Opinion ID: 2276759
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Statements in Voir Dire

Text: Strong objected to the following statement by the prosecutor during voir dire: [I]in most cases, we don't seek death, we don't ask for a death sentence in most first degree cases. Approximately 50 pages later, Strong also objected to the following statement by the prosecutor: But there are sometimes certain facts that may be so overwhelming and overbearing that they impact a person's ability to be fair and impartial. We only do that in very rare instances, but In both instances, the prosecutor, with the judge's approval, rephrased the statements. Following the second statement, Strong unsuccessfully requested the trial court to discharge the entire venirepanel, but the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's former statement. Nonetheless, Strong argues the combination of these statements amounted to unsworn testimony by the prosecutor that he had compared this case to others and found this one worse than most, deserving of death. Cf. State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 900-01 (Mo. banc 1995) (prosecutor improperly stated during penalty phase closing argument: This case is about the most brutal slaying in the history of this county.). Strong fails to consider either statement in context or to take into account that 50 pages of voir dire occurred between them. In making the first statement, the prosecutor was responding to this statement by the defense: Do you understand that everybody understands it's just the prosecutor is asking for the death penalty? It's not the Judge, it's not the law, just the prosecutor who's asking for that particular form of punishment? The prosecutor then explained to the jurors that the law prescribes a particular process for those cases in which he decides to ask for the death sentence. The statement was self-invited by Strong's implication that the prosecutor was not following the law by asking for the death penalty. State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171, 176 (Mo. banc 1998) (prosecutor may rebut defense counsel's questionable line of argument); see State v. Wilborn, 525 S.W.2d 87, 94-95 (Mo.App. 1975) (defendant injected issue of failure to testify, thereby inviting prosecutor's comment). The second statement occurred during the prosecutor's attempt to elicit any bias of the venirepanel regarding life in prison and the death sentence. He asked: Is there anyone who would automatically exclude life without eligibility for probation and parole and automatically vote for death? He explained the questions help the attorneys to pick a jury that's going to be unbiased, fair, impartial to everybody in the situation. But there are sometimes certain facts that may be so overwhelming and overbearing that they impact a person's ability to be fair and impartial. Nothing the prosecutor said in either statement was improper when viewed in full context. Contrary to Strong's assertion, those remarks did not encourag[e] the jury to believe that this case was appropriate for death because of the prosecutor's review of the cases he had tried. Furthermore, Strong did not request any additional relief after the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the second remark. In order to establish the necessity of striking the entire panel for improper comments, Strong must demonstrate that the comments were `so inflammatory and prejudicial that it can be said that a right to a fair trial has been infringed.' State v. Thompson, 985 S.W.2d 779, 789 (Mo. banc 1999) (quoting State v. Evans, 802 S.W.2d 507, 514 (Mo. banc 1991)). He has not met this requirement.