Opinion ID: 807913
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: 28-Day Limit

Text: DFS next challenges the district court’s extensions of its TRO. Harley-Davidson first moved for a TRO on August 12, 2011. DFS refused to accept service. When its counsel was contacted by the court on September 2, Nos. 11-3618, 11-3838 and 12-1280 33 the day of the TRO hearing, DFS chose not to participate. The TRO was entered on September 6, and was set to expire after 14 days. DFS was served on September 13. On September 19, unaware that DFS had already been served, the court extended the TRO until HarleyDavidson effected service on DFS pursuant to the Hague Convention. Although it did not set a definite expiration date, the court’s order anticipated that process could take three to four months. However, DFS appeared in the district court on October 4, making clear to both Harley-Davidson and the court, at least as of that date, that it had been served. On October 17, the court held a telephonic status conference. The court stood prepared to hold a preliminary injunction hearing immediately, but DFS requested 45 to 60 days to conduct discovery and to prepare. Accordingly, and per DFS’s request, the hearing was set for December 15, 2011, and once the hearing was held, the court entered a preliminary injunction, complete with the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law, on December 20. On appeal DFS argues that the TRO the court entered on September 6, 2011 was facially void and subject to being vacated because it was “indefinitely extended” by the district court, first on September 19 to allow HarleyDavidson to effect service, and again at the October 17 status conference pending the prelim inary injunction hearing. Rule 65 dictates that under ordinary circumstances a temporary restraining order cannot exceed 14 days, although the court may extend it “for a like period” for good cause. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2). 34 Nos. 11-3618, 11-3838 and 12-1280 In granting the extension on October 17, the district court cited cases asserting that a district court could extend a TRO for more than 20 (now 28) days to pro- vide the parties adequate time to prepare for a preliminary injunction hearing, see, e.g., Trefelner v. Burrell School Dist., 655 F. Supp. 2d 581, 598-99 (W.D. Pa. 2009), and some district courts have taken the approach that the 20- and 28-day limits do not apply if the TRO was issued with notice to the enjoined party. See 11A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2953 at 280-83 (2d ed. 1995) (rejecting notice argument but suggesting that extensions are appropriate if needed to prepare for hearing). In our view, the language of Rule 65(b)(2) and the great weight of authority support the view that 28 days is the outer limit for a TRO without the consent of the enjoined party, regardless of whether the TRO was issued with or without notice. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 86-88 (1974); Nutrasweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enterprises, Inc., 112 F.3d 689, 692 (3d Cir. 1997); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Engineers’ Int’l Ass’n, 306 F.2d 840, 842-43 (2d Cir. 1962); Connell v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 240 F.2d 414, 417 (5th Cir. 1957). If a court fails either to extend the TRO or to issue a preliminary injunction in its place, the TRO expires at the close of the 28-day period. “Where a court intends to supplant such an order with a preliminary injunction of unlimited duration pending a final decision on the merits or further order of the court, it should issue an order clearly saying so. And where it has not done so, a party against whom a temporary restraining order Nos. 11-3618, 11-3838 and 12-1280 35 has issued may reasonably assume that the order has expired within the time limits imposed by Rule 65(b).” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70 of Alameda County, 415 U.S. 423, 444-45 (1974) (defendant could not be held in contempt for violating TRO that was silent on its face as to its intended duration; without either extension of TRO or issuance of preliminary injunction, TRO could be presumed to have expired as of Rule 65(b) time limit). DFS argues that the Granny Goose Foods rule should apply here because the extensions of the TRO were indefinite. We disagree. The extensions were not silent about duration. The September 19 extension was until DFS was served under the Hague Convention, which had already happened on September 13 (though Harley- Davidson and the district court apparently did not know that until October 4). The October 17 extension stated the TRO would remain in effect until a decision on the motion for preliminary injunction, which occurred on December 20.6 6 We do find a gap, however, between October 4 and October 17. By the terms of the district court’s September 19 extension, the TRO lasted “until” DFS was served — or, on this record, until October 4, when it became clear to HarleyDavidson and the court that DFS had been served. The gap appears to have been inconsequential. This record does not demonstrate that any activity occurred either on the docket or between the parties between the short gap in time between October 4 and October 17, when the court effectively (continued...) 36 Nos. 11-3618, 11-3838 and 12-1280 When a TRO is extended beyond the 28-day limit without the consent of the enjoined party, it becomes in effect a preliminary injunction that is appealable, but the order remains effective. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. at 86-88 (where court expressly extends a TRO issued after notice and a hearing beyond the statutory limit, the TRO does not cease to exist but instead becomes an enforceable preliminary injunction subject to appellate review); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Lake Shore Asset Mgmt. Ltd., 496 F.3d 769, 771 (7th Cir. 2007) (“A temporary restraining order that remains in force longer than 20 days [now 28 days] must be treated as a preliminary injunction, which allows an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).”); Chicago United Indus. Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 445 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2006) (“A temporary restraining order . . . if kept in force by the district court for more than 20 [now 28] days without the consent of the parties, . . . is deemed a preliminary injunction and so is appealable.”); In re Criminal Contempt Proceedings Against Crawford, 329 F.3d 131, 135-37 (2d Cir. 2003) (analyzing interplay between Granny Goose Foods and Sampson in rejecting defendants’ argument that TRO automatically expired at end of Rule 65(b)(2) time period; TRO had been explicitly extended by district court and defendants could be held in criminal contempt for violating its terms). 6 (...continued) revived the terms of the September 6 order and extended it until the preliminary injunction motion was decided. Nos. 11-3618, 11-3838 and 12-1280 37 We take a moment to remind district courts that for a TRO to be viable beyond the 28-day mark as a preliminary injunction, the order must comport with the formal requirements for a preliminary injunction. Rule 65(d) requires both a TRO and a preliminary injunction to “state the reasons why it issued,” and Rule 52(a)(2) requires a statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law for decisions granting or refusing an “interlocutory injunction” (a phrase that includes preliminary injunctions). TROs issued on an emergency basis often provide only terse explanations. When a district court is considering extending a TRO beyond the 28-day limit, it would be prudent to review the explanation given to support the original order and to consider whether a further explanation may be appropriate to allow meaningful appellate review, as opposed to opening the order up to being vacated and remanded for lack of a sufficient explanation. We recognize there will be cases where the maximum 28day limit does not give the parties sufficient time to prepare for a preliminary injunction hearing, let alone time for the district court to decide it. In those cases, an extension of the TRO pending a preliminary injunction hearing and decision without consent of the enjoined party is technically a preliminary injunction: it is appealable, and the district court should provide a sufficient explanation of its decision to allow meaningful appellate review. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2). A court reviewing such an order for an abuse of discretion should take into account the urgency with which it was issued and the needs of the district 38 Nos. 11-3618, 11-3838 and 12-1280 court and the parties, but the law does not allow an indefinite and unreviewable extension of a TRO without the consent of the enjoined party. See Sampson, 415 U.S. at 86-88; Granny Goose Foods, 415 U.S. at 441.7 The district court’s September 6 TRO provided a short explanation that was not supplemented until the preliminary injunction was issued. If either party had thought the original explanation was not sufficient under Rule 52(a)(2) or Rule 65(d)(1)(A), it could have raised the issue and the court could have corrected any oversight very quickly. DFS did not raise such an issue before the district court or on appeal and has waived any argument it might have made in that re- gard. See United States v. Johns, 686 F.3d 438, 449 (7th Cir. 2012) (defendant waived argument by failing to present it on appeal); Kunz v. DeFelice, 538 F.3d 667, 681 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Failure to adequately present an issue to the district court waives the issue on appeal.”).