Opinion ID: 792539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Officer Vidal's Sweep of the Second Bedroom

Text: 23 In entering the second bedroom, Vidal was aware of significant facts that justified his belief that he needed to follow Miller [f]or safety. Tr. at 24. Vidal knew that (1) Miller had made a specific threat to shoot Newkirk in the head; (2) Newkirk had taken the threat seriously and obtained an order of protection; (3) this was a domestic dispute in which the emotions that triggered the threat might resurface; and (4) Miller had expressed suspicion that Newkirk might take [his] stuff while moving out of the apartment. In light of these specific facts and the inferences a reasonable officer might draw from them—namely, that Miller might use unsupervised time in the second bedroom to obtain a weapon—it was reasonable for Vidal to conclude that if Miller entered the second bedroom alone, he might pose a threat to those on the scene. 4 See Martins, 413 F.3d at 150 (explaining that there was reasonable suspicion to justify a Buie sweep in a non-arrest context when the inference of danger was much more real and immediate than a generic fear); cf. United States v. Waldner, 425 F.3d 514, 517 (8th Cir.2005) (holding that a protective sweep exceeded its permissible scope under the Fourth Amendment when an officer entered [a] room based upon his belief that [an individual being served with a protective order] might go there to get a firearm even though the individual had not entered the room and was five to ten feet from the room when [the officer] entered); Gandia, 424 F.3d at 264 (determining that officers lacked specific articulable facts to justify a search, because they looked in an adjoining room to which [defendant] had no ready access). When Miller entered the second bedroom, the danger and imminence of ambush then dramatically increased, justifying the [brief] `sweep.' Gould, 364 F.3d at 589. Vidal did not engage in a sweep of areas inaccessible to Miller for the purpose of ferreting out secreted firearms, cf. Waldner, 425 F.3d at 517; Gandia, 424 F.3d at 264, but rather, followed Miller—about whom Vidal had an objectively reasonable fear—to ensure the safety of everyone on the scene. 24 The protective sweep that Vidal conducted was limited. It amounted to following Miller into the second bedroom and watching him briefly. When Miller immediately left the room, Vidal followed him and thereupon caught sight of a firearm in plain view inside an open closet as he walked out of the room. This quick and unobtrusive search was narrowly tailored to dispel the threat that Miller would have posed by being in the second bedroom alone. Consequently, we conclude that Vidal did not violate Miller's Fourth Amendment rights by entering the second bedroom. 25 On appeal, Miller does not dispute the application of the plain view doctrine to the discovery of the shotgun in the closet. When inside the second bedroom, Vidal saw a shotgun in the open closet and lawfully seized it pursuant to the plain view doctrine. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) (Under [the plain view] doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.). At that point, the officers had a legitimate basis for arresting Miller. Accordingly, the other firearm that Miller turned over and the custodial statements he made thereafter were not the result of unlawful conduct and therefore were not excludable as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804-05, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).