Opinion ID: 790471
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Restrictions on Time, Place, and Manner of Speech

Text: 172 If a regulation restricting speech in a public forum is content neutral, our standard for determining whether it is narrowly tailored is more relaxed. Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). The policy adopted need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means available to survive this intermediate level of constitutional scrutiny. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). But a government entity is not free to adopt any regulation that serves its interests more effectively than no regulation at all; a restriction may not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further the government interest at stake. Id. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746; see also Kuba v. 1-A Agricultural Ass'n, 387 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir.2004). A statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the `evil' it seeks to remedy. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988); see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (Government may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.). This is so even if the rule is completely effective in eliminating the targeted evil. Id. at 799 n. 7, 109 S.Ct. 2746. 173 The 25 square blocks of downtown Seattle cordoned off by Order No. 3 were plainly a public forum; indeed, city streets are quintessential public forums which `have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.' Perry Education Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939)); see also ACLU of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir.2003). No particularized inquiry into the precise nature of a specific street is necessary; all public streets are held in the public trust and are properly considered traditional public fora. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481, 108 S.Ct. 2495. 174 Our inquiry into whether Order No. 3 was narrowly tailored should begin by analyzing the government's asserted interests in responding to the violence confronting Seattle on November 30. See Kuba, 387 F.3d at 858. Without doubt, a city has a significant interest in preserving the safety of its residents and visitors, and in preventing violence and vandalism on city streets. 6 See, e.g., Perry v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 121 F.3d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir.1997) (Government interests in promoting public safety and the orderly movement of pedestrians, and in protecting the local merchant economy are . . . substantial.). A city cannot, however, use a concededly-legitimate interest in security to justify a rule drawn as broadly as it wishes. See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir.2004) (Security is not a talisman that the government may invoke to justify any burden on speech (no matter how oppressive). (emphasis in original)). Here, Klotz's declaration suggests, [t]he City's goal should have been to transport the delegates to the conference, not necessarily to protect a particular method of getting them to the conference (walking individually, without any designated route). Viewing the City's interest in this broader context, 7 it becomes clear that such a sweeping prohibition on speech as Order No. 3 imposed was not justified. 8 175 Like a hypothetical ban on handbilling, see Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 n. 7, 109 S.Ct. 2746, Seattle's ban on all protesting within a large area of downtown Seattle might have effectively quelled violence and improved safety. Nonetheless, because it burden[ed] substantially more speech than [was] necessary to further the government's legitimate interests[,] Kuba, 387 F.3d at 861, Order No. 3 was not narrowly tailored. The City's solution was a poor fit in several respects. 176 First, Order No. 3 was geographically larger than justified. 9 Protestors were banned from a 25-square-block area of downtown Seattle that purposely encompassed every place they could hope to communicate to delegates. 10 Mayor Schell testified in his deposition that he never scrutinized or questioned why the zone needed to be that large—simply, the concept was to enclose all of the delegate hotels. But as Klotz pointed out, the size of the No Protest Zone actually impeded law enforcement anywhere other than the perimeter, since [i]t takes more officers to secure a larger space than a smaller one. The majority cites no case in which a court has upheld a similarly-large prohibition; in fact, we have struck down restricted zones of much smaller scale. 11 177 Second, the Order banned all protesting without regard to the likelihood that it would lead to violence or disorder. Not only that, but any individual intent on causing harm could easily enter the zone simply by asserting that he or she fell within one of the Operations Order's exceptions. Order No. 3 banned peaceful expressive activity without regard to the City's stated safety-related goals. The majority concludes that it would have been too burdensome to require police to make case-by-case distinctions between those protestors with benign intentions and those with violent intentions. Maj. op. at 1134 (citing Hill, 530 U.S. at 729, 120 S.Ct. 2480). This case is significantly different from Hill: the police established a perimeter around the No Protest Zone precisely so they could make case-by-case determinations as to who would be allowed in the restricted area. The majority would allow the police to search people they suspected of carrying stickers and handbills, but concludes that it would not have been practical for police to search for crowbars or spray paint. Id. at 1135. I see no basis for that conclusion. 