Opinion ID: 170376
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prejudicial Captions on Photographs

Text: During trial, the government admitted into evidence ten photographs, Government Exhibits 2-11, taken by Lieutenant Treadway. Each photograph contained a caption indicating who took the photograph, the date and time the photograph was taken, and a brief description. Abo-Seba does not complain about the admission of the photographs, only the admission of the captions on Exhibits 3-8 and 10. The captions read in relevant part: -11- Exhibit 3 (picture of Lieutenant Simek’s neck injury): “Lt. Simek, assaulted by inmate ABO-SEBA” Exhibit 4 (picture of Lieutenant Simek): “Lt. Simek, assaulted by inmate ABO-SEBA” Exhibit 5 (picture of Officer McIntire): “Officer McIntire, assaulted by inmate ABO-SEBA” Exhibit 6 (picture of Officer McIntire’s leg injury): “Officer McIntire, assaulted by inmate ABO-SEBA” Exhibit 7 (picture of cuts to Abo-Seba’s abdomen and arm): “Inmate ABOSEBA . . ., assault on staff” Exhibit 8 (picture of cuts to Abo-Seba’s abdomen and neck): “Inmate ABOSEBA . . ., assault on staff” Exhibit 10 (picture of Lieutenant Simek’s injury to forehead): “Lt. Simek, assaulted by inmate ABO-SEBA” (Appellant’s Opening Br., Attachment 1.) Abo-Seba claims the admission of these captions was error because they were (1) inadmissible hearsay under Rule 802 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, (2) irrelevant under Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because they merely restated the charges in the indictment and the captions under the pictures of McIntire did not relate to the indictment as he was not charged with assaulting McIntire and (3) evidence of “other crimes” under Rule 404(b) of the Federal -12- Rules of Evidence because he was not charged with assaulting McIntire. Additionally, he contends even if the captions were relevant, their probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Specifically, he asserts the captions allowed the government to introduce as evidence the ultimate conclusion the government wanted the jury to draw and told the jury what result to reach. Because his trial was a “swearing match” between himself and the guards, each asserting the other was the first to assault, Abo-Seba argues the error in admitting the captions affected his substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness of his trial. (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 29.) The government claims the district court did not err in admitting the captions. It argues the captions were not hearsay because they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. It also claims the probative value of the photographs, which documented the victims’ injuries and Abo-Seba’s selfinflicted injuries, substantially outweighed any prejudice caused by the captions. It asserts it was the photographs, not the captions, which were the evidence being presented to the jury. Indeed, neither party emphasized the captions during trial. The government also attacks Abo-Seba’s claim that the photographs’ probative value was substantially outweighed by the prejudice caused by the captions. It contends the captions did not state anything not testified to by Simek and McIntire, who were subject to cross-examination. Lastly, the government argues -13- even if it was error to admit the captions, the error did not affect Abo-Seba’s substantial rights because the other evidence against him supported the jury’s verdict. Because Treadway identified the subject of each photograph, the captions could have been omitted. And, had Abo-Seba properly objected to the captions, the district court could have taken corrective action -- striking them, re-wording them or instructing the jury as to their limited use -- rendering an appeal on this issue unnecessary. See United States v. Hubbard, 603 F.2d 137, 142 (10th Cir. 1979) (“Unless a party is required to timely object before the trial court, the trial judge and opposing counsel are deprived of any opportunity to take corrective action, if such be required, in order to assure an orderly, fair and proper trial.”). Nevertheless, we need not decide whether their admission was error because their presence on the photographs (whose admission is not challenged) did not affect Abo-Seba’s substantial rights, i.e., they did not affect the outcome of the district court proceedings. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). Nor did they seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. The captions merely restated the charges against him; there is no indication they were emphasized to the jury; and they were no more prejudicial than the testimony of the guards, who alleged Abo-Seba assaulted them with the razor. If there was error, it does not satisfy the third (and certainly not the fourth) prong of the plain error inquiry. -14- C. Government’s Misstatements During Closing Argument Abo-Seba claims the government made two material misstatements of law and fact during its closing argument. First, during its initial closing argument, the government discussed the second element of the charged offense, i.e., that AboSeba acted with specific intent to do bodily harm. It claimed it had proved the second element based on Abo-Seba’s words (“I will kill you. I will kill you all. I will kill all you Americans.”) and actions (swinging the razor at the guards and cutting Simek on the neck). (R. Vol. VIII at 23.) It further stated: “There’s been absolutely no evidence, none at all, that these guards did anything other than talk to the defendant until the time that