Opinion ID: 2816269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fowler v. United States

Text: Tarantino next argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Fowler v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2045 (2011), requires that we vacate his conviction for the obstruction-of-justice murder of his accomplice, Louis Dorval. We disagree. In Fowler, the Supreme Court held that “where a defendant killed a person with an intent to prevent that person from communicating with law enforcement officers in general but where the defendant did not have federal law enforcement officers (or any specific individuals) particularly in mind . . . . the Government must show that there was a reasonable likelihood that a relevant communication would have been made to a federal officer.” Id. at 2048. Here, however, the evidence showed that Tarantino murdered Dorval to prevent him from communicating specifically with federal law enforcement officers, not “law enforcement officers in general.” Id. Among other things, just days before his murder, a federal grand jury had indicted Dorval, federal agents had secured a warrant for his arrest, local newspapers had reported widely on the federal investigation, and Dorval had subsequently met with Tarantino. Fowler is therefore inapposite and, even if it applied, there was a “reasonable likelihood” that, had Dorval communicated with law enforcement officers, at least one relevant communication would have been made to a federal law enforcement officer. Id. at 2052. 2 Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Tarantino’s conviction for Dorval’s murder, there was no error in the relevant jury instructions, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tarantino’s motion for a new trial.