Opinion ID: 2059905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Prior Photographic Identifications

Text: First, we shall address whether the trial court erred in permitting Detective Wyatt to testify to the victims' pre-trial photographic identifications. As previously noted, Detective Wyatt testified that each of the family members identified Doa and/or Tren from photographic arrays shown to them nine days after the robbery. At the preliminary hearing, only Phoung Huynh and Thu Huynh took the witness stand. Phoung identified Doa as one of the robbers. She did not identify Tren. Thu identified Tren and Doa. At trial, the following identifications were made by the family members: Thu and Phoung identified co-defendant Su Le, but were uncertain about Doa and Tren; Chahn was unable to identify any of the defendants, and he stated that he had been uncertain of his prior photographic identification; Anh identified Su Le, but flatly denied that Doa and Tren were involved in the robbery; Phouc could not recall whether any of the defendants were the robbers of his grocery. Until recently, Pennsylvania adhered to the traditional rule that the prior inconsistent statements of a non-party witness are not admissible as substantive evidence under any circumstance. See Commonwealth v. Waller, 498 Pa. 33, 444 A.2d 653 (1982); Commonwealth v. Gee, 467 Pa. 123, 354 A.2d 875 (1976); Commonwealth v. Tucker, 452 Pa. 584, 307 A.2d 245 (1973). This principle was upheld by a sharply divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Floyd, 508 Pa. 393, 498 A.2d 816 (1985). In Floyd, a Commonwealth witness, who was an eyewitness to a shooting, testified at trial that he gave a statement to the police shortly after the shooting when the events were fresh in his mind. Portions of the statement, including a description of the perpetrator which resembled the defendant, were read into evidence. The witness was unable to make an in-court identification of the defendant, and, in fact, stated that the defendant was not the gunman. No reference to a photographic identification was made by the witness during his testimony. Subsequently, the Commonwealth called a detective to the witness stand. He testified that he had shown the eyewitness a photographic array and that the eyewitness had selected a photograph of the defendant and identified him as the wrongdoer. The defendant was convicted and post-trial motions were denied. On appeal, this court reversed the trial court and remanded the matter to the trial court for a new trial on the dual grounds that the photographic evidence was erroneously admitted by the trial court as substantive evidence and that the Commonwealth failed to disclose the photographic identification to the defendant before the trial. A plurality [1] of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the decision of this court and held that a witness may testify as to an identification made by another person if and only if such other person is present in court, is available for cross-examination, has testified, has been questioned about the previous identification, and has denied making it. . . . Applying Waller [ Commonwealth v. Waller, 498 Pa. 33, 444 A.2d 653 (1982)], we hold that the evidence is admissible only for impeachment and not as substantive evidence. [2] Floyd, 508 Pa. at 399, 498 A.2d at 819. Since the decision in Floyd, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has overruled a long line of cases in this Commonwealth by holding that prior inconsistent statements of a non-party witness at trial are admissible as substantive evidence under certain, undefined circumstances. Commonwealth v. Brady, 510 Pa. 123, 507 A.2d 66 (1986). Hence, the traditional rule utilized in Floyd is no longer the law of the Commonwealth. In Brady, the defendant awakened his girlfriend and persuaded her to take a ride with him. After driving around for some time, the defendant ran the automobile into a ditch alongside the road. They were unable to extricate the automobile from the ditch. Consequently, they began to walk back toward their home town, passing by a manufacturing plant along the way. They climbed over the fence surrounding the plant, entered the plant through a side door, and attempted to pry open a dollar-bill change machine. A fight ensued between the defendant and a security guard who encountered the two trespassers. During the fight, the security guard was stabbed. On that same evening, the girlfriend gave a tape-recorded statement to the police recounting the events of the day. At trial, the girlfriend, a Commonwealth witness, recanted her tape-recorded statements and testified that neither she nor the defendant entered the manufacturing plant. Over objection, the trial court permitted the Commonwealth to introduce the tape recorded statement as substantive evidence. Ultimately, a jury convicted the defendant on the charges of second degree murder, burglary, and criminal mischief. A panel of this court, applying the `law in Pennsylvania that prior inconsistent statements of a non-party witness are not admissible as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter asserted,' held that the trial court erred in admitting the girlfriend's tape-recorded statement as substantive evidence. Brady, 510 Pa. at 127, 507 A.2d at 68, quoting Commonwealth v. Brady, 338 Pa.Super. 