Opinion ID: 4398244
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: King’s Testimony

Text: Allied Erecting first argues that the district court abused its discretion by permitting King to testify about her understanding of the agreement and the quitclaim deed. As noted above, the district court allowed Norfolk Southern employees King and Sylvester to testify about their understanding of these documents insofar as their understanding was relevant to explain their actions in the history of the dispute. Allied Erecting now argues that because Norfolk Southern 14 No. 18-3247, Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc. was not involved in negotiating the terms of the Canfield Branch conveyance, even King’s testimony about her communications with Ramun should have been excluded. To support its theory, Allied Erecting argues that Ohio contract law permits extrinsic evidence to be admitted only if it is relevant to the intent and understanding of the parties to the contract at the time of formation.2 It is true that King’s testimony was irrelevant to the jury’s task of determining the meaning of the agreement and the quitclaim deed, as she was neither a party to nor a negotiator on behalf of a party to those documents. See Graham v. Drydock Coal Co., 667 N.E.2d 949, 952 (Ohio 1996) (stating that “[e]xtrinsic evidence is admissible” in contract cases “to ascertain the intent of the parties when the contract is unclear or ambiguous”). However, we need not decide whether the district court should have excluded King’s testimony, because even if we assume that some of it should have been excluded, any error was harmless. The testimony that Allied Erecting now claims was erroneously admitted was, in pertinent part, as follows: Q. Did you look at [the agreement and the quitclaim deed] to determine any property issues with regard to the Canfield Branch? A. Yes, I did. Q. And based on your experience and training, what did you determine following your investigation? A. I determined that the deed was to convey the Canfield Branch to Allied Erecting. .... 2 At one point, Allied Erecting asserts that King’s testimony “violated the parol evidence rule.” Appellant Br. at 21. However, the parol evidence rule is a substantive rule of contract law that governs when the contracting parties’ oral promises may be considered together with a writing as part of a contract. See Charles A. Burton, Inc. v. Durkee, 109 N.E.2d 265, 270–71 (Ohio 1952). Allied Erecting is challenging the admission of what it sees as irrelevant opinions about the contract’s meaning rather than arguing that the district court improperly considered evidence of the parties’ extratextual commitments. Therefore, we will address the relevancy issue and harmless error rather than the parol evidence rule. 15 No. 18-3247, Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc. A. The agreement was that within a ten-year period, Allied Erecting was to build a roadway for the railroad for its own exclusive use—and—well, basically that’s all. Q. Was that to connect Poland Avenue with Haselton Yard? A. Yes. R. 167, PageID 3497. This testimony was little more than a brief recitation of some of the plain language of the quitclaim deed and the agreement.3 Later, counsel for Norfolk Southern asked King to read aloud the letter she had written to Ramun in 2012 explaining her understanding of the quitclaim deed’s and the agreement’s respective terms. The letter was also published to the jury. In pertinent part, it said: Thank you for returning my calls so promptly this afternoon. As discussed today, I was asked to review ownership of the driveway utilized by Norfolk Southern railway employees to access our Haselton Yard facility off of Poland Avenue. The reason for the question was due to the poor condition of the driveway. Our research uncovered a deed which conveyed a portion of the railroad property known as the Penn Central E&A branch, aka, the Canfield Branch, from Consolidated Rail Corporation to Allied Erecting and Dismantling Company, dated October 12, 1994. In connection with that deed, there was an instrument dated October 10, 1994, whereby Allied Erecting and Dismantling Company, Inc., grantor, grants to Consolidated Rail Corporation, grantee, a permanent easement for a new roadway which location, bounds and design of the new roadway were to be subject to the prior approval of grantee. The conveyance of said easement was to be completed within ten years of the date of the agreement which would have been October of 2004. The grantor was to conduct [sic] the new roadway at grantor’s sole cost and expense. Id. at PageID 3501–02. Although Allied Erecting views this letter as encapsulating improper opinions about the contract’s meaning, the letter simply gave a very close paraphrase of some of 3 To the extent that King’s statement that Allied Erecting had agreed to build a new roadway within ten years could be seen as more than a mere paraphrase of the agreement, that statement was harmless to Allied Erecting. Although the agreement stated that Allied Erecting would provide an easement for a new roadway within ten years, and not necessarily build the new roadway itself within that time, the dispute at trial was over whether Allied Erecting had any obligations at all under the agreement, not over the timing of any roadway construction vis-à-vis the conveyance of an easement for a new roadway. 16 No. 18-3247, Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc. the terms of the quitclaim deed and the agreement. Allowing King to read her letter to the jury was not prejudicial to Allied Erecting.