Opinion ID: 201336
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Timing of the Restitution Order

Text: 67 Although the government concedes that the order was not entered within 90 days of sentencing, it urges us to overlook this irregularity to further the statute's purpose of increasing the likelihood that victims of crime will receive restitution from the defendant. The government also argues that the court's statements about restitution at the change-of-plea and sentencing hearings and in the original judgment gave notice to Cheal that she would face a restitution order after a delay of 90 days. Finally, the government notes that Cheal has never objected to restitution, either at the sentencing hearing or after the original judgment, and even now has not identified any actual disagreement with the order. 68 Cheal had the opportunity to object to the district court's scheduling of a deferred restitution order but did not. When the court entered judgment on February 25, 2003, it deferred determination of restitution until May 25, 2003, and indicated that it would enter an amended judgment at some unspecified time thereafter. Even though it was now a virtual certainty that the restitution order would be entered more than 90 days after her sentencing, Cheal did not object. By failing to object at the time, Cheal subjected her appellate claim of error to plain-error review. 69 Cheal cites no prejudice from the delay in entering the restitution order. Indeed, as the government points out, she does not claim even now that she disagrees with the government's accounting of her victims' losses and the court's final determination. In an effort to avoid the prejudice showing required by plain error, Cheal argues that § 3664 is a jurisdictional provision. That is, by not entering a restitution order within 90 days after her sentencing hearing, Cheal argues, the district court no longer had jurisdiction to enter any restitution order. This jurisdictional argument is undermined by § 3664's provision for continued revision of the restitution order in light of later discoveries of losses. Indeed, the title of the provision (Procedure for issuance and enforcement of order of restitution) advertises its procedural nature, including the 90-day time frame. 15 70 The legislative history of the MVRA reveals Congress's determination to provide full restitution to victims of fraud if at all possible. The Senate Judiciary Committee, in its report on the bill that would become the MVRA, stated: It is essential that the criminal justice system recognize the impact that crime has on the victim, and, to the extent possible, ensure that [the] offender be held accountable to repay these costs. S.Rep. No. 104-179, at 18 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 930. 16 Although the Committee acknowledged the importance of the need for finality and certainty in the sentencing process, it added that justice cannot be considered served until full restitution is made. Id. at 20. 17 The Committee did not relate the 90-day requirement to the interests of defendants, stating that the sole due process interest of the defendant being protected during the sentencing phase is the right not to be sentenced on the basis of invalid premises or inaccurate information. Id. See United States v. Zakhary, 357 F.3d 186, 191 (2d Cir.2004) (As this court has now twice explained, the purpose behind the statutory ninety-day limit on the determination of victims' losses is not to protect defendants from drawn-out sentencing proceedings or to establish finality; rather, it is to protect crime victims from the willful dissipation of defendants' assets.). The Seventh Circuit has also emphasized that the MVRA's intended beneficiaries are the victims, not the victimizers. United States v. Grimes, 173 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir.1999). 71 Cheal's timing argument would abrogate an obligation to pay more than $2 million in restitution to thousands of defrauded investors. On the facts here, such an outcome would be antithetical to the purpose of the MVRA. Moreover, a finding of plain error in Cheal's favor would turn the plain-error doctrine on its head by seriously impair[ing] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Duarte, 246 F.3d at 60. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (Indeed, it would be the reversal of a conviction such as this which would have that effect.) We will not countenance such a result. 18