Opinion ID: 1477292
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Correct Standard to the Instant Case

Text: I turn now to consider whether Family Law Section 2-201 (Only a marriage between a man and a woman is valid in this State.), survives strict scrutiny. A statutory classification will be upheld under strict scrutiny only if it further[s] a compelling state interest, and if it is deemed to be suitably, or narrowly, tailored to achieving that goal. Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 438, 921 A.2d 171, 191 (2007); Burning Tree II, 315 Md. at 296, 554 A.2d at 387; Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 641, 458 A.2d at 781. Regardless of the strength of the governmental interest at stake, statutory classifications subject to strict scrutiny must `fit this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate . . . prejudice or stereotype.' Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2112, 132 L.Ed.2d 158, 181 (1995), quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493, 109 S.Ct. 706, 721, 102 L.Ed.2d 854, 882 (1989). In other words, the classification at issue must `fit' with greater precision than any alternative means. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n. 6, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 1850 n. 6, 90 L.Ed.2d 260, 272 n. 6 (1986), citing John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L.Rev. 723, 727 n. 26 (1974). An example of a compelling state interest that survived strict scrutiny under the ERA is the sex-based classification scheme inherent in the crime of rape. At common law and under the current statutes, [57] it is impossible for a woman to commit first or second degree rape other than as a principal in the second degree, because vaginal intercourse is required, [58] see, e.g., Wilson v. State, 132 Md.App. 510, 517-18, 752 A.2d 1250, 1254 (2000); nevertheless, this sex-based distinction has been upheld under strict scrutiny. See, e.g., People v. Green, 183 Colo. 25, 514 P.2d 769, 770 (1973) (upholding Colorado rape statute [59] against an ERA challenge). Other examples of sex-based classifications that were upheld under an ERA analysis include prohibitions on public nudity that prohibit display of female breasts, City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash.2d 584, 584 P.2d 918 (1978); City of Albuquerque v. Sachs, 135 N.M. 578, 92 P.3d 24 (App.2004); Messina v. State, 904 S.W.2d 178 (Tex.App.1995), and affirmative action programs designed to alleviate the effects of past discrimination. Brackett v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 447 Mass. 233, 850 N.E.2d 533 (2006); S.W. Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash.2d 109, 667 P.2d 1092 (1983). Thus, strict scrutiny of sex-based classifications under the ERA need not always be strict in theory, but fatal in fact. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237, 115 S.Ct. at 2117, 132 L.Ed.2d at 188 (citation omitted) (holding that minority set-asides must pass strict scrutiny, but emphasizing that benign discrimination may constitute a compelling state interest). Because the early equal protection cases typically examined racial classifications, subsequent jurisprudence in the area of gender discrimination necessarily analogized to the precedents involving racial discrimination. One point of attack by opponents of equal rights for women has been to emphasize the limitations of the analogy between race and sex classifications; equal rights opponents have distinguished racial discrimination from sex-based discrimination on the basis of the inherent differences between the sexes. See Brown, supra at 893-96. See also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2276, 135 L.Ed.2d 735, 752 (1996) (noting that `inherent differences' are no longer accepted as a basis for racial and national origin classifications, but that [p]hysical differences between men and women . . . are enduring). Evolution of the law in this area has been, in no small measure, a process of sifting truly substantial gender differences from distinctions that masquerade as such but in reality merely embody traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3337, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090, 1099 (1982). The movement among the several states to enact equal rights amendments was motivated, in part, to counteract the tendency of courts to extend deference to sexual stereotypes cloaked as truly substantial differences. Brown, supra at 879-82. There can be no doubt that Marylanders overwhelmingly adopted this approach through enactment of the ERA. See Rand, 280 Md. at 515-16, 374 A.2d at 904-05 ([W]e believe . . . the people of Maryland are fully committed to equal rights for men and women. The adoption of the E.R.A. in this state was intended to, and did, drastically alter traditional views of the validity of sex-based classifications.). The only operative distinction between sex-based and race-based classifications obtains from the inherent differences between the sexes; thus, some sex-based classifications may survive strict scrutiny whereas comparable race-based classifications could not be sustained. Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 98, 501 A.2d at 840. However, this distinction has been construed narrowly, generally applying only to cases of obvious anatomical differences. For example, the ERA has been interpreted to permit separate bathrooms for each sex in public accommodations, id. at 98 & n. 8, 501 A.2d at 840 & n. 8, and rape statutes that punish only men. Brooks v. State, 24 Md.App. 334, 337-39, 330 A.2d 670, 672-73, cert. denied, 275 Md. 746 (1975); 74 Op. Att'y Gen. 19, 22 (Md.1989). See also People v. Barger, 191 Colo. 152, 550 P.2d 1281 (1976); Green, 514 P.2d at 770. Chief Judge Murphy suggested, if anything, an even narrower construction of the inherent differences exception to strict scrutiny. See Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 64 n. 3, 501 A.2d at 822 n. 3 (Disparate treatment on account of physical characteristics unique to one sex is generally regarded as beyond the reach of equal rights amendments.). Accord Brown, supra at 893 (The fundamental legal principle underlying the Equal Rights Amendment, then, is that the law must deal with particular attributes of individuals, not with a classification based on the broad and impermissible attribute of sex. This principle, however, does not preclude legislation (or other official action) which regulates, takes into account, or otherwise deals with a physical characteristic unique to one sex.). The implications of the inherent differences between males and females for the present case are unclear. There would appear to be a colorable argument that traditional marriage arose out of an inchoate recognition that reproduction of our species and thus, the very future existence of society, is inextricably linked to the state interest in promoting the formation of stable, nurturing families beginning with the intimate sexual union of a man and a woman. Fornshill v. Murray, 1 Bland 479, 481 (1828) (Marriage has been considered among all nations as the most important contract into which individuals can enter, as the parent not the child of civil society. ) (emphasis added). With regard to narrow tailoring, the Burning Tree cases themselves illustrate the concept through its exact opposite. The anti-discrimination provision invalidated in Burning Tree II, for instance, permit[ted] a club to engage in periodic sex discrimination in any of its facilities for any reason at all; consequently, the statute failed the narrow tailoring requirement. 315 Md. at 296, 554 A.2d at 387. The touchstone of narrow tailoring is whether, when faced with other, reasonable ways to achieve [its] goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, the State has rejected the way of greater interference and chosen instead the least burdensome means to further its interest. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1003, 31 L.Ed.2d 274, 285 (1972). It is critical to bear in mind the allocation of burdens under the various equal protection review standards. Regardless of the applicable standard, the plaintiff always bears the initial burden of production, just as in any other civil cause. Under rational basis review, the plaintiff also shoulders the burden of persuasion, because rational basis review presumes the validity of the challenged classification. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-21, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2643, 125 L.Ed.2d 257, 271 (1993) (A State, moreover, has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification. . . . A statute is presumed constitutional, and `[t]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it,' whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record.) (citations omitted) (alteration in original). Under both intermediate and strict scrutiny, on the other hand, the government has the burden of justifying the challenged classifications. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 1146, 160 L.Ed.2d 949, 958 (2005) (Under strict scrutiny, the government has the burden of proving that racial classifications `are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.'), quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 227, 115 S.Ct. at 2113, 132 L.Ed.2d at 182; United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533, 116 S.Ct. at 2275, 135 L.Ed.2d at 751 (Under intermediate scrutiny, [t]he burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State.); Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 641, 458 A.2d at 781 (Laws which are subject to [strict scrutiny] violate the equal protection guarantee unless the State can demonstrate that the statute is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.). The compelling interests asserted in the State's brief are (1) maintaining the same definition of marriage as that mandated by the Federal DOMA, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); (2) ensuring that dramatic cultural changes be adopted through vigorous public debate culminating in legislative decisions; and (3) maintaining the traditional institution of marriage because it is so deeply ingrained in our history and traditions. The first state interest expresses a general public policy of promoting comity in relations with our sister states and the federal government; undoubtedly that interest could comport with rational basis review, because the desire to conform Maryland laws with those of other jurisdictions has been a touchstone of our jurisprudence in many areas of the law. See, e.g., Section 9.5-101 et seq. of the Family Law Article, Maryland Code (1984, 2006 Repl.Vol.) (Maryland Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act); Section 7-101 et seq. of the Criminal Procedure Article, Maryland Code (2001) (Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act); Section 11-1201 et seq. of the Commercial Law Article, Maryland Code (1975, 2005 Repl.Vol.) (Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act). The policy of promoting uniformity is not confined to our statutory law; our cases are replete with instances where we look to our sister states for guidance in interpreting our own common law. See, e.g., Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 66-70, 95-98, 501 A.2d at 823-25, 838-40. The examples illustrating the point are literally too numerous to mention. The fundamental difficulty with the State's argument, however, is that it has pointed to no case, nor am I aware of a single case, where this Court has held that the desire to conform our laws to those of other jurisdictions rises to the level of a compelling interest. Indeed, the State's position inverts the fundamental legal hierarchy, because the values embodied in the Maryland Constitution take precedence over every Act of the General Assembly. The only recognized exception, inapplicable to the present case, is where our organic law conflicts with the U.S. Constitution itself. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (state constitutional amendment prohibiting any governmental action to afford protection to homosexuals held violation of Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause); Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227, 233, 105 S.Ct. at 1919-20, 85 L.Ed.2d at 227-28, 231 (facially neutral state constitutional provision disenfranchising disproportionate numbers of African-Americans held in violation of Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause). The State's argument that there is a compelling interest in ensuring that social and economic change of this type is accomplished through a robust public debate, through the legislative process is wholly without merit. If we were to accept this argument, we would be ignoring the fact that robust public debate resulted in the adoption of the ERA. Moreover, the lone Maryland case cited by the State pertaining to legislative deference, Sugarloaf Citizens Ass'n v. Gudis, 319 Md. 558, 573 A.2d 1325 (1990), is easily distinguished from the instant case, because that case dealt with a county ethics law purporting to confer authority on a court to void legislation whenever it thought the public interest so required, which we determined violated the constitutional separation of powers mandated by Article 8 [60] of the Declaration of Rights. Here we deal with a constitutional challenge to legislative action; our authority to construe the Maryland Constitution is mandated by Article IV, Section 1 [61] of our Constitution. See Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 611, 781 A.2d 851, 858 (2001) (If, however, a statute violates a `mandatory provision' of the Constitution, `we are required to declare such an act unconstitutional and void.'). This proposition has been well-settled since the earliest days of our statehood; one year before Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), Chief Judge Jeremiah Townley Chase of the Maryland General Court stated the doctrine of judicial review in terms that still ring true today: The power of determining finally on the validity of the acts of the Legislature cannot reside with the Legislature, because such power would defeat and render nugatory, all the limitations and restrictions on the authority of the Legislature, contained in the Bill of Rights and form of government, and they would become judges of the validity of their own acts, which would establish a despotism, and subvert that great principle of the Constitution, which declares that the powers of making, judging, and executing the law, shall be separate and distinct from each other.    It is the office and province of the Court to decide all questions of law which are judicially brought before them, according to the established mode of proceeding, and to determine whether an Act of the Legislature, which assumes the appearance of a law, and is clothed with the garb of authority, is made pursuant to the power vested by the Constitution in the Legislature; for if it is not the result of emanation of authority derived from the Constitution, it is not law, and cannot influence the judgment of the Court in the decision of the question before them. Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 236, 243-44 (1802). The final argument posed by the State is the public's direct interest in marriage as an institution of transcendent importance to social welfare. Picarella v. Picarella, 20 Md.App. 499, 504, 316 A.2d 826, 830 (1974), citing to, inter alia, Fornshill, 1 Bland at 479. Indeed, in Fornshill our predecessors expressed the view that [m]arriage has been considered among all nations as the most important contract into which individuals can enter, as the parent not the child of civil society. 1 Bland at 481. Thus, it has been recognized from time immemorial that marriage preceded its legal recognition; i.e., marriage originated as an organic constituent of society that predated the development of the legal system. Undoubtedly, until the recent advances in assisted reproductive technology, there was a close albeit imperfect fit between opposite-sex marriage and the inherent biological fact that reproduction of our species could result only from the sexual union of a man and a woman. What had not been fathomed exists today, however. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. at 279, 923 A.2d at 122. The correspondence between opposite-sex marriage and biological necessity has never been more tenuous than it is today. What had always been an imperfect fit between marriage and procreation [62] is now called into question. Although infertility is not a bar to marriage, it is nonetheless true that traditional marriage remains the only way to create families in which children are biologically related to both parents. Certainly it is true that opposite-sex couples can and do cohabit and produce offspring and thus create non-traditional families, but that very fact points to the substantiality of the state interest: the State asserts a strong interest in encouraging opposite-sex couples to formally recognize their child-bearing unions. The difficulty faced by the State is that this interest has been posed and defended successfully only under the deferential rational basis standard. See, e.g., Andersen, 138 P.3d at 982-83; Hernandez, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d at 7. Likewise, the argument that the State has an interest in promoting marriage between opposite-sex couples because their careless sexual unions pose a significant possibility of creating offspring and all the attendant burdens and duties, whereas same-sex couples cannot reproduce without extensive, expensive outside intervention that evinces a far greater level of responsibility and commitment, has been upheld only under rational basis scrutiny. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24-25 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005). The Appellees assert a number of reasons why Section 2-201 does not even rationally further a legitimate governmental interest, and thus purport to refute any compelling interest presented by the State on the theory that failure to survive the most deferential test obviously implies failure under strict scrutiny. Logically that theory is unassailable as far as it goes, but the Appellees do not address a crucial underlying assumption: in order to dispose of the opponent's arguments, it is necessary in the first instance actually to address each opposing argument. Many of the arguments disposed of in the Appellees' brief almost certainly would fail under the strict scrutiny mandated under Article 46. Thus, arguments that the same-sex marriage ban promotes cost savings or that the ban is justified on grounds of legislative hegemony obviously fail strict scrutiny. Indeed, such assertions approach the level of straw man arguments, a status undoubtedly applicable to the supposed state interest in discrimination for its own sake. The Appellees also dispute the notion that the same-sex marriage ban rationally furthers a legitimate state interest in child welfare; here the Appellees stand on shakier ground, and quite possibly would fail to sustain their burden if the standard were rational basis review. However, the correct standard is strict scrutiny, a much greater burden for the State. Let us assume arguendo that the State has failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that there exist no other, reasonable ways posing a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343, 92 S.Ct. at 1003, 31 L.Ed.2d at 285, to further the undoubtedly substantial state interest in promoting child welfare. At this stage there still remains the possibility that the Appellees are wrong in their assertion that there is no causal link between judicial recognition of same-sex marriage and the behavior of opposite-sex couples, an argument asserted with particular force by amici, The American Center for Law & Justice. The phenomena of assisted reproduction and same-sex marriage are so new and radical that there exists no evidence thus far to support or refute the asserted link and its concomitant external effects. Thus far, courts that have weighed this argument favorably have done so under rational basis review. See, e.g., Hernandez, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d at 7-8; Andersen, 138 P.3d at 983, 984. The State's contention that the same-sex marriage ban arises organically from the nature of marriage itself, and that the much later codification accomplished by Section 2-201 merely clarifies society's compelling interest in the historic family unit as a mechanism for protecting the progeny of biological unions, actually asserts the state interest in promoting an orderly, stable society. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E.2d 941, 997 & n. 20 (2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting) (`It is important to distinguish the individual interests in domestic relations from the social interest in the family and marriage as social institutions.'). On the present state of the record, I believe neither party has explored this issue in the depth appropriate to an issue of such permanent, transcendent magnitude. Under our authority to order a remand so that justice will be served by permitting further proceedings, Md. Rule 8-604(d), I would remand this case to the Circuit Court for a full evidentiary hearing. Without expressing an ultimate opinion on whether the State could meet its burden, I believe the State's unrebutted contention regarding the broad societal interest in retaining traditional marriage presents an issue of triable fact that requires a remand. If there is any issue of fact undisposed of and remaining to be determined by the trier of the facts upon the weight of the evidence, summary judgment can not be granted. Tellez v. Canton R.R. Co., 212 Md. 423, 431, 129 A.2d 809, 813 (1957). Especially in light of the grave issues of constitutional dimension presented here, I believe it is inappropriate to reach this issue on the basis of such an undeveloped record. See Montgomery County v. Broad. Equities, Inc., 360 Md. 438, 457, 758 A.2d 995, 1005 (2000) ([T]he constitutional exception to the exhaustion requirement does not apply when the constitutional challenge to a statute `as a whole' involves the need for some factual exploration, which may be necessary