Opinion ID: 1387285
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Automatic Standing

Text: `[C]apacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends ... upon whether the person who claims the protection... has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.' [11] In Jones v. United States, [12] the United States Supreme Court recognized a limited exception to this rule for cases in which a defendant is charged with a possessory offense. In such cases, a defendant legitimately on the premises may challenge the search or seizure even though the defendant did not have a privacy interest in the premises searched. [13] The automatic standing rule was intended to prevent the government from arguing at a suppression hearing that a defendant did not possess the substance and thus had no Fourth Amendment protected interests, and then contrarily asserting at trial that the defendant was guilty of possessing the substance. [14] The court in Jones was also concerned about the possibility of self-incrimination, where requiring a defendant at a suppression hearing to establish standing by admitting possession of the items seized would provide evidence for the prosecution to use at trial. [15] Following Jones, this court stated in State v. Michaels that [t]he reasoning of [the Jones ] opinion commends itself to this court. [16] It recognized that requiring a defendant in a suppression hearing to admit possession of items seized would result in confession by the defendant of an element of the possessory offense. The court in Michaels did not analyze the state constitution separately from the federal constitution, but treated the two provisions as coextensive, holding that the defendant had standing under both the state and federal constitutions. [17] When the United States Supreme Court ruled in Simmons v. United States [18] that a claim by a defendant in a pretrial hearing of a privacy interest in the place of seizure cannot be admitted at trial to establish guilt, it changed the federal rule. The court stated that, as a matter of public policy, defendants should not be deterred from challenging a search and seizure for fear that their suppression hearing testimony would be used to link them to the contraband. [19] Thus, after Simmons, the reasons which led to the rule of automatic standing seemed no longer to be of consequence. Recognizing that Simmons effectively eliminated the problem of self-incrimination by defendants, the Supreme Court in United States v. Salvucci [20] overruled Jones and abandoned the automatic standing rule. It held that defendants charged with possessory offenses must establish an expectation of privacy in the area searched. [21] After Salvucci, this court considered whether automatic standing was independently available under our state constitution. In State v. Simpson, [22] the plurality opinion declared adherence to the automatic standing rule a matter of state constitutional law. It said this rule is already established under our state constitution and has served our state well for 17 years and declined to abandon it. [23] The defendant in Simpson was arrested under a warrant for forgery after he parked in front of his residence and alighted from the truck he was driving. The officers later obtained a key to the truck from his property box at the jail. They returned with it to the arrest scene to impound the truck because it was improperly licensed. Upon unlocking the truck, they checked its vehicle identification number (VIN) and learned the vehicle was stolen. The defendant was then charged with possession of stolen property. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress evidence produced by seizure of the VIN, finding it was the fruit of an unconstitutional search. The plurality decision by this court affirmed the decision of the trial court. [24] It determined a defendant has automatic standing to challenge a search and seizure if (1) the charged offense involves possession as an essential element, and (2) the defendant was in possession of the subject matter at the time of the search or seizure. [25] Applying this test, it concluded the defendant was entitled to full protection of the automatic standing doctrine. It held that search for the VIN inside a locked truck when the defendant was in custody violated both the federal and state constitutions. [26] In State v. Zakel, [27] this court declined to decide whether our state constitution requires adherence to the automatic standing doctrine, finding it unnecessary for resolution of that case. The Court of Appeals in Carter interpreted the statement in Zakel to support the proposition that `there is no authority in Washington binding this court [of Appeals] to apply automatic standing as a matter of state constitutional law.' [28] Respondent State urges the court in this case to affirm the Court of Appeals and reject the reasoning of the Simpson plurality, contending there is no legal or policy basis for upholding automatic standing under article I, § 7 of the Washington Constitution. Petitioner maintains that abrogating the automatic standing rule would prevent defendants from asserting their privacy interest because of the possibility that statements made at the suppression hearing would later be used to incriminate them through impeachment. In relying on this rationale stated by the plurality in Simpson, Petitioner Carter seeks to equate the constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination with protection from impeachment. But the risk of impeachment was not part of the self-incrimination concern which formed the basis for automatic standing. [29] The United States Supreme Court has stated that [e]very criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. [30] The automatic standing doctrine was never intended to confer upon defendants a license to make false representations on the witness stand. [31] Petitioner contends the automatic standing doctrine provides a rule more easily understood than the legitimate expectation of privacy test, and that offenders' entitlement to it deters illegal police behavior. Petitioner's reasoning is not persuasive. Adopting a blanket rule that a defendant charged with a possessory offense will always have a privacy interest promotes blind adherence to the assumption that possession of a seized good is an adequate measure of Fourth Amendment rights. [32] The trial court can determine whether a due process violation exists on a case-by-case basis in motions to suppress evidence under CrR 3.6. [33]