Opinion ID: 555443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Guideline on Grouping Closely-Related Counts and Combined Offense Level for Multiple Counts

Text: 77 As we have explained, Riviere pleaded guilty to (1) possession of firearms by a felon under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1), (3) (count one); (2) delivery of firearms to a common/contract carrier under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(e) (count five); and (3) possession of an altered firearm under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(k) (count six). Riviere's base offense level for possession of a firearm by a felon was 9, plus a 1-level increase for an obliterated serial number for an adjusted level of 10. The district court treated each count as a separate group in determining the combined offense level under guidelines Sec. 3D1.4, and thus impliedly found that the offenses were not closely-related counts under guidelines Sec. 3D1.2. For the three groups of offenses, the court increased the base offense level for the highest offense level, 10, by 3 levels for a combined offense level of 13. Riviere received a 2-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, for a total offense level of 11. Thus, predicated on his criminal history category of IV, the sentencing table provided for a range of 18 to 24 months for the firearms offenses. The district court sentenced Riviere to a general sentence of 24 months on these charges. 78 Riviere contends that the district court improperly added 3 unit levels pursuant to guidelines Sec. 3D1.4 to this sentence, because it improperly determined that the firearms offenses constituted three separate groups of offenses under guidelines Sec. 3D1.2. Riviere suggests that the trial court should have combined the offenses into a single group because they are closely related and should have used the highest offense level as the combined offense level pursuant to the application notes to guidelines Sec. 3D1.3. This contention requires a construction of the guidelines so that our scope of review on the contention is plenary. United States v. Nottingham, 898 F.2d 390, 392 (3d Cir.1990); United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 125, 126-27 (3d Cir.1989). 79 There was, of course, no individual victim of these firearms offenses. Thus, the issue turns on whether offenses for which society is the victim are properly grouped together under the multiple count provisions of the guidelines which require grouping of offenses against the same victim and the same or connected transactions. Guidelines Sec. 3D1.2, as effective here, provides that: 80 [a]ll counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into a single Group. Counts involve substantially the same harm within the meaning of this rule: 81 (a) When counts involve the same victim and the same act or transaction. 82 (b) When counts involve the same victim and two or more of the acts or transactions connected by a common criminal objective or constituting part of a common scheme or plan, including but not limited to: 83 (1) [a count for conspiracy or solicitation plus a count for the substantive offense that was the object of the conspiracy or solicitation] 84 (2) [a count charging attempt plus a count charging commission of the same offense] 85 (3) [a count charging offense based on general prohibition plus a count charging offense based on specific prohibition within that general prohibition]. 86 (c) When one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the guideline applicable to another of the counts. 87 (d) Counts are grouped together if the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the total amount of harm or loss, the quantity of a substance involved, or some other measure of aggregate harm, or if the offense behavior is ongoing or continuous in nature and the offense guideline is written to cover such behavior.... 88 Subsection (d) lists offenses it specifically includes and excludes; however, the firearms offenses involved here are neither specifically included or excluded. Id. Sec. 3D1.2(d). Subsection (d) further provides that: 89 For multiple counts of offenses that are not listed, grouping under this subsection may or may not be appropriate; a case-by-case determination must be made based upon the facts of the case and the applicable guidelines (including specific offense characteristics and other adjustments) used to determine the offense level. 90 Exclusion of an offense from grouping under this subsection does not necessarily preclude grouping under another subsection. 91 The application notes following guidelines Sec. 3D1.2 provide that the term victim is not intended to include indirect or secondary victims. Ambiguities as to the identity of the victim should be resolved in accordance with the purpose of this section to identify and group 'counts involving substantially the same harm.'  For victimless crimes in which society at large is the victim, the grouping decision must be based primarily upon the nature of the interest invaded by each offense. Id., application note 2. 92 Riviere contends that either subsection (a) or (b) applies to the firearms offenses, presumably because society was the same victim for all offenses. His best argument, however, is predicated on subsection (c), which provides for grouping of offenses in which one count is also a specific offense characteristic of another count. The guidelines provide that the base offense level for possession of a firearm by a felon is increased for specific offense characteristics if that firearm has an altered or obliterated serial number, and there was such an increase here. Riviere also pleaded guilty under count six to possession of a firearm with an altered or obliterated serial number, the same conduct treated as a specific offense characteristic in count one. Thus, these two offenses should have been grouped as closely related counts under guidelines Sec. 3D1.2(c). 93 Riviere cites United States v. Berkowitz, 712 F.Supp. 707 (N.D.Ill.1989), in support of his argument that subsection (a) or (b) required that the trial court group counts one and five because they arose from a single incident affecting one victim. In Berkowitz, the district court rejected the government's argument that counts for obstruction of justice (counts I and II) and stealing government property (count III) should not be combined because the offenses affected multiple victims, that is, society at large and the United States Attorney's office. Id. at 710. The defendant stole documents from that office material to a separate mail and tax fraud prosecution against him. Id. at 708. The court explained that the office is a representative of society and not a separate victim. Id. at 710. Finding that the three counts involved substantially the same harm because they related to the same victim, that is, society, and the same criminal objective, the court grouped the three offenses under guidelines Sec. 3D1.2, presumably pursuant to subsection (a). 