Opinion ID: 1664496
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Osborne

Text: During the summary judgment proceedings, the depositions of both Charles Payne and Kevin Osborne were taken. Payne testified that as a result of discovering the adulterous affair, he suffered a nervous breakdown, lost his religion, lost his house and lost his job as well as his wife. Osborne testified that after the sexual affair, he had resigned from the ministry and was no longer employed as a priest and had moved to Tennessee. Craft v. Rice, Ky., 671 S.W.2d 247 (1984), is the seminal case involving the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrageous conduct in Kentucky. In order to establish such a claim, the plaintiff must prove the following elements: The wrongdoer's conduct must be intentional or reckless; the conduct must be outrageous and intolerable in that it offends against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality; there must be a causal connection between the wrongdoer's conduct and the emotional distress and the distress suffered must be severe. As noted in Kroger Company v. Willgruber, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 61 (1996), the tort is not available for petty insults, unkind words and minor indignities. Nor is it to compensate for behavior that is cold, callous and lacking sensitivity. Humana of Ky., Inc. v. Seitz, Ky., 796 S.W.2d 1 (1990). Rather, it is intended to redress behavior that is truly outrageous, intolerable and which results in bringing one to his knees. Willgruber, supra . The circuit court summarily dismissed the claim against the former priest for failure to allege misconduct that was sufficient to satisfy the outrageous element of the tort, relying on Whittington v. Whittington, Ky.App., 766 S.W.2d 73 (1989). In that case, the claim of the wife was dismissed under CR 12.02 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; the circuit court concluded that ordinary fraud and adultery can never reach the status of outrageous conduct. Here, the most important element of the complaint by Payne, as demonstrated by his deposition testimony, is that he was injured as a result of the misconduct of Osborne while in a special relationship as priest and counselor. Moreover, the alleged exploitation of that relationship occurred in a situation when the former priest was aware that the marriage partners were most vulnerable. This Court in Seitz, supra , indicated that the special relationship of patient to nurse had not been violated, but left for another day a decision as to whether such special relationships are part of the tort of outrageous conduct. In this case, as distinguished from Seitz , Payne has presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that he had a special relationship with his priest or marriage counselor and that this special relationship was violated in an outrageous fashion so as to cause him severe emotional distress. It is the concept of special relationship that distinguishes this factual situation from Whittington . The establishment of the existence of a special relationship between the parties can make conduct outrageous. The use of a confidential relationship between Payne and his priest counselor is the heart of his lawsuit. The relationship itself cannot be used to give rise to a presumption of outrageousness, rather the relationship between the parties, is an aid in determining whether the conduct itself is outrageous. For the purpose of summary judgment, it is evident that the former priest used his relationship with the husband and the wife to obtain a sexual affair with the wife. Conduct and relationship can form the basis for outrageous conduct. It must be remembered that pursuant to CR 56.03 the grounds for summary judgment are: 1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and 2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This Court has repeatedly announced that summary judgments are to be cautiously applied and not to be used as a substitute for trial. A movant must convince the court, based upon evidence in the record, of the nonexistence of a material fact issue, and a motion will not be granted unless the right to summary judgment is shown with such clarity that there is no room left for controversy. Osborne has not satisfied that requirement and cannot seek refuge in summary dismissal. Reliance on Whittington does not solve the issue as to whether the conduct of Osborne was sufficiently outrageous to allow the matter to proceed to a jury verdict. The mere fact that in recent years there has been apparently an increasing number of claims against clergy for sexual misconduct does not make the behavior any less outrageous or disgraceful or otherwise actionable. Some jurisdictions have denied relief under a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress after concluding that the claims were merely an attempt to bring amatory actions which were no longer viable. See Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (1988). However, we are persuaded by the reasoning used in the cases noted by the Court of Appeals including Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 285 (Colo.1988), in which it was stated that: a plaintiff will not be able to mask one of the abolished actions ... behind a common law label. However, if the essence of the complaint is directed to a cause of action other than one which has been abolished, that claim is legally cognizable. See also Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 321 Md. 642, 584 A.2d 69 (1991). We note that this Court abolished the action for breach of promise to marry in Gilbert v. Barkes, Ky., 987 S.W.2d 772 (1999), but stated that it in no way prohibited other remedies, such as claims for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress, should a party be able to make such a case. It should be emphasized that these claims must be approached on a case-by-case basis, and there is no blanket or automatic imposition of a cause of action in the clergy/counselor relationship.