Opinion ID: 1038331
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1244 (11th Cir. 2008). We will not disturb a guilty verdict unless, based on the evidence in the record, no trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 2 Case: 13-10041 Date Filed: 08/23/2013 Page: 3 of 8 1327 (11th Cir. 2005). To support a conviction for attempted possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, the government must prove that the defendant (1) acted knowingly or intentionally to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute; and (2) engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the crime, thus creating circumstances strongly corroborative of criminal intent. United States v. McDowell, 705 F.2d 426, 427–28 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 1974). 1 On appeal, Moore only argues that the government failed to produce sufficient evidence that he engaged in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. A substantial step must be shown by objective acts that are strongly corroborative of criminal intent. United States v. Carothers, 121 F.3d 659, 661 (11th Cir. 1997). A substantial step does not require an actual exchange so long as other objective acts corroborate an intent to complete the crime. See McDowell, 705 F.2d at 427–28 (holding that the defendant had completed a substantial step toward possession with intent to distribute, despite defendant’s refusal to complete the transaction, based on acts including (1) a prior drug transaction; (2) recorded 1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as precedent decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981. 3 Case: 13-10041 Date Filed: 08/23/2013 Page: 4 of 8 phone conversations about a possible cocaine deal; (3) defendant’s trip to the site of the deal; and (4) defendant’s conversations with the informant at the location of the deal). Here, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably determine that Moore attempted to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute. There were several objective acts by Moore on the day of the deal that were strongly corroborative of a criminal intent: (1) Moore confirmed that he was “ready” to do the deal and that he would meet the informant at a parking lot in five minutes; (2) Moore showed up at the parking lot minutes later; (3) Moore asked the informant if he had the half-kilo of cocaine; (4) Moore brought approximately $17,000 in cash with him, which was the price that he and the informant had previously agreed on for the sale; and (5) Moore began counting the cash in front of the informant, ultimately counting $14,000 when law enforcement arrived and arrested him. Moore argues that a discussion over the price on the day of the deal rendered Moore’s acts prior to that point irrelevant. However, Moore’s actions on the day of the deal were consistent with an intent to complete the transaction under the terms originally agreed upon by the two men, especially considering that Moore began counting the money only after he discussed the price with the informant and 4 Case: 13-10041 Date Filed: 08/23/2013 Page: 5 of 8 that Moore was arrested with approximately $17,000 in cash. See id.; Carothers, 121 F.3d at 661–66. 2