Opinion ID: 775727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Terrance Roberts

Text: 65 Terrance Roberts was convicted under the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a), of knowingly persuading, inducing, or enticing an individual to travel in interstate commerce to engage in prostitution; under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), of transporting an individual under the age of 18 in interstate commerce with the intent that the individual engage in prostitution; and under 18 U.S.C. § 371, of conspiracy to violate the Mann Act. He also was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 2, of money laundering and under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), of conspiracy to launder money. 66 Following his conviction, the District Court sentenced Terrance Roberts to 36 years in prison (432 months). Based on a total offense level of 37 and a criminal history category of III, the imprisonment range under the Sentencing Guidelines was 262 to 327 months. From the high end of the range, the Court departed upward by 105 months. 67
68 Terrance Roberts raises a number of arguments on appeal. He first argues that the District Court's general knowledge instruction, given as part of the Mann Act instructions, conflicted with the Court's specific knowledge instruction under the money-laundering count. 69 The Mann Act prohibits anyone from knowingly transport[ing] any individual in interstate... commerce for purposes of prostitution, 18 U.S.C. § 2421, from knowingly persuad[ing], induc[ing], entic[ing], or coerc[ing] any individual to travel in interstate... commerce for purposes of prostitution, 18 U.S.C. § 2422, and from knowingly transport[ing] an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate... commerce for purposes of prostitution, 18 U.S.C. § 2423. The District Court gave the following definition of the term knowingly in jury instruction number 8: 70 An act is done knowingly if a defendant is aware of the act and does not act through ignorance, mistake, or accident. The government is not required to prove that a defendant knew that his acts or omissions were unlawful. You may consider evidence of a defendant's words, acts, or omissions, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether that defendant acted knowingly. 71 Brief of Terrance Roberts at 9a; Eighth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 7.03 (modified). 72 In contrast to the general knowledge requirement of the Mann Act--in which the jury need not find that the defendant knows that the act being committed is unlawful--the money-laundering statute does require certain knowledge of illegality. Specifically, to be convicted under the money-laundering statue, an individual must, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conduct[ ] or attempt[ ] to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). In conjunction with the money-laundering counts, the District Court gave jury instruction number 40, which stated that to convict on those counts the jury had to find that at the time that defendant conducted or attempted to conduct the financial transaction, that defendant knew the property represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity. Brief of Terrance Roberts at 10a. In jury instruction number 43, the Court gave supplemental instructions defining knowledge with regard to the money-laundering counts: 73 The phrase knew the property represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, means that the defendant knew the property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form, though not necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony offense under State or Federal law. Thus, the government need not prove that the defendant specifically knew that the property involved in the financial transaction represented the proceeds of the transportation of individuals in interstate commerce with the intent that said individuals engage in prostitution, or any other specific offense; it need only prove that the defendant knew it represented the proceeds of some form, though not necessarily which form, of felony under state or federal law. 74 Brief of Terrance Roberts at 13a; Eighth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 6.18.1956J (modified). 75 Mr. Roberts argues that these instructions provided conflicting directions for the jury on the mental element of money laundering. The conflict resulted, he argues, in the effective omission of the requirement that he know that the money being transferred came from an unlawful activity. Because he failed to raise an objection at sentencing, our review is for plain error. 76 Not only is there no plain error, there is no error. Jury instructions are evaluated in the context of the entire charge, United States v. Davis, 237 F.3d 942, 944, n.2 (8th Cir. 2001), and we may not reverse a conviction unless, viewed in their entirety, the jury instructions fail to state the law correctly. Paul, 217 F.3d at 996. In this case, the knowledge requirement under one statute, the Mann Act, is different from the knowledge requirement under the money-laundering statute. The District Court correctly presented the requirements of the respective statutes in its jury instructions. Its separate instructions do not conflict; they simply relate to different statutes. There is no evidence of juror confusion and no indication that an element of money laundering was effectively omitted; therefore, there is no error.
