Opinion ID: 2586
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Engaging in an Offense Punishable Under Section 841(b)(1)(A)

Text: Santos argues that, as a matter of law, the government was required to prove that he was actively engaged in the distribution of drugs. Appellant's Br. 42. We disagree. Statutory interpretation always begins with the plain language of the statute, assuming the statute is unambiguous. Universal Church v. Geltzer, 463 F.3d 218, 223 (2d Cir.2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 961, 166 L.Ed.2d 706 (2007). When a court determines that the language of a statute is unambiguous, its inquiry is complete. See, e.g., Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 290 (2d Cir.2002). Thus, although Santos argues that his position is supported by the legislative history of section 848(e)(1)(A) and principles of statutory construction favoring a narrow interpretation of criminal statutes, we need not resort to these modes of interpretation if the plain language of the statute is clear. See, e.g., Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992); Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 808 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed.2d 891 (1989); Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir.2007); Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F.3d 335, 337-38 (2d Cir.2006). Section 848(e)(1)(A), as relevant to this appeal, applies to any person engaging in an offense punishable under [21 U.S.C. §] 841(b)(1)(A) ... who intentionally kills or counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes the intentional killing of an individual and such killing results. 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Section 841(b)(1)(A), referred to in section 848(e)(1)(A), does not itself proscribe specific conduct; it establishes penalties, including imprisonment for ten years to life, for drug offenses involving specific types and quantities of controlled substances. [3] The penalties set forth in section 841(b) apply not only to those who knowingly or intentionally ... manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance, id. § 841(a)(1), but also to those who attempt[] or conspire[] to do so, id. § 846. See United States v. Richards, 302 F.3d 58, 70 n. 8 (2d Cir. 2002). That is, [a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in [21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904] [is] subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy. 21 U.S.C. § 846. Therefore, conspiracy to commit a substantive offense punishable under section 841(b)(1)(A) is itself an offense punishable under section 841(b)(1)(A), id. § 848(e)(1)(A). [4] Consequently, and contrary to Santos's argument, a defendant need not be actively engaged in the distribution of drugs, Appellant's Br. 42, in order to be convicted under the drug-related murder prong of section 848(e)(1)(A). The defendant need only be engaging in an offense punishable under section 841(b)(1)(A), which includes conspiracy to commit such an offense. Santos also argues that the drug-related murder prong of section 848(e)(1)(A) does not apply to persons who are doing no more than working in furtherance of a drug offense, Appellant's Br. 31; that such a drug offense must be committed independent of the killing itself, id. at 36; and that it must be ongoing when the killing occurs, id. at 35. We may assume that these interpretations of the statute are correct. They do not help Santos, however, because the drug conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846, does not require proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 11, 115 S.Ct. 382, 130 L.Ed.2d 225 (1994). Thus, the conspiracy itself  and no act in furtherance of it, homicidal or otherwise  serves as the predicate drug offense under section 848(e)(1)(A). So long as the defendant enters into the unlawful agreement before the killing, and the conspiracy is ongoing when the killing occurs, the drug-offense and killing elements of section 848(e)(1)(A) are satisfied by independent acts that overlap in time. Santos, noting that he was not involved in the charged drug conspiracy before the day of the murders, complains that his conviction rests on an interpretation of section 848(e)(1)(A) that would allow the drug-offense and killing elements to be satisfied by one and the same act. Appellant's Br. 33. We disagree. The while engaging in language does imply two separate elements: one drug offense and one killing. An unlawful act committed in furtherance of a drug conspiracy, however, is not itself the drug conspiracy or any element thereof. But such acts  including killings  may and often do serve as powerful circumstantial evidence that the charged conspiracy existed and that the actor joined it. See United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 308 (2d Cir.2007); United States v. Aleskerova, 300 F.3d 286, 292-93 (2d Cir.2002); see also United States v. Hunte, 196 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir.1999); United States v. Johnston, 146 F.3d 785, 789 (10th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1088, 119 S.Ct. 839, 142 L.Ed.2d 694 (1999). Thus, although a murder committed by the defendant in furtherance of a drug conspiracy cannot itself satisfy the drug-offense element of section 848(e)(1)(A), it can, in appropriate circumstances, persuade the jury that the defendant was a member of the drug conspiracy in furtherance of which the killing was committed. This would be consistent with the commands of the statute.