Opinion ID: 2639110
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was the Juvenile Court's Decision to Authorize Prosecution as an Adult Supported by Substantial Evidence?

Text: In stating his first issue on appeal, Mays recognizes that an appellate court reviews the district court's decision to allow the State to prosecute a juvenile as an adult to determine if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. State v. Jones, 273 Kan. 756, Syl. ¶ 2, 47 P.3d 783, cert. denied 537 U.S. 980 (2002). As we explained in Jones: Substantial evidence is evidence which possesses both relevance and substance and which furnishes a substantial basis of fact from which the issues can reasonably be resolved. It is not for this court to reweigh the evidence, substitute its evaluation of the evidence for that of the trial court, or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. 273 Kan. 756, Syl. ¶ 2. Our review of whether there was substantial competent evidence to support the district court's decision must be based upon the standards and procedures delineated in K.S.A. 38-1636 which, in turn, governed the district court's consideration of the State's motion to prosecute Mays as an adult. A court considering or reviewing such a motion must determine which statutory presumption created by K.S.A. 38-1636(a) applies. K.S.A. 38-1636(a)(1) provides that the respondent shall be presumed to be a juvenile unless good cause is shown to prosecute the respondent as an adult. However, if the exceptions specified in K.S.A. 38-1636(a)(2) apply, the respondent shall be presumed to be an adult. In this case, the district court correctly found that both exceptions applied to the prosecution of Mays. First, because Mays was 14, 15, 16 or 17 years of age at the time of the offense or offenses alleged in the complaint and the charged offenses were crimes which, if committed by an adult, would constitute offgrid or person felonies, the exception stated in K.S.A. 38-1636(a)(2)(A)(i) applied. Second, because Mays was 14, 15, 16 or 17 years of age at the time of the offense or offenses alleged in the complaint and the crime was committed while in possession of a firearm, the exception stated in K.S.A. 38-1636(a)(2)(A)(ii) applied. Because there was a presumption that Mays was an adult, the burden of proof was upon Mays to rebut the presumption. K.S.A. 38-1636(a)(2). Even where the presumption is that the accused is an adult, the factors listed in K.S.A. 38-1636(e) must be considered. State v. Medrano, 271 Kan. 504, 507, 23 P.3d 836 (2001). Those factors are: (1) The seriousness of the alleged offense and whether the protection of the community requires prosecution as an adult or designating the proceeding as an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution; (2) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner; (3) whether the offense was against a person or against property. Greater weight shall be given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted; (4) the number of alleged offenses unadjudicated and pending against the respondent; (5) the previous history of the respondent, including whether the respondent had been adjudicated a juvenile offender under this code and, if so, whether the offenses were against persons or property, and any other previous history of antisocial behavior or patterns of physical violence; (6) the sophistication or maturity of the respondent as determined by consideration of the respondent's home, environment, emotional attitude, pattern of living or desire to be treated as an adult; (7) whether there are facilities or programs available to the court which are likely to rehabilitate the respondent prior to the expiration of the court's jurisdiction under this code; and (8) whether the interests of the respondent or of the community would be better served by criminal prosecution or extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution. K.S.A. 38-1636(e). At the hearing, after the judge announced that the burden was on Mays and the two other juveniles to show why they should not be prosecuted as adults, Mays and the other juveniles presented evidence. Mays' mother testified that he had experienced difficulty in coping with the shooting death of a 10-year-old cousin which he had witnessed. She indicated his family was unable to obtain counseling or other assistance for Mays other than what those programs provided at a neighborhood center. Jean Bridgewater, the center's minister and director, testified that Mays was a fairly decent kid and a follower, and we could have an effect on him and work with him. Additionally, evidence was presented regarding the programs and facilities in the juvenile justice system. Testimony established that Mays had never been adjudicated as a juvenile offender or had access to any of the programs available in the juvenile justice system; that, if Mays were sentenced as a juvenile offender rather than an adult, he would likely remain in custody until he was 22 and 1/2 years old; and that his mother and others thought he would benefit from the programs available in the juvenile justice system. At the conclusion of the evidence presented by the three juveniles, the prosecutor moved for a directed verdict arguing that the juveniles had failed to