Opinion ID: 6335088
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: One Claim

Text: Rather than applying controlling law to find the judgment is final because it disposed of all issues, the principal opinion gratuitously undertakes to consider whether the judgment was a final judgment that could be certified under Rule 74.01(b). A judgment that does not dispose of all issues may nevertheless be final and certified for appeal under Rule 74.01(b) if it either: (1) disposes of all claims by or against at least one party, or (2) disposes of a distinct judicial unit. Wilson v. City of St. Louis, 600 S.W.3d 763, 769-70 (Mo. banc 2020) (citing Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 244-45). Here, it can easily be determined from the face of the judgment that the circuit court did not certify the judgment for appeal under Rule 74.01(b). The principal opinion recognizes this fact, stating: “The circuit court did not certify it or make the predicate finding that justice required such certification.” Having determined the circuit court did not certify the judgment for appeal under Rule 74.01(b), there is no reason for the principal opinion to go any further. Nevertheless, the principal opinion expressly opines about whether the judgment could be certified for appeal under Rule 74.01(b): “This judgment was not eligible to be certified under Rule 74.01(b).” No determination about eligibility is required; the principal opinion’s analysis can end with its determination that the circuit court did not certify the judgment for appeal under Rule 74.01(b). 12 This is important because, in a seemingly innocuous discussion, the principal opinion changes established law when it gratuitously opines about the number of claims presented in the petition: The circuit court’s order in this case is a judgment because it met the form requirements in Rule 74.01(a) and it fully resolves the Dispatch’s claim that section 190.327.5 violates article III, section 42, of the Missouri Constitution.2 [Footnote 2 states: The substantive definition of judgment is “a legally enforceable judicial order that fully resolves at least one claim in a lawsuit and establishes all the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to that claim.” State ex rel. Henderson v. Asel, 566 S.W.3d 596, 598 (Mo. banc 2019). As a matter of form, such an order must be in writing, signed by the judge, and denominated a “judgment” or “decree” to be considered a judgment. Rule 74.01(a).] But it is not a “final judgment” for purposes of section 512.020(5) because that is the only one of the Dispatch’s three claims that it resolves. The Dispatch’s claim that section 190.327.5 violates the complete prohibition for certain types of local or special laws found in article III, section 40, as well as its claim that this statute violates the prohibition against laws that are retrospective in their operation found in article I, section 13, remained (and still remain) pending. “[I]n determining whether an action presents more than one claim for relief, the focus is on the number of legal rights asserted in the action.” Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 878 S.W.2d 446, 451 (Mo. banc 1994) (“CEE”). If a petition “seeks to enforce only one legal right, it states a single claim, regardless of the fact that it seeks multiple remedies.” Id. Here, the Dispatch’s petition sought to enforce at least three legal rights: (a) the constitutional prohibition against certain local or special laws under article III, section 40; (b) the constitutional requirement that local or special laws that are not prohibited outright by article III, section 40 nevertheless cannot be passed without prior notice by publication as set forth in article III, section 42; and (c) the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of statutes that are retrospective in their operation found in article I, section 13. The Dispatch’s prayers for declaratory judgment, mandamus, and/or an injunction are merely the remedies the Dispatch seeks should it prevail in its efforts to enforce one or more of these three legal rights. 13 Superficially, the principal opinion’s discussion of the number of claims in the petition may appear innocuous, but it has far-reaching ramifications. In these paragraphs, the principal opinion utilizes a general definition of “claim,” when “claim” is a legal term of art referring to the judicial unit for appeal. Nowhere in the discussion does the principal opinion acknowledge its deviation from the Court’s settled precedents, provide analysis to support such deviation, or consider the impact of its mistaken usage of “claim.” Further, its unacknowledged deviation from controlling law and mistaken usage of a general or lay meaning of “claim” is at odds with other legal doctrines that have historically utilized the same definition used in the final judgment analysis. The word “claim” has two meanings. The principal opinion uses its lay meaning: “what is otherwise called a cause of action or theory of recovery.” Butala, 620 S.W.3d at 93 n.4. This is its most general meaning and is broad enough to refer to any legal issue presented for determination, including “some of several issues arising out of the same transaction or occurrence,” legal issues, remedies, or legal theories. See Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 244; Comm. for Educ. Equal., 878 S.W.2d at 450-51. As a legal term of art, however, “claim” refers to “the bundle of legal theories or causes of action that may be asserted as against one party arising from a particular set of facts,” Butala, 620 S.W.3d at 93 n.4, i.e., a judicial unit, Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 244. Under controlling law, “claim” as a legal term of art is the appropriate definition to use when determining whether a judgment is final for purposes of appeal. Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 244; Comm. for Educ. Equal., 878 S.W.2d at 451. In Gibson, the Court held, “The required ‘judicial unit for appeal’ has a settled meaning: ‘the final judgment on 14 a claim . . . .’” Id. at 244 (emphasis added) (quoting State ex rel. State Highway. Comm’n v. Smith, 303 S.W.2d 120, 123 (Mo. 1957)). “Rule 74.01(b) permits a trial court to designate as final a judgment as to one or more claims but fewer than all claims. Thus, the minimum unit of disposition is at least one claim.” Comm. for Educ. Equal., 878 S.W.2d at 450 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Said another way, Rule 74.01(b) “conditioned the exercise of discretion by the trial court on the existence of a judgment that disposed of at least one claim as to one party.” Id. at 451 (emphasis added). Committee for Educational Equality undertook a lengthy analysis to establish the meaning of “claim” as a legal term of art. The Court held: If a complaint seeks to enforce only one legal right, it states a single claim, regardless of the fact that it seeks multiple remedies. A further refinement of what is meant by “one claim” is that a claim is the aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a right enforceable in the courts. Worded somewhat differently, claims are considered separate if they require proof of different facts and the application of distinguishable law, subject to the limitation that severing the claims does not run afoul of the doctrine forbidding the splitting of a cause of action. Id. (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). It is easy to understand how a cursory reading of Committee for Educational Equality could lead to the mistake manifested in the principal opinion’s determination that the Dispatch’s petition asserts three claims. After all, for the Dispatch to prevail under its theories that section 190.327.5 violates article III, section 40; article III, section 42; or article I, section 13, each theory would require subtly different evidentiary facts and the application of different law. 6 6 Contributing even more to the confusion surrounding the meaning of “one claim” is the fact this Court has used both meanings of “claim” in a single decision determining whether 15 But “separate legal theories are not to be considered as separate claims, even if the several legal theories depend on different shadings of the facts, or would emphasize different elements of the facts, or would call for different measures of liability or different kinds of relief.” King Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 821 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Mo. banc 1991). As subsequent decisions make clear, one claim encompasses the enforcement of all legal rights arising from the same transaction or occurrence. Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 244. Claims cannot be considered separate if doing so would split a cause of action. 7 Comm. for Educ. Equal., 878 S.W.2d at 451. This Court has stated the doctrine prohibiting splitting a cause of action as follows: A cause of action which is single may not be split and filed or tried piecemeal, the penalty for which is that an adjudication on the merits in the first suit is a bar to a second suit. In general, the test for determining whether a cause of action is single and cannot be split is: 1) whether separate actions brought arise out of the same act, contract or transaction; 2) or whether the parties, subject matter and evidence necessary to sustain the claim are the same in both actions. The word “transaction” has a broad meaning. It has been there was a final judgment. In Gibson, after deciding the circuit court’s order dismissing fewer than all counts against one of the defendants was not a final judgment because the counts were “differing legal theories or issues presented for recovery on the same claim,” 952 S.W.2d at 244 (emphasis added), the Court then referred to the various counts against the defendant as “the claims” against him, id. at 245 (emphasis added). 7 “Cause of action” has general and technical meanings that mirror the different meanings of “claim.” In its general meaning, “cause of action” merely refers to a theory of recovery. Cause of Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); cf. Butala, 620 S.W.3d at 93 n.4. As a term of art, however, it refers to “[a] group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person.” Cause of Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); accord Chesterfield Vill., Inc. v. City of Chesterfield, 64 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Mo. banc 2002). As terms of art, “cause of action” and “claim” are “nearly the same.” Chesterfield Vill., 64 S.W.3d at 318. “No practical difference is seen between the new ‘claim for relief’ and the old ‘cause of action.’” Gerber v. Schutte Inv. Co., 194 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Mo. 1946). 16 defined as the aggregate of all the circumstances which constitute the foundation for a claim. It also includes all of the facts and circumstances out of which an injury arose. King Gen. Contractors, 821 S.W.2d at 501. The principal opinion’s definition of “one claim” would run afoul of the doctrine forbidding splitting a claim because the constitutional violations the Dispatch asserts in counts I and II all arise from the same set of facts. That constitutional violations arising from the same set of facts are not separate claims but rather aspects of one claim is clearly demonstrated in Chesterfield Village, Inc. v. City of Chesterfield, 64 S.W.3d 315, 321 (Mo. banc 2002). There, the plaintiff prevailed in an action against the defendant on the theory that the defendant violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution. Id. at 317. Nonetheless, the plaintiff filed a second lawsuit seeking damages asserting violations of, among other things, article I, sections 26 and 28 of the Missouri Constitution, which had not been raised in the first action. Id. This Court held both actions were based on the actions of the city in its 1994 zoning decision, id. at 320, and: Any claim for damages that Chesterfield Village attempts to assert in this second action is part of the claim in the previous action against the city of Chesterfield for refusing to rezone the tract. The factual basis for asserting constitutional violations is the same in both actions. A somewhat altered legal theory, or even a new legal theory, does not support a new claim based on the same operative facts as the first claim. Chesterfield Village cannot split its claim. 17 Id. at 321 (emphasis added). Merely asserting the violations of different constitutional provisions, therefore, does not create separate claims even when the different provisions would require different evidentiary details. Committee for Educational Equality’s holding that a “claim” encompasses all the rights and remedies arising out of a single transaction or occurrence was made even clearer in Gibson. There, the plaintiffs sued a priest and a Catholic diocese, “alleging nine counts: battery, negligent hiring/ordination/retention, negligent failure to supervise, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, agency liability, and independent negligence of the Diocese.” 952 S.W.2d at 243-44. The circuit court issued two judgments it determined were final and appealable; one dismissed all counts against the Diocese, and the other dismissed all counts against the priest except battery, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 244. The question before the Court was whether the judgment against the priest was final when it dismissed the counts alleging “negligent hiring/ordination/retention,” negligent failure to supervise, breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and agency liability but left unresolved the counts alleging battery, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. In resolving that issue, the Court reiterated that a claim is defined in relation to the transaction or occurrence at issue, stating: Although a circuit court may designate its judgment final as to particular claims, this designation is effective only when the order disposes of a distinct “judicial unit.” The required judicial unit for an appeal has a settled meaning: the final judgment on a claim, and not a ruling on some of several issues arising out of the same transaction or occurrence which does not dispose of 18 the claim. An order dismissing some of several alternative counts, each stating only one legal theory to recover damages for the same wrong, is not considered an appealable judgment while the other counts remain pending because the counts are concerned with a single fact situation. It is differing, separate, distinct transactions or occurrences that permit a separately appealable judgment, not differing legal theories or issues presented for recovery on the same claim. Id. (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court then dismissed the appeal against the priest because the remaining counts “clearly ar[o]se from the same set of facts, and the same transactions and occurrences, as the counts supposedly appealed” and, therefore, the judgment was not a final judgment on a claim, i.e., it did not dispose of a distinct judicial unit. Id. In Gibson, as in prior cases, “claim” was used as a legal term of art meaning “distinct judicial unit,” not “theory of recovery.” That is clear from the Gibson court’s application of the principles it articulated. In holding that the circuit court’s order – which dismissed fewer than all causes of action against the priest arising from one set of facts – had not disposed of a distinct judicial unit, the Court in Gibson was holding the circuit court had not resolved a single “claim” as against the priest. The Court’s analyses in Chesterfield Village and Gibson make unavoidably clear that counts asserting different theories of recovery – including the violations of different constitutional provisions – are only aspects of one claim when the theories arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. Accordingly, whether an action presents multiple claims, as that word is used in the context of final judgments, or only a single claim is not determined simply by asking whether the counts relate to different constitutional provisions or require proof of different evidentiary facts. Rather, consistent with the prohibition 19 against splitting a cause of action, “[i]t is ‘differing,’ ‘separate,’ ‘distinct’ transactions or occurrences” that divide