Opinion ID: 171391
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Warning Contained in the Application

Text: As noted above, the application for asylum form that Mr. Ribas signed warned him that Applicants determined to have knowingly made a frivolous application for asylum will be permanently ineligible for any benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. at 662. This appears to be a standard, boilerplate form of notice contained on the I-589 asylum application form. There is no factual dispute concerning its content. We have located no cases holding that the written notice on the application is sufficient to meet the requirements of § 1158(d)(4)(A). Nor have we found any authority indicating that it is insufficient. At least two recent cases have noted that this is an unsettled question in the law. See Luciana v. Attorney General, 502 F.3d 273, 281 (3d Cir.2007); Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 275 n. 3 (2d Cir.2007). The one published ruling by the BIA on this question merely notes that the asylum form (Form I-589) contains a written warning. It does not discuss whether that warning is sufficient. In re Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 151, 155 (BIA 2007). While in general we are wary of determining significant issues not yet passed upon by the agency, see Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, the notice issue here involves the proper interpretation of a statute under undisputed facts rather than the resolution of an issue committed in the first instance to agency determination, and may be resolved as a matter of law. We will therefore proceed with statutory construction. Cf. Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 313 n. 15 (2d Cir.2007) (We, rather than the BIA, have primary authority under Chevron to determine whether a particular agency interpretation is consistent with the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2472, 171 L.Ed.2d 766 (2008). As in all cases of statutory construction, our foremost duty is to ascertain the congressional intent and give effect to the legislative will. Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir.2005) (quotation omitted). [I]t is a well established law of statutory construction that, absent ambiguity or irrational result, the literal language of a statute controls. U.S. v. Saenz-Gomez, 472 F.3d 791, 794 (10th Cir.) (quotation and citation omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2992, 168 L.Ed.2d 717 (2007). Further, [w]hen the meaning of the statute is clear, it is both unnecessary and improper to resort to legislative history to divine congressional intent. Id. (quotation omitted). Applying these principles, we note first that subsections 1158(d)(4)(A) and (d)(6) unambiguously require that the alien be advised that if the Attorney General determines that he knowingly made a frivolous application for asylum, he will be permanently ineligible for benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Under the statute, this notice is to be provided [a]t the time of filing of the application. § 1158(d)(4). Although the Attorney General's regulations permit filing the application in a variety of different ways, including simply mailing the form or presenting it at the IJ hearing, in each case the alien is required to complete and sign the asylum application form and to provide it to the agency. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(b). The only warning given at the time of filing in all such cases is that contained on the form itself. Moreover, nothing in the statute requires that the notice be provided in verbal form or that the consequences of filing a frivolous application be explained in detail to the applicant. [5] While § 1158(d)(4)(A) requires the Attorney General to advise the alien of the consequences of filing a frivolous application, § 1158(d)(6) clarifies that this duty is fulfilled if the alien has received the notice required under § 1158(d)(4)(A). In sum, in order to implement the statutory provisions, the Attorney General provides a written notice on its asylum form. The wording of this notice supplies all of the information concerning the consequences of filing a frivolous application to which the alien is entitled under the unambiguous language of § 1158(d)(4)(A). We therefore conclude, as a matter of law, that the written notice provided on the asylum form is sufficient. Mr. Ribas urges a number of policy arguments against this conclusion. None of them demonstrates that application of the statute's plain language here would achieve an irrational result. Saenz-Gomez, 472 F.3d at 794. He argues that reliance on a boilerplate form is inappropriate where so much is at stake. Had Congress wished to provide a more explicit warning, however, it could have done so. He also suggests that his pro se status should be taken into account. But he makes no argument that he did not speak English well enough to read the warning or that he did not understand the warning. Mr. Ribas notes that the BIA held in another context that unless both oral and written notice were provided, an alien who had been penalized for failure to appear had grounds for reopening his case to seek adjustment of status. See In re M-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 349, 352-57 (BIA 1998) (en banc). That case only supports the result we have reached here. The statute applied in M-S-, unlike § 1158(d), specifically required verbal notice. Id. at 352 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1) (1994)). Finally, Mr. Ribas argues that the IJ's later misstatement about a ten-year bar vitiated the notice he received on the application. This argument fails, in light of our determination that his asylum application was filed at the time he signed and submitted it, and the written notice he received prior to that time was sufficient to fulfill the statutory requirement. Any defect in a later verbal notice was irrelevant. In addition, it appears Mr. Ribas may have misunderstood the import of the IJ's statement at the hearing on April 13, 2004. Taken in context, the advisement may not even have been wrong. Since the IJ did not specifically reference frivolousness when referring to a ten-year bar, he may simply have meant to accurately report the consequences if Mr. Ribas's asylum application were unsuccessful. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (creating ten-year ineligibility period for aliens removed after more than one year of unlawful presence in United States).