Opinion ID: 3013373
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disparagement Claims

Text: Aside from his age discrimination claims, McNulty also claims that Citadel tarnished his reputation after his termination by creating a materially false impression that he only appealed to the elderly. Because McNulty has not proven actual harm from the statements made by Citadel, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment. Although McNulty addresses his four disparagement claims together, we will dispose of them separately.
16 McNulty first claims that Citadel violated the Lanham Act. A claim for false advertising under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1125(a) (1998), requires proof that: 1) the defendant has made false or misleading statements regarding a product; 2) there is actual deception or at least a tendency to deceive a substantial portion of the intended audience; 3) the deception is material in that it is likely to influence purchasing decisions; 4) the advertised goods traveled in interstate commerce; and 5) there is a likelihood of injury to the plaintiff in terms of declining sales, loss of good will, etc. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1994). Lanham Act claims require proof of a nexus between the false statement and a third party’s decision not to do business with the plaintiff. Synygy, Inc. v. Scott-Levin, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 570, 577 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff’d in a nonprecedential opinion, 229 F.3d 1139 (3d Cir 2000). McNulty has not shown a nexus between the statements and his later inability to get a job in broadcasting. Furthermore, he has offered no proof that Citadel’s statements had a tendency to deceive “a substantial portion of the intended audience.” In Johnson-Merck, we examined exhaustive consumer surveys to determine whether they were objective and provided enough proof that a substantial portion of the intended audience, not just a select few individuals, had been misled. Johnson-Merck, 19 F.3d at 133-36. McNulty has not presented any such evidence. We will therefore affirm summary judgment.
McNulty next claims tortious interference with prospective contractual relations. In 17 Pennsylvania, a claim for tortious interference requires proof of: 1) a reasonable probability of a contract; 2) purpose or intent to harm plaintiff by preventing the relationship from occurring; 3) absence of privilege or justification on the part of the defendant; and 4) occurrence of actual damage. Advent Sys. Ltd v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1991); KBT Corp. v. Ceridian Corp., 966 F. Supp. 369, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1997). The District Court found that McNulty had not proven actual damages or the existence of a prospective contractual relationship, but simply implied that his reputation had been damaged. We agree that McNulty has not proven there was a link between the statements and his inability to get a broadcasting job, and will therefore affirm summary judgment.
McNulty also claims commercial disparagement. In Pennsylvania, a claim for commercial disparagement requires proof that: 1) the statement is false; 2) the publisher either intends the publication to cause pecuniary loss or reasonably should recognize that publication will result in pecuniary loss; 3) pecuniary loss does in fact result; and 4) the publisher either knows that the statement is false or acts in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. Neurotron Inc. v. Medical Serv. Assoc. of Pa., Inc., 254 F.3d 444, (3d Cir. 2001). In Neurotron, we examined Pennsylvania’s rule regarding commercial disparagement. At the time, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not decided a trade libel case for over 25 years. The most recent case, Menefee v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 329 A.2d 216 (Pa. 1974), had been decided under the Restatement (First) of Torts, and did not require the 18 fourth falsity element. Since then, the Restatement (Second) of Torts has added the requirement. In Neurotron, we held that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would follow the Restatement (Second), not Menefee, and would require evidence that the publisher was reckless with regard to the falsity of its statement. Neurotron, 254 F.3d at 449. McNulty relies heavily on Menefee because the facts in that case are strikingly similar, involving a radio broadcaster fired because of low ratings, suing over press accounts of his departure. Menefee, 329 A.2d at 217. Although we decided Neurotron a year after the District Court’s summary judgment decision, the District Court’s decision was based on simply interpreting what Pennsylvania law was at the time, and the Superior Court had already predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would follow the Restatement (Second), as had several other federal district courts. See Neurotron, 254 F.3d at 448-49. McNulty’s reliance on Menefee now is therefore misplaced. McNulty has not even addressed, let alone proven, that Citadel either knew or was reckless to the possibility that the statements it made were false. Furthermore, as with the previous two claims, he has not proven any pecuniary loss arising from the statements. Therefore, we will affirm summary judgment.
Finally, McNulty claims defamation. In Pennsylvania, a plaintiff seeking to recover for defamation bears the burden of proving: 1) the defamatory character of the communication; 2) its publication by the defendant; 3) its application to the plaintiff; 4) the understanding by the recipient of its defamatory meaning; 5) the understanding by the 19 recipient of it as intended to be applied to the plaintiff; 6) special harm resulting to the plaintiff from its publication; and 7) abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion. 42 Pa.