rebut the presumption that they should be tried as adults. After hearing arguments but no additional evidence, the district court found that all three juveniles had failed to rebut the presumption that they should be prosecuted as adults. The judge made the following findings with regard to the factors listed in K.S.A. 38-1636: [T]he first three are matters that are . . . clearly in this case, in terms of the seriousness of the offense, whether or not violence was used, and whether it was a person offense . . . those are clearly factors which, from what's before me, are in concert with the presumption that exists. Let me address, for a moment, the issues of factors four and five regarding previous offenses and unadjudicated pending offenses. I find that, with regard to Shawndell Mays, that there are none. . . . With regard to the issue of sophistication, as I have read the cases that have addressed that particular factor, they have to do with whether or not the individual is less or more sophisticated than a person his age. And. . . I'm not convinced that any of them are, in level of sophistication, different from people who are generally of their . . . respective ages. With regard to issue number seven, I suppose that's what I've heard most of the evidence about; and I've heard lots of evidence about what's available, and what has been done, and what hasn't been done. But the factor, as set forth in the statute, that I'm to consider is whether there are facilities or programs available to the court which are likely to rehabilitate the respondent prior to the expiration of the court's jurisdiction under this code; and I have absolutely no evidence, a dearth of evidence on that issue as to the likelihood of rehabilitation. There . . . is no evidence. I'm not suggesting that there . . . could have been. . . . I don't know that there is any evidence . . . of likely rehabilitation, but that's the language of the standard. And finally, the issue of . . . whether . . . the respondent or the community would be better served by a criminal justice prosecution. . . . I have no difficulty in finding, from what I've heard today, that there is not evidence which rebuts the presumption established by the Legislature that [the juveniles]in the cases that are before me today  should, in fact, be determined to be adults for the purpose of prosecution in those cases; and the Court so finds. In his brief, Mays argues that the district court's decision to authorize his prosecution as an adult was not supported by substantial evidence because the State presented no evidence and relied solely on the complaint. In support of this argument, Mays cites State v. Stephens, 266 Kan. 886, 975 P.2d 801 (1999). In Stephens, this court reviewed a district court's decision to authorize prosecution of a 17-year-old as an adult. The version of K.S.A. 38-1636 in effect at the time of Stephens' hearing required the State to present substantial evidence supporting his prosecution as an adult. See K.S.A. 38-1636 (Furse 1993). Mays was authorized for prosecution as an adult pursuant to K.S.A. 38-1636(a)(2), which places the burden on the respondent to rebut the presumption that he is an adult. Thus, the analysis in Stephens is not applicable. Furthermore, the holding in Stephens does not support Mays' argument. In Stephens, the district court reviewed each of the eight factors set out at K.S.A. 38-1636(e). As to factor (8), which requires the court to consider whether the interests of the respondent or of the community would be better served by criminal prosecution, the district judge made the following conclusory finding: `There's a strong interest in this community to be able to feel safe and if nowhere else certainly in your own home. There's a strong interest in this community that juveniles should be held accountable for their actions, and when juveniles who have the necessary intellect make adult decisions they should receive adult consequences. I see both of the Respondents in this matter had a choice back in November as to what it is they wanted to do.' Stephens, 266 Kan. at 891. Noting that the district court had failed to discuss whether the respondents' interests would be served by criminal prosecution, although reference was made to the community, this court found there was not substantial evidence in favor of adult prosecution as to factor (8). 266 Kan. at 892. It is upon this conclusion which Mays relies. However, the Stephens court held that, despite the lack of substantial competent evidence as to factor (8), the record as a whole reflected substantial evidence to show that Stephens was properly prosecuted as an adult. 266 Kan. at 892. This holding follows from K.S.A. 38-1636(e), which provides: The insufficiency of evidence pertaining to any one or more of the factors listed in this subsection, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of the issue. Similarly, in this case, insufficiency of evidence as to one or more factors does not, of itself, defeat the district court's conclusion that Mays failed to rebut the presumption that he should be tried as an adult. Clearly, the district court weighed each factor of K.S.A. 38-1636(e). We conclude that the court's decision to try Mays as an adult was supported by substantial evidence.