Opinion ID: 184453
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Storming of the Plane

Text: 65 Rezaq also sought to bar the United States from introducing into evidence the fact that 57 passengers died in the Egyptian commandos' ill-fated storming of the plane. The district court denied his motion, finding that the United States could reasonably contend that Rezaq's claimed posttraumatic stress disorder only developed after the hijacking, and that the storming of the plane could have contributed to the symptoms his experts had identified. At trial, the United States brought up the storming of the plane in precisely this context, while cross-examining Rezaq's experts on posttraumatic stress disorder. 66 The fact that 57 passengers died in the storming of the plane might well have been unfairly prejudicial. Even though these deaths were not at issue in the case, the jury could have concluded that someone should be punished for them; the relevant Egyptian officials were not before the court, so that Rezaq would have borne the brunt of the jury's ire. But the facts surrounding the storming of the plane also had significant probative value, as it could be argued that the traumatic effects of this incident were comparable to the effects of many of the incidents Rezaq himself cited as causes of his asserted PTSD. We therefore find that the district court's decision to admit the evidence was an appropriate application of Rule 403. 11 E. Mid-Trial Publicity 67 The night after the government's closing argument, on Wednesday, July 17, 1996, TWA Flight 800 crashed off the coast of Long Island, on its route from New York to Paris. The disaster was covered extensively in various media; indeed, one survey indicated that it was the most heavily covered news event of 1996. News coverage was filled with speculation as to the cause of the crash, and one frequently cited theory was that terrorists (perhaps from the Middle East) were responsible. News coverage also observed that the plane had previously flown out of Athens, which one article (in the Washington Post) said was known as a base for terrorists. Don Phillips, 747 Explodes with 229 Aboard, WASHINGTON POST, July 18, 1996, at A1, A19. Athens, of course, was where Rezaq and his confederates boarded the Air Egypt flight. 68 The jury had not been sequestered or instructed to avoid news coverage, and was thus presumably exposed to the initial news of the crash. On the morning after the crash, at the request of Rezaq's counsel, the district court told the jury that the crash was unrelated to the case and to put the event out of their minds. Rezaq's counsel did not, however, ask that the jury be told to avoid further news coverage, and they were not given any such instruction. Rezaq's counsel gave his closing argument that same day, and the jury began to deliberate that afternoon. On the following day, Friday, July 19, after further news coverage speculating about terrorism, Rezaq moved for a mistrial; the motion was denied. That afternoon, the jury returned a guilty verdict. Rezaq now argues that the district court erred in declining to grant his motion for a mistrial, and, in the alternative, that the district court should have conducted individual voir dire of the jurors, and that its failure to do so requires that he receive a new trial. 69 Given that it is quite unlikely that publicity about an unrelated air crash could impair a jury's ability to remain impartial, we find that the district court's response to the publicity was appropriate in all respects. This court has adopted a three-part approach for district courts to apply in addressing potentially prejudicial media influence on the jury. The court is to (1) decide whether the material is prejudicial, (2) decide whether jurors were exposed to it, and (3) examine jurors to see if they can remain impartial. See United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 501 (D.C.Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 986, 136 L.Ed.2d 867 (1997). As to the second factor, the jurors hardly could have avoided exposure. As to the first, we find that there was at most a modest risk of prejudice. In most cases involving prejudicial publicity during trial, the publicity relates directly to the issues in the trial itself; here, the publicity was about an unrelated event that might have indirectly influenced the jury's perceptions of the case before it. Given the magnitude of the crash, the saturation news coverage, and the speculation that terrorists were to blame, it is theoretically possible that the sensibilities of some jurors might have been affected, heightening their reluctance to consider on their merits Rezaq's defenses of insanity and obedience to orders. 12 70 Turning to the third element of Williams-Davis, Rezaq complains that the district court, rather than conducting an individual voir dire, only questioned the jury as a whole as to whether it could remain impartial. Although the method of conducting the voir dire is left to the sound discretion of the district court, Waldorf v. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 710 (3d Cir.1993), the collective voir dire is not ordinarily the instrument of choice for discerning the impartiality of jurors. See Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504, 508 (D.C.Cir.1959) (It is too much to expect of human nature that a juror would volunteer, in open court, before his fellow jurors, that he would be influenced in his verdict by a newspaper story of the trial.). Here, however, the district court found, and Rezaq's counsel agreed, that it was important to avoid linking the crash with the trial in the jurors' minds, and that a single general question, directed to the jury as a whole, was the most appropriate way to accomplish this goal. Given the close involvement of his counsel in the process of formulating the court's response to the crash, Rezaq cannot object now to the approach the district court adopted. Indeed, Rezaq's counsel has effectively conceded on this appeal that he made a strategic decision not to seek an individual voir dire, saying that [s]uch a suggestion from counsel would have undercut the defense position that nothing could be done to alleviate the prejudice short of a mistrial. 71 Nor did the district court err in declining to declare a mistrial. The risk of prejudice from the crash-related publicity, although real, was somewhat reduced by the fact that the district court instructed the jurors to put the publicity out of their minds. On balance, the risk falls short of that degree of significance which has in other cases been found to warrant a new trial. See, e.g., Waldorf v. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 711 (3d Cir.1993) (jurors brought relevant news article into the jury room and discussed it there); United States v. Littlefield, 752 F.2d 1429, 1432 (9th Cir.1985) (similar); United States v. Lord, 565 F.2d 831, 838 (2d Cir.1977) (news coverage revealing prejudicial information about the defendant). F. Restitution 72 The district court ordered that Rezaq pay a total of $254,000 in restitution to seven victims. Rezaq argues that the district court erred in the manner in which it calculated the amount of his restitution, both in failing to consider his ability to pay, and in failing to demand more detailed proof of the amount of the victims' losses. 1. Ability to Pay 73 The provision under which the district court ordered restitution states: 74 The court, in determining whether to order restitution under section 3579 of this title and the amount of such restitution, shall consider the amount of the loss sustained by any victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate. 75 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a). Rezaq claims that the district court failed to consider his financial resources and his earning ability in setting the amount of his restitution, and that this was error. 13 76 In United States v. Bapack, 129 F.3d 1320 (D.C.Cir.1997), we set forth our interpretation of section 3364's requirement that the district court shall consider these factors. We found that it was appropriate to treat orders of restitution as we do fines; as to fines, where the record demonstrates that the judge considered [a] factor before imposing the fine, the appellate court will not reverse the fine merely because no express finding was made but will review the finding of ability to pay necessarily implied by such consideration. See Bapack, 129 F.3d at 1328 (quoting United States v. Mastropierro, 931 F.2d 905, 906 (D.C.Cir.1991)). 77 The record demonstrates that the district court considered Rezaq's ability to pay in setting the amount of its restitution order. As to Rezaq's present ability to pay, the district court ordered at sentencing that [t]he $850 in the registry of the court will be paid to the victims, demonstrating that it knew the (limited) extent of Rezaq's assets. As to Rezaq's future earning ability, the district court could hardly have been ignorant of the fact that Rezaq's anticipated sentence would greatly restrict his earnings; imprisonment is rarely lucrative. In a brief filed with the district court, the United States argued that Rezaq might seek to write books or articles on his crimes, and thus might later have the resources to pay a large order of restitution. Rezaq's brief replied that this was quite unlikely to occur. Given the district court's demonstrated familiarity with Rezaq's present ability to pay, an issue addressed in the same set of briefs, it is fair to conclude that the district court made its ruling in light of those briefs, and hence considered the information they presented as to Rezaq's future earning ability. Cf. United States v. Cannizzaro, 871 F.2d 809, 811-12 (9th Cir.1989). We therefore find that there is adequate evidence that the district court considered this factor. 14 2. Adequacy of Documentation 78 The Probation Office provided the district court with copies of Victim Impact Statements from seven victims of the hijacking. The statements were very detailed, consuming a total of forty-two pages; the impacts they listed included extensive injuries and associated medical expenses, psychological harms, disruptions to the victims' lives, and loss of income and property. The record also included numerous signed statements from physicians, psychiatrists, and employers corroborating the victims' accounts of their losses; one victim also appended translations of newspaper articles and of an appellate brief relating to her unsuccessful efforts to obtain compensation in the Egyptian courts. The district court's order of restitution included all of the financial impacts listed in the victims' statements, including medical expenses, lost wages, and lost property. 