Opinion ID: 77977
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Affirmative Bargaining Order and Changed Circumstances

Text: Upon finding the numerous labor law violations discussed above, the Board issued, among other remedies, an affirmative bargaining order that would require Goya to bargain with the Union for a reasonable time before a lawful decertification could take place. We have little doubt, given the seriousness of the labor violations before us, had this case not fallen victim to the Board's much delayed process, there would be no concern with regard to the appropriateness of the affirmative bargaining order, as its imposition was subject to the reasoned analysis discussed below. But as a result of an inexplicable five-year delay in this case, we must also address whether the Board had an obligation to consider changed circumstances at the time it rendered its affirmative bargaining order.
In order to grapple with the issue at hand, it is important to understand the dynamics of the Board's chosen remedy in this case  an affirmative bargaining order  from both a procedural and remedial perspective. The Board has available to it an array of remedies to redress unfair labor practices: The Board may order the employer, for example, to cease and desist his unfair practices, to post a notice or read one aloud, and to reinstate and reimburse unlawfully discharged employees. [15] Avecor, Inc. v. NLRB, 931 F.2d 924, 935 (D.C.Cir.1991). A bargaining order is appropriate only where the unfair practices have so intimidated employees that an election, even with the full complement of traditional NLRB remedies, would not reflect their true sentiments. Id. at 935. A cease and desist order and an affirmative bargaining order essentially serve the same function in the context of an incumbent union, except for the bargaining order's accompanying decertification bar which protects the union from a decertification election for a reasonable time, not more than one year. Caterair Int'l v. NLRB, 22 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (D.C.Cir.1994) (discussing differences between these remedies); Sullivan Indus. v. NLRB, 957 F.2d 890, 903 n. 5 (D.C.Cir.1992) (The decertification bar would last for a `reasonable period'  at least six months, perhaps as much as one year  during which time the employer and the union would presumably bargain.). As such, an affirmative bargaining order is an extraordinary remedy because it infringes on the free association rights of present employees to choose their own representation or no representation. Caterair Int'l, 22 F.3d at 1122. It is both retrospective and prospective in nature. See Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 612, 89 S.Ct. at 1939 ([A] bargaining order is designed as much to remedy past election damage as it is to deter future misconduct.). There are generally two categories of cases from which an affirmative bargaining order may issue: precertification election cases and incumbent union withdrawal cases. The typical affirmative bargaining order case is the former and is exemplified by NLRB v. Gissel Packing Company, 395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969), where the Supreme Court set out a three category test for issuing an affirmative bargaining order when a union claims precertification labor violations caused it to lose an election despite evidence of majority support. See Caterair Int'l, 22 F.3d at 1122-23 (discussing difference between Gissel case and incumbent union case). This case, however, falls into the latter category and is not a Gissel case because here the Union was an incumbent union at the time of withdrawal of recognition. We are presented instead with an unlawful withdrawal of recognition case, where an employer refuses to bargain with an incumbent union and where anti-union animus has sufficiently tainted an otherwise lawful decertification petition. See, e.g., Peoples Gas System, Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 46 (D.C.Cir.1980); see also Sullivan Indus., 957 F.2d at 897-98 (successive employer withdrawal of recognition). The D.C. Circuit, which has seen a disproportionate share of NLRB enforcement actions, [16] requires the Board, prior to issuing an affirmative bargaining order, to justify its remedy in light of the facts of each case. See Peoples Gas, 629 F.2d at 45-46. In Peoples Gas, the court recognized, for the first time, the Board's obligation to provide a reasoned explanation for ordering an affirmative bargaining order: A remedial order should recognize the competing considerations which are potentially affected by the remedy chosen, be grounded in factual determinations rather than speculation, and explain how, in light of present circumstances its remedy can be expected to effectuate the purposes of the Act. [17] Id. at 45 (footnote omitted). The Board has begrudgingly adopted the approach mandated by the D.C. Circuit (and other circuits), [18] and now supports its selection of an affirmative bargaining order remedy with a reasoned explanation that will enable the reviewing court to determine from the Board's opinion (1) that it gave due consideration to the employee's section 7 rights, which are, after all, one of the fundamental purposes of the Act, (2) why it concluded that other purposes must override the rights of the employees to choose their bargaining representatives and (3) why other remedies, less destructive of employees' rights, are not adequate. Charlotte Amphitheater Corp. v. NLRB, 82 F.3d 1074, 1078 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also