Opinion ID: 220601
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mutual Intent of the Parties

Text: Leviton argues that the mutual intent of the parties in the present case distinguishes this case from the facts of TransCore. Leviton contends that a number of provisions in the Settlement Agreement make clear that the parties intended that settlement to be merely a “walk away.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 8. For instance, Leviton refers to provisions preserving Leviton’s right to sue on related patents and GPG’s right to rely on the prior claim constructions and its inequitable conduct defense. Leviton argues that each of these provisions, by anticipating future litigation, evidences mutual intent not to grant any rights that would imply a license to any other patents. TransCore is instructive in addressing Leviton’s arguments. The Settlement Agreement there stated that “This Covenant Not To Sue shall not apply to any other patents issued as of the effective date of this Agreement or to be issued in the future.” TransCore, 563 F.3d at 1273. Nonetheless, this court found that, by filing the subsequent suit, TransCore had derogated from the right it previously granted and that therefore the continuation patent was impliedly licensed. The provisions to which Leviton points manifest a mutual understanding that future litigation between the parties concerning related patents was a distinct possibility. But this does not address the question of whether the parties intended that continuations could be asserted against the same products. At best, the Settlement Agreement is silent on this point. At worst, the careful establishment of rules of engagement without any menGENERAL PROTECHT v. LEVITON MFG 13 tion of later suits involving the same products and related patents shows that Leviton did not reserve this right. Expressio unius exclusio alterius. The question of mutual intent in the present case is controlled by TransCore.