Opinion ID: 512652
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rights and obligations of the United States.

Text: 29 Appellants argue that there is a significant federal interest in the quality of the air in the Mono Lake area. The district court's decision also might be read as implicating unique rights and obligations of the United States, when it states that the defendant's actions invade federally protected interests ... (the integrity of the nation's air and water).... 30 We acknowledge that in the context of an interstate water pollution case, the Supreme Court stated that federal courts do fashion federal laws where federal rights are involved and that there is a federal common law when dealing with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 103, 92 S.Ct. at 1392. The Supreme Court made this statement in the following context. The remedy sought by Illinois for interstate water pollution was not within the precise scope of remedies prescribed by Congress in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Id. at 103, 92 S.Ct. at 1392. The Act makes pollution of interstate and navigable waters subject 'to abatement' when it 'endangers the health and welfare of any persons.'  Id. at 102, 92 S.Ct. at 1392. The abatement authorized by the Act, however, is a long-drawn-out procedure. Id. at 103, 92 S.Ct. at 1392. According to the Supreme Court, remedies which Congress provides are not necessarily the only federal remedies available and [i]t is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal rights are concerned. Id. at 103, 92 S.Ct. at 1392 (quoting Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57, 77 S.Ct. 912, 917-18, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957)). Accordingly, in Milwaukee I, the Supreme Court acknowledged a federal common law remedy to abate interstate or navigable water pollution but says nothing regarding federal common law as to the rural fugitive dust at issue here. 31 By promulgating the Clean Air Act, Congress has recognized some limited federal interest with regard to the nation's air quality. The Clean Air Act also provides that [e]ach state shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geographic area comprising such state, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7407(a), and [t]hat the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of states and local governments. Id. at Sec. 7401(a)(3). Thus, there is not a uniquely federal interest in protecting the quality of the nation's air. Rather, the primary responsibility for maintaining the air quality rests on the states. 32 Additionally, the cases cited in the Texas Industries decision as well as controlling precedent in federal common law nuisance cases indicate that this case does not involve the kind of right or obligation that must be protected by federal common law. 33 In Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 641, n. 12, 101 S.Ct. at 2067, n. 12, the Court cited United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 93 S.Ct. 2389, 37 L.Ed.2d 187 (1973), and Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 63 S.Ct. 573, 87 L.Ed. 838 (1943), as examples of cases in which rights and obligations of the United States were involved. 34 The Little Lake Misere case involved a written agreement made by the United States to acquire land for public purposes explicitly authorized by Congress. The Supreme Court held that in a setting in which the rights of the United States are at issue in a contract to which the United States is a party and 'the issue's outcome bears some relationship to a federal program, no rule may be applied which would not be wholly in accord with that program.'  Id., 412 U.S. at 604, 93 S.Ct. at 2403 (citation omitted). In Clearfield Trust Co., the United States was suing for reimbursement on a forged check drawn on the Treasurer of the United States. The Court held that the rule of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, does not apply and the rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which the United States issues are governed by federal rather than local law. 318 U.S. at 366, 63 S.Ct. at 574-75. The specific facts underlying the Little Lake Misere and Clearfield Trust cases clearly indicated that the federal rights (U.S. agreement to acquire land) and obligations (U.S. commercial paper) at issue required application of federal law. The controversies intimately involved the authority and duties of the United States as sovereign, Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 641, 101 S.Ct. at 2067, therefore making application of anything but federal law inappropriate. 35 The facts of our case stand in marked contrast. Although there might arguably be some unquantified federal interest in protecting the nation's air quality, this type of interest does not necessarily involve the authority and duties of the United States as sovereign to the extent that our federal system requires that the controversy be resolved under federal law, to the exclusion of state law. 36 Quite to the contrary, application of state law in this case is particularly appropriate. The appellant has failed to demonstrate that our federal system does not permit the controversy to be resolved under state law, Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 641, 101 S.Ct. at 2067, nor could it do so. There is no conflict between the alleged federal policies or interests that might be involved in this case and the use of California's common law of nuisance. Additionally, because the appellant is currently seeking the protection of California nuisance laws in California State court, the appellant has clearly demonstrated that California nuisance law is both well-suited and applicable to the case at bar. Therefore, it is inconsistent to argue that both federal and state nuisance law apply to this case. If state law can be applied, there is no need for federal common law; if federal common law exists, it is because state law cannot be used. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 313, n. 7, 101 S.Ct. at 1790, n. 7. Finally, we note that California may have a substantial interest in applying its own nuisance laws to this case which involves primarily state law claims. See Little Lake Misere, 412 U.S. at 599, 93 S.Ct. at 2400; Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corporation, 384 U.S. at 68, 86 S.Ct. at 1304. Consequently, our case does not involve the same sort of rights and obligations of the United States as sovereign which required application of federal law in Little Lake Misere and Clearfield Trust. 37 Rather, our case is more analogous to the Texas Industries case, where the Court decided that a right to contribution among antitrust wrongdoers did not implicate uniquely federal interests of the kind that oblige courts to formulate federal common law. In so holding, the Court reasoned that contribution among antitrust wrongdoers does not involve the duties of the Federal Government, the distribution of powers in our federal system, or matters necessarily subject to federal control even in the absence of statutory authority. Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 642, 101 S.Ct. at 2068. Similarly, because our case also does not involve any of the requisite uniquely federal interests, we decline to recognize the appellants' federal common law nuisance claim based on air pollution. 38