Opinion ID: 6501097
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Consent / Waiver

Text: Plaintiffs next rely on the third exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity—consent or waiver. They argue that the states waived their immunity by ratifying the Fifth and Fourteenth No. 21-2985 Skatemore, Inc., et al. v. Whitmer, et al. Page 10 Amendments. Defendants respond relying on Ladd to argue that the Sixth Circuit has already denied a functionally identical argument. Plaintiffs reply that Ladd is not applicable to this argument because Ladd is an abrogation case. Plaintiffs are correct in arguing that Ladd is technically an abrogation case. See Ladd, 971 F.3d at 579 (“[T]he Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause does not abrogate sovereign immunity” (emphasis added)). Nevertheless, even if Ladd is not necessarily controlling in this appeal, we find its logic persuasive. To accept Plaintiffs’ argument that the states waived their sovereign immunity by ratifying the Fifth Amendment would effectively overrule Ladd. As recognized by the Fifth Circuit, “[n]othing in Knick alters . . . bedrock principles of sovereign immunity law.” Bay Point Props., Inc. v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 937 F.3d 454, 456 (5th Cir. 2019). Moreover, both this court and other circuits have held, consistent with Ladd, that the Eleventh Amendment bars takings claims against states in federal court, as long as a remedy is available in state court. See, e.g., DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 526–28 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that Eleventh Amendment barred takings claim against states in federal court and stating that “the Kentucky courts would have had to hear that federal claim”), overruled on other grounds by San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005); Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 552 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that “the Eleventh Amendment bars Fifth Amendment takings claims against States in federal court when the State’s courts remain open to adjudicate such claims.” (emphasis in original)). Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Michigan state courts remain open to hear their claims. See, e.g., K & K Constr., Inc. v. Dep’t of Nat’l Res., 575 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 1998) (adjudicating takings claim against state entity under Fifth Amendment and Michigan constitution). Relying on the recent Supreme Court decision in PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 141 S. Ct. 2244 (2021), Plaintiffs also argue that the states consented to federal court jurisdiction or waived their immunity to takings claims by ratifying the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In that case, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) authorized PennEast to construct an oil pipeline from central Pennsylvania to New Jersey. Id. at 2253. PennEast extensively researched the best path for the pipeline and ultimately settled on a path that passed through property in which the State of New Jersey had a proprietary interest. Id. PennEast then No. 21-2985 Skatemore, Inc., et al. v. Whitmer, et al. Page 11 commenced in federal court a condemnation action against New Jersey under 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) to take possession of the necessary property. Id. New Jersey invoked Eleventh Amendment immunity and sought to have the condemnation action dismissed. Id. The Supreme Court held New Jersey could not invoke Eleventh Amendment immunity to have the case dismissed. It explained that under the “plan of the Convention,” New Jersey consented to federal court jurisdiction in takings claims brought by (or on behalf of) the federal government. Id. at 2259 (“PennEast’s condemnation action to give effect to the federal eminent domain power falls comfortably within the class of suits to which States consented under the plan of the Convention.”). Historically, sovereigns had enjoyed the power of eminent domain; and the practice was “inextricably intertwined with the ability to condemn.” Id. at 2260. Because the power to take land for public use was inherent in the sovereignty of the United States, New Jersey impliedly consented to the exercise of federal court jurisdiction in condemnation proceedings commenced by the federal government when it consented to federal sovereignty. PennEast is markedly different than the present case. In that case, PennEast, lawfully exercising the federal eminent domain power, sought to seize state-owned property. In a takings suit between the federal government and a state, it is reasonable to assume, as the Supreme Court did, that the “judicial Power of the United States” extends to such suits. U.S. Const., art. III. But in the present appeal, citizens of Michigan seek compensation from the State of Michigan. The dispute is a purely intra-state matter. To agree with Plaintiffs would be to go beyond the holding of PennEast. Nor can ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment be construed as a waiver of states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Fifth Amendment. See Kerns v. Chesapeake Expl., LLC, 762 F. App’x 289, 295 (6th Cir. 2019). Plaintiffs further argue that by ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment after the Eleventh Amendment, states impliedly waived their immunity to takings claims. This argument is