Opinion ID: 2520047
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instruction Claims

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on theft, after-acquired intent, first degree premeditated murder and second degree murder, and erred in giving the jury a truncated version of CALJIC No. 8.81.17. Such error, according to defendant, violated his United States Constitution Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. We find no error.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on theft as a lesser included offense of robbery. Although theft is a lesser included offense of robbery ( People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 690, 268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887; People v. Ramkeesoon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 346, 351, 216 Cal.Rptr. 455, 702 P.2d 613), defendant was not charged with robbery. As this court has recently made clear, when robbery is not a charged offense but merely forms the basis for a felony-murder charge and a special circumstance allegation, a trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on theft. ( People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 737, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332 ( Cash ) [Defendant ... was not charged with robbery, and the court therefore had no duty to instruct on theft as a lesser included offense of robbery.]; Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 371, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769 [Although a trial court on its own initiative must instruct the jury on lesser included offenses of charged offenses, this duty does not extend to uncharged offenses relevant only as predicate offenses under the felony-murder doctrine].) As in Silva and Cash, defendant was not charged with robbery; rather, robbery was the underlying predicate felony in the felony-murder charge and the special circumstance allegation. Defendant attempts to distinguish Silva on the ground that the jury in Silva was instructed on felony murder, robbery murder, and first degree premeditated and deliberate murder, while in his case, the jury was instructed only on felony murder. This distinction is of little or no significance. The issue presented here is whether the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense of an uncharged crime. That issue was resolved in Silva contrary to defendant's position. We also reject defendant's assertion that Silva rests on faulty reasoning and decline his invitation to revisit the issue.
Defendant did not request a jury instruction on after-acquired intent, which would have informed the jury that if defendant first formed the intent to steal after killing or applying force against the victim, he could not be found guilty of robbery. He contends on appeal, however, that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to so instruct the jury. As we stated in Silva, an after-acquired intent instruction is a pinpoint instruction that the trial court need not give sua sponte. ( Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 371, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769, citing People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443, 285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273.) In any case, along with the standard robbery instruction, CALJIC No. 9.40, [11] the trial court gave the felony-murder instruction, CALJIC No. 8.21, which instructed the jury that a killing which occurs during the commission or attempted commission of the crime of robbery is murder of the first degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit such crime. We recently reaffirmed that CALJIC Nos. 9.40 and 8.21 together `adequately cover the issue of the time of the formation of the intent to steal.' ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 359, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432; People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 643, 244 Cal.Rptr. 181, 749 P.2d 836; Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 371, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769; People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 625-626, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.) The defendant in Hughes argued, as does defendant here, that the version of CALJIC No. 8.21 given in his case was crucially different from the one this court upheld in Hayes and Hendricks. In those cases, in addition to the language quoted above, the version of CALJIC No. 8.21 read to the jury also stated that a killing was first degree murder if it occurred  as a result of the commission of ... robbery ( People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 359, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432), while in Hughes, as well as in this case, the as a result of language was not given. In Hughes, we found the omission insignificant. This was especially so because, as in this case, the Hughes jury was also given CALJIC No. 3.31, which instructed the jury that there must exist a concurrence of act or conduct and specific intent. [12] Reading CALJIC Nos. 8.21 and 9.40 together with No. 3.31, we believe that a reasonable juror would understand that defendant had to possess the specific intent to steal prior to or during his application of the force required for the commission of the offense of robbery. ( Hughes, at p. 360, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432.) We therefore reject defendant's claim of error. [13]
