Opinion ID: 175626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Esther's Unreasonable Seizure Claim

Text: Esther claims she was unreasonably seized during the August 2004 search. The district court found Esther was unquestionably seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when [appellees] arrived on the Lykken property the morning of August 24, 2004, and Brady and Devaney separated her from her family members. Brady made Esther show Brady around the property in the golf cart Esther used for mobility, and thereafter Brady and Devaney questioned Esther. The district court found, after the questioning, Brady and Devaney escorted Esther outside and told her to sit on a bench in the yard. The district court found from the time she was seized to the time she sat on the bench, Esther's detention was justified by Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981), which permits law enforcement officers to detain a person while a search warrant for contraband is executed on his or her property. In a more recent case applying Summers, Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005), the Supreme Court referred to police authority to detain incident to a search as categorical, and not depending on the `quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure.' Mena expressly allows the use of force to carry out a Summers detention. Id. at 98-99, 125 S.Ct. 1465. The Mena Court concluded the additional force used, a 2- to 3-hour detention in handcuffs, was justified by the inherently dangerous circumstances of the search. Id. at 99, 125 S.Ct. 1465. Guarded by only two officers, Mena and three others were held in handcuffs in the garage of a gang house while it was searched for dangerous weapons. Id. The Court found the officers' interest in safety in such an inherently dangerous environment justified the level of force used in that case. Id. at 100, 125 S.Ct. 1465. However, the Mena Court also analogized the search in that case to a dog sniff performed in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005), and noted that a lawful seizure `can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.' Mena, 544 U.S. at 101, 125 S.Ct. 1465. In view of the Supreme Court's categorical approach, and the relatively short time period involved in Esther's case, [6] we agree with the district court that, regarding the period between appellees' arrival and Esther's placement on the bench, her detention was plainly permissible under Summers. The district court next noted what it considered a potential factual dispute regarding whether Esther was still being seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment after she was left sitting on the bench. The court noticed Esther has provided conflicting testimony on whether she was free to leave the Lykken property at this point. More specifically, at her deposition, Esther testified: Q. During any of the searches you have said that during some of them you weren't allowed to go in your house. Were you ever told you couldn't leave the property? A. No. Q. You were told you couldn't go certain places on the property, but not told you couldn't leave. A. No, I was not told I couldn't leave. But why would I leave home? That thought never entered my mind, that I would have left, no. Later, in her response to the appellees' motions for summary judgment, Esther swore in an affidavit that, After I walked around the farm with them, I was told that I had to remain at the farm. I was told to stay outside of my home, which I did from approximately 10:30 AM through 8:15 PM. The district court found it need not resolve Esther's conflicting testimony because even if the seizure of Esther continued from the time Brady and Devaney escorted her outside until around 8 p.m. when another officer ordered her to leave the Lykken property, this seizure meets the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The district court employed a balancing test pursuant to Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)) ([W]hether the force used to effect a particular seizure is `reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.), weighing the government's strong interests in having Esther open locked doors and safes on the Lykken property during the search and providing other assistance, against Esther's slight interest in her freedom for at least nine hours. The district court concluded Esther's seizure was not unreasonable. We agree Esther's unreasonable seizure claim was properly dismissed, but we arrive at this conclusion by a different route. In Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1365 (8th Cir.1983), this court held where a party creates an issue of fact by filing an affidavit contradicting earlier testimony in order to avoid summary judgment, the party raises a sham issue of fact instead of a genuine one. One possible exception to this rule is where the party did not file an inconsistent affidavit for the purpose of circumventing Rule 56. Id. at 1364. This may occur, for example, when the affidavit merely explains aspects of the prior testimony, or when the deposition resulted from confusion on the deponent's part requiring explanation. Id. at 1365. Neither of these possible exceptions are present here. Esther's affidavit does not attempt to explain her deposition testimonyit merely contradicts it. Upon our careful review of the transcript of Esther's deposition, we do not detect any confusion in Esther's deposition testimony. To the contrary, Esther's testimony is quite clear, she responds to questioning in detail, and Esther maintains a vivid recollection of the day of the search. Because we conclude Esther's summary judgment saving affidavit should be ignored to the extent it conflicts with her prior deposition testimony, it is clear she was not in custody from the time she sat on the bench until she was ordered to leave. Because appellees were justified in initially detaining Esther pursuant to Summers, and she was thereafter free to leave, Esther's brief detention was not an unreasonable intrusion upon her Fourth Amendment rights.