Opinion ID: 704022
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The scope of Dudden's informal immunity agreement

Text: 28 Immunity issues usually arise when a defendant refuses to testify before a grand jury or court on Fifth Amendment grounds. The government may compel the testimony over the defendant's claim of the privilege against self-incrimination, if it grants use and derivative use immunity to the defendant under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 6002, which provides that no [compelled] testimony ... (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. Id.; see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 1661, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); United States v. Plummer, 941 F.2d 799, 802 (9th Cir.1991). Use immunity means that the compelled statements cannot be used against the defendant. Plummer, 941 F.2d at 803. Derivative use immunity means that the government must derive all the information used as the basis for any prosecution of the defendant from sources wholly independent of the defendant's statements. Id. The government may not use the statements to uncover other incriminating evidence, focus the investigation, decide to initiate prosecution, interpret other evidence, or otherwise plan trial strategy. Montoya, 45 F.3d at 1295; United States v. Crowson, 828 F.2d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831, 109 S.Ct. 87, 102 L.Ed.2d 63 (1988). 29 When, as in this case, the defendant has not been forced to testify and so has not claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the government can grant the defendant varying degrees of immunity in an informal agreement. Plummer, 941 F.2d at 802. As with a grant of formal immunity under the statute, if the government informally promises that the statements will not be used against the defendant, it is also precluded from using the statements to uncover other incriminating evidence, unless the agreement expressly provides otherwise. Id. at 804-05. 30 We interpret informal immunity agreements using ordinary contract principles. Id. at 802. The standard of review of the district court's denial of Dudden's motion is the same as in civil contract cases: we review factual determinations for clear error, and we review de novo whether the facts show a violation of the contract. Id. at 803. If there is any ambiguity in the language of the immunity agreement, the ambiguity will be resolved against the government. Id. at 804. 31 The district court concluded that the immunity agreement never included immunity from prosecution on methamphetamine distribution charges and did not cover the time period alleged in the indictment (January to March 1988). That interpretation, however, is not supported by the terms of the agreement as described by Dudden and the federal agents, or as set forth in the letter from AUSA Seykora. 32 Dudden testified at the pretrial hearing that the agents told her whatever information I provided, I would not be prosecuted for, and I ... fully understood that I was under immunity, and I would have no criminal charges against me. The government did not argue that the agreement with Dudden was narrower in scope. The immunity letter prepared by AUSA Seykora and shown to Dudden at the United States Attorney's office in Billings stated that if Dudden testified at Jacobsen's trial, the United States does not intend to prosecute you based on Title 21, U.S.C. violations which may be revealed and upon which prosecution could be based as a result of your testimony at the trial, with the exception of perjury and crimes of violence. While the letter was predicated on Dudden's testifying against Jacobsen, the government does not contend that the letter did not embody the terms of the oral agreement, which was not conditioned on Dudden's testimony, but was in exchange for the information she furnished to the agents. The letter protected Dudden against any prosecution for drug offenses, with no limitation as to the type of drug offense or the time thereof. There is thus no evidence that the immunity agreement was limited to cocaine charges, or to any particular time period. 33 We conclude that the informal immunity agreement extended to the prosecution of Dudden for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in 1988. It therefore was necessary for the district court to determine whether the government breached the immunity agreement, either by using the immunized statements against Dudden directly or by using the statements to help develop the prosecution's case. The remaining issue is whether a hearing was required to make that determination. 34