Opinion ID: 6326387
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: KRS 342.710 and KRS 342.125

Text: KRS 342.710 specifically relates to rights, duties, and procedures relating to vocational rehabilitation services. “KRS 342.710(1) makes it clear that one of the primary purposes of Chapter 342 is the physical and vocational rehabilitation of injured workers so they can return to gainful employment.” Haddock v. Hopkinsville Coating Corp., 62 S.W.3d 387, 391 (Ky. 2001). Regarding the latter, KRS 342.710(3) provides: When as a result of the injury [the injured worker] is unable to perform work for which he or she has previous training or experience, he or she shall be entitled to such vocational rehabilitation services, including retraining and job placement, as may be reasonably necessary to restore him or her to suitable employment. Thus, “a factual finding concerning whether a worker is unable to perform work for which he [or she] has previous training or experience is mandatory” and prerequisite to adjudicating appropriateness of vocational rehabilitation services. Haddock, 62 S.W.3d at 391 (citation omitted). “Suitable employment” has been defined to mean: Work which bears a reasonable relationship to an individual’s experience and background, taking into consideration the type of work the person was doing at the time of injury, his age and education, his income level and earning capacity, his vocational aptitude, his mental and physical abilities and other relevant factors both at the time of injury and after reaching his post-injury maximum level of medical improvement. SKW Alloys, Inc., 893 S.W.2d at 802. By effectuating a return to a pre-injury level of self-reliance, the statute not only achieves the primary legislative purpose of diminishing individual financial hardship but also, logically, reduces significant private sector and governmental expenditures incurred 10 from dependence on income, subsistence, medical, and other social programs, and thereby spurs broader economic prosperity and greater business investment throughout the Commonwealth. KRS 342.710(3) indicates an injured worker “is entitled to prompt medical rehabilitation services . . . to accomplish physical rehabilitation goals which are feasible, practical, and justifiable,” but includes no analogous requirement for prompt provision of vocational rehabilitation services. (Emphasis added). As the Board correctly reasoned: [T]here is no enumerated time frame within which to seek vocational rehabilitation. We concede that, in most cases, entitlement to vocational rehabilitation is raised during the pendency of the [original] claim. However, the statute does not explicitly require the claimant to seek vocational rehabilitation during the pendency of the original claim seeking income and medical benefits. Consequently, vocational rehabilitation may be invoked by a party by seeking a referral from an ALJ for an “evaluation of the practicability of” and “need for” vocational rehabilitation after the claim has been resolved. The Board further explained: One can conceive of situations wherein the injured worker does not perceive vocational rehabilitation is necessary or underestimates the need for vocational rehabilitation during the pendency of the claim. Instead, only after the claim has concluded does the claimant realize that, without some form of vocational rehabilitation, he or she is unable to return to suitable employment. In those cases, the worker is not precluded from seeking rehabilitation to secure suitable employment. We agree and are convinced the legislature intended no time limitation relative to addressing vocational rehabilitation services under KRS 342.710(3), intended no requirement that such benefits be sought during the pendency of 11 the original claim, and intended no bar to seeking such benefits in a postaward reopening. KRS 342.710(3)’s silence in establishing any time limitation or particular procedural mechanism for addressing disputes relating to vocational rehabilitation services is a persuasive indicator of legislative intent. Sweeney v. King’s Daughters Med. Ctr., 260 S.W.3d 829, 833 (Ky. 2008). Here, based on the statute’s primary goal of returning injured workers to suitable employment and because matters relating to the appropriateness of retraining services may not arise or become apparent until the original action has ended, we are persuaded the Board and Court of Appeals correctly concluded the statute’s silence indicates the legislature’s intent to authorize the raising of such disputes at any time and by any mechanism, whether during an original claim or in a post-award reopening. Further, whether raised during the pendency of an original claim or in a post-award reopening, KRS 342.710(3) mandates “[i]n all such instances” in which the injured worker has been found unable “to perform work for which he or she has previous training or experience” the ALJ “shall inquire” whether such services “have been voluntarily offered and accepted.” This mandate is necessitated because administrative procedures for implementing vocational rehabilitation services under KRS 342.710(3) are informal, encouraging cooperation between the injured worker and the employer and its insurance carrier. Neighbors v. River City Interiors, 187 S.W.3d 319, 324-25 (Ky. 2006). 