Opinion ID: 780450
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Entrapment under California Law

Text: 13 The purpose of the entrapment defense is to deter impermissible police conduct. People v. Barraza, 23 Cal.3d 675, 153 Cal.Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947, 956 n. 5 (1979); People v. Holloway, 47 Cal.App.4th 1757, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 551 (1996), overruled on other grounds by People v. Fuhrman, 16 Cal.4th 930, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 941 P.2d 1189, 1199 n. 11 (1997). In adopting an objective test of entrapment, the California Supreme Court reasoned, the function of law enforcement manifestly `does not include the manufacturing of crime.' Barraza, 153 Cal.Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d at 954 (quoting Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958)). 14 It is permissible for the police to offer the simple opportunity to act unlawfully, by the use of decoys or otherwise. Id. at 955. However, it is impermissible for the police or their agents to pressure the suspect by overbearing conduct such as badgering, cajoling, importuning, or other affirmative acts likely to induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the crime. Id. It is also impermissible for the police or their agents to conduct themselves in a manner that would induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the act because of friendship or sympathy, instead of a desire for personal gain or other typical criminal purpose. Id. Entrapment is a jury question because of its potentially substantial effect on the issue of guilt. Id. at 956 n. 6; see also People v. Lee, 219 Cal.App.3d 829, 268 Cal.Rptr. 595, 598 (1990) (Entrapment is ordinarily a fact question.) (citations omitted). The defendant is entitled to an entrapment instruction if he presents sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that he was entrapped. See People v. Watson, 22 Cal.4th 220, 91 Cal. Rptr.2d 822, 990 P.2d 1031, 1032 (2000) (citing substantial evidence standard from People v. Flannel, 25 Cal.3d 668, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1, 10 (1979)). Doubts as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant instructions should be resolved in favor of the accused. Flannel, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d at 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 15 In this case, the California Court of Appeal found that Bradley was not entitled to an entrapment instruction under California law. However, its decision involved an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Moreover, it failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Bradley. 16 First, the California Court of Appeal's decision was unreasonable in light of the record. The court characterized the police conduct as an ordinary, run-of-the-mill, undercover drug operation in which a decoy was used. In so doing, it stated that [n]either officer badgered, cajoled, nor did any other affirmative act likely to induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the crime. 17 Although the California Court of Appeal was correct that neither Officer Pena nor Officer Town badgered, cajoled, or importuned Bradley personally, their decoy did. The court overlooked Flores' actions in determining that the facts did not support an entrapment instruction. Yet, a decoy who is manipulated by the police also constitutes a police agent for purposes of the entrapment defense, even [if] the third party remains unaware of the law enforcement object. People v. McIntire, 23 Cal.3d 742, 153 Cal.Rptr. 237, 591 P.2d 527, 530 (1979). 18 Flores, the unwitting police agent, targeted Bradley individually and begged him for drugs. Flores' appeal, Please, please, big man, would you help me out?—despite Bradley's statements that he neither had drugs nor sold them—could certainly be found by a jury to constitute badgering or cajoling. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 161 (1966) (defining badger as to pester ... in a manner likely to confuse, annoy, or wear down); id. at 313 (defining cajole as to persuade with deliberate flattery esp[ecially] in the face of reasonable objection or reluctance). In light of the urgency of Flores' requests, his conduct also constituted importuning in the ordinary meaning of the term. Id. at 1135 (defining importune as to press or urge with ... unreasonable requests). 19 Moreover, the California Court of Appeal's determination that the police merely offered the opportunity to act illegally was unreasonable in light of the record. Officers Pena and Town chose as their hook a drug addict who was going through withdrawals and was very ill. This was not a case in which the police merely used an underage decoy to purchase alcohol, see Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 7 Cal.4th 561, 28 Cal. Rptr.2d 638, 869 P.2d 1163 (1994), or to respond to an ad soliciting sex with a female of any age. See People v. Reed, 53 Cal.App.4th 389, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 658 (1996). This was a case in which the police used a decoy whose physical suffering would appeal to the sympathies of most people. 