Opinion ID: 1180163
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Controverting Facts Contained in the Affidavit

Text: (7a) Defendant next complains that he was denied the opportunity to controvert the facts contained in the affidavits in support of the search warrant. He contends that on a motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5 a defendant may go behind the face of the affidavit in an effort to prove there was no probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. Defense counsel asserted below that frankly, we do not believe the statements which are set forth in the affidavit, and we feel the factual inconsistencies will be shown by the examination of the affiant. Defendant was denied an opportunity to call Officer Celmer; he also suggests error in the refusal of the magistrate to allow him to examine other witnesses who in some way participated in the arrest of the confidential informant. Defendant maintains that the Fourth Amendment and Penal Code sections 1538.5, 1539 and 1540 permit him to controvert the truth of the facts contained in the affidavit. Because we conclude that the Penal Code provisions authorize such an inquiry, we need not reach the constitutional issue. [6] Section 1538.5 was enacted in 1967 following hearings and studies during 1965-1967 by the Assembly Interim Committee on Criminal Procedure. This project produced a series of committee recommendations, [7] a substantial portion of which became law. (Stats. 1967, ch. 1537, § 1, p. 3652.) Section 1538.5 provides a comprehensive scheme for challenging the introduction into evidence, and for the return, of items unlawfully seized. It sets forth the proper time for such motions, the procedure for appellate review and for extraordinary writs, and other significant procedural matters all relating to unlawful searches and seizures. While section 1538.5 solved many of the procedural difficulties occasioned by the increased number of motions to suppress evidence, it is silent on whether a defendant may controvert the factual statements contained in an affidavit in support of a warrant. Thus section 1538.5 differs from Penal Code sections 1539-1540 which specifically provide for a challenge to the factual basis of the affidavit. [8] Prior to enactment of section 1538.5, sections 1539-1540 were employed as a principal means of suppressing evidence even though by their express terms, the two sections refer only to the return of property unlawfully seized. As stated in People v. Prieto (1961) 191 Cal. App.2d 62, 67 [12 Cal. Rptr. 577]: Although, as an original proposition, we might have doubted whether the language of the sections literally applied to an attempt of a defendant to suppress the evidence, rather than to regain it, we think the cases have clearly disposed of the issue. Because section 1538.5 has since replaced sections 1539-1540 as the principal device for suppressing unlawfully seized evidence, and yet unlike the latter two provisions does not expressly permit a defendant to controvert the facts contained in an affidavit, we are faced with the question of whether the Legislature, in enacting section 1538.5, intended by its silence to abrogate the established rule that a defendant could make such a factual challenge. (8) We are reminded, in this connection, of the policy that it should not be presumed that the Legislature in the enactment of statutes intends to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is made clearly to appear either by express declaration or by necessary implication. ( County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 644 [122 P.2d 526].) (7b) Before it was amended at the time of adoption of section 1538.5, section 1539 had been interpreted to allow a defendant to suppress evidence by showing the factual grounds upon which the warrant was issued were untrue. (See, e.g., People v. Keener, supra, 55 Cal.2d 714, 719; People v. Peterson (1965) 233 Cal. App.2d 481, 487 [43 Cal. Rptr. 457]; Dunn v. Municipal Court, supra, 220 Cal. App.2d 858, 866; People v. Marion (1961) 197 Cal. App.2d 835, 839 [18 Cal. Rptr. 219]; People v. Perez (1961) 189 Cal. App.2d 526, 532 [11 Cal. Rptr. 456]; People v. Dosier (1960) 180 Cal. App.2d 436, 440 [4 Cal. Rptr. 309]; People v. Lepur (1959) 175 Cal. App.2d 798, 802 [346 P.2d 914]; People v. Nelson (1959) 171 Cal. App.2d 356, 360 [340 P.2d 718]; People v. Phillips (1958) 163 Cal. App.2d 541, 545 [329 P.2d 621]; People v. Thornton (1958) 161 Cal. App.2d 718, 721-722 [327 P.2d 161]; Arata v. Superior Court (1957) 153 Cal. App.2d 767, 770 [315 P.2d 473]; [9] see also Comment, supra, 19 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 96, 106-107, fn. 40, 122-123 and fn. 98.) In 1966, this court decided People v. Butler (1966) 64 Cal.2d 842 [52 Cal. Rptr. 4, 415 P.2d 819], in which we held that a defendant need not avail himself of sections 1539-1540 as a prerequisite to attacking the validity of a warrant at a preliminary hearing or at trial. (64 Cal.2d at pp. 844-845.) In Butler Chief Justice Traynor traced the history of the two sections and noted that the provisions predated the exclusionary rule first adopted in this state in People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905, 