Opinion ID: 31970
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unconstitutional Jury Instructions

Text: 82 In his application for COA, Bigby further argues that the district court's jury instruction gave the jurors an option of nullifying mitigating circumstances and thus impinged his right to have an individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty in his case. According to Bigby, this violated Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) ( Penry I ). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected this complaint when Bigby raised it on direct appeal. Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 890. Relying on Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 3007, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976), Bigby reiterates his nullification argument by claiming that there is an element of capriciousness in making the jurors' power to avoid the death penalty dependant on their willingness to accept [an] invitation to render a false verdict. 83 A State's capital punishment scheme must do two things to meet the requirements of the Eighth Amendment. First, it must channel the discretion of the judge or jury to ensure that the death sentence is not meted out wantonly or freakishly. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 468, 113 S.Ct. 892, 898, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993). Second, it must confer sufficient discretion on the sentencing body to consider the character and record of the individual offender. Id. Thus, the relevant mitigating evidence cannot be placed beyond the effective reach of the jury. Id. at 475, 113 S.Ct. 892. To grant relief on a Penry claim, we must determine (1) that the ... evidence was constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence, and, if so, (2) that the ... evidence was beyond the effective reach of the jury. Madden v. Collins, 18 F.3d 304, 308 (5th Cir.1994). 84 We conclude that Bigby has demonstrated that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of his Penry claim debatable. See Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at 1040. First, Bigby has established there exists evidence of constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. In particular, Bigby has provided testimony that he suffers from chronic paranoid schizophrenia, an involuntary, permanent, and severe mental condition that contributed to his criminal actions consistent with the standard set forth in Robertson v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 243 (5th Cir.2003). Second, the nullification instruction at issue in the instant case is similar to the nullification instruction that the Supreme Court rejected as unconstitutional in Penry I, rendering the constitutionally mitigating evidence out of the reach of the jurors during the punishment phase of Bigby's trial. Thus, we reverse the district court's denial of a COA on this issue and grant the COA. During the pendency of this appeal the Supreme Court handed down Penry II, 532 U.S. 782, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 1922, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) and the en banc court decided Robertson v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 243 (5th Cir.2003). Because the post oral argument briefing has fully addressed these cases and because the evidentiary record is complete, we conclude that the merits of the COA Penry claim — that the nullification instruction during the sentencing phase of his trial was constitutionally defective — is ripe for decision. 85 1) Constitutionally Relevant Mitigating Evidence 86 This Circuit has created a two-part test that a defendant must prove in order to submit relevant evidence that he is less culpable for the crime he committed. The evidence presented must establish (1) a uniquely severe permanent handicap[] with which the defendant was burdened through no fault of his own, and (2) that the criminal act was attributable to this severe permanent condition. Davis v. Scott, 51 F.3d 457, 460-61 (5th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Robertson, 325 F.3d at 251 (This formulation encompasses four principles found in Penry I: voluntariness, permanence, severity, and attribution.). 87 During Bigby's trial, Dr. James Grigson (Dr. Grigson), psychiatrist, was called to testify on Bigby's behalf. Dr. Grigson stated that in his opinion, Bigby suffers from chronic paranoid schizophrenia. He testified that paranoid schizophrenia is one of the more serious and severe forms of mental illnesses. When asked to explain to the jury the effects of this disease, Dr. Grigson stated that usually individuals suffering from this mental condition feel[] that people are plotting against them or doing things to hurt them. He continued to clarify that schizophrenia means that the individual is suffering from a psychosis where there is gross impairment in terms of interpersonal relationships ... and reality testing, meaning that they misperceive what is going on around them. As a result, Dr. Grigson stated that this paranoid disorder manifests itself in psychotic delusional beliefs. 88 Bigby's trial counsel asked Dr. Grigson if Bigby had suffered from any delusions or psychotic beliefs. The physician responded in the affirmative. Specifically, he stated that at the time the murders occurred, Bigby suffered from delusions that Michael Trekell was involved in a conspiracy against him. In his opinion, Dr. Grigson testified that at the time of the offense ... Bigby was suffering from [this] serious severe mental illness and was not aware of the difference between right and wrong. Dr. Grigson concluded that there is no other explanation for Bigby's actions other than the fact that he suffers from a mental illness. 5 At the sentencing phase, Dr. Grigson reiterated his belief that Bigby suffers from chronic paranoid schizophrenia. 