Opinion ID: 1642699
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Use of the proceeds from the court fee and the lodging tax

Text: The relevant substance of the trial court's order is as follows: The following constitutes the Court's interpretation of the significant language of the Amendment [Amendment No. 634]: As set forth in the third sentence, there are two (2) projects for which the fees are to be used: the planning, designing, construction, financing, and operation of a new county jail; the planning, design, repair, renovation, financing, and operation of the existing county courthouse; these compound objects of the preposition `for' are joined by the coordinating conjunction `and'; `construction' precedes `a new county jail,' whereas `construction' does not precede `the existing county courthouse,' `renovation' precedes `the existing county courthouse,' but does not precede `a new county jail'; the words `county jail' are preceded by an indefinite article (`a') and an adjective (`new'); whereas the word `courthouse' is preceded by a definite article (`the') and a descriptive adjective (`existing'). There is nothing in the wording of either sentence to suggest the building of a new courthouse. The language clearly states that the fees shall be used to construct a new county jail and to renovate the existing county courthouse. `And' is a coordinating conjunction connecting these two (2) equal projects, neither of which has priority. Therefore, the County Commission does not have discretion to use all of the fees for one (1) of the projects to the exclusion of the other project. The following constitutes the Court's interpretation of the significant language of Section 12 of the Act [Act No. 98-657]: This Section contains one long prepositional phrase with two equal purposes joined by a coordinating conjunction, i.e., `and' (sometimes referred to by the Alabama Supreme Court as a conjunctive conjunction); `... such funds shall be used exclusively for the purposes of ...' describes a subject (`funds'), a verb (`shall be used'), a preposition (`for') and objects of the proposition (two (2) purposes); the mandatory word `shall' stresses the use of the `funds,' and the adverb `exclusively' emphasizes the specificity of the use of the funds; [T]his long paragraph states two (2) purposes for the funds from the tax: paying for construction and equipping a new county jail; paying for renovating and rehabilitating the courthouse in Conecuh County, and then paying for the operation, upkeep and maintenance of the courthouse; there is no language which indicates any priority with regard to the payment of either of the two (2) purposes because they are two (2) equal purposes; the purposes are clear as to their meaning, and are not joined by the disjunctive conjunction `or'; the words `county jail' are preceded by an indefinite article (`a') and an adjective (`new'); whereas the words `Conecuh County Courthouse' are preceded by a definite article (`the') and a descriptive adjective (`historic'); the adjective `historic' is not defined anywhere in the statute, and nowhere in the record is there any evidence or testimony that there was any legislative history or finding regarding the use of this descriptive adjective, so the Court construes the word merely as its generic meaning, especially since it is not included in the language of the Amendment. Thus, the Court declines to interpret the word `and,' as used in the Amendment and in the Act, to have a disjunctive meaning. This finding by the Court is in contrast to the testified interpretation of said word by [the County Commission's] witness. As bond counsel stated: `It was my interpretation of those statutes that the revenues that were to be collected from the taxes or the fees specify they could be used for the construction of a new jail or for the renovation of the existing courthouse. It was not my interpretation that they had to be used for both.' (wit.'s test. p. 159-60) (emphasis added); and `... that those warrants would have to be for either for the construction of a new jail or for the renovation of the existing courthouse.' (wit.'s test. p. 159) (emphasis added). .... ... It is the opinion of this Court that attributing to the word `and' its literal meaning in the Amendment and in the Act does not render either the Amendment or the Act inoperable, nor does such use of the word `and' cause the meaning of either the Amendment or the Act to become questionable. The language set forth in the Official Statement is that of the draftsman (bond counsel). Included in the Official Statement is the following language, `... (i) to finance the costs of renovating, repairing and improving the courthouse building in the County (the County Courthouse.) ...'. With respect to said language, bond counsel testified `and I wrote it that way deliberately.' (wit.'s test. p. 163). However, this phrase contains a word that appears nowhere in either the Amendment or in the Act; viz. `improving.' The inclusion of the unauthorized word improving by the draftsman is significant, since, repeatedly, bond counsel justified his contention that construction of a new courthouse was authorized by his interpretation of the word `improving.' But, the legislature did not include the word `improving' in the statute, and the electorate did not vote to adopt a constitutional amendment that included the word, `improving.' Consequently, the Court determines that there is no word or language in either the Amendment or the Act which authorizes the expenditure of fees or proceeds generated by the Amendment or the Act to be used for purposes of planning, designing, financing, and/or constructing a new county courthouse in Conecuh County, Alabama. The Court is aware of the contents of § 11-14-10, Code of Alabama 1975, as amended, wherein it is mandated, inter alia, `The county commission shall erect courthouses, ... such courthouses to be adequate and commodious for the business of such (circuit) court and county at such place....' The Court, having been in and around the `existing county courthouse' during the trial of this cause, finds that the plans and specifications prepared by the architect at the direction(s) of the County Commission and/or the Building Authority would, if implemented, provide a most adequate and commodious courthouse for the use of the public and the public officials. The Court finds, particularly, that the construction of a new courthouse pursuant to such plans and specifications would provide for adequate safety of individuals required to conduct business or be in attendance at proceedings in the county courthouse and for enhanced security for official documents and records which provide evidence of proceedings of courts of record, matters relating to title of real property, historical materials not otherwise in existence elsewhere which pertain to individuals, families, the County, etc. In fact, the Court commends the County Commission for attempting to provide the citizens of Conecuh County, as well as citizens of other counties and states, with a safe, modern, and commodious (spacious) new courthouse. However, regardless of how commendable the actions of the County