Opinion ID: 2630548
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Will Proponent's Rebuttal of the Presumption

Text: ¶ 32 The party against whom a presumption of undue influence operates has the burden of introducing evidence which would support a finding of the nonexistence of undue influence. In In re Estate of Maheras, we cited two factors as admissible evidence to meet this burden: (1) the termination of the confidential relationship prior to the will's execution and (2) the receipt by the will maker of independent and competent advice regarding the disposition of the estate. [27] Some may have interpreted Maheras as restricting the evidence admissible to rebut the presumption to these two factors alone. Recognizing that Maheras lends itself to this interpretation, we take today the opportunity to clarify that while proof of the two factors cited in Maheras will generally suffice to rebut the presumption, their absence is not fatal to the presumption's rebuttal so long as other probative evidence is adduced. This accords with the unfettered evidentiary norm set out in our earlier common law that the presumption of undue influence is one that may be overcome by evidence such as will lead the court to conclude that no undue influence was exerted. [28] ¶ 33 The will proponent argues that she introduced evidence which would support a finding of the nonexistence of undue influence. The will proponent does not bear the burden of persuasion, but must simply introduce some evidence from which the trier could find that undue influence did not engender the will's dispositive provisions. While we agree with contestants that record proof of the two Maheras factors  termination of the confidential relationship and receipt of independent advice  is lacking, we hold that the will proponent introduced other evidence sufficient to support a finding of the nonexistence of undue influence. ¶ 34 We address the Maheras factors first. With respect to the first factor, the record contains no evidence  and the will proponent does not contend  that the confidential relationship between Elaine and her mother was severed prior to the initiation and execution of the will in contest. ¶ 35 The second factor recognized in Maheras as sufficient to rebut the presumption is that the will maker received independent advice, i.e. advice separate and apart from the party with whom the will maker stands in a confidential relationship. Advice is an opinion or recommendation offered as a guide to action. [29] For advice to be considered independent, the advisor must (1) provide the will maker with a full and private consultation regarding the disposition of his estate, (2) be competent to inform the will maker about the legal effect of his dispositive intentions, and (3) be sufficiently dissociated from the interest of the party with whom the will maker stands in a confidential relationship that the advisor can provide impartial and confidential advice. [30] ¶ 36 The record before us indicates that although Mrs. Holcomb's attorney met privately with her from time to time, he spent a great deal more time with Elaine consulting about Mrs. Holcomb's legal affairs than he did with Mrs. Holcomb. These consultations included lengthy discussions of family history from Elaine's perspective and resulted on a few occasions in documents being drafted for Mrs. Holcomb's execution without first consulting her. A critical component of independent advice is the advisor's knowledge of the will maker's circumstances ascertained through consultation with the client. The inference in this case is practically unavoidable that any advice Mr. Gaston gave Mrs. Holcomb regarding the disposition of her estate was formulated in the context of information received from Elaine rather than from Mrs. Holcomb. Additionally, Mr. Gaston's testimony did not establish that he offered her any advice or counsel about the legal consequences or familial ramifications of leaving her entire estate to Elaine. In light of the attorney's knowledge of Mrs. Holcomb's physical infirmities, her dependence on Elaine, and Elaine's active involvement in her mother's legal affairs in general, the record proof of the attorney's interaction with Mrs. Holcomb can hardly be said to show that independent advice was given. [31] ¶ 37 Despite the absence of proof of the Maheras factors, we agree with the will proponent's contention that other evidence in the record was sufficient to support a finding of the nonexistence of undue influence. Elaine was not only a natural object of her mother's bounty, but had by nature a greater claim to her mother's affection and gratitude in light of the daily care she provided to her for five years. [32] Influence arising out of acts of kindness, does not constitute undue influence. [33] There was testimony that Mrs. Holcomb, despite her physical impairments, continued to have at the time of the critical events in controversy a strong will and independent nature, which prevented anyone, including Elaine, from controlling her actions. Inferences to the contrary from Elaine's physical control of Mrs. Holcomb's financial and legal affairs were controverted by testimony that all financial and legal transactions initiated or carried out by Elaine were done so only at Mrs. Holcomb's express direction and under her complete control. ¶ 38 Furthermore, the inference from Elaine's active involvement in her mother's