Opinion ID: 1877210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Aaron Banks Was Charged With Two Separate Conspiracies

Text: The majority's approach avoids the alternative argument of defendant Banks that the test for successive double jeopardy claims differs under the federal and state constitutions, the issue addressed in part III. Assuming arguendo that the test is the Blockburger same evidence test under both state and federal constitutions, the question whether a single conspiracy has been impermissibly divided into multiple conspiracies is guided by all the facts, including, but not limited to, the charges themselves and any other relevant circumstance, such as (1) the time, (2) persons acting as coconspirators, (3) the statutory offenses contained in the charges, (4) the overt acts charged by the government or any other description of the offenses charged that indicate the nature and scope of the activity that the government sought to punish in each case, and (5) places where the events alleged as part of the conspiracy took place. The essence of the determination is whether there is one agreement to commit two crimes, or more than one agreement, each with a separate object. [ Thomas, supra at 662.] As this Court recognized in applying Blockburger, People v. Robideau, 419 Mich. 458, 470, 355 N.W.2d 592 (1984), the test is solely one of statutory construction. Blockburger does not apply where the Legislature intends to impose separate punishments for criminal activity. Thus, the ultimate question is whether the Legislature intended that the conviction of defendant Banks of conspiracy to distribute drugs in Muskegon precludes conviction of a conspiracy to distribute over 650 grams of drugs in Oakland, Detroit, and outside the state. The majority's response to this inquiry is the statement that conspiracy to deliver 50 to 224 grams of cocaine is a lesser-included offense of conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver over 650 grams. In addition to ignoring the fact that the crime of conspiracy is the agreement to commit the illegal act, the conclusion posits that the cocaine possessed by defendant Banks in Muskegon, like the theft of the car that was the unit of prosecution in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977), was the same cocaine possessed by conspirators Gerald Hill and Franklin in Southfield on July 5, 1990, and in Muskegon on July 6, 1990, by Anthony Johnson some seven months after the arrest of Banks and Wilson. Stated otherwise, if any conspiracy is an included offense of a charge of an over-650-gram conspiracy, there could never be prosecution of a separate conspiracy. It would follow that no person tried for conspiracy to possess cocaine could ever be prosecuted for a separate and larger conspiracy, a result that would frustrate, rather than effectuate, legislative intent. People v. Morris, 450 Mich. 316, 338, 537 N.W.2d 842 (1995); [9] M.C.L. § 333.7401(3); M.S.A. § 14.15(7401)(3). [10] Moreover, People v. Marji, 180 Mich.App. 525, 531, 447 N.W.2d 835 (1989), cited by the majority for the proposition that conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver 50 to 224 grams of cocaine is a lesser-included offense of conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver over 650 grams, op. at 47, actually holds: While delivery of lesser amounts of cocaine are crimes within the same category as delivery of over 225 grams of cocaine and share some elements with the greater offense, they also contain essential elements not present in the greater offense, namely proof of lesser quantities of controlled substances.... Thus these lesser offenses must be considered cognate offenses.
The Supreme Court has not set forth a clear test for determining, for double jeopardy purposes, whether there is one conspiracy or many. [11] The Court has agreed with lower federal courts that, where the conduct is multilayered, the Blockburger approach is an inadequate guide in jeopardy analysis. United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 390, 112 S.Ct. 1377, 1384, 118 L.Ed.2d 25 (1992). Thus, while the United States Supreme Court has held that a substantive charge with a conspiracy charge is not barred by double jeopardy, id. at 389, 112 S.Ct. at 1384, and that conspiracy is a lesser-included offense of a continuing criminal enterprise in a single indictment, [12] Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996), guidance on the issue of double jeopardy in multiple conspiracy situations must be drawn from decisions of the federal courts of appeal.
