Opinion ID: 1404383
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: CEQ's Broad Reading of Emergency Circumstances and NEPA

Text: The district court also held that CEQ's broad reading of emergency circumstances here is ultra vires because it subverts NEPA's directive that agencies perform their NEPA duties to the fullest extent possible. [44] See 42 U.S.C. ง 4332. The existence of specific Congressional exemptions to NEPA informed the district court's decision not to read the regulation so broadly as to independently authorize CEQ to do the same, in the absence of a legitimate `emergency.' Feb. 4, 2008 Dist. Ct. Order at 1230-1231. Moreover, the court noted that many of the exemptions granted in other cases involved agencies faced with conflicting Congressional mandates. Id. at 1231. NEPA, the statute authorizing 40 C.F.R. ง 1506.11, requires federal agencies to prepare an EIS for a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, 42 U.S.C. ง 4332(2)(C), or, in the alternative, to implement mitigation measures to minimize impacts to the point where an EIS in not required. See, e.g., Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722, 734 (9th Cir.2001). Although CEQ justified its approval of alternative arrangements to satisfy NEPA as grounded in urgent national security concerns, see Jan. 15, 2008 CEQ Letter at 4, the district court noted that, in the absence of a bona fide emergency, the alternative arrangements operate[ ] to exempt [the Navy] from the usual rigors involved in the preparation of an EIS, which forms the `heart' of NEPA. Feb. 4, 2008 Dist. Ct. Order at 1230 n. 14 (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Andrus, 619 F.2d 1368, 1374-5 (10th Cir.1980)). Reviewing CEQ's justification in this light, the district court concluded that CEQ's broad reading of emergency circumstances has the effect of reading a national security or defense exemption into NEPA, where none exists. [45] As the district court pointed out, Congress knows well how to exempt planned Defense Department activities from the requirements of NEPA. See, e.g., Nat'l Defense Auth. Act, Pub.L. No. 106-398, ง 317, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A-57 (2000) (specifically exempting Defense Department from preparing nationwide EIS for low-level flight training). The fact that Congress has not so exempted the Navy's exercises in the Southern California Operating Area further supports the district court's conclusion that 40 C.F.R. ง 1506.11 should not be read to exempt the routine SOCAL exercises from NEPA's requirements. The district court's interpretation also comports with well-established Supreme Court precedent that narrowly interprets NEPA's requirement that agencies comply with its provisions to the fullest extent possible. The Supreme Court has made clear that the to the fullest extent possible language was intended to address only cases in which there is an irreconcilable and fundamental conflict between NEPA's requirements and the requirements of another statute. See Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n. of OK, 426 U.S. 776, 787-88, 96 S.Ct. 2430, 49 L.Ed.2d 205 (1976). Here, as the district court noted, the Navy has never contended that it could not reconcile the district court's injunction with the requirements of NEPA. Similarly, NEPA regulations interpret the language to the fullest extent possible to mean that each agency of the Federal Government shall comply with that section unless existing law . . . expressly prohibits or makes compliance impossible. 40 C.F.R. ง 1500.6. The legislative history of ง 1500.6 explains that this language shall not be used by any Federal agency as a means of avoiding compliance with [NEPA's] directives. . . . 115 Cong. Rec. (Part 29) 39702-39703 (1969); see also Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C.Cir. 1971) (We must stress as forcefully as possible that this language does not provide an escape hatch for footdragging agencies; it does not make NEPA's procedural requirements somehow `discretionary.' . . . Indeed, [the language] sets a high standard for the agencies, a standard which must be rigorously enforced by the reviewing courts.). The Navy asserts that national policy requires that it must be confident that its west coast-based strike groups are prepared and certified for deployment to hostile areas overseas during a time of war. However, as the district court noted, nothing prevented the Navy from preparing an EIS prior to commencing the SOCAL exercises; indeed, the fact that the Navy is currently developing an EIS for exercises in the Southern California Operating Area confirms that it is fully capable of meeting NEPA's requirements. See Notice of Intent To Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement/Overseas Environmental Impact Statement for the Southern California Range Complex, 71 Fed.Reg. 76,639 (Dec. 21, 2006). Although the Navy argues that NEPA must give way so that it may proceed with its training and certification unhindered by environmental rules, quoting Flint Ridge, 426 U.S. at 788, 96 S.Ct. 2430, Flint Ridge itself holds that NEPA's procedural requirements are not discretionary and do not give way unless a clear and unavoidable conflict in statutory authority exists, id, here, the district court carefully examined the record, with which it has longstanding familiarity, and determined that there was no such conflict in statutory authority, concluding that conditioning phrases like consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, 42 U.S.C. ง 4331(b), and to the fullest extent possible, id. ง 4332, do not indicate Congressional intent to create a statutory escape hatch. Nor does any intent appear in the implementing regulations, that would allow the Navy to conduct its exercises before completing an EIS. [46] Feb. 4, 2008 Dist. Ct. Order at 1231-1232. In reaching these conclusions, the district court examined the various legal rules and applied those that were relevant to this proceeding. Having done so, it acted well within its discretion in determining that CEQ's broad interpretation of emergency circumstances is contrary to the dictates of NEPA.