Opinion ID: 2611058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 33

Heading: Vagueness challenges to ORS 163.095(2)(d) and (2)(e)

Text: Defendant argues that the two relevant sections of the aggravated murder statute, namely ORS 163.095(2)(d) (hereafter referred to as aggravated felony murder) and ORS 163.095(2)(e) (hereafter referred to as aggravated murder by concealment), are impermissibly vague and in violation of the state constitutional protections of fair notice (Art. I, § 11), proportionality (Art I, § 16), privileges and immunities (Art I, § 20), and the prohibition against ex post facto laws (Art I, § 21). He also alleges that the statutory provisions violated the vagueness, due process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant specifically claims that ORS 163.095(2)(d) and (2)(e) are facially vague and that they cannot be saved by judicial construction. We hold that they are not facially vague and require no judicial construction. This court restated the vagueness standard in State v. Graves, 299 Or. 189, 195, 700 P.2d 244 (1985), as follows: The terms of a criminal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it of what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. State v. Hodges, 254 Or. 21, 27, 457 P.2d 491 (1969). In addition to its function of giving fair notice of the forbidden conduct, [a] criminal statute must not be so vague as to permit a judge or jury to exercise uncontrolled discretion in punishing defendants, because this offends the principle against ex post facto laws embodied in Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution. Id. The equal privileges and immunities clause is also implicated when vague laws give unbridled discretion to judges and jurors to decide what is prohibited in a given case, for this results in the unequal application of criminal laws. See State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 408, 649 P.2d 569 (1982). A criminal statute need not define an offense with such precision that a person in every case can determines in advance that a specific conduct will be within the statute's reach. However, a reasonable degree of certainty is required by Article I, sections 20 and 21. (Footnote omitted.) See also State v. Cornell/Pinnell, 304 Or. 27, 30-31, 741 P.2d 501 (1987). ORS 163.095(2)(d), read in conjunction with ORS 163.115(1)(b), provides that a person commits aggravated felony murder if he personally and intentionally kills in the course of and in furtherance of the [felony that] the person is committing or attempting to commit, or during immediate flight therefrom   . Defendant argues: ORS 163.115(1)(b) is unduly vague, because it appears to expand the reach of the felony murder statute beyond the scope of acts constituting the commission or attempted commission of the specified felonies to apparently include killings occurring preceding the substantial steps of an attempted felony (i.e., `in furtherance of') and to apparently include killings occurring after the completed felony or after the attempted felony (i.e., during immediate flight therefrom). (Emphasis in original.) The short answer to defendant's argument is that the murder at issue here allegedly occurred during the felony  not that it preceded the killing or that the killing occurred during immediate flight therefrom. It therefore fell squarely within the statute's prohibitions. Defendant's abstract concern about how the statute might be applied to others is irrelevant to the validity of his own conviction. See State v. Robertson, supra, 293 Or. at 411 n. 8, 649 P.2d 569. [7] Defendant argues next that the initial phrase in ORS 163.095(2)(e), in an effort to conceal the commission of a crime, is not limited by objectively reasonable criteria. He notes initially that conceal is not defined by the legislature. He also notes that the term `effort' lacks a statutory definition and a coherent standard. The statutory phrase the murder was committed in an effort to conceal means the murder must have been committed for the purpose of hiding the fact of the commission of the separate crime. No separate definition of effort or conceal are required. Both ORS 163.095(2)(d) and 163.095(2)(e) identify what each prohibits. They do not present an unconstitutional risk under state or federal law of ad hoc or ex post facto application.