Opinion ID: 1747260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Belvedere

Text: In its opinion, the First District concluded that  Belvedere controls by explicitly holding that [littoral] rights cannot be constitutionally reserved to the landowners as described in section 161.201. 31 Fla. L. Weekly at D1177, ___ So.2d at ____. Contrary to the First District, we do not find our decision in Belvedere controlling or even particularly relevant. In Belvedere, the Department of Transportation sought to acquire uplands in fee simple absolute, while expressly reserving the littoral rights to the former upland owners. 476 So.2d at 649. The Department severed the littoral rights in an attempt to limit the compensation for uplands in eminent domain proceedings. In Belvedere, we were particularly concerned that the former upland owners did not have the actual ability to exercise any of their reserved littoral rights since they held no easement or right to enter upon their former land. See id. at 651 (quoting Belvedere Dev. Corp. v. Div. of Admin., 413 So.2d 847, 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (Hersey, J., specially concurring)). Therefore, we held in Belvedere that littoral rights cannot be severed by condemnation proceedings without the consent of the upland owner. Id. at 653. In so holding, we emphasized that our decision was limited to the context of condemnation of upland property. See id. at 652. This case is clearly distinguishable from Belvedere. STBR is not arguing that the Act necessitates the condemnation of uplands. Thus, our holding that was limited to the context of condemnation of upland property is inapplicable. Furthermore, in contrast to the circumstances of Belvedere, upland owners under the Act continue to have the ability to exercise their littoral rights to access, use, and view. See §§ 161.201; 161.141. Given these significant differences, Belvedere does not apply here.