Opinion ID: 705158
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Introduction of plea agreements into evidence

Text: 58 Wright argues that the district court committed error when it permitted the government to introduce into evidence plea agreements of co-defendant witnesses. Wright asserts that, because these agreements contained promises to testify truthfully, they improperly and prejudicially vouched for the credibility of the witnesses. Wright also asserts that the government improperly vouched for the veracity of the co-defendant witnesses in its closing argument. Finally, Wright argues that it was impermissible for one government witness, Debbie Behmer, to testify that her plea agreement included a provision requiring her to take a polygraph test if asked. None of these arguments is persuasive. 59 In general, statements contained in a plea agreement that require a witness to testify truthfully should not be used during direct examination and may be used on re-direct only if the credibility of the witness is attacked on cross examination. 57 When the defense attacks the witness's credibility in its opening statement, however, then the prosecutor is permitted to elicit testimony about the truth telling requirement on direct examination. 58 Wright's counsel attacked the credibility of the government's witnesses in his opening statement. 59 As such, counsel opened the door for the government to introduce the plea agreements on direct examination. 60 Nor did the government improperly bolster or vouch for its witnesses. The test for whether a witness has been improperly bolstered is whether the jury could reasonably believe that the prosecutor was indicating a personal belief in the witness' credibility. 60 As this court has stated, this test may be satisfied in two ways: 61 First, the prosecution may place the prestige of the government behind the witness, by making explicit personal assurances of the witness' veracity. Secondly, a prosecutor may implicitly vouch for the witness' veracity by indicating that information not presented to the jury supports the testimony. 61 62 The government's closing argument did not violate either prong of this standard. The impermissible language complained of is the following: 63 Now, do they ever tell the truth, and how do you know they are telling the truth? Well, yeah, first thing you do is make it so the truth helps them and lies hurt them. You give them a carrot stick, you get a break for the truth, and hurt for lying.... And I submit, ladies and gentlemen, that if you examine the testimony of the witnesses, you will find that it is worthy of belief, that it does comport with the other evidence. 64 The government has this deal with them, and they are required to cooperate, and the cooperation [sic] is defined in the agreements, the cooperation and taking the stand and telling the truth. 65 Now do we have a lot of control over them? Yeah, we put them--we put the squeeze on them, you better believe it is a big squeeze ... 62 66 Before making these statements, however, the government urged caution in evaluating the testimony of co-defendant witnesses: 67 Let me talk about the government witnesses. You know, and this applies to the defendants' comments that a number of the witnesses are crooks; and, ladies and gentlemen, they are, but we have caught a lot of crooks, and you have seen a lot of them testify from this stand, and you have every right to use caution when you listen to a person like that. When you listen to a person who's gotten convicted, you ought to be cautious.. 63 68 When read in context, it is clear that the government's comments did not improperly vouch for the witnesses. Rather, the government urged a cautious and detailed examination of the witnesses' testimony. We find no impropriety in the prosecutor's statement--he never issued a personal assurance regarding the witnesses' veracity. 69 Finally, Wright's argument regarding testimony about a polygraph examination is without merit because this testimony was elicited by Wright's counsel himself, not the government. 64 Accordingly, there was no error. 70 G. Denial of motion for mistrial based on prosecutor's impermissible reference to Wright's failure to take the stand 71 Wright contends that the court erred by failing to grant his motion for mistrial based on the government's allegedly impermissible comment on his decision to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 65 During rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor said: 72 And who's William Hall, ladies and gentlemen? Meet William Hall, Danny Wright. Start with that, and then put the six other witnesses on there. Listen to their stories. Does it fit? Does it make sense? Does it comport with your common sense? Why in the world is he living under a phony name? Did you ever hear an explanation for that? 73 Mr. SILVERMAN: I'm going to object and move for a mistrial on that. THE COURT: It's denied. 66 74 Wright argues that although this was not a direct reference to his failure to testify, it was an implied reference sufficient to meet the test for impropriety. 