Opinion ID: 718327
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The State Law Defamation Claim.

Text: 43 Walleri alleged a state law defamation claim on the basis of a memorandum from FHLBS, signed by Faulstich, to the bank staff. The allegedly defamatory statements contained in the memorandum were (1) that Walleri was unable to return to work and that she was terminated for this reason; and (2) that her report of examination was incompletely, inaccurately and inadequately written. Pl. Op. Br.App. at 10. Walleri has conceded her status as a public figure. The court below held that Walleri had failed to come forward with facts from which a reasonable jury could find that defendants had acted with actual malice, as required by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). E.R. at 38-39. 44 To create liability for defamation, there must be a false and defamatory statement. A statement is defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 558, 559 (1976). We fail to see how the first statement--that Walleri was terminated because she was unable to work--is defamatory in nature. Therefore, we find that Walleri could not have maintained a defamation claim based on that statement. 45 As to the second statement--that Walleri's report of examination was incompletely, inaccurately and inadequately written--Walleri admits that she was, in fact, unable to submit any evidence at all that the statement was made with actual malice. However, she argues that she was unable to do so, not because such evidence did not exist, but because at the time of the motion discovery was still pending. Pl. Op. Br. at 37. While defendants' motion for summary judgment on the claim was pending, Walleri requested an extension of time (apparently of about one week) within which to file her response. E.R. at 63-69. The extension was granted. E.R. at 70. Walleri then asked for a continuance of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment so that she would have more time to complete discovery, which she needed to support her first amendment claim; Walleri said nothing in her application about the defamation claim. E.R. at 71-76. The motion for a continuance, which defendants opposed, was denied. E.R. at 87. In the absence of a request for additional discovery on this claim, and of any showing under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f) in support of such a request, the denial of the continuance was not an abuse of discretion. 46 Walleri having produced no evidence of actual malice, the district court properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the defamation claim.