Opinion ID: 2623595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Introduction of Allegedly Coerced Statements

Text: Defendants contend their convictions must be reversed because the trial court improperly allowed the prosecutor to impeach them with postarrest statements that each allegedly made involuntarily as a result of police coercion. Although the issue is close, we reject defendants' contentions and conclude the statements were voluntarily made.
In order to resolve this issue, we find it necessary to recite in some detail the circumstances under which the statements were given. By the time of defendants' arrest on November 14, 1986, seven days after Novis disappeared, Redlands Police Department investigators had become aware of possible connections between the Novis case and the murder of Lynell Murray in Huntington Beach. After defendants' arrest, investigators from both localities interviewed them at the Redlands Police Department. Officers believed that in light of Marlow's criminal experience, he probably would not be forthcoming during interrogation and that Coffman, by contrast, was more likely to cooperate with them. Accordingly, they first questioned Coffman for some three and a half hours, from about 5:30 p.m. until about 9:00 p.m. During the course of this interview, officers gave Coffman coffee, cigarettes, food and socks for her bare feet. Coffman complained of a wound on her leg, but the record does not reflect that she was provided medical attention during this period. Officers also falsely told Coffman that Marlow was providing police with information and ratting on her. At the end of this first interview, officers drove Coffman to the area of Lytle Creek, where officers believed defendants had spent time, returning to Redlands in the early morning hours of November 15. Coffman then was questioned further until she agreed to take investigators to Novis's body, which was found, pursuant to her direction, around 4:00 a.m. in a vineyard in Fontana. Marlow, meanwhile, was questioned for over three hours, from 9:00 p.m. until after midnight. During this interrogation Marlow was provided with food and allowed to smoke. Marlow ultimately agreed to try to take officers to Novis's burial site. Marlow directed officers to the Sierra Street off-ramp in Fontana, but once there he asked that Coffman be brought to the scene so she could show the officers where the body was located. As the officers could not at that time reach Sergeant Smith, who then had custody of Coffman, they returned Marlow to the Redlands Police Department. At 8:30 the same morning, after the discovery of Novis's body, officers resumed interrogating Marlow and informed him that Coffman had told them all about the Novis and Murray homicides. During this portion of the interrogation, Marlow gave a detailed statement about both murders, as well as the Kentucky killing. A further interrogation took place two days later, on November 17. At the outset of the interviews, defendants each were advised of and invoked their Miranda rights. ( Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602.) Investigators nevertheless continued to question each defendant despite their repeated requests for counsel. Sergeant Fitzmaurice told Marlow, numerous times, that because he had invoked his Miranda rights, whatever he told officers in the course of the interrogation could not be used in court. Ruling on defendants' motions to suppress their statements to investigators, the trial court concluded all statements had been made voluntarily and thus could properly be used for impeachment purposes under Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 225-226, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1, despite the officers' noncompliance with Miranda. With respect to Coffman's motion to suppress the fruits of her statement, namely the location of Novis's body and testimony relating to its condition, after hearing evidence regarding the grave's shallowness and its proximity, in a working vineyard, to roads and a residential area, the court ruled that testimony regarding the body and its location was admissible pursuant to the doctrine of inevitable discovery.
