Opinion ID: 4201660
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Psychological Harm Is Harm

Text: {¶ 13} Because the court of appeals based its ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel and plain-error holdings on its finding that Mohamed had released J.K. in a safe place physically unharmed, we first must decide whether the definition of “harm” in the kidnapping statute also contemplates psychological harm. We start, as we always do in cases of statutory interpretation, with the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. {¶ 14} “Unharmed” means “not harmed.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2497 (2002). “Harm” is defined in the dictionary as “physical or mental damage.” Id. at 1034. This is consistent with how we use the word in ordinary conversation. We use the term “harm” to describe both physical injuries and emotional or psychological injuries. We might say that someone was “mentally harmed” or that they were “physically harmed,” but in both cases, we say that they were “harmed.” Under its plain meaning, the statute includes both physical and psychological harm. {¶ 15} This plain-meaning approach is consistent with the way the General Assembly has used the term in statutes. When the legislature wants to limit harm 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO to physical harm, it has done so explicitly. The assault statute, for example, prohibits anyone from knowingly causing “physical harm to another.” R.C. 2903.13(A). Indeed, in over 150 different sections of the Revised Code (including 89 sections of the criminal code, R.C. Title 29), the General Assembly specifies “physical harm.” It did not do so in R.C. 2905.01(C)(1). We cannot create a limitation of harm to “physical” harm that is not found in the statutory language. The lower court erred in holding otherwise. III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Plain Error {¶ 16} Ultimately, the trier of fact decides whether a victim has been released in a safe place unharmed, and we hold in this case that triers of fact may consider the psychological harm to the victim in making that determination. However, our holding that the lower court erred in writing a psychological-harm exclusion into the statute does not resolve the matter. Here, arguably at least, a jury might have found based upon the evidence presented at trial that J.K. was released unharmed both physically and psychologically. The questions are then, with a proper definition of the term “unharmed” guiding our analysis, was counsel ineffective for failing to ask for the safe-place-unharmed jury instruction and did the trial court commit plain error in failing to provide such an instruction? In our view, the answer to both questions is no.
{¶ 17} Considering the record as a whole, we determine that Mohamed has failed to overcome the presumption that counsel’s failure to request the safe-placeunharmed instruction was the result not of ineffectiveness but of trial strategy. To show that his trial counsel was ineffective, Mohamed was required to prove that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation and that the deficiency prejudiced him. State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 6 January Term, 2017 {¶ 18} Questionable trial strategies and tactics, however, do not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 49, 402 N.E.2d 1189 (1980). “To justify a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must overcome a strong presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 558, 651 N.E.2d 965 (1995), citing Strickland at 689. {¶ 19} In Clayton, the defendant was charged with and convicted of two counts of attempted murder. Clayton at 45. On appeal, the defendant challenged his counsel’s decision not to request jury instructions on lesser included offenses. Id. at 46, 48-49. We concluded that the decision not to request the mitigating instruction, despite being a “tactical error” and a “questionable” strategy, did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 48-49. Simply because there was “another and better strategy available” did not mean that counsel provided ineffective assistance. Id. at 49. {¶ 20} In this case, Mohamed’s counsel’s trial strategy was simple: completely deny that any kidnapping or sexual assault occurred and attack the credibility of J.K. Throughout trial, counsel maintained that J.K.’s story just didn’t add up: if what she said about Mohamed’s conduct were really true, she would have taken advantage of the multiple opportunities she had to flee. She could have stayed in her apartment when she went back to get her debit card, taken off when he took her to the ATM, or jumped out of the cab at a stop sign on the way to her exboyfriend’s home. In addition, he pointed out that at no point did Mohamed brandish a weapon and that, even under her account, J.K. had been able to physically fight off Mohamed. Nor did J.K. seek medical attention after the alleged assault. {¶ 21} Counsel closed with an attack on J.K.’s veracity. He charged that she was “evasive on the stand,” had “impeach[ed] herself,” and had gotten “caught up in her own lies.” He finished with this summation: “What I’m saying to you is 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO that the story is preposterous. It’s preposterous. It is offensive, it is deceitful and misleading. If you can go back and convict him on that, God bless, God bless. I’m done.” {¶ 22} Understood in this context, defense counsel’s decision not to request a jury instruction concerning the safe-place-unharmed defense would seem to be part of a reasonable trial strategy. The theory that defense counsel presented to the jury was that the victim was telling one big whopping lie. Counsel could not at the same time have credibly argued to the jury that even if Mohamed did kidnap her, he released her in a safe place unharmed. And counsel could have reasonably concluded that requesting such a jury instruction would have undercut his “she’s a liar” defense. See, e.g., State v. Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 536, 684 N.E.2d 47 (1997) (failure to present mitigating evidence not “demonstrably deficient trial strategy” when it was at least arguably consistent with defendant’s claim of complete innocence). {¶ 23} Furthermore, a safe-place-unharmed instruction would have opened the door for the prosecution to argue that Mohamed had caused profound psychological damage to J.K.—a point that J.K. emphasized after trial in her victim’s letter, which the judge mentioned at the sentencing hearing. Defense counsel may well—and quite reasonably—have thought it better to avoid discussion of lasting emotional injury done to J.K. This is a factor that the appellate court does not consider, because under its reasoning, the state could not have presented to the jury any evidence regarding the psychological harm J.K. suffered. {¶ 24} Our determination that counsel was not ineffective is premised on the appropriate definition of “unharmed” in R.C. 2905.01. The concurring opinion suggests that under any definition of “unharmed” (even the erroneous definition adopted by the court of appeals), trial counsel provided effective assistance, and therefore, we should avoid addressing the proposition of law on which this case was accepted. But we must identify what the law is before we can determine 8 January Term, 2017 whether counsel’s strategy in not requesting an instruction on it was reasonable. The analysis about what is reasonable trial strategy would be different in a hypothetical case—under a hypothetical statute—where only physical harm could be considered. Our job is to decide the case before us, not hypotheticals. Under the proper definition of “unharmed” in R.C. 2905.01, it was not ineffective assistance for counsel to not ask for the instruction. Doing so would have undermined counsel’s trial strategy and opened the door for testimony about the psychological harm suffered by the victim. {¶ 25} Mohamed has not overcome the presumption that his counsel’s failure to request the safe-place-unharmed instruction was a matter of trial strategy. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in finding that his counsel was ineffective.
{¶ 26} We reach a similar conclusion on the Eighth District’s determination that the failure to provide the instruction amounted to “plain error.” To establish plain error, a defendant must show that (1) there was an error or deviation from a legal rule, (2) the error was plain and obvious, and (3) the error affected the outcome of the trial. State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). We find plain error only “ ‘with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d at 47, 402 N.E.2d 1189, quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 27} When the decision not to request a particular jury instruction may be deemed to be part of a reasonable trial strategy, we will not find plain error. Clayton at 47-48; State v. Claytor, 61 Ohio St.3d 234, 240, 574 N.E.2d 472 (1991). Thus, in Clayton we found no plain error when counsel had failed to request an instruction on a lesser included offense and instead sought a total acquittal for his client. Similarly, in Claytor—a death-penalty case in which the defendant was convicted 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO of aggravated murder—we found no plain error in the trial court’s failure to provide an instruction on the lesser included offense of murder when counsel’s “tactical decision” was to argue that his client was not guilty by reason of insanity. Claytor at 240. {¶ 28} The same goes here. Having determined that counsel’s decision not to request an instruction on the safe-place-unharmed defense falls within a reasonable trial strategy, we will not find that the trial judge committed plain error in failing to provide the unrequested instruction. Mohamed has failed to show that the trial judge’s decision not to give the jury the instruction was obvious error, that it deviated from clear legal rules, or that it affected the outcome of the trial.