Opinion ID: 2156350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Plummer's claim of judicial bias at sentencing.

Text: During Plummer's sentencing hearing, the judge stated, inter alia: Well, Mr. Plummer hada  other chances at probation, other  another period of incarceration and  that made no impression on Mr. Plummer, and he certainly to me doesn't appear to have taken responsibility for his actions here. I mean, Mr. Plummer had his friend sit on the stand and lie for him. Mr. Plummer wore glasses and his friends would come in and smirk and smile at him because he was wearing his disguise for the jury. I don't think Mr. Plummer has respect or regard for the judicial system. Defense counsel represented that the glasses that Plummer was wearing were prescription glasses and that they were issued at the jail after Plummer took an eye test. Plummer claimed that the glasses that he previously wore were broken. The judge asked, rhetorically and somewhat sarcastically: He just doesn't wear them when he deals? Is that it? The judge then imposed a sentence of ten to thirty years, but suspended execution of all but five years and added a five-year term of probation. Plummer claims that a sentence of ten to thirty years in prison for selling three $20 bags of crack cocaine was excessive, [12] and that the suspension of half of the term is irrelevant. This contention is without merit. The power to affix the penalty upon conviction is vested exclusively in the trial court, and the appellate court is vested with no jurisdiction in respect of that power, provided [the penalty] does not exceed the statutory limit. In re L.J., 546 A.2d 429, 434 (D.C.1988) (quoting Raymond v. United States, 26 App. D.C. 250, 257 (1905), cert. denied, 200 U.S. 619, 26 S.Ct. 755, 50 L.Ed. 623 (1906)); see also Walden v. United States, 366 A.2d 1075, 1076 (D.C.1976). Indeed, until fairly recently, the non-suspended portion of Plummer's jail term would not have been much longer than the mandatory minimum for a first offense. See Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d 61, 82 (D.C.1996). Moreover, Plummer had a substantial criminal record, and Hughes testified that even before Operation Blockbuster, Plummer had sold him crack cocaine twenty to forty times. In determining what sentence to impose, the trial judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry, broad in scope, largely unlimited `either as to kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it came.' United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972); see Harris v. United States, 612 A.2d 198, 208 (D.C.1992) (quoting Tucker ); see, generally, Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949). The sentence imposed in this case did not reflect judicial bias, nor could it reasonably be described as excessive. [13] The judge's remark that Mr. Plummer had his friend sit on the stand and lie for him is more troublesome. Without going into detail with respect to the background of her comment, we think that although it is possible that the assertion by the judge is correct, it is not at all obvious to us that the record fully supports a statement as categorical, positive, and accusatory as the trial judge made. It does appear, however, that the defense witnesses' testimony that Plummer regularly wore glasses was disbelieved by the jury as well as by the judge. The judge's comment was plainly based on what she believed the facts to be, and Plummer does not contend otherwise. [14] Moreover, the judge's remarks were made after the trial itself, as distinguished from the sentencing, was over.