Opinion ID: 4544174
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: This certiorari proceeding arises out of Lisa E. Alkire’s (“Alkire”) conviction for the offense of operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (“OVUII”) in violation of  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 291E-61(a)(1) (Supp. 2014) on Likelike Highway in the early morning hours of October 15, 2016. Alkire raises four questions in her application for writ of certiorari, which challenges the Intermediate Court of Appeals’ (“ICA”) January 24, 2019 summary disposition order (“SDO”). The ICA’s SDO affirmed the District Court of the First Circuit’s (“district court”) August 30, 2017 judgment.1 The four questions raised on certiorari are: I. As a matter of first impression, did the ICA gravely err in finding that the Tachibana admonishment was sufficient where Petitioner was not informed of her right to testify in her consolidated suppression hearing without that testimony being used to determine guilt or innocence and/or where the court specifically declined to inform Petitioner of her right to remain silent? II. As a matter of first impression, did the ICA gravely err in rejecting Petitioner’s HRPP, Rule 48 and/or constitutional speedy trial challenges, where the trial “commenced” with one state witness but was subsequently continued for eight months at no fault of Petitioner? III. Did the ICA gravely err in holding that HRPP Rule 16 usurps United States Supreme Court precedent that requires individual prosecutors to obtain and disclose impeachment materials rather than merely relying on representations of the police to determine whether and what materials should be disclosed to Defendants? IV. Did the ICA gravely err in finding that discovery, requested for its potential exculpatory value, was not material because the evidence of guilt was “overwhelming” and/or in affirming the conviction where Ms. Alkire was deprived of an opportunity to establish an appropriate record as to the existence of the video? 1 The Honorable James H. Ashford presided. 2  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  The first question on certiorari was resolved through our opinion in State v. Chang, 144 Hawaiʻi 535, 445 P.3d 116 (2019).2 With respect to the second question on certiorari, we adopt the California Supreme Court’s reasoning in Rhinehart v. Municipal Court, 677 P.2d 1206, 1211-12 (Cal. 1984), and hold that, in order to effectuate its intent, Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal Procedure (“HRPP”) Rule 48 (2000) requires a “meaningful” commencement of trial. A trial is “meaningfully” commenced when a trial court reasonably commits its resources to the trial. As this is a “new rule,” it will only apply prospectively to events occurring after publication of this decision, i.e., to trials that commence after the date of this opinion.3 With respect to the third question on certiorari, we hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the prosecutor was not required to personally review files of the testifying police officers. As to the fourth question on certiorari, we hold that because the video recording showing Alkire at the police station 2 In Chang, we noted that because the defendant had the right to testify for the purpose of his motion to suppress without having that testimony used against him at trial, it was essential that the defendant be informed of those rights in order to ensure that his decision on whether to testify at the suppression hearing was knowingly and intelligently made. 144 Hawaiʻi at 545, 445 P.3d at 126. Overruling State v. Texeira, 62 Haw. 44, 609 P.2d 131 (1980), we also prospectively held that trial courts could no longer consolidate a motion to suppress hearing with a trial. 144 Hawaiʻi at 546, 445 P.3d at 127. We therefore need not further address this issue. 3 See also infra note 8. 3  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  after her arrest was material to Alkire’s defense and her request was reasonable, the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion to compel. We set out additional parameters the district court must consider. Although the district court may not reach this issue, we also hold that the permissive adverse inference rule, which allows a trier of fact to draw an adverse inference that lost or destroyed evidence was unfavorable to the spoliator, also applies in criminal cases. Accordingly, we vacate the ICA’s February 25, 2019 judgment on appeal, which affirmed the district court’s August 30, 2017 judgment, and we remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.