Opinion ID: 1459004
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: This Court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. See XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Kiewit Offshore Serv., Ltd., 513 F.3d 146, 149 (5th Cir.2008); Hirras v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 95 F.3d 396, 399 (5th Cir.1996). Summary judgment is proper if the record reflects that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Lockett contends that the district court erred in finding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to his claim of false arrest. As set forth below, because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants had probable cause to believe that Lockett was driving in violation of the speed limit, his arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment. The district court therefore properly afforded the defendants qualified immunity regarding his claim of false arrest. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), the Supreme Court set forth a two-step inquiry for resolving government officials' qualified immunity claims: first, a court must decide whether the facts alleged or shown are sufficient to make out a violation of a constitutional right; second, the court must decide whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct. Id. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If the official's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right, then qualified immunity is not applicable. Additionally, in a recent decision, the Supreme Court explained that while the sequence set forth [in Saucier ] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory, and that judges should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand. Pearson v. Callahan, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). Lockett concedes that [a]t the moment of the traffic stop, [the officers] arguably had probable cause to stop [him] for careless driving. Nonetheless, he contends that because the officers have admitted that they did not believe that careless driving was an arrestable offense, there was no probable cause to arrest him. Lockett relies on the following language in Resendiz v. Miller: Probable cause exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances within a police officer's knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense. 203 F.3d 902, 903 (5th Cir.2000) (emphasis in brief). Lockett misconstrues this precedent. That quoted language is referring to facts within the officer's knowledgenot whether the officer was aware of the legal consequences of the facts. To analyze Lockett's claim, it is important to understand what he does not argue. In his brief, Lockett does not challenge the probable cause the officers had to make the traffic stop based on his speeding. Instead, Lockett asserts that probable cause for a traffic stop is separate and distinct from the probable cause necessary to affect an arrest when the initial probable cause for the traffic stop is insufficient for the arrest. Lockett is mistaken. If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001). In Atwater, the very minor criminal offense was the plaintiff's failure to fasten a seatbelt. Id. at 349, 121 S.Ct. 1536. Significantly, in its opinion, the Supreme Court rejected Atwater's contention that it would not be reasonable to arrest a driver for speeding unless the speeding rose to the level of reckless driving. Id. at 349-50, 121 S.Ct. 1536. Therefore, in the instant case, because the defendants had probable cause to believe that Lockett had been driving in violation of the speed limit, the arrest did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. Nonetheless, Lockett claims that the defendants conspired to violate his constitutional rights by stacking traffic violations against him to justify an arrest made in retaliation for complaining of race discrimination and harassment. Our precedent, however, clearly dictates [that] subjective intent, motive, or even outright animus are irrelevant in a determination of qualified immunity based on arguable probable cause to arrest, just as an officer's good intent is irrelevant when he contravenes settled law. Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir.2000). [3] In sum, because there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the defendants had probable cause to believe Lockett was speeding, Lockett has not alleged facts sufficient to make out a claim of false arrest. Thus, the district court properly found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the claim of false arrest.
Lockett next contends that he has raised a fact issue with respect to his claim of excessive use of force, and thus, the district court erred in finding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. To establish an excessive use of force claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an injury (2) which resulted directly and only from the use of force that was excessive to the need and (3) the force used was objectively unreasonable. Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 314 (5th Cir.2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, the injury must be more than a de minimis injury and must be evaluated in the context in which the force was deployed. Id. Lockett asserts that he sustained an injury to his wrists when the defendants affixed the handcuffs too tightly, causing him pain. Lockett has admitted that he did not complain to the defendants about the pain while he was handcuffed, and the jail's medical intake screening form does not indicate that Lockett complained of pain. However, after being released from the jail, Lockett and his wife met with Major Douget of the Louisiana National Guard, and he complained that the handcuffs had hurt his wrist. Also, several days later, Lockett visited a physician, complaining of pain in his wrists. However, at his deposition, Lockett testified he was not currently under his physician's care for the wrist injury. Lockett's claim boils down to an allegation that the handcuffs were too tight. Such a claim, without more, does not constitute excessive force: This court finds that handcuffing too tightly, without more, does not amount to excessive force. Glenn, 242 F.3d at 314; accord Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 417 (5th Cir.2007) (rejecting as de minimis the plaintiff's claim that the deputies twisted her arms behind her back while handcuffing her, `jerked her all over the carport,' and applied the handcuffs too tightly, causing bruises and marks on her wrists and arms.). Lockett also contends that the defendants' multiple searches of his person constitute excessive use of force. We first note that Lockett fails to allege an injury resulting from the pat downs. Further, Lockett's deposition testimony completely undermines his claim that the searches constituted excessive use of force. When Lockett was asked [d]o you think there was anything inappropriate in the way [Bieber] searched you?, he responded: No. It seemed like a standard search to me. Lockett also testified that Arceneaux searched him [a]ppropriately. With respect to Ahner's search of his person, Lockett testified that Ahner's pat down was similar in manner to the previous two pat downs. Lockett further testified that, at one point, Arceneaux removed the handcuffs and allowed him to stretch his arms before putting the handcuffs back on in a much more appropriate way, so instead of my arms being between my shoulder blades now they are just in a normal way behind my back. Lockett testified that after Ahner placed him once again in handcuffs, it was much more comfortable. Subsequently, NOPD Officer Gains took off the handcuffs belonging to the Louisiana National Guard and replaced them with NOPD handcuffs. At that point, Lockett testified he was once again allowed to stretch his arms. Officer Gains also performed a [g]eneral pat down on Lockett as he was transferred to the custody of the NOPD. In light of the above testimony and the lack of a more than de minimis injury, [4] we are persuaded that Lockett has failed to make a claim of excessive use of force with respect to the pat downs. Thus, the defendants were properly accorded qualified immunity with respect to the claim of excessive use of force.
