Opinion ID: 2581358
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutor's presence at hearing on severance motion

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred by not hearing his severance motion in chambers without the prosecution present. He argues that the court's failure to do so prejudiced his ability to advance inconsistent defenses  on the one hand, his defense that his killing of Bettancourt was at most second degree murder, and on the other hand that there was reasonable doubt as to whether he was the actual killer of either Sadler or Morris  without revealing to the prosecution the work product and possible strategy of the defense. The trial court's failure to hear the motion in chambers, defendant argues, deprived him of his rights to remain silent and to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, respectively, to the United States Constitution. Because defendant mentions no defense request for such a hearing, presumably his point is that the trial court was obliged on its own initiative to hear defendant's severance motion without the prosecution present. He offers no authority for that proposition, instead citing cases where in-chambers review was sought of discovery documents containing private or privileged information. ( State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 847, 855-856, 210 Cal. Rptr. 219, 693 P.2d 804 [accident reports for collision site]; Kelvin L. v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 823, 829, 133 Cal.Rptr. 325 [juvenile's Pitchess request for police officer records].) Absent some evidence the defense requested an in-chambers hearing and articulated the harm defendant might suffer from a hearing at which the prosecution was present, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it did not exclude the prosecution from the hearing on defendant's severance motion.