Opinion ID: 2074284
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The centrality of the error.

Text: The case against Mack consisted, essentially, of (1) his identification by Jones as one of the shooters; (2) Burley's testimony regarding his encounters with Mack on the night of the shooting and on the following day; (3) Mack's possession of the Bryco shortly before his arrest; and (4) Mack's videotaped statement to the police. In its redacted form, Mack's statement was an unqualified confession that he possessed one of the murder weapons on July 21, unaccompanied by any explanation of how he obtained it or any denial of complicity in the murder. Although Mack did not admit, in his statement to the police, that he was involved in the murder of the decedent, the existence of the redacted statement enabled the government to use Mack's possession of the Bryco on July 21 as persuasive evidence that he was one of the murderers. The prosecutor even asserted, albeit inaccurately, both in his opening statement and in rebuttal argument, that Mack had referred to the murder weapon as my gun. [16] Mack's redacted statement to the police was thus, at least, a major part of the case for the prosecution. Indeed, it is fair to state that the prosecutor attributed great significance to the admissions in Mack's redacted statement during his opening remarks to the jury and in his closing and rebuttal arguments. [17] When the government was presenting its case, a police detective described in some detail the circumstances under which Mack gave the statement, without ever mentioning Mack's version of the manner and timing of his acquisition of the pistol. A prosecutor's repeated highlighting, during the course of the trial, of an erroneously admitted statement is persuasive evidence of its centrality and prejudicial character. See Hill v. United States, 858 A.2d 435, 448-49 (D.C.2004). Moreover, the government's assertion on appeal that the improper redaction of Mack's statement probably did not affect the jury's verdict is difficult to reconcile with the prosecution's argument to the judge at trial. Claiming that the jury should not be apprised of Mack's claim that he received the pistol only two or three days before his arrest, the prosecutor asserted that everything beyond the simple affirmation that he had the gun on the day he was arrested . . . is really exculpatory. It is unduly prejudicial. . . . I think those kind[s] of self-serving exculpatory and we believe untrue assertions by Mr. Mack really are prejudicial to the government's case. (Emphasis added.) The judge agreed with the prosecutor's argument and excluded the questions and answers that Mack's counsel sought to bring to the jury's attention. If the admission of the contested parts of Mack's statement would have been substantially prejudicial to the government, as the prosecutor insisted, then it is difficult to understand why the exclusion of the same evidence was not similarly and unfairly prejudicial to the defense. Indeed, the prosecutor's representation to the trial court that the exculpatory portions of the statement would unfairly undermine the government's case is a powerful indication of the centrality  at least in the prosecutor's mind  of the error. Allen, 837 A.2d at 923. Moreover, [a prosecutor's] own estimate of his case, and of its reception by the jury at the time, is, if not the only, at least a highly relevant measure now of the likelihood of prejudice. Garris v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 96, 100, 390 F.2d 862, 866 (1968); Allen, 837 A.2d at 923. To paraphrase the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals in United States v. DeLoach, 164 U.S.App.D.C.116, 504 F.2d 185 (1974), if [the exculpatory portion of Mack's statement] had really been unimportant, the prosecutor would not, we think, have objected to [it] so strenuously. 164 U.S.App.D.C. at 122, 504 F.2d at 191. The government's claim at trial that the admission of the exculpatory questions and answers in Mack's statement would be unfair and prejudicial was not entirely unreasonable. As the prosecutor pointed out, the government would have no opportunity to cross-examine Mack, who chose not to testify, with respect to Mack's assertion that he did not receive the Bryco pistol until approximately twelve days after the murder. Moreover, as the trial judge explained in excluding the contested parts of Mack's statement, the redacted version of that statement did not amount to a confession of guilt of the murder: The government is free to argue [that] the fact that [Mack] had the gun on July 21 is circumstantial evidence that he had it on July 7. And on the other hand, [Mack] is free to argue that the fact that he had it on July 21 does not mean that he had it on July 7.[ [18] ] Indeed, the defense questioned several jurors during voir dire about the connection and each juror questioned indicated that he or she understood that possession of the gun on July 21 did not mean possession of the firearm on July 7. Moreover, an impartial juror could reasonably be expected to infer from the redacted statement that Mack did not confess participation in the murder, for if he had confessed, then that confession would surely have been brought to the jury's attention. Thus, in our view, the claim in Mack's reply brief that [t]he government chose to exploit the unfairly redacted version of the statement to make its point that Mack essentially confessed to having the murder weapon on the day of the murder  (emphasis added), overstates the effect of the trial court's ruling. Nevertheless, the impermissible redaction of the statement went to a major piece of evidence. The importance of that evidence  i.e., of the statement without its exculpatory portion  was emphasized by the prosecutor when the issue arose in the trial court. In our view, therefore, the trial court's failure to apply the rule of completeness had substantial, if not overwhelming, centrality, and it was significantly prejudicial to Mack's defense.