Opinion ID: 497333
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Uniform Act

Text: 26 We now turn to Ingersoll's contention that the district court erred in its determination that the Belgian judgment was entitled to recognition and enforcement. As the district court recognized, and as the parties agree, this question must be resolved under Illinois law. Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F.Supp. 885, 892 (N.D.Tex.1980). The district court also recognized, and the parties agree, that this issue is governed by the Uniform Act as enacted by Illinois. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, paras. 12-618 to -626. 27
28 First of all, we believe that there is no serious question as to whether the Belgian judgment meets the basic requirements of the Uniform Act. It is a judgment which grants or denies recovery of a sum of money. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, para. 12-620. It was presented to the district court after the completion of all appellate review in Belgium and therefore was final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered.... Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, para. 12-619. There is also no doubt about the Belgian court's jurisdiction. Ingersoll concedes that the court had personal jurisdiction over it. See Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, para. 12-621(a)(2). Nor is there a serious contention 3 over whether the Belgian court had subject matter jurisdiction. See Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, para. 12-621(a)(3). In fact, it would be hard to imagine how the Belgian courts would not have subject matter jurisdiction over the employment dispute between the parties. This case involves an employee who lived and performed his employment duties in Belgium for a Belgian company. 29 Ingersoll's contention that the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, para. 12-621(a)(1), is also without merit. In this regard, Ingersoll submits: 30 The Belgian court was a relatively inadequate forum. The documents were all in English. The distance for witnesses was great. The Belgian courts, as Granger conceded, do not usually take oral testimony or allow cross-examination. Ingersoll could not compel Granger, a party, to give live testimony. It was important in this case to demonstrate through live testimony that the parties intended to rely exclusively on Illinois law and to provide benefits to Granger exclusively based on Illinois law and the agreement between the parties. 31 Appellant's Br. at 23. Ingersoll also states: 32 The Belgian Labor Court does not allow cross-examination of a party or a party's witnesses if that party does not put himself or his witnesses before the tribunal to testify. The Belgian Labor Court does not allow live testimony to be taken absent the issuance of letters rogatory. Since Granger did not present himself in front of the Belgian Labor Court, Ingersoll was denied the ability to cross-examine Granger and impeach his credibility or refute his testimony. Ingersoll was also unable to gather and present evidence through live testimony other than by requesting and receiving letters rogatory. 33 Id. at 36. In response to this argument, the district court wrote: 34 Ingersoll also intimates that it did not receive a full and fair opportunity to present its claims in Belgium and that the Belgium court denied it the right of cross examination. All of this appears to be an attempt by Ingersoll to show that it was not afforded due process in the Belgian action. 35 In response, Granger submits the affidavit of Edward Hayward, an experienced attorney familiar with the process afforded litigants in the courts of Belgium. Mr. Hayward points out that the Belgian Judicial Code granted Ingersoll the right to call witnesses as well as the right to take testimony outside of Belgim [sic] through letters rogatory. Ingersoll does not dispute the accuracy of Mr. Hayward's statements. Ingersoll never petitioned the Belgian court to hear live testimony and it never requested issuance of letters rogatory to take testimony outside of Belgium. Granger also points out that, like Ingersoll, he chose to call no witnesses. Thus, given that there were no witnesses, due at least in part to Ingersoll's own tactical decision, Ingersoll cannot point to the lack of cross-examination as a violation of due process. 36 Also, contrary to Ingersoll's speculation about the Belgian courts' predisposition to apply Belgian law, this court has been shown nothing to indicate that the Belgian court system provided Ingersoll with anything less than a full and fair opportunity to present its claims. Had this court acted first and applied Illinois law, Granger could hardly have advanced a similar due process claim to the Belgian courts. A forum court's decision that the forum's substantive law should govern a given dispute should not alone serve to negate the apparent fairness of the forum's court system. This court is unwilling to hold that Ingersoll was denied due process based solely on its unfounded speculation concerning bias of the Belgian courts. 37 Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 631 F.Supp. at 317 (citation omitted). 38 In assessing this contention, we begin by noting that the Uniform Act does not require that the procedures employed by the foreign tribunal be identical to those employed in American courts. The statute simply requires that the procedures be compatible with the requirements of due process of law. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, para. 12-621(a)(1) (emphasis supplied). The drafters of the Uniform Act made it clear that a mere difference in the procedural system is not a sufficient basis for nonrecognition. A case of serious injustice must be involved. Unif. Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act Sec. 4 comment, 13 U.L.A. 268 (1986). 4 The district court found that the procedures afforded Ingersoll by the Belgian judicial system were fundamentally fair and did not produce an injustice. That determination meets the standard of the Act. The similarity or dissimilarity of the Belgian procedures to our own is not the issue; the issue is only the basic fairness of the foreign procedures. Because Ingersoll has raised no meritorious challenges (as provided in Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, para. 12-621(a)) to the conclusiveness of the Belgian judgment, we agree with the district court that that judgment was conclusive, and enforceable, and thus met the basic requirements for recognition and enforcement under the Uniform Act. 39
