Opinion ID: 1754908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Points of Error Common to Glenn and Richards

Text: 1. Motion to Recuse In Glenn's point of error one and Richards' point of error 10, the defendants assert Judge Leonard Hoffman erred in denying their motion to recuse Judge Bill Elliott. In their motion, they alleged that Judge Elliott's partiality was reasonably in question because of his relationship with Roy Mease, one of Helen's attorneys. At the hearing, Mease testified that he and Judge Elliott had known each other since 1965 and had been friends since 1983. The Mease and Elliott families had travelled together; in July 1991, the two couples went to Europe together. Mease had received a number of ad litem appointments from Judge Elliott, as well as from other judges. The largest ad litem fee he had ever earned was from a case to which he had been appointed by Judge Elliott, a divorce case styled Platt v. Platt. It is the Platt case that provides the basis for the defendants' complaints about the relationship between Mease and Judge Elliott. Judge Elliott appointed Mease to represent the Platt children. Debra Jo Catlett represented Mr. Platt. Ed Wheeler represented Mrs. Platt. (Wheeler had been Mease's campaign manager in Mease's unsuccessful bid to become a district court judge.) A jury awarded custody of the Platt children to Mr. Platt. Judge Elliott granted Mrs. Platt's motion for new trial. Mr. Platt was again awarded custody after the second trial. Catlett testified at the recusal hearing that, during the first trial, she, Mease, and Wheeler agreed to the amount of attorney's fees each would receiveMease would get $18,000, Catlett would get $12,500, and Wheeler would get $7,000. The lawyers did not, however, agree who would pay those fees. Catlett stated Mease told her that if Mr. Platt did not pay his fee, he would have Judge Elliott render the ad litem fees against Mr. Platt; Mease further threatened that if Platt did not pay, Mease would join the motion for new trial filed by Wheeler and the motion for new trial would be granted,... he would get temporary orders entered where Mr. Platt would be ordered to deposit the $18,000 into the Court or pay him directly, he would ask for an additional $10,000 for temporary fees for the next trial, he would have the children removed from the custody of Mr. Platt, ... and he would make sure that Mr. Platt's child support increased. Judge Elliott ordered Mr. Platt to pay Mease's and Wheeler's fees. [1] Catlett wrote Mease a check for $18,000 on behalf of Mr. Platt on July 8. About 10 days later, the Meases and the Elliotts took their trip to Europe. According to Catlett, Judge Elliott later granted the motion for new trial filed by Wheeler on behalf of Mrs. Platt. [2] Mease told Catlett Judge Elliott granted the motion because Catlett had not paid Wheeler. After Judge Elliott granted the motion for new trial, Catlett asked Judge Elliott to order Mease to return the $18,000. Judge Elliott refused. On behalf of Platt, Catlett filed a suit against Mease for conversion of the $18,000. Shortly after she served Mease with interrogatories, Judge Elliott recused himself sua sponte from Platt. In their motion for recusal, the defendants implied a connection between the $18,000 check Catlett gave to Mease on July 8, and the tour of Europe taken by the Meases and Elliotts a fortnight later. In their motion they asserted: While ordinarily a judge and an attorney travelling together in Europe, standing alone, would not be improper, in this instance where such travel followed immediately upon the heels of such attorney cashing an $18,000 check which had been ordered by the court and then proceeding on such travel raises an appearance of impropriety. On appeal, defendants assert that in Platt, Mease used his friendship with Judge Elliott to his advantage. They also note that once the fee to Mease was questioned, Judge Elliott saw fit to recuse himself from the Platt matter.... If it was appropriate for Judge Elliott to recuse himself in the Platt matter, it was likewise appropriate, if not mandated, in the Vickery case. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a judge shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. TEX.R. CIV. P. 18b(2)(a). We review the denial of a motion to recuse for abuse of discretion. TEX.R. CIV. P. 18(a); McElwee v. McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). As Judge Hoffman suggested during the hearing, the comments made by Mease to Catlett could have been mere posturing. [3] Mease testified that, with respect to the trip to Europe, he paid no part of the Elliott's transportation costs or travel expenses. The record is silent as to why Judge Elliott recused himself from Platt. We cannot say Judge Hoffman abused his discretion when he denied the motion to recuse. We overrule Glenn's first point of error, and Richards' tenth point of error. 