Opinion ID: 752168
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admissibility of Statements Made to State Officials

Text: 32 Mr. Castro claims that inculpatory statements made to three state agents were improperly admitted at his trial. The three state agents are Raymond Ham, an investigator with the District Attorney's office; Charles Blair, an agent with the Oklahoma Department of Corrections' Probation and Parole Division; and jailer Kevin Beier. The trial court conducted a Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), hearing on each of these statements, before concluding that they were admissible.
33 As found by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the following are the facts concerning the statement to Ham: On September 30, 1983--four days after charges were filed against Mr. Castro--while Mr. Castro was in the Kay County jail awaiting trial on the Pappan murder, he told the jailers that he wanted to talk. Raymond Ham, an investigator with the district attorney's office, went to see Mr. Castro. Mr. Castro told Ham that he wanted to talk and that he wanted his attorney present. After his attorney for the Pappan murder, Kenneth Holmes, arrived, Mr. Castro was notified of his Miranda rights by both Holmes and Ham, and he then confessed to the Cox murder. Mr. Castro had not received a court-appointed lawyer for the Cox murder at the time of the confession. 34 Mr. Castro argues that the statement was improperly admitted for two reasons: because the statement occurred during the long delay between the filing of charges and his arraignment, it is presumptively involuntary; and the attorney present during the statement, Kenneth Holmes, had a conflict of interest because he had previously represented Steven Gregory, the cell mate to whom Mr. Castro had made prior incriminating statements. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals addressed, and rejected, both of these arguments.
35 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found that [t]he record reflects that at the time of the September 1983 confession, Mr. Holmes was not representing Gregory; Tom Rigdon had been court-appointed to represent Gregory in May 1983. Castro, 844 P.2d at 165. It concluded there was no conflict. Id. The district court also held no conflict existed: [T]he Court finds no evidence in the record suggesting that Castro's attorney, Holmes, was in a position of professional conflict at the time he assisted Castro.... Although Holmes may have represented Gregory on an unrelated matter at some earlier date, there is no indication that Holmes' representation of Castro was prejudiced by any duty owed to Gregory. Memorandum Op. and Order at 40-41, R. Vol. I at Tab 24. We agree. 36 Whether multiple representation in a particular case gave rise to a conflict of interest presents a mixed question of law and fact. Edens v. Hannigan, 87 F.3d 1109, 1113 (10th Cir.1996). Mr. Castro has the burden of showing specific instances to support his claim of actual conflict of interest. Id. at 1114. An actual conflict of interest arises from joint representation if the interests of those jointly represented  'diverge with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action.'  Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 356 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1722 n. 3, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)). While the typical conflict of interest case involves joint representation of codefendants, it is not limited to such cases. Rather, a defendant's right to representation free of conflicts  'extends to any situation in which a defendant's counsel owes conflicting duties to that defendant and some other third person.'  United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 393 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Soto Hernandez, 849 F.2d 1325, 1328 (10th Cir.1988)). 37 We agree with the district court and the Oklahoma courts that the record fails to support the existence of any actual conflict of interest due to Mr. Holmes' prior representation of Gregory on unrelated charges and his representation of Mr. Castro on the Pappan murder charge. Indeed, the evidence surrounding the confession to Ham indicates that Mr. Holmes did everything he could to assist Mr. Castro and make sure that Mr. Castro understood what he was doing. Unsubstantiated and vague allegations are insufficient to establish an actual conflict of interest.
38 Mr. Castro made his statement to investigator Ham four days after the information was filed against him for the Cox murder, but eight months prior to his arraignment on those charges. He appears to argue that the length of time between the filing of the information and his arraignment renders his statement to Ham involuntary. We have already held that Mr. Castro's speedy trial rights were not violated by the length of time before arraignment. Furthermore, inasmuch as the confession occurred at the very beginning of the period which Mr. Castro claims was unconstitutionally long, it is difficult to see how the length of time between the filing of charges and arraignment affected the voluntariness of that confession. Moreover, as the Oklahoma courts found, and we have already indicated, the record surrounding the confession fully supports the conclusion that the statement to Ham was, in fact, voluntary.
