Opinion ID: 677357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: First Amendment/Harassment Claim

Text: 22 The alleged threats of physical violence outside the legislative arena by some defendants in response to plaintiff's opposition during his term in office present a different question because [r]etaliation by public officials against the exercise of First Amendment rights is itself a violation of the First Amendment. Fraternal Order of Police Hobart Lodge #121, Inc. v. Hobart, 864 F.2d 551, 553 (7th Cir.1988); see also Reichert v. Draud, 701 F.2d 1168, 1170 (6th Cir.1983); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). The district court correctly held that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for this misconduct. 23 As noted above, Zilich's allegations of harassment are supported by the testimony of Thomas Furth, who attended meetings in which the mayor and others discussed threatening Zilich, slapping him around, breaking his legs, cutting him and intimidating him. These threats coincided with the vandalism and harassing telephone calls that plaintiff and his wife experienced. The defendants maintain that the threats were jokes, but Furth testified that none were made in a joking manner. Only a trial will permit Zilich the full opportunity to prove defendants' involvement in the actions taken against him. The defendants respond that these actions, even if true, were anonymous and thus cannot provide the basis for a suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Here, it is alleged that the mayor and other city officials--on city time and in city offices--plotted to injure plaintiff for his political views. In light of the resolution and ordinance demonstrating hostility toward plaintiff, these allegations, if proved, are sufficient to support a conclusion that defendants were acting under color of official right. 24 We also agree with the findings of the district court that Zilich's First Amendment right of free speech was clearly established for qualified immunity purposes. The law is well settled in this Circuit that retaliation under color of law for the exercise of First Amendment rights is unconstitutional, and retaliation claims have been asserted in various factual scenarios. Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 979 F.2d 1154 (6th Cir.1992) (firemen dismissed); Boger v. Wayne County, 950 F.2d 316 (6th Cir.1991) (county employee in Medical Examiner's Office transferred); Draud, 701 F.2d at 1170 (change in public school teacher's duties); Hildebrand v. Board of Trustees, 662 F.2d 439 (6th Cir.1981) (university professor denied tenure), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 910, 102 S.Ct. 1760, 72 L.Ed.2d 168 (1982); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969) (prisoner retaliated against for seeking access to courts). No reasonable official could possibly believe that it is constitutionally permissible to retaliate against a political opponent with physical threats, harassment and vandalism. Because officials of reasonable competence could [not] disagree on this issue, immunity should [not] be recognized. Mumford v. Zieba, 4 F.3d 429, 432 (6th Cir.1993). 4 25 Thus we conclude that the district court erred in holding that the bill of attainder and First Amendment claims based on the resolution and ordinance should go forward to a trial on the merits. We agree that the First Amendment claim based on threats or acts of physical violence should go to trial. Accordingly we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 5