Opinion ID: 2750493
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standards for Applying Comity

Text: Conflict” The Supreme Court’s most recent most discussion of international comity was in Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798. Hartford Fire did not explain, however, what factors we should or must consider when addressing comity; in particular, it left unclear whether a “true conflict” is a predicate to prudential abstention on the grounds of comity. The district court in the instant litigation held that, “at least in the Ninth Circuit, the application of international comity is generally limited to cases where there is a ‘true conflict’ between domestic and foreign law.” Mujica I, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1155–56 (citing Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 794–95, and In re Simon, 153 F.3d at 999). And Plaintiffs argue here that “[t]he existence of a ‘true conflict’ is a threshold requirement for abstention on international comity grounds,” and that “[i]n this Court, . . . [the] rule is absolutely clear that application of the law of international comity is limited to cases in which there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and foreign law.” We do not think that Hartford Fire stands for the proposition adopted by the district court and urged by Plaintiffs. Hartford Fire involved the reach of U.S. antitrust laws, which applied extraterritorially; in that case, the question was whether a U.S. district court could exercise jurisdiction over antitrust claims filed against a group of London reinsurers. 509 U.S. at 769, 798–99. The London reinsurers argued that, based on international comity, the antitrust laws should not be read to extend to their activities, which were regulated by British law. See id. at 797–98. MUJICA V. AIRSCAN 41 The Supreme Court stated that the “only substantial question in th[e] litigation” was “whether there [wa]s in fact a true conflict between domestic and foreign law.” Id. at 798 (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendants argued that applying federal antitrust laws would conflict with British law because Britain had established its own comprehensive regulatory regime for antitrust issues and the defendants’ conduct was consistent with British law. Id. at 798–99. But the Court held that this situation did not qualify as a “true conflict,” explaining that “[n]o conflict exists, for these purposes, where a person subject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both.” Id. at 799. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And “[s]ince the London reinsurers d[id] not argue that British law require[d] them to act in some fashion prohibited by the law of the United States, or claim that their compliance with the laws of both countries [wa]s otherwise impossible, [the Court saw] no conflict with British law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In light of the lack of conflict, the Court held that there was “no need . . . to address other considerations that might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction on grounds of international comity.” Id. Justice Scalia dissented from that part of the opinion and pointed out that “prescriptive comity” or “the practice of using international law to limit the extraterritorial reach of statutes” was “firmly established.” Id. at 817–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Since the majority did not address the “other considerations” bearing on comity, the Court’s Hartford Fire analysis “left unclear whether it was saying that the only relevant comity factor in that case was conflict with foreign law . . . or whether the Court was more broadly rejecting 42 MUJICA V. AIRSCAN balancing of comity interests in any case where there is no true conflict.” Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Litigation in United States Courts 80 (2008). We think that Hartford Fire does not require proof of a “true conflict” as a prerequisite for invoking the doctrine of comity, at least in a case involving adjudicatory comity. See id. (concluding that since such a reading of the case “would be a much more dramatic result for the Court to have reached sub silentio, I am inclined to doubt that it meant to rule so broadly”). Since Hartford Fire, the circuits have refined the Court’s “true conflict” analysis and have generally required proof of such a conflict only in cases where prescriptive comity is at issue—that is, where a party claims that it is subject to conflicting regulatory schemes, such as antitrust laws or bankruptcy rules that apply extraterritorially.17 As the Southern District of New York has observed, “[i]n postHartford Fire cases, conflict analysis has not been rigidly invoked to preclude consideration of the full range of principles relating to international comity. Rather, conflict analysis is most often applied when comity principles intersect with issues of statutory construction.” Freund v. Republic of Fr., 592 F. Supp. 2d 540, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citation omitted), aff’d sub nom. Freund v. Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais, 391 F. App’x 939 (2d Cir. 2010) (unpublished); see also, e.g., Maxwell, 93 F.3d at 1049 (requiring a “true conflict” in a bankruptcy case). 