Recently, in People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 79-80, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650, 72 P.3d 280, we reviewed certain legal principles governing the admissibility of defendants' custodial statements. It long has been settled under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution that an involuntary statement obtained by a law enforcement officer from a criminal suspect by coercion is inadmissible in a criminal proceeding. (See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi (1936) 297 U.S. 278, 285-286 [56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682].) In Miranda v. Arizona [, supra, ] 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694] . . . , recognizing that any statement obtained by an officer from a suspect during custodial interrogation may be potentially involuntary because such questioning may be coercive, the United States Supreme Court held that such a statement may be admitted in evidence only if the officer advises the suspect of both his or her right to remain silent and right to have counsel present at questioning, and the suspect waives those rights and agrees to speak to the officer. The court further held in Miranda that if the suspect indicates that he or she does not wish to speak to the officer or wants to have counsel present at questioning, the officer must end the interrogation. In Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378] . . . , the high court held that if the suspect invokes the right to counsel, the officer may not resume questioning on another occasion until counsel is present, unless the suspect voluntarily initiates further contact. In Harris v. New York [, supra, ] 401 U.S. 222 [91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1] . . . , the court held that although a statement obtained in violation of Miranda may not be introduced by the prosecution in its case-in-chief, Miranda was not intended to grant the suspect license to lie in his or her testimony at trial, and thus if an ensuing statement obtained in violation of Miranda is voluntary, the statement nonetheless may be admitted to impeach a defendant who testifies differently at trial. In People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184 [73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865, 953 P.2d 1212], we addressed the issue whether a law enforcement officer's intentional continuation of interrogation of a defendant, in spite of the defendant's invocation of his or her right to counselâ in deliberate violation of Miranda â renders the statement obtained by the officer inadmissible even for impeachment purposes. We concluded that in light of the emphasis in Harris that Miranda should not be interpreted to permit a defendant to testify falsely at trial with impunity, under Harris the officer's misconduct in Peevy did not affect the admissibility of the statement as impeachment evidence. ( Id. at pp. 1193-1194, 1203-1205, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865, 953 P.2d 1212.) ( People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 67, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650, 72 P.3d 280.) A statement is involuntary [citation] when, among other circumstances, it `was `extracted by any sort of threats . . . , [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight. . . .'' [Citations.] Voluntariness does not turn on any one fact, no matter how apparently significant, but rather on the `totality of [the] circumstances.' ( People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 79, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650, 72 P.3d 280.) In reviewing the trial court's determinations of voluntariness, we apply an independent standard of review, doing so `in light of the record in its entirety, including all the surrounding circumstances â both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the [encounter]. . . .' ( People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 80, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650, 72 P.3d 280.) But we accept the trial court's factual findings, based on its resolution of factual disputes, its choices among conflicting inferences, and its evaluations of witness credibility, provided that these findings are supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 733, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) Relevant to this case, too, is the line of judicial decisions, beginning with the pre- Miranda decision in People v. Modesto (1965) 62 Cal.2d 436, 42 Cal.Rptr. 417, 398 P.2d 753 and finding support in the high court's decision in New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550, that recognized an exception to the usual constraints on custodial interrogation in the situation where an overriding need exists to rescue persons in danger or to protect human life. In Modesto, the defendant was arrested on suspicion of murdering one young girl, whose body had been found, and harming another, who was missing. This court concluded that the possibility of finding a missing child alive allowed interrogation without advising the suspect of his rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel. ( Modesto, supra, at p. 446, 42 Cal.Rptr. 417, 398 P.2d 753.) The Court of Appeal in People v. Dean (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 875, 114 Cal.Rptr. 555, involving custodial questioning of a kidnap suspect concerning a missing victim's whereabouts, concluded that the Modesto rule remained viable after Miranda. ( Dean, supra, at p. 882, 114 Cal.Rptr. 555.) Similarly, the Court of Appeal in People v. Riddle (1978) 83 Cal. App.3d 563, 574-575, 148 Cal.Rptr. 170, relied on Modesto in holding that Miranda did not preclude recognition of a limited exception to the normal rules governing custodial interrogation under exigent circumstances involving a possible threat to human life. Riddle held that under circumstances of extreme emergency where the possibility of saving the life of a missing victim exists, noncoercive questions may be asked of a material witness in custody even though answers to the questions may incriminate the witness. Any other policy would reflect indifference to human life. ( Riddle, supra, at p. 578, 148 Cal.Rptr. 170.) Since in the Riddle case the court concluded the defendant's statements were voluntarily made and lawfully obtained, it found no basis on which to exclude them. ( Id. at pp. 580-581, 148 Cal.Rptr. 170.) In New York v. Quarles , the high court recognized an analogous exception to Miranda in situations involving a threat to public safety. In that case, a woman approached police officers to say she had just been raped and that her assailant, who had carried a gun, had entered a nearby grocery store. Officers entered the store and confronted Quarles, who fit the woman's description of her assailant. Frisking him, an officer discovered an empty shoulder holster. After handcuffing him, the officer asked where his gun was located. Quarles nodded toward some empty cartons, saying, The gun is over there. After retrieving a loaded .38-caliber gun from an empty carton in the area Quarles had indicated, officers read Quarles his Miranda rights and questioned him further following his waiver of rights. ( New York v. Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 651-652, 104 S.Ct. 2626.) The Supreme Court reversed the state court's decision suppressing the gun and initial statement, concluding that the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. ( Id. at p. 657, 104 S.Ct. 2626.) The court declined to make the availability of the public safety exception turn on the subjective motivation of the particular officers involved. ( Id. at p. 656, 104 S.Ct. 2626.) The court noted that Quarles was free, on remand, to argue his statement was coerced under traditional due process standards. ( Id. at p. 655, fn. 3, 104 S.Ct. 2626.) Under New York v. Quarles and People v. Modesto, the circumstances in the present case, involving the rescue of a known individual, were sufficiently exigent to place the initial interrogations, that is, those taking place before the discovery of Novis's body, outside the scope of Miranda. Novis had been missing for a week at the time defendants were questioned, this passage of time lessening but by no means eliminating the possibility that she remained alive. (Compare People v. Manning (Colo.1983) 672 P.2d 499, 509 [police concern for rescuing child who had been missing for 14 weeks had long since ceased to be realistic, hence rescue doctrine inapplicable].) Before the interrogation, Marlow's sister, Veronica Koppers, had told the police that Marlow previously had been known to leave individuals bound and stranded alive in rural areas. Officers did not know whether defendants had done the same with Novis, or whether she was being held in a residence or other structure somewhere. The absence of any blood or other signs of physical trauma in Novis's car supported a reasonable hope that she might be alive and justified questioning defendants despite their invocation of their Miranda rights. That officers employed an interrogation technique of referring to Novis alternately as dead and as still alive by no means negated the exigency, as the officers apparently sought to avoid alienating defendants and instead attempted to gain their confidence, whichever circumstance might in fact exist. Under these circumstances, the rescue doctrine applied, and statements defendants made before police discovered the victim's body, if voluntarily made, were admissible despite the officers' noncompliance with Miranda.
As noted, whether the admission of Marlow's statements violated due process depends upon whether they were voluntarily made in the totality of the circumstances. ( People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 79-80, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650, 72 P.3d 280.) Marlow, joined by Coffman, contends his November 14 statement was involuntary because (1) his interrogator, Sergeant Fitzmaurice, ignored his nine requests to speak with an attorney; (2) Fitzmaurice repeatedly assured Marlow that nothing he said could be used in court, a promise that both rendered Marlow's statement involuntary and gave rise to estoppel or use immunity; (3) the statement was induced by a promise of better jail conditions if Marlow cooperated and a threat of worse conditions if he did not; and (4) the police exercised a coordinated strategy of extracting statements first from Coffman and then from Marlow. We disagree: Marlow's interrogation, while prolonged, was not accompanied by a denial of all creature comforts or accomplished by means of physical or psychological mistreatment, threats of harsh consequences or official inducement amounting to coercion, nor were Marlow's admissions the product of coerced statements by Coffman. The record reflects that what Marlow characterizes as a promise of better jail conditions if he cooperated or a threat of worse if he did not simply amounted to Fitzmaurice's acknowledgment that the nature of the crimes of which Marlow stood accused tends to evoke negative feelings, that Marlow's cooperation could be made known to jail authorities, and that the latter might look favorably on such cooperationâ all of which Marlow evidently well knew. [13] Any coordinated strategy of confronting Marlow with Coffman's statements violated his due process rights only if doing so actually and proximately caused him to make his admissions against his will. (See People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1240-1241, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475.) Marlow points to no evidence in the record supporting such a conclusion; his interrogators' comments that Coffman was cooperating with them surely did not render Marlow's statements involuntary. That Sergeant Fitzmaurice repeatedly ignored Marlow's requests for an attorney does give rise to concern, butâ given Marlow's maturity and criminal experience (he was over 30 years old and a convicted felon at the time of the interrogation)â it was unlikely Marlow's will was thereby overborne. Fitzmaurice's assurances that any statements Marlow might make could not be used in court similarly raise the specter of coercion, but after independently reviewing the transcripts of the interrogation and the hearing on Marlow's suppression motion, we see no reason to disturb the trial court's determination that his statements were voluntarily made. Significantly, for a considerable period after Fitzmaurice began to assure Marlow his statements would not be used, Marlow continued to resist disclosing Novis's whereabouts or admitting he committed the offenses. His resistance, far from reflecting a will overborne by official coercion, suggests instead a still operative ability to calculate his self-interest in choosing whether to disclose or withhold