Opinion ID: 170445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Decision of the Commission

Text: The ALJ's decision was appealed to the Commission. The Commission summarized Plateau's arguments before it as follows: Plateau argues that its bleeder system complied with the requirements of section 75.334(b)(1) and that the judge erred in finding a violation. It maintains that the judge erred in interpreting the standard to prohibit methane accumulations in a gob, and that the judge's conclusion that its ventilation system was overextended is not supported by substantial evidence. Plateau asserts that the judge also erred by relying upon a misinterpretation of section 75.323(e) and in concluding that a violation of section 75.334(b)(1) could exist even if the operator complied with its ventilation plan. Finally, Plateau submits that section 75.334(b)(1) does not provide criteria for determining the effectiveness of a bleeder system, and that the judge's finding that Plateau knew or should have known that its system was not functioning effectively was not supported by substantial evidence. Plateau Mining Corp., 28 FMSHRC 501, 508-09 (Aug.2006) (internal citations omitted). Four commissioners heard the appeal. They split evenly on whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding of a § 75.334(b)(1) violation, thereby allowing the ALJ's decision to stand. For convenience, we refer to the commissioners in favor of affirming as the affirming commissioners and to the commissioners in favor of vacating and remanding as the dissenting commissioners. In several respects, however, the Commission's decision was unanimous. All commissioners reaffirmed the Commission's holding in an earlier case that implicit in § 75.334(b)(1) is a requirement that `a bleeder system must effectively ventilate the area within the bleeder system and protect active workings from the hazards of methane accumulations.' Id. at 509, quoting RAG Cumberland Res. LP, 26 FMSHRC at 647. The Commission explained that the regulation expresses the effectiveness requirement in general terms to be broadly adaptable to myriad circumstances. Id. at 510 (internal quotation marks omitted). But because of this generality, a mine operator cannot be punished for a violation unless it has proper notice that it is violating the regulation. The Commission explained: [S]uch broad statements must afford reasonable notice of what is required or proscribed. When faced with a challenge that a safety standard fails to provide adequate notice of prohibited or required conduct, the Commission has applied an objective standard, the reasonably prudent person test. The appropriate test is not whether the operator had explicit prior notice of a specific prohibition or requirement, but whether a reasonably prudent person familiar with the mining industry and the protective purposes of the standard would have recognized the specific prohibition or requirement of the standard. The Commission has recognized that various factors that bear upon what a reasonably prudent person would do include accepted safety standards in the field, considerations unique to the mining industry, and the circumstances at the operator's mine. Id. (citations, footnotes, and internal quotation marks omitted) All the commissioners also agreed that compliance with the mine-specific ventilation plan does not preclude a violation of § 75.334(b)(1). See id. at 511; id. at 520 (opinion of affirming commissioners); id. at 531 (opinion of dissenting commissioners). An affirming commissioner explained the relationship between the regulation requirement and ventilation plans: Ventilation regulations and ventilation plan provisions were designed to recognize that mine ventilation is a dynamic process. The provisions of 75.334 set forth a level of safety required at all mines, while ventilation plan provisions specify precautions and practices applicable to the particular conditions at a mine. . . . [A]n operator is required to comply with ventilation plan provisions, which encompass conditions specific to a mine, in addition to the more general requirements of section 75.334, which establish a general baseline which all mines must meet. Conditions in a mine may change unexpectedly so that compliance with specific ventilation plan provisions may not necessarily assure that the general protections imposed by ventilation regulations are being met. Thus, an operator is required to address its bleeder system if the bleeder system is not effectively controlling air through the worked-out area as required by section 75.334, even if the operator is complying with the terms of its ventilation plan. Id. at 511. Two commissioners, Duffy and Suboleski, voted to vacate the ALJ's decision and remand the case. In their view the ALJ had tried to rescue the Secretary from her unsupported theory of liability by concocting another theory contradicted by the Secretary's own witnesses. The overview section of their opinion states: This is a case in which MSHA had little evidence that the ventilation system was malfunctioning, yet the mine experienced an explosion and fire. Prior to the first explosion, air volumes were above design levels and all measuring points were within expected ranges. The explosion itself was caused by a very small amount of methane (50 cubic feet), a volume that would not be unexpected at the fringe of the rubble zone. However, MSHA found what it believed to be the causes of a distribution problem, near the headgate at the inby corner of the gob, where the explosion was believed to have originated. This problem, which was allegedly caused by a combination of a largely intact undercast, an un-removed check curtain, and a series of check curtains in the set up rooms, combined to restrict air flow in this corner, and resulted in a violation of section 75.334(b)(1). However, trial testimony showed that these obstructions were not present and MSHA's primary