Opinion ID: 778993
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: conclusion

Text: 96 As noted earlier, Peppers first mentioned the issue of proceeding pro se in a letter/motion to the Court on October 20, 2000, and his attorney referred to the matter again on November 2. The Court never dealt directly with the October 20 letter, referring the matter to counsel, and in its order of November 20 it seemed to downplay the import of its contents based on Peppers' conduct at the November 2 hearing. 13 Whether or not the October 20 letter would have been sufficient to require the District Court to inquire about Peppers' desire to represent himself, the November 6 colloquy clearly sufficed. As the Eleventh Circuit said in Dorman v. Wainwright: 97 To invoke his Sixth Amendment right under Faretta a defendant does not need to recite some talismanic formula hoping to open the eyes and ears of the court to his request. Insofar as the desire to proceed pro se is concerned, petitioner must do no more than state his request, either orally or in writing, unambiguously to the court so that no reasonable person can say that the request was not made. 98 798 F.2d 1358, 1366 (11th Cir.1986) (quoted in part in Buhl, 233 F.3d at 790 n. 9 and Stubbs, 281 F.3d at 118 n. 5). Although the District Court did conduct a colloquy with him at that time, we view it as inadequate under our precedent. While the Court did seek to ascertain the basis for Peppers' dissatisfaction with counsel — his reasons — it did not satisfactorily address the heart of the Faretta inquiry. 99 As stated above, the second, and, in this case, core responsibility that the court bears is to inquire as thoroughly as needed to satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the charges, the range of possible punishment, potential defenses, technical problems that the defendant may encounter, and any other facts important to a general understanding of the risks involved. Charles, 72 F.3d at 404. The Court never sought to determine whether Peppers understood the risks — the structural limitations or perils of representing himself — but focused instead on the ways that Peppers could be accommodated by counsel's representation: 100 Mr. Peppers, you have some very, very serious charges against you in this matter. You have had no experience in doing this before. Conspiracy is a complicated matter. So is the killing of an individual in the course of a drug transaction. 101 You also have a lot of witnesses that the government needs to obtain on your behalf. He is out there able to do that. You are confined. You will have every opportunity to convey your wishes to Mr. Welch, to present questions to him to present to the jury. 102 . . . 103 Well, this case is scheduled for the 20th. There are two weeks in between. I am directing Mr. Welch to sit down with you and go over the strategy that he intends. You can certainly supply him with the questions that you want him to address to your witnesses. 104 You will have the opportunity while you are sitting there at trial to present — you will have a pad and paper. You can pass over to him questions. Of course, it is up to him to decide whether or not the question is relevant and whether or not it would be objected to. 105 Although the Court characterized this exchange as advis[ing] Defendant of the dangers of proceeding pro se, it did not apprise him of the full range of risks and structural limitations that would be attendant upon Peppers should he proceed pro se ; nor does it even attempt to ascertain the extent of Peppers' understanding. The responsibility of determining whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary can be fulfilled only through adequate inquiry and thorough explanation by the District Court. Absent a proper inquiry, the District Court had no basis upon which to deny — or to grant — Peppers' request for self-representation. McMahon v. Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934, 946 (3d Cir.1987). 106 The Court's conclusion to deny Peppers' motion to proceed pro se was based largely on its determination that, taking into consideration the fact that Peppers was charged with serious offenses and incarcerated, he is unable to contact or interview witnesses and prepare a case. Furthermore, Defendant has no legal training or expertise, and to allow Defendant to represent himself is equivalent to allowing him to stand trial with no representation at all. The Court's concern over Peppers' skill and legal competency misses the mark. Federal courts have stated repeatedly that a court must not evaluate whether the defendant is competent to represent himself as part of its determination of whether he is knowingly asserting the right to self-representation: 107 The record affirmatively shows that Faretta was literate, competent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free will.... We need make no assessment of how well or poorly Faretta had mastered the intricacies of the hearsay rule and the California code provisions that govern challenges of potential jurors on voir dire. For his technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself. 108 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-36. See also Lopez v. Thompson, 202 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir.2000) (In assessing waiver of counsel, the trial judge is required to focus on the defendant's understanding of the importance of counsel, not the defendant's understanding of the substantive law or the procedural details.); United States v. McKinley, 58 F.3d 1475, 1481 (10th Cir. 1995) (listing cases finding error when a court denies self-representation based on its evaluation of a defendant's skills or preparation). 