Opinion ID: 626549
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Newell's expert witness

Text: Newell first argues that the district court erroneously excluded the testimony of Railsback, its expert witness. The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. At the time of trial, Rule 702 provided: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Fed.R.Evid. 702 (2010) (amended December 1, 2011 for stylistic reasons only, see cmt. 2011 amends.). A district court's task in assessing evidence proffered under Rule 702 is to determine whether the evidence both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). One key consideration is whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid. Id. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The inquiry is a flexible one, and [t]he focus ... must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate. Id. at 594-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786. An expert who presents testimony must employ[] in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). Although there is no definitive checklist or test for meeting this standard, Daubert set forth a number of factors that typically bear on the inquiry. 509 U.S. at 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786. These include whether the theory or technique in question can be (and has been) tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, whether it has a known or potential rate of error, and whether the theory or technique enjoys general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. Id. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (internal quotation marks omitted). Red flags that caution against certifying an expert include reliance on anecdotal evidence, improper extrapolation, failure to consider other possible causes, lack of testing, and subjectivity. Best v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 177 (6th Cir.2009). In addition, if a purported expert's opinion was prepared solely for litigation, that may also be considered as a basis for exclusion. Johnson v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, Inc., 484 F.3d 426, 434 (6th Cir.2007). The use of an expert witness in a forklift design-defect case was previously before this court in Brown, where the panel upheld the decision of the district court to exclude the expert's opinion. In Brown, the expert witness failed to present or test any alternative forklift designs and could not speak to the comparative risks or benefits of the various designs. The district court noted that the design of industrial equipment is a complex process and changes to prevent one problem could create other problems, thus increasing the overall danger of using a product. Brown v. Raymond Corp., 318 F.Supp.2d 591, 599 (W.D.Tenn.2004), aff'd, 432 F.3d 640 (6th Cir.2005). In affirming Brown, this court relied heavily on Dhillon v. Crown Controls Corp., 269 F.3d 865 (7th Cir.2001), where the Seventh Circuit excluded an expert witness's testimony because the expert had not designed forklifts of the model at issue in that case or performed the crucial tests on alternative designs that were necessary for considering product- and manufacturer-specific issues. Id. at 870. Based on Dhillon, this court concluded that the expert witness's failure to provide evidence of testing on his alternative design justified the district court's ruling to exclude the testimony. Brown, 432 F.3d at 647-48.
Raymond initially argues that Railsback is not qualified to serve as an expert because he is employed as a forensic engineer, meaning that his work product was necessarily prepared for litigation. But we question whether employment alone should bar Railsback from testifying as an expert witness, since forensic scientists  professionals in a field similar to Railsback's  are frequently considered qualified to testify at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 385 Fed.Appx. 497, 499 (6th Cir.2010) (describing testimony from a forensic scientist about processing gunshot residue); United States v. McPhearson, 303 Fed.Appx. 310, 312 (6th Cir.2008) (highlighting a forensic scientist's testimony as an expert in chemistry); United States v. Frost, 182 F.3d 919 (table), 1999 WL 455434, at  (6th Cir. June 24, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (discussing a forensic scientist's expert opinion about marijuana-growing equipment). We need not decide this issue, however, because even if Railsback was qualified to serve as an expert, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that his methodology was not sufficiently reliable to allow his testimony. Railsback's report was comprehensively evaluated by the district court. The court concluded that Railsback's methods are clearly not scientifically sound. He merely counts accidents from accident reports relating to non-Raymond forklifts. Without questioning or verifying the data and without conducting any tests of his own ..., he reaches conclusions about the forklift involved in this case. Furthermore, although... he opines that a latching or spring-loaded rear door is necessary to make this forklift safe and that such a modification would be technically and economically feasible, he never actually tested either of these alternative designs. Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. v. Raymond Corp., No. 5:08CV2632, 2010 WL 2643417, at  (N.D.Ohio July 1, 2010) (unpublished opinion) (footnotes omitted, ellipses added). In this short paragraph, the district court identified at least four red flags in Railsback's methodology: anecdotal evidence, improper extrapolation, failure to consider other possible causes, and, significantly, a lack of testing. These concerns have been deemed sufficient to warrant exclusion in prior cases. See, e.g., Best, 563 F.3d at 177-78; Brown, 432 F.3d at 647-48; Dhillon, 269 F.3d at 869-70. In response to the district court's opinion, Newell argues on appeal that the only evidence available to Railsback was anecdotal in nature. Perhaps this should have been an indication to Newell that it needed a different expert. In any event, Newell has not attempted on appeal to clarify Railsback's testing methodology or the evidence supporting his position that a rear guard door would have prevented the injury here. In addition, Newell does not dispute Raymond's assertion that Railsback's expert opinion favoring a rear guard door runs contrary to industry standards. The district court's extensive discussion of the problems posed by Railsback's report is well supported. Newell has failed on appeal to show an abuse of discretion that would call into question the decision to exclude Railsback as an expert witness. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court's ruling on this issue.