Opinion ID: 2434794
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: López-Capó

Text: López-Capó, who was alleged to be one of the owners of the crack distributed at Carioca, was found guilty of Counts One and Three (the conspiracy count and the substantive count of possessing crack with the intent to distribute it). In addition to the claim addressed above, López-Capó challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him and argues that the district court erred by: (1) admitting hearsay statements of his co-conspirators; (2) admitting evidence of his relation to a known drug dealer; (3) admitting evidence of a riot that occurred in Carioca; (4) failing to give the jury a multiple conspiracy instruction; (5) imposing a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice; (6) imposing a two-point enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.2(a)(1); and (7) sentencing him to 360 months' imprisonment, which he claims was not a reasonable sentence. We affirm on all counts. [11]
López-Capó first argues that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he participated in the drug conspiracy. We review de novo the district court's denial of López-Capó's Rule 29 motion, examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Pérez-Meléndez, 599 F.3d at 40. A defendant challenging his conviction for insufficiency of the evidence faces an uphill battle. United States v. Hernández, 218 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir.2000). We will affirm if a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty of every element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Pérez-Meléndez, 599 F.3d at 40. To prove conspiracy, the government must show that: (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant voluntarily participated in the conspiracy. United States v. Bristol-Martir, 570 F.3d 29, 39 (1st Cir.2009). To prove that the defendant belonged to and participated in the drug conspiracy, the government must show two kinds of intent: `intent to agree and intent to commit the substantive offense.' Id. (quoting Hernández, 218 F.3d at 65). The government can meet its burden with direct or circumstantial evidence. United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1173 (1st Cir.1993). López-Capó makes a general allegation, supported by little argumentation and almost no case law, that the government failed to prove that he knew of an agreement to distribute drugs in Carioca. We have recounted above just a portion of the evidence that a conspiracy to distribute drugs existed at Carioca from 2006 to 2009. The first element of the conspiracy test was undoubtedly met. The evidence was also sufficient for the jury to conclude that López-Capó knew of that conspiracy and voluntarily participated in it. First, co-conspirator Heriberto García-Román testified that López-Capó supplied the drug point with crack and that he had seen López-Capó deliver crack to another drug point employee. Second, co-conspirator Leonardo Martínez de León identified López-Capó as a runner of cocaine, crack, and heroin at the drug point and said that he had personally dealt drugs with López-Capó. Martínez de León also testified to having seen López-Capó at the drug point several times, delivering drugs and collecting money and tallies. Third, co-conspirator Yamil Irizarry-Lucas identified López-Capó as the supplier of crack for the drug point and testified that, on two occasions, he had picked up hundreds of vials of crack from López-Capó for sale at Carioca. It is not for us to weigh this evidence or to make credibility determinations. Hernández, 218 F.3d at 64. A reasonable jury could have found López-Capó guilty of every element of the conspiracy count beyond a reasonable doubt. Pérez-Meléndez, 599 F.3d at 40.
López-Capó's next claim is that various statements made by his co-conspirators and admitted at trial were inadmissible hearsay. Because López-Capó preserved his challenge to the district court's admission of these statements, we review for abuse of discretion. Vázquez-Botet, 532 F.3d at 65. Finding none, we affirm. López-Capó argues that the district court erred by admitting four statements, one made by García-Román and three made by Martínez de León. García-Román testified that Suki and Cesar, the alleged owners of the drug point, had told him that López-Capó brought drugs to Carioca from the metropolitan area. Martínez de León testified that: (1) Edwin Casiano-Roque, another co-conspirator, had instructed him to collect the tallies for López-Capó; (2) Casiano-Roque had told him that López-Capó lived in the metropolitan area; and (3) Suki had said that López-Capó cooked better crack than Cesar. [12] Statements made by a defendant's co-conspirators during and in furtherance of the conspiracy do not qualify as hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). A district court faced with a challenge to the admission of a co-conspirator's statement must provisionally admit the statement and then wait until the end of the trial to consider whether, in light of all the evidence, the following four conditions are satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the defendant was a member of the conspiracy; (3) the declarant was also a member of the conspiracy; and (4) the declarant's statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Vázquez-Botet, 532 F.3d at 65; United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir.1977). Addressing the first two elements of the test, we have outlined the evidence that a conspiracy to distribute drugs operated at Carioca and that López-Capó was