Opinion ID: 4194144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discussion of the Sentencing Factors

Text: Jackson also argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a procedurally unreasonable sentence because the sentencing judge did not address the § 3553(a) factors and did not explain how he arrived at the sentence imposed. A district court makes a significant procedural error by “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “Although the district court need not explicitly reference each of the § 3553(a) factors, there must be sufficient evidence in the record to affirmatively demonstrate that the court gave each of them consideration.” United States v. Battaglia, 624 F.3d 348, 351 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Simmons, 501 F.3d 620, 625 8 No. 16-3711 (6th Cir. 2007)). “A sentencing explanation is adequate if it allows for meaningful appellate review, which is accomplished by ‘set[ting] forth enough [of a statement of reasons] to satisfy the appellate court that [the sentencing judge] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.’” United States v. Brooks, 628 F.3d 791, 796 (6th Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)) (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). At the original 2005 sentencing, the district court spent the majority of the hearing determining what the applicable Guidelines range should be. After determining that Jackson had a Guidelines range of 360 months to life, the court remarked: I’m also going to look at all the Section 3553(a) factors. And what I am going to do is I’m going to take into consideration everything that should be, but I’m going to sentence you at the lowest end of those guidelines. And I think that would take into consideration all the factors that the Court is required to take into consideration . . . . (R. 115, First Sentencing Tr., PageID #755.) The district court then proceeded to impose a sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment. At the beginning of the second sentencing hearing, which was conducted in 2016 after Jackson’s first sentence was vacated, the district court announced that he was “going to incorporate by reference everything we did in the original sentence.” (R. 166, Second Sentencing Tr., PageID #711.) The court made a “tentative finding” of Jackson’s offense level and criminal history category and then explained: I’m going to look at 18 U.S. Code, Section 3553(a) statute that enumerates a lot of factors, and I’ll take that look at your background, your character, history, go through all that, compare it to all the facts and circumstances in the case, and fashion a sentence that’s sufficient but not greater than necessary to meet the ends of justice. 9 No. 16-3711 (Id., at 713–14.) The court then conducted a detailed discussion about whether Jackson should be considered a career offender. After the district court ruled that Jackson was, in fact, a career offender, Jackson’s counsel asked to be heard regarding a downward variance. Defense counsel articulated the following reasons for a lower sentence: (1) no one was injured in the bank robbery and almost all the money was recovered; (2) Jackson suffers from mental health issues; (3) Jackson’s codefendant was only sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment, creating a sentencing disparity; and (4) the time Jackson has already served in prison has been particularly difficult given the extreme level of violence present in the prison where he has been incarcerated. Jackson also exercised his right of allocution and testified about how miserable his time in prison has been so far. After hearing the defense’s arguments, as well as the government’s request for a sentence within the Guidelines range, the district court proceeded to announce that he would impose the minimum Guidelines sentence of 262 months on Count 1, to run concurrently with a 120 month sentence on Count 3, as well as an 84 month consecutive sentence on Count 2. Upon hearing this sentence, Jackson started yelling and asking to leave the courtroom. The sentencing hearing ended abruptly without any further explanation of how the district court arrived at the minimum sentence, whether it considered the § 3553(a) factors, and why it was denying Jackson’s request for a downward variance. Seemingly due to the confusing nature of the end of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel failed to raise the issue of the district court’s lack of explanation. Indeed, when the district court asked, in the midst of the commotion, whether either party had “[a]ny objections that haven’t already been raised,” (R. 166, at 728), in line with United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872 (6th Cir. 2004), Jackson’s counsel only said that he wished to preserve his objections to 10 No. 16-3711 the career offender enhancement. The day after the hearing, and before the district court issued the judgment, Jackson filed a notice of objections to the sentence, raising this issue and citing Bostic. Two days later, the district court issued its judgment without addressing Jackson’s objections contained in the notice. Because defense counsel filed a notice with the district court, Jackson properly preserved this issue for appeal. Therefore we review the procedural reasonableness of Jackson’s sentence “under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard,” Brooks, 628 F.3d at 795 (citation omitted), instead of for plain error, see Bostic, 371 F.3d at 873 (holding that, if a party does not raise an objection after being given a final opportunity to raise new objections, “that party will have forfeited its opportunity to make any objections not previously raised and thus will face plain error review on appeal”). We furthermore agree with Jackson that the district court made a significant procedural error in not articulating its reasons for arriving at the sentence it imposed. As detailed above, the district court only made passing reference to the § 3553(a) factors, explaining that he had to consider them but failing to detail how they affect the Guidelines range. All that is apparent from the record is that the district court thought that a sentence at the minimum of the Guidelines range was appropriate. However, the court did not explain why that was so and also did not address at all the request for a downward variance. This Court has vacated sentences for similar reasons in previous cases. For example, in United States v. Thomas, 498 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 2007), this Court vacated a sentence because: the district court considered the applicable Guidelines range, but not much else. The district court generally noted “the defendant’s background and behavior in this particular case” but otherwise never mentioned anything resembling the § 3553(a) factors, save a conclusory reference to “considering the additional factors contained within 18 [U.S.C.] Section 3553(a).” 11 No. 16-3711 Id. at 340 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). The district court in Thomas also failed to address the arguments contained in the defendant’s sentencing memorandum beyond generally noting “that it had received, read, and understood the sentencing memorandum.” Id. at 341. However, that “conclusory statement [left this Court] unsure as to whether the district court adequately considered and rejected [the defendant’s] arguments regarding proper application of the § 3553(a) factors or whether it misconstrued, ignored, or forgot [the defendant’s] arguments.” Id. This Court thus vacated the defendant’s sentence “[b]ecause the district court did not ‘set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.’” Id. (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 356). Similarly, this Court vacated the defendant’s sentence in United States v. Penson, 526 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 2008), because: [b]eyond mentioning casually and generally on the first day of the sentencing hearing that it could apply the § 3553(a) factors, the district court never verbalized which of these factors were particularly important to the circumstances of this case or how it selected the sentence in light of these factors. Indeed, the district court did not again make any mention of § 3553(a) or the factors listed therein and, thus, left us no record on review showing that it considered the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 338. Furthermore, the district court did not satisfy its duty to explain its sentence merely by stating, “I think a sentence within the guideline range is appropriate.” Id. Just as in Thomas and Penson, the district court in this case failed to properly articulate its reasoning for arriving at Jackson’s sentence. The district court only made passing reference to the § 3553(a) factors, and, indeed, this reference was at the beginning of the sentencing hearing when explaining the procedure that would be used. After both parties had presented 12 No. 16-3711 their arguments, the district court announced the sentence without ever mentioning any of the factors set forth in § 3553(a). The district court also did not address Jackson’s arguments for why he deserved a belowguidelines sentence. While the district court may have ultimately rejected those arguments, the court still was required to make clear that it at least considered them. See Thomas, 498 F.3d at 341 n.3 (noting that while the dissent in that case provided reasons why the district court may have rejected the defendant’s arguments, “it is not our role to supply reasons for the district court’s sentencing determination where the district court itself supplied none”). Although district courts are generally granted considerable leeway in determining how much explanation is required in a given case, see Rita, 551 U.S. at 356, in this case, the district court did not supply even the minimum required explanation. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion, and this case is remanded for resentencing.