Opinion ID: 1461838
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Closer Proximity to Contraband

Text: The government argues that a person who is closer to contraband has a greater ability than others also present (even if not an exclusive ability) to control the contraband, and that because Rivas was in closer proximity to the drugs on the center console than any of the three other persons in the car, the inference of his intent to possess the drugs is less speculative, notwithstanding the inherent ambiguity of the situation. The argument is based on the testimony of Officer Mitchell that the drugs were in the well for the brake lever and that the brake lever would be closer to the passenger's seat, due to the design of the automobile's console. According to the officer, the drugs were an inch closer to Rivas than to his co-defendant, Melgar, the driver of the vehicle. Such a small difference in the proximity of one person to contraband does not make a dispositive legal difference when determining whether that person constructively possessed the contraband. See Porter, 282 A.2d at 561 (not of controlling significance that the weapon was closer to one passenger or other). Here, there was no evidence relating to proximity that tipped the balance in favor of a finding that Rivas had the requisite intent. To the contrary, when viewed in the context that Melgar, as the driver of the vehicle, was in operational control of the console, and that the drugs' slightly more proximate location to Rivas could well be only by mere happen-stance of the console's design, the negligible difference between Rivas' and Melgar's proximity to the drugs loses whatever probative potential it might have had to reasonably support an inference that Rivas intended to exercise dominion and control over the drugs on the center console. [34] Based on the evidence it is at least equally plausible that the driver could have placed the drugs on the handbrake console. In Parker, 601 A.2d at 52, we concluded that an inference of shared possession of the drugs, which were virtually equidistant between appellants on the front bench seat of an older-model car, was permissible because the drugs, a commodity of considerable value, was not being hoarded by either of the appellants ... each control whether to be present with the other at all in the car and where to locate a valuable container of illicit drugs. Id. Cf. In re T.M., 577 A.2d at 1152. (in case where six persons roughly equidistant from an unlicensed .45 pistol, court held that, [a]lthough, like the other occupants of the room, were sufficiently close to the pistol and ammunition to enable the judge to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that they knew that these items were there, and that they had the power to exercise dominion over them, the proof here will take the government no further); Speight, 599 A.2d at 796 (evidence insufficient to prove possession where appellants equidistant from drug paraphernalia and drugs in apartment). Parker recognized that the proof must reflect both an ability and an intent to exercise dominion and control over the contraband in question, 601 A.2d at 51 n. 19, and found the intent requirement satisfied by the additional proof of government expert evidence of an ongoing criminal operation. As discussed below, there was no such expert evidence in this case. Moreover, whereas the appellants in Parker were found seated in the automobile next to the contraband, as already noted, in the instant case the drugs were found several minutes after Rivas had exited the vehicle, during which time any of the three remaining occupants could have put the drugs on the brake console where they were discovered by the police. Our cases, therefore, do not support that the fact that Rivas was minimally closer to the drugs satisfies the intent requirement of constructive possession.