89 [F]or evidence to have mitigating relevance to the special issues, there must be a nexus between the mitigating evidence and the criminal act. Davis v. Scott, 51 F.3d at 460. In Davis, we determined that Davis's evidence of paranoid schizophrenia did not rise to the level of constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. Specifically, we found that if Davis in fact suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, he failed to submit any evidence linking his mental condition to the commission of the murders. The holding in Davis, however, can be distinguished from the instant case. 90 Applying the requirements set out in Davis, it is clear that the evidence submitted by Bigby constitutes constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. Paranoid Schizophrenia is a severe mental illness that is permanent and is not caused by any fault of the individuals suffering from the disease. Thus, as an individual suffering from this mental condition, Bigby has satisfied the first prong of the test. In regard to the second requirement, unlike in Davis, Bigby's paranoid schizophrenia caused an insane delusion that there was a conspiracy for which at least one of his victims was a part of and, as a direct result of this delusion, Bigby committed the crimes for which he was convicted. Thus, Bigby has established a sufficient nexus between his mental illness and the murders. 2) Jury Instructions 91 We now turn to Bigby's contention concerning the constitutionality of the jury instructions given by the district court judge at the sentencing phase. Bigby argues that the jury instructions impermissibly restricted the jury's consideration of mitigating circumstances in violation of the Supreme Court's decision in Penry I. In Penry I, the Court held that Penry's Eighth Amendment rights were violated because the jury was inadequately charged with respect to mitigating evidence at Penry's sentencing hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the jury was instructed to answer three special issues: (1) whether the conduct that caused the death of the victim was committed deliberately and with a reasonable expectation that death would result; (2) whether there was a probability that the defendant would commit acts that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and (3) whether the conduct was an unreasonable response to any provocation by the victim. The Supreme Court held that none of these special issues were broad enough to allow the jury to consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence offered by Penry that he was mentally retarded and had been severely abused as a child. 92 On remand, Penry was again found guilty, and the state court instructed the jury to answer the same three special issues given at his first trial. The jury was also admonished that a yes answer to any of the special issues was warranted only if supported by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, while a no answer is appropriate only if there is a reasonable doubt that the answer to the special issues should be yes. In addition, the court also provided a supplemental instruction indicating that when the jury deliberated on the special issues, it was to consider mitigating issues, if any, presented by the evidence. The instruction provided in relevant part that [the jury] must decide how much weight [the mitigating evidence] deserve[s], if any, and therefore, give effect and consideration to them in assessing the defendant's personal culpability at the time [the jury] answers the special issues, if the jury were to determine, when giving effect to the mitigating evidence, if any, that a life sentence, as reflected by a negative finding to the issue under consideration, rather than a death sentence, is an appropriate response to the personal culpability of the defendant, a negative finding should be given to one of the special issues. The verdict form contained only the text of the three special issues, however, and gave the jury the choice of only answering yes or no. The jury again answered all of the special issues yes and Penry was sentenced to the death penalty. 93 In Penry II, the Supreme Court ruled that this supplemental instruction provided an inadequate vehicle for the jury to make a reasoned moral response to Penry's mitigating evidence. 532 U.S. 782, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 1922, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001). Specifically, the Court again stated that the special issues were not broad enough to give effect to Penry's mitigating evidence, and thus, held that the supplemental instruction was of no practical effect because the jury's ability to give weight to Penry's mitigating evidence was still shackled and confined within the scope of the three special issues. Id. at 1921 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme Court also noted that instructing the jury to answer the special issues yes only if supported by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, while at the same time instructing the jury to answer one or more of the special issues no in order to give effect to any mitigating evidence presented by Penry did not comport with reason and logic. It stated that in effect, the instruction allowed the jurors to change one or more truthful `yes' answers to an untruthful `no' answer in order to avoid the death sentence for Penry. Id. at 1922. Thus, if the jury desired to answer one or more of the special issues untruthfully to give credence to the mitigating evidence presented by Penry, they would have had to violate their oath to render a true verdict. Penry II, 532 U.S. at 800, 121 S.Ct. 1910 (citation omitted). 94 The special issues and supplemental instruction given at the conclusion of Bigby's sentencing hearing are almost identical to those discussed in Penry II. 6 Because we discern no meaningful distinction between the charges given in Penry II and those given in the instant case, we find that Bigby has demonstrated that the contested jury instructions stripped the jury of a vehicle for expressing its reasoned moral response 7 to the appropriateness of the death penalty. As in Penry II, the verdict form in Bigby listed the three special issues but with no mention of mitigating circumstances. In short, the same constitutional infirmities criticized by the Supreme Court in Penry II are present in Bigby. Accordingly, since the decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is contrary to clearly established federal law, we reverse the district court's denial of Bigby's application for COA with regard to his jury instruction claim, vacate his sentence, and remand this case to the district court for entry of an order granting Bigby habeas relief on his Penry claim and setting aside his sentence.