Opinion ID: 2597473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State Agent Requirement

Text: As a threshold issue, we determine whether the park security officers were state agents for purposes of Miranda. The Court of Appeals, Division Three, held that questioning by any government employee comes within Miranda whenever prosecution of the defendant being questioned is among the purposes, either definite or contingent, for which the information is elicited, and such is the case where `the questioner's duties include the investigation or reporting of crimes.' Heritage, 114 Wash.App. at 597-98, 61 P.3d 1190 (quoting 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.10(c), at 624 (2d ed.1999)). The court stated, [A]rrest and prosecution of the juveniles was at least a contingent purpose of the questioning, and one of the duties of the security guards was the investigation of criminal activities in the park. Heritage, 114 Wash.App. at 598, 61 P.3d 1190. Thus, the court concluded that the park security officers were state agents under Miranda and that their actions invoked the Miranda rule. Division One of the Court of Appeals took a different approach in State v. Wolfer, 39 Wash.App. 287, 294, 693 P.2d 154 (1984), review denied, 103 Wash.2d 1028 (1985), holding that Miranda warnings are required only when the interrogation is by law enforcement officers. The appellate court stated that the security guard at issue in that case was not a state agent because he was not `employed by an agency of government, federal, state or local, whose primary mission is to enforce the law.' Wolfer, 39 Wash.App. at 294, 693 P.2d 154 (emphasis omitted) (quoting People v. Wright, 249 Cal.App.2d 692, 694-95, 57 Cal.Rptr. 781, 782 (1967)). Because the state agent in Wolfer was not a law enforcement officer, Division One concluded that Miranda warnings were not required. In reaching this decision, Division One broadly read our holding in State v. Valpredo, 75 Wash.2d 368, 450 P.2d 979 (1969). In Valpredo, we considered whether private retail store security guards are required to give Miranda warnings. We said no. The Wolfer court read Valpredo to hold that Miranda warnings need not be given by other than law enforcement officers. Wolfer, 39 Wash.App. at 294, 693 P.2d 154. Miranda's applicability is not as narrow as the Wolfer court held. The United States Supreme Court in Miranda stated that [b]y custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been ... deprived of his freedom in any significant way. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (emphasis added). However, the United States Supreme Court since has clarified that law enforcement officers encompasses more than just police officers. In Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381 (1968), the United States Supreme Court applied Miranda to an internal revenue agent conducting a routine tax investigation. In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 466, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that Miranda applies to court ordered psychiatric examinations. The Court added: That the respondent was questioned by a psychiatrist designated by the trial court ..., rather than by a police officer, government informant, or prosecuting attorney, is immaterial. When [the psychiatrist] went beyond simply reporting to the court on the issue of competence and testified for the prosecution ..., his role changed and became essentially like that of an agent of the State recounting unwarned statements made in a postarrest custodial setting. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 467, 101 S.Ct. 1866. Miranda, therefore, applies not only to law enforcement officers but to any agent of the state who testifie[s] for the prosecution regarding the defendant's custodial statements. We have recognized this application in a previous discussion of Miranda. In State v. Warner, 125 Wash.2d 876, 889 P.2d 479 (1995), we considered application of the Miranda rule to a state-employed counselor in the context of a court ordered sex offender treatment program analogous to group therapy. Under the facts of the case, we found that the counseling session lacked the level of compulsion contemplated in Miranda to constitute interrogation. Warner, 125 Wash.2d at 884, 889 P.2d 479. Further, we did not find a level of restraint analogous to a custodial situation beyond the fact that the defendant was already incarcerated at the time of the counseling session. Under the unique facts of the case, we reasoned that the counselors at issue were not the type of state employees implicated by the Miranda rule. However, we stated, It is likely ... any state employee [who] is conducting a `custodial interrogation' would probably qualify as a state agent for [ Miranda ] purposes. Warner, 125 Wash.2d at 885, 889 P.2d 479. Application of Miranda to a broader class of government employees rather than merely law enforcement officers is consistent with other jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Trigon, Inc., 657 N.W.2d 441, 444 (Iowa 2003) ([W]hen a state official conducts a custodial interrogation that would require a Miranda warning if undertaken by a police officer, then the official is similarly required to give a Miranda warning. (quoting State v. Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784, 790 (Iowa 1994))); see also State v. Lekas, 201 Kan. 579, 442 P.2d 11, 16 (1968) (holding that parole officers must give Miranda warnings if the incriminating statements they elicit from a parolee are to be admissible as evidence in the prosecution of the new offense.). Further, such an application generally is consistent with our cases deciding when a citizen is entitled to constitutional protections in the criminal context. We determine applicability of constitutional protections by an objective test: the belief of a reasonable person in the defendant's position. See, e.g., State v. O'Neill, 148 Wash.2d 564, 62 P.3d 489 (2003). Here, the security officers wore bullet proof vests under t-shirts bearing gold badges containing the words Security Officer. They also wore a duty belt containing pepper spray, a collapsible baton, handcuffs, a radio, and a flashlight holder. The officers approached the juveniles and authoritatively asked questions. A reasonable person in Heritage's position would view such officers to be law enforcement officers with authority over him or her. Based on these above facts, plus the fact that the parties do not dispute the park security officers were acting in their official capacity at the time they confronted the respondent, that their duties included the investigation or reporting of crimes, and that information elicited during interrogation was used to prosecute Heritage, we hold that the park officers were state actors for purposes of Miranda.