Opinion ID: 2759701
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: juror concurrence

Text: Article VII (Amended), section 5(7), and ORCP 59 G(2) both provide: “In civil cases three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict.” Although the text of those provisions is identical, defendant is correct that our analysis must begin by looking to the meaning of the rule. State ex rel Engweiler v. Felton, 350 Or 592, 617, 260 P3d 448 (2011) (court’s practice is to address rule before turning to statute or constitution). Thus, the initial question that we address is the intent of the Council on Court Procedures (Council) when it adopted ORCP 59 G(2). State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 620, 317 P3d 889 (2013); A. G. v. Guitron, 351 Or 465, 479, 268 P3d 589 (2011); Waddill, 330 Or at 382 n 2. After undertaking that analysis, we then assess whether the Oregon Constitution imposes additional or more stringent concurrence requirements. parties agreed, became binding upon both of them as the ‘law of the case.’ Upon examination of the record, we also believe that there was evidence in this case from which the jury could have properly found that the requirements of the rule as stated in that instruction were satisfied.” Id. at 267 (emphasis added). We understand Wampler as resting on preservation principles and deciding that the trial court did not err in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard the parties had agreed at trial. 6 Further discussion of the preservation issue would not be of benefit to the bench or bar. 532 Kennedy v. Wheeler To discern the intent of the Council, “we use an analytical process that parallels the one we use to interpret statutes—that is, we examine text, context, and, if helpful, legislative history.” Vanornum, 354 Or at 620. The text of ORCP 59 G(2) instructs that a jury’s verdict need not be unanimous, but may be supported by a vote of threefourths of its members. Thus, for a jury of twelve, at least nine jurors must vote in favor of the jury’s verdict. When a verdict includes more than one finding, however, ORCP 59 G(2) is less explicit. It could mean that at least nine jurors must vote in favor of each of the jury’s findings, or it could mean that the same nine jurors must vote in favor of all or some subset of those findings. As applied to the facts of this case, the parties agree that ORCP 59 G(2) requires that at least nine jurors agree on the answers to each of the questions posed by the court, including the amounts of economic and noneconomic damages awarded. The parties disagree, however, about whether that rule requires that the same nine jurors agree on the amounts of those two types of damages. In considering which of those potential meanings the Council intended, we turn to the rule’s context, including its enactment history. Vanornum, 354 Or at 620 (so stating). In 1978, the Council promulgated the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, including ORCP 59 G(2).7 In adopting ORCP 59 G(2), the Council incorporated verbatim the wording of a 1953 statute—former ORS 17.355(1) (1977), repealed by Or Laws 1979 ch 284, § 199. At the time that the 1953 statute was enacted, the Oregon Constitution also permitted, as it does now, three-fourths of a jury to render a verdict.8 ORCP 59 G(2) does not define the term “verdict,” but ORCP 61 addresses the issue, defining both “general” and “special” verdicts.9 ORCP 61 A pertains to general verdicts and provides: 7 ORCP 59 G(2) has remained unchanged since that time. The Council and the legislature have amended other sections of ORCP 59, but ORCP 59 G(2) has not been amended. 8 Article VII (Amended), section 5(7), was added to the constitution by initiative petition in 1910. Or Laws 1911, p 8, § 5. See Ex parte Jack Wessens, 89 Or 587, 589, 175 P 73 (1918) (so stating). 9 ORCP 61 has remained unchanged since the Council promulgated it in 1978. Cite as 356 Or 518 (2014) 533 “(1) A general verdict is that by which the jury pronounces generally upon all or any of the issues either in favor of the plaintiff or defendant. “(2) When a general verdict is found in favor of a party asserting a claim for the recovery of money, the jury shall also assess the amount of recovery. A specific designation by a jury that no amount of recovery shall be had complies with this subsection.” ORCP 61 B permits a court to require a jury to return only a “special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact,” and provides that if the court omits an issue of fact raised by the pleadings or the evidence, the court may make a finding.10 The Council derived the text of ORCP 61 from sev- eral sources. In ORCP 61 A(1), defining the term “general verdict,” the Council used wording identical to that used in former ORS 17.405 (1977), repealed by Or Laws 1979, ch 284, § 199, a statute that dated to the Deady Code.11 Similarly, in the first sentence of ORCP 61 A(2), requiring that the jury assess the amount of recovery, the Council incorporated the substance of former ORS 17.425 (1977), repealed by Or Laws 1979 ch 284, § 199, also adapted from the Deady Code.12 In the second sentence of ORCP 61 A(2), providing that a jury may assess the amount of recovery by designating no amount of recovery, the Council reversed this court’s decision to the contrary in Fischer v. Howard, 201 Or 426, 458, 271 P2d 1059 (1954). See Fredric R. Merrill, Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure: 1984 Handbook 140 (1984) 10 ORCP 61 B provides, in part: “The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact.    