Opinion ID: 1396611
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of the Third Wicks Exception to Incorrect Burden-of-Proof Statements Made by the Prosecutor during Voir Dire

Text: In the past we have only allowed issues to be considered under the third Wicks exception where the error affected the very structure of the criminal trial. In Calnan v. State, this court considered what constituted waiver of a defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial. 310 Ark. 744, 841 S.W.2d 593 (1992). The State contended that the issue was not preserved for appellate review because the defendant did not object at the circuit court level. Id. We stated that [t]he third exception applies in this case. There need be no contemporaneous objection to raise an issue on appeal if otherwise a serious error will result. Id. at 748, 841 S.W.2d at 596. On the same date that this court handed down Calnan , we also decided Winkle v. State, 310 Ark. 713, 841 S.W.2d 589 (1992). Winkle was similar to Calnan in that both were DWI cases, both involved the fundamental right to a jury trial, both considered the issue without a contemporaneous objection as Wicks three exceptions, and both reversed the trial court. Id. The holding in Winkle is instructive on the application of the third Wicks exception: The right to jury trial is part of the basic structure of our courts. Every judge, on his own motion, should accord such a basic right. In Wicks v. State, supra , we set out various exceptions to the contemporaneous objection rule, and we provided that the rule is not applicable when the trial court should intervene on its own motion to correct a serious error. This is such a serious error. The right to a trial by jury in a criminal case is a fundamental right of our jurisprudence and is recognized by the Magna Charta, the Declaration of Independence, the federal constitution, and our state constitution. Id. at 717-18, 841 S.W.2d at 591. In 1995, we considered an appellant's conviction for disorderly conduct that was tried before a six-member jury. Grinning v. City of Pine Bluff, 322 Ark. 45, 907 S.W.2d 690 (1995). Relying on Winkle and Wicks , this court reversed: In both cases, neither the appellants nor their counsel objected to the violation of their jury trial right. In Winkle , this court stated that denial of the right to trial by jury in a criminal case, without the requisite waiver in accordance with the law, is a serious error for which the trial court should intervene, and is therefore an exception to the contemporaneous objection rule. Winkle, 310 Ark. 713, 717, 841 S.W.2d 589, 591 (citing Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980)). Id. at 49, 907 S.W.2d at 692. Grinning extended Winkle and Calnan by holding that the right to a jury trial included not only having a jury, but having a properly constituted jury with twelve members rather than only six. Id. Our case law is clear that Wicks presents only narrow exceptions that are to be rarely applied. Specifically, the third Wicks exception has only been applied to cases in which a defendant's fundamental right to a trial by jury is at issue. Calnan, supra ; Winkle, supra ; Grinning, supra . The third Wicks exception has not been applied to consider possible prosecutorial errors in relation to cross examination, Vaughn v. State, 338 Ark. 220, 992 S.W.2d 785 (1999), to privileged testimony, Hale v. State, 343 Ark. 62, 31 S.W.3d 850 (2000), or closing arguments, Buckley, supra and Greene v. State, 343 Ark. 526, 37 S.W.3d 579 (2001). The issue here is whether prosecutorial misstatements during voir dire concerning the State's burden of proof rise to the level of a Wicks -three exception. The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the significance of the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). After explaining that the right to a trial by jury is founded on centuries of common law, the Supreme Court stated: Equally well founded is the companion right to have the jury verdict based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The `demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient times, [though] its crystallization into the formula beyond a reasonable doubt seems to have occurred as late as 1798. It is now accepted in common law jurisdictions as the measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must convince the trier of all the essential elements of guilt.' C. McCormick, Evidence § 321, pp. 681-682 (1954); see also 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2497 (3d ed.1940). [ In re ] Winship, 397 U.S. [358], at 361, 90 S.Ct. 1068 [25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)]. We went on to explain that the reliance on the reasonable doubt standard among common-law jurisdictions `reflect[s] a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered.' Id., at 361-362, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (quoting Duncan [ v. State of La. ], 391 U.S. [145], at 155, 88 S.Ct. 1444 [20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968)]). Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. at 478-79, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the right to be judged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial is a fundamental right even though not expressly guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980). The State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the only mechanism by which the State may overcome the presumption of innocence that surrounds a criminal defendant until and unless proven guilty. [3] In 1976, we reversed a conviction where the prosecutor, in closing arguments, stated that the defendant was lying to the court and jury. After an objection, the trial court admonished the jury and reminded them that the defendant had not testified. This court found reversible error because the prosecutor's statement constituted error beyond doubt. We explained that the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt attach when the defendant pleads not guilty. He had entered a plea of not guilty. By so doing, he availed himself of any defense and all matters of justification and excuse available under the law, which are not required to be specifically pleaded. He put all material facts alleged in the information in issue. Even the most patent truths were in issue. This plea was a continuing denial of every bit of evidence and every statement of every witness who testified against him. More importantly, he invoked his right to the presumption of his innocence and put the burden upon the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as well as the right to remain silent in the hope that the jury would not be convinced of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Williams v. State, 259 Ark. 667, 672, 535 S.W.2d 842, 846 (1976) (citations omitted). We then penned the oft-quoted statement: The presumption of innocence is so strong that it serves an accused as evidence in his favor throughout the trial and entitles him to an acquittal unless the state adduces evidence which convinces the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the crime charged. It is a fundamental right in the American system antedating any constitution and an essential of due process of law. It alone puts in issue the truth and credibility of all of the evidence offered against an accused. Id. at 672-73, 535 S.W.2d at 846. (citations omitted). See e.g. Williams v. State, 347 Ark. 728, 67 S.W.3d 548 (2002). We have referred to the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as constitutional guarantees protecting every accused person being tried by a jury. Rector v. State, 280 Ark. 385, 389, 396, 659 S.W.2d 168, 169-70, 173 (1983). In a long line of cases, we have emphasized the inviolability of the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof. For example, in 1922, we stated: The law will not countenance any presumption, which by overcoming the presumption of innocence will cast the burden of proving his innocence upon the defendant. Hence, where presumptions apparently conflict, the law will recognize the presumption of innocence alone, and will impose no restriction on its operation, but will apply it to the whole scope of the charge, against the accused and to every fact essential to the crime. Gilcoat v. State, 155 Ark. 455, 462, 244 S.W. 723, 726 (1922) (quoting Section 19, p. 35, UNDERHILL ON CRIMINAL EVIDENCE). [4] In 1990, we restated the fundamental nature of the presumption of innocence and set out our requirement that a challenge to this presumption calls for close judicial scrutiny. The presumption of innocence is not articulated in the Constitution of the United States; however, it is a basic component of a fair trial and the right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the fourteenth amendment. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 [96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126] (1976). Consequently, courts must be vigilant in guarding against dilution of the presumption of innocence so that guilt will be established beyond a reasonable doubt by probative evidence. Deleterious effects on fundamental rights call for close judicial scrutiny. Id. at 504 [96 S.Ct. 1691]. Factors which might affect a juror's judgment, however, cannot always be avoided Id. at 505 [96 S.Ct. 1691]. Terry v. State, 303 Ark. 270, 273, 796 S.W.2d 332, 334 (1990). In Terry the conduct of the defendant required his removal from the courtroom in spite of his right to confront the witnesses against him; however, in a case where a prosecutor clearly shifts the burden of proof, the court can avoid depriving a defendant of the presumption of innocence by intervening to correct the misstatement of the law. The failure to provide a criminal defendant with a jury trial is an error so serious that the circuit court has an obligation to intervene, and this court may consider the issue on appeal without an objection below. Calnan, supra ; Winkle, supra ; Grinning, supra . Likewise, today we conclude that failure to secure the companion rights of the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an error so serious that the circuit court should intervene, and we will consider the issue on appeal even without a contemporaneous objection. This conclusion is consistent with the circuit court's proper role in voir dire, which is to direct the process and insure that no undue advantage is gained. Britt v. State, 334 Ark. 142, 974 S.W.2d 436 (1998). Since attorneys sometimes tend to take over the voir dire process and confuse the jurors, the judge may have to step in, especially in death cases, after the questioning to insure fairness by clarifying answers. Id. at 162, 974 S.W.2d at 446. [5] The burden of proof, either the State's or the defendant's, is necessary to preserve a defendant's presumption of innocence and is an issue akin to the right to a jury trial in that both are fundamental rights. Unlike many other constitutional rights, the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt may not be waived once the accused pleads not guilty. When the State clearly and unequivocally shifts the burden of proof to the defendant during voir dire, without a contemporaneous curative instruction from the circuit court, the defendant's fundamental right may be abridged. The defendant is entitled not only to the jury's consideration of the correct burden of proof in jury-room deliberations, but also when the jury is hearing, weighing, and sifting the evidence presented at trial. [6] Therefore, under the third Wicks exception, we will consider appellant's argument that the prosecutor shifted the burden of proof during voir dire.