Opinion ID: 1959182
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Defendant's Past Conduct

Text: Defendant contends that under the guise of penalty-phase rebuttal, the Prosecutor elicited improper testimony of his past conduct. One of the mitigating factors the defense alleged was that McDougald was suffering from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance brought about by the departure of his wife and son. The State therefore sought to show that even prior to the murders McDougald had been acting irrationally, and was even suicidal. In relation to this mental state, as well as the other alleged mitigating factors, defendant called six witnesses. Debra Jones from Mt. Carmel Guild Medical Center testified that defendant came to that facility looking for help because he was having a lot of problems, [] his wife left him, he didn't know what to do, [and] that he tried to commit suicide [by] driving his car into a brick wall.... William Campbell testified that he had witnessed defendant drive his car into a building and then state, Damn it, I can't even kill myself. During cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited testimony to the effect that Mr. Campbell was a neighbor and acquaintance of defendant's wife  a different wife from Bernice Simmons, whose departure purportedly caused the emotional disturbance. Karen Vogel, a hospital social worker, testified to defendant's significant attachment and concern for his premature son. Debra Wilder, a friend of defendant's mother, testified that she encountered the defendant in July of 1984, and that on that occasion he looked wild and scared, believed someone to be following him, and admitted to taking drugs. The defense next called defendant's mother, Shirley McDougald. As previously indicated in the facts, Ms. McDougald testified at length on direct about defendant's troubled childhood. She also testified to defendant's concern for his son, and his distress on learning Bernice Simmons and his son were not going to return from South Carolina. She stated that this caused him to change, that he began to act irrationally (crying, couldn't keep still, all wound up), and that at one point he tried to attack her in her room at the YMCA. On cross-examination, the prosecutor inquired about her assertion that defendant tended to fight in school and on defendant's attempt to harm her. Following this, he ventured into the area of defendant's bigamy, asking Ms. McDougald if she had informed Bernice Simmons that her son was already married. Defense counsel objected to that line of questioning as irrelevant. The State responded that it was relevant to Ms. McDougald's credibility, whether or not [she] was protecting her son by not revealing a marriage that she knew about and allowing him to marry Bernice Simmons knowing that he had already been married. The court allowed the question for this purpose. The final witness for the defense was an acquaintance of the defendant, Donald Winston, who testified that he had been to the defendant's apartment that summer and (1) had seen many candles lit and (2) had heard defendant chanting and (3) had seen him crying over a crib and (4) had told him he had lashed out by breaking a television. The State then called four rebuttal witnesses, one of whom was Bernice Simmons. Bernice Simmons testified about her fear of her husband, his threats against her and her family and his prior violent behavior. Her testimony rebutted the defense's assertion  communicated through its witnesses  that McDougald was a changed man the summer he killed the Basses. Bernice had, by her own account, always been afraid of Anthony McDougald. She testified that she married him out of fear because he had told her he had rape charges pending against him in Japan. After denying defense counsel's motion for a mistrial and over defense counsel's objections the Court gave a limiting instruction regarding use of the rape charge in Japan. Although, unlike Rose, defendant did not present direct character evidence, these instances of misconduct may be found to have legitimately related both to the change (or absence thereof) in defendant's personality subsequent to the departure of his family, and to demonstrating bias on the part of his mother. In Rose, extensive evidence of the defendant's past conduct was revealed during the penalty phase, including his racially-motivated purchase of a shotgun and threats to use it, incidents of misconduct in school, in the service, and in jail, and numerous acts of physical violence directed at girlfriends. We noted that to the extent this information was relevant and admissible, it was for a limited purpose. The Court observed the appropriateness of a limiting instruction in such a situation, and further commanded the jury to consider only those aggravating factors specified by statute in the penalty phase of a capital case. State v. Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 506-07, 548 A. 2d 1058. The Court stated that [i]n the penalty phase of a capital case, the function of the jury has been sharply defined by the Legislature.    The jury is not permitted, in its weighing process, to add other evidence of defendant's past conduct to the weight it assigns to the aggravating factors, nor to consider other evidence of defendant's past conduct, except to the extent offered to rebut mitigating factors, as detracting from the weight it assigns to the mitigating factors. [ Id. at 507-8, 548 A. 2d 1058]. Because the trial court had failed to instruct the jury of the limited purpose for which it could consider the abundant evidence of defendant's past conduct, the Court could not conclude that it was not improperly factored into the weighing process. The Court held that in the face of that evidence and because that was a capital proceeding, the necessity for a careful and precise limiting instruction to this jury was clear and compelling, and that its omission was prejudicial beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 508, 548 A. 2d 1058. In this case we find that the trial court also should have instructed the jury that to the extent that the information was relevant and admissible, it was for a limited purpose. At the new sentencing procedure, therefore, the trial court should give proper limiting instructions with respect to these comments about defendant's past conduct, and should further caution the jury to consider only those aggravating factors specified by statute in the penalty phase of a capital case.