Opinion ID: 2631798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: NRS 34.726 applies to successive petitions

Text: NRS 34.726 was enacted in 1991 and applies to petitions filed on or after January 1, 1993. [9] Pellegrini filed his second petition on April 12, 1999more than ten years after the issuance of remittitur on direct appeal and more than six years after NRS 34.726 became effective. Accordingly, without a showing of good cause for the delay and actual prejudice, Pellegrini's successive petition is barred under the terms of NRS 34.726(1). Pellegrini and amicus argue, however, that NRS 34.726 may not be applied to successive petitions because: (1) the legislative history shows an intent not to deprive petitioners of the right to file successive petitions at any time subject only to the laches bar at NRS 34.800 for delay in filing; (2) such application leads to absurd results and renders nugatory the procedural bars at NRS 34.800 and NRS 34.810; and (3) representatives of state government, including a former employee of this court, testified in support of the bill leading to enactment of the statute, assuring that such application would not occur, and therefore, in the case of a successive petition, equitable estoppel prevents the State from asserting the bar and prevents this court from recognizing it. Pellegrini also argues that applying NRS 34.726 to successive petitions would constitute an unconstitutional suspension of the writ. These contentions lack merit. We have previously applied the time bar at NRS 34.726 to successive petitions in published and unpublished dispositions. [10] We now specifically hold that NRS 34.726 applies to successive petitions. The right to seek the remedy of habeas corpus is protected by the Nevada Constitution. [11] Article 1, Section 5, states: The privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus, shall not be suspended unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require its suspension. [12] As late as 1967, however, no statutory framework existed to govern the procedure for obtaining post-conviction relief, though the constitutional right to petition for habeas corpus relief was recognized in Chapter 34 of the NRS. [13] That year, our Legislature enacted the Nevada Criminal Procedure Act (1967 Act), providing for procedures to obtain post-conviction relief, [14] which were ultimately codified at NRS Chapter 177 (Chapter 177 remedy). Because the drafters of the 1967 Act intended to offer but one remedy in post-conviction, [15] they designated the Chapter 177 remedy as habeas corpus [16] and made it the exclusive means of collaterally attacking the validity of a conviction or sentence. [17] Unfortunately, the drafters of the 1967 Act overlooked the limits to the constitutional grant of jurisdiction over writs of habeas corpus. Article 6, Section 6, provided: The District Courts, and the Judges thereof shall... have power to issue writs of Habeas Corpus on petition by, or on behalf of any person held in actual custody in their respective districts. [18] The 1967 Act, however, vested jurisdiction over the Chapter 177 remedy in the district court in which the conviction took place. [19] This oversight proved to be fatal to the intent of offering a single post-conviction remedy. In Marshall v. Warden, [20] this court addressed the constitutionality of the 1967 Act in light of the jurisdictional limits on the power of the district courts to grant habeas relief. We held that the Act's attempt to make the Chapter 177 remedy the exclusive means of pursuing post-conviction habeas relief was unconstitutional. [21] Still, this language in the Act was severable; therefore, we concluded that the Chapter 177 remedy could be given effect as a post-conviction remedy alternative to the constitutional writ of habeas corpus. [22] In 1969, the Legislature amended NRS Chapters 34 and 177 to delete the provisions making the Chapter 177 procedure the exclusive means of obtaining post-conviction relief. [23] Reference in Chapter 177 to its remedy as habeas corpus was deleted and replaced by reference to post-conviction relief. [24] In subsequent sessions, the Legislature incrementally amended Chapters 34 and 177 to curtail the ability to alternatively use the two remedies and to limit the filing of successive or delayed applications for post-conviction or habeas relief. For instance, aside from the exclusive remedy provision severed as a result of Marshall, the only procedural bar contained in either chapter in 1967 was the provision eventually codified at NRS 177.375 for dismissal based on waiver of claims not raised in a first petition or already adjudicated in or knowingly and understandingly waived in a prior proceeding. [25] In 1973, NRS 177.375 was amended to delete the reference to a knowing and voluntary waiver, replace the reasonable cause standard with a good cause standard, and make more specific the grounds for waiver. [26] Chapter 177 was further amended to provide the first statutory time bar to filing of post-conviction