Opinion ID: 2344127
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Defendant Collins Selective Prosecution Based on Race

Text: The defendant Collins argues that Officer Costa's reliance upon Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 13 as authority to stop the vehicle was pretextual and that the traffic stop was motivated by race and discriminatory intent and therefore violated his right to due process. In reviewing claims of selective prosecution, we follow the holding in Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985). See State v. Ricci, 704 A.2d 210, 211 (R.I.1997) (adopting Wayte for review of claims of selective prosecution). To prevail on an allegation of selective prosecution, the defendant must prove two elements: (1) that the challenged enforcement has both a discriminatory effect and (2) that the prosecution was `deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or some other arbitrary classification.' Ricci, 704 A.2d at 211 (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608, 105 S.Ct. 1524). The defendant's allegation of selective prosecution is without merit. There simply is no evidence tending to support the bald assertion that this stop was racially motivated. Collins argues that merely because Officer Costa noticed that some of the Jeep's occupants were brown or black, his decision to stop the vehicle was motivated by race. As the trial justice noted, Officer Costa's behavior at the scene belies any indication that the stop was racially motivated: the occupants were not immediately ordered out of the Jeep, and they were not handcuffed until the body parts were discovered inside the bloody bag. There is no suggestion of racial animus or bias with respect to the stop or the search. Because Collins has not offered any proof about either element, his allegation of selective prosecution must fail.