Opinion ID: 2633469
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The circuit court's interpretation of fraud yields absurd and unjust results.

Text: In addition to arguing that an ambiguity exists as to the plain meaning of fraud in the tolling statute, the prosecution further contends that the circuit court's interpretation of fraud yields absurd and unjust results. We concur. The prosecution argues that the circuit court's narrow interpretation of fraud in the tolling statute excludes a sizeable number of offenses involving clearly fraudulent behavior. (Citing, inter alia, HRS §§ 19-3 (1993)) (Election frauds), 19-3.5 (1993) (Voter fraud), 231-34 (Supp.1999) (Attempt to defeat or evade tax), 346-43.5 (1993) (Medical assistance frauds), 431:10C-307.7 (Supp.2000) (Insurance fraud), 708-870 (1993) (Deceptive business practices), 708-871 (1993) (False advertising), 708-873 (1993) (Defrauding secured creditors), 708-874 (1993) (Misapplication of entrusted property), and 708-8200 (1993) (Cable television service fraud). The prosecution points out that the commentaries accompanying two of the offenses within the rubric of Business and Commercial Frauds, HRS §§ 708-871 and 708-873, suggest that they are lesser or inchoate misdemeanor forms of theft by deception. The circuit court's interpretation of HRS § 701-108(3)(a), however, would result in these misdemeanors being tolled, while the felony offense of theft by deception would not, merely due to the presence or absence of the phrase intent to defraud, thereby rendering the scope of the tolling provision illogically restrictive. A more rational reading of fraud, the prosecution argues, would encompass statutes that describe fraudulent states of mind or conduct but that may not expressly contain the word fraud or defraud. The Appellees counter that while the circuit court's interpretation of HRS § 701-108(3)(a) excludes a number of statutes arguably dealing with fraudulent practices, it nonetheless does apply to an equal number of offenses involving fraud, which demonstrates that the circuit court's interpretation of the term is not illogically restrictive. [17] Nevertheless, the fact that the circuit court's interpretation of the tolling statute extends to a number of statutes involving fraudulent behavior is not itself dispositive of the issue. More important is that the circuit court's interpretation excludes felonies from tolling but includes misdemeanors by creating a false dichotomy between offenses that expressly contain the phrase intent to defraud in the body of the statute and those that do not. The interpretation urged by the prosecution would eliminate the absurd and unjust result of subjecting those charged with misdemeanor infractions such as falsifying business records, making false statements concerning vaccinations, or tampering with commercial scales to extended exposure to prosecution while those charged with voter fraud, election fraud, insurance fraud, tax fraud, and other serious crimes would be afforded early relief from the threat of prosecution. Therefore, wholly independent of the statutory ambiguity discussed supra, and mindful of the language of HRS § 1-15(3) that [e]very construction which leads to an absurdity shall be rejected, we may look beyond the language of the tolling provision to determine legislative intent. See State v. Haugen, 104 Hawai`i 71, 77, 85 P.3d 178, 184 (2004) (Inasmuch as a literal construction would produce an absurd and unjust result, we are willing to look beyond the plain, obvious, and unambiguous language of the statute and ascertain its underlying legislative intent.) (Internal quotations, citations, and brackets omitted.).