Opinion ID: 147841
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pseudoephedrine Logs and the Confrontation Clause

Text: Mashek argues that admission of the pseudoephedrine logs violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment in light of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009). As recounted above, Mashek filed a motion in limine to suppress the pseudoephedrine logs, citing Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 801. In denying the motion, the district court explained: I'm going to overrule No. 2 in the defendant's motion in limine with the exception that I think that the defendant may have a reasonable basis to require that you have a witness that he can cross-examine so that he can test the quality of this so that we can see if, in fact, he has an ultimate hearsay objection; but with regard to its admissibility under 401 and 403, I find that it's part and parcel of the transaction, and therefore, I'm going to allow the evidence if we have the proper foundation. During the trial the court inquired having overruled the objection on those [401 and 403] grounds there is no objection to foundation, is that right . . . ? Mashek responded, [t]hat's correct. Mashek did not raise a Confrontation Clause challenge to the pharmacy logs at trial; therefore, our review is limited to plain error. Puckett v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___ _ ___, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1428-29, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). Plain error review requires Mashek to show that (1) there was an error that was not affirmatively waived, (2) the error was plain, meaning clear and obvious, (3) the error affects his substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-36, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Marcus, 2010 WL 2025203, at  (May 24, 2010). The government contends that Mashek affirmatively waived his right to confront and cross-examine a witness about the pseudoephedrine logs. Mashek responds that although he waived the right to a live witness for the specific purpose of attacking the foundational elements of the hearsay exception, he did not waive his rights under the Confrontation Clause. In Melendez-Diaz, the Court held that admission of laboratory reports via a certificate of analysis, rather than through the live testimony of the laboratory analyst violated the Confrontation Clause. 129 S.Ct. at 2542. The Court explained that the laboratory reports were testimonial because they were prepared for the purpose of providing evidence against the accused at trial. Id. at 2532. Assuming that Mashek did not waive his right to confrontation, Melendez-Diaz does not provide him any relief. The pseudoephedrine logs were kept in the ordinary course of business pursuant to Iowa law and are business records under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6). Business records under Rule 803(6) are non-testimonial statements, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), to which the Confrontation Clause does not apply. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 167 L.Ed.2d 1 (2007); see Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2539-40 (explaining that business records are typically not testimonial). Thus, the admission of the pseudoephedrine logs did not violate Mashek's constitutional confrontation rights. See United States v. Foreman, 588 F.3d 1159, 1162 n. 5 (8th Cir.2009).