Opinion ID: 765383
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: United States v. Lanier

Text: 158 In United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997), a state judge had been convicted under 18 U.S.C. 242 of criminally violating the constitutional rights of five women by assaulting them sexually in his chambers. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence, United States v. Lanier, 33 F.3d 639(6th Cir. 1994), but the full court, on rehearing en banc, set aside the convictions for lack of any notice to the public that 242 covers simple or sexual assault crimes, holding that 242 criminal liability may be imposed only if the constitutional right allegedly violated is first identified by a decision of the Supreme Court, and only when the right has been held to apply in a factual situation fundamentally similar to the one at bar. United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, declared that [t]he question is whether this standard of notice is higher than the Constitution requires, and we hold that it is[,] Lanier, 520 U.S. at 261, vacated the judgment, and remanded for application of the proper standard [b]ecause the Court of Appeals used the wrong gauge in deciding whether the prior judicial decisions gave fair warning that respondent's actions violated constitutional rights. . . . Id. at 272. 159 Because 242, in lieu of describing the specific conduct it forbids, incorporates constitutional guarantees by reference, which themselves are stated with some catholicity of phrasing[,] [t]he result is that neither the statute[] nor a good many of [its] constitutional referents delineate the range of forbidden conduct with particularity. Id. at 265. The irony of this is that a prosecution to enforce one application of 242's protection of due process can threaten the accused with deprivation of another: what Justice HOLMES spoke of as 'fair warning . . . in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear.' Id. (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)). 'The . . . principle is that no man shall be criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.' Id. (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964) (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954))). 160 In Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), a plurality of the Supreme Court recognized that the openness of the constitutional guarantees, when incorporated by reference into 242, generally are ill-suited to the task of giving fair warning about the scope of criminal responsibility. At the same time, that plurality declared that this constitutional difficulty does not arise when the accused is charged with violating a 'right which has been made specific either by the express terms of the Constitution or laws of the United States or by decisions interpreting them.' Lanier, 520 U.S. at 267 (quoting Screws, 325 U.S. at 104). Accordingly, Screws limited the statute's coverage to rights fairly warned of, having been 'made specific' by the time of the charged conduct. Id. 161 Consequently, the Supreme Court in Lanier concluded that the Sixth Circuit erred in adding as a gloss to this standard the requirement that a prior decision of the Supreme Court has defined the constitutional right at issue in a factual situation fundamentally similar to the one at bar. Id. at 268. The Court explained that the Screws plurality referred in general terms to rights made specific by 'decisions interpreting' the Constitution, and no subsequent case has held that the universe of relevant interpretive decisions is confined to our opinions. Id. (internal citation omitted). It further explained that the Court has specifically referred to court of appeals decisions in defining the established scope of a constitutional right under 241 (citing Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 223-27 (1974)); and in inquiring whether a right was clearly established when applying the qualified immunity rule under 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388(1971). Lanier, 520 U.S. at 268. According to the Court, [D]isparate decisions in various Circuits might leave the law insufficiently certain even on a point widely considered, [but] such a circumstance may be taken into account in deciding whether the warning is fair enough. . . . Id. at 269. 162 Further, the Supreme Court in Lanier stated, it had not demanded precedents applying the constitutional right at issue to a fundamentally similar factual situation, but that it had upheld convictions under 241 or 242 despite notable factual distinctions between the precedents relied upon and the cases then before the court, so long as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights. Id. The Sixth Circuit erred, the Supreme Court stated, in concluding that due process fair warning under 242 demands more than the clearly established qualified immunity test under 1983 or Bivens. Id. [T]he object of the 'clearly established' immunity standard is not different from that of 'fair warning' as it relates to law 'made specific' for the purpose of validly applying 242. . . . To require something clearer than 'clearly established' would, then, call for something beyond 'fair warning.' Id. at 270-71. 163 In sum, the Court in Lanier concluded, as with civil liability under 1983 or Bivens, all that can usefully be said about criminal liability under 242 is that it may be imposed for deprivation of a constitutional right if, but only if, 'in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [under the Constitution is] apparent[.]' Where it is, the constitutional requirement of fair warning is satisfied. Id. at 271-72 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 164