Opinion ID: 2260302
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: contempt parameters on agreements

Text: This leaves us to the resolution of the appeal at No. 01343 Philadelphia, 1986, in which the trial court, under Order dated May 13, 1986, found defendant in contempt and ordered payment of $10,000 forthwith or commitment to jail for 90 days. There is no question this is an appealable Order as a final contempt Order was entered after hearing in compliance with Crislip, supra . The appellant contends the court below erred in holding him in contempt because it ignored a valid defense of inability to pay and that incarceration is not an appropriate sanction for failure to comply with a support agreement. As to the first issue, a thorough review of the record and testimony of the parties leads us to conclude the evidence, presented by appellee as to appellant's ability to pay and that of the appellant in his defense, will not support the contempt finding. There is no contempt in refusing to obey an Order when the alleged contemnor, without fault, is unable to comply with it. Grubb v. Grubb, 326 Pa.Super. 218, 473 A.2d 1060 (1984). To enforce a support agreement through an equity action and decree of specific performance by a finding of contempt and imposition of sanctions which include incarceration, the evidence presented must establish beyond a reasonable doubt the willful non-compliance with the decree of specific performance, despite the ability to do so. The general rule in civil contempt cases is that the complaining party has the burden of proving non-compliance with the court Order (for specific performance) by a preponderance of the evidence, and that present inability to comply is an affirmative defense to be proved by the contemnor. Barrett v. Barrett, 470 Pa. 253, 263, 368 A.2d 616, 621 (1977); In Re Grand Jury, 251 Pa.Super. 43, 53, 379 A.2d 323, 327 (1977). [7] The trial court, in imposing the sanction of immediate payment of $10,000 or commitment for 90 days, heard the evidence concerning appellant's financial circumstances, including changes in those circumstances which would effect his present ability to pay, without giving that evidence any weight. It appears that because appellant voluntarily entered into the agreement and the agreement is valid, as indicated above, the trial court took the position there was little or no change in income from the time of the agreement to the time of the contempt hearing and, therefore, appellant had the ability to pay and would be in willful contempt of the Order if payment was not immediately made. From the trial court Opinion, it is evident the court gave no credence to appellant's testimony. At the outset of the hearing, after finding appellant in contempt, the trial court appeared predisposed to impose sanctions based on a previous finding of Judge Stefan. He properly agreed to go forward with testimony to permit appellant to interpose a defense of inability to pay. It appears the trial court assumed that if income had not substantially changed from the time of the agreement to the time of the contempt hearing, there could be no defense. Appellant maintains there was never adequate income to perform the agreement which was the reason he unilaterally reduced payment, in May 1984, from $800 to $400 per month after approximately six months payment at the $800 level. Thus the fact his income level had not substantially changed, and to some extent appeared to be improving at the beginning of 1986 at a moderate rate due to liquidation of a family-medicine practice and greater concentration on a psychiatric practice, according to the court, the inability to pay an Order of $800 per week was not established. From the evidence presented in this case, even allowing for puffing of business expenses and the possibility (not proven) of unreported fees, the record fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant can pay the Order in full and is in willful non-compliance with the contempt Order. See Barrett, supra : [8] Durant v. Durant, 339 Pa.Super. 488, 489 A.2d 266 (1985); Commonwealth ex rel. Heimbrook v. Heimbrook, 295 Pa.Super. 300, 441 A.2d 1242 (1982) (in imposing a coercive sentence upon a finding of civil contempt, the court must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the contemnor has the ability to purge himself). The procedural posture of these cases tended to force the conclusion the appellant was in willful non-compliance. At the outset, as indicated above, the first proceeding tested the validity of the agreement (No. 02259 Philadelphia, 1985), when in fact appellant wished to contest his ability to pay. Once the agreement was held to be valid, with no change in circumstances, the subsequent hearing focused on the lack of change to support the finding of contempt for non-payment, and on limited evidence, held there was ability to pay (No. 03025 Philadelphia, 1985). The present proceeding (No. 01343 Philadelphia, 1986), buttressed by the two earlier hearings, resulted in a determination the evidence as to inability, though substantial, was not credible and resulted in a finding of willful non-compliance with the earlier contempt Order. Throughout, the appellant has maintained, and established with some conviction, his inability to pay the amount to which he agreed. While a party may agree to conditions in a contract, which in actuality he is unable to perform, this does not invalidate the contract. He may, however, have a valid defense to a contempt action for non-payment. This appears to be the case here. This agreement, as to the husband, was uncounselled, which is possibly the root of the