Opinion ID: 203405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Male Comparators

Text: A plaintiff can demonstrate that an employer's stated reasons are pretextual in any number of ways, including by producing evidence that plaintiff was treated differently from similarly situated employees. Kosereis, 331 F.3d at 214. To successfully allege disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show `that others similarly situated to [her] in all relevant respects were treated differently by the employer.' Id. (quoting Conward v. Cambridge Sch. Comm., 171 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1999)). The comparison cases need not be perfect replicas, but they must closely resemble one another in respect to relevant facts and circumstances. Conward, 171 F.3d at 20. García makes several arguments as to how she was treated differently from her male peers. Most prominently, she points to the disparity between Sánchez's 2004 mid-year evaluation and her own and claims that because she received ratings of Meets Expectations in all categories whereas Sánchez received one rating of Needs Improvement, it was he, and not she, who should have been placed on a PIP. García's argument, however, ignores the timeline of events. When Vélez made the decision to place her on a PIP in June 2004, she and Sánchez were by no means similarly situated. She had received a far more negative 2003 year-end assessment from Abadía than Sánchez had. Additionally, Vélez had been informed about problems with García's oversight of equipment qualifications which had required transferring that responsibility to a different department, and he had issued García a warning in April for her failure to follow internal protocols. García's mid-year evaluation was not completed until October, several months after Vélez decided to place her on a PIP, and he stated that he gave García relatively good ratings on this mid-year evaluation because she had been demonstrating improvement since being placed on the PIP. García has not rebutted any of these facts. [3] García also claims that she was treated differently because she was assigned more difficult projects than her peers while she was on the PIP; because Vélez made it more difficult for her than for her male co-workers to communicate with him; because she was not allowed to attend a training on the stage gate process; and because Sánchez was not disciplined for purchasing incorrect equipment. None of these allegations are supported by the record. García argues that [a]bout the same time [she was] put on probation through her PIP, Vélez assigned García various old projects that had been previously assigned to other project engineers and that nobody had been able to finalize. BMS contests this allegation, but even assuming that it is true, García has not demonstrated that she was treated differently from similarly situated male peers. For one thing, she was the only person with the title of Senior Project Engineer and she had different job responsibilities from the others in her department. Moreover, she has not provided any evidence regarding men at BMS who were placed on PIPs and whether they were also assigned old projects. As for Vélez's communication with García, she claims that she had trouble getting in touch with him, in particular with respect to her request regarding vacation days in December. Even if we credit García's version of the facts, which defendants contest, her only evidence that similarly situated men were treated differently consists of the following exchange from Sánchez's deposition: Q: Have you ever had a problem reaching Mr. Vélez, or having him ... answer your calls? A: If he's available, he will return my call; if he's not available, there have been times in which I have called him and he has not been able to call me back. Q: But is it the norm that it is difficult for you to get a hold of him ... [?] A: No, no, the time that I have called him, if he's available, he would return my call at that time or later on. This exchange does not indicate that Sánchez never had trouble reaching Vélez; on the contrary, it indicates that Vélez sometimes was not able to call Sánchez back, at least not immediately. This testimony hardly shows that Vélez communicated better with male employees than he did with García. As for the stage gate process training, García alleges that everyone else in the department went to the off-site training but Vélez asked her to stay at the plant to assist with an audit. After they returned, Vélez and Sánchez filled García in and gave her notes to review. García has not shown that it was not necessary for her to stay at the plant and assist with the audit, nor has she rebutted defendants' contention that she did not need to attend the training because she had already attended the same training the previous year. García also claims that Sánchez purchased the wrong equipment while working on a project she was managing. At deposition, she asserted that she, as the project manager, was given a warning because she made mistakes regarding installation and communicating with the financial department, but he was not given a warning for purchasing the wrong equipment. [4] García provides no evidence to support this allegation, but even assuming that it is true, García and Sánchez were not in the same position. García was directly responsible for the entire project and made different mistakes than Sánchez did. [5] Thus, as in Kosereis, all of the instances of disparate treatment cited by [García]... are either unsupported by the record or are distinguishable in important respects from the facts and circumstances that [García] faced. Kosereis, 331 F.3d at 216.