The federal courts have rejected a strict Blockburger double jeopardy analysis in dealing with subsequent prosecutions when more than one conspiracy is at issue. The same-evidence test of Blockburger is of questionable value in conspiracy double jeopardy issues. United States v. Thomas, supra at 662. The federal circuits have developed a totality of the circumstances test that provides a more accurate analysis in determining whether multiple conspiracies exist. Id. The following factors from Thomas, which we previously cited with approval in Mezy, are: (1) time, (2) persons acting as coconspirators, (3) the statutory offenses charged in the indictments, (4) the overt acts charged by the government or any other description of the offenses charged that indicate the nature and scope of the activity that the government sought to punish in each case, and (5) places where the events alleged as part of the conspiracy took place. [ Id. at 285, 551 N.W.2d 389.] [13] The majority of the federal circuits employ a similar test to determine whether two charged conspiracies constitute the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy, [14] although the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adds as a factor the interdependence between the alleged conspiracies. United States v. Korfant, 771 F.2d 660, 663 (C.A.2, 1985). The first factor is time. The time frame of the two conspiracies in this case demonstrates that the smaller Muskegon conspiracy ran from December 7, 1989, through December 11, 1989, whereas the larger Oakland conspiracy ran from approximately fall, 1988, through fall, 1990. Thus, the time frame of the smaller conspiracy is subsumed by the larger. In Thomas, supra at 667, the Eighth Circuit held that the fact that the conspiracies overlap in time does not prove that there was only one conspiracy, and the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Chiattello, 804 F.2d 415, 419 (C.A.7, 1986), indicated that the fact that a three-week period for one conspiracy was totally subsumed within the duration of the other was far from sufficient to establish the existence of only one conspiracy. A situation identical to that presented in the instant case has been considered by the Second Circuit. United States v. Macchia, 35 F.3d 662, 669 (C.A.2, 1994). In Macchia, the court recognized that where the smaller conspiracy is charged first, there is not the same opportunity for prosecutorial abuse, and the overlap of time is therefore a less important consideration. Consequently, the time factor in the present case is not dispositive in respect to whether there was one conspiracy or two. The second factor is consideration of the persons acting as coconspirators. In the Muskegon conspiracy, the persons charged in the information with conspiracy were Wilson and Banks, plus Franklin, who had been named as an unindicted coconspirator. Also named were accomplices Cato Peterson, a street seller for Banks, and Ronald Gardner, the designated driver for the Muskegon trip, who had been arrested along with the defendants on December 11, 1989. Both Peterson and Gardner testified for the prosecution and pleaded guilty of lesser offenses. By comparison, the Oakland conspiracy involved many more people and many more witness. There were two indictments naming ten persons in the Oakland conspiracy: defendants Wilson and Banks, Gerald Hill, Terrence Moore (T-Bone), Anthony Johnson (Mark or Robert Johnson, Tone), Ricky Franklin, Kevin Jackson (Fat Kevin), Demetris Shapel (38, 30/30, Dee), Dwayne Winn (Freddy Kruger), and Martese Weidaman (M & M). The Oakland conspiracy trial included other unindicted coconspirators and numerous witnesses either unknown or not called in the Muskegon conspiracy trial. The only persons common to both conspiracies who were actually charged with both conspiracies were Wilson and Banks. Although Franklin was named in the information, he was never formally charged in Muskegon. Peterson and Gardner were not indicted in Oakland. The Muskegon information indicates that Ricky Franklin was a coconspirator; however, he was only indicted in the Oakland conspiracy where the evidence demonstrated that he was a major cocaine dealer and unquestionably a central figure in the conspiracy. The federal courts have on numerous occasions evaluated the importance of the overlap of participants and its importance for double jeopardy purposes. Where the extent of the overlap was found to be significant in terms of participants, the court weighed this fact with the other factors in determining if one or two conspiracies existed. For the most part, if the overlap was not considerable, the courts have found two conspiracies. For example, where there were two common defendants out of sixteen in one conspiracy, and seven in the other conspiracy, United States v. Reiter, 848 F.2d 336, 341 (C.A.2, 1988), or twenty-two persons named in two indictments in which only two were common to both indictments, United States v. Futch, 637 F.2d 386, 390 (C.A.5, 1981), the conspiracies were held to be