Opinion ID: 2778691
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trigger/Facilitation/Complicity

Text: Argument We first must identify what conduct the appellees contend is burdensome to their religious exercise. It is not the act of filling out or submitting EBSA Form 700 itself. The appellees conceded at oral argument that the mere act of completing EBSA Form 700 does not impose a burden on their religious exercise. The appellees’ essential challenge is that providing the self-certification form to the insurance issuer or third-party administrator “triggers” the provision of the contraceptive coverage to their employees and students. The appellees reframed this proposition at oral argument, stating that the accommodation requires them to be “complicit” in sin. Appellees urge that there is a causal link between providing notification of their religious objection to providing contraceptive coverage and the offering of contraceptive coverage by a third party. That link, they argue, makes them complicit in the provision of certain forms of contraception, which is prohibited by their religious beliefs. Without testing the appellees’ religious beliefs, we must nonetheless objectively assess whether the appellees’ compliance with the self-certification procedure does, in fact, trigger, facilitate, or make them complicit in the provision of 29 contraceptive coverage. Through RFRA’s adoption of the Supreme Court’s pre-Smith free exercise jurisprudence, Congress has required qualitative assessment of the merits of the appellees’ RFRA claims. See Korte, 735 F.3d at 705 (Rovner, J., dissenting).10 “It is virtually self-evident that the Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption from a governmental program unless, at a minimum, inclusion in the program actually burdens the claimant’s freedom to exercise religious rights.” Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 (1985). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated that “[a] governmental burden on religious liberty is not insulated from review simply because it is indirect; but the nature of the burden is relevant to the standard that the government must meet to justify the burden.” Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 706-07 (1986) (citation omitted). These principles were applied in Lyng, where the Supreme Court recognized that the Native American respondents’ beliefs were sincere, and that the government’s proposed actions would have severe adverse effects on their religious practice. However, the Court disagreed that the burden on the respondents’ belief was “heavy enough to violate the Free Exercise Clause unless the 10 We note that the Korte majority opinion may have been undermined by the later decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547, 554 (7th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, No. 14392 (Oct. 3, 2014). The majority opinion in Notre Dame, decided after Korte but before Hobby Lobby, analyzes the mechanics of the accommodation and weakens the Korte majority’s urge for deference. This type of analysis remains good law after Hobby Lobby. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d 229, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 30 Government can demonstrate a compelling need to complete the . . . road to engage in timber harvesting in the . . . [challenged] area.” 485 U.S. at 447 (emphasis added). While the Supreme Court reinforced in Hobby Lobby that we should defer to the reasonableness of the appellees’ religious beliefs, this does not bar our objective evaluation of the nature of the claimed burden and the substantiality of that burden on the appellees’ religious exercise. This involves an assessment of how the regulatory measure actually works. Indeed, how else are we to decide whether the appellees’ religious exercise is substantially burdened? “[T]here is nothing about RFRA or First Amendment jurisprudence that requires the Court to accept [the appellees’] characterization of the regulatory scheme on its face.” Mich. Catholic Conference & Catholic Family Servs., 755 F.3d 372, 385 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wash. v. Sebelius, 19 F. Supp. 3d 48, 71 (D.D.C. 2013)). We may consider the nature of the action required of the appellees, the connection between that action and the appellees’ beliefs, and the extent to which that action interferes with or otherwise affects the appellees’ exercise of religion—all without delving into the appellees’ beliefs. See, e.g., Korte, 735 F.3d at 710 (Rovner, J., dissenting). For example, the court in Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2008), “[a]ccept[ed] as true the factual allegations that Kaemmerling’s beliefs are sincere and of a religious nature— but not the legal conclusion, cast as a factual allegations, that his religious exercise is substantially burdened.” The court further explained: “we conclude that Kaemmerling does not allege facts sufficient to state a substantial burden on his 31 religious exercise because he cannot identify any ‘exercise’ which is the subject of the burden to which he objects.” Id.11 The Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby evaluated whether the requirement to provide contraceptive coverage absent the accommodation procedure substantially burdened the religious exercise of the owners of closely-held, for-profit corporations. The issue of whether there is an actual burden was easily resolved in Hobby Lobby, since there was little doubt that the actual provision of services did render the plaintiffs “complicit.” And in Hobby Lobby, the Court came to its conclusion that, without any accommodation, the contraceptive coverage requirement imposed a substantial burden on the religious exercise of the for-profit corporations, because those plaintiffs were required to either provide health insurance that included contraceptive coverage, in violation of their religious beliefs, or pay substantial fines.12 See 134 11 The Zubik/Persico appellees argue that we should not independently analyze the burdens imposed on them, or the substantiality of that burden, because the government stipulated to facts contained in the appellees’ declarations— particularly, that the appellees believe that participation in the accommodation, including signing the self-certification form, facilitates moral evil in violation of Catholic doctrine. The appellees are mistaken, because the government’s factual stipulation does not preclude this Court from determining the contours of the asserted burden or whether the burden is substantial. 