Opinion ID: 438686
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Donald Rugito

Text: 31 Donald Rugito was employed by H & W as a tool and die maker from March 16, 1979 to November 14, 1980. 10 In September 1980 Rugito was appointed Union Vice-President, Chief Steward, Grievanceman and Agent. His active involvement in his two-month tenure as a Union officer included the filing of several grievances over discharged Union officers, complaints over workplace conditions, and a dues payment problem. (App. 106, 114, 116). On November 14, 1980, following a hearing over one of those grievances--the discharge of employees Robert Broker and Roger Cottrell--Giannotti handed Rugito a suspension pending discharge based on nine unexcused absences. 11 Rugito then obtained two excuses from his doctor relating to his July 8 and 14 absences. He brought the doctor's excuses to H & W on November 17, 1980. H & W rejected his excuses because (1) the excuses showed visits to the doctor on July 9 and 15, whereas he had been absent from work on July 8 and 14, 12 and (2) Rugito had waited all those months (from July to November 1980) to obtain the excuses, whereas ninety percent or more of the employees bring in excuses the next day or the day after. (App. 579). 32 The General Counsel relied on Rugito's aggressive Union activity and H & W's refusal to accept the two medical excuses in support of its argument that Rugito's absenteeism was a mere pretext for his discharge. The ALJ commented on all of the relevant evidence and concluded that H & W's animus directed against Rugito, as well as the disparate treatment exhibited in rejecting his doctor's excuses, were sufficient to find that H & W violated section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act in discharging Rugito. (App. 22). 33 As we have previously noted, under the Wright Line test, the General Counsel was obligated to make a prima facie showing that Rugito's discharge was the result of H & W's antiunion animus. In our view, the General Counsel met his threshold obligation, even though the evidence supporting his prima facie case is limited to one statement made by Giannotti, Rugito's supervisor, to Rugito, and overheard by a co-worker, Brenda May. Despite the fact that this statement was made a week after Rugito had been terminated, we cannot say that it is not entitled to weight, particularly since the ALJ credited the testimony of both Rugito and Brenda May. 34 The statement made by Giannotti was made to Rugito when he entered the plant to attend a Union meeting more than a week after his discharge. Rugito was asked to leave, and, according to Rugito, Giannotti said that everything that [he] had done had been bad for the Company. (App. 130, 148). Brenda May testified that Giannotti told Rugito that he thought whatever office Don took in the Union that he was going to help the relationship between the Union and the Company and that in his opinion, he had only heard [sic] it. (App. 323). 13 Giannotti admitted having a confrontation with Rugito, although it was his recollection that he referred to Rugito's lack of cooperation in filing the number of verbal grievances he filed. (App. 679). Giannotti's statement is sufficient--although barely so--to carry the General Counsel's initial burden under Wright Line. The burden then shifted to H & W to prove that it would have discharged Rugito regardless of his protected Union activities. Although this too is an extremely close question, we cannot say that H & W satisfied its burden. 35 The record compiled by H & W shows that Rugito had been terminated for excessive absenteeism in 1979, and that he had accumulated eight unexcused absences by the time he became a Union officer. The ALJ was correct in noting that H & W would not have shown any disparate treatment in discharging him based on a fair application of Rule 30, particularly when it is considered that he should have been concerned about any unexcused absences following his discharge in 1979 for excessive absenteeism. (App. 21). Our evaluation cannot stop there, however, because the ALJ went on to find disparate treatment of Rugito amounting to a violation of section 8(a)(3) and (1). 36 In order to carry its burden under Wright Line, H & W would have had to prove that any employee in Rugito's situation would have been discharged and that no employee would have been permitted to submit excuses four months after an absence. The ALJ found, however, that prior to H & W's refusal to accept Rugito's excuse, the Company had never rejected a written excuse as untimely. (App. 23) The ALJ apparently discredited the unsupported statement of personnel director Barron that H & W's policy was to reject medical excuses submitted more than a couple of weeks after the absence (App. 523-24). In addition, the ALJ pointed to record evidence that H & W had accepted the excuse of one employee, Jeff Speicher, dated two days after the actual date of his absence. (App. 859) 14 The ALJ also pointed to H & W's refusal to verify Rugito's excuses with his physician, thereby underscoring the technicality which it had already waived in Speicher's case. 15 Finally, the ALJ found that one workday prior to Rugito's attempt to hand in the late excuses, H & W agreed to accept excuses from Broker and Cottrell which would equally have been untimely. (App. 22). 16 37 As this court noted in Behring International, Inc. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 291, 292 (3d Cir.1983) (per curiam, opinion on remand), although we might have resolved the issue differently had we heard it in the first instance, our limited scope of review requires us to accept the Board's conclusion that the employer did not meet the burden assigned to it. In this case the Board concluded that H & W did not carry its burden of demonstrating that Rugito would have been discharged in any event without regard to his protected activities. Since there exists substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's finding of disparate treatment in violation of section 8(a)(3) and (1), we will enforce that part of the Board's order as pertains to Donald Rugito.