Opinion ID: 4576082
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether consent was voluntary

Text: Mr. Quezada-Lara argues that Mr. Lara’s consent was involuntary because of (1) Mr. Lara’s dementia and (2) coercive tactics employed by the agents. Aplt. Br. at 24–35. This argument is preserved for our review. Mr. Quezada-Lara challenged the voluntariness of the consent on these grounds before the district court, and the district court ruled on them. See ROA, Vol. I at 38 (Mr. Quezada-Lara arguing that the consent was involuntary because of the time of night, number of armed agents, and Mr. Lara’s dementia); id. at 56–57 (the district court finding that “the record is devoid of evidence that the agents attempted to coerce Mr. Lara or exploit any of his vulnerabilities” and that “[t]he testimony of the FBI agents establishes that at the time of the search, Mr. Lara appeared to be lucid”). Voluntariness is a factual finding determined under the totality of the circumstances, which we review for clear error. Thompson, 524 F.3d at 1133.
As in United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945 (10th Cir. 2005), “the most troubling issue is whether, given [Mr. Lara’s] mental condition, his consent was nonetheless the ‘product of a rational intellect and a free will’ and made with a ‘mental awareness so that the act of consent was that of one who knew what he was doing.’” Id. at 953 (quoting United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 377 (10th Cir. 1985)). This mental 11 awareness “requires both understanding and judgment.” Id. But “our cases have never required perfect mental ability to find a consent to search was voluntary.” Id. In Gay, for instance, we concluded that the defendant’s argument that consent was involuntary had “no merit” where the defendant was so intoxicated that he “was staggering and swaying as he walked” and slurred his speech, but was able to answer questions and produce his driver’s license upon request. 774 F.2d at 375–77. In determining whether a district court’s finding of voluntariness was clearly erroneous, our cases have considered whether the impairment was apparent to the officers, emphasizing that our inquiry regarding impairment focuses on the individual’s condition at the time of the search, rather than at a later date. For example, in Sims, 428 F.3d at 953, we upheld the district court’s finding of voluntariness despite suggestions in the record that the defendant suffered from dementia, “a degenerative disorder that could ultimately affect [the defendant’s] judgment.” We reasoned that the district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous given that the defendant did “not point[ ] this court to any specific evidence of the extent of his impairment at the time of his consent to search,” the police testified “that no aspect of [the defendant’s] dysfunction was apparent to them,” and there was no evidence that the officers “had attempted to exploit any of his vulnerabilities.” Id. Mr. Quezada-Lara contends that Mr. Lara’s dementia rendered his consent involuntary, and, for support, he relies on (1) the fact that he “had no idea where he was, or what was happening” at the suppression hearing, Aplt. Br. at 31; (2) his daughter’s testimony at the suppression hearing that he had dementia for five years, 12 id. at 32; and (3) medical records presented to the district court that were created months after the search, id. These arguments fail because, as in Sims, the agents here testified that no aspect of Mr. Lara’s dysfunction was apparent to them, and the district court credited that testimony. See ROA, Vol. I at 57. The agents testified that Mr. Lara was friendly, cooperative, showed no signs of dementia, and seemed to understand what was going on because his answers were responsive to their questions. See, e.g., id., Vol. II at 11, 74. For instance, when asked if he would consent to a search, Mr. Lara nodded affirmatively and signed the consent-to-search form. Id. at 79–80. He was also able to explain that he was Mr. Quezada-Lara’s grandfather, and that he lived in the home with him. Id. at 76. In addition, he knew that his daughter had gone to Mexico, id. at 94, and he told the agents that Mr. Quezada-Lara had come to the home earlier that day to take a shower, which agents confirmed when they found some of his clothing in the bathroom, id. at 19. Moreover, like in Sims, “the district court found no evidence that the police had attempted to exploit any of his vulnerabilities.” 428 F.3d at 953; see ROA, Vol. I at 57 (“[T]he record is devoid of evidence that the agents attempted to . . . exploit any of his vulnerabilities.”). Mr. Lara’s testimony at the March 30, 2018 suppression hearing says nothing about the extent of his impairment at the time of the search, given that the suppression hearing took place more than nine months after the search. The same is true of the medical records introduced. As to his daughter’s testimony that Mr. Lara had dementia at the time of the search, the district court found that her testimony 13 suggested that “his dysfunction was limited and perhaps not apparent because he was largely able to care for himself.” Id. In other words, while her testimony indicated that he had dementia (which was true of the defendant in Sims), it also indicated that the “extent of his impairment at the time of his consent to search” was not severe. Sims, 428 F.3d at 953. Moreover, Ms. Lara’s testimony does not show that the dysfunction was “apparent to [the agents].” Id. Indeed, the agents testified that no aspect of the dysfunction was apparent to them, which is consistent with his daughter’s testimony suggesting that his dysfunction was limited at the time of the search. And, in any event, “our cases have never required perfect mental ability to find a consent to search was voluntary.” Id. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Mr. Lara was mentally capable to consent.
