Opinion ID: 2219269
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Nature of the Proscribed Conduct

Text: ถ 91. The third factor, the nature of the proscribed conduct, requires an examination of the policy considerations embedded in the various battery statutes. ถ 92. Wisconsin Stat. ง 940.19 lays out gradations of victim injury and offender intent and assigns punishment in accord with the severity of these factors. This pattern is perfectly illustrated by the escalating definitions of bodily harm, substantial bodily harm, and great bodily harm: (1) Bodily harm means physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. Wis. Stat. ง 939.22(4). (2) Substantial bodily harm means bodily injury that causes a laceration that requires stitches; any fracture of a bone; a burn; a temporary loss of consciousness, sight or hearing; a concussion; or a loss or fracture of a tooth. Wis. Stat. ง 939.22(38). (3) Great bodily harm means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily injury. Wis. Stat. ง 939.22(14). ถ 93. By contrast, the special circumstances batteries in Chapter 940 enhance the penalty that may be imposed for bodily harm because of the status of the offender or the status/vulnerability of the victim. Plainly, the legislature wanted more severe punishment for intentional bodily harm to a law enforcement officer, a fire fighter, a judge, or a juror, than to the ordinary participant in a bar fight. ถ 94. This objective will be achieved when the offender intends and causes only bodily harm and is charged under a special circumstances battery. However, Davison's interpretation of the statute would permit an offender to be charged with only one battery, regardless of the aggravating circumstances. See ถ 68 above for discussion. This would mean, for instance, that an offender who causes substantial bodily harm to a woman by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm, will suffer no incremental punishment by virtue of the fact that the offender is under court injunction and the woman is the person who sought the injunction. Both งง 940.19(2) and 940.20(2) are Class E felonies. Likewise, an offender who causes substantial bodily harm by fracturing a person's bone by an act done with intent to cause only pain will suffer no incremental punishment, even though the person battered is a public officer and the offender battered the public officer in order to influence the action of the officer. See Wis. Stat. งง 940.19(2), 940.20(4). An offender who succeeds in intentionally breaking a police officer's nose but stops short of inflicting great bodily harm will suffer no incremental punishment as a result of the officer's status. See Wis. Stat. งง 940.19(3), 940.20(2). These results show that Davison's interpretation would undermine the objective of special circumstances batteries in a number of situations. ถ 95. A battery is an act causing a degree of bodily injury, whether the act is prosecuted under ง 940.19 or ง 940.20(1). But the legislature did not wish to treat all pains, all lacerations and broken bones, and all permanent disfigurements equally. It is not merely the underlying act that distinguishes the offenses involved. The circumstances in which the offender commits the act are also important. State v. Selmon, 175 Wis. 2d 155, 166, 498 N.W.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1993). The statutes are designed to protect different interests. See Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d at 170. ถ 96. The defendant might argue that many acts of battery will be more severely punished if prosecuted successfully as special circumstances batteries and that subsection (2m) therefore serves to prevent a second charge and punishment under a subsection of ง 940.19. In fact, however, misdemeanor battery is normally a lesser-included offense under งง 940.20, 940.201, 940.203, 940.205, and 940.207. Cf. State v. Fitzgerald, 2000 WI App 55, ถ 8, 233 Wis. 2d 584, 608 N.W.2d 391. Hence, defendants would not be eligible for multiple convictions in these circumstances because of ง 939.66(1), assuming subsection (1) is interpreted to apply to both charged and uncharged offenses. The problem of a true lesser-included offense under the special circumstances batteries was addressed by ง 939.66(1) before the enactment of subsection (2m). [28] ถ 97. As a result, we believe that the nature of the proscribed conduct supports the position that the legislature did not intend to preclude prosecution and punishment under both งง 940.19(6) and 940.20(1).