Opinion ID: 1426852
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: applicability of the wyoming telecommunications act of 1995

Text: Although U S West and the PSC frame their opposing arguments under the provisions of the Telecommunications Act, Silver Star contends that the Telecommunications Act does not apply. Relying on Wyo. Stat. § 8-1-107 (1997), Silver Star argues that the PSC's authority must be determined under the Public Utilities Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 37-1-101 through XX-XX-XXX (Repl. 1977 & Cum.Supp.1994), because the changes contained in the Telecommunications Act were passed while this proceeding was pending. Wyo. Stat. § 8-1-107 provides: If a statute is repealed or amended, the repeal or amendment does not affect pending actions, prosecutions or proceedings, civil or criminal. If the repeal or amendment relates to the remedy, it does not affect pending actions, prosecutions or proceedings, unless so expressed, nor shall any repeal or amendment affect causes of action, prosecutions or proceedings existing at the time of the amendment or repeal, unless otherwise expressly provided in the amending or repealing act. The plain language of this statute prohibits the retroactive application of new law unless: (1) the change relates to the remedy rather than a substantive right; and (2) the legislature expressed an intent that the change be applied to pending proceedings. There can be no doubt that the proceedings, initiated by citizen petition in July 1994 and presented at a public hearing before the PSC in December 1994, were pending when the Telecommunications Act was approved on March 1, 1995. U S West argues, however, that Wyo. Stat. § 8-1-107 does not apply because the Telecommunications Act is the creation of a new form of regulation for telecommunications companies, which did not amend or repeal any statute. For its part, the PSC insists that its powers to set rates for an EAS were not affected by the passage of the Telecommunications Act. We must, therefore, determine whether the Telecommunications Act repealed or amended the provisions of the Public Utilities Act. If so, and the change in law relates to the remedy, we review the statute to determine if the legislature expressed its intent to apply the new provisions to pending cases. When interpreting a statute, this court's primary focus is to determine the legislature's intent. In re Honeycutt, 908 P.2d 976, 978 (Wyo.1995). A statute will be construed as a whole with ordinary and obvious meaning applied to words as they are arranged in paragraphs, sentences, clauses and phrases to express the intent of the legislature. Wyoming Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Woods, 888 P.2d 192, 197 (Wyo.1994). If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning and need not resort to the rules of statutory construction. Sue Davidson, P.C. v. Naranjo, 904 P.2d 354, 356 (Wyo.1995); Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 565 (Wyo.1995); Houghton v. Franscell, 870 P.2d 1050, 1054 (Wyo.1994). The language of a statute will be strictly construed when determining the powers granted to an agency. Tri County Telephone Ass'n, Inc. v. Wyoming Public Service Com'n, 910 P.2d 1359, 1361 (Wyo.1996); Montana Dakota Utilities Co. v. Public Service Com'n of Wyoming, 847 P.2d 978, 983 (Wyo.1993). If there is a reasonable doubt as to the existence of particular power, the statute will be construed as not granting that power. Tri County Telephone Ass'n, Inc., 910 P.2d at 1361. The parties do not contest that prior to March 1, 1995, the PSC's powers relating to the regulation of telecommunications companies found in the Public Utilities Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 37-1-101 through 37-3-115, included the power to set rates for an EAS. Under the Public Utilities Act, the PSC was granted the general and exclusive power to regulate and supervise every public utility within the state in accordance with the provisions of this act. Wyo. Stat. § 37-2-112. The PSC's power to establish an EAS was granted in Wyo. Stat. § 37-2-122(b), which authorized the PSC to investigate services and, if it finds a service inadequate, to prescribe and order substituted therefor such service    as it shall determine to be adequate   . The legislative authorization to set rates for such service was found in Wyo. Stat. § 37-2-121 (if any rate is found to be inadequate, the PSC may fix and order substitute rate) and Wyo. Stat. § 37-3-107 ([w]hen joint service is participated in by two or more public utilities the commission after hearing    may ascertain, determine, and fix for such services just and reasonable rates   .). On March 1, 1995, the Telecommunications Act was enacted to provide a transition from rate of return regulation of a monopolistic telecommunications industry to competitive markets and to maintain affordable essential telecommunications services through the transition period   . Wyo. Stat. § 37-15-102. The Telecommunications Act separates and defines the PSC's rate making powers on the basis of competitive and noncompetitive telecommunications services. Competitive services are not    subject to regulation of prices by the commission. Wyo. Stat. § 37-15-202(a). The parties agree with the PSC's determination that the EAS is a non-competitive service. Regulation of the price of non-competitive services is governed by Wyo. Stat. § 37-15-203, which provides: (a) Prices for telecommunications services which have not been determined by the legislature or the commission to be competitive shall be regulated by the commission in accordance with this section. (b) The prices for any local exchange company may contain provisions for incentives for improvement of the company's performance or efficiency, lowering of operating costs, control of expenses or improvement and upgrading or modernization of its services or facilities. Any local exchange company may apply to the commission for incentives and innovative or nontraditional price regulation, including price indexing. The commission shall issue a final order approving, modifying or rejecting any application made under this subsection within one hundred eighty (180) days of the filing date of the application with the commission. If no order is issued by the commission within the one hundred eighty (180) day period, the application shall be deemed approved as filed. If during consideration of an