The court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon each issue. If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives the right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires such party demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand, the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict.” 11 General Laws of Oregon, Civ Code, ch II, title IV, § 210a, p 191 (Deady 1845-1864). 12 General Laws of Oregon, Civ Code, ch II, title IV, § 211, p 191 (Deady 1845-1864). 534 Kennedy v. Wheeler (“The last sentence of 61 A(2) allows a jury properly to return a verdict in favor of a plaintiff asserting a right to recover damages in the amount of ‘zero’ damages. See Fischer v. Howard[.]”). Finally, in ORCP 61 B the Council provided more detailed treatment of special verdicts. Before the adoption of ORCP 61 B, former ORS 17.405 provided: “A special verdict is that by which the jury finds the facts only, leaving the judgment to the court.” From that context, it appears that the parties are correct that a fundamental requirement of ORCP 59 G(2) is that at least three-fourths of the jury must vote in favor of each of the jury’s written findings that form a basis for the trial court’s judgment. Oregon law has long used the word “verdict” to describe both a jury’s pronouncement in favor of one party or the other and its assessment of recovery (a general verdict) and a jury’s written findings (a special verdict). Thus, when a jury’s verdict includes an assessment of a monetary recovery under ORCP 61 A(2), at least nine jurors out of twelve must agree on that assessment. Although a jury may be entitled to award zero dollars in damages under ORCP 61 A(2), at least three-fourths of the jurors must vote for that result. In this case, that fundamental requirement was satisfied. The jury’s verdict was a special verdict. The jury did not make a pronouncement in favor of plaintiff; it made factual findings. At least nine jurors voted in favor of each of those findings, including the assessment of economic and noneconomic damages, and the court entered a judgment based on those findings. The judgment provided that the trial had “resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff” against defendant. The judgment also included, in a section labeled “Money award,” a judgment for the total of the economic and noneconomic damages assessed by the jury. Thus, at least three-fourths of the jury voted in favor of each of the written findings included in the jury’s special verdict that formed a basis for the trial court’s judgment. That does not, however, resolve the question on which the parties disagree. Defendant argues that ORCP 59 G(2) imposes additional concurrence requirements and urges us to consider our prior decisions construing Article VII (Amended), section 5(7), as further context for our interpretation of the rule. Because the texts of the two provisions Cite as 356 Or 518 (2014) 535 are identical, we agree that such analysis is appropriate. See State v. Shaw, 338 Or 586, 600, 113 P3d 898 (2005) (discussing prior interpretations of earlier versions of a provision); Mastriano v. Board of Parole, 342 Or 684, 693, 159 P3d 1151 (2007) (“[W]e generally presume that the legislature enacts statutes in light of existing judicial decisions that have a direct bearing on those statutes.”). We begin with Clark v. Strain, 212 Or 357, 319 P2d 940 (1958). In Clark, the jury rendered a general verdict “in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of [$10,000].” Id. at 360. Polling of the jurors revealed that only eight jurors had agreed both that defendant was liable and that plaintiff had incurred damages of $10,000. A ninth juror had agreed that defendant was liable, but had disagreed on the amount of damages awarded. The trial court announced that the verdict was 8 to 4 and therefore invalid. The jurors then corrected the court, explaining that nine jurors had voted in favor of liability and nine also had voted in favor of the damages awarded. However, one of the nine who had voted for the award of damages had voted against liability. Despite the fact that that juror’s decision was logically inconsistent—in that a plaintiff is entitled to damages only if a defendant is liable—the trial court accepted the verdict. On review, the court noted that the jury had ren- dered a general verdict and cited former ORS 17.405 for its understanding that a general verdict is a “pronouncement on all issues.” Id. at 364. The court reasoned that such a verdict must be “a document reflecting the integration of the minds of the jurors to such an extent that it, in fact, constitutes a legal verdict” and that the trial court’s discussion with the jurors demonstrated that the jurors’ verdict did not meet that standard. Id. To comport with Article VII (Amended), section 5(7), the court opined, the same legally required number of jurors must agree on the issues necessary to support a judgment for the plaintiff—in that case, liability and damages. Id. at 359, 364. The court therefore reversed the trial court’s judgment. In reaching that conclusion, the court discussed a California case, Earl v. Times-Mirror Co., 185 Cal 165, 196 P 57 (1921), in