Opinion ID: 152284
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did Instructional Error Occur?

Text: The challenged instruction was delivered before the opening statements as part of the court's explanation of how the case would proceed: I just have a few special instructions about your conduct as jurors. The first one is the hardest. You are not to discuss the case with each other or anyone else until you retire to the jury room at the end of the case to deliberate on your verdict. This rule is not as strict as it sounds. When I say you are not to discuss the case, I mean it in this sense. You are not to express an ultimate opinion about the outcome of the case. Personally, even this rule, the way I state it, I don't think is a terribly good rule. I understand the reason for it. The thought is that because some of us tend to be more opinionated and assertive than others, jurors who are more assertive will tend to influence the opinions of fellow jurors if jurors are talking about the case before they hear all of the evidence. I think this, in fact, underestimates the intelligence of almost all the jurors that I have worked with over the years, but, nonetheless, this is the federal rule. It's been abolished in a number of states, but it is the federal rule. So we have to respect it. Like I say, whether we agree with the wisdom of a rule or not, it is the rule, the rule we follow. But, again, don't over-interpret what I said. Of course you'll talk about interesting things that happened during the course of the trial, idiosyncracies of the judge and the lawyers, interesting things witnesses say, significant pieces of evidence. Just do not express an opinion about the case, again, -24- until you begin deliberations and each have an opportunity to make your opinions known. Jadlowe's counsel properly objected to the instruction, arguing that it's inappropriate for the jurors to discuss the case in any way, shape, or form until all of the evidence is in, they've heard closing argument, and they'[v]e heard your Honor's charge. The court disagreed: No. Human nature, if you tell them not to discuss the case, defies anything we know about human beings. What's important is that they not form any ultimate opinions about the case until they've heard all of the evidence and that they not express opinions about the resolution of the case to one another. And that's – if you want me to repeat the thrust of that instruction again, I will, but that's what I meant. Defense counsel then elaborated on his concern: Your honor, my objection is I don't think they should be talking about interesting things that the witnesses said. I just think that that's not what the jury should be doing. They should be simply – they can talk about the weather or the Red Sox. They should not be talking about the case. The court concluded the colloquy as follows: I disagree, and I think that's the reason states, at least those who have a progressive view of jury service, have abolished that rule now. In fact, even as to ultimate opinions as to the case, which I restrict them from talking about. I think you will find that the modern trend is against the old-fashion rule. The court's instruction was unmistakably erroneous, including the assumption that the modern trend in criminal cases -25- is to allow juror discussion. For more than a century, it has been a common-law principle that it is improper for jurors to discuss a case prior to its submission to them, a practice that safeguards a defendant's entitle[ment] under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution to a fair trial to an impartial jury. Winebrenner v. United States, 147 F.2d 322, 329, 327 (8th Cir. 1945); id. at 329 (So general is the rule that jurors should not discuss a case prior to its submission to them, that it has been enacted into statute in practically all the states of the Union.). While jury innovations in some jurisdictions now include allowing jurors to discuss evidence among themselves throughout the trial, see, e.g., Ariz. R. Civ. P. 39(f),25 such developments have arisen 25 Rule 39(f) states: If the jurors are permitted to separate during the trial, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse with or permit themselves to be addressed by any person on any subject connected with the trial; except that the jurors shall be instructed that they will be permitted to discuss the evidence among themselves in the jury room during recesses from trial when all are present, as long as they reserve judgment about the outcome of the case until deliberations commence. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the jurors' discussion of the evidence among themselves during recesses may be limited or prohibited by the court for good cause. See also, e.g., Colo. Jury Instr., Civil 1:4 (4th ed.) (allowing discussion of evidence only among yourselves and only in the jury room when all of you are present); N.D.R.Ct. 6.11 (permitting court, without objection, to allow predeliberation discussion in civil cases). -26- primarily in the context of civil cases,26 and even in that setting such discussions have remain[ed] controversial. Kelly v. Foxboro Realty Assocs., LLC, 909 N.E.2d 523, 528 & 529 n.17 (Mass. 2009) (While the parties in a civil case may consent to juror discussions during the trial, we would not approve of that practice in a criminal case.);27 see also, e.g., Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The Verdict on Juries, 91 Judicature 226, 229 (2008) (noting that allowing jury discussions during trial remains one of the more controversial jury reforms); Juror Discussions During 26 The Arizona Supreme Court Committee on the More Effective Use of Juries recommended that discussion be permitted in both civil and criminal trials, but the court accepted the proposal only for civil trials. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2003) (Juror Discussions During Civil Trials). The American Bar Association also has endorsed discussion of the evidence during recesses in civil, but not in criminal cases. See American Bar Association, Principles for Juries and Jury Trials, Principle 13(F) (2005) (stating that jurors in civil cases may be instructed that they are permitted to discuss the evidence among themselves in the jury room with the same limitations as the Arizona rule). 27 Indeed, the results of a national survey of jury operations and practices (the State-of-the-States Survey) conducted by the National Center for State Courts Center for Jury Studies, published in 2007, indicate that the practice is still rarely used. The relevant report data was generated from 11,752 surveys completed by judges and lawyers involved in state and federal trials that took place primarily between 2002 and 2006. Gregory E. Mize et al., The State of the States Survey of Jury Improvement Efforts: A Compendium Report 4 (April 2007), available at www.ncsconline.org/d_research/cjs/pdf/SOSCompendiumFinal.pdf. According to the report, jurors were allowed to discuss evidence before formal deliberations in 2.2 % of the civil trials and 0.7% of the criminal trials in state court, and in 1.3% of the civil trials and 0.3% of the criminal trials in federal court. Id. at 32. -27- Civil Trials, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. at 77 (Ultimately, like many other proposals for change, the innovation permitting jurors to discuss the case during trial has both desirable and undesirable features.).28 At least for now, the prevailing view in the federal courts remains that it is improper for jurors to discuss the case other than during their formal deliberations. In December 2009, the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management reaffirmed the general no-discussion rule in its proposed model jury instruction on the use of electronic technology. See Judicial Conference of the United States, Comm. on Court Admin. and Case Mgmt., Proposed Model Jury Instructions: The Use of Electronic Technology to Conduct Research on or Communicate about a Case (Dec. 2009), available at www.uscourts.gov/News/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/News/2010/docs/DI 28 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court observed that the studies on innovative jury practices have not established decisively that these jury techniques are beneficial or detrimental to the outcomes. Foxboro Realty Assocs., 909 N.E.2d at 528 n.13. Specifically with respect to the bar on juror discussions about the case while the trial is ongoing, it has been observed that the prohibition is based upon historical assumption rather than any real understanding as to how task-oriented groups actually render decisions or how discussions prior to the jury instructions would actually be likely to impact that process. Ted A. Donner & Richard K. Gabriel, Jury Selection Strategy and Science § 39:3 (3d ed. & Supp. 2010) (Jury Selection Strategy); see also, e.g., N.D. Sup. Ct. Joint Proc. Comm. Minutes, May 6-7, 1999, at 11-12 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of predeliberation d i s c u s s i o n ) , a v a i l a b l e a t http://www.ndcourts.com/court/jp/minutes/may1999.htm. -28- R10-018.pdf (proposing that courts tell jurors in pre-trial instructions that, [u]ntil you retire to deliberate, you may not discuss this case with anyone, even your fellow jurors). Our circuit's pattern instruction is to the same effect: First, do not talk among yourselves about this case, or about anyone involved with it, until the end of the case when you go to the jury room to decide on your verdict. Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the First Circuit § 1.07 (1997), available at www.med.uscourts.gov/practices/crpji.97nov.pdf.29 Case law from other circuits, including recent decisions, reveals similar disapproval of discussions by jurors about the case before formal deliberations begin. See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 337 F. App'x 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that [t]he evidence of premature jury deliberation revealed a departure from the preferred process, where some jurors reported hearing other jurors discussing the case); United States v. Cox, 324 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir. 2003) ('It is a generally accepted principle of trial administration that jurors must not engage in discussions of a case before they have heard both the evidence and the court's legal instructions and have begun formally deliberating as a collective body.' (quoting United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 688 (3d Cir. 29 We note that, although pattern instructions are often helpful, United States v. Urciuoli, 513 F.3d 290, 299 n.7 (1st Cir. 2008), their use is