Opinion ID: 2499424
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: free speech infringement

Text: [¶ 56] We turn next to OSA's contention that the TRO violated its free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. [1]
[¶ 57] The First Amendment reflects a `profound national commitment' to the principle that `debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen.' Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 1162, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)). [A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. United States v. Stevens, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1584, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 535 U.S. 564, 573, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 1707, 152 L.Ed.2d 771 (2002)); see also Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2729, 2733, 180 L.Ed.2d 708 (2011). Its general protections are not, however, absolute. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 573, 122 S.Ct. at 1707. [¶ 58] Through its numerous decisions interpreting First Amendment protections, the United States Supreme Court has outlined the required considerations for determining whether a government restriction on speech is permissible. That determination turns on the type of restraint, the type of speech, the forum in which the speech is restrained, and the nature of the restriction, that is, whether it is content-neutral or content-based. See, e.g., Stevens, 130 S.Ct. at 1584-85 (type of speech); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469-70, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 1132, 172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009) (type of forum); Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 2524-25, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994) (type of restraint); Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 2403-04, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992) (content regulation). [¶ 59] These considerations dictate the level of scrutiny that must be used in determining whether a government restriction on speech is constitutional, and we thus consider each in turn as they apply to the TRO issued in this case.

[¶ 60] The term prior restraint is used to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550, 113 S.Ct. 2766, 2771, 125 L.Ed.2d 441 (1993) (quoting M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 4.03 at 4-14 (1984)). A temporary restraining order is a classic example of a prior restraint. Id. [¶ 61] The Supreme Court has described prior restraints on speech as the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559, 96 S.Ct. at 2803. Any prior restraint on expression bears a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 2141, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971); see also CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1317, 114 S.Ct. 912, 914, 127 L.Ed.2d 358 (1994); Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 130, 112 S.Ct. at 2401; Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., Inc., 445 U.S. 308, 316 n. 13, 100 S.Ct. 1156, 1161 n. 13, 63 L.Ed.2d 413 (1980). [¶ 62] The Supreme Court has explained the presumption against the validity of prior restraints, and the preference for other restrictions: The presumption against prior restraints is heavierand the degree of protection broaderthan that against limits on expression imposed by criminal penalties. Behind the distinction is a theory deeply etched in our law: a free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand. It is always difficult to know in advance what an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable. Vance, 445 U.S. at 316 n. 13, 100 S.Ct. at 1161 n. 13 (citations omitted). Along these lines, the Court has further commented: A criminal penalty or a judgment in a defamation case is subject to the whole panoply of protections afforded by deferring the impact of the judgment until all avenues of appellate review have been exhausted. Only after judgment has become final, correct or otherwise, does the law's sanction become fully operative. A prior restraint, by contrast and by definition, has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication chills speech, prior restraint freezes it at least for the time. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559, 96 S.Ct. at 2803 (footnote omitted); see also Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764, 114 S.Ct. at 2524 (injunctions carry greater risk of censorship and discrimination than do ordinances). [¶ 63] The TRO issued in this case acted as a prior restraint on OSA's speech, and there is thus a heavy presumption against its constitutionality.
[¶ 64] The First Amendment does not offer all speech the same degree of protection. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 444-45, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 1973, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The degree of protection differs depending on whether the speech is political interest/public issue speech, commercial speech or government speech. Id. Additionally, certain categories of speech are afforded limited or no protection, such as obscenity, fighting words, defamation, and fraud. Stevens, 130 S.Ct. at 1584. [¶ 65] Speech on public issues or matters of public concern are classic forms of speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 377, 117 S.Ct. 855, 867, 137 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997). The Supreme Court has consistently observed the central importance of protecting speech on public issues, which has led it to scrutinize carefully any restrictions on public issue picketing. Boos, 485 U.S. at 318, 108 S.Ct. at 1162; United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180-81, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1708-09, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). [¶ 66] Speech directed at abortion policy is public issue speech. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 714-15, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 2488-89, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000); Schenck, 519 U.S. at 377, 117 S.Ct. at 867; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762-64, 114 S.Ct. at 2523-25. The fact that the messages conveyed by those communications may be offensive to their recipients does not deprive them of constitutional protection. Hill, 530 U.S. at 715, 120 S.Ct. at 2488-89. As a general matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide `adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.' Boos, 485 U.S. at 322, 108 S.Ct. at 1164 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56, 108 S.Ct. 876, 882, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988)). [¶ 67] OSA's speech is protected public issue speech, and based on these precedents, any restriction on that speech must be carefully scrutinized. We find that this level of protection must likewise be extended to the graphic photographs OSA chooses to use in its demonstrations. The Supreme Court has stated it will not expand the categories of speech that receive limited protection, such as obscenity, unless there is a demonstration of a longstanding American tradition forbidding such speech or expressive conduct. Stevens, 130 S.Ct. at 1585. In Stevens, a 2010 decision, the Court declined to decrease the level of protection to be given depictions of animal cruelty. Id. Even more recently, in 2011, the Court rejected an argument for decreased protection of video games available commercially to young children that contain violent images, including sexual assault and murder. Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 2734. The Stevens Court explained: The First Amendment's guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it. The Constitution is not a document prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure. Stevens, 130 S.Ct. at 1585 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 178, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)).
