Opinion ID: 782512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Access to the Transcripts from the County Investigating Grand Jury

Text: 34 In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the Supreme Court of the United States articulated some of the principles and policies that underlie the notion of `comity' that exists between our national and state governments. This 35 notion of comity ... is [] a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as our Federalism, and one familiar with the profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of Our Federalism. ... What the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. 36 Id. at 44-45, 91 S.Ct. 746. 37 The Supreme Court has stated that these elementary principles of federalism and comity are embodied in the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 35-36, 113 S.Ct. 1075, 122 L.Ed.2d 388 (1993); see also Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523, 106 S.Ct. 768, 88 L.Ed.2d 877 (1986). It is, of course, a longstanding principle of Constitutional jurisprudence that because a statute is a `public act,' faith and credit must be given to its provisions[.] John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 183, 57 S.Ct. 129, 81 L.Ed. 106 (1936) (Brandeis, J.). Thus, so as not [to] unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States, Younger, 401 U.S. at 45, 91 S.Ct. 746, and to enforce the protections intended to States by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, see Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 n. 16, 71 S.Ct. 980, 95 L.Ed. 1212 (1951), Congress has further directed that: 38 The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken. 39 28 U.S.C. § 1738. The Full Faith and Credit Act therefore provides that, to the extent that the Acts of State legislatures do not conflict with the federal Constitution, statutes, and regulations and, thus, run afoul of the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, the federal courts are obliged to afford the Acts of state legislatures the same respect that the States' own courts would grant those statutes. McDonald v. City of West Branch, Michigan, 466 U.S. 284, 288 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. 1799, 80 L.Ed.2d 302 (1984); cf. Growe, 507 U.S. at 36, 113 S.Ct. 1075 (28 U.S.C. § 1738[] obligated the federal court to give that judgment legal effect and the district court erred in concluding that a state redistricting plan violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act). 40 In Pennsylvania, as in the federal system, [g]rand jury proceedings have traditionally been conducted in secrecy. In re Investigating Grand Jury of Philadelphia County, 496 Pa. 452, 437 A.2d 1128, 1130 (1981). Through the enactment of the Investigating Grand Jury Act, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4541-4553, Pennsylvania's legislature has endeavored to ensure the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings conducted in that state by limiting access to the transcripts of these proceedings. 41 [S]ecrecy, which is indispensable to the effective functioning of a grand jury investigation, is designed `(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before [the] grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect [an] innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.' 42 In re Investigating Grand Jury, 437 A.2d at 1130 (quoting United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n. 6, 78 S.Ct. 983, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958) (quoting with approval United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir.1954))). 43 Section 4549 of the Investigating Grand Jury Act limits the circumstances under which matters occurring before an investigating grand jury may be disclosed, providing that: 44 [d]isclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the Commonwealth for use in the performance of their duties. The attorneys for the Commonwealth may with the approval of the supervising judge disclose matters occurring before the investigating grand jury including transcripts of testimony to local, State, other state or Federal law enforcement or investigating agencies to assist them in investigating crimes under investigative jurisdiction. Otherwise, [a participant] ... may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed by the court. All such persons shall be sworn to secrecy, and shall be in contempt of court if they reveal any information which they are sworn to keep secret. 45 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4549(b) (emphasis added). Under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 229, the supervising judge of the grand jury shall control the original and all copies of the transcripts and shall maintain their secrecy. Pa. R.Crim. P. 229. While Rule 230 provides for disclosure to the Commonwealth's attorneys and, to a limited extent, the defendant in a criminal case, subsection (C) allows the supervising judge to grant Other Disclosures to another investigative agency only upon appropriate motion, and after a hearing into relevancy[.] Pa. R.Crim. P. 230(C). 46 As is evident from these provisions, Pennsylvania's grand jury process is strictly regulated, Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 277 A.2d 764, 775 (1971), and the supervising judge has a singular role in maintaining the confidentiality of grand jury proceedings. Indeed, Pennsylvania's Supreme Court has declared that an investigating grand jury is an arm of the court ... [and] is judicially supervised from its inception contrary to the practice in most jurisdictions[.] Id. Thus, subject to certain limited exceptions which are not applicable here, matters occurring before a county investigating grand jury may not be disclosed in the absence of an order from that grand jury's supervising judge. Pennsylvania's courts have barred attempts to utilize grand jury materials in civil contexts outside of the criminal investigative purposes for which the grand jury was empaneled. In re Investigating Grand Jury, 437 A.2d at 1128 (concluding that Court of Common Pleas had erred in granting full disclosure of grand jury transcripts and evidence to Philadelphia law department in order to aid in a civil investigation); In re November 1975 Special Investigating Grand Jury, 299 Pa.Super. 