Opinion ID: 6333300
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Green’s Title VII claim fails

Text: Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee based on their race, color, religion, gender, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e– 2(a)(2). Plaintiffs can show that facially neutral employment practices are discriminatory if they have a disparate impact on a protected class. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577-78 (2009). Disparate impact claims follow a three-step burden-shifting framework. NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 476 (3d Cir. 2011). First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of disparate impact by “demonstrat[ing] that application of a facially neutral standard has caused a significantly discriminatory . . . pattern.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We agree with the District 5 Court that Green has failed to make a prima facie case, so we will not proceed to steps two and three.1 Establishing a prima facie case requires the plaintiff to “prove a significant statistical disparity and to ‘demonstrate that the disparity [he] complain[s] of is the result of one or more of the employment practices that [he is] attacking.’” Id. (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 643, 657 (1989)). Mathematical certainty is not required to prove a causal link, but “statistical disparities must be sufficiently substantial that they raise such an inference of causation.” Meditz v. City of Newark, 658 F.3d 364, 371 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Green has identified an employment practice—the use of hair tests to screen for drug use—but has failed to offer anything more than raw statistical data to prove that this practice has caused a disparate impact in the rates of positive tests for African American officers. The statistics Green proffered indicate that .038% of African American officers, .008% of Caucasian officers, and 1% of officers identifying as “other” had positive test results. These numbers reveal nothing about the rate of false positives and do not show a disparate impact without further statistical analysis using accepted measures of statistical significance. Meditz, 658 F.3d at 372–73. Without statistical analysis, it is impossible 1 If the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the challenged practice is job-related and consistent with a business necessity. Id. at 477. If the employer shows a legitimate business justification, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that alternative practices exist that could fulfill the same business purpose with a less discriminatory impact. Id. We need not discuss the legitimate business justification for hair testing or alternative practices because Green’s claim fails at the first step of the analysis. 6 for a jury to reasonably conclude that the difference in the raw percentages is caused by the City’s use of hair tests rather than a simple product of chance.2 Green argues that he can establish a prima facie case based on the statistics and testimony of his expert witness, Dr. Bobst, who claimed that hair tests “cause[] racial disparity for African Americans.” App. 1202. However, as the District Court pointed out, Dr. Bobst’s testimony only suggests that hair testing has a potential risk of bias generally. His testimony does nothing to show that the PPD’s use of hair testing has actually had a disparate impact on African American officers. Without any evidence of causation offered by Green or his expert, the raw statistics and Dr. Bobst’s testimony cannot establish that the PPD’s use of hair tests has disparately impacted African American officers. Thus, Green has failed to bring forth concrete evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). We therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City on Green’s Title VII claim.3 2 It is possible for a plaintiff to make a prima facie case based on statistics alone and without statistical analysis, but that is only in rare cases when there is a “significant statistical disparity” between classes. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 587. Green cites to cases from the First Circuit for this proposition, but this is not a “singularly compelling factual context,” in which “the logical force of the conclusion that the numbers suggest” is obvious. EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594, 604–05 (1st Cir. 1995). 3 Green cites to a case from the First Circuit, Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2014), where the Court held that a plaintiff presented a prima facie case of disparate impact based on the Boston Police Department’s use of hair tests. Id. at 53. Jones is distinguishable from Green’s case because the plaintiff and the Court in Jones relied on a sophisticated statistical analysis involving a set p-value and standard deviations. Id. at 7