Opinion ID: 795717
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Denial of the Motion for Severance

Text: 139 This Court reviews a district court's severance ruling only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Saadey, 393 F.3d 669, 678 (6th Cir.2005); see also United States v. Breinig, 70 F.3d 850, 852 (6th Cir.1995) ([T]he decision to deny a motion for severance rests within the wide discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed unless there was an abuse of discretion.). Prior to trial, Lupo joined a motion for severance that was presented in the district court by then co-defendant, Raymond Contesti. The district court denied the motion, and Lupo here appeals that denial. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for severance. 140 Rule 8(b) of the Fed. R.Crim.P. provides that [t]he indictment or information may charge 2 or more defendants if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses. Under Rule 8(b), defendants who are `indicted together, [ordinarily] should be tried together.' Breinig, 70 F.3d at 852 (quoting United States v. Warner, 971 F.2d 1189, 1196 (6th Cir.1992)). The Supreme Court has announced that [t]here is a preference in the federal system for joint trials of defendants who are indicted together. Joint trials play a vital role in the criminal justice system. They promote efficiency and serve the interests of justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 141 Notwithstanding the strong preference for joint trials, if a defendant or the government is prejudiced by joinder, Rule 14 permits the court to grant a severance or to `provide whatever other relief justice requires.' Breinig, 70 F.3d at 853 (quoting Fed.R.Crim.P. 14). In order to prevail on a motion for severance, a defendant must show compelling, specific, and actual prejudice from a court's refusal to grant the motion to sever. Saadey, 393 F.3d at 678 (citing United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1215 (6th Cir.1995)); see also Warner, 971 F.2d at 1196 (A showing that a defendant would have a better chance of acquittal in a separate trial does not establish prejudice requiring severance. [] To show enough prejudice to require severance, a defendant must establish substantial prejudice.). Severance should not be granted where the same evidence is admissible against all defendants, nor should it be granted where evidence is admissible against some defendants but not others. Warner, 971 F.2d at 1196. Moreover, a defendant is not entitled to severance because the proof is greater against a co-defendant. Id. (citations omitted). The burden is on defendants to show that an antagonistic defense would present a conflict so prejudicial that defenses are irreconcilable, and the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty. Id. (citations omitted). 142 Lupo argues that the district court erred in not granting the motion to sever because [t]he overwhelming evidence at trial pertained to Gardiner's case and did not involve Mr. Lupo. The jury was left with no other to conclusion to reach but that, due to the strong case against Gardiner, Lupo must also be guilty. (Defendant's Br. at 42.) Not only do we disagree with Lupo's characterization of the evidence presented at trial, but Lupo's argument is expressly foreclosed by the Warner holding that severance is not required because the proof may be stronger against one defendant than another. Lupo's argument that more evidence was presented at trial against Gardiner is not enough to show specific, actual or compelling prejudice. Accordingly, Lupo's motion for severance was properly denied. III. 143 For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM both Defendants' convictions on all grounds, and we AFFIRM Defendant Lupo's sentence, but VACATE Defendant Gardiner's sentence, and REMAND his case back to the district court for resentencing.