Opinion ID: 764678
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Blackburn's CEPA Claim

Text: A. Prima Facie Case 87 In this case, the District Court found that Blackburn had failed to make out a prima facie case because he had not shown that he had engaged in protected whistleblowing activity. Given New Jersey case law and the intent of the legislature in enacting CEPA, we have some doubt as to the correctness of the District Court's conclusion on this point. 4 88 However, rather than engage in a lengthy exegesis on the matter, we will assume that Blackburn presented sufficient evidence to meet his prima facie burden at the summary judgment stage, and will dispose of this appeal on the alternative ground that he has presented insufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment. B. UPS's Stated Reason for the Discharge 89 UPS's stated reason for firing Blackburn was his violation of the company's anti-nepotism, favoritism, integrity, and accountability policies, which it placed in the record. UPS adduced evidence that Blackburn failed to divulge that Shepard was his relative, and that he recommended her for positions within UPS without disclosing to the relevant decisionmakers that she was his sister-in-law. UPS also offered evidence that it has consistently enforced its antinepotism policy, which supports its proffer that Blackburn's violation of this policy was the actual reason he was discharged. 5 Indeed, Blackburn himself conceded at his deposition that UPS has regularly enforced the antinepotism policy (although, as we detail below, he offers purported examples of the policy's nonenforcement). Therefore, UPS has met its burden of production at the second step of the burden-shifting analysis. See Woodson, 109 F.3d at 920 n. 2 (The defendant's burden at this stage is relatively light: it is satisfied if the defendant articulates any legitimate reason for the discharge....). It is thus incumbent upon Blackburn to offer sufficient admissible evidence that this justification is pretextual and that the real reason that he was fired was for complaining about UPS's possible antitrust violations to survive UPS's motion for summary judgment. In other words, he must show  'weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons.'  Kolb, 727 A.2d at 531 (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir.1994)). C. Pretext 1. Blackburn's Evidence 90 In order to meet his burden, Blackburn must point to admissible evidence in the record showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). In attempting to show that UPS's stated reason for firing him was pretextual, Blackburn claims that he never hid his relationship with Shepard. Rather, he testified that he regularly commuted to and from work with her, entered the building with her each day, often met her for lunch and breaks, displayed a wedding picture prominently on his desk with Shepard in the wedding party, and was otherwise open about the relationship, including the fact that they shared an address. Similarly, Shepard testified that she told colleagues about the relationship and even inquired about it at her initial interview, and nothing was done. Blackburn also testified that he assumed that the prohibition on the hiring of relatives included only blood relatives. 6 91 We find the foregoing less than persuasive evidence to support Blackburn's burden, even at summary judgment, of proving that UPS's stated reason was pretextual. The only portion of this evidence that is probative of pretext--i.e., that UPS knew of Blackburn's relationship to Shepard but did nothing about it, and later fired him for his whistleblowing activity under the pretext of its antinepotism policy--is Shepard's allegation that, when she applied for a job at UPS, she informed the initial interviewer that her brother-in-law worked for UPS. There is no indication that the decisionmakers who fired Blackburn for his violations of the anti-nepotism and related policies were informed of Shepard's comments at her interview. In fact, the record evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the relevant UPS managers were unaware of Blackburn's relationship with Shepard until the anonymous tip was received in September 1994, at which time immediate action was taken against both Shepard and Blackburn. Cf. Delli Santi v. CNA Ins. Cos., 88 F.3d 192, 201-02 (3d Cir.1996) (holding that jury could find that employer had retaliatory intent because relevant decisionmakers were aware of plaintiff's discrimination complaints). 92 Blackburn's stronger argument for pretext--and one that would be sufficient to preclude summary judgment, if supported by adequate admissible evidence--is that UPS did not consistently enforce its anti-nepotism policy, which, according to UPS, was the primary basis for his discharge. If Blackburn has presented admissible evidence that would raise a fact question whether UPS enforced its antinepotism policy, it would be for a jury to decide whether UPS's proffered reason for firing him was pretextual. Given our assumption that Blackburn has presented sufficient evidence to meet his prima facie burden under CEPA, we would have to reverse summary judgment in UPS's favor if a fact issue regarding pretext existed. 