Opinion ID: 2844000
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plea

Text: We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Gamble, 327 F.3d 662, 663 (8th Cir. 2003). Relevant here, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d), a defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty before the court imposes a sentence if the defendant can show a fair -4- and just reason for requesting the withdrawal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). 'While the standard is liberal, the defendant has no automatic right to withdraw a plea.' United States v. Heid, 651 F.3d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 826 (8th Cir. 2006)). Rule 11(b)(3) additionally mandates that [b]efore entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). A defendant may establish a fair and just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea by demonstrating that his plea is not supported by an adequate factual basis. Heid, 651 F.3d at 855-56. Van Doren renews his contention that an inadequate factual basis existed for his guilty plea and, thus, that a fair and just reason exists for withdrawing the plea. The crux of Van Doren's claim is that because count 24 does not specify the facts supporting the basis for the underlying wire fraud charge (the specified unlawful activity supporting the money laundering charge), we look to count 23 of the indictment, where allegations of conduct underlying a wire fraud charge are explicated, to discern whether the conduct that Van Doren admitted to in his plea constitutes the offense charged in count 24. In that vein, Van Doren argues that, looking to count 23, the only specification in the indictment for the manner of commission of the wire fraud was through a scheme and artifice to defraud Barber's creditors and for obtaining money and property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises.3 Proceeding with that reasoning, Van 3 In part, and in addition to myriad facts supporting the charge, count 23 specifically alleges that during a specific time period, Van Doren did knowingly and intentionally combine, conspire, confederate and agree with . . . other[s] to devise and intend to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud Barber's creditors and for obtaining money and property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises thereby affecting financial institutions and other creditors and in furtherance of that scheme did transmit and cause to be transmitted certain wire communications in interstate commerce. All in violation of -5- Doren argues that because no other means of committing the offense was charged, and because the government relied upon a concealment theory to prove the wire fraud here, it necessarily failed to identify a single alleged falsity, fraudulent pretense, misrepresentation or promise committed by Van Doren and thus fell short of proving the requisite wire fraud supporting the money laundering charge. Van Doren maintains that he was engaging in routine banking transactions and that the entire transaction was completely truthful at all times–that he misrepresented nothing. Accordingly, Van Doren claims there was no factual basis to support the guilty plea in count 24. We agree with Van Doren that the determinative issue in this matter is whether the factual basis supporting the plea suffices to establish the offense charged in the indictment as required, but our agreement ends there. See United States v. Cheney, 571 F.3d 764, 769 (8th Cir. 2009) (describing when a guilty plea is supported by a sufficient factual basis). The factual basis of Van Doren's plea suffices to establish the offense charged.4 Based on the factual basis of the plea, Van Doren committed 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349 and 1343. That specific language of count 23 tracks the language of § 1343 Fraud by wire, radio, or television, which provides that [w]hoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises transmits by wire, any writing, sign, signal, picture or sound for the purpose of executing the fraudulent scheme, shall be fined or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1343. 4 As an aside, even were we to indulge Van Doren's argument that there is no allegation of concealment in count 23, he fails in that pursuit. Count 23 first incorporates paragraphs 29-37 of the indictment, which paragraphs discuss the transactions underlying the wire fraud charge and allege, among other claims of concealment, that the transactions were completed in order to benefit Barber, thereby concealing the money from creditors and placing it beyond the reach of his creditors. -6- wire fraud as charged. The plea agreement states that Barber transferred $64,000 to Van Doren pursuant to an agreement between them to conceal the funds from Barber's creditors so that the funds could later be directed back to Barber for his personal use. [T]he Supreme Court has placed some outside limits on what constitutes a scheme to defraud under sections 1341, 1343, and 1344, by finding that these statutes must be interpreted with an eye toward the commonlaw understanding of fraud. . . . At common law, fraud has not been limited to those situations where there is an affirmative misrepresentation or the violation of some independently-prescribed legal duty . . . . Rather, even in the absence of a fiduciary, statutory, or other independent legal duty to disclose material information, commonlaw fraud includes acts taken to conceal, create a false impression, mislead, or otherwise deceive in order to prevent the other party from acquiring material information. United States v. Steffen, 687 F.3d 1104, 1113 (8th Cir. 2012) (third alteration in original), (quoting United States v. Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 898-99 (4th Cir. 2000)). Simply, wire fraud under § 1343 can be established by a fraudulent scheme involving concealment. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 356 (2005) ([F]raud at common law included a scheme to deprive a victim of his entitlement to money. For instance, a debtor who concealed his assets when settling debts with his creditors So even were we to hold that the government could not proceed with its concealment theory unless count 23's recitation included language in addition to the language tracking the statutory definition of wire fraud and the facts already contained therein, the entirety of count 23 encompasses the theory nonetheless and the factual basis thus established the crime. -7- thereby committed common-law fraud.).5 Van Doren's plea is thus supported by an adequate factual basis, as there is sufficient evidence upon which this court can reasonably determine that Van Doren likely committed the offense as charged in count 24. Cheney, 571 F.3d at 769 (A guilty plea is supported by an adequate factual basis when the record contains 'sufficient evidence at the time of the plea upon which a court may reasonably determine that the defendant likely committed the offense.' (quoting United States v. Gamble, 327 F.3d 662, 664 (8th Cir. 2003))). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Van Doren's motion to withdraw his plea on this basis.6 As to Van Doren's alleged actual innocence supporting a fair and just reason for his requested withdrawal, we have thoroughly analyzed Van Doren's arguments on appeal, carefully reviewed the record, and adopt the court's thorough and well- 5 In the instant analysis, Van Doren's insistence that he had no legal duty to speak and, thus, cannot be criminally liable for participating in these lawful transactions misses the mark. The claim of wire fraud in this matter is not premised upon Van Doren's nondisclosure but rather on Van Doren's act of knowingly helping Barber fraudulently conceal money from his creditors, among other similar allegations, and their use of wires to do so. This collective conduct of fraudulent concealment is the basis for the wire fraud charged. '[T]he common law clearly distinguishes between concealment and nondisclosure. The former is characterized by deceptive acts or contrivances intended to hide information, mislead, avoid suspicion, or prevent further inquiry into a material matter. The latter is characterized by mere silence.' Steffen, 687 F.3d at 1114 (quoting Colton, 231 F.3d at 898-99). This indictment alleges acts to conceal. 6 Although we resolve Van Doren's challenge based on his admission to wire fraud, we note that the government need not always prove that a defendant convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1957 participated in the specified unlawful conduct underlying a money laundering charge. Instead, the government need only show that the defendant knew that the money was criminally derived. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(c); United States v. Hare, 49 F.3d 447, 452 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Lombardi, 5 F.3d 578, 570 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993). -8- reasoned orders on this issue. 8th Cir. R. 47B. We therefore affirm the district court in all respects on Van Doren's motions to withdraw his plea and reconsideration of the same following the district court's initial denial.