Opinion ID: 2995288
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Possession Standard

Text: Lane first contends that the district court misunderstood the legal standard of possession and as a result, wrongly instructed the jury and prevented Lane from presenting a viable trial theory. To prove that Lane was a felon in possession of a firearm, the government was required to show that Lane (1) had been convicted of a crime punishable by a prison term exceeding one year and (2) knowingly pos sessed a firearm (3) that traveled in or affected interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. sec.sec. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2); United States v. Phillips, 239 F.3d 829, 847 (7th Cir. 2001). We review Lane’s legal challenge de novo. See United States v. Stott, 245 F.3d 890, 904 (7th Cir. 2001). At trial, the government agreed to focus only on the incidents at the Twin Oaks Tavern and not the gun’s presence in Lane’s garage. We likewise limit our inquiry. At trial, the judge held that momentarily handling a gun satisfied the legal definition of possession as a matter of law. While possession can be actual or constructive, see United States v. Kitchen, 57 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 1995), the government has pressed the actual possession theory. Actual possession occurs when a defendant knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at a given time. United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Kitchen, 57 F.3d at 520). Lane contends that although it is possible for physical contact to constitute possession, it does not do so as a matter of law. According to Lane, he was entitled to argue that the gun was not under his control when he held it because he was merely inspecting a gun owned by someone else. Lane relies heavily on Kitchen, 57 F.3d at 518-23, a drug case, to bolster his reasoning and to provide an example of a situation when momentarily holding contraband did not prove control or possession. In Kitchen, the defendant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. See 57 F.3d at 518- 19. Kitchen’s conviction stemmed from a would-be drug transaction, when Kitchen, a drug buyer, met undercover federal agents to purchase cocaine from them. See id. at 519. The agents showed Kitchen the cocaine, which Kitchen picked up and inspected for two or three seconds. See id. However, before Kitchen could complete the transaction, the federal agents arrested him. See id. Kitchen contested his conviction arguing that he never possessed the drugs despite briefly handling and inspecting them. We reversed the conviction, reasoning that Kitchen’s momentary handling of the cocaine did not constitute possession in the context of the 21 U.S.C. sec. 841(a)(1) charge because Kitchen never exhibited assent to the drug transaction and therefore never demonstrated that he had the authority to exercise control over the cocaine. See id. at 523. We explained that we require . . . some factor indicating that [the defendant] had the authority or the ability to exercise control over the contraband. Id. at 523. In Kitchen we also made clear that [w]e do not attempt to use the present case to formulate a rule workable for all circumstances. Id. We find Lane’s case to be distinguishable. There is a marked difference between the steps necessary to exercise control over drugs and those necessary to control a gun. To deal with the growing menace of drug abuse in the United States, H.R. Rep. No. 91-1444, at 1 (1970), Congress made it illegal to possess drugs with the intent to distribute them. To obtain control over drugs in this context, a defendant needs more than just mere physical contact; he must have the perceived right among the criminals with whom he is interacting to deal, use, transport, or otherwise control what happens to the drugs. See Kitchen, 57 F.3d at 524. Such control is not a foregone conclusion when a defendant’s sole physical contact with drugs is momentary inspection of drugs he does not own or over which he did not have recognized authority. There is a meaningful distinction between physical contact and the ability or authority to control the drugs, so we require proof of a factor beyond mere physical contact to show that the defendant exerted authority or the ability to physically control the drugs. In contrast to drugs, it is much easier to obtain control and therefore possession of a gun in the context of 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(1). Congress originally passed this law as the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 to ’prevent the crook and gangster, racketeer and fugitive from justice from being able to purchase or in any way come in contact with firearms of any kind.’ Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 220 (1975) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1189, at 33 (1937)). Throughout this Act’s subsequent history, this purpose has remained constant. See S. Rep. No. 90-1501, at 22 (1968); H.R. Rep. No. 99-495, at 1-3. From the purpose of the Act, it is reasonable to infer that Congress intended to prohibit felons from exercising any physical control over a gun. Physical control over a gun is remarkably easy to effect. Once the gun is in the defendant’s hands he need only pull the trigger, an act which can be completed in a split second and which is controlled and influenced by nothing more than the defendant’s whim. Lane protests that the circumstances surrounding his inspection of the gun show that he did not possess it. He points out that he was merely inspecting the gun and that when he held the gun it belonged to Bowen. But none of these circumstances bear on Lane’s ability to shoot the gun. Felons handling guns, unlike defendants who have touched drugs, do not need recognition of their authority or any extra element to obtain the ability to shoot the gun. Lane had just as much control over the gun when he inspected it while it belonged to Bowen as he would have if he as the gun’s owner took aim at a rabbit. Because a defendant can shoot a gun so quickly and easily once he holds it in his hands, we conclude that evidence showing that a felon held a gun is by itself a factor indicating that the defendant had the ability to exercise direct control over the [firearm]. The distinction between holding a gun and obtaining control over a gun as required to prove possession is academic. We do not address whether touching a gun as opposed to holding a gun mandates the same result. Lane asserts that in United States v. Wilson, 922 F.2d 1336, 1338-39 (7th Cir. 1991) we implicitly decided that momentarily holding a gun does not constitute possession as a matter of law. In dicta, we offered as an example ofinnocent contact between a felon and a gun the scenario of a felon momentarily handling a gun while taking it away from children who were playing with it. We do not decide whether this example is correct because it may implicate a defense not relevant to Lane’s case. But as a general proposition of law, this statement was dicta and put forth without any reasoning to justify it and we decline to proceed down this path. Our conclusion is further bolstered because it is consistent with holdings of two sister circuits. In United States v. Adkins, 196 F.3d 1112, 1115, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1999), the Tenth Circuit held that a convicted felon violated 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(1) when, in his friend’s presence, he carried the gun she had just purchased from the gun store to her car. Explaining the law, the court stated that once it was established that a felon held a gun even for a mere second or two, the felon was guilty of possessing a firearm unless he truly did not know that the item was a firearm. See id. In United States v. Scales, 599 F.2d 78, 80 (5th Cir. 1979), the defendant was a convicted felon who purchased a gun for his wife to use to defend herself. The defendant advanced the theory that he never actually possessed the gun because he never intended to exercise control over it himself, but only to deliver it to his wife for her use. See id. He requested jury instructions stating that possession required actual control, care, and management of the gun, not passing control, fleeting and shadowy in its nature. The court held that the district court correctly refused to issue this instruction. See id. at 81. These cases are virtually indistinguishable from Lane’s. For the reasons above, we find that holding a firearm establishes possession as a matter of law in the context of a charge under 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(1) and that neither of the district court’s challenged rulings were erroneous. This holding depends heavily on both the purpose of the law in question and on the physical nature of guns. For these reasons, we do not intend to make a rule that is applicable to other statutes or physical situations without analysis spe cific to both.