Opinion ID: 1797214
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: The Robbery Aggravator

Text: Foster believes that because the jury found that he committed capital murder in the commission of the crime of robbery, that this aggravating circumstance duplicates an element of the offense of capital murder, and thereby the double counting is constitutionally infirm for it does not narrow the class of death-eligible defendants in a rational manner. Though procedurally barred, on the merits, this Court has spoken to this exact question in Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645 (Miss. 1983). He [being the defendant Leatherwood] reasons that since robbery is an element of capital murder, that it should not also be used as an aggravating circumstance as permitted under Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-19 (Supp. 1982). The appellant suggests that this causes him to begin the sentencing stage with one aggravating circumstance against him and thus, starts at a disadvantage rather than with a clean slate. He argues that the weighing process is already stacked against him before he even gets up to offer anything in mitigation; and that his practice brings us precariously close to the old ways of mandatory, arbitrary statutes condemned in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). We do not agree with the appellant's contention. Under our capital murder statute, when an accused is found guilty of capital murder arising out of a robbery, he then becomes subject to a jury finding that he should not be executed if the jury feels that the facts justify it. However, his execution is not mandated and the jury may properly find that he should be sentenced to life in prison. They may so find whether the defendant puts on any evidence of mitigating circumstances or not. This is a far cry from the old statute which mandated execution upon conviction of a capital offense. Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d at 650. Because we have already answered this question, there was no reason for counsel to object to the underlying felony being counted as an aggravator. This Court has already upheld the use of underlying offense as an aggravating circumstance in keeping with the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). This Court adopted Lowenfield in Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743, 763 (Miss. 1991). See also Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329 (Miss. 1988), cert. granted and judgment vacated by Pinkney v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 1075, 110 S.Ct. 1800, 108 L.Ed.2d 931 (1990).