Opinion ID: 1059489
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Motion to Set Aside the Jury Verdict

Text: The defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence that he had committed a capital murder in violation of Code § 18.2-31(3). The defendant states that due to the similarities in the weapons taken from Remington and Lenz it was impossible to determine which of Parker's wounds came from Lenz's weapon. The defendant contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove that stab wounds created by Lenz could by themselves have killed Parker. Continuing, the defendant argues that the testimony of correctional Officers Jones, Simmons, and Houching was not credible and that the Commonwealth failed to prove that the defendant had a specific intent to kill the victim. The defendant's contentions are without merit. We hold that the Commonwealth proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant intentionally killed Parker. The jury was instructed that it may find the defendant guilty of capital murder if the evidence establishes that the defendant jointly participated in the fatal stabbing, if it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was an active and immediate participant in the act or acts that caused the victim's death. As we have already stated, Officer Jones testified that he saw the defendant stab Parker on the front part of [Parker's] body. Officer Houching testified that he saw the defendant stab Parker between 10 and 15 times. Officer Simmons testified that when he arrived at the meeting room, he saw the defendant stab Parker about six or seven times. Officer Jones also testified that the defendant stabbed the victim from the waist up. Dr. Wagner testified that the victim had 40 stab wounds in his chest area and that the stab wounds had penetrated the victim's lungs, liver, and other major organs. He also testified that all the wounds contributed to the victim's death. The defendant, relying upon Smith v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 696, 261 S.E.2d 550 (1980), argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with premeditation. The defendant's argument is without merit. We stated in Smith: To premeditate means to adopt a specific intent to kill, and that is what distinguishes first and second degree murder. The intent to kill must come into existence at some time before the killing; it need not exist for any particular length of time. As we said in Pannill v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 244, 255, 38 S.E.2d 457, 463 (1946), quoting from McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 281, 284 (1883), `it is necessary that the killing should have been done on purpose and not by accident or without design. . .' The exact state of the defendant's mind at the time of killing is the crucial factor in determining intent. `It is the will and purpose to kill, not necessarily the interval of time, which determine the grade of the offense.' Akers v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 40, 48, 216 S.E.2d 28, 33 (1975). 220 Va. at 700-01, 261 S.E.2d at 553; accord Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 480, 485, 384 S.E.2d 95, 98 (1989). The evidence of record in this case was sufficient to permit the jury to find that the defendant acted with premeditation. The jury was entitled to conclude that the defendant had a specific intent to kill the victim, based upon the defendant's acts of stabbing the victim repeatedly in the chest with a knife. The defendant's argument that the testimony of Officers Jones, Simmons, and Houching is not credible lacks merit. It was the province of the jury to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Phan v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 506, 513, 521 S.E.2d 282, 286 (1999); Goins v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 285, 289, 237 S.E.2d 136, 139 (1977).