Opinion ID: 2351097
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Knight has standing under RCW 36.70C.060

Text: ¶ 22 The relevant decision under review in a LUPA case is the final land use decision by the local government. RCW 36.70C.020(2) (defining land use decision as a final determination by a local jurisdiction's body . . . with the highest level of authority to make the determination, including those with authority to hear appeals). In this case, the relevant decision under review is the City Council's decision affirming the hearing examiner's approval of the Tahoma Terra preliminary plat. City of Yelm Resolution 481 affirmed and amended the hearing examiner's decision and states that [t]he exact quantity of water rights that the City currently holds . . . is immaterial because the City presented evidence . . . that substantial additional water rights have been obtained by the City and that their transfer is reasonably expected to be approved [by] the State Department of Ecology. CP at 25, 28. The City Council stated that the hearing examiner had concluded such evidence satisfied the requirements of RCW 58.17.110. Id. at 28. Finally, the City Council stated, The City has made appropriate findings of water availability at the appropriate points in the application process. Id. Unlike the hearing examiner's conditional approval, the City Council's resolution does not explicitly condition preliminary plat approval on a showing of adequate provision of water at the final plat approval stage. Instead, Resolution 481 indicates that the City, by fully satisfying the requirements of RCW 58.17.110, has no further burden to make a showing at the final plat approval stage of an adequate water supply. ¶ 23 LUPA limits standing to challenge land use decisions to applicants and land owners of property to which the land use decision is directed or [a]nother person aggrieved or adversely affected by the land use decision. [9] RCW 36.70C.060(1)-(2). Under LUPA, [a] person is aggrieved or adversely affected . . . only when all of the following conditions are present: (a) The land use decision has prejudiced or is likely to prejudice that person; (b) That person's asserted interests are among those that the local jurisdiction was required to consider when it made the land use decision; (c) A judgment in favor of that person would substantially eliminate or redress the prejudice to that person caused or likely to be caused by the land use decision; and (d) The petitioner has exhausted his or her administrative remedies to the extent required by law. RCW 36.70C.060(1)-(2). ¶ 24 To satisfy LUPA's prejudice requirement, a petitioner must show that he or she would suffer an injury-in-fact as a result of the land use decision. Nykreim, 146 Wash.2d at 934, 52 P.3d 1. To show an injury in fact, the plaintiff must allege specific and perceptible harm. If the plaintiff alleges a threatened rather than an existing injury, he or she `must also show that the injury will be immediate, concrete and specific; a conjectural or hypothetical injury will not confer standing.' Suquamish Indian Tribe v. Kitsap County, 92 Wash.App. 816, 829, 965 P.2d 636 (1998) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harris v. Pierce County, 84 Wash.App. 222, 231, 928 P.2d 1111 (1996)). `[A] party need not show a particular level of injury in order to establish standing' under LUPA. Nykreim, 146 Wash.2d at 935, 52 P.3d 1 (quoting Suquamish, 92 Wash.App. at 832, 965 P.2d 636) (alteration in original). ¶ 25 `In general, parties owning property adjacent to a proposed project and who allege that the project will injure their property have standing' under LUPA. Id. at 934-35, 52 P.3d 1 (quoting Suquamish, 92 Wash.App. at 829-30, 965 P.2d 636). In Suquamish, members of the petitioning organization alleged that a proposed land use project would affect them by resulting in increased traffic. 92 Wash.App. at 831, 965 P.2d 636. One member lived 150 feet from the proposed project; another member lived on property that would be surrounded on three sides by the project. Id. Evidence that the members would be affected by the large, predicted increase in traffic was sufficient to establish injury-in-fact. Id.; see also Anderson v. Pierce County, 86 Wash. App. 290, 300, 936 P.2d 432 (1997) (finding sufficient allegations to support injury in fact where a coalition member testified he owned 60 acres adjacent to the proposed project and his property would be damaged by storm water runoff from the project site). ¶ 26 In contrast, the interveners in Nykreim lacked standing because their `sole interest' in the matter was `to preserve the protections of the zoning in the district.' 