Opinion ID: 1653579
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bakke's immunity from negligence

Text: ¶ 13 Whether Bakke is immune from liability in the case at hand involves the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 895.525(4m)(a) as that statute relates to the allegations of Bakke's negligence. We first address the language of the statute in order to determine if Bakke is qualified to receive immunity from a negligence suit arising out of an incident that occurred while he was participating as a cheerleader at Holmen High School. Noffke argues that Wis. Stat. § 895.525(4m)(a) provides immunity only to those persons who are competing in a contact sport. As a result, she asserts that cheerleading is neither competitive nor a contact sport, and thus, Noffke argues that Bakke is not entitled to immunity. Bakke argues that the plain language of the statute renders him immune from negligence because cheerleading involves physical contact between persons. We agree with Bakke and conclude that pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.525(4m)(a), Bakke is immune from liability because of the statute's plain language. Bakke was participating in a recreational activity that includes physical contact between persons in a sport involving amateur teams[.] ¶ 14 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.525(4m)(a) provides immunity from negligence actions for participants in a recreational activity that involves physical contact between persons in a sport involving amateur teams. Subsection (4m)(a), Liability of Contact Sports Participants, provides: A participant in a recreational activity that includes physical contact between persons in a sport involving amateur teams, including teams in recreational, municipal, high school and college leagues, may be liable for an injury inflicted on another participant during and as part of that sport in a tort action only if the participant who caused the injury acted recklessly or with intent to cause injury. ¶ 15 For those recreational activities that do not involve physical contact, no immunity from negligence actions exists under the statute. See Wis. Stat. § 895.525(4). A recreational activity is defined as: In this section, recreational activity means any activity undertaken for the purpose of exercise, relaxation or pleasure, including practice or instruction in any such activity. Recreational activity includes hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, bowling, billiards, picnicking, exploring caves, nature study, dancing, bicycling, horseback riding, horseshoe-pitching, bird-watching, motorcycling, operating an all-terrain vehicle, ballooning, curling, throwing darts, hang gliding, hiking, tobogganing, sledding, sleigh riding, snowmobiling, skiing, skating, participation in water sports, weight and fitness training, sight-seeing, rock-climbing, cutting or removing wood, climbing observation towers, animal training, harvesting the products of nature, sport shooting and any other sport, game or educational activity. Wis. Stat. § 895.525(2). ¶ 16 Therefore, to obtain the benefit of immunity, a defendant must be (1) participating in a recreational activity; (2) that recreational activity must include physical contact between persons; (3) the persons must be participating in a sport; and (4) the sport must involve amateur teams. In this case, there is no dispute that cheerleading is a recreational activity. Noffke asserts that Bakke's reliance on this statute is misplaced because he and Noffke were not engaged in a contact sport involving competitive teams.  (Emphasis added.) We address Noffke's two arguments regarding contact sports and competition in ¶¶ 24-34. ¶ 17 However, we note here that cheerleading, as discussed in ¶ 32, is a sport because a sport is [a]n activity involving physical exertion and skill that is governed by a set of rules or customs; [3] and cheerleaders are on amateur teams because a team is [a] group organized to work together [4] and cheerleaders, as provided in the spirit rules, are a group dedicated to leading fan participation and taking part in competitions. ¶ 18 Accordingly, the central question to be answered in this case is whether cheerleading involves physical contact between persons. While it is undeniable that cheerleaders touch one another, i.e., they have physical contact with one another during the course of their activity, we utilize a dictionary to guide our interpretation and ensure that we have accurately defined the common, ordinary phrase at issue: physical contact. See Swatek v. County of Dane, 192 Wis.2d 47, 61, 531 N.W.2d 45 (1995) (stating that this court may consult a dictionary for the common meaning of a word). Reliance on a dictionary, however, does not render a word or phrase ambiguous. Sample, 215 Wis.2d at 499-500, 573 N.W.2d 187. ¶ 19 The American Heritage Dictionary is frequently relied upon by courts. Id. at 500, 573 N.W.2d 187. It defines contact as follows: 