Opinion ID: 475765
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Clayborn Nash

Text: 17 Nash was told not to come back to work after he absented himself from his assigned position on February 17, 1977. In a meeting with the director and assistant director other complaints about his performance were discussed, including his leaving valid and unused parking tickets on the floor of a garage and blocking traffic by sitting in his car to issue tickets. He was never recalled to work. On April 11, 1977 Nash wrote a letter to the civil service director of the City to protest a conspiracy against him by the civic center department director and assistant director and to charge the department with discrimination and inefficient practices. On April 14 the director wrote Nash to tell him that his name would no longer be carried on the parking attendant lists and explaining the reasons as those discussed in their February meeting. 18 The district court found a causal connection between his complaint on April 11, 1977 and his termination three days later and that Nash was fired in retaliation for his opposition to the City's racially discriminatory employment practices. This finding is clearly erroneous. Nash, by pleading and testimony, has always claimed that he was discharged because he was black and never has there been any testimony or claim that the termination was in retaliation for the April 11 letter or other act. In his complaint he alleged that he was discharged because of his race and the proposed findings of fact as well as the pretrial order stated Nash's claim as predicated on racial animus. His misconduct on the job had led to his work being discontinued long prior to the letter of April 11. The action taken against Nash two months earlier can hardly be said to be pretext to cover a retaliation for Nash's later letter.B. Romie Blount 19 Blount testified that his working hours were reduced after he filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) a charge of discrimination (based on the part-time classification) on January 7, 1981, and that he was discharged from his position as parking attendant on September 16, 1981. The City promptly rehired Blount to work in another division as a full time mechanic with civil service benefits. However, the district court found that his hours were reduced in retaliation for his civil rights charge, awarded him $6,350 for loss of wages and emotional distress, and ordered deletion of the City record of his discharge for insubordination. 20 The record will not support the trial court's findings, and we conclude that they are clearly erroneous. Blount's own testimony, as well as the city records and unanswered testimony of his supervisors, proved his insubordination and unwillingness to work under the direction of his superiors in the parking division. Prior to any purported retaliatory action of which Blount complains, he had been reported by supervisors Hearne and O'Koli for several instances where he refused to work where he was assigned. He had demanded the removal of the parking manager and had called the assistant director of the department a liar. The assistant director had recommended that Blount be fired because the parking manager was unable to obtain Blount's cooperation on the job. Two meetings were held by the supervisors with Blount, one in October 1980 and another in September 1981 when he was finally discharged. Both meetings, under Blount's own version, were unacceptable to those under whom he had to work. He told his superiors that they were lying and he showed no disposition to cooperate. One might understand the City rehiring Blount despite his unwillingness to follow instructions of supervisors in the parking division, but if the objective were to punish him for an EEOC filing, it is highly unlikely that he would instead be reinstated in a better position in a different City department. The record is clearly at odds with a finding that the City acted against Blount to retaliate for his EEOC charge. We have the definite and firm conviction that the district judge committed a mistake. C. Alvin Moore 21 Moore testified by deposition that he would not have discharged Nash if it had been for him to decide. This content of his deposition was subsequently reported by Moore to his supervisor. At the trial Moore testified that this superior was said by others to have become personally antagonistic to Moore. When a new parking division manager was selected on April 14, 1980 three months after the superior was told of Moore's testimony, Moore's application was rejected. Moore himself had occupied this position from 1972 to 1976. 22 The district court found that Moore was denied the promotion to parking manager in retaliation for his testimony in support of Nash's civil rights claim. The court awarded additional back pay from April 14, 1980 to January 17, 1984 when the position was abolished. While we are inclined to believe that there was merit in the reasons given by the City for choosing the successful applicant and not Moore to be manager, and while we are disturbed by the other findings made in this case by the district judge, we are unable to say that this particular finding was clearly erroneous. Because there are two permissible views of the evidence, we must affirm. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). The record convinces us that only trivial effort was expended by counsel on Moore's personal claim and that remand for consideration of attorney's fees isolated for this cause is unwarranted. If affidavits to the contrary are presented on motion for rehearing, they will be considered.