Opinion ID: 1226361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence with respect to Counts 2, 9, 10 and 11

Text: Kuehne, proceeding pro se, challenges the district court's denial of his motion for acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. A Rule 29 motion is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. [W]hen the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, the standard of review is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime[.] United States v. Jones, 102 F.3d 804, 807 (6th Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). [T]his court may conclude that a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence even though the circumstantial evidence does not remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Before reaching the merits of Kuehne's challenge, however, we must determine if the issue was properly preserved for appeal. A Rule 29 motion is properly preserved for appeal when a defendant makes a motion for acquittal at the end of the prosecution's case-in-chief and at the close of evidence. Failure to make the required motions constitutes a waiver of the objections to the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Chance, 306 F.3d 356, 368-69 (6th Cir.2002). In the instant case, Kuehne moved for an acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 at the close of the government's evidence. The district court denied the motion. As discussed above, Kuehne failed to make a timely renewal of his Rule 29 motion at the close of all of the evidence. Because a Rule 29 motion was not timely renewed at the close of evidence, Kuehne's sufficiency of the evidence challenge is reviewed under a manifest miscarriage of justice standard. United States v. Carnes, 309 F.3d 950, 956 (6th Cir.2002). Under this standard, we only reverse a conviction if the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt. Id.
Kuehne challenges the district court's denial of his Rule 29 motion for acquittal with respect to counts 2, 9, 10 and 11 of the indictment. Kuehne alleges that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for violation of those counts. This challenge is without merit. The evidence in this case is sufficient to sustain a conviction on counts 2, 9, 10 and 11 of the indictment, especially under the manifest miscarriage of justice standard. United States v. Taniguchi, 49 Fed.Appx. 506, 514-15 (6th Cir.2002) (unpublished). Count 2 of Kuehne's indictment charged that he aided and abetted Marlow and Duckro in knowingly steal[ing] and unlawfully tak[ing] and carry[ing] away from the premises of . . . Rich-Mart Guns and Ammo . . . two firearms. (J.A. at 26-27) In the instant case, there was ample evidence from which the jury could convict Kuehne of the offense enumerated in count 2 beyond a reasonable doubt inasmuch as both individuals whom Kuehne allegedly aided and abetted testified that Kuehne cased the Rich-Mart and directed them regarding which firearms to steal. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Kuehne's motion for acquittal. Counts 9, 10 and 11 of the indictment alleged that Kuehne used a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of § 924(c). Kuehne alleges that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for counts 9, 10 and 11 of the indictment because the government did not offer proof regarding the specific type of firearm alleged to have been stolen, possessed or used as alleged in the indictment. Rather, he alleges that the government offered proof of a different type of weapon. This claim is without merit. As this Court noted in United States v. Robison , under § 924(c) the specific type of firearm used or possessed by a conspirator is not an essential element of the crime. 904 F.2d at 369. Cf. United States v. Smith, 27 Fed.Appx. 577, 581 (6th Cir.2001) (unpublished) (finding that the type of firearm used during a robbery was not an essential element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)). Thus, the government need not prove, and the jury need not find, that a particular kind of weapon was used during an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. [12]