Opinion ID: 78060
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disparate Treatment in Terms and Conditions of Employment

Text: With respect to Crawford's disparate pay claim, the district court determined that Brennaman was not a proper comparator for purposes of a straight salary comparison. We agree with that conclusion. [16] See Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1019 (11th Cir.1994) (stating that to establish a prima facie case of disparate pay, a plaintiff must show she occupies a position similar to that of a higher paid employee who is not a member of her protected class). Not only had Brennaman been employed at GSU for several years longer than Crawford but also Brennaman possessed specialized and highly valued expertise in the information systems field that Crawford does not claim. See Mulhall v. Advance Security, Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 599 (11th Cir.1994). The district court noted that Crawford also presented what it termed a more nuanced pay claim, i.e., that she was not paid at the proper level for her manager position while Caucasian employees in the department, including Brennaman, were paid at the high end of the range for their positions. With respect to this narrower claim the district court apparently accepted, arguendo, that Brennaman and the other employees so paid were proper comparators and that Crawford's allegations could constitute adverse employment actions. Again relying on its analysis of Stavropoulos, however, the district court reasoned that Crawford's successful grievance, which resulted in an upward adjustment of her salary, resulted in no loss of salary or benefits and thus she had suffered no adverse employment action. For essentially the same reasons discussed previously regarding Crawford's merit pay increase claim, we conclude that the district court also erred in finding that Crawford failed to show an adverse employment action in connection with her disparate pay claim. [17] Although Crawford's salary eventually was adjusted to $54,740 (without the four percent merit pay increase), she was denied the use or benefit of that pay raise during the time it should have been in effect. Crawford therefore has shown that she was subjected to a serious and material change affecting her compensation that was sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action for purposes of her disparate pay claim. See Davis, 245 F.3d at 1240; Phelan, 463 F.3d at 780.