Opinion ID: 151874
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Scope, Standard, and Importance of Appellate Review

Text: Our review of a sentence that is challenged on substantive grounds is deferential but still important, as the history of substantive review of federal sentences indicates. Before the Sentencing Reform Act was enacted in 1984, there was practically no appellate review of federal sentences, except to ensure that they did not stray outside of the statutory minimum and maximum. So long as sentencing judges stayed within the statutory boundaries, they had unbridled discretion to arrive at any sentence they pleased. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431-32, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 3047, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974) ([O]nce it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end.); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972) ([A] sentence imposed by a federal district judge, if within statutory limits, is generally not subject to review.). The result, predictably, was widespread disparity in sentences, a problem that gave rise to a lot of criticism. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 38-39 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221-22 (complaining of the unjustifiably wide range of sentences different judges imposed on similarly situated defendants). One of the leading champions of change was Marvin Frankel, who was himself a district judge. Frankel described federal sentencing as it then existed as a non-system in which every judge is a law unto himself or herself and the sentence a defendant gets depends on the judge he or she gets. Marvin E. Frankel, Jail Sentence Reform, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1978, at E21. He proposed a number of reforms, some of which were similar to what would become the sentencing guidelines system. See Marvin Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order 113-14 (1972). One of Judge Frankel's key proposals was that federal sentences be subject to at least a limited degree of appellate review. See id. at 75-85. The standard he recommended was abuse of discretion, see id. at 82-84, which he described in these terms: Correctly understood, the discretion of judicial officers in our system is not a blank check for arbitrary fiat. It is an authority, within the law, to weigh and appraise diverse factors (lawfully knowable factors) and make a responsible judgment, undoubtedly with a measure of latitude and finality varying according to the nature and scope of the discretion conferred. But discretionary does not mean unappealable. Discretion may be abused, and discretionary decisions may be reversed for abuse. Id. at 84. The goal of the new system, Frankel explained, was [s]entencing [that] would be more just. Like cases would tend to be treated alike, because [t]he most fundamental of our legal principles `equal justice under law'demands that this be so. Frankel, Jail Sentence Reform, at E21; see also Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139, 126 S.Ct. 704, 710, 163 L.Ed.2d 547 (2005) (Discretion is not whim, and limiting discretion according to legal standards helps promote the basic principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike.). Frankel and other reformers won the debate, although it took a number of years to enact the necessary legislation and put the new sentencing system in place. The legislation was the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, whose primary purpose was to channel district courts' sentencing discretion and reduce disparity in sentencing. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364-69, 109 S.Ct. 647, 651-53, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) (discussing background to the Sentencing Reform Act and the guidelines). The Act, which became effective on November 1, 1987, created the Sentencing Commission and gave it the responsibility to develop a system of sentencing guidelines. The sentencing guidelines were binding, and district courts were required to state reasons for imposing a particular sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)-(c). A court could impose a sentence outside the applicable guidelines range only if it found the existence of an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. Id. § 3553(b)(1). In making such a finding, a sentencing court could consider only the guidelines themselves and the policy statements and official commentaries of the Sentencing Commission. Id. As the Supreme Court later noted, departures on this basis were rarely available because [i]n most cases, as a matter of law, the Commission will have adequately taken all relevant factors into account, and no departure will be legally permissible. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234, 125 S.Ct. 738, 750, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Restraints on the exercise of discretion by district courts are enforced through appellate review, and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 provided for it. 18 U.S.C. § 3742. Under the Act, a sentence could be appealed on the ground that: (1) it was imposed in violation of the law; (2) it was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the guidelines; (3) the term of imprisonment, fine, or supervised release was greater than the maximum or less than the minimum established in the guidelines range; or (4) it was imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing guideline and was plainly unreasonable. Id. § 3742(a)-(b). Departures from the guidelines range were reviewed under the third of the statutorily listed grounds for appeal, see id. at § 3742(a)(3), (b)(3), and the resulting sentence was vacated if the appellate court determined that it was unreasonable in light of the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence under § 3553(a) and the district court's stated reasons for the sentence. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 261, 125 S.Ct. at 765 (quoting the pre-2003 version of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (1994 ed.)). In conducting its review, the court of appeals accepted the district court's findings of fact unless they were clearly erroneous, which was decided only after giving due regard to that court's opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1994 ed.). The reviewing court also gave due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. Id. The district court's decision to depart from the guidelines was reviewed for abuse of discretion in a three-step process. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98-100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 2047-48, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). First, the court of appeals deferentially reviewed the district court's determination of whether the facts of the case took it outside the heartland of the applicable guideline. United States v. Hoffer, 129 F.3d 1196, 1201 (11th Cir. 1997). A case was outside the heartland only if there was something unusual, either about the defendant or the circumstances surrounding the crime, that warranted a different sentence. See United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir.1998). That determination was made by comparing the facts of the case to the facts of other cases falling within the heartland of the guidelines. Id. As the second step in reviewing departure decisions the court of appeals determined for itself whether the departure factor used by the district court has been categorically proscribed, is encouraged, encouraged but taken into consideration within the applicable guideline, discouraged, or not addressed by the [Sentencing] Commission. Hoffer, 129 F.3d at 1201. In the third step the appeals court reviewed with deference the district court's finding that the factor on which the departure was based did exist. Id. In 2003 Congress amended the sentencing statute to provide for closer review of sentences that were outside the guidelines. Under the amendments a sentence could be vacated if the departure from the guidelines range was based on a factor that: (1) did not advance the objectives of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a)(2); (2) was not authorized under § 3552(b); or (3) was not justified by the facts of the case. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(B); Pub.L. 108-21, § 401(d)(1), 117 Stat. 670. The court of appeals made each of those determinations de novo. Id. § 3742(e); see also United States v. Pressley, 345 F.3d 1205, 1209 n. 1 (11th Cir.2003). The 2003 amendments also specified that a sentence must be vacated if it departed to an unreasonable degree from the guidelines range, in light of the § 3553(a) factors and of the district court's stated reasons for imposing the particular sentence. Id. § 3742(e)(3)(C). The result was that an outside-the-guidelines sentence could be vacated if it was based on an impermissible factor or if the degree of departure was unreasonable. A sentence within a correctly calculated guidelines range, however, was essentially unreviewable as long as the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and explained its reasoning. See id. § 3553(c). The 2003 amendments restricted even further the ability of a district court to depart downward from the guidelines in cases involving sex crimes against children. In that type of case a court could depart downward only if it found two things: (1) the existence of a mitigating circumstance that had been affirmatively and specifically identified as a permissible ground of downward departure by the sentencing guidelines or policy statements, taking into account any amendments by Congress; and (2) that mitigating circumstance had not been taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines range for that offense. Id. § 3553(b)(2). The guidelines themselves also sharply limit the permissible grounds for downward departure in cases of sexual abuse of children, specifically disallowing departures based on diminished capacity (U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13), aberrant behavior ( id. § 5K2.20), substance abuse ( id. § 5K2.22), or family responsibilities and community ties ( id. § 5H1.6). They provide that generally an offender's age and health are not relevant, except in rare cases where the offender is so elderly and infirm that home confinement would be an effective alternative to prison. Id. §§ 5H1.1, 5H1.4. The guidelines also provide that charitable contributions and a defendant's mental and emotional condition generally are not appropriate grounds for departure. Id. §§ 5H1.11, 5H1.3.
