Opinion ID: 4687628
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court abused its discretion in awardingattorney fees based on the percentage of the amountof money recovered compared to the amount soughtto be recovered.

Text: ¶17 The standard of review for the award of attorney fees by the trial court is for an abuse of discretion. 7 The State argues that the trial court's method of awarding 10% of the amount recovered as the award of attorney fees was not clearly erroneous. Hingey argues that such a method deviates inequitably from other methods this Court has set forth to calculate attorney fees. Even though we have not previously interpreted the statute, we are not the first court to do so. ¶18 The Washington Supreme Court, in Guillen v. Contreras , 169 Wash. 2d 769, 771-72, 238 P.3d 1168, 1169-70 (2010) noted that forfeiture statutes were adopted to protect the people from having their property wrongfully seized by the government. The purpose of the addition of the attorney fee provision was to provide greater protection to people whose property is seized. Read in terms of citizens' rights threatened by the State's power, the statute should be read as granting fees when the claimants receive substantial relief--something more than nominal--as opposed to receiving half or more of what they sought. In other words, a claimant need not prevail on the entire claim or prevail in the main, to recover attorney fees under such a statute. ¶19 We agree with the Washington Court's rationale, even though 63 O.S. Supp. 2016 §2-506, uses the terms prevails and prevailed, it is not a prevailing party statute because only the claimant, not the State, may recover fees and costs if any seized money is recovered. 8 It does, however, require that the reasonable attorney fees be directly related to the claim on which the defendant or claimant prevailed. 9 This does not equate to mean that a reasonable attorney fee to award is merely a percentage equivalent to the amount the claimant prevailed in recovering. It is based on what they sought, not what they got. ¶20 Clearly, reasonable attorney fees must relate to the amount the claimant prevailed. Nevertheless, the problem with using a percentage of the amount recovered, like the trial court used in this cause, is that unlike other types of lawsuits where the damages must be determined, the amount the claimant is seeking to recover is always a finite amount determined purely by what was forfeited. It may not relate at all to the time and work required to recover it on behalf of a claimant. ¶21 It is not unusual for the attorney fee to exceed the amount recovered by the litigants. 10 An example where the work does not necessarily reflect the amount recovered is found in Spencer v. Okla . Gas & Electric , 2007 OK 76, ¶20, 171 P.3d 890. Spencer involved the dispute over $484.00 which the company argued was outstanding, and the customer argued had been paid in full. After a year of litigation, the company confessed judgment for $5,000.00. When the customer's attorney sought $8,775.37 in attorney fees and costs, the trial court only awarded $2500.00 because the amount recovered was only $5000.00. Although the trial court listed, as part of its consideration, the Burk , supra, factors, we held that the failure to follow the directives of Burk , supra, in setting the attorney fees, and to make an award consistent with the evidence presented constituted an abuse of discretion requiring reversal. ¶22 In Spencer , supra, we said: ¶13 A trial court's attorney fees award is reviewed for abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no rational basis in evidence for the ruling. Generally, the correct formula for calculating a reasonable fee is to: 1) determine the compensation based on an hourly rate; and 2) enhance the fee through consideration of the factors outlined in Burk v. Oklahoma City , 1979 OK 115, 598 P.2d 659 (Burk factors). In all cases, the attorney fees must bear some reasonable relationship to the amount in controversy. ¶14 The factors set out in Burk v. Oklahoma City are: time and labor required; novelty and difficulty of the questions; skill requisite to perform the legal service; preclusion of other employment; customary fee; whether the fee is fixed or contingent; time limitations; amount involved and results obtained; experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys involved; risk of recovery; nature and length of relationship with the client; and awards in similar causes. An attorney seeking an award must submit detailed time records and offer evidence of the reasonable value of the services performed based on the standards of the legal community in which the attorney practices. Thereafter, steps are taken to determine a reasonable fee. First, from the detailed time records, a lodestar fee is arrived at by multiplying the attorney's hourly rate by the hours expended. Second, the fee may be enhanced by application of the Burk factors. Finally, any fee so calculated is subject to the rule that it must be reasonable and bear some reasonable relationship to the amount in controversy. (Footnotes omitted.) ¶23 We also cautioned trial court judges to set forth with specificity the facts, and computation to support an award. In Spencer , supra, the trial court listed the Burk factors in making its ruling, but there was no evidence that guidelines, other than the comparison of the fee to the amount recovered played any real role in setting the $2,500.00 attorney fees award. No baseline was arrived at from either Spencer's detailed time records or the draft records offered by the electric company. The awarded fee did not result from the multiplication of an hourly rate, based on evidence presented, times the hours expended. Simply, the trial court awarded the fee based on a determination that the cause was never worth more than $5,000.00, and that it would not support an award of more than $2,500.00 in attorney fees. The award did not comport with the guidelines of Burk v. Oklahoma City , 1979 OK 115, 598 P.2d 659, and we reversed and remanded the cause. ¶24 The same rationale applies to this cause. It appears that the trial court based its award on a determination the claimant only recovered 10% of what was seized and thus should have been only entitled to 10% of his attorney fees. While the amount recovered is one factor to consider, 11 a reasonable attorney's fee should be determined on remand in accordance with an appropriate balancing of the guidelines delineated in State ex rel . Burk v. City of Oklahoma City , 1979 OK 115, ¶ 3, 598 P.2d 659. 12