17 See generally Christen Broecker, The Clash of Obligations: Exercising Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Conformance with Transitional Justice, 31 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 405, 454–56 (2009) (describing how some jurisdictions require a true conflict before triggering comity). MUJICA V. AIRSCAN 43 By contrast, the courts have not required proof of a true conflict—although they have considered such a conflict relevant—when considering adjudicatory comity. Instead, the courts have considered a range of factors when deciding whether to abstain from exercising jurisdiction due to a past or potential judicial proceeding elsewhere. See, e.g., Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1238 (determining that a true conflict was not required and examining “the strength of our government’s interests in using the Foundation [established to hear claims from victims of the Nazis], the strength of the German government’s interests, and the adequacy of the Foundation as an alternative forum”); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 448 F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he only issue of international comity properly raised here is whether adjudication of this case by a United States court would offend ‘amicable working relationships’ with Egypt.” (citations omitted)); JP Morgan Chase Bank, 412 F.3d at 424 (deference to foreign adjudicatory proceedings “is appropriate so long as the foreign proceedings are procedurally fair and . . . do not contravene the laws or public policy of the United States”); Int’l Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Research Ltd., 257 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“As a general rule, comity may be granted where it is shown that the foreign court is a court of competent jurisdiction, and that the laws and public policy of the forum state and the rights of its residents will not be violated.” (quotation marks and internal citation omitted)); Freund, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 574 (“[T]he existence of a true conflict does not bar the Court from applying the doctrine and considering other legitimate concerns implicated by United States courts exercising jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign.”). But see S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 283 (holding true conflict analysis required in ATS suit against corporations that conducted business in apartheid South Africa). 44 MUJICA V. AIRSCAN Our own decision in In re Simon—a prescriptive comity case—is consistent with this pattern. There, we considered whether a bankruptcy court could sanction a foreign creditor for pursuing collection of a foreign debt that had been discharged in bankruptcy. 153 F.3d at 994. Although the creditor (HSBC) was based in Hong Kong, it had participated in the bankruptcy proceeding in the United States. Id. We began our analysis with a discussion of the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Id. at 995. We concluded that “Congress intended extraterritorial application of the Bankruptcy Code as it applies to property of the estate.” Id. at 996. We then turned to whether we were “require[d]” by comity to vacate the bankruptcy court’s injunction. Id. at 997. We noted that “[i]nternational comity in transnational insolvency proceedings must be considered in the context of bankruptcy theory.” Id. at 998. We then explained that the Bankruptcy Code “provides for a flexible approach to international insolvencies” in which there is general “deference to the country where the primary insolvency proceeding is located.” Id. The “sole, plenary insolvency proceeding” involving the debtor had been in the United States. Id. at 999. Because there were no “competing bankruptcy proceedings,”18 and because HSBC (which was 18 The dissent seizes upon this language to argue that In re Simon was “not merely a prescriptive comity case,” but also an adjudicative-comity case. We are unconvinced. The Simon court emphasized the lack of “conflicting bankruptcy proceedings” in that case not because the court was conducting an adjudicative comity analysis but because that fact proved that HSBC was in no danger of being exposed to two conflicting bankruptcy schemes—a prescriptive-comity concern. The dissent’s argument on this point also ignores our post-Simon cases—cases that are inconsistent with the dissent’s reading of Simon. See infra at 45–46. MUJICA V. AIRSCAN 45 seeking to apply comity to avoid sanctions from the US bankruptcy court) had participated in the US bankruptcy proceeding and had enjoyed its benefits, we held that, under the circumstances, international comity did “not dictate a result contrary to that reached by the district and bankruptcy courts. Rather, it [wa]s consistent with the general principles of international comity which is limited to cases in which ‘there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and foreign law.’” Id. (quoting Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798 (quotation marks and citation omitted)). Simply put, we do not interpret In re Simon—which referenced the concept of a “true conflict” in passing and in the specialized context of a bankruptcy statute that applied extraterritorially—to require proof of “true conflict” as an irreducible minimum for abstention in all comity cases. Our other post-Hartford Fire cases also suggest that proof of “true conflict” is not a prerequisite to comity. In those cases we took account of whether there was a conflict between American and foreign law. Even when we did not find a conflict, we did not end our inquiry but moved on to consider other factors. For example, in Metro Industries, Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839, 846–47 (9th Cir. 1996), we found no conflict between American and Korean law, but considered other factors to determine the reach of the Sherman Act. We looked to seven factors we had previously set out in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976) (“Timberlane I”), for what we called “a jurisdictional rule of reason.” Id. at 613. One of the Timberlane I factors was a conflict between foreign and domestic law. We noted that Hartford