Opinion ID: 2978761
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sims’ Confidential Informant Status

Text: “The use of informers . . . may raise serious questions of credibility.” On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757 (1952). Indeed, jurors often have a negative predisposition toward informants. “Ordinary decent people are predisposed to dislike, distrust, and frequently despise criminals who ‘sell out’ and become prosecution witnesses. Jurors suspect their motives from the moment they hear about them in a case, and they frequently disregard their testimony altogether as highly untrustworthy and No. 09-5243 Robinson v. Mills Page 10 unreliable . . . .” Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47 Hastings L.J. 1381, 1385 (1996); see also Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 701-02 (2004) (favorably citing Trott, Words of Warning, supra). Accordingly, since “a defendant is entitled to broad latitude to probe credibility by cross-examination and to have the issues submitted to the jury with careful instructions,” the State’s suppression of this evidence deprived Robinson of the opportunity to demonstrate Sims’ untrustworthiness. On Lee, 343 U.S. at 757; accord Banks, 540 U.S. at 702. Given juries’ negative predisposition regarding informants, the trial jury would likely have been suspicious of Sims and cautious about her testimony. Such suspicion could have very likely redounded to Defendant’s benefit. The suppressed evidence could have also supported the assertion that at the time of trial, Sims was biased in favor of the local authorities. The term “bias” describes “the relationship between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party.” United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984). Bias is “not limited to personal animosity against a defendant or pecuniary gain.” Schledwitz v. United States, 169 F.3d 1003, 1015 (6th Cir. 1999). Instead, it includes mere “employment or business relationships” with a party and “is always relevant in assessing a witness’s credibility.” Id. A defendant has the constitutional right to impeach a witness by showing bias. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974). If a defendant is denied this right, then a new trial must be granted, except if the error was harmless. United States v. Stavroff, 149 F.3d 478, 481 (6th Cir. 1998). However, “once a reviewing court applying [the] Bagley [materiality analysis] has found constitutional error there is no need for further harmless-error review.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435. The undisclosed evidence would have been helpful to demonstrate bias by Sims. The State argues that there was no “relationship of mutual profit between Sims and the authorities.” Yet, Sims worked for the Sparta Police Department as a CI on at least nine occasions between the time of Irwin’s death and Robinson’s trial, earning money each time for her cooperation. She also worked as a CI for the PCSO and the TBI, both of No. 09-5243 Robinson v. Mills Page 11 which spearheaded the Robinson/Irwin investigation. As a matter of fact, Sims worked with the PCSO and TBI a mere eighteen days before Robinson’s trial began, making a controlled buy from Wade McClure who, like Sims, later served as a witness at Robinson’s trial. The State also argues that although Sims was a CI for the local authorities, she only informed on behalf of the State in unrelated cases and that the special prosecutor and lead TBI investigator in the instant case had no knowledge of her informant activities. We find both arguments unconvincing. First, the facts show that Sims assisted authorities as a CI and, in exchange, was paid for her services. Regardless of whether the cases were unrelated, Sims had a working relationship with law enforcement, including the agencies spearheading the investigation of this case. Robinson was entitled to present such evidence to the jury in order to call into question Sims’ credibility and truthfulness. Second, the prosecutor’s actual knowledge is irrelevant because “the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf . . . , including the police.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, regardless of whether the prosecution succeeds in meeting this obligation, its “responsibility for failing to disclose known, favorable evidence rising to a material level of importance is inescapable.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38.