Opinion ID: 1660492
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The circuit court had jurisdiction to review the decision of MDOC.

Text: ¶ 18. The circuit court held that it lacks jurisdiction to review the actions of the Classification Committee absent due process violation, this court found none here. The circuit court correctly interpreted Mississippi law in finding that Edwards did not have a liberty interest in his inmate classification. Carson v. Hargett, 689 So.2d 753, 755 (Miss.1996); Lewis v. State, 761 So.2d 922 (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (holding that removal from house arrest and return to general prison population was a matter of inmate classification). ¶ 19. Absent the infringement of a significant constitutional right, there can be no deprivation of constitutional due process. However, Miss.Code Ann. §§ 47-5-801 to 47-5-807 (1999), authorizes MDOC to adopt its administrative review procedures and creates a statutory scheme of due process. ¶ 20. Section 47-5-807 expressly provides for the right of judicial review as follows: Any offender who is aggrieved by an adverse decision rendered pursuant to any administrative review procedure under Sections 47-5-801 through 47-5-807 may, within thirty (30) days after receipt of the agency's final decision, seek judicial review of the decision. This right is limited by a preceding section, 47-5-803, which provides that [n]o state court shall entertain an offender's grievance or complaint which falls under the purview of the administrative review procedure unless and until such offender shall have exhausted the remedies as provided in such procedure.  (emphasis added). ¶ 21. The Court of Appeals has recently interpreted section 47-5-801 to hold that the administrative review procedures are the sole means to review decisions of the classification committee. In Morris v. State, 767 So.2d 255, 261 (Miss.Ct.App. 2000), the appellate court used section 47-5-807 to hold Morriss's petition time-barred as not brought within the requisite 30 days. The court ignored the remaining language of that section, which states that inmates who are aggrieved by a decision rendered pursuant to administrative review may seek judicial review. The appellate court concluded bluntly that [t]here is no right to appeal to a court from this review. Id. at 261. This cannot be correct. We have stated: [I]t is ... a cardinal rule of exposition, that the intention is to be deduced from the whole and every part of the statute, taken and compared togetherfrom the words and the contextand such a construction adopted as will best effectuate the intention of the law-giver.... Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. (3 George) 650, 668 (1856). The legislature clearly intended to confer upon any offender the right to seek judicial review of the decision. ¶ 22. Section 47-5-803(2) allows a state court to review a decision of the administrative body, so long as the offender has first exhausted all administrative remedies. Section 47-5-807 grants to offenders the right to judicial review, so long as it is brought within 30 days of receipt of the agency's decision. Together, these statutes provide that an inmate may challenge an adverse decision of the classification committee, so long as he has exhausted all administrative remedies and has brought the petition within 30 days of receipt of the agency's final decision. Morris is therefore overruled to the extent that it is inconsistent with this principle. ¶ 23. Later, in Jensen v. State, 798 So.2d 383 (Miss.2001), we held that Jensen's remedy was to pursue the MDOC grievance procedure rather than filing his petition in circuit court. We went on to hold as follows: Only after all administrative remedies have been exhausted will Jensen be entitled to petition for judicial review of his case ... and we reverse so that Jensen may properly pursue the offender grievance procedures. Jensen, at 386. It is clear from both statutory and case law that an inmate may petition the circuit court after, and only after, following MDOC's grievance procedure to its conclusion. ¶ 24. MDOC's Disciplinary Procedures provide that classification committee decisions may be appealed to the Institutional Superintendent/Community Services Director within 15 days of notification of the decision. Mississippi Department of Corrections, Standard Operating Procedure 18.02.01, Disciplinary Procedures, Formal Resolutions at 8 (effective 1/15/99). The parties agree in their briefs that Edwards appealed the committee's decision, which was affirmed by John Brinson, prior to filing his writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court. Edwards had therefore properly exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing his writ of habeas corpus. The circuit court had jurisdiction to hear it, but failed to exercise it. This case is therefore remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.