Opinion ID: 1121458
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Taped Statement

Text: Defendant advances two reasons why the Taped Statement was inadmissible under Miranda. [16] First, defendant argues that he requested counsel prior to giving his statement, but that his request was ignored and interrogation did not cease as required by Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. 477. Second, defendant argues that he did not understand his Miranda rights and, therefore, was unable to knowingly and intelligently waive them. We reject defendant's contentions. (12a) Defendant first argues that he invoked his right to counsel while being advised of his rights. In support of his argument, defendant points to his repeated phrase what can an attorney do for me and his comment I'm really confused, I mean, I don't know what the fuck to do. Whether defendant invoked his right to counsel is a factual question, which is reviewed by this court for substantial evidence or clear error. (E.g., People v. Hayes (1985) 38 Cal.3d 780, 784 [214 Cal. Rptr. 652, 699 P.2d 1259] [invocation of right to counsel is a factual question]; People v. Bestelmeyer (1985) 166 Cal. App.3d 520, 526 [212 Cal. Rptr. 605] [invocation of right to counsel is a factual question]; but see Robinson v. Borg (9th Cir.1990) 918 F.2d 1387, 1390 [whether defendant's words constitute a request for counsel is a legal determination reviewed de novo].) The record supports the trial court's implicit finding that the defendant did not invoke his right to counsel during this colloquy. [17] It is true, as defendant urges, that a request for counsel need not be unequivocal to invoke defendant's right to call a halt to questioning. (E.g., People v. Thompson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 165.) Defendant cites numerous cases which have found equivocal language sufficient to invoke the right to counsel. In context ( People v. Thompson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 165), however, defendant's statements in this case did not amount even to an equivocal assertion of his right to counsel. It is clear from the record that defendant evaluated whether he should waive his rights and give the Taped Statement. He spoke of the reasons that would prompt him to do so. He asked questions to help him evaluate his position. The interrogators, while avoiding giving the defendant detailed legal advice, provided information responsive to his questions. The interrogators were at all times courteous, polite, and restrained. Although the defendant was aware from his experience that morning in connection with the Sergeant's Room Statement that if he invoked his rights the questioning would cease, he did not do so. In fact, notwithstanding his vocalized soul-searching, the record reflects that he waived his rights three times prior to the initiation of substantive questioning. With respect to the specific comments to the effect of what can a lawyer do for me, a review of the transcript and the cassette, including the tone and inflections of defendant's voice, reveals that defendant's questions were rhetorical in nature and linked to his repeated explanation of the reasoning behind the waiver of his rights. (See People v. Thompson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 165.) Defendant repeatedly explained that he did not feel that a lawyer could assist him since he was guilty and previously had revealed this fact to the police. For these reasons, he was willing to talk without assistance of counsel. Similarly, defendant's statement regarding his confusion, both in context and on its face, cannot be reasonably construed as a request for counsel. The Taped Statement demonstrates that defendant understood that he had a right to counsel; it is irrelevant, in the absence of coercion, that he had difficulty in deciding whether to exercise his right. Even assuming that these comments, separately or in tandem, could be construed as an ambiguous request for counsel, the conduct of the interrogators was proper and defendant's subsequent waiver was valid. [18] (13) When the person under interrogation makes an ambiguous statement that could be construed as a request for counsel, the interrogators may clarify the suspect's comprehension of, and desire to invoke or waive, the Miranda rights. (E.g., People v. Carey (1986) 183 Cal. App.3d 99, 102, 103 [227 Cal. Rptr. 813], cert. denied (1987) 479 U.S. 1089 [94 L.Ed.2d 153, 107 S.Ct. 1297]; United States v. Fouche (9th Cir.1989) 776 F.2d 1398, 1404-1405.) (12b) The colloquy regarding defendant's rights consisted of such permissible clarification. The interrogators did not ask defendant substantive questions until defendant's position was clarified and a valid waiver was obtained. Moreover, no coercive tactics were employed in order to obtain defendant's Miranda waiver. (14) We next turn to defendant's contention that his waiver of his rights was not knowing and intelligent. Defendant provides two reasons why his waiver was deficient. First, he argues that he had an insufficient understanding of the function of an attorney. Second, he renews his argument that his mental state rendered him incapable of providing a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. The trial court explicitly found that defendant did knowingly and intelligently waive his rights prior to giving the Taped Statement. After an independent review of the record ( People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 649), we agree. The Miranda warnings given to the defendant at the beginning of the Taped Statement were complete and accurate. Again, all that is required for a valid waiver of these rights is that the defendant understand that he could stand mute, request a lawyer and that anything he did choose to say could be used against him to secure a conviction. ( Moran v. Burbine, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 422-423 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 421-422].) The record reveals that defendant understood these rights. In fact, the record reveals that defendant was provided with more information than the Constitution requires in order to assist him in evaluating the wisdom of waiving his rights. Defendant contends, however, that his waiver was deficient because he did not adequately comprehend what a lawyer could do for him. There is no constitutional requirement that the defendant understand the types of assistance that an attorney can provide. (Cf. Patterson v. Illinois (1988) 487 U.S. 285, 293-294 [101 L.Ed.2d 261, 272-274, 108 S.Ct. 2389] [addressing Sixth Amendment right to counsel].) Unadorned Miranda warnings, which the defendant received, sufficed to give defendant all the information necessary for him to make a knowing and intelligent choice to waive or invoke his right to counsel. (Cf. ibid. ; Moran v. Burbine, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 422-424 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 421-423].) Defendant was not only provided with the information necessary for him to make an informed decision to waive his rights, but the record reveals beyond a reasonable doubt that he comprehended this information. As we have previously stated, we have reviewed all of the evidence relating to the defendant's mental state at the time the Taped Statement was taken, reviewed the transcript of the statement and listened carefully to the audiocassette tape-recording of the statement. Defendant understood and effectively invoked his Miranda rights earlier that day. At the time of the Taped Statement, he was thinking rationally enough to provide the date when Detective Kelley could not remember it. The addition to his partially exculpatory story of his blackout during the crime, as well as other favorable embellishments, also lead us to conclude that defendant was not so mentally impaired as to be unable to make a valid waiver of his rights. We recognize that the defendant felt a degree of hopelessness regarding the situation in which he found himself as well as self-pity arising from his unfortunate family life. At points in the initial colloquy, he expressed some confusion regarding what he should do. Nevertheless, we find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was capable of understanding and did understand his Miranda rights. Therefore, we conclude that defendant's waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. ( People v. Breaux, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 301.)