Opinion ID: 2831116
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cruz-Ramos's Motion to Suppress

Text: To start us off, Cruz-Ramos claims that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the fruits of the 2010 police search of his home (and the car garaged there), as the police had no probable cause to enter his home without a warrant, let alone to search. He also argues that the statements he made to police after the search (and his subsequent arrest) should also be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous search. Because we agree with Cruz-Ramos that probable cause was lacking and therefore the search of the home and car violated the Fourth Amendment, we find that the evidence seized during the search should have been suppressed. We also conclude that including the erroneously admitted evidence at trial was not harmless, given the lack of other compelling evidence linking CruzRamos to drug crimes, and thus, a new trial for Cruz-Ramos is warranted. - 31 - District Court Decision Based on the testimony from three law enforcement agents (the only witnesses to testify at the suppression hearing), the district court made the following factual findings. See United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1999) (In reviewing the court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress, we recite the facts as found by the district court to the extent they are not clearly erroneous.).18 On August 28, 2010, Puerto Rico Police Department Officer Carlos A. Jimenez-Rolon showed up at Las Dalias housing project around 2:30 a.m. to conduct a preventative round (Las Dalias had one of the highest crime rates of the island's housing projects). During the round, Officer Jimenez-Rolon saw a man walking. The Officer got out of his (marked) car and told the man to stop. Instead of complying, the man took off running. Officer Jimenez-Rolon gave chase. The man reached into his pocket and threw an unidentified object toward the second story of the nearby building. 18 While Cruz-Ramos additionally argues that some of the district court's factual findings were clearly erroneous, see United States v. Brown, 621 F.3d 48, 55 (1st Cir. 2010), we need not address that argument, as we conclude that even adopting the court's findings as-is, there was no probable cause to search. - 32 - Office Jimenez-Rolon realized he wouldn't be able to catch the fleer, so instead went to investigate what the man had purged from his pocket. Officer Jimenez-Rolon went up to the second floor of the nearby building and discovered a different man lying down (presumably in the hallway), with a firearm at his side. Officer Jimenez-Rolon arrested this man and took him to the police station.19 At the police station, Officer Jimenez-Rolon began to interview the arrested man. The arrestee told Officer JimenezRolon that if the police could provide security to his family, he would tell them where to find Bernard, one of Puerto Rico's mostwanted fugitives for allegedly shooting down the municipal helicopter. Officer Jimenez-Rolon brought his supervisor, Lieutenant Luis David Flores-Ortiz, into the loop, and Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz agreed to the deal and continued with the interview. Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz had not met or spoken to the man prior to this encounter, and as far as the Lieutenant knew, the man had never previously served as an informant to the Puerto Rico police. The arrestee (who we'll call from now on the Informant) told Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz that Bernard was hiding at a house in 19Among the other details that are difficult to gather from the police officers' story, it is unclear why the police arrested this man. The record does not reflect that he was charged with any crime (i.e., unlawful possession of a firearm), or that his tip, which we discuss shortly, was provided in exchange for prosecutorial leniency. - 33 - the Berwind Estates housing subdivision in Rio Piedras with at least four other people -- Cruz-Ramos, two females, and perhaps other unidentified males. Bernard would have on him many weapons, firearms, and controlled substances, the Informant warned. Four rifles would also be hidden in a flower box on the terrace, and sidearms (like Berettas and Glocks) and drugs would be in a hidden compartment in a red Ford Expedition. The Informant did not provide any further details concerning what police would find at the home, nor a description of the house. The Informant said Bernard wouldn't stick around for long and would depart at sun-up through the back of the house. The Informant further warned that Bernard would open fire at the police as soon as he saw them. Upon leaving the Berwind Estates home, Bernard would head for the Las Dalias housing project, the Informant claimed, at which point the PRPD would lose their opportunity to arrest him that night. The brief interview ended sometime between 3:30 and 4:00 a.m. Despite the fact that neither the Puerto Rico police nor Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz had any prior relationship with the Informant, the Lieutenant deemed him reliable based on the fact that both the Informant and Bernard came from the Las Dalias housing project, and thus the Informant could likely be part of Bernard's 'close-knit' group and know Bernard's whereabouts. - 34 - With that, shortly after the interview ended, Officer Jimenez-Rolon drove the Informant to the house where Bernard was supposedly located. After they reached Berwind Estates and passed a manned security hut, the Informant pointed out a good-sized residence with lots of vegetation behind and to the side of it. The vegetation was relatively thick, but someone hiding in the bushes could still be seen from certain angles. A terrace with a flower box was also visible. Apparently satisfied with what he had observed, Officer Jimenez-Rolon took the Informant back to the police station, and around 5:00 a.m., the police returned to the house to arrest Bernard. They did not attempt to obtain either a federal or local search warrant to enter or search the home. After the police secured the home's perimeter (and extended the perimeter out to the guardhouse), an entry team comprising six officers entered through the property through the vegetation on the side of the house, crossed over the terra-cotta floored portion of the carport driveway, and proceeded to the door located on the side terrace. To enter the carport, the officers had to jump a cement wall, and to enter the terrace, they opened a closed gate. From the terrace, the officers saw through a window an unidentified female sitting in the kitchen. They told her they were police, instructed her to stay silent, and asked her to open - 35 - the door. She complied. They asked the woman where Bernard was, and she said he was in the bedroom. While the police made their way to the bedroom, other men (including Cruz-Ramos) appeared out of adjacent rooms. The officers detained them. The police continued into the bedroom, where they found Bernard in a bed either asleep or just halfawake. Close by Bernard was a pistol. They arrested him. All of the detained people were also arrested for harboring a fugitive. With everyone under arrest and the house secure, Officer Jimenez-Rolon searched the flower box on the terrace, where he found hidden under the dirt four rifles. Then he went in the house, walked through the foyer and through a glass door that opened into the carport, where a red Ford Expedition was parked. In the car, Officer Jimenez-Rolon found a hidden compartment with weapons, ammo, and drugs. Officer Jimenez-Rolon seized all of the drugs and guns he found. Cruz-Ramos, along with the other arrestees, was taken to the police department following his arrest. Sometime between 10:30 a.m. and noon, Cruz-Ramos was placed in a small room with three federal agents for an interview, which was not recorded. CruzRamos was verbally apprised of his constitutional rights (particularly, his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney), and while he acknowledged that he understood them, he refused to sign any paperwork waiving his rights. - 36 - The police proceeded to interview Cruz-Ramos anyway, and he told the agents that he lived in the house where he and Bernard were arrested, but that he was originally from the Las Gladiolas housing project. He admitted to being affiliated with a group of housing projects that were partners and supported each other. Cruz-Ramos also admitted to carrying a gun for personal defense and to having numerous rifles hidden or buried somewhere. He told the agents that he knew Bernard because they hung out together in different bars, and Bernard was acquainted with his stepdaughter. Cruz-Ramos said he knew Bernard was wanted by the police and had tried to arrange for Bernard to find a lawyer and surrender himself. Based on all these facts, the district court concluded that the police had probable cause to search Cruz-Ramos's home without a warrant. Specifically, the court found that [a]lthough the Informant had never provided information before, and only offered the information upon his arrest and interrogation, all of the other facts and circumstances support the [police's] conclusion that the Informant was indeed truthful and reliable. Those facts were: the Informant was arrested in Las Dalias, a housing project that Bernard was associated with; the Informant provided very detailed information; the Informant agreed to travel with Officer Jimenez-Rolon to point[] out the precise residence, which matched the description he had already provided; and the - 37 - Informant put himself in danger by providing the tip. The court also found that exigent circumstances were present, namely, Bernard's risk of escape and the threat he posed to public safety. Additionally, the court concluded that the warrantless search of the Ford Expedition was legal, as the Informant had provided a basis for probable cause that guns and drugs were hidden in it. While the court found no exigency, it nonetheless denied suppression of the car-search based on the auto exception to the warrant requirement. See United States v. Polanco, 634 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that under the auto exception, if there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, agents can search without a warrant any area of the vehicle in which the evidence may be found (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even if the automobile exception didn't apply though, the police made a good faith error because based on their legal presence on [the] property, the probable cause known to them at the time, and the automobile exception, it was entirely reasonable for them to believe that the warrantless search of the Expedition was justified, the district court concluded. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1987) (recognizing that evidence resulting from a Fourth Amendment violation should only be suppressed if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment (internal - 38 - quotation marks omitted)). The court did, however, exclude the search of the flower box, on the grounds that even though the police had probable cause, there were no exigent circumstances to justify searching there because Bernard had been arrested and the house was secure, rendering safety a non-issue. The court likewise excluded the fruits of the flower-box search (four rifles found under the dirt) because they dropped from a poisonous tree (the illegal search of the flower box), and no good faith exception applied.20 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) ([E]vidence seized during an unlawful search [can]not constitute proof against the victim of the search.). As for Cruz-Ramos's statement to the police, the court found that it could not be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous search because the search of the house was not poisonous (i.e., illegal). The court likewise rejected Cruz-Ramos's argument that his statement was not given voluntarily, which he said violated the Fifth Amendment. No Probable Cause As we hinted at above, the focus of our analysis here is on whether the police had probable cause to search Cruz-Ramos's home. Cruz-Ramos argues that since the sole basis of probable 20 The government does not dispute the suppression of the flower-box evidence. - 39 - cause was the uncorroborated tip from an unknown informant, the police needed more than just his word to search without a warrant. [W]e review de novo the district court's conclusions of law, including its application of the law to the facts, its probable cause . . . determination[], and the district court's ultimate legal decision to grant or deny the motion to suppress. United States v. Camacho, 661 F.3d 718, 724 (1st Cir. 2011). In assessing whether there was probable cause for a search, our task, like that of the . . . district court, is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. United States v. McLellan, No. 14-1561, 2015 WL 4071914, at  (1st Cir. July 6, 2015) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). We first provide a little background on the relevant law before diving into our analysis. The Fourth Amendment instructs that no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Based on this constitutional tenet, the law clearly establishes that even when police have a warrant to arrest someone, a search warrant is still ordinarily required to enter the home of a third person to arrest an individual who is believed to be - 40 - inside the home. Fletcher v. Town of Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 49 (1st Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, a warrantless entry into a person's dwelling may be permitted to effect an arrest, United States v. Samboy, 433 F.3d 154, 158 (1st Cir. 2005), so long as two conditions are met: one, the police had probable cause to enter the home, and two, exigent circumstances existed, like a fugitive's threat to public safety. Hegarty v. Somerset Cty., 53 F.3d 1367, 1373-74 (1st Cir. 1995). And probable cause only exists when the totality of the circumstances suggests that there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. United States v. Gifford, 727 F.3d 92, 98 (1st Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). As was the case here, police often rely on tips from confidential informants to underlie probable cause. But the principle is long-standing that [e]ven where a search warrant is obtained, the police must show a basis for the search beyond the mere fact of an assertion by an informer. Recznik v. City of Lorain, 393 U.S. 166, 169 (1968). It follows then that [a]t least as much is required to support a search without a warrant. Id. at 169-70. Therefore, when, as here, the primary basis for a probable cause determination is information provided by a confidential informant, law enforcement must provide some information from which a [court] can credit the informant's - 41 - credibility. Gifford, 727 F.3d at 99. In other words, a probable cause finding may be based on an informant's tip so long as the probability of a lying or inaccurate informer has been sufficiently reduced. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To help assess an informant's reliability, we look to a nonexhaustive list of factors:
knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information; (2) whether an informant's statements reflect first-hand knowledge; (3) whether some or all of the informant's factual statements were corroborated wherever reasonable and practicable (e.g., through police surveillance); and (4) whether a law enforcement [officer] assessed, from his professional standpoint, experience, and expertise, the probable significance of the informant's provided information. United States v. Tiem Trinh, 665 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2011) (citations, internal quotations marks, and alterations omitted). Applying these factors to the instant case, we find that there is simply no indication on this record that the police explored the Informant's basis of knowledge for the information he relayed, or that the police bothered to corroborate any of the information that actually suggested that criminal activity was afoot at Cruz-Ramos's home. Even if we were to agree with the district court that the information the Informant provided was detailed, we find that because the police did not sufficiently - 42 - test the reliability of the detailed information, the denial of the motion to suppress cannot stand. Specifically, nothing in the district court's factual findings indicates the informant's basis of knowledge, such as whether the informant had firsthand knowledge of Bernard's whereabouts (i.e., he had seen Bernard at the house), or just heard about it as hearsay or through rumor. See Gifford, 727 F.3d at 100; cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983) ([An informant's] explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case.). Notably, the only basis Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz articulated for trusting the Informant was that because he came from the same housing project as Bernard, [h]e could form a part of [Bernard's] close-knit group. That inference could implicate every resident in the complex, yet Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz apparently never bothered to ask the Informant whether he actually was part of Bernard's crew. The Informant could have been relaying a rumor he overheard on the street, or even fabricating the information. It is also undisputed that the police here had no past history with the informant to establish that informant's credibility. See Gifford, 727 at 100; cf. United States v. Dixon, 787 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 2015) (that informant had given police fruitful tips in the past and police had met with the informant - 43 - before in person on several occasions supported the informant's reliability). Furthermore, while the district court credited the police for corroborating the Informant's tips, our review shows that the only information the police actually corroborated before they entered the premises was the Informant's (very general) outside description of the house. Indeed, all the police did here before entering the premises was drive by the home and confirm the readily apparent details the Informant described -- that the home was in the gated community the Informant identified and had a flower box. But this kind of information, indeed, the kind that is immediately visible to anyone who passes the house, is not -- without more -- useful information when it comes to making a probable cause determination. True, corroboration of even innocent activity reported in [a] tip may support a finding of probable cause, at least when [c]orroboration of apparently innocent activity can establish the reliability of the informant because the activity might come to appear suspicious in light of the initial tip. Tiem Trinh, 665 F.3d at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the information must be at least marginally useful in establishing that criminal activity is afoot. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (noting that it is also important that . . . 'the anonymous tip contained a range of - 44 - details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted.' (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 245)). Here, the police did not corroborate any of the information that might actually have suggested suspicious activity. For instance, one could find it curious to see multiple adults (at least one the Informant even identified by name) coming in and out of a single-family home. Or perhaps if the police had staked out the house, they might have seen someone protectively guarding or manipulating the flower box in an unusual way. Cf. id. at 11 (police conducted surveillance to corroborate much of the informant's information, including the fact that the informant had, multiple times, been in and out of the house where the purported drug operation was going down). In sum, we find that the police did not do enough to confirm the unknown Informant's story such that probable cause could issue.21 21 The fourth Tiem Trinh factor, whether the police officer assessed from his professional standpoint the probable significance of the tip, 665 F.3d at 10, is arguably met here because Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz did surmise that the Informant was reliable. However, we give his assessment little weight because the police knew nothing about the Informant other than his affiliation with Las Dalias and still did not inquire into the Informant's source of knowledge. Thus, the officer had no real basis for making his assessment. The district court, relying on an out-of-circuit case, also emphasized that the Informant put himself in danger by providing the tip. See United States v. One 56-Foot Yacht Named Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1287 (9th Cir. 1983) (considering as a factor in the reliability analysis that [t]he information was given to the - 45 - Our outcome should be no surprise, given our precedent. In addition to the test we laid out in Tiem Trinh, we have emphasized on multiple occasions that an informant's reliability must be vetted. For instance, in United States v. Jordan, we carefully weighed the police's efforts to corroborate a hearsay tip, and specifically noted some of the various means by which an informant could be corroborated, such as direct surveillance or circumstantial evidence, vouchsaf[ing] by a highly experienced law enforcement officer, independent corroboration (i.e., conducting controlled drug buys), and most particularly, the informant's history of providing reliable information and investigative assistance to the police in the past. 999 F.2d 11, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1993). We found that on balance, all of these efforts on the part of the police sufficed to corroborate the informant's tip. In Dixon, the police officer took similar measure, meeting with the informant face-to-face on several occasions, independently corroborat[ing] facts, including not government in circumstances subjecting the informants to possible personal or penal risk (alterations omitted)). But even if we took into account the risk of retaliation the Informant faced, the record does not reflect that La ONU knew or would have been able to figure out that the (confidential) Informant was the one talking to police. If the Informant had heard the information through a rumor or eavesdropping, there would be no reason -- at least not one we can discern from this record -- to think the gang would suspect him. And we reiterate that the officers here did not probe the Informant's basis of knowledge (e.g., whether the Informant knew the information because he was in the gang and thus would be in danger because he cooperated). - 46 - only innocent facts like the defendant's phone number and cartype, but also by conducting controlled drug buys that were carefully monitored and regulated to minimize the chance that the [informant] could have falsely implicated the defendant. 787 F.3d at 59. Further, the informant in that case also had given fruitful tips in the past. Id. In contrast, anyone driving by Cruz-Ramos's home could parlay the generic description the Informant gave, and confirming only those innocuous details is not, on its own, sufficient to corroborate a tip from an unknown confidential informant. The Informant did not even say that the house was the only one in the area with a flower box, meaning that the flower box's existence did not make for a distinguishing characteristic. Given the lack of other indicia of the Informant's reliability, the police had an obligation to corroborate something of the tip before entering Cruz-Ramos's home without a warrant. See Recznik, 393 U.S. at 169 (finding that police did not have probable cause to enter a home when no effort was made to show that either the petitioner or the apartment was at that time connected with criminal activity, and the police did not even attempt to establish that the informers were reliable). In sum, there was no probable cause to search Cruz-Ramos's home. Cruz-Ramos further asserts that the search of his car was also illegal for lack of probable cause. As we discussed - 47 - above, the Informant's tip was not sufficiently reliable on its own, and we agree with Cruz-Ramos that the same reasoning extends to the search of the Expedition. See United States v. Dickerson, 514 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that police may only conduct a warrantless search of a car if there is probable cause to believe the car has contraband or evidence of a crime (emphasis added)). Contrary to the district court's decision, we conclude that the initial entry into the home was illegal, and so the police could not form probable cause from what illicit activity they observed once they entered the home. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.). Thus, there was no basis for probable cause to search the Expedition. For the same reason, the so-called automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment does nothing to save the search of Cruz-Ramos's car (assuming the exception even applies to a car parked within the curtilage of a defendant's home, as was the case here). See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460-62 (1971). Sure, the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home, such that warrantless examinations of automobiles have been upheld in - 48 - circumstances in which a search of a home . . . would not.22 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976). However, police still need probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband before conducting a warrantless search. United States v. Silva, 742 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2014). As with a home-search, in this context [p]robable cause exists when the facts and circumstances as to which police have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that evidence of a crime will be found. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis added). As we discussed, the police did not probe the Informant's basis for his claims that weapons and drugs were in the car and therefore had no reasonable basis for believing the Informant's tip, such that probable cause could issue on the tip alone. One final point on probable cause -- that the police actually did end up finding guns, drugs, and, of course, Bernard in Cruz-Ramos's home cannot enter our calculus, as [a] search unlawful at its inception may [not] be validated by what it turns up. United States v. Mercedes-De La Cruz, 787 F.3d 61, 69 (1st The logic behind this automobile exception is that [o]ne 22 has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976) (internal quotation mark omitted). - 49 - Cir. 2015) (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Based on these facts,23 we conclude that there was no probable cause to enter Cruz-Ramos's home or car. Thus, while we certainly understand (though we do not address whether) exigency may have been a legitimate concern here because of Bernard's status as a dangerous fugitive, the Constitution does not permit the police to forego a search warrant in situations like this based on exigency alone. Rather, as we have discussed, they also need probable cause. See Hegarty, 53 F.3d at 1373-74. The Seized Physical Evidence We must next consider whether the evidence seized as a result of the illegal search should also have been suppressed at trial. It is well established under the exclusionary rule that generally, evidence seized during an unlawful search [can]not constitute proof against the victim of the search. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484. That is, the government may make no use of evidence illegally seized. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961). It's clear, then, that per the plain language of the exclusionary rule, 23To the extent additional facts came out during the two-day evidentiary hearing that the district court did not address in its decision, the government did not point them out to us. Indeed, the government's curiously scant brief did not provide any developed argument as to the motion to suppress (as well as several other issues the Defendants raised), instead choosing to simply regurgitate large chunks of the district court's factual findings. - 50 - the physical evidence seized during the illegal search of CruzRamos's home (including the car and flower box), should have been suppressed. The district court said as much when it determined that if the initial entry into Cruz-Ramos's home was illegal, then everything subsequently discovered by the [police] would be subject to suppression as fruit of the poisonous tree.24 Like most rules, however, the exclusionary rule has exceptions. We examine their applicability next. Good-Faith Exception Police practices trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield meaningful deterrence, and culpable enough to be worth the price paid by the justice system. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). This good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule dictates, then, that even when the seizure of evidence results from a Fourth Amendment violation, that evidence should only be suppressed if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Krull, 480 U.S. at 348-49 (internal quotation marks omitted). 24 The government does not dispute this conclusion in its briefing. - 51 - We conclude that the good-faith exception does nothing for the government here. For one, the government did not ask us to invoke the exception. Cf. United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013) (finding that a good-faith argument can be waived, at least when the government fails to raise it below); United States v. Archibald, 589 F.3d 289, 301 n.12 (6th Cir. 2009) (declining to address the good-faith exception where it had not been raised, preserved, or argued by the government). In fact, the government makes no argument concerning the good-faith exception at all, even though it bears the heavy burden of proving that the good-faith exception applies. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). Regardless, the good-faith exception would not help the government in this case. Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz admitted at the evidentiary hearing that the reason the police did not try to get a warrant was because to get a warrant, PRPD must 'conduct several surveillances over a period of days, a lot of photographs, videos; and the process gets complicated. It's a process that takes a great deal of time.' Cruz-Ramos urges us to interpret this testimony as an admission that the police specifically knew that corroboration was generally necessary for probable cause, did not want to put in the work required to get it, and decided to barge into Cruz-Ramos's home anyway. And the government makes no argument that we should interpret the testimony differently. Based - 52 - on Cruz-Ramos's interpretation of the testimony (which is not contradicted by the district court's findings, and, again, importantly, was not disputed by the government), the officers' disregard of the lack of probable cause was certainly deliberate, such that excluding the evidence would have [r]eal deterrent value, Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28, in discouraging future intentional and unlawful police practices. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 348-49; Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (noting that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterring Fourth Amendment violations in the future).25 The Supreme Court has also said, however, that [f]or exclusion to be appropriate, the deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy costs. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 25We note that the record in this case, as it was presented to us, reflects that the good-faith exception does not apply because the police acted in deliberate disregard of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, we need not address today the full extent of the exception's applicability to warrantless searches in general. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2439 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing scenarios where the good-faith exception has been applied and noting that the good-faith exception has not generally been applied to warrantless searches). Nor need we address whether the exception applies to negligent police mistakes. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 146 (2009) (stating that negligent police mistakes could also be sufficiently culpable to bar application of the good-faith exception, at least [i]n a case where systemic errors were demonstrated, such that it might be reckless for officers to rely on an unreliable . . . system); see also Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that if courts apply the exclusionary rule only where a Fourth Amendment violation was deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent, then the good faith exception will swallow the exclusionary rule (internal quotation marks omitted)). - 53 - 2427. We recognize (indeed, regret) the substantial social costs that might come to bear as a result of the vacation of Cruz-Ramos's conviction and his resulting re-trial. See id. As we noted above, the police found several guns in the car, along with an extraordinary amount of drugs (specifically, more than 1,000 decks of heroin, 80 baggies of cocaine, 21 containers of marijuana, 740 vials of crack, and almost 1,000 vials of crack), and it's a hard pill to swallow that none of that evidence can be introduced at Cruz-Ramos's trial. But the law instructs us that [w]hen the police exhibit deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). So is the case here, as we cannot overlook the egregious Fourth Amendment violation that occurred. At the end of the day, law enforcement simply cannot cut corners at the cost of a person's constitutional privileges. We conclude that the exclusionary rule bars the admission of evidence obtained from the illegal search of CruzRamos's house and car. Harmless Error Even if the evidence was illegally obtained (and even if the police had no good-faith reason