Opinion ID: 3187889
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Amendment to Section 2254 Application

Text: We now turn to the issues that arise from the district court’s denial of Ayestas’s motion to supplement his claims with arguments about the Capital Murder Summary memorandum. That is the document that suggested that Ayestas’s non-citizen status was one of two factors that led to the recommendation that the death penalty should be sought. Ayestas’s appellate brief supporting his application for a COA acknowledged that in district court, he had “sought to amend with a claim wholly unrelated to the IATC claim litigated under Trevino,” which was the matter we had remanded to the court. Under what is called the “mandate rule,” a district court on remand is limited to consideration of the matters that were the subject of the order from the appellate court. Henderson v. Stadler, 407 F.3d 351, 354 (5th Cir. 2005). We have used this articulation of the requirement: [T]he mandate rule compels compliance on remand with the dictates of a superior court and forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate court. Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 358 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2004)). The district court held that adding the unrelated claims to the subject of the remand would violate the mandate rule. Ayestas disagrees, first arguing the district court misinterpreted our remand order as limiting its discretion, and then arguing the mandate rule does not preclude the addition of a new claim. We disagree on both fronts. As to his first argument, Ayestas claims that the last sentence of our remand order shows that we expressly declined to constrain the district court: 13 Case: 15-70015 Document: 00513434126 Page: 14 Date Filed: 03/22/2016 No. 15-70015 We REMAND to the district court to reconsider Ayestas’s procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel claims in light of Trevino. We express no view on what decisions the district court should make on remand. Ayestas v. Stephens, 553 F. App’x 422, 423 (5th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). Ayestas reads too much into this sentence. As the penultimate sentence clearly reads, the remand was limited to the reconsideration of the defaulted IATC claim. The last sentence simply indicates that we express no view as to how the district court should decide or approach this IATC claim. As to his second argument, Ayestas relies heavily on a Supreme Court case as standing for the proposition that “the circuit court may consider and decide any matters left open by the mandate of this court.” In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 256 (1895). But as explained above, our remand order did not leave open any matter other than the defaulted IATC claim. If anything, Sanford Fork supports our decision in this case. The district court did not err in its interpretation of our remand order or its application of the mandate rule. Additionally, Ayestas’s new constitutional claims are unexhausted in state court and therefore cannot now be reviewed here on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Realizing the need for exhaustion, Ayestas filed a motion to stay and hold the proceedings in abeyance in order to return to state court to exhaust the new claims. “When a petitioner brings an unexhausted claim in federal court, stay and abeyance is appropriate when the district court finds that there was good cause for the failure to exhaust the claim; the claim is not plainly meritless; and there is no indication that the failure was for purposes of delay.” Williams v. Thaler, 602 F.3d 291, 309 (5th Cir. 2010). “[W]hen a petitioner is procedurally barred from raising [his] claims in state court, his unexhausted claims are plainly meritless.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 14 Case: 15-70015 Document: 00513434126 Page: 15 Date Filed: 03/22/2016 No. 15-70015 Hence, we turn to examining whether Ayestas would be barred under Texas law from bringing his new claims. In Texas, subsequent petitions for writ of habeas corpus in a death penalty case based upon newly available evidence, are handled as follows: (a) If a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus is filed after filing an initial application, a court may not consider the merits of or grant relief based on the subsequent application unless the application contains sufficient specific facts establishing that: (1) the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been presented previously in a timely initial application or in a previously considered application filed under this article or Article 11.07 because the factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous application . . . . TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 11.071 § 5(a)(1). Section 5(e) further provides that “[f]or purposes of Subsection (a)(1), a factual basis of a claim is unavailable on or before a date described by Subsection (a)(1) if the factual basis was not ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence on or before that date.” Id. art. 11.071 § 5(e). Thus, Ayestas must show he exercised reasonable diligence in trying to obtain evidence such as the memorandum. Ayestas’s briefing in this court and in the district court never suggests he sought to examine the prosecution’s file prior to the December 22 search that uncovered the memorandum. A defense counsel’s “duty to investigate” includes “efforts to secure relevant information in the possession of the prosecution [and] law enforcement authorities.” ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DUTY TO INVESTIGATE AND ENGAGE INVESTIGATORS 4-4.1(c) (4th ed. 2015); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 385– 89 (2005) (explaining that counsel’s failure to look at a “readily available” prosecution file was deficient performance for the purposes of Strickland). Moreover, Ayestas makes no claim “that [the memorandum] was unavailable 15 Case: 15-70015 Document: 00513434126 Page: 16 Date Filed: 03/22/2016 No. 15-70015 to [his] trial counsel through a reasonably diligent examination of the case file the prosecution had made available.” Amador v. Dretke, No. Civ.SA-02-CA230-XR, 2005 WL 827092, at  (W.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2005). Ayestas offers two explanations for his failure to investigate the prosecution’s file. First, he argues that the state was under an affirmative duty to turn the memorandum over to him. Second, he argues he properly assumed a search of the folder would not uncover information as material as this document. The first explanation is based on Ayestas’s having made two demands under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Under Brady, the state must disclose exculpatory evidence upon a proper demand by the defendant. Id. at 87. While the state was under an obligation to turn over such evidence in this case, there is no Brady violation if counsel, “using reasonable diligence, could have obtained the information.” Williams v. Scott, 35 F.3d 159, 163 (5th Cir. 1994). Though Ayestas is not asserting a Brady claim, the fact that there would be no Brady violation unless Ayestas were reasonably diligent in discovering evidence suggests to us that any alleged failings on the part of the state in not turning over the memorandum do not mitigate Ayestas’s own responsibility to undertake a reasonably diligent investigation for the purposes of Section 5 of Article 11.071. Hence, even though Ayestas filed two Brady demands, Ayestas was under an independent obligation to use reasonable diligence in attempting to discover exculpatory evidence, which, as explained above, he failed to do. Ayestas’s latter justification is that he “rightly assume[d] that the District Attorney would redact its file of all privileged work product, such as the capital murder summary.” This justification is circular and without merit. Ayestas essentially argues that he assumed no material information was contained in the file, and that had he known such material information was in 16 Case: 15-70015 Document: 00513434126 Page: 17 Date Filed: 03/22/2016 No. 15-70015 the file, he would have investigated the file. Of course, had Ayestas known the memorandum was in the file he would have no doubt searched it, but the point of reasonable diligence is to ensure that such evidence is found when it is unclear where such evidence may lie. Ayestas’s assumption does not serve to excuse his duty to secure information in the possession of the prosecution. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DUTY TO INVESTIGATE AND ENGAGE INVESTIGATORS 4-4.1(c) (4th ed. 2015). Additionally, as discussed above, even if not procedurally defaulted, Ayestas’s claims are not likely to succeed on the merits. The district court did not err in concluding Ayestas’s trial counsel and his state habeas attorneys were not ineffective. Hence, even if Ayestas could prove he exercised reasonable diligence in discovering the memorandum, he still cannot exhaust his new claims in the Texas courts because his claims are not meritorious. Ayestas did not exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to discover the memorandum earlier. Therefore, he is unable to prove under Section 5 of Article 11.071(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure that he would be entitled to a subsequent state habeas hearing to exhaust his new claims that are based on the newly discovered memorandum. Hence, Ayestas has not exhausted, and will not be able to exhaust, these claims in state court. Because we are unable to review unexhausted claims, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ayestas’s motion for a stay and abeyance. The request for certificate of appealability is DENIED. The judgment rejecting Ayestas’s Section 2254 application is AFFIRMED. 17