Opinion ID: 2994866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unfettered Discretion?

Text: It is well established that where a statute or ordinance vests the government with virtually unlimited authority to grant or deny a permit, that law violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech. See Saia v. People of State of New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559-60 (1948) (city ordinance prohibiting use of sound amplification devices, except with permission obtained from chief of police, is invalid as infringing right of free speech, in absence of any standards prescribed for exercise by chief of police of his discretion); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988) (licensing scheme which gives the government unlimited discretion is facially unconstitutional). As we have reiterated, where virtually unlimited discretion exists, the possibility is too great that it will be exercised in order to suppress disfavored speech. MacDonald v. Chicago Park Dist., 132 F.3d 355, 361 n.6 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757-58). MacDonald argues that Chicago Ordinance 10-8- 330(h) confers on the Commissioner unfettered discretion to approve or deny parade-permit applications, and thus it violates the First Amendment. For instance, MacDonald points to the ordinance’s requirements that the Commissioner consider whether the proposed parade will substantially or unnecessarily interfere with traffic in the area contiguous to the route, whether there are available sufficient city resources to mitigate the disruption, whether there are available a sufficient number of peace officers to police and protect lawful participants and non-participants from traffic related hazards in light of the other demands for police protection, and whether the concentration of persons will prevent proper fire and police protection or ambulance service. He then queries the court, What are ’substantially,’ ’unnecessarily’ and ’sufficient’? He argues that this loose language leaves the Commissioner with complete discretionary authority to grant or deny a parade permit, and therefore the ordinance is unconstitutional. In support of his position, MacDonald cites several Supreme Court cases, such as Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 394 U.S. 147 (1969). In Shuttlesworth the Court considered the constitutionality of a Birmingham ordinance that required the city commission to issue a parade permit unless in its judgment the public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience required that it be refused. Id. at 149-50. The Court struck the ordinance because it unconstitutionally conferred the government with unbridled discretion. Similarly in Schneider v. State of New Jersey, Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), the Court struck down a municipal ordinance which allowed the Chief of Police to deny a permit to door-to-door solicitors if he determined the speaker was not of good character. In Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958), the Court likewise invalidated a city ordinance because of the unfettered discretion granted the decisionmaker. Id. at 321. In that case the mayor could deny permits to applicants requesting permission to solicit others to join their organization based on the character of the applicant, the nature of the business of the organization for which members are desired to be solicited, and its effects upon the general welfare of citizens of the City of Baxley. Id. But as the district court correctly noted, [i]n contrast to the obscure standards in the cases cited above, the provisions of sec. 10-8- 330(h)(1)-(4) specify legitimate safety concerns in as precise a manner as such concerns can reasonably be articulated. D.Ct. Opn. at 13. Moreover, as the district court further reasoned, in terms of the type of discretion that it confers, sec. 10-8-330 is more analogous to other ordinances that have been upheld in this circuit. Specifically, in Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309 (7th Cir. 1993), this court considered en banc whether a Chicago ordinance which contained six criteria for determining whether to grant a license application for a newsstand unconstitutionally conferred unlimited discretion on the designated city officials. Among the six criteria, city officials were required to consider [w]hether the design, materials and color scheme of the newspaper stand comport with and enhance the quality and character of the streetscape, including nearby development and existing land uses and the extent to which services that would be offered by the newspaper stand are already available in the area. Id. at 1317-18 (quoting Chicago Mun. Code sec. 1028- 160(a)). The ordinance further empowered city officials to remove a newsstand that ’endangers public safety or property,’ that interferes with or impedes the flow of pedestrian or vehicular traffic, or that is placed in such a manner as to impede or interfere with the reasonable use of [a display window.] Id. at 1319 (quoting Chicago Mun. Code sec.10-28158(a) & (b)). Notwithstanding the flexibility in the above quoted criteria, a majority of the Graff court concluded that the ordinance did not provide the decisionmaker with such unfettered discretion that it offended the First Amendment. Id. at 1317-18; id. at 1329 (Flaum, J., concurring) (noting that while the enumerated factors allow flexibility, they are the kinds of legitimate concerns one would expect a city to weigh when deciding how to allocate limited public space in a neutral way.); id. at 1335 (Ripple, J., concurring) (In no way does the ordinance