Opinion ID: 2447331
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Adequate Section 3507 Foundation

Text: Turner next contends that the Superior Court improperly admitted Rothwell's out-of-court statement under section 3507. We review the Superior Court's admission of an out-of-court statement for abuse of discretion. [7] Section 3507 provides: (a) In a criminal prosecution, the voluntary out-of-court prior statement of a witness who is present and subject to cross-examination may be used as affirmative evidence with substantive independent testimonial value. (b) The rule in subsection (a) of this section shall apply regardless of whether the witness' in-court testimony is consistent with the prior statement or not. The rule shall likewise apply with or without a showing of surprise by the introducing party. In Woodlin v. State, 3 A.3d 1084, 1087(Del.2010), this Court explained the foundational requirements of section 3507 (citations omitted): The basic procedure for admitting a statement under section 3507 was first announced ... in Keys v. State [337 A.2d 18 (Del.1975)]. In [ Keys ], we held: In order to offer the out-of-court statement of a witness, the Statute requires [that] the direct examination of the declarant ... [touch on] both the events perceived or heard and the out-of-court statement itself. Three weeks later, we supplemented Keys in Hatcher v. State [337 A.2d 30 (Del.1975) ], where we addressed another foundational requirement for the admission of a witness' statement pursuant to section 3507voluntariness.... In Ray v. State [587 A.2d 439 (Del.1991) ], we also explained (and cited Johnson ) in holding in order to conform to the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an accused's right to confront witnesses against him, the declarant must also be subject to cross-examination on the content of the statement as well as its truthfulness. [8] In Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d 124, 127 (Del.1975), this Court discussed the problem of incomplete and inconsistent testimony: [T]he draftsmen of the Statute expressly contemplated that the in-court testimony might be inconsistent with the prior out-of-court statement. One of the problems to which the Statute is obviously directed is the turncoat witness who cannot recall events on the witness stand after having previously described them out-of-court. We conclude that there is nothing in the Statute or its intent which prohibits the admission of the statements on the basis of limited courtroom recall. In Smith v. State, 669 A.2d 1, 8 (Del.1995), this Court explained that the statement must be offered into evidence no later than at the conclusion of the direct examination of the declarant. This Court also noted that the offering party should be allowed as much flexibility as the statute permits, but the statement cannot be timed so as to place any strategic burden on the non-offering party. [9] Here, the State satisfied the foundational requirements that this Court recently reaffirmed in Woodlin. [10] First, the State presented the direct examination of Rothwell as to both the events perceived and the out-of-court statement itself. [11] Although Rothwell denied making the statement to Detective Stoddard, the Superior Court properly determined that section 3507 is appropriate to apply to the testimony of a turncoat witness. [12] Second, the Superior Court determined that Rothwell's statement was voluntary. [13] Finally, although Rothwell's statement was offered after the conclusion of the direct examination of Rothwell, it did not place a strategic burden on Turner because Turner's counsel only asked Rothwell four brief questions on cross-examination before the State moved under section 3507 and Rothwell was subsequently subject to cross and recross examinations. [14]