Opinion ID: 678894
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Withdrawal of the plea.

Text: 17 Frank argues on appeal that he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, because the judge participated in plea bargaining in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1), as interpreted by United States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.1992). His argument focuses on the colloquy in open court, and on the in-chambers remark by the judge that if Frank had not agreed to plead, he would have sentenced him to life if he could. 18 Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1) the court shall not participate in any such discussions. [S]uch discussions refers to discussions intended to reach a plea agreement under Rule 11(e)(1). We said in Bruce that this rule simply commands that the judge not participate in, and remove him or herself from, any discussion of a plea agreement that has not yet been agreed to by the parties in open court. Bruce, 976 F.2d at 556. 19
20 Frank's appellate counsel argues that the Rule 11 colloquy in open court was participation in plea bargaining. She demonstrates that the judge did indeed discuss the plea agreement, as set out above, in open court, before Frank answered the question, What is your plea, with the word guilty. This discussion does literally violate the command quoted from Bruce. It was a discussion, and the open court agreement was not final until Frank himself said the word guilty. 21 This, of course, establishes nothing except that the language of Bruce should not be quoted out of context. As appellant interprets Bruce, it would be absurd, because compliance with the nonparticipation requirement of Rule 11(e)(1) would require that the judge violate the colloquy requirements of Rule 11(c), (d), and (f). It cannot be true in all senses that Rule 11(e)(1) simply commands that the judge not participate in, and remove him or herself from, any discussion of a plea agreement that has not yet been agreed to by the parties in open court. Bruce, 976 F.2d at 556. The judge has to address the defendant personally before accepting a guilty plea, to ascertain his understanding of the charges, the penalties, his rights, and so forth. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c). The judge must also address[ ] the defendant personally before accepting his plea, to assure that the plea is voluntary. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d). The judge must also ascertain whether there is a factual basis for the plea. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(f). Usually much of this discussion takes place before the defendant states that the terms of the plea agreement are consistent with his understanding and that he has received no undisclosed promises. Substantially all of it takes place before the defendant actually states that he pleads guilty. 1 Bench Book for United States District Judges Sec. 1.06 (3d ed. 1986). 22 Frank's appellate counsel quotes out of context various statements made during his Rule 11 colloquy. For example, she claims that the judge did tell Frank that he should enter the plea knowing that a life sentence could be imposed, which means 'all of your days until you die.'  She characterized the judge's conduct as participating in the discussions advising Frank as to the course of action he should prepare for. She argues that this was just like Bruce, 976 F.2d at 555, where the judge advised the defendant what he should do, and then sent him home to think about it overnight. 23 This argument is meritless. The April 9 proceeding in open court was an appropriate and careful Rule 11 colloquy. The judge had a duty under Rule 11(c)(1) to assure that Frank knew the maximum penalties to which he exposed himself by pleading guilty. Yet his lawyer now argues that telling him those maximums, as the judge was required to do under Rule 11(c)(1), violated Rule 11(e)(1). 24 Bruce is good law, and it establishes a precedent binding in this circuit. The problem with appellant's use of it is that his attorney would have us read it as quotations in the air, instead of as a case. We judges cannot write laws, like Congress. We can only perform the humbler task of deciding particular cases before us. In order to decide them, we have to state what principles we are following, and we are obligated to follow precedent, so that we can decide like cases alike. But we cannot legislate, by announcing a principle of decision which if taken literally would nullify a law passed by Congress. The several rules quoted requiring the kind of colloquy the judge held are such laws. All that is said in a decision, Bruce or this case, must be understood merely as a reason for deciding that case that way. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 36 (1930). This is so because the court can decide only the particular dispute before it; ... all that is said is to be read with eyes on that dispute. Id. at 38. Frequently in explaining our decision in a case, we use words which, if quoted without regard to their purpose in the particular case would lead to a ridiculous result in other factual circumstances. For that reason, the words of a pronouncement such as the one in Bruce cannot be understood without reference to the factual and procedural context in which they were written. 25 In Bruce, the defendants had not agreed to the deal worked out between the lawyers. The judge was trying to talk them into it. He called one of the defendants son and after the defendants told the judge they did not need any more time to think about the deal, the judge nevertheless told them to take some time, emphasizing the life sentence they faced if they did not plead, compared to the 42 months if they did. The judge told them to think seriously about it overnight, and asked if they were parents. The judge said, If it was my child, I would think carefully about it. We held that this violated the principle that before the parties have concluded a plea agreement and disclosed its terms in open court, the judge should refrain from all forms of plea discussion. 26 The avuncular advice in Bruce is distinguishable, because the purpose to which Bruce speaks has no application here. The purposes of Rule 11(e)(1) are to keep the judge from shaping the plea bargain or persuading the defendant to accept particular terms, and to preserve judicial impartiality. See Bruce, 976 F.2d at 556-57; Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 Advisory Committee Note on 1974 Amendment. The judge in the case at bar, unlike the judge in Bruce, was not trying to shape the agreement or persuade either side to accept it. The colloquy took place after, not before, the parties had concluded their agreement, and the prosecutor had laid it out in open court. True, the agreement was not yet formal and binding. It was not yet in writing and the defendant had not yet said guilty in response to the question what is your plea. That question and answer take place at the end of the Rule 11 colloquy, and many plea agreements are oral. The rule against judicial participation in plea bargaining protects the parties against implicit or explicit pressure to settle criminal cases on terms favored by the judge. It does not establish a series of traps for imperfectly articulated oral remarks. Such an interpretation would compel the judge to read his bench book as a script, instead of addressing the defendant personally as required by the other parts of the rule. The judge may have to talk to the defendant, in informal diction, to find out whether he understands the agreement, means to accept it, is fit to plead, and committed the crimes to which he proposes to plead guilty. This requires some flexibility, though it does not require or permit encouragement or threats to obtain pleas of guilty. 27
28 The remark in chambers presents additional concerns. Many judges generally refrain from any in-chambers discussion of a proposed change of plea in a criminal case, lest they overstep Rule 11(e)(1). Here the judge had another concern, though, besides the plea. He had a jury waiting in the jury room. He had a duty to manage the trial. They were in the middle of it. As part of his trial management, a judge frequently must consult counsel in chambers regarding things which will affect the timing of the events at trial. The mid-trial context of the inquiry justified bringing the lawyers into chambers to find out what was going on, for trial management purposes. The judge had to determine whether to bring the jury into the courtroom and proceed with trial, discharge the jury, or send the jury home for the day but keep it on call for the next day. The judge decides, under Rule 11(e)(3) and (4), whether to accept or reject the plea agreement. The judge was not obligated to waste the trial day, or the entire portion of the trial which had already taken place, if the proposed plea bargain were one which the judge was sure he would reject. 29 Had the judge suggested a change of plea, and given force to his suggestion by saying that the defendant faced life if he went to a verdict and lost, but would get a lesser sentence if he pleaded guilty now, we would have a case like Bruce. The message would be communicated back to Frank, so keeping him out of the room would not insulate the discussion. But that is not what happened. The judge needed to know whether the plea discussions were serious enough to justify sending the jury home. He did not threaten anything if Frank did not plead, or promise anything if he did. Frank was still exposed to life, whether he took the deal or not. The deal was being set before the judge as a justification for sending the jury home instead of continuing with trial that day, not as an impasse which the judge was being invited to resolve. Nor did the judge volunteer the remark about what sentence he would have liked to impose if the law allowed. Frank's lawyer asked him. The government characterizes it as subjunctive mode, condition contrary to fact, as in, what would you have done if we had not agreed on a deal. Even if that is not so, and the deal was not final, and even if it was error for the judge to answer Mr. Polis's question, at worst it was invited error. The doctrine of invited error prevents a defendant from complaining of an error that was his own fault. United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir.1992). 30 Frank's argument that the plea agreement was impermissibly coercive because it was a package deal is meritless. Even if the deal was the type of package deal contemplated by United States v. Caro, 997 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.1993), all that Caro requires is careful scrutiny to ensure voluntariness. Id. at 659-60. The judge gave it just the kind of careful scrutiny he was supposed to give. The careful scrutiny is what Frank claims was undue participation in the April 9 proceeding. 31 Frank's remaining claims do not merit extended discussion. Negotiating the plea was not ineffective assistance of counsel, and the agreement was not unconscionable. There is nothing unusual or unconscionable about a defendant with a hopeless case giving the government an easier time of it in exchange for lenience for other people whom the defendant cares about. Frank waived any complaints about the wording of the indictment and the information by pleading guilty. See Cox v. United States, 428 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir.1970). Frank was adequately informed of the charges against him as required by Rule 11(c). The factual basis for Frank's guilty plea, including his supervision of five or more people, was sufficiently established by the trial testimony, and by Frank's open-court statements during the Rule 11 colloquy. United States v. Delgado, 4 F.3d 780, 785 (9th Cir.1993).