Opinion ID: 2542811
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the alternative test

Text: ¶35 While the Sierra Club has satisfied the traditional test and thus has standing, we hold alternatively that the Sierra Club also has standing under the alternative standing test. In Jenkins v. Swan, we recognized that a failure to satisfy the traditional test is not necessarily fatal to a party's ability to assert an interest before the courts of this state. 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983). Rather, Jenkins provides an alternative means by which a party can prove standingby showing that it is an appropriate party raising issues of significant public importance. Id. We reexamine this test here. ¶36 Under the alternative test, a petitioning party must first establish that it is an appropriate party to raise the issue in the dispute before the court. Id. A party meets this burden by demonstrating that it has the interest necessary to effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual questions and that the issues are unlikely to be raised if the party is denied standing. Id. We recognize that there is language in both Jenkins and subsequent cases suggesting that in making this determination the court may grant standing only to the party with the greatest interest in the case, or in other words, the most appropriate party. See, e.g., id. (If the plaintiff does not have standing under the first step, we will then address the question of whether there is anyone who has a greater interest in the outcome of the case than the plaintiff.); Sierra Club. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 857 P.2d 982, 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding the Sierra Club was not the most appropriate plaintiff). We now conclude, however, that the notion that a court must find the most appropriate party, thereby limiting standing under the alternative criteria to only one party in any given case, is unnecessary and counter-productive. We think that in many cases, such as the one before. us, there will be more than one party interested in the outcome of the case who can effectively raise issues that would otherwise escape review. In such cases, the interests of justice will be served by providing a forum where qualified interested parties can be heard. Thus, a court addressing standing under the alternative test does not need to determine which party seeking to intervene is the most appropriate party in comparison to any other potential party, but rather needs to determine only which parties are, in fact, appropriate parties to a full and fair litigation of the dispute in question. ¶37 Recognizing that more than one party may be appropriate in a given case is consistent with the reason we provide an alternative path to standingto ensure that relevant issues are raised by a party who can effectively address them. Limiting the ability to claim alternative criteria standing to one party in any given case will inevitably mean that some issues will not be addressed because each party competing for the coveted most appropriate status will raise its own distinct issues. Likewise, even where competing parties raise similar issues, no two parties will present them identically. ¶38 Allowing multiple parties to establish standing under the appropriate party test should not necessarily result in the intervention of every party asserting any interest. Parties hoping to intervene must still show a real and personal interest in the dispute. 675 P.2d at 1150. Moreover, where multiple intervenors raise identical or similar issues, the judge or administrative board has the discretion to require the parties to collaborate on their briefing so as to protect the court or administrative board from being overwhelmed by duplicative filings. ¶39 In addition, an appropriate party must still satisfy the second part of the alternative test before we will grant standing. Once a party has established that it is an appropriate party to the litigation, it must also demonstrate that the issues it seeks to raise are of sufficient public importance in and of themselves to warrant granting the party standing. Id. This requires the court to determine not only that the issues are of a sufficient weight but also that they are not more appropriately addressed by another branch of government pursuant to the political process. Id. The more generalized the issues, the more likely they ought to be resolved in the legislative or executive branches. ¶40 A number of post-Jenkins cases have interpreted Jenkins as treating issues of sufficient public importance as a third and separate test for standing. See, e.g., Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1993) (holding that plaintiff National Parks had standing because it raised issues of significant public importance); Sierra Club v. Utah Solid & Hazardous Waste Control Bd., 964 P.2d 335, 339-40 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing three separate standing tests and holding that the Sierra Club had standing because it raised issues of great public importance); Sierra Club v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 857 P.2d 982, 986-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (listing the traditional criteria, most appropriate plaintiff, and issues of public importance as three distinct paths to standing and denying standing on all three grounds). However, Jenkins did not treat issues of public importance as a separate test. Rather, Jenkins specifically stated, The absence of a more appropriate plaintiff will not automatically justify granting standing to a particular plaintiff. This Court must still determine, on a case-by-case basis, that the issues are of sufficient weight. 