Opinion ID: 2319115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Standard for Disability Benefits

Text: When the Superior Court acts as an intermediate tribunal, we directly review the board's decision for error of law, abuse of discretion, or findings not supported by substantial evidence in the record. WLH Mgt. Corp. v. Town of Kittery, 639 A.2d 108, 109 (Me.1994). The primary issue for us is one of lawstatutory interpretation. As a general rule, an administrative agency's construction of its own statute is entitled to deference. Porter v. Maine State Retirement System, 609 A.2d 1146, 1149 (Me.1992) (interpretation by agency upheld unless the statute plainly compels a contrary result); Imagineering, Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 593 A.2d 1050, 1053 (Me.1991). We look first to the language of the statute to ascertain the legislative intent. Robinson v. Board of Trustees of the Maine State Retirement System, 523 A.2d 1376, 1379 (Me. 1987). The statute at issue reads: Upon the filing, with the board of trustees, of an application by a member in service or by his department head, and upon the determination by the board of trustees that he has incurred disability as the result of injuries received in the line of duty, any member may be retired on a disability retirement allowance ... provided the medical board, after a medical examination of such member, shall certify that the member is mentally or physically incapacitated for further performance of duty, that such incapacity is likely to be permanent and that he should be retired. 5 M.R.S.A. § 1122(2)(A) (1964) (emphasis added). The question is whether the Board could reasonably interpret the statute to require that Carr be evaluated to determine his capacity to perform his duties as a vehicle maintenance supervisor. According to Carr, the plain language shows that performance of duty must be linked to in the line of duty, so that the statute requires that he be evaluated as a public safety officerthe line of duty in which he was injured. The City argues that the plain language is on their side: Carr incurred his disability while acting as a vehicle maintenance supervisor, and it is unreasonable to evaluate Carr based on a job he has not held for more than twelve years. The Board portrays the statute as ambiguous, and argues that its interpretation is reasonable and therefore entitled to deference by the courts. When interpreting a statute, we consider the structure of the entire statutory system. Robinson, 523 A.2d at 1379. Our interpretation must be consistent with the overall structure of the retirement statute and with the Legislature's intent. Id. The statute [2] recognizes two types of disability (1) non-line of duty; and (2) line of duty. 5 M.R.S.A. § 1122. The phrasing disability as the result of injuries received in the line of duty creates a distinction from disability as a result of injuries not received in the line of duty, in which case only members with at least ten years service are eligible for disability benefits. 5 M.R.S.A. § 1122(1)(A). Line-of-duty disability benefits are available to any memberi.e., regardless of length of service. 5 M.R.S.A. § 1122(2)(A). The phrase line of duty is therefore distinct from the performance of duty referred to in the latter half of the section. The line of duty phrasing is concerned with the eligibility of an employee for benefits; to be eligible, an employee must either have served ten years or be injured in the line of duty. In contrast, the phrase incapacitated for further performance of duty defines the requisite severity of an eligible employee's incapacity. The concepts are separate. Carr's interpretation severs the word duty in each sentence from the other words in the sentence in order to create an identical meaning in both places. His position is unpersuasive. See State v. Leonard, 470 A.2d 1262, 1264 (Me.1984) (attach meaning to all the words in the statute). The statute further provides that any member retired on disability must undergo an annual physical examination for the first five years after retirement, and once every three years thereafter. 5 M.R.S.A. § 1122(3). If the medical board and board of trustees certify that the beneficiary is able to engage in a gainful occupation paying more than the difference between his retirement allowance and his average final compensation at retirement then the retirement benefits shall be reduced. 5 M.R.S.A. § 1122(4). This section undermines Carr's contention that the Board's interpretation would discourage employees from seeking work; the statute already requires that employees seek work if they are able to do so. In light of the overall ambiguity in the statute with regard to how to handle Carr's unique situation, the provision for follow-up physical examinations supports the Board's interpretation of the statute. Carr seeks to base his disability evaluation on a job that he has not held since 1978. Plainly, the Legislature intended that a disabled employee be re-evaluated periodically for ability to engage in a gainful occupation, not for ability to perform the duties that the employee performed at the time of the original injury. The purpose of disability retirement is to provide replacement wages during a period of incapacity, and benefits are meant to terminate with the end of the worker's incapacity. Dishon v. Maine State Retirement System, 569 A.2d 1216, 1217 (Me.1990). Carr's proposed interpretation of the statute would base a worker's right to benefits on his ability to perform a single occupation, and not on that worker's ability to support himself in general. That interpretation does not comport with the overall legislative intent. The statute also provides that a worker's retirement allowance ceases when the worker is restored to service, and his earnings exceed his retirement benefits. 5 M.R.S.A. § 1123. Although the record is unclear with regard to the relationship between Carr's earnings as a vehicle maintenance supervisor and his disability benefits if retired as a public safety officer, this statutory provision supports the interpretation by the Board. The Board found that Carr had made a clear and definite break with his former position. That finding makes sense, particularly in light of the statute's explicit provision that a worker who returns to work and earns more than his retirement allowance severs himself from that allowance. Although Carr remained in service to the City, he long ago left the light-duty position created to return him to the workforce after his injury as a public safety officer. In fact, in the intervening twelve years, Carr twice applied for and received an entirely different position with the City. The original determination by the Boardthat Carr made a clear and definite break in his employmentunder the unique circumstances of this case is a reasonable interpretation of the statute. We therefore direct the Superior Court to affirm the Board's decision.