petitions. A new subsection was added to state that, absent good cause shown for delay, an application for post-conviction relief under Chapter 177 must be filed within 1 year following entry of judgment of conviction or, if an appeal has been taken from such judgment, within 1 year from the final decision upon or pursuant to the appeal. [27] The 1973 amendments also provided that the Chapter 177 remedy was not available if a writ of habeas corpus is used to attack a conviction or sentence. [28] The grounds for relief in a Chapter 177 proceeding were narrowed to encompass only constitutional violations. [29] In 1985, Chapter 34 was amended to include provisions for dismissal based on laches (later codified at NRS 34.800) [30] and provisions for dismissal based on waiver or abusive filing of successive petitions (later codified at NRS 34.810). [31] In 1987, the Legislature amended Chapter 34 to state: A petitioner may not file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless he previously filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to [Chapter 177], or demonstrates good cause for the failure to file a petition for post-conviction relief or meet the time requirements for filing a petition for post-conviction relief and actual prejudice to the petitioner. [32] This amendment eliminated the availability of habeas corpus as an alternative remedy, as we had earlier recognized it in Marshall. [33] NRS 177.375 was also amended to require a showing of actual prejudice to the petitioner in addition to good cause to excuse the procedural bars for waiver and successive petitions. [34] In 1989, NRS 34.810 was amended to add subsection 3, requiring petitioners to carry the burden of pleading and proving specific facts to demonstrate good cause to overcome the waiver and successive petition bars. [35] The movement toward abolishing the dual remedy system finally culminated in the 1989 passage of Senate Joint Resolution (SJR) 13, which proposed to amend the Nevada Constitution to extend the jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus to district courts wherein petitioners suffered their criminal convictions. [36] The proposal was intended to set the stage for the Legislature to increase efficiency by consolidating the dual post-conviction remedies while retaining the jurisdictional reach of Chapter 177 to courts of conviction. The latter was necessary to ease the burden on courts in districts where most prisoners are incarcerated and allow the courts already familiar with the case to rule on a petitioner's claims challenging his conviction and sentence. [37] In anticipation of the approval and passage of SJR 13, this court appointed a committee to study the impact of the constitutional amendment and to propose and draft statutes necessary to adopt a single post-conviction remedy. [38] The committee's efforts resulted in Assembly Bill (AB) 227, which proposed to amend Chapter 34 and repeal the post-conviction provisions in Chapter 177. The time bar provisions at NRS 34.726 were part of the AB 227 amendments to Chapter 34. [39] AB 227 was approved and enacted in 1991 and became effective on January 1, 1993, after SJR 13 was passed by the 1991 Legislature [40] and ratified by the people at the 1992 general election. [41] The provisions of AB 227 did not apply to any post-conviction proceeding commenced before January 1, 1993. [42] Pellegrini, with support from amicus, argues that the legislative history of the post-conviction habeas remedy reveals an intent to exempt successive petitions from the one-year time limit of NRS 34.726. Pellegrini argues that applying the time limit to successive petitions would create absurd results as this would effectively time bar all successive petitions, which, he argues, cannot possibly be filed within the time limit, and this result would render nugatory NRS 34.800 and NRS 34.810, which both contemplate the possibility of successive petitions. However, words in a statute will generally be given their plain meaning, unless such a reading violates the spirit of the act, and when a statute is clear on its face, courts may not go beyond the statute's language to consider legislative intent. [43] Thus, we are not at liberty to `go fishing in ... the legislative mind' where a statute is clear and unambiguous. [44] Further, when reviewing a legislative change in a statute, `[w]e are bound to presume that it was done ex industria, for the purpose of effecting the change which is effected in the law.' [45] Still, we must construe statutory language to avoid absurd or unreasonable results, and, if possible, we will avoid any interpretation that renders nugatory part of a statute. [46] NRS 34.726 provides no exception for successive petitions, and we conclude that the plain language of the statute indicates that it applies to all petitions filed after its effective date of January 1, 1993. We add one caveat, albeit unhelpful to Pellegrini's cause, based on the rule that [t]he legislature cannot extinguish an existing cause of action by