Opinion ID: 2166762
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Matter of Oldalys O.

Text: On August 23, 1996, the presentment agency filed a juvenile delinquency petition alleging that an undercover officer had purchased two tins of cocaine from Oldalys. The petition asserted that those acts, if committed by an adult, would constitute criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third and fifth degrees (class B and D felonies respectively), criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third and fifth degrees (class B and D felonies respectively), and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree. On the day of his arrest, Oldalys appeared before Family Court and entered a general denial. The matter was then transferred to another Judge, who adjourned the probable cause hearing to August 26 and remanded Oldalys to the custody of the Commissioner of Juvenile Justice for non-secure detention. Following the August 26 hearing, Family Court concluded that probable cause existed and adjourned the matter to August 30 for a fact-finding hearing. Oldalys remained in detention. On August 30, however, the presentment agency requested an adjournment. The court adjourned the proceeding, scheduled the fact-finding hearing for September 6, and continued Oldalys' remand. On September 6  14 days after Oldalys' initial appearance  the presentment agency moved for a good cause adjournment pursuant to Family Court Act § 340.1 (4) (a) on the ground that the two police officers needed for the hearing had not received the notification forms because they had each been transferred to different precincts the previous week. Counsel for Oldalys moved to dismiss the matter, arguing that good cause had not been shown and the only remedy for holding a fact-finding hearing beyond the fourteenth day following the initial appearance was dismissal of the proceeding. The court granted the presentment agency's motion, stated for the record that good cause existed, continued the remand of Oldalys and adjourned the hearing to September 10. On September 10  now 18 days after Oldalys' initial appearance  the presentment agency informed the court that it was not ready to commence the fact-finding hearing because the agency was still unable, despite diligent efforts, to reach the police officers, who were apparently on vacation. The Law Guardian moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that dismissal was the only appropriate remedy for the presentment agency's failure to proceed within statutory speedy trial limits. The court ruled that the motion to dismiss should be made in writing, released Oldalys, and adjourned the fact-finding hearing until October 2. Forty days after Oldalys' initial appearance, on October 2, the court denied the written motion to dismiss and proceeded with the fact-finding hearing. Thereafter, the court determined that Oldalys was guilty of committing crimes which, if committed by an adult, would constitute criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. After another hearing, the court placed Oldalys with the Division for Youth for a period of 18 months. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the speedy fact-finding hearing provisions of Family Court Act § 340.1 had been observed, and that good cause existed for the adjournment on the fourteenth day following Oldalys' initial appearance. The court also noted that, on the adjourned date of September 10, Oldalys was released from detention and the 60-day period for commencement of the fact-finding hearing became applicable. As a result, Family Court was free to adjourn the fact-finding hearing as a matter of discretion, without a showing of good cause or special circumstances. We now affirm in both cases.