Opinion ID: 1474553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Selection of Jury Six Weeks Prior to Trial

Text: Appellant's second contention of error concerns a practice in Potter County of selecting juries substantially in advance of trial. In this case, jury selection took place on September 8, 1980, while trial did not commence until October 22, 1980. Immediately prior to trial, the jury was sworn. The trial judge then asked the jurors whether any juror had received any information regarding the case between the time they were chosen and the present. N.T. of October 22, 1980, at 15. The trial judge asked for a show of hands in response to his question, and none of the jurors raised his hand. Appellant asserts that since Potter County is a rural, sparsely populated county, there was considerable opportunity within the six week delay for outside influence to have reached the selected jurors. Thus, he contends that he was deprived of his due process right to a fair trial by an impartial jury: The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print. Patterson v. State of Colorado ex rel. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454, 462, 27 S.Ct. 556, 558, 51 L.Ed. 879 (1907). Appellant does not point to any specific taint, but argues under Turner v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965); and Commonwealth v. Stewart, 449 Pa. 50, 295 A.2d 303 (1972); that the situation was so inherently prejudicial that prejudice must be presumed. We disagree. In most cases involving claims of due process deprivations, a showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused is required. Estes v. State of Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965). Nevertheless, there are times when a procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process. Id. at 542-43, 85 S.Ct. at 1633. Thus, in Turner v. State of Louisiana, supra , prejudice was presumed where two key witnesses for the prosecution were deputy sheriffs who doubled as jury shepherds during the trial. In Commonwealth v. Stewart, supra , prejudice was presumed where the father of a murder victim was on the same panel as the jurors who had been selected for the murder trial, and the father had been in the same room with the jurors who were hearing the case for as long as two and one-half days. In neither Turner v. State of Louisiana nor Commonwealth v. Stewart , was there any proof that any juror had been spoken to; however, prejudice was presumed to prevent the probability of unfairness. We do not believe that a six week lapse of time between jury selection and the day of trial gives rise to a probability of unfairness requiring presumption of prejudice. This court has recently addressed this issue and held that actual prejudice must be demonstrated: Appellant next assigns as error the failure of the court to swear the jury immediately after it was chosen. It appears that the jury members were impaneled on August 7, 1978, but were not actually sworn until August 18, 1978, the day of trial. Appellant directs us to no authority, and our research has disclosed none, requiring the jury to be sworn immediately after it is chosen. `In the absence of statute, the time for swearing jurors in chief after they have been examined and opportunity given for challenge is within the discretion of the court.' 50 C.J.S. Juries § 294b. Before swearing the jury on August 18, the court inquired whether any had become aware of facts or engaged in any discussion which would disallow them from sitting fairly and impartially. None responded, and appellant's counsel made no attempt to inquire of any other possible prejudice stemming from the delay. R.R. 24a In the absence of any actual prejudice, we do not believe the procedure followed to be improper. Compare, Commonwealth v. Bruno, 466 Pa. 245, 352 A.2d 40 (1976); Commonwealth v. Bobko, 453 Pa. 475, 309 A.2d 576 (1973). (Footnote omitted). Commonwealth v. Darush, 279 Pa.Super. 140, 152, 420 A.2d 1071, 1077 (1980); judgment of sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing, 501 Pa. 15, 459 A.2d 727 (1983) (Superior Court's disposition of issue regarding delay in swearing of jury was approved, see 501 Pa. at 20 n. 4, 450 A.2d at 730 n. 4). Since appellant has failed to show actual prejudice, this claim of error is devoid of merit.