Opinion ID: 1822625
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Qui facit per alium, facit per se [10]

Text: In Benson v. State, 68 Ala. 544 (1881), the defendant, after conviction, moved the court to set aside the verdict, and to arrest the judgment, `on the ground that the indictment was not indorsed A true bill by the foreman of the grand jury.' The defendant proved irregularities in the signature of the foreman of the grand jury, specifically `that his signature was not upon the indictment, but that his name was written upon it, under the words, A true bill, at his request, and in his presence, by the clerk of the grand jury.' On this evidence, the court overruled the motion, and the defendant excepted. This Court, in an opinion written by Somerville, J., held: If the evidence had shown that the indictment was indorsed `A true bill,' in the name of the foreman of the grand jury, and without his authority, it is clear that it could have been quashed on motion. But, as the name was signed in the presence of, and by the direction of the foreman, the clerk of the grand jury acting as his amanuensis in the matter, the signature was, in law, the act of the foreman himself. Qui facit per alium, facit per se. The indictment was not, therefore, invalidated by this irregularity; but such a practice is reprehensible, and not to be indulged, because [it is] liable to lead to unnecessary complications. 68 Ala. at 545-46. Even though this Court found that the practice was reprehensible, it nevertheless held that the method for attacking the practice was by a motion to quash the indictment. If that is the rule of law involving an indictment, why is it not the rule in this case involving a traffic ticket? Alabama case law concerning affidavits also states that defects in documentation must be timely raised. See, Wells v. State, 245 Ala. 511, 17 So.2d 878 (1944). See also Bolling v. State, 21 Ala.App. 244, 107 So. 40 (1925); and Fealy v. City of Birmingham, 15 Ala.App. 367, 73 So. 296 (1916), in which it is generally held that objections to the sufficiency of an affidavit must be timely raised. There are also several cases that stand for the proposition that a defendant may waive the very presentment of a complaint if a demand for presentment is not made at the trial level. See City of Dothan v. Holloway, supra; Ex parte Hood, 404 So.2d 717 (Ala.1981); Chaney v. City of Birmingham, 246 Ala. 147, 21 So.2d 263 (1944); and Aderhold v. City of Anniston, 99 Ala. 521, 12 So. 472 (1892). Because of this rule of law, I am of the opinion that the use of the rubber stamp was a waivable defect, if a defect at all, and on that point I cite, once again, the two cases cited above: Benson v. State , [11] 68 Ala. 544 (1881), and Prince v. State, 140 Ala. 158, 37 So. 171 (1904).