Opinion ID: 844217
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Jury's Discussion of the Murder of a Witness's Wife

Text: Defendant contends that his convictions should be reversed because jurors committed prejudicial misconduct in reading or listening to news reports about the death of a witness's wife and discussing the topic during deliberations. Witness Mark Buster had testified that he sold a red 1992 Chevrolet 454 pickup truck to defendant. During guilt phase deliberations, a juror revealed to the court that a discussion had occurred among the jurors about the death of Buster's wife, who had been shot shortly before Buster's testimony. Defendant moved for a mistrial. After questioning each juror about this subject, the court denied defendant's motion, concluding that although technically there had been a violation of the admonition not to read or listen to news reports about the case or to consider information that was not presented in court, the matter had not entered into the jury's deliberations. The court then informed the jury that the death of Mark Buster's wife has nothing to do with this case and is unrelated to this case; that is, it is not to enter into your deliberations or decision-making in any way, any form, or fashion. (23) Although inadvertent exposure to out-of-court information is not blameworthy conduct, as might be suggested by the term `misconduct,' it nevertheless gives rise to a presumption of prejudice, because it poses the risk that one or more jurors may be influenced by material that the defendant has had no opportunity to confront, cross-examine, or rebut. ( People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 579 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454, 941 P.2d 87].) This presumption of prejudice may be rebutted ... by a reviewing court's determination, upon examining the entire record, that there is no substantial likelihood that the complaining party suffered actual harm. ( People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 174 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781], italics added.) (24) Respondent contends that no presumption of prejudice arises in the present case because the information did not concern a party to the case or events involved in the case. We need not decide whether respondent's argument is correct because, in any event, we find no substantial likelihood that any juror was biased by the information regarding the death of Buster's wife. When juror misconduct involves the receipt of information from extraneous sources, a substantial likelihood of juror bias can appear in two different ways. First, we will find bias if the extraneous material, judged objectively, is inherently and substantially likely to have influenced the juror. [Citations.] Second, we look to the nature of the misconduct and the surrounding circumstances to determine whether it is substantially likely the juror was actually biased against the defendant. [Citation.] ( In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 653 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985].) In reviewing the trial court's ruling regarding a claim of juror misconduct, we accept the trial court's findings of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence, but we review independently the question of whether prejudice arose from juror misconduct. ( Id. at pp. 646, 658-659.) In an extraneous-information case, the `entire record' logically bearing on a circumstantial finding of likely bias includes the nature of the juror's conduct, the circumstances under which the information was obtained, the instructions the jury received, the nature of the evidence and issues at trial, and the strength of the evidence against the defendant. ( Id. at p. 654.) The record here establishes no reasonable likelihood that any juror was influenced by the information that Buster's wife had been killed because it is not the type of information that was inherently likely to influence the jurors. Buster's testimony involved only defendant's purchase of his truck, which was not a matter that was actively contested in the case. Furthermore, no juror reported any speculation that Buster's wife was targeted because of her husband's testimony, or that defendantwho was in custody at the time of her deathwas involved. The trial court noted that Buster had demonstrated a good relationship with defendant in front of the jury, by shaking his hand and speaking to him. According to the jurors, who were questioned by the court, the subject of the killing came up when the jurors discussed Buster's testimony and they talked about it for about five minutes, but they recognized that it was not relevant and moved on to other matters. Finally, the trial court clearly instructed the jury that the death of Buster's wife had nothing to do with the case and that it should not enter into the jury's deliberations. [13] C. Penalty Phase Issues 1. Admission of Weapons Convictions (25) Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting, as evidence in aggravation, defendant's two felony convictions for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm (former § 12021, subd. (a)) and being in possession of a concealed weapon (former §§ 12021, subd. (a), 12025, subd. (a)). These convictions resulted from his guilty plea to charges that were part of the present case. Defendant is correct that prior felony convictions are not admissible under section 190.3, factor (c), unless the conviction preceded the commission of the capital crime. ( People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1271 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 117 P.3d 544]; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1373-1374 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259]; People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 201-202 [222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480].) Defendant further argues that these convictions were not admissible under section 190.3, factor (b), as evidence of criminal activity involving the express or implied threat to use force or violence. (See People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 973 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 70 P.3d 277] [mere possession of guns does not constitute a crime of violence]; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1235 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254] [firearm possession is not, in every circumstance, an act committed with actual or implied force or violence]; but see People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 631 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 941 P.2d 788] [Possession of sawed-off firearms and silencer materials carries an implied threat of violence because their obvious purpose is to harm humans.].) Respondent argues that the weapons convictions were properly considered by the jury under section 190.3, factor (a), as circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding. [W]e have assumed that factor (a), though it speaks in the singular of the `crime' of which defendant was currently convicted, covers the `circumstances' of all offenses, singular or plural, that were adjudicated in the capital