a member of that conspiracy. We thus need only address whether the declarants were also members of the conspiracy and whether their statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. The declarants' statements alone cannot satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard; there must be some independent corroboration to allow admission. United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 703 (1st Cir.1999). Evidence other than the out-of-court statements themselves established by a preponderance of the evidence that all of the declarants at issueSuki, Cesar, and Casiano-Roquewere members of the conspiracy. Multiple witnesses identified Suki and Cesar as co-owners of the drug point and testified to their activity at the drug point. As for Casiano-Roque, Martínez de León testified that Casiano-Roque had paid him $125.00 per week as a runner, and Officer Veguilla testified to having arrested Casiano-Roque with Rodríguez-Romero during a drug sale. The evidence was also sufficient for the district court to find that all of the relevant statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. When Suki and Cesar told García-Román that López-Capó brought drugs to Carioca, those were statements identifying other members of the conspiracy, made in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Pelletier, 845 F.2d 1126, 1128-29 (1st Cir.1988). Casiano-Roque's statement instructing Martínez de León to collect the tallies from the sellers was a statement related to the operation of the conspiracy, made in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Rodríguez-Vélez, 597 F.3d 32, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2010). Since Martínez de León knew that the crack for the drug point was supplied from the metropolitan area, Casiano-Roque's statement that López-Capó lived in the metropolitan area was a statement related to the inventory of the drug point, made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. Finally, Suki's statement to Martínez de León that López-Capó cooked better crack than Cesar was a statement identifying other members of the conspiracy, again made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Pelletier, 845 F.2d at 1128-29. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the out-of-court statements of López-Capó's co-conspirators.
López-Capó also argues that he was unfairly prejudiced when the district court: (1) allowed the government to question him about his relationship with his cousin, a known drug dealer, when López-Capó took the stand; and (2) admitted evidence of a riot at Carioca at which López-Capó was not present. Again, we review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Vega Molina, 407 F.3d at 522. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 allows a district court to exclude relevant evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Because Rule 403 judgments are typically battlefield determinations, and great deference is owed to the trial court's superior coign of vantage, only rarelyand in extraordinarily compelling circumstanceswill we, from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a district court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative value and unfair effect. United States v. Bunchan, 580 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir.2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). This is not such an instance. The district court allowed the government to ask López-Capó two questions regarding his familial relationship with Alexander Capo Trujillo during its cross-examination of López-Capó. First, the government asked whether López-Capó knew Trujillo; López-Capó responded that he did. Second, the government asked what López-Capó's relationship with Trujillo was; López-Capó responded that Trujillo was his cousin. On appeal, López-Capó argues that these questions were irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial because Trujillo was a drug kingpin and a well known federal fugitive whose names [sic] was in the Puerto Rico press with great frequency. Thus, López-Capó argues, the questions made more credible the possibility that [López-Capó] was a member of a drug conspiracy. The district court found the evidence admissible after the government explained that it had reason to believe that López-Capó had inherited all the contacts of Alex Trujillo once Alex Trujillo got arrested by the Federal government. The record establishes that the court considered both the relevance and the prejudicial effect of the evidence, and we find no abuse of discretion in the court's decision to admit it. Furthermore, while this is not the kind of extraordinarily compelling circumstance in which we might reverse a district court's Rule 403 judgment, even if it were, any error would likely be harmless, given the ample evidence against López-Capó. See United States v. Piper, 298 F.3d 47, 56 (1st Cir.2002) (an error is harmless if it is highly probable that the error did not influence the verdict). Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing Police Officer Pedro Flores-Sánchez to testify about a riot that occurred at Carioca in September 2006. The government argued that the riot evidence was relevant to show the dangerousness of Carioca, in support of Count Six of the indictment (conspiring to use firearms to carry out drug crimes), and we agree. Flores-Sánchez did not testify that López-Capó was present at the riot, or that he was in any way associated with the riot. We thus fail to see how López-Capó could have been prejudiced by the testimony. See Fed.R.Evid. 403.
