Opinion ID: 1605808
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the trial court erred when it denied sandra's motion to declare the judgment null and void.

Text: ¶ 43. Sandra avers that the proceedings of the divorce did not comply with the statutory requirements of Mississippi Code Section 93-5-2. She argues that, despite the parties having entered into a consent agreement to divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences at the beginning of the hearing on May 4, 2006, the parties never withdrew the fault grounds stated in their original pleadings. Therefore, according to Sandra, pursuant to Section 93-5-2(5), which provides that no divorce shall be granted on the ground of irreconcilable differences where there has been a contest or denial . . . [unless] the contest or denial has been withdrawn or cancelled by the party filing the same by leave and order of the court, the final judgment awarding the parties a divorce on said grounds is void. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-2(5) (Rev.2004). ¶ 44. Henry's estate (Estate) argues, however, that when read in its entirety, Section 93-5-2(5) is excepted by subsection (3) of the statute, which allows parties to consent to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences and to stipulate to what issues they wish the court to decide for them. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-2(3) (Rev.2004). The Estate contends that the parties clearly consented to divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences on the first day of the hearing, and submits that at no time did Sandra ask for leave to withdraw her consent, nor did she raise the issue in her Motion for Reconsideration, and that she wishes to do so now only because Henry has passed away. ¶ 45. At the beginning of the trial, a lengthy exchange occurred regarding discovery violations and the admissibility of evidence. The parties then requested a brief recess, following which Sandra and Henry jointly filed with the court a written instrument entitled Consent of Parties to Divorce on Irreconcilable Differences. In open court, the trial judge read into the record that both parties had requested that a divorce based on irreconcilable differences be granted, and that they had agreed to submit to the court for its determination all matters of real and personal property, and all other things listed in the instrument. ¶ 46. Review of the document shows that each party, upon advice of counsel, voluntarily agreed to be bound by the court's decision and understood that it would be a lawful judgment, and that the consent granted could not be withdrawn by either party without leave of the court. The document was signed by both parties and their attorneys. The record, however, contains no mention of an order being issued or requested allowing the parties to withdraw or cancel the contest or denial requested by each in their respective complaint and counter complaint for divorce. Nor did Sandra seek leave of court to withdraw her consent. ¶ 47. In denying Sandra's motion to set aside the judgment as void, the chancellor reasoned as follows: By the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, 93-5-2(5), a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences may be granted only where and if contests or denials have been withdrawn or cancelled with leave and by order of the court. The exception to this is contained in the first 10 words of 93-5-2(5): Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section. . . . It is the opinion of this court that in writing the statute in this manner, the legislature intended that when the parties execute a consent under subsection (3), the requirements of subsection (5) are not required. Logically, if the parties consent to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences and meet the requirements of subsection (3), such an act necessarily shows and establishes that the parties intend to and do withdraw all contests and denials. It is the opinion of this court that the requirements of subsection (5) are applicable only where a divorce commences as a contested divorce with grounds asserted and is concluded with a written agreement containing adequate and sufficient provision for the custody and maintenance of any children and for the settlement of any property rights between the parties. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-2. Moreover, assuming the plaintiff is correct in her motion and were the court to grant the plaintiff's motion, such would encourage parties to enter into a consent pursuant to subsection (3), await the decision of the trial court, and then assert that the judgment is void. Generally, matters not objected to contemporaneously with the occurrence cannot later be considered error. This court finds that the plaintiff's assertion that the parties, herself included, did not comply with subsection (5) should and had to have been made at the commencement of the trial, not after 3 days of proof and testimony, and because of her dissatisfaction with the decision of the trial court. Such a claim should and must be made at the time the alleged error or failure occurred, not post judgment. ¶ 48. We agree. Section 93-5-2 governs divorces based on irreconcilable differences, and states in pertinent part as follows: (3) If the parties are unable to agree upon adequate and sufficient provisions for the custody and maintenance of any children of that marriage or any property rights between them, they may consent to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences and permit the court to decide the issues upon which they cannot agree. Such consent must be in writing, signed by both parties personally, must state that the parties voluntarily consent to permit the court to decide such issues, which shall be specifically set forth in such consent, and that the parties understand that the decision of the court shall be binding and lawful judgment. Such consent may not be withdrawn by a party without leave of the court after the court has commenced any proceeding, including the hearing of any motion or other matter pertaining thereto. The failure or refusal of either party to agree as to adequate and sufficient provisions for the custody and maintenance of any children of that marriage or any property rights between the parties, or any portion of such issues, or the failure or refusal of any party to consent to permit the court to decide such issues, shall not be used as evidence, or in any manner, against such party. No divorce shall be granted pursuant to this subsection until all matters involving custody and maintenance of any child of that marriage and property rights between the parties raised by the pleading have been either adjudicated by the court or agreed upon by the parties and found to be adequate and sufficient by the court and included in the judgment of divorce. (5) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section, no divorce shall be granted on the ground of irreconcilable differences where there has been a contest or denial; provided, however, that a divorce may be granted on the grounds of irreconcilable differences where there has been a contest or denial, if the contest or denial has been withdrawn or cancelled by the party filing same by leave and order of the court. (6) Irreconcilable differences may be asserted as a sole ground for divorce or as an alternate ground for divorce with any other cause for divorce set out in Section 93-5-1. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (Rev.2004). ¶ 49. The legislative purpose behind Section 93-5-2 is to provide a less painful alternative to the traditional grounds for divorce which require[s] . . . parties to publicly put on proof of sensitive private matters. Grier v. Grier, 616 So.2d 337, 339 (Miss.1993). The statute expressly permits parties to bargain on the premise that reaching an agreement will avoid the necessity of presenting proof at trial. Id. The cornerstone of the process is mutual consent. Id. To ensure that end, the statute contains certain conditions. Perkins v. Perkins, 787 So.2d 1256, 1261 (Miss.2001) (citations omitted). The chief of these conditions is, that neither spouse contest its granting. Id. (quoting Sanford v. Sanford, 749 So.2d 353, 357 (Miss. Ct.App.1999)). ¶ 50. Such was the understanding in Massingill v. Massingill, 594 So.2d 1173 (Miss.1992), in which the parties, having failed to prove a fault-based divorce, were granted a divorce based on irreconcilable differences, having pleaded that ground in the alternative. In reversing, this Court held that simply pleading the ground is not enough to satisfy the consent provisions required by subsection (3). [6] Id. at 1176. These provisions are that the consent (1) must be in writing and signed by both parties; (2) must state that the parties voluntarily consent to permit the court to decide the issues upon which the parties cannot agree; (3) must specifically set forth the issues upon which the parties are unable to agree; and (4) must state that the parties understand that the decision of the court shall be a binding and lawful judgment. Id. at 1177. The Court found that, even though both parties had requested a divorce based on irreconcilable differences, the husband nonetheless had denied that the wife was entitled to a divorce on this ground, and had also filed a complaint claiming fault grounds. Id. at 1778. By virtue of subsection (5), there remained both a contest and denial. Id. The Court opined, [a]ccordingly, the facts negate any conclusion there was mutual consent to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Without speaking any further on subsection (5), the Massingill Court concluded on this point with the following: [I]t is conceivable the required mutual consent in writing could have been accomplished by written stipulation, written agreement, or by some other viable means either prior to or during the last appearance before the chancellor. Id. ¶ 51. In Perkins, this Court reversed a chancellor's judgment granting a divorce based on irreconcilable differences as requested in a settlement agreement between the spouses for its failure to comply with a number of statutory requirements set forth by Section 93-5-2. Perkins, 787 So.2d at 1264-65. [7] Though subsection (3) was not at issue, the Perkins Court's opinion nonetheless expounded on some of Massingill 's implications. Id. at 1263. Of relevance was Perkins 's treatment of a point argued by the appellee in countering the appellant's charge that the appellee had failed to withdraw his original fault grounds. Id. at 1262. The appellee argued that subsection (5) was met when the settlement agreement was signed. Id. Perkins responded only by saying that the Court interprets subsection (5) as pertaining to cases where irreconcilable differences had been pleaded in the alternative to fault grounds, which neither of the Perkinses had done. Id. at 1262. ¶ 52. The Perkins Court then addressed the appellee's main contention that each of the procedural shortcomings in the matter were technical flaws and should be considered harmless error, claiming that the appellant had failed to show prejudice. Id. at 1262-63. In so doing, Perkins acknowledged this Court's volition, in some instances, to affirm a lower court's judgment granting a divorce based on irreconcilable differences despite failure to follow certain procedural safeguards. Id. at 1262-64. However, the Court then expressly indicated this is not appropriate when a party's substantive rights are at issue. Id. at 1264. Notably, Perkins also stated that [h]ad either party pled irreconcilable differences as an alternative, this case would be in line with [ Rounsaville v. Rounsaville, 732 So.2d 909 (Miss.1999)], and the parties could have agreed to a property settlement on the day of trial. Id. at 1264. Rounsaville upheld a trial court's decision to grant a divorce based on irreconcilable differences where, at the time of the granting of the divorce, the parties had not entered into a property settlement, nor had the trial court adjudicated the presented issues as required under the statute. Rounsaville, 732 So.2d at 911 (noting that, although this was error, it was harmless error since the appellant demonstrated no prejudice which would make the error reversible). ¶ 53. We find that the facts here differ from those which determined the outcome in both Massingill and Perkins, as the record in this case clearly shows mutual consent. Sandra and Henry fully complied with the procedural requirements set forth in subsection (3). Both, along with their attorneys, signed the written consent agreement; the agreement expressly stated that both parties voluntarily consented to permit the court to decide the issues upon which they could not agree; it specifically set forth those issues; and both expressly acknowledged their understanding that the decision of the court would be a binding and lawful judgment. The agreement was then read into the record in open court. This distinguishes this case from both Massingill and Perkins. Unlike what concerned the Court in those two cases, our appellant's substantive rights are not in question. ¶ 54. It is well understood that divorce in Mississippi is governed by statute, and that its provisions must be strictly complied with. Perkins, 787 So.2d at 1264. The plain language of subsection (5) mandates that a contest or denial be withdrawn or canceled, by leave and order of the court, by the party who filed the contest or denial. This is a procedural safeguard which has existed within the framework of Section 93-5-2 since its promulgation. See e.g. Alexander v. Alexander, 493 So.2d 978, 979 (Miss. 1986) (discussing Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (Supp.1985)). However, the exception clause, which was added in 1990 when the statute was amended to provide for trial by mutual consent, clearly indicates that subsection (5) should be read in conjunction with subsection (3). Once the parties fully and properly acceded to the procedural strictures of subsection (3), the safeguards provided by subsection (5) were no longer necessary. ¶ 55. The trial court's decision denying Sandra's motion to set aside the final judgment decreeing an irreconcilable-differences divorce is affirmed.