Opinion ID: 3179417
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasonability and Chevron Discretion

Text: Because we have concluded that Congress has not resolved whether adjustment to LPR status terminates an alien’s asylum status, we next consider whether the BIA’s assertion that LPR status terminates asylum status is reasonable under Chevron step two. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843– 44. However, when the BIA has not yet exercised its Chevron discretion to interpret the statute in question, “the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.” Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 523 (2009) (quoting Gonzalez v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006) (quoting I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002))). In Negusie, the Supreme Court remanded to the BIA “for its initial determination of the statutory interpretation question and its application to this case” because the BIA relied on a case that was not controlling. 3 Id. at 523–25. In C-J-H-, the BIA relied on non-controlling case 3 Other circuits have remanded to the BIA for elaboration in circumstances similar to Ali’s case. See Velerio-Ramirez v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 111, 112–13 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting that the BIA incorrectly relied on a statute with different language and did not make reference to the correct statutory provision and stating, “[i]nconsistent characterization of the governing law by the immigration authorities and insufficient analysis by the [BIA] lead us, in an abundance of caution, to remand this petition to the BIA”); Lawl v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 710 8 Case: 15-60004 Document: 00513391037 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 No. 15-60004 law that addressed the relationship between refugee status and LPR status and did not address the asylum termination grounds listed in § 1158(c); thus, we conclude that the BIA did not exercise its Chevron discretion because it did not fully consider the statutory question presented here, and we remand in accordance with Negusie. The BIA’s assertion in C-J-H- that an alien’s asylum status is terminated upon adjustment to LPR status involves the interpretation of a statute that is ambiguous as to this issue. However, in making this assertion, the BIA made no mention of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)—even though it would seem necessary to interpret this subsection in order to conclude that adjusting to LPR status terminates asylum status. In addition to making no mention of § 1158(c), the BIA did not analyze DHS regulations that suggest that LPR status may not terminate asylum status. Instead, the BIA relied on previous BIA and federal court interpretations of INA provisions related to refugees without acknowledging significant differences between asylees and refugees provided in the INA and DHS regulations. In C-J-H-, the BIA made no mention of the asylum termination grounds provided in § 1158(c)(2). The BIA held that an asylee who adjusted to LPR status could not readjust to LPR status under § 1159(b) during deportation proceedings. 26 I. & N. Dec. at 286–87. In reaching this holding, the BIA relied solely on case law that addressed whether refugees who had adjusted to LPR status could readjust under § 1159(b). Id. The BIA also relied on its assertion F.3d 1288, 1292–94 (11th Cir. 2013) (recognizing the inconsistency between BIA interpretations, the immigration statutes, and regulations and, thus, remanding to the BIA); Sandoval v. Holder, 641 F.3d 982, 988 (8th Cir. 2011) (remanding and noting “[w]hile this court is prepared to give deference to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute, in this case such interpretation is simply missing”); Isidro-Zamorano v. Holder, 365 F. App’x 846, 847 (9th Cir. 2010) (remanding because the BIA applied BIA precedent that was “not determinative” and thus did not exercise its Chevron discretion). 9 Case: 15-60004 Document: 00513391037 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 No. 15-60004 that “[o]nce [the asylee] became a lawful permanent resident, he no longer had the status of an asylee.” See id. at 285. However, the BIA made that assertion by relying on the same refugee case law. The BIA cited In re Smriko, 23 I. & N. Dec. 836, 841 (BIA 2005)—a case that it recognized “held that a refugee admitted as a lawful permanent resident is subject to removability even though his refugee status has not been terminated.” C-J-H, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 285; see Romanishyn v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 455 F.3d 175, 183 (3rd Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Board so held, [in Smriko,] not because it believed the acquisition of LPR status itself ‘terminated’ refugee status, but because refugee status never provided absolute exemption from removal in the first place.”). In C-J-H-, the BIA extended the Smriko holding and concluded that refugees who adjust to LPR status do not retain refugee status. 26 I. & N. Dec. at 285. Moreover, Smriko did not control the BIA’s decision in C-J-H- because it interpreted INA provisions relating to refugees—a distinction only briefly addressed by the BIA in C-J-H-. 4 In C-J-H-, the BIA equated refugees and asylees in the context of readjustment under § 1159(b). The only difference the BIA acknowledged between the two types of aliens was that § 1159(a) expressly prohibits refugees who have adjusted to LPR status from readjustment under that subsection; however, § 1159(b) does not contain the same prohibition for asylees who have adjusted to LPR status. C-J-H-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 285. The BIA adopted the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Robleto-Pastora v. Holder that the language of § 1159(b) is plain and that “[t]he legislative history [of the Refugee Act] shows 4 The BIA also cited a Seventh Circuit case, Gutnik v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 683, 692 (7th Cir. 2006), which held that refugees who adjust to LPR status are ineligible to apply for a waiver of inadmissibility because they do not retain refugee status once they adjust to LPR status. Gutnik is the only case the BIA cited in C-J-H- that explicitly asserts that LPR status terminates refugee status. See 26 I. & N. Dec. at 285. Again, this case only interpreted INA provisions relating to refugees. 