Opinion ID: 2360235
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Introduction of evidence of a clog, a broken pipe and Thompson's comparative negligence

Text: We find that the trial judge abused her discretion by granting Thompson's Motion for a New Trial on the ground that merely hearing Wilson's evidence that suggested that Thompson tried to remove a clog, slipped, and broke the pipe by grabbing it would have necessarily confused the jury. The record simply does not support her conclusion that the jury's verdict clearly resulted from confusion. The trial judge's evident belief that the jury confused the mere presence of a clog with the pipe breaking resulting in Thompson's fall is speculation. The jury never gave any indication that it was confused. The jury never sent a note to the trial judge. It neither rendered an inconsistent verdict, nor rendered a verdict against the great weight of the evidence. The record suggests no basis to conclude that the jury ignored the judge's instruction that Thompson was not negligent as a matter of law. In fact, the jury's response to the special verdict form removed the predicate for them to even consider Thompson's alleged comparative negligence. Thompson suggests that the trial judge was in the best position to observe the demeanor of the jury and that her statements throughout the trial about the clog evidence indicated that she considered the clog testimony to be confusing to the jury. Thompson ignores the fact that the trial judge stated early on that, if I get the sense that the jury is getting confused I will stop the questioning and try to craft a curative. Even though the trial judge expressed some speculative concern about the testimony concerning the clog confusing the jury, it is evident that she never got the sense that the jury was confused because she never gave a curative instruction to put an end to the confusion. Likewise, Thompson must not have believed that the jury was becoming confused because he never requested a cautionary or limiting instruction. Moreover, it is difficult to accept the trial judge's contention that the clog testimony somehow injected contributory negligence into the case and thereby confused the jury about the extent to which Thompson's alleged negligence played any role in the case. We cannot, contrary to Delaware law, assume that the jury ignored the trial judge's instruction that Thompson's comparative negligence was no longer an issue in the case. [20] Furthermore, any speculative confusion could have not affected the jury's verdict here because the jury never reached the issue. Because the jury answered No in response to the predicate question of whether Reinco was negligent, and credible evidence supports that finding, the jury would have no reason to consider Thompson's comparative negligence. Put simply, confusion about comparative negligence could not have clearly caused the jury's verdict because the jury plainly found no negligence of Reinco to which Thompson's could be compared.