Opinion ID: 1059329
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: jury question regarding early release

Text: In accordance with our decision in Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 347, 374, 519 S.E.2d 602, 616 (1999), the circuit court instructed the jury that [t]he words `imprisonment for life' mean imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. During the penalty phase deliberations, the jury inquired, Understanding that imprisonment for life means no possibility of parole, is there any other way to be released from prison? Recognizing that geriatric release is not available to a defendant convicted of capital murder, the court's proposed answer was, No. Not when the Defendant has been convicted of capital murder. Bell agreed with this response, but the Commonwealth objected because there could be other ways for a defendant convicted of capital murder to be released early, such as by an act of executive pardon or clemency. To answer the question truthfully would therefore require that the jury be informed about such things, argued the Commonwealth. Concluding that the Commonwealth's position was correct, the court told the jurors that they would have to rely on the evidence that they heard, and the instructions already presented in deciding the punishment. In the circuit court's view, a truthful answer to the jury's question would have opened the door to matters that were speculative and inappropriate for the jury to consider. Bell argues that the circuit court erred by not answering the jury's question and instructing that other forms of early release are not available to defendants convicted of capital murder. He contends that the question indicated that the jurors were speculating about whether, despite the instruction that life means life without parole, Bell could still receive some form of early release. He claims that this speculation, which remained unresolved, caused the jury to impose the death penalty instead of life imprisonment. Thus, Bell argues that his sentence of death was rendered in violation of Virginia law, see Yarbrough, 258 Va. at 373, 519 S.E.2d at 616, his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Simmons, 512 U.S. at 171, 114 S.Ct. 2187, and his rights to a fair and reliable sentencing determination under the Eighth Amendment, id. at 172-73, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (Souter, J., concurring). However, Bell acknowledges that the court's proposed response to the jury's question was not accurate. Even though a defendant convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for certain forms of early release, such as geriatric release under Code § 53.1-40.01, an act of executive pardon or clemency is still available for such a defendant. Bell, nevertheless, argues that the circuit court had a duty to fashion an appropriate response to the jury's question and suggests that such a response would have been that a life sentence for Bell would permit no parole, no community supervision, no early release program, or any other credits that would reduce the mandatory imprisonment. Recognizing that even this answer does not address the possibility that the jury was concerned about release by an act of executive pardon or clemency, Bell suggests that the court should also have told the jury not to concern itself with anything else. We agree that, when a principle of law is materially vital to a defendant in a criminal case, a trial court cannot merely refuse a defective instruction, but must correct the instruction and then give it in the proper form. Whaley v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 353, 355-56, 200 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1973), cited in Fishback v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 104, 117, 532 S.E.2d 629, 635 (2000). The issue in this case is not whether the circuit court failed to correct a defective instruction. Instead, we must decide whether the court's answer to the jury's question was, in fact, defective. Stated differently, the issue is how the jury's question in this case should have been answered so that [the jury could be] properly informed and [could] render a fair trial to both parties while preserving ... the separation of the judicial branch's function of assessing punishment and the executive branch's function of administering the punishment. Fishback, 260 Va. at 113-14, 532 S.E.2d at 633. To address this issue and the response that Bell now puts forward as a proper answer to the jury's question, we must first examine our decision in Fishback. There, the question was whether a defendant convicted of a non-capital felony was entitled to have the jury instructed that parole has been abolished in Virginia for offenses committed after January 1, 1995. 