case fell apart. In the course of presenting that case, MSHA witnesses pointed out that the mine fan was at capacity; that, as production increased from start-up at the longwall, methane levels were rising; that the tailgate-side bleeder regulators were open as wide as possible to maximize air flow across the face and gob; that it took a great deal of air to dilute the methane level from the face and gob to the 2% concentration limit specified at the point where the bleeder air enters another air stream; and that once, two shifts before the explosion, the system's ability to dilute to the 2% level, i.e., the bleeder-system capacity, had briefly been reached. Finally, MSHA testified that Plateau's only recourse when it reached system capacity was to temporarily halt production. The judge, rather than dismissing the case, used these circumstantial facts to construct an entirely new theory of the case since MSHA had failed to prove that the ventilation system had significant distribution problems. Moreover, he added a crucial element that directly contradicted the testimony of the MSHA witnesses  that the volume of air in the gob was inadequate. Id. at 523. The dissenters took issue with the ALJ's reliance on the evidence regarding the mine fan and the regulator doors. They argued as follows: That the fan was operating at full capacity did not mean that the full capacity was insufficient. Likewise, evidence of a decrease in the air volume sweeping the gob did not establish that there was insufficient air, because [d]ecreased flow is not the same as insufficient flow. Id. at 527. Moreover, the ALJ's finding of insufficient air was contrary to uncontradicted testimony from two of the Secretary's witnesses, Mr. Urosek and Mr. Wirth. Also, the ALJ's conclusion that gob airflow was becoming a smaller percentage of total airflow was based on a mathematical error. In light of these mistakes, the ALJ's finding that methane was accumulating too rapidly in the gob was unwarranted. In addition, the dissenting commissioners rejected the ALJ's criticism of Plateau for its response to the elevated readings at MPL B1. They did not believe that the evidence showed that Plateau should have taken any additional action. Plateau had reacted as its protocol required, by temporarily ceasing production. It could not have made other changes to its ventilation system because major changes to an MSHA-approved ventilation plan require approval. According to the dissenters, Plateau could not have investigated the cause of the exceedance at MPL B1 because the methane levels there dropped when production ceased. They thus fail[ed] to see what Plateau would have investigated. Id. at 528-29 n. 9. The dissenting commissioners further contended that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Plateau had notice that its system was in violation of § 75.334(b)(1). The case, they said, turns on whether the Secretary can establish that a reasonable operator familiar with the conditions in the mine . . . would have made adjustments to the bleeder system, but if the Secretary and the [ALJ] cannot agree on the basis for determining whether the bleeder system was operating effectively, it is unclear how Plateau could have responsively addressed any performance problems in the system under 75.334(b)(1). [1] Id. at 524. The dissenters believed that the methane readings at MPLs 7 and 8 were better indicators of conditions in the gob than MPL B1 because the air at MPLs 7 and 8 was closer to the gob and had been mixed with fewer sources of other air; and they noted that those readings did not reveal any problem with the system. They concluded that it is difficult to ascertain how a reasonably prudent operator would have known that there was a violation of the regulation. Id. at 532. Commissioner Young, joined by Commissioner Jordan, said that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusions. Like the ALJ, Commissioner Young found it significant that the mine fan was running at capacity and the regulator doors were wide open. He agreed with the ALJ that the leakage of fresh air into the bleeder entries meant that the readings at the § 75.323(e) measuring point (MPL B1) were artificially low, id. at 511, and were a critical indicator that the bleeder system was ineffective, id. at 516. He disputed the dissenters' assertion that the ALJ should have placed primary importance on the readings at MPLs 7 and 8, stating that the MPL B1 location had inherent significance because its limit was established by regulation. Id. at 516 n. 5. He did not address the mathematical error that the dissenting commissioners described. Commissioner Young also agreed with the ALJ that a reasonably prudent mine operator would have known that the mine was operating at its maximum ventilation capacity and would have recognized a disruption in the system's effectiveness because of the elevated § 75.3232(e) readings. In support of this conclusion, he pointed to the testimony of two of Plateau's witnesses, mine manager Kerry Hales and mining engineer Steven Jones. Commissioner Young described their testimony: Jones and Hale[s] testified that they were aware of an increasing trend in methane in late July. Hales acknowledged that methane readings were a little high and that they had been struggling with it for a few days, trying to reach the next gob vent borehole, and that reaching the borehole would have alleviated the methane problem. Hales testified that the increasing trend in methane was of particular concern because the fan was at full capacity. Hales and Jones testified that the operator's only option was to slow down or cease production to let the methane bleed off. Nonetheless, even with this information, the operator increased production and did not take the corrective action required. Id. at 517-18 (citations omitted). Considering this evidence, Commissioner Young concluded, Plateau's notice argument must be rejected.