Opinion ID: 1796794
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Direct or Indirect Contempt.

Text: Contempt is also characterized as direct or indirect. A civil or a criminal contempt may be either direct or indirect. Direct contempts are those committed in the judge's presence, where all of the essential elements of the contempt are under the eye of the court, and are actually observed by the court. In a direct contempt case, the judge can summarily and instantaneously find the person to be in contempt. If some of the essential elements of contempt are not personally observed by the judge, the contempt is indirect. Tetter v. State, 358 So.2d 1046 (Ala.1978). An indirect contempt is committed outside the presence of the court and is characterized by the act of disobeying the court's orders. Brooks v. Brooks, 480 So.2d 1233 (Ala.Civ. App.1985); Nichols v. Nichols, 46 Ala.App. 67, 238 So.2d 186, cert. denied, 286 Ala. 156, 238 So.2d 190 (1970). The elements of due process to be afforded an individual charged with indirect contempt are different from the elements of due process to be afforded one charged with a direct contempt. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925); Charles Manufacturing Co., supra . Where an individual is charged with indirect or constructive contempt, due process requires that he be given notice of the charges and a reasonable opportunity to meet them, the right to call witnesses and confront his accuser, and the right to give testimony relevant either to complete exculpation or to extenuation of the offense and evidence in mitigation of the penalty to be imposed. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 136 v. Davis Constructors & Engineers, Inc., 334 So.2d 892 (Ala.1976). The line between civil and criminal contempt can sometimes become blurred, as in this case. Conceivably, if the juvenile court had jurisdiction, then Mrs. Thomas's actions could have constituted indirect criminal contempt, direct criminal contempt, indirect civil contempt, and direct civil contempt. Prior to May 24, 1988, the date she appeared before the juvenile court, Mrs. Thomas was guilty, if at all, of indirect civil contempt and indirect criminal contempt. Any act by Mrs. Thomas occurred outside the presence of the court. On May 24, 1988, the day she appeared before the juvenile court, her actions could have constituted direct civil contempt, direct criminal contempt, indirect civil contempt, and indirect criminal contempt. Because Mrs. Thomas disobeyed the order of the court by not producing her son, Mrs. Thomas would have been guilty of criminal contempt. Confusion arises in attempts to classify civil and criminal contempts, because the elements often overlap. In appropriate circumstances, however, a party's actions can support a finding of both civil and criminal contempt. Klingler v. White, 465 So.2d 405, 408 (Ala.Civ.App.1984); Wilson v. Freeman, 402 So.2d 1004 (Ala.Civ. App.1981). Because incarceration on a finding of civil contempt is a sanction coercive in nature and is designed to compel compliance with the court's orders, when the punishment can no longer have any coercive effect it becomes punitive and may no longer be imposed. Brooks, supra . Because it is impossible to coerce that which is beyond a person's power to perform, once the confinement ceases to have any coercive impact, continued imprisonment for civil contempt constitutes a violation of due process. Brooks, supra ; In re Grand Jury Investigation, 600 F.2d 420, 424 (3d Cir. 1979); Lambert v. State of Montana, 545 F.2d 87 (9th Cir.1976). In the present case, the juvenile court held Mrs. Thomas in direct civil contempt. Mrs. Thomas repeatedly denied knowing her son's whereabouts. Because Mrs. Thomas was held in civil contempt, she conceivably could have remained incarcerated indefinitely. But what if she actually did not know where her son was located? In cases such as this, after the contemnor has been incarcerated for a substantial length of time, the trial judge should bring the contemnor before him for another due process hearing in which he can reevaluate the factual basis of his first adjudication. If he is satisfied that his determination was correct, he should again incarcerate her. If he is of the opinion that she is telling the truth, of course, he should release her. This issue is moot, however, because she was released on August 18, 1988. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is due to be affirmed. AFFIRMED. JONES, ALMON, SHORES, HOUSTON, STEAGALL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. MADDOX, J., dissents.