Opinion ID: 481333
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Williams Check Evidence

Text: 21 At the outset we reject the government's argument that Peterson did not sufficiently challenge the admission of the Williams check evidence at trial. Her counsel objected to the introduction of the Williams check and to the elicitation of Raichle's testimony regarding it, and he repeatedly sought to curtail the government's cross-examination of Peterson into the assumed other instances of dealing with other persons' checks. He also had objected to the cross-examination of the character witness called by Peterson insofar as the witness was asked about the assumed similar acts by Peterson. Though the grounds may not have been stated with each of counsel's objections, we conclude that the objections were sufficient, taken in context, to alert the trial court that Peterson objected to this other act evidence for any purpose. See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1) (party should state the specific ground of objection unless the specific ground is apparent from the context). Indeed, during the cross-examination of Peterson as to these matters, after the court had previously sustained objection to the use of the other assumed incidents in the cross-examination of the character witness, Peterson's counsel sought to approach the bench but was told by the court that it was [n]ot necessary. In all the circumstances, we conclude that Peterson's objections to the use of the Williams check evidence either for purposes of impeachment or to show knowledge were adequately preserved for appeal.
22 If the Williams check had been offered by the government solely to impeach Peterson's credibility, the court would have been required to exclude it from evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) provides, in pertinent part, that [s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking ... his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. Thus, if the admission of the Williams check evidence is to be upheld, it must have been properly admissible to prove Peterson's knowledge that the Azapian check was stolen.
23 Preliminarily, we note our rejection of Peterson's argument on appeal that the admission of any similar act evidence was improper because her knowledge was not in issue. For a party to prevail on such an argument, [t]he record must reflect ... unequivocal concession of the element by the defendant. United States v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748, 754 (2d Cir.1979); accord United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 942 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Williams, 577 F.2d 188, 191 (2d Cir.) (defendant must affirmatively take the issue ... out of the case), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 868 (1978). Here, however, Peterson's counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the government's case on the precise ground that knowledge had not been proven. Further, his last question to Peterson on direct examination was Do you know this check was stolen from the United States mails? She responded, No sir, I don't. Plainly, Peterson failed to remove the issue of knowledge from the case. 24 Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) allows the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts in order to prove, inter alia, that the defendant had knowledge of a pertinent fact. When the other act is unconnected with the offense charged it must be sufficiently similar to the conduct at issue to permit the jury reasonably to draw from that act the knowledge inference advocated by the proponent of the evidence. See generally 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence Sec. 5245 (1978). In determining whether to allow similar act evidence, the trial judge is required to perform a balancing analysis, and he may exclude the evidence, even if it has some relevance to prove knowledge, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its potential for prejudice. Fed.R.Evid. 403, 404(b) Advisory Committee Note. 25 When it is clear that the trial court has performed its balancing task under Rule 403, the appellate court will not overturn its decision to admit or exclude the evidence unless the trial court has plainly abused its discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Martino, 759 F.2d 998, 1005 (2d Cir.1985); United States v. Smith, 727 F.2d 214, 220 (2d Cir.1984). We would consider it an abuse of discretion to admit such evidence if the other act were not sufficiently similar to the conduct at issue, see United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076, 1090-91 (2d Cir.1975) (dictum), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958, 96 S.Ct. 1737, 48 L.Ed.2d 202 (1976); United States v. Cook, 557 F.2d 1149, 1152-55 (5th Cir.1977) (only evidence proffered of prior fraudulent act was defendant's consent to entry of an injunction in which defendant neither admitted nor denied fraud), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020, 98 S.Ct. 744, 54 L.Ed.2d 767 (1978), or if the chain of inferences necessary to connect evidence with the ultimate fact to be proved were unduly long, see United States v. Lyles, 593 F.2d 182, 195-96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972, 99 S.Ct. 1537, 59 L.Ed.2d 789 (1979). 26 In the context of cases such as the present one, in which the government did not offer into evidence all of the information that it represented it had with respect to the other act, it is important to note that the probative value to be weighed by the trial court in its balancing analysis is the degree to which the advocated inference is warranted from the evidence that is to be introduced. Since it is the jury that is to decide whether or not to draw such inferences, the court, in weighing the proffered evidence's probative value, must take care to assess the strength of the evidence in the form that it is to be presented to the jury and not to assess it in the light of facts that will remain unknown to the jury. The evidence, standing alone, might, for example, only weakly support the desired inference but strongly support that inference if proof of additional facts were in evidence; if that additional information is not to be placed in evidence, however, and is made known only to the court, the court should not consider the additional information in assessing the proffered evidence's probative value. 