Opinion ID: 78287
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ferguson's Petition

Text: Ferguson argues that the BIA erred by limiting St. Cyr exclusively to guilty pleas and urges us to reject any reliance requirement for the purpose of determining whether IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c) impermissibly applies retroactively to aliens like herself. [25] Ferguson argues that because IIRIRA impermissibly attached new legal consequences and inflicted new legal disabilities on her past conviction, she is still eligible to apply for § 212(c) relief. And she asks us to adopt an approach akin to the Third Circuit's. The government, on the other hand, asks that we narrowly interpret the St. Cyr retroactivity shield as only applicable to aliens who pled guilty. It points out that the Executive Office for Immigration Review has promulgated regulations consistent with this narrow interpretation of St. Cyr. [26] The government contends that only those aliens who pled guilty can show reliance interests strong enough to warrant tempering the retroactive effects of IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c). We decline to adopt the approach urged by Ferguson. In our view, reliance is a core component of St. Cyr 's retroactivity analysis as it applies to aliens challenging the application of IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c). For starters, we do not write on a blank slate. In Alexandre, we interpreted the retroactivity rationale of St. Cyr  as inapplicable where the alien did not plead guilty to his drug trafficking charge, but instead proceeded to trial and was convicted by a jury. 452 F.3d at 1207. Although this dictum is not binding, we recognize it as a persuasive reason to reject Ferguson's argument that reliance should not bear on a retroactivity analysis in this context. Second, our reading of St. Cyr bolsters our conclusion. To take an alternate view would render the Supreme Court's reasoning and analytical approachexplained in St. Cyr superfluous by half. Were Ferguson correct, the Supreme Court's discussion of reliance in St. Cyr was a wholly unnecessary and gratuitous academic exercise. And the notion that IIRIRA plainly attached new legal consequences to [Ferguson's] conviction, Atkinson, 479 F.3d at 230, was so plain that it was lost on the Supreme Court. The fact that it is possible to advance a retroactivity claim in some circumstances without a showing of reliance does not give us carte blanche to discard the Supreme Court's pronouncements on the matter. Even if reliance is not the only basis for determining whether a statute is impermissibly retroactive, see St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 321 n. 46, 121 S.Ct. 2271, the retroactivity analysis is still informed and guided by considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations, id. That is, just because an alien is not required to demonstrate reliance does not mean that she may exclusively rely on other portions of the Supreme Court's retroactivity jurisprudence and pretend reliance is irrelevant. [27] We recognize the Supreme Court has refused to adopt a rigid, single test for determining whether a statute has an impermissible retroactive effect. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 321 n. 46, 121 S.Ct. 2271. However, it strikes us as more reasonable to focus on the reliance elements, as laid out in St. Cyr, than other elements of a retroactivity analysis, put forth in cases such as Landgraf. St. Cyr confronted the exact statutory provision at issue here § 212(c)and laid out a sensible framework for deciding whether IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c) relief has an impermissible retroactive effect. In our view, the St. Cyr approach is entitled to more weight than a decision concerning the retroactivity analysis of a completely different statute. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 250, 114 S.Ct. 1483; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 19 U.S. 264, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821) (It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used.). We therefore hold that reliance is a component of the retroactivity analysis as it applies to aliens, deportable for criminal offenses, who wish to show that IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c) has an impermissible retroactive effect. Here, Ferguson did not plead guilty but was convicted by a jury. And aside from her decision to go to trial, she points to no other transactions or considerations already past on which she relied. Joining the majority of circuits, we decline to extend St. Cyr to aliens who were convicted after a trial because such aliens' decisions to go to trial do not satisfy St. Cyr 's reliance requirement. Therefore, § 212(c) relief is not available to such aliens. [28] See Hernandez-Castillo, 436 F.3d at 520; Montenegro, 355 F.3d at 1037; Rankine, 319 F.3d at 102; Chambers, 307 F.3d at 290-93; Dias, 311 F.3d at 458; see also Saravia-Paguada, 488 F.3d at 1131; Armendariz-Montoya, 291 F.3d at 1121. Accordingly, Ferguson's petition for relief is DENIED.