Opinion ID: 409582
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Watchlisting

Text: 62 In Halkin I, we held that because the state secrets privilege barred proof of the fact that particular communications were intercepted by NSA, the district court could properly dismiss claims against the NSA defendants 72 based on the acquisition of plaintiffs' international communications. We are now presented with the related but not identical question whether the district court could also properly dismiss the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against the CIA defendants based upon their submission of plaintiffs' names on watchlists to NSA. 73 Because we conclude that appellants are at present incapable of demonstrating that they have standing to challenge that practice, we affirm the district court's judgment. 63 The district court was of the view that as a result of the state secrets privilege holding in Halkin I regarding NSA interceptions, plaintiffs cannot show any injury from having their names submitted to NSA because NSA is prohibited from disclosing whether it acquired any of plaintiffs' communications. Since a showing of present or imminent future injury was a basic precept of the relief sought, the court entered summary judgment for defendants on the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to future submission of watchlists to NSA by the agencies concerned with foreign intelligence. 74 64 Appellants argue that this judgment was error. They contend that the very fact of submission of names to NSA, as to which no claim of state secrets privilege has ever been made, creates a sufficient threat of injury to warrant injunctive or at least declaratory relief enforcing Fourth Amendment protections even in the absence of proof that the submissions actually resulted in the acquisition of communications to or from the named subjects. 75 A contrary ruling, it is argued, would create a dangerous variant of the silver platter doctrine 76 by permitting intelligence officials to insulate surveillance undertaken by others at their direction (i.e., as a result of their submission of names to NSA) from fourth amendment scrutiny. 65 Before considering the merits of this position, it is necessary to define precisely the nature of appellants' argument. That argument proceeds as follows: if the warrantless interception of a plaintiff's communications would violate the fourth amendment, then watchlisting-which creates a substantial threat of such interception-would also violate the fourth amendment, just as the use of silver platter evidence by federal prosecutors does by encouraging unlawful searches and seizures by state officers. 66 The flaw in the argument is not in the validity of the if-then inference, but in the soundness of its premise. Manifestly, watchlisting by itself would never be a fourth amendment violation: the mere forwarding of a name by one agency to another involves no search or seizure triggering the constitutional limitation. Only the fact that the act of forwarding the name might lead to an unlawful search or seizure could make watchlisting constitutionally suspect. While appellants argue strenuously that watchlisting leads to interception, they fail to establish the critical second half of the premise, i.e., that the resulting interception would be unlawful. In short, the if underlying their argument-if interception would violate their fourth amendment rights, then watchlisting would do so also-is nowhere proved. 67 Nor can it be proved. Our ruling in Halkin I is controlling on the point that the presence of one's name on a watchlist cannot be presumed to establish that interceptions of one's communications have occurred. Since it is the constitutionality of such interceptions that is the ultimate issue, the impossibility of proving that interception of any appellant's communications ever occurred renders the inquiry pointless from the outset. The district court was therefore correct in applying Halkin I to the watchlisting claims against the CIA defendants. 77 68 In holding that Halkin I concluded the watchlisting claims against the plaintiffs, the district court viewed the matter as one concerning the law of remedies: whether the inability to demonstrate the fact of acquisition barred an award of injunctive or declaratory relief against future submissions of names. While we do not disagree with this approach to the problem, we agree with appellees that a more serious flaw in appellants' claims for such relief is the problem of justiciability they present. 78 We hold that appellants' inability to adduce proof of actual acquisition of their communications now prevents them from stating a claim cognizable in the federal courts. In particular, we find appellants incapable of making the showing necessary to establish their standing to seek relief. 69 In Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C.Cir.1977), this court discussed at length the constitutional requirement of standing. 79 We stated: 70 The first, and primary inquiry, concerns the existence of injury in fact, economic or otherwise, ... This requirement is the irreducible constitutional minimum which must be present in every case. If the court finds that there is no injury in fact, no other inquiry is relevant to consideration of standing. 71 553 F.2d at 205 n.68 (citations omitted). 72 The standing issue is now ripe for our consideration. Although standing generally is a matter dealt with at the earliest stages of litigation, usually on the pleadings, it sometimes remains to be seen whether the factual allegations of the complaint necessary for standing will be supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 115 n.31, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1615 n.31, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979). See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n.10, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1215 n.10, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974); Public Citizen v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 565 F.2d 708, 718 n.22 (D.C.Cir.1977). In the present case, there can be little doubt that the complaint alleged facts-interception of plaintiffs' private communications-which if proved would constitute an injury in fact, permitting plaintiffs to go forward in an effort to prove the truth of those allegations and any consequent liability of the defendants. United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph, 642 F.2d 1285, 1291 (D.C.Cir.1980). The sufficiency of those allegations must, however, be reevaluated in view of our ruling in Halkin I that evidence of the fact of acquisition of plaintiffs' communications by NSA cannot be obtained from the government, nor can such fact be presumed from the submission of watchlists to that Agency. In this situation, it can only be concluded that appellants are incapable of demonstrating that they have sustained a violation of their fourth amendment rights. That conclusion compels the finding that appellants are without standing to assert the watchlisting claims set forth in their complaint. 