Opinion ID: 2995365
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was Plaintiff a Qualified

Text: Individual with a Disability? The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(a). A qualified individual with a disability is an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position . . . . Id. sec. 12111(8). Further, a disability means a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual./2 Id. sec. 12102(2)(A). Thus, to prevail on his ADA claim, plaintiff must show that (1) he is disabled; (2) he is qualified to perform the essential function of the job either with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability. See Moore v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 221 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has devised a three- part test for determining whether a plaintiff is disabled under 42 U.S.C. sec. 12102(2)(A), thereby satisfying the first prong of an ADA discrimination claim. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 141 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1998). First, we determine whether plaintiff suffered from a physical or mental impairment. See id. If so, we then determine whether the major life activity claimed by plaintiff constituted a major life activity under the ADA. See id. at 637. Finally, we analyze whether plaintiff’s impairment substantially limited the major life activity. See id. at 639. Plaintiff suffers from cirrhosis caused by chronic Hepatitis B. Dr. Dolin testified at his deposition that cirrhosis is significant scarring [of the liver] to the point where it compromises the liver. This reduced liver functioning affects the ability of plaintiff’s body to eliminate toxins and maintain appropriate glucose levels. Therefore, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that plaintiff suffered from a physical impairment. See, e.g., Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916, 923 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding plaintiff’s insulin-dependent diabetes was a physical impairment because it affected many of the organ systems in his body). Plaintiff’s ADA claim fails, however, because his alleged major life activity is not a major life activity under the ADA. On appeal, plaintiff alleges that his Hepatitis B impairment affected the major life activity of liver function. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Regulations interpreting the ADA (ADA regulations) describe major life activities as activities such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.2(i). While this list is intended to be illustrative, rather than exhaustive, see Sinkler v. Midwest Property Management Limited Partnership, 209 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2000), liver function bears little resemblance to the major life activities enunciated in the ADA regulations. The Supreme Court’s decision in Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637-38, clarifies what type of activities constitute major life activities under the ADA. In that case, the plaintiff, who had the HIV virus, brought an ADA claim against a dentist who refused to treat her in his office. See id. at 629. The plaintiff claimed that her HIV infection substantially lim ited the major life activity of reproduction. See id. at 637. The Court concluded that reproduction was a major life activity for ADA purposes. See id. at 638. Citing regulations that were nearly identical to the ADA regulations, the Court reasoned that reproduction was a major life activity because it was central to the life process. Id. In other words, the touchstone for determining an activity’s inclusion under the statutory rubric is its significance. Id. (citation omitted). This court has interpreted Bragdon to mean that a major life activity is something that is integral to one’s daily existence. Lawson, 245 F.3d at 923. Using this standard, this court has held that eating constitutes a major life activity for purposes of the ADA. Id. (quotation omitted). Similarly, we have held that working can be a major life activity. See, e.g., Skorup v. Modern Door Corp., 153 F.3d 512, 514 (7th Cir. 1998). Although liver function is integral to one’s daily existence in that one needs a healthy liver to remove toxins from the blood, liver function is not integral to one’s daily existence under Bragdon and its progeny. The alleged major life activity here--liver function--is a characteristic of the impairment, much as a decline in white blood cells is a characteristic of the HIV virus. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 635. However, in Bragdon, the Court did not hinge its conclusion that the plaintiff was disabled on a characteristic of her impairment. For example, the Court did not focus on the fact that her blood health was impacted. Rather, the Court evaluated the impairment’s impact on her ability to reproduce. The activities that have been held to be major life activities under the ADA (e.g., eating, working, reproducing) are not the impair ments’ characteristics--they are activities that have been impacted because of the plaintiffs’ impairments. Therefore, we reject the notion that liver function is a major life activity under the ADA. Plaintiff’s argument misses that essential link. He argues that Hepatitis B should be a disability because it is a chronic illness that affects the functioning of a major organ. However, under the ADA, even a serious illness such as Hepati tis B does not equate with a disability. Only when the impact of the illness substantially limits a major life activity--such as working--is an individual considered disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Plaintiff, however, has never asserted working--or any other activity--as being substantially limited. Liver function is the only alleged major life activity that this court can consider, as it was the only one articulated by plaintiff. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638. In that case, the Court noted that a party who had the HIV virus could have alleged that the infection imposed substantial limitations on a number of major life activities other than reproduction. Id. at 637. However, because the case ha[d] been treated as one in which reproduction was the major life activity limited by the impairment, the Court circumscribe[d] [their] discussion to the activity of reproduction. Id. at 637-38. Similarly, although a party could theoretically allege a number of major life activities that were substantially limited by Hepatitis B and cirrhosis, plaintiff chose to hinge his case on liver function being a major life activity. As it is not a major life activity under the ADA, plaintiff is not disabled and cannot prevail on his ADA claim. Even if liver function served as a major life activity under the ADA, plaintiff’s claim would fail because he cannot prove that his disease substantially limited the functioning of his liver. The ADA regulations state that a person is substantially limited by an impairment if that person is either ’[u]nable to perform a major life activity’ or is’significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration’ under which the individual can perform the major life activity as compared to the average person in the general population. Skorup, 153 F.3d at 514 (quoting 29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.2(j)(1)). Thus, the analysis for determining whether a person’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity has three facets: 1) the nature and severity of the impairment; 2) the duration of the impairment; and 3) the permanent or long-term impact resulting from the impairment. See Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 506 n.3 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing 29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.2(j)(2)). The district court relied on the deposition testimony of Drs. LaBreque and Dolin to conclude that plaintiff’s liver function was not substantially limited. Dr. LaBreque testified that as of June, 1996, one month before plaintiff was fired, his liver function was right on the borderline, if you will, but it was--it was adequate. Dr. Dolin testified that as of June, 1997, plaintiff’s liver function tests [were] absolutely normal. The record reveals that plaintiff’s liver function was not substantially limited. To summarize plaintiff’s relevant medical history, Dr. Dolin prescribed Interferon treatment in January, 1996, but by May, 1996, Dr. Dolin concluded that the treatment was not working. In June, 1996, he referred plaintiff to Dr. LaBreque, who concluded that plaintiff’s liver function was adequate. Although plaintiff suffered from some fatigue due to his disease, Dr. LaBreque placed no work or travel restrictions on plaintiff. In fact, plaintiff only missed 12 hours of work during the entire year in 1996, and there was no evidence demonstrating that plaintiff ever suffered from restrictions on his ability to care for himself or perform manual tasks./3 Dr. LaBreque placed plaintiff on the drug Lamivudae, and by June, 1997, tests revealed that plaintiff’s liver function was absolutely normal. Plaintiff ceased taking Lamivudae in December, 1997, at which time his virus was completely dormant. Looking at the three factors--the nature and severity of the impairment, its duration, and the long-term effects--it is clear that plaintiff’s disease did not substantially limit his liver function. In evaluating the effect of plaintiff’s impairment on his liver function, we must examine the plaintiff’s condition as it exist[ed] after corrective or mitigating measures used to combat the impairment were taken. Lawson, 245 F.3d at 924. At the time of plaintiff’s termination, Dr. LaBreque considered plaintiff’s liver function to be adequate enough to do the job. As Dr. LaBreque stated in his deposition: if you’ve got cirrhosis, [plaintiff is] doing as well as you can do with cirrhosis. The duration of plaintiff’s impairment also militates against finding that his liver function was substantially impaired. After treating his disease with Lamivudae, plaintiff’s liver disease became dormant. Finally, plaintiff may not suffer long-term effects from his liver disease. Dr. Dolin testified that in June, 1997, plaintiff’s liver function tests were absolutely normal with no evidence of liver failure. Therefore, plaintiff’s Hepatitis B and cirrhosis did not substantially limit his liver function.