Opinion ID: 777088
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The MDLEA Instruction

Text: 80 Count Four of the Indictment charged the defendants with conspiring to violate the MDLEA between 1989 and 1991 based on their attempts to offload hashish into Canada from ships in Canadian waters. The evidence produced by the government at trial demonstrated that in 1989 the defendants orchestrated and participated in the offload of many tons of hashish from a vessel in the St. Lawrence River. In 1990, the defendants planned another such offload, but the shipment did not arrive. In 1991, the defendants planned to offload a 60 ton shipment of hashish from two vessels in the Gulf of the St. Lawrence. The effort failed, and barrels of hashish were subsequently discovered floating in the St. Lawrence River. The defendants were arrested after this failed offload. 81 The MDLEA makes it unlawful for any person on board a vessel of the United States, or on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ... to knowingly or intentionally ... distribute... a controlled substance. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a). The Act states that a `vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States' includes ... a vessel located in the territorial waters of another nation, where the nation consents to the enforcement of United States law by the United States. Id. § 1903(c)(1)(E). Consent ... may be proved by the certification of the Secretary of State or the Secretary's designee. Id. § 1903(c)(1)(E). 6 82 In this case, the defendants were charged with a conspiracy that ended in late July 1991. In July 1996 the defendants were indicted for violating the MDLEA. It is undisputed that the government did not obtain consent from Canada to enforce United States law until after the return of the Superseding Indictment in July 1996. 83 The District Court instructed the jury as follows: 84 The government has introduced evidence of ... a certification by a designee of the Secretary of State of the United States. This certification alone is sufficient evidence from which you may find that the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the vessels ... were vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 85 The defendants challenge this instruction, asserting that because the certification of consent was obtained in 1996, it conferred jurisdiction in 1996. Thus, the certification could not have shown that the vessels were subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a), at the time of the alleged conspiracy. We review the jury instruction de novo. See United States v. Miller, 148 F.3d 207, 211 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1072, 119 S.Ct. 804, 142 L.Ed.2d 665 (1999). 86 We have not previously had occasion to interpret the MDLEA's jurisdictional provisions. We agree with the District Court, however, that the statute's jurisdictional element may be satisfied by consent provided any time before trial. First, the MDLEA requires the consent of foreign nations for purposes of international comity and diplomatic courtesy, not as a protection for defendants. See S.REP. No. 99-530, at 16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5986, 6001 ([O]nly the flag nation of a vessel should have a right to question whether the Coast Guard has boarded that vessel with the required consent because the international law of jurisdiction is an issue between sovereign nations.); see also United States v. Devila, 216 F.3d 1009, 1017 (11th Cir.2000) (per curiam), aff'g United States v. Preciado, No. 96-0534 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 13, 1998) (order denying motion for new trial) (The [MDLEA] requires the consent of a vessel's flag nation for jurisdiction to protect the interest of that flag nation and international comity, not the interest of the individuals aboard the vessel.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 103, 151 L.Ed.2d 62 (2001); United States v. Rasheed, 802 F.Supp. 312, 321 (D.Haw.1992) ([T]he consent requirement of § 1903 is a courtesy extended to foreign governments, not to drug smugglers.). As such, consent given at any time prior to trial achieves the purpose of § 1903(c)(1)(E). 87 Moreover, we are persuaded by the fact that several of our sister circuits have found that consent under the MDLEA can relate back to activity that occurred before consent. See, e.g., Devila, 216 F.3d at 1017, aff'g United States v. Preciado, No. 96-0534 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 13, 1998) (order denying motion for new trial) ([W]hile the individuals may challenge jurisdiction over a vessel on the basis that the flag nation failed to consent before trial, they may not do so on the basis that the flag nation's consent was obtained after the vessel was boarded.); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 552 (1st Cir.) (finding jurisdictional requirement of MDLEA satisfied though consent was provided after boarding of ship by Coast Guard), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 838, 120 S.Ct. 101, 145 L.Ed.2d 86 (1999); United States v. Juda, 46 F.3d 961, 966 (9th Cir.) ([W]hen MDLEA jurisdiction is premised on consent of the flag nation, such consent relates back to activity that occurred prior to consent.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1169, 115 S.Ct. 2632, 132 L.Ed.2d 872 (1995); United States v. Khan, 35 F.3d 426, 431 (9th Cir.1994) ([T]he timing of ... consent is irrelevant.). Cf. United States v. Aikins, 923 F.2d 650, 655 (9th Cir.1990) (The statute is not applied to the defendants ex post facto; although Panama gave its consent after they had set to sea, they took the risk of such consent being given.); United States v. Reeh, 780 F.2d 1541, 1547 (11th Cir.1986) (noting that consent under predecessor statute, 21 U.S.C. § 955a, is valid if given before th[e] case came to trial). 88 Indeed, the above cases interpreted § 1903(c)(1)(C), an arguably more restrictive provision which involves ships registered in foreign nations, as opposed to § 1903(c)(1)(E), which involves ships in foreign waters. As the District Court noted, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c)(1)(E), the subsection under which the government sought to establish jurisdiction here, provides that a vessel is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States if a foreign nation consents to United States enforcement. In contrast, § 1903(c)(1)(C) provides that a vessel is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States if a foreign nation has consented to United States enforcement. The difference in statutory language makes the rationale of the above cases all the more persuasive in our context. The fact that courts have allowed consent to relate back even under § 1903(c)(1)(C) — despite its has consented language — convinces us that it can relate back under § 1903(c)(1)(E). 89 Although consent here was given five years after the fact — as opposed to weeks or months — there is no clear rationale for drawing the line at any point prior to the beginning of trial. If consent after the fact is permissible, then it is as logical to allow it years after securing of the vessel as it is days after. 90 Accordingly, we hold that the District Court's instruction—that consent provided even after prosecution is initiated may establish jurisdiction under § 1903(c)(1)(E) — was not erroneous.