Opinion ID: 182452
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Order Striking Third Amended Complaint

Text: Initially, we reject Mr. Matthews’s contention that the district court abused its discretion by striking his third amended complaint. See Hertz v. Luzenac Grp., 576 F.3d 1103, 1117 (10th Cir. 2009) (reviewing denial of leave to amend -4- complaint for abuse of discretion). He had been permitted to file his second amended complaint as a matter of course because he filed it within 21 days of LaBarge’s first motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). But his third amended complaint could be filed “only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Although leave should be freely given when justice so requires, Mr. Matthews made no attempt to procure either LaBarge’s consent or the court’s permission before filing it. Mr. Matthews argues that he was unaware of these conditions and must be allowed to respond to LaBarge’s objection; but LaBarge highlighted the requirements of Rule 15(a)(2) in its motion to strike the third amended complaint, and Mr. Matthews’s response did not explain his failure to satisfy those requirements. He merely stated that he had submitted the third amended complaint to add “names, dates and events” because LaBarge’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint had objected to the lack of supporting facts. R., Vol. 1 at 98. He said that the new complaint “did not modify the Claims nor did it revise the existing facts.” Id. Moreover, a comparison of the second and third amended complaints indicates that the additions in the third amended complaint are almost all irrelevant to the grounds on which the district court dismissed the second amended complaint. Under these -5- circumstances, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in striking the unauthorized pleading. 2