Opinion ID: 2084452
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Life Sentences

Text: The bulk of the comparison cases resulted in life sentences. Thus, if defendant is less culpable than the defendants in most of those cases, he has arguably demonstrated that his death sentence was an aberration. If he is more culpable than most of those cases, his disproportionality claim is diminished. The case of Vincent Brown is similar to defendant. Brown sexually assaulted a young girl and strangled her to death. He confessed to sexual assault and murder after unsuccessfully attempting to deceive the police. Brown's criminal record included violent offenses. During his youth, he was physically and sexually abused. In one respect, Brown is more culpable than defendant: Brown left his victim to die in a ditch as she screamed for help. Nevertheless, defendant is more deathworthy than Brown. Unlike defendant, Brown did not penetrate his victim. In addition, Brown suffered from major depression with psychotic features and was declared incompetent to stand trial. On the other hand, Jerome Dennis's life sentence supports defendant's disproportionality claim. Dennis stabbed a fourteen-year-old girl twenty-four times and raped her. Although his victim was less vulnerable than Megan and he did not kill to avoid apprehension, Dennis's murder entailed more victimization than defendant's murder. Dennis, a prior sex offender, committed murder two weeks after he was released on parole. He killed four more people in the following four months. Moreover, there is no indication that Dennis was sexually abused or suffered from any mental illnesses. The substantial victimization, Dennis's prior record, and the lack of mitigating evidence make him more deathworthy than defendant. Ralph Edwards's victim was nearly as vulnerable as Megan. Like defendant, Edwards had a history of psychological illness, and his jury found the c(5)(d) (diminished capacity) mitigating factor. However, no juror in Edwards's case found the c(5)(a) (extreme emotional disturbance) mitigating factor. In contrast to defendant, Edwards was only eighteen years old and had no prior criminal record. Those factors render defendant more deathworthy than Edwards. James Henderson and Gary Lippen caused extraordinary victimization. Henderson raped the victim while Lippen held her down, and Lippen may have also raped her. They crushed her throat with a stick, and Henderson stabbed her several times and broke her legs. Henderson had a history of mental illness. There is no indication that Henderson had an abusive childhood or that he expressed remorse for what he had done. Henderson's case included mitigating evidence not present in defendant's case: Henderson was illiterate, and apparently had only one drug conviction in his prior record. Henderson also did not kill to escape detection for the rape. Moreover, the seventeen-year-old victim in that case was not nearly as vulnerable as Megan; however, Henderson and Lippen neutralized the victim's ability to resist the rape when Lippen held her down while Henderson raped her. Overall, Henderson and defendant are similarly deathworthy. In contrast, Lippen is less culpable than defendant. Lippen claimed that his participation in the murder was due to his fear of Henderson. That situation is distinct from Morton II, in which we held that a defendant's culpability should not be diminished because a co-defendant primarily planned the crime when the defendant willingly participated. Morton II, supra, 165 N.J. at 252, 757 A. 2d 184. Lippen's allegation was that he participated in the crime because he feared Henderson. He did not willingly participate, contrary to the dissent's suggestion. Post at 87, 773 A. 2d at 57. In addition, Lippen may have been intoxicated, did not kill to escape detection, had no prior convictions, and was only nineteen years old. Although he did not have a history of mental illness, Lippen is less deathworthy than defendant. Michael Manfredonia inflicted gratuitous pain on his fourteen-year-old victim whom he stabbed twenty-six times and sexually assaulted. The victimization in Manfredonia's case was substantial, as his victim suffered more than Megan. The c(5)(d) (diminished capacity) mitigating factor was not present in Manfredonia's case. Like defendant, Manfredonia was extremely emotionally disturbed and had borderline intelligence. In addition, he was nineteen years old and suicidal, had no prior record except for a disorderly persons theft offense, and allegedly felt provoked by the victim's verbal insults. Also, the victim was seven years older than Megan. Manfredonia's and defendant's culpability are comparable. The similarities between the rape-murders Rasheed Muhammad and defendant committed are striking. They both kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and lethally strangled young girls. As children, both Muhammad and defendant were physically and sexually abused, neglected, and raised in homes replete with violence. Muhammad did not attempt to establish the c(5)(a) (extreme emotional disturbance) and c(5)(d) (diminished capacity) mitigating factors; however, pursuant to the c(5)(h) (catchall) factor, the jury found that Muhammad was emotionally unstable and had twice attempted suicide. Muhammad's jury rejected the c(4)(f) (escape detection) aggravating factor. Muhammad's prior record included property-crime convictions, but no sexual or other violent offenses. Furthermore, it appears that Muhammad confessed without attempting to outwit the