Opinion ID: 2538693
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: mayans' argument

Text: Mayans now contends, for the first time, that the transfer of funds from his legislative campaign committee to his mayoral campaign committee was not a contribution. We note that in the district court and in the Court of Appeals, Mayans' position was that this transfer was a contribution. He thus raises a new legal theory for the first time on appeal. Generally, parties may not raise a new legal theory for the first time on appeal. Jarboe v. Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 262 Kan. 615, 622, 938 P.2d 1293 (1997). In Jarboe, this court recognized three exceptions to the general rule: `(1) Cases where the newly asserted theory involves only a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and which is finally determinative of the case; `(2) Questions raised for the first time on appeal if consideration of the same is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent denial of fundamental rights; and `(3) That a judgment of a trial court may be upheld on appeal even though that court may have relied on the wrong ground or assigned a wrong reason for its decision. [Citation omitted.]' 262 Kan. at 622-23. We will review Mayans' claims because consideration of the issue is necessary to serve the ends of justice. Mayans' contention is, and the Commission agrees, that the Campaign Finance Act and the related Kansas Administrative Regulations do not consider the transfer of funds between different and diverse campaign committees to be a contribution. Resolution of this issue requires the interpretation of the Campaign Finance Act and the related administrative regulations. Generally, administrative regulations have the force and effect of statutes. Jones v. The Grain Club, 227 Kan. 148, 150, 605 P.2d 142 (1980). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this court exercises de novo review. Matjasich v. Kansas Dept. of Human Resources, 271 Kan. 246, 250-51, 21 P.3d 985 (2001). In Matjasich, we stated: Although an appellate court gives deference to the agency's interpretation of a statute, the final construction of a statute lies with the appellate court, and the agency's interpretation, while persuasive, is not binding on the court. 271 Kan. at 250. The fundamental rule for statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be determined. The legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the language in the statutory scheme. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the legislative intent as it was expressed rather than determine what the law should or should not be. Williamson v. City of Hays, 275 Kan. 300, 305, 64 P.3d 364 (2003). Courts, however, are not limited to examining the language of the statute alone but may also consider the causes that impel the statute's adoption, the statute's objective, the historical background, and the effect of the statute under various constructions. Bell v. Simon, 246 Kan. 473, 476, 790 P.2d 925 (1990). In addition to considering the language and the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the statute, this court must consider the various provisions of an act together with a view of reconciling and harmonizing the provisions if possible. See KPERS v. Reimer & Koger Assocs., Inc., 262 Kan. 635, 643-44, 941 P.2d 1321 (1997). As a general rule, statutes should be interpreted to avoid unreasonable results. In re M.R., 272 Kan. 1335, 1342, 38 P.3d 694 (2002). Mayans contends that K.A.R. 19-22-1 supports his position that the transfer of funds from his legislative campaign account to his mayoral campaign account is not a contribution. K.A.R. 19-22-1(a) provides in part: [T]he carryover of funds or inventory by a candidate, candidate committee, party committee or political committee from one election period to another or the transfer thereof to a bona fide successor committee or candidacy does not constitute a contribution. (Emphasis added.) K.A.R. 19-22-1(b), however, provides: Transfer of funds. Except as provided in subsection (a), the transfer of funds between any two (2) or more candidates, candidate committees, party committees or political committees constitutes a contribution made to the recipient. Our focus is drawn to the phrase bona fide successor committee or candidacy in K.A.R. 19-22-1(a). Neither the Campaign Finance Act nor the regulations define bona fide successor committee or candidacy. The Commission has previously interpreted the phrase to include transfers from legislative campaign accounts to local campaign accounts. For the reasons stated below, we disagree with such an interpretation. Mayans and the Commission argue that the transfer from Mayans' legislative campaign to his mayoral campaign must be a transfer to a bona fide successor candidacy because a contribution is prohibited by K.S.A. 25-4157a(c) (No candidate or candidate committee shall accept from any other candidate or candidate committee for any candidate for local, state or national office, any moneys received by such candidate or candidate committee as a campaign contribution.). The Commission further argues that K.S.A. 25-4157a does not specifically render K.A.R. 19-22-1 invalid, so the regulation must be interpreted to permit the transfer Mayans made. The Commission, however, fails to offer any authority for the proposition that a statute must specifically repeal a regulation in order to invalidate the regulation. We are unable to find any authority for