Opinion ID: 1201220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Pretrial Statements of Sharon Cogdell and Jimmy Locklear

Text: Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting the pre-trial statements of Sharon Cogdell and Jimmy Locklear for the purpose of corroborating their testimony. Although defendant raises this as a constitutional issue on appeal, he did not object on constitutional grounds at trial and does not contend plain error; accordingly, we will not review these assignments of error on constitutional grounds. See id. 10(b); id. 10(c)(4); see also Raines, 362 N.C. at 16, 653 S.E.2d at 136. We will review defendant's assignments of error only for alleged violations of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, and we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statements for corroborative purposes. `Corroborative testimony is testimony which tends to strengthen, confirm, or make more certain the testimony of another witness.' State v. Harrison, 328 N.C. 678, 681, 403 S.E.2d 301, 303 (1991) (quoting State v. Rogers, 299 N.C. 597, 601, 264 S.E.2d 89, 92 (1980)). Deciding whether to receive or exclude corroborative testimony, so as to keep its scope and volume within reasonable bounds, is necessarily a matter which rests in large measure in the discretion of the trial court. State v. Garcell, 363 N.C. 10, 39-40, 678 S.E.2d 618, 637 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 510, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2009). Indeed, prior statements of a witness can be admitted as corroborative evidence if they tend to add weight or credibility to the witness' trial testimony. New information contained within the witness' prior statement, but not referred to in his trial testimony, may also be admitted as corroborative evidence if it tends to add weight or credibility to that testimony. State v. Davis, 349 N.C. 1, 28, 506 S.E.2d 455, 469-70 (1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1161, 119 S.Ct. 2053, 144 L.Ed.2d 219 (1999). [I]f the testimony offered in corroboration is generally consistent with the witness's testimony, slight variations will not render it inadmissible. Such variations affect only the credibility of the evidence which is always for the jury. State v. Warren, 289 N.C. 551, 557, 223 S.E.2d 317, 321 (1976) (citations omitted). When determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we look to whether the court's ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. Hennis, 323 N.C. at 285, 372 S.E.2d at 527. In our review, we consider not whether we might disagree with the trial court, but whether the trial court's actions are fairly supported by the record. Lasiter, 361 N.C. at 302, 643 S.E.2d at 911. Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when Detective Robert Gilford of the Cumberland County Sheriff's Office was allowed to testify that Sharon Cogdell told him that Leavy had received a telephone call from Gillard on 9 October 2001 and that Gillard asked Leavy to go somewhere with him. While Cogdell did not testify at trial that Leavy had received a telephone call from Gillard, she did testify that Leavy received a telephone call at her residence, that about fifteen minutes later a car came to her residence and Leavy left in the car, and that she called Gillard a short while later, asking to talk to Leavy, and was told they would return her call. The trial court instructed the jury to disregard Detective Gilford's testimony insofar as it did not corroborate Cogdell's testimony. Gilford's testimony generally tracked Cogdell's testimony and was not contrary to or inconsistent with it. We cannot say that the trial court's decision to allow the testimony was manifestly unsupported by reason. Defendant also argues the trial court erred when Detective Charles Disponzio of the Cumberland County Sheriff's Office gave corroboration testimony detailing a statement allegedly made by defendant to his cellmate Jimmy Locklear before the murders. At trial, Locklear testified that defendant was upset with an unidentified person because that person owed him money and was ducking him. Defendant told Locklear that he was going to f him up. Locklear also testified that the unidentified man had only paid a portion of the sales price and that he still owed defendant $1500 to $2000. Locklear testified that defendant was involved in the stealing and selling of motorcycles and that defendant had mentioned a nine millimeter at one time. Detective Disponzio's testimony regarding Locklear's statement was that defendant said about the man who owed him money that [h]e was going to kill him and f him  or f him up, in other words. While Locklear testified that defendant did not use the word kill, we note that Detective Disponzio made only a fleeting mention of the word, which could certainly be a reasonable interpretation of f him up. Any prejudicial effect of the admission of this portion of the detective's testimony is mitigated by Gillis's testimony that defendant said he was going to kill Gillard upon defendant's release from the detention center. Additionally, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the corroborative purposes of Disponzio's testimony. Defendant also argues the trial court erred in allowing Disponzio to testify that the unnamed person with whom defendant was angry had given him the runaround, that defendant recruited Locklear to help him boost motorcycles, and that defendant had talked a lot about nine millimeters and a Glock and stuff and all that  Rugers, nine millimeters. Detective Disponzio's testimony generally tracked the testimony given by Locklear and was not in any way inconsistent with Locklear's testimony. We cannot say the trial court's decision to allow the testimony exceeded the bounds of reason. Accordingly, defendant's assignments of error are overruled.