Opinion ID: 891631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: respondent's claims of prosecutorial misconduct are unfounded

Text: {23} Respondent also asserts that the disciplinary proceedings against him should be dismissed because of prosecutorial misconduct that was pervasive, incessant, and outrageous. To support his argument, Respondent relies on In re Stein, 2008-NMSC-013, 143 N.M. 462, 177 P.3d 513 (per curiam). Although we discussed and rejected claims of prosecutorial misconduct in Stein, we also questioned the applicability of the criminal law concept of prosecutorial misconduct within the context of an attorney disciplinary proceeding. Id. at ¶ 54. We continue to have reservations about the use of this concept outside the criminal law arena. See Cohen v. State Bd. of Med., 676 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996) (finding the criminal concept of prosecutorial misconduct inapplicable to administrative disciplinary proceedings); see also In re Oxman, 496 Pa. 534, 437 A.2d 1169, 1173 n. 11 (1981). As in Stein, we need not definitively decide its applicability because Respondent has failed to establish the kind of pervasive, incessant, and outrageous conduct the concept was intended to remedy. See State v. Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 37, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792. {24} For the most part, Respondent's claim of prosecutorial misconduct is based on claims that disciplinary counsel misused the discovery process, example, Respondent claims that disciplinary counsel concealed potentially exculpatory documents, suborned a false affidavit, misrepresented communications that disciplinary counsel had with Respondent, coached witnesses during discovery, and failed to provide Respondent with copies of subpoenas disciplinary counsel issued for witnesses he planned to call at the hearing. However, Respondent's claims in this regard are based on factual disputes that the hearing committee resolved against him when denying his motions to dismiss. While Respondent also claims that disciplinary counsel misrepresented to the hearing panel the nature of the admonishment disciplinary counsel received in Stein, the hearing panel could review our opinion in Stein and judge for itself whether disciplinary counsel was being forthright with the committee. Because Respondent's claims of prosecutorial misconduct depend on factual determinations that were resolved against him, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the hearing committee on questions of fact. See Bristol, 2006-NMSC-041, ¶ 15, 140 N.M. 317, 142 P.3d 905 (Because the hearing committee directly observes witness testimony, it is in the best position to weigh the evidence, resolve matters of credibility, and choose between the conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.). Moreover, other than general assertions of prejudice, Respondent failed to specifically demonstrate how any of disciplinary counsel's purported misconduct prejudiced Respondent's defense or would result in a different outcome if rectified. See In re Castellano, 119 N.M. 140, 144, 889 P.2d 175, 179 (1995) (per curiam) (holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice). For all of the foregoing reasons, we reject Respondent's claim of prosecutorial misconduct.