50 A.L.R.2d 513] and made applicable to all the states by Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 [6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 84 A.L.R.2d 933]. Accordingly, it was concluded that the Legislature's purpose in enacting those sections was not to regulate the procedure for objecting to the introduction of evidence in criminal trials but to afford the person from whom property was wrongfully seized an expeditious remedy for its recovery. (64 Cal.2d at p. 845.) Butler is also significant for what it did not decide: that a defendant was prohibited from seeking to suppress evidence under a sections 1539-1540 motion. Instead, we held that he is not required to proceed under those two provisions prior to making an attack at the preliminary hearing or at trial. Thus People v. Keener, supra, 55 Cal.2d 714, and the Court of Appeal cases disapproved on other grounds in Butler, cases which allowed a defendant to attack the factual veracity of a warrant pursuant to sections 1539-1540, continued to provide support for that proposition after Butler. For example, in People v. Kesey (1967) 250 Cal. App.2d 669 [58 Cal. Rptr. 625], decided less than a year after Butler, the court upheld the availability of sections 1539-1540 as a means to suppress evidence even though the item was contraband and hence could not be returned lawfully. A reading of Butler indicates that we were concerned only with the timing of various search and seizure motions. The case is not to be interpreted as limiting a defendant's right to suppress evidence by denying him relief under sections 1539-1540 or precluding him from controverting the factual basis of the affidavit. (See 64 Cal.2d at pp. 844-846.) Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions in Butler intimate that a defendant should be denied an opportunity to contest the facts contained in an affidavit under sections 1539-1540; the disagreement was purely over a matter of procedure, i.e., when the motion was to be made. (See People v. Phillips, supra, 163 Cal. App.2d 541, 545.) Soon after our decision in Butler the Assembly Interim Committee on Criminal Procedure released its report on the then current procedure for suppressing evidence obtained by an unlawful search or seizure. (Assem. Com. Rep., supra. ) In its summary of existing law, the report stated: Although [sections 1539-1540] pertain to the return of property which has been illegally seized the procedure is also used as a device to quash a warrant. Thus the procedure is available to test the seizure of property which cannot be returned because of its contraband nature. [¶] A motion pursuant to sections 1539 and 1540 tests the truthfulness of the facts supporting the issuance of a search warrant.... (Assem. Com. Rep., supra, at p. 11.) It is clear from the report that the committee was not concerned with eliminating the right of a defendant to controvert the facts contained in an affidavit. Its proposals, which essentially became section 1538.5, were designed to enact a comprehensive scheme for the timing of search and seizure motions: The existing procedure results in an unnecessary expenditure of time and effort because it allows search and seizure questions to be raised repeatedly within the context of criminal proceedings. ( Id. at p. 13; italics omitted.) The committee recommends that the procedure for challenging the legality of a search and seizure question be changed (1) to provide for final determination of these questions prior to trial; and (2) to allow the prosecution greater latitude in initiating appellate review of an adverse decision on a search and seizure issue. ( Id. at p. 18; italics omitted.) Finally, the committee indicated that the same procedure should be used regardless of whether defendant sought to suppress evidence or only sought to have his property returned. This intent was effectuated in the first clause of section 1538.5: (a) A defendant may move for the return of property or to suppress as evidence.... It is undisputed that a defendant could controvert the facts contained in an affidavit prior to Butler and also prior to the enactment of section 1538.5, with no undue burden on the administration of criminal justice. It is likewise clear that Butler and section 1538.5 were concerned with the timing of a motion to suppress; neither attempted to limit the substance of the motion. Accordingly, in the absence of an express indication to the contrary in the statute, we cannot assume the Legislature when it enacted section 1538.5 intended to abrogate the rule that defendants may attack the truthfulness of the affidavit. (Cf. Kaplan v. Superior Court (1971) 6 Cal.3d 150, 159 [98 Cal. Rptr. 649, 491 P.2d 1].) This position was adopted sub silentio in Lockridge v. Superior Court (1969) 275 Cal. App.2d 612, 622 [80 Cal. Rptr. 223], and based upon the foregoing statutory history and analysis, we approve the decision on this issue. [10] This conclusion is fortified by pondering the anomalous result if section 1538.5 were to be interpreted as barring challenges to the truth of an affidavit. Since section 1539 continues to permit a defendant to controvert the facts upon which the warrant is issued, to preclude