Opinion ID: 2126176
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: DNA Testing Act Allows Testing in Connection With Plea-Based Convictions.

Text: The district court denied Winslow's motion for DNA testing on the basis that Winslow waived his right to DNA testing because he pled no contest rather than being convicted after a trial. Contrary to the district court's reasoning, we conclude as a matter of law that under the DNA Testing Act, a defendant who was convicted based on a plea is eligible for testing, and that a defendant does not waive such rights if his or her conviction was based on a plea. The district court reasoned that a defendant who pleads waives relief under the DNA Testing Act because normally a plea waives all defenses to a criminal charge and, therefore, the defendant has already waived any defense that may be supported by DNA testing results. Initially, we note that the entry of a plea does not invariably waive all forms of relief pertaining to a plea-based conviction. Thus, for example, we have stated that a court will consider an allegation that the plea and associated conviction were the result of ineffective assistance of counsel brought under the postconviction act, Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 29-3001 to 29-3004 (Reissue 1995). State v. Barnes, 272 Neb. 749, 724 N.W.2d 807 (2006). Further, the court's analysis did not focus on the specific language pertaining to the relief available under the DNA Testing Act, which we believe controls our analysis. The district court's reasoning ignores the fact that under the DNA Testing Act, a court is required to order DNA testing if, among other requirements, the court determines that such testing may produce evidence relevant to the claim that the person was wrongfully convicted or sentenced.  § 29-4120(5) (emphasis supplied). With respect to the impact the results of DNA testing might have on a sentence, we note that we customarily consider challenges to sentences in plea-based convictions. See State v. Burkhardt, 258 Neb. 1050, 607 N.W.2d 512 (2000) (guilty plea waived right to challenge factual basis for conviction, but this court considered challenge to sentence). Because DNA testing results may be used to support a claim that the person was wrongfully sentenced, it does not follow that a person who was convicted based on a plea has waived his or her rights to relief under the DNA Testing Act. More importantly, contrary to the reasoning of the district court, the language of the DNA Testing Act does not limit the scope of its relief to persons convicted following a trial. In this regard, we note that § 29-4120(1) of the DNA Testing Act provides, Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a court may, at any time after conviction, file a motion, with or without supporting affidavits, in the court that entered the judgment requesting forensic DNA testing. . . . The language of the DNA Testing Act affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the judgment of a court, and such persons may include those in custody pursuant to either a conviction following trial or a plea-based conviction. The language of Nebraska's DNA Testing Act may be contrasted to the language of DNA testing statutes in other states where courts have determined, based on the specific language of their relevant DNA testing statutes, that relief pursuant to such statutes is limited to defendants who were found guilty following trial and testing is not available to defendants convicted pursuant to a plea. In People v. Byrdsong, 33 A.D.3d 175, 180, 820 N.Y.S.2d 296, 299 (2006), the court noted that New York's statute referred a number of times to `trial resulting in the judgment.' Based on such language, the court concluded that the New York State statute explicitly requires conviction by verdict and judgment after trial and that therefore, a defendant who pled guilty was not entitled to relief under the New York statute. Id. See, also, Stewart v. State, 840 So.2d 438 (Fla.App.2003) (stating that Florida DNA testing statute referring to defendant who `has been tried and found guilty excludes defendant who pled guilty or nolo contendere) (abrogated by amendment of statute as recognized in Lindsey v. State, 936 So.2d 1213 (Fla.App. 2006)); People v. Lamming, 358 Ill.App.3d 1153, 1155, 833 N.E.2d 925, 927, 295 Ill. Dec. 719, 721 (2005) (stating that Illinois DNA testing statute requiring that identity was at issue at his trial excludes defendant who pled guilty). We recognize that Nebraska's DNA Testing Act contains a reference to trial in that an order for DNA testing requires, inter alia, a determination that such testing was effectively not available at the time of trial. § 29-4120(5). However, reading Nebraska's DNA Testing Act as a whole, we do not read this reference to limit the scope of the relief granted under the DNA Testing Act to persons convicted after a trial. See Weeks v. State, 140 S.W.3d 39 (Mo.2004) (stating that despite some references to time of trial, Missouri DNA testing statute, when read as a whole, applied both to those convicted after plea and to those convicted after trial). Nebraska's DNA Testing Act applies to a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a court, § 29-4120(1), and is more similar to the language of the Kansas statute at issue in State v. Smith, 34 Kan. App.2d 368, 119 P.3d 679 (2005). The Kansas statute referred to `a person in state custody, at any time after conviction.' Id. at 370, 119 P.3d at 682. The Kansas court noted that the statute itself fails to restrict its ambit based upon the plea entered by the defendant and concluded that it would be inconsistent with the statute if DNA testing were denied solely because the conviction was the result of a guilty plea. Id. at 371, 119 P.3d at 683. The Kansas court stated, The legislature is perfectly capable of limiting such postconviction relief to those who pled not guilty or no contest to the material charges, and no such limitation appears in the text of the statute. Id. Nebraska's DNA Testing Act, read as a whole, does not limit its application to those who were convicted following a trial. The Legislature expressed a broad intent that wrongfully convicted persons have an opportunity to establish their innocence through [DNA] testing, § 29-4117, and that the court shall order DNA testing upon a showing that the biological material may be relevant to the claim that the person was wrongfully convicted or sentenced, § 29-4120(5). Based on such intent and the language of the DNA Testing Act, we conclude that the DNA Testing Act does not exclude persons who were convicted and sentenced pursuant to pleas. The district court in this case therefore erred in concluding that because of his plea, Winslow was not entitled to relief under the DNA Testing Act.