Opinion ID: 2388738
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Hall Case

Text: Indeed, the Knox County Circuit Court made just such an accommodation in the Hall case, only to have its judgment overturned by the Court of Appeals. We conclude, in light of the facts set out below, that the trial court's judgment in Hall was essentially correct under Tennessee's version of the UCCJA and must, therefore, be reinstated. Deborah and Harry Hall were married in 1982 in Georgia but moved soon after to Knoxville, Tennessee, where he was employed; they lived there together until late 1986. Matthew, the child whose custody is at stake here, was born on April 8, 1984. The couple separated in September 1986, and Deborah Hall took the child and moved back to Atlanta, Georgia, in December of that year, shortly before the divorce action was filed. The divorce decree was entered on June 11, 1987; it gave Deborah Hall custody of Matthew and gave liberal visitation to the father, Harry Hall. The parents were able to maintain a long-distance visitation schedule for the next two years, but as the child grew older and circumstances in their work patterns changed, it became obvious that some adjustments in the schedule would be necessary. Unfortunately, the parties were unable to reach an agreement concerning visitation, and on March 30, 1990, Deborah Hall filed a petition to modify in the Georgia Superior Court. Notice of the petition was served on Harry Hall on April 12, 1990. In the meantime, on April 3, 1990, Harry had filed a petition to modify in the same Knoxville chancery court that had rendered the initial decree, and an emergency hearing was set in that court for April 11, 1990. The child's mother appeared on that occasion, and the dispute was set for a full evidentiary hearing on May 2, 1990. On April 26, 1990, a Georgia petition requesting cooperation was filed in the Tennessee court. In that petition, counsel for Deborah Hall conceded (erroneously, we think) that Tennessee continued to have jurisdiction, but argued that Tennessee should decline to exercise that jurisdiction, predicated on the statutory criteria in T.C.A. § 36-6-208(c)(1)-(5), set out in full in section 1 of this opinion. On May 2, 1990, Deborah Hall also filed a response to her ex-husband's petition for modification. That filing did not request declination, but apparently there was a motion to dismiss for jurisdictional reasons, made on behalf of Deborah Hall and filed on or before May 30, 1990. On that date, the trial judge entered an order dismissing Harry Hall's petition for modification, based on the court's determination that Georgia was the more appropriate forum in which to determine the questions raised in the Tennessee petition. The trial court's determination was based on a correct interpretation of Tennessee law, specifically the jurisdictional provisions in T.C.A. § 36-6-203, the modification provisions in § 36-6-215, and the criteria for determining whether to decline jurisdiction in § 36-6-208. First of all, it should be noted that Georgia had become the child's home state under T.C.A. § 36-6-202(5). If the petition to modify filed by Harry Hall in April 1990 is seen as the commencement of the [current] proceeding, which we conclude is the correct interpretation of § 36-6-203(a), then the trial court did not have jurisdiction to determine the propriety of modification, because the Tennessee statute, unlike the UCCJA and the Georgia version of the UCCJA, does not permit a court of this state to exercise significant connection jurisdiction under § 36-6-203(a)(2)(A) unless [i]t appears that no state has jurisdiction as the home state. (Emphasis added.) At the point that Harry Hall filed for modification, the Georgia courts, of course, had home state jurisdiction. But even if Tennessee arguably had jurisdiction, the Tennessee trial court was correct in its decision to defer to the Georgia court, because the facts before the court met the three principal criteria of T.C.A. § 36-6-208(c)(1), (2) and (3), regarding a finding of inconvenient forum. Georgia is the child's home state, the first of the three main criteria set out in subsection (1); Georgia has a closer connection with the child and family or with the child and one ... of the contestants, as provided in subsection (2); and there is more readily available in Georgia substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships ..., as set out in subsection (3). Finally, although there were only four days between the filing of the mother's petition to modify in Georgia and the father's petition to modify in Tennessee  and despite the fact that we are reluctant to condone what might appear to be a race to the courthouse  the fact is that the Georgia proceeding was properly initiated there, in the child's home state, and was pending at the time the Tennessee action was initiated. Under both Tennessee and federal law, the trial judge in Tennessee should have (and ultimately did) stay or dismiss the Tennessee action, pending a determination of the issue by the Georgia court. See T.C.A. § 36-6-207(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(g). As noted in Section 1 of this opinion, the federal statute preempts state law and provides: A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody determination commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a court of another State where such court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this section to make a custody determination (emphasis added). Since the PKPA, like the Tennessee statute, makes home state jurisdiction the preferred if not exclusive basis for awarding or modifying custody, it cannot be argued that the Tennessee court erred in declining to exercise jurisdiction and deferring to the Georgia court. In deciding otherwise, the Court of Appeals relied almost solely on this Court's opinion in State ex rel Cooper v. Hamilton, 688 S.W.2d 821 (Tenn. 1985). In that child custody case, the parents were divorced in Indiana, the state of their marital residence, in January 1980. Mr. Cooper was awarded custody of the two older children and Mrs. Cooper the youngest child, a daughter three years old at the time. Visitation was granted both parents. The day after the divorce, however, Mrs. Cooper left Indiana without notice to her ex-husband and went to Cocke County, Tennessee, where she remarried. A month later, in February 1980, Mr. Cooper, still unsuccessful in his efforts to find his daughter, filed a contempt petition against his ex-wife in Indiana that was eventually granted. He also asked the court to modify the divorce decree to give him custody of his youngest child. The Indiana court modified its own decree on May 12, 1980, to award him temporary custody of the child, whose whereabouts at the time were still unknown. Mr. Cooper finally located his ex-wife and daughter in Tennessee in January 1981 and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus here, seeking to have his daughter returned to Indiana so that the Indiana court could further adjudicate the custody dispute. Apparently the child's mother simultaneously filed a petition in the Cocke County Circuit Court requesting modification of the visitation provisions contained in the original Indiana decree. Cooper at 822-832. At this point, under the statutory provisions discussed above, the trial court in this state should have ruled that although Tennessee was the child's home state, jurisdiction should not be exercised in Tennessee while proceedings were pending in Indiana; the effect would have been to defer to Indiana the authority to decide all questions related to the custody of the Cooper child. Instead, the Tennessee court assumed jurisdiction and refused to recognize and enforce the Indiana decree, despite the mandate to do so in T.C.A. § 36-6-214. The Tennessee court held that the ex parte proceedings in Indiana following the divorce were of no force and effect, because the child's custodial parent had not been afforded due process. Cooper at 823. Due process, of course, is treated in the UCCJA and the Tennessee version of the UCCJA under the notice provisions of T.C.A. § 36-6-206. It is sufficient to note at this point that the authority of a court to act in the best interest of a child cannot be thwarted by the actions of one parent in hiding the location of the child from the other parent. In Cooper, we held that the jurisdiction of the Indiana court to decide the issues in dispute continued, despite the fact that Tennessee had become the child's home state. Cooper at 826. We stressed the concern of the UCCJA in the retention of jurisdiction by the rendering court. What we did not stress was the effect of the mother's conduct in failing to honor the orders of the Indiana court's original decree, awarding visitation rights to the father. In T.C.A. § 36-6-209, the so-called unclean hands statute, the residual relief clause in subsection (b) provides that in a modification proceeding, [i]f the petitioner had violated any other custody decree of another state, the [forum] court ... may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the circumstances. In Cooper, the petitioner in the Tennessee action was the child's mother, who had spirited the child away from Indiana and deprived the father of the visitation privileges granted in the original decree. Under T.C.A. § 36-6-209(b), the Tennessee court should instead have declined to assist her in any way and should have recognized and enforced the Indiana decree, both the original award and the modified award of custody. The contrast between the facts in Cooper and those in Hall, the case now before us, is dramatic. Here there is no intimation of misconduct by either party. Both parents had been struggling long-distance to accommodate the child's best interest, and as the circumstances changed, the need for modification of the visitation schedule was clearly indicated. When the two parties could not agree on a new schedule, the pertinent question became: which of two courts is authorized to decide the matter for them? The Tennessee trial court's order deferring to the jurisdiction of Georgia is in keeping with both the letter and the spirit of the UCCJA. It is also mandated by federal law. We therefore hold that State ex rel. Cooper v. Hamilton , while proper on the facts of that case, does not mandate a different result in this case. The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Hall v. Hall is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for the entry of appropriate orders under T.C.A. § 36-6-208.