Opinion ID: 1765791
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: reformation of the contract

Text: Corson contends that the trial court evidently found the covenant in the 1989 contract to be unreasonable and so reformed it by narrowing the scope of the area covered by the injunction. He further contends that because the covenant at issue does not implicate Ala.Code 1975, § 8-1-1, the trial court was without the power to reform the contract. Once the trial court determined that the covenant was unreasonable as to territory, so the argument goes, the covenant was void, absolutely, and the court was without power to enforce it to any extent. Corson argues, in effect, that the only power to reform a covenant involving post-employment restraint derives from § 8-1-1. Although we agree that the covenant does not implicate § 8-1-1, we disagree with Corson's contention that the trial court was without the power to reform the contract. Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court's actions did have the effect of reforming the contract, [1] such action is consistent with the broad power vested in the courts of this state to mould relief to meet the equities developed in the trial. Winslett v. Rice, 272 Ala. 25, 31, 128 So.2d 94, 99 (1960); Tyler v. Eufaula Tribune Publishing Co., 500 So.2d 1005, 1008 (Ala. 1986); see also Hoppe v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 470 So.2d 1161 (Ala.1985) (affirming action of the trial court in narrowing the class of persons whom defendant could not solicit); cf. Ala.R.Civ.P. 54(c) (final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings).