Opinion ID: 863607
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 34

Heading: whether the trial court erred in refusing edwards' proposed lesser-included offense instruction on the codera bradley murder?

Text: ś 112. Edwards complains that the trial court erred in not giving defense instruction D-3, a lesser-included offense instruction which read: The court instructs the jury that if you find that the State of Mississippi has failed to prove any one or more of the essential elements of capital murder involving Cordera Bradley beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to find the defendant not guilty of capital murder of Cordera Bradley. If you find the defendant not guilty of the capital murder of Cordera Bradley, you may continue your deliberations to determine whether or not the defendant is guilty of murder. If you find from the evidence a reasonable doubt that: 1. On or about the 5th day of October, 1995 in Clarke County, Mississippi; 2. The defendant, Frontrail Edwards, did, along with Kelvin Jordan, kill Cordera Bradley, a human being, without authority of law by any means or in any manner; 3. By deliberate design to effect the death of Cordera Bradley; then it is your sworn duty to find the defendant guilty of murder under Count I. Should the State of Mississippi fail to prove any one or more of the essential elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt then you shall find the defendant not guilty of murder under Count I. The State asserts that this assignment of error is procedurally barred for lack of objection to this refusal. The state finds its authority for this proposition in Nicholson ex. rel . Gollott v. State, 672 So.2d 744, 752 (Miss.1996). However, this Court explained in Duplantis v. State, 708 So.2d 1327 (Miss.1998) that: Although in dicta we indicated that we could impose a procedural bar, we did not intend to overrule existing caselaw and therefore require litigants to object to the denial of instructions that they themselves have offered. Prior precedent of this Court makes it clear that an issue involving the denial of a requested jury instruction: ... is procedurally preserved by the mere tendering of the instructions, suggesting that they are correct and asking the Court to submit them to the jury. This in and of itself affords counsel opposite fair notice of the party's position and the Court an opportunity to pass upon the matter. When the instructions are refused, there is no reason why we should thereafter require an objection to the refusal unless we are to place a value upon redundancy and nonsense. Carmichael v. Agur Realty Co., Inc., 574 So.2d 603, 613 (Miss.1990) Duplantis, 708 So.2d at 1339-40. Relying on Duplantis, we will address this issue on the merits. ś 113. Edwards contends that the jury should have been instructed concerning the lesser-included offense of murder. The trial court denied instruction D-3 because it found no evidence to warrant giving it. Edwards contends the trial court erred in refusing D-3 because the jury could have convicted him of murder if it found the killing of Codera Bradley took place at some time other than during the commission of robbery. ś 114. In Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239 (Miss.1993), this Court in discussing when lesser included offense instructions should be granted, stated: [a] lesser-included offense instruction should be granted unless the trial judge and ultimately this Court can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the accused and considering all the reasonable inferences which may be drawn in favor of the accused from the evidence, that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty of a lesser-included offense (conversely, not guilty of at least one essential element of the principal charge). Conner, 632 So.2d at 1254 ( quoting McGowan v. State, 541 So.2d 1027, 1028 (Miss.1989)). ś 115. A lesser included instruction was not appropriate. This Court suggests that Edwards' argument that the jury could have disbelieved that a robbery was taking place when Codera was killed and thus found Edwards guilty only of murder is absurd. In this case, Codera is dead. The unrefuted testimony is that Edwards and Jordan robbed Tony at gunpoint while his son, Codera was in the vehicle. There is further testimony that they drug Tony into a field where they soon after shot Codera in the back of the head. There are pictures of the crime scene evidencing that Tony's pockets had been emptied at this location, further demonstrating a continued robbery. Lastly, Edwards and Jordan drove off in Tony's car completing the robbery of Tony's vehicle. Applying the above test stated in Conner, it is clear that no rational jury could find Edwards guilty of the lesser included offense of murder and not guilty of capital murder. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e)(1994) defines as capital murder, any murder [w]hen done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of ... robbery ... or in any attempt to commit such felon[y]. ś 116. Here, there is simply nothing to indicate that Codera was killed in any context but an armed robbery. Edwards admitted in his confession that Jordan and he discussed committing a robbery. They were both armed. The only evidence presented by both the State and Edwards pointed to an armed robbery. This Court has often and consistently stated that there must be an evidentiary basis for lesser included instructions. Harveston v. State, 493 So.2d 365, 375 (Miss.1986); Fairchild v. State, 459 So.2d 793, 800 (Miss.1984); Colburn v. State, 431 So.2d 1111, 1114 (Miss.1983); Johnson v. State, 416 So.2d 383, 388 (Miss.1982). Thus, even taking all the evidence in the light most favorable to Edwards, no rational jury could have disbelieved the armed robbery element of the State's case and also found Edwards guilty of murder. Necessarily then, under Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e), the murder of Codera was capital murder if it was anything. Therefore, there is no merit to this assignment of error.