2. Evidence About the Annuity In her seventh amended petition, Helen sought a partition of undivided assets that were not discussed or divided in the divorce decree. One of these assets was an annuity that paid approximately $35,000 a month. The monthly check was made payable to both Glenn and Helen. In a 1992 deposition, Glenn stated he was claiming the entire annuity for himself. However, in February 1994, he filed a Clarification and Supplementation of Deposition Testimony, in which he stated, I do not have and never have had ownership or control over the annuity itself. At trial, Glenn's attorney, Raborn, mentioned the annuity in opening argument and the following exchange occurred: Ms. Raborn: [Helen] has placed herself in the position she finds herself in. And I'm not saying that it is a bad position at all because I think the evidence is going to show that she is going to have half of the annuity for the rest of her lifethat is, income of $250,000 for the rest of her life a year [sic]. Mr. Krist [counsel for Helen]: If I may, just for a point of clarification: Is that a judicial admission that Helen is entitled to one-half of the annuity, in open court? Ms. Raborn: Your Honor, we have had a clarification of the deposition on file for months. Mr. Krist: I'm asking you if this is a judicial admission. Ms. Raborn: Absolutely it is. Never been in contest from our standpoint and they know it. After opening argument, the issue of the annuity again came up when the trial court asked the attorneys for a stipulation regarding whether the annuity was an issue in the case. Raborn told the trial court that because of a misunderstanding in terms of depositions, Glenn filed a sworn clarification of the deposition. She reiterated that Helen was entitled to one-half of the annuity. Krist noted that the clarification affidavit contradicted Glenn's deposition testimony that he was entitled to all of the annuity, and that he intended to impeach the dickens out of Glenn Vickery with reference to the position that they're now taking. During Helen's direct examination, she testified about the annuity. Her attorney asked her if she remembered Glenn's deposition testimony regarding the annuity. When Helen stated she did not remember specific testimony, her attorney asked her if looking at the deposition would refresh her recollection. Helen answered that it would, and her attorney gave her the deposition. After asking her a series of questions about the annuity, counsel asked her to read Glenn's deposition. Both Glenn's and Richards' counsel objected that this was an improper use of the deposition. Richards' counsel further objected that Krist and Raborn entered into a stipulation regarding the annuity, upon which Richards was entitled to rely. The trial court overruled the objection, and Helen continued to read portions of Glenn's deposition. The trial court refused to allow Glenn's supplement to his deposition testimony to be admitted as evidence. Later in the trial, Helen's counsel again read the same portions of Glenn's deposition testimony into the record. Defendants' counsel did not object and were allowed to read additional portions of the deposition under the rule of optional completeness. In Glenn's point of error 2(B), he asserts the trial court erred in allowing Helen to read Glenn's deposition. In Glenn's point of error 2(C) and in Richards' point of error 4(A) and 4(C), the defendants assert the trial court erred in not admitting Glenn's affidavit supplementing his deposition testimony. In point of error 4(B), Richards asserts the trial court erred in not enforcing the stipulations made during opening argument by counsel for Glenn and Helen regarding the annuity. A. Helen's use of Glenn's deposition Glenn asserts that reading his deposition testimony, not as if he were `present and testifying,' but rather in the midst of Helen's testimony, was erroneous. He also asserts there is no authority to support Helen's reading Glenn's deposition into the record as a method of refreshing her recollection. We agree with Helen that Glenn has not demonstrated harm from any alleged error. Glenn does not explain how (or even argue that) the reading of Glenn's deposition testimony by Helen probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. See TEX.R.APP. P. 44.1(a)(1). [4] After Helen testified, the same deposition excerpts were later read into the record without objection from either defendant. Even assuming the trial court erred in allowing Helen to read from Glenn's deposition, the error was harmless. We overrule Glenn's point of error 2(B). B. Glenn's supplementation of his deposition Glenn argued to the trial court that his affidavit supplementing his deposition had been filed pursuant to TEX.R. CIV. P. 166b(6)(a), which provides: A party is under a duty to reasonably supplement his response [to a discovery request] if he obtains information upon the basis of which: (1) he knows that the response was incorrect or incomplete when made; (2) he knows that the response though correct and complete when made is no longer true and complete and the circumstances are such that failure to amend the answer is in substance misleading[.] Helen, however, argued to the trial court the supplementation was an improper attempt to correct a deposition. The trial court agreed with Helen, stating Glenn had not complied with TEX.R. CIV. P. 205, the rule governing how changes to deposition testimony are to be made. [5] In point of error 2(c), Glenn asserts his affidavit was not a correction to his deposition, but was clearly