Opinion ID: 2219911
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Defendant claims that the evidence in this case is insufficient to prove him guilty of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. If he is correct, his conviction must be reversed. The Criminal Code of 1961 provides: A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death: (1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or (2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another[.] 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1998). With this statute in mind, we will consider defendant's claim. As this court has noted, [t]he due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a person may not be convicted in state court `except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.' People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill.2d 274, 278, 288 Ill.Dec. 616, 818 N.E.2d 304 (2004), quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970). When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court considers whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, ` any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (Emphasis in original.)' People v. Collins, 106 Ill.2d 237, 261, 87 Ill.Dec. 910, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979); see also People v. Smith, 185 Ill.2d 532, 541, 236 Ill.Dec. 779, 708 N.E.2d 365 (1999). The United States Supreme Court has stated that the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 318, 99 S.Ct. at 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d at 573. This standard of review applies, regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial [citation], and regardless of whether the defendant receives a bench or jury trial [citation]. People v. Cooper, 194 Ill.2d 419, 431, 252 Ill.Dec. 458, 743 N.E.2d 32 (2000). This court will not retry a defendant when considering a sufficiency of the evidence challenge. People v. Smith, 185 Ill.2d 532, 541, 236 Ill.Dec. 779, 708 N.E.2d 365 (1999). The trier of fact is best equipped to judge the credibility of witnesses, and due consideration must be given to the fact that it was the trial court and jury that saw and heard the witnesses. Smith, 185 Ill.2d at 541-42, 236 Ill.Dec. 779, 708 N.E.2d 365. Accordingly, a jury's findings concerning credibility are entitled to great weight. Smith, 185 Ill.2d at 542, 236 Ill.Dec. 779, 708 N.E.2d 365. The simple fact that a judge or jury accepted the veracity of certain testimony does not guarantee reasonableness, however. As we have previously stated, [r]easonable people may on occasion act unreasonably and, thus, while a fact finder's decision to accept testimony is entitled to deference, it is neither conclusive nor binding. Cunningham, 212 Ill.2d at 280, 288 Ill.Dec. 616, 818 N.E.2d 304. Accordingly, a conviction will be reversed where the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. Smith, 185 Ill.2d at 542, 236 Ill.Dec. 779, 708 N.E.2d 365. Supporting defendant's conviction, the State argues that, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, evidence at trial showed that: (1) defendant knew and had associated with Hunter and Forrest; (2) Forrest was a likely State's witness in a murder trial against the defendant; (3) defendant's attorney knew that Forrest would likely testify against defendant in the murder trial; (4) defendant found out that Forrest was going to testify against him; (5) defendant told people that he did not want to go to prison; (6) defendant had access to and possessed handguns; (7) two men matching defendant's and Hunter's general descriptions ran away from the murder scene and were spotted by police officers; (8) the police officers gave chase and found defendant hiding in the bushes; and (9) gunpowder residue was found on a jacket that defendant discarded as he fled from police. All of this, the State argues, makes it neither improbable nor irrational that a jury would convict defendant of first degree murder. Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the State's evidence was insufficient to meet its burden of proof. Defendant points out a lack of eyewitnesses. Moreover, defendant believes the lack of forensic evidence to be critical. As noted in the background, no gunshot residue was found on defendant. Though there was a good deal of blood in Forrest's car and evidence indicated he was killed at close range, defendant had no blood on him. While defendant wore soft-soled shoes conducive to picking up glass and the driver's side window of Forrest's car was shattered, leaving glass strewn about the street, the only glass found in defendant's shoes came from some other source. No fingerprints were found tying defendant to the murder. Though some human head hairs were found in the mask and stocking cap recovered by police, those hairs did not belong to defendant. Additionally, defendant attempts to reanalyze the evidence, pointing out situations where the jury could have drawn inferences tending to exculpate defendant. For example, where the State explains the lack of blood found on defendant by noting expert testimony that any blood would have ejected away from the shooter in this situation, defendant notes that the expert refused to say that no blood came from the entrance wound and photos in evidence did show small amounts of blood on the driver's side roof of the car. This, the defense contends, could support an inference that whoever shot Forrest would have been spattered with some blood. Since no blood was found on defendant, then, it could further be inferred that defendant was not the murderer. While defendant's arguments are well-taken, a reviewing court must give the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Cunningham, 212 Ill.2d at 280, 288 Ill.Dec. 616, 818 N.E.2d 304. As already discussed, the evidence analyzed in challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d at 573; Cunningham, 212 Ill.2d at 280, 288 Ill.Dec. 616, 818 N.E.2d 304 (citing Jackson for the same proposition). This court has stated that this means the reviewing court must allow all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution. Cunningham, 212 Ill.2d at 280, 288 Ill.Dec. 616, 818 N.E.2d 304. Defendant contends that the State, and the appellate court on review, failed to properly consider all of the evidence. In Jackson, the Supreme Court stated that on appeal the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. (Emphasis in original.) Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d at 573. Defendant thus argues that appellate review must include consideration of all of the evidence, not just the evidence convenient to the State's theory of the case. We agree. However, the mandate to consider all the evidence on review does not necessitate a point-by-point discussion of every piece of evidence as well as every possible inference that could be drawn therefrom. To engage in such an activity would effectively amount to a retrial on appeal, an improper task expressly inconsistent with past precedent. Smith, 185 Ill.2d at 541, 236 Ill.Dec. 779, 708 N.E.2d 365. Indeed, this court has stated that even the trier of fact is not required to disregard inferences which flow normally from the evidence and to search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt. People v. Hall, 194 Ill.2d 305, 332, 252 Ill.Dec. 653, 743 N.E.2d 521 (2000). We have also stated that [t]he trier of fact need not    be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain of circumstances. Hall, 194 Ill.2d at 330, 252 Ill.Dec. 653, 743 N.E.2d 521. Accordingly, this court is not required to search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence or be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain of circumstances. On the contrary, we must ask, after considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In the present case, we answer that question in the affirmative. Winifred Forrest and Michael Cunningham testified regarding defendant and Hunter's association. Further, Deosha Singleton made a statement to Detective Gannon wherein she stated that she overheard defendant and Hunter speaking on the day of the murder. Considering this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it would be reasonable for a jury to conclude that defendant and Hunter were associates who both knew Demetrian Forrest. Scott Rueter testified that Forrest was a witness prepared to testify and implicate defendant at defendant's trial for the murder of Angelo Williams. Michael Cunningham testified that he told defendant that if he were in defendant's situation he would pay Forrest not to testify. Cunningham further testified that defendant expressed his desire not to go back to prison. Considering this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it would be reasonable for a jury to conclude that defendant knew Forrest was prepared to implicate him in the murder of Angelo Williams. From this, it would also be reasonable for a jury to infer that defendant had a strong motive to kill Forrest. Cunningham also testified to seeing defendant in possession of at least one handgun. Considering that testimony in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it would be reasonable for a jury to conclude that defendant possessed or had access to a handgun. Officers Brandel, Street, and Derbort testified to the events surrounding the chase and eventual capture of defendant and Hunter. Moreover, the officers testified to their actions in recovering various items of evidence. Considering this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it would be reasonable for a jury to infer that defendant and Hunter had just murdered Demetrian Forrest, were running from the scene of the crime when they were seen by police, and thereafter fled, dropping evidence along their path (including the murder weapons and clothing). The officers' testimony also supports the inference that defendant was hiding when he was found in the bushes at 1304 East Clay. Forensic pathologist Travis Hindman and forensic scientist Robert Hunton testified regarding the types of handguns and ammunition they believed were used in the murder of Forrest. Considering their testimony in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it would be reasonable for a jury to conclude that the guns recovered by police were actually used to kill Forrest. Teronica Jones testified regarding her relationship with Hunter, including the fact that she had a child with him. She also testified to the fact that she had lent Hunter her car and picked it up the morning after the murder. At trial, Jones' testimony regarding the location of the car was inconsistent with a written statement she had completed shortly after the murder occurred, which indicated she found it somewhere southwest of the scene of the crime. Considering this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it would be reasonable for a jury to trust Jones' written statement over her trial testimony and thus infer that defendant was running toward a getaway car when he was caught at 1304 East Clay, southwest of the scene of the crime. Misty Gilman testified that, after hearing gunshots, she looked out her window at 1423 East Prairie and saw five persons, including one wearing a Chicago Bulls jacket. Gilman had completed a written statement, however, that contradicted this testimony and indicated that she only saw three persons. Considering her testimony, as well as her contradictory written statement, in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it would be reasonable for a jury to conclude that her testimony should carry little weight or that two of the persons she reported seeing in her written statement were defendant and Hunter. Tamara Hodges testified that upon hearing gunshots, she looked out her window at 1363 East Prairie Street and saw two men run north on Stone Street, hop into a car, and drive off. She also testified, however, that the car did not squeal its tires or make any remarkable sound as it drove off. Considering this in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it would be reasonable for a jury to conclude that Hodges' testimony shed little light at all on the case, or even that the two individuals she observed jump into a sports car had nothing to do with the murder. The above conclusions and inferences are not the only conclusions and inferences that could be drawn. They are reasonable, however, and taken together they support a finding that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the first degree murder of Demetrian Forrest. This finding is further supported by the fact that this court has consistently held that a conviction may be based solely on circumstantial evidence. People v. Patterson, 217 Ill.2d 407, 435, 299 Ill.Dec. 157, 841 N.E.2d 889 (2005); Hall, 194 Ill.2d at 330, 252 Ill.Dec. 653, 743 N.E.2d 521 (Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction, provided that such evidence satisfies proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of the crime charged). Moreover, we have previously utilized motive and flight in support of a finding that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Moore, 171 Ill.2d 74, 95-96, 215 Ill.Dec. 75, 662 N.E.2d 1215 (1996). After considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, then, we hold that the record evidence reasonably supports a finding that defendant was guilty of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt in that: (1) defendant or someone for whose conduct he was legally responsible performed acts that caused Forrest's death; and (2) when defendant or someone for whose conduct he was legally responsible performed those acts, he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to Forrest, knew his acts would cause Forrest to die, or knew his acts created a strong probability that Forrest would die or suffer great bodily harm. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1998).