Opinion ID: 2633286
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Exclusion of Testimony from Rego Roberto Maderos Regarding the Identity of His Mother's Attacker

Text: During pretrial interviews, de Maderos denied that she told her son, Rego Roberto de Maderos (Rego Roberto), that she did not recognize her attacker. She stated she recognized defendant's voice. During Rego Roberto's interview, he stated that at the time of the attack, his mother stated, I didn't recognize him. Defense counsel sought to introduce this statement to rebut the prosecution's evidence that defendant attacked de Maderos and sought an evidentiary hearing under Evidence Code section 402. Rego Roberto would have testified that at the time de Maderos was attacked, he was working in a nearby field when he heard her scream and ran to her. He asked de Maderos, What happened to you, mother? She answered that a man wanted to kill her and that his face was covered. When Rego Roberto asked her, Who could it be?, she replied I didn't recognize him. Rego Roberto would have testified further that the attacker did not leave a machete behind, that defendant was not the attacker, and that he considered defendant to be a nice person. The trial court denied defendant's motion on the grounds Rego Roberto was not competent to testify about the attack because he did not witness it and his belief that someone else attacked de Maderos was irrelevant. During the penalty phase, defendant renewed his motion for the admission of Rego Roberto's testimony, specifically his statement that he told his mother someone else attacked her. The court denied his motion, explaining that Rego Roberto's testimony was inadmissible because he did not witness the attack, his testimony was offered on a collateral issue, and his testimony was based on rumors. In addition, the court ruled the testimony was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352 on the grounds it would mislead the jury and necessitate undue consumption of time. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding the proffered testimony on the ground that de Maderos's statement that she did not recognize her attacker was admissible as a prior inconsistent statement. (Evid.Code, § 1235). [19] The People argue defendant forfeited this issue because he failed to object on this ground at trial. We disagree. To preserve for appeal an alleged error in excluding evidence, a party must make an offer of proof informing the trial court of the purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence. (Evid.Code, § 354, subd, (a); see People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 108, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296.) In this case, defense counsel's written motion made clear he sought admission of Rego Roberto's testimony to rebut de Maderos's testimony that she was assaulted by defendant in Guatemala. We find this offer of proof adequate to preserve the issue. Evidence that de Maderos told her son that she did not recognize her attacker would have been admissible as a prior inconsistent statement. Evidence Code section 1235 states, in pertinent part: Evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with his [or her] testimony at the hearing. . . . Prior inconsistent statements are admissible under this provision to prove their substance as well as to impeach the declarant. ( People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 55, fn. 4, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118.) In this case, de Maderos's testimony at trial identifying defendant as her attacker was inconsistent with the proffered testimony that shortly after the attack she said she did not recognize her attacker. Nonetheless, error in excluding this evidence was harmless. De Maderos was impeached by counsel when she revealed on cross-examination that prior to giving her testimony on direct examination, she had not mentioned that she saw defendant's face during the attack. During previous interviews, she stated that defendant's face was covered by a bandana and that she recognized him only by his voice. In addition, de Maderos gave equivocal or ambiguous answers when asked why she failed to report the attack and whether she feared retaliation for testifying against defendant. Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable possibility that further impeachment of de Maderos regarding her identification of defendant as her attacker would have affected the verdict. ( People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1265, fn. 11, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 468, 64 P.3d 762; see also People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 479, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442 [with respect to penalty phase error, our state law reasonable possibility standard is equivalent to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 which governs federal constitutional error].) [20]