Opinion ID: 2455719
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Drafter's declaration

Text: ¶ 17 Even if the language of MUMA were ambiguous, the extrinsic evidence cited by Roe would not support reading an employment protection into the statute. Roe argues statements by Timothy Killian, a co-drafter and campaign manager for I-692, demonstrate that voters intended MUMA to prohibit the discharge of an employee for authorized use of medical marijuana. In a declaration prepared for this litigation, Killian stated MUMA was intended to broadly protect the right of qualifying patients to use medical marijuana and to protect the privilege of employment. [5] ¶ 18 Roe claims this court's holdings in Duke, 133 Wash.2d 80, 942 P.2d 351, and Kovacs, 121 Wash.2d 795, 854 P.2d 629, allow this court to rely on Killian's declaration as evidence of the voters' intent. In both cases, a legislator's statement regarding language in a statute was relevant to the question of the legislature's intent. While [n]ormally, one legislator's comments from the floor are... inadequate to establish legislative intent, where the legislator proposed the enacted language and no evidence in the record contradicted the legislator's statement as to the meaning of the language, this court in Duke presumed that the legislator understood the meaning of the amendment which he proposed and found his statement (made at the time the legislature was debating the bill) supported the plain meaning of the statute. 133 Wash.2d at 87, 942 P.2d 351. Similarly, in Kovacs this court acknowledged that individual lawmakers' statements do not conclusively establish legislative intent, but noted such statements can be instructive in illustrating the reasons for proposed changes to legislation. 121 Wash.2d at 807, 854 P.2d 629. In Kovacs no evidence in the record contradicted the remarks of a prime sponsor and drafter of the bill, so it was appropriate to consider his comments when determining the purpose of the statutory language. Id. at 807-08, 854 P.2d 629. ¶ 19 While Duke and Kovacs support looking to statements of individual drafters and sponsors of statutory language, they do not support considering Killian's declaration as evidence of the voters' intent in approving I-692. First, unlike the relevant statements in Duke and Kovacs, where a legislator made a statement while the legislature was debating the proposed statutory language, Killian made the declaration Roe relies upon almost 10 years after voters approved I-692. In Duke and Kovacs, the other legislators were aware of the intent of the drafters when they voted on the statute, but in this case, no voter could have been aware in 1998 that Killian would opine in 2008 that the initiative would insulate employees from drug testing for marijuana if the employee qualified for the medical use of marijuana. ¶ 20 Second, the relevant statement in Duke supported a plain reading of the statute; the court considered the statement only after finding the amended language clear. 133 Wash.2d at 86, 942 P.2d 351. In contrast, Killian's declaration claims MUMA contains specific protections that are not supported by the text of the statute. It is the voters' intent that is relevant to the meaning of ambiguous initiative language. If we were to accept Killian's declaration as evidence of the voters' intent, it would give drafters an incentive to write vague language to be expanded in later litigationlanguage that would not give voters a true representation of the meaning and consequences of the proposed initiative.