Opinion ID: 6107079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Requests for New Counsel

Text: On numerous occasions during defendant's first trial, the court facilitated discussions  between defendant and Hauser about their relationship and encouraged defendant to talk with and listen to counsel. On a couple of those occasions, defendant requested new counsel be appointed on the ground that Hauser's performance was inadequate or that he and Hauser were in irreconcilable conflict, but those motions were denied. (See People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 , 84 Cal.Rptr. 156 , 465 P.2d 44 ( Marsden ).) Defendant concedes that any error in failing to remove Hauser in those instances was arguably rendered moot by the mistrial, and he does not challenge those rulings here. He claims instead that the trial court erred in denying what he characterizes as three separate Marsden motions following the declaration of a mistrial: on July 7, 1998; on July 14, 1998; and on September 17, 1998, when he attacked Hauser in the jury assembly room. We find no error because the record does not demonstrate that defendant ever made a Marsden motion on those dates. The legal principles governing a Marsden motion are well settled.  ' When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation , the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney's inadequate performance. '  ( People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830 , 878, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 830 , 251 P.3d 943 , italics added; cf. People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522 , 580, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 809 P.2d 290 [When the basis of a defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel is set forth in a letter of sufficient detail, however, a full-blown  hearing is not required].) But the trial court has no sua sponte duty to inquire whether the defendant's desire to substitute another attorney is based on inadequate representation or an irreconcilable conflict. (See People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80 , 89-90, 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 564 , 264 P.3d 349 [a trial court is obligated to conduct a Marsden hearing on whether to discharge counsel for all purposes and appoint new counsel when a criminal defendant indicates after conviction a desire to withdraw his plea on the ground that his current counsel provided ineffective assistance [and] there is 'at least some clear  indication by defendant' ... that defendant 'wants a substitute attorney'  (italics added) ].) So when a defendant asks for new counsel, a trial court's duty to undertake the Marsden inquiry arises ' only when the defendant asserts directly or by implication that his counsel's performance has been so inadequate as to deny him his constitutional right to effective counsel.'  ( People v. Leonard (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 776 , 787, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 ; see People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399 , 421, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 732 , 213 P.3d 77 [we agree with the decisions of the Courts of Appeal holding specifically that the trial court is not required to conduct a Marsden hearing on its own motion (citing Leonard ) ].) Defendant did not assert inadequate performance, nor did he claim an irreconcilable conflict existed, as the basis for requesting new counsel directly or by implication at the proceedings on July 7 or July 14, 1998. At the hearing on July 7, which began with defendant spitting on his attorney and included his repeated outbursts and copious profanity and insults directed at the court, defendant said Fuck you and then said, I ask that I be allowed another attorney. When the court responded, I am not getting you another attorney, defendant replied, I'll get me one. At another status conference the following week, defendant interrupted the court to announce he would like a continuance and another counsel. Under the Sixth Amendment-. The court said, Denied, without specifying whether it was denying the motion on the ground that defendant had interrupted the court or was denying it as insufficient. In any event, though defendant did in the latter instance refer to a constitutional provision, he still failed to link his request to counsel's performance at that point or any earlier point in the proceedings. Nor do we discern a valid request for substitute counsel on September 17, 1998, when defendant attacked Hauser in the jury assembly room. While defendant was being restrained by the deputies, defendant said, That mother fucker. [¶] I don't want him. [¶] Mother fucker. [¶] Fucking ho (sic). He also added: I don't want you. [¶] I do not want  this man. He do not represent my interest, ladies and gentlemen. [¶] I'm qualified to represent myself. [¶] This man has intentionally dumped me in trial. It does not appear that defendant was addressing the court; rather, he directed his comments at counsel and at the 400 prospective jurors in the room. Even if construed as a motion directed at the court, defendant never requested the appointment of substitute counsel.  (See People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41 , 103, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 , 833 P.2d 561 ( Clark ) [He never asked for appointment of substitute counsel, but only to discharge Keith].) Defendant, moreover, was well aware of how to trigger the Marsden inquiry. On May 13, 1998, during his first trial, defendant said, I would ask for a Marsden , noting the obvious conflict between Mr. Hauser and myself. On May 26, 1998, defendant complained of irreceiveable [ sic ] differences. And nothing I can do could change this. [¶] I'd like him removed if possible-although defendant conceded the very next day that Hauser was competent. Defendant's comments in the three proceedings he has identified on appeal, by contrast, merely evidenced his displeasure with Hauser. (See Clark , supra , 3 Cal.4th at p. 103, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554 , 833 P.2d 561 [Defendant's diatribes about Keith did not ... constitute a Marsden motion].) So even assuming defendant's violent conduct did not relieve the court of its duty to consider his comments, nothing he said triggered the court's obligation to undertake a Marsden inquiry.  We likewise reject defendant's claim that the trial court ought to have appointed new counsel on its own-notwithstanding defendant's failure to request new counsel or to justify such an appointment-on the ground that defendant could no longer get along with his attorney. (See People v. Gay (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1065 , 1070, 270 Cal.Rptr. 747 [unless requested to do so by [the] defendant, the trial court has no statutory or inherent power to substitute appointed counsel, sua sponte, based on the judge's subjective opinion the attorney is incompetent].) Nor may a defendant argue on appeal that the trial court ought to have discharged counsel for reasons that the defendant failed to make known to the trial court at the time of the proceedings. (See People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472 , 489, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 526 , 161 P.3d 58 .) A court would risk interfering with the attorney-client relationship if its responsibility to substitute counsel could be triggered by such a meager showing. (See People v. Martinez , supra , 47 Cal.4th at p. 420, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 732 , 213 P.3d 77 .) Moreover, a defendant may not force the substitution of counsel by manufacturing a conflict or a breakdown in the relationship through his own conduct. ( People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86 , 138, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796 , 825 P.2d 781 ; cf. Daniels v. Woodford (9th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3d 1181 , 1197 [noting that the conflict was not one created by Daniels or by his counsel].) Here, it was defendant who repeatedly spit on and unilaterally refused to cooperate or even speak with counsel-and who ultimately assaulted counsel in open court. A defendant cannot take such steps and then rely on that same behavior to assert an irreconcilable conflict with counsel. (See People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833 , 860, 251 Cal.Rptr. 227 , 760 P.2d 423 .)  As it turned out, defendant's behavior at this trial confirmed the observation made by the trial court prior to the first trial, in addressing defendant's criticism of his attorney: I have carefully observed this particular subject matter. And it is my considered opinion, after an extensive evaluation, that your only purpose is to try to build up a ground for appeal if you should be convicted in this case. And that is your entire purpose for carrying on this way. You have a competent, effective counsel. You have even acknowledged he was competent. I think you are simply trying to play games with this court. And I want that placed clearly in the record because I carefully observed that. And that is my considered evaluation of the matter. This is nothing more than gamesmanship by your trying to develop a ground or grounds for appellate lawyers and nothing else. And there is no substance, basis, or truth to it.