Opinion ID: 589445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Expert testimony regarding leadership role

Text: 30 Bantula and Romero contend that there was an insufficient factual basis for allowing Officer LaCroix, a narcotics expert, to testify at trial that they were leaders of the cocaine deal. We review the district court's decision to admit expert testimony for abuse of discretion or manifest error. United States v. Kinsey, 843 F.2d 383, 388 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1223, 488 U.S. 836 (1988). 31 Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides for the testimony of experts in the form of an opinion if it will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. The admission of expert testimony requires a proper foundation establishing the witness' expertise, a sufficient factual basis for the opinion, and that the probative value of the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect. See Edward W. Cleary et. al., McCormick on Evidence § 13, at 33-34 (3d ed. 1984).
32 Officer LaCroix testified to the jury that [i]t is my opinion that Mr. Bantula and Mr. Romero were the people in charge of this narcotics transaction. See R.T. 2/15/90, at 16. The factual basis for his opinion included the following information: First, LaCroix was told that Pelaez would meet with the cocaine suppliers in the parking lot and the surveillance thereafter showed that Pelaez met with Bantula, Romero, and Perez. Second, Bantula and Romero arrived with Perez, who later drove the load car to pick up the cocaine. Third, LaCroix believed that the people who control these transactions generally speaking have other people do the dirty work for them, such as delivering or guarding the cocaine. We find that this information provided a sufficient factual basis for admitting Officer LaCroix's testimony. Cf. United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1333, 1336 (9th Cir.) (affirming admission of expert opinion regarding defendant's role relying upon similar factual basis), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044 (1982). 33 We are also unpersuaded by Romero's contention that Pelaez' statement could not provide an adequate factual basis for the expert opinion because it was improperly admitted against Romero. In light of our conclusion that this statement was properly admitted under Bourjaily, the jury was entitled to consider the statement as part of the factual basis for the opinion testimony regarding Romero's leadership.
34 Bantula and Romero also contend that the probative value of the testimony was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. In United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044 (1982), this court first recognized that testimony about a defendant's role in an illegal enterprise is distinct from inadmissible opinion about the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. Id. at 1335-36. Reasoning that FRE 704 allows the admission of opinion testimony embracing an ultimate issue of fact, we affirmed the introduction of expert testimony that the defendant was acting as a lookout in a drug conspiracy. Id. at 1336. We also observed that the expert's opinion was necessary to explain the significance of the defendant's seemingly innocuous conduct to the jury. Id. Various cases since Fleishman have permitted the introduction of similar testimony regarding a defendant's role in a drug conspiracy, despite claims that such testimony is unduly prejudicial. See, e.g., United States v. Bosch, 914 F.2d 1239, 1242-44 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208, 1210-13 (9th Cir.1989); Kinsey, 843 F.2d at 387-89. 35 Faced with this wall of precedent, we are compelled to find that the district court did not manifestly err or abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony. Here, Officer LaCroix's testimony had probative value in explaining to the jury why Bantula and Romero would be associated with the conspiracy despite the apparent absence of conduct on their part in delivering or guarding the cocaine. Furthermore, the challenged testimony pertained solely to the surveillance and facts in this case, unlike cases involving more generalized testimony which may offer little probative value. Cf. United States v. Echavarria-Olarte, 904 F.2d 1391, 1397-98 (9th Cir.1990) (expert testimony regarding the Medellin Cartel was irrelevant to defendant's activities); see generally Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d at 1210-11 (noting the judicial hostility to the use of drug courier profile testimony as substantive evidence of guilt).
36 Finally, Bantula also challenges the court's failure to give the jury an adequate limiting instruction regarding the expert testimony. When there is no objection to the jury instructions at trial, we review for plain error. United States v. Kessi, 868 F.2d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir.1989). Here, Bantula did not request an alternate jury instruction at trial. Since the jurors received a standard expert testimony instruction, in which they were told that they could accept or reject the expert testimony, we find no plain error.