Opinion ID: 1094919
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: whether the circuit court erred in refusing to grant oliver's motion for j.n.o.v. or in the alternative, a new trial?

Text: Oliver next argues that the lower court erred in not granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative a new trial. [A] motion for J.N.O.V. tests the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict. It asks the court to hold, as a matter of law that the verdict may not stand. Goodwin v. Derryberry Co., 553 So.2d 40, 42 (Miss. 1989) (citing Stubblefield v. Jesco, Inc., 464 So.2d 47, 54 (Miss. 1984) (quoting Jesco, Inc. v. Whitehead, 451 So.2d 706, 713 (Miss. 1984))). In deciding a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Goodwin, 553 So.2d at 42. To review a denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict this Court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inference that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. If the facts so considered point so overwhelmingly in favor of the appellant that reasonable men could not have arrived at a contrary verdict, [this Court is] required to reverse and render. On the other hand if there is substantial evidence in support of the verdict, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions, affirmance is required. Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So.2d 248, 252 (Miss. 1993) (citing Munford, Inc. v. Fleming, 597 So.2d 1282, 1284 (Miss. 1992) (citing Litton Systems, Inc. v. Enochs, 449 So.2d 1213, 1214 (Miss. 1984))). This standard of review is predicated upon the fact that the trial judge applied the correct law. Sperry-New Holland, 617 So.2d at 252. As was stated in the previous issue, both parties were working under a different assumption in the lower court. The evidence adduced by Misso, dealt with the propriety of the decision by the election commission to open the sealed ballots, and Oliver was presenting evidence about the legality of the twelve challenged votes that were opened by the election commission. Oliver was working one step ahead of Misso and did not address that issue to the lower court. Oliver is asking this Court to hold that the lower court should have overruled the jury's verdict that it did not know who received the most legal votes, and hold as a matter of law that he received the most legal votes. However, that was not the issue before the lower court. What Oliver needed to ask the lower court was to hold that the election commission had the right to open the sealed ballots, and determine that they were legal, but he did not present any evidence at the trial to sustain this verdict. The jury was unable to determine which testimony to believe and found the evidence insufficient on both sides. Oliver argues that the jury's verdict was against the substantial weight of the evidence. To the contrary, the jury's verdict was a statement that the evidence was insufficient on both sides. The lower court judge was correct in not granting the J.N.O.V. because neither side presented enough evidence to convince the jury, nor the judge in that matter, and the grant or denial of a new trial has always been within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and absent an abuse of discretion, this Court is `without power to disturb such a determination.' American Fire Protection, 653 So.2d 1387, 1390 (Miss. 1995) (quoting Muse v. Hutchins, 559 So.2d 1031, 1034 (Miss. 1990)). Unless the lower court abused its discretion in finding that the verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, we will not reverse. James v. Mabus, 574 So.2d 596, 601 (Miss. 1990) (citing Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So.2d 1172, 1177 (Miss. 1990); Cummins v. Century 21 Action Realty, Inc., 563 So.2d 1382, 1386 (Miss. 1990); see Miss.R.Civ.Pro. 59)). Under such circumstances it cannot be held that the lower court abused its discretion.