Opinion ID: 3013236
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Aftermath of Ellerth and Faragher and the

Text: Issue of Constructive Discharge in the Courts of Appeals In light of the Supreme Court’s guidance in Ellerth and Faragher, we reach the critical issue in this case: when a supervisor’s harassment culminates in a constructive discharge, as Suders persuasively supported in her opposition to the motion for summary judgment, may her employer assert the affirmative defense to liability? As our analysis above demonstrates, the issue may be reduced 32 more simply to whether a constructive discharge constitutes a tangible employment action. We recognize that constructive discharge did not appear in either the Supreme Court’s discussion pertaining to what constitutes a tangible employment action or the list of representative employment actions. This absence is not dispositive, however, as a claim of constructive discharge was not before the Court in either of the two cases. Therefore, the principles underlying a tangible employment action, together with the relevant agency and Title VII concerns, should guide our inquiry. The PA State Police argues on appeal that a constructive discharge does not constitute a tangible employment action and that its position is supported by case law from other jurisdictions. We recognize a division among the Courts of Appeals as to this issue. A survey of the courts that have addressed the issue reveals a number of different approaches. The PA State Police correctly notes that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that a “constructive discharge does not constitute a ‘tangible employment action,’ as that term is used in Ellerth and Faragher.” Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 294 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1107 (2000). In Caridad, the court based its decision on three grounds. First, the court noted that “[c]o-workers, as well as supervisors can cause the constructive discharge of an employee.” Id. Second, “unlike demotion, discharge, or similar economic sanctions, an employee’s constructive discharge is not ratified or approved by the employer,” id., which would seem to contravene the Supreme Court’s observation in Ellerth, that a tangible employment generally requires a “a company act.” 524 U.S. at 762. Third, the Second Circuit suggested that in Ellerth, the Supreme Court implicitly addressed the issue of constructive discharge and that its holding does not permit the conclusion that such action constitutes a tangible employment action: Moreover, the facts of Ellerth, where the plaintiff, like Caridad, did not complain of the harassment prior to quitting her job, indicate that constructive discharge is 33 not a tangible employment action depriving the employer of the availability of the affirmative defense to Title VII liability. Ellerth alleged that she had been constructively discharged as a result of sexual harassment by her supervisor . . . ; in remanding the case for a determination of whether the employer could make out an affirmative defense, the Supreme Court noted that ‘Ellerth has not alleged she suffered a tangible employment action at the hands of [her supervisor].’13 Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294-95 (citations omitted). Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, has adopted the holding in Caridad that a “claim of constructive discharge is not a tangible employment action for purposes of Faragher and Burlington.” Turner v. Dowbrands, Inc., No. 99-3984, 2000 WL 924599, at  (6th Cir. June 26, 2000); see also Keaton v. State of Ohio, No. C2-00-1248, 2002 WL 1580567, at  (S.D. Ohio June 3, 2002).14 In addition, other district courts 13. We believe that the particular factual circumstances in Caridad shed some light on the court’s decision there and distinguish that case from the present. Plaintiff in that case had consulted defendant’s Director of Affirmative Action. She told the Director that she was being sexually harassed, without telling him the details of any incidents. The Director responded that it would be impossible to take further action without the details of the sexual harassment to which she alluded. Even still, the Director offered to transfer plaintiff to another shift, but she declined this and the offer to investigate further. The court underscored plaintiff ’s reluctance to take advantage of the remedial measures in place, noting that plaintiff “did not complain of the harassment prior to quitting her job,” thus indicating that “a constructive discharge is not a tangible employment action.” Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294. We believe that all of these probative facts as to plaintiff ’s failure to provide details and to cooperate with the Director are clearly relevant, but more to the issue of whether there was a constructive discharge in the first place. We do not believe that these facts should bear upon the question of whether a constructive discharge would constitute a tangible employment action. 14. Several district courts have also adopted the holding in Caridad for substantially the same reasons advanced by the Second Circuit. See Scott v. Ameritex Yarn, 72 F. Supp. 2d 587, 594 (D.S.C. 1999); Desmarteau v. City of Wichita, Kansas, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1079 (D. Kan. 1999); Alberter v. McDonald’s Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1147 (D. Nev. 1999). 34 aligning themselves with the Second Circuit have rejected the notion that a constructive discharge constitutes a tangible employment action on other grounds. For instance, in Powell v. Morris, the court held that a constructive discharge is not a tangible employment action because if the Supreme Court had intended to include constructive discharge, it “could have easily listed ‘constructive discharge’ along with the other incidents as constituting a tangible employment action.” 37 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1019 (S.D. Ohio 1999). In contrast to the Second and Sixth Circuits, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a constructive discharge, when proved, would constitute a tangible employment action. See Jaros v. LodgeNet Entertainment Corp., 294 F.3d 960, 966 (8th Cir. 2002) (“The district court did not err in its instruction, since a constructive discharge constitutes a tangible employment action which prevents an employer from utilizing the affirmative defense.”) (citations omitted); Jackson v. Arkansas Dep’t of Ed., 272 F.3d 1020, 1026 (8th Cir. 2001) (“If [plaintiff] was in fact constructively discharged, then the constructive discharge would constitute a tangible employment action and prevent the [defendant] from utilizing the affirmative defense.”), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2366 (2002). The Eighth Circuit, however, did not address the rationales advanced by the Second Circuit in Caridad. Among the district courts, the leading case for the position contrary to Caridad is Cherry v. Menard, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Iowa 2000). In a well-reasoned decision, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, presented a compelling counterpoint to the Second Circuit’s decision in Caridad. In Cherry, the court found that “none of [the] reasons [advanced in Caridad] stands up to a probing scrutiny,” and that “the court is not persuaded by [defendant’s] argument, that a constructive discharge does not constitute a ‘tangible employment action’ as defined in Ellerth/Faragher.” Id. at 1171, 1176. Other district courts have followed Jaros and Cherry. See Vasquez v. Atrium Door & Window Co. of Arizona, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1142 (D. Ariz. 2002) (“After careful consideration of the issue, the Court finds that a 35 constructive discharge constitutes a tangible employment action.”); Haworth v. Romania Imported Motors, Inc., No. CV 00-1721, 2001 WL 34041893, at  (D. Or. Dec. 27, 2001) (“Under the reasoning provided by the Supreme Court in Ellerth/Faragher, constructive discharge constitutes a tangible employment action as the Court contemplated the term.”); Taylor v. United Regional Health Care System, Inc., No. CIV. A. 700CV145-R, 2001 WL 1012803, at  (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2001) (“[C]onstructive discharge and a failure to promote are ‘tangible employment actions’ for the purposes of Title VII.”). Other Courts of Appeals have noted the issue, but expressly declined to rule on it. See Kohler v. Inter-Tel Technologies, 244 F.3d 1167, 1179 n.8 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We have not yet determined whether a constructive discharge is a tangible employment action. . . . We do not reach this issue in this case because Kohler has waived her constructive discharge claim.”); Mosher v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 662, 666-667 (7th Cir.) (“First, it should be noted that we have yet to determine whether a constructive discharge is a tangible employment action within the meaning of Ellerth and Faragher. . . . However, we need not settle that issue today, for we find that [plaintiff] did not raise a genuine issue of material fact that she was constructively discharged.”) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1041 (2001).