Opinion ID: 1420265
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Substantial Evidence of Sexual Harassment

Text: Norcon contends that the evidence was insufficient to warrant submission of the issue of sexual harassment to the jury. The jury was instructed on claims for hostile environment sexual harassment and quid pro quo sexual harassment. The basic elements of the former theory were encompassed in Instruction No. 21, which outlined the following elements that Kotowski had to prove: (1) that she was subjected to sexual advances, requests for sexual favors or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, (2) that this conduct was unwelcome, (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment and to create an abusive working environment, and (4) that she suffered damages as a result of the sexual harassment. The elements of the quid pro quo claim were encompassed in Instruction No. 24. Kotowski was required to prove: (1) that she was subjected to sexual advances, requests for sexual favors or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; (2) that this conduct was unwelcome; and (3) either (a) that submission to such conduct was made either explicitly or implicitly, a term or condition of her employment, or (b) that her submission or rejection of such conduct was used as the basis for an employment decision or decisions affecting her employment; and (4) that she suffered damages as a result of the sexual harassment. We find the evidence was sufficient to present claims under both theories. Viewed most favorably to Kotowski, evidence existed that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and physical conduct of a sexual nature. The jury could reasonably conclude that these acts were sufficiently severe (if not pervasive from the standpoint of Kotowski) to create a hostile working environment. Given the evidence that Posehn was trading favorable assignments for sex, Posehn's sexual conduct toward Kotowski, Kotowski's assignment to the Foss 280, her reassignment to the beach, and Posehn's cancellation of that assignment can reasonably be viewed as decisions affecting her employment. Thus there was also evidence of quid pro quo sexual harassment. Norcon also argues that Kotowski was required to prove that Posehn was aided in accomplishing the tort by existence of the agency relation. Norcon states that Kotowski failed to prove this. In Veco, we held that an employer may be vicariously liable for acts of a supervisor who creates a hostile working environment even where the acts are outside the scope of the supervisor's employment: Harassment by supervisors is facilitated, made more serious, and is less apt to be reported because supervisors are understood to be clothed with the employer's authority. [ Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57] at 77 [106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)]. The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d) supports imposing vicarious liability in such circumstances. It provides: (2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless: .... (d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation. Veco, 970 P.2d at 911. But the jury was not instructed on this theory in the present case. Instead, there were two other theories on which the jury might have held Norcon liable for sexual harassment. Under Instruction No. 25 the first was if Norcon had actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment and failed to take prompt and adequate remedial measures. Under Instruction No. 28 the second was if Posehn was acting within the course and scope of his employment. Norcon does not challenge the substance of either instruction in this appeal. But it argues that Instruction No. 25 should not have been given because it was unwarranted by the evidence. The evidence was sufficient to justify a finding that Norcon knew or should have known of Posehn's sexual harassment of female employees and took no remedial measures. Posehn had several victims. He roomed and partied next door to Norcon's managers, some of whom partied with him. Norcon had not communicated instructions to its employees concerning what to do in cases of sexual harassment. When Kotowski, through Savell, complained of sexual harassment, Norcon turned a deaf ear to the substance of her complaint. Thus Instruction No. 25 was warranted by the evidence. [16]