Next, López-Capó argues that the district court erred by refusing to give the jury a multiple conspiracy instruction, which would have allowed the jury to find that López-Capó participated in a different conspiracy than Díaz, Rodríguez, and Rodríguez-Romero. We review the district court's decision not to provide the jury instruction for abuse of discretion. United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 139 (1st Cir.2008). A district court should give a multiple conspiracy instruction when a reasonable jury could find more than one illicit agreement, or an illicit agreement other than the one charged, based upon the evidence put forward at trial. United States v. Balthazard, 360 F.3d 309, 315-16 (1st Cir.2004). We will reverse a district court's decision not to provide a multiple conspiracy instruction only if the defendant can show that he suffered substantial prejudice. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d at 139. In the context of alleged multiple conspiracies, the defendant's main concern is that jurors will be misled into attributing guilt to a particular defendant based on evidence presented against others who were involved in a different and separate conspiratorial scheme. United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 450 (1st Cir.1994). It was only after the district court finished instructing the jury that Díaz requested a multiple conspiracy instruction, and López-Capó joined in that request. Although López-Capó did submit a written request for a jury instruction, asking the court to instruct the jury regarding the weight they should give his criminal record, that motion contained no mention of a multiple conspiracy instruction. López-Capó's motion belies his claim that the court gave him no opportunity to request the multiple conspiracy instruction, which is his excuse for failing to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30. Because we find that López-Capó's claim fails on its merits, however, we need not decide whether López-Capó forfeited that claim as a result of his failure to comply with Rule 30. See, e.g., United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 9 (1st Cir.2009) (The right to a jury instruction can be waived by not requesting the instruction, or not objecting at the proper time.). López-Capó has pointed to no evidence in the record indicating that a reasonable jury could have found that he participated in an illicit agreement other than the one charged. Rather, the evidence established that López-Capó participated in the very same conspiracy to distribute drugs at Carioca as his co-defendants. López-Capó seems to argue that a multiple conspiracy instruction was necessary because the evidence failed to establish that he participated in the Carioca drug point in 2009. [13] Even assuming that is true, we do not see why it would necessitate a multiple conspiracy instruction. A conspiracy with a continuity of purpose and a continued performance of acts . . . is presumed to exist until there has been an affirmative showing that it has terminated. United States v. Elwell, 984 F.2d 1289, 1293 (1st Cir.1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The trial testimony established that this conspiracy operated continuously between 2006 and 2009 and that López-Capó was active in the drug point at least in 2007 and 2008. López-Capó has put forward no evidence that he acted affirmatively either to defeat or disavow the purposes of the conspiracy in 2009. United States v. Juodakis, 834 F.2d 1099, 1102 (1st Cir.1987). Nor does he provide any support for his conclusory claim that the lack of a multiple conspiracy instruction made it difficult for the jury to believe [his] testimony and arguments that he was not involved in the conspiracy. There was no abuse of discretion.
Finally, López-Capó argues that the district court committed four errors at sentencing. We review the district court's factual findings made at sentencing for clear error. United States v. Shinderman, 515 F.3d 5, 18 (1st Cir.2008). We review the reasonableness of the defendant's resulting sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); United States v. Bunchan, 626 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir.2010). At sentencing, the district court found that López-Capó was responsible for at least 1.5 kilograms of crack, which resulted in a base offense level of 36. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (amended 2011). [14] The court then added two enhancements: one for obstruction of justice, see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, and one for drug activity near a protected area, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.2(a)(1), which yielded an adjusted offense level of 40. Using a CHC of III, the court determined that López-Capó's sentencing guideline range was 360 months to life. The court imposed a sentence at the bottom of that range: 360 months (thirty years) of imprisonment, followed by ten years of supervised release. First, López-Capó argues that the district court committed clear error by applying the two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice. The sentencing guidelines allow the court to increase a defendant's offense level by two points if he has willfully obstructed justice, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, which includes perjury, United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 92-94, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993). A defendant commits perjury when he intentionally gives false testimony under oath on a matter material to the proceedings. Shinderman, 515 F.3d at 19. To impose an enhancement for perjury, the sentencing court must make an independent finding that the elements of perjury have been satisfied. Id. The district court here applied the enhancement after concluding that López-Capó's testimony had been a complete fabrication. The court's findings sufficed to establish that the elements of perjury were met. Id. López-Capó's testimony occurred under oath, in court, and he addressed various matters material to the proceedings. Id. The court found that López-Capó had intentionally fabricated his testimony in an attempt to convince the jury that he had been a student, living off little amounts, just making ends meet, who knew none of the cooperating witnesses and only traveled to Carioca to see his mother. López-Capó had lied through his teeth, the court found, by portraying a world different from Carioca, the world in which he participated, and the world . . . he was supplying narcotics to. When López-Capó's attorney asked, at sentencing, for the specific instances in which López-Capó had lied, the court responded, [h]is whole testimony [was] a