146 Wash.2d at 935, 52 P.3d 1 (quoting interveners reply). The interveners could not show prejudice under RCW 36.70C.060(2) where their interest in the case was merely `the abstract interest of the general public in having others comply with the law.' Id. Without alleging more specific injuries adversely affecting them or their property, the interveners could not satisfy LUPA's prejudice requirement. Id. ¶ 27 Knight has shown sufficient prejudice to satisfy RCW 36.70C.060(2). Her interest is not abstract. Knight owns land 1,300 feet away from the proposed subdivisions, and she has senior water rights within the same aquifer as Tahoma Terra's proposed sources of water for the new development. She presented allegations that the City is overdrawing its water rights and that it has insufficient water supplies to serve the proposed developments, allegations bolstered by the DOE in an amicus brief filed in support of Knight's LUPA petition in the superior court. In particular, Knight presented evidence that the City has had a water deficit every year since 2001 and will have a deficit at least through 2012 (the last year for which Knight's expert calculated the City's supply and demand), even after accounting for a recent transfer of water rights from the Tahoma Valley Golf Course and assuming the DOE approves a future rights transfer from a nearby farm. [10] Knight also presented a hydrogeologist's report detailing the adverse impact the subdivisions' water demand would have on her water rights. Specifically, any additional groundwater withdrawals by the City at its existing wells would reduce the flow in Thompson Creek, adversely affecting Knight's ability to withdraw water from the creek under her permit. Additionally, reduced flow in Thompson Creek would reduce leakage flow that resupplies the shallow aquifer from which Knight draws groundwater pursuant to her senior water rights. [11] CP at 593-94. ¶ 28 The importance of preliminary plat approval within the scheme of planning and approving new development demonstrates that the injury Knight alleges is immediate and specific. A preliminary plat application is meant to give local governments and the public an approximate picture of how the final subdivision will look. It is to be expected that modifications will be made during the give and take of the approval process. Friends of the Law v. King County, 123 Wash.2d 518, 528, 869 P.2d 1056 (1994) (citation omitted). The applicant must make a threshold showing that the completed development is able to comply with applicable zoning ordinances and health regulations. See id.; Topping v. Pierce County Bd. of Comm'rs, 29 Wash.App. 781, 783, 630 P.2d 1385 (1981). ¶ 29 While the process anticipates negotiations and modifications, the preliminary plat process is not merely an insignificant stage of the proceedings without real consequence. Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wash.2d 754, 759, 513 P.2d 1023 (1973). Any modifications included in a conditional approval of the preliminary plat are binding on the party seeking approval and the local decision-making body granting conditional approval. Id. at 761, 513 P.2d 1023. A local decision-making body cannot conditionally approve a preliminary plat and then disapprove a final plat application for a project that conforms to the conditions of the preliminary approval. Id. The failure to challenge environmental issues at the preliminary plat stage could result in decisions by the local land use authority that have a binding impact on interested parties without their consent or participation. Id. at 759, 513 P.2d 1023. ¶ 30 In this case, while the hearing examiner conditioned approval of Tahoma Terra's preliminary plat on a showing of adequate provision of water at the final plat approval stage, the City Council's Resolution 481 did not contain such an explicit statement. Instead, Resolution 481 indicates that the City complied with RCW 58.17.110, removing any burden on the City to make a showing of adequate water supply at the final plat approval stage. If the decision by the City Council, the body with the sole authority to approve Tahoma Terra's final plat approval application under RCW 58.17.100, forecloses further review of the City's evidence of adequate water supply, then it has denied Knight any opportunity to challenge the evidence and the potential threat to her water rights. [12] At a minimum, Resolution 481 is ambiguous as to whether the City and Tahoma Terra must make a further showing to secure final plat approval. Knight was entitled to clarification of the City Council's decision and an opportunity to challenge the City's evidence of water provisions before final plat approval, and that is exactly what the superior court provided when it stated that all requirements must be satisfied and confirmed in writing before final plat approval, when it provided Knight notice of any final plat approval proceedings, and when it remanded to the City Council for modification. [13] ¶ 31 Knight also satisfied RCW 36.70C.060(2)(b) because her interests were among those that the City Council was required to consider when it granted preliminary plat approval to Tahoma Terra. RCW 58.17.110(1) requires a local governmental body to inquire into the public use and interest proposed to be served by a new development and to determine [i]f appropriate provisions are made for . . . the public health, safety, and general welfare . . . [and] potable water supplies. . . . Determining whether there are adequate water sources to serve the Tahoma Terra development is certainly within the public interest the City Council must consider before approving the plat application. ¶ 32 Finally, Knight exhausted her administrative remedies, as required by RCW 36.70C.060(2)(d), by appealing the preliminary plat approval to the highest local decision-making body with authority to approve the plat application. Knight had standing to bring the LUPA action in superior court.