Opinion ID: 62880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Slander Claim

Text: McCray argues that the district court erred in dismissing her claim that Howard violated her procedural due process rights by making defamatory statements about her in a press conference that were intended to disgrace her and 8 causing her to temporarily lose her job. “‘The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.’” Behrens v. Regier, 422 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2705 (1972)). Specifically, the Supreme Court has instructed that injury to reputation, by itself, does not constitute the deprivation of a liberty or property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Paul, 424 U.S. at 701-02, 712, 96 S. Ct. at 1161, 1166. In order to fall within the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause, a plaintiff must establish more than a mere defamation claim. Id. at 706, 96 S. Ct. at 1163. In Paul, the Supreme Court established the “stigma-plus” test, which requires that “a plaintiff claiming a deprivation based on defamation by the government must establish the fact of the defamation ‘plus’ the violation of some more tangible interest before the plaintiff is entitled to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause.” Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 701-02, 96 S. Ct. at 1161). In summarizing the requirements of the “stigma-plus” test, this Court has stated that “‘[t]o establish a liberty interest sufficient to implicate the fourteenth 9 amendment safeguards, the individual must be not only stigmatized but also stigmatized in connection with a denial of a right or status previously recognized under state law.’” Smith ex rel. Smith v. Siegelman, 322 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Cannon, 250 F.3d at 1302-03). “In order to establish that a deprivation of a public employee’s liberty interest has occurred without due process of law, the employee must prove that: (1) a false statement (2) of a stigmatizing nature (3) attending a governmental employee’s discharge (4) was made public (5) by the governmental employer (6) without a meaningful opportunity for employee name clearing.” Cannon, 250 F.3d at 1301. McCray challenges the district court’s determination that she had not been discharged and had not alleged any other “plus” violation of a tangible interest. McCray argues the three-and-one-half months she missed work following the March 31, 2006 incident constituted a “constructive termination.” Assuming, as the district court did, that McCray has a protected interest in her job, she still fails to explain how a temporary leave of absence from work constitutes a deprivation of a state-recognized liberty or property interest. See Cannon, 250 F.3d at 1303 (“[I]n this circuit a discharge or more is required in order to satisfy the ‘plus’ element of the stigma-plus test. A transfer or a missed promotion is not enough.” (quotation marks omitted)). Further, McCray has also failed to allege: (1) that she 10 was stigmatized “in connection with” a change in her employment status, because McCray alleged in her complaint that she missed work because of her physical injuries, not because of Howard’s alleged defamatory statements; or (2) that Howard, the Fulton County District Attorney, was her employer. Thus, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of McCray’s slander claim. AFFIRMED. 11