he started swinging at them.” (Id. at 24.) Abo-Seba challenges this statement, claiming it was factually and legally erroneous because he testified it was the guards who started the altercation by coming into his cell and beating him and his testimony, like the guards’, constituted evidence. Second, in its rebuttal closing argument, the government asked the jury to evaluate the credibility of Abo-Seba’s testimony: Ladies and Gentlemen, you get to be the judge of who is telling the truth in this case. I’m going to ask you to evaluate the defendant’s testimony. He claims that he was beat with fists, batons, chair legs, but in the photographs of the scene, there aren’t any chairs in there, there’s no room for a chair in his cell, or is he suggesting they went out to the office and brought back a chair to beat him with when they could just as easily continued beating him with their fists and batons? He went to the extreme to bring up chair legs. -15- (Id. at 34-35.) Abo-Seba challenges this statement because he never mentioned chair legs during his testimony. While not suggesting the government’s misstatements were intentional, Abo-Seba claims they were, nevertheless, unfairly harmful because they undercut his credibility, the central focus of the trial, and tainted the jury’s ability to fairly evaluate his testimony. In closing instructions prior to closing argument, the court advised the jury that the arguments of counsel were not evidence. AboSeba contends the instruction did not cure the harm because it was not given until the end of trial and nothing linked the instruction to the government’s misstatements. The government admits its statement that there was no evidence the guards did anything other than talk to Abo-Seba before he started swinging at them was erroneous; it should have said there was no “credible” evidence. (Appellee’s Br. at 19 (emphasis omitted).) However, it claims, considering its closing argument as a whole, the jury could not reasonably have taken the statement to mean AboSeba’s testimony did not constitute evidence but rather that his testimony was unworthy of belief. Moreover, the mistake was but one statement made during the course of the entire trial and the jury instructions adequately cured any error. Therefore, the government asserts the statement did not amount to plain error or render the trial fundamentally unfair. As to the chair legs statement, incredibly, the government claims it was not -16- improper. However, it concedes the transcript of Abo-Seba’s testimony contains no mention of chair legs. Nevertheless, the government contends this statement merely reflects its innocent misrecollection of Abo-Seba’s testimony. 5 It also argues the chair legs statement did not affect the outcome of the trial given the strong evidence of guilt. It further maintains the statement was just one of several bases it used to attack Abo-Seba’s credibility and the jurors were properly instructed that the attorneys’ arguments were not evidence. “We use a two-step process when evaluating claims of prosecutorial misconduct.” United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1288 (10th Cir. 1996). First, we determine whether the conduct was improper; if so, we decide whether the improper conduct warrants reversal. Id. “In evaluating such incidents for plain error, we will reverse only if, after reviewing the entire record, we conclude that 5 The government acknowledges in its brief it is not sure how it came up with the chair legs statement but explained: [Abo-Seba], while having some English speaking ability, testified with the assistance of a translator. [He] would often begin answering questions in broken English, either before the translator could begin speaking, or as the translator would begin speaking. Thus, cross talk was common during [his] testimony. Furthermore, any conversations between [Abo-Seba] and translator, even if they were in English, would not be transcribed by the court reporter. (Appellee’s Br. at 22 (citation omitted).) At oral argument, the government reiterated it was not sure where the chair legs comment came from but stated it made its closing argument without the aide of a transcript. It further alleged the chair legs comment was reflected in its notes and may have come from AboSeba’s testimony that the guards chained his legs. -17- the error is obvious and one that would undermine the fairness of the trial and result in a miscarriage of justice.” Gonzalez-Montoya, 161 F.3d at 650 (quotations omitted). The evidence in a trial includes the sworn testimony of witnesses who have first-hand knowledge of the facts. See C LIFFORD S. F ISHMAN , J ONES ON E VIDENCE , C IVIL & C RIMINAL , § 1:3 (7th ed. 1992). This, of course, includes a defendant’s testimony. In this case, Abo-Seba testified the guards came in his cell and started beating him without provocation. Consequently, the government’s statement that there was absolutely no evidence the guards did anything other than talk to Abo-Seba until the time he started swinging at them misstated both the law and facts. Similarly, the government’s chair legs comment misstated the facts. Abo-Seba did not testify the guards beat him with chair legs. Both of the government’s comments were improper. Ivy, 83 F.3d at 1288 (mischaracterization of evidence during closing argument improper); United States v. Hollis, 971 F.2d 1441, 1455 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Certainly, it is improper for the prosecution to misstate the law in its closing argument.”). Nevertheless, the improper comments did not rise to the level of plain