which the same nine jurors had not agreed 536 Kennedy v. Wheeler on the amounts of compensatory and punitive damages awarded.13 In Clark, the court distinguished Earl on the basis that the jury’s decisions on the amounts of the two types of damages were “independent.” Id. at 365.14 The court later applied Clark in considering the validity of a jury’s special verdict and, in doing so, clarified the reasoning on which Clark rested. In Munger v. S.I.A.C., 243 Or 419, 414 P2d 328 (1966), the plaintiff had received a final permanent partial disability award to compensate him for a 35 percent loss of use of one arm as a result of a 1961 injury. The plaintiff later claimed that he was entitled to an additional award for an aggravation of that injury. The workers’ compensation board denied the plaintiff’s claim, and, on the plaintiff’s appeal, the first question to the jury was whether the plaintiff had suffered an aggravation. Nine jurors answered “yes” to that question. A subsequent question asked the extent of the loss of use that the plaintiff suffered as a result of the 1961 injury. Nine jurors answered that the plaintiff had suffered a 70 percent loss of use. However, two of those nine jurors were among the jurors who had answered that the plaintiff had suffered no aggravation at all. The trial court refused to receive the verdict and this court affirmed. This court reasoned that the decision of the two jurors that the plaintiff had not suffered an aggravation was inconsistent with their finding that the plaintiff’s loss of use was greater than the 35 percent established in 1961, id. at 422, and that, “[i]f the findings are inconsistent, a verdict based on them is invalid.” Id. at 426. The court cited Clark and explained that “[t]he reasons for requiring a general verdict to be consistent are equally valid as to special verdicts in which answers to more than one question are necessary to establish liability.” Id. at 425. The court concluded that 13 As we will discuss, California’s constitution also permits three-fourths of a jury to render a verdict. See Cal Const, art I, § 16 (“[I]n a civil cause three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict.”). 14 This court’s decision in Estate of Michelle Schwarz v. Philip Morris Inc., 348 Or 442, 235 P3d 668 (2010), is consistent with that reasoning. There, the court distinguished Clark and held that the fact that one jury had decided defendant’s liability and damages did not preclude retrial of the issue of punitive damages by a different jury. Id. at 460 n 6. Therefore, the determination of whether to award punitive damages was independent from the determination of liability and damages. Cite as 356 Or 518 (2014) 537 “[a]n integrated verdict of the type presented here—one in which the answer to a question is dependent on the answer to a previous question and both are necessary to the determination of the final verdict—does not differ in principle from a general verdict.” Id. at 423-24. We assume that when the Council adopted ORCP 59 G(2), it was aware of the court’s decisions in Clark and Munger and intended that its rule be consistent with the court’s interpretation of the identically worded constitutional provision.15 Therefore, we understand ORCP 59 G(2) to require that, when a jury of twelve renders a special verdict and makes written findings in response to questions posed by the court, (1) at least nine jurors must agree on the answers that form a basis for the trial court’s judgment; and (2) the votes of the jurors on those questions must be consistent. That is, the jurors’ answers to questions necessary to a judgment may not demonstrate a logical inconsistency.16 15 Although defendant agrees with that proposition, she interprets Clark and Munger more broadly than we do and cites three additional cases for her argument that Article VII, section 5(7), requires that same nine jurors agree on “all issues determined by the verdict”: Freeman v. Wentworth & Irwin, 139 Or 1, 15-16, 7 P2d 796 (1932); Schultz v. Monterey, 232 Or 421, 424, 375 P2d 829 (1962); and Sandford v. Chev. Div. Gen. Motors, 292 Or 590, 613, 642 P2d 624 (1982). Defendant’s argument is not convincing. In Freeman, only eight jurors voted in favor of the damages awarded and the court held that nine out of twelve jurors are required to agree on damages as well as on liability. In Schultz, the court confronted the same logical inconsistency that was apparent in Clark: at least one juror who voted against liability also voted in favor of awarding damages. In Sanford, the court held that the defendant was entitled to have the jurors polled on their answers to each of the questions they had been asked. The court did not consider the nature of those questions or whether concurrence on the answers to those questions would be constitutionally required. Neither those three cases, nor Clark or Munger, stand for the broader proposition that defendant urges. 