Opinion ID: 4111397
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inferior Officers and Freytag

Text: The Supreme Court has defined an officer generally as “any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam). The term “inferior officer” “connotes a relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers below the President: Whether one is an ‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he has a superior.” Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662.7 7 Other uses of “inferior” in the Constitution confirm the term speaks to a hierarchical, subordinate-superior relationship. The word appears once in Article I and twice in Article III, each time describing courts “inferior” to the Supreme Court. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III, § 1; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 805-07 (1999) (discussing the use of “inferior” in Articles I, II, and III). Statements from Alexander Hamilton and James Madison also indicate “inferior” means subordinate. In Federalist No. 81, Hamilton described inferior courts as those “subordinate to the Supreme.” The Federalist No. 81, at 484 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). In the brief debate about the Excepting Clause at the Federal Constitutional Convention in 1787, Madison “mention[ed] (as in apparent Continued . . . -7- This description of “inferior” may aid in understanding the distinction between principal and inferior officers. But we are concerned here with the distinction between inferior officers and employees. Like inferior officers, employees—or “lesser functionaries”—are subordinates. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 n.162. Justice Breyer has provided this summary of the different ways the Supreme Court has described inferior officers: Consider the [Supreme] Court’s definitions: Inferior officers are, inter alia, (1) those charged with “the administration and enforcement of the public law,” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 139; (2) those granted “significant authority,” id. at 126; (3) those with “responsibility for conducting civil litigation in the courts of the United States,” id. at 140; and (4) those “who can be said to hold an office,” United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1879), that has been created either by “regulations” or by “statute,” United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1888). Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 539 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation style altered and some citations omitted). The list below contains examples of inferior officers drawn from Supreme Court cases spanning more than 150 years: ______________________________________ Cont. contrast to the ‘inferior officers’ covered by the provision) ‘Superior Officers.’” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 720 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 627-28 (M. Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)). He also referred to “subordinate officers” in contradistinction to “principal officers” when explaining the appointment power during the Virginia ratification convention. 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 409-10 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836); see also Tuan Samahon, Are Bankruptcy Judges Unconstitutional? An Appointments Clause Challenge, 60 Hastings L.J. 233, 251 (2008) (discussing Madison’s remarks at the Virginia convention). -8-  a district court clerk, In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 258 (1839);  an “assistant-surgeon,” United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 762 (1877);  “thousands of clerks in the Departments of the Treasury, Interior, and the othe[r]” departments, Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511 (1878);  an election supervisor, Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98 (1879);  a federal marshal, id. at 397;  a “cadet engineer” appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 484-85 (1886);  a “commissioner of the circuit court,” United States v. Allred, 155 U.S. 591, 594-96 (1895);  a vice consul temporarily exercising the duties of a consul, United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898);  extradition commissioners, Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 378 (1901);  a United States commissioner in district court proceedings, Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352-54 (1931);  a postmaster first class, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 (1976) (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926));  Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) commissioners, id.;  an independent counsel, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988);  Tax Court special trial judges, Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881-82 (1991); and  military judges, Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 170 (1994); Edmond, 520 U.S. at 666 (1997).8 8 See also Edmond, 520 U.S. at 661 (listing examples of inferior officers); Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 540 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing examples of officers). -9- We think these examples are relevant and instructive. Although the Supreme Court has not stated a specific test for inferior officer status, “[e]fforts to define [‘inferior Officers’] inevitably conclude that the term’s sweep is unusually broad,” Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 539 (Breyer, J., dissenting), and the Freytag opinion provides the guidance needed to decide this appeal.
The question in Freytag was whether the Tax Court had authority to appoint special trial judges (“STJs”) under the Appointments Clause. 501 U.S. at 877-92. As a threshold matter, the Court addressed whether STJs were inferior officers or employees. Id. at 880-82. That question strongly resembles the one we face here. In our view, Freytag controls the result of this case. Under the then-applicable 26 U.S.C. § 7443A(b), the Tax Court could assign four categories of cases to STJs. Id. at 873. For the first three categories, § 7443A(b)(1), (2), and (3), “the Chief Judge [could] assign the special trial judge not only to hear and report on a case but also to decide it.” Id. In other words, STJs could make final decisions in those cases. But in the fourth category, § 7443A(b)(4), STJs lacked final decisionmaking power: “the chief judge [could] authorize the special trial judge only to hear the case and prepare proposed findings and an opinion. The actual decision then [was] rendered by a regular judge of the Tax Court.” Id. The Tax Court assigned the petitioners’ case to the STJ under § 7443A(b)(4), the fourth category, which did not allow STJs to enter final decisions. Id. at 871-73. The - 10 - STJ issued a proposed opinion concluding the petitioners were liable, and the Tax Court adopted it. Id. at 871-72.9 On appeal, the petitioners argued the STJs were inferior officers under the Appointments Clause and that the chief judge of the Tax Court could not appoint them because he was not the President, a court of law, or a department head. Id. at 878. The government contended STJs were not inferior officers because they did not have authority to enter a final decision in petitioners’ case. Id. at 881. The Court first expressly approved prior decisions from the Tax Court and the Second Circuit that held STJs were inferior officers. Id. “Both courts considered the degree of authority exercised by the special trial judges to be so ‘significant’ that it was inconsistent with the classifications of ‘lesser functionaries’ or employees.” Id. (discussing Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 930 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1991); First W. Gov’t Sec., Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 94 T.C. 549 (1990)).10 9 As discussed below, Ballard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 544 U.S. 40 (2005), spelled out the STJs’ and Tax Court judges’ collaborative decision-making process in which STJs and Tax Court judges jointly “worked over” STJs’ preliminary “in-house drafts” to produce an opinion. 544 U.S. at 42. 10 In Samuels, the Second Circuit concluded STJs are inferior officers. 930 F.2d at 985. It stated: Although the ultimate decisional authority in cases under section 7443A(b)(4) rests with the Tax Court judges, the special trial judges do exercise a great deal of authority in such cases. The special trial judges are more than mere aids to the judges of the Tax Court. They take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to Continued . . . - 11 - The Court then turned to the government’s argument that the STJs were employees because they “lack[ed] authority to enter a final decision” under § 7443A(b)(4). Id. The Court said the argument “ignore[d] the significance of the duties and discretion that special trial judges possess.” Id. First, the STJ position was “established by Law.” Id. (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2). Second, “the duties, salary, and means of appointment for that office are specified by statute.” Id. “These characteristics,” the Court stated, “distinguish special trial judges from special masters, who are hired by Article III courts on a temporary, episodic basis, whose positions are not established by law, and whose duties and functions are not delineated in a statute.” Id. Third, STJs “perform more than ministerial tasks. They take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery orders. In the course of carrying out these important functions, the [STJs] ______________________________________ Cont. enforce compliance with discovery orders. Contrary to the contentions of the Commissioner, the degree of authority exercised by special trial judges is “significant.” They exercise a great deal of discretion and perform important functions, characteristics that we find to be inconsistent with the classifications of “lesser functionary” or mere employee. Id. at 985-86 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126). In First Western, the Tax Court concluded STJs are inferior officers: “Because [they] may be assigned any case and may enter decisions in certain cases, it follows that special trial judges exercise significant authority.” 94 T.C. at 557. Although a factor, final decision-making power was not the linchpin of the Tax Court’s analysis. Id. And in any event, the Freytag Court endorsed the Second Circuit’s and Tax Court’s analyses because they relied on “the degree of authority” STJs possessed. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881. - 12 - exercise significant discretion.” Id. at 881-82. Accordingly, the Court held STJs were inferior officers. Id. Next, the Court addressed a standing argument from the government. Id. at 882. The government had conceded STJs act as inferior officers when hearing cases under § 7443A(b)(1), (2), and (3), but argued petitioners “lack[ed] standing to assert the rights of taxpayers whose cases [were] assigned to [STJs] under [those three categories].” Id. The Court stated, “Even if the duties of [STJs] under [§ 7443A(b)(4)] were not as significant as we and the two courts have found them to be, our conclusion would be unchanged.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court explained that an inferior officer does not become an employee because he or she “on occasion performs duties that may be performed by an employee not subject to the Appointments Clause.” Id. “If a special trial judge is an inferior officer for purposes of subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3), he is an inferior officer within the meaning of the Appointments Clause and he must be properly appointed.” Id. The Court thus rejected the government’s standing argument as “beside the point.” Id. In the end, the Freytag majority held the Tax Court was a “Cour[t] of Law” with authority to appoint inferior officers like the STJs. Id. at 890, 892. Justice Scalia’s partial concurrence, joined by three other justices, agreed with the majority’s conclusion regarding the STJs’ status: “I agree with the Court that a special trial judge is an ‘inferior Office[r]’ within the meaning of [the Appointments Clause].” Id. at 901 (Scalia, J., concurring) (first alteration in original). Thus, a unanimous Supreme Court concluded - 13 - STJs were inferior officers.