Opinion ID: 2996577
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discovery and Pretrial Rulings

Text: Defendants also raise several objections to pretrial rulings by the district court, and we review their complaints keeping in mind that “[d]istrict courts have broad discretion in discovery matters.” Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 3 Although neither party discusses the case, in United States v. Pace, 314 F.3d 344, 350 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit held that venue for a wire fraud offense may only “lie where there is a direct or causal connection to the . . . wires.” This approach differs with the rubric we have established for analyzing venue in Frederick, Ochoa, and Ringer, and we decline to adopt the analysis outlined by the Ninth Circuit in Pace. Nos. 02-4356, 03-1005 & 03-1232 11 F.3d 628, 646 (7th Cir. 2001). We review discovery challenges for abuse of discretion, and “[w]e shall not reverse the district court’s ruling absent a clear showing that the denial of discovery resulted in actual and substantial prejudice to [defendants].” Id. at 646; see also United States v. Avery, 208 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2000). We note at the outset that the government maintained an open-file policy in this case, by which defendants, through their copy vendor, could copy all of the government’s records, and the district court observed that defendants had “extraordinary access” to documents in this case. Furthermore, defendants have failed to show actual prejudice from any of the issues they have raised with the discovery process. Despite this fatal flaw, we will briefly discuss their contentions for the sake of completeness. We first review the district court’s rejection of defendants’ motion for a continuance. In late January 2002, Pearson moved for a trial continuance, the third such request made by defendants. Defendants argue that they needed more time to prepare for trial because 86 boxes of discovery material had not yet been copied by defendants’ copy vendor, and because of the large volume of documents. Importantly, defendants do not argue that the government did not make the 86 boxes of documents available to them, only that the log maintained by the U.S. Postal Inspector’s Office to account for the government boxes being taken for copying by defendants’ copy vendor indicated that 86 boxes had not yet been copied.4 After providing defendants free and open access to the documents through its open-file policy, the government was under no obligation to ensure 4 Defendants also complain about an additional 23 boxes that the log indicates were received by defendants’ copy vendor, but of which defendants did not receive copies. This seems to be a problem more properly addressed to the copy vendor, not to the court. 12 Nos. 02-4356, 03-1005 & 03-1232 that defendants took advantage of the open files by actually copying or reviewing each box. Further, although there was a large amount of discovery to review in preparation for trial, defendants had one year from the date of the first superceding indictment and seven and one-half months from the date of the second superceding indictment to prepare for trial. We do not find any abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion for a continuance, as defendants had adequate time and access to discovery in order to prepare for trial. Second, we consider defendants’ argument that the district court should have required the government to provide defendants with a list of potential witnesses and a list of its trial exhibits. Despite the fact that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 addresses many of the defendants’ concerns, their briefs are noticeably silent as to the Rule’s provisions. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E) provides: Upon a defendant’s request, the government must permit the defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph books, papers, documents . . . or copies or portions of any of these items, if the item is within the government’s possession, custody, or control and: (i) the item is material to preparing the de- fense; (ii) the government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial; or (iii) the item was obtained from or belongs to the defendant. As we have noted before, the law is clear that neither the Constitution nor Rule 16 entitles a defendant to a list of all prospective witnesses before trial in a noncapital case. See United States v. Napue, 834 F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. Nos. 02-4356, 03-1005 & 03-1232 13 1987).5 The district court may require the government to provide a witness list, see United States v. Edwards, 47 F.3d 841, 843 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Jackson, 508 F.2d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 1975), but, as Congress recognized when it declined to include such a requirement in Rule 16, a district court may also choose not to exercise that prerogative, since providing a witness list might in some cases discourage witnesses from testifying or lead to “ ‘improper contact directed at influencing their testimony.’ ” Napue, 834 F.2d at 1317 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 94-414 (1975), reprinted in U.S.S.C.A.N. 674, 713, 716). With respect to the provision of an exhibit list, defendants admit that they received copies of the exhibits themselves, and they limit their complaint to the lack of a list of the exhibits to aid in their organization for trial. As noted earlier, Rule 16 requires the government to make certain physical objects and documents available for inspection and copying, but it is silent as to any responsibility by the government to provide an organizational guide to those materials for defendants. Although provision of an exhibit list likely would have made this trial more efficient for all involved, and we certainly encourage parties to exchange them pretrial, we cannot find the district court abused its discretion for failing to order the government to furnish lists that Rule 16 does not require it to provide.6 5 We note that defendants do not argue that the government failed to comply with the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b), which requires the government, upon defendants’ motion, to produce statements made by any of its witnesses which the particular witnesses signed, adopted, or approved, and which pertain to their testimony at trial. Instead, defendants’ argument focuses on the provision of a list of witnesses before they took the stand. 