1.a. A coming together or touching, as of objects or surfaces. b. The state or condition of touching or of immediate proximity[.] The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 406 (3d ed. 1992). The same dictionary defines physical as follows: 1.a. Of or relating to the body as distinguished from the mind or spirit ... b. Involving or characterized by vigorous bodily activity: a physical dance performance. Id. at 1366 (italics omitted). ¶ 20 As evident from the record, cheerleading involves a significant amount of physical contact between the cheerleaders that at times results in a forceful interaction between the participants. The record contains the 2004-05 spirit rules of the National Federation of State High School Associations. Pages 37 through 62 contain pictures illustrating the spirit rules that govern the various stunts. Every picture but one shows at least two cheerleaders in contact with one another. ¶ 21 The text of the spirit rules also supports the determination that cheerleading involves a significant amount of contact between cheerleaders. For example, rule one, section seven of the definition section describes a pendulum. A pendulum is [a] stunt in which the top person in a straight body position falls forward and/or backward away from the base(s) to a horizontal position to catchers while maintaining constant hands-to-feet/legs contact with the base(s). [5] In the General Risk Management section of the spirit rules, rule two, section six, article seven provides that [d]ismounts from multi-base stunts to a cradle must be cradled by at least two catchers and an additional head and shoulders catcher/spotter. [6] ¶ 22 In addition to the physical contact discussed above, some of the stunts performed by the cheerleaders produce a forceful interaction between the participants. For example, rule two, section 2.12.3, Tosses, provides four situations where one cheerleader is tossed up into the air and then caught by those same cheerleaders who originally tossed the cheerleader. An illustration of another toss, the Basket Toss to Original Bases With Spotter is provided on page 57. This illustration reveals that multiple cheerleaders toss another cheerleader high up into the airat least a full body length above the catchers' headsand then catch the cheerleader on the way down. ¶ 23 Accordingly, cheerleading involves a significant amount of contact among the participants that at times can produce a forceful interaction between the cheerleaders when one person is tossed high into the air and then caught by those same tossers. As a result, we conclude that cheerleaders are immune from negligence actions because they participate in a recreational activity that includes physical contact between persons in a sport involving amateur teams.
¶ 24 Noffke argues that cheerleading does not give rise to the type of physical contact contemplated by the legislature. Specifically, Noffke asserts that the type of physical contact contemplated by the legislature must be more than the incidental contact that takes place in cheerleading. Noffke relies on the title of subsection (4m) for her argument, which provides: Liability of contact sports participants. The court of appeals accepted Noffke's argument and further relied on the dictionary definition of contact sport. It determined that `contact sport' is normally used to describe sports in which opposing players make aggressive and sometimes injury causing contact, such as football and hockey. Noffke v. Bakke, 2008 WI App 38, ¶ 16, 308 Wis.2d 410, 748 N.W.2d 195 (relying on Webster's New College Dictionary for a definition of contact sport). However, interpreting the statute in this manner is not persuasive for three reasons. ¶ 25 First, reliance on the title for this interpretation is problematic. The titles to subchapters, sections, subsections, paragraphs and subdivisions of the statutes and history notes are not part of the statutes. Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6). In addition, a title may not be used to alter the meaning of a statute or create an ambiguity where no ambiguity existed. Estate of Reichenberger, 272 Wis. 176, 179, 74 N.W.2d 740 (1956). Therefore, reliance on the title is not persuasive. ¶ 26 Furthermore, even if we looked to the title, it does not provide clear guidance. The dictionary uses football, hockey, and boxing as examples of contact sports. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 406 (3d ed.1992). However, subsection (4m)as both parties and the court of appeals have assertedwas passed in response to Lestina v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., 176 Wis.2d 901, 501 N.W.2d 28 (1993). In Lestina, this court concluded that negligence was the appropriate standard of care to govern the conduct of soccer match participants. Id. at 903, 501 N.W.2d 28. We doubt the legislature passed a statute in the wake of Lestina and then only protected aggressive contact sports such as football, hockey, or boxing. Relying on the title in this case requires this court to make a policy decision that is more appropriately performed by the legislature. Instead, we conclude that the plain language of the statute provides the answer. We give due respect to the legislature's decision to provide immunity to persons who participate in recreational activities that include physical contact between persons in a sport involving amateur teams. ¶ 27 Second, the language of the statute does not restrict its application to only aggressive sports such as football hockey, or boxing. Rather, the statute encompasses any recreational activity that includes physical contact between persons in a sport involving amateur teams. If the legislature intended such a narrow construction, the legislature could have clearly placed such a restriction in the text of the statute. [7] ¶ 28 Third, Noffke's interpretationthat the statute does not apply to incidental contact but only to aggressive, competitive contactwould be difficult to apply and creates uncertainty. How much aggressive competitive contact is required for a sport to fall within that interpretation? The purpose behind Wis. Stat. § 895.525, is to decrease uncertainty. (1) Legislative purpose. The legislature intends by this section to establish the responsibilities of participants in recreational activities in order to decrease uncertainty regarding the legal responsibility for deaths or injuries that result from participation in recreational activities and thereby to help assure the continued availability in this state of enterprises that offer recreational activities to the public. Wis. Stat. § 895.525(1). ¶ 29 Unlike Noffke's requirement that a sport must involve a requisite amount of aggressiveness in order to qualify for immunity, the plain meaning of the words chosen by the legislature lends certainty regarding the legal responsibilities and liabilities of those who participate in recreational activities.
¶ 30 Noffke argues that subsection (4m)(a) applies only to competitive team sports. In support of this argument, Noffke relies on the portion of subsection (4m)(a) that states, recreational activity that includes physical contact between persons in a sport involving amateur teams.  Wis. Stat. § 895.525(4m)(a) (emphasis added). To not require competition, Noffke argues, would render this portion of the statute superfluous. ¶ 31 We disagree with Noffke's assertions for three reasons. First, no competition requirement exists in the statute. If the legislature sought to require competition, it could have used the word competition. To assert that such a requirement exists because the word teams is plural, elevates one letter in the statute to an absurd importance that would change the entire scope and application of the statute, which seems unlikely because the legislature could have easily used the word competition to clearly articulate such a requirement. [8] While the legislature's use of a plural form is generally significant, in this case we decline to conclude that the use of the plural form dictates that the statute requires competition between two teams. ¶ 32 Second, no surplusage exists because the words of the statute are not ignored by our interpretation. Physical contact between persons takes place in cheerleading. Cheerleading is a sport because a sport is [a]n activity involving physical exertion and skill that is governed by a set of rules or customs, [9] and construing the word sport to exclude cheerleading in this case is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute, which is discussed in ¶ 28. [10] Cheerleaders are on amateur teams because a team is [a] group organized to work together [11] and cheerleaders, as provided in the spirit rules, are a group dedicated to leading fan participation and taking part in competitions. ¶ 33 Third, inserting a competition requirement would produce inconsistent results. For example, assuming that immunity is not afforded because cheerleaders do not compete when cheering at a basketball game, would they then receive immunity, perhaps the very next day, when competing against other teams at a cheerleading competition? Similarly, under Noffke's analysis, when a hockey or football team practices but is not in competition with another team there is no immunity, but when that team plays a game the players receive immunity. Perhaps such inconsistent applications could be why the legislature specifically chose not to insert a competition requirement into this statute. ¶ 34 Accordingly, we conclude that cheerleaders are immune from negligence actions because they participate in a recreational activity that includes physical contact between persons in a sport involving amateur teams. However, we encourage the legislature to once again review this important statute and consider our interpretation and application to the facts of this case and how the statute may apply to such school team sports as golf, swimming, or tennis.