Opinion ID: 625109
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the Raisin Marketing Order to the Hornes

Text: For the reasons discussed in the district court's opinion below, we conclude that the Hornes, who admit that their toll-packing business stems, sorts, cleans, and packages raisins for market as raisins, 7 C.F.R. § 989.14, satisfy the regulatory definition of a packer and are thus handlers subject to the Raisin Marketing Order's provisions, see 7 C.F.R. § 989.15. See Horne v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 2009 WL 4895362, at -18, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115464, at -49 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 11, 2009). The USDA's interpretation of its own regulation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation and thus must be given controlling weight. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945); accord Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997); Miller v. Cal. Speedway Corp., 536 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir.2008). Furthermore, its findings regarding the Hornes' handler operations are supported by substantial evidence and are neither arbitrary nor capricious. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E). The Hornes argue they are statutorily exempt from regulation because they also satisfy the regulatory definition of a producer, and the AMAA provides that [n]o order issued under this chapter shall be applicable to any producer in his capacity as a producer. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(13)(B). However, by expressly limiting the exemption from regulation only to a producer in his capacity as a producer, the AMAA contemplates that an individual who performs both producer and handler functions may still be regulated in his capacity as a handler. Even if the AMAA is considered silent or ambiguous on the regulation of individuals who perform both producer and handler functions, we must give Chevron deference to the permissible interpretation of the Secretary of Agriculture, who is charged with administering the statute. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); see 7 U.S.C. § 608c(1); see also Morales-Izquierdo v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 600 F.3d 1076, 1086-87 (9th Cir.2010); Midway Farms v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 188 F.3d 1136, 1140 n. 5 (9th Cir.1999). Other courts have similarly rejected the Hornes' argument that a producer who handles his own product for market is statutorily exempt from regulation under the AMAA. See, e.g., Freeman v. Vance, 319 F.2d 841, 842 (5th Cir.1963) (per curiam); Ideal Farms, Inc. v. Benson, 288 F.2d 608, 614 (3d Cir.1961), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965, 83 S.Ct. 1087, 10 L.Ed.2d 128 (1963); Evans, 74 Fed.Cl. at 557-58. Deferring to the agency's permissible interpretation of the statute, as we must, we conclude that applying the Raisin Marketing Order to the Hornes in their capacity as handlers was not contrary to the AMAA.