Opinion ID: 792622
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it.

Text: 21 To establish the elements of the statutory crime of burglary under § 9A.52.025(1), the state need not prove intent to commit a specific crime, but rather, can prove intent to commit any crime. State v. Cantu, 123 Wash.App. 404, 98 P.3d 106, 108 (2004). Once the state has shown that a person entered the premises unlawfully, the inference arises that the entry was made with intent to commit a crime, and the burden of proof then shifts to the defense to rebut the inference of criminal intent. Wash. Rev.Code § 9A.52.040; Cantu, 98 P.3d at 108-109 (concluding that, because the juvenile defendant offered no evidence to rebut the statutory inference of intent upon showing that defendant kicked in his mother's locked bedroom door without her permission, sufficient evidence supported his conviction for burglary). 22 Thus, under Washington law, a person can be guilty of the offense of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling with an intent to commit a crime. See Cantu, 98 P.3d at 108. We agree with the BIA that the act of entering is not itself base, vile or depraved, and that it is the particular crime that accompanies the act of entry that determines whether the offense is one involving moral turpitude. See Matter of M, 2 I. & N. Dec. at 723. Because, under Washington law, an intent to commit any crime satisfies the accompanying crime element of burglary, the offense encompasses conduct that falls outside the definition of a crime of moral turpitude. 23 For example, under Washington law, a person is guilty of the crime of malicious mischief if he or she knowingly and maliciously causes physical damage to the property of another in an amount exceeding $250. See Wash. Rev.Code § 9A.48.080 (setting forth the elements of the crime of malicious mischief). Malicious intent includes the wish to vex, annoy, or injure another person and may be inferred from an act wrongfully done without just cause or excuse, or an act or omission of duty betraying a wilful disregard of social duty. Wash. Rev.Code § 9A.04.110(12). As we noted in Rodriguez-Herrera v. INS, 52 F.3d 238 (9th Cir.1995), the [malicious mischief] statute's reach ... include[s] pranksters with poor judgment. Id. at 240. We concluded in Rodriguez-Herrera that malicious mischief, as defined by § 9A.48.080, does not necessarily involve an act of baseness or depravity contrary to accepted moral standards and therefore is not necessarily a crime involving moral turpitude. Id. 24 Like the example cited by the BIA in Matter of M, 2 I. & N. Dec. at 723, of a group of young boys who enter an abandoned barn intending to play cards, there are numerous other examples of acts that constitute burglary under the Washington statute but that cannot be deemed base, vile, or depraved. See, e.g., United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 1004 (9th Cir.1991) (concluding that crime of gambling did not necessarily involve moral turpitude). The offense of residential burglary set forth in § 9A.52.025(1) encompasses conduct that does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. We conclude that the offense therefore is not a crime involving moral turpitude under the categorical approach.