Opinion ID: 798076
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Racial and Religious Discrimination

Text: 115 The Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the Plaintiff's First Amendment claim of religious discrimination and Fifth Amendment claim of racial or ethnic discrimination on three grounds: (1) the Plaintiff has failed to state a violation of clearly established rights, (2) the Plaintiff's allegations of discriminatory intent are too conclusory, and (3) the Plaintiff has not alleged the personal involvement of Ashcroft and Mueller. 12 116 The arguments of Ashcroft and Mueller challenging the sufficiency of the Plaintiff's race, ethnic, and religious discrimination claims misunderstand his complaint. They contend that his complaint amounts to an objection that most of those persons determined to be of high interest to the 9/11 investigation were Muslim or from certain Arab countries, which they justify by pointing out that the 9/11 hijackers were Muslims from Arab countries. However, what the Plaintiff is alleging is that he was deemed to be of high interest, and accordingly was kept in the ADMAX SHU under harsh conditions, solely because of his race, ethnicity, and religion. The Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants specifically targeted [him] for mistreatment because of [his] race, religion, and national origin. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim of animus-based discrimination that any reasonably competent officer would understand to have been illegal under prior case law. See Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092; see also Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir.1999) (stating that racial classifications violate Equal Protection Clause where motivated by racial animus and having a discriminatory effect). Accordingly, the Plaintiff's racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination claims cannot be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds at this stage of the litigation. 117 Hasty also argues that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of discrimination. Citing Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) ( AAADC ), he argues that the Equal Protection Clause does not apply in the context of proceedings to remove illegal aliens and that the Government can permissibly deem nationals of a particular country to be a special threat. In AAADC, the Supreme Court concluded that a provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction to consider an illegal alien's selective enforcement challenge to deportation. See 525 U.S. at 487, 119 S.Ct. 936. The Court rejected the argument that it nevertheless had jurisdiction to consider an alien's constitutional arguments, holding that an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation, see id. at 488, 119 S.Ct. 936, even when the Government deports the alien for the additional reason that it believes him to be a member of an organization that supports terrorist activity, id. at 492, 119 S.Ct. 936. AAADC affords the Defendants no relief. The Plaintiff is not challenging his deportation or even his arrest on criminal charges. Moreover, AAADC does not stand for the proposition that the Government may subject members of a particular race, ethnicity, or religion to more restrictive conditions of confinement than members of other races, ethnic backgrounds, or religions. 118 The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's allegations of racial, ethnic, and religious animus are too conclusory. But, as discussed above, see Part I(e), Crawford-El indicates that courts cannot require a heightened pleading standard for civil rights complaints involving improper motive. In Phillip, 316 F.3d at 298-99, this Court held that Swierkiewicz 's notice pleading standard applied to a civil rights complaint alleging racial animus. Although recognizing that the complaint did not contain many evidentiary allegations relevant to intent, see id. at 299, we found the allegations sufficient to state a claim, observing that the complaint alleged that the plaintiffs were African-American, described the defendants' actions in detail, and alleged that the plaintiffs were selected for maltreatment solely because of their color, id. at 298. 119 The Plaintiff's allegations suffice to state claims of racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination. He alleges in particular that the FBI Defendants classified him of high interest solely because of his race, ethnic background, and religion and not because of any evidence of involvement in terrorism. He offers additional factual support for this allegation, stating that within the New York area, all Arab Muslim men arrested on criminal or immigration charges while the FBI was following an investigative lead into the September 11th attacks—however unrelated the arrestee was to the investigation—were immediately classified as `of interest' to the post-September 11th investigation. We need not consider at this stage of the litigation whether these allegations are alone sufficient to state a clearly established constitutional violation under the circumstances presented because they are sufficient to state a violation when combined with the Plaintiff's allegation that he was singled out for mistreatment and for unnecessarily punitive conditions of confinement based on his racial, ethnic, and religious characteristics. 120 Finally, Ashcroft and Mueller argue that the Plaintiff failed to allege their personal involvement in any discrimination. However, the complaint alleges broadly that Ashcroft and Mueller were instrumental in adopting the policies and practices challenged here. The complaint also alleges that the FBI, under the direction of Defendant Mueller, arrested thousands of Arab Muslims and that Ashcroft and Mueller knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject Plaintiff[] to these conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest. The Plaintiff acknowledges that the FBI Defendants made the determination that Plaintiff was of high interest, but this allegation does not necessarily insulate Ashcroft and Mueller from personal responsibility for the actions of their subordinates under the standards of supervisory liability outlined above, see Part I(d). As with the procedural due process claim, the allegation that Ashcroft and Mueller condoned and agreed to the discrimination that the Plaintiff alleges satisfies the plausibility standard without an allegation of subsidiary facts because of the likelihood that these senior officials would have concerned themselves with the formulation and implementation of policies dealing with the confinement of those arrested on federal charges in the New York City area and designated of high interest in the aftermath of 9/11. Whether or not the issues of personal involvement will be clarified by court-supervised discovery sufficient to support summary judgment remains to be determined.