16 Plaintiff may disagree with that conclusion. She argues that a party has a right to have all of the empanelled jurors decide each issue presented and that Oregon law should not be applied to deprive a party of that right, arguing that a verdict in which nine jurors agreed, for example, on liability and a different nine jurors agreed on the amount of damages is permissible under Article VII (Amended), section 5(7). See Fritz v. Wright, 589 Pa 219, 237-39, 907 A2d 1038 (2006) (holding that Pennsylvania Constitution did not require a “same-juror” rule); Resch v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 36 Cal 3d 676, 682, 685 P2d 1178 (1984) (“[A] juror who dissented from a special verdict finding negligence should not be disqualified from fully participating in the jury’s further deliberations.”). We need not consider that argument given the result that we reach in this case. 538 Kennedy v. Wheeler Before we apply ORCP 59 G(2) to the facts of this case, however, we must consider whether Article VII (Amended), section 5(7), imposes additional or more stringent concurrence requirements than does that rule. Although the court construed that constitutional provision in Clark and Munger, it did not fully analyze it under the rubric of Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 415-16, 840 P2d 65 (1992). In Priest, we explained that in evaluating the meaning of a constitutional provision, we begin with the “specific wording” of the provision, then discuss the “case law surrounding it,” and finally consider the “historical circumstances” of its adoption. As we observed in discussing the identical text of ORCP 59G(2), the text of Article VII (Amended), section 5(7), does not explicitly impose a concurrence requirement other than by declaring that a “verdict” may be reached by the agreement of three-fourths of a jury. And, as we also explained in discussing ORCP 59 G(2), the statutes that were in existence in 1910 when the voters approved Article VII (Amended), section 5(7), used the term “verdict” to mean a jury’s written findings necessary to the court’s judgment. Therefore, the constitutional framers likely intended to impose a fundamental requirement that at least threefourths of the jury must vote in favor of each such finding. Whether the framers intended to impose additional concurrence requirements is not obvious from the text of that provision. However, the voters’ pamphlet submitted with the measure is instructive. The proponents of the measure stated that “[t]he purpose of this amendment is    to prevent mistrials and hung juries, by allowing threefourths of a jury to render a verdict in civil cases.” Official Voters’ Pamphlet, General Election, Nov 8, 1910, 176-77. The proponents further noted that “[m]any states now allow a majority of the jury in civil cases to render a verdict” and that in such states “[u]sually three-fourths of the jury is required to render a verdict.” Id. at 177. The proponents did not specify which states had adopted such provisions, but our research indicates that fourteen state constitutions permitted civil verdicts by non-unanimous juries in 1910.17 We 17 See Ark Const, art 2, § 7; Cal Const, art I, § 16; Idaho Const, art I, § 7; Ky Const, § 248; Minn Const of 1857, art I, § 4 (five-sixths); Miss Const, art 3, § 31; Cite as 356 Or 518 (2014) 539 have not discovered an appellate decision in any of those states that would have been available to the drafters of the Oregon provision in 1910 and that interpreted such provisions to require that the same jurors decide all issues necessary to the verdict. From the available history, it therefore is probable that the voters intended only to increase the efficiency of the court system by permitting jurors to render non-unanimous verdicts, not to impose complex concurrence requirements. When this court later decided Clark and Munger and interpreted Article VII, section 5(7), to require that the jurors’ findings be consistent, it based those decisions on the need to have a jury’s verdict function as a coherent whole. On further reflection and with greater attention to the historical circumstances existing at the time that that provision was adopted, we are not persuaded that it imposes more stringent concurrence requirements than those delineated in Clark and Munger and intended by the Council when it adopted ORCP 59 G(2). The final step in our analysis is to apply ORCP 59 G(2) as we have construed it to the facts of this case. Defendant argues that, even if ORCP 59 G(2) does not require that the same nine of twelve jurors agree on all written determinations that a jury makes, it does require such concurrence as to the awards of economic and noneconomic damages because “economic damages are not recoverable in the absence of an award of noneconomic damages except in very limited circumstances which are not present in this case.” In support of that contention, defendant cites Wheeler v. Huston, 288 Or 467, 605 P2d 1339 (1980). Defendant is incorrect in her understanding of Wheeler. Wheeler does not make an award of economic damages dependent on an award of noneconomic damages. Rather, Wheeler addresses the problem posed by verdicts in which jurors who disagree about a defendant’s liability arrive at an improper compromise and award only “special” Mo Const of 1875, § 22(a) (1900); Mont Const of 1889, art II, § 23; Nev Const, art I, § 3; Okla Const, art 2, § 19; SD Const, art VI, § 6; Tex Const, art V, § 13; Utah Const, art I, § 10; Wash Const, art 1, § 21. 