enacting a new limitation period without first providing a reasonable time after the effective date of the new limitation period in which to initiate the action. [47] Prior to the effective date of the statute, the sole statutory considerations for timely filing under Chapter 34 were laches, pursuant to NRS 34.800, and the prerequisite at former NRS 34.725 that a prior post-conviction petition pursuant to NRS Chapter 177 had to be timely filed. If a petitioner was not barred by laches and had met the prior petition prerequisite, his Chapter 34 petition was not subject to dismissal on grounds of failing to meet a one-year filing rule. Because the enactment of NRS 34.726 created a new limit for filing a successive petition pursuant to Chapter 34, petitioners whose convictions were final before the effective date of NRS 34.726 and who had filed a timely first petition under Chapter 177 were entitled to a reasonable period of time after the effective date of the new limitation period in which to file any successive petitions. The State concedes, and we agree, that for purposes of determining the timeliness of these successive petitions pursuant to NRS 34.726, assuming the laches bar does not apply, it is both reasonable and fair to allow petitioners one year from the effective date of the amendment to file any successive habeas petitions. [48] However, any such successive filing would remain subject to other procedural bars applicable to successive petitions. Pellegrini did not file his petition until 1999 and, therefore, could not have qualified for timely filing under this narrow exemption from the requirements of NRS 34.726. Moreover, we conclude that application of the time bar to successive petitions does not violate the spirit of AB 227 or lead to absurd results. We have already recognized that the statutory time limit at NRS 34.726(1), like the former one-year time limit at NRS 177.315, evinces intolerance toward perpetual filing of petitions for relief, [49] which clogs the court system and undermines the finality of convictions. [50] A plain reading of AB 227 shows its overall spirit was one of limiting habeas petitioners to one time through the system absent extraordinary circumstances. Furthermore, the application of NRS 34.726 to successive petitions does not render nugatory the laches provision of NRS 34.800 or the waiver and successive petition provisions of NRS 34.810. For example, it is conceivable that a petitioner could demonstrate good cause for failure to comply with the one-year time limit and actual prejudice, but laches would nevertheless bar the claim because of prejudice to the State and failure to demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. [51] Additionally, despite Pellegrini's argument, it is possible for a petitioner to file more than one petition within the one year allotted under NRS 34.726. The waiver and successive petition bars at NRS 34.810 deal with the potential for such piecemeal application, and therefore, that statute is not rendered nugatory. Actually, it is Pellegrini's interpretation of NRS 34.726 that could create absurd results. Under Pellegrini's interpretation, a petitioner could file an untimely first petition, and after its proper dismissal, assuming the claims were not waived on direct appeal or barred by law of the case, would be permitted to raise the same claims in a successive petition, subject only to laches. This is possible because, absent good cause and actual prejudice, NRS 34.810(2) bars successive petitions raising claims that were raised and determined on the merits in a prior petitionit does not address claims that were raised in a prior petition but were not determined on the merits. Allowing for such abusive application for relief would be irrational. In sum, the plain language of the one-year provision requires its application to all petitions; this reading is consistent with the spirit of AB 227, is not absurd, and does not render nugatory other habeas procedural bars. Accordingly, we do not look beyond the statutory scheme itself to interpret NRS 34.726. Nonetheless, even were we to consider the relevant legislative history, it does not support Pellegrini's arguments. Nowhere in the legislative history is the intended effect of NRS 34.726 on successive petitions expressly addressed. Moreover, the legislative history of the habeas statutes shows that Nevada's lawmakers never intended for petitioners to have multiple opportunities to obtain post-conviction relief absent extraordinary circumstances. From our Marshall decision, which identified the constitutional flaw in the Legislature's initial effort to create only one remedy in habeas, and through the eventual elimination of the Chapter 177 remedy, the Legislature made every effort to limit the ability to bring repetitive, meritless and delayed petitions. By the time Chapter 177's post-conviction relief provisions were repealed, we had already interpreted its one-year time limit at NRS 177.315 to apply to successive Chapter 177 petitions. [52] The statutory