Opinion ID: 655958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vega's motion to compel the government to disclose the identity of informant.

Text: 18 We review the denial court of Vega's pretrial motion to compel disclosure of the government's confidential informant for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Sanchez, 908 F.2d 1443, 1451 (9th Cir.1990). Vega argues that the district court abused its discretion in not compelling disclosure of the informant because Mendez could have offered corroborating testimony regarding Vega's lack of participation in the conversations at the convenience store, as well as Vega's lack of knowledge of the impending drug transaction. The government responds that disclosure is required only if Mendez had been the only witness to the critical events, and that Soto-Espinosa was available to testify regarding these events. 19 The Supreme Court has rejected a fixed rule with respect to disclosure in favor of a balancing test. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). The public interest in protecting the flow of information is balanced against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Id. at 62; United States v. Sanchez, 908 F.2d at 1451. Whether nondisclosure is erroneous depends on the particular circumstances of each case, including the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors. Rovairo v. United States, 353 U.S. at 62. 20 Vega must show more than a mere suspicion, United States v. Johnson, 886 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 (1990), or mere speculat[ion], United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005 (1978), that the informant's testimony would prove helpful to his defense. The testimony that Vega wished to illicit from the confidential informant Justo Mendez--i.e., that Vega did not take part in the conversations between Mendez and Soto-Espinosa--would have been of questionable helpfulness to Vega. In addition, that any statements by Soto-Epinosa to Mendez existed regarding Vega's lack of involvement in the drug sale is pure speculation by Vega. 21 Notwithstanding Vega's claims, the potential significance of Mendez's testimony is low in view of the availability of Soto-Espinosa to testify. Having pled guilty, Soto-Espinosa was available to testify at Vega's trial. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (defendant's guilty plea constituted a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination). In United States v. Jaramillo-Suarez, 950 F.2d 1378, 1387 (9th Cir.1991), this Court found it significant that there was no evidence to suggest that the informant was the only witness to any critical event. Vega presented no evidence why the informant's testimony, who had made a deal with the government, would have been any more favorable than that of Soto-Espinosa. 22 The district court did not find that disclosure would have been highly relevant and might have been helpful to the defense. United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793 (9th Cir.1984) (district court abused its discretion in not ordering disclosure of informer's identity). In addition, Vega has the burden of demonstrating the need for disclosure. United States v. Johnson, 886 F.2d at 1122. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the district court abused its discretion in finding that Vega did not meet his burden. 23 Lastly, the government asserts that Vega has waived his right to appeal nondisclosure since he failed to renew his pretrial motion once trial began. The Eleventh Circuit decision that the government cites for this proposition is not on point. In United States v. McDonald, 935 F.2d 1212, 1216-1218 (11th Cir.1991), the magistrate treated the defendant's motion for disclosure of the informer's identity as a request for access to the informer because the defendant already knew his identity. The defendant failed to object to the magistrate's specific treatment of his motion. The Eleventh Circuit held that any objection the defendant may have had was waived. Id. at 1218. 24 There was evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Vega took part in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Vega's pretrial motion to disclose the government's confidential informant. 25 AFFIRMED.