Opinion ID: 4103812
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Reciprocal Discovery

Text: Defendant argues the trial court‘s failure to order discovery from her codefendant, Phillip Sanders, violated her state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, to due process, to present a defense, to confront the witnesses against her, and to a reliable death penalty verdict (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15), as well as her rights under section 1054 governing discovery in criminal cases. As explained below, we reach the following three conclusions: Section 1054 does not require a court to order one 53 codefendant to provide discovery to another codefendant; the trial court‘s failure to order such discovery did not violate defendant‘s state or federal constitutional rights; and; assuming error occurred, it was harmless.
After defendant rested her defense, codefendant Phillip Sanders was scheduled to begin his defense to the charges. As part of his defense, he intended to introduce letters, sent to him by defendant while both were in pretrial custody, urging him not to trust his lawyer and promising financial rewards were he to change his story blaming her for the murder. (One letter was handwritten by defendant herself, but the others were copied by her cellmate from letters defendant provided.) Around this time (i.e., midtrial), the prosecution for the first time formally received copies of the letters from Phillip‘s counsel and thereafter disclosed them to defendant‘s attorney, who protested the belated disclosure of the evidence. In fact, the prosecution had learned much earlier both that Phillip possessed the letters and that he intended to introduce them as evidence. Two months earlier, on June 9, 1992, Phillip‘s two attorneys, Cary Weiss and David Wesley, along with the prosecutor, held an ex parte meeting before Judge Trammell, during which the attorneys revealed the existence of the letters and informed the prosecutor they had located a witness (defendant‘s former cellmate, Jennifer Lee) who could authenticate them. Weiss and Wesley asserted they did not want to formally disclose the evidence to the prosecutor because that would trigger the latter‘s obligation under applicable discovery rules to disclose the evidence to defendant. Wesley acknowledged he would have to provide discovery to the prosecution at some point but, as a strategic matter, wished to wait until after defendant had presented her defense and ―locked herself into a position.‖ Wesley 54 explained that Lee, the authenticating witness, was afraid defendant would retaliate violently against her should she discover Lee had cooperated with the prosecution. Wesley echoed Lee‘s concern that Lee‘s safety in jail would be compromised if defendant had advance knowledge that Phillip intended to use the letters. The prosecution agreed not to press for disclosure at that time. The trial court agreed that Phillip‘s attorneys would not have to disclose Lee‘s existence until after defendant testified. At a later ex parte hearing on July 27, 1992, the trial court approved Phillip‘s agreement with the prosecution not to disclose the evidence until trial. The prosecution, in effect, declined to insist on its right to pretrial discovery. Indeed, the agreement between Phillip and the prosecution went so far as to permit Phillip‘s counsel to submit the letters to the Los Angeles Police Department‘s handwriting expert to permit analysis, with a court order directing the expert not to disclose the letters without the court‘s permission. When the codefendant‘s possession of the letters was finally revealed, defendant moved for a continuance, renewed her motion for severance, and then moved for a mistrial, but all three motions were denied. The trial court ordered the prosecution to disclose to defendant‘s attorneys the copies they had in their possession. Phillip‘s defense began on August 17, 1992. Although defendant would later stipulate that she wrote one of the letters, she objected to the introduction of the letters not in her own handwriting, arguing they had not been properly authenticated. The trial court ruled that Phillip could not discuss the content of those letters until they were authenticated, but later denied defendant‘s further motion for production of the actual letters as well as her request for a list of the witnesses Phillip intended to call, explaining, ―I don‘t believe I have the right to order that because it‘s a codefendant and the discovery statute doesn‘t address that issue.‖ Phillip later testified and admitted receiving the letters but denied 55 accepting any financial benefits from defendant in exchange for changing his testimony. Instead, Phillip said he turned the letters over to his lawyers. Jennifer Lee testified and authenticated the letters, explaining that she copied the letters as a favor to defendant. Lee also testified that defendant and Phillip‘s wife, Carolyn, were friends at county jail, that defendant told her she was on a cruise when her husband was killed, and that she (defendant) had a lot of money, owned a yacht, and lived in Calabasas. Outside the presence of the jury, defendant unsuccessfully renewed her motion for a mistrial due to the failure to provide discovery. In closing argument, both the prosecution and Phillip relied on the letters. The prosecutor emphasized the letters were powerful evidence that defendant and Phillip were working together, noting that the letters showed they discussed their common defenses and strategies, that they ―clearly show a conspiracy,‖ and that ―[i]t‘s obvious there is no animosity between any of these people‖ and Phillip‘s counsel, in turn, argued the letters were ―the best evidence of what is really going on in somebody‘s mind‖ and they show that defendant was ―afraid that [Phillip] is going to admit to getting rid of this gun and tell everything that happened.‖ According to Phillip‘s counsel, another letter showed that Carolyn Sanders and defendant had decided Phillip should take the blame for the killing and ―lays out a story for him to tell‖ that would allow the two women to avoid prison. In return for Phillip presenting such evidence exculpating Carolyn and defendant, according to the letter, defendant promised ―to take care of him and [Carolyn] for the rest of your lives.‖
