Opinion ID: 2321640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Evidentiary Mistakes

Text: The remaining claims made by appellants relate only to appellee CMR. Appellants assert that the trial court made four evidentiary errors that warrant reversal. First, appellants contend that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding an accident report authored by Grimberg's quality control manager, Joseph Angsten. Second, appellants contend that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing portions of an unauthenticated pre-trial interview of Daniel Presley, appellant Charles Presley's brother, as conducted by workers' compensation insurance investigator Sharon Poole, to be used for impeachment. Third, appellants argue that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to provide an immediate limiting instruction to the jury after portions of the interview transcript were read. Fourth, appellants argue that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to allow other sections of the interview to be used to rehabilitate Daniel Presley, in violation of the rule of completeness. In considering these claims, we start from the well-established proposition that [t]he trial court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence is relevant and should be admitted. Price v. United States, 697 A.2d 808, 813 (D.C.1997) (citing United States v. Mosby, 495 A.2d 304, 305 (D.C. 1985); United States v. Riley, 550 F.2d 233, 236 (5th Cir.1977)). Applying this proposition to the present case, we conclude that appellants' arguments are without merit.
First, appellants assert that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the First Report of Injury Form prepared by Joseph Angsten as inadmissible hearsay. The trial court excluded the report, over appellants' objection, because Angsten did not witness the accident and could not recall from whom he obtained the information that he included in his second-hand report, thus making the report inadmissible hearsay. Appellants argue that the accident report was not hearsay, as it was admitted only to bolster Presley's credibility. However, we fail to see the distinction. Hearsay is an out-of-court assertion of fact offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Jones v. United States, 17 A.3d 628, 632 (D.C.2011) (citing Mercer v. United States, 864 A.2d 110, 117 (D.C.2004)). The report was prepared by Angsten shortly after the accident and indicated that the fan shroud had struck Presley. The report would bolster Presley's credibility only if the information contained within the report was admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the report was inadmissible hearsay. Nor are we persuaded by appellants' argument that the accident report should have been admitted to rebut the theory that Charles Presley had fabricated the story about his fall in order to recover on his negligence claim. The trial court rejected this argument and excluded the report because Presley did not make the statements in the report. A witness' prior consistent statement used in rebuttal to overcome a charge of recent fabrication, [is admissible] if the statements were made before the motive to fabricate arose. . . . Ventura v. United States, 927 A.2d 1090, 1103 (D.C.2007) (citing Daye v. United States, 733 A.2d 321, 325 (D.C.1999)); see also D.C.Code § 14-102(b)(2) (2001). However, appellants cannot avail themselves of this exception because the statement they sought to admit was not made by Presley, but rather, as appellants concede, by one of three other workers. Neither the report, nor any of the alleged statements upon which the report was based, is a prior consistent statement made by Presley. Therefore, none of the statements would be admissible under the fabrication rebuttal exception. See Ventura, supra, 927 A.2d at 1103. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the accident report. We also reject appellants' contention that the report should have been admitted during the testimony of their safety and accident reconstruction expert. The trial court ruled that the expert could rely on the report as a basis for his opinion, but could not disclose the content of the report to the jury because it contained inadmissible hearsay. Appellants' contention is based upon a misunderstanding of the law as it pertains to expert testimony and the use of inadmissible hearsay. `[E]xperts may testify on the basis' of not only personal observation and evidence admitted at trial, but also `other sources relied upon in their fields or specialties.' L.C.D. v. District of Columbia ex rel. T.-A.H.D., 488 A.2d 918, 921 n. 8 (D.C.1985) (quoting S.W. GRAAE, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA STATUTORY AND CASE LAW ANNOTATED TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE ¶ 7.9 (1976)). In forming an opinion, an expert may rely on facts or data that are not admissible, including hearsay. See Reed v. United States, 584 A.2d 585, 591 (D.C.1990); see also FED.R.EVID. 703. [17] However, while experts may rely on hearsay to form their opinions, their testimony is not a vehicle by which evidence that is otherwise inadmissible may be introduced. The trial court properly applied this rule because the report upon which the expert relied constituted inadmissible hearsay, and thus we can see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to preclude the admission of the accident report.