12 The statute and supporting regulations “anticipate the Department representative will present the results of the evaluation and the available options for physical and/or vocational rehabilitation to the parties,” that the parties “will cooperate in devising and implementing a reasonable plan for the injured worker’s rehabilitation,” and that the statute’s punitive measures found in KRS 342.710(5) and (6) will encourage cooperation. Neighbors, 187 S.W.3d at 324. Adjudication and entry of an appropriate order by an ALJ is necessitated only “where the parties disagree.” Id. In the present case, Harper’s right to invoke the vocational rehabilitation procedures under KRS 342.710(3) did not accrue or become readily known until the ALJ found she was incapable of returning to work for which she had previous training and experience. And, appropriateness for vocational rehabilitation services was not established until Harper was unsuccessful in returning to suitable employment and she obtained a vocational evaluation indicating retraining would be beneficial. Even then, the informal administrative procedures envisioned by the statute presumed the parties would cooperate in discussing, developing, and implementing a reasonable plan. Post-award reopening for ALJ adjudication became necessary only because a dispute arose between Harper and Kindred Healthcare. Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals correctly recognized “vocational rehabilitation benefits provided in KRS 342.710 do not fall neatly within the category of contested issues advanced in a claim.” As such, KRS 342.270(1)’s requirement for joinder of all causes of action in an original proceeding is 13 inapplicable to Harper’s circumstances and she did not waive her right to seek vocational retraining by failing to pursue such benefits during the pendency of her original claim. The ALJ’s compliance with the procedures mandated in KRS 342.710(3) is not elective or conditioned upon any claim or action by the parties, nor is it required that any request for such services be listed as a contested issue by either party. Upon the necessary finding of inability to perform previous work, the ALJ “shall” make inquiry regarding any voluntary vocational rehabilitation services and may exercise discretion in assessing the merits of awarding vocational rehabilitation services. Commonwealth, Transp. Cabinet v. Guffey, 42 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Ky. 2001). To aid assessment, KRS 342.710(3) authorizes the ALJ to “refer the employee to a qualified physician or facility for evaluation of the practicability of, need for, and kind of service, treatment, or training necessary and appropriate to render him or her fit for remunerative occupation.” A referral may be initiated on the ALJ’s “own motion, or upon application of any party or carrier” and the parties shall be afforded “an opportunity to be heard.” KRS 342.710(3). Whenever requested by either party, “[t]he procedure set out in KRS 342.710 must be followed” to allow the ALJ to make the requisite findings relative to the injured worker’s level of disability and the merits of vocational rehabilitation services. Edwards v. Bluegrass Containers Div. of Dura Containers, Inc., 594 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Ky. App. 1980). “[I]f the employee ‘is unable to perform work for which he has 14 previous training or experience’ as a result of a work-related accident, he is entitled to vocational rehabilitation services.” Id. Conversely, KRS 342.125 specifically relates to motions to reopen seeking to “end, diminish, or increase compensation previously awarded . . . or change or revoke a previous order” related thereto. KRS 342.125(4). Reopening compensation awards “previously dismissed or denied on the merits” is prohibited absent a showing of one of four grounds, including: (a) fraud, (b) newly discovered evidence, (c) mistake, or (d) change of disability. KRS 342.125(1) and (2). “Compensation” is defined as meaning “all payments made under the provisions of this chapter representing the sum of income benefits and medical and related benefits.” KRS 342.0011(14). None of the benefits referenced under the definition of “compensation”—including “income benefits,” “medical and related benefits,” “medical services,” and coal workers’ “retraining incentive benefits”—encompass vocational rehabilitation services. See KRS 342.0011(12), (13), (14), and (15); KRS 342.732; and KRS 342.125(5).