Opinion ID: 36021
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Recapitulation of Issue One

Text: All but one of the alleged uses of perjured testimony fail as a matter of law. Summary 15 judgment as to those issues is appropriate. Petitioner’s claim that Cynthia admitted to Nancy Brown that she testified falsely because agents of the state threatened her, however, cannot be defeated on the merits without making a credibility determination regarding Nancy Brown’s affidavit. At summary judgment it is inappropriate to make such a determination. We must, therefore, reverse and remand as to this part of Issue One. b. ISSUE TWO: The state’s alleged failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence Kelly contends that the state, in violation of Brady and its progeny, failed to disclose evidence that could have been used to impeach Cynthia or otherwise aid in his defense. “Brady, we reiterate, held that ‘the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’” Banks v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 1256, 1272 (2004) (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). There are “three components or essential elements of a Brady prosecutorial misconduct claim: ‘The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the state, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’” Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1272 (quoting Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)). As to the prejudice, or materiality, requirement, “[i]t is not whether the result [at trial] would have been different. Rather, it is whether given the non-disclosures of material evidence the verdict is less worthy of confidence.” Morrow v. Dretke, 367 F.3d 309, 316 (5th Cir. 2004). The state contends that this claim is procedurally defaulted. Petitioner argues, as he does with respect to his first claim, that this default is excused because he has shown cause and prejudice and 16 that failure to consider these alleged instances of the use of perjured testimony would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-86 (1986). The district court declined to determine whether the claim was procedurally defaulted, and, if so, whether the default was excused. Instead, it denied the claim on the merits. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(2) (West 2004). Petitioner alleges that the government failed to disclose the following: 1) that Cynthia and her baby were threatened with death if she did not testify against Petitioner; 2) that Cynthia discussed the Morgan murders with Detective Roy Bean several years prior to 1989 despite having claimed during a deposition that she first contacted the prosecution regarding the murders in 1989; 3) that Cynthia was more deeply involved in Petitioner’s drug dealing than she admitted in a defense deposition and at trial; 4) that Cynthia helped dispose of John Ford’s body and the weapon used to kill him, and that she admitted being involved in killing John Ford; 5) that Cynthia was on Demerol when she testified at Petitioner’s trial; 6) that, during an argument, Cynthia produced a machine gun and threatened Bill Morgan; 7) that Cynthia once shot at Petitioner and was involved in a four-way standoff where she and the other three participants were armed; 8) that Cynthia used drugs and cooked methamphetamine; 9) that in 1985, Cynthia lied to her doctor by telling him that her first two children had been killed when they had been removed by the state and by indicating that she did not have a drug problem despite having a drug problem;10) that Cynthia requested and was made offers of witness protection; and 11) that Walter Shannon was in Tyler the day after the Morgan murders and said that he had dropped off a car at the hospital. 1. Alleged impeachment evidence related to Cynthia We first address the first through tenth allegedly withheld facts related to Cynthia. To 17 overcome the procedural default bar to federal habeas consideration of this claim, Petitioner urges as prejudice that, had these facts been disclosed, his trial counsel could have more convincingly impeached Cynthia’s key testimony. It is uncontested that Cynthia was a key prosecution witness. As to the first sub-claim, that the state failed to disclose that Cynthia was coerced by law enforcement into testifying against Petitioner, the district court acknowledged that if Nancy Brown’s affidavit, the same affidavit discussed supra, were true, then Petitioner may have a claim for relief. The district court, however, made a credibility determination that the affidavit was not credible. This was inappropriate at summary judgment for the same reason discussed vis-a-vis Nancy Brown’s affidavit in the first claim. Accordingly, we must reverse this part of the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. We again note that we take no position as to the ultimate disposition of this sub-claim, either on its merits or on procedural