Fire overruled our holding in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Timberlane II”), as to what “would 46 MUJICA V. AIRSCAN amount to conflict of law,” but determined that Hartford Fire “did not question the propriety of the jurisdictional rule of reason or the seven comity factors set forth in Timberlane I.” Metro Indus., 82 F.3d at 846 n.5. Similarly, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 40 F.3d 959, 964–65 (9th Cir. 1994), we presumed that there was a difference between a grand jury witness’s rights under American law and his rights under Austrian law regarding the privacy of his Austrian bank accounts. That conflict, however was not the “true conflict” described by the Court in Hartford Fire. The laws of Austria and the United States did not require the witness to commit inconsistent acts; rather, he had greater privacy rights under Austrian law than American law, but it would not violate Austrian law for him to waive those rights in response to an order from a U.S. court. Id. at 966. Thus, the witness could “comply with the laws of both.” Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Had we believed that proof of a “true conflict” was required, that fact would have ended our inquiry. It did not. Instead, we decided that “[i]n considering international comity, we balance the competing interests of Austria and the United States . . . to determine whether the purported illegality of the order under Austrian law precludes its enforcement.” In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 40 F.3d at 965. As our decisions in In re Simon, Metro Industries, and In re Grand Jury Proceedings demonstrate, we have not read Hartford Fire as imposing a rigid new set of requirements for finding comity. At least in cases considering adjudicatory comity, we will consider whether there is a conflict between American and foreign law as one factor in, rather than a prerequisite to, the application of comity. MUJICA V. AIRSCAN 47 Accordingly, the district court erred when it required the existence of a true conflict when it analyzed the application of international comity. And, since the district court did not identify the correct legal rule, “we must conclude it abused its discretion.” Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1262; see also, e.g., Perry v. Brown, 667 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2012). Having determined that a true conflict is not always required for the application of adjudicatory comity and that the district court abused its discretion in concluding otherwise, we proceed to consider the proper framework for analyzing comity.
Beyond the question of true conflict, courts have struggled to apply a consistent set of factors in their comity analyses. As one commentator has observed, because there is “no clear analytical framework for its exercise, . . . courts have been left to cobble together their own approach to [international comity].” Childress III, supra, at 51. The district court in this case followed a three-part framework articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in Ungaro-Benages for the prospective application of international comity. See Mujica I, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1160 (citing Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1238)).19 Under Ungaro-Benages’ approach, a court 19 The Ungaro-Benages court articulated different standards for “retrospective” and “prospective” claims of adjudicatory comity. “When applied retrospectively, federal courts evaluate three factors: (1) whether the foreign court was competent and used ‘proceedings consistent with civilized jurisprudence,’ (2) whether the judgment was rendered by fraud, and (3) whether the foreign judgment was prejudicial because it violated American public policy notions of what is decent and just.” 379 F.3d at 48 MUJICA V. AIRSCAN “evaluate[s] several factors, including [1] the strength of the United States’ interest in using a foreign forum, [2] the strength of the foreign governments’ interests, and [3] the adequacy of the alternative forum.” Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1238 (citations omitted). The Ungaro-Benages framework is a useful starting point for analyzing comity claims, but the case offers no substantive standards for assessing its three factors. UngaroBenages tells us to consider the respective interests of the United States and the foreign country, but it does not tell us what interests count or what makes a foreign forum adequate or inadequate. See id. at 1238–39. For those considerations, we may draw on our oft-cited opinion in Timberlane I. We note that the criteria we considered in that antitrust case20—which also influenced § 403, “Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe” of the Restatement (Third) of 1238 (citation omitted). We find it unnecessary to draw a distinction between retrospective and prospective comity in this case. 20 Timberlane I articulated seven elements courts should weigh: [1] the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, [2] the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of businesses or corporations, [3] the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, [4] the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, [5] the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, [6] the foreseeability of such effect, and [7] the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad. 549 F.2d at 614. MUJICA V. AIRSCAN 49 Foreign Relations Law,21 see Koh, supra, at 66—are better adapted to the commercial context. Nevertheless, these factors help provide us with a general list of indicia to which we may look when weighing U.S. and foreign interests and the adequacy of the alternative forum.
