Opinion ID: 712148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The October, 1992 and March, 1993 Injunctions and Mootness.

Text: 66 The Sheriff argues that Shabazz's claims for injunctive relief pertaining to publication and content of the Jail's library access policy are moot. We review de novo questions of mootness. Aiona v. Judiciary of State of Hawaii, 17 F.3d 1244, 1246 (9th Cir.1994). 67 The district court's jurisdiction depends of course upon the existence of a live case or controversy. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). The court has no authority to decide  'questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before [it].'  DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 1705, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974) (citing North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S.Ct. 402, 404, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971)). This case deals with just such a question. Shabazz brought the root action in an individual capacity, and not as the representative of a class of inmates. When he was removed from the Jail, then, any question of the library policy's constitutionality ceased to affect Shabazz's rights, which were the only rights at issue in the action. The issue of the injunction thus ordinarily would be moot. 68 Shabazz argues, however, that the circumstances of his case are capable of repetition yet evading review, and therefore merit exception from the usual mootness rule. The exception applies when: 1) duration of the challenged conduct is too brief ever to be fully litigated prior to its cessation; and 2) a reasonable expectation is shown that plaintiff will again be subject to the challenged activity. GTE California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir.1994). 69 When it issued its Orders, the court noted that the duration of an inmate's stay in the Jail is short, typically only 38 days. Any challenge an inmate might make to the Jail's library access policy would move too slowly through the legal system to reach conclusion in that period. From these facts the court concluded that Shabazz had satisfied the evading review prong of the exception's test. Dupnik does not dispute this conclusion. 70 The court also recognized that although Shabazz had been moved to the state prison before it issued either of its last two injunctions, Shabazz was pursuing post-conviction relief, which if granted would necessitate his return to the Jail during pendency of such proceedings and a possible new trial. After considering this information, the court found that there was in fact a reasonable expectation that Shabazz would again be subject to the challenged library access policy. The court held that the capable of repetition prong of the test was also satisfied, and concluded that the issue was not moot. 71 At the time the district court ordered the injunctions, Shabazz's circumstances arguably satisfied the exception's second prong. Those circumstances have changed. The Arizona Court of Appeals has since denied Shabazz's petitions for post-conviction relief. Shabazz's only reason for returning to the Jail no longer exists, and it is clear that he now has no expectation that he will be again subject to the Jail's policies. Because we determine questions of mootness in light of the present circumstances where injunctions are involved, Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 148, 96 S.Ct. 347, 348, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975), we conclude that the issue is moot and vacate each of the district court's injunctive orders.