Opinion ID: 2056206
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Court's Analysis

Text: We begin our construction of the Deed of Easement by reviewing the principles that govern interpretation of such instruments. In construing the language of a deed, the basic principles of contract interpretation apply. The grant of an easement by deed is strictly construed. The extent of an easement created by an express grant depends upon a proper construction of the conveyance by which the easement was created. The primary rule for the construction of contracts generallyand the rule is applicable to the construction of a grant of an easementis that a court should ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties at the time the contract was made, if that be possible. Miller v. Kirkpatrick, 377 Md. 335, 351, 833 A.2d 536, 545 (2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted). As we stated in White v. Pines Community Improvement Association, Inc., 403 Md. 13, 32, 939 A.2d 165, 176 (2008), the language of the agreement itself is of foremost importance: `A court construing an agreement under this test must first determine from the language of the agreement itself what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated. In addition, when the language of the contract is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction, and a court must presume that the parties meant what they expressed.' (Citations omitted.) The principles of deed construction require, moreover, consideration of the character of the contract, its purpose, and the facts and circumstances of the parties at the time of execution[.] Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 355 Md. 110, 123, 733 A.2d 1055, 1062 (1999) (citations omitted). [W]e must consider the deed as a whole, viewing its language in light of the facts and circumstances of the transaction at issue as well as the governing law at the time of conveyance. Id. [T]he primary consideration in construing the scope of an express easement is the language of the grant. Id. at 143, 733 A.2d at 1073. Furthermore, [i]f the grant contains no limitations, the court will attempt to discern what the parties would have reasonably expected, and will usually be generous in its interpretation. The language of the easement can grant to the easement holder a good deal of discretion in the use of the easement or limit the use very narrowly; if the grant is not clear, the court will interpret the scope of the easement in favor of free and untrammeled use of the land. Id. at 145, 733 A.2d at 1074 ( citing 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 60.04(a), at 451 (Thomas ed.1994) (quotation marks, footnotes, and citations omitted)). In applying these principles, we must first clarify what is at issue in this appeal. Although as a practical matter, use and title may go hand in hand, when analyzing an easement, it is use, not title that is involved. With this in mind, we look carefully at the Deed of Easement. Claggett, in granting the Easement, agreed: Except as otherwise provided in this instrument, the [Claggett Property] may not be used for any ... residential purpose. (Emphasis added). Thus, our task is to determine what, if any, exceptions from this general prohibition against residential use are contained in the document. Section A(1)(b) contains a limited exception: As a personal covenant only and one that is not intended to run with the land, the Grantee, on written application from the Grantor, shall release free of easement restrictions only for the Grantor who originally sold this easement, 1 acre or less for the purpose of constructing a dwelling house for the use only of that Grantor or the Grantor's child[.] It is clear from this language that the dwelling house may only be used by the Grantor or the Grantor's child. This provision excludes any possible inference that the parties to the Easement, speaking objectively, intended that an unrelated third party could dwell in a house on the Claggett Property. Claggett would have us construe the language in Section A(1)(b) that classifies the right to a release for a dwelling as a personal covenant only and one is not intended to run with the land to mean that if the Owner's Lot is transferred, it is free of all easement restrictions and can be used by anyone for any purpose. We do not see this as a reasonable construction of the instrument. This language simply means that if Claggett were to transfer title to the servient property or to the owner's lot contained therein, which he may do, the new owner does not acquire the right to obtain a release to use the property as a dwelling, free of the agricultural preservation easement. The Easement is written this way because the agricultural preservation Easement is not a grant to the Foundation of title to the land, and it does not restrict land transfer. The Easement simply prescribes use of the land for certain purposes. So the instrument makes clear that, while the land may be transferred, the new owner does not receive the same right to a limited release of a lot (for a dwelling) from the agricultural preservation restrictions. In short, the new owner could use the Claggett Property for any agricultural activities, but cannot use the property as a dwelling. Subsection A(1)(c) reiterates this intent with its requirement that any release from the easement restrictions must contain a declaration that the lot and dwelling house are only for the use of the landowner or the landowner's child, whichever is the case[.] Subsection A(1)(d), regarding the two-step procedure to obtain a release, says: After certifying that the landowner or child of the landowner has met the conditions provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the Foundation shall issue a Preliminary Release which shall: (i) Become final when the Foundation receives and certifies a non-transferrable building permit in the name of the landowner (or child of the landowner if the proposed lot is intended for the landowner's child's use) for the construction of a dwelling house; or (ii) Become void upon the death of the person whose benefit the release was intended if the Foundation has not yet received a building permit as provided in this regulation. We see this subsection as perfectly consistent with the others discussed aboveit creates a procedure whereby a building permit can be obtained in order to allow Claggett or his child to build a house. Although Claggett takes comfort in subparts (d)(i) and (ii), arguing that they mean that once the house is built, it can be used as a dwelling for any person, we do not read this language as he does. Not only does the clause fail to state that a third person may live there, but such an interpretation is diametrically opposed to the clear language in section A(1)(b) restricting use of the property released from the Easement to use as a dwelling for Claggett or his children. Subsection (A)(1)(e) is equally clear, providing that [t]he right reserved to the Grantor under paragraph (1)(b) belongs only to the Grantor who originally sold this easement and may be exercised only by the Grantor named in the instrument. Claggett's argument that this right consists of a right to obtain a building permit, build a house, and then sell the house for use as a dwelling for a third person is inconsistent with this languageif the intent were to allow the Grantor to profit by a sale of the lot free of the use restrictions, there would be no reason to require that he be the one to obtain the building permit and construct the house. Claggett points to no other language in the Easement, and we find none, which creates an exemption from his covenant that his property may not be used for any... residential purpose. (Emphasis added). Without additional language in the Easement which would meet the [e]xcept as otherwise provided in this instrument requirement, the overall restriction in section A(1)(a) prohibiting use of the property for any commercial, industrial, or residential purpose still applies. We do not see any ambiguity in the instrument, and construe it according to its plain language. Contrary to Claggett's argument, there is no need for any further explicit provision against third party use after the house is built because the express covenant against use of the entire property, which is subject to the easement, contains this use restriction, and there is nothing in the instrument that states a contrary intent.