Opinion ID: 2010761
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Heading: Juvenile Delinquency Adjudication as Basis for Forfeiture.

Text: Under Iowa Code section 809A.3, [t]he following conduct may give rise to forfeiture: 1. An act or omission which is a public offense and which is a serious or aggravated misdemeanor or felony. Terrell argues that he was adjudicated a delinquent under Iowa Code chapter 232; he was not found guilty of a misdemeanor or felony under section 809A.3(1). The statute is therefore inapplicable on its face, according to him. He relies on Iowa Code section 232.55, which states a delinquency adjudication shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime. The district court rejected this argument and ruled that chapter 809A applies to juvenile as well as adult conduct and does not require a conviction. While Terrell contends his adjudication as a delinquent does not amount to a conviction, it is clear a conviction is not required in order to forfeit. See Iowa Code § 809A.12(14) (An acquittal or dismissal in a criminal proceeding shall not preclude civil proceedings under this chapter.). Attempted third-degree burglary and possession of burglary's tools are both aggravated misdemeanors. See Iowa Code §§ 713.6B, 713.7. Therefore, Terrell's acts are sufficient bases for forfeiture, even though he was processed in a manner different from adult prosecutions because of his age. We believe it is the nature of the acts committed by the offender, not the forum (adult or juvenile court) in which the offender is prosecuted, that we look to under section 809A.3 to determine if forfeiture is authorized. Other states have applied forfeiture statutes in juvenile cases. See, e.g., People ex rel. Burmila v. One 1983 Oldsmobile, 239 Ill.App.3d 1011, 180 Ill.Dec. 417, 607 N.E.2d 311, 313 (1993) (holding only issue is whether the forfeitable property was used in the commission of the offense; juvenile status not determinative). The Nevada Supreme Court observed: We see no reason why juveniles need to be protected from this incidental adverse result. Our court system is more lenient with juveniles because they lack life experience, and because youth is a formative time that should not be spent paying for past crimes. However, the punitive result of forfeiture does not deprive the former owner of time or of life experience. Instead, it plainly teaches that crime does not pay. City of Sparks Police Dep't v. Nason, 107 Nev. 202, 807 P.2d 1389, 1390 (1991). For the reasons discussed, Terrell's conduct, even though it was prosecuted in juvenile court, was an act or omission which is a public offense covered by Iowa Code section 809A.3 and therefore a proper basis for forfeiture. Terrell does not challenge the nexus between the use of his vehicle and the commission of the offenses under Iowa Code section 809A.4(2)(a)(2) (property [u]sed or intended to be used in any manner or part to facilitate conduct giving rise to forfeiture may be forfeited). We reject Terrell's argument that the forfeiture statute is inapplicable on its face and proceed to the second issue: whether forfeiture may constitutionally be applied under these facts.