Opinion ID: 658352
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged JDA Violations

Text: 53 With respect to count 15, the one juvenile count of conviction that we do not reverse based on improper transfer, we must consider the several alleged violations of the JDA that Rupley, Jr., claims merit reversal. We apply a three-step inquiry to alleged procedural violations of the JDA. We first ask whether the government violated the JDA's requirements. If it did, we ask whether the government's conduct was so egregious as to constitute a deprivation of due process. If it was not, we must determine whether the violation was harmless to the juvenile beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Doe, 862 F.2d 776, 779 (9th Cir.1988).
54 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5032 (1988) provides in part: 55 A juvenile alleged to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency ... shall not be proceeded against in any court of the United States unless the Attorney General, after investigation, certifies to the appropriate district court of the United States that (1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such alleged act of juvenile delinquency, (2) the State does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles, or (3) the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony or an offense described in [21 U.S.C. Sec. 841] ... and that there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction. 56 The government filed the certification on February 13, 1987, nearly a year before trial but approximately four months after Rupley, Jr.'s arrest and arraignment. Rupley, Jr., argues that the government violated Sec. 5032 by failing to file a proper certification before any proceedings in the district court had begun. We review this issue of statutory interpretation de novo. See Doe, 862 F.2d at 779. 57 Certification is a jurisdictional requirement. United States v. Juvenile Male, 864 F.2d 641, 643 (9th Cir.1988). But see United States v. Gonzalez-Cervantes, 668 F.2d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir.1981) (filing of accurate certification is not jurisdictional). The statute includes no deadline for filing the certification, however, and no court has imposed one. See United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1260 (6th Cir.1991) (certification filed at close of prosecution's case-in-chief was timely where defendants failed to invoke JDA earlier), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1217, 117 L.Ed.2d 455, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1680, 118 L.Ed.2d 397 (1992); United States v. Cuomo, 525 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.1976) (without deciding the latest time for filing, holding that certification filed before arraignment was timely). Our own cases are unclear on the point. Compare Gonzalez-Cervantes, 668 F.2d at 1077 n. 6. ([Section 5032] does not set forth when the certification need be filed. The statute provides: 'shall not be proceeded against ... unless ...' a certification is filed. It does not state that proceedings cannot be undertaken until a certificate is filed.) with id. at 1077 ([Section 5032] quite clearly requires the filing of a certification before the district court can institute proceedings against the juvenile....) (emphasis added) and Juvenile Male, 864 F.2d at 643 ([Section 5032] require[s] the government to file a special certification regarding the juvenile before it can proceed against that juvenile.) (emphasis added). See also Chambers, 944 F.2d at 1260 ([E]stablishing the factors for federal jurisdiction is not always a prerequisite to initiating federal proceedings.); Cuomo, 525 F.2d at 1289 ([Section 5032] does not expressly apply to the commencement of an action against a juvenile....) (emphasis added). 58 Congress' purpose in enacting the certification requirement was to help ensure that state and local authorities would deal with juvenile offenders wherever possible, keeping juveniles away from the less appropriate federal channels. Juvenile Male, 864 F.2d at 644. We need not decide in this case whether a deadline for filing a certification is necessary to effectuate this purpose. The certification was furnished nearly a year before trial, and more than eight months before the filing of the superseding indictment on which Rupley, Jr., was tried and convicted. The certification was clearly timely. 59
60 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5035 (1988) provides in part: 61 A juvenile alleged to be delinquent may be detained only in a juvenile facility or such other suitable place as the Attorney General may designate.... The Attorney General shall not cause any juvenile alleged to be delinquent to be detained or confined in any institution in which the juvenile has regular contact with adult persons convicted of a crime or awaiting trial on criminal charges. 62 Because Rupley, Jr., was under 21 and stood accused of violating federal law prior to his eighteenth birthday, he was [a] juvenile alleged to be delinquent within the meaning of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5031. During the 15 months between his arrest and indictment in October 1986 and his transfer to adult status, however, Rupley, Jr., was confined with his codefendants in a maximum security prison. Rupley, Jr., argues that the government's violation of Sec. 5035 requires reversal of his convictions. The government concedes that the statute was violated but argues that no prejudice resulted and that reversal is not warranted. Because Rupley, Jr., although represented by counsel at all times subsequent to his initial arrest and indictment, did not raise this argument in the district court, we review for plain error. Calabrese, 825 F.2d at 1346. 63 Section 5035 does not prescribe a remedy for its violation, and no court has addressed the specific issue. Under the circumstances of this case, we do not find the government's lapses so egregious as to require reversal. See Doe, 862 F.2d at 780. There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent. United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 717, 110 S.Ct. 2072, 2077, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990). Had Rupley, Jr., objected to the conditions of his detention as violating Sec. 5035, the proper remedy would likely have been dismissal of the juvenile charges without prejudice. 6 He did not make such an objection. In September 1987, the government filed a superseding indictment charging Rupley, Jr., with two adult offenses as well as several committed before his eighteenth birthday. The superseding indictment mooted the earlier indictment and any procedural violations that may have tainted it. From that time on, Rupley, Jr., was properly detained in an adult facility, and any non-civil remedies that might previously have been available were waived. Moreover, Rupley, Jr., was eventually transferred to adult status and received credit at sentencing for the full period of his pretransfer confinement, thus minimizing any prejudice from the government's error. See Doe, 862 F.2d at 780-81. We therefore need not invoke the exceptional remedy of reversal for plain error to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process. United States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Bustillo, 789 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir.1986)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 858, 110 S.Ct. 167, 107 L.Ed.2d 124 (1989).
