Opinion ID: 1195492
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The claim for damages from delay in performance caused by adverse weather conditions.

Text: The Contractor computes its claim for weather delay damages by attributing to this cause 376 of the 554 calendar days which elapsed between the contract completion date of July 25, 1968 and the final inspection by the State on January 30, 1970. Assessing its jobsite and other indirect expenses at the rate of $1,023 per calendar day, the Contractor arrives at the sum of $384,648 as the amount which it is entitled to recover from the State as weather delay damages. [1] No findings were made by the trial court with respect to the period of delay in completion of the contract caused by adverse weather conditions. We assume arguendo that the Contractor's computations are correct and turn to the question whether the evidence sustained the alleged liability of the State to indemnify the Contractor for its costs attributable to adverse weather conditions. The Contractor advances the following legal propositions in support of its claim: (a) The State has an affirmative duty to disclose its superior knowledge where it possesses special knowledge, not shared by the contractor, which is vital to the performance of the contract. (b) Where the State in inviting bids discloses certain facts regarding site conditions, it may not conceal other facts within its knowledge which materially qualify those stated. (c) Where the State in inviting bids makes positive representations as to certain existing conditions material to the performance of the contract, the contractor may rely on the representations despite a general provision requiring him to investigate the site. (d) The State implicitly warrants in a construction contract that if the contractor complies with the specifications furnished he will be able to complete the project within the specified time. The Contractor also seeks to base its claim for weather delay damages on the refusal of the State to suspend work on days of adverse weather. This argument will be dealt with after the above propositions have been considered. Each of these propositions has some validity under appropriate factual situations. However, the trial court was requested by the Contractor, and refused, to find that the State contributed to the delayed completion of the contract by not fully informing the Contractor of weather conditions the State knew could be expected on Mauna Kea, and to find that it was not feasible to complete the contract work in the contract period. On the other hand, the trial court found that the Contractor failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of Mauna Kea's weather and climate conditions before bidding, and that the State did not withhold any information on such weather and climate. [2] With respect to raw weather data accumulated by the State, the trial court found that the Contractor was aware that such data existed and did not ask to see them. The standard which governs our review of these findings of the trial court was enunciated in J.A. Thompson & Son, Inc. v. State, 51 Haw. 529, 465 P.2d 148 (1970). There the plaintiff had entered into a contract with the State for the construction of a highway. The action was brought to recover additional costs alleged to have resulted from the State's misrepresentation of material facts or its failure to disclose all material information in its possession. In affirming a judgment against the plaintiff, entered after a trial without a jury, we said: Further, the gist of the appeal is that the trial court erred in its finding that the State had not misrepresented fact and that it had not failed to disclose material information which it had in its possession; however, the plaintiff has failed to prove that the findings of fact of the trial court are clearly erroneous, because under the record of this case we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed by the trial court. Id., p. 539, 465 P.2d p. 155. Our review here must also take into account the fact that the findings fail to fully dispose of the issues raised by the Contractor in its claim for weather delay damages. No findings were made with respect to the alleged positive representations as to existing conditions material to the performance of the contract. However, we have found the record to be sufficiently clear that we do not need the aid of additional findings in reviewing the judgment which denies this portion of the Contractor's claim. Mayer v. Alexander & Baldwin, Inc., 56 Haw. 195, 206, 532 P.2d 1007, 1010 (1975); Abramson v. Board of Regents, 56 Haw. 680, 548 P.2d 253 (1976). We turn now to consideration of the various contentions made by the Contractor in support of this claim.