178 In Collins, we evaluated a similar emergency order adopted under analogous circumstances. 12 After the verdict was announced in the first Rodney King beating trial, San Francisco found itself amidst a number of demonstrations—both peaceful and violent. 110 F.3d at 1367. Those demonstrations led to a number of violent incidents, which caused property damage and minor injuries. Id. In response, then-Mayor Jordan declared a state of emergency and issued an order, approved by the Board of Supervisors, authorizing the police to disperse any gatherings anywhere in the City and County of San Francisco whenever the peace officer on the scene has reason to believe that the gathering endangers or is likely to endanger persons or property. Id. The order was thus specifically targeted to bar only demonstrations that would likely lead to violence. We nonetheless held not only that the order was facially unconstitutional, but that the law was so clearly established than no reasonable officer could believe it would be constitutional. Id. at 1374. 179 In making that determination, we noted that the proper response to potential and actual violence is for the government to ensure an adequate police presence and to arrest those who actually engage in such conduct, rather than to suppress legitimate First Amendment conduct as a prophylactic measure. Id. at 1372. Similarly, in Baugh, we noted that [t]he Park Service, in lieu of restraining the expressive activity by refusing to issue the permit, should have issued the permit for the lawful expressive activity and then arrested the demonstrators if and when they trespassed. 187 F.3d at 1044. The plaintiffs here argue that police should have had more extensive staffing on the street so that they could permit protestors to enter anywhere and simply arrest and remove those who violated the law. Maj. op. at 1135. Yet in the face of our clear precedent, the majority asserts we should hesitate to say that the law requires such a solution where a city confronts actual law-breakers. Id. at 1135. That hesitation is plainly contrary to our circuit's law. 180 Third, even those who were exempt under the plain terms of the Order were denied entry if they displayed any visible signs, stickers, or messages related to the WTO. The City's policy was clear: protesting was not a legitimate purpose for entering the No Protest Zone. This restriction cannot survive constitutional scrutiny. In Virginia v. Hicks, the state housing authority similarly attempted to ban any person from the streets of a public low-income housing development when such person is not a resident, employee, or such person cannot demonstrate a legitimate business or social purpose for being on the premises. 539 U.S. 113, 116, 123 S.Ct. 2191, 156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003) (emphasis in original). Again like here, the policy was enacted in an effort to combat the rampant crime that had infected the area. Id. at 115, 123 S.Ct. 2191. The Supreme Court upheld the policy under the First Amendment only after interpreting legitimate business to include expressive activity. Id. at 122, 123 S.Ct. 2191; see also Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048, 1059 (7th Cir.2004). Seattle's clear policy of excluding any form of protest from its definition of legitimate purposes disregards the primacy we afford such core political speech under the First Amendment. 181 We considered a similar problem in Grossman v. City of Portland, where we invalidated a law forbidding organized demonstrations in a public park without a permit. 13 33 F.3d 1200, 1203 (9th Cir.1994). Like Seattle's interpretation of Order No. 3, whether an individual was subject to arrest under the statute depended entirely on whether that individual was displaying a message. 182 Consider this: if [the plaintiff] and his companions had been standing in a group in the park after meeting unexpectedly, and had been discussing gardening, or the Portland Trailblazers, the [plaintiff] would not have been arrested. While the addition of signs—or T-shirts, or an address—would have occasioned the application of [the challenged ordinance], the distinctions are absolutely empty in terms of the ordinance's stated goals. 183 Id. at 1207. Order No. 3 operated in exactly the same way, and we should not condone that affront to First Amendment protections. 184 The majority's conclusion to the contrary is plainly wrong. Finding Grossman inapposite, the majority states that Seattle's distinction between groups displaying messages and groups not displaying messages was appropriate because protestors— and not emergency personnel, business employees, or shoppers—caused the violence. Maj. op. at 1137 n. 46. The majority, however, overlooks two important points: First, a distinction between protestors and non-protestors was not at the heart of Order No. 3. The Order instead aimed to preserve the public safety by implementing a limited curfew, which would alleviate the disorder and chaos in the downtown area. See id. at 18-19 (quoting Order No. 3 pmbl). But the majority is also wrong as a factual matter. People within the zone ( including employees and shoppers) who simply displayed messages were no more likely to cause violence than those without messages. See id. at 15 (describing an incident where a delegate, not a protestor, drew a gun against the crowd). Whether or not an individual wore a No WTO button should have had no bearing on her treatment by the police. 