Opinion ID: 2071683
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Timothy Jordan

Text: The Jordan case arose from a failure to appear at trial, but it implicated as well failures in delegation and assignment. In May, 1989, following a one-car accident in which he lost control of his car and hit a tree, Jordan was charged, in Washington County, with driving while intoxicated, driving under the influence, failing to wear a seat belt, and speeding. In response to a mailed solicitation from Ficker, Jordan met with Burfield on the parking lot of a Holiday Inn in Frederick on June 17, 1989, retained Ficker to represent him for a fee of $999, and gave Burfield $100 toward the fee. Shortly thereafter, Ficker entered his appearance on behalf of Jordan and prayed a jury trial. That, of course, caused the case to be transferred to the Circuit Court for Washington County. Ficker was made aware that Jordan had previously been convicted of driving while intoxicated, in 1982, resulting in a suspended sentence in favor of probation, and that he was then facing a separate driving, while intoxicated charge in Frederick County. In his testimony, Ficker acknowledged that because Jordan had a second and third offense, he was looking at lots of jail time, unless we knocked out one of the cases and that it was important to know what the facts were to assess which of the cases, if not both of them, were winnable in a trial because it is the third offense where they really hammer you. The record before us does not reveal when the Frederick County case was tried. Ficker represented Jordan in that case and was pleased that his client escaped incarceration. Trial in the Washington County case was scheduled for March 6, 1990. On March 5, a court clerk called Ficker's office twice to confirm the date and to inquire whether Ficker intended to insist on a jury. Someone from Ficker's office called back and informed the clerk that a jury would be required. Despite the notice and the fact that Jordan himself was in court, no one appeared from Ficker's office when the case was called at about 9:45 a.m. As a result, after a later hearing, Ficker was held in contempt of court and fined $1,000. [2] The Jordan case was assigned to Mr. Saslaw, who had begun employment that week and had never tried a jury case, although Ficker said that he was unaware of that lack of jury experience and believed that Saslaw was competent to try the case. Saslaw was not given the file until March 5, the day before trial. In addition to the Jordan case, Saslaw had two cases to try in the District Court in Frederick. Ficker said that he called Saslaw that evening and discussed the case with him, although their recollections differed as to the extent of the conversation. Saslaw said that it consumed only three to five minutes; Ficker said that he discussed the facts and assumed that Saslaw would be able to handle the matter. Ficker regarded it as a simple case. There would be just the police officer and Jordan and the only question was could they prove the guy was driving. That defense, presumably, was based on the fact that, after Jordan had driven his car off the road and into a tree, he left the scene and went to a nearby hospital for treatment, and that the police did not catch up with him until he was at the hospital. The police report, however, indicated a strong odor of alcohol in the car and emanating from Jordan. Jordan refused to take the breathalyzer test. Overlooked by Ficker probably because, according to Jordan, the matter was never discussed between them was the fact that Jordan's face was imprinted in the windshield of the car. His hair was stuck to the windshield, and he had glass fragments on him when he met the officer at the hospital. It appears that Saslaw misunderstood what he was expected to do. He admitted that Ficker had told him that it was a jury trial case, and, indeed, the file reflected that to be so, yet Saslaw somehow was under the impression that the case was still in the District Court and that his mission was simply to request a jury trial. When he arrived at the District Court, he attempted to locate the Jordan case on the District Court docket, and, finding no record of the case in that court, he proceeded to try his two District Court cases and then returned to the office. It was not until after 4:30 p.m. that he learned that the case was in circuit court and that no one had appeared. In testimony given at Ficker's contempt hearing, Saslaw took full responsibility for the error, attributing it to a rookie mistake. Jordan was eventually tried, convicted, and given a sentence of one year, suspended in favor of three years probation, and a fine. On these facts, Ficker was charged with violating MLRPC Rules 1.1, 1.3, 3.4, 5.1, and 8.4(d). Judge Ferretti found no violation of Rules 1.3, 3.4, or 8.4. He did, however, find a violation of Rules 1.1 and 5.1. Given the nature of Ficker's practice, Judge Ferretti held that Ficker had an obligation to determine the extent of Saslaw's prior experience in handling DWI jury trials before assigning him such a case. He declared that Mr. Ficker did not inquire into or ascertain Mr. Saslaw's experience in jury trials; that Mr. Saslaw did not expect to try a jury trial; that Mr. Ficker did not discuss a jury trial in depth in the Jordan case with Mr. Saslaw; that Mr. Ficker did not prepare Mr. Saslaw nor require Mr. Saslaw to prepare for a jury trial. He found that there was no procedure in place for checking on the Jordan case in the Hagerstown Circuit Court. From this, Judge Ferretti concluded that Ficker had violated MLRPC Rule 5.1 by not making reasonable efforts to insure that a subordinate lawyer could provide competent representation to the client based upon adequate legal knowledge, skill and preparation reasonably necessary for the proposed representation.... That failure, the judge concluded, also constituted a violation of Rule 1.1. Ficker filed no exceptions to Judge Ferretti's findings and conclusions in Jordan. AGC excepted to his failure to find a violation of Rules 3.4(c) and 8.4(d). Liability under Rule 3.4(c), it urges, stems from Ficker's failure to have in place a system or procedure to check on a particular matter, and that, as a result, Ficker is as responsible as Saslaw for Saslaw's failure to appear. It seeks to fit under Rule 3.4(c) as well the fact that Saslaw was, in fact, unprepared to try the Jordan case in any event, due to Ficker's practice of assigning cases the day before trial. Ficker's responsibility for Saslaw's failings suffices to constitute a violation of Rule 8.4(d) as well, in its view. We shall overrule AGC's exceptions. Although we do not absolutely reject the notion that a supervising lawyer may be responsible under Rule 3.4 or 8.4 when a subordinate fails to appear in court for a scheduled hearing or appears with insufficient knowledge to provide adequate representation, we believe that, on this record, Judge Ferretti's analysis of the problem was essentially correctresponsibility is more appropriately placed under Rule 5.1. Saslaw was an admitted novice in this area of law, which, according to Ficker, constituted 98% of his practice. If he intended to have Saslaw jump immediately into trying jury cases involving charges of driving while intoxicated, he had an obligation to determine whether Saslaw was, in fact, sufficiently trained or experienced to provide competent representation in that area. He had no right merely to assume such competence, as he admittedly did. Moreover, and, indeed, more important, especially when dealing with a novice, it was wholly and inexcusably inappropriate for him to assign such cases the day before trial, with a minimum of instruction. Saslaw had never met the client, had never talked to the officer, knew nothing about the case, and obviously was unaware even that the case was to be tried. Moreover, this was not, as Ficker so cavalierly assumed, a simple case. According to his own client, there was ample evidence that Jordan had been driving the car, and this was his second or third offense, for which a jail sentence was a distinct possibility. Saslaw's appearance had not been entered in the case, and the client was fully expecting Ficker to appear on his behalf. The deficiency here was in failing to supervise the associates, such as Saslaw, exacerbated by the manner in which cases were assigned to them.