Opinion ID: 1027636
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Actual Progress and the Least Restrictive Environment

Text: Having remanded the case for further proceedings, we now address two other legal arguments made by M.S.'s parents that are relevant on remand: the district court erred by (1) considering M.S.'s lack of progress and (2) applying the least restrictive environment requirement to their private placement. [13] The district court found, as a factual matter, that M.S. made minimal actual progress at Lindamood-Bell. M.S., No. 1:05cv1476, 2007 WL 1378545, at -, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33735, at -. The parents contend that, because the IDEA speaks of programs reasonably calculated to provide an educational benefit, M.S.'s actual progress while at Lindamood-Bell is irrelevant as to whether his initial placement there was appropriate. [14] We begin by noting that the parents' argument lacks support in our caselaw. Although other circuits have held that an IEP's appropriateness is judged prospectively so that any lack of progress under a particular IEP ... does not render that IEP inappropriate, Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 530 (3d Cir.1995) (emphasis added); see also Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 992 (1st Cir.1990) (An IEP is a snapshot, not a retrospective. In striving for `appropriateness,' an IEP must take into account what was, and was not, objectively reasonable when the snapshot was taken, that is, at the time the IEP was promulgated.), we have concluded that, in some situations, evidence of actual progress may be relevant to a determination of whether a challenged IEP was reasonably calculated to confer some educational benefit, see MM ex rel. DM, 303 F.3d at 532 (finding error where the district court concluded that the 1995-96 IEP was inadequate because it failed to consider the actual educational progress made by the student during the 1995-96 school year). To be sure, however, progress, or the lack thereof, while important, is not dispositive. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207 n. 28, 102 S.Ct. 3034 ([T]he achievement of passing marks and advancement from grade to grade will be one important factor in determining educational benefit. (emphasis added)). Here, the district court's decision correctly followed precedent. The court looked at M.S.'s actual progress on standardized tests, but only as one factor. Rather, the court also joined with the HO in finding that M.S. required both one-on-one and group instruction, as well as vocational and social education. Accordingly, the district court's decision to consider M.S.'s actual progress as a factor in determining whether the Lindamood-Bell placement was proper. We also believe the district court did not err in handling the least restrictive environment requirement in the IDEA. Under the IDEA, schools must place disabled students in the least restrictive environment to achieve a FAPE. Thus, a disabled child should participate in the same activities as nondisabled children to the maximum extent appropriate. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5)(A). As we have explained, [m]ainstreaming of handicapped children into regular school programs ... is not only a laudable goal but is also a requirement of the Act. DeVries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 878 (4th Cir.1989). The district court agreed with the HO that the Lindamood-Bell placement was highly restrictive by IDEA standards. M.S., No. 1:05cv1476, 2007 WL 1378545, at , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33735, at . Although we have never held that parental placements must meet the least restrictive environment requirement, see Carter, 950 F.2d at 160 (noting that the [IDEA]'s preference for mainstreaming was aimed at preventing schools from segregating handicapped students from the general student body and that the school district ha[d] presented no evidence that the [IDEA's preference for mainstreaming] was meant to restrict parental options when the public schools fail to comply with the requirements of the [IDEA] (emphasis in original)), the district court's consideration of Lindamood-Bell's restrictive nature was proper because it considered the restrictive nature only as a factor in determining whether the placement was appropriate under the IDEA, not as a dispositive requirement. M.S., No. 1:05cv1476, 2007 WL 1378545, at , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33735, at ; see also M.S ex rel. S.S. v. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 96, 105 (2d Cir.2000) (recognizing that parents seeking an alternative placement may not be subject to the same main-streaming requirements as a school board, but concluding that the IDEA's mainstreaming requirement remains a consideration that bears upon a parent's choice of an alternative placement and may be considered by the hearing officer in determining whether the placement was appropriate).