Opinion ID: 1882758
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Balancing Competing Policies

Text: In adopting the rule, we were confronted with balancing two important but often competing policies and concerns in supervising the orderly and fair resolution of civil litigation: one, to see that legitimate disputes are fairly resolved in the courts on the merits, and the other, to identify cases that are not being properly prosecuted and whose presence in the system may hinder the courts in processing other cases on the merits. [3] Those concerns remain with us. Florida's Constitution provides that the courts will be open and accessible to our citizens to address all legitimate grievances. Art. I, § 21, Fla. Const. Hence, a primary concern of the courts is to see that cases are resolved on their merits. A secondary concern is to see that the resolution of cases on the merits is not impaired by the processing of cases without merit or cases that are filed and then abandoned in the system. It is this secondary concern that is addressed by rule 1.420(e). However, while we have provided a mechanism for identifying the dead wood in the system, we must never lose sight of our primary policy of fostering resolution of cases on the merits. We must be careful not to throw out the baby with the bath water. We must also acknowledge that today the system provides other methods for seeing that cases are properly and promptly resolved including mediation, case management, and time standards for judges. Nevertheless, we continue to believe that rule 1.420(e) has a useful role to play in processing cases through the system. The language adopted by us in 1976 in pertinent part reads: All actions in which it appears on the face of the record that no activity by filings of pleadings, order of court, or otherwise has occurred for a period of one year shall be dismissed. . . . In re Fla. Bar, Rules of Civil Procedure, 339 So.2d at 629 (emphasis added); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e). By this language, we provided a clear mechanism for initially identifying those cases not being diligently prosecuted, i.e., those cases in which no record activity took place within a year. While the selection of the period of a year may have appeared arbitrary, that was the time period in the statute and, of course, any time period selected would be somewhat arbitrary. But we picked a year of record inactivity that would presumptively require dismissal. However, we also provided a safeguard to ensure that legitimate matters would be decided on the merits, a provision allowing for a showing of good cause for failure to act within the year. Thus, the rule provides a balance to address the two policy concerns discussed above. However, the language of the rule is clearif a review of the face of the record does not reflect any activity in the preceding year, the action shall be dismissed, unless a party shows good cause why the action should remain pending; however, if a review of the face of the record reveals activity by filings of pleadings, order of court, or otherwise, an action should not be dismissed. See Hall, 784 So.2d at 1090. This construction of the rule establishes a bright-line test that will ordinarily require only a cursory review of the record by a trial court. As Justice Wells noted in Hall, there is either activity on the face of the record or there is not. Id. We find this bright-line rule appealing in that it establishes a rule that is easy to apply and relieves the trial court and litigants of the burden of determining and guessing as to whether an activity is merely passive or active. It is this burden which has created the difficulty with which litigants and trial courts have struggled to determine whether a particular filing or action will advance the cause to resolution. The subjective analysis that is currently being applied in that struggle has simply proven unworkable and has spurred an increase in non-merit-based litigation that has led us down a path we are no longer willing to follow. Too many times we have seen that reasonable persons have assessed and reached contrary conclusions as to whether particular filings or actions would hasten the proceedings to conclusion. The analysis has simply become too subjective.