Opinion ID: 1714382
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in granting the MSC defendants' motions for a summary judgment.

Text: Rosen argues that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment for the MSC defendants because, she says, there was sufficient evidence to show that they had invaded her privacy and had violated a duty they owed her not to disclose her medical information. Our review of a summary judgment is de novo. In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment, `we utilize the same standard as the trial court in determining whether the evidence before [it] made out a genuine issue of material fact,' Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988), and whether the movant was `entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' Wright v. Wright, 654 So.2d 542 (Ala.1995); Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. When the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating such an issue. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989). Evidence is `substantial' if it is of `such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.' Wright, 654 So.2d at 543 (quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)). Our review is further subject to the caveat that this Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Wilma Corp. v. Fleming Foods of Alabama, Inc., 613 So.2d 359 (Ala.1993); Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So.2d 412, 413 (Ala.1990). Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 690 So.2d 341, 344 (Ala.1997). The MSC defendants each filed separate motions for a summary judgment stating, as required by Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P., what they alleged to be the undisputed material facts. They attached supporting affidavits and presented arguments to the effect that Rosen had failed to present a supportable invasion-of-privacy claim. This Court defines the tort of invasion of privacy as the intentional wrongful intrusion into one's private activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities. Carter v. Innisfree Hotel, Inc., 661 So.2d 1174, 1178 (Ala.1995) (citing Nipper v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 638 So.2d 778 (Ala. 1994); Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., Inc., 435 So.2d 705 (Ala.1983); Alabama Elec. Co-operative, Inc. v. Partridge, 284 Ala. 442, 225 So.2d 848 (1969)). In response to the MSC defendants' motions for a summary judgment, Rosen did not present any evidence of disputed facts, as she could have done under Rule 56(c)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. In regard to the dissemination of her medical information, Rosen quoted Beverly Ellis's motion for a summary judgment for the undisputed facts that [a]fter the surgery, Royce Ellis told her mother-in-law, Beverly Ellis, that [Rosen] had the appendectomy, and that it was the first appendectomy performed at [MSC], and that `[s]hortly after hearing of [Rosen's] appendectomy,' from her daughter-in-law, Beverly Ellis proceeded to tell at least `two of plaintiff's co-worker's that the cause of [Rosen's] long-term and widely known abdominal problems had been identified and that she had undergone an appendectomy.' Citing Horne v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So.2d 824 (1973), Rosen argued that the physician-patient relationship is confidential, and that a cause of action for invasion of privacy exists for a physician's wrongful dissemination of a patient's medical information. Rosen further cited Johnston v. Fuller, 706 So.2d 700 (Ala.1997), for its discussion of conduct that could constitute an invasion of privacy. However, Rosen made no argument and cited no authority in response to the MSC defendants' argument that she had failed to establish an invasion-of-privacy claim because she had failed to establish the element of publicity concerning her medical information. Rosen has similarly relied on Horne and Johnston in her brief on appeal. In Horne, this Court held that a physician has a general duty to not disclose a patient's medical information acquired in the course of the physician-patient relationship and stated that the [u]nauthorized disclosure of intimate details of a patient's health may amount to unwarranted publicization of one's private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern such as to cause outrage, mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities. 291 Ala. at 709, 287 So.2d at 830 (emphasis added). Rosen's argument does not support her assertion that the duty she argues the MSC defendants have violated arises out of the physician-patient relationship, such as to amount to an invasion of privacy. None of the MSC defendants are physicians; indeed, Beverly Ellis, as Rosen's coworker, has no connection to the medical profession. Therefore, the MSC defendants cannot have violated a duty arising out of a physician-patient relationship. In Johnston, this Court stated: Alabama has long recognized the tort of invasion of privacy. Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So.2d 118 (1948). It is generally accepted that invasion of privacy consists of four limited and distinct wrongs: (1) intruding into the plaintiffs physical solitude or seclusion; (2) giving publicity to private information about the plaintiff that violates ordinary decency; (3) putting the plaintiff in a false, but not necessarily defamatory, position in the public eye; or (4) appropriating some element of the plaintiff's personality for a commercial use. Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So.2d 321 (1961). 706 So.2d at 701. Rosen does not clearly state which wrong the defendants allegedly committed. However, we infer from the record that she is proceeding under the second wrong stated in Johnston. [2] At the end of her argument in her brief to this Court, Rosen concludes that [t]he disclosure of such personal and private matters would have offended the sensibilities of any ordinary person similarly situated. Thus, she argues that the defendants' disclosure of the informationnot the manner in which the information was gathered was wrongful. In regard to the second wrong, this Court stated in Johnston: The Restatement provides: `One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that `(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and `(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.' Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (emphasis added [in Johnston ]). The comments to § 652D describe the key element of this tort, `publicity,' as follows: `Publicity, as it is used in this Section, differs from publication, as that term is used ... in connection with liability for defamation. Publication, in that sense, is a word of art, which includes any communication by the defendant to a third person. Publicity, on the other hand, means that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. The difference is not one of the means of communication, which may be oral, written, or by any other means. It is one of a communication that reaches or is sure to reach, the public. `Thus it is not an invasion of the right of privacy, within the rule stated in this Section, to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff's private life to a single person or even to a small group of persons.' Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. a (1977)(emphasis added [in Johnston ]). Accord Nobles v. Cartwright, 659 N.E.2d 1064, 1074 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995). 706 So.2d at 703. Rosen stated in her statement of undisputed facts in her response to the MSC defendants' motions for a summary judgment that Royce Ellis told one person, Beverly Ellis, about her appendectomy and that Beverly Ellis thereafter told at least two of their coworkers. As this Court concluded in Johnston, because the defendants did not broadcast over the radio the information obtained about [Rosen], [they] did not print it in a newspaper, and [they] did not tell it to a large number of people[,] their actions were not an invasion of privacy through publicity. 706 So.2d at 703 (footnotes omitted). See also Ex parte Birmingham News, Inc., 778 So.2d 814 (Ala.2000)(plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case of invasion of privacy because she failed to show a wide dissemination of the allegedly private information and therefore failed to establish the element of publicity). Similarly, we conclude that Rosen has failed to present substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact concerning the element of publicity essential to her claim. Accordingly, the trial court's summary judgment for the MSC defendants is due to be affirmed.