Opinion ID: 1882486
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 38

Heading: mr muhammad was absent from critical stages of his resentencing proceeding. as a result mr. muhammad's rights under the fifth, sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendments to the united states constitution were violated.

Text: The defendant claims that due to his mental illness, he was unable to conduct himself during the trial. The defendant again alleges, as he did in the previous claim that the trial court predetermined that his actions were those of will not mental illness. Issues regarding a denial of a defendant's right to be present are issues that could have and should have been raised on appeal. Vining v. State, 827 So.2d 201, 217 (Fla.2002). As this claim could have and should have been raised on appeal, it is procedurally barred. Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d 1253, 1256 (Fla.1995). Additionally, the claim is meritless. As noted by the Florida Supreme Court, Our review of the record reveals that the trial judge bent over backwards to accord Knight his right to be present in the courtroom. Despite rambling monologues and general obstructionist conduct, the trial judge let Knight return to the courtroom every morning for another opportunity to behave properly and remain for the proceeding. However, without exception, Knight daily refused to obey the judge's instruction that he remain silent until the proper time. The judge was remarkably patient, even allowing a lengthy, uninterrupted monologue by Knight on the second day of voir dire, January 24, 1996. Shortly thereafter, Knight was again removed from the courtroom for refusing to obey the judge's instructions. Even then, the judge resolved to give Knight a daily opportunity to act acceptably in court. [FN 11] FN11. Immediately after Knight's second removal from the courtroom, the following exchange took place between the prosecutor, Mr. Laeser, and the trial judge: Mr. Laeser: I think the first thing that concerns me is whether or not we are going to spend an hour every morning going through the theater of the absurd or whether this proceeding is not going to have the benefit of Mr. Knight on future days. The Court: No. I am afraid that we are going to have to  it was not an hour. I actually counted 25 minutes. I feel obligated to ensure that no other judge is ever going to have to go through this, and I want the defendant here every day. If he can behave and he can announceor it appears that he can behave, we will let him stay. Moreover, the judge's actions were consistent with this Court's case law, as well as United States Supreme Court precedent. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. We believe trail judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case where a defendant disrupts the proceedings); Diaz v. State, 513 So.2d 1045, 1047 (Fla.1987) (applying Allen in finding that the court's obligation to maintain safety and security in the courtroom outweighs, under proper circumstances, the risk that the security measures may impair the defendant's presumption of innocence); accord Joseph v. State, 625 So.2d 109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). Knight, 746 So.2d at 432. The trial court heard the testimony of numerous witnesses regarding the in courtroom behavioral difficulties of the defendant. Based on their testimony, the court found the behavior willful. RST 204-282. Defendant also stated that he wanted to waive his right. This claim is lacking in merit. He was removed from the courtroom based on his own behavior and own willful misconduct. Accordingly, this claim is denied without an evidentiary hearing.