Opinion ID: 2570151
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the trial court applied the appropriate legal standards

Text: We first consider whether, as Taggart argues, the trial court committed legal error by failing to apply the appropriate legal standards in exercising its broad discretion. The equitable division of marital assets is a three-step process: first, the court must determine what specific property is available for distribution; second, it must find the value of this property; third, it must decide how an allocation can be made most equitably. [8] In determining the most equitable division, the starting point is the presumption that an equal division is the most just. [9] From there, the superior court must consider the Merrill v. Merrill [10] factors now codified in AS 25.24.160(a)(4). [11] The superior court may divide the assets and liabilities unequally if it finds that such a division is just after considering the statutory factors. [12] Before unequally dividing property, the superior court must consider the necessities element of AS 25.24.160(a)(4) by specifically discussing the parties' individual needs. We have upheld an unequal division of property in a case in which the superior court discussed each of the statutory factors, [13] and affirmed a fifty-six/forty-four percent property division in a case in which the superior court found the wife needed future income while pursuing a professional degree. [14] Likewise, we have vacated an unequal property division and remanded because the superior court did not appear to discuss the needs of the parties beyond discussing the property available. [15] The superior court here entered thoughtful and detailed findings of fact discussing all of the relevant factors set out in AS 25.24.160(a)(4). [16] The findings discussed Sabra's present relative lack of employment skills, the parties' relative earning capacities, the disparity in the parties' incomes, the duration of the marriage, the time Sabra spent and will spend raising the children, and  in a general way  the economic needs of the parties, including Sabra's need for money either to refinance the home or to repair and sell it. The findings also discussed the amount of equity in the home and the exact amount the court was awarding each party from the marital estate, apart from what they were also to receive from the retirement accounts. These findings addressed the appropriate legal standards for property division. The trial court therefore committed no legal error. We next consider whether the findings are sufficient for appellate review of the disparate awards challenged by Taggart. In deciding whether to deviate from the presumptively appropriate fifty/fifty division, a superior court must consider the statutory factors, including the parties' economic circumstances and necessities. [17] The superior court did not explain the mathematical process by which it reached a conclusion that Sabra should receive about sixty-seven percent of the marital property, and thus $110,000 more of the non-retirement account property than Taggart received. But the findings discussed the parties' significant income disparity and broadly discussed Sabra's need to keep the family home, if possible. The findings did not directly address the parties' monthly needs. They did not identify Sabra's specific monthly financial necessities, [18] or the value of any extraordinary expenses Sabra might face that might themselves justify the disparity in the awards. [19] On the other hand, Taggart's main property division theme at trial was that Sabra was voluntarily underemployed and capable of earning more than she did. The court rejected Taggart's contention that Sabra had unilaterally chosen not to return to full-time employment; there was no significant dispute that Sabra was disadvantaged economically, to the point the court declined to penalize her after she violated a court order by selling marital property to pay expenses. And when Taggart failed to make several mortgage payments on the marital home in 2005, a foreclosure notice was issued for the marital home occupied by Sabra and the children. As the court noted, this left her in financial difficulties. The court thus effectively found Sabra had no financial reserves. The trial court's order correctly noted that the parties had noticeably disparate incomes, and that Taggart earns far more than Sabra and has a greater earning capacity. The court found that Taggart earns at least $3,000 net monthly, and Sabra earns $1,200 net monthly, during the school year. [20] These figures reflect a roughly 2.5-to-1 disparity in the parties' incomes; that disparity exceeds the approximately 2-to-1 disparity between the parties' property awards. The court also noted that Taggart had regularly deposited more than 7.5 percent of his income in his retirement plans. The findings and conclusions sufficiently explain why the court awarded Sabra approximately two times what it awarded Taggart. We are therefore able to determine whether the awards were within the superior court's considerable discretion. This is not to say that the size of the disparity from the fifty/fifty norm for property division does not cause concern. Care must be taken to adhere to the norm unless there are good reasons for deviating from it. Here, the reasons for deviation are sufficient and we are influenced in this conclusion by the relatively modest size of the marital estate.