big lie. Having reviewed the record, we cannot say we disagree. Where a district court finds that a defendant has fabricated his entire testimony, the court need not delineate every specific instance in which the defendant lied. But here, the court did specifically mention López-Capó's visual expressions and demeanor on the stand, as well as his financial records, which the court found were totally at odds with the testimony that he was portraying. We give those credibility assessments reasonable latitude. Shinderman, 515 F.3d at 19. There was no clear error. Second, López-Capó argues that the district court erred by enhancing his offense level for committing a drug offense near a protected area, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.2(a)(1). López-Capó bases this challenge on the government's alleged failure to establish the 1,000-foot requirement or the existence of a protected area. As discussed above, we reject that argument. The evidence was sufficient for the jury, and the district court, to conclude that the relevant activity occurred within 1,000 feet of a protected area. As the court stated at sentencing, it was evident from the evidence that the drug point operated on top almost of the children's playground and that the drug offenses occurred in the Public Housing Project. Again, there was no clear error. Third, López-Capó claims that his sentence was unreasonable because the district court included two recency criminal history points when calculating his CHC, as was then required by U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e), which was subsequently amended. [15] The government's brief entirely fails to address this argument. In López-Capó's pre-sentence investigation report (PSI), the U.S. Probation Office assigned him three criminal history points as a result of his prior criminal activity, to which the Probation Office added two points because López-Capó had committed the instant offense fewer than two years after being released from prison. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e) (amended 2010). Five criminal history points resulted in a CHC of III, which is what the court used to calculate López-Capó's sentence. López-Capó argues that he should only have been assigned two criminal history points, which would have resulted in a CHC of II. López-Capó was sentenced on April 30, 2010. The U.S. Sentencing Commission had voted earlier that month, on April 7, 2010, to eliminate the recency points required by section 4A1.1(e), but the proposed amendment (Amendment 742) did not become effective until November 1, 2010. See United States v. Adams, 640 F.3d 41, 42 (1st Cir.2011). Amendment 742 is not retroactive. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c). And while we have previously remanded cases for reconsideration of a sentence in light of a later amendment to the guidelines . . . even where that amendment had not been made retroactive, we have chosen not to do so where the district court was made aware at sentencing of the proposed guideline amendment and . . . was unmoved by the prospect of the elimination of the `recency' points. Adams, 640 F.3d at 43. López-Capó filed objections to the PSI, which included notification to the court that the U.S. Sentencing Commission had proposed to amend section 4A1.1(e), and he reiterated at sentencing his objection to the CHC calculation. López-Capó has not distinguished Adams or provided us with any reason to believe that a different result would follow on remand. See id. There was no abuse of discretion. Fourth, López-Capó argues that his sentence was unreasonable because the district court did not properly consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors to determine whether a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines was warranted. This argument seems to have two prongs: (1) the district court failed to adequately explain why it was denying López-Capó's request for a downward departure; and (2) López-Capó's co-defendants received much shorter sentences than he did. Both claims fail. Addressing the first contention, particularly where the district court sentences a defendant within the guideline range, as was the case here, the court's explanation of the sentence need not be precise to the point of pedantry, United States v. Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir.2006), and brevity is not to be confused with inattention, id. at 42. López-Capó provides no actual support for his claim that it is fair to say that there is no evidence that the District Court examined the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) through (5). Our review of the sentencing hearing transcript reveals that the district court considered the PSI, as well as the arguments of both López-Capó and the government. The court carefully explained its calculation of López-Capó's offense level, choosing for the sake of being fair to attribute 1.5 kilograms of crack to López-Capó, though the court had no doubt that López-Capó was responsible for at least 4.5 kilograms of crack. The court then rejected the government's request for a sentence at the upper end of the guideline range (meaning life imprisonment), found that [t]he guidelines, although advisory, adequately reflect the nature of the offence and the characteristics, and noted that the defendant has not given the Court any . . . explanation other than the fact that we have the wrong person basically, that he didn't do it. Thus, the court found that there was nothing on th[e] record that would lead it to give [López-Capó] the benefit of a different calculation under 3553(a). We find the explanation adequate. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) ([W]hen a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.); Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d at 40-42. We also reject López-Capó's claim that his sentence was unreasonable because he received a longer sentence than any of his co-defendants. First, López-Capó provides no argumentation or case law in support of the assertion. See Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17 ([I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.). Second, López-Capó raised this issue at sentencing, arguing that Rodríguez had only received a sentence of 188 months. The district court responded that Rodríguez had started with the same base offense level as López-Capó but had a lower CHC and fewer enhancements. [W]here the defendant's own sentence has been justified and the basis for a co-defendant's lesser sentence is set forth or is apparent, no more precise calibration of the difference between them is customarily feasible, let alone required. United States v. Mueffelman, 470 F.3d 33, 41 (1st Cir.2006).