Opinion ID: 1103979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT THE GUILT AND SENTENCING PHASES OF THE TRIAL WITHIN THE MEANING OF STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON , AND CORRESPONDING PORTIONS OF THE MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTION.

Text: ¶ 43. This Court has stated the following on ineffective assistance of counsel and the standard provided in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984): The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness [of counsel] must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case. Id. at 687, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 477 (Miss.1984) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). The focus of the inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. Id. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. (citation omitted) ... A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy.' Stringer, 454 So.2d at 477 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Defense counsel is presumed competent. Id. Then, to determine the second prong of prejudice to the defense, the standard is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss.1991). This means a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome. Id. The question here is: whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer  including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence  would have concluded that the balance of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. There is no constitutional right then to errorless counsel. Cabello v. State, 524 So.2d 313, 315 (Miss.1988); Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss.1991) (right to effective counsel does not entitle defendant to have an attorney who makes no mistakes at trial; defendant just has right to have competent counsel). If the post-conviction application fails on either of the Strickland prongs, the proceedings end. Neal v. State, 525 So.2d 1279, 1281 (Miss.1987); Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426 (Miss.1991). Davis v. State, 743 So.2d 326, 334 (Miss. 1999) (citing Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1130 (Miss.1996)). Brown v. State, 798 So.2d 481, 493-94 (Miss.2001).
¶ 44. During the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, the defense called Puckett's Boy Scout Leader and Assistant Leader as character witnesses. Puckett also took the stand in his own defense. Puckett asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective because [t]hese three witness [sic] comprised the sum total of the defense. Puckett concludes that his counsel failed to provide a meaningful defense. ¶ 45. Again, it was Puckett's defense that David Griffis committed the murder. All of those individuals who were at the scene of the crime following Rhonda's murder and witnessed Puckett at the scene testified as witnesses for the State. Puckett neither provides this Court with insight as to who else should have been presented as a defense witness during the guilt phase nor does he assert that defense counsel was deficient in his cross-examination of the state's witnesses. Puckett has offered nothing by way of proof that his defense counsel was ineffective other than the conclusory allegation that only calling three witnesses, including Puckett, was deficient. ¶ 46. Puckett has not presented this claim with any specificity. [I]n order to sustain summary dismissal, of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, under Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-11(2) (Supp.1997), the allegation must be alleged with specificity. `[H]e must specifically allege facts showing that effective assistance of counsel was not in fact rendered, and he must allege with specificity the fact that but for such purported actions by ineffective counsel, the results of the trial court decision would have been different. Smith v. State, 434 So.2d 212, 219 (Miss.1983). See also Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-9(1)(c) (1994); Ford v. State, 708 So.2d 73, 75 (Miss. 1998). Wilcher v. State, 863 So.2d 776, 805 (Miss. 2003). This claim is summarily dismissed.
¶ 47. In this claim, Puckett revisits the issue of juror No. 35, Ms. Tomoe Parker. He asserts that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to strike Ms. Parker because she did not personally complete her juror questionnaire. Puckett concludes his argument by stating that the inclusion of Mrs. Parker on Petitioner's jury panel, after she clearly indicated that she could not adequately understand English, was prejudicial. ¶ 48. As discussed previously, the trial court asked the venire if there was anyone who could not read or write. Ms. Parker was one of two venire members who came forward at that time. As the trial court conducted voir dire of these two venire members, Ms. Parker indicated that her daughter filled out the questionnaire for her. However, the trial court questioned Ms. Parker extensively and was satisfied that she could, in fact, read and write. The trial court was also satisfied as to her English speaking abilities. As was stated above in Puckett's first claim of error, Puckett was not denied a fundamental right by Ms. Parker having been seated as a juror. It cannot be maintained that Puckett's counsel was deficient for not moving to have her stricken from the jury. ¶ 49. Defense counsel is presumed competent. Stringer, 454 So.2d at 477. There is a presumption that counsel's conduct is reasonable and professional and that decisions made are strategic. Murray v. Maggio, 736 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir.1984). Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that Puckett's counsel was deficient for failing to have Ms. Parker stricken from the jury, Puckett has not demonstrated how the outcome of the trial would have been different. ¶ 50. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails because Puckett has not demonstrated the requisite deficient performance and resulting prejudice.