supplemental, and was necessary because Helen and her counsel had misinterpreted his deposition statements regarding the annuity, and that in an attempt to clarify this stance, a more complete statement was provided.... We agree with Helen that rule 166b(6)(a) is inapplicable. Glenn does not argue his deposition statements were incorrect or incomplete when made, or the statements were correct and complete when made, but were no longer true and complete. He asserts his statements had been misinterpreted, and he needed to clarify not correct or completethem. Glenn also asserts his affidavit was admissible under the rule of optional completeness. That rule provides in part: When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may at that time introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it. TEX.R. CIV. Evid. 106. We are not convinced that rule 106 applies. Under the rule of optional completeness, if one party introduces part of a statement or document, the opposing party may contemporaneously introduce as much of the balance as is necessary to explain the first part. Jones v. Colley, 820 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex.App.Texarkana 1991, writ denied). The rule is based on two considerations: (1) the danger that material may be made misleading by being taken out of context, and (2) the inadequacy of delayed repair. Id. In his deposition, Glenn stated that under the terms of the divorce decree, the annuity had been awarded to him as a right or privilege arising out of the operation of his business. [6] He also affirmatively answered the question, [Y]ou're claiming the entire annuity for yourself? In his affidavit, executed more than a year after the deposition, Glenn stated that he would control and manage the annuity checks until Helen moved from the ranch and then [a]t that time, we would make arrangements to have separate [annuity] checks issued to each of us individually.... I do not have and have never had ownership or control over the annuity itself. The affidavit is not a part of the deposition. There is no argument that the deposition excerpts were taken out of context and are therefore misleading. Glenn sought to clarify his deposition testimony by contradicting it. Rule 106 is inapplicable. Moreover, Glenn's videotaped deposition, played to the jury during his case-in-chief, contained a statement somewhat similar to the statement in the affidavit; he testified that he and Helen had reached an agreement by which he would give her one-half the annuity after the June Wright case seemed to be going, fading away. Although this statement does not contain the express disavowal that he did not own or control the annuity, it reflects an intention to share the annuity with Helen. We conclude Glenn was not harmed by the exclusion of the affidavit. Richards asserts in point of error 4(C) that the trial court erred in not permitting Glenn to supplement his deposition with the affidavit because Glenn had a duty to supplement under rule 166b. She provides no argument or authority for this proposition. Richards has waived point of error 4(C). See TEX.R.APP. P. 38.1(h). Moreover, we have already held that rule 166b does not apply. In point of error 4(A), Richards asserts the trial court erred because the ownership of the annuity was as a matter of law partitioned prior to the divorce pursuant to section 3.52 of the Texas Family Code (Vernon 1993). Richards does not support this assertion with explanation, argument, or authority. She has waived point of error 4(A). See TEX.R.APP. P. 38.1(h). In point of error 4(B), Richards asserts the trial court erred by not enforcing the stipulation made by Helen during Glenn's opening argument. She has provided neither argument nor authority to support this assertion. Point of error 4(B) is waived. See TEX.R.APP. P. 38.1(h). We overrule Glenn's point of error 2(C) and Richards' point of error 4(A), (B), and (C). 3. The Jury Charge In Glenn's point of error four, he asserts [t]he trial court erred in failing to include in the charge to the jury any and all questions tendered by Glenn, including his affirmative defenses. He specifically argues the trial court apparently denied his proposed questions on the basis of Helen's trial amendment, in which she asserted Glenn was judicially estopped from asserting any rights based on the June 18 agreement. In a portion of Richards' point of error seven, she asserts the trial court erred in refusing her tendered jury questions on the issues of ratification and estoppel. Richards adopts Glenn's arguments and authorities regarding these issues. To determine whether an alleged error in the jury charge is reversible, we must consider the pleadings, the evidence presented at trial, and the charge in its entirety. Island Recreational Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Texas Sav. Ass'n, 710 S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tex.1986); Merckling v. Curtis, 911 S.W.2d 759, 767 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). Error in the charge is reversible only if harmfulin other words, if it probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. TEX. R.APP. P. 44.1(a)(1); see Island Recreational Dev. Corp., 710 S.W.2d at 555; Merckling, 911 S.W.2d at 767. A. Glenn's tendered and refused questions Glenn's tendered questions asked if Helen: breached any of the three agreements [7] (question A); was estopped from claiming that any of the three agreements was enforceable (question C); was guilty of laches with respect to any of the three agreements (question D); waived her right to disaffirm any of the three agreements (question E); reached an accord and satisfaction with Glenn by signing the June 18 agreement (question F); effected a novation by signing the May 1992 nunc pro tunc decree or the June 18 agreement (question G); or ratified any of the three agreements (question H). In response to Helen's trial amendment, Glenn also tendered questions regarding his counterclaim for breach of contract and his affirmative defenses of estoppel, laches, waiver, novation, and ratification that referred only to the divorce decree and nunc pro tunc decree and contained no reference to the June 18 agreement. Helen asserts that Glenn's tendered questions were immaterial because [i]t is the very essence of a bill of review action that a party is entitled to set aside a prior judgment, and is not by any theory estopped from doing so, if she can prove that the judgment was the result of fraud. The jury affirmatively answered the question, Did Glenn Vickery commit fraud against Helen Vickery in the division of the marital property of Helen Vickery and Glenn Vickery? It also found the division of marital property between Helen and Glenn was the result of extrinsic fraud unmixed with any negligence on Helen's part. The jury was instructed there are two types of fraud and was required to answer separately for each type. The jury was instructed fraud occurs when: a. a party makes a material misrepresentation, b. the misrepresentation is made with the knowledge of its falsity or made recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion, c. the misrepresentation is made with the intention that it should be acted on by the other party, and d. the other party acts in reliance on the misrepresentation and thereby suffers injury. The jury was further instructed that fraud also occurs when: a. a party conceals or fails to disclose a material fact within the knowledge of that party, b. the party knows that the other party is ignorant of the fact and does not have an equal opportunity to discover the truth, c. the party intends to induce the other party to take some action by concealing or failing to disclose the fact; and d. the other party suffers injury as a result of acting without knowledge of the undisclosed fact. B. Breach of contract Glenn asserts the trial court erred in refusing his tendered questions regarding breach of contract because Helen's failure to comply with the three agreements was raised by the pleadings. The jury found Glenn committed fraud against Helen in the division of the couple's marital property. We read this question to encompass all three agreements. Helen's fraud claim was based on her assertion that Glenn tricked her into getting a sham divorce as a means to protect their assets from the June Wright malpractice case. A June 10, 1992, letter from Helen's attorney to Glenn's attorney reflects Helen still believed the June Wright malpractice case posed a threat to the couple's assets. However, unbeknownst to Helen, June Wright had offered to settle the case within Glenn's policy limits in October 1991, and the malpractice case actually settled on June 5, 1992two weeks before Helen signed the June 18 agreementfor less than Glenn's policy limits. Fraud vitiates every transaction tainted by it. Middleman v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 597 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Tex.Civ.App. Waco 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). There is no real assent to any agreement induced by fraud. Id. The jury found Glenn committed fraud. Thus, the three agreements were vitiated. Helen could not breach a contract vitiated by fraud. Any error in failing to submit Glenn's questions regarding breach of contract was harmless. C. Estoppel Glenn asserts the trial court erred in denying submission of his questions and definitions regarding estoppel. He asserts it was error because estoppel was pleaded and proved by her signing of the original, as well as subsequent decree and contract. He further asserts that Helen judicially admitted that the November 1991 decree and May 1992 nunc pro tunc decree existed and were enforceable and is therefore estopped from denying their enforceability. We again note fraud vitiates every transaction tainted by it. The jury found Glenn committed fraud. Helen is not estopped from claiming the documents she signed are unenforceable. Moreover, we have looked at Glenn's sole record reference in support of his assertion Helen stipulated to the existence and effectiveness of both the November 1991 decree and the subsequent May 1992 Nunc Pro Tunc decree, and find it does not support his contention. [8] D. Laches Laches is an equitable remedy that prevents a plaintiff from asserting a claim because of a lapse of time; the claim is said to be stale. Bluebonnet Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Grayridge Apartment