Opinion ID: 221597
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to SuppressMaldonado

Text: Maldonado appeals the district court's refusal to suppress the phone number that he gave to the Minneapolis police officers during the December 10 vehicle stop, which was instrumental in establishing at trial that he had talked to Rodriguez over the phone 279 times between November 27 and December 22, 2009. On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Fiorito, 640 F.3d 338, 344 (8th Cir.2011). First, Maldonado suggests that the Government should have been precluded from introducing the information derived from his phone number at trial because the prosecutor initially claimed at the suppression hearing not to possess any statements or confessions, which Maldonado interprets as encompassing the statements he gave the police regarding his identity and phone number. This contention fails to persuade. Even assuming that Maldonado's interpretation of this representation is reasonable, the Government swiftly clarified that it intended to introduce statements made by [Maldonado] relating to [his] identit[y], and after conducting an evidentiary hearing the magistrate judge recommended that [s]uppression of the defendants' identification, ... or statements that may have been obtained subsequent to the vehicle stop was not required. Indeed, Maldonado was aware of the Government's intention to use the defendants' identification statements in sufficient time to challenge their use in his objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. We conclude that, at least by this point, Maldonado was no longer entitled to rely on his interpretation of the Government's initial representation that it did not possess any statements or confessions by him. See United States v. Salcedo, 360 F.3d 807, 810 (8th Cir.2004) (affirming the district court's admission of defendant's inculpatory statement, despite the Government's initial representation that it did not intend to introduce any statements by defendant at trial, in part because the Government elsewhere had disclosed the existence of the statement and [t]here is no indication the government attempted to unfairly surprise [the defendant], nor is there any indication [he] was unfairly surprised). Next, Maldonado objects to the admission of the information derived from his phone number on Fourth Amendment grounds. On appeal, he does not challenge the district court's determination that the police officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop of the Dodge Dakota on the night of December 10, based on the information relayed to them by the DEA task force members that the occupants of the Dakota had been involved in drug transactions earlier that day. See United States v. Williams, 139 F.3d 628, 629-30 (8th Cir.1998). He also admits that an officer conducting an investigative stop may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). However, Maldonado now contends that, by asking for his phone number, the officers exceeded the permissible scope of the investigative detention. Because Maldonado failed to make any argument related to the scope of the investigative stop before the district court, our review is limited to plain error. See United States v. Cardenas-Celestino, 510 F.3d 830, 833 (8th Cir.2008). [7] We will reverse only if Maldonado shows that the district court committed an error that was plain, that affected his substantial rights, and that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Meeks, 639 F.3d 522, 526-27 (8th Cir.2011). After making an otherwise lawful Terry stop, an officer may conduct an investigation `reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.' United States v. Banks, 553 F.3d 1101, 1105 (8th Cir.2009) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). [Q]uestions concerning a suspect's identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 186, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004). Knowledge of identity may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder. On the other hand, knowing identity may help clear a suspect and allow the police to concentrate their efforts elsewhere. Id. However, the request for identification [must be] reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop. Id. at 188, 124 S.Ct. 2451. Similarly, the Supreme Court has suggested that the Fourth Amendment [might] permit seizures for the purpose of fingerprinting, if there is reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed a criminal act, but only if there is a reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect's connection with that crime. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817, 105 S.Ct. 1643, 84 L.Ed.2d 705 (1985). Applying these principles, we believe that the request for Maldonado's phone number was properly within the scope of the investigative stop. The DEA task force members had observed the involvement of the two occupants of the Dodge Dakota in two drug transactions earlier that day. The confidential informant had arranged both of the December 10 transactions by phone, and the members of the task force knew the phone number of at least one of the suspects. Under these circumstances, the officers conducting the investigative stop could reasonably conclude that learning the phone numbers of the occupants of the Dodge Dakota might establish or negate [their] connection with [the] crime, Hayes, 470 U.S. at 817, 105 S.Ct. 1643, and that this information was `reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that initially' prompted the stop. See United States v. Shafer, 608 F.3d 1056, 1062 (8th Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Fuse, 391 F.3d 924, 927 (8th Cir.2004)). Accordingly, we conclude that Maldonado has failed to demonstrate error, let alone plain error. Finally, Maldonado argues that his statement giving the police officers his phone number should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The Supreme Court in Miranda stated that warnings are required when interrogation is initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody and whether an individual is in custody ultimately turn[s] on whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. United States v. Boslau, 632 F.3d 422, 427 (8th Cir.2011) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes is a question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Muhlenbruch, 634 F.3d 987, 995 (8th Cir.2011). In this case, the Minneapolis police officers asked Maldonado for his name and phone number in the context of a brief investigative stop. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that the temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a traffic stop or Terry stop does not constitute Miranda custody. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224, 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010) (internal citation omitted) (citing McCarty, 468 U.S. at 439-40, 104 S.Ct. 3138); see also United States v. Morse, 569 F.3d 882, 884 (8th Cir.2009). Because the record establishes that Maldonado never was subjected to a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest, Boslau, 632 F.3d at 427 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983)), the district court was correct to conclude that he was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he gave the officers his phone number.