712 F.Supp. at 710. 94 Riviere's argument that subsection (a) or (b) required grouping of the offenses is problematic in view of the clarifying amendment, effective November 1, 1989, to the background commentary to the application notes to guidelines Sec. 3D1.2, which provides that [c]ounts involving different victims (or societal harms in the case of 'victimless' crimes) are grouped together only as provided in subsection (c) or (d). See United States v. Ofchinick, 877 F.2d 251, 257 n. 9 (3d Cir.1989). However, the application note discussing the term victim, which appears in guidelines Sec. 3D1.2(a) and (b), provides that, for victimless crimes in which society at large is the victim, the grouping decision must be based primarily upon the nature of the interest invaded by each offense. Id., application note 2. 95 Because the commentary is not entirely clear, it is appropriate to refer to the stated purpose of Part D to determine whether counts one and five should be grouped. See id., background commentary ([i]n interpreting this Part and resolving ambiguities, the court should look to the underlying policy of the Part as stated in the Introductory Commentary.). The introductory commentary to Part D provides that some offenses are so closely intertwined with other offenses that conviction for them ordinarily would not warrant increasing the guideline range. It uses embezzlement and falsification of records as an example of offenses which, even though legally distinct, represent essentially the same type of wrongful conduct with the same ultimate harm that are appropriately treated as a single offense for sentencing. Id. Thus, it is clear that multiple counts are not restricted to two or more counts of the same statutory violation, but may include violations of different statutes. 96 Likewise, the introductory commentary provides that [c]onvictions on multiple counts do not result in a sentence enhancement unless they represent additional conduct that is not otherwise accounted for by the guidelines. Id. (emphasis added). One of the offenses stems from Riviere's status as a felon rather than his conduct. Because one of the offenses, delivery of firearms to a common/contract carrier, required that Riviere possess the firearms, it follows that Riviere's sentence was enhanced due to his status rather than his conduct. Thus, for these two offenses, the policies underlying the multiple count provision support the interpretation that, because the offenses affect the same victim, society, the court should group them. Additionally, if society may serve as the same victim for two offenses, counts one and six, there seems little basis to reject it as the basis for the third. 97 While the government argues that the district court correctly refused to group because the offenses require proof of different elements, it cites no authority for its contention that the presence of different elements precludes grouping and, in fact, this argument misstates the law and we reject it. The guidelines anticipate that offenses requiring proof of different elements will be grouped; for example, they provide grouping for conspiracy and the substantive offense that was the sole object of the conspiracy which clearly require proof of different elements. See guidelines Sec. 3D1.2(b)(1). Another example provides that grouping is appropriate for kidnapping and assaulting the same victim. Id., application note 3, example 2. Additionally, application note 4 states that counts that are part of a single course of conduct with a single criminal objective and represent essentially one composite harm to the same victim are to be grouped together, even if they constitute legally distinct offenses occurring at different times. (Emphasis added). 98 The government also argues that guidelines Sec. 3D1.2(d) does not list firearms offenses as offenses to be grouped. 20 But neither does subsection (d) exclude firearms offenses. In any event, we must make a case-by-case determination ... based on the facts of the case and the applicable guidelines ... used to determine the offense level. Id. Sec. 3D1.2(d). 99 Overall, we conclude that the three offenses are of the type that the Commission intended to be grouped under guidelines Sec. 3D1.2; therefore, the district court erred in its application of the guidelines. The guidelines already provided for enhanced punishment for possession of a firearm by a felon if that firearm was altered; to enhance the penalty further by adding a unit for the count for possession of an altered firearm clearly violates guidelines Sec. 3D1.2(c) which requires grouping for these offenses. Additionally, grouping of the offenses of possession of a firearm by a felon and delivery to a common/contract carrier was required because to hold otherwise would provide enhanced punishment for Riviere's status as a felon, rather than his additional conduct that is not otherwise accounted for by the guidelines. Id. Part D, introductory commentary. We will, therefore, vacate Riviere's sentence and remand for resentencing, grouping the three firearms offenses for purposes of determining Riviere's combined offense level. 100 We find support for our result in United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir.1990). There, various firearms offenses were grouped, the most serious offense being for transporting an explosive in interstate commerce, with the knowledge or intent that it will be used to kill, injure, or intimidate an individual or unlawfully damage or destroy property. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(d). We find it particularly significant that one count grouped was for the possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(5). Thus, Kikumura, as here, involved an offense in part predicated on status, and in Kikumura there was grouping, though that issue seemed not to be in dispute. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1093-94, & n. 6 & n. 8. See also United States v. Scott, 914 F.2d 959, 960-61 (7th Cir.1990). We think that it is also significant that one court has indicated that the guidelines, including Sec. 3D1.2(d), provide for grouping where the offenses in question constitute part of the same continuing, common criminal endeavor. United States v. Porter, 909 F.2d 789, 793 (4th Cir.1990). We acknowledge, however, that, at least with respect to counts one and five, a different result could be reached if the focus is placed on the societal interest involved. See United States v. Pope, 871 F.2d 506, 510 (5th Cir.1989); see also United States v. Egson, 897 F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir.1990). 101