The (nonexclusive) factors we should consider when assessing U.S. interests include (1) the location of the conduct in question, (2) the nationality of the parties, (3) the character 21 The Restatement lists a number of considerations for determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction is “unreasonable,” including:
regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; (b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect; (c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted[;] (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation; (e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system; (f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system; (g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and (h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 403(2) (1987). 50 MUJICA V. AIRSCAN of the conduct in question, (4) the foreign policy interests of the United States, and (5) any public policy interests. When some or all of a plaintiff’s claims arise under state law, the state’s interests, if any, should be considered as well. The doctrine of comity is particularly concerned with “sovereign interests,” Childress III, supra, at 61–62, and the sovereign whose interests are relevant when a federal court is hearing state-law claims is as much the individual state—whose law the federal court must faithfully apply—as the United States.22 Cf. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). See generally Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 403(2)(c) (courts considering whether jurisdiction is reasonable should assess “the importance of regulation to the regulating state” (emphasis added)). We caution, however, that in cases of this kind there is always a 22 It bears mentioning that a state’s interest will not necessarily be in the application of its own law to a case. Here, for example, although Plaintiffs pled California causes of action, if the case were to proceed to litigation, the district court would follow California’s conflict-of-laws methodology, which calls for a governmental-interest analysis. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). That analysis could favor the application of Colombia’s law rather than California’s. See, e.g., Arno v. Club Med, Inc., 22 F.3d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1994) (under California’s governmental-interest analysis, French law, rather than California law, applied to plaintiff’s tort claims against former employer and supervisor); McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 871 F.2d 1412, 1422–26 (9th Cir. 1989) (Saudi law, rather than California law, applied to plaintiffs’ state-law claims against employer); Tucci v. Club Mediterranee, S.A., 89 Cal. App. 4th 180, 194 (Ct. App. 2001) (Dominican Republic law, rather than California law, applied to tort and worker’s compensation claims); Hernandez v. Burger, 102 Cal. App. 3d 795, 804 (Ct. App. 1980) (Mexican law, rather than California law, applied to personal-injury claims arising out of auto accident in Mexico). Thus, in stating that a court sitting in diversity should consider the state’s interests, we mean to refer primarily to the state’s interest, if any, in providing a forum or remedy for particular claims. MUJICA V. AIRSCAN 51 risk that “our foreign relations could be impaired by the application of state laws, which do not necessarily reflect national interests.” Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1232–33. Out of regard for that risk, we should be careful not to give undue weight to states’ prerogatives. We will discuss each of the foregoing factors in turn. First, comity is most closely tied to the question of territoriality. We should consider where the conduct in question took place. This is a critical question in determining the extraterritorial reach of U.S. statutes, see Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663–65; Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 248, and it is a relevant consideration in adjudicatory comity as well. The general presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law recognizes that “United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.” Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 454. Comity similarly rests on respect for the legal systems of members of the international legal community—a kind of international federalism—and thus “serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord.” Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 248. Not surprisingly, U.S. courts have afforded far less weight, for comity purposes, to U.S. or state interests when the activity at issue occurred abroad. See Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 965 F. Supp. 899, 909 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (dismissing action under comity where the “activity and the alleged harm occurred entirely in Peru [and] Plaintiffs are all residents of Peru”), aff’d, 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 63 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (declining jurisdiction under comity where challenged activity occurred entirely in Ecuador); see also Chowdhury v. 52 MUJICA V. AIRSCAN Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 2014) (reversing lower court and foreclosing jurisdiction over ATS claims filed by Bangladeshi plaintiff allegedly detained and tortured by Bangladeshi authorities in Bangladesh). See generally Koh, supra, at 18–19, 51–57 (describing courts’ aversion to adjudicating extraterritorially as rooted in principle of national sovereignty). Second, we should take account of whether any of the parties are United States citizens or nationals, and also whether they are citizens of the relevant state. See Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating dismissal, on forum non conveniens, comity, and failure to join indispensable party grounds, of action by Ecuadorians against American oil company for injuries that allegedly resulted from action in Ecuador); Reebok Int’l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 556–57 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that U.S. courts have jurisdiction where some parties were U.S. corporations and U.S. persons and other non-nationals had substantial contacts with the United States). As we previously discussed in the context of the ATS, even if the presence of U.S. nationals as defendants does not establish jurisdiction in this country on its own, it can, as we have noted, contribute to a finding that there is a “nexus” between the United States and the parties and claims in a case. See supra; see also, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC (“Sarei III”), 650 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1016 (C.