260 Va. at 108, 532 S.E.2d at 630. We answered that question affirmatively. Id. at 115, 532 S.E.2d at 634. In addition, we also concluded that, because Code § 53.1-40.01 is in the nature of a parole statute, where applicable juries shall also be instructed on the possibility of geriatric release pursuant to that statute. Id. at 115-16, 532 S.E.2d at 634. To clarify our new rule, we further stated that the task of the trial courts will require only that instructions with regard to the abolition of parole be tailored to the facts of a particular case. Thus, when a defendant's age and the permissible range of punishment for the offense in question totally negate the applicability of Code § 53.1-40.01, the jury will be instructed that the defendant is not eligible for parole in accordance with Code § 53.1-165.1. In those cases where geriatric release is a possibility, then the jury will be instructed in accordance with the applicable provisions of Code § 53.1-40.01 along with the instruction that parole is otherwise abolished. Id. at 116, 532 S.E.2d at 634. Implicit in this holding is the recognition that fairness to both the defendant and the Commonwealth requires that jurors be told that, despite the abolition of parole, certain defendants still qualify for geriatric release. But when a defendant does not qualify for geriatric release, the jury need only be informed that the defendant is not eligible for parole. In the present case, Bell's conviction of capital murder totally negated the possibility of geriatric release under Code § 53.1-40.01. Thus, pursuant to our direction in Fishback, the jury was instructed that Bell was not eligible for parole, i.e., that life means life without the possibility of parole. As we stated in Fishback, geriatric release is in the nature of parole, and thus, when a defendant does not qualify for geriatric release, an instruction that a defendant is not eligible for parole is correct, and nothing more is required in order to have truth in sentencing. Id. at 113, 532 S.E.2d at 632. Hence, the jury in this case was properly instructed with regard to the abolition of parole, and when it asked whether there is any other way to be released from prison, the court properly referred the jury to its prior instructions. With regard to the issue of sentencing credits under Code § 53.1-202.2, we recognized in Fishback that a defendant's eligibility for this type of early release remains dependent upon the prisoner's conduct and participation in various programs established by the Department of Corrections, and on the executive branch's subjective assessment of that conduct and participation. Id. at 115, 532 S.E.2d at 634. Thus, a jury could not, without engaging in speculation, factor the possibility of sentencing credits into its determination of an appropriate sentence. Id. at 116, 532 S.E.2d at 634. For that reason, we held that juries are not to be instructed with regard to sentencing credits available under Code § 53.1-202.2. Id. Unlike the defendant in Fishback, Bell's conviction of capital murder precludes the possibility of his earning sentencing credits. Thus, the reasons underlying our conclusion in Fishback that juries are not to be instructed about sentencing credits do not apply to Bell's situation. However, because the nature of Bell's conviction negates the applicability of Code §.§ 53.1-202.2 and-202.3, just as with geriatric release, we conclude that the circuit court's instructions were correct and that, in response to the jury's question, the court again properly referred to its prior instructions. This leaves only the question whether the jury should have been advised about the availability of early release through an act of executive pardon or clemency. Even Bell does not advocate inclusion of that information in responding to the jury's question. Instead, he argues that the circuit court should have instructed the jury that geriatric release and sentencing credits are not available to him and that the jury should not concern itself with anything else. Bell's suggested response highlights the anomaly presented by the jury's question in this case. If the jury had inquired about a specific form of early release, such as geriatric release, then the court could have answered that question accurately and dispelled any possible speculation by the jury. Here, however, the question was general and could not have been accurately answered without telling the jury about executive clemency or pardon. Yet, we have never allowed a jury to have that information because of the potential for jury speculation resulting in a harsher sentence than would otherwise be warranted. See Yarbrough, 258 Va. at 372, 519 S.E.2d at 615. So, the only response that would have comported with our precedent was to instruct the jurors that geriatric release and sentencing credits were not available to Bell and that they should not concern themselves with anything else. Yet, that kind of response would have suggested that there is some other form of early release still available to Bell and would have, in fact, invited the jury to speculate. See Simmons, 512 U.S. at 170, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (trial court's admonishment that jury should not consider parole and that parole was not a proper issue for the jury to consider actually suggested that parole was available but that the jury, for some unstated reason, should be blind to this fact). Such speculation is inconsistent with a fair trial both to the defendant and the Commonwealth. Fishback, 260 Va. at 115, 532 S.E.2d at 634. Given the nature of the jury's question, we conclude that the circuit court did not err when it responded by directing the ... jury to rely on the evidence that it had heard and the instructions that had been given. Any other answer would either have been inaccurate or have led to further speculation by the jury. The instruction that imprisonment for life means life without the possibility of parole was correct under our holdings in Yarbrough and Fishback. Nothing more was required in this case. Thus, Bell's rights under our case law, the Due Process Clause, and the Eighth Amendment were not violated.