Opinion ID: 1465501
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The warrant was sufficiently specific.

Text: Specificity has two aspects: particularity and breadth. Particularity is the requirement that the warrant must clearly state what is sought. Breadth deals with the requirement that the scope of the warrant be limited by the probable cause on which the warrant is based. United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir.2006) (citation omitted). The prohibition of general searches is not ... a demand for precise ex ante knowledge of the location and content of evidence ... The proper metric of sufficient specificity is whether it was reasonable to provide a more specific description of the items at that juncture of the investigation. United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 716 (9th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). The warrant in this matter sought evidence that Banks was engaged in the production and transmission of child pornography. In doing so, it limited its range to items containing a connection to child pornography, child erotica, or minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct as defined by statute. This description was sufficiently particular to overcome Banks's argument that the items to be seized were not specifically identified. Id. Banks's contention that the warrant's lack of a time frame rendered it insufficiently particular is unpersuasive because the record and affidavit do not demonstrate knowledge on the part of the government that the illegal conduct was limited to any particular time frame. Cf. United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 427 (9th Cir.1995) (invalidating a warrant where the affidavit indicated that the criminal activity began at a specific time period but the warrant was not limited to a particular time frame). Banks's final suggestion that the warrant was insufficiently particular because it did not specifically seek to recover the videos known to have been transmitted and because it failed to identify the name of the internet chat room that Banks moderated also fails. Although the government may have known the name of certain files that supported the finding of probable cause, there is no requirement that the warrant be tailored to obtain only that evidence already known to exist. In fact, this heightened limitation has been specifically rejected. See Meek, 366 F.3d at 716. Banks also challenges the breadth of the warrant, asserting that the items seized could have been described more specifically and that the warrant should have excluded a search of Banks's home-based business. The affidavit submitted in support of the warrant in this case explained that computer storage devices . .. can store the equivalent of thousands of pages of information. It also noted that a user wanting to conceal evidence often stores it in random order with deceptive file names. The affidavit then stated that searching computers for criminal evidence is a highly technical process requiring expert skill and a properly controlled environment. Finally, the affidavit provided evidence that computers at the Banks's residence had been used to obtain and transfer child pornography. [N]o more specific description of the computer equipment sought was possible, United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir.2000) (citation and footnote reference omitted), because there was no way to know where the offending images had been stored. Further, the affidavit explained why it was necessary to seize the entire computer system in order to examine the electronic data for contraband, id., and the warrant did not authorize[ ] seizure of every document, but of child pornography which is a sufficiently specific definition to focus the search. Id. at 638 (footnote reference omitted). A generalized seizure of business documents may be justified if it is demonstrated that the government could not reasonably segregate .. . documents on the basis of whether or not they were likely to evidence criminal activity. Kow, 58 F.3d at 427, 428 (citations omitted). A full reading of the affidavit in this matter reveals that no more limited search would have been feasible, even if the evidence of Banks's home business had been more fully set forth. As in Meek, the warrant here did not authorize `the seizure of virtually every document and computer file' without indicating how items were related to the suspected crime. 366 F.3d at 715 (citation omitted) (distinguishing Kow ). Rather, the warrant sought only evidence of child pornography and appropriately limited its search and seizure provisions to attain this objective. See id. at 715-16. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Banks's motion to suppress.