Opinion ID: 2671506
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sharp’s Appeal

Text: Sharp raises five issues in his appeal: two sufficiency-of-theevidence issues, two instruction-related issues, and, lastly, a challenge to his convictions based upon this court’s decision in United States v. Cochran, 109 12 F.3d 660 (10th Cir. 1997). We conclude, for the reasons we shall discuss in greater detail below, that all of these issues lack merit. 1. Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to establish that Sharp obtained money by false pretenses or representations? Sharp argues in his first issue on appeal that his convictions for mail fraud and conspiracy to commit mail fraud must be reversed because the evidence presented by the government at trial was insufficient to establish that he obtained money by false pretenses or representations. “We review the sufficiency of evidence de novo.” United States v. Serrato, 742 F.3d 461, 472 (10th Cir. 2014). “The question for the court is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The district court in this case instructed the jury that to find the defendants guilty of mail fraud, the government had to establish beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 1. That the named defendant devised or participated in a scheme to defraud or to obtain money or property by means of false pretenses or representations as that scheme is described in the Indictment. 2. That the named defendant acted with the specific intent to defraud or to obtain money or property by false pretenses or representations. 13 3. That the scheme involved a person making false pretenses or representations that were material, and 4. That the named defendant knew or could have reasonably foreseen that a person would use the mails or an interstate private or commercial carrier to transmit documents relating to the scheme as set forth in the Indictment. ROA at 3064 (Instruction No. 25); see United States v. Schuler, 458 F.3d 1148, 1152 (10th Cir. 2006) (outlining essential elements of mail fraud claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1341). The district court further instructed the jury as to the meaning of a false pretense or representation: A representation or pretense is false if it is known to be untrue or it is made with reckless indifference to its truth or falsity. A representation or pretense can also be false if it is a half-truth or omits or conceals a material fact if it is made with the intent to defraud. ROA at 3066 (Instruction No. 28). As Sharp notes, “[t]he most common type of statement relied upon by the government was a subcontractor line item consisting of a dollar figure and some additional statement like, ‘per estimate from . . .’ or ‘per invoice from . . .’ the subcontractor.” Sharp Br. at 14. Sharp argues that, “[a]s a matter of law, none of these statements [we]re false.” Id. at 15. To begin with, he argues, “[a] number standing alone cannot constitute a false statement: it makes no sense to say that ‘$4,000’ is something that is ‘true’ or ‘false.’” Id. “Nor,” he argues, “can any of these statements be considered false simply because the dollar amount 14 was accompanied by an explanation that the figure was ‘per invoice,’ ‘per estimate,’ or some similar phrase.” Id. “[I]n order for the jury to have properly concluded that a line item was false,” Sharp argues, “it was required to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that DRI represented that line item to be, not only the price that DRI proposed to charge the insurance companies for the subcontractor’s work, but also that the line item stated the amount of money that DRI was going to pay its subcontractor to perform that work.” Id. But, he asserts, “[n]othing in either the DRI estimate or the subcontractor’s underlying invoice stated or implied that the price being charged by DRI was the same as the amount that DRI would pay the subcontractor for its work.” Id. at 16. That is because, Sharp argues, “the purpose of a DRI estimate was to define the scope of work to be performed and to provide a basis for negotiating a fair and reasonable price for that work, . . . not to disclose DRI’s arrangements with subcontractors, what it pays laborers, or the costs of material that DRI uses.” Id. Sharp argues that “[t]he same holds true with respect to the statements at issue in Counts 22 and 36 (relating to the Evans and List jobs), where DRI’s estimates included line item prices for subcontractor work accompanied by statements that the number was ‘per invoice’ or ‘per estimate’ provided by the subcontractor and included ‘ten and ten’ or 20% O&P.’” Id. (quoting Exhibits 336 and 779). “With respect to both of these Counts,” Sharp asserts, “DRI provided the insurance companies with a proposed price for 15 subcontractor work without representing that that price was identical to what DRI would in turn pay the subcontractor.” Id. More specifically, Sharp asserts that “[t]he disclosure that the contractor’s price was increased by ‘10+10’ or by 20% does not constitute a representation that the line item price itself includes no markup, and that the only markup is the ‘10+10’ or 20% referenced in the estimate.” Id. at 16-17. The government argues in