Opinion ID: 223533
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Susinka Sentencing Issues

Text: Susinka was sentenced to twenty years in prison followed by five years of supervised release. He raises several arguments in appeal of his sentence, only one of which has merit. We begin there. Susinka was convicted of a Class C felony (18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3)), and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2) establishes a maximum term of three years for supervised release for Class C felonies. The government concedes the point. We must modify Susinka’s sentence to reduce the supervised release term to three years. All of Susinka’s other arguments regarding his sentencing relate to the district judge’s consideration of acquitted conduct in determining his sentence for the RICO conspiracy, which was the statutory maximum of twenty years. Although Susinka was convicted of the RICO conspiracy, the jury found that the murder of Robert Perez was not proven as to him. The district judge, however, had “no doubt” that Susinka was the driver in the fatal shooting in which Delatorre and Crowder were the shooters. Regardless of how Susinka frames his arguments, the district judge did not err by considering the murder in deciding his sentence. Susinka argues first that the court violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (prohibiting sentences beyond the maximum allowed by the facts found by the jury), when it considered his participation in the Perez murder at his sentencing. But Apprendi does not apply when the defendant’s sentence does not exceed a prescribed statutory maximum for findings made by a jury. See 530 U.S. at 487 n.13. Susinka’s sentence did not exceed the twenty years prescribed for RICO conspiracy without further aggravation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). There was no Apprendi problem here. Susinka also argues that the district court’s consideration of his role in the murder of Robert Perez violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), which instructs district courts to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. It is well settled that a sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct in determining the applicable guideline range. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1997). We will not overturn his sentence on these bases. On the other side of this same coin, Susinka argues that the court was prohibited from considering his role in the Perez murder under the Sixth Amendment and the background note Nos. 09-1190, 09-1224, 09-1225, 09-1226, 09-1227, 09-1251 Page 23 to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, which states: “Conduct that is not formally charged or is not an element of the offense of conviction may enter into the determination of the applicable guideline sentencing range.” The logic of the argument is not entirely clear, but Susinka contends that the Perez murder was an element of the RICO conspiracy charge. This is incorrect. To prove that Susinka was guilty of RICO conspiracy, the government had to prove that Susinka agreed that a member of the conspiracy would commit two predicate acts of racketeering. See Salinas, 522 U.S. at 65-66. One of these predicate acts could have been the Perez murder, but the Perez murder was not a necessary element of Susinka’s RICO conspiracy conviction. In a similar vein, Susinka argues that the standard of proof employed by the court was erroneous. The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Susinka participated in the Perez murder. The standard of proof the district court employed was correct. See United States v. Heckel, 570 F.3d 791, 797 (7th Cir. 2009) (“a wide range of conduct is relevant at sentencing – including uncharged conduct and charges of which the defendant was acquitted – so long as that conduct is established by a preponderance of the evidence”). Susinka also contends that the evidence presented at trial did not support the court’s finding that he participated in Perez’s murder or that Susinka was still a member of the Insane Deuces at the time of the murder. The court’s conclusions were both on solid ground. Rivera testified to Susinka’s participation in the Perez murder and his ongoing role in the Insane Deuces. Susinka does not give us reason to overturn these findings, and we find no error. Susinka contends that his presentence investigation report improperly assigned six criminal history points to him for his convictions for possession of a firearm and delivery of cocaine in April 2002. Because the prosecution relied on these convictions to establish the pattern of racketeering activity, Susinka believes those convictions were double-counted. Application Note 4 to U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1 specifically allows conduct for which the defendant has been sentenced previously, and which is then charged in the present count of conviction as part of the pattern of racketeering activity, to be counted in the criminal history as a prior sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1). See Morales, — F.3d at —. The only requirement for such treatment is that the conviction for the conduct predate the last overt act of the charged conspiracy. Susinka was convicted of cocaine distribution and possession of a firearm in April 2002, and the Insane Deuces’ racketeering activity continued well after that. Susinka also contests the district court’s failure to give him a downward departure to give him credit for the 81 months he served between his arrest and incarceration in April 2002 for distribution of cocaine and possession of a firearm and his sentencing on January 20, 2009. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 gives a district court discretion to impose a sentence to run concurrently with, partially concurrent with, or consecutive to prior undischarged terms of imprisonment. As established, these 2002 convictions were not double-counted and did not serve as a basis for an increase in Susinka’s offense level. Nothing required the district court to grant Susinka a downward departure. Here, the court ordered that the Susinka’s new twenty-year federal term Nos. 09-1190, 09-1224, 09-1225, 09-1226, 09-1227, 09-1251 Page 24 was “to be served concurrent with your current state sentence.” In other words, Susinka received both federal and state credit for time served after the federal sentence was imposed, but no more. The district court’s intent was clear, and we find no abuse of discretion.6 Susinka argues that his twenty-year sentence exceeds the twelve-year limit on sentences for Class C felonies. But, as the government points out, his argument is based on a misapprehension of Title 18. The section on which Susinka relies, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3), classifies offenses that carry a sentence of less than twenty-five years but more than ten years as Class C felonies, and 18 U.S.C. § 3581(b)(3) authorizes sentences of no more than twelve years for Class C felonies. But 18 U.S.C. § 3559(b) states that notwithstanding the classification of offenses in subsection (a), “the maximum term of imprisonment is the term authorized by the law describing the offense.” And 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), the RICO conspiracy statute under which Susinka was charged and convicted, carries a maximum term of imprisonment of twenty years under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). Finally, Susinka argues that the twenty year sentence is substantively unreasonable under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. We disagree. The district court properly considered Susinka’s involvement with the Insane Deuces, his willingness to participate in acts of violence, his ongoing refusal to accept responsibility for his acts or his membership in the Insane Deuces, and the fact that the guideline sentencing range was life in prison. The court’s sentence of twenty years in light of these factors was well within reason. Susinka further argues that imposition of a $2,500 fine was unreasonable because he has been incarcerated since April 2002 and does not have the ability to pay. The guidelines range for a fine was $25,000 to $250,000. In imposing a much lesser fine on Susinka, the court recognized that Susinka would be incarcerated for a long time but that while incarcerated he would be working and generating some income. The below-guideline fine was reasonable.