Opinion ID: 2598459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: victim's competency

Text: [¶ 30] We will briefly address this issue, but recognize that appellant could potentially raise the issue again on remand in the context of an entirely different record. Appellant contends that the district court erred in finding that the victim was competent to testify at trial. According to appellant, selected portions of the victim's testimony at the competency hearing indicate that the victim did not understand her obligation to testify truthfully, did not have the mental capacity to testify, and was easily distracted. Appellant also argues that the district court's review of Huylar's videotaped interviews with the victim did not sufficiently address the other possible instances of suggestion presented by appellant's trial counsel, and that the victim's lack of competency prevented his trial counsel from effectively cross-examining the victim at trial. The Wyoming Rules of Evidence provide that [e]very person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules. W.R.E. 601. A person is generally competent to testify if he can understand, receive, remember and narrate impressions and is sensible to the obligations of the oath taken before testifying. English [ v. State ], 982 P.2d [139] at 145 [ (Wyo.1999) ] (citing Simmers [v. State], 943 P.2d [1189] at 1199 [(Wyo. 1997)]); Larsen v. State, 686 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo.1984). Intelligence, not age, is the guiding criteria in determining the competency of a witness. Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 879 (Wyo.1987). It is a well-established principle of law that competency of witnesses to testify is a question within the sound discretion of the trial court. English, 982 P.2d at 145. However, when children are called into the courtroom to testify, we have held that once the child's competency is called into question by either party, it is the duty of the court to make an independent examination of the child to determine competency, and that determination will not be disturbed unless shown to be clearly erroneous. Id. We have directed the district courts to use a five-part test for determining the competency of child witnesses: (1) an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand; (2) the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he is to testify, to receive an accurate impression of it; (3) a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the occurrence; (4) the capacity to express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the capacity to understand simple questions about it. Id.; Larsen, 686 P.2d at 585 (quoting State v. Allen, 70 Wash.2d 690, 424 P.2d 1021 (1967)). In English, we decided that the existing state of the law adequately addresses pretrial taint concerns and a pretrial taint hearing is not necessary. At the time of a child's competency hearing, a defendant can argue memory taint at that hearing to discredit the reliability of a child's testimony. We held that if a defendant can establish a child's memory of events has been corrupted by improper interviews, it is possible the third Larsen factor, a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the occurrence, may not be satisfied. English, 982 P.2d at 146. Although we declined to adopt a separate pretrial taint hearing procedure, we did, however, endorse the use of the following factors as they relate to the question of independent recollection. Id. The factors that should be considered in assessing the reliability of a complaint regarding sexual offenses are: `(1) the age of the victim; (2) circumstances of the questioning; (3) the victim's relationship with the interrogator; and (4) the type of questions asked.'    Undue suggestiveness can occur when an interviewer has a preconceived notion of what has happened to a child, the interviewer uses leading questions, the interviewer is a trusted authority figure, the person accused of wrongdoing is vilified during the interview, or the interviewer uses threats or rewards to pressure the child. Id. (quoting State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. 363, 694 A.2d 196, 245-46 (1997)) (summarizing and quoting State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 642 A.2d 1372, 1377-1383 (1994)). Billingsley v. State, 2003 WY 61, ¶¶ 10-13, 69 P.3d 390, 395-96 (Wyo.2003) (emphasis in original). [¶ 31] The district court held a competency hearing the first day of trial. [12] At the hearing, the district court heard testimony from the victim, in addition to having previously reviewed the videotapes of Huylar's interviews with the victim. The district court concluded that the victim clearly met the referenced competency criteria. It found that the victim clearly understood the difference between the truth and untruth, that she had the requisite mental capacity and there was no indication to the contrary, that she had the ability to retain an independent recollection and the capacity to express in words the memory of the occurrence, and the capacity to understand simple question[s] about it from both Prosecutor and Defense Counsel. The district court also found that Huylar's videotaped interviews did not contain improperly suggestive questions of or statements to the victim. [ Id. at 127] [¶ 32] We cannot say that, based on the record before it, the district court erred in finding the victim competent to testify at trial. The district court applied the requisite factors to that record and made specific findings. We do not presume to place ourselves in the shoes of the trial court in these cases by reading a cold record. The trial court sees the witness' facial expressions, hears inflections in her voice and watches her mannerisms during examination. These observations are a vital part of the ultimate ruling on competency. In Interest of CB, 749 P.2d 267, 271 (Wyo. 1988). During her testimony as a whole, the victim was able to differentiate between the truth and a lie by way of specific examples and negative consequences associated with lying, even during questioning by appellant's trial counsel. She also was able to state her age, birth date, age at previous and next birthdays, name, family members, who she lived with, identified appellant, the state in which she lived, and counted accurately to twelve but inaccurately thereafter. It is worth noting that at trial, the victim was able to articulate and testify regarding her version of what happened to her in addition to utilizing anatomically correct drawings. [¶ 33] Appellant claims that the district court somehow prevented appellant from adequately exploring taint issues at the competency hearing. The record does not support this contention. At a motion hearing earlier in the case, appellant's trial counsel mentioned three areas in which the victim's disclosure might have been tainted: evidence regarding a potential custody dispute between the victim's mother and father, evidence pointing to the victim's maternal grandfather as the perpetrator, and evidence of improper influence during the videotaped interviews Huylar conducted. Yet, during the motion hearing, the district court specifically referred to Barbee's potential testimony in this respect, stated that it would look into the issues and if necessary, counsel may inquire of Lynn Huylar and Officer Bilk[ie], and indicated that it would hold a competency hearing at a later date. These witnesses could have provided information addressing the very three areas that appellant identified at the motion hearing (based on his trial testimony, Detective Bilkie would have been able to provide testimony regarding the maternal grandfather as the perpetrator). [¶ 34] The district court reviewed the videotaped interviews involving Huylar and the victim (appellant does not contest the district court's finding regarding these interviews) prior to the competency hearing, received the victim's testimony at the competency hearing, and made its findings based on the record before it. Nothing in the record indicates that appellant's trial counsel ever attempted to call, or requested that the district court receive testimony from, any other witness at the competency hearing. In fact, other than summarily objecting to the district court's competency ruling, appellant's trial counsel made no argument regarding these taint issues at the competency hearing. [¶ 35] The record similarly does not support appellant's argument as to whether the victim's competence interfered with his ability to cross-examine her.