Opinion ID: 759258
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Erred when it Denied Ricky Salyers' Motion to Suppress.

Text: 19 Defendant Salyers alleges that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress in which he sought exclusion of (1) statements he made to investigators prior to being advised of his Miranda rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)); and (2) evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant that Salyers claims contained information known to be false by the detective who applied for and received the warrant. In denying Ricky's motion to suppress, the experienced trial judge found that Ricky was free to leave, and not in the custody of the officers, at any time prior to receiving a Miranda warning. Also upon review, the judge found that detective Eiman did not knowingly provide false information to obtain the search warrant for the farmhouse. We review the trial court's findings on the suppression of evidence question under a clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 349 (7th Cir.1996). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, after a comprehensive review of the evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1224 (7th Cir.1994). 20 1. Did the Trial Court Incorrectly Find that Ricky Salyers was not in Custody at any Time Prior to Receiving a Miranda Warning? 21 Initially, defendant Ricky Salyers argues that the trial court improperly denied Salyers' motion to suppress statements he made to investigators on January 21 and 22, 1997. Specifically, Salyers alleges that two conversations should have been excluded from being used as evidence against him: (1) his January 21 conversation with detective Eiman at the kitchen table, and (2) his January 22 conversation with Agent Beebe, again at the kitchen table. Salyers alleges that on each of these occasions he was subjected to a custodial interrogation by the law enforcement officers prior to being arrested and advised of his Miranda rights at 8:30 p.m. on January 22, 1997. The government argues, and the district court found, that Ricky was not in custody until the time of his arrest at 8:30 p.m. on January 22, 1997, and thus officers were not required to give the Miranda warning prior to that time. We review de novo the district court's determination that a custodial interrogation did not occur prior to the time that Ricky was placed under arrest. See United States v. James, 113 F.3d 721, 727 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Yusuff, 96 F.3d 982, 988 (7th Cir.1996). Any historical facts and credibility determinations are reviewed deferentially under the clear error standard. See id. 22 It is well-established that Fifth and Sixth Amendment warnings are required only during a custodial interrogation. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). The Supreme Court has defined a custodial interrogation as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Thus, a suspect must be both in custody and subject to interrogation to trigger the Miranda warnings requirement. See Yusuff, 96 F.3d at 987; United States v. Burns, 37 F.3d 276, 280 (7th Cir.1994). Because we agree with the trial court's finding that Salyers was not in custody until that time when he was read his Miranda rights, the question of any interrogation prior to that time does not arise. See United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996) (custody is a prerequisite for determining whether an interrogation occurred). 23 An individual is considered in custody when his freedom of movement is restrained to the degree comparable to a formal arrest. See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983); Yusuff, 96 F.3d at 987. Custody implies a situation in which the suspect knows he is speaking with a government agent and does not feel free to end the conversation; the essential element of a custodial interrogation is coercion. United States v. Martin, 63 F.3d 1422, 1429 (7th Cir.1995). An individual is not in custody if a reasonable person would have believed he was free to leave, and the test is an objective one. See United States v. Boden, 854 F.2d 983, 991 (7th Cir.1988). 24 Before examining the factual circumstances concerning Ricky's allegations that he was in custody, we address his specific and unique argument that we examine his military experience, wherein he was trained to obey orders from those in authority, as a factor in analyzing whether or not Ricky believed he was free to leave during the kitchen table conversations. In essence, Salyers requests that we apply a subjective test. This we decline to do. The test is not whether the particular defendant thought he was free to go, but whether a reasonable person in the circumstances would have believed so. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988); United States v. Lennick, 917 F.2d 974, 977 (7th Cir.1990); Boden, 854 F.2d at 991; see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (the initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by ... the person being questioned); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 422, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's shoes would have understood his situation). As such, we will not consider Ricky's alleged inclination to blindly obey authority figures to determine whether he was free to leave. 25 When reviewing a district court's determination regarding the question of whether a suspect was in custody, this court has repeatedly directed that the trial judge make a specific finding as to freedom to leave in the Fourth Amendment context. See, e.g., Boden, 854 F.2d at 991; United States v. Pavelski, 789 F.2d 485, 489 n. 2 (7th Cir.1986); United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 310 (7th Cir.1985); United States v. Notorianni, 729 F.2d 520, 523 (7th Cir.1984). Here, Judge Baker assisted the appeal process and followed this court's previous mandates with an explicit finding that Ricky was not in custody and was free to leave until such time as Agent Beebe read him his Miranda warnings. In his April 11, 1997, Order on Defendant's Amended Motion to Suppress, the judge made a detailed finding that at no time prior to the time Eiman arrested [Salyers] was he told he couldn't leave, nor did he ask to leave, or attempt to leave. I find there was no custodial interrogation of [Salyers] prior to the time Eiman placed him under arrest and Beebe read him his rights. Up until that time [Salyers] was free to leave. We are in agreement with the trial court's finding. 