application for regulation under this subsection, the commission materially alters the plan as filed in the application, the applying local exchange company may notify the commission in writing, at any time, but not later than sixty (60) days after any final commission order on the application, that it elects not to be price regulated as approved by the order. The local exchange company's prices shall then be regulated as they were prior to the application until such time as a new application is filed, approved and accepted. (c) During the transition to total service long-run incremental costs pursuant to W.S. XX-XX-XXX, noncompetitive services prices shall be established in public hearing in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act and other applicable provisions of this chapter. (d) Any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to provide local exchange service may elect to be regulated by a price index approved by the commission The price index shall only apply to noncompetitive services offered by the exchange company. The commission may approve indexes which provide additional flexibility for nonessential telecommunications services and nonaccess services. (Emphasis added.) The PSC insists that the only logical interpretation of the language in Wyo. Stat. § 37-15-203(c) is that the legislature intended to give the PSC the authority to set rates, after a public hearing, as an extension of its authority to approve non-traditional methods of price regulation found in Wyo. Stat. § 37-15-203(b). We disagree. The statutory language in Wyo. Stat. § 37-15-203 is clear and unambiguous. The PSC's contention that it continues to have the authority to set rates for non-competitive telecommunications services fails to acknowledge that the new provisions expressly limit the PSC's rate setting powers to approval, modification, or rejection of a plan submitted by a company or the approval of a price index. Moreover, the company's ability to reject the PSC's order if its plan is materially altered, or to elect to be regulated by price index, is clearly inapposite to the proposition that the PSC may set a price for services over the objection of the company. Reading the statute as a whole, it clearly aspires to the comprehensive statutory regulation of telecommunications companies. Wyo. Stat. § 37-15-408 specifically lists those statutes in the Public Utilities Act which are to be included in the Telecommunications Act. Notably, not one of the former statutes granting rate making powers to the PSC remains. Where a statute enumerates the subject or things on which it is to operate    it is to be construed as excluding from its effect all those not expressly mentioned   . City of Cheyenne v. Huitt, 844 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Wyo. 1993). The legislature's detailed inclusion of specific statutory provisions can only lead to the conclusion that the omitted statutory provisions were repealed and amended as applied to telecommunications regulation. We now turn to whether the removal of the PSC's jurisdiction to set rates relates to a remedy or a substantive right. The distinction between a substantive change in law as opposed to a remedial or procedural change in law is not always clear. As acknowledged in State ex rel. Holdridge v. Industrial Commission, 11 Ohio St.2d 175, 178, 228 N.E.2d 621, 623 (1967): It is doubtful if a perfect definition of substantive law or procedural or remedial law could be devised. However, the authorities agree that, in general terms, substantive law is that which creates duties, rights, and obligations, while procedural or remedial law prescribes methods of enforcement of rights or obtaining redress. See also State v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist., 715 P.2d 191, 194 (Wyo.1986) and Matter of Boyd's Estate, 606 P.2d 1243, 1245 (Wyo.1980). A jurisdictional change in law is generally held to be procedural or remedial. State ex rel. Frederick v. District Court of Fifth Judicial Dist. In and For Big Horn County, 399 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo.1965); State of Fla., Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services on Behalf of Petit v. Breeden, 21 Kan.App.2d 490, 901 P.2d 1357, 1365 (1995). In this case, the change in the powers of the PSC did not affect the public's right to reasonable and fair rates nor did it change the substantive duties and obligations of the telecommunications companies. Rather, the amendment relates to the process by which the rates will be set and, therefore, relates to the remedy. U S West urges that because the change in law is merely procedural, we may retroactively apply the new provisions. This we cannot do. The mandatory language of Wyo. Stat. § 8-1-107 directs that an amendment relating to a remedy be applied to a pending proceeding only when the legislature has expressed its intent to do so. See Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 908, 915 (Wyo.1977). In this case, we find that there is no indication that the Telecommunications Act was intended to apply retroactively. To the contrary, the language of the Telecommunications Act acknowledges a profound change in the status quo. The legislature refers to a transition period and provides for the adoption of new rules and regulations. Wyo. Stat. §§ 37-15-401 and 37-15-402. Other provisions contemplate studies to be submitted for the purpose of assisting the PSC in rule making, Wyo. Stat. § 37-15-406; as well as the establishment of a universal service fund to be administered by the PSC to assist those customers in areas of this state with relatively high rates for essential services. Wyo. Stat. § 37-15-501(c). Moreover, the provisions relating to pricing for non-competitive services place unprecedented choices in the hands of the telecommunications companies which were not contemplated when these proceedings were the subject of public hearings. We find the language in the Telecommunications Act does not contain an express or implied intention that its provisions be applied to a case initiated through citizen petition and heard before the public prior to the statute's existence. Consequently, we hold that the PSC's authority to set rates for the implementation of an EAS and to direct U S West to make an annual payment to Silver Star must be decided under the provisions of the Public Utilities Act prior to the enactment of the Telecommunications Act.