Opinion ID: 1226896
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claim of Skipper Error

Text: (52a) Defendant claims in substance that by instructing the jury as it did, the trial court committed so-called  Skipper error. ( Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1 [90 L.Ed.2d 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669].) ... [I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment, [citation], requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death. This conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case. ( Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 304-305 [49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961, 96 S.Ct. 2978] (lead opn. of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.).) (53) To guarantee that capital sentencing decisions are as individualized and reliable as the Constitution demands, the Eighth Amendment requires that the defendant may not be barred from introducing any relevant mitigating evidence. ( Skipper v. South Carolina, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 4-8 [90 L.Ed.2d at pp. 6-9]; see Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 112-116 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 9-12, 102 S.Ct. 869]; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 597-605 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 985-990, 98 S.Ct. 2954] (plur. opn. by Burger, C.J.); Bell v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 637, 642 [57 L.Ed.2d 1010, 1016, 98 S.Ct. 2977] (plur. opn. by Burger, C.J.).) It follows that the Eighth Amendment also requires that a jury and its individual members ( McKoy v. North Carolina (1990) 494 U.S. 433, 438-443 [108 L.Ed.2d 369, 378-381, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 1231-1234]) may not ... be precluded from considering `any relevant mitigating evidence[ ]' ( Skipper v. South Carolina, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 4 [90 L.Ed.2d at p. 6], quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 114 [71 L.Ed.2d at p. 11]; accord, McKoy v. North Carolina, supra, 494 U.S. at pp. 438-443 [108 L.Ed.2d at pp. 378-381, 110 S.Ct. at pp. 1231-1234]; Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393, 394, 398-399 [95 L.Ed.2d 347, 350, 352-353, 107 S.Ct. 1821]; Mills v. Maryland (1988) 486 U.S. 367, 374-375 [100 L.Ed.2d 384, 393-394, 108 S.Ct. 1860]). Therefore, when any barrier, whether statutory, instructional, evidentiary, or otherwise (see Mills v. Maryland, supra, 486 U.S. at pp. 374-375 [100 L.Ed.2d at pp. 393-394]), precludes a jury or any of its members ( McKoy v. North Carolina, supra, 494 U.S. at pp. 438-443 [108 L.Ed. at pp. 378-381, 110 S.Ct. at pp. 1231-1234]) from considering relevant mitigating evidence, there occurs federal constitutional error, which is commonly referred to as  Skipper error. (See generally Skipper v. South Carolina, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 4-8; Hitchcock v. Dugger, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 394, 398-399; Mills v. Maryland, supra, 486 U.S. at pp. 374-375; McKoy v. North Carolina, supra, 494 U.S. at pp. 438-443 [108 L.Ed.2d at pp. 378-381, 110 S.Ct. at pp. 1231-1234].) When the claimed barrier to the jury's consideration of relevant mitigating evidence is an instruction, the crucial question for determining error is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of such evidence. ( Boyde v. California, supra, 494 U.S. 370, 380 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 329, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1198].) (52b) After close consideration, we reject defendant's claim of error. The challenged instructions told the jury that you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factors of ... mitigating circumstances, which may include, but are not limited to, Douglas Scott Mic[k]ey's character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition. They also declared that You may consider pity, sympathy or mercy in deciding the appropriate punishment.... Further, in their summations both the prosecutor and defense counsel delivered the same message. Defendant argues that the challenged instructions had two flaws: first, they did not require the sentencer to consider the mitigating evidence but simply permitted it to do so, and, second, they placed the mitigating factors of character, background, history, etc., on a different plane than [ sic ] the factors enumerated in CALJIC No. 8.84.1, [factors] (a) through (k). The instructions themselves, which are quoted above, refute the assertion. In view of the foregoing, there is not a reasonable likelihood that the jurors applied the challenged instructions in a way as to prevent themselves from considering any or all of the potentially mitigating evidence adduced at trial. (54) Under the foregoing analysis, we also reject defendant's claim that the trial court committed Skipper error by failing to delete the italicized word from each of the following penalty factors: Whether or not the offense was committed while Douglas Mickey was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (italics added); and, Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which Douglas Mickey reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct (italics added). Defendant argues in substance that the challenged instructions amounted to an incorrect statement of the law: (1) under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the jury may not be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence; (2) such evidence was presented in the form of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and reasonable belief in moral justification or extenuation  and also in the form of non-extreme disturbance and unreasonable belief; and (3) contrary to the constitutional principle stated above, the instructions implied that the jurors could consider only the former and not the latter. To be sure, the major premise of defendant's argument is sound. But a crucial minor premise is not. First, the challenged instructions simply did not carry the preclusive implication he asserts they did: they did indeed state that the jury could consider extreme mental or emotional disturbance and reasonable belief in moral justification or extenuation  but not only  extreme mental or emotional disturbance and  reasonable belief in moral justification or extenuation. Second, one of the instructions given on defendant's request was expressly inclusive: Factors in mitigation may include, but are not limited to, Douglas Scott Mic[k]ey's character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition. (Italics added.) On the record set out above, there is not a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have inferred that they could not consider disturbance or belief of any kind or degree whatever in mitigation of penalty. (55) We also reject defendant's claim that the trial court erred by refusing to give, on his request, Defense Instruction No. 23: A mitigating circumstance does not have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to exist. You must find that a mitigating circumstance exists if there is any substantial evidence to support it. A court may  and, indeed, must  refuse an instruction that is an incorrect statement of the law. (See People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1275.) A court may also refuse an instruction that is duplicative. (See People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 805, fn. 12.) The second sentence of Defense Instruction No. 23 is incorrect. The law simply does not so constrain the discretion of the jury or its individual members. The first sentence is duplicative. Implicit in the penalty charge as a whole was the statement expressed therein.