Opinion ID: 1815100
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether hallman was denied a fair trial because of the court's failure to appoint an expert in the dynamics of an incest situation.

Text: Hallman is clearly indigent and has received the benefit of court appointed counsel. Under such circumstances this court has established the guidelines for the appointment of experts to be paid for by the county. In State v. Sahlie, 90 S.D. 682, 690, 245 N.W.2d 476, 480 (1976), we said, Initially, the request must be made in good faith. The request must be reasonable in all respects. The request must be timely and must set forth specific reasons which seem to make such services needed or necessary to the defendant. The request must specify that the defendant is financially unable to obtain the required service himself and that such services would otherwise be justifiably obtained were the defendant financially able. However, that appointment should not be made if the Court finds that the request is frivolous, unreasonable, unnecessary for an adequate defense, or without underlying factual support[.] ... Sahlie, 90 S.D. at 691, 245 N.W.2d at 480. We readily recognize that in a case involving an offense such as incest there may be serious psychological implications; the trier of fact should be made aware of the psychological status of the victim. Indeed, where the victim recants previous testimony, it may become highly probative. This area of consideration is within the trial judge's sound discretion. The trial judge is in a better position than we to judge the nature and necessity of the appointment of an expert in a given factual environment. State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D.1985). In this case, the motion was made prior to any knowledge that the victim would recant her prior testimony. Further, Hallman did not articulate any facts which would support his request for a court appointed expert. Merely making a generalized request without a factual basis therefor is insufficient to establish the right of a defendant to a court appointed expert. Sahlie, supra . More particularly, at the time the motion was made, the state had not hired experts to assist it in this area. There was no reason to believe that the state anticipated utilizing any expert testimony in this area, and there were already two doctors with expertise who were equally available to the state and Hallman. The mere fact that the state chose to call those witnesses at trial does not make them any more the state's witnesses prior to the trial than Hallman's. Those witnesses were clearly dedicated to the needs of the children and not hired guns of the state or solicited by the state to assist the state in its prosecution of this case. In cases of this nature, the court should consider the appointment of an expert to insure that all necessary information is available. However, in this case we find no fault with the trial court denying Hallman's request for an expert. There was no significant reason to believe that the expert would be necessary for an adequate defense in this case, and no reason to believe that the state would call experts to testify about the victim's psychological status and the trauma and psychology surrounding a victim of incest. Until the victim recanted her prior statements, this testimony could not reasonably be anticipated. We recognize that this created a Catch-22 for Hallman. He did not know that an expert would be needed until after the victim recanted her statements. He, nonetheless, was obligated to articulate a basis supporting the court's appointment. Without that basis the trial court could not proceed to appoint such an expert. In any event, this is an area of sound discretion for the trial judge, and this court will not tamper with that judgment, save in its abuse. Logue, supra ; State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159 (S.D.1984). We noted in McCafferty that the defendant has the obligation of showing substantial need before expert examination of a victim is warranted. Hallman failed to make such a showing. Hallman's request was imprecise and in the nature of a fishing expedition. We criticized such tactics in State v. Wounded Head, 305 N.W.2d 677 (S.D.1981). Trial courts should, however, scrutinize a defense request for an expert in order to insure that an indigent defendant may procure any reasonable defense or information necessary to a reasonable defense. In balancing the reasonableness of the appointment, the trial court should, when in doubt, lean toward the appointment of an expert. Sahlie, supra . We recognize that it is sometimes difficult to articulate the unique factual basis needed for a generalized defense. Where the state has an expert, that alone is not sufficient to warrant the appointment of an expert for the defense. The defense must establish an articulable basis for believing that the state's expert will present evidence which could reasonably be contradicted by other experts in the field. See generally, Wounded Head, supra ; Sahlie, supra . Where there is a reasonable expectation that the state will be using psychological testimony at the trial, the trial court should accord considerable weight to whether the defendant would have a need to prepare psychological evidence to refute the state's assertions. Sahlie, supra . The defendant, however, before an expert could be appointed, would need to establish that basis by affidavit. The trial court's decision on such appointment, even where the state does anticipate presenting psychological testimony, is only reversible if there is a clear showing of abuse of that discretion. Logue, supra .