Opinion ID: 2236352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Law Regarding Superseder

Text: Passing from mootness to the merits, we begin analysis with a recognition that when the Governor acts by Executive Order pursuant to a valid grant of discretionary authority, his actions are largely beyond judicial review ( see, e.g. , Matter of Cunningham v Nadjari , 39 N.Y.2d 314, 317-318; Gaynor v Rockefeller , 15 N.Y.2d 120, 131; Matter of Nistal v Hausauer , 308 N.Y. 146, 152-153, cert denied 349 US 962). Judicial review in such cases is generally limited to determining whether the State Constitution or the Legislature has empowered the Governor to act, and does not include the manner in which the Governor chooses to discharge that authority ( see, e.g. , Mulroy v Carey , 58 AD2d 207, 214-215, affd 43 N.Y.2d 819; People ex rel. Saranac Land & Timber Co. v Extraordinary Special & Trial Term of Supreme Ct. , 220 N.Y. 487, 491; People v Kramer , 33 Misc 209, 219). For abuse of lawful discretionary authority, the remedy as a rule lies with the people at the polls, or with a constitutional amendment, or with corrective legislation. Whether a Governor is empowered to supersede a District Attorney in a particular prosecution is not a novel question. We have long held that article IV, § 3 of the Constitution and Executive Law § 63 (2) together provide the Governor with discretionary authority to supersede the District Attorney in a matter ( see , Mulroy v Carey , 43 NY2d at 821, supra ; see also , Matter of Additional Jan. 1979 Grand Jury of Albany Supreme Ct. v Doe , 50 N.Y.2d 14, 16). [2] Article IV, § 3 delegates to the Governor, as head of the executive branch, the duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. Executive Law § 63 (2), the legislative grant of authority, provides: The attorney-general shall    [w]henever required by the governor,    manag[e] and conduc[t]    criminal actions or proceedings as shall be specified in such requirement; in which case the attorney-general    shall exercise all the powers and perform all the duties in respect of such actions or proceedings, which the district attorney would otherwise be authorized or required to exercise or perform; and in any of such actions or proceedings the district attorney shall only exercise such powers and perform such duties as are required of him by the attorney-general. The statute neither limits the Governor's authority to supersede nor requires the Governor to explain that choice. Consistent with that authority, Governors have numerous times invoked the superseder power ( see, e.g. , Pitler, Superseding the District Attorneys in New York City  The Constitutionality and Legality of Executive Order No. 55 , 41 Fordham L Rev 517, 522-527 [1973]). In Mulroy v Carey (43 NY2d at 821, supra ), this Court reserved the possibility that in some undefined circumstance, the courts could invalidate this executive action. There we upheld the Governor's superseder of the Onondaga County District Attorney, rejecting the argument that the Governor was required to establish to the satisfaction of the court the necessity of such action in that case (58 AD2d at 208, supra ). We added, however, that no view is expressed whether in any or all circumstances the exercise of the executive power to supersede an elected District Attorney would be beyond judicial review or correction in a direct or collateral action or proceeding brought or defended by the county or the elected District Attorney involved (43 NY2d at 821, supra ).