challenge under section 1538.5 would allow a factual inquiry if the item sought to be suppressed was not contraband, but would preclude inquiry into truthfulness if it was contraband. Such a distinction bears no discernible relationship to Fourth Amendment principles. The practical effect of such a holding would be to encourage all defendants moving to suppress evidence to seek a hearing on whether the item was contraband, a determination to which they would be clearly entitled under sections 1539-1540. Whether the warrant would be quashed because of false statements critical to a showing of probable cause would, therefore, depend upon chronology; that is, whether the magistrate heard the challenge to the factual accuracy of the affidavit before or after he made a determination of the contraband nature of the item involved. Such a curious result could not have been intended by the Legislature, which, by enacting section 1538.5, attempted, inter alia, to minimize the differences between objects which a defendant sought to suppress and those which he sought to have returned. (See Assem. Com. Rep., supra, at p. 18.) (9a) We now turn to the scope of the challenge to the accuracy of the affidavit. At the outset we note that misstatements contained in an affidavit generally fall into three categories: reasonable errors made in good faith; negligent mistakes; or intentional falsehoods. Misinformation may be in the form of inaccurate personal observations of law enforcement personnel, an officer's miscalculation of the reliability of an informant or inaccurate information gathered by the informant. (See Comment, The Outwardly Sufficient Search Warrant Affidavit: What If It's False? (1971) supra, 19 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 96, 102, fn. 26; Kipperman, Inaccurate Search Warrant Affidavits as a Ground for Suppressing Evidence (1971) supra, 84 Harv. L.Rev. 825, 831-832; see also United States v. Pearce (7th Cir.1960) 275 F.2d 318, 322 [information alleged to have been received from informant actually received from affiant/officer's superior].) [11] (10) In assessing what standard should be employed in testing the truthfulness of an affidavit in support of a search warrant, we are guided by the general principle that probable cause, not certainty, is the cornerstone of the warrant-issuing process. ( Dumbra v. United States (1925) 268 U.S. 435, 441 [69 L.Ed. 1032, 1036, 45 S.Ct. 546].) Probable cause exists where `the facts and circumstances within ... [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' a crime has been or is being committed. ( Brinegar v. United States (1949) 338 U.S. 160, 175-176 [93 L.Ed. 1879, 1890, 69 S.Ct. 1302] [search without a warrant]; see 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure (1969) § 662, at p. 22.) The standard of probable cause is most often relevant in the determination of whether the inferences drawn by a magistrate or officer from the facts presented (see Aguilar v. Texas, supra ; Spinelli v. United States (1969) 393 U.S. 410 [21 L.Ed.2d 637, 89 S.Ct. 584]) are reasonable. ( Dumbra v. United States, supra, 268 U.S. 435, 441.) However, if a magistrate is presented with false or inaccurate information in an application for a warrant, the inferences he draws from such information are not based on reality but on the fantasies of the misinformed or misinforming affiant. Regardless of whether misstatements are intentionally false or the product of reasonable or unreasonable cerebration, their ineluctable result is an adverse effect upon the normal inference-drawing process of the magistrate. Because of the significance rightfully attached to the neutral magistrate, at least one commentator suggests (see Comment, supra, 19 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. at pp. 143, 145) and some cases imply (see Lockridge v. Superior Court, supra, 275 Cal. App.2d 612, 622; United States v. Nagle (N.D.N.Y. 1929) 34 F.2d 952, 954; United States v. Henderson (D.D.C. 1954) 17 F.R.D. 1, 2) that if inaccuracies are demonstrated they must be excised from the affidavit regardless of whether the errors were reasonable under the circumstances. Under this approach the court is to determine whether probable cause existed for the search only on the basis of the remaining truthful information. [12] We reject this approach as being inconsistent with the overriding principle of reasonableness which governs the application of the Fourth Amendment to the criminal law. Instead, we conclude that only when the affiant has acted unreasonably in making factual mistakes must those errors be excised from the affidavit before testing the existence of probable cause. While undeniably misstatements impede the function of the magistrate, once it has been determined that the affiant has acted reasonably under the circumstances, little more can be required of him. To exclude evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant issued on the basis of facts upon which an affiant has reasonably relied as being accurate serves no purpose of deterrence to unlawful conduct since, by definition, the affiant has already made a reasonable attempt to comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The right to