Opinion ID: 2808709
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Farnsworth

Text: Farnsworth argues he is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not know of Danial's medical need or a substantial risk of serious harm such that Farnsworth would have known that his response was inappropriate. It is undisputed Farnsworth did nothing to respond to Danial's need (e.g., he did not follow up with anyone, did not ask anyone else to check on Danial, and did not go to the TCU). Farnsworth challenges only the knowledge aspect of the claim. Plaintiffs do not contend anyone told Farnsworth directly about Danial's condition. Rather, they argue the facts demonstrate Farnsworth had knowledge of a risk based on inferences from obvious dangers. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842–43 (noting knowledge can be inferred from obvious risks). The pertinent facts can be summarized as follows: Gastineau called Farnsworth and told him that medical personnel wanted to check Danial's vitals and conduct a well-being check. Gastineau told Farnsworth that Danial had refused lunch and had -9- not moved since Gastineau started her shift (approximately three and half hours beforehand). Farnsworth knew from his experience that only the most at-risk inmates are placed in the padded cell and that requests to open the padded cell from medical personnel are unusual. He also knew that a request to open the padded cell generally meant there was an emergency or a potential emergency. Finally, Farnsworth knew prison policy dictated that if a prisoner fails to respond, central command is to be notified. This evidence, taken together, supports the inference that Farnsworth knew of the risk to Danial. In light of this knowledge, Farnsworth did nothing; he told Gastineau he could not check on Danial because he was busy passing out meals to other inmates. Farnsworth also claims he is absolved of any liability because the nurse in the wing, Nurse Hook, stated she was not concerned about Danial when Gastineau asked Farnsworth to open the cell. Farnsworth argues that because a medically trained employee more familiar with the situation allegedly did not show concern, then he—someone less familiar with the situation and without medical training—could not have recognized a substantial risk of harm. To support his argument, Farnsworth relies on Krout. Farnsworth's reliance on Krout, however, is misplaced. Krout held that a prison guard's failure to act did not constitute deliberate indifference where two EMS technicians informed the guard that no additional medical attention was necessary and the prison guard relied on the technicians' statements. 583 F.3d at 568–69. The focus of Krout was the guard's knowledge of the severity of the risk, not the EMS technicians' beliefs. Id. We focus on the mind of the prison official and the information at his disposal, not the thoughts of third-party actors who do not disclose their thoughts. See id. Here, Farnsworth heard only that a nurse wanted the door open to take Danial's vitals. Even assuming Nurse Hook was not concerned about Danial, there is no evidence that Farnsworth was aware of this lack of concern or relied on it when Farnsworth decided to take no action. - 10 - A jury could infer from this evidence that a person in Farnsworth's position would have recognized a substantial risk of harm to Danial, acted inappropriately in light of the risk, and recognized the impropriety of his response. See Krout, 583 F.3d at 567 ([T]he obvious inadequacy of a response . . . may support an inference that the officer recognized the inappropriateness of his conduct.). We therefore affirm the denial of summary judgment with respect to Farnsworth.