proceeding. ( People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 938, fn. 33 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277]; accord, People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 909 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135] & People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 70 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129].) Defendant contends, however, that factor (a) includes only the circumstances of any crimes for which the death penalty is contemplated, and that crimes that are entirely unrelated to the capital offense do not become admissible at the penalty phase merely because they were charged in the same proceeding as the capital crimes. We need not resolve whether the jury should have been allowed to consider this evidence because, in any event, there is no reasonable possibility that evidence of these two convictions affected the penalty verdict. ( People v. Howard (2010) 51 Cal.4th 15, 38 [118 Cal.Rptr.3d 678, 243 P.3d 972].) The evidence was cumulative of other evidence establishing that defendant had possessed firearms on several occasions. Each of the victims was shot with a handgun. At the guilt phase, defendant's wife testified that she had seen defendant with a gun and that he had given her a gun. Evidence was presented at the penalty phase that defendant once threw a gun as police officers chased him. The penalty verdict would not have been different if evidence of these two convictions had been excluded. 2. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct Defendant contends the prosecutor committed three instances of misconduct at the penalty phase, denying him a fair trial and violating his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the federal Constitution to a reliable capital sentence. In general, a prosecutor commits misconduct by the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade either the court or the jury. ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 447; see People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673].) When, as here, the point focuses on comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion. ( People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1072.) We conclude that none of the prosecutor's actions constituted misconduct. Defendant's first complaint concerns the prosecutor's argument that if defendant were sentenced to life imprisonment he could be a danger to other inmates. The prosecutor stated, If he engages in some type of acts of violence on another inmate without parole, what could be done to him? It would be a freebie. When trial counsel objected to the latter remark, the trial court told the jury to disregard it. Defendant contends this remark was designed to appeal to the jury's passions and prejudices and that, in any event, future dangerousness is not a proper aggravating factor under California law. (26) To the contrary, prosecutorial argument regarding defendant's future dangerousness is permissible when based on evidence of the defendant's conduct rather than expert opinion. ( People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 99 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506] [prosecutor's argument, based on the defendant's record, that he would present a discipline problem in prison because he would have `nothing to lose,' was not improper].) `It is settled that a prosecutor is given wide latitude during argument. The argument may be vigorous as long as it amounts to fair comment on the evidence, which can include reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom. [Citations.]' ( People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 567 [280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290].) The evidence of defendant's crimes presented at the guilt phase and the other incidents of violent criminal conduct properly presented at the penalty phase provided a sufficient basis for the prosecutor's argument. (See People v. Taylor (1990) 52 Cal.3d 719, 750 [276 Cal.Rptr. 391, 801 P.2d 1142] [argument that defendant would present a danger in prison was proper based on defendant's record of violence outside the prison walls].) Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jurors to disregard the prosecutor's comment that any future act of violence would be a freebie. We can only assume they followed the instruction, and did not allow this isolated remark to affect the verdict. ( Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 571.) Defendant further complains that during the cross-examination of defendant's wife, Deshaunna Cody Thomas, the prosecutor asked whether she intended to have conjugal relations with defendant while he was imprisoned. Defense counsel's objection to this question was sustained. Defendant contends that this question constituted misconduct because it solicited clearly irrelevant information and insinuated that defendant would be able to have sexual relations with his wife if he were given a life sentence. Although the subject matter of conjugal relations is not necessarily irrelevant in an appropriate case (see, e.g., People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 178 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980]), there was no evidence in the present case that such visits could occur. To the extent the prosecutor's question insinuated such visits could occur when there was no evidence on that point, defendant failed to request an admonition, which could have cured any potential harm. (See Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 568 [defendant forfeited claim of prosecutorial misconduct by failing to request a curative admonition].) Defendant contends, finally, that the prosecutor committed misconduct in questioning certain witnesses about how defendant obtained money and in referring to defendant's purchase of a truck for $18,000 shortly before the shooting of the police officers. [14] Defendant argues the prosecutor was improperly attempting to suggest to the jury that defendant was involved in some kind of illegal activity such as drug dealing, thereby impermissibly introducing facts not in evidence and causing the jury to consider a nonstatutory aggravating factor. Putting aside the merits of defendant's claim, any misconduct was clearly harmless. If the prosecutor was attempting to elicit information from defense witnesses that defendant was engaged in illegal moneymaking activities, he was not successful. The prosecutor asked several of defendant's friends and relatives if they knew how he obtained money. None of them were aware of how defendant earned money, other than his occasional work as a security guard at a liquor store. [15] To the extent the prosecutor's questions may have insinuated that he was aware of illegal moneymaking activities by defendant, the jury was admonished not to assume to be true any insinuation suggested by a question asked a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it helps you to understand the answer. (CALJIC No. 1.02.) Furthermore, the prosecutor made no suggestion during his closing argument that defendant was engaged in illegal moneymaking activities. He stated that defendant gave money to his family only when asked, Yet he can afford a truck the cost of which is $18,000. The prosecutor argued that defendant's actionsincluding fathering several children with women other than his wife, staying away from home one or two nights a week, dropping out of school, not working, and spending money on a truck while contributing very little to his childrenwere not consistent with being a good husband and father. These arguments were a fair comment on the evidence and contained no suggestion that the prosecutor was aware or believed that defendant was selling drugs or engaged in other illegal activity. Under these circumstances, defendant was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's line of questioning regarding defendant's income. 