Opinion ID: 2512536
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Barrington's due process claim

Text: We have determined that due process applies to administrative proceedings. [47] We have adopted the three-part balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge to determine whether administrative proceedings satisfy due process. [48] This test takes the following into account: [f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the [probable] value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.[ [49] ] We first consider Dr. Barrington's private interests. He asserts two: his interest in being paid for his services, and his procedural interest in having the board hear his claim. The appeals commission decided that Dr. Barrington only had an economic interest and that this interest was represented by Williams. Because Dr. Barrington had an independent right to file a claim and Williams could not adequately represent his interest, we conclude that Dr. Barrington had a cognizable property interest in filing an independent claim and that this interest was entitled to due process protection. [50] The second step in our due process analysis is evaluating the risk of erroneous deprivation using current procedures and the benefits of additional process. Dr. Barrington asserts that the risk of erroneous deprivation using the board's procedures is one hundred percent; ACS counters that Dr. Barrington had the opportunity to join his claim before the settlement and slept on his rights. We disagree with ACS that Dr. Barrington delayed unduly in filing his claim. Given the assurance he received from Williams's attorney, who then filed Dr. Barrington's bill with the board, Dr. Barrington initially reasonably relied on Williams to protect his interest. The record does not reflect precisely when Dr. Barrington became aware of the settlement, but he filed his own claim about two months after the board approved the settlement and within six weeks after Williams filed for bankruptcy. The record does not establish that Dr. Barrington learned, in time to file his own claim and seek joinder before the board considered and approved the settlement, that the proposed settlement would not fully compensate him for his services. In the abstract, board regulations appear adequate to protect the due process interests of healthcare providers in board proceedings. But the manner in which the board applied the regulations here subjected Dr. Barrington to the risk that he would be unable to obtain payment for his services. When a judgment has the effect of destroying a person's rights, failure to join a person to the action from which the judgment arose may amount to a violation of due process. [51] Because AS 23.30.097(f) could foreclose Dr. Barrington's ability to sue Williams, or at least make collection problematic even without the complication of Williams's bankruptcy, due process required his joinder. The final step in our analysis is determining the government's interest. The appeals commission expressed concern that compulsory joinder of healthcare providers would impede settlement and crowd workers' compensation claims. ACS echoes these fears and argues that additional process would unduly burden employers and put past settlements at risk. But the board and appeals commission decisions in this case give healthcare providers an incentive to file independent claims early in a workers' compensation case or risk having their right to payment compromised without prior notice. The significant disruption caused by even infrequent attempts to set aside settlements would seem to counterbalance any burden that might be created by additional process and the possibility of joining healthcare providers. The board may have an additional administrative burden in joining medical providers in some claims. The board will have to examine settlements to be sure that healthcare providers' claims are not foreclosed without notice. But we are not convinced that the administrative burden on the board will be great: board regulations already create a presumption that settlements waiving medical benefits are not in an employee's best interest, and the workers' compensation act requires the board to review settlements that waive future medical benefits. [52] In addition, board regulations already permit providers to file their own claims. [53] We do not hold that parties need to notify or join healthcare providers in all circumstances. But when, as here, a settlement is intended to pay for or compromise past medical expenses without requiring payment directly to the providers, the board must provide notice and an opportunity to be heard to providers whose claims will be extinguished by the settlement. The board should either begin proceedings to join providers or give them adequate advance notice of the proposed settlement so they can file their own claims. Because board regulations permit the board to consider the objections of the person whose joinder is sought, providers who do not want to become parties can object to joinder. [54] If, as ACS suggests, most healthcare providers are willing to forgo payment in such cases, they can notify the board that they waive their right to payment and ask the board not to join them. But providers who wish to present their claims must be given the opportunity to do so.