Homes, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 904, 912 (Tex.App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). The two essential elements of laches are: (1) an unreasonable delay by one having legal or equitable rights in asserting them, and (2) a good faith change of position by another to his detriment because of the delay. Rogers v. Ricane Enter., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex.1989). Although a court applying the doctrine of laches is not bound by any statute of limitations, the statute of limitations is one measure of whether a claim has become stale. Bluebonnet Sav. Bank, 907 S.W.2d at 912. Laches does not bar a plaintiff's suit before the statute of limitations has run unless estoppel or extraordinary circumstances are present. Id. Glenn asserts he pled and proved a delay that worked to his disadvantage. He does not explain how he was disadvantaged, howeverhe refers only to his own pleadings and to the three agreements. Glenn has not established that his defense of laches was raised by the evidence. Moreover, Glenn does not argue extraordinary circumstances exist that would bar Helen's claim. Any error in refusing Glenn's questions regarding laches is harmless. E. Waiver Glenn asserts the trial court erred in failing to submit his tendered questions regarding waiver because waiver, which is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right, was pleaded and proved by Helen's signing of the two decrees. As we have noted, there is no real assent to any agreement induced by fraud. The jury found Glenn committed fraud. Any error in the trial court's failure to submit Glenn's questions regarding waiver is harmless. F. Accord and satisfaction Glenn asserts the trial court erred in refusing his question regarding whether an accord and satisfaction was reached between Helen and Glenn by the signing of the 6/18 agreement. He further argues, Helen certainly had the right to seek a division of property, however, she signed and accepted the benefits of the November 1991 and May 1992 property divisions in the decrees in accord and satisfaction of this right. The tendered question asked, Was an accord and satisfaction reached between Helen Vickery and Glenn Vickery by the signing of the 6/18/92 agreement?  (Emphasis added.) However, his argument on appeal in support of this issue seems to be based on Helen's signing of the November 1991 decree and the May 1992 nunc pro tunc decree, not the June 18 agreement. To the extent we understand his argument on appeal, it appears Glenn has not supported his assertion that the June 18 agreement constituted an accord and satisfaction with any argument. Glenn has waived any error with respect to this issue. Moreover, we conclude that the jury's finding of fraud rendered harmless any error in refusing Glenn's questions on this issue. An accord requires a bargaining evidenced in a new contract, either express or implied, that replaces an old agreement. Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). In the new contract, the parties mutually agree that one party may give or perform, and the other will accept, something different from what each was expecting from the old contract. Id. The satisfaction is the actual performance of the new agreement. Id. As we have noted, there is no real assent to any agreement induced by fraud. Thus, in light of the jury's finding of fraud, there could be no accord because there was no mutual agreement. G. Novation Glenn asserts the trial court erred in refusing his questions regarding whether a novation was effected when Helen signed the May 1992 nunc pro tunc decree or the June 18 agreement. The essential elements of a novation are: (1) a previous, valid obligation; (2) a mutual agreement of the parties to the acceptance of a new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old contract; and (4) the validity of the new contract. Flanagan v. Martin, 880 S.W.2d 863, 867 (Tex.App.Waco 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Mandell v. Hamman Oil and Ref. Co., 822 S.W.2d 153, 163 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied). As we have repeatedly stated, fraud vitiates every transaction tainted by it, and there is no real assent to any agreement induced by fraud. Because the jury found Glenn committed fraud, he cannot establish the first, second, or fourth elements of novationthere was no valid previous obligation, no mutual agreement to the acceptance of a new contract, and no valid new contract. Any error in failing to submit the tendered question regarding novation is harmless. H. Ratification Glenn asserts the trial court erred in refusing his questions regarding whether Helen ratified any or all of the three agreements. He states ratification rests upon a manifestation of assent to confirm one's prior act or that of another, and ratification was pleaded and proved ... by Helen's signing. We assume Glenn refers to Helen's signing of the three agreements. Again, there can be no real assent to any agreement induced by fraud; if Helen was induced by fraud to sign the three agreements, she cannot have manifested assent to the documents she signed. Any error in refusing the tendered questions and instructions regarding ratification was harmless.