Opinion ID: 2570477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Vouching for Victim's Credibility

Text: In his initial issue, Cook argues that the trial court erred by allowing three expert witnesses to vouch for the victim's credibility. He alleges that Deputy Stensaas, AE's physician, and AE's psychologist each testified that they had assessed AE's credibility and determined that she was truthful in her accusations. Defense counsel did not object to the testimony of the physician and the psychologist, and objected to the deputy's testimony on unrelated grounds. Our review is, therefore, limited to a search for plain error. Hodgins v. State, 962 P.2d 153, 156 (Wyo. 1998). A three-part test has been established for determining whether an error may achieve the status of plain error. First, the record must be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error. Second, the party claiming that the error amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, that party must prove that a substantial right has been denied him and as a result he has been materially prejudiced. Id. (citing Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Wyo.1981)). The first prong of our plain error test is satisfied because the challenged testimony of all three witnesses is preserved in the trial transcript included in the record before us. Cook's brief articulates and argues a different standard of review, but we may discern from it that he believes the challenged testimony was admitted in violation of our pronouncement that an expert witness may not vouch for the truthfulness of another witness's testimony. Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227, 233 (Wyo.1986). If substantiated, that violation would satisfy the second prong of our test. We will examine the contested testimony of each expert witness separately. Deputy Stensaas testified that when conducting an investigation, he observes the demeanor of individuals to evaluate their credibility. The deputy went on to relate the details of AE's allegations against Cook. In closing arguments, the prosecutor referred to Deputy Stensaas' training and experience in a way that Cook contends was meant to bolster AE's testimony. We have closely examined the deputy's testimony and found no instances where he offered an opinion or conclusion about whether AE had been molested or whether her story was credible. The deputy merely explained some of the procedures for interviewing alleged victims of sexual abuse. AE's physician testified that when interviewing alleged victims of sexual abuse, he observes their behavior to develop an impression from the story that the patient tells us. He also repeated AE's accusations against Cook. Cook argues that the doctor vouched for AE's credibility during the following exchange on direct examination: Q: In your training, practice and experience, how many children victims would you estimate you've examined? A: I think that I've examined three. Q: Is [AE] one of those three? A: Yes. Taken out of context, the doctor's testimony might support an argument that he conveyed to the jury a conclusion that AE was indeed a victim of sexual abuse. Viewed in its proper context, however, the testimony belies that theory. Both before and after the exchange reported above, the prosecutor spoke exclusively of alleged victims of sexual abuse or victims of alleged sexual abuse. After reviewing all of the doctor's testimony, we are convinced that he was speaking of alleged victims of abuse, and included AE in that category. AE's psychologist testified that AE didn't seem programmed or rehearsed in any way. She further testified It is my opinion and my diagnosis that [AE] is a victim of sexual abuse. On cross-examination, the psychologist testified that her diagnosis depended on AE's statements to her, and that absent those statements, she could not have concluded that AE had been sexually abused. Cook argues that by admitting that she relied on AE's statements in reaching a diagnosis, the psychologist vouched for the truthfulness of those statements. Because the psychologist did offer an opinion that AE had been a victim of abuse, we must look at her testimony to determine whether it 1) assisted the jury in understanding some aspect of the victim's behavior; and 2) did not include any comment on the victim's truthfulness or credibility. Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 361 (Wyo.1988). In its full context, the first part of the psychologist's testimony that Cook challenges is: She presented prettywhat we call a flat affect, which means that if these kids aren't acting out angry a lot, they're pretty calm. They're kind of without emotion when they talk about it. Because ifyou know, if they don't fall apart, they've found a way to kind of live with it and go to school and not cry every day and keep a lid on things so that theythey're emotionless. They're not mad. They're not sad. They're not angry. They're just kind of telling me the facts. She didn't seem programmed or rehearsed in any way thatwith programming it's kind of like you plug in the tape and they tell the whole thing, the whole story from beginning to end. This is more, you know, I asked her a question. She answered. I asked her a question. She answers. It's not a lot of, you know, and I say this and I say this and I say this and I say this, although she's certainly told her story enough to quite a few people by now. Here, the psychologist differentiated between behavior characteristic of a child who had been abused, and that characteristic of a child who was fabricating, and reported that AE's behavior was consistent with the former. We have held testimony explaining that an alleged victim's behavior is typical of a particular type or class of victim is admissible to explain the behavior and is not an impermissible comment on the victim's credibility. Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 979 (Wyo.1988); Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1046-47 (Wyo.1987). The testimony quoted above, therefore, was properly admitted. The second part of the psychologist's testimony of which Cook complains was also free from plain error. Cook argues that by admitting reliance on AE's statements, the psychologist vouched for their truthfulness. We disagree. The psychologist simply acknowledged that her diagnosis was based on all of the information available to her, much of which came directly from AE. Essentially, she admitted that the reliability of her diagnosis rested on AE's truthfulness. That left the issue of credibility entirely with the jury, where it belongs. The challenged testimony transgressed no clear and unequivocal rule. Because Cook cannot satisfy the second prong of our plain error test, we hold that the court did not commit plain error in admitting it.