Opinion ID: 1463584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The 10-Year Sentence on the Firearms Count

Text: Section § 924(c)(1)(A), under which the court sentenced Payne to 10 years' imprisonment as a mandatory minimum, to be served consecutively to his terms of life imprisonment on the RICO, murder-in-aid-of-racketeering, and narcotics counts, provides as follows: (c)(1)(A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime  (i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years; (ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and (iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (emphases added). Payne contends (1), relying on United States v. Williams, 558 F.3d 166 (2d Cir.) ( Williams ), petition for cert. filed, No. 09-466, 78 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct.20, 2009), that this section's provisions for mandatory minimum sentences were not applicable to him because he was subject to a greater minimum sentence, and (2) that subsection (iii) could not be applied because there was no finding, by the jury or by the sentencing courtand no evidence that he had discharged a firearm within the five-year statute-of-limitations period. We find no basis for reversal.
Payne did not argue in the district court that § 924(c)(1)(A) was not applicable on the ground that other provisions subjected him to a longer minimum sentence. Accordingly, this contention is reviewable only for plain error. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b). A plain error is an error that is plain and that prejudicially affected the defendant's substantial rights and seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Payne does not meet this standard. Our decision in Williams, on which Payne relies, was preceded by United States v. Whitley, 529 F.3d 150 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 540 F.3d 87 (2d Cir.2008), in which we closely examined the literal language of § 924(c)(1)(A) as it affected a defendant who had been sentenced to both the 15-year mandatory minimum prison term provided by 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) for armed career criminals and the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence provided by § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) for a defendant who discharged a weapon during and in relation to a crime of violence. We ruled that § 924(c)(1)(A)'s except clause, i.e., [e]xcept to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, should be applied in accordance with its terms. See Whitley, 529 F.3d at 153, 158. Since § 924(e) provided a longer mandatory minimum prison term than § 924(c)(1)(A), we concluded that the defendant was exempt from the latter, and that the imposition of the § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) sentence constituted plain error. See 529 F.3d at 158; id. at 152 n. 1. In Williams, 558 F.3d 166, the defendant was convicted of drug trafficking in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), for which he was sentenced to a mandatory minimum of 10 years' imprisonment; and he was convicted of possession of a firearm in furtherance of that crime, for which he was sentenced to the mandatory minimum five-year prison term provided by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), consecutive to his 10-year sentence on that underlying narcotics count. The government argued, inter alia, that the rule announced in Whitley should be limited to cases in which the greater minimum sentence, impeding application of § 924(c)(1)(A)'s mandatory minimums, was a punishment for a firearms offense. We rejected that argument. Although stating that we do not hold that the `except' clause is unbounded, we held that the `except' clause includes minimum sentences for predicate statutory offenses arising from the same criminal transaction or operative set of facts. 558 F.3d at 170-71. Thus, we concluded that, in light of the greater mandatory minimum provided for the predicate drug offense, 10 years, the imposition of a mandatory minimum term of five years' imprisonment pursuant to § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) constituted plain error. The boundary suggested in Williams was applied in our subsequent decision in United States v. Parker, 577 F.3d 143 (2d Cir.2009). The defendant in Parker was convicted on several narcotics counts, including one that charged him with trafficking in a detectable amount of crack in July 2002 in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) (Count II), and one that charged him with trafficking in five grams or more of crack in April-May 2002 in violation of § 841(a)(1), a quantity that subjected him, because he had a prior drug felony conviction, to a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (Count V). He was also convicted on two firearms counts, on one of which (Count I) he was given a mandatory minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). We pointed out that one element of a § 924(c) offense is an underlying crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during and in relation to which the firearm was used or carried, and that the underlying crime specified in Count I of the indictment was the July 2002 distribution alleged in Count II. We noted that the Count II § 841(b)(1)(C) offense . . ., in contrast to the § 841(b)(1)(A) predicate in Williams, `provides for no mandatory minimum' sentence. 577 F.3d at 146 (quoting United States v. Pressley, 469 F.3d 63, 64 (2d Cir.2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1297, 127 S.Ct. 1859, 167 L.Ed.2d 349 (2007) (emphasis in Parker )). Accordingly, Parker's predicate drug-trafficking crime provide[d] for no `greater minimum sentence,' 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), than that mandated by § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Parker, 577 F.3d at 146. Although a different count of the indictment in Parker, Count V, alleged a drug offense in April-May 2002 that did carry a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years, the Count V offense was not alleged to be a predicate offense for the § 924(c) firearms offense. We stated that [a]s Williams observed, the `except' clause is not unbounded, and we held that it applie[d] only to `minimum sentences for predicate statutory offenses arising from the same criminal transaction or operative set of facts. ' Parker, 577 F.3d at 147 (quoting Williams, 558 F.3d at 171 (emphasis in Parker )). We concluded that because the indictment did not allege, and the jury did not find, that the weapon Parker possessed was carried in furtherance of the April-May offense alleged in Count V, the district court's statutory obligation under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) to sentence Parker to a minimum 120-month prison term on Count V did not relieve it of its statutory obligation under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) to sentence Parker to a consecutive 60-month prison term on Count I for the drug offense detailed in Count II. 577 F.3d at 147. In the present case, count twelve of the indictment charged Payne with using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to the drug offenses charged in counts ten and eleven, to wit, conspiracy to distribute, and distribution of, cocaine. The jury, after being instructed that it could not convict Payne of the firearms offense unless it first found him guilty on one or both of those drug counts, found him guilty on both drug counts and on the firearms count. As the drug trafficking crimes in the count ten and count eleven predicate offenses for Payne's § 924(c)(1)(A) conviction carried mandatory minimum prison terms of 10 years, and the mandatory minimum prison term imposed on Payne on the firearms count pursuant to § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) was 10 years, the mandatory minimums provided for the drug offenses were the same as, not greater than, the 10-year firearms sentence. Accordingly, the except clause of § 924(c)(1)(A) was not triggered by the mandatory minimums provided for Payne's narcotics offenses. Payne argues, however, that by reason of his convictions on the murder-in-aid-of-racketeering counts he was subject to mandatory minimum prison terms greater than the 10 years to which he was sentenced under § 924(c)(1)(A) because 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1) carries a mandatory minimum sentence of life in prison, United States v. James, 239 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir.2000) ( James ). cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1000, 121 S.Ct. 1668, 149 L.Ed.2d 648 (2001). Under the principle established in Parker, however, § 924(c)(1)(A)'s except clause does not encompass those counts in this case because murder in aid of racketeering was neither alleged nor found to be a predicate offense for Payne's firearms offense. Accordingly, we see no error, plain or otherwise, in the district court's imposition on Payne of a mandatory consecutive prison term pursuant to § 924(c)(1)(A). And were we to find error, we would be bound to conclude that the plain-error test is not met: Given that the firearms sentence is not to begin until Payne has completed his life, the 10-year sentence does not affect his substantial rights.