Opinion ID: 77631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Circuit Law on Arrestees under the ADA

Text: 48 In order to state a Title II claim, a plaintiff generally must prove (1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that the exclusion, denial of benefit, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability. See Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1079 (11th Cir.2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132). 49 The parties do not contest that Bircoll is a qualified individual with a disability under the first prong, or that Miami-Dade is a public entity under the second prong. 14 Rather, the dispute in this case is over whether Bircoll was excluded from participation in, or denied the benefit of, some services, programs, or activities of Miami-Dade by reason of his disability, or was subjected to discrimination by Miami-Dade by reason of his disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 50 Relying heavily on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Rosen, in which a deaf person was arrested for DUI, Miami-Dade argues that arrests of deaf persons are not services, programs, or activities that fall within the parameters of the ADA. See Rosen, 121 F.3d at 157 ([C]alling a drunk driving arrest a `program or activity' of the County, the `essential eligibility requirements' of which (in this case) are weaving in traffic and being intoxicated, strikes us as a stretch of the statutory language and of the underlying legislative intent.). In Rosen, the Fourth Circuit concluded that even [i]f we assume, however, that the police were required [under the ADA] to provide auxiliary aids at some point in the process, that point certainly cannot be placed before the arrival at the stationhouse. The police do not have to get an interpreter before they can stop and shackle a fleeing bank robber, and they do not have to do so to stop a suspected drunk driver, conduct a field sobriety test, and make an arrest. Id. at 158. 51 In reply, Bircoll emphasizes that Rosen was decided before the Supreme Court's Yeskey decision, which concluded that a state prisoner has a cognizable ADA claim if he is denied participation in a required activity in prison by reason of his disability. Additionally, Bircoll relies on three other circuits' decisions indicating that arrestees may state cognizable ADA claims under Title II. See Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795 (5th Cir.2000); Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir.1999); Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1998). However, none of these cases extends the ADA as far as Bircoll claims. 52 For example, in Hainze, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Title II does not apply to an officer's on-the-street responses to reported disturbances or other similar incidents . . . prior to the officer's securing the scene and ensuring that there is no threat to human life. 207 F.3d at 801 (emphasis added). The police officers responded to a request to take a mentally ill individual, Hainze, to a hospital. Id. at 797. When they arrived at the scene, Hainze, with a knife in his hand, began to walk toward one of the officers. Id. In concluding that the ADA did not govern the police officers' actions, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that officers already face the onerous task of frequently having to instantaneously identify, assess, and react to potentially life-threatening situations. Id. at 801. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that requiring police officers called to the scene of a reported disturbance to factor in whether their actions are going to comply with the ADA, in the presence of exigent circumstances and prior to securing the safety of themselves, other officers, and any nearby civilians, would pose an unnecessary risk to innocents. Id. 53 Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit indicated that [o]nce the area was secure and there was no threat to human safety . . . deputies would have been under a duty to reasonably accommodate Hainze's disability in handling and transporting him to a mental health facility.  Id. at 802 (emphasis added). 15 54 Likewise, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the ADA applies to police transportation of the arrestee from the scene to the police station. See Gorman, 152 F.3d at 912-13. In that case, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that [t]ransportation of an arrestee to the station house is . . . a service of the police within the meaning of the ADA. Id. at 912. The Eighth Circuit decided that the `benefit' [arrestee] Gorman sought . . . was to be handled and transported in a safe and appropriate manner consistent with his disability. Id. at 913 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)). The Eighth Circuit ruled that Gorman's allegations pass[ed] the threshold required to bring a case under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and reversed the judgment for the defendants. 16 Id. 55 The Tenth Circuit also recognized the possibility that arrestees may be able to state an ADA claim based on police conduct during an arrest. Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1220-21. However, the Tenth Circuit ultimately left the theory of such a claim an open question in the circuit because the facts did not show a wrongful arrest based on a disability and the plaintiff made no claim that the police had failed to accommodate his disability during the arrest. Id. at 1221. 17 56 We need not enter the circuits' debate about whether police conduct during an arrest is a program, service, or activity covered by the ADA. This is because Bircoll, in any event, could still attempt to show an ADA claim under the final clause in the Title II statute: that he was subjected to discrimination by a public entity, the police, by reason of his disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Indeed, this Court already has explained that the final clause of § 12132 protects qualified individuals with a disability from being `subjected to discrimination by any such entity,' and is not tied directly to the `services, programs, or activities' of the public entity. Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 821-22 (11th Cir.1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132). We said in Bledsoe that this final clause in Title II `is a catch-all phrase that prohibits all discrimination by a public entity, regardless of the context.' Id. at 822 (quoting Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 44-45 (2d Cir.1997), overruled on other grounds by Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163 (2d Cir.2001)); see also Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1220 (noting that the magistrate judge ignored the second basis for a Title II claim and emphasizing the disjunctive language  or be subjected to discrimination in the final clause of § 12132). 57 In this case, Bircoll identifies three separate points at which he contends Miami-Dade subjected him to discrimination by reason of his hearing disability: (1) the field sobriety tests on the roadside; (2) the consent warning and Intoxilyzer test at the police station; and (3) his incarceration at TGK. Specifically, Bircoll argues that he was entitled to effective communication with the police throughout his arrest; that he needed auxiliary aids, such as an oral interpreter, for effective communication during these tests; and that the police failed to make reasonable modifications to their procedures to ensure effective communication, thereby subjecting him to discrimination in violation of the ADA. 58 Bircoll claims that if he had been provided with auxiliary aids, he would have understood what the police were asking him to do, would have consented to and passed the Intoxilyzer test, and would not have lost his license or gone to jail. Even if he would have failed the Intoxilyzer test, Bircoll argues that he still was injured because with effective communication he would have consented to the Intoxilyzer test and would not have had his license automatically suspended. We examine each point at which Bircoll claims that he was denied effective communication and discriminated against because of his disability.