Opinion ID: 6107541
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of Miranda Waiver on March 21st

Text: Defendant claims his initial Miranda waiver was constitutionally invalid because he was deceived into waiving his rights at the outset of the San Quentin interview. Specifically, he agreed to speak to Chicoine because Chicoine said he was a sex crime investigator conducting a routine pre-release interview of defendant, who would have to register as a sex offender under section 290. According to defendant, because of Chicoine's deliberate  falsehood the waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The claim fails. The governing principles are well established. Before subjecting suspects to custodial interrogation, 8 the police must inform them of their Miranda rights and obtain a waiver that is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. ( Miranda , supra , 384 U.S. at pp. 444, 478-479, 86 S.Ct. 1602 .) The test for validity is as follows. First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the 'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. ( Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412 , 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410 ( Moran ).) The prosecution must demonstrate the validity of a suspect's waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. ( Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157 , 168-169, 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 ( Connelly ).)  There is no factual dispute as to the circumstances of defendant's initial waiver at San Quentin. Chicoine testified that he and Dudek came up with a ruse to make defendant think they had come to talk to him about sex offender registration matters. Chicoine told defendant that he had files full of sex registrants, and that the objective was for defendant to stay out of the red file on his desk of the guys I'm going after. Chicoine did not reveal that he was investigating McKenna's death. Nonetheless, he did say that he wanted to talk to defendant about some of your past crimes and some  of the sex registration laws and things like that. (Italics added.) Whether Chicoine's statements about the purpose of the interrogation invalidated defendant's Miranda waiver is a legal question subject to our independent review. The high court has made it clear that merely withholding certain information from a defendant does not invalidate a Miranda waiver. In Moran , supra , 475 U.S. 412 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 , a public defender called the police station where the defendant was in custody on a burglary arrest. She said she would act as his counsel if he were to be interrogated and was told he would not be. However, the defendant's cohorts in the burglary had implicated him in a murder, and police from a different jurisdiction soon began questioning him about that crime. The defendant waived his Miranda rights and gave a statement. ( Moran , at p. 417, 106 S.Ct. 1135 .) The court affirmed the denial of a suppression motion, holding there was no need for the police to inform the defendant that his attorney was trying to reach him. Noting there was no question the waiver was voluntary, and that the defendant understood his rights, the Moran court said [e]vents occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right. ( Moran , supra , 475 U.S. at p. 422, 106 S.Ct. 1135 .) The court reasoned that we have never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights. [Citations.] Once it is determined that a suspect's decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State's intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law. ( Id . at pp. 422-423, 106 S.Ct. 1135 ; see People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013 , 1070, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 130 , 324 P.3d 1 [valid waiver does not require that a defendant be told of the evidence against him, the severity of his predicament, or the chances he will be  charged]; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381 , 411, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 58 P.3d 391 [valid waiver does not require that a defendant be informed of an arrest warrant].) The court returned to the subject of withholding information in Colorado v. Spring (1987) 479 U.S. 564 , 107 S.Ct. 851 , 93 L.Ed.2d 954 ( Spring ). There, an informant told agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) that Spring was selling stolen firearms, and had spoken of his role in a Colorado killing. Agents arrested him when Spring tried to sell them guns during an undercover operation in Kansas City. ( Id . at p. 566, 107 S.Ct. 851 .) He was given his Miranda rights and signed a waiver form. After questioning about the transactions for which he was arrested, the agents asked if he had a criminal  record. He admitted to a juvenile record for shooting his aunt. Asked if he had ever shot anyone else, he mumbled,  'I shot another guy once.'  He  went on to deny he had ever been to Colorado and denied shooting a man there. ( Id . at p. 567, 107 S.Ct. 851 .) Some two months later, Colorado officers interviewed Spring in a Kansas City jail. Given the Miranda warnings, he again signed a waiver. When they brought up the Colorado homicide, Spring indicated he was ready to talk, and confessed. ( Spring , supra , 479 U.S. at pp. 567-568, 107 S.Ct. 851 .) The trial court denied a suppression motion, but the Colorado Court of Appeals and Supreme Court held the waiver invalid because the ATF agents had not told Spring he would be questioned about the Colorado homicide during his interview. ( Id . at pp. 568-570, 107 S.Ct. 851 .) The high court reversed, finding the waiver voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. ( Id . at pp. 573-577, 107 S.Ct. 851 .) It was undisputed that  'the agents did not tell [the defendant] that they were going to ask him questions about the killing of Walker before [the defendant] made his original decision to waive his Miranda rights.'  ( Spring , supra , 479 U.S. at p. 575, fn. 7, 107 S.Ct. 851 .) Nonetheless, the court observed that, under Moran , supra , 475 U.S. at page 422, 106 S.Ct. 1135 , a valid waiver does not require that an individual be informed of all information 'useful' in making his decision or all information that 'might ... [affect] his decision to confess.'  ( Spring , at p. 576, 107 S.Ct. 851 .) Instead, the essential requirement of Miranda is that a suspect understand the nature of his constitutional right-'his right to refuse to answer any question which might incriminate him.'  ( Ibid . ) The court explained: This Court's holding in Miranda specifically required that the police inform a criminal suspect that he has the right to remain silent and that anything he says may be used against him. There is no qualification of this broad and explicit warning. The warning, as formulated in Miranda , conveys to a suspect the nature of his constitutional privilege and the consequences of abandoning it. Accordingly, we hold that a suspect's awareness of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment privilege. ( Ibid . ) In People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635 , 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 ( Tate ), we applied Spring 's ruling. Tate was arrested while driving a murder victim's car on the day of the murder. ( Id . at pp. 641-642, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 .) Brought to the police department's homicide division, officers told him they were investigating the car because it was stolen and a lady had been 'hurt.'  ( Id . at p. 681, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 .) They gave the Miranda admonitions and Tate agreed to talk. At the beginning of a recorded interview, he asked if he was in the homicide division. Told that he was, the defendant noted  ' So I'm here for a car that was stolen.'  ( Ibid . ) The interviewing officer said again that he was investigating an incident in  which a car was stolen and a lady was 'hurt'; and ... stated that 'I'm not here to trick you into anything.' Defendant said, 'I know you ain't, just tell me, you just said a car was stolen.' [The officer] repeated that he was investigating 'the incident [in] which the car was taken.' Defendant responded, 'Whatever you said, okay.' [The officer] asked if everything was now clear in defendant's head, and defendant answered, 'Yeah.'  ( Ibid . )  After another Miranda advisement, Tate denied any knowledge of the incident, and lied about how he obtained the car. The officers eventually told him the victim was dead. They confronted him with the implausibility of his story and the facts that he had just been arrested wearing  bloodstained clothing and in possession of the victim's car and other property. Urged to tell the truth, the defendant responded,  'Why should I tell the truth? Well, what's in it for me? I'm going to jail anyway.'  ( Tate , supra , 49 Cal.4th at p. 681, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 .) The trial court rejected his claim that he had been tricked into waiving his Miranda rights when the officers did not tell him he was suspected of a homicide, saying instead they were investigating a car theft in which a lady got hurt. The court noted that the defendant knew he was being questioned in the homicide division and must have inferred a killing was involved. ( Id . at p. 682, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 .) We upheld the ruling. Summarizing the holding in Spring , we observed: The warnings required by Miranda , supra , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 for a suspect in custody-i.e., that the suspect has the right to refuse to talk, to talk only with counsel present, and to stop talking at any time, and that criminal prosecutorial use will be made of any statements the suspect does utter-are designed fully to protect the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent exercise of the constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination in that custodial context. [Citation.] Thus, in general, a suspect in custody who, having heard and understood a full explanation of these rights, then makes an uncompelled and uncoerced decision to talk, has thereby knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived them. ( Tate , supra , 49 Cal.4th at p. 683, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 .) The facts in Tate supported a conclusion that defendant understood the serious nature of the investigation. He did not appear to have been misled by any ambiguity in the officers' use of the word 'hurt' rather than 'killed.'  ( Id . at p. 682, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 .) He had ascertained that he was in the homicide division, and must certainly have understood that the injury at issue was fatal. ( Id . at p. 683, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 .) We further observed that [e]ven if this evidence were not present ... we would not accept defendant's contention. We conclude the officers did nothing to invalidate defendant's two separate waivers of his Miranda rights. ( Ibid . ) This is because mere failure by law enforcement officers to advise a custodial suspect of all possible topics of interrogation is not trickery sufficient to vitiate the uncoerced waiver of one who heard and understood the warnings required by Miranda . ( Ibid ., citing Spring , supra , 479 U.S. at pp. 564, 576, 107 S.Ct. 851 .)  