Opinion ID: 575188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment Claims

Text: 17 The district court suppressed appellant's first three statements, but it found no bar to admission of his fourth statement, which was made after he had waived his Miranda rights at the police station. Appellant argues that the fourth statement should have been suppressed as well, since it was clearly influenced by his earlier admissions. 18 In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), the Supreme Court held that a voluntary statement given after Miranda warnings is admissible, notwithstanding prior unwarned statements, so long as the prior unwarned statements were not coerced. Id. at 318, 105 S.Ct. at 1298. The Court held that 19 absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion. A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement. In such circumstances, the finder of fact may reasonably conclude that the suspect made a rational and intelligent choice whether to waive or invoke his rights. 20 Id. at 314, 105 S.Ct. at 1296. 21 Appellant argues that he was faced with a police presence that was intimidating and inherently coercive when he made his second and third statements and that therefore his fourth statement should be suppressed under Oregon v. Elstad. Brief for Appellant at 32. 8 Every post-arrest custodial interrogation by the police is in some sense inherently coercive. Elstad, however, clearly requires more, for if every such interrogation were deemed coercive within the meaning of Elstad, the failure to give Miranda warnings before one statement would always undo a later statement given after such warnings, thereby fatally undermining the rule of Elstad itself. Rather, the Court in Elstad was concerned about actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will, id. at 309, 105 S.Ct. at 1293, coercion of a confession by physical violence or other deliberate means calculated to break the suspect's will, id. at 312, 105 S.Ct. at 1295, and inherently coercive police tactics or methods offensive to due process, id. at 317, 105 S.Ct. at 1297 (emphasis supplied). The district court found no such deliberate police tactics in this case, expressly finding that appellant made his first three statements voluntarily, freely and knowingly. Tr. II at 34. We find nothing in the record to suggest that this finding is in error. 9 22 Nor are we persuaded by appellant's reliance on United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368 (8th Cir.1989), in which the court affirmed the suppression of a post-Miranda confession on the ground that it was tainted by the defendant's prior, unwarned statements. In Carter, postal inspectors interrogated the defendant for an hour and a half, obtaining various incriminating statements from him. Only after the postal inspectors had elicited the incriminating [293 U.S.App.D.C. 224] statements did they inform him of his Miranda rights, whereupon the defendant waived his rights and wrote out a full statement confessing all aspects of his guilt. Id. at 369. 23 The Eighth Circuit rejected the government's argument that the written confession was admissible under Elstad, pointing out that the post-Miranda statement in Elstad was made approximately one hour after the unwarned, suppressed statement, whereas the statement in Carter came directly on the heels of the unwarned confession and was thus part of one continuous interrogation process. Id. at 373. The court also noted that Elstad was not intended to give a green light to law enforcement officers to ignore the requirements of Miranda until after such time as they are able to secure a confession, id. (emphasis in original), thus agreeing with the Carter district court's concern about the police get[ing] practically all [they] want out of a person before [they] ever give them the Miranda rights, id. (internal quotation omitted). The court concluded that Elstad did not go so far as to fashion a rule permitting this sort of end run around Miranda. Id. 24 This case is clearly distinguishable from Carter. Appellant's fourth statement did not come on the heels of his unwarned statements, but was separated, as in Elstad, by almost an hour. Moreover, Officer Stroud did not get practically all [he] wanted out of appellant before administering Miranda warnings. He asked only one improper question and the unwarned statements made in response to that question involved a different subject--the location of additional drugs--from that of appellant's post-Miranda statement which focused on his motive for distributing the illegal drugs. We do not of course sanction the police officers' failure promptly to advise appellant of his Miranda rights following his arrest; we find no evidence, however, of a deliberate end run around Miranda and, consequently, no error in the district court's refusal to suppress appellant's fourth statement.