Opinion ID: 2632280
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prior Decisions Interpreting 59-29a06

Text: Two Court of Appeals decisions have held that the requirement in 59-29a06 that trial be conducted within 60 days after the probable cause determination is jurisdictional. In Brown, 26 Kan. App.2d 117, the trial court found probable cause to believe that Brown was a sexually violent predator and ordered him to be taken into custody for an evaluation on May 16, 1996. On October 15, 1997, Brown moved to dismiss the proceeding, asserting that K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 59-29a06 mandates that a trial be conducted within 60 days of the probable cause hearing and that he had been substantially prejudiced by the delay. No motion for extension of time had been filed in the case. The district court denied the motion. At the hearing, the court stated that the delay between the probable cause hearing held in May 1996 and June 1997 was to await the United States Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act. The court also ruled that the 60-day limitation was directory and that Brown was not prejudiced by the delay. Brown remained in detention until trial. On January 26, 1998, over 600 days after the probable cause determination, the district court held a hearing and determined that Brown was a sexually violent predator. On appeal, Brown alleged a violation of a timely hearing pursuant to K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 59-29a06, contending that the 60-day limitation in K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 59-29a06 was mandatory and that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss. The Brown court observed that in construing a statute, the court must interpret the statute to give the effect intended by the legislature. 26 Kan. App.2d at 119 (citing West v. Collins, 251 Kan. 657, 661, 840 P.2d 435 [1992]). `In construing statutes, statutory words are presumed to have been and should be treated as consciously chosen, with an understanding of their ordinary and common meaning and with the legislature having meant what it said. [Citation omitted.]' 26 Kan. App.2d at 119 (quoting International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Kansas City, 264 Kan 17, 31, 954 P.2d 1079 [1998]). It noted that when a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court will not speculate as to the legislative intent behind the statute and will not read such a statute so as to add something not readily found in the statute. 26 Kan. App.2d at 119-20 (citing In re Marriage of Killman, 264 Kan. 33, 43, 955 P.2d 1228 [1998]). The Brown court observed that in construing the language of K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 59-29a04, this court held that the `75-day provision is jurisdictional, and a district court has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition filed beyond the time provided,' noting that this was done despite the word shall not being used in the statute. 26 Kan. App.2d at 120 (citing Ingram, 266 Kan. at 49). The Brown court stated that the language of K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 59-29a06 was clear and that the use of the term shall indicated that the legislature had mandated that the commitment trial be held within 60 days after the probable cause hearing. The court held the inclusion of the language [t]he trial may be continued does not render the term shall discretionary. 26 Kan. App.2d at 120. The court also observed that continuance is conditional. A continuance (1) must be considered upon a motion; (2) must be granted for the purpose of due administration; and (3) cannot substantially prejudice the defendant. 26 Kan. App.2d at 120. After noting that neither the district court nor the parties had filed a motion for continuance of trial, the Brown court held that the 60-day requirement specified in K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 59-29a06 was mandatory and jurisdictional. 26 Kan. App.2d at 120. In Blackmore, 30 Kan. App.2d 90, the attorney general filed a petition seeking to have Blackmore declared a sexually violent predator on April 13, 2000. On April 28, 2000, the trial court held a hearing pursuant to K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 59-29a05 and found there was probable cause to believe Blackmore was a sexually violent predator. A journal entry was filed which ordered that the matter be `scheduled for jury trial within sixty (60) days or whenever the parties advise the Court that they are prepared to proceed to trial.' 30 Kan. App.2d at 91. The Blackmore court noted that the journal entry was apparently filed without a clear waiver of the 60-day period under K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 59-29a06 being obtained from Blackmore. The record appeared to indicate that Blackmore's case was set for a trial on August 14, 2000, after Blackmore filed a motion requesting a jury trial on August 2, 2000, which was later waived. The trial court granted Blackmore's motion that day. The Blackmore court noted, however, that by that time, the 60-day limitation had already been exceeded. 30 Kan. App.2d at 91. On August 8, 2000, Blackmore moved for continuance of the trial for the following reasons: (1) defense counsel had learned that an essential witness was unavailable on August 14, 2000; (2) the State did not oppose the continuance; and (3) Blackmore would suffer undue prejudice and harm if compelled to be tried without the attendance of the witness. The motion for continuance was granted. Blackmore's trial was held on October 5, 2000. The trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Blackmore was a sexually violent predator. At trial, Blackmore did not challenge his trial as being outside the 60-day period provided for under K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 59-29a06. Blackmore was committed to the custody of the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services for control, care, and treatment at an appropriate facility until such time as his mental abnormality had so changed that he was safe to be at large. Blackmore pointed out for the first time, on appeal, that more than 60 days had elapsed between the probable cause determination and his original trial date and argued that the trial court did not have jurisdiction under K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 59-29a06 to find he was a sexually violent predator. The Blackmore court observed that under K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 59-29a06, a court is required to conduct a trial within 60 days after completion of the probable cause hearing under K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 59-29a05. It noted, however, that the trial may be continued upon the request of either party and a showing of good cause, or by the court on its own motion in the due administration of justice and when the respondent will not be substantially prejudiced. 30 Kan. App.2d at 92-93; see K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 59-29a06. In reaching this decision, the court noted two cases that had previously addressed this 60-day limitation In re Care and Treatment of Goracke, 27 Kan. App.2d 837, 9 P.3d 595 (2000), and Brown, 26 Kan. App.2d at 117. The Blackmore court noted that in both Brown and Goracke the issue of the 60-day period had first been addressed by the trial court. In Blackmore, the issue was being raised for the first time on appeal. Blackmore argued his case raised jurisdictional issues based on the Brown court's decision that the 60-day limitation under K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 59-29a06 was mandatory and jurisdictional. The Blackmore court observed that it had unlimited review to determine jurisdiction, regardless of whether the issue was previously raised in the district court. It noted that the appellate courts may raise the issue of jurisdiction at any time and whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which the appellate court's scope of review is unlimited. 30 Kan. App.2d at 94 (citing Maggard v. State, 27 Kan. App.2d 1060, Syl. ¶ 1, 11 P.3d 89 [2000]). The Blackmore court held that unless the statutory provisions to continue the trial of an action brought under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act are followed, district courts are without jurisdiction to entertain actions after the expiration of 60 days. 30 Kan. App.2d 90, Syl. ¶ 2. The Blackmore court pointed out that a defendant does not acquiesce to an extension beyond 60 days by requesting a continuance after the 60 days have already run. 30 Kan. App.2d 90, Syl. ¶ 3. The district court's decision that Blackmore was a sexually violent predator under K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 59-29a02(a) was reversed due to the district court's lack of jurisdiction to hear the proceeding because of the failure to bring the matter to trial in a timely fashion. 30 Kan. App.2d at 95-96.