place unfettered discretion in the hands of city officials.). In fact, this court recently made this same point in another case involving MacDonald: nine of twelve judges on the en banc court [in Graff] concluded that [that] ordinance was sufficiently objective and specific to limit the decisionmaker’s discretion and thereby to survive a facial First Amendment challenge. MacDonald v. Chicago Park Dist., 132 F.3d 355, 361 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Graff, 9 F.3d at 1318, 1329, 1335). Section 10-8-330 more closely resembles the ordinance at issue in Graff than those rejected in Schnieder, Staub, and Shuttlesworth. Like the Graff ordinance, Section 10-8-330 specifically and narrowly identifies the reasonable and necessary governmental concerns--traffic flows, traffic hazards, and emergency transportation. Moreover, to the extent that Section 10-8-330 provides flexibility for the Commissioner’s evaluation of those concerns with the use of such words as substantially, unnecessarily, and sufficient, this actually provides an additional limitation on the government’s discretion, as compared to that contained in the ordinance in Graff; there, the ordinance allowed City officials to remove a newsstand if it endangers public safety or property, or interferes with or impedes the flow of pedestrian or vehicular traffic, but the ordinance did not provide officials with any threshold of harm. Yet, a majority of this court found the ordinance in Graff sufficiently precise so as to conclude that it did not provide the City with unconstitutionally unfettered discretion. Graff, 9 F.3d at 1317-18; id. at 1329 (Flaum, J., concurring); id. at 1335 (Ripple, J., concurring). See also, Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989) (While these standards are undoubtedly flexible, and the officials implementing them will exercise considerable discretion, perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity.); United States v. Kistner, 68 F.3d 218, 221 (8th Cir. 1995) (park permit regulation that required consideration of peace and tranquility, public health and safety, and potential for damage to park resources and facilities, did not unconstitutionally vest government with unbridled discretion). Similarly, while Chicago’s ordinance provides some flexibility, it limits the Commissioner’s discretion by requiring the Commissioner to grant a parade permit, unless specifically articulated public-safety concerns exist. And the public- safety concerns contained in the Ordinance closely resemble the type of factors approved of in Graff. For instance, in Graff city officials had discretion to consider whether the newsstand interfere[d] with or impede[d] the flow of pedestrian or vehicular traffic, while here the Commissioner considers whether the parade unnecessarily interfere[s] with traffic in the area contiguous to the route. While the other factors set forth in Section 10-8-330 differ in type from those approved of in Graff, they are of the same nature, and similarly limit the Commissioner’s discretion. More recently, this court considered the constitutionality of a closely analogous Chicago ordinance--one covering park permits. In Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 227 F.3d 921 (7th Cir. 2000), the same plaintiffs as involved in this case presented a facial challenge to the City of Chicago’s regulations which govern the use of parks, and which require a permit for an assembly, parade, demonstration, sporting event, or other use of the park by a group of 50 or more persons. Chi. Park Dist. Code ch. VII. In that case, the plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that the ordinance provided the City with unconstitutional discretion. In support of their position, the plaintiffs cited various sections of the ordinance, including a provision allowing the City to deny a permit if the applicant has on prior occasions made material misrepresentations regarding the nature or scope of any event or activity previously permitted. The plaintiffs also pointed to a provision that provided that the park district ’may’ deny a permit because of a misrepresentation, the failure to tender the fee, having damaged property of the park district on a previous occasion, or other grounds listed in the regulation, . . . . Notwithstanding the flexibility of words such as material and misrepresentations, and the discretion provided the park district with the word may, this court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that these provisions unconstitutionally vested the City of Chicago with too much discretion. In doing so, this court noted that words such as material actually restricted the limitation on the City’s discretion. Thomas also observed the difficulty in defining more specifically the factors to be considered given the various competing interests at play. Id. at 925 (The plaintiffs complain that this is vague, but do not indicate how it could be made less vague yet encompass the myriad activities that the First Amendment has been held to protect.). The ordinance at issue in this case closely resembles the park-permit ordinance upheld in Thomas. While both ordinances included language providing city officials with flexibility in assessing the proposed activity, the flexibility is no more than is necessary so as to allow the city officials to balance the competing interests at issue. Therefore, based on Graff, and more recently Thomas, we conclude that Section 10-8- 330 sufficiently articulates definitive standards on which the Commissioner must base his decision concerning a parade application to withstand constitutional scrutiny.