Opinion ID: 2257538
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Brown's Guilty Plea and Proffer Admissible Under D.R.E. 804(b)(3).

Text: Brown's guilty plea and proffer were admissible under Delaware Rule of Evidence 804 as declarations against penal interest that were made by an unavailable witness. [37] D.R.E. 804(b)(3) provides: 3. Statement against interest. A statement which was, at the time of its making, so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless the declarant believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Such a statement is admissible if the witness is unavailable. D.R.E. 804(a)(1) states that a declarant is unavailable who is exempted by ruling of the Court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement. The State frequently invokes the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule as a basis for introducing statements by a non-testifying co-defendant who has asserted a Fifth Amendment right and is, therefore, unavailable. [38] In this case, the trial judge ruled that Brown was entitled to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. [39] Therefore, Brown was unavailable within the meaning of D.R.E. 804(a)(1) and Linda's attorneys were entitled to introduce Brown's guilty plea agreement and proffer under D.R.E. 804(b)(3), the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. To be admissible, Rule 804(b)(3) requires the statement to be made at a time when it was so far contrary to the declarant's best interests that a reasonable person would not make the statement unless the declarant believed it to be true, [40] e.g., a guilty plea to murder. Once that determination is made, the inquiry ends unless the statement would simultaneously expose the declarant to criminal liability and exculpate the accused. [41] In this case, that should have been the end of the trial judge's inquiry because Brown's statements did not exculpate Linda. The State's action resulted in the guilty plea agreement and Brown's proffer. The State alone could compel Brown to testify at trial. When the State refused to call Brown as a witness and the trial judge permitted Brown to assert his Fifth Amendment right not to testify for the defense, Linda's motion in limine should have been granted. It was reversible error not to admit Brown's plea agreement and proffer into evidence under D.R.E. 804(b)(3) as declarations against penal interest made by an unavailable witness. [42] The trial judge's ruling denied Linda's right to a fair trial and the effective assistance of counsel that are guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.