Opinion ID: 781994
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The First Amendment Defense — Three Approaches

Text: 61 Defendants allege that even if Parks' evidence demonstrates some likelihood of consumer confusion regarding their song and album, their First Amendment right of artistic expression trumps that concern. Defendants make an arguable point. From ancient times, music has been a means by which people express ideas. As such, music is firmly ensconced within the protections of the First Amendment. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995) (stating that paintings, music and poetry are unquestionably shielded by the First Amendment); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (Music, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.). However, the First Amendment cannot permit anyone who cries artist to have carte blanche when it comes to naming and advertising his or her works, art though it may be. As the Second Circuit sagely observed, [t]he purchaser of a book, like the purchaser of a can of peas, has a right not to be misled as to the source [or endorsement] of the product. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997; see also Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 493 (2d Cir.1989)(Trademark protection is not lost simply because the allegedly infringing use is in connection with a work of artistic expression. (citation omitted)). Courts have adopted three approaches to balance First Amendment interests with the protections of the Lanham Act: (a) the likelihood of confusion test; (b) the alternative avenues test; and (c) the Rogers v. Grimaldi test. We will examine each one in turn. 62
63 One approach is to rely solely on the likelihood of confusion factors applied in other, more traditional, trademark cases. That is, we analyze: 1) the strength of the plaintiff's mark; 2) the relatedness of the goods; 3) the similarity of the marks; 4) evidence of actual confusion; 5) the marketing channels used; 6) the likely degree of purchaser care; 7) the defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and 8) the likelihood of expansion in the product lines of the parties. See Frisch's Rests., Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir.1982) (adopting the test from AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir.1979)); see also Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.1961) (creating a variant of the test). Based upon that evidence, we then decide if the plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to the likelihood of consumer confusion. Under this approach, we do not pay special solicitude to an asserted First Amendment defense. 64 This approach has been inferred from the Ninth Circuit case, Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.1997). See Films of Distinction, Inc. v. Allegro Film Prods., Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1078 (C.D.Cal. 1998) ([I]t appears the Ninth Circuit will not adopt [a] .... test balancing trademark protections against the artistic interest in protecting literary titles.... Dr. Seuss strongly suggests that this `balancing' has already been adequately accomplished by the statutory framework [of the Lanham Act].). But see Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 993, 154 L.Ed.2d 912 (2003) (distinguishing Dr. Seuss ). The Tenth Circuit has obliquely endorsed this approach as well. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 970 (suggesting the likelihood of confusion test serve[s] to avoid First Amendment concerns in trademark cases). 65
66 A second approach is the alternative avenues test. This is the test urged upon us by Parks, and endorsed by a panel of the Eighth Circuit. Under the alternative avenues test, a title of an expressive work will not be protected from a false advertising claim if there are sufficient alternative means for an artist to convey his or her idea. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir.1987) (creator of parody tee-shirts not protected by First Amendment because he could still produce parody editorials in books, magazines, or film); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F.Supp.2d 727, 734 (D.Minn.1998) (no First Amendment protection for an infringing movie title because there were other titles the producers could use); cf. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir.1994) (First Amendment protection not available to parodist because the confusing trademark use was wholly unnecessary to the parodist's stated purpose). 67
68 Finally, a third approach is the one developed by the Second Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi and adopted by the district court in this case. Under Rogers, a title will be protected unless it has no artistic relevance to the underlying work or, if there is artistic relevance, the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. This test was explicitly adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 664-65 (5th Cir.2000), and by a panel of the Ninth Circuit in Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902. It was also adopted by a district court in the Third Circuit in Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F.Supp. 331, 339 (1996). 69
70 We conclude that neither the first nor the second approach accords adequate weight to the First Amendment interests in this case. The first approach — unmodified application of the likelihood of confusion factors in trademark cases — gives no weight to First Amendment concerns. Instead, it treats the name of an artistic work as if it were no different from the name of an ordinary commercial product. However, this approach ignores the fact that the artistic work is not simply a commercial product but is also a means of communication. See Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.Supp. 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ([M]ore so than posters, bubble gum cards, or some other such `merchandise', books and movies are vehicles through which ideas and opinions are disseminated and, as such, have enjoyed certain constitutional protections, not generally accorded `merchandise.'); see also Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 970 (The fact that expressive materials are sold neither renders the speech unprotected, nor alters the level of protection under the First Amendment.) (citations omitted). The names artists bestow on their art can be part and parcel of the artistic message. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998 (Film-makers and authors frequently rely on word-play, ambiguity, irony, and allusion in titling their works.). The fact that Defendants use the Rosa Parks title in advertising does not automatically erase the expressive function of the title and render it mere commercial exploitation; if a song is sold, and the title is protected by the First Amendment, the title naturally will be inextricably intertwined with the song's commercial promotion. See id. ; see also Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988) (holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech, the court will treat the entire message as protected); Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 970. 71 The public has at least as much interest in the free exchange of ideas as it does in avoiding misleading advertising. If Parks possesses a right to police the use of her name, even when that right can be exercised only to prevent consumer confusion, she has the means to restrict the public discourse to some extent. As Judge Kozinski has pointed out, Intellectual property rights aren't free: They're imposed at the expense of future creators and of the public at large. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir.1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Intellectual property ... includes the words, images, and sounds that we use to communicate, and `we cannot indulge in the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.' Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 971 ( quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971)). In sum, we do not find the unmodified likelihood of confusion test applied to commercial products adequate to differentiate between those artists who choose titles for the purpose of legitimate artistic relevancy and those artists who choose misleading titles for the purpose of commercial gain. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 900 ([W]hen a trademark owner asserts a right to control how we express ourselves ... applying the traditional [likelihood of confusion] test fails to account for the full weight of the public's interest in free expression.). Therefore, we reject the first approach. 72 The second approach, the alternative avenues test, is similarly problematic. The alternative avenues test was articulated in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.1979), and is derived from real property law. The test is premised on the notion that, just as a real property owner may exclude a speaker from a shopping mall so long as other locations exist for the speaker to deliver his message, a celebrity may prohibit use of his or her name so long as alternative ways exist for the artist to communicate his or her idea. See id. ( citing Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567, 92 S.Ct. 2219, 33 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972)). See also Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 836 F.2d at 402 ( citing Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 206); Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 35 F.Supp.2d at 734. 73 More than one court has noted the awkwardness of analogizing property rights in land to property rights in words or ideas. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 672 ([T]he reasonable alternative avenues approach bears a tenuous relation to communicative and property interests embodied in trademarks.); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1987) (The first amendment issues involved in this case cannot be disposed of by equating the rights of a trademark owner with the rights of an owner of real property.). Furthermore, the Second Circuit all but retracted its Dallas Cowboys decision in Rogers. See 875 F.2d at 999 n. 4 (We do not read Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders as generally precluding all consideration of First Amendment concerns whenever an allegedly infringing author has `alternative avenues of communication.'). 74 To suggest that other words can be used as well to express an author's or composer's message is not a proper test for weighing First Amendment rights. As Mark Twain observed, The difference between the almost-right word and the right word is really a large matter — it's the difference between the `lightning-bug' and the `lightning.' J. Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 527 (16th ed.1992); see also New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir.1992) ([W]e need not belabor the point that some words, phrases or symbols better convey their intended meanings than others.). Finally, adopting the alternative avenues test would needlessly entangle courts in the process of titling works of art; courts would be asked to determine not just whether a title is reasonably artistic but whether a title is necessary to communicate the idea. We therefore reject the alternative avenues test. 75 The third approach, the Rogers test, was adopted by the district court in this case and has been endorsed by panels in the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. Although the Rogers test has been criticized, see, e.g., 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 10:31 (4th ed.2002), we find it the most appropriate method to balance the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion with the public interest in free expression. 76 In Rogers, the plaintiff was dancer and film star Ginger Rogers. Italian movie maker Federico Fellini made a fictional movie titled Ginger and Fred about the reunion of two erstwhile cabaret dancers who became known to their fans as Fred and Ginger because they imitated Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers in their act. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996-97. Rogers' complaint alleged, inter alia, that the title misled viewers into thinking that the movie was about her famous collaboration with Fred Astaire, in violation of the Lanham Act, and that the use of her name infringed her right of publicity. See id. at 997. The Rogers court, finding that overextension of Lanham Act restrictions in the area of titles might intrude on First Amendment values and that the alternative avenues test is insufficient to accommodate the public's interest in free expression, adopted a two-pronged test: In the context of allegedly misleading titles using a celebrity's name, that balance [between avoiding consumer confusion and protecting free expression] will normally not support application of the Act unless [1] the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless [2] the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work. 77 Id. at 999. 78 Courts in the Second Circuit have routinely applied the Rogers test to other Lanham Act cases. See Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir.1993); Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494; DeClemente v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 860 F.Supp. 30, 51 (E.D.N.Y.1994); Girl Scouts of U.S. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 808 F.Supp. 1112, 1119-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The Fifth Circuit has followed suit. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 664. 79 In addition, a panel of the Ninth Circuit recently adopted the Rogers test in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. In Mattel, the manufacturer of the well-known Barbie doll, sued a Danish band, Aqua, for their song Barbie Girl, which, among other things, contained lines that portrayed Barbie in a negative light. 4 Mattel alleged that Aqua's use of the name Barbie in the title had confused consumers into believing that Mattel was affiliated with the song. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 899. Mattel argued that the song was not about Barbie and hence could not be protected by the First Amendment. In the district court, as support, Mattel introduced statements by Aqua band members in interviews that [t]he song isn't about the doll. We're making fun of the glamourous life. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 28 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1138 (C.D.Cal.1998). Mattel also supplied evidence that purported to show that individuals were misled into believing Mattel and the song were affiliated in some way. Among the evidence was a survey of 556 persons of various ages in six states, 17% of whom believed that Mattel or Barbie was the source of, connected with, or gave permission for the Barbie Girl song. Id. at 1132-33. 80 On appeal from a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the Ninth Circuit, applying Rogers, concluded that the First Amendment outweighed any risk of confusion between Mattel and the song title. Specifically it found: 81 Under the first prong of Rogers, the use of Barbie in the song title clearly is relevant to the underlying work, namely, the song itself.... [T]he song is about Barbie and the values Aqua claims she represents. The song title does not explicitly mislead as to the source of the work; it does not, explicitly or otherwise, suggest that it was produced by Mattel. The only indication that Mattel might be associated with the song is the use of Barbie in the title; if this were enough to satisfy this prong of the Rogers test, it would render Rogers a nullity. 82 Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902. 83 The application of Rogers in Mattel, as well as in cases decided in other circuits, persuades us that Rogers is the best test for balancing Defendants' and the public's interest in free expression under the First Amendment against Parks' and the public's interest in enforcement of the Lanham Act. We thus apply the Rogers test to the facts before us.