to seize it), we will only remand for a new trial if letting in the evidence was not harmless. - 54 - United States v. Burgos-Montes, 786 F.3d 92, 114 (1st Cir. 2015). While the government does not address this issue in its brief,26 we conclude that the introduction of the seized evidence in this case was not harmless. Since the error here rises to the level of constitutional, we must assess whether we can consider the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 60 n.22 (1st Cir. 1995). We must find, then, that beyond a reasonable doubt, it is highly probable that the result would have been the same if the error had not occurred. United States v. Leon-Delfis, 203 F.3d 103, 112 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). We are not concerned here with whether there was sufficient evidence on which the petitioner could have been convicted without the evidence complained of. United States v. Argentine, 814 F.2d 783, 789 (1st Cir. 1987). Instead, [t]he question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. Id. We have the discretion to address harmless error sua sponte 26 in certain situations, but we remind the government that it bears the burden of persuasion with respect to showing that the error was harmless. United States v. Rose, 104 F.3d 1408, 1414 (1st Cir. 1997). We will not fret over whether it is appropriate to exercise our discretion to address harmlessness here despite the government's failure to raise it because the argument would have failed anyway. - 55 - Cruz-Ramos points out (and the government does not dispute) that the evidence seized from Cruz-Ramos's car -- seven guns, and more drugs than we care to recount -- was the only physical evidence at trial that directly connected Cruz-Ramos to La ONU activities (or to any drug trafficking). As far as we can tell, without this physical evidence the only other evidence connecting Cruz-Ramos to anything illegal was the testimony of the cooperators, which they provided in exchange for leniency in their own cases. Further, as Cruz-Ramos points out, even if we take the witnesses at their word, their testimony did not make for a slamdunk for the government by any means -- for instance, while Gutierrez-Santana initially said that Cruz-Ramos was at the planning meeting for Pequeque's murder, he later (unequivocally) testified on cross that Cruz-Ramos was not there. See United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1123 (1st Cir. 1978) (considering that the government's case consisted primarily of the testimony of admitted accomplices, whose credibility was attacked in finding that a constitutional error was not harmless); United States v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 27-28 (1st Cir. 2008) (in harmless beyond a reasonable doubt analysis, considering that no physical evidence tied defendant to drug activity); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1571 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that there was no conclusive evidence that tie[d] petitioner tightly to the crime, and that it did not suffice that it [was] probable that - 56 - petitioner committed the crime). Thus, we simply cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt it is highly probable that the jury would have reached the same verdict without the wrongly admitted physical evidence. See Leon-Delfis, 203 F.3d at 112; cf. United States v. Jiménez, 419 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding harmless error when erroneously admitted evidence pale[d] in light of the other evidence introduced at trial); United States v. Crooker, 688 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding harmless error where drug residue was illegally obtained, but the government presented a wealth of other evidence, including bags of drugs, drug paraphernalia, and the defendant's confession that he used and possessed drugs). All in all, neither the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule nor the harmless-error doctrine apply here. Therefore, Cruz-Ramos is entitled to a new trial, and the evidence that was illegally seized from his home cannot be introduced. Cruz-Ramos's Statement We are left with one unresolved issue concerning the motion to suppress. While, as we discussed above, it's clear that the physical evidence seized during the illegal search of CruzRamos's home should have been suppressed, whether Cruz-Ramos's statements to the police should have been too is a tad trickier since the statement was provided after the search of the house. - 57 - In examining this more complicated question, we generally look at whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court did not undertake this inquiry, given its finding that the search was legal. Further, the government does not address this issue (along with numerous others) at all in its brief (meaning it is likely waived). However, because this question depends primarily upon weighing the facts in the particular case, . . . and is thus a matter especially suitable for resolution by the district court in the first instance, United States v. AcostaColon, 157 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), we think it appropriate that the district court address this issue on remand. See id.; United States v. Cordero-Rosario, 786 F.3d 64, 78 (1st Cir. 2015). For the reasons discussed, we must reverse in-part the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, vacate CruzRamos's conviction, and remand his case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because we find that Cruz-Ramos is entitled to a new trial based on suppression error, we need not address his other allegations of reversible trial or sentencing errors. - 58 - We move on to the grievances pressed by his cohorts.