Opinion ID: 4521869
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant’s inability to commit crime

Text: Before trial, defendant filed an in limine motion requesting that defendant’s two doctors be permitted to testify that they had prescribed defendant pain medication and to testify about the medications’ likely effects on defendant. Defendant sought to show he “was incapable of plotting a murder and could not have committed the acts that are alleged.” The prosecution countered that this evidence constituted evidence of “voluntary intoxication” and that it was only admissible in the guilt phase to show a defendant’s diminished capacity. (Former § 22, subd. (c), renumbered as § 29.4, subd. (c) by Stats. 2012, ch. 162, § 120.) Because defense counsel conceded he did not intend to offer this evidence to negate defendant’s intent, the trial court excluded the evidence. We conclude the trial court did not err. 73 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 6. Insufficient Evidence of Special Circumstance Allegations a. Insufficient Evidence of Financial Gain The jury found true the special circumstance that defendant murdered Pamela for financial gain. (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(1), (c); CALJIC No. 8.81.1.) The prosecution presented two theories supporting this special circumstance allegation. First, it pointed out that defendant would stand to get all—instead of just half—of the marital and business assets if Pamela were killed, rather than if they got divorced. Second, over defense objection, the prosecution also argued that defendant did not have to financially gain from the murder if he hired Moya: “In other words, if you find that Mr. Moya was going to or did gain financially to the tune of $25,000, then that is enough to establish the special circumstance for financial gain.” On appeal, defendant challenges this second theory, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding on this basis. Distinguishing both People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731 and People v. Freeman (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 337, on which the prosecution relied, defendant asserts that the prosecution improperly argued it only had to show that Moya received some financial gain; the prosecution was required to, but did not, show that Moya was the actual killer. On review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdicts. (People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 630.) Under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(1), a defendant is subject to the special circumstance if the “murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain.” Even if the defendant is “not the actual killer,” if that defendant “with the intent to kill, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, 74 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. requests, or assists any actor in the commission of murder in the first degree,” he or she is also subject to this special circumstance. (§ 190.2, subd. (c).) “Reading the two provisions together it is clear that one who intentionally aids or encourages a person in the deliberate killing of another for the killer’s own financial gain is subject to the special circumstance punishment.” (People v. Freeman, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 339 [construing 1978 version of § 190.2]; see People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 933.) Defendant suggests that evidence of Moya’s financial gain is insufficient without evidence that he was the actual killer and not just an intermediary. Freeman did not address a multiparty situation involving the hirer of a contract killer, the actual killer, and someone who acts as intermediary between the two. Thus, contrary to defendant’s suggestion, Freeman does not stand for the proposition that the actual contract killer, as opposed to an intermediary, must have a financial gain from the murder. Rather, subsequent cases have rejected that interpretation. (People v. Singer (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 23, 44; see People v. Battle (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 50, 82 [following People v. Singer].) “[I]t is hard to see why, as a matter of policy, the Legislature would want to differentiate between a murder for hire where there is no intermediary and one where there is. Apart from possible causation problems where the link between the hirer and actual killer is extremely attenuated (not our case), the moral culpability of the hirer would be the same. (People v. Freeman, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d 337, 340.) The distinction urged by defendant would tend to snare amateurs while letting practiced killers with impersonal, large networks of thugs off the hook. It hardly makes sense.” (People v. Singer, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 44.) 75 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. This policy argument articulated in Singer has particular relevance here. When responding to Smith’s incredulity at how “this many people” got involved in Pamela’s murder, defendant reassured Smith that he had “the insulation, cause I don’t know them, and they don’t know me. I never met them. I never seen them. I wouldn’t recognize him.” The prosecution reiterated that defendant boasted he was “insulated” because it was Moya who had “subcontract[ed]” with Simmons and Marquez. In sum, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s true finding of the financial-gain special-circumstance allegation. b. Insufficient Evidence of Lying in Wait The jury also found true the lying-in-wait special circumstance allegation. CALJIC No. 8.81.15.1 provides in part that the jury must find: “1. The defendant intentionally killed the victim; and [¶] 2. The murder was committed by means of lying in wait.” In closing argument, the prosecution explained that as to the second element, the question is, “[W]as the murder committed while the defendant or any co-conspirator was lying in wait? Any co-principal, any aider and abettor was lying in wait? Well, that’s the three folks in the parking garage, Simmons, Marquez and Moya. They were the ones lying in wait.” Defendant did not object to the instruction as given, did not seek to modify the instruction, and did not later object to the prosecution’s explanation of the instruction at closing argument. On appeal, defendant insists that section 190.2, subdivision (a)(15) is ambiguous in terms of who must be lying in wait. In any event, he argues that allowing an aider and abettor—who specifically intended to kill, but did not intend to lie in wait, did not actually lie in wait and did not aid and abet 76 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. the lying in wait—to be subject to the lying-in-wait special circumstance violates due process. Defendant asserts that the prosecution’s closing argument that evidence that any of the codefendants were lying in wait would support a true finding of the special circumstance allegation was improper. We reject this claim. To determine whether an aider and abettor who is not the actual killer can be subject to the lying-in-wait special circumstance, “the questions are whether defendant, with the intent to kill, aided and abetted the victim’s killing, and whether the actual killer intentionally killed the victim by means of lying in wait.” (People v. Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 630; see People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 331 [interpreting earlier version of 190.2].) The record contains ample evidence that defendant aided and abetted Moya’s killing of Pamela by lying in wait. Defendant admitted to Smith that “[t]here were four different other occasions where I had it so it was perfectly clean. Yeah, it was a rural area. I even had the times, dates, everything, location. . . . I physically made sure that it was prechecked and cleared with, you know—and there’s no—no cameras, none. But they pick the day before my fuckin’ court hearing at the busiest place in LA.” Indeed, when describing a prior missed opportunity for Moya to kill Pamela, defendant essentially admitted that he wanted Moya to kill her by means of lying in wait: “All he had to do was sit there, wait for her to get in the car, and jack it.” Contrary to defendant’s assertion, defendant’s liability was based on his own intent and his own significant actions in masterminding the killing of Pamela. Based on the foregoing, we conclude the record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury’s lying-in-wait specialcircumstance finding. 77 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 7. Prosecutorial Misconduct at Guilt Phase Defendant maintains that the prosecution committed various acts of misconduct at the guilt phase, including mischaracterizing the evidence, misstating the law, making inflammatory remarks, and referring to facts outside the record. It is prosecutorial misconduct to misstate the law. (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 130.) It is also misconduct to misstate the evidence or go beyond the record. (People v. Gonzalez (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 947; People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 550.) However, the prosecution “enjoys wide latitude in commenting on the evidence, including the reasonable inferences and deductions that can be drawn therefrom. (People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 928; People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 277 [“hyperbolic and tendentious” comments, even if “harsh and unbecoming,” may be reasonable if they can be inferred from the evidence].) “A defendant asserting prosecutorial misconduct must . . . establish a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks in an objectionable fashion.” (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 568); see People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 522 [“whether the prosecutor has employed deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade either the court or the jury”]; see also People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 695 [prosecutor’s “remark was gratuitous, but his misconduct was also de minimis”].) To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal, “ ‘a criminal defendant must make a timely and specific objection and ask the trial court to admonish the jury to disregard the impropriety. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] The failure to timely object and request an admonition will be excused if 78 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. doing either would have been futile, or if an admonition would not have cured the harm.” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 960 (Clark); see People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 226.) We discuss each claim of alleged prosecutorial misconduct in turn. a. Closing Argument During closing argument at the end of the guilt phase, Prosecutor Jackson described Pamela’s last moments after she had been stabbed and was still conscious. He next asked: “What do you think she might have been thinking? Those two or three or even four minutes when she had time to think? Time to feel? Time to realize what was happening? She would never again touch the hand of her daughter, never kiss the cheek of [J.F.], never see their smiling faces. And she had time. How long do you think a minute is? She had three or four. While all this is going through her mind, how long do you think that minute lasted? An eternity. Think about what she was going through. And I am going to ask you just to think for one minute, starting now.” At this point, defendant objected, arguing this line of questioning only engendered prejudice that outweighed any probative value. Jackson countered that the circumstances of Pamela’s death were relevant to show “the brutality of how she died, the fact that this was a personal execution.” The trial court overruled defendant’s objection. Afterwards, the prosecution continued and asked the jury again to think for one minute. On appeal, defendant argues that the prosecution improperly asked the jury to view the crime from the perspective of the suffering victim and that the trial court erred in overruling his objection. 