Opinion ID: 2290920
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dismissal Was Inappropriate.

Text: Even if joining the owner was not feasible, the trial judge still improperly concluded that in equity and good conscience the action should not proceed in the owner's absence. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 19(b). A trial judge confronted with a Rule 19(b) inquiry should seek to identify with precision how the parties or the absent person would be prejudiced if the action were to proceed without the absent person. Provident Tradesmens, supra, 390 U.S. at 112-16, 88 S.Ct. at 739-41 (practical effect of allowing the case to continue without the absent party). In the instant case the only asserted prejudice caused by the owner's absence stems from the possibility that appellees would face multiple litigation. In particular, appellees maintain that if appellant were to prevail in his suit, the owner would be required to convey the units to appellant, and appellees would then be forced to sue the owner. This prejudice, however, could have been alleviated by use of measures much less extreme than dismissal of appellant's declaratory judgment claims. See Heath v. Aspen Skiing Corp., 325 F.Supp. 223, 229 (D.Colo.1971) (the philosophy of present Rule 19 is to avoid dismissal whenever possible). For over two years the owner was a party to the lawsuit. During that time appellees had ample opportunity to assert cross-claims against the owner, thereby eliminating the possibility of future litigation: [A] defendant faced with the prospect of multiple actions may be in a position to bring in absent persons ... by means of defensive interpleader, or by using impleader or asserting a counterclaim.... In short, the Rule 19(b) notion of equity and good conscience contemplates that the parties actually before the court are obliged to pursue any avenues for eliminating the threat of prejudice. 7 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra, § 1608 at 112-13. Even after appellant settled with the owner, appellees could have moved to implead the owner under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 14. Rather than taking any of these measures, the first time appellees complained of the defect in parties was when they moved for dismissal. Because appellees made no effort to cure the prejudice they asserted, the trial judge should have looked more skeptically on their claim that equity and good conscience required dismissal. See Kelly v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 709 F.2d 973, 978 (5th Cir.1983) (If the defendant's fears of exposure to double liability were justified, it could, as the district court suggested, have filed a counter claim ... but it chose not to do so); Boone v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 682 F.2d 552, 553 (5th Cir.1982) (reversing trial court dismissal because, in part, the defendants could protect their interests by joining the dealer as a third party should they care to do so); Abel v. Brayton Flying Serv., 248 F.2d 713, 716 (5th Cir.1957) (the defendant did not avail himself of the right to file ... a counterclaim [against the absent party] and cannot now complain); Gauss v. Kirk, 91 U.S. App.D.C. 80, 83, 198 F.2d 83, 86 (1952) (we note that [the defendant] has made no effort to avoid the risk of double liability by seeking to interplead the [absent] parties or by depositing the fund with the court). The trial judge's reliance on Donnelly v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 99, 269 F.2d 546, 548 (1959) ([j]ustice and fairness required the tenant's presence in the case, if indeed it was not a necessary party) was misplaced; the opinion does not suggest that declaratory judgment counts should be dismissed under such circumstances as existed here, where the judge failed to determine whether joinder of the owner was feasible and appellees could have taken steps to cure the asserted prejudice. [6] Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of appellant's declaratory judgment claims and remand the case for the trial judge to exercise his discretion by taking some action other than dismissing the claims. There are various ways in which the judge could cure the prejudice asserted by appellees. The owner could be joined as a defendant, or (if the judge concludes that this is a proper case) as an involuntary plaintiff. See Super.Ct.Civ.R. 19(a). Alternatively, the judge could allow appellees to implead the owner to state a claim against it (perhaps for a declaratory judgment). The judge also might allow appellant to amend his complaint in order to seek more limited declaratory relief. We need not and do not choose among these options; nor do we intend this list to be exclusive. The trial judge, on remand, is free to take whatever action, short of dismissal, that he concludes is appropriate after considering the proper factors. See generally Johnson, supra, 398 A.2d at 365.