Opinion ID: 1540750
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The Timing Requirements

Text: Section 5-312(b) provides, in relevant part, that [w]ithout the consent of the child's natural parent, a court may grant a decree of adoption to [an individual] who has exercised physical care, custody or control of a child for at least 6 months, if ... [ inter alia ] the child has been out of the custody of the natural parent for at least 1 year. Ernest argues that the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that the 6 months and 1 year provisions refer not to the filing, but to the granting of the petition. As we stated earlier, in discerning legislative intent with regard to these provisions, we look first to the plain language of the statute. Condon, supra, 332 Md. at 491, 632 A.2d 753. The statute states plainly that a court may grant a decree of adoption upon the passage of the relevant time periods. It does not refer explicitly to the timing of the filing of the petition. Ernest asks that we construe the statute to impose this time requirement upon the filing, as well. However, where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we will not add words to reflect an intent not evidenced by that language. State v. In re Patrick A., 312 Md. 482, 487, 540 A.2d 810 (1988). Moreover, Ernest apparently finds no support for his interpretation in the legislative files. [9] He relies instead upon the principle that a cause of action must be ripe at the commencement of a suit; he thus contends that the petition was filed prematurely because the D.'s cause of action did not then exist. We disagree. The continued custody of the prospective adoptive parents and lack of custody of the natural parent for the specified period of time before a court may grant the adoption are not required to exist at the filing of the petition for adoption if the petition otherwise complies with statutory requirements. As to Ernest's assertion that this interpretation of the statute denies him due process, we observe that throughout the period in question, Ernest was afforded the opportunity to assert his parental rights with regard to Baby G. He does not contend, nor could he, that he was not afforded an opportunity to be heard with regard to custody and other issues affecting Baby G.'s future.