Opinion ID: 1834622
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the limitation impinges upon the indigent defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel

Text: Each state has a constitutional obligation to provide indigent defendants in all felony cases with assistance of counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). [21] This right has been interpreted to mean the right to effective assistance of counsel for the state has a compelling interest to ensure that the defendant at the trial [is] given a realistic and meaningful opportunity to assert and enjoy all rights secured to him by the Constitution and laws. Read v. State, 430 So.2d 832, 837, 841 (Miss. 1983). Cf. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988) (Both stages of the prosecution, [trial and appeal], although perhaps involving unique legal skills, require careful advocacy to ensure that rights are not forgone and that substantial legal and factual arguments are not inadvertently passed over.); see also, Waldrop v. State, 506 So.2d 273, 275 (Miss. 1987); accord Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). [22] The state's interest is even more compelling in capital cases. See, supra, 1344-1346. According to Pruett, [t]he failure to provide adequate funding for court-appointed counsel tends inevitably to curtail this most fundamental right. (Brief of Appellant at 22). Although the issue in this case remains the same  the right to effective assistance of counsel  the analysis of the constitutional claim in the case sub judice differs considerably from the usual post-conviction ineffectiveness challenge. When an appellate court reviews counsel's performance in a post-conviction proceeding, the strong judicial interest in finality precludes the court from acting the Monday morning quarterback. Under the Strickland standard, [j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Accord. Evans v. State, 485 So.2d 276, 281 (Miss. 1986). Moreover, requiring intensive scrutiny of counsel during post trial performance would adversely affect his performance and even his willingness to serve. Stated another way, rigid requirements for acceptable assistance [made after trial] could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between the attorney and client. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. Simply put, when retrospectively reviewing counsel's performance, the court's purpose is not to improve the quality of legal representation although that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 (emphasis added). But, it is crucial that the defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Id. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. On the other hand, when this Court acts in its role of supervising the judiciary, very different concerns control the evaluation under the Sixth Amendment and Section 26. Cf. BRIEF OF APPELLEE in Wilson v. State , at 48-9 (State's most demanding and far reaching responsibility in criminal law is to protect the innocent, to prosecute and punish the guilty, and in all cases to see that justice is done in accord with constitutional imperative). Now, there is no issue of finality  except insofar as better legal representation would better assure finality in capital cases. Cf. State v. Tokman, 564 So.2d 1339 (Miss. 1990) (counsel found ineffective); Leatherwood v. State, 539 So.2d 1378 (Miss. 1989) (same); Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir.1986). Furthermore, the financial disincentives in the current system for appointing counsel act to discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, dampen the ardor of counsel, and reduce the quality of legal representation. Cf. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir.1988) ([S]ixth [A]mendment protects rights that do not affect the outcome of a trial. Thus, deficiencies that do not meet the [Strickland] `ineffectiveness' standard may nonetheless violate a defendant's rights under the [S]ixth [A]mendment). For this reason, in order to show a constitutional violation in the system as applied, it is not necessary that it be shown that all defendants who are represented by inadequately funded attorneys, were provided with assistance below the minimum standards set forth in Strickland. [23] This Court finds that the statutory scheme adversely affects the right to counsel without finding that counsel's performance in this case fell below the minimum standards. It is important to note as one court held: even though the record in this particular case does not indicate that the defendant was inadequately represented[, t]he fact that one felony defendant out of 149 felony defendants was given minimum adequate representation does not mean that others were properly represented. State v. Smith, 140 Ariz. 355, 681 P.2d 1374, 1381 (1984). Because these are capital cases, this Court ensures that all defendants in capital cases are effectively represented. [24] The evidence provided in this case suggests that the current statutory scheme encourages the appointment of less qualified lawyers to capital cases. As Judge William F. Coleman notes in his affidavit: An inexperienced attorney cannot adequate [sic] represent a defendant in a capital murder case. There are a limited number of lawyers with sufficient legal experience and criminal practice experience to adequately represent defendants in capital murder cases. In the Seventh Judicial District, this pool of attorneys had been exhausted for appointments to defendant capital murder cases.       