Opinion ID: 2718842
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Recusal Issue on Appeal

Text: [¶23] We first address the trusts’ contention, presented for the first time on appeal, that the judgment and “all other orders and decisions” entered by Justice Cole in the Superior Court must be vacated because Justice Cole violated the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct by not recusing himself from the case or disclosing to the parties that he had formerly served on the Superior Court with an individual who is now an attorney at KRZ. The trusts allege that Justice Cole maintains a longstanding social relationship with former Superior Court Justice Robert Crowley, who is now of counsel at KRZ, that resulted in “judicial overreach in direct service to the financial interests of [Justice Cole’s] old friend’s 14 law firm.” Raisin and Samsara therefore assert that Justice Cole violated the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct by not disqualifying himself pursuant to Maine Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(1)-(2) or disclosing his relationship with Crowley pursuant to Canon 3(E)(3). Review of the record does not indicate that former Justice Crowley had any involvement with this litigation, nor does it provide any details on Crowley’s financial relationship with KRZ. [¶24] The trusts’ serious allegations of judicial bias require us to clarify the ethical obligation placed on judges in cases where they have some association with an attorney whose law firm appears before them. We take this opportunity to further define the standards for judicial recusal and disclosure in Maine, where the legal and judicial communities are small and lawyers and judges necessarily know one another and enjoy cordial and professional relationships. We also reaffirm that the responsibility to promote and preserve the integrity of the legal system is shared by members of the judiciary and the bar alike. The duty of judges to avoid impropriety or the appearance of impropriety is paralleled by the duty placed on attorneys to raise allegations of judicial partiality in a timely manner, in accordance with proper procedure, and in good faith. In applying these standards to this case, we conclude that the trusts’ allegations of judicial bias are without merit. 15
[¶25] We begin by addressing the applicable standard of review in light of the trusts’ failure to raise their arguments regarding judicial bias prior to this appeal. When a party fails to make a timely motion for recusal or disclosure, we review for obvious error. See Charette v. Charette, 2013 ME 4, ¶ 22, 60 A.3d 1264; In re Kaitlyn P., 2011 ME 19, ¶ 9, 12 A.3d 50; In re William S., 2000 ME 34, ¶ 8, 745 A.2d 991. “A motion for disqualification should come at the ‘earliest moment after knowledge of the facts’ that suggest recusal.” MacCormick v. MacCormick, 513 A.2d 266, 267 (Me. 1986) (quoting Satterfield v. Edenton-Chowan Bd. of Educ., 530 F.2d 567, 574 (4th Cir. 1975)). When a party fails to make a timely motion for recusal before the entry of judgment, that party has forfeited its objection to the judge’s qualification and cannot be heard to complain following a result alleged to be unfair. In re Kaitlyn P., 2011 ME 19, ¶ 8, 12 A.3d 50; MacCormick, 513 A.2d at 267-68. “The rationale for this rule is obvious: A party should have no incentive to roll the dice for a favorable decision and then, if the decision is unfavorable, raise grounds for recusal of which she or [her] counsel had actual knowledge prior to the decision being made.” In re Kaitlyn P., 2011 ME 19, ¶ 9, 12 A.3d 50 (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). “Not only is such a tactic unfair, but it may evidence a belief that 16 the judge is not in fact biased.” In re Michael M., 2000 ME 204, ¶ 13, 761 A.2d 865 (quotation marks omitted). [¶26] It is undisputed that Justice Cole and former Justice Crowley served together on the trial courts, sometimes in the same courthouse, for over twenty years. Their service is well known to members of the bar. The trusts contend that their failure to raise the issue of judicial bias before the Superior Court should be excused because they “lacked actual knowledge” of the purported relationship between Justice Cole and former Justice Crowley.4 This assertion is suspicious for two reasons. First, the trusts do not state with specificity the date or circumstances by which they became aware of any alleged relationship between Justice Cole and former Justice Crowley so as to enable us to determine whether the trusts raised the issue at the “earliest moment after knowledge of the facts that suggest recusal.” MacCormick, 513 A.2d at 267 (quotation marks omitted); see also Stevens v. Somerset Cnty. Comm’rs, 97 Me. 121, 127, 53 A. 985 (1902) (denying a request to quash the proceedings of county commissioners due to an improper relationship in part because the appellant’s petition was “entirely silent as to when she made the 4 Because of the relative professional isolation required of ethical judges, one hopes that judges who serve on the same court, and sometimes in the same courthouse for long periods of time, do develop amicable professional and social relationships. The existence of such relationships among judges should be of surprise to no one. 17 discovery of the alleged disqualifying relationship”).5 Second, the trusts’ insistence that they “lacked actual knowledge” contradicts their simultaneous assertion that “[t]he longstanding personal and professional friendship between Justice Cole and retired Justice Crowley—and Justice Crowley’s affiliation with KRZ since his retirement—is well known among the bench and bar in Cumberland County where this Court sits . . . [and] is not subject to reasonable dispute.” [¶27] Regardless of the exact timing of the trusts’ discovery of Justice Cole’s alleged social relationship with Crowley, to develop an adequate record, the trusts should have moved to set aside the court’s entry of default in accordance with the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure rather than raise their allegations of bias for the first time on appeal. We will not consider new facts, testimony, exhibits, or other factual materials relating to the merits of an appeal that were not presented to the trial court and included in the trial court record. Beane v. Me. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 2005 ME 104, ¶ 9, 880 A.2d 284; Bradstreet v. Bradstreet, 2004 ME 5, ¶ 3, 840 A.2d 105. 5 The trusts’ representations to this Court suggest that they did not learn of the alleged personal relationship between Justice Cole and former Justice Crowley until they discharged their former counsel and hired their present counsel after the entry of judgment in the Superior Court. However, Raisin and Samsara do not state that their former attorney was unaware of the purported grounds for Justice Cole’s recusal. If their former attorney did know about the alleged relationship, then the trusts’ assertions that they “lacked actual knowledge” would be inaccurate, as “it is well settled that the knowledge of trial counsel is imputed to [the client].” Orlandella v. O’Brien, 637 A.2d 105, 106 n.1 (Me. 1994). In any event, even if the trusts were unaware of the purported social relationship until they hired their present counsel, their failure to file a motion to set aside the entry of default is fatal to their allegations of judicial bias, for the reasons discussed below. 18 [¶28] Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) provides that “[f]or good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).” Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) in turn provides that the court may relieve a party from a final judgment due to “newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b).” Although we generally review a decision denying a motion made pursuant to either Rule 55(c) or 60(b) for an abuse of discretion, “a party’s failure to make an appropriate post-judgment motion afford[s] us no basis on which to review the court’s discretion and thus preclude[s] our consideration of any related issues on appeal.” Fleet Mortg. Corp. v. Cobb, 611 A.2d 565, 566 (Me. 1992); see also Rossignol v. Raynes, 650 A.2d 935, 937 (Me. 1994) (“We adhere to the proposition that Rule 55(c) and Rule 60(b) provide the only basis for the review of a default judgment.”). [¶29] Basic notions of fairness require the filing of an appropriate post-judgment motion in order to permit the presiding judge an opportunity to address a party’s concerns regarding perceived judicial partiality. Equally important is the necessity of creating a proper record for us to review. By pursuing their allegations of judicial bias for the first time on appeal instead of making an appropriate motion before the Superior Court, the trusts failed to provide a record 19 that supports their contentions regarding Justice Cole’s purported friendship with Crowley or its possible effect on Justice Cole’s ability to be fair and impartial. See M.R. App. P. 5; State v. Jordan, 659 A.2d 849, 851 (Me. 1995) (“As a general rule, we will not consider an issue on appeal unless it was raised in the trial court and the record on appeal is sufficient to allow an informed review of the questions involved.” (quotation marks omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Nichols, 1997 ME 178, ¶ 3, 698 A.2d 521. Instead, the trusts ask us to take judicial notice of the alleged relationship, and to infer that the relationship is one that requires disclosure or recusal, based on little more than their bare assertions and a newspaper article that makes passing mention of a Cole-Crowley friendship. Judicial notice is not appropriate under these circumstances. Maine Rule of Evidence 201(b) provides that “[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Not only is the alleged nature of the personal relationship between Justice Cole and Crowley and its possible effect on Justice Cole’s obligations very much “subject to reasonable dispute,” but a single newspaper article expressing a reporter’s perception is certainly not an appropriate source for judicial notice. Id.; see also City of Hammond v. Doody, 553 N.E.2d 196, 197-98 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) 20 (holding that the identity of a trial judge’s law clerk was not subject to judicial notice on appeal, in determining whether the judge’s recusal was required, because the party requesting recusal failed to provide any evidence regarding the law clerk apart from its own assertions).6 [¶30] For the foregoing reasons, we reemphasize that a party who is concerned about a judge’s impartiality should tender its concerns to the court at the earliest possible moment. See MacCormick, 513 A.2d at 267-68. To the maximum extent possible, this should occur before adjudication takes place. If a party becomes aware of facts potentially bearing on judicial impartiality after the entry of judgment, and those facts could not reasonably have been known earlier, then the party should file an appropriate post-judgment motion. Because the trusts failed to make an appropriate motion before the Superior Court, we review the judgment to determine whether there existed an obvious error that “deprived the [trusts] of a fair trial and resulted in a substantial injustice.” In re William S., 2000 ME 34, ¶ 8, 745 A.2d 991. With this standard of review in mind, we now address the trusts’ contentions that Justice Cole violated the Maine Code of 6 At oral argument before this Court, the trusts’ counsel represented that he had polled local attorneys regarding their opinions of the relationship between Justice Cole and Crowley. In so doing, the trusts’ counsel inappropriately attempted to introduce facts at the appellate level which were beyond the existing record. See Beane v. Me. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 2005 ME 104, ¶ 9, 880 A.2d 284. Furthermore, the proffered statements of the polled attorneys constitute subjective and unverified opinions that are inappropriate sources for judicial notice. 21 Judicial Conduct, and that the violation was such that the judgment must be vacated.