[¶ 68] Streets, sidewalks and parks have long been held to be the traditional fora for First Amendment protected speech, and government entities are strictly limited in their ability to restrict speech in those areas. This Court long ago recognized that members of the public retain strong free speech rights when they venture into public streets and parks, which `have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.' Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (quoting Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.)). In order to preserve this freedom, government entities are strictly limited in their ability to regulate private speech in such traditional public fora. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985). Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions are allowed, see Perry Ed. Assn., supra, at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, but any restriction based on the content of the speech must satisfy strict scrutiny, that is, the restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, see Cornelius, supra, at 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439, and restrictions based on viewpoint are prohibited, see Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 463, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980). Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 469, 129 S.Ct. at 1132. [¶ 69] The TRO in this case restricted OSA's speech in the Town Squarea park, and on the surrounding streets and sidewalks. The Town nonetheless contends that the TRO did not apply to a traditional public forum because it has enacted a resolution that allows it to issue permits regulating the Town Square's use for larger events. We disagree that the Town's regulation changed, or could change, the nature of the park as a traditional public forum. See United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 278 n. 9 (3rd Cir.2010) (The issuance of a permit to use a public forum does not transform its status as a public forum.); see also Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677, 118 S.Ct. 1633, 1641, 140 L.Ed.2d 875 (1998) ([T]raditional public fora are open for expressive activity regardless of the government's intent.). [¶ 70] The Town Square and the surrounding streets and sidewalk are traditional public fora, and the TRO's restrictions are therefore subject to the heightened scrutiny applicable to that fora.
[¶ 71] The final consideration in determining the level of scrutiny that must be used in determining the TRO's constitutionality is the nature of the TRO's restriction, that is, whether the TRO is content-neutral or content-based. Content-neutral restrictions are those that are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech. Boos, 485 U.S. at 320, 108 S.Ct. at 1163. A restriction that seeks to protect or shield an audience from disturbing or distressing aspects of speech is content-based. Id. at 321, 108 S.Ct. at 1164; see also Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 2733-34. Likewise, a restriction that is based on an audience's hostile response to the speech is content-based regulation. Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 134-35, 112 S.Ct. at 2403-04. [¶ 72] The Town sought the TRO and the district court issued the TRO to protect children from the images contained in OSA's demonstration materials and to address the concern that there may be a hostile response to the OSA demonstrations. The restrictions were thus content-based. [¶ 73] Because the TRO imposes content-based restrictions on OSA's speech in a traditional public forum, the TRO is subject to strict scrutiny. Because the Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless [the government] can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutinythat is, unless it is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest. R.A.V. [ v. City of St. Paul ], 505 U.S. [377], at 395, 112 S.Ct. 2538, [120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992)]. The State must specifically identify an actual problem in need of solving, [ United States v. ] Playboy [ Entertainment Group, Inc. ], 529 U.S. [803], at 822-823, 120 S.Ct. 1878 [146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000)], and the curtailment of free speech must be actually necessary to the solution, see R.A.V., supra, at 395, 112 S.Ct. 2538. That is a demanding standard. It is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible. Playboy, supra, at 818, 120 S.Ct. 1878. Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 2738.
