Opinion ID: 1333537
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The extent of due process protection

Text: Again in North, supra, we summarized some broad principles relating to the scope of due process procedures that would be made available in given cases: First, the more valuable the right sought to be deprived, the more safeguards will be interposed. Second, due process must generally be given before the deprivation occurs unless a compelling public policy dictates otherwise. Third, a temporary deprivation of rights may not require as large a measure of procedural due process protection as a permanent deprivation. Further refinement of these principles was not necessary to the resolution of North because of the serious deprivation that had occurred. Here, we have a temporary deprivation and a more selective test is appropriate. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, (1976), the United States Supreme Court has enunciated some of the factors which should be considered in determining the process which is appropriate to protect a property interest. The Court held that such a determination: . . . generally requires consideration of three distinct factors; first, the private interests that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [a property] interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Id. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903, 47 L.Ed.2d at 33. We consider these factors to be germane to a selection of an appropriate procedure under our Due Process Clause. Applying the first factor, we find that the appellant suffered tangible economic loss when suspended without pay. Moreover, under the statutory scheme appellant could be deprived of one-twelfth of her annual income before any statutory relief is possible. Utilizing the second factor which relates to the risk of an erroneous deprivation, there are presently no statutory procedures designed to protect against an erroneous suspension of under thirty days. Consequently, any procedural safeguards will diminish this risk of error. Finally, and of no small consideration, is the State's interest, including the additional burden that would be added by imposing some due process procedures. Like any State agency, the hospital has a strong interest in being able to deal quickly and inexpensively with routine personnel matters in order to promote efficiency and economy in administration. Moreover, because appellant is a registered nurse, the hospital's interest is more particularized than in the ordinary case. As a State mental hospital, the employer has special interests in ensuring that enough staff nurses be available for patient care. The hospital's interest is unusual in another respect. A hospital staff is highly interdependent, both in the sense that a physician needs the skills and presence of a nurse and in the sense that the collegial nature of the staff requires the presence of the nurse for effective performance. Obviously if a nurse is absent without authorization, the hospital is required to find a replacement to perform those tasks. There can be no doubt that the State's interest is not inconsequential and it should not be required to afford extensive procedural protection on short suspensions. In Goss, supra, the Supreme Court held that due process requires, in connection with a suspension of ten days or less, that a student be given written or oral notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his version. Moreover, the Court stated that generally notice and hearing should precede the student's removal from school, since the hearing may almost immediately follow the misconduct. If prior notice and hearing are not feasible, as where the student's presence endangers persons or property or threatens disruption of the academic process, thus justifying immediate removal from school, the necessary notice and hearing should follow as soon as practicable. We expressly sanctioned this approach in North. 233 S.E.2d at 417. We are of the opinion that due process requires that similar procedures must be afforded a State classified civil service employee who is suspended for thirty days or less on charges amounting to misconduct or delinquency. Appellant's property interest is important enough that she should have not only notice of the charges against her, but also an opportunity to present her side of the story to the decision-maker. Allowing appellant to give her side of the story will ensure that all relevant facts are before the decision-maker before the decision to suspend is made. Moreover, the employee should be accorded the right to reply in writing if she so desires. [7] There is no substantial burden that will be placed upon the State agency by requiring such procedure. In fact, a similar statutory procedure exists for those who are given a discharge or reduction in rank, under W.Va.Code, 29-6-8(11) (1961). Before such action can be taken, they must be presented . . . with the reasons for such discharge or reduction stated in writing, and [have] been allowed a reasonable time to reply thereto in writing, or upon request to appear personally and reply to the head of the department or his deputy. The statement of reasons and the reply shall be filed as a public record with the director. [8] In fashioning any procedural remedies arising out of our due process standards, we have utilized the doctrine of least obtrusive remedy to . . . avoid striking down legislation whenever `. . . there is an adequate remedy to prevent such legislation from being unconstitutionally applied.' Point 4, Syllabus, State ex rel. Alsop v. McCartney, W.Va., 228 S.E.2d 278 (1976). State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, W.Va., 233 S.E.2d 318, 323 (1977). Therefore, under the doctrine of least obtrusive remedy, we decline to declare W.Va.Code, 29-6-13, unconstitutional, since we conclude that the appellant is not entitled to an appeal to the Civil Service Commission from a suspension of less than thirty days. Her due process rights are as described above, and since she has been restored to her position, there is no further relief which can be accorded.