185 Fourth, the Order completely disregarded any interest in maintaining peace and security in areas outside the zone. While the Order may have served to protect delegates, it did not protect anyone outside of the perimeter. [P]olice operations. . . should convey a perception of even-handed commitment to protecting demonstrators as well as the larger public[;] the City's response to the demonstrations in Seattle did not serve that goal. ARC Report at 4. The majority recognizes the poor fit between the City's asserted interests and the means it chose to respond to the violence: 186 Even outside the restricted zone, there were some problems of violence incidental to protest. Some violent protestors caused property damage, threw debris, blocked the street, and trapped people in their cars. Some protestors jumped onto an officer's patrol car and shook it by its light bar, while others laid in front of the car and prevented the officer from escaping. Some protestors took over the fuel pumps at a gas station and attempted to fill small bottles with gasoline. 187 Maj. op. at 1126 n. 21. The majority acknowledges that a Seattle police captain's report noted that officers `heard and saw numerous incidents of property destruction, burglary, and looting; but we were unable to leave our lines to take enforcement actions.' Id. at 1124. The large perimeter created by Order No. 3 could only be maintained by a substantial police presence; its size thereby allowed the violence in areas outside the No Protest Zone to continue. The perimeter in fact served only the goal of protecting WTO delegates. It therefore violated Ward's requirement that [t]he tailoring of the restraint must of course correspond to the purposes it serves. Id. at 1131 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746). 188 Finally, and fundamentally, Order No. 3 was not narrowly tailored to the City's interests because, as Klotz put it, it was sought to pursue the wrong goal. . . . That is, the Order guaranteed that WTO delegates could walk safely from their hotels to the Convention Center on city sidewalks. But as noted above, 14 the City's significant interest was not so narrow; the City had less-restrictive alternatives available that would have served its interest in safety and security equally well. We have stated that while the City need not employ the least restrictive alternative in promoting its interest in public safety, `if there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on [protected] speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the fit between ends and means is reasonable.' Edwards v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 262 F.3d 856, 865 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 418 n. 13, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993)) (alteration in original). Here, the plaintiffs suggested several. 189 The majority concludes that because Seattle's pedestrian tunnels. . . did not connect all of the hotels and venues being used by WTO delegates[,] the plaintiffs' suggestions were not feasible. Maj. op. at 1134 n. 39. Even assuming the pedestrian tunnels were an inadequate solution, the plaintiffs in fact suggested various other worthwhile alternatives. First and foremost, the City should have developed a plan to ensure that delegates could get to the convention. As Assistant Police Chief Clark Kimerer explained in his declaration, the City was aware that [a]n avowed and announced goal of some of the protestors was to shut down the WTO convention, i.e., prevent the delegates from reaching their venues[;] therefore, transportation should have been an important part of the City's response. 15 Klotz suggested, for example, planned bus and van service routes or controlled access routes for the delegates; instead, the only transportation option for delegates was to walk from their various hotels to [the] Convention Center through routes of their own choosing. Klotz suggested several concrete alternatives: 190 A dedicated drive called Convention Way runs underneath the Convention Center from approximately Ninth and Pike to Seventh and Union. It is designed to accommodate tour busses and has an easily protected indoor entrance to the facility. . . . Thus, one transportation method that should have been explored was sending buses from the hotels out to the Interstate, and into the Convention Center through this entrance. This route is indirect, but it avoids almost all protest points. 191 Another transportation option that I did not see explored is the pedestrian tunnel that runs from the Rainier Square building . . . and exiting only a few yards from a well protected off-street entrance to the Convention Center. Mayor Schell testified in his deposition that he used this route without incident on the afternoon of November 30. 192 Further, the City could have used flying squads, or mobile teams without responsibility for maintaining police lines, that could have pursued and arrested vandals and violent protestors. Although the City originally planned on pursuing this strategy, [w]hen the day arrived, the flying squads were pulled off that duty to join the fixed police lines. As a result, the relatively small number of vandals could destroy property without threat of arrest. Lieutenant Neil Low, who was responsible for deploying flying squads, stated in his internal WTO After Action report that [i]n concept, we were to work along with Lt. Joe Kessler's plain-clothes squad in locating and arresting hardcore protestors committing criminal acts. In actuality, we became involved in crowd control within one hour of being on the street, continuing with that for the remainder of the week. 193 [T]he First Amendment demands that municipalities provide `tangible evidence' that speech-restrictive regulations are `necessary' to advance the proffered interest in public safety. Edwards, 262 F.3d at 863. As this list of alternative possibilities demonstrates, Order No. 3, as written, was not necessary to advance that interest, nor did the City provide any tangible evidence of such a requirement. The Order was not narrowly tailored and the majority's contrary conclusion disregards these important considerations.
194 Not only was Order No. 3 not narrowly tailored to serve the significant government interest in safety and security, it also failed to leave open ample alternative methods of communication. An entire medium of speech was foreclosed and the WTO protestors were silenced and relegated to the sidelines. If an ordinance effectively prevents a speaker from reaching his intended audience, it fails to leave open ample alternative means of communication. Id. at 866 (citing Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981)); see also Bay Area Peace Navy, 914 F.2d at 1229 (An alternative is not ample if the speaker is not permitted to reach the `intended audience.'). Order No. 3 prevented protestors from entering the 25-square block area where WTO delegates could see and hear them. It confined all demonstrations to outside areas where the message the protestors sought to convey may never have reached the intended audience. 16 195 In Bay Area Peace Navy, we found that a 75-yard security zone rendered the [plaintiffs'] . . . demonstration completely ineffective and that passing out pamphlets on land or demonstrating at the entrance to the pier are not viable alternatives because the invited visitors, who are the [plaintiffs'] intended audience, are not accessible from those positions. 914 F.2d at 1229 (quotation marks omitted). And in Baugh, we held that forcing demonstrators to an area 150 to 175 yards away from their intended audience [did] not provide a reasonable alternative means for communication of [the plaintiffs'] views. 187 F.3d at 1044. Because the regulation at issue in Baugh was not tailored narrowly to allow for lawful demonstrations, it did not leave open ample alternative means of communication. Id. Similarly, Order No. 3, which forced protestors to the sidelines and back entrances to the WTO conference venues, did not provide viable alternatives. 196 City officials all but conceded that the avenues of expression left open were insufficient to allow for meaningful communication. Before the conference began, Seattle police negotiated with organized protest groups to set up established protest areas. As Assistant Chief Joiner testified, 197 In establishing those sites we had tried to make sure that they were well located or that they met the needs of the protest groups, that they were visible, that they could see whatever event that they were protesting. In other words, they would be located very close to them. And so we had tried to do everything we could to accommodate peaceful protests on the front side. Obviously that—those agreements broke down on Tuesday morning. 198 After the agreements broke down and the Mayor issued Order No. 3, Joiner explained that we had to move people out of that area. In other words, the carefully-crafted protest areas, which would have allowed protestors to see the delegates and be seen by them, were eliminated. Instead, protestors were relegated to the inaccessible areas where no WTO delegates would be bothered by their presence. 199 Without citing any authority, the majority concludes that the ample alternatives test should be applied with a practical recognition of the dire facts confronting the City. . . . Maj. op. at 1140. Nowhere in our case law, however, have we even suggested that courts should balance this factor against a city's asserted need to restrict speech. Rather, we require that ample alternative avenues of expression be available in order for a time, place, and manner restriction to withstand First Amendment scrutiny. There is no exception for exigency. 200 The City asks us to adopt the rule advocated by the Second Circuit in Bl(a)ck Tea Society. There, the court noted that demonstrators' messages at a high-profile event—the 2004 Democratic National Convention—may reach delegates even if speech is curtailed, through television, radio, the press, the internet, and other outlets. 378 F.3d at 14. Because the majority concludes that the ample alternatives requirement was met in any event, it does not address this argument. Maj. op. at 1139 n. 49. The district court, however, relied on this argument to conclude that Order No. 3 did not foreclose reasonable alternative avenues of expression. The district court was mistaken and we should dispel any notion that media interest in an event can be a substitute for constitutionally-required alternative avenues of communication. As the Seventh Circuit stated in Hodgkins, there is no internet connection, no telephone call, no television coverage that can compare to attending a political rally in person. . . . 355 F.3d at 1063. Public protests are at the heart of the First Amendment and are critical for incubating civic engagement and encouraging spirited debate. 201 We evoked this concern in Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1205 n. 8, and reiterated the particular importance of preserving parks as forums for public debate precisely because ordinary people lack reliable access to the media. The need to protect the average citizen's ability to be heard is increasingly significant now, when the extremely rich have an enormous variety of privately-owned media through which to reach the public. . . . At present, more democratic means of communication—demonstrations in parks, bumper stickers, signs in the windows of homes—must be jealously protected. Id. The City would place the demonstrators at the mercy of the media industry. There is no way to guarantee that the message protestors seek to convey would be heard in any recognizable format. The First Amendment cannot allow a city to require that subjugation.
