Opinion ID: 2625337
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Vagueness and Ex Post Facto Claims

Text: Defendant challenges the financial gain special circumstance as vague, arguing that it violates due process because persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. We have in the past rejected a similar challenge. In People v. Howard, supra, 44 Cal.3d at page 410, 243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279, this court held that financial gain is not a technical term, obviating any need for further refinement of the phrase absent a showing of confusion resulting from use of the term. We thus reject defendant's claim that the financial gain special circumstance is impermissibly vague or overbroad on the ground that persons must guess at its meaning. ( People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1025, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1.) We also reject defendant's contention that the financial gain special circumstance is unconstitutionally vague on the ground that a defendant would have no reason to be on notice or understand that the adoption of the 1978 death penalty law changed the definition of financial gain contained in the 1977 law that it superseded. The 1977 financial gain special circumstance provided: The murder was intentional and was carried out pursuant to agreement by the person who committed the murder to accept a valuable consideration for the act of murder from any person other than the victim.... (Stats.1977, ch. 316, § 9, p. 1257.) The 1978 financial-gain special-circumstance provision reads: The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1).) Defendant's contention is belied by a comparison of the statutory language. In any event, the murder in this case was committed in 1982. Defendant further contends that the application of the financial gain special circumstance here would have the unconstitutional effect of an ex post facto law. He argues that this court's decisions after People v. Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d 731, 209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994, cannot be retroactively applied to expand the financial gain special circumstance. He claims this is so because later judicial construction of the statute was unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue. ( Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964) 378 U.S. 347, 354, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894.) We reject defendant's contention. The due process clause, not the ex post facto clause, bars retroactive application of a judicial construction of a criminal statute that is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law expressed before the conduct in issue. ( People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 238, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512.) We reject defendant's claim that the due process clause requires application of what defendant characterizes as the narrow construction as stated in People v. Bigelow . Defendant killed Nancy in 1982, two years before this court's 1984 decision in Bigelow. Accordingly, he cannot argue that the Bigelow construction existed at the time the crime at issue here was committed.