Opinion ID: 852456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count I Premises Liability

Text: The amended complaint describes Count I as a claim for negligence. The plaintiffs' brief on appeal asserts that discovery had more clearly defined that count as a claim for premises liability and a claim for negligent supervision. However, the plaintiffs' argument focuses entirely on premises liability, and cites the alleged lack of supervision as evidence of breach under premises liability rather than as a separate tort, so we will treat it as such. A landowner's liability to persons on the premises depends on the person's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee. Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind.1991). The Bargers argue that Alisha was a trespasser, and therefore their only duty was to refrain from willful or wanton behavior. The plaintiffs contend Alisha was a social guest and therefore an invitee to whom the Bargers owed a duty to exercise reasonable care for her protection while on the premises. The Court of Appeals held that the determination of Alisha's statusand therefore the duty owed to Alisha by the Bargersis a matter of law for the trial court. Kopczynski v. Barger, 870 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (citing Taylor v. Duke, 713 N.E.2d 877, 881 (Ind.Ct.App.1999)). We have observed that the existence of a duty is ordinarily a question of law for the court to decide, but it may turn on factual issues that must be resolved by the trier of fact. Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 386 (Ind.2004) (citing Douglass v. Irvin, 549 N.E.2d 368, 369 n. 1 (Ind.1990) (While it is clear that the trial court must determine if an existing relationship gives rise to a duty, it must also be noted that a factual question may be interwoven with the determination of the existence of a relationship, thus making the ultimate existence of a duty a mixed question of law and fact.)); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 cmt. l (1965) (Since the status of the visitor as an invitee may depend upon whether the possessor should have known that the visitor would be led to believe that a particular part of the premises is held open to him, the question is often one of fact for the jury, subject to the normal control which the court exercises over the jury's function in such matters.). For the reasons explained below, we conclude that factual issues preclude summary judgment in this case. If Alisha entered the Bargers' property without authority, she was a trespasser. See Burrell, 569 N.E.2d at 640. If her entry was authorized, she was either a licensee or an invitee. See id. In some contexts the distinction between licensees and invitees is murky, but Burrell makes it clear that a social guest is an invitee. Id. at 643. Because her visit was solely social, Alisha was not a licensee, and was either a trespasser or an invitee. Alisha's status as trespasser or invitee, therefore, depends on whether she was authorized to be on the Bargers' property. Bryan's invitation to join the group on the trampoline is the only evidence suggesting Alisha had permission to enter the Bargers' property and use the trampoline. [A]n invitation is conduct which justifies others in believing that the possessor desires them to enter the land. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 cmt. b. An invitation does not have to come directly from the landowner. Whether a landowner's consent can be based on the action of another turns on standard agency principles. See Botka v. Estate of Hoerr, 105 Wash.App. 974, 21 P.3d 723, 727-28 (2001) (Permission sufficient to establish invitee or licensee status can be implied from the prior conduct and statements of the property possessors or their agents.); Kern v. Ray, 283 A.D.2d 402, 724 N.Y.S.2d 457, 458 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (holding that children were acting as parents' agents in inviting people to their house); cf. St. Mary's Med. Ctr. of Evansville, Inc. v. Loomis, 783 N.E.2d 274, 279 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002) (holding that employee's knowledge of unsafe condition on premises is imputed to employer). In the absence of actual authority to invite third parties to the house, the issue is whether the landowner's conduct gave the third party reason to believe that the landowner was willing to allow the third party to enter the land. See 62 Am.Jur.2d Premises Liability § 112 (2005) (The word `consent' or `permission' indicates that the possessor of the land is in fact willing that the visitor, or entrant, enter and remain thereon, or that the possessor's conduct gives the entrant reason to believe that the possessor is willing to allow him or her to enter if he or she desires to do so. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 330 cmt. c )); cf. Holman v. State, 816 N.E.2d 78, 82 (Ind.Ct. App.2004) (applying a totality of the circumstances test to determine the validity of a minor's invitation in a criminal residential entry case). The plaintiffs concede that the Bargers issued no express invitation because Bryan was not a landowner and did not have actual authority to invite Alisha onto the premises. Thus, the question becomes whether the Bargers gave Alisha reason to believe that they were willing to allow her on their land. The Bargers testified that they had once run off some children who were jumping on the trampoline, one of whom was Michael Spears. But Alisha had never met the Bargers, and was not among the group the Bargers had run off. Whether she had reason to know that Bryan did not have actual authority is a factual question. Although Bryan was only six years old, his parents left him alone in the unfenced backyard. Bryan's age might suggest to an adult that he lacked authority. But Alisha is also a minor. A landowner's greater duties to children may arise taking into account the abilities, age, experience, and maturity of the child. . . . Johnson v. Pettigrew, 595 N.E.2d 747, 750-51 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 339, 343). Accordingly, we agree with Judge Crone that the reasonableness of twelve-year-old Alisha's belief that she had permission to jump on the Barger's trampoline by virtue of six-year-old Bryan's invitation . . . presents a genuine issue of material fact that precludes a determination of her status as a matter of law. Kopczynski, 870 N.E.2d at 11 (Crone, J., dissenting). Summary judgment as to Count I must be reversed.