Opinion ID: 2243679
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: satisfaction of the death penalty requirements

Text: Defendant makes two arguments concerning the eligibility phase of the death penalty hearings. First, the court erred in finding that the murder was committed in the course of an aggravated criminal sexual assault. Second, the court erred in finding that the murder was exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. Defendant's claim that the murder was not committed in the course of an aggravated criminal sexual assault is based on his interpretation that the aggravating factor requires the murder to follow the underlying felony. He argues that the assaults occurred after the murder and therefore they could not have occurred in the course of the murder, as contemplated by section 9-1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)). Defendant's argument fails for two reasons. First, it is not adequately grounded in fact. Defendant began his sexual assault before the murder when he ordered the girls to disrobe in the bathroom. He then used his actions as a threat to the girls if they did not cooperate. Second, his contention that the murder must follow the felony has no legal basis. It is well established that the language in the course of another felony does not necessarily mean following the other felony. See People v. Flores (1989), 128 Ill.2d 66, 96-97, 131 Ill.Dec. 106, 538 N.E.2d 481; People v. Foster (1987), 119 Ill.2d 69, 94-95, 115 Ill. Dec. 557, 518 N.E.2d 82; People v. Ramirez (1983), 98 Ill.2d 439, 458-59, 75 Ill. Dec. 241, 457 N.E.2d 31. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred when it found that the murder was exceptionally brutal or heinous and indicative of wanton cruelty an aggravating factor making a defendant eligible for death under section 9-1(b)(7) of the Criminal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(7)). There was evidence at the sentencing stage that the victim was unconscious 5 to 10 seconds after he was stabbed, and that he probably died within half a minute after the stabbings. The State agrees that the victim died quickly. Defendant argues that, in light of People v. Lucas (1989), 132 Ill.2d 399, 139 Ill.Dec. 447, 548 N.E.2d 1003, the victim's quick death precludes a finding of brutal or heinous behavior. In Lucas, defendant was convicted of murder after he, in a drunken stupor, shook his seven-month-old son, banged him against his crib, and suffocated him. The boy suffocated almost immediately after the injuries were inflicted, and the injuries themselves could have resulted from a single blow. The court concluded that there was not enough evidence to establish that the death was premeditated, prolonged, or tortuous, and therefore the State could not show that the circumstances surrounding the death were exceptionally brutal or heinous. Since this was the sole aggravating factor, this court vacated the death sentence. Lucas, 132 Ill.2d at 446, 139 Ill.Dec. 447, 548 N.E.2d 1003. Lucas is distinguishable from the instant case. Lucas does not stand for the proposition that any wound quickly inflicted is never brutal or heinous, or that a quick death can never be the result of brutal or heinous behavior. Rather, the court ruled that the particular facts of that case required such a finding. Pertinent to the case at bar was the finding in Lucas that there was no evidence of premeditation. ( Lucas, 132 Ill.2d at 446, 139 Ill.Dec. 447, 548 N.E.2d 1003.) Here, on the other hand, defendant took three knives from his home, walked two blocks to the victim's house, broke in, woke up and chased his victim before he stabbed him to death. The victim was nearly decapitated. The trial court specifically found that the murder was premeditated, calculated, and in cold blood. There was ample support for this finding; hence, the conclusion that the murder was extremely brutal or heinous and indicative of wanton cruelty was not inconsistent with Lucas.