Opinion ID: 2281590
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction of cellular antenna tower siting and construction

Text: The PSC and Bluegrass Wireless argue that the Court of Appeals and the Franklin Circuit Court erroneously concluded that jurisdiction over the application for the siting and construction of the proposed cellular tower in this case rested with the PSC. The main statutes in play in this case are KRS 100.987, KRS 278.650, and KRS 278.665. The pertinent provisions in KRS 100.987, originally enacted in 1998, state as follows: (1) A planning unit as defined in KRS 100.111 and legislative body or fiscal court that has adopted planning and zoning regulations may plan for and regulate the siting of cellular antenna towers in accordance with locally adopted planning or zoning regulations in this chapter. (2) Every utility or a company that is engaged in the business of providing the required infrastructure to a utility that proposes to construct an antenna tower for cellular telecommunications services or personal communications services within the jurisdiction of a planning unit that has adopted planning and zoning regulations in accordance with this chapter shall: (a) Submit a copy of the applicant's completed uniform application to the planning commission of the affected planning unit to construct an antenna tower for cellular or personal telecommunications services. The uniform application shall include a grid map that shows the location of all existing cellular antenna towers and that indicates the general position of proposed construction sites for new cellular antenna towers within an area that includes: 1. All of the planning unit's jurisdiction; and 2. A one-half (1/2) mile area outside of the boundaries of the planning unit's jurisdiction, if that area contains either existing or proposed construction sites for cellular antenna towers; (b) Include in any contract with an owner of property upon which a cellular antenna tower is to be constructed, a provision that specifies, in the case of abandonment, a method that the utility will follow in dismantling and removing a cellular antenna tower, including a timetable for removal; and (c) Comply with any local ordinances concerning land use, subject to the limitations imposed by 47 U.S.C. sec. 332(c), KRS 278.030, 278.040, and 278.280. (emphasis added). KRS 278.650, originally enacted in 1996, provides: If an applicant proposes construction of an antenna tower for cellular telecommunications services or personal communications services which is to be located in an area outside the jurisdiction of a planning commission, the applicant shall apply to the Public Service Commission for a certificate of public convenience and necessity pursuant to KRS 278.020(1), 278.665, and this section. The commission shall convene a local public hearing on the application upon the receipt of a request from the local governing body or from not less than three (3) interested persons that reside in a county or municipal corporation in which the tower is proposed to be constructed. In reviewing the application, the commission may take into account the character of the general area concerned and the likely effects of the installation on nearby land uses and values. A local government may charge a fee for a building permit, in connection with the construction or alteration of any structure for cellular telecommunications services or personal communication services, if the fee does not exceed that charged for any other commercial structure of comparable cost of construction. (emphasis added). KRS 278.665(1), enacted in 1998, provides, The commission shall, by administrative regulation promulgated in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A, establish the minimum content of an application for a certificate of convenience and necessity to construct cellular antenna towers for areas outside the jurisdiction of a planning commission. (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals determined from the permissive languagemayin KRS 100.987(1) that the local planning commission had discretionary authority to regulate cellular tower construction within its political boundaries, and that this authority is triggered by the local adoption of regulations specific to the construction of cellular towers. Because the London/Laurel Joint Planning Commission had not adopted regulations regarding construction of cellular towers, the Court of Appeals concluded that the planning commission had declined to exercise jurisdiction over the application by Bluegrass Wireless and, therefore, the PSC was required to fill the jurisdictional vacuum pursuant to KRS 278.650. This Court, however, is not persuaded of such an interpretation by the word may in KRS 100.987(1). Rather, we read the word shall in section (2) of KRS 100.987, in requiring every applicant to submit a copy of the application to the planning commission of the affected planning unit[,] as demonstrating the Legislature's intent that jurisdiction over cellular tower siting and construction