Opinion ID: 1725241
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Did the state improperly present evidence of other crimes in an effort to slander the defendant?

Text: Cotton argues that the prosecution posed improper questions to the defense witness Felicia McGaffney in an attempt to inappropriately give the jury the inference that Cotton was involved in other illegal activities. During cross-examination, the prosecution delved into the reason Cotton had so much money in his house in the form of small bills. In Sumrall v. State, 272 So.2d 917, 919 (Miss. 1973), this Court held that the prosecution's interjection and repeated questioning concerning other criminal acts committed by the defendant was prejudicial and therefore reversible error. In Caldwell v. State, 443 So.2d 806 (Miss. 1983), this Court stated: It is a settled rule in Mississippi that proof of a crime distinct from that alleged in the indictment is generally inadmissible at the accused's trial on the merits. Eubanks v. State, 419 So.2d 1330 (Miss. 1982). The rationale for this rule is that evidence of other crimes may tend to prejudice the minds of the jurors or confuse them as to the real issues on trial... . In Brooks v. State, 242 So.2d 865 (Miss. 1971), this Court held that the acid test is the relevancy of the evidence to the purpose or purposes for which it is sought to be introduced. The case at hand is distinguishable from Sumrall in that the prosecution in the case at bar, through its questioning, only made inferences of other criminal activity. Regardless, the questions were entirely irrelevant to the charges in the case at hand. As interpreted by this Court, the questions were clearly an attempt to give the jury the inference that Cotton needed small bills in order to deal narcotics. There was no probative value in this line of questioning, and the prosecution is admonished for this behavior. Notwithstanding the inappropriate cross-examination of McGaffney, the court properly responded to and sustained the defense's objection to these questions. Because the defense failed to request that the jury be admonished, the sustaining of the objection was sufficient to prevent reversible error. See Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798, 809 (Miss. 1984) (court's sustaining of objection was sufficient to prevent reversal where defense failed to request admonishment). There is no reversible error where the court did all that it was asked to do. Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803, 811 (Miss. 1987); Clanton v. State, 279 So.2d 599 (Miss. 1973). The prosecution is nevertheless cautioned to avoid this line of questioning on remand. REVERSED AND REMANDED. DAN M. LEE, Jr., C.J., PRATHER and SULLIVAN, P.JJ., and PITTMAN, BANKS, ROBERTS, SMITH and MILLS, JJ., concur.