Opinion ID: 2594774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: source of allocution right under state law

Text: Petitioner claims that, even if the right of allocution is not guaranteed under the United States Constitution, it is guaranteed under the Washington Constitution. Since its establishment as a state, the State of Washington has provided defendants with a right of allocution only by statute. [33] The statute, last recodified as former RCW 10.64.040, provided in part: When the defendant appears for judgment, he must be ... asked whether he have [sic] any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him. The Legislature repealed RCW 10.64.040 in 1984 after enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981. [34] At the time of its repeal, former RCW 10.64.040 had already been substantially replaced by former CrR 7.1(a)(1), [35] which provided: (a) Sentencing. (1) Imposition of Sentence. Sentence shall be imposed or an order deferring sentence shall be entered without unreasonable delay. Pending such action the court may release or commit the defendant, pursuant to CrR 3.2. Before disposition the court shall afford counsel an opportunity to speak and shall ask the defendant if he wishes to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment. (Emphasis added.) Former CrR 7.1 was rewritten in 1984 and recodified as CrR 7.2 with deletion of the allocution provision. [36] The deleted language addressed matters that [were] now covered in more detail in RCW 9.94A.110. [37] RCW 9.94A.110, now in effect, provides in part: Sentencing hearingPresentencing procedures. Before imposing a sentence upon a defendant, the court shall conduct a sentencing hearing.... . . . . The court shall consider the risk assessment report and presentence reports, if any, including any victim impact statement and criminal history, and allow arguments from the prosecutor, the defense counsel, the offender, the victim, the survivor of the victim, or a representative of the victim or survivor, and an investigative law enforcement officer as to the sentence to be imposed. [38] . . . . (Emphasis added.) Under former RCW 10.64.040, former CrR 7.1 and RCW 9.94A.110, a defendant's right of allocution is derived from state statutes. Its legal provenance under state law is not constitutional in nature. Citing In re Personal Restraint of Powell, [39] Petitioner nevertheless claims the right of allocution is guaranteed under the Washington Constitution. [40] In Powell this Court stated: Petitioners correctly point out that it is a violation of due process ... to deny a defendant the opportunity to speak immediately prior to the imposition of a sentence, State v. Happy, 94 Wash.2d 791, 620 P.2d 97 (1980). [41] It is questionable whether the Court intended to announce a rule that the right of allocution is constitutional. The Court in Powell cited State v. Happy as authority. In Happy this Court considered a defendant's right of allocution only under former CrR 7.1(a)(1) and not under the due process clause of either the Washington Constitution or the United States Constitution. [42] Even if the court intended to declare a constitutional due process right, Petitioner Echeverria in this case was not denied the opportunity to speak immediately prior to imposition of sentence. Petitioner claims, in the alternative, that even if the right of allocution is not guaranteed under the United States Constitution, the Washington Constitution affords greater protection by guaranteeing the right under Washington Constitution article I, section 3 [43] and article I, section 32. [44] He argued the Gunwall factors in a comprehensive brief. [45] But he still could not establish that the trial court's not using ritualistic language specifically asking him whether he had anything to say resulted in actual prejudice. RCW 9.94A.110 provides in part: The court shall ... allow arguments from... the offender ... as to the sentence to be imposed. The record indicates Petitioner made an argument for leniency as part of his direct testimony during his sentencing hearing on June 18, 1996. This met the requirement of RCW 9.94A.110. The statute does not require that Petitioner's argument be made immediately prior to imposition of sentence. It does not specify when the court must allow the argument so long as it is made in the sentencing hearing at some time prior to imposition of sentence. Although we conclude in the limited circumstances of this case that Appellant was afforded his right of allocution by addressing the court at length on matters of mitigation during the sentencing hearing and prior to imposition of sentence, we nevertheless believe trial courts should scrupulously follow RCW 9.94A.110 by directly addressing defendants during sentencing hearings, asking whether they wish to say anything to the court in mitigation of sentence, and allowing arguments from ... the offenders[s] ... as to the sentence to be imposed. This would unequivocally acknowledge the right of allocution as a significant aspect of the sentencing process. Petitioner has not demonstrated actual prejudice in the imposition of his aggravated exceptional sentence under former RCW 9.94A.390, which at the time of his sentencing hearing on June 18, 1996 provided in part: Departure from the guidelines. ... The following are illustrative factors which the court may consider in the exercise of its discretion to impose an exceptional sentence. The following are illustrative only and are not intended to be exclusive reasons for exceptional sentences. . . . . (2) Aggravating Circumstances . . . . (d) The current offense was a major economic offense or series of offenses, so identified by a consideration of any of the following factors: (i) The current offense involved multiple victims or multiple incidents per victim; . . . . (iii) The current offense involved a high degree of sophistication or planning or occurred over a lengthy period of time; or . . . . The defendant's prior unscored misdemeanor or prior unscored foreign criminal history results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly too lenient in light of the purpose of this chapter as expressed in RCW 9.94A.010. [46] Under RCW 9.94A.390, the trial court determined, as justification for the exceptional sentence, that gang activity was a motivating factor; the crime involved a high degree of long-term planning; the crime took place within the victim's zone of privacy; and the facts were extreme and egregious beyond that normally involved in a charge of this nature. Petitioner nevertheless claims he was not allowed to address the court and argue for mercy or leniency, which could have convinced the court to impose a sentence within the standard range or one less severe. [47] The fact that Judge Brown imposed an exceptional sentence of 384 months upon Petitioner for second degree murder does not of itself establish that Petitioner was denied his right of allocution. Under RCW 9.94A.110, the trial court must consider many factors before imposing a sentence, including criminal history and arguments from the prosecutor, defense counsel, the offender, the victim, the survivor of the victim, and an investigative law enforcement officer. Judge Brown heard Petitioner's argument for leniency when he addressed her upon the invitation of his counsel during his direct testimony. She also heard the State's recommendation for an exceptional sentence of 384 months and received information concerning Petitioner's criminal history of malicious mischief in the second degree under RCW 9A.48.080, theft in the second degree under RCW 9A.56.040 and possession of firearm by minor under RCW 9.41.040. She then imposed the exceptional sentence recommended by the prosecutor. Petitioner's exceptional sentence for murder in the second degree is not subject to collateral attack by personal restraint petition in which he claims the trial court denied him his right of allocution during his sentencing hearing. He cannot establish that his claim of error is constitutional in nature under either federal or state law. Nor can he establish that his claim of error resulted in either actual prejudice or a complete miscarriage of justice. From the record in this case, it is established that Petitioner did in fact make an argument for leniency in his direct testimony during his sentencing hearing on June 18, 1996, which satisfied the requirement of RCW 9.94A.110. This was an allocutive statement made to the court in mitigation of punishment and can be characterized as allocution.