Opinion ID: 2343638
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Parentage Determination

Text: ¶ 41. Lisa's third argument attacks the temporary visitation order on the basis that Janet is not a parent of IMJ. [4] She argues that Janet cannot be a parent of IMJ because she is not biologically connected to her. In making this argument, Lisa looks primarily to the Parentage Proceedings Act, 15 V.S.A. §§ 301-308. Under § 308(4): A person alleged to be a parent shall be rebuttably presumed to be the natural parent of a child if . . . (4) the child is born while the husband and wife are legally married to each other. This statute applies to civil unions by virtue of § 1204(f): (f) The rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a child of whom either becomes the natural parent during the term of the civil union, shall be the same as those of a married couple, with respect to a child of whom either spouse becomes the natural parent during the marriage. See also id. § 1204(d) (The law of domestic relations, including annulment, separation and divorce, child custody and support, and property division and maintenance shall apply to parties to a civil union.). ¶ 42. Lisa contends that because the Legislature used the word natural in § 308(4), it must have intended the presumption of parentage to apply only to a person who is biologically connected to the child. She argues, therefore, that because she is IMJ's biological mother, and Janet is not, Janet cannot be a parent of IMJ. If Janet is not IMJ's parent, Lisa continues, then the family court erred in awarding Janet visitation. ¶ 43. The Vermont court responded to Lisa's argument by holding that, because Lisa gave birth through artificial insemination, the presumption of parentage contained in § 308 applied to Janet, just as it would have applied to Lisa's husband if she had had one at the time of the birth. ¶ 44. Section 308(4) was not intended to produce the result Lisa advances and is ultimately irrelevant to the circumstances creating parenthood in this case. The presumption provision was added to § 308 quite recently, see 1993, No. 228 (Adj.Sess.), § 13 (adding subsection (4) to 15 V.S.A. § 308), apparently to make the collection of child support easier, see 15 V.S.A. § 293(b) (where presumption applies, it is a sufficient basis for initiating a support action . . . without any further proceedings to establish parentage). We have examined the legislative history of the statute and can find no indication that it was intended to govern the rights of parentage of children born through artificial insemination or to same-sex partners, or to do anything other than provide a speedy recovery of child support. Thus, to accept Lisa's argument, we would have to find that Lisa's desired effect of § 308(4) is an unintended consequence of a legislative amendment enacted for a different purpose. As explained below, we find § 308(4) does not have that unintended consequence. ¶ 45. Ultimately, we have both a short and a long answer to Lisa's argument regarding the effect of § 308(4), and, because of the public interest in the issue, we provide both. The short answer is that the issue is controlled by this Court's decision in Paquette v. Paquette, 146 Vt. 83, 499 A.2d 23 (1985), under which the presumption of parentage contained in § 308 is irrelevant. In Paquette, the parties were involved in a divorce and the husband sought custody of both the child born of the marriage and another child born of the wife's prior marriage. The lower court ruled that custody could not be awarded to a stepfather and, on that basis, denied the husband custody of the older child. On appeal, this Court reversed, holding that where the stepparent has assumed the role of a parent with respect to the child  that is, had acted in loco parentis  the lower court can give custody to the stepparent, over the opposition of the biological parent, if it finds that it is in the best interest of the child to do so and the natural parent is unfit or . . . extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant such a custodial order. Id. at 92, 499 A.2d at 30. ¶ 46. Paquette does not explicitly discuss visitation, but its rationale fully applies to visitation as well as to custody. See S. Silverman, Stepparent Visitation Rights: Toward the Best Interests of the Child, 30 J. Fam. L. 943, 948 (1992) (characterizing Paquette as a stepparent visitation case). In fact, the concerns expressed about the possible interference with the rights of biological parents are of much less weight in the case of visitation. ¶ 47. Under Paquette, regardless of the meaning of 15 V.S.A. § 308(4), Janet has at least the status of a stepparent of IMJ by virtue of § 1204(d) and (f). Assuming extraordinary circumstances are even required for a visitation order, we conclude that extraordinary circumstances are present in this case. The court's findings demonstrate that Janet acted in loco parentis with respect to IMJ as long as Janet and Lisa were together. Thus, our short answer to Lisa's argument is that the visitation order is supported by Paquette even if Janet is not considered IMJ's parent under § 308(4). ¶ 48. There is also a longer answer to Lisa's argument that biology must control the parentage issue. We find that Janet has status as a parent, even beyond her stepparent status under Paquette. If we were to accept Lisa's opposing position and conclude biology controlled, a child born from artificial insemination would have no second parent  whether that status is sought by a man married to the child's mother or by a woman or man in a civil union with the child's biological parent  unless the putative second parent adopted the child. In fact, the logical extension of Lisa's position that a biological connection is necessary for parentage is that the husband of a wife who bears an artificially inseminated child cannot be the father of that child, just like a civil union spouse cannot be a parent to the child. Such a holding would cause tremendous disruption and uncertainty to some existing families who have conceived via artificial insemination or other means of reproductive technology, and we must tread carefully so that we incur such a consequence only if necessary. As a result, we reach the broader and longer answer to Lisa's argument and conclude that such a holding would be wrong. ¶ 49. We are facing a situation similar to that in In re B.L.V.B., 160 Vt. 368, 628 A.2d 1271 (1993), which was decided before the civil union law and involved a same-gender couple. As in this case, one member of the couple in In re B.L.V.B. conceived a child through artificial insemination, and her partner sought to adopt the child to also become a parent. The probate court ruled that the governing statute, which stated that a child's natural parent's rights shall not be affected when the parent's spouse adopts the child, required that if the adoption were granted to the same-sex partner, the biological mother's parental rights would be terminated because the adopting parent was not the biological parent's spouse (or the child's stepparent). ¶ 50. Despite the language of the governing statute, we reversed in that case, holding that the probate court's result was at odds with the intent of the Legislature: [W]e cannot conclude that the legislature ever meant to terminate the parental rights of a biological parent who intended to continue raising a child with the help of a partner. Id. at 373, 628 A.2d at 1274. We stated further: When social mores change, governing statutes must be interpreted to allow for those changes in a manner that does not frustrate the purposes behind their enactment. To deny the children of same-sex partners, as a class, the security of a legally recognized relationship with their second parent serves no legitimate state interest. . . . As the case law from other jurisdictions illustrates, our paramount concern should be with the effect of our laws on the reality of children's lives. It is not the courts that have engendered the diverse composition of today's families. It is the advancement of reproductive technologies and society's recognition of alternative lifestyles that have produced families in which a biological, and therefore a legal, connection is no longer the sole organizing principle. But it is the courts that are required to define, declare and protect the rights of children raised in these families, usually upon their dissolution. At that point, courts are left to vindicate the public interest in the children's financial support and emotional well-being by developing theories of parenthood, so that legal strangers who are de facto parents may be awarded custody or visitation or reached for support. Id. at 375-76, 628 A.2d at 1275-76. ¶ 51. The disruption that would be caused by requiring adoption of all children conceived by artificial insemination by nonbiological parents is particularly at variance with the legislative intent for civil unions. The Legislature's intent in enacting the civil union laws was to create legal equality between relationships based on civil unions and those based on marriage. The Legislature added a separate section on the construction of the civil union statutes that provides in part: Treating the benefits, protections and responsibilities of civil marriage differently from the benefits, protections and responsibilities of civil unions is permissible only when clearly necessary because the gender-based text of a statute, rule or judicial precedent would otherwise produce an unjust, unwarranted, or confusing result, and different treatment would promote or enhance, and would not diminish, the common benefits and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law. 1999, No. 91 (Adj.Sess.), § 39(a). The result of Lisa's statutory argument would be to produce separate benefits and protections for couples in civil unions. Under her argument, no partner in a civil union could be the parent of a child conceived by the other partner without formally adopting that child. ¶ 52. As in In re B.L.V.B., we face the problem here of a family with a child created by artificial insemination, and the Legislature has not dealt directly with new reproductive technologies and the families that result from those technologies. Nonetheless, the courts must define and protect the rights and interests of the children that are part of these families. See In re B.L.V.B., 160 Vt. at 376, 628 A.2d at 1276; In re Estate of Kolacy, 332 N.J.Super. 