10 Case: 15-60004 Document: 00513391037 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 No. 15-60004 that Congress saw asylees and refugees as having similar status under the law.” C-J-H-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 286–87 (second alteration in original) (quoting Robleto-Pastora v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2010)). Notably, although the Ninth Circuit addressed the differences between asylees and refugees in relation to § 1159(a) and (b), the court did not address whether adjustment under § 1159(b) terminates asylum status. Robleto-Pastora, 591 F.3d at 1059 (“Without deciding and regardless of whether [the petitioner] simultaneously holds asylee and LPR status, we conclude that he is ineligible for relief from removal under section 209 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1159, and that his petition must therefore be denied.”). Therefore, the Ninth Circuit also did not interpret § 1158(c). In C-J-H-, the BIA did not address significant differences between refugees and asylees as provided in the INA. As noted above, § 1158(c)(2) provides a possibly exhaustive list of grounds for termination of an alien’s asylum status. Additionally, as recognized by the BIA in Smriko, § 1159(a) and its implementing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 209.1, require aliens admitted as refugees to apply for adjustment to LPR status after being present in the United States for one year. 23 I. & N. Dec. at 839. If the application is denied or a refugee does not timely file the application, he will be susceptible to removal proceedings. See id. In Smriko, the BIA emphasized that under these mandatory provisions, an alien’s refugee status does not need to be terminated to begin removal proceedings and consequently refugees that have adjusted to LPR status can be removed without termination of refugee status. Id. at 839– 40. For the BIA to properly exercise its Chevron discretion by relying on refugee case law to hold that adjustment to LPR status also terminates an alien’s asylum status, it must address these differences. In C-J-H-, the BIA also failed to acknowledge BIA precedent and several DHS regulations that suggest that an asylee maintains asylum status even 11 Case: 15-60004 Document: 00513391037 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 No. 15-60004 after an asylee adjusts to LPR status. In Matter of V-X-, the BIA recognized that “the statutory grounds for termination of asylum status are narrower than the grounds of removability” and referenced the list provided in § 1158(c)(2) as the grounds for termination. 5 26 I. & N. Dec. at 149 (emphasis omitted). In addition, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.14(g) specifically allows asylum applicants to seek adjudication of their asylum status, even after being granted LPR status: If an asylum applicant is granted adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident, the Service may provide written notice to the applicant that his or her asylum application will be presumed abandoned and dismissed without prejudice, unless the applicant submits a written request within 30 days of the notice, that the asylum application be adjudicated. 6 Finally, the BIA also did not address the legislative history of § 1158(c). As recognized by the Supreme Court in Negusie: “[O]ne of Congress’ primary purposes’ in passing the Refugee Act was to implement the principles agreed to in the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees . . . as well as the [1951] United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.” 555 U.S. at 520 (citations omitted). Notably, the termination grounds found in § 1158(c)(2) are consistent with the six grounds for cessation of refugee status enumerated under Articles 1(C) and 1(F) of the 1951 Convention, and paragraph 116 of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 5 We recognize that the asylee in Matter of V-X- had not adjusted to LPR status. 26 I. & N. Dec. at 148. However, when the BIA first heard Ali’s case, it remanded for the IJ to terminate Ali’s asylum status under § 1158(c) in part due to Matter of V-X-. 6 Ali also highlights that asylees who have converted to LPR status maintain certain benefits only available to asylees under 8 C.F.R. § 223.1(b) and 8 C.F.R. § 207.7. The petitioner in Smriko pointed to similar regulations that apply to refugees who have adjusted to LPR status, and the BIA held that such benefits did not “shield[] [a refugee who adjusted to LPR status] from placement in removal proceedings.” 23 I. & N. Dec. at 841–42. The BIA did not address whether these regulations conflict with the assertion that adjustment to LPR status terminates an alien’s asylum or refugee status. 12 Case: 15-60004 Document: 00513391037 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 No. 15-60004 Status (Geneva 1972) notes that this list is “exhaustively enumerated.” 7 Given that the BIA’s assertion may be contrary to DHS implementing regulations, that the BIA only relied on refugee case law without addressing significant differences between the two statuses, and that the BIA provided no statutory interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c), we find that the BIA did not give “full consideration of the statutory question here presented.” See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 521. We conclude this discussion by recognizing the importance of the BIA’s assertion. In 2013, 42,235 asylees were granted LPR status. 8 Office of Immigration Statistics, 2013 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, at 18 (August 2014). 9 But, as acknowledged by the Government in its supplemental brief, DHS “does not advise asylees of the potential consequences of adjusting” to LPR status—that, in the Government’s view, they will be eligible for removal proceedings under § 1227 without their asylum status having to be terminated under § 1158(c). The Supreme Court has recognized that deference to the BIA in immigration matters is particularly appropriate given that immigration officers “exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.” I.N.S. v. Abdudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988). Recognizing this importance, we remand for the BIA to exercise its Chevron discretion to determine whether adjustment to LPR status terminates an 7 As noted by amici curie, the Supreme Court has stated that the UNHCR Handbook “provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to conform.” Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 439 n.22. 8 Prior to the passage of the REAL ID Act in 2005, the INA limited the annual number of asylees authorized to adjust to LPR status to 10,000. Office of Immigration Statistics, Annual Flow Report, U.S. Lawful Permanent Residents: 2006, at 1 (March 2007), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/IS-4496_LPRFlowReport_04vaccess ible.pdf. 9 Available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_yb_2013_0.pdf. 13 Case: 15-60004 Document: 00513391037 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/22/2016 No. 15-60004 alien’s asylum status. 10 How the agency considers the interplay between § 1158(c) and § 1159(b) of the INA, the regulatory provisions presented above, the distinctions between refugees and asylees, and the legislative history “may have relevance in determining whether its statutory interpretation is a permissible one.” Negusie, 555 U.S. at 519.