Opinion ID: 314947
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: NEPA and Matters Pertaining to Health and Natural

Text: Resources 36 There were, however, more significant environmental effects relating to both health and injury to natural resources, that had to be taken into account by the Corps in its decision not to file an impact statement. These problems related to storm water run-off, oil run-off from the parking lot, and traffic. They were the basic matter of two studies of Giffels Associates, and a constant subject of review of NCPC, originally raised by MNCPC in its consulting role in 1970. 37 Problems of this description would ordinarily call into play an environmental impact statement requirement. This could only be obviated, we believe, by a showing that the potential damage to river ecology, to health by floods, and to the air we breathe, was curtailed by modification of the project design. The water run-off was to be solved by the incorporation of a controlled run-off system based on the ponding of rain water on the roof. The use of the California Control package and testing by the Post Office of their vehicles was the plan by which air pollution was to be minimized. There was, however, no final plan for solving the oil run-off problem. 38 What should be the approach of the Court to an assessment in which an environmental impact is identified but not thought to require an impact statement, because the impact itself can be controlled by a change in the mission? We believe that an assessment statement must provide convincing reasons why a construction project with arguably potentially significant environmental impact does not require a detailed impact statement. In this sense we agree with both the majority and the dissent in Hanley II, supra. We agree with Judge Friendly's dissent that in cases of true insignificance an impact statement is not required, and, thus when there are arguably cases of true significance, an impact statement is required. 471 F.2d at 837. On the other hand, we can rely on a review of the record, here consisting of the assessment as supplemented by other submissions to NCPC, to determine whether the agency has supplied convincing reasons why potential impacts are truly insignificant. See Hanley II, Opinion of Mansfield, J., at 832-833. 39 There are a number of criteria that can be used by a court to make such a determination. First, did the agency take a hard look at the problem, as opposed to bald conclusions, unaided by preliminary investigation? On the record before us we believe this condition satisfied by two rather complete studies, by Giffels Associates and the Corps of Engineers. Second, did the agency identify the relevant areas of environmental concern? Here, the three significant environmental problems, water and oil run-off, and increased traffic, were the focus of discussion between the Postal Service and NCPC, as well as review by Giffels. 8 Appellants have raised no environmental concerns which were not the subject of such considerations. 9 We note that in Hanley II the majority remanded to the agency to consider factors not adequately identified or investigated in its 25 page assessment. 471 F.2d at 834. Third, as to problems studied and identified, does the agency make a convincing case that the impact is insignificant? 10 On our facts, we would characterize the position of the agency as admitting the true significance of potential impacts. 40 The agency has presented a justification for omitting an impact statement which presents, at least as to water runoff, an issue involving what we may term the fourth criterion: If there is impact of true significance has the agency convincingly established that changes in the project have sufficiently minimized it? 11 It is only because of differences in timing and particular focus that this is identified as a separate criterion, for in the last analysis changees in the project are not legally adequate to avoid an impact statement unless they permit a determination that such impact as remains, after the change, is not significant. 41 We have already made it clear that in cases involving genuine issues as to health, and environmental resources, there is a relatively low threshold for impact statements, and that an agency that relies on an assessment to dispense with an impact statement may well run risks not warranted by any countervailing benefits. 42 In the case before us, looking first at the problem of water run-off, we have no findings before us by the District Court on this matter, and we note the on-going concern evidenced by NCPC in its requests to the Postal Service, that more be done about this problem. 43 As to the oil run-off, the position of the agency is not that the problem has been solved, but rather that it cannot be. However, an inability to solve the problem would not justify failure to write a detailed impact statement concerning effect on environment, if there are significant effects on environment. 12 The policies of NEPA partly rest on informing Congress and the public about potential environmental effects, as well as exploring alternatives to the action which might lead to less environmental impact. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, supra. 44 If we had to decide this case on the merits on the record before us, we would be hard put to avoid a ruling that the requisite impact statement had erroneously been bypassed. As to water run-off, it is difficult to say that the agency has shown that the project changes have left the environmental effects devoid of significance. As to oil run-off, it does not appear that the agency has asserted that the problem is devoid of significance. 45 What counsels prudence on our part, however, is the fact that the record before us is one made up on an application for temporary injunction. It is traditional that appeals from the granting or denial of a temporary injunction generally involve matters of discretion with which an appellate court should hesitate to interfere. This is subject to an overriding doctrine that where the case has such a shape that it is governed by doctrines of law that the appellate court can reasonably identify, it should not hesitate to set forth the applicable legal principles merely because the application for permanent injunction has not been formally determined. Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 142, 158, 450 F.2d 603, 619 (1971). 46 The difficulty with the case before us lies, in part, in the reality that the NEPA issues have not been adequately focused by the parties and the trial court. This opinion sets forth our heft of the record as gleaned from the papers before us, but this is sketchy and has not been tested in the crucible of a trial. Even though we have identified the drift of our legal impressions, we hesitate to crystallize them into a mandate on this sketchy basis. Accordingly, we refrain from either affirming or reversing the District Court's denying of a preliminary injunction, and we remand for further investigation by that Court, using whatever procedures are required. 13 See Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). At the end of the road, unless the problems of water run-off and oil run-off can be determined to lack significance perhaps as a result of project modification, a full impact statement under 102(C) would seem to be indicated. 14 The assessment of probability of success that governs decisions on preliminary injunction would be affected by like consideration. 47