scheme permitted petitioners to resort to a Chapter 34 petition only in exceptional circumstances, where the prerequisite of a prior timely Chapter 177 petition was met or excused and where petitioners could overcome the statutory laches, waiver, and successive petition bars. Still, it is clear that these limitations had proven inefficient, and therefore AB 227, along with its procedural bars, was intended to ensure that petitioners would be limited to one time through the post-conviction system. The first argument made in voters' sample ballots in 1992 in favor of the constitutional amendment proposed by SJR 13 evidences this one time through the system intent: Under the existing system, a prisoner has two chances at habeas corpus relief, one in the court of his conviction and one in the court in the district in which he is incarcerated. This amendment would allow the Legislature to specify only one comprehensive process, giving more finality to criminal convictions. By reducing costly paperwork, the amendment would also result in significant savings to the state. [53] Additionally, the bill sponsor's testimony made clear that the effect of repealing the Chapter 177 remedy would be that only one course of action would exist for a prisoner to challenge the constitutionality of his/her conviction or sentence. [54] Pellegrini and amicus also argue that the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents the State from asserting and the courts from applying NRS 34.726 in cases of successive petitions. They cite to testimony before the legislative committees considering AB 227. A representative of the Attorney General's Office testified in support of AB 227 that he assessed the bill as doing nothing more than transferring jurisdiction where it should be. [55] This court's employee, who was chairman of the study committee involved in drafting the proposed bill, also testified that under AB 227 [n]o access to the courts would be cut off, but rather the process was being simplified by eliminating a redundant procedure, [56] and that petitioners would lose no procedural safeguards currently afforded [them] under Chapter 177. [57] He testified that AB 227 remove[d] process for the sake of process, but [did] nothing to preclude complete review of a conviction. [58] Pellegrini and amicus characterize these statements as representations, binding upon the State and this court, that NRS 34.726 would not be applied to successive petitions. We reject their contentions. Pellegrini and amicus cite no authority that would support application of equitable estoppel to disregard a statute which is clear on its face. Further, we conclude that the doctrine may not be invoked under the circumstances presented here. [E]quitable estoppel operates to prevent the assertion of legal rights that in equity and good conscience should be unavailable because of a party's conduct. [59] It requires justifiable reliance by the party invoking the doctrine. [60] We have recognized that the doctrine generally may not be invoked against the government or its agencies [61] and that equitable principles will not justify a court's disregard of statutory requirements. [62] [T]he fact that the writ has been called an `equitable' remedy does not authorize a court to ignore ... statutes, rules, and precedents. [63] Here, Pellegrini cannot demonstrate any justifiable reliance on the testimony in question. We conclude that the testimony did not constitute representations that successive petitions were exempt from the time limit later codified at NRS 34.726, and cannot reasonably be construed to have misled either the Legislature or Pellegrini in this respect. As we have noted, a full review of the legislative history makes it abundantly clear that the Legislature understood AB 227 would leave petitioners only one opportunity to obtain post-conviction relief absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. Further, Pellegrini neither alleges nor demonstrates that he relied on the testimony at issue. He failed to file his petition until over ten years after issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal and well beyond the presumptive period of prejudice under the laches bar at NRS 34.800. [64] Accordingly, the doctrine of equitable estoppel provides no basis for relief here. Finally, Pellegrini argues that NRS 34.726, as it applies to successive petitions, is an unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus. We disagree and conclude that the Legislature's enactment of the statutory one-year time limit as applicable to successive petitions is a reasonable regulation of the right to pursue habeas corpus relief, especially in light of the provisions for excusing the bar in instances of cause and actual prejudice. Therefore, the Legislature had the power to enact the statute, and we find no constitutional infirmity in it. [65] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that under NRS 34.726, all of Pellegrini's claims are barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice.