Opinion ID: 1699144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Tripp Line of Cases

Text: Tripp, the case principally relied upon by the DOC and the First District as justifying the imposition of a forfeiture penalty in this case, concerned credit for time served on a completed sentence when a defendant is sentenced on a different offense to a term of incarceration upon revocation of probation. In Tripp, the Court rejected the contention that because convictions for two separate crimes result in two separate sentences, the offender is not entitled to credit for time served. See 622 So.2d at 942. We determined that where a term of incarceration on one offense is followed by a term of probation on another, credit for time served on the first offense must be awarded on the guidelines sentence imposed after revocation of probation on the second offense. See id. Although we did not identify the combined sanctions in Tripp as a true or probationary split sentence, we emphasized that the offenses were factors that were weighed in the original sentencing. Id. We stated that our decision served two purposes: first, to ensure that offenses originally sentenced as a unit continue to be treated in relation to each other, even after a portion of the sentence has been violated, and second, to prevent offenders from receiving a sentence upon revocation of probation that, combined with the sentence originally received, exceeds the maximum guidelines sentence. Id. In a decision issued shortly after Tripp, Horner v. State, 617 So.2d 311 (Fla.1993), we stated that the provision now found in section 948.01(6) defines split sentencing with regard to the sentencing that the trial court is imposing for all cases against the defendant. Id. at 313. Horner involved a multiple-case sentence, id. at 312, in which the defendant was sentenced in three separate cases. We concluded that because the trial court adjudicated three cases in one hearing and imposed a single split sentence, a term of probation on one offense that created a gap between the incarceration and probation imposed on another offense did not violate the statutory requirement that probation immediately follow incarceration in a split sentence. Id. at 313. In subsequent decisions based on Tripp, we continued to emphasize that several sentences imposed in a single sentencing based on a single scoresheet were to be treated as a single unit upon revocation of probation or community control. In Hodgdon v. State, 789 So.2d 958 (Fla.2001), we repeated the imperative that offenses treated together at sentencing via a single scoresheet continue to be treated as a single unit for purposes of sentencing upon a violation of probation. Id. at 962 n. 5 (emphasis supplied). The issue in Hodgdon was whether the defendant was entitled to have Tripp credit applied individually to the sentence for each offense on which he violated probation. This Court held that Tripp's requirement of credit for time previously served applies to the overall sentence imposed upon violation of probation rather than against each individual count on which probation is revoked. See id. at 963. The driving force in Hodgdon, as in Tripp, was fairness. To have applied credit against the sentence on each individual count rather than against the overall sentence would have circumvented the guidelines by providing a sentencing boon or windfall to defendants upon violations of probation. Id. In Hodgdon, per-count credit would also have resulted in the defendant serving no time in prison  a result surely contrary to the trial court's intent. See id. at 962. In another case arising from Tripp, this Court reaffirmed that because of the continuing interrelationship of sentences originally imposed together,  Tripp should be applied notwithstanding the fact that the newly imposed sentence is within the guidelines. State v. Witherspoon, 810 So.2d 871, 873 (Fla.2002). Thus, we held in a single-scoresheet scenario that an offender was entitled to Tripp credit even though the sentence imposed upon violation of probation would not exceed the maximum overall guidelines sentence when combined with the time previously served on a different offense. Id. at 873. Most recently, in Moore v. State, 882 So.2d 977 (Fla. 2004), this Court held that Tripp does not apply to the Criminal Punishment Code, which is effective for offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998. We explained that the interrelationship of sentences under the guidelines is absent from the Criminal Punishment Code, which provides no ceiling other than the statutory maximum penalty and authorizes consecutive sentences. See id. at 980-81.