that proposition. In Kansas Commission on Civil Rights v. City of Topeka Street Department, 212 Kan. 398, 402, 511 P.2d 253, cert. denied 414 U.S. 1066 (1973), this court noted: `The power to adopt rules and regulations is administrative in nature, not legislative, and to be valid, must be within the authority conferred. An administrative rule and regulation which goes beyond that which the legislature has authorized, which is out of harmony with or violates the statute, or which alters, extends, limits or attempts to breathe life into the source of its legislative power, is said to be void.' (Quoting State, ex rel., v. Columbia Pictures Corporation, 197 Kan. 448, 454, 417 P.2d 255 [1966].) We note that K.S.A. 25-4157a(c) was added to the Campaign Finance Act in 1991. L. 1991, ch. 150, sec. 12. Prior to the addition of subsection (c), the only direction given to candidates who chose to close out their campaign accounts was that such funds could not be used by the candidate personally. See K.S.A. 25-4157a(a). The result was that many candidates contributed the money in their campaign accounts to candidates for other public offices. The legislature ended the practice of contributing to other candidates by establishing specific and limited depositories for such residual funds from a terminated campaign account. See K.S.A. 25-4157c(d). The legislative intent, as determined by a plain reading of the statute, leads us to conclude that K.S.A. 25-4157a does not prohibit the use of campaign accounts for reelection, but it does prohibit the transfer of campaign funds between different candidacies. Thus, the question remains, may those funds be transferred to the same individual who is running for a different office? Mayans and the Commission argue that if the transfer between candidacies is a contribution, then K.S.A. 25-4157a(c) prohibits candidates from using their campaign accounts for reelection. We conclude that K.S.A. 25-4157a(c) and K.A.R. 19-22-1 may be read together harmoniously to permit the transfer of campaign funds between candidacies when the candidate is running for reelection to the same office. We interpret the phrase bona fide successor committee or candidacy in K.A.R. 19-22-1(a) to include an individual who is a candidate for reelection to the same office. This interpretation of the statute and the regulation comports with public policy and this court's determination that the purpose of the Campaign Finance Act is to protect the public. See Nichols v. Kansas Political Action Committee, 270 Kan. 37, 51, 11 P.3d 1134 (2000). This goal is enunciated in K.A.R. 19-20-3, which states that the provisions of the Kansas Administrative Regulations relating to the Campaign Finance Act shall be liberally construed to accomplish the purposes of the act including the administration of fair and open elections. Those individuals serving in statewide offices and members of the legislature whose every act has a statewide impact receive contributions from many sources, including individuals, corporations, and special interest groups whose interests and concerns are statewide. Such contributors may not have any interest in local government issues or policies and, currently, are not given the option to withdraw their contributions for a candidate who may be seeking to transfer such funds to a local office or an office the contributors have no interest in whatsoever. In addition, a candidate for a statewide office or the legislature will potentially have a large pool of contributors, including special interest groups, corporations, business entities, and political action committees, which may allow that candidate to accumulate a large campaign account. To allow such a candidate to transfer a large sum of money to a local campaign runs contrary to the goal of promoting fair and open elections in K.A.R. 19-20-3, and such a transfer potentially would give that candidate a decidedly unfair advantage in a local campaign. Contributors to Mayans' legislative campaign funds came from many diverse sources, including political action committees and corporations. With contributions from these sources, Mayans accumulated over $50,000 in his legislative campaign account. Other candidates for the Wichita mayoral campaign were prohibited by the Wichita campaign finance ordinances from receiving contributions from any political action committee or corporation, and all contributions were limited to $500. By transferring the funds from his legislative campaign account, Mayans could effectively undermine the Wichita campaign finance ordinances and clearly frustrate the Wichita city ordinances and the Campaign Finance Act's goal of fair and open elections. We conclude that an interpretation of K.A.R. 19-22-1(a) allowing such transfers would place statewide or legislative office candidates in a special category and grant them a privilege that usurps local authority to enact more restrictive campaign finance laws in violation of the home rule provision of the Kansas Constitution. See Kan. Const. Art. 12, § 5(c)(1), which states: Any city may by charter ordinance elect in the manner prescribed by this section that the whole or any part of any enactment of the legislature applying to such city, other than enactments of statewide concern applicable uniformly to all cities, and enactments prescribing limits of indebtedness, shall not apply to such city. The plain language of 25-4143 also supports the Court of Appeals' conclusion that a transfer from a legislative campaign