75 The Fifth Amendment prohibits a prosecutor from commenting directly or indirectly on a defendant's failure to testify. 67 A prosecutor's statement violates the defendant's right to remain silent if either (1) the statement was manifestly intended to be a comment on the defendant's failure to testify; or (2) the statement was of such a character that a jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. 68 The question is not whether the jury possibly or even probably would view the remark in this manner, but whether the jury necessarily would have done so. 69 The defendant bears the burden of establishing the existence of one of the two criteria. 70 The comment must be examined in context, in order to evaluate the prosecutor's motive and to discern the impact of the statement. 71 Because the trial judge is the only person who has the opportunity to observe the prosecutor's demeanor firsthand, we review the district court's denial of the motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. 72 76 Under this standard, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. The remark is not one that a jury would necessarily take to be a comment on Wright's failure to testify. Besides taking the stand in one's own defense, there are a variety of ways to explain the use of a phony name. As such, the remark is not so much a comment on Wright's failure to testify, but rather on Wright's counsel's failure to counter or explain the false name. It is not error to comment on the failure of the defense as opposed to the defendant, to counter or explain the evidence. 73 Thus, we find no error. H. Sentencing 77 Knowles and Squires contend that the court erred by applying the sentencing guidelines, when there was no evidence that the conspiracy continued past the guidelines' effective date, November 1, 1987. The government offers two reasons why the guidelines should apply. First, there was testimony that drug importation continued at least until December, 1987. Second, this court has already upheld application of the Guidelines in this case in the sentencing of co-defendant Fitzwater. 74 Neither contention is persuasive. 78 The testimony relied upon by the government is that of Mark Govea. Govea was the right-hand man to Kennie Rodriguez, one of the leaders of the organization. During the course of his testimony, the government questioned Govea regarding houses that were used to off-load the contraband: 79 Q: Let's go back to the offload houses. You said there was one in Destin? 80 A: Yes. That was Kevin Lacey's house, his actual residence. 81 Q: His home? 82 A: Yes. 83 Q: You said there were two in Fort Myers. 84 A: Yeah. 85 Q: And there was--what other ones? You said three in the Miami/Fort Lauderdale area. 86 A: There was Duguay's house. 87 Q: Gilbert Duguay? 88 A: Yeah, which was at Lighthouse Point, and later on we used--in 1987, Archie used his home in Keystone Heights, which is in North Miami. 89 Q: Archie who?A: Archie Jones. 90 Q: What was he bringing in there? 91 A: Cocaine. 92 Q: Okay. When was the last time that came in? 93 A: December '87, that was the second trip there. 94 Q: What boat was he using to do that on? 95 A: The OLIVES. He had bought the OLIVES from Kennie and Jose. 75 96 We agree with the defendants that this testimony alone is insufficient to tie Archie Jones' venture in December 1987 to the charged conspiracy. Several factors are significant in this determination. First, Archie Jones bought the boat from Kenny Rodriguez and Jose Sepulveda and used Gilbert Duguay's house as an off-load house. This indicates that Jones was operating on his own--no evidence was ever submitted that it was standard for pilots working for the organization to buy the boats they used, and no evidence was submitted the Duguay's house was used for any other ventures by the organization. Second, Govea corrected himself, saying that Archie not we (i.e., the drug organization) used the house as an off-load house. Third, Jones smuggled in cocaine, and Govea had testified that although the Rodriguez organization at one time did smuggle cocaine, it had long ago switched exclusively to marijuana and hash oil. 97 The government's second reason is likewise unavailing. Fitzwater pled guilty, and thus was obliged to accept the dates as stated on the indictment. Fitzwater's counsel failed to argue that the conspiracy ended prior to November 1, 1987, arguing only that there was no evidence to tie Fitzwater to any events after that date. In the case of the defendants here, the dates were a contested trial issue. The government was required to prove that the conspiracy continued after November 1, 1987, and, as the only evidence provided was Govea's testimony, they failed to carry their burden. We therefore vacate the defendants' sentences, and remand for resentencing pursuant to pre-Guidelines law. 76 98 The defendants raise various other challenges to the application of the Guidelines to their sentences. In light of our decision, these issues are rendered moot.