77 Mr. Roberts also argues that a number of the jurors' actions were misconduct and merit a mistrial. Specifically, he asserts that a juror slept during the evidence, that jurors discussed evidence while the case was being presented, that a juror watched news reports about the case, that a juror read advertisements in a newspaper referred to in the trial, and the jurors began to deliberate and form opinions of guilt or innocence early in the trial. We review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Williams, 77 F.3d 1098, 1100 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 967 (1996) (noting that district court has broad discretion in handling allegations of juror misconduct). 78 Regarding the sleeping juror, once the existence of a sleeping juror was brought to the Court's attention, the Court stated that it would watch the juror and order more recesses. At a later side-bar conference with counsel, the Court stated that it had been watching the juror, concluding that [h]e's been okay. Trial Transcript, Vol. III at 147. The Court handled the matter appropriately and did not abuse its discretion. 79 During the voir dire of the jury on the fourth day of trial, juror 12 testified that his wife had talked to him about newspaper reports of the case, and that he had seen television coverage of the trial. He also admitted to having referred to the news coverage in conversations with other jurors. In response to this testimony, juror 12 was--properly--stricken. Several of the other jurors testified that they had participated in or overheard conversations regarding the professional conduct of the defense attorneys, speculation as to the defendants' assets, and the existence of news coverage and the presence of the media. One juror also testified that he had seen personal advertisements in the RiverFront Times that were similar to ones posted by the defendants. 80 Relying on United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1172 (1996), Mr. Roberts argues that when juror misconduct exposes the jury to factual matters not in evidence, a presumption of prejudice attaches, requiring the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct did not harm the defendants. Id. at 1016-17. The principal problem with this argument is that there has not been a sufficient showing that any of the jurors--other than juror 12, who was dismissed--were exposed to any prejudicial extrinsic information related to a substantive issue at trial; so the presumption does not attach. Moreover, the allegations of misconduct arose on the fourth day of a fourteen-day trial, and there were no further allegations of misconduct. Finally, even if any presumption did attach, any extrinsic information that certain jurors received was likely harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the jurors remained competent to serve. 81 Mr. Roberts also argues that juror 8 was unable to provide adequate assurances of impartiality. We addressed this argument, as made by Derry Evans, above. 82 Mr. Roberts also argues that the District Court violated the Double Jeopardy Clause by imposing a sentence for both money laundering and transporting an individual for prostitution. He argues that because the money-laundering statute requires the use of proceeds from a specified unlawful activity--in this case, transportation for prostitution under the Mann Act--the specified unlawful activity is itself a lesser included offense of money laundering. He is incorrect. As the government points out, Mr. Roberts was convicted of multiple crimes flowing from an extended course of conduct. Interstate transportation for prostitution--the specified unlawful activity that triggers the money laundering statute in this case--is not a lesser included offense of money laundering even though money laundering requires the existence of some specified unlawful activity. The money-laundering statute includes, as predicate offenses, so to speak, a long list of specified unlawful activities. No single one of them is invariably an essential element of money laundering. It is not the law that anybody convicted of money laundering is thereby, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, immunized from prosecution for the underlying offense. Money laundering and interstate transportation for prostitution are separate offenses that each bear their own punishment, and neither the Court's decision to sentence Mr. Roberts for both of them nor its decision to make the sentences consecutive violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. 83 Similarly, Mr. Roberts contends that he was subjected to multiple punishments double counting) for obstruction of justice in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Specifically, he argues that the Court erred by enhancing his sentence for obstruction of justice, under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (1998), for instructing Deanna Kirkman, one of his prostitutes, to lie to a federal grand jury, when that act served as one of the overt acts alleged in the charge of conspiracy to transport individuals for prostitution under the Mann Act. Our review is de novo. 84 We find no error here. A convicted defendant can be punished for an overt act, as well as for the conspiracy requiring an overt act, assuming the overt act itself is also a crime. Conspiracy and a substantive act taken as part of that conspiracy can be separate crimes. See United States v. Halls, 40 F.3d 275, 277 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1076 (1995) (Even though the substantive offense was within the time frame of the conspiracy, 'the same overt acts charged in a conspiracy count may also be charged and proved as substantive offenses, for the agreement to do the act is distinct from the act itself.' ) (internal citation omitted); United States v. Thomas, 971 F.2d 147, 149 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 839 (1993) ([N]o double jeopardy violation occurs when a person is... convicted of conspiracy and a substantive overt act of the conspiracy.) (citation omitted). Therefore, it was not incorrect for the District Court to enhance Mr. Roberts's sentence for obstruction of justice simply because that act also served as an overt act of the conspiracy. 