Opinion ID: 770943
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Special Circumstance Issues

Text: 59 Sassounian contends that the jury's consideration of facts not in evidence invalidated the special circumstance finding. Juror misconduct is a mixed question of law and fact, reviewed de novo. See Rodriguez v. Marshall, 125 F.3d 739, 744 (9th Cir. 1997). 60 A juror's communication of extrinsic facts implicates the Confrontation Clause. See Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1490 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). The juror in effect becomes an unsworn witness, not subject to confrontation or cross examination. See id. The government concedes, and the California Court of Appeal found, that the reference to [the] phone call introduced into the deliberations a matter which was not admitted into evidence and as such constituted jury misconduct. People v. Sassounian, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 900. Thus, the only issue before us is whether the error was harmless; that is, whether the extrinsic information had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); cf. Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating we now join the vast majority of our sister circuits by deciding that the Brecht standard should apply uniformly in all federal habeas corpus cases under 2254). 61 Before turning to the merits, we must determine what evidence may be considered in evaluating the jury's consideration of the improper evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides that: 62 [A] juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention.... 63 A long line of precedent distinguishes between juror testimony about the consideration of extrinsic evidence, which may be considered by a reviewing court, and juror testimony about the subjective effect of evidence on the particular juror, which may not. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 125 F.3d at 744; Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1988) (the question of prejudice is an objective, rather than a subjective, one); United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 884-85 (9th Cir. 1981) (Jurors may testify regarding extraneous prejudicial information or improper outside influences. They may not be questioned about the deliberative process or subjective effects of extraneous information, nor can such information be considered by the trial or appellate courts.); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 121 n.5 (1983); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892). As Justice Johnson noted, having to ignore the most direct evidence of prejudice -- Rankins' testimony that she relied on the extrinsic information -- lends an Alice in Wonderland quality to the discussion of whether [Sassounian] was actually prejudiced by the admitted jury misconduct. People v. Sassounian, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 914. Nevertheless, the weight of authority and sound policy reasons support this view. See, e.g., McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915) (noting that finality of verdicts supports the rule). Therefore, although we may consider testimony concerning whether the improper evidence was considered, we may not consider the jurors' testimony about the subjective impact of the improperly admitted evidence. Even with this limitation, however, analysis of the relevant factors compels the conclusion that the fact that four jurors recalled discussing the phone call, when and how it occurred, the nature of the extrinsic evidence it introduced into the deliberations and the weakness of the trial evidence bearing on the special circumstance, had a substantial and injurious effect or influence  on the special circumstance finding. 64 There is no bright line test for determining whether a defendant has suffered prejudice from an instance of juror misconduct. Rodriguez, 125 F.3d at 744 (9th Cir. 1997). However, we place great weight on the nature of the extraneous information that has been introduced into deliberations. Id. (citing Jeffries, 114 F.3d at 1490). We have identified the following factors as relevant to the inquiry: 65 (1) whether the material was actually received, and if so, how; (2) the length of time it was available to the jury; (3) the extent to which the juror discussed and considered it; (4) whether the material was introduced before a verdict was reached, and if so at what point in the deliberations; and (5) any other matters which may bear on the issue of the reasonable possibility of whether the extrinsic material affected the verdict. 66 Dickson, 849 F.2d at 406 (quoting Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 506 (9th Cir. 1987)). We have also pointed to other factors that might nonetheless suggest that the potential prejudice of the extrinsic information was diminished in a particular case. Jeffries, 114 F.3d at 1491. These include: 67 whether the prejudicial statement was ambiguously phrased; [2] whether the extraneous information was otherwise admissible or merely cumulative of other evidence adduced at trial; [3] whether a curative instruction was given or some other step taken to ameliorate the prejudice; [4] the trial context; and [5] whether the statement was insufficiently prejudicial given the issues and evidence in the case. 68 Id. at 1491-92 (footnotes omitted). 69 Here, there is no doubt the jury received the improper evidence. Four jurors testified that the phone call taking credit for the killing came up during deliberations. Although other jurists in the long course of these proceedings have been quick to note that Juror Castillo testified that the phone call was mentioned but not considered, a close reading of that testimony reveals that Juror Castillo was not referring to the same phone call, i.e., the call to the Turkish embassy claiming credit for the Arikan assassination. Rather, Juror Castillo was referring to another telephone call related to a map drawn by informant Busch, which contained references to actions taken against Turkish government properties. During the map discussions, the jurors spoke of the incidents that were written down there, that somebody had called up and claimed responsibility for those. 70 Moreover, at least two jurors, Rankins and Kennelly, testified that they thought the call had been received into evidence. Although only two, or possibly three, jurors remembered hearing about the improper information, [t]he number of jurors affected by the misconduct does not weigh heavily in the prejudice calculus for even a single juror's improperly influenced vote deprives the defendant of an unprejudiced, unanimous verdict. Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 613 (9th Cir. 1995); see Dickson, 849 F.2d at 408 (If only one juror was unduly biased or improperly influenced, Dickson was deprived of his sixth amendment right to an impartial panel.); Dyer v. Calderon, 151f.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998) (The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants a verdict by impartial, indifferent jurors. The bias or prejudice or even a single juror would violate Dyer's right to a fair trial.); United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2000); Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 523-24 (9th Cir. 1990) (Even if only one juror is unduly biased or prejudiced, the defendant is denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury.) (internal quotations omitted); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969) (recognizing that we must reverse if we can imagine a single juror whose mind might have been made up because of Cooper's and Bosby's[inadmissible ] confessions and who otherwise would have remained in doubt and unconvinced); United States v. Delaney, 732 F.2d 639, 643 (8th Cir. 1984) (If a single juror is improperly influenced, the verdict is as unfair as if all were.). 