Opinion ID: 2232165
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extension of Time on Trial Court's Own Motion.

Text: Respondents rely on the case of Beck v. Wallmow (1938), 226 Wis. 652, 277 N. W. 705, to sustain their position that sec. 270.49 (1), Stats., grants the trial court discretion to enter an order extending the time for cause on its own motion. It is appellants' position that the holding of the Beck Case was overruled by Boyle v. Larzelere (1944), 245 Wis. 152, 13 N. W. (2d) 528, which case stands for the proposition according to the appellants, that the matter of enlarging time came under the provisions of sec. 269.45, a statute of general application, except as limited as to time for making the order under sec. 270.49. The Boyle Case however does not overrule Beck v. Wallmow, supra . Boyle holds that the court cannot extend the time after the period (within sixty days after rendition of verdict) has run since sec. 270.49, Stats., controls over sec. 269.45 in this respect. 33 W. S. A., p. 121, sec. 270.49. In the instant case the court granted an extension of time on its own motion within sixty days after rendition of verdict when the court learned that the defendants' brief, though filed with the court, had not been served upon plaintiffs. This court in Kamuchey v. Trzesniewski (1959), 8 Wis. (2d) 94, 98 N. W. (2d) 403, said trial courts should as a matter of practice require that any briefs submitted to the court be served upon opposing counsel. Beck v. Wallmow, supra , states (p. 657): The statute [sec. 270.49 (1)] is clear and unambiguous. The trial judge may, on his own motion for cause, enter an order extending the time in which to decide the motion. In the administration of justice many situations will arise which properly may be considered causes for extending the time for hearing and deciding motions after verdict. It is clearly within the power of a trial judge to act in such situations. The requirements of sec. 269.45, Stats., do not apply to granting an extension of time under sec. 270.49 (1). The power conferred by sec. 269.45 is highly discretionary with regard to granting an extension of time, and the court's action in granting an extension of time under sec. 270.49 (1) is also highly discretionary. Such determination by the trial court will not be disturbed except in cases where it clearly appears that it has been abused. See Syver v. Hahn (1958), 4 Wis. (2d) 468, 90 N. W. (2d) 632; Miller v. Belanger (1957), 275 Wis. 187, 81 N. W. (2d) 545; and Banking Comm. v. Flanagan (1940), 233 Wis. 405, 289 N. W. 647. We determine that the record fails to disclose an abuse of discretion.