Opinion ID: 2082188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the appellate role as to sentence

Text: While an appellate court has, and of course must have, the power to modify any criminal sentence that is manifestly excessive, even when it is within statutory limits, State v. Leggeadrini, supra ; State v. Bess, 53 N.J. 10, 18 (1968); State v. Laws, 51 N.J. 494, 509-10 (1968), the power is one which should be exercised sparingly and only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Velazquez, 54 N.J. 493, 495 (1969). In Velazquez, Justice Jacobs noted the reference in a civil case, Schuttler v. Reinhardt, 17 N.J. Super. 480, 485 (App. Div. 1952), that: We would emphasize that it is only in the exceptional case that a discretionary act will lead to a reversal. The circumstance that the appellate judges, had they been presiding at the trial, would have made a contrary ruling, is far from enough to bring about a reversal. [54 N.J. at 495 (Jacobs, J. concurring )]. And even in Schuttler, Judge Bigelow expressed concern about the amorphous nature of the term abuse of discretion. 17 N.J. Super. at 485. Appropriate precision is embodied in the norm stated in Leggeadrini, supra, which we have quoted, such as by its association, causatively, of abuse of discretion and the imposition of a manifestly excessive sentence. Yet it may be timely now for this Court to sharpen even this definition by comparisons with the rule on the civil side of the law, limiting the appellate role, in order to cope with the natural temptation of reviewing judges to substitute their subjective views for the judgment of a jury or other trier of fact. This would seem particularly needful because of the marked proliferation of appeals from allegedly excessive sentences. More than 20 percent of Appellate Division appeals from criminal convictions involve claimed excessiveness of sentence. It would appear from the statistics that most of these appeals are unsuccessful on this ground. In the court year ending August 1977, 628 such appeals were filed of which 30 were successful. Administrative Director of the Courts, Annual Report 1976-77, B33. In the court year ending August 1978, 652 such appeals were filed of which 41 were successful. Administrative Director of the Courts, Statistical Supplement to the Annual Report 1977-78, B33. This proportion would seem to indicate a proper circumspection on appellate approach to revising sentences imposed by the trial judge. And so that such circumspection may be institutionalized, so to speak (and taking into consideration that constitutional concerns are of surpassing importance in the criminal process), we think it appropriate to suggest that appellate courts should have in mind the safeguards erected on the civil side of the law, as to interference with the judgment expressed on the trial level. These strictures upon appellate supervision have been expressed in various ways, all oriented to the concept of a clear and compelling finding of a miscarriage of justice. In Sweeney v. Pruyne, 67 N.J. 314 (1975), for instance, and in Taweel v. Starn's Shoprite Supermarket, 58 N.J. 227 (1971), the rule was put in terms of such shock to the judicial conscience as to be convincing that upholding the action reviewed would be manifestly unjust. 58 N.J. at 236. Our rule limiting judicial interference with a jury verdict forbids it unless it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law. R. 4:49-1(a). In Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474 (1974), we had occasion to review the limited scope of appellate review of basic trial level findings, as follows: [O]ur courts have held that the findings on which it is based should not be disturbed unless    they are so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice, and that the appellate court should exercise its original fact finding jurisdiction sparingly and in none but a clear case where there is no doubt about the matter. Greenfield v. Dusseault, 60 N.J. Super. 436, 444 (App. Div. 1960), aff'd o.b. 33 N.J. 78 (1960). That the finding reviewed is based on factual determinations in which matters of credibility are involved is not without significance. Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J. 450 (1967). Findings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence. New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Sisselman, 106 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 1969), certif. den. 54 N.J. 565 (1969). It has otherwise been stated that our appellate function is a limited one: we do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice, Fagliarone v. Twp. of No. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963), and the appellate court therefore ponders whether, on the contrary, there is substantial evidence in support of the trial judge's findings and conclusions. Weiss v. I Zapinsky, Inc., 65 N.J. Super. 351, 357 (App. Div. 1961). [65 N.J. at 483-84]. There is much logical force to the recommendation of appellate restraint in disrupting a jury verdict, the presumptive correctness of which has behind it the wisdom of centuries of common law merged into our constitutional framework. Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 598 (1977). A similar respect is due the judgment of the initial fact finder in non-jury cases. Leimgruber v. Claridge Assoc., 73 N.J. 450 (1977); State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964). In the latter case, Justice Hall closely examined this principle, quoting Brochin and Sandler, Appellate Review of Facts in New Jersey, Jury and Non-Jury Cases, 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 482, 484-85 (1958), as follows: New Jersey courts under the new system have held that findings of fact made by trial judges in non-jury cases must be affirmed if amply supported by the evidence; or by competent, reasonably credible evidence; that such findings are entitled to great weight on appeal; that they are entitled to every intendment in their favor and must not be reversed merely because a doubt is raised; that they must not be set aside unless so plainly unjustified by the evidence that interests of justice necessitate their nullification; or unless in conflict with the preponderating proofs; or so manifestly unsupported by or discordant with competent, relevant, and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interest of justice. [42 N.J. at 160]. These commentators therefore emphasized that [T]he trial judge or the jury is    the primary trier of fact    [T]he deference which appellate courts must accord such findings should be determined by considerations of policy and practicality. Brochin and Sandler, supra at 484. The considerations of policy and practicality referred to are importantly rooted in what is sometimes called the feel of the case factor mentioned in State v. Johnson, supra . The appellate tribunal should give deference to those findings of the trial judge which are substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the `feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy, 42 N.J. at 161, since it depends rather upon the cold appellate record. And while the trial court's factual judgment is never sacrosanct, so as to permit the perpetuation of a clear and identifiable miscarriage of justice, judges, including appellate judges, are admonished to resist the natural temptation to substitute their judgment for that of the jury, as though in the role of a thirteenth juror. Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., supra, 74 N.J. at 597; Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 6 (1969). As suggested by Justice Pashman in Leggeadrini, supra, there would seem to be no logical reason why these rules of restraint, so frequently projected in civil judgment appeals, should not apply as well to review of the basic discretion of the trial judge in the matter of criminal sentence. As he stated there: Appellate deference to the discretionary decision of a sentencing judge is similar, in purpose and origin, to that accorded decisions of a trier of fact. It is based primarily on the sentencing judge's presumed superior ability to make a first-hand evaluation of the background and character of the defendant and the offense. [75 N.J. at 162]. In his review of the purposes of sentencing in State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. 197 (1960), Chief Justice Weintraub took occasion to quote from the comment to the Model Penal Code (Tentative Draft No. 2, May 3, 1954) as follows:    The Section is drafted in the view that sentencing and treatment policy should serve the end of crime prevention. It does not undertake, however, to state a fixed priority among the means to such prevention, i.e., the deterrence of potential criminals and the incapacitation and correction of the individual offender. These are all proper goals to be pursued in social action with respect to the offender, one or another of which may call for the larger emphasis in a particular context or situation. [33 N.J. at 201]. The variables mentioned in Ivan as suggesting primary attention to the offender vis-a-vis the offense, or those recapitulated in Leggeadrini, supra, do not exist in the present case, except perhaps as to the age of the offender, 19 years. Here there was no crime `steeped in emotional pressures' or one comprising, in an otherwise blameless life, an `isolated excursion beyond the pale of the law induced by engulfing circumstances,' State v. Leggeadrini, supra, 75 N.J. at 158; but on the contrary a cold-blooded criminal venture, as was observed by the sentencing judge. Here there was not, as in Leggeadrini, an unlikely recidivist    already    punished by his continuing deep remorse or one whose acknowledgment of wrongdoing would seem conducive to rehabilitation. Id. at 160. On the contrary. The sentencing judge here very properly [gave] paramount concern to the magnitude of the crime and the deterrence of others rather than to the attributes of the offender and thus he appropriately fashioned a sanction which will neither diminish the gravity of the offense nor embolden would-be criminals to act with any expectation of leniency or impunity. Id. at 158. The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the sentences imposed by the trial judge are reinstated. PASHMAN and HANDLER, J.J., concurring in the result. For reversal  Chief Justice HUGHES and Justices MOUNTAIN, SULLIVAN, PASHMAN, CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER and HANDLER  7. For affirmance  None.