Opinion ID: 202809
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: vessel manning requirements for buzzards bay

Text: The district court held that the two vessel manning requirements of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21M, § 4for tank barges and for tow vessels in Buzzards Bayare field preempted because they are unambiguously covered by Title II, and not Title I. The district court did not engage in the overlap analysis described in Locke. See Massachusetts, 440 F.Supp.2d at 35-37. The United States did not seriously present argument to the district court that if Title I applied, federal regulations preempted the vessel manning requirements. Subject to certain exceptions, [14] the state's manning provision for tank barges requires that crews consist of 2 personnel, 1 of whom shall be a certified tanker-man under [federal regulations] who shall be on the tank barge at all times. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21M, § 4(b). The manning provision for tow vessels towing 6000 or more barrels of oil requires (a) at least 1 licensed deck officer or tow vessel operator, who shall serve exclusively as a lookout with no other concurrent duties, and (b) three licensed officers or tow vessel operators. Id. § 4(a). The parties raise different preemption arguments for section 4(b), the tank barge provision, and for section 4(a), the tow vessel provision.
Massachusetts argues that although section (4)(b)'s tank barge manning requirement could be encompassed by Title II, there is nonetheless overlap with Title I. Because of this overlap, the state contends that more facts needed to be developed, and so the issue should not have been resolved at the pleadings stage. The United States disagrees, arguing that because the manning of vessels is listed in Title II, [15] see 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a)(4), all state manning regulations are field preempted by Title II and no overlap analysis is necessary. That contention overreaches. The position of the United States, which the district court accepted, is inconsistent with Locke 's recognition that Title I and Title II can overlap. See 529 U.S. at 111, 120 S.Ct. 1135. While the district court was correct to begin with the text of the Title II, this should not have ended the inquiry. Title II of the PWSA addresses the manning of vessels to which this chapter applies, 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a), and the chapter applies to tank vessels, see id. § 3702(a). A tank vessel is in turn defined as a vessel that is constructed or adapted to carry, or that carries, oil or hazardous material in bulk as cargo or cargo residue, and that(A) is a vessel of the United States; (B) operates on the navigable waters of the United States; or (C) transfers oil or hazardous material in a port or place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Id. § 2101(39). Congress required the Coast Guard to promulgate regulations addressing the manning of [tank] vessels and the duties, qualifications, and training of the officers and crew. Id. § 3703(a)(4). Courts must also examine the text of Title I when analyzing the preemptive effect of the PWSA on particular state regulations. See Locke, 529 U.S. at 111-12, 120 S.Ct. 1135. As the state points out, Title I gives the Secretary authority to promulgate regulations for protecting the marine environment, which may include operating requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1223(a)(1). Further, for areas the Secretary considers to be hazardous, the Secretary may establish vessel operating conditions and/or may restrict operations to vessels which have particular operating characteristics or capabilities which he considers necessary for safe operation. Id. § 1223(a)(4)(C), (D). The state argues that its manning requirements are thus a type of operational requirement under Title I, for certain vessels in Buzzards Bay, and not a general manning requirement under Title II. The United States responds that the phrase operating requirements is a term of art that refers only to navigational operations in a traffic safety system of the type expressly addressed in Title I of the PWSA. The general operation and manning of vessels, the United States says, are dealt with in Title II and are thus field preempted. See 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a). As the state notes, however, Title I's Statement of Policy also refers to manning: The Congress finds and declares . . . that increased supervision of vessel . . . operations is necessary in order to . . . insure that vessels operating in the navigable waters of the United States shall comply with all applicable standards and requirements for vessel construction, equipment, manning, and operational procedures. 33 U.S.C. § 1221(c)(3) (emphases added). Analysis of the texts of Title I and Title II does not fully resolve the source of the potential preemption here. Nor does initial consideration of the purposes behind Title I and Title II resolve the matter. Both Titles are concerned with enhanced protection of the marine environment. See Locke, 529 U.S. at 110-11, 120 S.Ct. 1135. As a result, that cannot itself be the distinguishing factor. Nor is it helpful to talk abstractly about the safety of vessels, which, depending on the particular regulations at issue, may be a Title I or a Title II concern. The analysis becomes clearer when one considers Locke 's approach. The Court invalidated training requirements which applied statewide, controlled manning outside of state waters, and did not address matters unique to the waters of Puget Sound. Id. at 113, 120 S.Ct. 1135. The Court also invalidated an English language proficiency requirement for tanker crews that affected staffing decisions outside of state waters and was not limited to governing local traffic or local peculiarities. Id. at 113-14, 120 S.Ct. 1135. Further, the Court invalidated as field preempted a statewide navigation-watch requirement. The Court noted that this was a general operation and manning requirement under Title II