Opinion ID: 692321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Puentes's Specialty Doctrine Claim

Text: 33 Our review of an order of extraditability presents a legal question concerning the interpretation of a treaty and is, therefore, subject to plenary review. Cheng Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 734 F.Supp. 988, 990 (S.D.Fla.1990). The extradition treaty between the United States and Uruguay provides that an extradited person shall not be detained, tried or punished in the territory of the requesting Party for an offense other than that for which extradition has been granted.... Treaty on Extradition and Cooperation in Penal Matters, April 6, 1973, United States-Uruguay, art. XIII, P.I.A.S. No. 10850. Puentes makes the unassailable assertion that the prosecutable offense from an extradition proceeding is the offense specified in the warrant of extradition. In its order granting the government's extradition request, the Uruguayan court found as 34 valid, the claim of the United States of North America, in respect of the following fact: as from an unknown date, approximately located about 1982, continually, up to November 29, 1988, the required person, together with other persons, associated in order to import cocaine into the territory of the United States, from some place abroad from it. 35 The order further stated: It can be taken for evidenced that Puentes had, at least, projected and organized the transporting of cocaine on board a freighter vessel in 1985. (Emphasis added.) According to Puentes, the Uruguayan court's reference to the 1985 Orient Star conspiracy limits the government's prosecution to that single instance of cocaine smuggling. To buttress this assertion, he points out that the two affidavits the United States submitted to Uruguay in support of his extradition only referred to the Orient Star conspiracy. We disagree. 36 Puentes's prosecution under the superseding indictment did not violate the doctrine of specialty. Article X of the extradition treaty provides in relevant part: 37 The requested party may require the requesting party to produce evidence to establish probable cause that the person claimed has committed the offense for which extradition is requested. The requested Party may refuse the extradition request if an examination of the case in question shows that the warrant is manifestly ill-founded. 38 Treaty on Extradition and Cooperation in Penal Matters, April 6, 1973, United States-Uruguay, art. X, P.I.A.S. No. 10850. The extradition warrant's reference to the Orient Star conspiracy indicates that, in the Uruguayan court's opinion, the United States had submitted sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe that Puentes had committed the offense charged in Count IV of the original indictment. Essentially, Puentes argues that a foreign court may limit the quantum of proof used to secure a conviction in an American court. This court previously rejected that argument when it held that the doctrine of specialty does not purport to regulate the scope of proof admissible in the judicial forum of the requisitioning state. United States v. Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d 1402, 1414 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1032, 110 S.Ct. 1484, 108 L.Ed.2d 620 (1990). Additionally, we do not believe that the superseding indictment materially altered the substance of the offense for which Puentes has been extradited. Count IV of the superseding indictment merely added additional defendants and extended the conspiratorial period for three years. 2. Sentencing 39 Whether a defendant should be sentenced under the Sentencing Guidelines is a question of law which we review de novo. United States v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 201, 203 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1037, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 789 (1992). We reject Puentes's claim that he should not have been sentenced under the Sentencing Guidelines that became effective on November 1, 1987. His claim is based on the assertion, which we have just rejected, that the extradition treaty limits his prosecution to the Orient Star cocaine shipment in 1985. Count IV of the indictment listed a conspiratorial period that extended beyond November 1, 1987. Moreover, even if the indictment limited the length of the conspiracy to the date specified in the original indictment, November 29, 1988, the government presented evidence at trial of Puentes's role in the successful importation of 380 kilograms of cocaine into Puerto Rico in May of 1988. In United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1123 (11th Cir.1990), this court held that the Sentencing Guidelines governed a conspiracy to possess cocaine which began prior to the effective date of the Sentencing Guidelines and continued past that date. 3. Cumulative Evidentiary Error Claims A. Admission of Wiretap Transcripts 40 Puentes challenges the district court's admission of the contents of wiretap conversations between him