Opinion ID: 2584187
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fibre's business necessity claim is pretextual

Text: ¶ 20 Fibre might have justified its refusal to hire Hegwine because of her pregnancy on the ground of business necessity. See WAC 162-30-020(3)(b). The term business necessity is not defined in the WAC or the RCW. However, this court has previously discussed the meaning of business necessity in the employment discrimination context. Specifically, in Shannon v. Pay `N Save Corp., 104 Wash.2d 722, 709 P.2d 799 (1985), this court held that to establish a business necessity defense an employer must prove . . . that the [challenged employment practice] utilized . . . significantly correlates with the fundamental requirements of job performance. Id. at 731, 709 P.2d 799. [8] Further guidance as to the proper application of the business necessity defense is provided by the text of the regulation. In particular, WAC 162-30-020(3)(b) includes the following example of business necessity: [A]n employer hiring workers into a training program that cannot accommodate absences for the first two months might be justified in refusing to hire a pregnant woman whose delivery date would occur during those first two months. ¶ 21 The Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that business necessity, under WAC 162-30-020(3)(b), is an affirmative defense of which the employer bears both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. Hegwine, 132 Wash.App. at 566, 132 P.3d 789 (citing CR 8(c)). The characterization of the business necessity justification as an affirmative defense conflicts with the analysis applicable to disparate treatment claims and the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme. It also conflicts with this court's decision in Kastanis v. Education Employees Credit Union, 122 Wash.2d 483, 859 P.2d 26, 865 P.2d 507 (1993). In Kastanis, we specifically rejected that the contention that an employer's claim of a business necessity in a disparate treatment case was an affirmative defense, reasoning that [s]ince the ultimate burden of proving discrimination rests with the plaintiff . . . the burden of proof on the issue of business necessity also rests with the plaintiff. Id. at 492, 859 P.2d 26. Although the burden of production shifts to the employer to produce evidence of a business necessity, the burden of persuasion always remains with the employee to show intentional discrimination. ¶ 22 Fibre met its intermediate burden of production by asserting that its decision to withdraw its offer of employment was based on Hegwine's inability to meet an essential function of the position she applied for, i.e., a weight-lifting requirement. The presumption that arose from prima facie evidence was thus rebutted, and dropped from the case. The ultimate burden was on Hegwine to show that the proffered weight-lifting requirement was pretextual and that Fibre intentionally discriminated against her because of her pregnancy. Hegwine succeeded in meeting her burden. As the Court of Appeals explained: [T]he record contains evidence sufficient to show that [Fibre's facially discriminatory reason for not hiring Ms. Hegwine] was a pretext to avoid hiring a pregnant woman: (1) the job advertisement listed no lifting requirements; (2) in the interview only 25 pounds was mentioned as a lifting requirement; (3) Hegwine never suggested any pregnancy related limitations to Fibre or its doctor; (4) when Fibre learned Hegwine was pregnant through its mandatory physical, it immediately assumed she had restrictions that her doctor would have to identify; (5) when Hegwine's doctor's permission exceeded the 25 pound lifting requirement, Fibre changed the requirement and told her it was 40 pounds; (6) when Hegwine's doctor submitted a second form responding to the new 40 pound lifting requirement, Fibre's doctor talked to Hegwine's doctor and obtained a third form, still allowing lifting adequate to do the job as explained by Fibre; (7) Fibre then told Hegwine to leave its premises and not return until the alleged situation all sorted out; (8) only after Hegwine was removed did Fibre undertake a job analysis that resulted in an even greater lifting requirement  60 pounds; (9) Fibre did not communicate this new requirement to either Hegwine or her doctor; (10) instead, it told Hegwine that her availability precluded her from performing the job and therefore rescinded her job offer; and finally (11) Fibre altered its position and argued at trial that it rescinded its offer, not because of Hegwine's availability, but because she could allegedly not perform an essential function of the job that was determined after it rescinded its offer. Hegwine, 132 Wash.App. at 565-66, 132 P.3d 789. Reasonable minds could not differ given this evidence, and therefore, as a matter of law, Hegwine established that Fibre's claim of business necessity was pretextual. ¶ 23 Because Hegwine established that Fibre's business necessity claim was clearly pretextual, we hold that Hegwine has proved sex discrimination in violation of RCW 49.60.180(1) and WAC 162-30-020(3)(a)(i), as a matter of law.