Opinion ID: 1283806
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: search of van

Text: Appellant argues that the initial search of the van, at the time he was arrested outside the Executive Inn, was not pursuant to a valid consent. At trial Wilde's testimony was limited to the circumstances surrounding his conversation with Deputy Ferrin in the latter's office. But there was a motions hearing specifically on the issue of consent to search the van. At that hearing, Deputy Ferrin testified: A I stated to Mr. Wilde that I had information to believe that there was a large amount of cocaine in his van and I would like permission to search his van. Q Okay. Now, how long did this conversation last? A Just as long as it took me to say it to you. Q What was Mr. Wilde's response to that? A He stated, `You're [sic] information is bad. Go ahead and search my van.' Q Okay. A This was after I had identified myself, also as working for the sheriff's office. At the trial, outside of the hearing of the jury, Mr. Wilde testified: Q [By Mr. Long] That's at the point where Ferrin confronted you with the information that he had that you had a large amount of cocaine in the van? A Yes. Q And then tell us what happened. A I was shocked and very scared at the time. And he said he wanted to search the van, and I don't remember saying anything. I was so amazed. I was thinking to myself, I'm wondering if the person that it belonged to had taken it with him when I dropped him off.       Q (By Mr. Fix) I'm not quite sure, then, Mr. Wilde, what you're saying. They went ahead and searched the van without your consent? A Yes. THE COURT: No, he said he didn't say anything that he remembers. A I didn't give consent. Q (By Mr. Fix) You didn't say anything? A No, not that I remember. The court ruled that there was a consent which was freely and voluntarily given. Appellant argues that he was surrounded by three police officers, that he was afraid and told not to move, and that any consent was not voluntary but a mere submission to authority. Further, appellant claims in this brief, no sane man who denies his guilt would actually be willing to allow authorities to search his vehicle for contraband which is certain to be discovered. Fortunately, we have the impressions of the trial court relative to the argument that Wilde was somehow bullied or frightened, by the multitude of officers confronting him, into giving a consent.    I would like the record to show the Court's observations with reference to Mr. Wilde. He is a young, healthy male, caucasian. Obviously in good health. He's husky, looks strong, looks tough, however that is, not the kind of a person who could be easily intimidated by anyone. I want the record to show that.    The general rule is that warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable, both under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 4, of the Wyoming Constitution, with a few well-established exceptions. Hunter v. State, Wyo., 704 P.2d 713 (1985). One of these exceptions is a search pursuant to valid consent. Ortega v. State, Wyo., 669 P.2d 935, 941 (1983); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). A valid consent is one which is voluntary, in light of the totality of the circumstances. Amin v. State, Wyo., 695 P.2d 1021, 1024 (1985); Stamper v. State, Wyo., 662 P.2d 82, 87 (1983). The burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the consent was voluntary. Stamper v. State, supra. This involves a question of fact, and on appeal the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing party below. Amin v. State, supra. At the motions hearing, the trial court heard the testimony of two of the officers present at the arrest. At the trial the issue was reargued with the same two officers testifying again, and in addition the defendant and the third officer testified. The trial court ruled both times that the consent was voluntary. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we must agree with the trial court's ruling. Three police officers testified that appellant consented to the search, while appellant merely said that he was shocked and scared and didn't remember saying anything. Appellant urges that under Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790 (1925), and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), probable cause and exigent circumstances are required. We need not reach this argument, inasmuch as we find defendant's consent to have been voluntarily given. Accordingly, the trial court is affirmed in all respects.