Opinion ID: 1878473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the trial court properly apply the albright factors to the evidence presented at trial?

Text: ¶ 18. This Court has stated that child custody matters are within the chancellor's discretion, and this Court will not reverse absent a finding that the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard. M.C.M.J. v. C.E.J., 715 So.2d 774, 776 (Miss.1998); Delozier v. Delozier, 724 So.2d 984, 986 (Miss.Ct.App.1998). Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003 (Miss. 1983) clearly states that the primary consideration in all child custody cases is the best interest and welfare of the child. Id. at 1005. Albright sets forth a number of factors which should be considered by a chancellor in a child custody case: We reaffirm the rule that the polestar consideration in child custody cases is the best interest and welfare of the child. The age of the child is subordinated to that rule and is but one factor to be considered. Age should carry no greater weight than other factors to be considered, such as: health, and sex of the child; a determination of the parent that has had the continuity of care prior to the separation; which has the best parenting skills and which has the willingness and capacity to provide primary child care; the employment of the parent and responsibilities of employment; physical and mental health and age of parents; emotional ties of parent and child; moral fitness of parents; the home, school and community record of the child; the preference of the child at the age sufficient to express a preference by law; stability of home environment and employment of each parent, and other factors relevant to the parent-child relationship. Id. ¶ 19. Adam claims that the Chancellor erred in the application of the following factors: A) age, B) health of parties, C) future religious example, D) home environment, and E) willingness and ability to provide primary care. Dawn contends that the Chancellor properly considered the Albright factors before rendering her decision.
¶ 20. Adam asserts that the Chancellor erred in concluding that the age of Darby must be considered in favor of Dawn. Adam refers to a statement in the Chancellor's Memorandum Opinion and Judgment where she wrote: [e]ven though the tender years doctrine has been weakened, Darby's being less than two years old must be a factor which strongly favors the mother having custody. Adam claims that the Chancellor is mistaken and refers to Smith v. Smith, 614 So.2d 394, 397 (Miss.1993), where custody of a two-year-old boy was awarded to the father. Adam asserts that the tender years doctrine, even at its prime, only applied until [the child] reaches that age and maturity where it can be equally cared for by other persons. Albright, 437 So.2d at 1004 (citing Johns v. Johns, 57 Miss. 530 (1879)). ¶ 21. Adam argues that the tender years doctrine is inapplicable in the present matter because Dawn voluntarily relinquished custody of Darby and that this act should prohibit any assumption of special maternal feelings. Adam also feels that it has already been proven that he is capable of caring for Darby as shown by the fact that he had paramount physical custody of Darby while she was under two years of age for the ten months preceding the chancery court hearing. ¶ 22. Dawn responds by claiming that there are pertinent differences between the Smith case, as relied upon by Adam, and the matter at hand. Smith dealt with a mother who used the presence of her unborn child as a bargaining chip to coerce her husband into meeting her demands or risk an abortion. Smith, 614 So.2d at 395. At the time the trial court granted the father custody, the child in question was twenty-seven months old. Id. Dawn also believes that the fact that the Smith case involved a male child further distinguishes it from the present case. ¶ 23. Dawn also counters Adam's assertion that Dawn voluntarily relinquished custody for the purpose of re-enlisting in the military by maintaining that she was pressured by Adam into giving custody to him instead of to her sister, her first preference. Dawn asserts that the trial court recognized the strain that Dawn was under when she made her decision to re-enlist and had to transfer custody to someone else. The Chancellor stated: The Court is clearly convinced that the intention of the agreement and order was that the custody was only of a temporary nature, only until Dawn obtained permanent party status in the military. Dawn counters Adam's declaration that he had custody for the ten months preceding by reminding the Court that the trial court found that Dawn was the primary care giver during Darby's first year. ¶ 24. The maternal preference in this case may not be warranted in light of the fact that the father had primary care-giver status for the ten months prior to the custody hearing. One can question whether the tender years doctrine has any validity despite the maternal preference rule as referenced in Albright, especially in a case such as this one where the child is likely to have a stronger bond with the male parent who has most recently been the primary care giver. Albright, 437 So.2d at 1004. What is clear is that this Court in Albright felt that abandoning of the tender years doctrine altogether would discard a factor worthy of weight in determining the best interest of a child in a particular case. Id. at 1005. ¶ 25. Regardless of how the Chancellor viewed the tender years doctrine in making her decision, it is but one factor out of many to be considered in a child custody case. Given the findings below, it cannot be said that the Chancellor's decision is manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or the result of the application of an erroneous legal standard.