Opinion ID: 1789110
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: degoode's testimony

Text: In May 1953 DeGoode was living at Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. John Azzone and the defendant, Lupino, whom DeGoode had known for a number of years, met with him to discuss a contemplated crime. They then left, returning in early August 1953 with Fred Mussehl and Anthony DeVito. The five of them burglarized a safe at Aynor, South Carolina, located about 30 miles from Myrtle Beach. Shortly thereafter, all five were arrested and charged with the offense. DeVito and Mussehl gave written statements to the South Carolina police officers in which they admitted the Aynor burglary and asserted that Azzone, DeGoode, and Lupino had participated. All were released on bond. It was agreed between Lupino, Azzone, and DeGoode that DeVito and Mussehl, having given the written statements, would probably testify against them in the anticipated criminal proceedings in South Carolina and that, to prevent this, it would be necessary to kill them. DeGoode was in the Twin Cities again on or about September 23, 1953, and while here, discussed with Lupino and Azzone the possibility of having Mussehl set DeVito up for a killing. But DeVito was wary. On September 25, 1953, DeGoode, Lupino, Azzone, and Sam Cimin kidnaped one John O'Hara, who operated a tavern in Minneapolis, as he was about to enter his home and, taking him back to his bar, forced him to turn over the contents of a safe to them. On Sunday, September 27, 1953, DeGoode, Lupino, Azzone, and Cimin went to the Italian Village, then run by Joseph Forese, on Kellogg Boulevard in downtown St. Paul. While there, defendant went to the telephone and reported that he was talking to a Tony Legatto. Between midnight and 1 a.m. they left the Italian Village and drove to the vicinity of Jack's Lounge and Cafe on West Seventh Street where it was observed that DeVito and Legatto were in the restaurant. They then parked their car and waited for them to come out. When they did, and as they walked past the car which the four men were using, DeVito was seized. DeGoode put a pistol in his back and Cimin gagged him. Legatto, who had been walking down the street with DeVito, said, that's it, Rock and left without interference. Sam Cimin put a sash cord in DeVito's mouth to prevent him from calling for help. They got into the car, Azzone and Cimin holding DeVito in the back seat, Lupino driving, and DeGoode in the front seat on the passenger side. Ultimately they came to a place east of St. Paul by a deserted house and near a swamp. DeVito was taken out of the car. A box containing two shovels and a carton of lye was also removed. Lupino and Azzone dug a ditch. DeVito, disrobed, was told to lie down. He did so. Then Cimin, at the end aided by Lupino, tightened a rope around his neck with a twisting stick, thus terminating his life. DeVito's body was placed in the ditch and covered with the lye. The hole was filled and, to discourage dogs, the surface of the new ground was covered with red pepper. The living four then retired, tearing up and casting away DeVito's garments as they returned to the city. DeGoode left St. Paul immediately, arriving in South Carolina again on Tuesday, September 29, where he received a call from defendant stating that things were hot in the Twin Cities and that he was coming to South Carolina. Lupino arrived at the Charleston airport with Azzone on September 30, 1953. Mussehl came to Columbia, South Carolina, on October 2, 1953. DeGoode, Lupino, and Azzone met him there. He assured them, DeVito now being dead, that he would not testify against them. In the early morning hours of Saturday, October 3, DeGoode, Lupino, and Azzone burglarized the safe of a beer distributor in Charleston, South Carolina. The three of them were arrested that same day on account of this burglary. It was finally agreed among them that DeGoode, Lupino, and Azzone would plead guilty to the Aynor job. They were sentenced to 5 years. Mussehl also pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a term of 3 years. All four were sent to the South Carolina State Prison at Columbia. On January 28, 1958, DeGoode, still confined in prison, was interviewed by Lieutenant Ralph Merrill of the St. Paul Police Department. Thereafter, Lupino, also jailed there, contacted DeGoode approximately a dozen times inquiring what he was going to do and what he had told Lieutenant Merrill and pleading that he should not expose defendant. In June 1958, DeGoode, Lupino, and Azzone were indicted for unlawful flight to avoid prosecution for kidnaping and murder by a Federal grand jury in St. Paul, Minnesota. DeGoode pleaded guilty and testified against Lupino and Azzone in the Federal District Court. He was in the custody of the Federal marshal from June 1958 until the time of this trial. It is evident that the testimony of DeGoode, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to support its verdict of guilty with respect to Lupino. In State v. Mathiasen, 267 Minn. 393, 127 N.W. (2d) 534, the Minnesota decisions pertaining to the statutory requirements of corroboration were reviewed and it was pointed out that the corroborating evidence, to be sufficient, must affirm the truth of the accomplice's testimony and point to the guilt of the defendant in some substantial degree. Relevant facts corroborative in character include participation in the preparation for the criminal act; opportunity and motive; proximity of the defendant to the place where the crime was committed under unusual circumstances; and association with persons involved in the crime in such a way as to suggest joint participation. We find adequate corroboration in testimony from which the jury could find: (a) DeVito did in fact confess to the Aynor robbery and give a written statement to the South Carolina police implicating Lupino, Azzone, and DeGoode. (b) Lupino did state that DeVito would have to be killed because of his anticipated testimony. (c) DeVito did in fact disappear on September 28, 1953, never to be seen again. (d) On the morning of Monday, September 28, 1953, Lupino was in possession of a 1950 Dodge automobile owned by Anthony Petrangelo, who had been using Lupino's brightly colored car on the weekend of September 26-27. When DeVito was last seen shortly after leaving Heinie's Bar at about 1 a.m. on the morning of September 28, 1953, he was standing beside this same Dodge automobile. (The testimony that Lupino was in possession of this car, separated from DeVito by only 5 hours in time, if accepted by the jury, became even more significant when Lupino denied that he had the car and claimed that he was home in bed when, according to the witness John Potter, he delivered it at 6 a.m. on the morning of the 28th to Potter's service station to be washed.) (e) Lupino boarded an airplane at Rochester, Minnesota, on September 29, 1953, to fly to South Carolina. The jury was free to accept or reject his explanation of having chosen Rochester as a point of departure because he had been referred to a man living there as a possible source of a loan. It seems more probable that the jury concluded, in light of the fact that Legatto was arrested on September 29, that Lupino left from Rochester rather than from the Twin Cities airport in order to avoid interrogation or apprehension. Other testimony in the record, although less directly corroborative, lends general credence to DeGoode's gruesome recitation. For example, witnesses related a marked change in Lupino's attitude toward DeGoode after it became known that Lieutenant Merrill had interviewed DeGoode in person in the month of January 1958. Again, the similarity between John O'Hara's recitation of the events of the kidnaping of September 25, 1953, as he, the victim, recalled them and the circumstances as related by DeGoode, one of the participants in the crime, makes believable DeGoode's testimony about the occurrence of the incident and his association with Lupino, Azzone, and Cimin at that time. 3. We have concluded that neither the State nor Federal constitutional rights of defendant were violated in connection with the proceedings which resulted in his conviction, and that the interests of justice do not require another trial in this case. 3a. A motion for change of venue was made before the trial judge on March 8, 1960  2 days before the trial was scheduled to commence. The motion was based upon the ground that newspaper articles which had been written about the case, and television and radio coverage preceding the trial, prevented a consideration of the criminal charge in an atmosphere of fairness. Particular objection is made to the fact that news broadcasts on television and radio asserted a link between the defendant Lupino and the notorious Mafia. A man experienced in the field of radio and newspaper work was called as a witness by defendant in support of his motion for a change of venue, but objection to a question which sought to develop his opinion as to whether defendant would have a fair and impartial trial in Ramsey County was sustained and the opinion, whatever it may have been, was not received. In addition, a local television and radio station carried a program based on the theme that the body of DeVito might be located with the aid of a Dutch clairvoyant. After the trial commenced, defendant's counsel requested the court to either change the venue, insulate the jury, or grant a mistrial because of the increased newspaper publicity, radio and television broadcasts, and the like. It is unnecessary to repeat what has been so recently outlined in State v. Thompson, 266 Minn. 385, 123 N.W. (2d) 378, where attention was called to those recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court emphasizing that the right of an individual to a fair trial is not to be undermined by the unrestrained exercise of the rights and privileges of press, radio, and television. It is not claimed in this case, however, that the extraordinary publicity given the trial included dissemination of pretrial opinions of responsible public authorities intimating the guilt of the defendant as in the Thompson case. The matter was carefully considered by the trial court, and the claims of the defendant with respect to the possibility of a fair trial were objectively evaluated as indicated by these comments appearing in the transcript: The Constitution of our state as well as the United States and the laws of Minnesota guarantee each defendant a fair and impartial trial, and this Court agrees that if a fair trial cannot be had in the County in which the crime has been committed, then it is the duty of the Court to transfer the venue of this action or any action to such county in which a fair trial can be had. However, the Court must be careful in reviewing the evidence to find that there is a reasonable showing that the public has been inflamed or has been wrought up because of the publicity on radio programs or [through] whatever media the dissemination might be [effected], and upon a review of all of this evidence, this Court is of the opinion that no such inflammatory result is apparent.    Safeguards are provided by law for challenges and other defenses   . The Court is doubtful that any corner of the state could be selected at the present time which would insure less publicity than that already apparent, and the daily coverage of TV, radio, and newspaper, as just stated, covers every corner of the state, and before the trial would get underway in any jurisdiction, such coverage would, perhaps, be as complete as it is in our local area at the present time. In arriving at this conclusion, the trial court was impressed by a report of a survey of the citizens of Ramsey and Washington Counties and the suburban area, in which it was found out not one person in 10 who were contacted had a working knowledge of the details of the main events of this particular crime. Despite the plea of the participants of the program, Behind the Parade, to the public for their participation and cooperation in the assistance of law enforcements, the record discloses that not one in 10 of the persons in the area in which the body is    allegedly buried    [is informed] as to details leading up to the present time in connection with this crime. Recognizing as we do the importance of protecting the right of a defendant to be tried in court rather than by public opinion conditioned by publicity media, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a change of venue, confinement of the jury, or a mistrial in this case. Refusal to accept opinion testimony on the legal issue was not error. 3b. A petition was filed in behalf of defendant with the trial court for an order requiring that Sheriff John Henry of Conway, South Carolina, and one James Leathers, an inmate of Alcatraz Penitentiary, Alcatraz, California, be made available in St. Paul as witnesses for the defense. In our opinion neither Minn. St. 634.06 nor State and Federal constitutional provisions impose upon the state an obligation to procure witnesses for the defendant who are living outside of the territorial limits of the state, and therefore, beyond the reach of its process. There may be circumstances where the presence of an out-of-state witness whose testimony could be determinative of the innocence of the defendant can be secured with reasonable facility at the time of trial. It is to be assumed that in such an instance arrangements would be made to secure the presence of the vital witness if it is possible to do so. No such showing was made in this case and, therefore, this problem is not before us. 3c. Before beginning cross-examination of the state's principal witness, DeGoode, defendant's attorney stated: MR. CONNOLLY: In my cross-examination I would like to make a motion at this time to have available all statements Mr. DeGoode has given to the FBI, the Ramsey County Sheriff's office, the St. Paul Police, and his statement for the purpose of strictly of impeachment. THE COURT: Well, I don't know whether I can give you that service or not, Counsel. Those are confidential files of a law enforcement officer. There has been no evidence of the contents of those statements in evidence except that he gave his statement. Of course, you can resort to your own methods of impeachment, but I don't believe I could force the FBI or the police department [to] let you examine their file for the purpose of possible impeachment. Appreciate my position? MR. CONNOLLY: Yes, I would like to ask for them though. In number 3f of this opinion there will be discussion of a statement of the witness, DeGoode, which was received in evidence. Apart from this, we do not find in the record any point at which the attorney for the defendant moved the court for an order directing that a specific person be required to produce a specific statement given by the witness being cross-examined so that such statement could be examined by the trial court to ascertain whether it contained impeaching material. There is nothing in the record before us which makes it possible to determine whether it was within the power of the trial court to compel production of such a statement and, if so, whether the statement, if produced, would contain impeaching data of sufficient significance to make the absence of it prejudicial to the defendant. We conclude, therefore, that error is not made to appear on this ground. 3d. During the trial reference was made to the fact that defendant was involved in a burglary in Aynor, South Carolina, in August 1953; that he helped rob a gambler in Minneapolis; and that he participated in the robbery of one John O'Hara in Minneapolis a few days before the alleged kidnaping. Reference to the robbery in Aynor, South Carolina, was justified because it was DeVito's confession of it involving Lupino, DeGoode, and Azzone which motivated the kidnaping. The testimony with respect to the robbery of John O'Hara occurring on or about September 25, 1953, related by DeGoode and confirmed by O'Hara, was relevant and admissible because the same persons participated in it as those who allegedly participated in the kidnaping of September 28, 1953  i.e., Lupino, DeGoode, Azzone, and Cimin  and because it was done at a time and in a way having evidentiary significance in this case. See, State v. Elli, 267 Minn. 185, 125 N.W. (2d) 738. Evidence as to the third robbery would not have been admissible ordinarily, but defendant cannot claim prejudice considering the circumstances under which this testimony developed. The record shows that the following occurred as DeGoode was examined: Q Did you have occasion to come to the Twin City area after John and Rock left from Florence? A Yes, he called me that he had a score up here, and I came up on the plane, and we got the guy. MR. CONNOLLY: I will ask that the witness only ask the question  THE COURT: All right. MR. CONNOLLY: Answer the question. BY MR. RANDALL: Q Do you recall the time that you came? A No, I can't name the time, no. Q Do you recall how long you stayed? A I just stayed a day or two that time.