Opinion ID: 197264
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 11 Fulmer contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction on two grounds, first, that an ambiguous statement cannot be considered a true threat, and second, that the evidence did not support a finding that Fulmer had the requisite intent. We begin with the now-familiar standard of review: 12 In assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, taken as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, would allow a rational jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant [was] guilty as charged. 13 United States v. Sullivan, 85 F.3d 743, 747 (1st Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Mena-Robles, 4 F.3d 1026, 1031 (1st Cir.1993)). 14
15 Fulmer argues that the appropriate standard for determining a true threat is whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault. United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.1990). The government argues that the proper standard is whether an ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the [statement] would interpret it as a threat of injury. United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th Cir.1973). This circuit has not yet ruled on the appropriate standard regarding the nature of a true threat. Although our sister circuits that have reviewed the standard under this and other 1 federal threat statutes agree that an objective standard is required, they disagree regarding the appropriate vantage point--what a person making the statement should have reasonably foreseen or what a reasonable person receiving the statement would believe. Compare United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir.1994) (The test is an objective one--namely, whether 'an ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the letter would interpret it as a threat of injury.'  (quoting Maisonet, 484 F.2d at 1358)), and United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir.1990) (The test for whether a statement is a threat is an objective one; it is not what the defendant intended but whether the recipient could reasonably have regarded the defendant's statement as a threat.) with Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1265 (Whether a particular statement may properly be considered to be a threat is governed by an objective standard--whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault.) and United States v. Welch, 745 F.2d 614, 619 (10th Cir.1984) (maintaining that the test is whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by persons hearing it as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of the President of the United States. (internal quotations omitted)). See also United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 148 (6th Cir.1992) ([T]he standard ... is an objective standard, i.e., would a reasonable person consider the statement to be a threat.). 16 We believe that the appropriate standard under which a defendant may be convicted for making a threat is whether he should have reasonably foreseen that the statement he uttered would be taken as a threat by those to whom it is made. This standard not only takes into account the factual context in which the statement was made, but also better avoids the perils that inhere in the reasonable-recipient standard, namely that the jury will consider the unique sensitivity of the recipient. We find it particularly untenable that, were we to apply a standard guided from the perspective of the recipient, a defendant may be convicted for making an ambiguous statement that the recipient may find threatening because of events not within the knowledge of the defendant. Therefore, we follow the approach of several circuits by holding that the appropriate focus is on what the defendant reasonably should have foreseen. 17 Fulmer contends that the statement was at most ambiguous and could not have been a true threat. Fulmer cites United States v. Andjar, which states that 18 [i]f the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence of the crime charged, this court must reverse the conviction. This is so because ... where an equal or nearly equal theory of guilt and a theory of innocence is supported by the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt. 19 49 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir.1995) (citation, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). 20 Although Fulmer properly recites the law, we find that Andjar 's wisdom does not apply here. A reasonable jury could have found the following. A bankruptcy trustee referred Fulmer's complaint to Egan in May 1994. In August or September, Egan met with Fulmer, and found his demeanor regarding his family intense. Fulmer expressed his belief that Boschetti and David Fulmer had engaged in illegal activities and further claimed that they were vicious people who had used the courts to keep Fulmer away from his family. Thereafter, Egan had conversations with Boschetti and David Fulmer who reiterated the ill feelings Fulmer bore toward them. Fulmer contacted Egan frequently, by letter and by telephone, leaving voicemail messages when Egan was not available. 21 After a thorough investigation, Egan and an Assistant United States Attorney determined that the evidence was insufficient to support a prosecution. Fulmer protested, but when Egan told him there was nothing further to discuss, he said goodbye and hung up. Egan's next interaction with Fulmer occurred three months later, when Fulmer left the voicemail message at issue. 22 The jury could have also found that, although the usage of the term silver bullets varies, the phrase may be used as a threat. 23 Reviewing all of these facts, and drawing all inferences in favor of the verdict, we cannot say that no rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Fulmer's statement was a threat. Whether a given [statement] constitutes a threat is an issue of fact for the trial jury. Malik, 16 F.3d at 49. The use of ambiguous language does not preclude a statement from being a threat. See id.; Schneider, 910 F.2d at 1570 (The threat in this case was ambiguous, but the task of interpretation was for the jury.); Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1265 (The fact that a threat is subtle does not make it less of a threat. (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Maisonet, 484 F.2d at 1358 (finding determination of whether statement constitutes a threat a jury question); see also United States v. Barcley, 452 F.2d 930, 934 (8th Cir.1971) (Aldrich, J., sitting by designation, dissenting) (contending that the interpretation of an ambiguous statement is a factual question to be resolved by a jury). While the statement on its face may be susceptible to more than one interpretation, some factors not discernable from the record, such as the tone of the defendant's voice or the credibility of the government's and Fulmer's witnesses, may legitimately lead a rational jury to find that this statement was a threat. 24 Fulmer further suggests that we must strictly apply the true threat standard in order to avoid trampling on his First Amendment rights, citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969). Watts involved a statement made against the president in the context of a political rally against a war. The Court was concerned with punishing Watts' constitutionally protected political speech. See id. at 706-08, 89 S.Ct. at 1401 (The language of the political arena, like the language used in labor disputes, ... is often vituperative, abusive and inexact.... Taken in context, and regarding the expressly conditional nature of the statement and the reaction of the listeners, we do not see how it could be interpreted otherwise.). In this case, Fulmer does not argue his message was one criticizing either Egan or any other government figure. Moreover, a true threat is unprotected by the First Amendment. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1265. Thus, a conviction under this statute, based on a finding that the statement was a true threat, would not violate Fulmer's constitutionally protected right to speech. 25
26 The jury was entitled to infer Fulmer's intent from the circumstances surrounding the statement. See United States v. DiMarzo, 80 F.3d 656, 661 (1st Cir.) (The jury was entitled to rely upon circumstantial evidence ... to infer essential elements of the crime ....), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 259, 136 L.Ed.2d 185 (1996); United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 975 (1st Cir.1995) (noting that a showing of criminal intent may be made wholly on the basis of circumstantial evidence). Drawing all inferences and credibility determinations in favor of the government's case, we find that a rational jury could have found that Fulmer knowingly made the statement alleged to be a threat, and that he did so with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with Egan in the performance of his duties, or to retaliate against him, within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). 27 Although we find that the evidence was not insufficient as a matter of law, we come to this conclusion by viewing the properly admitted evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and by drawing all credibility determinations in favor of the verdict. As we discuss in section III, we believe that the improperly admitted evidence was so inflammatory that it may have prompted the jury at the outset to weigh the properly admitted evidence in the government's favor. This sort of taint we cannot condone, and justifies a reversal even where Fulmer's argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.