Opinion ID: 1749548
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: should the trial court have given an instruction on insanity?

Text: Prior to trial, appellant served notice that he intended to introduce evidence of mental illness or insanity at the time of the offense(s). At trial, Dr. John Schremly, a psychiatrist, testified in some detail. He stated that appellant was suffering from an organic mental disorder. He conceded that appellant knew right from wrong, but he definitely felt that appellant may well have been unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. The doctor stated that there was, . . . up to a 50/50 chance that he (appellant) didn't have the capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. He reiterated this opinion on recross examination; and on redirect examination he stated it was more likely than not that appellant would have great difficulty conforming his behavior to the requirements of the law. In addition, the doctor recounted evidence that indicated a family history of mental illness, that appellant suffered a serious head injury while serving in Vietnam, and that an intelligence test strongly suggested there was a possibility of appellant's having a central nervous system illness. In addition, appellant's father testified that his son was not the same after the war. Moreover, the court had available to it a written medical report prepared by Dr. Schremly, which referred to the Vietnam injury, drug dependency, and blackouts suffered by appellant. The trial judge, in a colloquy with Dr. Schremly, inquired as to whether he could state with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the various crimes. The doctor repeated what he had previously testified. Although the trial judge did not specifically say why he denied the requested insanity instruction, it is a reasonable assumption that it is because Dr. Schremly refused to say unequivocally that appellant was insane. The Kentucky statute relating to, and setting forth the principle of insanity that was in effect at the time of the commission of the alleged crimes that are the subject of this appeal, is KRS 504.020. It provides as follows: Mental disease or defect  (1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. (2) As used in this chapter, the term `mental disease or defect' does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. (3) A defendant may prove mental disease or defect, as used in this section, in exculpation of criminal conduct. Id. (emphasis added). The issue we address only concerns whether the evidence presented by appellant, as exculpatory of criminal conduct, was sufficient to justify the giving of an instruction on the issue of insanity to the jury. The trial court thought not. We disagree. Appellant argues there was sufficient proof of insanity to mandate the giving of an appropriate instruction. Appellee disagrees, claiming that the evidence of appellant's inability to conform his conduct was equivocal in that the doctor could not state that he was medically certain of appellant's inability to conform his behavior to the requirements of law. It is textbook law that it is the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury on the whole law of the case. RCr 9.54(1). It is fundamental that in a criminal case it is the duty of the court `by the instructions to give to the accused the opportunity for the jury to determine the merits of any lawful defense which he has.' Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534, 550 (1988) (per curium, plurality) (quoting Curtis v. Commonwealth, 169 Ky. 727, 184 S.W. 1105, 1107 (1916)). This general principle applies to the insanity defense. A silver thread that runs through our precedents on the question of insanity is that, if there is any evidence of insanity, even that of lay witnesses, the jury, under instructions, is the final arbiter of the ultimate question of the defendant's sanity (or insanity). Tunget v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 834, 198 S.W.2d 785 (1947). In Corder v. Commonwealth, Ky., 278 S.W.2d 77 (1955), the question before us was whether there was sufficient evidence of substance to raise an issue of the appellant's insanity at the time of the offense. Id. at 79 (emphasis in original). The majority of the court answered the question in the negative. The court said that there was not a shred of evidence in the record that at the time the offense was committed, Corder was insane. Id. (emphasis in original). Appellant, who was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and who received a prison sentence of 21 years, was placed in jail immediately after the crime. Five days later, he was examined by a physician who diagnosed Corder as having advanced diabetes. He opined that Corder had had this condition for several months and that such condition was regularly accompanied by diabetic coma and shock. Moreover, Corder was not rational at the time of the examination. Though the doctor avowed that his case of diabetes was the most advanced he had ever seen, Corder was not undergoing treatment for the diabetes. In spite of this evidence, the trial court refused an instruction on insanity, and a majority of this court upheld that decision. Apparently, the majority felt that the evidence of insanity necessary to warrant an instruction had to be pinpointed, in time, to the moment of the occurrence of the crime. Finding no evidence of such a precise nature, presumably because of the transitory quality of diabetic coma and shock within the diabetic condition, the majority upheld the trial court's decision. Judge Porter Sims, in a very prophetic dissent, stated: If the majority opinion should be followed in the future, and I seriously hope it will not be, I cannot understand how in any criminal case a question of an accused's sanity can be submitted to a jury, unless he is examined by a score of physicians either a few minutes preceding or a few minutes succeeding the crime and such physicians pronounce him insane. Id. at 80 (Sims, J., dissenting). Judge Sims concluded that the evidence of the doctor who examined Corder five days after the crime and found him to be irrational from a diabetic condition which had existed for several months and in the most advanced stage the doctor had ever evidenced was sufficient to submit the question of insanity to the jury. We agree