Opinion ID: 167923
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Placement on the PIP

Text: 29 In essence, the district court concluded Haynes' placement on a PIP was per se an adverse employment action because it constituted a disciplinary action in the form of a written warning. Most courts that have considered whether a PIP, standing alone, is an adverse employment action have found it is not. Givens v. Cingular Wireless, 396 F.3d 998, 998 (8th Cir.2005) ([P]lacing [an employee] on a `performance improvement plan,' without more, did not constitute an adverse employment action.); Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1293 (D.C.Cir.2003) ([F]ormal criticism or poor performance evaluations are not necessarily adverse actions and they should not be considered such if they did not affect the employee's grade or salary.); Agnew v. BASF Corp., 286 F.3d 307, 310 (6th Cir.2002) (the possibility of termination mentioned in the plaintiff's PIP was contingent on future developments, rather than being a present plan or decision and therefore did not constitute an adverse employment action supporting a constructive discharge claim.). 30 Although the district court recognized the existence of this non-binding precedent, it determined the Tenth Circuit had reached the opposite conclusion. Relying on Hysten v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Railway Company, 296 F.3d 1177, 1183 (10th Cir.2002), and Roberts v. Roadway Express, Inc., 149 F.3d 1098, 1104 (10th Cir.1998), it held [Haynes] could have filed a charge of discrimination immediately after being placed on the PIP because a written warning in the Tenth Circuit constitutes an adverse employment action. (R. Vol. IV at 61.) We disagree with the district court's interpretation of our precedent and expressly join our sister circuits in holding a PIP, standing alone, is not an adverse employment action. 31 A written warning may be an adverse employment action only if it effects a significant change in the plaintiff's employment status. For example, in Roberts, the defendant had peppered plaintiff's file with twenty warning letters, and the record demonstrated that the more warnings an employee received, the more likely he or she was to be terminated for a further infraction. 149 F.3d at 1104. 10 Thus, the effect on the plaintiff's employment status was an immediate placement in an at-risk status. The facts in this case do not demonstrate that Haynes' placement on the PIP in November had any immediate effect on her employment status. She was not demoted, her pay did not change and her responsibilities were not significantly modified. Instead, she was presented with clear goals to achieve her continued employment. 32 She also concedes no one at Level 3 anticipated the economic downturn that would result in the RIF seven months later. Further, no one could have predicted that Haynes would be unable to meet the PIP due to her subsequent unforeseen medical leave. Therefore, her placement on the PIP had no apparent tangible effects other than the requirement she meet her sales quota and a plan to assist her in her efforts. Consequently, Haynes' placement on a PIP was not an adverse employment action. See Dick, 397 F.3d at 1270 (holding a single write-up is not an adverse employment action.).