Opinion ID: 2709246
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The August 2002 and December 2002 Promotions

Text: The district court granted summary judgment to the General Board on all of Johnson’s claims regarding the August No. 12-1699 7 2002 and December 2002 promotions because Johnson did not file a timely application to either position, meaning that she could not make a prima facie case of either discrimination or retaliation under Title VII. “[T]he prima facie case for a failure to promote claim … requires that the plaintiff show … she applied for and was qualified for the position sought [and] she was rejected for that position.” Fischer v. Avanade, Inc., 519 F.3d 393, 402 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted); see also Hudson, 375 F.3d at 558–59 (affirming summary judgment for employer where employee did not apply for the position at issue). Johnson admits that she did not apply for the December 2002 position (allegedly because she was discouraged from doing so), but asserts that the timeliness of her application to the August 2002 position was in dispute. We agree with the district court, however, that the record shows beyond reasonable dispute that the position had been filled before August 30, 2002, when Johnson submitted her application. Regardless of the method of proof used, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on claims that Johnson was denied promotions for which she did not apply. B. Discrimination Claims for the March 2001 and January 2003 Promotions Johnson’s claims of discrimination based on the March 2001 and January 2003 promotions were also properly resolved by summary judgment. Johnson presented no direct evidence of discrimination in the district court and has not pursued such a theory on appeal. For a failure-to-promote claim, the indirect method of proof required Johnson to offer evidence that: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she applied for and was qualified for the position sought; (3) she was rejected for 8 No. 12-1699 the position; and (4) the employer promoted someone outside the protected group who was not better qualified than the plaintiff. Grayson v. City of Chicago, 317 F.3d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 2003). We can bypass the question of a prima facie case here, as the district court did. Even if Johnson had sufficient evidence for a prima facie case of discrimination on these two promotions, defendants were entitled to summary judgment. The defendants articulated non-discriminatory reasons for the decisions not to promote Johnson. The General Board and Jung offered evidence that Johnson was not selected for the positions because the hiring officials believed she lacked the leadership and interpersonal skills necessary for the job. Johnson has not presented evidence to counter that explanation and permit a finding of pretext, so summary judgment was properly granted. Jung was named as a defendant only on Johnson’s race discrimination claims under §1981, so dismissing Jung from the lawsuit was also proper. C. Termination Defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on Johnson’s claims of discrimination and retaliation based on her firing in March 2004. Again, Johnson has no direct evidence of racially discriminatory intent, and even if we assume that Johnson could establish a prima facie case, there is no evidence that the stated reason for her termination was a pretext. The General Board asserts that it fired Johnson because she recorded conversations with co-workers without obtaining their consent, in violation of the General Board’s policies and Illinois law. Johnson argues that the Board’s explanation is a No. 12-1699 9 pretext because the Board recorded some employees’ phone calls without their consent for several months. Johnson did not make this argument in opposing summary judgment in the district court, so it is waived on appeal. Pond v. Michelin North America, Inc., 183 F.3d 592, 597 (7th Cir. 1999). However, even if that were not the case, the General Board’s own recording does not suggest that its explanation for terminating Johnson was pretext. The undisputed evidence shows that the General Board’s recording was the accidental result of a computer glitch that took some time to sort out. This conduct is simply not analogous to Johnson’s clandestine and intentional recording of her conversations with co-workers. Defendants were therefore entitled to summary judgment on Johnson’s termination claims. D. Sexual Harassment Johnson’s sexual harassment claim based on seeing one video with nudity on a co-worker’s computer was also properly resolved on summary judgment. The sole alleged incident was not severe enough to support a claim under Title VII. Although a single instance of behavior can give rise to liability if it is sufficiently severe, past cases finding liability for a single incident have involved facts much more severe than those claimed by Johnson. See, e.g., Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 983–84 (7th Cir. 2008) (single instance of sexual assault by a co-worker was sufficiently severe to constitute a hostile work environment: “We have held that assaults within the workplace create an objectively hostile work environment for an employee even when they are isolated.”); Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 808–09 (7th Cir. 2000) (non-consensual violent kiss and attempted unfastening of plaintiff’s bra 10 No. 12-1699 were acts sufficiently severe to create a hostile work environment; the incident presented “overtones of an attempted sexual assault”). Showing Johnson one video containing a momentary display of male nudity does not come close to reaching the required level of severity for a sexual harassment claim. See, e.g., Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 141 F.3d 751, 757-58 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment for employer; circulating a safe-sex cartoon and a photograph of a co-worker with a stripper was not severe enough to support liability). Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted on Johnson’s claim for sexual harassment.