Opinion ID: 2547910
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Proof Regarding Persistent Felony Offender Status

Text: Appellant next argues that he was denied due process because the Commonwealth failed to prove that he was a first-degree PFO. As a result, Appellant posits that the trial court erred by failing to enter a directed verdict. Conceding that this issue was unpreserved, Appellant requests palpable error review pursuant to RCr 10.26. [4] The Commonwealth responds that it sufficiently proved that Appellant was a first-degree PFO. Specifically, the Commonwealth directs our attention to the Court of Appeal's decision in Williams v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 788 (Ky.App.1982) to support its argument that Appellant's felony conviction for driving a motor vehicle with a suspended license and subsequent conviction for fleeing or evading police sufficiently prove his first-degree PFO status. We agree. To be deemed a first-degree PFO, a person must, among other things, have been convicted of two previous felonies. KRS 532.080(3). KRS 532.080(4) outlines the methodology used to evaluate whether an individual has been convicted of two previous felonies: For the purpose of determining whether a person has two (2) or more previous felony convictions, two (2) or more convictions of crime for which that person served concurrent or uninterrupted consecutive terms of imprisonment shall be deemed to be only one (1) conviction, unless one (1) of the convictions was for an offense committed while that person was imprisoned. In Williams, the appellant was released on parole after being convicted of and imprisoned for four counts of forgery. 639 S.W.2d at 789. While on parole, he was convicted of theft by unlawful taking and sentenced to four years' imprisonment. Id. The Court of Appeals aptly rejected his interpretation of KRS 532.080(4) [5] that would require two or more convictions to be treated as one even when prison time has been served after the first conviction and the second crime is committed while on parole from the first conviction: Appellant's suggested interpretation of KRS 532.080(4) would erode the purpose of the statute. Without analyzing the entire history and purposes of the statute, it is enough to say that the statute is designed to strengthen the Commonwealth's attempts at rehabilitation of convicted persons. Greater penalties are sanctioned for those persons who, after serving a prison term for a conviction, demonstrate the futility of their rehabilitation by committing other crimes after their release. The concurrent sentence break is provided only to those who may have committed more than one crime but received their sentences for these crimes prior to serving any time in prison. . . . . It is clear from the wording of the statute and the Commentary thereto that a person who, in appellant's situation, serves time in prison for a felony, is released on parole, commits another crime and is resentenced to prison, that upon his release again and third conviction, he has two prior felonies for purposes of a persistent felony offender charge. That is, the rehabilitative efforts on his first conviction failed, the rehabilitative efforts on his second conviction failed, and he is, under the statute, a persistent felony offender in the first degree upon receiving his third conviction. Id. at 790 (emphasis added). We adopt this reasoning. In this case, the Commonwealth showed that Appellant was sentenced for a period of five years' imprisonment on December 20, 1999 for driving a motor vehicle with a license suspended for driving under the influence. [6] Appellant was subsequently sentenced for fleeing or evading police, an act committed outside of the prison, on February 21, 2002. Appellant's previous convictions thus demonstrated that he was a first-degree PFO. Although we agree with the Commonwealth that the trial court did not err by failing to enter a directed verdict because Appellant was convicted of two previous felonies, we pause to further explain why the concurrent sentence break does not apply to Appellant. Much consternation between Appellant and the Commonwealth derives from the February 2, 2004 Order wherein the trial court stated that the judgment for case 01-CR-00059 [7] was in error when it did not make defendant's sentence concurrent with that in 98-CR-00057, [8] or did not reflect in 98-CR-00057 that defendant would not serve any more time on that charge. The trial court went on to amend[] its Judgment in 01-CR-00059 to sentence defendant to a 5 year sentence which is to run concurrent with any other sentences which he may serving out of the Marshall Circuit Court. Assuming that any other sentence from Marshall Circuit Court refers to the driving a motor vehicle with a suspended license charge, Appellant posits that it is perfectly clear that the two sentences for driving with a suspended license and fleeing or evading police ran concurrently. This is irrelevant. Again, the concurrent sentence break does not apply to individuals who commit a felonious act, receive a sentence, and then subsequently commit another felonious act and receive another sentence. We will not subvert the rehabilitative purpose of KRS 532.080 as outlined by the Court of Appeals in Williams by interpreting the statute in an absurd manner which is necessary to sustain Appellant's argument. See Hall v. Hospitality Resources, Inc., 276 S.W.3d 775, 785 (Ky. 2008) (stating that [w]e have often said that statutes will not be given [such a] reading where to do so would lead to an absurd or unreasonable conclusion.) (internal citations omitted).