Opinion ID: 804877
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Duty of Air Traffic Controllers

Text: The FTCA serves as a limited waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States. It therefore opens the federal government to tort liability “under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). We agree with the parties that Ohio law governs this case. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1962). Because the alleged negligent act or omission occurred in Ohio, we apply Ohio choice-of-law rules. See SpurginDienst v. United States, 359 F.3d 451, 455 n.2 (7th Cir. 2004). Ohio has adopted the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Conflicts § 146, under which “a presumption is created that the law of the place of the injury controls unless another jurisdiction has a more significant relationship to the lawsuit.” Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 474 N.E.2d 286, 289 (Ohio 1984). At the time Ms. LeGrande was injured, Flight 2745 was flying in Ohio airspace and was under the jurisdiction of air traffic controllers based in Cleveland, Ohio. The parties have not suggested that any other state has a more significant relationship to the lawsuit than does Ohio. Therefore, we apply Ohio tort law. Under Ohio law, it is well settled that the elements of an ordinary negligence suit between private parties are (1) the existence of a legal duty, (2) the de- fendant’s breach of that duty and (3) an injury that is proximately caused by the defendant’s breach. Wallace v. 16 No. 11-2205 Ohio Dep’t of Commerce, 773 N.E.2d 1018, 1025-26 (Ohio 2002).
The parties agree that the FAA air traffic controllers at the Cleveland Center had a duty to provide air traffic control guidance to Flight 2745. What they dispute is the scope of that duty.7 In Ms. LeGrande’s view, FAA personnel knew that severe turbulence had been predicted on Flight 2745’s flight path, and the agency therefore breached its duty to her when the air traffic controllers failed to warn the captain of the forecaster’s predictions. As we noted earlier, in analyzing negligence claims under the FTCA, the courts of appeals are in agree- ment that state substantive law governs whether the 7 To the extent that Ms. LeGrande may be attempting to challenge the FAA’s determination as to which weather products are useful to pilots, we believe that this determination is a discretionary function that falls within the discretionary function doctrine, which limits the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-25 (1991) (discussing discretionary function doctrine); Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988) (same); United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814-15 (1984) (applying the discretionary function doctrine to an FAA certification process); Collins v. United States, 564 F.3d 833, 83839 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying the discretionary function doctrine to the FAA’s decision not to install radar at a regional airport). No. 11-2205 17 defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.8 In the aviation context, however, the courts often have given content to the elements of state law by referring to federal standards. The reasons for this reference to federal law are twofold. First, exclusive federal jurisdiction over such claims, as a practical matter, has prevented state courts from developing controlling legal principles at a sufficient level of specificity.9 More fundamentally, when the federal employee’s actions are dictated by federal law and regulations, reference to those sources is necessary to understand the nature of the employee’s duties and the limitations on his authority. Accordingly, it is not surprising that FTCA cases concerning air traffic controllers have imported standards from the regulations or the air traffic manuals in determining the contours of the state-law duty.1 0 Notably, Ohio law 8 See, e.g., Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 581 F.3d 737, 743 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that Minnesota law governs plaintiff’s negligence action brought under the FTCA); St. Tammany Parish ex rel. Davis v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 556 F.3d 307, 317 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating that, “[a]s long as state tort law creates the relevant duty, the FTCA permits suit for violations of federal statutes and regulations”); Ochran v. United States, 273 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that, in a negligence action, the court would “turn to the law of Florida to determine whether [the defendant] owed a duty of care”). 9 Glorvigen, 581 F.3d at 743. 10 See id. at 743-44; see also Tinkler v. United States ex rel. F.A.A., 982 F.2d 1456, 1461 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Mead’s duty arose from (continued...) 18 No. 11-2205 10 (...continued) both the dictates of the Flight Services Manual as well as the reliance pilots place on FSS briefers.”); Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int’l, Inc., 828 F.2d 278, 282 & nn. 13-14 (5th Cir. 1977) (relying on the manual to establish a duty of care); Gill v. United States, 429 F.2d 1072, 1075 (5th Cir. 1970) (same); cf. Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 728-29 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that violation of a duty created by federal law would not support an FTCA claim, but noting that the same violation may constitute a violation of a state-imposed duty on a “negligence per se concept”); Jackson v. United States, 156 F.3d 230, 234 (1st Cir. 1998) (rejecting, as a matter of West Virginia law, plaintiff’s negligence per se theory built on controller’s failure to follow manual, but suggesting that it could be “some evidence of negligence”). It should be noted that some of these cases have imported the standards with a more precise legal analysis than others by specifically explaining the difference between importing a federal duty and importing a federal standard of care to define a state-law duty. But cf. Holbrook v. United States, 673 F.3d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 2012) (“If select passages from a lengthy and complex order could serve as the basis for government tort liability, the FAA would be hobbled by the specter of litigation as it worked to promote aircraft safety. The price of circulating internal guidance should not be an exponential increase in exposure to a tort suit.”). It is worth noting that this approach to defining state-law duties by reference to federal sources is not unique to the aviation context. See Parrott v. United States, 536 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that, under Supreme Court cases, federal statutes provided a duty of care owed to federal inmates, but (continued...) No. 11-2205 19 appears to recognize the necessity of referring to federal legal principles in such a situation. See Salisbury v. Gordon Air Mgmt. Corp., No. 19085, 2000 WL 92087, at  (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2000);1 1 see also Freeman v. United States, 509 10 (...continued) also that, “[t]o the extent that the FTCA requires us to assess the Government’s duty under Indiana law, . . . there is no hint that Indiana law would differ on this point”); see also Bolt v. United States, 509 F.3d 1028, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 2007) (reiterating that a federal rule, such as the Army rules for snow removal, can determine standard of care in exercising state law duty); Medina v. United States, 259 F.3d 220, 223 (4th Cir. 2001) (in case involving immigration detention of foreign diplomat, noting that the FTCA “serves to convey jurisdiction when the alleged breach of duty is tortious under state law, or when the Government has breached a duty under federal law that is analogous to a duty of care recognized by state law” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 11 In Salisbury v. Gordon Air Mgmt. Corp., No. 19085, 2000 WL 92087 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2000), a pilot was sued following a crash for failure to abide by an FAA regulation concerning when an aircraft may fly into “known or forecast moderate icing conditions.” Id. at . Relying in part upon “persuasive authority on the federal level,” the Court of Appeals of Ohio concluded that “the regulations do establish the standard of care of a reasonable pilot in [Ohio].” Id. The court noted both that “the federal air regulations have been adopted by the State of Ohio as its own,” citing Ohio Revised Code § 4561.05, and that cases from both the Third and the Ninth Circuits suggested that the adoption of the federal regulations as (continued...) 20 No. 11-2205 F.2d 626, 629 (6th Cir. 1975) (applying FAA regulations to establish the standard of care controllers owe parachutists in FTCA case governed by Ohio law). Indeed, Ohio has adopted federal air regulations as its own. Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4561.05, 4561.14. As Judge McCree wrote in Freeman, therefore, “violation of a federal air regulation constitutes a violation of Ohio law.” 509 F.2d at 630. Ms. LeGrande, who bears the burden of proof, has pointed to no statute, regulation or other directive that imposes on FAA traffic controllers the responsibility to transmit MIS weather products to pilots. Indeed, a review of the governing directives makes clear that no such obligation exists. At the time Ms. LeGrande was injured, FAA Job Order 7110.65P prescribed air traffic control procedures regarding, among other things, the dissemination of weather-related information to pilots.1 2 The Job Order states, in relevant part: Controllers shall advise pilots of hazardous weather that may impact operations within 150 [nautical miles] of their sector or area of jurisdiction. Hazardous weather information contained 11 (...continued) the standard of care or as evidence thereof is the norm. Id. at . The court found this sufficient to establish ordinary negligence in that case and, therefore, did not consider whether, because it involved a violation of a safety statute designed to prevent the harm at hand, it amounted to negligence per se. Id. 12 These regulations have since been revised and can be found in substantially the same form at FAA Job Order 7110.65T. No. 11-2205 21 in HIWAS broadcasts includes Airmen’s Meteo- rological Information (AIRMET), Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMET), Convective SIGMET (WST), Urgent Pilot Weather Reports (UUA), and Center Weather Advisories (CWA). FAA Job Order 7110.65P § 2-6-2. Indeed, Ms. LeGrande’s expert, when asked whether air traffic controllers were “permitted to broadcast a HIWAS alert for an MIS,” answered by saying, “Not that I know of.” R.60-6 at 12 (Burgess Dep. 203). Ms. LeGrande contends, in essence, that the first sentence of FAA Job Order 7110.65P § 2-6-2—“Controllers shall advise pilots of hazardous weather that may impact operations within 150 [nautical miles] of their sector or area of jurisdiction”—operates independently from the remainder of that subsection, which, in her view, details how air traffic controllers must advise pilots of hazardous weather. We believe that Ms. LeGrande’s textual interpretation of the job order is a strained one that, when read in the context of the rest of the directive, would produce a decidedly unrealistic result. First, it is important to note, at the outset, that, under the procedure mandated by the job order, air traffic controllers in HIWAS areas, including the airspace controlled by the Cleveland Center, are not directed to broadcast detailed in-flight weather advisories. Instead, as a general rule, the controllers read the limited information on a General Information Strip to inform pilots that an advisory has been published and then instruct pilots to turn to the HIWAS broadcast on another radio 22 No. 11-2205 frequency for more detailed information. The FAA Job Order directs controllers to use the following phraseology: “ATTENTION ALL AIRCRAFT. HAZARDOUS WEATHER INFORMATION [type and number of weather product issued] FOR (geographical area) AVAILABLE ON HIWAS, FLIGHT WATCH, OR FLIGHT SER- VICE FREQUENCIES.” FAA Job Order 7110.65P § 2-6-2 (noting that the inclusion of the type and number of weather advisory responsible for the HIWAS advisory is optional). Notably, even on the HIWAS frequency,1 3 which is dedicated to weather conditions that are of immediate interest to pilots of aircraft currently in flight, MIS weather products are not broadcast because they are not immediately pertinent to aviators aloft. We also cannot accept the suggestion that the FAA Job Order imposes on air traffic controllers a duty to broadcast information about predicted turbulence regardless of the weather product in which that prediction is included. It is true that the first sentence of FAA Job Order 7110.65P § 2-6-2 instructs air traffic controllers to “advise pilots of hazardous weather that may impact operations within 150 [nautical miles] of their sector or area of jurisdiction.” It is also true that the FAA Pilot/Controller Glossary defines “Hazardous Weather Information” as informa- 13 These products also are not available on Flight Watch or Flight Service frequencies relied upon by aviators traversing areas not covered by a HIWAS service. No. 11-2205 23 tion contained in various listed weather products 1 4 and “any other weather . . . which is considered significant and [is] not included in a current hazardous weather advisory.” To determine the significance of weather conditions, we receive some help from another section of FAA Job Order 7110.65P, which charges the controller to be prepared to suggest alternate routes and altitudes in “areas of significant weather,” notes that “[w]eather significant to the safety of aircraft includes such conditions as . . . moderate to extreme turbulence (including [clear air turbulence]).” FAA Job Order 7110.65P § 2-6-4(b) note. Even if we read these provisions to suggest that there may be occasions when an air traffic controller is obliged to alert aloft aircraft to a weather condition such as turbulence when that condition is not included in a current advisory, we do not think that it is plausible to read these documents to require that the controller advise the pilot of the content of an MIS. The relevant Job Order provisions clearly apply to current specific weather conditions of sufficient severity to impede the aircraft’s flight. As we have noted earlier, the FAA has categorized weather 14 According to the FAA Pilot/Controller Glossary, Hazardous Weather Information includes information contained in urgent PIREPs and CWAs as well as weather products known as SIGMETs, convective SIGMETs, and AIRMETs. None of those weather products are implicated in this case. Notably, the list of weather products that the glossary uses to define Hazardous Weather Information does not include the weather product at issue in this case—an MIS. 24 No. 11-2205 products into those that are disseminated to pilots, such as a CWA, and those that are not, such as an MIS, precisely to ensure that pilots receive useful information without being distracted by forecasts of no practical significance. The pilot of an aircraft, alert for immediate meteorological dangers, simply would not profit from—or want to be distracted by—the information contained in an MIS. Here, MIS 02 and MIS 03 pertained to a 10,000- to 15,000foot high block of airspace above parts of four states—Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania and New York—over a period of some twenty hours.1 5 Even taking all the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. LeGrande, the general forecast of frequent moderate turbulence to isolated severe turbulence in such a massive area and for such a lengthy period of time, while useful to the FAA for flight planning purposes, was far too indefinite to be of assistance to pilots. Therefore, not only has Ms. LeGrande failed in carrying her burden of proof, but the governing regulations and job orders make clear that the district court was correct in determining that FAA air traffic controllers have no duty to advise pilots of the content of MIS weather products. FAA personnel in this case therefore had no duty to disseminate the turbulence predictions contained in 15 MIS 02 was issued at 2:42 p.m. About eight and a half hours later, MIS 03 was issued at 9:06 p.m. In total, the prediction encapsulated in MIS 02 and MIS 03 lasted from 2:42 p.m. until 9:06 a.m. the following morning, a total of over twenty hours. No. 11-2205 25 either MIS 02 or MIS 03 to Flight 2745. Nor did air traffic controllers have any duty to broadcast the CWA to Flight 2745; it was limited to airspace that Flight 2745 would not traverse on its path from Cleveland to Chicago.16 16 In further support of her contention that air traffic controllers should have broadcast the turbulence predictions from MIS 02 and MIS 03, Ms. LeGrande invites our attention to United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. United States, 562 F.3d 1297, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009), in which the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated in the course of its decision: “The United States concedes that, once the National Weather Service forecasts moderate to severe turbulence, the United States government has no discretion to decline to provide that information to pilots.” The Government’s concession in Aviation Underwriters was limited to the duty of an NWS Meteorological Watch Office to disseminate, per NWS procedures, a weather product known as a SIGMET. There is no SIGMET implicated in this case, which revolves instead around an MIS, an entirely different weather product. Additionally, the FAA personnel Ms. LeGrande accuses of negligence in this suit are not governed by NWS directives. The governmental concession on which Ms. LeGrande relies is therefore inapposite to this case. Ms. LeGrande also relies on Spurgin-Dienst v. United States, 359 F.3d 451, 455 (7th Cir. 2004), in which we suggested that an air traffic controller erred by, among other things, not providing a pilot with an MIS about icing conditions. The statement in Spurgin-Dienst on which Ms. LeGrande relies is dicta. At the core of that decision was our holding addressing the actions of FAA personnel; we held that the district court (continued...) 26 No. 11-2205