Opinion ID: 692998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Salvation Army

Text: 12 Our examination of the district court's decision to grant summary judgment to the Salvation Army is governed by the de novo standard of review. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The record must be viewed, and inferences must be drawn, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Schultz v. General Elec. Capital Corp., 37 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir.1994). The judgment will be affirmed if there exists no genuine issue of material fact and if judgment for the Salvation Army is proper as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). 13 As a preliminary matter, we note that, because Holly attacked Ms. Bailor in Indiana, the substantive law of Indiana should be applied to this case. Maroon v. State, Dep't of Mental Health, 411 N.E.2d 404, 409 (Ind.Ct.App.1980); see In re Estate of Bruck, 632 N.E.2d 745, 747 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (citing Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind.1987)). In any event, both Ms. Bailor and the Salvation Army agree that Indiana law should be applied in this case. Under Indiana law, Ms. Bailor must establish three elements to allege a negligence claim: (1) a duty of the Salvation Army to conform conduct to a standard of care arising from its relationship with Ms. Bailor; (2) a failure of the Salvation Army to conform conduct to the requisite standard of care arising from the relationship; and (3) a showing that Ms. Bailor's attack was proximately caused by the Salvation Army's failure to conform to the standard of care. See Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind.1991). 14 The first element, whether the Salvation Army owed Ms. Bailor a duty, is a question of law which we determine de novo. Sports, Inc. v. Gilbert, 431 N.E.2d 534, 535 (Ind.Ct.App.1982) (citing Neal v. Home Builders, Inc., 232 Ind. 160, 111 N.E.2d 280 (1953)). Three factors should be considered in determining whether a duty existed: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured; and (3) public policy concerns. Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d at 995 (Ind.1991). 15
16 Absent privity deriving from a special consensual relationship between Ms. Bailor and the Salvation Army, there must exist another independent basis to impose a duty of care on the Salvation Army. When addressing the duty to control the conduct of others, the courts of Indiana generally follow the principles set forth in the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts. Cole v. Indiana Dep't of Correction, 616 N.E.2d 44, 46 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.1993). The general rule is set forth in Sec. 315. That section provides in relevant part: 17 There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless 18 (a) a special relationship exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or 19 (b) a special relationship exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right of protection. 20 Section 319 elaborates on these general criteria in the context before us today. That section, entitled Duty of Those in Charge of Person Having Dangerous Propensities, provides: 21 One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm. 22 To establish the special relationship needed to impose a duty, Ms. Bailor must establish that the Salvation Army took charge of a third person. Indiana law does not delineate in comprehensive fashion what is required to conclude that an entity has taken charge of an individual. Nor are there any Indiana cases directly on point as to whether a private halfway house, providing transitional services to pre-release inmates, meets the criteria for liability under Sec. 319 of the Restatement. 5 However, in Estate of Mathes v. Ireland, 419 N.E.2d 782, 784 (Ind.Ct.App.1981), the court held that under Sec. 319, [f]or the duty to exist there must therefore not only be an actual taking charge of the third person, there must also be a knowledge of the likelihood that he will cause bodily harm. Further, in Sports, Inc., 431 N.E.2d at 538, the appellate court added that the entity taking charge must possess the right to intervene or control the actions of a third person. Thus, Ms. Bailor must demonstrate that the Salvation Army had the legal right to control Holly, did actually control Holly, and had knowledge of his propensity for violence. In order to make this determination, we must examine the relationship between the Salvation Army halfway house and the Department of Corrections (Bureau of Prisons). 23 Although Holly clearly resided at the Salvation Army facility, he remained under the legal custody of the Attorney General and the Bureau of Prisons. 6 The Salvation Army's ability or right to control Holly was limited. The contract that defined the parameters of the Salvation Army's responsibilities allowed minimal discretion to the Salvation Army. The Salvation Army personnel were not authorized to possess lethal weapons while on duty; the personnel could not use physical force to restrain a resident except in instances of justifiable self-defense, prevention of loss or damage to property or person, or the prevention of self-inflicted harm, and only to the degree necessary. R.101, Ex. B at 3. The Salvation Army also had limited independent disciplinary discretion, and could impose sanctions on residents only for the most minor of prohibited acts. Any serious sanctions required approval of a Bureau of Prisons representative. 24 Under its arrangement with the government, the Salvation Army facility, as a halfway house, could not detain a resident. Residents were free to leave, provided they signed a sign-out sheet. The facility could not be locked down in order to prevent residents from leaving, and individual rooms could be locked only by the residents themselves from the inside. In sum, residents could leave the facility at any time, subject only to the consequences that could be imposed by the courts or by the Bureau of Prisons. Once Holly left the facility, the Salvation Army could only report the incident to the Bureau of Prisons. 25 The district court's determination that the Salvation Army had the responsibility to house Holly in a safe, clean and nurturing environment; but virtually no say-so as to effectuating meaningful control over him 7 supports the conclusion that the Salvation Army did not possess sufficient control over Holly to create a duty to Ms. Bailor as a matter of law. The limitations on the authority of the halfway house are important and we believe a controlling factor in the relationship between the Salvation Army and Ms. Bailor. The Salvation Army had but limited authority to restrict the activity of Holly and, therefore no realistic opportunity to control Holly's activities with respect to Ms. Bailor.
26 The second factor to consider under Indiana law in determining the question of legal duty is whether the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim injured by a foreseeable harm. Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d at 996-97. The courts of Indiana have held that the duty of reasonable care is not, of course, owed to the world at large, but rather to those who might reasonably be foreseen as being subject to injury by the breach of the duty. Id. at 997. We examine what forces and human conduct should have appeared likely to come on the scene and we weigh the dangers likely to flow from the challenged conduct in light of those forces and conduct. Id. The question of foreseeability is a matter of law. Fawley v. Martin's Supermarkets, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 10 (Ind.Ct.App.1993). 27 Although the courts of Indiana have not had the opportunity to address this factor in the context of a halfway house, we believe that their reliance on the Restatement as a general guide, coupled with the application of those principles in other jurisdictions, can guide our estimation as to how Indiana would resolve the matter if this case were presented to its Supreme Court today. Restatement (Second) Sec. 281(b) states that an actor is liable for the invasion of the interest of another if 28 the conduct of the actor is negligent with respect to the other, or the class of persons within which he is included.... 29 The commentary accompanying this provision expands upon the text: 30 In order for the actor to be negligent with respect to the other, his conduct must create a recognizable risk of harm to the other individually, or to a class of persons--as, for example, all persons within a given area of danger--of which the other is a member. 31 Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 281(b) cmt. c. The Supreme Court of Virginia confronted the application of this provision in the context of a halfway house in Dudley v. Offender Aid & Restoration of Richmond, Inc., 241 Va. 270, 401 S.E.2d 878 (1991). The court concluded that when a person who has charge of a dangerous person is negligent and the person escapes, the duty is to 32 an entire class of prospective victims: those who are directly and foreseeably exposed to the risk of bodily harm as a result of the defendant's failure to control his dangerous charge. Frequently, the circumstances will be such as to include within the class 'all persons within a given area of danger,' in the words of the comment on Restatement Sec. 281(b). 33 Dudley, 401 S.E.2d at 883. The court then applied this principle to the context of a halfway house: 34 If a prisoner escapes, penniless and on foot in a remote, unpopulated area, and is soon recaptured, the class of potential victims foreseeably at risk during the time of his escape may be very small indeed. By contrast, if a dangerous prisoner is allowed, by a defendant's negligence, to run at large in a city throughout the night time hours, the class of potential victims at risk may extend to all who are present within the area to which the prisoner will foreseeably have access during the period of his freedom. 35 Id. Applying these principles to the case before it, the Virginia court reasoned that the liability of the negligent halfway house ought to extend to the entire city in which the halfway house was located. 36 In this case, Holly's attack on Ms. Bailor took place three days after he had walked out of the halfway house in a city approximately 150 miles away. The halfway house's arrangement with the United States Marshals Service clearly vested responsibility for the whereabouts of Holly on the government, not on the halfway house that had neither the information gathering capabilities nor the investigative resources to deal with the danger that Holly might pose at such a time and distance.
37 In determining the existence of a duty, the final factor that Indiana courts weigh is public policy concerns. There is no doubt an important rehabilitative interest in assisting federal inmates in their transition to self-sufficient, contributing members of the community. R.101, Ex. B at 1. There is also, however, an extraordinarily important interest in protecting the members of the public from brutal assaults at the hands of those still serving a sentence to incarceration. We believe that, given the importance of both of these factors, the Indiana courts would decline to give determinative weight to either and would define the duty of care assumed by the halfway house as circumscribed by the first two factors of the analysis. The duty of the halfway house ought to be defined in terms of its authority to restrain the prisoner and the foreseeability of the risk, considered both temporally and spatially. 38 We believe that the district court correctly determined that the halfway house owed, under the law of Indiana, no duty in tort to Ms. Bailor. We therefore need not consider Ms. Bailor's further contentions: Whether the Salvation Army exercised reasonable care in dealing with Holly, and whether the Salvation Army proximately caused Ms. Bailor's injuries.