Opinion ID: 167100
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pretext in Pippin's prior work performance evaluations

Text: 46 Pippin also argues he has presented evidence of pretext because his evaluations were too subjective. He complains, in particular, that the process included input from other supervisors and the possibility of changes being imposed by higher-level managers. 47 Our cases have regularly affirmed grants of summary judgment for employers who based RIF terminations on employee rankings. E.g., Rea, 29 F.3d at 1456; Fallis, 944 F.2d at 744. The subjective nature of the evaluations may be a factor to consider in pretext but it ordinarily is not by itself sufficient to establish pretext. Furr, 82 F.3d at 987 (the use of subjective criteria does not suffice to prove intentional age discrimination.); see also Simms, 165 F.3d at 1328 (Evidence of pretext may include ... the use of subjective criteria.); Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1046 (10th Cir.1981) (noting that although subjective criteria are not wrongful per se, it does provide[] an opportunity for unlawful discrimination). 48 Nonetheless, Pippin cites language from one of our subsequent non-RIF ADEA cases where we said [a]bsent evidence that [the employer's] system of ranking and evaluation relies on objective criteria, we hold that [the employee] has satisfied his burden to demonstrate pretext ... for the purposes of avoiding summary judgment. Garrett, 305 F.3d at 1218. Although this language is indeed broad, our holding in Garrett was much more narrow. There, the plaintiff's rankings had taken an abrupt turn for the worse almost immediately after that plaintiff began organizing a pro-diversity committee at the work place. Moreover, the defendant did not contest, consistent with expert testimony on the subject, that the rankings were wholly subjective. Id. at 1214, 1218. Indeed, elsewhere in Garrett we clarified that  [w]hen viewed in the aggregate, his proffered evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine doubt about Defendant's motivation. Id. at 1220 (emphasis added, quotation omitted). 49 Unlike in Garrett, here we do not consider Burlington's evaluation process wholly subjective. The evaluations, while covering such subjective considerations as team building, personal leadership, and personal accountability, also required the employee's immediate supervisor to enumerate specific results achieved with supporting examples. Burlington also used a particular evaluation form that included multiple mandatory areas for evaluation, and Pippin's evaluations showed a consistent pattern of soft skill issues over more than ten years. Thus, neither the contents of, nor Burlington's reliance on, these evaluations support an inference that Burlington's proffered reasons for terminating Pippin were pretextual.
50 Pippin also asserts pretext by asserting that the evaluations and rankings used by management for the announced purpose of determining bonus levels is known and understood by management to be the likely basis for layoffs or reductions in force. He claims that the RIF must have been in the wind at the time of the 1999 ranking process and that his 1999 evaluations were manipulated in order to place him last because there was personal animosity between himself and one of the team supervisors. Finally, Pippin argues that the criticisms in his evaluations were false, vague, and ... put in the evaluation so they could fire Pippin because of his age and that instead he had very substantial success at Burlington. 51 However, we see no permissible inference of pretext from any of these self-serving claims. For example, Pippin complains that one of the upper-level managers had previously suggested that Pippin should be managed out of the company. 9 He asserts that this establishes an ulterior motive other than the supposedly objective criteria which Defendant claimed to use which Pippin asserts evidences manufactured reasons for termination. To the contrary, this statement simply supports Burlington's assertion that Pippin had a longstanding performance problem prior to the 2000 RIF. 52 Similarly, Pippin's complaint that his 1999 evaluation was manipulated is without merit. He cites two versions of this evaluation in the record—the first is unsigned and the second is signed by Pippin, Pippin's immediate supervisor, and his supervisor's manager, and dated January 2000, well before the April 2000 RIF. Pippin notes that the second copy includes additional negative comments that do not appear on the first, unsigned version. 10 Although this language may well have been added, Pippin's final scores in the 360 degree feedback portion of the evaluation are the same on both versions and, on both, Pippin received an overall rating of Met Expectations +. Furthermore, similar, albeit more generic comments, are on both versions under Pippin's Development Needs. Finally, multiple supervisors' opinions are imbedded in the ranking process itself and, as this evaluation is in substance consistent with Pippin's earlier evaluations, we see no reason to suspect pretextual manipulation of the evaluations. 53 Finally, although Pippin certainly thinks he was well qualified and a good performer, [i]t is the perception of the decision maker which is relevant, not plaintiff's perception of [him]self. Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768, 772 (10th Cir.1988). Indeed, an employer may chose to conduct its RIF according to its preferred criteria of performance ... and we will not disturb that exercise of defendant's business judgment. Beaird, 145 F.3d at 1169; see also Lucas v. Dover Corp., Norris Div., 857 F.2d 1397, 1403-04 (10th Cir.1988) (This court will not second guess business decisions made by employers, in the absence of some evidence of impermissible motives.); Simms, 165 F.3d at 1330 (noting it is not court's role to establish defendant's hiring criteria or act as super personnel department). 11 Pippin may have produced technical results, but Burlington's decision to terminate Pippin due to his poor soft skills does not warrant an inference of pretext. 54