Opinion ID: 1223875
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal duty to retrofit

Text: The plaintiffs' second contention is that well-settled and basic principles of negligence should lead this court ineluctably to impose upon the manufacturer of a hazardous product a continuing and open-ended duty  heretofore unrecognized in this jurisdiction  to retrofit its product with such safety devices as it might develop after the product has been manufactured and sold. [9] For the reasons discussed below, we are not so led. This court has long adhered to the basic principle that a negligence action lies only where there is a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Bidar v. AMFAC, Inc., 66 Haw. 547, 551, 669 P.2d 154, 158 (1983) (citations omitted). See also Johnston v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 71 Haw. 229, 232, 788 P.2d 159, 161 (1990) (A necessary element in a negligence action is a duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable risks.) (quoting Ono v. Applegate, 62 Haw. 131, 137, 612 P.2d 533, 538 (1980) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). The existence of a duty, that is, whether such a relation exists between the parties that the community will impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the other  or, more simply, whether the interest of a plaintiff who has suffered invasion is entitled to legal protection at the expense of a defendant  is entirely a question of law. Bidar, 66 Haw. at 552, 669 P.2d at 158 (citing W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 37, at 206 (4th ed.1971)). Birmingham v. Fodor's Travel Publications, Inc., 73 Haw. 359, 366, 833 P.2d 70, 74-75 (1992). See also Hao v. Campbell Estate, 76 Hawai`i 77, 80, 869 P.2d 216, 219 (1994); Doe v. Grosvenor Properties (Hawaii) Ltd., 73 Haw. 158, 162, 829 P.2d 512, 514-15 (1992). Thus, In Johnston, 71 Haw. at 232-33, 788 P.2d at 161, we noted that: `as our ideas of human relations change[,] the law as to duties changes with them.... Changing social conditions lead constantly to the recognition of new duties.' W.P. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on The Law of Torts § 53, at 359 (5th ed.1984). This court, however, is reluctant to impose a new duty upon members of our society without any logical, sound, and compelling reasons taking into consideration the social and human relationships of our society. Lee v. Corregedore, 83 Hawai`i 154, 178, 925 P.2d 324, 348 (1996) (Levinson, J., dissenting) (ellipsis points in original) (some brackets in original and some deleted) (emphasis added). This court has stated in the past that the construct of duty, within the context of negligence principles, is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. Cootey v. Sun Inv., Inc., 68 Haw. 480, 484, 718 P.2d 1086, 1090 (1986). The determination as to whether a duty exists, for purposes of such negligence analysis, therefore entails a question of fairness that involves a weighing of the nature of the risk [to which the novel duty relates], the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution. Hao, 76 Hawai`i at 80, 869 P.2d at 219 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the risk/burden calculus described above obliges us to assess, among other things, whether there are any logical, sound, and compelling reasons for  as well as any public interests in  the plaintiffs' proposed duty to retrofit. This assessment necessarily includes a consideration of the extent and sufficiency of the duties to which manufacturers of potentially hazardous or otherwise dangerous products are already burdened with possible liability for the purpose of according a solution to the risks attendant to their use. In this connection, we note that the proposition that the Series 510 straddle carrier was defective in some respect lies at the heart of all of the plaintiffs' claims for relief against Clark. A product may be defective under any one of three general theories: defective manufacture[;] defective design[;] or insufficient warning. Wagatsuma v. Patch, 10 Haw.App. 547, 564, 879 P.2d 572, 583, cert. denied, 77 Hawai`i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under Hawai`i law, plaintiffs in design defect cases may proceed on both a theory of negligence for negligent design and a theory of strict liability in tort for defective design. Ontai v. Straub Clinic and Hosp., Inc., 66 Haw. 237, 247, 659 P.2d 734, 742 (1983) (citing Brown v. Clark Equip. Co., 62 Haw. 530, 618 P.2d 267 (affirming wrongful death and personal injury judgment against manufacturer of shovel loader that lacked outboard rear view mirror, thereby creating blind spot), reconsideration denied, 62 Haw. 689 (1980)) (emphases added); see also Wagatsuma, 10 Haw.App. at 563, 879 P.2d at 582 (A party who asserts that his or her injuries were caused by a defective product may proceed against the alleged tortfeasor under principles of negligence and/or strict liability. (Citations omitted.)). The plaintiff's burden in a negligent design claim is to prove that the manufacturer was negligent in not taking reasonable measures in designing its product to protect against a foreseeable risk of injury and the manufacturer's negligence was a [legal] cause of the plaintiff's injury. Wagatsuma, 10 Haw.App. at 565, 879 P.2d at 583 (citing, inter alia, Ono, supra ). With respect to a claim of strict product liability, [t]he plaintiff's burden ... is to prove (1) a defect in the product which rendered it unreasonably dangerous for its intended or reasonably foreseeable use; and (2) a causal connection between the defect and [the] plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 566, 879 P.2d at 583-84 (citing Ontai, 66 Haw. at 243, 659 P.2d at 740). Pursuant to either