Opinion ID: 2451
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Devising a New Bivens Damages Action

Text: Even apart from our disagreement with the majority that Arar's claims present a new context in which to extend Bivens liability, we are puzzled by the majority's analysis as to whether to do so. Having decided that the issue for our consideration is whether a Bivens action should be permitted in what it has concluded is a new context, the majority engages in a two-part inquiry: whether there is an alternative remedial scheme available to the plaintiff; and whether `special factors counsel[] hesitation' in creating a Bivens remedy. Supra at 572 (quoting Wilkie, 127 S.Ct. at 2598). Our colleagues wisely decline to decide the first issue, whether an alternative remedial scheme is available, partly because they conclude that this is not an immigration case (or, at least, not a typical one), see supra at 570, and partly because Arar has alleged that he was actively prevented from seeking any meaningful review and relief through the INA processes, supra at 573; see also supra at 570-71. This is significant inasmuch as the Supreme Court has observed that it has recognized new Bivens actions precisely, inter alia, to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative remedy for harms caused by an individual officer's unconstitutional conduct. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70, 122 S.Ct. 515 (emphasis omitted). The majority moves on to the second prong of the test, concluding that special factors are clearly present in the new context of this case, and they sternly counsel hesitation. Supra at 573. We think it unfortunate that the majority concludes that Arar should be afforded no Bivens right of action in light of such special factors. We quarrel not only with their conclusion, but also the majority's apparent treatment of the existence vel non of special factors counseling hesitation as the determinative legal standard for whether an extension of Bivens is warranted. Setting aside for the moment our view that many of the special factors cited by the majority are not properly considered to be such, we think it mistaken to preclude Bivens relief solely in light of a citation or compilation of one or more purported examples of such special factors.
The majority is not altogether clear in conveying its understanding of the legal significance of a finding that special factors counseling hesitation, sternly or otherwise, are present. The majority acknowledges that [h]esitation is a pause, not a full stop, or an abstention; and to counsel is not to require, supra at 574, but it also states that countervailing factors are not considered, and that no such factors have ever been cited by the Supreme Court as a reason for affording a Bivens remedy where it would not otherwise exist, id. What we are left with is an implication that the presence of special factors counseling hesitation in fact does require a full stop, or an abstention. We disagree. It seems to us that the existence of such special factors alone does not compel a conclusion that a Bivens action is unavailable. When the words special factors counseling hesitation were first uttered by the Supreme Court, in Bivens itself, the Court asserted that there is a general rule that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court then said: The present case involves no special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress, citing cases in which the general rule had not been applied. [26] Id. The Bivens Court's observation that there was no cause for hesitation, and its simultaneous recognition in the case before it of a private right of action did not imply, however  as the majority seems to  that if there had been reason to hesitate, then the Court, ipso facto, would not have recognized a right of action. [27] The Supreme Court has not told us that special factors counseling hesitation are to be understood to prohibit a private right of action. In Wilkie, for example, the Court noted that deciding whether to recognize a Bivens remedy may require two steps, the second of which asks that the court pay[] particular heed ... to any special factors counselling hesitation, id., 127 S.Ct. at 2598 (emphasis added). And the Court, in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983), relied upon by the Wilkie Court in this regard, similarly observed that [i]n the absence of ... a congressional directive [that a right of action lies], the federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counseling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation. Id. at 378, 103 S.Ct. 2404 (emphasis added). [H]eed means [c]lose attention or notice. American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 813 (4th ed. 2000). To pay heed, then, means to notice, it does not mean to be governed by. The majority tells us that `[h]esitation' is `counseled' whenever thoughtful discretion would pause even to consider. Supra at 574. If the existence of special factors counseling hesitation were determinative of the existence of a right of action, the bar to declining to allow a new Bivens claim would be less than remarkably low. Id. It would be chimerical. It is difficult to deny the existence of special factors counseling hesitation in this case. We have been hesitating  in order to deliberate in light of those factors  for nearly two years. While the time we have taken to consider special factors strongly indicates that they counsel hesitation, it cannot follow that having hesitated, we must therefore halt, and dismiss the Bivens complaint. [28]
The special factors cited by the majority fall into one of two general categories: those involving security, secrecy, and confidentiality, and those involving other policy considerations. We turn to the latter category first, briefly summarizing each factor as the majority describes it and then setting forth our view of the factor's weight.