137, 140, 487 A.2d 891, 892 (1985) (citations omitted). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in reversing this court, held that the otherwise admissible prior inconsistent statements of a [non-party] declarant who is a witness in a judicial proceeding and is available for cross-examination may be used as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein. Brady, 510 Pa. at 131, 507 A.2d at 70. The court stated, in pertinent part: The availability of cross-examination at trial also assures a meaningful opportunity for the trier of fact to observe the declarant who has been called upon and sworn as a witness and questioned as to the discrepancy between the prior statement and the direct testimony. The trier of fact may bring to bear his or her sensory observations, experience, common sense and logic upon the witness to assess credibility and to determine the truth and accuracy of both the out-of-court declarations and the in-court testimony. Brady, 510 Pa. at 129, 507 A.2d at 69. Additionally, the court emphasized that hearsay concerns surrounding the admission of this type of evidence as substantive evidence are minimal when the declarant is present in court and available for cross-examination. Since Pennsylvania adopted the modern rule in Brady, the appellate courts of this Commonwealth have not applied the principles espoused in Brady to a factual situation akin to the instant matter, i.e. where an eyewitness has made a prior identification but is unable to identify the defendants at trial and another witness is called to testify as to the eyewitness's prior identification. [3] Here, the victims of the robbery identified Doa and Tren in a photographic array but failed to identify them at trial. The Commonwealth called, as a witness, the police detective who showed the photographs to the victims. The police detective testified to the prior identifications made by the victims. Because we are presented with this unique situation, a careful analysis of the traditional hearsay concerns and the reasoning expressed in Brady and other jurisdictions is required for a proper resolution of this issue. [4] Proponents of the traditional rule assert three general, interrelated premises for not permitting the use of prior inconsistent statements as proof of the truth of the matter asserted. [5] The concern was . . . that hearsay problems arose from its introduction, that is, that the prior statement was too unreliable to be introduced as substantive evidence because the declarant had not been under oath or subject to punishment for perjury, because the declarant was not in the presence of the trier of fact, and because the declarant was not subject to cross-examination. Commonwealth v. Mott, 372 Pa.Super. 133, 143, 539 A.2d 365, 370 (1988) (Cirillo, J., concurring), citing Commonwealth v. Gee, 467 Pa. 123, 134-135, 354 A.2d 875, 880 (1976); 3A Wigmore, Evidence, Section 1362; State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 752-753, 513 A.2d 86, 92 (1986). See Commonwealth v. Brady, 510 Pa. 123, 507 A.2d 66 (1986); McCormick, Evidence, Section 251 (3d. ed. 1984). [6] Ultimately, the Brady court stated that each prong of this three-fold rationale has been logically and thoroughly debunked by the scholars and by the growing number of jurisdictions adopting the modern rule governing prior inconsistent statements on non-party witnesses by statute, rule or case law. Brady, 510 Pa. at 128, 507 A.2d at 69. [7] Other jurisdictions have considered the admissibility of prior identifications generally and have concluded that they are admissible as substantive evidence over a hearsay objection in a wide variety of circumstances. See United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. den. 435 U.S. 973, 98 S.Ct. 1618, 56 L.Ed.2d 66; State v. Kevil, 111 Ariz. 240, 527 P.2d 285 (1974); People v. Gould, 54 Cal.2d 621, 7 Cal.Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865 (1960); People v. Trujillo, 189 Colo. 206, 539 P.2d 1234 (1975); State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 513 A.2d 86 (1986); State v. Freber, 366 So.2d 426 (Fla. 1978); Barriner v. State, 161 Ga.App. 59, 289 S.E.2d 289 (1982); State v. Naeole, 62 Haw. 563, 617 P.2d 820 (1980); People v. Miller, 27 Ill.App.3d 667, 327 N.E.2d 8 (1975); Johnson v. State, 237 Md. 283, 206 A.2d 138 (1965); Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 469 N.E.2d 483 (1984); State v. Harris, 477 S.W.2d 42 (Mo.1972); State v. Adail, 555 S.W.2d 672 (Mo.App. 1977); State v. Draughn, 121 N.J.Super. 64, 296 A.2d 79 (1972) aff'd 61 N.J. 515, 296 A.2d 68; People v. Nival, 33 N.Y.2d 391, 353 N.Y.S.2d 409, 308 N.E.2d 883 (1974); State v. Blackwell, 16 Ohio App.3d 100, 474 N.E.2d 671 (1984); Washington v. State, 568 P.2d 301 (Okla.Cr. 1977); State v. Fennell, 7 Or.App. 256, 489 P.2d 964 (1971); Blankenship v. State, 1 Tenn.Crim.App. 178, 432 S.W.2d 679 (1967); Niblett v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 76, 225 S.E.2d 391 (1976); State v. Simmons, 63 Wash.2d 17, 385 P.2d 389 (1963). An increasing number of those jurisdictions have held that a non-party witness may testify at trial to an eyewitness's prior identification of the defendant in those instances when the eyewitness fails to, or is unable to, identify the defendant at trial. See United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248 (2nd Cir. 1977) cert. den. 435 U.S. 973, 98 S.Ct. 1618, 56 L.Ed.2d 66; United States v. Elemy, 656 F.2d 507 (9th Cir.1981); Rice v. United States, 437 A.2d 582 (D.C. 1981); State v. Kevil, 111 Ariz. 240, 527 P.2d 285 (1974); State v. Jackson, 24 Ariz.App. 7, 535 P.2d 35 (1975); People v. Gould, 54 Cal.2d, 621, 7 Cal.Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865 (1960); People v. Trujillo, 189 Colo. 206, 539 P.2d 1234 (1975); State v. Freber, 366 So.2d 426 (Fla. 1978); Bedford v. State, 293 Md. 172, 443 A.2d 78 (1982); State v. Barela, 97 N.M. 723, 643 P.2d 287 (App. 1982); State v. Draughn, 121 N.J.Super. 64, 296 A.2d 79, aff'd 61 N.J. 515, 296 A.2d 68 (1972); State v. Fennell, 7 Or.App. 256, 489 P.2d 964 (1971); Lucas v. State, 160 Tex.Crim. 443, 271 S.W.2d 821 (1954); Niblett v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 76, 225 S.E.2d 391 (1976). The seminal case is People v. Gould, 54 Cal.2d 621, 7 Cal.Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865 (1960). In Gould, an eyewitness identified the defendant from a photographic array, but she was unable to identify him at trial. A police officer subsequently testified that the eyewitness had previously identified the defendant. Justice Traynor writing for a unanimous California Supreme Court said as follows: Evidence of an extra-judicial identification is admissible, not only to corroborate an identification made at the trial [citations omitted], but as independent evidence of identity. Unlike other testimony that cannot be corroborated by proof of prior consistent statements unless it is first impeached [citations omitted], evidence of an extrajudicial identification is admitted regardless of whether the testimonial identification is impeached, because the earlier identification has greater probative value than an identification made in the courtroom after the suggestions of others and the circumstances of the trial may have intervened to create a fancied recognition in the witness' mind. [citations omitted]. The failure of the witness to repeat the extrajudicial identification in court does not destroy its probative value, for such failure may be explained by loss of memory or other circumstances. The extrajudicial identification tends to connect the defendant with the crime, and the principal danger of admitting hearsay evidence is not present since the witness is available at the trial for cross-examination. [citations omitted]. Gould, 54 Cal.2d at 631, 7 Cal.Rptr. at 278, 354 P.2d at 870. We find that the rationale expressed by legal commentators and other jurisdictions which have followed People v. Gould, 54 Cal.2d 621, 7 Cal.Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865 (1960), and its progeny is not only persuasive, but compelling. First, the Gould court cogently concluded that the identification made, in most instances, very close in time to the occurrence of the event in question is of superior reliability. There is a greater likelihood that the identification rendered soon after a crime has been committed may be more objective and accurate and possess greater probative value than a subsequent in-court identification. Niblett v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 76, 82, 225 S.E.2d 391, 394 (1976); see Brady, 510 Pa. at 130, 507 A.2d at 69 (Moreover, the prior statement can be viewed as possessing superior indicia of reliability as it was rendered at a point in time closer to the event described . . . when memory will presumably be fresher and opportunity for fabrication lessened.); State v. Harris, 711 S.W.2d 881, 885 (Mo.App. 1986) (The reasons for admitting identification statements as substantive evidence are that out-of-court identifications are believed to be more reliable than those made under the suggestive conditions prevailing at trial . . .); State v. Naeole, 62 Haw. 563, 569, 617 P.2d 820, 825 (1980) (Such pretrial identification is usually conducted as soon after the commission of the offense as possible, and this closer relationship . . . affords less opportunity for the deterioration or fading of eyewitness impressions . . .); Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 61, 469 N.E.2d 483, 488 (1984) (Prior identifications are admissible as probative evidence notwithstanding their hearsay attributes because of the superior probative worth of an identification made closer in time to the events in question.). Pursuing this line of logic, Congress has recognized, as do most trial judges, that identification in the courtroom is a formality that offers little in the way of suggestibility. The experienced trial judge gives much greater credence to the out-of-court identification. United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d at 1251, citing 4 Weinstein's Evidence, 801-103. The hearsay rule is replete with exceptions which rely heavily upon the freshness of a declarant's memory as a prevailing indicia of reliability. Even those persons who most vigorously oppose the admissibility of prior identification evidence are hard-pressed to rebut the proposition that the passage of time dilutes the memory. In addition, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that an identifying witness may be inhibited by threat or intimidation from making a positive in-court identification, or, the appearance of the alleged perpetrator may have changed since the date of the offense. Niblett, 217 Va. at 82, 225 S.E.2d at 394; see Naeole, 62 Haw. 563, 617 P.2d 820; see United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 996 (2nd Cir. 1977) ([T]he purpose of the rule [Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(c)] was to permit the introduction of identifications made by a witness when memory was fresher and there had been less opportunity for influence to be exerted upon him.). Here, the victims have repeatedly testified that they have feared revenge since the date of the robbery. The admission of prior identifications, made shortly after the event in question, as substantive evidence would virtually eliminate the opportunity for corrupt persons to silence the voices of potential witnesses through coercion, intimidation, or force. And, it would prevent the sands of time from drifting over the eyes and memory of a witness, converting a once clear scene into an amorphous blur at trial. The prior statements of identification would be admitted into evidence, as they were in this instance, by the testimony of reliable persons more impervious to the persuasions of those who seek to violate the sanctity of the judicial truth finding process by hindering a witness from giving honest and complete testimony. Second, critics of the modern rule express the important concern that defendants may be convicted upon the unsworn testimony of a witness. It is conceded that the modern rule permits the admission of prior inconsistent statements uttered while the declarant is not under oath. However, we are unconvinced that this is necessarily a flaw fatal to the admission of the testimony in the case at bar. The eyewitness who takes the witness stand is obligated to tell the truth under penalty of perjury. The eyewitness may or may not be able to make an in-court identification. But, if the evidence of the eyewitness's prior identification is introduced via the eyewitness's own testimony or through another witness's testimony, the eyewitness remains legally bound to testify to the veracity and accuracy of the prior identification if requested to do so upon direct or cross-examination. The same safeguard is extant when another witness testifies to the content of the eyewitness's prior identification. Just as the eyewitness is compelled to tell the truth, the other witness must truthfully narrate the substance of the prior identification. If the accounts of the two witnesses vary, the factfinder may accept or dismiss any portion of either witness's testimony. Third, inextricably intertwined with the aforementioned hearsay concerns is Appellant's allegation that the admission of the police detective's testimony violates the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. The nation's highest court has recognized that there exists a partial overlap between the requirements of the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, i.e. the right of an accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, ___, 108 S.Ct. 838, 843, 98 L.Ed.2d 951, 956 (1988); see U.S. Const. amend. VI. In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated: The [Confrontation] Clause envisions `a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.' Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-64, 100 S.Ct. at 2537-2538, citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-243, 15 S.Ct. 337, 339, 39 L.Ed. 409, 411 (1895). [8] We believe that a defendant has ample opportunity to challenge the accuracy and the credibility of a prior identification when the hearsay declarant is present at trial and subject to unrestricted cross-examination. Owens, 108 S.Ct. at 843; [9] see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970); Brady, 510 Pa. at 131, 507 A.2d at 70. Here, the five eyewitnesses were present in court and were available for cross-examination. The Confrontation Clause guarantees only `an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.' Owens, 108 S.Ct. at 842, citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2664, 96 L.Ed.2d 631, 643 (1987), quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 294, 88 L.Ed.2d 15, 19 (1985) (per curiam). Four of the five eyewitnesses testified that they had viewed photographic arrays. One of the witnesses was not examined on this point. Two of the eyewitnesses testified that they had identified persons from the photographic array. The other two eyewitnesses stated that they were uncertain of their prior identifications. The opportunity was available for Appellants' counsel to use the tool of cross-examination to unearth the very foundations of the eyewitnesses' prior identifications and, later, the immediate ability of the police detective to accurately recall the prior identifications made by the victims. Counsel for Appellants chose not to cross-examine the eyewitnesses regarding their prior identification testimony. We shall not deem erroneous the trial court's decision to admit the