40 Ingersoll next argues that, even if the Belgian judgment is entitled to recognition, the district court should have exercised its discretion under paragraph 12-621(b) to deny such recognition. Paragraph 12-621(b) provides: 41 A foreign judgment need not be recognized if 42 (1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him or her to defend; 43 (2) the judgment was obtained by fraud; 44 (3) the cause of action on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the policy of this State; 45 (4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment; 46 (5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in that court; or 47 (6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action. 48 Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, para. 12-621(b). 49 Ingersoll argues that Mr. Granger's cause of action on which his Belgian judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of Illinois, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, para. 12-621(b)(3), that the proceeding in Belgium was contrary to an agreement between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in that court, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, para. 12-621(b)(5), and that the Belgian court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, para. 12-621(b)(6). 50 The language of subparagraph (b) is not mandatory, but rather optional. In other words, even if Ingersoll's arguments with respect to the provisions of subparagraph (b) were valid, the statute does not require the district court to deny recognition of the judgment; it simply provides that it may deny recognition of that judgment. Here, the district court characterized Ingersoll's argument as merely an improper attempt to relitigate the merits of this case. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 631 F.Supp. at 318. Given the extended history of this dispute, combined with the fairness afforded the litigants in the Belgium courts, this court would not be inclined to deny enforcement of the judgment even if one of the six conditions of paragraph 12-621(b) were present here. Id. On this record, we see no reason to disagree with the district court. Certainly, the court's decision cannot be characterized as an abuse of discretion. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we shall address briefly Ingersoll's principal arguments. 51 (1) Public Policy--Ingersoll argues that the Belgian judgment is contrary to the public policy of Illinois. It contends that Illinois has a strong public policy favoring freedom of contract. Moreover, it argues that the state has extensively regulated employment relationships, and that, therefore, employment relationships entered into in that state should be subjected to Illinois regulation. We find Ingersoll's arguments to be unpersuasive. The Belgian court did nothing to abrogate the employment contract. It merely held that, because this employment relationship involved an employer doing business in Belgium through a Belgian resident for seven years, the relationship was subject to regulation by Belgium. 52 (2) Parties' Choice of Law--Ingersoll argues that the Belgian judgment contravenes the parties' agreement to be bound by the law of Illinois. We agree with the district court that paragraph 12-621(b)(5) is a choice of forum, rather than a choice of law, provision. The fact that the parties chose to subject the relationship to Illinois law would not prevent the enforcement of a judgment of a Belgian court in litigation involving that relationship. Paragraph 12-621(b)(5) addresses the situation where the parties agree that any litigation pertaining to the contract will be carried out in a particular forum. Thus, for Ingersoll's arguments to have any merit, the agreement between Mr. Granger and Ingersoll would have had to provide that any suit regarding the employment relationship be brought in the courts of Illinois. However, the contract has no such provision. 53 (3) Inconvenient Forum--Ingersoll argues that, under paragraph 12-621(b)(6), Belgium was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of this action. In the process of making this argument, Ingersoll quotes the official comment from the Uniform Laws Annotated and states that jurisdiction over Ingersoll in Belgium was based on personal service of process. Appellant's Br. at 35. The comment to the Uniform Act states: 54 The last ground for non-recognition under subsection (b) authorizes a court to refuse recognition and enforcement of a judgment rendered in a foreign country on the basis only of personal service when it believes the original action should have been dismissed by the court in the foreign country on grounds of forum non conveniens. 55 Unif. Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act Sec. 4 comment, 13 U.L.A. 268-69 (1986). However, the Belgian court's jurisdiction was not based solely upon personal service. As the Belgian Labour Court of Appeal noted: 56 In light of [the] fact that the appellant Companies and INGERSOLL Inc. are managed by a nucleus of identical persons, the economic and financial overlapping of said Companies, their economic cohesion (since the organization and activities of subsidiaries must work toward an identical purpose: the American Company's development) all lead to the conclusion that they mey [sic] considered to be one and the enterprise for which the respondent did not cease to work from 1971 to 1977 in Belgium: the several members of said enterprise, which includes the appellant Companies, shared authority over the respondent. Hence, from 1971 until 1977, both appellant Companies were joint employers of the respondent, who pursued the fulfillment of a single contract. This situation notably explains the fact that part of the respondent's salary was paid by the Belgian Company (notably his monthly salary, even though it was paid by the American Company), while another part was paid by the American Company (fringe benefits including life insurance, retirement plans, etc.). 57 Because the contract in which the employee continuously fulfilled was the same, there can be no doubt that the parties had intended to bring their contractual relations before [the] State of Illinois jurisdiction. However, in view of the fact tha[t] the contract was fulfilled in Belgium from 1971 until 1977, the Belgian police and security laws applicable by vitue [sic] of Article 3 of the Civil Code, must therefore be taken into consideration; legal provisions dealing with work contracts which protect workers and which are compulsory ... make up such laws.... 58 Appellant's App., Tab 11 at 11. Ingersoll voluntarily conducted business in Belgium. The obligation to submit to the jurisdiction of that nation's courts with respect to a labor dispute involving an employee stationed there on a long-term assignment can hardly be termed seriously inconvenient.(4) Right to Hearing--Finally, Ingersoll also argues that it was entitled to a hearing on its claims under paragraph 12-621(b). See Appellant's Br. at 24-26 (citing Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Galadari, 777 F.2d 877 (2d Cir.1985), and Hennessy v. Marshall, 682 S.W.2d 340, 344-45 (Tex.App.1984)). We disagree. First, we note that the statute contains no such requirement. Second, the two cases upon which Ingersoll relies are clearly distinguishable. In both of those cases, the party challenging recognition raised issues that could not be resolved without some type of hearing. Here, Ingersoll has raised, in rather summary fashion, conclusory reasons why the Belgian judgment should not be recognized. Mr. Granger has rebutted Ingersoll's contentions with submissions from an attorney experienced in Belgian law. Rather than answering Mr. Granger's rebuttal, Ingersoll continues to rely on the same conclusory arguments. In view of Ingersoll's failure to raise more specific challenges to the recognition of the Belgian judgment, we cannot say that it was entitled to a hearing on its claims. 59