71 The timing of the jury's discussion of the improper evidence was critical. After fifteen days of deliberations, at 1:55 p.m. on January 4, the jury asked what it should do if it could agree on a verdict but could not agree on any of the special circumstances. The jury was sent back to the jury room at 2:40. It was during the next hour, before the verdict was returned at 3:50 p.m., that the jury discussed the phone call as the reason the Turkish Consul was killed. Without even considering Juror Rankins' statement that the phone call is what caused her to stop holding out on the special circumstance finding, the timing of this pivotal information alone compels the conclusion that it was not harmless. Lengthy deliberations preceding the misconduct and a relatively quick verdict following the misconduct strongly suggest prejudice. See Moreno, 812 F.2d at 505 (granting petition when jury returned verdict shortly after juror, who had held out for thirty days, considered improper evidence). But even more compelling is the fact that the evidence was discussed in response to Juror Rankins' question based on the jury instruction about the most reasonable reason for the killing. The improper phone call evidence thus supplied the reasonable reason Juror Rankins needed to convict. 72 The very nature of the improper evidence also suggests that it prejudiced Sassounian. The government argues that unlike in other cases granting relief, the extrinsic information did not directly implicate the defendant. See Jeffries, 114 F.3d 1484 (petition granted where jury learned about defendant's prior criminal record); Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 1995) (petition granted where jury improperly told that defendant was violent); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th Cir. 1993) (petition granted where jury learned that defendant had committed prior armed robbery); Dickson, 849 F.2d 403 (petition granted where jury told that defendant had committed a similar crime); Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1987) (petition granted where juror did experiment testing whether she could fire a gun in a particular position). A review of the government's cases, however, reveals that the improperly considered evidence here was even more damaging. Unlike the evidence of prior bad acts found prejudicial in those cases, the evidence of the phone call supplied an element of the very issue being deliberated. 73 The phone call directly related to Sassounian's motive, which was at issue in the special circumstance for which he was convicted. Cf. Rodriguez, 125 F.3d at 144 (stating that reversible juror misconduct usually relates directly to a material aspect of the case (emphasis added) (citing Bagnariol, 665 F.2d at 885)). Three jurors testified to the same phone call -- this phone call could only have been the one discussed during the lengthy and contentious side bar described in footnote 3. In her proffer, the state prosecutor represented that the UPI reporter received a phone call which named the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide as the organization taking credit for the crime. Thus, the call specifically pointed to a nationality-based motive. This reference was all the more significant because it corroborated Busch's testimony that Sassounian committed the crime for the Justice Commandos, the same group mentioned in the call. Thus, the phone call not only powerfully suggested that the killers acted based on the nationality of the victim, but also rehabilitated Busch's thoroughly impeached testimony about Sassounian's confession to a political killing. 74 It cannot be said that the other evidence amassed at trial was so overwhelming that the jury would have reached the same result even if it had not considered the extraneous material. Although the jury did hear other evidence related to the special circumstance, all of it was either circumstantial or challenged at trial. The prosecution presented Sassounian's brother's statement that he and his brother had bad feelings for Turkey, Busch's testimony about Sassounian's membership in an Armenian terrorist organization, and evidence that Arikan traveled in an official limousine with diplomatic license plates. However, on the stand, the brother denied making the statement about his feelings about Turkey. In addition, vague expressions of ill will are not nearly as probative as a definite statement taking responsibility for the killing on behalf of an anti-Turkish terrorist organization. Because the defense vigorously cross-examined Busch and introduced evidence that he was a notorious liar, Busch's credibility was suspect. As Justice Johnson explained, Busch's testimonial thread was tattered. People v. Sassounian, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 917 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Finally, Arikan's official status, revealed by license plates reading only Consul Corps, does not specifically implicate Sassounian. By contrast, the phone call not only demonstrates that the killers targeted Arikan because of his nationality, but also directly connects Sassounian to the crime and the special circumstance motivation by corroborating Busch's testimony that Sassounian killed Arikan while working for the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide. Because the phone call provided significant probative evidence of a nationalitybased motive of Sassounian, it reasonably could have had a profound effect on the jury. 75 Finally, the judge never had an opportunity to diminish the prejudicial effect of the extraneous information. Because he did not know that the jury found out about the phone call until after the verdict, the jury was never told not to consider it. 76 We therefore conclude that jury misconduct had a substantial and injurious effect on the special circumstance finding. We believe that the dissent misapplies the substantial and injurious effect test to the facts presented here. Rejecting the standard established in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Supreme Court in Brecht imported the harmlesserror standard of Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), into review of habeas petitions. In Kotteakos, the Court explained the application of the substantial and injurious effect test: 77 if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand. 78 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765 (emphasis added). Here, when all is said and done, these simple facts remain: after fifteen days of deliberation the jury was hung on each of the special circumstances. Then, in response to Juror Rankin's searching question for the reason for the killing, the improper extrinsic evidence was introduced into the deliberations. Within one hour, the jury found true the special circumstance of murder because of nationality or national origin but hung on each of the other charged circumstances. 79 We cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping from the deliberations the improper introduction of the Justice Commandos phone call, that the special circumstance verdict was not substantially swayed by the error. Id. Thus it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights -- the difference between life and life without the possibility of parole were not affected. Id. By reciting a list of evidence to reach the conclusion that Arikan was killed because of his nationality, see infra at 13544 (Silverman, J., dissenting), the dissent not only improperly places itself in the role of the jury, it disregards Kotteakos' admonition that the inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. Id. We therefore reverse the district court as to the special circumstance. 80
81 Because we find that juror misconduct warrants relief on the special circumstance finding, we need not address Sassounian' arguments that the special circumstance finding should be invalidated because of an improper aiding and abetting instruction, 7 the vagueness of the special circumstance statute, or lack of sufficient evidence.