because [t]he general watch requirement is not tied to the peculiarities of Puget Sound; it applies throughout Washington's waters and at all times. Id. at 114, 120 S.Ct. 1135. Locke thus held that the state's general watch regulationrequiring at least four specified personnel in state waters at all timeswas preempted by Title II as an attempt to regulate a tanker's operation and manning under 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a). Id. However, at the same time, the Court remanded for performance of an overlap analysis to determine whether a narrower navigation-watch requirement, for times of restricted visibility, should be analyzed under Title I. In line with the Court's articulation of the method for differentiating between Title I and Title II concerns, the Court suggested that, on remand, consideration should be given to Washington's arguments that the narrower requirement was of limited extraterritorial effect and necessary to address the peculiarities of Puget Sound. Id. at 116, 120 S.Ct. 1135. Relying on this aspect of Locke, the state suggests that any time a state regulation on a given topic is restricted to a particular local waterway, overlap analysis is required. This argument stretches too far and is inconsistent with the balance of Locke as well as Ray. Some topics are Title II topics, regardless of limited geographic application, as the state has essentially conceded in not attempting to defend other sections of its statute. With regard to the manning requirement before us, however, the district court must undertake an overlap inquiry, including a full consideration of the various Locke factors. Further development of the record is in order to resolve this point. The United States suggests to us that even if Title I conflict preemption analysis were used, various federal requirements in the area of manning, including regulations promulgated under Title I, suffice to preempt. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 164.13(c). The argument has not been sufficiently made either before the district court or on appeal, and can be made on remand.
We have concluded that the state's tank barge manning requirements for Buzzards Bay must be reconsidered under overlap analysis. For similar reasons, we also conclude that a remand is necessary on the state's tow vessel manning provisions. The state nonetheless asks us to go farther. It points out that the text of Title II addresses tank vessels, not tow vessels, see 46 U.S.C. § 3702(a), and it contends that the two are not the same. [16] Accordingly, the state argues that section 4(a) cannot be within the scope of Title II, and the provision's validity must instead be considered under Title I conflict preemption analysis. The United States disagrees with this interpretation of the PWSA. It argues that although the PWSA expressly addresses tank vessels, and not tow vessels, that fact is immaterial. The definition of tank vessel includes any vessel that carries . . . oil or hazardous material in bulk as cargo, and not just vessels that are constructed or adapted to carry . . . oil or hazardous material in bulk as cargo. Id. § 2101(39). That definition, in the United States' view, can encompass a tug vessel when it pushes, pulls, or hauls a vessel containing oil or hazardous material (although the vessel would not be within the scope of the definition when it carries some other type of cargo). This interpretation is based on an argument that when a vessel carrying oil or other hazardous material is not self-propelled and requires a tug (as would be the case with a barge), the tug and the non-self-propelled vessel effectively become one vessel which carries the cargo. The state responds that a 2004 amendment added towing vessels to the list of vessels covered by a separate chapter of Title 46 of the United States Code, but did not similarly add towing vessels to the list of vessels covered by Title II of the PWSA. See Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004, Pub.L. No. 108-293, § 415, 118 Stat. 1028, 1047 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 3301(15)). The amended section already applied to tank vessels. 46 U.S.C. § 3301(10). The state argues that this means the term tank vessel does not encompass towing vessels. The district court held that although Title II does not expressly use the term tow vessels, this was a legally insignificant distinction. Massachusetts, 440 F.Supp.2d at 36-37. The district court adopted the United States' argument that towing vessels that are pushing, pulling, or hauling tank barges carrying oil or other hazardous materials are, as part of the tow-barge combination, `tank vessels' and are, thus, within the scope of Title II. Id. at 37. The court explained that adoption of the state's proposed distinction between tank vessels and tow vessels would undermine important federal interests: The towing vessel, although it does not physically carry the oil, is the crucial element of the tow-barge combination and, therefore, poses the most risk to the marine environment. Defendants' argument, furthermore, would give the Coast Guard exclusive jurisdiction to regulate one form of tank vessel, self-propelled tankers, but would grant concurrent jurisdiction with the states to regulate the driving force of the tow-tank barge combination. That result would make little practical sense and would hinder the Congressional goal of creating uniform national regulations for all tank vessels. Id. This led the court to hold that the matter was clearly within Title II, and so section 4(a) was field preempted. Id. Our resolution of this appeal does not require us to determine if the state or the federal government has correctly interpreted the meaning of `tank vessel.' Even if the federal government's interpretation is correct, our discussion in Part III.A shows why overlap analysis would still be required before a court could find preemption as a matter of law. That is sufficient for us to reverse the district court's decision to grant judgment on the pleadings, and to remand this issue. [17]