Opinion ID: 1266115
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Congressional Policy

Text: Three of our sister Circuit Courts of Appealsin the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuitshave taken another approach in re-evaluating this issue after Kimbrough, concluding that it has no effect on fast-track sentencing arguments. [7] United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d 554, 559 (5th Cir.2008) ( Kimbrough, which concerned a district court's ability to sentence in disagreement with Guideline policy, does not control this case, which concerns a district court's ability to sentence in disagreement with Congressional policy.); United States v. Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d 736, 741 (9th Cir.2009) (same); United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1237 (11th Cir.2008) (same and refusing to apply Kimbrough to fast-track disparity issue because Kimbrough dealt with the cocaine Guidelines). These Courts of Appeals focused on congressional policy expressed in the PROTECT Act as the sole factor distinguishing the fast-track issue from the crack cocaine question in Kimbrough. Because of this, they essentially concluded that the Guidelines are binding on the fast-track question. We disagree with this analysis. Focusing on congressional policy here is illusory, as we will explain in more detail, and it does not justify prohibiting a district court's discretion at sentencing. [8] Moreover, we reject as superficial the factual distinction made by the Eleventh Circuit Court in Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d at 1237, that Kimbrough dealt with crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity and not fast-track sentencing disparity. See United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 585 (6th Cir.2009) (stating in an illegal reentry case that [w]e thus see no reason to limit the authority recognized in Kimbrough and confirmed in Spears to the crack-powder cocaine context.... [Nor do] we stand alone in that regard. (citing cases from the First, Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals)). Instead, we are more aligned with the post- Kimbrough view of the First Circuit Court expressed in United States v. Rodriguez. 527 F.3d 221 (1st Cir.2008) (holding that post- Kimbrough a district court can consider fast-track disparity as grounds for a variance); see also United States v. Stone, 575 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir.2009) (And our precedent has interpreted Kimbrough as supplying this power even where a guideline provision is a direct reflection of a congressional directive.). There is no question that the Guidelines are advisory only. The congressional policy argument attempts to carve out an exception to this Booker norm by binding a district court's sentencing discretion on the fast-track issue. The crux of the argument is that the PROTECT Act's congressional directive sanctioning fast-track programs in certain judicial districts necessarily authorizes disparate sentencing of immigration defendants between fast-track and non-fast-track districts, so that the disparity is not unwarranted under § 3553(a)(6). Thus, a district court cannot vary from the Guidelines range on the basis of a disagreement with the treatment of defendants in non-fast-track districts because it is mandated by Congress. Most courts pre- Kimbrough took this position (see, for example, Vargas, 477 F.3d at 98-99 (collecting cases)), but it does not have continued vitality post- Kimbrough. In Kimbrough, the Supreme Court rejected the Government's argument that the 100-to-1 crack/powder cocaine ratio represented a specific policy determinatio[n] that Congress has directed sentencing courts to observe, thus making it an exception to the general freedom that sentencing courts have to apply the [§ 3553(a) ] factors. 128 S.Ct. at 570 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). The Court made clear that, absent an express directive from Congress, it would not read any implicit directive into the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Id. at 571-72 (explaining that Congress used the 100-to-1 crack/powder ratio to trigger the mandatory minimums and maximums). We think the Supreme Court's rejection of the Government's argument in Kimbrough crosses over to apply to the implicit congressional directive argument made to support fast-track sentencing disparities. The PROTECT Act contains no express congressional fast-track directive that would constrain a sentencing judge's discretion to vary from the Guidelines. The First Circuit Court stated in Rodriguez that by its terms, [the fast-track Guideline, § 5K3.1, which restates the PROTECT Act's congressional directive,] neither forbids nor discourages the use of a particular sentencing rationale, and it says nothing about a district court's discretion to deviate from the [G]uidelines based on fast-track disparity [under the § 3553(a) factors]. The statute simply authorizes the Sentencing Commission to issue a policy statement and, in the wake of Kimbrough, such a directive, whether or not suggestive, is not decisive as to what may constitute a permissible ground for a variant sentence. 