inquire into the accuracy of an affidavit in other jurisdictions, especially in federal courts, remains unsettled; most of the decisions in this area have concentrated on the issue of whether the challenge itself is permitted and have failed to prescribe the standard to be employed when an inquiry is allowed. (See, e.g., United States v. Dunnings (2d Cir.1969) 425 F.2d 836, 839-840; United States v. Bowling (6th Cir.1965) 351 F.2d 236, 241; King v. United States (4th Cir.1960) 282 F.2d 398, 399; United States v. Pearce, supra, 275 F.2d 318, 322; Kenney v. United States (1946) 157 F.2d 442 [81 App.D.C. 259]; United States v. Halsey, supra, 257 F. Supp. 1002, 1005; United States v. Gianaris (D.D.C. 1960) 25 F.R.D. 194, 195; O'Bean v. State (Miss. 1966) 184 So.2d 635, 638-639; Lerner v. United States (D.C.Mun.Ct.App. 1959) 151 A.2d 184, 187; Southard v. State (Okla. Crim. 1956) 297 P.2d 585, 588; People v. Burt (1926) 236 Mich 62 [210 N.W. 97, 101].) However, the several cases that have attempted to deal with the problem in greater depth have concluded that the proper standard is one of reasonableness. For example, in United States v. Freeman (2d Cir.1966) 358 F.2d 459, 463, footnote 4, the court stated: A defendant may be able to challenge the veracity of recitals of `previous reliability' by a motion to suppress pursuant to Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. [Citations.] Such a procedure would diminish the danger of a warrant issuing on an officer's good faith misjudgment as to the reliability of an informant, as well as dangers of police laxity or bad faith. The temptation for officers to include unjustified recitals of informants' reliability would be reduced. The Freeman court acknowledged that a mere good faith belief in the accuracy of the facts contained in an affidavit is insufficient. This conclusion is in accord with established search and seizure principles which declare that in assessing probable cause, good faith alone is insufficient. [13] Moreover, the view of the second circuit that factual challenges will deter police laxity in acquiescing in intentional falsehoods, apparently contemplates that an affiant must neither act in bad faith in acquiring information nor act unreasonably in believing the truth of such information. Similarly in United States v. Poppitt (D.Del. 1964) 227 F. Supp. 73, defendant complained that the warrant was defective because it described the place to be searched as a one-family ... dwelling. The structure was, in fact, a multiple resident dwelling. The question to be resolved is whether evidence obtained under a search warrant which has been properly issued initially by the Commissioner, must be suppressed when later evidence discloses that it applies not only to premises occupied by the defendant, but also to an apartment occupied by three other persons who, so far as it appears, are in no way implicated in the alleged crime. The answer would appear to depend upon whether [Internal Revenue Service Agent] Camplone, in executing the affidavit, had probable cause to believe that the house ... was, as he stated, a single family dwelling.... [¶] [A]ccess to the second story apartment was by means of a doorway inside of a glassed-in porch, which led to a vestibule inside the house, from which a stairway led to the apartment. On the outside of the house there was no indication that it was anything other than a one family dwelling. Defendant has pointed to nothing which would have put Camplone on notice that the second floor was rented to third persons. Camplone has reasonable grounds to believe that the house was occupied only by defendant and her husband, and he was justified in describing it as he did in his affidavit. (227 F. Supp. at pp. 77, 78; italics added.) Further support for the rule of reasonableness is found in United States v. Perry (2d Cir.1967) 380 F.2d 356, in which the defendant unsuccessfully sought to quash the warrant solely because of the presence of errors in the supporting affidavit, notwithstanding the fact the police had acted reasonably. There the court said (at p. 358): Probable cause is established if the facts alleged by the informant, if true, establish illegality and the affiant-agent has reasonable grounds for believing in the truth of the allegations. (See also United States v. Ramos (2d Cir.1967) 380 F.2d 717, 720 [defendant contended information provided by informant inherently incredible]; 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedures, supra, § 673, at p. 106.) That reasonableness is the test governing challenges to the facts set forth in an affidavit is demonstrated by the rules which apply in the analogous area of warrantless arrests and searches. In Hill v. California (1971) 401 U.S. 797 [28 L.Ed.2d 484, 91 S.Ct. 1106], affirming People v. Hill (1968) 69 Cal.2d 550 [72 Cal. Rptr. 641, 446 P.2d 521], police admittedly had probable cause to arrest defendant Hill. They proceeded to Hill's address and encountered an individual who professed to be one Miller. The officers nevertheless arrested Miller, believing on the basis of descriptions received from various sources and statements made by Miller that he was in actuality Hill. Pursuant to the arrest they