Opinion ID: 3020164
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: CEPA and LAD

Text: Because § 341(Fifth) preempts state employment laws that provide remedies beyond those permitted in the ADA or 12 U.S.C. § 1831j, what remains is to determine whether CEPA or the LAD are indeed such expansive laws. We hold that they are, and are therefore preempted to the extent of these divergences. We will adopt the Evans approach and decline to usurp the New direct preemption, and does not preempt the Federal Reserve Act. It would be a mistake, however, to argue that because the ADA preempts neither the Federal Reserve Act nor CEPA or LAD, the Federal Reserve Act cannot have such preemptive force. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 101 n.22 (1983) (argument “simplistic” and properly rejected); Evans, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13265, at -20. Application of CEPA or the LAD frustrates the Congressional purpose behind § 341(Fifth), as impliedly amended by the ADA and 12 U.S.C. § 1831j. See supra Part V.A. 28 Jersey legislature’s province by rewriting these state laws. Therefore, we will remand the case to the District Court with instructions to dismiss Fasano’s Complaint. Both the LAD and CEPA go well beyond their federal counterparts. See Dist. Ct. Op. (Mar. 31, 2004) at -23. For example, neither the ADA nor 12 U.S.C. § 1831j11 permit individual damages liability on the part of employees. Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 178 (3d Cir. 2002) (ADA). The LAD permits the imposition of individual liability on an employee who has aided or abetted barred acts. Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921 (N.J. 2004). Of particular importance to an employer, the LAD permits an employee to directly pursue a claim in Superior Court, without first pursuing an administrative complaint. Hernandez v. Region Nine Hous. Corp., 684 A.2d 1385, 1389 (N.J. 1996). The LAD unquestionably protects a broader range of 11 While no Circuit appears to have directly held that 12 U.S.C. § 1831j does not permit individual liability, several District Courts have so held, with no contrary authority brought to our attention. See, e.g., Rouse v. Farmers State Bank, 866 F.2d 1191 (N.D. Iowa 1994); Hicks v. Resolution Trust Corp., 767 F. Supp. 167 (N.D. Ill. 1991). The Fifth Circuit has held that 12 U.S.C. § 1831j “applies only to the actors named in the statute,” the only actors being certain types of institutions. Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 498, 503 (5th Cir. 1994). The District Court accepted that CEPA provided for individual liability, in contrast to 12 U.S.C. § 1831j. Dist. Ct. Op. (Mar. 31, 2004) at . 29 “disabilities” or “handicaps” than the ADA. The ADA limits covered disabilities to those which “substantially limit[] one or more of the major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). In contrast, Fasano would be able to prove disability under the LAD by merely showing, for example, “physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness . . . any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical coordination . . . or any mental, psychological or developmental disability . . . which prevents the normal exercise of any bodily or mental functions.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-5(q) (West 2006). The LAD, therefore, imposes a significantly “lower standard” than the ADA. Failla v. City of Passaic, 146 F.3d 149, 154 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Motley v. New Jersey State Police, 196 F.3d 160, 165 n.5 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting the “more stringent ADA standard”). Accord Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 800 A.2d 826 (N.J. 2002). The LAD also expands the recovery options available to a successful plaintiff. See, e.g., Lanni v. New Jersey, 259 F.3d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2001) (unlike ADA, a LAD award “may reflect any risk of nonpayment of a fee assumed by counsel” and apply a multiplier enhancement). LAD damages are uncapped. Baker v. Nat’l State Bank, 801 A.2d 1158, 1165-66 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). The differences are also apparent with respect to CEPA. CEPA provides extremely “broad protections against employer retaliation.” Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 707 A.2d 1000, 1008 (N.J. 1998); see also id. (“[A]t the time of its enactment [CEPA was described as] the most far-reaching ‘whistleblower statute’ in the nation.”). CEPA allows for individual employee liability, Palladino ex rel. United States v. VNA of S. N.J., Inc., 68 F. 30 Supp. 2d 455, 474 (D.N.J. 1999), while as noted above, 12 U.S.C. § 1831j does not. 12 U.S.C. § 1831j protects a Federal Reserve Bank employee from retaliation for disclosing suspected wrongdoing to a very circumscribed list of entities: the Bank itself, a federal banking agency, or the Attorney General. 12 U.S.C. § 1831j(a)(2). By contrast, CEPA permits an employee to complain to any public body, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3 (West 2006), about virtually any topic, even those within the employee’s own control. In sum, Fasano’s belated attempt to claim that the LAD and CEPA are merely parallel and consonant with the ADA and 12 U.S.C. § 1831j is meritless. We conclude that both CEPA and the LAD provide remedies and substantive protections that go far beyond their federal analogs. These additional provisions, by further limiting the New York Fed’s ability to exercise the broad “dismiss at pleasure” discretion granted it by Congress, frustrate that Congressional purpose, and cannot be applied to Federal Reserve Banks due to conflict preemption. The final matter we must address is whether our proper course of action is to dismiss Fasano’s Complaint or to attempt to pare back CEPA and the LAD to exactly match the ADA and 12 U.S.C. § 1831j. We conclude that we would be ill-suited for the latter task. We agree with Judge Padova that instead of attempting to “essentially rewrite the relevant provisions of the [CEPA and LAD] to parrot Federal anti-discrimination law,” and “risk frustrating the intent of the publicly elected legislature which enacted the [CEPA and LAD] in the first place,” dismissal is 31 appropriate. See Evans, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13265, at . There is simply no way to give full effect to such state laws while picking and choosing which parts of them may apply. For example, as noted above the LAD does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies; a plaintiff elects whether to proceed in the administrative arena, or in court, but a final decision in either forum is binding and renders the other forum unavailable. Were we to graft the ADA’s exhaustion requirement onto the LAD, we would transform formerly final, binding administrative determinations into non-binding preliminaries to litigation. We will not step on the toes of the New Jersey legislature in this or any other like manner.