527 F.3d at 229 (internal quotations and citation omitted). As embodied in the Guidelines, Congress generally sanctioned district-wide fast-track programs as a matter of prosecutorial discretion and cabined the extent of a formal departure at step 2 pursuant to these programs. The PROTECT Act did not reduce sentences for illegal reentry defendants in any specific districts, nor did it dictate the departure level in fast-track districts for similarly situated defendants. See United States v. Medrano-Duran, 386 F.Supp.2d 943, 947 (N.D.Ill.2005) (surveying various departure levels in fast-track districts). Moreover, as with all departure motions, the Act did not bind a sentencing court to accept the Government's motion, and a court can exercise its discretion to reject the departure. The Act also did not expressly stop an individual sentencing judge from granting variances at step 3 in non-fast-track districts based on the congressionally mandated § 3553(a) factors, nor did it require non-fast-track courts to mete out higher sentences than courts in fast-track jurisdictions. See Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 571 (discussing that Congress has shown that it knows how to direct sentencing practices in express terms); Rodriguez, 527 F.3d at 229 (noting that the PROTECT Act says nothing about the court's capacity to craft a variant sentence within the maximum and minimum limits). By contrast, Congress expressly defined that the statutory maximum for illegal reentry is 20 years, and a district court cannot exceed that maximum sentence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (a prior aggravated felony triggers this maximum penalty). In sum, a Guideline is not a statute. If Congress does not want district courts to exercise their judicial function to sentence defendants based on the facts and circumstances of each case under the guidance of the § 3553(a) factors, then it has the power to amend the pertinent statute. It has not done so here. Indeed, to argue otherwise is an attempt to manipulate the advisory character of the Guidelines. [9] Thus, the attempt to distinguish fast-track programs from the sentencing guidance provided in Kimbrough, and constrain a district court's sentencing discretion solely on the basis of a congressional policy argument, is unpersuasive. See Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 570-73 (indicating that when Congress exercised its power to bar district courts from using a particular sentencing rationale, it did so by the use of unequivocal terminology). Paradoxically, the Fifth Circuit Court case, Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d 554, which relied on the congressional policy rationale to differentiate the fast-track issue from Kimbrough, appears to have curtailed a district court's sentencing discretion post- Kimbrough more than it had before that decision. The Court at first stated that it has never held that a district court may not consider and give effect to defendant's argument for a reduced sentence on th[e] basis [of a fast-track disparity]. Rather our cases have only concluded that a district court is not required to factor in, when sentencing a defendant, the sentencing disparity caused by early disposition programs to prevent a sentence from being unreasonable. Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d at 558 n. 1 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Yet it went on to say that post- Kimbrough it would be an abuse of discretion for the district court to deviate from the Guidelines on the basis of sentencing disparity resulting from fast track programs that was intended by Congress.... [This deviation] would result from an erroneous view of the law. Id. at 563 n. 4 (citation omitted). In light of Kimbrough, this statement strays from the standard set by the Supreme Court. In its sentencing cases post- Booker, the Court has been clear that a sentencing judge has discretion to impose a sentence grounded in the § 3553(a) factors regardless whether it varies from the Guidelines range. See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007); Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Moreover, the existence of charge-bargaining programs in several districts underscores that these alternative district-wide, early-disposition programs operate outside the bounds of not only the Protect Act, but also Guidelines § 5K3.1. See Medrano-Duran, 386 F.Supp.2d at 946-47; see also Sentencing Commission Report, at 69 (indicating that these programs may be used to achieve sentencing outcomes below the otherwise applicable [G]uideline[s] range and the effect of charge bargaining on achieving the statutory purposes of sentencing is hard to analyze). The way these programs work is that, rather than recommending a departure via motion at step 2, the Government at the outset reduces the more serious illegal reentry charge to one or two less serious chargesimproper entry, or eluding examination and inspection by an alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a). The qualifying defendant pleads guilty to one or both of these lesser charges, and thus alters the Guidelines range calculation at step 1. As noted, this type of immigration fast-track protocol can result in a sentence that is lower than what would have been a four-level departure from an illegal reentry offense. See Medrano-Duran, 386 F.Supp.2d at 946-47. Charge-bargaining programs are not part of the PROTECT Act, and are only incorporated into the Attorney General's policy memorandum. See, e.g., Attorney General Memorandum (discussing charge-bargaining programs). Though these programs appear to be a permissible extension of prosecutorial discretion, there is nothing to show that defendants in charge-bargaining districts are less culpable than those who have committed the same offense in non-fast-track districts. While charge-bargaining brings even greater disparity to the system by fostering lower sentences for certain immigration offenses, it does not violate the PROTECT Act. Because it is not included in the PROTECT Act (and thus is not swept into the congressional policy argument), as part of a district court's sentencing function, particularly § 3553(a)(6), the court could take into account such disparate treatment among these immigration defendants.