error because they did not affect the fairness of the trial or result in a miscarriage of justice. Placed in context, it is clear the government’s statement that there was no evidence the guards did anything other than talk to Abo-Seba before he started swinging at them could only be taken to suggest Abo-Seba’s testimony was not -18- credible. As to the chair legs comment, although it was an attack on Abo-Seba’s credibility and the jury could have acquitted him had they found him credible and disbelieved the guards, it was just one of several such attacks. Importantly, the physician assistant who examined Abo-Seba after the incident testified Abo-Seba was agitated, cursing and saying he wanted to kill himself. He further testified there was no evidence Abo-Seba was beaten and the only wounds he observed were superficial cuts Abo-Seba inflicted upon himself with the razor. The chair legs comment was just one comment, made in rebuttal closing argument, throughout the course of the two-day trial. Gonzalez-Montoya, 161 F.3d at 651 (“We generally do not reverse a conviction if the conduct that the defendant challenges was merely singular and isolated.”) (quotations omitted). The jury instructions also mitigated any potential harm. The jurors were instructed they were “the exclusive judges of the facts proved, the weight of the evidence, and the credibility of the witnesses,” the “[s]tatements and arguments of counsel are not evidence in the case unless made as admissions or stipulations of facts,” “[t]he evidence in the case always consists of the sworn testimony of the witnesses” and they were “to consider only the evidence in the case.” (R. Vol. I, Doc. 71 at 3, 7.) We presume juries follow their instructions. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987). The evidence against Abo-Seba was substantial. The guards involved in the incident testified Abo-Seba assaulted them and the photographs of their -19- injuries supported this testimony. The physician assistant who examined AboSeba contradicted Abo-Seba’s self-serving testimony. Given this strong evidence of guilt, the context in which the misstatements were made (closing argument) and the jury instructions, we cannot say the government’s improper statements, even when considered collectively, affected Abo-Seba’s substantial rights. 6 D. Cumulative Error Abo-Seba argues that to the extent we find multiple harmless errors, their cumulative effect rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. A cumulative-error analysis merely aggregates all the errors that individually have been found to be harmless, and therefore not reversible, and it analyzes whether their cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial is such that collectively they can no longer be determined to be harmless. Unless an aggregate harmlessness determination can be made, collective error will mandate reversal, just as surely as will individual error that cannot be considered harmless. The harmlessness of cumulative error is determined by conducting the same inquiry as for individual error--courts look to see whether the defendant’s substantial rights were affected. United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470 (10th Cir. 1990). Step three of plain error analysis is, in wording and effect, identical to harmless error analysis – an error not affecting substantial rights is not 6 The case relied upon by Abo-Seba, United States v. Carter, is distinguishable. 236 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 2001). There, the Sixth Circuit concluded the government’s misstatements during closing argument satisfied the plain error analysis. Id. at 793. Unlike this case, however, the misstatements in Carter pertained to a key witness’s testimony and evidence of the defendant’s guilt was weak. In particular, some witnesses had initially identified another individual as the burglar. Id. at 786. -20- reversible. 7 Here the district court did not err in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on self-defense. We assumed error (arguendo) in allowing explicit captions to remain on exhibits sent to the jury and found error in the government’s misstatements during closing argument. But in each instance the error did not affect Abo-Seba’s substantial rights. We need not contemplate the esoteric aspects of cumulative step three plain error review 8 because both errors (assuming there were two) considered in combination did not affect Abo-Seba’s substantial rights. 7 Harmless error is “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights . . . .” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). 8 To date, we have never addressed the question of how to, if at all, incorporate into the cumulative error analysis plain errors that do not, standing alone, necessitate reversal. Some circuits combine all non-reversible errors (i.e., harmless errors and plain errors failing to necessitate reversal) into their cumulative error analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1223 (11th Cir.2005). Other circuits, in contrast, appear to review separately any cumulative plain errors. See United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1283 (9th Cir.1993) (“we review the cumulative impact of the possible plain errors for plain error”). United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1121 n.20 (10th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Jones, 468 F.3d 704, 711 (10th Cir. 2006). -21- We DISMISS Abo-Seba’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We AFFIRM in all other respects. ENTERED FOR THE COURT Terrence L. O’Brien