593, 753 A.2d 1257, 1263 (2000) (finding that even though child was conceived via assisted reproductive technology, once a child has come into existence, she is a full-fledged human being and is entitled to all of the love, respect, dignity and legal protection which that status requires). We express, as many other courts have, a preference for legislative action, see, e.g., In re M.J., 203 Ill.2d 526, 272 Ill.Dec. 329, 787 N.E.2d 144, 150 (2003); Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 435 Mass. 285, 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1139 (2001), but in the absence of that action, we must protect the best interests of the child. ¶ 53. With this background in mind, we turn back to § 308(4). The purpose of the statute is to create a rebuttable presumption, the main effect of which is to assign the burden of production. Godin v. Godin, 168 Vt. 514, 530, 725 A.2d 904, 915 (1998) (Dooley, J., dissenting). Thus, the presumption serves the purpose of allowing more summary support actions even in the absence of a parentage adjudication, which effectively eases child support decisions. See 15 V.S.A. § 293(b) (where presumption of parentage under § 308 applies, a support action against the presumed parent may be filed without a prior parentage adjudication). Because the statute creates only a presumption, however, it does not prevent proof of the fact in issue through other means. Thus, if the presumption did not apply, [5] the only effect in this case would be that Janet would have the burden of production to prove parenthood, a burden she assumed in presenting her case to the family court. Where the presumption cannot apply, it does not mean the individual is not a parent; it simply means we must look to see whether parentage exists without the use of the presumption  the same way we would have determined parentage before the adoption of § 308(4). ¶ 54. Lisa focuses almost exclusively on the word natural, finding in its use the legislative intent that only biological parents can be parents for purposes of the parentage statute. [6] We find this to be an overly broad reading of the language. The parentage act does not include a definition of parent. It does not state that only a natural parent is a parent for purposes of the statute. In fact, the statute is primarily procedural, leaving it to the courts to define who is a parent for purposes of a parentage adjudication. Given its origin and history, it is far more likely that the legislative purpose was to allow for summary child support adjudication in cases where biological parenthood is almost indisputable. ¶ 55. We reach then the ultimate question  whether Janet is a parent within the meaning of the parentage act  without consideration of § 308, which is irrelevant to both sides of the argument in this case. We have held that the term parent is specific to the context of the family involved. For instance, in In re S.B.L., 150 Vt. 294, 302, 553 A.2d 1078, 1083-84 (1988), we held that the biological father of a child born out of wedlock is not a parent for purposes of 14 V.S.A. § 2645, one of our guardianship statutes. Again, we stress that the difficulty in interpretation in this context arises because the Legislature has not addressed assisted reproductive technologies. Thus, we cannot discern in the parentage statutes any helpful legislative intent for such familial circumstances. ¶ 56. Many factors are present here that support a conclusion that Janet is a parent, including, first and foremost, that Janet and Lisa were in a valid legal union at the time of the child's birth. The other factors include the following. It was the expectation and intent of both Lisa and Janet that Janet would be IMJ's parent. Janet participated in the decision that Lisa would be artificially inseminated to bear a child and participated actively in the prenatal care and birth. Both Lisa and Janet treated Janet as IMJ's parent during the time they resided together, and Lisa identified Janet as a parent of IMJ in the dissolution petition. Finally, there is no other claimant to the status of parent, and, as a result, a negative decision would leave IMJ with only one parent. The sperm donor was anonymous and is making no claim to be IMJ's parent. If Janet had been Lisa's husband, these factors would make Janet the parent of the child born from the artificial insemination. See generally People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal.2d 280, 66 Calaptr. 7, 437 P.2d 495 (1968). Because of the equality of treatment of partners in civil unions, the same result applies to Lisa. 15 V.S.A. § 1204. ¶ 57. Virtually all modern decisions from other jurisdictions support this result, although the theories vary. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 83 Ark.App. 217, 125 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Ct.App.2003) (husband estopped from denying child support where husband knew wife was using artificial insemination to have child); Sorensen, 66 Cal.Rptr. 7, 437 P.2d at 498-500 (husband is lawful father of child conceived through artificial insemination born during marriage to child's mother); In re Buzzanca, 61 Cal.App.4th 1410, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 280, 286-87 (Ct.App.1998) (finding virtually all decisions hold husband to be parent based on his consent to artificial insemination); In re M.J., 272 Ill.Dec. 329, 787 N.E.2d at 152 (mother of children conceived through artificial insemination may seek to establish paternity of man with whom she had ten-year intimate relationship based on theories of oral contract or promissory estoppel); Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 604-05 (Ind.1994) (husband who orally consented to artificial insemination of wife estopped from denying fatherhood of child); R.S. v. R.S., 9 Kan.App.2d 39, 670 P.2d 923, 928 (1983) (husband who orally consented to artificial insemination of wife estopped from denying fatherhood); State ex rel. H. v. P., 90 A.D.2d 434, 457 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (1982) (wife estopped from denying husband's paternity where she fostered parent-child relationship); Brooks v. Fair, 40 Ohio App.3d 202, 532 N.E.2d 208, 212-13 (Ct.App.1988) (public policy disallows wife from denying paternity of husband where parties agreed during marriage to conceive via means of artificial insemination); In re Baby Doe, 291 S.C. 389, 353 S.E.2d 877, 878 (1987) (husband is legal father of child where he consented to artificial insemination of wife during marriage); see generally A. Stephens, Annotation, Parental rights of man who is not biological or adoptive father of child but was husband or cohabitant of mother when child was conceived or born, 84 A.L.R.4th 655 (1991). Some courts find the party a parent as a result of contract theory or estoppel. E.g., R.S., 670 P.2d at 928. Estoppel is often invoked because of the strong reliance interests that arise from consensual artificial insemination. Other courts reach the result more as a matter of policy, particularly stressing the adverse consequences of leaving the child without a parent despite the clear intention of the parties. E.g., Brooks, 532 N.E.2d at 212-13. We adopt the result in this case as a matter of policy, and to implement the intent of the parties. ¶ 58. This is not a close case under the precedents from other states. Because so many factors are present in this case that allow us to hold that the non-biologically-related partner is the child's parent, we need not address which factors may be dispositive on the issue in a closer case. We do note that, in accordance with the common law, the couple's legal union at the time of the child's birth is extremely persuasive evidence of joint parentage. See People ex rel. R.T.L., 780 P.2d 508, 515 n. 11 (Colo.1989) (We acknowledge that the presumption that a child born during wedlock is the legitimate child of the marriage was one of the strongest presumptions known to the common law.); Cicero v. Cicero, 58 A.D.2d 573, 395 N.Y.S.2d 117, 117 (1977) (presumption of legitimacy attached to issue of the marriage); LC v. TL, 870 P.2d 374, 380 (Wyo. 1994) (The presumption of legitimacy is one of the strongest in law.); see also Godin, 168 Vt. at 522, 725 A.2d at 910 (Thus, the State retains a strong and direct interest in ensuring that children born of a marriage do not suffer financially or psychologically merely because of a parent's belated and self-serving concern over a child's biological origins.). ¶ 59. Lisa raises three additional reasons why we cannot affirm the temporary visitation award. First, she argues that awarding Janet visitation, without a finding that Lisa is unfit to parent, interferes with her exclusive constitutional right to parent her child. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (indicating fundamental due process right of parents to make child rearing decisions). This argument was not adequately raised below and has been waived. See Will v. Mill Condo. Owners' Ass'n, 2004 VT 22, ¶ 4, 176 Vt. 380, 848 A.2d 336 (rejecting claim that mere mention of argument in one pretrial memorandum preserved issue for appeal). In any event, we reject it. Janet was awarded visitation because she is a parent of IMJ. Lisa's parental rights are not exclusive. See In re L.B., 155 Wash.2d 679, 122 P.3d 161, 178 (2005). ¶ 60. We have a similar response to Lisa's argument that Janet's parental status must be determined under Virginia law. Again, the argument was not preserved below. See Adams v. Adams, 2005 VT 4, ¶ 15, 177 Vt. 448, 869 A.2d 124 (arguments not raised below are not preserved for appeal). In any event, we also reject this argument. We have adopted the most significant relationship test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 287 (1971) in determining choice-of-law questions. Id. (law of the state with the most significant relationship to the child and parent determines legitimacy); see Myers v. Langlois, 168 Vt. 432, 434, 721 A.2d 129, 130 (1998). As we held in the first section, the Vermont court had jurisdiction to adjudicate custody and visitation of IMJ under both the PKPA and the UCCJA. Although these acts primarily determine jurisdiction, their provisions are such that they establish the state with the most significant relationship to a child custody or visitation dispute. Stubbs v. Weathersby, 320 Or. 620, 892 P.2d 991, 997-98 (1995). Accordingly, we conclude that where jurisdiction is exercised consistent with the PKPA and UCCJA, the law of the forum state is applicable. In this case, as discussed in depth supra, ¶¶ 9-18, Vermont had jurisdiction under both statutes, and, accordingly, Vermont law applies here. ¶ 61. In reaching this conclusion, we do not hold that there is an actual conflict between the law of Vermont and that of Virginia with respect to the power of the court to award visitation in cases involving same-gender partners. The parties have not pointed to any Virginia cases on point, and we have not found any. We do note, however, that a growing number of courts have recognized parental rights in a same-gender partner of a person who adopts a child or conceives through artificial insemination. See Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 37 Cal.4th 108, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 46, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (2005) (same-gender partner is presumed mother of twins conceived by artificial insemination and is responsible for child support); In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 562 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (same-gender partner who is psychological parent of child adopted by other partner may be awarded joint parental responsibilities); C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1151-52 (Me.2004) (court may award parental rights and responsibilities to same-gender partner who is de facto parent of child); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 711 N.E.2d 886, 892-93 (1999) (probate court can provide visitation to same-gender partner of biological mother who is de facto parent of child); V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 748 A.2d 539, 552-54 (2000) (same-gender partner who is a psychological parent to child may be awarded custody of, or visitation with, the child); T.B. v. L.R.M., 567 Pa. 222, 786 A.2d 913, 920 (2001) (where same-gender partner is in loco parentis with consent of child's biological mother, court may award partial custody or visitation); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 976 (R.I.2000) (court may award visitation to same-gender partner based on theory of estoppel); In re L.B., 122 P.3d at 176 same-gender partner who is de facto parent has same right to custody as biological mother; In re H.S.H.-K., 193 Wis.2d 649, 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-37 (1995) (same-gender partner with parent-like relationship with child can be awarded visitation, but not custody). In these cases, there was no marriage or civil union between the partners. This result was endorsed in 2000 by the American Law Institute. Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 2.03, cmt. (b)(iii), at 114. It may be that the Virginia courts will follow this trend. ¶ 62. Lisa next argues that the court erred by awarding visitation without first determining parentage. Temporary relief requests in divorce or dissolution proceedings must be heard and decided promptly. 15 V.S.A. § 594a. Necessarily, a temporary order will not be based on the full record required to support a final order. A speedy decision was required in this case to allow Janet to have some contact with IMJ, pending resolution of the dispute over custody and visitation. Meanwhile, Lisa went through three lawyers during the early stage of the dissolution action. Her complaint alleged that Janet was a parent of IMJ, and she maintained that position through the first day of the temporary relief hearing. Indeed, her counsel stated on the record that Lisa waived any claim that Janet was not a parent of IMJ. Thereafter, with a new lawyer, she attempted to change her position, to roughly the position she espouses here. She sought to delay the temporary relief proceeding while she adjudicated whether Janet was a parent, and she argued that the court should give no interim relief until parenthood was fully resolved. We believe the family court acted within its broad discretion in awarding temporary visitation as it did, even if it could not make a final determination of parentage. See id. (court can make such orders pending final hearing as it could upon final hearing); V.R.F.P. 4(c)(2). ¶ 63. In any event, the timing of the court's action was harmless in this case. The family court eventually ruled that Janet had parental status with respect to IMJ, a ruling we have affirmed. The relevant facts are largely undisputed and were before the court when it issued the temporary order. Lisa sought to delay the ruling on the basis that Janet was not the biological mother of IMJ, a fact that is undisputed and is not determinative. Thus, the timing of the court's action has no significance at this time. The Commonwealth of Virginia's judgment regarding parentage is not entitled to full faith and credit.