539, 445 A.2d 1260 (1982) (rejecting political candidate's attempt to obtain grand jury testimony of his opponent); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (requiring every court to afford the same full faith and credit as the Courts of such State ... from which they are taken). Before a supervising judge may grant or deny any request for disclosure of certain matters occurring before a county investigating grand jury as required by § 4549(b) of the Act, that judge must be formally presented with an appropriate motion to permit such a determination, and may require a hearing into relevancy. Pa. R.Crim. P. 230(C). 47 Camiolo contends that he complied with these requirements by hand-delivering a letter to Judge Subers's chambers, which included a copy of the motion he filed in federal court, and indicating that the federal District Judge would like a reply within seven business days. Nonetheless, Camiolo never presented an appropriate motion to Judge Subers. Pa. R.Crim. P. 230(C). As we read Pennsylvania law, Camiolo's courtesy copy of his federal motion did not sufficiently present the matter to Judge Subers for his review and determination. Indeed, in the absence of a motion filed with the state court, there was no reason for Judge Subers to weigh in on whether access should be granted to the transcripts from the county investigating grand jury. In light of the secrecy afforded grand jury matters in Pennsylvania and the respect owed by federal courts to Pennsylvania law, it was not unreasonable for Judge Subers to presume that the District Judge would refrain from ruling on the accessibility of the transcripts until Camiolo formally petitioned the state court for disclosure. Camiolo failed to do so. 48 In the absence of a ruling from the supervising judge either granting or denying access to the state grand jury materials, the question before us is whether the District Court should have proceeded to rule on Camiolo's motion seeking to compel the production of state grand jury testimony. We conclude that it should not have. At a minimum, and out of the respect and deference owed the state court, the District Court should have abstained from addressing Camiolo's motion. See, e.g., Younger, 401 U.S. at 41, 91 S.Ct. 746. Principles of comity and federalism demand that a district court presented with a request to compel the disclosure of any matter occurring before a Pennsylvania investigating grand jury should direct the party to first formally petition the judicial officer who possesses the supervisory authority to grant or deny such access. Accordingly, a party seeking such state grand jury testimony should first present his request to the appropriate state judicial officer. 49 This approach has been endorsed by other courts. In Socialist Workers Party v. Grubisic, 619 F.2d 641 (7th Cir.1980), the Seventh Circuit considered an appeal by the state's attorney of a district court order requiring that he produce transcripts from a Cook County grand jury. That court held that notions of comity between the state and federal courts require that the plaintiffs first seek disclosure in the state court with the supervisory powers over the grand jury. Id. at 643. The Grubisic Court explained that 50 comity dictates that the federal courts defer action on any disclosure requests until the party seeking disclosure shows that the state supervisory court has considered his request and has ruled on the continuing need for secrecy. Otherwise the potential threat of disclosure orders in subsequent federal civil litigation would seriously weaken the state court's control over the secrecy of this essential component of its criminal justice system. 51 Id. at 644. 52 Similarly, in American Tank Transport, Inc. v. First People's Cmty. Fed. Credit Union, No. 95-1303, 86 F.3d 1148 (Table), 1996 WL 265993 (4th Cir. May 20, 1996) (per curiam), the Fourth Circuit relied on principles of comity in determining that the district court had not erred by refusing to consider transcripts of witness testimony taken before a state grand jury presented as evidence in opposition to a summary judgment motion. The American Tank Court recognized that although the grand jury matter had been released to the appellant by the state court, that court had determined, after receiving a motion for reconsideration during the pendency of the federal action, that the transcripts were in fact improperly released[.] Id.  n. 2. To remedy that error, the state court recalled the material then before the district court and prohibited any further disclosure. Id. at , n. 2. 9 Thereafter, the district court concluded that no further discovery was necessary and disposed of the summary judgment motion without considering the grand jury transcripts. After reviewing its own caselaw and that of other courts, the American Tank court concluded that 53 it was proper ... for the district court to have acknowledged and honored the state court's ruling recalling the grand jury materials. First, the state court ruled upon the application of its own criminal rules governing the release of grand jury materials. Federal courts have indicated that state court rulings on their own procedural matters are due a significant amount of deference.... 54 Additionally, by asking the district court to ignore the state court's recall order, ATT essentially asked the district court to act as a state appellate court and overturn the state courts [sic] ruling.... In this case, if the district court had considered the grand jury materials after the recall order, it would have impermissibly intruded into the province of the state appellate courts to review questions concerning state procedural matters.... 