Opinion ID: 2679890
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Establishing De Facto Parenthood

Text: [¶18] Parenthood is meant to be defined by the Legislature, steeped as it is in matters of policy requiring the weighing of multiple viewpoints. See Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 142 n.21 (1979) (stating that the foster care system involves “issues of legislative policy [that] are better addressed to the wisdom of 12 [the legislature] than to the judgment of this Court” (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted)); Brann v. State, 424 A.2d 699, 704 (Me. 1981) (“It is appropriate for the legislature rather than the court to make the policy decision regarding what is practicable in a given situation.”) Although we have been discussing de facto parenthood for almost thirteen years, 9 there is currently no Maine statutory reference to de facto parenthood. We take this opportunity to again emphasize that, given the evolving compositions of families and the need for a careful approach, this issue would be best addressed by the Legislature. [¶19] In the absence of Legislative action in such an important and unsettled area, however, we must provide some guidance to trial courts faced with de facto parenthood petitions. See Cheshire Med. Ctr. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 49 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Ordinarily issues of public policy are in the first instance appropriate for a legislature’s determination by statute and, if not determined by statute, may be determined by a state court of last resort in its decisions setting precedents.”). Although in Rideout we discussed the constitutionality of the Grandparents Visitation Act, the grandparents had acted as “parents” for the children involved, and in our discussion of their circumstances we noted that other jurisdictions, “without statutory authority, have modified the common law 9 Our first mention of the phrase “de facto parents” appears in Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 39, 761 A.2d 291 (Wathen, C.J., concurring). Earlier decisions set the stage for de facto parenthood, however, by discussing the award of child custody to a non-biological parent over the objection of the biological parent. See, e.g., Merchant, 139 Me. at 120-24, 27 A.2d 816 . 13 presumption and opened the door to visitation by adults who have become the de facto parent[s] of a child.” 2000 ME 198, ¶ 40, 761 A.2d 291 (Wathen, C.J., concurring). Five months later, we concluded that a person might obtain de facto parenthood status in Maine “through the development of the parental relationship over time.” Stitham v. Henderson, 2001 ME 52, ¶ 24, 768 A.2d 598 (Saufley, J., concurring). In that case, a man and woman were married for seven years before the woman gave birth to a child. Id. ¶ 2. The parties divorced when the child was three years old, but the man did not learn until after the divorce that he was not the child’s biological father. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. The man had been declared as the child’s father on a variety of legal documents, including the child’s birth certificate and the parties’ divorce judgment, and had acted as her father since her birth. Id. ¶ 2. In response to his attempt to maintain parental rights, we held that the court may award contact to a “person with significant bonds to the child” who has had more than a “limited relationship to the child.” Id. ¶ 17 n.6. [¶20] Since our announcement in 2001 that in some circumstances we would recognize de facto parents, we have had occasion to discuss the concept in only four cases—C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 2004 ME 43, 845 A.2d 1146; Young v. Young, 2004 ME 44, 845 A.2d 1144; Leonard v. Boardman, 2004 ME 108, 854 A.2d 869; and Philbrook, 2008 ME 152, 957 A.2d 74. In C.E.W., two women agreed that one 14 of them would conceive a child through artificial insemination, and both signed a parenting agreement detailing their equal rights to the child. 2004 ME 43, ¶ 2, 845 A.2d 1146. Five years after the child’s birth, the couple separated and the non-biological mother instituted parental rights proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3, 5. We discussed de facto parenthood in terms of “third persons who have played an unusual and significant parent-like role in a child’s life,” and characterized the role as “permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible,” but we did not precisely determine its parameters given the parties’ agreement that the non-biological parent was a de facto parent. Id. ¶¶ 9, 13-14. Rather, in C.E.W., we were concerned only with the remedy of an award of parental rights and responsibilities when the parties stipulate that a de facto parenthood relationship exists. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. [¶21] In Young, a man married a woman who already had a child, and the couple then had a child together. 2004 ME 44, ¶ 2, 845 A.2d 1144. When the parties began divorce proceedings after five years, the District Court, on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction, refused to consider the man’s role in his stepchild’s life in awarding parental rights and responsibilities between the parties. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. We vacated the judgment after concluding that the District Court “possesses broad powers to ensure that a child does not, without cause, lose the relationship with the person who has previously been acknowledged to be the 15 father through the development of the parental relationship over time.” Id. ¶ 5 (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted). [¶22] Similarly, in Leonard, a man began a relationship with a pregnant woman, and the couple eventually began living together and had two more children over the course of seven years. 2004 ME 108, ¶¶ 3-5, 854 A.2d 869. Later, in a habeas corpus action, the court found that the man was the de facto parent of the eldest child. Id. ¶ 11. We remanded the matter for a determination of parental rights and responsibilities based on that finding. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. [¶23] Finally, in Philbrook, a woman and her children lived with the woman’s parents for periods of time over a span of ten years. 2008 ME 152, ¶¶ 2-6, 957 A.2d 74. When the trial court determined that the grandparents did not have standing to pursue a parental rights action, the grandparents appealed. Id. ¶ 14. In affirming the judgment, we held that de facto parenthood is a doctrine of limited application, to be employed “when the putative de facto parent has ‘undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the child’s life.”’ Id. ¶ 22 (quoting C.E.W., 2004 ME 43, ¶ 14, 845 A.2d 1146). We also noted that in each case where we recognized a person as a de facto parent, that person had been understood and acknowledged as a parental figure by both the child and the child’s biological or adoptive parent. Id. ¶ 23. 16 [¶24] In our discussions of de facto parenthood in Maine through these five decisions, we have not yet determined what precise test of de facto parenthood will satisfy the exceptional circumstances requirement of strict scrutiny. See id. ¶ 22 (“[W]e have not precisely defined the parameters of the de facto parent concept . . . .”); C.E.W., 2004 ME 43, ¶ 13, 845 A.2d 1146 (“We do not address the separate and more fundamental question of by what standard the determination of de facto parenthood should be made.”). We also have not announced the standard of proof to be applied in such a determination. [¶25] Moore encourages us to adopt the test of de facto parenthood set out in American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 2.03(1)(c) (2002), which defines a de facto parent as a person who, for two years or more, has lived with the child and performed at least as much of the caretaking for the child as the legal parent.10 See Stitham, 2001 ME 52, ¶ 25, 768 A.2d 598 10 American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 2.03(1)(c) (2002) defines a de facto parent as follows: (c) A de facto parent is an individual other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel who, for a significant period of time not less than two years, (i) lived with the child and, (ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a result of a complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking functions, (A) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking functions for the child, or 17 (Saufley, J., concurring). The American Law Institute also has set forth the definition of a parent by estoppel, but Moore does not make any claim pursuant to that principle. 11 American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 2.03(1)(b) (2002). [¶26] After considering our precedent, the ALI standards, and the decisions of other jurisdictions, we continue to decline to adopt the ALI standards as the test of de facto parenthood in Maine. See, e.g., C.E.W., 2004 ME 43, ¶ 14 n.13, (B) regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived. 11 American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 2.03(1)(b) (2002) defines a parent by estoppel as follows: (b) A parent by estoppel is an individual who, though not a legal parent, (i) is obligated to pay child support under Chapter 3; or (ii) lived with the child for at least two years and (A) over that period had a reasonable, good-faith belief that he was the child’s biological father, based on marriage to the mother or on the actions or representations of the mother, and fully accepted parental responsibilities consistent with that belief, and (B) if some time thereafter that belief no longer existed, continued to make reasonable, good-faith efforts to accept responsibilities as the child’s father; or (iii) lived with the child since the child’s birth, holding out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the child’s legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents) to raise a child together each with full parental rights and responsibilities, when the court finds that recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child’s best interests; or (iv) lived with the child for at least two years, holding out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an agreement with the child’s parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents), when the court finds that recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child’s best interests. 