Opinion ID: 72176
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unconstitutional Prior Restraint

Text: 33 Defendants argue that because the preliminary injunction does not remedy past or threatened (future) unlawful conduct, it is non-remedial and amounts to an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech. Because it is a prior restraint, defendants contend, the preliminary injunction should be subject to strict scrutiny and the concomitant presumption against its constitutionality. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 766, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 2525, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994). Their theory derives from Justice Scalia's concurrence in the Supreme Court's summary denial of certiorari in Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S. 1110, 115 S.Ct. 2264, 132 L.Ed.2d 269 (1995). In his Lawson concurrence, Scalia argued that when courts cut injunctions loose from their remedial moorings, they allow the injunctions to drift dangerously close to unconstitutional prior restraints: 34 All speech-restricting injunctions are prior restraints in the literal sense of  'administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur.'  [Cit.] Precedent shows that a speech-restricting injunction that is not issued as a remedy for an adjudicated or impending violation of law is also a prior restraint in the condemnatory sense, that is, a prior restraint of the sort prohibited by the First Amendment.... The danger that speech-restricting injunctions may serve as a powerful means to suppress disfavored views is obvious enough even when they are based on a completed or impending violation of law. Once such a basis has been found, later speech may be quashed, or not quashed, in the discretion of a single official, who necessarily knows the content and viewpoint of the speech subject to the injunction; the injunction is enforceable through civil contempt, a summary process without the constitutional protection of a jury trial; and the only defense available to the enjoined party is factual compliance with the injunction, not unconstitutionality.... 35 Lawson, 515 U.S. at 1113, 115 S.Ct. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring). 36 We need not address this argument, however, because we have carefully adhered to the principle that injunctions must be remedial. Cf. id. at 1111-12, 115 S.Ct. at 2265. As the Court in Madsen recognized, [i]njunctions ... are remedies imposed for violations (or threatened violations) of a legislative or judicial decree. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764, 114 S.Ct. at 2524. 13 37 The Supreme Court in Madsen rejected a prior restraint argument similar to the one asserted by defendants in this case, holding: 38 Not all injunctions which may incidentally affect expression, however, are prior restraints in the sense that that term was used in New York Times Co. [v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971) ], or Vance [v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 100 S.Ct. 1156, 63 L.Ed.2d 413 (1980) (per curiam) ]. Here petitioners are not prevented from expressing their message in any one of several different ways; they are simply prohibited from expressing it within the 36-foot buffer zone. Moreover, the injunction was issued not because of the content of petitioners' expression, as was the case in New York Times Co. and Vance, but because of their prior unlawful conduct. 39 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763 n. 2, 114 S.Ct. at 2524 n. 2. We discuss the Madsen context in detail below. Suffice it to say at this point that the context in Madsen is not distinguishable in principle from the instant context. In both cases, the trial court had made a judicial determination that the defendants' past conduct was harassing and unlawful. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757-58, 763-65, 114 S.Ct. at 2521, 2524; see also Schenck, --- U.S. at ---- n. 6, 117 S.Ct. at 865 n. 6. Although defendants in this case argue that their past conduct was not unlawful, the district court clearly found otherwise. 14 After summarizing defendants' past conduct, the district court concluded: The conduct of the defendants is a nuisance. 15 On the basis of Madsen, we readily conclude that the instant preliminary injunction, as modified in this opinion, does not constitute a prior restraint. 40 2. Whether the Preliminary Injunction Burdens More Speech than Necessary to Serve Significant Government Interests 41
42 Defendants rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994), to argue that the preliminary injunction unconstitutionally abridges their First Amendment rights. Because the Court in Madsen set forth a new standard by which to judge First Amendment challenges to injunctions, and because Madsen arose in a similar factual context, we pause to examine that case in some detail. 43 Madsen arose out of abortion protest activities in Florida. A Florida state court permanently enjoined the defendant protesters from blocking or interfering with public access to the clinic and from physically abusing people entering or leaving the clinic. Six months later, plaintiffs sought to broaden the injunction when the protesters continued their unlawful conduct. The Florida trial court found that the protesters had impeded access to the clinic by congregating on the street leading up to the clinic and by marching up to the clinic's driveways. It found that as vehicles heading toward the clinic slowed to allow the protesters to move out of the way, sidewalk counselors would approach and attempt to disburse anti-abortion literature. The number of people outside the clinic varied from a handful to 400, and their volume varied from singing and chanting to the use of loudspeakers and bullhorns. The court found that these protests took a physical toll on the clinic's patients. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 757-58, 114 S.Ct. at 2521. Doctors and clinic workers were also picketed at their residences and generally harassed. Id. 16 44 In Madsen, the abortion protesters first argued that because the injunction only restricted the speech of anti-abortion protesters, it necessarily was content- or viewpoint-based. Id. at 761-63, 114 S.Ct. at 2523. The Court explicitly rejected this argument on the ground that an injunction, by its very nature, applies only to a particular group or to individuals. Id. The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech 'without reference to the content of the regulated speech.'  Id. (citations omitted). In Madsen, the trial court had not enjoined actors on the basis of their speech, but rather on the basis of their conduct. Id. at 763-65, 114 S.Ct. at 2524. Thus, because the injunction was not content-based, it was not subject to heightened scrutiny. 17 Id. 45 Turning to the injunction, the Court in Madsen developed a new standard for evaluating content-neutral injunctions. The Court noted that the constitutionality of content-neutral, generally applicable statutes is typically assessed under the standards set forth in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791-92, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2753-54, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989), and similar cases. Because the areas surrounding clinics are typically traditional public fora, these cases require that time, place, and manner regulations be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764, 114 S.Ct. at 2524. However, injunctions carry a greater risk of restricting speech than generally applicable statutes because injunctions apply only to the person whose prior unlawful conduct prompted the injunction. Accordingly, the Court determined that the standard time, place, and manner analysis was not sufficiently rigorous. Id. at 763-67, 114 S.Ct. at 2524-25. Instead, the Court adopted a new, purposefully stricter standard: whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest. Id. at 765, 114 S.Ct. at 2525. 46 The Court in Madsen readily found that numerous significant government interests were protected by the injunction in that case. These included the State's interest in: (1) protecting a woman's freedom to seek lawful medical or counseling services in connection with her pregnancy; (2) ensuring public safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on public streets and sidewalks, and protecting the property rights of all citizens; (3) ensuring residential privacy; and (4) analogously, protecting captive patients from targeted picketing. Id. at 767-69, 114 S.Ct. at 2526. Accordingly, the Court examined each contested provision of the injunction to determine whether it burdened more speech than necessary to serve these significant government interests. 47 First, the trial court had enjoined the protesters from congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering any portion of the public right-of-way or private property within 36 feet of the property line of the clinic. Id. The Court held that the buffer zone on public property was no more broad than necessary to protect unfettered passage to and from the clinic and to ensure that the protesters did not block traffic on the adjoining road. 18 Id. at 769-71, 114 S.Ct. at 2527. As to the private property, the Court noted that patients and staff attempting to reach the clinic did not have to traverse private property abutting the clinic and that nothing in the record indicated that the protesters' activity on the private property obstructed access to the clinic. Id. at 771-73, 114 S.Ct. at 2528. Absent such evidence, the Court held that this portion of the buffer zone burdened more speech than necessary to protect access to the clinic. Id. 48 Second, the injunction restrained the protesters from singing, chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns, auto horns, sound amplification equipment, or other sounds or images observable to or within earshot of the patients inside the [c]linic during the hours of 7:30 a.m. through noon on Mondays through Saturdays. Id. The Court held that the noise restrictions burdened no more speech than necessary to ensure the health and well-being of patients at the clinic. Id. In so holding, the Court noted that it had taken into account the place to which the restriction applied in determining whether the restriction burdened more speech than necessary; to-wit: The First Amendment does not demand that patients in a medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of political protests. Id. 49 Third, as noted, the injunction also restrained the protesters from projecting images observable (i.e., signs) outside the clinic. The Court held that this prohibition burdened more speech than necessary to achieve the purpose of limiting threats to clinic patients or their families. Id. at 773-75, 114 S.Ct. at 2529. It so held on the grounds that patients inside the clinic could easily avoid these images by pulling the curtains on the clinic's windows. Id. 50 Fourth, the injunction ordered that the protesters refrain from physically approaching people seeking the clinic's services unless such person indicates a desire to communicate in an area within 300 feet of the clinic. Id. The Court held that this provision burdened more speech than necessary to prevent intimidation and to ensure access to the