Opinion ID: 1478707
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was appellant deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, in violation of Art. I, Sec. 7 of our constitution, Del.C.Ann.?

Text: On March 4, 1957, Garner and Thompson were jointly indicted. On March 8 the case was continued in order that counsel might be appointed. On March 20, 1957, the court appointed counsel for both defendants. On March 22, the Court appointed Henry A. Wise, Jr. and Edmund D. Lyons as counsel for Garner, and on April 1 appointed other counsel for Thompson. On April 5 Mr. Wise accepted the appointment. At the May Term Thompson's counsel moved for a continuance. Garner's counsel objected and asked for a speedy trial. At that time a joint trial was contemplated. Thompson's motion was granted and the case was continued to the September Term (the next term), presumably to protect his right to sufficient time to prepare his case. Necessarily, Garner's trial was also postponed. Later in May Garner moved for a severance. This motion was, of course, addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Ordinarily, defendants indicted jointly as principals should be tried together, but the court may, if justice requires it, grant separate trials. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 933-934. The motion was heard a few days later and was denied. The order of continuance to the September Term was vacated, and the motion for a speedy trial was granted. The case was set for trial on July 29. This date, we gather, was not objected to by Garner. On June 4 a motion by Thompson to produce certain property of himself or his co-defendant was filed, was briefed and argued, and was decided July 25. On July 2 the court granted Garner's previous motion for a severance subject to a further hearing on July 8. On that day the order of severance was stricken and September 10 was fixed as the date of trial over Garner's objection. Thompson's motion to produce was then pending and undecided. During July and the early part of August other motions on behalf of Thompson were heard and disposed of. On September 3 there was a pre-trial conference. On September 10 the court again granted Garner's motion for a severance and permitted the Attorney General to elect which defendant he would first try. Thompson was tried September 10 to 14 and was convicted. On September 20 the calendar was called and Garner's trial fixed for October 7. He was tried October 8 to 10. These facts entirely fail to show unwarranted delay on the part of the State in bringing Garner to trial. The first continuance was necessitated by the application of his co-defendant. Obviously, Thompson's right to sufficient time to prepare his case had to be protected. Nevertheless, the court vacated on July 8 the continuance and set July 29 for the joint trial. The further continuance obviously resulted from the necessity of hearing and disposing of Thompson's later motions. Garner's insistence on a separate trial was finally acceded to, and the postponement from September 10 to October 7 was the result of the severance. It must not be overlooked that at the time these cases were tried they were capital offenses, and a bench of three judges was required. Because of the pressure of other business such a case cannot be tried immediately. But the important point here is that we find no evidence that the State delayed the trial. Practically all of the delay was caused by motions of one or both of the two defendants, and the court was faced with the necessity of doing justice to both defendants. It had to deal not only with Thompson's motion for further time, but also with Garner's request for a severance. The matter of severance was within the court's discretion, and Garner does not suggest any abuse of discretion. He merely claims that the length of time itself compels the conclusion that he was denied a speedy trial. This does not follow. The right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative; it is consistent with delays and depends on the circumstances. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 467, p. 715. The cases cited by Garner are so clearly distinguishable that no detailed analysis of them is required. In State v. Arkle, 76 Mont. 81, 245 P. 526, the defendant was charged in March and the court refused to call the regular jury for the trial of cases in May. People v. Molinari, 23 Cal.App.Supp. 2d 761, 67 P.2d 767, involved the violation of a statute requiring a trial in thirty days' time in a justice's court. In Culver v. State, 11 Okl.Cr. 4, 141 P. 26, the delay was attributable to the State. In Von Feldstein v. State, 17 Ariz. 245, 150 P. 235, no excuse was shown by the State for failure to try the defendant within 60 days, as required by statute. In People v. Grandstaff, 324 Ill. 70, 154 N.E. 448, no reason was shown by the State for delay beyond the statutory period. No case is cited to us holding that delay incident to the consideration and decision of a defendant's motions is attributable to the State or can be used as a basis of a claim that defendant has been denied a speedy trial. Garner also bases an argument on 10 Del.C. § 6910, requiring trial at not later than the second term. If the delay is attributable to the State, the defendant is entitled to discharge, though not to a dismissal of the indictment. Galliao v. State, 7 Boyce 488, 108 A. 279; State v. Walker, 9 Terry 190, 48 Del. 190, 100 A.2d 413. The same reasoning applicable to the constitutional provision is a fortiori applicable to the statute. The delay must be attributable to the State before the defendant can complain. We find no denial of Garner's constitutional or statutory rights. We have carefully considered the record in this case and all of counsel's arguments. We are satisfied that the verdict must stand. The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.