Opinion ID: 891666
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence to Establish Deliberate Intent to Kill

Text: {18} The only sufficiency of evidence argument that we need address in any greater detail is the one that was the primary focus of Defendant's appeal: whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's determination that he committed the killing with the deliberate intent to kill that distinguishes first-degree from second-degree murder. {19} In New Mexico, first-degree murder is defined as any kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1(A) (1994). Deliberate intention is intention that is arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and the weighing of the consideration for and against the proposed course of action. Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 25, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have emphasized that circumstantial evidence alone can amount to substantial evidence. Id. ¶ 29; see also Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 23, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829. Indeed, [i]ntent is subjective and is almost always inferred from other facts in the case. ... Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, ¶¶ 7-8, 140 N.M. 94, 140 P.3d 515 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (Deliberate intent may be inferred from the particular circumstances of the killing. ...). {20} To support his argument of legal insufficiency, Defendant relies primarily on Garcia, in which this Court held that there was insufficient evidence of deliberation to uphold a first-degree murder conviction. 114 N.M. at 271, 837 P.2d at 864. The defendant and the victim in Garcia drank large amounts of alcohol and quarreled for a number of hours before eventually agreeing to fight. The fight culminated in the defendant's stabbing the victim in his chest several times. Id. at 270, 837 P.2d at 863. We concluded that there was insufficient evidence in Garcia to support the jury's conclusion that ... [the defendant] decided to stab [the victim] as a result of careful thought; that he weighed the considerations for and against his proposed course of action; and that he weighed and considered the question of killing and his reasons for and against this choice. Id. at 274, 837 P.2d at 867; see also State v. Adonis, 2008-NMSC-059, ¶ 20, 145 N.M. 102, 194 P.3d 717 (concluding that the record contained no evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably infer that there had been any reflection or contemplation before the killing by the defendant). {21} The facts in Garcia have been distinguished many times by this Court from the facts in cases where there was sufficient evidence of deliberation. For example, in Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, ¶ 11, 140 N.M. 94, 140 P.3d 515, we found that the jury could draw rational inferences of deliberation from the large number of wounds, the evidence of a prolonged struggle, the evidence of the defendant's attitude toward the victim, and the defendant's own statements. Duran relied on a number of our precedents that had similarly rejected comparisons to the facts in Garcia: See Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 24, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829 (deliberate intent to kill established when strangulation took several minutes and defendant had motive to kill victim); Sosa, 2000-NMSC-036, ¶ 14, 129 N.M. 767, 14 P.3d 32 (evidence that defendant went armed to victim's home, waited for victim to arrive, shot at unarmed victim, and continued attack after victim tried to flee supported inference of deliberate intent); State v. Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, ¶ 76, 128 N.M. 192, 991 P.2d 477 (jury could infer defendant formed deliberate intent to kill victim when defendant told victim to get back in his car then shot victim several times from behind); Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 28, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176 (deliberate intent inferred from defendant firing fatal shot at victim after victim was incapacitated and defenseless). Id. ¶ 8. {22} In this case, there was ample evidence from which a reasoning jury could have found that Defendant (1) was embittered by Green's rejection of him, (2) tried to hurt Green by making scandalous accusations to his ex-wife and the police, (3) made methodical plans for a trip to New Mexico in pursuit of Green, (4) surreptitiously followed Green to Carlsbad, (5) stalked Green in Carlsbad over a period of days, (6) found out about Green's plans to attend the alcohol server class, (7) inquired about the time and place of Green's class, (8) found out when he could get Green alone during a class recess, (9) deliberately lay in wait for Green, (10) carried the screwdriver with him to the fatal confrontation for no other discernible purpose than to use it as a weapon, (11) stabbed Green so many times that it evidenced an effort at overkill, (12) immediately and calmly walked away from Green's bleeding body, (13) began getting rid of the evidence as he walked away, (14) fled the scene, (15) tried to deceive and evade the authorities, and (16) attempted to concoct a false alibi. {23} Not only may Defendant's acts before and during the crime provide evidence of intent, evidence of flight or an attempt to deceive the police may prove consciousness of guilt. State v. Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 29-30, 127 N.M. 207, 979 P.2d 718 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). {24} The sufficiency of the evidence in this case provides a striking contrast with that which we have found insufficient to justify a reasoned finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in State v. Vigil, 2010-NMSC-003, ___ N.M. ___, 226 P.3d 636 (No. 30,896, January 5, 2010), filed this same date. The totality of the evidence in this record certainly supports rational findings by a jury that Defendant personally inflicted the multiple deadly stab wounds and that he acted deliberately, rather than rashly and impulsively, in killing Green. Adonis, 2008-NMSC-059, ¶ 24, 145 N.M. 102, 194 P.3d 717. The jury would have been amply justified in reasoning from the evidence in this record that Defendant made and carried out a plan over a two-week period to exact revenge on Green for rejecting him and to make sure that if he could not have Green, no one else ever would. We therefore hold that substantial evidence supported the jury's determination that Defendant was guilty of willful, deliberate, and premeditated first-degree murder.