Opinion ID: 1175747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: contempt orders and fee assessments

Text: Contemnors in this case argue that the trial court erred by issuing contempt orders for violation of the permanent injunction on the ground the injunction constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint. The contemnors were not charged with violation of the content restriction, but rather with violation of the place restriction. Because the contempt orders only relate to violation of the place restriction, which we conclude was valid under both the First Amendment and Const. art. 1, § 5, we affirm the trial court's findings of contempt. Furthermore, given the heightened emotional tension surrounding the abortion issue, we approve of the trial court's use of civil contempt sanctions, recognizing the trial court may wish to resort to criminal sanctions in the appropriate case. [11] Appellants also contend the trial court erred by assessing attorney fees of $7,000 and costs of $1,200 against contemnors Grace Gerl and Teresa Lindley. Statutory authority, however, provides that the aggrieved party in a contempt proceeding may receive judgment from the defendant to satisfy the costs and disbursements incurred as a result of the contempt. RCW 7.20.100. [9] To recover fees, the contempt must be of a lawful order and have been committed willfully. State ex rel. Lemon v. Coffin, 52 Wn.2d 894, 898, 327 P.2d 741, 332 P.2d 1096 (1958). The contempts adjudicated against all the parties, including Ms. Gerl and Ms. Lindley, were based upon their refusal to obey a content-neutral, geographic restriction. Because the place restriction was valid, the contempts triggered the statutory fees provision. Further, the court found the contemnors had knowingly and intentionally violated the geographic restriction. Such violations are willful for the purposes of the Coffin rule. The trial court has discretion in determining the propriety of costs and fees under RCW 7.20.100. As we said in Coffin, [i]n all actions and proceedings other than those mentioned in this chapter ... where no provision is made for the recovery of costs, they may be allowed or not, and if allowed may be apportioned between the parties, in the discretion of the court. Coffin, at 898 (quoting RCW 4.84.190). We conclude the trial court did not abuse that discretion. Counsels' supporting affidavits from other attorneys in Spokane establish that the hours and hourly rates were reasonable. Given the complexity of the issues, the extensive record of Ms. Lindley's and Ms. Gerl's defiance to the lawful order of the trial court, and the reasonable efforts by counsel to comply with the court's request to document noncompliance with its order, the trial court's award of fees in the amount of $7,000 and costs in the amount of $1,200 was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's award of attorney fees against contemnors Gerl and Lindley. Because Share did not substantially prevail on appeal, the request for attorney fees is denied. DOLLIVER, C.J., UTTER, BRACHTENBACH, and CALLOW, JJ., and CUNNINGHAM, J. Pro Tem., concur. DOLLIVER, C.J. (concurring specially) I concur with all aspects of the majority opinion except that portion discussing the place restriction in the trial court's injunction. The majority has gone farther than necessary to uphold the injunction by resorting to the State's interest in protecting the right of privacy afforded women by the decision of the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973). I believe the injunction is supported simply by the State's interest in maintaining access to and from a health care facility. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 13 L.Ed.2d 487, 85 S.Ct. 476 (1965); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 20 L.Ed.2d 182, 88 S.Ct. 1335 (1968); Pickens v. Okolona Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 594 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.1979); Concerned Jewish Youth v. McGuire, 621 F.2d 471 (2d Cir.1980). I would go no further. DORE, J. (dissenting) I would hold that the place and content restrictions in the permanent injunction, ordering the picketers to refrain from picketing directly in front of the medical clinic and enjoining oral use of the words murder, kill and their derivatives, while young children are present, violate federal free speech protections. I would reverse the trial court and dismiss the contempt orders.