Opinion ID: 2981456
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Equal Protection in the Voting Context

Text: The right to vote is a “precious” and “fundamental” right. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). “Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” Wesburry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (finding that the right to vote is “preservative of all rights”). “‘The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the franchise. Equal protection applies as well to the manner of its exercise.’” League of Women Voters v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 477 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000)). “[A] citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972). “Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of another.” Bush, 531 U.S. at 104–05; see also Wesburry, 376 U.S. at 17 (“Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges [the right to vote.]”). Nos. 12-4055/4076 Obama for America, et al. v. Jon Husted, et al. Page 8 The Equal Protection Clause applies when a state either classifies voters in disparate ways, see Bush, 531 U.S. at 104–05 (arbitrary and disparate treatment of votes violates equal protection), or places restrictions on the right to vote, see League of Women Voters, 548 F.3d at 478 (voting system that burdens the exercise of the right to vote violates equal protection). The precise character of the state’s action and the nature of the burden on voters will determine the appropriate equal protection standard. See Biener v. Cailo, 361 F.3d 206, 214 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The scrutiny test depends on the [regulation’s] effect on [the plaintiff’s] rights.”). If a plaintiff alleges only that a state treated him or her differently than similarly situated voters, without a corresponding burden on the fundamental right to vote, a straightforward rational basis standard of review should be used. See McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807–09 (1969) (applying rational basis to a state statute that prohibited plaintiffs’ access to absentee ballots where no burden on the right to vote was shown); Biener, 361 F.3d at 214–15 (applying rational basis where there was no showing of an “infringement on the fundamental right to vote”). On the other extreme, when a state’s classification “severely” burdens the fundamental right to vote, as with poll taxes, strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992); see also Harper, 383 U.S. at 670 (“We have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined.”). Most cases fall in between these two extremes. When a plaintiff alleges that a state has burdened voting rights through the disparate treatment of voters, we review the claim using the “flexible standard” outlined in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). See Hunter, 635 F.3d at 238 (applying Anderson-Burdick balancing in an equal protection challenge to the counting of provisional ballots). Although Anderson and Burdick were both ballot-access cases, the Supreme Court has confirmed their vitality in a much broader range of voting rights contexts. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (Scalia, J., Nos. 12-4055/4076 Obama for America, et al. v. Jon Husted, et al. Page 9 concurring.) (“To evaluate a law respecting the right to vote—whether it governs voter qualifications, candidate selection, or the voting process—we use the approach set out in Burdick . . . .”). The Burdick Court stated the standard as follows: A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs’ rights.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789)). This standard is sufficiently flexible to accommodate the complexities of state election regulations while also protecting the fundamental importance of the right to vote. There is no “litmus test” to separate valid from invalid voting regulations; courts must weigh the burden on voters against the state’s asserted justifications and “make the ‘hard judgment’ that our adversary system demands.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190 (Stevens, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). The district court applied the Anderson-Burdick standard and ultimately concluded that the justifications proffered by the State were insufficient to outweigh the burden on Plaintiffs’ voting rights. Instead of the Anderson-Burdick standard, the State and Intervenors urge us to apply a rational basis standard of review to the early voting restriction at issue. Because Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges a straightforward equal protection violation, they argue, a straightforward equal protection analysis should follow. However, when a state regulation is found to treat voters differently in a way that burdens the fundamental right to vote, the Anderson-Burdick standard applies. See Hunter, 635 F.3d at 238; see also Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 965 (1982) (rejecting the assertion that traditional equal protection principles should automatically apply in the voting rights context “without first examining the nature of the interests that are affected and the extent of the burden”). The State and Intervenors argue that the Anderson-Burdick standard is applicable only when a state regulation is alleged to have violated the free association and due Nos. 12-4055/4076 Obama for America, et al. v. Jon Husted, et al. Page 10 process guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, not when a plaintiff alleges only an equal protection violation. The State seeks to disconnect and isolate these areas of constitutional law as they apply to voting rights, but its approach would create inflexible doctrinal silos. The Supreme Court in Anderson explicitly imported the analysis used in equal protection cases to evaluate voting rights challenges brought