Opinion ID: 2631650
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: On February 3, 2003, before the voters approved Proposition 64, plaintiffs Thomas Branick and Ardra Campbell filed a complaint against defendant Downey Savings and Loan Association under the unfair competition and false advertising laws. (§§ 17200 et seq., 17500 et seq.) Plaintiffs alleged defendant had misrepresented and overcharged customers for fees charged by governmental entities to record official documents used in real estate transactions, such as deeds, reconveyances and powers of attorney, among others. Plaintiffs did not allege they had transacted business with defendant, paid fees to defendant, suffered injury in fact, or lost money or property as a result of defendant's alleged practices. Instead, plaintiffs claimed standing to sue on behalf of the general public under the language of former sections 17204 and 17535. As relief, plaintiffs sought restitution, interest, injunctive relief, and costs and attorneys' fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. [2] Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the federal Home Owners' Loan Act (12 U.S.C. § 1461 et seq.) and the regulations promulgated thereunder by the Office of Thrift Supervision (12 C.F.R. § 560.2 (2006)) preempted plaintiffs' claims. The superior court granted the motion and entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs appealed. On November 3, 2004, while the appeal was pending, Proposition 64 took effect, having been approved by the voters the preceding day. (See Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a).) The Court of Appeal, after considering the parties' supplemental briefs on the effect of Proposition 64, reversed. Relying on Gibson v. World Savings & Loan Assn. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1291, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, the Court of Appeal held federal law did not preempt plaintiffs' claims. Concerning Proposition 64, the court concluded the measure's standing provisions governed pending cases and thus revoked the standing of plaintiffs, who did not allege that they had suffered injury in fact and [had] lost money or property as a result of [the alleged] unfair competition. (§ 17204.) Finally, the Court of Appeal remand[ed] the matter to the trial court to determine whether, if there is a request to amend the amended complaint, the circumstances of this case warrant granting leave to amend. [T]hat issue, the Court of Appeal observed, was not before the trial court at the time it granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the case.... Defendant petitioned for review. We granted the petition, directing the parties to brief and argue the following issue: If the standing limitations of Proposition 64 apply to actions under the Unfair Competition Law that were pending on November 3, 2004, may a plaintiff amend his or her complaint to substitute in or add a party that satisfies [the] standing requirements of Business and Professions Code section 17204, as amended, and does such an amended complaint relate back to the initial complaint for statute of limitations purposes? [3]