information. Marlow's admissions followed and appeared to be precipitated by continued confrontation with the evidence authorities possessed. (Cf. State v. Walton (1989) 159 Ariz. 571, 769 P.2d 1017, 1025-1026 [when 45 minutes elapsed between officer's assurance that it's nothing that can't be worked out and defendant's admissions, during which time officer continued to confront defendant with known evidence, court concluded admissions were not made in reliance on the assurance].) Moreover, Marlow was not promised leniency in exchange for admissions; rather, his interrogators advised him they had sufficient evidence to convict him without them. Marlow contends that under People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 941 P.2d 788, the use of his statements in court violated due process. In Quartermain, this court, relying on the rationales of Santobello v. New York (1971) 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (when a guilty plea rests in any significant degree on the prosecutor's promise or agreement, the promise must be fulfilled), Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610, 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (fundamental fairness precludes use of a defendant's post- Miranda -warning silence to impeach his trial testimony), and their progeny, concluded that when a prosecutor violated an agreement made with the defendant not to use his statement in any court proceedings against him, fundamental fairness required that the prosecutor honor the agreement, and under the circumstances the introduction of the statement to impeach the defendant resulted in prejudice requiring reversal of the judgment. ( Quartermain, supra, at pp. 618-622, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 941 P.2d 788.) We observed that the prosecutor's improper use of the defendant's statements for impeachment purposes and in closing argument, by paint[ing] defendant as a fabulist, struck at the heart of his defense, as to which the jury's assessment of his credibility was crucial. ( Id. at pp. 620, 622, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 941 P.2d 788.) Assuming the use of Marlow's statements after repeated assurances to the contrary was fundamentally unfair, here the prosecutor presented abundant other evidence of defendants' guilt, enabling us confidently to conclude the verdict was unattributable to any error in admitting the statements. ( Id. at p. 622, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 941 P.2d 788, citing Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182; cf. People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1132-1133, 124 Cal. Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572 [defendant's statement not involuntary despite circumstance that investigating officer told him it would not be used in court for any purpose].) Marlow's further contentions that the officers' representations that any statements he might make would not be used in court estopped the prosecution to introduce them, or resulted in a kind of use immunity, are unpersuasive. The Right to Truth-in-Evidence Law (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d)), added to our state Constitution in 1982 when the voters passed Proposition 8, provides in pertinent part that relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding. The provision was intended to abrogate judicially created rules requiring the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence, such as voluntary admissions. (See People v. Macias (1997) 16 Cal.4th 739, 749, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659, 941 P.2d 838; People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 318, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369, 748 P.2d 307.) Marlow does not explain how a common law estoppel or immunity theory might avoid the stricture of this constitutional provision. Even were we to assume, for argument's sake, the trial court erred in finding Marlow's statements were voluntarily made and thus admissible for impeachment purposes, we would conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705; People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 487, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037.) As respondent observes, Marlow did not challenge the prosecution's evidence that, in concert with Coffman, he kidnapped, robbed and killed Corinna Novis, and that he entered her apartment and stole several items of property; his only defense was that he lacked the intent to kill. Yet the evidence of Marlow's intent to kill, apart from his statements, was overwhelming: Marlow, with Coffman, abducted Novis and sodomized her in the shower at the Drinkhouse residence, inducing her to disclose the PIN for her bank card in order to steal her money. Marlow sought to assuage Drinkhouse's anxiety at Novis's presence in his house by saying, How is she going to talk to anybody if she's under a pile of rocks? Defendants equipped themselves with a shovel when they drove to the vineyard where Novis was strangled. Sufficient force was employed in the strangulation to permit the pathologist to opine a second person (such as Coffman) might have assisted Marlow in the killing, or the killer might have placed his foot on Novis's back as her face was pressed into the ground, accounting for the soil inside her mouth. On this record, it appears beyond a reasonable doubt the error, if any, did not contribute to the verdict. ( Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35; Chapman, supra, at p. 24, 87 S.Ct. 824.) [14]
A similar analysis leads to the conclusion that Coffman's statements were voluntary and thus properly admitted. Although Coffman's interrogation was lengthy and officers ignored her requests for an attorney, they provided her with food and coffee, allowed her a cigarette, and brought her socks and other clothing after she complained of feeling cold. Although officers did not immediately provide medical attention for Coffman's leg wound, the injury, approximately two weeks old at the time, clearly was not as serious as that in Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 399-402, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, in which the high court held that statements resulting from the repeated interrogation of a hospitalized suspect suffering from a gunshot wound were involuntary. Coffman's admissions occurred after repeated confrontation with the known evidence. She contends that investigators improperly threatened to have her child removed from his home in Missouri, but since she rejected the factual possibility their suggestion clearly had no coercive effect on her. Coffman also contends the officers induced her to involuntarily admit her guilt by falsely telling her Marlow had incriminated her and by making promises of assistance. [15] What the officer meant in asserting he would help Coffman is unclear, but we are unpersuaded his comments constituted a promise of leniency that rendered her subsequent statements and conduct involuntary. The scenario here differs from Collazo v. Estelle (9th Cir.1991) 940 F.2d 411, on which Coffman relies. There, the federal court of appeals found reversible error in the admission of a confession obtained after an interrogating officer attempted to discourage a suspect from talking with a lawyer by predicting a lawyer would direct him not to speak with the police and it might be worse for the suspect. ( Id. at pp. 414, 416, 420.) Here, the officersâ questioning Coffman in the midst of authorities' efforts to locate Novisâ did not hint she would receive harsher treatment if she failed to cooperate. Moreover, Coffman continued for a considerable period to resist the officers' requests that she tell them where Novis could be found. Rather than threaten Coffman, interrogators attempted by various techniques to appeal to her sense of moral integrity and any possible sympathy or sensitivity she might have toward the victim's family. The record supports the conclusion that Coffman's statements were the product of her own free will. Even were we to conclude otherwise, i.e., that the trial court erred in finding Coffman made her statements voluntarily, the record contains overwhelming evidence of her guilt. Specifically, the testimony of Richard Drinkhouse and Veronica Koppers supported the conclusion that Coffman willingly participated in the offenses; Harold Brigham testified Coffman was the person who pawned the stolen typewriter using Novis's identification; Victoria Rotstein placed Coffman near the location where identification belonging to Coffman, Marlow and Novis was found several days after the offenses; and Coffman's (along with Marlow's) fingerprints were found on Novis's car. Any error in the admission of Coffman's statements therefore did not, beyond a reasonable doubt, contribute to the verdict. ( Neder v. United States, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827.) Coffman further contends the discovery of Novis's body and the evidence derived from it were the product of her coerced statements and should have been excluded. Having concluded Coffman's statements were voluntarily made, we further conclude the fruits of those statements were properly admitted. Moreover, even had the statements been involuntary, the trial court properly ruled the physical evidence was admissible under the doctrine of inevitable discovery, which recognizes that if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means, then the exclusionary rule will not apply. ( Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 443-444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377.) This is so because the rule is intended to ensure that the prosecution is not placed in a better position than it would have been had no illegality occurred; the rule does not require it be put in a worse one. ( Ibid. ) Novis's body lay, partially exposed, in a shallow grave in a working vineyard near a residential area. Investigators found evidence that bicycles and horses had been ridden nearby. On these facts, the trial court reasonably could find that Novis's body ultimately would have been found regardless of defendants' statements.
When defendants' extrajudicial statements were admitted into evidence, the trial court gave the jury no instruction limiting their use to impeachment of defendants' credibility. Among the instructions the trial court read at the close of the guilt phase was CALJIC No. 2.13, which informs the jury that a witness's prior inconsistent statements may be considered not only as they bear on the witness's credibility, but also as evidence of the truth of the facts as stated by the witness on the prior occasion. Marlow, joined by Coffman, contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that statements taken in violation of Miranda could be used only for impeachment purposes under the rule of Harris v. New York, supra, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643. They argue that the court's giving of CALJIC No. 2.13 resulted in the jury's improper use of the statements as substantive evidence of guilt. In People v. Nudd (1974) 12 Cal.3d 204, 209, 115 Cal.Rptr. 372, 524 P.2d 844, overruled on other grounds in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 113, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272, this court declined to impose on trial courts a sua sponte obligation to give a limiting instruction when admitting Miranda -violative statements for impeachment purposes. Marlow, however, contends Nudd is, in this respect, no longer good law in light of Richardson v. Marsh, supra, 481 U.S. at pages 206-207, 107 S.Ct. 1702, in which the high court in dictum observed that in [ Harris v. New York, supra, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643], we held that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of [ Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602], can be introduced to impeach that defendant's credibility, even though they are inadmissible as evidence of his guilt, so long as the jury is instructed accordingly.  (Italics added.) The Courts of Appeal have been divided on the question whether such a sua sponte instructional obligation exists. (Compare People v. Torrez (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1088-1091, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 712 [no sua sponte obligation] with People v. Duncan (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 613, 620-622, 251 Cal.Rptr. 355 [imposing sua sponte duty].) Recently, however, in People v. Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at page 1134, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572, this court rejected a claim that the admission for impeachment of a defendant's Miranda -violative statement, without a limiting instruction and notwithstanding the giving of CALJIC No. 2.13, constituted error. The same conclusion obtains here. [16]