6 Because the government did provide the district court with a courtesy copy of an exhibit list, defendants also argue that the (continued...) 14 Nos. 02-4356, 03-1005 & 03-1232 Next, defendants argue that the district court erred in rejecting their motion to compel the production of approximately 3800 allegedly-defective batteries that the government obtained from Sears. Defendants allege that, despite the fact that the batteries were never introduced at trial, the government’s refusal to turn over the batteries compromised their ability to defend against the accusation that the batteries were defective because they could not have the batteries tested to determine their quality. The batteries were never analyzed by any party, and the government contends that they could not have been tested because their condition had deteriorated to a point that made reliable testing impossible. Defendants disagree and argue that testing would have been merely difficult, not impossible. Rule 16 requires the government to provide access to objects “which are material to the preparation of the defendant’s defense or are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at trial.” In United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 462 (1996), the Court held that “material to the preparation of the defendant’s defense” means “the defendant’s response to the Government’s case in chief,” and does not include materials deemed by defendants to be necessary to prove their own defense theory or to challenge the pros- 6 (...continued) government’s failure to provide them with the same list constituted ex parte communication in violation of United States v. Culp, 7 F.3d 613 (7th Cir. 1993). Culp rightly noted that the government has a professional obligation under ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5(b) to provide a copy to defense counsel of “any papers, documents or exhibits he files with the court in order to avoid an ex parte contact with the judge.” Id. at 616 n.1. Despite the fact that defendants’ ex parte argument misses the mark—no information was hidden from them since they had copies of the exhibits themselves—we emphasize that simply providing a copy of the exhibit list to the defendants would have avoided this unnecessary dispute. Nos. 02-4356, 03-1005 & 03-1232 15 ecutor’s conduct of the case. Defendants argue that even though the 3800 batteries were not part of the government’s case, test results could have been used to respond generally to the government’s allegations that the batteries were defective. But even if we assume that the batteries could have been tested and we assume that defendants could have used test results to defend against the government’s case in chief under Armstrong, it is difficult to imagine how defendants could have suffered actual prejudice from the lack of access to the batteries. When Exide pled guilty, it stipulated that the batteries were manufactured and distributed with latent defects. On the other hand, we fail to see what harm could have come from the government turning over the batteries. But given the uncertainty about the condition of the batteries and Exide’s stipulation that the batteries were in fact defective, we do not think the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion to compel the batteries rises to an abuse of discretion.7 Finally, defendants allege that the government improperly failed to turn over several documents in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In order to establish a Brady violation, defendants must show “(1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) that the evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) that the evidence was material to an issue at trial.” United States v. Silva, 71 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1995). Defendants offer three “examples” of Brady violations, but in each case fail to articulate why the evidence sought was not available to defendants 7 Defendants also object to the district court’s refusal to compel production of a CD-Rom holding battery data. The CD-Rom contained an inventory of manufacturing codes and internal serial numbers that were placed on the batteries. We do not see how this information is relevant to defendants’ case, and we find no error in the district court’s decision to deny defendants’ motion to compel. 16 Nos. 02-4356, 03-1005 & 03-1232 through the exercise of due diligence. See United States v. O’Hara, 301 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2002). They first point to the government’s refusal to turn over the grand jury testimony of Tim Findlay, who, according to Pearson, coordinated an Exide management buy-out plan to purchase Kmart’s auto centers. Putting aside their failure to explain the relevance of Findlay’s grand jury testimony to the case at bar, the district court found, and defendants do not dispute, that Findlay was available to be called as a witness for the defense. Defendants’ other Brady allegations are equally unconvincing. They posit that the government should have turned over the debriefing notes of a co-defendant who pled guilty and agreed to cooperate with the government, and that it should have provided the grand jury testimony of defendant Hawkins’s son, Lee Hawkins. These strike us as witnesses who would be easily available to defendants, and defendants have not explained to the contrary. Under these circumstances, we find no error under Brady in the district court’s refusal to order the government to turn over these materials.