Opinion ID: 1889517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Right to Speedy Trial Under KRS 500.110

Text: Dunaway first argues that his conviction was obtained in violation of KRS 500.110, which requires, generally, that a person serving a prison term within the state must be tried on any new indictment which causes a detainer to issue within 180 days after proper notice by the prisoner. Dunaway asserts both that he complied with the notice provisions of the statute [2] and that the statute applies to him because the detainer was lodged against him while he was incarcerated. The trial court found to the contrary on both points. As to the latter issue, the trial court found that KRS 500.110 was not available to Dunaway because he served out his prior sentence during the 180-day time period of the statute, which requires continuance of the term of imprisonment. Dunaway contends that his release from his prison term, subsequent to the detainer, should not disqualify him from the protection of the statute. We agree with the trial court. Because this issue is dispositive, we address it alone. The right to a speedy trial is an important right that receives constitutional protection. See United States Constitution, Amendment Six; Kentucky Constitution, § 11. The right to a speedy trial can be even more important to prisoners who have new indictments brought against them if those indictments result in a detainer being lodged. (A detainer is a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution to either hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner is imminent. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985)). The General Assembly, recognizing this heightened need, provided some prisoners with additional guarantees to a speedy trial when it enacted KRS 500.110: Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of this state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any jurisdiction of this state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty (180) days after he shall have caused to be delivered ... his request for a final disposition... There is no Kentucky case law addressing Dunaway's claim that KRS 500.110 applied to him even though he finished serving his term of imprisonment after the detainer was lodged. However, there are a substantial number of cases which interpret the identical language found in the interstate equivalent of KRS 500.110. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) (Article III, § 1), excepting an additional sentence and the interstate application, is substantively indistinguishable from KRS 500.110. See KRS 440.450. The Kentucky Court of Appeals noted the similarity between the two statutes in Rushin v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 931 S.W.2d 456, 458 (1996). The IAD is an agreement adopted by the overwhelming majority of states and the federal government. The IAD requires that a prisoner against whom an interstate detainer has been filed must be promptly notified of that fact and of his right to demand trial, and if he demands trial then trial must be had within 180 days; the request is a waiver of extradition by the prisoner; if trial is not had within 180 days and good cause for delay is not shown, the charges are dismissed with prejudice. See 4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure, § 18.4(c) at 711-13 (2d ed.1999). The IAD was adopted in Kentucky in 1974, four years prior to KRS 500.110. Prior to the IAD, there existed an unsanctioned practice of lodging detainers based on untried criminal charges that were unsubstantiated. The detainers were often withdrawn just before the prisoner was released. Though unfounded, the detainers would have a detrimental effect on the prisoner's treatment. See Carchman, 473 U.S. at 729, 105 S.Ct. at 3408, 87 L.Ed.2d at 526; see also Leslie Abramson, The Interstate Agreement on Detainers: Narrowing its Availability and Application, 21 N.E.J. on Crim. & Civ. Con. 1 (1995). The purpose of the IAD is to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments ... KRS 400.450, Article I. The specific problems that a prisoner, against whom a detainer has been filed, might face include being: (1) deprived of an opportunity to obtain a sentence to run concurrently with the sentence being served at the time the detainer is filed; (2) classified as a maximum or close custody risk; (3) ineligible for initial assignments to less than maximum security prisons (i.e., honor farms or forestry camp work); (4) ineligible for trustee [sic] status; (5) not allowed to live in preferred living quarters such as dormitories; (6) ineligible for study-release programs or work-release programs; (7) ineligible to be transferred to preferred medium or minimum custody institutions within the correctional system, which includes the removal of any possibility of transfer to an institution more appropriate for youthful offenders; (8) not entitled to preferred prison jobs which carry higher wages and entitle [him] to additional good time credits against [his] sentence; (9) inhibited by the denial of possibility of parole or