Opinion ID: 1304396
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: REOPENING UNDER I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4).

Text: The majority relies upon Nieman v. Nieman, 105 Idaho 796, 673 P.2d 396 (1983), where we refused to allow a husband's motion to reopen a divorce decree wherein his military retirement pay was treated as community property, in light of the then controlling McCarty decision, on grounds that a judgment is not void and therefore not within the ambit of 60(b)(4) simply because it is erroneous, or is based upon precedent which is later deemed incorrect or unconstitutional. 105 Idaho at 797, 673 P.2d at 396. In Nieman, we reemphasized this Court's continued affirmation of the doctrine of finality of judgments. I view Nieman as distinguishable. In Nieman, we were not presented with clear Congressional intent in favor of retroactive application of a new rule of law; nor were we presented with a situation where only a few claimants might petition for reopening. In short, none of the extraordinary circumstances detailed in Flannagan (i.e. congressional intent, the speed with which congress enacted the USFSPA, the anomaly of not allowing for the division of military retirement pay in only a twenty-month period, and the limited number of decrees which became final during that twenty-month period were present). As already stated, the factual scenario of this case is so extraordinary and so compelling that, in this instance, it justifies a limited exception to the doctrine of finality of judgments. The majority asserts that allowing reopening in the instant case will distort the doctrines of finality and res judicata. I disagree. I have already addressed the issue of finality, and beyond that, other courts have persuasively noted the inapplicability of the doctrine of res judicata in analogous cases. For the doctrine of res judicata to apply, the issues must have been, or reasonably could have been, decided in the prior action. (citation omitted). [T]he issue of dividing the retirement payments could not have been decided because of McCarty. Res judicata does not prevent reopening the decrees. (citation omitted). Flannagan, 709 P.2d at 1253. Flannagan also cited to Trahan v. Trahan, 682 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App. 1984), wherein it was held that res judicata did not apply when it would subvert the intent of congress and the plain meaning of the act (USFSPA) which is to restore state law to what it was prior to the McCarty decision. 682 S.W.2d at 337. Here, a significant community asset  the military retirement pension  was never before the court as a community asset. Res judicata simply does not apply. Due to the compelling and limited nature of the instant case, I would allow for reopening under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) despite the absence of jurisdictional defect normally required for such relief. ( See, Catledge v. Transport Tire Co., 107 Idaho 602, 691 P.2d 1217 (1984).)