Opinion ID: 1690049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interest on Unpaid Balance.

Text: Paragraph four of the basic agreement calls for interest to be paid: . . . on the unpaid balance of the aggregate purchase price twelve months from the date of final Subdivision approval by municipality and F. H. A. and approved by State of Wisconsin, improvements are completed and accepted by the City of Port Washington. However, the second paragraph of the addendum provides: Paragraph Four in offer to purchase is amended to read that interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the unpaid balance of the aggregate purchase price from time of final subdivision approval by municipality and approved by state of Wisconsin and F. H. A. approval and improvements completed and accepted by City of Port Washington. . . . The trial court found that the addendum controlled the commencement of interest on the purchases in the original subdivision, and that interest was to run from the time of F. H. A. approval of the subdivision and not from one year after such approval. Relying on the doctrine that qualifying phrases refer to the next preceding antecedent, [2] appellant contends that the provision relied on by the trial court pertains to the first paragraph of the addendum, which in turn deals with an option for the purchase of land in an entirely different subdivision and not to paragraph four of the agreement. However, this rule of construction cannot be invoked if the context clearly shows the contrary. [3] That the provision in question expressly recites that, Paragraph Four in offer to purchase is amended to read . . . without specifically referring to the other paragraph demonstrates that a qualification of the preceding paragraph was not intended. Appellant next contends that evidence of surrounding circumstances, practical construction by the parties, and declarations of the parties indicate that interest was to start a year after F. H. A. approval. In order to resort to this evidence, the contract must be ambiguous. [4] Had there been two provisions in the agreement, one declaring that interest was to begin a year from an event and the other requiring commencement at the time of the event, the agreement would clearly be ambiguous. But the paragraph which was inserted in the addendum specifically stated that the previous reference to the running of interest was to be amended. Thus there is nothing ambiguous about the terms of the agreement on this particular point. Even assuming ambiguity, the evidence in the record is insufficient to shed any light on the meaning to be attributed to the conduct of the parties. There was testimony that respondents had demanded interest payments prior to December 1, 1961, the time from which the court ultimately found it was to have run. At least one later demand was made. This is consistent with their position that interest was to begin then. On the other hand, appellant refused to pay any interest. This is in accord with Lesperance's version of the terms. Other testimony concerning the interpretation and construction of the agreement by the parties is likewise of little value because it is either contradictory, self-serving, or both. In arriving at its decision, the trial court placed weight on the fact that the secretary of Hope Acres, Joseph W. Restle, was not called to testify. [5] Appellant contends that this was error because Restle did not participate in the negotiation which produced the final agreement. However, the record discloses that Restle played a significant role in the discussions. Lesperance testified that the March 17th agreement which Joe Restle had negotiated was not acceptable to him. Lesperance added that the strike-outs and substitutions [in the March 17th agreement] were at my direction either done by my secretary or Joseph W. Restle . . . . There are many other similar references in the testimony to situations where Restle participated in contract discussions, both before and after its execution. It cannot be said that the finding of the trial court is against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.