Opinion ID: 2636899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Denial of automatic motion for reduction of penalty.

Text: Before ruling on appellant's automatic motion for reduction of the penalty (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) (section 190.4(e)), the trial judge stated that he had read the probation officer's report and recommendation. Appellant contends that, in ruling on the motion, the trial court improperly relied on information contained in a probation officer's report and misconstrued factor (b) of section 190.3 [50] as including acts or threats of violence occurring during the commission of the capital offense. The People concede the latter point, but argue that appellant suffered no prejudice as a consequence, and argue that while the judge referred to information in the probation report, that information was inconsequential in the ruling. We agree. While it appears that the judge did improperly mention information that was not before the jury, we are satisfied that the information had no effect on either his conclusions with regard to the individual aggravating and mitigating circumstances or his ultimate conclusion that the jury's findings were supported by the weight of the evidence and were not contrary to the law and evidence. Section 190.4(e) provides that whenever a verdict of death has been returned, the defendant is deemed to have applied for modification of the penalty. It further provides that, in ruling on the application, the judge is to review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances ... and shall make a determination as to whether the jury's findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence presented. ( Ibid. ) The judge is to state the reasons for his or her findings on the record. Judge Finney did so here. Those findings refute any claim that error in the procedure was prejudicial to appellant. The court must review the probation officer's report prior to imposition of sentence for noncapital offenses if the defendant is eligible for probation. (§ 1203, subd. (b)(3).) Because it may consider only evidence that was before the jury in ruling on an automatic application for reduction of a death verdict (§ 190.4(e); People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 775, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754), we have stated that the court should neither read nor consider a probation officer's report before ruling on an application for modification of the death verdict. ( People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 383, 75 Cal. Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) Failure to defer reading the report is not invariably prejudicial, however. ( People v. Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1329-1330, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221.) In the course of ruling on motions for a change of venue or to exclude evidence and in dealing with other routine matters, it is inevitable that a judge will become aware of information that is not presented to the jury. As an aspect of the presumption that judicial duty is properly performed, we presume, nonetheless, in other proceedings that the court knows and applies the correct statutory and case law ( People v. Mack (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1032, 224 Cal.Rptr. 208) and is able to distinguish admissible from inadmissible evidence, relevant from irrelevant facts, and to recognize those facts which properly may be considered in the judicial decisionmaking process. (Evid.Code, § 664; Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 899, 913-915, 141 Cal. Rptr. 133, 569 P.2d 727; In re Contreras (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 549, 555, 119 Cal. Rptr. 757; People v. Ozene (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 905, 915, 104 Cal.Rptr. 170.) A section 190.4(e) proceeding is subject to the same presumption regardless of the source of the judge's knowledge. We presume that a judge is aware that a section 190.4(e) ruling is to be based solely on the evidence before the jury. Not only does the language of section 190.4(e) make that clear, but prior to the January 20, 1989, proceedings at which the section 190.4(e) motion was denied here, we had stated in People v. Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 1329, 248 Cal. Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221, that a probation report is not relevant to the court's determination of such motions. [51] Absent evidence to the contrary the court will assume that the judge was not influenced by the material that was not before the jury of which he became aware through the probation report or other proceedings. ( People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th 701, 775, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754; People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 81, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224.) The trial court here did refer to matters in the probation report that were not before the jury  that appellant's trailer was a virtual arsenal of firearms; that appellant had purchased a gun to use in these crimes; that appellant had complained about the adequacy of funds for his defense; that defendant had told the probation officer he knew his conduct was wrong but believed it was all right because he was commanded by God to do it; and that such force had been used in tightening the FLEX-CUFs that the cuffs were the size of a wrist. [52] We must therefore examine the record to determine whether the court may have been improperly influenced by material in the report. ( People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 383, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) We are assisted in this by the trial court's thorough recitation of the reasons for denying the application to modify the death verdict. Before making his section 190.4(e) ruling, the court made a statement in response to the arguments