Opinion ID: 1945963
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: The Jury's Consideration of Co-Defendant Vreeland's Age and Ineligibility for the Death Penalty

Text: In its cross appeal, the State argues that the trial court should not have informed the jury that co-defendant Vreeland was under the age of eighteen at the time of the murders and, therefore, not subject to the death penalty under statutory law. The State maintains that allowing the jury to consider that information was improper because it was irrelevant to defendant's character. Defendant contends that the precedent relied on by the State is inapposite, and that the court properly instructed the jury that the information was relevant to the statutory mitigating factor about defendant's age. (As previously noted, Vreeland was not subject to the death penalty because he was a juvenile at the time of the murders. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3g.) At the start of the penalty phase, the State objected to a mitigating factor proffered by defendant that provided, the codefendant, Jason [sic] Vreeland, who is equally culpable, is not exposed to the death penalty simply because he was 17 at the time of the commission of the offense, only 16 months younger than Thomas Koskovich. The trial court refused to allow that mitigating factor to be considered under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h), the catch-all mitigating factor, explaining that the State Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled ... that the treatment given to a codefendant is not admissible under catch all factor (h). That's the ruling of the State Supreme Court. ... [W]e have the Supreme Court rule which indicates that the treatment of a codefendant is not a mitigating factor. And although I, perhaps, would not have voted that way, ... I am, of course, required to follow the directives of the Supreme Court, the rulings of the Supreme Court. So I will not permit the age of Jason [sic] Vreeland to be offered as a mitigating factor. Although the court did not allow Vreeland's age to be introduced as a catch-all factor, the court stated that: I will permit, as part of discussing the significance of age as it relates to the defendant, Thomas Koskovich, I will allow the defense to point out that by statute people under 18 are not even possiblypotentially subject to the death penalty. They are absolutely shielded from the death penalty because they are less than 18 years of age.... And I think in the context of this case,... it is appropriate to point out, not as a mitigating factor standing independently, but as a way of giving meaning to Mr. Koskovich's age related mitigating factor, I think it is appropriate to point out that below 18 one does not even get exposed to the death penalty, and, indeed, we have an example of that in this case, ... which is that the codefendant is not being exposed to the death penalty. So I will allow it to come in as a way of urging that age should be an important mitigatingthat Mr. Koskovich's age should be an important mitigating factor for him. Accordingly, in instructing the jury about the statutory mitigating factor concerning age, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(c), the court informed the jury that age can be significant in some cases. It's up to the jury to see what it was. Here the defendant was 18 years of age. He had passed his 18[th] birthday and not yet reached his 19[th] birthday when the murder waswas committed. So he is relatively young at the time he committed the murder. And that might have something to do with respect to whether a jury would consider his age to be a mitigating factor or not. It was, perhaps, in the minds of some of us, a thought that let us say an 18 year old person mightmight not be expected tohe's certainly expected not to kill people. So it's notit's not justification. But heit might be understood that he would behave less good judgment and less control than, let us say, aa 40 year old person who'swho's matured more and has had more life experience. So this is something that you can consider. In considering whether age is a mitigating factor here, you can also take notice of the fact that although Mr. Koskovich is of an age where he is subject to the death penalty, if other things end up that way, in terms of his age, he barely qualifies. In our state people below the age of 18 cannot be put to death. They can be sentenced to life imprisonment, but they cannot be put to death forfor any murder. So you might consider that in deciding whatwhat weight you might want to give, if any, to this mitigating factor. And you can also note that, although it does not excuse, and is not necessarily controlling, the fact that the other defendant in this case, Mr. Vreeland, was short of 18 years of age. He was 17. And because of that he will not be subject to the death penalty. So you may consider that in deciding what weight you will give, if any, to this mitigating factor. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(c) provides that the jury may find as a mitigating factor [t]he age of the defendant at the time of the murder[.] N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h), the catch-all factor, allows juries to find as a mitigating factor [a]ny other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense. As the State correctly points out, this Court has prohibited juries from being permitted to consider a co-defendant's sentence as a mitigating factor under (5)(h). In State v. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 105, 549 A. 2d 792, the Court held that the sentencing court or jury may not consider the co-defendants' sentences as a mitigating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h). We reasoned that the legislature has limited the scope of section (5)(h) to any factor that is `relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense[,]' and the sentences received by [a] co-defendant ... plainly is not relevant to either [a defendant's] character or his record. Id. at 103, 549 A. 2d 792. In State v. Brown, supra, 138 N.J. at 554-57, 651 A. 2d 19, and State v. DiFrisco, supra, 137 N.J. at 502-06, 645 A. 2d 734, we repeated that juries are not permitted to consider a co-defendant's sentence as a catch-all mitigating factor. Consistent with that case law, the trial court correctly chose not to instruct the jury about Vreeland's sentence as an independent mitigating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h). We also agree that the trial court did not improperly inform the jury that, as a matter of statutory law, Vreeland was not subject to the death penalty. In commenting on the distinction between Vreeland and defendant, the trial court did not improperly inform the jury of Vreeland's sentence, nor was the court's instruction inconsistent with our reasoning in Gerald and its progeny. A significant amount of evidence concerning Vreeland and his role in this case was presented to the jury during the guilt and penalty phase of the trial. Rather than have jurors speculate on whether Vreeland was subject to the death penalty (which, in turn, could have distracted the jury from considering the evidence presented), the court simply informed the jury about New Jersey's capital sentencing law. By instructing the jury as it did, the court properly focused the jury's attention on the crucial issues before it and furnished for the jury a context in which to consider the statutory mitigating factor concerning defendant's age. We find no error in that part of the court's charge.