theory, it is [t]he legal duty of manufacturers ... to exercise reasonable care in the design and incorporation of safety features to protect against foreseeable dangers[.] Ontai, 66 Haw. at 247, 659 P.2d at 742 (citations omitted). Accordingly, [t]he failure of [a] manufacturer to equip its product with a safety device may constitute a design defect. Id. at 243, 659 P.2d at 740; see also Wagatsuma, 10 Haw.App. at 564, 879 P.2d at 583 (citing Ontai). For purposes of establishing negligence liability, a manufacturer must give appropriate warning [10] of any known dangers [11] which the user of its product would not ordinarily discover. Ontai, 66 Haw. at 248, 659 P.2d at 743 (citation omitted). However, The obviousness of the danger, unless it justifies the conclusion that the condition is not unreasonably dangerous, has been held not to preclude liability on the part of a manufacturer who negligently designs a machine.... The creation of any unreasonable danger is enough to establish negligence, even though the danger is obvious. And it is ordinarily a question for the jury as to whether or not a failure to install a safety device creates an unreasonable risk. Wagatsuma, 10 Haw.App. at 570, 879 P.2d at 585 (quoting Brown, 62 Haw. at 539-40, 618 P.2d at 273 (citations omitted)) (emphasis in original). Given the foregoing menu of legally recognized duties or obligations  requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable risks, see Birmingham, 73 Haw. at 366, 833 P.2d at 74 (citation omitted)  to which manufacturers are already subject, we do not believe that there are sufficiently logical, sound, and compelling reasons, see Johnston, 71 Haw. at 232, 788 P.2d at 161, to justify a public interest, see Hao, 76 Hawai`i at 80, 869 P.2d at 219, in the plaintiffs' proposed duty to retrofit. In other words, we perceive no reason to impose a duty upon manufacturers, independent of those enumerated above, to retrofit products because established legal duties already afford adequate protection and redress to potentially injured plaintiffs. [12] It appears that virtually every court that has confronted the issue head-on has reached the same conclusion. For example, in Gregory v. Cincinnati Inc., 450 Mich. 1, 538 N.W.2d 325 (1995), an injured worker brought a product liability action against the manufacturer and supplier of an allegedly defective brake press that crushed his thumb when he accidentally depressed the operating pedal. The circuit court entered judgment for the plaintiff worker, and the defendant manufacturer and supplier appealed. The court of appeals reversed, and the plaintiff took a further appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. Affirming the decision of the court of appeals that the matter should be remanded to the circuit court for a new trial, the Michigan high court ruled as follows: At issue in this case is the propriety of a continuing duty to repair or recall theory of products liability in a negligent design case. The inquiry is whether Michigan law recognizes a continuing duty to repair or recall.... We hold that there is no continuing duty to repair or recall ... a product. .... In Michigan, there are two theories that will support a finding of negligent design. The first theory is based on a failure to warn. This theory renders the product defective even if the design chosen does not render the product defective. This warning includes the duty to warn about dangers regarding the intended uses of the product, as well as foreseeable misuses. If, however, the manufacturer is not aware of the defect until after manufacture or sale, it has a duty to warn upon learning of the defect; if there exists a point-of-manufacture duty to warn, a postmanufacture duty to warn necessarily continues upon learning of the defect. The other, more traditional means of proving negligent design questions whether the design chosen renders the product defective, i.e., whether a risk-utility analysis favored an available safer alternative. In such a complaint, the focus of any duty begins with whether the product was defective when it left the manufacturer's control. .... Because a prima facie case is established once the risk-utility test is proven, we are persuaded that it is unnecessary and unwise to impose or introduce an additional duty to retrofit or recall a product. Focusing on postmanufacture conduct in a negligent design case improperly shifts the focus from point-of-manufacture conduct and considers postmanufacture conduct and technology that accordingly has the potential to taint a jury's verdict regarding a defect. Id., 538 N.W.2d at 326, 328-29, 333-34 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Similarly, in Habecker v. Copperloy Corp., 893 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.1990), the widow and child of a forklift operator, who was crushed to death when the forklift he was backing off a ramp overturned and fell on top of him, brought a product liability action  based, inter alia, on theories of strict liability and negligence  against, inter alia, Clark Equipment Company, the manufacturer of the forklift. The forklift had not been designed with (and did not contain) any operator restraints, such as seat belts. Accordingly, the plaintiffs alleged that the forklift was defective because ... it had no operator restraints (seat belts). Id. at 50. At trial, the jury returned a defense verdict in Clark's favor on the seat belt issue. On appeal, the Habecker court reversed the verdict and remanded for a new trial on the operator restraints issue on the basis that the district court had erred in refusing to allow the plaintiffs to adduce the testimony of an expert witness regarding the causal relation between the lack of operator restraints and operator injury. Id. at 51. The following analysis is especially pertinent to the issue before us: The plaintiffs ... contend that the district court erred ... by eliminating the issue of retrofitting the forklift with a seat belt. ... As pertains to the district court's elimination of the retrofit issue, we note that the district court only eliminated the issue of failure to retrofit, and not the issue of failure to give a post-sale warning.... As to the retrofit issue, no Pennsylvania case has recognized a duty to retrofit, and, indeed, one Pennsylvania case has suggested that such a duty would be inappropriate under established principles of Pennsylvania law. See Lynch v. McStome & Lincoln Plaza Assoc., 378 Pa.Super. 