Opinion ID: 2535305
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial Precedent

Text: In Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So.2d 361 (Fla.2003), we considered whether an inmate's petition for writ of mandamus challenging forfeiture of gain time is essentially a collateral criminal proceeding or whether it is a civil proceeding subject to the payment and lien provisions of the Prisoner Indigency Statute. We concluded that a gain time challenge was analogous to a collateral criminal proceeding for the purposes of section 57.085(10) and was therefore exempt from the fee and lien provisions of section 57.085. In so holding, we recognized that section 57.085 was enacted as part of a Legislative effort intended to reduce unnecessary or frivolous prisoner filings. Id. at 363; see also Geffken v. Strickler, 778 So.2d 975, 977 (Fla.2001) (The legislative history of these amendments makes clear that the intent of all the amendments was to reduce the filing of frivolous lawsuits and reduce the amount of funds unnecessarily expended on such lawsuits in the courts.). Because gain time challenges, if successful, affect the amount of time a prisoner must spend in prison, we concluded in Schmidt that such challenges were analogous to collateral criminal proceedings. In arriving at this holding in Schmidt, we also considered the provisions of the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) enacted by Congress in 1996. See Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat. XXXX-XX-XXXX-XX (1996) (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2006)). We noted that the PLRA was also intended to discourage filing of frivolous inmate actions, but the federal courts have concluded that claims contesting the computation of criminal sentences should continue to be treated as traditional collateral criminal proceedings under habeas corpus, since they were not the type of civil lawsuits Congress meant to discourage or restrict. Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 365. The federal courts have held that the PLRA was promulgated by Congress to curtail prisoner tort, civil rights and conditions litigation and not the filing of habeas type suits. Anderson v. Singletary, 111 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir.1997). [6] We further explained in Schmidt that [t]he federal decisions have found no indication in the text of the PLRA or its legislative history to indicate that Congress expected its filing fee payment requirements to apply to traditional hybrid civil-criminal, habeas-type actions in which inmates assert an entitlement to gain time and an accelerated release from prison but were not contesting their conditions of confinement. Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 364. We similarly concluded that Florida's Prisoner Indigency Statute, section 57.085, was intended only to discourage the filing of frivolous inmate lawsuits, but not to prevent the filing of claims contesting the computation of criminal sentences. Id. at 366. In holding that prisoners' gain time challenges are collateral criminal proceedings for purposes of section 57.085(10), we explained: Long ago, [the United States Supreme Court] made clear that [a] prisoner's eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a significant factor entering into both the defendant's decision to plea bargain and the judge's calculation of the sentence to be imposed. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 32[, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17] (1981).... It is clear that the Supreme Court has refused to be bound by the variations in terminology used in the various challenges to the computation of an inmate's sentence. Instead, it has looked to the effect the challenged action had on the amount of time an inmate has to actually spend in prison. We think we should do the same; thus, we conclude that a gain time challenge is analogous to a collateral challenge to a sentence in a criminal proceeding because the end result is the samethe inmate's time in prison is directly affected. In the instant case, Schmidt's loss of gain time effectively lengthened his sentence, since by the Department of Corrections' action he now has to serve that additional time in prison. Therefore, we agree, in accord with the authorities discussed above, that his gain time challenge should be considered a collateral criminal proceeding, and the Prisoner Indigency Statute should not apply. To hold otherwise would result in an unlawful `chilling' of a criminal defendant's right to appeal or otherwise challenge the propriety or constitutionality of the conviction or sentence, Geffken v. Strickler, 778 So.2d 975, 977 n. 5 (Fla. 2001), and raise a serious issue as to criminal defendants' constitutional rights of access to the courts to challenge their sentences. Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 366-67 (footnote omitted). The next relevant decision in this line of cases is Cox v. Crosby, 27 So.3d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). In Cox, the First District had for consideration the question of whether Cox's petition for writ of mandamus challenging the constitutionality of a 1993 amendment to section 944.275, Florida Statutes, was exempt from the fee and lien requirements under section 57.085(10). Section 944.275, as amended, precluded Cox from receiving basic gain time. The trial court in Cox held that the action was not exempt from the payment and lien provisions of section 57.085. See id. at 45. Cox sought review in the district court, where the State argued that the holding in Schmidt should be limited to actual gain time forfeitures and not apply to an action challenging a statute. The First District disagreed and concluded that Cox's action was one that is exempt from payment and lien requirements because, if successful, it would directly affect the time that Cox would spend in prison. Cox, 27 So.3d at 46. The district court then certified the following question to this Court in Cox v. Crosby : Does the holding in Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So.2d 361 (Fla.2003), extend to all actions, regardless of their nature, in which, if successful, the complaining party's claim would directly affect his or her time in prison, so to preclude imposition of a lien on the inmate's trust account to recover applicable filing fees? Id. We granted review and rephrased the certified question in McNeil v. Cox, 997 So.2d 343, 346 (Fla.2008). After specifically limiting the question to all gain time actions, we answered it in the affirmative. See id. at 344. In so holding, we determined that [t]he prisoner indigency statute was intended to supplant the general indigency statute for most purposes where prisoners' civil filings are concerned. Id. at 345. We also concluded that the prisoner indigency statute was intended to `discourage the filing of frivolous civil lawsuits' with respect to prison conditions. Id. at 348 (quoting Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 366). Based on the text and intent of section 57.085 and on our decision in Schmidt, we held in Cox that all gain time actions, including actions challenging a gain time statute, are collateral criminal proceedings for the purposes of section 57.085(10), and thus exempt from the payment and lien requirements of the act. Cox, 997 So.2d at 348. Because the question we answered in Cox was limited to gain time challenges, that decision is not dispositive of the question presented in this case, which pertains to actions challenging the Commission's determination of an inmate's presumptive parole release date. We have never addressed the question now before us concerning whether an action challenging the Commission's determination of an inmate's PPRD is a collateral criminal proceeding intended to be exempt from the lien provisions of section 57.085. Thus, we must examine the statutory framework in which the Commission calculates a prisoner's presumptive parole release date and attempt to determine the effect that calculation has on the setting of an inmate's actual parole release date.