Opinion ID: 2633743
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Heading: General Principles Regarding Extradition

Text: Proceedings for the interstate extradition of prisoners are controlled by the federal Constitution and federal law. Sanders v. Conine, 506 F.2d 530, 532 (10th Cir.1974); Hill v. Roberts, 359 So.2d 911, 912 (Fla.Dist. App.1978); People ex rel. Dimas v. Skimp, 83 Ill.App.3d 150, 152, 38 Ill.Dec. 519, 403 N.E.2d 750 (1980); Prettyman v. Karnopp, 192 Neb. 451, 455, 222 N.W.2d 362 (1974). More specifically, extraditions are controlled by Article IV, § 2 of the United States Constitution, which provides in part: A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime. Kansas has implemented the requirements of the federal Extradition Clause by adopting. the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA), K.S.A. 22-2701 et seq. The federal counterpart is 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (2000). In Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 288-89, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held: [T]he courts of an asylum state are bound by Art. IV, § 2, . . . by [18 U.S.C.] § 3182, and, where adopted, by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. A state may not impose more stringent standards or refuse a demand for extradition on the basis of requirements not articulated by federal law. Dunn v. Hindman, 18 Kan.App.2d 537, 544, 855 P.2d 994, rev. denied 253 Kan. 857 (1993); Breckenridge v. Hindman, 10 Kan.App.2d 50, 53, 691 P.2d 405 (1984), rev. denied 236. Kan. 875 (1985). In view of the constitutional mandate for extradition, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that extradition proceedings were intended to be limited in scope in order to facilitate a swift and efficient transfer of custody to the demanding state: Interstate extradition was intended to be a summary and mandatory executive proceeding derived from the language of Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. [Citations omitted.] The Clause never contemplated that the asylum state was to conduct the kind of preliminary inquiry traditionally intervening between the initial arrest and trial. ` . . . [Extradition] is but one step in securing the presence of the defendant in the court in which he may be tried, and in no manner determines the question of guilt.' Doran, 439 U.S. at 288, 99 S.Ct. 530 (quoting In re Strauss, 197 U.S. 324, 332-33, 49 L.Ed. 774, 25 S.Ct. 535 [1905]). Generally a district court's review powers in the asylum state, therefore, are limited. Once a governor has granted extradition, a court considering release on habeas corpus can do no more than decide: (a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive. These are historic facts readily verifiable. Doran, 439 U.S. at 289, 99 S.Ct. 530. See Pacileo v. Walker, 446 U.S. 1307, 1309, 100 S.Ct. 1633, 64 L.Ed.2d 221 (1980). In Kennon v. State, 248 Kan. 515, 521, 809 P.2d 546 (1991), this court discussed Doran and explained that being a fugitive means the accused was in the demanding state when the alleged crime was committed. Further, the court distinguished between mandatory extradition under K.S.A. 22-2702, which applies when it is alleged the person was in the demanding state at the time the alleged crime was committed, and discretionary extradition under K.S.A. 22-2706, which applies when it is alleged the person committed an act in Kansas or a third state that intentionally resulted in a crime in the demanding state. 248 Kan. at 522-23, 809 P.2d 546. This court also discussed the fugitive requirement in State v. Smith, 232 Kan. 128, 652 P.2d 703 (1982), where the court concluded that extradition had been appropriately ordered even though Smith disputed his presence in the demanding state on the dates of the alleged crime. Smith admitted to having been in the demanding state around the time of the alleged crime and to being the person identified in the demand. The Smith decision is illustrative of a long line of Kansas cases in which it has been determined that an extradition proceeding in the asylum state is not the proper forum for considering defenses or resolving the issue of guilt or innocence. Those matters must be raised at trial in the demanding state. See Perry v. Gwartney, 162 Kan. 607, Syl. ¶ 2, 178 P.2d 185 (1947); Dunn, 18 Kan.App.2d at 545, 855 P.2d 994; see also California v. Superior Court of California, 482 U.S. 400, 407-08, 107 S.Ct. 2433, 96 L.Ed.2d 332 (1987); Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 135, 38 S.Ct. 41, 62 L.Ed. 193 (1917); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192, 206, 27 S.Ct. 111, 51 L.Ed. 148 (1906). But Patton does not raise issues regarding his competency at the time of the crime or his competency to stand trial; rather, the focus of this appeal is on his competency during the extradition procedure itself.