Opinion ID: 2598652
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statement against Penal Interest by Avalos.

Text: {8} Defendant also objects to the testimony of another witness, William Marckstadt, who came forward after Defendant's first trial. Marckstadt shared a cell with Avalos in the Dona Ana County Detention Center when he heard Avalos make incriminating statements to another group of prisoners about having taken turns with another man in raping and stabbing a female college student. In a pretrial motion, Defendant tried to have these statements excluded, arguing (1) that Mr. Marckstadt was not a reliable witness and (2) the statements were inadmissible hearsay which violated his right to confrontation. The trial court ruled that the statements by Avalos were admissible as statements against penal interest under Rule 11-804(B)(3) NMRA 2002, an exception to the hearsay rule that applies when the declarant is unavailable. {9} On appeal, Defendant renews the claims that he made to the trial court. First, he contends that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony claiming that Mr. Marckstadt was a jailhouse informant and, therefore, was an inherently unreliable witness. In support of his proposition, Defendant refers us to cases from other jurisdictions. However, those cases are based on statutes which differ significantly from our own, so Defendant's reliance upon them is misplaced. See State v. Dunsmore, 119 N.M. 431, 434, 891 P.2d 572, 575 (Ct.App.1995) (determining that reliance on law from other jurisdictions is misplaced when those jurisdictions are governed by different statutes). Even if we were to accept Defendant's characterization of Mr. Marckstadt, we do not agree that the testimony of a fellow prisoner is inherently unreliable. See State v. Reyes, 2002-NMSC-024, ¶ 39, 132 N.M. 576, 52 P.3d 948 (recognizing that `jailhouse confessions to cellmates are also trustworthy and admissible under Rule 804(b)(3)') (quoting United States v. Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618, 628 (7th Cir.2001)). More importantly, as this Court has previously stated, the witness's credibility is irrelevant to the question of the admissibility of Avalos's statement. The hearsay rule is not concerned with the veracity of the testifying witness. State v. Toney, 2002-NMSC-003, ¶ 5, 131 N.M. 558, 40 P.3d 1002; accord State v. Williams, 117 N.M. 551, 561, 874 P.2d 12, 22 (1994). Mr. Marckstadt testified in court; Defendant was afforded an opportunity to test the witness's credibility during cross-examination. He was cross-examined extensively by Defendant about his credibility and about Avalos's statement. {10} Defendant's second claim of error is that the admission of Avalos's statement through the testimony of Mr. Marckstadt violated his right of confrontation. In general, there is no Confrontation Clause problem in admitting a hearsay statement if the declarant is unavailable and the statement bears adequate indicia of trustworthiness. Gonzales, 1999-NMSC-033, ¶ 17, 128 N.M. 44, 989 P.2d 419. Defendant does not challenge the unavailability of Avalos. The requisite indicia of trustworthiness may be found either by determining that the hearsay exception is a firmly rooted one or that the circumstance surrounding the making of the statement bears adequate indicia of reliability. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (quotation marks omitted). This Court previously has held that the penal interest exception to the hearsay rule is a firmly rooted hearsay exception for purposes of satisfying the indicia of reliability requirement of the Confrontation Clause. Torres, 1998-NMSC-052, ¶ 32, 126 N.M. 477, 971 P.2d 1267; accord Gonzales, 1999-NMSC-033, ¶ 19, 128 N.M. 44, 989 P.2d 419. We have subsequently reaffirmed that, in New Mexico, a statement against penal interest within the meaning of Rule 11-804(B)(3) is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. Reyes, 2002-NMSC-024, ¶ 40, 132 N.M. 576, 52 P.3d 948; Toney, 2002-NMSC-003, ¶¶ 10-11, 131 N.M. 558, 40 P.3d 1002; State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 2001-NMSC-029, ¶ 27, 131 N.M. 47, 33 P.3d 267, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1317, 152 L.Ed.2d 225 (2002); Gonzales, 1999-NMSC-033, ¶ 19, 128 N.M. 44, 989 P.2d 419. The trial court did not err in admitting these statements, and their admission did not violate Defendant's right of confrontation. {11} In his remaining challenge to the trial court's evidentiary rulings, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the admission of several statements attributed to Avalos. During the cross-examination of an acquaintance of Avalos, Defendant asked the trial court for a ruling on whether four statements allegedly made by Avalos in the presence of the witness could be introduced as statements against penal interest. After a proffer by Defendant on the content of the statements, the trial court ruled that only one of the statements would be admissible as a statement against penal interest. The court concluded that the others were not admissible as statements against penal interest, were not relevant, and were not admissible under Rule 11-403 NMRA 2002. At that point, Defendant apparently decided not to pursue the matter and did not question the witness further. On appeal, Defendant does not support this assertion of error with either argument or authority. We have long held that to present an issue on appeal for review, an appellant must submit argument and authority as required by rule. In re Adoption of Doe, 100 N.M. 764, 765, 676 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1984); accord State v. Hernandez, 104 N.M. 268, 274, 720 P.2d 303, 309 (Ct.App.1986) (A contention on appeal is deemed abandoned if appellant fails to cite authority or to explain the claim.). Therefore, we do not address this claim.