Opinion ID: 1789106
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Commission's Past Inaction

Text: As noted in the majority opinion, this Commission has not exercised jurisdiction over the wholesale rate structure of a rural electric cooperative or municipal electric utility at any time since the enactment of Section 366.04(2)(b), Florida Statutes. However, we have not affirmatively stated at any time that Section 366.04(2)(b), Florida Statutes, does not give us jurisdiction over the wholesale rate structures of rural electric cooperatives, nor has any court. Seminole contends that by our past inaction we have tacitly acknowledged that we lack such jurisdiction and cannot now abandon our practical interpretation of Section 366.04(2)(b), Florida Statutes. LCEC argues that our past inaction does not amount to a determination that we lack jurisdiction. Even assuming that our past inaction does amount to a tacit determination on jurisdiction, LCEC argues that we are not bound by that determination. I am persuaded by LCEC's analysis. As LCEC points out, agency inaction cannot deprive an agency of jurisdiction conferred. See, e.g., State ex rel[.] Triay v. Burr, [79 Fla. 290] 84 So. 61, 74 (Fla.1920); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 647 [70 S.Ct. 357, 94 L.Ed. 401] (1950); United States v. American Union Transport, 327 U.S. 437, 454, n. 18 [66 S.Ct. 644, 90 L.Ed. 772] (1946). In State ex rel[.] Triay v. Burr , the Florida Supreme Court spoke on this subject: When a valid statute confers a power or imposes a duty upon designated officials, a failure to exercise the power or perform the duty does not affect the existence of the power or duty or curtail the right to require performance in a proper case. Id[.], at 74. Further, while an agency's failure to exercise a power may be significant as a factor in evaluating whether that power was actually conferred, it alone does not extinguish that power or compel an inference that the agency has concluded it lacks jurisdiction. United States v. American Union Transport , at 454, n. 18 [66 S.Ct. 644]. In this case, the jurisdiction granted by the plain language of Chapter 366, Florida Statutes, cannot be extinguished or outweighed by this Commission's past inaction. Even assuming that our past inaction does amount to an implicit determination on jurisdiction, this Commission is not precluded by its past inaction from exercising jurisdiction over Seminole's rate structure. In United States v. American Union Transport , the court stated: An administrative agency is not ordinarily under an obligation immediately to test the limits of its jurisdiction. It may await an appropriate opportunity or clear need for doing so. It may also be mistaken as to the scope of its authority. Id[.], at 454, n. 18 [66 S.Ct. 644]. LCEC asserts that we may have misapprehended the scope of our authority when we failed to require Seminole to file its tariffs along with the distribution cooperatives in 1978. LCEC's argument is reasonable. In 1967, the Federal Power Commission, FERC's predecessor, disavowed jurisdiction over the wholesale sales of cooperatives, Dairy-land Power Cooperative, et al., 37 F.P.C. 12 (1967), but it was not until 1983 that the U.S. Supreme Court held in Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Public Service Commission, 461 U.S. 375 [103 S.Ct. 1905, 76 L.Ed.2d 1] (1983), that state regulation of wholesale electric cooperatives was not preempted by federal law and may not constitute an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. In addition, there is no indication that this Commission has had a clear need yet to exercise jurisdiction in this area. I am not persuaded by Seminole's contention that we cannot now abandon our practical interpretation of Section 366.04(2)(b), Florida Statutes. First, this contention is clearly inconsistent with the principle, stated above, that an agency's failure to exercise power conferred upon it does not affect the existence of that power. Second, none of the cases cited by Seminole hold that an agency cannot, under any circumstance, change its interpretation, explicit or implicit, of its governing statute. The cases cited by Seminole stand for the proposition that an agency's construction of its governing statute is persuasive and should be given great weight, but is not controlling. See, Carter, at 806; Walker v. State Department of Transportation, 366 So.2d 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Green v. Stuckey's of Fanning Springs, 99 So.2d 867 (Fla.1957).