Opinion ID: 2223930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Grand Jury Charges and Legally Sufficient Evidence

Text: The prosecutor charged the grand jury as though the Rules of Judicial Conduct were criminal statutes. On May 20, 2003, the prosecutor charged the grand jury on the rules that govern judicial conduct, not on the criminal law, reciting, verbatim, two provisions of the Rules of Judicial Conduct. They were the following: 22 NYCRR 100.2, which is headed: A Judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge's activities. Subdivision (C) states: A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or others; nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. 22 NYCRR 100.3, which is headed: A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently. Subdivision (B) (6) states: A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law. A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties or their lawyers concerning a pending or impending proceeding, except: . . . Ex parte communications that are made for scheduling or administrative purposes that do not affect a substantial right of any party are authorized, provided the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication, and the judge, insofar as practical and appropriate, makes provision for prompt notification of other parties or their lawyers of the substance of the ex parte communication and allows an opportunity to respond. . . . A judge, with the consent of the parties, may confer separately with the parties and their lawyers on agreed-upon matters. Concerning indictment No. 3515/2003, the prosecutor instructed the grand jury that it could indict the defendant for violating the Rules of Judicial Conduct if it determined that defendant had accepted cigars, accepted money, referred persons to Paul Siminovsky or gave advice. Pursuant to CPL 190.65, a grand jury indictment is authorized as follows: 1. Subject to the rules prescribing the kinds of offenses which may be charged in an indictment, a grand jury may indict a person for an offense when (a) the evidence before it is legally sufficient to establish that such person committed such offense provided, however, such evidence is not legally sufficient when corroboration that would be required, as a matter of law, to sustain a conviction for such offense is absent, and (b) competent and admissible evidence before it provides reasonable cause to believe that such person committed such offense. Legally sufficient evidence is defined under CPL 70.10 (1) as competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof. Three crimes alleged in the consolidated indictment are authorized because they charge violations of the Penal Law. The Rules of Judicial Conduct were not meant to serve as elements of criminal statutes or as criminal statutes. The charges given to the grand jury by the prosecutor indicate that the People are alleging both violations of the Penal Law and violations of the Rules of Judicial Conduct in prosecuting defendant. The Rules of Judicial Conduct are rules of ethics and not criminal statutes or predicates for criminal statutes. There has been no legislative enactment allowing for their use in criminal prosecution and the Rules have not been subjected to any standards of proof. Further, the burden of proof for violations under the judicial rules of conduct is preponderance of the evidence whereas, for felonies, it is beyond a reasonable doubt ( see Matter of Collazo [State Commn. on Jud. Conduct], 91 NY2d 251, 253 [1998]). In Matter of Stern v Morgenthau (62 NY2d 331, 333 [1984]), this Court determined that the grand jury's purpose and investigations would not be thwarted if the prosecutor is not allowed to have access to confidential records of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct which developed as part of the Commission's investigation into misconduct by two judges. Specifically, this Court held that the grand jury and the Commission serve quite different purposes ( see id. at 334). The Court illuminated the difference with the following words: The Grand Jury is drawn from the population at large and charged with the duty of investigating and preferring charges against those suspected of criminal conduct while the Commission is composed of members appointed for fixed terms as defined in the Constitution and charged with the duty of investigating misconduct in the judicial branch of government and imposing discipline if misconduct is found. Thus, while the two bodies serve similar functions, they are separate and independent. One is responsible for investigating crime; the other for disciplining Judges. ( Id. ) The difference addressed in Stern between the grand jury and the Commission on Judicial Conduct is relevant to the case at bar. In order to prosecute defendant under the consolidated indictment, the People must show that defendant violated duties as a public servant defined in the Penal Law and separate and apart from the rules that govern judicial conduct. The indictment repeatedly makes reference to being a public servant. However, except for the charge referred to in footnote 2 (at 619), there is no reference to what duties in the criminal statutes defendant violated. The People argue that the Rules put judges on notice that if they engage in official misconduct, they will be held accountable for their actions through criminal prosecution. Further, failure to prosecute judges for engaging in illegitimate actions will have a negative effect on the public's confidence in the judiciary. According to appellant, defendant failed not only in his duty as a public servant but also in not complying with both the judicial rules of conduct and the criminal statutes. Defendant asserts that there are no cases which hold that a judge can be criminally liable for failure to comply with the judicial rules of conduct. Defendant argues, Simply put, that a judge has a duty to comply with the Rules does not mean that compliance with those Rules is enforceable under the Penal Law. There appear to be no statutes and no cases that hold that a judge can be held criminally liable for failure to comply with the Rules of Judicial Conduct. There is no question that the prosecutor has amassed a great deal of damning evidence against the defendant. However, what is at issue is whether or not Rules of Judicial Conduct (22 NYCRR part 100) can be used as a predicate for criminal prosecution, not whether or not there is enough evidence to prosecute the defendant. One count of bribe receiving in the third degree (Penal Law § 200.10) for accepting benefits from Siminovsky upon an agreement or understanding that defendant would provide Siminovsky with favorable treatment is legally sufficient. Second, defendant allegedly accepted a box of cigars and two loose cigars for providing advice on the Levi divorce case which was pending before him. As a result of these actions, the charge that the judge violated Penal Law § 195.00 by accepting compensation for giving advice is appropriate ( see La Carrubba, 46 NY2d 658, 664 [1979], supra ). Thus, one charge of official misconduct is appropriate. Third, the evidence was legally sufficient to establish one count of receiving unlawful gratuities in violation of Penal Law § 200.35 because defendant accepted the cigars for advice concerning the Levi divorce case. However, the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the other six charges pursuant to Penal Law § 200.25.