Opinion ID: 4564398
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the apa’s waiver of sovereign immunity is

Text: BROAD, BUT IT IS SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. Because the SEC’s subpoenas have harmed his businesses, Gentile sues the SEC to challenge the legitimacy of its investigation. But the United States and its agencies are generally immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). And absent congressional authorization – through an unequivocal statutory waiver – it is “unquestioned” that the federal government retains sovereign immunity. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999); see also FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 290 (2012) (“We have said on many occasions that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be ‘unequivocally expressed’ in statutory text.”). A statutory waiver of sovereign immunity thus defines the scope of a “court’s jurisdiction to 7 entertain the suit.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); see also Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475. In light of that jurisdictional limitation, Gentile attempts to bring claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 702. As originally enacted, § 702 did not contain an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity.6 Instead, it imposed a ‘statutory standing’ requirement on judicial review, which, as amended, provides that: A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Statutory standing under § 702 depends on agency action. To have such standing, a person must suffer a legal wrong because of agency action or, under the zone-of-interests test, a person must be “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.” 6 See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 10(a), 60 Stat. 237, 243 (June 11, 1946); see also Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378, 392 (Sept. 6, 1966) (codifying the provision at 5 U.S.C. § 702). 8 5 U.S.C. § 702; Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).7 The 1976 amendments to the APA supplemented § 702. The added text explicitly waived sovereign immunity to sue the United States for “relief other than money damages”: An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party. Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721, 2721 (Oct. 21, 1976); see also 5 U.S.C. § 702. To ensure that that broad waiver of sovereign immunity did not overtake pre-existing limitations on judicial review, the 1976 amendments conditioned the waiver through two provisos: Nothing herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground; or (2) confers authority to grant relief if any other 7 See also Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 395-96 (1987); Shalom Pentecostal Church v. Acting Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 783 F.3d 156, 163-64 (3d Cir. 2015). 9 statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought. Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721, 2721 (Oct. 21, 1976); see also 5 U.S.C. § 702. Putting the pieces together, to proceed under the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity a person must (i) possess statutory standing; (ii) seek relief other than money damages; and (iii) not be excluded by the waiver’s two provisos. As a further limitation, two exceptions apply to the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985) (“[B]efore any review at all may be had, a party must first clear the hurdle of [5 U.S.C.] § 701(a).”). Under the first exception, the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply when “statutes preclude judicial review,” either for an entire subject matter8 or for a specific class of persons.9 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). The second exception 8 See Dunlop v. Backowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1975) (requiring evidence that Congress meant to preclude “all judicial review” of a decision of the Secretary of Labor); see also Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 543-45 (1988) (reversing a determination that a statute, 38 U.S.C. § 211(a), precluded review of a claim to extend the period for obtaining veterans education benefits); Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 779-80 (1985) (declining preclusion because the statute did not bar judicial review of all aspects of civil service claims for disability). 9 See, e.g., Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 34548 (1984) (interpreting the Agricultural Marketing Adjustment 10 prevents judicial review of “agency action [that] is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).