clinic because it prohibited all uninvited approaches of patients regardless of how peaceful the contact may be. Id. Before such approaches could be restrained, the Court required evidence that the protesters' speech was independently proscribable (e.g., fighting words or threats) or was otherwise indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm. Id. 51 Finally, the Court examined the injunction's restraint of picketing, demonstrating, or using sound amplification equipment within 300 feet of the residences of clinic staff. The injunction also enjoined demonstrators from impeding access to streets which provided the sole access to streets on which those residences were located. Id. As to noise, the Court upheld the restriction on the same grounds it used to uphold noise outside the clinics. Id. As to the picketing, the Court found that the 300-foot zone was broader than necessary to protect particular residences given the evidence in that case. Id. at 775-77, 114 S.Ct. at 2530. It found that a smaller zone could have accomplished this result. Id. at 775-77, 114 S.Ct. at 2530. 19 52
53 In Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 855, 137 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997), the Supreme Court addressed another challenge to an injunction in the abortion protest context, and reaffirmed the principles articulated in Madsen. 20 The abortion protesters enjoined in Schenck had engaged in a variety of activities, including blocking the plaintiff abortion clinics' driveways and entrances, disrupting clinic operations by entering the clinics, flinging themselves onto patients' cars, crowding cars approaching the clinics, and distributing literature to and conversing with patients approaching the clinics. Id. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 860. The protesters also had used more aggressive techniques, such as yelling in the faces of women approaching the clinics; jostling, grabbing, pushing, and shoving women attempting to enter the clinics; and elbowing, grabbing, and spitting on volunteers who escorted patients to the clinics. Id. Protesters called sidewalk counselors walked alongside women attempting to enter the clinics and tried to persuade the women not to have abortions; sometimes these efforts degenerated into physical altercations. Id. 54 The district court in Schenck issued an injunction which barred the protesters from demonstrating within a fixed 15-foot buffer zone around the clinic doorways, driveways, and parking lot entrances. The injunction also established 15-foot floating buffer zones around people and vehicles entering or leaving the clinic facilities. A cease and desist provision in the injunction allowed two sidewalk counselors to enter the buffer zones, but the sidewalk counselors were required to retreat 15 feet from the person they were counseling if the person indicated a desire not to be counseled. See id. at ---- - ---- & n. 3, 117 S.Ct. at 861-62 & n. 3. 55 The Court began its analysis by reviewing its Madsen decision, noting that the test to be applied when evaluating content-neutral injunctions is  'whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.'  Id. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 864 (quoting Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765, 114 S.Ct. at 2525). The Court explained that the injunction at issue protected the same significant government interests as were implicated in Madsen: ensuring public safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on public sidewalks and streets, protecting property rights, and protecting women's freedom to obtain pregnancy-related services. Id. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 866. The Court then turned to an examination of the challenged portions of the injunction. 56 The Court struck down the 15-foot floating buffer zones around people approaching the clinics because the floating buffer zones burdened more speech than was necessary to serve the relevant government interests. Id. at ---- - ----, 117 S.Ct. at 866-67. The Court explained that the floating buffer zones prevented protesters from engaging in speech which lie[s] at the heart of the First Amendment, such as having a normal conversation with people entering or leaving the clinics or handing leaflets to people entering or leaving the clinics who are walking on the public sidewalks. Id. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 867. Additionally, the floating nature of the buffer zones made it difficult for protesters who wished to be in compliance with the injunction to know how to do so because the protesters would have to continually readjust their positions as numerous people entered and exited the clinics. Id. at ---- & n. 9, 117 S.Ct. at 867 & n. 9. The floating buffer zones thus created impermissible uncertainty about what activity was allowed under the injunction, and created a substantial risk that more speech would be burdened than the injunction actually prohibited. Id. at ---- - ----, 117 S.Ct. at 867-68. 21 57 The Court, however, upheld the 15-foot fixed buffer zones around clinic doorways, driveways, and parking lot entrances. Id. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 868. The Court explained that these fixed buffer zones were necessary to ensure that people and vehicles could enter and exit the clinic facilities, and that the imposition of such fixed buffer zones was appropriate in light of the protesters' past conduct. Id. at ---- - ----, 117 S.Ct. at 868-69. The Court also noted that it would defer to the District Court's reasonable assessment of the number of feet necessary to keep the entrances clear. Id. ----, 117 S.Ct. at 869. 22 58