Opinion ID: 1922714
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal.

Text: ¶ 49. Generally, the failure to object to the prosecution's statements during closing arguments operates as a procedural bar. Ross v. State, 954 So.2d 968, 1001 (Miss.2007) (citing Spicer v. State, 921 So.2d 292, 309 (Miss.2006)). Because Hughes failed to object to the prosecution's statements during closing arguments, this issue is procedurally barred on appeal. ¶ 50. Procedural bar notwithstanding, the prosecution's reference to other local armed robberies which involved a similar pattern of behavior was for illustrative purposes, and was not intended to incite the passions and prejudices of the jury. See Brewer v. State, 704 So.2d 70, 71-73 (Miss.1997). The prosecution also repeatedly used the word they because the state's theory of the case was that Hughes and Webster acted in concert. ¶ 51. Hughes argues further that the prosecution violated his constitutional due-process rights by misrepresenting Hughes as the shooter. The alleged misrepresentation is set out below: Why did [Hughes] hide his head? He was hoping that [the Warners] couldn't identify them. He was hoping [the Warners] wouldn't know who did it. If [the Warners] didn't get killed, they wouldn't be able to identify [Hughes and Webster], and luckily, [the Warners] didn't get killed. Of course, when you are shooting somebody four times, what are you intending? We do not find that this statement was intended to implicate Hughes as the gunman. The context of the prosecutor's argument is that Hughes knew that serious bodily injury was intended, and therefore, he tried to conceal his identity. ¶ 52. Finally, Hughes argues that the prosecutor misrepresented Hughes's statement about his and Webster's conversation earlier that night. The prosecutor asserted that Hughes admitted right before we went there, one of the things we were talking about was robbing somebody. Hughes contends that robbery was a general topic of his and Webster's broader conversation and that they never talked about robbing anyone in particular. We find that if robbery was being discussed as a way to make money, a reasonable inference can be made that some person or entity was to be targeted. ¶ 53. The trial judge instructed the jury that arguments, statements, and remarks of counsel are not evidence. When a jury is instructed that comments made by counsel are not evidence, reversal is not required. Burns v. State, 729 So.2d 203, 229 (Miss.1998) (citing Ormond v. State, 599 So.2d 951, 961 (Miss.1992)). For all the reasons discussed above, we find no prosecutorial misconduct to require reversal.