Opinion ID: 304354
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Minimization Issue

Text: The touchstone for deciding the minimization issue is that it rests on a statutory command and therefore turns on the intent of Congress in issuing that directive. The constitutional question of the discreteness required of a wiretap is a separate question discussed infra. Also, the fact the wiretap warrant included a command to minimize is directly attributable to the statutory requirement that the order so specify. Accordingly, we turn to the Act's provisions and history which, when read together, indicate that the minimization requirement of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(5) is nothing more than a command to limit surveillance as much as possible in the circumstances, i. e., the minimization question must be considered on a case-by-case basis. . . . Senate Report No. 1097, 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm.News, at 2190. In making this case-by-case inquiry, we also must be mindful that the statute's framers recognized that interceptions which might be excessive in some circumstances might be appropriate in others. As the favorable committee report said of minimization: Where it is necessary to obtain coverage to only one meeting, the order should not authorize additional surveillance. Where a course of conduct embracing multiple parties and extending over a period of time is involved, the order may properly authorize proportionately longer surveillance. . . What is important is that the facts in the application on a case-by-case basis justify the period of time of the surveillance. Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, where, as here, the investigation is of an organized criminal conspiracy conversing in a colloquial code, surveillance of most of the telephone calls made during several days does not constitute a failure to minimize simply because in retrospect it can be seen that a substantial portion of them had no evidentiary or investigative value. Accord, United States v. Focarile, 340 F.Supp. 1033; United States v. LaGorga, 336 F.Supp. at 195-197. We recognize that the present case involves an extensive use of electronic eavesdropping. The order was approved by Judge Hunter at 9:00 A.M., April 30, 1970, the tap commenced on that date, and it continued until midnight, May 19, 1970. The tap recorded conversations almost, if not in fact, continuously, producing 90 reels of recorded conversations. Apparently there were irrelevant conversations recorded. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that Judge Hunter, with his characteristic care for detail, exercised great caution not only in ordering the wiretap, but also in supervising the interceptions. He limited the order to 20 rather than the permissible 30 days. No renewal of the order was requested. He required reports from the U.S. Attorney at five-day intervals 10 in order to oversee administration of the tap and to terminate it when the investigation succeeded. He also meticulously gathered an inventory of all taped conversations and promptly sealed them. Under these circumstances, the only complaint that can be made against the breadth of this wiretap is that the inherent nature of strategic electronic surveillance renders it unusable in investigating organized criminal conspiracies such as that in this case. As we demonstrated above, that clearly was not the conclusion of the framers of Section 2518(5). Congress apparently concluded, as did Judge Weis in United States v. LaGorga, supra, that: it is often impossible to determine that a particular telephone conversation would be irrelevant and harmless until it has been terminated. 13