Opinion ID: 867207
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Constitutionality of (F)(9) aggravator

Text: ¶ 25 Nelson contends that [t]he (F)(9) aggravating circumstance is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment[s] on its face and as applied to [him] because it fails to adequately and rationally narrow those defendants subject to the death penalty. He also argues under the Eighth Amendment that sentencing him to death based solely upon the (F)(9) aggravator is cruel and unusual punishment. We review de novo the constitutionality of statutory aggravating factors. See State v. Hargrave, 225 Ariz. 1, 13 ¶ 42, 234 P.3d 569, 581 (2010).
¶ 26 Nelson argues that the (F)(9) aggravator draws an arbitrary and irrational distinction at age fifteen and is not based upon any factual or constitutionally meaningful distinction. A death penalty sentencing scheme `must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.' Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 7, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994) (quoting Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988)). The eighth amendment requires that the sentencer's discretion be channeled and limited to avoid the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. State v. Hinchey, 165 Ariz. 432, 436, 799 P.2d 352, 356 (1990). Aggravating circumstances `play a significant role in channeling the sentencer's discretion.' State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 323, 916 P.2d 1035, 1039 (1996) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990)). To be valid, aggravating circumstance[s] may not apply to every defendant convicted of murder and may not be unconstitutionally vague. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994). ¶ 27 The aggravator in this case was that [t]he defendant was an adult at the time the offense was committed ... and the murdered person was under fifteen years of age. A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(9). This aggravating circumstance meets constitutional requirements. First, as Nelson concedes, it does not apply to every murder. Nor is the (F)(9) aggravator vague. It is difficult to imagine an aggravating factor less susceptible than (F)(9) to a challenge on the grounds of vagueness or overbreadth. Jones v. Schriro, 450 F.Supp.2d 1047, 1078 (D.Ariz.2006). It provides a bright line factor based on the age of the victim and the age of the offender.
¶ 28 Nelson next contends that [t]he (F)(9) aggravator violates equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. He argues that the state does not have a compelling or rational basis for executing a defendant who kills someone fourteen years and ten months old and sparing the life of those who kill someone fifteen years and one day old. We have previously held, however, that the legislature had a rational basis for creating the (F)(9) aggravator: [T]he age of a victim is an appropriate aggravating factor because a rational basis exists for it. By adopting the (F)(9) factor, the legislature determined that the young and old are especially vulnerable and should be protected. It is not irrational for the legislature to conclude that murders of children and the elderly are more abhorrent than other first-degree murders. Thus, in the absence of sufficient mitigating factors, murders of this sort should be punished more severely. In addition, the age of the victim is relevant to an inquiry into the defendant's characteristics and propensities. Those who prey on the very young or the very old are more dangerous to society. State v. Smith, 193 Ariz. 452, 462 ¶ 48, 974 P.2d 431, 441 (1999).
¶ 29 Nelson also argues that sentencing him to death based solely on the (F)(9) aggravating circumstance is cruel and unusual punishment. He makes two separate claims: (1) that we must conduct a proportionality review and hold that his sentence is grossly disproportionate to his crime, and (2) that we should also compare this aggravator to age-based aggravators in other states and find it invalid. ¶ 30 Although we once conducted proportionality review to determine whether the sentences of death are excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and defendant, State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 196, 560 P.2d 41, 51 (1977), we discontinued the practice in 1992 because proportionality review is fraught with problems and not constitutionally required, State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 416-17, 844 P.2d 566, 583-84 (1992); see also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not require comparative proportionality review by an appellate court). We decline to do so in this case as well. ¶ 31 Nelson also contends that because this murder would satisfy the age-based capital aggravator in only four jurisdictions, [3] a national consensus exists that a sentence of death based on the murder of a child under fifteen constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Nelson argues that we should find a categorical restriction on imposing the death penalty when the single aggravator found is based on the age of the victim, using the analysis in Graham v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). Graham, however, acknowledges two subsets of categorical rules against the death penalty, one determining that capital punishment is impermissible for nonhomicide crimes against individuals and the other turning on the offender's characteristics. Id. at 2022. Neither applies here. There is no categorical rule precluding the imposition of the death penalty on the basis of an otherwise constitutional statutory aggravator. ¶ 32 Even if we assume Graham supplies the proper analysis for challenging an aggravator, such a challenge fails here. Under Graham, a court considers `objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice' to determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue. 130 S.Ct. at 2022 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005)). In the past decade, the Supreme Court has used this approach in three death penalty cases. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (concluding the death penalty cannot be imposed for rape); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (holding [t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of [eighteen] when their crimes were committed); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (holding that the execution of mentally retarded criminals violates the Eighth Amendment). ¶ 33 Admittedly, Nelson would be eligible for death in fewer jurisdictions than were the defendants in Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy. But those cases turned on the characteristics of the defendant or the nature of the crime, not the identity of the victim. Currently thirty-five out of fifty-two jurisdictions (including the United States and Washington, D.C.) have the death penalty. In seventeen of these jurisdictions, murdering a victim of a certain age alone qualifies a person for the death penalty. [4] Eleven jurisdictions consider the victim's age as an aggravator with additional qualifying circumstances. [5] Thus, in twenty-eight of the thirty-five jurisdictions, age of the victim is a factor in sentencing a defendant to death. This shows consensus that the victim's age is relevant in determining whether a person who commits murder deserves the death penalty. ¶ 34 To be sure, states use different ages in their capital aggravation statutes, and there is no clear consensus on what age should trigger eligibility. It is the legislature's province, however, to determine at what ages child victims are most vulnerable. The Arizona Legislature has set the age at fifteen, well within the range of other jurisdictions. Compare S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(10) (2011) (eleven years old), with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-102(h)(ix) (2011) (seventeen years old).