Opinion ID: 2450649
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scope of Release

Text: We are first asked to consider whether the scope of the release includes the named attorneys and whether the release of any claims, known or unknown includes allegations of wiretapping. Because it is undisputed that her former husband is released, the sole issue is whether the attorneys are similarly protected. Interpretation of a release or settlement agreement is governed by the same principles applicable to any other contractual agreement, and the primary rule of construction is that the intention of the parties shall govern. State ex rel. Normandy Orthopedics, Inc. v. Crandall, 581 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Mo. banc 1979); Community Title Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 795 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Mo.App.1990). Any question regarding the scope and extent of the release is to be resolved according to what may fairly be said to have been within the contemplation of the parties at the time the release was given. This, in turn, is to be resolved in light of all the surrounding facts and circumstances under which the parties acted. Normandy Orthopedics, 581 S.W.2d at 833; Community Title, 795 S.W.2d at 457. However, language that is plain and unambiguous on its face will be given full effect within the context of the agreement as a whole unless the release is based on fraud, accident, misrepresentation, mistake, or unfair dealings. See, e.g., Ragan v. Schreffler, 306 S.W.2d 494, 499 (Mo.1957); Montrose Sav. Bank v. Landers, 675 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Mo. App.1984); see also, Haines v. St. Charles Speedway, Inc., 689 F.Supp. 964, 968-69 (E.D.Mo.1988); aff'd, 874 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1989). The specific release in the Final Marital Settlement states: Except as otherwise provided herein, each party releases the other from all claims and marital rights arising by reason of common law or the statutes pertaining to marriage.... Each party further releases the other from any claims, known or unknown, which involve the other party and/or their respective counsel being, Charlotte P. Thayer, Michael J. Albano and Rose Anne Nespica. Counsel for Respondent agrees that they will cooperate with Wife in any litigation involving Wife and her former counsel from the firm of Dietrich, Davis, et al. The language of this clause is ambiguous. On the one hand, it states that each party releases the other.... Although it is clear that the other means the other party, the release refers to the other party only. It does not state the other party and counsel for the other party. On the other hand, the next clause refers to claims, known or unknown, which involve the other party and/or their respective counsel.  (emphasis added). In our view, the release operates to relieve Frick of liability for all claims in which he is involved, regardless of the reference to claims which involve his counsel. We are at a loss, then, to give some meaning and purpose to the clause and/or their respective counsel unless the parties intended for the respective counsel, themselves, to benefit from the release. Given this ambiguity, we must determine the intent of the parties by resorting to the surrounding facts and circumstances under which the parties acted. Normandy Orthopedics, 581 S.W.2d at 833. In this endeavor, the obvious starting place is the oral testimony elicited at the September 25, 1985, hearing. Andes' testimony is dispositive. When put to the question ... and each of you likewise release any claims that you might have against the counsel of another party; is that correct?, she answered, That's correct. Although the question was phrased in terms of releasing claims as opposed to releasing parties, it is clear that Andes agreed not to pursue claims against Frick or Frick's counsel. There is no ambiguity, however, in the clause any claims, known and unknown. These words are unqualified and unrestricted and would, therefore, include any allegations of wiretapping. See Rudisill v. Lewis, 796 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Mo.App.1990). As stated earlier, the only exceptions to the operation of such plain and unambiguous language is if the release is based on fraud, accident, duress, mistake, misrepresentation, or unfair dealings. Ragan, 306 S.W.2d at 499; Montrose, 675 S.W.2d at 671; see also, Ellis v. Reisenbichler, 712 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Mo.App.1986).