73 Appellants have alleged, but ultimately cannot show, a concrete injury amounting to either a specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 2326, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972). Although the contours of the CIA activity giving rise to appellants' claims are spelled out in considerable detail in the record of this case and in the public reports on that activity, as we held in Harrington v. Bush, supra, a litigant is required to allege that he has suffered some specific harm, not that the injury emanates from some specific source. 553 F.2d at 211 (emphasis added). 80 It is the nature of the injury, and not the source, that is the primary focus of concern when dealing with the question of standing. 81 Consequently, the absence of proof of actual acquisition of appellants' communications is fatal to their watchlisting claims. 74 In terminating appellants' action on grounds that may make it extremely difficult ever to pursue similar claims, it is important to stress the dimensions of the question appellants ask us to resolve in passing on the constitutional status of watchlisting. The constitutionality of warrantless electronic surveillance of United States citizens in connection with foreign intelligence operations is a question that has been specifically reserved for decision by the Supreme Court. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 308, 321-22, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2132, 2138-2139, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). 82 Were we to permit appellants to litigate the merits of that question in the district court, the focus of the proceedings would necessarily be upon the 'reasonableness' of the search and seizure in question, and the way in which that 'reasonableness' derives content and meaning through reference to the warrant clause. Id. at 309-10, 92 S.Ct. 2132-2133; see id. at 315, 92 S.Ct. at 2135. The valid claim of the state secrets privilege makes consideration of that question impossible. Without evidence of the detailed circumstances in which the CIA forwarded appellants' names to NSA, the contents of communications intercepted as a result (in particular, whether the communications were sent or received by appellants or simply mentioned them), the duration of the appellants' stays on the watchlists, and like matters-in short, the essential information on which the legality of executive action (in foreign intelligence surveillance) turns 83 -it would be inappropriate to resolve the extremely difficult and important fourth amendment issue presented. Determining the reasonableness of warrantless foreign intelligence watchlisting under conditions of such informational poverty, armed only with the fact that the CIA at some point submitted a watchlist without obtaining a warrant, would be tantamount to the issuance of an advisory opinion on the question. See Chagnon v. Bell, 642 F.2d 1248, 1263 (D.C.Cir.1980) (dictum). 75 With no hope of a complete record and adversarial development of the issue, we cannot authorize such inquiry. The limits upon our consideration of such claims were stated by the Supreme Court in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War: 76 Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. It adds the essential dimension of specificity to the dispute by requiring that the complaining party have suffered a particular injury caused by the action challenged as unlawful. This personal stake is what the Court has consistently held enables a complainant authoritatively to present to a court a complete perspective upon the adverse consequences flowing from the specific set of facts undergirding his grievance. Such authoritative presentations are an integral part of the judicial process, for a court must rely on the parties' treatment of the facts and claims before it to develop its rules of law. Only concrete injury presents the factual context within which a court, aided by parties who argue within the context, is capable of making decisions. 77 Moreover, when a court is asked to undertake constitutional adjudication, the most important and delicate of its responsibilities, the requirement of concrete injury further serves the function of insuring that such adjudication does not take place unnecessarily. This principle is particularly applicable here, where respondents seek an interpretation of a constitutional provision which has never before been construed by the federal courts. 78 418 U.S. 208, 221-22, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 2932-2933, 41 L.Ed.2d 706. Because here, as in Schlesinger, it can only be a matter of speculation whether the claimed violation has caused concrete injury to the particular complainant(s), id. at 223, 94 S.Ct. at 2933, appellants' watchlisting claims were properly dismissed. Although (u)nder this analysis there may indeed be illegal or unconstitutional actions which will go unchallenged in a federal court due to the lack of a proper party to (bring suit), 84 that is the result required here. 79 As in the other cases in which the need to protect sensitive information affecting the national security clashes with fundamental constitutional rights of individuals, we believe that (t)he responsibility must be where the power is. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 2148, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring). In the present context, where the Constitution compels the subordination of appellants' interest in the pursuit of their claims to the executive's duty to preserve our national security, this means that remedies for constitutional violations that cannot be proven under existing legal standards, if there are to be such remedies, must be provided by Congress. 85 That is where the government's power to remedy wrongs is ultimately reposed. Consequently, that is where the responsibility for compensating those injured in the course of pursuing the ends of state must lie. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 2947, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974).