Opinion ID: 2815243
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sex-abuse Convictions

Text: First, the State argues that the district court improperly granted Gabaree relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to his sex-abuse convictions. The State asserts that the state court reasonably concluded that counsel’s purported reasons not to object to the testimony of Drs. Kelly and Sisk were part of a reasonable trial strategy. Thus, the State concludes, the district court improperly rejected the state court’s conclusions and failed to defer to the state court’s decision under § 2254. We separately will discuss each Strickland factor. -8-
Under the first part of the Strickland test, we review whether the performance of Gabaree’s attorney “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” keeping in mind that “counsel’s function . . . is to make the adversarial testing process work.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 690. Our review is “highly deferential” to counsel’s performance, and we determine whether counsel’s conduct was reasonable based on “the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Id. at 689–90. We are in an awkward posture in this case because counsel was unable to remember her trial strategy or her rationale for any decision made during the trial. Thus, as we have done in this situation in the past, “we will examine counsel’s trial tactics and strategy as revealed by the state court record because that record best reflects ‘counsel’s perspective at the time.’” Fretwell v. Norris, 133 F.3d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see Paul v. United States, 534 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 2008). Though counsel in this case repeated that she had no memory of the case, she gave possible reasons for her decisions regarding the testimony of the two doctors. Thus, as the district court did, we will consider her proposed tactics and strategy, in conjunction with the state court record, so that we may best perceive “counsel’s perspective at the time.” Fretwell, 133 F.3d at 624 (quotation omitted).5 The state court first concluded that counsel gave sufficient possible reasons why she might not have objected to the testimony of Dr. Kelly, crediting her belief 5 We acknowledge the dissent’s concern about basing habeas relief “on little more than trial counsel’s inability to recall why certain instantaneous decisions were made.” (Dissenting Opinion, infra, slip op. at 17.) But it is not counsel’s inability to recall the reasons for her decisions that warrants relief in this case—nor could it be, for that would violate the presumption that the attorney has performed reasonably. See Fretwell, 133 F.3d at 624. Rather, it is what we can discern from the state record reasonably could have been counsel’s strategy, and the unreasonable nature of that strategy, that convinces us that relief is appropriate. See id. -9- that she did not want to call attention to the testimony. The court also recognized, as counsel had testified in the post-conviction hearing, that she simply may have missed the objectionable testimony. Nonetheless, the state court ruled that, because counsel “identified reasons why she might have chosen not to object as a matter of trial strategy[,] and the record does not conclusively establish that such a strategic decision would have been unreasonable” (emphasis added), Gabaree could not overcome the presumption that counsel’s purported strategic reasons for not objecting were reasonable. The district court rejected the state court’s rationale and concluded that “in this context,” in which the only inculpating evidence was the inconsistent testimony of the girls, counsel’s putative strategy not to draw attention to Dr. Kelly’s corroboration of the girls was unreasonable. We agree with the district court that, in the context of this case, the state court’s application of Strickland is unreasonable. The main evidence against Gabaree on these counts was the testimony of the girls; there was no medical evidence nor eyewitness accounts to support their testimony. And the girls’ testimony was inconsistent: The second trial was ordered because, the state post-conviction court decided, the State’s case was weak and based predominately on the believability of the two young girls, who had recanted their allegations. Faced with this situation, we do not think it reasonable not to object when an expert witness tells the jury he believed the girls were truthful when speaking with a different doctor. Dr. Kelly’s testimony, in fact, was inadmissible bolstering of other witnesses (the girls) and, as the state court recognized, should have been excluded after a proper objection. See Olesen v. Class, 164 F.3d 1096, 1102 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding that counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to object to psychologist’s opinion that child–victim would not have fabricated sexual-assault allegations); State v. Churchill, 98 S.W.3d 536, 539 (Mo. banc 2003) (noting that trial courts must reject expert testimony “concerning a specific victim’s credibility as to whether they have been abused . . . because it usurps the decision-making function of the jury”). Yet counsel did not object to this statement “very possibly” because she “just missed it.” Given -10- the weak nature of the case, and Dr. Kelly’s improper opinion on the contested issue of the girls’ credibility, not objecting to avoid highlighting this inadmissible testimony, if counsel heard the testimony at all, would not be objectively reasonable trial strategy. The state court also concluded that Dr. Sisk’s testimony was inadmissable propensity evidence but ruled that counsel’s purported strategy not to highlight the damning testimony was not unreasonable. The state court also found reasonable counsel’s other possible strategy of “arguing away” Dr. Sisk’s testimony by characterizing his opinion as only a suggestion, in a “complicated, ‘I am a doctor’ sort of way,” that Gabaree needed parenting classes and counsel’s worry that objecting to or impeaching Dr. Sisk’s testimony would reveal that there had been an earlier trial. The district court again concluded that counsel’s trial strategy was unreasonable. The court noted counsel’s failure to recognize, at the evidentiary hearing, that Dr. Sisk’s testimony was inadmissible and her failure to interpret the testimony as harmful. Moreover, the court pointed out, counsel did not employ her