searched Hill's house and the fruits of that search were introduced at trial. In affirming, the Supreme Court said: The upshot was that the officers in good faith believed Miller was Hill and arrested him. They were quite wrong as it turned out, and subjective good-faith belief would not in itself justify either the arrest or the subsequent search. But sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and on the record before us the officers' mistake was understandable and the arrest a reasonable response to the situation facing them at the time. (401 U.S. at pp. 803-804 [28 L.Ed.2d at pp. 489-490]; see also id. at p. 802 [28 L.Ed.2d at p. 489].) The wisdom of the court's holding in Hill is manifest. Under those circumstances in which an officer makes an arrest without a warrant (see Pen. Code, § 836), he is in essence required to perform two tasks: first, he must ascertain what events have transpired, i.e., what are the facts; second, from those facts he must deduce whether a crime has been committed. It is to this task in a warrantless search or arrest that the probable cause standard usually refers. (See Brinegar v. United States, supra, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176 [93 L.Ed. 1879, 1890-1891] [search without a warrant]; People v. Fein (1971) 4 Cal.3d 747, 752 [94 Cal. Rptr. 607, 484 P.2d 583] [arrest without a warrant].) Hill correctly applies the probable cause guideline to the facts upon which those inferences are drawn. Similarly, the broad statement of the court in Brinegar v. United States, supra, 338 U.S. 160, 176 [93 L.Ed. 1879, 1891], recognizes that in those instances in which a warrantless search is allowed, officers are permitted reasonable factual errors. Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability. (See also Note (1966) 34 Fordham L.Rev. 740, 745.) There is no reason to hold an officer to a standard of absolute accuracy in those instances in which the inference-drawing power is reserved for the magistrate who is to issue a warrant, when the officer is only required to reach a reasonable factual deduction in those instances in which he makes the inferences and acts without a warrant. In both cases, the constitutional standard is one of reasonableness. (9b) Accordingly, we hold that pursuant to a motion under Penal Code section 1538.5, a defendant may challenge the factual veracity of an affidavit in support of a warrant and if statements contained therein are demonstrated to be false and if the affiant was unreasonable in believing the truth of such information, those facts must be excised from the affidavit and probable cause tested from the remaining truthful information. [14] We now turn to the issue of the burden of proof on such matters. (11) In general, the burden is on the defendant to raise the issue of illegally obtained evidence. ( People v. Prewitt (1959) 52 Cal.2d 330, 335 [341 P.2d 1]; Badillo v. Superior Court (1956) 46 Cal.2d 269, 272 [294 P.2d 23].) (12) Thus if the defendant attempts to quash a search warrant, as defendant here seeks to do, the burden rests on him. ( People v. Wilson (1967) 256 Cal. App.2d 411, 417 [64 Cal. Rptr. 172] (hg. den.).) In cases in which the defendant also challenges the accuracy of an affidavit, the question is more complex since there are two preliminary issues to resolve: (1) did the affidavit contain factual misstatements; (2) if so, and if the misstatements were not intentional, did the affiant nevertheless act reasonably in believing the facts to be true. Applying the general rule it is manifest that the defendant must carry the initial burden of demonstrating the inaccuracy or falsity of allegations set forth in the affidavit. A presumably reliable person has attested to the truth of the matters alleged in the affidavit and a magistrate has in the exercise of his impartial function determined that the affidavit was truthful and acted upon it. Thus the state has sustained its initial burden by virtue of the affidavit itself. (13) If the defendant seeks to controvert the allegations contained therein, it is his duty to come forth to reveal any inaccuracies. (Cf. People v. Alfinito (1965) 16 N.Y.2d 181, 186 [264 N.Y.S.2d 243, 246, 211 N.E.2d 644]; Note (1966) 51 Cornell L.Q. 822, 825-826.) However, once the defendant has demonstrated to the court that the affidavit contains errors, the burden then shifts to the prosecution to establish that the inaccuracies were included as the result of reasonable misapprehensions. Since inaccurate statements in an affidavit frustrate the inference-drawing process, the magistrate's function is circumvented in much the same manner as when no warrant is obtained. To require the prosecution to demonstrate the reasonableness of any inaccuracies, therefore, is consistent with the well established rule applicable to warrantless searches and arrests: the burden rests on the prosecution to show proper justification. ( Badillo v. Superior Court, supra, 46 Cal.2d 269, 272; see also People v. Superior Court (Simon) (1972) 7 Cal.3d 186, 192 [101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 496 P.2d 1205]; People v. Fein, supra, 4 Cal.3d 747, 752.) To require the defendant to prove unreasonableness would impose an