Opinion ID: 1202176
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Delay in Promptly Presenting the Defendant Before A Magistrate

Text: The defendant urges that several incriminating admissions that he made should have been suppressed because he was not promptly presented before a magistrate. In Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Guthrie, ___ W.Va. ___, 315 S.E.2d 397 (1984), we stated: `The delay in taking a defendant to a magistrate may be a critical factor [in the totality of circumstances making a confession involuntary and hence inadmissible] where it appears that the primary purpose of the delay was to obtain a confession from the defendant.' Syllabus Point 6, State v. Persinger, [169 W.Va. 121], 286 S.E.2d 261 (1982), as amended. The defendant was arrested around 4:00 p.m. at his place of employment and was taken to the state police headquarters for fingerprinting, photographing, and other routine processing. He was given Miranda warnings, [7] which he waived in writing. He did not give a formal confession at this time. When the defendant learned that the police were going to search his bedroom, he agreed to cooperate with them and to show them where the contraband was hidden. He accompanied the police to the boarding house and helped them locate the stolen property. Afterwards, the group returned to police headquarters where the merchandise was inventoried in the defendant's presence. The only incriminating statement that the defendant made was after he returned to the police station. He stated that while he was hidden in the loft of the store, he saw the police searching for him and that had they had come closer, he would have shot them. Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears that the defendant was presented to a magistrate around 9:00 p.m., shortly after the evidence was inventoried at the station house. Most of the time between the defendant's arrest and his presentment was consumed by routine processing, the trip to secure the stolen property, and the subsequent inventory. The search at the boarding house, according to the police, took approximately two hours. The record does not reflect the time consumed traveling to and from the boarding house, initially processing the defendant, or completing the inventory. The defendant was read his Miranda warnings and waived them in writing shortly after being arrested. He voluntarily agreed to accompany the police to his boarding house during the search. During this time, he was not subjected to any formal interrogation. His only inculpatory statement was voluntarily made, according to the police. Under our prompt presentment rules, W.Va.Code, 62-1-5, [8] and Rule 5(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, [9] we have recognized that the delay in transporting a defendant to police headquarters and the time consumed in routine processing is not critical for prompt presentment purposes. State v. Persinger, 169 W.Va. 121, 286 S.E.2d 261 (1982). In several other cases, we have found that a delay in presenting the defendant to a magistrate after he has confessed does not violate our prompt presentment statute either, because the purpose of the statute is to avoid prolonged interrogation in order to coerce a confession. State v. Hutcheson, ___ W.Va. ___, 352 S.E.2d 143 (1986); State v. Humphrey, ___ W.Va. ___, 351 S.E.2d 613 (1986). Moreover, this case is somewhat analogous to State v. Wickline, ___ W.Va. ___, 399 S.E.2d 42. In Wickline, the defendant was arrested at the murder site around 5:00 a.m. and was instructed to remain in a police cruiser while the officers completed their investigation. At approximately 9:00 a.m., the police officers left the crime scene and drove the defendant to the state police barracks. At around 10:00 a.m., the defendant gave a written confession. From the time she was arrested until she arrived at the police station, the defendant was not interrogated. We concluded that this delay was not critical and explained in Syllabus Point 4: The delay between the time of the arrest or custodial interrogation and the giving of a confession is most critical for prompt presentment purposes because during this time period custodial confinement and interrogation can be used to attempt to produce a confession. Here, the delay in presentment was caused by routine police processing and the trip to the defendant's residence. The defendant voluntarily agreed to accompany the police on this occasion. There was no evidence to suggest that the defendant was interrogated during this time or while the merchandise was inventoried at the police station. It is clear that the oral statement was not the product of any custodial interrogation. We find no reversible error. [10]