and the absence of a genuine factual dispute material to its application, we rely on equitable tolling to affirm the board decision. We have previously stated that even though the defense of statute of limitations is a legitimate defense, [14] we look on it with disfavor and will strain neither the law nor the facts in its aid. [15] We have identified several policies served by limitations periods: providing defendants with notice of the nature of adverse claims and barring plaintiffs who have slept on their rights, [16] as well as protecting against prejudice from stale claims. [17] Here, Fairbanks Gold had notice of the claim: it indicated in a 1997 letter to its workers' compensation carrier that the first jury verdict stayed Cartrie's claim for benefits and that the claim would go into excess at some point. In 1998 its workers' compensation carrier instructed Fairbanks Gold to leave a reserve on that claim. The evidence also suggests that the Irbys did not sleep on their rights. Cartrie promptly filed the first presumptive death petition only seven weeks after the accident. In 1998 Cartrie contacted Fairbanks Gold, the workers' compensation adjuster, and board staff seeking advice about pursuing a claim for benefits and information about reports or other evidence related to the accident. In 2000 she again contacted Fairbanks Gold to see if it had any new information about the accident. The record also shows that the Irbys contacted the Fairbanks court in 1999 and again in 2002 about filing another presumptive death petition. Finally, nothing indicates that any evidence became more stale between the running of the five-year presumptive death period and the time Edward II filed the second presumptive death proceeding. Under the doctrine of equitable tolling, when a party has more than one legal remedy available, the statute of limitations is tolled while the party pursues one of the possible remedies. [18] In Gudenau v. Sweeney Insurance, Inc., we adopted a three-part test for equitable tolling: (1) the alternative remedy must give notice to the defendant; (2) the defendant must not be prejudiced; and (3) the plaintiff must have acted reasonably and in good faith. [19] The initial remedy must be pursued in a judicial or quasi-judicial forum. [20] A party is generally entitled to the full statutory period after the circumstances which justify equitable tolling abate. [21] Because the statute of limitations on workers' compensation death benefits runs from the time of death [22] and because Fairbanks Gold insisted that Irby was still alive, the Irby beneficiaries needed to establish a date of death or presumed death. [23] The alternative legal remedies we discuss are different ways to establish the fact of Irby's death. Here, Cartrie had more than one way to pursue a finding of Irby's death. To obtain a presumptive death certificate from the state, she could either file a presumptive death petition in district court [24] or, after five years had elapsed, begin a superior court proceeding, presumably in probate. [25] She chose the first alternative. It is less clear whether, without first obtaining a presumptive death certificate, she could have filed a workers' compensation claim with the board and asked the board, rather than a court, to determine that Irby had died. Here, the board did not determine that it had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the fact of Irby's death. [26] It permitted the Irbys to introduce the presumptive death certificate into evidence and gave Fairbanks Gold the opportunity to present evidence that Irby was not in fact dead. Even if the board had jurisdiction to find that Irby was in fact dead (in addition to finding that his death was the result of an industrial accident), Cartrie had other avenues available to establish that he had died, namely filing a presumptive death petition or a probate proceeding. We first consider the reasonableness of the Irbys' actions. Relying on AS 09.55.020-.060, Cartrie initially chose to file a presumptive death petition in district court shortly after Irby's disappearance. Her actions were reasonable: a district court presumptive death hearing is the only way to obtain a certificate of presumptive death without waiting five years, [27] and, given the circumstances of Irby's disappearance, it was not unreasonable for her to think that a jury would find that he had died at the mine. [28] After the first jury decided that the evidence was insufficient to presume that Irby was dead, Fairbanks Gold filed its second controversion with the board, specifically relying on the jury verdict. Because the 1997 verdict did not establish the presumptive death, and because Fairbanks Gold took the position that as a result of that verdict no workers' compensation benefits were payable, Cartrie cannot be faulted for failing to file a claim for benefits after the jury returned its 1997 verdict. In effect, given the jury's verdict in 1997, the time in which to file a claim was not yet running. [29] In addition, when Cartrie contacted the board in 1998, she received conflicting advice. One staff member suggested that the statute of