Opinion ID: 2631958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Date of judgment

Text: We first look to statutory authority to determine which judgment date triggers the applicable interest rate. NRS 17.130(2) provides, in relevant part, that the interest rate to be applied to any prejudgment interest is the rate that is established immediately preceding the date of judgment. In this appeal, the district court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict in March 2006 and the amended judgment upon remand was entered in December 2008. Under NRS 17.130(2)'s plain language, we have not previously been called upon to determine what judgment date applies when this court affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands the matter to the district court with instructions to offset a plaintiffs award. Thus, we turn to a Nevada rule governing a similar issue and caselaw from other states for guidance. NRAP 37 establishes the judgment date for purposes of the accrual of post-judgment interest when an appeal has been decided by this court. Logically, the judgment date is the same for purposes of determining the appropriate rate of prejudgment interest. Pursuant to NRAP 37(a), [ujnless the law provides otherwise, if a money judgment in a civil case is affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law is payable from the date when the district court's judgment was entered. Further, NRAP 37(b) states, [i]f the court modifies or reverses a judgment with a direction that a money judgment be entered in the district court, the mandate must contain instructions about the allowance of interest. In our previous opinion, this court did not modify or reverse the judgment with a direction that a judgment for money be entered; we affirmed the judgment for money but remanded with instructions to offset Winchell's judgment by the amount he recovered under his insurance policy. Winchell, 124 Nev. at 949-50, 193 P.3d at 953-54. This court has not previously made a determination as to whether a modification to the amount of a money judgment constitutes an affirmation or a reversal of the original judgment. We take the opportunity to do so now. In neighboring states, courts have determined that when a judgment is modified on appeal, the modification is treated as an affirmation of judgment and interest accrues from the date of entry of the original judgment. Pearson v. Schmitt, 260 Or. 607, 492 P.2d 269, 270 (1971) (The view as now taken by a majority of the states is that where a money award has been modified on appeal... then the interest on the award, as modified, should run from the date of original judgment.); L.R. James, Annotation, Date From Which Interest on Judgment Starts Running, as Affected by Modification of Amount of Judgment on Appeal, 4 A.L.R.3d 1221 (1965 & Supp.2010); Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo, 55 Cal.2d 439, 11 Cal.Rptr. 580, 360 P.2d 76, 78 (1961); Munoz v. City of Union City, 173 Cal.App.4th 199, 92 Cal. Rptr.3d 527, 531 (2009); Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 329 Or. 369, 987 P.2d 476, 478 (1999); Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 978 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Fulle v. Boulevard Excavating, Inc., 25 Wash.App. 520, 610 P.2d 387, 389 (1980). Each of these states considers any modification on appeal, whether upward or downward, as an affirmation of the original judgment. Stockton Theatres, 11 Cal.Rptr. 580, 360 P.2d at 78; Munoz, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d. at 531; Brown, 978 P.2d at 477; Lakin, 987 P.2d at 478; Fulle, 610 P.2d at 389. We adopt the same rationale for Nevada. Since this court effectively affirmed the original judgment in the prior appeal in this case, we conclude that the original date of the district court judgment should set the prejudgment interest rate as set forth in NRS 17.130(2). Accordingly, we affirm the amended judgment of the district court. We concur: HARDESTY and PICKERING, JJ.