Opinion ID: 2751912
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Application of Alleyne to this Appeal

Text: The Supreme Court's decision in Alleyne applies to any case pending on direct appeal at the time Alleyne was decided. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) ([A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases . . . pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past.). In Ramirez-Burgos v. United States, 313 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2002), we held that a new Supreme Court precedent -- Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) -- applied retroactively to Ramirez's case. Ramirez-Burgos, 313 F.3d at 29. We had previously affirmed Ramirez's convictions, vacated his sentence, and remanded to the district court for resentencing. Id. at 27. After Ramirez was resentenced and one day after he filed his reply brief in his second appeal, the Supreme Court decided Jones. Id. at 28. Citing Griffith, we held that Ramirez could bring a new claim of jury-instruction error under Jones because Ramirez's case was still on direct appeal at the time Jones was decided. Id. at 29 (citing Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328). See also Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937) (Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment.); United States v. Dodson, 291 F.3d 268, 275-76 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that where court of appeals affirms convictions -10- but vacates sentence and remands for resentencing on any count, judgment of conviction is not final as to all counts). Alleyne was decided in 2013 after we had twice vacated Pizarro's sentence and remanded for resentencing, and after Pizarro had filed his opening brief in this third appeal. The fact that the Supreme Court denied Pizarro's petition for a writ of certiorari after his first appeal, Pizarro-Morales v. United States, 546 U.S. 1199 (2006), does not change the fact that his judgment of conviction was not final at the time Alleyne was decided, given that we had vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. See Berman, 302 U.S. at 212 (indicating that a judgment of conviction would not be final if the sentence were vacated); see also Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U.S. 152, 153 (1964) (per curiam) (holding it is settled that [the Supreme Court] may consider questions raised on the first appeal [after which the Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari], as well as those that were before the court of appeals upon the second appeal, after which the Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari (internal quotation marks omitted)); Dodson, 291 F.3d at 276 n.3 (citing Mercer for the proposition that following a second direct appeal brought after a resentencing hearing ordered by the court of appeals in a criminal defendant's first direct appeal, the defendant can petition the Supreme Court for certiorari as to every -11- issue, including those the court of appeals denied in his first appeal). Therefore, as the government recognizes in its supplemental brief,5 Pizarro's case was pending on direct appeal at the time that the Supreme Court handed down Alleyne, and Pizarro can now challenge his convictions under the new rule announced in Alleyne. See Ramirez-Burgos, 313 F.3d at 29.