Then came the Booker decision in 2005. In it the Supreme Court held the sentencing statute unconstitutional insofar as the guidelines were mandatory and to the extent that they allowed the upper limits of the sentence to depend on facts that had not been established by a plea of guilty or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244, 125 S.Ct. at 756. Instead of striking down the entire guidelines system, the Court salvaged much of it by making the guidelines advisory rather than mandatory. Id. at 245, 125 S.Ct. at 756-57. The salvage work required the Court to sever and excise two provisions of the Act: (1) § 3553(b)(1), which had required the district court to impose a sentence within the guidelines range; and (2) § 3742(e), which had set forth the scope and standard of review of sentences. Id. at 259, 125 S.Ct. at 764. The excision of § 3742(e) left a gap: § 3742 still created appellate jurisdiction for sentencing review, but with subsection (e) gone it no longer specified the standard of review. The Supreme Court filled that gap by inferring a standard of review from related statutory language, the structure of the statute, and the sound administration of justice. Id. at 260-61, 125 S.Ct. at 765 (quotation marks omitted). Those considerations, as well as the past two decades of appellate practice in cases involving departures, implied a practical standard of review already familiar to appellate courts: review for unreasonableness. Id. (brackets omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (1994 ed.). [12] The Court reasoned that appellate courts had ample experience applying the reasonableness standard to sentences outside the guidelines range before the 2003 amendments and to sentences for offenses not addressed by the guidelines. Booker, 543 U.S. at 262, 125 S.Ct. at 766. The Booker Court saw appellate review of sentences as important to the new system, because it would tend to iron out sentencing differences, avoiding undue disparity. Id. at 263, 125 S.Ct. at 767. Section 3553(a) plays a critical role in appellate review of sentences, just as it does in the initial sentencing decision. Booker instructs us that not only must district courts apply the § 3553(a) factors in making their sentencing decisions, but courts of appeals also must apply those same factors in determining whether a sentence is reasonable. Id. at 261, 125 S.Ct. at 766 (Those factors in turn will guide appellate courts, as they have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable.); accord United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1188 (11th Cir.2008) ( Booker further held that in performing this review, we must measure `reasonableness' against the factors outlined by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).); United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (We must evaluate whether the sentence imposed by the district court fails to achieve the purposes of sentencing as stated in section 3553(a).). [13] Read in light of earlier decisions, the reasonableness standard Booker adopted entails review for abuse of discretion that accords substantial deference to the district court's sentencing decisions. Koon, 518 U.S. at 97-99, 116 S.Ct. at 2046-47. Pre- Booker decisional law, of course, only applied the reasonableness standard to sentences that departed from the guidelines range or to sentences for offenses not addressed in the guidelines. See id. at 98-99, 116 S.Ct. at 2046-47. After Booker, the abuse of discretion standard outlined in Koon applies more broadly to the district judge's sentence decision, whether the sentence is within or without the guidelines range. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 364, 127 S.Ct. at 2472 (Stevens, J., concurring). Two years after Booker, the Supreme Court addressed in greater detail the sentence review function of a court of appeals, leaving no doubt about the importance of that function. See Rita, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203. As we pointed out at the beginning of this opinion, the opening line of the Rita opinion categorically states that courts of appeals are to review federal sentences and set aside those they find `unreasonable.' Id. at 341, 127 S.Ct. at 2459. And later in the Rita opinion the Supreme Court explains that, in the world according to Booker, courts of appeals exist to correct substantively unreasonable sentences imposed by the district courts. Id. at 354, 127 S.Ct. at 2466-67. The specific holding of Rita is that a court of appeals may presume that a sentence within the guidelines range is reasonable. Id. at 347, 127 S.Ct. at 2462. The Supreme Court believed that such a presumption simply reflects the fact that when both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission have reached the same conclusion as to the proper sentence, it significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is reasonable. Id., 127 S.Ct. at 2463. After all, the Court explained, Congress directed both the Sentencing Commission and the sentencing judge to carry out the same basic § 3553(a) objectives; the guidelines themselves reflect application of the § 3553(a) factors, and so should the district