Opinion ID: 6326312
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: As his sole assignment of error, Joshua claims that “[t]he juvenile court’s order placing custody of B.C. with Stacy was void because it exceeded the juvenile court’s authority under - 685 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports IN RE INTEREST OF A.A. ET AL. Cite as 310 Neb. 679 the mandate.” The order on appeal filed May 18, 2021, determined a number of issues, including overruling Joshua’s motion for legal custody, sustaining DHHS’ motion for a placement change, and placing physical custody with Stacy. [2,3] As an initial matter, we iterate that the scope of our appellate analysis is determined by the error assigned. That is, our appellate review is guided and constrained by the assignment of error as articulated by the party appealing. See Neb. Ct. App. P. § 2-109(D) (rev. 2021). See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1919 (Reissue 2016); In re Interest of Mekhi S. et al., 309 Neb. 529, 960 N.W.2d 732 (2021); Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Transit Auth. of Omaha, 308 Neb. 916, 958 N.W.2d 378 (2021). We have repeatedly refused to waive the requirement of § 2-109(D)(1) that an appellant set forth a separate and concise statement of each error the party contends was made by the trial court, through separately numbered and paragraphed assignments of error contained in a separate section of the brief, designated with an appropriate heading, and located after the statement of the case and preceding the propositions of law. Great Northern Ins. Co., supra. The assignments of error section is one of the most critical sections of an appellant’s or cross-appellant’s brief. Id. It gives the opposing party notice of what alleged errors to respond to and advises the appellate court of what allegations of error by the trial court it has been called upon to address. Id. Designated assignments of error are required not only by our court rules but also by § 25-1919, which states that “[t]he brief of appellant shall set out particularly each error asserted and intended to be urged for the reversal, vacation, or modification of the judgment, decree, or final order alleged to be erroneous . . . .” Accordingly, we decline to take up additional claims beyond that concerning “[t]he juvenile court’s order placing custody of B.C. with Stacy . . . .” [4,5] The focus of Joshua’s assignment of error is on placement of B.C. with Stacy and the relationship of such placement vis-a-vis our main opinion and mandate. Thus, we review several principles of procedure following an appeal. A “remand” - 686 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports IN RE INTEREST OF A.A. ET AL. Cite as 310 Neb. 679 is an appellate court’s order returning a proceeding to the court from which the appeal originated for further action in accordance with the remanding order. TransCanada Keystone Pipeline v. Tanderup, 305 Neb. 493, 941 N.W.2d 145 (2020). When a lower court is given specific instructions on remand, it must comply with the specific instructions and has no discretion to deviate from the mandate. Id. But it is also true, as we recognized in our main opinion, A.A. I, that the juvenile court has retained its continuing jurisdiction over this juvenile matter even during Joshua’s prior appeal. See In re Interest of Jedidiah P., 267 Neb. 258, 673 N.W.2d 553 (2004). Referring to A.A. I, Joshua highlights that we reversed the juvenile court’s order that denied Joshua’s motion for placement and remanded the cause “with directions to grant Joshua temporary physical placement after establishing, with the most up-to-date information, an appropriate plan for B.C.’s transition into Joshua’s temporary physical custody.” 307 Neb. at 851, 951 N.W.2d at 171. From this, Joshua maintains that he is entitled to B.C.’s placement non plus ultra. We do not agree. [6] Contrary to Joshua’s argument and assignment of error, nothing in our opinion or mandate was antithetical to reunification of B.C. with Stacy, nor did our previous disposition undermine the juvenile court’s power to expeditiously proceed with Stacy’s “rehabilitative plan and placement of the children back in her care.” A.A. I, 307 Neb. at 860, 951 N.W.2d at 175. The portion of our main opinion which Joshua asserts stripped the juvenile court of power concerned temporary physical custody of B.C. with a parent as a preferred alternative to placement with a nonparent. We explained that at the time of B.C.’s removal, Stacy was the de facto custodial parent; and further, the juvenile court had the power to require her cooperation with orders of visitation and its reunification plan which could return B.C. to her home. A.A. I, supra. We noted that temporary physical custody with a noncustodial parent should not create a “‘substantial and unnecessary hindrance to efforts of reunification’” with the custodial parent. Id. at 852, 951 N.W.2d at - 687 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports IN RE INTEREST OF A.A. ET AL. Cite as 310 Neb. 679 171 (quoting In re Interest of Ethan M., 15 Neb. App. 148, 723 N.W.2d 363 (2006)). In our main opinion, we explained that a juvenile court may exercise its parens patriae responsibilities to “develop a transition plan constituting a reasonable intrusion of limited duration into the nonoffending parent’s rights to autonomy in the care and custody of the child.” Id. at 850, 951 N.W.2d at 170. We explained that it would not violate due process for the juvenile court to adjudicate custody rights between two parents to require the nonoffending parent’s cooperation of goals with reunification back into the home from where the child was taken. Id. We emphasized that the juvenile court needed to establish the most up-to-date information in developing an appropriate plan for temporary placement. See A.A. I, supra. As noted, the juvenile court always retained continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate B.C., and if warranted by up-to-date facts, it could proceed with a plan of reunifying B.C. with Stacy, the only parent over whom the court had jurisdiction at the time reunification was proposed. The fact that Joshua may have been proceeding on a parallel track to acquire temporary placement did not eclipse the potential for Stacy to acquire placement. The mandate associated with our main opinion, favorable to placement with Joshua, was not issued to the exclusion of “goals of reunification back into the home from where the child was taken.” Id. at 850, 951 N.W.2d at 170. Accordingly, Joshua’s sole assignment of error in which he claimed that placement of B.C. with Stacy exceeded the mandate is without merit.