problem, although binding because he had the opportunity to obtain counsel. The agreement entered into requires the appellant to: 1. pay all bills incurred prior to the separation agreement; 2. pay $800 per week for support of the two children until oldest child's graduation from high school; reduces to $400; 3. payment to wife shall terminate when the youngest child begins a course of post-high school education or graduation from high school; 4. wife's employment or earnings shall not be a basis for modification and/or reduction in payment under the agreement; 5. he can claim children as dependents if no defaults; 6. appellant is responsible for payment of tuition and college expenses; 7. appellant is responsible for yearly campership for each child at cost of approximately $3,000 each; 8. wife to receive net proceeds from sale of residence. The evidence presented by appellant to establish his defense as to inability to comply with the agreement may be summarized as follows. In November 1983 through December 1985, appellant had a family practice which, according to his patient visit books, serviced a high of 269 patients per month to a low of 110 per month when it was terminated as a failing business. His private psychiatric practice averaged 17 patients per month between November 1983 and February 1986. Only in the two months prior to the hearing was there a substantial increase; in March 1986, it was 32, and in April, it was 44. Dr. Sonder testified time would never permit more than 44 patients per month. His business deductions included standard expenses such as employee salaries, rent, utilities, insurance, parking, automobile rental, drug and lab expenses. Allowing these expenses against gross income for the first year of the agreement (11/83-11/84) and including the salary received from Bryn Mawr Hospital ($2,166 per month), the total gross income for that period was $112,262 (this figure is different than testified by appellant as different months were used; the figures are drawn from appellant's recapitulation submitted on the record). The business expenses during that period totalled $65,570. Other business related expenses totalled $6,086 for a combined total of $71,656. Taking appellant's figures at face value, the gross income, without considering taxes and living expenses, available to pay support was $40,606 during the year following the agreement. During that period (11/83-11/84), he paid $32,400 toward support and $4,000 toward the camperships, or $36,600. The agreement called for payment of $41,600 and $6,000 in campership expenses, or $47,600. Taking the evidence presented by the appellant for the period when he gave up the family practice and focused on the psychiatric practice, while the data is limited, by projecting those figures for the coming year, the anticipated income would be: contract with Northeastern Hospital, $2,640/month; Bryn Mawr, $2,166/month; psychiatric practice (average 30 patients per month at $75 per visit equals $2,250/month, totals $7,056/month or $84,672/year. Appellant's own projection given in testimony was $72,150 per year. Business expenses were considerably less as he had no employees and reduced rent and, according to appellant, projected for the following year to approximately $22,604. His gross income before taxes and without consideration of living expenses would be $49,556. Taxes would further reduce this amount by $17,567 to $32,000, according to appellant's figures. With our higher estimate of income, the net, after taxes, would still not exceed $44,000. Thus, despite reducing his business expense by giving up the family practice while obtaining a second contractual position with Northeastern Hospital and focusing on increasing the psychiatric practice, appellant still will produce substantially less income than needed to fulfill his obligation of $47,600 under the agreement. Appellee hints or alleges that while living together and while she handled the books, there was an unspecified amount paid in cash through the family practice that did not appear on the books. Appellant did acknowledge he retained amounts of $100 to $250 per week that did not get deposited, but which were reported for income tax purposes and which are accounted for in his patient visit books. To account for maintaining the standard of living which the agreement sought to replicate, appellant alleges he received frequent gifts ($1,500 per month), including one of $10,000, from appellee's father, as well as a loan of $51,000 to establish the family practice. According to him, the family was constantly on the verge of default. After the separation, appellant testified he was able to sustain himself and the amount paid in support by loans from friends ($7,000 from Dr. Zois; $8,000 from Janet Azar), liquidation of the family practice and sale of its equipment and furnishings and going into debt. In further support of this position, he presented testimony and evidence that he filed for bankruptcy in December 1985, claiming $112,000 in debts for business and personal expenses. Unquestionably, various items of expenses and income may be disputed but it appears from a close examination of the record that whether from appellant's figures or an independent calculation of the income and expenses from undisputed evidence presented on the record, appellant was and is incapable of paying $47,600 yearly and is presently incapable of paying $10,000 toward the arrears on the agreement. The trial court relied on Hopkinson v. Hopkinson, 323 Pa.Super. 404, 470 A.2d 981 (1984) as authority to impose a jail sentence for contempt for non-payment under the agreement. We hold Hopkinson not to be applicable. There, it was determined the appellant had the ability to pay at least some part of the agreement but failed to pay anything. Here, appellant paid according to his ability. We also have serious doubts that Hopkinson is a correct statement of the law. There, the trial court imposed a sentence of weekend incarceration, pursuant to the Divorce Code, in what appeared to be a merged agreement. This Court held the merger concept was not applicable as the agreement had been entered in February, 1978, prior to the effective date of the Divorce Code. The court then affirmed the trial court on other grounds, holding it was a proper exercise of judicial power to enforce compliance with its Orders if its purpose is to compel performance and not to inflict punishment. In support of this proposition, the Hopkinson Court cites numerous cases, none of which has to do with imposition of incarceration for failure to pay on a support agreement after a contempt finding. Our exhaustive research discloses no Pennsylvania case, aside from Hopkinson, which permits incarceration for non-payment of support pursuant to an agreement. (It is treated as an agreement although a consent decree; see infra p. 506.) The last definitive pronouncement in that regard was Colburn v. Colburn, 279 Pa. 249, 123 A. 775 (1924). There, the Supreme Court, in a Per Curiam Opinion, stated: The question before us is the power of a court of equity to enforce its decree for the payment of money due under a separation agreement by attachment of the person of the defaulting husband. Section 1 of the Act of July 12, 1842, P.L. 339, provides: `No person shall be arrested, or imprisoned on any civil process issuing out of any court of this Commonwealth, in any suit or proceeding instituted for the recovery of any money due upon an judgment or decree founded upon contract, or due upon any contract, express or implied, or for the recovery of any damages for the nonperformance of any contract, etc.' Here plaintiff's bill is founded upon a contract and the decree is for the payment of money. While it is admitted equity has jurisdiction in separation agreements, it is denied that decrees for payment of money in such proceedings are enforceable by attachment of the person. This court has held that attachment in such cases does not lie. In Pierce's Appeal, 103 Pa. 27, 29, it is said: `The statute applies alike to all judgments at law and to decrees in equity, and prohibits arrest in every case upon contract which is not included in the exceptions. Where it applies, an attachment cannot be lawfully issued, for the party shall not be arrested and put to his answer to the satisfaction of the judge or chancellor, that he is unable to pay the judgment or decree, under pain of imprisonment. The object being to prevent oppression of debtors in furtherance of that end, it should be liberally construed.' Id., 279 Pa. at 250-251, 123 A. at 775-76. Pierce's Appeal, 103 Pa. 27 (1883) and Colburn rely on the Act of July 12, 1842, P.L. 339, which prevents imprisonment for debt. While repealed by the Judiciary Act Repealer Act (J.A.R. A.), it was reenacted in 1978 as part of the Judicial Code, by Act of 1978, April 28, P.L. 202, No. 53 ง 10(59). As reenacted, 42 Pa.C.S.A. ง 5108 provides: ง 5108. Imprisonment for debt (a) Constitutional restriction. โ The person of a debtor, where there is not strong presumption of fraud, shall not be continued in prison after delivering up his estate for the benefit of his creditors in such manner as shall be provided or prescribed by law. [9] The language above is simply a restatement of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article I, ง 16, which provides: ง 16. Insolvent debtors The person of a debtor, where there is not strong presumption of fraud, shall not be continued in prison after delivering up his estate for the benefit of his creditors in such manner as shall be prescribed by law. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has had at least two occasions, in more recent times, upon which it could have construed Colburn and the constitutional and legislative enactments differently, but declined to do so. In Silvestri v. Slatowski, 423 Pa. 498, 503-04, 224 A.2d 212, 216 (1966), Justice Eagen stated: We note in passing that this Court has previously ruled that attachment of the person may not issue in this type of case: (citing Colburn ). Appellants ask us to reconsider Colburn. This we refuse to do on the present posture of the record. In Commonwealth ex rel. Magaziner v. Magaziner, 434 Pa. 1, 253 A.2d 263 (1977), on an agreement not merged with the court Order, after finding that contempt proceeding and incarceration for contempt was improper for lack of procedural due process, the Supreme Court said, per Justice O'Brien: Assuming arguendo that Mr. Magaziner violated the terms of that agreement, the contempt process of the County Court is surely not the proper vehicle to redress the violation of the contract. The appropriate legal remedy would be an action of assumpsit or replevin or perhaps even a bill in equity for specific performance. Even then, if Mrs. Magaziner won, grave doubt would exist as to whether any judgment, order, or decree could be enforced by an attachment of the person of the defendant. See Colburn v. Colburn, 279 Pa. 249, 123 A. 775 (1924) and Silvestri v. Slatowski, 423 Pa. 498, 224 A.2d 212 (1966). Although we understand the feelings of the trial judge faced with a father who required litigation to force him to perform the responsibilities of that status, we cannot allow the processes of the law to be prostituted to achieve what may