court's sentencing decision. Id. at 347-48, 127 S.Ct. at 2463. It follows that when a particular sentence is consistent with the guidelines' application of the § 3553(a) factors in the mine run of cases, it is probable that the sentence is reasonable. Id. at 351, 127 S.Ct. at 2465. If the sentence is not consistent with the guidelines that same probability does not exist, although the reviewing court may not presume a sentence that is outside the guidelines is unreasonable, id. at 354-55, 127 S.Ct. at 2467. The decision in Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007), illustrates the importance of all the facts and circumstances to the reasonableness of the sentence. As a sophomore in college Gall had participated in a conspiracy to distribute ecstasy. Id. at 41, 128 S.Ct. at 591-92. His role was limited to delivering drugs between conspirators. Id., 128 S.Ct. at 592. Later Gall voluntarily stopped using drugs himself, and seven months after joining the conspiracy he withdrew from it and told the others he was quitting. Id. Drug free, Gall graduated from college and became a master carpenter. Id. at 41-42, 128 S.Ct. at 592. Two years after withdrawing from the conspiracy, Gall was questioned by federal agents and admitted his participation. Id. Three and a half years after he had withdrawn from the conspiracy and turned his life around, Gall was indicted for conspiracy to distribute illegal drugs. Id. He pleaded guilty. Id. His co-conspirators, who had not withdrawn from the conspiracy, received sentences ranging from 30 to 36 months. Id. at 54-55, 128 S.Ct. at 599-600. Gall's guidelines range was 30 to 37 months. Id. at 43, 128 S.Ct. at 593. The district court varied downward from that range to a sentence of probation, largely because Gall had been young and immature when he committed the crime, he had withdrawn from the conspiracy years before the charges were filed, and he had made something of himself. Id. at 43-44, 128 S.Ct. at 593. When the government argued for a guidelines range sentence on the ground that the three co-conspirators had received sentences in that range, the district court noted that, unlike Gall, the other conspirators had continued with the conspiracy. Id. at 54-55, 128 S.Ct. at 599-600. The court of appeals vacated the probationary sentence as unreasonable, concluding that the district court had erred by giving too much weight to Gall's voluntary withdrawal, his age at the time of the offense, and his post-offense rehabilitation, and too little consideration to the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities. Id. at 45, 128 S.Ct. at 594. The Supreme Court reversed that decision after discussing at some length the unique facts of Gall's situation. Id. at 54, 128 S.Ct. at 599. In doing so, the Court reiterated that all sentences, whether within or without the guidelines, are to be reviewed only for reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 46, 128 S.Ct. at 594. It rejected any requirement that an outside-the-guidelines sentence must be justified by extraordinary circumstances, and rejected any rigid mathematical formula that uses the percentage of departure as the standard for determining the strength of justification required for a specific sentence. Id. at 47, 128 S.Ct. at 595. At the same time, however, the Court said that the sentencing court must give serious consideration to the extent of any departure from the guidelines, and must offer sufficient justifications for its conclusion that an unusually harsh or light sentence is appropriate. Id. at 46, 128 S.Ct. at 594. That means, the Court explained, that the justification for the deviation from the guidelines range must be sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance. Id. at 50, 128 S.Ct. at 597. About appellate review, the Supreme Court held in Gall that [i]n reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence outside the Guidelines range, appellate courts may therefore take the degree of variance into account and consider the extent of a deviation from the Guidelines, in addition to the sentencing court's justifications. Id. at 47, 128 S.Ct. at 594-95. While rigid mathematical formulas and proportionality tests cannot be used, the Court concluded that the extent of the difference between a particular sentence and the recommended Guidelines range is surely relevant, id. at 41, 128 S.Ct. at 591, and that a major departure should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one. Id. at 50, 128 S.Ct. at 597. [14] In other words, the justification for the variance must be sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance. Id. Checking to see that the justification is sufficiently compelling remains the duty of the court of appeals. At the same time, the appellate court may not presume that a sentence outside the guidelines is unreasonable and must give due deference to the district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance. Id. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597. The fact that the court of appeals might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is not sufficient to justify reversal. Id. ; see also Talley, 431 F.3d at 788 (A district court may impose a sentence that is either more severe or lenient than the sentence we would have imposed, but that sentence must still be reasonable.). In Gall's case the court of appeals erred by giving virtually no deference to the district court's decision that a significant variance from the guidelines was justified. Gall, 552 U.S. at 56, 128 S.Ct. at 600. The Supreme Court decided that it was entirely reasonable for the district court to give substantial weight to Gall's voluntary withdrawal. Unlike all his co-defendants and the vast majority of defendants convicted of conspiracy in federal court, Gall's efforts at self-rehabilitation began long before he got caught, which gave the district court greater justification for believing Gall's turnaround was genuine. Id. at 56-57, 128 S.Ct. at 600-01. It was also reasonable for the district court to conclude that a guidelines range sentence for Gall would have created unwarranted sentencing disparities, because his co-conspirators who were sentenced within the guidelines had not voluntarily withdrawn from the conspiracy and had not shown any comparable rehabilitation. Id. at 55-56, 128 S.Ct. at 600; see also Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir.1999) (en banc) ([I]t is worth noting that equal treatment consists not only of treating like things alike, but also of treating unlike things differently according to their differences.). The district court reasonably concluded that under the unusual facts of that case the § 3553(a) factors on the whole justified the below-the-guidelines sentence it imposed on Gall. Gall, 552 U.S. at 59-60, 128 S.Ct. at 602. The same day that Gall was released the Supreme Court also issued its decision in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), which involved sentencing for an unremarkable drug-trafficking offense and an unremarkable firearm possession offense, id. at 110, 128 S.Ct. at 575. Thanks in large part to the much-criticized 100 to 1 crack/powder cocaine disparity in the guidelines, the bottom of the advisory range for the combined charges was 19 years. Id. at 92, 128 S.Ct. at 565. After considering all of the § 3553(a) factors and the strong upward influence of the crack/powder disparity on the guidelines range, the district court concluded that a 19-year sentence would have been greater than necessary to accomplish the purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a). Id. at 92-93, 128 S.Ct. at 565. For that reason, it varied downward to a sentence of 15 years. Id. at 93, 128 S.Ct. at 565. The government appealed the sentence and the Fourth Circuit reversed solely because of its view that a variance based on disagreement with the crack/powder ratio in the guidelines was per se unreasonable. Id. After the Supreme Court granted review, the government argued against the variance on that same ground. Id. at 101-07, 128 S.Ct. at 570-74. It asserted that while the guidelines are usually only advisory, the 100 to 1 crack/powder ratio guidelines were an exception because Congress had directed sentencing courts to follow that ratio. Id. at 101-02, 128 S.Ct. at 570. The government's position, in essence, was that the crack/powder ratio in the offense level part of the guidelines was a little pocket of mandatoriness in an otherwise advisory system. The Supreme Court rejected that position, disagreeing with all of the government's arguments that Congress had required the Sentencing Commission and sentencing courts to follow the 100 to 1 ratio in every case. Id. at 102-11, 128 S.Ct. at 570-76. The government did not contend that the below-the-guidelines sentence was unreasonable for any other reason, and the Court found that it was reasonable. Id. at 110-11, 128 S.Ct. at 575-76; see also Spears v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 840, 843-44, 172 L.Ed.2d 596 (2009) (per curiam) (clarifying that Kimbrough means district courts are entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines). The Kimbrough decision involved a specific part of the guidelines, the one involving the peculiar crack/powder disparity, which the Sentencing Commission itself had consistently and emphatically criticized as at odds with the goals behind § 3553(a). See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 111, 128 S.Ct. at 576; see also Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1189 n. 7 ( Kimbrough primarily involved issues related to the guidelines for crack cocaine offenses.). The Supreme Court's opinion in that case, however, also contains a number of observations of broader application. For example, the Court discussed the discrete institutional strengths of sentencing courts and the Sentencing Commission, and how those different strengths affect the amount of respect due a court's decision to vary from the guidelines range. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109, 128 S.Ct. at 574-75. It said that decisions to vary may attract greatest respect when the sentencing judge finds a particular case outside the heartland to which the Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply. Id. at 109, 128 S.Ct. at 574-75 (quotation marks omitted). By contrast, closer review may be in order when the sentencing judge varies from the Guidelines based solely on the judge's view that the Guidelines range fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations even in a mine-run case. Id., 128 S.Ct. at 575 (quotation marks omitted). The Court in Kimbrough also reiterated the importance of appellate review of sentences for substantive reasonableness. See id. at 107-08, 128 S.Ct. at 573-74 (explaining that appellate review along with the ongoing revision of the guidelines will help to avoid excessive sentencing disparities and variations among district courts).
