Opinion ID: 1740065
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Subjective Element of Provocation

Text: Regarding the subjective element of the provocation defense, Bird asserts that a person in a psychotic state can have delusions and yet appear more rational than he actually is, and that Gratzer's testimony would have helped the jury understand that Bird's dead calm affect may have masked his true emotional state. In essence, Bird appears to be concerned that his psychosis eliminated or at least obscured key cues the jury could consider in determining whether he was actually provokedcues such as expressions of anger toward Laurie Bird. The state argues that determining a defendant's emotional state is no different from determining his mental state or mens rea and that accordingly, a jury must evaluate actual provocation based on what the defendant says and does, not on a psychiatrist's opinion. We agree that there is no meaningful difference between an emotional state and a mental state with respect to the subjective element of the provocation defense. We do not dispute Bird's contention that what a psychotic defendant says and does may be an imperfect indicator of that defendant's emotional state. But what a psychotic defendant says and does may be an equally imperfect indictor of what that defendant has in mind with respect to intent and premeditation, and Minnesota law unambiguously prohibits expert psychiatric testimony regarding these mental states unless the testimony is offered to establish a mental illness defense. See Provost, 490 N.W.2d at 104 (stating that expert testimony concerning the fact and effects of defendant's schizophrenia added nothing to the jury's determination of the intent the defendant actually had in mind); Brom, 463 N.W.2d at 762-63 (reasoning that expert psychiatric testimony is not helpful in deciding either intent or premeditation because both issues are subjective and must be inferred from the totality of the circumstances). We therefore conclude that like the mental states of intent and premeditation, the emotional state of heat of passion must be inferred from the totality of the circumstances rather than established through expert testimony. [6] Provost Revisited Because the foregoing conclusion draws substantial support from but is arguably not mandated by our holding in Provost, it is appropriate for us to revisit and comment on Provost. We do so in the context of Bird's assertion that expert psychiatric testimony about his alleged psychosis at the time of the shooting is relevant to the jury's determination of whether he acted in the heat of passion. In Provost, we acknowledged that under some circumstances, an expert's opinion that a defendant suffered from a particular mental illness could be relevant to determining whether that defendant actually harbored a particular mental state. 490 N.W.2d at 99. We likewise accept Bird's argument that under some circumstances, psychiatric testimony on the existence and effects of a mental illness may have some tendency to make the existence of an emotional state such as heat of passion more probable or less probable than it would be without the [testimony]. See Minn. R. Evid. 401. But as we noted in Provost, relevancy is not the only consideration in determining whether evidenceincluding expert psychiatric testimonyshould be admitted: While Minn. R. Evid. 401 adopts a minimal relevancy approach, this is counter-balanced by Minn. R. Evid. 403, which provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by other considerations, including prejudice and confusion of the issues.    Consequently, to conclude that psychiatric testimony may have some relevance to a guilty mind is only the beginning, not the end, of any inquiry into admissibility of that testimony. 490 N.W.2d at 99. We ultimately concluded in Provost that any probative value expert psychiatric testimony might have to a jury in determining whether a defendant actually formed a particular mens rea would be substantially outweighed by the risk that the jury [would] inevitably take the testimony as an invitation to consider whether the defendant could or couldn't [form] a guilty mind. Id. at 100. In other words, we concluded that allowing expert psychiatric testimony on the issue of whether a defendant formed a particular mental state would inevitably open the door to jury verdicts influenced by the doctrine of diminished capacity or responsibilitya doctrine not recognized in Minnesota law. Id.; see also Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d at 706 (rejecting doctrine of diminished capacity). After reexamining the foregoing conclusion in the context of the case before us today, we find no basis for limiting our holding in Provost in order to deem Gratzer's testimony admissible. Assuming without deciding that Gratzer's proposed testimony would have probative value in determining whether Bird acted in the heat of passion, we conclude that such value is substantially outweighed by the risk that the testimony would lead the jury to undertake an impermissible inquiry into Bird's capacity to form the intent required for first-degree murder. [7] Accordingly, we conclude that Gratzer's testimony is inadmissible on the question of whether Bird acted in the heat of passion at the time of the shooting.