Opinion ID: 447572
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Intent

Text: 28 Appellant alleges that the word knowingly in the first line of section 922(e) establishes an element of specific intent that requires the government to prove that appellant had knowledge of the duty to provide written notice to the carrier. We disagree. 29 A plain reading of the statute leads to the conclusion that knowingly modifies to deliver or cause to be delivered. Such a reading would indicate a knowing act as the required element, not a specific intent to violate the statute. It seems logical that knowingly would be included as it is in the statute in order to prevent the conviction of a person who has delivered to a carrier a parcel which contains, unknown to that person, a firearm. On the other hand, there is nothing in the section to indicate a Congressional purpose to require an element of specific intent as the appellant alleges. Further, the absence of words such as intent and willfully, which traditionally accompany specific intent crimes, supports our conclusion. Congress would have included similar language ... had it intended to require proof of willful conduct. United States v. Launder, 743 F.2d 686, 692 (1984) (Choy, J., dissenting). 30 It is possible that scienter is required regardless of the absence of an express requirement in the section. To determine if it is so required, this court has used a two-question test under the guidance of United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971). The questions to be resolved are (1) is the nature of the act innocent or bad, and (2) is the policy behind the statute one of regulation with an emphasis on achievement of a social benefit such as public safety or one of punishment for acts motivated by some corrupt motive. See United States v. Pruner, 606 F.2d 871, 873 (9th Cir.1979) (citing Freed, 401 U.S. at 609, 91 S.Ct. at 1118). The crux of the test is that if the act done by the accused is itself a bad act and if the policy behind the statute is regulatory, then scienter need not be proven. 31 There can be no question that concealing weapons under false bottoms in steamer trunks for shipment out of the country is a bad act. The very manner in which it was attempted attests to the nature of the act. Appellant evinced a recognition that it was not innocent when he planned to lie about the contents of the trunks, if asked. 32 Secondly, there can be no question that the policy behind the Gun Control Act is regulatory with an emphasis on achievement of public safety. This was squarely the finding of our court in Pruner, 606 F.2d at 874. 33 We conclude, therefore, that section 922(e) is a general intent statute. This was also the conclusion of the Fourth and the Eighth Circuits when dealing with the questions presented by this appeal. United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 973 (4th Cir.1983); United States v. Udofot, 711 F.2d 831, 835-37 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 245, 78 L.Ed.2d 234 (1983). 34 For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the decision by the district court is 35 AFFIRMED. 36