Opinion ID: 2219142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis of certified issue

Text: ś 43. The certified issue requires this court to determine to what extent, if any, the Dickerson decision undermines Yang. ś 44. The scope of protection afforded to citizens under the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination has received considerable attention in the opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court, and in this court as well. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). See also Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428; Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460-61 (1972); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964); Yang, 233 Wis. 2d 545, review denied 2000 WI 121, 239 Wis. 2d 310, 619 N.W.2d 92. ś 45. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. The Fifth Amendment is applicable here through the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 2-3 n.1 (1964). The protection from compulsory self-incrimination has been referred to as the mainstay of our adversary system of criminal justice, Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (quoting Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966)), and as one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized. Id. (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956)). Moreover, the privilege against self-incrimination was aimed at a . . . far-reaching evilâ a reoccurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality. Ullmann at 428. Wisconsin, in full accord with the well-founded Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, has also extended protection from self-incrimination in a criminal case to its citizens through Article I, Section 7, of the Wisconsin Constitution. [12]
[5] ś 46. In 1966 the U.S. Supreme Court in a landmark decision, Miranda v. Arizona , expanded restrictions on police interrogation practices. In protecting one's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the Supreme Court established a set of procedural safeguards. According to Miranda, the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of a defendant unless it demonstrates compliance with Miranda dictates. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. [13] If police fail to read the warnings, the suspect's statements in response to questioning are presumed to be coerced, and the prosecution is prohibited from using the statements at trial in its case-in-chief. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). [6] ś 47. Under Miranda, [c]ustodial interrogation means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
[7] ś 48. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Supreme Court articulated the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. According to the Wong Sun majority, derivative evidence, such as physical evidence, is not the fruit of the poisonous tree simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Id. at 488. Rather, derivative evidence must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, if it was discovered by exploiting an illegal search. Id. Consequently, if the derivative evidence is discovered by means sufficiently distinguishable [from the illegality] to be purged of the primary taint, then it is admissible. Id. ś 49. Since 1966 on two occasions the U.S. Supreme Court has considered whether derivative evidence obtained in violation of Miranda should be suppressed. Those two cases are pivotal to our analysis. ś 50. First, in Tucker, the Supreme Court was asked to apply the Wong Sun tainted fruits doctrine to the testimony of a witness whose identity was discovered as the result of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda. Tucker involved an un- Mirandized custodial interrogation that occurred prior to the issuance of the Miranda decision. During the course of the interrogation the defendant identified a relevant witness of whom the police previously had been ignorant. The defendant argued before the Court that the testimony of the witness so identified by the defendant should have been barred as the fruit of the Miranda violation. The Court's rejection of this argument rested largely on its conclusion that excluding the fruits of this confession would have minimal prophylactic effect because the officers were acting in complete good faith under prevailing pre- Miranda law that barred only coerced confessions. The Tucker court explained: The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. . . . Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force. We consider it significant to our decision in this case that the officers' failure to advise the respondent of his right to appointed counsel occurred prior to the decision in Miranda. Although we have been urged to resolve the broad question of whether evidence derived from statements taken in violation of the Miranda rules must be excluded regardless of when the interrogation took place, we instead place our holding on a narrower ground. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447. ś 51. Second, in Elstad the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether a defendant's post- Mirandized statements must be suppressed as the fruit of the earlier Miranda violation. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 303. In that case, the defendant made incriminating statements while in custodial interrogation prior to the Miranda warnings. The police then administered Miranda warnings, and, thereafter, the defendant made further incriminating statements. The Elstad court held that suppression was not required, rejecting the view that the post-warning statements were the unconstitutional product of a subtle form of lingering compulsion, the psychological impact of the suspect's conviction that he has let the cat out of the bag. . . . Id. at 311.
