Opinion ID: 675243
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pervasive Practice or Custom

Text: 67 The plaintiffs also have failed to show a substantial likelihood of success under the practice or custom approach. In Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir.1986), this Court held that to establish a practice or custom: 68 it is generally necessary to show a persistent and widespread practice. Moreover, actual or constructive knowledge of such customs must be attributed to the governing body of the municipality. Normally random acts or isolated incidents are insufficient to establish a custom or policy. 69 In Depew, a police brutality case, we upheld a jury verdict for the plaintiffs on the basis of approximately five prior incidents of excessive force. We held that while the mayor and [city] council members were aware of prior complaints of excessive force, they continued to assert that the department's supervision was satisfactory and that the officers were doing a good job. Id. at 1498. Because the city had knowledge of improper police conduct, but failed to take proper remedial action, id. at 1499, the jury could legitimately infer that the city had implicitly ratified a custom or policy permitting the police to use excessive force against its citizens, id. at 1501. In Brooks v. Scheib, 813 F.2d 1191, 1193 (11th Cir.1987), another police brutality case, we explained that: 70 A municipality's failure to correct the constitutionally offensive actions of its police department may rise to the level of a custom or policy if the municipality tacitly authorizes these actions or displays deliberate indifference towards the police misconduct. 71 We reversed the district court's judgment for the plaintiff, holding that [q]uite simply, there [was] no evidence that city officials were aware of past police misconduct. Id. 72 Here, with the exception of the eviction of the homeless from under the bridges, there is no evidence that any final policymaker was ever aware of the various incidents described by the witnesses at the hearing. Moreover, the evidence did not establish that City employees had a pervasive practice of violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The four homeless witnesses at the preliminary injunction hearing all testified that the City police had repeatedly harassed them, but they described only a few isolated instances with any specificity. Much of what the witnesses called harassment consisted of the police arresting them for public intoxication when they were admittedly intoxicated. 7 The Constitution does not exempt the homeless from the laws against public intoxication, and the enforcement of those laws, when there is probable cause to believe that they have been violated, is not unconstitutional. 8 The other incidents related by the witnesses, for the most part, occurred a year or more before the hearing. Even assuming that they amounted to constitutional violations, such isolated incidents can not support a finding that the plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial likelihood that a pervasive practice of constitutional violations now exists. 9 Furthermore, even if the evidence would support a finding of a pervasive practice, there was no evidence to suggest that the City Council or Mayor had actual or constructive knowledge of the incidents reported by the witnesses. 73 The plaintiffs attempted to prove that the City was aware of a practice of constitutional violations by using a passage in a 1991 demographic study commissioned by the City. The study notes that during the six months prior to our [census of the homeless,] street people in Huntsville had been 'rousted' with some regularity by the police and other city officials. However, this evidence alone cannot support a finding of municipal liability. First, there is no evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that roust[ing] involved a violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Even if we assume that roust[ing] involves the use of force, the constitutionality of the use of force by police against citizens is governed by the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment: [T]he question is whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). The study's use of the single word rousted provides no information on the circumstances in which force was used, nor the amount of force applied. The evidence simply does not support an inference that the homeless persons' constitutional rights were violated. Second, the study dates from 1991, and is therefore not conclusive as to the existence of a City effort to expel the homeless at the time the complaint was filed in June 1993. Third, contrary to the plaintiffs' position, the fact that the study was commissioned by an unidentified City department does not demonstrate that the final policymakers, here the City Council and the Mayor, were aware of its content. 10