to a mayoral campaign is a contribution. K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 25-4143(e)(1)(C) defines contribution to specifically include the transfer of funds between candidacies. Likewise, K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 25-4143(e)(2) specifically excludes four items from the definition of contribution. The transfer of the funds between candidacies is not included in the specific list of excluded items. When an item is not included in a specific list, this court can presume that the legislature intended to exclude the item by applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, i.e., the inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of another. In re Marriage of Killman, 264 Kan. 33, 42, 955 P.2d 1228 (1998). We further conclude that the attempted transfer from the Mayans' legislative campaign account to his mayoral campaign account is a contribution and that his mayoral campaign account is not a bona fide successor committee or candidacy. Using the same maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, this court concludes that had the legislature intended that such a transfer be allowed, it could have specifically so stated. Absent such specificity, we find nothing in the Campaign Finance Act or in the regulations relating thereto which authorizes such a transfer or contribution under the facts before us. The Commission opines that the plain language of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 25-4143(e)(1)(C) defining contribution does not include the transfer between Mayans' legislative campaign account and his mayoral campaign account because the statute specifically states that such transfers must be made between candidate committees and Mayans' mayoral campaign account is not a candidate committee. A candidate committee, as defined by K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 25-4143(b), is a committee appointed by a candidate to receive contributions and make expenditures for the candidate. The Commission appears to differentiate between candidacies based on the form of the campaign organization. Under the Commission's interpretation of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 25-4143(e)(1)(C), Mayans could transfer the money if he used a treasurer rather than a candidate committee to administrate the financial aspects of his campaign. However, according to the Commission, if Mayans had named a campaign committee rather than a treasurer, he would have been precluded from transferring the funds. K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 25-4143(e)(1)(C) states that a contribution means: a transfer of funds between any two or more candidate committees, party committees or political committees. Such a position seems to suggest form over substance and begs the question Treasurer for what? The obvious answer is treasurer for the candidate or candidate committee seeking election to a different office from the one to which the contributions were originally made. See K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 25-4143(o) (definition of treasurer). The Commission essentially argues a distinction without a difference. This distinction is invalidated by K.S.A. 25-4146(b) which requires all contributions and expenditures to go through a treasurer. The Commission further asserts in its amicus brief that the legislature included the term candidate in K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 25-4143(e)(1)(A) and (D), so it must have specifically intended to leave the term candidate out of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 25-4143(e)(1)(C), where it only referred to candidate committees. This argument overlooks the application of other subsections. K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 25-4143(e)(1)(A) provides that contribution means [a]ny advance, conveyance, deposit, distribution, gift, loan or payment of money or any other thing of value given to a candidate, candidate committee, party committee or political committee for the express purpose of nominating, electing or defeating a clearly identified candidate for a state or local office. (Emphasis added.) This subsection recognizes that donors may contribute to a candidate personally without giving to the candidate's campaign fund. For example, a donor could offer to pay a candidate's financial obligations while the candidate was campaigning, so the candidate would not have to work during the campaign. Because the language in subsection (e)(1)(A) includes the term candidate in the list of recipients, this type of donation would be considered a contribution subject to the statutory limitations placed on contributions. The subsection prevents candidates from personally receiving donations outside the Campaign Finance Act. K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 25-4143(e)(1)(D) provides that contribution means the payment, by any person other than a candidate, candidate committee, party committee or political committee, of compensation to an individual for the personal services rendered without charge to or for a candidate's campaign or to or for any such committee. (Emphasis added.) By including the term candidate in this subsection, the legislature chose to exclude the candidate's personal payments from the definition of contribution under subsection (e)(1)(D). In contrast, K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 25-4143(e)(1)(C) provides that a contribution is a transfer of funds between