Lockett's final § 1983 claim is that the district court erred in granting the defendants qualified immunity because he raised a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether the defendants' conduct was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. He argues that the defendants' detention of him for approximately an hour and their multiple searches of his person were objectively unreasonable.
As an initial matter, as set forth previously, the defendants did have probable cause to arrest Lockett and detain him. With respect to the length of the detention, because Lockett made three phones calls that lengthened the duration of his detention, we do not believe he has stated a claim that the defendants' conduct was objectively unreasonable. More specifically, Lockett's failure to have a current proof of insurance card and his subsequent phone call to his insurance company in an attempt to obtain proof of current insurance lengthened the detention. Lockett also made phone calls to: (1) the emergency number 911, requesting that NOPD officers meet him at the scene; and (2) his wife, requesting that she meet him at the scene. Additionally, we note that the transfer of custody of Lockett from the Louisiana National Guard to the NOPD added to the length of the detention. In light of these circumstances, we conclude that the one-hour detention is not unreasonable. Thus, we affirm the district court's grant of qualified immunity to the defendants as to the length of detention claim.
The district court held that defendants' multiple frisks of Lockett constituted illegal searches under Supreme Court precedent because there was no evidence that the defendants had a reasonable suspicion that Lockett was armed. The district court concluded that Lockett had alleged facts sufficient to constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment, thus satisfying the first prong of the qualified immunity test. Nonetheless, the district court granted the defendants qualified immunity because it found that Lockett did not satisfy the second prong, which requires that the constitutional right was clearly established. With respect to whether the defendants' searches of Lockett's person violated a clearly established right, the district court held as follows: Given the unique circumstances of this case, as well as the expressly open question in the Fifth Circuit of whether and to what extent the strictures of Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)], apply to probable cause traffic stops for arrestable offenses, the Court finds that the MP Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Lockett's illegal search claims under Terry, as the right at issue was not clearly established in light of the circumstances of this case. The district court apparently was referring to this Court's recognition that at least one of our sister circuits has recently suggested that different constitutional standards may apply to stops based on probable cause. United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 n. 4 (5th Cir.2004) (en banc). [5] We find it unnecessary to address the first prong because we agree with the district court that it is not clearly established that the defendants' searches of Lockett's person were objectively unreasonable. Here, the defendants had probable cause to stop Lockett based on their belief that he was speeding. As Lockett concedes, Bieber initially misunderstood Lockett to be stating that he was affiliated with the FBI. Lockett testified that Bieber's statement that Lockett need[ed] to go to SUNO disturbed him and that he asked Bieber why [Bieber] would say such a thing? Lockett concedes that he could not provide a current proof of insurance card and made a phone call to his insurance company in an attempt to obtain the required proof. [6] Lockett admits that he called 911 and informed the operator that the military police were making racial slurs and requested NOPD officers because the situation looks like it's getting out of hand. Lockett then called his wife and asked her to meet him at the scene. As requested, NOPD officers and Lockett's wife arrived on the scene. In view of the defendants' initial misunderstanding regarding Lockett's FBI affiliation and Lockett's multiple phone calls requesting assistance of his attorney-wife and the presence of law enforcement officers from the NOPD in addition to the Louisiana National Guard at the scene, this was an unusual traffic stop. The reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment search depends on the circumstances under which the search was conducted. United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 319 F.3d 726, 731 (5th Cir.2003). More to the point, the Supreme Court has held that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a `reasonable' search under that Amendment. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). [7] We note that, like the instant case, Robinson involved an arrest based upon probable cause that a traffic violation had occurred. Today we make no attempt to set forth the state of the law in this Circuit regarding the limits on searching an arrestee's person during a traffic stop based on probable cause. Suffice it to say that it was not clearly established that the defendants' searches of Lockett's person were objectively unreasonable under the facts surrounding this arrest. [8] Thus, we affirm the district court's grant of qualified immunity to the defendants as to this claim.
