Opinion ID: 1124174
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Transactions can be explained in a general or particular manner:

Text: The code also provides that the differences settled by a compromise can be recited in a general manner. Plaintiff nonetheless contends that the strong emotional overtones inherent in the execution of anticipatory releases of wrongful death claims dictate that this court adopt a blanket express waiver requirement. [17] Conversely, Defendants contend that the adoption of such a blanket requirement would be inconsistent both with LSA-C.C. Art. 3073's express authorization of general recitals to explain the differences settled and with Daigle. Defendants contend that Daigle does not mandate the use of particular verbiage and that Daigle despite the drastic difference in verbiage between the Daigle release [18] and the release instrument hereis dispositive. Continuing, Defendants cite as controlling the test enunciated in Daigle that the compromise of a prospective wrongful death claim has res judicata effect if there is no error, fraud, duress or undue influence which vitiates the consent of the potential wrongful death beneficiary. 613 So.2d at 620-21. Applying that test, Defendants emphasize that no vice of consent is either alleged or present herePlaintiff was represented by counsel throughout, indeed the same counsel still represents her; Plaintiff received substantial compensation; and the release instrument was executed almost three years post-accident, and five years pre-death. It follows, Defendants contend, that Daigle 's authorization of anticipatory releases of wrongful death claims, coupled with LSA-C.C. Art. 3073's authorization of general recitals of the differences settled, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the general recitals of the release instrument cover Plaintiff's wrongful death claim. We agree with Defendants' contention that Daigle disposes of Plaintiff's argument that anticipatory releases of wrongful death actions should be treated differently than releases of other future actions, and thus decline Plaintiff's invitation to adopt an express waiver requirement. We disagree, however, with Defendants' further contention that Daigle compels a conclusion that the general recitals in the release instrument encompass Plaintiff's future wrongful death action. Even when valid, releases of future actions are narrowly construed to assure that the parties fully understand the rights released and the resulting consequences. As a result, if the release instrument leaves any doubt as to whether a particular future action is covered by the compromise, it should be construed not to cover such future action. [19] In Ritchey v. Azar, 383 So.2d 360 (La.1980), we recognized that fail[ure] to use language in the contract which would have clearly provided for waiver of [a] future action evidences a lack of intent to compromise such future action. Id. at 364; see also Bogalusa Community Medical Center v. Batiste, 603 So.2d 183, 188 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1992); Succession of Magnani, 450 So.2d 972, 977 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984). By the same token, Defendants' failure to use language in the release instrument which would have clearly provided for a waiver of a future wrongful death action evidences a lack of intent to compromise such future action. [20] The underlying rationale for the special treatment accorded releases of future actions is succinctly stated as follows: [w]herever a bargain is intended to operate in the future as an exemption from liability the courts apply more stringent rules of interpretation, partly because the chances are smaller that the parties have adverted to this very cause of action, and partly because these contracts tend to be against public policy. 15 W. Jaeger, Williston on Contracts § 1825, pp. 479-80 (3d Ed.1972). [21] While Daigle puts to rest the public policy concern raised by the release of such future actions, Daigle does not even consider the other concern of whether the parties adverted to the specific future cause of action allegedly released, which is the pivotal issue here. That the parties probably did not advert to the wrongful death action in entering the release instrument is supported by both the facts and the state of the law at the time the agreement was executed. Factually, nothing in the circumstances surrounding the execution of the release instrument suggests that the parties were contemplating Buel Brown's death. To the contrary, no one thought Buel Brown would die from his injuries. Plaintiff attests to this fact in her affidavit. Defendants concede this fact, noting in their brief that at the time the release instrument was executed, Buel Brown's death was not imminent. Indeed, hindsight confirms this fact; Buel Brown lived another five years after the release instrument was executed. This fact is further corroborated by the plain language of the release instrument; while Buel Brown acknowledged in the release instrument that his condition might worsen, the instrument does not mention death as a possible consequence of the claimed tort. The state of the law at the time the release instrument was executed likewise reflects that the parties did not advert to a future wrongful death action. On September 8, 1982, the prevailing jurisprudence was that neither Buel nor Ruth Brown could compromise a future wrongful death action. [22] While this factor alone is not necessarily sufficient to establish the parties' intent, it weighs in favor of our finding that the parties did not clearly comprehend that this future action would be covered by the release instrument. Hence, the state of the law at the time the release instrument was executed is relevant in that it sheds light on what the parties intended by the language employed in the instrument. Summarizing, we find that the parties did not clearly contemplate that the release instrument would cover Ruth Brown's future wrongful death action. As established above, the factual and legal circumstances surrounding the execution of the release instrument establish that the parties did not advert to a future wrongful death action in executing the instrument. Moreover, there is no language in the instrument indicating that the parties intended to settle anything other than claims arising out of Buel Brown's personal injuries. While on this factor, we address Defendants' related contention that under LSA-C.C. Art. 3083, an all-encompassing, general release of all differences between the partiesas Defendants characterize the release instrument herecovers all claims, even ones that the parties were not thinking about. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Cloy Constr. Co., 425 So.2d 887, 892 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983) (holding that LSA-C.C. Art. 3083 applies to a compromise of all differences, and LSA-C.C. Art. 3073 applies to a compromise of limited scope). [23] The jurisprudence construing LSA-C.C. Art. 3083 is sparse. Nonetheless, as Defendants contend, this article has been construed in a handful of cases to mean that a releasor will be bound by the unconditional language of the written release instrument he signed, despite his claims of contrary subjective intent. [24] This construction of LSA-C.C. Art. 3083 conflicts with LSA-C.C. Art. 3073's provision that compromises do not extend to differences the parties never intended to include in them. See Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1321-22 (5th Cir.1983) (noting apparent conflict between these codal provisions). In an attempt to resolve this apparent conflict, we retrace LSA-C.C. Art. 3083 back to its source provision. As noted elsewhere, this article is one of the obscurely worded codal provisions designed to illustrate a particular instance in which parties err. 2 M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law § 2301 (La.State Law Inst.Trans.1959) ( Planiol ) (discussing the source provision of this article). [25] Planiol explains that the occasion of error this article deals with is [w]here the parties compromised in ignorance of existing titles in favor of one of them. Planiol, supra at § 2301. [26] Given that this article was intended to be illustrative of the general principles regarding rescission of compromise, we conclude that the codal scheme contemplates that when, as here, the issue is not rescission, but rather construction, of a compromise, LSA-C.C. Art. 3073 should control. Nonetheless, there was no existing wrongful death claim at the time the release instrument was executed that was later discovered; Plaintiff's wrongful death claim did not come into existence until Buel Brown's death several years later. Moreover, the release instrument, contrary to Defendants' characterization, is not one extending to all differences between the parties; instead, it is limited in two respects. One, as established above, it extends only to Buel Brown's personal injury claims. Two, it does not include a release of the other wrongful death beneficiary's claim ( i.e., Kimberly Brown's claim). Regardless of the reason for Defendants' failure to obtain a release from the other beneficiary, the absence of such party from the release instrument undercuts Defendants' characterization of the release instrument as one settling all differences between the parties. Moreover, not only does the release instrument not purport to end all differences between the parties, but also by including the indemnity provision, discussed below, it substitutes one dispute for another. See Rivett, supra . Defendants' reliance on LSA-C.C. Art. 3083 is thus misplaced.