Opinion ID: 2629770
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The circuit court's limiting instruction adequately dispelled the potential for prejudice resulting from the evidence of Cordeiro's other bad acts.

Text: Finally, Cordeiro contends that, even if the probative value of the individual references to his involvement with illegal drugs was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the constant and numerous references amounted to cumulative overkill. In addition, he maintains that it was plain error for the circuit court (1) to wait until the conclusion of the trial before giving a limiting instruction regarding the other bad acts evidence and (2) to fail to identify the drug evidence covered by the limiting instruction. [21] We disagree. Cordeiro cites Austin, 70 Haw. at 309, 769 P.2d at 1103, in support of his contention that the evidence of his use and sale of illegal drugs rose to the level of cumulative overkill. Austin was convicted of the sale of cocaine. Austin, 70 Haw. at 300, 769 P.2d at 1098. The evidence, however, that we described as unnecessary overkill in Austini.e., an illegal drug operation with which Austin's associates, but not Austin himself, were involvedwas not relevant to any fact of consequence in the case; unlike the present matter, the evidence was not relevant to show the defendant's identity, motive, preparation, or plan. Id. at 309, 769 P.2d at 1103. Rather, it was merely somewhat relevant to outline how the police received information about [Austin's] incriminating statement[.] [22] Id. Indeed, the evidence was not even technically other bad acts evidence, because Austin was not directly linked to the illegal operation. We therefore, held that the danger of unfair prejudice i.e., guilt by association substantially outweighed any relevance the evidence might have. Id. By contrast, we also held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing proof of Austin's own prior sales of illegal drugs as evidence of a common scheme. Id. at 308, 769 P.2d at 1102. Unlike the improperly admitted evidence of the defendant's associates' bad acts in Austin, the evidence of Cordeiro's use and sale of illegal drugs was directly relevant and probative. Thus, it was analogous to the properly admitted other bad acts evidence in Austin. Moreover, as we have discussed above, there were no drug charges in Cordeiro's consolidated trial, thereby significantly diminishing the danger of unfair prejudice. Given the length of Cordeiro's trial and the evidence of use and sale of illegal drugs on the part of numerous involved individuals, we do not believe that the evidence relating to Cordeiro constituted cumulative overkill. At the conclusion of the trial, the circuit court instructed the jury: You have heard evidence that the Defendant at another time may have committed other crimes, wrongs, or acts. You must not use this evidence to determine that the Defendant is a person of bad character and, therefore, must have committed the offenses charged in this case. Such evidence may be considered by you only on the issue of the Defendant's motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or state of mind and for no other purpose. The circuit court's limiting instruction accurately enumerated the permissible uses of HRE Rule 404(b) evidence and correctly admonished the jury not to utilize other bad acts evidence for any improper purpose. [The] jury is presumed to have followed the [circuit] court's instructions. Balanza, 93 Hawai`i at 289, 1 P.3d at 291 (citing Jhun, 83 Hawai`i at 482, 927 P.2d at 1365). Cordeiro cites no authority in support of his position that the trial judge must specifically identify the other bad acts evidence covered by the limiting instruction, [23] nor are we aware of any. Indeed, we do not believe that a trial judge should necessarily specify the HRE Rule 404(b) evidence covered by a limiting instruction given at the conclusion of the trial. Such specificity would risk prejudicial omission or unnecessary highlighting of the evidence in the minds of the jurors immediately prior to their deliberations, especially in a case, such as the present matter, in which a significant quantity of other bad acts evidence is introduced over the course of several weeks. Furthermore, the circuit court's decision to issue a single limiting instruction at the conclusion of the trial, rather than each time the prosecution introduced HRE Rule 404(b) evidence, did not, in our view, jeopardize Cordeiro's right to a fair trial. The trial judge must consider on a case-by-case basis whether to issue a limiting instruction when HRE Rule 404(b) evidence is introduced and/or at the conclusion of the trial. There is no bright-line rule. Compare Barretto v. Akau, 51 Haw. 383, 397-98, 463 P.2d 917, 926 (1969), with State v. Chong, 3 Haw. App. 246, 253-54, 648 P.2d 1112, 1117-18 (1982). Inasmuch as Cordeiro was not on trial for any drug-related offenses, but evidence of the use and sale of illegal drugs nevertheless permeated the trial, numerous and repetitive limiting instructions might well have needlessly highlighted and focused attention upon the evidence. Ultimately, Cordeiro's contention that the jury was roused to overmastering hostility by the evidence of his involvement with drugs is belied by the fact that the jury acquitted him of two of the attempted first degree murder charges. [24] Thus, the record is devoid of any indication that the jury, in fact, made inappropriate use of the other bad acts evidence or that his right to a fair trial was jeopardized. In sum, we hold (1) that the circuit court correctly determined that the evidence of Cordeiro's use and sale of illegal drugs and his threat to shoot Mitsumura were relevant and (2) that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value of these other bad acts was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.