Opinion ID: 1227867
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: bunnell error

Text: (1) It has long been recognized that under the federal Constitution a defendant's plea of guilty to a criminal charge is only valid if it is voluntarily and knowingly made. ( Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 291 [110 Cal. Rptr. 329, 515 P.2d 273].) In Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709], the United States Supreme Court held that an appellate court may not presume from a silent record that a defendant has voluntarily and intelligently waived the constitutional rights which he implicitly relinquishes by entering a plea of guilty. A few months later, in In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449], certiorari denied, Tahl v. California (1969) 398 U.S. 911 [26 L.Ed.2d 72, 90 S.Ct. 1708], we construed Boykin to require the record to reveal on its face that the trial court, before accepting a guilty plea, expressly advised the accused and obtained his or her waiver of the full panoply of constitutional rights: the rights to trial by jury, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and against self-incrimination. We have often reiterated the Boykin-Tahl requirement that the record show explicit advisements and waivers of constitutional rights. ( People v. Rizer (1971) 5 Cal.3d 35 [95 Cal. Rptr. 23, 484 P.2d 1367] [plea of not guilty by reason of insanity]; In re Sutherland (1972) 6 Cal.3d 666 [100 Cal. Rptr. 129, 493 P.2d 857] [guilty plea entered pursuant to a plea bargain]; Mills v. Municipal Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d 288 [guilty plea of misdemeanor through counsel permitted if record shows defendant's awareness and personal waiver of constitutional rights]; In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 [112 Cal. Rptr. 513, 519 P.2d 561] [admission of allegations of prior felony convictions]; People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 157, fn. 9 [167 Cal. Rptr. 844, 616 P.2d 826] [stipulation to the status of ex-felon].) When the defendant actually pleads guilty or admits prior felony convictions and no such showing appears on the face of the record[,] the conviction must be set aside. ( In re Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d 857, 862; see In re Ronald E. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 315, 321 [137 Cal. Rptr. 781, 562 P.2d 684].) In In re Mosley (1970) 1 Cal.3d 913, 924-926 [83 Cal. Rptr. 809, 464 P.2d 473], certiorari denied, Mosley v. California (1970) 400 U.S. 905 [27 L.Ed.2d 142, 91 S.Ct. 144], albeit in dictum, we extended the Boykin-Tahl advisement and waiver requirements to cases in which a defendant's submission on the transcript of the preliminary hearing was in fact tantamount to a guilty plea. (2) In People v. Levey (1973) 8 Cal.3d 648, 654 [105 Cal. Rptr. 516, 504 P.2d 452], we adopted the dictum of Mosley and held that if a submission is tantamount to a guilty plea, a conviction obtained without advisement and waiver of the right against self-incrimination is reversible per se. These cases describe the right against self-incrimination in very broad terms. (3) The privilege against self-incrimination is applicable not only to a frank admission of guilt but also to statements which could furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed for conviction. ( Blau v. United States (1950) 340 U.S. 159, 161 [95 L.Ed. 170, 172, 71 S.Ct. 223].) A defendant who by his stipulation permits the prosecution to prove its case without requiring the production of any evidence in court, other than the transcript of a prior hearing, furnishes far more than a mere link in the chain of evidence. ( People v. Levey, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 652.) He necessarily forfeits his constitutional right against self-incrimination. In such cases, an affirmative showing of an advisement and waiver rather than a silent record is necessary to establish that the confession of guilt is voluntarily made and that the defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. ( Id., at pp. 653-654; In re Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 132; see Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 395 U.S. 238, 243-244 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 279-280].) Finally, in Bunnell v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.3d 592, we required advisements and waivers of the constitutional rights whether or not a submission is tantamount to a plea of guilty. (4) We specifically held that in all cases in which the defendant seeks to submit his case for decision on the transcript or to plead guilty, the record shall reflect that he has been advised of his right to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and against self-incrimination.... Express waivers of the enumerated constitutional rights shall appear.... In all guilty plea and submission cases the defendant shall be advised of the direct consequences of conviction such as the permissible range of punishment provided by statute.... ( Id. at p. 605.) We stated two purposes for this rule: (1) to assur[e] criminal defendants that the full panoply of constitutional and statutory rights provided by our system of criminal justice is available to them and ... that any waiver thereof by defendants is both voluntary and intelligent ( id. at pp. 605-606); and (2) to relieve trial courts of the unnecessary burden of attempting to determine in advance of the acceptance of the submission whether guilt is apparent, acknowledged, or contested ( id. at p. 605). We expressed the hope that [t]his practice will also lessen the burden on appellate courts which must now attempt to ascertain by examination of the record whether a submission was `tantamount to a plea of guilty' ( id. at p. 606).