Mr. Quezada-Lara also argues that Mr. Lara’s consent was involuntary because of coercive police tactics, stating that the agents: (a) awoke him late at night; (b) pointed rifles at him; (c) allegedly broke his bedroom window; (d) told him to come out to the back porch; (e) yelled into the house for other occupants to come outside; (f) did not ask for consent to accompany him into the residence; (g) did not tell him that they wanted to search for guns and drugs before he signed the consentto-search form; and (h) did not explain that he had a right to refuse consent to the search. Aplt. Br. at 29–30, 33. He also contends (i) that the number of agents present had a coercive effect. Id. at 33. Before the district court, Mr. Quezada-Lara 14 relied only on grounds (a), (h), and (i). See ROA, Vol. I at 38 (arguing that consent was involuntary when “[c]oupling his dementia . . . with the time of night . . . and the number of armed agents” and noting that “apparently [Agent Stemo] did not explain to him that he had a right to refuse”). The other arguments are therefore waived. Again, “the question whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227. Regarding coercion, relevant factors “include physical mistreatment, use of violence, threats, promises, inducements, deception, trickery, or an aggressive tone, . . . the number of officers on the scene, and the display of police weapons.” United States v. Sawyer, 441 F.3d 890, 895 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). The district court found that “the record is devoid of evidence that the agents attempted to coerce Mr. Lara or exploit any of his vulnerabilities.” ROA, Vol. I at 57. We review each of Mr. Quezada-Lara’s coercion arguments below, noting which arguments have been preserved and which have been waived. We conclude by analyzing whether the preserved arguments outweigh the numerous factors indicating that Mr. Lara’s consent was not coerced.
Mr. Quezada-Lara argues that because the agents came to the residence in the middle of the night, their request that Mr. Lara sign a consent form was coercive. The arrival of police officers at a home in the middle of the night can be more coercive than their arrival during the day, but this factor alone does not show that the 15 consent was involuntary. See United States v. Abdenbi, 361 F.3d 1282, 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 2004) (concluding that “the record is void of any indication that [the third party’s consent] was threatened or coerced in any way” even though the third party was contacted at his home “very early in the morning”). Thus, while this factor likely weighs against a conclusion that the consent was voluntary, the district court’s ruling was based on a totality of the circumstances.
As for the argument that the consent was involuntary because the agents pointed rifles at Mr. Lara, Mr. Quezada-Lara never made this argument before the district court. He relied only on the “number of armed agents,” ROA, Vol. I at 38, never mentioning the agents pointing their rifles at Mr. Lara. This argument is therefore waived.
Next, without record support, Mr. Quezada-Lara contends that the consent was involuntary because “agents br[oke the] bedroom window.” Aplt. Br. at 29. Mr. Quezada-Lara never made this argument before the district court. It is therefore waived. While Mr. Quezada-Lara pointed in his district court briefing to testimony showing that the window had a hole in it, see ROA, Vol. I at 35, he never stated who broke the window, or that the agents’ purported breaking of the window made the consent involuntary or a product of coercion, see id. 16 (d), (e), (f) Requesting Mr. Lara come to the back porch; yelling for others in the home to come outside; and lack of consent to accompany him into the kitchen None of these arguments were raised below. They are therefore waived. Regardless, Agent Acee testified that they moved Mr. Lara to the porch because they thought an exchange of gunfire with Mr. Quezada-Lara was possible, id., Vol. II at 57, and the agents were yelling to find out who else was in the home, see id. at 42. As the government points out, these actions had a “valid, non-coercive purpose,” so they do not undermine the district court’s finding of voluntariness. Warwick, 928 F.3d at 946. Moreover, there is no evidence that Mr. Lara later went into the kitchen with agents unwillingly. Agent Stemo asked him if he would go inside, and both of them went to the kitchen. ROA, Vol. II at 75. (g) Whether agents told Mr. Lara of the purpose of the search Next, Mr. Quezada-Lara argues that the consent was involuntary because agents did not tell Mr. Lara they were searching for guns and drugs. This argument was not raised before the district court, so this argument, too, is waived. In fact, Mr. Quezada-Lara argued the opposite below—that agents “indicated [at the suppression hearing] that they explained [to Mr. Lara] that they wanted to search the house for contraband.” Id., Vol. I at 36. (h) Right to refuse consent Mr. Quezada-Lara next contends that the consent was involuntary because Mr. Lara was not asked if he understood that he had a right to refuse the search. Although Mr. Quezada-Lara raised this argument before the district court, the record 17 indicates that Agent Stemo read the consent-to-search form to Mr. Lara, including its statement, “I’ve been informed of my right to deny permission to search.” Id., Vol. II at 77. After the consent-to-search form was read to Mr. Lara, he signed it. In United States v. Iribe, 11 F.3d 1553, 1557 (10th Cir. 1993), we concluded that “the evidence indicates that [the] consent was intelligently given” because the third-party “signed a consent to search form [and t]he form contained a clause discussing the right to refuse consent.” The same holds true here. See also Warwick, 928 F.3d at 945 (“A signed consent form indicates voluntary consent.”). And, in any event, “knowledge of the right to refuse consent” is not “a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a ‘voluntary’ consent.” Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 232–33.