27 This point has particular application to the present case, for the evidence presented to the jury with respect to the Williams check consisted solely of the physical exhibit and the testimony of Raichle that the Williams endorsement was in Peterson's handwriting. In and of itself, this evidence provided at best minimal support for the proposition that Peterson had knowledge that the Azapian check had been stolen. The district court may well have been influenced by the government's earlier representation that it had information from Williams that she had never received her check; but since the government stated that no witness could be called to place this information before the jury, the court could not properly consider Williams's alleged nonreceipt of the check as enhancing the probative value of the check and the expert's testimony. 28 Moreover, even if the government had actually introduced the information it represented it had received, the evidence before the jury would have only weakly supported an inference that Peterson knew the Azapian check had been stolen, for that information was only that Williams had not received her check. There was no suggestion that the government could prove any other facts sufficient to show similarity between the circumstances surrounding the Azapian check and those surrounding the Williams check. There was, for example, no offer of proof that the Williams check had been deposited into any account owned by Peterson or that Peterson had otherwise received any of the proceeds; thus, absent the opinion testimony of the handwriting expert, there was no evidence that Peterson had ever possessed the Williams check. Further, even the expert's opinion that Peterson had written the Williams endorsement was insufficient to establish that either her possession or her endorsement was wrongful. Endorsing a check in another's name is not in itself a forgery; indeed, when such a signature is authorized it is an act specifically approved by law, see N.Y.U.C.C. Sec. 3-403(1) (McKinney 1964). It is an illegal or wrongful act, and thereby an act similar to the Sec. 1708 offense, only if it is done knowingly without authorization. Yet the government neither proved nor offered to prove that Peterson had not been authorized to possess or to endorse Williams's name to this check. 29 Thus the record was barren of evidence that endorsement of the Williams check represented a similar act from which the jury could reasonably infer that Peterson knew the Azapian check had been stolen. There was no evidence that the Williams check itself had been stolen, no evidence that any possession of that check by Peterson was unauthorized, and no evidence that Peterson's signing of Williams's name in the endorsement was unauthorized. Though the prosecutor asked Peterson whether she had forged that endorsement, the question itself was obviously not evidence, and the government was not entitled to prove forgery of the endorsement on that check merely through elicitation of a denial which it could ask the jury to disbelieve. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 512, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1966, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (Normally the discredited testimony is not considered a sufficient basis for drawing a contrary conclusion.). 30 Since the jury could not reasonably infer knowledge that the Azapian check had been stolen merely from Peterson's endorsement of Williams's name on another check as to which the jury was given no background information whatever, the effect of the admission of the Williams check evidence was to lead the jury to speculate that the Williams check too had been stolen and that Peterson's endorsement of it was unauthorized. The prejudicial effect of allowing such speculation was amplified by representations of the prosecutor in his summation that improperly suggested that he had knowledge beyond what was in the record, i.e., that 31 the Jacobo [sic ] Azapian check is not the only check she forged. We know from government Exhibit 6, check for $192 to Christine Williams, that is also in evidence that you can also look at, that she forged the endorsement of Christine Williams on that check as well. 32 (Emphasis added.) Thus, the minimal probative value of the evidence itself increased the likelihood of unfair prejudice from its admission, for a jury is quite likely to accept such a statement by the prosecutor--which, of course, went far beyond the evidence that was in the record--at face value. 33 The record does not reflect any recognition by the district court of the very limited amount of information provided by the Williams check evidence actually offered by the government, or of the consequence that in order to make any reasonable use of this evidence as a basis for inferring Peterson's knowledge that the Azapian check had been stolen, the jury would be forced to speculate as to the existence of crucial unproven facts. We are thus not persuaded that the court properly performed the balancing analysis envisioned by Rules 403 and 404(b), and we conclude that the admission of this evidence was an abuse of the court's discretion. 34 We are unable to conclude that the error in admitting the Williams check evidence was harmless since we  'cannot say with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error....'  United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 359 (2d Cir.1978) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1247-48, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). The principal issues were Peterson's knowledge that the Azapian check was stolen and her credibility in denying that she had had anything to do with that check. The jury was instructed that it could use the Williams check evidence in deciding both issues, and this evidence became the focal point for the prosecutor's summation on both issues: 35 She says on the stand she knows nothing about these checks, nothing about forged checks and, yet on two the endorsement is hers, forgery on each of them. 36 I submit to you ladies and gentlemen ultimately her testimony too is not worthy of belief. 37 The prosecutor's dwelling on the Williams check evidence strongly suggests that its admission had more than slight effect. See, e.g., United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d at 359-60 (prosecutor's dwelling on erroneously admitted evidence suggests error was not harmless); United States v. Pagan, 721 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir.1983) (when accused's credibility was critical issue, erroneous admission of evidence to impeach accused's credibility was not harmless error). And given the addition of the prosecutor's improper statement that the government kn[e]w that Peterson had forged the Williams endorsement, we are unable to reach any conclusion other than that the erroneously admitted evidence likely had a substantial effect on the jury. 38 Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.