Opinion ID: 1887352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Videos from the CD

Text: Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress the CD labeled PTCH Vicky, arguing it was obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of his right to privacy under Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, he argued that because he did not abandon his interest in the contents of the bureau, the police should have obtained a search warrant before viewing the contents of the CD. The State contended that the property had been abandoned because the defendant was given ample opportunity to remove his belongings and he did not do so. The trial court denied the motion to suppress because the defendant had no expectation of privacy in the bureau or its contents because he voluntarily abandoned the property. We first address the defendant's claim under the State Constitution, and cite federal opinions for guidance only. State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33, 471 A.2d 347 (1983). Under Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution, a person has the right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. State v. Westover, 140 N.H. 375, 379, 666 A.2d 1344 (1995); see also N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 19. In determining whether a search or seizure was reasonable, we will analyze whether the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the evidence seized. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); State v. Goss, 150 N.H. 46, 48-49, 834 A.2d 316 (2003). In Goss, we adopted a two-part reasonable expectation of privacy analysis under Part I, Article 19. Goss, 150 N.H. at 49, 834 A.2d 316. First, a person must have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and, second, that expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as `reasonable.' Id. Absent an invasion of the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy, there has been no constitutional violation. Id. When a person abandons a possession... he or she gives up the right to be secure from unreasonable searches of that possession. Westover, 140 N.H. at 380, 666 A.2d 1344; see also Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960). Abandonment is determined based upon evidence of a combination of act and intent. Westover, 140 N.H. at 380, 666 A.2d 1344. Intent is to be ascertained from what the actor said and did since intent, although subjective, is determined from objective facts at hand. Id. Also relevant are where and for what length of time the property is relinquished and [its] condition. Id. Whether property has been abandoned is generally a question of fact. Id. Therefore, we will uphold the fact finder's determination regarding abandonment unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. Our review of the trial court's legal conclusions, however, is de novo. State v. Sullivan, 157 N.H. 124, 129, 949 A.2d 140 (2008). We cannot say the trial court's conclusion that the defendant abandoned the room and its contents was clearly erroneous. Ms. Turner told the defendant that he needed to move out and gave him one week to remove his belongings. He returned to the apartment twice within one week to remove his clothing, and several larger items such as a television and stereo. This demonstrates that the defendant knew he had only one week to remove his property and he was complying with Ms. Turner's order. In addition, at no point during his second visit did he indicate to the Turners that he would be returning to take the remaining property. After returning to the Turners' apartment for the second time, the defendant had no further contact with them. He neither requested more time nor left a forwarding address at which the Turners could contact him regarding the rest of his belongings. Ms. Turner waited an additional five days beyond her original seven-day deadline before she began going through his things. The fact the defendant appeared to have lived elsewhere for approximately two weeks without them indicated that he did not need these items. The defendant's actions demonstrate a clear intent to abandon the bedroom, including the bureau and the CDs therein. The defendant argues that he only temporarily abandoned his property, including the CD. See Westover, 140 N.H. at 380-81, 666 A.2d 1344. We disagree. The defendant left his belongings in the apartment for five days after the expiration of Ms. Turner's deadline; twelve days lapsed from the time Ms. Turner told him to leave and the time she searched his room. Federal courts have found less time to be enough to constitute abandonment. See, e.g., United States v. Kress, 446 F.2d 358, 361 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 947, 92 S.Ct. 304, 30 L.Ed.2d 264 (1971) (finding abandonment after absence of only two days). As set forth above, the defendant's conduct before and during his absence indicated that he intended to abandon his belongings. Although the defendant asserts that the fact he was vacationing necessarily implies a temporary rather than permanent absence, the trial court reasonably found the property had been abandoned based upon all of the circumstances. See Westover, 140 N.H. at 380, 666 A.2d 1344 (abandonment determined from objective facts at hand). The defendant also relies on Goss, where we held that a defendant has an expectation of privacy in his trash. Goss, 150 N.H. at 49-50, 834 A.2d 316. Goss is inapplicable because the defendant in this case did not remove the bureau or its contents and place them in the trash, which would have ensured that his belongings would be destroyed. Nor did he instruct the Turners to dispose of his property. Ms. Turner told him that she intended to throw away any items remaining after seven days. This reasonably would entail going through the drawers and any property he left behind. Once he moved out and left his belongings in the room, it was, as the trial court stated, a virtual certainty that the Turners would go through them. Therefore, the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the items he left behind. We conclude that under the State Constitution, there was no protected privacy interest requiring the police to obtain a search warrant before viewing the videos on the CD because the defendant had abandoned it. The Federal Constitution provides no greater protection than the State Constitution under these circumstances. See Goss, 150 N.H. at 49, 834 A.2d 316. Therefore, we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution as we do under the State Constitution.