Opinion ID: 2631205
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Open Education Clause

Text: ¶ 14 In pertinent part, the Open Education Clause requires that the public education system shall be open to all children of the state. Utah Const. art. X, § 1. We hold that this provision is self-executing. ¶ 15 First, the clause is presumptively mandatory and prohibitory under article I, section 26. There is no wording in the Open Education Clause constituting a contrary declaration. ¶ 16 Second, the clause is judicially definable and enforceable absent enabling legislation. In fact, this court has already defined and applied the Open Education Clause. For example, in Logan City School District v. Kowallis, this court stated that [t]he requirement that the schools must be open to all children of the state is a prohibition against any law or rule which would separate or divide the children of the state into classes or groups, and grant, allow, or provide one group or class educational privileges or advantages denied another. No child of school age, resident within the state, can be lawfully denied admission to the schools of the state because of race, color, location, religion, politics, or any other bar or barrier which may be set up which would deny to such child equality of educational opportunities or facilities with all other children of the state. This is a direction to the Legislature to provide a system of public schools to which all children of the state may be admitted. It is also a prohibition against the Legislature, or any other body, making any law or rule which would deny admission to, or exclude from, the public schools any child resident of the state, for any cause except the child's own conduct, behavior, or health. The schools are open to all children of the state when there are no restrictions on any child, children, or group of children which do not apply to all children in the state alike. 94 Utah 342, 347-48, 77 P.2d 348, 350-51 (1938). ¶ 17 Finally, certain historical facts strongly suggest that the constitutional framers intended that the Open Education Clause take immediate effect without the necessity of implementing legislation. First, a public education system already existed at the time article X, section 1 was enacted. See Logan City Sch. Dist., 94 Utah at 349, 77 P.2d at 351. It cannot seriously be argued that the framers crafted the Open Education Clause with the intent that it would not immediately apply to the existing public schools. Second, Congress made Utah's adoption of an open education provision a prerequisite to admission into the Union. See Meyers v. Board of Educ. of San Juan Sch. Dist., 905 F. Supp. 1544, 1557 (D. Utah 1995) (citing Act of July 16, 1894, ch. 138, § 3, 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1893-95)). On the assumption that Congress would not have been satisfied with an inoperative open education provision, it seems reasonable to conclude that the framers therefore intended the Open Education Clause to be immediately operative in order to obtain statehood. ¶ 18 In sum, we hold that the Due Process Clause and the Open Education Clause are self-executing. However, a self-executing constitutional provision does not necessarily give rise to a damages suit. Self-executing constitutional provisions are commonly enforced in various ways that do not necessarily involve a monetary remedy. For example, the exclusionary rule, the Miranda doctrine, the invalidation of unconstitutional statutes, injunctive relief, the overturning of unconstitutional convictions, and declaratory judgments are all well-recognized and effective means of protecting important constitutional rights. Accordingly, we now turn to the question of when a self-executing constitutional provision may be enforced by a private suit for damages.