Commission may be in its attempt to construct a new county courthouse in Conecuh County, such cannot be accomplished by the misapplication of public funds. The County Commissioners, as well as the undersigned, are public officials. As such, each is oath-bound to uphold the laws and Constitution of the State of Alabama. As presently phrased, the language of said Amendment No. 634 and of said Act No. 98-657 does not mandate, or permit, proceeds or funds generated by either the Amendment or the Act to be used to fund the construction of a new county courthouse in Conecuh County. The two mandated equal purposes are clearly and unambiguously set forth in the language of the Constitution and the Act. Neither the Legislature nor the vote of the qualified electors has authorized the use of such funds or proceeds to be used only for a singular mandated purpose stated therein. This Court did not create this legislative/financial quagmire. Nevertheless, it is the duty of this Court to follow the law as it understands and interprets the Amendment and the Act. For this Court to construe the Amendment and the Act contrary to their clear meaning would be not only to frustrate the intent of the legislature but also to disregard the vote of the electorate of this State. In summary, the Court finds as follows: 1. That some of the language contained in the Official Statement was, at least, a misstatement, if not a misrepresentation; 2. That the Amendment and the Act were in effect at the time of the issuance of the Series 2000 Warrants. Bond counsel, counsel for the County, members of the Commission, and members of the Building Authority had ample opportunity and responsibility to become acutely and intimately aware of the language and content of the Amendment and the Act prior to the authorization of the issuance of the Series 2002 Warrants. Yet, apparently, there have been no efforts to repeal, amend, modify, or otherwise legally alter the language of the Amendment and/or the Act; 3. That absent funds from other sources, the fees and proceeds generated solely by the Amendment and by the Act do not produce adequate revenues to fund either the renovating of the existing county courthouse or the construction of the new county jail; 4. That it would be misapplication of public funds for the fees or proceeds from the Amendment and the Act to be used for the demolition of the existing Conecuh County Courthouse; 5. That it would be a misapplication of public funds for the fees or proceeds from the Amendment and the Act to be used for the construction of a new county courthouse in Conecuh County; and, 6. That it would be a misapplication of public funds for the fees or proceeds from the Amendment and/or the Act to be used as set forth in the [First] Supplemental Indenture. (Emphasis in original.) We agree with the trial court that the language of Amendment No. 634 and of Act No. 98-657 forbids the use of the proceeds collected from the court fee and the lodging tax to demolish the existing county courthouse and to construct a new courthouse. We adopt its reasoning in support of that holding. As the trial court noted, there is simply no rational way to interpret the words of Amendment No. 634 and Act No. 98-657 to allow such a use; both the Amendment and the Act clearly indicate that the proceeds are to be used for the renovation of the known, existing, historic county courthouse, along with the construction of a new county jail. This is made clear beyond doubt by the comparison of the words used, in close proximity to each other, to describe the two entities being discussed: a jail and the courthouse. See Amend. No. 634, Ala. Const. 1901 (to be used by the county commission for the planning, designing, construction, financing, and operation of a new county jail and the planning, design, repair, renovation, financing, and operation of the existing county courthouse); § 12, Act No. 98-657 (used exclusively for the purposes of ... paying costs of constructing and equipping a new County jail in the County and of renovating and rehabilitating the historic Conecuh County Courthouse). The County Commission argues that terms like renovation and repair are broad enough to encompass the construction of a new courthouse. If those words are viewed in a vacuum, such an interpretation may have merit. However, those words cannot be so viewed in the contexts in which they appear in Amendment No. 634 and Act No. 98-657. The drafters of the texts of the Amendment and the Act demonstrated that they knew the difference between the creation of something new and the renovation of something old, and they assigned those words in light of this knowledge. Amendment No. 634 and Act No. 98-657 are now law, and they are not ambiguous; therefore we may not go beyond the clear meaning of the words used therein in interpreting them. See DeKalb County LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So.2d 270, 275-277 (Ala. 1998). The County Commission also contends that the trial court erred in holding that the proceeds from the court fee and the lodging tax had to be used for both projects (the jail and the courthouse) simultaneously and in equal amounts; i.e., that the funds could not be solely, or at least initially, dedicated by the County Commission to fund the construction of a new county jail. The County Commission argues that the trial court erred in interpreting the word and as it is used in Amendment No. 634 (to be used by the county commission for the planning, designing, construction, financing, and operation of a new county jail and the planning, design, repair, renovation, financing, and operation of the existing county courthouse), and in Act No. 98-657 (used exclusively for the purposes of ... paying costs of constructing and equipping a new County jail in the County and of renovating and rehabilitating the historic Conecuh County Courthouse) to require such a result. We agree. No specific direction is given in either Amendment No. 634 or in Act No. 98-657 as to exactly how the proceeds of the court fee and the lodging tax are to be spent; for example, there is no direction regarding the appropriate timing, amount, or percentage of disbursements of funds to each project. While the appellants' position that the County Commission must fund the projects simultaneously and in equal amountsis one possible interpretation, it is not the only possible interpretation. In such a situation, the issue of the disbursement of those funds becomes a political, quasi-legislative issue, see Board of Revenue of Etowah County v. Hutchins, 250 Ala. 173, 176, 33 So.2d 737, 738 (1948); the County Commission has full discretion to direct the disbursement of the proceeds from the court fee and the lodging tax in the manner that in its judgment seems best and most efficient. This discretion is limited only in that the County Commission cannot use those proceeds for anything other than a new jail or the renovation of the existing county courthouse, and the County Commission must avoid fraud, corruption, or unfair dealings. Hutchins, 250 Ala. at 176, 33 So.2d at 738. To the extent that the trial court's order conflicts with this conclusion, that order is reversed.