Opinion ID: 1111566
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: todd, brown, and jennings

Text: (2) This court's opinion in Todd, supra, 119 Cal. 57, is the apparent source of the belief that imposition of a contempt sanction on a parent who willfully disables himself or herself from having the ability to comply with a child support order is constitutionally impermissible. Tamara argues that, regardless of whether Todd was based on the constitutional prohibition of slavery and involuntary servitude or on the proscription of imprisonment for debt, it should be disapproved or overruled. Supported by amicus curiae Appellate Committee of the California District Attorneys Association, she asks the court to reconsider Todd. The one-page Todd opinion offered no explanation for its holding that the court lacked power to punish a person for failing to seek employment in order to pay spousal support. In Todd the contemner discontinued making court-ordered alimony payments to his ex-wife. After a hearing on an order to show cause re contempt, the court found that the contemner had no money or other means of payment and had not committed a fraud on his creditors by disposing of property. The court also found that the contemner had been allowed a month within which to seek employment so that he could earn money to make the weekly alimony payments, but had made no effort to obtain employment. He was committed to jail until he paid the $200 then due. This court held: This order was clearly in excess of the power of the court, which cannot compel a man to seek employment in order to earn money to pay alimony, and punish him for his failure to do so. ( Todd, supra, 119 Cal. at p. 58.) Todd was followed by Brown, supra, 136 Cal. App.2d 40, a case in which the habeas corpus petitioner had been sentenced to a five-day jail term for failure to comply with a judgment ordering him to pay alimony. The affidavit in support of the contempt citation was construed by the Court of Appeal to allege that the contemner had insufficient money to comply due to his being unemployed. The court concluded that there had been a sufficient showing of ability to work, but this was inadequate. If ability to work in remunerative employment was, in a pertinent legal sense, ability to comply with the mandate of the judgment, and if it had been alleged that petitioner wilfully refused to work for the express purpose of avoiding compliance with his obligations, the affidavit would have been sufficient. But mere ability to work is not the same as ability to pay. ( Brown, supra, 136 Cal. App.2d at p. 43.) The court then noted that Todd was still the controlling law, quoting the opinion, but went on to say: Cases holding that a husband who has no money but has the ability to work may be ordered to pay support money to his wife ( Dimon v. Dimon [(1953)] 40 Cal.2d 516 [254 P.2d 528]) are not in point. Also inapplicable is the rule that one may be punished for contempt if he wilfully and voluntarily puts it out of his power to comply with a court mandate. Our courts have never applied the rule to the case of a husband who has no money, but having ability to obtain employment fails or refuses to do so. [¶] As we have stated, the affidavit did not allege that petitioner gave up his employment voluntarily or refused to accept employment that was available. ( Id. at pp. 43-44.) The habeas corpus petitioner in Jennings, supra, 133 Cal. App.3d 373, had been sentenced to 60 days in jail following a finding that he was in contempt of court for failure to pay spousal support and attorney fees. He claimed that, since there was proof that he did not have the ability to pay, the order was in excess of the court's jurisdiction because it imprisoned him for a debt that he could not pay. At the time of the proceedings the petitioner, an architect, was unemployed and had no assets, but the contempt court found that he had the ability to earn $80,000 per year. He had received unrestricted personal loans and unemployment insurance during the period in which alimony payments were due. The contempt court found that he had willfully and unjustifiably quit working to avoid his financial obligation of spousal support and had allowed his business interests to depreciate to the point at which they were practically useless. (133 Cal. App.3d at p. 379.) Because the contemner had voluntarily ceased work, the court had made the support order on the basis of his ability to earn, rather than on his current earnings. The court found with respect to each count that the petitioner had the ability to pay the support obligation in full and had willfully and intentionally failed to do so, and even though he had the ability to employ himself, he had deliberately refused to employ himself so as to be unable to make the payments. Relying on its understanding of Todd and Brown, the Jennings court held that the contempt order was in excess of the court's jurisdiction because it was based on capacity to earn rather than actual ability to pay. ( Jennings, supra, 133 Cal. App.3d at p. 380.) The court recognized that it is permissible to base an order for support on earning capacity rather than actual income when there is evidence of an attempt to avoid family financial responsibilities by refusing to seek employment. It concluded nonetheless that a contempt sanction could not be imposed for failure to comply with the support order. It found in Todd a clear implication that federal and state constitutional provisions barring involuntary servitude were applicable. ( Id. at p. 383.) Citing Pollock v. Williams (1944) 322 U.S. 4, 18 [64 S.Ct. 792, 799, 88 L.Ed. 1095], the court found no difference in the imprisonment of the petitioner for failure to employ himself and other constitutionally impermissible practices where, under threat of criminal sanction, a person is compelled to work in order to force that person to pay a debt (133 Cal. App.3d at p. 384), and ultimately held that it was bound by the holding in Ex parte Todd, supra, 119 Cal. 57 that contempt may not be applied to incarcerate [petitioner] because he is unemployed. ( Id. at p. 386.)