Opinion ID: 2043235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: In December 2004, Wenke was cited in Holt County for operating a motor vehicle without a valid license. He pled guilty and was sentenced to pay a fine and court costs totaling $91.50. After paying $25.50, Wenke applied for and was granted an extension of time to pay the remaining $66. In the extension agreement, he agreed to pay in full by January 26, 2005. The agreement provided that if the judgment was not paid by that date, Wenke would be required to appear before the county court to show cause why [he] should not be committed to jail and/or fined for contempt for non-payment of judgment. On January 27, 2005, the Holt County Court mailed written notice to Wenke that he had failed to pay the amount due. The notice required him to either pay the fine immediately or appear before the court on February 9. The notice stated that failure to comply with its provisions could result in a warrant being issued for Wenke's arrest. On February 10, 2005, the county court issued a Warrant/Order of Commitment directed to the Holt County sheriff or any duly authorized law enforcement officer. This document stated that Wenke had failed to pay the judgment and costs or show cause why he should not be committed to jail for failing to make payment as ordered. The document further stated: [Wenke] shall be allowed to pay all judgments for fines and costs set out below. [Wenke] shall be released from custody upon payment of the same, PLUS the cost of service of this warrant. Upon failure to make payment of the fines and costs [Wenke] shall be delivered to the jailer of Holt County to stand committed to serve [his] judgment(s) and costs at the rate provided by law. On February 12, 2005, Officer Mike Parks of the O'Neill Police Department was dispatched to a local bar to investigate a report of minors consuming alcohol. Parks, who had issued the December 2004 citation to Wenke, observed him in the bar and recalled seeing a copy of the warrant described above at the police station. Parks understood the document to be a warrant for ... Wenke's arrest for [f]ailing to make payment on fines and costs in the County Court of Holt County. Parks asked Wenke to step outside with him, and Wenke complied. Outside the bar, Parks informed Wenke of the warrant, told him that he was under arrest, and placed him in handcuffs. Parks did not give Wenke an opportunity to pay the fine prior to arresting him, because, in Parks' words, I don't collect money; I arrest people. His standard procedure when arresting someone on a warrant for nonpayment of fines is to transport the person to the county jail, where payment of the fine can be made. Immediately after arresting Wenke, Parks conducted a search of his person. Inside a cigarette box which he removed from Wenke's trouser pocket, Parks found a small straw containing a substance later confirmed to be methamphetamine. Wenke was subsequently charged by information with one count of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, a Class IV felony. [1] He filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized by Parks during the search of his person. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion. In its order, the court noted that Wenke does not argue the court lacked authority to issue the warrant or that the warrant itself was invalid.... [Wenke] argues the officer should have given [him] the opportunity to refuse to make payment before he was arrested. The court found this argument to be without merit, because Wenke had already been given ample opportunity to pay or show cause why he did not pay the fine before the warrant was issued. Wenke was convicted after a bench trial, sentenced to imprisonment for 60 days, and fined $250 plus court costs. His appeal was dismissed due to his lawyer's failure to file a brief. Wenke was granted a new direct appeal in a postconviction proceeding, and execution of the sentence was stayed pending appeal. This appeal was then timely filed. We moved the case to our docket pursuant to our statutory authority to regulate the caseloads of the appellate courts of this state. [2]