in the end by a just result. We must always remain a nation of laws not of men โ non sub homine sed sub deo et lege. Id., 434 Pa. at 6-10, 253 A.2d at 267-268. The thrust of these cases, with no case other than Hopkinson, to the contrary, requires us to find that even if the ruling by the trial court was correct as to appellant's ability to pay, it could not be enforced by an attachment of the person of appellant. [10] As an intermediate appellate court, we are not permitted to alter a policy based on constitutional and statutory law as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Hopkinson, as to the imposition of incarceration as a sanction, is, therefore, specifically overruled. In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Judge Cavanaugh would have us retain Hopkinson as a proper statement of the law. We would agree that the procedure in Hopkinson was correct until sanctions were imposed, and it is the imposition of those sanctions which must be overruled. We note that although Hopkinson was an agreement that subsequently was made part of a consent decree, it does not come under the merger doctrine enunciated by the Divorce Code of 1980. This was recognized when this Court held the court below improperly relied on the Divorce Code to empower it to enforce the decree as a court Order. Prior to the Divorce Code of 1980, enforcement of a decree containing a separation agreement was pursuant to an assumpsit action for payment of money or equity for specific performance. The Divorce Code of 1980 brought into play all of the extraordinary powers accorded to statutory imposed duties for enforcement of payment of support and alimony, as well as the concomitant power in the court to modify Orders and mitigate arrears. The Divorce Code in section 103 specifically provides: The provision of this act shall not apply to any case in which a decree has been rendered prior to the effective date of the act. This act shall not affect any marital agreement executed prior to the effective date of this act or any amendments or modifications thereto. While Brown v. Hall, 495 Pa. 635, 435 A.2d 859 (1981), in dicta, acknowledged the possibility of merger of agreements into decrees based on Buswell v. Buswell, 377 Pa. 487, 105 A.2d 608 (1954), Buswell discussed merger in the context of enforcement of an Illinois decree according to Illinois law. It did not enforce the merger provision of that decree but permitted specific performance of non-monetary aspects of the prior oral agreement. Also, the doctrine of merger did apply to very specific statutory provisions for support and alimony. Prior to the 1980 Code, our courts permitted merger of agreements in consent Orders under the support laws for alimony pendente lite and alimony in insanity and bed and board divorce cases. Since, prior to 1980, we had no post-divorce alimony and the law did not permit orders for spousal support after divorce, whether an agreement merged in a decree for absolute divorce or not, enforcement was obtained through assumpsit and equity actions and not as a judgment enforced by the court. Hopkinson correctly held that the consent decree was enforceable in equity as an Order, but since it was an Order for payment of money and it was not covered by the support laws, it improperly provided for incarceration as a sanction. Two exceptions existed under the Divorce Code of 1929 (as amended in 1953). The first is a decree for Bed and Board Divorce, 23 P.S. ง 11 (repealed), which provided at section 47 for such alimony as the court determined a husband's circumstances would admit of, not to exceed one-third of his income. The Code also specifically provided: ง 47 Alimony in Divorce From Bed and Board ..... Attachment; imprisonment or discharge. โ The courts may enforce their decrees by attachment, on the return of which they may make such Order either to imprison or discharge the defendants as the facts of the case may justify. 23 P.S. ง 47. These Orders, of course, could be modified and the courts would accept stipulations or agreements in regard to such decrees. Once accepted by the court, they merged. In every sense, they were considered maintenance and support Orders as opposed to the general concept of alimony. Strickler v. Strickler, 138 Pa.Super. 34, 10 A.2d 69 (1939). The second provision for post-divorce alimony under the earlier Code was when the respondent was insane, 23 P.S. ง 45 Permanent Alimony Where Respondent Insane. However, no provision was made for enforcement by attachment or imprisonment. This is not a defect, at least after 1953, as any form of court-directed alimony or alimony pendente lite, was enforceable pursuant to the Civil Procedural Support Law, Act of July 13, 1953, P.L. 431, 62 P.S. งง 2043.31, et seq., which provided enforcement of any court order, decree or judgment, whether interlocutory or final, whether incidental to a proceeding in divorce.. . . or otherwise. Attachment and incarceration were permitted by statute, as these Orders were derived from public policy and not out of contract. Agreements for alimony pendente lite, if approved by the court, resulting in an Order were subject to this enforcement. Agreements not approved by the court but entered of record were not. Such an agreement had no judicial sanction and was incapable of judicial compulsion. See Law of Marriage and Divorce in Pennsylvania, Freedman, 2nd Edition, Vol. III, ง 457. Agreements, however, whether consent decrees or incorporated into divorce decrees, for post-divorce payments after absolute divorce (A Vinculo matrimonii) were not accorded this stature, as is succinctly stated in Freedman, supra. ง 