Peoples Gas, 629 F.2d at 46. Peoples Gas expressly rejected relieving the Board of its obligation to provide a reasoned justification for imposing a bargaining order in a withdrawal of recognition case: Gissel, of course, involved unfair labor practices committed before any election was held, and the balance of interests at that point may appropriately place more weight on the employees' free choice. In withdrawal of recognition cases, deterrence and industrial stability emerge as important considerations. However, the fact that the balance may be different depending on the facts of the case does not mean that no balance need be drawn. Peoples Gas, 629 F.2d at 47 n. 23; see also Williams Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 956 F.2d 1226, 1237 (D.C.Cir.1992) (The requirement that a bargaining order be accompanied by a reasoned explanation applies not only in election cases ..., but also in cases like Peoples Gas where an employer withdraws recognition from an incumbent union.); Sullivan Indus., 957 F.2d at 903 (refusing to enforce bargaining order in successive employer withdrawal of recognition case where Board failed to give a reasoned analysis). In Lee Lumber and Building Material Corporation v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 1454, 1460-62 (D.C.Cir.1997), the D.C. Circuit again specifically rejected applying a different analytical framework to incumbent union withdrawal of recognition cases: Gissel, of course, involved a non-incumbent union and as such is not directly implicated here. This court, however, has required the Board to make detailed findings as to why a bargaining order is appropriate not only in cases involving non-incumbent unions, but also in cases involving incumbent unions .... We have repeatedly held that if the Board wishes to impose an affirmative bargaining order, it must explain why that remedy is appropriate given the facts of that particular case. Id. at 1461 (emphasis added). Although the relevant considerations may change somewhat in a withdrawal of recognition case, the necessity of an analysis that explain[s] how, in light of present circumstances its remedy can be expected to effectuate the purposes of the Act does not change. Peoples Gas, 629 F.2d at 46. The Seventh Circuit has also required the Board to justify its imposition of an affirmative bargaining order, regardless of the type of case in which it is ordered. See Ron Tirapelli Ford, Inc. v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 433, 441 (7th Cir.1993) ([T]he Board must follow the dictates of Gissel and its progeny and consider whether less drastic measures would serve the balance of interests. At all times, the Board is charged with accomplishing and articulating this balance of interests against the backdrop of its obligation to craft a remedy for employer misconduct that is remedial rather than punitive.) (emphasis added). [19] Accordingly, we now follow the D.C. Circuit and other circuits, and hold that in all cases, whether a Gissel -type bargaining case or an unlawful withdrawal of recognition case, the Board must justify its imposition of an affirmative bargaining order by employing a reasoned analysis to justify its chosen remedy. In this case, we are satisfied that the Board adequately analyzed the three prongs of the D.C. Circuit's test. [20] Central to the Board's findings that supported the issuance of a bargaining order were the ongoing and pervasive nature of the violations, which occurred during the first year of certification, a time in which unions are usually at their greatest strength. (Board at 6.) The Board specifically rejected a cease and desist order, which the D.C. Circuit has noted should usually be the appropriate remedy when a certified union is in place. See Caterair Int'l, 22 F.3d at 1123 (noting, in an incumbent union case, that a cease and desist order is a prime example of an alternative remedy to those affirmative bargaining orders outlined in Gissel ). Here, the Board found that the employees need the protection of a temporary (no more than one year) decertification bar in order to regroup and bargain through their representative in an effort to reach a collective-bargaining agreement. (Board at 6.) The effect of rampant violations in the first year of union representation underscores the fact that the Union never had an opportunity to bargain with and adequately represent its members: [Goya] substantially undermined the Union's opportunity to effectively bargain, without unlawful interference, during the period when unions are usually at their greatest strength. Because the Union was not given a truly fair opportunity to reach an accord with [Goya], it is only by restoring the status quo ante and requiring [Goya] to bargain with the Union for a reasonable period of time that employees will be able to assess for themselves the Union's effectiveness as a bargaining representative. ( Id. ) We observe that this reasoning is entirely consistent with the purpose of the affirmative bargaining order recognized by the Supreme Court in Gissel Packing Co., see 395 U.S. at 612, 89 S.Ct. at 1939, wherein the Court observed that a bargaining order serves as much as a remedy to right past wrongs as it does serve as a deterrent for future misconduct. One aim of a Board remedy should be to return to the status quo ante the unfair labor practices. [21] See NLRB v. Williams Enters., Inc., 50 F.3d 1280, 1289 (4th Cir.1995) (finding, in the successive employer incumbent union context, that only an affirmative bargaining order