26 Salyers' argument is that he was in custody on January 21 and again on January 22, 1997, before he was apprised of his Miranda rights. At the suppression hearing, the judge received testimony from Detective Eiman, Agent Beebe, Rusty Salyer and Ricky Salyers. Ricky testified that during the January 21, 1997 discussion in the kitchen, there was nothing physically done by the officers to corroborate [his] feeling that [he] should stay at the table, and furthermore, no one was arrested at that time, nor was anyone told that they could not leave, nor were they placed in any type of restraint. Neither Eiman nor any other officer drew or displayed their weapons, nor did they make any other show of force or authority. Significantly, Ricky admits he volunteered to speak to the EOD sergeant on the telephone and informed him of the presence of C-4 explosives. As another example of Ricky's freedom of movement and overall state of mind, he testified that he assisted the officers in measuring guns found inside the farmhouse. Ricky also testified that at the end of the first day, after a search of the farmhouse, Detective Eiman told the defendant that he and his family were free to do whatever we wanted to do, and they'd be back sometime around noon the next day. Relying on Detective Eiman's statement, Ricky decided to drive to the sheriff's station the morning of January 22 to acquire another copy of the search warrant, and even acknowledged at the suppression hearing that he fully believed he was free to leave on the evening of January 21. 27 Now dealing with January 22, 1997, Salyers was read his Miranda rights at 8:30 p.m., but he objected to the admissibility of statements he made during a kitchen table discussion with Agent Beebe prior to the Miranda reading. At no time did Ricky attempt to leave the table, nor was he restrained or coerced in any manner from leaving the table, and nobody interfered with his right to exit. Furthermore, he was neither handcuffed nor physically restrained in any manner. Agent Beebe neither drew nor displayed her weapon to Ricky as they sat at Ricky's kitchen table. In fact, Agent Beebe testified very explicitly, in response to a question, that Ricky was not in custody at that time. Ricky has failed to point to any statements made or any other evidence in the record that would lead one to the conclusion that he was not free to leave the table. The record indicates only that Ricky felt the conversation was going nowhere and stated to Agent Beebe that he would rather speak to my lawyer, at which time Beebe read him his rights. 28 Moreover, Ricky has failed to state, much less point us to, any of the allegedly inadmissible statements made during the conversation with Agent Beebe. The record demonstrates that Ricky had previously provided all the information referred to herein that he now seems to argue is inadmissible, and furthermore, it is clear that he voluntarily assisted Detective Eiman and local enforcement officers during their inspection and search, including assisting the officers in measuring the guns in the farmhouse, and leading Eiman to the trailer, opening the door, and describing the trailer's contents. He also volunteered to discuss the characteristics of his various weapons when he spoke with the Fort Leonard Wood EOD specialists on the telephone. Thus, any statements that Ricky seems to be insinuating (though not explicitly stating) were inadmissible, were made prior to the allegedly improper discussion he had with Agent Beebe. 29 Upon review, we have been unable to discover, nor has the appellant directed us to, any evidence of coercion in the record, see Martin, 63 F.3d at 1429, and the facts demonstrate that a reasonable person in Ricky's position would have understood he or she was free to leave. The trial court's finding that Salyers was not in custody until Agent Beebe read him his rights at 8:30 p.m. on January 22 is more than adequately supported in the record, and thus is not clearly erroneous. 30 2. Did Detective Eiman Knowingly or Recklessly Include False Statements in his Application for a Search Warrant? 31 Salyers next argues that the trial court should have suppressed evidence obtained pursuant to the first search warrant because Detective Eiman knowingly include[d] false information in his application for a search warrant of the Salyer's home. Specifically, Salyers argues Eiman knowingly relied upon Rusty Salyer's statement that he (Rusty) had seen a rocket launcher in Ricky's possession within the past two to three months, when Eiman knew this statement to be false. 32 A criminal defendant is entitled to a hearing if he or she makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). Ricky states that Detective Eiman knowingly made a false statement when he applied for the first search warrant, and he manufactures this assertion based upon the suppression hearing testimony of his brother, Rusty. At the hearing, Rusty testified about the events which took place at the sheriff's office, when Rusty originally informed Eiman about the weapons kept at the farmhouse. According to Rusty's suppression hearing testimony, Rusty originally told Eiman he had last seen the rocket launcher in 1993. According to Rusty, Eiman allegedly told him that he (Eiman) could only procure a warrant if Rusty changed his statement and alleged that he had seen the rocket launcher recently. Rusty claims that based on Eiman's prompting, he (Rusty) decided to lie and agreed to change and tailor his testimony to state that he had seen the rocket launcher in the past two or three months. Under these circumstances, Ricky argues, Eiman coerced Rusty into testifying falsely that he had seen the rocket launcher in the past two or three months, and more importantly for purposes of Franks, supra, Eiman knew it was a falsehood when he included Rusty's statement in his application for a warrant. 