police and the victim's family by giving a false statement to the police or feigning assistance with searching for the victim. Therefore, defendant is slightly more deathworthy than Muhammad. Defendant is also more culpable than Frederick Ritchie. Evidence of Ritchie's intent to kill his twelve-year-old victim was disputed; no direct evidence contradicted Ritchie's claim that the drunken victim accidentally fell into a washing machine and walked into a tree and that the impact of colliding with the tree caused him to fall into a creek. The strength of the evidence may have induced the prosecutor to plea bargain for an aggravated manslaughter conviction. Cooper II, supra, 159 N.J. at 100, 731 A. 2d 1000. In addition, Ritchie's victimization was not as great as in this case. Furthermore, Ritchie was a veteran who suffered from Crohn's disease and alcoholism. Ritchie drank while committing the crimes, and demonstrated, to some extent, diminished capacity. Ritchie's prior record included a burglary as well as sex crimes. Based on those factors, Ritchie is less deathworthy than defendant. Apparently to exact revenge from his girlfriend who was having an affair with another man, Leroy Taylor sexually assaulted and strangled to death her thirteen-year-old niece. Although Taylor did not kill to avoid apprehension for the sexual assault, his revenge motive is as morally blameworthy as defendant's escape-detection motive. Taylor previously murdered a four-year-old girl in California; however, he was a juvenile when he committed the prior murder. Taylor was on parole when he committed the New Jersey murder. Taylor refused to cooperate with police, fleeing to California when New Jersey authorities sought blood and hair samples. There is no indication that Taylor was abused or emotionally disturbed. Taylor is more deathworthy than defendant, based on his prior murder and lesser mitigating evidence. Thus, Taylor's life sentence buttresses defendant's claim that his death sentence is disproportionate. As in defendant's case, the c(5)(a) (extreme emotional disturbance) and c(5)(d) (diminished capacity) mitigating factors were present in Alphonso Timpson's case. Like defendant, Timpson had borderline intelligence. Although Timpson was not diagnosed as a pedophile, he had similar characteristics as defendant: Timpson was diagnosed as highly impulsive and unable to exhibit emotional control. Moreover, Timpson drank excessively and smoked marijuana on a daily basis. He was only nineteen years old. Like defendant, Timpson denied killing the victim before eventually confessing to the kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder. However, Timpson did not pretend to help search for the victim after killing her. In contrast to defendant, Timpson inflicted gratuitous violence on his victim. Primarily due to Timpson's age, he is less deathworthy than defendant. Defendant is significantly more culpable than Mark Luciana. Luciana's case involved less victimization, and his fifteen-year-old victim, who was less vulnerable than Megan, willingly accompanied Luciana into the woods. Like defendant, Luciana was neglected as a child. In both cases, the juries found the c(5)(d) (diminished capacity) mitigating factor. However, Luciana was only twenty years old and had no violent prior criminal convictions. Consequently, Luciana's life sentence does not support defendant's disproportionality claim. Likewise, Lester Wilson's life sentence does not suggest disproportionality. His victim was twice Megan's age, and Wilson victimized her less than defendant victimized Megan. Moreover, Wilson was mildly mentally retarded and had no criminal record. That evidence demonstrates that he is less deathworthy than defendant. The agreed-upon comparison cases, both life- and death-sentenced defendants, do not support defendant's claims of disproportionality. Defendant is more culpable than David Cooper, whose death sentence was held not disproportionate. Cooper II, supra, 159 N.J. at 116, 731 A. 2d 1000. That undercuts his claim of disproportionality, as it supports the notion that there is a consensus that murderers as culpable as defendant and Cooper deserve the death penalty. Defendant is also more culpable than Vincent Brown, Ralph Edwards, Rasheed Muhammad, Frederick Ritchie, Alphonso Timpson, Mark Luciana, Gary Lippen, and Lester Wilson. Thus, those defendants' life sentences do not bolster defendant's disproportionality claim. Although defendant is equally as culpable or less culpable than Dennis, Henderson, and Taylor, those three cases are not sufficient to demonstrate a societal consensus that murderers like defendant generally receive a life sentence. b. Contested Cases Defendant also proposes ten additional comparison cases. The Attorney General objects to their inclusion. We must determine whether each case is sufficiently similar to defendant's case to include them within the comparison group. Morton II, supra, 165 N.J. at 256, 757 A. 2d 184. We presume that cases not in defendant's combined D category are outside of his comparison group. Ibid. Conversely, we presume that cases in defendant's salient-factor category fall within his comparison group. Ibid. Other than the common salient factor, Kevin Conley's rape-murder shares one substantial characteristic with defendant's crime: both victims were vulnerable because of their age. Thus, Conley's case falls within defendant's comparison group. Because Conley not only beat and stabbed his victim, but sexually assaulted and strangled her to death