Opinion ID: 1561405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Ineffective AssistanceFailure to Present Mitigation Evidence

Text: Floyd contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and present statutory and nonstatutory mitigation. According to Floyd, had existing mitigation evidence been presented, the mitigating circumstances would have outweighed any aggravating circumstances, and the jury would have recommended a life sentence. Floyd also asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for the failure to object to an erroneous jury instruction which prohibited the jury from considering any nonstatutory mitigator aside from other circumstance[s] of the offense. Lastly, Floyd contends that the failure of trial counsel to seek a jury instruction based upon age as a mitigating circumstance constituted ineffective assistance. We reject each of these claims. With regard to assertions of penalty-phase ineffectiveness, we recently explained: To succeed in an ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel claim, the claimant must demonstrate that counsel performed deficiently and that such deficiency prejudiced his defense. Hannon v. State, 941 So.2d 1109, 1124 (2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Prejudice, in the context of penalty phase errors, is shown where, absent the errors, there is a reasonable probability that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances would have been different or the deficiencies substantially impair confidence in the outcome of the proceedings. Gaskin v. State, 737 So.2d 509, 516 n. 14 (Fla. 1999), receded from on other grounds by Nelson v. State, 875 So.2d 579, 582-83 (Fla.2004). Lynch v. State, 2 So.3d 47, 70 (Fla.2008). We have further established standards for the review of ineffectiveness challenges that are based on allegedly defective investigation and presentation of mental mitigation: This Court has found counsel's performance was deficient where counsel never attempted to meaningfully investigate mitigation although substantial mitigation could have been presented. Rose, 675 So.2d at 572; Hildwin v. Dugger, 654 So.2d 107, 109 (Fla.1995) (woefully inadequate investigation failed to reveal a large amount of mitigating evidence, such as prior psychiatric hospitalizations and statutory mental health mitigators); State v. Lara, 581 So.2d 1288, 1289 (Fla.1991) (finding counsel virtually ignored preparation for penalty phase). However, in those cases where counsel did conduct a reasonable investigation of mental health mitigation prior to trial and then made a strategic decision not to present this information, we have affirmed the trial court's findings that counsel's performance was not deficient. See Rutherford, 727 So.2d at 223; Jones, 732 So.2d at 317; Rose v. State, 617 So.2d 291, 293-94 (Fla.1993). This case is similar to Jones, where the defendant had been examined prior to trial by a mental health expert who gave an unfavorable diagnosis. As we concluded in Jones, the first evaluation is not rendered less than competent simply because appellant has been able to provide testimony to conflict with the first evaluation. 732 So.2d at 320; see Rose, 617 So.2d at 295. Also instructive is our opinion in Rose, where a psychologist advised trial counsel prior to the penalty phase that the defendant suffered from antisocial personality disorder and ruled out the possibility of an organic brain disorder. 617 So.2d at 294. In both Rose and Jones, we affirmed the trial court's finding that counsel had made a reasonable tactical decision not to further pursue an investigation of mental health mitigation evidence after receiving an initial unfavorable diagnosis. See Jones, 732 So.2d at 320 n. 5; Rose, 617 So.2d at 294. Asay v. State, 769 So.2d 974, 985-86 (Fla. 2000). Here, the postconviction court found, based on competent, substantial evidence, that counsel properly relied on Dr. Kropan experienced and well-documented expertto conduct a thorough mental-health evaluation. The court ultimately concluded that a thorough mental-health evaluation had, in fact, been performed. Trial counsel's investigation into mental-health mitigation is not rendered incompetent merely because the defendant has now secured the testimony of a more favorable mental health expert. Asay, 769 So.2d at 986. Furthermore, the postconviction court found, based on competent, substantial evidence, that trial counsel made a strategic decision not to present mitigation evidence after consultation with Dr. Krop. It was reasonable for trial counsel to conclude that the evidence offered in mitigation would do more harm than good in light of Floyd's antisocial personality disorder diagnosis, the fact that he killed his brother at age fourteen, and the inconsistencies between the statements of Floyd's parents. This strategic decision did not render trial counsel's performance deficient. Floyd further contends that after Dr. Krop advised counsel that he should not testify during the penalty phase, trial counsel totally abdicated his duty to investigate mitigation. Conversely, trial counsel testified during the evidentiary hearing that he investigated Floyd's background, but was unable to locate much mitigation. Trial counsel explained that he avoided the incident in which Floyd killed his brother because he had spoken with a police officer, who informed counsel that the prior killing was a whole lot worse [than the charge indicated], toward the premeditated range. Despite the alleged failures of trial counsel to offer mitigation, a review of the record demonstrates that postconviction counsel did not offer a single family member, teacher, or acquaintance to provide information about Floyd's upbringing or with regard to any abuse or neglect that he allegedly suffered as a child. Rather, the only witnesses offered during the postconviction hearing were experts who testified with regard to Floyd's mental health. There was no non-mental-health-related evidence presented during the postconviction proceedings, and we conclude that Floyd has failed to establish that his trial counsel exhibited deficient performance with regard to the mitigation investigation. See generally Holland v. State, 916 So.2d 750, 757 (Fla.2005) ([C]ounsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to investigate or present mitigation evidence unless the defendant establishes that mitigation exists.  (emphasis supplied)). With regard to the failure of trial counsel to object to the jury instruction that addressed nonstatutory mitigation, Floyd has not established that any purported error in the jury instruction satisfies the prejudice requirement of Strickland. In our decision that affirmed Floyd's conviction and sentence, we specifically held that when we further considered the three strong aggravating factors present in this case, the possible mitigation factors, and the eleven-to-one jury recommendation for a sentence of death, we concluded that  a perfect instruction would not have in any way altered the jury's recommendation here. Floyd, 850 So.2d at 403 (emphasis supplied). Finally, with regard to the mitigating circumstance of age, we have held: [W]here the defendant is not a minor, as in the instant case, no per se rule exists which pinpoints a particular age as an automatic factor in mitigation. [ Shellito v. State, 701 So.2d 837, 843 (Fla. 1997)]. The existence and weight to be given to this mitigator depends on the evidence presented at trial and the sentencing hearing. See id. For example, this Court has held that age twenty, in and of itself, does not require a finding of the age mitigator. See Garcia v. State, 492 So.2d 360, 367 (Fla.1986). In Gudinas v. State, 693 So.2d 953 (Fla.1997), we held, Although Gudinas is certainly correct that he had a troubling past and had always been small for his age, there was no evidence presented that he was unable to take responsibility for his acts and appreciate the consequences thereof at the time of the murders.  Id. at 967. In that case, we found that there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that Gudinas was mentally and emotionally mature enough that his age should not be considered as a mitigator. Id. Nelson v. State, 850 So.2d 514, 528-29 (Fla.2003). In Nelson, this Court upheld the lower court's rejection of the age mitigator and concluded that evidence demonstrated the maturity of the defendant based on the following considerations: [H]e obtained and temporarily held a job; he provided his child's mother with money to buy necessities when she was visiting; Nelson did not have a home of his own, but arranged to stay with [others]; and Nelson did not have a driver's license or a car, yet was able to travel places on his own. Id. at 529. Here, at the time of the murder, Floyd was twenty-one years old and married, he maintained employment, and he assumed responsibilities for a household and his wife's children from a prior relationship. Since many aspects of Floyd's life were consistent with that of a mature adult, it was not unreasonable for trial counsel to conclude that the age mitigator was inapplicable. Accordingly, Floyd has failed to establish that trial counsel was ineffective, and we reject this claim.