any two or more candidate committees, party committees or political committees. The word candidate is not necessary in this subsection because transfers to candidates themselves are prohibited by the Campaign Finance Act. K.S.A. 25-4157a(a) provides that [n]o moneys received by any candidate or candidate committee of any candidate as a contribution under this act shall be used or be made available for the personal use of the candidate. Thus, transfers must be made to the candidate's campaign treasury, whether that treasury is administered by a one-person treasurer or a committee of more than one person. Mayans and the Commission also argue that this court should defer to the Commission's previous decisions regarding the transfer of funds from state level campaign accounts to local level campaign accounts because the Commission is an agency of special competence and experience. In support of this proposition, the Commission cites Kansas Bd. of Regents v. Pittsburg State Univ. Chap. of K-NEA, 233 Kan. 801, 810, 667 P.2d 306 (1983). As stated by this court in Matjasich v. Kansas Dept. of Human Resources, 271 Kan. 246, 250-51, 21 P.3d 985 (2001): [T]he interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing the statute is entitled to judicial deference and is called the doctrine of operative construction. Deference to an agency's interpretation is particularly appropriate when the agency is one of special competence and experience. [Citation omitted.] ... Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which an appellate court's review is unlimited. [Citation omitted.] As further stated by this court in the Kansas Bd. of Regents case cited by the Commission: If, however, the reviewing court finds that the administrative body's interpretation is erroneous as a matter of law, the court should take corrective steps; the determination of an administrative body on questions of law is not conclusive, and, while persuasive, is not binding on the courts. [Citations omitted.] 233 Kan. at 810. The Commission's interpretation of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 25-4143(e) unreasonably distinguishes between candidates based upon the organizational structure of the campaign and does not harmonize the various provisions of the Campaign Finance Act and its administrative regulations. In this instance, such an interpretation does not comport with the stated goal of the regulations relating to the Campaign Finance Act of promoting fair and open elections. The task of this court is to harmonize the statutes and regulations while avoiding unreasonable results. See In re M.R., 272 Kan. 1335, 1342, 38 P.3d 694 (2002); KPERS v. Reimer & Koger Assocs., Inc., 262 Kan. 635, 643-44, 941 P.2d 1321 (1997). We conclude, therefore, that the Commission's interpretation of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 25-4143(e), which attempted to limit the definition of contribution by distinguishing between candidacies based on whether they have a treasurer or a candidate committee controlling the finances, should be rejected. The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the transfer of funds between Mayans' legislative campaign account to his mayoral account was a contribution. However, the Court of Appeals failed to consider the impact of K.S.A. 25-4157a(c), which specifically prohibits contributions between candidacies. Pursuant to Wichita City Ordinance 2.56.010 (2001), the Campaign Finance Act applies unless the Wichita ordinances are more restrictive. In this case, the Campaign Finance Act is more restrictive. Consequently, the portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion that permits the transfer of $500 to Mayans' mayoral account must be reversed. We hold that the Campaign Finance Act and the related regulations, when coupled with the purpose for the Campaign Finance Act, must be construed to limit the transfer of campaign contributions from a candidate's campaign account for a specific office to the same candidate's campaign account for election to that same office. Thus, there are only two situations in which the transfer can be made. The first is when an incumbent runs for reelection to the same office. The second is when a candidate loses an election for a specific office but seeks election to the same office in a subsequent election. The goal of promoting fair and open elections can best be served by a legislative enactment clearly defining a bona fide successor candidacy. Further, a legislative enactment should require the Commission to promulgate rules and regulations for the orderly return of contributions to donors who have contributed to a candidate for a specific office but do not want to contribute to the same candidate if he or she decides to run for a different office. Such regulations would bring to the election process a sense of fundamental fairness by prohibiting statewide or legislative office candidates from accumulating tens of thousands of dollars and transferring those contributions to a candidacy for a local office. Allowing the transfer of a large war chest of contributions to a local election encourages politicians to buy another office. In our view, this type of transfer does not comport with the current statutory language and administrative regulations, nor does it meet the overall goal of fair and open elections. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The decision of the district court is reversed. BEIER, J., not participating. Wahl, S.J., assigned. [1]