Opinion ID: 1870964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Entitlement to work product part of client's file.

Text: Having found a writ of mandamus to be the appropriate remedy here, we now address whether the Court of Appeals properly concluded that Appellant was not entitled to the work product and find the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Appellant was not entitled to the work product in his file as Appellant, as a criminal litigant, was clearly entitled to the entire contents of his file, including that which is characterized as work product. As previously discussed, in denying the writ, the Court of Appeals held that Appellant's request for the work product was equal to a request for discovery, and as such, the request is specifically prohibited by Haight, supra . However, as Appellant correctly points out, Eardley would have to be a client of the Commonwealth for his request to constitute discovery. This has been specifically denied by the Commonwealth, and the trial court specifically found that Eardley was not the Commonwealth's client. Although the Kentucky Bar Association (KBA) has issued several ethics opinions on client files, those opinions do so only in the context of a civil case and under different facts. Here, we have a criminal defendant who is contesting his conviction on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The difference between the two lies in the nature of the action as well as the circumstances attendant to such a request. Most pertinent to this case is KBA Ethics Comm., Ethics Opinion KBA E-424 (2005). In this ethics opinion, the Committee addressed the question of whether or not a lawyer who terminates his/her relationship with a private law firm to practice elsewhere may take the files of current clients whom the departing lawyer is representing. In giving a qualified yes answer, the Committee stated that [a]s a general rule, client files and property must be handled in accordance with the client's wishes and this is a matter that should be addressed in conjunction with the client's decision regarding future representation. KBA Ethics Comm., Ethics Opinion KBA E-424 (2005). Further, the Committee suggested that where a client has paid his former attorney or firm for specific work, i.e. work product, the client is entitled to that for which he has paid. Thus, where an attorney is paid for that which could be considered work product, the client is entitled to that portion of the file. In this case, Appellant was represented by an attorney from Fayette County Legal Aid, whose fee services are paid from other sources, rather than the clientbut paid for, nevertheless. Thus upon termination of representation, Appellant, upon request, was entitled to the entirety of his file, work product included. A review of the record indicates that the Fayette Circuit Court relied on KBA E-395, as well as other previous ethics opinions, in denying Appellant's request to compel Mr. Eardley to produce the work product. Yet, these opinions dealt with facts involving the narrow issue of whether an attorney could retain his work product where the client had not necessarily paid for the services. Furthermore, these opinions were addressing questions within the context of civil matters, not criminal defendants seeking post-conviction relief. The work product privilege provided in CR 26.02(3)(a) is nearly identical to that contained in Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3) and provides that the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation. CR 26.02(3)(a). The work-product doctrine is designed to protect an adversary system of justice, Morrow v. Brown, Todd & Heyburn, 957 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Ky.1997), and, generally, has its roots in the United States Supreme Court decision in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947). It is meant to protect an attorney, but not from his own former client, and it does not override questions of ownership. We note other jurisdictions that have addressed the same issue in the context of the federal rules. For example, in Spivey v. Zant, 683 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir.1982), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the work product doctrine does not apply to the situation in which a client seeks access to documents or other tangible things created or amassed by his attorney during the course of the representation. Spivey , of course, was decided in the context of a civil case where the constitutional rights to adequate representation were not as attendant as they are in a criminal case such as the one here. The same year the decision in Spivey was rendered, the United States Court of Military Appeals addressed the same issue before this Court. In United States v. Dupas, 14 M.J. 28 (1982), the appellant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming his trial attorney failed to call a possible alibi witness at his rape trial. Appellant Dupas then sought access to his trial attorney's file in order to determine what the attorney had done on his behalf. Trial counsel refused to grant Dupas and his post-conviction counsel access to the files or information about tasks performed in defending the case. The court, however, noted that the `work product privilege' applies only against third persons and cannot be invoked against the client himself or against his agent. Id. at 31 (citations omitted). The court did, however, recognize two limitations to this holding. First, if reproduction costs are incurred, the client must pay those costs. Second, if information has been provided to the attorney in confidence, such as information in a presentence report, then that information must be kept confidential. As Appellant has noted, Eardley has not offered either of these reasons as justification for his refusal to give Appellant access to his entire file. In a similar case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held in United States v. Dorman, 58 M.J. 295 (2003), that regardless of whether there is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, trial counsel must grant appellate counsel access to the case file upon request. The court stated further: In short, trial defense counsel maintains a continuing obligation to the client beyond the trial's conclusion, which includes providing reasonable assistance where permitted and refraining from acting in a manner inconsistent with the client's right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. Implicit in both the right to appeal and counsel's duty of loyalty is the understanding that trial defense counsel will not interfere with appellate defense counsel's representation, and to the extent necessary and possible, will assist appellate defense counsel in preparing the appeal. Id. at 298. The American Bar Association has also recognized the continuing duty of trial defense counsel. An attorney's duty of loyalty and duty to advocate for the defendant do not terminate upon a defendant's conviction. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense Function Standards and Commentary 4-8.2, 4-8.4, 4-8.6 (3d ed.1993). Although the ABA Standards contemplate that some defense attorneys may represent the same client at trial and throughout the appeals process as well as post-conviction proceedings, the resounding message is that defense attorneys, because of their intimate knowledge of the trial proceedings and their possession of unique information regarding possible post-conviction claims, have an obligation to cooperate with their client's attempts to challenge their convictions. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense Function Standards and Commentary 4-8.2, 4-8.5 (3d ed.1993). Finally, we reiterate that Mr. Eardley asserted the work product privilege on his own behalf. The Commonwealth has thus described Mr. Eardley as someone who may be adversely affected by the relief sought, CR 76.36(8), and thus he should be named as a Real Party in Interest in the Original Action. We believe these assertions have no merit at this late stage. The possibility that Mr. Eardley may be adversely affected if he turns over the work product to Appellant is no more probable than the fact that he may be exonerated of any claims of ineffective assistance. We do not, by this opinion, intend to establish any sweeping ownership rule by which any party, in connection with non-criminal litigation, may lay claim to any matter connected with his own case, or file, however tenuous. The facts of this case provide a specific scenario in which work product, properly characterized as such, may be requested and obtained by a former criminal client where that criminal defendant now seeks post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and therefore needs his file.