93 In support of his pretext argument, Blackburn provides numerous examples of UPS employees who were related to other employees yet allegedly were not disciplined or terminated for this apparent violation of the anti-nepotism policy. His examples include brothers-in-law, siblings, spouses, uncles and nephews, fathers and sons, and intimate relationships between employees who were dating or living together. UPS responds with evidence that, within the last five years, twenty-nine people at Mahwah left UPS in accordance with the anti-nepotism policy, and that no exceptions currently exist there. 94 In order to resolve this issue, we must first determine whether any of Blackburn's evidence in this regard is admissible, based as it is on hearsay and, in some instances, multiple hearsay. See Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 961 n. 1 (3d Cir.1996) (noting that a hearsay statement that is not capable of being admissible at trial should not be considered on a summary judgment motion). Then, we must determine whether the hearsay evidence that might be admissible at trial is sufficient to defeat UPS's summary judgment motion or whether judgment was properly entered in favor of UPS. See Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1234 n. 9 (3d Cir.1993). 95 Blackburn's testimony regarding UPS employees he believes to be related includes the following. We take the descriptions of these allegedly related persons from Blackburn's appellate briefs, see Appellant's Br. at 16-17; Suppl. Br. at 1-3, with citations to the place in the record in which the evidence is presented: 96 (1) Bill and Tim Jawor, a father and son (App. at 109); 97 (2) Jackie and Sal Biancardi, a married couple who work at the UPS facility in Morristown (id.); 98 (3) Larry Zileski and Mr. Manzi, brothers-in-law (id. at 95); 99 (4) Barry Graziano and Tim Krill, relation not identified (id. at 96); 100 (5) Steve Collamore and Eileen O'Connor, husband and wife (id. at 97); 101 (6) an uncle and nephew working together at a UPS facility in Parsippany (id. at 103-04); 102 (7) two brothers in New York (id.); 103 (8) Mark Hopkins and his wife, Beth (id. at 97); 104 (9) Bill and Art Weyrauch, brothers (id. at 96-97); 105 (10) Don McKenny and Vern Cormie, relation not identified (id. at 97); 106 (11) Joe Rossano, Jack Davies, and Joe Reynolds, relation not identified (id.); 107 (12) Lorrain Curley and Dan Grace, relation not identified (id.); 108 (13) Karen Montemarano and another driver in a Yorktown, New York, UPS facility (id.); 109 (14) Kathleen Jewell and someone else, relation not identified (id. at 101); and 110 (15) Howard Kaufman and Mindy, in the Mt. Vernon facility (id. at 101-02). 111 Blackburn has no personal knowledge of any of the alleged relationships listed above. See Fed.R.Evid. 602. Rather, he testified in his deposition that he was told of these relationships by other persons. The alleged relationships are offered for their own truth. Therefore, Blackburn's information is based on hearsay, see Fed.R.Evid. 801(c), and in some cases on multiple hearsay, so that it must fall within an exception to the rule against hearsay to be admissible. See Fed.R.Evid. 802 (providing that hearsay is not admissible unless it falls under a particular exception); Fed.R.Evid. 805 (providing that multiple hearsay is admissible if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule). 112 When asked by us to comment on the admissibility of his pretext evidence, and in particular on the applicability of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(19), Blackburn responded that this evidence was admissible as admissions by a partyopponent, Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A), admissions by a partyopponent's agent, Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D), statements against interest, Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3), or reputation evidence concerning family history, Fed.R.Evid. 803(19). We consider the first, second, and fourth of these contentions below. We dismiss as without merit Blackburn's attempt to admit any of the evidence he has presented under the exception for statements against interest. Not only do we find the contention that the particular statements at issue were against interest to be baseless within the meaning of the Rule, 7 but there is no indication that the hearsay declarants are unavailable, as required by Rule 804. 113 2. Rule 801(d)(2)(A): Admissions by Party-Opponent 114 Under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), a statement offered against a party is not hearsay if it is the party's own statement. Blackburn claims that the first two relationships listed above fall within the terms of Rule 801(d)(2)(A), because these relationships were identified by defendant Patricia Knowles at her deposition. Admissions by a party-opponent need not be based on personal knowledge to be admitted under Rule 801(d)(2). See United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 254 (3d Cir.1983). Therefore, we need not be concerned here that the basis for Knowles's statement is likely hearsay--i.e., she was told by someone (or discerned from a written document) that Bill and Tim Jawor were father and son, and that Jackie and Sal Biancardi were married--which would ordinarily require an additional exception to make her statements admissible. See Fed.R.Evid. 805. 