Opinion ID: 2810564
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre-termination statements

Text: There is only one clear allegation that opinions expressed while still working for HPD led to retaliation. The claim is based on Wong’s conversation with the Chief of Police. Another alleged conversation with a supervisor may also have been pre-departure. We consider these claims first. We know from Ceballos, as refined by Lane, that if those conversations were part of Wong’s official duties, there is no First Amendment protection. Ceballos, a supervisor in a district attorney’s office, doubted the veracity of an affidavit that was used by someone else to gain a search warrant; Ceballos reported his findings to his superiors. Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 413-14. Ceballos was called to testify at a hearing. Id. at 414-15. He later suffered what he perceived to be retaliation from his superiors. Id. The Supreme Court held that there may be First Amendment protection for comments made privately within the employment setting. Id. at 420. Ceballos’s comments, though, were part of his official duties and were not protected. Id. at 421. Wong does not assert that the statements he made to the Police Chief and the supervisor before leaving HPD was a job duty. The complaint has no direct allegations about job duties, and there was no argument in the district court that such allegations were required. The issue of job duties came up in the motion to dismiss and in the response, as the briefing cited the caselaw whose applicability turns on whether speech was a job duty. The district court’s opinion did not rely in its analysis on whether any of the speech was a job duty. Relying thus only on the complaint, we cannot conclude that the pre- 11 Case: 13-20569 Document: 00513087139 Page: 12 Date Filed: 06/22/2015 No. 13-20569 c/w 13-20751 termination statements are unprotected speech performed as part of the plaintiffs’ job duties under Ceballos or Lane. In assessing the sufficiency of the complaint as to Wong’s pretermination statements, we apply the four factors applicable to analyzing the First Amendment rights of public employees: (1) an adverse employment decision, (2) the speech involved a matter of public concern, (3) the relative balance of the plaintiff's and the governmental defendant's interests, and (4) causation. Kinney, 367 F.3d at 356. There is an extra analytical step here, though, because by the time the adverse employment decision was made, Wong was working for Lone Star College. The public employee analysis still applies as Wong worked for a governmental contractor and was sufficiently subject to the indirect effects of the exercise of governmental power. Id. at 357-58. The first factor, the suffering of an adverse employment action, is met by the complaint’s allegations that Wong lost his position at Lone Star. The second factor is also satisfied, that Wong’s speech about the unreliability of the breath alcohol testing can be considered a matter of public concern. We analogize that speech to the statements in Kinney in which it was not even disputed that the testimony about possible improper police conduct was a matter of public concern. Id. at 361. We do not at this point apply the third factor of comparing the plaintiffs’ interest in speaking to the governmental defendant's interest in promoting efficiency, as the district court should conduct the initial balancing inquiry. It is the final factor, whether protected speech motivated the defendant's conduct, which controls the outcome now. We will address that factor later, after considering some of the other claims.