Opinion ID: 3031949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Plaintiffs’ Additional Arguments

Text: The plaintiffs assert a myriad of legal arguments attacking the district court’s decision, all of which lack merit. We address each in turn.
The plaintiffs contend that the district court erred by requiring them to show evidence of animus in order to succeed on their claims under the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses. The district court, however, did not require animus under the Establishment Clause. Nor did it require animus under the Free Speech Clause as the plaintiffs contend; instead, it held that a showing of animus could render an otherwise reasonable policy unconstitutional. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 587. -8-
Next, the plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by limiting the unbridled discretion doctrine to licensing and prior restraint cases. We need not, however, resolve the scope of this doctrine. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 793 (1989) (noting that the scope of the doctrine is “far from clear”). We affirm the district court’s decision based on its alternative holding that, assuming the doctrine applies, UC provides sufficient guidance for course review to defeat a challenge of unbridled discretion.
The plaintiffs mistakenly argue that the district court erred by inventing a “primary effect” standard under the Establishment Clause. The district court did not invent the “primary effect” language. The Supreme Court used that language in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). As we have explained, the “second prong of Lemon bars governmental action that has the ‘principal or primary effect’ of advancing or disapproving of religion.” Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1256 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612).
-9- The plaintiffs contend that the district court erred by not applying strict scrutiny to their free exercise claim under the so-called hybrid-rights doctrine. Yet the plaintiffs offer no reason to depart from our recent decision in Jacobs v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 440 n.45 (9th Cir. 2008) where we “declin[ed] to be the first” court to allow a “plaintiff to bootstrap a free exercise claim” using the hybrid-rights doctrine. Id. The plaintiffs’ contention that the district court misread Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) in its discussion of the Free Exercise Clause is irrelevant. The plaintiffs do not and cannot challenge the crux of the district court’s rejection of their free exercise claim—that UC’s policies were more akin to the civil regulation that was upheld in Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) than the criminal prohibition that was invalidated in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
The district court properly applied rational basis scrutiny to the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 721 n.3 (“Because we hold . . . that the program is not a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, however, we apply rational-basis scrutiny to his equal protection claims.”) (citations omitted). The plaintiffs nevertheless argue that strict scrutiny applies because religion is a suspect -10- class. Courts, however, only apply strict scrutiny when distinctions are made on the basis of a suspect class, like religion. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Ball v. Massanari, 254 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2001). The record is devoid of any evidence showing that UC discriminates on the basis of religion. UC’s course approval policy is the same for all in-state applicants, regardless of religion. The plaintiffs do not contend that any student has been denied UC admission based on the student’s religion. Nor do they contend that any student has been denied eligibility based on UC’s rejection of a high school course. UC’s policy and its individual course decisions are not based on religion, but on whether a high school course is college preparatory. As the defendants point out, whether a course is college preparatory is not a suspect classification; therefore, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that UC’s distinctions be rational. F. The 150 Rejected Courses and the “Overbreadth” Doctrine The plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by “entirely ignoring” evidence that UC rejected over 150 courses from religious high schools (the majority of which are not plaintiffs in this case) and by refusing to apply the overbreadth doctrine. To the contrary, the district court expressly recognized the -11- laundry list of 150 rejected courses proffered by the plaintiffs and concluded it was irrelevant because the plaintiffs did “not provide an analysis as to why any of the more than 150 courses rejected by UC should have been approved.” That the district court did not specifically address the rejected courses in its analysis of the overbreadth doctrine does not constitute error. The plaintiffs’ list of 150 rejected courses, without any supporting analysis, does not raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether UC’s policy “punishes a ‘substantial’ amount of protected free speech” in violation of the overbreadth doctrine. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19 (2003). The plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence of punishment, or even a chilling effect, because high schools are free to continue teaching the courses even if UC denies approval. G. The Plaintiffs’ Additional Expert Affidavits The plaintiffs contend, without support, that the district court erred in excluding “certain opinions” in its additional expert affidavits. The plaintiffs do not specify which opinions in the affidavits were improperly excluded, nor do they explain why the exclusions were erroneous, and have therefore failed to preserve this argument. See Greenwood v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We review only issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief . . . . We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, -12- and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim, particularly when, as here, a host of other issues are presented for review.”). AFFIRMED. -13-