Opinion ID: 2635258
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence of depraved indifference

Text: ¶ 60 Hales next argues that there was not sufficient evidence that he acted with the state of mind necessary to convict him of murder and we should therefore vacate his conviction. We disagree. At trial, the State presented its murder case against Hales on two alternative theories: (1) that intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, [he] commit[ted] an act clearly dangerous to human life that cause[d] the death of another [61] or (2) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, [he] engage[d] in conduct which create[d] a grave risk of death to another and thereby cause[d] the death of another. [62] The State needed to provide only enough evidence to satisfy either of these tests, and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's guilty verdict. ¶ 61 To convict a defendant of depraved indifference murder, which is not as difficult to prove as intentional murder, a jury must find that the defendant (1) engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another and that conduct resulted in the death of anotherthe actus reus; (2)  knew that his conduct or the circumstances surrounding his conduct created a grave risk of death to anotherthe mens rea; and (3) acted under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life . . . an evaluation of the actus reus. [63] ¶ 62 Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, Westerman's testimony that Hales said, I'm sorry I did it while driving her to the hospital supports an inference that Hales believed that he had harmed Luther, but it is insufficient to support a reasonable inference that Hales confessed to inflicting the injuries intentionally or with depraved indifference. Therefore, all of the evidence relating to Hales's mental state is circumstantial. When determining whether a mental state is sufficiently supported by circumstantial evidence, we ask (1) whether the State presented `any evidence' that [the defendant] possessed the requisite intent, and (2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove that [the defendant] possessed the requisite intent. [64] ¶ 63 In this case, the evidence regarding the injuries that Luther suffered constitutes the key circumstantial evidence as to Hales's mental state. At trial, Dr. Walker testified that Luther suffered a massive brain injury caused by shaken baby syndrome and that the injury shown on the CT scans must have been caused by violent force. Further, because Westerman testified that Luther was fine when she put him to sleep and Dr. Walker testimony testified that Luther's brain injuries must have caused immediate unconsciousness, the jury could have inferred that Luther was fine until the 20 to 30 minutes that he spent with Hales on the night of December 5, 1985. ¶ 64 Combining this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer, consistent with logic and reasonable human experience, that Hales injured five-month-old Luther by violently shaking him, an act that created a grave risk of death to Luther and that resulted in Luther's death, that Hales knew his conduct presented a grave risk of death to Luther, and that the circumstances evidenced depraved indifference to human life. Regardless of Hales's degree of knowledge regarding the scientific theory of shaken baby syndrome, reasonable human experience indicates that an adult would know that violently shaking a five-month-old baby with less-developed neck control presents a grave risk of death to the baby. ¶ 65 In State v. DeMille, [65] we came to a similar conclusion in holding that the state of mind necessary for a murder conviction was satisfied by expert testimony regarding a child's injuries in a child abuse case. In that case, the evidence showed only that a three-year-old child was in the care of the defendant when she sustained a skull fracture and attendant brain injury that was caused by a blunt object striking with a force equivalent to a fall from a two- or three-story building. [66] Here, as in DeMille, the jury was presented with evidence of nonaccidental injuries caused by violent force-evidence from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that the perpetrator knew that his conduct would create a grave risk of death and that he acted under circumstances evidencing depraved indifference to human life. ¶ 66 Further, in addition to the evidence regarding the nature of the injuries, Westerman testified to the following at trial: that Luther was an inconvenience to Hales; that two days prior to Luther's injuries, Hales had an argument with Westerman in which he told Westerman that he would hurt her; that Hales was the only person with Luther and that Luther was securely belted into Hales's truck when he sustained the bruising to his face; and that Hales was tired and did not want to be disturbed when he returned home from work on the night of December 5, 1985. Finally, Westerman testified at trial that Hales told her while driving to the hospital that he was sorry he did it. This additional circumstantial evidence bolsters the physical evidence that Hales acted with knowledge that his conduct presented a grave risk of death to Luther. Accordingly, we hold that Hales's conviction was supported by sufficient evidence, and we turn to Hales's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.