Opinion ID: 2428819
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Constitutionality of Tennessee Death Penalty Statute

Text: Out of an abundance of caution the Defendant has raised six issues challenging the constitutionality of the Tennessee Death Penalty Statute upon various grounds, all of which have been previously determined by this Court. The first contention is that the shall language of the statute in T.C.A. § 39-2-203(f) and (g) violates Article I, § 19 of the Tennessee Constitution. This argument was recently rejected in State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1991). The Defendant's next contention is that the death penalty, as applied in Tennessee, is cruel and unusual punishment under both the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. Defendant asks this Court to adopt the dissent of Justice Brock in State v. Dicks, 615 S.W.2d 126, 132-142 (Tenn. 1981). A similar argument was made in Black, 815 S.W.2d at 188-91, and a majority of this Court found no violation of either the state or federal constitution. The Defendant avers that T.C.A. § 39-2-203 places the burden of proof on the Defendant to prove that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances. This proposition has previously been considered and rejected in State v. Thompson, 768 S.W.2d 239, 251-252 (Tenn. 1989), and State v. Boyd, 797 S.W.2d 589, 595-596 (Tenn. 1990). The Defendant alleges that the statute impermissibly interferes with the jury's discretion by creating a presumption of death. The statute specifically requires that the jury return a sentence of life imprisonment if it determines that no statutory aggravating circumstances have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, or that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt but said circumstance or circumstances are outweighed by one or more mitigating circumstances. T.C.A. § 39-2-203(f). The statute authorizes the jury to return a sentence of death only if the jury finds that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt are not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances. T.C.A. § 39-2-203(g). There is no merit to this issue. See State v. Boyd, 797 S.W.2d 589, 596-597 (Tenn. 1990). The Defendant's next contention is that the Tennessee Death Penalty Statute is unconstitutional because it fails to apply the reasonable doubt standard to the sentencing determination. This claimed defect is not constitutionally mandated. The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of weighing statutes such as the one adopted by Tennessee. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976); and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976); see also State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 20-21 (Tenn. 1990). The Defendant next complains that the Tennessee Death Penalty Statute does not sufficiently narrow the class of persons eligible for the death sentence in the case of felony murder. This Court recently addressed this issue in Statute v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn. 1992), and upheld the validity of the death penalty under the felony murder statute. A majority of the Court, however, found that T.C.A. §§ 39-2-203(i)(7) (1982) and 39-13-204(i)(7) (1991) do not narrow the class of death eligible murderers sufficiently under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution by using felony murder as an aggravating circumstance and thereby duplicating the elements of the offense. The Court held that it would simply require that an aggravating circumstance other than that in (i)(7) support the death penalty for a felony murder. In this case the jury found two aggravating circumstances neither of which were (i)(7).