Opinion ID: 2775225
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: mr roberts’ constitutional challenge to the

Text: SEXUAL EXPLOITATION STATUTE FAILS ¶40 Mr. Roberts challenges the Sexual Exploitation Statute under the Uniform Operation of Laws Provision of the Utah Constitution. UTAH CONST . art. I, § 24 (“All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.”). He argues that the statute creates at least two unconstitutional classifications. First, he claims that the statute unconstitutionally distinguishes between individuals who can legally view child pornography (i.e., law enforcement officers acting to further a criminal investigation and employees of designated entities acting in good faith to report or prevent child pornography) and those who may not. See UTAH CODE § 76-5a-3 (2009). Second, he argues that the statute unconstitutionally distinguishes between prosecuting attorneys who encounter child pornography as part of their work and similarly situated criminal defense attorneys. We reject both arguments—the first on its merits and the second due to a lack of standing.6 6 Mr. Roberts clearly has standing to raise his first challenge to the Sexual Exploitation Statute because (1) he has suffered an injury (i.e., (continued...) 15 STATE v. ROBERTS Opinion of the Court A. The Classifications Created by the Sexual Exploitation Statute Are Constitutional ¶41 For a statute to comply with the Uniform Operation of Laws Provision of the Utah Constitution, “it is not enough that it be uniform on its face. What is critical is that the operation of the law be uniform.” Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ¶ 37, 54 P.3d 1069 (internal quotation marks omitted). A statute is not uniform in its operation, and is thus unconstitutional, if (1) “the statute creates any classifications,” (2) those classifications “impose any disparate treatment on persons similarly situated,” and (3) “the legislature had [no] reasonable objective that warrants the disparity.” State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30, ¶ 17, 254 P.3d 183 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶42 Looking to the first Robinson requirement, Mr. Roberts correctly argues that the Sexual Exploitation Statute creates certain classifications. Most notably, it imposes criminal and civil liability on individuals who “knowingly produce[], possess[], or possess[] with intent to distribute” or “intentionally distribute[] or view[] child pornography”; but the statute exempts from liability law enforcement officers who encounter child pornography as part of a criminal investigation and employees of certain organizations acting in good faith and within the scope of their employment to report or prevent child pornography. UTAH CODE § 76-5a-3 (2009). ¶43 Under the second Robinson requirement, however, these classifications are not unconstitutional because they do not discriminate between similarly situated individuals. The key distinction between the individuals in each classification is the context within which they view, possess, or distribute child pornography. The statute exempts only those law enforcement officers “acting within the scope of a criminal investigation” and only employees of specific entities who are “acting within the scope of employment” and “for the good faith performance of” reporting or preventing child pornography. Id. Any law enforcement officer or 6 (...continued) criminal prosecution and conviction), (2) that injury was caused by the statute’s alleged unconstitutionality, and (3) we have the authority to redress his injury if we determine the statute is unconstitutional. See Carlton v. Brown, 2014 UT 6, ¶ 31, 323 P.3d 571 (explaining that to have standing, a party must show injury, causation, and redressability). 16 Cite as: 2015 UT 24 Opinion of the Court employee of an exempt entity who knowingly or intentionally produces, possesses, views, or distributes child pornography for any other reason will be subject to the same criminal liability as other individuals. Because this classification does not distinguish between similarly situated individuals, it fails the second requirement of the Robinson test. The Sexual Exploitation Statute therefore does not violate the Uniform Operation of Laws Provision of the Utah Constitution based on this classification. B. Mr. Roberts Lacks Standing to Challenge the Constitutionality of the Sexual Exploitation Statute’s Disparate Treatment of Prosecutors and Criminal Defense Attorneys ¶44 Mr. Roberts also contends that the Sexual Exploitation Statute unconstitutionally distinguishes between prosecuting attorneys and defense attorneys.7 Specifically, he argues that prosecuting attorneys, are exempt under the Sexual Exploitation Statute when viewing, possessing, or distributing child pornography within the scope of a criminal investigation. Defense attorneys, on the other hand, are granted no such exemption, and thus would be in violation of the statute by possessing, viewing, or distributing child pornography as part of their legal representation of a criminal defendant. ¶45 On its face, the Sexual Exploitation Statute provides no exemption for criminal defense attorneys who must view evidence that may include child pornography in order to zealously advocate for their clients. Before addressing the constitutionality of this apparent oversight, however, we must first determine whether Mr. Roberts has standing to bring this challenge. See Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18, ¶ 9, 299 P.3d 1098 (“Since standing is a jurisdictional requirement, we first must determine whether 7 In 2009, the Legislature amended the Sexual Exploitation Statute to expressly exclude liability for law enforcement officers and employees of exempt organizations. See UTAH CODE § 76-5b-201(6). It did not, however, include an exemption for others involved in the judicial process who may be required to view child pornography during the course and within the scope of their employment. As a practical matter, those involved in the judicial process, including judges, court staff, jurors, and lawyers—both prosecuting and defense—are unlikely to be prosecuted under this statute. Nevertheless, the Legislature may wish to consider broadening the exclusion to include such participants in the judicial process. 17 STATE v. ROBERTS Opinion of the Court Appellants have standing to bring any of their claims.”); see also State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah 1989) (explaining that this court may raise the issue of standing “sua sponte at any time”). ¶46 Standing requires that we view the constitutionality of a statute from the perspective of the party raising the challenge. See State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987) (“The constitutionality of a statute is considered in light of the standing of the [party] who raises the question and of its particular application in his case.”). To establish standing under our traditional test, the party bringing a constitutional challenge must show three things: (1) ”that [the party] has been or will be adversely affected by the [challenged] actions,” (2) that a “causal relationship [exists] between the injury to the party, the [challenged] actions and the relief requested,” and (3) that the relief requested is “substantially likely to redress the injury claimed.” Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, ¶ 19, 148 P.3d 960 (second and fourth alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶47 Under the first requirement, a party may only challenge a statute “to the extent the alleged basis of its infirmity is, or will be, applied to his detriment.” Hoffman, 733 P.2d at 505. In other words, to obtain standing, a party challenging a statute must suffer an injury as a result of the statute’s alleged unconstitutionality. In this case, Mr. Roberts has not shown that he has been or will be injured by the alleged unconstitutionality of the Sexual Exploitation Statute. Instead, he raises only a hypothetical injury. He argues that because defense attorneys could be subject to criminal and civil liability for viewing evidence containing child pornography, their representation of criminal defendants charged under the Sexual Exploitation Statute will be hindered, thereby depriving criminal defendants of their right to effective assistance of counsel. But Mr. Roberts cannot establish an actual injury. First, Mr. Roberts bases his alleged injury on defense counsel’s fear of prosecution—not his own. But a party generally lacks standing “to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). ¶48 And although Mr. Roberts alleges an indirect harm to criminal defendants based on defense counsel’s fear of prosecution, he has not shown that his counsel genuinely feared prosecution so as to render his counsel’s representation ineffective. While Mr. Roberts baldly asserts that his counsel was “unable to challenge the provenance and character of the evidence against him” because counsel was “at jeopardy of criminal prosecution” under the statute, 18 Cite as: 2015 UT 24 Opinion of the Court he wholly fails to substantiate this assertion. In fact, defense counsel was given government-sanctioned access to the child-pornography evidence at the RCLF without threat of prosecution. As the district court noted in ruling on this issue, “[d]efense counsel has not alleged that its access to the evidence was in any way inadequate under the facts of this case.” ¶49 Defense counsel’s purported fear of prosecution and the impact of that fear on counsel’s representation of Mr. Roberts are speculative at best, and therefore are insufficient to demonstrate an injury for purposes of standing. See Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26, ¶ 22, 73 P.3d 334 (citing to United States Supreme Court precedent for the proposition that “standing exists when fear of criminal prosecution under allegedly unconstitutional statute is not imaginary or wholly speculative”); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971) (“[P]ersons having no fears of state prosecution except those that are imaginary or speculative, are not to be accepted as appropriate [parties] in such cases.”). Because Mr. Roberts cannot demonstrate that he has or will suffer an actual injury based on the Sexual Exploitation Statute’s disparate treatment of prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys, he lacks traditional standing to challenge the statute’s constitutionality. ¶50 We next consider whether Mr. Roberts has standing under our alternative, public-interest test. See Gregory, 2013 UT 18, ¶ 25. Parties who fail to gain standing under the traditional test may nevertheless have standing “if they can show that they are an appropriate party raising issues of significant public importance.” Cedar Mountain Envtl., Inc. v. Tooele Cnty. ex rel. Tooele Cnty. Comm’n, 2009 UT 48, ¶ 8, 214 P.3d 95. But the party arguing alternative standing has the burden of showing it satisfies the requirements of this test. See Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ¶ 36. ¶51 Mr. Roberts has not presented any argument as to why he should be granted standing under our alternative test. By not presenting any argument, Mr. Roberts fails to satisfy his burden of showing that he is entitled to public-interest standing. ¶52 In summary, we conclude that Utah’s Sexual Exploitation Statute does not violate the Uniform Operation of Laws Provision of the Utah Constitution because it does not treat similarly situated individuals differently. And Mr. Roberts lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Sexual Exploitation Statute’s purported disparate treatment of prosecuting and defense attorneys. 19 STATE v. ROBERTS Opinion of the Court