Opinion ID: 541767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: FERC's Jurisdiction to Modify a Prior Order

Text: 19 Vitco first argues that FERC did not have jurisdiction to modify its May 5, 1987 abandonment order so as to make Transco's abandonment authorization retroactive because Transco did not file a timely petition for rehearing raising the issue of retroactivity, and therefore the May 5, 1987 order became final as to that issue when the time for filing a petition for rehearing expired. 20 FERC modified the May 5, 1987 order on its own motion pursuant to section 19(a) of the NGA, which provides, in pertinent part: 21 Until the record in a proceeding shall have been filed in a court of appeals, as provided in subsection (b), the Commission may at any time, upon reasonable notice and in such manner as it shall deem proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any finding or order made or issued by it under the provisions of this Act. 22 15 U.S.C. Sec. 717r(a). This provision gives the Commission the power to correct an order until such time as the record on appeal has been filed with a court of appeals or the time for filing a petition for judicial review has expired. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 999, 1004 (D.C.Cir.1963). 23 Obtaining judicial review of a FERC order has a jurisdictional prerequisite: applying for rehearing within 30 days after issuance of the order. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 717r(a). A party aggrieved by a FERC order has 60 days after FERC issues an order upon an application for rehearing in which to file a petition for judicial review. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 717r(b). If no one files an application for rehearing within 30 days of the FERC order, the time for judicial review expires at the end of the 30-day period, the FERC order becomes final, and FERC can no longer modify the order. See Hirschey v. FERC, 701 F.2d 215, 217-18 (D.C.Cir.1983). 24 Vitco urges that because Transco failed to file a petition for rehearing requesting retroactive abandonment authorization within 30 days of the May 5, 1987 order, that order became final as to the issue of retroactivity. In other words, Vitco contends that a timely petition for rehearing keeps FERC's jurisdiction alive only as to those particular issues raised in the petition. Since Vitco did not raise the issue of retroactivity in its petition for rehearing, Vitco contends FERC no longer had the authority to modify its order to authorize retroactive abandonment. 25 The recent case of Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 871 F.2d 1099 (D.C.Cir.1989), disposes of Vitco's argument. In Tennessee Gas, the court upheld FERC's conclusion that it had authority under the NGA to modify a prior order sua sponte, even as to matters not raised in a timely petition for rehearing, as long as a petition for rehearing of that order was timely filed on some other grounds. Tennessee Gas, 871 F.2d at 1107-09. In other words, the timely filing of any petition for rehearing prolongs the life of all issues for purposes of modification on the Commission's own motion, even of issues not raised in that petition, because the order does not become final and nonreviewable until 60 days after the Commission rules on the pending petition. Id.; see also Swanson Mining Corp. v. FERC, 790 F.2d 96, 100-101 (D.C.Cir.1986) (interpreting the same language in Sec. 313(a) of the Federal Power Act). The D.C. Circuit found support for this view in judicial interpretations of similar language in other statutes: Virtually the same language in other statutes has been consistently interpreted as granting the agency power to modify any aspect of an order at any time until an appeal has been filed. Tennessee Gas, 871 F.2d at 1108 (emphasis in original) (citing, inter alia, International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers v. Eagle-Picher Mining and Smelting Co., 325 U.S. 335, 65 S.Ct. 1166, 89 L.Ed. 1649 (1945) (National Labor Relations Act); New York v. United States, 568 F.2d 887, 893 & n. 9 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887, 101 S.Ct. 242, 66 L.Ed.2d 113 (1980) (Interstate Commerce Act)). 26 Accordingly, Transco's failure to apply for rehearing of the May 5, 1987 order within 30 days did not bar FERC from modifying that order on its own motion, because Vitco's petition for rehearing prevented the order from becoming final. 27 Vitco offers an alternative reason why FERC lacked authority on July 11, 1988 to modify the May 5, 1987 order: The order of February 5, 1988 denying Vitco's petition for rehearing became final and nonreviewable 60 days after February 5, or on April 5, 1988. FERC takes the position that the tolling order issued on April 6, 1988 in response to Transco's March 7 rehearing request kept FERC's jurisdiction alive until it issued the July 11, 1988 order. Vitco contends, however, that because FERC later vacated its tolling order and dismissed Transco's March 7, 1988 petition as an untimely request for rehearing of the May 5, 1987 order, Transco's March 7 petition was a legal nullity that could not prolong the Commission's jurisdiction, and the tolling order was devoid of legal effect because it was issued one day too late. 28 We agree with FERC that by issuing the April 6 order keeping open consideration of Transco's March 7, 1988 petition for rehearing, FERC indicated that it was considering action regarding the proceeding, and therefore the February 5 order did not become final so as to cause expiration of the time for filing for judicial review. The April 6 order was timely as a response to Transco's petition for rehearing because it was issued on the 30th day after Transco timely filed its petition; 3 if FERC had not issued the tolling order, Transco's petition would have been deemed denied by operation of law after 30 days. See 15 U.S.C. Sec. 717r(a). 29 Despite Vitco's attempts to distinguish it, we think the case of Cities of Campbell & Thayer v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1180 (D.C.Cir.1985), is instructive. That case involved section 313 of the Federal Power Act, which is essentially identical to section 19 of the NGA. See 16 U.S.C. Sec. 825l; 15 U.S.C. Sec. 717r. The petitioners in Cities of Campbell filed an untimely request for rehearing of a FERC order. When the request was denied as untimely, the petitioners filed a request for rehearing of the order denying rehearing. The Commission then denied the second request for rehearing but decided sua sponte to reconsider the very first order for which the petitioners had filed their initial rehearing request. Id. at 1182. The D.C. Circuit found that by staying the first order and deciding to reconsider that entire order, FERC made clear that it had not yet made a final decision in the proceeding, and the first order was therefore not a final, reviewable order. Id. at 1184. Similarly, in this case FERC's tolling order of April 6, 1988 made clear that FERC had not yet made a final decision in the proceeding, and the May 5, 1987 order was therefore still open for its consideration. 30 Moreover, we agree with FERC that its authority to modify its orders is not contingent upon the underlying validity of any petition for rehearing but only upon whether its orders have become final and the time for filing an appeal has expired. Transco's March 7 filing, whether or not later dismissed as untimely, was within the Commission's jurisdiction to consider at the time it was filed. The Commission necessarily had jurisdiction to decide whether to grant or deny the rehearing request. The April 6 tolling order postponed that decision and indicated that FERC wished to keep the proceedings open. 31 Finally, Vitco urges that if we accept the Commission's position, a litigant could indefinitely delay the finality of an order by filing a series of papers styled as petitions for rehearing to keep the proceedings open in the hope that FERC will decide to modify an order on its own motion. We think this is unlikely to become a problem. A person aggrieved by a FERC order who wants to obtain judicial review must first petition for rehearing. See 15 U.S.C. Sec. 717r(a). It seems improbable that such a person would file multiple petitions for rehearing, thereby delaying the finality needed to obtain judicial review. Addressing an argument similar to Vitco's, the Third Circuit found that the 60-day period to file for judicial review under section 313(b) of the Federal Power Act was tolled while FERC considered a timely petition for rehearing of an issue addressed in an earlier order on rehearing. Cities of Newark, New Castle, and Seaford v. FERC, 763 F.2d 533, 545 (3d Cir.1985). The court said that concern over the prospect of dilatory, repetitive petitions for rehearing can readily be remedied by Commission regulation. Id. at 542-43. We agree.