Opinion ID: 2675940
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Regulation Applied

Text: Eller-ITO contends the ALJ erred in determining the standard in 29 C.F.R. § 1918.86(n) applies generally to cargo discharged from a vessel and is not expressly limited to “vehicle stowage positioning.” In full, the regulation provides: Vehicle stowage positioning. Drivers shall not drive vehicles, either forward or backward, while any personnel are in positions where they could be struck. 29 C.F.R. § 1918.86(n). The ALJ’s interpretation of 29 C.F.R. § 1918.86(n) as applying to both rollon and roll-off longshoring operations is not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. See Fluor Daniel v. OSHRC, 295 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002). Titles and headings are not a part of the law itself, and it is well-established that they “cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.” Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947). Further, the Secretary’s interpretation of the regulation is reasonable and is therefore entitled to deference. See Fluor Daniel, 295 F.3d at 1236. Thus, the Secretary met the first element of its prima facie case, showing that 29 C.F.R. § 1918.86(n) applied to the conduct at issue. 3 Case: 13-12006 Date Filed: 05/28/2014 Page: 4 of 6 II. Whether Eller-ITO Knowingly Disregarded the Act’s Requirements Eller-ITO asserts the Secretary failed to show that it “knowingly disregarded” the requirements of § 1918.86(n). Specifically, Eller-ITO contends the record evidence is insufficient to support a finding that it knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known, of the violative condition created by Hyman. The knowledge element of the prima facie case can be shown in one of two ways. ComTran, 722 F.3d at 1307. “First, where the Secretary shows that a supervisor had either actual or constructive knowledge of the violation, such knowledge is generally imputed to the employer.” Id. at 1307-08. “In the alternative, the Secretary can show knowledge based upon the employer’s failure to implement an adequate safety program, with the rationale being that—in the absence of such a program—the misconduct was reasonably foreseeable.” Id. at 1308 (citation omitted). An employer’s safety program may be deemed inadequate if it is not adequately communicated to employees. PSP Monotech Indus., 22 BNA OSHC 1303, 1306 (No. 06-1201, 2008); see also Daniel Int’l Corp. v. OSHRC, 683 F.2d 361, 364 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[W]e have little doubt that Daniel has a work rule requiring employees to tie off . . . which is communicated effectively to all of its employees.” (emphasis added)); H.B. Zachry Co. v. OSHRC, 4 Case: 13-12006 Date Filed: 05/28/2014 Page: 5 of 6 638 F.2d 812, 820 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981)1 (finding, in the context of establishing a defense of negligent employee misconduct, substantial evidence in the record supported a finding that a company failed to communicate and enforce its work rules needed to comply with OSHA standards). After reviewing the record, and applying the “considerable deference” afforded to OSHRC decisions, we conclude substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Eller-ITO knowingly disregarded the Act’s requirements. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(a); Fluor Daniel, 295 F.3d at 1236 (explaining “[s]ubstantial evidence is more than a scintilla, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion”). Accordingly, the Secretary established all four elements of his prima facie case that Eller-ITO violated 29 C.F.R. § 1918.86(n). See ComTran, 722 F.3d at 1307.