[¶ 74] We understand the Town of Jackson faced a difficult situation with the disturbing materials OSA directed toward audiences of children, and with our decision today, this Court does not intend to be dismissive of the Town's legitimate concerns and efforts to address those concerns in a limited timeframe. Nonetheless, the TRO requested by the Town and issued by the district court imposed a prior restraint on the OSA's public issue speech in a traditional public forum, based on the content of that speech. Any such restriction is presumptively invalid and faces the most demanding level of First Amendment scrutiny. We find the Town did not meet its burden under the First Amendment's rigorous constitutional standards. [¶ 75] The strict scrutiny level of analysis requires that the restriction on speech be justified by a compelling government interest and be narrowly drawn to serve that interest. Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 2738; Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 358-59, 129 S.Ct. 1093, 1098, 172 L.Ed.2d 770 (2009); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2549-50, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). The government bears the burden of establishing its compelling government interest and that the interest cannot be served in a less restrictive manner. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428-29, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 1219, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006). The Supreme Court has explained the government's burden as follows: When the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions. Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183, 119 S.Ct. 1923, 144 L.Ed.2d 161 (1999) ([T]he Government bears the burden of identifying a substantial interest and justifying the challenged restriction); [ A.C.L.U. v. ] Reno, 521 U.S. [844], at 879, 117 S.Ct. 2329[, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997)] (The breadth of this content-based restriction of speech imposes an especially heavy burden on the Government to explain why a less restrictive provision would not be as effective ...); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-771, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993) ([A] governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree); Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989) ([T]he State bears the burden of justifying its restrictions ...); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) (In order for the State ... to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint). When the Government seeks to restrict speech based on its content, the usual presumption of constitutionality afforded congressional enactments is reversed. Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992), and the Government bears the burden to rebut that presumption. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816-17, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 1888, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000).
[¶ 76] The Town cites the need to protect children attending the Boy Scout Elk Fest from disturbing images of aborted and dismembered fetuses as its compelling government interest in support of the TRO. It further asserts an interest in preserving the peace, order, safety and tranquility of the Boy Scout Elk Fest. [¶ 77] The need to protect the psychological well being of children has been recognized as a compelling government interest. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126, 109 S.Ct. at 2836; Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638, 88 S.Ct. at 1280. The Supreme Court, however, has declared that that interest is not without boundary. [M]inors are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection, and only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may government bar public dissemination of protected materials to them. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-213, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975) (citation omitted). No doubt a State possesses legitimate power to protect children from harm, Ginsberg, supra, at 640-641, 88 S.Ct. 1274; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944), but that does not include a free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which children may be exposed. Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them. Erznoznik, supra, at 213-214, 95 S.Ct. 2268. Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 2735-36. [¶ 78] Our concern in the present case is not with the general proposition that protecting youth is a compelling government interest, but is instead with the record. The record contains no evidence concerning the injury or potential injury to children from viewing the images displayed by OSA, and of particular importance in the context of the request for injunctive relief, evidence of irreparable harm to the children. The affidavit of Lt. Gilliam describes the contact OSA had with youth in the community and describes the materials OSA showed to the young audience, but it does not describe how those materials impacted them, or could impact them. In the absence of such evidence, the government has not made its required showing of an actual problem in need of solving. Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 2738; Playboy, 529 U.S. at 816, 120 S.Ct. at 1888. [¶ 79] We turn then to the Town's concerns with a breach of the peace. While a government does have a recognized interest in maintaining peace in its community and at its events, the Supreme Court has held that this is not a basis to proscribe speech, unless that speech is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2542, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989); see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 1829, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969). The Court has observed: The State's position, therefore, amounts to a claim that an audience that takes serious offense at particular expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace and that the expression may be prohibited on this basis. Our precedents do not countenance such a presumption. On the contrary, they recognize that a principal function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S.Ct. 894, 896, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949). See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551, 85 S.Ct. 453, 462, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. at 508-509, 89 S.Ct. at 737-38; Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1689, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56, 108 S.Ct. 876, 881-882, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988). It would be odd indeed to conclude both that if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3038, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978) (opinion of STEVENS, J.), and that the government may ban the expression of certain disagreeable ideas on the unsupported presumption that their very disagreeableness will provoke violence. Thus, we have not permitted the government to assume that every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot, but have instead required careful consideration of the actual circumstances surrounding such expression, asking whether the expression is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 1829, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) (reviewing circumstances surrounding rally and speeches by Ku Klux Klan). To accept Texas' arguments that it need only demonstrate the potential for a breach of the peace, Brief for Petitioner 37, and that every flag burning necessarily possesses that potential, would be to eviscerate our holding in Brandenburg. This we decline to do. Texas, 491 U.S. at 408-09, 109 S.Ct. at 2542 (footnote omitted). [¶ 80] The evidence the Town submitted concerning the potential for a breach of peace as a result of the OSA demonstrations was an incident in which a counter-protestor tried to run over an OSA member with his vehicle. Lt. Gilliam's affidavit reported that this individual was arrested and charged. The record contains no evidence that OSA engages in speech that is directed at inciting violence or is likely to produce imminent lawless action, and in the absence of such evidence, we conclude that prohibiting OSA's speech is not supported.
