Opinion ID: 2401195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the wife's contentions

Text: In a long line of cases discussing D.C.Code § 16-910, this court has consistently applied the well-settled principle that the trial court has considerable discretion and broad authority in distributing marital property as part of a judgment of divorce. See, e.g., Negretti v. Negretti, 621 A.2d 388, 389 (D.C.1993); Mosley v. Mosley, 601 A.2d 599, 600-601 (D.C.1992); Leftwich v. Leftwich, 442 A.2d 139, 142 (D.C.1982); Benvenuto v. Benvenuto, 389 A.2d 795, 797 (D.C.1978). The trial court is charged by statute with distributing marital property in a manner that is equitable, just and reasonable, after considering all relevant factors, D.C.Code § 16-910(b), and so long as the trial court considers all relevant factors, its conclusions will not be disturbed on appeal. Bowser v. Bowser, 515 A.2d 1128, 1130 (D.C.1986) (citing cases). We have recognized on many occasions that the factors which may be considered relevant vary from case to case, [5] and thus on appeal we need only decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in its assessment of the totality of circumstances and its resultant order. Id.; Mosley, supra, 601 A.2d at 601; see Murville, supra note 5, 433 A.2d at 1110. If the trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, taken together ... present an integrated, internally consistent and readily understood whole, its decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Bowser, supra, 515 A.2d at 1130. With this standard of review in mind, we turn to Mrs. Dews' claims of error. [6] First, Mrs. Dews argues that because a portion of the mortgage on the E Street home was obtained for the purpose of giving $10,000 to each of her father's three daughters, including herself, the trial court erred in failing to give her a credit of Ten Thousand Dollars in the acquisition of the E Street property. She asserts that it is undisputed from the testimony that the property was a gift to [her] from her father with the proviso that upon his death she pay to her sisters the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars each. From this premise she concludes that $10,000 of the money that went into the house was rightfully [her] sole property and not marital property. The trial court rejected this argument, saying: What is clear from the record is that when Mrs. Dews' father turned over the house to Mr. and Mrs. Dews, it became a marital asset. Mr. and Mrs. Dews later took out a $40,000 loan. From that loan they paid $10,000 apiece to two of Mrs. Dews' sisters. The other $10,000 from the loan was used, along with proceeds from the sale of [their prior home] and some monies which Mr. Dews had received from his parents, all those monies were used for substantial renovations that were made and were necessary at [the E Street house]. On this claim Mrs. Dews had the burden of proof. [T]he party who claims sole and separate ownership has the burden of establishing that it is the same property that he or she acquired before the marriage or by gift, bequest, devise, or descent. Jordan v. Jordan, 616 A.2d 1238, 1239 (D.C.1992); see D.C.Code § 16-910(a) (1989). The trial court was in the best position to evaluate each witness' credibility, and we are satisfied that its findings adequately support its decision not to credit Mrs. Dews specifically with the $10,000. Moreover, this court has held that under the District of Columbia statutory scheme [t]here is no room ... for tracing funds. Jordan, supra, 616 A.2d at 1239 (citation omitted). Thus the court did not err in declining to do so. Mrs. Dews argues next that the trial court failed to consider several of the factors listed in section 16-910(b) in distributing the marital property. For example, she maintains that the court did not take into account the duration of the marriage, her contribution as homemaker, and the source of the Marital Home, namely, [Mrs. Dews'] father. These arguments are without merit. As we have said, the court is required by statute to consider only relevant factors, and its disposition of marital assets must be based on an assessment of the totality of the circumstances. Bowser, supra, 515 A.2d at 1130. Thus, if the trial court's findings and conclusions present an integrated, internally consistent and readily understood whole, this court must affirm the judgment. Id. Contrary to Mrs. Dews' assertions, it is apparent to us that the trial court considered all relevant factors, including the ones that Mrs. Dews says it did not consider. In its factual findings the court noted the time of the marriage, the period during which the parties lived together, the date when Mrs. Dews temporarily moved out of the home, the short period of reconciliation, and, finally, the point at which the parties ultimately separated and for all intents and purposes ended the marriage. In addition, the court specifically referred to Mrs. Dews' argument that she should be given some additional credit because the house came from her father, but concluded that this fact was outweighed by others favoring Mr. Dews. It is also evident that the trial court considered Mrs. Dews' contribution as a homemaker, one of the statutory factors. The court made clear its view that Mrs. Dews had made little or no positive contribution to the home or the marriage, at least in its later years: it was [Mrs. Dews] who left the marriage, and the court does credit the testimony of Mr. Dews that at least one substantial factor having to do with the deterioration and ultimate breakup of the marriage was drug use on the part of [Mrs. Dews]. The court also found that since April 1986 Mr. Dews had made all necessary payments on the house, including the mortgage, taxes, and repairs. In fact, the evidence showed that in order to halt the foreclosure proceedings resulting from his wife's extended inattention to financial matters, Mr. Dews made substantial payments and obtained mortgage insurance, but had to obtain a loan from his employer to enable him to do so. [7] Mrs. Dews asserts that the trial court addressed a few factors, that the distribution of their most valuable asset [the home] merited more discussion, and that the trial court's conclusions are just beyond what this Court has seen as a bare legal conclusion lacking the support of underlying factual findings. To the extent that these arguments are distinct from her other claims, we reject them. As we have said, the court need only consider relevant factors, and we are satisfied that it did so. Although we cannot define precisely the extent to which the trial court must state its findings, this court has held that the findings need only be sufficient to allow meaningful appellate review. Pimble v. Pimble, 521 A.2d 1173, 1175 (D.C.1987). As long as the findings contain sufficient detail to enable this court to be in a position to review the trial court's ruling for errors of law and clear factual errors,  the record is adequate. Williams v. Williams, 554 A.2d 791, 793 (D.C.1989) (citations omitted; emphasis added). The trial judge's oral findings in this case extend over thirteen pages of transcript. They are meticulous and detailed and, as is obvious from what we have already said, have enabled us to conduct a meaningful review. We will not substitute our own interpretation of the evidence for that reached by the primary finder of fact. Murville, supra, 433 A.2d at 1109 (citation omitted). We find no error of law and no abuse of discretion, and hence no basis to reverse the trial court's distribution of the marital property. [8]