Opinion ID: 2554480
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Evidence of Gang Activity

Text: Campos-Alvarez's main contention on appeal is that the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence of his membership in Mara R and the violent rivalry between Mara R and Vatos Locos. Campos-Alvarez argues that this evidence was unnecessary to advance the government's case and served only to inflame the jury against him. According to Campos-Alvarez, guilt by association subverted his defense. We disagree. The admissibility of the evidence of gang membership and activity was raised in advance of trial. The government moved for leave to introduce the evidence, contending that it showed the context of and motivation for the shootings. Campos-Alvarez moved in limine to exclude the evidence, arguing it was unnecessary and unduly prejudicial because, under the prosecution's theory of the case, he had a motive to commit the shootings to avenge the killing of his friend Walter Villatoro regardless of his membership in Mara R. The judge rejected appellant's argument and permitted the prosecution to present the proffered gang evidence. The judge reasoned that the evidence would be helpful in making sense of the crime, [p]articularly where there [was] no evidence that the victim ... was the person that shot the friend [Walter Villatoro]. Proof that the attack took place in the context of ongoing gang rivalry showed that it was more than just revenge for the shooting of a friend. The trial judge's decision to admit the gang evidence is subject to review for abuse of discretion. [3] Evidence is relevant, if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. [4] When gang evidence is relevant, the trial judge must balance the probative value of the gang references against their potential for prejudice. [5] We recognize that a defendant may be prejudiced in the eyes of the jury by evidence of his gang involvement. This court has cautioned trial judges to consider carefully before admitting evidence of gang retaliation, and then only after ensuring that the government's evidence is relevant, necessary and supported by competent evidence. [6] The trial judge has the discretion to exclude [such] evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. [7] There is, however, no special admissibility rule for gang-related evidence: it is subject to the same balancing standard as applies to the admission of evidence generally. [8] Such balancing is quintessentially a discretionary function of the trial court, and we owe a great degree of deference to its decision. [9] We are satisfied that the trial judge did not exercise his discretion erroneously here. There was legitimate probative force to the evidence of Campos-Alvarez's membership in Mara R, the shooting victims' membership in Vatos Locos, and the violent rivalry between the two gangs; and the government had a substantial need for that evidence. [10] Without it, the government would have been left to argue, implausibly, that Campos-Alvarez, an apparently ordinary member of the community, embarked on a vigilante shooting spree to avenge the killing of his friend Walter Villatoroand not by targeting Villatoro's actual killer, but by indiscriminately attacking three persons who had nothing to do with the killing. Only when viewed in the context of an ongoing gang war did this picture of violent retaliation by Campos-Alvarez make sense. Because Villatoro was a friend associated with Campos-Alvarez's gang and was killed by a rival gang member at a time when the two gangs were feuding, it was understandable that Campos-Alvarez would seek revenge against any member of that rival gang. Campos-Alvarez's effort to recruit Roque Lopez, a member of Mara R, to participate in an attack on Vatos Locos members likewise made sense in light of their gang rivalry. Campos-Alvarez argues there was no evidence the leadership of Mara R directed him to carry out an attack on the enemy gang, but that is beside the point. A gang member can act on behalf of the gang, or for gang-related reasons, without following command and control protocol, and he can do so with more than a single purpose. The trial judge reasonably could find that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We perceive no significant danger that [Campos-Alvarez's] conviction rested merely on guilt by association. [11] Kenny Loza's and Javier Morales's eyewitness identifications, combined with Roque Lopez's testimony about Campos-Alvarez's incriminating statements, ensured that Campos-Alvarez's gang membership did not substitute for proof of his guilt. [12] And while [t]he admission of evidence whose sole purpose is to connect a defendant to a group of people of questionable character and [that is] not relevant to some other factual issue is improper, [13] the evidence concerning Campos-Alvarez's gang activity was limited to what was directly probative of the charges against him. There was no evidence, for example, of Campos-Alvarez's position in Mara R or his unrelated gang activities. Nor did the government possess alternative methods or evidence [to] prove the same proposition in a manner that [would have been] less unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. [14] Any risk of unfair prejudice was further mitigated by the fact that the gang evidence supported the theory of Campos-Alvarez's defense at trial. He argued to the jury that Kenny Loza, Noel Loza, and Javier Morales conspired among themselves to accuse him falsely of the shootings. That argument was made far more plausible by his membership in a rival gang. In short, the trial judge fairly found that the probative value of the evidence of Campos-Alvarez's membership in Mara R and of the violent conflict between Mara R and Vatos Locos was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. The judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting that evidence.