Opinion ID: 1266053
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Branzburg

Text: Branzburg was a 5-4 decision in which Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion. The four dissenters maintained that newsmen should enjoy either a qualified or absolute privilege. [2] The plurality opinion authored by Justice White rejected both claims, but it did recognize that newsgathering is entitled to first amendment protection. Early in his decision, Justice White states Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated. Branzburg v. Hayes, supra at 681, 92 S.Ct. at 2656. At the end of his opinion he states, Finally as we have earlier indicated, news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections and grand jury investigations if instituted or conducted other than in good faith, would pose wholly different issues for resolution under the First Amendment. 408 U.S. at 707, 92 S.Ct. at 2670. To be sure, the protection that Justice White would allow the first amendment is narrowly circumscribed. The opinion as a whole seems to indicate that first amendment protection would only exist when the newsgatherer could show that the grand jury proceedings were being used as a means of harassment. In addition, the burden of proving lack of good faith appears to be on the newsgatherer which is contrary to the traditional approach in first amendment cases. But what is significant is that Justice White reached this result by balancing the burden disclosure would place on newsgathering against the importance of disclosure to the criminal justice system. Justice White found the latter compelling. 408 U.S. at 690, 92 S.Ct. 2646. The question in the present case is whether the interest in civil litigation is equally compelling. It should also be noted that commentators and courts have not found Branzburg conclusive even in regard to the balance that should be struck between the first amendment and the needs of the criminal justice system. Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir.1972); State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429 (1974). Note, Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 Hastings L.J. 709 (1975); Comment, Right of the Press to Gather Information after Branzburg and Pell, 124 U.Penn.L.Rev. 166 (1975); Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 52, 137-48 (1972). The seeds of disputation were sown in Justice Powell's concurring opinion. Justice Powell, although he was the fifth justice to join the Branzburg majority, allows the first amendment greater weight than the plurality opinion does. First of all, Justice Powell does not impose a burden of proof on either the newsgatherer or the government. Instead he maintains that: the court  when called upon to protect a newsman from improper or prejudicial questioning  would be free to balance the competing interests on their merits in the particular case. 408 U.S. at 710 n.[], 92 S.Ct. at 2671. Secondly, Justice Powell expanded the scope of a newsgatherer's first amendment protection. In addition to being protected from grand jury proceedings conducted in bad faith, Justice Powell thought that a newsgatherer might seek a motion to quash or a protective order whenever he was called upon to give information bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, or if he has some other reason to believe his testimony implicates confidential source relationships, without a legitimate need of law enforcement. 408 U.S. at 710, 92 S.Ct. at 2671. A majority of this Court contends that Powell's concurrence gives a newsgatherer immunity from disclosure only if a grand jury investigation is conducted in bad faith. Whatever the meaning of Powell's concurrence  and some commentators and courts contend that it establishes a qualified privilege  it cannot be read as the majority reads it. If Justice Powell intended that when an investigation is not being conducted in good faith [the newsman] is not without remedy, there would have been no reason for him to write a special concurrence. Justice White's plurality opinion conceded that much to the first amendment. The majority's interpretation bears no relation to the language of the opinion itself. Justice Powell explicitly stated that he did not think disclosure would be justified in a case when the requested information was remote or tenuous to the subject of the investigation. 408 U.S. at 710, 92 S.Ct. at 2671. Admittedly the opinion is opaque, but since Powell was the deciding vote, it cannot be cavalierly dismissed  especially in view of the pains to which Powell went in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 94 S.Ct. 2811, 41 L.Ed.2d 514 (1974) to point out that his opinion in Branzburg was extremely limited. I emphasized the limited nature of the Branzburg holding in my concurring opinion. `The Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news or the safeguarding of their sources.' In addition to these explicit statements, a fair reading of the majority's analysis in Branzburg makes plain that the result hinged on an assessment of the competing societal interests involved in that case rather than on any determination that First Amendment rights are not implicated. 417 U.S. at 859-860, 94 S.Ct. at 2819. Justice Powell's concurrence has had important consequences in the application of Branzburg. In Bursey v. United States, supra , for example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit deviated from the conclusion reached by the Branzburg plurality. In response to the government's contention that the first amendment is of no weight in grand jury proceedings, the court said: No governmental door can be closed against the amendment. No governmental activity is immune from its force. That the setting for the competition between rights secured by the first amendment and antagonistic governmental interests in a grand jury proceeding is simply one of the factors that must be taken into account in striking the appropriate constitutional balance. 466 F.2d at 1082. The court struck the balance in favor on the first amendment. The burden was on the government to establish that the government's interest in the subject matter of the investigation is `immediate, substantial, and subordinating,' that there is a `substantial connection' between information it seeks to have the witness compelled to supply and the overriding governmental interest in the subject matter of the investigation, and that the means of obtaining information is not more drastic than necessary to forward the asserted governmental interest. 466 F.2d at 1083. In short, the court accorded newsgathering a qualified privilege. The newspaper reporters in Bursey had refused to answer 56 of the grand jury's questions. The court required them to answer only those questions that fell under the above standard. To that end the court distinguished between those questions regarding direct witnessing of possible criminal activity and those relating to newsgathering activities, even though the latter might have something vaguely to do with conduct that might have criminal consequences. The newspapermen were required only to answer questions about criminal activity that they witnessed. Although the Bursey decision was technically decided and released the day following Branzburg, the opinion was undoubtedly written before it. Accordingly, the government moved for a rehearing arguing that the Bursey holding was inconsistent with Branzburg. Maintaining that the Branzburg holding was limited to its facts, the Ninth Circuit denied the government's motion. The court noted that it adhered to the Branzburg formulation that the government or a grand jury did not have to make a preliminary showing before the grand jury could ask questions of witnesses. Nor did Bursey permit a grand jury witness to refuse to identify a person whom he had seen committing a crime. Nothing in Branzburg, moreover, purported to disavow the balancing standards traditionally used in first amendment cases. Competing interests were balanced in Bursey and the balance was struck in favor of the first amendment. The court concluded: We have reexamined our analysis of the factors involved in balancing the First Amendment rights against the governmental interests asserted to justify compelling answers to the questions here involved, and we have concluded that the balance we struck is not impaired by Branzburg.  466 F.2d at 1091. Special emphasis was placed on Justice Powell's concurring opinion. The court followed Powell's prescription that the balance of these vital constitutional societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions. Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, 408 U.S. at 710, 92 S.Ct. at 2671. For the purposes of this case it is unnecessary to attempt a clarification of the Branzburg decision. [3] The ultimate meaning of the case will have to be determined by subsequent case law. It will suffice to say that Branzburg has not been given in a criminal context the weight that a majority of this Court gives it in a civil context.