 This action asks for damages, but it functionally operates as a constitutional challenge to the policies promulgated by the executive. Supra at 574. We should hesitate to allow such an action to proceed because to do so would tacitly decide, id., that Bivens can subject federal officers to the kind of enterprise liability that was established for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), but has not been established for Bivens actions. This paraphrase sets forth the strongest argument (factor), we think, for denying a Bivens remedy to Arar. After Iqbal, it would be difficult to argue that Arar's complaint can survive as against defendants who are alleged to have been supervisors with, at most, knowledge of Arar's mistreatment. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; see also id. at 1955 (Souter, J., dissenting). And to the extent that the United States remains a defendant, perhaps it should be dismissed for want of possible liability under Bivens too. But that does not dispose of the case against the lower-level defendants, such as Blackman, McElroy, and the Doe defendants, who are alleged to have personally undertaken purposeful unconstitutional actions against Arar. It also may be that to the extent actions against policymakers can be equated with lawsuits against policies, they may not survive Iqbal either. But while those championing Arar's case may in fact wish to challenge extraordinary rendition policy writ large, the relief Arar himself seeks is principally compensation for an unconstitutional implementation of that policy. That is what Bivens actions are for.  Actions for damages against federal officers who implement rendition policy implicate sovereign immunity concerns, by influenc[ing] government policy, prob[ing] government secrets, invad[ing] government interests, enmesh[ing] government lawyers, and... elicit[ing] government funds for settlement. Supra at 574.  Recognizing a Bivens action for Arar would entail a judicial assessment of the validity and rationale of rendition, which directly affect[s] significant diplomatic and national security concerns. Supra at 575. The concern here is in part one of separation of powers, see supra at 575, and in part one of institutional incompetence, see supra at 575. Aside from diplomatic and national security considerations, which we address below, this consideration applies to all civil rights actions. Bivens by its nature implicates government interests, enmeshes government lawyers, and elicits government funds for settlement. Bivens by its nature authorizes courts to invalidate exercises in executive power. A Bivens action, like any other civil rights action, is an attempt to hold members of the executive accountable for their allegedly unconstitutional acts, through the courts. If these special factors were persuasive grounds on which to deny Bivens actions, they would not only not be permitted in new contexts, they would not be permitted at all. Similarly, insofar as this Bivens action may influence executive policy, we doubt that that should be a factor counseling hesitation either. Civil rights actions influence policy: They make it more costly for executive officers to violate the Constitution. That is their point. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992) (The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.). Finally, the majority suggests that [i]n the small number of contexts in which courts have implied a Bivens remedy, it has often been easy to identify both the line between constitutional and unconstitutional conduct, and the alternative course which officers should have pursued, a distinction [the majority says] may or may not amount to a special factor counseling hesitation in the implication of a Bivens remedy. Supra at 580. It should be noted to the contrary that in the two Supreme Court decisions that did extend a Bivens remedy in a new context, such identification was anything but easy. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980), involved the line between constitutional and unconstitutional medical treatment and medical facilities in prisons, whose management the Supreme Court has found peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials  and thus outside of the competence of judges  and instructed courts to ordinarily defer to [prison officials'] expert judgment, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974). And Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), addressed the line between constitutional and unconstitutional discrimination in public employment, which the Court later observed raises issues requiring decisions [that] are quite often subjective and individualized, resting on a wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify, Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 2154, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008). The factors relied upon by the majority that do not relate to secrecy or security therefore do not appear to us to counsel strongly against recognition of a Bivens remedy here. 2. Factors involving secrecy or security. The other special factors cited by the majority focus our attention on the ability of the executive to conduct the business of diplomacy and government in secret as necessary and to protect public and private security. It is beyond dispute that the judiciary must protect that concern. See, e.g., Doe v. CIA, 576 F.3d 95 (2d Cir.2009). But inasmuch as there are established procedures for doing just that, we think treating that need as giving rise to special factors counseling hesitation is an unfortunate form of double counting. The problem can be, should be, and customarily is, dealt with case by case by employing the established procedures of the state-secrets doctrine, see id.; see also section VI, below, rather than by barring all such plaintiffs at the courtroom door without further inquiry.
At least some factors weigh in favor of permitting a Bivens action in this case. We assume, as we are required to, that Arar suffered a grievous infringement of his constitutional rights by one or more of the defendants, from his interception and detention while changing planes at an international airport to the time two weeks later when he was sent off in the expectation  perhaps the intent and expectation  that he would be tortured, all in order to obtain information from him. Breach of a constitutional or legal duty would appear to counsel in favor of some sort of opportunity for the victim to obtain a remedy for it. Justice Harlan's landmark concurrence in Bivens explains: The[government's] arguments for a more stringent test to govern the grant of damages in constitutional cases [than that governing a grant of equitable relief] seem to be adequately answered by the point that the judiciary has a particular responsibility to assure the vindication of constitutional interests.... To be sure, it must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts. But it must also be recognized that the Bill of Rights is particularly intended to vindicate the interests of the individual in the face of the popular will as expressed in legislative majorities; at the very least, it strikes me as no more appropriate to await express congressional authorization of traditional judicial relief with regard to [the plaintiff's constitutional] legal interests than with respect to interests protected by federal statutes. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation and footnote omitted). And more generally, Bivens should be available to vindicate Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights such as those asserted here. As Judge Posner wrote for the Seventh Circuit with respect to a Bivens action: [I]f ever there were a strong case for substantive due process, it would be a case in which a person who had been arrested but not charged or convicted was brutalized while in custody. If the wanton or malicious infliction of severe pain or suffering upon a person being arrested violates the Fourth Amendment  as no one doubts  and if the wanton or malicious infliction of severe pain or suffering upon a prison inmate violates the Eighth Amendment  as no one doubts  it would be surprising if the wanton or malicious infliction of severe pain or suffering upon a person confined following his arrest but not yet charged or convicted were thought consistent with due process. Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1026, 110 S.Ct. 733, 107 L.Ed.2d 752 (1990); [29] accord Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir.2004) (reversing district court's dismissal of pretrial detainee's Bivens action alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement at federal penitentiary in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Cale v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 943, 946-47 (6th Cir.1988) (concluding that federal courts have the jurisdictional authority to entertain a Bivens action brought by a federal prisoner, alleging violations of his right to substantive due process), abrogated on other grounds, Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 387-88 (6th Cir.1999); see also Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 193, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that a [Bivens] action ... is available to federal pretrial detainees challenging the conditions of their confinement) (citing Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202 (3d Cir.1988)). [30] A federal inmate serving a prison sentence can employ Bivens to seek damages resulting from mistreatment by prison officials. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980). It would be odd if a federal detainee not charged with or convicted of any offense could not bring an analogous claim. [31] Finally, a factor counseling recognition of a Bivens action is that Arar has no other remedy for the alleged harms the defendant officers inflicted on him. Cf. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70, 122 S.Ct. 515 (In 30 years of Bivens jurisprudence we have extended its holding only twice, to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged to have acted unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative remedy for harms caused by an individual officer's unconstitutional conduct.).