Opinion ID: 1963182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Motions For Directed Verdicts

Text: The appellants contend that the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in their favor (a) at the close of the case for the plaintiffs and (b) at the conclusion of the whole case. The contention is based on the claim that the plaintiffs failed to prove any negligence on the part of the defendants in that neither of the witnesses (the passenger and the eye witness) could testify that the driver closed the cab door and, to the contrary, proved that the passenger was negligent in that she either closed the cab door on her coat or let it get caught on the bumper of the cab, but these suppositions, for that is all they are, overlook the fact that the testimony clearly indicated that there were conflicting contentions which presented a question for the jury, as the trier of fact, to decide. While there was evidence on behalf of the appellants to the effect that the cab driver had neither opened nor closed the door for the passenger and that he had seen her behind the cab before he drove away, there was also the evidence of the passenger, corroborated by the disinterested eye witness, to the effect that the cab driver had reached over, grabbed the door and shut it. A party is not entitled to a directed verdict in his favor under Rule 552 a unless the facts and circumstances are such as to permit of only one inference with regard to the issue presented. Smack v. Jackson, 238 Md. 35, 207 A.2d 511 (1965). This is so, because if there is any legally relevant and competent evidence to prove the plaintiff's case, a directed verdict should not be granted. Plitt v. Greenberg, 242 Md. 359, 219 A.2d 237 (1966); State use of Bowman v. Wooleyhan Transport Co., 192 Md. 686, 65 A.2d 321 (1949). The refusal of directed verdicts was proper.