Opinion ID: 842363
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: contesting use of lot 52

Text: Defendant argues that, even if the deed restriction was violated by use of Lot 52 as a dog park, plaintiff cannot enforce the deed restriction in light of its acquiescence to prior violations of the deed restriction. That is, defendant contends that the deed restriction was effectively waived. With regard to whether a restriction has been waived, we likewise have said that whether or not there has been a waiver of a restrictive covenant or whether those seeking to enforce the same are guilty of laches are questions to be determined on the facts of each case as presented. [ Id., quoting Grandmont Improvement Ass'n v. Liquor Control Comm., 294 Mich. 541, 544, 293 N.W. 744 (1940).] We have found that waiver did not occur if a plaintiff promptly filed suit [w]hen it became apparent to plaintiff that the owner of [a restricted lot] was about to use it for commercial purposes [in violation of a deed restriction]. Baerlin v. Gulf Refining Co., 356 Mich. 532, 536, 96 N.W.2d 806 (1959). Defendant asserts that plaintiff's failure to promptly file suit to preclude the use of Lot 52 as a park effectively waived plaintiff's ability to contest the use of Lot 52 as a dog park. Plaintiff argues, however, that though it has never contested the use of Lot 52 as a park, it may still contest the proposed use of Lot 52 as a dog park. In Jeffery v. Lathrup, 363 Mich. 15, 108 N.W.2d 827 (1961), we stated the general rule that if a plaintiff has not challenged previous violations of a deed restriction, the restriction does not thereby become void and unenforceable when a violation of a more serious and damaging degree occurs.  Id. at 22, 108 N.W.2d 827 (emphasis added). See also Sheridan v. Kurz, 314 Mich. 10, 13, 22 N.W.2d 52 (1946); Cherry v. Bd. of Home Missions of Reformed Church in United States, 254 Mich. 496, 504, 236 N.W. 841 (1931); Goodlove, supra at 629, 227 N.W. 772 (Plaintiffs are not estopped from preventing a most flagrant violation of the restrictions on account of their theretofore failure to stop a slight deviation from the strict letter of such restrictions.). When determining whether prior acquiescence to a violation of a deed restriction prevents a plaintiff from contesting the current violation, we compare the character of the prior violation and the present violation. Only if the present violation constitutes a more serious violation of the deed restriction may a plaintiff contest the violation despite the plaintiff's acquiescence to prior violations of a less serious character. In general, a more serious violation occurs when a particular use of property constitutes a more substantial departure from what is contemplated or allowable under a deed when compared to a previous violation. See, e.g., Sheridan, supra (holding that a more serious violation occurred when noise caused by a later violation represented a dramatic increase from noise caused by an earlier violation). That is, use that constitutes a more serious violation imposes a greater burden on the holder of a deed restriction than the burden imposed by a previous violation. Although determining whether a more serious violation occurred will hinge on the facts of a particular case, some relevant factors that may be considered include: (1) whether the later violation involved the erection of a structure where no such structure had previously been permitted; [5] (2) whether the later violation constituted a more extensive violation of restrictions on the size or extent of a building; [6] (3) whether the later violation increased the use of land from a sporadic violation of the restriction to a continuous violation; [7] (4) whether the later violation significantly increased the noise or pollutant level on restricted land; [8] (5) whether the later violation increased the level of traffic occasioned by the prior violation; [9] (6) whether the later violation permitted an action that had been previously prohibited; and (7) whether the later violation altered in some material respect the character of the use of the restricted property. [10] The dog park constitutes a more serious violation of the deed restriction than the previous uses of Lot 52. First, the dog park includes a permanent structure  an enclosed, fenced area  on Lot 52. Before the dog park, no such structures existed on the restricted lots. Second, the dog park will create continuous and systematic use of Lot 52, whereas previously the use of the restricted lots was irregular and sporadic. Third, the dog park will affirmatively encourage people to bring their dogs to Lot 52. Before Lot 52 was used as a dog park, dogs were prohibited from the park by posted No Dogs signs. Hence, an activity that was once expressly prohibited is now sanctioned and encouraged by the creation of the dog park. Fourth, by encouraging more regular use of Lot 52, the dog park will generate more traffic in the surrounding neighborhoods than the previously irregular and sporadic use of the restricted lots. In summation, use of Lot 52 as a dog park effectively transforms the property from a vacant park to something akin to a public kennel. Consequently, this use constitutes a more serious violation of the deed restriction than the previous use as an open section of Springdale Park. Because plaintiff has previously objected to more serious violations of the deed restrictions that also raised similar concerns of noise and the erection of permanent structures on restricted land, plaintiff has not, in our judgment, waived its ability to contest this more serious violation. Defendant raises several arguments in opposition to the application of this rule. It argues that the park had previously been subject to noisy uses, and thus plaintiff acquiesced to noisy uses of the park, pointing to the park's previous use for overnight Girl Scout camping, large dances, and baseball on permanent baseball diamonds. However, these uses occurred in sections of the park that were unburdened by the relevant deed restrictions. [11] Defendant would thus require plaintiff to object to violations of the deed restriction that occurred on unrestricted land, i.e., land uses that simply did not violate deed restrictions. However, plaintiff would have no authority or basis on which to object to violations of deed restrictions that did not apply to the land on which the violations occurred. We have never imposed such an obligation on the holders of a restricted deed. See, e.g., Brideau v. Grissom, 369 Mich. 661, 667, 120 N.W.2d 829 (1963) (allowing the plaintiff property owners to enforce a deed restriction on adjacent property even though the plaintiffs had not objected to similar violations that occurred several blocks away). [12] Defendant also argues that allowing plaintiff to contest the dog park after acquiescing to the park itself will permit those with the right to enforce deed restrictions to pick and choose which violations will be tolerated. However, allowing a plaintiff to enforce a deed restriction against a more serious violation does not grant that plaintiff an unlimited right to pick and choose which violations to allow and which violations to contest. A plaintiff can only contest more serious violations of the relevant deed restriction. Therefore, a plaintiff who acquiesces to one violation is thereafter prevented from contesting violations of an equivalent nature. However, a plaintiff who acquiesces to a seemingly innocuous violation would not forever be prevented from challenging more serious violations. Defendant essentially proposes a rule that would require those with the right to enforce deed restrictions to challenge every arguable violation of the deed restrictions, even minor technical violations, in order to ensure that the deed restrictions retain their effect. A plaintiff should not be impelled to engage in overzealous covenant enforcement fearing possible waiver of future enforcement rights. 2 Restatement Property, 3d, § 8.3, comment f, p. 502. In this case, defendant's proposed rule would prevent plaintiff from challenging the use of Lot 52 for a zoo, a waterpark, or a motocross track. Adopting defendant's rule would create increasing chaos in the enforcement of deed restrictions.