Opinion ID: 2584803
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The superior court erred when it dismissed Lorenz's defamation counterclaims.

Text: Lorenz's first and second counterclaims were for defamation. Lorenz alleged that Maddox made false statements to the government, the press, and local citizens about issues related to the lawsuit and her cleanup efforts. She alleged that Maddox's words placed an unfortunate shadow on her vocation as an interior designer and her role as one of Seward's Historical Preservation Commissioners. In his motion for dismissal, Maddox argued that Lorenz's pleadings did not set forth the allegedly false statements and that Lorenz failed to properly allege damages. On appeal Lorenz argues that a complete reading of her complaint provided sufficient information about Maddox's statements. She also argues that she adequately alleged damages by claiming harm to her standing in the community. In response, Maddox contends that Lorenz never set forth the allegedly defamatory statements, made no claim that the statements were false, and inadequately pled damages. The elements of defamation are: (1) a false and defamatory statement; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) the existence of either `per se' actionability or special harm. [37] A charitable reading of Lorenz's pro se counterclaim leads us to conclude that Lorenz included sufficient allegations of the statements that Maddox made. Lorenz alleged that Maddox wrote disparaging letters to the editor in the Seward Phoenix Log, that Maddox sought news coverage of the effects of the burn, that Maddox contacted state and federal agencies alleging illegal activities in connection with Lorenz's fire, and that Maddox distributed flyers disparaging Lorenz's cleanup activities. While these allegations did little to suggest the substance of Maddox's statements, they generally put Maddox on notice of Lorenz's claims. Lorenz's complaint sufficiently alleged that the statements Maddox made were false by making the general assertion that Maddox made wholly and in-part false statements. While the lack of specific statements in her pleadings makes this falsity allegation broad, this assertion was sufficient to put Maddox on notice of Lorenz's position. Lorenz's complaint insufficiently alleged damages for some of her potential defamation claims. Lorenz's complaint could be read to state causes of action in libel and slander per se. These claims do not require an allegation of special damages. [38] However, to the extent that Lorenz attempted to recover for slander requiring proof of special damages (slander per quod), she failed to plead damages with any specificity. [39] But this failure might be attributable to insufficient guidance from the trial court. On remand, Lorenz should replead all of her defamation claims. The trial court can then consider a renewed Rule 12(b)(6) motion or a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). Maddox can also utilize discovery to distill Lorenz's claim and may choose to file a motion for summary judgment. We note that some of Maddox's statements may be privileged. For example, Maddox's communications with state and federal officials alleging illegal activities likely warranted a qualified privilege and, if so, the only question would be whether the privilege was abused. [40] We further note that the jury's special verdict in favor of Maddox might provide him with a defense of truth as to most of Lorenz's defamation claims. But we take no conclusive position on the validity of Lorenz's claims as they relate to Maddox's ability to assert privileges or other defenses.