Opinion ID: 153088
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Allocution Statement

Text: 26 Harvey challenges the use of his allocution statement as evidence of guilt in his conspiracy trial. Harvey contends that his allocution statement was not made voluntarily and that he did not know the rights he was giving up by making the statement. 27 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) an application for a writ of habeas corpus to disturb a state court judgment may issue only if it is found that the applicant is in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court ... in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. Thus, the only injury that will suffice to support a petition for habeas corpus relief is an injury to a petitioner's federally protected right; state law injuries cannot and do not suffice. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41, 104 S.Ct. 871, 874-75, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984). 28 While Wyoming has recognized the right to make a statement in mitigation of a fine or punishment as constitutionally protected, see Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Wyo.1987), under federal law, the right to allocution is not constitutionally protected. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S.Ct. 468, 471, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962); United States v. Gardner, 480 F.2d 929, 932 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 977, 94 S.Ct. 297, 38 L.Ed.2d 220 (1973). Rather, it is a right delineated by Fed.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(3)(C) 4 , the violation of which is not subject to collateral attack as unconstitutional. Hill, 368 U.S. at 426, 82 S.Ct. at 470. Therefore, the fundamental issue here is not whether Harvey's right to allocution was violated, but whether his right to due process was violated by forcing him to choose between his constitutional right to remain silent and his statutory right to speak on his own behalf in mitigation of punishment. 29 In Crampton v. Ohio, decided with McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971), vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 941, 92 S.Ct. 2873, 33 L.Ed.2d 765 (1972), the Court addressed a similar situation under Ohio's single trial procedure where a defendant could exercise his constitutional right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself on the issue of guilt only at the cost of surrendering any chance to plead his case on the issue of punishment. The Court upheld Ohio's single procedure, stating: 30 The criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations requiring the making of difficult judgments as to which course to follow. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. [759, 769, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1448, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) ]. Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose. The threshold question is whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved. 31 Crampton, 402 U.S. at 213, 91 S.Ct. at 1470. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 236, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 2128, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218-19 n. 8, 99 S.Ct. 492, 497 n. 8, 58 L.Ed.2d 466 (1978) (quoting Crampton ); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 48, 96 S.Ct. 1281, 1293-94, 47 L.Ed.2d 556 (1976) (quoting Crampton ); United States v. Jenkins, 904 F.2d 549, 558 n. 10 (10th Cir.1990). 32 We turn first to the privilege against self-incrimination. The contention is that Harvey was unlawfully compelled to become a witness against himself in order to take advantage of his right to allocution in the hope of receiving a lenient sentence. The Court in Crampton defined the issue as whether it is consistent with the privilege for the State to provide no means whereby a defendant wishing to present evidence or testimony on the issue of punishment may limit the force of his evidence ... to that issue. Id. at 213-14, 91 S.Ct. at 1470. 33 The Crampton Court concluded that the policies of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination are not offended when a defendant ... yields to the pressure to testify on the issue of punishment. Id. at 217, 91 S.Ct. at 1472. In reaching its decision, the Court cited to many examples where the defendant is forced to choose between competing rights. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 78 S.Ct. 622, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958) (one who takes the stand in his own behalf cannot then claim the privilege against cross-examination on matters reasonably related to the subject matter of his direct examination); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 561, 87 S.Ct. 648, 652, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967) (a defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf may be impeached by proof of prior convictions or otherwise inadmissible evidence); United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160, 164 n. 1, 75 S.Ct. 186, 188 n. 1, 99 L.Ed. 202 (1954) (a defendant whose motion for acquittal at the close of the State's case is denied must decide whether to stand on his motion or put on a defense, with the risk that in so doing he will bolster the State's case enough to support a verdict of guilty); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970) (upheld a Florida law requiring a defendant to choose between abandoning his alibi defense or giving the State both an opportunity to prepare a rebuttal and leads from which to start). 34 Accordingly, the privilege against compelled self-incrimination is not offended when a defendant yields to the pressure to testify on the issue of punishment in the hope of leniency. A defendant's choice to exercise his right to allocution, like the choice to exercise the right to testify, is entirely his own; he may speak to the court, but he is not required to do so. Once a defendant chooses to testify, though, he waives his privilege against compelled self-incrimination with respect to the testimony he gives and the testimony is admissible in evidence against him in later proceedings. See Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 2010, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968) ([W]e do not question the general evidentiary rule that a defendant's testimony at a former trial is admissible in evidence against him in later proceedings.). It makes no difference that the defendant may have been motivated to testify in the first instance only by reason of the strength of the lawful evidence adduced against him. Id. Therefore, the use of a Harvey's allocution statement in his subsequent conspiracy trial did not violate his due process rights if the making of the statement was an effective waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights. 35 An effective waiver of one's Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination may exist only if it is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent with an understanding of the consequences of such waiver. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573, 107 S.Ct. 851, 857, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987), the Court stated that the inquiry of whether a waiver is coerced has two distinct dimensions: 36 First the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. 37 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1140-41, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)). 38 We hold that Harvey's decision to make an allocution statement was voluntary. At the pretrial hearing to determine if his allocution statement was admissible in his conspiracy trial, Harvey conceded that he made his allocution statement voluntarily and that he was not coerced. 5 (ROA, Vol. I, Tab 3, Exhibit C at 969). Therefore, our only concern is whether or not he did so knowingly, intelligently, and with an understanding of the consequences. 39 Although Harvey may not have been aware of the specific consequences that ultimately resulted from his waiver of his right to remain silent at the sentencing hearing, [t]he Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Colorado, 479 U.S. at 574, 107 S.Ct. at 857. The Fifth Amendment guarantee is both simpler and more fundamental: A defendant may not be compelled to be a witness against himself in any respect. Id. at 574, 107 S.Ct. at 857. Under Miranda, the defendant must be aware of his right to remain silent and of the consequences of abandoning that right. Id. at 577, 107 S.Ct. at 859. 40 There is no allegation that Harvey failed to understand the basic privilege guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment; Harvey understood that he had the right to remain silent. Nor is there any allegation that he misunderstood the consequences of speaking freely to the district court; Harvey knew that anything he said could be used as evidence against him. Harvey was advised of his Fifth Amendment rights at the time he was arrested, at the time of his initial appearance in county court, and at the time of his arraignment in district court. Harvey was represented by counsel at all times. Finally, Harvey made his allocution statement under oath after having been sworn in by the trial court. In sum, we agree with the district court that Harvey voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right against self-incrimination at his first sentencing hearing. Harvey III, 893 F.Supp. at 1030.