Opinion ID: 797934
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury Communication/Denial of Counsel: Jimmy Ray Only

Text: 44 Jimmy Ray alleges he was denied counsel during a critical stage of his trial. The relevant facts are as follows. The jury began deliberating at approximately 9:00 a.m. on Thursday, February 10, 2000. The next morning, when the jury reconvened to continue its deliberations, the court sent it the following message: 45 Dear jury, there is no time limit nor is there any hurry in your deliberations. However, I must catch a plane today at 1:30. Therefore, if you do not have a verdict by 12:00, I will discharge you until Tuesday morning at 8:30, February the 15th, 2000. 46 The court did not contact the defendants' attorneys prior to delivering its message. During the morning, however, the court gave defense counsel an opportunity to submit a substitute note, which he declined. Court was reconvened later that morning after the jury delivered a note to the court indicating that it had reached a verdict on all but one defendant, and had deliberated about that defendant for six hours. Defense attorney Mitchell objected to the note, arguing that it had the potential of creating a verdict before the verdict's time. The court overruled the objection. The district court asked if the note made the jury feel rushed in reaching its verdicts, and the jury also answered No. The jury then delivered its verdicts with respect to all defendants but one, and reconvened the following Tuesday to continue deliberations.
47 In his brief, Jimmy Ray frames this scenario as a Sixth Amendment denial of counsel claim, rather than an instance of ineffective assistance by his trial counsel (his § 2255 petition argued both theories). Because the court gave its message to the jury after trying and failing to gather the defendants' lawyers, it is difficult for counsel to be considered ineffective. Thus, if Jimmy Ray is entitled to relief under this claim, it would be because he was denied counsel, not because counsel was ineffective. 48 Jimmy Ray invokes the principle that denial of counsel during a critical stage of a judicial proceeding mandates a presumption of prejudice. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n. 25, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). Stated another way, denial of counsel is considered a structural error, which entitles a defendant to a new trial without showing prejudice under Strickland 's second prong— prejudice is presumed because the error makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039. Jimmy Ray must show that the district court's communication with the jury constituted a critical stage of the trial, recently defined by the Supreme Court as a step of a criminal proceeding, such as an arraignment, that [holds] significant consequences for the accused. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695-96, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). Because this court has held that certain instances of jury re-instruction and the reading of supplemental instructions to the jury qualify as critical stages, see, e.g., Caver v. Straub, 349 F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir.2003); French v. Jones, 332 F.3d 430, 436 (6th Cir.2003), Jimmy Ray labels the district court's note an instruction given outside the presence of counsel. We reject this characterization. Cases in which this court has found denial of counsel at a critical stage invariably involve a court instructing the jury about the substantive elements of an offense or giving a deadlocked jury further instructions about how to proceed. See, e.g., Caver, 349 F.3d at 349 n. 6 (counsel was absent when the jury was re-instructed on certain elements of the offense after they had deliberated); French, 332 F.3d at 430 (judge gave an improvised deadlocked jury instruction, later complained of as coercive, after hearing that the jury had reached a third impasse). 49 In this case, however, the note conveyed only scheduling information, with the caveat that jury need not hurry its deliberations—arguably not an instruction at all. The Tenth Circuit addressed a factually similar situation in United States v. McMurry, 818 F.2d 24 (10th Cir.1987), where the defendant challenged a statement the trial judge made to the jury in the absence of his counsel as an improper Allen charge. After several hours of deliberations, the trial judge told the jury that he had to catch a plane in several hours and that if it had not finished deliberating by then he would call a recess over the weekend and allow deliberations to continue the following week. Id. at 26-27. Although the procedural posture and claims at issue in McMurry differ from this case, the Tenth Circuit's conclusion is informative: 50 The statement was simply not an instruction at all. . . . The statement was made after the jury had deliberated about four hours on a Thursday and three hours on Friday. The judge had called the jury into the courtroom to discuss lunch arrangements. We must view this as no more than an explanation about the schedule for lunch and for subsequent deliberations. With the weekend having arrived it was necessary to give the jury a schedule for the balance of the day and the next week. The jury was entitled to such an explanation for its plans. It had nothing whatever to do with the length of deliberations but was, again, a needed schedule. The explanation can in no way be considered as an instruction. 51 Id. We view the district court's message in the same way, as not fitting within the category of jury instruction or re-instruction that demands the presence of counsel. 52 And though a coercive instruction could be characterized as a critical stage, which holds significant consequences for the accused, Cone, 535 U.S. at 695-96, 122 S.Ct. 1843, we have held similar statements not coercive. See United States v. Markey, 693 F.2d 594, 597 (6th Cir.1982); see also Gibson v. United States, 271 F.3d 247, 258 (6th Cir.2001), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Leachman, 309 F.3d 377 (6th Cir.2002); United States v. Ratliff, 63 Fed.Appx. 192 (6th Cir.2003) (unpublished opinion). 53 In evaluating for coercive effect a judge's statement to the jury, this Court must consider the statement in context, assessing it under the totality of the circumstances. Gibson, 271 F.3d at 258. In Markey, the defendant contended that the district judge `coerced' the jury into reaching a speedy verdict [because the judge commented,] at the conclusion of trial, that the courthouse would be available the following morning (Christmas Eve) if the jury was unable to reach a consensus that afternoon. 693 F.2d at 594. The Markey defendant's coercion charge mirrors Jimmy Ray's: The court's message in both cases informed the jury that if it did not reach a verdict by a certain time, it would have to return to deliberate at a supposedly undesirable time, a holiday in Markey and several days later in Jimmy Ray's case. The court in Markey found that the trial judge's charge was not `likely to give the jury the impression that it was more important to be quick than to be thoughtful.' Id. (quoting United States v. Green, 523 F.2d 229 (2d Cir.1975)). Viewing this situation with the lens Markey provides, we are confident the message did not coerce the jury into reaching its verdict, its quickness notwithstanding. This court has repeatedly held that the jury's speed in reaching a verdict is irrelevant to whether an instruction was coercive. Ratliff, 63 Fed.Appx. at 195-96 (citing United States v. Giacalone, 588 F.2d 1158, 1168 (6th Cir.1978)); United States v. Tines, 70 F.3d 891, 896 (6th Cir.1995). Therefore, we deny his petition for relief on these grounds. 54