Opinion ID: 1474108
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: The Imposition of Costs.

Text: Defendant alleges one further error. It is that costs could not be imposed upon him in addition to his sentence of imprisonment and fine. Such an argument is seldom made. It is directly contrary to the unamended 1792 Statute. When judgment is rendered against the defendant in a prosecution for any fine or forfeiture incurred under a statute of the United States, he shall be subject to the payment of costs; and on every conviction for any other offense not capital, the court may, in its discretion, award that the defendant shall pay the costs of the prosecution. [24] Defendant cites three cases in his original brief, [25] supposedly in support of his argument. These cases do not touch defendant's asserted principle of law, top, side, or bottom. The Government's brief called attention to the statute and to the case of Oates v. United States, 4 Cir. [26] Defendant's counsel give two full pages in their reply brief to the heading Government Brief is in Error in Claiming that Sentence Was in Accordance with Statute. In this two-page development, defendant's reply brief relies entirely upon its own assertions and upon the case of Whitworth v. United States, 8 Cir. [27] The reply brief makes the clash head-on. The brief quotes from the Oates case: `The Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit has expressly decided the point contrary to the position of the defendants. [Citing the Whitworth case.]' [28] The reply brief continues: The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals evidently did not know what the 8th Circuit did decide in the Whitworth case. That was a case of embezzlement from the United States and Section 4046, Revised Statutes, provided for imprisonment and a fine equal to the amount embezzled. The trial court imposed a sentence of imprisonment, a fine equal to the amount embezzled, and the costs of the prosecution of the case. The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals said: `This judgment was erroneous. The statutes gave to the court below no power to add to the fine prescribed by the act of congress the costs of the prosecution of the case.    The result is that, while there was no error in the receipt and acceptance of the defendant's plea of guilty, the judgment rendered thereon was not warranted by the law.' [29] Thus the defendant's counsel have expressly represented to this Court that the Whitworth case stands for the principle that costs cannot be added to a sentence. Counsel have further bluntly asserted that the 4th Circuit misread the Whitworth case. At the bottom of the same page in the Federal Reporter where counsel closed their quote from the Whitworth case, the following appears: Since the above opinion was announced, the attention of the court has been called for the first time to section 974 of the Revised Statutes, which provides: [quoting the statute which we have quoted above]. This statute undoubtedly empowered the court below to adjudge that the defendant, Whitworth, should pay the costs of the prosecution, and, if this provision of the acts of congress had been called to our attention, the judgment below would not have been reversed on account of the imposition of the costs. Meanwhile the case has been remitted to the court below, and the defendant has probably been re-sentenced pursuant to our direction. No motion for a rehearing has been made, and no injustice has resulted from our decision, because the conviction was not disturbed. The former sentence was very severe, and the presumption is that a just sentence has been imposed since our mandate issued. For these reasons the judgment will be allowed to stand, notwithstanding the fact that section 974 undoubtedly empowers the trial judge to award that the defendant shall pay the costs of the prosecution when he is convicted of any offense not capital. [30] This definite, but incorrect, representation by defendant's counsel to this Court of what the case stands for requires our notice and the expression of our hope that it was done inadvertently. Yet, it is illustrative of defense counsel's tenacious adherence to technical arguments at the trial and in this Court. With this we pass it by.