85 Mr. Roberts also contends that the District Court abused its discretion and violated the Double Jeopardy Clause by granting the government's motion for an upward departure of 105 months based on U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 5K2.2 (significant physical injury) and 5K2.8 (extreme conduct) and for enhancing his sentence for being a leader and an organizer. Regarding significant physical injury, there is sufficient evidence of significant injury to both Tammy Huisinga (head trauma and cuts) and Deanna Kirkman (ear damage) as a result of beatings from Mr. Roberts. Although Mr. Roberts argues that neither victim went to the hospital or obtained medical documentation of permanent injury, there is sufficient testimonial evidence of injury. The Court did not abuse its discretion. 86 Regarding extreme conduct, there also is sufficient evidence, including Mr. Roberts's forcing Ms. Huisinga to participate in the making of a pornographic videotape with Ms. Kirkman and Theresa Krueger. Mr. Roberts argues that the departure was impermissible double counting and a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause because the guideline base for sexual exploitation of a minor, § 2G2.1, which the District Court used, already accounted for that conduct. However, under Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), conduct can be considered both in the crime and in the upward departure. Id. at 96. The key question is whether the factor is present to an exceptional degree, or something else makes the case different from the ordinary case where the factor is present. Id. Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to determine that the departure basis was not already fully taken into account because of the severity of the beatings and because of the coercion involved in the making of the child pornographic videotape. 87 Mr. Roberts argues that the District Court erred in determining that he was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, so as to warrant a four-point sentence enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1 (1998). Specifically, Mr. Roberts contends that the District Court abused its discretion because it failed to state in open court its specific reasons for departing, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). However, Mr. Roberts failed to object to this adjustment at the time of sentencing, so we review for plain error only. Despite the language of § 3553(c), under United States v. Flores, 9 F.3d 54 (8th Cir. 1993), unless the defendant objects, the court can adopt the recommendation of the presentence report without stating its reasons on the record. Id. at 55. Under the plain error standard, there is evidence to support enhancement because Mr. Roberts supervised prostitute Tammy Huisinga, who served as a trainer for minor prostitute Deanne Kirkman. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2G1.1 (1998), cmt. n.3. Cf. Jarrett, 956 F.2d at 868 (noting that prostitutes are victims and not participants unless they assist in unlawful transportation of others). 88 Mr. Roberts also argues that the District Court clearly erred by enhancing his sentence for targeting vulnerable victims. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3A1.1(b)(1) (1998). He argues that the basis for the enhancement--his targeting of the 15-year-old Theresa Krueger--is erroneous because Ms. Krueger's age was already incorporated into his base-offense-level calculation under § 2G2.1 (sexual exploitation of a minor). United States v. Coates, 996 F.2d 939 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that when court uses § 2G2.1 as base offense level, vulnerable-victim adjustment for age alone may constitute impermissible double counting). Moreover, he argues, even though Ms. Krueger had worked as a prostitute prior to meeting Mr. Roberts, her father had died when she was young, and her mother was incarcerated, she was not atypically vulnerable as compared to other victims that the Mann Act is intended to protect. The government's own expert witness testified that such victims are often runaways and individuals with family problems and drug dependency. Nevertheless, despite some commonality between Ms. Krueger and the typical underage victim of the Mann Act, given the deference to the District Court's findings of fact, there is not sufficient evidence to find that the Court clearly erred in enhancing Mr. Roberts's sentence under § 3A1.1(b)(1) for targeting vulnerable victims. The District Court did not clearly err in finding Ms. Krueger more vulnerable than the average minor victim. 89 Mr. Roberts further argues that the District Court erred in submitting to the jury the alias Terry Evans as applicable to him. He contends that the evidence adduced at trial showed that he was not known as Terry Evans, and that there was another, older, individual who was known to the witnesses as Terry Evans. Although we have recommended that aliases not be used, see Petrilli v. United States, 129 F.2d 101, 104 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 657 (1942), we have also upheld their use. See United States v. Bradford, 246 F.3d 1107, 1117-18 (8th Cir. 2001). Mr. Roberts is correct that there was evidence of another man named Terry Evans; however, one witness, Julia Wilson, identified Mr. Roberts by both names and distinguished the older Terry Evans from Mr. Roberts. The record also reveals that on the other occasions when witnesses testified concerning the older Terry Evans, it was made clear to the jury that the testimony did not refer to Mr. Roberts. The record does not indicate that juror confusion resulted from the use of the alias, so there was no prejudice to Mr. Roberts. Moreover, any association to the Evans family implied by use of the alias was not inaccurate, given that he is the son of Monroe Evans. 90 Finally, Mr. Roberts argues that the District Court abused its discretion by refusing to grant a severance of Mr. Roberts's trial from those of the other co-defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14. We reject this argument for the reasons set out above with regard to the same argument made by Derry Evans.