Opinion ID: 793749
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Ambulance Corps's Cross-Appeal

Text: 93 The Corps has cross-appealed, challenging the district court's posttrial order denying its motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(2) for a jury trial on the issue of punitive damages. The district court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain that motion because defendants had filed a notice of appeal from the Judgment, and it stated that if it had jurisdiction, it would deny the motion on grounds of waiver and lack of merit. We disagree with the court's views on jurisdiction and waiver, and we remand for further proceedings with respect to the merits of the request for punitive damages. 94 First, given the sequence and timing of the pertinent filings, the district court had jurisdiction to decide the Corps's motion. A motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a) must be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(b). When one or more such motions have been timely file[d], . . . the time to file an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). If a party files a notice of appeal after judgment has been entered but before the court has disposed of a timely filed Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial, the notice of appeal simply does not become[] effective before an order disposing of that motion has been entered. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i). 95 Here, the Judgment was entered on May 10, 2004. The Corps's Rule 59(a) motion was filed on May 14 and hence was timely. The court did not dispose of that motion until June 8. Thus, the Town's notice of appeal, filed on June 4, was not effective before June 8 because the Corps's Rule 59 motion was still pending. When the district court addressed the new-trial motion on June 8, it had jurisdiction to decide that motion. 96 Second, we disagree with the district court's view that the Corps had waived its right to a jury trial on the issue of punitive damages. In finding a waiver, the court stated as follows: 97 The lawsuit was tried without a jury, following consolidation of a preliminary injunction motion with trial of the merits pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a). At no time did the Plaintiff, which had an interest in prompt restoration of its property, raise any issue about punitive damages or the appropriateness of the order of this Court consolidating the case for trial. Trial has been had and all that remains is the appeal. It is too late to raise the issue of punitive damages and the point is waived. 98 June 8 Order at 1-2. 99 It is established, however, that a party's [a]greement to a consolidation of trial on the merits with a hearing for a preliminary injunction by itself in no way amounts to a waiver of the right to jury trial. Heyman v. Kline, 456 F.2d 123, 130 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847, 93 S.Ct. 53, 34 L.Ed.2d 88 (1972). In Heyman, we held that even a party's failure to object to an off-hand remark by the judge characterizing the case as 'a non jury case,' id. at 128, and stating that he hoped to handle the case himself, did not constitute a waiver of the party's right to a jury trial, id. at 128-29. 100 In the present case, there is even less of a basis than in Heyman for finding a waiver. Here, in announcing that it was consolidating the hearing on the preliminary injunction motion with the trial on the merits, the court stated, inter alia, that the Court wants to make clear that its consolidation is not intended to deprive anybody of the right to a jury determination as to any issues which are not equity in nature.  (March 18 Tr. at 79 (emphasis added).) The court repeated, I want to make it clear in doing [the consolidation] that I'm doing it without prejudice to anybody's right to a jury trial as to money issues, money damage issues.  ( Id. at 80 (emphasis added).) The court's June 8 statement that the Corps had waived its right to a jury trial on punitive damages was thus contradicted by the court's earlier assurances that no party's right to a jury trial on any money damages issues was being impaired. We cannot conclude that the Corps's right to a jury trial on the issue of punitive damages was waived. 101 Finally, we view the district court's statement that punitive damages were unwarranted on the merits as, at best, premature. Punitive damages may be awarded in a § 1983 action when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). To be entitled to an award of punitive damages, a claimant must show a positive element of conscious wrongdoing. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 538, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). The fact that the constitutional violation does not warrant an award of compensatory damages is not a basis for denying an award of punitive damages. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cattaraugus County, 147 F.3d 153, 161 (2d Cir.1998); King v. Macri, 993 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir.1993); Stolberg v. Members of Board of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir.1973). The district court's determination that punitive damages are unwarranted as a matter of law is reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Farias v. Instructional Systems, Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 101 (2d Cir.2001); Schonfeld v. Hilliard, 218 F.3d 164, 172 (2d Cir.2000). 