Opinion ID: 1879671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Opinion Testimony of Officer Corr

Text: Shane Corr, an officer with the Bay St. Louis Police Department assigned to the Gulf Coast Multi-Jurisdictional Task Force, testified that a typical user of marijuana purchased his supply in quarter (1/4) gram quantities. According to Corr, thirty-one (31) grams equals an ounce. After testifying that he had an opportunity to observe the marijuana seized in this case, Officer Shane Corr was asked whether, in his experience, he had ever found anyone with that much marijuana who intended it merely for their personal consumption. Sample objected to this question. After some discussion about the matter, the objection was overruled. Corr then answered as follows: For the common user no, sir, this is way too much of a quantity for him to use for his personal use. Sample claims this testimony was inadmissible because Corr was never qualified and tendered as an expert witness. Officer Corr had been a member of the Mississippi Gulf Coast Multi-Jurisdictional Narcotic Task Force (NTF) for ten (10) months at the time he became involved in this case and had worked the streets of Harrison County in an undercover capacity making purchases of drugs, including cocaine and marijuana. He was never qualified as an expert witness. Corr testified without objection that the street value of one (1) ounce of marijuana in January of 1990 was $140 to $160, that normal street usage would be for a person to purchase a quarter gram of marijuana for his personal use, and that there were 31 grams in an ounce. Corr also testified, over objection, that based upon his experience with the task force, the customary packaging of marijuana was in ziploc bags, of either quarter grams or half grams. The State, citing Stringer v. State, 557 So.2d 796, 797-98 (Miss. 1990), and Boches v. State, 506 So.2d 254, 260 (Miss. 1987), contends this type of testimony was relevant on the issue of intent to distribute. On occasion this Court has brought this matter to the attention of the State for failing to present evidence. See Bryant v. State, 427 So.2d 131, 132-33 (Miss. 1983). The proof established no more than a mere suspicion of intent to deliver because the State failed to demonstrate that the quantity the defendant possessed did not exceed what Sample could consume within a reasonable time. Although Officer Corr was never qualified as an expert witness, he had worked the streets as a member of the narcotics task force. The basis for his testimony was his recent experience in buying illegal drugs, including marijuana and cocaine. Rule 701, Miss.R.Ev., which deals with opinion testimony by lay witnesses, states, in its entirety, that [i]f the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to the clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. There is often a very thin line between fact and opinion. The problem with Corr's expert testimony is that it runs afoul of our stated policy requiring that expert witnesses be first tendered as such before being allowed to express expert opinions. Roberson v. State, 569 So.2d 691, 696 (Miss. 1990). To sanction this testimony attempts to circumvent this policy by the familiar retreat to Miss.R.Evid. 701, which some attorneys would use to justify all transgressions of our discovery and evidentiary policies concerning expert opinion. There is a bright line rule. That is, where, in order to express the opinion, the witness must possess some experience or expertise beyond that of the average, randomly selected adult, it is a Miss.R.Evid. 702 opinion and not a Rule 701 opinion. Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Gilich, 609 So.2d 367, 377 (Miss. 1992) (lay opinions are those which require no specialized knowledge however attained); Seal v. Miller, 605 So.2d 240, 244 (Miss. 1992) (question calling on police officer to respond based on experience as an officer investigating accidents is by definition not a lay opinion.) Wells v. State, 604 So.2d 271, 279 (Miss. 1992) ([I]f particular knowledge ... is necessary to assist the trier of fact ... then such testimony would never qualify as a lay witness opinion under M.R.E. 701.) It is important that we not blur the distinction between Rules 701 and 702, not so much for admissibility, as for notice and opportunity to prepare rebuttal. Expert testimony and opinions are subject to special discovery rules in both the civil and criminal arenas. Miss.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4); Unif.Cr. R.Cir.Ct. 4.06(a)(4). This Court has also adopted a policy which dictates that Rule 702 witnesses be offered as such before offering Rule 702 testimony. Roberson v. State, 569 So.2d at 696. This policy allows the opposing party ample opportunity to challenge the witness' qualifications to render such opinion before the question soliciting opinion is posed in front of the jury. Corr was allowed to express his opinions concerning the value, normal street usage and customary packaging of marijuana based upon his training and experience as a narcotics officer. He was, therefore, a Rule 702 expert. Wells v. State, 604 So.2d at 279. Under this Court's policy, he should have been tendered as such to have his qualifications tested through voir dire before being allowed to offer the expert opinions. Roberson v. State, 569 So.2d at 696. Corr was not so tendered and, in the failure to require that procedure, the court erred. On retrial, this procedure should be followed.