Opinion ID: 2975114
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: is denied.

Text: The most meritorious of Durr’s claims, and the most troublesome allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, are raised in sub-claim (b). Durr claims that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution’s repeated references at mitigation to Durr’s decision not to testify under oath. Durr points to three occasions when the prosecutor made such statements. The first example occurred during mitigation when the prosecutor said: This man has taken the stand and talked to you in an unsworn statement, never den[y]ing that he killed that girl, never apologizing that he killed that girl, never explaining to you why he did these things. This is his time. He could have said anything from that witness stand and a man, I think with a little more courage than an aunt(sic), would have done more than send women to the stand on his behalf and then take the stand and try to create a reasonable doubt in your mind to intimidate you. The second objectionable statement occurred when discussing the application of the mitigating factor concerning duress, coercion, or strong provocation, the prosecutor said: You saw him on the stand, calm and cool in his statements, prepared to face you. Of course he doesn’t want to face cross-examination. A third time, when addressing the mitigating factor concerning whether Durr had prior convictions, the prosecutor said: The defendant’s lack of prior criminal convictions. Will he take the stand with a [s]worn statement? Unfortunately, I don’t know how that applies to this case. Durr’s counsel objected to this third statement, which the trial court sustained. Defense counsel then asked the court to instruct the jury to disregard that line, which the court then did. On direct appeal in the context of a prosecutorial misconduct claim, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that the prosecutor’s first statement was “adequately tailored to inform the jury that the appellant’s statements were made absent oath or affirmation.” Durr, 568 N.E.2d at 683. As for the prosecutor’s third statement, the state court held that it violated State v. DePew, 528 N.E.2d 542 (Ohio 1988) (syllabus), but found no denial of a fair trial as the trial court admonished the jury to disregard the remark. Id. at 684. The district court found no merit in this claim on habeas review when it was raised as an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Because the Ohio Supreme Court denied this claim on the merits, we review under the AEDPA standard. As a general proposition, a prosecutor’s comment regarding a defendant’s failure to testify violates the Fifth Amendment. DePew v. Anderson, 311 F.3d 742, 750 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)). In Ohio, a defendant may present an unsworn statement during the mitigation phase without being subjected to cross-examination. Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.03(D)(1). Accordingly, “the prosecution may comment that the defendant’s statement has not been made under oath or affirmation, but such comment must be limited to reminding the jury that the defendant’s statement was not made under oath, in contrast to the testimony of all other witnesses.” DePew, 311 F.3d 742, 745 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting DePew, 528 N.E.2d 542, 553-54 (Ohio 1998)). DePew involved several inflammatory statements made by the prosecutor during the penalty phase, each designed to completely undercut the defendant’s sole mitigation theory that he was basically a law-abiding and peaceful person. DePew, 311 F.3d 748-49. The prosecutor made No. 00-3353 Durr v. Mitchell Page 15 several inflammatory statements. First, the prosecutor commented on the defendant’s failure to testify in the following manner: [T]he gentleman for the defendant, he told you five different times about the oath you took, and about the oath we all take, and the oath I take, and the oath you take – everybody takes the oath except the defendant; he isn’t man enough to get up here and take the oath. Everybody in this case took the oath. Everybody in this case raised his right hand to this man, and he says I solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help me God. Everybody except DePew. DePew, 528 N.E.2d at 554. The prosecution then made several more improper statements regarding the defendant’s past. The prosecutor asked a defense witness on cross-examination whether he was aware of the defendant’s involvement in a knife fight at a convenience store. DePew, 528 N.E.2d at 553. This question “was particularly inflammatory because it involved the same violent act of which the defendant had been convicted . . . .” DePew, 311 F.3d at 749. Next, the prosecutor presented without authentication or foundation, an irrelevant photograph of the defendant standing next to a marijuana plant. DePew, 528 N.E.2d at 555. “The admission of this photograph raised unsubstantiated questions about the defendant’s criminal history, threatening his assertions of having a law-abiding past.” DePew, 311 F.3d at 749. “Finally, the prosecutor stated in his closing argument that the defendant failed to take the stand in order to prevent the prosecutor from asking him whether he had a subsequent conviction.” Id. “This improper statement also undermined defendant’s theory that he was a law-abiding citizen, implying that the defendant was instead a recidivist continually engaged in criminal conduct.” Id. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed DePew’s convictions and sentence, finding the remarks “harmless error in light of the overwhelming weight of the aggravating circumstances in this case relative to the factors offered in mitigation . . . .” DePew, 528 N.E.2d at 554. On habeas review, however, this Court reversed, holding that the improper statements, particularly when taken together: [W]ere designed to keep the jury from properly considering and weighing the mitigating evidence offered by the defendant. While improper comments of a prosecutor do not generally warrant automatic reversal, the statements in [DePew] require it because they go to the heart of the defendant’s sole mitigating theory . . . [a]llowing the prosecutor to make inadmissible, inflammatory – and in the words of the Ohio Supreme Court, ‘misleading’ – statements . . . undermines the defendant’s right under the Eighth Amendment to receive the ‘constitutionally indispensable’ consideration of his proffered mitigating evidence. DePew, 311 F.3d at 749. We also held that the prosecutor’s statement concerning the defendant’s refusal to testify at sentencing violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights as set forth in Griffin. DePew, 311 F.3d at 750 (citing Griffin, 380 U.S. 609). We concluded that the state courts improperly applied the harmless error standard. DePew, 311 F.3d at 751. The Ohio Supreme Court had found the error harmless on the grounds that “the crime was ‘brutal’ and that reversal of the death penalty on these grounds violated the ‘interest of the public, which has every right to expect its criminal justice system to work effectively.’” Id. (quoting DePew, 528 N.E.2d at 557). This Court held that this was not the proper constitutional definition of harmless error, and that “[t]he public’s, or the voter’s feelings in favor of capital punishment for brutal crimes are a well-known part of our political tradition, but these feelings No. 00-3353 Durr v. Mitchell Page 16 cannot rise above or displace constitutional provisions ensuring a fair trial.” DePew, 311 F.3d at 751. Thus, cumulatively, it was clear that the errors were not harmless, because “we [had] ‘grave doubt’ that the statements by the prosecutor did not have an effect on the sentencing of the defendant.” DePew, 311 F.3d at 749. Although close, we find that DePew is distinguishable. In DePew, defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s unsworn statement, and did not request, nor did the trial court give, any curative instruction. See Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441, 473-74 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding it was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law to deny claim of prosecutorial misconduct in spite of prosecutor’s comment pointing out defendant’s failure to take the stand, when the comment was not flagrant and the court instructed the jury about defendant’s right not to testify), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1827 (2007). In Durr’s case, defense counsel did object to the prosecutor’s third reference to Durr’s failure to testify under oath. Durr’s counsel also requested, and received, an instruction to the jury to disregard the statement. The prosecutor made no subsequent references to Durr’s failure to testify under oath after the objection was granted and the curative jury instruction was given. At the close of mitigation, defense counsel went so far as to move for a mistrial based on the objections to the prosecution’s statements during final argument. Furthermore, unlike DePew, the prosecutor in Durr’s case did not question any of Durr’s witnesses in an attempt to bring up Durr’s inflammatory criminal past: his two previous rape convictions. Also, the prosecutor in this case did not introduce any irrelevant prejudicial evidence that tended to “raise unsubstantiated questions about [Durr’s] criminal history, threatening his assertions of having a law-abiding past.” DePew, 311 F.3d at 749. Also, here, the prosecutor made no impermissible statements in his closing argument. Durr’s claim is also distinguishable because DePew was a pre-AEDPA case subject to de novo review. DePew, 311 F.3d at 748. Clearly, the prosecution’s statements regarding Durr’s failure to testify under oath were improper, and utterly gratuitous given the strength of the evidence against Durr. The rule in Griffin is simple, and there is no reason why any prosecutor should flirt with violating it. However, we are not on direct appeal here, but applying the deferential standard of the AEDPA. Cf. DePew, 311 F.3d at 748 (applying pre-AEDPA standard by reviewing the district court’s grant of habeas corpus de novo). And the prosecutor’s behavior in this case was much more limited than that in DePew, and attempts were made to correct it. On balance, then, we are not convinced that the prosecutor’s conduct “‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. 643). Nonetheless, we would like to remind prosecutors to avoid such dramatic, needless errors. Nevertheless, for the reasons just discussed, this case is distinguishable from DePew, and therefore, is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.4 4. Failure to Object to Jury Instructions Durr claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the following jury instructions upon completion of the mitigation phase: (a) informing the jury that it could consider additional evidence and argument on the aggravating circumstances as submitted during the mitigation phase; (b) instructing the jury on all statutory mitigating factors, including those not raised by the defense; (c) instructing the jury that it was making a recommendation only; and, (d) instructing the jury that it was not permitted to consider sympathy or mercy. 