Opinion ID: 2211498
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the duty to seek a continuance

Text: Although the Court of Appeals erred in finding specific discovery violations in this case, the fact remains that neither defendant nor the prosecutor knew of the evidence of sperm until the morning of the first day of trial. Defendant might have learned of this evidence sooner if defense counsel had asked Dr. Randall more probing questions at the preliminary examination, or if the prosecutor had discovered the existence of the wet swab laboratory report before to the first day of trial. [5] Whatever the reason for defense counsel's lack of knowledge before trial, it surely constituted reasonable grounds for seeking a continuance at trial. Of course, defense counsel may also have had sound reasons to avoid any delay. Defense counsel's strategy at trial was to challenge Dr. Randall's credibility by arguing that he lacked experience. The prosecutor argues that a delay would have allowed it to endorse and call the laboratory technicians who prepared the wet swab sample laboratory report. Testimony from the laboratory technicians confirming that the wet swab sample contained sperm fragments would have undermined defendant's argument regarding Dr. Randall's lack of experience. In any event, faced with the dilemma of Dr. Randall's trial-day disclosure, defense counsel elected to seek suppression of the evidence on the ground that it came as a surprise to him, and not to seek a continuance. The Court of Appeals conclusion that suppression of Dr. Randall's testimony was unwarranted was correct. Because defendant failed to allege or establish a specific discovery violation, or any other sort of prosecutorial misconduct, the trial court lacked a basis upon which to punish the prosecutor by suppressing otherwise admissible evidence. Furthermore, even if defendant had established an inadvertent discovery violation, a continuance, had one been requested, would have alleviated any harm to defendant's case by allowing both parties to prepare for the evidence of sperm without requiring the exclusion of relevant evidence. Under such circumstances, the more severe remedy of suppression would not have been appropriate. See People v. Clark, 164 Mich.App. 224, 230, 416 N.W.2d 390 (1987). We reject defendant's alternative argument below that, in lieu of granting defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court should have sua sponte ordered a continuance, in order to give the defense a reasonable opportunity to prepare to confront the late testimony. Although defense counsel had ample reason to seek a continuance at trial, he elected not to do so. The longstanding rule of this state is that, in the absence of a request for a continuance, a trial court should assume that a party does not desire a continuance. See People v. Lee, 307 Mich. 743, 750, 12 N.W.2d 418 (1943); People v. Ranney, 153 Mich. 293, 299, 116 N.W. 999 (1908); People v. Kelly, 186 Mich.App. 524, 527, 465 N.W.2d 569 (1990); People v. Kvam, 160 Mich.App. 189, 200, 408 N.W.2d 71 (1987); People v. McLendon, 51 Mich.App. 543, 546, 215 N.W.2d 742 (1974); People v. Lakin, 30 Mich.App. 441, 445, 186 N.W.2d 867 (1971). Given this clear rule, the trial court cannot be faulted for failing to grant a continuance on its own motion. This rule makes sense because (1) it acknowledges the fact that the parties may have strategic reasons for wishing to proceed, and (2) a contrary rule would place trial courts in the difficult position of having to order unrequested delays as a prophylactic measure against reversal.