of counsel. The court incorporated some of those remarks into his explanation for denial of the application to modify the death verdict. Considered together, the court's introductory remarks and explanation make it unmistakably clear that his consideration of material in the probation report did not improperly influence the ruling. The court's knowledge that defendant stated to the probation officer that God was telling him what to do could not have been prejudicial. The court, having heard the expert testimony offered during the sanity phase of the trial, was well aware of appellant's claims in that regard and this information added nothing other than the fact that the statement to the probation officer was consistent with appellant's statements to the psychiatrists. As discussed below, the court did not believe that appellant believed that God was commanding or condoning appellant's actions. We are also satisfied that consideration of the other evidence did not influence the outcome of the section 190.4(e) proceedings. The reference to appellant's statement about the funds spent for his defense was made in the court's introductory remarks and not referred to again. The judge said only that if there was anything in the probation report that disturbed him it was appellant's comment about the way the trial was handled and whether or not sufficient funds were spent to defend him. The court stated that defense counsel had served appellant well throughout the trial, that they had done a premiere job, and the judge could not recall any case in the county where funds were spent to the extent they had been an attempt to give appellant every conceivable advantage at trial. Nothing in those remarks or the court's explanation of the denial of the section 190.4(e) motion suggests that the court considered this information relevant to the sentencing decision or was influenced in any way by this aspect of the probation report. To the contrary. The court's statements indicate that the circumstances of the crime justified the jury verdict and his denial of the application to modify the penalty. In his introductory remarks the judge stated that, while the murders presented one of the least gory murder situations he had seen as a trial judge and attorney, appellant's conduct was probably the most completely evil course of conduct that I have ever been involved in. There were no extenuating circumstances. The court noted the planning that had occurred over a considerable length of time. Appellant had to have in mind that he would have to get rid of the chaperones and bought the FLEX-CUFs and the gun because he might have to take life in order to have his way with the girls. In that sense, I think it was one of the most diabolical and evil schemes that I've ever seen in my career. The judge rejected the evidence of mental illness, stating that he did not believe appellant's story to the psychiatrists, did not believe that appellant thought God was telling him to do certain things, and thought that appellant's claim was a rationalization of what appellant wanted to use to explain his conduct. The court believed appellant was a tremendously egocentric person who constructed his own religion and when you create your own God, then you can dictate what that God tells you to do ... this is nothing else than an individual who knows that that's not God talking to him, that's a rationalization of what he wants to use to explain his conduct. This was consistent with evidence offered at the sanity phase. The court then said: And so having heard the testimony, I just do not believe that Mr. Coddington was under the impression that God was telling him what to do, and if he wasn't, then I'm correct that this was the most evil of evil schemes, and I firmly believe that it was. Before addressing the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation, the judge expressly stated that he was acting pursuant to his statutory obligation as set forth in section 190.4 and was making an independent determination whether the jury's findings were contrary to the law on the evidence that was presented to the jury. In his subsequent explanation of his section 190.4(e) ruling, the judge first addressed factor (a)the circumstances of the crimereferring back to his earlier remarks and describing appellant's conduct in detail. He mentioned the purchase of the gun twice and once cited the probation report as the source of that information. [53] Those references are so minor in comparison to the other events in the court's recital that we are satisfied in the court's conclusion, that the murders were a callous, calculated, and heinous scheme in which appellant was willing to kill the women so he could carry out his own desires, and thus the circumstances of the crime were aggravating circumstances, would not have differed had the court been unaware of the statement in the probation report that appellant bought a gun specifically for use in the scheme to sexually assault young girls. The same is true of the court's mention that appellant had an arsenal of guns. No gun was used in the crimes. The ownership of guns was irrelevant to any factor. Addressing factor (b)  the presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant involving the use or attempted use of force  the court did err by considering appellant's use of force during the murder under that factor, which refers only to other instances of violent conduct or threatened violence ( People v. Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 945, 39 Cal. Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93), and by failing to recognize that the absence of prior criminal activity involving force is mitigating. However, there is no indication that the court considered appellant's use of force during the murders to be an aggravating circumstance that was additional to factor (a) and double counted the aggravating nature of that conduct when concluding that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating. Appellant argues that the error did affect the balance because absent the error, factor (b) would have been considered mitigating  reflecting an absence of prior violence or threats of violence  and would have been weighed as such with factor (c) which the court found was mitigating  the absence of prior felony convictions. We agree that the court erred, but not that this error affected the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors in the court's ruling on the motion for modification of sentence. The court's other remarks make that clear. Additionally, it was during the court's statement about factor (b) that the court made the italicized reference to information that was not before the jury: [H]e used such force in strangling the two older women with the Flex-cufs that Detective O'Brien described the circumference of those Flex-cufs as being approximately the size of a human wrist. One can hardly imagine a more violent or sadistic act than strangulation. Consideration of this information could not have been prejudicial, however, in the court's conclusion that appellant had engaged in violent criminal acts. The remnants of one of the FLEX-CUFs were in evidence, as was a photo of Walsh with the FLEX-CUF around her neck, and the medical examiner had described the means by which the murder victims were strangled. That appellant had engaged in violent criminal acts was clearly established by the evidence and effectively conceded by appellant at the penalty phase. We see no possibility that the court may have considered appellant's conduct more aggravated because of Sergeant O'Brien's description of the used FLEX-CUF than he did simply on the basis of the evidence at trial regarding the manner in which the victims were killed and the photographs depicting the effect of the FLEX-CUF. Discussing factor (d)whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance the judge stated that in his 20 years of involvement with trial of criminal cases, he had never seen a more complete exploration and exposition of the issue concerning mental status. He expressed his view that the jury's rejection of appellant's claim that he was insane at the time he committed the crimes was correct. The court acknowledged that appellant had been suffering emotional disturbance occasioned by the excitement of the event, but, the court concluded, this was not the type of emotional disturbance contemplated by the Legislature. The judge referred to his initial remarks, and again stated that he did not believe the defendant's claim that he was operating under the commands of his concept of a God. There was no independent evidence other than appellant's own statements to the psychiatrists. Evidence that appellant was flighty and his actions were somewhat bizarre just before the crimes did not indicate severe emotional or mental distress. He made no mention of voices of God or any mental aberration when he confessed to the police. Unless being self-centered and egocentric constituted a legally cognizable form of insanity or mental duress, the court found no basis for mitigation under this factor. The Court specifically finds that the evidence including the testimony of the psychiatrists do [ sic ] not demonstrate that the Defendant was insane or acting under such emotional or mental distress as to reduce the punishment from death to life without possibility of parole. The court further found that the weight of the evidence supports the jury's findings, and that this does not then constitute a mitigating factor. The court reached the same conclusion as to factors (f) and (h)  whether the offense was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct, or whether the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or intoxication. There was no evidence of intoxication and the judge again stated that he did not believe that appellant believed that he was acting with moral justification. Factor (e)whether the victim was a participant in or consented to the homicidal conductwas found to be totally absent, as was factor (g)whether appellant acted under duress or the domination of another person. The judge stated once again that he did not believe appellant's statements about God and the directions of God. The judge considered appellant's age at the time of the offense (27) to be mitigating under factor (i), and as to factor (j) whether the defendant was an accomplice or a minor participantstated that the factor would be mitigating if present, but found it was not present and therefore not mitigating. The court found no other circumstance that would extenuate the gravity of the crime (factor (k)), stating that he believed the course of conduct was of such an evil nature that there were no extenuating circumstances that would diminish the gravity of the crime. The factor was absent and thus not mitigating. The court then concluded that the jury findings and verdict were supported by the weight of the evidence, and found after independent review of all the evidence that the jury's verdicts and findings were not contrary to the law or the evidence. Appellant argues that, had the court not considered the information in the probation report, it might have given greater importance to the evidence of mental disturbance. He also claims that the court ruled as it did because of the nature of appellant's religious beliefs. As the People note, however, the judge did not simply give less weight to factor (d) as a mitigating factor, he disbelieved the evidence that appellant acted under emotional or mental disturbance. The rejection of the claim was not based on the nature of appellant's religious beliefs. The court simply did not believe appellant's claim that appellant believed that God, any God, condoned or directed appellant's actions. The court found only two mitigating circumstances: appellant's age at the time of the offense and the absence of prior felony convictions. In light of the court's remarks regarding the heinous, calculated, and evil nature of appellant's conduct, we see no possibility that had the court not considered information in the probation report, or considered the absence of other crimes of violence to be mitigating, those circumstances would have been found to outweigh the aggravating circumstances or be a basis for a verdict less than death. We conclude, therefore, that the errors of which appellant complains were not prejudicial. In People v. Lewis, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pages 266-267, 266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892, on which appellant relies for his assertion that consideration of this extraneous matter was prejudicial, the information in the probation report which the court considered was about the defendant's juvenile record and his involvement in a prior homicide, information which influenced the court's conclusion that aggravating evidence outweighed mitigating. This is not the case here. Rather, as in People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at page 775, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754, while the court did make reference to the probation report, we are satisfied that the irrelevant matters therein did not influence the ruling on the motion to modify the death verdict.

Defendant was restrained by leg irons throughout the trial. Counsel had objected, but the judge ruled that in light of the nature of the crimes, the district attorney's instruction that the defendant be treated as a risk while being transported, and the bailiffs request, he would permit the restraint. Based on a statement made by trial counsel during penalty phase argument, appellant asserts that the jury was aware of the restraint. [54] Because there was no manifest need or compelling reason for the restraint, he argues, his due process and confrontation clause rights were violated. Assuming that the restraint was unjustified, the record does not support the claim that the jury was aware of the restraints. Absent evidence that the jury was aware that appellant was restrained any error is harmless. ( People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 583-584, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142.) We will not assume solely on the basis of a statement by counsel made during penalty phase argument after months of trial and in the absence of any complaint by counsel during trial that the precautions taken to avoid prejudice to appellant were ineffective and that the jury was aware of, or influenced by, the restraint. When the subject was raised at the beginning of jury selection, the court authorized leg irons, but not handcuffs. He also directed that if handcuffs were used in transporting appellant, he should be brought into the courtroom before the jurors arrived and removed after they left. The bailiff assured the court that the practice had been to use handcuffs during transport and in the elevator but not in court, and that [w]e make sure he's out of the view of the jurors first before we take him out. There is no indication that this practice was not followed throughout the trial, and counsel made no further complaint or objection to the manner in which the restraints were used. Moreover, prejudicial error is not established simply on the basis of one or more jurors having seen the defendant in shackles. ( People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 584, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142.)
Appellant offers several bases other than those rejected above in support of his claim that his trial counsel did not afford constitutionally adequate representation. To establish constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel under either the state or federal constitutional right to counsel, appellant must demonstrate (1) that his attorney's performance fell below an objective level of reasonableness, i.e., that counsel's performance was not within an objective level of reasonableness and thus did not meet the standard to be expected of a reasonably competent attorney, and (2) that he suffered prejudice as a result of that failure. Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's errors, the result would have been different. ( Lockhart v. Fretwell (1993) 506 U.S. 364, 371, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180; Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052; People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 414, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442.) We have applied these standards in rejecting several of appellant's ineffectiveness of counsel claims. In addition, however, when the reason for counsel's action or inaction is apparent on the record, the court will determine whether that reason reflects reasonably competent performance by an attorney acting as a conscientious and diligent advocate. If no explanation appears, an ineffective counsel claim will be rejected unless the attorney was asked for and did not offer an explanation, or there can be no satisfactory explanation. ( People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 700-701, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640.) In other cases the appellant is left to his remedy on habeas corpus where evidence outside the record may shed light on the reason for the attorney's action. In any assessment of trial counsel's conduct of a criminal defense we are mindful of the admonition of the United States Supreme Court that we must make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.) The burden is on an appellant who challenges the competence of his or her trial counsel to overcome the presumption that counsel's conduct is within the range of reasonably professional assistance. ( Ibid.; People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 896, 85 Cal. Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15.) With these standards in mind, we address the remainder of appellant's ineffective counsel claims and conclude that none has merit.
