Opinion ID: 2806257
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Permissible Interpretation

Text: Proceeding to step two of the Chevron framework, we must determine whether the BIA’s construction was “a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845. This is a generous standard, requiring deference “even if the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation.” National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005). Regardless of whether Y- N-P- might reasonably have been decided differently, we conclude that the BIA arrived at a permissible construction of an ambiguous statutory scheme. Garcia-Mendez’s argument to the contrary centers on the BIA’s decision in Matter of Bustamante, 25 I. & N. Dec. 564 (B.I.A. 2011). Although Bustamante predated Y-N-P- and did not address the question presented here, Garcia-Mendez GARCIA-MENDEZ V. LYNCH 13 contends that the reasoning of the former case undermines that of the latter. In Bustamante, the BIA held that section 212(h) waivers are unavailable to applicants for standard cancellation of removal (as distinct from special rule cancellation). 25 I. & N. Dec. at 570. To be entitled to standard cancellation of removal, an alien must demonstrate (in relevant part) that he “has not been convicted” of certain offenses. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). Noting this language, the BIA pointed out that section 212(h) refers to waiving “inadmissibility,” not “convictions.” 25 I. & N. Dec. at 567. Because section 212(h) does not operate to nullify “convictions,” the BIA reasoned, it provides no relief to applicants for standard cancellation of removal. Id. at 569–70. In so holding, the BIA found it instructive that, in drafting the special rule cancellation provision, “Congress chose to use language relating to inadmissibility”—as opposed to the “convictions” language found in the standard cancellation provision. Id. at 568. The implication of the BIA’s reasoning, according to Garcia-Mendez, is that Congress intended to make the section 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility available to special rule applicants—who must demonstrate they are “not inadmissible”—but not to aliens seeking standard cancellation, who must show they have “not been convicted.”6 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) with id. at (b)(2)(A)(iv). 6 In Y-N-P-, the BIA rejected this argument. 26 I. & N. Dec. at 17–18 (“[A]lthough we cannot explain the disparate language regarding the bars to relief in [the standard cancellation provision] and the [special rule cancellation provision], we find it unlikely that Congress would have made such an effort to ensure that the domestic violence waiver was made available to special rule cancellation applicants if other waivers of inadmissibility and deportability were already implicitly available . . . .”). 14 GARCIA-MENDEZ V. LYNCH The foregoing argument, whatever its persuasive force, does not render the BIA’s interpretation impermissible. The symmetry between special rule cancellation (which requires applicants to demonstrate they are “not inadmissible”) and section 212(h) (which expunges grounds of inadmissibility) is not dispositive proof that the two provisions were intended to work together. Nor does the ameliorative intent behind VAWA, invoked again by Garcia-Mendez, change our conclusion. Our inquiry is confined to whether the agency’s interpretation was “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Wilderness Society, 353 F.3d at 1059 (en banc) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844) (internal quotation marks omitted). Again, the INA is inconclusive as to whether special rule applicants may apply for a section 212(h) waiver. The BIA’s resolution of that question in the negative was a permissible interpretation of an ambiguous statutory scheme. We therefore deny Garcia-Mendez’s petition for review.