20 Second, the California Court of Appeal failed to resolve its doubts as to whether a normally-law-abiding person would have been induced to commit the crime out of sympathy for Flores in favor of Bradley. See Flannel, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d at 10. The court denied Bradley's claim, reasoning that the average person would not ... purchase illegal drugs to aid a stranger, even if the stranger appeared to be a drug addict going through withdrawal. 2 What a normally-law-abiding person would do under the circumstances should have been left to the jury. A reasonable jury could find that a normally-law-abiding person would feel sympathy for Flores in his desperate state and decide to help him obtain drugs to relieve his suffering. 21 The Court of Appeal compounded its error by speculating that a normally-law-abiding person confronted by an evidently ill drug-addicted stranger in the throes of withdrawal would not purchase drugs for Flores, but would opt for a legal alternative. Of course, calling the police is an alternative to acquiescing in illegal activity, and it is conceded that taking a drug addict to a clinic is preferable to enabling his drug addiction. But one could always speculate about a legal alternative to the illegal action ultimately taken. 3 22 A normally-law-abiding person does not always take the high road in the face of pressures or inducements by the police or their agents. As Justice Frankfurter observed in Sherman: Human nature is weak enough and sufficiently beset by temptations without government adding to them and generating crime. 356 U.S. at 384, 78 S.Ct. 819 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The state ignores the purpose of the entrapment defense, which is to curb unsavory police conduct. Instead of focusing on the impermissible police conduct, the state chooses to blame Bradley and to point out what he should have done differently. This argument is circuitous and leaves no situation where the defendant can assert entrapment as a defense. 23 Moreover, in faulting Bradley for failing to call the police or take Flores to a treatment center, the state turns a blind eye to the fact that the officers did not do so either. Not only did the officers in this case fail to help Flores, they isolated him from any potential assistance, using him as a decoy and then arresting him as a co-defendant in this case. If anyone in this case had a duty to assist Flores, it was the officers, not Bradley. This is especially true because Bradley was on a bicycle (and could not transport Flores anywhere), whereas the officers were in a vehicle and had control over Flores as a passenger. However, instead of taking him to get help, the officers decided to exploit Flores' addiction as a tool to induce another person's participation in a drug sale. Under Barraza and its progeny, this is impermissible. 24 It is important to remember that at Bradley's first trial, the trial judge found that the evidence presented required that the jury be given an entrapment instruction. The evidence presented at the second trial was exactly the same as the first trial, yet the second trial judge refused to give the instruction. As the District Court below observed: 25 By refusing to instruct the jury on entrapment, the trial judge essentially left the jury with petitioner's confession to the offense, without ever allowing them to consider petitioner's preclusive defense. By rejecting petitioner's request for an entrapment instruction, the trial court effectively deprived petitioner of his only defense. (ER 77) 26 This kind of manipulation of the jury is simply not permissible. The trial judge is... barred from attempting to override or interfere with the jurors' independent judgment in a manner contrary to the interests of the accused. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 573, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). 27 Moreover, when one judge determines, as a matter of law and fact, that the evidence requires the giving of an entrapment instruction, and no additional evidence to the contrary is proffered at a subsequent trial, the second judge may not simply ignore the findings of the first. It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence... that a question of fact or of law distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a[criminal or civil] court of competent jurisdiction cannot afterwards be disputed between the same parties. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 334, 35 S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969 (1915) (internal citation omitted). California recognizes this application of the law of the case doctrine. The California Court of Appeal recently held that a superior court judge lacked the authority to vacate and redetermine the bail setting determination of another superior court judge. In re Alberto, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 526, 2002 WL 31116128, slip. op.11205 (Ct.App. 2002). The decision reasoned that for one superior court judge, no matter how well intended, even if correct as a matter of law, to nullify a duly made, erroneous ruling of another superior court judge places the second judge in the role of a one-judge appellate court. Id. at 11206. See also, People v. Woodard, 131 Cal.App.3d 107, 111, 182 Cal.Rptr. 254 (1982). In the instant case, the second judge simply ignored the findings of the previous judge, without even bothering to assert that the earlier decision was erroneous or that the circumstances of the case had changed. This kind of unauthorized second-guessing is impermissibly arbitrary and can amount to a violation of Due Process.