Opinion ID: 2823846
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Weiss Resulted from Improperly Comingled Legal Principles

Text: Â¶18Â Â Â Â Â After examining Weiss and its extensive analysis of prior authority, we determine that Weiss improperly conflated the burden-shifting analysis from arcane common-carrier cases, which shifted the burden of proof onto common-carrier defendants at the outset, with the then-existing res ipsa loquitur jurisprudence, which did not shift the burden of proof once a plaintiff had proven a prima facie case of negligence through res ipsa loquitur. Â¶19Â Â Â Â Â We issued Weiss in 1958âseven years before the Restatement (Second) of Torts disapproved of its burden-shifting approach and twenty-one years before Colorado adopted CRE 301 in 1979. See Restatement (Second) of Torts Â§ 328D (1965) (hereinafter âRestatementâ). At that time, we determined that it was necessary to review the varied cases involving res ipsa loquitur and then âremove existing confusion and . . . state a formulary for the use of the doctrine.â Weiss, 137 Colo. at 548, 328 P.2d at 91. Thus, we embarked on a sweeping review of previous Colorado cases addressing res ipsa loquitur and determined that most cases shifted the burden of proof onto the defendant upon a showing that res ipsa loquitur applied. Id. at 549â53, 328 P.2d at 91â93. Critically, however, we performed this review without the benefit of the Restatementâs admonition regarding res ipsa loquitur: In its inception the principle of res ipsa loquitur was merely a rule of evidence, permitting the jury to draw from the occurrence of an unusual event the conclusion that it was the defendantâs fault. Shortly after its origin, however, it became confused, in cases of injuries to passengers at the hands of carriers, with the older rule which placed the burden of proof upon the carrier to show that its negligence had not caused the injury. This confusion resulted in a great deal of disagreement among the courts as to the application of the principle and its procedural effect. Restatement, Â§ 328D cmt. a (citation omitted). In Weiss, it appears that we too fell into this trap, reading the burden-shifting in common carrier cases as the result of res ipsa loquiturâs application. 137 Colo. at 549â51, 328 P.2d at 91â93. Specifically, the three cases we addressed in detail in Weiss all involved common carriers. See Kansas Pac.Â Ry. Co. v. Miller, 2 Colo. 442, 457 (1874) (holding that the defendant railway company bore the burden of showing that there was no negligence on its part where, âinstead of carrying the [passenger] safely over its road, as the defendant had contracted to do, [the passenger was] killed by the breaking down of a bridge, which [formed] part of [the defendantâs] roadwayâ because âit is the duty of the company to use the highest degree of care to have all their arrangements safe and in good conditionâ); Wall v. Livezay, 6 Colo. 465, 469â70 (1882) (âWhen, therefore, an injury happens to a passenger from an accident to the vehicle or other means of transportation employed, until explained it is presumable that it happened for want of due care on the part of the carrierâ; in such cases â[i]t devolves upon the carrier then to rebut this presumption by evidence that he exercised the greatest degree of diligence practicable under the circumstances.â); Sanderson v. Frazier, 8 Colo. 79, 80â81, 5 P. 632, 636 (1885) (applying the common carrier burden-shifting rule from Livezay to a commercial coach line). Â¶20Â Â Â Â Â Additionally, the defendants in most of the cases that Weiss further cited in support of its holding were also common carriers. See Weiss, 137 Colo. at 551, 328 P.2d at 92â93 (collecting cases). While the burden-shifting approach may have bled over intoa few non-common carrier cases before Weiss was decided, see, e.g., Gylling v. Hinds, 122 Colo. 345, 347â51, 222 P.2d 413, 414â15 (1950) (approving of a jury verdict that seemingly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant in a case about a collapsed roof in a potato cellar but never addressing the burden of proof specifically because the defendant offered no relevant evidence), on balance Weiss was incorrectly decided because it conflated common-carrier presumptions and res ipsa loquitur when it determined that res ipsa loquitur shifts the burden of proof to the defendant under Colorado law. Because Weiss was wrongly decided, we now must determine which view of res ipsa loquiturâs burden-shifting effect will best serve Colorado.