Since the Supreme Court's Booker decision it has been pellucidly clear that the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of review now applies to appellate review of sentencing decisions. Gall, 552 U.S. at 46, 128 S.Ct. at 594; see also Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191 (explaining that the Supreme Court's teachings leave no doubt that an appellate court may still overturn a substantively unreasonable sentence, albeit only after examining it through the prism of abuse of discretion, and that appellate review has not been extinguished). That familiar standard allows a range of choice for the district court, so long as that choice does not constitute a clear error of judgment. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir.2004) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rasbury v. I.R.S., 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir.1994)). As we have explained, under the abuse of discretion standard of review there will be occasions in which we affirm the district court even though we would have gone the other way had it been our call. That is how an abuse of discretion standard differs from a de novo standard of review. Id. (quoting Rasbury, 24 F.3d at 168); see also, e.g., Ledford v. Peeples, 605 F.3d 871, 922 (11th Cir.2010) ([T]he relevant question [when reviewing for abuse of discretion] is not whether we would have come to the same decision if deciding the issue in the first instance. The relevant inquiry, rather, is whether the district court's decision was tenable, or, we might say, `in the ballpark' of permissible outcomes.). A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors. United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1174 (11th Cir.2006) (en banc). As for the third way that discretion can be abused, a district court commits a clear error of judgment when it considers the proper factors but balances them unreasonably. See Ameritas Variable Life Ins. Co. v. Roach, 411 F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir.2005) ([A]n abuse of discretion can occur ... when all proper factors, and no improper ones, are considered, but the court, in weighing those factors, commits a clear error of judgment. (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted)). The principle that discretion can be abused by unreasonably balancing proper factors is solidly established in Supreme Court precedent and our circuit law. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257, 102 S.Ct. 252, 266, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981) (The forum non conveniens determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion; where the court has considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference. (emphasis added)); Ford v. Brown, 319 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir.2003) (We conclude that the district court overlooked some highly relevant factors, and that it ultimately struck a balance that was an abuse of discretion.). In the context of sentencing, the proper factors are set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and a district court commits a clear error in judgment when it weighs those factors unreasonably, arriving at a sentence that does not achieve the purposes of sentencing as stated in § 3553(a). Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191 (quoting Talley, 431 F.3d at 788 (quotation marks omitted)). In order to determine whether that has occurred, we are required to make the [sentencing] calculus ourselves and to review each step the district court took in making it. Id. ; see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 261, 125 S.Ct. at 766 (Those [§ 3553(a)] factors in turn will guide appellate courts, as they have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable.); Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1194 (Indeed, we could not begin to review the reasonableness of a sentence without examining all of the relevant factors embodied in Section 3553(a).). In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we must, as the Supreme Court has instructed us, consider the totality of the facts and circumstances. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1192 (unreasonableness of sentence depends on an examination of the `totality of the circumstances' (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597)). To the extent that the district court has found facts, we accept them unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. At the same time we can and should consider additional salient facts that were elicited, and uncontroverted. Id. The difference is between contradicting a factfinding, on the one hand, and ignoring uncontroverted facts that the district court failed to mention on the other. That difference is important because a district court cannot write out of the record undisputed facts by simply ignoring them. The failure to mention facts may well reflect the district court's judgment that those facts are not important, but the importance of facts in light of the § 3553(a) factors is not itself a question of fact but instead is an issue of law. See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 337, 108 S.Ct. 2413, 2419-20, 101 L.Ed.2d 297 (1988) (Factual findings of a district court are, of course, entitled to substantial deference and will be reversed only for clear error. A judgment that must be arrived at by considering and applying statutory criteria, however, constitutes the application of law to fact and requires the reviewing court to undertake more substantive scrutiny to ensure that the judgment is supported in terms of the factors identified in the statute. (citations omitted)). [15] After performing the required analysis, we are to vacate the sentence if, but only if, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191 (quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir.2009); United States v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293, 1297-98 (11th Cir.2007); United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir.2007). We are not often left with [that] definite and firm conviction because, as we have explained, our examination of the sentence is made through the prism of abuse of discretion. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191. But sometimes we are. See United States v. Livesay, 587 F.3d 1274, 1278-79 (11th Cir.2009) (vacating as patently unreasonable a sentence of probation for participant in billion-dollar fraud scheme and holding that only a meaningful period of incarceration would fulfill the goals of sentencing under § 3553(a)); Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1188-94 (vacating as substantively unreasonable a sentence of probation for receiving and distributing child pornography); United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1238-39 (11th Cir.2006) (vacating a seven-day sentence for billion-dollar securities fraud as shockingly short and wildly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense, even though the defendant had rendered substantial assistance that was extraordinary); United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir.2006) (vacating as outside the range of reasonableness a sentence of five hours' imprisonment for bank fraud even though the defendant had provided substantial assistance that was crucial in the prosecution of his co-defendant). Out of the hundreds of sentences that we have reviewed up to this point in the five years since the Booker decision, those are the only four we have found to be substantively unreasonable. Looking at sentencing decisions through the prism of discretion is not the same thing as turning a blind eye to unreasonable ones. And, as we said in Pugh, the district court's choice of sentence is not unfettered. Id. The fetters on a district court's sentencing discretion are the requirement of reasonableness and the existence of appellate review to enforce that requirement. While those fetters are loosened by the substantial discretion we afford district courts in sentencing, at the boundaries of reasonableness the fetters do fetter. See Frankel, Criminal Sentences 84 (`[D]iscretionary' does not mean `unappealable.' Discretion may be abused, and discretionary decisions may be reversed for abuse.); cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2371, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975) (That the court's discretion is equitable in nature hardly means that it is unfettered by meaningful standards or shielded from thorough appellate review. (citation omitted)). [16] We may notit bears repeating set aside a sentence merely because we would have decided that another one is more appropriate. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597. See generally Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1259; Ledford, 605 F.3d at 922. A district court's sentence need not be the most appropriate one, it need only be a reasonable one. We may set aside a sentence only if we determine, after giving a full measure of deference to the sentencing judge, that the sentence imposed truly is unreasonable. [17] Judge Edmondson's dissenting opinion argues that in reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness we may not decide whether the district court placed unreasonable weight on any of the § 3553(a) factors. See Dissenting Op. of Edmondson, J., at 1272 ([T]o grant something in the record more or less value than the District Judge did and so to conclude that the record overall weighs more heavily for a higher sentence ... oversteps [appellate] authority.). We disagree for several reasons. First, the only authority the dissenting opinion cites for that proposition is Gall, which actually contradicts it. The Supreme Court decided that Gall's sentence was reasonable only after reviewing the weight the district court had assigned to various factors as well as its decision that the § 3553(a) factors, as a whole, justified the sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 56-60, 128 S.Ct. at 600-02. It stated that the district court quite reasonably attached great weight to the fact that Gall voluntarily withdrew from the conspiracy after deciding, on