Opinion ID: 815370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Right of Access is Distinct from

Text: the Right to Free Speech Before proceeding further, we note that the word “access” may cause some consternation.8 Much of First 8 The plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), recognized this potential issue and noted that the name of the right was immaterial — the distinction lay in what the right protected: It is not crucial whether we describe this right to attend criminal trials to hear, see, and communicate observations concerning them as a „right of access‟ or a „right to gather information,‟ for we have recognized that 13 Amendment jurisprudence is couched in the language of access. For example, when addressing traditional issues of free speech on government property, courts apply the wellestablished forum analysis (where the essential formulation is whether the government may restrict “access” to a particular forum). See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-46 (1982) (discussing the constitutional difference between restriction on access to public and nonpublic fora in the language of a “right of access to public property”). Importantly, we do not address here limitations on access to a forum for speech purposes; indeed, we are not concerned here with expressive conduct or speech at all. (Appellant conceded as much at the beginning of oral argument.) Rather, our focus is on access to information.9 „without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.‟ Id. at 576 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting, among others, Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681). 9 Likewise, we do not address here the right to listen — a concept analogous to, but still distinct from the right at issue in this case. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976); see also Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and not buyers.”). The right to listen is derivative of an individual‟s right to speak, for the Supreme Court has held that “where a [willing] speaker exists . . . the protection afforded is to the communication, to 14 Thus, we do not believe that the traditional forum analysis is apposite here. If we were to apply such a framework, the government would be free to shut down nonpublic fora completely, thereby hiding any activities behind a veil of secrecy.10 It cannot be that the First Amendment would its source and to its recipients both.” Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 756 (footnote omitted). Our own jurisprudence likewise maintains that “where one enjoys a right to speak, others hold a „reciprocal right to receive‟ that speech, which „may be asserted‟ in court.” Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2007) (“In determining standing, the right to listen depends entirely on the infringement on the rights of a willing speaker.”). Interestingly, while courts have sometimes cast the right to listen in the mold of “the media‟s right to gather news,” see, e.g., Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1988), that is merely a matter of semantics — those cases still dealt with questions of speech and the forum analysis. 10 We take this opportunity to make explicit that which has been implicit in our preceding discussion: A polling place is a nonpublic forum. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 201-06 (plurality) (discussing the history of voting and the longevolving pattern of laws limiting expression in and access to the polling place); id. at 216 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is doctrinally less confusing to acknowledge that the environs of a polling place, on election day, are simply not a „traditional public forum‟ — which means that they are subject to speech restrictions that are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”); Marlin v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 236 F.3d 716 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The forum here, the interior of a polling place, is neither a traditional public forum nor a governmentdesignated one. It is not available for general public 15 countenance such a course of action. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979) (“A free press cannot be made to rely solely upon the sufferance of government to supply it with information.”).11 discourse of any sort.” (citing Burson, 504 U.S. at 201-06)); see also United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1099 v. City of Sidney, 364 F.3d 738, 749-50 (6th Cir. 2004); Cotz v. Mastroeni, 476 F. Supp. 2d 332, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Polling places clearly are non-public fora and voters present are subject to various First Amendment restrictions, including those based on content.”). Despite Appellant‟s conclusory statement in its Amended Complaint that “[a] polling place is a traditional public forum under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,” (App. at 80a), the weight of precedent holds that it is not. Moreover, Appellant can point to no conduct on the part of the Commonwealth — neither in its policy nor its practice — that would suggest an intent to designate the polling place otherwise. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (O‟Connor, J.) (noting that “[t]he government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse”). 11 As our discussion above should make clear: the right of access is distinct from the right to free speech. Thus, where the First Amendment does not protect a right of access to a particular proceeding, this fact has no bearing on any constitutional protections for expressive speech at the same proceeding. For instance, even if we find no constitutional protection for a right of access to the polling place, this would not absolve courts from undertaking a traditional forum analysis in determining whether an individual has the right to speak inside of the polling place. 16 For this reason, we consider Appellant‟s citation to cases such as Munro, which focused on exit-polling, to be of little help. Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir. 1988). The act of exit-polling has been held by our sister circuits to constitute protected expressive speech. See, e.g., id. at 384 (“The media plaintiffs‟ exit polling constitutes speech protected by the First Amendment, not only in that the information disseminated based on the polls is speech, but also in that the process of obtaining the information requires a discussion between pollster and voter.”). The analysis that these courts apply to laws curtailing exit-polling activities — i.e., the traditional forum analysis — is therefore distinct from what is necessary here. Appellant also urges that the instant case should be evaluated under the rubric of a prior restraint. We disagree. While it is true that restricting access to information may work a prior restraint on speech, see In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978), this principle is not unlimited. For [i]t is one thing to say that a journalist is free to seek out sources of information not available to members of the general public, that he is entitled to some constitutional protection of the confidentiality of such sources, and that the government cannot restrain the publication of news emanating from such sources. It is quite another thing to suggest that the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of information not available to members of the public generally. This proposition finds no 17 support in the words of the Constitution or in any decision of this Court. Pell, 417 U.S. at 834-35 (1974) (citing, among others, N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)). Thus, the case at hand does not implicate the “kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First Amendment scrutiny.” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32-34 (1984); see also United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 861 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that there was “[n]o prior restraint . . . involved” where the court imposed restrictions on information adduced at a pre-trial suppression hearing).12 For this reason, we distinguish those cases cited by Appellant that concern court orders prohibiting members of the press (and others) from contacting jurors. See, e.g., In re 12 We do not come to this conclusion lightly. Systems of prior restraint are rightly considered to be antithetical to the Constitution and thereby come before the courts “bearing a heavy presumption against [their] constitutional validity.” N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 714; see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (“It is difficult to conceive of a more obvious and flagrant abridgement of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press [than a restraint on the publication of editorials].”). But “[t]he phrase „prior restraint‟ is not a self-wielding sword. Nor can it serve as a talismanic test.” Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957). We find that the instant case — where the law concerns only access (not even subsequent use) to already nonpublic information — does not necessarily implicate the exacting constitutional scrutiny reserved for evaluating prior restraints. 18 Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807; Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358. Here, the government is not restricting access to information per se; rather it is restricting access to a particular proceeding (i.e., the voting process that occurs inside polling places). Unlike the juror-interview cases, therefore, Appellant is free to contact voters and individuals working in a polling place in order to obtain information about the goings-on inside. There is no blanket gag order curtailing access to this information.13 Instead, we find that the analysis in this case turns on the question of whether the source of information (here, access to the polling place) should be “available to members of the public generally.” Thus, we must determine the proper 13 We have also defined the right of access as being distinct from the right of publication (which, as explained below, is a particular kind of prior restraint): The obvious must also be stated. The Coalition‟s claims are based on an alleged right of access, not a right of publication. Although both have their roots in the First Amendment, these principles are doctrinally discrete, and precedents in one area may not be indiscriminately applied to the other. In general, the right of publication is the broader of the two, and in most instances, publication may not be constitutionally prohibited even though access to the particular information may properly be denied. First Amendment Coal. v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 471-72 (3d Cir. 1986). 19 analytical framework for evaluating this question. As the discussion below demonstrates, the matter here concerns information about government bodies, their processes, and their decisions. As such, our analysis of the public‟s right to access the source of this information turns on both historical and structural considerations. We must balance the interests of the government on the one hand and those of the press and public on the other.