Opinion ID: 2639482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Constitutionality of the California Death Penalty Law

Text: Defendant contends that numerous features of the California death penalty law, and the absence of other features that might protect against unfair or unreliable verdicts, violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and parallel California constitutional provisions. He emphasizes California's failure to require that the jury find aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt before it can return a death verdict. He also briefly raises a number of other contentions that this court has previously rejected.
In People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 960, 245 Cal.Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395, we said that application of a reasonable doubt standard at the penalty phase is inappropriate because the decision is a normative judgment reflecting the juror's individual moral assessment of the defendant's culpability. Thereafter, in People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 80, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129, we affirmed that the federal Constitution does not require a jury to find that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Noting that the United States Supreme Court has never directly decided this issue, defendant asks us here to reconsider our past decisions. Defendant points out that several states do require a reasonable doubt standard for the penalty decision, suggesting that there is nothing inappropriate in the use of that standard. He then quotes from Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 112, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1: [C]apital punishment [must] be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all. That language, however, did not impose a requirement that all states use the same procedures in determining penalty. The requirement of reasonable consistency must be understood to mean consistency within a state; there is, for example, no requirement that all states use the same aggravating and mitigating factors. Defendant further argues that the decision whether to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt is one made by weighing the social interests at stake. Among the many examples he cites are In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (juvenile court adjudication) and People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 338, 121 Cal.Rptr. 509, 535 P.2d 373 (commitment as mentally disordered sex offender). All of the cases cited, however, involve an adjudication of guilt or status. Such adjudications are analogous to the guilt phase determination in a capital trial, which is governed by the reasonable doubt standard. The penalty decision, on the other hand, is the counterpart of judicial sentencing in a noncapital case. A trial judge imposing a sentence has never been required to believe that the considerations on which it is based have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, whether or not the sentencing decision involves issues of great social interest. To the contrary, in imposing a sentence the judge may consider actions and offenses that have not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Gragg (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 32, 44-45, 264 Cal.Rptr. 765.) The requirement that prior criminal conduct asserted as an aggravating consideration under factors (b) and (c) of section 190.3 be proven beyond a reasonable doubt is imposed by statute, not by the state or federal Constitution. ( People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 589, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) The Legislature, by vesting the penalty decision in the jury instead of the judge, recognized the importance of the social interests at stake in a capital trial. (See People v. Bacigalupo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 457, 470, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 808, 862 P.2d 808.) But entrusting that decision to a jury does not automatically carry with it a requirement that the jury's decision be made by a reasonable doubt standard. ( People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 566, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931; People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1137-1138, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450.) In conclusion, California death penalty statutes do not provide for a burden of proof in the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and no constitutional authority imposes that requirement. ( People v. Michaels, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 541, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032, and cases there cited.) We therefore adhere to our decisions rejecting defendant's contention.
Defendant argues that section 190.3 does not sufficiently narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty. (See Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 877-878, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235; People v. Bacigalupo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 465-466, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 808, 862 P.2d 808.) As in People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 669, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80, defendant has not demonstrated on this record, or through sources of which we might take judicial notice, that his claims are empirically accurate, or that, if they were correct, this would require the invalidation of the death penalty law. The statistics defendant cites are drawn solely from published decisions of this court and the Court of Appeal, reviewing cases in which a defendant was found guilty. As defendant recognizes, this is obviously a skewed sample. It omits all unpublished decisions, and all cases in which the defendant did not appeal, groups likely to include a higher proportion of cases without special circumstances. Thus defendant's figures fail to show the extent to which the California statute narrows the proportion of death-eligible murderers.
CALJIC No. 8.88 instructs the jury that it may impose a death sentence if the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. The jury was so instructed in this case. Defendant raises three objections to this instruction. First, he contends it allows the jury to impose a death penalty even if death is not the appropriate penalty, an argument we rejected in People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 171, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980. Second, he argues the instruction does not tell the jury that it may not impose the death penalty unless aggravating circumstance outweigh mitigating circumstances, an argument we rejected in People v. Wader, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 662, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80. Finally, he asserts that the instruction does not inform the jury that it cannot return a death verdict if mitigation outweighs aggravation, an argument we rejected in People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432. Defendant also contends that CALJIC No. 8.88 creates a presumption of death. His theory is that a case does not reach the penalty stage unless there is a special circumstance, and the jury is unlikely to view that special circumstance as insubstantial. But CALJIC No. 8.88 does not mandate death whenever aggravating factors are substantial; instead, it requires a weighing of those factors in relation to the mitigating factors.
Defendant contends that the aggravating circumstances listed in section 190.3, especially factors (a) (circumstances of the crime) and (b) (criminal activities involving force or violence), are unconstitutionally vague. The same argument was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-976, 114 S.CT 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750, and by this court in numerous cases. (See People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1137, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450, and cases cited therein.) The trial Court is not required to specify which factors are aggravating or mitigating nor to delete any inapplicable mitigating factors from the list of factors presented to the jury. ( People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1230, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068.) The trial court is not required to instruct the jury that a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole means that defendant will never be paroled, and a sentence of death means that defendant will be executed. ( People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 189, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960.) Evidence about a day in the life of a prisoner on death row, or the effect of a life without possibility of parole sentence, is not admissible. ( People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 876-877, 277 Cal. Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906.) This court has repeatedly rejected arguments that the prosecutor's discretion in deciding whether to seek the death penalty is unconstitutional. (See, e.g., People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 843, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) Finally, defendant contends that all of the specified aggravating and mitigating factors are unconstitutionally vague. This catchall argument fails. Earlier in this opinion we cited authority holding that factors (a), (b), and (d) of section 190.3 are not unconstitutionally vague. ( Ante, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 397-398, 70 P.3d at pp. 382-383.) In the absence of a more focused argument we need not examine the remaining factors. In another catchall contention, defendant asserts that California's failure to adopt penalty phase safeguards found in the statutes of other states renders the California law unconstitutional. Defendant says that in the course of discussing other issues, he has mentioned various safeguards used by other states, but that none is in effect in California. He presents no additional argument or authority here to show that such safeguards are constitutionally required. Citation to procedures used in other states, unaccompanied by any argument to show that California is constitutionally compelled to adopt such procedures, does not raise any issue we must consider.