Opinion ID: 2396152
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: evidence of involvement by witness in burglary and theft

Text: [¶ 26] During the cross-examination of the victim, Almurshidy's counsel requested the court's permission to ask the victim about her role in a burglary and theft of drugs from a veterinarian's office two months before the August 9 incident. Almurshidy's counsel properly alerted the court at sidebar to the question he was about to ask. Almurshidy had information that the victim had admitted her involvement in the burglary and theft to a caseworker. The State objected to the proposed questioning on several grounds, and the objection was sustained. Because we are vacating the judgment on other grounds, we find it unnecessary to determine whether the proposed question about the victim's involvement in a burglary and theft should have been allowed. Given the likelihood that this issue will be presented on retrial and for the guidance of counsel, we briefly discuss the State's objections to the question and the trial court's ruling. [¶ 27] There is no merit to the State's first objection which was that the proposed question could not be permitted because the victim was not charged or convicted of burglary and theft. The lack of a conviction makes M.R. Evid. 609 inapplicable, but a charge or conviction is not a prerequisite for the introduction of specific acts pursuant to Rule 608(b). See United States v. Smith, 80 F.3d 1188, 1193 (7th Cir.1996). [¶ 28] The State also objected on the grounds that evidence of specific acts is not admissible unless evidence of reputation for truthfulness is admitted on the direct examination of the witness. The trial court agreed and sustained the objection on this basis. The plain wording of Rule 608(b)(1), however, does not require an attack on the truthful character of the witness as a prerequisite to cross-examining the witness on specific instances of the witness' own conduct. In objecting on this ground, the State may have been confusing Rule 608(a), which deals with reputation evidence, with 608(b)(1). Rule 608(a) allows evidence of the reputation of truthful character to be admitted only when the witness' character for truthfulness has been attacked. See FIELD & MURRAY § 608.3, at 268. Rule 608(b)(1), however, allows a witness to be cross-examined about specific instances of her own conduct even though no evidence of her character for truthfulness or untruthfulness has been introduced previously as long as the specific instances of conduct are probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness and concern the witness' character for the same. [¶ 29] The State further objected to the question because the victim would have the right to claim her Fifth Amendment privilege if asked about the burglary and theft. On appeal the State also argues that Almurshidy's information about the victim's involvement in the burglary and theft was not sufficiently reliable. Both of these factors should be considered by a court in determining whether a witness can be questioned about prior specific acts. [¶ 30] Trial courts have wide discretion in determining whether the evidence sought to be admitted pursuant to Rule 608(b)(1) is relevant. See FIELD & MURRAY § 608.2, at 266. The appropriate exercise of that discretion requires an examination of several factors in order to determine how probative the offered evidence is of the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. See id. at 267; 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 6118, at 93-94 (1993). One of the factors to be considered is the importance of the witness to the case. Another factor is how probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness the bad acts are. [6] The reliability of the information that the bad acts in fact occurred is another factor. [7] Fishing expeditions into possible bad acts of the witness cannot be allowed, and the party seeking to inquire about specific instances of conduct should have a good faith belief that the conduct occurred and must be prepared to make a preliminary showing. WRIGHT & GOLD § 6118, at 96 n. 19 (1993 & Supp.1999). [¶ 31] A court should also consider factors similar to those in a Rule 403 analysis, such as undue delay, including the delay that might be caused by a voir dire of the witness in the absence of the jury. [8] Another consideration is whether the evidence of specific acts is cumulative of other evidence probative to the issue of the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. [¶ 32] This is not an exhaustive list of factors to be analyzed by the trial court in considering whether a witness can be questioned about specific instances of conduct, but it is a list of the factors raised by the arguments of counsel in this case. Upon retrial other factors may be raised. Here the trial court did not have the opportunity to analyze the factors because it relied upon the mistaken objection by the State. Because we have vacated the judgment, we need not reach the harmless error argument of the State on this issue. The entry is: Judgment of conviction vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein. Appeal of judgment of probation revocation dismissed. WATHEN, C.J., with whom CLIFFORD, J. joins, dissents with an opinion. WATHEN, C.J., with whom CLIFFORD, J., joins, dissenting. [¶ 33] I must respectfully dissent. In my judgment, we neither adopted nor applied in State v. Robbins, 666 A.2d 85 (Me.1995) the three-part test used by the court in this case to determine the admissibility of a photo array. We simply observed in a footnote its use in another jurisdiction. See Robbins, 666 A.2d at 88 n. 7. Instead, we found that the court erred in admitting the photo array because it served no purpose. See id. at 88. In addition, we found in Robbins that the admission of the photo array was harmless error. See id. [¶ 34] I would not adopt the three-part test. I would continue to leave the decision to the broad discretion of the trial court. See id. at 87. Further, I would find any error harmless in this case as well. The lines behind the defendant in the picture did not so clearly identify the picture as a mug shot to inform the jury that the defendant may have a prior criminal record. Even if jurors understand the significance of the lines, they are intelligent enough to assume that the photo was undoubtedly taken when the defendant was arrested on the pending charges.