precatory, not mandatory, United States v. Tse, 375 F.3d 148, 157 (1st Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and citations omitted). -29- 1993)); United States v. Dominguez, 226 F.3d 1235, 1248 n.13 (11th Cir. 2000) (describing predeliberations jury discussions as a violation of the proper process for jury decision-making); Winebrenner, 147 F.2d at 328-29; see also Jury Selection Strategy § 39:3 (The rule as enunciated in Winebrenner has remained the standard in most courts in the United States . . . .). The traditional view that jury discussion of the case during the trial is improper arises from concerns that jurors will prematurely form judgments that will be difficult to dislodge later in the proceedings. See Resko, 3 F.3d at 689; Winebrenner, 147 F.2d at 328-29. The court in Resko cogently summarized these concerns in a criminal case: First, since the prosecution presents its evidence first, any premature discussions are likely to occur before the defendant has a chance to present all of his or her evidence, and it is likely that any initial opinions formed by the jurors, which will likely influence other jurors, will be unfavorable to the defendant for this reason. Second, once a juror expresses his or her views in the presence of other jurors, he or she is likely to continue to adhere to that opinion and to pay greater attention to evidence presented that comports with that opinion. Consequently, the mere act of openly expressing his or her views may tend to cause the juror to approach the case with less than a fully open mind and to adhere to the publicly expressed viewpoint. Third, the jury system is meant to involve decisionmaking as a collective, deliberative process and premature discussions among individual jurors may thwart that goal. Fourth, because the court provides the jury -30- with legal instructions only after all the evidence has been presented, jurors who engage in premature deliberations do so without the benefit of the court's instructions on the reasonable doubt standard. Fifth, if premature deliberations occur before the defendant has had an opportunity to present all of his or her evidence . . . and jurors form premature conclusions about the case, the burden of proof will have been, in effect, shifted from the government to the defendant, who has the burden of changing by evidence the opinion thus formed. [Winebrenner, 147 F.2d] at 328.30 Finally, requiring the jury to refrain from prematurely discussing the case with fellow jurors in a criminal case helps protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial as well as his or her due process right to place the burden on the government to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 F.3d at 689-90 (citations omitted). To be sure, not all of these reasons have force when the jurors are expressly told – as they are, for example, in Arizona – that they may discuss the evidence only in the presence of all jurors and that they must reserve judgment about the outcome of the case until deliberations commence. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 39(f). Yet, impressions formed about the evidence early on may nonetheless 30 In this case, for example, Jadlowe points out that the government introduced a number of audio recordings to prove his involvement in the drug conspiracy and that the jurors could have concluded early in the case, after discussion among themselves, that those tapes reflected his participation. Defense counsel, however, later sought to give those cryptic conversations a more benign interpretation by introducing other audio recordings indicating that Ferreira and Gonsalves were involved in various construction projects with the speaker believed to be Jadlowe and that furniture was being stored in the garage. -31- have a significant impact on the verdict, even if the jurors do not make their ultimate judgment until the end of the case. In our view, the traditional rationales remain persuasive. Of course, not all premature jury discussion about a case will compromise a defendant's fair trial rights, particularly where the conversation does not reflect a point of view about the evidence or the outcome. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 597 F.3d 56, 63 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that jurors apparently discussed only a legal principle and not the merits of the case against the defendant). Discussion such as that endorsed by the court in this case, however – about interesting things witnesses say, significant pieces of evidence – is inappropriate, even if the conversation was not what we ordinarily would consider premature deliberations. Cf. State v. Washington, 438 A.2d 1144, 1148 (Conn. 1980) (noting that [d]iscussion is an integral part of deliberations and that, [i]n a constitutional sense, the distinction between discussion and deliberation is more apparent than real). Moreover, while jury discussion that does not involve expressions of ultimate opinions may be found harmless in retrospect, it is a different question whether district courts may give the jury permission at the outset of the trial to talk about the case before formal deliberations begin. We now hold expressly that they may not. We thus conclude that the court erred by giving -32- the jurors permission to discuss significant aspects of the case as the trial progressed.31