Opinion ID: 599004
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Luscier's Tribal Court Conviction

Text: 14 The district court should not have relied on Luscier's prior tribal conviction as a reason for departing from the applicable criminal history category. The guidelines provide that a sentencing court may consider a tribal conviction in determining whether to depart. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a) p.s. As we have stated above, however, the tribal conviction is not a valid basis for departure unless it qualifies as an aggravating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d at 746. The Lira-Barraza rule reinforces section 4A1.3, which provides that [a] departure ... is warranted when the criminal history category significantly under-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit further crimes. The examples listed in the policy statement accompanying section 4A1.3 uniformly refer to either serious or large-scale offenses. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 p.s. 15 Luscier was convicted in tribal court for breaking and entering. He was sentenced to thirty days in jail. The district court did not find, and simply could not have found, that because of this single tribal conviction criminal history category IV significantly under-represents the seriousness of Luscier's criminal history. We hold, therefore, that the district court erred in relying on Luscier's tribal conviction as a ground for departing upward.