Consistent with these authorities, the court properly concluded defendant's Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Notwithstanding Chicoine's failure to disclose that he was investigating McKenna's death, defendant was aware that he was speaking with law enforcement officers and that the scope of the interview would include his past crimes. Having received full and complete Miranda warnings, defendant was also aware that anything he said during the interview could be used against him. This broad and explicit warning conveyed to defendant the nature of his constitutional privilege and the consequences of abandoning it. ( Spring , supra , 479 U.S. at p. 577, 107 S.Ct. 851 .) Thus, in general, a suspect in custody who, having heard and understood a full explanation of these rights, then makes an uncompelled and uncoerced decision to talk, has thereby knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived them. ( Tate , supra , 49 Cal.4th at p. 683, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 .) As in Spring , the fact that the officers did not tell defendant they were going to ask him about McKenna's killing does not invalidate the waiver. Defendant's lack of  awareness of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to determining whether [he] voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment privilege. ( Spring , at p. 577, 107 S.Ct. 851 .) The officers were not constitutionally required to supply [defendant] with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights. ( Moran , supra , 475 U.S. at p. 422, 106 S.Ct. 1135 .)  Defendant attempts to distinguish Moran , Spring , and Tate because none of those cases involved affirmative deception. (See Spring , supra , 479 U.S. at p. 576 & fn. 8, 107 S.Ct. 851 ; Moran , supra , 475 U.S. at p. 423, 106 S.Ct. 1135 ; Tate , supra , 49 Cal.4th at pp. 682-683, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 .) Here, by contrast, defendant argues that misleading him about the purpose of the interview constitute[s] a form of misconduct by officers that society seeks to discourage, is likely to overbear the will of suspects and therefore produce involuntary confessions, and constitutes a kind of unfairness that shocks the conscience and brings law enforcement and the justice system into disrepute .... Defendant's arguments are unpersuasive. The high court has intimated that some circumstances may invalidate a waiver. The Miranda court declared: [A]ny evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked , or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege. The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual .... ( Miranda , supra , 384 U.S. at p. 476, 86 S.Ct. 1602 , italics added.) In Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 , the court said, The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing .... ( Id . at p. 433, 104 S.Ct. 3138 , italics added and deleted.) Similarly, in Moran, supra, 475 U.S. 412 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 , the court stated that the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the  product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception . ( Id . at p. 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135 , italics added; see Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370 , 382-383, 130 S.Ct. 2250 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 .) The Supreme Court has nonetheless clarified that the Constitution does not punish lack of candor for its own sake. The Moran court explained: Granting that the 'deliberate or reckless' withholding of information is objectionable as a matter of ethics, such conduct is only relevant to the constitutional validity of a waiver if it deprives a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them. ( Moran , supra , 475 U.S. at pp. 423-424, 106 S.Ct. 1135 .) Moran expressly dismissed the idea that the intent of the police to deceive might make a difference. ( Ibid . ) And in Spring , the court cited examples of certain circumstances under which the court had previously invalidated Fifth Amendment waivers; those examples all involved misrepresentations that were coercive in nature. ( Spring , supra , 479 U.S. at p. 576, fn. 8, 107 S.Ct. 851 , citing Lynumn v. Illinois (1963) 372 U.S. 528 , 534-535, 83 S.Ct. 917 , 9 L.Ed.2d 922 [misrepresentation by police officers that suspect would be deprived of state financial aid for her dependent child unless she cooperated]; Spano v. New York (1959) 360 U.S. 315 , 319, 322-324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 [misrepresentation by suspect's friend that friend would lose his job if suspect failed to cooperate].) The officers' ruse, that their purpose was to interview defendant regarding his  sex offender registration status, was not coercive. Defendant argues that Chicoine's reference to a red file of problem offenders that sits on his desk plainly implied that there might be consequence for failing to cooperate. The record belies this assertion. The comment suggested only that defendant should stay out of trouble following his release from prison. Moreover, as he was filling out the waiver form, defendant asked if his parole would be affected [i]f I don't answer any of these questions. Chicoine replied, No, absolutely not. Defendant further maintains it is clear from the record that [he] would not have waived his Miranda rights if he had actually been told who the officers were and what they were investigating. Defendant reasons that he promptly invoked his right to an attorney when the officers actually broached the subject of McKenna's death. But the fact that he did so only reinforces the conclusion that he understood his options and his will was not overborne. (See  People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405 , 442, 444, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 233 P.3d 1000 .)  For these reasons, defendant's initial Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 9