Opinion ID: 557865
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sentencing Phase Jury Instructions on Mitigation

Text: 13 The trial court orally charged the jury that it was authorized to consider all of the evidence received by you in open court in both phases of the trial, including all mitigating and/or extenuating facts and circumstances, if any on behalf of the defendant. It did not define mitigating or extenuating. The trial court later repeated the instruction to consider all of the evidence, but did not mention mitigating or extenuating facts. The trial court then proceeded to instruct the jury as to aggravating circumstances, but gave the jury no oral charge instructing that it could recommend a life sentence even if the state proved the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. 14 The district court found that the trial court's oral charge on mitigating circumstances was constitutionally deficient because it did not adequately explain the meaning and function of mitigating circumstances and it did not instruct the jury that it could still recommend a life sentence even if the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances. The court acknowledged that the written charge that was submitted properly contained these instructions. It concluded, however, that the jury had no reason to look at the written charge because the oral charge suggested that the written charge would be identical to the oral charge. 15 The state argues that the trial court's oral charge is virtually identical to the charge this Court held constitutional in High v. Kemp, 819 F.2d 988 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 926, 109 S.Ct. 3264, 109 L.Ed.2d 609 (1989). Moreover, the state contends that once the written instructions are considered there is no reasonable possibility that a juror could have misunderstood the meaning and function of mitigating circumstances. 3 16 A jury charge on mitigating circumstances is constitutionally valid if there is no reasonable possibility that a juror will misunderstand the meaning and function of mitigating circumstances. Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479, 1494 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939, 107 S.Ct. 421, 93 L.Ed.2d 371 (1986). The charge must be viewed as a whole and in the context of the entire sentencing proceeding. See High, 819 F.2d at 991. 17 The oral charge in the instant case is significantly different from the oral instructions found constitutional in High. In High, 819 F.2d at 991, this Court specifically noted that the challenged instruction orally charged the jury that it could recommend a life sentence even if the state had proven one or more aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The oral charge in the instant case provided no such instruction. The oral charge did instruct the jury that it could recommend a life sentence, but this was unrelated to the charge on aggravating circumstances. 18 Furthermore, in High the petitioner failed to present any mitigating evidence. This Court refused to reproach the trial judge for deciding not to belabor instructions on mitigation where the effect would have been to emphasize that there was no mitigating evidence on the defendant's behalf. High, 819 F.2d at 992. Unlike the petitioner in High, Cunningham presented mitigating evidence including his own testimony and the testimony of his employer. Where a defendant has specifically presented mitigating evidence, the absence of any explanatory instructions on mitigation creates a reasonable possibility that the jury misunderstood the meaning and function of the mitigating evidence in the sentencing deliberations. 4 Moreover, although the written instructions adequately explained mitigation, after reviewing the oral charges, we concur with the district court's determination that the jury had no reason to look at the written charge because the trial court had orally instructed the jury that the written charge was the same as the oral charge. 5 19 The state argues that the Georgia Supreme Court and the state habeas court made implicit factual findings that the jury had considered the written charge. It contends that these implicit findings are binding on the federal courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2254(d) (West 1977). See Marshall, 459 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 850. Our reading of the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion as well as the state habeas court's final order reveals, however, that those courts found only that the charges as a whole, written combined with oral, met constitutional requirements. Neither the Georgia Supreme Court nor the state habeas court directly addressed the question of whether the jury actually read the written charge. See Cunningham v. State, 284 S.E.2d at 396-97; Cunningham v. Kemp, No. 5598 (slip op. at 34-35) (May 31, 1988). The Supreme Court has stated that factfinding procedures aspire to a higher standard of reliability in capital cases. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 2602, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (plurality). Accordingly, this Court will not infer an implicit finding that the jury consulted the written charge from the Georgia Supreme Court's and the state habeas court's finding that the entire charge, written as well as oral, was constitutionally sufficient.