Opinion ID: 1405837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Alleged misconduct by Juror Walker.

Text: Defendant cites two alleged instances of prejudicial misconduct by Juror Walker. Again, we see no circumstances which undermine the validity of the penalty verdict. 1. Note-passing to spectator  on our side.  On Thursday, December 9, 1982, just prior to closing arguments in the penalty phase, the court learned that Juror Walker had passed a note to the sister of the murder victim, Robert Opel. Walker was immediately questioned by the court in chambers, without counsel present. Walker explained that an acquaintance had accosted him in the corridor and confirmed that Walker was a juror in the Keenan case. The acquaintance then asked Walker to give a note to Opel's sister if she was present. The man indicated he was an old friend of the sister, that they had been out of touch, and that the note simply gave a telephone number where she could reach him if she wished. The intended recipient was described as having long black hair. Walker had seen a woman meeting this description in the courtroom; like other jurors, he had assumed she was a relative of the victim. Walker said he carried the note around in his wallet for several days because he knew he was not supposed to speak to any spectator and didn't want to deal with it. Finally, he handed the note to the woman without reading it. [31] Walker stated that when the man asked if Opel's sister was in the courtroom[,] ... I said that, of all the people, we know the regulars, I take it for granted this woman sits on this side would be something to do with this. (Italics added.) At a later point in the chambers discussion, Walker remarked, Honestly, what  we, as a collective, sat back there and we know who most of the regulars are in the courtroom, outside of the witnesses and stuff. There's  we'll sit there and say, `Well, this lady must be on our side, ' or she's not looking at so and so. (Italics added.) The court admonished Walker to [k]eep in mind though there are not sides to this case. Our side or their side or anything like that. [¶] As a juror you are an objective and impartial observer and you are not to pick sides in the case. You have to judge the case on the evidence. Walker said he agreed [a]bsolutely and stated in response to a direct question that he absolutely felt he could be a fair juror. The court then released Walker and summoned counsel. It summarized the discussion with Walker, noting Walker had been asked whether the incident would affect his ability to be fair. The court stated its belief that there was no problem. It did not, however, advise counsel of Walker's on our side comment. Defense counsel expressed concern about Walker's violation of the no-communication admonition. At this point, however, he did not request that Walker be excused and did not ask the court to declare a mistrial. On Monday, December 13, the second day of penalty deliberations, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The defense motion asserted Walker's misconduct in passing the note, and also argued that the court's failure to disclose the comment about our side had denied counsel the opportunity to investigate, before deliberations began, whether one or more jurors had prejudged the sentencing issue. [32] The court responded that, during the trial, Opel's sister had been sitting directly behind the prosecution table, which was on the side of the courtroom nearest the jury. According to the court, it had assumed Walker's on our side remark referred to the physical layout of the courtroom. [A]s a matter of caution, however, the court had admonished Walker not to take sides. The motion for mistrial was denied, and the court indicated its willingness to excuse Walker if further questioning demonstrated it was necessary. Walker was again summoned and examined by the court in counsel's presence. Defense counsel's requests to conduct his own examination were denied. Walker reiterated his prior account of the note-passing incident. The following exchange then occurred between the court and Walker: Q. When you were talking to me about this incident concerning the note, you indicated, if I can find it here  we have a record of everything that goes on, and that is how this was brought to my attention. You made a statement that the lady was `on our side,' something to that effect. [¶] A. I meant this side of the courtroom. [¶] Q. You meant the side of the courtroom the jury is on? [¶] A. Yeah. [¶] Q. You didn't mean anything about the prosecution side of the case or anything like that? [¶] A. No, sir, not at all. (Italics added.) At the conclusion of the questioning, the court told Walker, I had assumed that you were talking about your side of the courtroom, and that is how you identified the lady because she had been sitting there, and she does have long black hair. Walker replied, I don't turn around and watch everybody that comes through the door, but I have noticed certain people in the courtroom, and I only meant that she was sitting on this side of the courtroom. After Walker departed chambers, defense counsel