Opinion ID: 821449
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officer Bateman

Text: In reviewing the grant of summary judgment to Officer Bateman, we decline to consider whether the district court erred in concluding no constitutional violation occurred and instead opt to address whether the rights at issue were clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; see also Brady v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 538 F.3d 1319, 1327 (10th Cir. 2008) (“This court . . . may affirm for any reason supported by the record, but not relied on by the district court.”). “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). “Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly -5- established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1185, 1196 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). Because, however, the existence of excessive force is a fact-specific inquiry, . . . there will almost never be a previously published opinion involving exactly the same circumstances. Thus, we have adopted a sliding scale: The more obviously egregious the conduct in light of prevailing constitutional principles, the less specificity is required from prior case law to clearly establish the violation. Id. (quotations omitted). Thus, to overcome Officer Bateman’s defense of qualified immunity, Becker must demonstrate it was clearly established as of May 14, 2005, that Officer Bateman’s use of force was excessive. Becker has not carried this burden. In Novitsky v. City of Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244, 1255–56 (10th Cir. 2007), this court considered whether an officer’s application of a “twist lock” maneuver to a potentially intoxicated individual found in the backseat of a vehicle constituted a violation of clearly established law. The court concluded a reasonable jury could have concluded the officer’s use of the twist lock was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1255. The court nonetheless concluded the officer was entitled to qualified immunity, however, because “the risks presented by potentially intoxicated individuals are inherently fact-dependent and the extent to which an officer may use force in such situations -6- has not been definitively answered by this circuit.” Id. at 1257. The court reached this conclusion notwithstanding authority in other circuits discussing at greater length “the extent to which law enforcement officers may use forceful techniques to protect themselves from the risks presented by potentially intoxicated individuals.” Id. at 1256–57. Novitsky thus indicates there was no clearly established law as of 2007 regarding the appropriate level of force which may be used to arrest a potentially intoxicated person during a stop. Accordingly, because the conduct in Becker’s complaint took place in 2005, Becker cannot carry his burden under the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. Becker’s attempts to either distinguish Novitsky or demonstrate the law was otherwise clearly established are unpersuasive. First, Becker argues the result in Novitsky can be explained not by a genuine lack of clearly established law in 2007 but by the plaintiff’s failure to adequately direct the court’s attention to applicable authority. Novitsky did note the plaintiff’s arguments were “poorly framed and hard to follow.” Id. at 1252. The court’s conclusion that this circuit had not definitively determined the extent to which an officer may use force in a confrontation with a potentially intoxicated person, however, was not framed as a response to the plaintiff’s poor briefing. Id. at 1257. Rather, it was framed as a legal conclusion which is binding precedent in this court. See id.; Rezaq v. Nalley, 677 F.3d 1001, 1012 n.5 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e are bound by prior panel decisions absent superseding en banc review or Supreme Court decisions.”). -7- Becker next cites to Corder v. Denver, No. 98-1453, 2000 WL 1234846 (10th Cir. Aug. 31, 2000) (unpublished). In Corder, the court affirmed the denial of a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity on an excessive force claim involving an intoxicated plaintiff. Id. at . The police arrested a large, belligerent, intoxicated man who had been thrown out of a bar. Id. at . They then attempted to take the arrestee to jail in a transport van, but pulled over when he began rocking the van violently from side to side. Id. The police removed him from the vehicle and held him down over an extremely hot manhole cover while they attempted to place leg shackles on him. Id. at –2. The man did not resist when he was first asked to exit the van, and voluntarily complied with the officers’ instructions to lay over the manhole cover. Id. at . While he was being held down, he began kicking, screaming, and yelling that he was “on fire.” Id. at . One of the officers eventually maced the man in the face. Id. The arrestee suffered severe second and third degree burns and sued the officers under § 1983. Id. The district court denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and this court affirmed. Id. at , . Corder is insufficient to satisfy Becker’s burden to show a violation of clearly established law. A single unpublished case does not necessarily indicate that the law was clearly established. 2 Morris, 672 F.3d at 1197 n.5. More importantly, 2 Similarly, Becker’s citation to Hays v. V.P. Ellis, 331 F. Supp.2d 1303 (D. Colo. 2004), is inadequate to demonstrate Officer Bateman’s conduct violated (continued...) -8- Corder is not factually analogous to the present case because it did not concern the propriety of the officers’ initial takedown but rather whether the conduct after the takedown constituted excessive force. The additional authority Becker cites is similarly unavailing. Neither Casey v. City of Federal Heights, 509 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2007) nor York v. City of Las Cruces, 523 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2008) involved a potentially intoxicated plaintiff. 3 Herrera v. Bernalillo County Board of County Commissioners, 361 F. App’x 924, 926 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished), Shannon v. Koehler, 616 F.3d 855, 857–58 (8th Cir. 2010), and Lustig v. Mondeau, 211 F. App’x 364, 365 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) were all decided after 2005, and the former two involved incidents which occurred after 2005. 4 Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2012), was decided long after the events giving rise to Becker’s claim. Further, although the plaintiff there was eventually cited with public intoxication, the officers were unaware of the intoxication until after the takedown. Id. at 1190. 2 (...continued) clearly established law. Not only is Hays an interlocutory district court decision, it is also unclear whether it involved a police encounter with an intoxicated plaintiff. See id. at 1307–08. 3 See Novitsky v. City of Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244, 1255 (“Because individuals who are intoxicated are often unpredictable, [officers are] confronted with an additional layer of uncertainty.”). 4 Although the plaintiff in Herrera was cited for minor in possession of alcohol, there are no indications he was potentially intoxicated. See Herrera v. Bernalillo Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 361 F. App’x 924, 926 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished). -9- The only case published before the incident here involving analogous facts is Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853–54 (9th Cir. 2002). In Santos, the Ninth Circuit concluded there existed a disputed issue of material fact whether the police used excessive force in taking an intoxicated plaintiff to the ground and thereby breaking his back. Id. This single published decision from another circuit, however, falls short of demonstrating “the clearly established weight of authority from other courts [has] found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Morris, 672 F.3d at 1196. Moreover, the summary judgment record does not establish Officer Bateman’s conduct was so obviously egregious as to diminish the specificity needed from prior case law to clearly establish the violation. See id. Because Becker has thus failed to carry his burden to show the law was clearly established at the time of the incident, the district court properly concluded Officer Bateman was entitled to qualified immunity for Becker’s excessive force claim.