Opinion ID: 1825816
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conflict with Clift

Text: Laura also argued in her petition for a writ of certiorari that the ruling of the Court of Civil Appeals conflicts with Clift, supra, which holds that religious beliefs alone shall not constitute the sole determinant in child custody awards. 346 So.2d at 434. The record does reveal that the majority, if not all, of the actions taken by Brian and Laura with regard to the child were pursued in adherence to their religious beliefs. However, while Clift did hold that religion cannot be the sole determinant in a child-custody award, it also recognized: [T]hat one's religious beliefs may not serve as the sole consideration in a child custody proceeding does not necessarily preclude exploration into those beliefs. In this State, as in other jurisdictions, the ultimate consideration in determining the proper custody of the child is what is in his best interests.... `....' ... We hold that questions concerning religious convictions, when reasonably related to the determination of whether the prospective custodian's convictions might result in physical or mental harm to the child, are proper considerations for the trial court in a child custody proceeding. 346 So.2d at 435 (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court was not precluded from considering the effect on the child of Brian and Laura's parenting practices simply because those practices were based on religious beliefs. The trial court found that [t]he actions of Brian Snider resulted in a significant and detrimental change in the personality and behavior of the child, which [the court found] to have been a direct result of [Brian's] conduct towards her, and that since she has been placed in the pendente lite custody of [William], the child is now happy and well adjusted, and is being well cared for by [William] in his household. The record reveals evidence sufficient to support the trial court's ruling, and in its written order, the court expressly states that it did not rely solely on religion in making its decision: This Court has not decided this case based on the religious beliefs of either of the parties to this action. While it is true that there is considerable difference in religious beliefs between the households of the parties, this Court does not find it appropriate, legally or otherwise, to base its decision on whether or not this Court agrees or disagrees with a party's religious beliefs. The fact is that the evidence was in dispute, but it is clear from a reading of the record that the trial court's findings of fact and its determination that a change in custody would materially promote the child's welfare were not plainly and palpably wrong. See generally Pielach, 681 So.2d at 154 (The appellate courts are not allowed to substitute their own judgment for that of the trial court if the trial court's decision is supported by reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.). The trial court was obviously impressed with the solidarity of the child's extended family in its support for the change of custody to William. [5] At the time of the final hearing, the child had been living with William for five months. Laura's father described the personality and behavioral changes in his daughter and granddaughter after Laura's marriage to Brian, as well as his granddaughter's return to normal after custody had been awarded to William pendente lite. We conclude that the trial court did not base its ruling solely on the religious beliefs of Brian and Laura (or, for that matter, William), but rather on the best interests of the child. Because the trial court's order was not based solely on the religious beliefs of any of the parties involved in this case, the Court of Civil Appeals' affirmance of the trial court's ruling does not conflict with Clift.