18 845 A.2d 1146 (“Although [Rideout and Stitham] cite to the A.L.I.’s PRINCIPLES, neither adopts its standard, nor do we do so today.”); Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 27, 761 A.2d 291. If and when the Legislature ventures into this area, it may choose to adopt some or all of the ALI standards. [¶27] Instead, in the absence of legislation in this area, we cleave to the standard we have already announced. An individual seeking parental rights as a de facto parent must therefore show that (1) he or she has undertaken a “permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the child’s life,” Philbrook, 2008 ME 152, ¶ 22, 957 A.2d 74 (quoting C.E.W., 2004 ME 43, ¶ 14, 845 A.2d 1146), and (2) that there are exceptional circumstances sufficient to allow the court to interfere with the legal or adoptive parent’s rights. Because the fundamental rights of a biological or adoptive parent are at issue and strict scrutiny must be applied to any interference with that right, see Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶¶ 18-19, 761 A.2d 291, and because the establishment of parental rights is no less permanent than the termination of parental rights, see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2), the petitioner must make those showings by clear and convincing evidence. 1. Permanent, Unequivocal, Committed, and Responsible Parental Role [¶28] We define a “permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role” by looking to the elements of de facto parenthood employed in Massachusetts: 19 A de facto parent is one who has no biological relation to the child [as a parent], but has participated in the child’s life as a member of the child’s family. The de facto parent resides with the child and, with the consent and encouragement of the legal parent, performs a share of caretaking functions . . . . E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999)). This language, which we have already cited with approval, see Stitham, 2001 ME 52, ¶ 25 n.15, 768 A.2d 598 (Saufley, J., concurring); see also Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 40, 761 A.2d 291 (Wathen, C.J., concurring) (citing E.N.O. generally), gives litigants and courts a list of the necessary elements for determining whether an individual’s relationship with a child is permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible.12 It is a test that not only requires the petitioner to establish that he or she has resided with the child “as a member of the child’s family,” E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 891, but also distinguishes between “parenting functions”—an umbrella term that encompasses activities that benefit the child but do not necessarily involve direct involvement with the child, such as providing financial support for the family or maintaining the 12 Unlike the ALI or the Dissenting Opinion, we do not impose a minimum duration for the relationship that categorically eliminates the possibility of a de facto parent for a child younger than two or five years old, respectively. See Dissenting Opinion ¶ 68; Smith v. Jones, 868 N.E.2d 629, 635 n.10 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (discussing the Massachusetts courts’ similar “reluctance to adopt a bright-line time requirement” and noting that a failure to satisfy any particular duration element “would not likely be sufficient for a conclusion that no de facto parenthood status existed”). Nevertheless, we note that in the de facto parenthood cases presented to us, none involved a relationship between the de facto parent and child that was shorter than five years. See Philbrook v. Theriault, 2008 ME 152, ¶¶ 2-6, 957 A.2d 74; Leonard v. Boardman, 2004 ME 108, ¶¶ 3-5, 854 A.2d 869; Young v. Young, 2004 ME 44, ¶ 2, 845 A.2d 1144; C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 2004 ME 43, ¶¶ 1-3, 845 A.2d 1146; Stitham v. Henderson, 2001 ME 52, ¶ 2, 768 A.2d 598. 20 home—with the more relevant subset of “caretaking functions”—which involve “the direct delivery of day-to-day care and supervision of the child, including grooming, feeding, medical care, and physical supervision.” 13 A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1071-72 (Mass. 2006) (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted) (noting that “the parent-child bond grows from the myriad hands-on activities of an adult in tending to a child’s needs”). Only by establishing that he or she provided some actual caretaking functions can a petitioner be successful.14 In addition, the test accounts for the intent of the legal parent and the putative de facto parent to co-parent, as measured before the dissolution of their relationship, or the intent of the legal parent that the non-parent act as parent in place of the legal parent.15 See Smith v. Jones, 868 N.E.2d 629, 634 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). It also ensures that the relationship was not undertaken for the purposes of financial 13 This distinction has been held to be “not appropriate” as between two legal parents. A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1072 n.15 (Mass. 2006). 