Defendant next contends the trial court erroneously gave the jury a truncated version of CALJIC No. 8.81.17, which defines the robbery-murder special circumstance, depriving him of his federal Constitution Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a trial by jury on the special circumstance allegation. The version of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 read to the jury instructed: To find that the special circumstance, referred to in these instructions as murder in the commission of robbery is true, it must be proved: 1a. The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery. Omitted from the instruction was the following language: The murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the [robbery] or to facilitate the escape therefrom or to avoid detection. In other words, the special circumstance referred to in these instructions is not established if the [robbery] was merely incidental to the commission of the murder. Defendant argues the omission was critical and prejudicial because it allowed the jury to find true the robbery-murder special circumstance based merely on a finding that the murder took place during a robbery, as opposed to finding that the murder occurred to advance the independent felonious purpose of robbery. Such error, defendant urges, is reversible per se. Defendant did not request the clarifying language he now contends was crucial and may not now complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete. ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627; People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 218, 260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285.) Defendant's failure to either object to the proposed instruction or request that the omitted language be given to the jury forfeits his claim on appeal. ( People v. Hart, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 622, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683.) The claim fails on the merits as well. The language defendant asserts should have been included in the court's instruction is based upon our discussion in Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at page 61, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468, in which we observed that the purpose of the special circumstance was to single out those defendants who killed in cold blood in order to advance an independent felonious purpose.... (See also People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 322, 165 Cal.Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883.) Although the defendant in Green technically committed a robbery, it was clear from the evidence that it was not a murder in the commission of a robbery but the exact opposite, a robbery in the commission of a murder. ( Green, at p. 60, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) But in People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803, we expressly rejected the suggestion that Green's clarification of the scope of felony-murder special circumstances has somehow become an `element' of such special circumstances, on which the jury must be instructed in all cases regardless of whether the evidence supports such an instruction. ( Kimble, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 501, 244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803; People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 505, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182 [no error in giving truncated instruction where no significant evidence of any motive for the murders other than robbery existed].) Green simply made clear that a robbery, in a special circumstance allegation, cannot be merely incidental to the murder. ( Green, at p. 61, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) [14]
The trial court instructed the jury on first degree felony murder [15] and on the definition of murder. [16] Defendant contends the trial court's failure also to instruct, sua sponte, on first degree premeditated murder and second degree murder as lesser included offenses of felony murder deprived him of his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. [17] DEFENDANT ARGUES THat failure to give these instructions violated his constitutional rights because the jury was left with an `unwarranted all-or-nothing choice' ( People v. Ramkeesoon, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 352, 216 Cal.Rptr. 455, 702 P.2d 613), making it likely that it resolved any doubts in favor of conviction ( Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 634, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 ( Beck )). `[A] defendant has a constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence. [Citations.]' ( Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1007, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519, quoting People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 645, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.) Accordingly, `[i]t is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case. [Citation.] That obligation has been held to include giving instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present [citation], but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged. [Citations.]' ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) Although defense counsel advised the court that after consulting with defendant he did not want the jury instructed on lesser included offenses, the obligation to instruct on [such] offenses exists even when as a matter of trial tactics a defendant not only fails to request the instruction but expressly objects to its being given. ( People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 154, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) The Attorney General contends that under the invited error doctrine, defendant may not now complain on appeal that such instructions were not given because defense counsel informed the trial court that, after consulting with defendant, they did not want to request any lessers. Invited error, however, will only be found if counsel expresses a deliberate tactical purpose in resisting or acceding to the complained-of instruction. ( People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 830, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865; People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 332, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311.) The record in this case is ambiguous as to whether defense counsel was referring solely to voluntary and involuntary manslaughter instructions, which had been raised as possible jury instructions in previous discussions between the court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor, or whether defense counsel considered and rejected instructions on all potential lesser included offenses. Therefore, we do not find invited error with respect to the lack of an instruction on second degree murder. We conclude, nonetheless, that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on second degree murder because `[s]peculation is an insufficient basis upon which to require the giving of an instruction on a lesser included offense.' ( People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 620, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152; People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 941, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212 ( Wilson ).) [T]he existence of ` any evidence, no matter how weak' will not justify instructions on a lesser included offense.... ( People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) Rather, substantial evidence must exist to allow a reasonable jury to find that the defendant is guilty of a lesser but not the greater offense. ( Ibid. ) `Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to `deserve consideration by the jury,' that is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive.' ( Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1008, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.) [18] There was no substantial evidence introduced at defendant's trial that the killing was other than robbery murder. [19] And on appeal defendant does not advance a theory that would support a second degree murder instruction, but merely points to evidence that there may have been a struggle in the house and that the victim was shot at close range. [20] This is insufficient to support the murder instruction defendant claims should have been given to the jury sua sponte. (See, e.g., People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 424, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000 [`Defendant advances no theory consistent with the evidence that would have allowed the jury to convict him of second degree murder']; People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 211, 279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949, overruled on another point in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 394, 889 P.2d 588.) At most, defendant raises the issue of sufficiency of the evidence relating to the robbery, and from that would have us hold that he acted with malice in killing defendant and he could, therefore, have been found guilty of second degree murder, and even first degree premeditated murder. But [a]ll the evidence points to robbery as the motive for the killing [ ] ( People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 970, 281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131), and contrary to defendant's assertion, the evidence relating to the robbery was not weak or virtually nonexistent (see ante, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 300-302, 82 P.3d at pp. 321-322). [21] Indeed, in his argument on appeal, defendant accepts the prosecution evidence and theory that he did not have a gun while at the victim's house and that he did not go to the victim's house with the intention of killing him. Based on this, a jury finding of second degree murder, and especially first degree premeditated murder, would have been based on pure speculation. The defendant concedes as much when he argues to this court that he may have killed [the victim] in self defense, in anger, or for any reason ranging from first degree murder to justifiable homicide. He speculates further that a gunfight may have ensued between himself and the victim or that the victim may have shot at defendant, causing the defendant to retaliate. He states: There is no way of telling when or in what order any of this transpired. We rejected a similar argument in Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 926, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212. The victim in Wilson was discovered in his automobile with his left pants pocket turned inside out, and a $20 bill in his rear pocket. ( Id. at p. 931, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212.) Similar to defendant's contention in this case, the defendant in Wilson argued that a second degree murder instruction was warranted because the circumstantial evidence did not conclusively prove that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery. As in this case, the defendant in Wilson also maintained that the evidence was not inconsistent with the theory that [he] shot and killed the victim ... and then fled, and that another person then came upon the victim's body and removed the wallet, or that the victim was not carrying a wallet or cash at the time he was shot. ( Id. at p. 940, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212.) We held the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on second degree murder because the defendant's argument rested on mere speculation. [22] Because there was no substantial evidence supporting an instruction on second degree murder, the high court's decision in Beck is not implicated. As defendant acknowledges, even under Beck, instructions on lesser included offenses are not constitutionally required in the absence of evidence warranting those instructions. In Beck, the state conceded that, but for the prohibition on giving instructions on lesser included offenses in capital cases, the defendant's testimony would have entitled him to an instruction on a lesser included offense. ( Beck, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 630, 100 S.Ct. 2382.) [23] Moreover, as the Supreme Court clarified, the constitutional infirmity of the law invalidated in Beck was partly the result of the artificial barrier erected in capital cases prohibiting instructions on any lesser included offenses, even though such instructions were available in noncapital cases. (See Hopkins v. Reeves, supra, 524 U.S. at pp. 97-98, 118 S.Ct. 1895.) But as we have previously explained, California does not preclude a trial court from giving instructions on lesser included offenses in capital cases. (See People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 736, fn. 15, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) We also explained in People v. Waidla that the Beck rule [was] not implicated in its purpose in that case because the jury was not forced into an all-or-nothing choice between a conviction of murder that would legally compel it to fix the penalty at death, on the one side, and innocence, on the other: Even if it found [the defendant] guilty of [felony murder under the special circumstance allegations], it was not legally compelled to fix the penalty at death, but could fix it instead at a term of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. ( Ibid., italics added.) The same is true in this case.