Opinion ID: 1136028
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Chancellor erred in refusing to reinstate alimony by John Weathersby to Sally Weathersby after it had been terminated.

Text: Sally argues that the Chancellor erred in refusing to reinstate her alimony payments by John. She first apparently disputes that she ever lived in cohabitation with another man in violation of the divorce settlement, citing Cutrer v. State, 154 Miss. 80, 121 So. 106 (1929), for the proposition that evidence of sexual intercourse, without a showing of cohabitation, is insufficient to prove cohabitation. Sally overlooks the fact that she herself joined in the petition alleging that she was cohabiting with another man in violation of the agreement. Sally also places much stock in the cases of Hammonds v. Hammonds, 641 So.2d 1211 (Miss. 1994), and Hammonds v. Hammonds, 597 So.2d 653 (Miss. 1992), for the propositions that cohabitation alone is not a complete bar to an ex-spouse's receiving alimony, and that approaches to alimony modification should be reasonable and flexible in the event of cohabitation by the recipient ex-spouse. These cases are easily distinguishable from the instant case. In these cases there was no clause incorporated into the divorce decree whereby the ex-wife would forfeit her right to alimony by cohabiting with another man. Sally reiterates to this Court that periodic alimony is subject to modification upon proof of material changes in circumstances. Taylor v. Taylor, 392 So.2d 1145, 1147 (Miss. 1981). This applies to a divorce based upon irreconcilable differences. Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909 (Miss. 1994). The thrust of Sally's argument is that the Chancellor erroneously denied Sally's counterclaim to reinstate alimony under the assumption that alimony may not be reinstated after it has been terminated. Sally quotes the Chancellor at trial: BY THE COURT: Can you change it, though, Mr. Chapman, after you have terminated it? BY MR. CHAPMAN: I think you can, your Honor, because it was modified once. What's to say it can't be modified again if the circumstances dictate. BY THE COURT: I will have to agree that it's somewhat odd that the word modification was used, but it was actually a termination. I'm just speaking. I know of no law that allows for further modification after it is terminated unless you can show me some. The appellant provides no cases decided by this Court where alimony was reinstated after it was terminated. The Chancellor in his order stated: This Court finds that the joint petition of the parties and Decree terminating alimony for Defendant's cohabitation was a forfeiture of her right to future alimony by her repudiation of the right thereto and same cannot be reinstated. The order cited McRae v. McRae, 381 So.2d 1052, 1055 (Miss. 1980), where this Court affirmed the Chancellor's termination of alimony, finding that the ex-wife, by her admitted cohabitation with another man, forfeited her right to alimony by her repudiation of the right thereto. It is significant in the instant case, that the alimony was terminated not only because of Sally's admitted cohabitation, but also pursuant to a clause in the divorce settlement freely agreed to by both parties, and upon a joint petition filed by both parties. Where the ex-spouse has cohabited with a member of the opposite sex in violation of a cohabitation clause in the divorce settlement reached by the parties, and alimony is then terminated in accordance with that clause, the Chancellor shall refuse to later reinstate alimony.