response that “[a] rational jury could . . . have found that the subcontractor line items within the DRI estimates were themselves affirmative false representations.” Gov’t Br. at 23. In support, the government asserts that “[f]or each count of conviction, the relevant DRI estimate had language in the subcontractor line items that, in addition to the context of the estimate itself, caused the line item to be a false representation regarding what the subcontractor was charging DRI.” Id. Specifically, “[l]ine items on each of these DRI estimates included one of the following references to the subcontractor documents: ‘per detailed breakdown,’ ‘per invoice,’ ‘actual cost . . . per invoice,’ ‘per estimate,’ ‘per Rescue Tech Electronics,’ ‘per CertaPro Painting,’ and ‘per proposal.’” Id. (quoting various trial exhibits). “Additionally,” the government argues, “the insurance adjusters testified that they understood the listed prices on the subcontractor line items to be what the subcontractors were charging DRI.” Id. “The evidence,” the government asserts, “supports the inference that [Sharp and Griggs] knew this and that this was precisely the reason they required DRI 16 employees to obtain the falsely inflated invoices/proposals from subcontractors.” Id. “Unless [Sharp and Griggs] intended to deceive the insurance companies regarding what the subcontractors were charging DRI, there would have been no need to obtain the false subcontractor invoices/proposals.” Id. And, the government asserts, “Sharp’s statement to DRI employees in 2005 that ‘if the insurance companies found out what we’re doing, our life would end as we know it’ is powerful evidence that [Sharp and Griggs intended to deceive the insurance companies.” Id. at 23-24. In any event, the government argues, it is clear that the false subcontractor invoices/proposals requested by DRI employees at the direction of Sharp and Griggs “were kept in DRI’s job files to be provided to insurance adjustors [sic] ‘upon request.’” Id. at 21 (quoting ROA at 306, 2981-82, 300304). “While these false subcontractor invoices/proposals were not always provided to insurance companies,” the government argues, “DRI’s practice of routinely obtaining them so they could be provided to the insurance companies ‘upon request’ pervades the entire fraudulent scheme and conspiracy.” Id. at 22. Further, the government argues, “DRI sent those false documents to the insurance companies in connection with the jobs at Belterra (Count 4), Clear Creek (Counts 16 & 17), Evans (Count 23), Justen (Count 31), Lusman (Count 37), and Taddonio (Count 53).” Id. “A rational jury,” the government argues, “could have found these false subcontractor invoices/proposals were sufficient to support its 17 verdicts in this case.” Id. After carefully examining the record on appeal, we agree with the government that there was sufficient evidence to support Sharp’s convictions on Counts 4, 23, 31, 37 and 53. 2 As the government notes, those counts of conviction related to projects in which DRI supplied the insurers at issue with copies of the inflated subcontractor invoices/proposals it had requested from its subcontractors. Quite clearly, those invoices were false because they did not show the true amount that the subcontractors had bid for the work, had expected to receive from DRI, had billed DRI, or were ultimately paid by DRI. In other words, those invoices falsely suggested, in each instance, that DRI was being charged a higher amount by the subcontractor than was actually the case. And DRI’s purpose in providing the invoices/proposals to the insurers was to persuade them to pay the inflated amounts so that DRI could reap a profit on the subcontractor’s work. We likewise conclude that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the remaining counts of conviction (Counts 7, 8, 15, 22, 30 and 36) relating to projects in which the insurers did not request DRI to provide copies of the underlying subcontractor invoices/proposals. In each of those circumstances, DRI provided the insurer with an estimate that included at least 2 The jury convicted Griggs on Counts 16 and 17, but was unable to reach a verdict on those counts as to Sharp. 18 one subcontractor line item listing a dollar amount accompanied by a phrase such as “per estimate,” “per proposal,” “per invoice,” or something similarly worded. These statements were true in the sense that the subcontractors at issue had, in fact, provided DRI with proposals matching the dollar amounts listed on DRI’s estimates. But the statements omitted or concealed a key material fact: that there was another, lower-priced proposal from the subcontractor that listed the true price that DRI would be paying the subcontractor for its work on the project. Thus, the estimates submitted by DRI to the insurers omitted or concealed a material fact. Relatedly, the government presented evidence from which a jury reasonably could have found that Sharp and the other defendants acted with the intent to defraud the insurers. To begin with, the government’s evidence established that Sharp and the other defendants knew that DRI would make no profit on its subcontractors’ work unless it submitted to the insurers estimates that contained inflated prices for the subcontractors’ work. The government’s evidence further established that DRI’s employees, at the direction of Sharp and Griggs, began requiring DRI’s subcontractors, as a condition of receiving future work from DRI, to submit two invoices: one listing the actual price that DRI would pay the subcontractor upon completion of the work, and a second listing an inflated price — typically 20-30% higher than the actual price — that DRI would 19 provide to the insurer upon request. 