Opinion ID: 1516098
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether An Ordinance Specific To The Property Was Required

Text: Delphey argues that Section 2(b)(24) of Article 23A required that the Aldermen enact an ordinance specific to 134 through 140 West Patrick Street before initiating the condemnation process because the decision to condemn is a legislative, and not executive, act, citing Inlet Associates v. Assateague House Condominium Ass'n, 313 Md. 413, 545 A.2d 1296 (1988), (Inlet), as authority. We agree that condemnation is a legislative function; we disagree with Delphey that an ordinance specific to each property is required in order to condemn, but note that, even if a legislative act specific to each property was required, that the Aldermen, as a legislative body, did vote to condemn the Delphey property on November 6, 2003, in a closed session. The City of Frederick was incorporated as a municipality in 1816 pursuant to Chapter 74 of the Acts of 1816. As a municipality, it is governed by Article 23A, the first section of which provides: The inhabitants of every incorporated municipality in Maryland constitute and shall continue to be a body corporate, and under the corporate name shall have perpetual succession, may sue and be sued, and may pass and adopt all ordinances, resolutions or bylaws necessary or proper to exercise the powers granted herein or elsewhere. Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl.Vol.), Article 23A Section 1. Section 2 of Article 23A enumerates the express ordinance-making powers conferred in Section 1 and states: (a) General authority.  The legislative body of every incorporated municipality in this State, except Baltimore City, by whatever name known, shall have general power to pass such ordinances not contrary to the Constitution of Maryland, public general law, or, except as provided in § 2B of this article, public local law as they may deem necessary. . . . (b) Express powers.  In addition to, but not in substitution of, the powers which have been, or may hereafter be, granted to it, such legislative body also shall have the following express ordinance -making powers:    (24) To acquire by conveyance, purchase or condemnation real or leasehold property needed for any public purpose; to erect buildings thereon for the benefit of the municipality; and to sell at public or private sale after twenty days' public notice and to convey to the purchaser or purchasers thereof any real or leasehold property belonging to the municipality when such legislative body determines that the same is no longer needed for any public use. Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl.Vol.), Article 23A Section 2 (emphasis added). The plain language of Section 2(b) confers the power of condemnation on the legislative body of the municipality. Section 7 of Article 2 of the City of Frederick Charter vests [a]ll legislative powers of the city in the Aldermen, and Section 173 of Article Fourteen of the Charter also authorizes the Aldermen to: condemn any property, right, or interest belonging to any person, persons, corporation, or corporations for the purpose of making any public improvement. Thus, pursuant to the express grant of authority of Section 2(b)(24) of Article 23A and Section 173 of the City of Frederick Charter, the Aldermen, acting in their legislative capacity, possessed the requisite authority to condemn the Delphey property specifically when they so voted in the November 6 closed, executive session. Whether they styled the result as an ordinance is of no moment, nor whether the session was characterized as executive; the action taken by the Aldermen was legislative within the meaning of the Section 2 of Article 23A. Delphey, however, cites Inlet, supra, as authority for its contention that an enabling ordinance specific to the property is required to condemn. Delphey misconstrues Inlet. Inlet, which does not even pertain to a condemnation, held that the substance of the Ocean City Council's actions conveying property did not comply with the requirements of Article 23A and the Ocean City Charter for an ordinance conveying City property. Inlet involved an agreement by Ocean City to convey twenty-five feet of a city street and its appurtenant riparian rights to Inlet, a private corporation, in exchange for Inlet's agreement to develop and maintain the property. Section 2(b)(24) of Article 23A authorizes municipalities to convey to the purchaser or purchasers thereof any real or leasehold property belonging to the municipality when such legislative body determines that the same is no longer needed for any public use. Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl.Vol.), Article 23A Section 2(b)(24). This Court, in an opinion by Chief Judge Robert Murphy, first emphasized that it is the substance of the City Council's action which determines its legality: considering the legality of the action taken by the City Council in this case, therefore, and in particular whether in the circumstances the conveyances could properly be authorized by resolution, we look to the substance of what the City Council undertook to achieve by its action. Inlet, 313 Md. at 430, 545 A.2d at 1305 (emphasis added). The Court then pointed out that the conveyance of the City's interest in the [property] solely for the private benefit of another, is not within the legislative body's power, and went on to state that both the Ocean City Charter and Section 2(b)(24) of Article 23A required that the Ocean City Council affirmatively make a determination that there is no longer any public need for the street before undertaking the conveyance, and that the Council's actions failed to comply with this requirement. Id. at 431, 545 A.2d at 1305. The Court also stated that an ordinance conveying property was required to be signed by the Mayor or passed over the Mayor's veto, and that the City Council's actions failed to meet this requirement. Id. at 433-34, 545 A.2d at 1306. The Inlet opinion concluded that: Considering the central involvement of South Division Street and the waters of the bay in Inlet's proposal, and the magnitude of the property interest involved (City property of estimated value approximating one million dollars), a simple resolution, neither reduced to writing nor journalized as required by the City Charter, cannot suffice to validate the City's actions. An ordinance was thus fundamental to the legality of the conveyances here in question; without it, the City Council's action was without legal effect. Id. (emphasis added). The record is devoid in the present case of any evidence that the actions of the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Frederick failed to comply with Article 23A and Charter requirements for the condemnation of property, which is a failure of proof on the part of Delphey, the movant for dismissal and summary judgment in which the City's authority was challenged. See Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 343 Md. 185, 206, 680 A.2d 1067, 1078 (1996) (stating that moving party bears initial burden of proof). As a result, Delphey's reliance on Inlet is misplaced. In recognizing that the Mayor and Aldermen did act legislatively in condemning the specific Delphey property, we do not hold that a property specific ordinance, or legislative act, is always required in order to condemn. In fact, our jurisprudence supports the opposite conclusion. In Anne Arundel County v. Bowen, 258 Md. 713, 267 A.2d 168 (1970), and Boswell v. Prince George's County, 273 Md. 522, 330 A.2d 663 (1975), this Court held that no ordinances specific to the properties being condemned were required when legislative authorization had previously been granted. In Bowen, the respondents challenged the County Executive's authority to condemn their property because no ordinance had been passed by the County Council specific to their property. We affirmed the condemnation because the County Council had set aside funds in the annual budget for the construction of the road for which the respondents' property was being condemned, and therefore the condemnation had been legislatively authorized. Bowen, 258 Md. at 720, 267 A.2d at 171. In Boswell, we again affirmed a condemnation executed by the Prince George's County Executive and held that no ordinance specific to property was required because the project was already authorized by the county council in the annual budget and therefore the proper legislative authorization for this project existed. 273 Md. at 533, 330 A.2d at 670. In the case sub judice, the decision to utilize the City's condemnation power in order to acquire the Delphey property was approved by the Mayor and reduced to writing in the minutes and represented the consummation of a long history of legislative actions taken to secure the best site for the construction of a new parking deck, to include: adoption by ordinance, in open meetings, a five-year budget every year since 1989 allotting funds for the construction of the new parking deck; in 1999, again in an open meeting, commissioning a Garage Site Evaluation Study, which recommended the Delphey property as the best location for the new parking deck; in 2001, again in an open meeting, assembling the Parking Task Force which confirmed the selection of the Delphey location in its Downtown Parking Plan; commissioning two separate appraisals of the Delphey property, and; in 2002, again in an open meeting, approving the Deck 4 Parking Agreement, a finance agreement between the City and the County. We therefore hold that Aldermen's vote in the November 6, 2002 meeting constituted sufficient authority for the City to condemn the Delphey property.