Opinion ID: 780593
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Criminal History Downward Departure

Text: 81 The government appeals the District Court's decision to grant Thorn a downward departure from Criminal History Category II to I. The Presentence Report (PSR) recommended a Criminal History Category of II based on Thorn's November 4, 1985 conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and his June 10, 1993 conviction for offering to file a false instrument that falsely represented that his business had the required insurance. Although the record suggests that defendant did not expressly move for a downward departure from Criminal History Category II to I, 14 the District Court found that Thorn's criminal history was overrepresented and was better represented by Criminal History Category I. It did not make any findings, however, to explain its conclusion that Category II overrepresented the seriousness of Thorn's criminal history. In response, the government asked the Court to confirm that the judge was downwardly departing from II to I, and when the Court responded, yes, the government said okay. The government offered no objection to this departure at the time of sentencing. 82 The government concedes, as it must, that § 4A1.3 provides for a downward departure when a defendant's Criminal History Category significantly overrepresents the seriousness of the particular defendant's criminal history. But it argues that the District Court offered no reasoning to support its conclusion that Category II overrepresented the seriousness of Thorn's criminal history. Further, the government asserts that there is nothing about the defendant's criminal history that would take him outside of the heartland of Category II; rather, that Thorn previously had been cited for civil violations of both OSHA and wage regulations and that his 1993 conviction involved falsified documentation for his business suggested a particularly high risk of recidivism. 15 83 The defendant responds that the government had an opportunity at sentencing to object to the District Court's decision to grant a downward departure. Because the government did not object or oppose the District Court's decision, the defendant asserts that the government waived any objection to the departure. He does not cite any case law, however, to support this argument. Alternatively, the defendant argues that the departure was supported by the credible evidence, considering the age of his previous convictions. 84 We conclude that the government did not forfeit 16 its objection to the criminal history departure because it had inadequate notice that the District Court intended to depart on the ground that Thorn's criminal history score significantly overrepresented his criminal past. Before sentence is imposed, the district court must give the government both notice of the court's intention to depart, including the factors that the judge is planning to rely upon, and some brief explanation as to why these factors warrant a departure, and an opportunity to be heard as to why the contemplated departure is unwarranted. United States v. Jagmohan, 909 F.2d 61, 63-64 (2d Cir.1990); see also United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1120 (2d Cir.1991) (finding that the government had not waived an objection to a departure, even though it had not presented the argument to the court at the time of sentencing, because the government had not received adequate notice of the possibility of departure). As we noted in Jagmohan, 85 The value of prior notice is manifold. First, it will alert counsel to the need to present any available challenge to the accuracy of [those] factors [on which the court intends to rely] and to the propriety of their use for a departure. [ United States v. ] Kim, 896 F.2d[,678,] 681 [(2d Cir.1990)]. Just as defense counsel often will alter the argument made to the court at sentencing once counsel is given notice of the court's intention to depart upward, see id., so too might the focus of the government's presentation prior to the imposition of sentence change if it is informed of the court's intention to depart downward. For example, notice will direct the government to address the technical questions presented by the Guidelines such as whether a departure is permitted on the basis of the factors raised by the sentencing court. Furthermore, notice will permit both parties to develop the record further, giving the sentencing court a sounder basis for assessing the contemplated departure and making appellate review of a departure easier. 86 909 F.2d at 63-64. 87 At sentencing, the District Court acknowledged that Thorn had raised numerous grounds for downward departure and then stated that another factor is the criminal history. This language suggests that the District Court at sentencing was raising for the first time the issue of whether Category II overrepresented the seriousness of Thorn's criminal history, an issue that Thorn had not raised specifically in his sentencing memoranda or orally before the District Court. By not informing the government prior to sentencing of its intention to depart downward on the ground that Thorn's Criminal History score overrepresented the seriousness of Thorn's criminal history and providing the government an opportunity to research and present its opposition to this intended departure, the District Court did not comply with Jagmohan and Alba. Thus, we conclude that the government did not forfeit its argument that the District Court abused its discretion in granting a downward departure from Category II to I. 17 See Alba, 933 F.2d at 1120 ([The government] can scarcely be penalized for failing to raise issues before the district court of which it had no notice. Hence, the government is entitled to advance these arguments on appeal.). 18 88 Although whether a Criminal History score significantly overrepresents the seriousness of a defendant's criminal record may be a permissible ground for a downward departure, see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3 (2000), the District Court did not articulate its findings of fact or conclusions of law that support a finding that Category II significantly overrepresented Thorn's criminal history. 19 Absent some explanation of its reasoning, we are unable to assess whether the District Court abused its discretion in granting a downward departure on this ground. Thus, we remand this issue to the District Court for specific findings consistent with this opinion. See United States v. Tropiano, 50 F.3d 157, 162 (2d Cir.1995) (We will vacate a sentence and remand for resentencing if the district court fails to follow the procedures for making such a departure.); United States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216, 225 (2d Cir.) (holding that in making [a departure on the ground that defendant's criminal history category significantly overrepresents the seriousness of a defendant's criminal history], the sentencing judge must state the `specific reason' for doing so) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (1988) and Cervantes, 878 F.2d at 54), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 980, 113 S.Ct. 480, 121 L.Ed.2d 385 (1992).