Opinion ID: 3133564
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantial Reliance Interest

Text: If the trial court finds that Mother manifested an intention to treat the judgment terminating her parental rights as valid, then the trial court must determine whether granting relief from that judgment ―would impair another person‘s substantial interest of reliance on the judgment.‖ Id. § 66. Reliance interests protected by denying relief include ―interests in status‖ and ―interest in repose from legal controversy.‖ Id. § 66 cmt. c. Father‘s petition to terminate Mother‘s parental rights recited that the woman he had remarried after divorcing Mother was functioning as the children‘s parent and intended to adopt them. However, aside from the statements of counsel in the trial court,20 additional statements of counsel during oral argument before this Court,21 and the Court of Appeals‘ statement that Father‘s new wife ―subsequently sought to adopt the children in another court,‖22 the record does not actually establish, by stipulation of the parties or any other permissible means,23 whether an adoption ever occurred before Mother filed her petition under Tennessee Rule 60.02(3) seeking relief from the void judgment. Neither child testified at the hearing, nor did the woman Father married after divorcing Mother. Additionally, we note that one child is no longer a minor, and the other child will reach 19 Consistently with section 66, the trial court must limit its consideration of whether Mother manifested an intention to treat the judgment as valid to Mother‘s conduct during the two-year period after she received actual notice of the order terminating her parental rights, even though the record indicates that Mother made no effort to contact, visit, or financially support the children after the date of her last visit on January 3, 2000—more than ten years before her motion was filed. As explained below, however, the trial court may consider Mother‘s conduct during the time before she obtained actual notice of the judgment when determining whether granting relief from it ―would impair another person‘s substantial interest . . . .‖ Id. § 66. 20 Before the trial court, counsel for Father stated that ―the termination of parental rights and subsequent adoption has been in effect for a period of almost nine years.‖ 21 During oral arguments before this Court, Father‘s attorney made statements indicating that the children have been adopted by the woman Father married after divorcing Mother. Counsel for Mother stated that Father had already filed a new action in Madison County seeking to terminate Mother‘s parental rights and that the new action had been stayed pending resolution of this appeal. 22 Turner v. Turner, No. W2013-01833-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 3057320, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. July 7, 2014). 23 See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-125 to -126 (2014) (discussing the confidentiality of adoption records and access to them). -28- majority on January 4, 2016. A person eighteen or older may choose to be adopted, and when this choice is made, ―only the sworn, written consent of the person sought to be adopted shall be required.‖ Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-117 (j)(1) (2014). The record on appeal contains no proof establishing: (1) whether the children have ever been adopted by the woman Father married after divorcing Mother; (2) whether either child has a preference concerning a maternal relationship with Mother or the woman Father married after divorcing Mother; and (3) whether the adult child has already made legal choices concerning adoption, as the law permits. These are factual matters the trial court must resolve on remand when determining whether granting Mother relief from the void judgment would impair another person‘s substantial reliance interests in status. See In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d at 569 (―If, after learning that a judgment has terminated her rights, a parent unreasonably stands mute, and granting relief from the judgment would impair another party‘s substantial reliance interest, the trial court has discretion to deny relief.‖); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 66 illust. 3 (person who was not a party to the original proceedings that resulted in the void judgment may contest the petitioner‘s action to set aside the void judgment); Attebery v. Attebery, 111 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Neb. 1961) (stating that a party against whom void divorce was obtained may be barred if he delays proceedings to contest the decree, to the detriment of ―innocent persons‖ such as the other party‘s new spouse) (cited in Reporter‘s Note to Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 66). Whether Father‘s decision to refrain from seeking child support also amounts to a substantial reliance interest that would be impaired by granting Mother relief from the void judgment is another factual matter that should be developed and considered on remand.24 Furthermore, in determining whether granting relief from the void judgment would impair another person‘s substantial reliance interest, the trial court may consider the relative equities between the parties. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 66 cmt. c. Mother‘s failure to make any effort to contact her children or financially support them from January 2001 until July 29, 2010, when she filed her petition is relevant to determining where the relative equities lie. This is particularly true here, where, although Father‘s residence changed, his place of employment remained the same throughout the years of Mother‘s inaction. Thus, the record on appeal establishes that Mother could have attempted to contact and support her children during this time by contacting Father 24 We decline to address in this appeal Father‘s assertion that the one-year statute of repose applicable to termination of parental rights proceedings, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(q), bars Mother‘s claim. As the Court of Appeals recognized, Father failed to argue that this statute applies to bar challenges to void judgments, and the Attorney General asserted that the statute of repose does not apply to void judgments, like the judgment at issue in this appeal. Thus, we decline to address the question in this appeal. We note, however, that Mother argued that applying the statute of repose in these circumstances would be unconstitutional, and most state courts have held that a state-law time limit, even those imposed on judgments terminating parental rights or finalizing adoptions, cannot be applied in a manner that would deprive the party challenging the judgment of Due Process. See In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d at 562 & n.21 (collecting cases). -29- at his place of employment but failed to do so. On remand, the trial court may consider this circumstance, and any other fact relevant to the relative equities of the parties, when determining whether granting relief from the void judgment would substantially impair another person‘s substantial reliance interest on the judgment.