Opinion ID: 1967495
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hearsay Statement & Trial Court's Ruling

Text: The disputed hearsay statement was first elicited when the prosecutor asked Barrick to describe Officer Lee's reaction to watching the woman remove handbags on the video monitor: [Prosecutor]: Mr. Barrick, this other officer, could you describe his reaction when he sawwas watching the tape- ... [Barrick]: [Lee] became excited and pointed to the camera, to the monitor I should say and said, that's the lady that hit the Coach handbags on a previous occasion. [2] The prosecutor continued to lay a foundation to have the statement admitted as an excited utterance [3] and a present sense impression. Asked about Lee's statement, Barrick testified that [Lee] stated that he recognized her from a previous [occasion]. Defense counsel objected to the statement as hearsay, arguing that the statement was not admissible as a present sense impression because it was an identification, noting that [t]he reason that there's a separate identification exception [under the terms of D.C.Code § 14-102(b)(3)] is to allow reliable identifications to be admitted into evidence. And this is taking an [un]reliable identification and trying to say that it should be admissible merely because the person made it while watching a tape. Interpreting Burgess v. United States, 608 A.2d 733 (D.C.1992) (per curiam), the prosecutor argued that the indicia that the court [looks for are] the spontaneous nature of the statement, the contemporaneous nature of the statement, [and] both of those indicia are present here. The trial court admitted the statement as a present sense impression. Adopting the prosecutor's interpretation, the court concluded, I'm going to receive it and treat [defense counsel's] argument as going to the weight of the evidence. When finally asked the question for the record, the following exchange occurred: [Court]: What did [Lee] say? [Barrick]: He said, that's the woman and he pointed to the monitor. And I asked him what woman and he said, that's Theresa Hallums, the woman that hits for handbags. [Court]: One second. I will strike from the evidence everything after the word, Hallums. At the close of the evidence, defense counsel again sought to exclude Barrick's testimony about Lee's out-of-court statement identifying appellant, arguing that nothing distinguishes this case from identifications at a show-up, a line-up, or a photo array, none of which can be admitted under D.C. CODE § 14-102(b)(3) (2001) unless the out-of-court declarant is available for cross-examination. In announcing his verdict, the trial judge noted that the evidence was far from overwhelming, and the case was close and posed considerable difficulty to decide. The trial judge found appellant guilty based on: 1) the in-court identification made by Gibson, who testified that three months before the incident she had spent forty-five minutes paying close attention to Ms. Hallums at the Hecht's store and then saw the Lord & Taylor videotape after the incident; 2) the in-court identification made by Barrick, who watched the shoplifter on the monitor and then saw the woman for a few seconds in broad daylight as she was leaving the store before she got into a van; and 3) Lee's out-of-court declaration, as he watched the video monitor, that he recognized the woman as Ms. Hallums. Although the trial court acknowledged that the government's case [is] heavily centered on the videotape, it declined to base the finding of guilt on a comparison between the tape and the court's own observations of appellant. [4]