540 Kennedy v. Wheeler damages.18 In Wheeler, the court explained that awards of only “special” damages had been deemed improper because they suggested that the jury had “stubbornly adhered to what was apparently a compromise verdict between some who found liability and others who found none.” Id. at 471 (quoting Hall v. Cornett, 193 Or 634, 240 P2d 231 (1952)). The court noted the difficulty of determining whether a jury had reached such an improper compromise, but decided not to abandon the effort. Instead, the court restated and adhered to the following rule: “If there is a question whether any general damages were sustained, the jury may conclude that the plaintiff suffered no general damages but did reasonably incur wage loss and/or medical expense. Such verdicts are valid and include cases in which (a) the plaintiff’s evidence of injury is subjective, (b) there is evidence that the plaintiff’s injuries for which general damages are claimed were not caused by the accident, and (c) the objective evidence of a substantial injury sustained by plaintiff is controverted by other competent evidence, or could be disbelieved by the trier of fact.” Id. at 479 (emphasis in original). Here, plaintiff reiterates the criticism leveled at the rule discussed in Wheeler and argues that, because damages are no longer defined as “special” or “general,” but instead are defined as “economic” and “noneconomic,”19 Wheeler does not represent current law and should be disavowed. However, even if Wheeler is still good law, the improper compromise 18 In Hoskins v. Scott, 52 Or 271, 278, 96 P 1112 (1908), this court defined “general” and “special” damages: “Damages are either general or special. General, when they are such as the law implies or presumes to have accrued from the wrong complained of. Special, when they are such as really took place and are not implied by law, and are superadded to general damages arising from an act injurious in itself.    The former, being the direct and immediate result of the act complained of, and necessarily arising out of it, can be recovered under the general allegation of damages, without stating their particular nature, or how they arose, because the law implies or presumes such damages to follow the breach of the contract or the act or wrong complained of.” (Internal citations omitted). 19 See ORS 31.710 (defining economic and noneconomic damages). That statute was enacted in 1987 and renumbered in 2003. See Or Laws 1987, ch 774, § 6 (enacting statute as former ORS 18.560). Cite as 356 Or 518 (2014) 541 that it prohibits is neither evident in this case nor a basis for imposing the juror concurrence requirement that defendant urges. In this case, defendant admitted liability and all twelve jurors determined that defendant’s negligence was a cause of some damage to plaintiff. The remaining issue for the jury’s determination was the specific amounts of the economic and noneconomic damages plaintiff had suffered. We know, therefore, that the concern addressed in Wheeler— that jurors might have agreed to special or economic damages in spite of a decision that defendant was not liable—is not presented. Further, we presume that each juror who voted to award plaintiff economic damages also decided that plaintiff was entitled to at least some amount of noneconomic damages. The trial court instructed the jury that “[i]f you find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover economic damages, you must award some noneconomic damages,” and we must presume that the jurors followed that instruction in answering the first question on the special jury verdict form. See Purdy, 355 Or at 227 (requiring court to presume that jury followed trial court’s instructions). Thus, we further presume that the jurors who disagreed with the noneconomic damages awarded disagreed only about the particular amount and not the fact of those damages. The jury verdict in this case does not demonstrate a compromise verdict in violation of the rule discussed in Wheeler. Moreover, ORCP 59 G(2) addresses a different con- cern than that which was the subject of the court’s decision in Wheeler. As we have explained, in a case in which a jury enters a special verdict, ORCP 59 G(2) requires that three-fourths of the jury agree on each of its written findings and that those findings be logically consistent. Under Clark, when the same nine out of twelve jurors do not agree on liability and damages their findings do not meet that standard. The same logical inconsistency is not apparent, however, when the same nine out of twelve jurors do not agree on the specific amounts of economic and noneconomic damages awarded. The law does not require a jury to award any specific amount of economic or noneconomic damages 542 Kennedy v. Wheeler as a prerequisite to entry of a valid judgment for a plaintiff. ORCP 61 A(2). And logic does not require a connection between the amount of economic damages and the amount of noneconomic damages awarded.20 In this case, at least nine jurors agreed on the sums of economic and noneconomic damages awarded and their verdict does not demonstrate a logical inconsistency similar to those that rendered the verdicts in Clark and Munger invalid. The jury’s verdict did not violate ORCP 59 G(2) or the Oregon Constitution and the trial court was correct to accept it. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 20 Of course, awards of economic and noneconomic damages may be factually related, in that a greater award of general damages often results in a greater award of noneconomic damages. However, the legal question is one of logical inconsistency, and, at least in this case, the specific amounts of economic and noneconomic damages awarded do not reveal logical inconsistency.