Opinion ID: 213981
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonable Likelihood of Mental Retardation Requirement

Text: Our inquiry does not end there, however. As we noted in Holladay, a state prisoner seeking leave to file an Atkins claim in a second § 2254 petition must also show that there is a reasonable likelihood that he is in fact mentally retarded: [O]ur finding that the requirements expressly set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) are satisfied in this case does not terminate our analysis. Indeed, these requirements merely represent the minimum showing that Holladay must make if we are to permit him to file a second or successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See § 2244(b)(3)(C) (The court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.). In this case, we find it manifestly obvious that in order to make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to file a second or successive petition based on [the] Supreme Court's decision in Atkins, Holladay also must demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that he is in fact mentally retarded. Holladay, 331 F.3d at 1173. [5] To determine whether the reasonable-likelihood-of-mental-retardation standard is met, we measure the state prisoner's application and supporting documentation against the entire record in th[e] case and ask whether the prisoner has made a sufficient showing of possible merit to warrant a fuller exploration by the district court. Id. at 1173-74 (quotation marks omitted). Doing so requires us to consider the definition of mental retardation. In Atkins, the Supreme Court noted that although different states' statutory definitions of mental retardation were not identical, they generally conform to the [American Association on Mental Retardation (`AAMR') and the American Psychiatric Association (`APA')] clinical definitions. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 n. 22, 122 S.Ct. at 2250 n. 22. The Supreme Court also listed the clinical definitions of mental retardation formulated by the AAMR and APA: The American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) defines mental retardation as follows: Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18. Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 5 (9th ed. 1992). The American Psychiatric Association's definition is similar: The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C). Mental Retardation has many different etiologies and may be seen as a final common pathway of various pathological processes that affect the functioning of the central nervous system. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 41 (4th ed. 2000). Mild mental retardation is typically used to describe people with an IQ level of 50-55 to approximately 70. Id., at 42-43. Id. at 308 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. at 2245 n. 3. As outlined below, Florida's definition of mental retardation substantially parallels the clinical definitions discussed by the Supreme Court in Atkins.