Opinion ID: 2612481
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: history of the structure of wyoming law

Text: From before the time of statehood, Wyoming sentencing processes provided broad discretion to the trial court. [10] S.F. 100, 10th Leg. (1909), enacted as Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 87 (1909), successfully introduced [a]n act relating to the parole of prisoners found guilty by a jury on their plea of guilty of crimes charged against them. As first offense sentencing process, the enacted statute was a juvenile sentencing act with comprehensive characteristics for purposes of clarity and to differentiate a succeeding statute. This enactment will be called the Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act. [11] PAROLE. Section 1. Whenever any person, not over twenty-one years of age, shall have been found guilty by the verdict of a jury empaneled to try his case, or by his plea of guilty, duly entered in the cause, of any felony except murder, rape of a woman or female child forcibly and against her will, or arson of a dwelling house or other human habitation in the actual occupancy of a human being, the court in which such verdict was found or plea of guilty entered, shall ascertain, if possible, whether the offense of which the accused is found guilty is his first offense, as well as the extent of moral turpitude involved in the act committed, and such other facts and circumstances relating to the accused as he may desire to know; and if satisfied that such person was a person of good reputation before the commission of the offense charged and had never before been convicted of any felony, and that if permitted to go at large would not again violate the law, may in its discretion, by an order entered of record, delay the passing sentence upon such verdict, or plea, and parole such person and permit him to go at large upon his own recognizance    and the Court, if satisfied   , that such person has demeaned himself in a law-abiding manner and lived a worthy, respectable life, may by an order of record, continue such parole from time to time for the period of five years, at the expiration of which period the Court shall enter an order finally discharging such person, and no further proceedings shall be had upon such verdict or plea; Provided, however, That at any time after the expiration of one year from the date of said original parole the Court shall have the power in its discretion to terminate said parole and finally discharge such person and annul such verdict or plea of guilty. ABSOLUTE DISCRETION. Sec. 2. The Court, in the exercise of its power to determine the previous good character of any such person, to determine the advisability of paroling such person, to determine the propriety of finally discharging such person at any time after the end of one year, and to determine the fact of violation of the terms of the parole and recognizance and propriety of imposing sentence upon such person, shall have absolute discretion, and no appeal or proceeding in error shall lie from the determination of the Court upon any of said questions. NO DELAY. Sec. 3. No delay in the passing of sentence or parole of a person as provided in this act shall be ordered against the consent or will of such person. Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 87 (1909) (emphasis added). Exercise of the parole or probationary status provided by the act was initially subject to consent of the charged individual because of exposure to a probation term of five years. That statute, initially limited to persons under twenty-one years of age, was followed in initial success with a 1931 change by which the age limitation was removed. Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 73, § 9 (1931). [12] The sentencing statute was triggered by a conviction or a plea of guilty followed by imposed parole obligations and gave authority to the trial court to annul the verdict or plea in order that a conviction of a felony did not result. After the age limitation had been removed from the 1909 enactment, the statute remained essentially unchanged until Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157 (1987). It was in the recodification of this Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act where the prosecutorial veto provision became appended by legislative passage as the provision from which this appeal is presented. What had started as a juvenile sentencing statute has now expanded to a first offender, non-conviction statute by W.S. 7-13-301 with transposition of provisions from another statute. With the 1909 Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act in place, the legislature, by Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 91 (1939), enacted a separate procedure as a new sentencing code which provided for suspension of trial as well as suspension of sentence by probation. Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 91 (1939) in part provided: Power of Court to Suspend Sentence or Trial in Some Cases  Probation. Section 1. After conviction or plea of guilty for any offense, except crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may suspend the imposition or the execution of sentence and may also place the defendant on probation or may impose a fine applicable to the offense and also place the defendant on probation. With the consent of a defendant charged with a crime, except a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may suspend trial and place such defendant on probation. County Attorney  Clerk of Court  Duties. Section 2. When directed by the court, the county attorney shall fully investigate and report to the court in writing the circumstances of the offense, and the criminal record, social history and present conditions of the defendant, including, whenever practicable, the findings of a physical and mental examination of the defendant. No defendant charged with a felony, and, unless the court shall direct otherwise in individual cases, no other defendant shall be placed on probation or released under suspension of trial or sentence until the report of such investigation shall have been presented to and considered by the court. If such defendant is committed to any institution, a copy of the report of such investigation shall be sent to the institution at the time of commitment. In all cases the clerk of court shall forward copies of such report to the Board of Charities and Reform, and copies of all orders entered by the court. Court May Modify Conditions. Section 3. The court shall determine and may, by order duly entered, impose in its discretion, and may at any time modify any condition or conditions or probation or suspension of trial or sentence. Extension of Suspension or Probation  Discharge  Violation of Conditions by Defendant. Section 4. The period of probation or suspension of trial or sentence and the conditions thereof shall be determined by the court and may be continued or extended. Upon the satisfactory fulfillment of the conditions of suspension of trial or sentence or probation the court shall by order duly entered discharge the defendant. At any time during the period of suspension of trial or sentence or probation, the court may issue a warrant and cause the defendant to be arrested for violating any of the conditions of probation or suspension of trial or sentence. As soon as practicable after the arrest the court shall cause the defendant to be brought before it and may proceed to deal with the case as if no suspension of trial or sentence or probation had been ordered. Fines. Section 5. When imposing a fine and also placing the defendant on probation, the judge of the district court may permit such fine to be paid in such installments and over such periods of time as he deems possible and reasonable. Power of the Governor.[ [13] ] Section 6. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to impair the power of the Governor to grant a pardon or commutation in any case. The difference between the 1909 Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act and the 1939 adult suspension of trial or sentence act was essentially operational. The Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act required plea or conviction and afforded an opportunity to avoid the felony conviction. Alternatively, the adult suspension of trial or sentence act, if applied following plea, permitted no remission of the felony status but could result, if applied for suspension of trial, with the same result as the Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act. The practical difference between the Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act and the adult suspended trial or sentence act is the provision in the latter where no plea was required for utilization if trial was suspended. Another obvious difference is the flexibility afforded in the Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act permitting a conclusion after one year, which provision might not necessarily be equally available under the later statute. The finality of the adult sentencing statute was established not only by the probationary terms but by provisions for entry of a judgment for the payment of a fine. Then, Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 68, § 1 (1984) provided a potential for prison labor when the statute then numbered W.S. 7-13-301, 7-13-302, and 7-13-303 was amended to add: 7-13-303. Imposition or modification of conditions; work as a condition of probation.       (b) As a condition of any probation, the court, subject to W.S. 7-13-701 through 7-13-704, may order the defendant to perform work for a period not exceeding the maximum probation period. 7-13-701. Work for persons confined in county jail or probationers; generally. (a) The sentencing court may require the following persons to perform work pursuant to W.S. 7-13-701 through 7-13-704:       (iii) Persons for whom work is imposed as a condition or probation pursuant to W.S. 7-13-303(b). Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 68 (1984). These two statutes were essentially restated in the 1987 Title 7 recodification with the Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act restated as W.S. 7-13-301 and the adult suspended trial or sentence act restated as W.S. 7-13-302 through 7-13-307. [14] The Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act was turned upside down by a Senate judiciary committee amendment (without change in the title of the bill) to provide prosecutorial veto for use of the sentencing statute by the addition of the words with the consent of the defendants and the state.  The adult suspended trial or sentence act lost its principle reason for existence by deletion of the provision which permitted suspension of trial and entry of a probationary sentence. The provision for suspension of trial disappeared in the same way that the prosecutorial veto provision was inserted. Without question, the adult suspended trial or sentence act was turned into a pure sentencing statute by deletion of the provisions. The majority now contends that the Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act, circa 1909, was also turned into a diversion statute. The majority uses this contention to justify the legislature's insertion of the prosecutorial veto as a limitation on sentencing authority of the judiciary. The majority is totally wrong in context and the citation of authority fails to sustain the basic arguments presented. The only diversion feature of either statute had been found in the adult suspended trial or sentence act. These cases presented never considered the question of diversion. First justification for finding the Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act to be a diversionary process and not a sentencing statute is presented by the majority in discussion of prosecutorial powers of nolle prosequi. The presentation is well structured, but contains a pervasive fault. Nolle prosequi has nothing to do with these cases and this prosecutorial veto power in the sentencing statutes. Pure nolle prosequi cases addressing executive and judicial discretion can be immediately excluded as totally inapplicable for any precedent in this case. [15] Of more arguable relation, we can find the cited cases involving prosecutorial participation in pretrial diversion programs. A clearer look is required to perceive why even this line of authority really does not justify application since W.S. 7-13-301, as the successor to the 1909 juvenile sentencing statute, is still a sentencing statute and not a diversion program as it relates to the cases actually presented. What might have happened if diversion  probation without plea  had been attempted is hypothetical and not presented by any of the cases addressed. The reason is that judicial action is invoked only following trial conviction or guilty plea and the sentencing mechanism is restricted to a confined class of individuals and specific offenses. The statute provides a probationary sentence which is wholly unremarkable in sentencing technique with the only individualized feature different from many laws being the opportunity to avoid the burden of a conviction of a felony by good behavior. Over a lifetime, that burden will no doubt exceed any immediate detriment and responsibility impressed by compliance with terms of probation. The structure of Wyoming criminal statutes for juvenile offenses vests exclusive authority in the juvenile courts for persons under the age of thirteen, court discretionary transfer authority under seventeen, and exclusive discretion in the prosecutor for youths age seventeen or older. W.S. 14-2-203; Menapace v. State, 768 P.2d 8 (Wyo. 1989). Now, the prosecutor has discretion to require adult proceedings for young people seventeen or older and the power to insist on the entry of a felony judgment.