12 Indeed, Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Hobby Lobby comments favorably on the accommodation procedure at issue here, which separates an eligible organization from the objected-to contraceptive services: 32 HHS itself has demonstrated that it has at its disposal an approach that is less restrictive than requiring employers to fund contraceptive methods that violate their religious beliefs. As we explained above, HHS has already established an accommodation for nonprofit organizations with religious objections. Under that accommodation, the organization can self- certify that it opposes providing coverage for particular contraceptive services. If the organization makes such a certification, the organization’s insurance issuer or third-party administrator must “[e]xpressly exclude contraceptive coverage from the group health insurance coverage provided in connection with the group health plan” and “[p]rovide separate payments for any contraceptive services required to be covered” without imposing “any cost-sharing requirements . . . on the eligible organization, the group health plan, or plan participants or beneficiaries.” We do not decide today whether an approach of this type complies with RFRA for purposes of all religious claims. At a minimum, however, it does not impinge on the plaintiffs’ religious belief that providing insurance coverage for the contraceptives at issue here violates their religion, and it serves HHS’s stated interests equally well. 33 S. Ct. at 2775-76; see also Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 245. Here, the appellees are not faced with a “provide” or “pay” dilemma because they have a third option—notification pursuant to the accommodation—to avoid both providing contraceptive coverage to their employees and facing penalties for noncompliance with the contraceptive coverage requirement. The appellees urge that a burden exists here because the submission of the self-certification form triggers, facilitates, and makes them complicit in the provision of objected-to services. But after testing that assertion, we cannot agree that the submission of the self-certification form has the effect the appellees claim. First, the self-certification form does not trigger or facilitate the provision of contraceptive coverage because coverage is mandated to be otherwise provided by federal law. Federal law, rather than any involvement by the appellees in filling out or submitting the self-certification form, creates the obligation of the insurance issuers and third-party administrators to provide coverage for contraceptive services. As Judge Posner has explained, this is not a situation where the self-certification form enables the provision of the very contraceptive services that the appellees find sinful. Rather, “[f]ederal law, not the religious organization’s signing and mailing the form, requires health-care insurers, along with third-party administrators of self-insured plans, to cover contraceptive services.” Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 554. Thus, federal law, not the submission of the self-certification form, enables the provision of contraceptive coverage. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 34 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted Judge Posner’s logic that the obligation to cover contraception is not triggered by the act of self-certification. Rather, it is triggered by the force of law—the ACA and its implementing regulations. See Mich. Catholic Conference, 755 F.3d at 387 (“Submitting the self-certification form to the insurance issuer or third-party administrator does not ‘trigger’ contraceptive coverage; it is federal law that requires the insurance issuer or the third-party administrator to provide this coverage.”). Most recently, and after the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hobby Lobby, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed with these courts’ explanations of the mechanics of the accommodation. See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 252 (“As the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have also concluded, the insurers’ or [the third-party administrators’] obligation to provide contraceptive coverage originates from the ACA and its attendant regulations, not from Plaintiffs’ self-certification or alternative notice.”). Thus, submitting the self-certification form means only that the eligible organization is not providing contraceptive coverage and will not be subjected to penalties. By participating in the accommodation, the eligible organization has no role whatsoever in the provision of the objected-to contraceptive services.13 13 Geneva argues that there is no guarantee that its employees and students would obtain the objected-to contraceptive coverage if they were not enrolled in Geneva’s health plans. Therefore, Geneva asserts, the obligation to provide contraceptive coverage arises only because it sponsors an employee or student health plan. Geneva cites the following passage from Notre Dame in support: “By refusing to fill out 35 Moreover, the regulations specific to the Zubik and Persico appellees’ self-insured plan are no different in this respect, and in no way cause the appellees to facilitate or trigger the provision of contraceptive coverage. Those Department of Labor regulations state that EBSA Form 700 “shall be treated as a designation of the third party administrator as the plan administrator under section 3(16) of ERISA for any contraceptive services required to be covered.” 