To make a showing of constitutionally inadequate representation by counsel when failure to seek suppression of evidence on a Fourth Amendment ground is asserted as the basis for the ineffective counsel claim, the party must establish that the Fourth Amendment claim had merit and that it is reasonably probable that a different verdict would have been rendered had the evidence been excluded. ( Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986) 477 U.S. 365, 375, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305; Mason v. Godinez, supra, 47 F.3d at p. 855.) Appellant's claim that counsel should have argued that the FBI manufactured an emergency in order to avoid getting a warrant lacks merit. The evidence confirms that there was no unjustified delay in seeking a warrant. As of the time the FBI agents broke into appellant's trailer, only three days after the victims had been reported missing, one of the investigating agents had contacted a Sacramento agent who acted as legal adviser, described the available information, and obtained the legal adviser's opinion that probable cause to obtain a warrant existed. The agent had then been instructed, according to FBI procedure, to contact the office of the United States Attorney to obtain a formal legal opinion on probable cause. Instructions had been given to contact the United States Magistrate in the South Lake Tahoe area to see if he would be available to execute a warrant and if application could be made to him. The call to the United States Attorney was not made only because ensuing developments led the FBI agents to conclude that an immediate entry was necessary. The FBI did not precipitate or manufacture those developments.
Appellant argues that undoubtedly trial counsel had a copy of FBI Agent McKevitt's report regarding his interview with Allen Hacker in which, McKevitt testified, Allen Hacker told McKevitt that appellant often read The Anarchist Cookbook and seemed interested in killing women. Therefore, he argues, counsel should have anticipated, before calling Allen Hacker as a defense witness, that the prosecution would offer McKevitt's statement in rebuttal. Counsel should have sought a ruling on the admissibility of McKevitt's testimony before Hacker took the stand. This argument is no more than an invitation to second-guess trial counsel's tactics. As appears above, their primary defense was an effort to persuade the jury that the murders were not premeditated. They obviously believed that Allen Hacker's testimony was important to dispel any implication to that effect in the prosecutor's opening statement. We will not engage in this type of second-guessing. We cannot say on this record that the tactic chosen was one that competent counsel would not elect. Moreover, in light of the extensive evidence of premeditation, even were we to conclude otherwise it is not reasonably probable that a different verdict would have been reached had Hacker's and McKevitt's testimony not been heard by the jury.
We have rejected appellant's misconduct claims above. To the extent that any of the instances cited as misconduct might be considered so, however, we note that mere failure to object to prosecutorial argument ... rarely establishes incompetence on the part of defense counsel in the absence of some explanation on the record for counsel's action or inaction. ( People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 855, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) That is true here.
The same objective standard for assessing the competence of counsel applied at the guilt phase is applied to a claim of ineffective assistance at the subsequent phases of a trial. ( People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 855, 64 Cal. Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) Dr. Mills testified on cross-examination by the prosecutor at the sanity phase that Carol Wiseman, a former girlfriend of appellant's, told him that appellant was sometimes physically intimidating when angry and had frightened her. The claim of incompetent representation is based solely on trial counsel's failure, after the court had ruled they could do so, to bring out that Wiseman had also said with regard to the charged crimes that the person she knew would not have done them and appellant must have been insane if he did them. The record offers no explanation for counsel's decision not to proceed in that manner, and thus is not a basis for concluding that counsel had no satisfactory reason. In any event, there could have been no prejudice. All of the expert witnesses testified that the incidents with Wiseman or Cluff had no relevance to their diagnoses.
