Opinion ID: 614681
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Juror Martinez

Text: The sixth stricken Hispanic juror, Martinez, did not say anything particularly favorable to either the prosecution or the defense. The district court found that Martinez’s disability, and the 30-mile drive from his home to the courthouse, “could give rise to concern over daily punctuality.” In his comparative analysis, Carrera contends these purported group bias-neutral reasons could not have formed the basis of the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge. Although Martinez was never questioned about the type of disability to which he was subject, or how it would affect his potential service as a juror, he did state that he had been a truck driver, but had been disabled from that work since 1976—for 7 years by the time of trial. Martinez’s commute from Delano to court in Fresno was 30 miles. Another potential juror (Juror Allen) had a longer commute than Martinez and said the commute would “cause a problem,” whereas Martinez said his commute would not be difficult. There was nothing to show Allen CARRERA v. AYERS 18725 was in any way disabled. Allen became a juror in Carrera’s trial. Carrera contends that had a Wheeler motion been made, this evidence would tend to suggest the prosecutor’s peremptory was based on group bias. However, the question we face is one step removed: Was defense counsel deficient to either (1) believe a Wheeler motion would fail because the prosecutor could come up with a race-neutral reason to challenge Martinez, or (2) decide she was happy the prosecutor struck Juror Martinez? Martinez presented with a combination of facts which imply a race-neutral reason for the prosecutor to have excused him. First, Martinez had a long-standing disability, of seven years’ duration. Second, this disability had invalidated him from his work—truck driving. Third, his commute from Delano to the Fresno courthouse was 30 miles long. The description of this disability may have been obvious in the courtroom, but was left undescribed in the record. One explanation that comes to mind for the prosecutor’s decision to excuse Martinez: the prosecutor wanted to ingratiate himself with the remaining jurors by relieving the disabled Martinez from sitting on a long jury trial. However, this does not end the inquiry. There are reasons for striking a potential juror that would not show up in a trial transcript. See, e.g., Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341 (2006) (holding that “eye rolling” and “youthfulness” were permissible grounds for exercising a peremptory challenge). Any number of reasons for striking Juror Martinez may have been apparent to every person in the courtroom, yet unavailable to one reading the transcript of voir dire. But it is Carrera who has the burden of showing defense counsel was deficient in failing to bring a Wheeler motion in response to the prosecutor’s peremptories. On this record, Carrera has failed to carry his burden. 18726 CARRERA v. AYERS [6] Indeed, during state habeas proceedings, the prosecutor declared there were race bias-neutral reasons for striking each Hispanic juror. The prosecutor declared that, although, understandably, he could not remember nearly five years later his reason for striking each juror he had “specific reasons justifying each of [his] challenges not based on race.” The prosecutor further declared: I believed the crimes Constantino Carrera committed were so brutal and senseless that any responsible juror would hold Carrera responsible if I proved my case. I thought responsible Hispanic jurors would be very good jurors, as they would not tolerate such lawless, senseless, brutal and vicious conduct and would be particularly interested in holding Carrera responsible for his actions. Specifically, the prosecutor declared: “I know I didn’t kick off any jurors just because they were Hispanic. Race was never a cause for me to excuse any juror.” This declaration provides some evidence of the fact that—although five years later he could not detail them—the prosecutor had group bias-neutral reasons for his exercising peremptory challenges against each of the six Hispanic jurors, and therefore that defense counsel was reasonable in not making a Wheeler motion. Further, this court’s jurisprudence demonstrates the high level of deference given to counsel’s decisions during jury selection. In United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344 (9th Cir. 1995), Quintero-Barraza contended, on direct appeal, that counsel was ineffective for failing to strike a potentially biased juror. Id. at 1349. During voir dire in QuinteroBarraza’s criminal trial, prospective juror David Miller, a criminal justice student, stated his belief that one is guilty until proven innocent. Id. He also stated that it would be “difficult” for him to be impartial. Id. Counsel did not strike Miller; instead, he expressed his admiration for Miller’s CARRERA v. AYERS 18727 truthfulness: “I was impressed with him. I thought he gave a very candid answer.” Id. at 1349 & n.4. This court held: Counsel’s actions in this regard pose a