Opinion ID: 531041
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applying the Green Factors

Text: 49
50 The district court concluded that the DCSS fulfilled its constitutional duties in the areas of transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities. Neither party appeals these rulings; therefore, those rulings are not before us. 10
51 The former Fifth Circuit held that principals, teachers, teacher-aides and other staff who work directly with children at school shall be so assigned that in no case will the racial composition of a staff indicate that a school is intended for Negro students or white students. Singleton, 419 F.2d at 1217-18. School systems, therefore, maintain legal responsibility for the allocation of minority faculty and staff. School systems and district courts must focus on minority ratios in each school. Singleton, 419 F.2d at 1218. The district court concluded that the DCSS failed to comply with Singleton. Specifically, the district court ruled that the DCSS would not satisfy Singleton until each school's minority staff ratio varied from the system average by no more than 15-percent. The court adopted this 15-percent guideline from its 1976 order. 52 Only the plaintiffs appeal the district court's Singleton ruling. The plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by permitting a 15-percent variance in each school. The plaintiffs cite two cases in which courts approved plans that permitted deviations of less than 10-percent. See Tasby v. Estes, 517 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 939, 96 S.Ct. 299, 46 L.Ed.2d 271 (1975); Smith v. Concordia Parish School Board, 445 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.1971). The DCSS, however, argues that a 15-percent deviance rule does not constitute error. The DCSS points to a non-binding case in which a court approved a 15-percent deviance in some of a system's schools. See United States v. Texas Education Agency, 679 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir.1982). 53 We hold that the district court's Singleton order did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Our holding does not establish 15-percent as the standard for all cases; we merely find no abuse of discretion on the facts of this case. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision permitting the DCSS to comply with Singleton when each school's minority staff varies from the system average by no more than 15-percent. We stress, however, that under this circuit's definition of unitary status, the DCSS must simultaneously comply with Singleton and the other Green factors for several years before it will achieve unitary status.
54 In recent years, the DCSS student population has become increasingly segregated. The district court, however, refused to hold the DCSS responsible for this segregation because no evidence [exists] that the school system's previous unconstitutional conduct may have contributed to this segregation. Pitts v. Freeman, No. 11946 at 25. 55 The plaintiffs argue that the DCSS never achieved a constitutionally-sufficient level of desegregation. The plaintiffs argue that until the DCSS achieves unitary status, it must affirmatively move toward the maximum practical level of desegregation. The plaintiffs also argue that demographic shifts do not excuse the DCSS's resegregation. 56 The DCSS argues that it fulfilled its duties in the area of student assignment when it closed all de jure black schools following the district court's 1969 order. The DCSS argues that the district court properly refused to find it responsible for segregation caused by demographic changes. 57 We hold that a school system that has not achieved unitary status must take affirmative steps to gain and maintain a desegregated student population. The DCSS may not shirk its constitutional duties by pointing to demographic shifts occurring prior to unitary status. 11 Accordingly, we reverse the district court's conclusion that the DCSS fulfilled its constitutional obligations in the area of student assignment. 58
59 The DCSS has a continuing constitutional duty to achieve the greatest possible degree of desegregation and to prevent re-segregation. Columbus Board of Education, 443 U.S. at 460, 99 S.Ct. at 2948 (school board cannot perpetuate or re-establish the dual school system); Davis, 402 U.S. at 37, 91 S.Ct. at 1292 (make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation); Green, 391 U.S. at 440, 88 S.Ct. at 1695 (continuing duty to take whatever action might be necessary). The district court must continue to impose this duty on the DCSS until it removes all vestiges of the dual system. 60 The DCSS asserts that the district court could not hold it responsible for segregation not caused by its dual system. The DCSS cites Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 282, 97 S.Ct. at 2758 to support this assertion. We reject the DCSS's reading of Milliken II. The Milliken II Court did not require causation between each Green factor and a dual system. Rather, the Milliken II Court stated that federal-court decrees must directly address and relate to the constitutional violation itself.... [F]ederal-court decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate the Constitution or that does not flow from such a violation.... Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 281-82, 97 S.Ct. at 2757-58. As we stated earlier, the DCSS violated the Constitution by operating a dual system. Under Milliken II, federal court orders may address all vestiges of that system. Student segregation, prior to achieving unitary status, indicates that vestiges remain. Therefore, the DCSS must continue to work toward desegregation until it removes all vestiges. The fact that the DCSS achieved racial parity in the area of student assignment on the day it closed the de jure black schools does not demonstrate that it fulfilled its duties to achieve maximum possible desegregation and to avoid the reestablishment of a dual system. 61
