Opinion ID: 1893942
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Heading: Iowa Code section 554.9105(1)(d) (1985) provides this definition of a debtor:

Text: Debtor means the person who owes payment or other performance of the obligation secured, whether or not the person owns or has rights in the collateral, and includes the seller of accounts or chattel paper. Where the debtor and the owner of the collateral are not the same person, the term debtor means the owner of the collateral in any provision of the Article dealing with the collateral, the obligor in any provision dealing with the obligation, and may include both where the context so requires[.] This broad definition of debtor obviously encompasses more than the principal debtor, and is not limited to parties having a direct interest in the collateral. In light of this broad definition, one authority has noted that the Uniform Commercial Code requirement for service of notice may conceivably encompass a variety of people, although it suggests a relatively narrow interpretation of the term so as to avoid an unnecessary trap for the unwary creditor. J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 26-10, at 1113 (1980). In Stockdale, Inc. v. Baker, 364 N.W.2d 240, 242-43 (Iowa 1985), we held that a cosigner was a debtor under section 554.9504(3) and thus entitled to receive notice regarding disposal of the collateral. The rationale of Stockdale was that a cosigner has an interest in seeing that the collateral sells for the maximum price possible so as to minimize the cosigner's ultimate exposure to payment. 364 N.W.2d at 243. The same rationale applies here. See Chemlease Worldwide, Inc. v. Brace, Inc., 338 N.W.2d 428, 433 (Minn.1983). Other jurisdictions have held that a guarantor is a debtor entitled to notice. See, e.g., United States v. Lang, 610 F.Supp. 292 (D.Vt.1985) (applying Vermont law); United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 584 F.Supp. 671 (M.D.Pa.1984) (applying Pennsylvania law); National Acceptance Co. v. Medlin, 538 F.Supp. 585 (N.D.Ill.1982) (applying Illinois law); Commercial Discount Corp. v. King, 515 F.Supp. 988 (N.D.Ill. 1981) (applying Illinois law); Prescott v. Thompson Tractor Co., 495 So.2d 513 (Ala. 1986); Connolly v. Bank of Sonoma County, 184 Cal.App.3d 1119, 229 Cal.Rptr. 396 (1986); Barnett v. Barnett Bank of Jacksonville, 345 So.2d 804 (Fla.App.1977); Commercial Discount Corp. v. Bayer, 57 Ill.App.3d 295, 14 Ill.Dec. 647, 372 N.E.2d 926, 5 A.L.R.4th 1283, 1288 (1978); McEntire v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 471 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind.App.1984); In re Estate of Bluestone, 121 Mich.App. 659, 329 N.W.2d 446 (1982) (dictum); Chemlease Worldwide, Inc., 338 N.W.2d at 433 (noting this is majority rule); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Watton, 215 Neb. 318, 338 N.W.2d 612 (1983); Butte State Bank v. Williamson, 215 Neb. 296, 338 N.W.2d 598 (1983); DeLay First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Jacobson Appliance Co., 196 Neb. 398, 243 N.W.2d 745 (1976); T & W Ice Cream, Inc. v. Carriage Barn, Inc., 107 N.J.Super. 328, 333, 258 A.2d 162, 165 (1969); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Natarelli, 93 Misc.2d 78, 401 N.Y.S.2d 404 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1977); State Bank of Burleigh County Trust Co. v. All-American Sub, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 772 (N.D.1980) (dictum); Zion's First Nat'l Bank v. Hurst, 570 P.2d 1031 (Utah 1977); Adams v. B & D Builders & Developers, Inc., 144 Vt. 353, 477 A.2d 628 (1984); Rhoten v. United Virginia Bank, 221 Va. 222, 269 S.E.2d 781 (1980). See generally, Annotation Construction of Term Debtor as Used in UCC § 9-504(3), Requiring Secured Party to Give Notice to Debtor of Sale of Collateral Securing Obligation, 5 A.L.R.4th 1291, 1293-97 (1981). Based on the Code's broad definition of debtor and the rationale of cases from other jurisdictions and our Stockdale case, we conclude that a guarantor is a debtor for purposes of notice under Iowa Code section 554.9504(3). II. The guaranty agreement signed by Jensen was broad and, if given full effect, would waive any rights she might otherwise have under section 554.9504(3) to receive notice of the intended disposition of collateral. Jensen, in fact, does not argue otherwise. We cannot accept the government's argument, however, that, while she may be a debtor under the general definition of that term, she is not a debtor for purposes of section 554.9504(3)'s prohibition against predefault waivers. To do so would give the term debtor different meanings under sections 554.9105(1)(d) and 554.9504(3). Cases from other jurisdictions have held that a guarantor may not waive notice before default under similar statutes. See, e.g., McEntire v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 471 N.E.2d at 1224-25; Chemlease Worldwide, Inc., 338 N.W.2d at 433; Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Watton, 215 Neb. at 324, 338 N.W.2d at 615-16 (citing cases from several jurisdictions). Contra Kukowski, 735 F.2d at 1058-59 (applying similar language from North Dakota statute, held guarantor may waive before default). In summary, we conclude that Jensen was a debtor entitled to notice of the bank's intended disposition of the collateral and that the purported waiver signed prior to default was prohibited by section 554.9504(3). CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED.