Opinion ID: 1266137
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Ramos Satisfies One of the Threshold Requirements

Text: To qualify for special rule cancellation, an applicant first must show that he falls into one of the five groups identified in 8 C.F.R. § 1240.61(a). [7] As an initial matter, we must briefly address whether we have jurisdiction to consider the BIA's ruling that Ramos failed to satisfy one of these threshold requirements. We hold that we do. Section 309(c)(5)(C)(ii) of IIRIRA, as amended by section 203(b) of NACARA, appears to limit our jurisdiction to review an agency's determination that an applicant failed to satisfy one of the threshold requirements set forth in section 309(c)(5)(C)(i). However, section 106 of the Real ID Act of 2005 restored our jurisdiction over `constitutional claims or questions of law' raised in a petition for review. Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir.2008) (per curiam). In Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646 (9th Cir.2007) (per curiam), we held that such questions of law include not only `pure' issues of statutory interpretation, but also application of law to undisputed facts, sometimes referred to as mixed questions of law and fact. Id. at 648; see also Khunaverdiants v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 760, 765 (9th Cir.2008); Ghahremani v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 993, 998-99 (9th Cir.2007). Because the IJ accepted Ramos's testimony as true and none of the facts pertaining to Ramos's NACARA application is in dispute, we have jurisdiction to consider whether the BIA properly applied the law. We conclude that the BIA erred in adopting the IJ's conclusion that Ramos failed to satisfy one of the threshold requirements. Ramos stated in his NACARA application and argued to the IJ that he was eligible for relief under section 1240.61(a)(4). The IJ acknowledged this fact during an initial hearing. Addressing Ramos's counsel, he stated: You're arguing that [Ramos] falls under the fourth paragraph [of section 1240.61(a)], which is that he is the child of a person who is applying for NACARA. Subsection (a)(4) provides that [a]n alien who is the spouse or child of an individual described in paragraph (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of this section at the time a decision is made to suspend the deportation, or cancel the removal, of the individual described in paragraph (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) is eligible for special rule cancellation, subject to certain exceptions not relevant here. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.61(a)(4). Subsections (a)(1) through (3) classify the individual aliens who qualify for suspension of deportation or special rule cancellation. Despite the IJ's acknowledgment that Ramos claimed relief under subsection (a)(4), the IJ mistakenly analyzed Ramos's claim under subsection (a)(5). Subsection (a)(5) applies only to an applicant who is 21 years of age or older at the time a decision is made to [grant NACARA relief to the applicant's parent], id. § 1240.61(a)(5)(i), and requires a showing that the applicant [e]ntered the United States on or before October 1, 1990, id. § 1240.61(a)(5)(ii). This subsection is plainly inapplicable because, as the IJ found, Ramos was only seventeen years old when he applied for NACARA relief. Therefore, subsection (a)(4) applies, which Ramos undoubtedly satisfies based on the facts found by the IJ. [8] Ramos's father, Roberto Ramos Chamale (Chamale), was granted NACARA relief in the form of permanent resident status on May 25, 2004. [9] Moreover, Ramos qualifies as Chamale's child as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1). Ramos therefore was eligible for NACARA relief subject to meeting the physical presence requirement.