Opinion ID: 1980583
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: probable cause affidavit

Text: WALTER D. FERRELL, being first duly sworn, says that: On January 12, 1969, I saw a young man take my 1955 Mercury automobile from my driveway. I chased and caught him, recovering the car, but he got away. He was later caught by the Indiana State Police and identified as Richard Allen French. /s/ WALTER D. FERRELL Walter D. Ferrell Subscribed and sworn to before me, M. Dale Palmer, Prosecuting Attorney, 55th Judicial Circuit, this 13 day of February, 1969. /s/ M. DALE PALMER M. Dale Palmer Prosecuting Attorney My Term Expires: December 31, 1970 CERTIFICATE I certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing Probable Cause Affidavit upon Mr. Thomas J. O'Brien, attorney for the defendant, Richard Allen French, by depositing a copy of same in the receptacle provided in the Hendricks County Clerk's Office this 13 day of February, 1969. /s/ M. DALE PALMER M. Dale Palmer Exhibit G is a copy of Motion to Quash Affidavit Titled Probable Cause Affidavit, omitting heading, signature verification and memorandum in support such motion reads in pertinent part as follows: The defendant, Richard Allen French, appearing specially herein by his attorney, Thomas J. O'Brien, for the purpose of filing a motion to quash probable cause affidavit, and for no other purpose whatsoever; does now request the Court to quash the arrest warrant in the above entitled cause on the following grounds: 1. That the affidavit in itself contains facts which, if true, would constitute a legal bar to the prosecution of this defendant, and 2. That there is no authority provided in law for the filing of an affidavit for probable cause thirty (30) days after an arrest warrant has already been issued. We have, at some length, set out the record in the case at bar to delineate the issues here for determination. It appears clear to us that two questions are here presented: A. Must a showing of probable cause before a neutral and detached magistrate precede the issuance of a lawful arrest warrant? B. If the answer to A is yes, then who must make the determination of the existence of probable cause, and how may the showing of probable cause be made within the framework of existing constitutional, statutory and case law? It is clear to us that proposition A must be answered in the affirmative. This has been, since 1852, a constitutional requirement embodied in Article 1, § 11 of the Constitution of the State of Indiana, which is identical to the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Article 1, § 11, provides in part that: No warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. Consequently, since the Constitution provides that the warrant cannot issue except upon probable cause, the showing of probable cause must necessarily precede the issuance of the warrant. As to proposition B, above, it is a long standing rule in Indiana that the determination of probable cause is a judicial determination to be made by a judge or magistrate, and not a ministerial determination. Wallace v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 317, 157 N.E. 657. In Kinnaird v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 506, 242 N.E.2d 500, this Court stated that, a judicial determination is a requirement that goes to the heart of the Fourth Amendment. In Kinnaird the term magistrate was used to describe the type of judicial officer before whom the showing of probable cause must be made, and who must make the determination as to the existence of probable cause. the word magistrate appeared in Giordenello v. United States (1958), 357 U.S. 480, and Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U.S. 108, and was carried over into Kinnaird v. State, supra . In Kinnaird the word magistrate was given a broad interpretation. As used in that case the word magistrate includes the judge of any court of this state authorized to issue process, to accept pleas, to hear and determine cases and to render judgments. The magistrate is a neutral and detached magistrate if at the time of the issuing of the warrant, he has no personal interest in the case other than that of performing the judicial duty of determining the presence of probable cause before issuing the warrant. Further, the mere fact that a judge has ruled upon a showing of probable cause does not necessarily disqualify that judge from trying that case on its merits. The manner in which the showing of probable cause may be made is clearly indicated, we think, in the Kinnaird case, supra. For years the courts of this and our sister states have been able to cope successfully with the problem of probable cause in the preliminaries to the issuance of search warrants, and it seems to us quite reasonable to expect them to do so with respect to arrest warrants. In our opinion, the showing of probable cause may be made in several ways. It may be in the form of an affidavit setting forth enough of the underlying facts and circumstances to enable a neutral and detached magistrate to draw his own conclusions as to the existence of probable cause. The showing may also be made by the testimony of sworn witnesses transcribed by the court reporter and made a matter of record, and which testimony sets forth the facts and circumstances upon which the judicial determination of probable cause may be made. However, the affidavit setting forth the showing of probable cause for obtaining the arrest warrant need not be the same affidavit that charges the accused with the crime for which his arrest is sought. Further, there is, in our opinion, no need for a hearing to determine probable cause where a grand jury has returned an indictment. The return by the grand jury is a showing of probable cause as at least five of the six members of the grand jury must concur before the indictment can be returned. Therefore, since the grand jury, in returning the indictment, makes the determination as to the existence of probable cause, the probable cause determination need not be made by a neutral and detached magistrate in those cases where the prosecution is by indictment. Turning now to the question of the effect of the filing of the Probable Cause Affidavit in the case at bar, we hold that inasmuch as the same was sworn to and filed thirty days or more after the arrest warrant was issued it was not and could not have been considered in aid of a showing of probable cause immediately before or at the time of the issuance of the arrest warrant. We agree with relator that the filing of such affidavit at such late date is a tacit admission on the part of the State of Indiana that there was no hearing or determination of probable cause prior to the issuance of the warrant for relator's arrest. Therefore, we must, and do, hold that the arrest warrant issued herein, as shown by the record, was illegally issued in that it was issued without a showing of probable cause as is required by both the Constitution of the State of Indiana and the Constitution of the United States. Kinnaird v. State, supra ; Art. 1, § 11, supra; U.S. Const. amend. IV. Accordingly, since the arrest warrant of January 13, 1969, was illegally issued, it is null and void, and respondents are hereby ordered to discharge relator from custody on said warrant. However, since relator has been in custody of the Sheriff under arrest prior to the filing of the original affidavit ( supra, P. 6, entry 2-24-69) we are unable to grant that portion of the relator's prayer for relief seeking discharge from custody of the Sheriff of Hendricks County. Relator's petition does not challenge the validity or seek relief from the arrest referred to by the court in its minutes and that question is not before us, hence we here express no opinion as to the validity thereof. That portion of relator's petition which seeks to prohibit respondents from assuming, taking or exercising any further authority or jurisdiction by virtue of the warrant for relator's arrests over the cause of action entitled State of Indiana v. Richard Allen French now pending in respondent court as number SCR 69-3 is hereby denied. DeBruler, C.J., concurs; Hunter, J., concurs with opinion; Arterburn, J., dissents with opinion; Givan, J., dissents with opinion. CONCURRING OPINION. HUNTER, J. I completely concur in the majority opinion and add to it only because I wish to minimize any potential for confusion that might arise from what I believe is a misstatement of the facts in the dissenting opinion of Arterburn, J.