Opinion ID: 2600070
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Alleged comment on defendant's silence

Text: During closing statements, defense counsel argued, consistently with the defense theory of the homicide, that the evidence did not support a finding that defendant entered the victim's home with the specific intent to commit robbery, rape, or oral copulation, and that it was defendant's sudden, startling appearance in the living room that set into motion the fright and stress that caused the victim to suffer the fatal cardiac arrest. In rebuttal, the prosecutor asserted the defense theory was based on a technicality. Focusing on defense counsel's acknowledgement that defendant may have been up to no good when he entered the house, the prosecutor remarked: What is it, what's up to no good? What options do we have? The prosecutor observed that up to no good is stealing and may include the felony of rape . . . or . . . oral copulation, and then rhetorically asked: What are those reasonable choices of up to no good? What is it that you can do at someone else's house at night that is up to no good that would not constitute theft or a felony? . . . Who took this stand and gave you a reasonable explanation as to another reason that the defendant may have been there? Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's argument. The trial court overruled the objection. The prosecutor then continued: I don't know. Did a neighbor or a friend or somebody say that there was a debt between these two people so [defendant] would have some reason that is up to no good of entering through the window, but that would still be a felony. So there is no reasonable explanation. Therefore, that argument has to fall. (24) The Fifth Amendment prohibits a prosecutor from commenting, directly or indirectly, on a defendant's decision not to testify on his own behalf. ( Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 613 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229]; People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 670 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392] [directing the jury's attention to defendant's failure to testify runs the risk of inviting the jury to consider the defendant's silence as evidence of guilt].) Defendant contends that the prosecutor violated this constitutional prohibition when she asked, Who took this stand and gave you a reasonable explanation [as to defendant's presence in the victim's home]? In making this statement, defendant asserts, the prosecutor was clearly referring to defendant. We disagree. The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the prosecution from commenting on the state of the evidence presented at trial, or on the defense's failure to introduce material evidence or to call witnesses other than the defendant. ( People v. Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 764.) In context, the prosecutor's query was a proper comment on the evidence against defendant, not an implicit suggestion that defendant should have, or could have, provided a nonfelonious reason for his initial entry into the victim's home. (See People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 755-756 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2] [prosecutor's comment directed to the defendant's failure to provide an innocent explanation for the prosecution's evidence falls outside of Griffin 's purview].) The thrust of the prosecutor's argument is further confirmed by the question she posed immediately after the court overruled defense counsel's objection, which asked whether a neighbor or a friend or somebody had provided an explanation for defendant's entry into the victim's home. The prosecutor was entitled to comment on the defense's failure to call witnesses other than defendant. ( People v. Cleveland, supra, at p. 764.) Contrary to defendant's argument, on this record, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury understood the prosecutor's remarks as an invitation to draw an improper inference of guilt from defendant's decision not to testify. ( People v. Medina, supra, at p. 756.) Defendant's claim of Griffin error therefore fails.