102 In stating that an award of punitive damages to the Corps was not warranted, the district court stated that 103 the facts of this case, in this Court's opinion, are not sufficiently egregious to warrant the imposition of punitive damages. Punitive damages are allowed against public officials such as defendant Meyers only to punish outrageous conduct. 104 However wrong-headed, the decision to lock out the Ambulance Corps[], Supervisor Meyers' conduct does not rise to the level of justifying punitive damages. He was acting in his capacity as sole commissioner of the Ambulance District, and with the apparent acquiescence of the Town Board of the Town of New Windsor. He had a belief, apparently not entirely unsupported by the fact, that the services being rendered by the Ambulance Corp[s] were inadequate or unsatisfactory, or that they threatened to become so. In order for this Court to resolve the issues presented in the litigation, it was not necessary to ascertain whether his judgment in the matter, or that of the Town Board, was valid or invalid. The only issue was the improper sequestration and deprivation of the machinery and equipment, almost all of which this Court found to be the property of the Plaintiff. 105 June 8 Order at 2 (emphases added). In so stating, the district court incorrectly described the scope of the litigation. 106 The litigation as a whole was not limited to the ownership of the ambulances and other equipment seized by the Town. The litigation included the Corps's claims for unjust enrichment (Complaint ¶ 38)—discussed in Part II.B. above—and punitive damages against the individual defendant for his willful and malicious actions (Complaint ¶ 45). The complaint, on its face, demanded a jury trial. And, as discussed above, the district court stated at the end of the hearing that its consolidation of the preliminary injunction issues with the merits issues was without prejudice to anybody's right to a jury trial as to money issues, money damage issues. (March 18 Tr. at 80.) The consolidated hearing, which began barely three weeks after the Town's seizure of the vehicles, was quite limited in scope, focusing on the question of ownership of the vehicles. For example, during the examination of the first witness, the court identified the issue before it as ownership, rather than any issue as to whether the seizure was justified: 107 I understand the issue to be that there are important items, including vehicles, which are locked up, which the Town asserts that it has the right to control, and which the plaintiff asserts that it owns and has the right to use, and wishes to use, as I understand it, to render similar services from a different location. 108 . . . . 109 Now, unless I misunderstand the case, I'm not concerned with whether that decision is a wise one or a justified one. I have to decide whether this Court should order the Town to deliver all or some of these things to the plaintiff. Because it's apparent, at least, I'm assuming from the documentation, that the Town no longer wishes to continue as in the past, is that correct? 110 . . . . 111 MR. DUNN [counsel for the Town]: With the New Windsor Volunteer Ambulance Corps, that's correct. We don't wish to have them provide services to the district. 112 THE COURT: So it doesn't really matter. The Court doesn't have to adjudicate whether the decision is wise or unwise, or justified or not. 113 MS ULLRICH [counsel for the Corps]: That's correct, Your Honor. We are here today to present evidence of ownership. 114 (March 4 Tr. at 28-29 (emphases added).) 115 Consistent with the court's stated understanding that the issue at the hearing was ownership, the parties, encouraged by the court to stick to that issue, made no apparent effort to present evidence as to whether the seizure of the Corps's property was prompted by a motivation or state of mind on the part of Meyers that could justify an award of punitive damages against him. Accordingly, the factual record was not sufficiently developed for a ruling by the court that an award of punitive damages is unwarranted as a matter of law. 116 Nor could the denial of a trial on the issue of punitive damages be justified by the district court's observation that Meyers was acting in his capacity as sole commissioner of the Ambulance District, and with the apparent acquiescence of the Town Board of the Town of New Windsor, June 8 Order at 2. Although a municipality itself is immune from a claim for punitive damages, see City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258-68, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981), that immunity does not extend to a municipal official sued in his individual capacity, see, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 55-56, 103 S.Ct. 1625. If there were sufficient evidence to permit the factfinder to infer that the responsible official was motivated by malice or evil intent or that he acted with reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of the plaintiff, the apparent acquiescence of the municipality would not protect the individual defendant from liability for punitive damages. 117 In sum, the record makes clear that there was no waiver of the right to a jury trial on the damages issues, and the record remains to be developed as to whether punitive damages are warranted. Accordingly, we vacate the court's denial of the Corps's motion for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages and remand for further proceedings. This remand does not foreclose a new decision that punitive damages are unwarranted as a matter of law if the further proceedings fail to produce evidence sufficient to meet the standard for an award of such damages.