Opinion ID: 178801
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Grant of Injunctive Relief

Text: The district court granted the injunction sought by the Board and ordered that all fifty-five workers who were participating in the unfair labor practices strike be reinstated. Although the EPD contests this grant of temporary injunctive relief, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in mandating that EPD reinstate those striking workers. The district court employed the two-prong test from Pilot Freight Carriers. As we noted above, this inquiry, and not a hybridization with a traditional four-part equity inquiry, is the correct test to use when considering a § 10(j) petition. When it did so, the district court determined that the strike was an unfair labor practices strike, not an economic one. Strikers in an unfair labor practices strike are entitled to immediate reinstatement to their former positions or to back pay on an unconditional offer to work. [25] The fact that EPD hired replacements does not affect the entitlement of unfair labor practices strikers to return to work. [26] As the district court determined that this was an unfair labor practices strike, the Union and the strikers had reasonable cause to believe that EPD violated § 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by not reinstating the strikers when they unconditionally offered to be reinstated. EPD nevertheless insists that there is no reasonable cause supporting the district court's conclusion that the strike was an unfair labor practices strike. EPD argues that (1) the record does not support the contention that EPD engaged in bad faith bargaining, and (2) even if there is some evidence of bad faith, there is no causal linkage between such evidence and the strike. To the contrary, the record contains evidence that EPD did engage in bad faith bargaining. For example, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees. [27] Both parties are required to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder. [28] We will sustain a determination of bad faith as long as we find[ ] support in the record as a whole... even though the court would justifiably have made a difference choice had the matter been before it de novo.  [29] The record contains a significant amount of evidence which suggests that EPD failed to meet its responsibilities as a negotiating partner. It did not meet at reasonable times, delayed the initial bargaining session for four months, and refused to negotiate for more than five hours a day. EPD's representatives often left those meetings early to catch flights out of town and attended only fourteen bargaining sessions over a thirteen-and-one-half month period (for a total bargaining time of sixty hours). In addition, EPD refused to schedule sessions with the Union unless all three negotiators could attend, and EPD failed to negotiate in good faith by refusing to negotiate the Dues Check-Off provision, which is a mandatory subject of bargaining under the Act. [30] Further, EPD insisted on offering a last, best, and final offer after only two meetings to negotiate economic issues and no discussion relating to longevity bonuses. Lastly, EPD refused to consider the bulk of the Union's counter to EPD's final offer. EPD's conduct away from the bargaining table was no better. [31] As further evidence of its bad faith, EPD instituted changes to working conditions unilaterally and conducted unilateral interviews with employees. When we consider all the totality of the evidence in the light most favorable to the Board, we perceive more than reasonable cause for the Board to conclude that EPD engaged in bad faith bargaining. Contrary to EPD's assertions, the record reflects evidence of a causal link between EPD's bad faith bargaining and the strike. If the Board shows that an unfair labor practice is a `contributing cause' of a strike, then as a matter of law, the strike must be considered as an unfair labor practice strike. [32] Moreover, the Board's evidentiary burden is low because as long as an unfair labor practice had anything to do with causing the strike, it was [and will be considered by the court] an unfair labor practice strike. [33] A causal connection, however, must be more than employees' mere awareness of the protected status afforded to unfair labor practices strikers. [34] Nevertheless, the burden is on the employer to show that the strike would have occurred even if it had not committed unfair labor practices. [35] In the instant case, there was employee testimony before the ALJ that both economics and unfair labor practices caused the strike. At two separate Union meetings, employees expressed frustration at the slow pace of negotiations. In response, the Union representative explained during the meeting at which the strike was declared that he believed the strike to be an unfair labor practices strike. In addition, Union picketers and representatives consistently maintained that the strike was an unfair labor practices strike. As the Board has met its minimal burden of showing a causal link between the strike and unfair labor practices, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that such a connection existed. Neither did the district court abuse its discretion when, under the second prong of the Pilot Freight Carriers test, it determined that the remedy of reinstatement was just and proper. Ordinarily, courts properly leave the decision whether to reinstate strikers to the Board. [36] The Board's remedial process may be effective even if the district court does not grant an injunction ordering reinstatement. [37] In exceptional cases, however, the district court may employ an injunction ordering reinstatement, so as to prevent the destruction of employee interest in collective bargaining, irreparable injury to the union's bargaining power, and the undermining of the effectiveness of any resolution through the Board's process. [38] One potential problem here is the time that has elapsed between the strike and any potential reinstatement. In Pilot Freight Carriers, we refused to hold that the district court had abused its discretion when it refused to order reinstatement. [39] The district court in that case justified its reluctance to grant such an injunction on the fact that the Board's delay of three months in seeking injunctive relief after discharge demonstrated that harm had already been incurred and reinstatement thus would serve no purpose. [40] Other circuits, however, have affirmed grants of reinstatement to preserve the status quo ante pending the Board's decision. [41] Even though in Muffley, eighteen months elapsed between the employee's discharge and the filing of the petition, the district court was not held to have abused its discretion when it concluded the delay was reasonable, especially given the Board's need to wait for the ALJ to make a decision in that complex case. [42] Because the ALJ's fact finding here aided the district court's adjudication of Overstreet's petition, delay alone is not dispositive. Other factors support the conclusion that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting injunctive relief and ordering reinstatement of the strikers. The ALJ found, and the district court agreed, that EPD's discharge of the strikers and failure to reinstate them was a direct cause of the anti-Union sentiment among the workers that led to several petitions to decertify the Union as the workers' representative. As EPD still had not reinstated thirty-two of the fifty-five striking workers, the district court found that a large nucleus of Union support had been replaced because of EPD's failure to reinstate. [43] Of the eleven Union strikers who were recalled, six had signed the disavowal petition. These findings of fact, which are not clearly erroneous, support the district court's order of reinstatement as necessary to avoid severely diminishing Union support and, with it, the ability of the Union to negotiate with EPD. Reinstatement preserves the status quo by returning the workforce to pre-strike level of Union support. Finally, a refusal to reinstate in this case would merely reward EPD for its unfair labor practices, as it would gain a benefit from its decision to deny the right of unfair labor practices strikers to be reinstated after they stop striking. The evidence in the record demonstrates that the court did not abuse its discretion in holding that reinstatement was just and proper and equitably necessary: Reinstatement restores the status quo ante as intended by § 10(j).