79 Any amount to be paid in restitution must be obtained by accurate computation and cannot exceed the amount of loss actually caused. United States v. Forzese, 756 F.2d 217, 222 (1st Cir.1985) (emphasis omitted). This rule protects both the rights of the defendant and those of the victims, who will often share the defendant's limited assets pro rata and who will therefore be harmed if another victim receives an improperly high award. The district court had sufficient evidence on which to base its award of restitution in this case. The documentation before the court was extensive, especially when considered in light of the fact that the crime was committed over ten years earlier. Awards of restitution are reviewed for abuse of discretion, United States v. Henoud, 81 F.3d 484, 487 (4th Cir.1996); we are satisfied that no such abuse occurred here.G. Classified Materials 80 When classified materials may be relevant to criminal proceedings, the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. app. III (1994), provides procedures designed to protect the rights of the defendant while minimizing the associated harm to national security. In the course of preparing for trial, the United States identified a number of arguably discoverable classified materials, and obtained permission from the district court to file an ex parte, in camera motion for a protective order. After reviewing this motion and the accompanying documents, the district court ordered the United States to prepare an index listing the contents of each document, whether it believed the document to be subject to discovery, and why. This document, too, was submitted ex parte and in camera; the district court subjected this document to detailed review, and prepared a list of the materials that it considered discoverable. 81 Under CIPA, the court may allow the United States to disclose a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend to prove, in lieu of disclosing the information itself. 18 U.S.C. app. III § 4 (1994). The United States sought, and obtained, permission to substitute admissions for all of the documents that the district court had identified as discoverable. The district court reviewed the United States's proposed substitutions, and concluded that they fairly stated the relevant elements of the classified documents. The substitutions were then disclosed to Rezaq's attorney. 82 Rezaq's request on appeal is very limited. He does not ask us to review the district court's determination as to which documents were discoverable in the first instance. Instead, he asks only that we review the documents that the district court found to be discoverable, and decide whether the summaries that the court furnished to him were as helpful to his defense as the original documents would have been. He is particularly concerned that the summaries may have omitted important information, or that the process of transforming the documents into desiccated statements of material fact might have hampered the evidentiary richness and narrative integrity of the defense he was able to present. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 651. 83 We found in Yunis that a defendant seeking classified information is not entitled to receive it on a mere showing of theoretical relevance, but is entitled only to information that is at least 'helpful to the defense of the accused.'  867 F.2d at 623 (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61, 77 S.Ct. 623, 627-28, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957)). This principle applies to sub-elements of individual documents; if some portion or aspect of a document is classified, a defendant is entitled to receive it only if it may be helpful to his defense. A court applying this rule should, of course, err on the side of protecting the interests of the defendant. In some cases, a court might legitimately conclude that it is necessary to place a fact in context in order to ensure that the jury is able to give it its full weight. For instance, it might be appropriate in some circumstances to attribute a statement to its source, or to phrase it as a quotation. As the Court said in Old Chief, [a] syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a courtroom may be no match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove it. 519 U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 654. 15 84 The district court's substitution decisions turned on the relevance of the facts contained in the discoverable documents, and are therefore reviewed, like other relevance decisions under CIPA, for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 625 (D.C.Cir.1989). We are obliged to consider the district court's substitution decisions very carefully, as Rezaq's counsel is unable to consult the original documents, and so cannot present arguments on his client's behalf. We have accordingly conducted a detailed in camera comparison of the originals of the discoverable documents with the summaries approved by the district court. We find that the district court did a commendable job of discharging its obligations under CIPA, and in particular that its orders protected Rezaq's rights very effectively despite the fact that Rezaq's attorney was unable to participate in the CIPA proceedings. No information was omitted from the substitutions that might have been helpful to Rezaq's defense, and the discoverable documents had no unclassified features that might have been disclosed to Rezaq.