662. Alimony and Property Agreements In Pennsylvania there is no statutory provision authorizing the court to include as part of the decree the agreement of the parties for the adjustment of their property rights and for the payment of post-divorce support. The absence of this authority, common in other states, has caused considerable difficulty to Pennsylvania domiciliaries since the passage of the Revenue Act of 1942. . . . The statute (Revenue Act) has now been broadened but legislation is still desirable in Pennsylvania to authorize the inclusion of property settlement agreements in the divorce decree. (Emphasis added.) Not until 1980 did the legislature heed this call and enact legislation which now permits merger of a separation/property settlement agreement into a divorce decree. The Hopkinson agreement, while termed a consent decree, preceded this legislation and, therefore, does not receive the benefit accorded to merged agreements under present law. Thus enforcement cannot be pursuant to attachment of the person, as permitted by properly merged agreements, under current law or those limited areas discussed above under earlier law. It, therefore, is governed by contract law; breach creates a debt, debts may not be enforced by jailing under the Pennsylvania Constitution and statutes, supra. By ignoring Hopkinson, as the Cavanaugh dissent would have us do, we permit a confusing and erroneous statement of the law to remain, which will return time and time again on appeal producing wasteful and unnecessary litigation. Thus the enforcement provisions for failure to comply with an agreement, not merged into a support Order or divorce decree, are those available in any other civil action, at law or in equity for payment of money โ judgments and execution or attachment of property. It is likely for this reason that the legislature has enacted provisions in the Divorce Code and support law permitting agreements for support to be merged into support Orders which supersede the agreement as these can be enforced by attachment of the person and attachment of wages. As an instrument of public policy, Orders of support create a legal duty and not a contractual undertaking; willful failure to pay becomes a violation of law and not breach of contract; arrearages become a legal obligation enforced by the court, and not a debt enforced through private litigation. It also means, however, such Order is controlled by the court and, subject to the law, may be modified, terminated, suspended or reinstated as conditions warrant and arrearages may be remitted. Finally, in the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Judge Cavanaugh states the majority has misconstrued the nature of the agreement to support a spouse or child. He goes on to state: An agreement to support a child should not be equated with a commercial agreement with respect to the remedies for breach of such a contract. A commercial contract or ordinary agreement does not subject the defaulting obligor to confinement. (Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Cavanaugh, J., p. 518.) He would go on to find that the court below properly found appellant in willful contempt and imposed an Order of incarceration to bring about compliance. [11] While these are admirable sentiments, nothing in our research of the law of Pennsylvania supports a special law of contract as it applies to separation/property settlement agreements. Quite to the contrary, the forerunner of the Divorce Code of 1980 was the Joint State Government Commission Report, June 1961, Proposed Divorce Code for Pennsylvania (JSGC). Section 306 (Separation Agreement) clearly set forth a detailed approach to court consideration and approval of separation agreements, which, if adopted in full, would have eliminated the problem we are presented with here. Indeed, it would appear that some of those provisions, not adopted by the legislature, have crept into the Montgomery County Form 2 Decree. It is relevant and illuminating, however, to detail statements of the commissioners in relation to how agreements should be treated in law. ง 306 [Separation Agreements] Commissioner's Note An important aspect of the effort to reduce the adversary trappings of marital dissolution is the attempt, made by Section 306, to encourage the parties to reach an amicable disposition of the financial and other incidents of their marriage. This section entirely reverses the older view that property settlement agreements are against public policy because they tend to promote divorce. Rather, when a marriage has broken down irretrievably, public policy will be served by allowing the parties to plan their future by agreeing upon a disposition of their property, their maintenance, and the support, custody, and visitation of their children. Subsection (b) undergirds the freedom allowed the parties by making clear that the terms of the agreement respecting maintenance and property disposition are binding upon the court unless those terms are found to be unconscionable. The standard of unconscionability is used in commercial law, where its meaning includes protection against one-sidedness, oppression, or unfair surprise (see section 2-302, Uniform Commercial Code), and in contract law, Scott v. U.S., 12 Wall ([(79)] U.S.) 443 [20 L.Ed.2d 438] (1870) (contract . . . unreasonable and unconscionable but not void for fraud); Stiefler v. McCullough, 174 N.E. 823, 97 Ind.App. 123 (1931); Terre Haute Cooperage v. Branscome, 35 So.2d 537, 203 Miss. 493 (1948); Carter v. Boone County Trust Co., 92 S.W.2d 647, 338 Mo. 629 (1936). It has been used in cases respecting divorce settlements or awards. Bell