Lockett contends that the district court erred in dismissing his claims under § 1985. Section 1985(3) prohibits, among other things, conspiracies to deprive any person equal protection of the laws. To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving a person of the equal protection of the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) which causes injury to a person or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652-53 (5th Cir.1994). Additionally, the conspiracy must also have a racially based animus. Id. at 653. Lockett asserts that the defendants conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights based on his race and that the district court erred because he created a genuine issue of fact with respect to this claim. Lockett points to the following statement defendant Bieber made to Lockett: You need to be at SUNO. From this short statement, Lockett testified that he understood Bieber meant that: SUNO being an African-American university and him telling me that I need to go there as a substandard school that obviously he was insinuating that an African-American school was a substandard school. We agree with the district court that Bieber's statement as alleged by Lockett does not demonstrate the racial animus needed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. This conclusion is supported by the undisputed fact that, although the driveway upon which the traffic stop occurred lead both to the FBI building and SUNO, when Lockett told Bieber he was going to class, Bieber assumed Lockett meant he was in training with the FBInot SUNO. Moreover, as set forth above, the defendants had probable cause to stop and arrest Lockett. He was not detained for an unreasonable length of time and the defendants' pat-down searches of him have not been shown to have violated clearly established rights. Indeed, his previously set forth deposition testimony describing the defendants' treatment of him during the searches (and adjustment of his handcuffs) undermine any allegation of an act intended to injure him. We conclude that he has not demonstrated facts sufficient to demonstrate a conspiracy to deprive him of equal protection and the required act in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused injury or deprivation of any right. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants with respect to Lockett's § 1985(3) claim. Lockett also asserts a claim under § 1986, which provides that [e]very person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 . . . are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid . . . neglects or refuses so to do . . . shall be liable to the party injured. Having failed to demonstrate a claim under § 1985, by definition Lockett cannot sustain a claim under § 1986. Galloway v. State of La., 817 F.2d 1154, 1159 n. 2 (5th Cir.1987).
Lockett also contends that the district court improperly dismissed his state claims as a matter of law. The only challenge that he adequately raises is that the district court improperly held that the military police were immune under Louisiana law. Lockett contends that under Louisiana law, the military police should not have been granted immunity. Lockett relies on the following statutory language: This Section is not intended to prevent Civil Code Article 2320 or other such laws from imposing master-servant liability on the state, or to prevent Civil Code Articles 2315 et seq. generally from imposing liability in circumstances to which such codal articles and/or laws would otherwise impose liability for damages caused by the offenses or quasi offenses of members of the National Guard committed within the course and scope of their National Guard duties when the Federal Tort Claims Act does not apply. La.Rev.Stat. 29:23.1. However, as stated by the district court, that statute expressly applies only to causes of action that arise during the time a National Guard member is in training or the member's status has not yet been activated. The district court granted immunity based on the following statute, which provides as follows: No officer or other member of the military forces of this state shall be indicted, prosecuted, or sued for any injury to any person or property performed or committed by him while in the active service of the state of Louisiana in the course of the business of the military forces of this state as required of him by this Part. La.Rev.Stat. 29:23. In his brief, Lockett does not dispute that the military police defendants were in the course of the business of the military forces of Louisiana during the arrest at issue. Accordingly, the district court properly found that § 23 applied and granted the military police qualified immunity.
Lockett's final claim is that the district court improperly dismissed Melanie Lockett's bystander claim brought pursuant to La. Civ.Code art 2315.6, which allows a spouse who view[s] an event causing injury to his or her spouse to recover damages for mental anguish or emotional distress. More specifically, the injured person must suffer such harm that one can reasonably expect a person in the claimant's position to suffer serious mental anguish or emotional distress from the experience, and the claimant's mental anguish or emotional distress must be severe, debilitating, and foreseeable. Id. We agree with the district court that Lockett has not raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Melanie witnessed Lockett suffer any injury that one can reasonably expect would cause her severe, debilitating distress. Thus, the district court properly denied Lockett relief on this claim.