Opinion ID: 2284287
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fundamental Rights of Parents and Standard of Appellate Review

Text: The interest of parents in the care and custody of their children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the United States Supreme] Court. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). Therefore, [t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in raising their children does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their children to the State. In the Interest of K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. banc 2004). Instead, because parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), due process demands that a judgment terminating parental rights be supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. Id. at 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388. In reviewing the circuit court's judgment that termination of a parent's rights was supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence, this Court applies the standard of review set forth in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976): a judgment will be sustained unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence or the trial court erroneously declares or applies the law. In re Adoption of W.B.L., 681 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Mo. banc 1984). As W.B.L. notes, Murphy v. Carron : is not inconsistent with the high `clear, cogent and convincing' standard of proof which Missouri law requires to be satisfied by the trial court as fact finder in termination cases. That same standard of proof applies both to termination cases initiated by the state, § 211.447.2(2), RSMo Cum.Supp.1984; see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 749, n. 3 [102 S.Ct. 1388] ..., and in conjunction with adoption under Chapter 453. Id. at 454 (emphasis in original). As W.B.L. further explained in regard to both chapter 211 and chapter 453 proceedings to terminate parental rights, while the existence of contrary evidence does not necessarily mean that the clear, cogent and convincing evidence standard was not met, that standard of proof requires that: the evidence instantly tilt[s] the scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition and the fact finder's mind is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true. In re O'Brien, 600 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. App.1980). Id. This high standard for showing clear, cogent and convincing evidence is not unique to termination of parental rights cases. This is the standard applied on review of any judge-tried case in which the applicable standard of proof is clear, cogent and convincing evidence, whether the case involves a termination of parental rights [3] or some other kind of proceeding. See, e.g., Mace v. Loetel, 166 S.W.3d 114, 117 (Mo.App.2005) (The standard of proof in a discovery of assets proceeding is that of `clear, convincing, and cogent evidence'... As a result, in order for the trial court's judgment to be supported by substantial evidence, the evidence must also be clear, cogent, and convincing). Indeed, as noted by In re Estate of Dawes, 891 S.W.2d 510, 522 (Mo.App. 1994), in construing a constructive trust, [t]he requirement of an extraordinary measure of [clear, cogent and convincing] proof is not inconsistent with our standard of review, which is governed by ... Murphy v. Carron . ... `Substantial evidence' and `the weight of the evidence,' as those terms are used in Murphy v. Carron , ... must satisfy the applicable standard of proof. In other words, what evidence is sufficient to meet the substantial evidence and weight of the evidence standard set out in Murphy v. Carron will vary depending on whether the trial court had to find the proposition was proved by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. Or, as the court of appeals stated in requiring proof of mental illness by clear, cogent and convincing evidence in an involuntary commitment proceeding: Substantial evidence as used in Murphy means clear, cogent and convincing when that standard of proof is applicable. Thus, if it cannot be said that the judgment in this case is supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence, then it cannot be said the judgment is supported by substantial evidence, and under Murphy v. Carron , must be reversed. In re O'Brien, 600 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Mo. App.1980) (emphasis added). O'Brien concluded that, in the case before it, Because this court cannot find clear, cogent and convincing evidence that [O'Brien] presented a likelihood of serious physical harm to others, [his commitment] is not supported by substantial evidence. Id. It is plain then that the standard for reviewing the termination of the mother's parental rights below must be informed by the clear, cogent and convincing standard of proof. To affirm based on evidence that, at most, may be sufficient to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard would defy the legislative requirement that the fundamental rights of a parent and child not be rent apart except on clear, cogent and convincing evidence. It would render the applicable standard of review, as set forth in Murphy v. Carron , devoid of any meaningful content. As applicable here, that means that, although the evidence adduced below is viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, In the Interest of C.W., 211 S.W.3d 93, 99 (Mo. banc 2007), the appellate court must not cast a blind eye to overwhelming evidence undermining the judgment. To the contrary, when reviewing a trial court's termination of parental rights, appellate courts must examine the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law closely. In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. banc 2004). The judgment in this case is not based on clear, cogent and convincing evidence. The principal opinion has not considered the contrary evidence in the record itself, including a letter from the mother to the court and information provided by a neighbor of the mother in determining whether there is clear, cogent and convincing evidence or whether there was a manifest injustice. The principal opinion has not even set out this evidence except briefly to discredit it (not entirely correctly) as being of little relevance because it was filed after the petition. Neither has it given any weight to the fact that the findings of abandonment are based almost entirely on hearsay evidence. While, as the principal opinion notes, hearsay evidence may be considered when not objected to, its hearsay nature and lack of specificity still detract from the weight of that evidence. [4] The court below and the principal opinion erred in failing to consider the record evidence, sent to the court's attention by the mother herself, evidencing her lack of abandonment, lack of notice, desire for visitation and contact with her son, and the falseness of the testimony to the contrary of Ms. Davenport from Parents as Teachers.