Opinion ID: 537466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Defendants Perkins and Ware Denial of Severance Motion.

Text: 78 Defendants Perkins and Ware argue that joinder was improper under Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(b) since they did not participate in the same series of acts or transactions as the other defendants. Alternatively, defendants argues that even if joinder was proper under Rule 8(b), severance should have been granted under Fed.R.Crim.P. 14 because of the substantial prejudice to defendants resulting from the jury considering the evidence against other persons in order to convict the defendants. 79 At trial, all defendants joined in the motion asserting improper joinder, Rule 8(b), and requesting severance due to prejudice, Rule 14; however, only Perkins and Ware address this issue on appeal. The district court held that there was a factual similarity in the counts; the proofs overlapped; the participants had the same objective, to burn homes and collect the insurance; and judicial economy would best be served by joinder. The court further held that the defendants failed to make a strong showing of substantial prejudice and declined to sever the trial under Rule 14. 80 Joinder of multiple defendants under Rule 8(b) is proper if each count in the indictment arises out of the same series of acts or transactions. United States v. Hatcher, 680 F.2d 438, 441 (6th Cir.1982). A group of acts or transactions constitutes a series if they are logically related and involve overlapping proofs. United States v. Swift, 809 F.2d 320, 322 (6th Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Johnson, 763 F.2d 773, 776 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 862 (1985)). Rule 8(b) is broadly construed in favor of joinder because Rule 14 provides protection against prejudicial joinder. Swift, at 322. A significant consideration is whether joinder would promote judicial economy. Id. Review of a district court's refusal to sever pursuant to Rule 8 is reviewed for an error of law but is subject to the harmless error standard. Hatcher, 680 F.2d at 442. 81 We conclude joinder was proper. All twenty-three counts of the indictment involved a series of schemes to defraud insurance companies by intentionally setting fire to residential dwellings in order to collect insurance proceeds. The record reveals that defendants Perkins and Ware, as well as the other defendants, were connected to the kingpin of the entire scheme to defraud, defendant Migdaleck, and the mail fraud counts against Perkins and Ware were logically interrelated with the other acts charged in the indictment. See Johnson, 763 F.2d at 776. Moreover, joinder served the interest of judicial economy. See, Swift, 809 F.2d at 322. We conclude, therefore, that joinder was proper under Rule 8(b). 82 Under Fed.R.Crim.P. 14, the trial court may order severance if a defendant is prejudiced by joinder of defendants or claims. Swift, 809 F.2d at 322. This court reviews the district court's denial of a severance motion under Rule 14 for an abuse of discretion, and to establish an abuse of discretion the defendant must make a strong showing of prejudice. Id. The defendant must show the jury was not able to separate and treat distinctively evidence relevant to each defendant and even if some potential jury confusion is established, this must be balanced against society's need for speedy and efficient trials. Id. (quoting United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1525 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1068, and 474 U.S. 1069, and 475 U.S. 1017 (1986)). 83 Defendants' basic contention on appeal is that they were prejudiced by the spillover of evidence relating to the other arson fires because the evidence against them was not overwhelming. 84 Albert Meredith, Jr. testified that defendant Ware contacted him and told him that defendant Perkins wished to speak to him about burning a dwelling. Meredith, Jr. spoke to Perkins in Ware's presence and discussed the arson, the fire repairs, and the monetary advancement. They proceeded to Perkins' home where Meredith, Jr. examined Perkins' insurance policy and determined where the fire should be set. Thereafter, the fire was set by Adar Hassan. Perkins admitted Meredith, Jr., Hassan and Ware into her home and then Perkins and Ware left. Hassan set the fire. 85 Adar Hassan testified that he, Meredith, Jr. and Ware drove to Perkins home on the day of the fire. They discussed what type of fire was required. At Perkins' home, Hassan discussed the location of the fire with defendant Perkins and then asked everyone to leave while he prepared the fire. 86 Absent a showing of substantial prejudice, spillover of evidence from one case to another does not require severance. Johnson, 763 F.2d at 777 (quoting Gallo, 763 F.2d at 1526). 87 In view of the foregoing evidence, any spillover evidence of other schemes to intentionally set fire to residential dwellings cannot establish substantial prejudice. Moreover, the district court gave the jury cautionary instructions regarding the separate consideration to be give to each defendant. A jury is presumed capable of sorting out evidence and considering each count and each defendant separately. Swift, 809 F.2d at 323. That the jury did so in the instant case is evidenced by the fact that one homeowner was acquitted and defendant Migdaleck was acquitted in part. 88 As this court said in Swift, even if there is some potential for jury confusion, it is small and does not outweigh 'society's need for speedy and efficient trials.'  Id. (quoting Gallo, 763 F.2d at 1525). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' severance motion under Rule 14. 89