¶ 51. Puckett testified that he had gone into the Griffis home with the intention of stealing money to pay his truck note. Puckett, 737 So.2d at 329. Puckett also testified that Rhonda was home and let him enter the home. Id. Further, Puckett told the jury that he and Rhonda began kissing and then he began to live out his sexual fantasy of undressing a woman while he remained dressed. Id. Puckett's theory of the case was that David Griffis murdered his wife after learning that Rhonda and Puckett were having an affair. He asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to voir dire the jury to determine whether members of the venire had any bias or prejudice regarding adultery, fornication and/or underage sex. Id. ¶ 52. As the State properly points out, Puckett was on trial for capital murder during the course of sexual battery, not while engaged in the acts of adultery or fornication. Further, there was no question of underage sex because Puckett was eighteen at the time of the crime and the victim was twenty-eight. ¶ 53. Puckett does not demonstrate how the failure to question the venire about this was deficient, nor does he demonstrate how he was prejudiced. Puckett's claim is nothing more than a conclusory allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel that is completely without merit. Puckett has failed to allege with specificity his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel and the claim should be summarily dismissed. Wilcher, 863 So.2d at 805.
¶ 54. The following is Puckett's argument in its entirety: Trial counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to request and send evidence samples for independent testing. Testing of the samples and evidence collected would have enabled the Petitioner to challenge to prosecution on their theory of the case. The failure to provide independent testing prejudiced the Petitioner by preventing a vigorous defense. Puckett's petition, at 35. ¶ 55. Again, Puckett has done nothing more than submit a conclusory allegation. He has failed to allege with specificity support for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and the claim should be summarily dismissed. Wilcher, 863 So.2d at 805. Further, Puckett cites no authority for his contention. This Court has continually considered issues of error not supported by citation or authority as abandoned. Thibodeaux v. State, 652 So.2d at 155. Puckett does not demonstrate what sample or samples should have been tested, what the independent testing would have revealed, or that the testing that was performed was inaccurate or somehow defective. ¶ 56. It is clear that Puckett has not demonstrated how counsel's performance was deficient. This claim does not pass the first prong of the standard set forth in Strickland.
¶ 57. Puckett asserts that during the sentencing phase his counsel presented limited testimony from a former teacher, a superintendent, a scouting master, a prison chaplain, Puckett's mother and a friend of hers. Puckett did not testify on his own behalf. Puckett claims that he was unfairly prejudiced and denied his fundamental Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel because none of his classmates, friends or other relatives were called to testify. ¶ 58. The record indicates that defense counsel called six witnesses to testify on Puckett's behalf during sentencing. Puckett's counsel first called Susan Greer, one of Puckett's high school teachers who had taught Puckett in three different subjects during a one-year period. She testified that Puckett was a good student, a very mannerly young man, and that she never had a problem with him in the classroom. She testified of her experience with Puckett and several other children while on a seven-day field trip to Washington D.C. Greer testified that Puckett was a very friendly young man and that she had no disciplinary problems with Puckett. She then asked the jury to spare Puckett's life. ¶ 59. The next witness to testify on Puckett's behalf was Pat Jones, the Superintendent of Education of Perry County Schools. Jones testified that he knew Puckett very well and had known Puckett since Puckett was in the ninth grade at Perry Central High school. Jones testified that Puckett often came to visit at Jones's home for swimming parties, and that Puckett visited even after having graduated high school. Jones stated that Puckett was a good, caring child and that Jones never saw violence in Puckett. Jones testified that he and Puckett often talked about religion and feelings. Jones told the jury that Puckett had a self esteem problem and that Jones made it a point to help build Puckett's good moral character. Jones affirmed that he thought Puckett could make something positive of this life experience despite being incarcerated, and Jones asked the jury to spare Puckett's life. ¶ 60. The third witness to testify in mitigation was Bill Wall. Wall owns a finance company and is an inmate chaplain where Puckett is incarcerated. Wall testified that he met