Opinion ID: 2323932
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of the 9-1-1 Call

Text: [¶ 18] Taylor argues that the court erred and exceeded the bounds of its discretion when it admitted the recording of the 9-1-1 call pursuant to M.R. Evid. 803(2), the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. He asserts that the victim had abundant opportunity to reflect and fabricate, because, after Taylor left her house, the victim did not immediately call 9-1-1, but first called her ex-husband. [¶ 19] We assume for purposes of our discussion that the victim's 9-1-1 call constitutes a hearsay statement that is not admissible as substantive evidence unless it meets an exception to the hearsay rule, such as the exception for excited utterances. [3] M.R. Evid. 802, 803(2). A hearsay statement is admissible as an excited utterance if it is a statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. M.R. Evid. 803(2). [¶ 20] Accordingly, [a] court may admit a hearsay statement as an excited utterance if it finds that: (1) a startling event occurred; (2) the hearsay statement related to the startling event; and (3) the hearsay statement was made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by that event. State v. Watts, 2007 ME 153, ¶ 5, 938 A.2d 21. These findings are preliminary questions for the trial court pursuant to M.R. Evid. 104. Id. We review the court's foundational findings or implicit findings to support admissibility of evidence for clear error, and we will uphold those findings unless no competent evidence supports the findings. See State v. Lipham, 2006 ME 137, ¶ 7, 910 A.2d 388. The trial court acts within its discretion to admit the statement or statements into evidence unless its foundational findings are clearly erroneous. Watts, 2007 ME 153, ¶ 5, 938 A.2d 21; State v. Robinson, 2001 ME 83, ¶ 10, 773 A.2d 445. [¶ 21] Taylor does not contest the first two elements necessary to support admissibility of the 9-1-1 call as an excited utterance. The record amply supports the conclusion that these elements were met there was a startling event and the victim's 9-1-1 call related to that event. Taylor's argument focuses on the third element whether the victim's statement was made while she was under the stress of excitement caused by that event. [¶ 22] [A] crucial question in determining whether a statement qualifies as an excited utterance is how long the state of excitement may be found to last. Robinson, 2001 ME 83, ¶ 11, 773 A.2d 445. There is no `bright line' time limit to use in deciding when the stress of excitement caused by a startling event has dissipated. Watts, 2007 ME 153, ¶ 6, 938 A.2d 21. In making this determination, a court must instead consider a variety of factors. Id. The factors include: the nature of the startling or stressful event, the amount of time that passed between the startling event and the statement, the declarant's opportunity or capacity for reflection or fabrication during that time, the nature of the statement itself, and the declarant's physical and emotional condition at the time of the statement. Id. [¶ 23] It is apparent from the evidence admitted at trial that several of these factors were readily met: the nature of the eventTaylor breaking into the victim's home in the night while she was alone with two young children, assaulting her and causing her to fear for her life, and essentially holding her hostagewas startling and stressful; the statement in the form of a 9-1-1 call did not indicate that it was the product of fabrication; and the evidence would support the conclusion that the victim's condition at the time of the statement was one of high emotion. Accordingly, we focus on the remaining two factors suggested in Watts: (1) the amount of time that passed between the startling event and the statement, and (2) the victim's opportunity or capacity for reflection or fabrication during that time. See id. [¶ 24] We have upheld determinations that the stress of excitement caused by a startling event had not dissipated after a wide range of times between the startling event and the statement. For example, we implicitly affirmed the trial court's determination that a victim's initial statement to police qualified as an excited utterance when those statements were made five to eight minutes after police were called after a two-hour-long incident in which the victim's husband took her hostage, held her at knifepoint, forced her to perform a sexual act on him, and bound her; she ultimately escaped through a window and drove to a nearby store for help. State v. Rega, 2005 ME 5, ¶¶ 3-5, 8-9, 18-19, 863 A.2d 917. [¶ 25] Reviewing application of the excited utterance exception, we have also approved admission of (1) a statement made after seven minutes had passed between the time the victim called 9-1-1 and time she made the statement to the responding police and an unknown amount of time had passed between the startling event and when the victim called 9-1-1, State