Opinion ID: 406081
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: admissibility of the atlanta robbery

Text: 7 Rule 404(b) provides that Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), this court construed the rule in light of the other rules of evidence and held that Rule 404(b) calls for a two-step test: First, it must be determined that the extrinsic offense evidence is relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character. Second, the evidence must possess probative value that is not substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice and must meet the other requirements of rule 403. 1 The resolution of these questions lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the decision to admit extrinsic evidence will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. United States v. Vincent, 648 F.2d 1046, 1051 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. De La Torre, 639 F.2d 245, 250 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Benton, 637 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir. 1981). This Court is unusually mindful of this standard of review in a case like the instant one where the question of admissibility is difficult and where the trial judge carefully weighed the appropriate criterion in light of the proof presented. 8 Before we discuss the probative value of the extrinsic offense, we discuss briefly what the government must prove to obtain a conviction. A person violates 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) when he takes money from a bank through force or intimidation. Bank robbery under this section is a general intent and not a specific intent crime. United States v. Smith, 638 F.2d 131, 132 (9th Cir. 1981). Appellant has never urged that he lacked the capacity to distinguish right from wrong for purposes of criminal liability. Rather, he insists that he lacked the requisite intent because his paranoiac delusions rendered him unable to conform his conduct to the law. His capacity to conform his conduct to law thus constituted the focal point of dispute at trial. Now this Court must consider whether evidence of appellant's conduct during the Atlanta robbery is relevant to that issue. 9 An offer of proof is relevant when it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 401. The District Judge concluded that the extrinsic offense was relevant after listening to the testimony of a psychiatrist who stated that evidence of the Atlanta robbery was a significant factor in his analysis of whether appellant was legally insane. The judge's finding of relevancy is consistent with one of the few decisions in this circuit which address the relevancy of an extrinsic offense to an insanity defense. In United States v. Davis, 513 F.2d 319, 321 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 921, 96 S.Ct. 1129, 47 L.Ed.2d 329 (1976), the appellant raised an insanity defense to a charge of kidnapping. The government presented evidence of (1) another crime in which the appellant used the same alias; (2) a car theft occurring the same day of the kidnapping; and (3) the rape of the kidnapped victim. Finding that the evidence was properly submitted to the jury, this Court accepted the government's contention that: 10 (A)ppellant's conduct on all these occasions evidenced a well organized goal directed individual; that his acts, including his attempt to conceal his identity, to cover the course of his conduct, and to facilitate his escape, indicated no lack of coordination or reasoning, nor acts of a person acting out of impulse, but clearly indicated that he was acting according to design and plan, wholly consistent with the acts of a sane person and equally inconsistent with one afflicted with a mental disease. 513 F.2d at 321. 2 11 Appellant argues that even if the extrinsic offense is relevant, it is relevant only to his defense of paranoia because it tends to establish compulsion. He, therefore, insists that the evidence cannot be admitted on behalf of the government. The government, on the other hand, contends that appellant's behavior during the Atlanta robbery reveals a rational mind capable of adapting to the demands of the law. Since the extrinsic offense is identical and close in time to the San Antonio robbery, it is highly likely, according to the government, that appellant indulged himself in the same state of mind in the perpetration of both the extrinsic and charged offenses. United States v. Renteria, 625 F.2d 1279, 1281 (5th Cir. 1980); Beechum, supra, 582 F.2d at 911. 