Opinion ID: 2997214
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedures afforded Ms. Pugel

Text: We review first the process Ms. Pugel received. As alleged in the complaint, in April of 2001, Ms. Pugel received notice of an academic inquiry into her conduct in generating and presenting her data.5 That inquiry led to a full-scale in- 5 Ms. Pugel may have had notice of faculty concern with her methodology even prior to this time. One of Ms. Pugel’s own allegations suggests that, before the March 2001 APS meeting and prior to the allegations of misconduct, she had been warned as to the invalidity of her data: 11. Specifically, the research standards officer in a letter dated April 27, 2001 set forth the specific allegations for the Inquiry Team to consider: 1) You continued to use a seriously flawed algorithm to analyze your experimental data even after you were informed that the negative probabilities included in the algorithms were nonsensical; 2) You presented the data in Figure 2 at the March 2001 meeting of the American Physical Society, even though you knew that there were questions about the validity of the data . . . . R.1 at 3. Ms. Pugel did not allege any facts contrary to the letter’s accusations. It might be reasonable therefore to infer that she was in fact questioned as to the validity of the data prior to its presentation (continued...) 12 No. 03-3717 vestigation, the existence of which Ms. Pugel was notified in the fall of 2001. At this time, she also was notified of the formal charges against her: the submission of fraudulent data to Nature and the presentation of data she knew to be invalid at the APS conference. In September 2001, a hearing was held before the Investigation Panel, at which time Ms. Pugel had an opportunity to present witnesses and to introduce evidence on her behalf. The December decision of the Investigation Panel, that Ms. Pugel had engaged in academic misconduct, was subject to review by the Chancellor. In April of 2002, Ms. Pugel received notice that the Chancellor concurred with the Investigation Panel and had determined that dismissal was appropriate. Ms. Pugel then had an opportunity to appeal that decision to the President. The President affirmed the Chancellor’s decisions on five of six grounds asserted by Ms. Pugel but did, in fact, reverse the Chancellor’s discharge decision on the ground that another decisionmaking body should review the sanction. In September of 2002, Ms. Pugel was informed that the Senate Committee on Student Discipline had determined that dismissal was warranted and that her discharge had become effective as of August 23, 2002. We turn next to Ms. Pugel’s specific allegations of inadequate process. As part of her due process claim, Ms. Pugel alleged that the University failed to inform her of the charges and that the decision to discharge her was based on an alle- 5 (...continued) at the APS conference. Cf. Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 597 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he court is not required to ignore facts alleged in the complaint that undermine the plaintiff’s claim.”). Nonetheless, in cautious deference to the standard of review, we do not rely upon any warnings Ms. Pugel may have received prior to April of 2001. No. 03-3717 13 gation abandoned before the formal charges. These claims contradict her prior factual allegations. According to her own complaint, Ms. Pugel received written notice of an inquiry into her research. She later received written notice of formal charges that she fabricated data submitted to Nature and that she presented data she knew to be invalid at the APS meeting. The Investigation Panel found Ms. Pugel guilty of those charges. The Senate Committee concluded that dismissal was warranted based on those conclusions. Thus, Ms. Pugel’s own complaint reveals that she had notice of the charges against her and that the decision to discharge her was based on those same charges. This court is not obligated by the standard of review to disregard factual allegations that undermine a plaintiff’s claim. See, e.g., Roots P’ship v. Lands’ End, Inc., 965 F.2d 1411, 1416 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Endsley v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 276, 284 (7th Cir. 2000) (indicating that a plaintiff may plead herself out of court by including factual allegations, which, if true, reveal that legal rights were not invaded). Ms. Pugel further alleged that she lacked a meaningful opportunity for a hearing. She submits that the Investigation Panel reached a conclusion contrary to the testimony of her physician and that one of the Investigation Panel members did not hear a portion of that testimony. We conclude that these alleged insufficiencies do not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. First, according to the complaint, Ms. Pugel’s physician testified that she could not be guilty of academic misconduct because she suffered from ADHD. Due process did not entitle Ms. Pugel to a favorable result based on this testi14 No. 03-3717 mony, only to a meaningful opportunity to present it.6 It is clear from the complaint that, in presenting her physician’s testimony, Ms. Pugel had an opportunity to explain why she should not be found guilty of academic misconduct. Due process does not require decisionmakers to adopt the charged party’s explanation. Second, the absence of one panel member from a portion of the physician’s testimony did not invalidate the meaningfulness of the hearing. Three other members of the Investigation Panel were present, and the panel’s decision was subject to further review by the Chancellor, President and Senate Committee. Although the panel member’s absence may have violated Ms. Pugel’s rights under the University’s policies, a violation of state law is not necessarily a violation of due process. See Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[A] violation of state law (for purposes of this case the student judicial code may be treated as a state law) is not a denial of due process, even if the state law confers a procedural right.”). Ms. Pugel’s allegations reveal that she received an opportunity to present witnesses on her behalf to the Investigation Panel. After the hearing and determination of misconduct, she was able to appeal the Chancellor’s decision to dis- 6 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (“The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement.”); cf. Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 286 F.3d 1007, 1010-11 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting in the context of a high school expulsion that due process requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard); Linwood v. Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 763, 770 (7th Cir. 1972) (indicating in the case of a high school expulsion that a “hearing must be at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”). No. 03-3717 15 charge her to the University’s President. She then received a further review of the sanction by the Senate Committee on Student Discipline. The complaint does not allege that these procedures were a sham. Cf. Levenstein v. Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 351-52 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that constructively discharged medical school professor who essentially alleged that procedures were “a sham through and through” sufficiently alleged a due process violation). Nor do the specific allegations of error rise to the level of a due process violation. Thus, the complaint itself establishes that Ms. Pugel received substantial opportunity for hearing that comports with due process. In sum, according to Ms. Pugel’s own complaint, five decisionmaking entities found evidence that she had fabricated data and then publicly had presented that data knowing it to be invalid. The ultimate decisionmakers determined that the misconduct warranted dismissal. Throughout the seventeen-month disciplinary process, Ms. Pugel received notice of the charges against her and of the decisionmakers’ determinations. She had an opportunity both to present evidence on her behalf and to appeal the discharge decision. Accepting these factual allegations as true, we conclude that Ms. Pugel’s claims of inadequate process either contradict her factual allegations or do not rise to the level of constitutional concern. Ms. Pugel therefore has failed to state a claim for violation of due process.