Opinion ID: 1658505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: First, a few basics.

Text: The Chancery Court of Harrison County, Mississippi, First Judicial District, has subject matter jurisdiction of this action. This is so by reason of the well pleaded allegations of Clayton Brown's August 17, 1984 complaint which states a claim for divorce. Miss. Const. Art. 6, § 159(b) (1890); Miss. Code Ann. § 9-5-81 and 93-5-2 (1972 and Supp. 1985); see generally Lee v. Coahoma Opportunities, Inc., 485 So.2d 293, 294 (Miss. 1986); American Fire Insurance Co. v. Athens Stove Works, Inc., 481 So.2d 292, 296 (Miss. 1985); Luckett v. Mississippi Wood, Inc., 481 So.2d 288, 290 (Miss. 1985). Second, the parties appear subject to in personam jurisdiction in the Chancery Court of Harrison County. Though the record contains no suggestion that process has been served upon Mary Darlene Brown, it does contain at least three pleadings she has filed in none of which does she object to in personam jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), Miss.R.Civ.P. Lack of in personam jurisdiction being a matter that may be waived if not timely asserted, Rule 12(h)(1), Miss.R.Civ.P., that question is behind us. The problem is that full subject matter and in personam jurisdiction of the matter respecting the dissolution of the marriage of the parties and custody of their child appears also to be vested in the Superior Court of Ventura County, California. While the subject matter jurisdiction of the Chancery Court of Harrison County was first invoked  August 17, 1984 as compared with August 28, 1984  it appears that the California court first acquired in personam jurisdiction, September 17, 1984, as compared with January 14, 1985. That there is another action regarding the same subject matter pending in the courts of a sister state poses no jurisdictional obstacle to a court of this state of otherwise competent jurisdiction hearing and adjudging the matter in controversy. Kline v. Burke Construction Company, 260 U.S. 226, 232, 43 S.Ct. 79, 81, 67 L.Ed. 226, 231 (1922); Cuevas v. Cuevas, 191 So.2d 843, 847-48 (Miss. 1966); Cox v. Cox, 234 Miss. 885, 892, 108 So.2d 422, 424 (1959); Ex Parte Buck, 291 Ala. 689, 287 So.2d 441, 443 (1973). Cf. Streckfus Steamers, Inc. v. Kiersky, 174 Miss. 125, 141, 163 So. 830, 835 (1935). The question is not whether the Chancery Court has jurisdiction of this matter but how it should exercise such jurisdiction as it has. Whether under these facts Mississippi should defer to California is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the Chancery Court, informed by the presence or absence of exigent circumstances, the legitimate needs and conveniences of the parties, and considerations of interstate comity and the need to avoid unseemly forum shopping. No one has suggested that there is any immediate threat to the best interest of the parties' fifteen year old son, a matter which if present would greatly influence our view of this case. We are concerned that the California court has stayed its proceedings, apparently respecting Clayton Brown's rights under the Soldiers and Sailor's Civil Relief Act. 50 U.S.C.App. § 513. Of greater concern, however, is Brown's conduct in invoking his rights as a serviceman by virtue of this Federal enactment in California while insisting upon the Chancery Court of Harrison County proceeding to hear the matter. The Chancery Court appears to have been of the view that Clayton Brown was engaged in a certain amount of gamesmanship, invoking the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act when it suited his convenience and waiving it when it did not. Clayton Brown is trifling with the courts in a manner we do not find endearing. Cf. Brown v. Brown, 450 So.2d 1083, 1084 (Miss. 1984). By reason of the fact that the California court had first acquired in personam jurisdiction of the matter, the Chancery Court below stayed all proceedings before it pending a ruling by the Superior Court of California on the issues of divorce and child custody. Contrary to the assertion made on behalf of Clayton Brown, the Chancery Court had inherent authority to enter such a stay, which Mary Darlene had requested in her Motion and Answer filed January 14, 1985. The Chancery Court fully appreciated all applicable jurisdictional principles and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, that court determined that the Mississippi proceedings should be stayed. Finding no basis for concluding that the Chancery Court has abused its discretion, we affirm. The case is remanded to the Chancery Court for such further proceedings, if any, as may be appropriate. [1] AFFIRMED WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE and HAWKINS, P.JJ., and DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.