Opinion ID: 769263
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Marsalis' Evidentiary Challenge

Text: 18 We next turn to Marsalis' claim that the court abused its discretion when it excluded the reception of evidence dealing with an unsolved ATM theft from the same bank that occurred just four months prior to the date of the instant offense. We review a trial judge's determination of the admissibility of evidence under the abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Johnson, 137 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 1998). We afford great deference to the trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence because of the trial judge's first-hand exposure to the witnesses and the evidence as a whole, and because of the judge's familiarity with the case and ability to gauge the impact of the evidence in the context of the entire proceeding. United States v. Van Dreel, 155 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1998). Indeed, 19 [a]ppellants who challenge evidentiary rulings of the district court are like rich men who wish to enter the Kingdom: their prospects compare with those of camels who wish to pass through the eye of the needle. United States v. Coleman, 179 F.3d 1056, 1061 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted) (brackets in original). Because we give special deference to the rulings of the trial judge[,] [a defendant] obviously carries a heavy burden. Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1339 (7th Cir. 1997). In this context, we will not reverse unless the record contains no evidence on which [the district court] rationally could have based [its] decision, or where the supposed facts found are clearly erroneous. Id. (internal quotes omitted). Moreover, if an error in the admission or exclusion of evidence was committed during the trial, the court will grant a new trial only if the error had a substantial influence over the jury, and the result reached was inconsistent with substantial justice. Id. (internal quotes omitted). Agushi v. Duerr, 196 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir. 1999). 20 Sometimes referred to as reverse 404(b) evidence, [e]vidence regarding other crimes is admissible for defensive purposes if it 'tends, alone or with other evidence, to negate [the defendant's] guilt of the crime charged against him.' Agushi, 196 F.3d at 760 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1404 (3d Cir. 1991)). But of course, a court should balance the evidence's probative value under Rule 401 against considerations such as prejudice, undue waste of time and confusion of the issues under Rule 403. Id. 21 Here, the court concluded, and we agree, that the evidence regarding the unsolved February 1996 ATM theft was irrelevant because it was unsolved and occurred four months prior to the instant theft and neither tended to prove nor disprove the defendants' involvement in the charged offense, and also that the evidence might conceivably be interpreted as prejudicial to the defendants because it might have suggested to some that the defendants also committed the unsolved ATM theft: [U]nless there is evidence tending to show that [the defendants] were not involved in the February occurrence, all this evidence that you propose to offer would suggest that somebody, including [the defendants] as a very real possibility, committed a similar offense back in February. That doesn't tend to show that they are not guilty of the offense charged here.(Emphasis added). 22 Because we give great deference to the district court's evidentiary rulings and because of the obvious lack of relevance and prejudicial nature of the evidence relating to the unsolved ATM theft, we are convinced that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding this evidence. See United States v. Mancillas, 183 F.3d 682, 705 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1271 (2000).