complained that the court had not adequately investigated what Walker meant by his suggestion on December 9 that this lady must be on our side (italics added). This phraseology, counsel asserted, could not reasonably be interpreted as a mere reference to physical location in the courtroom. Counsel then moved to excuse Walker. The court briefly took the matter under submission, then denied the motion because I just don't believe that Mr. Walker has done anything improper that would justify his being excused in the case. Defendant renews his contention that he was denied a timely opportunity to determine whether good cause existed to excuse one or more jurors. He also suggests he was denied his rights to counsel and confrontation at critical stages of the proceedings, the two examinations of Juror Walker. (31) However, defendant fails to persuade us that the court was obliged to allow cross-examination of Walker. Under California law, the court must conduct an inquiry sufficient to determine the facts when placed on notice that good cause to discharge a juror may exist. ( Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 519.) In a criminal case, such investigation may include live testimony where appropriate ( In re Stankewitz (1985) 40 Cal.3d 391, 398 [220 Cal. Rptr. 382, 708 P.2d 1260]; People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199, 207-208 [155 Cal. Rptr. 657, 595 P.2d 91]), but no decision has suggested counsel must be allowed to examine witnesses on the misconduct issue. The prevailing federal rule is in accord; the court has broad discretion as to the mode of investigation of allegations of juror misconduct. (E.g., United States v. Bradshaw (10th Cir.1986) 787 F.2d 1385, 1389; United States v. Kelly (1st Cir.1983) 722 F.2d 873, 881, cert. den. (1984) 465 U.S. 1070 [79 L.Ed.2d 749, 104 S.Ct. 1425].) Even cases suggesting a full investigation is necessary in such cases imply that this duty is satisfied by the court's examination of pertinent witnesses. (E.g., United States v. Brantley (11th Cir.1984) 733 F.2d 1429, 1440, fn. 20, cert. den. (1985) 470 U.S. 1006 [84 L.Ed.2d 383, 105 S.Ct. 1362].) The court conducted an extensive investigation here, and we find no abuse of discretion in its mode of procedure. (32) Moreover, the record amply supports the trial court's conclusion that no prejudicial misconduct occurred. Obviously Walker violated his duty of silence when he passed the note to a trial spectator, but any presumption of prejudice from this misconduct (see, e.g., People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 156 [141 Cal. Rptr. 698, 570 P.2d 1050]) was fully rebutted. Walker's explanation made clear that the brief communication had no relation to the issues in the case and did not impair his duty to serve impartially. [33] The court was also within bounds in concluding that Walker's on our side remark was an innocent reference to physical location. His ambiguous statement that Opel's sister  must be on our side had been preceded by a similarly directed comment about his observation that she was  sit [ ting ] on this side .... Walker repeatedly and vehemently insisted that his remarks dealt only with where the woman was sitting in the courtroom, and that he absolutely understood his duty to remain impartial and not take sides. The court stated at several points that this had been its initial assumption. Since the court could observe Walker's demeanor when the critical remarks were made, we must defer to its assessment of his credibility. No reversible misconduct appears. 2. Jury-room outburst. (33) Subsequent to the penalty verdict, defendant moved for a new trial on grounds, among others, that Juror Walker had committed prejudicial misconduct (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. 2) by his diatribe against another panelist. The court dismissed the claim of misconduct and denied the new trial motion. Defendant urges the claim of misconduct received inadequate investigation. We agree with the trial court, however, that the conduct asserted, even had it been proven, was insufficient to impeach the penalty verdict. We explain in further detail. The motion for new trial included the declaration of defense investigator Cathy Kornblith. Kornblith declared Juror Walker had told her that, on the afternoon of Friday, December 10, he lost his temper in the course of deliberations. According to Kornblith, Walker said he pointed a finger at Juror Zadonsky, an elderly woman who was the lone holdout against death, and said, If you make this all for nothing, if you say we sat here for nothing, I'll kill you and there'll be another defendant out there  it'll be me. In a January 14, 1983, hearing on the new trial motion, defense counsel said he had subpoenaed Walker, who refused to sign a declaration but had agreed to testify in open court and was present. The court opined that a juror could not be called to impeach the verdict, that the threat was simply a display of temper during deliberations, and that the mental processes of jurors could not be investigated. However, the court granted a one-week continuance to enable the