Opinion ID: 2797758
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Shelton III Addressed Retroactivity

Text: As just noted, the Plaintiffs contend that Shelton III already determined the retroactive effect to be accorded that decision, and that, if not, we should certify the issue of 2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A); we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Pearson, 775 F.3d at 601. When a district court dismisses on the basis of an affirmative defense, as is the case here, we will affirm only when the defense is “apparent on the face of the complaint” and documents relied on in the complaint. Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 9 retroactivity to the Supreme Court of New Jersey. The Plaintiffs correctly observe that Shelton III contains several passages that suggest the Supreme Court of New Jersey was applying its ruling to the parties before it. For example, when it reformulated the questions of law that we certified, it phrased each new question in terms of whether “Restaurant.com’s coupons” fell within the relevant statutory terms. Shelton III, 70 A.3d at 549. Similarly, it stated that its “task [was] to define ‘property’ in order to determine whether the certificates offered by Restaurant.com are within the scope of the TCCWNA,” id. at 550, “whether the certificates offered by Restaurant.com qualify as property ‘which is primarily for personal, family or household purposes,’” id. at 554, and “whether the coupons or certificates issued by Restaurant.com to plaintiffs are ‘written consumer contract[s]’ or whether the coupons ‘gave or displayed any written consumer warranty, notice or sign,’” id. at 555. Although the court concluded its opinion with a generic summary of its legal rulings, id. at 558-59, it followed that summary with the following case-specific language: Thus, plaintiffs can properly be considered “consumers” within the scope of the TCCWNA because the certificates acquired by them through the Restaurant.com website are property primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. Further, in construing the plain language of the terms of the TCCWNA and the Act’s relationship to the Plain Language Act, we conclude the certificates purchased from Restaurant.com can be considered “consumer contracts[,]” and the standard terms 10 provided on the certificates can be considered “notices” subject to the TCCWNA. Id. at 559. In other words, the court stated, “The statute as drafted … covers the certificates in question.” Id. While Shelton III spoke in terms of the TCCWNA’s application to Restaurant.com, nothing in that opinion expressly addresses the issue of retroactivity. None of New Jersey’s cases on retroactivity are cited, nor is the test for departing from the general rule of retroactivity mentioned. Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs argue that, to the extent Shelton III is silent as to its retroactive effect, its intent is clear and we should presume that the Supreme Court of New Jersey meant for its interpretation of the TCCWNA to be retroactive. New Jersey law suggests that any appellate opinion that considers remedial issues in the course of its analysis, or remands for consideration of such issues, ordinarily contemplates retroactive application to the parties in that case. The Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted that approach when it addressed one of its cases that had been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court: Although the [United States] Supreme Court’s opinion is silent on the issue of retrospective application, the remand to this Court to determine severability and “for further proceedings” carries with it the implicit direction that we determine the relief appropriate to the holding that the [legislation at issue] is partially pre-empted. If the Court conceived that its decision might apply only 11 prospectively, which would significantly affect the remedy we must fashion, it is reasonable to assume that the opinion would at least have adverted to that possibility. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 534 A.2d 1, 7 (N.J. 1987). In the Plaintiffs’ view, that reasoning should guide us here. But it cannot. That reasoning is sound when applicable, but it is plainly not applicable in the context of an opinion given on certification. The Supreme Court of New Jersey was not called upon to directly fashion a remedy or resolve the Plaintiffs’ case. Nor did it sit as an appellate tribunal reviewing a decision of the federal courts and remanding for a determination of the appropriate remedy. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.) (defining appellate jurisdiction as “the revision of a decision of an inferior court”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (“It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted … .”). As the New Jersey Supreme Court itself put it in Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, “[t]he purpose of the certification process is to answer the question of law submitted pursuant to [New Jersey Rule of Court] 2:12A, not to resolve … factual differences.” 912 A.2d 104, 108 (N.J. 2006). In Delta Funding, the court addressed how the facts of that case interacted with the legal principles governing arbitration agreements, id. at 111-12, but it clarified that it did so in furtherance of its effort to “identify general principles of New Jersey contract law that the Third Circuit and the arbitrator can then apply to the agreement.” Id. at 110. 12 Certified questions should be such as to “control the outcome of a case pending in the federal court.” L.A.R. 110.1; see also N.J. R. 2:12A-1 (providing that the Supreme Court of New Jersey has authority to accept a certified question from our court “if the answer may be determinative of an issue in litigation pending in the Third Circuit”). But there is a distinction between deciding a controlling legal issue and resolving a dispute. In answering the certified question, the Supreme Court of New Jersey was not applying the law to the facts of this case in the sense that it was resolving a dispute among litigants. That can only be done by a court with jurisdiction over the dispute itself, and jurisdiction, coupled with the mutual respect inherent in the seeking and granting of certification of a controlling question of law, circumscribes the opinion rendered. The Supreme Court of Utah has insightfully provided a state-court perspective on the process: We routinely refer to surrounding facts and circumstances not just to set the stage for our resolution of questions certified by federal courts, but also to illustrate the application of our answer in the context of the case. That is not to say that our opinion on certification will itself resolve the underlying federal case. The resolution of the parties’ competing claims and arguments will be up to the federal courts, which of course retain jurisdiction to decide this case under the law as they see it. … Those courts retain the independent authority to decide whether and to 13 what extent to apply our law or to recognize limitations on or caveats to it. Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Horne, 289 P.3d 502, 505-06 (Utah 2012) (Lee, J.) (footnote and paragraph numbering omitted)); cf. Nemours Found. v. Manganaro Corp., 878 F.2d 98, 101 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that an order of the district court certifying a question to the Delaware Supreme Court “does not mean the effective end of the federal litigation. Further proceedings, including possibly a trial on the merits, will be held in the district court after the Delaware Supreme Court either answers the certified questions or declines to accept them.”). Thus, despite the Plaintiffs’ insistence to the contrary, Shelton III could not and did not adjudicate the question of retroactivity, and we doubt that the New Jersey Supreme Court intended any such thing. We also doubt the wisdom of returning to that court with the question of retroactivity. We have already imposed upon it once in this case, and it graciously answered our call for help in clarifying the scope of the TCCWNA. We are no longer faced with a “[n]ovel, unsettled question[] of state law,” which is a prerequisite for certification. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79 (1997). Certification would be inappropriate here – indeed, it would serve no purpose – because the requirements of New Jersey law on the issue of retroactivity are clear. All that remains is to apply them to the acknowledged facts. It appears that, in essence, the Plaintiffs are attempting to escape the effect of the removal of their case to federal court and would like to have the Supreme Court of New Jersey adjudicate the matter. They chose a state forum in the first instance, so their efforts 14 are perhaps understandable, but we are not free to shirk our responsibility to decide what is properly before us.