Opinion ID: 186091
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Count II: Failure to Promote

Text: 29 In Count II of her complaint Taylor claimed she was denied a promotion because of her race. Taylor does not claim she sought promotion into a vacant position. Rather, she claims, with her current responsibilities, she should have received an increase in grade and salary. Because the traditional McDonnell Douglas test does not fit such a case, we adjust the McDonnell formula to ask whether a similarly situated person ... requested and received the benefit she sought. Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 517 (D.C.Cir.2000). In order to make out a prima facie case of discriminatory refusal to promote, therefore, the plaintiff must show that she sought and was denied a promotion for which she was qualified, and that other employees of similar qualifications ... were indeed promoted at the time the plaintiff's request for promotion was denied. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C.Cir.1981). 30 At the time Taylor requested a promotion to GS-12, she had spent less than eight months as a GS-11 employee. Under the applicable personnel regulation, an employee must have spent at least one year in grade GS-11 before she may be considered for promotion to a GS-12 or higher position. See 5 C.F.R. § 300.604(a). The district court therefore properly found Taylor was not eligible for promotion at the time she sought it. 31 Taylor argues the district court erred in failing to consider requests for promotion she claims to have made in July and November 1995. Although a district court should consider on a motion for summary judgment whether postpleading material suggests there are triable issues of material fact, 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER AND MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL 3D § 2721, at 366, the motion cannot be defeated by factual assertions in a brief by the party opposing it, id. § 2723, at 389-90. Because mention of these purported requests and denials appear only in Taylor's memorandum in opposition to the Smithsonian's motion for summary judgment, and not in her complaint or other verified pleading, the district court properly concluded it was not obliged to deal with them at all. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue....). 32 In any event, Taylor's present claim to have sought promotion in July and November 1995 finds scant support in the record. As support for the alleged request of July 1995, Taylor cites a memorandum dated July 7 from herself and Hedlin to two other employees of the OSIA. The subject of the memorandum is Agenda, and the relevant portion reads: 33 Promotion for Carolyn [Taylor] beyond the GS-11 will be dependent upon her budget responsibilities. Julie indicated that OSIA may not have a large enough budget to warrant further grade increases for Carolyn, but they would do comparisons and give her the info. 34 The memorandum does not indicate that Taylor requested promotion in July 1995. It contains a statement, albeit an ambiguous one, about the possibility of a promotion, but it does not indicate she requested a promotion. The alleged November 1995 request is nowhere even mentioned in the record. Indeed, as the Smithsonian points out, the only document Taylor cites as support for her claim that she sought promotion in November is dated September 1995. Finally, and most important, Taylor's claim to have sought promotion in July and November 1995 is contradicted by her own earlier deposition, in which she testified only that she requested promotion within a month or two after Hedlin became Director of the SIA. Clearly, therefore, Taylor failed to provide sufficient evidence she sought promotion in July or November to withstand a motion for summary judgment. See Ben-Kotel v. Howard Univ., 319 F.3d 532, 536 (D.C.Cir.2003) (A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must point to more than just `a scintilla of evidence' supporting [her] position; `there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff') (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512). 35 Not only did Taylor fail to raise a genuine issue with regard to her eligibility for promotion, she also failed to point to any circumstance giving rise to the inference she was denied the promotion because of her race. Taylor's claim rests solely upon Hedlin's having promoted four Caucasian employees from GS-11 to GS-12. The undisputed facts show, however, that those individuals were not situated similarly to Taylor. Three were archivists who had spent over ten years in grade GS-11 before Hedlin promoted them; the other was a supervisory archivist in a career ladder position GS-11/GS-12. Because Taylor falls far short of showing that Hedlin promoted other employees of similar qualifications, Bundy, 641 F.2d at 951, the district court properly held her claim fails as a matter of law, irrespective of her eleventh-hour allegation that she sought promotion after she had spent sufficient time in grade.