14 The E.N.O. court required a petitioner to demonstrate that he had performed a share of caretaking functions “at least as great as the legal parent.” E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999). At this juncture, we do not set the bar so high for this portion of the de facto parenthood standard. Moreover, we disagree with the statements in the Dissenting Opinion that our decision not to require an equal amount of caretaking “effectively relaxes the Massachusetts standard” or creates a “less demanding approach” to establishing de facto parenthood. Dissenting Opinion ¶ 70. To the contrary, we, unlike the Massachusetts court in E.N.O., require proof of harm to the child in the absence of a declaration of de facto parenthood in order to more robustly satisfy the strict scrutiny requirement. Infra ¶ 29. Thus, the de facto parenthood standards we announce today are, overall, significantly more burdensome than those discussed in the E.N.O. decision. 15 A court-ordered substitution of a non-parent for a legal parent, e.g., the creation of a guardianship, may also be considered. See 18-A M.R.S. § 5-204. 21 compensation or with other institutional approval, as with a nanny, foster parent, or daycare provider. See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176 (Wash. 2005). 2. Exceptional Circumstances [¶29] As discussed below, a de facto parent potentially may be awarded all of the parental rights and responsibilities enjoyed by a biological or adoptive parent. A non-parent should have the opportunity to obtain the full panoply of rights and responsibilities only under the most exceptional circumstances, i.e., only when the non-parent can establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that harm to the child will occur if he or she is not acknowledged to be the child’s de facto parent. We are not here announcing that “harm” in these cases must be the equivalent of “jeopardy” in title 22 cases. Nonetheless, a court contemplating an order that creates a parent out of a non-parent must first determine that the child’s life would be substantially and negatively affected if the person who has undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in that child’s life is removed from that role. B. Effect of a Determination of De Facto Parenthood [¶30] A determination that a person is a de facto parent means that he or she is a parent on equal footing with a biological or adoptive parent, that is to say, with the same opportunity for parental rights and responsibilities. See C.E.W., 2004 ME 43, ¶ 11, 845 A.2d 1146 (holding that once a person is determined to be a de facto 22 parent, “the court may consider an award of parental rights and responsibilities to that individual as a parent”); see also In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 177 (concluding that a de facto parent “stands in legal parity with an otherwise legal parent”). Although the Legislature has yet to speak about de facto parenthood, it has provided the framework in which parental rights and responsibilities are awarded as between parents, that is, through 19-A M.R.S. § 1653. In particular, section 1653 enumerates the provisions that a court “must include” in a parental rights order: (1) Allocated parental rights and responsibilities, shared parental rights and responsibilities or sole parental rights and responsibilities, according to the best interest of the child as provided in subsection 3. An award of shared parental rights and responsibilities may include either an allocation of the child's primary residential care to one parent and rights of parent-child contact to the other parent, or a sharing of the child's primary residential care by both parents. If either or both parents request an award of shared primary residential care and the court does not award shared primary residential care of the child, the court shall state in its decision the reasons why shared primary residential care is not in the best interest of the child; (2) Conditions of parent-child contact in cases involving domestic abuse as provided in subsection 6; (3) A provision for child support as provided in subsection 8 or a statement of the reasons for not ordering child support; (4) A statement that each parent must have access to records and information pertaining to a minor child, including, but not limited to, medical, dental and school records and other information on school activities, whether or not the child resides with the parent, unless that access is found not to be in the best interest of the child or that access 23 is found to be sought for the purpose of causing detriment to the other parent. If that access is not ordered, the court shall state in the order its reasons for denying that access; (5) A statement that violation of the order may result in a finding of contempt and imposition of sanctions as provided in subsection 7; (6) A statement of the definition of shared parental rights and responsibilities contained in section 1501, subsection 5, if the order of the court awards shared parental rights and responsibilities; .... 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(2)(D). [¶31] Section 1653(2)(D)(3) requires that “[e]ither parent of a minor child shall contribute reasonable and just sums as child support payable weekly, biweekly, monthly or quarterly.” 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(8). Child support is calculated pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. §§ 2001-2012 (2013). In particular, section 2005 imposes a rebuttable presumption “that the parental support obligation derived from the support guidelines is the amount ordered to be paid, unless support is established under section 2006, subsection 5 or section 2007.” 