Opinion ID: 852100
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Concerned Citizen Tip

Text: Courts across this country evaluate the quality of information depending on if it was from a professional or criminal informant, or if it was from a cooperative citizen who witnessed or fell victim to a crime. We have addressed the issue in Pawloski v. State, 269 Ind. 350, 380 N.E.2d 1230 (1978). Reliability of the professional informant or anonymous tipster generally must be established by reference to underlying facts and circumstances which indicate that the information is trustworthy. Id. at 354, 380 N.E.2d at 1232. Our requirement for corroboration is necessitated because this type of information may be unreliable or self-serving, especially if given in return for favors such as money or leniency in possible criminal prosecution. Id. On the other hand, we recognize a concerned citizen tip is different. This tip is made up of people who may have been victims of crime or have witnessed a crime. Id. These individuals generally come forward with information out of a spirit of good citizenship and a desire to help law enforcement. Id. Some jurisdictions have therefore held informants of this type are considered more reliable. Id. In Kellems, we again reaffirmed our belief that there may well be great indicia of reliability in the report of the `concerned citizen' as distinguished from the `professional informant'though again the totality of the circumstances controls. 842 N.E.2d at 356. These concerned citizens are usually one-time informants, and no basis exists from prior contacts to determine their reliability, such as in the case of an undercover police informant. Kellems, 842 N.E.2d at 356. The present case deals with a concerned citizen's tip to police. Although the concerned citizen in the case before us gave his name to the 911 dispatch operator, we can also analogize this case with cases involving an anonymous tip. The federal standard of anonymous tip validity was set forth in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). The United States Supreme Court found the anonymous tip in that case did provide reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. The Court reasoned, What was important was the caller's ability to predict [White's] future behavior, because it demonstrated inside informationa special familiarity with [White's] affairs. The general public would have had no way of knowing that [White] would shortly leave the building, get into the described car, and drive the most direct route to Dobey's Motel. Because only a small number of people are generally privy to an individual's itinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe that a person with access to such information is likely to also have access to reliable information about that individual's illegal activities. White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412. Thus, in White, the factors upholding the anonymous tip were the officers' observations that validated the information received, substantiating the reasonable suspicion requirement. In Kellems, we found the United States Supreme Court held that such tips from an identified informant may be sufficiently reliable to justify an investigatory stop. Kellems, 842 N.E.2d at 355. Terry stops have a limited scope and purpose, not to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.... Id. (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)). As we wrote then, since reasonable suspicion is all that is necessary to support a Terry stop and it `is a less demanding standard than probable cause ... [t]he Fourth Amendment requires [only] some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.' Kellems, 842 N.E.2d at 355 (alterations in original) (quoting White, 496 U.S. at 329-330, 110 S.Ct. 2412). In Indiana, the Court of Appeals has held that an anonymous tip, or a tip from an unidentified informant, can supply information that gives police reasonable suspicion. Bogetti v. State, 723 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000). Furthermore, [a] tip will be deemed reliable when an individual provides specific information to police officers such as a vehicle description. Id. In Bogetti, several police officers were dining at a McDonald's restaurant. Id. at 877. During the meal, a man approached one of the officers and informed him that another individual, Bogetti, had just exited the restaurant, drove away in a white semi, and may be intoxicated. Id. at 877-78. Immediately thereafter, the officers left the restaurant and began to follow the white semi. Id. at 878. The officers stopped Bogetti and smelled alcohol on his breath. Id. After conducting field sobriety tests, Bogetti was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated. Id. The Court of Appeals held that facts possessed by the Officers gave rise to the reasonable suspicion that the truck was being operated by an impaired driver and were sufficient to sustain the legality of the investigatory stop. Id. at 879. Although we do not believe this case involves an anonymous tip, we still reach the same conclusion through the Bogetti analysisthe tip was enough to permit a brief Terry stop. Davies provided independent indicia of reliability. He provided the color and make of the vehicle, at the location the police arrived, at a time of night with minimal vehicular traffic, and importantly, the police officer arrived almost immediately after the 911 dispatch. Because we believe Davies's tip provided enough independent reliability, we need not rely on Renzulli's future behavior. Similar to the officers in Bogetti failing to stop and question the unidentified informant, the officers in the present case did not speak with Davies. However, the circumstances of this case warranted an immediate response by the police for the safety of the general public, as well as for the safety of Renzulli herself. There are legitimate State concerns in deterring driving while intoxicated. Bogetti, 723 N.E.2d at 878 (citing State v. Garcia, 500 N.E.2d 158, 161 (Ind. 1986)). [T]he average number of deaths per year for the last ten (10) years attributable to drunk drivers in the United States is 25,000. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that the current state of affairs has resulted in such terrible carnage wreaked upon society by drunk drivers that the slaughter exceeds that of all our wars. Garcia, 500 N.E.2d at 161 (citing South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983)). The U.S. Supreme Court revisited the dangers of drunk driving in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990). It pointed out that over 25,000 deaths, one million injuries, and $5 billion worth of property damage is caused by drunk driving every year. Id. at 451, 110 S.Ct. 2481.