Opinion ID: 2085108
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Interpretation of the Insurance Policies at Issue

Text: Whether a particular contract is or is not ambiguous is a question of law. Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732, 738 n. 8 (R.I.2005) (It is a fundamental principle of contract law that the existence of ambiguity vel non in a contract is an issue of law to be determined by the court.); Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91, 94 (R.I.1996) (Whether the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous is itself a question of law   .); see also Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Dufault, 958 A.2d 620, 625 (R.I.2008). [2] Accordingly, a trial court's ruling as to that issue is reviewed by this Court on a de novo basis. Zarrella v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co., 824 A.2d 1249, 1259 (R.I.2003) ([T]his Court reviews the trial justice's interpretation of contracts de novo. ). When a contract is determined to be clear and unambiguous, the meaning of its terms constitutes a question of law for the court   . Cassidy v. Springfield Life Insurance Co., 106 R.I. 615, 619, 262 A.2d 378, 380 (1970); see also Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc./Franki Foundation Co. v. Gill, 652 A.2d 440, 443 (R.I.1994). [3] In determining whether or not a particular contract is ambiguous, the court should read the contract in its entirety, giving words their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning. Mallane v. Holyoke Mutual Insurance Company in Salem, 658 A.2d 18, 20 (R.I.1995); see also Cerilli v. Newport Offshore, Ltd., 612 A.2d 35, 37-38 (R.I.1992) (Unless plain and unambiguous intent to the contrary is manifested, words used in contract language are assigned their ordinary meaning.). And, while carrying out this task, the court should refrain from engaging in mental gymnastics or from stretching the imagination to read ambiguity    where none is present. Mallane, 658 A.2d at 20; see also Garden City Treatment Center, Inc. v. Coordinated Health Partners, Inc., 852 A.2d 535, 542 (R.I.2004); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Sullivan, 633 A.2d 684, 686 (R.I.1993); Mullins v. Federal Dairy Co., 568 A.2d 759, 762 (R.I.1990). It is true that both insurance policies in the instant case contain other insurance clauses. This fact alone, however, does not mandate the use of the pro rata approach discussed in Hindson. As the Court articulated in Ferreira, 811 A.2d at 1177, the pro rata rule regarding apportionment of liability should be resorted to only if the two insurance policies at issue are actually in conflict. The hearing justice in this case determined that the language of both policies is plain and unambiguous and that the policies do not conflict with each other. We are in full agreement. The pertinent portion of the Travelers XTend Endorsement provides that the insurance afforded to the additional insured is excess over any valid and collectible insurance available to such additional insured, unless you have agreed in a written contract for this insurance to apply on a primary or contributory basis. The lease between Emblem & Badge and Irene Realty provides that Emblem & Badge will provide evidence of insurance coverage to Irene Realty and will also add Irene Realty as an additional insured on Emblem & Badge's insurance policies. There was no written agreement that referred to or promised that the coverage under this policy would be primary. Further, this Court has repeatedly held that language in contracts and insurance policies must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Mallane, 658 A.2d at 20; Cerilli, 612 A.2d at 37-38. The defendant contends that, although both policies contain other insurance clauses which purport to limit coverage to excess coverage when the insured is covered by another policy providing primary coverage, those clauses are in complete harmony. See, e.g., Ferreira, 811 A.2d at 1177. We agree. The American Empire policy provides that its insurance for Irene Realty is primary unless any other applicable insurance is primary. The Travelers policy provides that its coverage of Irene Realty as an additional insured is excess unless the parties have agreed in writing for the insurance to be primary. The plain and simple fact is that no such writing exists. Accordingly, the hearing justice properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.