Opinion ID: 563774
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Requests for Admission.

Text: 34 In the course of discovery, FRG propounded requests for admission of facts under Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a). Responding on behalf of EWM Co. (of which he was an officer and part-owner), Mongillo refused to answer a number of the requests, invoking his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. At trial, FRG sought to have those requests, and Mongillo's responses, read to the jury so that the talesmen might draw an adverse inference against the corporation. The court ruled that the requests and responses could not be read because they were cumulative; the information sought through the requests had already been conclusively established in other ways. FRG argues that the court erred in excluding this evidence because, wholly apart from the information the requests sought to elicit, the mere fact that Mongillo was designated to answer the questions was relevant to prove the agency relationship between Mongillo and EWM and to establish the adverse inference. 35 These arguments are disingenuous. A review of the requests reveals that those in question dealt with Mongillo's role in the Veranda Beach transaction, not the relationship between Mongillo and EWM or the business of EWM Co. per se. 5 In other words, no one but Mongillo could usefully have responded. FRG's attempt to contrive some indicia of a far-flung agency relationship out of the fact that Mongillo was designated to address inquiries that were unanswerable by any other officer of the corporation is palpably unconvincing. 36 To be sure, when requests to admit are served on a corporate party, Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a) does not expressly require them to be answered by the most knowledgeable person available. The rule does require, however, that the respondent make reasonable inquiry into the subject matter of the requests. See 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2261 (1970) (a party may not give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failing to admit or deny unless he states that he has made reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtainable by him is insufficient to enable him to admit or deny). Here, Mongillo was the only officer of the corporation who could conceivably respond to these requests. Whether EWM Co. asked him to address them directly or to answer them indirectly by reacting informally to the reasonable inquiry of some other corporate officer seems to us a distinction without a difference. 37 There is also a second fallacy in FRG's argument. An individual's invocation of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a personal decision. It cannot be imputed to a corporation. Since the privilege against self-incrimination is a purely personal one, it cannot be utilized by or on behalf of any organization, such as a corporation. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944). In a civil case, therefore, an individual's invocation of a personal privilege against self-incrimination cannot, without more, be held against his corporate employer in circumstances analogous to those at the bar. Thus, FRG's contention that Mongillo's exercise of his fifth amendment right should be interpreted adversely to EWM is unsupportable. 6 38 We have said enough. As a general proposition, we review rulings excluding evidence in civil cases by reference to an abuse-of-discretion benchmark. See, e.g., Knowlton v. Deseret Medical, Inc., 930 F.2d 116, 124 (1st Cir.1991); Freeman, 865 F.2d at 1339. In these circumstances, we discern no abuse. 39