Opinion ID: 2318232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Carpen's Testimony

Text: In addition to the restitution issues, Hilton Silver raised two evidentiary issues on appeal. First, Hilton Silver objects to the Circuit Court's admission of Officer Carpen's testimony, arguing that the prosecutor failed to provide Carpen's written report prior to trial. The alleged discovery violation was raised during Silver's counsel's cross-examination of Carpen, when Silver's counsel learned that much of Carpen's testimony was contained in a report that the State apparently did not provide to Silver. Silver alleges that the State's failure to turn over the document prejudiced Hilton Silver's ownership defense. [21] Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(3) requires the State to provide the name and... the address of each State's witness whom the State's Attorney intends to call to prove the State's case in chief or to rebut alibi testimony, together with all written statements of the person that related to the offense charged[.] Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(1) further requires the State to produce [a]ll written and all oral statements of the defendant and any codefendant that relate to the offense charged[.] When the State fails to provide the necessary documents, the Circuit Court may select one of the following options: [T]he court may [1] order that party to permit the discovery of the matter not previously disclosed, [2] strike the testimony to which the undisclosed matter relates, [3] grant a reasonable continuance, [4] prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the matter not disclosed, [5] grant a mistrial, or [6] enter any other order appropriate under the circumstances. Md. Rule 4-263(n). Importantly, the same section provides that [t]he failure of a party to comply with a discovery obligation... does not automatically disqualify a witness from testifying[,] and that disqualification is within the discretion of the trial court. (emphasis added). As the statutory language suggests, we apply an abuse of discretion standard to a Court's decision whether to strike testimony due to a discovery violation. See, e.g., McLennan v. State, 418 Md. 335, 352-53, 14 A.3d 639, 649 (2011). After a close examination of the record, we find no merit in Silver's arguments that the Circuit Court abused its discretion in denying the motion to strike the testimony. Indeed, it is hard to see how this information surprised or prejudiced his case. Clearly, the Silvers were aware of the State's claim that Calypso, and the other horses, were owned by, or in the custody of, the Silvers. Moreover, Mr. Silver were given time to consider this testimony, an opportunity to cross-examine the State's witnesses regarding the ownership issues, and the opportunity to call his own witnesshis daughterto testify regarding his relative level of custody over the horses. Even if Silver's counsel was surprised by Carpen's claim that Hilton Silver had vaccinated the horses, this testimony was but one of many indicia of Silver's ownership that the State introduced at trial. It is entirely within the discretion of the Circuit Court to deny a motion to strike a witness's testimony, and that discretion was not abused here. Accordingly, we find no error in the Circuit Court's decision to deny Silver's motion to strike. Hilton Silver also argues that, even if denying the motion to strike would otherwise be within the Circuit Court's discretion, the Circuit Court failed to exercise that discretion and justify its decision to do so. Silver quotes Nelson v. State, 315 Md. 62, 70, 553 A.2d 667, 671 (1989), where we stated: If the judge has discretion, he must use it and the record must show that he used it. On review, a court must be able to determine that the judge did not merely apply some predetermined position. As the cases cited by Silver demonstrate, a Circuit Court is required to give its due attention to alleged discovery errors and, when appropriate, select an option for remedying that error from those listed in Maryland Rule 4-263(n). We disagree with Silver, however, and find that the Circuit Court did exercise its discretion in this case. After the discovery issue was raised, the Circuit Court directed the State to provide the material to the defendants, and gave the Silvers time to review the documents in question. The Circuit Court heard both the Silvers' and the State's position on the matter. The Circuit Court then chose to remedy the alleged discovery violation by order[ing] that party to permit the discovery of the matter not previously disclosed, and by grant[ing] a reasonable continuance[.] Here, the court did not apply some predetermined position, but instead saw that the Silvers were provided with the discovery material and given an opportunity to examine it, apparently to the satisfaction of the Silver's counsel. Our precedents do not require a trial court to engage in a prolonged and formal analysis of prejudice whenever a discovery error is alleged. Instead, a court is required to hear the arguments of the parties and determine the correct remedy, as the court did in this case.