Opinion ID: 2966253
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Agent's Vouching

Text: Tom argues that the district court erred when it allowed the following exchange on redirect examination of DEA Special Agent Pevarnik: Q. In fact, you were asked by [defense counsel] if [Quezada] was truthful and if you took steps to check his truthfulness. Do you remember those questions? A. Yes. Q. Did any facts come to your attention in the course of our investigation, agent Pevarnik, to Indicate that [Quezada] had not been truthful with you? After Tom's objection to the question was overruled, Pevarnik responded No. According to Tom, this was improper bolstering in which the United States used its prestige to vouch for Quezada. Because Tom objected to the admission of Pevarnik's statement, we review for abuse of discretion. Marino , 277 F.3d at 24. It is beyond dispute that the government may not use the prestige of the United States to enhance the credibility of a witness. United States v. Rosario-Díaz , 202 F.3d 54, 64 (1st Cir. 2000). It is also undisputed that the prosecution cannot accomplish such improper bolstering of a witness through the testimony of other government witnesses. Id. at 65 (citing United States v. Mazza , 792 F.2d 1210, 1214-1216 (1st Cir. 1986)). The government's question clearly was not intended to elicit improper vouching for Quezada, and Pevarnik did not, in fact, vouch for Quezada's credibility. Here, the government did not ask Pevarnik for his personal assurances as to Quezada's credibility. Rather, the government's question to Pevarnik was directed at whether he had any specific evidence of Quezada's credibility or the lack thereof; that is, whether Pevarnik had learned of any specific facts that indicated that Quezada had not been truthful in the past. Government witnesses may of course testify to facts within their personal knowledge that support or corroborate another witness's testimony. Rosario-Díaz , 202 F.3d at 65. Pevarnik was merely asked for facts, not opinions. Thus, admission of the testimony was not an abuse of discretion. While our above ruling ends the matter, we note further that even supposing error in admitting the testimony, it would have been harmless. The essential inquiry in harmless error review is whether the improperly admitted evidence likely affected the outcome of trial. See United States v. Rosales , 19 F.3d 763, 767 (1st Cir. 1994); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). Here, it is unlikely that Pevarnik's one statement about whether he had learned any facts that made him aware whether Quezada was not truthful was outcome determinative. The evidence against Tom was voluminous: there were numerous recorded conversations in which Tom inculpated himself, and the testimony of Quezada, along with corroborating testimony by both Pevarnik and Burgos, provided ample support for the jury's verdict. In light of the other evidence, the jury would most likely have convicted even without Pevarnik's one comment about Quezada's truthfulness. Thus, the district court's admission of Pevarnik's statement was, at most, harmless error.