Opinion ID: 2654485
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does Ouellette control?

Text: The Parishes’ first proposition depends on whether the states maintained historic police powers to apply their local law to interstate water pollution even if the pollution originated outside the state. The Supreme Court’s discussion of the issue in Milwaukee I contradicts the Parishes’ position. 406 U.S. at 105-06, 92 S. Ct. at 1393-94. A federal common law of nuisance, not the competing laws of each affected jurisdiction, was applied to interstate water pollution cases from an early period. 406 U.S. at 106-07, 92 S. Ct. at 1394-95. This is not to say the states were deprived of rights and remedies in such cases, but only that they had to rely on the common body of federal law to do so. The claim by the states (and 15 Case: 12-30012 Document: 00512542591 Page: 16 Date Filed: 02/24/2014 No. 12-30012 their localities) to apply their historic police power in these situations is therefore dubious. Even assuming the Parishes have some residual police power to apply local law to this OCSLA-originated discharge, however, they must overcome federal preemption under the CWA. As the Supreme Court predicted in Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 107, 92 S. Ct. at 1395, Congress could and did supplant federal common law with an overarching regulatory framework to protect the nation’s waters. To effectuate the full purposes of the regulations, Ouellette held that the states’ ability to apply local law to out-of-state point sources of alleged water pollution was in conflict with the CWA. 479 U.S. at 494, 107 S. Ct. at 812-13. The Parishes contend that Ouellette is distinguishable. First, it applies only to the CWA’s permitting provision (33 U.S.C. § 1342), not to the oil discharge prohibition (33 U.S.C. § 1321(o)). Relatedly, the savings provisions that Ouellette found inapposite are different from the provisions the Parishes rely on. Second, since Ouellette considered only interstate water pollution, the decision has no bearing on discharges from the OCS. We find these distinctions unpersuasive. The Supreme Court’s subsequent interpretation of Oullette substantially undermines any cramped reading of the case. The Court reiterated Ouellette’s holding that “the Clean Water Act taken ‘as a whole, its purposes and its history’ pre-empted an action based on the law of the affected State and that the only state law applicable to an interstate discharge is ‘the law of the State in which the point source is located.’” Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 100, 112 S. Ct. at 1053 (citing Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 493, 487, 107 S. Ct. at 812, 809) (emphasis added). This statement is not limited to the specific provisions of the CWA at issue in Ouellette; in fact, Arkansas refers to “interstate discharge” irrespective of type or permit status. The Fourth Circuit confirmed Ouellette’s reach by applying it to an interstate pollution dispute arising under the Clean Air Act. North 16 Case: 12-30012 Document: 00512542591 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/24/2014 No. 12-30012 Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 306-07 (4th Cir. 2010). That court concluded, “[t]here is no question that the law of the states where emissions sources are located . . . applies in an interstate nuisance suit. The Supreme Court’s decision in Ouellette is explicit: a ‘court must apply the law of the State in which the point source is located.’” Id. at 306 (citation omitted). Hoping to confine Ouellette to NPDES permitting cases and the specific savings provisions the Court considered, the Parishes contend that the Court’s goal in Ouellette was to prevent disruption of the point-source effluent permitting system by redundant or conflicting state legal regimes. 33 U.S.C. § 1342. On the other hand, they contend, because the CWA essentially prohibits “discharges” of “oil or hazardous substances” into the nation’s navigable waters and the waters of the OCS, 33 U.S.C. 1321(b), allowing all affected states to impose their laws on the illegal activity creates not conflict, but reinforcement of federal law. The Court’s opinion, however, resists such limitation. In the paragraph that introduces the Court’s reasoning, Ouellette speaks plainly: “We hold that when a court considers a State-law claim concerning interstate water pollution that is subject to the CWA, the court must apply the law of the state in which the point source is located.” 479 U.S. at 487, 107 S. Ct. at 809. There is no mincing about the precise preemptive provisions of the federal CWA. Later, the Court responds to the plaintiffs’ allegations that the point source violated the terms of its NPDES permit by noting the availability of a citizen suit under the CWA in lieu of the law of the affected state. 479 U.S. at 498 n.18, 107 S. Ct. at 814 n. 18. A permit violation constitutes a “discharge” prohibited by Section 1321(b). 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(definition of “discharge”), (b)(3). The Court’s logic must extend to oil discharges, which are illegal under the same provision. With respect to oil pollution originating from the OCS, Ouellette offers an analogous 17 Case: 12-30012 Document: 00512542591 Page: 18 Date Filed: 02/24/2014 No. 12-30012 answer: the affected parties can sue for the generous remedies, including for loss of wildlife, that the OPA offers. OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(D). A weaker argument against Ouellette urges that it quelled disputes over the application of competing state laws to interstate water pollution but has no impact on the overlay of state laws on a federally controlled point source. On the contrary, the federal responsibility for the OCS is clear. The Macondo well site was developed under a plethora of federal regulations, including an NPDES permit. See generally Gulf Restoration Network, 683 F.3d at 165-66. The federal government's interest is no different from that of point-source states, which aim to encourage economic development while preserving optimal environmental conditions for their citizens. Allowing up to five states along the Gulf Coast to apply their individual laws to discharges arising on the Shelf would foster the legal chaos described by Ouellette. That three Gulf coast states submitted amicus briefs in this appeal, and all five Gulf Coast states filed suits11 to recover damages based on particular state laws testifies to the problem. Moreover, just as with entities operating in point-source states, if entities engaged in developing the OCS were subjected to a multiplicity of state laws in addition to federal regulations, they could be forced to adopt entirely different operational plans or in the worst case be deterred by the redundancy and lack of regulatory clarity from even pursuing their OCS plans. The reasons for avoiding redundant or conflicting legal regimes are equally potent whether the point source is located in a state or a federal enclave. In sum, Ouellette forms a controlling backdrop for resolving claims caused by the blowout. Federal law, the law of the point source, exclusively applies to the claims generated by the oil spill in any affected state or locality. 11 The Local Government Entity Master Complaint alleges breach of tort duties under the laws of Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. 18 Case: 12-30012 Document: 00512542591 Page: 19 Date Filed: 02/24/2014 No. 12-30012