v. Bell, 371 P.2d 773, 150 Colo. 174 (1962) (this division of property is manifestly unfair, inequitable and unconscionable). Hence the act does not introduce a novel standard unknown to the law. In the context of negotiations between spouses as to the financial incidents of their marriage, the standard includes protection against overreaching, concealment of assets, and sharp dealing not consistent with the obligations of marital partners to deal fairly with each other. In order to determine whether the agreement is unconscionable, the court may look to the economic circumstances of the parties resulting from the agreement, and any other relevant evidence such as the conditions under the agreement was made, including the knowledge of the other party. If the court finds the agreement not unconscionable, its terms respecting property division and maintenance may not be altered by the court at the hearing. (Emphasis added.) If the parties must deal with each other in reaching an agreement according to the established law of contracts under commercial law, as indicated by the commissioners, the court cannot employ a different standard, which would be ephemeral and personal to each judge in enforcing those agreements. To deviate from established contract law in any respect, except where the legislature has clearly spoken (and it has in numerous ways), is to invite confusion and uncertainty. It is not the prerogative of an intermediate appellate court to pronounce such a far reaching and unpredictable principle of law in one of the most volatile areas of legal and personal relationships in our society. In summation, we hold separation or property settlement agreements for support remain as contracts to be enforced at law or in equity unless they are merged into a divorce decree or court Order. Upon merger, they are superseded as contracts and take on all of the attributes of support Orders for purposes of modification and enforcement. This is so whether they be agreements for spousal support or child support. It is also possible to have agreements and support Orders standing apart and enforced separately. See Brown v. Hall, supra ; Madnick v. Madnick, 339 Pa.Super. 130, 488 A.2d 344 (1985); Millstein v. Millstein, 311 Pa.Super. 495, 457 A.2d 1291 (1983). In this case, since there was no merger, the agreement may not be modified or enforced as a court Order. As a contract, it may be enforced only in accordance with the law regulating contracts through proceedings of law or in equity. Judgments would be enforced as indicated in footnote 5, supra. The breach of agreement by failure to pay creates a debt which, pursuant to our constitution and statutory law, may not be enforced by attachment of the person even when there is a finding of contempt for failure to obey an Order requiring specific performance. The debt may be the basis for judgment and liens which remain undiminished until paid, as they cannot be vacated by the court absent finding of fraud or invalidity of the contract. Litwack, supra . Any personal or other property, subject to lien and execution obtained by appellant, will be hostage to this debt; however, attachment of his person is not permitted. The Order of attachment must be vacated. The appeal at No. 02259 Philadelphia, 1985 is dismissed; the appeal at No. 03025 Philadelphia, 1985 is quashed. At appeal No. 01423 Philadelphia, 1986, Order of dismissal affirmed; at appeal No. 01343 Philadelphia, 1986, the Order of attachment is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings to determine remedies available to enforce the agreement in accordance with appellant's ability to pay and consistent with this Opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished. Concurring and dissenting opinion by CAVANAUGH, J. Concurring and dissenting opinion by WIEAND, J., joined by ROWLEY, J. Concurring and dissenting opinion by BECK, J. CAVANAUGH, Judge, concurring and dissenting: I dissent from that part of the majority opinion entitled Section E. Contempt Parameters on Agreement which reversed the order of contempt entered against the appellant and vacated the order of attachment at Appeal No. 01343 Philadelphia, 1986. I would affirm the order of contempt based on the appellant's willful failure to comply with the Court's order directing that he carry out the terms of the support agreement he voluntarily entered. Three judges of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County gave separate consideration to the appellant's conduct in refusing to comply with the terms of the property settlement entered between Dr. Carl R. Sonder, the appellant, and his wife, Suzanne C. Sonder, on November 29, 1983. The agreement was in simple and understandable language and Dr. Sonder actively participated in analyzing, correcting and rewriting the agreement under which he was to pay his wife $800.00 per week. Subers, J. determined the agreement to be valid and binding and that the contract spoke for itself. Dr. Sonder initially complied with the terms of the contract. As pointed out by Subers, J. slip opinion, page 6, opinion of January 22, 1986: It stretches the imagination of this Court to believe that Dr. Sonder was not aware of the contents of this P.S.A. that he signed or that the P.S.A. would not constitute a binding agreement. An order was entered by the court below directing Dr. Sonder to pay to Suzanne Sonder the sum of $28,000.00 pursuant to paragraph 6 (A) of the settlment agreement and counsel fee after a hearing. Stefan, J. of the court below, in an opinion dated February 4, 1986, held that the issue was one of credibility concerning the appellant's ability to comply with the agreement. The court heard testimony concerning the appellant's income from his medical practice. It found his wife's testimony concerning his income was credible and that the appellant's was not. The court concluded the appellant simply did not choose to meet his obligations under the property settlement agreement and that he was properly found in contempt of the order of March March 27, 1985 directing compliance with the settlement agreement. A civil contempt proceeding was held before Salus, J. on May 12, 1986 and again extensive testimony was taken concerning the appellant's ability to comply with the support agreement. The court found that Dr. Sonder had the present ability to pay the full amount of the support agreement. [1] By an adjudication of Salus, J. dated July 8, 1986, the court affirmed its order directing the appellant to make payment on arrearages or be committed to the county prison on weekends until purging himself of contempt. The court below, in my opinion, properly relied on Hopkinson v. Hopkinson, 323 Pa.Super. 404, 470 A.2d 981 (1984). In that case the husband and wife entered into a written agreement providing that the husband was to pay the wife $23,500.00 per year in weekly installments and to pay support for his children. Subsequently, the parties were divorced. The wife filed a complaint in equity alleging that the husband had breached his obligations under the property settlement agreement. A consent decree was entered directing the husband to pay certain sums and to comply with all aspects of the property settlement agreement. Judgment was entered against the husband for arrearages. It was determined that the husband wilfully failed to comply with this consent decree and notwithstanding his claim that he was not financially able to comply, he was held in contempt and sentenced to weekends in prison until he purged himself of contempt. On appeal, we affirmed, Opinion by Cirillo, P.J., on the basis that the court below properly exercised its civil contempt powers to enforce compliance with the orders of the court where the purpose is to compel performance and not impose a penalty. The majority opinion at page 503 specifically overrules Hopkinson v. Hopkinson . [2] I find no basis for overruling Hopkinson, and note that in Schoffstall v. Schoffstall, 364 Pa.Super. 141, 527 A.2d 567 (1987) appeal denied Schoffstall v. Schoffstall, 517 Pa. 608, 536 A.2d 1333 (1987) Tamilia, J., the author of the present majority, quoted extensively from Hopkinson v. Hopkinson, supra , with approval. [3] As recently as November 12, 1987, in Colbert v. Gunning, 368 Pa.Super. 28, 533 A.2d 471 (1987) we cited Hopkinson with approval in support of the rule that a court may exercise its civil contempt powers to enforce compliance with its orders. The majority states that even if the trial court's ruling was correct concerning the appellant's ability to pay the amount of support ordered, it would be powerless to enforce its order by holding appellant in contempt of court. It relies on Commonwealth ex rel. Magaziner v. Magaziner, 434 Pa. 1, 253 A.2d 263 (1977) to support this conclusion. In my opinion Magaziner is so distinguishable on the facts and procedure to be of little precedential value. In Magaziner, an order for support was entered and the parties were divorced. A dispute arose, not about the support order, but about various personal items belonging to the wife and children and located in the husband's house. Judge Bonnelly informed the husband's counsel by letter that the husband had breached his agreement to permit wife to take the children's and her belongings from the house and told the husband's counsel that the wife would appear at the house at a certain time and if the husband refused to comply with the order of the court, the husband would be considered in contempt. The husband was not at the house at the appointed hour. At a hearing before the court, the husband did not appear. Subsequently, the husband would not let the wife into the house to get her belongings and the court signed an order stating let attachment issue, Returnable Forthwith for the arrest of husband and he was arrested. The Supreme Court issued a writ of special certiorari so that it could exercise its King's Bench Powers to correct an allegedly flagrant violation of petitioner's rights. The court stated at 434 Pa. 5-6, 258 A.2d 266: Our review of the record convinces us that petitioner's characterization of the proceedings below has much merit in it. Assuming arguendo that petitioner could be shown to be in contempt of a valid order of the County Court, surely that court did not follow the proper procedure for putting the question in issue. ...... In other words, it is a several step process that must take place to hold one in civil contempt โ rule to show cause why an attachment should not issue, answer and hearing, rule absolute (arrest), hearing on the contempt citation, adjudication of contempt. The court pointed out at 434 Pa. 6-8, 253 A.2d 267: For it should be beyond question that one can be held in civil contempt only for failure to obey some process or order of court. ..... In the instant case also, there is no order of court upon which the contempt order is predicated. (Emphasis added) What the Supreme Court stated about the agreement of the parties, and which is quoted at length by the majority at page 495 as simply dictum, as the case had nothing to do with visitation of a support order. The only issue was the improper procedure followed in an endeavor to imprison the husband for failure to allow his wife to take her belongings out of his house. I do not agree that