Discovery in criminal cases is governed by section 1054, which was added to the Penal Code by Proposition 115 in 1990. ― ‗Proposition 115 added both constitutional and statutory language authorizing reciprocal discovery in criminal 56 cases.‘ The new constitutional provision, article I, section 30, subdivision (c) of the California Constitution, declares that ‗[i]n order to provide for fair and speedy trials, discovery in criminal cases shall be reciprocal in nature, as prescribed by the Legislature or by the People through the initiative process.‘ ‖ (Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096, 1102, superseded by statute on another ground, as stated in People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1193.) ―The same proposition also added chapter 10 to part 2, title 6 of the Penal Code, commencing with section 1054 . . . , establishing the procedures for, and limitations on, discovery in criminal cases. Section 1054 sets forth the purposes of this new chapter, including that ‗no discovery shall occur in criminal cases except as provided by this chapter, other express statutory provisions, or as mandated by the Constitution of the United States.‘ (Id., subd. (e).) We have emphasized this statutory exclusivity, noting that ‗all court-ordered discovery is governed exclusively by—and is barred except as provided by—the discovery chapter newly enacted by Proposition 115.‘ (In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122, 129.)‖ (Verdin, supra, at pp. 1102–1103.)9 9 Section 1054, in full, states: ―This chapter shall be interpreted to give effect to all of the following purposes: ― (a) To promote the ascertainment of truth in trials by requiring timely pretrial discovery. ― (b) To save court time by requiring that discovery be conducted informally between and among the parties before judicial enforcement is requested. ― (c) To save court time in trial and avoid the necessity for frequent interruptions and postponements. ― (d) To protect victims and witnesses from danger, harassment, and undue delay of the proceedings. ― (e) To provide that no discovery shall occur in criminal cases except as provided by this chapter, other express statutory provisions, or as mandated by the Constitution of the United States.‖ 57 As defendant acknowledges, and the trial court held, no provision in the statutory scheme governing criminal discovery explicitly or even impliedly requires one codefendant to disclose any evidence to another codefendant. Thus, section 1054.1 states that ―[t]he prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the defendant or his or her attorney all of the following materials and information . . . .‖ (Italics added.) Similarly, section 1054.3, subdivision (a) requires a ―defendant and his or her attorney [to] disclose to the prosecuting attorney‖ certain materials. (Italics added.) Nothing in the language of these two provisions requires one codefendant to provide discovery to another codefendant. We have adhered strictly to this language; for example, we held in People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, that although reciprocal discovery of penalty phase evidence between a defendant and the prosecution is generally required by section 1054, ―no statutory basis exists for the discovery of codefendants‘ penalty phase witnesses‖ (Ervin, supra, at p. 101). Despite the absence of express authority requiring discovery among codefendants, defendant argues that, having decided early on to have Jennifer Lee testify to authenticate the letters, Phillip was required to provide discovery of that fact to the prosecution, which would in turn have required the prosecution to disclose that information to defendant. But the prosecution, made aware of the evidence, expressly acquiesced in Phillip‘s proposal to delay disclosure. Nothing in the statutory scheme prohibits the prosecution from doing so. Noting that section 1054.7 provides that discovery ―shall be made at least 30 days prior to the trial, unless good cause is shown why a disclosure should be denied, restricted, or deferred‖ (italics added), defendant further argues the trial court abused its discretion by permitting deferral of disclosure without first making a finding of good cause. But the quoted language, read in context, clearly addresses the trial court‘s discretion in cases where discovery is otherwise 58 required. Because we find the statutory scheme beginning with section 1054 does not require discovery between codefendants, the good cause provision is beside the point. But even if a showing of good cause were required to defer discovery, such cause was shown by Lee‘s expressed fear of retaliation should defendant learn of Lee‘s cooperation with the prosecution. (§ 1054.7 [good cause includes evidence of ―threats or possible danger to the safety of a . . . witness‖].) Defendant does not, even now, suggest these concerns over Lee‘s safety were fabricated or exaggerated. Defendant also contends language in section 1054, subdivision (b) can be read to require mandatory discovery between codefendants. That section sets forth the general purposes of the criminal discovery scheme and states in part that discovery is required ―[t]o save court time by requiring that discovery be conducted informally between and among the parties before judicial enforcement is requested.‖ (Italics added.) According to defendant, by using the words ―between‖ and ―among‖ in this passage, the drafters of the statute ―make[] clear they intended the reciprocal discovery rules to apply to all those involved in a criminal case as ‗parties.‘ ‖ While defendant‘s reading is plausible as a general matter, inferences drawn from the definitions of the words ―between‖ and ―among‖ cannot overcome the more specific provisions in sections 1054.1 and 1054.3 that speak in terms of discovery flowing specifically from the ―prosecuting attorney‖ to the ―defendant‖ (or his or her attorney), and vice versa. Moreover, as is clear from the context of section 1054, subdivision (b), that provision merely expresses the Legislature‘s general intent that parties first attempt to obtain discovery informally, ―before judicial enforcement is requested.‖ We cannot reasonably infer from either the language or the context of this passage that the Legislature intended to authorize reciprocal discovery between codefendants being jointly tried. 59
