Opinion ID: 1726105
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: merger/bar and gcr 203.1

Text: Justice RYAN'S opinion, in its interpretation of the instant case, would limit the scope of GCR 203.1 to cases falling within the technical limits of merger, [8] on the ground that the rule makes specific reference to merger without similar specific reference to bar. Under such an interpretation, if a plaintiff had won a prior suit during which a defendant had failed to object to plaintiff's nonjoinder, GCR 203.1 would operate to allow the maintenance of a second suit because the defense of merger would have been waived. If a plaintiff had lost the prior suit, as occurred herein, however, under Justice RYAN'S interpretation GCR 203.1 would be inapplicable despite a defendant's similar failure to object. This inconsistent result would obtain because a defendant could waive assertion of the defense of merger but could not waive assertion of the defense of bar under his reading of the rule, although in fact both actions were almost identical. We cannot agree that the rule can be interpreted in this manner for a number of reasons. First, Justice RYAN'S interpretation would mean that Malesev, which we believe correctly interpreted and applied GCR 203.1, was incorrectly decided. In Malesev, the plaintiff was unsuccessful in his first suit, but then Judge KAVANAGH found that plaintiff could maintain a second suit because the waiver provision of GCR 203.1 precluded defendant's assertion of bar. Second, we note that the concepts of merger and bar are almost identical despite their technical distinction. [9] In fact the terms merger and bar are often used interchangeably to convey the same meaning. In specific reference to the waiver provision of GCR 203.1, an example of this interchangeability in common usage can be found in Wayne Circuit Judge Horace W. Gilmore's oft-cited treatise, Michigan Civil Procedure Before Trial. The treatise states in § 8.103, failure    to object to    failure to join claims required to be joined, constitutes a waiver of the required joinder, and the judgment does not merge more than the claims actually litigated. (Emphasis added.) In the very next section, § 8.104, the treatise states, [a]s pointed out in the previous section, § 8.103, failure to object to the nonjoinder of mandatory claims means that the action does not bar a subsequent suit on that unjoined claim. [10] (Emphasis added.) The fact that the terms are frequently not distinguished in common usage is further demonstrated by the fact that this limited interpretation of the waiver provision solely to those cases falling within the technical definition of merger has not arisen in prior Court of Appeals cases examining GCR 203.1. [11] Third, even if merger is given its technical meaning, we do not find the language discussing merger to control that which precedes it. The second sentence of GCR 203.1 contains two clauses. The first states, failure    to object    constitutes a waiver of the required joinder rules. This clause unequivocally waives all joinders, whether plaintiff won or lost. So the technical difference between merger and bar does not come into play at all. We hold this clause is absolute and controlling. The second clause states    and the judgment shall not merge more than the claims actually litigated. We find the language in the second clause subordinate to the language contained in the first clause and hold that the term merge in the second clause is used in its more general sense. Waiver of the joinder rules necessarily includes waiver of the defense of bar. This reasoning is substantiated by the Committee Notes discussing the harshness the waiver provision is meant to mitigate: [t]he harshness of the present practice as it relates to the enforcement of compulsory joinder provisions    is the fact it almost always is enforced after the fact, through the doctrine of merger and res judicata (emphasis added). Res judicata includes both the doctrines of merger and bar. James, Civil Procedure (Little, Brown & Company, 1965), p 549. Further, and perhaps of greatest significance, to apply the GCR 203.1 waiver provision solely to merger and not to bar does not make sense in light of a primary purpose of the waiver provision. That purpose is to encourage a defendant to assert, by motion, an objection to plaintiff's nonjoinder in the first suit when the defect can be cured. [12] At this point it could not be known whether plaintiff would win or lose. The introduction of fairness and certainty into this area of litigation is the obvious beneficial impact intended by the rule in requiring assertion in the first suit. For example, if a plaintiff initially fails to join all claims and there is no objection made by defendant to this defect, then all parties are on express notice that plaintiff may later institute suit on matters not actually litigated therein. Conversely, if plaintiff fails to join all claims and defendant does object, all parties know that plaintiff will be precluded from suing again absent an amendment in plaintiff's complaint joining those additional claims. Hence, as stated in the Committee Notes and Authors' Comments, the unfairness or harshness of the joinder rule is mitigated by bringing the matter to the fore in the original suit when the nonjoinder defect can be cured. Clearly, if the waiver provision were solely applied to cases which, once litigated, come within the technical definition of merger, there could be no certainty until plaintiff's success was determined; that very certainty sought to be realized by the rule during the original suit would be frustrated. [13] We cannot and do not find that this rule drafted to effectuate fairness and certainty during an original action, can be interpreted to render the matter uncertain until after finality of the original action. Finally, the unreasonableness of interpreting the waiver provision as restricted only to cases falling within the technical definition of merger is further supported by the fact that we cannot logically find that the provision was intended to avoid harshness only with respect to the successful plaintiff. If a choice had been undertaken by the rule  and we do not find that one was  it would appear to us far more logical to assist the plaintiff suffering most significantly by the harshness of the traditional compulsory joinder requirement, i.e., the plaintiff who has been unsuccessful and therefore recovered nothing from the defendant as a result of the original suit. For the above reasons we cannot conclude that the GCR 203.1 waiver provision applies only to cases falling within the technical scope of merger and therefore only in favor of previously successful plaintiffs. We find the waiver provision to mean what it says  a defendant who fails to object to a plaintiff's nonjoinder waives the use of the defense in a subsequent suit based on additional claims.