Opinion ID: 2623519
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Validity of Plea

Text: Defendant contends his guilty plea to murder with special circumstances must be set aside for lack of an express waiver of his rights to a jury trial and against self-incrimination, as required by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and article I, section 16 of the state Constitution. [A] valid guilty plea presuppose[s] a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the defendant's constitutional trial rights, which include the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers. ( People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1175, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) The reviewing court must determine whether the record affirmatively demonstrates that the plea was voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. ( Id. at p. 1178, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) Here, during the proceedings on the change of plea at the conclusion of the People's guilt phase case-in-chief, the prosecutor advised defendant as follows: Now, when you plead guilty, you are going to be giving up certain rights. And you have the right to be tried by a jury in a public and speedy trial. And so far in the guilt phase of this case, you have actually had a trial up to this point by a jury picked by your lawyers and yourself. [¶] When you plead guilty, you are giving up the right to have that same jury decide whether or not you are guilty and you are giving up that right to have the jury decide whether or not those special circumstances are true. [¶] Do you understand that you are giving up that right when you plead guilty? Defendant responded: Yes, sir. The prosecutor continued: In the course of that trial, the trial we've had so far, you've had the opportunity through your lawyers or yourself, if you want, to confront the witnesses that are brought into the courtroom and to cross-examine those witnesses. And that's been done so far. [¶] When you plead guilty at this point, you are giving up the right to confront and cross-examine any other witnesses that the prosecution might want to bring in in the guilt phase. Do you understand that? Defendant answered: Yes, sir. The prosecutor inquired: [Is that] what you want to do? Defendant responded: Yes, sir. The prosecutor continued: There is the right at a guilt phase of the trial to testify in your own behalf if you want. You can get on the witness stand and testify under oath, or you can sit in the courtroom with your lawyers and remain silent and not say anything at all. When you plead guilty, in effect you are giving up your right to remain silent because you are making a statement about these crimes. Do you understand that? Defendant answered: Yes, sir. The prosecutor asked: Is that what you want to do? Defendant responded affirmatively. Defendant contends the record reflects merely that he was informed of his rights and expressed a desire to give them up, not that he actually did so. In the totality of the circumstances, however  in particular, defendant's having been represented by counsel and having participated in the trial to that point pursuant to his former plea of not guilty  we have no doubt his words signified actual waiver of his rights preparatory to his change of plea. Defendant further contends article I, section 16 of the state Constitution requires express waiver of the jury right in this context. He acknowledges we held in People v. Ernst (1994) 8 Cal.4th 441, 446, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 238, 881 P.2d 298, that that provision does not apply when a defendant waives the right to trial by pleading guilty, but applies only when a defendant exercises his right to trial but waives the right to a jury. Defendant urges that by creating a higher standard for the acceptance of a jury trial waiver when the accused chooses a court trial, where all that is waived is not the right to have the facts tried, but just the right to have a jury as the trier of fact, than the standard for the acceptance of a jury trial waiver when a defendant pleads guilty, thereby waiving his right to have any trier of fact adjudicate the charges, is a denial of equal protection of the laws, guaranteed by the United States Constitution. He contends a defendant pleading guilty is situated similarly to a defendant forgoing a jury and electing a court trial, and that the constitutional provision differentially affecting the exercise of such fundamental rights can be justified only by a compelling state interest. To the contrary, a case involving a guilty plea, in which no issues are to be tried, is indeed different from one in which issues remain for trial before the court. (See id. at p. 448, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 238, 881 P.2d 298.) We therefore conclude article I, section 16 of the state Constitution, as we have interpreted it, is consistent with federal equal protection principles.