Opinion ID: 444672
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Interjection of Extraneous Prejudicial Information Into the Jury's Deliberations

Text: 86 In addition to failing to admit his knowledge of the defendant during voir dire, juror Goad used this knowledge during the jury's deliberations. Eight of the jurors who served with juror Goad testified at the post-trial hearing that Goad had stated during deliberations that he knew Perkins and/or that he had served on a committee with him. Several also stated that Goad had disputed Perkins' testimony as to where Dr. Scanks lived. 87 The sixth amendment guarantee of a trial by jury requires the jury verdict to be based on the evidence produced at trial. Turner v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472, 85 S.Ct. 546, 549, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). This requirement goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury. Turner, 379 U.S. at 472, 85 S.Ct. at 549. Extrinsic evidence, evidence that has not been subject to the procedural safeguards of a fair trial, threatens such constitutional safeguards as the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel. Id. at 473, 85 S.Ct. at 550. In addition, since such evidence has not been subject to the rules of evidence, it may confuse the jurors, United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 868 (5th Cir.1975); Farese v. United States, 428 F.2d 178, 180 (5th Cir.1970). 88 When jurors consider extrinsic evidence, a new trial is required if the evidence poses a reasonable possibility of prejudice to the defendant. See e.g., Howard, 506 F.2d at 869; Paz v. United States, 462 F.2d 740, 745 (5th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820, 94 S.Ct. 47, 115, 38 L.Ed.2d 52 (1973); Farese v. United States, 428 F.2d at 180. Prejudice from extrinsic evidence is assumed in the form of a rebuttable presumption and the government bears the burden of demonstrating that the consideration of the evidence was harmless. Howard, 506 F.2d at 869. See also Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 451, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954); Richardson v. United States, 360 F.2d 366, 369 (5th Cir.1966). Thus, beginning with the presumption that juror Goad's words were prejudicial, we look to whether that presumption has been rebutted. 15 89 Goad's remarks that he knew Perkins and/or had served on a committee with him were heard by eight of Goad's eleven co-jurors. These comments were made before a jury which for many hours had remained hopelessly deadlocked, and were made by a juror who was outspoken in his belief that Perkins should be convicted. The likelihood of prejudice on a jury is obvious. As stated in a similar case, United States v. Blair, 444 F.Supp. 1273 (D.D.C.1978) (jury reported overhearing one juror tell another that she knew codefendant): 90 [The juror's] statement during the deliberations that she knew [the codefendant] on its face may appear to be quite general and innocuous. However, when the statement coupled with [the juror's] prior vote for conviction on Count Two, is examined in the context of the entire record in this case, the requisite prejudice is apparent. The court particularly takes note of the circumstantial nature of the Government's case. 91 Id. at 1276. See also United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865 (5th Cir.1975) (prejudice found where one juror mentioned that defendant had been in trouble two or three times before), United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906, 91 S.Ct. 1373, 28 L.Ed.2d 646 (1971) (prejudice found where three jurors during deliberations alleged specific unfavorable incidents in the defendant's life). 92 Goad also stated that he knew where Dr. Scanks lived. At trial, Perkins testified that he did not tell FBI Special Agent Wilkerson on March 12, 1980 that Sweetie Marshall had not resided at the address that was now Perkins' office address; rather, Perkins alleged that he was referring to where Dr. Scanks currently lived. Wilkerson testified that Perkins' comments were directed toward where Sweetie Marshall lived. This conversation was one of the overt acts in the conspiracy charge. While the question of where Dr. Scanks actually lived at the time was not in dispute, information about where Dr. Scanks had lived in the past and whether he had moved could have implicated Perkins' credibility. Goad's asserted extrinsic knowledge might have allowed him to question Perkins' veracity. Thus, we find that the Government did not successfully rebut the presumption that the extrinsic evidence that Goad knew Perkins and that Goad knew where Dr. Scanks lived was prejudicial. The introduction of this evidence into the jury's deliberations also warrants a new trial. 93 For the foregoing reasons we REVERSE and REMAND for a new trial.