Opinion ID: 2570148
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Injection of Personal Beliefs

Text: Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly injected his personal beliefs, feelings, and experiences into the penalty phase of trial. During closing argument, the prosecutor said, Because of the way I was raised I can't find a great deal of sympathy for Mr. Loker. I find it astonishing that when you compare what happened to all of the other members of his family and his religious group he's the only one that went bad. Defendant objected that the prosecutor was vouching for his own case and injecting his own personal beliefs, feelings and opinions. The trial court overruled the objection, stating, I think in context it is a discussion of the evidence. . . . [T]he jury is admonished that it would be improper for either counsel to give you their own personal views or opinions or feelings. All counsel can do is discuss with you the evidence and . . . how that relates to the instructions. But counsel are entitled to do that in a variety of ways. And in context I think [the prosecutor] is doing just that. The prosecutor later told the jurors they were free to feel greater sympathy for defendant than he did, and that it was their decision that mattered. [22] (15) Defendant claims it was improper for the prosecutor to vouch for a death verdict by referring to his own upbringing and biases. A prosecutor may legitimately advance the view that death is the appropriate penalty based on the evidence. ( People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 310 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433]; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 772 [239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].) However, defendant is correct that prosecutors should not purport to rely in jury argument on their outside experience or personal beliefs based on facts not in evidence. ( People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 776 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2].) Here, the prosecutor improperly injected his own experiences and beliefs into the argument. The court should have sustained counsel's objection, but defendant suffered no prejudice. The court did promptly admonish the jury regarding the prosecutor's personal views, and on other occasions reminded it that the arguments of counsel are not evidence. The prosecutor himself emphasized to the jury that its opinion was determinative, not his. Under these circumstances, the error was harmless under any standard. Defendant also complains about a reference to the prosecutor's wife. After reading the jury instruction that [t]o return the judgment of death each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole, but that a judgment of death . . . is never mandated, the prosecutor brought up something Marcie, my wife, said . . . I said, I'm concerned, honey, because we have heard nothing for the last four or five weeks but defense witnesses who come in and talk about hamburger incidents or whatever. . . . And I'm concerned because there may be what Rush Limbaugh would call a bleeding heart on the jury that wants to save somebody, a rescuer. . . . But she said, David, you have to bring this up and talk about it to the jury. And so that's why I'm bringing it up to you. There may be among you, all of you who are good people, and who because of the types of work you do and the professions you're in, you care about people, you know, you do good work and you care. And I'm concerned that maybe you will become so focused on that, that you care and you want to save people and you want to rescue people, that you're going to forget about what your duty is under this instruction; that you're going to forget about weighing the totality of everything he's done, the pain he's inflicted on not only the victims but their families and so forth. Remember the victims. Who was there to rescue them? Defendant did not object to this argument. No exception to this requirement is applicable, and his claim is therefore forfeited. ( People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 215.) In any event, to the extent these remarks were improper, they were clearly not prejudicial. The prosecutor's reference to the conversation with his wife was a passing one, and the jury was appropriately instructed regarding the arguments of counsel.