Having concluded no statutory basis exists for requiring a criminal defendant to provide discovery to a codefendant in a joint trial, we now turn to whether defendant was entitled to discovery of the letters as a constitutional matter. Although section 1054, subdivision (e) sets forth a strict rule limiting the availability of discovery in criminal cases (―no discovery shall occur in criminal cases except as provided by this chapter‖), it also acknowledges two key exceptions: discovery is available if required by ―other express statutory provisions, or as mandated by the Constitution of the United States.‖ We have previously recognized that discovery in criminal cases is sometimes compelled by constitutional guarantees to ensure an accused receives a fair trial. (See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Johnson) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 696 [requiring disclosure of potentially impeaching material contained in a law enforcement officer‘s personnel file]; People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932 [requiring disclosure of the prosecution‘s rebuttal witnesses at the penalty phase of a capital trial]; Alvarado v. Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1121 [requiring disclosure of the identities of crucial prosecution witnesses].) In such cases, we have ―reaffirmed that a criminal defendant‘s right to discovery is based on the fundamental proposition that the accused is entitled to a fair trial and the opportunity to present an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.‖ (People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, 965.) Defendant argues Phillip‘s failure to disclose the letters and Lee‘s identity as an authenticating witness, as well as the failure to disclose the prosecution‘s agreement to forgo insisting on its statutory right to discovery of the material, violated her constitutional rights under both the Sixth Amendment (to confront the witnesses against her) and the Fourteenth Amendment (her due process right to a fair trial and to a meaningful opportunity to present a defense). But although 60 defendant, as one accused of serious crimes, was unquestionably entitled to the right to confrontation and to a fair trial, she does not explain how her codefendant‘s failure to provide her with pretrial disclosure of the letters and of Lee‘s expected testimony denied her the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.10 Defendant presumably knew the content of the letters (because she wrote them) and knew of Lee‘s participation as well, so she could not have been caught off guard to such an extent that we might conclude she was unable to prepare a meaningful defense and thereby denied her due process right to a fair trial. She was, moreover, able to cross-examine Phillip and Lee about the letters, thereby satisfying her right to confrontation. Under the circumstances, we conclude the trial court‘s decision to permit Phillip to pursue a trial strategy disadvantageous to defendant Thompson did not violate her constitutional rights. To the extent defendant asserts the decision to hold a joint trial and the denial of her many motions for severance deprived her of notice and the timely discovery of evidence she would have otherwise received in a separate trial, she fails to establish the failure to provide her with discovery of the letters before trial violated her constitutional rights. As we explained in People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at page 379, ―[s]imply because the prosecution‘s case will be stronger if defendants are tried together, or that one defense undermines another, does not render a joint trial unfair. [Citation.] Indeed, important concerns of public policy are served if a single jury is given a full and fair overview of the defendants‘ joint conduct and the assertions they make to defend against ensuing charges.‖ Accordingly, the mere possibility she would have 10 Although defendant‘s opening brief also contends the denial of discovery denied her state constitutional rights under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, she provides no separate discussion or analysis of that provision. 61 obtained discovery of the letters earlier had she been tried separately is insufficient to demonstrate a violation of her constitutional rights to a fair trial and to confront the witnesses against her. Although defendant is correct that we strive to interpret statutes (such as § 1054) so as to avoid constitutional problems (see In re Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal.4th 757, 800), because we find defendant had no constitutional right to discovery from her codefendant, we have no occasion to reinterpret section 1054 to require reciprocal discovery among codefendants.
Finally, even were we to find defendant was entitled, either by statutory or constitutional compulsion, to earlier discovery of the letters and of Lee‘s identity, we would conclude any error was harmless under any standard. Because defendant wrote the letters, and personally asked Jennifer Lee to copy them in her own handwriting before sending them to Phillip, defendant was undoubtedly aware of both the existence of the evidence and its potential significance, and she had sufficient opportunity to fairly meet the evidence when it was presented to the jury. For example, defendant failed to take advantage of the trial court‘s offer to have Lee return to the stand to allow defendant to cross-examine her on the circumstances of her purported authentication of the letters. Under the circumstances, defendant could not have suffered any prejudice from her inability to obtain discovery at an earlier time from her codefendant.