Opinion ID: 185672
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: BART Issues

Text: Under s 169A of the Act, each state must review allBART-eligible sources - meaning all major stationary sourcesbuilt between August 1962 and August 1977 - to determinewhether the sources emit any air pollutant which may reasonably be anticipated to cause or contribute to any impairment of visibility in a Class I area.2 42 U.S.C.s 7491(b)(2)(A). After deciding that a BART-eligible sourceemits a pollutant which may reasonably be anticipated to __________ 2 A major stationary source is a source that has the potentialto emit 250 tons or more of any pollutant. See 42 U.S.C.s 7491(g)(7). cause or contribute to Class I visibility impairment, the statethen must determine what is the best available retrofit technology for controlling emissions from that source. See id.Under the Act, states must take the following five factors intoconsideration when deciding what BART controls to place ona source: the costs of compliance, the energy and nonair quality environmental impacts of compliance, any existing pollution control technology in use at the source, the remaining useful life of the source, and the degree of improvement in visibility which may reasonably be anticipated to result from the use of such technology. Id. s 7491(g)(2). The Haze Rule interprets and implements these statutoryBART provisions in two main ways. First, the Haze Rulerequires states to find that a BART-eligible source is 'reasonably anticipated to cause or contribute' to regional haze ifit can be shown that the source emits pollutants within ageographic area from which pollutants can be emitted andtransported downwind to a Class I area. 64 Fed. Reg. at35,740 (italics added). In other words, states must subjectBART-eligible sources to BART requirements even absentempirical evidence of that source's individual contribution tovisibility impairment in a Class I area so long as the source islocated within a region that may contribute to visibilityimpairment. See id. at 35,740; see also Br. for EPA at 26-27. EPA explained in the preamble to the Haze Rule that thissort of collective contribution approach was consistent withthat taken in the programs for acid rain and ozone, programswhich also address regional air quality problems caused bytransported pollutants. 64 Fed. Reg. at 35,740; see also 63Fed. Reg. at 57,376. Second, the Haze Rule provides that once a state hasdecided that a particular source is subject to BART and isconsidering what BART controls to place on that source, thestate must analyze the degree of visibility improvement thatwould be achieved in each mandatory Class I Federal area asa result of the emission reductions achievable from all sources subject to BART located within the region that contributes tovisibility impairment in the Class I area. 40 C.F.R.s 51.308(e)(1)(ii)(B) (italics added). This means that of thefive statutory factors to be considered by states when determining BART controls, see 42 U.S.C. s 7491(g)(2), only fourfactors (the costs of compliance, the environmental impacts ofcompliance, any existing pollution control technology in use atthe source, and the remaining useful life of the source) areconsidered on a source-specific basis. The Haze Rule requires states to consider the fifth statutory factor (the degreein improvement) on a group or area wide basis. Industry petitioners attack EPA's decision to use a grouprather than a source-by-source BART approach, arguing thatthe language, statutory structure, and legislative history ofs 169A make it clear that the Haze Rule runs afoul of theAct. See Br. for Industry Pet'rs and Intervenor in Case Nos.99-1348, et al. at 13. For the reasons that follow, we grantthe petition for review, vacate the BART rules, and remandto EPA. In the Haze Rule, EPA extracts one of the five statutoryfactors listed in s 169A(g)(2) and treats it differently than theother four. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 35,741 (providing that onlythe degree in improvement in visibility that would be expected at each Class I area as a result of imposing BART is tobe considered on a group rather than a source-specific basis). In effect, EPA bifurcates the states' determination of theappropriate BART emission limitations for specific sources. States must first estimate possible emission reductions on asource-by-source basis based on the application of the technology, the cost, time for compliance, energy and nonairenvironmental impacts, and the remaining useful life of thesource. See id.; see also 40 C.F.R. s 51.308(e)(1)(ii)(A). Taking these factors into account allows the State to arriveat an estimate of the 'best system' of retrofit control technology for a particular source. 64 Fed. Reg. at 35,741. Statesmust then calculate the degree in improvement in visibilitythat would be expected at each Class I area as a result of imposing BART on all sources subject to BART. See id.; seealso 40 C.F.R. s 51.308(e)(1)(ii)(B). EPA argues that its bifurcated approach to determiningappropriate BART controls is permissible becauses 169A(g)(2) is unclear about how a state must analyzeanticipated visibility improvement. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc.v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). We cannot agree. The Haze Rule's splitting of the statutoryfactors is consistent with neither the text nor the structure ofthe statute. See 42 U.S.C. s 7491(g)(2). All fives 169A(g)(2) factors inform the states' inquiries into whatBART controls are appropriate for particular sources. Although no weights were assigned, the factors were meant tobe considered together by the states. The language ofs 169A(g)(2) can be read in no other way. To treat one ofthe five statutory factors in such a dramatically differentfashion distorts the judgment Congress directed the states tomake for each BART-eligible source. This is most apparentwith respect to the states' duty to take into account the costsof compliance in deciding not only whether to order anindividual source to install any new pollution control equipment, but also what type of equipment - or as the statuteputs it, what type of retrofit technology. How is a state todetermine what is too costly (and what is not) for a particularsource? The statute answers that the state must consider thedegree of improvement in visibility in national parks andwilderness areas that would result from the source's installingand operating the retrofit technology. EPA has a far different answer: in assessing the cost of compliance imposed on asource, the state may not consider the degree to which newequipment at a particular source would help cure the haze insome distant national park. Under EPA's take on the statute, it is therefore entirely possible that a source may beforced to spend millions of dollars for new technology thatwill have no appreciable effect on the haze in any Class Iarea.3 A similar problem arises when a state considers, as it __________ 3 EPA's rule requires states to consider the cost of compliancein terms of the likely emission reductions which would be achieved must, the existing pollution control technology in use at thesource. How is a state to decide whether the source alreadyhas installed sufficient devices without determining howmuch, if at all, the source is contributing to visual impairmentin downwind Class I areas? As the industry petitionerscorrectly note, there is no point during the Haze Rule'sBART determination in which it could be demonstrated thatthe degree of improvement in visibility obtained from installing a particular set of emissions controls at a source with'exceedingly low' or even merely theoretical visibility impactsis not justified by the cost of BART in light of those low ortheoretical impacts. Br. for Industry Pet'rs and Intervenorin Case Nos. 99-1348, et al. at 17-18. The Haze Rule's treatment of s 169A(g)(2)'s degree-ofimprovement calculation is, the industry petitioners argue,not the only respect in which the rule is inconsistent with theAct. As they see it, the Haze Rule also unlawfully constrains __________ by the imposition of BART, no matter whether this reduction wouldenhance visibility in downwind national parks. See 64 Fed. Reg. at35,741 (explaining that the four factors, including cost, should betaken into account for each source subject to BART in order tocompare tradeoffs between the control efficiencies and costs associated with various control alternatives). The preamble to the ruleprovides very little guidance about how states are to calculate thedegree of improvement in visibility under the regime EPA contemplates. The preamble tells the states only this: To calculate the degree of improvement in visibility that would be expected at each Class I area as a result of imposing BART on all sources subject to BART, the State should estimate the possible emissions reductions resulting from the application of BART at all subject sources located within the region that contributes to visibility impairment in the Class I area. The State should work on its own or in conjunction with other States, such as a regional planning body, to determine the geographic scope of the region that contributes to each Class I area. The States should consult with one another to determine the emission reductions achievable from sources subject to BART in other states. Id. the states' statutory authority because under the Act it is thestates - not EPA - who must determine which BART-eligiblesources should be subject to BART. See 42 U.S.C.s 7491(b)(2)(A) (providing that each BART-eligible sourcethat, as determined by the State ... emits any air pollutantwhich may reasonably be anticipated to cause or contribute toany impairment of visibility, shall install and operate thebest available retrofit technology (italics added)); see also id.s 7491(g)(2) (listing the factors that the State ... shall takeinto consideration in determining BART controls (italicsadded)). We agree with these petitioners that the Haze Rule'sBART provisions are inconsistent with the Act's provisionsgiving the states broad authority over BART determinations. See id. s 7491(b)(2)(A); see also id. s 7491(g)(2). The HazeRule ties the states' hands and forces them to require BARTcontrols at sources without any empirical evidence of theparticular source's contribution to visibility impairment in aClass I area. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 35,740; see also Br. for EPAat 26-27. If the Haze Rule contained some kind of a mechanism by which a state could exempt a BART-eligible sourceon the basis of an individualized contribution determination,then perhaps the plain meaning of the Act would not beviolated. But the Haze Rule contains no such mechanism. Section 169A(c)(1) - on which EPA relies - is a procedure bywhich the Administrator, with the approval of federal landmanagers, can exempt a source from BART requirements. See 42 U.S.C. s 7491(c)(1) (The Administrator may, by rule,after notice and opportunity for public hearing, exempt anymajor stationary source from [the BART requirements], uponhis determination that such source does not or will not, byitself or in combination with other sources, emit any airpollutant which may reasonably be anticipated to cause orcontribute to a significant impairment of visibility in anymandatory class I Federal area.); see also id. s 7491(c)(3). It does not provide the states with a means by which they canexempt sources based on individual contribution determinations. Our conclusion that the Haze Rule's BART provisionsimpermissibly constrain state authority is reinforced by theConference Report on the 1977 amendments to the Act. SeeDemby v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 507, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1981). TheReport explains: The agreement clarifies that the State, rather than the Administrator, identifies the source that impairs visibility in the Federal class I areas identified.... In establishing emission limitations for any source which impairs visibility, the State shall determine what constitutes best available retrofit technology ... in establishing emission limitations on a source-by-source basis to be included in the State implementation plan so as to carry out the requirements of this section. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-564 (1977), reprinted in 3 SenateComm. on Env't and Pub. Works, A legislative History of theClean Air Act Amendments of 1977, at 535 (1978) [hereinafter1977 Legislative History]. The agreement to which theConference Report refers was an agreement to reject theHouse bill's provisions giving EPA the power to determinewhether a source contributes to visibility impairment and, ifso, what BART controls should be applied to that source. See id. at 533-35. Pursuant to the agreement, language wasinserted to make it clear that the states - not EPA - wouldmake these BART determinations. See id. at 533-35; seealso H.R. Res. 4151, 95th Cong. (1977), reprinted in 1977Legislative History at 1985, 2325-30. The Conference Reportthus confirms that Congress intended the states to decidewhich sources impair visibility and what BART controlsshould apply to those sources. The Haze Rule attempts todeprive the states of some of this statutory authority, incontravention of the Act. In sum, we conclude that the Haze Rule's BART provisionsare contrary to the text, structure and history of s 169A ofthe Act because the rule isolates s 169A(g)(2)'s benefit calculation and constrains authority Congress conferred on thestates. Although petitioners also contended that no conceptof a group or area-wide BART determination could ever be consistent with the Act,4 we need not decide that broad issuetoday. We hold only that the Haze Rule's treatment ofs 169A(g)(2)'s benefit calculation and its infringement onstates' authority under the Act render the BART provisionsof the rule impermissible. III. The Natural Visibility Goal and the No Degradation Requirement The industry petitioners in Case Nos. 01-1111, 01-1112, and01-1113 (Reconsideration Petitioners) cite four grounds insupport of their claim that the natural visibility goal and theno degradation requirement in the Haze Rule should bevacated as arbitrary and capricious and otherwise not inaccordance with law: (1) EPA exceeded its authority unders 169A(a)(1) and adopted regulations that conflict with thePSD program in establishing natural visibility as the goal ofthe regional haze program; (2) the regulations impermissiblyconstrain state discretion in requiring that the states developtheir visibility programs using the no degradation requirement as a bench mark; (3) EPA has no authority to imposeupon the states the goal of achieving natural visibilityconditions, and thereby restrict the opportunity of somestates to participate in the planning process aimed at addressing regional haze; and (4) EPA promulgated the Haze Rulewithout providing adequate notice and an opportunity forcomment. We find no merit in these claims and, accordingly,deny industry petitioners' challenge to the natural visibilitygoal and the no degradation requirement. __________ 4 The industry petitioners argued that source-by-source BARTdeterminations are required by the statute and that no concept ofarea-wide BART determinations is permissible. See Brief for Industry Pet'rs and Intervenor in Case Nos. 99-1348, et al. at 14(arguing that s 169A makes it clear that BART determinationsmust be made on a source-by-source basis). Cf. Train v. NaturalRes. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975) (discussing the history ofthe Clean Air Act and how the premise of the Act was to give statesand local governments responsibility over preventing air pollutionat its source). Before we turn to the merits of petitioners' claims, we mustfirst address EPA's contentions that petitioners' challenge tothe natural visibility goal and their claims of inadequatenotice are barred because they were not properly raisedbefore the agency. We find no merit in EPA's contentions. Petitioners argued that the Haze Rule conflicted with thePSD program in both their comments to the agency beforethe regulations were issued and in their petition for reconsideration. See Supplemental Comments of the Utility AirRegulatory Group at 22, reprinted in Joint Appendix (J.A.)156; Petition for Reconsideration of the Regional Haze Regulations Submitted by Utility Air Regulatory Group & National Mining Ass'n at 10-11, reprinted in J.A. 97-98. Petitionersalso sought notice and comment in connection with theseportions of the Haze Rule in their petition for reconsideration. See Petition for Reconsideration of the Regional Haze RuleSubmitted by the Center for Energy and Economic Development at 11-14, reprinted in J.A. 116-19. On the merits, we reject petitioners' claim that EPA had noauthority under s 169A to adopt the natural visibility goal. EPA acted under express congressional authorization in promulgating the challenged regulations. See 42 U.S.C.s 7491(a)(4). In a case such as this, where there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-844, ... any ensuing regulation is binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (footnote omitted). The natural visibility goal is neither manifestly contrary to the statute nor arbitrary or capricious insubstance. Indeed, the goal is an eminently reasonableelucidation of the statute. The statutory goal enunciated in s 169A(a)(1) is quite clear: the prevention of any future, and the remedying of anyexisting, impairment of visibility. 42 U.S.C. s 7491(a)(1). Petitioners argue that a natural visibility goal cannot be gleaned from this statutory standard. This claim is specious. Agency regulations that aim to remedy any existing impairment of visibility and prevent any future impairment - as thestatute commands - will of necessity aim to achieve a state ofnatural visibility. There is no material inconsistency betweenthe statutory and regulatory goals, for the latter merelyelucidates the former. The petitioners also claim that Congress did not intend forthe statutory goal of s 169A(a) to displace the objectives ofthe PSD program. Therefore, according to petitioners, thenatural visibility goal and the no degradation requirementcannot be squared with the PSD program, because thatprogram recognizes that some impairment of visibility wouldbe acceptable in Mandatory Federal Class I areas. We rejectthis argument, because EPA has reasonably construed thePSD program and the disputed regional haze rules as complementary regulatory regimes. There are two things worth noting at the outset. First, thenatural visibility goal is not a mandate, it is a goal. As EPAhas explained, this goal serves as the foundation for analyticaltools to be used by the states to set reasonable progressgoals. 64 Fed. Reg. at 35,732-33 Petitioners' claim that theagency is without authority to mandate attainment of thenational goal is therefore meritless. Second, the statute specifically calls for regulations toassure reasonable progress toward meeting the nationalgoal of remedying any current and preventing any futureimpairment of visibility. 42 U.S.C. s 7491(a)(4). The nodegradation provision requires implementation plans to provide for an improvement in visibility for the most impaireddays over the period of the implementation plan and ensureno degradation in visibility for the least impaired days overthe same period. 40 C.F.R. s 51.308(d)(1). This regulationplainly and permissibly serves to assure the reasonable progress sought by Congress. The PSD program was adopted pursuant to the 1977amendments to the Act. See generally Ala. Power Co. v.Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 349-51 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The program generally controls any additional deterioration of air qualityby establishing maximum allowable increases of certain pollutants in specified areas. See 42 U.S.C. s 7473(b). It istherefore true, as industry petitioners point out, that the PSDprogram may sometimes allow for limited air quality deterioration. EPA, however, has taken pains to explain that thePSD program and the Haze Rule are not at odds: Section 169A of the CAA requires the EPA to promul- gate regulations to ensure that the States revise their implementation plans to contain those measures necessary to make reasonable progress toward the national visibility goal. In addition to the remedying of any existing visibility impairment, that goal requires the prevention of any future