Opinion ID: 397839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sunshine Act

Text: 22 WATCH alleges that notices of the Commission's August 2 meeting-the meeting at which it did no more than set a date to consider Taft's amended application-were inadequate in terms of the Sunshine Act and the agency's regulations. 21 We are unable to conclude that the FCC's action should be set aside as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law under 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). We do, however, find fault with the regulations under which the Commission was operating. 23 The Sunshine Act exempts from its definition of meeting, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(2) (1976), deliberations required or permitted by id. § 552b(e). That subsection deals with a seven-day notice requirement and refers to deliberations about whether to schedule future meetings with shorter notice. We conclude from this that the August 2 meeting was not embraced by the statutory definition. As a result, it was not subject to the statutory notice provisions. 24 The FCC's regulations implementing the statute are stricter than the statute demands. The Commission's own definition of meeting does not contain an exception regarding deliberations about short notice like that found in § 552b(a)(2) of the statute. Apart from one exception that is not relevant here, it includes deliberations that result in the joint conduct of (sic) disposition of official agency business. 47 C.F.R. § 0.601 (1980). And the following provision regarding short notice, again stricter than the statutory requirement, 22 applies to FCC practice: 25 If the prompt and orderly conduct of agency business requires that a meeting be held less than one week after the announcement of the meeting, or before that announcement, the agency will issue the announcement at the earliest practicable time. In addition to other information, the announcement will contain the vote of each member of the agency who participated in the decision to give less than seven days' notice and will specify the nature of the emergency situation if it is not clear from the subject matter. 26 47 C.F.R. § 0.605(e) (1980). 27 The record shows that whether the August 2 meeting was noticed promptly enough, and whether there really was an emergency situation, are questions that certainly are open to debate. We decline to enter the debate, however, for we conclude that a precondition for it is lacking. The agency's definition of a meeting at 47 C.F.R. § 0.601 is impermissibly broad; like the statute it is supposed to track, it should not include meetings such as the one that took place on August 2. 28 The Commission's regulation requires it to give seven days' notice of meetings whose only order of business is to decide whether to call a future meeting with shorter notice. The statute itself, of course, demands no such absurd, wasteful result. The regulation increases the agency's administrative burden significantly with no conceivable corresponding public benefits. Indeed, we are unable to discern any reason for the breadth of the agency's definition of meeting-apart from shoddy draftsmanship, perhaps. While we recognize that an agency generally is free to shoulder burdens more onerous than those specifically imposed by statute, the regulation at issue here is in excess of the Commission's rulemaking discretion under 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1976). Consequently, we set it aside to the extent that its definition of meeting is more inclusive than the one contained in the Sunshine Act. 23