Opinion ID: 2639498
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discrimination Pursuant to Section 132a

Text: Lauher next claims that his employer discriminated against him within the meaning of section 132a because he had suffered an industrial injury. This discrimination, he claims, took the form of his employer's insistence that he use his accumulated sick and vacation leave for the time he was out of the office seeing Dr. Houts for treatment of his injury. Lauher claims he was thus treated differently than other employees who had not sustained a work-related injury.... [6] Section 132a provides: It is the declared policy of this state that there should not be discrimination against workers who are injured in the course and scope of their employment. [¶] (1) Any employer who discharges, or threatens to discharge, or in any manner discriminates against any employee because he or she has filed or made known his or her intention to file a claim for compensation with his or her employer or an application for adjudication, or because the employee has received a rating, award, or settlement, is guilty of a misdemeanor and the employee's compensation shall be increased by one-half, but in no event more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), together with costs and expenses not in excess of two hundred fifty dollars ($250). Any such employee shall also be entitled to reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and work benefits caused by the acts of the employer. (Italics added.) No criminal penalty is at issue in this case; we address only the Board's imposition of a $10,000 administrative penalty on Lauher's employer. [T]o warrant an award [pursuant to section 132a] the employee must establish at least a prima facie case of lost wages and benefits caused by the discriminatory acts of the employer. ( Dyer v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1994) 22 Cal. App.4th 1376, 1386, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 30.) The employee must establish discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence ( Western Electric Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 629, 640, 160 Cal.Rptr. 436), at which point the burden shifts to the employer to establish an affirmative defense ( Barns v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 524, 531, 266 Cal.Rptr. 503). Although we defer to the Board's determination of facts if supported by substantial evidence, we review the Board's legal decisions de novo, for [i]t is for the court to decide whether the facts found by the Board constitute a violation of section 132a. ( Id. at pp. 530-531, 266 Cal.Rptr. 503.) To decide the merits of Lauher's claim, we must decide what section 132a means when it refers to discrimination. As one appellate court has noted, [n]either the Legislature nor the courts have fashioned a clear rule for distinguishing those forms of discrimination which are actionable under section 132a and those forms which are not. ( Smith v. Workers'Comp. Appeals Bd. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1104, 1108, 199 Cal.Rptr. 881 ( Smith ).) Nevertheless, some boundary markers have been delineated. Under its express terms, an employer may not discharge[ ], or threaten[ ] to discharge an employee because, like Lauher, he has filed a claim for compensation. Moreover, citing the prefatory statement that [i]t is the declared policy of this state that there should not be discrimination against workers who are injured in the course and scope of their employment (§ 132a), we have explained that the type of discriminatory actions subject to penalty under section 132a is not limited to those enumerated in the statute. Instead, we have interpreted section 132a liberally to achieve the goal of preventing discrimination against workers injured on the job. ( Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 658, 666-669, 150 Cal.Rptr. 250, 586 P.2d 564.) We immediately cautioned, however, that [s]ection 132a does not compel an employer to ignore the realities of doing business by `reemploying' unqualified employees or employees for whom positions are no longer available. ( Id. at p. 667, 150 Cal.Rptr. 250, 586 P.2d 564.) Noting this last passage, the court in Smith, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d 1104, 199 Cal.Rptr. 881, held that save for the two exceptions just described [i.e., reemploying employees who are unqualified or for whom no position is available], action which works to the detriment of the employee because of an injury is unlawful under section 132a. ( Id. at p. 1109, 199 Cal.Rptr. 881, italics added.) This test of detriment to the employee was accepted as the applicable standard in Barns v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at page 531, 266 Cal.Rptr. 503 (a worker proves a violation of section 132a by showing that as the result of an industrial injury, the employer engaged in conduct detrimental to the worker) as well as by at least one commentator (1 Hanna, supra, § 10.11[1], p. 10-20 [[t]he critical question is whether the employer's action caused detriment to an industrially-injured employee]). The Court of Appeal in this case, however found the Smith formulation analytically incomplete. The court explained that, although Lauher had clearly suffered a detriment by having to use his accumulated sick leave and vacation time for his will to see Dr. Houts, he never established he had a legal right to receive TDI and reatin his accured sick leave and vacation time, and that [his employer] had a corresponding legal duty to pay TDI and refrain from docking the sick leave and vacation time. [7] Thus, said the court, [t]o meet the burden of presenting a prima facie claim of unlawful discrimination violation of section 132a, it is insufficient that the industrially injured worker show only that ... he or she suffered some adverse result as a consequence of some action or inaction by the employer that was triggered by the industrial injury. The claimant must also show that he or she had a legal right to receive or retain the deprived benefit or status, and the employing employer had a corresponding legal duty to provide or refrain from taking away that benefit or status. We agree that for Lauher merely to show he suffered an industrial injury and that he suffered some detrimental consequences as a result is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination within the meaning of section 132a. As we explained, ante, our system of workers' compensation does not provide a make-whole remedy. The Workers' Compensation Law is intended to award compensation for disability incurred in employment. 'The purpose of the award is not to make the employee whole for the loss which he has suffered but to prevent him and his dependents from becoming public charges during the period of his disability.' ( Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 99 Cal.App.3d at pp. 659-660, 160 Cal.Rptr. 597.) The purpose of workmen's compensation is to rehabilitate, not to indemnify, and its intent is limited to assuring the injured workman subsistence while he is unable to work and to effectuate his speedy rehabilitation and reentry into the labor market. ( Solari v. Atlas-Universal Service, Inc. (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 587, 600, 30 Cal. Rptr. 407.) Consistent with this view, for example, section 4653 provides that payment for temporary total disability is only two-thirds of the average weekly earnings during the period of such disability. An employer thus does not necessarily engage in discrimination prohibited by section 132a merely because it requires an employee to shoulder some of the disadvantages of his industrial injury. By prohibiting discrimination in section 132a, we assume the Legislature meant to prohibit treating injured employees differently, making them suffer disadvantages not visited on other employees because the employee was injured or had made a claim. Lauher claims he was subjected to discrimination within the meaning of section 132a because he was treated differently than other employees who had not sustained a work-related injury and were not under the mandates of the Labor Code. He claims [t]he employer's actions were directly related to the work injury and the resultant time the injured employee had to miss from work because of the medical appointments to cure or relieve the effects of the work injury. Lauher's argument fails to appreciate that, although his injury was industrial, nothing suggests his employer singled him out for disadvantageous treatment because of the industrial nature of his injury. We assume that employees with nonindustrial injuries must follow the same rule and use their sick leave when away from the office attending medical treatment. Certainly nothing Lauher alleges suggests otherwise. For example, he does not allege he alone is being singled out for the requirement that he use his sick leave, or that other employees are permitted to leave the office for medical appointments related to nonindustrial injuries and are not required to use their sick leave. Because Lauher does not allege that other employees are permitted to be away from their workplace for medical care yet need not use their sick leave if they wish to be paid their full salaries, we conclude Lauher fails to demonstrate he was the victim of discrimination within the meaning of section 132a. To hold otherwise would elevate those who had suffered industrial injuries to a point where they enjoyed rights superior to those of their coworkers. Nothing in the history or meaning of section 132a's antidiscrimination rule supports such an interpretation. [8]