defaults grounds. As to the second sub-claim, that the state failed to disclose that Cynthia had been in contact with Detective Roy Bean prior to 1989, but refused to discuss the Morgan murders in detail, Petitioner does not indicate how this is materially exculpatory or impeaching evidence. Cynthia never testified regarding her contact with investigators prior to 1989. It is not clear what this would impeach, other than Cynthia’s general truthfulness. As the district court noted, however, Detective Roy Bean’s and Cynthia’s statements do not necessarily conflict. This allegation, if true, in no way diminishes our confidence in the verdict. See Morrow, 367 F.3d at 316. Accordingly, this sub-claim fails. Summary judgment as to this allegedly withheld piece of evidence was appropriate. Petitioner’s third sub-claim is that the state failed to disclose that Cynthia was more deeply 18 involved in Petitioner’s drug dealing than she admitted in a defense deposition and at trial.8 Petitioner has not made any showing that the Prosecution knew, and therefore suppressed, evidence of Cynthia’s involvement in Petitioner’s drug trade. Moreover, Petitioner would have know the extent of Cynthia’s involvement with him selling drugs. Failure to disclose evidence of which the Petitioner has first hand knowledge is not a basis for relief. See Williams v. Brown, 609 F.2d 216, 221 (5th Cir. 1980). Accordingly, this sub-claim fails. Summary judgment as to this allegedly withheld piece of evidence was appropriate. Similarly Petitioner’s fourth sub-claim, that the state failed to disclose that Cynthia helped dispose of John Ford’s body and the weapon used to kill him, fails because Petitioner pleaded guilty to the crime. He, therefore, had first hand knowledge of the murder. See id. Summary judgment as to this allegedly withheld piece of evidence was appropriate. Petitioner’s fifth sub-claim, that the state failed to disclose that Cynthia was on Demerol when she testified at Petitioner’s trial also fails. Petitioner has offered no evidence that reasonably suppo rts his contention that the government knew, or had any legitimate reason to believe, that Cynthia was on Demerol during the trial. Absent any reason to know that Cynthia was on Demerol, the go vernment could not have suppressed such evidence. Moreover, even if the government did suppress the fact that Cynthia was on Demerol, the suppression fails the prejudice test. We in no way have less confidence in the verdict because of the suppression. See Morrow, 367 F.3d at 316. Accordingly, Petitioner fails on this sub-claim. Summary judgment as to this allegedly withheld piece of evidence was appropriate. 8 Although this claim references statements made by Cynthia at trial, Petitioner has not offered this to support his claim that the state knowingly used perjured testimony to secure the conviction. 19 Petitioner’s sixth and seventh sub-claims, that the state failed to disclose that during an argument Cynthia produced a machine gun and threatened Bill Morgan and that Cynthia once shot at Petitioner and was involved in a four-way standoff where she and the other three participants were armed, both fail. Petitioner was present for these events. Accordingly, he had firsthand knowledge of what transpired. See Williams, 609 F.2d at 221. Summary judgment as to these allegedly withheld pieces of evidence was appropriate. Similarly, the eighth sub-claim, that the government failed to disclose that Cynthia was heavily involved in drugs, fails. Petitioner does not make a showing as to how the government suppressed her use of drugs. This fact was well known and Cynthia told Petitioner’s counsel as much. See Exhibit 51 (Dist. Ct. R. at 508) attached to Petitioner’s First Supplemental Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dist. Ct. Doc. 48). This claim fails because Petitioner knew the information. See Williams, 609 F.2d at 221. Summary judgment as to this allegedly withheld piece of evidence was appropriate. Petitioner’s ninth sub-claim, that the government failed to disclose that in 1985, Cynthia lied to her doctor by telling him that her first two children had been killed when they had been removed by the state and by indicating that she did not have a drug problem despite having a drug problem also fails. We agree with the district court that Petitioner had failed to show how this would do anything other than minimally impeach Cynthia’s general trustworthiness. She did not lie to her doctor as part of an official investigation. This allegation, if true, does not diminish our confidence in the verdict. See Morrow, 367 F.3d at 316. Summary judgment as to this allegedly withheld piece of evidence was appropriate. Petitioner’s tenth sub-claim is that the government failed to disclose that Cynthia requested 20 and was made offers of witness protection. The only evidence Petitioner offers in support of the claim that Cynthia requested or was offered witness protection is an apparent investigation note, the entire relevant part of which reads: “witness protection - Roy Bean?” Exhibit 44 (Dist. Ct. R. at 501), attached to Petitioner’s First Supplemental Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dist. Ct. Doc. 48). There is no actual proof that Cynthia requested or was offered witness protection. Moreover, even if there were proof that she requested or was offered protection, the subclaim fails. Petitioner argues that this fact would impeach her deposition testimony that she “‘really did not give a lot of thought’ to whether she could be prosecuted and that she had no deals with the State” Appellant’s Br. at 45 (quoting Exhibit 51 (Dist. Ct. R. at 501)), attached to Petitioner’s First Supplemental Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dist. Ct. Doc. 48)). These statements do not conflict. Witness protection and an agreement not to prosecute are not the same. This evidence is not impeaching and is, therefore, of no discernable benefit to Petitioner. See Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1272. This sub-claim, therefore, raises no genuine issue of material fact. Summary judgment as to this allegedly withheld piece of evidence was appropriate. 2. Alleged impeachment evidence related to Walter Shannon Petitioner alleges that the state knew that a man named Walter, whom Petitioner presumes was Walter Shannon, was in Tyler the day after the Morgan murders and had left a vehicle at the same hospital parking lot in which Petitioner abandoned the Morgans’ vehicle. Petitioner argues that this information could have been used to implicate Walter Shannon in the Morgan murders. The district court noted that this information was not material. We agree. Petitioner’s trial strategy was to cast the blame for the murders on an unknown black male. The strategy was based upon was based on the hair containing Negroid characteristics. Walter 21 Shannon was not black. Petitioner, in the single paragraph in which he discusses this sub-claim in his brief, see Brief of Appellant at 46, does not begin to show how he could have used this evidence to cause a jury to believe Walter Shannon may have possibly committed the Morgan murders, thereby creating a reasonable doubt as to Petitioner’s guilt. We in no way have less confidence in the verdict because of the state’s purported failure to disclose this information. See Morrow, 367 F.3d at 316. Accordingly, this sub-claim fails. Summary judgment as to this allegedly withheld piece of evidence was appropriate. 3. Recapitulation of Issue Two All but one of the allegedly withheld pieces of material evidence do not cause us to lose any amount of confidence in the verdict, either because the facts were known to Petitioner, the facts were not impeaching, or the facts would have had no impact on a jury. Those sub-claims, therefore, fail as a matter of law. As to the first allegedly withheld piece of evidence, that Cynthia was coerced by law enforcement into testifying falsely against Petitioner, however, we cannot be certain that our confidence in the verdict would not be undermined if Nancy Brown’s affidavit were true. At summary judgment it is inappropriate to make such a credibility determination. We must, therefore, reverse and remand as to this part of Issue Two. c. ISSUE THREE: The state’s alleged failure to disclose agreements made with witnesses Petitioner alleges that the prosecution failed to disclose that the state entered into agreements with Cynthia and Steven in which the prosecution agreed not to prosecute Cynthia or Steven for other crimes in exchange for their testimony against Petitioner. Under Brady and its progeny, the government must disclose agreements that it has made with witnesses if the 22 agreements could call into question the credibility of a witness. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972). As we have noted already, the state habeas court found that no agreements were made with Cynthia. This presumptively correct factual finding has not been rebutted. Cynthia’s credibility could not be called into question as a result of a non-existent agreement. As for Petitioner’s apparent argument that the state made a deal with Steven in exchange for his testimony, Petitioner offers nothing in support of this claim. Other than the heading to his discussion of the issue, see Brief of Appellant at 55, Petitioner makes no mention of Steven with respect to this issue. As such, to the extent Petitioner actually claims that the state failed to disclose an agreement it made with Steven, Petitioner’s complete lack of briefing as to Steven defeats the claim. See Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994) (“A party who inadequately briefs an issue is considered to have abandoned the claim.”). Petitioner’s Giglio claim does not raise a question of material fact. It fails as a matter of law. Summary judgment as to this claim was appropriate.