his own initiative, to change his life, which len[t] strong support to the District Court's conclusion that Gall is not going to return to criminal behavior and is not a danger to society. Id. at 57, 128 S.Ct. at 601. The Court also stated that the district court quite reasonably attached great weight to Gall's self-motivated rehabilitation, which ... lends strong support to the conclusion that imprisonment was not necessary to deter Gall from engaging in future criminal conduct or to protect the public from his future criminal acts. Id. at 59, 128 S.Ct. at 602. [18] If appellate review did not extend to the weight placed on a § 3553(a) factoras Judge Edmondson's dissenting opinion contendsthose statements in Gall would make no sense. [19] Second, the position that Judge Edmondson's dissenting opinion takes is inconsistent with the familiar abuse of discretion standard that the Supreme Court has told us to apply. As we have already explained, a district court commits a clear error of judgment, abuses its discretion, when it considers the proper factors but balances them unreasonably. See Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 257, 102 S.Ct. at 266; Campa, 459 F.3d at 1174; Ameritas Variable Life Ins., 411 F.3d at 1330; Ford, 319 F.3d at 1308. One purpose of reasonableness review is to correct those errors. If the weight given various factors could not be reviewed on appeal, there would be no way to serve that purpose. If appellate courts were limited to determining whether proper procedures were followed and whether factfindings are clearly erroneous, there would be no substantive review, only procedural review. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597 (defining procedural review to include a determination of whether the sentence was based on clearly erroneous facts). We would be back to a non-system in which every judge is a law unto himself or herself. Frankel, Jail Sentence Reform, at E21. Third, the position that the weight a sentencing court gives to the § 3553(a) factors may not be reviewed has been rejected not only by this Court but also by all of our sister circuits that have addressed the issue. See United States v. Russell, 600 F.3d 631, 633 (D.C.Cir.2010) (Substantive reasonableness is the catch-all criterion under which the reviewing court monitors (deferentiallyfor abuse of discretion) whether the district court has given reasonable weight to all the factors required to be considered.); United States v. Ressam, 593 F.3d 1095, 1131-32 (9th Cir.2010) ([I]t appears that the district court abused its discretion in weighing the relevant factors by giving too much weight to [the defendant's] cooperation and not enough weight to the other relevant § 3553(a) factors, including the need to protect the public.); United States v. Camiscione, 591 F.3d 823, 834 (6th Cir. 2010) (General deterrence is one of the key purposes of sentencing, and the district court abused its discretion when it failed to give that matter its proper weight. (quotation and other marks omitted)); United States v. Sayad, 589 F.3d 1110, 1118 (10th Cir.2009) (Unlike procedural reasonableness review, which focuses on the permissibility of relying on a particular factor, substantive reasonableness review broadly looks to whether the district court abused its discretion in weighing permissible § 3553(a) factors in light of the `totality of the circumstances.' (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir.2009) (stating that a sentence is substantively unreasonable if it does not account for a factor that should receive significant weight, it gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or it represents a clear error of judgment in balancing sentencing factors); United States v. Moore, 565 F.3d 435, 438 (8th Cir.2009) (We may find an abuse of discretion where the sentencing court fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors. (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir.2008) (en banc) (At the substantive stage of reasonableness review, an appellate court may consider whether a factor relied on by a sentencing court can bear the weight assigned to it.); United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 261 (3d Cir. 2007) ([D]eterring the production of child pornography and protecting the children who are victimized by it are factors that should have been given significant weight at sentencing....); United States v. Hampton, 441 F.3d 284, 288-89 (4th Cir. 2006) (vacating sentence as substantively unreasonable because the district court gave excessive weight to one statutory factor and failed to account for others); see also Torres-Rivera v. O'Neill-Cancel, 524 F.3d 331, 335-36 (1st Cir.2008) (stating that, in general, abuse of discretion may occur if the court fails to consider a significant factor in the decisional calculus, if it relies on an improper factor in working that calculus, or if it considers all the appropriate factors but makes a serious error in judgment as to their relative weight.). We join those circuits in reaffirming that substantive review exists, in substantial part, to correct sentences that are based on unreasonable weighing decisions. If we accepted the position set out in Judge Edmondson's dissenting opinion, we would be the only circuit to do so. [20]