Opinion ID: 595259
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ratification of Gillette's discipline.

Text: 17 In denying the City's motion for JNOV, the district court reasoned that a City Manager may make city policy by acquiescing in discipline imposed on a city employee.... [A] City Manager may be held to have 'affirmatively commanded' a constitutional violation by failing to overrule the imposition of a disciplinary sanction. The court held that municipal liability had been established because [t]he City Manager here was aware of the imposition of plaintiff's discipline and did not overrule it, but instead defended the sanction in a formal arbitration proceeding. We disagree with the district court's reasoning. 18 In Pembaur, the Supreme Court held that a single decision by a municipal policymaker may be sufficient to trigger section 1983 liability under Monell, even though the decision is not intended to govern future situations. See 475 U.S. at 480-81, 106 S.Ct. at 1298-99. There must, however, be evidence of a conscious, affirmative choice. Municipal liability under section 1983 attaches only where a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483-84, 106 S.Ct. at 1300 (plurality opinion); accord City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2436, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) (plurality opinion) ([T]he word 'policy' generally implies a course of action consciously chosen from among various alternatives.). 19 Gillette contends that the City Manager, by not countermanding the Fire Chief's final decision to terminate Gillette and by not objecting to the hiring of counsel to represent the City in the arbitration of Gillette's grievance, ratified the Fire Chief's decision and thereby effectively made employment policy. Gillette relies primarily on the statement in Praprotnik that [i]f the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final. 485 U.S. at 127, 108 S.Ct. at 926. 20 The cases make clear that the unconstitutional discretionary actions of municipal employees generally are not chargeable to the municipality under section 1983. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 126, 108 S.Ct. at 926 (observing that [i]f the mere exercise of discretion by an employee could give rise to a constitutional violation, the result would be indistinguishable from respondeat superior liability). In Praprotnik, the Court considered whether a policymaker's deferential review of a subordinate's discretionary decision constituted a delegation of policy-making authority. The plurality concluded that there was no delegation and thus no basis for section 1983 liability, but observed that it would be a different case if a particular decision by a subordinate was cast in the form of a policy statement and expressly approved by the supervising policymaker ... [or] if a series of decisions by a subordinate official manifested a 'custom or usage' of which the supervisor must have been aware. Id. at 130, 108 S.Ct. at 927-28. 21 Gillette's evidence is not sufficient under Pembaur or Praprotnik to establish section 1983 liability based on the City Manager's alleged acquiescence in Gillette's termination. Pembaur requires that an official policymaker make a deliberate choice from among various alternatives to follow a particular course of action. See Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir.1992), quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483-84, 106 S.Ct. at 1300. Likewise, Praprotnik requires that a policymaker approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it before the policymaker will be deemed to have ratified the subordinate's discretionary decision. See Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1231 (9th Cir.) (Bouman ) (citing Praprotnik ), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 640, 116 L.Ed.2d 658 (1991). Gillette has produced no evidence of affirmative or deliberate conduct by City Manager Gleason that may be said to have ratified Chief Hall's decision to fire Gillette. 22 Gillette relies on Hammond, 859 F.2d at 802-03, for the proposition that a policymaker's ratification of a subordinate's decision can occur long after the original decision and still give rise to municipal liability. Hammond, however, is inapposite because in that case the relevant policy-making body played a significantly more active role than the City Manager played in Gillette's suspension. See id. at 802-03 (holding the county liable for unconstitutional trespasses on plaintiffs' land where the county board actively participated in the deprivation of appellant's property rights). 23 Gillette also points to our recent statement in Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir.1991), that evidence that [Police] Chief Gates, an authorized policymaker on police matters, made, or ratified a decision that deprived plaintiffs of their constitutional rights would suffice for official liability under Pembaur. Id. at 646 (citation omitted). This excerpt from Larez merely recites the rule that proof of ratification by an official policymaker will trigger municipal liability. It does not alter our conclusion that City Manager Gleason's inaction in Gillette's case does not amount to ratification under Pembaur and Praprotnik. 24 At most, Gillette has established that the City Manager did not overrule a discretionary decision by the Fire Chief and did not object to the retention of counsel to represent the City in an arbitration proceeding pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. The Fire Chief did not cast his decision to discipline Gillette in the form of a policy statement, and the City Manager's testimony that he did not object to hiring counsel for Gillette's arbitration is at least equally consistent with a general policy of routinely hiring lawyers to defend the City in all litigation or labor grievance proceedings. There is no evidence that the City Manager made a deliberate choice to endorse the Fire Chief's decision and the basis for it. 25 The fact that the City Manager did not overrule the Fire Chief in this instance thus cannot form the basis of municipal liability under section 1983. To hold cities liable under section 1983 whenever policymakers fail to overrule the unconstitutional discretionary acts of subordinates would simply smuggle respondeat superior liability into section 1983 law under the guise of Pembaur's single decision rule. We decline to endorse this end run around Monell. 26