can restore the status quo ante  that is, reseat the union as the incumbent and restore to it the bargaining opportunity it would have had but for the successor's unlawful refusal to bargain); see also Ron Tirapelli Ford, Inc., 987 F.2d at 445 (finding in an incumbent union context that a bargaining order is the appropriate remedy to return the parties to the status quo ante). In contrast, a non-incumbent union never enjoyed a presumption of majority status; therefore, an affirmative order to bargain with a nonincumbent union grants it a better position than the status quo  initial recognition as the bargaining agent which it would not have had even before the company's unlawful conduct. Williams Enters., Inc., 50 F.3d at 1289. At oral argument, counsel for Goya acknowledged that the Board was correct to credit in its analysis the fact that the extensive violations that occurred here took place during the Union's first year of certification. Cf. Arlook v. S. Lichtenberg & Co., Inc., 952 F.2d 367, 373 (11th Cir. 1992) (recognizing how vulnerable newly certified unions are to management resistance). The Union was deprived of the opportunity to enjoy the irrebuttable presumption of majority status that ordinarily accompanies unions in the first year of certification, and the attendant bargaining strength that comes with it. The unfair labor practices found by the Board began well before the first year of certification. But just because union support was strong enough to overcome Goya's anti-union efforts in order to secure certification, it would be unfair to penalize the Union by returning to the precertification status. Instead, it seems eminently reasonable and consistent with the remedial purpose of the affirmative bargaining order to restore the Union to the position it would have been in were it not for the unfair practices and the misconduct during its first year of certification that deprived the Union both of its year of presumptive support and  given the evident strength of the Union at the time of certification  a meaningful opportunity to bargain for an initial agreement with Goya. The Board satisfied its burden here: it evaluated each of the required factors in light of the record before it at the time it issued its order. Thus we conclude that the Board adequately justified its imposition of an affirmative bargaining order, which appears from the Board's reasoning to be the appropriate remedy in this case. However, Goya argues that the Board's order, and in particular the affirmative bargaining order, should not be enforced because of the extensive passage of time and changed circumstances (especially employee turnover). We address this argument in the next section.
Goya argues that the case law requires the Board to justify any affirmative bargaining order by taking into consideration the present circumstances [22] existing at the time that the Board issues its order, as opposed to the past circumstances extant at the time of the unfair labor practices. It is true that the circuit courts of appeals are almost unanimous in concluding that such changed circumstances are relevant with respect to the justification for affirmative bargaining orders in pre-certification- Gissel cases. [23] Our own precedent suggests as much. In Piggly Wiggly, Tuscaloosa Division Commodores Point Terminal Corporation v. NLRB, 705 F.2d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 1983), we recognized that [i]n some cases, these factors [passage of time and employee turnover] play a role in determining the contemporary necessity of issuing a bargaining order, particularly if the employees have reason to no longer fear company reprisals and harassment if they vote for the union. [24] Several cases have extended the same rationale, and required consideration of changed circumstances, in the context of withdrawal of recognition from an incumbent union, a context analogous to the instant case. See Peoples Gas, 629 F.2d at 45-46; see also id. at 45, note 18 (We think it clear that no responsible decision making body can formulate a reasonable remedy without taking into account conditions at the time its order is entered, though there seems to be some dispute among the circuits whether the Board must do so.); see also Ron Tirapelli Ford, Inc. v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 433, 440 (7th Cir.1993). [25] Because of the peculiar posture and particular facts of the instant case, we can assume arguendo, but not actually decide, that the passage of time and changed circumstances are relevant when evaluating the justifications for imposing an affirmative bargaining order, whether the context be a pre-certification- Gissel -type case or a case like the instant withdrawal of recognition from an incumbent union. The peculiar posture of the instant case is as follows. Notwithstanding the extensive delay between the ALJ decision on February 22, 2001, and the Board's decision on August 30, 2006, Goya filed nothing with the Board to indicate that significant changes had occurred during this passage of time. Thus, at the time of the Board's decision challenged by Goya, the record before the Board revealed no changed circumstances. Promptly after receiving the Board's decision, Goya filed a motion for reconsideration and to reopen the record for consideration of certain listed changed circumstances, including employee turnover. In the most peculiar aspect of the posture of this case, Goya's brief on appeal fails to fairly raise a challenge to the Board's denial of its motion for reconsideration. Neither