and coconspirators in 1985. The district court admitted the testimony of Federico Perez, an inspector with the Spanish National Police, who read from a document which contained the Spanish transcription of these taped recordings. Puentes makes the following objections: the evidence should not have been admitted because the prosecution failed to produce the original tape recordings; Inspector Perez lacked personal knowledge of the contents of the transcriptions; the government did not adequately authenticate the transcripts from which the officer testified, in violation of Federal Rules of Evidence 901; and, the district court incorrectly found that Perez adequately established the identity of Puentes as one of the voices on the tape. 41 The government contends it could not provide Puentes with the original tape recordings because, as Inspector Perez testified, the tapes were erased as a matter of routine procedure after three or four years had passed. The government also contends that because Inspector Perez was one of the two Spanish officers who conducted the wiretap, he was not barred from giving testimonial evidence concerning the contents of recorded conversations which he overheard. Finally, the government also contends that it satisfied rule 901's authentication requirement, and Inspector Perez's lack of familiarity with Puentes's voice prior to commencement of the wiretaps does not undermine the reliability of his identification of Puentes's voice at trial. 42 We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1510 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 890, 112 S.Ct. 253, 116 L.Ed.2d 207 (1991). We are satisfied that the government properly authenticated the contents of the transcripts in compliance with Federal Rules of Evidence 901(a). The inspector testified that he heard every conversation that was contained in the transcripts; that the conversations were then written out in longhand; that the longhand transcription was then compared to the recorded conversation; and, finally, that the longhand transcription was then dictated to a secretary and the typewritten product compared to the longhand transcription. Moreover, the lack of the actual tape recordings does not bar the admission of the transcripts' contents into evidence, when as in this case, an independent ground for their authentication exists. The defense was able to cross-examine Inspector Perez concerning the manner in which the recordings were transcribed. The jury was, therefore, able to draw its own conclusions as to authenticity of the evidence. We also note that Puentes does not contend that the tapes were erased in bad faith. See James v. Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562, 1567-68 n. 4 (11th Cir.1992). Finally, rule 901(b)(5) does not require Inspector Perez to have been familiar with Puentes's voice prior to commencing the wiretapping activity. At trial, Inspector Perez testified that he became familiar with Puentes's voice during the two-month wiretap surveillance. This testimony satisfied the requirements of rule 901(b)(5). B. Bruton claim 43 The government presented evidence through Inspector Valdomoro of the Spanish Police who testified as to the circumstances surrounding the arrest of Puentes's coconspirator, Indelacio Iglesias. Inspector Valdomoro, in response to a prosecutor's question, apparently stated in Spanish that at Iglesias's arrest he implicated Puentes in the drug conspiracy. Puentes characterizes Valdomoro's statement as an incriminating hearsay statement of a non-testifying codefendant, and argues that he was therefore entitled to a mistrial because five of the jurors were Cuban-Americans who understood what had been said. The government disputes Puentes's interpretation of what Valdomoro said. 44 A district court's ruling on a motion for a mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United v. Cousins, 842 F.2d 1245, 1247 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 853, 109 S.Ct. 139, 102 L.Ed.2d 111 (1988). Our review of the record suggests that Inspector Valdomoro stated in Spanish that at Iglesias's arrest he made statements which caused a Spanish judge to order Puentes's arrest. These remarks, while inappropriate, were not a violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). Inspector Valdomoro volunteered his remarks in response to a prosecution question designed to elicit a yes or no response. Additionally, the district court sustained Puentes's objection, and the district court instructed the jury to disregard the remarks. The rule in this circuit is that evidence withdrawn from the jury with a court's direction that it be disregarded may not be the basis of reversible error, unless a significant possibility exists that the words had a substantial impact on the jury's verdict. United States v. Ruz-Salazar, 764 F.2d 1433, 1437 (11th Cir.1985). We think it highly unlikely that Inspector Valdomoro's statements had a substantial impact on the jury. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Puentes's new trial motion.