Opinion ID: 1166357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the decision of the district court

Text: The following are among the factors that the district court considered critical in reaching its decision: (1) When the magistrate declined to allow the prosecutor to reopen his case for presentation of additional evidence at the preliminary hearing, it was not apparent what kind of evidence he hoped to produce; (2) The magistrate had not compromised the prosecution's rights at the preliminary hearing; (3) The dismissal and the refiling of the charge were not provided for in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and therefore the refiling was in violation of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; and, (4) The dismissal and refiling of the charges violated Stockwell's due process rights and if allowed to stand would set dangerous precedent that would allow prosecutors to circumvent adverse rulings of a magistrate at the preliminary hearing. We disagree with those assessments in this case. As we have already shown in the portion of the transcript quoted at p. 119 supra, the prosecutor had indicated that the subject matter of the additional evidence he wished to introduce at the preliminary hearing concerned Stockwell's physical impairment due to intoxication, which was certainly relevant to the impairment of his mental faculties, and the magistrate erred in failing to allow the prosecutor to reopen the proceeding.
The statutes specifically contemplate that a second criminal complaint may be filed in a felony case following dismissal of the first criminal action. I.C. § 19-1717 provides: 19-1717. What is not a former acquittal.  If the defendant was formerly acquitted on the ground of variance between the indictment and the proof, or the indictment was dismissed upon an objection to its form or substance, or in order to hold the defendant for a higher offense, without a judgment of acquittal, it is not an acquittal of the same offense. (Emphasis added). This provision is also applicable to criminal proceedings brought by information rather than indictment. See I.C. § 19-1303. I.C. § 19-3506 provides the following: 19-3506. Effect of dismissal as bar.  An order for the dismissal of the action, as provided in this chapter, is a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense, if it is a misdemeanor; but it is not a bar if the offense is a felony.  (Emphasis added). Thus, I.C. § 19-1717 specifically contemplates a dismissal of a proceeding against a defendant in order to bring higher charges against him and I.C. § 19-3506 specifically provides that the first dismissal is not a bar to second prosecution if the offense involved is a felony. Thus, none of Stockwell's rights under the statutes of Idaho were violated by the second filing. Neither do the Idaho Rules of Criminal Practice and Procedure necessarily prevent the refiling. I.C.R. 48(a) provides that the prosecuting attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of a complaint. I.C.R. 48(b), like I.C. § 19-3506, provides that a dismissal which will serve the interests of justice is not a bar to a second prosecution if the offense is a felony. Thus, the dismissal and refiling are not prohibited either by the statutes or the criminal rules of this state. The motion for dismissal filed by the prosecuting attorney specifically stated that the motion for dismissal was without prejudice and in the interests of justice, and the district court's order stated, It is so ordered. In his order in the habeas corpus proceeding the district court again affirmed that first order of dismissal. [6] Under these circumstances the right of the prosecutor to refile was clearly protected. The dissenting opinion of Justice Bistline relies strongly upon the language of I.C. § 19-3504 which requires that when the court dismisses the action upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, the reasons of the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes. Admittedly, the motion of the prosecuting attorney set out no grounds other than in the interests of justice, and the record contains no minute entry setting out the court's reasons for the dismissal as required by I.C. § 19-3504. While the district court may have erred, as the dissent argues, in failing to set out the reasons for dismissal in the minutes, it does not follow that the order is thus void. The cases of People v. Orin, 13 Cal.3d 937, 120 Cal. Rptr. 65, 533 P.2d 193 (1975), and Salt Lake City v. Hanson, 19 Utah 2d 32, 425 P.2d 773 (1967), relied upon by the dissent, certainly do not so hold. In the Salt Lake City case the city brought a proceeding comparable to a common law writ of certiorari, to appeal the dismissal of seven complaints which charged violations of a Salt Lake City ordinance. The judge had dismissed the complaints because they were signed by a police