Opinion ID: 4537941
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Chiropractor’s Testimony

Text: I also dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the circuit court did not err in admitting the medical-causation opinions of Dr. Carson. “Not every doctor can qualify as an expert in every given case.” Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 28 S.W.3d 42, 48 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000). Allowing Dr. Carson to testify that the fall Elder experienced at Dollar General necessitated the surgeries to her neck, back, and shoulder, which took place months and years later, was in error. Dr. Carson had no role in these procedures, and they were outside his area of expertise. If the plaintiff wanted to establish causation between her fall and these procedures, then the plaintiff should have called as witnesses the specialists who performed those procedures. It was speculative at best for Dr. Carson to testify that it was the plaintiff’s fall at Dollar General which caused her to need the surgeries performed by these other specialists. Causation between the plaintiff’s fall and her subsequent surgeries was a disputed element of the plaintiff’s case. The plaintiff’s chiropractic records establish that she had been experiencing the same pains she attributed to the fall at trial for years predating the fall at Dollar General. In fact, one May 5, 2009 report alone establishes that the plaintiff was experiencing pain in her neck, middle back, low back, and shoulder that day. Note that the plaintiff testified that she experienced no shoulder pain until after the fall at Dollar General on June 10, 2010. The May 5, 2009 report provided that she had been experiencing these symptoms for “years” and that she rated her pain that day as an “8” out of 10. Other observations contained in Dr. Carson’s records from that same date 22 (connecting the plaintiff’s symptoms to a “sprain” and a “strain”) suggest trauma that predates the fall. In other words, Dr. Carson’s own medical records undercut his testimony that the fall at Dollar General is what necessitated the plaintiff’s subsequent surgeries performed by other specialists. As the majority writes, Dr. Carson received training in orthopedics and neurology as part of his chiropractic curriculum. However, Dr. Carson’s training did not include any sort of surgical residency, and he has never performed any surgeries. Indeed, neurosurgeons’ and orthopedic surgeons’ training and experience are not synonymous. As Dr. Carson testified during voir dire, chiropractors provide different treatment than medical doctors. Chiropractors’ treatment focuses on physical medicine, like spinal manipulation, muscle stimulation, and disc decompression; whereas neurosurgeons’ and orthopedic surgeons’ treatment may include prescription medications and surgery. Thus, given his training and experience, Dr. Carson could make certain neurologic and orthopedic diagnoses. But it was reversible error for the circuit court to allow him to relate his diagnoses to the reasonableness of the surgeries rendered and prescriptions given by her medical doctors, or to causally relate those surgeries to her fall. See Structural Pres. Sys., Inc. v. Petty, 927 A.2d 1069 (D.C. 2007) (treating chiropractor unable to testify as to necessity of physical therapy because she could not prescribe physical therapy on her own authority); Sebroski v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 2d 681 (D. Md. 1999) (chiropractor not qualified to testify as to the necessity of an MRI because such test is beyond his expertise and training); Brodersen v. Sioux Valley Mem. Hosp., 902 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Iowa 1995) 23 (physicians unable to testify as to standard of care of a chiropractor). Other jurisdictions have recognized this and emphasized the importance of limiting chiropractor testimony to their area of expertise. “The district court sufficiently limited Dr. Reilly (chiropractor) to his treatment of Kudabeck and the conclusions he drew from his treatment and expertise.” Kudabeck v. Kroger, 338 F.3d 856 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining the district court did not allow the chiropractor to testify that he based his conclusions on the reports of other physicians and that it prevented him from testifying as to his opinion of the patient’s MRI) See also Moreno v. Ingram, 454 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that chiropractor was not qualified to testify as to non-chiropractic medical expenses nor could he give testimony concerning matters because he was not “qualified by training, education, or statute to perform the procedures himself and that he did not make the decisions whether to undertake the treatment”). This error was compounded by the fact that the defendants were denied a continuance after the plaintiff’s late (two weeks before trial) disclosure that Dr. Carson would be testifying about causation, when he had specifically averred during his deposition that he would offer no such testimony at trial. Causation was a necessary (and disputed) element of the plaintiff’s case, and the plaintiff offered no other expert testimony as to a causal connection between the plaintiff’s fall and these subsequent procedures. The defendants should have been afforded the opportunity to re-depose Dr. Carson, and the denial of this opportunity was prejudicial. I dissent. 24 WOOD and WOMACK, JJ., join this opinion. Dover Dixon Horne PLLC, by: Todd Wooten and Carl “Trey” Cooper, for appellants. The Applegate Firm, PLLC, by: Kayla M. Applegate and Ryan J. Applegate, for appellee. 25