Opinion ID: 782204
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: New York's Statute and Case Law

Text: 94 New York's preservation rule, codified at N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 470.05(2), specifies that: 95 [f]or purposes of appeal, a question of law with respect to a ruling or instruction of a criminal court during a trial or proceeding is presented when a protest thereto was registered, by the party claiming error, at the time of such ruling or instruction or at any subsequent time when the court had an opportunity of effectively changing the same. Such protest need not be in the form of an exception but is sufficient if the party made his position with respect to the ruling or instruction known to the court, or if in response to a protest by a party, the court expressly decided the question raised on appeal. 14 96 In analyzing the adequacy of the claimed procedural bar, we look to the statute and caselaw interpreting New York's statutory preservation rule in criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Lee, 534 U.S. at 382, 122 S.Ct. 877 ([N]o published Missouri decision directs flawless compliance with [the state procedural rule] in the unique circumstances this case presents.); Arce v. Smith, 889 F.2d 1271, 1273 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 937, 110 S.Ct. 2185, 109 L.Ed.2d 513 (1990) (analyzing New York cases to determine whether the claim raised by the petitioner is not regularly the subject of a procedural default in New York). 97 Respondent cites several New York cases, and our own opinion in Garcia, in support of the proposition that New York's contemporaneous objection rule is firmly established and regularly followed in these circumstances. Petitioner cites several New York cases in support of the opposite conclusion. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that petitioner has the better of the argument. 98 Respondent contends that the issue here is whether after the court has issued its ruling on the merits and announced the relief it was awarding the moving party, New York regularly requires a complaint about that relief [granted] to preserve the claim that the relief ordered was wrong. In support of such a requirement, respondent primarily cites several Appellate Division cases involving Hinton hearings, state proceedings to determine whether the courtroom should be closed, either completely, or to certain individuals, during the course of trial. See, e.g., People v. Lucas, 290 A.D.2d 304, 736 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1st Dep't 2002); People v. Williams, 287 A.D.2d 337, 731 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1st Dep't 2001); People v. Lanhorn, 283 A.D.2d 254, 724 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1st Dep't 2001). Respondent also argues that the circumstances here are very similar to those in Garcia, a case also involving a Hinton hearing. 99 We conclude, however, that these cases are distinguishable. In Garcia, we relied on the fact that the defendant had failed to put the trial judge on notice as to what the defendant now claims he wanted — in that case, the presence of his mother's companion in the courtroom — and so failed to preserve his claim. Garcia, 188 F.3d at 80-81. Similarly, in the Appellate Division cases cited by respondent, the defendants expressed no dissatisfaction with the relief ordered. Here, in contrast, before the Sirois hearing even began, defendant made clear his position on the preclusion of cross-examination: [T]o not allow me to cross-examine Mr. Echevarria on any or all of his background ... is really totally completely unfair. Given Lee 's case-specific inquiry, we conclude that the cases cited by respondent do not control here, where the trial court could not have doubted that counsel wanted to cross-examine Echevarria. 100 Further, other New York cases interpreting the scope of CPL § 470.05(2) undercut respondent's claim. Since our decision in Garcia and the Court of Appeals' decision denying Cotto's direct appeal, the Court of Appeals has held that, under similar circumstances to those presented in this case, an issue of law is preserved even if it is not specifically raised by the defendant so long as the trial court expressly rules on the issue following an earlier objection. In People v. Edwards, 95 N.Y.2d 486, 719 N.Y.S.2d 202, 741 N.E.2d 876 (2000), the Court of Appeals reached the merits of a probable cause issue, decided by the trial court at the close of a suppression hearing. In so doing, the court specifically held that contrary to the People's contention, the issue of probable cause to arrest is preserved for our review because, in its written decision denying defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court `expressly decided' the question in response to a `protest by a party.' Id. at 491 n. 2, 719 N.Y.S.2d 202, 741 N.E.2d 876 (citing CPL § 470.05(2)). 101 Intermediate appellate courts in New York have followed the same principle. See, e.g., People v. Ayala, 142 A.D.2d 147, 157, 534 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1011 (2nd Dept 1988), aff'd, 75 N.Y.2d 422, 554 N.Y.S.2d 412, 553 N.E.2d 960 (1990) (in case where protest was made by the government, issue pressed by defense on appeal was still preserved because a question of law is preserved if the point was expressly decided by the trial court in response to a protest, even though the protesting party overlooked that argument when making the protest) (quoting Preiser, Supp. Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 470.05, 1988 Pocket Part, at 5) 15 ; People v. Seabrook, 241 A.D.2d 325, 326, 659 N.Y.S.2d 463, 464 (1st Dept 1997) (defense counsel's motion to share responsibilities with counsel for co-defendant preserved issue of law as to all parts of ruling despite failure to specifically object); People v. Duncan, 177 A.D.2d 187, 190-91, 582 N.Y.S.2d 847, 849-50 (4th Dept 1992) (defendant's litigation of Batson hearing preserved issue of law as to ruling on prosecutor's peremptory challenges); People v. Johnson, 144 A.D.2d 490, 491, 534 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (2d Dept 1988) (defense objection to the admissibility of photographs preserved issue of law as to whether they were admissible under collateral evidence rule, even though the ground was not specifically raised at trial). In short, CPL § 470.05 and the governing New York caselaw does not indicate that Cotto was required to make an additional objection after the litigated hearing in order to preserve his confrontation claim for appellate review.