33 But Rusty's actions prior to the execution of the warrant are totally inconsistent with his later suppression hearing testimony. On January 21, 1997, following his original meeting with Eiman, Rusty signed an affidavit, (which is part of the record), expressly stating that he had the opportunity to view the rocket launcher within the past year. Rusty admits that he stated to the state judge who issued the warrant that everything in the affidavit was true. He further admits that he told an investigator from the United States Attorney's Office that every line in the affidavit was accurate. In essence, Rusty, now with a change of heart, argues that he was lying when he spoke to Eiman, lying when he signed the affidavit, lying when he testified to the judge who issued the warrant, but at the suppression hearing he finally decided to tell the truth. The district judge found Rusty's testimony to be less than credible and found this scenario unlikely. 34 The trial court explicitly found that I do not believe Rusty Salyer when he says that Lt. Eiman knew Rusty's statements about [the time at which he viewed] the shotgun and the launcher were lies. It is far more likely that Rusty now repents giving evidence against his family members and realizes the serious nature of the charges against his brother, Ricky. On the other hand, the court went on and explicitly found Detective Eiman credible, stating: I believe Eiman when he says that he did not know the statements in the complaint were false ... perhaps Rusty did lie [when he spoke to Eiman], but I don't believe Eiman knew it at the time. 35 Of course, the judge's credibility assessment is entitled to a great deal of deference. As this court has held on numerous occasions, 36 we do not second-guess the sentencing judge because he or she has had the best opportunity to observe the verbal and non-verbal behavior of the witnesses focusing on the subject's reactions and responses to the interrogatories, their facial expressions, attitudes, tone of voice, eye contact, posture and body movements, as well as confused or nervous speech patterns in contrast with merely looking at the cold pages of an appellate record. 37 United States v. Garcia, 66 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1497 (7th Cir.1993) (quotation omitted)). 38 In fact, a district judge's credibility determination will not be disturbed unless it is completely without foundation. See United States v. Ferguson, 35 F.3d 327, 333 (7th Cir.1994). [T]he trial judge's ... choice of whom to believe is conclusive on the appellate court unless the judge credits exceedingly improbable testimony. United States v. Cardona-Rivera, 904 F.2d 1149, 1152 (7th Cir.1990). In other words, [w]e must accept the [judge's determination] unless it is contrary to the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no reasonable fact-finder could accept it. Yusuff, 96 F.3d at 986 (citing United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir.1992)). Based upon our review of the record, we refuse to disturb the trial judge's findings because the circumstances surrounding Rusty's suppression hearing testimony provide an adequate foundation for the trial judge's finding that Rusty's testimony was false. It is certainly conceivable that Rusty concocted a new version of events once he realized he had set his brother up for a conviction and subsequent punishment. 39 Another factor prompts us to believe that Detective Eiman did not knowingly lie when he applied for the search warrant. Because of the clarity, specificity and detail in Rusty's statements, Eiman certainly could have believed that Rusty had access to his father's home and had seen the weaponry. Detective Eiman simply view[ed] the facts through the lens of his experience and expertise. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). We can well understand why Eiman chose to believe Rusty's statements. 40 There is more than sufficient evidence in this record to support the trial judge's finding that Eiman did not knowingly or recklessly include false statements in the warrant application. We agree with the experienced trial judge and refuse to hold that the court's finding rises to the level of clear error. 41 B. Whether the District Court Erred when it Found the MK 141 is a Destructive Device for Purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(3). 42 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(3) mandates a two level enhancement to the base offense level if the offense involved a destructive device. The Commentary to section 2K2.1 of the guidelines defines a destructive device as follows: 43 any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas--(i) bomb, (ii) grenade, (iii) rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, (iv) missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, (v) mine, or (vi) device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding clauses; any type of weapon which will, or which may be readily converted to, expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or other propellant, and which has any barrel with a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter; or any combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any device into any destructive device listed above. For a more detailed definition, refer to 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f). 44 The more detailed definition referred to in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f) is nearly identical to the Commentary definition, with one exception. Namely, § 5845(f) states that the term destructive device does not include any device which is neither designed nor redesigned for use as a weapon; any device, although originally designed for use as a weapon, which is redesigned for use as a signaling, pyrotechnic, line throwing, safety or similar device. 