Opinion ID: 4522480
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Claim

Text: We now turn to whether the inclusion of the phrase so help me God in the naturalization oath violates RFRA. -33- Perrier-Bilbo contends that RFRA provides greater protection than the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Under this broader protection, Perrier-Bilbo believes that we must acknowledge her sincere belief in atheism and find that the Government's inclusion of the phrase so help me God in the naturalization oath has forced her to choose between beginning her citizenship as an equal among her co-participants at the price of violating her sincerely held religious beliefs and freely exercising her religious beliefs at the price of sacrificing the ability to start off her American citizenship . . . as an equal among her co-participants. She argues that the inclusion of that phrase substantially burdens her free religious exercise. RFRA, as Perrier-Bilbo appropriately contends, offers very broad protection for religious liberty. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 693 (2014). It prohibits the government from substantially burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b). A plaintiff alleging a RFRA claim has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie -34- case by showing that the application of the challenged law substantially burdens a sincere religious exercise. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428 (2006). While substantial burden is not defined in RFRA, case law counsels that a substantial burden on one's exercise of religion exists [w]here the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981); see also Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2008) (Under RFRA, a 'substantial burden' is imposed only when individuals are forced to choose between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a governmental benefit . . . or [are] coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions.). The district court found that, in light of the two options afforded to Perrier-Bilbo to avoid the phrase, the Government has not put substantial pressure on her to violate her sincere beliefs in order to naturalize. And Perrier-Bilbo's argument that she was forced or pressured to choose between following the tenets of her religion and receiving the benefit of -35- naturalization fails to account for the option she was given of remaining silent because she can naturalize without saying the phrase that violates her religious beliefs, or even without hearing it spoken if she naturalizes in a private ceremony. Nor does she argue that she is being penalized for practicing her religious beliefs. The Government has provided her with options so that she can adhere to her religious beliefs while still taking the naturalization oath, be it with the rest of the prospective citizens or in a private ceremony. The Government has only stopped Perrier-Bilbo from imposing her religious mandates on others. See Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1063-64 (describing as problematic the idea that, without a substantial burden, RFRA would give each citizen an individual veto when a practice offended his religious beliefs or sensibilities, despite depriving others of a governmental benefit). While she might find the options offered by the Government subjectively burdensome, however, the district court was right to conclude that not every imposition or inconvenience rises to the level of a substantial burden. See Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15, 21-22 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that a government program imposed no cognizable burden for the purposes of RFRA despite the plaintiffs' belief that such program violated their free exercise rights); New Doe Child #1 v. United -36- States, 901 F.3d 1015, 1026-27 (8th Cir. 2018) (finding that not all burdens constitute substantial burdens and mere inconvenience does not always amount to a substantial burden); New Doe Child #1 v. Congress of U.S., 891 F.3d 578, 590 (6th Cir. 2018) (finding that a substantial burden must be more than a 'mere inconvenience'); Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (same). Because we find that Perrier-Bilbo failed to establish that the Government imposed a substantial burden on her exercise of religion, our RFRA analysis ends here. 4. Equal Protection Under the Fifth Amendment Claim The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause contains within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013). That Clause prohibits the government from invidiously discriminating between individuals or groups. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)). To establish an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must show that, compared with others similarly situated, the plaintiff was treated differently because of an improper consideration, such as his religion.14 Kuperman 14 We evaluate Fifth Amendment equal protection claims under the same standards as equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, -37- v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69, 77–78 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Tapalian v. Tusino, 377 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004)). Invoking the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantees, Perrier-Bilbo asserts that offering her a separate, private ceremony in which the oath would not contain the phrase so help me God violates the principle that separate . . . facilities are inherently unequal. She equates the accommodations the Government offered her to the segregation policies at issue in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and those struck down in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Despite her efforts, Perrier-Bilbo fails to show that, based on her religion, she was treated differently from other similarly situated prospective citizens with regards to the recital of the naturalization oath. Indeed, the regulation providing the language of the oath does not 'require different treatment of any class of people because of their religious beliefs,' nor does it 'give preferential treatment to any 217-18 (1995); see also United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 n.16 (1987) (noting that