Opinion ID: 615500
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Considering the $300 Fines Mandatory Minimums Was Error.

Text: When explaining its decision to impose a $300 fine for each of Brown's three counts of conviction, the district court explained that there was a mandatory minimum fine [of] $300 on each count. It also explained that the payment was owed immediately. The parties agree that Brown's convictions carried no mandatory minimum fine amounts. Accordingly, Brown asks for a remand to correct the mistake. Because Brown neither objected to nor made an argument about the fines the district court imposed at the time, we review their imposition for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Riley, 493 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir.2007) (applying plain error review to arguments forfeited at sentencing regarding the imposition of fines). [1] Under plain error review, we must determine (1) that error occurred; (2) that the error was plain; and (3) that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights. United States v. Luepke, 495 F.3d 443, 448 (7th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If these criteria are met, we may reverse. An error is plain if it is clear or obvious. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Further, defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that their substantial rights were affected by the error, which generally requires showing prejudice: the error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770; see also Luepke, 495 F.3d at 450-51. Finally, the Supreme Court has explained that when a plain error affects the defendant's substantial rights, we should invoke our discretion to remand a case in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result, and it defines miscarriage of justice as an error that seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also United States v. Newman, 965 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir.1992). We find plain error in this case. Brown was not subject to a mandatory minimum fine, and the district court erred in stating otherwise. Brown pled guilty to three counts of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) for Count I and § 841(b)(1)(C) for Counts II and III. Neither of those statutes nor the general fine statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571-3574, impose a mandatory minimum fine. The Sentencing Guidelines provide that [t]he court shall impose a fine in all cases, except where the defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any fine, U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a), and further states that, under those circumstances, the court may impose a lesser fine or waive the fine, U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(e). Accordingly, we have explained that criminal fines are discretionary, and sentencing courts must consider ability to pay when determining whether to impose any fine at all. United States v. Ellis, 522 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir.2008). Faced with an advisory guideline fine range of $20,000 to $8,000,000, the presentencing report concluded that Brown did not have the ability to pay a fine within the guideline range nor does he have the ability to pay a fine immediately. Further, the district court's Statement of Reasons states the following: [f]ine waived or below the guideline range because of inability to pay, and also that [t]he court has departed downward on the fine due to the defendant's inability to pay. We may consider these comments to interpret the district court's oral pronouncements at sentencing. See United States v. Pape, 601 F.3d 743, 747 (7th Cir.2010). On a correct understanding of the law, Brown's inability to pay permitted the district court to not impose a fine at all. Yet, the Statement of Reasons indicates that the district court erroneously believed that the $300 fines were mandatory minimums. This mistake of law implicated Brown's substantial rights because it dictated the outcome of his sentencingthe district court viewed itself as obligated to impose the fines. See McMath, 559 F.3d at 663 n. 2 (noting that mistakes of law typically satisfy plain error and merit reversal); United States v. Flores-Sandoval, 94 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir.1996) (explaining that, in the context of imposing fines, an error prejudices the defendant's substantial rights if it likely would have affected the amount of the fine). We may remand to correct this mistake. Cf. United States v. Jumah, 599 F.3d 799, 813 (7th Cir.2010) (finding that plain error exists and remand is proper when a sentence is based on a miscalculation of the guidelines range); Garrett, 528 F.3d at 529-30 (same); United States v. Ortiz, 613 F.3d 550, 554 (5th Cir.2010) (remanding for resentencing when a district court imposed a sentence that it believed was a mandatory minimum, but which exceeded the actual mandatory minimum for the offense).