with the dissent and overrule Corder v. Commonwealth to the extent that it, even inferentially, requires evidence of insanity to be pinpointed at the moment of the crime before it can be submitted to the jury for decision. We believe that, at the very least, the jury should have been permitted to hear the medical testimony, and, under instruction, make the decision based on all of the evidence, not just part of it. In Cooley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 459 S.W.2d 89 (1970), although we denied appellant's contention that a specific instruction on his epilepsy should be given, we reiterated the rule that where a defendant admits facts constituting an offense but interposes a legal excuse exonerating him from criminal intent, instructions should submit the excuse to the jury in concrete form. Id. at p. 91. In Edwards v. Commonwealth, Ky., 554 S.W.2d 380 (1977), a key issue was the alleged error of the trial court in failing to direct a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. We discussed the defendant's burden of proof. Where one chooses to rely upon insanity as a defense, the burden rests upon him to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that at the time the offense was committed, as a result of a mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. KRS 504.020; also see Henderson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 454 (1974). Thus, the presentation of evidence merely proving the defendant to be suffering from some form of mental illness at the time of the offense, without also proving him unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to resist his impulse to commit the illegal deed due to the perceived mental disease or defect, will not relieve him from the consequences of his criminal act. Newsome v. Commonwealth, Ky., 366 S.W.2d 174, 177 (1962). Id. at 383. Upholding the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a peremptory instruction, we found that although the defendant has presented persuasive evidence of her mental disorder, she failed to show that on the morning of the crime her mental disorder had rendered her unable to appreciate the criminality of her acts or to conform her conduct. We further noted however, that the introduction of proof of insanity by a defendant does not place a burden on the Commonwealth to prove him sane; rather, it entitles the defendant to an instruction to the jury that they may find him not guilty by reason of insanity, and thus properly makes the issue of insanity a matter for the jury's determination. Id. We do not quarrel with this discourse on the defendant's burden of proof and the nature of the evidence required to excuse the perpetrator of a crime by reason of insanity. See also KRS 500.070. The defendant in Edwards was required to present evidence not only of a mental disease or defect, but also that this disorder affected her ability to appreciate the criminality of her act or her ability to conform her conduct at the time of the offense. It was her failure to establish her incapacity, by virtue of a mental disorder, which supported the determination that she was not entitled to a directed verdict. We concur with the court's final analysis that the issue of insanity is a matter for the jury's determination. In Brewster v. Commonwealth, Ky., 568 S.W.2d 232 (1978), we again held that the determination of the question of insanity was the function of the trier of fact  in this case, the court. In Wiseman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 587 S.W.2d 235 (1979), even though the medical testimony was uniform in portraying appellant as the victim of a mental disease or defect, and even though that evidence was supported by lay testimony to the same effect, we upheld the right of the jury to make a determination that appellant was sane. We said: . . . The status of the law in Kentucky as to the propriety of submitting an issue of insanity to the jury is clearly stated in Edwards v. Commonwealth, Ky., 554 S.W.2d 380 (1977). . . . . . . . As to the quality of the testimony of the expert witnesses, in Tunget v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 834, 198 S.W.2d 785 (1947), we held that even though all expert witnesses testify favorably for the accused as to his insanity, where there is any evidence indicative of his sanity, there is presented an issue of fact for a jury determination. It is not necessary that there be a battle between the experts as to the sanity of the accused. Oftentimes, lay witnesses testifying as to the customary conduct of an accused more nearly reflect his mental capacity than the high sounding names tagged to imaginary self-induced complaints. Id. at 237-38. Finding from a review of the record that the jury had a sufficient basis for finding Wiseman sane at the time of the commission of the crime, we upheld the jury's determination. Id. at 238. In Wiseman , we reinforced the proposition that the appropriate factfinder is the sole arbiter of sanity/insanity, so long as there is any evidence relative to the issue which reasonably supports the factfinder's determination. The evidence necessary in order to submit the issue of sanity/insanity to the jury certainly must be relevant to the two legal requirements set out in KRS 504.020(1). As we have said, even lay testimony is acceptable, if relevant. A trial court and an appellate court, before determining the appropriateness of an instruction on insanity, must consider all the evidence; it must consider the totality of the evidence. If there is any probative evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that at the time of the offense, as a result of mental disease or defect, the defendant lacked substantial capacity to either appreciate the criminality of his act or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, the defendant is entitled to an instruction on insanity. In the case before us, the trial court  seemingly  required medical certainty as a prerequisite to giving the requested instruction. As stated in Rogers v. Sullivan, Ky., 410 S.W.2d 624, 627-8 (1967), certainty is not the issue; what counts is whether the supporting evidence, taken as a whole, is sufficient to infer a reasonable probability the condition exists. Dr. Schremly's testimony, taken as a whole, was sufficient to submit the question of appellant's sanity/insanity to the jury.