theories and the assertions of multiple legal rights into separate claims. Id. The Dispatch sets forth one claim in its four-count petition – that section 190.327.5 is constitutionally invalid so the director should be ordered to continue to collect and pay over to the Dispatch the full one-half percent emergency services sales tax. Each count in the petition is based on the same factual allegations. No count required the application of different operative facts, and all counts sought the same relief. Therefore, the petition set forth only one claim. What the principal opinion calls different “claims” are merely what the Court in Gibson called “differing legal theories or issues presented for recovery on the same claim.” Id. Acquiescing in the principal opinion’s failure to use “claim” as a legal term of art has significant ramifications for other areas of law. It is evident from the role the doctrine against splitting a cause of action plays in determining when a petition presents a single claim or separate claims that the final-judgment analysis shares its common transactionor-occurrence-based meaning of “claim.” So applying the general, informal meaning of “claim” in determining whether the Dispatch’s petition presents one or multiple claims will have an impact on what “claim” means in the doctrine prohibiting splitting a cause of action. Res judicata also shares a transaction-or-occurrence-based concept of claim. Chesterfield Vill., 64 S.W.3d at 318. Res judicata precludes relitigation of a “claim” formerly made, and “claim” is defined for purposes of res judicata as “[t]he 20 aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court.” Id. (alteration in original). When a judgment is rendered in the plaintiff’s favor, the judgment extinguishes the plaintiff’s claim, which includes “all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any party of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.” King Gen. Contractors, Inc., 821 S.W.2d at 502 (quoting the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982)). Similarly, “[a] valid and final personal judgment rendered in favor of the defendant bars another action by the plaintiff on the same claim.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 19 (1982) (emphasis added). This is not to say, however, that the principal opinion’s use of the general meaning of “claim” has no appeal. The general meaning aligns with common informal usage, as the word is often used to refer to mere theories of recovery. Nonetheless, given the serious risk of disturbing other doctrines that have historically shared a common definition of “claim” with that used to decide whether a judgment is final, the Court should decide whether to use the general meaning of “claim” in determining whether there is a final judgment only after fully weighing its benefits against its detriments. This is not the proper case, where it is unnecessary to resolution of the issues and has not been briefed or argued. And should the Court so decide, it should openly acknowledge it is adopting a definition of “claim” at odds with the definition employed in Committee for Educational Equality and Gibson. To summarize, in the context of final judgments, “claim” is a legal term of art that means “the bundle of legal theories or causes of action that may be asserted as against one 21 party arising from a particular set of facts.” Butala, 620 S.W.3d at 93 n.4. It encompasses all the rights and remedies arising from the aggregate of operative facts from which the action arises. See Comm. for Educ. Equal., 878 S.W.2d at 451. That meaning of “claim” is shared by other foundational aspects of the law regarding the preclusive effect of judgments, see, e.g., King Gen. Contractors, Inc., 821 S.W.2d at 502, and should be preserved to continue the settled application of those doctrines. The principal opinion’s application/substitution of the general meaning of “claim” – cause of action or theory of recovery – in place of its meaning as a term of art – judicial unit of rights and remedies arising from same transaction or occurrence – fails to follow the Court’s precedent and will have unwanted effects in other areas of law. Whether there is a final judgment in this case, however, can be determined solely by deciding whether the judgment disposed of all issues and left nothing for future determination. The principal opinion concludes the judgment did not dispose of all issues and was not certified under Rule 74.01(b). As a result, even if accepting the principal opinion’s conclusions, it is unnecessary to analyze the number of claims set forth in the petition or to analyze whether the judgment could have been certified under Rule 74.01(b). But for the principal opinion’s unnecessary analysis of the number of claims presented in the Dispatch’s petition, there would be no reason for the Court to decide in this case whether to follow its precedent and use the meaning of “claim” as a legal term of art to be synonymous with judicial unit or to depart from precedent and use the general meaning of “claim.” 22 Rather than engaging in unnecessary analyses about the number of claims presented in the petition and whether the judgment was eligible for certification under Rule 74.01(b), the Court should adhere to its precedent. The judgment resolved all issues, either expressly or implicitly, and left nothing for future determination. Therefore, the judgment is a final judgment over which this Court has jurisdiction.