Opinion ID: 196927
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 22 At the end of the presentation of evidence, Fernandez moved for a judgment of acquittal, which motion the trial court denied. Fernandez now argues anew that the evidence was insufficient to support his conspiracy conviction. 23 We are cognizant of the government's burden in this case: In order to win a conspiracy conviction the government was required to establish, by direct or circumstantial evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant and one or more coconspirators 'intended to agree and ... to commit the substantive criminal offense which was the object of their unlawful agreement.'  United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d 33, 39 (1st Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 917 F.2d 607, 610 (1st Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 977 (1991)). In our review, we evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole, and resolve credibility issues and draw inferences in the government's favor, since the issue is whether a jury could reasonably have arrived at the verdict. United States v. Morrow, 39 F.3d 1228, 1233 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1421 (1995). 24 Fernandez contends that the evidence in this case was insufficient to prove his guilt, since there was no direct testimony of any agreement. However, the government need not prove a formal agreement existed: as it points out, the illegal agreement may be either 'express or tacit.'  United States v. Sanchez, 917 F.2d 607, 610 (1st Cir.1990). Indeed,  '[t]he evidence may be entirely circumstantial and need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; that is, the factfinder may decide among reasonable interpretations of the evidence.'  Lopez, 944 F.2d at 39 (quoting United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir.1991)). 25 We agree with the government that, under our standard of review, Bruno's testimony, and that of other government witnesses, suffices to show that a tacit agreement existed. Bruno testified that Sardinas and Loredo each paid $80,000 to buy into Carrier in order to ship cocaine; he stated that he saw them collect the money to make a payment to Fernandez, and heard them discussing the use of Carrier. Bruno testified about sending the nine shipments of cocaine, and about Fernandez' personal participation in the operation, including telephone calls and meetings. He stated that he went to the Carrier warehouse in New Jersey, his first visit being in July 1991, and that Fernandez was there on at least one occasion. Aloisi's testimony generally corroborated Bruno's statements. De Jesus testified that he participated in at least four shipments of cocaine, including deliveries of cocaine to Fernandez at a warehouse in Carolina, Puerto Rico, and retrieval from the New Jersey warehouse. His testimony contradicted Bruno's on several points, regarding the amount of cocaine in particular loads and who participated in specific meetings and loads. 4 Our review of this record leads us to conclude that, having heard the evidence, including nuances and intimations that a cold record cannot capture, a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that [Fernandez] was guilty of conspiracy. Moran, 984 F.2d at 1301-02. 26 Fernandez also argues that this court must reverse the verdict below because it was physically impossible that Carrier was the company used to transport cocaine in 1991: he presented evidence that Carrier did not exist until after April 1991, and that it did not occupy the New Jersey warehouse until October of that year. Since the chief government witnesses testified that Carrier was used, the argument continues, there is no reason to credit the witnesses' testimony as to this point, or any other. Thus, Fernandez concludes that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for acquittal. 27 While there were inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimony, and while they all had an incentive to please the government, these aspects of the evidence were pointed out to the jury by defense counsel. As the government notes, Bruno and De Jesus did not go to any warehouse for the first loads--indeed, Bruno testified that Carrier had previously had a different address--and the evidence regarding Gulf suggests that Fernandez had knowledge of and access to shipping facilities during the relevant time frame. It was within the province of the jury to disregard some of the inconsistencies and to accept aspects of the witnesses' testimony as credible. The force of the evidence as a whole, including all reasonable inferences favorable to the verdict, was sufficient to support a rational jury finding: that defendant was guilty. Lopez, 944 F.2d at 40.