Opinion ID: 1753250
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: was defendant entitled to a comparative negligence instruction?

Text: On the afternoon of September 2, 1977, Plaintiff left her office in downtown Gulfport to return to her home on Klondyke Road. Plaintiff was proceeding north on Pineville Road south of the V-intersection where it is intersected by Klondyke Road, and saw Defendant's southbound car stopped on Pineville Road opposite the Golden Nugget Package Store. Defendant's turn signal indicated his intention to turn left across Pineville. Several cars were stopped in back of Defendant and some cars were ahead of Plaintiff in her lane of travel but were not immediately in front of Plaintiff. According to Plaintiff, Defendant suddenly turned in front of her as she passed in front of the package store and a collision resulted. There was a light rain falling; plaintiff had her windshield wipers on; she estimated her speed at about 25 miles per hour at the time of impact, and estimated her speed was about 25 miles per hour after she turned on Pineville Road to proceed north. Plaintiff was asked if she slowed her speed below 25 miles per hour when she reached the point where Defendant's car was. She responded, No, I had no reason to. I didn't expect him to pull out in front of me. Defendant testified that he was traveling south on Pineville Road and was going to the Golden Nugget Package Store which is located on the Pineville Road where it intersects with Klondyke Road. His windshield wipers were on, and as he approached the area where the package liquor store was, he came to a stop and turned on his left turn signal. He remained stopped until a car, which was approaching in the northbound lane, passed and then started to turn to the left. At that time Plaintiff's automobile was about 180 feet south of Defendant. Defendant testified that Plaintiff's car was at a canal, which crosses Pineville Road, when he started his turn; that he measured the distance from the canal to the center of the parking lot into which he was turning. Plaintiff argues that Jones v. Craft, 218 So.2d 727 (Miss. 1969) is almost identical to this case, thereby requiring a reversal. In Jones, Plaintiff was driving east on Highway 28 which is a paved highway having two lanes of traffic, one for eastbound traffic and one for westbound traffic. The accident occurred in front of Sullivan's store which was located on the south side of the highway. The area between the store and highway was graveled and a gravel road ran south along the west side of Sullivan's store. Wilson, who was driving west, arrived in front of Sullivan's store about the time Plaintiff approached from the west. Wilson stopped his pickup truck in the westbound lane to allow Plaintiff to pass before he turned south on the gravel road. Plaintiff slowed his vehicle to about 55 miles per hour as he approached the store and blew his horn as he passed the Wilson vehicle. Defendant arrived from the cast about this time and undertook to turn to his left so as to stop in front of Sullivan's store. Defendant turned left directly across Plaintiff's lane of traffic and the two vehicles collided. The trial court peremptorily instructed the jury to find for the Plaintiff on the question of liability and there was no cross-appeal by Defendant questioning the propriety of this instruction. Plaintiff assigned as error the granting of two instructions requested by Defendant instructing the jury to consider the contributory negligence of plaintiff, if any, in awarding damages. The court noted that Plaintiff testified that he reduced his speed to about 55 miles per hour before reaching the Sullivan store, in an area where the speed limit was 65 miles per hour. The only proof that Plaintiff was guilty of excessive speed was the testimony of Defendant that he did not see Plaintiff's automobile until, It was right ready to hit me. When asked if he observed the speed of Plaintiff's vehicle, he answered, Well, it was coming like lightning. The Court held that the testimony of Defendant was no more than a bare scintilla that Plaintiff was driving at an excessive speed; therefore, no instruction on contributory negligence should have been given because the record failed to reveal any substantial evidence of any negligence on the part of Plaintiff. In the case at bar, Plaintiff admitted seeing Defendant stopped with his left turn signal on some distance prior to the impact, and that she did not reduce her speed from 25 miles per hour because, I had no reason to. I didn't expect him to pull out in front of me. Moreover, Defendant testified that he started his turn across Pineville Road when Plaintiff was approximately 180 feet south of the point of the collision. Jones was correctly decided on the facts in that case, but the case at bar presents an entirely different factual situation. Plaintiff's theory of Defendant's negligence, set forth in her instructions, was that the Defendant turned his vehicle into the lane occupied by her at a time when she was so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. Defendant's theory of Plaintiff's negligence set forth in his instructions was that when he turned his vehicle to cross the northbound lane of Pineville Road, the Plaintiff was not close enough to constitute an immediate hazard and Plaintiff negligently failed to yield the right of way. A policeman who investigated the collision made a sketch showing that Defendant's vehicle was located partially in the package store parking lot and partially in the lane of traffic after the collision, corroborating Defendant's testimony that his car was about two feet into the parking lot when the collision occurred. Plaintiff and Defendant were the only two witnesses who testified about the collision. Plaintiff claimed that Defendant suddenly turned in front of her when she was so close that she could not stop. Defendant denied this, and, claimed that he started his turn when Plaintiff's vehicle was approximately 180 feet from him and, in his opinion, he had sufficient time to make the turn safely across the road. Under these disputed facts, we hold that the Defendant was entitled to have the question of whether the Plaintiff negligently failed to yield the right-of-way presented to the jury.