any commutation of his sentence; (10) caused anxiety and thus hindered in the overall rehabilitation process since he cannot take maximum advantage of his institutional opportunities. Carchman, 473 U.S. at 730, 105 S.Ct. at 3409, 87 L.Ed.2d at 527, quoting Cooper v. Lockhart, 489 F.2d 308, 314, n. 10 (1973) (overturned on other grounds). In summary, KRS 500.110 was adopted after the IAD and used the same language. In addition, the reasons supporting the IAD seem to apply with equal force to the intrastate statute. Consequently, contrary to Dunaway's unsupported suggestion, we find cases interpreting the IAD insightful for our decision in this case regarding KRS 500.110. [3] Courts that have considered the issue of whether the IAD applies after a prisoner is no longer imprisoned for the prior offense(s) have overwhelmingly found that the IAD does not apply. Most of the cases involved a prisoner who was released on parole; however, a case involving a prisoner who completed his sentencelike Dunaway would receive the same analysis. Once the prisoner has been released, the need for protection from detainerssubstantiated or not evaporates. See United States v. Reed, 620 F.2d 709, 711 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 880, 101 S.Ct. 229, 66 L.Ed.2d 104, (1980) (neither a pretrial detainee nor a parole violator has a sufficient interest in the rehabilitation programs of his confining institution to justify invocation of the Act); see also Cunningham v. State of Arkansas, 341 Ark. 99, 14 S.W.3d 869 (2000) (prisoner released on parole after detainer lodged but before expiration of 180-day period no longer protected by IAD); State v. Dunlap, 57 N.C.App. 175, 290 S.E.2d 744, 746 (1982), petition for review denied, 306 N.C. 388, 294 S.E.2d 213 (1982) (once prisoner released, the cloud of the detainer no longer has an adverse effect on the prisoner's status within the prison); State v. Foster, 107 Or.App. 481, 812 P.2d 440, 441 (1991) (when defendant was released on parole, the relevant term of imprisonment ended). Appellant cites Davis and Snyder both IAD casesin support of his argument that, since he was incarcerated when the detainer lodged, the protection of KRS 500.110 still applies. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Davis, 2000 Pa.Super. 217, 757 A.2d 959 (2000); Snyder v. Sumner, 960 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.1992). We believe Davis is inapposite because it does not address the present issue. The issue in that case was whether the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act [(UCEA)] applies where a fugitive is returned after completing a sentence in another state, but where the request for custody of that defendant is made while he is serving a sentence in the other state. Davis at 960 (the UCEA is distinct from the IAD). The court determined that the IAD applies merely to sentenced prisoners and in doing so relied on two other cases that were not construing the IAD. Davis at 961, citing Commonwealth v. Forrest, 508 Pa. 382, 498 A.2d 811 (1985); Commonwealth v. Alexander, 318 Pa.Super. 344, 464 A.2d 1376 (1983). While examining the UCEA, the Davis court completely ignored the case law construing the IAD. Appellant's reliance on Snyder is likewise unpersuasive. In that case, the court held that when a prisoner who has a detainer lodged against him is paroled during the 180-day period of the IAD, he continues to benefit from the statute's protection. The court stated that the defendant's being placed on parole does not stop the clock as to his IAD[] rights. Snyder at 1453. That case involved an interstate detainer and the court reached its decision based on concerns that permitting the sending statethe state where the prisoner is serving timeto parole the prisoner after it transfers the prisoner to the receiving statethe state which issues the detainerwould frustrate the purpose of the IAD. We agree with the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which sidestepped the specious arguments in Snyder : We simply do not share the Snyder court's concerns that the IAD's requirements can or will be so easily manipulated by the states, but more importantly, we believe that the rationale in Snyder ignores the plain language contained in Article III [sec. 1] of the [IAD] which by its own terms, provides the IAD only applies during the period when a prisoner continues to serve a term of imprisonment. Cunningham, 14 S.W.3d at 872; see also United States v. Saffeels, 982 F.2d 1199, 1204 (8th Cir.1992), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 510 U.S. 801, 114 S.Ct. 41, 126 L.Ed.2d 12 (1993) (by its own terms, Article III only applies during the period when a prisoner continues to serve a term of imprisonment). The statutes both the IAD and KRS 500.110explicitly refer to the continuance of the term of imprisonment. The word continuance forecloses Appellant's interpretation that KRS 500.110 continued to apply to him after he completed his sentence. Because Dunaway did not qualify for KRS 500.110, he cannot claim that his right to a speedy trial under that section was violated.