would always be in the local planning commission if the area in question has such a commission. See Kentucky Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Jeffers ex rel. Jeffers, 13 S.W.3d 606 (Ky.2000) (cardinal rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature). This interpretation is more consistent with KRS 278.650, in that it gives the phrase in an area outside the jurisdiction of a planning commission its plain meaning of outside the geographical jurisdiction of the local planning commission. See Devasier v. James, 278 S.W.3d 625 (Ky.2009) (plain, commonly accepted meaning of language in statute controls). The mandatory shall language in KRS 100.987(4), regarding the planning commission's duty to review and approve or disapprove each application, further evinces an intent to vest jurisdiction of cellular tower applications in the local planning commission. This construction can also be harmonized with the permissive language in KRS 100.987(1) providing that the local government planning unit may plan for and regulate the siting of cellular antenna towers in accordance with locally adopted planning or zoning regulations in this chapter. See Combs v. Hubb Coal Corp., 934 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Ky.1996) (Courts must try to harmonize and give effect to all sections of a statute.). Under the statutory scheme of KRS Chapter 100, the planning unit's compliance with the comprehensive plan provisions is mandatory, see KRS 100.183-100.197, whereas the regulation of property through zoning ordinances is permissive. See KRS 100.203(1) (Cities and counties may enact zoning regulations.... The city or county may regulate ....) (emphasis added); see also Grannis v. Schroder, 978 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Ky.App. 1997). Hence, a local planning unit is not required to enact any zoning regulations for its area, let alone regulations that specifically pertain to cellular antenna towers. Pursuant to KRS 100.203, the planning unit may choose to regulate one type of activity or structure, but not another. Thus, our reading of the word may in KRS 100.987(1) is that a planning unit has the discretion to enact regulations pertaining to cellular antenna towers, as they do with any other activities or structures, but this exercise of discretion is not a condition of jurisdiction. If the area of the proposed cellular tower has a planning unit that has adopted planning and zoning regulations, the jurisdiction over matters relating to cellular tower placement and construction rests with that planning commission, not the PSC, regardless of whether the planning unit has enacted regulations specifically relating to cellular towers. If there are no regulations specifically pertaining to cellular towers, as in the present case, the applicant will, however, still need to meet the general restrictions of the particular zone in which the proposed cell tower is to be constructed, e.g. permitted uses within the zone, height and setback requirements, etc. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. Any further proceedings, if any, on Bluegrass Cellular's application must occur before the London/Laurel County Joint Planning Commission. All sitting. MINTON, C.J.; ABRAMSON, CUNNINGHAM, NOBLE, and VENTERS, JJ., concur. SCOTT, J., dissents by separate opinion. SCOTT, J., Dissenting. Because I believe the majority misconstrues KRS 100.987, I cannot join its opinion. Quite frankly, I cannot conceive that the General Assembly ever intended that cellular antenna towerswith all their transmission capabilitieswould not be regulated in any way if a county fiscal court or planning commission defaulted. Therefore, I respectfully dissent as to the determination that the PSC does not have jurisdiction in this case. KRS 100.987 provides in pertinent part: (1) A planning unit as defined in KRS 100.111 and legislative body or fiscal court that has adopted planning and zoning regulations may plan for and regulate the siting of cellular antenna towers in accordance with locally adopted planning or zoning regulations in this chapter. (2) Every utility or a company that is engaged in the business of providing the required infrastructure to a utility that proposes to construct an antenna tower for cellular telecommunications services or personal communications services within the jurisdiction of a planning unit that has adopted planning and zoning regulations in accordance with this chapter shall: (a) Submit a copy of the applicant's completed uniform application to the planning commission of the affected planning unit to construct an antenna tower for cellular or personal telecommunications services. The majority makes much of the words shall and every in sub-section (2) of KRS 100.987, gleaning that the legislature intended local planning commissions to always maintain jurisdiction over cellular tower placement if the area in question has such a commission. I do not believe that shall and every as used in subsection (2) evinces such an intention, particularly given