64 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5036 (1988) provides in part: 65 If an alleged delinquent who is in detention pending trial is not brought to trial within thirty days from the date upon which such detention was begun, the information shall be dismissed on motion of the alleged delinquent or at the direction of the court, unless the Attorney General shows that additional delay was caused by the juvenile or his counsel, or consented to by the juvenile and his counsel, or would be in the interest of justice in the particular case. 66 Rupley, Jr., argues that because the government failed to bring him to trial or move to transfer him to adult status within 30 days of his detention, the charges against him should have been dismissed. 7 67 Rupley, Jr., was arrested on October 10, 1986, and ordered detained on October 14, 1986. On November 3, 1986, he moved for an extension of time to file pretrial motions and filed motions to suppress and for severance, among others. The time attributable to these motions is excludable from the 30-day limit under the caused by the juvenile or his counsel exception. Moreover, on January 16, 1987, the magistrate found that the ends of justice served by the granting of the government's motion to continue the trial date ... outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. [ER F-5-6] This finding was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Murray, 771 F.2d 1324, 1327 (9th Cir.1985). Thus any remaining time before filing of the government's motion to transfer on February 13, 1987, was excludable under the interest of justice exception. 68 We therefore hold that none of the alleged procedural violations of the JDA require reversal of Rupley, Jr.'s count 15 conviction.IV. Discovery 69 Appellants allege at least 40 separate discovery violations, including the calling of witnesses not on the government's pretrial witness list and violations of Fed.R.Crim.P. 16, the Jencks Act (18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Fortunately, we need not address each alleged violation individually. 70 To reverse a conviction for a discovery violation, we must find not only that the district court abused its discretion, but that the error resulted in prejudice to substantial rights. United States v. Michaels, 796 F.2d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 893, 93 L.Ed.2d 845 (1987); see also United States v. Span, 970 F.2d 573, 582 (9th Cir.1992) (violation of Jencks Act will not result in reversal if error is more likely than not harmless), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1283, 122 L.Ed.2d 676 (1993); United States v. Tham, 884 F.2d 1262, 1266 (9th Cir.1989) (reversal for Brady violation requires reasonable probability that result would have been different had the evidence been disclosed); United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1324 (9th Cir.1980) (reversal based on testimony of undisclosed government witness requires defendant to show that he suffered prejudicial surprise from the testimony), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1043, 101 S.Ct. 1764, 68 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981). 71 Assuming arguendo that the district court abused its discretion in each alleged instance by not finding a discovery violation, Appellants fail to demonstrate that prejudice resulted. The district court routinely granted the defense recesses and continuances to examine newly disclosed physical evidence or to prepare for cross-examination of unanticipated witnesses. In many cases, the district court based the length of a continuance or recess on the defense's own estimate of how much preparation time was needed, and confirmed that the defense was ready to proceed when the trial reconvened. Appellants do not point to a single instance when the district court denied a request for additional time or when an alleged discovery violation otherwise caused them prejudice. 8 72 Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in selecting remedies for those discovery violations that it found to have occurred. [A] district court has broad discretion to fashion remedies for the violation of its discovery orders, United States v. Spillone, 879 F.2d 514, 522 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 864, 111 S.Ct. 173, 112 L.Ed.2d 137, 498 U.S. 878, 111 S.Ct. 210, 112 L.Ed.2d 170 (1990), and the sanction chosen should not be harsher than necessary to accomplish the goals of Rule 16, United States v. Gee, 695 F.2d 1165, 1169 (9th Cir.1983), or disproportionate to the conduct of counsel, United States v. Aceves-Rosales, 832 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1077, 108 S.Ct. 1056, 98 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1988). Given the district court's positive evaluation of the government's cooperation 9 and the court's own accommodation of defense requests for additional time, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to impose severe sanctions for all discovery violations. 10