Opinion ID: 173639
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: privilege analysis

Text: A grand jury’s “investigative powers are necessarily broad” and its “authority to subpoena witnesses is not only historic, but essential to its task.” Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (internal citations omitted). Although “the powers of the grand jury are not unlimited,” id., “[n]owhere is the public’s claim to each person’s evidence stronger than in the context of a valid grand jury subpoena,” In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Only a very limited number of recognized privileges—protected by a constitutional, common-law, or statutory privilege—provide legitimate grounds - 14 - for refusing to comply with a grand jury subpoena. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688. The Supreme Court “has cautioned that such . . . privileges must be strictly construed and accepted only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.” In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980). Now turning to the merits, we initially address Appellant’s specific grounds for invocation of two common-law privileges: attorney-client and work product. We will deal with each privilege in turn. We review “the district court’s rulings on attorney-client privilege and work-product protection for abuse of discretion. Underlying factual determinations are reviewed for clear error and purely legal questions are reviewed de novo.” United States v. Ary, 518 F.3d 775, 782 (10th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
“The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). “Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” Id. - 15 - The attorney-client privilege protects “‘confidential communications by a client to an attorney made in order to obtain legal assistance’ from the attorney in his capacity as a legal advisor.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued on June 9, 1982, 697 F.2d 277, 278 (10th Cir. 1983) (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)). “[T]he mere fact that an attorney was involved in a communication does not automatically render the communication subject to the attorney-client privilege,” Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1550-51 (10th Cir. 1995); rather, the “communication between a lawyer and client must relate to legal advice or strategy sought by the client,” United States v. Johnston, 146 F.3d 785, 794 (10th Cir. 1998). Although this description of the attorney-client privilege suggests the privilege only applies one way, operating to protect the client’s communications to a lawyer, it is generally also recognized that “the privilege will protect at least those attorney to client communications which would have a tendency to reveal the confidences of the client.” Kenneth S. Brown, McCormick on Evidence § 89 (6th ed. 2006); see also United States v. Defazio, 899 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Communications from attorney to client are privileged only if they constitute legal advice, or tend directly or indirectly to reveal the substance of a client confidence.”). However, “when an attorney conveys to his client facts - 16 - acquired from other persons or sources, those facts are not privileged.” 15 In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (internal quotation omitted); see also McCormick § 89 (The “prevailing rule [of the attorney-client privilege] does not bar divulgence by the attorney of information communicated to him or his agents by third persons[, n]or does information so obtained become privileged by being in turn related by the attorney to the client in the form of advice.”). “The burden of establishing the applicability of [the attorney-client] privilege rests on the party seeking to assert it.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 697 F.2d at 279. “The party must bear the burden as to specific questions or documents, not by making a blanket claim.” In re Foster, 188 F.3d 1259, 1264 (10th Cir. 1999). The privilege “must be strictly constructed and accepted ‘only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.’” Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50 15 The Appellant and the district court refer to this as the “conduit” exception to the attorney-client privilege, because under this scenario the communication is not privileged since the attorney serves only as a “conduit” to relay information from a third party to the client. The government, however, argues that this sort of communication should not be considered an exception to the attorney-client privilege—rather, according to the government, these communications fall outside the scope of the general rule because they do not involve any client confidence. We need not resolve the proper characterization of “conduit” information, as all parties are agreed, for one reason or another, that “conduit” information is not protected from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege. - 17 - (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). We now turn to the issue of whether the government’s questions are subject to the attorney-client privilege because they involve confidential communications with respect to the seeking of legal advice. Before us are nine questions that the district court concluded are not privileged. We agree. The nine questions asked for several general types of information; we will consider each type of requested information in turn. The first category of questions requested Attorney #1 to testify regarding statements he had previously made to the government or that the government made to him. 16 These questions clearly are not protected by attorney-client privilege; the questions do not even involve attorney-client communications. A communication by an attorney to a third party or a communication by a third party to an attorney cannot be invoked as privileged. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (United States v. Anderson), 906 F.2d 1485, 1492 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Anderson”) (“The purpose behind the attorney-client privilege is to preserve confidential communications between attorney and client.” (emphasis added to final phrase)). The second category of questions requested Attorney #1 to testify regarding information that he received from the government and then communicated to 16 {REDACTED} - 18 - Appellant. 17 These questions thus requested “conduit” information—whether a third party’s statement was passed along by the attorney to the client. Where questions only request information regarding communications where the attorney was acting as a “conduit” for non-confidential information, the client may not invoke the attorney-client privilege. 18 See DeFazio, 899 F.2d at 635; In re Grand Jury Testimony of Attorney X, 621 F. Supp. 590, 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (“Attorney X”). These questions did not request information regarding privileged legal advice provided by the attorney to his client, nor would the questions tend, directly or indirectly, to require the attorney to reveal the substance of any legal confidence. See DeFazio, 899 F.2d at 635. The third set of questions at issue here requested that both Attorney #1 and Attorney #2 testify regarding information that Attorney #1 received from the government and then passed on to Attorney #2. 19 These questions also request “conduit” information and are substantively the same as the second set of questions. The mere fact that the information was passed along to another attorney instead of to the client does not cloak the communication in privilege. 17 {REDACTED} 18 {REDACTED} 19 Under this category of questions, the district court ordered Attorney #1 to answer the following question: {REDACTED} - 19 - Finally, we address the remaining set of questions concerning Appellant’s {employee} John Doe’s 20 contact and communications with Appellant’s counsel, Attorney #2. 21 However, we need not resolve whether the fact that Doe contacted Attorney #2 at a certain time or the fact that Doe read a certain question to his attorney is a privileged communication. Even if such information was initially privileged, Appellant waived that privilege by submitting Doe’s affidavit, describing these communications, to the district court in support of Appellant’s earlier motions to remove the AUSA from proceeding as counsel for the government in the § 1001 investigation and in support of Appellant’s motion to quash the testimonial subpoena issued to Attorney #1. Because confidentiality is the key to maintaining the attorney-client privilege, a party waives the privilege when he voluntarily discloses to a third party material or information that he later claims is protected. See In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d at 1185; United States v. Bernard, 877 F.2d 1463, 1465 (10th Cir. 1989) (“Any voluntary disclosure by the client is inconsistent with the attorney-client relationship and waives the privilege.”). Here, although the court record was sealed because it related to an ongoing grand jury investigation, the affidavit was also given to the government. Therefore, Appellant waived any privilege that attached to Doe’s 20 We assume, without deciding, that Appellant’s {employee} was acting as an agent for Appellant in communicating with his attorneys. 21 {REDACTED} - 20 - communications with Attorney #2 in preparing {Form 1} when he voluntarily submitted Doe’s affidavit in the proceedings below.
“The work-product doctrine[ was] first recognized by the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509-11 (1947).” 22 Ary, 518 F.3d at 783 (additional citation omitted). In that case the Court rejected “an attempt, without purported necessity or justification, to secure written statements, private memoranda and personal recollections [of witness interviews] prepared or formed by an adverse party’s counsel in the course of his legal duties.” Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510. Underlying the work-product doctrine is a strong public policy interest in protecting the “‘adversary trial process itself.’” In re Foster, 188 F.3d at 1272 (quoting Moody v. IRS, 654 F.2d 795, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). At its core, the work-product doctrine serves to protect society’s interest in “the adversary system by shielding litigants’ work-product from their opponents, and thus freeing lawyers to create such materials without fear of discovery and exploitation.” Id. (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11). The doctrine achieves this purpose by “shelter[ing] the mental processes of the attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his client’s case.” 22 Although Hickman was a civil case, and the work-product doctrine is most frequently asserted as a bar to discovery in civil litigation, the doctrine also has applicability to criminal cases. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975). And a party can invoke the work-product doctrine in response to a grand jury’s investigation. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 156 F.3d at 1042. - 21 - Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238. As such, the work-product doctrine only prevents disclosure of information that was prepared by the attorney in anticipation of litigation or for trial. 