Opinion ID: 3010594
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Kole's Prosecution in the Philippines Was

Text: Consistent With The Concept of Fundamental Fairness Contained In The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause In 1994, the Philippine Supreme Court issued an opinion which summarizes the rights of the accused under the Philippine legal system. In People of the Philippines v. Lopez, 1994 Philippine S.Ct. Lexis 5145 (1994), four men charged with armed robbery and murder were tried before a judge. During the trial, the prosecution introduced an eyewitness who identified each of the accused, and confessions that had been signed by each of them. The four defendants offered alibi witnesses in their defense, and the trial court acquitted three of the four. The convicted defendant appealed. The Philippine Supreme Court reversed that conviction and ordered that an order of acquittal be entered in his behalf. The Court's analysis illustrates the 15 extent to which a criminal defendant in the Philippines is afforded protection similar to those afforded under our own legal system. We refer to it at length as it is of substantial assistance to our inquiry into whether Kole's conviction in the Phillipines was consistent with concepts of fundamental fairness that are implicated by 21 U.S.C. S 851. The Court in Lopez noted that the trial court had disregarded the alibi testimony of all four defendants, but nevertheless properly acquitted three of the four because they were merely present. The Court stated: from the inception of the crime to its final termination, they were merely bystanders and did not participate in one way or another in the commission thereof . . . . The mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy. Lopez, 1994 Philippine S. Ct. Lexis at . The Court also examined the signed confessions that the prosecution introduced and concluded that those confessions should not have been used against any of the accused as they appeared to have been coerced, and obtained without benefit of counsel. The Court rejected the prosecution's claim that any such infirmity was cured because the confessions had been witnessed and counter-signed by a municipal attorney. The Court reasoned: From the records, it can be gleaned that when accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated . . . they had no counsel present . . . And counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was . . . the Municipal Attorney of [the village]. On top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used against the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the Constitution [of the Philippines] which mandates in Sec. 12, Art. III, that: (1) Any person under investigation . . . shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights 16 cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. . . . (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation . . . hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Id. at -. The Court then elaborated upon the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, and the duty of arresting officers under the Philippine Constitution. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional right to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means . . . . It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel . . . . The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel . . . . [T]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, . . . . Hence, if there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation . . . any statement elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. . . . Id., at -2. The Court ruled that the prosecution had not met its burden of proving that the statements of the accused were properly obtained and therefore the statements should not have been admitted into evidence. The Court rejected the prosecution's argument that the propriety of the statements was corroborated by the signature of the village attorney who had apparently been present when the statements were taken. 17 The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. Obviously he cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. . . . Attorney Zerna assisted [the defendants] when they executed their respective extrajudicial confessions . . . . As legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor . . . . He is no better than a . . . prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations. Id. at . The Court also noted that the circumstances under which the statements had been taken suggested that the statements had been coerced. For, why did the investigators not inform the accused of their right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel . . . even before attempting to elicit statements that would incriminate them? Why did the investigators not advise the accused that if they could not afford the services of counsel they could be provided with counsel free of charge? . . . How did accused Sedigo get his `black eye' . . .? How and why did accused-appellant . . . suffer a fractured rib? We cannot close our eyes to these unanswered questions. This Court is greatly disturbed with the way the accused were treated or mistreated. In fine, we cannot accept the extrajudicial confessions of the accused and use the same against them or any of them. Where there is doubt as to their voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto. Id. at . Accordingly, the Court declared that the trial court improperly used the confessions against the appellant. The Court then examined the remaining evidence and concluded that it was not sufficient to convict the appellant. Even though the prosecution had produced the testimony of an eyewitness who identified the appellant, the