Opinion ID: 1192043
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: summary judgment was improperly granted against helstrom's duress claim.

Text: In Totem Marine, 584 P.2d at 21-23, we held that there are three elements to be satisfied before a contract can be voided for duress: 1) one party involuntarily accepted the terms of another, 2) circumstances permitted no other alternative, and 3) such circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the other party. Id. at 21. The burden is on the party seeking to void the contract to show these elements by clear and convincing evidence. Schmidt v. Lashley, 627 P.2d 201, 204 (Alaska 1981). The first two prongs of Totem Marine are met if the challenging party believed that he had no reasonable alternative to agreeing to the other party's terms, or, as it is often stated, that he had no adequate remedy if the threat were to be carried out. Totem Marine, 584 P.2d at 22. What constitutes a reasonable alternative is a question of fact, depending on the circumstances of each case. Id. An available legal remedy ... may provide such an alternative. Id. [T]he adequacy of the remedy is to be tested by a practical standard which takes into consideration the exigencies of the situation in which the alleged victim finds himself. Id. (citations omitted). However, [a]n available alternative or remedy may not be adequate where the delay involved in pursuing the remedy would cause immediate and irreparable loss to one's economic or business interest. Id. The belief must be held subjectively; the reasonableness of the alternatives is to be judged objectively. The coercive acts prong has been liberally construed, requiring that the strained circumstances be the result of acts which are criminal, tortious, or even merely wrongful in the moral sense. Id.; Wassink v. Hawkins, 763 P.2d 971, 974 (Alaska 1988). When the contract sought to be avoided is a settlement of litigation, relevant considerations also include the manner in which the release was obtained, including whether it was hastily secured at the instigation of the releasee, whether the releasor was represented by counsel, and whether he relied on representations of the releasee. Finally, the relative bargaining positions of the parties should be weighed. Schmidt, 627 P.2d at 204 n. 8. Taking the facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Helstrom, we conclude that summary judgment was improper on Helstrom's duress claim. Most of Helstrom's duress allegations focus on the various acts of the Borough which had the effect of depriving him of income. Helstrom claims that the deprivation of his income interfered with his ability to retain counsel and visit his sick daughter. These acts by the Borough, however, did not interfere with Helstrom's ability to leave Barrow or retain counsel, since Helstrom's execution of the settlement agreement did not free up any of these sources of income lost due to arguable Borough actions. The settlement transfers the rights to these potential sources of income to the Borough. Yet without these funds, Helstrom flew out of Barrow immediately after signing the settlement and formally retained Taylor as his attorney. Thus, these acts by the Borough did not by themselves deprive Helstrom of his ability to leave Barrow or retain Taylor in this fashion. A far different case is presented by Helstrom's claim that, money aside, he believed that he could not get a plane ticket out of Barrow to see his sick daughter until he settled with the Borough. According to Helstrom's affidavit, the Borough police officers who served Helstrom told him that anything I purchased, such as a plane ticket, would be subject to execution. The Markair agent allegedly told Helstrom not merely that a ticket might be subject to execution under state law, but rather the specific fact that  she could not let me on a plane without permission from David Weber. (Emphasis added). Although Weber contradicts Helstrom's assertion, for purposes of summary judgment factual disputes must be resolved in the non-movant's favor. Sea Lion, 787 P.2d at 116. The involuntariness prong of duress is a subjective test. The question is not whether a reasonable person's will would have been overcome; the question is whether Helstrom's was. Totem Marine, 584 P.2d at 21. Given that Helstrom believed that he could not leave without settling with the Borough and that he has adduced a factual basis for this belief, a material question of fact remains as to the involuntariness prong of Totem Marine. We conclude that Helstrom has adduced sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could reasonably find that Helstrom had no other reasonable alternative than to settle. Neither party disputes that the only practical way to get from Barrow to Fairbanks in early March is to fly. Arguably Helstrom may have had alternatives to signing the settlement in order to obtain a ticket which would not be seized. Helstrom could have asked Weber if he was going to seize any ticket. Alternatively, Helstrom could have attempted to buy a ticket and see if it would have been seized. Helstrom could have also called Taylor and asked him his advice. However, a trier of fact might reasonably find that these options would have been futile, and thus not reasonable. The writ of execution was broad enough to cover plane tickets. According to Helstrom, Weber had already stated that his permission would be required to leave town. Previous pleas by Taylor on Helstrom's behalf had been unavailing. Moreover, the adequacy of these alternatives must be measured by a practical standard taking into account the extreme exigencies of the situation. Helstrom's daughter was seriously ill and it was his perception that he had to get to Fairbanks promptly. Given this as well as his belief that he could not do so without settling, Helstrom was in a much weaker bargaining position, a factor weighing in favor of voiding the settlement. Schmidt, 627 P.2d at 204 n. 8. Also, the fact that Helstrom was not represented at the settlement's execution weighs in favor of voiding the settlement. Id. Finally, again taking the facts most favorably to Helstrom, the Borough caused his plight through acts that were tortious or at least wrongful in the moral sense. See Totem Marine, 584 P.2d at 22. If Weber knew that Helstrom was trying to leave Barrow and, by procuring the aid of the airlines, prevented his only reasonable means of departure, Helstrom might have a claim sounding in false imprisonment. Indeed, Helstrom eventually counterclaimed against the Borough for false imprisonment. The Markair agent, apparently after having spoken to Weber, allegedly told Helstrom that he couldn't leave without Weber's permission. Weber admits talking to the Markair agent about the subject, but denies that he intended to prevent Helstrom from leaving. An actor is subject to liability for false imprisonment if (a) he acts intending to confine the other or a third person within boundaries fixed by the actor and (b) his act directly or indirectly results in such a confinement of the other, and (c) the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35(1) (1965). Cf. Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 461 (Alaska 1986) (elements of false arrest are (1) a restraint upon plaintiff's freedom (2) without proper legal authority.) Taking the facts most favorably to Helstrom, as we must for purposes of summary judgment, Sea Lion, 787 P.2d at 116, [2] the deprivation of a plane ticket at the instigation of the Borough, effectively preventing Helstrom from leaving Barrow, sufficiently confined him. [3] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 36, comment b, illustration 6 & 7; see also Allen v. Fromme, 141 A.D. 362, 126 N.Y.S. 520, 520-21 (1910) (defendant liable for causing sheriff to restrain plaintiff from leaving New York City to prevent plaintiff from evading a meritless debt claim). Helstrom lacked other practical means of leaving. Cf. Whittaker v. Sandford, 110 Me. 77, 85 A. 399, 402 (1912). Nor, taking the facts most favorably to Helstrom, did the Borough have proper legal authority to so confine him. Helstrom had been suspended from his job without pay and was apparently not otherwise earning regular income. Former AS 09.38.030(b) provided that under such circumstances Helstrom was entitled to an exemption of $700 per month in his liquid assets. The writ, which we note was a form writ prepared and submitted by the Borough, extends to all of Helstrom's assets, without excluding statutorily exempt property. The writ could not lawfully have seized so much of Helstrom's assets as to prevent him from leaving town. In summary, material questions of fact remain as to Helstrom's duress claim.