Opinion ID: 1377787
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: Guiding Jury Discretion

Text: Defendant claims nonetheless that the instructions given were constitutionally inadequate because they failed to channel the jury's discretion by affording the clear and objective standards or specific and detailed guidance held by the United States Supreme Court to be required by the Eighth Amendment. Defendant's argument, based on isolated language in the court's decisions in Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 198 [49 L.Ed.2d 859, 888-889, 96 S.Ct. 2909], and Proffitt v. Florida (1976) 428 U.S. 242, 253 [49 L.Ed.2d 913, 923, 96 S.Ct. 2960], is directed first to the statutory scheme, the 1977 death penalty statute itself (former §§ 190-190.5). He acknowledges the contrary conclusion of this court expressed in People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d 142, and reaffirmed both in People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 315-317 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149] and People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 964 [171 Cal. Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240], but urges reconsideration. We find no necessity to do so. Any issue as to the adequacy of the 1977 death penalty law in this regard has been resolved by the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Pulley v. Harris, supra, 465 U.S. 37, 53 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 42], where the court said: By requiring the jury to find at least one special circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, the statute limits the death sentence to a small subclass of capital-eligible cases. The statutory list of relevant factors, applied to defendants within this subclass, `provide[s] jury guidance and lessen[s] the chance of arbitrary application of the death penalty,' [ Harris v. Pulley (9th Cir.1982)] 692 F.2d, at 1194, `guarantee[ing] that the jury's discretion will be guided and its consideration deliberate,' id, at 1195. The jury's `discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.' Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189. Its decision is reviewed by the trial judge and the State Supreme Court. On its face, this system, without any requirement or practice of comparative proportionality review, cannot be successfully challenged under Furman and our subsequent cases.