Opinion ID: 1939082
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ficker's Exceptions

Text: Ficker insists that he did not violate DR 6-101(A)(3) in the Daley matter because a single inadvertent failure to appear is not neglect of a legal matter. Nor is his failure to enter his written appearance neglect, he says, because that was not shown to be part of a pattern of neglect. [5] The text for his argument is American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Informal Opinion 1273 (1973). The Committee opined that Neglect involves indifference and a consistent failure to carry out the obligations which the lawyer has assumed to his client or a conscious disregard for the responsibility owed to the client. The concept of ordinary negligence is different. Neglect usually involves more than a single act or omission. Neglect cannot be found if the acts or omissions complained of were inadvertent or the result of an error of judgment made in good faith. Accord, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1428 (1979); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1467 (1981); Informal Opinion 1273 also is cited in R. Rotunda, Professional Responsibility 86 (1988). We have considered the ABA Committee's construction of DR 6-101(A)(3), but decline to follow it. First, it is an advisory opinion given in a vacuum with the conclusion already assumed in the question submitted to the Committee. The opinion responds to this question:  Assume a lawyer has not neglected the matter entrusted to him, is his ordinary negligence involving an affirmative act or omission grounds for disciplinary action? Informal Op. 1273, supra [emphasis supplied]. Second, we already have read DR 6-101(A)(3) more broadly than has the ABA Committee. In Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Montgomery, 296 Md. 113, 460 A.2d 597 (1983), we considered, among other things, a complaint of Gerald McCants. An action brought by Montgomery on behalf of McCants was dismissed at a hearing attended by McCants but not by his lawyer, Montgomery. 296 Md. at 119, 460 A.2d at 600. We concluded that Montgomery was not present in court when the dismissal took place and this alone would constitute neglect. Id. We did not speak of patterns or consistent failure or conscious disregard of responsibility, nor did we suggest that inadvertence might be a defense. We found a single failure to appear to be neglect. We believe Ficker's single failure to appear also was neglect, as was his failure to enter his written appearance. See also Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Myers, 302 Md. 571, 579, 490 A.2d 231, 235 (1985) (single instance of failure to include attestation clause and witness signature lines on will is neglect). Given the duty of zealous representation that a lawyer owes the client, we are not persuaded that a failure to appear caused by poor office practices or simple forgetfulness can never be neglect. Nor are we convinced that inadvertent failure to comply with a mandatory rule like Rule 4-214(a) can never be a violation of DR 6-101(A)(3). [6] Ethical Consideration 6-1 (under Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) directs a lawyer to act with ... proper care in representing clients. Ethical Consideration 6-4 also admonishes a lawyer who has undertaken representation to use proper care to safeguard the interests of his client. Derelictions of the sort involved here can result in serious harm to the client, even when the cause is no more than carelessness. Both Daley and Ficker are fortunate that no major prejudice occurred in this case, but we reject Ficker's argument that a single act of negligence that causes no serious harm is not, as a matter of law, a violation of DR 6-101(A)(3). We agree with Judge Messitte that inadvertence, lack of a persistent pattern of conduct, lack of prejudice to the client, and other such matters more properly pertain to mitigation of any sanction, rather than the fact of violation. See Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Phoebus, 276 Md. 353, 362, 347 A.2d 556, 561 (1975) ([w]here an attorney has been shown to have been negligent, or inattentive to his client's interests ... in violation of the canons ..., the imposition of some disciplinary sanction against him may be warranted; the extent of the discipline to be applied, however, is generally dependent upon the severity of the conduct and the particular facts and circumstances surrounding it). Ficker also insists that his inadvertent failure to be present at Daley's trial cannot be conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5). [7] He argues that to pass constitutional muster the term conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice must be narrowly defined or limited to particularly egregious conduct or conduct flagrantly violative of accepted professional norms. In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 632, 449 A.2d 483, 498 (1982) (citing Committee on Professional Ethics v. Durham, 279 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1979)). Hinds does not hold, however, that DR 1-102(A)(5) would be unconstitutional if not construed as Ficker wishes; it says only that if so construed, the rule is sufficiently definite. More to the point, we have very recently concluded that Rule 1-102(A)(5) is neither facially overbroad nor void for vagueness.... Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Alison, 317 Md. 523, 538, 565 A.2d 660, 667 (1989). There, we pointed out that `[t]he regulation ... applies only to lawyers, who are professionals and have the benefit of guidance provided by case law, court rules and the lore of the profession. In re Snyder, ... 472 U.S. [634] at 645, 105 S.Ct. [2874] at 2881 [86 L.Ed.2d 504 (1985)].' 317 Md. at 538, 565 A.2d at 667 (quoting Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 531, 102 L.Ed.2d 563 (1988)). See also Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Korotki, 318 Md, 646, 667-668, 569 A.2d 1224, 1234-1235 (1990). In that case we upheld DR 2-106, prohibiting excessive fees, against a vagueness challenge. Judge Rodowsky, for the Court, observed that [t]he regulations governing conduct of members of the bar are civil and not criminal and subject to more tolerant scrutiny than an enactment imposing criminal penalties. `All that is necessary is that the [disciplinary] rule prescribe general principles so that those subject to the rule are reasonably able to determine what conduct is appropriate.' 318 Md. at 667, 569 A.2d at 1235 (quoting In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Against N.P., 361 N.W.2d 386, 394 (Minn.), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 976, 106 S.Ct. 375, 88 L.Ed.2d 330 (1985)). Ficker fares no better with his contention that inadvertent failure to appear in court cannot constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Unlike the respondent in Matter of Alexander, 496 A.2d 244, 250 (D.C.App. 1985), a case Ficker relies on, Ficker knew precisely when Daley's trial was to be held and had agreed to be there. His negligent failure to be present at that trial interfered with the orderly disposition of the court's docket; a trial set for 9:00 a.m. had to be postponed until afternoon. We have held that failure to be punctual in a scheduled court appearance is not only detrimental to the administration of justice but also constitute[s] discourteous conduct degrading to the tribunal. Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Howard, 282 Md. 515, 523, 385 A.2d 1191, 1196 (1978). We have held that an attorney who fails to appear punctually at a trial is guilty of a contempt of court. Kandel v. State, 252 Md. 668, 250 A.2d 853 (1969). Misconduct of that sort is a contempt of court because it interferes with the conduct of court business. [A]n attorney plays such an integral role in the judicial process that without his presence the wheels of justice must, necessarily, grind to a halt. The attorney's absence from the courtroom is immediately cognizable by the judge and intrudes upon the operation and dignity of the court. Murphy v. State, 46 Md. App. 138, 146, 416 A.2d 748, 753 (1980). If being late for a scheduled court appearance interferes with the administration of justice, it is obvious that being altogether absent from a scheduled trial does so as well. As in the case of neglect, the circumstances surrounding the failure to appear and the actual consequences of that failure are matters that go to the question of sanction. We overrule Ficker's exceptions to Judge Messitte's conclusions of law in the Daley matter.