Opinion ID: 64044
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due Process Claim Against the Doctors

Text: Mrs. Tebo's basis for asserting a violation of her due process rights to liberty is the so-called stigma-plus theory. While infliction of a stigma on a person's reputation by a state official, without more, does not infringe upon a protected liberty interest, a plaintiff may assert a constitutional violation by alleging a stigma plus an infringement of some other interest. Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 936 (5th Cir.1995). The necessary stigma consists of concrete, false factual assertions; infringement occurs if the state sought to remove or significantly alter a life, liberty, or property interest recognized and protected by state law or the federal constitution as incorporated against the states. Texas v. Thompson, 70 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir.1995). Mrs. Tebo must first show that statements by a state actor stigmatized her in some way. While the Defendants, especially Dr. Holbrook, argue that actual commitment to an institution is necessary for a stigma, the precedents they cite simply recognize that actually being committed is a stigma and thus requires heightened due process. The stigma portion of the analysis is concerned with speech from the government about an individual. See Garcia v. City of Albuquerque, 232 F.3d 760, 772 (10th Cir.2000) (a sufficient stigma is one involving serious mental illness). We do not find any inherent bar to the statements made in the doctors' report being considered for stigma purposes. However, Mrs. Tebo's argument fails to grapple with another aspect of the stigma requirementthe stigma must have been published by the government. See Bledsoe v. City of Horn Lake, 449 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir.2006) (an element of the stigma-plus infringement test is that the charges were made public). Placing a charge in a publicly available file has been held to satisfy the publication requirement, Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir.2001), although mere presence in a file not normally available to the public is insufficient. Hughes v. City of Garland, 204 F.3d 223, 228 (5th Cir.2000). Mrs. Tebo argues that one of our precedents held that a stigma claim can lie even when it was not shown that records of treatment are subject to public disclosure. See Coleman v. Dretke, 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2005). The Coleman appeal, however, was a habeas challenge to the imposition of mandatory sex offender treatment at the conclusion of a prisoner's sentence. The court held that even if the state did not publicize the petitioner's status by placing him on the sex offender registry or disclosing records of his treatment, there were adverse social consequences that arose from requiring him to attend sex offender therapy; those effects required heightened due process. Id. at 668. Coleman was not applying the Section 1983 stigma-plus test, but rather interpreting the due process standards for commitment of prisoners to mental institutions. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980). Mrs. Tebo's only evidence of publication is an affidavit by one witness in the community that she heard that Thurman Tebo had tried to have Mrs. Tebo committed because she was mentally incompetent. There is no indication that this information came from the report signed by Doctors Bush and Holbrook, or from anyone else connected to the government. We find no basis to conclude that the publication element is met by evidence of this sort. Even if there were a stigma, it would not be enough. Mrs. Tebo must also establish that an independent constitutional interest was violated. She must show that she was deprived of a right previously existing under state law or the U.S. Constitution. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). Mrs. Tebo alleges that her right to liberty was violated by the threat of mental commitment. Even though she was not committed, she claims she went to Doctors Bush and Holbrook involuntarily. She asserts that Joan Sonnier told her she had to go see the two doctors on Monday, and she was scared the defendants would have her locked up ... if she did not obey their commands. Mrs. Tebo cites Dr. Holbrook's deposition testimony, in which he testified that Mrs. Tebo told him that someone else made her come and [s]he did not want to be there. Holbrook, in turn, cites Mrs. Tebo's deposition, in which she agreed that the sheriff did not force her to go, that her brother drove her to the doctor, and that her attorney did not tell her not to go. The cases cited by Mrs. Tebo did not find that a person's liberty interest was violated on facts consisting of nothing more than a sense of being pressured to receive this sort of medical examination. Moreover, Mrs. Tebo does not contest that Doctors Bush and Holbrook had no contact with or knowledge of her before she arrived at their offices for her appointment. Joan Sonnier, who Mrs. Tebo says told her she was required to attend the evaluations, is no longer a party. Mrs. Tebo does not explain how the doctors could have been involved in any such conspiracy. Thus, there is not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the doctors deprived Mrs. Tebo of a protected liberty interest. Summary judgment on this claim is affirmed.