Daniel Presley testified at trial that he heard contact, that he saw his brother's hard hat go off, and that out of the corner of [his] eye, he saw his brother get knocked off the tower by the fan shroud. CMR then sought to impeach Daniel Presley's trial testimony with what it contends was his prior inconsistent statement made during a workers' compensation claim interview conducted in March 2002 by Poole. In the interview, Daniel Presley stated that he had his back to the crane operator at the time of the accident. He then noticed out of the corner of [his] eye [that his] brother had lost his footing due to whatever reason, and he . . . fell over the side of the tower and caught himself on the edge of the lip of the top of the cooling tower momentarily, and couldn't hang on and then fell. Daniel Presley also stated, I mean I could sit here, I could sit right here and tell you that yea, the dude definitely done it, he swung it, but I'd be lying like hell you know what I'm saying? When asked to confirm that he made the prior statements, Daniel Presley testified at trial: [If] [y]ou have a recording that could be played that I could listen to, then I can actually confirm that yep, I hear myself saying that. But for you to present something to me saying that this is what I said, the only thing I can answer is if you're saying that this is authentic, it must be so. But for me to tell you that I recall saying this five years ago, I can't recall. On redirect examination, appellants sought to rehabilitate Daniel Presley by having him explain the portions of the interview with which CMR sought to impeach him. CMR objected, however, arguing that Daniel Presley did not adopt the statements and thus could not put into context statements that he did not remember making. Appellants then abandoned that line of questioning, and sought to have Daniel Presley explain other portions of the interview that CMR had not used for impeachment, including his statement to Poole that his brother, Charles Presley, told him that he had been knocked off the tower by the crane. The trial court rejected appellants' attempt to introduce the other portions of the interview, reasoning that the statements did not actually rehabilitate the witness. Ultimately, however, the trial court allowed appellants to use the interview to refresh Daniel Presley's recollection about what his brother had said about the accident. Daniel Presley eventually testified that his brother told him that he would hate to think that the crane operator intentionally knocked him off the tower. During deliberations, the jury requested to see a copy of Poole's report on the interview containing Daniel Presley's statement. In response, the trial court, with the agreement of the parties, fashioned a note which read: [P]ortions of the deposition testimony of Sharon Pool [sic] was [sic] read to you in evidence, both parties have the right to select what would be read. Her report is not in evidence, therefore, the Court is unable to provide additional information. Thank you.
Appellants argue that the workers' compensation interview should not have been used to impeach Daniel Presley because it was inadmissible hearsay and did not actually contradict his testimony. With respect to the hearsay argument, we have largely adopted the traditional common-law rule that a prior inconsistent statement can be used to impeach a witness when the witness testifies at trial in a manner contrary to that [prior] statement; however, the substance of the prior statement cannot be used as evidence of its truth. Johnson v. United States, 820 A.2d 551, 556 (D.C.2003). Here, the record indicates that CMR did not seek the admission of the statements as substantive evidence of its truth, but rather to impeach Daniel Presley. Because the trial court declined to admit the statements as substantive evidence, it is immaterial whether the statement was hearsay. Thus, we reject appellants' contention that Daniel Presley's statements during the worker's compensation interview should have been excluded as inadmissible hearsay. Although the statements were not admitted as substantive evidence, we still need to address appellants' arguments that the prior statements could not be used for impeachment purposes because they were not authenticated and did not actually contradict Daniel Presley's testimony at trial. The trial court addressed both of these issues during final instructions to the jury, as both issues were within the jury's purview. See Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 3-8 (2010 ed. rev.); see also Georgetown Univ. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs., 862 A.2d 387, 392 (D.C.2004). The trial court instructed the jury to decide whether a witness made a statement on an earlier occasion and whether it was, in fact, inconsistent with the witness' testimony here in court. The trial court further instructed that: If the witness was not under oath and subject to cross examination, they were not at a deposition when he or she made this statement, then you may not treat that prior statement as evidence of the facts in the statement. You may only consider that statement to evaluate the witness' credibility. The trial court's instructions were appropriate and conformed to the Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia. See Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 3-8. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to determine whether Daniel Presley made the prior statements, whether the prior statements were inconsistent, and the effect, if any, that Daniel Presley's prior statements had on his credibility at trial.