v. Ahmed, 2006 ME 133, ¶ 15, 909 A.2d 1011; (2) a statement made to police more than five to ten minutes after the alleged attack, after the victim had driven herself to the police station, State v. Barnes, 2004 ME 38, ¶ 4 & n. 3, 845 A.2d 575; (3) a statement made after three to twelve minutes had passed between the time the police first arrived and the time the victim made statements and some number of additional minutes had passed between the startling event and when police arrived, Robinson, 2001 ME 83, ¶¶ 3-6, 14, 773 A.2d 445; and (4) a statement made by the victim after he waited several minutes until he thought his assailants had left the building and it was safe to leave, State v. Hafford, 410 A.2d 219, 219-20 (Me.1980). But see State v. Lafrance, 589 A.2d 43, 46 (Me.1991) (statement not an excited utterance when nearly a day had passed between the event and the statement, and the record showed that the declarant was not still under the stress of the excitement caused by the event); State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 465-66 (Me.1981) (holding that the victim's statement was inadmissible when made two to three hours after victim was allegedly raped because the victim's testimony supported the conclusion that her statement was made with conscious reflection). [¶ 26] In this case, approximately an hour passed between the time Taylor confronted the victim at her bedside and the time he left her home. Accordingly, less than one hour elapsed between the time when Taylor assaulted the victim and threatened her life and when he left her home, and the victim called 9-1-1 only two minutes after Taylor left her home. We need not determine precisely when the startling event ended, whether it was after Taylor physically attacked the victim and threatened her life, as Taylor asserts, or whether it was when Taylor left the victim's home and the victim wanted to avoid having her children see her break down once the adrenaline [was] gone. Either way, the evidence allowed the trial court to conclude that the brief amount of time that elapsed before the victim called 9-1-1 permitted her statement to qualify as an excited utterance. [¶ 27] The second pertinent factor here is the declarant's opportunity or capacity for reflection or fabrication during that time. In this case, the record supports the court's implicit findings that the victim did not have an opportunity or capacity for reflection or fabrication prior to calling 9-1-1. There is no question that the victim remained under a great deal of stress throughout the period that Taylor was in her home, from the time the victim first awakened to find him standing over her in a dark bedroom to the time he ceased to hold her hostage and left her home. Whether the legally operative startling event ended after Taylor's physical assault on the victim or after Taylor left the home, the record evidence supports the determination that the victim did not have the capacity for reflection or fabrication before she made the 9-1-1 call and that the stress of excitement caused by the startling event had not dissipated as of the time the victim placed the 9-1-1 call. [¶ 28] The fact that the victim made a brief call to her ex-husband before calling 9-1-1 does not, under our case law, require a court to conclude that she had the capacity for reflection or fabrication and that her 9-1-1 call could not qualify as an excited utterance. As the victim testified, she was acting under the adrenaline of the incident with Taylor when she called her ex-husband, and the sole purpose for that call was to get her children to safety because she feared that Taylor, who had just left, would return. [¶ 29] We addressed similar facts in State v. Hafford when we held that an assault victim's statement to a neighbor was admissible even though the victim wrapped up his injured hand and waited several minutes in his apartment after the attack until he felt it was safe to leave to seek help. 410 A.2d at 219-20. In several other instances, we have held that a declarant's statement qualified as an excited utterance when the declarant made the statement after engaging in a short intervening act after the startling event occurred. See, e.g., Watts, 2007 ME 153, ¶ 8, 938 A.2d 21 (holding that a victim's statement to her sister that she had been raped was an excited utterance when, between the time of the assault and her making the statement, the victim dressed herself and walked down the stairs); Barnes, 2004 ME 38, ¶ 4 & n. 3, 845 A.2d 575 (holding that the victim's statement to police was admissible when, between the attack and her making a statement to police, the victim got into a car and drove herself to the police station). [¶ 30] Based on a review of all of the pertinent factors, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the victim's 9-1-1 call, to the extent it addressed Taylor's attack upon her, was an excited utterance, or abuse its discretion in admitting it as such.