Opinion ID: 196719
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Court's Balancing Test

Text: 21 The district court dismissed Serafino's claims upon concluding that 1) the alleged illegal conduct underlying the outside benefits was central to defendants' defense; 2) there was no effective substitute for Serafino's answers; and 3) there was no adequate alternative remedy to dismissal. Though Serafino hotly disputes each premise, our more detailed analysis compels us to agree with the court's conclusions.
22 Serafino's alleged illegal conduct is relevant in two ways. First, defendants justify their discharge of Serafino on their belief that he conspired to defraud Hasbro. Under the framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), which generally guides claims under Mass.Gen.L.Ann. ch. 151B, Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 263 (1st Cir.1994), if defendants propose a nonretaliatory reason for the termination and present facts in support, Serafino cannot prevail unless he proves that the reason is pretext, see Tate v. Dep't of Mental Health, 419 Mass. 356, 362-63, 645 N.E.2d 1159 (1995). In this context, the significance of information that goes directly to the nonretaliatory justification is self-evident. 23 Second, if in fact the benefits were illegally obtained, then defendants could effectively argue that Serafino is not entitled to compensation based on them. Though we do not, and need not, determine whether his alleged misconduct would foreclose all possible relief, 6 we easily conclude that, at the very least, it would greatly diminish his recovery. Cf. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 879, 886, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995) (holding that after-acquired evidence of an employee's misconduct does not bar all relief under the ADEA but must be taken into account in determining an appropriate remedy). Without the ability to investigate a matter that goes to the heart of the damages sought, defendants would be substantially prejudiced.
24 The district court found that there are no company records or other Hasbro employees whose information could effectively substitute for responses from George Serafino himself. We agree. Even if a paper trail might show some irregularities, it is a poor proxy for Serafino's testimony. As for other employees, such as Peckham and Gulluni, if they were involved in illegal conduct, they would almost certainly assert their Fifth Amendment privilege. If, instead, they denied involvement, defendants would be back at square one, handicapped in their defense by Serafino's silence.
25 We are left to consider whether a less drastic remedy would have sufficed. At oral argument on the motion to dismiss, counsel for Serafino listed several possibilities--staying the matter, allowing an adverse inference to be drawn, and striking testimony--but did not recommend one, suggesting instead that the court's first alternative should be a motion to compel. We doubt that the court could have ordered Serafino to answer questions to which the privilege attached. See Wehling, 608 F.2d at 1087. In any event, since counsel did not even suggest that Serafino would waive his privilege, a motion to compel was not a reasonable alternative. 26 Though he never requested one, Serafino contends that the court could have issued a stay and cites Wehling in support. In Wehling, the Fifth Circuit reversed the denial of plaintiff's motion for a protective order and stayed the civil proceedings for three years, until the expiration of the criminal limitations period. 608 F.2d at 1089. Here, upon considering Serafino's failure to file a motion, and the hardship that delay would impose on defendants, the district court refused to sua sponte impose a stay. We cannot say this constitutes an abuse of discretion.