Opinion ID: 402449
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Brady Issue and Sufficiency of the Evidence

Text: 39 McIver was interviewed by the FBI on January 23, 1979, and appeared before a grand jury on January 25. He was later granted immunity, was interviewed again by the FBI in May and June, and appeared before a grand jury on June 7. Quick asserted that the FBI report of its initial interview with McIver constituted Brady 5 material to which he was entitled and without which he was denied fair trial. The district court, after examining the report in camera, refused to order the government to furnish the material. 40 Quick points out several specific areas in which both the initial grand jury testimony and the first FBI statements are inconsistent with McIver's trial testimony. The initial grand jury testimony was available to Quick and was used at trial for impeachment, but Quick contends that the FBI report was nevertheless necessary to his defense. He maintains that statements to the FBI are more thorough and lengthy than grand jury testimony, so that the report has greater weight. Quick further argues that because the tape recordings are subject to the interpretation that there was only a bribe involved, 6 the failure to order that the FBI's report be furnished to him cannot be harmless error. 41 We reject Quick's contentions. As impeachment evidence, the statements to the FBI are cumulative with the initial grand jury testimony. After examining the content of the report, we do not believe that the statements could have been used to impeach McIver in any way that the defense did not already know about and have the opportunity to exploit. What was sought to be proven regarding credibility was proven. Since the appellants were properly allowed to show that McIver had given sworn inconsistent statements prior to the trial, the jury knew that McIver had persisted in a version of the transaction different from the version he gave after he was granted immunity. The mere fact that he had also given the earlier version to investigating agents would not have added a feather's weight to the impeachment effort. The district court's failure to have ordered disclosure, if error, was harmless since the report could not have affected the outcome of the trial. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). See generally Monroe v. Blackburn, 607 F.2d 148, 150 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957, 100 S.Ct. 2929, 64 L.Ed.2d 816 (1979). Nonetheless, we are disappointed in the government's refusal to disclose the information upon Quick's specific request. We note that the Brady rule requires disclosure of all material evidence favorable to a defendant, and we caution the government that such materials should not be sparingly produced. 42 Finally, the appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. After reviewing the record, we determine that the relevant evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, could be accepted by a reasonably minded jury as adequate and sufficient to support the conclusion of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 Accordingly, the convictions are 43 AFFIRMED.