[¶31] The trusts contend that Justice Cole violated the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct by not disqualifying himself pursuant to Canon 3(E)(1)-(2) or disclosing his alleged relationship with former Justice Crowley pursuant to Canon 3(E)(3). We address the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct’s requirements for recusal and disclosure in turn. [¶32] Maine Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E) establishes two instances where a judge’s recusal or disqualification from a case is warranted. First, “[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself on the judge’s own initiative in any proceeding in which the judge has reason to believe that he or she could not act with complete impartiality.” M. Code Jud. Conduct 3(E)(1). “This is a purely subjective test which the judge should apply based on his or her own understanding of personal feelings or attitudes or factual matters involved in the proceeding.” Advisory Comm.’s Notes to the M. Code Jud. Conduct at 34 (effective Sept. 1, 1993) (hereinafter, “Advisory Notes”). “A judge acting under this subsection . . . need not state the grounds of disqualification.” M. Code Jud. Conduct 3(E)(1). 22 [¶33] Second, “[a] judge may disqualify himself or herself on the judge’s own initiative without stating the grounds of disqualification, and shall disqualify himself or herself on a motion for recusal made by a party, in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” M. Code Jud. Conduct 3(E)(2). Canon 3(E)(2) establishes an objective test that asks, “[r]egardless of the judge’s own belief about his or her ability to act impartially, [whether] the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned by others.” Advisory Notes at 34-35. Canon 3(E)(2) also sets forth a nonexhaustive list of examples of when a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, such as when “the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer.” M. Code Jud. Conduct 3(E)(2)(a). [¶34] Independent of these principles governing judicial recusal is the requirement of disclosure set out in Canon 3(E)(3), which provides as follows: Unless a judge disqualifies himself or herself under subsections (1) or (2) of this section, a judge shall promptly disclose to the parties in any proceeding any fact known to the judge that is relevant to the question of impartiality and that the judge knows or reasonably ought to know could connect the judge . . . to any of the parties, counsel, witnesses, or issues in the proceeding. The Advisory Notes explain the purpose of this disclosure requirement and the analysis to be employed: The purpose of the provision is to assure that parties trying to determine whether to seek recusal are aware of relevant information in 23 more specific detail than is provided in the general judicial financial disclosures required under Canon 6. The relevance standard for disclosure is lower than that for disqualification or recusal. The test of relevance is that of M.R. Ev. 401: A fact that must be disclosed is one “having any tendency” to make the fact of impartiality “more probable or less probable than it would be without the” fact. Advisory Notes at 38. [¶35] Applying these Canons of the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct to the present case requires an understanding of the practice of law in Maine, where the legal and judicial communities are small.7 It is unavoidable, and indeed desirable, that judges who serve on the bench together will necessarily develop close professional relationships. We do not expect that such cordial relationships will end if a judge leaves the bench and returns to the practice of law. We are cognizant that the party status of the law firm in this instance makes this case somewhat different from those where a former colleague is simply an advocate for a party before the court. However, it remains a “fact of litigation in small Maine communities that a judge, or members of his or her family, may know of a party, or a witness, or someone related to a party or a witness, or may even have done 7 At oral argument, counsel expressed surprise that judges will often have lunch together. To be clear, the entire Maine judiciary is comprised of only sixty active state court judges. Those judges are encouraged to maintain collegial relationships through the organization of regular lunches, collegial support, mentoring, and judicial education. The bar is similarly small, with only approximately 3800 active in-state lawyers. Registration Statistics, Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, https://www1.maine.gov/cgi-bin/online/maine_bar/statistics.pl. Collegiality is encouraged among the bar and between judges and lawyers, and bench/bar events, designed to encourage collegiality among lawyers and judges, are held regularly throughout the year. These events include lunches, dinners, golf tournaments, and hockey games. 