the motion nor the Board's denial thereof are mentioned in Part A of Goya's brief, entitled Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Tribunal. The Statement of Issues does not mention the motion or the order denying same. No heading in the argument section of its brief mentions the motion or the order denying same. Nor does the summary of the argument. In the part of the brief in which the motion and order denying same would appropriately have been challenged  i.e., Point IV entitled Circumstances have Changed so Radically During the More than Six Years Since the Administrative Trial that the Decision Should Not be Enforced, or Should at Most be Remanded  the motion and the order denying same is mentioned only in a single sentence. That sentence reads: Such a motion was made in this case and denied by the Board, but not on timeliness grounds. That single sentence did not undertake to challenge the Board's rationale in denying the motion. In order to establish that the Board erred in denying a motion for reconsideration, Goya would have had to argue, inter alia, that its motion was justified by extraordinary circumstances, and that its motion to reopen the record was based upon additional evidence, with an explanation of why it was not presented previously. [26] No such arguments were made in Goya's brief on appeal. Of course, it is true that we could construe Goya's brief with liberality. We would have discretion to construe its argument about changed circumstances as raising the challenge it never mentions  i.e., that the Board abused its discretion in concluding that the motion failed to present extraordinary circumstances warranting reconsideration and reopening of the record. The issue before us is whether we should invoke our well established law that issues not fairly presented to us are deemed abandoned, or whether we should exercise our discretion in the interests of justice to overlook Goya's deficiency. For the reasons that follow, we decline to exercise our discretion to excuse Goya's deficiencies. First, to do otherwise would require that we write an opinion without adequate briefing. Neither brief focuses on the rationale of the Board's order denying the motion. Neither brief focuses on the concept of extraordinary circumstances. Neither brief focuses upon the significance of Goya's failure to present to the Board evidence of changed circumstances during the five-year period that the matter was pending before the Board's decision on August 30, 2006. Second, even if we excuse Goya, and even if we conclude that the Board abused its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider and reopen the record, the most favorable possible result for Goya would be a remand to the Board. There are at least two issues which we would want to be addressed in the first instance by the Board. The first such issue is whether Goya's motion satisfies the high threshold of extraordinary circumstances required by the regulation. [27] The second issue on which we would want the benefit of the considered judgment of the Board involves whether or not Goya should be excused for having waited in silence for the five years between the issuance of the ALJ decision and the Board decision. Goya's motion acknowledged that [t]he changes described have accumulated in an incremental fashion over the entire intervening period of time. The Board might have a legitimate question as to why Goya should not have been responsible for evaluating the changes as they occurred, and moving the Board to reopen the record at such time as Goya, in its judgment, deemed the changes of such significance to influence the Board's decision. In this regard, the Board's interpretation of its own regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 102.48(b), [28] would be instructive. The Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. U.S.A. Polymer Corp., 272 F.3d 289, 295 (5th Cir.2001), construed this regulation to give the Board discretion to entertain a motion to reopen the record prior to the Board's decision. However, the D.C. Circuit has suggested otherwise. See Cogburn Health Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 F.3d 1266, 1272 (D.C.Cir.2006). The Board's interpretation of its own regulation would of course be accorded appropriate deference. See Federal Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1147, 1155, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2008) (Just as we defer to an agency's reasonable interpretations of the statute when it issues regulations in the first instance, ... the agency is entitled to further deference when it adopts a reasonable interpretation of regulations it has put in force.); Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc., 522 U.S. at 377, 118 S.Ct. at 828 (Substantive review of an agency's interpretation of its regulations is governed only by that general provision of the Administrative Procedure Act which requires courts to set aside agency action that is `arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,'.... It falls well within this text to give the agency the benefit of the doubt as to the meaning of its regulation.); see also Piggly Wiggly, 705 F.2d at 1539 (It is for the Board to regulate its own procedures and interpret its own rules, so long as it does not act unfairly or in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.). Thus, even if we excused Goya's deficiency in failing to challenge the Board's denial of its motion for reconsideration and reopening of the record, it would merely result in a further prolongation