Opinion ID: 3014312
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d 234, 241 (Pa. Super. 2003).

Text: Hawley argues that the use of the word “insure” in an explanatory comment to the rule, as opposed to “change,” or other similar words, demonstrates the intent of the 5 Pennsylvania Supreme Court for the provision to be applied retroactively. 3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court made clear in Commonwealth v. Rockwell Manufacturing, however, that such strained attempts to key in on a particular term in arguing for retroactive application will not succeed. 140 A.2d 854, 857-58 (Pa. 1958) (comparing Speck v. Philips, 51 A.2d 399 (Pa. Super. 1947), which included a discrete clause addressing retroactive application). If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in promulgating this rule of civil procedure, had intended retroactive application it would have clearly indicated as much through a separate clause or other clear statement of that desire. Id. Because Rule 1910.16-4(f)(3) does not support Hawley’s argument that his obligation to make the payments would have terminated upon Gilbert’s death, Pennsylvania’s longstanding public policy which favors a continuing obligation to provide support for unemancipated children poses an insurmountable hurdle to his appeal. 4 Cf. Ritter v. Ritter, 518 A.2d 319, 322 (Pa. Super. 1986); Bowen v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Public Welfare, 343 A.2d 690, 691 (Pa. Commw. 1975). It is true that death abates a divorce action and the obligation to pay alimony. See Drumheller v. Marcello, 516 Pa. 428, 432 (1987)); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3707 (the right 3 That comment states, “The new language is intended to insure alimony tax treatment of unallocated orders pursuant to § 71 of the Internal Revenue Code.” 4 Hawley argues that the Tax Court erred in failing to reconcile its decision in this case with the Tax Court opinions in Lawton v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 153 (1999), and Simpson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 191 (1999), which held that unallocated payments are considered alimony. We agree with the Tax Court’s distinguishing treatment of those cases, however, in that neither case considered the application of subparagraph (D) of Code § 71(b)(1). 6 to receive alimony terminates automatically at the death of the payee). Yet the obligation to pay child support remains. Courts are bound to promote the best interests of the children. See Oeler v. Oeler, 594 A.2d 649, 651 (Pa. 1991). Even if the technical obligation to make payments under the order to Gilbert would have ended upon her death, the obligation to make substitute payments would have continued because Hawley would still have been required to support his children. 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4321(2) (“Parents are liable for the support of their children who are unemancipated and 18 years of age or younger.”). Hawley has not provided, nor have we found, any authority to support his position that he properly took deductions in 1993, 1994 and 1995 for the payments made pursuant to the unallocated support order.5 We will therefore affirm the decision of the Tax Court with respect to Hawley. Consistent with that conclusion, we also affirm the court’s decision as to Gilbert. 5 The Tax Court cited the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Lovejoy v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2002), for its conclusion in this case. In that opinion, addressing the treatment of payments made pursuant to an unallocated support order under substantially similar laws as those in Pennsylvania, the Court predicted that the Colorado Supreme Court would hold that the payments would not automatically terminate on the death of the payee spouse, and that the payments were not therefore deductible by the payor. We reach the same conclusion with respect to Pennsylvania law in this case and reject Hawley’s argument for retroactive application of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1910.16-4(f)(3). 7