Opinion ID: 572427
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Gilbert Was Otherwise Qualified

Text: 23 In order to establish his prima facie case, however, Gilbert was required to show not only that he was a person with handicaps, but also, inter alia, that he was otherwise qualified for the position he was denied. The phrase otherwise qualified is not defined in the Act. It has been interpreted generally by the Supreme Court to refer to  'one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap.'  Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n. 17, 107 S.Ct. at 1131 n. 17 (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2367, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979)); see Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. at 406, 99 S.Ct. at 2367 (rejecting contention that a person need not meet legitimate physical requirements in order to be 'otherwise qualified' ). Consistent with this interpretation, the regulations interpreting the Act generally use the term qualified handicapped person, rather than otherwise qualified handicapped person, on the reasoning that the omission of the word 'otherwise' is necessary in order to comport with the intent of the statute because, read literally, 'otherwise' qualified handicapped persons include persons who are qualified except for their handicap, rather than in spite of their handicap. 45 C.F.R. Part 84, App. A, at 362 (1990); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f). 24 With respect to employment, the HHS regulations define the term qualified handicapped person, in pertinent part, as a handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job in question. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (emphasis added). In light of this definition, the Supreme Court in Arline recognized a two-part analysis of the Act's otherwise qualified requirement. First, after determining the essential functions of the job in question, the court must evaluate the medical evidence to determine whether the plaintiff can perform the job despite the handicap; if the answer is in the negative, [t]he next step in the 'otherwise-qualified' inquiry is for the court to evaluate, in light of these medical findings, whether the employer could reasonably accommodate the employee under the established standards for that inquiry. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288, 107 S.Ct. at 1131; see also Hall v. United States Postal Service, 857 F.2d 1073, 1078 (6th Cir.1988) (the 'otherwise qualified' inquiry requires a consideration not only of the handicapped applicant's ability to perform the job's essential function, but also whether a reasonable accommodation by the employer would enable the handicapped person to perform those functions). 25 Since a plaintiff must show that she or he was otherwise qualified as part of the prima facie case, and since that term has been defined to include the concept of reasonable accommodation, a plaintiff must, in order to make out a prima facie case, show that she or he can perform the essential functions of the job in spite of the handicap either (a) with no need for accommodation, or (b) with a reasonable accommodation. We do not view the plaintiff's burden with respect to the latter alternative as a heavy one. We would deem it sufficient on this issue for the plaintiff to present evidence as to her or his individual capabilities and suggestions for some reasonable assistance or job modification by the employer. This permits the court to make an individualized inquiry into whether the plaintiff is otherwise qualified for the job in question. It must be noted, however, that though reasonable accommodation may include such adjustments as modification of physical facilities, work schedules, or equipment, or some job restructuring, see 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b), reasonable accommodation does not mean elimination of any of the job's essential functions. See, e.g., Hall v. United States Postal Service, 857 F.2d at 1078 (an accommodation that eliminates an essential function of the job is not reasonable); Jasany v. United States Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1250 (6th Cir.1985) (post office was not required to accommodate [plaintiff] by eliminating one of the essential functions of his job) (emphasis in original). 26 Once the plaintiff has made a prima facie case that she or he is otherwise qualified by showing the ability to perform the essential functions of the job with some reasonable accommodation, the burden shifts to the employer to show that no reasonable accommodation is possible. Indeed, in light of the goals of the Rehabilitation Act and the greater access of the employer to information regarding the feasibility of various possible job modifications, the employer is given the ultimate burden of proof on the issue of reasonable accommodation. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (employer covered by Act shall make reasonable accommodation ... unless [it] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(a) (same); see also Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423-24 (9th Cir.1985) (in action under § 501 of the Act and 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(a), burden of persuasion in proving inability to accommodate always remains on the employer); Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 308 (5th Cir. Unit A Nov. 1981) (same). We note that Mantolete and Prewitt appear to have placed even the initial burden of raising the accommodation issue on the employer, characterizing the plaintiff's burden as one of coming forward to rebut the showing of the employer that no reasonable accommodation is available. See Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d at 1423-24; Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d at 308. These cases, however, do not address the fact that the definition of otherwise qualified includes reference to reasonable accommodation. As indicated above, in our view the inclusion of reasonable accommodation in the definition of otherwise qualified makes either (a) the lack of any need for accommodation, or (b) the possibility of reasonable accommodation, a part of the plaintiff's prima facie case. No burden shifts to the defendant, of course, until the plaintiff has established a prima facie case. 27 In the present case, the district court found that the lifting and handling of 70-pound mail bags were essential functions of the Manual MD Clerk's job, a finding that has not been challenged on this appeal and that is not clearly erroneous, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). We thus turn to the matter of Gilbert's proof that he was qualified, despite his handicap, to perform those functions. 28
29 Gilbert attempted to prove his claim by showing that he was fully qualified for the position of MD Clerk without any need for accommodation. His contention was that he was fully capable of handling 70-pound mail sacks. Accordingly, when the court asked at trial whether Gilbert had ever made a written request that the Postal Service waive the physical requirements of the Manual MD Clerk position for him, his attorney responded: 30 MR. WATSON: Has Mr. Gilbert ever indicated that he could not meet the physical requirement that the job requests [sic ]? No, the Postal Service is the only entity that has ever considered Mr. Gilbert unable to meet the requirements of the position. 31 (Trial Transcript, January 16, 1991, at 265.) Thus, the principal focus at trial was on the medical evidence as to whether Gilbert's condition was incompatible with the lifting and handling of 70-pound mail bags and the pushing of carts containing such mail bags. There was both documentary and testimonial evidence. 32 At the time Gilbert was rejected for the Manual MD Clerk position in 1982, his treating physician, Dr. Joseph T. McGinn, had written a letter stating that Gilbert was able to lift up to twenty-five pounds. When Gilbert was rejected for the position in 1985, Dr. Morton J. Kleiner, another of his treating physicians, had written a letter stating that Gilbert should be restricted from 'heavy lifting' and 'moderate carrying' and any physically traumatic activities. Though Gilbert thereafter submitted a new letter from Dr. McGinn that purported to clarify Dr. Kleiner's evaluation by contradicting it and opining that Gilbert could lift sufficient weights to perform the Manual MD Clerk's tasks, the court chose to credit Dr. Kleiner's evaluation and found that the clarification from Dr. McGinn was insufficient to require the Postal Service to reject the evaluation of Dr. Kleiner. 33 Five physicians testified at trial. They were Drs. McGinn and Kleiner; plaintiff's expert witness Dr. Andrew Peter Lundin III; Dr. Dan Acaru, a Postal Service physician who had examined Gilbert in 1985; and the Postal Service's expert witness Dr. Allan Gibofsky. Dr. McGinn reiterated his 1985 opinion that Gilbert could perform the lifting functions of the Manual MD Clerk job. Dr. Lundin expressed a similar opinion on the basis of 20-minute physical tests he had performed on Gilbert. The court found these evaluations not particularly persuasive. Dr. Kleiner, who viewed himself as Gilbert's primary treating physician because he saw Gilbert more frequently than did Dr. McGinn during Gilbert's hospitalizations, reiterated his earlier evaluation, testifying that it was not medically advisable for Gilbert to perform the Manual MD Clerk job. Dr. Gibofsky likewise testified that such employment was strongly contraindicated. He stated that repeated lifting would increase the risk of cyst rupture and that such a rupture could cause Gilbert hemorrhaging and infection. He testified that he regarded the medical risk of Gilbert's sustaining a rupture if employed as a Manual MD Clerk as significant and over 50%. 34 The district court found the views of Drs. Kleiner and Gibofsky persuasive: 35 We find Dr. Kleiner's evaluation of the medical risks to plaintiff of engaging in the tasks assigned to a MDC-[Part-time, Flexible schedule] to be more persuasive than Dr. McGinn's, especially when viewed in the light of Dr. Gibofsky's testimony which we also accept and adopt. 36 Opinion at 5. It thus found that the medical evidence showed that Gilbert was not physically able to perform the essential Manual MD Clerk functions. 37 The weighing of the evidence, including the evaluation of expert testimony, is within the province of the district court as finder of fact, see, e.g., Jim Beam Brands Co. v. Beamish & Crawford Ltd., 937 F.2d 729, 736 (2d Cir.1991); Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d 361, 367-68 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 916, 100 S.Ct. 1276, 63 L.Ed.2d 600 (1980). The court's findings are not to be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous, Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), and [w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). The evidence described above was ample to support the court's finding that Gilbert was not able, without accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the Manual MD Clerk position. Accordingly, that finding may not be overturned. 38 We turn, therefore, to the question of whether Gilbert made a prima facie showing with respect to whether reasonable accommodation could permit him to perform those functions.
39 Presumably because of his contention that he was fully able to perform the essential functions of the Manual MD Clerk position without accommodation, Gilbert minimized his efforts to show that a reasonable accommodation by the Postal Service could permit him to perform those functions despite his handicap. What little effort he made consisted solely of questions by his attorney to Postal Service witnesses as to whether the Postal Service could waive the heavy lifting and handling requirements in Gilbert's case, or whether it could assign other postal employees working with Gilbert to lift mail bags for him. The suggestion that the lifting and handling requirements might be waived for Gilbert was not a suggestion for reasonable accommodation since these tasks were essential functions of the job. The suggestion that coworkers might perform this part of Gilbert's job as Manual MD Clerk likewise sought the elimination, for Gilbert, of essential functions of the job. We note that the Postal Service witnesses' responses to the trial questions containing these suggestions did nothing to supply the gaps in Gilbert's prima facie case. The witnesses, who were, respectively, managers of operations and personnel, stated that having a coworker do the heavy lifting for Gilbert would not be a reasonable way to operate for several reasons, including (1) the fact that Gilbert would not know until he attempted to lift a sack how much it weighed, and the very attempt to handle a too-heavy sack could thus pose a danger to Gilbert and his coworkers; and (2) having two workers performing tasks that one worker is assigned would slow down and reduce the productivity of the operation. 40 Since, as discussed above, reasonable accommodation does not mean elimination of any of the job's essential functions, we conclude that the district court correctly ruled that Gilbert had failed to establish a prima facie case under the Act.