12 Admittedly, the extrinsic offense evidence in this case lends itself to conflicting interpretations, primarily because a defendant's mental state is frequently not revealed through physical conduct. Nevertheless, we cannot say that the district court abused his discretion in deeming the evidence admissible. First, we have encouraged trial judges to be liberal in their evidentiary rulings affecting proof of sanity. This is in keeping with the philosophy of letting in all facts which might be helpful to the jury in making the final determination of the criminal responsibility of the accused. United States v. McRary, 616 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1980). See also United States v. Ives, 609 F.2d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 919, 100 S.Ct. 1283, 63 L.Ed.2d 605 (1980). Second, once the trial court has determined that an offer of proof makes the existence of a fact more likely or less likely, it is for the jury to weigh that evidence and to draw reasonable inferences therefrom. See United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc). 13 The district court determined that the extrinsic offense evidence was relevant on the basis of a psychiatrist's opinion that it was a factor leading to his diagnosis and, after listening to lay witnesses describe appellant's behavior during the Atlanta robbery, on the basis of the government's contention that the robbery revealed appellant's capacity to conform his conduct to law. Although the psychiatrist for the defense testified that the prior bank robbery tended to prove compulsion, the jury was not bound to accept his conclusion. 3 They were free to regard the extrinsic offense in the light urged by the government if that interpretation could be characterized as a reasonable one. We think that it can. 14 Psychiatrists for the government described appellant as having the ability to make a choice between bank robbery and some other means of obtaining money. They reached this result in part because no aspect of bank robbery was part of appellant's delusion. The argument that he was compelled to rob banks appears weaker when one considers that he had resisted the alleged impulse prior to August 1980. Appellant travelled for many months apparently without experiencing an overwhelming compulsion to rob banks. In the context of this history, the Atlanta robbery may represent simply a voluntary decision to disobey the law though he has the capacity to conform. Thus, it indicates that when appellant robbed the Atlanta bank, he nevertheless continued to possess the ability to resist a criminal impulse. When he robbed South Park National in San Antonio one month later, he may have been simply repeating conduct that had been proven successful, rather than acting out of compulsion. Furthermore, appellant's conduct during the robbery supports the inference that he was able to conform to the requirements of the law insofar as it shows the capacity to formulate a plan and to follow it through rationally and with self-control. 4 When appellant arrived in San Antonio and decided to rob another bank, he checked out at least one other target before choosing South Park National. This again suggests an ability to resist the power of his delusions. 15 We do not find the extrinsic offense to be persuasive evidence of legal sanity standing alone. It must be considered in the context of appellant's history with the recognition that sanity is a unique issue requiring proof of many facts that by themselves may lack significance. Because a well considered judgment on the criminal responsibility of the accused requires a wide knowledge of the facts relating to his behavior, McRary, supra, 616 F.2d at 184, and because the jury, considering the extrinsic offense in light of all the evidence presented, reasonably could have viewed the Atlanta robbery as suggesting an ability to conform to the law, we cannot say that the trial judge clearly abused his discretion in finding the evidence relevant. De La Torre, supra, 639 F.2d at 250. 16 Appellant also contends that even if the evidence is relevant, the government did not need to introduce it to prove its case. Beechum requires that the admission of the extrinsic offense evidence constitute more than a  'needless presentation of cumulative evidence.'  582 F.2d at 917. While this Court has not defined the degree of need that the government must show to render the evidence admissible, see Benton, supra, 637 F.2d at 1057, and United States v. McMahon, 592 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1979), it seems clear that the government's case need not be flimsy to justify admission of the extrinsic offense evidence. United States v. Barnes, 586 F.2d 1052, 1059 n.8 (5th Cir. 1978). Even if the government's proof of intent is adequate, we may find its need sufficient to warrant admission of the testimony. McMahon, supra, 592 F.2d at 875. 17 In considering the government's need for the extrinsic offense evidence, we first acknowledge the heavy burden placed on the government once a defendant introduces slight evidence of lack of capacity: The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the capacity to conform his conduct to the law. United States v. Mota, 598 F.2d 995, 999 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom., 444 U.S. 1084, 100 S.Ct. 1042, 62 L.Ed.2d 770 (1980); United States v. Phillips, 519 F.2d 48, 49 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059, 96 S.Ct. 796, 46 L.Ed.2d 650 (1976). This task is difficult not only because the government has a weighty burden of proof, but also because the object of proof-sanity-can never be established directly. 