Opinion ID: 2974239
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing in Violation of Booker and Blakely

Text: Bowen presented a lengthy argument in his brief regarding the illegality of his sentence in -15- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. light of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Booker, 543 U.S. 220, and Blakely, 542 U.S. 296.3 However, he conceded at oral argument circuit precedent is contrary to his argument, and presented it on the briefs merely to preserve it as an issue if this circuit’s precedent changes. Bowen in this argument asserts Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S. Ct. 2406, 153 L. Ed. 2d 524 (2002), was implicitly overturned by the Booker and Blakely decisions. Harris held the subsections in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) that raise the statutory mandatory minimum sentence for brandishing or discharging a firearm were sentencing factors that may be found by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than elements of the crime that must be found by the higher beyond a reasonable doubt standard, as they did not raise the statutory maximum for the crime. 536 U.S. at 557. Further, Harris held § 924(c), which allowed for a two-year increase in a defendant’s minimum sentence based on a judicial finding a weapon was brandished, did not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendments. Id. at 568. Booker, of course, held the Sixth Amendment prevents judges from making factual determinations, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict under the mandatory United States Sentencing Guidelines, and its remedy was to hold the Guidelines 3 In our own research in preparation for oral argument, we discovered this section of Bowen’s brief, close to 20 pages, was copied almost verbatim from a published district court decision, United States v. Malouf, 377 F. Supp. 2d 315 (D. Mass. 2005) (Hall’s Brief at 15-35). Malouf was not even cited by Bowen, much less was it notated in any way that would indicate the argument was lifted largely word for word from it. W hen our discovery of this outright plagiarism was called to the attention of Bowen’s counsel, Robert Little, at oral argument, he did little to explain it, stating only he did not cite the case because it does not constitute binding precedent in this circuit, and he copied from it verbatim because he would lose the essence of the argument if he changed even one word. W hile our legal system stands upon the building blocks of precedent, necessitating some amount of quotation or paraphrasing, citation to authority is absolutely required when language is borrowed. W e made it very clear to Mr. Little during oral argument this behavior is completely unacceptable and reiterate it here as an admonishment to all attorneys tempted to “cut and paste” helpful analysis into their briefs. -16- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. to be advisory rather than mandatory. 543 U.S. 220. Bowen argues after Booker, Harris’s distinction between mandatory minimums and statutory maximums is no longer good law, and the Sixth Amendment now requires the drug quantity (in excess of 50 grams) attributable to him and his status as a double felon to be submitted to the jury and determined beyond a reasonable doubt, as both of these findings raise the mandatory minimum sentence he faces. The Ninth and Seventh Circuits and several district courts have explicitly held Harris was not overruled by Booker or Blakely. United States v. Dare, 425 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We agree that Harris is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, but Harris has not been overruled.”); United States v. Jones, 418 F.3d 726, 732 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Under Harris, which the Supreme Court did not disturb in Booker, imposition of the . . . mandatory minimum sentence for a violation of 924(c)[] . . . did not violate the Sixth Amendment.”); United States v. Duncan, 413 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Nothing in Booker or Blakely suggests that the Court reconsidered, much less overruled, its holding in Harris.”); United States v. Perkins, 421 F. Supp. 2d 209, 218-219 (D. Maine 2006) (“The Supreme Court has never formally overruled Harris and Malouf appears to be the only decision against its continuing validity.”); United States v. Ezell, 417 F. Supp. 2d 667, 671 (D. Pa. 2006) (“This Court concludes that, although the reasoning of Harris . . . has been undermined by Booker and Blakely, it is not the role of this Court to overrule a decision of the Supreme Court, or even to anticipate such an overruling by the Supreme Court.”). -17- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. However, this appears to be an issue of first impression in this circuit.4 We will address Bowen’s arguments separately. As none of them was raised during the district court proceedings, they are reviewed for plain error. Mahon, 444 F.3d at 532.
Bowen first argues, after Booker, the Sixth Amendment requires his status of a double felon must be submitted to the jury and determined beyond a reasonable doubt, as this finding raises the mandatory minimum sentence he faces. In Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), the Supreme Court held a trial court’s factual findings regarding prior convictions do not implicate the Sixth Amendment. 530 U.S. at 488. Further, the Sixth Circuit has concluded Booker implicitly adopted Apprendi’s understanding regarding prior convictions. See United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2005)(“there is no language in Booker suggesting that the Supreme Court, 4 In United States v. Harris, 397 F.3d 404, 414 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit addressed the type of firearm enhancement in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and held this was an element of the crime that must be charged to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt, unlike the brandishing or discharging enhancements found to be sentencing factors by the Supreme Court in Harris v. United States. However, the Sixth Circuit expressly declined to “address the general constitutionality of mandatory-minimum sentences imposed through judicial fact-finding,” noting that was “a practice explicitly approved by the Supreme Court prior to Booker when traditional sentencing factors, rather than elements, are involved,” and citing Harris for this proposition. Id. The Sixth Circuit further pointed out its holding was narrow and applied only to the § 924(c) firearm-type enhancement. Id. In a recent unpublished case, the Sixth Circuit reiterated Harris’s holding “only exposure to a higher maximum sentence, not the triggering of a mandatory minimum, will necessarily affect a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.” United States v. Diaz, 2006 W L 1228696 at  (6th Cir. May 8, 2006) (unpublished) (citing United States. v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 602 n.5 (6th Cir. 2003)(“W e read [the Harris] opinion to indicate that a majority of the Justices agree that Apprendi [v. New Jersey 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000)],does not apply to mandatory minimum sentences, and thus consider that holding to be binding.”)). However, that case did not explicitly consider Booker or Blakely’s impact on Harris. Additionally, the Sixth Circuit has recently quoted Harris approvingly in discussing mandatory minimums under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) although, again, it did not consider Booker or Blakely’s impact on that decision. See United States v. Van Hoosier, 442 F.3d 939, 944 (6th Cir. 2006). -18- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. as part of its remedial scheme adopted in that case, intended to alter the exception to Apprendi allowing district courts to consider the fact and nature of prior convictions without submitting those issues to the jury”). The district court here did just what Apprendi, even after Booker, allowed it to do, in finding Bowen had at least two prior felony convictions that qualified for a higher mandatory minimum under § 841(b)(1)(A). Therefore the district court did not commit plain error in finding Bowen had committed at least two prior felonies that, combined with the drug quantity of which he was found guilty, made him eligible for the mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
Bowen next argues, after Booker, the Sixth Amendment requires the drug quantity for which he is held responsible (in excess of 50 grams) to be submitted to the jury and determined beyond a reasonable doubt, as this finding raises the mandatory minimum sentence he faces. This argument is without import, because the drug quantity used in sentencing of more than 50 grams of crack cocaine actually was submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. The verdict form specifically asked the jury whether Bowen was guilty of “the offense of conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base (crack) . . .” (JA at 78). Even if Bowen prevailed on this argument, he would be without remedy as the district court already did what he is now seeking. Therefore, the district court did not commit plain error when it sentenced Defendant Bowen to the mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment required where a defendant was convicted -19- Nos. 05-1706, 05-1795 United States v. Bowen, et al. of a crime involving in excess of 50 grams of crack, in conjunction with his two prior felony convictions.
Bowen also argues the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment requires application of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for drug quantity. However, he failed to flesh out this argument thoroughly enough in his brief for this court to evaluate it. Further, as noted above, the quantity that triggered the mandatory minimum sentence at issue here was in fact submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt, so even if he prevailed on this argument it would not merit a reversal and remand. For all the above reasons, the district court did not commit any error in sentencing Defendant Bowen and therefore there was no plain error. Mahon, 444 F.3d at 532.
In conclusion, we see no reason to hold Harris has been implicitly overruled by Booker and Blakely here, particularly considering one of the bases for the mandatory minimum life sentence, Bowen’s prior convictions, has been upheld as a sentencing factor a judge may find without submission to a jury, and the other basis for his sentence, the drug quantity, actually was submitted to and found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. If there were a case in which to consider whether Harris’s reasoning has been overruled by Booker and Blakely, this is not it. We AFFIRM Bowen’s sentence.