23 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 156 F.3d at 1042. Similar to the attorney-client privilege, “[t]he party asserting work product privilege has the burden of showing the applicability of the doctrine.” Id. Appellant has failed to establish that any of the same nine questions request protected work-product. The majority of questions focus on the government’s attempt to elicit whether Appellant’s attorneys passed on certain information to Appellant. The questions do not seek any legal advice, nor do the questions delve into the attorneys’ impressions about the facts that might have been conveyed to Appellant. 24 See Attorney X, 621 F. Supp. at 593 (conduit questions are not protected under the work-product doctrine). The questions do not seek legal conclusions, opinion or legal theories created in anticipation of litigation. See Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 668 (10th 23 The work product doctrine “is broader than and distinct from the attorneyclient privilege.” In re Foster, 188 F.3d at 1272 (citing Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238, n.11). 24 Additionally, we note that Attorney #1 waived any privilege concerning communications about Appellant’s status in the grand jury investigation when he testified that he told Appellant that he was a subject in {REDACTED} and after receiving the {REDACTED} “subject letter.” “[A] litigant cannot use the work product doctrine as both a sword and shield by selectively using the privileged [information or documents] to prove a point but then invoking the privilege to prevent an opponent from challenging the assertion.” Frontier Refining, Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 704 (10th Cir. 1998). - 22 - Cir. 2006) (“[W]ork product protection only applies to attorneys’ or legal representatives’ mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories authored in anticipation of litigation.”). The questions seek only factual confirmation concerning events the attorney personally witnessed (either as the receiver or giver of information). See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dabney, 73 F.3d 262, 266 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he work product doctrine is intended only to guard against divulging the attorney’s strategies and legal impressions[;] it does not protect facts concerning the creation of work product or facts contained within work product.”). Therefore these questions do not ask for protected attorney work product because they do not seek the attorneys’ mental impressions—the questions only ask for the attorneys’ testimony regarding facts they observed firsthand. The other questions, regarding Attorney #2’s contacts with John Doe, likewise do not seek any legal advice or attorney impressions. These questions only attempt to verify whether certain events occurred: the fact that Attorney #2 talked with Doe on a certain date or the fact that Doe read something to Attorney #2. 25 Moreover, as to the questions relating to Doe’s consultations with Attorney #2 in the preparation of {Form 1}, Appellant has failed to establish that 25 As in the context of our discussion of the attorney-client privilege, Doe’s affidavit—which Appellant provided to the government—waived his ability to assert that his staff member’s conversations and contacts with Attorney #2 regarding preparation of {Form 1} are protected by the work-product doctrine. - 23 - any of these contacts or communications were related to Attorney #2’s legal services in anticipation of litigation or for trial. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 156 F.3d at 1042. Doe’s communications with Attorney #2 were in preparation for submitting Appellant’s application materials for a {Form 1} position—the communications were not in preparation for litigation. Here, Appellant has made a very broad argument: that if his attorney was forced to disclose his recollection of any conversations, then his attorney’s recollections will necessarily involve work product because they will reflect his attorney’s own mental impressions and necessarily will reflect what the attorney considers most important. We reject that very broad-brushed claim of work product in the context asserted by Appellant. The cases Appellant cites for this proposition all have to do with an attorney’s recollections of interviewing witnesses and attending client interviews. 26 Interviewing witnesses for purposes of litigation is very different from acting as a conduit to convey facts from a third party to a client. See Attorney X, 621 F. Supp. at 593-94.
Appellant also argues that the testimonial subpoenas issued to Attorney #1 and Attorney #2 violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Appellant’s claims are foreclosed by our precedent in Anderson, 906 F.2d at 1493. 26 The cases Appellant relies on are Hickman, 329 U.S. 495; In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973); and In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Zerendow), 925 F. Supp. 849 (D. Mass. 1995). - 24 -
Appellant further argues that the district court erred in denying its motion to quash because the government is bound by state ethics rules, and the state rule, {REDACTED}, required the government “to establish that the information sought was not protected by privilege and could not be obtained elsewhere.” (Aplt. Br. at 55.) Even if the {state} Rules of Professional Conduct were to apply to federal prosecutors’ practice before a federal grand jury—a proposition about which we have considerable doubt—the {state} Rules do not bestow any rights upon Appellant that he can invoke to this appellate court or to the district court in attempting to quash the subpoena. The Rules state that their purpose is “to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies.” {REDACTED}. {And the Rules provide that a violation should not “give rise to a cause of action,” nor does it “imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement.”} Id.