Opinion ID: 1443964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: At the threshold, we are met with Negrete's claim that we lack jurisdiction over the district court's order because it was not an injunction and because, even if it was, the issue is now moot. We disagree. We recognize that, in general, our jurisdiction extends only to final district court decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Dependable Highway Express, Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2007); Alsea Valley Alliance v. Dep't of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, a major exception to that rule is for [i]nterlocutory orders ... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1); see also Plata v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.2003). That may not seem to dispose of Negrete's challenge because the district court did not denominate its order as an injunction [4] and even denied Negrete's request for a temporary restraining order. But looks can be deceiving. We cannot content ourselves with the surface, but must expiscate further. Simply put, we are not bound by what a district court chooses to call an order, or even by a failure to give an order a particular name. We, instead, `look to [the order's] substantial effect rather than its terminology.' Orange County, Cal. Airport Hotel Assocs. v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd., 52 F.3d 821, 825 (9th Cir.1995). That does not mean that we take an expansive view of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Id. It does mean, however, that in deciding whether an appeal is proper, we will ask: (1) does the order have the practical effect of the grant or denial of an injunction; (2) does the order have serious, perhaps irreparable consequences; and (3) is the order one that can be effectively challenged only by immediate appeal? Thompson v. Enomoto, 815 F.2d 1323, 1326-27 (9th Cir.1987); see also Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83-84, 101 S.Ct. 993, 996-97, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981); Plata, 329 F.3d at 1106. Reviewing the order at hand, we must answer all of those questions in the affirmative. The order enjoins Allianz from even discussing settlements in other cases that could affect any claims in this litigation, without obtaining the permission of its opponent in this litigation or allowing its opponent to actually conduct the discussions; it further precludes any proposed settlement of other cases without the approval of this district court. In practical effect, it was an injunction. [5] The consequences of the order are serious to say the least  none of the other cases in which Allianz is, or may be, involved can be settled by or in the other courts in which they are located absent permission of Negrete Counsel and the court in this case. And, of course, the order can only be challenged by immediate appeal because if Allianz awaits the final determination of this case, the damage to prompt proceedings in other cases will have already been done. A decision by us months or years after that cannot repair the damage. Nor does Negrete's attempt to characterize the order as nothing more than a scheduling order change our analysis. That is just another inventive label with no real substance. The order does not set forth a mere pretrial procedure, [6] or merely prescribe the conduct of the parties while they await trial. [7] As already explained, the order effectively precludes Allianz from proceeding in other actions brought against it in other courts. In fact, the district court recognized as much when it declared that it did not presently intend to enforce the order as to certain other federal actions because it did not wish to interfere with the other judges' handling of the progress of those actions at that time. Negrete seizes on those statements by the district court in suggesting a final reason that we lack jurisdiction  mootness. We recognize that an issue becomes moot when no controversy remains, [8] or where the parties have no real interest in the outcome as far as the law is concerned. [9] But that surely does not decide this case. This is not even a case where an order has been withdrawn so that it has no continuing effect but the parties are still contending over whether it could be, or would be, reimposed at a later time. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 221-22, 120 S.Ct. 722, 725, 145 L.Ed.2d 650 (2000) (per curiam); Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 199-200, 108 S.Ct. 523, 528, 98 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988). Here, the district court has never withdrawn its order, even though it recognized withdrawal as a possibility and even though Allianz asked it do so. Rather, the court has merely indicated that it will not now enforce the order regarding certain other federal cases because those courts have indicated that they wish to proceed and the district court is not inclined to interfere with them. We see no basis for determining that the controversy is over, that Allianz is not still affected, or that no effective relief will be granted if we reverse the district court's decision. Again, the mere fact that the district court has not seen fit to withdraw the order itself indicates that it still considers the order to be viable and enforceable against Allianz. Therefore, we have jurisdiction over this appeal.