Opinion ID: 1639440
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the chancellor abused his discretion in denying Ruff's request for a mandatory permanent injunction.[5]

Text: ¶ 12. Ruff argues that he is entitled to an injunction because the Estate gained an unconscionable advantage, and he suffered irreparable harm, due to his mistaken belief that Big Oaks' November 2006 distribution satisfied his December 2006 payment to the Estate. To prevent the intolerable injustice of him losing his farm and cattle based on a mere mistake, Ruff submits that the quitclaim deed in lieu of foreclosure should be set aside and the parties should be allowed to return to the status quo under the terms of the Chancery Consent Order. ¶ 13. For a permanent injunction to issue, a party must show an imminent threat of irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. Punzo v. Jackson County, 861 So.2d 340, 347 (Miss.2003) (quoting Reynolds v. Amerada Hess Corp., 778 So.2d 759, 765 (Miss.2000)). A mandatory injunction is a harsh remedy that is not favored by courts, and should be used only in cases of great necessity. Punzo, 861 So.2d at 348 (quoting Pattillo v. Bridges, 247 So.2d 811, 812 (Miss.1971)). ¶ 14. Equity prevents an intolerable injustice where a party has gained an unconscionable advantage by mistake and the mistaken party is not grossly negligent. Rotenberry v. Hooker, 864 So.2d 266, 271 (Miss.2003). The general rule provides that: [W]here the mistake is of so fundamental a character, that the minds of the parties have never, in fact, met; or where an unconscionable advantage has been gained, by mere mistake or misapprehension; and there was no gross negligence on the part of the plaintiff, either in falling into the error, or in not sooner claiming redress; and no intervening rights have accrued; and the parties may still be placed in statu quo; equity will interfere, in its discretion, in order to prevent intolerable injustice. Rotenberry, 864 So.2d at 271 (emphasis added) (quoting Miss. State Building Comm'n v. Becknell, 329 So.2d 57, 60-61 (Miss. 1976)). ¶ 15. Ruff does not seem to argue that the mistake was of such fundamental character that the parties' minds never met. Instead, he contends that [a]ll four prongs set forth in Rotenberry are met and supported by the substantial evidence.... ¶ 16. The Estate, on the other hand, disputes that a mistaken belief caused Ruff's failure to make the December 2006 payment. But even assuming that he was mistaken, the Estate argues that Ruff is not entitled to an injunction. The Estate maintains that a chancellor is not required to grant injunctive relief on a finding of a unilateral mistake, even if one party will incur some injustice. Rather, the chancellor retains discretion to grant or deny an injunction, even though the evidence is sufficient for the chancellor to grant such relief. ¶ 17. We agree that even if Ruff satisfied all the conditions set forth in Rotenberry, the chancellor nevertheless retained discretion on whether to grant equitable relief. After setting forth considerations for granting equitable relief, Rotenberry states that equity will interfere, in its discretion, in order to prevent intolerable injustice.  Rotenberry, 864 So.2d at 271 (emphasis added) (quoting Becknell, 329 So.2d at 60-61). Thus, even if all the conditions described in Rotenberry are present, the chancellor still reserves discretion on whether equity should interfere. See Rotenberry, 864 So.2d at 271 (quoting Becknell, 329 So.2d at 60-61). ¶ 18. Here, the chancellor conceded that Ruff had presented a good case for equitable relief. Ruff gave a reasonable explanation for not making the December 2006 payment. He knew that a distribution had been made on Big Oaks' A shares in November 2006, [6] and believed that his portion had been paid to the Estate pursuant to the 2005 assignment. His portion of the November 2006 distribution would have been sufficient to satisfy the $2,000 he owed the Estate for December. [7] Because of his omission, the Estate acquired the farm by filing the quitclaim deed in lieu of foreclosure. As a result, Ruff stood to lose his cattle herd and, potentially, to have the breed compromised. [8] Ruff asserts that the parties can be returned to the status quo. He claims that he is able to bring all of his debts current, and is willing to reimburse the Estate for any expenditures. ¶ 19. After hearing all of the evidence, the chancellor granted the Estate's motion to dismiss. The chancellor reasoned that: [Ruff] has not lived up to any of his obligations on his loan from the very beginning. His father had to take him to court and get an equitable lien, he got that, and then he ran to Bankruptcy Court, and then he stopped at that, and then  then went into court to  in, what, 2002? ... And now he's back before the court again today. He's lived up to none of it. He's even behind on the Federal Land Bank. [9] If it was just the simple fact of a $2,000 payment in November and that was it, I think you would have some merit. You say, Yes, it was an oversight. But the truth of the matter is he did not have the money, didn't have the money to pay the Bank of Holly Springs, that debt was due in September. He didn't have the money to pay the Federal Land Bank, that debt it due now. I'm going to deny your motion. I think that's the only fair thing to do. And I'm going to allow the deed in lieu. ¶ 20. We find that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in denying Ruff's motion for injunctive relief. Ruff exhibited a pattern of failing to pay his debts and, at the time of trial, was in default on both the Federal Land Bank and Bank of Holly Springs's notes. Furthermore, Ruff's income prospects were suspect. He acknowledged that the farm itself did not generate income. He planned to bring his debt obligations current by using family funds and selling some of his cattle. ¶ 21. Balancing the equities, Ruff's default also damaged the Estate. Ruff's parents had taken out a loan to finance their loan to him. The Estate continued to make payments on this loan, which was not kept current because of Ruff's default. The Estate's continuing obligation on this loan, combined with Ruff's failure to pay, contributed to a state of insufficient funds for the day-to-day living expenses of Mrs. Ruff. The Estate had to liquidate some of its assets in order to keep up Mrs. Ruff's living conditions. ¶ 22. As noted by the chancellor, equitable relief may have been appropriate if this had been an isolated incident. But given Ruff's history of default, we cannot say that the chancellor abused his discretion in refusing to impose a mandatory injunction. ¶ 23. Under this first issue, Ruff also argues that the Estate violated the terms of the Chancery Consent Order and the Bankruptcy Consent Order by: (1) filing the quitclaim deed when he was not in default; (2) intercepting disbursements due to him when such money could have been used to make his December 2006 payment to the Estate; and/or (3) failing to apply his disbursement toward the December 2006 payment. We decline to reach the merits of these arguments because these issues were not raised before the chancery court. Hataway v. Estate of Nicholls, 893 So.2d 1054, 1057 (Miss.2005) (citing Ellis v. Ellis, 651 So.2d 1068, 1073 (Miss.1995)). Consent orders are in the nature of a contract and are binding and conclusive in the absence of fraud, mutual mistake, or collusion. Guthrie v. Guthrie, 233 Miss. 550, 557, 102 So.2d 381, 383 (1958). Ruff did not pursue equitable relief under a breach-of-contract theory. At trial, Ruff alluded to his desire for the Estate to abide by the terms of the Chancery Consent Order. Yet he never specifically argued that the Estate had violated either consent order, and did not seek a determination as to the legal effect of such orders. [10]