Opinion ID: 1301576
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Religious Freedom under the Wisconsin Constitution

Text: ¶ 56 Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution was included as part of Wisconsin's original constitution in 1848. [24] It provides as follows: Freedom of worship; liberty of conscience; state religion; public funds. Section 18. The right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship; nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries. ¶ 57 As with any document, the interpretive task is to ascertain its true intent and meaning. State v. Beno, 116 Wis.2d 122, 136-37, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984). The authoritative, and usually final, indicator of the meaning of a provision is the textthe actual words used. [25] See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 44, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (discussing statutory interpretation). ¶ 58 The text here contains several clauses applying in different factual scenarios. It contains two clauses referring to the rights of conscience (the Freedom of Conscience Clauses), which we understand to refer generally to the exercise of religious freedom. [26] The main right protected is to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of conscience. This right is accorded to every person. By logical extension and as affirmed by the Supreme Court with respect to First Amendment rights ( see Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1167), individuals also have the right to practice their religious faith in groups, as collections of individuals, and to form houses of worship and faith-based organizations committed to achieving their faith-based ends. ¶ 59 The Wisconsin Constitution uses the strongest possible language in the protection of this right. It provides that the right to worship as one is so convinced shall never be infringed. It goes even further, stating, nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted. It is difficult to conceive of language being stronger than this. The question is, how do these strong prohibitions on state government apply here? ¶ 60 This court has stated that Article I, Section 18 serves the same dual purposes as the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 55 Wis.2d 316, 332, 198 N.W.2d 650 (1972). However, we have also recognized that these provisions, though sharing some similarities with the federal provisions, are not the same. State v. Miller, 202 Wis.2d 56, 63-66, 549 N.W.2d 235 (1996). The protections and prohibitions in the Wisconsin Constitution are far more specific. And with regard to the rights of conscience, this clause contains extremely strong language, providing expansive protections for religious liberty. Thus, we are not limited to current First Amendment jurisprudence when interpreting our own constitutional protections for religious liberty; rather, we are required to give effect to the more explicit guarantees set forth in our state constitution. Id. at 65-66, 549 N.W.2d 235. ¶ 61 When faced with a claim that a state law violates an individual or organization's freedom of conscience, we have generally applied the compelling state interest/least restrictive alternative test. Id. at 66, 549 N.W.2d 235. Under this test, the religious organization has to prove (1) that it has a sincerely held religious belief, and (2) that such belief is burdened by the application of the state law at issue. Upon this showing, the burden shifts to the state to prove (3) that the law is based upon a compelling state interest (4) that cannot be served by a less restrictive alternative. Id. ¶ 62 This analysisthough appropriate in most circumstances [27] regarding laws burdening the rights of conscience is not helpful here. The law at issue in this case is not simply a burden on an individual's or organization's religious beliefs; it is an effort by the state to intrude into the hiring and firing decisions of a religious organization. As we have previously stated, Article I, Section 18 operate[s] as a perpetual bar to the state from the infringement, control, or interference with the rights of conscience. State ex rel. Weiss v. Dist. Bd. of Sch.-Dist. No. 8 of City of Edgerton, 76 Wis. 177, 210-11, 44 N.W. 967 (1890). ¶ 63 No one could legitimately claim, for example, that the state's compelling interest in prohibiting racial discrimination (and a law narrowly tailored to doing precisely that) would allow the state to adjudicate a race discrimination claim in the selection of a religious leader such as a priest, pastor, rabbi, imam, etc. There is no weighing of the state's interest or examination of whether the law is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. The state simply has no authority to control or interfere with the selection of spiritual leaders of a religious organization with a religious mission. The text of our constitution states that the state cannot do itat all. The main inquiry is not how important the right in question is, but whether the law is controlling or interfering with religious freedom. ¶ 64 By analogy, the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides: Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. U.S. Const. amend. XIII. We think it inconceivable that one might conclude slavery can exist in the United States as long as the state has a compelling interest. The text is clearslavery is not allowed. ¶ 65 We do not mean to suggest that anything interfering with a religious organization is totally prohibited. General laws related to building licensing, taxes, social security, and the like are normally acceptable. Similarly, employment discrimination laws applying to employees who are not in positions that are important and closely linked to the religious mission of a religious organization also do not rise to the level of control or interference with the free exercise of religion. ¶ 66 The Wisconsin Constitution, with its specific and expansive language, provides much broader protections for religious liberty than the First Amendment. Miller, 202 Wis.2d at 64, 549 N.W.2d 235. We need not explore the outer boundaries of those protections here. But it is clear that the Wisconsin Constitution provides at least the protections contained in the First Amendment as outlined earlier in this opinion. ¶ 67 Thus, the state may not interfere with the hiring or firing decisions of religious organizations with a religious mission with respect to employees who are important and closely linked to that mission. These employees are ministerial. With respect to these ministerial employees, laws such as the WFEA constitute an impermissible effort to control or interfere with the organization's rights of conscience in violation of Article I, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution. [28]