115 Although these statements are admissible as admissions by a party-opponent, 8 only one is arguably relevant to the pretext issue. Knowles testified that the Jawors worked at UPS in 1973, more than twenty years before Blackburn was fired and before UPS's current anti-nepotism policy was in force. We therefore find the testimony regarding the Jawors immaterial to the pretext issue. 9 On the other hand, Knowles testified that the Biancardis remain UPS employees, Jackie as an administrative assistant and Sal as a driver. This could therefore be probative evidence in support of Blackburn's pretext argument. However, the anti-nepotism policy prohibits only the hiring of related persons, and the continued employment of persons who marry while working for UPS when one of them is a management employee. The Biancardis reportedly were married after both had begun working for UPS, and neither holds a management position, so their continued employment does not appear to come within the prohibitions of the anti-nepotism policy. 116 3. Rule 801(d)(2)(D): Admissions by Party-Opponent's Agent 117 Blackburn argues that testimony regarding the relationships of Larry Zileski and Mr. Manzi; Barry Graziano and Tim Krill; Steve Collamore and Eileen O'Connor; the unnamed uncle and nephew working together at the UPS facility in Parsippany; and the unnamed brothers in New York, are all admissible as admissions by UPS's employees, under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Blackburn reads the Rule much too broadly, however, and fails to establish that most of these statements were made by UPS's agents or employees concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). We discuss each alleged relationship in turn. 118 First, Blackburn testified that a UPS employee, John Cipriani, informed him that UPS employees Larry Zileski and a Mr. Manzi were brothers-in-law. Cipriani's position is not identified, however, and there is no indication that the statement was made concerning a matter within the scope of Cipriani's agency or employment with UPS. 10 Blackburn testified that Zileski himself told Blackburn that Manzi was his brother-in-law. This statement too is inadmissible hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Although Zileski may be able to so testify on the basis of Rule 803(19), see infra, there is again no indication that he was speaking for UPS on a matter within the scope of his agency or employment so that Blackburn could testify as to what Zileski told him. 11 119 Blackburn testified that UPS Operations Manager Michael Lattari informed him that Graziano and Krill were somehow related. While Lattari may have been speaking about a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, Blackburn has offered no evidence of the actual relationship between Graziano and Krill, whether it was one that was covered by the UPS policy, and whether UPS addressed any violation of the policy by discharging one of the employees. Therefore, while this may be appropriate Rule 801(d)(2)(D) evidence, it would be immaterial to prove that UPS's stated reason for discharging Blackburn was pretextual. 120 Blackburn testified that Steve Collamore told him that Collamore's wife, Eileen O'Connor, also worked for UPS. However, Blackburn admitted that at some point after they got married, O'Connor left UPS, and there is no indication that they were both allowed to remain at UPS in violation of the anti-nepotism policy. Finally, while Linda Shepard testified that she was told of certain related employees by the person who interviewed her for a job at UPS, these employees are not even identified by name and no testimony was provided as to whether they were disciplined for violating UPS's anti-nepotism policy. We find this evidence plainly inadmissible to prove pretext, both because Blackburn has failed to establish that it is proper Rule 801(d)(2)(D) evidence and because, without more details regarding the alleged relationships and UPS's failure to act on them, they are clearly irrelevant to the pretext issue. 121 4. Rule 803(19): Reputation Concerning Personal or Family History 122 As all of Blackburn's evidence that we are considering here involves personal or family history, the hearsay exception in Rule 803(19) would appear to be a particularly appropriate basis for finding the evidence admissible. The Rule allows for the admission of otherwise excludable hearsay, regardless of the declarant's availability (or lack thereof), when it consists of: 123 Reputation among members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a person's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history. 124 Fed.R.Evid. 803(19). 