Opinion ID: 3001539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jamie Briesemeister

Text: Counsel’s Anders brief is facially adequate, and Briesemeister has not responded to counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Cir. R. 51(b). Review is limited to the potential issues identified in counsel’s brief. See Schuh, 289 F.3d at 973‐74. Briesemeister has informed counsel that she wants her guilty plea vacated. Thus, counsel first considers whether Briesemeister could challenge the adequacy of the plea colloquy conducted under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, in particular the requirement in Rule 11(b)(3) that the district court satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the guilty plea. Because Briesemeister did not seek to withdraw her plea in the district court, we would review only for plain error. United States v. Arenal, 500 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2007). Counsel suggests that during the Rule 11 colloquy the district court failed to inform Briesemeister of her right to confront the witnesses against her, and that she was waiving her trial rights by pleading guilty. But counsel concludes that it would be frivolous for Briesemeister to challenge the voluntariness of her plea on the basis of these purported omissions because her plea agreement includes both advisements, rendering any error harmless. This is correct, but in any event counsel’s assessment of the record is incomplete. In addition, the district court specifically informed Briesemeister that by pleading guilty she was giving up her trial rights, including her right to cross‐examine the witnesses against her. As for the requirement of a factual basis, counsel considers whether Briesemeister could argue that the government’s proffer at her plea hearing showed only a buyer‐seller Nos. 06‐3633, 06‐3726 & 06‐3851 Page 7 arrangement, and not a conspiracy. But the proffer included evidence that for more than a year Briesemeister acted as a “salesperson” for Michele Nelson. And, as counsel notes, we could consider the presentence report, see Arenal, 500 F.3d at 638, which includes Michele Nelson’s statement that Briesemeister “middled” drugs for her, customers’ statements that they were aware that Nelson supplied the drugs they bought from Briesemeister, Taylor’s statement that Briesemeister built a relationship with Michele Nelson that allowed her to bypass Taylor as a “middleman,” and Briesemeister’s admission that she “took over” some of Taylor’s customers when Taylor’s drug habit prevented her from doing business. Those facts are more than sufficient to show a “prolonged and actively pursued course of sales coupled with the seller’s actual knowledge and a shared stake in the buyer’s illegal venture.” United States v. Hach, 162 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 1998). Counsel next considers whether Briesemeister could challenge the district court’s adoption of the probation officer’s drug‐quantity calculation. Briesemeister initially disputed its accuracy, but explicitly withdrew her objection after concluding that it would not affect her guidelines’ range. Because Briesemeister waived this argument, counsel correctly concludes that it would be frivolous to pursue it. See United States v. Sensmeier, 361 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Cunningham, 405 F.3d 497, 502 (7th Cir. 2005). Counsel also briefly considers and rejects a potential argument that Briesemeister could qualify for safety‐valve treatment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). But counsel correctly concludes that such a contention would be frivolous because Briesemeister has two criminal history points. See id. § 3553(f)(1). Finally, counsel considers mounting a challenge to the reasonableness of Briesemeister’s sentence based on her “very sympathetic background.” The district court sentenced Briesemeister to 121 months’ imprisonment—a month longer than the mandatory minimum, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)—along with five years’ supervised release. Counsel notes that the district court properly calculated her guidelines range: with a base offense level of 34, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3), less three points for acceptance of responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1, Briesemeister’s adjusted offense level was 31. With a criminal history category of II, her guidelines imprisonment range was 121 to 151 months. See id. Ch. 5, Pt. A. In selecting a sentence at the bottom of that range, the district court considered Briesemeister’s background, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), the need to hold her accountable for her serious criminal conduct, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(A), and the importance of substance‐abuse treatment in her rehabilitation, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). Given the court’s adequate explanation of the sentence, we agree that it would be frivolous for Briesemeister to challenge it on this ground. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2468. Nos. 06‐3633, 06‐3726 & 06‐3851 Page 8 Accordingly, we AFFIRM Taylor’s sentence, GRANT the Anders motions, and DISMISS Nelson’s and Briesemeister’s appeals.