Opinion ID: 2190239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Impeachment of Prosecution Witness As to Disciplinary Action

Text: Appellants next contend that their Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was denied when the trial court disallowed their request to impeach Mitsos through the use of a prior disciplinary action against him by the Philadelphia Police Department resulting in his demotion from detective to patrolman. Appellants' attorney made an offer of proof on two occasions, once at sidebar and once in chambers, requesting permission to support his contention that the action against Mitsos was based upon his having accepted bribes in 1975, 1976, and years prior. He also made available a witness, Thomas Schultz, who had testified at the disciplinary hearing that he had paid bribes to Mitsos and other officers. The trial court denied this questioning on the basis that the disciplinary actions against Mitsos had not amounted to a conviction. (Trial court opinion at 14.) For the reasons stated below, we reverse. To decide this issue, we must balance the Appellants' Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against the prejudice and detriment of allowing this type of questioning. Appellants rely upon the United States Supreme Court case of Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), to support their contention that cross-examination of prosecutorial witnesses be construed broadly in order to permit the defendant to delve into the witness's story and test his perceptions and memory, but, more importantly, to allow the cross-examiner to discredit or impeach the witness. Id. at 316, 94 S.Ct. at 1110. In Pennsylvania, the rule has generally been that unless a prior bad act results in a conviction, it cannot be used to impeach a witness. Commonwealth v. Katchmer, 453 Pa. 461, 309 A.2d 591 (1973). The rationale behind this rule is to prevent the smearing rather than merely discrediting of the witness. Id., 453 Pa. at 464, 309 A.2d at 593. The case before us, however, presents a situation which lies somewhere in the gray area between mere allegation and actual conviction and is one of first impression in this jurisdiction. While the witness here has not been convicted of the crime of bribery, there is present in the offer of proof evidence that he was subject to a disciplinary proceeding which resulted in his demotion, purportedly on the basis of the testimony of the subpoenaed witness, who stated that he had on several occasions bribed detectives, including Mitsos. We must determine whether the circumstances here  the witness's testimony directly reflects upon the charges against, and the defense asserted by, the Appellants, and the disciplinary proceeding offers more reliability than a mere allegation or arrest of an individual for a crime  affects the balance struck by our traditional rule. The administrative proceeding conducted by the Philadelphia Police Department, being an orderly, factfinding proceeding, has some of the indicia of reliability attributable to an adjudicatory body. While the burden of proof may be lighter, the proceeding is adversarial, and there is a strong interest on the part of an officer to defend himself. We can therefore safely assume that its findings of fact and subsequent action with regard to a matter are indeed more credible than the mere allegation or arrest of an individual. The essence of Appellants' defense was duress and/or entrapment. It is clear that the necessity existed to discredit Mitsos as to his story that the bribery attempt was conceived by Appellants alone. Had the proffered testimony been introduced, it would have cast a shadow on the credibility of Mitsos by bolstering Peetros's contention that the idea behind payment for the books was Mitsos's alone until the deal went sour late in July of 1981, when he (Mitsos) then threatened that if Peetros didn't buy the books, he would sell them to another. Q. Did you see Mitsos? A. [Peetros]: It was at Mr. Louvaris's restaurant that he gave the message Mr. Mitsos wanted to see me a couple days after I told him I didn't want to have anything to do with it anymore. And I asked Mr. Louvaris to contact Mr. Mitsos at home. I believe it was a Sunday. And he reached him on the phone, and he handed me the instrument. And Lefty said, I want to meet with you; it's very important. I said, Well, I only got a couple more days. He says, How about where you're at? I says, What time? He said, 12:00 midnight. I said, I'll be here. Q. Did he come? A. He showed up. Q. What did you and he discuss? A. We went in the back, sat at the table. At that time, he says to me, Listen. Do you know Joe Cadillac? I said, Yes, I know a Joe Cadillac. Is his correct name Joe Carey? He said, No, no. I said, Is this fellow from Center City? He said, No. I'm talking about someone from Delaware County, someone who owes your brother like $50,000; Joseph Landmeister. I said, I don't know the man. He said, Well, I've got an offer from him. I said, Well, why don't you sell it to him? He says, Look, Jim. We made a deal. You're going to buy these books because if you don't buy them, he said, I'm going to sell them to the highest bidder. And he said, And, furthermore, all this extra assistance that you're looking for from our department, specifically Dan Rosenstein and our boss, the captain, to help you get out to a center, to go on parole, early parole, you can forget about that. Jim, he said, when you get out, you'll be an old man. You're an old man now, but you'll think a ton of bricks fell on you. You'll never see daylight. Q. Did he say anything else? A. Well, I said, This is entrapment, my friend. He said, Oh, yes. So what? Who's going to believe you? Q. Jimmy, why did he ever say to you, if this other man, Landmeister  whatever his name was  why didn't he sell the books to him? A. I have no idea why he didn't. Q. Did he ever give you any indication that what happened to any deals that he might have had with Landmeister? A. No. No, he didn't specifically say anything about any deals. Q. So he told you what when you told him this was entrapment? What did he tell you? A. He says, That's right. He said, I'll have you locked up for bribery. He says, You'll be in for what would be considered the rest of your life. Q. What did you say? A. I told him it was entrapment, and that's  he says to me, Well, you're going to buy these books. You ain't got the money, you'll get it someplace. He says, If you haven't got the money, get it from Pete Louvaris. He says, He's been getting some money left here from some of those customers that we've talked about. Q. Now, after this conversation, what was your state of mind? What did you think? A. I didn't know what to think. I was very upset and very concerned because I had discussed with Mr. Mitsos at an earlier meeting, I believe at that Roundhouse, about the legality of what I was doing. And he said, Oh, you don't have to worry. These books ain't evidence. He said, They actually belong to Helen Peetros, he said, but I'm going to keep them out because they're worth a lot of money. And he said, I don't want to see them get in the wrong hands. N.T., Oct. 15, 1982, pp. 156-159. Balancing these factors, we must conclude that defendants' right under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution to fully cross-examine this prosecution witness, and their need to do so, outweighs the possible diminution of evidentiary value to which a disciplinary proceeding might be subject. This is especially true because the subject matter sought to be explored directly relates to the heart of the allegations being made against the defendant. To allow otherwise would permit the accuser to be shielded from having the jury hear evidence of his prior willing participation in the very crimes he now attempts to place upon Appellants. Such would place too great a restraint upon the search for truth. [5] Subject to proper presentation, the trial court should have granted Appellants' request to discredit Mitsos by means of his prior disciplinary action. We therefore order a new trial for Appellants. As to Appellants' contentions that it was error to deny them the right to cross-examine Mitsos as to whether he had ever taken a bribe or to rebut a negative response, these must fail. Our review of the record reveals that Appellants' attorney made such a request in chambers, and the judge properly refused to rule on the request until the question was asked. It never was, and therefore this issue was not preserved. We also reject Appellants' contention that it was error to allow their rearrest and preliminary hearing to occur before a second issuing authority after the first had dismissed the bribery and weapons charges. After full review of the record, trial court opinion and briefs of the parties, it is clear that the trial judge properly disposed of this issue pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 23. Judgment of sentence reversed and new trial granted. [6] NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, J., concur in the result. HUTCHINSON, Former J., did not participate in the decision of this case.