Opinion ID: 3157591
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Plain View Exception Justified Seizing the Laptop

Text: Â¶19Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Under the plain view exception, a warrantless seizure of a container is reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes if police observed the container in plain view and if the seizure satisfies three requirements: (1) the police were lawfully in the position from which they viewed the container, (2) the incriminating nature of the container was immediately apparent, and (3) the police had a lawful right of access to the container. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993); People v. Koehn, 178 P.3d 536, 537 (Colo. 2008). Â¶20Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The trial court found, and Swietlicki concedes, that the first and third requirements were satisfied but decided that the incriminating nature of the laptop was not immediately apparent. We disagree.
Â¶21Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Both Swietlicki and, to a lesser extent, the trial court emphasize the phrase âimmediately apparentâ in analyzing plain view. Thus, before turning to the merits, we take this opportunity to clarify the âimmediately apparentâ language first enunciated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (plurality opinion), and frequentlyÂ reiterated in our plain view cases. A naked reading of this phrase could fairly lead to the conclusion that, for the incriminating nature of an object to be âimmediately apparent,â the seizing officer must experience a split-second revelationâa product not of thought but of reflexâin which he knows, at the moment he lays eyes upon the object, that the object is incriminating. But more than three decades of jurisprudence conclusively forecloses such an interpretation. Â¶22Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Instead, the Supreme Court has long equated this language to probable cause. E.g., Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375. We have done the same. E.g., Herrera, Â¶ 26, 357 P.3d at 1231. More specifically, what has been required is that the seizing officer have âprobable cause to associate the item with criminal activity without conducting a further search.â People v. Glick, 250 P.3d 578, 585 (Colo. 2011); accord Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375; United States v. Gordon, 741 F.3d 64, 71 (10th Cir. 2014). See also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment Â§ 4.11(d), at 1028 (5th ed. 2012) (âIt must be emphasized that the âimmediately apparentâ requirement relates only to probable cause, not certainty. That is, if the police are able to establish probable cause that the object is a fruit, instrumentality or evidence of a crime without [searching it], this is all that is required . . . .â). Â¶23Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In Texas v. Brown, the Court explicitly disapproved contrary interpretations, noting first that âthe use of the phrase âimmediately apparentâ was very likely an unhappy choice of words, since it can be taken to imply that an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminatory character of evidence is necessary,â before holding that probable cause is all that the âimmediately apparentâ prong requires. 460 U.S. 730, 741â42 (1983) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted); id. at 748â50 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (agreeing that probable cause is the applicable standard). Â¶24Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Even before Brown was announced, this court arrived at the same conclusion, stating that the immediately apparent requirement âclearly implies that justification for the warrantless seizure is nothing more and nothing less than probable cause to believe that the article to be seized is connected with criminal behavior.â People v. Franklin, 640 P.2d 226, 229 (Colo. 1982). Over time, we have retained the âimmediately apparentâ language and added the interchangeable term âreasonable beliefâ to the mix. See, e.g., People v. Alameno, 193 P.3d 830, 834 (Colo. 2008) (â[P]olice must have had a reasonable belief that the evidence seized was incriminating. This . . . requirement is met if the incriminating nature was âimmediately apparentâ to the officer, which means that the officer had probable cause to associate the item with criminal activity without conducting a further search.â (citing People v. Pitts, 13 P.3d 1218, 1222 (Colo. 2000))). Nonetheless, the clear import of our plain view cases is that the âimmediately apparentâ requirement of the plain view exception means nothing more than the police must possess probable cause without conducting a further search. See, e.g., Herrera, Â¶ 26, 357 P.3d at 1231; People v. Brant, 252 P.3d 459, 464 (Colo. 2011); Glick, 250 P.3d at 585; People v. Smith, 13 P.3d 300, 308 (Colo. 2000); People v. Dumas, 955 P.2d 60, 64 n.9 (Colo. 1998). Â¶25Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In sum, the second prong of the plain view exception requires only that the seizing officer have probable cause to associate the object with criminal activity withoutÂ conducting a further search. Neither the âimmediately apparentâ nor âreasonable beliefâ phrasing carries independent meaning.
Â¶26Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â We now consider whether Deputy Clauss had probable cause in this case. The trial court determined that Deputy Clauss lacked probable cause to seize Swietlickiâs laptop. The People argue the fellow officer rule imputed the policeâs collective knowledge to Clauss and that such collective knowledge established probable cause. We agree with the People.