18 Since the extrinsic offense evidence in this case, as we have explained, has its real significance within the context of appellant's behavior during the year prior to the robbery, we view the government's need for the evidence in light of its need to rely generally on the observations of lay witnesses. Lay testimony was perhaps unusually important to the government's case because the experts were not sharply conflicting. Experts for both sides conceded appellant's paranoia. One psychiatrist for the government, Dr. John C. Sparks, diagnosed appellant's mental disorder as paranoiac. The government's other psychiatrist stated that paranoia was possible. The clinical psychologist for the government admitted that he could not rule out paranoia as the correct diagnosis. As the last witness to testify before closing arguments, Dr. Sparks also stated that the ultimate question of legal sanity in this case was not answered easily, and for this reason, other experts could dispute his conclusion that appellant could conform his conduct to the law. He even conceded that it was possible for appellant to be unable to conform his conduct to law on the day of the robbery. Insofar as evidence of the Atlanta robbery portrays appellant as a person who can conform his conduct to the law's requirements, it tends, however slightly, to help the trier of fact choose among expert explanations of appellant's conduct or reject expert opinion entirely. Bearing in mind again the narrow scope of review available to us on this issue, we find that the government's need for the extrinsic offense was sufficient to justify admission of the evidence. 19 In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that relevance and need cannot be considered in a vacuum. The application of Beechum to the facts of any case requires a commonsense assessment of all the circumstances surrounding the extrinsic offense. Rule 404(b) offers no mechanical solution: The determination must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means of proof and other factors appropriate for making decisions of this kind under Rule 403. Advisory Committee Notes on Proposed Rules of Evidence, 28 U.S.C. Rules of Evidence at 109 (1975). See also United States v. Wesevich, 666 F.2d 984, 988 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982). This brings us to the second step in the two-part test established in Beechum, which requires us to ask whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. We accept the district court's conclusion on this point for several reasons. 20 First, though appellant did not choose to offer this evidence, he recognizes that the jury could weigh the evidence in his favor. At least one expert testified that he interpreted the prior bank robbery as additional evidence of appellant's compulsive desire to escape intelligence agencies. Appellant's attorney made this view of the extrinsic offense clear to the jury. Second, a record of over one thousand pages convinces us that the government did not use the extrinsic offense to portray appellant as a bad man with a propensity for robbing banks. In its closing statement, the government made a single direct reference to the Atlanta robbery. The focus of the trial from the beginning was whether appellant could conform his behavior to the standards set by law. In light of the overwhelming amount of psychiatric testimony, it is highly unlikely that the jury was misled as to the probative purpose of the extrinsic offense evidence. Finally, we note that the extrinsic offense here is not of a heinous nature: (I)t would hardly incite the jury to irrational decision by its force on human and emotion. Beechum, supra, 582 F.2d at 917. Under these circumstances, the judge's cautionary instructions to the jury on the limited use of the extrinsic offense evidence were adequate to prevent any undue prejudice engendered by testimony regarding the Atlanta robbery. 21 The admissibility of the extrinsic offense evidence to prove appellant's legal sanity has troubled this Court just as it disturbed the district judge. Nevertheless, we are convinced that appellant has shown no clear abuse of discretion in the district court's admission of the evidence. Sanity is very hard to define and to prove, and in the past, we have encouraged district judges to be liberal in their rulings affecting proof of sanity. McRary, supra, 616 F.2d at 181. We believe that rational disobedience of the law in Atlanta can be construed, in the context of appellant's history prior to the robbery, as evidence of capacity to conform to the law. The district court's discretion to determine questions of relevancy is a basic doctrine in the law of evidence. That this case presents a close relevancy question only tends to justify leaving the determination in the hands of the district judge. For all of the reasons in the foregoing analysis, we hold that evidence of the Atlanta robbery was admissible under Rule 404(b).