different. [15] In Dortch, the Seventh Circuit held that when two out of twenty-three charged in one indictment were subsequently charged in another, a common conspiracy was not necessarily suggested, noting that a greater overlap of participants would be expected if there were really only one conspiracy. Dortch, supra at 1062. Conspiracies are not necessarily mutually exclusive in terms of participants, thus [o]ne individual can certainly join more than one conspiracy to distribute drugs. Id. at 1063. In all these cases, the courts found two distinct conspiracies despite the overlap of participants. Therefore, the fact that in the instant case three conspirators are common to both conspiracies does not present a bar to finding two discrete conspiracies. [16] The third factor is an examination of the statutory offenses charged. Because often there is only one statute involved in multiple conspiracy cases, United States v. Hart, 933 F.2d 80, 85 (C.A.1, 1991), and because any drug conspiracy necessarily would come within the purview of the federal Controlled Substance Act, similarity in the charges for both conspiracies would not be surprising. United States v. Henry, 661 F.2d 894, 897, n. 4 (C.A.5, 1981). The Dortch court found reliance on the fact that the indictments charged a violation of only one statute to be the weakest evidence of a single conspiracy stating that the guarantee against double jeopardy does not insulate a criminal from punishment for subsequent offenses merely because he chooses to continue committing the same type of crime.' Id. at 1063, quoting United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 681 (C.A.7, 1982). Because it is possible to have two different conspiracies violating the same statute to commit the very same crime, Thomas, supra at 666, the fact that defendants may have violated the same conspiracy statute to deliver drugs more than one time by engaging in more than one conspiracy does not preclude a second prosecution. The fourth and probably most significant factor [17] in analyzing successive conspiracy charges is a comparison of overt acts or any other description of the offenses charged indicating the nature and scope of the activity that the government seeks to punish in each case. The Muskegon conspiracy as related in testimony at the first trial was an agreement to sell drugs in the Muskegon projects, a hot market where drugs were rolling, carried out by Banks on behalf of Franklin, which involved picking up and using Peterson and Wilson as street runners. The overt acts in that conspiracy were the trip to Muskegon from Detroit (which resulted in the arrest), the placing of cocaine in a hot plate, transporting it under the jack of the missing spare tire, [18] and some evidence that there had been previous trips, not all with these same defendants from Detroit, to the projects in Muskegon for the purpose of selling crack cocaine. There is no indication from any source of an Oakland County connection. Nor was there evidence of Banks' relationship to Terrence Moore, who had processed cocaine in Oakland County or of his connection to Anthony Johnson, both codefendants in the Oakland conspiracy. The agreement in the Oakland conspiracy was also to sell drugs, but it included the purchase, processing, and sale of drugs in Oak Park and had a geographic scope extending to Ohio, Illinois, and Minnesota. Testimony in the Oakland case implicated moving amounts of cocaine well in excess of 650 grams both before and after the December, 1989, arrest of Banks. The Oakland conspiracy scheme involved purchasing large amounts of raw cocaine over time from different suppliers, cooking the cocaine into crack at various places in Southfield, Oak Park, and Detroit, and employing different persons other than those named in the Muskegon trial to transport and sell the cocaine. Unlike the limited Muskegon conspiracy, the extensive activities of the Franklin agreement are indicative of a far greater commercial enterprise in which Ricky Franklin was the central player and the hub of the wheel and Aaron Banks, his trusted lieutenant, was more than just one of his regional supervisors. The federal courts consider the overlap [19] of acts as meaningful to the determination whether there are one or more conspiracies. However, not surprisingly, as the court noted in United States v. Hart, 933 F.2d 80, 86 (C.A.1, 1991), while conspiracies may be similar in nature to the extent that each involved cocaine deals, the evidence presented by six government witnesses revealed different transactions in different places with different people. [20] Thus, the fact that Banks was in an agreement with Wilson, (and with many other runners) whose object was the Muskegon market, does not negate the fact that Banks was an integral part of the much larger and more ambitious Oakland enterprise. As the court observed in United States v. O'Dell, 462 F.2d 224, 227, n. 2 (C.A.6, 1972): In the absence of any evidence that the two distinct groups worked together toward a common goal, rather than merely following parallel plans built around the central figures ... we do not find any reason to view the two plots as part of a single unified conspiracy. The Oakland County prosecutor presented both witness testimony and other evidence of the larger conspiracy by introducing evidence of different drug transactions, different casts of characters, different methods of operation, and use of diverse locations within the state to advance different purposes (drug purchases, processing, and sales) of the conspiracy. [21] Further, any contention by Banks that he was only involved in the Muskegon operation that was terminated with his arrest in Muskegon and for which he has already been punished is refuted by the prosecutions' offer of proof and testimony at the preliminary examination in the Oakland trial that, after the December 11, 1989, Muskegon arrest, Banks contacted accomplice Ronald Gardner with a request that Gardner not say anything further to police, that he should fire his lawyer, hire the same attorney that Banks had retained, and that Ricky Franklin would pay for the lawyer's services. [22] Other indicia of Banks continuing facilitation and involvement in the larger conspiracy is Peterson's testimony that Banks told him not to tell the Muskegon authorities that the drugs belonged to him, promising Peterson that if he did as he asked, he would put money in his account. While incarcerated, Banks continued to pay for phone calls incurred by the larger conspiracy. Miss Louise testified that after Tone went to jail following his arrest in July, 1990, Banks helped pay off Tone's long distance phone bills. [23] [F]urther [participation in an] `old' conspiracy after being charged with that crime becomes a new offense for purposes of a double jeopardy claim. [ United States v. Dunn, 775 F.2d 604, 607 (C.A.5, 1985), quoting Stricklin supra at 1121, n. 2.] In contrast to Amir Wilson, who from all that appears was a runner, testimony in the Oakland case indicated that Banks was involved in numerous overt acts for which he was never in jeopardy in Muskegon. The fifth factor in the totality-of-circumstances analysis is location. The Muskegon conspiracy started in Detroit and ended in Muskegon with an arrest for the attempted delivery of over fifty grams of cocaine. The location of the conspiracy in Oakland County was Southfield and Oak Park, Detroit in Wayne County, and Muskegon Heights in Muskegon County. There was also testimony that Franklin obtained his drugs from many sources and that overt acts during the Franklin agreement involved drug sales in Grand Rapids, Benton Harbor, Kalamazoo, and out of state in Minnesota, Pittsburgh, Indiana, and Lima, Ohio, and that Franklin had traveled to Chicago and other Ohio locations to sell drugs. [24] The federal circuits have not found that agreements even within closely related geographical communities are compelling evidence of a single conspiracy. In Futch, supra at 390, the two conspiracies occurred in six counties in the Southern District of Georgia. The conspiracies named different counties as the place where the conspiracies occurred. The court found that this factor indicated the operations were dissimilar, lending credence to the conclusion that the conspiracies were separate. The Second Circuit noted that the New York metropolitan area was certainly large enough to harbor two simultaneous narcotics conspiracies. United States v. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971, 983 (C.A.2, 1974). [25] Similarly in metropolitan areas such as Pittsburgh, greater St. Louis, and Atlanta, the Third Circuit, United States v. Inmon, 594 F.2d 352, 354 (C.A.3, 1979), Seventh Circuit, Dortch, supra at 1063, and Fifth Circuit, United States v. Henry, supra at 897, n. 4, respectively, have also stated that it was possible for more than one scheme or conspiracy to exist to distribute drugs in one metropolitan area. Although the geographic locations of both conspiracies in the instant case have a Detroit-Muskegon overlap, the breadth of the Oakland conspiracy indicates two distinct conspiracies. In summary, a proper review under federal standards relevant to a double jeopardy claim regarding successive conspiracies supports the position that there were two separate and distinct conspiracies. The dissimilarity of persons, places and modes of operation does not show an unbroken or repetitive pattern ... [and] [m]ost of the seeming similarities represent those factors which would be common to separate conspiracies carried out in a similar manner. [ Futch, supra at 391.] Banks was a major player in the Oakland conspiracy who continued to pursue its criminal objectives even after his arrest.
Assuming that the defendant's conviction for the Oakland conspiracy was not the same offense as the agreement in Muskegon, under the federal test, the question is, as the parties recognize, whether People v. White, supra , bars the second prosecution of Banks under the Michigan interpretation of double jeopardy protection in the context of successive prosecutions.