Opinion ID: 163083
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Race-Based Remedial Measures

Text: 15 CWC argues that the ordinances violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which provides that [n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Because the use of racial preferences is a highly suspect tool, the race-based measures contained in the ordinances are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493, 109 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) (plurality opinion) ([T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to `smoke out' illegitimate uses of race ... [and] ensure[] that the means chosen `fit' [the] compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.). To withstand CWC's challenge, the race-based measures in the ordinances must serve a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995) ( Adarand III ); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986) (plurality opinion). 16 Denver asserts that it has a compelling interest in remedying racial discrimination within its jurisdiction. A clear majority of the Supreme Court has expressly held that [a] State's interest in remedying the effects of past or present racial discrimination may in the proper case justify a government's use of racial distinctions. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996). A plurality of the Court has also stated that a governmental entity can use its spending powers to remedy private discrimination, if it identifies that discrimination with the particularity required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492, 109 S.Ct. 706 (plurality opinion). Because an effort to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination is not a compelling interest, Denver can demonstrate that its interest is compelling only if it satisfies two conditions. Shaw, 517 U.S. at 909-10, 116 S.Ct. 1894 (emphasis added). First, it must identify the past or present discrimination with some specificity. Id. at 909, 116 S.Ct. 1894 (quotation omitted). Second, it must also demonstrate that a strong basis in evidence supports its conclusion that remedial action is necessary. Id. at 910, 116 S.Ct. 1894 (quotation omitted). 17 Denver can meet its burden without conclusively proving the existence of past or present racial discrimination. See Concrete Works II, 36 F.3d at 1522 ([T]he Fourteenth Amendment does not require a court to make an ultimate judicial finding of discrimination before a municipality may take affirmative steps to eradicate discrimination.). Denver may rely on empirical evidence that demonstrates `a significant statistical disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors ... and the number of such contractors actually engaged by the locality or the locality's prime contractors.' Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 509, 109 S.Ct. 706 (plurality opinion)). Furthermore, Denver may rely on statistical evidence gathered from the six-county Denver Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). See id. at 1520. Denver may supplement the statistical evidence with anecdotal evidence of public and private discrimination. See id. at 1520-21; see also id. at 1520 (Personal accounts of actual discrimination or the effects of discriminatory practices may, however, vividly complement empirical evidence.). 18 Neither Croson nor its progeny clearly state whether private discrimination that is in no way funded with public tax dollars can, by itself, provide the requisite strong basis in evidence necessary to justify a municipality's affirmative action program. Id. at 1529. Denver, however, clearly may take measures to remedy its own discrimination or even to prevent itself from acting as a passive participant in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction industry. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492, 109 S.Ct. 706 (plurality opinion) (quotation omitted). Thus, Denver may establish its compelling interest by presenting evidence of its own direct participation in racial discrimination or its passive participation in private discrimination. See Concrete Works II, 36 F.3d at 1519 & n. 7. 19 The question of whether Denver has demonstrated a strong basis in evidence is a question of law. See id. at 1522. As such, we review that question and any attendant legal questions de novo. Underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. See id. Once Denver meets its burden, CWC must introduce credible, particularized evidence to rebut [Denver's] initial showing of the existence of a compelling interest. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1175 (10th Cir.2000) ( Adarand VII ). [R]ebuttal evidence may consist of a neutral explanation for the statistical disparities. Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 921 (9th Cir.1991) (cited with approval in Concrete Works II, 36 F.3d at 1531). CWC can also rebut Denver's statistical evidence by (1) showing that the statistics are flawed; (2) demonstrating that the disparities shown by the statistics are not significant or actionable; or (3) presenting contrasting statistical data. Id.; see also Eng'g Contractors Ass'n of S. Fla., Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 916 (11th Cir.1997) (same); Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1007 (3d Cir.1993) (same). This court has repeatedly emphasized that the burden of proof at all times remains with CWC to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the ordinances. 3 See Adarand VII, 228 F.3d at 1176 (We reiterate that the ultimate burden of proof remains with the challenging party to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of an affirmative-action program. (quotation omitted)); Concrete Works II, 36 F.3d at 1522-23; see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277-78, 106 S.Ct. 1842 (plurality opinion) (The ultimate burden remains with the [plaintiff] to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of an affirmative-action program.).