Puckett the second day of Puckett's incarceration in October of 1995. Wall testified that Puckett had completed three Bible study courses and was about to begin the fourth. Wall also testified that Puckett always came to the Wednesday afternoon counseling sessions. Wall told the jury that Puckett got along well with the other inmates and officers. Wall stated that Puckett had accepted the Lord and Wall was of the belief that Puckett could encourage [other inmates] in the study of God's word. Wall asked the jury to spare Puckett's life. He also asked the jury to consider Puckett's age. ¶ 61. The next witness to testify for Puckett was Dora Harrington. Mrs. Harrington and Puckett's mother attended school together. Mrs. Harrington testified that her children and Puckett had spent considerable time together camping, swimming and picnicking. She told the jury that she had been close to Puckett, and she asked the jury to spare his life. ¶ 62. Puckett's mother, Mary Puckett, testified next. The defense counsel asked Mary Puckett if she was asking the jury to spare her son life, to which she replied, yes, I am. The State submits that the line of questioning to Mary Puckett by the defense was limited because Puckett's mother had asked him to move out of the family home just two weeks prior to the murder, which the State asked her to expound upon. ¶ 63. The final witness called on Puckett's behalf was Lamar Pritchard. Pritchard works for the Internal Revenue Service and was Puckett's leader in the Boy Scouts. He testified that he knew Puckett for approximately five years and that he last saw Puckett in May of 1995, approximately five months before the murder occurred, when Puckett received his Eagle Scout award. Pritchard told the jury that Puckett showed leadership qualities, had perseverance, and that Puckett took younger scouts and helped them develop. Finally, Pritchard explained to the jury that Puckett could live a productive life in prison and asked them to spare Puckett's life. ¶ 64. Puckett asserts that his counsel failed to investigate and produce mitigating evidence that could have been offered by calling classmates, friends or other relatives. As proof of his contention, Puckett offers an affidavit of Mary Puckett and two unsworn statements from friends. ¶ 65. Mary Puckett states in her affidavit that [e]ven though Mr. Adelman chose to call only a few witness [sic] on Mike's [sic] behalf, there were many other people-family and friends who could have testified: Debbie Puckett, his aunt; Paul Puckett, uncle; Harold Puckett, stepfather; Larry Ross, Matt's natural father; Lisa Connerly, aunt; Keith Stennet, uncle; Frankie Harold, Corey McLain and Herbert Wiggins, friends. There was also the person who certified Matt as an Eagle Scout and did an extensive investigation into matt's background. There were also several other teachers who were available. I told Mr. Adelman about some of these people and would have had more information and witnesses if I had been told these things were important. This affidavit does nothing more than identify people that Mary Puckett feels would have been helpful to her son's sentencing hearing. She does not state what these potential witness might have testified to or how that testimony would have been any different than the testimony that was offered from the six individuals that did testify on Puckett's behalf. Further, Puckett has failed to provide affidavits from those individuals named by his mother in her affidavit. ¶ 66. Puckett also offers the unsworn statements of Ronnie Ainsworth and Iris Moree Hinton which he refers to as affidavits. [5] An affidavit is [a] written or printed declaration or statement of facts, made voluntarily, and confirmed by the oath or affirmation of the party making it, taken before a person having authority to administer such oath or affirmation.  Black's Law Dictionary, 58 ( 6th ed.1990). (emphasis added); see also Wilborn v. State, 394 So.2d 1355, 1359 (Miss.1981) (Patterson, C.J., dissenting). ¶ 67. In his unsworn statement, Ainsworth states that Puckett was a good friend, the kind of person you could call in the middle of the night for a ride. He'd help you get a job, anything for a friend. Ainsworth also states, I do not keep in touch with Matt but still consider him a friend. Matt was loved by his friends and none of us was [sic] ever asked to testify on his behalf. I can think of 15-20 people who would have testified on Matt's behalf had we been asked. ¶ 68. Iris Moree Hinton's unsworn statement reveals that Puckett was living with Hinton and her husband at the time he was arrested. She stated that she was concerned that Puckett had been seeing a married woman with two kids and that defense counsel never asked what she knew of the married woman. Hinton's unsworn statement does not tell this Court anything else about what Hinton may have known about the woman she alleges Puckett was seeing. ¶ 69. First of all, the unsworn statement does not mention this woman's name. Second, if