Opinion ID: 2545785
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instructions Defining Extenuating Circumstances

Text: A standard instruction (CALJIC No. 8.88) told the jury how to weigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence offered at the penalty phase. The instruction defined a mitigating circumstance as any fact, condition or event which, as such, does not constitute a justification or excuse for the crime in question, but may be considered as an extenuating circumstance in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty. (Italics added.) During its deliberations, the jury asked, We, the jury, in the above entitled action, request the following: Exact definition of extenuating circumstances. After consulting with counsel, the trial court gave this written answer: Extenuating circumstances: Such as render a crime less aggravated, heinous, or reprehensible than it would otherwise be, or tend to lessen its guilt. Such circumstances may ordinarily be shown in order to reduce the punishment. Extenuation: That which renders a crime less heinous than it would be without it. It is opposed to aggravation. The source for these two definitions was Black's Law Dictionary. (See Black's Law Dict. (5th ed.1979) p. 524.) Defendant now challenges the definitions given by the trial court in answer to the jury's question. The Attorney General argues that he is barred from doing so by the doctrine of invited error, noting that the trial court told the jury that we decided on the definitions (italics added), referring to the court, the prosecutor and defense counsel, and the prosecutor later stated (without contradiction from the defense) that both parties approved the court's answer. The doctrine of invited error bars a defendant from challenging an instruction given by the trial court when the defendant has made a conscious and deliberate tactical choice to request the instruction. ( People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 658, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80; see also People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 38, fn. 14, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 831, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865.) Our cases do not address, however, whether a defendant's approval of a court's instruction, as occurred here, is equivalent to a request. It is also unclear from the record whether in this case defendant's approval of the trial court's definitions of extenuation and extenuating circumstances was the result of a conscious and deliberate tactical choice. But we need not decide whether the doctrine of invited error bars defendant's challenge, because, as we shall explain, we find that the court properly answered the jury's question. Defendant complains that the trial court's definitions of extenuation and extenuating circumstances were inaccurate because they did not tell the jury that mitigating evidence not directly related to the crime itself, such as defendant's character, his history, and his accomplishments, could be considered in determining punishment. But the jurors' question did not indicate that they were confused about whether they could consider defendant's mitigating evidence; they merely asked the trial court to define the term extenuating circumstances. The jury had no reason to be confused about whether it could consider defendant's mitigating evidence, for the trial court had instructed the jury that among the factors to be considered in weighing the evidence was this: Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial. (Italics added.) Thus, the jury was aware it could consider defendant's mitigating evidence even if it did not believe that the evidence extenuated the gravity of the murders he committed. Defendant argues the trial court's definition of extenuation was wrong because, by stating that extenuation was opposed to aggravation, the court effectively defined mitigation as the opposite of aggravation. This juxtaposition, he claims, is inaccurate because mitigation is open-ended (that is, the jury is free to consider any evidence to be mitigating), while the jury may consider evidence as aggravating only if it is relevant to an aggravating factor listed in section 190.3. We are not persuaded that the court's definition of extenuation would have caused any confusion by the jury as to whether it could consider aggravating evidence not mentioned in section 190.3. The trial court gave the jury a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.85, a standard instruction describing the aggravating and mitigating factors the jury could consider in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. We find nothing in the court's definition of the word extenuation that would have caused the jury to disregard this instruction.