Opinion ID: 2165775
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Actual causation and legal causation

Text: In all tort cases, the plaintiff must prove that each defendant's conduct was an actual cause, also known as cause-in-fact, of the plaintiff's injury: Any attempt to find liability absent actual causation is an attempt to connect the defendant with an injury or event that the defendant had nothing to do with. Mere logic and common sense dictates that there be some causal relationship between the defendant's conduct and the injury or event for which damages are sought. Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hospital, 863 S.W.2d 852, 862 (Mo. banc 1993). Once actual causation has been established, the issue becomes one of legal causealso known as proximate cause that is, whether the defendant should be held liable because the harm is the reasonable and probable consequence of the defendant's conduct. Id. at 865. In most cases, the plaintiff must establish actual causation by showing that the alleged harm would not have occurred but for the defendant's conduct. Id. at 862. The only exception is for cases involving two independent torts, either of which is sufficient in itself to cause the injury. [3] Id. The city argues that the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth the proper standard for causation in a public nuisance case: One is subject to liability for a nuisance caused by an activity, not only when he carries on the activity but also when he participates to a substantial extent in carrying it on. Restatement (Second) of Torts section 834. To the extent the city's argument is that the Restatement requires something less than proof of actual causation or should replace actual causation in a public nuisance case, it is incorrect. The comments accompanying section 834 reveal that substantial participation refers to legal cause and is not meant to replace the requirements of actual causation: When a person is only one of several persons participating in carrying on an activity, his participation must be substantial before he can be held liable for the harm resulting from it. This is true because to be a legal cause of harm a person's conduct must be a substantial factor in bringing it about. (See [sections] 431-433, and [section] 876). Restatement (Second) of Torts section 834, comment d; see also sections 431 and 432 (providing that conduct is a legal cause if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, but it cannot be a substantial factor unless it first meets the test for actual causation). The Restatement does not abandon the requirement of proving actual causation in a public nuisance claim. Missouri public nuisance cases are in accord and require the plaintiff to show a causal link between the defendant and the alleged nuisance. City of St. Louis v. Varahi, Inc., 39 S.W.3d 531, 535-38 (Mo. App. 2001) (city failed to prove that hotel's hourly rental policy, reputation and few incidents of arrest caused public nuisance of prostitution on street outside hotel); see also State ex rel. Weatherby v. Dick & Brothers Quincy Brewing Co., 270 Mo. 100, 192 S.W. 1022, 1024-25 (1917) (state failed to prove that brewery's beer sales to dry county caused public nuisance of drinking and causing a disturbance); State ex rel. Chicago, B. & Q. Railway Co. v. Woolfolk, 269 Mo. 389, 190 S.W. 877, 879 (1916) (state failed to prove that railroad's delivery of liquor to dry county created public nuisance of drinking and causing disturbance). The city's argument also seems to be that actual causation can be proven by showing that the defendant substantially contributed to the public health hazard created by lead paint via evidence of community wide marketing and sales of lead paint. The defendants correctly contend that here, as in Zafft , where a plaintiff claims injury from a product, actual causation can be established only by identifying the defendant who made or sold that product.