Opinion ID: 2339016
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Manslaughter Under Pre-Code Law

Text: Before the adoption of our new Code of Criminal Justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1 et seq., the substantive law of homicide was in a state of flux, particularly with regard to the interplay between the varying levels of culpability and legislative grading. A homicide committed intentionally could fit within the categories of first degree murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter or justifiable homicide, depending upon the particular set of facts surrounding the killing. [3] Given such intent to kill, a finding that the killing was committed in the heat of passion resulting from legally adequate (reasonable) provocation [4] was a prerequisite to reduction of the homicide from murder to manslaughter. Because the manslaughter provision was so narrowly circumscribed, courts confronted with claims of mitigation focused on the emotional state of mind of the accused at the time of the killing, to see whether the circumstances surrounding the homicide could somehow be fitted into a provocation/passion category. [5] The situation was complicated further when the courts were forced to look to the record themselves (without any request by counsel) for circumstances that could provide the inference of provocation/passion where an altercation had taken place. This sometimes became necessary, for example, in cases where the defense sought acquittal based upon an exercise of perfect self-defense when there was no claim that defendant had flown into a rage as a result of being attacked and acted in the heat of the moment. We took this step ourselves in State v. Bonano, 59 N.J. 515 (1971). In spite of a record barren of evidence of any loss of self-control on the part of the defendant we pointed out that a defendant claiming self-defense would also be entitled to an instruction on provocation/passion, since menacing gestures by the victim could reasonably provoke fear and anger of such magnitude as to effectively deprive the killer of the mastery of his understanding. Bonano, supra, at 523, quoting from State v. King, 37 N.J. 285, 300 (1962). [6] Earlier, State v. Williams, 29 N.J. 27 (1959), extended the category of manslaughter to include the concept of partial justification [7] as a form of mitigation (from murder to manslaughter) where a police officer used excessive force in pursuit of his duties. We explained there that such an act constituted a culpable error of judgment made in the stress of an encounter he did not invite, id. at 43, making a finding of malice (and thus second degree murder) inappropriate. We did so after determining that a parity of considerations between a provocation/passion situation and a situation where a police officer was engaged in meeting physical resistance and was obliged to overcome it supported a finding of mitigation in both that represented a fair concession to the frailties of man, Williams, supra, quoting Brown v. State, 62 N.J.L. 666, 710-11 (E. & A. 1899). Thus, even before adoption of the new Code of Criminal Justice, our case law had extended the definition of manslaughter to cover acts now characterized as excessive use of force where the act provoking the use of force could be analogized to adequate provocation producing a passionate response. The logic that supports this extension of manslaughter would similarly justify a claim of imperfect self-defense where the exercise of self-defense was provoked by an act that clouded the defendant's perceptions as to the imminence of danger, the extent of the danger, or the amount of force called for to eliminate the danger. [8] Certainly, if Powell's perception of danger was unreasonable because he was in a state of fear or agitation because he had been attacked by his wife, recognition of this fact in mitigation of the offense would likewise be a fair concession to the frailties of man. Thus we hold that, in addition to the conventional provocation/passion manslaughter instruction, Powell will be entitled upon retrial to a manslaughter instruction based on a homicide committed in imperfect self-defense. While such category of manslaughter may represent some extension of prior case law, we hold that that was the law in effect at the time of the offense. [9]