Criminal defense lawyers are solo practitioners or from small law firms. Because of the economic consequences to these lawyers caused by the $1,000.00 statutory limitation, I cannot repeatedly appoint these lawyers to defend capital murder cases. Because of the statutory fee limitation, therefore, there is a crisis in obtaining the appointment of adequate and competent counsel to represent indigent defendants in capital murder cases in this Circuit Court district. Affidavit of William F. Coleman (Wilson Record at 55-6) (emphasis added). [25] The financial trauma which results from taking a capital case is effectively eliminating most experienced attorneys from ever taking another case. [26] Undoubtedly the statutory limitation on fees has created this predicament that Judge Coleman and other circuit judges face. We cannot deny that [i]n our pecuniary culture the caliber of personal services rendered usually has a corresponding relationship to the compensation provided. Makemson, 491 So.2d at 1114-115 (quoting MacKenzie v. Hillsborough County, 288 So.2d 200, 202 (Fla. 1973) (dissenting, opinion)). The one thousand dollar limitation acts as an obvious disincentive to the lawyers involved. For every additional hour's work, the hourly fee decreases, until it finally slips below the minimum wage. Cf. Jewell, 383 S.E.2d at 544 ([I]t is unrealistic to expect all appointed counsel with office bills to pay and families to support to remain insulated from the economic reality of losing money each hour they work.); Cunningham, 177 Cal. App.3d at 355, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 866 (The more conscientiously the attorney fights for the indigent's cause, the greater chance of the attorney's financial loss.); see also, Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d at 835 (A lawyer has a right to make a living). While conscientious lawyers might take one capital case every few years, as a quasi- pro bono commitment, financial pressures militate against lawyers regularly taking cases, thereby building specialized knowledge in this most complex legal field. A defendant's right to effective representation and the attorneys right to fair compensation is inextricably interlinked. Makemson, 491 So.2d at 1112. This point has been emphasized on numerous occasions. See, e.g. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 199, 100 S.Ct. 402, 406-07, 62 L.Ed.2d 355 (1979) (Congress established reasonable compensation for lawyers in the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 [i]n response to evidence that unpaid appointed counsel were sometimes less diligent or less thorough than retained counsel ...) (footnote omitted); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 708, 104 S.Ct. at 2075 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (It is an unfortunate but undeniable fact that a person of means ... usually can obtain better representation than that available to an indigent defendant ...); see also, White v. Commissioners of Pinellas County, 537 So.2d 1376, 1380 ([R]elationship between an attorney's compensation and the quality of his or her representation cannot be ignored); Cunningham, 177 Cal. App.3d at 355, 222 Cal. Rptr. 866 (it may be unrealistic to expect the satisfaction which arises from performing a charitable act [ie., free services to the indigent] to constitute the sole motivation to expend maximum effort.); Jewell, 383 S.E.2d at 540 ([L]ow hourly fee may prompt an appointed lawyer to advise a client to plead guilty, although the same lawyer would advise a paying client in a similar case to demand a trial.); Cf. McLaughlin v. Royster, 346 F. Supp. 297, 300 (E.D.Va. 1972) (Attorney admitted that had he been employed and paid to represent [defendant] he would have proceeded in the case differently ... [and] interviewed more people); In the Matter of Dale, 37 N.C. App. 680, 681, 247 S.E.2d 246, 248 (1978) (Attorney failed to file an appeal for indigent client sentenced to death because I didn't have a savings account or any funds in the bank that I could live on. It was just a matter of me having to live and placing my priority on living instead of doing what I should have been doing...); In the Matter of Hunoval, 294 N.C. 740, 741, 247 S.E.2d 230, 231 (1977) (Attorney who represented indigent defendant at trial in a capital case later won a stay of execution, but he never filed a petition for certiorari and supporting brief to the United States Supreme Court because he was dissatisfied with the fee allowed in prosecuting the appeal, and [he] [could] not justify working for nothing or at a rate less than that received by a garage mechanic.). [27] Even if we were to deny relief on the other propositions presented thus far, this point  that the statutory cap curbs criminal defendants' right to effective assistance of counsel can not be refuted. As Makemson pointed out: ... [W]e find that the statutory maximum fees, as inflexibly imposed in cases involving unusual or extraordinary circumstances, [28] interfere with the defendant's [S]ixth [A]mendment right `to counsel for his defence.' The statute, as applied to many of today's cases, provides for only token compensation. The availability of effective counsel is therefore called into question in those cases when it is needed most. 491 So.2d at 1112 (emphasis added). Consequently, Mississippi's inflexible statutory limitation frustrates indigent defendants' rights to effective assistance of Counsel. This is particularly so in capital trials, which consist of two separate trails. Moreover, the fee has the affect of encouraging counsel to perform deficiently. Because our system has created these deficiencies, we must act or we would fail in upholding our Constitutional mandate.