Opinion ID: 2709180
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ADA Title II Claim

Text: The district court dismissed Brumfield’s Title II claim for failure to state a plausible claim for relief. In the process, however, the court held that Title II of the ADA prohibits disability discrimination in state and local public employment, supplementing the remedy provided in Title I. The City disagrees and argues that Title II does not apply. Whether Title II applies to employment discrimination is an open question in this circuit. Staats v. County of Sawyer, 220 F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has noted the question but never directly addressed it. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 n.1 (2001). Three of our sister circuits, however, have directly decided the issue. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held that Title II unambiguously does not apply to employment-related disability discrimination. See Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1313–14; Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1178.1 The 1 The Second Circuit has held that Title II unambiguously does not apply to the employment decisions of public entities large enough to be covered by Title I but reserved the issue of whether Title II regulates the employment decisions of smaller public entities. See Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Local Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2013). With a few inapplicable exceptions, Title I defines “employer” to mean “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5). So long as a public entity meets Title I’s definition of “em ployer,” its employment practices would fall within the scope of the ADA’s employment-specific provisions. The Second Circuit decided the question whether Title II addresses the (continued...) 8 Nos. 11-2265 & 11-3836 Eleventh Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion. See Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 825.2 (...continued) employment practices of public entities primarily by comparing Title II of the ADA with Title I’s more specific provisions rather than by grappling with the meaning of Title II itself. See Mary Jo C., 707 F.3d at 168–69 (“We are persuaded primarily by the structure of the ADA, including differences between Title I and Title II, that Congress did not intend to extend Title II to employment discrimination claims, at least not those that are covered by Title I … .”). The court therefore reserved the question whether Title II addresses the employment practices of public entities not covered by Title I. See id. at 171 n.12 (“We need not, and do not, decide here whether a Title II claim may be brought against a public employer employing fewer than fifteen employees … .”). 2 Other circuits have addressed closely related issues. The Third Circuit, in a case determining whether Title III of the ADA prohibits disability discrimination in the employment context, has stated that “it is evident that Congress sought to regulate disability discrimination in the area of employment exclusively through Title I, notwithstanding the broad language of Title III.” Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem’l Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 113, 118–19 (3d Cir. 1998). The Sixth Circuit faced the same issue and agreed that Title I is the only part of the ADA governing employment practices. See Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he statutory framework of the ADA expressly limits discrimination in employm ent practices to Title I of the ADA … .”). The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have implicitly assumed that employment-discrimination claims are cognizable under Title II of the ADA, though neither court has directly confronted the issue. See Holmes v. Tex. A&M Univ., 145 F.3d 681 (5th Cir. 1998) (engineering professor dismissed from university); Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995) (doctor dismissed from residency). Finally, the First Circuit has flagged the Title II issue as a difficult one and noted that “[t]he words ‘public services, programs, or (continued...) Nos. 11-2265 & 11-3836 9 We have considered whether it makes sense to leave the question undecided here. After all, Brumfield brought a Title I claim in her third suit, and there is no doubt that Title I prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of disability. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 516–17 (2004) (The ADA “forbids discrimination against persons with disabilities in three major areas of public life: employment, which is covered by Title I of the statute; public services, programs, and activities, which are the subject of Title II; and public accommodations, which are covered by Title III.”). But we cannot sidestep the issue of Title II’s scope by focusing on the Title I claim in Brumfield’s third suit. Judge Kennelly dismissed that com- plaint and entered judgment on res judicata grounds. Although Brumfield argued against preclusion in the district court, her appellate briefing is silent on res judicata so she has waived the issue. See Local 15, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Exelon Corp., 495 F.3d 779, 783 (7th Cir. 2007) (arguments raised in the district court but not developed on appeal are waived). Brumfield’s waiver is dispositive in Appeal No. 11-3836; with the res judicata bar in place and unchallenged, the Title I claim is precluded and the judgment is summarily affirmed. That leaves only Appeal No. 11-2265 and Brumfield’s claims under Title II and the Rehabilitation Act. So we cannot avoid the Title II question and turn to it now. Title II of the ADA provides: “[N]o qualified person with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from (...continued) activities’ do not necessarily exclude employment.” Currie v. Grp. Ins. Comm’n, 290 F.3d 1, 6–7 (1st Cir. 2002). 