Opinion ID: 2299170
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Required Use of the Term Heirs

Text: [¶ 11] Wentworth contends that the Superior Court erred when it applied the unyielding common law rule that the term heirs must be used in a clause conveying an easement to create an interest of perpetual duration. He relies on our decisions in Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69, 770 A.2d 592; O'Neill v. Williams, 527 A.2d 322 (Me.1987); and O'Donovan, 1999 ME 71, 728 A.2d 681, to support his argument that the court should have disregarded the technical failure of the easement clause and determined the parties' intent from the wording of the entire deed or from the surrounding facts. [¶ 12] The law recognizes two different types of easements or rights of use over the property of another: easements appurtenant and easements in gross. Stickney, 2001 ME 69, ¶ 31, 770 A.2d at 605. Grantors create easements appurtenant to benefit a dominant estate and such easements run with the land. Id. To be appurtenant, the easement must be attached or related to a dominant estate. Id. [¶ 13] In contrast, easements in gross are personal interests in land or the right to use another's land. Id. ¶ 32, 770 A.2d at 605. They are not appurtenant to any estate in land and do not belong to any person by virtue of his ownership of an estate in other land. Id. (quoting LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984, 987 n. 2 (Me.1979)). An easement in gross is generally not assignable and terminates upon the death of the grantee. Id. However, when evidence demonstrates that the parties clearly intended that an easement in gross be assignable, it is. Id. This policy is grounded in the general principle of property law favoring free alienability of property. Id. [¶ 14] When construing deeds created prior to the enactment of the Short Forms Deeds Act, we look to the laws in effect at the time the deed was drafted. [6] Id. ¶ 39, 770 A.2d at 607. In 1917, the common law strictly required the use of the technical word heirs in a deed to an individual to create an interest in land of perpetual duration. Id. ¶ 34, 770 A.2d at 605. Without the word heirs, courts could only construe the interest created as a life interest in the grantee, regardless of how clearly the deed otherwise expressed an intent to create an interest of perpetual duration. Id. [¶ 15] However, in O'Neill, we explained that we have long recognized that this technical requirement often frustrated the parties' intent; therefore, we have routinely construed a provision in a deed purporting to reserve an easement for the benefit of land retained by the grantor as the creation of an easement appurtenant to that land ... obviat[ing] the requirement of the technical word `heirs' to preserve an interest of perpetual duration. O'Neill, 527 A.2d at 324; see e.g., Hall v. Hall, 106 Me. 389, 392-93, 76 A. 705, 707 (1910). [¶ 16] More recently, in Stickney, we considered a reserved right-of-way [7] and determined that even though the easement clause omitted the term heirs, the easement was perpetual because the grantor's intent to make it perpetual could be presumed from the facts at play. Stickney, 2001 ME 69, ¶ 41, 770 A.2d at 607. We applied the longstanding rule that, in the context of a reservation of an easement for the benefit of land retained by the grantor, the failure to include the term heirs may be overlooked if the parties' intent is clearly discernible from the deed or the facts of the case. Id. ¶¶ 36-41, 770 A.2d at 606-07. [¶ 17] Here, unlike the granting clauses in O'Neill and Stickney, the easement clause does not reserve an easement for the benefit of the grantor's land, rather it burdens the grantor's land for the benefit of the grantee's land. In this context, we cannot assume that the grantor intended to indefinitely burden his land and convey anything other than a life estate in the easement. In a case decided only eight years prior to the drafting of the Small-Harding deed, we explicitly stated that the phrase assigns forever created only a life interest and that the term heirs was essential to create an estate in fee. Brown v. Dickey, 106 Me. 97, 103, 75 A. 382, 385 (1909). We must assume the parties understood the meaning of the technical terms employed. Thus, we decline to extend the rule applied in O'Neill and Stickney to this case. The absence of the required term heirs in an easement clause that does not reserve an easement for the benefit of the grantor's retained estate creates an easement that is not perpetual. The Superior Court did not err in distinguishing between easements affirmatively conveyed and those retained or excepted by the grantor. Harding's easement terminated when he died, and Wentworth holds no easement across Sebra's property. [¶ 18] Finally, as the Superior Court found, O'Donovan does not assist Wentworth. In O'Donovan, we were asked to decide whether an easement in gross created in a 1989 deed was assignable, not whether it was perpetual. [8] O'Donovan, 1999 ME 71, ¶¶ 1, 6, 728 A.2d at 682-83. We held that, although easements in gross are not generally assignable because they are personal rights, when the parties clearly express an intent in the language of the deed to make an easement in gross assignable, it is assignable. Id. ¶ 12, 728 A.2d at 685. Here, the easement was not in gross, and more importantly, the question is not whether it was assignable. Moreover, O'Donovan represented a change in the law and applied to the construction of a 1989 deed. It does not change the common law in effect in 1917 and does not control our determination of what type of interest the 1917 deed created.