125 a. Background Principles 126 The matters of personal and family history that are within the ambit of Rule 803(19) are often difficult to prove through personal knowledge. For example, if a witness has not been present at someone's wedding, or has not personally seen that person's valid marriage license and executed marriage certificate, see, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 37:1-2, 37:1-17 (1968 & Supp.1999), he or she presumably could only testify regarding the marriage on the basis of hearsay. However, [m]arriage is universally conceded to be a proper subject of proof by evidence of reputation in the community. Fed.R.Evid. 803(19) advisory committee's note. This is no doubt because a wellgrounded belief that two persons are married--by those who know them, have attended their family functions, and have regarded them as a married couple--is sufficiently reliable evidence to prove the fact of the marriage. Other matters of personal and family history also seem to be susceptible to being the subject of well founded repute. Id. That two community members are brothers or that a member of the community is another member's father are likely to be matters that have been discussed within the community and that have become well-established facts if no reason has been presented to doubt their truth. Therefore, reputations regarding relationships and other personal and family matters within a well-defined community are considered to have the circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness that justifies a hearsay exception. See 3 Stephen A. Saltzburg et al., Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 1699 (7th ed. 1998) ([G]eneral reputation about facts of interest to the community is probably trustworthy....). 127 In applying the Rule 803(19) exception to Blackburn's evidence of relatives working at UPS, we must answer at least two questions. First, does a person's place of work come within the Rule's coverage? And second, what foundation is required for testimony to be admitted under Rule 803(19)? In other words, is Blackburn's evidence sufficiently based on actual reputation, or is it based on some other, less reliable foundation such as rumor or speculation? 128 b. Relevant Community for Reputation 129 On the first question, we believe that Rule 803(19), in referring to reputation ... among a person's associates, or in the community, encompasses one's reputation at a place of work. The advisory committee certainly foresaw this application of the exception in Rule 803(19): The 'world' in which the reputation may exist ... has proved capable of expanding with changing times from the single uncomplicated neighborhood, in which all activities take place, to the multiple and unrelated worlds of work, religious affiliation, and social activity, in each of which a reputation may be generated. Fed.R.Evid. 803(19) advisory committee's note. In the context of reputation evidence of a person's character, courts have readily extended the concept of community to include the community in which one works, as well as where one lives. United States v. Oliver, 492 F.2d 943, 946 (8th Cir.1974). 12 130 Both before and since enactment of the Federal Rules, commentators have made the same point. See 5 Wigmore on Evidence § 1616, at 591 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1974) (The traditional requirement about 'neighborhood' reputation was appropriate to the conditions of the time; but it should not be taken as imposing arbitrary limitations not appropriate in other times.); 5 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 803.24 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1999) (Allowing such proof [under Rule 803(19) ] to come from 'associates' reflects the fact that nowadays a person's reputation may no longer exclusively be found in the place where the person lives, but frequently can only be ascertained from coparticipants in the varied activities that make up a modern person's world.). 131 c. Trustworthiness of Reputation Evidence Concerning Family History; Foundational Requirements 132 As for the basis of the reputation evidence regarding relationships within a workplace, we find little guidance in the sparse case law surrounding Rule 803(19). 13 We believe, however, that the principle behind admitting such evidence despite its hearsay origin--i.e., that general reputation about facts of interest to the community is probably trustworthy, Saltzburg et al., supra, at 1699--requires that a proponent of Rule 803(19) evidence establish that the reputation testimony arises from sufficient inquiry and discussion among persons with personal knowledge of the matter to constitute a trustworthy reputation. Rumors and speculation are clearly insufficient in this regard. Testimony by a declarant that he heard, from some unknown source, that two people were related in some way would be inadmissible under Rule 803(19). Rather, what is required is the laying of a foundation of knowledge grounded in inquiry, discussion, interactions, or familiarity among a person's associates, or in the community in which he works. 133 We find support for our reading of the Rule in a number of places. In discussing the rationale behind the Rule, Weinstein notes that it is likely that these matters have been sufficiently inquired about and discussed with persons having personal knowledge so that a trustworthy consensus has been reached. Weinstein's Federal Evidence, supra, § 803.24. Weinstein continues: 134 Before a witness can testify to reputation, the witness must be qualified by showing membership in a group that could have been familiar with the personal or family history of the person in question, namely, family, associates or community.... The judge should consider ... not only the foundation that has been laid for the reception of this reputation evidence, but also such factors as the significance and nature of the fact towards which the proof is directed, the availability of other evidence, and the nature of the litigation. 135 Id. § 803.24 (footnote omitted). In discussing the similar hearsay exception in Rule 803(20), for reputation concerning boundaries or general history, Saltzburg explains: 136 [I]t is considered unlikely that a falsehood could become generally accepted as truth in the community, where the matter is of importance to the community. 137 ... [T]he testimony must report a general consensus in the community, an assertion of the group as opposed to one or a few of its constituents. The fact that the information has been considered by and was subject to the general scrutiny of the community is an essential guarantee of reliability for the exception. 138 Saltzburg et al., supra, at 1699. As these comments indicate, when a matter has been sufficiently discussed within a well-defined community so that its truth has obtained circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, Fed.R.Evid. 807, it is properly the subject of reputation testimony. 139 We find further support for our interpretation of the requirements of Rule 803(19) in the more extensive discussion of the required foundation for testimony regarding character reputation. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(a), 405(a), 803(21). We acknowledge that reputation about someone's character and reputation of family relationships are, in many ways, very different concepts. The first might be thought of as a collective community opinion, while the second involves a factual issue. Both, however, require a foundation that is trustworthy and a well-defined community that is capable of, in a figurative sense, forming an opinion or discerning a fact. Cf. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1929 (1966) (defining reputation as a particular character in popular estimation or ascription). We therefore find persuasive those authorities that have discussed the foundation that must be laid before a witness may testify about the community's opinion of someone. 140 The leading case in this area predates the Federal Rules of Evidence, but is helpful nonetheless. In Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948), the Supreme Court discussed character evidence in the context of a criminal trial. It noted that a witness who testifies about a defendant's character is allowed to summarize what he has heard in the community, although much of it may have been said by persons less qualified to judge than himself. Id. at 477. The Court limited this rule, however: [T]he witness must qualify to give an opinion by showing such acquaintance with the defendant, the community in which he has lived and the circles in which he has moved, as to speak with authority of the terms in which generally he is regarded. Id. at 478. 141 In a pre-Federal Rules case applying the hearsay exception we are considering here (for reputation of family matters), the Ninth Circuit reiterated the Supreme Court's point in Michelson: 142 It is not every statement or tradition in the family that can be admitted in evidence. The tradition must be from persons having such a connection with the party to whom it relates, that it is natural and likely, from their domestic habits and connections, that they are speaking the truth, and that they could not be mistaken. 143 Young Ah Chor v. Dulles, 270 F.2d 338, 344 (9th Cir.1959) (internal quotations omitted). In Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512 (1st Cir.1961), government witnesses had testified at a criminal trial regarding the defendant's reputation on the basis of hearsay of unknown origin. The court of appeals vacated the conviction, finding the testimony to be inadmissible, as there must be some demonstrable basis evincing the competence of the witness to give his opinion about the defendant's character. Id. at 517. While we have held that a witness need not know the defendant personally in order to testify about his character, we have found it sufficient if the witness knew of [him] and his reputation among the community and the persons making up at least one of the circles which [he] frequented. United States v. Neff, 475 F.2d 861, 863 (3d Cir.1973). 144 From these cases, we discern a clear principle: A witness who wishes to testify about someone's reputation within a community must demonstrate that he or she knows of the person and is truly familiar with the community in which the reputation has been formed, and that the basis of the reputation is one that is likely to be reliable. Where the alleged reputation is based on nothing more than rumors of unknown origins, or a single instance of someone told me so, a proper foundation has not been laid for admitting such evidence under Rule 803(19). 14 145 d. Applying Rule 803(19) to Blackburn's Evidence 146 We must now determine whether any of Blackburn's evidence involving allegedly related persons working at UPS is likely to be admissible under the exception in Rule 803(19). We note preliminarily that our determination that a workplace may constitute a community under Rule 803(19) is limited by the requirement that a proponent of such evidence establish a reliable foundation for admitting this hearsay testimony. In other words, allegations regarding relationships at far-flung facilities of a large employer such as UPS almost certainly cannot be admissible as reputation evidence within a community or among one's associates. 