Opinion ID: 899617
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Remand for Limited Resentencing

Text: When Malki's case was last before us, a panel of this Court remanded for resentencing so that the determination of an appropriate sentence, whether a Guidelines or a non-Guidelines sentence, will begin with the use of section 2M3.3 as the applicable sentencing guideline. Malki, 609 F.3d at 512. Malki argues that the district court -- wrongly -- interpreted this mandate as a remand for de novo sentencing and, therefore, miscalculated his Guidelines range by adding the two-level enhancement for abuse of a position of trust. We agree. -10- The text of the mandate did not unequivocally identify whether we contemplated limited or de novo resentencing. Nor was it evident from the 'spirit of the mandate' that we intended de novo resentencing. To the contrary, the mandate identified only a specific error to be corrected -- the use of the incorrect guideline when calculating Malki's Guidelines range. Malki, 609 F.3d at 510-11. We did not vacate Malki's conviction, but remanded for correction of a sentencing error; this suggests that the prior panel intended a limited resentencing. See Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1226, 1228 & n.6. Furthermore, we addressed -- and disposed of -- three additional arguments raised by Malki, see Malki, 609 F.3d at 511-12, which would have been unnecessary had we contemplated de novo resentencing proceedings. The district court acknowledged the lack of clarity in our remand order. See Resentencing Tr. 21:2522:1 (The matter is not free from doubt. The circuit perhaps could have been clearer on it.). Although our prior mandate could have -- and should have -- been more explicit, to the extent the mandate was unclear, the -11- ambiguity should have been resolved in Malki's favor. Cf., e.g., United States v. Saccoccia, 433 F.3d 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2005) ([W]e must read any ambiguities or omissions in a court order as redounding to the benefit of the person charged with contempt. (quotation and omission omitted)); United States v. Raftis, 427 F.2d 1145, 1146 (8th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) ([T]he law construes ambiguous language in a sentence pronouncement favorably to a prisoner.) . Although, on rare occasions, parties may re- litigate issues foreclosed by a limited mandate, this is not such a case. Before Judge Korman, the government did not object to omitting the enhancement for abuse of a position of trust even though it had both an opportunity and an incentive to raise it. Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1229. Likewise, it did not appeal Judge Korman's decision not to impose this enhancement. Furthermore, neither intervening circumstances nor cogent or compelling reasons justified reconsidering Judge Korman's finding during the resentencing phase. See, e.g., United States v. Bryson, 229 F.3d 425, 426 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam); United States v. Tenzer, 213 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000) -12- (citing, as examples of compelling reasons, a change in law, new evidence, correction of a clear error, and preventing manifest injustice). A change in the base offense level, rather than undo[ing] the entire 'knot of calculation,' merely requires transposing adjustments to a new baseline range. See Quintieri, F.3d at 1228 ([R]esentencing to correct specific sentencing errors does not ordinarily undo the entire 'knot of calculation.'). Hence, the district court procedurally erred by adding a two-point offense-level enhancement for abuse of a position of trust. See Cavera, 550 F.3d at 190 (district court errs when it makes a mistake in its Guidelines calculation).