3 The government’s evidence also established that DRI, at the direction of Sharp and Griggs, concealed from insurers the existence of the lower, actual-priced invoices. When this evidence of intent to defraud is considered in connection with defendants’ concealment of the actual subcontractor invoices and prices, the government’s evidence was clearly sufficient to allow the jury to convict Sharp on these mail fraud counts. See generally Schuler, 458 F.3d at 1152 (noting that intent to defraud may be inferred from a variety of circumstantial evidence). Sharp also makes two specific arguments regarding Counts 37 and 53. To begin with, Sharp notes that Count 37 “was based upon the fact that DRI provided James Lynch — an independent adjuster for Sentry Insurance — with a copy of a subcontractor proposal for abatement work prepared by Rocky Mountain Abatement.” Sharp Br. at 17. Sharp asserts that “DRI made no representations that the price to be charged Sentry was identical to what DRI intended to pay for the abatement work.” Id. Rather, he asserts, “DRI simply quoted a price (which Mr. Lynch determined was both fair and reasonable).” Id. As the government notes, however, the subcontractor proposal that DRI provided to Lynch was the higher of the two invoices DRI was provided by 3 As the government aptly notes, “[u]nless Appellants intended to deceive the insurance companies regarding what the subcontractors were charging DRI, there would have been no need to obtain the false subcontractor invoices/proposals.” Gov’t Br. at 23. 20 its subcontractor, Rocky Mountain Abatement, and this higher invoice failed to reflect the actual cost that DRI would be paying Rocky Mountain Abatement for its work. Further, Lynch testified at trial that he relied on the accuracy of the Rocky Mountain invoice in determining how much DRI should be reimbursed by Sentry. Tr. at 1635. Consequently, we conclude that this count is not materially distinguishable from the other counts of conviction. As for Count 53, which related to the Taddonio project, Sharp argues that it “requires a somewhat different analysis.” Sharp Br. at 17. Sharp notes that Count 53 “was based upon an estimate provided by DRI which included a subcontractor line item together with the statement that ‘actual cost once incurred will be billed.’” Id. (quoting Exhibit 1048). Sharp argues that, “[b]ecause this statement constitutes a representation about something that is to occur in the future, it cannot be ‘false’ as a matter of law.” Id. The government argues in response that “there was ample evidence for the jury to find that the statements in the DRI estimate for the Taddonio job were false at the time they were made.” Gov’t Br. at 24. To begin with, the government explains that “[t]he DRI estimate included a subcontractor line item that stated, ‘Motorized shades - per proposal from Ananda and Suns’ for $4,293.44,” and “[b]elow that line item, DRI Employee Justin Blackburn stated, ‘The above two line items are uncommon, and may not reflect the actual costs. If this is the case, the actual costs once incur[r]ed will be billed.’” Id. (quoting Ex. 21 App. at 1048). “However,” the government notes, “per Mr. Blackburn’s instructions, DRI employee Greg Rye had previously obtained from Ananda & Suns . . . two invoices for this work,” one “reflect[ing] the $3,484.32 that Ananda . . . intended to charge DRI, and one falsely inflated by 20% to $4,293.44.” Id. at 25. And, the government notes, “Blackburn provided the falsely inflated invoice to the insurance company.” Id. “This evidence,” the government argues, “supports the jury’s conclusion that the statements in this DRI estimate were intentionally false at the time they were made because . . . Blackburn knew that Ananda . . . had already agreed to charge DRI a lower price.” Id. We agree with the government. At the time DRI submitted its estimate to the insurance company, it knew that Ananda had bid the job for $3,484.32, approximately $800 less than the amount listed on DRI’s estimate. DRI, however, concealed this fact from the insurance company and, instead, listed the higher of the two amounts on its own estimate and in turn provided the insurance company with the invoice from Ananda that falsely suggested Ananda was charging DRI $4,293.44 for its work. 2. Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to establish that the alleged omissions or misstatements were “material”? In his second issue on appeal, Sharp challenges his mail fraud convictions on another ground, i.e., that the government’s evidence was insufficient to allow the jury to find that any of the alleged omissions or 22 misstatements underlying those counts were “material.” Sharp Br. at 20. In support, Sharp argues that “[n]o person of ordinary prudence, engaged in an arm’s-length negotiation over the fair and reasonable cost of a restoration project, would rely upon his adversary’s representations about the costs associated with that project when those costs can be, and usually are, verified independently.” Id. at 21. “To determine whether a statement is material the appropriate test is to examine whether it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing a decision or action by another.” 4 United States v. Lawrence, 405 F.3d 888, 901 (10th Cir. 2005). “The question of whether a statement is material is a question of fact for the jury to decide.” Id. We conclude, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements at issue in DRI’s estimates were material. The phraseology that DRI chose to utilize in describing the subcontractor line items in its own invoices clearly suggested that the dollar figures in those line items were consistent with the amounts that DRI was paying its subcontractors. And DRI perpetuated that false suggestion, when necessary, by providing copies 4 The district court instructed the jury, consistent with law of this circuit, that “[a] false representation or pretense is material if it has a natural tendency to influence or is capable of influencing the decision of a person or entity to whom the representation or pretense is addressed.” ROA at 3066. 23 of the inflated subcontractor invoices to insurers upon request. In short, DRI’s communications with the insurers suggested that DRI was simply charging the insurers the actual amount that DRI would ultimately pay to its subcontractors. Notably, the insurance adjusters who worked on the projects at issue testified that they relied on the accuracy of this information provided to them by DRI. Thus, DRI effectively lulled the insurance companies and their adjusters into believing there was no need to investigate further the subcontractor line items, or to prepare their own, independent estimates of the costs associated with the subcontractor line items. 3. Did the district court err by refusing to instruct the jury that Sharp could be convicted of mail fraud on the basis of an omission only if he had a duty to disclose the withheld fact? In his third issue on appeal, Sharp argues that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that Sharp could be convicted of mail fraud on the basis of an omission only if he had a duty to disclose the withheld fact. “We review the district court’s decision to give a particular jury instruction for abuse of discretion; however, we review the instructions as a whole de novo to determine whether they accurately informed the jury of the governing law.” United States v. Toledo, 739 F.3d 562, 567 (10th Cir. 2014). Sharp is correct in noting “that ‘[w]hen an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.’” United 24 States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 665 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980)). The question for us in this case is whether Sharp was entitled to have the jury instructed on this legal principle. And that, in turn, depends upon whether such an instruction was “supported by competent evidence.” Pratt v. Petelin, 733 F.3d 1006, 1009 (10th Cir. 2013). In order to resolve that question, we begin by reviewing the precise arguments that were made by Sharp and his co-defendants prior to the district court instructing the jury. As previously noted, the district court ultimately instructed the jury, in Instruction No. 28, as to the meaning of a false pretense or representation: A representation or pretense is false if it is known to be untrue or it is made with reckless indifference to its truth or falsity. A representation or pretense can also be false if it is a half-truth or omits or conceals a material fact if it is made with the intent to defraud. ROA at 3066 (Instruction No. 28). Prior to the district court doing so, defendants objected to the last sentence of Instruction No. 28, in particular its reference to “omit[ting] or conceal[ing] a material fact.” ROA at 3033-34. Griggs’ counsel argued that it was his understanding “that omissions were coming out of the case,” leaving at issue “some variety of affirmative misrepresentation.” Id. at 3034. The district court responded, “Omissions are not out of the case. They – omissions that fall within the mid-range of the spectrum that I identified during the ruling [on defendants’ motion for judgment of acquittal] are part of the 25 case.” Id. Griggs’ counsel then stated, “I’ll just say that I think if omissions are still in the case, then there should be some instruction about a duty to speak.” Id. The district court stated: Let me be clear here. I have gone over the counts, and I had a judgment – actually dismissed Count 51, where there was no duty to speak. What I have determined as a matter of law is that a mail fraud claim can be premised on a combination of an affirmative representation coupled with knowledge and omission that renders that representation ambiguous or misleading. Cochran refers to deceitful concealment of material facts. And that’s in conjunction with . . . a representation. Id. at 3034-35. The district court continued: Let me clarify. And to the extent I was not