3. Admission of Photographs of Victims and Their Families Defendant contends the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor, over defense objection, to illustrate the testimony of penalty phase witnesses with photographs of the victims and their family members. Before trial, the prosecutor sought to introduce photographs of Officer Burrell in his uniform; Burrell with his arm around his mother; Burrell's infant son, Kevin, Jr.; Officer MacDonald with his brother when they were children; MacDonald with his brother at a wedding; and MacDonald's graduation from the police academy. The court excluded the picture of MacDonald and his brother and the one of MacDonald at his brother's wedding, but allowed the prosecutor to use the rest. During his penalty phase argument, the prosecutor referred to the photographs and asked the jurors to look at the photographs of the officers with their families and to compare those to the autopsy photographs. [16] Defendant contends the admitted photographs are not the type of victim impact evidence that is permissible at the penalty phase because they provided no new information beyond the testimony that was given by family members and their sole purpose was to inflame the passions of the jurors. Defendant also asserts that the photographs were unduly prejudicial and likely to provoke irrational, capricious, or purely subjective responses from the jury. We have rejected such arguments in previous cases, upholding the admission of similar types of photographs when used to illustrate victim impact testimony. (See People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 618 [94 Cal.Rptr.3d 322, 208 P.3d 78] [photograph of victim's mother and sister taken shortly after the victim was kidnapped]; Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 565 [photograph of victim with her husband]; People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 444 [photographs of victims]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 836 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436] [photographs of victims at the time of the crimes].) The photographs admitted here, and the prosecutor's use of them in argument, assisted the jury in evaluating the consequences of defendant's crimes and they were not the type of irrelevant information or inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury's attention from its proper role or invites an irrational, purely subjective response. ( People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 864 [180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776], quoted in People v. Edwards, supra, at p. 836.) 4. Absence of Cautionary Instruction on Victim Impact Evidence Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to read to the jury a special cautionary instruction offered by defense counsel regarding victim impact evidence. [17] We have previously rejected claims that an identical instruction should have been given, finding it to be duplicative and potentially confusing and misleading. We concluded in People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 455 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78], that [t]he proposed instruction would not have provided the jury with any information it had not otherwise learned from CALJIC No. 8.84.1 .... In People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 359 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545], we noted that the instruction proffered by defendant is confusing because it is unclear as to whose emotional reaction it directed the jurors to consider with cautionthat of the victim's family or the jurors' own. Furthermore, we concluded that the instructions read to the jury, including the standard penalty phase instruction, CALJIC No. 8.85, which was also provided in the present case, did not give the jurors the mistaken impression that they could consider emotion over reason, nor did the instructions improperly suggest what weight the jurors should give to any mitigating or aggravating factor. ( People v. Harris, supra, at p. 359; see also People v. Carey (2007) 41 Cal.4th 109, 134 [59 Cal.Rptr.3d 172, 158 P.3d 743].) In People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 368 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 181 P.3d 105], we stated that an instruction similar to the one proposed here is misleading to the extent it indicates that emotions may play no part in a juror's decision to opt for the death penalty because in considering victim impact evidence the jury may exercise sympathy for the murder victims and their family members. Defendant also argues that if the proposed instruction was imperfect, the trial court should have altered it. (See People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 924 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182] [concluding the trial court erred in failing to tailor defendant's proposed instruction [(regarding evidence of other sex offenses)] to give the jury some guidance regarding the use of the other crimes evidence, rather than denying the instruction outright]; People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1110 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36] [to the extent the defendant's proffered instruction regarding eyewitness identification was argumentative, the trial court should have tailored it rather than denying it outright]; People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 159 [167 Cal.Rptr. 844, 616 P.2d 826] [trial court should have tailored instruction regarding reasonable doubt and eyewitness identification rather than refusing it].) Because we have concluded that the gist of the proposed instruction was adequately covered by the standard instructions that were given (see, e.g., People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 455), even a modified version of defendant's instruction would have been duplicative and unnecessary. 5. Refusal to Instruct on Lingering Doubt Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying defendant's request that the jury be instructed that a lingering or residual doubt [(about guilt)], although not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt at the guilt phase, may still be considered as a mitigating factor at the penalty phase. There was no error. Such an instruction is not required by the federal Constitution. ( Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988) 487 U.S. 164, 174 [101 L.Ed.2d 155, 108 S.Ct. 2320].) [W]e repeatedly have held that although it is proper for the jury to consider lingering doubt, there is no requirement that the court specifically instruct the jury that it may do so. [Citations.] ( People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1219 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262].) (27) Defendant contends that even if an instruction on lingering doubt is not generally required, it was required in this case. He cites our statement in People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618 [280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351], that a trial court may be required to give a properly formulated lingering doubt instruction when warranted by the evidence. ( Id. at p. 678, fn. 20.) We have since concluded, however, that such an instruction is unnecessary when the jury is properly instructedas was defendant's juryregarding the aggravating and mitigating factors described in Penal Code section 190.3, factors (a) (circumstances of the crime) and (k) (other circumstances that extenuate the gravity of the crime). ( People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 219-220 [30 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717]; People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1068 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388].) 6. Refusal to Define Life Without Possibility of Parole Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that life without parole means exactly what it says. The defendant will be imprisoned for the rest of his life and the death penalty means exactly what it says: That the defendant will be executed. We have consistently held that such an instruction need not be given because it is incorrect to tell the jurors that the penalty they select will inexorably be carried out. ( People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 130 [246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37]; cf. People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 204-206 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746, 235 P.3d 62] [suggesting that an appropriate instruction would admonish the jury not to be influenced by speculation on whether the chosen penalty will come about].) 7. Refusal of Instructions Regarding Mercy Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it could be influenced by mercy. Defendant offered five different instructions that included the topic of mercy, all of which the trial court refused. [18] (28) Defendant acknowledges that this court has consistently rejected similar claims of instructional error because we have concluded that the standard CALJIC instructions on section 190.3, factor (k) leave adequate room for the consideration of mercy. (See People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 591 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344].) Defendant's jury was likewise instructed that it could consider any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial and that it was free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. (See CALJIC Nos. 8.85 & 8.88.) These instructions allowed the jury to exercise mercy based upon any of the factors presented, and defense counsel argued that the law permitted the jury to exercise mercy. (You can exercise mercy. The law allows you to do that.) Although defendant asserts that an instruction on mercy should have been given to inform the jury that it could exercise mercy based upon how an execution would affect defendant's family members, sympathy for a defendant's family is not itself a mitigating factor. ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1000 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171].) Refusal was appropriate. 8. Refusal to Instruct That Facts Supporting the Murder Verdict Are Not Aggravating Factors Defendant asserts the trial court erred in refusing a proposed instruction that would have informed the jury that [i]n deciding whether you should sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or to death, you cannot consider as an aggravating factor any fact which was used by you in finding him guilty of murder in the first degree unless that fact establishes something in addition to an element of the crime of murder in the first degree. The fact that you have found Mr. Thomas guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder in the first degree is not itself an aggravating circumstance. (Defendant's requested instruction No. 6.) The trial court did not err. In People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th 1, the trial court refused an instruction containing language identical to the first sentence in defendant's proposed instruction. We rejected the same arguments defendant makes in the present case, concluding that the proposed instruction is an incorrect statement of the law. ( Id. at p. 41.) Furthermore, in People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 900-901 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15], we concluded that similar instructions were duplicative of CALJIC No. 8.88, which tells the jury that [a]n aggravating factor is any fact, condition or event attending the commission of a crime which increases its severity or enormity, or adds to its injurious consequences which is above and beyond the elements of the crime itself. CALJIC No. 8.88 was given in defendant's case. 9. Refusal of Other Proposed Penalty Phase Instructions Defendant argues the trial court erred in refusing to give several other instructions requested by the defense that were offered to address particular aspects of defendant's theory of the case in mitigation. We find no error. (29) The court did not err in declining defendant's proposed instructions informing the jury that any mitigating factor, standing alone, may be the basis for a decision that death is not the appropriate punishment. (Defendant's requested instructions Nos. 7, 20.) (See People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1099-1100 [instruction that one mitigating circumstance may justify a life sentence would have been proper, but was not required]; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 317 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585].) Nor did the court err in refusing instructions elaborating on the scope of mitigation. An instruction that specifically identifies defense evidence that the jury may consider in mitigation is not required. [19] (See People v. Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1159 [defendant not entitled to instruction listing the evidence he viewed as mitigating].) The remainder of the proposed instructions, [20] which defendant contends would have clarified the scope of mitigation, were duplicative of CALJIC Nos. 8.85 and 8.88, which were given. The standard instructions are sufficient to advise the jury of the full range of mitigating evidence, and nothing more is required. ( People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 841-842.) Finally, the proposed instruction directing the jury not to consider the deterrent effect or cost of the death penalty (defendant's requested instruction No. 14) was properly refused because neither party raised those issues. (See People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 566 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137].)