Opinion ID: 788141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Of the Judgment Bar Provision

Text: 24 The FTCA provides that [t]he judgment in an action under section 1346(b) of this title shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2676. The bar was intended to prevent dual recovery from both the Government and its employees and to avoid the waste of Government resources in defending repetitive suits. See Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1437-38 (9th Cir.1994). Moreover, [s]ince a judgment in an action against the United States under the FTCA will constitute a [judgment bar] in favor of the employee whose act gave rise to the claim, the rule increases the likelihood that claims for torts [will] be made against the United States rather than, as Bivens suits, against the employee. Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 333 (2d Cir.1978). And [t]hat is as it should be. Id. A Government agent should not be made to suffer alone an ignominious financial ruin. Id. Indeed, [c]ompensation for incidental harm resulting from the Government's pursuit of its... interests is more justly borne by the entire body politic than by agents of the Government[] who, out of [excess] zeal, exceeded the outer limits of their delegated authority. Id. 25 In addition, Congress ... was concerned about the [G]overnment's ability to marshal the manpower and finances to defend subsequent suits against its employees. See Gasho, 39 F.3d at 1437 (noting that [t]he prevention of dual recovery ... is not the only purpose of the statute). At the Congressional hearings on the statute, [o]ne witness testified that multiple suits imposed a `very substantial burden' on the [G]overnment. Id. (quoting Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1942)). Moreover, included in the legislative history is a statement that `[i]t is just and desirable that the burden of redressing wrongs of this character be assumed by the Government alone within limits, leaving the employee at fault to be dealt with under the usual disciplinary controls.' Gilman v. United States, 206 F.2d 846, 848 n. 3 (9th Cir.1953) (quoting S.Rep. No. 1196, at 5 (1942) (statement of Francis Shea, Assistant Attorney General)). 26 In reaching its conclusion that Section 2676 did not apply in the present context, the District Court drew a distinction between cases in which claims are dismissed for a procedural error (as the court characterized a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA) and cases in which claims are dismissed on the merits. See Hallock II, 281 F.Supp.2d at 427 (citing, e.g., Gasho, 39 F.3d at 1436 (determination on summary judgment), and Farmer, 275 F.3d at 962 (dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b))); see also Rodriguez v. Handy, 873 F.2d 814, 816 (5th Cir.1989) (FTCA claims determined pursuant to a bench trial); Arevalo v. Woods, 811 F.2d 487, 488 (9th Cir.1987) (same); Serra v. Pichardo, 786 F.2d 237, 239 (6th Cir.1986) (FTCA claims determined in a jury trial). Although the Government cites Gasho for the proposition that Section 2676 speaks of `judgment' and suggests no distinction between judgments favorable and judgments unfavorable to the Government, 39 F.3d at 1437, the District Court was correct to cite Gasho as a case decided on the merits. 27 In Hoosier Bancorp of Indiana, Inc. v. Rasmussen, 90 F.3d 180 (7th Cir.1996), however, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision applying Section 2676 to bar a Bivens claim on the basis of a prior judgment dismissing an FTCA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Circuit Court join[ed] the conclusion that any FTCA judgment, regardless of its outcome, bars a subsequent Bivens action on the same conduct that was at issue in the prior judgment. Id. at 185 (internal quotation marks omitted). We do not stand with the Seventh Circuit in its analysis of the issue before us, nor do we adopt the District Court's characterization of the dismissal of plaintiffs' FTCA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a procedural loss. Hallock II, 281 F.Supp.2d at 428 ([P]laintiffs' earlier procedural loss does not prevent them from pursuing enforcement of their substantive rights against the proper defendants.). 28 As we see it, an action brought under the FTCA and dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it falls within an exception to the restricted waiver of sovereign immunity provided by the FTCA does not result in a judgment in an action under section 1346(b) [the Federal Tort Claims Act]. 28 U.S.C. § 2676. This is so because the action was not properly brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act in the first place and is a nullity. We hold that for the judgment bar to apply, the action must first be a proper one for consideration under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In other words, it must fit within the category of cases for which sovereign immunity has been waived. If it does not, then a judgment declaring a lack of subject matter jurisdiction denotes that sovereign immunity has not been waived and that the case is not justiciable in any event. 29 We reject the District Court's approach because any number of procedural defects and/or reasons having nothing to do with the merits of the claim may justify dismissal of an action properly brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. For example, in an action properly pleaded under the FTCA, a judgment of dismissal based on the statute of limitations, laches, release, res judicata, or improper venue will justify the assertion of the judgment bar in a subsequent Bivens action. Indeed, even where an involuntary dismissal without prejudice is ordered pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b), the judgment entered thereon will constitute a complete bar if the action was one properly invoking jurisdiction under the FTCA. Cf. Farmer, 275 F.3d at 963-64.