24 business with somebody whose name may come up in a case.” Charette v. Charette, 2013 ME 4, ¶ 24, 60 A.3d 1264 (quotation marks omitted). [¶36] Other state courts have reached similar conclusions: “We note that in many areas, particularly rural areas, where judges have known practically all the people for many years, if such were a disqualification, the judge could never preside on most cases.” Medley v. State, 600 So. 2d 957, 961 (Miss. 1992). “Unless a judge in a small community was a hermit or a newcomer to the region (neither of which is a good foundation for the position) before assuming the bench, the judge will necessarily have had relationships—business or personal—with most of the attorneys in the community. That is not necessarily a bad thing.” Tatham v. Rogers, 283 P.3d 583, 603 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (Korsmo, C.J., dissenting). [¶37] With these concepts in mind, we conclude that there was no obvious error in Justice Cole failing to sua sponte recuse himself or disclose his purported friendship with Crowley. First, with respect to recusal, there was no obvious error in Justice Cole’s decision not to disqualify himself from the case pursuant to Maine Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(1). Canon 3(E)(1) espouses a purely subjective standard for recusal. Advisory Notes at 34. Because there is no record of Justice Cole’s state of mind on the matter, we lack the necessary record to review his decision not to disqualify himself pursuant to Canon 3(E)(1). 25 [¶38] That Justice Cole did not disqualify himself pursuant to Canon 3(E)(2) was also not obvious error, because the trusts have not put forth any competent evidence that establishes that Justice Cole’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned by others.”8 Advisory Notes at 35. “The mere belief that a judge might not be completely impartial is insufficient to warrant recusal.” State v. Atwood, 2010 ME 12, ¶ 21, 988 A.2d 981 (quotation marks omitted). Even assuming arguendo that the trusts’ representations to this Court are credible—i.e., that Justice Cole maintains a friendly relationship with Crowley, who is now employed of counsel at KRZ—“[t]here are many levels or degrees of friendship in our society. Thus, when a question arises as to whether a judge’s acquaintance or friendship with a particular person requires the judge’s disqualification, the answer must ultimately turn on the specific facts of the case—in particular, the precise nature of the judge’s relationship with that person, and the way in which that person is connected to the litigation.” Phillips v. State, 271 P.3d 457, 469–70 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012); see also Jacobson v. Manfredi, 679 P.2d 251, 254 (Nev. 1984) (“[A] judge, especially a judge in a small town, need not disqualify himself merely because he knows one of the parties.”). 8 Because the trusts did not move for recusal, Justice Cole’s duty to recuse himself pursuant to Canon 3(E)(2) was discretionary rather than mandatory. 26 [¶39] To be clear, there is no allegation on the record that Justice Cole and Crowley are family members, that they have any financial entanglements, or that they have any significant relationship other than a friendship born of long careers on the bench. In support of his argument, counsel alleged orally, without factual support in the record, that Justice Cole and Crowley frequently had lunch together and engaged in other social events such as bar meetings, golfing, etc. However, a friendship between colleagues or former colleagues that includes such interactions does not provide a basis for requiring recusal. On the limited record before us, which contains no details regarding the relationship between Justice Cole and Crowley, we conclude that there was no obvious error in Justice Cole not recusing himself from a case in which one of the parties employs an attorney who is a former colleague and who did not appear in the present matter. [¶40] Finally, that Justice Cole did not make the type of disclosure required by Maine Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(3) likewise did not constitute obvious error. Canon 3(E)(3)’s requirement that judges disclose any information that is relevant to the issue of impartiality is a rule of reason. There can be little question that former judicial colleagues may be understood to be friends. Requiring disclosure of such a fact when that fact alone will not lead to recusal serves no practical purpose. Based on the limited record before us, there is simply no competent evidence requiring Justice Cole to make disclosures pursuant to 27 Canon 3(E)(3). Even assuming that some form of friendship exists between Justice Cole and Crowley, that fact is not so relevant to the question of impartiality that Justice Cole’s failure to disclose it deprived the trusts of a fair trial and resulted in a substantial injustice. See In re William S., 2000 ME 34, ¶ 8, 745 A.2d 991; Hathcock v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 912 So. 2d 844, 852-53 (Miss. 2005) (interpreting a similar disclosure requirement and concluding that the judge’s failure to disclose was harmless because there was no real basis for disqualification); see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 882 F.2d 1556, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding no error in the trial judge’s failure to disclose that his son was an employee of one of the parties to the case). [¶41] For these reasons, we conclude that the trusts’ contentions regarding judicial bias are without merit.