Opinion ID: 460125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Validity of the District Court's Sentencing Procedure

Text: 51 The Reeses' final challenge is to the legality of their sentences. Thomas Reese was sentenced to fifteen years on count one, ten years on count seven and ten years on count nine, the sentences to run consecutively. Reese also received sentences of ten years on each of counts five, eleven, thirteen and fifteen, and one year and one day on each of counts sixteen through twenty, twenty-three and twenty-four, to run concurrently with his other sentences. The district court imposed a fifteen-year special parole term on counts seven and nine. Linda Reese was sentenced to ten years on each of counts one, nine, eleven and fifteen, to run concurrently, with a special parole term of five years imposed on counts nine, eleven and fifteen. 52 The Reeses contend that their sentences were based, in part, on the district court's consideration of written material submitted ex parte by the prosecution. We have carefully reviewed that material and have determined that none of it related to Linda. Rather, information contained in the submission related only to Thomas. Thus, even if the district court did consider the information, we are unable to conclude that it had any bearing on Linda Reese's sentences. We therefore affirm the sentences imposed on her by the district court. 53 Subsequent to trial, the government filed a request for a hearing under the Special Drug Offender Statute, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 849 (1982), to determine whether Thomas Reese was a special drug offender. 8 Ordinarily this statutory procedure is invoked when the prosecution seeks to have the court impose longer sentences on a defendant than it might otherwise order. On July 16, 1984, the prosecution filed its regular sentencing memorandum, which covered both Reeses, with the district court. As is required, a copy was furnished to defense counsel. At the same time, the prosecution filed a second sentencing memorandum in camera directed only toward Thomas Reese in support of its request for a hearing under the Special Drug Offender Statute. Defense counsel was denied access to this submission. The second submission consisted of four documents: a pre-sentence report on Thomas Reese that had been prepared in connection with a previous conviction for receiving a firearm while under indictment; grand jury testimony by a witness in connection with a prior narcotics investigation; and two confidential declarations relating to alleged on-going narcotics trafficking by Reese. 54 On July 18, 1984, the government filed 10-15 pounds of additional material in support of its first sentencing memorandum. The supporting material, like the first memorandum, was provided to defense counsel. 55 On July 19, 1984, the district court conducted the first of two proceedings relating to the question of sentencing. At the first proceeding, the district court stated that it did not intend to sentence Thomas Reese in accordance with the provisions of the Special Drug Offender Statute. The court proposed tabling the government's motion for a section 849 hearing and, in light of the court's stated intention, the government agreed. Defense counsel then requested a continuance so that the defendants could have an opportunity to review the massive amount of material filed by the government in connection with the first sentencing memorandum. The court granted defense counsel's request, noting that it had read the material and that defense counsel should have an opportunity to rebut it since the court could not say that it would not rely in part on the material at the time of sentencing and would be unable to quantify the degree of reliance ... or the effect that having read it might have. 9 56 On July 25, 1984, the district court conducted the second sentencing proceeding. At this time, defense counsel specifically requested access to the sentencing memorandum filed ex parte by the prosecutor. This request was denied. Defense counsel also attempted to rebut certain information contained within the 10-15 pounds of material filed by the government in connection with the first sentencing memorandum. In the context of this rebuttal, the district judge indicated that material that had been submitted by the government that did not involve the offenses for which Reese had been convicted would not be considered when the court imposed sentence. 10 57 We have repeatedly held that it is improper for the prosecution to make, or for the court to receive from the prosecution, ex parte communications bearing on a sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Wolfson, 634 F.2d 1217, 1221-22 (9th Cir.1980) (where record strongly suggested that district court relied on prosecution's ex parte sentencing report, receipt of report was error requiring remand for resentencing); United States v. Perri, 513 F.2d 572, 574 (9th Cir.1975) (where district court sentenced defendant on the basis of information contained in a confidential report submitted by prosecution, sentence was invalid and case was remanded for resentencing). 58 The government argues that the ex parte information was properly before the district court because it was submitted in connection with the government's request for a hearing under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 849 (1982). Implicit in this argument is the proposition that section 849 authorizes the prosecution to furnish the court with ex parte information. The government's argument, however, conflicts with the plain language of the statute. 59 Section 849 authorizes the court, in extraordinary cases, to withhold material contained in the defendant's presentence report. 11 Unlike a sentencing memorandum, which is prepared by the prosecution, or the defense, the presentence report is generally prepared by the United States Probation Service, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c), 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3552(a) (1982), which provides a neutral, third party analysis of the defendant's background and his prospects for rehabilitation. 12 There is no suggestion in the language of section 849 that the function of preparing presentence reports was to be transferred to the prosecution or that the prosecutor--an obviously interested party--was to be authorized to submit ex parte sentencing material to the court. Accordingly, we conclude that section 849 does not provide for the ex parte submission of material to the court by the prosecution. Because the information herein involved was not disclosed to the defense, any reliance placed on it by the district court was clearly improper. See Wolfson, 634 F.2d at 1221; Perri, 513 F.2d at 575. 13 60 The government also contends that even if its ex parte submission of material was improper, the district court's statements at the time of sentencing establish that the sentences imposed on Thomas Reese were not based on any such information. The government first points to the district court's statement that it intended to sentence Reese for what he did in this case. See n. 10, supra. The government next points to the substance of the ex parte submission, arguing that it contains no information concerning the offenses for which Reese was convicted. Thus, the government reasons that the sentences imposed by the district court escaped any influence from the ex parte submission. 61 The government is correct in its limited assertion that none of the material filed ex parte related to the specific transactions for which Reese was convicted. We are not convinced, however, that at the time of sentencing the district judge was free of influence from that material. We find it significant that there is no statement in the record suggesting that the district judge did not read the material that was filed with the court. In denying defense counsel's request for access to the second memorandum, the district judge made no statement indicating that he was unaware of its contents. We therefore find it appropriate to presume that the district judge had knowledge of the information contained in the ex parte submission. 62 The government is also correct that at the time of sentencing the district court indicated an intention to sentence Reese on the basis of his conduct in the present case. However, it is also true that six days prior to the imposition of sentence, the district court stated that it could not disclaim reliance on certain other material that had been properly submitted and disclosed by the prosecution--material that included information unrelated to the offenses for which Reese had been convicted. Moreover, the ex parte submission contained information tending to show that Reese's conduct in the instant case was part of a continuing pattern of drug dealings. Under all the circumstances, we cannot say with any certainty that the sentencing judge could avoid being influenced by the ex parte submission. We agree with his initial comments that determinations of that nature require a finer test than is reasonable to impose. 63 Although we acknowledge the ability of a district court to limit its sentencing considerations to discrete bodies of information, in this case the judge's conflicting statements, made less than one week apart, together with the substantial similarity between the information contained in the ex parte submission and the conduct for which Reese was convicted, raise a serious question concerning the possibility of reliance, conscious or otherwise, on the ex parte submission. Notwithstanding the district court's conscientious efforts to assure that the sentencing proceedings were conducted in as fair and equitable a manner as possible, we believe the question is sufficiently serious to warrant resentencing. See United States v. Alverson, 666 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir.1982) (where question existed as to whether district judge had relied on improper ex parte communication, case remanded for resentencing). Accordingly, we vacate Thomas Reese's sentences and remand the matter for resentencing. 14