Opinion ID: 1745489
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: tax refund

Text: We next consider whether the trial court erred in giving its ruling prospective effect and thereby denying cross-appellants McKesson and Tampa Crown a refund. McKesson argues that only a refund of the difference between the disfavored product's tax rate and the favored product's tax rate will cure the constitutional injury which it has suffered. It maintains that because it has paid the discriminatory taxes under protest, pursuant to section 215.26, Florida Statutes (1985), it is entitled to a refund under both state and federal law. Cross-appellant Tampa Crown makes a similar argument. We agree with the DABT that the prospective nature of the rulings below was proper in light of the equitable considerations present in this case. See Gulesian v. Dade County School Board, 281 So.2d 325 (Fla. 1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 93 S.Ct. 1463, 36 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973). Not only was the tax preference scheme implemented by the DABT in good faith reliance on a presumptively valid statute, as pointed out by the DABT, if given a refund, cross-appellants would in all probability receive a windfall, since the cost of the tax has likely been passed on to their customers. Accordingly, both those portions of the judgments below finding [t]hat the provisions of [Florida Statutes] 564.06(2), (3) following the term $3.00 per gallon, (4) following the term 3.50 per gallon, (7) and (9) through (13) and [Florida Statutes] 565.12(1)(b), (1)(c), (2)(b), (2)(c) and (5) through (10) are ... unconstitutional on their face, and those portions giving the rulings prospective effect are affirmed. It is so ordered. McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.