Opinion ID: 1951369
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Florida Statute

Text: Several Florida statutes prohibit unauthorized uses of law enforcement and military uniforms. For example, section 250.43(2), Florida Statutes (2004), is almost identical to the federal armed services uniform ban contained in 18 U.S.C. § 702 (2000), which the Supreme Court held valid in Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 61, 90 S.Ct. 1555, 26 L.Ed.2d 44 (1970). [5] The statute prohibits everyone except members of our armed forces from wearing any part of any service branch's uniform, or an imitation of it, except as provided by law. § 250.43(2), Fla. Stat. (2004) (making unauthorized wearing a misdemeanor offense); see also § 321.02, Fla. Stat. (2004) (directing the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to prescribe a distinctive uniform and distinctive emblem to be worn by all officers, and providing that it shall be unlawful for any other person or persons to wear a similar uniform or emblem, or any part or parts thereof); § 30.46(4), Fla. Stat. (2004) (prohibiting anyone but sheriffs and their deputies from wearing an official sheriff's badge or insignia or wearing a badge or insignia of such similarity that it is indistinguishable from twenty feet away); § 250.43(1) (prohibiting unauthorized persons from wearing the uniform or insignia of the Florida National Guard). The State regulates even the wearing of uniforms of retired or deceased law enforcement officers. See § 112.193(4), Fla. Stat. (2004) (providing that a single uniform and badge of a law enforcement officer may be awarded to a retiring employee or to the family of a deceased officer, but that such items are presented to commemorate prior service and must be used only in such manner as the employer prescribes by rule). Finally, section 843.085(3) prohibits unauthorized persons from selling governmentally authorized law enforcement indicia of authority, except to authorized law enforcement personnel. These statutes, including the statute at issue here, address only conduct. Section 843.085(1), provides as follows: It is unlawful for any person: (1) Unless appointed by the Governor pursuant to chapter 354, authorized by the appropriate agency, or displayed in a closed or mounted case as a collection or exhibit, to wear or display any authorized indicia of authority, including any badge, insignia, emblem, identification card, or uniform, or any colorable imitation thereof, of any federal, state, county, or municipal law enforcement agency, or other criminal justice agency as now or hereafter defined in s. 943.045, which could deceive a reasonable person into believing that such item is authorized by any of the agencies described above for use by the person displaying or wearing it, or which displays in any manner or combination the word or words police, patrolman, agent, sheriff, deputy, trooper, highway patrol, Wildlife Officer, Marine Patrol Officer, state attorney, public defender, marshal, constable, or bailiff, which could deceive a reasonable person into believing that such item is authorized by any of the agencies described above for use by the person displaying or wearing it. By its express terms, the statute prohibits persons not authorized by the governor or law enforcement agencies from wearing or displaying the official criminal justice agency insignia (or colorable imitations thereof) in such a way that a reasonable person could be deceived into believing the wearer or displayer to be authorized by law enforcement to use this official insignia and symbol of governmental authority. Even the prohibition on the use of specific words applies only when the words appear on governmentally authorized insignia, or a colorable imitation, and could deceive a reasonable observer into believing the wearer to be so authorized by a law enforcement agency. To reiterate, under O'Brien a statute that regulates conduct but also affects some speech is nevertheless valid if it is within the constitutional power of the government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673. Assuming for the moment that O'Brien applies because the statute here regulates some speech  a premise I dispute  the Florida statute nevertheless meets the requirements of O'Brien. The State certainly has the authority to regulate the conduct the statute addresses  the unauthorized wearing of official law enforcement insignia. The law furthers an important governmental interest  protecting unwitting citizens from people passing themselves off as or appearing to be law enforcement personnel through the unauthorized use of the official symbols of government authority. The statute's obvious intent is to preserve the use of the indicia of law enforcement authority to those authorized to exercise such powers. No one can deny that this is a substantial state interest. Also, the government's interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech. Citizens are free to express any view they please about law enforcement. Rather, the statute ensures that only law enforcement agents appear to be such. Finally, any incidental effect on speech is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the government's interest. In fact, I can find no effect on speech at all, incidental or otherwise. Dressing like a police officer in such a way that others reasonably could be deceived into believing the person to be a police officer never has been protected under the First Amendment. The majority holds the statute unconstitutional because, it claims, the statute prohibits some politically expressive conduct. Majority op. at 1021. The majority holds the statute to too high a standard, however, and one which no other court employs. The Supreme Court has explained the connection between regulating conduct and speech: But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct  even if expressive  falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect  at best a prediction  cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. To put the matter another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In Broadrick itself, the challenged statute validly prohibited many activities, but it also forbade constitutionally protected exercises. Nevertheless, the Court found it unnecessary to invalidate the statute on its face, holding that improper applications of the statute could be dealt with as the situation arose. Id. at 618, 93 S.Ct. 2908. Clearly, the measure of a statute's overbreadth is not whether it may possibly prohibit some speech. As the Supreme Court has warned, the mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 800, 104 S.Ct. 2118. Rather, a statute's overbreadth must be both real and substantial. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908; see also Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494, 102 S.Ct. 1186 (noting, in this context, that a court's first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987) (same). Even if the majority were correct that a negligible infringement on protected speech is sufficient to doom a statute, the majority must misread the statute to find such an infringement here. Contrary to the majority's interpretation, nowhere does the statute prohibit protected speech. The majority cites some examples of constitutionally protected activity that it claims the statute prohibits. Majority op. at 1021. These include wearing a shirt with the word police on it in combination with a depiction of police committing a wrong in a traffic arrest; the word sheriff worn at a political rally involving a campaign for sheriff; and similar words on costumes that have a frivolous meaning. Id. Again, assuming that all these examples are constitutionally protected, the statute prohibits none of them. The mere wearing of a shirt with the word police on it does not, as the majority claims, violate the statute. Depictions of police officers in skits or movies do not violate it. Nor does attending a costume party dressed as a police officer. Moreover, any kind of political speech is permitted. Anything on a shirt from support your local Sheriff to the police stink is fair game. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) (finding that the First Amendment was implicated in a criminal prosecution for wearing a jacket that said Fuck the Draft and reversing the conviction). Children may wear shirts bearing the word police, as can a group attending a pro-(or anti-) law enforcement rally. The statute prohibits only wearing an official uniform shirt, or colorable imitation, with the word police on it in a way that essentially says to a reasonable observer, I am the police. [6] But a statement by someone not a law enforcement official that he is one or has authority to use these official indicia of government authority has never been held to be protected speech, nor should it be. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (stating that there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact and that [t]hey belong to that category of utterances which `are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality'); see also City of Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476 So.2d 197, 202 (Fla.1985) (emphasizing that the right to dress as one pleases, vis-à-vis style and fashion, has little or no first amendment implications). Sult does not argue that she intended to convey a political or any other expressive message. The majority, too, fails to identify any political message inherent in displaying the word police on a shirt in a manner which could deceive a reasonable person into believing that such item is authorized for use by the person wearing it. Instead, to hold the statute unconstitutional, the majority must first delete the language quoted in the foregoing sentence, ignore the requirement that the word appear on governmentally authorized indicia of authority, and then conclude that wearing a shirt with the word police does, in many cases, convey a political message that most people viewing it would understand. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404, 109 S.Ct. 2533. In other words, the majority ignores that the statute itself excepts those very circumstances from its operation.