Opinion ID: 1135208
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in denying CMG's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on the theory of vicarious liability for CMG's employee's actions.

Text: ¶ 12. In its motion to dismiss, CMG argues that Robert cannot be granted relief against it based on the theory of vicarious liability. The trial court found that a jury should determine whether Dr. Freeman's actions were within the course and scope of his employment, such that Robert could maintain a claim for vicarious liability against CMG. Although these determinations can be highly fact sensitive, some actions are so clearly beyond an employee's course and scope of employment that they cannot form the basis for a claim of vicarious liability, as a matter of law. ¶ 13. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the master is liable for the acts of his servant which are done in the course of his employment and in furtherance of the master's business. Sandifer Oil Co. v. Dew, 220 Miss. 609, 630, 71 So.2d 752, 758 (1954). Under Section 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency: (1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master. (2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958); see also Commercial Bank v. Hearn, 923 So.2d 202, 208 (Miss.2006). If an employee deviates or departs from his work to accomplish some purpose of his own not connected with his employment  goes on a `frolic of his own'  the relation of master and servant is thereby temporarily suspended, and the employer is not vicariously liable. Seedkem S., Inc. v. Lee, 391 So.2d 990, 995 (Miss.1980) (citations omitted). See also Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church, 884 So.2d 747, 756 (Miss.2004) (as a matter of law, church not vicariously liable for priest's surreptitious taping of counseling session with parishioner); Gulledge v. Shaw, 880 So.2d 288, 295 (Miss.2004) (as a matter of law, bank not vicariously liable for employee's knowing notarization of forged signature); Adams v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 831 So.2d 1156, 1159 (Miss.2002) (as a matter of law, theater not vicariously liable for assault on movie patron). ¶ 14. In Cockrell v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply District, 865 So.2d 357, 362 (Miss.2004), this Court held that a law enforcement officer was outside the scope of his employment when he made romantic advances toward an arrestee. In L.T. v. City of Jackson, 145 F.Supp.2d 750, 757 (S.D.Miss.2000), the district court found that a security guard who stopped the female plaintiff in his capacity as a city police officer and had sex with the woman in exchange for letting her go with a warning was acting outside the course and scope of his employment. ¶ 15. Other jurisdictions have specifically found that an employee's affair with a coworker is beyond the course and scope of employment. In Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court considered a situation in which a jilted husband sued the employer of his wife's paramour. The court found that the employee's romantic advances were so clearly outside the scope of his employment that reasonable minds cannot differ. Id. at 1391. See also Mercier v. Daniels, 139 N.C.App. 588, 533 S.E.2d 877, 881 (2000) (no vicarious liability where workplace affair in no way furthered the business of the employer). ¶ 16. The question we must consider is whether Robert can prove any set of facts showing Dr. Freeman's alleged consensual sexual relationship with Robert's wife was within the course and scope of his employment with CMG. We find no such showing can be made. The comment to Section 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency explains that not all physical acts of the kind authorized performed within the time and at the place of service are within the scope of employment, since only those which the servant does in some part for the purpose of giving service to the master are included.  Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 cmt. a (emphasis added). It defies reason to argue that engaging in an affair at work or during working hours in any way furthered the business interests of CMG or enhanced the medical care of CMG's pediatric patients. ¶ 17. The trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that a claim was stated as to whether Dr. Freeman, in having an alleged consensual affair with a coworker, was acting within the course and scope of his employment with CMG. Robert can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to recover against CMG under a theory of vicarious liability. Therefore, we find the trial court should have granted CMG's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss this theory.