visibility impairment in mandatory Class I Federal areas. As part of the overall strategy to effectuate that goal, the final rule requires States to identify all anthropogenic sources of visibility impairment. The States accordingly should take into account the cumulative effect of all existing, man-made sources of air pollution in developing their regional haze implementation plan as well as potential new sources. With respect to the comment that EPA lacks authority to impose a welfare-based standard which renders other requirements of the CAA such a[s] PSD and NSPS largely superfluous, EPA notes that when Congress amended the CAA in 1977 to provide for the protection of visibility, it was aware of both the PSD and NSPS provisions. Nevertheless, Congress required EPA to issue regulations to address visibility. In contrast, the final regional haze rule requires States to take into account the visibility impact of emissions from both existing and new sources, and stationary and nonstationary sources. This is only one of many instances under the CAA in which Congress has provided for overlapping regulation. Indeed, the PSD and NSPS programs both focus on the control of emissions from new stationary sources. EPA believes that the regional haze rule and these other provisions are complementary means of improving air quality. Commenters raised a number of specific questions regarding the interaction of the PSD program and the regional haze rule. One commenter asked the EPA to address the relationship of allowable Class I impacts to the proposed visibility impact limits. All PSD areas are categorized as Class I, II, or III. The classification of an area determines the corresponding maximum allowable increases, or increment, of air quality deterioration. Only a relatively small increment of air quality deterioration is permissible in Class I areas. These increments are measured over annual, 24-hour, and/or 3-hour averaging times. Nowhere, however, does the CAA provide that air quality must be allowed to deteriorate to the full extent allowed by the Class I increments standing alone. To read the statute in that manner would contravene both the general goals of the CAA to protect and enhance air quality (see section 101(b)(1)) but the specific long-term goal of section 169A is to eventually remedy existing visibility impairment in Class I areas. Accordingly, we believe that allowing localized air quality increases in the short-term due to the emissions from major new sources subject to PSD is not inconsistent with the regional haze program. The regional haze program is focused on long-term emission decreases from the entire regional emission inventory, comprised of major and minor stationary sources, area sources and mobile sources. We expect that long-term emission strategies for regional haze will derive substantial emission decreases from the inventory as a whole, and that these overall strategies will be able to accommodate some localized increases within the framework of a regional decrease. We also note that the overall inventory would decrease in cases where new sources are built that replace older, more polluting sources. Accordingly, we do not see any inherent conflict between the two programs. While the PSD program generally allows for a small increment of air quality deterioration in Class I areas, section 165 of the CAA also provides for the additional protection of air quality-related values, including visibility, in Class I Federal areas beyond that provided by the increments. That is, where the FLM [Federal Land Manager] demonstrates that emissions from a new or modified source will have an adverse impact on air quality-related values (AQRVs), notwithstanding the fact that the emissions from the source do not cause or contribute to concentrations in excess of the increment for a Class I area, a permit shall not be issued. Section 165(d). Thus, under PSD there can be no increase in emissions from the construction or modification of a major stationary source where that increase would result in adverse impacts on AQRVs in a Class I Federal area. Responses to Significant Comments on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking s I.F (Apr. 1999), reprinted in J.A. 106263. The Government also reminds us that the PSD programdoes not require that [visibility] deterioration occur. Nordoes it create an entitlement to degrade air quality in generalor visibility in particular, because nothing in the CAA provides for issuance of a PSD permit as a matter of right. Br.for EPA at 59. We agree. Petitioners cite Alabama Power in an attempt to supporttheir claim that the existence of the PSD program effectivelybars natural visibility as a viable regulatory goal. AlabamaPower supports no such claim. Indeed, the court noted that[s]ection 169A is available to protect visibility in Class Iareas where visibility is an important characteristic, and the[agency] may choose to invoke [its] rulemaking authority ... to address this problem. 