Opinion ID: 2657910
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Maples Claim

Text: Wilkins first argues he has cause to excuse his procedural bar under Maples v. Thomas because his state habeas counsel, Jack Strickland (“Strickland”), abandoned him during state habeas proceedings. A federal habeas petitioner is ordinarily bound by his attorney’s negligence because the attorney and the client have an agency relationship under which the principal is bound by the actions of the agent. 22 However, an 17 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 18 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013). 19 Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127 (2011) (first alteration in original) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729–30). 20 Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1316 (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750). 21 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.071 § 5(a); see also Balentine v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 842, 857 (5th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that Section 5 is an independent and adequate state law ground for rejecting a claim). 22 See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (“Attorney ignorance or inadvertence is not ‘cause’ because the attorney is the petitioner’s agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner must ‘bear the risk of attorney error.’” (citation omitted)). 6 Case: 13-70014 Document: 00512572256 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/25/2014 No. 13-70014 attorney who “abandons his client without notice . . . sever[s] the principalagent relationship” and “no longer acts, or fails to act, as the client’s representative.” 23 In Maples, the Supreme Court held that this sort of complete attorney abandonment can constitute the kind of “extraordinary circumstances” necessary to supply cause for a procedural default. 24 In Maples, the petitioner’s pro bono counsel, two attorneys in a large New York law firm, left the firm months before the state procedural default occurred, and, unbeknownst to the petitioner, no other lawyer was serving as the petitioner’s agent in any meaningful sense of the word. 25 Consequently, the petitioner was “left without any functioning attorney of record.” 26 The petitioner failed to timely appeal the denial of his state post-conviction petition in state court because he was not notified of the denial until the time to appeal had lapsed. 27 The instant case and Maples are distinguishable. Wilkins asserts he was abandoned by Strickland because Strickland worked under multiple conflicts of interest arising out of professional relationships with counsel at trial and direct appeal, as well as the court. As a result of these conflicts, Wilkins argues Strickland refused to investigate and raise any IATC claims, and failed to hire a psychologist or mitigation specialist, contrary to Wilkins’s desires. 28 We have previously noted that counsel’s failure to raise all issues a petitioner would like 23 Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 922–23 (citation omitted). 24 Id. at 924. 25 See id. at 924–27. 26 Id. at 927. 27 Id. at 920. 28 Wilkins brought this claim before the district court, which quickly rejected his argument in a footnote, stating that “Maples simply would not apply to this case even if petitioner’s state habeas counsel had not performed properly.” 7 Case: 13-70014 Document: 00512572256 Page: 8 Date Filed: 03/25/2014 No. 13-70014 to argue does not amount to abandonment. 29 Moreover, the record indicates that, unlike counsel in Maples, Strickland never missed a filing deadline and filed a lengthy petition which raised eighteen points of error on Wilkins’s behalf. The record reflects that Strickland actively represented petitioner and, unlike counsel in Maples, did not abandon his client. Maples has no application in this case.