Opinion ID: 1204963
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to instruct sua sponte

Text: Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, regarding: (1) identity (CALJIC No. 2.91) [32] and eyewitness identification factors (CALJIC No. 2.92); (2) defendant's alibi (CALJIC No. 4.50); and (3) the reliability of jailhouse informant Frederick Williams. Defendant did not request instructions on any of these matters but asserts the trial court had a duty to provide the jury with such instructions in light of the testimony of the numerous witnesses who linked him to the Huntington Beach area, or to Robin, on June 19-20, 1979. Defendant also contends his counsel's failure to request certain instructions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, we reject each of defendant's contentions.
(22) Defendant contends the pivotal nature of eyewitness testimony in this case imposed a duty on the trial court to instruct the jury sua sponte pursuant to CALJIC Nos. 2.91 and 2.92. We rejected a similar argument in People v. Blair (1979) 25 Cal.3d 640, 662-663 [159 Cal. Rptr. 818, 602 P.2d 738]. In Blair, the defendant argued that due to the unreliability of the identification evidence and the importance of that evidence, the trial court should have instructed the jury on its own motion, either pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.91 or the more elaborate instructions set forth in People v. Guzman (1975) 47 Cal. App.3d 380, 386-387, footnote 1 [121 Cal. Rptr. 69]. (25 Cal.3d at p. 663.) The Guzman instructions, viewed together, are similar to CALJIC No. 2.92. ( People v. Sanchez (1990) 221 Cal. App.3d 74, 76 [270 Cal. Rptr. 275].) In declining to accept the defendant's argument in Blair, we adopted the view set forth in People v. Richardson (1978) 83 Cal. App.3d 853, 860-862 [148 Cal. Rptr. 120], that the trial court had no such duty because, inter alia, the court's general instructions on credibility and burden of proof were sufficient to inform the jury of the test they should apply to the identification evidence. ( People v. Blair, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 663.) In the instant case, as in Blair ( supra, 25 Cal.3d at 663 fn. 22), the trial court admonished the jury pursuant to such general instructions. The court instructed the jury regarding witness credibility (CALJIC No. 2.20), discrepancies in testimony (CALJIC No. 2.21), the weighing of conflicting testimony (CALJIC No. 2.22), the sufficiency of testimony from one witness (CALJIC No. 2.27), and reasonable doubt (CALJIC No. 2.90), also furnishing other instructions involving the evaluation of testimony. Although the trial court did not instruct on alibi (CALJIC No. 4.50) as the court did in Blair ( supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 663), that distinction is immaterial, because in each case the trial court's instructions clearly addressed the defendant's challenge to the reliability of the testimony which identified him. Moreover, as in Blair, supra, there was substantial corroborating evidence in the present case connecting defendant to the crime, apart from the eyewitness testimony. The trial court's instructions were sufficient to inform the jury that the prosecution had the burden of establishing identity, and that defendant should be acquitted in the event the jury harbored a reasonable doubt on the issue of identity. (See also People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1144 [248 Cal. Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049] [CALJIC No. 2.92 or a comparable instruction should be given when requested in a case in which identification is a crucial issue and there is no substantial corroborative evidence. (Italics added.)]; People v. Sanchez, supra, 221 Cal. App.3d at pp. 76-78 [relying on Blair in holding that a trial court is under no duty to deliver CALJIC No. 2.92 sua sponte]; CALJIC No. 2.92, 5th ed., Comment [no sua sponte duty to instruct].)
(23) Defendant contends his alibi defense imposed a duty upon the trial court to instruct the jury sua sponte pursuant to CALJIC No. 4.50. We repeatedly have rejected the identical contention. (See People v. Freeman (1978) 22 Cal.3d 434, 437-439 [149 Cal. Rptr. 396, 584 P.2d 533], and cases cited therein.) For the purpose of instructing with respect to an alibi defense, it is sufficient that the jury be instructed generally to consider all the evidence, and to acquit the defendant in the event it entertains a reasonable doubt regarding his or her guilt. ( Id., at p. 438.) Because the jury was so instructed in the present case (see ante, p. 803), defendant's contention lacks merit. [33]
(24) Defendant contends the testimony of inmate Frederick Williams imposed a duty on the trial court to instruct the jury sua sponte to view with distrust the testimony of a jailhouse informant. We repeatedly have rejected the identical contention. (See People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1250, fn. 13, and cases cited therein.) Defendant invites this court to reconsider the issue in light of United States v. Garcia (5th Cir.1976) 528 F.2d 580 [reversal where the conviction was based entirely on the informer's uncorroborated testimony]. Such reconsideration is unwarranted. Not only did our decision in People v. Hovey, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pages 565-566, implicitly reject Garcia, but Garcia also is factually distinguishable from the instant case. Moreover, at defendant's trial the court instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.23, regarding the credibility of a convicted felon. [34] The trial court thus adequately instructed the jury regarding William's testimony.
Defendant contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel by his attorneys' failure to request that the jury be instructed pursuant to CALJIC Nos. 2.91, 2.92 and 4.50. In light of our determination that the instructions given adequately apprised the jury of all relevant legal principles, any failure by counsel clearly was not prejudicial.