19-A M.R.S. § 2005. [¶32] In short, once the court finds that a party is a de facto parent, that party is a parent for all purposes, and the court must then go on to consider the appropriate award of parental rights and responsibilities—including child 24 support—pursuant to title 19-A.16 See Leonard, 2004 ME 108, ¶¶ 17-18, 854 A.2d 869 (holding that when a party is found to be a de facto parent, the court must “give complete relief to the parties [by] establish[ing] parental rights and responsibilities” pursuant to section 1653 in proceedings involving the biological father). [¶33] We recognize that many aspects of the parental rights order may be cumbersome in matters in which there are more than two legal parents. Nevertheless, the parental rights statutes already contain language pursuant to which such a judgment may be fashioned to reflect the reality of a family. See, e.g., 19-A M.R.S. § 2007(3)(A) (setting out when the court may deviate from the child support guidelines, such as when the result would be “unjust, inequitable or not in the child’s best interest”). 16 Other jurisdictions have begun to determine child support as applied to de facto parents. See, e.g., Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 823 n.3 (Utah 2007) (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (“De facto parenthood is a two-way street. While de facto parent status entitles a third party to standing for visitation, it also requires a de facto parent to provide financial support for the child.”); see also Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780, 784 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985) (holding that a person who agreed to co-parent a child conceived by means of artificial insemination could not assert that she was not responsible for child support for lack of parenthood); In re Streibeck, No. 26553-6-III, 2008 WL 4599683, at  (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2008) (involving a biological father of a child who attempted to challenge a child support order requiring him to pay the biological mother on the ground that it failed to include a reduction to account for another man’s child support obligation as a de facto parent); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995) (adopting a four-part test of parenthood that includes whether the petitioner has assumed the financial obligations of parenthood, including “contributing towards the child’s support”); cf. T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1253 (Mass. 2004) (refusing to force a domestic partner to pay child support for a child for whom she was not a de facto parent). 25 C. Procedure [¶34] We cannot emphasize enough that parenthood is forever, whether the relationship is biological, adoptive, or de facto. The role of a de facto parent is no less permanent than that of any other parent; it is a role that may be surrendered, released, or terminated only in limited circumstances as approved by a court. See 18-A M.R.S. §§ 9-202, 9-204, 9-302 (2013); 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(1). The obligation of a de facto parent to pay child support, too, remains in force until modified by the court, or until the child turns eighteen or graduates from secondary school, or marries, or joins the armed services. 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(12). [¶35] The determination of the rights and responsibilities of a person petitioning for status as a de facto parent must occur in three stages. First, because forcing a parent to expend time and resources defending against a third-party claim to a child is itself an infringement on the fundamental right to parent, 17 Conlogue, 2006 ME 12, ¶ 13, 890 A.2d 691; Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 30, 761 A.2d 291, a party seeking de facto parenthood status must, at the outset, establish his or her standing to initiate the litigation by making a prima facie showing of de facto parenthood according to the two-part test we have announced today, i.e., that the petitioner had a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible role 17 This preliminary determination regarding a person’s standing to assert de facto parenthood is but one means of satisfying the strict scrutiny test. See Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 19, 761 A.2d 291; Conlogue, 2006 ME 12, ¶ 13, 890 A.2d 691. 26 according to the E.N.O. elements, and that, if that relationship is terminated, the child will suffer harm. At this first stage, “the court must make a preliminary determination that such a relationship does in fact exist before a parent can be required to fully litigate the issue.” Philbrook, 2008 ME 152, ¶ 19, 957 A.2d 74. If the biological or adoptive parent opposes the petition, this initial determination may be decided on affidavits through a motion to dismiss. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17. [¶36] Second, if the petitioner satisfies the prima facie burden, the petitioner must then prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that he or she satisfies both elements of the two-part test we announce here and is, therefore, the child’s de facto parent. Whether the petitioner has established these elements is a highly fact-intensive inquiry that requires a consideration of the totality of the circumstances. [¶37] Finally, if, and only if, the individual is a de facto parent, the court must establish the extent of the de facto parent’s rights and responsibilities pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1653. See C.E.W, 2004 ME 43, ¶ 11, 845 A.2d 1146. This task is accomplished according to the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to parental rights actions generally because the court will reach this question only if the petitioner has established, by clear and convincing evidence, that he or she is the child’s de facto parent. See Hatch v. Anderson, 2010 ME 94, ¶ 12, 4 A.3d 904. 27 [¶38] At the heart of the determination of a de facto parent’s rights and responsibilities, as with any other award of parental rights and responsibilities, is the best interest of the child, which is defined with reference to nineteen factors in 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3). See C.E.W., 2004 ME 43, ¶ 11, 845 A.2d 1146; see also Kelley v. Snow, 2009 ME 128, ¶ 15, 984 A.2d 1281. D. Conclusion [¶39] Amidst the sequence of events and consolidation of actions that constituted the case presented to it,18 the trial court handled this case with care and skill. It followed the procedure for de facto parenthood that has already been established by making a prima facie determination of standing, and by imposing the burden of proof on Pitts. It also applied the clear and convincing standard of proof to protect the fundamental right at issue, and expressly considered Pitts’s de facto parenthood status before, and independently from, its best interest determination in fashioning the remedy of an award of contact with the child. See In re Scott S., 2001 ME 114, ¶ 19, 775 A.2d 1144. [¶40] Nevertheless, because this is our first articulation of the force and duration of the consequences of de facto parenthood, and our first announcement 18 As noted earlier, the parental rights and responsibilities action involving the child’s biological parents, Moore and Hague, was consolidated with Pitts’s de facto parenthood action, and Hague actually participated in and testified during the consolidated hearing. Given these facts, we need not address how the absence of a biological or adoptive parent might affect a petitioner’s attempt to establish de facto parenthood. 28 of the two-part standard pursuant to which de facto parenthood petitions must be evaluated, we vacate the court’s judgment and remand the matter for the court— and the parties—to consider anew their positions on this lifelong remedy affecting the life of a child. [¶41] On remand, the court must reconsider the record and allow the parties to submit additional evidence to determine whether Pitts can meet his burden of establishing de facto parenthood. If Pitts is determined to be the child’s de facto parent, the court must fashion a remedy by delineating his parental rights and responsibilities, including child support, and will have to do so in conjunction with re-determining the parental rights and responsibilities of Moore and Hague. The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. JABAR, J., with whom SILVER, J., joins, concurring. [¶42] I join with the Plurality Opinion, which takes substantial steps to clarify this unsettled area of law, and with its result. However, on one aspect of the Plurality’s analysis, I disagree with it, and, necessarily, with the Dissent.19 I do not 19 The Dissent agrees with the Plurality that a measurable degree of harm is required before interfering with a parent’s constitutional liberty interests, Plurality Opinion ¶ 16, Dissenting Opinion ¶ 62, but would require a much greater showing of serious harm to a child’s “long-term physical, emotional, or developmental well-being.” Dissenting Opinion ¶ 63. 29 join section II(A)(2) of the Plurality Opinion, and I write separately because I do not believe that harm to the child is constitutionally required in order to obtain de-facto-parenthood status over a fit parent’s objection. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000) (plurality opinion); Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 23, 761 A.2d 291 (plurality opinion). But see Plurality Opinion ¶¶ 16, 29; Dissenting Opinion ¶ 62. [¶43] The Plurality holds that, as a matter of constitutional law, persons seeking de facto parenthood status must demonstrate that “the child’s life would be substantially and negatively affected” before a court can award that status over a biological or adoptive parent’s objections. Plurality Opinion ¶ 29. I disagree. Parents’ fundamental rights to the custody and control of their children do not require a threshold showing of harm to the child before a court can interfere with those rights. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73; Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 23, 761 A.2d 291. Rather, the appropriate constitutional inquiry should weigh both a parent’s fundamental liberty interests and a child’s interest in continuing contact with an adult “‘who has acted as a parent to [the child].’” Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 27, 761 A.2d 291 (quoting Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165, 172 (Mass. 1999)). [¶44] Although the Dissent notes that we have “recognized . . . [that] a compelling state interest requires a showing of some degree of harm or the threat 30 of harm to the child before a court may interfere with the parental rights of a fit parent,” Dissenting Opinion ¶ 62, neither our precedent nor that of the U.S. Supreme Court has ever required harm to the child as the only compelling state interest to justify interfering with a parent’s fundamental liberty interest. Rather, in Troxel, the Supreme Court explicitly declined to address “whether the Due Process Clause requires . . . a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation,” 530 U.S. at 73, and it has not yet conclusively addressed the issue.20 [¶45] We have, however, addressed the question of whether some degree of harm or potential harm is a necessary prerequisite before awarding a right of custody or visitation to third parties. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, ¶¶ 23-25, 761 A.2d 291 (plurality opinion). Contrary to the Dissent’s characterization of that case, a plurality of this Court concluded that a showing of harm is not constitutionally required. See id. But see Dissenting Opinion ¶ 62. In Rideout, the District Court had concluded that the Grandparents Visitation Act was unconstitutional because it did not require a finding of harm or a threat of harm as a precondition to interfering with the parents’ fundamental liberty interests. 20 The Dissent states that the U.S. Supreme Court “did not reach the question of to what extent harm must be shown for a court to override a parent’s decision” regarding the custody and care of his or her children in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000) (plurality opinion). Dissenting Opinion ¶ 61 n.21 (emphasis added). However, the Troxel Court expressly declined to decide “whether the Due Process Clause requires . . . a showing of harm or potential harm to the child” at all. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 76-77 (Souter, J., concurring). 31 2000 ME 198, ¶ 22, 761 A.2d 291. We vacated that judgment, stating, “An element of ‘harm’ in the traditional sense is not, however, the only compelling state interest extant when matters relating to the welfare of children are under scrutiny.” Id. ¶ 23 (emphasis added). We concluded that although the threat of harm to a child is certainly sufficient to provide the State with a compelling interest, harm consisting of a threat to physical safety or imminent danger is not a sine qua non for the existence of a compelling state interest. . . . [Rather,] “[t]he natural right of a parent to the care and control of a child should be limited only for the most urgent reasons.” We conclude that “urgent reasons” exist, where, as here, a grandparent who has functioned as a parent to the child seeks continued contact with that child. Id. ¶¶ 23-25 (footnote and citation omitted) (quoting Merchant v. Bussell, 139 Me. 118, 122, 27 A.2d 816 (1942)). [¶46] Although I disagree with the Plurality’s conclusion that interference with a parent’s fundamental liberty interest requires a showing of harm to the child, we agree on several substantive points within the constitutional analysis. First, in both Maine and federal constitutional law, it is “firmly established” that a parent possesses a liberty interest, classified as a “fundamental right,” in making decisions regarding the custody and control of his or her child. Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶¶ 18-19, 761 A.2d 291; see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66; Merchant, 139 Me. at 122, 27 A.2d 816; Plurality Opinion ¶ 11. Second, we agree that an award of parental rights and responsibilities to a de facto parent unquestionably 32 interferes with the parent’s protected liberty interest. See Sparks v. Sparks, 2013 ME 41, ¶ 20, 65 A.3d 1223 (“A court order that assigns even temporary rights to a nonparent interferes with the parent’s fundamental liberty interest.”); Plurality Opinion ¶ 17. In protecting that liberty interest, our decisions afford parents great protection by adopting a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children and by requiring any interference with that interest to pass the strict-scrutiny test, which provides “that the State’s action [must] be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 19, 761 A.2d 291; Plurality Opinion ¶ 12. [¶47] Third, we agree that both harm and the threat of harm to the child constitute a compelling state interest sufficient to override a parent’s fundamental liberty interest. Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 23, 761 A.2d 291 (“[T]he threat of harm to a child is certainly sufficient to provide the State with a compelling interest.”); Plurality Opinion ¶ 14. Finally, we agree that any interference with a parent’s fundamental liberty interest must be justified by something more than the best interest of the child. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73; Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 23, 761 A.2d 291; Plurality Opinion ¶¶ 11, 39. [¶48] However, we disagree on the issue of whether harm to the child is the only compelling state interest that justifies a court’s award of de facto parenthood status. See Plurality Opinion ¶¶ 16-17, 29; Dissenting Opinion ¶ 62. Because our 33 decisions require any interference with parents’ due process rights to satisfy the strict scrutiny test, I set out the state’s compelling interest and narrowly tailored means for safeguarding those rights in the de facto parenthood context. See Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 19, 761 A.2d 291. A. Compelling State Interest [¶49] The state has a compelling interest to justify interfering with the decision making authority of a fit parent “only for the most urgent reasons,” Merchant, 139 Me. at 122, 27 A.2d 816, or in “exceptional circumstances,” Plurality Opinion ¶ 12 & n.3; see also Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 23, 761 A.2d 291. There are certain vitally important relationships that a child shares with persons other than that child’s biological parents that are worth preserving and urgent enough to warrant state intervention, even over the biological parent’s objection. Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 27, 761 A.2d 291. For example, [w]hen a grandparent has been the primary caregiver and custodian for a child over a significant period of time, the relationship between the child and the grandparent warrants application of the court’s parens patriae authority on behalf of the child and provides a compelling basis for the State’s intervention into an intact family with fit parents. Id. (quotation marks omitted). [¶50] In order to safeguard the rights of the child, we have used our parens patriae authority to preserve close relationships between children and 34 grandparents, id., and we should do the same to protect relationships between children and those persons who function as parents to the child. This approach recognizes that “[t]here is at a minimum a third individual, whose interests are implicated in every case to which [a de facto parenthood determination] applies— the child.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Plurality Opinion ¶ 12. “Consideration of rights the child holds is of paramount importance because, regardless of the family constellation from which the child comes, in any placement dispute it is the child who is the most vulnerable and the most voiceless.” In re Custody of Shields, 136 P.3d 117, 130 (Wash. 2006) (Bridge, J., concurring). Recognizing the rights of de facto parents and children is part of a greater societal trend, as a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court has observed: The nationwide enactment of nonparental visitation statutes is assuredly due, in some part, to the States’ recognition of the[] changing realities of the American family. Because grandparents and other relatives undertake duties of a parental nature in many households, States have sought to ensure the welfare of the children therein by protecting the relationships those children form with such third parties. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). [¶51] By reading the Due Process Clause to require the child to suffer harm or a threat of harm before awarding rights to a putative de facto parent, the Plurality and the Dissent focus solely on the rights of the parents to the exclusion of any competing interest of the child or third parties, who may have played a 35 much greater role in the child’s life than the child’s biological parent. “To focus with strict scrutiny . . . on the compelling interest of the state, vis-a-vis [only] the parents, is to ignore what may in a particular case be the equally compelling interests of the children, the family, and the [third parties seeking custody or visitation].” Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 39, 761 A.2d 291 (Wathen, C.J., concurring); see also Merchant, 139 Me. at 123-24, 27 A.2d 816. [¶52] The expansive interpretation of parents’ due process rights elevates the rights of the biological relative at a time when advances in reproductive technology, the legalization of same-sex marriage, and the complexities of the modern family render biological ties less relevant in identifying familial relationships. See, e.g., Nolan v. LaBree, 2012 ME 61, ¶¶ 2-3, 5, 52 A.3d 923; St. Mary v. Damon, 309 P.3d 1027, 1029-31,1032-35 (Nev. 2013) (holding that both members of a same-sex couple could be considered “legal mothers” to a child born by implanting the fertilized egg of one partner into the other partner). Given the complexities of modern families, identifying the members of a child’s family is not reducible to single-factor discrete rules. As Justice Stevens noted in Troxel, [a] plurality of [the U.S. Supreme] Court [has] recognized that the parental liberty interest was a function, not simply of “isolated factors” such as biology and intimate connection, but of the broader and apparently independent interest in family. A parent’s rights with respect to her child have thus never been regarded as absolute, but rather are limited by the existence of an actual, developed relationship 36 with a child, and are tied to the presence or absence of some embodiment of family. 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). [¶53] Thus, if a person seeking de facto parenthood status has demonstrated that he or she has “fully and completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the child’s life,” C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 2004 ME 43, ¶ 14, 845 A.2d 1146 (emphasis added), the state has a compelling interest to intervene and apply its parens patriae authority to safeguard the relationships between children and their de facto parents.