limitations had already run, while a second indicated that filing for death benefits could be premature. The insurance adjuster offered her no information about pursuing a claim, even though she had no attorney at the time. Based on Fairbanks Gold's controversion and the conflicting advice she received from the board, it was reasonable for Cartrie not to file a workers' compensation claim immediately. It was also reasonable for the Irbys to wait for the five-year presumptive death period to pass before taking further action. The parties agree that there was no time limit by which the Irbys needed to refile a presumptive death petition. [30] Here, Edward II filed the second presumptive death petition about six years after Irby's disappearance. The one-year delay in filing beyond the five-year presumptive death period was not per se unreasonable. As we noted earlier, the Irbys inquired of Fairbanks Gold and the court during the time between the first jury verdict and the filing of the second presumptive death petition. Under the doctrine of equitable tolling, the first proceeding must give notice to the defendant. [31] Fairbanks Gold had ample notice of the circumstances of the accident, the two presumptive death petitions, and the workers' compensation claim. Fairbanks Gold conducted its own investigation of the accident in 1997 and had copies of the investigation of the Alaska State Troopers and the reports of the United States Department of Labor Mine Safety & Health Administration and the State of Alaska Occupational Injury Prevention Program. An attorney for Fairbanks Gold attended both presumptive death hearings. Several Fairbanks Gold employees testified at the first presumptive death hearing, and a former employee testified at the second presumptive death hearing. As we noted already, Fairbanks Gold interpreted the first verdict as deferring the possibility of a claim. Cartrie's continuing inquiries should also have alerted Fairbanks Gold that the family was not forgoing a claim for benefits. The board found that Fairbanks Gold had ample, timely opportunity to investigate and defend against possible claims by the beneficiaries. This finding is fully supported by the record. Finally, equitable tolling requires that the defendant not be prejudiced. [32] Fairbanks Gold asserts that because between 1997 and 2004 two important witnesses died and another moved out of state, it was prejudiced by the Irbys' delay in filing for benefits. It does not identify the witnesses. Before the board, Fairbanks Gold argued that it was prejudiced because of the deaths of Steve Bonham, who testified at the first presumptive death hearing, and Roger Lucas, the Fairbanks Gold employee who investigated the accident and wrote the incident report. But the record reflects that Lucas died in 1999, before the five-year presumptive death period expired. [33] Two other Fairbanks Gold employees testified at the first presumptive death hearing, and both participated in the later proceedings. One testified in person at the board hearing, and the other testified by telephone at the second presumptive death hearing. Fairbanks Gold alleges additional prejudice because of changes in its ownership but does not show how an additional eleven-month delay (from April 13, 2003 to March 1, 2004) prejudiced it. The board's finding that Fairbanks Gold had ample opportunity to investigate and defend the claim indicates that Fairbanks Gold was not prejudiced by any delay in pursuing a presumptive death certificate before filing a claim for death benefits. Carman v. Prudential Insurance Co. does not foreclose the equitable tolling principles we apply here. [34] There is no indication there was any dispute in Carman about whether the missing person was actually still alive and had engineered his disappearance. The statutory presumption of death is generally considered a rebuttable presumption, [35] and Fairbanks Gold insisted that Irby was still alive. Moreover, there was no attempt in Carman to obtain a prompt determination of death, [36] unlike the situation here. Nor was there any indication of relatively diligent inquiries by Ruth Carman that were either unsuccessful or discouraged. [37] In any event, she did not file suit until nearly fifteen years after her husband disappeared while piloting an airplane. [38] We conclude that there are no genuine factual disputes as to any of the elements of equitable tolling and that the parties had a fair opportunity to dispute parallel issues before the board. The Irbys satisfy the elements of equitable tolling: the Irbys' pursuit of a presumptive death certificate and related inquiries gave adequate notice of the claim to Fairbanks Gold; Fairbanks Gold was not prejudiced; and the Irbys acted reasonably and in good faith in pursuing a presumptive death certificate before filing their claim for death benefits, particularly in light of Fairbanks Gold's December 1997 controversion. Their claim was filed within a reasonable period of time for equitable tolling purposes because it was filed within one year of the jury verdict which found that Irby was presumed to have died in the April 1997 accident.