Opinion ID: 1564079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the trial court err in denying Gracie's motion to vacate the summary judgment without a hearing?

Text: Gracie filed a motion to vacate the summary judgment under Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P. FedEx filed a response in opposition. The trial court denied the motion, without a hearing. Gracie now contends that the failure to hold a hearing injuriously affected [her] substantial rights ... because there being no opinion, they could only speculate as to the justification employed by the Honorable Trial Court. (Gracie's brief at 39.) Gracie offers absolutely no evidence in support of this allegation. Rule 59(g), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides for an opportunity to be heard on postjudgment motions: Presentation of any post-trial motion to a judge is not required in order to perfect its making, nor is it required that an order continuing any such motions to a date certain be entered. All such motions remain pending until ruled upon by the court (subject to the provisions of Rule 59.1), but shall not be ruled upon until the parties have had opportunity to be heard thereon. Under Rule 61, Ala. R. Civ. P., any error in the court's refusing to hold a hearing on a motion is harmless unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. This Court has stated the following regarding whether a denial of a Rule 59 motion without a hearing was harmless error: This error, however, is not necessarily reversible error. Under Rule 45, Ala. R.App. P.,3 the failure to grant a hearing on a motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 59(g) is reversible error only if it `probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties.' See Greene[ v. Thompson ], 554 So.2d [376] at 380-81 [(Ala.1989)]; Walls [ v. Bank of Prattville ], 554 So.2d [381] at 382 [(Ala. 1989)]. In Greene v. Thompson, supra , this Court formulated a test to determine when the denial of a Rule 59(g) request for a hearing is harmless error: `Harmless error occurs, within the context of a Rule 59(g) motion, where there is either no probable merit in the grounds asserted in the motion, or where the appellate court resolves the issues presented therein, as a matter of law, adversely to the movant, by application of the same objective standard of review as that applied in the trial court.' _____ 3 Rule 45 provides: `No judgment may be reversed or set aside, nor new trial granted in any civil or criminal case on the ground of misdirection of the jury, the giving or refusal of special charges or the improper admission or rejection of evidence, nor for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court to which the appeal is taken or application is made, after an examination of the entire cause, it should appear that the error complained of has probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties.' Kitchens v. Maye, 623 So.2d 1082, 1088-89 (Ala.1993). In Greene v. Thompson, 554 So.2d 376 (Ala.1989), cited in Kitchens, this Court stated: If it is clearly perceivable to the appropriate appellate court that the failure to hold the hearing did not injuriously affect the movant's substantial rights, as it is in this case, where the Estate's motion was not well taken as a matter of law, the error will be considered harmless. See Hicks v. Alabama Pest Services, Inc., 548 So.2d 148 (Ala.1989). 554 So.2d at 381. Gracie has not presented any evidence that shows that her substantial rights were injuriously affected by the trial court's failure to hold a hearing on her motion to vacate. She simply states that she could only speculate as to the justification employed by the Honorable Trial Court. (Gracie's brief at 39.) The failure of the trial court to hold a hearing was harmless error.