Opinion ID: 2636747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Foreseeability element of common-law negligence cause of action

Text: This court has held that [a] negligent defendant is responsible for all foreseeable consequences proximately caused by his or her negligent act. Taylor v. Silva, 96 Nev. 738, 741, 615 P.2d 970, 971 (1980). A defendant's liability can be extinguished when an unforeseeable intervening cause occurs between a defendant's negligence and a plaintiffs injury. El Dorado Hotel v. Brown, 100 Nev. 622, 628-29, 691 P.2d 436, 441 (1984), overruled on other grounds by Vinci v. Las Vegas Sands, 115 Nev. 243, 984 P.2d 750 (1999). But when a third party's intervening intentional act is reasonably foreseeable, a negligent defendant is not relieved of liability. Id. at 629, 691 P.2d at 441. The issue of foreseeability, thus, can be a mixed question of law and fact. Elko Enterprises v. Broyles, 105 Nev. 562, 566, 779 P.2d 961, 964 (1989). Because the majority concludes that no special relationship exists between the pharmacies and third-party appellants to establish a duty of care owed to appellants, they decline to reach the foreseeability issue. As noted above, however, I conclude that the relationship between the pharmacy and its customer is sufficient to establish the first duty element and that sufficient allegations were pleaded by appellants to address the foreseeability element that precluded the district court from dismissing the common-law negligence cause of action. According to appellants' second amended complaint, the Task Force notified the pharmacies that Copening was potentially abusing drugs. The Task Force informed each pharmacy that Copening went, during a 12-month period, to multiple pharmacies to fill her prescriptions. According to appellants, in the months before the accident, the pharmacies continued to fill Copening's prescriptions for hydrocodone and SOMA and that the amount of prescriptions filled for Copening provided her with at least 25 pills a day. Why Copening obtained this amount of a narcotic prescription in a 12-month period is not clear, but it may involve misuse of prescription drugs. In my view, these are reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the facts alleged in the appellants' complaint, and the district court was required to accept them as true. See Malfabon v. Garcia, 111 Nev. 793, 796, 898 P.2d 107, 108 (1995) (providing that, in the context of a motion to dismiss under NRCP 12(b)(5), the plaintiffs allegations are taken as true and every reasonable inference is resolved in plaintiffs favor). Thus, it may have been reasonably foreseeable that Copening could not be expected to take the medication as prescribed and would drive while under the prescription drug's influence. A natural consequence of those combined actions was that Copening could cause harm to herself or others. Although the appellants' allegations are not conclusive of the pharmacies' potential liability, appellants were not required to prove their claim against the pharmacies while defending a motion to dismiss. See Malfabon, 111 Nev. at 796, 898 P.2d at 108. At a minimum, questions of fact remain as to whether the pharmacies had actual or inquiry notice that Copening was potentially abusing drugs and that she was purportedly pharmacy shopping. Thus, I conclude that sufficient allegations, raised in appellants' pleadings, regarding foreseeability exist and coupled with my determination that a special relationship, together with the actual notice received by the pharmacies, exists to support imposing a duty on the pharmacies for appellants' benefit. I would reverse and remand this issue to the district court for further proceedings.