Opinion ID: 2513979
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Distinguishing the Offenses

Text: A person commits criminally negligent homicide when he causes the death of another person by conduct amounting to criminal negligence. § 18-3-105, 6 C.R.S. (2002). Criminally negligent homicide is a class 5 felony. Id. Criminal negligence is a state of mind that exists when through a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise, he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will occur or that a circumstance exists. § 18-1-501(3). By contrast, a person commits reckless manslaughter, a class 4 felony, when he recklessly causes the death of another person. § 18-3-104(1)(a). A person acts recklessly in this context when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his actions will cause death. § 18-1-501(8). Second-degree murder is a class 2 felony, [3] which requires a showing that the defendant knowingly caused the death of the victim. § 18-3-103. We recently explained in detail the statutory elements of reckless manslaughter, which are distinguishable from criminally negligent homicide only by degree of culpability. In People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 215-16 (Colo.2000), we explained that to determine whether a risk was substantial and unjustifiable, the trier of fact must weigh the likelihood and potential magnitude of harm presented by the conduct and consider whether the conduct constitutes a gross deviation from the reasonable standard of care. The fact finder must consider the facts and circumstances of the individual case, both to weigh the magnitude of the harm against its likelihood, and to determine whether the risk was consciously disregarded. Id. at 211. To find the risk unjustifiable, the fact finder must find that the nature of the risk was so substantial as to be unjustified in relation to the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct. Id. at 217. In considering whether the risk was consciously disregarded, the fact finder may infer the actor's subjective knowledge of the risk or [consider] what a reasonable person with the actor's knowledge and experience would have been aware of in the particular situation. Id. at 216. In contrast, to constitute murder in the second degree the actor must knowingly cause[ ] the death of a person. § 18-3-103(1). A person acts knowingly when he is aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause the result. § 18-1-501(6). Thus there are two elements of second-degree murder, [f]irst, the death must have been more than merely a probable result of the defendant's actions. Second, the defendant must have been aware of the circumstances that made death practically certain. People v. Dist. Ct., 652 P.2d 582, 586 (Colo.1982). The first element is objective; the second is subjective. Id. For the subjective component, the People need not provide direct evidence of the defendant's state of mind..... [T]he defendant's subjective awareness may be inferred from his conduct and surrounding circumstances. Id. In sum, the mens rea with which the defendant acted in relation to the risk determines his degree of culpability. Distinguishing criminally negligent homicide from reckless manslaughter, [a]n actor is criminally negligent when he should have been aware of the risk but was not, while recklessness requires that the defendant actually be aware of the risk but disregard it. Hall, 999 P.2d at 219-20. Further, distinguishing manslaughter from second-degree murder, the actor commits murder not by disregarding some risk of death, but by engaging in conduct he knows is practically certain to cause death. When a defendant's actions result in death, criminally negligent homicide is the least culpable criminal offense for which he may be held liable. Criminally negligent homicide is a class five offense, on a par with first-degree assault committed in the heat of passion. § 18-3-105; § 18-3-202(2)(a). It is a lesser offense than first-degree assault (class 3), [4] vehicular homicide (class 4), [5] or second-degree assault (class 4). [6] This court has long held that the refusal to instruct on a lesser included offense in a homicide case is reversible error as long as there is some evidence, however slight, tending to establish the lesser included offense. People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375, 379 (Colo. 1982). Various court of appeals' cases demonstrate circumstances in which courts have required the giving of a criminally negligent homicide instruction when the facts clearly identified the guilty party as the perpetrator, the cause of death was known, and the defendant's actions suggested a higher degree of culpability than defendant argues here. See, e.g., People v. Castro, 10 P.3d 700 (Colo.App. 2000) (finding reversible error when trial court declined to give requested criminally negligent homicide instruction in case where defendant shot victim with a gun but the evidence could have supported a finding that the defendant did not perceive that death would result); People v. Mares, 705 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Colo.App.1985) (finding reversible error for refusal to give instruction on manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide in case where defendant stabbed victim multiple times). When considering whether a defendant is entitled to his proffered instruction, the trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. If there is any evidence whatever tending to establish a certain statutory grade of criminal homicide the defendant is entitled to an instruction thereon, regardless of how incredible or unreasonable his contention may be, Crawford v. People, 12 Colo. 290, 293, 20 P. 769, 770 (1889), or how improbable, unreasonable or slight it might be. People v. Garcia, 826 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Colo. 1992) (quoting Shaw, 646 P.2d at 380 (quoting Read v. People, 119 Colo. 506, 509, 205 P.2d 233, 235 (1949))). This court has declared, There is nothing in our criminal practice more thoroughly established or definitely settled than the principle that when there is any evidence however improbable, unreasonable or slight, which tends to reduce the homicide to the grade of manslaughter, the defendant is entitled to an instruction thereon upon the hypothesis that the same is true, and that it is for the jury, under proper instructions, and not the trial judge, to weigh and consider the evidence and determine therefrom what grade of crime, if any, was committed; and that the court's refusal to instruct thereon is reversible error. Read, 119 Colo. at 509, 205 P.2d at 235. This contention was reaffirmed in Ferrin v. People, 164 Colo. 130, 136, 433 P.2d 108, 111 (1967), wherein the court also observed, Cases which are `all white or all black'  either murder or nothingare not of frequent occurrence; we need only note the many, many decisions in which we have said the lesser degrees of the crime must be submitted in the instructions. Id. (reversing for jury to consider heat of passion manslaughter).