Opinion ID: 818057
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legitimation under Puerto Rico Law

Text: For more than a century, Puerto Rico law has provided that a child born under the same circumstances as L.N.R. is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of her parents. When Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the United States in 1898, the Spanish Civil Code provided that natural children, defined as children born out of wedlock to parents who could have married each other at the time of conception, may be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents. Ex Parte Hernández Martínez, 65 P.R.R. 132, 137 (1945). Puerto Rico's Civil Codes of 1902 and 1911 contained similar laws. Id. at 138, 140-41. Puerto Rico's current law is the same, except that it no longer requires that a child's parents be eligible to marry each other at the time of the child's conception: The legitimation of children had out of wedlock shall be accomplished by the subsequent reciprocal marriage of the parents; Provided, That there shall be considered as legitimated children, all children had out of wedlock prior to the approval of this Act, whose parents have married each other after the birth of said children. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 482; see also id. § 501 (All children born out of wedlock subsequent to [August 10, 1942], shall be natural children, whether or not the parents could have married at from the series of statutes above, or if it was based on an incorrect assumption that Patrick and Rivera were married when L.N.R. was born. -10- the moment when such children were conceived. These children will be legitimized by the subsequent marriage of the parents, to each other.). Despite this clear language, the district court held that Patrick's marriage to Rivera did not legitimate L.N.R. under Puerto Rico law because Patrick did not present his affidavit of paternity to the Vital Statistics Registry of Puerto Rico. The court stated that a child born out of wedlock will not be automatically considered as begotten by a man and woman who later marry, unless they register the child as theirs. Patrick, 2012 WL 5462677, at  (citing Ramos v. Rosario, 67 P.R.R. 641 (1947)). The court relied on León Rosario v. Torres, 9 P.R. Offic. Trans. 1082 (1980), for the proposition that Puerto Rico's legislative system allows no room for liberal interpretation regarding facts of life recorded in [the] Vital Statistics Registry of Puerto Rico and exceptions [to the Vital Statistics Registry Act of Puerto Rico] shall be construed restrictively. Patrick, 2012 WL 5462677, at . Neither opinion on which the district court relied adequately supports its decision. In Ramos, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico decided that a man could represent his minor son in court based on an affidavit of paternity that he filed with the Vital Statistics Registry. 67 P.R.R. at 644–45. But the Court did not hold that filing the affidavit with the Vital Statistics Registry, as opposed to the mere existence of the affidavit, -11- entitled the father to represent his son, and the opinion says nothing about whether filing the affidavit legitimated the son. In León Rosario, when the Court stated that the Vital Statistics Registry Act must be construed narrowly, it was simply rejecting a claim that the Vital Statistics Registry was required to register a birth that took place in Massachusetts. 9 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 1089–92. For her part, Rivera claims that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held in Ex Parte Hernández Martínez that for a child to be legitimated, both parents must be listed on the child's birth certificate. The opposite is true; in an opinion that discussed at length the relationship between acknowledgment and legitimation of children, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court explained that under the 1911 Civil Code, natural children were entitled to be legitimated by a subsequent marriage . . . . [Section 193 of the 1911 Civil Code] provided that a natural child might be acknowledged by the father and mother jointly or by either of them alone, either in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public instrument. 65 P.R.R. at 138. In short, the Court held that the subsequent marriage of the parents of a natural child legitimizes the child, whether or not the father appears in the record of birth, as long as the child is acknowledged in a public instrument. The 1911 Civil Code has been superseded by laws that expand the range of ways in which a parent can acknowledge a child. -12- Ocasio v. Díaz, 88 P.R.R. 658, 695-98 & n.7 (1963). The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has held that under current law, [t]he father, or in his default, his heirs, may acknowledge in any way their children, expressly or impliedly, regardless of the dates or circumstances of their births and for all legal purposes. Id. at 731 (emphasis added). Because Patrick needed only to acknowledge L.N.R. in any way, his affidavit acknowledging L.N.R. as his daughter sufficed to establish that he is her father. Because Patrick is L.N.R.'s father, his marriage to Rivera legitimated L.N.R.4 Rivera also argues that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held in Castro Torres v. Negrón Soto, 159 D.P.R. 568 (2003), that the subsequent marriage of a child's parents gives rise only to a presumption of paternity from which the mother's husband can benefit if he is registered as the child's father. This holding is inapposite because Patrick's paternity has been settled in this case: Patrick alleged in his petition that he is the father of L.N.R., Rivera admitted this allegation in her answer, and no one else has challenged Patrick's paternity. In the alternative, Rivera argues that L.N.R. cannot be legitimated because Puerto Rico's Constitution, as well as one of 4 In her reply brief, Rivera cites a provision of Puerto Rico law that describes the requirements for an affidavit of acknowledgment of paternity. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 8, § 510. This law is inapplicable here because it merely sets out an expedited administrative procedure for requesting child support. -13- its implementing acts, abolished the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children. In 1952, Puerto Rico ratified its Constitution, which guarantees that [n]o discrimination shall be made on account of race, color, sex, birth, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas. P.R. Const. art. II, § 1 (emphasis added). Later that year, Puerto Rico enacted Act No. 17, which provides that [a]ll children have, with respect to their parents and to the estate left by the latter, the same rights that correspond to legitimate children. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 441. Interpreting these laws, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held that [n]o judicial declaration of the status of child shall make any pronouncement as to the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the birth of the petitioner nor as to the civil status of his parents. The petitioner shall be simply called child and his progenitors father or mother, as the case may be. Ocasio, 88 P.R.R. at 731. On the basis of this holding, Rivera asks us to conclude that her marriage to Patrick did not legitimate L.N.R. under Puerto Rico law. Although Puerto Rico has abolished discrimination against children based on the circumstances of their birth, it has not abolished the concept of legitimacy. Act No. 17's reference to the same rights that correspond to legitimate children, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 441, presupposes that legitimate children still exist in Puerto Rico. See Ocasio, 88 P.R.R. at 732 (Any judicial -14- declaration of status of child shall acknowledge and decree that the child so declared shall have . . . the same rights that correspond to the legitimate children . . . .); Perez v. Gardner, 277 F. Supp. 985, 992 (E.D. Wis. 1967) ([Act No. 17] has been given a much broader application so as expressly to legitimate a bastard for all purposes as between parent and child.). The concept of legitimation still exists as well. Puerto Rico has never repealed the statute that provides for legitimation of children by the subsequent marriage of their parents, and the statute has been cited since Ocasio was decided, both in federal court and the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. E.g., Castro Torres, 159 D.P.R. 568, 583 (2003) (certified translation) (citing P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, §§ 481-484); Petition for Naturalization of Fraga, 429 F. Supp. 549, 551-52 (D.P.R. 1974) (citing P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 482); see also Vega ex rel. Morales v. Bowen, 664 F. Supp. 659, 661 (D.P.R. 1987) (citing Ocasio and stating that the status of legitimacy is to be preferred over that of illegitimacy, and compliance with the legal requirements to establish filiation under the laws of the state of the child's domicile should be enough to legitimate the child. The status of legitimacy . . . should be decided by the courts of her domicile, Puerto Rico. (citation omitted)). The concepts of legitimacy and legitimation remain important because the laws of jurisdictions other than Puerto Rico -15- may invoke them. Here, we are interpreting a United Kingdom law that turns on whether Patrick's marriage to Rivera legitimated L.N.R. under Puerto Rico law. In other cases, the legitimacy of a child under Puerto Rico law has determined the child's entitlement to Social Security benefits, Perez, 277 F. Supp. at 991-93, and the child's eligibility for naturalization, Petition for Naturalization of Fraga, 429 F. Supp. at 549-52. To hold that a child can no longer be legitimated under Puerto Rico law, as Rivera asks us to do, would turn the Puerto Rico Constitution and Act No. 17 on their heads. It would discriminate against L.N.R. on the basis of her status at birth--the very result that Puerto Rico law prohibits. Therefore, we hold that Patrick's marriage to Rivera legitimated L.N.R. under Puerto Rico law. As a result, Patrick has parental responsibility for L.N.R. under United Kingdom law, which means that he has rights of custody under the Hague Convention. The district court erred when it dismissed Patrick's petition on the grounds that he did not have rights of custody. C. Bond Requirement As we mentioned above, the district court ordered Patrick to pay a $10,000 bond, stating that [t]his bond will serve not only as a non-resident bond, but shall also respond to any damages that Respondent may incur should Petitioner not prevail on the merits. Patrick v. Rivera-Lopez, Civil No. 12–1501 (CVR) (D.P.R. June 25, 2012) (order to show cause). Patrick moved to vacate the -16- bond requirement, arguing that the Hague Convention explicitly prohibits a court from requiring such a bond: No security, bond or deposit, however described, shall be required to guarantee the payment of costs and expenses in the judicial or administrative proceedings falling within the scope of this Convention. Hague Convention art. 22. The district court continued to assert the authority to impose a bond but reduced the amount of the bond to $500. In a minute order dated June 28, 2012, the district court relied on three opinions that refer to instances in which a court imposed a bond in a Hague Convention case: Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2004); Bekier v. Bekier, 248 F.3d 1051 (11th Cir. 2001); and Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927 (11th Cir. 1998). The Hague Convention deprived the district court of authority to impose a bond on Patrick. We see no distinction between a bond imposed to respond to damages that Respondent may incur should Petitioner not prevail on the merits and the bond that the Convention prohibits. The opinions on which the district court relied refer only in passing to a district court's imposition of a bond, without saying whether ordering the bond was within the court's power. Whiting, 391 F.3d at 545; Bekier, 248 F.3d at 1053 & n.2; Lops, 140 F.3d at 948, 964. These opinions offer no reason to ignore the text of the Convention. -17-