Opinion ID: 516020
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: combi's alleged negligence

Text: 17 The DAUNTLESS interests challenge the district court's findings and conclusion that Combi was not at fault in the collision of the DAUNTLESS with the sunken Combi barge. Specifically, the DAUNTLESS interests claim that the district court erred in (1) its factual determination that Combi conducted a good faith search for its missing barge, (2) its determination that Combi had abandoned the barge, and (3) its finding that the great barge breakaway was an inevitable accident. We disagree. 18 In maritime as in most federal actions, the 'clearly erroneous' rule applies to the review of the factual findings of the trial court. Candies Towing, Co. v. M/V B & C Eserman, 673 F.2d 91, 93 (5th Cir.1982). See also McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20, 75 S.Ct. 6, 8, 99 L.Ed. 20 (1954) (In reviewing a judgment of a trial court, sitting without a jury in admiralty, the Court of Appeals may not set aside the judgment below unless it is clearly erroneous.); Chaney v. City of Galveston, 368 F.2d 774, 776 (5th Cir.1966). A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985).
19 The DAUNTLESS interests contend that this circuit's decisions in Allied Chemical 5 and Nunley I require Combi to have done more in order for its actions to qualify as a good faith search. We disagree. 20 In Allied Chemical, the owner of a sunken vessel employed sophisticated equipment and techniques and began his search on the day after the apparent sinking. The owners also hired divers to search for the wreck. Like the owners in Allied, Combi began its search for its vessel the first day after the barge breakaway; a Combi representative joined a Coast Guard helicopter search for missing vessels. Combi also hired Elwood Groom, who was skilled in using magnetometers and interpreting their readings, to conduct a search using both a magnetometer and a fathometer. 21 The DAUNTLESS interests mistakenly contend that Combi's failure to send a diver down to identify positively the two objects found in Groom's search is inconsistent with the district court's good faith finding. It is true that no divers were sent down, but as the record clearly indicates, river conditions were too dangerous to allow their use. According to trial testimony this dangerous condition lasted into the summer of 1974, by which time Combi considered the barge abandoned. 6 22 Further, our decision in Nunley I merely reiterated our position that a good faith search, such as the one conducted in Allied Chemical, could exonerate a non-negligent owner of a sunken vessel from his duties under the Wreck Act. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 409. 23 In fact, having read all of the DAUNTLESS interests' criticisms of the Combi search, we have found few additional actions that Combi could actually have taken. 7 The DAUNTLESS interests suggest that Combi should have conducted a more thorough follow-up on several reports of sunken objects or sightings of sinking vessels. We agree that such action would have been desirable, but it is not clear from the testimony that this additional information would have been conclusive. The Combi magnetometer and fathometer search identified two objects on the river bottom: one near the Algiers Lock Forebay and one near the Tenneco dock. According to the deposition of Combi representative Captain Plantinga, the apparent difference in size of the two objects greatly influenced Combi's determination that the object near the Algiers Forebay was most likely the Combi barge. The object near the Tenneco dock was thought to be too large to be the missing LASH barge. In contrast, the object near the Algiers Lock had dimensions more in keeping with that of a LASH barge. The district court apparently found Combi's decision as to which object was most likely to be its barge reasonable in light of the apparently different lengths. 24 Finally, we must remember our standard of review. In a trial that consumed weeks and many volumes of record, the district court was in the best position to evaluate Combi's efforts in locating its missing barge. Having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred.
