Opinion ID: 2604222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: impermissible mandatory presumption

Text: In Buckles v. State , we noted that the vehicular homicide statute does not carry a presumption that specified quantities of alcohol render one incapable of driving safely. Buckles, 830 P.2d at 706. Rather, we said the sole question is whether the driver, being under the influence, was incapable of driving safely. Id. Appellant argues that his conviction must be reversed because the statutory scheme establishes an impermissible mandatory presumption that appellant was incapable of safely driving because he had an alcohol concentration of .10 percent or more. The State, on the other hand, argues that any mandatory presumption is not at issue in this case because the district court did not employ an impermissible mandatory presumption in convicting appellant of aggravated vehicular homicide. After reviewing the record, we agree with the State that the district court did not rely on presumptions but instead found each element from the evidence presented at trial. Based on the evidence, and not any presumption, the district court properly concluded that appellant drove his motorcycle while under the influence of alcohol and cocaine to an extent he could not drive safely and that his impairment was the proximate cause of Ms. Davis' death. In this trial the State did not merely point to appellant's blood alcohol content as evidence of intoxication. Rather the State presented independent evidence of impairment. Both Undersheriff Kozisek and Patrolman Stauffacher testified that they could smell alcohol on appellant's breath at the scene of the accident. Deedra Hawk, a chemist from state public health, testified about an individual's level of impairment: At above .17 you're going to have a decrease in judgment, your sensory perceptions are going to be altered, decreased, and your motor skills, your reaction time and such is also decreased. Q. How would a blood alcohol concentration of a .17 affect a person's ability to operate a motor vehicle? A. Well, your sense of judgment for one thing is going to be off. It's not going, as you know, it's not going to be normal. You're not going to be able to react to situations near as quickly and your judgment on what you should do in that situation is going to be altered also. Ms. Hawk also testified that the cocaine present in appellant's blood stream was ingested within a 12-hour period of time prior to when the sample was taken after the accident. Ms. Hawk then testified about the effect of cocaine and alcohol together: Q. Now, what can you tell us then about the effect of cocaine and alcohol together on the human physiology? A. They are going to accentuate each other. The cocaine is going to make the alcohol more evident and vice versa. The one thing that they have also found in the studies that I have read is that the alcohol increases the toxicity of the cocaine which makes it more lethal. It also seems to increase the paranoia and hallucinations, especially the paranoia. They think that people are after them and such. The State also points out that the prosecutor was attempting to prove a violation of W.S. 6-2-106(b)(i), the driving while under the influence provision of the vehicular homicide statute rather than the recklessness provision under W.S. 6-2-106(b)(ii). While the indictment and complaint are not tailored that specifically, the evidence presented does reflect that approach, which is certainly permissible. Under W.S. 31-5-233, driving while under the influence can be proven in two ways. Section (b)(i) prohibits driving if the person has an alcohol concentration of .10 percent or more. W.S. 31-5-233 (1989). Section (b)(ii) prohibits driving if the person is under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving. W.S. 31-5-233(b)(ii). If the prosecutor had attempted to prove the aggravated vehicular homicide by using the blood alcohol concentration alone, then the mandatory presumption issue appellant discusses might be before us. However, the prosecutor proved that appellant was incapable of driving safely because he was under the influence of alcohol and a controlled substance. The prosecutor did not merely put on evidence of the blood alcohol concentration and then rest his case. Rather, he presented evidence demonstrating specifically that appellant was incapable of driving safely. Appellant's conviction did not result because he was presumed incapable of driving safely solely because of his blood alcohol concentration, rather he was shown incapable of driving safely because of the effect of the amount of alcohol he had consumed and the accentuating effect of the cocaine. Therefore, the prosecutor did what the statute requires and proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was incapable of driving safely because he was operating the motorcycle while under the influence.