insurmountable burden on him. Since the affiant knows the circumstances under which he was led to believe that the inaccurate facts were true, he alone is in a position to justify his errors as reasonable under the circumstances. In King v. United States, supra, 282 F.2d 398, the affidavit leading to the arrest of defendant was allegedly prepared by one Rutha Douglas. At the hearing the only Ruth Douglas in town testified that she did not make the affidavit purportedly made by her. Reversing the conviction, Chief Judge Sobeloff noted (at p. 399) that no other person was produced then or, so far as anyone has revealed, was such a person located later. In these circumstances it is not reasonable to require the defendant to scour the world to prove a negative. The short of it is that an oath by a person claiming a spurious identity is the sole basis for the warrant and the search. The uncontroverted facts admit of no other interpretation. The court's brief discussion in King supports our conclusion that once a defendant makes a prima facie showing of inaccuracy, the burden then shifts to the prosecution to negate that showing. We also conclude that once the court finds that the affidavit contains an inaccurate statement of fact, it is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that the affiant's belief that the erroneous statements were true was nonetheless reasonable under the totality of circumstances. (See also Chin Kay v. United States (9th Cir.1962) 311 F.2d 317, 324 (Murray, J., dissenting).) We now apply these general rules to the case at hand. The magistrate denied defendant the opportunity to controvert the facts set forth in the affidavits at least in part on the ground that defendant had failed to make a satisfactory offer of proof. (14) Before a hearing is required to test the veracity of an affidavit, the defense must relate, with some specificity, its reasons for contending that the affidavit is inaccurate. As the court said in United States v. Halsey, supra, 257 F. Supp. 1002, 1005-1006, in holding that defendant was not entitled to a hearing: This is not to say that there may never be occasions for trying out the truth of an affidavit on which a search warrant issues. It is only to say that there is no justification for allowing such a de novo trial of the issuing magistrate's determination as a routine step in every case. Until or unless the defendant has at least made some initial showing of some potential infirmities he proposes to demonstrate, the magistrate's acceptance of the affidavit as truthful should be enough.... [¶] [W]e reemphasize that defendant's bland and sweeping claim is for a right to try the affiant in every case, with no foundation beyond the hope that some inaccuracy or falsehood may emerge. The problem may be quite different where some initial showing of some sort  some suggestion of a basis or area of doubt  is tendered. (See also United States v. Dunnings, supra, 425 F.2d 836, 840; United States v. Roth (S.D.N.Y. 1968) 285 F. Supp. 364, 366; Chin Kay v. United States, supra, 311 F.2d 317, 324 (Murray, J., dissenting); 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, supra, § 673, at pp. 106-107.) Here defendant sought to examine the informant, Officer Celmer, two airline officials and a United States marshal to ascertain, among other things, whether there was any unlawful coercion of the informant by the arresting officers at the airport. On another occasion counsel stated that the discrepancy between the physical description of the informant's contact supplied in the affidavit and the likeness of defendant indicated that the informant was obviously speaking of someone else. Even if it were demonstrated that no one with a physical description matching the informant's alleged contact resided at the Fairywood Lane address, such error, if deleted, would not necessarily leave insufficient information to support a finding of probable cause. However, the defense theory of coercion gives rise to an inference that the police may have acted improperly when arresting the informant and that this conduct may have induced the informant, while under police restraint, to invent all or part of his story or to base it merely on circulating rumors. If the defense allegation of coercion of the informant is true, the burden of the prosecution to show that the arresting officers' reliance on the informant's statements was reasonable becomes proportionately heavier. Whether the naked offer of coercion coupled with defendant's other contentions advanced at the hearing constitute a sufficient offer of proof, we need not decide. Since much of the confusion evident at the combined section 1538.5, subdivision (f), hearing and preliminary examination was caused by refusal to disclose the informant's identity, and since we hold that disclosure is required, it is likely that on remand both counsel will produce a more intelligible record. At that time the magistrate will be able to exercise discretion to permit or deny inquiry into the truth of the matters contained in the affidavit on the basis of defendant's proposed theory of proof and to decide whether examination of the informant, Officer Celmer, and other witnesses is appropriate. [15]