the question at hand whether the PSC has jurisdiction in this case. To answer this question, I, like the Court of Appeals, concentrate on the description of the entity that may regulate cellular tower placement, i.e., [a] planning unit as defined in KRS 100.111 and legislative body or fiscal court that has adopted planning and zoning regulations .... in KRS 100.987(1) and a planning unit that has adopted planning and zoning regulations .... in KRS 100.987(2). A plain reading of these two provisions defies the majority's conclusion that a planning unit has the discretion to enact regulations pertaining to cellular antenna towers, as they do with any other activities or structures, but this exercise of discretion is not a condition of jurisdiction. While it is true enough that no jurisdiction must enact planning and zoning regulations, the fact remains that pursuant to the plain reading of KRS 100.987(1) and (2), they are required to do so before asserting authority over the placement of cellular towers. Otherwise, KRS 100.987(1) would simply read, A planning unit as defined in KRS 100.111 and legislative body or fiscal court that has adopted planning and zoning regulations may plan for and regulate the siting [sic] of cellular antenna towers in accordance with locally adopted planning or zoning regulations in this chapter. I decline to so edit the statute and render superfluous the phrase  that has adopted planning and zoning regulations.  Instead, I would give full effect and meaning to the Legislature's drafting of this provision. My belief that the majority misconstrues KRS 100.987 is bolstered by the question begged by the majority's opinion: when does the PSC have jurisdiction over the placement of cellular towers? Applying the rule announced by the Court today, and given the fact that every single jurisdiction in this Commonwealth has a fiscal court or a planning unit as defined in KRS 100.111, [1] the answer is never. This, I believe, is the result of the majority's conclusion that the Legislature intended the placement and regulation of cellular antenna placement to always be in the local planning commission if the area in question has such a commission. To the contrary, it seems to me that the legislative intention to be gleaned from KRS 100.987 was to provide jurisdiction to planning units which have opted to zone and plan their jurisdictions, but only if demonstrated by the local unit's adoption of planning and zoning regulations and not by the simple existence of the planning body. Where the local units decline to regulate, the Legislature intended the PSC to be the authority to fill the regulatory vacuum. Otherwise, and given the majority's sweeping statements in this case, the PSC would never have jurisdiction and the possibility exists that the placement of cellular towers could go entirely unregulated. My concern that the majority's opinion could permit cellular towers to go unregulated derives from the fact that there may be counties and planning units which have not designated zoning regulations of any kind. Thus, where a cellular tower is to be placed in a jurisdiction with some type of planning body, but that jurisdiction is lacking in regulations, a court would look to this opinion and determine that jurisdiction over cellular tower placement always resides in the local planning commission. This would be so merely because the area in question has such a commission regardless of whether the commission has planned or zoned in any way. Thus, the placement of the tower in such a jurisdiction would go unregulated. I therefore, cannot agree with the majority on this issue. In any event, while I think the majority reads out a key portion of KRS 100.987, I stop short of adopting the Court of Appeals' position on this issue for one simple reasonI believe it goes one step too far. The Court of Appeals held that in order for the local planning unit to maintain jurisdiction it must have first adopted local planning and zoning regulations dealing specifically with the construction of cellular towers. (emphasis added) Nothing in KRS 100.987 supports the conclusion that a local planning unit must have specifically regulated cellular tower placement or construction, but rather the only requirement necessary is that [it] has adopted planning and zoning regulations. Thus, I believe that a local planning unit invokes its authority by creating any regulations that could be read to apply to the placement of cell towers, and need not be specifically so. Therefore, in cases such as the one at bar, I would ask a simple question: has the local jurisdiction adopted a planning and zoning regulation that would regulate the placement of cellular towers in any way? Where the question is answered in the affirmative, then the local planning unit should be considered as having invoked its permissive authority to regulate the cell towers. Where the question is answered in the negative, the PSC is vested with the regulatory function. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority's opinion in this case.