10 Nos. 11-2265 & 11-3836 participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. As used in Title II, the term “qualified individual with a disability” has its own special definition. It means: [A]n individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in pro- grams or activities provided by a public entity. Id. § 12131(2). A “public entity” includes “any State or local government,” and “any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.” Id. § 12131(1)(A)–(B).3 The Attorney General has promulgated a regulation stating that Title II applies to disability discrimination in public employment: “No qualified individual with a disability shall, on the basis of disability, be subjected to discrimination in employment under any service, program, or activity conducted by a public entity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.140(a) (2012). Brumfield argues that we should defer to the Attorney General’s interpre- 3 Though not relevant here, Title II’s definition of “public entity” also includes “the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority (as defined in section 24102(4) of Title 49).” 42 U .S.C. § 12131(1)(C). Nos. 11-2265 & 11-3836 11 tation under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Not so fast. An agency’s interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference if Congress has authorized the agency to interpret the statute through rules carrying the force of law and the agency’s interpretation is both reasonable and promulgated through the exercise of the authority given by Congress. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–29 (2001); see also White v. Scibana, 390 F.3d 997, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004). But we do not address the deference question unless the statute is silent or ambiguous regarding the matter at hand. In other words, Chevron analysis proceeds in two steps. See Emergency Servs. Billing Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 459, 465 (7th Cir. 2012). First, we determine whether the statute is silent or ambiguous on the question at issue—here, whether Title II of the ADA covers discrimination in public employment. If the statute is unambiguous on the question, we give effect to the unambiguous statutory language and the inquiry goes no further. Id. at 465–66. If the statute is silent or ambiguous, the second step is to determine whether the agency has promulgated a reasonable interpretation of the statute; if so, we defer to that interpretation. Id. We conclude that Title II unambiguously does not apply to the employment decisions of state and local governments. To repeat: Title II provides that no eligible disabled person “shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination” by a state or local unit of government. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Our sister 12 Nos. 11-2265 & 11-3836 circuits have helpfully divided § 12132 into two clauses for purposes of analysis: no otherwise eligible individual with a disability may be (1) “excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity” by reason of such disability; or (2) “subjected to discrimination by” a public entity by reason of disability. Id.; accord Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1306; Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1174; Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 821. No circuit has held that the first clause of § 12132 applies to public employment. See Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1306; Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1174; Bledsoe, 133 F.3d at 821–22. This is for good reason: Under the first clause of the statute, eligible disabled persons may not be excluded from “participation in” or denied “the benefits of” the “services, programs, or activities” of state and local government; employment is not ordinarily conceptualized as a “service, program, or activity” of a public entity.4 See Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1306 (“[C]an 4 It is true that “[t]here are two long-standing civil rights laws, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. [§] 1681(a) (1994), under which the phrase ‘program or activity’ has been held to cover employment practices.” Currie, 290 F.3d at 7 n.4 (citing Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U .S. 624, 632–34 (1984); N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 520–35 (1982)). Even assuming that we could consider these uses of the phrase “program or activity” at this step in the Chevron analysis, see Emergency Servs. Billing Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 459, 465–66 (7th Cir. 2012) (reserving the use of “comparative statutes” for the second step of the Chevron analysis), this would not change our view that the phrase “services, programs, and activities” in § 12132’s first clause unambiguously does not refer to em ployment. Congress amended both Title IX and the Rehabilitation Act to confirm the Supreme Court’s broad, early reading of (continued...) Nos. 11-2265 & 11-3836 13 ‘employment’ be described fairly as a service, program, or activity of a public entity … ? We think not.”); Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1174 (“A common understanding of the first clause shows that it applies only to the ‘outputs’ of a public agency, not to ‘inputs’ such as employment.”). We join the emerging consensus and hold that § 12132’s first clause unambiguously does not address itself to disability discrimination in the employment context. Unlike the first clause of § 12132, the second clause more broadly prohibits disability-based “discrimination,” covering all forms of discrimination by state and local governments in (...continued) those statutes. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, secs. 3(a), 4, 102 Stat. 28, 28–29 (1988) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687, 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)) (providing that the phrase “program or activity” refers to “all of the operations of” covered entities in both Title IX and the Rehabilitation Act). Title II of the ADA— which was enacted after those amendments, see ADA, Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. II, 104 Stat. 327, 337 (1990)— contains no similar broad definition for “services, programs, or activities” and thus no basis for reading that phrase in a counterintuitive way. Perhaps our view would be different if the ADA didn’t already prohibit disability discrimination in employment. But as we have noted and will explain more fully later in this opinion, Title I of the ADA covers employ- m ent comprehensively. W hile the Supreme Court may have found it necessary to read Title IX and the Rehabilitation Act broadly in the 1980s in order to effectuate their apparent purposes despite the absence of an explicit reference to employment, there is no similar need to read Title II of the ADA expansively because Title I already covers employment. Cf. Darrone, 465 U.S. at 632 n.13 (“[I]t was unnecessary to extend Title VI [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] more generally to ban employment discrimination, as Title VII [of that act] comprehensively regulates such discrimination.”). 14 Nos. 11-2265 & 11-3836 the provision of public services, programs, or activities, not just the exclusion of disabled persons or the denial of benefits to them. But does this admittedly broader language extend to employment practices? In isolation the second clause of § 12132 might seem ambiguous. But § 12132 does not exist in isolation and cannot be read as if it did. Section 12132 protects only “qualified individual[s] with a disability.” Recall that the phrase “qualified individual with a disability” in Title II refers only to “an individual with a disability who … meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (emphasis added). As the Ninth Circuit has noted, “[o]btaining or retaining a job is not ‘the receipt of services,’ nor is employment a ‘program or activity provided by a public entity.’ ” Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1176 (brackets omitted); see also Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1306. Thus, the class of people who may invoke § 12132’s protection is limited to those eligible to receive or participate in the public entity’s outputs. This leaves two interpretive options. One is to interpret § 12132’s second clause without regard to this context and hold that § 12132 covers all forms of discrimination in state and local governmental operations. Under this approach Title II’s definition of “qualified individual with a disability” would have no bearing on the meaning of “discrimination” in § 12132. Of course, the definition of “qualified individual with a disability” would continue to limit the class of disabled persons eligible to proceed under § 12132. This would mean that the statute covers disabled employees Nos. 11-2265 & 11-3836 15 who also happen to be eligible to receive or participate in their respective employers’ services, programs, or activities. See Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1308 (“[I]f the second clause of § 12132 expanded liability to all of a public entity’s operations, … it would do so only for a limited class of disabled employees—for those who happen to be eligible to participate in an agency’s outputs.”); Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1175. That is a highly unlikely interpretation even when Title II is viewed in isolation, Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1308, and we reject it as unambiguously incorrect. The second, and sensible, way to read Title II’s prohibition against disability-based discrimination is to read it in context and in conjunction with the applicable definition of “qualified individual with a disability.” Since the only people who can invoke the protection of Title II are those who are eligible to receive or participate in the services, programs, or activities offered by state and local governments, the statute’s prohibition against discrimination is properly read to cover all types of disability discrimination in the “outputs” of state and local government—their delivery of public services, programs, and activities to eligible recipients. It does not also cover discrimination in employment relations, which are part of the internal operations of state and local government. This reading is confirmed if we expand our focus and consider Title II in light of the ADA as a whole. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007) (“In making the threshold determination under Chevron, a reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation. Rather, the 16 Nos. 11-2265 & 11-3836 meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” (alteration marks, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted)). The statute should be read to perform a nonredundant role in the broader statutory scheme. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). So read, Title II is clearly inapplicable to employment discrimination because Title I specifically, comprehensively, and exclusively addresses disability discrimination in employment. Unlike Title II, Title I defines “qualified individual” as “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added).5 And it protects these individuals against disabilitybased discrimination “in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” Id. § 12112(a). This provision in Title I—and particularly the final catch-all phrase—covers the waterfront of employment-related claims. 5 Title I of the ADA was amended effective January 1, 2009. Because the amendments do not affect our analysis of the case, we refer throughout to the amended ADA. Nos. 11-2265 & 11-3836 17 Furthermore, Title I provides employment-specific definitions of terms such as “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship,” id. § 12111(9)–(10), lists defenses specific to employers, see id. § 12113, and requires the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission—an agency that administers other statutes relating specifically to employment discrimination—to issue regulations carrying out Title I, see id. § 12116.6 The presence of a comprehensive employment-specific regulatory scheme sitting right next door in Title I confirms our reading 6 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have noted that Title I imposes administrative preconditions to filing suit whereas Title II does not. See Elwell v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 693 F.3d 1303, 1309 (10th Cir. 2012); Zimmerman v. Or. Dep’t of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir. 1990)). This is another textual indicator that Title II does not apply to employment because any other reading would render Title I’s requirements a nullity for employees of public entities that fall within its scope. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We have not previously addressed the question whether Title II imposes similar requirements, and because the parties in this case seem to agree that it doesn’t, we do not address the issue here. Cf. Mary Jo C., 707 F.3d at 170 n.11 (declining to address the issue); Gibson v. West, 201 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing with approval the “general pronouncement” in Charlie F. v. Board of Education of Skokie School District 68, 98 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 1996), that satisfying administrative preconditions in civil-rights cases is not a jurisdictional requirement that we would have a duty to address sua sponte). 18 Nos. 11-2265 & 11-3836 of Title II.7 See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2070–71 (2012) (noting that when Congress has enacted a “comprehensive scheme and has deliberately targeted specific problems with specific solutions,” that scheme will govern over more general statutory language that could be read to cover the same problems (internal quotation marks omitted)); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1310 (explaining that Title I of the ADA should govern over the less-specific Title II on the question of employment discrimination). The Eleventh Circuit arrived at a different conclusion in Bledsoe. See 133 F.3d 816. Like the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, we find its analysis unpersuasive. See Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1183–84; Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1314. The Eleventh Circuit never considered the specific definition of “qualified individual with a disability” found in Title II. Indeed, Bledsoe began its analysis by dismissing Title II’s language as “brief,” noting only that 7 We note as well that there is no requirement that Title I and Title II be implemented in a coordinated fashion Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (requiring the EEOC and the Attorney General to develop procedures ensuring that administrative employment-discrimination complaints filed under Title I and the Rehabilitation Act “are dealt with in a manner that avoids duplication of effort and prevents imposition of inconsistent or conflicting standards for the same requirements”). Nos. 11-2265 & 11-3836 19 § 12132’s last phrase prohibits “all discrimination” by a public entity. 133 F.3d at 821–22. Without further discussion, the court moved immediately to the statute’s legislative history where it found several statements to support the view that Title II prohibits public entities from engaging in employment discrimination. In light of the legislative history, the court found the Attorney General’s regulation worthy of Chevron deference. Id. at 822–23. The Eleventh Circuit also relied heavily on certain dicta in circuit precedent. See id. at 823 (“[W]ithout directly discussing the issue with which this court is presently faced, our court has assumed that Title II covers public employment discrimination.”). Indeed, one member of the panel, “concur[ring] with reluctance,” suggested that the court’s “precedent” had dictated the result. Id. at 825 (Hill, J., concurring specially). We are not similarly constrained. For the foregoing reasons, we join the Ninth and Tenth Circuits and hold that Title II of the ADA does not cover disability-based employment discrimination. Instead, employment-discrimination claims must proceed under Title I of the ADA, which addresses itself specifically to employment discrimination and, among other things, requires the plaintiff to satisfy certain administrative preconditions to filing suit. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a), 2000e-5. Brumfield’s Title II claim was properly dismissed.