Opinion ID: 411111
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prejudicial Impact

Text: 16 Even relevant evidence concerning an unlawful plan or scheme can be excluded, however, if the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 403. This balancing should include such considerations as other means of proof and other factors appropriate for making decisions of this kind under Rule 403. Fed.R.Evid. 404 advisory committee note. In general, when evidence of other crimes is offered, courts presume prejudice will occur. Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 89-90 (D.C.Cir.1964). Accord, United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312 (D.C.Cir.1974); United States v. McClain, 440 F.2d 241 (D.C.Cir.1971); United States v. Bussey, 432 F.2d 1330 (D.C.Cir.1970). But when the evidence concerns a plan or scheme, courts also frequently find that the probative value of the other crimes evidence outweighs the prejudice. See Drew v. United States, supra, 331 F.2d at 90. The trial court's weighing of the costs and benefits of such evidence will be disturbed only in cases of abuse of discretion. United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 525 (D.C.Cir.1980); Miller v. Poretsky, 595 F.2d 780, 783 (D.C.Cir.1978); United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861, 878-879 (D.C.Cir.1978). And when no objections are raised, reversible error will be found only if there is plain error. Fed.R.Evid. 103(d). 17 Appellant raised a timely objection to Wendell Williams' testimony. 24 At the time of the objection, however, Ms. Bottoms had already testified and much of the prejudicial evidence had already been heard. 25 The District Court openly assessed the probative value and potential impact of the evidence. The transcript includes a long colloquy between counsel and the District Court regarding both Wendell Williams' testimony and another witness' testimony. 26 After extensive argument, the District Court ruled that Wendell Williams could testify, but that the other witness could not. 27 Since the record shows that the District Court evaluated the possible prejudice with great care, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in allowing the admission of that evidence. 18 Appellant did not raise any objections to the testimony of either Yvette Bottoms or Ronald Nicks. As a result, the District Court had no opportunity to conduct the balancing called for in Rule 403. Fed.R.Evid. 403. Nonetheless, appellant claims that substantial prejudice occurred because the evidence was not necessary, 28 and that its admission was therefore in plain error. Fed.R.Evid. 103(d). See United States v. Shelton, 628 F.2d 54, 56 (D.C.Cir.1980). 19 This argument is clearly contradicted by the evidence. The government's primary evidence concerning the twenty money orders for which appellant was indicted involved testimony by three co-participants whose credibility was clearly subject to attack. By reinforcing its case with additional testimony showing the existence of a plan or scheme, the government sought to ensure the quantum of evidence necessary to support a conviction. See id. at 57; United States v. Gallo, 543 F.2d 361, 365 (D.C.Cir.1976). This evidence, if believed, could prove something that the other evidence could not prove: that appellant, not Denise Lewis, was the mastermind of the money order scam. 29 The evidence cannot, therefore, be considered either cumulative or unnecessary. 30 Indeed, there was no other way that the government could show that each of the other participants had been the spokes of this criminal wheel and that appellant had been the hub around which these spokes had turned. 20 Nor is the government, as appellant asserts, restricted to establishing appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt solely on the basis of crimes charged in the indictment. This court has held that even though only one offense may be charged in each count of an indictment, evidence of other similar acts is admissible to show design or plan. See, e.g., Payne v. United States, supra, 294 F.2d at 726; Martin v. United States, 127 F.2d 865, 869 (D.C.Cir.1942) (Stephens, J., concurring) (in certain classes of cases collateral offenses may be shown as reflecting    a plan or method,    and    that the accused persons committed such other offenses, and in so doing followed the same plan or method as is shown to have been followed in the commission of the crime charged in the indictment). The evidence in this case proves just such a plan. Appellant had possession of the stolen money orders, a check-writing machine with which to encode amounts, and an arrangement with Denise Lewis and her friends to pass these orders at a bank. The evidence is admissible even though appellant was charged only with single counts of a continuing offense, and it is not plain error for the court to admit evidence of a plan in which those single offenses were only isolated examples.