Opinion ID: 2492640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying instructions d-6 and d-8 and giving instruction s-1.

Text: ¶ 16. Bailey contends that the trial judge abused his discretion and deprived Bailey of his right to present his defense theory by denying Bailey's proposed jury instructions D-6 [6] and D-8. [7] Bailey asserts that, because the trial court denied these two instructions, the jury was denied its traditional right to weigh Bailey's defenses. Further, Bailey asserts that the trial judge denied the defense the right even to argue self-defense before the jury. Bailey claims the prejudice to the defense was extreme because the judge granted instruction S-1, which required the State to show that Bailey had acted not in necessary self-defense. ¶ 17. While Bailey specifically points to the denial of instructions D-6 and D-8 along with the granting of S-1, Bailey's claim centers on the judge's ruling that Bailey had failed to prove a case for self-defense. While discussing the jury instructions, the State argued that the defense had failed to present evidence that would support any self-defense instructions and offered authority to support the State's position. ¶ 18. The trial judge relied on this Court's ruling in Phillips v. State, 794 So.2d 1034 (Miss.2001), which addressed self-defense and manslaughter instructions. In Phillips, this Court held that jury instructions must have a foundation in the evidence, and that mere words and disagreements alone are not enough for a manslaughter instruction. Id. at 1037-39. In today's case, the trial court conducted a detailed analysis of the evidence presented during the trial, found that the evidence was insufficient to support an instruction on self-defense, and denied instruction D-6. ¶ 19. In denying instruction D-8, the trial judge cited Turner v. State, 773 So.2d 952 (Miss.Ct.App.2000), and Phillips, 794 So.2d 1034. The trial court found that, because there was no evidence that Evans was carrying a weapon, or that punches were thrown between Bailey and Evans, the evidence in today's case did not justify the rage, anger, hatred, furious resentment or terror that would be required for a manslaughter instruction. ¶ 20. Jury instructions are generally within the discretion of the trial court and the settled standard of review is abuse of discretion. Newell v. State, 49 So.3d 66, 73 (Miss.2010) (citations omitted). The instructions are to be read together as a whole, with no one instruction to be read alone or taken out of context. Young v. State, 891 So.2d 813, 819 (Miss. 2005) (citing Howell v. State, 860 So.2d 704, 761 (Miss.2003)). When read together, if the jury instructions fairly state the law of the case and create no injustice, then no reversible error will be found. Newell, 49 So.3d at 73 (citing Rubenstein v. State, 941 So.2d 735, 784-85 (Miss. 2006)). This Court has held that [a] defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case; however, this entitlement is limited in that the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. Hearn v. State, 3 So.3d 722, 738 (Miss. 2008) (citing Chandler v. State, 946 So.2d 355, 360 (Miss.2006)). This Court has repeatedly held that the accused is entitled to a lesser offense instruction only where there is an evidentiary basis in the record therefor. Such instructions should not be granted indiscriminately, nor on the basis of pure speculation. Jacobs v. State, 870 So.2d 1202, 1209 (Miss.2004) (citing Wilson v. State, 639 So.2d 1326, 1329 (Miss. 1994)) (citations omitted). ¶ 21. In Phillips, 794 So.2d at 1035, the defendant was convicted of murder and appealed to this Court, claiming that the trial court had erred in refusing a manslaughter instruction and an imperfect self-defense instruction. The facts at trial revealed that Phillips and the decedent, Thornton, had been in a verbal argument and that Thornton had pushed Phillips's hand a couple of times during the argument. Id. at 1036. An eyewitness to the argument testified that the two men exchanged no punches and that Thornton pushed Phillips only a couple of times during the verbal argument. Id. Before the trial court, Phillips claimed that he was entitled to manslaughter and imperfect self-defense instructions because he was in fear for his life or of great bodily harm because there had been testimony presented that [Thornton] was known to carry a gun. Id. at 1038. Phillips did not testify at trial, and no evidence was presented that Thornton was carrying a weapon. Id. In his argument on appeal, Phillips claimed that the following evidence provided a foundation for the instructions: (1) Phillips and Thornton never had problems prior to the confrontation; (2) Phillips had injuries on his face, and it should be inferred that they were caused by Thornton, who was a large individual; and (3) testimony revealed that Thornton often carried a pistol. Id. ¶ 22. Finding that the trial court did not err in refusing the instructions, this Court stated: Based on the record, there is insufficient evidence to warrant a manslaughter instruction for either theory submitted by Phillips. The record does not reflect that [Thornton] was using deadly force against Phillips, but instead that [Thornton] pushed Phillips's hand a few times and Phillips pushed [Thornton] back. The evidence is not sufficient to show that [Thornton] was armed during the course of his argument with Phillips, and [an eyewitness] testified that the two were not physically fighting, but were having a verbal argument. The evidence is insufficient to rise to the level of reducing Phillips's murder charge to that of manslaughter, and for that reason, Phillips's conviction and life sentence should be affirmed. Id. at 1038-39. ¶ 23. Recently, in Flowers v. State, 51 So.3d 911 (Miss.2011), this Court reversed the trial court's judgment, finding that the evidence warranted an instruction on the defense of necessity. At trial, Flowers testified that he had broken into a home because someone was trying to shoot him. Id. at 913. Flowers was insistent on cross-examination that someone was after him with a gun and that his only option was to break into the house. Id. Based on Flowers's testimony, this Court found that there was a foundation for the instruction on the defense of necessity. Id. ¶ 24. In Williams v. State, 53 So.3d 734 (Miss.2010), this Court reversed the defendant's conviction, finding evidence in the record that warranted an assisted-suicide instruction. The evidence included a statement by the defendant that he and the decedent had considered committing suicide together and testimony from third parties that the defendant and decedent had entered into a suicide pact. Id. at 742-43. In Banyard v. State, 47 So.3d 676 (Miss.2010), this Court also reversed the trial court's judgment, finding that the evidence warranted an instruction of duress. In Banyard, evidence was presented at trial that the thirteen-year-old defendant felt that he could not change his mind once a nineteen-year-old man had begun a plan to rob and kill a pizza-delivery man. Id. at 682. Banyard testified that he did not want to kill the man, but that he was afraid of the nineteen-year-old, and that he looked serious and mean. Id. Banyard also testified that he was afraid that the man would shoot him if he ran away. Id. at 683. This Court found that the evidence presented met the minimum threshold necessary to warrant a duress instruction. Id. ¶ 25. We find the facts of today's case are similar to those in Phillips, 794 So.2d 1034. Similar to the defendant in Phillips, Bailey now asserts on appeal that the decedent had a gun and that he was afraid for his life. However, no evidence was presented at Bailey's second trial that Evans had a gun. Bailey asks this Court to draw attenuated inferences from other evidence, including: Billy Donnerson's statement that after the gunshot, he had seen someone reach into Evans's truck as if to get something; Pickens's statement that he could not have seen whether Evans had a gun because Bailey was standing between Evans and himself; and Dr. Hayne's testimony that the bruise on Evans's arm occurred at or near the time of death. No evidence was presented at trial that demonstrated Bailey was afraid for his life or thought Evans had a gun. [8] The evidence Bailey presented is simply not enough to meet the threshold required to warrant the proffered instructions. Accordingly, we find that this issue is without merit.