430, 440-41, 548 A.2d 1276, 1281 (1988). [13] ... .... ... [W]e will reverse the judgment of the district court excluding the proffered expert testimony ... and will remand for a new trial against ... Clark ... on the operator restraints issue.... Id., 893 F.2d at 53-54 (footnote omitted). See also Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497, 503, 509-10 (8th Cir.1993) (In a case alleging negligent failure to warn, ... there may be a continuing duty to warn of dangers which become known after the product has entered the stream of commerce.... [However,] we find nothing to indicate that an independent cause of action exists in Iowa under a duty to redesign and/or retrofit.... Moreover, ... a duty to recall is not generally incorporated in a duty to warn. (Citations and footnotes omitted.)); Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Southeast, Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 344 (8th Cir.1988) (Appellants ... argue that [the defendant] was negligent by failing to retrofit the allegedly defective [equipment].... Appellants concede that at present, Missouri law does not impose a duty to retrofit; they argue, however, that the Missouri courts, if given the opportunity, would recognize failure to retrofit as a submissible legal theory of negligence.... The district court concluded that in the absence of any Missouri law imposing a duty on a manufacturer ... to retrofit a product absent a state or federal law mandating a recall of the product, [the defendant] was not negligent, as a matter of law, in failing to retrofit the allegedly defective [equipment]. (Citation omitted.)); Romero v. International Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444, 1452 (10th Cir.1992) ([T]he only post-sale duty to warn we can discern under Colorado law is [the manufacturer's] duty [under Downing v. Overhead Door Corp., 707 P.2d 1027 (Colo. Ct.App.1985), see supra note 11,] to warn of later discovered defects in a product. It does not impose a duty to retrofit.); Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 253 Kan. 741, 861 P.2d 1299, 1310-11, 1313, 1315-16 (1993) (A negligence analysis is more appropriate than an application of strict liability in the post-sale [duty to warn] context. In the case at bar, [the plaintiff] has asserted both negligence and strict liability claims.... We recognize a manufacturer's post-sale duty to warn ultimate consumers who purchased the product who can be readily identified or traced when a defect, which originated at the time the product was manufactured and was unforeseeable at the point of sale, is discovered to present a life threatening hazard.... [However, the plaintiff] has provided no statute or case law to support the claim that [the manufacturer] is subject to a duty to retrofit or recall the [product]. We reason that product recalls are properly the business of administrative agencies as suggested by the federal statutes that expressly delegate recall authority.... The decision to expand a manufacturer's post[-]sale duty beyond implementing reasonable efforts to warn ... should be left to administrative agencies and the legislature. (Citations omitted.)); Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 462 S.E.2d 321, 331 (S.C.Ct.App.1995) (approving, as an accurate recitation of law adopted by a majority of jurisdictions concerning a manufacturer's duty to recall or retrofit its products, a jury instruction advising that [a] manufacturer... has no duty ... to retrofit [its products with later-developed safety devices] if the products were nondefective under standards existing at the time of the manufacture or sale); Dion v. Ford Motor Co., 804 S.W.2d 302, 310 (Tex.Ct.App.1991) (Before holding a manufacturer negligent for breach of a post-sale duty, it must be established that the manufacturer assumed a duty and then did not use reasonable means to discharge the duty.... Ford did not assume a post-sale or post-manufacture duty to Dion in this case.... Ford sold rollover protection systems to retrofit unequipped tractors and encouraged dealers to encourage owners to install rollover protection systems. However, Ford did not assume a duty to improve upon the safety of its tractor by replacing an existing rollover protection system with an improved rollover protection system. Consequently, Ford did not institute a replacement program.... Therefore, ... Ford did not assume a post-sale duty which would require it to use reasonable means to retrofit all ... tractors with rollover protection systems.). [14] Because we are persuaded that it is unnecessary and unwise to impose or introduce an additional duty to retrofit or recall a product separate and apart from those duties to which manufacturers are already subject, see Gregory, 538 N.W.2d at 333-34, we hold that manufacturers are not subject in Hawai`i to an independent, continuing duty to retrofit its products, subsequent to their manufacture and sale, with post-manufacture safety devices that were unavailable at the time of manufacture. [15]