Opinion ID: 3008648
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applying KRS 342 .730(1)(b) and (c)

Text: KRS 342 .730(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows : 1) Except as provided in KRS 342 .732, income benefits for disability shall be paid to the employee as follows: (b) For permanent partial disability, sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66- 2/3%) of the employee's average weekly wage but not more than seventy-five percent (75%) of the state average weekly wage as determined by KRS 342 .740, multiplied by the permanent impairment rating caused by the injury or occupational disease as determined by Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, American Medical Association, latest edition available, times the factor set forth in the table that follows : AMA Impairment Factor 0 to 5% 0.65 6 to 10% 0.85 11 to 15% 1 .00 16 to 20% 1 .00 21 to 25% 1 .15 26 to 30% 1 .35 31 to 35% 1 .50 36% and above 1 .70 Any temporary total disability period within the maximum period for permanent, partial disability benefits shall extend the maximum period but shall not make payable a weekly benefit exceeding that determined in subsection (1)(a) of this section . Notwithstanding any section of this chapter to the contrary, there shall be no minimum weekly income benefit for permanent partial disability and medical benefits shall be paid for the duration of the disability . (c) 1 . If, due to an injury, an employee does not retain the physical capacity to return to the type of work that the employee performed at the time of injury, the benefit for permanent partial disability shall be multiplied by three (3) times the amount otherwise determined under paragraph (b) of this subsection, but this provision shall not be construed so as to extend the duration of payments ; or 3. Recognizing that limited education and advancing age impact an employee's post-injury earning capacity, an education and age factor, when applicable, shall be added to the income benefit multiplier set forth in paragraph (c)1 . of this subsection . If at the time of injury, the employee had less than eight (8) years of formal education, the multiplier shall be increased by four-tenths (0.4); if the employee had less than twelve (12) years of education or a high school General Educational Development diploma, the multiplier shall be increased by two-tenths (0.2); if the employee was age sixty (60) or older, the multiplier shall be increased by six-tenths (0.6); if the employee was age fiftyfive (55) or older, the multiplier shall be increased by fourtenths (0.4) ; or if the employee was age fifty (50) or older, the multiplier shall be increased by two-tenths (0.2). KRS 342 .730(1)(b) provides an income benefit that is based on the permanent impairment rating caused by the injury as determined by the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (Guides). KRS 342.0011(1) defines the term injury as being a work-related traumatic event that produces a harmful change in the human organism. In other words, it refers to the traumatic event . As illustrated in Thomas v. United Parcel Service, 58 S .W.3d 455, 458-59 (Ky. 2001), the Fifth Edition of the Guides contains a Combined Values Table on pages 604-06, which is used to combine the permanent impairment ratings from multiple harmful changes into a single permanent impairment rating for the injury . Reading the table and determining a combined permanent impairment rating requires no medical expertise, just as reading a conversion table required no medical expertise in Caldwell Tanks v. Roark, 104 S .W.3d 753 (Ky. 2003). The product of the permanent impairment rating and the statutory factor is the worker's disability rating, which is used to calculate the basic income benefit under KRS 342 .730(1)(b) and to determine the duration of the award under KRS 342.730(1)(d) . KRS 342.730(1)(c) applies to the entire benefit . 11. Psychiatric impairment The employer complains that the ALJ relied on the permanent impairment rating that Dr. Granacher assigned to the psychiatric condition but relied on Drs. Underwood and Wagner when concluding that the impairment resulted entirely from the injury. Dr. Granacher stated that the injury exacerbated a pre-existing anxiety disorder that made the claimant susceptible to stress and resulted in a 10% permanent impairment rating. He attributed a 5% rating to the injury and a 5% rating to pre-existing factors . Dr. Underwood assigned a 16-18% rating and, like Dr. Wagner, attributed the entire psychiatric impairment to the work-related injury . The ALJ acknowledged that the claimant experienced events that were stressful when in high school but noted that he had never been diagnosed with anxiety or depression or received any counseling or other treatment until after the work-related injury . Nor did any evidence indicate that symptoms he might have experienced when in high school continued to exist when the injury occurred . Noting that even Dr. Granacher did not state that a psychiatric impairment was active immediately before the injury, the AU concluded that the injury and resulting amputation were what caused the need for psychiatric treatment . The claimant had the burden to prove every element of his claim, including the amount of permanent impairment that the injury caused . KRS 342 .285 designates the ALJ as the finder of fact, and nothing requires an ALJ to rely entirely on the opinions of one physician . Special Fund v. Francis , 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986), explains that a decision favoring the party with the burden of proof may not be disturbed if it is reasonable under the evidence . The disputed finding may not be disturbed because no overwhelming evidence required a finding that the injury caused less than a 10% permanent impairment rating due to the psychiatric condition. 111. Post-injury physical capacity The employer asserts that the claimant retained the physical capacity to return to work as a forklift driver as shown by undisputed medical evidence. Therefore, the ALJ erred by applying the KRS 342.730(1)(c) multipliers . We disagree . The employer bases the argument on a supplemental report from Dr. Sheridan, which stated that the claimant's work restrictions would be lifted if he obtained an appropriate prosthetic device. Dr. Sheridan's initial report indicated that the claimant was at MMI and recommended extensive permanent work restrictions . Nothing in the report indicated that the restrictions were temporary or conditioned on the lack of an appropriate prosthesis . In fact, the report noted that the claimant had just received a new prosthesis and contained nothing to indicate that it was not appropriate . It was reasonable under the circumstances for the ALJ to rely on the initial report and infer that even an appropriate prosthesis would not enable the claimant to function outside the restrictions . The claimant testified that he could not. Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet v. Guffey, 42 S.W .3d 618, 621 (Ky. 2001), is but one in a line of cases indicating that a worker's testimony is competent evidence of his physical condition and ability to perform various activities both before and after a work-related injury. The AU found the claimant's testimony concerning the physical requirements of his job and his ability to perform only some of them after the injury to be credible and convincing. In reaching the conclusion, the ALJ noted that none of the physicians who thought that he might be able to return to work without restrictions evaluated him after he was fitted with the latest prosthesis . The decision must be affirmed because no overwhelming evidence showed it to be unreasonable .