Opinion ID: 2074738
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pro Se Defense

Text: After appellant's first trial, [2] he filed a motion on April 21, 1976 to proceed pro se before Judge Norma Johnson, and requested that Mr. Warren Nighswander be permitted to assist in his retrial scheduled for April 26th. On April 22nd, Mr. Nighswander sought a continuance for additional time to prepare for trial. During the hearing on the two motions, appellant informed the court that he had retained another attorney, and that if that attorney was unable to provide representation, he would seek to continue pro se. On April 26th, when the case was called for trial, Mr. Shorter, appellant's retained counsel, informed the court that he was unable to represent appellant and the motion to proceed pro se was renewed. A hearing was set for May 11, at which time appellant filed another motion for permission to choose his own court-appointed attorney or, in the alternative, to represent himself with Mr. Nighswander's assistance. The court denied the first motion, but granted the latter, and appointed Mr. Nighswander as amicus curiae. Appellant, at another pretrial hearing on June 9th asked the court to appoint a Mr. Lewis Kleinman, retained by appellant's sister, to act as co-counsel for appellant. A further hearing was scheduled and Mr. Muse, defense counsel at the first trial, was permitted to withdraw. [3] In September, the case was re-assigned to Judge Nunzio, who appointed Mr. Robbins as counsel for appellant. It was at appellant's first status hearing before Judge Nunzio that the court advised him that it would look to the attorney. Appellant filed a Motion to Continue Defendant as Counsel and later wrote two letters, received November 11th and 17th, in which he complained that he had not yet heard from Mr. Robbins. Meanwhile, Robbins made a motion to the court requesting clarification of his duties with respect to appellant's representation. The court's Order in response thereto stated: It further appears that the basis of the defendant's claim for self-representation lies in his belief that he is most qualified to litigate the factual aspects of his defense. In light of this belief, the Court will allow the defendant as much latitude in his self-representation in this area as the rules of evidence and the interests of justice allow. The court directed that: 1. Mr. Robbins shall represent the defendant at all purely legal proceedings, such as pretrial conferences, bench conferences, voir dire, and jury selection. 2. Mr. Robbins shall raise all evidentiary objections during the course of trial. 3. All future pleadings by the defense shall be filed by and through Mr. Robbins to insure compliance with the rules of the Court. On December 16, 1976, appellant filed a Motion to Vacate Order Denying Pro Se Right and on December 29, a Motion to Withdraw Counsel, in which appellant claimed dissatisfaction with Mr. Robbins' appointment and performance. The court denied both motions. Prior to trial, the court directed (1) that appellant conduct all examinations from behind counsel table; (2) that appellant file all evidentiary objections in writing at the conclusion of trial; [4] and (3) that Mr. Robbins alone participate in bench conferences during trial. Appellant filed two more motions prior to trial in which he objected to Mr. Robbins' participation. However, the objections were not renewed when trial commenced on January 12, 1977. Appellant cites numerous isolated comments from the bench in an attempt to support his allegation of denial of appellant's constitutional right to self-representation. He points specifically to the appointment of Mr. Robbins, claiming he was more than mere standby counsel, and to the court-imposed limitations on his own trial participation as unconstitutional deprivations. However, after a review of the entire transcript, we find that appellant was indeed permitted to present his defense. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). We recognize that any violation of the defendant's right to pro se representation, based as it is upon the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, requires reversal as presumptively prejudicial. Faretta v. California, supra at 836, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. See Jackson v. United States, D.C.App., 420 A.2d 1202 (1979). Several weeks before trial, Faretta clearly and unequivocally declared to the trial court his desire to represent himself. Id. at 836, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. The record revealed that he was literate, competent, and understanding, and . . . voluntarily exercising his informed free will. Faretta v. California, supra . Nevertheless, the trial court forced the defendant to accept against his will a state-appointed public defender, and required that Faretta's defense be conducted only through the appointed lawyer. . . . Id. at 811, 95 S.Ct. at 2529. Faretta was thus deprived of his constitutional right to present any of his [own] defense. However, in Faretta at 836 n.46, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 n.46, the Supreme Court explicitly condoned an appointment, even over a defendant's objection, of a stand-by counsel