Opinion ID: 2379771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: misconduct of trial judge and prosecuting attorney

Text: This trial lasted eight days much of which time was expended in bitter recrimination among counsel and bickering between counsel and the trial judge. Although a trial judge may be provoked by the tactics of defense counsel he must maintain an air of complete impartiality and do nothing which would indicate his personal feelings concerning guilt or innocence or demonstrate any bias against a defendant. Counsel for various appellants have devoted more than forty pages of their voluminous briefs to detailing and discussing alleged misconduct of the trial judge. The allegations of error are so numerous that it would be impracticable to undertake a discussion of all of them. We will set forth a few exchanges between counsel and court which are indicative of the conduct complained of. At one point the court overruled a defense motion with this comment: Counsel has probably forgotten that the Commonwealth of Kentucky is entitled to representation too. And this is cross-examination.  At another point this colloquy took place: MR. HEAVRIN: Note the objections for Pankey to the remarks of the court and the failure to give the admonition. BY THE COURT: The punks walked right into it. On another occasion the trial judge was profusely complimentary of the testimony of the Commonwealth's fingerprint expert. The following exchange took place during the closing argument by the Commonwealth's Attorney: MR. HEVEY: (Interrupting) Your Honor, objection. BY THE COURT: (Rapping bench) MR. LYON: Now, that  Mrs. Lochridge  BY THE COURT: Wait a minute. (unintelligible) when defense counsel were making their closing arguments. Now, we're not going to have much of this. I'll assure you of that. MR. HEVEY: (At bench, out of the hearing of the jury) Your Honor, at this time we'll object on the basis that counsel, and he knows quite well, that he is improperly bringing before the jury the prior criminal record of one of these defendants, a defendant who did not take the stand, and this is absolutely prejudicial. At this time we'll ask for a mistrial and and ask that the jury be discharged. BY THE COURT: Overruled. MR. HEVEY: Exception. (End of proceedings at bench, out of the hearing of the jury.) BY THE COURT: Proceed. MR. OUSLEY: Thank you, your Honor. And so the prints were sent there in September and they had them, and the word came immediately back, `They're Spears' prints.' And when he was arrested in March his prints were rolled here, again sent back to the FBI, and again it comes back, `They're Spears' prints.' MR. LYON: Objection, for the record on the  BY THE COURT: (Interrupting and rapping bench) Every counsel for the defendants, not only made a closing argument but in the absence of any objection by the Commonwealth's Attorney, they have testified before this jury. Are you getting that in the record, Miss Margaret, what I am saying? THE REPORTER: Yes sir. BY THE COURT: It speaks for itself. There will be no interruptions. Mr. Ousley did not object to your  whatever it was, speech or statement. He did not object to Mr. Hevey and, of course, he did not object to Mr. Heavrin. MR. HEVEY: Your Honor, may it please the Court, the only (unintelligible)  BY THE COURT: (Rapping bench and interrupting) I can take care of this in five minutes, even before the jury, I'll take care of. No more of it. Proceed. MR. LYON: (Aside) We object to this entire proceeding. Throughout the trial, the judge made numerous disparaging remarks reflecting upon the abilities of defense counsel. These remarks were made in the courtroom, although in some instances the court reporter has indicated that they were made outside the hearing of the jury. We can only speculate how the court reporter knew what the jury could or could not hear but in any event we regard the intemperate and injudicious remarks the trial judge made throughout the case as evidence of a judicial bias against the appellants which the jury could not help but notice. Other errors asserted by appellants include the failure to grant a change of venue,  the failure to separate witnesses, improper argument by Commonwealth's Attorney, improper comment upon the instructions by the trial judge and the use of perjured testimony by a police officer who testified for the Commonwealth. We find no basis for the allegation that the testimony of a police officer was perjured and the other alleged errors which we have not discussed in this opinion are unlikely to reoccur upon another trial. This was a case in which alert citizens and efficient police work combined to produce an impressive case against the appellants. The Commonwealth was not content, however, to rest its case upon the solid foundation of competent incriminating evidence but elected to garnish the case with incompetent and inflammatory testimony. The rules of law prohibiting such testimony are as old as the Commonwealth and it remains a constant mystery to this court why prosecuting attorneys in their zeal to obtain a conviction will unnecessarily hazard a reversal of the judgment and the great expense and inconvenience attendant upon a retrial. The judgment is reversed. All concur.