Philippine Supreme Court ruled that the record did not establish sufficient opportunity to observe, nor sufficient indicia of reliability to convict based solely upon that identification. The Court ruled the prosecution is left with nothing but the alleged positive identification of appellant 18 . . . by witness Salva. But this by itself does not measure up to the required standard of moral certainty. Id. at 26.6 The Court ordered that a judgment of acquittal be entered. In doing so, the court left no doubt about the importance of fundamental liberty under the Philippine legal system. The Court stated: [I]t is unfortunate that the investigators who are sworn to do justice to all appear to have toyed with the fundamental rights of the accused. Men in uniform who are sworn to do justice to all appear to have toyed with the fundamental rights of the accused. Men in uniform do not have blanket authority to arrest anybody they take fancy on, rough him up and put words into his mouth. There is a living Constitution which safeguards the rights of an accused, a penal law which punishes maltreatment of prisoners and a statute which penalizes failure to inform and accord the accused his constitutional rights. Id. at 27-8. Clearly, the legal system of the Philippines seeks to guard the individual against official tyranny and protect individual liberty. Congress could not have intended S 851 to be used to exclude criminal convictions obtained under such a system merely because that sovereign provides a method of protecting fundamental liberties that does not include the right to trial by jury. It would . . . be a form of cultural imperialism for the United States to insist that it would not countenance, for U.S. purposes, recognition of a foreign criminal judgment which came from a legal culture which did not employ the jury. United States v. Moskovits, 784 F. Supp. 193, 196 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (Pollak, J.). _________________________________________________________________ 6. Though the Court spoke of proof to a moral certainty it does not appear that the standard of proof needed to convict an accused in the Philippines differs from the reasonable doubt standard. The Court also stated [w]ith the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused- appellant . . . beyond reasonable doubt, acquittal should follow as a matter of course. Id. at 28 (emphasis added). 19 Here, Judge Felix's opinion reflects the judicial independence and respect for the rights of the accused that the Philippine Supreme Court speaks of in Lopez. Judge Felix noted that the police who searched Kole's apartment did not have a search warrant, but allowed the seized drugs into evidence because the owner of the condominium complex gave police written consent to search, and because police feared that the suspects were about to leave the jurisdiction. App. at 94. However, even after admitting the physical evidence, the trial judge was so skeptical of much of the testimony of the police and their informant, that he acquitted four of the defendants who were tried with Kole. App. at 106 ([t]he act imputed by the prosecution on the group . . . is very much not in accord with the natural course of things and human experiences, so that it evokes serious doubt on the truth of the offense charged.). However, despite his skepticism the trial judge did accept some of the prosecution's testimony stating that [the informant's] testimony was not completely discredited. App. at 107. In doing so, he applied the maxim so familiar to our own system of jurisprudence that a witness may be disbelieved in some facts but may be believed in other facts. . . . Id. He also noted that the mere presence of some of the accused did not establish their guilt. App. at 110. However, he concluded that the government had met its burden of proof as to the guilt of Kole, and Ike, because they were in full control and management of the room where the heroin was found, and because he did not accept their explanation of their flight when the police entered their apartment. App. at 107, 108. Judge Felix's opinion reflects the kind of careful, searching analysis of evidence that one would expect from a trial judge in the United States. The fact that Kole was denied a jury trial under the jurisdiction where she obtained her prior conviction for a felony drug offense in no way undermines her conviction there. The text of 21 U.S.C. S 960 reflects a congressional intent to significantly increase sentences for drug offenders with prior convictions for felony drug offenses. Repeat drug offenders are clearly more culpable than first time offenders, and the enhanced sentences required under 20 S 960 serve to incapacitate and punish those who have continued their involvement with drug trafficking despite prior prosecution. Given Congress' concern, it would not be logical to limit the enhancement to those persons who had been convicted of a prior drug felony (or its equivalent) only in the United States. This is particularly true in view of the conduct included under S 960. 21 U.S.C. S 960(a)(1) states any person who . . . knowingly or intentionally imports or exports a controlled substance . . . shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). (emphasis added). We do not think that Congress enacted a law that was intended to reach persons involved in international drug trafficking and then limited enhanced penalties to those persons who had previously been convicted in a court in the United States. That is inconsistent with Congress' attempt to reach those involved in importing or exporting controlled substances. Yet, since the United States Constitution does not apply to any foreign sovereign, that would be the result of adopting Ms. Kole's argument.