Opinion ID: 3165054
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: e., recklessly or wantonly.

Text: Unlike Everitt, the claims here are for intentional torts. However, the reasonableness of the defendants’ actions, and thus, the absence of negligence, is still a part of the analysis of both torts. To prevail on a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must show four elements: (1) the defendant acted with the intent of confining him within boundaries fixed by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s act directly or indirectly resulted in the plaintiff's confinement; (3) the plaintiff was conscious of or harmed by the confinement; and (4) the defendant acted without legal authority. Ojo v. Lorenzo, 164 N.H. 717, 726 (2013). Although “a lack of probable cause is not an element of false 12 imprisonment,” probable cause is “a defense to a claim for false imprisonment resulting from a warrantless detention.” Id. at 727. The four elements of a claim for malicious prosecution are: (1) the plaintiff was subjected to a criminal prosecution or civil proceeding instituted by the defendant; (2) without probable cause; (3) with malice; and (4) the prior action terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. Probable cause, or the lack thereof, is an element of malicious prosecution and a defense to a claim of false imprisonment. Therefore, negligence, which, as we earlier explained, equates to a lack of the reasonableness required for probable cause, remains a critical part of the analysis for these claims notwithstanding that they are intentional torts. Because there would be no liability if the officer acted reasonably, immunity would not offer any real protection, even for these intentional torts, if it could be defeated by a mere showing of negligence. Additionally, “objectively reasonable” has a particular meaning in the context of immunity. The proper standard is not the conduct expected of an individual who is disconnected from the situation. Rather, we consider objective reasonableness from the perspective of the actor in question. As the First Circuit stated in a qualified immunity case: “[T]his suit may go forward only if the unlawfulness of the arrest would have been apparent to an objectively reasonable officer standing in [the defendant]’s shoes.” Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2004) (emphasis added); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) (“Rather, objective reasonableness turns on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. A court must make this determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” (citation and quotation omitted)). Given the contours of “reasonably” and “objectively reasonable” in the immunity context, there is not the conflict between Huckins and Everitt that the plaintiff asserts. The trial court applied the recklessness standard from Everitt, which states that “municipal police officers are immune from personal liability for decisions, acts or omissions that are . . . not made in a wanton or reckless manner.” Everitt, 156 N.H. at 219. The standard we articulated in Huckins permits immunity “for intentional torts committed by government officials or employees who act under a reasonable belief in the lawfulness of their conduct.” Huckins, 166 N.H. at 182 (quotation omitted). Although the two standards may appear to be at odds because of the disparate language used, for the reasons explained above, the standards are in reality the same. We therefore hold that the determination of whether the defendants here are entitled to immunity from liability for the intentional tort claims brought by the plaintiff requires an inquiry into whether they acted recklessly or wantonly as to the lawfulness of their conduct. 13