Opinion ID: 3150405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Right to Proceed Pro Se

Text: Davis argues that the district court denied him the right to represent himself in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Section 1654 provides as follows: “In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” Citing § 1654, this court has noted that a “habeas petitioner does have a statutory right to self representation.” Scott v. Wainwright, 617 F.2d 99, 102 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980) (28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas case); see also Anderson v. United States, 948 F.2d 704, 705 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that although a § 2255 petitioner has a statutory right to represent himself, because there were allegations that he was incompetent, counsel was appointed to represent him) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1654). The district court ruled that Davis had forfeited any statutory right to represent himself because his pleadings only referred to his constitutional right under Faretta. Davis argues that the district court erred in finding that he waived his statutory claim. The government agrees. On March 7, 2011, Davis first asserted his right to represent himself during post-conviction proceedings. At that time, Davis filed a document in 6 Case: 14-30552 Document: 00513250539 Page: 7 Date Filed: 10/28/2015 Nos. 14-30516 & 14-30552 the district court entitled “Notification to Court Not to Appoint Nor Assign any Lawyers to Represent Defendant on PostConviction.” In that notice Davis did not specifically reference either a statutory or constitutional right to proceed pro se. Subsequently, standby counsel filed a “Motion to Vacate Grant of Faretta Relief,” seeking to preclude Davis from proceeding pro se. The district court ordered Davis to file any opposition to standby counsel’s Motion to Vacate Faretta Relief by March 14, 2013. On February 29, 2013, Davis filed a response opposing standby counsel’s motion. In that response, he did cite to his Sixth Amendment Right to self-representation. In addition, however, Davis relied upon this court’s two prior opinions issuing the writ of mandamus, Davis I and Davis II. In the first opinion, this court cited and discussed Davis’s statutory right to self-representation under § 1654. Davis, 2001 WL 34712238, at . Although that opinion involved waiver of counsel at trial, Davis was relying on that authority in his request to proceed pro se during his § 2255 proceedings. Thus, he was relying on his statutory right to represent himself. Further, it is well settled law that federal courts liberally construe briefs filed by pro se litigants to “avoid waiver.” United States v. Gonzalez, 592 F.3d 675, 680 n.3 (5th Cir. 2009); accord Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (explaining that the court holds a pro se litigant’s pleadings “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”). Under these circumstances, we are persuaded that Davis sufficiently raised his statutory right to proceed pro se. In addition to finding the claim waived, the district court also noted that the right to self-representation under the statute is limited by the phrase “by 7 Case: 14-30552 Document: 00513250539 Page: 8 Date Filed: 10/28/2015 Nos. 14-30516 & 14-30552 the rules of such courts.” That is correct. 6 Here, however, the district court did not identify a rule of the court that would prevent Davis from representing himself. Further, the district court has repeatedly had Davis examined for competency by psychiatrists and, based on their evaluations, has found him competent to waive his right to counsel each time. 7 Indeed, the district court is currently allowing Davis to proceed pro se with respect to all 19 of the claims that Davis agreed to raise in this § 2255 proceeding. This indicates that the court does not have an issue with Davis’s ability to proceed pro se. In light of the court’s determination that Davis is competent and that his waiver of counsel was voluntarily and intelligently made, the district court erred in ordering standby counsel to litigate issues he did not agree to raise. Accordingly, the district court erred in not allowing Davis to exercise his statutory right to represent himself in the instant proceedings.