109 We have had occasion several times to describe the elements of what a court should or should not do in questioning a defendant when a request to proceed pro se is made. 14 It presents a challenge for a judge, and it seems that invariably such a request comes at a time when it diverts from trial preparation. Just as there is no talismanic formula for a defendant's expression of desire in this regard, there is no talismanic formula for the court's inquiry. We have not hesitated to require that the defendant be informed of all risks and consequences associated with his decision for self-representation. 110 To ensure that an accused is aware of the pitfalls possible in self-representation, the district court should advise him in unequivocal terms both of the technical problems he may encounter in acting as his own attorney and of the risks he takes if his defense efforts are unsuccessful. See United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir.1982). As a matter of constitutional law, we have imposed a clear and unambiguous obligation upon a trial judge who is faced with an accused who states merely that he is aware of his right to counsel but wishes to waive that right.... At a minimum, to be valid [a defendant's] waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. 674 F.2d at 188-89 (quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948) (plurality opinion) (reversing denial of habeas petition because standard, pre-printed waiver of counsel form insufficient to satisfy Sixth Amendment)). We have held that an accused's protection under the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel is not satisfied when a trial judge has failed to conduct a penetrating and comprehensive examination of the accused's waiver attempt which ensures that the accused is knowledgeable about his decision, even when the colloquy skips just one of the above factors. See Welty, 674 F.2d at 189 (no waiver where court merely informed defendant that self-representation is inadvisable) ( quoting Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 724 (plurality opinion)); see also United States v. Moskovits, 86 F.3d 1303, 1308 (3d Cir.1996) (no waiver notwithstanding trial judge's detailed colloquy with defendant because judge failed to state that he was authorized to impose greater sentence than that imposed in defendant's first trial). 111 Henderson v. Frank, 155 F.3d 159, 166-67 (3d Cir.1998) (granting a writ of habeas corpus where a petitioner had signed a generic waiver form and a petition to proceed pro se, but the trial court had not conducted a detailed colloquy). Nevertheless, we think that the following questions (derived in large part from Federal Judicial Center, Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges § 1.02 (4th ed.2000)) would prove a useful framework for the court to assure itself that a defendant's decision to proceed pro se is knowing and voluntary. 112 1. Have you ever studied law? 113 2. Have you ever represented yourself in a criminal action? 114 3. Do you understand that you are charged with these crimes: [state the crimes with which the defendant is charged]? 115 4. Do you understand that the U.S. Sentencing Commission has issued sentencing guidelines that will be used in determining your sentence if you are found guilty? 116 5. Do you understand that if you are found guilty of the crime charged in Count 1, the Court must impose an assessment of $___, and could sentence you to as many as ___ years in prison and fine you as much as $ ___? [Ask defendant this question for each count of the indictment or information.] 117 6. Do you understand that if you are found guilty of more than one of these crimes, this Court can order that the sentences be served consecutively, that is, one after another? 118 7. Do you understand that if you represent yourself, you are on your own? I cannot tell you — or even advise you — as to how you should try your case. 119 7a. Do you know what defenses there might be to the offenses with which you are charged? Do you understand that an attorney may be aware of ways of defending against these charges that may not occur to you since you are not a lawyer? Do you understand that I cannot give you any advice about these matters? 120 8. Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Evidence?  121 8a. Do you understand that the Federal Rules of Evidence govern what evidence may or may not be introduced at trial and that, in representing yourself, you must abide by those rules? 122 9. Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure? 123 9a. Do you understand that these rules govern the way a criminal action is tried in federal court? Do you understand that you must follow these rules? 124 10. Do you understand that you must proceed by calling witnesses and asking them questions, and that, except when and if you yourself testify, you will not be permitted to tell the jury matters that you wish them to consider as evidence? 125 10a. Do you understand that it may be much easier for an attorney to contact potential witnesses, gather evidence, and question witnesses than it may be for you? 126 11. I must advise you that in my opinion a trained lawyer would defend you far better than you could defend yourself. I think it unwise of you to try to represent yourself. You are not familiar with the law. You are not familiar with court procedure. You are not familiar with the rules of evidence. I strongly urge you not to try to represent yourself. 127 12. Now, in light of the penalties that you might suffer if you are found guilty, and in light of all of the difficulties of representing yourself, do you still desire to represent yourself and to give up your right to be represented by a lawyer? 13. Are you making this decision freely, and does it reflect your personal desire? 128 14. Do you have any questions, or do you want me to clarify or explain further anything that we have discussed here? 129 If the answers to the foregoing questions satisfy the court that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily desires to proceed pro se, the court would then state the necessary conclusions, such as: 130 I find that the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to counsel. I will therefore permit the defendant to represent himself (or herself).