Opinion ID: 6216405
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mendoza’s Conviction for Possessing a Gun in

Text: Relation to or in Furtherance of a Drug- Trafficking Crime or Crime of Violence Last, Mendoza challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for carrying or possessing a firearm “in relation to” or “in furtherance” of a drug-trafficking crime or crime of violence. To obtain a conviction under § 924(c), the government must prove that the defendant “committed [an] underlying crime” of violence or drug trafficking, United States v. Hunter, 887 F.2d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam), and also “possessed [a] weapon to promote or facilitate th[at] underlying crime,” United States v. Krouse, 370 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 2004). The government must UNITED STATES V. MENDOZA 21 have sufficient evidence of “all elements of the crime created by section 924(c)(1).” Hunter, 887 F.3d at 1003. We focus on the first element of proof: whether Mendoza committed an “underlying crime” of violence or drug trafficking. The government suggested at trial that the jury could find that Mendoza committed any or all of three possible underlying crimes: 1) possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, which the judge instructed the jury was a drug-trafficking crime; 2) conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, which the judge instructed the jury was a drug-trafficking crime; and 3) RICO conspiracy, which the judge instructed the jury was “crime of violence.” 11 The jury acquitted Mendoza of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, so that charge cannot serve as an underlying crime supporting Mendoza’s § 924(c) conviction. This leaves Mendoza’s charges for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and RICO conspiracy. We concluded above that the government presented insufficient evidence to justify those two convictions. So, by the same token, we conclude that the government offered insufficient evidence to prove that Mendoza committed either of those two crimes as an “underlying crime” of drug trafficking or violence for the purposes of § 924(c). Hunter, 887 F.2d at 1003. Of course, the government need not “separately 11 We note that the Supreme Court recently held in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), that § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague, see id. at 2324, causing some courts to conclude that “RICO conspiracy is not a crime of violence” and can no longer support a conviction under § 924(c). E.g., United States v. Capers, 20 F.4th 105, 120 (2d Cir. 2021). This Court has yet to publish an opinion that follows Davis and reaches the same conclusion as Capers, and we need not take that step here. 22 UNITED STATES V. MENDOZA charge[] . . . and convict[]” a defendant charged under § 924(c) “of the underlying offense,” id., so whether or not Mendoza is convicted of either conspiracy is irrelevant. But because the government failed to prove the conspiracy charges beyond a reasonable doubt, the government failed to prove that Mendoza “committed” either conspiracy offense. As a result, neither conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine nor RICO conspiracy can serve as the underlying crime for Mendoza’s conviction under § 924(c). The government thus failed to prove an essential element of Mendoza’s § 924(c) offense, leaving that conviction unsupported by sufficient evidence.