ś 52. Relying on Tucker and Elstad, the Wisconsin court of appeals in Yang, 233 Wis. 2d 545, ś 3, held that the officer's failure to administer the Miranda warnings prior to Yang's oral statements was not a constitutional infringement. The court of appeals said: The Tucker and Elstad holdings could not be clearer: the poisonous tree in Wong Sun is a constitutional violation and, absent such a violation, there is no tainted fruit. It is well established that the failure to deliver Miranda warnings is not itself a constitutional violation. (Citing Elstad ). Accordingly, derivative physical evidence obtained as a result of an unwarned statement that was voluntary under the Fifth Amendment is not tainted fruit. Yang, 233 Wis. 2d 545, ś 36. ś 53. Moreover, the court of appeals in Yang said: Policemen investigating serious crimes [cannot realistically be expected to] make no errors whatsoever. If errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself. Yang, 233 Wis. 2d 545, ś 37 (citing Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308-309).
ś 54. Several months after Yang was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Dickerson that Miranda was a constitutional decision, and that it created a constitutional rule, and therefore, Congress could not legislatively overrule Miranda. Dickerson, 530 U.S at 441. ś 55. Consequently, we are faced with the question of whether the Supreme Court decision in Dickerson completely undermined the Yang decision. ś 56. Lower courts applying Dickerson have split on the proper application of Wong Sun to the physical fruits resulting from a Miranda violation. For example, the Third and Fourth Circuits have ruled that the physical fruits of a Miranda violation never are subject to Wong Sun suppression. In DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 179-81, cert denied, 122 S.Ct. 1631 (2002), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the admission of a gun found as a result of a voluntary statement made by the defendant before he was given Miranda warnings. The court held that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to derivative evidence secured as a result of a voluntary statement obtained before Miranda warnings are issued. Id. at 180. Based on Dickerson's discussion of Elstad, the Third Circuit concluded that Dickerson continued to observe the distinction between Miranda's application to cases involving the Fifth, rather than the Fourth, Amendment. Id. at 179. ś 57. Similarly, in United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 218-19 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 2606 (2002), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the admission of a gun found as a result of a voluntary statement made by the defendant before he was given Miranda warnings. The Fourth Circuit relied on its prior decision in United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135, 1142 (4th Cir. 1997), which held that derivative evidence obtained as a result of an unwarned statement that was voluntary under the Fifth Amendment is never `fruit of the poisonous tree.' The Fourth Circuit concluded in Sterling that the distinction [drawn in Tucker and Elstad ] between statements and derivative evidence survives Dickerson, Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219, and that  Dickerson does not overrule Tucker or Elstad, and our holding in Elie, based on those two cases, survives. Id. ś 58. In contrast to the Third and Fourth Circuits, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has ruled that the physical fruits of a Miranda violation must be suppressed in certain circumstances, depending on the need for deterrence of police misconduct, in light of the circumstances of each case. United States v. Faulkingham, 295 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2002). In Faulkingham, the First Circuit used a case-by-case approach that requires the suppression of derivative evidence only when the need for deterrence outweighs the reliability of the evidence in a particular case. Faulkingham upheld the admission of drugs and the testimony of a witness discovered as a result of voluntary statements made by the defendant who was not given Miranda warnings. The First Circuit recognized that [t]he various differences in purpose behind the Fourth and Fifth amendments, articulated in Elstad, continue unchanged by Dickerson, and those differences affect the remedial options appropriate for violations of the two distinct constitutional amendments, and more specifically, for violations of the Miranda rule. Id. at 93. Faulkingham acknowledged, contrary to Sterling and DeSumma, that Dickerson's recognition that Miranda violations are constitutional violations strengthened the argument that the physical fruits resulting from a Miranda violation must be suppressed. Id. at 93. ś 59. The Faulkingham court noted that: [un]like some other circuits, we are unwilling, at least until the Supreme Court addresses the issue, to say that the interest of deterrence may never lead to the suppression of derivative evidence from a Miranda violation. Id. ś 60. In a similar vein, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S.Ct. 1788 (2003), affirmed the district court's order that the evidence in that case must be suppressed as the physical fruit of a Miranda violation. The suspect