Opinion ID: 1464745
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brown's Affirmative Defense

Text: Because I would hold that Scott presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could have concluded that her protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in her termination, I would reach the question whether Brown established the affirmative defense outlined in Mt. Healthy. That defense required Brown to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the disciplinary action would have been taken against [Scott] even in the absence of the protected conduct. Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 855 (citing Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. 568); see also Ostad, 327 F.3d at 883 (holding a subordinate supervisor liable where the supervisor instigated an investigation, participated actively in that investigation, and failed to prove that the employee would have been terminated ... even in the absence of his protected speech). [4] Brown met that burden here. She introduced evidence that the journal initially was uncovered through an unrelated investigation, instigated by Fuller, of another employee; that Brown herself did not discover the journal; that employees in the human resources department were independently aware of the journal; and that the journal, by virtue of its length and inflammatory content, was likely to attract attention from HR employees and to warrant a report to senior management. Given that evidence, I would hold that a reasonable jury could only have concluded that Fuller would have learned of the journal, instigated the investigation of Scott and reached the same conclusion even without prompting from Brown, and therefore Scott's termination would have occurred even in the absence of the protected conduct. See Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 855. In sum, I would reverse the jury's verdict under part two, not part one, of the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting framework on the grounds that, based on the facts presented, Fuller's investigationand hence Scott's terminationwas inevitable. Such a holding acknowledges the deference we must afford to a reasonable decision by a jury, and avoids placing too great an evidentiary burden on a plaintiff seeking to vindicate her First Amendment rights. For all these reasons, I concur in the judgment, but not in the majority opinion.