39 Pursuant to court order from the Kay County District Court, Charles Blair, an employee of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections' Probation and Parole Division, visited Mr. Castro in January and February 1984 to conduct a presentence investigation for the Pappan murder conviction. Blair read Mr. Castro his Miranda rights, and, in the course of several interviews, Mr. Castro made incriminating statements. 7 Mr. Castro had not received a court-appointed lawyer in the Cox murder at the time the statements were made. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that the confession was the product of [Castro's] free and unconstrained choice. Castro, 844 P.2d at 171. 40 Mr. Castro argues that the statements were not voluntary because he was not represented by counsel at the time they were made, because he was most likely incompetent at the time, and because they were made in connection with a presentence investigation conducted following his guilty plea, later withdrawn, to the murder of Ms. Pappan, in violation of Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2410. Under § 2410, inculpatory statements made in the course of plea negotiations are inadmissible at a defendant's criminal trial. The district court found that: 41 Castro initiated conversation regarding the Cox murder during a February 21, 1984 pre-sentence interview with Blair pertaining to the Pappan murder case. When Castro mentioned the Cox murder, Blair stopped the conversation and read Castro his rights under Miranda. Once Castro stated he understood his rights, Blair allowed Castro to continue discussing the Cox case. 42 Memorandum Op. and Order at 44, R. Vol. I at Tab 24 (footnotes omitted). The district court accordingly held that Castro knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel at the time he made the statement to Blair. Id. Our review of the record supports that conclusion. After reading Mr. Castro his Miranda rights, Blair asked him if he understood them. Blair testified that Mr. Castro responded that he did and that he wanted to talk. Blair also testified that it really wasn't much of an interview from that point on.... Mr. Castro just started talking about various and sundry things. R. Vol. XIX at 2743. When asked if there was any time during the interview when Mr. Castro expressed reluctance or tried to stop the interview, Blair testified [n]o. Id. at 2744. The district court correctly concluded that Mr. Castro's statement to Blair was freely and voluntarily given. 43 With respect to his competency, the district court held there is nothing in the record that suggests [Castro] was not rational, lucid, or able to exercise judgment when he decided to continue talking to Blair after being advised of his rights. Memorandum Op. and Order at 44, R. Vol. I at Tab 24. Again, the record supports that conclusion. 44 Finally, with respect to the claimed violation of § 2410, the district court correctly observed that federal habeas relief is not available for violations of state law. See Matthews v. Price, 83 F.3d 328, 331 (10th Cir.1996). Thus, even were we to conclude that § 2410 had been violated, that would provide no basis for granting Mr. Castro's habeas petition.
45 Kevin Beier is a jailer at the Noble County jail. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found the following with respect to Mr. Castro's statement to Beier: On June 29, 1984, while incarcerated in the Noble County jail, at about 11:00 p.m., [Castro] began to create a disturbance. When the jailer went to investigate, [Castro] was emotionally upset. Without any Miranda warnings being given, [Castro] admitted to the jailer that he killed Beulah Cox. Castro, 844 P.2d at 171. 8 The court held the statement was the product of [Castro's] free and unconstrained choice. Id. The federal district court found no indication in the record that Castro ever asked Beier to call his counsel. Memorandum Op. and Order at 47, R. Vol. I at Tab 24. 46 Mr. Castro argues Beier conducted the functional equivalent of an interrogation, with respect to which Mr. Castro never received his Miranda rights nor affirmatively waived his right to an attorney. Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that the admission of Mr. Castro's statement to Beier was error, we conclude it is harmless error, in light of the other confessions properly admitted and Mr. Castro's own testimony detailing the crime. See United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1101 (10th Cir.1996) (after reciting that the erroneous admission of a coerced confession is subject to harmless error analysis under Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), we concluded such admission was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence to convict [the defendant] of the crimes charged even in the absence of his coerced statements), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1699, 137 L.Ed.2d 825 (1997).