clear in my ruling [on defendants’ motions for judgment of acquittal], this will supplement that ruling. The spectrum that I see is, on one hand, an affirmative misrepresentation. At the other end of the spectrum is a mere non-disclosure, where there is no duty to disclose. That’s the Cochran situation. And midway in between is an affirmative representation which becomes ambiguous or misleading in the absence of a disclosure of additional information. And that is the deceitful concealment of material facts. Id. at 3035-36. Ultimately, the district court held as follows: I find that Instruction No. 28 is an accurate statement of the law when read in conjunction with Instruction No. 25. Instruction No. 25 states the elements that must be proven by the Government with regard to each of the mail fraud claims. It repeatedly uses the phrase “false pretenses or representations.” And Instruction No. 28 really defines what is false in that context and it –– read literally, the sentence says, “a representation or a 26 pretense can be false if it is a half-truth or it omits or conceals a material fact.” That’s premised upon the fact that there is a representation or a pretense. It is not including a non-disclosure. And as read in that light, the jury in applying this definition must find a representation or pretense before determining whether it is false. That being the case, I find no problem in the instruction. Id. at 3039. We conclude, for two related reasons, that the district court’s analysis was correct. First, as the district court noted, the jury could not have found Sharp guilty based on a mere omission. Rather, Instruction Nos. 25 and 28 required the jury, in the course of considering each of the mail fraud counts, to find the existence of a representation or pretense. Second, and contrary to Sharp’s arguments below and now on appeal, none of the counts at issue were based on pure “omissions.” 5 Rather, as we have explained, the counts at issue were based on subcontractor line items in DRI’s estimates that listed the name of the specific subcontractor and included a dollar amount combined with a phrase such as “per detailed breakdown,” “per invoice,” “per estimate,” and “per proposal.” That information, taken together, could reasonably have been understood by the insurers as indicating that the dollar amounts listed by DRI were identical to the amounts being charged DRI by the subcontractors. And, 5 Sharp argues in his opening brief that “[t]he trial court’s instructions allowed the jury to convict [him] based upon a pure omission.” Sharp Br. at 25. But Sharp points to no evidence to support this argument. 27 whenever an insurance adjuster asked to see a copy of the underlying subcontractor invoice, DRI perpetuated the myth by providing the adjuster with a copy of the inflated subcontractor invoice. 6 Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury that Sharp could be convicted of mail fraud on the basis of an omission only if he had a duty to disclose the withheld fact. 4. Did the district court err in giving the jury an Allen instruction? In his fourth issue on appeal, Sharp argues that the district court erred by giving the jury an Allen instruction after it informed the district court that it was unable reach a verdict.
At approximately 1:26 p.m. on its fourth day of deliberations (Thursday, August 9, 2012), the jury sent a note to the district court asking, in effect, whether it was necessary for the defendants to have “know[n] about the statute prohibiting mail fraud in order to be guilty of mail fraud.” ROA at 324445. The district court responded to the jury as follows: “Please consider the instructions as a whole. The definition of intent for conspiracy is found in Instruction 21. The intent . . . required to commit mail fraud is set out in 6 This occurred in connection with Count 4 (the Belterra job), Counts 16 and 17 (the Clear Creek job), Count 23 (the Evans job), Count 31 (the Justen job), Count 37 (the Lusman job), and Count 53 (the Taddonio job). 28 Instructions 25 and 27.” Id. at 3250. Little more than an hour later, at 2:44 p.m., the jury sent a note to the district court stating, “Under careful consideration in our deliberations, we, the jury, are unable to return a verdict.” Id. at 3251. The note was signed by all twelve jurors. Sharp’s counsel argued that the jury’s note was a definitive statement that they were unable to reach a verdict, and that the district court should, consequently, declare a mistrial and discharge the jury. Counsel for the other defendants agreed. The district court, however, stated that it was “not inclined to grant the motion for mistrial at this time” because “[t]he jurors have not been instructed that they can reach a verdict on some but not all counts.” Id. at 3252-53. In turn, the district court stated that it “intend[ed] to call the jurors into the courtroom and to both reread the modified Allen instruction found at Instruction No. 34 and advise them that, one they can continue and should continue their deliberations as to all of the counts that are at issue, and, secondarily, those counts that they can render a verdict on, they should proceed to do so.” Id. at 3253. The government had no objection to this proposal, but Sharp’s counsel objected, arguing that the district court’s proposed instruction would act as “a signal of disapproval” to the jury. Id. at 3254. Griggs’ counsel likewise objected. Id. at 3254-55. The district court proceeded to bring the jury into the courtroom and instruct them as follows: 29 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I have received your communication which we’ve numbered as Communication No. 13, in which you have stated “Under careful consideration in our deliberations, we, the jury, are unable to return a verdict.” It is not uncommon in the course of deliberations for members of a jury to believe that they have reached an impasse. Sometimes the mere passage of time, taking a break, sometimes a fresh perspective, allows jurors to reach past an impasse. I remind you that Instruction No. 34 tells you that it is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. You must each evaluate the evidence for yourself, but only after impartially considering it with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if you are convinced it is erroneous. However, do not surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. A verdict in this case is not necessarily a singular verdict. You may render a verdict on any count upon which you can agree. There may be some counts upon which you cannot agree; and in that event, you may not be able to render a verdict. Your reference here to being able to return a verdict suggests to me that you are thinking that you cannot return a verdict because you cannot agree on all of the counts. I urge you to go back and reconsider and see if there are any of the counts that you can agree on. And if there are counts that you can agree on, to render a verdict on those counts. Recognizing that you’ve been working very hard this week, long hours, I think it will be helpful for you, perhaps, to take a break for the rest of the day. Id. at 3255-56. The jury proceeded, with the agreement of the district court, to take a three-day break and reconvened on Monday, August 13, 2012. On 30 the afternoon of Wednesday, August 15, 2012, after approximately two-and-a-half days of additional deliberation, the jury reached a partial verdict and was unable to return a verdict on the remaining counts. 7 Id. at 3277-79, 3281-85.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to give an Allen charge. See United States v. Cornelius, 696 F.3d 1307, 1321 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Ailsworth, 138 F.3d 843, 851 (10th Cir. 1998). “A district court may issue an Allen instruction urging deadlocked jurors to review and reconsider the evidence in the light of the views expressed by other jurors so as to avoid a mistrial, provided that the instruction does not impose such pressure on the jury such that the accuracy and integrity of the verdict becomes uncertain.” Cornelius, 696 F.3d at 1321 (internal quotations, 7 As to the conspiracy charge, which was Count 1, the jury found Sharp and Griggs guilty, but found Blackburn and Travers not guilty. As to the individual mail fraud counts, the jury found as follows: Count 2 (Griggs, Sharp and Travers all not guilty); Count 4 (Griggs and Sharp guilty); Counts 7-8 (Griggs guilty; unable to reach a verdict as to Sharp); Count 14 (all defendants not guilty); Count 15 (Griggs and Sharp guilty; Blackburn not guilty); Counts 16-17 (Griggs guilty; unable to reach a verdict as to Sharp); Counts 18-19 (Griggs, Sharp and Travers all not guilty); Count 22 (Griggs and Sharp guilty; Travers not guilty); Count 23 (Griggs and Sharp guilty); Counts 24-25 and 27-28 (Griggs, Sharp and Blackburn all not guilty); Counts 30-31 (Griggs and Sharp guilty; Blackburn not guilty); Counts 32-35 (Griggs, Sharp and Blackburn all not guilty); Count 36 (Griggs and Sharp guilty; Blackburn not guilty); Count 37 (Griggs and Sharp guilty; Blackburn not guilty); Counts 41-42, 47-48, 50, 52 (unable to reach a verdict as to any defendant); Count 53 (Griggs and Sharp guilty; unable to reach a verdict as to Blackburn); Counts 56-57 (unable to reach a verdict as to any defendant). 31 alterations, and citations omitted). “In considering whether an Allen instruction was improperly coercive, we consider (1) the language of the instruction, (2) whether the instruction is presented with other instructions, (3) the timing of the instruction, and (4) the length of the jury’s subsequent deliberations.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The ultimate question is whether the instruction was impermissibly coercive in a way that undermined the integrity of the deliberation process.” Id. (internal quotation marks, citation and alteration omitted). We conclude that the district court’s Allen instruction in this case was not improperly coercive. To begin with, the district court’s statement, “do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if you are convinced it is erroneous,” ROA at 3255, effectively “urged all jurors, not just those in favor of acquittal, to reconsider their views according to the proper standard of the law,” Cornelius, 696 F.3d at 1322. The language of the instruction also effectively encouraged, rather than “undermined,” the deliberative process. Id. To be sure, the instruction was