Opinion ID: 2260682
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Separate Dissenting Opinion

Text: I concur in the result urged by the dissenting opinion because I believe that opinion correctly recites both the current state of the Court of Appeals' decisions on sanctions in misappropriation cases [1] and the consistency standard of Rule XI. Taken together, those two factors justify a suspension in this case exceeding one year. I write separately, however, because I believe that there is a serious disparity in sanctions between cases involving gross dishonesty and cases, such as this one, involving technical, inadvertent misappropriation. In cases involving serious acts of dishonesty ( In re Reback, 513 A.2d 226 (D.C.1986) (en banc) ; In re Hutchinson, 521 A.2d 676 (D.C.1986) ( reh. en banc granted ); and In re Austern, 524 A.2d 680 (D.C.1987))all of which involved serious and intentional acts of dishonesty by attorneysthe Court imposed suspensions of six months or less. Following the Court's teaching, the Board recommended the sanction of a ninety-day suspension In re Sandground, Bd. No. 335-84 (B.P.R. Dec. 5, 1986), and a one year suspension in In re Miller, Bd. No. 175-81 (B.P.R. September 17, 1987). In each of these cases, disciplined attorneys acted dishonestly, knowingand in some cases intendingthat their dishonest conduct would deceive others to their prejudice. In this case, Hessler had no such knowledge or intention. He commingled client funds, that is a certainty. But in August he sent his client a check for all that was owed and, had she received and cashed it, she would have had her money. Were those the facts, this case would have been a simple commingling case which would likely never have reached the disciplinary system. Of course, those are not the facts and the subsequent history shows why the disciplinary system cannot condone commingling that ripens into even inadvertent misappropriation. There was a substantial period of time when the client funds were in jeopardy. But acknowledging that the disciplinary system cannot condone inadvertent misappropriation is a far cry from saying that it is more serious than dishonest conduct done with the intent to deceive or injure. I have come to the conclusion that some dishonesty cases are more serious than some misappropriation cases. I believe that the facts in Hutchinson, Reback, Sandground and Austern all demonstrated substantially more serious misconduct than do the facts in this case. And I believe that Rule XI's admonition of consistency requires more than simply insuring consistency within categories of cases. In my judgment, it is time to reexamine the ranges of sanctions in dishonesty and misappropriation cases, imposing the most severe sanctions in those cases of both kinds where the conduct is intentional, is designed to deceive and prejudice, and does cause prejudice, and imposing less severe sanctions in those cases of both kinds where the conduct is unintentional, is not designed to deceive or prejudice and does not in fact cause prejudice. What the extremes in those ranges should be I am not presently prepared to say. However, until such a reexamination, I believe that the case law requires a lengthy suspension in any misappropriation case, including those like this onewhich involve inadvertent misappropriation. /s/ Jeffrey Fruend JEFFREY FREUND Date: October 9, 1987