Opinion ID: 362346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Effect of the Treaty Violation

Text: 50 The defendants contend that because the second boarding was in violation of a treaty obligation of the United States, the district court did not have jurisdiction over them. We would summarily dismiss the defendants' contention, under the authority of ample precedent, if it concerned a mere violation of law not embodied in a treaty binding on the United States. A defendant may not ordinarily assert the illegality of his obtention to defeat the court's jurisdiction over him. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119, 95 S.Ct. 854, 865, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522, 72 S.Ct. 509, 511-12, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444, 7 S.Ct. 225, 229, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886); United States v. Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043, 1045 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946, 96 S.Ct. 356, 46 L.Ed.2d 277 (1975); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 985-86 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied sub nom. Parks v. United States, 423 U.S. 825, 96 S.Ct. 39, 46 L.Ed.2d 41 (1975); Voigt v. Toombs, 67 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1933), Cert. dismissed, 291 U.S. 686, 54 S.Ct. 442, 78 L.Ed. 1072 (1934). This proposition, the so-called Ker-Frisbie doctrine, is equally valid where the illegality results from a breach of international law not codified in a treaty. 16 United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1259-60 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d at 988-89; Autry v. Wiley, 440 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1971); See United States v. Quesada ; United States v. Lopez, 542 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). These precedentsrest on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will. 51 Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. at 522, 72 S.Ct. at 512. 17 52 Where a treaty has been violated, the rules may be quite different, as was demonstrated by the Supreme Court in the case of Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 53 S.Ct. 305, 77 L.Ed. 641 (1933). Cook involved a libel brought against the British vessel Mazel Tov, which had been seized for smuggling liquor into the United States. The Court held that the seizure had been effected in violation of a treaty between the United States and Great Britain. 18 The Court recognized the forfeiture principle paralleling the Ker-Frisbie doctrine that the wrongful acquisition of property against which a libel has been filed does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the property. 288 U.S. at 121, 53 S.Ct. at 312. It went on, however, to hold this principle inapplicable because the United States had imposed a territorial limitation upon its own authority by entering into the treaty. Id. Our government, lacking power to seize, lacked power, because of the Treaty, to subject the vessel to our laws. Id. 53 The result in Cook had been presaged by the Supreme Court in Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 47 S.Ct. 531, 71 L.Ed. 793 (1927), a prosecution for conspiracy to violate the liquor smuggling statutes. That case concerned the same treaty construed in Cook, and the Court expressly distinguished Ker v. Illinois. 54 The Solicitor General (asserts), on the authority of Ker v. Illinois . . . , that an illegal seizure would not have ousted the jurisdiction of the court to try the defendants. But the Ker Case does not apply here. It related to a trial in a state court, and this court found that the illegal seizure of the defendant therein violated neither the federal Constitution, nor a federal law, nor a treaty of the United States, and so that the validity of their (Sic ) trial after alleged seizure was not a matter of federal cognizance. Here a treaty of the United States is directly involved, and the question is quite different. 55 273 U.S. at 605-06, 47 S.Ct. at 535. Although the convictions in Ford were affirmed because the defendants had not timely raised the jurisdictional issue, the just-quoted dictum was given operative effect in two criminal prosecutions concerning seizures in violation of a treaty between the United States and Panama that was essentially the same as the treaty construed in Cook and Ford. In United States v. Schouweiler, 19 F.2d 387 (S.D.Cal.1927), and United States v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925 (N.D.Cal.1927), pleas to the jurisdiction of the district court were sustained, and the prosecutions were dismissed. 56 Cook and Ford must be viewed in the fuller context of treaty law to appreciate their reasoning, for it is not true that every treaty to which the United States is a party acts to limit the jurisdiction of its courts. Article 6 of the United States Constitution declares treaties made under the Authority of the United States (to) be the supreme Law of the Land, but it was early decided that treaties affect the municipal law of the United States only when those treaties are given effect by congressional legislation or are, by their nature, self-executing. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194, 8 S.Ct. 456, 458, 31 L.Ed. 386 (1888); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 311, 7 L.Ed. 415 (1829); Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952); Dickinson, Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing?, 20 Am.J.Int'l L. 444 (1926). In Whitney v. Robertson, the Court explained: 57 A treaty is primarily a contract between two or more independent nations, and is so regarded by writers on public law. For the infraction of its provisions a remedy must be sought by the injured party through reclamations upon the other. When the stipulations are not self-executing, they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect . . . . If the treaty contains stipulations which are self-executing, that is, require no legislation to make them operative, to that extent they have the force and effect of a legislative enactment. 58 124 U.S. at 194, 8 S.Ct. at 458. 59 Most significantly, the court in Cook declared the treaty in issue there to be self-executing. (I)n a strict sense the Treaty was self-executing, in that no legislation was necessary to authorize executive action pursuant to its provisions. 288 U.S. at 119, 53 S.Ct. at 311 (footnote omitted). The Court went on to hold that the treaty, being self-executing and therefore equivalent to federal legislation, superseded a customs statute that would otherwise have validated the seizure. Id.; see note 18 Supra. 60 We read Cook and Ford to stand for the proposition that self-executing treaties may act to deprive the United States, and hence its courts, of jurisdiction over property and individuals that would otherwise be subject to that jurisdiction. 19 The law of treaties teaches, however, that treaties may have this effect only when self-executing. Therefore, the determinative issue in the case before us is whether article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas is self-executing. See Ficken, The 1935 Anti-Smuggling Act Applied to Hovering Narcotics Smugglers Beyond the Contiguous Zone: An Assessment Under International Law, 29 U.Miami L.Rev. 700, 724-27 (1975). 20 We hold that it is not. 61 The question whether a treaty is self-executing is a matter of interpretation for the courts when the issue presents itself in litigation, Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 154(1) (1965), and, as in the case of all matters of interpretation, the courts attempt to discern the intent of the parties to the agreement so as to carry out their manifest purpose. Board of County Commissioners v. Aerolineas Peruanasa, 307 F.2d 802, 806 (5th Cir. 1962), Cert. denied, 371 U.S. 961, 83 S.Ct. 543, 9 L.Ed.2d 510 (1963); A. McNair, Law of Treaties 365 (1961); 1 D. O'Connell, International Law 271 (1965). The parties' intent may be apparent from the language of the treaty, or, if the language is ambiguous, it may be divined from the circumstances surrounding the treaty's promulgation. Cook,288 U.S. at 112, 53 S.Ct. at 308; Diggs v. Richardson, 180 U.S.App.D.C. 376, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C.Cir. 1976); Johansson v. United States, 336 F.2d 809, 813 (5th Cir. 1964). 62 The self-execution question is perhaps one of the most confounding in treaty law. 21 Theoretically a self-executing and an executory provision should be readily distinguishable. In practice it is difficult. Reiff, The Enforcement of Multipartite Administrative Treaties in the United States, 34 Am.J.Int'l L. 661, 669 (1940). A treaty may expressly provide for legislative execution. An example is found in articles 27 through 29 of the Convention on the High Seas, each of which begins with the preamble Every State shall take the necessary legislative measures to . . . . 22 Such provisions are uniformly declared executory. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 311-12, 7 L.Ed. 415 (1829); Dickinson, Supra, at 448. And it appears that treaties cannot affect certain subject matters without implementing legislation. A treaty cannot be self-executing . . . to the extent that it involves governmental action that under the Constitution can be taken only by the Congress. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 141(3) (1965). Thus, since article 1, section 9 of the Constitution prohibits the drawing of money from the treasury without congressional enactment, it is doubtful that a treaty could appropriate moneys. The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 845 (D.Conn.1925) (dictum); S. Crandall, Treaties § 74 (2d ed. 1916). The same appears to be the case with respect to criminal sanctions. The Over the Top, 5 F.2d at 845; Dickinson, Supra, at 449-50. 63 Apart from those few instances in which the language of the provision expressly calls for legislative implementation or the subject matter is within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, the question is purely a matter of interpretation. Id. at 449. In carrying out our interpretive task, we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties. Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32, 63 S.Ct. 672, 678, 87 L.Ed. 877 (1943) (citations omitted). In the specific context of determining whether a treaty provision is self-executing, we may refer to several factors: 64 the purposes of the treaty and the objectives of its creators, the existence of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate for direct implementation, the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods, and the immediate and long-range consequences of self- or non-self-execution. 65 People of Saipan v. United States Department of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974), Cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003, 95 S.Ct. 1445, 43 L.Ed.2d 761 (1975). With these principles in mind, we proceed to examine the treaty provision in issue here, article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas. 66 Article 6 declares the exclusivity of a nation's jurisdiction over the vessels entitled to fly its flag: Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas. 23 On its face, this language would bear a self-executing construction because it purports to preclude the exercise of jurisdiction by foreign states in the absence of an exception embodied in treaty. We are admonished, however, to interpret treaties in the context of their promulgation, and we think the context of article 6 compels the conclusion that it is not self-executing. 67 We start with the observation that the Convention on the High Seas, as its preamble states, is intended to be generally declaratory of established principles of international law. Indeed, that a state enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over its flag vessels, in the absence of an exception sanctioned under customary international law, is just such a principle. See The S.S. Lotus, (1927) P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 25; Le Louis, 165 Eng.Rep. 1464, 1475 (Adm.1817); 1 L. Oppenheim, International Law 589 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955). But the question we must answer is whether by ratifying the Convention on the High Seas the United States undertook to incorporate the restrictive language of article 6, which limits the permissible exercise of jurisdiction to those provided by treaty, into its domestic law and make it available in a criminal action as a defense to the jurisdiction of its courts. There is nothing in the circumstances surrounding the formulation and adoption of the Convention that would support the conclusion that it did. 68 The Convention on the High Seas is a multilateral treaty which has been ratified by over fifty nations, some of which do not recognize treaties as self-executing. 24 It is difficult therefore to ascribe to the language of the treaty any common intent that the treaty should of its own force operate as the domestic law of the ratifying nations. This is not to say that by entering into such a multilateral treaty the United States cannot without legislation execute provisions of it, but one would expect that in these circumstances the United States would make that intention clear. The lack of mutuality between the United States and countries that do not recognize treaties as self-executing would seem to call for as much. Here there was no such manifestation. 69 The 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which promulgated the conventions at issue here, adopted article 6 verbatim as submitted to it by the International Law Commission, which had been convened to draw a draft convention. See International Law Commission, Report, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 25, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956). As McDougal and Burke point out: At the 1958 Conference, very little attention was given to this portion of Article 30 (the Commission draft) and even certain inconsequential amendments proposed were not adopted. Article 6(1) therefore embodies the exact wording of Article 30 as it appears in . . . the 1956 Report of the Commission. M. McDougal & W. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans 874 (1962) (footnote omitted). Had the United States interpreted the International Law Commission's draft article as a limitation of its jurisdiction to that expressly conferred by treaty, we think that considerably more attention would have been directed to the article, for a self-executing interpretation would severely curtail the traditional practice of the United States in exercising jurisdiction on the high seas in the absence of treaty as evidenced by substantial legislation designed to enforce customs regulations there. 70 A literal reading of article 6 would prohibit the exercise of jurisdiction in all cases that do not come within exceptions embodied in treaty. Therefore, if the article were self-executing, the United States would lack jurisdiction, by virtue of Cook and Ford, over vessels and their crews seized in the enforcement of interests not expressly recognized by treaty. 25 But, (n)either international treaties nor succeeding articles of the Convention exhaust the instances in which other competence to apply (sanctions) is honored under international law. M. McDougal & W. Burke, Supra, at 875; See United States v. F/V Taiyo Maru, 395 F.Supp. 413, 420-21 (D.Me.1975). 71 Since its inception, the United States has asserted limited jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas, generally but not always within the twelve-mile limit, to enforce a variety of interests not expressly authorized in treaties. As early as 1790, the United States professed authority to board vessels beyond the three-mile territorial sea. 26 In An Act to Provide More Effectually for the Collection of Duties, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145 (1790), the United States first specified a twelve-mile limit in which foreign vessels bound for the United States could be boarded to examine their manifests and inspect their cargoes. The Act also prohibited the unloading of foreign goods within twelve miles. Severe sanctions, including fines and forfeitures, were imposed for violation of its provisions. 27 72 The Supreme Court, in the seminal case of Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 2 L.Ed. 249 (1804), approved this legislation as within the sphere of a nation's competence to protect against the violation of its laws beyond the territorial sea. Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, made the following observations in dictum: 73 The authority of a nation, within its own territory, is absolute and exclusive. . . . But its power to assure itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory. Upon this principle, the right of a belligerent to search a neutral vessel on the high seas, for contraband of war, is universally admitted, because the belligerent has a right to prevent the injury done to himself, by the assistance intended for his enemy; so, too, a nation has a right to prohibit any commerce with its colonies. Any attempt to violate the laws made to protect this right, is an injury to itself, which it may prevent, and it has a right to use the means necessary for its prevention. These means do not appear to be limited within any certain marked boundaries, which remain the same, at all times and in all situations. If they are such as unnecessarily to vex and harass foreign lawful commerce, foreign nations will resist their exercise. If they are such as are reasonable and necessary to secure their laws from violation, they will be submitted to. 74 6 U.S. at 234-35, 2 L.Ed. at 264-65. This proposition was buttressed by reference to the United States' practice as reflected in the customs statutes discussed above giving the right to our own revenue cutters to visit vessels four leagues from our coast. Id. at 236, 2 L.Ed. at 265. More particularly, Justice Story, interpreting the successor to the provision of the 1790 Act prohibiting unloading of cargoes within four leagues of the coast without payment of duties, wrote, (T)he policy of the act equally applies to all vessels; and indeed more strongly to foreign vessels; since frauds committed by them in evasion of the revenue laws are less easily detected, then like frauds are under the regulations applicable to American vessels. The Betsy, 3 F.Cas. 303, 304 (C.C.D.Mass.1818) (No. 1,365). 75 The 1790 Act is the progenitor of successive enactments authorizing the boarding and searching of foreign vessels within twelve miles of the coast of the United States and imposing penalties for violations of customs provisions operating within that limit. 28 Through the years the courts have had numerous occasions to address the issue of the propriety of the exercise of United States jurisdiction over foreign vessels within twelve miles but beyond three miles under these statutes and in the absence of treaty. A sampling of those cases is collected in the margin. 29 76 It is clear, therefore, that the consistent attitude of the United States has been that it may assert limited jurisdiction over foreign vessels within twelve miles of its coast. Although the conventions we construe today do provide for some control within this zone, the ambit of this control is much narrower than that which the United States has customarily asserted. See United States v. F/V Taiyo Maru, 395 F.Supp. 413 (D.Me.1975); M. McDougal & W. Burke, Supra, at 612-31, 875. A self-executing interpretation, which would eviscerate many of these provisions, would, therefore, be wholly inconsonant with the historical policy of the United States. 77 The United States has not, however, limited its claims of jurisdiction to twelve miles. 30 In an attempt to quell the ever increasing smuggling of alcohol into the United States, Congress enacted the 1935 Anti-Smuggling Act, Act of Aug. 5, 1935, Pub.L. No. 238, 49 Stat. 517. This act, presently codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1711 (1976), empowers the President, upon belief that a hovering vessel is engaged in smuggling any merchandise or person, Id. § 1701(a), to designate temporary enforcement zones in the place where such vessel is found. These zones may extend up to sixty-two miles from the coast and 100 miles laterally in both directions from the vessel. Id. The Act goes on to authorize customs officers to board and inspect any vessel within such zone and to pursue and seize or arrest and otherwise enforce upon such vessel, merchandise, or person, the provisions of the law . . . . Id. § 1701(b). The committee reports clearly indicate that the Act was founded on the rule of Church v. Hubbart, discussed above, and they make clear that Congress believed it was acting in accordance with established precedent, both domestic and international. 31 78 A recent article examined at length the interrelationship between the Anti-Smuggling Act and the Conventions on the High Seas and on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. Ficken, The 1935 Anti-Smuggling Act Applied to Hovering Narcotics Smugglers Beyond the Contiguous Zone: An Assessment Under International Law, 29 U. Miami L.Rev. 700 (1975). In his article, Ficken notes an issue strictly analogous to the one before us: whether a United States court would uphold a seizure or arrest (under the Act) in view of the (Cook ) exception indicating the possibility that the United States has by treaty imposed upon itself a territorial restriction of its jurisdiction. Id. at 724. He goes on to reason that the approach to the issue is similar to the construction of the liquor treaty in the (Cook ) case, the issue turning upon whether the treaty provision were given a self-executing character. Id. We have, therefore, in the 1935 Anti-Smuggling Act apparently another instance where a self-executing interpretation of article 6 of the High Seas Convention 32 would abrogate the legislative policy of the United States. Ficken concludes, however, that it is doubtful whether it has changed any existing internal legislation. Id. 79 That we do not believe that it was the intent of the United States to so limit the operation of its statutes is borne out by the legislative history of the conventions. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Arthur Dean, the Chairman of the United States Delegation to the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference, made the following remarks in response to questioning: 80 (SENATOR LONG) Mr. Dean, would you point out and explain any article of these conventions which has the effect of superseding domestic legislation in the United States, either Federal or State legislation, and would you also point out any articles which would require new Federal legislation? 81 MR. DEAN. Well, so far as I am aware, there is not anything in any of these conventions that we are presenting to the Senate which, so far as I am specifically aware, there is not anything that would supersede domestic legislation. I know you are familiar with the case of Missouri v. Holland (252 U.S. 416, 40 S.Ct. 382, 64 L.Ed. 641 (1920)) that insofar as the United States has entered into a treaty that then becomes the law of the land. In all my work on these matters and study on these matters, while there may be some domestic legislation that might be affected I am not familiar with it, if there is. 82 I think that as I said earlier, that all of these conventions would affect the relations of the United States in relation to the powers of other sovereign powers, and would not affect the relationship as between the United States and the several States. 83 Conventions on the Law of the Sea: Hearings on Executives J, K, L, M, N Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1960). Although Mr. Dean's statements are not wholly unequivocal, they do clearly indicate that it was not the intent of our delegation to affect the domestic legislation of the United States, either state or federal. Moreover, when the State Department was posed the same question by the Senate Committee, it responded, It does not appear that any of the convention provisions conflict with existing legislation. It does appear that some supplementary and new implementing legislation may be necessary or desirable. Id. at 92. We think these statements weigh against a self-executing interpretation of article 6. 84 Practically every observation we have made thus far concerning article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas and its effect if self-executing stands in stark contrast to the liquor treaty construed to be self-executing in Cook, the Convention for the Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors, Jan. 23, 1924, United States-Great Britain, 43 Stat. 1761. First, the liquor treaty with Great Britain was bilateral and established mutual rights and obligations. The United States was granted the privilege of boarding any British vessel within one hour's sailing distance of the coast for the purpose of examining the vessel's manifest. If reasonable grounds for suspecting that she was smuggling liquor arose the vessel could be searched, and, if reasonable cause arose to believe that the vessel was engaged in such activity the vessel could be seized and subjected to adjudication by the courts of the United States. These rights were narrowly circumscribed by the limitation that they be exercised within one hour's sailing distance only. 33 On the other hand, Great Britain was insured that the United States would not penalize British vessels that brought liquor into United States waters under seal in certain specified circumstances, Id. art. 3, thus reversing the Supreme Court's opinion in Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 43 S.Ct. 504, 67 L.Ed. 894 (1923), which had held that the National Prohibition Act prohibited foreign vessels from bringing liquors into United States territory or territorial waters even if under seal and not for delivery in the United States. 34 As Masterson notes, 85 The desire of the United States Government to break up the rum-row with the aid of far-reaching treaties, and the desire of foreign governments that their vessels be permitted to enter the ports and waters of the United States with alcoholic beverages under seal on board, presented an opportunity for a bargain, for which all parties were unquestionably eager. Public sentiment in Great Britain against the decision in Cunard v. Mellon and the indignation in the United States over the conditions that existed off the coasts induced the representatives of both countries to renew their negotiations for a treaty in 1923, which had been begun in 1922. 86 W. Masterson, Jurisdiction in Marginal Seas 335-36 (1929) (footnote omitted); Accord, United States v. Ford, 273 U.S. 593, 609-10, 47 S.Ct. 531, 536, 71 L.Ed. 793 (1927). Article 4 of the treaty established a mechanism for settling claims by British vessels that suffered loss from the improper exercise of the powers granted the United States under the treaty. As we noted above, article 6 of the High Seas Convention is a provision of a multilateral treaty, and it imposes no reciprocal obligations upon nations where it could not have self-executing effect. See note 24 Supra and accompanying text. 87 Second, the liquor treaty addressed the specific problem of liquor smuggling. Its operation is strictly limited to that concern. Therefore, a self-executing interpretation would affect the jurisdiction of the United States only as regards seizures of British vessels engaged in smuggling liquor; the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States remained otherwise unaffected. Article 6, however, is a sweeping prohibition on the exercise of jurisdiction against foreign vessels on the high seas. A self-executing interpretation would therefore impinge upon the operation and enforcement of any law sought to be applied. 88 Third, as the Court was eager to point out in Cook, the Secretary of State had expressed the view that in a strict sense the Treaty was self-executing. 288 U.S. at 119 & n.19, 53 S.Ct. at 311. The views of the State Department carry substantial weight in these matters, See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295, 54 S.Ct. 191, 196, 78 L.Ed. 315 (1933); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468, 33 S.Ct. 945, 952, 57 L.Ed. 1274 (1913), and it is therefore difficult to speculate as to the outcome of the case if no such opinion had been available to the Court. Here, both the chairman of the United States delegation to the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference and the State Department were of the view that the conventions do not affect domestic law. 89 Fourth, the liquor treaty was occasioned not so much by a concern on the part of the United States about the validity of seizures beyond the three-mile limit but by a desire to avoid the repeated protests that the British had lodged against such seizures. W. Masterson, Supra, at 304-05, 326. Indeed, article 2 of the treaty begins with the following phrase, His Britannic Majesty agrees that he will raise no objection to the boarding of private vessels under the British flag outside the limits of the territorial waters by the authorities of the United States . . . . See note 32 Supra. The British were staunch in their opinion that boardings and seizures beyond three miles for the enforcement of any domestic law were not justified. W. Masterson, Supra, at 331-33 & n. 6. It was absolutely clear, therefore, that the British position was that any interference not justified by the treaty would be unacceptable and subject to protest. Therefore, it was assumed that Great Britain would assert the rights of its vessels and their crews under international law not to be subjected to adjudication. Without such objection, the doctrine embodied in the Ker case would apparently have validated the jurisdiction of the court notwithstanding the violation of international law. See The Adela, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 266, 18 L.Ed. 821 (1867); Cf. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.) (failure to object would seem to preclude any violation of international law which might otherwise have occurred), Cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001, 95 S.Ct. 2400, 44 L.Ed.2d 668 (1975). The circumstances here are quite different. It may well be that a signatory to the High Seas convention would not object to the seizure of one of its vessels on the high seas. That is apparently the case here because the record does not indicate that a protest was made to the seizure of the La Rosa or to the subjection of its crew to the jurisdiction of the district court below. It might well be that by not so objecting, the Grand Caymans intended to acquiesce. See Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d at 67. A self-executing interpretation of article 6 would establish a defense to the jurisdiction of the United States in every case because its prohibition would be as authoritative as a statute of Congress depriving the United States courts of jurisdiction where seizure is effected in violation of the article. The executory interpretation we approve today leaves to the injured state the option of deciding whether it wishes to object. As we recently intimated in United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1261 (5th Cir. 1978), The violation of international law . . . may be redressed by other remedies and does not depend upon the granting of what amounts to an effective immunity from criminal prosecution to safeguard individuals against police or armed forces misconduct. 90 In sum, we do not believe that the United States intended to limit its traditionally asserted jurisdiction over foreign vessels on the high seas by adopting article 6 of the High Seas Convention. The determination of this intent must be the touchstone of our interpretation. Moreover, we think the liquor treaty held to be self-executing in Cook wholly distinguishable. 35 We hold, therefore, that article 6 is not self-executing and that, by virtue of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, the defendants cannot rely upon a mere violation of international law as a defense to the court's jurisdiction.