more difficult question for this Court. It is manifest, however, that he was making a tactical decision in declining to strike Miller. Counsel appears to have concluded that because Miller was honest about his pretrial views, he would also honestly apply the law as outlined in the judge’s instructions. Under Strickland, our review of this tactical decision “must be highly deferential,” and we must accord the decision “a strong presumption” of validity, regardless of whether we agree with it. We are not persuaded that appellant has overcome that strong presumption. Id. (citation to Strickland omitted). In Fields v. Woodford, 309 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2002), Fields appealed the district court’s summary judgment of his habeas petition. Id. at 1097-98. Fields contended “his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to conduct meaningful voir dire, specifically, by failing to question at all [beyond the questions asked by the court] six of the jurors who were ultimately empaneled.” Id. at 1107. Fields further contended that competent counsel, given potential juror Hillard’s equivocal answer as to impartiality due to an assault against Hillard’s wife, “would have questioned him further about the incident, challenged him for cause, and if that challenge were denied, exercised a peremptory challenge to remove him from the jury.” Id. This court stated: Whether counsel was deficient is a close call. On the one hand, it is tough to imagine why he did not pur- sue what kind of assault Hilliard’s wife suffered, given that the non-capital charges against Fields included rape. On the other hand, it may be that he decided not to emphasize Fields’s behavior through 18728 CARRERA v. AYERS additional questioning, or that counsel believed Hilliard’s statement that he could base his decision strictly on the evidence despite his wife’s experience. At oral argument the state suggested another possibility: that counsel may have wanted to keep Hilliard on the jury because he was African- American. Id. at 1108. This court concluded it could “not say that failure to inquire beyond the court’s voir dire was outside the range of reasonable strategic choice.” Id. In Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2006), Hovey appealed the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 897. One of Hovey’s claims was that counsel’s voir dire was so perfunctory that counsel failed to protect Hovey’s rights to an impartial jury. Id. at 909. Specifically, Hovey contended that “counsel should have questioned potential jurors on both the widespread pretrial publicity and Hovey’s decision not to testify.” Id. at 910. This court rejected the claim. Id. This court stated that “[t]he conduct of voir dire ‘will in most instances involve the exercise of a judgment which should be left to competent defense counsel.’ ” Id. (quoting Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 1980)). Counsel testified that he believed the least voir dire to be the best tactic, explaining that he preferred to rely on “nonverbal communication.” Id. Thus, this court held counsel’s performance was not deficient under Strickland. Id. [7] Similarly here, Carrera has not overcome the strong presumption that defense counsel’s decision not to challenge the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges was strategic. There are many reasons why an attorney may strike a juror. See, e.g., Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. ___ (2011) (per curiam) (holding that perceived racial harassment by police and educational background were permissible grounds for exercising peremptory challenges); Rice, 546 U.S. at 341 (holding that CARRERA v. AYERS 18729 “eye rolling” and “youthfulness” were permissible grounds for exercising a peremptory challenge). Further, there are many reasons why defense counsel may have supported the removal of the Hispanics struck by the prosecutor. Indeed, defense counsel may have been pleased with the resulting jury, despite the fact that the prosecutor had removed several Hispanic venirepersons. Moreover, when the prosecutor peremptorily challenged each Hispanic, defense counsel may have made a split-second decision that the challenge was on a permissible, bias-neutral ground, and that a Wheeler motion would therefore be futile. Carrera does not address these possibilities. The only evidence Carrera has proffered in support of the assertion that defense counsel was ineffective in not making a Wheeler motion is the declaration of an expert, who was not present at voir dire to observe the demeanor or appearance of the prospective jurors and did not even review any part of the voir dire transcript. This court has previously rejected similar (and stronger) evidence as unpersuasive. See Paradis v. Arave, 954 F.2d 1483, 1491 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting an attorney’s testimony in support of habeas petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the attorney was not present to observe the demeanor of jurors and reviewed voir dire of only the jurors ultimately empaneled), rev’d on other grounds, 507 U.S. 1026 (1993).