Opinion ID: 1398737
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Transfer to Juvenile Division

Text: R.M.W. moved under Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-27-318(e) to transfer his case to the juvenile division. He argued that he was intimidated and manipulated into participating in the robbery. In deciding the motion, the circuit court is to consider the following factors: (1) The seriousness of the alleged offense and whether the protection of society requires prosecution in the criminal division of circuit court; (2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner; (3) Whether the offense was against a person or property, with greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted; (4) The culpability of the juvenile, including the level of planning and participation in the alleged offense; (5) The previous history of the juvenile, including whether the juvenile had been adjudicated a juvenile offender and, if so, whether the offenses were against persons or property, and any other previous history of antisocial behavior or patterns of physical violence; (6) The sophistication or maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of the juvenile's home, environment, emotional attitude, pattern of living, or desire to be treated as an adult; (7) Whether there are facilities or programs available to the judge of the juvenile division of circuit court that are likely to rehabilitate the juvenile before the expiration of the juvenile's twenty-first birthday; (8) Whether the juvenile acted alone or was part of a group in the commission of the alleged offense; (9) Written reports and other materials relating to the juvenile's mental, physical, educational, and social history; and (10) Any other factors deemed relevant by the judge. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-318(g). R.M.W. appeals from the denial of a motion to transfer his case to juvenile court. See Otis v. State, 355 Ark. 590, 142 S.W.3d 615 (2004); Walker v. State, 304 Ark. 393, 803 S.W.2d 502 (1991). Section 9-27-318(e) permits any party to move to transfer, and an order on a motion to transfer may be appealed by any party. See Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-318( l ). On August 29, 2007, the State filed criminal charges against R.M.W. in the criminal division of the circuit court. Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-27-318(c)(2), the State could charge R.M.W. in either the criminal division of the circuit court or the juvenile division of the circuit court because at the time of the crime R.M.W. was fifteen and charged with capital murder and aggravated robbery. Upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence that a case should be transferred to another division of the circuit court, the circuit court may do so. See Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-318(h)(2); Otis, supra . Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the trier of fact a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Otis, supra . This court will not reverse the circuit court's decision unless it was clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court after reviewing the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. See Flores v. State, 350 Ark. 198, 85 S.W.3d 896 (2002). The critical question in this case was whether, as R.M.W. alleged, he was forced or manipulated into participating in the robbery, or whether he willingly participated. The circuit court found that R.M.W. has not matured, given his age. The circuit court also went on to find, as R.M.W.'s expert psychologist Dr. Nicholaus Paul testified, that it is unlikely a person would behave as an innocent child for fifteen years and then commit such a robbery at gunpoint. However, in weighing all the evidence, the circuit court concluded that R.M.W. was lying about the nature of his involvement in the robbery, and that regardless of his background, he was a willing participant in the robbery. The circuit court found that several facts in this case and several events shown on the videotape contradicted R.M.W.'s story. We agree. R.M.W. entered the store first, while M.B. remained outside. That is inconsistent with a desire to avoid participating. Once inside, R.M.W. had an opportunity to warn Hammad and Awwad and provide for his safety had he wished to do so. He did not do so. Further, R.M.W. walked in calmly and looked at goods on the shelves. Nothing on the videotape shows that R.M.W. was nervous or cowering in the moments before M.B. entered the store. Rather, he seems to be waiting for M.B. Additionally, R.M.W. was the first to confront Hammad, and he did so by pointing a pistol at him. In this first confrontation, R.M.W. came in physical contact with Hammad. That is not consistent with a desire to withdraw or not participate. After M.B. shot Hammad in the face, R.M.W. continued to hold his pistol on Hammad. Soon afterward, R.M.W. handed his pistol to M.B., however, why that was done is not revealed by the videotape. It is only a few more moments until R.M.W. is again pointing his pistol at both Hammad and Awwad. Shortly after this, we see Hammad approach R.M.W. and M.B. They back away. Hammad presses forward and a fight ensues. As this fight begins, R.M.W.'s black pistol falls to the floor. R.M.W. states that he threw down the pistol because he wished to stop participating in the robbery; however, the videotape shows that he dropped it during the fight. Hammad then pursued and grabbed M.B. R.M.W., who by this point is several feet away, returns to strike Hammad at least twice in an attempt to free M.B. from Hammad's attack. Coming to the robber's assistance hardly serves as evidence R.M.W. did not want the robbery to take place. Finally, once M.B. freed R.M.W. from Awwad, R.M.W. waited for M.B. and only left the store with him. We note that R.M.W. argues that he should be tried as a juvenile because he turned himself in, because he was developmentally delayed, because he was in special education for some subjects, and because he was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. We note that he produced credible witnesses who testified to his quiet, kind, and respectful demeanor. He was by most accounts a gentle boy who would have been thought incapable of such an act as armed robbery; however, the videotape and Awwad's testimony tell a different story. We also note that contrary to R.M.W.'s assertion in his brief, the circuit court did not find that he was guilty of the charged crimes. Rather, the circuit court concluded that it did not believe that a gun was put to his head before he went in the store. To decide whether transfer to the juvenile court was appropriate, the circuit court had to decide whether the clear and convincing evidence supported R.M.W.'s story that he was a manipulated or an unwilling participant in the robbery. At the close of evidence in the hearing, the circuit court told R.M.W. that the court would take a break and upon its return he would be asked if his story really happened or not. That question was asked, and the circuit court could not find his answer, his prior testimony, or his story credible. In this hearing, the circuit judge sat as the finder of fact. Credibility of witnesses is an issue for the finder of fact. Polk v. State, 348 Ark. 446, 73 S.W.3d 609 (2002). On appeal, we have no means to assess witness credibility and may not act as the finder of fact. Ridling v. State, 360 Ark. 424, 203 S.W.3d 63 (2005). R.M.W. has not borne his burden of proving that the circuit court was clearly erroneous. We are not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Affirmed.