testimonial evidence merely because Appellants' counsel failed to conduct a successful cross-examination. Further, we mention that the police detective testified after the five victims failed to make an in-court identification. Appellants had the opportunity to cross-examine the police detective regarding his recollections of the prior identifications made by the victims. Consequently, the jury was able to assess the credibility and solidity of the prior identifications and attribute whatever weight it desired to the sum of the evidence placed before it. Moreover, once the police detective concluded his testimony, Appellants could have sought to recall some or all of the five eyewitnesses, including the eyewitness who had not previously been asked whether she viewed a photographic array, to impeach the credibility of the police detective. Each eyewitness could have been called upon to adopt, explain, or disavow the testimony of the police detective. Then, the trier of fact would have been able to assess the totality of the evidence in rendering its verdict. [10] We must conclude there is no constitutional barrier to prohibit the admission of the prior identification in the present case. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Owens, stated: We do not think such an inquiry [into the indicia of reliability of the victim's testimony] is called for when a hearsay declarant is present at trial and subject to unrestricted cross-examination. In that situation, as the Court recognized in Green [ California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)], the traditional protections of the oath, cross-examination, and opportunity for the jury to observe the witness's demeanor satisfy the constitutional requirements. Owens, 108 S.Ct. at 843. We now turn to a consideration of the reliability of the identification testimony. Reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony, and even if the identification procedure itself was suggestive, so long as the challenged identification itself is reliable, it is admissible. State v. Blackwell, 16 Ohio.App.3d 100, 103-104, 474 N.E.2d 671, 675 (1984), citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977); see Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 327 Pa.Super. 305, 475 A.2d 810 (1984);. It is well established that the display of a photographic array to a potential witness is a permissible method for attaining the pretrial identification of a suspect. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 108 S.Ct. 838, 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988); Commonwealth v. Harris, 479 Pa. 131, 387 A.2d 869 (1978). In Simmons, the Supreme Court stated the following with respect to determining the admissibility of pre-trial photographic identifications: Despite the hazards of initial identification by photograph, this procedure has been used widely and effectively in criminal law enforcement, from the standpoint both of apprehending offenders and of sparing innocent suspects the ignominy of arrest by allowing eyewitnesses to exonerate them through scrutiny of photographs. The danger that use of the technique may result in convictions based on missidentification may be substantially lessened by a course of cross-examination at trial which exposes to the jury the method's potential for error. We are unwilling to prohibit its employment, either in the exercise of our supervisory power or, still less, as a matter of constitutional requirement. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384, 88 S.Ct. at 971. Further, the Supreme Court has declined to adopt the principle that because of the mere possibility of suggestive identification procedures, out-of-court statements of identification are inherently less reliable than other out-of-court statements. Owens, 108 S.Ct. at 843. In the case sub judice, Tren and Doa have not asserted that the underlying source for the prior identification, the photographic array, was suggestive. We shall not review, sua sponte, the propriety of the trial court's decision not to suppress the prior identifications made by the victims. There is no evidence in the record, nor allegation in the Appellants' briefs, that the prior identifications were not rendered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently or, were based upon a suggestive photographic array. If there had been evidence that the prior identifications were not given voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently or that the procedure was tainted, the veracity and the utility of the prior identifications would be seriously undermined. Lastly, we shall not affirm the convictions based solely upon the extra-judicial identification. See Gould, 54 Cal.2d at 630-631, 7 Cal.Rptr. at 278, 354 P.2d at 870. There is a plethora of other evidence linking the Appellants to the crime. Appellants were arrested in Boston. An inventory search made at the time of arrest uncovered numerous items, including their automobile, which were stolen from the Huynh family. At trial, Boston detectives identified Appellants as two of the persons arrested. Additionally, co-defendant Su Le did not identify the Appellants in court, but he did state that two of the robbers were from Virginia. Appellants are from Virginia.