62 We also reject the district court's refusal to require the DCSS to eradicate segregation caused by demographic changes. As the former Fifth Circuit stated in Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 616 F.2d 805, 810 (5th Cir.1980): 63 Not until all vestiges of the dual system are eradicated can demographic changes constitute legal cause for racial imbalance in the schools.... Notwithstanding the school authorities' apparent good faith attempt to desegregate in 1970, the system has never achieved unitary status.... Consequently, the school board in Tuscaloosa is still under an affirmative duty to dismantle the dual system, regardless of current housing patterns. (Citing Flax v. Potts, 464 F.2d 865, 868-69 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1007 [93 S.Ct. 433, 34 L.Ed.2d 299] (1972)). 64 We rejected a similar demographics argument in Pitts I. In Pitts I, the DCSS planned to accommodate white population growth in the Redan High School area by building an additional facility. The district court accepted the DCSS's plan, finding that the DCSS simply planned to build a school where students lived and that a discriminatory intent did not motivate the DCSS's actions. We noted the discriminatory effect of the proposed Redan expansion and held that [u]ntil the DeKalb County School System achieves unitary status, it has an affirmative duty to eliminate the effects of its prior unconstitutional conduct. Pitts I, 755 F.2d at 1426. We repeat what we said in Pitts I: The DCSS has not achieved unitary status; consequently, its affirmative duty remains in force. 12 65
66 In concluding that the DCSS failed to fulfill its constitutional duties regarding student assignment, we recognize that the Constitution does not require any particular degree of racial balance or mixing. Swann, 402 U.S. at 24, 91 S.Ct. at 1280. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280 n. 14, 97 S.Ct. at 2757 n. 14; Spangler, 427 U.S. at 434, 96 S.Ct. at 2703. 13 Accordingly, we do not require the DCSS to impose racial quotas in its schools. We do require, however, that the DCSS move toward the maximum possible level of desegregation. In direct conflict with Supreme Court authority and orders of this court, the DCSS claims no responsibility for student segregation based on its 1969 action of closing de jure black schools. The district court must increase its involvement in this case to ensure compliance with our order and the Constitution. The district court should require the DCSS to submit timely plans, establish firm deadlines, and require progress reports. 67
68 The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion to compel the DCSS to file a junior high school plan because it concluded that the DCSS achieved maximum practical desegregation before the 1986-87 school year. Because we reverse the district court's conclusion that the DCSS achieved maximum practical desegregation, we order the district court to reconsider the plaintiffs' motion.D. Distribution of Educational Resources 69 The district court ordered the DCSS to assign experienced teachers and teachers with advanced degrees equally between primarily black and primarily white schools. The district court also ordered the DCSS to equalize per pupil expenditures. The DCSS appeals this portion of the district court order, arguing that the district court improperly assigned it the burden of proof. 14 70 To the extent that the district court required the DCSS to allocate educational resources in a race-neutral fashion, we affirm. We note, however, that the district court based its conclusion on an improper premise: that the DCSS may properly operate a segregated school system prior to reaching unitary status. 15 Under our holding, the DCSS must desegregate its students. When the system desegregates, most schools will no longer be racially identifiable and the DCSS will be unable to distribute resources in a racially imbalanced fashion. E. Disposition 71 For many years, the DCSS planned, contributed to, and directly caused racial segregation in its schools. By operating a dual system, the DCSS affected the hearts and minds of its students and may have contributed to the housing patterns that today cause school segregation. Swann, 402 U.S. at 20-21, 91 S.Ct. at 1278-79; Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494, 74 S.Ct. at 691. The law requires that the DCSS achieve unitary status. The DCSS, however, refuses to take affirmative action and seeks to justify its inaction with frivolous and long-rejected arguments. 72 To comply with our mandate, the DCSS's actions may be administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations and may impose burdens on some. Swann, 402 U.S. at 28, 91 S.Ct. at 1282. The DCSS must consider pairing and clustering of schools, drastic gerrymandering of school zones, and grade reorganization. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 27-28, 91 S.Ct. at 1281-82. The DCSS and the district court must consider busing--regardless of whether the plaintiffs support such a proposal. The DCSS's neighborhood plan is not inviolable. See Davis, 402 U.S. at 37-38, 91 S.Ct. at 1291-92. The DCSS's M-to-M program and magnet program do not alone suffice to desegregate the schools. We note that the M-to-M program is not likely to desegregate white schools. Without extensive expansion, the magnet school programs are not likely to materially desegregate the system. 16 73 After twenty years of court supervision, the DCSS continues to operate racially identifiable schools. The DCSS has never achieved unitary status and it retains the duty to eliminate all vestiges of the dual school system.