in Patane was arrested for violating a domestic violence restraining order. The suspect himself cut off the officer's attempt to advise him of his Miranda rights, saying that he already knew his rights. ś 61. In recognizing the split of authority in applying Wong Sun after Dickerson, the Patane court disagreed with the Third and Fourth Circuit Courts in Sterling and DeSumma and said: We conclude that the First Circuit is correct that the physical fruits of a violation must be suppressed where necessary to serve Miranda 's deterrent purpose. However, we part company with the first circuit in the application of that standard, because we conclude that Miranda 's deterrent purpose requires suppression of the physical fruits of a negligent Miranda violation. We therefore conclude that suppression of the gun in the present case was appropriate. Patane, 304 F.3d at 1023, cert. granted, 123 S.Ct. 1788 (2003). ś 62. As noted above, the Patane court distinguished the First Circuit's decision in Faulkingham. Patane disagreed with Faulkingham's conclusion that suppression of the fruits of a Miranda violation is not required in every case. The court in Patane stated: We do not believe that the role of deterrence . . . becomes less primary once the statement itself has been suppressed. Instead, the relevant question remains whether suppression of the statement alone provides deterrence sufficient to protect citizens' constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Patane, 304 F.3d at 1028. ś 63. As noted previously, Wisconsin has also provided protection from self-incrimination in a criminal case to its citizens through Article I, Section 7, of the Wisconsin Constitution. ś 64. Turning to the issue of Dickerson's impact on Yang, we note that here the circuit court relied on Yang to hold that the physical evidence (the sweatshirt) discovered at Knapp's residence as a direct result of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda was admissible. ś 65. However, as discussed previously, Yang relied upon the Elstad-Tucker rule to justify its conclusion that the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine did not apply to physical evidence derived directly from statements given in violation of Miranda. See Elstad, 470 U.S. 298; Tucker, 417 U.S. 433. ś 66. Both Tucker and Elstad were predicated upon the premise that the Miranda rule was a prophylactic rule, rather than a constitutional one. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305 (The prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution . . . . (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)); see also id. at 308 (Since there was no actual infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights, [ Tucker ] was not controlled by the doctrine in Wong Sun that fruits of a constitutional violation must be suppressed.). ś 67. As discussed previously, the foundation upon which Tucker and Elstad were based has been fundamentally altered by Dickerson. Dickerson declared, unequivocally, that Miranda expressed a constitutional rule, rather than a mere prophylactic protection. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444. ś 68. We agree with the Patane court that Sterling and DeSumma focused on an isolated passage in Dickerson. Dickerson noted at the outset of the opinion that  Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. Later in the opinion, in the course of rejecting various arguments supporting the erroneous view that Miranda was not a constitutional decision, the Dickerson court made a distinction between Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438-41. The Sterling court interpreted the distinction to mean that statements and derivative evidence survive Dickerson. ś 69. The Patane court recognized two serious problems with the reasoning in DeSumma and Sterling.  Patane, 304 F.3d at 1024. First, the court in Patane noted that neither Elstad nor Tucker involved the physical fruits of a Miranda violation. Elstad expressly contrasted the subsequent confession it found admissible from the physical fruits, while Tucker expressly limited its holding to pre- Miranda interrogations. Accordingly, the court in Patane recognized that Dickerson effectively left Elstad and Tucker standing but prevented lower courts from extending their holdings. Id. at 1025. As such, Dickerson broke away from pre- Dickerson lower court case law. ś 70. The Patane court noted that DeSumma and Sterling improperly relied on the language in Dickerson that distinguishes Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations. The court in Patane stated that the two violations are different because of the narrowed application of the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine applied to Miranda violations. Patane, 304 F.3d at 1023-24. However, the Dickerson Court did not say that the doctrine did not apply at all. [14] ś 71. In pointing out the analytical flaws in DeSumma and Sterling, the Patane court concluded that: [a] blanket rule barring application of the fruits doctrine to the physical fruits of a Miranda violation would mark a dramatic departure from Supreme Court precedent. Patane, 304 F.3d at 1026 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984)). ś 72. In addition to the holding in Dickerson that Miranda violations are indeed constitutional violations, there