Opinion ID: 1210703
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whistleblower's action

Text: The County filed a motion for summary judgment asking the court to dismiss the Whistleblower's action as barred by the statute of limitations and as accruing prior to the effective date of the Whistleblower's Act. Judge Traxler denied County's motion holding that a question of fact existed as to the date of Baber's termination. At trial, after the presentation of all of the evidence, the trial judge, Judge Ervin, ruled as a matter of law that Baber was terminated on March 15, 1988, the day County Council voted to terminate Baber. We affirm. A Whistleblower's action is a suit against a public employer wherein a public employee claims to have been subject to adverse personnel action in retaliation for having exposed governmental wrongdoing. South Carolina created such an action by a statute that became effective March 14, 1988. S.C.Code Ann. § 8-27-10 to 50 (1988), amended by S.C.Code Ann. § 8-27-10 to 50 (Supp.1996). Under the 1988 statute, a Whistleblower's action must be brought within two years after its accrual. S.C.Code Ann. § 8-27-30(D) (1988) (providing 2 year statute of limitations), amended by S.C.Code Ann. § 8-27-30(B)(Supp.1996) (providing 1 year statute of limitations). The resolution of this issue depends on whether Baber's cause of action arose on the date he was initially notified of County's proposal to terminate his employment or whether Baber's cause of action arose on March 15, 1988 when Council formally voted to affirm its decision to terminate Baber and to amend its records to reflect a termination date of March 15, 1988. The Rules of the Greenville County Council set forth the procedure for termination of the Internal Auditor. The Rules provide that the Internal Auditor shall serve at the pleasure of Council .... If the Council determines to remove the Internal Auditor, the procedure set forth in Section I C will apply to the position of Internal Auditor. Rules of the Greenville County Council, Section 1 E. Section I C addresses the employment of the County Administrator. The section reveals the following procedure for removal of the County Administrator (and, hence, the Internal Auditor): If the Council determines to remove the County Administrator, he shall be given a written statement of the reasons alleged for the proposed removal and the right to a hearing thereon at a public meeting of the Council. Within five days after the notice of removal is delivered to the Administrator he may file with the Council a written request for a public hearing. This hearing shall be held at a Council meeting not earlier than twenty days nor later than thirty days after the request is filed. The Administrator may file with the Council a written reply not later than five days before the hearing. The removal shall be stayed pending the decision at the public hearing. Rules of the Greenville County Council, Section 1C (emphasis added). These Rules clearly indicate that the Internal Auditor shall be given a written statement of the reasons for the proposed removal, after which the Auditor may request a public hearing. This is precisely what occurred in the present case as Baber was given a termination notice, after which he requested a public hearing. The Rules conclude by declaring that The removal shall be stayed pending the decision at the public hearing. Thus, we find that Baber was not removed or terminated from office until the public hearing was held, and the Council rendered its decision on March 15, 1988. Accord Drawdy v. Town of Port Royal, 308 S.C. 462, 419 S.E.2d 215 (1992). This is confirmed by County's own letter to Baber, which stated that on March 15, 1988 County Council formally voted to affirm Baber's termination. The Council further wrote that Mr. Baber's personnel records have been amended to reflect a termination date of March 15, 1988, and the South Carolina Retirement System has been accordingly notified. In the same letter, they state, Since the effective date of his termination is March 15, 1988, the appropriate insurance deductions have been taken from the enclosed check to accurately reflect the length of Mr. Baber's employment with Greenville County. Thus, Council's own correspondence clearly supports our conclusion that March 15, 1988 was Baber's termination date. Accordingly, the trial judge did not err in holding as a matter of law that this date constituted Baber's termination date. [4] As March 15th was after the effective date of the Whistleblower's Act, Baber was entitled to pursue his cause of action under the Act. We also disagree with the County's contention that Baber's action is barred by the statute of limitations. Baber's action accrued and the statute of limitations began to run on March 15, 1988 when the Council formally voted to remove Baber from office. Baber filed this action on January 23, 1990, within the two year period provided by the statute at that time. S.C.Code Ann. § 8-27-30(D)(1988). [5] We affirm. We disagree with the County's contention that the trial judge overruled the prior order of Judge Traxler denying its motion for summary judgment by ruling Baber's action accrued on the date Baber was terminated by vote of County Council. The denial of summary judgment is interlocutory. Geiger v. Carolina Pool Equip. Distrib., Inc., 257 S.C. 112, 184 S.E.2d 446 (1971). An interlocutory denial of summary judgment is not a final order and is subject to change by the trial court. Cf. 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments § 203 (1994). Thus, the trial judge retained jurisdiction to rule, after the presentation of the evidence, on the same issue previously the subject of a pre-trial summary judgment motion. We affirm.