Opinion ID: 1702383
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court deprived the appellant of his right to a fair and impartial trial by allowing the jury to consider evidence of other crimes?

Text: At Baine's trial, the jury heard testimony from L.E., the victim. The prosecution instructed the child prior to her testimony to tell only what happened to her, not what happened to other children. Nevertheless, the victim made several references to what Baine did to us. She also stated that Baine would feel down our pants and up under our shirts and that we just usually said to stop; that it hurts. Later, while questioning the mother of another child who attended the day care center, the prosecution asked: Did you ever observe anything maybe unusual with reference to your child or [L.E.]? The defense objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. The defense thrice approached the bench to move for a mistrial upon the victim's use of plural pronouns. The court denied the motions and refused to admonish the jury on grounds that an admonition would simply call the jury's attention to the matter. The general rule in Mississippi is that in criminal trials, with certain exceptions, proof of other criminal conduct by the accused is inadmissible. Darby v. State, 538 So.2d 1168, 1173 (Miss. 1989). MRE Rule 404(b) outlines the exceptions: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is ... admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. The Court in Darby also noted that [p]roof of another crime is admissible where the offense charged and that offered to be proved are so connected as to constitute one transaction. Expounding on the same theme, the Court in McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130, 136 (Miss. 1987) stated that evidence of a defendant's other crimes is admissible, where it is integrally related in time, place, and fact to that for which he stands trial, thereby permitting the State to tell a rational and coherent story of what happened to the victim. The Court in McFee based its holding on Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743 (Miss.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1098, 105 S.Ct. 607, 83 L.Ed.2d 716 (1984), a case where we Court upheld a murder conviction despite trial testimony which revealed that the defendant had contemporaneously killed or raped three other victims. The Court in Neal held as follows: [E]vidence of defendant's crimes against Bobby Neal and Melanie Sue Polk were admissible because they were integrally related in time, place, and fact with the murder of Amanda Joy. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 416 So.2d 383, 387 (Miss. 1982), wherein we held that evidence of burglary and attempted rape were admissible in a capital murder prosecution where defendant was charged with the killing of a police officer as distinguished from felony murder. We are concerned here with the State's legitimate interest in telling a rational and coherent story of what happened to Amanda Joy Neal. What happened to Bobby Neal and Melanie Sue Polk is integrally intertwined with what happened to Amanda Joy. There was no error in the trial court's allowing this evidence to be presented to the jury. Neal, 451 So.2d at 759. The exception noted in Neal, McFee, and Darby applies with equal force in the instant case. Baine's actions toward other children were integrally related in time, place, and fact to the molestation of L.E. The child obviously did not attend the day care center alone. According to her testimony, she was often in the company of other children when Baine molested her. Baine's conduct toward other children who were present is rationally related to and integrally intertwined with the crime charged in the case sub judice. The general rule excluding evidence of other crimes is thus inapplicable. Even if the witness' use of plural pronouns did not fall within an exception to the general rule, however, the testimony would still not require reversal. MRE Rule 103 states that [e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected. In Davis v. State, 568 So.2d 277, 279 (Miss. 1990), this Court held that a witness' pluralization of the word indictment was an isolated, inadvertent reference to other crimes which should be deemed without substantial prejudice to the right of appellant to a fair trial. Similarly, in Branch v. State, 347 So.2d 957 (Miss. 1977), a rape victim testified that she had attended a lineup in order for us to identify which one we thought was the suspect. Id. at 959 (emphasis added). This Court refused to view the plural pronoun as grounds for reversal and observed: Ordinarily, when we have reversed cases because of inflammatory testimony, we have noted a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct as well as clear prejudice to the defendant. see, e.g., Tudor v. State, 299 So.2d 682, 685-86 (Miss. 1974). Here, the witness' remarks were totally inadvertent and we find no indication that they could have prejudiced the defendant. Branch, 347 So.2d at 959. As in Branch, the record now before the Court contains no indication that L.E.'s use of plural pronouns prejudiced the defense. As the trial court wisely noted, calling attention to the matter would have merely highlighted the testimony in the minds of the jurors. Further, the testimony did not arise from prosecutorial misconduct, particularly since the prosecution actively sought to forestall its occurrence. Since the testimony did not abridge a substantial right of the defendant, the error arising from its admission, if any, was harmless. The assignment of error is without merit.