Opinion ID: 2516369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-Arrest Statements to Police as Involuntary

Text: ś 25 Defendant contends that all statements given by him to police should have been suppressed as involuntary. He reasons that in the absence of suppression, the presentation of evidence in his own defense was unduly impaired because he could not testify without risking impeachment. We have previously rejected this argument. [Statements obtained in violation of ... Miranda ... may nevertheless be used for impeachment of the testimony given by the defendant ... provided the statements were obtained without violation of the traditional standards for evaluating voluntariness and trustworthiness. State v. Walker, 138 Ariz. 491, 495, 675 P.2d 1310, 1314 (1984) (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975)). ś 26 Specifically, defendant argues that police delayed the Miranda warning, ignored his request for counsel, and withheld medical attention until after interrogation. The state responds that the defendant's statements were voluntary, but that even if they were not, defendant waived his right to challenge the trial court's voluntariness ruling when he chose not to testify at trial. See State v. Gonzales, 181 Ariz. 502, 512, 892 P.2d 838, 848 (1995). ś 27 This court has held that when a defendant chooses not to testify, he waives the right to claim erroneous admission of involuntary statements for purposes of impeachment. See id.; State v. Conner, 163 Ariz. 97, 102-03, 786 P.2d 948, 953-54 (1990). Without the defendant's testimony, we are unable to ascertain whether error is prejudicial because the state chose not to offer the challenged statements. See Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 512, 892 P.2d at 848. By testifying, the defendant assures review of actual rather than hypothetical prejudice. See id. Such a requirement also precludes a defendant from manufacturing a specious ground for appeal by falsely alleging that the impeachment threat alone deterred him from testifying. See id. Therefore, because defendant in the present case did not testify, he waives his right to challenge the trial court's ruling on voluntariness. ś 28 Although our conclusion on this issue rests on waiver, we concur in the trial court's ruling that the statements were in fact voluntary. In assessing voluntariness, we consider the totality of circumstances to determine whether the statements were or were not the product of a rational intellect and a free will. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (internal quotations omitted). Defendant contends that the circumstances of his arrest on an isolated country road, the place and conduct of interrogation, the absence of food or water, alleged deceit by police as to the true nature of the investigation, defendant's age, immaturity, the lack of family support, the circumstance of the crime, and alleged excessive media coverage render his statements to police involuntary. ś 29 We disagree. The record reveals no coercive or pretextual police tactics, no intellectual or physical infirmity, no deceitful practice, and no attempt to undermine defendant's rational intellect or free will. Gonzales, 181 Ariz. at 512, 892 P.2d at 848. We conclude on this record that defendant's will was not overborne. His statements were neither coerced nor improperly induced, but were freely given in every respect.