Opinion ID: 583649
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant hospital.

Text: 53 1. The District Court Properly Applied the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine Evidentiary Framework to Plaintiff's Claims of Discrimination. 54 The McDonnell Douglas/ Burdine formula is the evidentiary framework applicable not only to claims brought under Title VII, but also to claims under ADEA, Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir.1975), to claims of discrimination under Ohio state law, In re Brantley, 34 Ohio App.3d 320, 518 N.E.2d 602 (1987), and to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2378, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989). Therefore, the District Court correctly lumped together Plaintiff's Title VII, ADEA, Section 1981 and Ohio state law theories of discrimination and applied the McDonnell Douglas/ Burdine evidentiary framework in analyzing the factual and legal merits of Plaintiff's claims. 55 2. Plaintiff Failed to Establish a Prima Facie Case of Race Or Age Discrimination. 56 It is well-established that the burden is on an employment discrimination plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1972); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). 57 As the District Court explained, under McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was discharged; (3) she was qualified for the position; and (4) she was replaced by a person outside the class. 4 58 The District Court held that Plaintiff satisfied the first three McDonnell Douglas/ Burdine elements but failed to satisfy the fourth element--i.e., she failed to show that she was replaced by a white or younger person. Therefore, the District Court held that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of either race or age discrimination. 59 Although the District Judge found no prima facie case had been established by Plaintiff because of the lack of the fourth replaced-by-a-'non-protected'-person element of the McDonnell Douglas/ Burdine criteria, a plaintiff can also make out a prima facie case by showing, in addition to the first three elements, that a comparable non-protected person was treated better. 60 As the Sixth Circuit has frequently phrased the requirements of a prima facie claim of disparate treatment using such a comparable non-protected person was treated better element as one of the requisites, the plaintiff must produce evidence which at a minimum establishes (1) that he was a member of a protected class and (2) that for the same or similar conduct he was treated differently than similarly-situated non-minority employees. See e.g., Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110, 109 S.Ct. 3166, 104 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1989); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir.1974). 61 It appears that it is under this formula that Plaintiff here attempted to make out her case. She alleges that one non-minority Hospital employee, Karen Lind, had a poor attendance record. She also alleges that, in 1987, Bobbie Walley, an employee in charge of filing, cursed at her team leader. But neither Lind nor Walley was fired. 62 According to Plaintiff, these facts establish a prima facie case that non-minority employees, guilty of conduct of comparable seriousness to the conduct for which she was fired, received more lenient treatment. 63 However, as the facts of this case demonstrate, Plaintiff's allegations regarding other employees not being fired for different, but what she subjectively believes to be more serious, misconduct simply does not satisfy that element either. 64 It is fundamental that to make a comparison of a discrimination plaintiff's treatment to that of non-minority employees, the plaintiff must show that the comparables are similarly-situated in all respects. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department, 858 F.2d 289 (6th Cir.1988). Thus, to be deemed similarly-situated, the individuals with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare his/her treatment must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them for it. Mazzella v. RCA Global Communications, Inc., 642 F.Supp. 1531 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 814 F.2d 653 (2d Cir.1987); Lanear v. Safeway Grocery, 843 F.2d 298 (8th Cir.1988) (plaintiff must prove that he and the white employee were similarly situated in all respects and that the other employee's acts were of comparable seriousness to his own); Cox v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 751 F.Supp. 680 (E.D.Mich.1990). 65 Plaintiff produced no facts to establish that the two white employees she identified as not having been fired were similarly situated in all respects. Moreover, she did not produce sufficient information about Ms. Lind's alleged absenteeism and Ms. Walley's insubordination to indicate whether the absenteeism and insubordination were of comparable seriousness to the conduct for which Plaintiff was discharged. 5 66 It is now quite well-established that, in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must present affirmative evidence to support his/her position; a mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, supra, 106 S.Ct. at 2510, 2514; Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., supra, 886 F.2d at 1479. 67 Because Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient affirmative evidence to establish that the non-minority employees with whom she compares her treatment were similarly situated in all respects, or that their conduct was of comparable seriousness to the conduct for which she was discharged, no claim for discrimination can be based upon a comparison of Plaintiff's and their treatment. 68 3. The Hospital Articulated a Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reason for Plaintiff's Discharge. 69 The District Court, however, went on to assume arguendo that Plaintiff had established a prima facie case and proceeded with the Burdine burden-shifting framework. 6 The Court found that the Hospital articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff's discharge--misuse of Hospital property. As the District Court noted, the non-discriminatory nature of the Hospital's decision is bolstered by the Affidavit of Donald Currier, the Vice-President of the Hospital's Human Resources Department who was a member of the Review Board that voted to discharge Plaintiff for her actions. In his Affidavit, Currier stated that there was no one similar to Plaintiff who was caught misusing Hospital property who was not discharged and that the decision by the Board to terminate Plaintiff was made without any consideration of her race or age. 70 4. Plaintiff Failed to Establish Pretext. 71 Because the Hospital articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff's termination, to withstand summary judgment, Plaintiff had to establish that the proffered reason was pretextual. 72 As the District Court found, Plaintiff has not met this burden. 73 All that Plaintiff offers to rebut the Hospital's articulated non-discriminatory reason is (1) her hearsay Affidavit that she had heard from some unidentified Hospital employees that at some unspecified point in time two white female employees supposedly had kept medicare and personal checks payable to the Hospital in their desks but were not discharged when this was discovered and (2) her denial that her actions on December 6-9, 1988 constituted misuse of Hospital property. 74 First of all, with regard to Plaintiff's hearsay Affidavit, the District Court correctly found that the Affidavit was not a proper Rule 56(e) affidavit because it was not made on personal knowledge and did not set forth facts that would be admissible into evidence. Even if the Court were to consider the Affidavit, the statements contained therein are nothing more than rumors, conclusory allegations and subjective beliefs which are wholly insufficient evidence to establish a claim of discrimination as a matter of law. See, O'Shea v. Detroit News, 887 F.2d 683 (6th Cir.1989); Simpson v. Midland-Ross Corp., 823 F.2d 937 (6th Cir.1987); Chappell v. GTE Products Corp., 803 F.2d 261, 268 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919, 107 S.Ct. 1375, 94 L.Ed.2d 690 (1987); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir.1984); Locke v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 676 F.2d 205 (6th Cir.1982). 75 With respect to Plaintiff's contention that her denial that her actions on December 5-9, 1988 constituted a misuse of hospital property is sufficient to get to a jury, Plaintiff is mistaken. Courts have repeatedly held that the plaintiff's denial of the defendant's articulated legitimate reason without producing substantiation for the denial is insufficient for a race discrimination claim to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Irvin v. Airco Carbide, 837 F.2d 724 (6th Cir.1987); Ridenour v. Lawson Co., 791 F.2d 52 (6th Cir.1986). 76 Thus, this Court agrees with the District Court--the record in this case reveals no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff's conduct constituted a misuse of hospital property or as to whether Ms. Mitchell told her superiors that the missing forms were locked in her file cabinet.