202 Even a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction will not survive First Amendment scrutiny if it allows for unduly broad discretion on the part of the official charged with enforcing the regulation. Thus, a regulation that restricts speech must contain adequate standards to guide the official's decision and render it subject to effective judicial review. Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 323, 122 S.Ct. 775, 151 L.Ed.2d 783 (2002). This rule applies even outside the traditional context of licensing schemes. For example, in Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a city ordinance that prohibited all First Amendment Activities at Los Angeles International Airport, even if the law were read to apply only to expressive activity that was not airport-related. 482 U.S. 569, 575, 576, 107 S.Ct. 2568, 96 L.Ed.2d 500 (1987). The Court refused to validate a law that would 203 give LAX officials alone the power to decide in the first instance whether a given activity is airport related. Such a law that confers on police a virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation of the resolution is unconstitutional because the opportunity for abuse, especially where a statute has received a virtually open-ended interpretation, is self-evident. 204 Id. (quotation marks omitted). 205 The First Amendment forbids even the opportunity for abuse, not just policies that encourage preference for a favored view. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). If that opportunity is present, the regulation `creates an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas.' Kuba, 387 F.3d at 856 (quoting Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629 (9th Cir.1998)). Order No. 3, however, clearly afforded officers the opportunity for abuse, and was therefore constitutionally infirm. 17 According to Mayor Schell's deposition testimony, the decision whether to arrest peaceful, lawful protestors within the zone would depend on the judgment of the officers and people charged with the responsibility of carrying out that order. 206 Chief Stamper acknowledged that Order No. 3 and the Operations Order interpreting it were sufficiently vague that it made it difficult from a working cop's point of view to distinguish between who should and who should not be left out. Stamper himself honestly [didn't] know the answer whether peaceful protest was a reasonable purpose under the Order. And Officer Smith testified at his deposition that he and his fellow officers were never given a laundry list of activities which would be deemed to be legitimate. Instead, he was told simply to apply what a reasonable person would think legitimate business is. In sum, the plaintiffs presented evidence that individuals with disfavored views—namely, anyone wearing a No WTO sticker or button—were systematically excluded from the zone, whether or not the individual should have been allowed entry under an exception to the Order. 18 Furthermore, officers were permitted complete discretion to determine who was a protestor and what was a reasonable purpose, and therefore who would be excluded. The majority's conclusion that there was no danger on the face of Order No. 3 that officers enforcing the restricted zone could indiscriminately withhold permission to speak, maj. op. at 1145, is flatly contrary to the evidence. 207 The majority concludes that under Chicago Park District, the guidelines contained in the Operations Order were sufficiently specific and objective, and [did] not leave the decision to the whim of the administrator. Id. at 1146 (quoting 534 U.S. at 324, 122 S.Ct. 775). But the discretion provided here is quite different—and clearly broader—than the ordinance upheld in Chicago Park District. That case involved a licensing scheme that allowed the district to deny a permit 208 when the application is incomplete or contains a material falsehood or misrepresentation; when the applicant has damaged Park District property on prior occasions and has not paid for the damage; when a permit has been granted to an earlier applicant for the same time and place; when the intended use would present an unreasonable danger to the health or safety of park users or Park District employees; or when the applicant has violated the terms of a prior permit. 209 534 U.S. at 324, 122 S.Ct. 775. In light of these highly objective criteria, the Supreme Court held that the disqualifying grounds were reasonably specific and objective to defeat a claim of unbridled discretion. Id. The Court has never held that a regulation allowing officers to determine unilaterally what constitutes a reasonable purpose, with no further elaboration on what might be considered other like type reasonable activity, provides sufficient guidance. 19 Even if Order No. 3 were in fact a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, it would nonetheless fail to satisfy the First Amendment's requirements foreclosing unbridled discretion in enforcement. 20