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-16(b). The Zubik/Persico appellees argue that these regulations cause it to “facilitate” the provision of contraceptives because the signed selfcertification form authorizes the third-party administrator to serve as the plan administrator. However, this purported the form Notre Dame would subject itself to penalties, but Aetna and Meritain would still be required by federal law to provide the services to the university’s students and employees unless and until their contractual relation with Notre Dame terminated.” 743 F.3d at 554 (emphasis added). However, Geneva’s argument is unavailing. The provision of contraceptive coverage is not dependent upon Geneva’s contract with its insurance company. “Once [the appellees] opt out of the contraceptive coverage requirement, . . . contraceptive services are not provided to women because of [the appellees’] contracts with insurance companies; they are provided because federal law requires insurers and TPAs to provide insurance beneficiaries with coverage for contraception.” Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 253. “RFRA does not entitle [the appellees] to control their employees’ relationships with other entities willing to provide health insurance coverage to which the employees are legally entitled.” Id. at 256. 36 causal connection is nonexistent. The eligible organization has no effect on the designation of the plan administrator; instead, it is the government that treats and designates the third-party administrator as the plan administrator under ERISA. See Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 555. “[The appellees] submit forms to communicate their decisions to opt out, not to authorize [the third-party administrators] to do anything on their behalf. The regulatory treatment of the form as sufficient under ERISA does not change the reality that the objected-to services are made available because of the regulations, not because [the appellees] complete a selfcertification.” Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 254-55. Indeed, this “opt-out” is just that—an indication that the eligible organization chooses not to provide coverage for the objected-to services. Moreover, the submission of the self-certification form does not make the appellees “complicit” in the provision of contraceptive coverage. If anything, because the appellees specifically state on the self-certification form that they object on religious grounds to providing such coverage, it is a declaration that they will not be complicit in providing coverage. Ultimately, the regulatory notice requirement does not necessitate any action that interferes with the appellees’ religious activities. “The organization must send a single sheet of paper honestly communicating its eligibility and sincere religious objection in order to be excused from the contraceptive coverage requirement.” Id. at 249. The appellees “need only reaffirm [their] religiously based opposition to providing contraceptive coverage, at which point third parties will provide the coverage separate and apart from [the appellees’] plan of benefits.” Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 7 F. Supp. 3d 88, 37 104 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, Priests for Life, 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The appellees’ real objection is to what happens after the form is provided—that is, to the actions of the insurance issuers and the third-party administrators, required by law, once the appellees give notice of their objection. “RFRA does not grant [the appellees] a religious veto against plan providers’ compliance with those regulations, nor the right to enlist the government to effectuate such a religious veto against legally required conduct of third parties.” Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 251. “The fact that the regulations require the insurance issuers and third-party administrators to modify their behavior does not demonstrate a substantial burden on the [appellees].” Mich. Catholic Conference, 755 F.3d at 389.14 14 A hypothetical example serves as a useful tool to demonstrate the fallacy in the appellees’ characterization of the accommodation: Assume that a person, John Doe, has a job that requires twenty-four-hour coverage, such as an emergency room doctor or nurse. John Doe is unable to work his shift on a certain Tuesday, as that day is a religious holiday that mandates a day of rest. As a result, John Doe believes that it is inappropriate for anyone to work on that holiday. John Doe can request time off by filling out a certain form, but he will be penalized if he fails to show up for work without appropriately requesting time off. However, by filling out this form, he believes that he will facilitate or trigger or be complicit in someone else working in his place on the religious holiday. John Doe sincerely believes that the simple filling out of the time-off request imposes a substantial burden on his religious beliefs. In this example, John Doe, like the appellees, is able to express his religious objection to working on a religious holiday by declining to work that day. 38 Thus, we cannot agree with the appellees’ characterization of the effect of submitting the form as triggering, facilitating, or making them complicit in the provision of contraceptive coverage. At oral argument, the appellees argued that it was not merely the filing of the form that imposed a burden, but, rather, what follows from it. But free exercise jurisprudence instructs that we are to examine the act the appellees must perform—not the effect of that act—to see if it burdens substantially the appellees’ religious exercise. The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the argument that an independent obligation on a third party can John Doe’s time-off request indicates that he will not be complicit in working on the religious holiday. Furthermore, declining to work on that Tuesday does not serve as a trigger or facilitator because one of his other colleagues will be forced to work that day, regardless of whether John Doe works or not. However, just because John Doe does not wish to be associated with or play any role in the result (working on a religious holiday), does not mean the conduct to which he objects (filling out the time-off request form) substantially burdens his free exercise of religion. Just as we cannot conclude that John Doe’s religious exercise is being burdened by filling out the form, we cannot conclude that the appellees’ religious exercise is burdened by filling out the selfcertification form. Furthermore, any “coercive” force attached to John Doe’s refusal to fill out the time-off request is similar to the fines that the appellees face if they refuse to either participate in the accommodation or provide contraceptive coverage. In any event, such “coercive” force is relevant only if the conduct itself actually does substantially burden one’s religious exercise. That is not the case in this analogy, and it is not the case for the appellees. 39 impose a substantial burden on the exercise of religion in violation of RFRA, as we discuss below. Pre-Smith free exercise cases, which RFRA was crafted to resurrect, have distinguished between what a challenged law requires the objecting parties to do, and what it permits another party— specifically, the government—to do. In Bowen, the Supreme Court determined that the Free Exercise Clause did not require the government to accommodate a religiously based objection to the statutory requirement that a Social Security number be provided to applicants for certain welfare benefits. Roy, a Native American, argued that the government’s use of his daughter’s Social Security number would “‘rob the spirit’ of his daughter and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual power.” 476 U.S. at 696. Roy’s claim was unsuccessful because “[t]he Federal Government’s use of a Social Security number for . . . [his daughter] d[id] not itself in any degree impair Roy’s ‘freedom to believe, express, and exercise’ his religion.” Id. at 700. Rather, Roy was attempting to use the Free Exercise Clause to dictate how the government should transact its business. Never to our knowledge has the Court interpreted the First Amendment to require the Government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual development or that of his or her family. The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens. Just as the Government may not insist 40 that appellees engage in any set form of religious observance, so appellees may not demand that the Government join in their chosen religious practices by refraining from using a number to identify their daughter. “[T]he Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can extract from the government.” . . . The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government’s internal procedures. Id. at 699-700 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring)). And, echoing the principles of Bowen, in Lyng, members of Native American tribes claimed that the federal government violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause by permitting timber harvesting and construction on land used for religious purposes. 485 U.S. at 441-42. The Supreme Court concluded that the Free Exercise Clause “does not and cannot imply that incidental effects of government programs, which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require government to bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful actions.” Id. at 450-51. Building on this line of cases, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit concluded that a federal prisoner failed to 41 state a RFRA claim when he sought to enjoin application of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act on the basis that DNA sampling, storage, and collection without limitations violated his religious beliefs about the proper use of the “building blocks of life.” Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 674. Kaemmerling could not state a claim that his religious exercise was substantially burdened because he did not identify any religious exercise that was subjected to the burden to which he objected: The government’s extraction, analysis, and storage of Kaemmerling’s DNA information does not call for Kaemmerling to modify his religious behavior in any way—it involves no action or forbearance on his part, nor does it otherwise interfere with any religious act in which he engages. Although the government’s activities with his fluid or tissue sample after the BOP takes it may offend Kaemmerling’s religious beliefs, they cannot be said to hamper his religious exercise because they do not “pressure [him] to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Id. at 679 (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718). “Like the parents in Bowen, Kaemmerling’s opposition to government collection and storage of his DNA profile does not contend that any act of the government pressures him to change his behavior and violate his religion, but only seeks to require the government itself to conduct its affairs in conformance with his religion.” Id. at 680. 42 Thus, the case law clearly draws a distinction between what the law may impose on a person over religious objections, and what it permits or requires a third party to do. Although that person may have a religious objection to what the government, or another third party, does with something that the law requires to be provided (whether it be a Social Security number, DNA, or a form that states that the person religiously objects to providing contraceptive coverage), RFRA does not necessarily permit that person to impose a restraint on another’s action based on the claim that the action is religiously abhorrent. These cases confirm that we can, indeed should, examine the nature and degree of the asserted burden to decide whether it amounts to a substantial burden under RFRA. Furthermore, we must assess how the objected-to action relates to the appellees’ religious exercise, and whether the appellees’ objections focus on the action itself or the result of the action, i.e., the obligations placed upon a third party. Far from “triggering” the provision of contraceptive coverage to the appellees’ employees and students, EBSA Form 700 totally removes the appellees from providing those services. “[T]he regulations provide an opt-out mechanism that shifts to third parties the obligation to provide contraceptive coverage to which health insurance beneficiaries are entitled, and that fastidiously relieves [the appellees] of any obligation to contract, arrange, pay, or refer for access to contraception . . . .” Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 252. The self-certification form requires the eligible organization or its plan to provide a copy to the organization’s insurance issuer or third-party administrator in 43 order for the plan to be administered in accordance with both the eligible organization’s religious objection and the contraceptive coverage requirement. The ACA already takes into account beliefs like those of the appellees and accommodates them. “The accommodation in this case consists in the organization’s . . . washing its hands of any involvement in contraceptive coverage, and the insurer and the third-party administrator taking up the slack under compulsion of federal law.” Notre Dame, 743 F.3d at 557. The regulations accommodate the interests of religious institutions that provide health services, while not curtailing the public interest that motivates the federally mandated requirement that such services shall be provided to women free of charge. Id. at 551. Because we find that the self-certification procedure does not cause or trigger the provision of contraceptive coverage, appellees are unable to show that their religious exercise is burdened. Even if we were to conclude that there is a burden imposed on the appellees’ religious exercise, we would be hard-pressed to find that it is substantial. Whether a burden is “substantial” under RFRA is a question of law, not a question of fact. See Mahoney v. Doe, 642 F.3d 1112, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2011). RFRA’s reference to “substantial” burdens expressly calls for a qualitative assessment of the burden that the accommodation imposes on the appellees’ exercise of religion. Korte, 735 F.3d at 705 (Rovner, J., dissenting). RFRA calls for a threshold inquiry into the nature of the burden placed on the appellees’ free exercise of religion: “substantial” is a term of degree that invites the courts to distinguish between different types of burdens. Id. at 708. 44 We have stated that a substantial burden exists where (1) “a follower is forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to other [persons] versus abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit”; or (2) “the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” See Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007) (interpreting a related statute, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, which applies to prisoner and land use cases). However, a government action does not constitute a substantial burden, even if the challenged action “would interfere significantly with private persons’ ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment according to their own religious beliefs,” if the government action does not coerce the individuals to violate their religious beliefs or deny them “the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.” Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449. Under this definition, can the submission of the self-certification form, which relieves the appellees of any connection to the provision of the objectedto contraceptive services, really impose a “substantial” burden on the appellees’ free exercise of religion? We think not. While Hobby Lobby rejected the argument that the burden was too attenuated because the actual use of the objected-to contraceptive methods was a matter of individual choice, here, where the actual provision of contraceptive coverage is by a third party, the burden is not merely attenuated at the outset but totally disconnected from the appellees. The reasoning of the District Courts was misguided in two ways. First, the District Courts accepted the appellees’ characterization of the accommodation as causing them to 45 “facilitate,” act as the “central cog,” or serve as the “necessary stimulus” for the provision of the objected-to contraceptive services. (J.A. 60-61.) For the reasons we have detailed, we cannot accept that characterization as a matter of fact or law. Second, the District Courts focused on the coercive effect, i.e., the fact that the appellees faced a choice: submit the self-certification form and “facilitate” the provision of contraceptive coverage, or pay fines for noncompliance. However, now that we have dispelled the notion that the self-certification procedure is burdensome, we need not consider whether the burden is substantial, which involves consideration of the intensity of the coercion faced by the appellees. We will accordingly reverse the challenged injunctions.