Opinion ID: 1913355
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in restricting the testimony of City's expert on wetlands.

Text: In this case there was a question whether the Corps of Engineers would issue a 404 permit if this property was declared a wetland. A 404 permit is required to develop federally designated wetlands. City contends that the issuance of a 404 permit was a crucial factor to be considered in appraising the condemned property. City called Jim Oehlerking (Oehlerking) from the Omaha District Corps of Engineers (Corps), the entity responsible for issuing 404 permits. The record does not indicate whether City called Oehlerking as an expert witness or simply a resource witness. At trial, City indicated that it intended to call Oehlerking as a resource person, not as an expert, and not to give opinions but to merely discuss and describe the regulatory processes involved in declaring wetlands and issuing 404 permits. [6] On appeal, City claims that Oehlerking was an expert witness called to rebut the testimony of Kelleys' wetlands expert. City argues the trial court erred when it did not allow City to ask Oehlerking the probability of a 404 permit being issued in this case. City argues that Oehlerking was not an expert retained or consulted specifically for trial preparation and, consequently, he is not subject to the discovery rules for expert witnesses. According to the record City has always claimed Oehlerking as its witness and, in fact, in its brief they refer to him as the City's expert witness on wetlands. Therefore, he will remain subject to the rules for discovery of expert witnesses. SDCL 15-6-37(b)(2) authorized the trial court to exclude this expert witness' testimony for failure to comply with a discovery order. City did not disclose the identity of its expert witness until the day before trial, more than five months after the original date set for disclosure of all witnesses. It must be noted that Kelleys also failed to comply with the court-ordered discovery deadlines; however, they were not as delinquent as the city. SDCL 15-6-37 is designed to compel production of evidence and to promote rather than stifle the truth-finding process. Magbuhat v. Kovarik, 382 N.W.2d 43, 45 (S.D. 1986), modified, 445 N.W.2d 315 (S.D.1989) (citing Chittenden & Eastman Co. v. Smith, 286 N.W.2d 314, 316 (S.D.1979)). The severity of the sanction must be tempered with consideration of the equities. Less drastic alternatives should be employed before sanctions are imposed which hinder a party's day in court and thus defeat the very objective of the litigation namely to seek the truth from those who have knowledge of the facts. Id. The trial court in this case only restricted City from asking the Corps of Engineers' expert whether or not he could say with reasonable certainty whether a 404 permit could be issued. After this ruling, City failed to make an offer of proof on what Oehlerking's testimony would be. [7] Where there has been no offer of proof on excluded testimony, and it is impossible to determine whether the party had been prejudiced by the court's ruling, the contention that the court erred in excluding testimony has not been preserved for appeal. Crilly v. Morris, 70 S.D. 584, 19 N.W.2d 836 (1945). The trial court specifically allowed City to ask this expert about wetlands and whether or not this land was a wetland. The trial court also permitted City to ask what people have to do to get a 404 permit. Therefore, we feel that such a minor restriction was justified, keeping in mind the fact that City did not disclose its expert witness for more than one hundred days beyond the court-ordered discovery deadline. City complains that the 404 permit is a crucial issue in this case. Before a 404 permit becomes an issue, the property must be declared a wetland by the federal government. Despite this very important issue, City failed to include a proposed instruction on wetlands and it did not ask the court to recognize the condemned property as a wetland. It is the duty of the parties to submit proposed instructions for the theory of their case. Glanzer v. St. Joseph Indian School, 438 N.W.2d 204 (S.D.1989). City did not call a witness to testify that this was a wetland. Nancy Kagel (Kagel), who was hired by the city to study this property, concluded that the property was a wetland and a 404 permit would be required before it could be developed. City did not call Kagel as a witness for trial, but Kelleys had her deposition read at trial where she testified that 97 to 98 percent of all applications are approved for a 404 permit. Consequently, judging from City's actions, we do not consider this issue of significant magnitude. The trial court did not commit prejudicial error in restricting Oehlerking's testimony.