when statutory classifications are challenged on equal protection grounds or under Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.); Ins. Comm'r v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 339 Md. 596, 623-24, 664 A.2d 862, 876 (1995). Consequently, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. Chief Judge BELL has authorized me to state that he joins in this dissenting opinion. Dissenting Opinion by BELL, C.J. I join Judge BATTAGLIA's dissent. As Judge Battaglia carefully and correctly explains, [1] sex-based classifications are analogous to race-based classifications and Maryland law, unlike federal law, by refusing to apply intermediate scrutiny to the review of sex-based classifications, does not draw a distinction between them. In State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315 Md. 254, 294, 554 A.2d 366, 386 (1989), this Court held that the burden of justifying sex-based classifications falls upon the State, and that the level of scrutiny to which the classifications are subject is at least the same scrutiny as racial classifications. See also Giffin v. Crane, 351 Md. 133, 148, 155, 716 A.2d 1029, 1037, 1040 (1998) (holding that the Equal Rights Amendment plainly prohibits sex-based classifications, absent substantial justification); Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 357 n. 7, 601 A.2d 102, 109 n. 7 (1992); Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 512-14, 374 A.2d 900, 903-04 (1977) (finding instructive, in interpreting the scope of the Equal Rights Amendment as it applied to sex discrimination, the Supreme Court of Washington's overriding compelling state interest standard). It, therefore, is clear that an equal application approach cannot render constitutional a discriminatory sex-based classification any more than it could do so for a discriminatory race-based classification. To justify its rejection of the enhanced standard of review, strict scrutiny, that this Court has applied to the review of gender-based classifications, the majority dismisses, an undisputed but extensive history of pervasive prejudice and discrimination targeted at homosexuals. Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 283-88, 291-92, 932 A.2d 571, 609-12, 614-15 (2007). It then concludes, as a result, that (1) homosexuals have enough political power to effect the eventual establishment, by statute, of marriage or civil unions for same-sex couples; and (2) this political power precludes their characterization as a suspect class. Id. I am not persuaded. The fact is that Maryland has not adopted, and it may safely be said, is not on the verge of adopting, a comprehensive statewide domestic partnership scheme for same-sex couples that approximates the institution of civil marriage, and thereby confers upon such couples the approximate rights and responsibilities of married heterosexual couples. Moreover, the laudable, though piecemeal, civil advances that the majority references and on which it relies, id. at 291-92, 932 A.2d at 614-15, occurred because marriage has remained an exclusive benefit of heterosexuality. See In Tyma v. Montgomery County, 369 Md. 497, 512, 801 A.2d 148, 158 (2002) (upholding local law granting benefits to the domestic partners of its employees by virtue of holding that such law does not implicate Maryland's marriage laws). Thus, the conditioning of advances that benefit same-sex couples on the limitation that homosexuals shall not acquire the right to marry belies any argument that the right to marry, or its functional equivalent, is imminent, or likely to be, not to mention, inevitable, for same-sex couples. In any event, a due process analysis requires that we reach a different result than the majority does. The majority determines that same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted in this State or in the United States, and, therefore, does not implicate a fundamental liberty interest. 401 Md. at 296-310, 932 A.2d at 617-26. That determination, however, only recognizes and gives voice and substance to an undisputed prejudice and objection  against and to homosexuality  that is not legally cognizable; it does not address, never mind resolve, the real issue. Chief Judge Kaye made this point, in addition to identifying the real issue, in Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d 1, 27 (2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). There, the New York Court of Appeals framed the issue, as the majority in this case has done, as whether same-sex marriage is deeply rooted in tradition, and concluded, again as the majority does here, that such marriages are not. Noting that[f]undamental rights are those `which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition . . . and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed,' id. at 770, 855 N.E.2d at 23, quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-721, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2268, 138 L.Ed.2d 772, 787-788 (1997), agreeing with the Supreme Court of the United States and Court of Appeals precedent, Chief Judge Kaye concluded that the right to marry is fundamental, id., citing, among others, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967) (holding unconstitutional statutes that prohibit interracial marriage) and Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 96 N.Y.2d 484, 730 N.Y.S.2d 15, 754 N.E.2d 1099, 1108 (2001) (G.B.Smith, J., concurring) (marriage is a fundamental constitutional right), and that, as a matter of due process, central to the right to marry is the right to marry the person of one's choice. Id. at 770, 855 