55 Accordingly, we find that, on the facts of this case, the district court's decision to respect the state court's recall order and thereby exclude the grand jury transcripts from the consideration of the evidence upon the summary judgment motion was in accordance with our basic principles of comity and federalism. 56 American Tank, 1996 WL 265993, ; see also United States v. Silva, 745 F.2d 840, 845 (4th Cir.1984) (finding that district court did not err in refusing to grant defendant access to transcripts from on-going state grand jury and citing as authority, inter alia, principles of comity); Brunson v. City of Dayton, 163 F.Supp.2d 919, 923 (S.D.Ohio 2001) (granting motion to quash subpoena seeking the production of state grand jury matter because of plaintiff's failure to first seek an order from the state court supervising the grand jury); Puricelli v. Borough of Morrisville, 136 F.R.D. 393 (E.D.Pa.1991) (court refrained from ordering disclosure of state grand jury transcripts because of comity consideration and directed parties to jointly petition supervising judge for release of materials). Cf. United States ex rel. Woodard v. Tynan, 776 F.2d 250, 252 (10th Cir.1985) (en banc) (instructing defendants, whose business records had been unconstitutionally seized and sealed by an order of the state court, to petition the state court for the return of those business records so the plaintiff could present its federal case, thereby avoiding having to decide the Supremacy and Full Faith and Credit Clause constitutional questions). 57 The approach utilized by the Seventh and Fourth Circuits, and generally adopted herein, is fully consistent with the one directed by the Supreme Court in Douglas Oil v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 227-228, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979), concerning the disclosure of federal grand jury testimony under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). Douglas Oil calls for a collaboration between a federal district court supervising a grand jury investigation and any district court presiding over discovery in a collateral civil proceeding seeking access to that testimony. 441 U.S. at 227-228, 99 S.Ct. 1667. The Supreme Court recommends that, in general, requests for disclosure of [federal] grand jury transcripts should be directed to the court that supervised the grand jury's activities[,] even if that grand jury session had concluded. Id. at 226, 99 S.Ct. 1667. 58 We need not address whether, pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, a party complying with the procedure outlined herein is then fully bound by the state court's decision, or if a district court might yet be entitled to order the disclosure of state grand jury materials in the event that a state supervising judge refused a federal plaintiff's request for access to such records. Federal law is, of course, supreme; [t]o [] federal statute and policy, conflicting state law and policy must yield. Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2. Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 309, 84 S.Ct. 391, 11 L.Ed.2d 347 (1964). Nonetheless, this record does not require us to reach such a question. Thus, our holding is limited to requiring that a district judge confronted with a request to compel disclosure of matters occurring before a state grand jury should, absent extraordinary circumstances... [or][o]ther unusual circumstances calling for federal intervention, see Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54, 91 S.Ct. 746, abstain from interfering with that state judicial process. In such a case, the district court should direct the requesting party to first apply pursuant to applicable state statutes or procedural rules to the appropriate state judicial officer. 10 59 In sum, Pennsylvania law generally governs the procedures for obtaining disclosure of the material sought here, and that law requires that a party seeking disclosure must petition the state supervising judge for their release. Because Camiolo never presented a motion to request disclosure of the state grand jury materials to Judge Subers, the District Court should have, at a minimum, abstained from ruling on the motion seeking to compel production of the state grand jury material until Camiolo complied with the dictates of Pennsylvania law. The District Court therefore also erred in compelling the District Attorney to produce the grand jury transcripts for its own in camera review, and in considering whether the production of those documents was justified. 60 Nonetheless, we conclude that remand to the District Court so it may consider whether to afford Camiolo additional time to formally present the state court with a specific request for the materials he sought is not warranted. 11 As we observed in Petrucelli v. Bohringer and Ratzinger, 46 F.3d at 1310, before a party may succeed on a motion to compel discovery, that party must first prove that it sought discovery in the manner required by the rules of procedure. Even assuming, arguendo, that there had been no concern raised about the secrecy of the grand jury transcripts, Camiolo failed to satisfy the basic prerequisites for compelling discovery. The record indicates that Camiolo never subpoenaed the District Attorney, but proceeded directly to a motion to compel. While Camiolo made an informal request, our prior decisions indicate that such requests will not warrant the reversal of an order denying a motion to compel where the alleged prejudice is due to the movant's failure to comply with the rules. See Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1310-1311. Here, even after the District Attorney informed Camiolo of the dictates of Pennsylvania law, Camiolo failed to file a motion for disclosure with the supervising judge. Instead, he sought to short-circuit Pennsylvania's carefully considered scheme by appealing directly to the District Court, treating the supervising judge of the state grand jury as a mere bystander in interest. Because we believe that any prejudice here results solely from Camiolo's failure to follow both federal and state procedures, we decline to afford him another opportunity to correct his past mistakes. 61