Opinion ID: 2163453
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: MERC and Court of Appeals Affirmance of ALJ Kurtz's Pre-Arbitral Deferral Order

Text: On April 4, 1977, MERC Commissioners Rehmus and Milmet affirmed the decision and recommended order of ALJ Kurtz; Commissioner Ellmann dissented. Detroit Fire Dep't, 1977 MERC Lab Op 267. [13] The MERC majority: (1) rejected the association's allegations of sufficient anti-union history and animosity toward the collective bargaining process to preclude deferral; (2) determined that deferral in this instance was consistent with prior MERC decisions and policy; (3) eschewed the notion that the association's disputes primarily involved statutory obligations; and (4) concluded that insufficient evidence had been presented to establish a clear refusal by the city to comply with the association's information request and that this charge could be properly resolved in the arbitral forum. Id., 277-278. [14] MERC retained jurisdiction to review both the arbitral proceedings and award. On September 13, 1977, the Court of Appeals affirmed by order the MERC decision to defer exercise of its jurisdiction to the arbitral process. CAVANAGH, J., dissented without separate opinion. Central to its ruling was the MERC finding that the dispute here, [is] arguably subject to the contractual arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. The Court of Appeals did not address the association's charge relative to the city's alleged refusal to furnish requested information. II. ISSUE AND ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES On April 17, 1978, this Court granted the association's application for leave to appeal, limited to the following issue: Whether the Michigan Employment Relations Commission may, when presented with allegations of unfair labor practices, defer hearing of those charges until after an arbitration award has been made pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, where the subject matter of the alleged unfair labor practices is arguably covered by the collective bargaining agreement in question. Along with other arguments raised by the association which we do not address, [15] the association contends that this question should be answered in the negative inasmuch as: (1) pre-arbitral deferral violates MERC's statutory obligation to remedy unfair labor practice charges as provided in § 16 of PERA; (2) PERA, as interpreted in Rockwell v Crestwood School Dist, 393 Mich 616, 642-643; 227 NW2d 736 (1975), app dis 427 US 901; 96 S Ct 3184; 49 L Ed 2d 1195 (1976), prohibits MERC from refusing to decide statutory unfair labor practice charges properly within its jurisdiction; and (3) unlike the Federal congressional policy favoring arbitral resolution of grievance disputes, no such countervailing policy is expressed in the Michigan statutory scheme to support arbitral deferral. The city responds to these arguments as follows: (1) § 16 of PERA grants MERC discretionary authority to defer disputes arguably within the parties' contractual, collective bargaining agreement; (2) Rockwell v Crestwood School Dist , is distinguishable from the deferral question and its general mandate has nonetheless been fulfilled; and (3) like the Federal policy, the Michigan labor regulatory scheme favors the concept of pre-arbitral deferral insofar as that concept furthers the policy preference for the voluntary resolution of grievance disputes. III. DISCUSSION The matter of pre-arbitral deferral under § 16 of PERA is one of first impression in this state. There are, however, abundant decisions of the NLRB, the United States Supreme Court and the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal considering comparable doctrine and provisions emanating from the NLRA, upon which the parties have relied in addressing the pre-arbitral deferral issue on leave. The Michigan labor relations acts are modeled on the NLRA, Rockwell v Crestwood School Dist , fn 2 supra, 635-636. PERA is derived from that act, Lamphere Schools v Lamphere Federation of Teachers, 400 Mich 104, 120; 252 NW2d 818 (1977). Section 16 of PERA is virtually identical in language to § 10, subds (b), (c), and (e) of the NLRA, from which the doctrine of pre-arbitral deferral arises. Therefore, this Court may appropriately look to the Federal precedents for guidance in considering the propriety of pre-arbitral deferral. MERC v Reeths-Puffer School Dist, 391 Mich 253, 260; 215 NW2d 672 (1974). See Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v Detroit, 391 Mich 44, 53; 214 NW2d 803 (1974). We will likewise review MERC's treatment of the deferral doctrine as it has been shaped by the Federal sphere. IV. THE NLRB'S AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY'S POSITION ON THE DISCRETIONARY EXERCISE OF DEFERRAL AUTHORITY UNDER THE NLRA