Opinion ID: 1428253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bills of Attainder

Text: The same constitutional sections prohibiting ex post facto legislation also prohibit bills of attainder. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; Const. art. I, § 23. This constitutional protection prohibit[s] legislatures from singling out disfavored persons and meting out summary punishment for past conduct. State v. Hennings, 129 Wash.2d 512, 527, 919 P.2d 580 (1996) (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1497, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994)). A statute violates this constitutional protection if it singles out named individuals or an easily ascertainable group and inflicts punishment without a judicial trial. Id. Legislation does not rise to the level of a bill of attainder if it merely requires a defined group to `bear burdens which the individual or group dislikes....' State v. Manussier, 129 Wash.2d 652, 666, 921 P.2d 473 (1996) (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 470, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977)). The 1994 and 1997 amendments to RCW 9.94A.142 are not bills of attainder because, as discussed above, they do not inflict punishment. The amendments may be burdensome, but do not add to a defendant's punishment as originally imposed by the sentencing court. Restitution was imposed in 1987, and the amendments do not alter the original obligation. See Hennings, 129 Wash.2d at 527, 919 P.2d 580 (finding an amendment to the restitution statute does not inflict punishment because [r]estitution was already required under the SRA, RCW 9.94A.142.).