N.E.2d at 22-23. (citations omitted). Chief Judge Kaye then opined: Fundamental rights once recognized cannot be denied to particular groups on the ground that these groups have historically been denied those rights. Indeed, in recasting the plaintiffs' invocation of their fundamental right to marry as a request for recognition of a `new' right to same-sex marriage, the Court misapprehends the nature of the liberty interest at stake. Id. at 770, 855 N.E.2d at 23. Relying on Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003), in which the United States Supreme Court warned against such misapprehension, she explained:  Lawrence overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986), which had upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy. In doing so, the Lawrence court criticized Bowers for framing the issue presented too narrowly. Declaring that ` Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today' (539 U.S. at 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472), Lawrence explained that Bowers purported to analyze erroneously-whether the Constitution conferred a `fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy' (539 U.S. at 566, 123 S.Ct. 2472 [citation omitted]). This was, however, the wrong question. The fundamental right at issue, properly framed, was the right to engage in private consensual sexual conduct-a right that applied to both homosexuals and heterosexuals alike. In narrowing the claimed liberty interest to embody the very exclusion being challenged, Bowers `disclose[d] the Court's own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake' ( Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 123 S.Ct. 2472). Hernandez, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d at 23. (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). What Chief Judge Kaye next said applies with equal force to the case sub judice: The same failure is evident here. An asserted liberty interest is not to be characterized so narrowly as to make inevitable the conclusion that the claimed right could not be fundamental because historically it has been denied to those who now seek to exercise it ( see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 [1992] [it is `tempting . . . to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only those practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against government interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. . . . But such a view would be inconsistent with our law']). Id. at 770, 855 N.E.2d at 23-24. It is clear to me that the majority misapprehends the nature of the liberty at issue in this case. It is not whether a same-sex marriage, with all the pejorative emotions that evokes, is a fundamental right; the real issue in this case, when properly framed, is whether marriage is a fundamental right. The issue has already been resolved; indeed, we all agree that it has been answered in the affirmative and the right is firmly established. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967) (holding unconstitutional statutes that prohibit interracial marriage); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) (concluding that state requirement that indigent individuals pay court fees to obtain divorce unconstitutionally burdened the fundamental right to marry); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978) (determining that states cannot require individuals with child support obligations to obtain court approval in order to marry); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (holding that inmates could not be denied the right to marry). The right to marry, encompassing as it does the related and critically important element of choice  the freedom to choose whom to marry, to select the lucky person  is not inherently party-centric. Neither is it either hetero  or homo  sexual. I agree with Chief Judge Kaye, to construe the right to marry as narrowly as does the majority, i.e., based on sexual orientation, makes inevitable the conclusion that this fundamental right, by virtue of historical prejudice, does not exist for same-sex couples. See Hernandez, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d at 24. (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted). As Chief Judge Kaye observed: the result in Lawrence was not affected by the fact, acknowledged by the Court, that there had been no long history of tolerance for homosexuality. Rather, in holding that `[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for the [] purpose [of making intimate and personal choices], just as heterosexual persons do.' Lawrence rejected the notion that fundamental rights it had already identified could be restricted based on traditional assumptions about who should be permitted their protection. As the Court noted, `times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper only served to oppress.' As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom ( Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579, 123 S.Ct. 2472; see also id. at 572, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472 [`(h)istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry. . . .']; Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 466, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 [1985] [Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part] [`what once was a `natural' and `self-evident' ordering later comes to be seen as an artificial and invidious constraint on human potential and freedom']). Simply put, fundamental rights are fundamental rights. They are not defined in terms of who is entitled to exercise