Opinion ID: 885947
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant shall be placed under supervision of

Text: the Montana Department of Corrections and Human Services, subject to all the administrative rules and regulations of said agency, including but not limited to residency, travel, reporting, full time employment, warrantless search, testing of his breath and bodily fluids, obeying of all laws and specifically including having no guns, firearms or ammunition in his possession. The State’s second petition to revoke Cihura’s suspended sentence alleged that Cihura violated Montana State Rule Number 1, requiring permission to change a place of residence, and Montana State Rule Number 4, requiring a defendant to report to a probation officer as directed. ¶13 At the December 17, 2001, hearing, Fladager testified that Cihura requested a move to Oregon in January of 2001. Fladager filed the necessary paperwork with Oregon but Oregon denied the request. Fladager notified Cihura of this denial but Cihura disregarded her admonition and moved to Medford, Oregon. Fladager testified that Cihura followed through with this move despite the fact that “he didn’t have Oregon’s permission to be living there at 5 that time. He certainly didn’t have my permission to be living there.” Further, Fladager testified that upon learning of Cihura’s move, she instructed Cihura to report to Montana by March 6, 2001. Cihura did not report to Montana as instructed and failed to maintain any contact with Fladager after March 6, 2001. ¶14 Cihura denied the allegations contained in the second petition but did not present any evidence at the December 17, 2001, hearing. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Cihura violated the terms and conditions of his suspended sentence. Therefore, the District Court did not err when it revoked the same. ¶15 Section 46-18-203(7)(a), MCA, provides: If the judge finds that the offender has violated the terms and conditions of the suspended or deferred sentence, the judge may: (1) continue the suspended or deferred sentence without a change in conditions; (2) continue the suspended sentence with modified or additional terms and conditions; (3) revoke the suspension of sentence and require the offender to serve either the sentence imposed or any lesser sentence; or (4) if the sentence was deferred, impose any sentence that might have been originally imposed. Cihura maintains that: The inquiry at any probation revocation hearing is whether the purposes of rehabilitation are being achieved, and whether, by virtue of subsequent criminal conduct or evidence that the defendant’s behavior was not in compliance with the rules and objectives of his probation, the purposes of probation are best served by continued liberty or by incarceration. 6 Cihura contends that his wife’s chronic health problems compelled the move to Oregon and Nebraska. Therefore, Cihura concludes that “the district court should have realized that incarceration was not the most beneficial option for this type of minor violation. The district court abused its discretion when it did not consider other options which would have allowed Cihura to remain at liberty.” ¶16 On appeal, this Court will only review sentences for their legality. State v. Baisch, 1998 MT 12, ¶ 15, 287 Mont. 191, ¶ 15, 953 P.2d 1070, ¶ 15. We will not review sentences for mere inequity or disparity. Baisch, ¶ 15. Any arguments regarding the fairness or equity of a sentence should be referred to this Court’s Sentence Review Division. Baisch, ¶ 15. ¶17 Essentially, Cihura’s arguments regarding the propriety of the sentence following revocation consist entirely of fairness issues. Cihura has not asserted that the District Court illegally imposed the three year sentence. Further, a sentence is not illegal when it is within the parameters provided by statute. State v. Brown, 1999 MT 31, ¶ 8, 293 Mont. 268, ¶ 8, 975 P.2d 321, ¶ 8. Section 46-18-203(7)(a), MCA, expressly authorized the District Court to impose the sentence that it did. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the three year sentence. ¶18 Affirmed. /S/ JIM REGNIER We Concur: 7 /S/ PATRICIA COTTER /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER /S/ JAMES C. NELSON /S/ JIM RICE 8