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) and aff’d, 722 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2013). Kiobel and the lower-court decisions that have followed in its wake confirm the importance of these first two factors MUJICA V. AIRSCAN 53 to courts’ jurisdictional analyses in cases involving international events. While Kiobel and its progeny specifically address the interpretation of a statute—the ATS—and not the prudential international comity doctrine, the guiding principle of those cases applies equally in the context of adjudicatory comity: the weaker the nexus between the challenged conduct and U.S. territory or U.S. parties, the weaker the justification for adjudicating the matter in U.S. courts and applying U.S. federal or state law. The third factor we should consider bearing on U.S. interests is the nature of the conduct in question. We should ask whether the action is civil or criminal; whether it sounds in tort, contract, or property; and whether the conduct is a regulatory violation or is a violation of international norms against torture, war crimes, or slavery. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731–33 (2004); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980). These inquiries may inform our judgment of the importance of the issue to the United States or to an individual state. The closer the connection between the conduct and core prerogatives of the sovereign, the stronger that sovereign’s interest. For example, in Timberlane I, which was an antitrust case, we considered “the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, . . . and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.” Timberlane I, 549 F.2d at 614. Fourth, we must take cognizance of the foreign policy interests of the United States. As we do when applying the political question, act of state, and foreign affairs doctrines, we must respect the Constitution’s commitment of the foreign 54 MUJICA V. AIRSCAN affairs authority to the political branches. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations”); art. II, § 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . . . and he . . . shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls); art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers”). See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413–15; Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964); Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. Courts have found that U.S. interests weigh against hearing cases where doing so would be harmful to U.S. foreign policy. See Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (dismissing as nonjusticiable ATS claims brought by Korean women in light of U.S government’s argument that “adjudication by a domestic court not only would undo a settled foreign policy of state-to-state negotiation with Japan, but also could disrupt Japan’s delicate relations with China and Korea, thereby creating serious implications for stability in the region” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1239 (abstaining in light of strong foreign policy interest in promoting settlement of Nazi-era claims through government-backed forum); O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 830 F.2d 449, 451 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal where district court concluded that U.S.-Colombian relations would likely suffer if U.S. litigation proceeded in light of foreign state’s “strong interest” in relevant protectionist legislation and ownership interest in defendant). This deference is rooted, in part, in separation of power concerns. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 417 (2002) (dismissing claim by Guatemalan widow alleging MUJICA V. AIRSCAN 55 federal officers concealed information about her husband’s fate and holding that “if there is to be judicial enquiry, it will raise concerns for the separation of powers in trenching on matters committed to the other branches”). Fifth, we may also weigh U.S. public policy interests, and those of the relevant state to a lesser extent, for “courts will not extend comity to foreign proceedings when doing so would be contrary to the policies . . . of the United States.” Pravin, 109 F.3d at 854. For example, we have held that there is a strong U.S. interest justifying U.S. jurisdiction in “preventing trademark violations,” Reebok Int’l, 970 F.2d at 556, and we have spoken of the strong U.S. policy favoring enforcement of arbitration and forum selection clauses. See Dependable Highway Exp. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 489 F.3d 1059, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2007). The Second Circuit has also refused to extend international comity to a foreign state’s debt negotiations as contrary to American policy because the United States “encourages participation in, and advocates success of” such debt resolution procedures, and the United States “has a strong interest in ensuring the enforceability of valid debts . . . owed to United States lenders.” Pravin, 109 F.3d at 855. We have treated differences in legal approach cautiously, however. Even when foreign practices may differ from American ones, we will respect those differences so long as the variance does not violate strongly-held state or federal public policy. See Belize Telecom, Ltd. v. Gov’t of Belize, 528 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that decision allowing Government of Belize to remove directors of telecom company did not “violate[] American public policy” where decision “merely g[ave] effect to the plain language” 56 MUJICA V. AIRSCAN of corporate articles of incorporation, which were interpreted under Belizean law).
