Opinion ID: 1946351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Initiating a Civil Contempt Proceeding

Text: Appellant alleges that the contempt proceeding is without force and effect because it was initiated by Officer Holter, who was not authorized to initiate a constructive civil contempt proceeding. Appellee contends that the Circuit Court initiated the proceeding for constructive civil contempt on its own accord by issuing an order that fully complied with the express provisions of the constructive civil contempt rule. We agree with appellant. Officer Holter initiated the contempt proceeding in the case sub judice and he was not an authorized party under Rule 15-206(b) to initiate a constructive civil contempt proceeding. As we have indicated, supra, Rule 15-206 provides, in relevant part, that: (b) Who may initiate. (1) The court may initiate a proceeding for constructive civil contempt by filing an order complying with the requirements of section (c) of this Rule. (2) Any party to an action in which an alleged contempt occurred and, upon request by the court, the Attorney General, may initiate a proceeding for constructive civil contempt by filing a petition with the court against which the contempt was allegedly committed. (3) In a support enforcement action where the alleged contempt is based on failure to pay spousal or child support, any agency authorized by law may bring the proceeding. Under the facts of the case sub judice, the contempt proceeding was not in a support enforcement action and was not initiated by a party to the proceeding or by the Attorney General. Therefore, sections (b)(2) and (b)(3) of Rule 15-206 do not apply. Appellee alleges that the contempt proceeding was in compliance with section (b)(1) because the Circuit Court initiated the contempt proceeding by filing an order in compliance with section (c) of Rule 15-206. Appellee, however, ignores the fact that the Petition for Contempt, which initiated the contempt proceeding, was filed by Officer Holter. The Petition for Contempt that was filed on August 31, 2000, stated that Officer Holter was the petitioner and that Officer Holter was requesting that Mr. Zetty be found in contempt of court. The Circuit Court then issued a Show Cause Order to appellant. It was not the Circuit Court's Show Cause Order that initiated the contempt proceeding, it was the Petition for Contempt filed by Officer Holter that prompted the Circuit Court to then issue the Show Cause Order. [9] Appellee states in its brief that Officer Holter's Petition for Contempt was just the catalyst that permitted the Circuit Court to issue a Show Cause Order. That would be similar to a party to the action in which the alleged contempt occurred, a party authorized to initiate a constructive civil contempt proceeding under Rule 15-206(b)(2), filing a Petition for Contempt, which would serve as a catalyst for the court to then issue an order. In that case, the authorized party or catalyst would be responsible for initiating the contempt proceeding. At the hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Circuit Court held that Officer Holter as the functionary of the agency that the Court charged with several duties under this protective order had standing to file a Petition for Contempt. We disagree with the Circuit Court's interpretation of Officer Holter's standing. The Protective Order stated that appellant shall surrender all firearms to the Charles County Sheriff's Office and that appellant shall arrange to return to his home with the Charles County Sheriff's Office to collect clothing and personal necessities. Rule 15-206 does not provide the sheriff's office with the authority to initiate a constructive civil contempt proceeding. We also point out that the subtitle in the Annotated Code of Maryland that covers domestic violence and protective orders, Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.), Title 4, Subtitle 5 of the Family Law Article, titled Domestic Violence, does not provide for a police officer to file a Petition for Contempt when a Protective Order has been violated; it merely grants a police officer the authority to arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to believe that the protective order has been violated. [10] At the protective order hearing, the Circuit Court [11] understood the difference in the authority to arrest that might exist for a sheriff's office under section 4-509 and the authority of a party to the action to file a petition for contempt under Rule 15-206. The Circuit Court stated that: Now, this is what is going to happen. The Sheriff is going to serve both of you with a copy of this order. The Sheriff for Charles County is going to keep a copy of the order. If there is a violation of the order then you should contact the Sheriff, tell them that the order is being violated and they will respond to it. They have the authority to arrest somebody for violating this order and to put them in jail. If there is a violation of the order you [the respective party] can also file a petition for contempt and if after a hearing I find that there has been a violation of the order I can sentence someone to serve up to 90 days in jail and fine them up to $500 for each violation. It is my order. The only way I have to enforce it is to enforce it by contempt. If either of you violate it there is a very good probability that I will put you in jail for the period of time that I am permitted to do. In examining the language of Rule 15-206 and the penalty provision of Maryland Code (1972, 1999 Repl.Vol.), section 4-509(b) of the Family Law Article, a police officer, in a case in which the officer is not a party, cannot initiate a constructive civil contempt proceeding by filing a Petition for Contempt.