Opinion ID: 380839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Law Officers' Statements

Text: 22 Law enforcement officers John Ellis, Arthur Flynn, Carl Miller, Ben Mahoney, and Gerald Douglas all testified, over defendant's objection, as to inculpatory statements defendant had made in their presence. Defendant contends these statements were taken in violation of his constitutional rights under either the Fifth Amendment, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), or the Sixth Amendment, see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). We recount the testimony as to each statement in the chronological order in which the statements were made. 23 Ellis. At the FBI interview on the afternoon of May 20, defendant signed an FBI form expressing his waiver of any right to remain silent or seek legal counsel. He was then questioned for about an hour, with his parents present during most of that time. Defendant told agent Ellis at this time that he was very angry with Larry Abernathy for forcing him to pay for blue jeans that defendant thought he had already bought. Defendant said he had wanted to bust (Abernathy) right there, but there were too many people in the store. Defendant also told Ellis he did not kill Scottie Abernathy, but could have done so if he had had a seizure. 24 Flynn. Defendant had another FBI interview the next morning. Defendant again signed the FBI waiver form. His parents again were present. Defendant explained to FBI agent Flynn that he had gone to the Howe residence after he had left the Abernathy store. Upon leaving the fifteen minute interview, defendant commented that if they all start lying about me, I'm going to beat up on the Howes, too. 25 Miller. When arrested that afternoon, defendant was driven from Fort Thompson to the Hughes County Jail in Pierre, South Dakota, by Fort Thompson police officer Miller. As defendant left the car in Pierre, officer Miller noticed he appeared upset and sought to assure him by telling him that everything would be all right. Defendant responded, Leave me alone or I'll kill you, too. 26 Mahoney. About one week later, defendant was driven by U.S. deputy marshal Mahoney from the Hughes County Jail to a federal courthouse so that defendant could make an appearance. During the trip defendant responded to a radio news item about food stamp fraud by saying they asked me why I did what I did. Abernathy has been ripping them off for years. 27 Douglas. Defendant made his last series of inculpatory statements while being driven by deputy U.S. marshal Douglas to and from psychiatric examinations. On August 24, 1979, after mentioning a mathematical problem he had been working on, defendant asked Douglas if the FBI had found out about the six lies Larry Abernathy had told about the defendant. Douglas said he did not know. Shortly thereafter, defendant looked out the window of the car, and changed the subject again, saying I guess I did it, I could have done it but I didn't mean to. On September 21, 1979, Douglas asked defendant why he was not taking his epilepsy medication. Defendant explained that the medication was responsible for his accidents, such as when I killed Scottie, it was an accident, this medication makes me get in all this mischief. On neither occasion had Douglas asked defendant about the killing of Scottie Abernathy. 28 The district court ruled each of the above statements was admissible. We find it convenient to consider first the statements made to Miller, Mahoney, and Douglas. 29 The Supreme Court established standards for the admissibility of a defendant's statements in Miranda v. Arizona, supra. The Miranda Court held the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the (Fifth Amendment) privilege against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. The Supreme Court explored the meaning of interrogation for purposes of Miranda in Rhode Island v. Innis, --- U.S. ---, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). The accused in Innis was arrested in connection with a crime that involved the use of a shotgun, which police were unable to locate. When the arresting officers apprised the accused of his Miranda rights he chose not to talk and asked for an attorney. Enroute to the police station, however, the accused chose to reveal the location of the shotgun when he overhead officers express their concern that a handicapped child from a nearby school might find the gun and hurt himself. The Court held that the admissibility of the shotgun and testimony related to its discovery was consistent with defendant's Miranda rights, on the basis that defendant had not been interrogated. 5 The test for interrogation was whether the suspect was subjected by police to words or actions that the police should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from him. --- U.S. at ---, 100 S.Ct. at 1691. The Court distinguished the officers' few off-hand remarks from a lengthy harangue in the presence of the subject. Id. 30 Applying Miranda and Innis to the facts of the present case, we conclude defendant's incriminating statements in the presence of law officers Miller, Mahoney, and Douglas did not stem from custodial interrogation. This is especially true with respect to Miller and Mahoney. Miller's expression of concern about defendant's apparent anxiety had only a remote connection with the crime of which defendant was accused; and Mahoney did no more than record defendant's spontaneous response to the content of a radio news item over which Mahoney had no control. Deputy marshal Douglas, by contrast, engaged in several protracted conversations with defendant; but the record nowhere indicates that Douglas' remarks on the two occasions in question had the motive or likely effect of interrogation. It was defendant, not Douglas, who adverted to the subject of Larry Abernathy and the killing. Douglas' verbal conduct more resembled the off-hand remarks the Innis Court condoned than the lengthy harangue the Court censured. Defendant points out that Douglas kept a careful log of defendant's incriminating statements. While perhaps this fact is logically probative of an intent to interrogate, it cannot alone be decisive, for a law officer would be derelict in his duty not to log an accused's incriminating statements, whether spontaneous or not. As to law officers Mahoney, Miller, and Douglas, then, the record on the whole satisfies us there was no interrogation under Innis, and thus no violation of defendant's rights under Miranda. 31 Nor, for the reasons just expressed, can it be said that defendant's statements were deliberately elicited in the absence of counsel in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment. 6 Cf. Brewer v. Williams, supra, (police officer deliberately played on defendant's religious beliefs by stating missing victim deserved a Christian burial). 32 The statements made to FBI agents Ellis and Flynn are of a different sort, for they stemmed from interrogation. The agents testified, however, that defendant was not under arrest at the time, that he was accompanied by his parents, that he spoke only after executing a formal waiver of any right to remain silent, and that he was permitted to leave the police station after the interview. Defendant argues that his Miranda rights were violated and that any waiver was not effective. Assuming arguendo that the interrogation was custodial, and thus brought defendant's constitutional rights into play, cf. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (Miranda applies only when defendant in custody), we hold defendant effectively waived any rights he had. The Miranda Court stated: 33 If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. 34 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. The question whether defendant has waived his Miranda rights is one that must be determined on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1758, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). 35 Defendant, although having a dull-normal IQ, was not mentally retarded. He had a fifth grade education and could read, write, and do math problems and crossword puzzles. When examined by doctors before trial he was responsive and followed directions. Prior to the May 20 interview, agent Ellis spent five minutes reading and explaining the FBI waiver-of-rights form to defendant, who followed along on his own copy. Agent Flynn read the same form prior to the May 21 interview. Neither agent made threat or promise to induce defendant to speak. To both agents defendant indicated both orally and in writing that he understood and was waiving his rights. On at least two other occasions during this general period defendant asserted his right to remain silent. 7 These circumstances convince us that defendant knowingly and effectively waived any constitutional right to silence he may have had.