Â¶27Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â âThe fellow officer rule provides that a law enforcement officer who does not personally possess a sufficient basis to [take action] nevertheless may do so if (1) he acts at the direction [of] or as a result of communications with another officer, and (2) the police as a whole possess a sufficient basis to [take the action].â People v. Arias, 159 P.3d 134, 139 (Colo. 2007); see also Grassi v. People, 2014 CO 12, Â¶ 13, 320 P.3d 332, 336 (â[T]he fellow officer rule operates to impute information that the police possess as a whole to an individual officer.â). The rule âallow[s] law enforcement agencies to work together as a team,â Arias, 159 P.3d at 139, and âreflects the ârealities of modern police work,â . . . recognizing that different officers who perform distinct duties are nevertheless working collaboratively in the same case,â Grassi, Â¶ 17, 320 P.3d at 337 (quoting People v. Hazelhurst, 662 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Colo. 1983)). When the scope of an investigation expands to include officers not at the scene of an alleged crime, the ruleÂ âoperates to integrate those outside officers and make them part of the coordinated investigation.â Id. at Â¶ 14, 320 P.3d at 336. Â¶28Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â We have applied the fellow officer rule to find probable cause for (1) an arrest, Hazelhurst, 662 P.2d at 1086â87, (2) a search warrant, People v. Reed, 56 P.3d 96, 100 (Colo. 2002), and (3) a blood draw, Grassi, Â¶Â¶ 23â24, 31, 320 P.3d at 338, 340. We see no reason why it should not apply to plain view seizures too. See id. at Â¶ 15 n.7, 320 P.3d at 336 n.7 (noting that the fellow officer rule applies equally to arrests and searches â[because] both scenarios require probable causeâ); Arias, 159 P.2d at 139 (stating generally that â[t]he fellow officer rule may be used to find . . . probable causeâ); see also People v. Jauch, 2013 COA 127, Â¶ 36, __ P.3d __ (finding âno principled reasonâ to exclude plain view seizures from the scope of the fellow officer rule). 5 Â¶29Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Turning to the facts of this case, then, the fellow officer rule provided Deputy Clauss with probable cause to seize Swietlickiâs laptop if (1) he acted at the direction of or as a result of communications with another officer, and (2) the police as a whole possessed probable cause to seize the laptop. Arias, 159 P.2d at 139. The first requirement is clearly established here. Clauss called the Colorado officers, was told to seize the laptop, and then seized itâthis sequence of events epitomizes âact[ing] at the direction [of] or as a result of communications with another officer.â See id. Â¶30Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Swietlickiâs appeal to the âpursuant to a coordinated investigationâ alternative phrasing of the first prong in Grassi does not change our conclusion. See Grassi, Â¶ 21, 320 P.3d at 338 (â[T]he fellow officer rule imputes information . . . if (1) [the] officer acts pursuant to a coordinated investigation . . . .â). For one, Grassi explicitly couples the two phrases: the requirement that an officer act âat the direction [of] or as a result of communications with another officerâ simply âensur[es] that he acted pursuant to a coordinated investigation.â Id. at Â¶ 15, 320 P.3d at 336 (first alteration in original). And for another, even if more were required, the record here would suffice. After Deputy Jorgenson contacted him, Deputy Clauss located several of Swietlickiâs relatives, conducted surveillance on multiple residences, gathered and analyzed information to form the opinion that Saegert was the relative most likely to be harboring Swietlicki, and then found and arrested Swietlicki. These facts refute Swietlickiâs contention that Clauss âwas not involved in the investigationâ and more than satisfy the first prong of the fellow officer rule. Â¶31Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Because the first requirement was met, the fellow officer rule justified Deputy Claussâs plain view seizure of the laptop so long as the police as a whole had probable cause to associate the laptop with criminal activity. We now consider whether they did.