supposed strategy of arguing away Dr. Sisk’s opinion. Last, the court found no reason why objecting would have revealed to the jury that there had been an earlier trial. We again agree with the district court. Dr. Sisk testified that Gabaree, if he was following the beliefs he expressed to Dr. Sisk, was “probably abusing or neglecting the children,” including by using them to meet his sexual needs. Like Dr. Kelly’s testimony, Dr. Sisk’s opinion improperly concluded for the jury that Gabaree had acted on his expressed beliefs and sexually abused his children. His testimony, with proper objection, would have been excluded. See United States v. Johnson, 439 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2006) (concluding that sexually explicit stories written by defendant should have been excluded from trial for possession of child pornography because stories improperly suggested his propensity to possess child pornography); Gabaree, 290 S.W.3d at 181 (“Because Dr. Sisk’s testimony about Mr. Gabaree’s beliefs constituted propensity evidence, it was not admissible.”) -11- Moreover, the state court’s conclusions regarding Dr. Sisk have no support in the record. First, counsel said she did not want to highlight Dr. Sisk’s testimony. Yet the record from the state court reveals that she did just that: On cross-examination she elicited additional statements from Dr. Sisk that bolstered his testimony, including that he did not believe someone would answer his questionnaire as Gabaree had and yet not abuse his children. This is not in line with a strategy to ignore the testimony—even if that strategy might be reasonable under some circumstances—and by itself could establish deficient performance. See United States v. Villalpando, 259 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court’s conclusion that counsel rendered deficient performance by eliciting from government witness harmful testimony that defendant was “threatening and murderous”). Nor did counsel follow her other purported strategy of recharacterizing Dr. Sisk’s testimony as mere doctor’s advice. Counsel mentioned neither doctor nor their testimony during her closing argument and said nothing to suggest that Dr. Sisk’s testimony related only to Gabaree’s need for parenting classes. We cannot impute to counsel a trial strategy that the record reveals she did not follow. See Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 871 (9th Cir. 2003); Griffin v. Warden, 970 F.2d 1355, 1358–59 (4th Cir. 1992). Last, counsel’s ancillary worry about revealing the earlier trial also is unreasonable. Nothing in the record suggests she could not have objected to Dr. Sisk’s testimony without mentioning the first trial. The state court’s determination of counsel’s strategic decisions thus “resembles more a post hoc rationalization of counsel’s conduct than an accurate description of [her] deliberations.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 526–27 (2003). Because the state court’s conclusions rely on this unreasonable determination of the facts, § 2254(d) does not require that we adhere to that court’s decision on this issue, and our review is de novo. See Rice v. White, 660 F.3d 242, 257 (6th Cir. 2011); Jones v. Walker, 540 F.3d 1277, 1288 & n.5 (11th Cir. 2008); Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1008 (9th Cir. 2004). We conclude that, unlike in Fretwell, and based on the state-court record in this case, there was no reasonable strategic reason for counsel not to object to the testimony of Dr. Sisk. -12- Though we apply a strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably, the state court record belies that presumption and reveals no reasonable strategic reason not to object to either doctor’s testimony. Nor do we believe that counsel’s possible “trial tactics and strategy,” even if in line with what counsel proposed they might have been, were reasonable. We thus conclude that the state court’s determination that counsel’s performance met professional norms involves an unreasonable application of Strickland and is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Counsel’s performance, we conclude, was objectively unreasonable.
Under the second factor of Strickland, we review whether counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Gabaree; that is, we must determine whether Gabaree has shown “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The state court, however, did not conduct this analysis and instead determined only that counsel had not performed deficiently. Thus, our review is not constrained by § 2254(d), and we review the question of prejudice de novo. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005); Worthington v. Roper, 631 F.3d 487, 495 (8th Cir. 2011). Based on our review of the doctors’ testimony, we agree with the district court that Gabaree suffered prejudice. The doctors’ inadmissible testimony strengthened an otherwise very weak case. Dr. Kelly told the jury that he believed the girls were credible despite never having discussed with them their allegations of sexual abuse. That statement improperly bolstered the credibility of the girls, which was a central issue in the trial. Dr. Sisk testified that, because Gabaree had answered questionnaires in a certain way, he likely acted in accordance with those answers and sexually abused his children, a conclusion that counsel helped bolster with her cross-examination. This testimony improperly drew a conclusion about Gabaree’s actions that was the jury’s to make. Because counsel did not object to these -13- inadmissible statements, the jury entered deliberations with the impression that the doctors’ testimony was credible, correct, and incontestable. Absent the doctors’ testimony, there was little evidence against Gabaree with respect to the sex-abuse charges. The State presented no medical evidence and no independent eyewitness accounts of sexual abuse. The testimony of the young girls was conflicting and inconsistent. As the district court noted, the doctors’ testimony improperly “shored up” the weaknesses in the State’s case. By not challenging that testimony, counsel failed “to make the adversarial testing process work.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Had counsel performed effectively, we believe, there is a reasonable chance that the outcome of the trial would have been different. We thus conclude that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance regarding the charges of sodomy and child molestation.