legal affairs that she unduly influenced the will at issue is directly contradicted by Mr. Gaston's testimony that Elaine had absolutely nothing to do with fashioning the contents of her mother's will. While admitting that he had performed some legal services for Mrs. Holcomb at Elaine's direction, Mr. Gaston was adamant that no such thing had taken place in the drafting of this will. He testified that it was Mrs. Holcomb alone who provided the dispositive terms of the will to him and that this was done outside of Elaine's presence. He further testified that Mrs. Holcomb cogently told him her reasons for the disposition she was making. [34] He also pointed out that after the will was executed, Elaine made a comment to him that indicated she did not know the nature of the changes her mother had made to her will. ¶ 39 Other evidence rebutting the presumption of undue influence came from Elaine's two daughters, who testified that on several occasions they had heard their grandmother say she wanted to leave everything to their mother and that their mother tried to dissuade their grandmother from doing so. ¶ 40 Finally, the testimony of the neighbor who frequently visited Mrs. Holcomb and served as the proxy signer to her 1995 will also supported a finding of the nonexistence of undue influence. She testified that she visited with Mrs. Holcomb for thirty minutes after the will's execution, at which time Mrs. Holcomb told her that she had left everything to Elaine because she wanted to be sure Elaine was financially secure. This expression of concern for Elaine's financial security was not inconsistent with actions Mrs. Holcomb had taken in the years prior to her illness to assist Elaine. ¶ 41 We hold that the outlined record proof is sufficiently probative of the absence of undue influence to make the presumption inoperative. C. The District Court's Finding That Mrs. Holcomb's Will Was Not Tainted by Undue Influence Is Not Clearly Contrary to the Weight of the Evidence. ¶ 42 The will proponent's successful rebuttal of the presumption restores the case to the procedural posture it would have had if the presumption had never been operative. [35] This means that contestants must prove the existence of undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence without the aide of the presumption. [36] Undue influence may be proved directly or circumstantially, but is ordinarily capable of proof only circumstantially. [37] In White v. Palmer, [38] we set out the general principles to be applied to evidence that undue influence was brought to bear. In that case we said, It is not necessary that there be direct testimony that threats were made or even persistent entreaty or persuasion was brought to bear upon the mind of the testator. It is sufficient that, if from the surrounding circumstances connected with the making of the will it appears that any undue influence has been exercised, the court should not admit the will to probate. In determining the question of undue influence, the court should take into consideration the association of the parties, the opportunity for undue influence afforded the person who is especially favored by the terms of the will, and the effect of the will upon those persons whom we would naturally expect to be the recipients of his bounty. [39] ¶ 43 Contestants introduced no direct proof that Elaine exercised undue influence over the terms of her mother's will. What they did introduce was a considerable body of circumstantial evidence that (a) Elaine was a dominant and manipulative figure in the dynamics of the Holcomb family, that (b) Mrs. Holcomb's frailty and dependence on Elaine made her vulnerable to Elaine's dominance and control, that (c) Elaine in fact exercised that dominance and control as demonstrated by her dubious handling of Mrs. Holcomb's money, her suspicious acquisition for herself and her daughter of $80,000 her mother inherited at a time when her mother was worried about her own financial situation, and by her active involvement in her mother's legal affairs. From this evidence the district court could have concluded that Elaine controlled the terms of her mother's testamentary instrument as well-but it did not. ¶ 44 Instead, the district court found that the will in contest was the product of Mrs. Holcomb's free and voluntary act. The evidence introduced by the will proponent in rebuttal of the presumption stands also as the proof of the nonexistence of undue influence in this post-presumption stage of the proceeding. That evidence included testimony that Mrs. Holcomb, although physically unable to carry out tasks on her own, directed Elaine in everything she did on her behalf so that, far from being dominated and controlled by Elaine, Mrs. Holcomb was the dominant force in the relationship. The will proponent also introduced evidence from several sources that her testamentary intent was to leave her entire estate to Elaine in gratitude for Elaine's caretaking and because she feared more for Elaine's financial security than for that of her other kin. The evidence showed that this concern for Elaine's financial situation did not suddenly arise after Mrs. Holcomb came to live with Elaine, but had already manifested itself for many years. On this record, we cannot say that the district court's finding that the will was not the product of undue influence is clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence.