Opinion ID: 159537
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Additional Disputed Facts

Text: 40 As to the appropriateness of summary judgment disposition in this case, we point out Dr. Lighton did not contest the facts presented by Dr. Ehleringer and Ms. McCreary in their summary judgment motion and brief, other than to claim additional disputed facts existed to prevent summary judgment disposition, and to dispute whether Dr. Lighton received a reasonable alternative to resignation and concurred with the settlement agreement. On appeal, Dr. Lighton continues to contend additional, disputed facts exist concerning: 1) the merit of Dr. Fielden's sexual harassment and retaliation claims; 2) his perceived view of Ms. McCreary's and Dr. Ehleringer's malice towards him as evidenced, in part, by their facial expressions and other intimations; 3) the inadequacy of their investigation into Dr. Fielden's claims; and 4) his subjective view he was constructively terminated. For these reasons, he purports the district court erred in granting summary judgment. 41 Although we view the evidence and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to Dr. Lighton as the party opposing summary judgment, he must identify sufficient evidence of material disputed facts to require submission of the case to a jury. Langley v. Adams County, 987 F.2d 1473, 1476 (10th Cir. 1993) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To determine what facts are material to summary judgment disposition, we look to the primary issues in this case, which involve Dr. Lighton's claims of constructive termination, a violation of his liberty interest in his name and reputation, and a restriction on his protected speech. In making a determination on these issues, we find the veracity of Dr. Fielden's sexual harassment and retaliation allegations against Dr. Lighton irrelevant or immaterial. 42 Obviously, Dr. Fielden's allegations began the chain of events leading to the controversy over Dr. Lighton's signing the settlement agreement. As a consequence, any significance we attach to them stems merely from the fact they were made, resulted in Dr. Ehleringer reporting Dr. Fielden's formal complaint against the department to its executive committee, influenced Dr. Ehleringer's and Ms. McCreary's desire to settle the dispute between Dr. Lighton and Dr. Fielden, and resulted in the settlement agreement, containing a provision on reporting allegations of improper acts to third parties, which Dr. Lighton contends he felt compelled to sign. Thus, while Dr. Fielden's allegations lead to the instant litigation, we find the truth of those allegations does not affect resolution of the issues at dispute. Because we hold any disputed facts as to the merits of Dr. Fielden's claims are immaterial to our decision, we also hold the adequacy of Dr. Ehleringer's and Ms. McCreary's investigation into them is immaterial. 43 We next direct our attention to Dr. Lighton's subjective perception Ms. McCreary and Dr. Ehleringer felt malice toward him and their actions caused him to involuntarily resign. In reviewing his allegations of constructive termination, Dr. Lighton's subjective view of the situation is clearly irrelevant. See Yearous, 128 F.3d at 1356. Therefore, his subjective views on Dr. Ehleringer and Ms. McCreary's perceived facial expressions and other intimations are irrelevant to our decision. Because we have already thoroughly discussed the undisputed facts we believe pertinent to making a summary judgment determination in this case, we will not repeat our analysis here. In sum, Dr. Lighton fails to identify evidence of additional undisputed, material facts sufficient to require submission of his case to a jury. See Langley, 987 F.2d at 1476. For these reasons, we hold the district court did not err in disposing of this matter by summary judgment decision.