a reading of Commonwealth ex rel. Magaziner v. Magaziner, supra , should lead us to conclude that even if the appellant wilfully failed to carry out the order of the court requiring him to pay support, that it was powerless to hold him in civil contempt. Further, Hopkinson v. Hopkinson, supra , does not appear to me to be in conflict with Commonwealth ex rel. Magaziner v. Magaziner , so that we must expressly overrule Hopkinson v. Hopkinson , as the majority would do. Finally, I believe that the majority has misconstrued the nature of an agreement to support a spouse or child. The majority states at page 509: Thus the enforcement provisions for failure to comply with an agreement, not merged into a support order or divorce decree, are those available in any other civil action, at law or in equity for payment of money โ judgments and execution or attachment of property. An agreement to support a spouse or child should not be equated with a commercial agreement with respect to the remedies for breach of such a contract. Breach of a commercial contract or ordinary agreement does not subject the defaulting obligor to confinement. Breach of a contract to purchase an automobile or failure to repay a bank loan, barring fraud or some other factor not here relevant, will not result in the imposition of the serious sanctions that should result in failure to support one upon whom the law imposes a duty to support where the court has entered an order requiring support. I agree with the court below that the appellant has wilfully failed to comply with an appropriate order and was properly held in contempt. As we stated in Schoffstall v. Schoffstall, 364 Pa.Super. 141, 147, 527 A.2d 567 570, relying on Hopkinson v. Hopkinson, supra : A court may exercise its civil contempt power to enforce compliance with its orders or decrees if its purpose is to compel performance and not to inflict punishment. Accordingly, I dissent from Part E of the majority opinion and the vacating of the order of attachment at Appeal No. 01343 Philadelphia, 1986. I concur in the result only as to the remainder of the opinion. WIEAND, Judge, concurring and dissenting: On November 29, 1983, Carl Sonder and his estranged wife, Suzanne, entered into a property settlement agreement which provided, inter alia, that Sonder would pay to his wife for the support of two minor children the sum of eight hundred ($800.00) dollars per week. Paragraph seventeen of the agreement provided further as follows: SEVENTEENTH: INCORPORATION IN JUDGMENT FOR DIVORCE. In the event either Husband or Wife at any time hereafter obtain a divorce in the cause presently or hereafter pending between them, this Agreement and all of its provisions shall be incorporated into any such judgment for divorce, either directly or by reference. This Agreement, upon incorporation, shall not merge into the decree, but shall remain in full force and effect. The court on entry of the judgment for divorce shall retain the right to enforce the provisions and terms of the Agreement. Sonder made the agreed support payments until May, 1984, when he unilaterally reduced the payments to four hundred ($400.00) dollars per week. On October 16, 1984, Suzanne Sonder filed a complaint in equity requesting a decree specifically enforcing the support agreement. Carl Sonder defended on the ground that the agreement had been merely a proposed draft presented during negotiations and did not represent a final meeting of the minds. He also contended that the agreement was invalid because of duress and undue influence. After hearing, the trial court entered a decree, dated March 27, 1985, which ordered Carl Sonder to comply with the terms of the agreement. Exceptions were dismissed, and Sonder appealed. This appeal was filed to No. 2259 Philadelphia, 1985. Three weeks later, on April 18, 1985, Suzanne Sonder filed a petition asking the court to hold Carl Sonder in contempt for failing to pay the full amount of the agreed support as directed by the court's order of March 27, 1985. After hearing, the court found that appellant was in contempt and ordered him to pay arrearages of twenty-nine thousand, eight hundred ($29,800.00) dollars, as well as counsel fees and costs in the amount of one thousand ($1,000.00) dollars. An appeal from this order, dated October 24, 1985, was filed to No. 3025 Philadelphia, 1985. Meanwhile, on December 13, 1984, a final decree of divorce had been entered which included the following language: [the agreement] is hereby incorporated into this Decree and Order by reference as fully as though the same were set forth at length. Said agreement shall not merge with but shall survive this Decree and Order. On January 3, 1986, Suzanne Sonder filed in the equity action a second petition to adjudicate Carl Sonder in contempt for refusing to comply with the parties' agreement by paying eight hundred ($800.00) dollars per week for the support of the children. Shortly thereafter, Carl filed in the divorce action a petition to reduce the amount of the court's support order and to remit arrearages on grounds that his financial circumstances had changed. The trial court dismissed Carl's petition for lack of jurisdiction. By order dated May 13, 1986, the trial court found Carl Sonder in contempt of court and directed him to pay the sum of ten thousand ($10,000.00) dollars or be committed to prison for a period of ninety (90) days. This order was the subject of an appeal filed to No. 1343 Philadelphia, 1986. An appeal from the order dismissing the petition to reduce the support provisions of the divorce decree for want of jurisdiction was filed to No. 1423 Philadelphia, 1986.