Opinion ID: 5126238
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evid.R. 403

Text: {¶ 23} OPERS correctly points out that Powell raised the argument that Evid.R. 403 bars consideration of Dr. Steiman’s and Dr. Mankowski’s opinions for the first time in his Tenth District reply brief. OPERS asserts that we need not consider the argument, citing State ex rel. Grounds v. Hocking Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 116, 2008-Ohio-566, 881 N.E.2d 1252, ¶ 24, in which we noted, in an original action filed in this court, that a party is not permitted to raise new arguments in its reply brief. OPERS acknowledges, though, that the Tenth District did address Powell’s Evid.R. 403 argument. We will therefore consider it; however, we find it meritless. {¶ 24} Evid.R. 403 states that evidence must be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The only authority that Powell cites in support of his argument that OPERS must refuse to consider some medical opinions is the existence of the fiduciary duty discussed above. He asserts that for the some-evidence standard to have meaning, OPERS must disregard any evidence that is more prejudicial than probative; otherwise, OPERS would not be fulfilling its fiduciary duty to Powell. But as explained above, Powell has not established the existence of the duty that his argument is premised on. Nor has he established any authority connecting Evid.R. 403 to any such duty, and we cannot mint such a connection in this mandamus case. {¶ 25} Because some evidence supports OPERS’s decision and Powell has not established that any evidence should have been excluded from OPERS’s consideration, we conclude that the Tenth District correctly denied the writ.