Opinion ID: 222707
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: The district court dismissed Stallworth’s § 1983 claims on the basis of qualified immunity. Stallworth argues on appeal that the district court erred in dismissing the claims on this basis because qualified immunity it not available to defendants who have been sued in their official—rather than their personal—capacities. Stallworth is correct that under Supreme Court case law, the personal defense of qualified immunity does not apply to official-capacity claims. See Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 483 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166–67 (1985), and Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991), as holding that qualified immunity is “inapplicable in § 1983 suits against government officials in their ‘official capacity’”). Stallworth’s complaint expressly names the defendants “in their official capacities” only. Further, the relief he seeks involves compensation decisions that fall squarely within the official decision-making authority of the Board members, President Slaughter, and Chancellor Pitcher. Therefore, Stallworth’s § 1983 claims are official-capacity claims that may not be dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity. Nonetheless, we may affirm the judgment of the district court on any ground supported by the record. TIG Specialty, 375 F.3d at 368. We do so today on the ground that Stallworth has failed to create a genuine dispute of material 6 Case: 10-30894 Document: 00511564439 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/08/2011 No. 10-30894 fact as to whether he had a constitutionally protected “property interest” in either the promised salary increase or the part of his salary that was cut. To prevail on his § 1983 claims for the denial of procedural or substantive due process, Stallworth must show that he has been denied a constitutionally protected property interest. See Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603, 607 (5th Cir. 1999) (“To show a due process violation in the public employment context, the plaintiff must first show that [he] had a legally recognized property interest at stake.”). To enjoy a property interest in employment, an employee must have “a legitimate claim of entitlement,” created and defined by “existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). “An expectation of employment carries with it some protected expectations as to a salary.” Williams v. Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 6 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 1993). “But the more detailed and conditional the understanding becomes between employer and employee, the weaker the linkage becomes between those understandings and the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 293 (citing Mangaroo v. Nelson, 864 F.2d 1202, 1206–08 (5th Cir. 1989)). Regarding his claim for the denial of the promised salary increase, Stallworth asserts a property interest based on the handshake deal he made with Pitcher in June 2005. We disagree that this informal and incomplete agreement created a legitimate claim of entitlement in the promised salary increase. Stallworth’s salary increase was never approved by the SU Board, and such approval is expressly mandated by several “independent sources” of law. For example, § 17:3305(A) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes states: The head of each college and university shall appoint and fix the salaries and the duties of the members of the faculty and 7 Case: 10-30894 Document: 00511564439 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/08/2011 No. 10-30894 administrative and professional staff for the college or university he heads, subject to the recommendation of the president or chief administrative officer of the system and approval of the appropriate management board. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3305(A) (emphasis added). Likewise, the Board’s bylaws and SULC’s 2005–2006 Faculty Guide both provide that the SULC Chancellor has the duty to “fix the salaries and duties” of SULC faculty and administrators, but that such responsibility is “subject to the recommendation of the President and the approval of the Board.” In his deposition, Stallworth admitted that he knew that the establishment of a particular salary for the position of Vice Chancellor had to be submitted to the Board for individual approval. He also testified that he understood that his salary increase would not be complete until the Board approved it. In other words, both Louisiana state law and SU’s own regulations imposed an explicit condition—Board approval—on the salary increase. This condition was known to Stallworth, and, for whatever reason, it did not occur. We thus find that Stallworth did not have a legitimate claim of entitlement in the promised salary increase because it had not been approved by the Board. See Hoffmans v. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 22 F.3d 1093, 1994 WL 198869,  (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (unpublished) (holding that a university professor did not have a cognizable property interest in an expected pay raise because her expectations were conditioned by the fact that her appointment had to approved every year by the Board of Regents). As for the salary reduction, Stallworth contends that because he has tenure as an SULC faculty member, he has a heightened expectation—and thus a protected property interest—in the whole of his salary. Putting aside the 8 Case: 10-30894 Document: 00511564439 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/08/2011 No. 10-30894 question of whether the fact of tenure alone creates a property interest in the whole of one’s salary, we find that Stallworth has failed to present sufficient evidence showing that he had tenure in his continued employment as Vice Chancellor. Other than his own unsubstantiated, conclusory assertion to the contrary, the record does not contain any evidence showing that Stallworth had tenure in his administrative post. Indeed, the only relevant evidence in the record—the Personnel Action Form from 1993 that memorializes Stallworth’s promotion to Full Professor, receipt of tenure, and appointment as Vice Chancellor—indicates that Stallworth did not have tenure in his administrative post: the notation of the award of tenure directly follows the notation of the status change to Full Professor. By contrast, the notation of his appointment to the Vice Chancellor position is on a different line and is not linked to any reference to tenure. Nor is there any other record evidence that suggests that Stallworth had a heightened expectation in his employment as Vice Chancellor (and therefore in the portion of his salary that was attributable to his employment as Vice Chancellor). Rather, common sense dictates that Stallworth should have expected that SU would likely reduce the salary of an administrator who relinquishes his administrative duties and, in doing so, exchanges a twelvemonth appointment for a nine-month appointment. While in this case it is difficult to isolate the portion of Stallworth’s salary that is attributable to his work as Vice Chancellor (because he was paid in one lump sum), we have no difficulty finding on the basis of the record before us that the 10% decrease that Stallworth suffered as a result of his voluntarily relinquishing the Vice 9 Case: 10-30894 Document: 00511564439 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/08/2011 No. 10-30894 Chancellor position did not impinge on any constitutionally protected property interest in his salary as a tenured professor.4
The district court dismissed Stallworth’s state-law claims for money damages on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity, and it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state-law claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. Stallworth abandoned his challenge to the first ruling at oral argument, and he has not appealed the second. Thus, the only issue that remains alive on appeal is whether the district court erred in dismissing the state-law claims with prejudice rather than without prejudice. We agree with Stallworth that the district court erred in doing so. For both grounds on which the district court relied, our precedent is clear that a dismissal must be without prejudice. See Bass v. Parkland Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 146 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he dismissal of . . . pendent claims [under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)] should be without prejudice so that the plaintiff may refile his claims in the appropriate state court.”); Warnock v. Pecos Cnty., Tex., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Because [Eleventh Amendment] sovereign immunity deprives a court of jurisdiction, the claims barred by sovereign immunity can be dismissed only under Rule 12(b)(1) and not with prejudice.” (emphasis added)).