Opinion ID: 1756539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Claim of Absolute Privilege.

Text: When Haldeman applied for unemployment compensation, the local office of Job Service told her she would need a statement from Total verifying the fact she had been discharged. She went to the manager of the station to request such a statement, and he complied by furnishing a company employee information form which included a section entitled reason for termination. The termination section had eleven printed reasons for termination. Each printed reason had a check box preceding it to designate any that were applicable. The first referred to a voluntary termination. The following ten check boxes related to various types of misconduct. One of those printed grounds was entitled theft or fraud (must be proven). This box was not checked by the manager, nor were any of the other enumerated grounds on the form. Rather, on a line entitled other reasons the manager wrote unexplained shortages. This form, with the manager's handwritten statement, was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 5. It is this written statement which Haldeman claims as the basis for her libel claim. The district court ruled that Total was entitled to a qualified privilege in connection with Exhibit 5 and instructed the jury on the elements necessary to establish such privilege. Total, however, argues the court should have gone further and ruled it was entitled to an absolute privilege. Total relies on two bases for claiming an absolute privilege. First, Job Service's claim proceedings are quasi-judicial in nature and thus entitled to the privilege accorded judicial proceedings. See Cowman v. LaVine, 234 N.W.2d 114, 121 (Iowa 1975); Mills v. Denny, 245 Iowa 584, 588, 63 N.W.2d 222, 224-25 (1954); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 585 (1977). The term judicial officers, for these purposes, includes such agencies as Job Service. See id. at comment b. Secondly, the defendants argue that Iowa Code section 96.11(7)(b)(2) (1983) immunizes a person who communicates with the Job Service in connection with the performance of its duties. That section provides: A report or statement, whether written or verbal, made by a person to the [Job Service] department or to a person administering this law is a privileged communication. A person is not liable for slander or libel on account of such a report or statement. On its face, this statute appears to apply here. Haldeman argues it does not, however, for two reasons. First, she argues the statute does not expressly state that it creates an absolute privilege, thus it should be presumed to create only a conditional one. In any event, she argues, even if the statute creates an absolute privilege, it is inapplicable here. We first consider the question of whether the statute applies. Haldeman points out that Exhibit 5, which contained the unexplained shortages language, was not a part of any official proceeding of Job Service and was not delivered to the department or a person administering this [employment security] law. She argues that, for these reasons, the statute is inapplicable by its terms. We believe this is a hypertechnical reading of the statute. Haldeman requested the statement from Total for the sole purpose of getting unemployment benefits. The statement was thus given in connection with the administering of the employment security law. The argument that the statement was actually handed to Haldeman and not to a Job Service employee is also unpersuasive. While Haldeman might have been the conduit for its delivery, the statement was clearly one given to the department or a person administering this law within the meaning of section 96.11(7)(b)(2). The court should have ruled that section was applicable. Haldeman also argues, and the trial court ruled, that section 96.11(7)(b)(2), even if applicable, created only a qualified privilege. We do not agree. If the immunity provided by it were intended to be only a qualified one, we believe the legislature would have added words to so indicate. No qualifying language, such as in the absence of malice ... or its equivalent, appears. We believe the legislature by providing that [a] person is not liable for slander or libel on account of such a report or statement, without qualifying language, intended that an absolute immunity be conferred. Because we conclude section 96.11(7)(b)(2) applies, and grants immunity, it is not necessary to address Total's alternative argument that it would be entitled to an absolute privilege under the rule applicable to quasi-judicial proceeding. It was error on the part of the trial court to submit the issue as a qualified privilege. It should have dismissed Haldeman's libel claim against Total based upon statutory immunity.