Opinion ID: 2599941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Refusal of Instructions Proposed by the Defense

Text: We find no merit in defendant's arguments that the trial court erred in refusing a number of instructions proposed by the defense. The trial court properly denied instructions proposed by the defense that would have required the jury to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors. (See People v. Murtishaw (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1001, 1025, 258 Cal.Rptr. 821, 773 P.2d 172 [trial court erred in giving instructions based on 1978 death penalty law in case to which 1977 law applied].) The 1977 death penalty law under which defendant was tried did not require specifically that the jury weigh aggravating factors, and the jury was instructed, in accordance with that statute, to consider, take into account and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. (See former § 190.3, added by Stats.1977, ch. 316, § 11, p. 1260.) Furthermore, we have noted that there may well be no significant difference between the 1977 law's requirement that the jury consider the aggravating and mitigating factors and the 1978 law's requirement that the jury weigh these factors. ( People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 884, fn. 19, 196 Cal.Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813; Murtishaw, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1027-1028, fn. 12, 258 Cal.Rptr. 821, 773 P.2d 172.) Because the jury was not instructed to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors, defendant's further request for an instruction that the jury could return a verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole even if the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors was irrelevant and unnecessary. The trial court properly refused to instruct that if the jurors had a doubt concerning which penalty to impose, they must return a verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. We consistently have held that [b]ecause the determination of penalty is essentially moral and normative . . . there is no burden of proof or burden of persuasion. ( People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 643, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376; People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 960, 245 Cal.Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395 [in case tried under 1977 death penalty law, trial court did not err in instructing the jury at penalty phase that the prosecution had no burden of proof].) The jurors cannot escape the responsibility of making the choice by finding the circumstances in aggravation and mitigation to be equally balanced and then relying on a rule of law to decide the penalty issue. ( Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at 643, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.) The court was not required to instruct the jury that it could spare the defendant's life for any reason you deem appropriate and satisfactory. The jury was fully instructed concerning the scope of its discretion to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole based on any evidence it deemed appropriate. The jury was instructed that it could consider, in addition to the mitigating factors listed, any other circumstances relating to the case or to the defendant as shown by the evidence as reasons for not imposing the death penalty. Any one of the mitigating factors or other mitigating evidence standing alone may support a decision that death is not the appropriate punishment in this case. (See People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 510, 244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803 [court did not err in instructing jury to base its penalty determination on evidence presented during the trial rather than on factors unrelated to such evidence].) Nor did the court err in refusing defendant's proposed instruction that the jurors were not to be governed by conjecture, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling. The substance of this instruction was covered in other instructions. At the guilt phase, the jury was instructed not to be influenced by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling. At the penalty phase, the jury was told to consider the instructions given during the guilt phase, but that the instruction previously given not to be influenced by pity or sympathy for the defendant did not apply. (See People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 718, fn. 26, 248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253; People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th 876, 982, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.)