Opinion ID: 509290
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Conduct of the Sentencing Hearing

Text: 16 Weinberg contends that in conducting the sentencing hearing, the district court erred in applying a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard and in admitting hearsay statements of his tenants as to his efforts to defraud them. He also contends that, in any event, the evidence was insufficient to support the government's contentions on the disputed issues. We reject all of these contentions. 17
18 The procedural arguments need not detain us long. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-93, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 2419-21, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), the Supreme Court held that due process does not require application of a standard of proof greater than preponderance in state sentencing proceedings. We have followed McMillan in adopting the preponderance standard for federal sentencing proceedings. See United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d 1052, 1057 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 350, 98 L.Ed.2d 376 (1987). The district court thus applied the proper standard of proof. 19 Nor is there merit in the challenge to the use of hearsay evidence. It has long been established that hearsay evidence is admissible at a sentencing hearing. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949). Even if the defendant challenges the hearsay portions of a presentence report, that evidence need not be disregarded if the government introduces corroborating evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Pugliese, 805 F.2d 1117, 1123 (2d Cir.1986). Here there was ample basis for the court to admit and consider the hearsay testimony now challenged by Weinberg. 20 Prior to the hearing, the government had revealed that it intended to rely on hearsay statements by certain of Weinberg's tenants, including grand jury testimony, and it stated that it would attempt to produce at the hearing any of those declarants desired by Weinberg. Weinberg did not, either in advance of the hearing or thereafter, request the presence of any of the tenants. Further, as indicated below, the hearsay evidence relied on by the government was corroborated by the live testimony of witnesses at the hearing. We conclude that the challenge to the admission of the hearsay evidence is baseless.
21 At the hearing, the government presented documentary evidence and the testimony of several witnesses to show that Weinberg had acted to commit arson, to defraud, inter alios, insurance companies and the tenants of his 82nd Avenue building, and to commit extortionate acts against the tenants. 22 With respect to the arsons and the insurance frauds, the government relied principally on the testimony of John McGhee, an employee of Weinberg. McGhee testified that, at Weinberg's request, he had set two fires at the Fulton Street building. Other evidence suggested that these fires had occurred as McGhee described them. Weinberg challenges the court's conclusion that he arranged for these two arsons, arguing that McGhee's testimony was not credible and pointing out that Weinberg had spent money on repairs to the building before each of the fires. It is, of course, within the province of the trier of fact to decide whether and to what extent a witness's testimony is credible, and to decide which of competing inferences to draw; we will not overturn its findings unless they are clearly erroneous. E.g., United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d at 1058. We find no clear error in the court's finding that Weinberg committed arson and mail fraud with respect to insurance claims. 23 With respect to the fraudulent acts toward the tenants of the 82nd Avenue building, the government introduced the testimony of several witnesses. A special agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms testified that he had spoken with numerous tenants of the building who stated that they had received eviction notices although their rent had in fact been paid. Tenants who had received an eviction notice stated further that they had never received a demand for rent prior to the institution of eviction proceedings, though such a demand was required by New York law. The government introduced these tenants' grand jury testimony to the same effect. 24 Testimony at the hearing by Lottie Mittleman, a former clerical worker at the 82nd Avenue building, corroborated the tenants' statements. The building contained 101 apartments, and Mittleman testified that in the fall and winter of 1979, in accordance with Weinberg's instructions, she prepared 8-10 eviction petitions each month. Each petition contained Weinberg's sworn statement that the rent had been demanded after it had become due and before the eviction petition had been prepared. Mittleman testified that to her knowledge, however, no member of the building staff had ever made a demand for payment of rent. She once asked Weinberg whether such a demand had been made and she was told simply to prepare the petitions and not to ask questions. Weinberg further instructed Mittleman that if a tenant who received an eviction notice complained that the rent had been paid, she was to tell the tenant to seek relief in court. Mittleman testified that Weinberg once asked her to testify falsely at an eviction proceeding that she had made a demand for rent, but she refused to do so. 25 Mittleman testified that Weinberg routinely charged rents in excess of those permitted under New York's rent stabilization guidelines. He instructed her that if a tenant were to inquire about the rent history of an apartment in order to determine whether the current rent was within the permissible range, she should tell the tenant that the old leases had been destroyed. To her knowledge, the old leases had not been destroyed. 26 James Felder, former superintendent of the 82nd Avenue building, testified that Weinberg had removed the sign in the lobby notifying tenants of their rights under the rent stabilization law. Like Mittleman, Felder had been asked by Weinberg to swear falsely at an eviction proceeding that Felder had demanded the rent. 27 Felder also testified with respect to Weinberg's attempts to frighten and use force against the elderly and low-paying tenants of the building. He testified that Weinberg had encouraged alcoholics to loiter in the building, provided them with wine, and instructed Felder not to bother them because he wanted them to frighten the tenants. Felder testified that Weinberg asked him whether he knew of anyone who might be willing to rob or assault some of the elderly tenants (McGhee similarly testified that Weinberg asked McGhee to arrange for someone to brush[ ] against or rough[ ] up tenants in the elevators and corridors) to encourage the tenants to move out. In addition, Felder testified that there was an elderly woman in the building who had complained to local authorities about lack of heat; Weinberg asked Felder whether he knew of anyone who would be willing to rape the woman. 28 We conclude that the evidence was ample to support the district court's findings that Weinberg had committed arson, fraud, and extortionate acts. 29