Opinion ID: 486555
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The jury's apportionment of damages

Text: 17 Defendants' final assertions of error--that it was improper to allow the jury to apportion damages, and that satisfaction of the judgment entered against O'Halloran should bar collection of the damage awards assessed against Reeves and Fisher--both turn on the assumption that this was necessarily a case of joint and several liability. We reject that assumption. 18 Defendants correctly note that [w]hen payment of the judgment in full is made by the judgment debtor, there is no doubt that the plaintiff is barred from a further action against another who is liable for the same damages.... (quoting Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, Sec. 48 (5th ed. 1984)). Most of defendants' cases apparently deal with this situation. However, there are two preconditions to the litigation bar just described: (1) liability for the same damages, and (2) full satisfaction of the judgment. When either of these preconditions is not met, further litigation will not be precluded. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 260 n. 8, 99 S.Ct. 2753, 2756 n. 8, 61 L.Ed.2d 521 (1979). FSLIC focuses on these preconditions. 5 19 (1) Liability for the same damages 20 When damages against multiple tortfeasors are apportioned, rather than assessed in a lump sum for which all are jointly and severally liable, recovery against one or more will not bar recovery against the others. See Rest. (2d) Judgments, Sec. 50 Comment c (1982); Rest. (2d) Torts, Secs. 881, 885 Comment a (1979). Apportionment is proper when two or more persons, acting independently, tortiously cause distinct harms or a single harm for which there is a reasonable basis for division according to the contribution of each.... Rest. (2d) Torts, Sec. 881 (emphasis added). Accord Rest. (2d) Torts, Sec. 433A (1965); Speiser, Krause & Gans, 1 The American Law of Torts, Sec. 3:12 (1983). See Huff v. Harbaugh, 49 Md.App. 661, 435 A.2d 108 (1981) (focus is to avoid double recovery for same injury). The question is primarily not one of the fact of causation, but of the feasibility and practical convenience of splitting up the total harm into separate parts.... Where a factual basis can be found for some rough practical apportionment, ... it is likely that the apportionment will be made. Prosser & Keeton, Sec. 52. This is true even where the harm is not divisible, but there is a reasonable and rational basis [for making a] fair apportionment among the causes responsible. Rest. (2d) Torts, Sec. 433A Comment d, Sec. 881. See also Speiser, et al., Sec. 3:12 (even where a single and seemingly indivisible harm or injury has resulted, apportionment will be sanctioned if it is reasonably possible between or among tortfeasors whose combined tortious activity has caused the harm). 21 The jury in this case, as is evident from the verdict, found it possible to apportion damages among the defendants. Despite repeated instructions to assign damages for each count, without a breakdown for each defendant, the jury's written questions to the court indicate its firm desire to assess different amounts against the three defendants. The district judge recognized as much, and when he finally told the jury that it could apportion damages based on the relative culpability of the defendants, the jury returned with its verdict within an hour's time. 22 Plaintiff points to ample evidence in the record which demonstrates the differing roles and responsibilities of the defendants in the management of County Federal. 6 Defendant Fisher's contribution occurred during a different time-frame from the others--a factor which itself justifies an apportionment of damages. See Rest. (2d) Torts, Sec. 433A Comment c. At times during the trial, the defense attorneys admitted (and Fisher's attorney affirmatively argued), that joint and several liability was inappropriate. Indeed, defendants in their brief concede (under the mistaken belief that apportionment is only warranted where there are distinct injuries) that the jury had a reasonable basis for finding different levels of culpability for the harm done. 23 Since the determination of whether the facts supported an apportionment of damages was one upon which reasonable men could differ, it was properly left to the jury. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. McLaughlin, 429 F.2d 1317, 1317 (4 Cir.1970). The issue of apportionment, in particular, is one on which juries are typically given wide latitude. Speiser, et al., Sec. 3:12 (apportionment will be sanctioned if it is reasonably possible; [i]n some instances of this kind where the extent of the harm or damage inflicted by the separate acts is seemingly incapable of any definite proof or ascertainment by evidence, the apportionment has been left to the fact triers nevertheless). See also Huff v. Harbaugh (whether defendants are responsible for the same injuries, and are thus joint tortfeasors, is a question of fact). The jury here clearly perceived some basis for differentiating the liability of the three defendants. 7 We see no compelling reason to disturb that assessment. 8 24 (2) Full satisfaction of the judgment 25 Defendants Reeves and Fisher claim that they should be relieved of any liability because of the judgment already entered against defendant O'Halloran. However, since the damages were appropriately apportioned among Reeves, Fisher and O'Halloran, there is no reason why O'Halloran's payment of the amount he owed should have any bearing on the damages due from Reeves and Fisher. The fact that O'Halloran's obligation was marked paid, settled and satisfied, relates only to that portion of the judgment and damages for which he was deemed individually responsible. 26 To the extent that defendants are really complaining about the fact of apportionment, they concede a lack of standing. See also Ohio Valley Bank v. Greenebaum Sons Bank & Trust Co., 11 F.2d 87 (4 Cir.1926) (even if apportionment is error, defendants have no right to complain when subjected to lower damages than would result from joint and several liability); 46 ALR 3d 801, 808, 843-44 (1972). 27 Finally, even if liability was considered joint and several, defendants would be released only if plaintiff had received full satisfaction of its claims; partial satisfaction would merely reduce the total for which the remaining defendants are responsible. See Prosser & Keeton, Sec. 48; Rest. (2d) Torts, Secs. 885-86, and Comments thereto; Rest. (2d) Judgments, Sec. 50 and Comments. Defendants' claim that payment of a lesser judgment will extinguish a greater one applies only where the court adjudges that lesser amount to constitute full satisfaction (Prosser & Keeton, Sec. 48; Rest. (2d) Torts, Sec. 886 (appendix)), or where the parties so agree (Grantham v. Bd. of County Commissioners for Prince George's County, 251 Md. 28, 246 A.2d 548 (1968)).