636 F.2d at 368. In acknowledging the availability of s 169A, the court implicitly embraced EPA's view that the visibility program is a supplementto the PSD program. Industry petitioners additionally claim that the no degradation requirement conflicts with s 169A(g)(1)'s list of factorsthat states must consider when determining reasonable progress. Section 169A(g)(1) states: in determining reasonable progress there shall be taken into consideration the costs of compliance, the time necessary for compliance, and the energy and nonair quality environmental impacts of compliance, and the remaining useful life of any existing source subject to such requirements. 42 U.S.C. s 7491(g)(1). Petitioners argue that, because reasonable progress could at times involve degradation, the nodegradation requirement restricts the States' authority toapply the statutory criteria. We disagree. As noted above, the statute commands EPA to promulgateregulations assuring reasonable progress toward meetingthe national goal. Id. s 7491(a)(4). The national goal includes the prevention of any future ... impairment ofvisibility. Id. s 7491(a)(1). The no degradation requirement simply elucidates reasonable progress. The requirement does not, however, in any way alter the list ofs 169A(g)(1) criteria. In fact, the cited statutory factors donot include degradation. Therefore, the States will be ableto comply with the no degradation requirement while applying the s 169A(g)(1) criteria. Next, although the petitioners assert that the Haze Rulesomehow restricts the opportunity of some states to participate in the planning process aimed at addressing regionalhaze, we can find no real evidence in support of this claim. This contention certainly offers no ground upon which tovacate the disputed regulations. Finally, petitioners claim that they did not have fair noticeand an adequate opportunity to comment on the regulatorygoal of natural visibility, because EPA provided no notice inits 1997 proposal that it intended to require States to achievenatural visibility conditions. Br. for Reconsideration Pet'rsat 25. Rather, according to petitioners, EPA merely proposed regulations patterned on the statutory goal enunciatedin s 169A(a)(1), i.e., 'preventing any future, and remedyingany existing, impairment of visibility.' Br. for Reconsideration Pet'rs at 25 (quoting old 40 C.F.R. s 51.300(a)(1)). Thisargument is meritless. As noted above, there is no material inconsistency between the statutory goal enunciated ins 169A(a)(1) and the regulatory goal of natural visibility. The latter is a logical outgrowth of the former. FertilizerInst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Therefore, EPA did not violate any notice and comment requirements in adopting the natural visibility goal as a part of theHaze Rule. If there is any tension between the Haze Rule and the PSDprogram, it is EPA's responsibility to harmonize the regulatory requirements. It has done so in a perfectly reasonablefashion. EPA's regulatory harmonization is both consistentwith the statute and reasonable. Accordingly, we deny thepetitions for review of the natural visibility goal and the nodegradation requirement. IV. The Reasonable Progress Criteria and the Extension of the Statutory Deadline While the Industry Petitioners attack the Regional HazeRule as overstepping EPA's statutory authority, Sierra Clubargues that EPA has not gone far enough to meet itsstatutory responsibilities. In its first cluster of attacks on the Haze Rule, Sierra Clubcontends that the Rule does not satisfy EPA's responsibilityunder CAA s 169A(a)(4) to promulgate regulations to assure... reasonable progress toward meeting the national [visibility] goal, 42 U.S.C. s 7491(a)(4), its responsibility under CAAs 169B(e)(1) to establish criteria for measuring 'reasonableprogress' toward the national goal, 42 U.S.C. s 7492(e)(1),and its obligation under the Administrative Procedure Act notto act in an arbitrary or capricious fashion, 5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(A). Sierra Club argues that the Haze Rule's requirements for improvement in visibility during the 20 percentmost impaired days and for no degradation during the 20percent least impaired days, 40 C.F.R. s 51.308(d)(1); seealso 64 Fed. Reg. at 35,734, do not qualify as reasonableprogress criteria and are arbitrary and capricious. Similarly, it argues that the Rule's requirement that a state notadopt a rate of improvement that would take more than 60years to achieve natural visibility unless the state demon- strates that the 60-year rate is unreasonable, 40 C.F.R.s 51.308(d)(1)(i)(b), (ii), does not meet the statutory mandatesand lacks requisite specificity because a state would befree to reject the 60 year time frame merely by claiming thatsuch a schedule is not 'reasonable.' Reply Br. for SierraClub at 5, 8. We might well consider the latter attack unripe evenwithout reference to our decision in Part II that the groupBART provisions of the Haze Rule are invalid. If in thefuture a state does conclude that it needs more than 60 yearsto achieve natural visibility, and if EPA decides to accept thatconclusion, it will at that time be open to Sierra Club tochallenge EPA's decision as arbitrary and capricious. In themeantime, this court will certainly 'benefit from postponingreview until the policy in question has sufficiently crystallized.' Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154 F.3d455, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Florida Power & Light Co.v. EPA, 145 F.3d 1414, 1421 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). But in any event, our decision to invalidate the groupBART provisions renders this entire cluster of challengesunripe for disposition. Because those provisions were intimately related to EPA's assessment of what was necessary toachieve the goal of natural visibility, we cannot be surewhether on remand EPA will retain its current criteria forevaluating reasonable progress or adopt others. If the invalidation of the group-BART provisions causes EPA to doubtthe efficacy of the remaining elements of the Haze Rule,perhaps EPA will see wisdom in some of Sierra Club'scomplaints and, for example, increase the percentage of daysduring which there must be improvement in visibility, orincrease the specificity of its criteria for reasonable progress. In light of the uncertainty that our decision creates withrespect to the form of the rule that may emerge uponremand, the only prudent course is for us to decline toaddress Sierra Club's challenges at this juncture. Sierra Club's second major attack on the Haze Rule challenges EPA's determination to give states 3 years to file hazeSIPs for areas designated attainment or unclassifiable. We are troubled by EPA's action, which appears to contra- vene express statutory language, but in light of our decisionregarding group-BART we leave this to EPA to reconsider onremand as well. The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub.L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107, 463 (1998) (TEA-21), providesthat, for areas designated as nonattainment for the newnational ambient air quality standard (NAAQS) for fine particulate matter, EPA shall require states to submit haze SIPs3 years after the area has been so designated. See TEA-21s 6102(c)(2) (incorporating the 3-year deadline of 42 U.S.C.s 7492(e)(2)). However, TEA-21 also expressly mandatesthat for any area designated as attainment or unclassifiable for that standard, EPA shall require the [SIP] to besubmitted 1 year after the area has been so designated. Id. Nonetheless, the Haze Rule permits a state to choose todefer addressing the [Rule's] core requirements for regionalhaze ... and the requirements for BART by submitting aso-called commitment SIP, containing a demonstration ofongoing participation in a regional planning process to address regional haze, and an agreement ... to continue participating, a description of the regional planning process, anda list of all BART-eligible sources within the state. 40C.F.R. s 51.308(c), (c)(1). If a state submits such a commitment SIP, the deadline for submitting a haze SIP is extendedfrom 1 year to 3. Id. s 51.308(c)(2); see Br. for EPA at 87; Br. for Sierra Club at 25. On its face, this provision of the Haze Rule appears toextend the express statutory deadline for attainment andunclassifiable areas, an action which is beyond the agency'sauthority. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 129 F.3d 137, 140 (D.C.Cir. 1997) (holding that EPA cannot establish a grace period for compliance when not authorized to do so by the CAA); Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1983)(reversing an EPA implementation plan that would haveeffectively extended the statutory deadline for state submissions under CAA amendments). The statute requires statesto submit, by the 1-year deadline, SIPs contain[ing] suchemission limits, schedules of compliance, and other measuresas may be necessary to carry out the haze regulations. 42 U.S.C. s 7492(e)(2) (incorporated by reference into TEA-21s 6102(c)(2)). A commitment SIP, which by definition addresses neither the Haze Rule's core requirements for regional haze, nor its requirements for BART, 40 C.F.R.s 51.308(c), does not appear to satisfy the statutory requirement. Cf. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 22 F.3d1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding, under CAA s 110(k)(4),that EPA cannot satisfy its responsibility to determine whether a state plan submission complies with the CAA unless thesubmission contains something more than a mere promise totake appropriate but unidentified measures in the future,and that a submission containing nothing more than such acommitment cannot extend the statutory deadline). Notwithstanding our doubts about the validity of this provision, we decline to vacate it in light of the uncertainty thatour decision invalidating the group-BART provisions of theHaze Rule will cast upon the contents of the SIPs required ofthe states. With the Rule and hence the contents of the SIPsnow altered and subject to revision on remand, the moreprudent course for this court is simply to remand the deadline-extension issue as well. This will permit the agency toreconsider its decision to extend the deadline at the sametime that it decides what form the substantive requirementsof a revised Haze Rule should take.