under the First Amendment, see Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786 n.7, thus creating a single standard for evaluating challenges to voting restrictions.2 The Supreme Court confirmed this approach in Crawford by directly connecting its equal protection voting rights jurisprudence in Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), with Anderson and Burdick, and finally applying the standard derived from those cases to a state statute allegedly burdening the right to vote. See Crawford, 553 U.S. 181, 189–91. Plaintiffs have demonstrated that their right to vote is unjustifiably burdened by the changes in Ohio’s early voting regime.3 The Anderson-Burdick standard therefore applies. The State relies heavily on McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), for the proposition that rational basis is the appropriate standard when a state denies absentee ballots to some citizens and not others. In McDonald, unsentenced Illinois inmates were denied access to absentee ballots because they were not among the categories of voters that were provided those ballots under Illinois law. Id. at 803. The Court applied a rational basis standard of review, reasoning that the state had not classified the inmates based on race or wealth, nor was there any evidence “in the record 2 The Anderson Court stated that it based its “conclusions directly on the First and Fourteenth Amendments” and did not “engage in a separate Equal Protection Clause analysis.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786 n.7. The Court did not need to conduct a separate equal protection analysis because it had already incorporated that analysis into its new “flexible standard.” The Court continued, “We rely, however, on the analysis in a number of our prior election cases resting on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Ill. Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979)). 3 Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that the State’s disparate treatment of non-military voters burdens their fundamental right to vote, and that this burden violates equal protection. (See R. 1, Pls.’ Compl., at ¶¶ 6, 12.) The State would presumably agree that if Plaintiffs had challenged the restriction based solely on the First Amendment, the Anderson-Burdick standard would apply. The State cannot escape that standard by asserting that not only does the restriction burden Plaintiffs’ right to vote, but it also does so disparately. Nos. 12-4055/4076 Obama for America, et al. v. Jon Husted, et al. Page 11 to indicate that the Illinois statutory scheme has an impact on appellants’ ability to exercise the fundamental right to vote.” Id. at 807. The Court found no fundamental right to receive an absentee ballot as such, and stated, “[W]e cannot lightly assume, with nothing in the record to support such an assumption, that Illinois has in fact precluded appellants from voting.” Id. at 808. The McDonald plaintiffs failed to make out a claim for heightened scrutiny because they had presented no evidence to support their allegation that they were being prevented from voting. See O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 529 (1974) (“Essentially the Court’s disposition of the claims in McDonald rested on failure of proof.”); Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 520–22 (finding that McDonald itself suggested a different result if plaintiffs had presented evidence that the state was effectively preventing them from voting). On the contrary, Plaintiffs introduced extensive evidence that a significant number of Ohio voters will in fact be precluded from voting without the additional three days of in-person early voting. (See, e.g., R. 34-32, Pls.’ Ex. 28, at 2.) The district court credited statistical studies that estimated approximately 100,000 Ohio voters would choose to vote during the three-day period before Election Day, and that these voters are disproportionately “women, older, and of lower income and education attainment.” 2012 WL 3765060, at . The district court concluded that the burden on Plaintiffs was “particularly high” because their members, supporters, and constituents represent a large percentage of those who participated in early voting in past elections. Id. at 15. The State did not dispute the evidence presented by Plaintiffs, nor did it offer any evidence to contradict the district court’s findings of fact. Id. Plaintiffs did not need to show that they were legally prohibited from voting, but only that “burdened voters have few alternate means of access to the ballot.” Citizens for Legislative Choice v. Miller, 144 F.3d 916, 921 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Burdick, 504 U.S. at 436–37). The State argues that the burden on non-military voters is slight because they have “ample” other means to cast their ballots, including by requesting and mailing an absentee ballot, voting in person prior to the final weekend before Election Day, or on Election Day itself. However, the district court concluded that because early voters have Nos. 12-4055/4076 Obama for America, et al. v. Jon Husted, et al. Page 12 disproportionately lower incomes and less education than election day voters, and because all evening and weekend voting hours prior to the final weekend were eliminated by Directive 2012-35, “thousands of voters who would have voted during those three days will not be able to exercise their right to cast a vote in person.” 2012 WL 3765060, at . Based on the evidence in the record, this conclusion was not clearly erroneous. Because the district court found that Plaintiffs’ right to vote was burdened, it properly applied the Anderson-Burdick standard.4 Therefore, if Plaintiffs can show that the State’s burden on their voting rights is not sufficiently justified, they are likely to succeed on their claim that the State has violated the Equal Protection Clause.