of this case which is already embarrassingly old. A final, and significant, reason that we decline to overlook Goya's failure to challenge the denial of its motion is as follows. The instant case involves what we consider to be egregious and pervasive unfair labor practices on the part of Goya. These unfair labor practices included, inter alia : Goya fired three employees and suspended one out of anti-union animus; Goya conducted numerous coercive interrogations of employees; Goya management made numerous coercive threats, for example to deny union members pension benefits, to close the facility, etc. Most significantly, Goya management repeatedly told numerous employees that it would never recognize or bargain with the union. Then, even after certification of the union, Goya refused to recognize union representatives, instituted numerous unilateral changes (without giving the union an opportunity to bargain thereon), and management repeatedly threatened job loss if union protests like the one at the Winn-Dixie store continued. Goya repeatedly made changes to its policies  policies that were the `bread and butter' issues that lead employees to seek union representation  without consulting the Union. (Board at 5.) The ALJ observed that the Union was ignored and [Goya] continued to operate its business as if the employees were not represented by the Union. (ALJ at 21.) In other words, Goya followed through on its threat that it would never recognize the union. As the ALJ found, the net effect was to reverse the outcome of the election by ignoring the union. (ALJ at 20-21.) The Board, adopting the ALJ's opinion, found the labor violations at issue in the instant case highly coercive. (Board at 4.) According to the Board, Goya engaged in a widespread and unrelenting pattern of unlawful conduct [that] continued from the beginning until the end of the certification year. (Board at 4.) In sum, the egregious nature of the unfair labor practices and the clear record of strong anti-union animus revealed by this record strongly militates against using our discretion to overlook Goya's waiver. Moreover, there is nothing in the instant record, or in Goya's motion for reconsideration, to indicate that the employees might prefer non-union status or representation by another union. To the contrary, the union won the election by considerable margins, and there is overwhelming evidence to support the ALJ's finding that the disaffection petition was caused by Goya's unfair labor practices. Additionally, the ALJ noted that a petition of support was signed by a majority of the warehouse employees one month after the disaffection. (ALJ at 23.) Having decided that the interests of justice do not support the exercise of our discretion to overlook Goya's waiver, the instant case is left in the following, very peculiar posture. In this posture, Goya's argument is in effect reduced to an argument that we should decline to enforce the Board's order merely because of the passage of time. In other words, on August 30, 2006, when the Board issued its order, there was no evidence before the Board with respect to changed circumstances. Thus, Goya's argument reduces to a proposition that the Board, after some unspecified period of delay, should be required to sua sponte reopen the record for the receipt of evidence of changed circumstances. Goya cites no case which has imposed such a sua sponte duty, nor has our research revealed any such case. Indeed, in a context somewhat similar to the peculiar context of the instant case, the Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. U.S.A. Polymer Corp ., has rejected the notion of any such sua sponte duty. The Fifth Circuit held: It is not the Board's responsibility to continually update the factual picture that the parties have provided. While the Board must consider properly presented or tendered evidence of materially changed relevant circumstances in bargaining order cases, we can see no reason why the Board itself should be required to gather evidence. The party that seeks to benefit from demonstrating a change of circumstances bears the burden of timely providing the Board with evidence of these changes. The Board is entitled to assume, in the face of the parties' silence, that the facts as initially presented continue to adequately describe the employer's work force. U.S.A. Polymer Corp., 272 F.3d at 296. We agree with the Fifth Circuit. It is self-evidently feasible to place the responsibility of providing the Board with evidence of changed circumstances upon the party privy to such changes. This party not only is the party seeking to benefit from the changes, but also is the only entity in a position to evaluate the changes as they occur and move the Board to reopen the record at such time as the party in its judgment deems the changes of such significance as to influence the Board's decision. While the Fifth Circuit's placement of this responsibility is self-evidently feasible, imposition of a sua sponte duty on the Board to gather evidence or reopen the record at some unspecified time is of doubtful feasibility. [29] Certainly Goya has not suggested how such a sua sponte duty might feasibly dovetail with agency decision making. In any event, in light of the egregious nature of the unfair labor practices and anti-union animus revealed by this record, and the lack of any evidence that the anti-union animus might have abated or that the pro-union sentiments of the employees might have changed, [30] we decline to impose upon the Board a sua sponte duty in this particular case.