Â¶32Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â A prolonged warrantless seizure of a closed container is unreasonable unless police have âprobable cause to believe that [the] container holds [or itself is] contraband or evidence of a crime.â See Place, 462 U.S. at 701. âProbable cause is a flexible standard deriving from a common sense concept of reasonableness.â People v. Grazier, 992 P.2d 1149, 1153 (Colo. 2000). Because â[p]robability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment,â Gall, 30 P.3d at 149, probable cause is measured not by âa âmore likely true than falseâ level of certitude,â but by a âcommonÂ­sense, nontechnical standard of reasonable cause to believe,â People v. Melgosa, 753 P.2d 221, 225 (Colo. 1988) (quoting Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 (plurality opinion)). It is determined based on an objective assessment of the totality of the facts and circumstances known at the time of the seizure. See People v. Coates, 266 P.3d 397, 400 (Colo. 2011); Grazier, 992 P.2d at 1154. Based on this assessment, there must be âa fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.â See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Â¶33Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Before the seizure in this case, J.M. disclosed that Swietlicki (1) had been sexually assaulting her for approximately four years, beginning when she was eight years old and ending about two months before the seizure of the computer; (2) sometimesÂ showed her child pornography on his desktop and laptop computers during the assaults; and (3) used a âblack and gray flash driveâ to transfer the pornography from the desktop to the laptop so the pornography could be viewed in different locations. The trial court found J.M.âs statements reliable. Â¶34Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â These facts supplied probable cause to believe child pornography would be found on Swietlickiâs laptop in Colorado. See United States v. Vallimont, 378 F. Appâx 972, 974 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (finding that child-victimâs statements that defendant had child pornography on his computer supplied probable cause to believe the computer held child pornography). And Swietlicki does not argue to the contrary. It is illegal to possess child pornography. Â§ 18-6-403(3)(b.5), C.R.S. (2015); see also 18 U.S.C. Â§ 2252 (2012); Wis. Stat. Â§ 948.12 (2015). Â¶35Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The question, then, is whether this probable cause remained sufficient to seize a laptop belonging to Swietlicki that was located not in Colorado, but in Wisconsin. See People v. Kerst, 181 P.3d 1167, 1172 (Colo. 2008) (explaining, in the context of assessing the affidavit underlying a warrant, that probable cause requires a nexus between the âcriminal activity, the things to be seized, and the place [where the things are found]â). We conclude it did. Â¶36Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Unlike the trial court, we do not view the officersâ lack of a physical description of the laptop or their inability to conclusively prove the laptop came from Colorado as precluding probable cause. At the time of the seizure, in addition to J.M.âs disclosures, police had the following information: (1) the laptop in Wisconsin belonged to Swietlicki, (2) the laptop on which J.M. viewed child pornography was missing from SwietlickiâsÂ Colorado residence, (3) Swietlickiâs desktop computer had been wiped clean, (4) Swietlicki had asked J.M.âs mother to send him pictures of the room off the garage, and (5) Swietlicki had limited disposable funds. Â¶37Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â These facts support a fair probability that child pornography would be found on the laptop in Wisconsin. First, this information supplied âreasonable cause to believeâ the Wisconsin laptop and Colorado laptop were one and the same. See Melgosa, 753 P.2d at 225. Police knew the Wisconsin laptop belonged to Swietlicki and that the laptop he had possessed in Colorado was missing from his Colorado residence. They also knew Swietlickiâs only source of income was unemployment disbursementsâa fact that suggests he had limited disposable funds with which to purchase a new computer. Although it is possible that Swietlicki bought a new laptop between his flight from Colorado and the seizure in Wisconsin, the alternative possibility that he simply brought the Colorado laptop with him reflects a more âcommon-sense conclusion[] about human behavior.â See People v. Crippen, 223 P.3d 114, 117 (Colo. 2010) (explaining that the concept of probable cause is founded on such conclusions). Â¶38Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Second, police reasonably could have believed Swietlicki had not removed child pornography from his laptop prior to the time it was seized. Swietlickiâs actions in wiping clean his desktop computer and asking for photographs of the room off the garage suggest he had attempted to quickly remove incriminating materials from Colorado before taking flight. Taking the laptop with him to Wisconsin would have furthered this objective without necessitating the immediate deletion of files from the laptop itself. Moreover, we agree with the People that the nature of the suspectedÂ criminal activityâpossession of child pornographyâsupplements the reasonableness of such a belief. See id. at 118 (explaining that the question of whether information supporting probable cause has become stale must account for factors including âthe nature of the criminal activity at issueâ). The Tenth Circuit, for instance, has repeatedly noted that âcommon sense and the casesâ support the observation that possessors of child pornography hoard and rarely dispose of their materials because the illegality of and social stigma surrounding such materials make them difficult to obtain. See, e.g., United States v. Burkhart, 602 F.3d 1202, 1206â07 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Potts, 586 F.3d 823, 828â29, 830 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1205â 06 (10th Cir. 2008). 6 Although insufficient on its own, this recognized propensity is theÂ type of âpractical consideration[]â that may be accounted for in ascertaining probable cause. See Mendez v. People, 986 P.2d 275, 280 (Colo. 1999). Â¶39Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Based on our objective assessment of the facts and circumstances known at the time of the seizure, we conclude that the seizure of Swietlickiâs laptop was supported by probable cause. We further conclude that the fellow officer rule imputed knowledge of this probable cause to Deputy Clauss. Since Clauss observed the laptop in plain view from a lawful vantage point, had probable cause to believe the laptop was associated with criminal activity, and had a lawful right of access to the laptop, the plain view exception rendered his warrantless seizure of the laptop reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.