Again appellant, with the benefit of hindsight, asks the court to second-guess counsel. It was not enough they attempted to dissuade appellant from absenting himself from the penalty phase argument, asked the court to counsel appellant, and conferred with appellant again after the court did so. Counsel should have done more. They should have asked the court to engage appellant in a dialogue, and should have objected that the court was presenting appellant with an unconstitutional and unnecessary choice. The court should have been asked to restrain the prosecutor's inflammatory style and appellant should have been offered the opportunity to remain and request a recess if that became necessary. The record confirms that the court and counsel did all that could reasonably be expected in this situation. The assumption that appellant had not been told by counsel that a recess could be requested if he became too upset to control himself is not supported by the record. The prosecutor's style of argument did not exceed permissible bounds and was not subject to the type of prior restraint now suggested by appellant simply to avoid upsetting him.
We have reviewed the penalty phase argument and do not agree with appellant that it fell short of the quality demanded by the Sixth and Eighth Amendments. For the most part his argument here is only that a better or different penalty phase argument could have been made. This is not a basis for finding constitutionally ineffective assistance. ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 471, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388.) Appellant also complains that trial counsel did not make it clear that the absence of prior violent criminal conduct in his past could be considered mitigating even if he had committed nonviolent criminal acts or that mental illness that was not extreme could be considered. But counsel did argue that unlike many capital cases, appellant had no prior felony convictions. With respect to mental illness, counsel acknowledged that the jury had found that appellant was not legally insane and argued that the jury could nonetheless say that he was crazy when he committed the crimes and urged the jury to remember that all five psychiatrists believed that he suffered a severe and prolonged mental defect absent which the crimes would not have occurred. Appellant received adequate representation in the penalty phase argument.
Trial counsel agreed that the court should delete factors (f) and (g) from the instructions describing the aggravating and mitigating factors. Factor (f) directs the jury to consider [w]hether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct. Factor (g) asks [w]hether or not the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. The record does not suggest that counsel could not have had a reasonable tactical reason for that decision. Since the factor is mitigating only if the defendant reasonably believes the conduct is morally justified, counsel may have concluded that reference to that factor would be harmful. Even assuming counsel had no tactical reason for the decision, however, we fail to see how appellant was prejudiced by the omission of these factors from the instructions.
When the jury returned its verdict of death, the court asked counsel whether they wanted the juror polled. Defense counsel responded simply [N]o. The court asked if the answer was no and counsel responded No. He did not request that the jury be polled when the earlier verdicts were returned. Appellant contends that this omission and the failure to poll the jurors when they returned guilt, special circumstances, and penalty phase verdicts requires reversal since a defendant has an absolute right, conferred by section 1163, to have the jury polled at the request of either party. Polling, he argues, is necessary to safeguard a defendant's right to a unanimous jury, to ensure that no juror has been coerced, and to ensure that the verdict is not mistaken. As appellant recognizes, this claim is actually an assertion that counsel's failure to request a jury poll constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. He is unable to establish prejudice, however, as this record does not reflect that any of the dangers polling seeks to avoid actually occurred.
Appellant contends that the California death penalty statute is constitutionally invalid on numerous grounds: (1) failure to require explicit jury findings on factors in mitigation and aggravation; (2) prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions; (3) lack of comparative (proportionality) review; (4) failure to meaningfully narrow class of offenses rendering defendant's offense death-eligible; and more specifically (5) the multiple-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) fails to meaningfully narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. This court has repeatedly rejected the first four challenges to the law ( People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1064, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 988 P.2d 531; People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 904-905, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15; People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1017, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171; People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 866, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280) and the United States Supreme Court recognized multiple murder as a narrowing factor in ( Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988) 484 U.S. 231, 246, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568.)
Appellant claims that remand for resentencing on the noncapital counts is required because, while the court stated reasons for imposing the upper term, the court failed to state its reasons for imposing consecutive terms or for sentencing under section 667.6 instead of section 1170.1. We disagree. The court's statement of reasons was adequate to demonstrate that the court was aware that the choice to sentence under section 667.6 was a sentencing choice separate from the decision to impose consecutive terms. That is all that is required. ( People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, 193 Cal.Rptr. 882, 667 P.2d 686.)