Opinion ID: 845581
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The First Amendment and a Trial Court's Ability to Restrict Speech

Text: The First Amendment guarantees that the freedom of speech shall not be abridged. It states: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. [U.S. Const., Am. I.] In Gentile, the United States Supreme Court addressed the standard governing the state's ability to discipline an attorney under an ethical rule that is identical in all relevant respects to MRPC 3.6, regarding speech about parties or proceedings in which an attorney is involved. The Court rejected the petitioner attorney's claim that he should be held to the clear and present danger standard applicable to the press, and concluded that the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for regulation of the press. Gentile, supra at 1074, 111 S.Ct. 2720. The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, explained: We agree with the majority of the States that the substantial likelihood of material prejudice standard constitutes a constitutionally permissible balance between the First Amendment rights of attorneys in pending cases and the State's interest in fair trials. When a state regulation implicates First Amendment rights, the Court must balance those interests against the State's legitimate interest in regulating the activity in question. The substantial likelihood test ... is constitutional... for it is designed to protect the integrity and fairness of a state's judicial system and it imposes only narrow and necessary limitations on lawyers' speech. The limitations are aimed at two principal evils: (1) comments that are likely to influence the actual outcome of the trial, and (2) comments that are likely to prejudice the jury venire, even if an untainted panel can ultimately be found. [ Id. at 1075, 111 S.Ct. 2720 (emphasis added).] The Court noted that [l]awyers representing clients in pending cases are key participants in the criminal justice system, and the State may demand some adherence to the precepts of that system in regulating their speech as well as their conduct. Id. at 1074, 111 S.Ct. 2720. The Court further observed that [f]ew, if any, interests under the Constitution are more fundamental than the right to a fair trial by `impartial' jurors, and an outcome affected by extrajudicial statements would violate that fundamental right. Id. at 1075, 111 S.Ct. 2720. Judge Giovan, after reviewing Gentile, found a substantial likelihood of prejudice: More important, however, is that the plaintiff should not be heard to make her argument, which goes like this: We deny that our behavior was intended to have a substantial likelihood of prejudice. But even if you establish that it was, you cannot dismiss the plaintiff's case until you establish that it has achieved its intended effect. We believe otherwise. That is not an acceptable standard for preserving the integrity of a court system. The behavior in question has been intentional, premeditated, and intransigent. It was designed to reach the farthest boundaries of the public consciousness. It should be presumed to have had its intended effect. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the applicable test under Gentile is whether the conduct generated a substantial likelihood of prejudice, yet remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether actual prejudice occurred. We hereby affirm the trial court's understanding of Gentile. Plaintiff's and her counsel's numerous public references to Bennett's inadmissible, expunged indecent exposure conviction, despite a court order excluding such evidence, were obviously intended to prejudice potential jurors. The trial court thus warned the parties and counsel that all public references to the expunged conviction in violation of the ethical rules would result in dismissal. This limitation on plaintiff's and her counsel's speech only applied to speech that was substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial effect and that, therefore, violated the rules of ethics. It did not prohibit plaintiff and her counsel from speaking about sexual harassment or the general nature of plaintiff's case. Judge Giovan, at the dismissal hearing, acknowledged the importance of upholding the First Amendment and drew a distinction between protected speech and speech merely designed to thwart the judicial process. He stated to defense counsel: Well, now, before we move further, I think you understand that we need to draw a distinction between a party's willingness and right to disseminate to the public their ideas of how they've been unjustly treated and the like, and even criticism of the Court as opposed to what's really at stake here, and that is efforts to thwart the judicial system, and that is to disseminate, for example, excluded evidence and evidence forbidden to be disseminated by statute, which you have referred to. But nevertheless, you do need to differentiate between those two things. The rules of evidence are designed to ensure fairness in the administration of justice, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the growth and development of the law of evidence. MRE 102. Judge Macdonald's exclusion of Bennett's expunged conviction was based on the rules of evidence. She specifically relied on MRE 404(b) in excluding the evidence, determining that the evidence would not be offered for any purpose other than to show Bennett's propensity to conduct himself in this manner. Judge Macdonald further relied on MRE 403 to determine that, even if the evidence were relevant, its undue prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value in light of the availability of alternative means of proof. Judge Macdonald's ruling, and Judge Giovan's subsequent limitation on plaintiff's and her counsel's speech, was in accord with the purpose of the evidentiary rules. Moreover, the rulings were necessary to protect defendants' fundamental right to a fair trial and were directly aimed at protecting potential jurors from prejudice. As the United States Supreme Court noted in the Gentile case, few, if any, interests are more fundamental than the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. Plaintiff stated that nothing would deter her from continuing to publicize Bennett's expunged conviction, and that she would post it on the Internet if she could. Additionally, plaintiff's counsel, despite court orders, publicly divulged information regarding the excluded expunged conviction. Judge Giovan merely exercised his `affirmative constitutional duty' to minimize the potential for prejudicial pretrial publicity, United States v. Koubriti, 307 F.Supp.2d 891, 897 (E.D.Mich., 2004), quoting Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979), in dismissing plaintiff's case, and did not violate the First Amendment in doing so. The Court of Appeals requirement that actual prejudice be shown conflicts not only with the substantial likelihood test set forth in Gentile, but also with the plain language of MRPC 3.6. Moreover, the Court of Appeals standard has no practical workability. It would be impossible to determine actual prejudice to a potential jury pool three years after the incident in question. We decline to order an evidentiary hearing that is no more than a fool's errand. The trial court narrowly tailored a restriction on plaintiff's and her counsel's speech consonant with the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct. The trial court's limitation on plaintiff's and her counsel's speech was narrowly tailored and necessary to prevent prejudice to the potential jury pool and did not violate the First Amendment.