Opinion ID: 4027039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Preemption Under Section 612

Text: Additionally, Rinehart urges the moratorium is preempted by title 30 United States Code section 612(b). We conclude no basis for preemption has been shown. Section 612 of title 30 United States Code was enacted in 1955 as part of a ― ‗crack-down‘ upon unauthorized uses of unpatented mining claims.‖ (Funderberg v. Udall (9th Cir. 1968) 396 F.2d 638, 639.) Concerned that some mining claims were being staked out as a pretext to support activities wholly unrelated to mineral development, Congress prospectively prohibited the use of unpatented mining claims for anything not ―reasonably incident‖ to prospecting and mining. (30 U.S.C. § 612(a); see U. S. v. Shumway, supra, 199 F.3d at p. 1101; Funderberg, at p. 639; H.R.Rep. No. 730, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), pp. 5–7, reprinted in 1955 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, No. 2, pp. 2478– 2480.) Congress also focused on the need to better accommodate competing surface and subsurface uses of federal land. (H.R.Rep. No. 730, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), pp. 3, 8, reprinted in 1955 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, No. 2, pp. 2475, 2480.)11 Mining claimants had traditionally been granted exclusive use 11 Contrary to Rinehart‘s view that Congress has deemed mining the absolute highest and best use of mining land, the congressional committee considering amendments to federal law that led to enactment of section 612 (30 U.S.C.) noted the ―principal problem faced by the Congress‖ in the years since the 1872 law‘s adoption had been how to ―encourage mining activity‖ in a way ―compatible with (footnote continued on next page) 23 of the land encompassed by their claims. (30 U.S.C. § 26; H.R.Rep. No. 730, at pp. 2477–2478; U. S. v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc. (9th Cir. 1980) 611 F.2d 1277, 1281.) Congress withdrew that exclusivity in favor of a right retained by the federal government and its permittees and licensees to use, manage, and dispose of the surface resources of the claim. (30 U.S.C. § 612(b);12 see H.R.Rep. No. 730, at pp. 2482–2483; Curtis-Nevada Mines, at pp. 1281–1283.) In turn, this retained right was subject to the condition that the United States and other users not ―endanger or materially interfere with‖ mining operations. (30 U.S.C. § 612(b); see Curtis-Nevada Mines, at pp. 1283–1286.) Nothing in California‘s regulation of suction dredging implicates or interferes with any of the purposes and objectives underlying this congressional reallocation of rights. Congress concerned itself with abuses of the existing claim system by miners and the need to accommodate competing demands on federal land, and sought to end sham claims and ensure to others enjoyment of federal lands to the extent compatible with mining. Section 612 of title 30 United States Code regulates the respective property rights of miners with claims on federal (footnote continued from previous page) utilization, management, and conservation of surface resources such as water [and] fish.‖ (H.R.Rep. No. 730, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), p. 3, reprinted in 1955 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, No. 2, p. 2475.) 12 That subdivision provides in relevant part: ―Any such mining claim shall also be subject, prior to issuance of patent therefor, to the right of the United States, its permittees, and licensees, to use so much of the surface thereof as may be necessary for such purposes [i.e., management etc. of surface resources] or for access to adjacent land: Provided, however, That any use of the surface of any such mining claim by the United States, its permittees or licensees, shall be such as not to endanger or materially interfere with prospecting, mining or processing operations or uses reasonably incident thereto . . . .‖ (30 U.S.C. § 612(b).) 24 land, on the one hand, and the United States and its permittees who may wish to use that same land for other purposes, on the other. It does no more. Rinehart infers from the text of title 30 United States Code section 612(b) a general command that state regulation to protect environmental interests may not ―materially interfere‖ with mining. The text is not susceptible to such a reading. By its terms, the ―materially interfere‖ standard defines what the United States and its licensees and permittees may not do on the surface of mining claims, not what states in the exercise of their police powers may not do. Rinehart also contends that because the last portion of section 612(b) assures certain states their laws concerning water rights will not be affected, Congress by implication preempted state law in all other regards. The final clause of section 612(b) states: ―Provided further, That nothing in this subchapter and sections 601 and 603 of this title shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or in any way interfere with or modify the laws of the States which lie wholly or in part westward of the ninety-eighth meridian[13] relating to the ownership, control, appropriation, use, and distribution of ground or surface waters within any unpatented mining claim.