Opinion ID: 603763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interference with Prospective Employment Prospects

Text: 16 Krc alleges that by advising the DISCO that it had developed adverse information about him, the USIA prevented him from pursuing another employment opportunity and intentionally interfered with his prospective employment opportunities and business advantage. In his complaint Krc requested both injunctive and monetary relief, but he subsequently withdrew all claims for monetary damages. 17 Although a claim for monetary damages would clearly be barred by sovereign immunity, see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (Federal Tort Claims Act does not waive sovereign immunity for claims arising out of ... interference with contract rights); Art Metal-U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 753 F.2d 1151, 1155 (D.C.Cir.1985) (claims for interference with prospective advantage are ... claims arising out of interference with contract rights), whether sovereign immunity bars Krc's claim for injunctive relief is not quite so easily answered. We start with the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides: Nothing herein ... confers authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Relying upon Sharp v. Weinberger, 798 F.2d 1521 (D.C.Cir.1986), the USIA argues that the Federal Tort Claims Act impliedly forbids specific relief for tortious interference with prospective employment opportunities. In Sharp we held that [t]he waiver of sovereign immunity in the [APA] does not run to actions seeking declaratory relief or specific performance in contract cases because, by expressly providing for money damages as the sole remedy for contractual breach by the federal government, the Tucker Act and the Little Tucker Act impliedly forbid [specific] relief. Id. at 1523. Here, in contrast, the FTCA specifically bars money damages as a remedy for Krc's claim, which by parity of reasoning implies that injunctive relief is available. Moreover, Krc does not seek specific performance of a contract, and the relief he does seek would impose a far lesser burden upon the Government than would an equitable action for breach of contract. Therefore, we conclude that the district court erred in finding that sovereign immunity bars Krc's request for specific relief. 18 The district court also held, in the alternative, that the USIA was entitled to summary judgment because its answer to the DISCO's inquiry regarding adverse information relevant to Krc's security clearance was no more than an accurate response. We agree. [T]here is a general duty not to interfere intentionally with another's reasonable business expectancies of trade with third parties ... unless the interference is not improper under the circumstances. Art Metal, 753 F.2d at 1154-55 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 comment b (1979)). The USIA's action was clearly not improper under the circumstances. The USIA is authorized to disclose relevant data to duly authorized security agencies regarding significant security information in the file of a USIA employee. 55 Fed.Reg. 31963 (August 6, 1990). 19 Furthermore, adverse information clearly had come to light subsequent to issuance of Krc's security clearance: the USIA had learned that he had had sexual relations with the military attache of a neutral country and with two nationals of a Communist country during his stint in Belgrade. This information can only be characterized as adverse because it shows such poor judgment on the part of an FSO with access to highly classified material that it caused the USIA to terminate his Foreign Service appointment. There is therefore no genuine issue of material fact relevant to Krc's claim of improper interference, and we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.