it is to be implied that the married woman Hinton is speaking of was Rhonda Griffis, the State correctly points out that this statement is in direct conflict with Puckett's testimony at trial. Puckett testified that he had only had sex with Rhonda Griffis once, which he asserts occurred during the early part of the spring of 1995. He also testified that he had nothing more to do with the victim until the day of the murder, October 14, 1995. The State contends that Hinton's testimony of Puckett seeing a married woman, if in fact it is to be implied from the unsworn statement that the woman was Rhonda Griffis, would have been contradictory to Puckett's testimony. Counsel cannot be said to be deficient for not wanting to contradict Puckett's theory of defense. This Court would then be evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for having called Hinton to testify. ¶ 70. As for the rest of Hinton's unsworn statement, Hinton states that Puckett was best friends with our grandson Corey. She further states that she would have told the jury about what a nice boy [Puckett] was. I would have told the jury about the nice, well mannered young man who lived in my house, cleaned his room, made his bed, and helped with chores like toting groceries and taking out the trash. Id. ¶ 71. Recently, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). In that case, Wiggins's counsel presented no mitigating evidence regarding Wiggins's horrible childhood. The Supreme Court determined that counsel's investigation into Wiggins's background as a youth was not sufficient to make an informed strategic decision not to present mitigating evidence regarding Wiggins's life as a child. The Court stated: In finding that [Wiggins' counsels'] investigation did not meet Strickland's performance standards, we emphasize that Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing. Nor does Strickland require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case. Both conclusions would interfere with the `constitutionally protected independence of counsel' at the heart of Strickland. 466 U.S., at 689. We base our conclusion on the much more limited principle that `strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable' only to the extent that `reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigations. Id., at 690-691. A decision not to investigate thus `must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all circumstances.' Id. at 691. Wiggins, 123 S.Ct. at 2541. ¶ 72. Even if this Court were to accept the unsworn statements of Ainsworth and Hinton, together with Mary Puckett's affidavit, there has been no showing that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call additional witnesses during the sentencing phase. The affidavit and unsworn statements relied upon by Puckett present nothing more than what would have amounted to cumulative character evidence already presented by other witnesses, had these people been presented to testify. Even if it is assumed, for the sake of argument, that defense counsel should have introduced these witnesses at the sentencing phase, Puckett has not demonstrated how their testimonies would have resulted in a different outcome. ¶ 73. This Court finds that this claim does not pass the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington .
¶ 74. In this final ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Puckett asserts that his counsel should have secured the resources from the trial court necessary to hire an independent pathologist to review the evidence or the findings of Dr. Hayne. He claims that testimony concerning the victim's injuries, cause of death and underlying aggravator(s) was crucial evidence necessary to prove the crime for which he was indicted. Puckett cites Johnson v. State, 529 So.2d 577, 591-92 (Miss.1988), for the proposition that the defense is entitled to all experts reasonably necessary for an effective defense. ¶ 75. Again, Puckett's defense was that he did not sexually assault or kill Rhonda Griffis. He never disputed that Rhonda was killed or sexually assaulted or that the State's Exhibit No. 3 was the murder weapon. There was never a dispute about the victim's injuries or the manner in which she died, short of Puckett's contention that he was not the one who killed her. It is difficult to see how a pathologist would have been useful to Puckett's defense, and Puckett fails to enlighten this Court in that regard. ¶ 76. Given Puckett's theory of defense, and the fact that he has now offered nothing more than undeveloped assertions that a pathologist would have been beneficial, it is not likely that the trial court would have granted the request for funds to retain an independent pathologist. See Johnson v. State, 529 So.2d at 590-92. Puckett has not demonstrated the need for an independent pathologist. Similarly, it cannot be said that Puckett's counsel was deficient by failing to request for the funds to hire an independent pathologist. This issue is without merit.
