Opinion ID: 3015327
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Persecution in Serbia

Text: Because the IJ properly determined that Serbia is Paripovic’s country of last habitual residence, we analyze his asylum and withholding of deportation claims as they relate to that country. To establish eligibility for asylum on the basis of past persecution, an applicant must show, inter alia, an incident (or incidents) that rise to the level of persecution or a wellfounded fear of future persecution. Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Turning first to past persecution, Paripovic contends that the efforts of the military police to conscript him to fight in Croatia is such persecution, but we have explained that it is “generally accepted ‘that a sovereign nation enjoys the right to enforce its laws of conscription, and that penalties for evasion are not considered persecution.’” Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting M.A. v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 312 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc)); see also Ambartsoumian v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[C]conscription by a sovereign nation cannot constitute persecution under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)). In addition, though Paripovic argued before the IJ and BIA that Serbia may forcibly remove him to Croatia, there is little evidence in the record to support this argument, and in any event there is contrary evidence on which the IJ relied. He also determined that the draft was no longer in effect, and this determination has not been challenged before us. Thus, the 14 conclusion that Paripovic neither was persecuted nor has a wellfounded fear of persecution in Serbia is supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, because he failed to establish eligibility for asylum, Paripovic necessarily also failed to meet the more stringent standard for showing a “clear probability of persecution” to be eligible for withholding of deportation. Reynoso-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 275, 278 (3d Cir., 2004) (quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 420 n.13 (1984).5 5 At the January 2002 hearing (at which time his case had been pending for approximately eight years), the IJ denied Paripovic’s last-minute request for continuance due to his expert’s unavailability. In view of the multiple prior continuances, the fact that the IJ had advised Paripovic about the desirability of expert testimony, and the lack of any explanation for why counsel had failed to raise the expert’s unavailability prior to the day of the hearing when he seemingly should have known to do so, we cannot say that the refusal to continue the hearing violated Paripovic’s right to procedural due process. Cf. Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that denial of counsel’s request for continuance and then proceeding with asylum hearing without counsel, where counsel requested continuance only two days before hearing and failed to explain his absence, was not an abuse of discretion). 15