Opinion ID: 1962584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instruction Regarding Chemical Analysis Certificate

Text: [¶ 12] Barnard contends that the court's jury instruction regarding the chemical analysis certificate constituted obvious error because it gave the jury the impression that the certificate was conclusive, rather than prima facie, evidence of the composition of the drug. From this, argues Barnard, the jury may have thought that the State had no burden of proof regarding the composition of the pills that Barnard sold. The State concedes that the instruction may have been confusing, but asserts that this was harmless because Barnard never contested the composition of the pills. [¶ 13] Barnard did not object to the jury instructions given by the trial court, therefore, we review those instructions only for obvious error. M.R.Crim. P. 52(b); State v. Small, 2000 ME 182, ¶ 5, 763 A.2d 104, 105. We will not grant relief unless the error in the instructions is so highly prejudicial and so taints the proceedings as to virtually deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Id. Further, we review jury instructions as a whole, taking into consideration the total effect created by all the instructions and the potential for juror misunderstanding. State v. Saucier, 2001 ME 107, ¶ 23, 776 A.2d 621, 627-28 (quoting State v. Cote, 462 A.2d 487, 490 (Me.1983)). [¶ 14] At the time Barnard was tried, requirements for drug analysis certificates and their prima facie evidentiary value were set by statute as follows: A laboratory that receives a drug or substance from a law enforcement officer or agency for analysis as a scheduled drug shall, if it is capable of so doing, analyze the same as requested by a method designed to accurately determine the composition of the substance, including by chemical means, visual examination, or both, and shall issue a certificate stating the results of the analysis. The certificate, when duly signed and sworn to by a person certified as qualified for this purpose by the Department of Human Services under certification standards set by that department, is admissible in evidence in a court of the State, and is prima facie evidence that the composition, quality and quantity of the drug or substance are as stated in the certificate.... 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1112(1) (Supp.2001) (amended by P.L.2001, ch. 383, § 142, effective January 31, 2003). [¶ 15] Where a criminal statute establishes that certain evidence carries prima facie weight, courts must instruct jurors in terms of reasonable inferences that the jurors are free to accept or reject from the evidence. M.R. Evid. 301(b) (stating that a statute providing that a fact is prima facie evidence of another fact establishes a presumption); M.R. Evid. 303(c) (stating that in criminal cases, court should instruct in terms of reasonable inference, not presumption); [4] State v. Liberty, 478 A.2d 1112, 1116-17 (Me.1984) (stating that it is error to instruct jury in terms of a presumption); State v. Raymond, 399 A.2d 223, 223 (Me.1979); Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 6-13 (4th ed.2003). The current version of section 1112(1) better reflects Maine law: The certificate . . . gives rise to a permissible inference under the Maine Rules of Evidence, Rule 303 that the composition, quality and quantity of the drug or substance are as stated [in the certificate] .... 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1112(1) (Supp.2002). [¶ 16] The court's instruction that as a matter of law ... this certificate is sufficient to prove [that the pills contained hydromorphone], standing alone, could have the effect of misleading the jury regarding the legal significance of the certificate. To avoid confusion, an instruction to a jury in a criminal case must avoid terms such as prima facie evidence or presumption, and use instead the terms inference or permissible inference. Liberty, 478 A.2d at 1116-17; M.R. Evid. 303(c). The jury should also be instructed that any inference does not shift the burden of proof, and that they are not bound to accept any inference and may reject it. Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 6-13; State v. Christianson, 404 A.2d 999, 1003 (Me.1979). [¶ 17] The portion of the instruction that as a matter of law the certificate was sufficient to prove that the pills contained hydromorphone cannot be analyzed in isolation from the remainder of the instruction. The next sentence of the court's instruction put the certificate back into its proper perspective: It is up to you to find, from all the evidence, including the exhibit or the certificate, whether it has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the pills alleged to have been sold in this instance were Hydromorphone. Taken together, these statements informed the jurors that it was up to them to determine from all of the evidence whether the composition of the pills was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶ 18] In measuring whether the instruction was so highly prejudicial as to virtually deprive the defendant of a fair trial, we also consider the extent to which the analysis of the pills was in dispute. Here, there was no serious issue at trial as to whether the pills obtained by the confidential informant were anything other than what the certificate of analysis, Agent Rolfe, and the confidential informant said they were: Dilaudid, which contains hydromorphone. [¶ 19] Considered as a whole, and in the context of the evidence presented to the jury, the court's instruction was not so highly prejudicial as to constitute obvious error or produce manifest injustice, State v. Child, 1999 ME 198, ¶ 7, 743 A.2d 230, 232.