Opinion ID: 1879728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prospective Effect of SDCL 35-4-78(2)

Text: The majority in Walz noted that the court in Griffin had declined to expand the common law to afford a remedy and also did not extend SDCL 35-4-78(2) to impose a civil liability duty. Walz, supra at 122. However, the court went on to state that [s]ince Griffin essentially turned on a reluctance to impose a common law duty [4] in the absence of express civil liability legislation, we did not fully reach Justice Dunn's interpretation of SDCL 35-4-78(2). We do now. Id. The court then discussed SDCL 35-4-78(2) and concluded that the statute had established a standard of care or conduct, a breach of which is negligence as a matter of law.  (emphasis added) Id. at 123. Clearly, the Walz decision is based upon a cause of action existent under SDCL 35-4-78(2), (which should control the date of application). It can be argued that Walz should not be applied retroactively because: (1) the Walz majority did not address the application issue, (2) caselaw holds that where prior settled law is overturned, the decision should be prospectively applied, and (3) to apply Walz retroactively would be inequitable. We believe the Walz majority opinion, read in its entirety, clearly demonstrates that the court determined that [s]ince this decision applies existing statutory law, it was unnecessary to state that the decision was both prospective and retrospective. SDCL 35-4-78(2) was a statute within the Codified Laws of South Dakota before any of the actions in this case or Walz occurred. As such, it provided a standard of care or conduct from the moment it became law. There has been criticism of the negligence per se rule, see Prosser, Law of Torts § 36 (4th ed. 1971); 3 Cooley on Torts § 481 (4th ed. 1932); 5 The Law of Torts § 17.6 (1988), however, it is clear that this rule has been adhered to by this court for some time. The violation of a statute enacted to promote safety constitutes negligence per se. Engel v. Stock, 88 S.D. 579, 581, 225 N.W.2d 872, 873 (1975); Bothern v. Peterson, 83 S.D. 84, 155 N.W.2d 308 (1967); Blakey v. Boos, 83 S.D. 1, 153 N.W.2d 305 (1967). It is inconceivable that violation of a statute may be negligence per se on one day, but cannot be the day before. Walz did not overrule prior settled law. Griffin dealt with the common law cause of action and there was no prior settled law construing civil liability under SDCL 35-4-78(2). Finally, it is no more inequitable to apply Walz retrospectively than it is, in any case, to acknowledge that violation of a criminal statute may result in a finding of civil liability. Generally, bar owners were aware of SDCL 35-4-78(2) and the acts it prohibited and cannot assert ignorance. The negligence per se rule has never been restricted to only those laws which facially provide both civil and criminal remedies and the wisdom of so doing is not a question before this court. Therefore, based upon a clear reading of Walz and the application of the well-settled rule of negligence per se, we hold that the decision in Walz was intended to apply both retrospectively and prospectively.