Opinion ID: 601888
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ryles' Fourth Amendment claim

Text: 4 On appeal, it is disputed whether Trooper Washington opened the driver's side door or stuck his head inside an open window before he smelled the marijuana. 4 The district court failed to make a finding regarding whether Washington smelled the marijuana before he pierced the airspace inside the vehicle. Ryles argues that we should remand the case to the district court for further fact-finding. The Government argues that, even if Washington pierced the airspace inside the van before he smelled the burnt marijuana, such an act was not an unconstitutional warrantless search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 5 We disagree with the Government that Washington's action did not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Irrespective of when he smelled the marijuana, Washington, without a search warrant, intruded inside a space that, under most circumstances, is protected by a legitimate expectation of privacy. See United States v. Pierre, 958 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir.1992) (en banc); cf. United States v. Lovell, 849 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir.1988) (airspace around luggage transported on common carrier not protected zone of privacy under Fourth Amendment). Although there is generally a diminished privacy interest in an automobile, as opposed to a residence, see, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), a driver or car owner does not abandon all expectations of privacy. 6 Nevertheless, like any other Fourth Amendment privacy interest, the expectation of privacy in the inside airspace of an automobile is not absolute. Rather, if Washington's intrusion was reasonable, his search was not a Fourth Amendment violation. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 1096, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990) (It goes without saying that the Fourth Amendment bars only unreasonable [warrantless] searches and seizures.). As the Court noted in Buie, [o]ur cases show that in determining reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against [the] promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Id. 7 In the particular factual context of the instant case, we do not believe that Trooper Washington would have been unreasonable either in placing his head inside the interior of the van through an open window or in opening the driver's door and placing his torso inside, even assuming he did not smell marijuana before the intrusion. Our conclusion is based on the reason behind Washington's actions. After pulling over a van in the wee hours of the morning on a relatively deserted Texas highway, Washington was immediately approached by the driver, who smelled of alcohol and admitted that he had no driver's license. Even though Ryles was not intoxicated, he still could not lawfully drive the van. At the Ryles' own suggestion, Washington approached the van to inquire whether anyone else in the van was licensed and could drive the vehicle away. Although he did not say so at the suppression hearing, we believe that Washington would have considered it necessary to determine whether the passenger who would ultimately be driving the van was impaired by alcohol--since, after all, Ryles had alcohol on his breath. Even assuming that he walked up to the driver's door and opened it without knocking, Washington would only have been attempting to assure that the van would be driven safely. We can hardly say that this would have been unreasonable. Cf. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (police officer's intrusion into interior of vehicle to remove papers obstructing VIN number not unreasonable warrantless search). 8 Ryles further argues that Washington's actions--again assuming that he intruded into the interior of the van before smelling burnt marijuana--were unreasonable because he did not pursue the least intrusive course in inquiring about whether any of the van's passengers were licensed. In particular, Ryles argues that Washington could have asked the passengers to step outside the van. Again, in view of the particular circumstances facing Washington--including the fact that it was Ryles himself who suggested that Washington ask the other passengers if they were licensed, cf. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (warrantless search valid when police reasonably believe they have consent to search)--we cannot say that Washington acted unreasonably. 9 In conclusion, we stress the limited nature of our holding. We do not intend to suggest that a police officer may in all circumstances constitutionally intrude into the interior of a vehicle simply because he has temporarily lawfully detained the vehicle because of a traffic violation. We, therefore, reject the Government's argument that we should extend the vehicle frisk doctrine to the facts of this case. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (holding that police may engage in warrantless frisks of vehicles when they have reasonable belief that driver poses danger and that weapon may be inside car). Rather, we hold only that, in view of the particular circumstances of this case, Trooper Washington acted reasonably, even assuming he did intrude into the interior space of the van before smelling burnt marijuana. Thus, we see no need to remand for further fact-finding.