Opinion ID: 1939904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Improper Sharing of Information

Text: Brown next argues that the trial court should have granted postconviction relief because of his trial counsel's alleged conflict of interest concerning the alleged improper sharing of information between the defense and the prosecution and the allegation that trial counsel's legal assistant had an affair with the lead detective. In his brief, Brown asserts three instances of ineffective assistance of counsel that were not part of his postconviction motion to the trial court. These include: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the credit card receipts; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the handwriting samples' evidentiary chain of custody; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the Bobby-Wanda note. While Brown's postconviction motion did argue that the lead detective and defense counsel's legal assistant had an improper personal relationship that led to the sharing of improper information about Mr. Brown's defense, he did not allege any of the specific instances of ineffective assistance of counsel listed above. Rather, the claims alleging improper sharing of information were made to support his broader claim that counsel operated under multiple conflicts of interest. Therefore, these claims are procedurally barred. See Thompson, 759 So.2d at 668 n. 12 (finding a claim procedurally barred because it was not alleged in the postconviction motion filed in the trial court); Finney v. State, 660 So.2d 674, 683 (Fla.1995) (stating that in order to be cognizable on appeal, claims must first be raised in the trial court). Even if the claims were not procedurally barred, trial counsel's testimony that he did not challenge the samples because they corroborated Brown's story and enhanced his truthfulness constitutes a well-reasoned trial strategy choice. See Kenon, 855 So.2d at 656 (Absent extraordinary circumstances, strategic or tactical decisions by trial counsel are not grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel claims.). As the trial court noted: Mr. Brown's story from the very beginning was, `I took the credit cards. I took the checkbook. I took the wallet. I took the car. I went to Orlando. I cashed the check.' Therefore, there was no reason for [trial counsel] to challenge the exemplars or the handwriting expert as it corroborated his story and made it sound like Mr. Brown was telling the truth. Therefore, Brown has not established deficient performance on the part of trial counsel. Next, as part of his postconviction motion, Brown argued that defense counsel's legal assistant and the lead detective were having an affair. This was argued to support his claim that trial counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest ... and that, but for this conflict, created by the personal relationship between counsel's assistant and the lead detective, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of Mr. Brown's trial would be different. Trial counsel testified that he first became aware of a possible relationship between his assistant and the detective when he saw the detective come by the office, fairly soon after the trial, to pick up his assistant for lunch. The assistant testified that she first met the detective during Brown's trial and that the extent of their conversation was small talk. She testified that, after the trial, it developed into a friendship that did have a physical aspect to it but that it did not last long and [that] it went back to a friendship. The detective testified that the relationship occurred after the trial and sentencing and that he did not discuss the case with her at any time during the trial. The trial court determined that while there might have been a relationship between the detective and trial counsel's legal assistant, that relationship occurred after the trial ended. [A]s long as the trial court's findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence, this Court will not `substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact, likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial court.' McLin v. State, 827 So.2d 948, 954 n. 4 (Fla.2002) (quoting Blanco v. State, 702 So.2d 1250, 1252 (Fla.1997)). Here, the trial court heard the testimony of all the relevant parties and determined that the affair occurred after the trial and sentencing. Its findings are entitled to deference. See Oats v. Dugger, 638 So.2d 20, 21 (Fla.1994) (upholding the trial court's finding that the defendant was competent despite conflicting expert opinions). In addition to alleging an affair between the legal assistant and the lead detective, Brown argued that this relationship led to the sharing of improper information between the defense and the State in the form of handwriting samples that the legal assistant apparently had taken. As part of its investigation, the State was trying to compare Brown's handwriting on various check and credit card transactions made in the victim's name. In addition, there was the Bobby-Wanda note, which Brown allegedly wrote. That note stated: Bobby: I'm going to run down to Arab, [Alabama] and see Wanda. I'll call you tonight from there. Also need to take care of something else. I'll be back up by Friday or will send your tag back by then. I appreciate your friendship. On October 2, 1990, the State filed its motion to compel handwriting samples. The court granted the motion on October 3, and the samples were taken on November 7. Trial counsel testified that the legal assistant was not present at the November 7 meeting. On November 27, the State filed a motion for additional samples of the Bobby-Wanda note, arguing that trial counsel was uncooperative during the November 7 meeting and directed his client not to provide some of the requested samples. Trial counsel apparently refused to grant the State's request that Brown write out the contents of the Bobby-Wanda note twenty to thirty times. On December 5, the court held a hearing regarding the State's motion for additional samples. At the hearing, trial counsel argued that the request for twenty to thirty handwriting samples of the same note was unreasonable. At the end of the hearing the judge ordered trial counsel to produce approximately ten samples of the note. According to the detective's report and evidence insert, the additional handwriting samples were collected on January 24, 1991, in the presence of trial counsel at the Polk County Jail. The Goodwin affidavit (named after the legal assistant) that both parties discuss is dated the same day. The legal assistant filed an affidavit to obtain handwriting samples. Brown alleges that the language used in the affidavit was similar to language that the lead prosecutor used in a letter to the detective regarding the procedure for obtaining such samples. Brown argued that this similarity evidenced an ongoing relationship between the legal assistant and the detective and that she was trying to assist the prosecution in gathering these samples. The trial court's order denying the postconviction motion does not mention this similarity but does conclude that the samples the detective obtained were not the same samples the legal assistant collected. The legal assistant testified that she collected these samples pursuant to trial counsel's instructions after the State requested further samples. When asked about the samples the legal assistant obtained, trial counsel testified that he had no independent recollection of the affidavit; however, he stated, I must have assumed that it was our job at that time [to obtain the writing samples] or [we] agreed to get it done. The trial court found that only the detective's samples were used at trial and that no improper information was shared. While the legal assistant's testimony was not in complete accord with trial counsel's (trial counsel did not specifically recall instructing the legal assistant to obtain the samples contained in the affidavit) the trial court's determination deserves deference. See Mason v. State, 597 So.2d 776, 779 (Fla.1992) (upholding the trial court's finding that defendant was competent despite conflicting testimony on the issue); cf. Padgett v. State, 780 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding, despite conflicting testimony at the evidentiary hearing, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting defendant's claim that he was coerced into entering the plea).