Opinion ID: 2633881
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Invocation of Right to Silence at First Interview

Text: Defendant first contends he invoked his right to remain silent at the conclusion of the first interview with the Placer County officers at the Carson City jail when he told them he wanted to stop the interview because he had a headache and wished to return to his cell. Defendant never raised this claim in the trial court. He filed only a generic written motion requesting the suppression of all statements made to the authorities, without any discussion of which particular grounds for suppression existed; indeed, his attorney conceded after the first suppression hearing that there was no basis to challenge the admission of the statements made by defendant to Placer County officers on grounds of involuntariness, and never mentioned an invocation of the right to silence. No further testimony or argument regarding an invocation of the right to remain silent during the interviews conducted by the Placer County officers was offered at the second hearing, and the trial court made no finding regarding whether defendant invoked his right to silence at the conclusion of the first interview. Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (a) allows a judgment to be reversed because of erroneous admission of evidence only if an objection to the evidence or a motion to strike it was `timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection.' Pursuant to this statute, `we have consistently held that the `defendant's failure to make a timely and specific objection' on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not cognizable. `[Citation.] ( People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 20, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229 ( Demetrulias). ) To satisfy Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (a), the objection or motion to strike must be both timely and specific as to its ground. An objection to evidence must generally be preserved by specific objection at the time the evidence is introduced; the opponent cannot make a `placeholder' objection stating general or incorrect grounds (e.g., `relevance') and revise the objection later in a motion to strike stating specific or different grounds. ( Id. at p. 22, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407,137 P.3d 229.) Thus, defendant's entirely generic motion to exclude all of his statements to law enforcement officers, coupled with the absence of specific argument that defendant had invoked his right to silence at the end of the first interview, failed to preserve this claim for appeal. [10] (See also People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434-35, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765 ( Partida ).) Even if this claim had not been forfeited, it is without merit. Defendant's request to stop the interview at the Carson City jail was not an assertion of his right not to incriminate himself. Defendant already had confessed to the Garcia murder and provided the officers with a map showing where the body was located. Defendant had not expressed any reluctance to speak further about the murder before asking to stop the interview because he had a headache. Immediately after defendant asked to end the interview, the officers, in fact, stopped the questioning, and asked him only whether they could pose more questions during the next few days, .to which he answered, Yes. Defendant never testified during the suppression hearing that when he asked to stop the interview because he had a headache, he at that time had decided not to speak further with the officers at any future occasion concerning the crimes. In fact, defendant's testimony was to the contrary: that he always intended to cooperate with the authorities because he thought that's what you do. It is clear from this record that defendant did not invoke his right not to incriminate himself, but merely asked for a break from questioning. The statements made by defendant during the later session with the officers, including the questioning by the Sacramento officers, therefore were not the fruits of any constitutional violation resulting from the continued questioning of defendant after he asked for a temporary suspension of questioning for the night.