[¶ 81] Assuming the Town had established a compelling interest in the protection of its youth and in maintaining the peace, we would nonetheless find the TRO unconstitutional. The Town has not met its burden of establishing that the TRO ban was necessary to serve the Town's interest and that less restrictive measures would not have been adequate. [¶ 82] Our first concern is with the geographical scope of the TRO. It prohibited OSA from displaying its graphic posters not just in the Town Square, but also on the streets and sidewalks two blocks in each direction of the park. This is a broader buffer zone than the Supreme Court has approved even when the restriction creating the buffer zone is content-neutral and thus subjected to a less demanding level of scrutiny. See Sclienck, 519 U.S. 357, 117 S.Ct. 855 (upholding content-neutral buffer zone of fifteen feet from clinic entrance to allow patients to freely enter and exit clinic, but overturning floating fifteen-foot buffer zone around patients as too restrictive of free speech rights); Madsen, 512 U.S. at 769-75, 114 S.Ct. at 2527-30 (upholding 36-foot content-neutral buffer zone around clinic, but overturning 300-foot content-neutral buffer zone around staff residences as too broad even though targeted picketing of personal residences is less protected and the government's interest in protecting the privacy of a residence is an interest of the highest order). [¶ 83] We find an Eighth Circuit decision holding unconstitutional a content-neutral ordinance that banned protesting within fifty feet of church property thirty minutes before or after scheduled services or events to be instructive. Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176 (8th Cir.1999). In that case, the court reasoned as follows: The question is whether the ordinance is a narrowly tailored effort to protect the legitimate interest identified by the District Court. The answer is plainly no. The ordinance purports to make the carrying of signs at the indicated times and places unlawful, no matter what the signs say or depict, and this prohibition is much broader than necessary to protect the psychological interest of young children as found by the District Court. Moreover, the ordinance prohibits communication with adults as well as with children. While most of the adults attending the Westminster Presbyterian Church probably do not like the signs and disagree with them, that is hardly a sufficient basis, under the First Amendment, to justify what the City is attempting to do here. Expressive communication is frequently upsetting, even abrasive. The protection of such robust debate is at the core of the First Amendment. Finally, the ordinance bans certain forms of communication even if all of those to whom it is directed in fact wish to hear it. In sum, the ordinance bans speech directed at adults, and is not narrowly tailored to prohibit only that sort of speech that would be psychologically damaging to children. For further elaboration, see [Olmer v. City of Lincoln], 23 F.Supp.2d [1091], at 1100-1102 [ (D.Neb.1998) ]. The City also claims that it has a legitimate interest in preserving the right of its citizens to exercise their religion freely. Such an interest, in the abstract, is undoubtedly substantial and important. If, for example, anti-abortion protestors were to attempt to enter a church without permission, or to interrupt church services with their own speech, the city could doubtless prosecute them under a general trespass or disturbing-the-peace provision, or, if necessary, adopt a more specific prohibition directed against disturbing or interrupting services of worship. The present ordinance goes way beyond that. It goes beyond the church building and church property, and seeks to forbid peaceful communication on property belonging to the public, even though the communication may be completely truthful, and even though there is absolutely no physical interference with access to the church. Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1180-81. [¶ 84] As in Olmer, the Town has not shown that the breadth of the TRO, prohibiting the displays by the OSA within two blocks in any direction from the Town Square, was necessary to serve the Town's interest of protecting its children from disturbing images. The same is true of the Town's interest in maintaining the peace. The Town has not shown that intervention by law enforcement, as was used in the one instance of violence cited by the Town, is not adequate to maintain the peace. See Grider v. Abramson, 994 F.Supp. 840, 845 (W.D.Ky. 1998) (employing police procedures to address concerns of violence between competing rallies). [¶ 85] In the absence of this required showing, the Town has not met its burden under the strict scrutiny analysis. [2]