Opinion ID: 155170
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Concreteness and Particularity

Text: 19 As noted above, to establish injury in fact, a party must first and foremost establish an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (quotations omitted). The Supreme Court addressed this aspect of standing in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947). In Mitchell, employees of the federal executive civil service and the United Public Workers of America sought a declaratory judgment that a portion of § 9(a) of the Hatch Political Activity Act (providing [n]o officer or employee in the executive branch of the Federal Government ... shall take any active part in political management or in political campaigns) was unconstitutional. Id. at 82, 67 S.Ct. at 560. Plaintiffs challenged the statute, inter alia, on First Amendment grounds, asserting it violated their rights of freedom of speech, the press, and assembly. Plaintiffs alleged a desire to engage in political campaigns and acts of political management, but did not allege specifically attempted but statutorily prohibited actions or statements. Id. at 82, 67 S.Ct. at 560. The Supreme Court stated: 20 [T]he federal courts ... do not render advisory opinions. For adjudication of constitutional issues, concrete legal issues, presented in actual cases, not abstractions are requisite. This is as true of declaratory judgments as any other field.... 21 The power of courts, and ultimately of this Court to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress arises only when the interests of the litigants require the use of this judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. A hypothetical threat is not enough. We can only speculate as to the kinds of political activity the appellants desire to engage in or as to the contents of their proposed public statements or the circumstances of their publication. 22 Id. at 89-90, 67 S.Ct. at 564-65 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 23 The same is true here. Plaintiffs do not advance a single claim they wish to make, or receive, which could be prohibited under the health claims regulations. Instead, plaintiffs make generalized assertions that they will be adversely affected by the health claims regulations. R. at 4. Such assertions are simply insufficient. 8 When we are left to speculate as to the nature of the claim plaintiffs may desire to make, and the treatment such a hypothetical claim may receive under the regulations, plaintiffs have failed to allege a sufficient injury in fact. 9 See Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Properties, Inc., 98 F.3d 590, 596 (10th Cir.1996) (holding purely abstract injury claims do not provide particular, direct, concrete injury necessary to confer standing). Without an allegation of specific, concrete harm, plaintiffs do not have standing.