The proper analysis of foreign interests essentially mirrors the consideration of U.S. interests. Foreign states, no less than the United States, have legitimate interests in regulating conduct that occurs within their borders, involves their nationals, impacts their public and foreign policies, and implicates universal norms. See Mich. Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 309 F.3d 348, 356 (6th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, courts have considered the territoriality of the questioned activity, its effects, the nationality of the parties, and the interests of the foreign state when deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction. See Jota, 157 F.3d at 160 (holding that deference to foreign state’s position on matters that took place within its territory is “inherent in the concept of comity”); see also Sequihua, 847 F. Supp. at 62 (declining jurisdiction in part because of Ecuador’s “official[]” protest that the litigation “will do ‘violence’ to the international legal system”). To illustrate, in Bi, the Second Circuit held that individual victims of the Bhopal gas leak disaster in India, which harmed almost exclusively Indians, did not have standing to challenge a settlement reached between India and the company responsible for the tort in light of an Indian law granting the Indian government exclusive standing to represent victims of the disaster. 984 F.2d at 586 (declining “to pass judgment on the validity of India’s response to a disaster that occurred within its borders” because doing so “would disrupt our relations with that country and frustrate MUJICA V. AIRSCAN 57 the efforts of the international community to develop methods to deal with problems of this magnitude in the future”); see also, e.g., Freund, 592 F. Supp. at 578 (declining jurisdiction where “Plaintiffs’ claims [we]re inextricably connected to France”).
The interests of the United States and the foreign government must be evaluated in light of the adequacy of the foreign forum. When it comes to the adequacy of the forum, courts consider decisions rendered by the alternative forum and ask “‘(1) whether the judgment was rendered via fraud; (2) whether the judgment was rendered by a competent court utilizing proceedings consistent with civilized jurisprudence; and (3) whether the foreign judgment is prejudicial [and] . . . repugnant to fundamental principles of what is decent and just.’” Belize Telecom, 528 F.3d at 1306 (quoting Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994)). Typically, courts ask whether one side has presented specific evidence that the judgment of the alternative forum was significantly inadequate. See id. (“In this case, neither party has argued that the Belizean judgments were rendered via fraud or that the Belizean proceedings lacked any element of civilized jurisprudence.”). The Second Circuit, for example, has held that deference to the judgment of a “foreign court is appropriate so long as the foreign proceedings are procedurally fair and . . . do not contravene the laws or public policy of the United States.” JP Morgan Chase Bank, 412 F.3d at 424. In that case, the court deferred to the jurisdiction of the Mexican courts even though there was a six-year delay in resolving the litigation, since such a delay did not result in “manifest injustice” or violate 58 MUJICA V. AIRSCAN “fundamental standards of procedural fairness.” Id. at 428 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jota, 157 F.3d at 160 (“When a court dismisses on the ground of comity, it should normally consider whether an adequate forum exists in the objecting nation and whether the defendant sought to be sued in the United States forum is subject to or has consented to the assertion of jurisdiction . . . in the foreign forum.”); U.S. ex rel. Saroop v. Garcia, 109 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 1997) (invoking comity to defer to foreign court on validity of extradition treaty absent assertion that foreign state failed to follow regular judicial proceedings, engaged in prejudicial or fraudulent practices, or refused to extend deference to United States’ judicial findings).23 We are justly proud of our legal system. But we recognize that there are other legal systems that have effected, in different ways, our constitutional values of separation of powers, due process of law, and the equal protection of the law. Comity, as the “golden rule among nations,” compels us to “give the respect to the laws, policies and interests of others that [we] would have others give to [our] own in the same or similar circumstances.” Mich. Cmty. Servs., Inc., 309 F.3d at 356 (internal quotation marks omitted). 23 Our decision in the context of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction is not contrary to these principles. In Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2009), we held that a Greek court’s decision that a child’s mother had not wrongly retained a child was not entitled to comity because the Greek court clearly misapplied the provisions of the Hague Convention, completely failed to determine the child’s habitual residence, as required by the Hague analysis, and made no factual findings to support its determination that the father had failed to exercise custody rights. Id. at 1016–17. MUJICA V. AIRSCAN 59 Accordingly, we proceed under the Ungaro-Benages framework as we have elaborated it from the case law, mindful that comity is circumstance-dependent and not susceptible to mechanical application. “Since comity varies according to the factual circumstances surrounding each claim for its recognition, the absolute boundaries of the duties it imposes are inherently uncertain.” Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937.