Opinion ID: 166022
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Integrity, Fairness, or Public Reputation of Judicial Proceedings

Text: 63 An appellate court has discretion to correct an error not preserved at trial when the error affects the integrity, fairness, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 736. This inquiry is independent from our analysis of whether a plain error affects a defendant's substantial rights. Id. The burden to satisfy this fourth prong of plain error analysis is on the defendant. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. This Court has identified three non-exclusive factors that guide the exercise of this discretion to correct constitutional Booker errors that are plain. United States v. Clifton, 406 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2005). First, if the underlying right is constitutional, we are more likely to conclude that a remand would be appropriate. See Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1178; see also Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 743 (Ebel, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing that failing to correct a constitutional plain error is much more likely to cast judicial proceedings in disrespect). Second, if the defendant challenged the factual basis of the judicial findings that affected his substantial rights, this weighs in favor of a remand. Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1178. Third, the magnitude of the difference between the sentence authorized by a jury's verdict or a plea of guilty and the sentence permitted after mandatory judicial fact finding affects whether or not we should correct the error. Id. at 1178-79. 64 All three of these factors suggest that a remand would be appropriate in Mr. Hauk's case. First, the error in his sentence is the type of constitutional error identified by the Booker merits majority as a violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. To leave an erroneous sentence intact after acknowledging that it was calculated through constitutionally suspect means could reflect poorly on the public reputation of the judiciary. Second, Mr. Hauk vigorously contested the factual basis of the enhancements that increased his sentence. Cf. United States v. Maldonado-Ramires, 384 F.3d 1228, 1231 n. 1 (10th Cir.2004) (holding that a Blakely violation is not plain error when the defendant did not dispute the court's factual findings, even if the court had discretion to reduce the sentence). Where a defendant acquiesces to the district court's findings of fact that support an enhancement with little or no objection, leaving the resulting plain error uncorrected poses little risk to the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings. United States v. Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672 (10th Cir.2005). However, when a defendant vigorously contests a factual finding that leads to a mandatory enhancement there is a much stronger argument for exercising our discretion to correct the error. Mr. Hauk's emphatic argument, that the offense to which he pleaded guilty was not part of a joint criminal enterprise with Mr. Starns, weighs in favor of remand. 65 Finally, we consider whether the mandatory application of judge-found facts substantially increased Mr. Hauk's sentence. This depends, in part, on whether we give Mr. Hauk credit for acceptance of responsibility, as the district court did. This Circuit has not decided whether adjustment for acceptance of responsibility is deemed to be judicial fact-finding for purposes of Booker; however, the outcome of Mr. Hauk's case does not depend on the answer to that question. With or without credit for acceptance of responsibility, the judge-found facts violated Mr. Hauk's Sixth Amendment rights, and they exposed him to a substantial increase in punishment. 66 The effect of the judge-found facts was to increase the bottom of the applicable sentencing range by either 30 or 56 months, depending on whether Mr. Hauk is credited with acceptance of responsibility. While these increases are not as large as the ten years the Supreme Court called very serious in Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 751, this is a substantial amount of prison time. Cf. Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1179 (calling a 20-level enhancement based on judicial fact finding sizable). Moreover, the district court sentenced Mr. Hauk at the bottom of the Guidelines range, which suggests that had the district court fully considered the tenuous nature of the evidence supporting the enhancements, Mr. Hauk might not have received these two and a half to almost five additional years of incarceration. Cf. United States v. Lawrence, 405 F.3d 888, 907 (10th Cir.2005) (citing the district court's imposition of a sentence two months above the bottom of the Guidelines range as evidence that constitutional Booker error had no effect on the defendant's sentence). We therefore conclude that failing to correct the plain error in Mr. Hauk's sentence would affect the integrity, fairness, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, and we exercise our discretion to remand his case for resentencing. 67 In doing so, we do not mean to suggest that the district court ought to reach a different conclusion on remand, but only that, in light of Booker, it should have the opportunity to resentence Mr. Hauk under the new, non-mandatory Guidelines regime.