Opinion ID: 1058491
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Demand for a Jury Trial under Apprendi and Ring

Text: Petitioner next argues that he is entitled to have a jury, rather than the trial court judge, determine whether he is mentally retarded. The petitioner would also place the burden on the State to prove his lack of mental retardation. Petitioner bases this argument upon the Supreme Court's holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey , [8] and Ring v. Arizona. [9] Both Apprendi and Ring essentially held that a jury must determine any aggravating factors used to enhance a criminal sentence beyond the statutory maximum. [10] The petitioner asserts that a defendant's lack of mental retardation is the functional equivalent of an aggravating circumstance and therefore must be found by a jury. We disagree. Under Tennessee's capital sentencing scheme, a jury determines guilt and also, in a separate proceeding, determines whether to impose the death penalty. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204 (2003). This sentencing scheme is qualitatively different from the Arizona statute in Ring. Under the Arizona law at issue in Ring, the maximum penalty for murder was death; [11] however, this sentence could only be imposed if the judge, not the jury, found aggravating factors present to support the death penalty. [12] In contrast, under Tennessee's capital sentencing scheme, it is the jury, the very same jury, in fact, that found the defendant guilty, that decides whether to impose the death penalty. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204 (2003). In its deliberations, the jury is instructed to consider any evidence tending to establish or rebut the aggravating circumstances ... and any evidence tending to establish or rebut any mitigating circumstances. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(c) (2003). Diminished mental capacity is among the mitigating factors that may by weighed against aggravating factors by the jury. See Tenn.Code Ann. section 39-13-204(j). However, mental retardation is now a threshold issue that determines whether a defendant is eligible for capital punishment at all. Following Van Tran and Atkins , mental retardation completely exempts a defendant from capital punishment, rather than simply being among the mitigating factors to be weighed against aggravating factors by the jury. The United States Supreme Court, in Atkins , pointedly expressed that mental retardation should be considered apart from mitigating factors. The Court stated mentally retarded defendants [are less able] to make a persuasive showing of mitigation in the face of ... aggravating factors. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320, 122 S.Ct. 2242. The Court went on to state that the demeanor of mentally retarded defendants may give the false impression of lack of remorse. Id. at 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242. This reasoning was also evident in Van Tran , in which we found that the limitations and impairments associated with mental retardation warrant more consideration than simply allowing the evidence to be weighed in the mix of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 66 S.W.3d at 810. The Tennessee General Assembly apparently agrees, as evidenced by its placing the prohibition on executing mentally retarded individuals in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203 rather than placing it among the mitigating factors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(j). Accordingly, the petitioner's reliance upon Ring is misplaced, as the issue is not one of aggravating or enhancing factors, but of eligibility for the sentence imposed by a jury. Further, the lack of mental retardation does not operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense that subjects the defendant to a greater penalty and which must be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, n. 4, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Both Apprendi and Ring dealt with cases in which the court made factual findings to increase the defendant's sentence beyond what was available based solely upon the jury's verdict. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482-483, 120 S.Ct. 2348; Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428. In fact, Apprendi carefully distinguished between facts used to enhance a sentence and those used to lessen a sentence: If facts found by a jury support a guilty verdict of murder, the judge is authorized by that jury verdict to sentence the defendant to the maximum sentence provided by the murder statute. If the defendant can escape the statutory maximum by showing, for example, that he is a war veteran, then a judge that finds the fact of veteran status is neither exposing the defendant to a deprivation of liberty greater than that authorized by the verdict according to the statute, nor is the judge imposing upon the defendant a greater stigma than that accompanying the jury verdict alone. Core concerns animating the jury and burden-of-proof requirements are thus absent from such a scheme. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, n. 16, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Tennessee's capital sentencing procedure is just such a scheme as discussed by the Court in Apprendi . Under this procedure, mental retardation works to reduce the maximum possible sentence, based upon the jury's verdict, from death to life imprisonment. Therefore, it is not an element of the offense and is not required to be proven by the State nor found by a jury. We also point out that our holding today is in line with an ever-growing number of courts to have considered the issue and held likewise. See Hedrick v. True, 2004 WL 594989 at  (W.D.Va. March 24, 2004) (mental retardation is not the equivalent of an element of the offense); In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 405 (C.A. 5 Tex.) 2003 (absence of mental retardation is not element of offense); Russell v. State, 849 So.2d 95, 148 (Miss.2003) ( Ring has no application to Atkins determination); State v. Flores, 135 N.M. 759, 93 P.3d 1264, 1267 (2004) ( Ring not applicable to mental retardation determination); Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 587 S.E.2d 613, 619 (2003) ( Ring and Atkins do not require jury trial on issue of mental retardation); State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (2002) (mental retardation does not represent a jury question); Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (lack of mental retardation is not implied element of capital murder). Therefore, we hold that the determination of mental retardation is more appropriately left to the trial court judge, as contemplated under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203(c) which states [t]he determination of whether the defendant was mentally retarded at the time of the offense of first-degree murder shall be made by the court.  (Emphasis added). Further, the burden of persuasion in this respect is upon the defendant rather than the State. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-203(c) (2003).