Appellants further argue that the trial court erred in refusing their request to give an immediate limiting instruction to the jury regarding the evaluation of impeachment evidence. We have held that [w]here there has been a request for a limiting instruction following the impeachment of a witness or the presentation of impeaching testimony and the use of the impeaching testimony as substantive evidence is potentially prejudicial, it is error for a trial court to refuse to give such an instruction. Brooks v. United States, 448 A.2d 253, 259 (D.C.1982) (citing Towles v. United States, 428 A.2d 836 (D.C.1981); Johnson v. United States, 387 A.2d 1084 (1978) (en banc)); see also Gilliam v. United States, 707 A.2d 784, 785 (D.C.1998). Arguably, the trial court erred in refusing appellants' request for a contemporaneous limiting instruction because Daniel Presley's prior statements during his interview with Poole were introduced for impeachment only, and the use of such statements as substantive evidence was potentially prejudicial to appellants' case because they tended to support CMR's version of events. However, assuming without finding error, we nevertheless conclude that the trial court's refusal to give the limiting instruction immediately was harmless because the court gave the requested instruction at the close of the evidence. We review the failure to give a requested limiting instruction to ascertain whether we can say with fair assurance that the verdict was not substantially swayed by the error. Gordon v. United States, 466 A.2d 1226, 1231 (D.C.1983) (citing Lucas v. United States, 436 A.2d 1282, 1284-85 (D.C.1981)). Appellants point to the jury's request for the interview transcript during deliberations as evidence that the jury thought the substance of Daniel Presley's prior statements was important. However, in light of the proceedings in this case, we can say here that the verdict was not substantially swayed by the error. Although it would have been preferable for the trial court to give the limiting instruction immediately when it was requested during trial, this error was mitigated when the court later gave a final jury instruction before deliberations serving the same purpose: the jury was to consider the prior statements solely to evaluate the credibility of Daniel Presley's testimony. See Byers v. United States, 649 A.2d 279, 285-86 (D.C.1994); cf. Mercer, supra, 864 A.2d at 118 (noting that we generally presume that the jury will follow the trial court's limiting instructions); Weeda v. District of Columbia, 521 A.2d 1156, 1163 (D.C.1987) (same). Moreover, the point was made again when the trial court responded to the jury's request for the transcript, emphasizing that Poole's interview with Daniel Presley was not evidence. Finally, CMR made no reference to Daniel Presley's statements during its closing arguments. Thus, we can say that the trial court's failure to give an immediate limiting instruction was harmless error.
Appellants also argue that they were improperly barred from introducing other portions of Poole's interview with Daniel Presley in order to place the parts of the interview that had been presented to the jury in context. Under the rule of completeness, a party is entitled, once a part of a document or recorded statement has been introduced into evidence, to seek admission of the remainder of the statement. Andrews v. United States, 922 A.2d 449, 458 (D.C.2007) (quoting Henderson v. United States, 632 A.2d 419, 424 (D.C.1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The underlying principle of this rule is fairness: to ensure that a statement may not be unfairly removed from its context. See Henderson, supra, 632 A.2d at 426. The rule of completeness, however, is not without its limitations. The rule allows a party to introduce only so much of the remainder of a document or statement already received as is germane to an issue at trial. Cox v. United States, 898 A.2d 376, 381 (D.C. 2006) (quoting Warren v. United States, 515 A.2d 208, 211 (D.C.1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the circumstances, the rule of completeness did not require the trial court to permit appellants to introduce portions of the interview that did not relate to Daniel Presley's impeachment or place those portions in context. As discussed above, CMR introduced the statements that Daniel Presley made to Poole during the interview for the purpose of impeaching his trial testimony. On redirect examination, the trial court permitted appellants' counsel to question Daniel Presley about other related statements from the interview in order to place the potentially impeaching statements in context and thus rehabilitate him. The trial court subsequently barred appellants from introducing other portions of the interview with Poole that neither related to the impeaching statements nor served to rehabilitate Daniel Presley's testimony. Nevertheless, the trial court did permit appellants to use Daniel Presley's statement from the interview regarding what his brother told him about the accident to refresh his memory. Daniel Presley subsequently testified that his brother told him that he would hate to think that the crane operator intentionally knocked him off the tower. Appellants did not seek to introduce any other portion of the Poole interview. Thus, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in refusing to allow appellants to introduce the other portions of Poole's interview of Daniel Presley that did not relate to his impeachment or place it in context. In conclusion, the evidentiary issues raised by appellants do not warrant reversal. The accident report itself was properly excluded as inadmissible hearsay. Furthermore, the impeachment of Daniel Presley with a statement that he made to Poole was conducted properly. Although the trial court erred by not providing an immediate limiting instruction on the use of impeachment evidence, such error was harmless. In addition, the other portions of Poole's interview were not necessary to place Daniel Presley's prior statements in context beyond the examination that the trial court allowed.