Opinion ID: 2174863
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Summary JudgmentWrongful Discharge

Text: We have divided our analysis of the summary judgment portion of this case into the medical malpractice section and the claims arising from the allegations of wrongful discharge. We have already reversed the summary judgment as to the medical malpractice issues and now consider the wrongful discharge portion. It has long been held that CR 56.03 provides that summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A well-supported motion for summary judgment can terminate litigation when, as a matter of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the responding party to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in its favor. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991); see also Paintsville Hospital v. Rose, Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985). It should be noted that this Court in Welch v. American Publishing Co., Ky., 3 S.W.3d 724 (1999), clarified the situation by stating that Steelvest did not repeal CR 56. Here, there is no evidence in the record which support the argument that the hospital retaliated against Wymer by discharging her for pursuing the workers' compensation claim. Clearly, KRS 342.197 protects workers from being harassed, coerced, discharged or discriminated against for pursuing a workers' compensation claim in this type of situation. The party opposing summary judgment cannot rely on their own claims or arguments without significant evidence in order to prevent a summary judgment. See Harker v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville, Ky., 679 S.W.2d 226 (1984), an age discrimination case in which the specific issue was whether the circuit court committed reversible error in ruling there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. All doubts must be resolved against the movant. In this case, the evidence demonstrates that the hospital terminated the employment of Wymer on the basis that she could no longer perform the duties of her position as an operating room technician. Her work related shoulder-injuries limited her ability to perform certain physical tasks which were essential to the operating room duties. Wymer admitted that there was no available position which she could perform. Wymer was terminated because she could not work and not because she was disabled. The record indicates that Wymer could not perform the essential duties of any position within the hospital system, with or without reasonable accommodation. Reasonable accommodation does not include creating a new job. See Magel v. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 776 F.Supp. 200 (E.D.Pa.1991), affirmed in 5 F.3d 1490 (3rd Cir.1993) . The United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that an employer has no obligation under disability discrimination to accommodate a disabled person beyond reasonable accommodation. Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriff's Dept., 227 F.3d 719 (6th Cir.2000). In addition, there is no evidence in the record to support the claim that her employment was terminated because she filed a medical negligence lawsuit against the hospital. See Boykins, supra . The circuit court properly granted the summary judgment with regard to claims of false light, intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrage, fraud, promissory estoppel and defamation. The trial court properly dismissed the claim for breach of implied contract resulting from her termination because she was an at-will employee and thus the hospital could terminate her at any time. Her discharge was not for refusal to break the law or for exercising her employment related rights. Accordingly, this Court affirms so much of the Court of Appeals decision as relates to the employment at-will termination and the claims arising from such termination. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court regarding the dismissal of medical malpractice claims is reversed and the matter is remanded to the circuit court for trial or other appropriate disposition. LAMBERT, C.J., GRAVES, KELLER, STUMBO and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur. COOPER, J., files a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which JOHNSTONE, J., joins.