45 The district court found the MK 141 qualified as a destructive device. The defendant Salyers asks us to review this finding de novo, and argues that the MK 141 clearly falls into the pyrotechnic category, and thus does not qualify as a destructive device. We disagree. To begin with, contrary to the defendant's assertion that we review this claim de novo, the district court's application of the guideline definitions to the characteristics of the MK 141 is reviewed for clear error. See United States v. Wyatt, 102 F.3d 241, 246 n. 7 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1325, 137 L.Ed.2d 486 (1997) (district court's application of § 2K2.1 to facts reviewed for clear error). A trial court's decision does not constitute clear error if it simply represents a choice between two permissible inferences based upon the evidence. See United States v. Bush, 79 F.3d 64, 66 (7th Cir.1996). 46 At Salyers' sentencing hearing, the government proffered one David Shatzner as an expert witness with knowledge about weapons classifications, including the classification of the MK 141 as a destructive device. At the time of the hearing Shatzner was an explosives officer with the ATF in the Explosive Technology Unit, and had served in that capacity for the preceding eight years. Prior to that time, he was an explosives expert in the military and had testified in federal court proceedings on more than 20 occasions, when called upon to explain whether certain devices met the definition of destructive devices under the Federal Firearms Law. Shatzner described the MK 141 and concluded it qualifies as a destructive device. Specifically, Mr. Shatzner testified: [t]his device was designed as an explosive weapon, not necessarily designed to kill, but designed to incapacitate and temporarily render someone blind or deafened.... He further explained that the MK 141 was designed solely as a weapon, that it contains a quantity of explosives which can kill or injure, and that if set off, the MK 141 blast contains enough pressure to cause injury to internal organs. 47 The only rebuttal evidence the defendant offered was his own testimony, as he took the stand and asserted, not surprisingly, that the MK 141 is not a destructive device, but rather a diversionary device. The trial judge, after weighing the defendant's self-serving testimony against that of Shatzner, accepted Shatzner's testimony as evidenced by the court's Order on Final Disposition: the testimony of [Shatzner] states unequivocally that the listed items are destructive devices within the meaning of the law. I credit his opinion and accept it. We give near absolute deference to a court's credibility determinations because the judge observed the witness's testimony first-hand. See United States v. Howard, 80 F.3d 1194, 1205 (7th Cir.1996). We hold there is ample evidence in the record supporting the trial judge's finding, and the finding is not clearly erroneous. 7 48 C. Whether the District Court's Application of the Sentencing Guidelines was Improper. 49 Finally, Salyers challenges the court's application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines in calculating his sentence. We review de novo the trial court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Mattison, 153 F.3d 406, 1998 WL 461901, at  5 (7th Cir., Aug.10, 1998) (citing United States v. Roy, 126 F.3d 953, 954 (7th Cir.1997)). U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(c) requires an addition of one point for a previous sentence of less than 60 days. When calculating Salyers' criminal history points, the district judge counted one point pursuant to § 4A1.1(c) for Salyers' previous conviction and 45-day sentence for the North Carolina Assault on a Government Official conviction. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) requires an additional two criminal history points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation.... The judge added two points pursuant to § 4A1.1(d) for committing the instant offense while on probation for the North Carolina state assault conviction. Salyers claims the court's simultaneous addition of points under these two sections constitutes impermissible double counting. Double counting occurs when a court allows two or more upward adjustments within the guideline range when both adjustments are premised on the same conduct. See United States v. Williams, 106 F.3d 1362, 1367 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Compton, 82 F.3d 179, 183 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Haines, 32 F.3d 290, 293 (7th Cir.1994). The same conduct cannot be described in two different ways such that two different adjustments apply, each of which leads to a separate upward adjustment in point totals. See United States v. Kopshever, 6 F.3d 1218, 1224 (7th Cir.1993). 50 The precise issue Salyers raises was examined and disposed of in Williams, 106 F.3d 1362. There, Williams received one point for his criminal history (having committed a crime in the past), and two additional points for committing the instant crime (possession of firearm by a felon) while on probation. We noted, Williams argues each adjustment stems from the same conduct: his earlier conviction. We [disagree]: the first adjustment results from the earlier conviction, the second from his current conduct. Williams, 106 F.3d at 1367. Salyers' case is indistinguishable. 8 The inclusion of one criminal history point for his past Assault on a Government Official state conviction is a result of his throwing a grenade at state law enforcement officers in North Carolina in 1995. The addition of two criminal history points for commission of the instant crime (possession of destructive devices) while on probation is based on other felonious conduct: namely, the possession of destructive devices kept in a Wells Cargo trailer first discovered by state officials on January 21, 1997. As was the case in Williams, separate adjustments are proper in Ricky Salyers' case because the adjustments were not premised on the same conduct. The trial judge correctly applied the guidelines in accordance with established precedent, and we agree with his ruling. 9