Opinion ID: 163442
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the order denying recusal

Text: 30 The plaintiff also argues on appeal that the district court judge, Judge Leonard, erred when he refused to recuse himself. In support of this contention, the plaintiff asserts the following: (1) then-Governor Keating was a prime mover behind the Oklahoma law authorizing the bond issue in dispute, signed the bill into law, and sat on the three-member Oklahoma Contingency Review Board, which was required to, and did, approve the authorized bond issue; (2) Judge Leonard's son is married to the daughter of Governor Keating; (3) both Governor Keating and Judge Leonard are members of the Republican party; and (4) Governor Keating may be a witness in the case. 31 The plaintiff moved for Judge Leonard's recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Section 455(a) provides: Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In applying this section, we employ an objective test: 32 [T]he judge's actual state of mind, purity of heart, incorruptibility, or lack of partiality are not the issue. The test in this circuit is whether a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality. The standard is purely objective. The inquiry is limited to outward manifestations and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. 33 United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir.1993) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 34 We begin by noting that two of the facts asserted by the plaintiff provide no support for the claim that a reasonable person would harbor doubts about Judge Leonard's impartiality. First, there was no likelihood that Governor Keating would have been called as a witness in the case. The plaintiff agreed with defendants in his summary judgment motion that there is no dispute of material fact and that this case presents a pure question of law. Second, that Judge Leonard and Governor Keating have been members of the same political party, and that Judge Leonard may once have been active in the party, do not call into question Judge Leonard's impartiality. It is, of course, an inescapable part of our system of government that judges are drawn primarily from lawyers who have participated in public and political affairs. United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1543 (11th Cir.1987). The fact of past political activity alone will rarely require recusal, and we conclude it does not do so here. See, e.g., In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 221 (1st Cir.1997) ( Former affiliations with a party may persuade a judge not to sit; but they are rarely a basis for compelled recusal.); In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990) (Courts that have considered whether pre-judicial political activity is ... prejudicial regularly conclude that it is not.) (collecting cases). 35 More significant is the plaintiff's allegation that the district court judge's family tie to Governor Keating, and the political importance to the Governor of the law at issue, would cause a reasonable person to harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality. In this case, Governor Keating is not a named party, nor is it alleged that he has a personal or financial interest in the outcome of this litigation. Any political interest that Governor Keating may have in the outcome of this case is filtered through the State of Oklahoma, which as we have held cannot be sued. Further, we note that the relationship between the judge and the Governor is not within the third degree of relationship traditionally utilized for determining whether there is a prohibited degree of financial or personal interest in the litigation before a judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5); id. § 455(d)(2); 13A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3548, at 607 n. 3 ([T]he following persons are within the third degree of relationship: children; grandchildren; great-grandchildren; parents; grandparents; great-grandparents; uncles; aunts; brothers; sisters; nephews; and nieces.). 36 Given the circumstances of this case, the resolution of the recusal issue is determined for us by the applicable standard of review. We review the denial of a motion to recuse for abuse of discretion, United States v. Smith, 997 F.2d 674, 681 (10th Cir.1993), and under that standard we will uphold a district court's decision unless it is an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment. Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control, 165 F.3d 767, 777 (10th Cir.1999) (quotation marks omitted). We cannot say that the district judge's decision not to recuse himself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) was manifestly unreasonable, much less arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical. 37 Even if it were an abuse of discretion for Judge Leonard to have refused to recuse himself, we would conclude that the error was harmless. In deciding whether a violation of § 455 is harmless error, ... [we] consider `the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process.' Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1571-72 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988)). We conclude that none of these risks is present. At issue here are straightforward questions of law decided following cross motions for summary judgment. We have independently reviewed those issues de novo and concluded that the plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed. And there were no extended proceedings or trial during which discretionary decisions by the trial judge — decisions which might be insulated by a deferential standard of review — could have determined the outcome. An error by the district court judge in not recusing himself would have been harmless under the circumstances of this case.