25 The DAUNTLESS interests fare no better in their argument that the district court inappropriately determined that the Great Barge Breakaway was a vis major, thereby precluding a finding of negligence on Combi's part for the CBLL-01315's breakaway. We agree with Combi that the breakaway is more properly classified as an inevitable accident. 8 Nevertheless, the district court had ample evidence to support its finding. 26 The determination of inevitability is primarily a finding of fact governed by the evidence. See The Anna C. Minch, 271 F. 192 (2nd Cir.1921); Griffin, The American Law of Collision, Sec. 238 (1949). The district court found that, The Great Barge Breakaway was unique in its magnitude. It made no distinction between barges located in riverbends and those on the straightaway, or between those moored six across and those moored directly to shore.... No fleet could have been designed to hold fast against this particular breakaway. The record thoroughly supports the court's finding. Combi's fleeting position, although in a river bend, was located at a site selected by the New Orleans Dock Board and approved by the Corps of Engineers. Many fleets were located in the bend. Even some barge fleets in the straight stretches of the Mississippi River were struck by the drifting vessels. In fact, Charlton Nettles, Chief of the Operations Division of the COE in New Orleans, testified that no fleet could be designed to ensure that its vessels would remain secure against drifting vessels from upriver. 27 In Dow Chemical Company v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 463 F.2d 120 (5th Cir.1972), we held that the mere location of an object on navigable waters, in technical violation of federal statute, did not amount to negligence on the part of the owners when the object (in this case a fender system) was struck by barges. There we found that the fender system neither obstructed navigation nor was inherently dangerous, and we further found that a different design or placement of the structure could not necessarily have avoided the collisions. We said, The record refutes any suggestion that the fender system 'caused or contributed to' the collision simply by being there. 463 F.2d at 122. Similarly, in the present case, the record indicated that the barges cascading down the Mississippi did not discriminate between barge fleet locations or tiering lengths. Charlton Nettles, a professional engineer himself, testified that a different fleeting design or placement could not have prevented uncontrolled, drifting vessels from dislodging moored vessels. 28 Unlike the arrival of a hurricane, the barge breakaway occurred without warning. Cf. Boudoin v. J. Ray McDermott & Company, 281 F.2d 81 (5th Cir.1960) (barge operator had ample warnings of Hurricane Audrey's approach and failed to take appropriate cautions). We are reminded that under the inevitable accident doctrine, [T]he highest degree of care is not required. It is sufficient if the navigator has complied with the tests of ordinary prudence ... Griffin, Sec. 238; See also The Grace Girdler, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 196, 203, 19 L.Ed. 113 (1879). Combi has satisfied this standard. 29 The DAUNTLESS interests also allege that Combi violated the terms of the COE permit by maintaining a barge tier length in excess of four barges and that this behavior constituted a statutory violation under the Pennsylvania Rule. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 22 L.Ed. 148 (1874). If this permit violation constituted a statutory violation under the Pennsylvania Rule, then Combi must prove that its violation could not have been one of the causes of the breakaway. 9 This burden of proof is extremely difficult to satisfy. 30 The record, however, lacks evidence to support the DAUNTLESS interests' claim that Combi violated the COE permit. Charlton Nettles testified that the COE permit would be violated only if it was a regular practice in [the] fleet to have barges in excess of four wide for lengthy periods of time. Nettles testified that it was common and acceptable practice for fleets to exceed the permit tier lengths for intervals of up to several hours. 10 The record is void of any evidence to show that Combi made a practice of exceeding its tier lengths for significant periods of time. In fact, the only testimony touching on this subject was provided by Anthony Valence. Valence did not indicate how often Combi exceeded the tier length or the duration of these excesses. He had worked at the Combi site for only six months prior to the breakaway. Equally important, Valence's testimony at trial was, at several points, atodds with his earlier deposition statements, and thus called his credibility into question. 31 The DAUNTLESS interests had the burden of proof that Combi violated a statute. Having carefully reviewed the record, we find that they have failed to meet this burden.
32 In determining that Combi was free of negligence in the DAUNTLESS collision, the district court found that Combi had abandoned the CBLL-01315 prior to July 1977. Again, we must review the district court's factual finding under the clearly erroneous standard. 11 33 The district court properly noted that a valid abandonment occurs through the act of deserting property without hope of recovery or intention of returning to it. See 3A Norris, Benedict on Admiralty Sec. 134 (7th ed. 1980); Bunge Corp. v. Agri-Trans Corp., 542 F.Supp. 961, 969 (N.D.Miss.1982), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, Agri-Trans Corp. v. Gladders Barge Line, Inc., 721 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.1983). Combi and the DAUNTLESS interests quarrel over whether the Wreck Act provides that a non-negligent vessel owner can abandon his vessel by failing to act to recover it within thirty days of the sinking. We decline to hold here that a mere thirty days' inactivity on the part of a barge owner to recover his sunken vessel constitutes legal abandonment of the vessel. The statute does not support such a conclusion. Moreover, important policy reasons argue against such a rule. 12 But in this case, more than three years elapsed between the end of Combi's search for and recovery efforts towards-- its barge and the DAUNTLESS's collision near the Tenneco Oil refinery. In that interval Combi may safely be deemed to have abandoned the CBLL-01315. On February 6, 1974 Combi telexed its insurers acknowledging Combi's failure to locate the sunken vessel and declaring the CBLL-01315 a total loss. In addition, Combi notified its underwriters of the loss and stated its intention to abandon the vessel to them. 13 Nothing in the record suggests that Combi made any efforts to recover the barge after the Spring of 1974. Under these facts, we cannot conclude that the district court finding of abandonment was clearly erroneous. 34 The DAUNTLESS interests make much of Combi's failure to tender written notice of abandonment with the Corps of Engineers until after the DAUNTLESS accident. We agree that owners wishing to absolve themselves of further liability in connection with their sunken vessels would be wise to tender a formal letter of abandonment to the Corps of Engineers immediately after deciding to abandon. However, under current law, there is no requirement for a written notice of abandonment, and we decline to fashion such a quasi-legislative rule here. 35 Since Combi was a non-negligent owner and had abandoned its vessel before the DAUNTLESS collision, the district court properly found Combi to be free from negligence in the DAUNTLESS collision.