Opinion ID: 1790101
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: motions to dismiss appeal

Text: Defendant filed a motion and two supplemental motions to dismiss this appeal. These motions present two distinct arguments. The first is that he was acquitted by the city court, and that therefore, the City cannot take an appeal from that decision. The second argument is that the City cannot take an appeal from the decision (on the oral motion to quash) declaring the statute unconstitutional, because the City failed to make a contemporaneous objection to that ruling. Neither of these contentions has merit. Defendant claims that an appeal from this judgment could could result in his being placed on trial again, a violation of his right not to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. U.S. Const., Amend. 5; La.Const. Art. I, Sec. 15. Louisiana's statutory scheme regarding double jeopardy appears in the following provisions. La. C.Cr.P. art. 591 provides that no person shall be put in jeopardy of life or liberty twice for the same offense except, when on his own motion, a new trial has been granted, the judgment has been arrested or a mistrial has been ordered. La.C.Cr.P. art. 592 provides in part that when a defendant pleads not guilty, and is tried without a jury, jeopardy begins when the first witness is sworn at the trial on the merits. La.C.Cr.P. art. 912(B) provides that the state may not appeal a verdict of acquittal. That section also lists certain judgments and rulings which may be appealed by the state, including a motion to quash. La.C. Cr.P. art. 912(B)(1). Defendant argues that jeopardy had attached in this case and that the City could not appeal the city court's acquittal, citing State v. Baskin, 301 So.2d 313 (La. 1974) and State v. Johnese, 304 So.2d 331 (La. 1974). However, in those cases, the trial judge had granted a directed verdict of acquittal for lack of evidence. In this case, the city court did not acquit defendant. The city court decided only the merit of the motion to quash and the constitutionality of the statute. The court did not decide defendant's guilt or innocence. The court gave the following reasons for its judgment: It's a conclusion of this court that the requirements of vagueness and overbreadth ought to be construed narrowly and that ordinances ought to be written in such a manner as to clearly put persons on notice that if they fail to do something, or that they do do something that's proscribed by the ordinances, that that's criminal, subjecting them to the possible prospect of deprivation of not only their money but their liberty. And believing that this particular ordinance does not meet muster, I'm going to declare it unconstitutional as a criminal ordinance. Additionally, there is no need for defendant to have to go through a second trial on this offense. Should this Court overturn the city court's ruling on the motion to quash, we need only remand the case to the city court for a ruling on the merits of the case. The judge has already heard all testimony, has a complete record, and can now make a decision on defendant's guilt or innocence. There is no need in this case to empanel a new jury or conduct a new trial. A successful appeal by the City therefore will not result in violating defendant's constitutional or statutory rights against double jeopardy. While motions to quash are usually filed before the beginning of trial, and appeals or writs thus taken from adverse rulings before the swearing of witnesses or empaneling of jurors, such is not always the case. In fact, C.Cr.P. art. 535(E) specifically authorizes the court to defer a hearing (and by implication, the ruling) on a motion to quash until the end of a trial. As stated earlier, the Legislature also specifically provided that the state may appeal an adverse ruling on a motion to quash, in C.Cr.P. art. 912(B)(1). Clearly, the Legislature intended that any adverse ruling on a motion to quash should be appealable, whether the ruling was made before, during or after a trial on the merits. Defendant also argues that the City may not appeal because it did not object to the court's ruling on the oral motion to quash. La.C.Cr.P. art 841(A) provides that an error cannot be availed of after a verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence. Article 841(B) states that the requirement of an objection shall not apply to the court's ruling on any written motion. Defendant's argument that these provisions preclude an appeal in this case is without merit. It is well settled in our law that an objection need not be raised by incantation. It is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take, or his objections to the action of the court, and the grounds therefor. State v. Vanderpool, 493 So.2d 574, 575 (La. 1986), citing C.Cr.P. art. 841 and State v. Boutte, 384 So.2d 773 (La.1980). The contemporaneous objection rule has two purposes: 1) to put the trial judge on notice of the alleged irregularity so that he may cure the problem and 2) to prevent a defendant from gambling for a favorable verdict and then resorting to appeal on errors that might easily have been corrected by objection. State v. Thomas, 427 So.2d 428, 433 (La.1982) (on rehearing). In this case, the City made it known at trial that it believed the motion to quash should be denied. When asked to present his arguments as to the constitutionality of the ordinance, the City Attorney stated: I don't think there's anything vague about the statute, Your Honor, and I don't think there's any overbreadth. Section 404 clearly tells a property owner what ... he can and can't do in this kind of situation. Moreover, I think that anybody, in reading, this can ... apply very easily ... what it's there for; to affect [sic] a reasonable and easy access to utilities by all people in the particular neighborhoods. Moreover, the penalty section is very clear. I don't see any vagueness, I don't see any overbreadth. I just simply see a man trying to do what he wanted to do and without having any concern and consideration for the law that is there to help everybody else. Whatever the merit of defendant's contention that the City needed to object to the granting of the motion to quash in order to appeal it, it is evident that the City did all it could to preserve its appeal by making the arguments above. This appeal is therefore properly before us.