15 Blackburn has not, in many cases, identified the UPS facility at which allegedly related persons were working. In order to meet his burden of establishing a reliable basis for the alleged reputations he invokes, he would need to identify the community in which those reputations exist. 16 Because we find that, even without this identification of the appropriate community, most of Blackburn's evidence would be inadmissible--and because, at all events, we conclude that his relevant, possibly admissible evidence is insufficient for him to survive summary judgment--we do not dwell on the shortcomings in his evidence regarding the work location of most of the allegedly related persons he offers. 147 Blackburn testified that [i]t was known by myself, certainly, and numerous other people, I presume, that Bill and Art [Weyrauch] were brothers. I believe that it was a regular topic of discussion. App. at 97. Although the requirements we have set forth above regarding admission of such reputation evidence may not be met by Blackburn's testimony, we will assume that upon further development of the background to his allegations, this testimony might be admissible at trial, see Petruzzi's, 998 F.2d at 1234 n. 9, and we therefore consider it below in our analysis of whether summary judgment for UPS was properly granted. 148 As for Don McKenny and Vern Cormie, Blackburn could not state how they were related, and admitted that the basis of his information that they were related was something that I was told by someone I worked with at UPS sometime before I left the company. App. at 97. This clearly fails to meet the standards we have outlined for reputation evidence under Rule 803(19). Not only does it appear that Blackburn does not know McKenny and Cormie (i.e., he could not identify their alleged relationship), but the source of his information--something that I was told by someone--cannot even be identified, let alone measured for its trustworthiness. 149 The same is true of the alleged relationships between Joe Rossano, Jack Davies, and Joe Reynolds (relationship unknown, and information based on something that someone told [Blackburn]); between Lorrain Curley and Dan Grace (source of information unknown); between Karen Montemarano and an unknown driver; between Kathleen Jewell and an unnamed relative (I just remember that she had a relative of some type working there); and between Howard Kaufman and Mindy (it was my understanding that they were related). Each of these cases fails to meet the standard we have established for admitting hearsay evidence under the exception for reputation concerning family matters. In each case, Blackburn does not appear to be familiar with the persons named, fails to identify the community involved, and does not establish any basis, let alone a reliable one, for the information that he is offering. In other words, he has failed demonstrably to identify a reputation concerning family relationships that would bring this testimony within the exception in Rule 803(19). 150 Finally, while we have held that Blackburn may not testify about what Zileski told him, as this is hearsay not within any exception, see supra note 11, Zileski himself could almost certainly testify at trial that Manzi is his brother-in-law. We will assume that Blackburn's testimony regarding what Zileski told him was effectively a proffer of the testimony that Zileski himself would give at trial, and we therefore treat this as evidence capable of being admitted at trial. However, Blackburn has presented no evidence that UPS knew of Zileski and Manzi's relationship, or that the company knew and did nothing about it. Therefore, this evidence, while potentially admissible under a hearsay exception, is not probative of pretext. 5. Summary Judgment 151 We conclude that Blackburn's evidence that UPS decisionmakers were aware of his relationship to Shepard, and later fired him for his whistleblowing activity under the pretext of its anti-nepotism policy, is, without more, insufficient to overcome summary judgment. As we have detailed supra Part III.C.2-.4, we find that virtually none of his evidence regarding other UPS employees who were allegedly related would likely be admissible at trial as relevant evidence that falls within a hearsay exception. We must therefore determine whether Blackburn has offered sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding UPS's stated reason for firing him. 152 Blackburn concedes that there were numerous instances in which UPS terminated employees who violated its antinepotism policy. We have held that only the following pretext evidence might be admissible at trial: Blackburn's testimony that Bill and Art Weyrauch were generally known as brothers among UPS employees, and Shepard's testimony that she informed UPS's interviewer about her relationship to Blackburn. This scintilla of evidence is clearly inadequate to create a genuine issue of material fact on UPS's proffered reason for firing Blackburn. In sum, on this record, we are satisfied that, even assuming that Blackburn has met his prima facie burden under CEPA, he has failed to adequately rebut UPS's proffered reason for his discharge by pointing to sufficient inconsistencies or anomalies that could support an inference that the employer did not act for its stated reasons. Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 731 (3d Cir.1995). The judgment of the District Court will therefore be affirmed.