Without stating the specific number of agents present at the time of the search, Mr. Quezada-Lara argues that the number of agents made the consent involuntary. Mr. Quezada-Lara raised this argument before the district court. While the presence of more than one officer increases the coerciveness of an encounter, Iribe, 11 F.3d at 1557, “that alone does not render consent per se involuntary.” Thompson, 524 F.3d at 1134. Although ten to twelve officers were present at the residence here, ROA, Vol. II at 35–36, only three officers were present with Mr. Lara when his consent was requested. Id. at 98–99; see Thompson, 524 F.3d at 1134 (concluding that consent was voluntary where “the record demonstrate[d] that when [the officer] requested permission to search . . . [the third-party] was approached by three police officers”). Regardless, the number of officers present does not “outweigh[] the numerous factors 18 indicating that [Mr. Lara] voluntarily consented to the search of the house.” Iribe, 11 F.3d at 1557.
In sum, regarding coercion, we are left with only three arguments preserved for appellate review: the time of day; the number of agents present; and the alleged failure to inform Mr. Lara that he could refuse consent. As for his right to refuse consent, Mr. Lara signed a form containing a clause describing his right to refuse. The number of officers present here and the fact that the search occurred in the middle of the night, however, both tend to make the officers’ request to search more coercive than had it occurred during the day with only a single officer. But these factors do not outweigh the numerous factors indicating that Mr. Lara’s consent was voluntary and not a product of coercion. The agents did not engage in coercive tactics such as “physical mistreatment . . . threats, promises, inducements, deception, trickery, or an aggressive tone.” Warwick, 928 F.3d at 945. The record also “does not reveal that [Mr. Lara] felt coerced, frightened or otherwise threatened” at the time he gave consent to search. Iribe, 11 F.3d at 1557. To the contrary, agents testified that Mr. Lara was joking with them, that he was “[c]alm and friendly,” even offering to make them food, and there is no evidence that he was handcuffed or restrained. ROA, Vol. II at 21, 73–74, 81, 90–91, 94; see Warwick, 928 F.3d at 945 (the fact that the defendant “was friendly and comfortable enough to engage the agents in small talk and jokes” supported finding that he voluntarily consented to a search); Iribe, 11 F.3d at 1557 19 (emphasizing that “[t]he conversation between [the officer] and [the third-party] regarding her consent to search the house was cordial and spoken in low volume”). And, as in Iribe, “[n]o promises or threats were made in an attempt to extract [his] consent.” 11 F.3d at 1557. Agent Stemo read the consent-to-search form to Mr. Lara in Spanish, including its statement that he had a right to refuse consent, and he signed it without hesitation. Given the numerous factors indicating Mr. Lara’s consent was not a product of coercion, the time of day and the number of agents present do not render the district court’s finding clearly erroneous. B. Whether the search exceeded the scope of the consent Finally, Mr. Quezada-Lara argues that “the search that took place exceeded the scope of any consent as Mr. Lara was not told agents were searching for drugs and firearms until after his written consent was obtained.” Aplt. Br. at 24 (capitalization omitted). This argument was not made before the district court, and he has not attempted to show good cause. Before the district court, Mr. Quezada-Lara did note, in setting forth the general legal standards, that a search cannot exceed the scope of the consent given. See ROA, Vol. I at 16. But he never argued that the search exceeded the scope of the consent given by Mr. Lara here. See id. at 15–18, 33–40. Thus, the argument has been waived. 20