Opinion ID: 2395626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The proper standard for a public policy exception

Text: This court has long and consistently adhered to the rule that employment is presumed to be at will, unless the contract of employment expressly provides otherwise. Thus an employer may discharge an at-will employee at any time and for any reason, or for no reason at all. Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., supra, 597 A.2d at 30 (citing cases); [1] see, e.g., Thigpen v. Greenpeace, Inc., 657 A.2d 770, 771 (D.C.1995); Taylor v. Greenway Restaurant, Inc., 173 A.2d 211, 211 (D.C.Mun.1961); Pfeffer v. Ernst, 82 A.2d 763, 764 (D.C.Mun.1951). In Adams we reiterated our commitment to this principle, but created a very narrow exception under which a discharged at-will employee may sue his or her former employer for wrongful discharge when the sole reason for the discharge is the employee's refusal to violate the law, as expressed in a statute or municipal regulation. [2] 597 A.2d at 32 (citations omitted). [3] In Sorrells v. Garfinckel's, supra note 3, a pre- Adams opinion, this court had turned down another plea to carve out a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine. We also observed that even if we had been so inclined, there was no statutorily declared public policy to support that particular plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim. Sorrells, 565 A.2d at 289 (citing Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831, 833 (D.C.1981) (Ferren, J., dissenting)). We rejected a request to `broaden' the policies expressed in [a certain statute] and to fill a perceived `gap' in the [statute], 565 A.2d at 289, choosing instead to limit ourselves to ascertaining whether any specific statutory right of the plaintiff had been infringed. Adams likewise limits its focus to an identifiable or officially declared public policy in considering whether to recognize a public policy exception. 597 A.2d at 34. I would hold that the recognition of any public policy exception to the at-will doctrine must be solidly based on a statute or regulation that reflects the particular public policy to be applied, or (if appropriate) on a constitutional provision concretely applicable to the defendant's conduct. [4] This is consistent with Sorrells and Adams, read together. See also Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1095, 824 P.2d 680, 687-688, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 881-882 (1992). To hold otherwise would reduce the at-will doctrine to a virtual nullity, for it would leave this court (and the trial court as well) without any standard by which to assess the so-called policy being urged upon us in a given case. I am aware that other courts have adopted public policy exceptions that are more expansive and based on broader foundations than ours. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 106 & n. 3 (Colo.1992) (noting thirty-seven jurisdictions with some sort of public policy exception to the at-will doctrine). One court, for example, has defined public policy as that principle of law which holds that no one can lawfully do that which tends to be injurious to the public or against the public good. Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 871 (Mo.Ct.App.1985). But this definition illustrates just how nebulous the concept of public policy can be. What court can, with any reasonable degree of certainty, identify the public good or decide just what is injurious to the public? One person's notion of public injury may well be another person's societal good. Indeed, the very notion of public policy is often vague and exists primarily in the eye of the beholder. In general, I believe that courts should refrain from trying to determine or articulate public policy. Unless the issue to be decided directly affects the administration of justice or the judicial process, or the application of established legal principles, courts should generally abstain from making declarations of public policy. Such pronouncements should be left to the other branches of government, particularly the legislature, which is in a far better position than a court to make policy decisions on behalf of the citizenry. The common law that the courts of the District of Columbia have developed over the years is that employment is at will unless a contract or a statute provides otherwise, or unless there is a public policy exception. This case does not alter that basic legal framework; it presents only the question whether Ms. Carl's situation involves a proper public policy exception. I do not question the judicial power to revis[e] and enlarg[e] the common law ... to meet the changes of a dynamic society, [5] and to look to prior decisions for guidance in recognizing and enforcing some policy that has already been established by the executive or legislative branch of the government. Indeed, judges throughout the land do exactly that on a daily basis. Where I disagree with some of my colleagues is over the suggestion that a judge or group of judges may create public policy and then enforce it. I am unwilling to accept the notion that a court can or should go that far, for policy-making is not part of the usual judicial function. Linkins, supra note 5, 87 U.S.App. D.C. at 355, 187 F.2d at 361. Judge Ferren's separate opinion, although primarily addressed to Judge Steadman's dissent, appears to find an inconsistency between my view of the general advisability of abstention by the courts from declaring public policy and this court's decision in Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062 (D.C.1990) (en banc). In Williams, however, while we recognized that the issue presented there (whether, and to what extent, a plaintiff can recover tort damages for fear of harm to a third person) was a question of policy for the court to decide, id. at 1072, we were referring to policy in the sense of the framework of traditional and accepted negligence principles, id. at 1073 (citation omitted). Within that framework we modestly expanded the scope of recovery for the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. That is very different from a court's undertaking in every case of claimed wrongful discharge to balance the interests of the employee, the employer, and the public, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 71, 417 A.2d 505, 511 (1980), and decide for itself the proper public policy outcome of the dispute. In this regard we are mindful of what the Supreme Court of California has said: [P]ublic policy as a concept is notoriously resistant to precise definition, and [therefore] courts should venture into this area, if at all, with great care and due deference to the judgment of the legislative branch, lest they mistake their own predilections for public policy which deserves recognition at law.      ... [C]ourts in wrongful discharge actions may not declare public policy without a basis in either the constitution or statutory provisions. A public policy exception carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions strikes the proper balance among the interests of employers, employees, and the public. The employer is bound, at a minimum, to know the fundamental public policies of the state and nation as expressed in their constitutions and statutes; so limited, the public policy exception presents no impediment to employers that operate within the bounds of law. Employees are protected against employer actions that contravene fundamental state policy. And society's interests are served through a more stable job market, in which its most important policies are safeguarded. Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, supra, 1 Cal.4th at 1095, 824 P.2d at 687-688, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 881-882 (citations omitted; emphasis in original). Like the court in Gantt, this court in the past has sought to make sure that any judicially recognized public policy exception to the at-will doctrine is carefully tethered [6] to rights officially recognized in statutes or regulations by the elected representatives of the peoplethe public whose policy we are talking about. Future requests to recognize such exceptions, therefore, should be addressed only on a case-by-case basis. This court should consider seriously only those arguments that reflect a clear mandate of public policy i.e., those that make a clear showing, based on some identifiable policy that has been officially declared [7] in a statute or municipal regulation, or in the Constitution, that a new exception is needed. Furthermore, there must be a close fit between the policy thus declared and the conduct at issue in the allegedly wrongful termination. [8]