Opinion ID: 77178
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Pedro Sarduy

Text: Pedro Sarduy, a medical doctor who worked at the Arias-owned First Option Medical Center, was convicted of conspiracy based on the government’s allegations that he participated in the fraud scheme by certifying false diagnoses of COPD. Sarduy argues that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on his defense of withdrawal from the conspiracy, because there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that he withdrew from the conspiracy more than five years before the government charged him. If the jury accepted his withdrawal defense, the statute of limitations would preclude conviction. Thus, he claims the district court erred by refusing to correctly that the statement was harmful to Iheagwara’s substantial rights. Our review of the record, however, indicates that Ogbenna and Ikejiani were not similarly situated, in terms of the evidence presented to the jury. Although they were co-owners of Maz Pharmacy, their similarity to Iheagwara ends there. Indeed, their co-ownership of Maz Pharmacy was virtually the only evidence implicating Ogbenna and Ikejiani. Regil testified that in her visits to Maz Pharmacy, “the only one I would actually see filling aerosol medications would be Michael [Iheagwara].” The government presented no evidence of personal knowledge or involvement by Ogbenna or Ikejiani. The evidence against Ikejiani and Ogbenna thus appears comparable to that presented against Reinaldo Landrove, who was also acquitted. This evidence did no more than establish that Ikejiani and Ogbenna were corporate officers for and were occasionally present at a business implicated in the fraud scheme, performing tasks such as compounding or delivering medicine that they could plausibly have executed with no personal knowledge of the underlying fraud. More comparable to Iheagwara were Marco and Suzanne Burgos, co-owners of La Moderna. As with Iheagwara, the evidence demonstrated that the Burgos were active in day-to-day management of businesses involved in the fraud over the course of several years. There was testimony establishing that both Marco and Suzanne had specific knowledge of fraudulent activity, and were active participants. The jury’s guilty verdicts for Marco and Suzanne, the evidence against whom was comparable to that against Iheagwara, bolsters our conclusion that the erroneous admission did not affect the jury’s verdict on Iheagwara. 23 instruct the jury on this defense, and that his conviction must be reversed. A criminal defendant has the right to a jury instruction on his theory of defense, separate and apart from instructions given on the elements of the charged offense. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988); United States v. Ruiz, 59 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 1995). If the proposed instruction presents a valid defense and there has been “some evidence” adduced at trial to support the defense, a trial court may not refuse to charge the jury on that defense. Ruiz, 59 F.3d at 1154. The burden of presenting evidence sufficient to support a jury instruction on a theory of defense is “extremely low.” Id. “[T]he defendant is entitled to have presented instructions relating to a theory of defense for which there is any foundation in the evidence, even though the evidence may be weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility.” United States v. Lively, 803 F.2d 1124, 1126 (11th Cir. 1986) (internal marks omitted). In reviewing the evidence adduced, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the accused. Ruiz, 59 F.3d at 1154. An accused conspirator’s participation is presumed to have continued until all objects of the conspiracy have been accomplished or until the last overt act has been committed by any of the conspirators. United States v. Reed, 980 F.2d 1568, 1583 (11th Cir. 1993). However, if a conspirator establishes the affirmative 24 defense of withdrawal, the statute of limitations will begin to run at the time of withdrawal.18 Id. at 1584; see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 465 n.38 (1978). Otherwise, the statute will not begin to run until the final act of the conspiracy has occurred. Reed, 980 F.2d at 1584. Because withdrawal constitutes a valid defense to the conspiracy charge, Sarduy was entitled to his requested instruction if there was “any foundation in the evidence” to demonstrate that he withdrew from the conspiracy more than five years before he was indicted. See Ruiz, 59 F.3d at 1154. Thus, Sarduy must demonstrate that the evidence provided a foundation to satisfy this circuit’s twoprong test for withdrawal: “first, the defendant must prove that he has taken affirmative steps to defeat the objectives of the conspiracy; and second, he must show either that he made a reasonable effort to communicate these acts to his co- 18 The government asserts that a conspirator cannot withdraw after an overt act has been committed. First, we note under the offense charged here, the conspiracy does not exist