‖ This language was added to ―make[] clear an intent to leave unaffected the operation of State water laws in the reclamation West governing the ownership, control, appropriation, use, and distribution of ground or surface waters.‖ (H.Conf. Rep. No. 1096 on H.R. 5891, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), reprinted in 1955 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 2497.) That Congress wanted to reassure western states that existing critical arrangements concerning their respective water rights would not be disturbed does 13 The 98th meridian cuts through the Great Plains states, from North Dakota through Texas. 25 not thereby establish an intent, not otherwise evident from the text or legislative history, to alter or displace state law in other respects. Nor do the cases Rinehart relies on support preemption under section 612(b). U. S. v. Shumway, supra, 199 F.3d 1093, 1105–1108 addresses the interplay between the mining laws and the Act of Congress authorizing oversight of the national forests by the National Forest Service. (See 16 U.S.C. §§ 478, 551.) Shumway concludes, consistent with precedent, that the Forest Service‘s authority extends to regulating mining claims insofar as such ―regulations are ‗reasonable‘ and do not impermissibly encroach on legitimate uses incident to mining and mill site claims.‖ (Shumway, at p. 1107; see U. S. v. Weiss (9th Cir. 1981) 642 F.2d 296, 298–299 [concluding the forest service may impose reasonable environmental regulations on mining operations in national forests].) Shumway does not interpret section 612(b), or any other federal statute, as preempting state environmental regulations. U. S. v. Backlund (9th Cir. 2012) 689 F.3d 986 likewise does not interpret the objectives of section 612(b) in a way that would require preemption of state environmental regulation. Rejecting a void for vagueness challenge to Forest Service limits on unpermitted permanent residences in national forests, the Ninth Circuit explains that the Forest Service‘s regulatory authority is limited by, inter alia, the requirement that regulations not ― ‗materially interfere‘ ‖ with mining. (Backlund, at p. 997, quoting 30 U.S.C. § 612(b).) Backlund reads section 612 as we do, as striking an accommodation between federal solicitousness for mining on federal land and federal management of the surface of mining claims. It does not impute to Congress any broader purpose that would support state law preemption. 26 DISPOSITION For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeal. WERDEGAR, J. WE CONCUR: CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. CHIN, J. CORRIGAN, J. LIU, J. CUÉLLAR, J. KRUGER, J. 27 See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion People v. Rinehart __________________________________________________________________________________ Unpublished Opinion Original Appeal Original Proceeding Review Granted XXX 230 Cal.App.4th 419 Rehearing Granted __________________________________________________________________________________ Opinion No. S222620 Date Filed: August 22, 2016 __________________________________________________________________________________ Court: Superior County: Plumas Judge: Ira R. Kaufman __________________________________________________________________________________ Counsel: Murphy & Buchal and James L. Buchal for Defendant and Appellant. Damien M. Schiff, James S. Burling and Jonathan Wood for Pacific Legal Foundation, Western Mining Alliance and Siskiyou County as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. Parsons Behle & Latimer, Brook B. Bond, L. Michael Bogert; Mountain States Legal Foundation, Steven J. Lechner and Jeffrey W. McCoy for American Exploration & Mining Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Edward C. DuMont, State Solicitor General, Mark J. Breckler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert W. Byrne, Assistant Attorney General, Joshua A. Klein, Deputy State Solicitor General, Gavin G. McCabe, Michael M. Edson, Marc N. Melnick and J. Kyle Mast, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Jonathan Evans; Saxton & Associates and Lynne R. Saxton for Karuk Tribe, Center for Biological Diversity, Friends of the River, Klamath Riverkeeper, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen‘s Associations, Institute for Fisheries Resources, Environmental Law Foundation, California Sportfishing Protection Alliance, Foothill Angler‘s Coalition, North Fork American River Alliance, Upper American River Foundation and Central Sierra Environmental Resource Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. Sean B. Hecht and Eric Biber for John D. Leshy and Alejandro E. Camacho as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, and Lane N. McFadden for The United States as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): James L. Buchal Murphy & Buchal 3425 SE Yamhill Street, Suite 100 Portland, OR 97214 (503) 227-1011 Marc N. Melnick Deputy Attorney General 1515 Clay Street, 20th Floor Oakland, CA 94612-0550 (510) 622-2133