Opinion ID: 439202
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the jencks act determination

Text: 14 Before trial, the defense requested that the prosecution produce certain notes taken during interviews with witnesses. The defense maintained that the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500, required the production of such notes. Without examining the contents of the prosecutor's notes, 6 the district judge ruled that the notes were work products of the government attorneys, and were not producible under the Jencks Act. Tr. 24; see Tr. 25-30. 15 Appellants ask this court to rule that the prosecutor's notes were in fact producible under the Jencks Act. Further, appellants, citing 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500(d), contend that because Jencks Act materials were not produced, the testimony of the witnesses with whom the prosecutor conducted the relevant interviews, several of whom were key witnesses for the prosecution, should be stricken from the trial record. Accordingly, appellants conclude, this court should rule that the failure to produce the prosecutor's notes was reversible error. 16 While we find that the district judge failed to discharge her duty to inquire into whether the notes were producible under the Jencks Act, we decline at this stage of the proceedings to hold that this failure constitutes reversible error. Instead, we remand this case for a redetermination of the Jencks Act issue. Pending such a redetermination, the appellants' convictions remain intact. 17 We note, to begin with, that the district judge ruled against the Jencks Act request on an erroneous legal ground. Without examining the prosecutor's notes, the district judge determined that they were work products, and accordingly held that they were not producible under the Jencks Act. However, the Supreme Court has held unequivocally that the work product doctrine does not bar the production of the notes of government attorneys that are otherwise producible under the Jencks Act. See Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94, 105-08, 96 S.Ct. 1338, 1345-47, 47 L.Ed.2d 603 (1976). 18 Moreover, established precedent requires the district court to engage in an adequate inquiry into the nature of the documents before ruling against Jencks Act production. As the Supreme Court has explained: 19 a Government objection to production may require that the trial court inspect documents or hold a hearing to gather extrinsic evidence bearing on the extent to which the documents are statements producible under Sec. 3500. In Campbell I [Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 81 S.Ct. 421, 5 L.Ed.2d 428 (1961) ] the Court unanimously concluded that the trial judge was obliged to conduct some inquiry into the circumstances of the witness' interview there in question. The circumstances of this case compel the same conclusion. [The defendant's] testimony raised a sufficient question under the Act to require the trial judge to conduct such an inquiry, and since we hold that the trial judge erred in exempting the material from production as attorneys' work product, a remand for such an inquiry by the District Court is required.... 20 Goldberg, 425 U.S. at 108-09, 96 S.Ct. at 1347 (citations and footnotes omitted). Furthermore, this court has held that a district judge has an affirmative duty to determine whether any [Jencks Act] statement exists and is in the possession of the Government and, if so, to order the production of the statement. Saunders v. United States, 316 F.2d 346, 349 (D.C.Cir.1963); see also Hilliard v. United States, 317 F.2d 150 (D.C.Cir.1963). The district court's inquiry may involve the interrogation of the witness or of the government agent, or an in camera examination of what is purported to be a statement under the statute. Saunders, 316 F.2d at 349. The district judge in this case entirely failed to make a reasonable inquiry into whether the prosecutor's notes should be produced under the Jencks Act. 7 21 Nor do we believe it is proper for this court to make the Jencks Act determination in this appeal. As a general rule, the initial determination of whether the documents constitute producible statements under the statute should be made in the district court. See Goldberg, 425 U.S. at 108, 96 S.Ct. at 1347 (The Court of Appeals erred in undertaking to make the initial determination whether the materials constituted producible 'statements.' ); id. at 109 n. 15, 96 S.Ct. at 1347 n. 15 (examination of the documents is initially a task for the District Judge). Accordingly, we remand for the district court to make the Jencks Act determination. 22 In doing so, the district court should consider whether the prosecutor's notes qualify as statements under either section 3500(e)(1) or section 3500(e)(2) of title 18. If the notes qualify as statements under either subsection, they must be produced. Under section 3500(e)(1), the notes constitute the statements of witnesses if they have been adopted or approved by those witnesses. While prior to trial the prosecutor maintained her very, very firm position that [the notes] ... have not been adopted by the witnesses, Tr. 24, the Jencks determination is to be made by the court, not the prosecutor. See, e.g., Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 92-93, 81 S.Ct. 421, 425, 5 L.Ed.2d 428 (1961); United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 428 (D.C.Cir.1975); see also Palmero v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 361, 79 S.Ct. 1217, 1229, 3 L.Ed.2d 1287 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring). Thus the trial court must determine whether the prosecutor's notes were actually read back to [the witness] and whether he adopted or approved them. Goldberg, 425 U.S. at 110, 96 S.Ct. at 1348. Under section 3500(e)(2), the notes constitute statutory statements if they are a substantially verbatim account of the witness interview. Notes that evidence substantial selection of material, or which were prepared after the interview without the aid of complete notes do not meet this standard. On the other hand, this standard does not require that the notes reflect a delusive exactness. See Palmero v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 352-53, 79 S.Ct. 1217, 1224-25, 3 L.Ed.2d 1287 (1959). So long as the notes can be fairly characterized as the witness' own words, they should be made available to the defense. Id. at 352, 79 S.Ct. at 1224. 23 We do not vacate the appellants' convictions pending resolution of the Jencks Act issue. If the district court, after adequate examination of the issues, determines that the notes do not constitute Jencks Act statements, it should supplement the record with findings and enter a new final judgment of conviction. However, if the district court finds that any of the notes should have been produced pursuant to the Jencks Act, and that the error was not harmless, 8 the judgment of conviction should be vacated and a new trial should be conducted. See, e.g., Goldberg, 425 U.S. at 111-12, 96 S.Ct. at 1348-49; United States v. Del Toro Soto, 676 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir.1982); United States v. Peters, 625 F.2d 366, 371 (10th Cir.1980); United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1273 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831, 100 S.Ct. 60, 62 L.Ed.2d 40 (1979).