Opinion ID: 2539162
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Dismiss Cross-Appeal

Text: Each of the cross-appellees, other than Simpson, has filed or joined a motion to dismiss the cross-appeal:  May 30, 2008Motion of Defendant-Appellee A.R. Mays Construction Co., f/k/a Devcon Enterprises, Inc., a/k/a Devcon by A.R. Mays Construction to dismiss designated cross-appeal of Plaintiffs-Appellants.  June 16, 2008Motion of Defendant-Appellee Atlas Construction of Arkansas, LLC, to dismiss designated cross-appeal of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Brief in Support.  June 18, 2008Motion of Defendant-Appellee Arkansas Western Gas's motion to join motion of Defendant-Appellee A.R. Mays Construction Company, f/k/a Devcon Enterprises, Inc., a/k/a Devcon by A.R. Mays Construction to dismiss designated cross-appeal of Plaintiffs-Appellants.  June 20, 2008Motion by L & L Plumbing and Hearing, Inc., to adopt the motion to dismiss the cross-appeal filed by A.R. Mays Construction, Inc., and Atlas Construction of Arkansas, LLC.  June 23, 2008Motion of Defendant-Appellee Architecture Design & Development and Thomas O'Neill to dismiss designated cross-appeal of Plaintiffs-Appellants. The movants ask this court to dismiss the cross-appeal because it should have been filed as a direct appeal rather than as a cross-appeal and, therefore, was untimely according to our rules of appellate procedure. Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure-Civil 4(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within thirty days of entry of the judgment, decree, or order. The rule also states that a cross-appeal must be filed within ten days of receipt of the notice of appeal. Ark. R.App. P.-Civ. 4(a) (2009). The circuit judge entered an order granting certification to Subclass A (to which the Simpson appellants were the only defendants) and denying certification to Subclass C (to which Simpson and the movants were defendants) on September 5, 2007. Simpson filed a notice of appeal on October 3, 2007, and the plaintiffs/appellees filed a notice of cross-appeal on October 12, 2007. If the plaintiffs/appellees/cross-appellants' challenge to the circuit judge's refusal to certify Subclass C was a proper cross-appeal, it was timely under Rule 4(a). However, if it should have been filed as a direct appeal, the notice of appeal was untimely. The movants rely on Johnson v. Carpenter for the proposition that where the matter sought to be appealed is separate from that which has been appealed in a timely manner, it should be the subject of an original appeal, and it may not be made timely by its denomination as a cross-appeal. 290 Ark. 255, 260, 718 S.W.2d 434, 437 (1986). The movants contend that the class members, their claims, their theories of recovery, and the defendants involved in Subclass C are all separate and distinct from those involved in Subclass A. The plaintiffs respond that each putative-class claim arises from the same underlying facts. This case is distinguishable from Johnson because in that case two cases were filed (one in probate court and another in circuit court) against different defendants and were consolidated into one case before the circuit court. While one order disposed of both cases, this court held that a cross-appeal was inappropriate because they were completely separate cases in different jurisdictions. In the instant case, the plaintiffs/appellees/cross-appellants filed one complaint in one jurisdiction in which they alleged, albeit by way of two subclasses, various theories of recovery against multiple defendants. We conclude that this is a critical distinguishing factor from the Johnson case. The motions to dismiss are denied.