as well, Conley inflicted more victimization than defendant. In addition, Conley's case presented no evidence of child abuse or mental illness. On the other hand, Conley had a college degree, was an Army Reservist, and had no prior criminal record. Furthermore, Conley did not kill to avoid apprehension or feign assistance with a rescue effort. Conley and defendant are similarly culpable. Like Conley, Frank Masini's rape-murders of elderly women fall within defendant's comparison group. Masini's deathworthiness exceeds defendant's. Masini stabbed four elderly people to death, and raped two of them, both of whom were his relatives. Despite Masini's lack of a prior record or escape-detection motive, and the detachments from reality that he experienced at the time of the murders, the number of victims Masini murdered renders him more culpable than defendant. Accordingly, Masini's life sentences augment defendant's disproportionality claim. Samuel Mincey's robbery-rape-murder should fall within defendant's comparison group because of his seventy-three-year-old victim's age-related vulnerability. However, she was less vulnerable than Megan and, thus, Mincey is less morally blameworthy in that regard. In contrast, Mincey's crime involved more victimization, and there were elements of torture in Mincey's case. Mincey's extensive prior record includes violent offenses, but not sex crimes. There is also no indication that Mincey was abused or emotionally disturbed. Mincey is roughly as culpable as defendant. Nevertheless, the prosecutor did not seek a death sentence against Mincey because of an erroneous belief that the statute of limitations for seeking a death sentence had passed. That constitutes a valid basis for the discrepancy between Mincey's life sentence and defendant's death sentence. Cooper II, supra, 159 N.J. at 100-01, 107, 731 A. 2d 1000. Thus, Mincey's life sentence does not buttress defendant's disproportionality claim. Rafael Rivera's sexual-assault murder of a seventy-eight-year-old woman belongs in defendant's comparison group because of the victim's age-related vulnerability. Nonetheless, Rivera's victim was not as vulnerable as Megan. Rivera's assault, sexual assault, and murder were not premeditated; he surprised the victim when she returned to her apartment while he was there looking for money. However, Rivera attacked the victim when she found him and caused extreme victimization; indeed, the jury found the c(4)(c) (torture or depravity) aggravating factor. Rivera's prior record includes theft offenses and a weapons-possession conviction, but no prior sexual or other violent crimes. Rivera abused alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine, and was seen drunk shortly before the murder. The jury found the c(5)(d) (diminished capacity) mitigating factor, presumably because of Rivera's intoxication. Rivera apparently presented no evidence of child abuse or mental illness. The enhanced victimization in Rivera's case counterbalances Megan's greater vulnerability, but defendant's more extensive prior criminal record offsets Rivera's lack of abuse or mental illness. However, Rivera was intoxicated when committing his crimes. Thus, defendant is more deathworthy than Rivera. Otis James's life sentence does not suggest disproportionality, as James is less deathworthy than defendant. Although James had several convictions in his record and subsequently attempted another murder, his mitigating evidence exceeds defendant's. James had a history of depression and once was hospitalized after attempting suicide. Thus, James's mental mitigating evidence is nearly as strong as defendant's, despite having no history of abuse. Further, James also had no prior sex offenses, his victim was not as vulnerable as Megan, and he was intoxicated when he committed the crime. Thus, James is less deathworthy than defendant, and his life sentence does not support defendant's claim. Carlos Vasquez's case is sufficiently similar to defendant's case. Both involve a rape and strangulation of a child under fourteen years old. Vasquez, who pled guilty to felony murder and received a life sentence, is more culpable than defendant. Although Vasquez's thirteen-year-old victim was less vulnerable than Megan, Vasquez was a prior murderer. Vasquez denied having mental health problems, and there is no indication that he endured an abusive childhood. Therefore, Vasquez's life sentence supports defendant's claim of disproportionality. The remaining cases that defendant seeks to add to his comparison group are dissimilar. As discussed, we presume that cases outside of defendant's category are excluded from his comparison group. Morton II, supra, 165 N.J. at 256, 757 A. 2d 184. Daniel Nicini's, Kevin Aquino's, and Kenneth Querns's cases are not sufficiently similar to overcome that presumption. Nicini did not commit any sex crimes contemporaneous with the murder. Despite intending to sexually assault the six-year-old victim when he burglarized her home, Aquino did not attempt any sex crimes during the incident. The evidence suggesting that Kenneth Querns sexually assaulted the nine-year-old victim was weak. The State did not allege that Querns raped the victim; instead, the State contended, based on the fact that the victim was found without underwear, that Querns fondled her. Querns did not plead guilty to any sex crimes. Thus, there is insufficient evidence that Querns committed a contemporaneous sexual assault to render his case sufficiently similar to defendant's and justify inclusion.