Opinion ID: 186000
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Special Master-Monitor

Text: 55 In its June 14 motion to revoke Kieffer's appointment and clarify the role of the Court Monitor, the Department among other things complained that Kieffer's actions at the April 19, 2002 ex parte meeting had created an appearance of partiality. The district court not only rejected the Department's arguments, it supplemented Kieffer's role by appointing him Special Master-Monitor. Again the Department claims this was clear error. Again we agree. 56 The relevant standard is to be found at 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): A judicial officer must be disqualified from any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, that is, questioned by one fully apprised of the surrounding circumstances. Sao Paulo State of the Federative Republic of Brazil v. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 535 U.S. 229, 232-33, 122 S.Ct. 1290, 1292, 152 L.Ed.2d 346 (2002) (per curiam). It is clear, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' objections, that in this Circuit the ethical restrictions of § 455 apply to a special master. Jenkins v. Sterlacci, 849 F.2d 627, 630-32 & n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1988). So much for the law; for the facts we rely solely upon the district court's own recitation, which establishes that Kieffer's prior role and personal involvement in this case as Court Monitor would cause a reasonable person to doubt his ability to remain impartial while serving as Special Master. 57 For instance, Kieffer was permitted to make and receive ex parte communications with all entities, Monitor Order, 226 F.Supp.2d at 165, and in fact engaged in numerous ex parte communications with officials of Interior. Id. at 167. Moreover, in the course of his investigation Kieffer acquired information upon the basis of which he apprised the Deputy Secretary that there was a dispute developing between the Secretary and the Special Trustee ... regarding the appropriate role of the Special Trustee. Id. at 170. The Court Monitor was also present at the heated ex parte meeting on April 19, 2002, about which he reported to the Court that defendants were unwilling to fully accept the Congressionally-mandated role of the Special Trustee. Id. at 171. At that meeting, Kieffer expressed his concerns to the Deputy Secretary about the actions of the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary regarding the Special Trustee. Id. In particular, he apprise[d] the Deputy Secretary in the presence of the Special Trustee of the obvious risks faced by the defendants in this litigation and the additional concerns he had regarding some of the Secretary's views, in an effort to set the stage to convince the parties attending the meeting to find some way to work together rather than continue the internecine warfare patently obvious in their own dueling memoranda. Id. at 172. 58 The district court's account of these events demonstrates that Kieffer had a settled opinion about what the Department should and should not do on remand to comply with the order of the district court, which opinion he developed in his extrajudicial role as Court Monitor with access to the internal deliberations of the Department regarding the lawsuit. The district court's account also demonstrates that Kieffer's opinion was based in part upon ex parte communications received in his extra-judicial capacity as Monitor. These facts so clearly cast a shadow over Kieffer's impartiality that the district court abused its discretion in appointing Kieffer to be Special Master (in addition to Monitor). 59 The plaintiffs argue the April 19 meeting was not extrajudicial because it took place with the knowledge and approval of the district court and of the parties. That does not change the key fact: The district court appointed Kieffer to a judicial role in a case in which he had significant prior knowledge obtained in his role as a Court Monitor, on the basis of which he had formed and expressed opinions of continuing relevance to the litigation. A newly appointed judge may not hear a case in which he previously played any role. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3) (a judge shall recuse himself [w]here he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy); ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(1)(b) (a judge is disqualified when the judge served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge has been a material witness concerning it). Similarly here, Kieffer's experience as Court Monitor disqualified him from later assuming a judicial role in this case. Accordingly, the order appointing Kieffer to be a Special Master-Monitor must be vacated.