¶ 77. Puckett contends that defense counsel was ineffective for failure to object during several instances at trial. He maintains that, although each incident may not amount to reversible error alone, the aggregate of the instances constitutes reversible error. ¶ 78. Puckett first asserts that his counsel should have objected to the prosecutor's line of questioning during cross-examination of Puckett with regards to the Canebrake incident. Puckett does not indicate on what grounds his defense counsel should have objected or why the prosecutor's line of questioning was inappropriate. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the post-conviction applicant to this Court must demonstrate with specificity and detail the elements of the claim. Woodward v. State, 635 So.2d 805, 808 (Miss.1993); Foster v. State, 687 So.2d at 1141. Puckett has failed to do so. ¶ 79. Puckett next asserts that his counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's statements made during testimony of Dr. Michael West. The prosecutor was questioning Dr. West with regards to finding finger prints on the murder weapon. The prosecutor stated You don't have to be a police officer to obtain fingerprints. I can do that. Puckett maintains that his counsel should have objected to the prosecutor's improperly expressing his personal opinions and ask the court to instruct the jury to disregard the prosecutor's comments. The transcript contains the following dialogue: Q [By Mr. Jones]: Did you make any effort to obtain any kind of fingerprints off that stick? A [By Dr. West]: Yes, sir. Q: What type of effort did you make? MR. ADELMAN: Your Honor, this witness hasn't been qualified as a fingerprint expert. MR. JONES: You don't have to be an expert to be an expert to obtain fingerprints. I'm not going to offer any prints in. You don't have to be a police officer to obtain prints. I can do that. MR. ADLEMAN He's not been qualified that he has any expertise in even taking fingerprints. MR. JONES: I'm not asking for an opinion on that. I'm just asking if he made any effort to obtain fingerprints. THE COURT: Well, let's find out if he did it, and then you may attempt to Q: Did you? Did you make any effort to obtain finger prints? A: Yes, sir. Q: Were you able to do so? A: No, sir. ¶ 80. It is clear from the transcript that Puckett's attorney had objected to Dr. West's qualifications in lifting latent finger prints. As the State properly points out, no finger print evidence was offered by the State against Puckett through the testimony of Dr. West or anyone else. Puckett does not allege prejudice, and it cannot be maintained that Puckett was actually prejudiced by the comment made by the prosecutor. This claim certainly does not pass the ineffective assistance of counsel standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington , or its progeny. ¶ 81. Third, Puckett asserts that his counsel failed to object to questions regarding burglary. Because the burglary portion of his indictment was dismissed on the motion of the State, Puckett asserts that any reference to burglary was highly prejudicial. ¶ 82. On direct appeal, Puckett claimed that it was reversible error for the prosecutor to inquire about Puckett's post- Miranda silence. Puckett, 737 So.2d at 347. Although no objection to that line of questioning was made by Puckett, this Court did discuss the merits to see if Puckett's fundamental rights had been violated. Id. at 350. In that discussion on the merits, this Court stated the following: ¶ 86. In the case at bar, after being placed under arrest and being read his Miranda warnings, Puckett made voluntary statements to his mother as well as to law enforcement officials. Specifically, in addition to other statements, Puckett made a comment to the effect that this is a lot of law enforcement for somebody who just committed a burglary. This statement is inconsistent with his assertion at trial, that he had hid in the woods because he was scared of David Griffis after witnessing Griffis brutally murder his wife. Puckett's statement upon his arrest indicated that he was running from the police after committing a burglary. However, Puckett's statement at trial indicate that he was running from the police because he was afraid of Griffis. Therefore, the prosecutor's questions upon cross-examination are admissible under Miss. R. Evid. 613 to show that Puckett's prior statements were inconsistent with his statements at trial. Id. at 351 (emphasis added). ¶ 83. This Court has already determined that the questions asked by the prosecutor regarding burglary were permissible. Puckett is barred from raising the issue again in the form of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We must caution that other issues which were either presented through direct appeal or could have been presented on direct appeal or at trial are procedurally barred and cannot be relitigated under the guise of poor representation by counsel. Foster v. State, 687 So.2d at 1129. ¶ 84. Further, without waiving the procedural bar, the issue is without merit. Puckett himself inserted burglary into his trial while being cross-examined. As part of his defense, Puckett maintained that he was merely going to burglarize the Griffis home in order to find money to pay his truck note. Puckett, 737 So.2d at 329. It is clear that the references to burglary were not objectionable. ¶ 85. Puckett claims that he was denied a fundamentally fair trial due to defense counsel's failure to object in the aforementioned instances. In Doss v. State, 709 So.2d 369 (Miss.1996), this Court held that [w]here there is no reversible error in any part, .... there is no reversible error to the whole. Id. at 401 (quoting McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130, 136 (Miss.1987)). This Court has held that a murder conviction or a death sentence can still not warrant a reversal where the cumulative effect of alleged errors, if any, was procedurally barred. Id. (citing Davis v. State, 660 So.2d 1228, 1256 (Miss.1995) ( See also Simmons v. State, 805 So.2d 452 (Miss. 2001))). Puckett's claim of cumulative error is without merit.