defense to gather further evidence. Subsequently, the defense submitted further declarations by the jury foreman, Piazza, by Kornblith, and by counsel. Piazza stated that Walker repeatedly shouted at Juror Zadonsky, the lone holdout, during the deliberations, and at one point shouted she should vote for death. On the afternoon of December 10, Walker became angry and shouted something at Zadonsky. Piazza could not recall the specific words used. Zadonsky began crying and shaking and went to the bathroom where I believe she vomited. Piazza said he expressed the view that it would not be right to vote while Zadonsky was in this emotional and physical state. Instead, two notes were sent to the judge stating that a juror was having a problem. After the subsequent weekend recess ordered by the court, Piazza declared, Zadonsky approached him on Monday morning and apologized for having been so emotional on Friday afternoon. Kornblith declared that in subsequent conversations with Walker, he admitted again he had threatened Zadonsky's life, agreed to tell the whole story in court, but refused to sign a confining written statement. Counsel's declaration recounted Walker's numerous efforts thereafter to avoid contact with him. The prosecution filed a counterdeclaration by Walker. In this declaration, Walker denied any death threat. He further claimed he had not engaged in repetitive shouting at Zadonsky, and had never shouted that she should vote for death. Walker stated that on a single occasion, during the afternoon of Friday, December 10, he rose from his chair and said to Zadonsky, I don't think you are as stupid as you are acting. At a hearing on January 21, counsel stated that he had contacted Zadonsky, who was unwilling to sign a declaration and simply does not want to be involved in this any more.... The court again denied a defense request that Walker be compelled to give live testimony. It reiterated that Mr. Walker cannot be called as a witness at this hearing, nor can any other juror, in my opinion. The court admitted into evidence the declarations of Piazza and Walker, accepted counsel's declaration for the limited purpose of showing defense efforts to contact Walker, and excluded Kornblith's declarations as hearsay. It then denied the new trial motion. The court found insufficient evidence of misconduct warranting a new trial. Defendant, said the court, was improperly attempting to delve into the details of deliberations and the jurors' mental processes. Moreover, [i]n my opinion, the alleged statement is not of a character that it would likely have influenced the verdict. Heated debate is expected of jurors, said the court, and to call a juror as a witness to impeach the verdict touches on the integrity of the jury system (citing Linhart v. Nelson (1976) 18 Cal.3d 641, 644-645 [134 Cal. Rptr. 813, 557 P.2d 104]). Defendant admits the current record, stripped of inadmissible hearsay, fails to establish that Walker specifically threatened to kill Zadonsky. However, he renews his contention that the court erred by refusing to compel a testimonial examination of Walker on the issue. We need not resolve the issue. Even if the described threat occurred, we must conclude as a matter of law that it was not prejudicial misconduct which impeaches the verdict. The outburst described in Kornblith's declarations was particularly harsh and inappropriate, but as the trial court suggested, no reasonable juror could have taken it literally. Manifestly, the alleged death threat was but an expression of frustration, temper, and strong conviction against the contrary views of another panelist. Jurors may be expected to disagree during deliberations, even at times in heated fashion. Thus, [t]o permit inquiry as to the validity of a verdict based upon the demeanor, eccentricities or personalities of individual jurors would deprive the jury room of its inherent quality of free expression. ( People v. Orchard (1971) 17 Cal. App.3d 568, 574 [95 Cal. Rptr. 66].) [34] Defendant urges that Zadonsky's objective manifestations of stress, such as shaking, crying, and vomiting, may be considered as proof the verdict was improperly affected. However, Hutchinson was not intended to establish such an indirect means of probing a juror's subjective mental processes. Even if such proof were competent, it is singularly weak in this case. Juror Walker's angry display occurred on Friday afternoon. Though the jury was subsequently recalled to the courtroom and asked how it wished to proceed in light of the notes received from the foreman (see discussion, ante ), Zadonsky made no effort, public or private, to apprise the court of Walker's intimidating behavior. When the jurors returned after the weekend recess, Zadonsky apologized to the foreman for being so emotional on Friday. After the penalty verdict was returned, the jurors were individually polled. Zadonsky affirmed, both by nodding and by oral response, that this was her individual verdict. Subsequently, she apparently declined to state under oath that she had been threatened or coerced. We find no basis for reversal on grounds of juror misconduct. [35]