Opinion ID: 1245616
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: state as joint tort-feasor

Text: The first error the State assigns in its petition for further review is that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that under § 81-8,215.01, state law enforcement officers and fleeing criminals are joint tort-feasors. The question before the Court of Appeals was not whether the State may be a joint tort-feasor, because that question had not been raised before the trial court in the motions for summary judgment. Rather, the question before the Court of Appeals was whether the release the Adamses gave to Kreizel also released the State. In order to decide the release question, the Court of Appeals was required to decide whether the State's potential liability in this case was primary or secondary. If the State's potential liability was secondary and derived from Kreizel's liability, then the State would have been released when Kreizel was released. See Brown v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 252 Neb. 95, 560 N.W.2d 482 (1997). If, on the other hand, the State's liability were primary, then the release of Kreizel would not necessarily have released the State unless the language of the release also described the State. See id. In deciding this question, the Court of Appeals stated: We agree with the plaintiffs... that the State may be jointly and not secondarily liable. Adams v. State, 2000 WL 1218431 at . The State claims that by asserting that the State may be jointly liable, the Court of Appeals erroneously injected negligence principles into a strict liability statute. It is apparent that in the context of its opinion, the Court of Appeals was not deciding the question of joint liability. Rather, it was deciding the question of whether the State's potential liability was primary or secondary. However, to the extent that the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of joint liability, it was in error. On the other hand, to the extent that it determined that the State's liability is not secondary but primary, it was correct. The plaintiffs sued on theories of negligence as well as statutory strict liability under § 81-8,215.01. If the State were found negligent, it would be primarily liable in tort for the damages its agents proximately caused. If, on the other hand, the State were found liable under § 81-8,215.01, its liability would still be primary. Section § 81-8,215.01, as it existed prior to the amendments in 1996, provided: In case of death, injury, or property damage to any innocent third party proximately caused by the action of a law enforcement officer employed by the state during vehicular pursuit, damages shall be paid to such third party by the state. For purposes of this section, vehicular pursuit shall mean an active attempt by a law enforcement officer operating a motor vehicle to apprehend one or more occupants of another motor vehicle when the driver of the fleeing vehicle is or should be aware of such attempt and is resisting apprehension by maintaining or increasing his or her speed, ignoring the officer, or attempting to elude the officer while driving at speeds in excess of those reasonable and proper under the conditions. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning absent anything to the contrary; thus, an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. Ameritas Life Ins. v. Balka, 257 Neb. 878, 601 N.W.2d 508 (1999). While the State argues that under § 81-8,215.01, its liability derives from the pursuee's liability, a reading of the plain language of the statute shows that the focus of the inquiry in determining whether the State is liable is the officer's actions. If the officer's actions during a vehicular pursuit proximately cause damage to an innocent third party, the State is strictly liable for those damages. § 81-8,215.01. The statute does indeed eliminate the need to assess an officer's culpability, but his conduct must still be examined to determine whether such conduct proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. Thus, we reject the State's argument that the officer's conduct is not to be examined in determining whether the State is liable under § 81-8,215.01. The pursuee's conduct comes into play only in determining whether a vehicular pursuit occurred. The language of the statute makes the pursuee's conduct merely a factual circumstance that must be proved in order to establish that a vehicular pursuit occurred. It is not a part of the proximate cause analysis. Thus, the statute does not create on the part of the State a secondary liability derived from the pursuee's liability during a vehicular pursuit; rather, it creates a primary liability based on the actions of officers the State employs. Because the State has primary liability, its liability is not dependent on Kreizel's liability. We therefore conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the State's liability was not secondary and that it was not released merely because Kreizel was released.