Opinion ID: 2547520
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: assault under extreme emotional disturbance instruction

Text: We next consider Driver's claim that the trial court erred by denying his request for an instruction on assault under extreme emotional disturbance (EED). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, stating, Driver failed to present any evidence of the state of his emotions at the time of the assault. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Driver's request for the instruction, albeit upon different reasoning than the Court of Appeals. Driver contends that he was entitled to the instruction on EED because the evidence introduced by the Commonwealth was that Mr. Driver learned of Ms. Driver's affair and that a fight began following this revelation, and that, by inference from the evidence presented at trial, Mr. Driver lost his temper and reacted based on raw, negative emotion. KRS 508.040(2)(a) states that [a]n assault committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance is... [a] Class D felony when it would constitute an assault in the first degree or an assault in the second degree if not committed under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance. We summarized the definition and elements of EED in Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76, 81-82 (Ky.2006) as follows: Although EED is essentially a restructuring of the old common law concept of heat of passion,[ [11] ] the evidence needed to prove EED is different. There must be evidence that the defendant suffered a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one's judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from [an] impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes. McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Ky. 1986). [T]he event which triggers the explosion of violence on the part of the criminal defendant must be sudden and uninterrupted. It is not a mental disease or illness.... Thus, it is wholly insufficient for the accused defendant to claim the defense of extreme emotional disturbance based on a gradual victimization from his or her environment, unless the additional proof of a triggering event is sufficiently shown. Foster v. Commonwealth, 827 S.W.2d 670, 678 (Ky.1991) (citations omitted). And the extreme emotional disturbance ... [must have a] reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. [ Spears v. Commonwealth, 30 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Ky. 2000)]. Further, an EED instruction must be supported by some definite, non-speculative evidence. Padgett v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Ky.2010). The defendant must be both extremely emotionally disturbed and acting under that emotional influence; and there must be an identifiable triggering event which resulted in the emotional disturbance. Spears v. Commonwealth, 30 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Ky.2000). An instruction on a lesser included offense is required only if, considering the totality of the evidence, the jury might have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt of the greater offense and, yet, believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the lesser offense. Wombles v. Commonwealth, 831 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Ky.1992). The trial court has no duty to instruct on theories of the case that are unsupported by the evidence. Payne v. Commonwealth, 656 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Ky.1983). Our examination of the trial, testimony discloses that there is no evidence to indicate Driver first learned of Vera's affair immediately preceding the altercation, or even on the same day as the assault. Vera's testimony was only that they were fighting about her affair, not that she first told him about the affair that night. Accordingly, Driver's assertion to the contrary is not supported by any testimony presented at trial. Rather, this central premise to Driver's argument is pure speculation. Because the answer to this question is absent from the record, it cannot be reasonably argued that the event which trigger[ed] the explosion of violence ... [was] sudden and uninterrupted, a precondition to obtaining the EED instruction. Similarly, as noted, the reasonableness of the emotional disturbance is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Because the record does not disclose the situation and circumstances relating to the disclosure of the affairwhenever and under whatever circumstances that may have beenthere is no means of assessing whether those circumstances could have reasonably and objectively provoked the outrage necessary to obtain an EED instruction, and whether the outrage could reasonably have still persisted, uninterrupted, until the night of the assault. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly declined the request to instruct the jury upon EED. Upon retrial, if the evidence presented is the same, no EED instruction should be submitted to the jury. If, however, sufficient evidence is presented to support an EED instruction pursuant to the authorities cited above, the instruction should, of course, be given.