until the commission of an overt act. See 18 U.S.C. § 371. Second, while we have stated that “withdrawal [from a conspiracy] is impossible once an overt act is committed,” see United States v. Marolla, 766 F.2d 457, 461 (11th Cir. 1985), we clearly noted that “withdrawal is not altogether irrelevant” after the overt act, as “withdrawal precludes liability for acts occurring after the withdrawal.” Id. Thus, an effective withdrawal insulates the defendant from Pinkerton liability for the substantive crimes of co-conspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy after his withdrawal. Finally, even though withdrawal will not absolve the defendant from liability for the inchoate crime of conspiracy, which is completed upon commission of an overt act, the statute of limitations for that charge will begin to run at the time of withdrawal. Here, Sarduy’s withdrawal from the conspiracy did not absolve him of criminal liability for the conspiracy charge. However, the subsequent running of the statute of limitations for that prior participation would preclude the government from prosecuting him for those acts. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a); United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1232-33 (7th Cir. 1980) (“Withdrawal becomes a complete defense only when coupled with the defense of the statute of limitations.”). 25 conspirators or disclosed the scheme to law enforcement authorities. United States v. Young, 39 F.3d 1561, 1571 (11th Cir. 1994). Mere cessation of participation is not sufficient to establish withdrawal; the accused must also establish that he communicated his withdrawal either to his co-conspirators or to law enforcement. See United States v. Finestone, 816 F.2d 583, 589 (11th Cir. 1987). The accused participant is not required to notify “each other member” that he will no longer participate, but the acts of withdrawal must be “communicated in a manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators.” See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 464-65 (1978). Sarduy argues that the evidence provides a sufficient foundation for a jury to infer that he had withdrawn from the conspiracy, and that withdrawal had been communicated to Jose Arias, the head of the scheme. First, he presents an August 28, 1995 letter to Blue Cross/Blue Shield, as administrator for Medicare Part B, wherein he advised them that he was no longer seeing patients at First Option, and requested his cancellation as provider at First Option.19 Sarduy’s expert testified that a physician could reasonably assume that by notifying Medicare that he was no longer working for a particular clinic, Medicare would notify any other 19 Sarduy also notes the testimony of government witness Adolfo Baron, a former physician's assistant at First Option, who testified that Sarduy departed First Option during the first half of 1995. 26 participating providers. Citing this expert testimony, Sarduy argues that the letter to Blue Cross/Blue Shield therefore constituted a communication “reasonably calculated” to reach Jose Arias, the scheme’s principal. Additional evidence indicates that his communication of withdrawal was indeed successful, bolstering his claim. Days after he mailed the August 28, 1995 letter to Blue Cross/Blue Shield, his name was crossed out from the list of individual provider numbers on First Option Medical Center’s Medicare electronic billing enrollment form.20 Further, checks submitted by the government, as well as a chart of those checks submitted into evidence by the government, illustrate that the checks purportedly paying Sarduy for his involvement in the scheme cease in September 1995. Finally, Sarduy argues that testimony by his former office manager stating that Jose Arias acquired a subsequent October 16th “To whom it may concern” letter from Sarduy, in which Sarduy wrote that “I will be providing medical services at First Option Medical Center,” indicated that Arias had actually received Sarduy’s communicated withdrawal (in the August 28th letter), and was attempting to engage Sarduy’s continued participation. After this October exchange, a final December 4, 1995 letter to Blue Cross/Blue Shield again requests Sarduy’s cancellation as a provider 20 These forms were signed by convicted co-conspirator Idania Arias. 27 for First Option, and advises Blue Cross/Blue Shield that he had not seen any patients since sending the previous cancellation letter in August. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Sarduy, see Ruiz, 59 F.3d at 1154, and in light of the “extremely low” burden that Sarduy must meet, id., we find that he has provided a sufficient foundation in the evidence from which a jury could conclude that he took affirmative steps to withdraw from the conspiracy and to communicate that withdrawal to his co-conspirators. Because Sarduy adduced evidence supporting his valid theory of defense, he was entitled to the jury instruction he requested. The district court’s erroneous refusal to charge the jury as requested mandates that we vacate Sarduy’s conviction.