the reach of the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment is coextensive with that of the Fourteenth); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) ([The Supreme Court's] approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.). -38- particular religion.' Freedom From Religion Found., 626 F.3d at 14 (quoting Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 283 (1st Cir. 2005)). Rather, as the district court correctly reasoned, the fact that the phrase so help me God makes up part of the oath does not take away from the fact that the regulation applies equally to those who believe in God, those who do not, and those who do not have a belief either way, giving adherents of all persuasions the right to participate or not participate in reciting the naturalization oath. Perrier-Bilbo, 346 F. Supp. 3d at 223 (quoting Freedom From Religion Found., 626 F.3d at 14). The regulation requires all applicants for citizenship, regardless of their religious beliefs, to take the oath. The provision allowing applicants that do not wish to say the phrase so help me God for religious or other reasons to modify the language of the oath, see 8 C.F.R. § 337.1(b), further proves that the regulation applies equally to all applicants. Moreover, Perrier-Bilbo's comparison of the accommodation of a separate, private naturalization ceremony to the kind of segregation policies at issue in Plessy and Brown is inapposite. Unlike those invidious segregation policies and the relegation of black people to separate facilities, designed to keep individuals of different races apart from one another, the private ceremony offered to Perrier-Bilbo was proposed as an -39- accommodation for her religious beliefs, after she expressed that she could not recite the phrase so help me God and did not want others around her to recite it either. The Government is not attempting to segregate her in any way. She is still welcome to attend the public ceremony from which she claims she is excluded and to refrain from speaking, or even engaging with, the phrase her beliefs proscribe. In sum, because the regulation does not create[] different rules for distinct groups of individuals based on a suspect classification, Wirzburger, 412 F.3d at 283, Perrier-Bilbo's equal protection claim fails. 5. Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause Claim Next, invoking the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, Perrier-Bilbo argues that she has a protected liberty interest in not having the law exclude her from the oath ceremony of her choice on the basis of her religious belief. The district court found below that Perrier-Bilbo had failed to establish a procedural due process claim. We agree. Procedural due process guarantees that before a significant deprivation of liberty or property takes place at the state's hands, the affected individual must be forewarned and afforded an opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' González-Droz v. González-Colón, 660 F.3d -40- 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 753 (1st Cir. 1990)). To state a valid procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must (1) 'identify a protected liberty or property interest,' and (2) 'allege that the defendants . . . deprived [her] of that interest without constitutionally adequate process.' Air Sunshine, Inc. v. Carl, 663 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting González-Droz, 660 F.3d at 13). Perrier-Bilbo fails to identify a protected liberty interest at issue here.15 We have not found, and Perrier-Bilbo does not cite, any case law that would entitle her to relief based on her alleged exclusion from the oath ceremony of her choice. While the Supreme Court has not clearly defined liberty in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause context, it has found the term not to be confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 n.11 (1972) (quoting Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499). In the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause context, however, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Id. at 572. Because of the aforementioned parallelism between the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, we look to the Supreme Court's interpretation of 15 In her briefing to this Court, Perrier-Bilbo did not identify or claim that any protected property interest was at play here. -41- liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment context for guidance. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 702 n.3 (1976). The Supreme Court has found that the term liberty denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). Perrier-Bilbo's asserted interest comes within none of those protected areas. A due process claim requires that a 'cognizable liberty or property interest be at stake,' Rivera v. Sessions, 903 F.3d 147, 150–51 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 2006)), and none is present here. Although the Due Process Clause may protect her ability to worship God according to the dictates of [her] own conscience, Roth, 408 U.S. at 572 -- a protection which presumably encapsulates Perrier-Bilbo's right not to worship any god -- the Government has not prevented Perrier-Bilbo from expressing her atheistic religious beliefs. Nor can Perrier-Bilbo claim that the regulation prescribing the oath prohibits her from having a public ceremony during which she does not have to say the phrase so help me God. Rather, the regulations enable her to alter the oath, and the -42- Government has given her alternatives to accommodate her beliefs so that she is comfortable during her ceremony and is able to naturalize. Perrier-Bilbo's actual complaint seems to be that the Government will not change the oath for everyone attending the public ceremony so that no one utters the words to which Perrier-Bilbo objects. Perrier-Bilbo certainly does not have a protected liberty interest in that. Finding no protected liberty or property interest to be implicated, we hold that the district court correctly denied Perrier-Bilbo's procedural due process claim. Our conclusion makes it unnecessary to address whether any deprivation occurred without constitutionally adequate process. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 534 (1st Cir. 1995).