Opinion ID: 1117896
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether the State's closing argument was improper.

Text: ¶ 45. This Court reviews the propriety of closing arguments giving deference to the trial court's ruling, because the trial court is in the best position to determine if an alleged improper comment had a prejudicial effect; therefore, absent an abuse of that discretion, the trial court's ruling will stand. Stevens v. State, 806 So.2d 1031, 1057 (Miss.2001) (citing Roundtree v. State, 568 So.2d 1173, 1178 (Miss.1990)). [A]ttorneys are allowed wide latitude in their arguments `limiting them not only to facts, but also to deductions and conclusions which may be drawn therefrom, and to the application of the law to those facts.' Stevens, 806 So.2d at 1057 (quoting Holly v. State, 716 So.2d 979, 988 (Miss.1998)). ¶ 46. On appeal, this Court must consider whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument of the prosecuting attorney [created] an unjust prejudice against the accused as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created. Wells v. State, 698 So.2d 497, 507 (Miss.1997); see also Caston v. State, 823 So.2d 473, 495 (Miss.2002) (The standard of review that appellate courts must apply to lawyer misconduct during opening statements or closing arguments is whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument is to create unjust prejudice against the accused so as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created.) (quoting Sheppard v. State, 777 So.2d 659, 661 (Miss.2000)). ¶ 47. In Wells, this Court addressed the golden rule. Id. at 506. A golden rule argument asks the jurors to put themselves in the place of one of the parties. Stevens, 806 So.2d at 1057. The Court, in Wells, 698 So.2d at 507, did not find that any prejudice resulted to the defendant, stating: In light of the overwhelming evidence against Wells, the jury's verdict likely was not influenced by any prejudice that might have resulted from the district attorney's isolated golden rule argument. (Emphasis added). ¶ 48. Jones takes issue with remarks made by the prosecutor in the closing argument, the first in the beginning of the close: You know, you have to use your common sense. If you leave that at home, you can let every slim killer in Jones County walk out of the courtroom. Who will speak for Dolores [Delores] Knight? The trial court did not issue a ruling as to the defense's objection. Instead, seeking a ruling from the trial court during the argument, the defense asked the trial court to take up the objection outside the presence of the jury. The prosecutor made the following comment in the State's final closing argument: I don't know  my grandfather didn't live over a jail. He was a farmer out at Calhoun. I don't know about all of that mess. I'm just a red-neck out of the west side of the county, and happened to be a lawyer. That is all I know. I just try to use my common sense. Okay? You know if you take the Hattiesburg judges or the Hattiesburg whatever, the only thing I have a problem with, I never did this when I represented people who was accused of all kinds of minor, heinous stuff. I never had the nerve to come up here and tell somebody that I was proud to represent them and I knew they were [not] guilty, and it was my privilege to do it. You know, he is representing him just like every other lawyer does, because he's paid him to do it. The defense objected, and the trial court reprimanded the prosecutor to go by the facts of the case, and take your personal opinions out of it . . . or I'm going to declare a mistrial . . . the next time that comes out. The defense also reserved the right to object outside the jury's presence. Once the closing argument concluded, the trial court again strongly reprimanded the prosecutor for his comment, but denied the request for a mistrial. ¶ 49. In his assignment of error, Jones fails to mention that the prosecutor's remarks in the final closing were made in response to the defense's statements in its closing argument. In the defense's closing argument, Jones's counsel argued: Mr. Parrish [prosecutor] tried his best. Let me say right now, I failed to mentioned (sic) this thought. I am thankful for the civil manner in which Mr. Parrish has conducted this trial because a lot of times, that doesn't happen. A lot of times the prosecutor is so vigorous and is so demeaning to the opposite side, they just want to get in there and they want to badger the Defendant and they want to badger the lawyer. That did not happen, and I want to thank J. Ronald for that. . . . I want you to remember all those things. I want you to remember that the alibi testimony is un-refuted. You know, our place in this life, a lot of times, has to do with our heritage. And I told you in addressing you that I supported law enforcement and Mr. Parrish objected to that. I told [you] that at a later time I would tell you why. Well, the reason why is that I have had family members in law enforcement. My grandfather was a deputy sheriff and constable. And in fact, we used to kid my daddy because he was in jail at one point in time, because they literally lived over the jail. But, my other grandfather, like Danny Jones [defendant], was a God-fearing master carpenter. He could build just about anything. But had a a (sic) great hobby and it was a hobby of playing Dominoes. And because he was a master carpenter, he made me a set of Dominoes that I was stupid enough to let get lost throughout the years. . . . I had said when I went back into the practice of law, that I would never represent anyone who had done something to  . . . [State objected to the personal opinions offered by the defense. The trial court overruled the objection] I obviously would not have done so in this case. If I thought that Danny Jones murdered anyone, I wouldn't be here today. . . . [State objected. The trial court overruled the objection.] I am here to tell you that it did not happen. (Emphasis added). ¶ 50. The prosecutor's remarks were invective and out-of-line. However, the defense's statements invited the prosecutor's response. The defense's statements were an attack on the prosecutor, personally, in front of the jury. The defense's statements also asked the jury to put themselves in the defense attorney's place, to share a common heritage with the witnesses, and to accept that he would never as an attorney represent a guilty person. Both the prosecutor and the defense crossed the line in the closing arguments. Clearly, the attorneys resorted to improper behavior. ¶ 51. But under the limited situation of this case, the prosecutor's remarks were sufficiently insignificant in the overall context of the case before us that any error was harmless. Further, the jury heard the trial court admonish and reprimand the prosecutor for his comment and threaten to declare a mistrial if the prosecutor continued to make such remarks. In considering whether a mistrial was warranted, this Court defers to the trial court's determination of whether the defendant suffered any prejudicial effect. Sipp v. State, 936 So.2d 326, 331 (Miss. 2006) (The trial court must declare a mistrial when there is an error in the proceedings resulting in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the defendant's case; however, the trial judge is permitted considerable discretion in determining whether a mistrial is warranted since the judge is best positioned for measuring the prejudicial effect.); Gossett v. State, 660 So.2d 1285, 1290-91 (Miss.1995); Roundtree v. State, 568 So.2d 1173, 1178 (Miss.1990). ¶ 52. In Monk v. State, 532 So.2d 592, 601 (Miss.1988), this Court stated: The right of argument contemplates liberal freedom of speech and range of discussion confined only to bounds of logic and reason; and if counsel's argument is within the limits of proper debate it is immaterial whether it is sound or unsound, or whether he employs wit, invective, and illustration therein. Moreover, figurative speech is legitimate if there is evidence on which it may be founded. Exaggerated statements and hasty observations are often made in the heat of debate, which, although not legitimate, are generally disregarded by the court, because in its opinion they are harmless. (Emphasis added). ¶ 53. While error occurred, we find that the error was harmless, as it resulted in no prejudice to Jones, and it does not merit reversal.