Opinion ID: 2071445
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: lps has failed to show right to intervene as plaintiffs

Text: If it cannot intervene as defendants, LPS argues that it should be allowed to intervene as plaintiffs if the school funding system is declared unconstitutional. It argues that it will lose funding if the statutes are unconstitutional and that it has a direct interest in the action. OPS, however, argues that LPS did not properly plead a direct legal interest and that any interest LPS has is speculative. The intervention statutes are to be liberally construed. In re Change of Name of Davenport, 263 Neb. 614, 641 N.W.2d 379 (2002). But the interest required as a prerequisite to intervention under § 25-328 is a direct and legal interest  an interest of such character that the intervenor will lose or gain by the direct operation and legal effect of the judgment which may be rendered in the action. In re Interest of Destiny S., 263 Neb. 255, 639 N.W.2d 400 (2002); Ruzicka, supra . An indirect, remote, or conjectural interest in the result of a suit is not enough to establish intervention as a matter of right. In re Change of Name of Davenport, supra . Therefore, a person seeking to intervene must allege facts showing that he or she possesses the requisite legal interest in the subject matter of the action. Id.; Ruzicka, supra . We have defined an interest in the matter in litigation as the subject matter of the action, `the thing in controversy.' Kirchner v. Gast, 169 Neb. 404, 411, 413, 100 N.W.2d 65, 72, 73 (1959). The Maryland Court of Appeals considered a similar case in which a school district sought to intervene as a plaintiff. See Montgomery County v. Bradford, 345 Md. 175, 691 A.2d 1281 (1997). In Bradford, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that students in Baltimore were deprived of their right to at least a minimum quality of education required in the state constitution. Montgomery County sought to intervene, contending in a detailed petition that if the funding statutes were found unconstitutional, it would result in a diminution of resources to other districts in the state, including Montgomery County. Montgomery County argued that it had a strong interest in the lawsuit and that it had a fundamental interest to participate in defining the constitutional parameters of an adequate education in Maryland that would not harm Montgomery County. The plaintiffs opposed intervention, arguing that Montgomery County did not have a direct legal interest in the litigation. The trial court denied intervention, finding that whether the Montgomery County students were receiving an appropriate education was not an issue in the suit and that any future loss of funds was speculative. Montgomery County appealed, presenting the same primary arguments as LPS: (1) that it had an interest in preserving state funding and (2) that should the funding scheme be found unconstitutional, it had an interest in the remedies that the court might fashion. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed. The court determined that Montgomery County's concerns were speculative because they were premised on future events that might not occur and that any decreased funding would not automatically follow. The court stated: [T]he County's concerns are indirect, remote, and speculative; they do not focus directly on the transaction involved in these cases, viz, whether the plaintiffs' actions, directed, as they are, solely to the constitutional adequacy of the education provided to children in the Baltimore City public schools, implicates Montgomery County's legal interest in any way which would give it a right to intervene in these cases under [the state intervention rule]. Were it otherwise, according to the plaintiffs, and that was all that was needed to establish a right to intervene, then any applicants' generalized interest in participating in the formulation of a constitutional standard, to which the person may be subjected, could intervene as a party from which an interpretation of a constitutional provision might emerge. Id. at 199, 691 A.2d at 1293. Likewise, the Connecticut Supreme Court denied intervention as a matter of right in a similar case. Horton v. Meskill, 187 Conn. 187, 445 A.2d 579 (1982). Discussing whether the intervenors had a direct interest when the action concerned students in a different district, the court noted that a person or political subdivision does not have a sufficient interest to create a right to intervene merely because an impending judgment might have some effect on the intervenor. Id. Here, without providing individualized details, LPS pled only the following allegations of a direct legal interest: [I]n the event Nebraska's school funding system or the state aid formula is held to be unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful... the causation of such must be determined, and that to the extent Nebraska's school funding system or the state aid formula is determined to be the cause, that Intervenors ... join [OPS] in claiming what is sought by the Complaint.... [LPS] will be subject to harm from any loss of funding and such loss of funding will cause the funding system or the state aid formula to be unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful as to [LPS]. Like Montgomery County v. Bradford, 345 Md. 175, 691 A.2d 1281 (1997), and Horton, supra, we hold that this speculative allegation is insufficient to state a direct legal right that would allow intervention. LPS has not alleged details to show how it would lose funding, or how much. Further, whether any funding would be lost is speculative because it is dependent on a ruling finding the funding scheme unconstitutional. Moreover, actions by the State that would act to decrease funding  actions such as legislative redrafting or budgeting  would fall outside of the trial court's control. For example, as the trial court has already noted, if it enjoined operation of the school funding statutes, it could not dictate to the state Legislature how and in what amount it should fund the schools. Instead, the court could find only that the current system was unconstitutional. The Legislature would then be required to resolve the issue through different budgeting, redrafting of statutes, and tax increases or by applying other unknown solutions. LPS would be free to participate in that process, which is outside of judicial control. Accordingly, we determine that the interest LPS alleges is indirect, remote, and conjectural and thus is not enough to establish intervention as a matter of right.