officer other than the arresting officer, and then only by a facsimile signature. The city argued that not only was the dismissal erroneous, but that the trial court had failed to set out his reasons in the court minutes. The Utah Supreme Court held first that the particular officer's facsimile signatures on the complaints were in compliance with Utah law, even though he was not the arresting officer. Additionally, the court held that the trial judge should have set out the reasons for the dismissal in the minutes. The court then reversed the decision of the trial court on both grounds, thus reinstating (not terminating, as in this case) the criminal proceedings. In the other case relied upon in the dissent, People v. Orin, supra , the trial court had, over the objection of the prosecuting attorney, dismissed the first two counts of the information when the defendant pleaded guilty to a third count. The trial court set out no reasons in the minutes as required by the California statute which is substantially the same as our I.C. § 19-3504. The record showed that the trial court was making a plea bargain for the prosecutor, over his objection. The case was on direct appeal by the state from the order of dismissal. The court did say what the dissenting opinion quotes, post at 140-141, but it also said the following: While it is probably true that dismissals under section 1385 are frequently ordered on mere statements of `grounds' (i.e., `in furtherance of justice') without any statement of reasons, this situation appears in a different light when the People oppose the dismissal and raise the issue on appeal. As the court said in People v. Curtiss (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 123, 127, 84 Cal. Rptr. 106, 109: `We recognize that throughout the state dismissals occur every day wherein the minutes do not set forth the reasons. A defendant, for example, is charged with four counts of burglary, pleads guilty to one count, the district attorney moves to dismiss the remaining three counts and the judge grants the motion without specifying the reasons in the minutes. In such a case, however, it is the prosecutor's own case which he is moving to dismiss and in so doing he is acting upon his own responsibility. Despite the defective procedure, no harm is done because the prosecutor obviously would not appeal from the order of dismissal.' 533 P.2d at 198, n. 10. Dismissals under section 1385 may be proper before, during and after trial. ( People v. Superior Court (Howard), supra, 69 Cal.2d 491, 503, 72 Cal. Rptr. 330, 446 P.2d 138.) Before trial, such dismissals have been upheld where designed to enable the prosecution ` to obtain further witnesses, to add additional defendants, to plead new facts, or to plead new offenses... .' ( People v. Silva (1965) 236 Cal. App.2d 453, 457, 46 Cal. Rptr. 87, 90; see also, Arnold v. Williams (1963) 222 Cal. App.2d 193, 196, 35 Cal. Rptr. 35.) 533 P.2d at 199. We do not say that the People's approval is in every instance indispensable to a dismissal under section 1385 (see, e.g., People v. Superiod [Superior] Court (Howard), supra, 69 Cal.2d 491, 502, 72 Cal. Rptr. 330, 446 P.2d 138) for to so hold would curtail or perhaps abrogate the sentencing discretion resident in the court, but such discretion must be reasonably exercised and where the court's action lacks reason it may be invalidated upon timely challenge.  533 P.2d at 201. In this case the defendant Stockwell did not seek to challenge and reverse the action of the district court in dismissing the first proceeding because of a failure of the court to set out the reasons for the dismissal in the minutes, and thus to seek reinstatement of the dismissed action as the courts did in Salt Lake City v. Hanson, supra , and People v. Orin, supra . Rather, Stockwell, in his habeas corpus proceeding, also filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice in which he not only affirmed the order of dismissal in the first proceeding, but also sought to amend the order of dismissal to make it with prejudice. Neither People v. Orin, supra , nor Salt Lake City v. Hanson, supra , are authority for permitting the defendant Stockwell to argue that the district court erred in failing to set out the reasons for the dismissal in the minutes and at the same time assert that the dismissal should not be set aside as the prosecutor had requested, but should be with prejudice. Had the defendant Stockwell argued that the failure to set out the reasons for dismissal in the minutes was grounds for setting aside the dismissal of the first action and reinstating that action, then the Salt Lake City case would have supported that argument. However, neither that case, nor People v. Orin, supra , support his contention that he should now be released from all charges. The district court erred when it granted the writ releasing the defendant.
The next issue is whether the dismissal and refiling violated the defendant's rights under the due process clauses of the state or federal Constitutions. The filing of a second criminal action following dismissal of the first criminal action after preliminary proceedings is not a per se violation of the due process clause of the federal Constitution. United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 981, 94 S.Ct. 1573, 39 L.Ed.2d 878 (1974). See DeMarrias v. United States, 487 F.2d 19 (8th Cir.1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 980, 94 S.Ct. 1570, 39 L.Ed.2d 877 (1974); Pearce v. Cox, 354 F.2d 884 (10th Cir.1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 976, 977, 86 S.Ct. 1869, 1871, 16 L.Ed.2d 685 (1966). Neither have our sister states interpreted the due process or double jeopardy clauses of their own constitutions to make this practice a per se violation of the defendant's rights. E.g., the following cases have allowed the state to file a second complaint accusing a person of a crime after the original complaint was dismissed, Skinner v. Superior Court, In and For Pima County, 475 P.2d 271 (Ariz. 1970); Wilson v. Garrett, 106 Ariz. 287, 448 P.2d 857 (1969) (refiling before a different magistrate prohibited by statute, but refiling before same magistrate allowed); In re Russell, 12 Cal.3d 229, 115 Cal. Rptr. 511, 524 P.2d 1295 (1974) ( dicta citing with approval holding in People v. Uhlemann, 9 Cal.3d 662, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657, 511 P.2d 609 (1973), that state may prosecute under an indictment after a complaint against the defendant has been dismissed); State v. Holloway, 219 Kan. 245, 547 P.2d 741 (1976); Walters v. Williams, 474 P.2d 661 (Okla.Cr. 1970); Nicodemus v. District Court of Oklahoma County, 473 P.2d 312 (Okla.Cr. 1970); State v. Weiss, 73 Wash.2d 372, 438 P.2d 610 (1968); Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217 (Wyo. 1976); see also cases collected in footnote 3 of Richmond v. State, supra, 554 P.2d at 1222; while the following cases have allowed the state to prosecute under an indictment returned following the dismissal of a complaint, State v. Gonzales, 111 Ariz. 38, 523 P.2d 66 (1974); State v. Elling, 19 Ariz. App. 317, 506 P.2d 1102 (1973); People v. Uhlemann, supra ; State v. Peavler, 88 N.M. 125, 537 P.2d 1387 (1975); Simpson v. Sheriff, Clark County, 86 Nev. 803, 476 P.2d 957 (1970). Like the federal government and our sister states, we do not construe the due process clause of the Idaho Constitution to create a per se prohibition against the refiling of criminal charges after the charges have first been dismissed with approval of the court and without prejudice. Cf. State v. Urie, 92 Idaho 71, 437 P.2d 24 (1968); State v. McKeehan, 49 Idaho 531, 289 P. 993 (1930). That is not to say, however, that dismissal and refiling of criminal complaints by the prosecutor done for the purpose of harassment or delay or forum-shopping cannot be a violation of the due process clause. We quote approvingly the following passage from Nicodemus v. District Court of Oklahoma County, supra : While the present statutes do not make dismissal of a prosecution  at the preliminary examination stage  a bar to further prosecution for the same offense, this Court views critically the practice of `shopping' among magistrates or the repeated refiling of a charge until a favorable ruling is obtained. Without the production of additional evidence, or the existence of other good cause to justify a subsequent preliminary examination, such a practice can become a form of harassment which may violate the principle of fundamental due process and equal protection of the law, as announced by the United States Supreme Court. This is not to say that when new evidence becomes available or when the prosecutor believes  in good faith  that the magistrate committed error, the charge should not be refiled ; but absent such circumstance, the continued refiling  numerous times  of a charge which has been dismissed by a magistrate is not to be desired. The facts of the instant case do not approach such an offensive degree to be violative of fundamental fairness. Accordingly, this Court holds that petitioner is not entitled to a writ of prohibition, for as stated before, under existing statutes, dismissal of a prosecution at a preliminary examination is not a statutory bar to further prosecution for the same offense regardless of the `judicial title' of the official sitting as examining magistrate. 473 P.2d at 316. (Emphasis added). In this case the prosecutor had cause to bring a second criminal complaint against Stockwell based upon his good faith belief that the magistrate erred in the preliminary hearing, both as to the evaluation of the evidence admitted and the magistrate's failure to allow the prosecuting attorney to present more evidence. A review of the record clearly discloses that the prosecuting attorney was not judge shopping. [7] Because the prosecutor had a good reason for filing the second criminal complaint, the district court erred in granting the petitioner relief on his habeas corpus petition. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court. We emphasize that our holding is a narrow one based upon the following circumstances of this case: (1) that the magistrate erred by preventing the state from reopening and introducing additional relevant evidence at the preliminary hearing; (2) that the record in this case does not suggest that the dismissal and refiling of the charge was done for harassment or delay or because the prosecutor had made no effort to present available evidence at the first preliminary hearing; and (3) the prosecutor followed steps in refiling the charge which were not prohibited by the statutes or criminal rules in felony cases. The second criminal complaint, which apparently is still pending, [8] is freed from the constraints of the district court's habeas corpus order. The bond which was in effect on November 20, 1975, the date of the habeas corpus order, is reinstated, subject to further order of the court below. [9] The order of the district court granting the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to quash the writ. McFADDEN, C.J., concurs. DONALDSON, J., concurs in result.