4 Durr raises a fifth issue in his brief before this Court. Even though not granted in the COA, Durr contends that the district court erred in denying him an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2). Even if properly brought before this Court, this claim would fail because Durr’s “bald assertions and conclusory allegations do not provide sufficient ground to warrant . . . an evidentiary hearing.” Stanford v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442, 460 (6th Cir. 2001). No. 00-3353 Durr v. Mitchell Page 17 “‘On habeas review, errors on instructions are not reviewable unless they deprive a defendant of constitutional due process.’” Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604, 638 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 321 (6th Cir. 2000)). This Court must determine “‘whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violate[d] due process.’” Byrd, 209 F.3d at 527 (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991)). In sub-claim (a), Durr argues that trial counsel should have objected to the trial court’s instruction that the jury could consider additional evidence and argument on the aggravating circumstances presented during the mitigation phase of his trial. The district court found this claim without merit. The Ohio Courts never ruled on the merits of this claim, so we review under the Maples standard. During mitigation, the State did not cross-examine any witness for the defense and offered no additional evidence. The State chose instead to rely upon the jury’s verdicts of guilty for kidnaping, robbery, and rape to support the death sentence for the aggravated murder conviction. Durr does not explain how this instruction resulted in prejudice, and we can find none. In sub-claim (b), Durr argues that trial counsel were ineffective at mitigation for failing to object to the trial court’s instructions to the jury on all statutory mitigating factors, including those not raised by the defense. On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court denied this claim, finding that Durr was afforded a fair trial in which counsel protected all of his constitutional rights. Durr, 568 N.E.2d at 685. The district court found no merit in this claim. Because it was ruled on the merits in state court, we review sub-claim (b) under the AEDPA standard. This Court has recently held that, “[t]he right to have certain statutory mitigating factors considered (or aggravating ones ignored) is a creature of state statute, not the federal Constitution.” Hill, 400 F.3d at 333 (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878-79 (1983)). The fact that an “‘instruction was allegedly incorrect under state law is not a basis for habeas relief’ by itself.” Hill, 400 F.3d at 333 (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72). “It is only when the error of state law “‘so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.’” Id. Durr does not show how the allegedly incorrect instruction “so infected the entire trial” that his conviction violated due process. The district court correctly determined that this instruction did not violate Durr’s federal rights. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. The district court did not err in denying this claim. Next, Durr argues that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s use of the term “recommendation” to describe the jury’s sentencing role at mitigation. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied this claim under Strickland, holding that based upon the facts in the case, the use of the term “recommendation” was not error, and remained within the constitutional boundaries set by Caldwell, so counsel’s performance could not have been deficient. Durr, 568 N.E.2d at 683, 85. The district court also found no merit in this claim. Because the state courts ruled on sub-claim (c) on the merits, we review this claim under the AEDPA standard. This Court has denied habeas relief arising from jury instructions that inform the jury that it is making a sentencing recommendation when such an instruction is an accurate recitation of state law. See Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 352-53 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.03(D)(2)). In Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 415 (6th Cir. 1999), the Court held that, “while it is somewhat inaccurate to state that a sentencing jury ‘recommends’ a life sentence when such a recommendation would be binding . . . even if the trial judge's instruction was erroneous it could not have diminished the jury's sense of responsibility in Caldwell terms . . . this is an accurate statement of Ohio Law. . . [t]here [is] no constitutional error.” Durr does not show resulting prejudice from this instruction. It follows that the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. We agree with the district court’s determination that this instruction did not violate Durr’s constitutional rights. Sub-claim (c) is denied. No. 00-3353 Durr v. Mitchell Page 18 Finally, Durr argues in sub-claim (d) that his constitutional rights were violated by the trial court’s instructing the jury at mitigation that they were not permitted to consider sympathy or mercy. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied this claim on the merits. Durr, 568 N.E.2d at 685. The district court found no merit in this claim, explaining that nothing in the instruction violated Durr’s federal rights. Because the state court ruled on this claim on the merits, we review sub-claim (d) under the AEDPA standard. This Court held in Mapes that “an instruction that the jury should not be swayed by ‘mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling’ was not only unobjectionable . . . it ‘served the useful purpose of confining the jury's imposition of the death sentence by cautioning it against reliance on [irrelevant,] extraneous emotional factors.’” Mapes, 171 F.3d at 416 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1987)). Based on this Court’s previous holdings, the instructions given at Durr’s trial were not improper. Thus, Durr cannot show any resulting prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to object. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, as the district court found. Subclaim (d) is denied. C. Insufficiency of Evidence for Rape Conviction Finally, Durr argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support his rape conviction. Specifically, Durr claims that the state failed to present proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Durr at any time raped Angel Vincent. He argues that there was no medical or eyewitness testimony to establish a rape occurred, and that circumstantial evidence of Angel’s partially naked body is insufficient to sustain the charge of rape and the capital specification that the offense occurred in the commission of rape. Durr initially raised this claim on direct appeal. Because the state court reviewed this claim on the merits, we review this claim under the stricter AEDPA standard. Ohio’s statute concerning rape at the time of Durr’s trial stated that no person shall engage in sexual conduct with another when the offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force. Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.02 (A)(2) (repealed 1995). Sexual conduct was defined as “vaginal intercourse between a male and female, and anal intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.01(A) (repealed 1995). Sexual contact was defined at the time of Durr’s trial as “any touching of an erogenous zone of another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the person is female, a breast for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.” Ohio Rev. Code 2907.01 (repealed 1995). Acknowledging that Vincent’s “body was so severely infested with bacteria, testing for the presence of acid phosphates and spermatozoa was inconclusive,” Durr, 568 N.E.2d at 677, the Ohio Supreme Court nevertheless rejected the claim, stating: In this case, the prosecution presented highly probative circumstantial evidence. Except for a pair of tennis shoes, the victim’s body was found nude from the waist down. In addition, Deborah Mullins testified that when she saw Angel tied up in the back of [Durr’s] car, [Durr] informed Deborah that he was going to kill Angel because she would tell. Based on these facts, we believe that there was sufficient probative evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found [Durr] guilty of rape beyond a reasonable doubt. Durr, 568 N.E.2d at 682. No. 00-3353 Durr v. Mitchell Page 19 Two state supreme court justices disagreed with the majority’s determination that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of rape. Id. at 686. (Moyer, C.J. and Brown, J., concurring). The district court held that “the evidence cited by . . . the Supreme Court of Ohio support[s] a finding that sufficient evidence existed for any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” We review this claim under the AEDPA standard. This issue presents a very close question, since there is absolutely no physical evidence of any penetration to affirmatively establish sexual conduct under Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.01(A) (repealed 1995), rather then a less severe charge of sexual contact under Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.01(B) (repealed 1995). Were this case before us on de novo review, we might be hardpressed to conclude “after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, [that] any trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). However, our review on habeas is very deferential to the state courts, and we simply cannot say that the insufficiency of evidence claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of Jackson. As the Ohio Supreme Court held, although circumstantial, the evidence in this case was “highly probative.” Deborah Mullins testified that she saw the victim tied up in Durr’s car, and that Durr told her that he was going to “waste” Angel because “she would tell.” The body was nude from the waste down, except for tennis shoes. Medical evidence was inconclusive because the amount of bacteria in the body. Based on this evidence, a jury could have reasonably inferred that Angel had been raped. As circumstantial evidence is entitled to equal weight as direct evidence, United States v. Farley, 2 F.3d 645, 650 (6th Cir. 1993), we cannot conclude on habeas review that the Ohio Supreme Court erred. As the state of Ohio has considerable expertise in matters of Ohio state criminal law, it is appropriate for this Court to exercise substantial deference to the Ohio Supreme Court in this area. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1992) (stating that Court “should not lightly construe the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual States.”). Therefore, claim thirty-six is denied.