Opinion ID: 867592
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether mitigating evidence was given sufficient weight

Text: ¶ 57 Defendant must prove the mitigating factors listed in A.R.S. § 13-703 by a preponderance of the evidence. See Laird, 186 Ariz. at 207-08, 920 P.2d at 773-74. The trial judge found one statutory mitigating circumstance, that of duress, A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(2). The judge found that Defendant was under unusual and substantial duress although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution. A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(2). He also found that Defendant's money, house, and child custody worries created stress that rose to the level of a mitigating circumstance. ¶ 58 Prior to sentencing, Defendant maintained that A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1) was applicable (Defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution.). The trial judge found that Defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct or to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law was not significantly impaired. ¶ 59 To establish this mitigator, a defendant must prove the existence of an identifiable mental disease or psychological defect that results in significant impairment. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. at 148 ¶ 93, 14 P.3d at 1018 ¶ 93. Moreover, proof of a causal connection between the impairment and the criminal act is essential. State v. Martinez, 196 Ariz. 451, 464 ¶ 57, 999 P.2d 795, 808 ¶ 57 (2000). Although the trial judge found Defendant suffered from brain damage, Defendant did not prove her brain damage resulted in significant impairment that led her to commit the crime. While the brain damage resulted in impulsivity and poor judgment, this does not equate to inability to conform one's conduct to the law. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. at 148 ¶ 93, 14 P.3d at 1018 ¶ 93. The facts support the judge's finding: Defendant's expert conceded that Defendant did not suffer from severe brain damage, that five to ten percent of the general population suffers from her type of minor brain damage, that a lot of these people function well in society, and that his testing did not rule out the possibility of Defendant being the mastermind in the plan to murder Lynne. This was actually the testimony most favorable to Defendant because the state's expert testified that no medical record indicated Defendant suffered from any type of brain damage, that neither testing by Defendant's expert nor letters written by Defendant suggested a diagnosis of brain damage, and that there was a real possibility Defendant was malingering as to brain damage issues. Thus, even assuming Defendant was able to prove brain damage by a preponderance of the evidence, she has failed to prove that she could not appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct or that her ability to conform her conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired. ¶ 60 Finally, the trial judge found Defendant was legally accountable for the conduct of another and her participation was major. See A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(3). Defendant planned the murder, hired the killers, gave them money to buy gloves, provided them with a key to Lynne's apartment, drove them to a place near Lynne's apartment, and awaited their return. The trial judge deemed this statutory mitigator did not exist. We agree.
¶ 61 When a defendant is being sentenced for first-degree murder, the sentencing judge must consider, in addition to the mitigating circumstances enumerated in A.R.S. § 13-703(G), any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any circumstance of the offense relevant to determining whether a sentence less than death might be appropriate. State v. McCall, 139 Ariz. 147, 162, 677 P.2d 920, 935 (1983). The defendant must prove the existence of non-statutory mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. McMurtrey, 143 Ariz. 71, 73, 691 P.2d 1099, 1101 (1984). We independently review the judge's findings concerning non-statutory mitigation factors. In this case, the judge found two non-statutory mitigating circumstances, absence of prior criminal history and brain damage. ¶ 62 A lack of prior felony convictions may constitute a non-statutory mitigating factor. State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 70, 969 P.2d 1168, 1182 (1998). In its presentence memorandum, the state conceded that Defendant had no prior criminal convictions. The judge therefore correctly found this mitigator to exist. ¶ 63 The judge then found that Defendant had established that she suffered from some brain damage as a result of difficulties at birth. While this impairment did not rise to the level of a statutory mitigator, it could be considered in mitigation to the extent it may have affected Defendant's conduct. State v. Clabourne, 194 Ariz. 379, 387 ¶ 31, 983 P.2d 748, 756 ¶ 31 (1999); see also McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. at 102, 664 P.2d at 646. But brain damage seems not to have affected Defendant's ability to manage the entire household and its financial affairs. Defendant argued that brain damage prevented her from coming up with the scheme to murder Lynne. However, the judge found that Defendant was the person who provided the motive and method. Defendant also argued that the brain damage could cause her to act impulsively and irresponsibly. The trial judge agreed to some extent, finding brain damage as non-statutory mitigation, but he gave it little weight. We agree with this conclusion. ¶ 64 Defendant next argues that the disparity between her sentence and those imposed on her codefendants should amount to a mitigating circumstance. She was the only one to be sentenced to death, but the judge reasoned that the disparity was justified under the circumstances and had no mitigating effect. The state argued that there were explanations for David, Dan, and Scott's sentences. David was charged with the same crimes as Defendant but was only convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder; he was sentenced in accordance with the law applicable to this offense: life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. Dan was convicted of the same charges as Defendant, but the judge received letters requesting leniency from members of the jury that convicted him. In addition, without promise of any benefit, Dan testified against Defendant, thus possibly waiving his appeal rights and exposing himself to retaliation by fellow prisoners. Dan was sentenced to natural life in prison. Scott, who was only the lookout, entered a guilty plea to second-degree murder in return for testifying on behalf of the state. ¶ 65 Disparity between the sentences received by a defendant and an accomplice may be a mitigating factor. Stokley, 182 Ariz. at 523, 898 P.2d at 472. However, disparity in sentences is mitigating only when not adequately explained. State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 57, 859 P.2d 156, 167 (1993). Simply because an accomplice has received leniency does not, in itself, prevent imposition of the death penalty. State v. Marlow, 163 Ariz. 65, 72, 786 P.2d 395, 402 (1989). In Marlow, the court said it appreciated the difficult tactical choices that must sometimes be made by the prosecution in obtaining a conviction. Id. In Scott's case, he was offered a plea in return for testifying on behalf of the state. Difference in sentences resulting from appropriate plea bargaining is not necessarily mitigating. State v. Gillies, 142 Ariz. 564, 571, 691 P.2d 655, 662 (1984). Furthermore, Scott's participation as lookout was relatively minimal compared to that of Defendant, who masterminded the plot. ¶ 66 It was Dan, however, who actually stabbed Lynne, and it was David who stood to directly benefit from Lynne's death and had the closest familial relationship to her. Neither Dan nor David received a death sentence. We dealt with a similar disparity problem in State v. Mann, in which the disparity was not considered mitigating because the person treated lightly was only an accomplice and Mann was the actual killer. 188 Ariz. 220, 230, 934 P.2d 784, 794 (1997). In the present case, the actual killer got the life sentence, and Defendant, who was not the actual killer, was sentenced to deaththe opposite of what justified the disparate treatment in Mann. See also State v. Clabourne, 142 Ariz. 335 at 348, 690 P.2d 54 at 68 (1984) (holding there was no mitigation where defendant, but not accomplices, did actual killing, which involved strangling and stabbing). The disparity in the present case must be given some weight. ¶ 67 In her presentence memorandum, Defendant also maintained that she was motivated to murder Lynne because she wanted to use the money that her husband would receive to obtain custody of her three minor children. Assuming, without deciding, this could have some mitigating weight, Defendant did not provide evidence that she planned and organized Lynne's murder to gain custody of her children. We agree with the trial judge that no mitigating weight should be given to this argument.