are important policy considerations underpinning the logic of the exclusionary rule. [8] ś 73. Here, it is undisputed that Roets intentionally violated Knapp's Miranda rights in order to procure derivative/physical evidence. As stated in the State's brief: The State conceded below (52:1) that Detective Roets violated the requirements of Miranda when, without an advisement and waiver of Miranda rights, he asked Matthew Knapp in his bedroom on December 13, 1987, what clothing he had been wearing on the evening of December 11 and the early morning of December 12. Appellant-Cross-Resp't Br. at 10. If we do not suppress physical evidence in situations of intentional violations of Miranda, we, in essence, undermine the deterrent effect upon which such a decision was based. ś 74. The rule argued for by the State would minimize the seriousness of the police misconduct producing the evidentiary fruits, breed contempt for the law, and encourage the type of conduct that Miranda was designed to prevent, especially where the police conduct is intentional, as it was here. See Patane, 304 F.3d at 1026 (citing Yale Kamisar, On the  Fruits  of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 929, 933 (1995) (Unless the courts bar the use of the often valuable evidence derived from an inadmissible confession, as well as the confession itself, there will remain a strong incentive to resort to forbidden interrogation methods.); David A. Wollin, Policing the Police: Should Miranda Violations Bear Fruit?, 53 Ohio St. L. J. 805, 843-48 (1992) (Police officers seeking physical evidence are not likely to view the loss of unwarned confession as particularly great when weighed against the opportunity to recover highly probative nontestimonial evidence such as a murder weapon or narcotics.)). As author Robert M. Pitler notes: [I]t is clear that if the police were permitted to utilize illegally obtained confessions for links and leads rather than being required to gather evidence independently, then Miranda warnings would be of no value in protecting the privilege against self-incrimination. The requirement of a warning would be meaningless, for the police would be permitted to accomplish indirectly what they could not accomplish directly, and there would exist no incentive to warn. Robert M. Pitler, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, Revisited and Shepardized, 56 Cal.L.Rev. 579, 620 (1968). ś 75. Tucker and Elstad recognized the important policy considerations underpinning Miranda and Wong Sun. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308 (identifying trustworthiness and deterrence as the two rationales for a broad fruits suppression rule). Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447-49. ś 76. The Patane court stated that Supreme Court precedent consistently has recognized that deterrence of police misconduct, whether deliberate or negligent, is the fundamental justification for the fruits doctrine. Patane, 304 F.3d at 1026 (citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-43) (The core rationale consistently advanced by this Court for extending the exclusionary rule to evidence that is the fruit of unlawful police conduct has been that this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory protections.). [15] ś 77. In State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ś 46-47, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517, we discussed the importance of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. Moreover, we recognized that the exclusionary rule not only acts as a deterrent tool in preventing police misconduct, but also acts to preserve judicial integrity. As we noted: Although this remedial principle appears to be the sole pillar supporting the Supreme Court's contemporary rationale for application of the exclusionary rule a second principle, judicial integrity, has been cited in the Court's exclusionary rule jurisprudence: It was of this [judicial integrity] that Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis so eloquently spoke in Olmstead v. United States . . . . For those who agree with me, said Mr. Justice Holmes, no distinction can be taken between the Government as prosecutor and the Government as judge. . . . In a government of laws, said Mr. Justice Brandeis, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the meansâ to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminalâ would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face. Ward, 231 Wis. 2d 723, ś 47 (citations and quotations omitted). ś 78. Based on the reasons set forth above, we reverse the order of the circuit court denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained as the direct result of a Miranda violation arising from the search conducted at the time of Knapp's arrest. [9] ś 79. We accept much of the reasoning in Faulkingham and in Patane, and as such, hold that Dickerson requires us to overrule Yang where the violation of Miranda was intentional. We hold that the policy considerations related to deterrent effect and judicial integrity, which are the underpinnings of the exclusionary rule, support the suppression of physical evidence in situations where there was an intentional Miranda violation. We do not have to, and do not, decide whether a negligent Miranda violation would result in the same holding.