Opinion ID: 867402
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Presumption of Death

Text: ¶ 52 Hampton argues that our death penalty statutes create a presumption of death. This presumption, he claims, arises from A.R.S. § 13-703(E), which requires a sentence of death if the trier of fact finds at least one aggravator and no mitigation sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. This argument, however, was expressly rejected in Anderson II, 210 Ariz. at 346 ¶ 77, 111 P.3d at 388. ¶ 53 Hampton also claims that the fact that mitigating circumstances are not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency is essentially an element of capital murder and the State has the burden of proving that fact. To the extent that Hampton is arguing that a defendant cannot constitutionally be required to prove the existence of mitigating facts, Anderson II also rejects that claim. Id. ¶ 54 Insofar as Hampton claims he was unconstitutionally saddled with the burden of proving that mitigating circumstances were sufficiently substantial to call for leniency, his factual premise is wrong. The jury was instructed that [n]either the State [n]or the defendant has a burden of proof with regard to weighing whether the mitigation is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. This instruction was in accord with State ex rel. Thomas v. Granville (Baldwin), in which we noted that [a]lthough § 13-703(C) requires the defendant to prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence, the statutory scheme does not place any burden of proof on the defendant in connection with establishing that the mitigation evidence is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. 211 Ariz. 468, 472 ¶ 14, 123 P.3d 662, 666 (2005).