Opinion ID: 209543
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: In Parker v. Flook the Court again rejected today's restrictions

Text: The eligibility of mathematical processes next reached the Court in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 98 S.Ct. 2522, 57 L.Ed.2d 451 (1978), where the Court held that the process category of Section 101 was not met by a claim to a mathematical formula for calculation of alarm limits for use in connection with catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons and, as in Benson, the claim was essentially for the mathematical formula. The Court later summarized its Flook holding, stating in Diamond v. Diehr that: The [Flook] application, however, did not purport to explain how these other variables were to be determined, nor did it purport to contain any disclosure relating to the chemical processes at work, the monitoring of the process variables, nor the means of setting off an alarm or adjusting an alarm system. All that it provides is a formula for computing an updated alarm limit. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186-87, 101 S.Ct. 1048 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 586, 98 S.Ct. 2522). The Court explained in Flook that a field-of-use restriction to catalytic conversion did not distinguish Flook's mathematical process from that in Benson. However, the Court reiterated that patent eligibility of computer-directed processes is not controlled by the qualifications of our earlier precedents, again negating any limiting effect of the usages of the past, on which this court now places heavy reliance. The Court stated: The statutory definition of process is broad. An argument can be made, however, that this Court has only recognized a process as within the statutory definition when it either was tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change materials to a different state or thing. As in Benson, we assume that a valid process patent may issue even if it does not meet one of these qualifications of our earlier precedents.[ [1] ] Flook, 437 U.S. at 589 n. 9, 98 S.Ct. 2522 (quoting Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 787). This statement directly contravenes this court's new requirement that all processes must meet the court's machine-or-transformation test or be barred from access to the patent system. The Court in Flook discussed that abstractions and fundamental principles have never been subject to patenting, but recognized the unclear line between an abstract principle and the application of such principle: The line between a patentable process and an unpatentable principle is not always clear. Both are conception[s] of the mind, seen only by [their] effects when being executed or performed. Flook, 437 U.S. at 589, 98 S.Ct. 2522 (alterations in original) (quoting Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728, 26 L.Ed. 279 (1880)). The decision in Flook has been recognized as a step in the evolution of the Court's thinking about computers. See Arrhythmia Res. Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1057 n. 4 (Fed.Cir. 1992) (it appears to be generally agreed that these decisions represent evolving views of the Court) (citing R.L. Gable & J.B. Leaheey, The Strength of Patent Protection for Computer Products, 17 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 87 (1991); D. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. Pitt. L.Rev. 959 (1986)). That Flook does not support today's per se exclusion of forms of process inventions from access to the patent system is reinforced in the next Section 101 case decided by the Court: