Opinion ID: 2450547
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Issue 2: What standard should the district court have used to review the County's decision to disapprove the rezoning?

Text: The district court reasoned that because the County's role was to conduct a quasi-judicial review of the City's decision, the district court's review was similarly governed by quasi-judicial review standards. With our decision that the County's role is not one of mere review, the premise of the district court's analysis is undercut. Nevertheless, all of the parties suggest that we can essentially step into the shoes of the district court and review the County's decision to disapprove the proposed rezoning. To determine if we can fulfill that role, we must determine the standard that should have applied to the district court's review and, in turn, the appropriate role of an appellate court. Because the City and the landowners primarily ask us to limit the County's role to one of quasi-judicial review, they do not discuss an alternative standard of review in detail. In the City's limited discussion of the question, it agrees, at least in broad terms, with the County's suggestion that a limited de novo standard of review should have applied to the district court's review and similarly limits our review. Even though there is apparent agreement that a limited de novo standard applied, the City and the County do not agree as to the source or the parameters of that limited review. The City notes that the landowners' action was filed in district court pursuant to K.S.A. 3-709. The City does not suggest what the scope of review should be for either the district court or an appellate court under that provision, other than to argue that the provision does not alter the ultimate burden of proof. The City then suggests the district court appropriately placed that burden of production on the County. The County cites K.S.A. 60-2101(d), a general statute allowing appeals to the district court from certain administrative decisions and defining the scope of review of a district court and an appellate court. Under that provision, the County asserts that we should utilize the appellate standard of review customarily applied when reviewing the action of a political subdivision exercising quasi-judicial functions. In such circumstances, a district court is limited to determining if the political subdivision's decision fell within the scope of its authority; was supported by substantial competent evidence; or was fraudulent, arbitrary, or capricious. Then, on appeal from the district court, an appellate court reviews the political subdivision's decision as though the initial appeal had been made directly to the appellate court, thus applying the same limited standard. Brown v. U.S.D. No. 333, 261 Kan. 134, 138, 928 P.2d 57 (1996); Kansas State Board of Healing Arts v. Foote, 200 Kan. 447, 450-51, 436 P.2d 828 (1968); see Gaslight Villa, Inc. v. City of Lansing, 213 Kan. 862, 864-66, 518 P.2d 410 (1974) (applying administrative review standard to review city's decision to deny special permit under city zoning ordinance). The County also offers an alternate standard of review, one that is unique to zoning cases and examines the reasonableness and lawfulness of a zoning action. This standard was stated in Golden, 224 Kan. at 598-99, 584 P.2d 130, restated in Board of Johnson County Comm'rs, 263 Kan. 667, 952 P.2d 1302, and Taco Bell v. City of Mission, 234 Kan. 879, 885-87, 678 P.2d 133 (1984), and summarized and enumerated in Combined Investment Co. v. Board of Butler County Comm'rs, 227 Kan. 17, 27-28, 605 P.2d 533 (1980), and many other cases, including our recent decision in Zimmerman, 289 Kan. at 944-45, 218 P.3d 400. This standard of review, which we will refer to as the Golden/Combined Investment Co. standard, is summarized in eight principles or rules: (1) The local zoning authority, and not the court, has the right to prescribe, change or refuse to change, zoning. (2) The district court's power is limited to determining (a) the lawfulness of the action taken, and (b) the reasonableness of such action. (3) There is a presumption that the zoning authority acted reasonably. (4) The landowner has the burden of proving unreasonableness by a preponderance of the evidence. (5) A court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body, and should not declare the action unreasonable unless clearly compelled to do so by the evidence. (6) Action is unreasonable when it is so arbitrary that it can be said it was taken without regard to the benefit or harm involved to the community at large, including all interested parties, and was so wide of the mark, that its unreasonableness lies outside the realm of fair debate. (7) Whether action is reasonable or not is a question of law, to be determined upon the basis of the facts which were presented to the zoning authority. (8) An appellate court must make the same review of the zoning authority's action as did the district court. Combined Investment Co., 227 Kan. at 28, 605 P.2d 533. The County does not explain why we would ignore these rules and apply K.S.A. 60-2101(d) and merely presents the two standards of review as alternatives. The parties presented these same standard of review options to the district court, and the district court decided to apply a combination of the principles set out in K.S.A. 3-709, K.S.A. 60-2101(d), and Golden/Combined Investment Co. To determine if this was appropriate, we begin our analysis with K.S.A. 3-307e because it includes a sentence that addresses judicial review, stating, in part, that [t]he provisions of article 7 of chapter 3 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated shall, insofar as the same can be made applicable, govern judicial review and enforcement and remedies for airport zoning regulations adopted pursuant hereto. (Emphasis added.) The term airport zoning regulations is not defined in the statutes relating to airport zoning. However, the term zoning regulations is defined in the general zoning statutes that apply to cities and counties to mean the lawfully adopted zoning ordinances of a city and the lawfully adopted zoning resolutions of a county. K.S.A. 12-742(11). In prior cases, this court applied the term zoning regulations to include actions regarding rezoning, concluding that an `action' by the governing body, denying a request for rezoning, is a `regulation' as contemplated by the statute, from which an appeal to the district court may be taken by petition. Olson v. City of WaKeeney, 218 Kan. 447, 448, 543 P.2d 932 (1975) (citing Bodine v. City of Overland Park, 198 Kan. 371, 383, 424 P.2d 513 [1967]). We explained this conclusion by noting that a decision to deny rezoning regulates the specific use which the appellees desire to make of their property, and is encompassed within the term `regulation.' Bodine, 198 Kan. at 383, 424 P.2d 513. Consequently, this action, both in the district court and on appeal, involves a judicial review of a zoning regulation, triggering the judicial review provisions of article 7 of chapter 3 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated. The specific provision of chapter 3 that relates to judicial review is K.S.A. 3-709, which provides: (1) Any person aggrieved, or taxpayer affected by any decision made under the provisions of this act may file within thirty days from the rendition of such decision in the office of the clerk of the district court of the proper county a verified petition setting forth and specifying the grounds for review upon which the petitioner relies and designating the decision sought to be reviewed. The clerk shall forthwith cause written notice of such appeal to be served upon the political subdivision or subdivisions. (2) Upon presentation of such petition the court shall set it down for hearing and the same shall be tried de novo as in a civil case, and enforcement of said regulations shall be stayed until said petition is finally determined by the court. Appeals may be taken to the supreme court from any order, ruling or decision as in other civil cases. (Emphasis added.) The district court applied K.S.A. 3-709, but the statute does not explicitly define the scope of review. Attempting to discern its role, the district court determined that in this type of a de novo review, there are restrictions to the court's authority. The court explained that although it could entertain evidence to clarify a parties' position or to clarify a point, the court's review would be confined to the issues raised below. The court then specified that it was reviewing a quasi-judicial decision of the Board of County Commissioners in denying the change in zoning located within one mile of the airport. This conclusion was based on the district court's attempt to reconcile the wording of K.S.A. 3-709 that refers to a review of the political subdivision's decision with the statute's wording that the matter is to be tried de novo as in a civil case. There is some incongruity in this wording because usually a review of an agency action is thought of as an appeal, and an appeal is usually thought of as a review based on the evidence and issues submitted to the agency. In contrast, a trial de novo is thought of as a trial anew. Nevertheless, such wording, while unclear, is not unique. In Frick v. City of Salina, 289 Kan. 1, 208 P.3d 739 (2009), we applied various principles in determining a district court's standard of review under similarly worded statutes. In doing so, we explained that a court's interpretation of a phrase such as trial de novo, when used in reference to a judicial review of administrative action, is constrained by the separation of powers doctrine. Further, in applying this doctrine, we determined that a district court's scope of review depends on whether the agency was performing a judicial, quasi-judicial, executive, or legislative function. Frick, 289 Kan. at 14-16, 208 P.3d 739. If the administrative agency performs a function that is legislative, executive, or a combination of the two, i.e., an administrative function, the doctrine of separation of powers restricts a reviewing court to a limited form of judicial review, even if a statute provides for de novo review. Frick, 289 Kan. at 14, 208 P.3d 739. This narrow standard of review protects against a court's intrusion into an agency's legislative or executive powers. Frick, 289 Kan. at 14, 208 P.3d 739. If, however, the administrative agency performs a purely judicial function, the separation of powers doctrine does not prevent a court from conducting a de novo review, although it still may not be a trial anew. Frick, 289 Kan. at 16, 208 P.3d 739. Consequently, use of the term trial de novo in a review statute can lead to varying procedures. To determine which of the variations applies, we must determine the nature of the function being performed when a rezoning decision is being made pursuant to K.S.A. 3-307e. In this regard, no one has suggested that the County's decision was purely judicial. Hence, we can conclude the district court correctly determined that it should not conduct a full trial or make independent findings of fact. Cf. Frick, 289 Kan. at 24, 208 P.3d 739 (holding that, where K.S.A. 58-3509[a] provides that an appeal to district court shall be a trial de novo, district court was required to make independent findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the administrative record because determination of relocation benefits under the Kansas Relocation Assistance for Persons Displaced by Acquisition of Real Property Act was a judicial function); Angle v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 12 Kan.App.2d 756, 765, 758 P.2d 226, rev. denied 243 Kan. 777 (1988) ([T]he Supreme Court has not interpreted any statute to allow true de novo review in the sense of a new trial on facts and issues as though they had never been tried.). Indeed, rather than being a judicial function, it is generally recognized that a zoning determination is classified as either a legislative or a quasi-judicial function. Zimmerman, 289 Kan. at 946-49, 218 P.3d 400. In Zimmerman, we concluded that regardless of which classificationlegislative or quasi-judicialapplied, Kansas courts have used the highly deferential language typically applied to judicial review of legislative action. Zimmerman, 289 Kan. at 948, 218 P.3d 400. For example, the Zimmerman court noted that the Golden/Combined Investment Co. standard of review include the rule that clearly exemplifies one of the chief characteristics of a legislative action's highly deferential review: Rule (6): `Action is unreasonable when it is so arbitrary that it can be said it was taken without regard to the benefit or harm involved to the community at large, including all interested parties, and was so wide of the mark that its unreasonableness lies outside the realm of fair debate.' (Emphasis added.) Combined Investment Co., 227 Kan. at 28 [605 P.2d 533]. Zimmerman, 289 Kan. at 948, 218 P.3d 400. The Zimmerman decision also noted that rules 1, 3, and 5 of the Golden/Combined Investment Co. standard of review are appropriate for reviewing legislative actions. Zimmerman, 289 Kan. at 948-49, 218 P.3d 400 (citing Combined Investment Co., 227 Kan. at 28, 605 P.2d 533). Ultimately, the Zimmerman decision reaffirmed the use of the Golden/Combined Investment Co. standard of review in rezoning decisions, stating: `[L]ater decisions have made clear that the Golden decision has little procedural or substantive impact beyond direct judicial review and the requirement that governing bodies should henceforth supply written findings in support of their decision to grant or deny a rezoning. The standard for validity is still one of reasonableness.' 3 Rathkopf, Rezonings: Validity and Review § 40.20, pp. 40-42 to 40-43 n. 11 (citing [ Landau v. City Council of City of Overland Park, 244 Kan. 257, 271, 767 P.2d 1290 (1989)]). Zimmerman, 289 Kan. at 949, 218 P.3d 400. Incorporation of the concept of reasonableness distinguishes the standard of review applied in rezoning decisions from the general standard stated in K.S.A. 60-2101(d). The appropriateness of testing a decision for reasonableness is reinforced by Kansas statutes that incorporate reasonableness as the guiding factor in either a court's review of a zoning decision or in the zoning body's consideration of zoning issues. See, e.g., K.S.A. 12-760 (Within 30 days of the final decision of the city or county, any person aggrieved thereby may maintain an action in the district court of the county to determine the reasonableness of such final decision regarding zoning.); K.S.A. 19-2964 (Any person having an interest in property affected may have the reasonableness of any such act, regulation or amendment thereto determined by bringing an action against the board of county commissioners.). Importantly, reasonableness is incorporated into the statutes regarding airport zoning. K.S.A. 3-706(1) provides that [a]ll airport zoning regulations adopted under this act shall be reasonable and none shall impose any requirement or restriction which is not reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of this act. (Emphasis added.) Even though the airport zoning statutes incorporate reasonableness as the guiding standard, there remains the distinction that the airport zoning judicial review provision K.S.A. 3-709differs from the judicial review provisions of general zoning statutes applied in Golden, 224 Kan. 591, 584 P.2d 130, and Combined Investment Co., 227 Kan. 17, 605 P.2d 533, by providing for a trial de novo as in civil cases. Nevertheless, the same separation of powers constraints that applied in Golden and Combined Investment Co. apply to our application of K.S.A. 3-709. Indeed, speaking generally of judicial review, we stated in Frick that even if a statute provides for de novo review, this court `has almost universally applied this doctrine of separation of powers to various appeal statutes providing for appeals from purely administrative tribunals, ruling that the court may not substitute its judgment on questions of fact for that of an administrative tribunal.' [Citation omitted.] Frick, 289 Kan. at 14, 208 P.3d 739. Consequently, we conclude that the difference in wording in K.S.A. 3-709 does not require a different test than is applied in other rezoning cases. Rather, despite the de novo language in K.S.A. 3-709, the separation of powers doctrine requires Kansas courts to apply a highly deferential standard of review to the County's decision to disapprove the proposed rezoning. As noted, the standard of review as summarized in Golden and Combined Investment Co. is consistent with this highly deferential scope of review. In summary, we hold that the Golden/Combined Investment Co. standard of review is consistent with the concept of trial de novo as provided for in K.S.A. 3-709. Under rule 8 of the Golden/Combined Investment Co. standard of review, an appellate court applies the same standard. Combined Investment Co., 227 Kan. at 28, 605 P.2d 533.