¶ 86. Puckett argues that his indictment is unconstitutional for failure to include and specify the aggravating factors used to sentence him to death. This issue was not raised at trial or on direct appeal and normally would be procedurally barred. However, Puckett primarily relies on Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), as intervening decisions which would nullify the procedural bar. ¶ 87. In Jones v. United States the United States Supreme Court considered a federal carjacking statute. The Supreme Court found in Jones that the carjacking statute, which allowed three different punishments increasing in severity depending on the degree of violence used or physical harm accomplished by the carjacker, could result in three distinct offenses, all of which had to be charged in the carjacker's indictment: [U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215 (emphasis added). ¶ 88. Jones was followed by Apprendi. Apprendi fired several shots into the home of an African-American family in Vineland, New Jersey. Apprendi was indicted on numerous state charges of shooting and possession of firearms. He eventually pled guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm for unlawful purpose and one count of possession of an explosive. After the judge accepted the guilty pleas, the prosecutor moved for an enhanced sentence on one of the counts on the basis that it was a hate crime. The judge concurred and rendered an enhanced sentence on twelve years on that particular count, with shorter concurrent sentences on the other two counts. ¶ 89. Relying in part on Jones, Apprendi argued that he was entitled to have the finding on enhancement decided by a jury. The Supreme Court agreed, stating: Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. However, the Court specifically stated that Apprendi has not here asserted a constitutional claim based on the omission of any reference to sentence enhancement or racial bias in the indictment.... We thus do not address the indictment question separately today. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n., 120 S.Ct. 23483. ¶ 90. The Court found in Apprendi that New Jersey's statutory scheme would allow a jury to convict a defendant of a second degree offense of possession of a prohibited weapon, and then, in a separate subsequent proceeding, allow a judge to impose a punishment usually reserved for first degree crimes made on the judge's finding based on a preponderance of the evidence. The Apprendi Court finally stated that its decision did not apply to capital sentencing cases, even those cases where the judge was the one deciding whether to sentence the defendant to death or some lesser sentence, citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511(1990), where the Arizona capital sentencing process had been upheld. ¶ 91. In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona . Ring addressed the issue of whether the Arizona capital sentencing process as upheld in 1990 in Walton v. Arizona , that of a jury deciding guilt and a judge making findings on aggravating factors, could survive the Apprendi decision. The Supreme Court decided it could not. Despite the efforts in Apprendi to distinguish non-capital enhancement cases from aggravating circumstances in capital cases in this context, the Supreme Court in Ring found that there was no difference. [W]e overrule Walton to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. See 497 U.S., at 647-649, 110 S.Ct. 3047. Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as `the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 494, n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.    `The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered.... If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it.' Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-156, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the fact finding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not the fact finding necessary to put him to death. We hold that the Sixth Amendment applies to both. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428. ¶ 92. Puckett argues that because Ring found the Apprendi decision persuasive on the issue of Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operating as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense, the Supreme Court necessarily adopted every other rule stated in Apprendi for state capital sentencing proceedings, specifically the rule first cited in Jones v. United States , that the Constitution requires that aggravating factors be listed in indictments. We find this argument is incorrect. Ring only found that juries must find aggravating factors: Ring's claim is tightly delineated: He contends only that the Sixth Amendment required jury findings on the aggravating circumstances asserted against him.... Finally, Ring does not contend that his indictment was constitutionally defective. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (Fourteenth Amendment has not ... been construed to include the Fifth Amendment right to `presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury'). Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 2428.