Opinion ID: 2534023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: what facts may a judge consider at sentencing?

Text: ¶ 8 It is clear that the trial court relied on extrajudicial information at the sentencing hearing. Constitutional and statutory procedures protect defendants from being sentenced on the basis of untested facts. See generally Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004); RCW 9.94A.530(2). Under the SRA, a trial judge may rely on facts that are admitted, proved, or acknowledged to determine any sentence, including whether to sentence a defendant to a DOSA. RCW 9.94A.530(2). Acknowledged facts include all those facts presented or considered during sentencing that are not objected to by the parties. See State v. Handley, 115 Wash.2d 275, 282-83, 796 P.2d 1266 (1990). ¶ 9 Under the SRA, where a defendant raises a timely and specific objection to sentencing facts, the court must either not consider the fact or hold an evidentiary hearing. RCW 9.94A.530(2) (requiring defendant to object); see also State v. Mail, 121 Wash.2d 707, 712, 854 P.2d 1042 (1993). Grayson did not object to the trial judge's statement concerning DOSA funding. If he had, then he might have been entitled to a hearing. [2] ¶ 10 We note that the SRA does not require our judges to make decisions in a factual vacuum. Our constitutional democracy is dependent upon an independent and informed judiciary. Our judiciary benefits from and relies upon judges who have studied and become learned in the law and whose personal experiences have taught them a practical understanding of the world we live in and how people live, work, and interact with the world around them. ¶ 11 We do not believe the legislature intended that judges leave their knowledge and understanding of the world behind and enter the courtroom with blank minds. Judges are not expected to leave their common sense behind. Nor do we believe the legislature expected judges to hold hearings on whether fire is hot or water is wet. We prize judges for their knowledge, most of which is obtained outside of the courtroom. Within the statutory and constitutional guidelines, judges may exercise their discretion to give a fair and just sentence. ¶ 12 These statutory guidelines do not require judges to hold hearings on the laws of the universe, but only on adjudicative facts. Adjudicative facts are usually those facts that are in issue in a particular case. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.Supp. 1406, 1414 (N.D.Cal.1984). In a criminal case, adjudicative facts generally relate to the facts of the crime and the defendant, but could also include social science and other research that directly affects the litigants before the court and are properly placed in contest by the parties. ¶ 13 But [l]egislative facts are `established truths, facts or pronouncements that do not change from case to case but [are applied] universally, while adjudicative facts are those developed in a particular case.'. . . [H]istorical facts, commercial practices and social standards are frequently noticed in the form of legislative facts. Korematsu, 584 F.Supp. at 1414 (quoting United States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 220 (8th Cir.1976)); see also John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L.REV. 477, 482-84 (1986). A trial judge may properly take judicial notice of such facts. See also ER 201. ¶ 14 The purpose of RCW 9.94A.530(2) is to prevent ex parte contact with the judge, sua sponte investigation and research of a judge, and sentencing based on speculative facts. Underlying this statutory procedure is the principle of due process. The court should only consider adjudicative evidence that the parties in an adversarial context have the opportunity to scrutinize, test, contradict, discredit, and correct. George D. Marlow, From Black Robes to White Lab Coats: The Ethical Implications of a Judge's Sua Sponte, Ex Parte Acquisition of Social and Other Scientific Evidence During the Decision-Making Process, 72 ST. JOHN'S L.REV. 291, 319 (1998) (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 57, 97 S.Ct. 2229, 53 L.Ed.2d 100 (1977)); see also DAVID BOERNER, SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON, A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1981 § 6.25 (1985) (discussing when a trial judge abuses discretion under the SRA by relying on improper information). ¶ 15 General information about a sentencing alternative such as how, why, and for whom the program is designed is properly classified as legislative. It is the kind of information that helps a judge decide questions of law and policy and exercise discretion. Generally, a trial court may rely on this kind of information without holding a sentencing hearing. However, a specific fact about a sentencing alternative program, the truth or falsity of which may determine whether a defendant will receive the alternative sentence, may be adjudicative. When a judge determines that a program such as DOSA is unavailable to a defendant because the program is underfunded, the fact may become adjudicative if the truth or falsity affects the party before the court. Under such circumstances, a litigant may be entitled to a hearing on the issue. ¶ 16 The SRA also provides for the proper treatment of disputed adjudicative facts: Where the defendant disputes material facts, the court must either not consider the fact or grant an evidentiary hearing on the point. RCW 9.94A.530(2). Here Grayson failed to request a hearing on the issue of whether or not there was adequate funding for DOSA. We recognize that Grayson did not have much time to formulate an objection. There may be a case where the failure to immediately object might not be fatal to a challenge to the sentence. This may be such a case because when the prosecutor suggested enriching the record with specific reasons that Grayson was not a suitable candidate for a DOSA, the judge vigorously interrupted mid-sentence with the statement, I'm not going to give a DOSA, so that's it. RP at 153. Under these circumstances, a party may be relieved of the duty to object. But since we resolve this case on other grounds, we need not decide whether this would be such a case. The best practice is to promptly object. See Mail, 121 Wash.2d at 712, 854 P.2d 1042.