Opinion ID: 785568
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: church arson prevention act

Text: 27 Corum was also charged and convicted of three violations of the Church Arson Prevention Act, which provides in relevant part: 28 (a) Whoever, in any of the circumstances referred to in subsection (b) of this section — 29 (2) intentionally obstructs, by force or by threat of force, any person in the enjoyment of that person's free exercise of religious beliefs, or attempts to do so.... 30 shall be punished as provided in subsection (d). 31 (b) The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are that the offense is in or affects interstate or foreign commerce. 32 18 U.S.C. §§ 247(a)(2) and (b). The offense in this case is the intentional obstruction of or attempt to obstruct the enjoyment of the free exercise of religious beliefs of the members of each of the three synagogues in the Twin Cities area. 33 Corum contends his convictions under the Church Arson Prevention Act must be vacated because: (1) the Act is unconstitutional, and (2) there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to satisfy the interstate commerce requirement of the Act. The Government contends the Act is a constitutional exercise of legislative power and there was sufficient evidence to satisfy all of the requirements of the Act. As the constitutionality of the Church Arson Prevention Act is the threshold issue, we will consider it first. 1) CONSTITUTIONALITY 34 Corum contends the Church Arson Prevention Act is unconstitutional in that it violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Our review is de novo. United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 953 (8th Cir.1995). Our analysis of this issue is governed by Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). 35 The First Amendment commands in part that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. A statute will pass constitutional muster under Lemon so long as it: (1) has a secular legislative purpose, (2) neither advances nor inhibits religion in its principal or primary effect, and (3) does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). The requirement the law serve a secular legislative purpose does not mean the law's purpose must be unrelated to religion. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987) (recognizing that the government may sometimes accommodate religious practices without violating the Establishment Clause). [T]hat would amount to a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups, and the Establishment Clause has never been so interpreted. Id. Rather, the objective of the secular legislative purpose requirement is to prevent the relevant governmental decision maker-in this case Congress-from abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters. Id. 36 The Church Arson Prevention Act has a secular purpose, that is, to curb threats of violence directed against religious institutions that affect interstate commerce. See United States v. Grassie, 237 F.3d 1199, 1209 (10th Cir.2001) (finding Section 247's legislative history informative on the specific impact of church attacks on interstate commerce). Moreover, the Act does not endorse, sponsor, or advocate religion. The Act does not single out one religious belief for special protection, but applies equally to all faiths. Consequently, the Act constitutes a valid exercise of congressional authority under the Lemon analysis. The fact 18 U.S.C. § 247 may have been motivated in part by a religious purpose is not fatal. Lemon only requires there be a secular purpose for the legislation, not that there be a solely secular purpose. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) (For even though a statute that is motivated in part by a religious purpose may satisfy the first criterion [of the Lemon test].); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984) (The Court has invalidated legislation or governmental action on the ground that a secular purpose was lacking, but only when it has concluded there was no question that the statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious considerations.). 37 The Church Arson Prevention Act likewise passes the second prong of the Lemon test because it neither advances nor inhibits religion in its principal or primary effect. For a law to have forbidden `effects' under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273. Such is not the case here. The primary effect of the Act is to curb violence and threats of violence that adversely affect an aspect of interstate commerce Congress found to be particularly vulnerable to violent interference. Any effect the Act may have with respect to the protection of those who chose to worship free from interference would not constitute an advancement of religion by the government itself. See Carter v. Peters, 26 F.3d 697 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1003, 115 S.Ct. 517, 130 L.Ed.2d 423 (1994) (finding that a statute that enhanced penalties for crimes committed in houses of worship had neither a religious purpose nor the principal effect of advancing religion). 38 Finally, we find the Church Arson Prevention Act does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion as contemplated under Lemon. 18 U.S.C. § 247 prohibits all violent interference with religious exercise. Although the government, in its role as the Act's enforcer, may interact with religious organizations, it is not required to engage in persuasive monitoring of or intrusion into the activities of these organizations. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) (acknowledging that some interaction between church and state is inevitable and that some involvement between the two has always been tolerated). Corum warns of a lurking danger the Act will be applied inconsistently, thereby giving favor to a particular religion or religious ideology. As with any law, there exists the possibility that the Church Arson Prevention Act will be abused in application. However, we believe the best course of action is vigilance as opposed to invalidation of the Act. 2) SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 39 Finally, Corum contends his convictions under the Church Arson Prevention Act should be vacated because there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to establish the violation was in or affected interstate or foreign commerce. As previously noted, when addressing sufficiency of the evidence claims we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. We will reverse only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Carlisle, 118 F.3d 1271, 1273 (8th Cir.1997). 40 The record reveals that the government presented sufficient evidence for the jury to have determined the offense (threatening telephone calls) affected interstate commerce. 41 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.