unconvincing. PennEast suggests that courts should consider the states’ intent at the time of ratification to determine whether they impliedly consented through ratification. Cf. 141 S. Ct. at 2258 (“The ‘plan of the Convention’ includes certain waivers of sovereign immunity to which all No. 21-2985 Skatemore, Inc., et al. v. Whitmer, et al. Page 12 States implicitly consented at the founding.” (emphasis added)). There is no indication that at the time Michigan ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in 1867 that the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause would apply to the states. In fact, the Takings Clause was the first right to be incorporated and that did not occur until 30 years after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Moreover, to accept Plaintiffs’ argument and hold that states waived their sovereign immunity in suits that invoke a right incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment would destroy the protection the Eleventh Amendment was specifically ratified to provide. Future plaintiffs could claim any right incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment is no longer subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 4. Ultra Vires Action as an Exception to the Eleventh Amendment In a final attempt to avoid Eleventh Amendment immunity, Plaintiffs strenuously argue that Governor Whitmer, specifically, is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because she acted ultra vires. Their argument is that the Michigan Supreme Court’s October 2, 2020, opinion, which declared the EOs invalid after April 30, 2020, rendered all Governor Whitmer’s conduct after that date an unlawful exercise of the police power.3 Plaintiffs rely, in part, on Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 689 (1982), which held that “the Eleventh Amendment does not bar an action against a state official that is based on a theory that the officer acted beyond the scope of his statutory authority.” See also Miami Univ. Associated Student Gov’t v. Shriver, 735 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1984) (“State officials are not entitled to [E]leventh [A]mendment immunity if they are acting ultra vires.”). “[A] state officer may be said to act ultra vires only when he acts ‘without any authority whatever.’” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 n.11 (1984) (quoting Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 697). The test to determine whether a state official has acted ultra vires is whether the state official had a “colorable basis for the exercise of authority.” Id. (quoting Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. at 716 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)). 3 Defendants argue that whether Governor Whitmer acted ultra vires is irrelevant because this lawsuit does not challenge the lawfulness of the taking; it simply seeks “just compensation.” While this is correct, the lawfulness of Governor Whitmer’s conduct is relevant to whether she is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. No. 21-2985 Skatemore, Inc., et al. v. Whitmer, et al. Page 13 There are several problems with Plaintiffs’ argument. First, Governor Whitmer’s conduct can hardly be said to have been done without any authority. She issued the EOs in accordance with then-existing Michigan laws. Nearly seven months after she began issuing the EOs, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the laws on which she relied were an “unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive.” In re Certified Questions, 958 N.W.2d at 24. Plaintiffs ask us to construe the Michigan Supreme Court’s holding as retroactively stripping Governor Whitmer of any authority she had; however, the opinion actually suggests the holding was merely prospective. See id. at 6, 31 (concluding that “the executive orders issued by the Governor in response to the COVID-19 pandemic now lack any basis under Michigan law;” and Michigan law “cannot continue to provide a basis for the Governor to exercise emergency powers”) (emphases added)). Second, Pennhurst and Treasure Salvors, the two main cases on which Plaintiffs rely for this ultra vires argument, are both cases in which the plaintiffs were seeking injunctive relief. Neither case involved a request for money damages. In fact, in Treasure Salvors, the Supreme Court even stated that “[i]f the action is allowed to proceed against the officer only because he acted without proper authority, the judgment may not compel the State to use its funds to compensate the plaintiff for the injury.” 458 U.S. at 689; accord Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Because Plaintiffs are seeking compensatory damages, the ultra vires theory of skirting Eleventh Amendment immunity is inapplicable. In sum, we hold that ratification of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments does not constitute waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity; nor can Defendants in this case be subject to suit in federal court for allegedly acting ultra vires. To hold otherwise would require the panel to effectively overrule Ladd, significantly expand the scope of PennEast, and ignore Treasure Salvors. Because Eleventh Amendment immunity is sufficient to affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint against each defendant, we decline to address the district court’s alternative holding that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim.