Opinion ID: 2784335
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Aisles

Text: Applying the interpretive aids just summarized, we conclude, as did the district court, that the obstructed aisles Chapman encountered while visiting the Store were not “isolated or temporary interruptions in . . . access” under 28 C.F.R. § 36.211(b). Chapman encountered several obstructed and blocked aisles on each of eleven separate visits to the Store in 2011 and 2012. The photographs Chapman submitted with his declaration depict a number of aisles that contain merchandise or other items, resulting in a functional width measurably less than the 36 inches required under the ADAAG. Many of the aisles appear inaccessible due to the presence of large items, such as furniture (armchairs and tables), or display racks holding merchandise and ladders. Some of the aisles blocked to wheelchair users would have 14 CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS been accessible to nondisabled customers, who could have walked around or along the side of the blockage. Additionally, Card’s expert report notes that when he visited the Store — on a different day than Chapman’s visits — he “witnessed a number of aisles blocked by merchandise or reduced in width below 36 inches.” The photographs Card took during his November 3, 2011, inspection confirm that some of the aisles were blocked to wheelchair users. To dispute this evidence, Pier 1 submitted, first, an expert report. The report states that, on two inspections of the Store in October and November 2011, the “aisles throughout the store were the required minimum 36” wide and clear of goods,” and that the expert was “able to navigate the aisles in [his] electric Invacare wheelchair.” That the Store’s aisles were clear on two visits by Pier 1’s expert does not create a triable issue of fact as to the state of the aisles on the eleven occasions when Chapman visited the Store in 2011 and 2012. If those occasions are sufficient to demonstrate noncompliance with the ADA — as we ultimately conclude they are — it does not matter that there was compliance on two occasions when Pier 1’s hired expert inspected the Store. Pier 1’s other factual submission in support of its summary judgment motion is the Snow Declaration. That Declaration, Pier 1 maintains, shows that the Store had “policies and procedures” in place to ensure that the aisles remained unobstructed by merchandise, and so “undisputably established that any items that were in the aisles or on the CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS 15 accessible check-out counter were ‘transitory’ or ‘in transit’ to their proper location.”7 The existence of policies designed to limit obstructions does not establish that the obstructions that Chapman encountered were “temporary.” Instead, Chapman’s evidence demonstrates that these policies and procedures were either ineffective in preventing frequent blocking of the aisles or honored in the breach. Moreover, as the district court observed, “the Snow Declaration . . . did not ascribe the aisle blockages to merchandise stocking,” but to the fact that any obstructions would be moved on request or in time. The DOJ interpretive authorities make clear that the presence of items in aisles is not “temporary” for the purposes of § 36.211(b) just because the obstructing items in the aisles were placed there by customers and would have been moved on request or eventually. The presence of blocking items was fairly frequent during Chapman’s visits to the Store, not a single or isolated occurrence. Nor is there any indication that the interruption of access was “due to maintenance or repairs,” id.; Manual § III-3.7000, or occurred in the course of moving the items from one place to another, or during re-stocking, see 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,270; 73 Fed. Reg. at 34,523. We note in this connection that given its frequency, the aisle access problem must be viewed systemically, not as a series of individual barriers to access. Removing one 7 The district court excluded the Snow Declaration from consideration on summary judgment. As we would affirm the grant of summary judgment to Chapman with or without the Snow Declaration, we do not consider whether the exclusion was an abuse of discretion. 16 CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS obstructing object does not assure accessible aisles where it is likely that soon thereafter another item will be moved and create a blockage. Thus, the evidence that Chapman encountered “repeated and persistent failures” in accessing the aisles, Manual § III-3.7000, confirms that the Store failed to remedy the problem “promptly,” — that is, within a “reasonable period of time,” 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,562 — rendering its maintenance “improper or inadequate.” Manual § III-3.7000. To be sure, the “regulations implementing the ADA do not contemplate perfect service.” Midgett v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist. of Or., 254 F.3d 846, 849 (9th Cir. 2001). Consequently, “an isolated or temporary hindrance to access does not give rise to a claim under the ADA.” Gilkerson v. Chasewood Bank, 1 F. Supp. 3d 570, 589 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (citing cases). But the cases so holding have generally concerned truly isolated failures to maintain readily accessible facilities. Foley v. City of Lafayette, Ind., 359 F.3d 925 (7th Cir. 2004), for example, addressed a plaintiff’s claim that a train station’s failure to clear snow from ramps and repair an elevator after a weekend of significant snowfall violated the ADA. Noting that the “train station is, in the normal course of operation, fully accessible to individuals with disabilities,” Foley determined that the single “weather-related breakdown of elevator service” at issue was not a violation of the ADA. Id. at 928–30. In so holding, the Seventh Circuit explained that “given the conditions, [the elevator] was repaired promptly,” and that “there was no evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that other disabled persons were denied access because of frequent elevator breakdowns.” Id. at 930; see also Tanner v. Wal-Mart Stores, CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS 17 Inc., No. 99-44-JD, 2000 WL 620425, at  (D.N.H. Feb. 8, 2000) (holding that a store’s single “failure to remove shopping carts and failure to properly remove ice and snow from [a] handicapped parking space does not constitute a Title III violation”). Likewise, Sharp v. Capitol City Brewing Co., LLC, 680 F. Supp. 2d 51, 59 (D.D.C. 2010), denied the plaintiff’s ADA claim based on an empty ADA-compliant toilet paper dispenser encountered on a single visit to the defendant restaurant. The court held that the plaintiff “failed to show that this one instance of the dispenser being empty was anything more than an ‘isolated or temporary interruption[ ] in . . . access.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.211(b)). Here, in contrast, the evidence demonstrates that Pier 1 repeatedly failed to maintain accessible routes in its Store. Furthermore, while the defendant did not cause the obstruction of access in Foley, at least some of the obstructions here appear to have resulted from the affirmative actions of Pier 1 and its employees. For example, the large step ladders obstructing the aisles on Chapman’s visits, were almost surely placed there by the Store’s staff rather than by customers. See also Madden v. Del Taco, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 320 (2007) (holding that a restaurant’s placement of a concrete trash container on entrance ramp, which “appear[ed] to be a result of the affirmative conduct of [defendant],” was not exempted under § 36.211(b)). In sum, Chapman’s evidence establishes that the barriers he repeatedly encountered in the Store’s aisles were not “temporary” within the meaning of § 36.211(b). We therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment to Chapman on his claim that the Store failed to maintain readily18 CHAPMAN V. PIER 1 IMPORTS accessible aisles, and affirm the denial of summary judgment to Pier 1.