read alone by the district court after the jury had deliberated for several days and then indicated that it was unable to return a verdict. See United States v. LaVallee, 439 F.3d 670, 690 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[T]here is no per se rule against giving an Allen charge once the jury has begun to deliberate.”). But in the present case, the instruction had been previously read to the jury as part of the initial jury instructions, and the district 32 court reminded the jury of that fact. Following the district court’s reading of the Allen instruction, the jury proceeded to deliberate for two-and-a-half more days. Notably, the jury did not convict Sharp and Griggs on all of the counts at issue. Indeed, the jury remained deadlocked with respect to several of the counts at issue. And, with respect to defendants Blackburn and Travers, the jury either acquitted them or was deadlocked. Thus, considering all of these factors together, we are not persuaded that the district’s Allen instruction imposed such pressure on the jury as to call into question the accuracy and integrity of its verdicts. Sharp argues, however, that “[t]here are three problems with the language of the court’s Allen instruction and its comments regarding a partial verdict that rendered the instruction improperly coercive.” Sharp Br. at 29. To begin with, Sharp argues, by telling the jury that “the mere passage of time [or] taking a break . . . allows jurors to reach past an impasse,” and then excusing the jury for a three-day break, the district court effectively “encouraged the jurors to take a break with an eye towards any holdouts returning at [a] later time and capitulating.” Id. at 30. As we have noted, however, the language of the district court’s Allen instruction actually encouraged all of the jurors, and not just the purported “holdouts,” to reconsider their views. Further, as the government correctly notes, it was the jury that requested the three-day break; the district court did not unilaterally impose that break on the jury. Thus, we reject Sharp’s assertion regarding the “message” sent to the jury by the district court. 33 Sharp next complains that the district court’s “instruction did not reiterate the fact that the burden of proof was on the government, and that [he] had no burden to prove anything.” Id. Sharp is correct on this point and “[i]t would, of course, be more palatable if the jury [had been] reminded of the presumption of innocence and burden of proof.” United States v. Winn, 411 F.2d 415, 417 (10th Cir. 1969). But, as the government notes, the absence of this language is not per se prejudicial. And, importantly, the district court did emphasize to the jurors that they should “not surrender [their] honest conviction[s] as to the weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of . . . fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.” ROA at 3256. Third, Sharp argues that “the court’s instruction improperly interfered with the structure and course of the jury’s deliberations by admonishing the jury to return a partial verdict if at all possible.” Sharp Br. at 31. But a close examination of the district court’s Allen instruction indicates that the district court’s reference to the possibility of a partial verdict was clearly intended to alleviate any concerns on the part of the jury “that [they could not] return a verdict because [they could not] agree on all counts.” ROA at 3256. Moreover, the district court did not suggest, as was the case in LaVallee, that the jury could or should seal or return partial verdicts as they were reached or prior to the conclusion of the deliberative process. Thus, Sharp’s argument in this regard 34 lacks merit. Finally, Sharp complains about the timing of the Allen instruction, noting that it “was given, not just after the jury had begun its deliberations, but after it had been deliberating for four days, and after it advised the court . . . that it was deadlocked.” Sharp Br. at 33. But we have previously upheld the giving of an Allen instruction under nearly the same circumstances as occurred here, i.e., “after the jury deliberated for four days, returned a partial verdict, and announced that it was deadlocked.” Ailsworth, 138 F.3d at 851-52. In concluding that “[t]he timing of the Allen instruction[] . . . was not problematic,” we noted that “[t]he court first gave an Allen instruction to the jury when it charged the jury before deliberations began.” Id. at 851. Notably, the district court in this case did so as well. In other words, the jury in this case was given the Allen instruction for the first time prior to deliberations, and it was reread to them after four days of deliberation. Consistent with Ailsworth, we conclude that this timing was not “problematic.” Id. 5. Is Sharp entitled to have his convictions vacated under the rule established in Cochran? In his fifth and final issue on appeal, Sharp “incorporates by reference the first argument advanced by . . . Griggs in his Opening Brief,” i.e., that his convictions must be vacated in light of this court’s decision in Cochran. Sharp Br. at 34. As we shall discuss in greater detail below in the section 35 addressing Griggs’ appeal, this issue lacks merit.