Opinion ID: 2234065
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 27

Heading: Independent Evaluation

Text: Vela correctly notes that there is no specific statutory authority for the independent medical examination ordered by the district court and conducted by Zlomke. The question before us is whether the district court erred in concluding that it had inherent discretionary authority to order the examination. In reaching its conclusion, the district court reasoned by analogy from our opinion in State v. Simants, [116] in which we held that a district court had inherent authority to grant the State's motion for an independent medical evaluation of a person who had been found not guilty by reason of insanity on six counts of first degree murder. The State requested the examination in preparation for an annual review to determine whether continued confinement was warranted. The applicable statute [117] specified that the court was to conduct an evidentiary hearing as a part of the review but did not specifically authorize an independent medical evaluation at the request of the State. We concluded that [t]he means for determining the acquittee's sanity, as in determining a defendant's competency to stand trial, should be discretionary with the court. [118] We reasoned in part that because the statute contemplated an evidentiary hearing on the question of the acquittee's mental status, the record should not be limited to the evidence offered on behalf of the acquittee and [t]he State should be allowed to submit additional evidence since the court, as trier of fact, is not required to take the opinion of an expert as binding. [119] We wrote: As stated in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985): Psychiatry is not ... an exact science, and psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness, on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms, on cure and treatment, and on likelihood of future dangerousness. If necessary, the factfinder must resolve differences in opinion within the psychiatric profession on the basis of all the evidence offered by each party. [120] Vela argues that Simants is inapposite because it involved a civil commitment proceeding in which the primary concern was protection of the public. He contends that State v. Woods [121] provides a closer analogy. In that case, we held that the district court lacked authority to order a defendant to make a pretrial disclosure of her alibi witnesses because Nebraska's noticeof-alibi statute [122] did not impose this requirement. Because Woods involved a question of pretrial discovery in a noncapital case, we do not find it to be controlling on the issue presented here. Other jurisdictions have recognized the inherent authority of a trial court to order an independent examination at the request of the government when a defendant in capital sentencing proceedings has placed his or her mental health at issue. For example, in State v. Reid, [123] the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that such authority existed even in the absence of a specific statute or rule, because an independent psychiatric examination was essential to afford the State the right to rebut expert psychiatric evidence offered by the defendant as a mitigating factor to be weighed against imposition of the death penalty. Arizona courts have held that `once a defendant notifies the state that he intends to place his mental condition at issue during the penalty phase of a capital trial, a trial judge has discretion to order the defendant to submit to a mental examination by an expert chosen by the state or the court.' [124] In U.S. v. Allen, [125] the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: There is no doubt that a district court has the authority to order a defendant who states that he will use evidence from his own psychiatric examination in the penalty phase of a trial to undergo a psychiatric examination by a government-selected psychiatrist before the start of the penalty phase. We have found only one case, People v. Lee, [126] which holds that a trial court may not order an independent evaluation in these circumstances in the absence of specific authority conferred by statute or court rule. We extend the reasoning of Simants to the issue before us here and hold that when a defendant files a verified motion to preclude imposition of the death penalty on the basis of mental retardation pursuant to ง 28-105.01(4), the trial court has inherent authority to grant a motion by the State to have the defendant evaluated by a mental health professional of the State's choosing. By providing for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of mental retardation and requiring the defendant to prove the diagnosis by a preponderance of the evidence, the Legislature clearly contemplated adversarial testing of any such claim. Our recognition in Simants that mental health professionals can reach conflicting opinions regarding a diagnosis is clearly illustrated by the record in this case. The identification of mental retardation is a diagnosis requiring the exercise of clinical judgment, and as Vela's own expert acknowledged, it is sometimes difficult for even mental health professionals to distinguish a person with mild mental retardation from one who does not have the condition. Piersel explained that because the identification of mental retardation requires the exercise of clinical judgment, on occasion, two people can take the same information, especially when the individual is very close to a particular line or particular cutoff, and reach different opinions. Given the significance of the diagnosis of mental retardation in the context of capital sentencing, the importance of meaningful adversarial testing cannot be overstated. Moreover, the State's interest in an independent evaluation goes beyond the adversarial testing of a capital defendant's claim of mental retardation. Under the unequivocal language of ง 28-105.01(2) and the constitutional rule established by Atkins v. Virginia, [127] the State is prohibited from executing a person with mental retardation. It follows that the State must have a means of independently confirming a capital defendant's assertion that he or she is such a person. We conclude that a district court has inherent authority to provide that means in the form of an independent evaluation when requested by the State. Relying upon Estelle v. Smith, [128] Vela argues that the independent examination ordered by the district court violated his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the federal and state Constitutions. In Estelle, the U.S. Supreme Court held that [a] criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him in a capital sentencing proceeding. [129] However, this court and others have indicated that when a criminal defendant places his or her mental condition at issue, the State may use the results of a court-ordered evaluation at trial without violating the defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. [130] Vela's constitutional claim is without merit. For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting the State's motion for an independent evaluation of Vela and in receiving the testimony of Zlomke with respect to that examination at the mental retardation hearing.