them. Hernandez, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d at 24. (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574, 579, 123 S.Ct. at 2472). To be sure, there are important differences between the African American experience and that of gay men and lesbians in this country, yet many of the arguments made in support of the antimiscegenation laws were identical to those made today in opposition to same-sex marriage and, as in Loving, their goal is to restrict the right of an individual to marry the person of his or her choice. Consequently, the reasoning of Loving requires rejection of the petitioners' argument. Hernandez, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d at 24-25, 26, (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (citing and quoting Brief of NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., as amicus curiae in support of plaintiffs). Finally, [i]t is no answer that same-sex couples can be excluded from marriage because `marriage,' by definition, does not include them. In the end, `an argument that marriage is heterosexual because it `just is' amounts to circular reasoning' ( Halpern v. Attorney Gen. of Can., 65 OR3d 161, 172 OAC 276, ¶ 71 [2003] ). `To define the institution of marriage by the characteristics of those to whom it always has been accessible, in order to justify the exclusion of those to whom it never has been accessible, is conclusory and bypasses the core question we are asked to decide' ( Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 348, 798 N.E.2d 941, 972-973 [2003] [Greaney, J., concurring] ). Hernandez, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d at 26 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). At the very least, the benefits appurtenant to marriage accrue, whoever and whatever the nature of the parties. Therefore, I agree with, and join, Judge Raker's dissent to the extent that it endorses and advocates that committed same-sex couples are entitled to the myriad statutory benefits that are associated with and flow from marriage. I do not join that part of her opinion that accepts the majority's analysis and determination that rational basis review is the appropriate standard to be applied in this case. As to a determination under rational basis review, again, I am persuaded by Chief Judge Kaye's Hernandez dissent. Thus, if the proper test were rational basis, I, like Chief Judge Kaye, believe that the classification at issue in this case does not pass muster: it does not satisfy even rational basis review, which requires that the classification `rationally further a legitimate state interest.' Hernandez, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d at 30. (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The majority determines that, under rational basis review, the limitation of marriage to a man and a woman [2] is reasonably related to the State's legitimate interest in fostering procreation, in a stable environment, i.e., traditional heterosexual marriage. See 401 Md. at 317-21, 932 A.2d at 630-32. While the State undoubtedly has an interest in encouraging heterosexual couples to marry prior to procreation, the exclusion of gay men and lesbians from marriage in no way furthers this interest. There are enough marriage licenses to go around for everyone. Hernandez, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d at 30. The majority discusses, at length, statistics and other evidence that support the existence of trend toward the gradual erosion of the `traditional' nuclear family in today's society, 401 Md. at 320, 932 A.2d at 632, and also identifies the ways in which Maryland Code (1957, 2006 Repl. Vol.), Family Law Article, § 2-201 (hereinafter Family Law § 2-201) is both over-and under-inclusive. Id. at 321-25, 932 A.2d at 633-35. Reasoning that, because rational basis review does not require mathematic exactitude, and may contain imperfections which result in some degree of inequality, the majority submits that both the aforementioned trend and the inexactness, that is, the over-and underinclusive nature of Family Law § 2-201, are insufficient to support a determination that Family Law § 2-201 runs afoul of equal protection. Id. at 325, 932 A.2d at 635 (emphasis added). At issue here, however, is not some degree of inequality but total exclusion of same-sex couples from the entire spectrum of protections that come with civil marriage  purportedly to encourage other people to procreate. Hernandez, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d at 31. (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Consequently, it is disingenuous indeed to surmise that the  possibility of procreation creates a reasonable relationship in this context. 401 Md. at 325, 932 A.2d at 635 (emphasis added). As simply put by Chief Judge Kaye, [m]arriage is about much more than producing children, and yet the majority leaves open gaping questions such as how offering only heterosexuals the right to visit a sick loved one in the hospital . . . conceivably furthers the State's interest in encouraging opposite-sex couples to have children. See id. at 770, 855 N.E.2d at 31 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). The sheer breadth of the benefits appurtenant to marriage that are, pursuant to Family Law § 2-201, made unavailable to same-sex couples renders justification impossible to credit. Id. at 770, 855 N.E.2d at 32. (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (citing Romer v. Evans ), 517 U.S. 620, 635, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1629, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996)).