79 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. “As a general rule, a prosecutor may not invite the jury to view the case through the victim’s eyes, because to do so appeals to the jury’s sympathy for the victim.” (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1406.) Though we have permitted such argument at the penalty phase (see People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 485-486; People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 263264), asking jurors to “imagine the thoughts of the victims in their last seconds of life” is rarely a relevant inquiry at the guilt phase. (People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1407; see People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1057.) The Attorney General does not dispute that the comments in this regard were improper. Nevertheless, even though these comments were improper, defendant is not entitled to relief. Given the strength of the evidence against defendant, not the least of which was his jailhouse confession, he did not suffer prejudice from the prosecutor’s comments. (See People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 957.) It was not reasonably probable that the verdict would have been more favorable without this misconduct. b. Misstatements of Law Defendant claims that at the end of the guilt phase, the prosecution made a number of misstatements of law in closing argument. For instance, with respect to the issue whether defendant withdrew from the conspiracy, the prosecution reiterated that defendant must “do everything in his power” to prevent the commission of the murder. Defendant maintains that the instruction misstates a defendant’s burden of proof for withdrawal. Even assuming error, any misstatement was 80 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. harmless. There was no dispute that defendant committed an overt act, i.e., paying Moya to kill Pamela, which completed the crime of conspiracy. (See People v. Sconce, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 703 [defendant’s “withdrawal from the conspiracy is not a valid defense to the completed crime of conspiracy”].) Next, in describing defendant’s liability as an aider and abettor, the prosecution used an analogy of a backup quarterback who never gets on the field but is still part of the team. Defendant claims this example misstated the law because it suggested a defendant’s mere presence or knowledge, similar to sitting on a bench and doing nothing, is sufficient to impose liability as an aider and abettor. Defense counsel did not object to the football analogy and seek an admonition and therefore, has forfeited the claim. (See Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 960.) Defendant also argues that the prosecution misstated the law on the lying-in-wait special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)), which permits aider and abettor liability if the actual killer killed the victim while or immediately after lying in wait. (People v. Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 630; People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 331-332 [construing identical language in § 190.2, former subd. (b) as statutory basis for aider and abettor’s liability].) Defendant focuses on the prosecution’s following statement about what defendant was doing right before Pamela was killed: “There is an argument that Mr. Fayed was actually lying in wait; he was sitting in a room, not five feet from Pamela Fayed thirty seconds before she was killed. So certainly he was concealing his purpose as well.” It was not reasonably likely the jury would have understood this remark to mean defendant’s actions were 81 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. sufficient to prove lying in wait. (People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 689.) The prosecution’s theory was not that defendant was the actual attacker, which would require that defendant intentionally killed Pamela by means of lying in wait. (People v. Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 630.) Rather, the prosecution consistently argued that “the three folks in the parking garage, Simmons, Marquez, and Moya. They were the ones lying in wait.” c. Reference to Extra-record Evidence (1) Statements about federal subpoena In describing the telephone calls between defendant and Moya and Moya and his cohorts two months before Pamela’s murder, the prosecution emphasized the timing of these calls, i.e., two days after the federal subpoena issued to the forensic accountants in the Fayeds’ divorce was “leaked” on May 27, 2008. Referring to the “leaked” subpoena at least four times (without any objection from defendant), the prosecution explained that “[y]ou get the idea that in the hours after the subpoena is leaked, these guys communicate and talk with each other by way of text message and phone to let each other know.” Based on his failure to timely object and seek an admonition, defendant has forfeited a challenge to the characterization that the subpoena was “leaked.” (See People v. Collins, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 226.) (2) Statements about federal case On a related point, defendant argues that the prosecution misstated that defendant “knew” about the sealed federal indictment before Pamela’s murder and that Pamela would definitely be a witness against defendant in the Goldfinger matter. Defendant forfeited the claim by failing to timely object 82 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. and request an admonition. (People v. Collins, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 209) In any event, the claim fails on the merits because the prosecution did not mischaracterize the facts but made reasonable inferences based on the record. (See People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 494-495.) The prosecution stated that defendant and Pamela “knew exactly what was going on as early as May of 2008. 154 days before her murder, the indictment comes out.” Fairly read, the statements merely underscored that defendant and Pamela were aware of the federal investigation against Goldfinger shortly before the indictment was filed. Also, Pamela’s criminal defense attorney, Willingham, testified that “Pamela wanted to be cooperative” and be a “witness” against defendant. Any technical meaning defendant affixes to “witness” does not support his claim of mischaracterization by the prosecution. (3) Statements about defendant’s mental state In depicting defendant’s anger at its height when Pamela tried to secure a money transmitting license, the prosecution described defendant as “enraged,” “absolutely furious,” “boiling over with rage” and “apoplectic.” Defendant claims that these descriptions are not supported by the record. Not so. These are reasonable inferences based on the record, including defendant’s outraged statements to Smith that Pamela “went out and made all these stupid accusations and ridiculous accusations against me just to try and make me look bad” and that with regard to defendant’s million dollar e-currency business, “she would’ve fucked it all up.” (See People v. Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 928.) “ ‘Closing argument may be vigorous and may include opprobrious epithets when they are reasonably warranted by the evidence.’ ” (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 750.) 83 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.