Opinion ID: 852644
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Heading: The Eleventh Amendment

Text: The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. This Amendment was adopted in 1798 in response to Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793), which upheld a common law action for assumpsit brought by two South Carolinians against the State of Georgia to collect a revolutionary war debt. Georgia had refused to appear, claiming that federal courts could not hear suits against a sovereign State, but the Supreme Court affirmed a default judgment for the plaintiffs. Recent Supreme Court precedent has made clear that the Eleventh Amendment has a broader reach than merely stripping federal courts of jurisdiction over claims against one State by citizens of another. Rather, the Amendment reflects the constitutional principle that a State may not be sued in federal court without its consent whether the suit is brought by a foreign citizen, a citizen of another state, or the state's own citizens. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III). This doctrine applies to federal legislation that is grounded in the Commerce Clause or any of Congress' other enumerated Article I powers. See, e.g., Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 155 L.Ed.2d 953 (2003). Moreover, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) established that Congress may not subject unconsenting States to suit in a state court under legislation passed pursuant to Congress' Article I powers. Thus, even though there may be concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction over claims asserting rights under a federal statute, a State may not be sued in either federal or state court without its consent under a federal statute grounded in Article I powers. The Court explained that states' Eleventh Amendment immunity is a convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 713, 119 S.Ct. 2240. Instead, that immunity stems from the structure of the original Constitution itself which incorporated the traditional understanding that a sovereign was not subject to suit without its consent. Id. at 728, 119 S.Ct. 2240. The Alden majority explained that until Chisholm, the Constitution was understood, in light of its history and structure, to preserve the States' traditional immunity from private suits. As the [Eleventh] Amendment clarified the only provisions of the Constitution that anyone had suggested might support a contrary understanding, there was no reason to draft with a broader brush. Id. at 724, 119 S.Ct. 2240. Thus, though the Eleventh Amendment speaks only of states' immunity from suit in federal court, the original constitutional design which the Amendment acted to restore embraced the fundamental structural principle that unconsenting states are shielded from private suits under federal law in their own courts as well as in the federal courts. Id. at 722, 119 S.Ct. 2240. Congress' Article I powers cannot support a claim against a State because the sovereign immunity reflected in the Eleventh Amendment trumps antecedent provisions of the Constitution. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 66, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (internal quotations omitted). Congress may, however, abrogate unconsenting States' sovereign immunity by exercising its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment which authorizes Congress to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment by appropriate legislation. See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 726, 123 S.Ct. 1972. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000), however, the Court concluded that the ADEA was not an exercise of Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore the provisions of the ADEA authorizing state employees to sue their state employers in federal or state court for monetary damages violated the Eleventh Amendment. Purdue and Montgomery agree that Kimel precludes a claim for monetary damages under the ADEA by state employees against their unconsenting state employers. Indiana has not consented to suit under the ADEA by enacting the IADA. As we explain more fully in Part II of this opinion, the IADA, though prohibiting discrimination in employment in terms similar to the ADEA, does not authorize aggrieved employees to bring private civil actions against their employers. Moreover, even if the IADA authorized private civil actions against state agencies, it would not constitute consent to suit by private individuals under the ADEA. Waiver of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity by the states must be express, unequivocal and voluntary. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). It must be done by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The IADA contains no express and unequivocal language by which Indiana consents to suits for damages brought by aggrieved state employees under the federal ADEA. [3]