Opinion ID: 465428
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Merits of the Westbrook Claim

Text: 156 Assuming the merits of Peek's Westbrook claim were properly before us, I would join Judge Hatchett's dissent. I write separately to underscore that, in my view, the majority has misapplied Francis v. Franklin, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). In Franklin, instructions on intent were held constitutionally inadequate because a juror could have understood them in an unconstitutional manner. The majority recognizes that: 157 the Constitution requires that there be no reasonable possibility that a juror will misunderstand the meaning and function of mitigating circumstances, i.e., that the law recognizes the existence of circumstances which in fairness or mercy may be considered as extenuating or reducing the punishment. 158 Ante at p. 1494. The majority finds two passages which it believes sufficient to meet constitutional requirements. First, the instruction at one point referred to mitigation as on the one hand, and aggravation on the other. Second, the charge gave an example of a sentencing consideration: the presence or absence of a criminal record. 159 Although it is possible that keen jurors may have made the inferences adopted by the majority, it is quite possible that they could have failed to make them. Under the majority's reasoning no instruction would be necessary: the jury could simply infer that because the defense presents evidence, that evidence is to be considered in favor of mercy. Moreover, the criminal record example relates specifically to an aggravating circumstance and gives the jury no guidance with respect to the great majority of mitigating circumstances that do not have a counterpart aggravating circumstance. 6 The majority concludes that the instructions here rely on jurors' common sense to divine the proper meaning and role of mitigating circumstances from self-evident sentencing considerations. The nuances and ramifications of capital sentencing, however, are too complex and significant to permit reliance on instructions that tacitly assume all jurors know the nature and function of mitigating circumstances. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117-18, 102 S.Ct. 869, 878-79, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (extraordinary precautions guarantee, as much as is humanly possible, that the [death] sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake.); Spivey v. Zant, 661 F.2d at 471 (in most cases, a judge must clearly and explicitly instruct the jury about mitigating circumstances). 7 In sum, the Peek instructions fail to eliminate the possibility that the jury understood the nature and function of mitigating circumstances in an unconstitutional manner. Accordingly, I cannot join this court's opinion on the Westbrook issue.