675 P.2d at 1150 (citation omitted). We also stated that the court will deny standing to a party who cannot demonstrate that it is an appropriate party, without suggesting that a court ought to then continue to the important issues analysis. Id. Moreover, we held the plaintiff in Jenkins did not have standing, noting that [s]ince [the plaintiff's] claim for standing . . . is predicated solely on the grounds of its public importance, we will not grant him standing when the pleadings reveal other potential plaintiffs with a more direct interest in this particular question. Id. at 1151. Jenkins thus contemplated that the important issues analysis was to serve as the second step of an alternative standing test and not as its own separate test, a conclusion we now endorse anew. ¶41 In summary, a party who satisfies the traditional test has standing and the court need not inquire further. Id. at 1150. However, when a party fails the traditional test, the court must then determine whether a party has standing under the alternative test. To make this determination, the court must first ask whether the party is an appropriate party. Id. If the party is not an appropriate party, the court's inquiry ends and standing is denied. Id. On the other hand, if the party is an appropriate party, the court then considers whether the party is asserting issues of sufficient public importance to balance the absence of the traditional standing criteria. Id. at 1150-51. If so, the party has standing. ¶42 Having clarified what a party must prove under the alternative standing test, we note that even if the Sierra Club had not met the traditional standing test, it would have standing under the alternative test. The Sierra Club is an appropriate party because it has the interest necessary to effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant and legal factual questions. Id. at 1150. The Sierra Club and its members have an interest in ensuring that the construction and the operation of the plant comply with all applicable state and federal environmental laws as well as with state administrative procedures, thus preventing any needless and unlawful pollution or other environmental destruction. Furthermore, as an entity focused on protecting the environment, the Sierra Club has the interest and expertise necessary to investigate and review all relevant legal and factual questions relating to the plant. ¶43 We do not doubt that the Citizens' Group is also an appropriate party, for it represents a large group of Sevier County citizens who live near the proposed site. However, the fact that the Citizens' Group is an appropriate party to litigate the claims of its members does not alter the Sierra Club's status as an appropriate party. Indeed, the Sierra Club may be better equipped to effectively assist the court with the relevant legal and factual issues because it has access to more resources and has more experience in the environmental litigation forum. Moreover, the Sierra Club's petition for standing does not merely duplicate that of the Citizens' Group. Rather, the Sierra Club presents its own distinct issues; for example, the Sierra Club asserts that the Executive Secretary did not adequately address carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions, did not sufficiently consider carbon injection for the control of mercury, did not require continuous opacity monitoring, and did not require appropriate Best Available Control Technology limits, as required under the Clean Air Act. Even where the Sierra Club's arguments overlap with those of the Citizens' Group, the Sierra Club presents the arguments from a different perspective, specifically focusing on the details of the Clean Air Act and the harmful effects of particular emissions. Accordingly, we believe that the Sierra Club's issues are unlikely to be raised effectively unless it is allowed to intervene. ¶44 As to the public importance requirement, the issues in this case are sufficiently important to warrant granting the Sierra Club standing. The plant will emit hazardous chemicals. Given the plant's proximity to homes and recreational areas, including Capitol Reef National Park, an area protected by the federal Clean Air Act, [6] the Executive Secretary must comply with all applicable state and federal laws. To ensure that this happens, it is important to give the opportunity to be heard to those persons who will be directly affected by the alleged violations of state and federal law. Moreover, the Sierra Club's allegations that the Executive Secretary failed to comply with state and federal law are not more appropriately addressed by other branches of government. Rather, the legislative and executive branches have already addressed these issues by passing the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 76719 (2000), the Utah Air Conservation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 12-101 to 127 (2003 & Supp. 2005), and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-0.5 to -23 (2004 & Supp. 2005). The Sierra Club is merely seeking compliance with these laws and thus is entitled to petition the Board for that relief.