Opinion ID: 2353947
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Tolling Under KRS 533.040(2)

Text: The Commonwealth also argues that Appellee's probationary period was tolled and extended beyond its initial date of expiration on June 17, 2009, placing the scheduled July 23, 2009 hearing within the period of probation. The basis of this argument is that the court's May 8, 2009 order reinstated Appellee's probation, thus triggering tolling under KRS 533.040(2). However, because the court's order specifically states that probation expires June 17, 2009, this Court disagrees that probation extended beyond that date. KRS 533.040(2) provides: If a court, as authorized by law, determines that a defendant violated the conditions of his probation or conditional discharge but reinstates probation or conditional discharge, the period between the date of the violation and the date of restoration of probation or conditional discharge shall not be computed as a part of the period of probation or conditional discharge. KRS 533.040(2) is triggeredand thus the probationary term is tolled from the time of the violation until the court orders that probation be reinstate[d] only if two requirements are met. First, the court must find that a violation occurred. And second, the court must, in its sound discretion, decide to reinstate probation rather than revoking it. In this case, there is no question that the first requirement is met. The court's May 8, 2009 order found that Appellee stipulated to violation of the terms of his probation, and this fact is not disputed. With respect to whether the court's order reinstate[d] probation, the order states in relevant part: the Court revokes the balance of [Appellee's] probation following his release from incarceration in Carroll County, which probation expires June 17, 2009. The Court orders that he be confined to the Oldham County Jail from May 29, 2009, the expected date of his release from the Carroll County Jail, to June 16, 2009. Both parties' briefs are confused as to the meaning of this order, no doubt because of its inartful use of the word revokes. This order does not actually revoke Appellee's probation, as the order requires incarceration only until the end of the probationary term. Revocation does not result in imprisonment for the balance of the probationary term, but results in imprisonment for the entire balance of the underlying sentence. [2] The order did not do this. The order is properly understood as a modification of Appellee's probation, adding incarceration as a new condition. KRS 533.010(6) provides that when a court modifies the terms of probation, it may order probation with the defendant to serve [an] alternative sentence, such as jail for a period not to exceed twelve (12) months with or without work release. This is the clear effect of the court's order. As a punishment for Appellee's violation, the court modified the terms of his probation to require him to serve the rest of his probation in jail. Thus, the Commonwealth is correct that the court's order reinstate[d] Appellee's probation within the meaning of KRS 533.040(2). The result of the court's order was that the exact same probation that applied to Appellee before the order still applied to him afterwards, with the sole exception being that incarceration was added as a new condition. The order punished Appellee for his violation by adding jail time as a new condition, and kept all the other terms of probation the same as before, including specifically its expiration. Consequently, although KRS 533.040(2) applies, this Court cannot accept the Commonwealth's argument that Appellee's probation tolled beyond its initial expiration on June 17, 2009. The order specifically states that probation expires on June 17, 2009, the same date it was set to expire initially. The order maintained all initial conditions of probation, specifically including the initial expiration date, except for the new condition of incarceration. Thus, to the extent that the running of the probationary term was tolled by KRS 533.040(2), the court's order effectively shortened the period of probation, as allowed by KRS 533.020(4), to maintain the initial date of expiration. Simply put, Appellee's probation expire[d] on June 17, 2009, just as the court ordered.