Opinion ID: 2994581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission Of Bennett’s Prior Testimony

Text: At Lowery’s first trial, Jim Bennett testified for the prosecution. He did so pursuant to a plea agreement that required his testimony and guaranteed him a sentence of 40 years. Before the retrial, Bennett informed the prosecutor that he would not testify again unless the prosecutor reduced his sentence to 10 years. The prosecutor refused. Bennett, then, true to his word, refused to testify when called. The trial judge held Bennett in contempt, but Bennett still refused to testify. As described below, this procedure was repeated several times, outside the jury’s presence. Finally, Bennett was called with the jury present. He refused again to testify and was again held in contempt. At that point, the trial judge declared Bennett to be an unavailable witness and allowed the prosecutor, over Lowery’s objection, to read to the jury Bennett’s testimony from the first trial. Lowery claims this was reversible error because it denied him his constitutional right to confront and cross- examine the witness against him. He also argues that Bennett was not truly unavailable because the State failed to exhaust other means which might have induced Bennett to testify. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of the accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. Const. Amendment VI. See also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986). The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity for cross- examination. United States v. Sasson, 62 F.3d 874, 882 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. den’d, 516 U.S. 1131 (1996). Lowery contends that he was deprived of this right when Bennett’s prior testimony was read to the jury. The Sixth Amendment confrontation clause, however, permits, where necessary, the admission of certain hearsay statements against a defendant despite the defendant’s inability to confront the declarant at trial. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847-48 (1990) (citations omitted). The confrontation clause is satisfied, and no constitutional violation occurs, when the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the earlier proceeding and the witness is unavailable for the subsequent proceeding. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972). Lowery admits that Bennett’s testimony was subject to cross- examination at the first trial and does not contend that the cross-examination was less than full or meaningful. He complains that Bennett’s prior testimony was improperly admitted because Bennett was not truly unavailable the second time around. It is well established that a witness may be deemed unavailable and use of his former testimony permitted if the witness persists in refusing to testify . . . despite an order of the court to do so. Fed.R.Evid. 804(a)(2). See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 168-69 (1970). However, there is more to consider. The prosecution must also demonstrate that it made a good faith effort to obtain the witness’ testimony, in person, before the trier of fact. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980). The lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness is a question of reasonableness. Id. Here, in an effort to secure Bennett’s testimony for the second trial, the prosecutor had Bennett transported from the state prison in which he was incarcerated to a county jail so that he could be available to testify. He also attempted to talk with Bennett before calling him as a witness, and kept calling him as a witness during the trial, even though Bennett refused to testify and had been held in contempt of court. What the prosecution did not do was, as the trial judge suggested, threaten to revoke Bennett’s plea agreement and try him for murder, or threaten to try him for obstruction of justice. The Supreme Court of Indiana found that Bennett was amenable to these tactics and Lowery suggests that because they might have worked, the State did not act reasonably or in good faith in attempting to obtain Bennett’s testimony for the retrial. The District Court disagreed, saying: [t]he fact that other steps the prosecution did not take might also have been reasonable does not show either that it failed to make a reasonable, good faith effort to secure Bennett’s testimony, or that Lowery’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated by use of Bennett’s testimony from Lowery’s first trial. Lowery, 69 F.Supp.2d at 1093. We agree. Although the record is silent as to why the prosecution chose not to threaten Bennett with further prosecution or charge him with a crime, there is no requirement that it do so and such decisions are well within the prosecution’s discretion. Johnson v. State, 675 N.E.2d 678, 683 (Ind. 1996); LaMotte v. State, 495 N.E.2d 729, 733 (Ind. 1986). We decline to impose a rule imposing the court’s will upon the prosecution and we fear that to do so would violate the separation of powers. The fact that more, theoretically, could have been done to persuade Bennett to testify does not persuade us to reach a contrary result. If we adopt Lowery’s position and mandate that the prosecution threaten recalcitrant witnesses, or possibly even charge them with minor crimes, where do we stop? A bright line test is not possible in cases such as this. We believe the better rule is to consider the totality of the circumstances and determine reasonableness and good faith on a case by case basis. In this case we find that the prosecution did make a good faith effort to secure Bennett’s testimony for the retrial. We understand the passion with which Lowery presents his argument, especially in light of the inconsistent statements Bennett made between the first and second trials. During that interim, Bennett wrote letters to state officials and to Lowery, saying in one that there were three people involved in the crime and, in another, that Lowery was not present when the crime occurred. In each instance, he offered to exchange information for a further reduction in his sentence./1 Lowery argues that he was irrevocably prejudiced by the prosecution’s failure to procure Bennett as a live witness so that he could cross-examine him with this new information. He asks that we review this claim under the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), and says that once we do reversal is mandated. Under the Chapman harmless error standard, the government has the burden of demonstrating that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 22. We have reviewed and rejected that argument and instead adopted the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993), which holds that an error is harmless unless the defendant can show that it had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 446-47 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. den’d, 516 U.S. 1041 (1996). See also Fleenor v. Anderson, 171 F.3d 1096, 1101 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. den’d, 120 S.Ct. 215 (1999) (applying the Brecht standard in a capital case). The Brecht standard recognizes that an earlier court has already reviewed the claimed error under the heightened Chapman standard and, therefore, permits a lower level of scrutiny on appeal. Here, the new evidence upon which Lowery relies developed before the second trial. His claims thereafter could have been reviewed by the Supreme Court of Indiana on direct appeal and on petition for collateral relief or by the U.S. District Court on the petition for writ of habeas corpus. They were not, however, because the letters and testimony regarding Bennett’s alleged recantation were not offered at trial. The Supreme Court of Indiana, in refusing to review the alleged error said the court did not have an opportunity to rule on the offer of the letter, and there is no error presented for our review. Lowery, 478 N.E.2d at 1223-24 (Ind. 1985). Thus, contrary to Lowery’s assertion, we believe that the courts before us have had an opportunity to address the claimed error and have rejected it, finding that it was either waived or did not present an issue of manifest injustice requiring the reversal of his conviction. We therefore believe the rationale behind Brecht has been satisfied and apply its standard of review to this case. We find that Lowery has not met that burden. The trial court indicated that Lowery could inform the jury about Bennett’s letter and statements, but Lowery’s attorney never attempted to do so. Lowery, 478 N.E.2d at 1223. Furthermore, the jury was informed that Bennett was testifying pursuant to a plea agreement which, as the State points out, could make the jury skeptical of his testimony anyway. But most importantly, we believe that Lowery fails to meet his burden of proving that the claimed error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict because of the wealth of corroborative information presented by the prosecution. Not only did Bennett testify that it was Lowery who shot the Thompsons and Ms. Brown, Lowery himself confessed those facts to various police officers and his cellmate and those statements were presented to the jury. Ms. Brown also testified and identified Lowery as her attacker and as the murderer of the Thompsons. And, finally, there was the testimony of Lowery’s ex-wife, Barbara. Our review of the entire record in this case convinces us that any error (and we believe there was none) in the admission of Bennett’s prior testimony was harmless.