to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, citing United States v. Dougherty, 154 U.S.App.D.C. 76, 87-89, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124-26 (1972), as an example. In Dougherty, supra, the court denied motions of the nine codefendants for pro se representation. The court required that motions, objections, and examination of witnesses be made through counsel. It did, however, agree to permit each defendant to make a five-minute opening statement and to testify in narrative form at reasonable length without a specific time limit. Dougherty, supra at 82, 473 F.2d 1113. Thus, the circuit addressed the question as to whether the overall format of the trial was such, in terms of the latitude given to the defendants, that they in effect had the substance though not the form of pro se representation, id. at 92, 473 F.2d 1113, but found that [t]he court's indulgence of defendants undoubtedly appeared as exactly that, a matter of grace  as something `extra' given to them beyond their due rights  which undercuts the objective of preserving defendant's personal autonomy and responsibility in the courtroom. Id. at 92, 473 F.2d 1113. [5] Judge Nunzio, on the other hand, made it abundantly clear from the outset, and reminded the jury frequently that Mr. Kleinbart was acting as his own attorney and permitted him a substantial measure of active participation. Appellant argues that standby counsel's role is thus limited to the extent that the defendant wishes to avail himself of the attorney's services. Mr. Robbins, he claims, actually served as co-counsel, apparently because of the amount of representation he afforded appellant. The record is replete with instances of consultation between the two, without any apparent interference or coercion by the court. Appellant assigns as error the court's directives that Mr. Robbins, against appellant's wishes, represent him at all purely legal proceedings, such as pretrial conferences, bench conferences, voir dire, and jury selection, in raising evidentiary objections, and in filing all pleadings. Appellant's contentions, however, are not supported by the record. We will address each briefly seriatim. First, in regard to appellant's claim that he was denied the right to act pro se, we note that appellant made both opening and closing statements to the jury, conducted an extensive examination of each witness and testified himself in narrative form. Additionally, he was permitted to make motions and objections, and to participate in all of the pretrial conferences and most of those held during the trial. His attorney made numerous evidentiary objections and participated in bench conferences, sometimes to a limited extent, when his client was present, and advised appellant on the frequent occasions that he sought help. Appellant cites 12 instances in which a bench conference during trial was held in which Mr. Robbins participated and appellant was excluded. Three of those resulted in rulings adverse to appellant: (1) the trial court refused to give an impeachment instruction; (2) the trial court admitted photographs of the crime scene into evidence; and (3) the trial court overruled appellant's objection to a propounded prosecution question regarding the place where appellant had first met one witness. These three isolated rulings alone in a trial that lasted several days are not sufficient to support appellant's contention that the trial court denied him his right to pro se representation. Appellant also argues that during the voir dire, appellant was restricted from participation in the questions propounded from the bench. However, the court performed the questioning itself, and then gave Mr. Robbins time to relate to appellant the prospective jurors' answers. In fact, the judge conducted the entire voir dire himself. It is unclear from the record whether Mr. Robbins or appellant exercised the defense strikes, however, there were no restrictions on appellant in that function. Each of appellant's written objections, submitted at the end of his trial, were considered by the court and are separate issues presented in this appeal. In each case, Mr. Robbins noted an objection for the record. Finally with regard to the directives for filing defense pleadings, the following colloquy took place: THE COURT: I'm not going to take anything [pleadings] from you because you have a lawyer now. If he approves. . . let him redo it and I'll receive it from him. You're working together. MR. KLEINBART: I can't file anything with the Court? THE COURT: I'll take it. It will be filed, but I want him to either adopt it or not, it's improper and redo it. Anything you have there, I'll accept, but I'm not going to rule on it if I'm not satisfied. The basis for the ruling was to insure compliance with the procedural rules of the court, which are binding on pro se defendants. See Faretta, supra at 834, n.46, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 n.46. Appellant has tried to make a forceful argument on this issue, but a reading of the record reveals that he had almost complete leeway and was in control of his own defense but for the few exceptional areas we have noted, which may properly be reserved to counsel. We conclude that appellant was not deprived of his right to act pro se.