Opinion ID: 4564067
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: e., his or her capacity to pay an award;

Text: (3) the extent (if at all) to which such an award would deter other persons acting under similar circumstances; (4) the benefit (if any) that the successful suit confers on plan participants or beneficiaries generally; and (5) the relative merit of the parties' positions. Cottrill, 100 F.3d at 225 (citing Gray v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 257–58 (1st Cir. 1986)). In its written opinion, the district court explained its view that only the second factor weighed in Doe's favor. We - 15 - find no legal or clear factual error in that exercise of the district court's discretion. Doe argues that Harvard Pilgrim failed to adhere to its previous clear agreement as to the scope of the administrative record, making it more culpable than the district court appreciated under the first factor, and that without a fee award Harvard Pilgrim will not be held accountable for its behavior. Doe I, 904 F.3d at 7. But Doe I concerned a factspecific procedural issue that is unlikely to arise often, and Harvard Pilgrim's position on that issue, although ultimately unsuccessful, was reasonable enough to convince the district court. See id. at 6–9. Doe also complains that the district court considered her subsequent loss in deciding whether to award fees for her interim gain. But because the degree of success on the merits may be considered in deciding whether an award of fees is potentially available in the first place, Hardt, 560 U.S. at 245, we see no reason why the district court in its discretion cannot consider whether and to what extent an interim procedural victory actually produced any benefits. See Gross, 763 F.3d at 83 (explaining that the Cotrill factors are not exclusive).