Opinion ID: 212034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ownership and Standing

Text: “The doctrine of standing limits federal judicial power and has both constitutional and prudential components.” Media Techs. Licensing, LLC v. Upper Deck Co., 334 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Constitutional standing only requires that a plaintiff suffer an injury-in-fact, that there be a causal connection between the plaintiff’s injury and a defendant’s conduct, and that the plaintiff’s injury be capable of redress by a favorable court decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Because Bellehumeur apparently was at least a co-owner of the ’161 and the ’187 patents, he had significant rights in those patents and thus would be injured by any party that infringed them. Thus, he apparently has constitutional standing to bring this lawsuit. However, a question is presented as to whether prudential standing requirements have been met, given the absence of other co-owners of the ’161 and ’187 patents as parties to this lawsuit.1 In the context of joinder of a patentee in a suit brought by an exclusive licensee, we have observed that “a patentee should be joined, either voluntarily or involuntarily, in any infringement suit”—a general rule that is “prudential rather than constitutional in nature.” Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Similarly, “United States patent law . . . requires that all coowners normally must join as plaintiffs in an infringement suit.” Int’l Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Research Ltd., 257 F.3d 1324, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“An action for infringement must 1 We decline to consider whether collateral estoppel applies, even though raised by the parties, because of the question of prudential standing. 04-1258 6 join as plaintiffs all co-owners.”); see also Schering Corp. v. Roussel-UCLAF SA, 104 F.3d 341, 345 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Ordinarily, one co-owner has the right to impede the other co-owner’s ability to sue infringers by refusing to voluntarily join in such a suit.”). Thus, the failure to join other co-owners of a patent in a patent infringement suit implicates prudential standing concerns. On appeal, Bellehumeur, the sole plaintiff in this proceeding against Bonnett, has failed to satisfy us that he exclusively owned all rights to the ’161 patent and, in turn, the ’187 reissue patent. Although patent assignments must be in writing, 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000) (“Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing.”), we can find no evidence of any written assignment of rights in the ’161 patent or ’187 reissue patent, either to Bellehumeur or any other parties in the record on appeal. At oral argument, Bellehumeur conceded that no written assignments of the ’161 patent or ’187 reissue patent exist. Because the ’187 reissue patent, like the predecessor ’161 patent, issued in the names of the three coinventors with no assignment listed on the face of the patent, they are presumptively the owners of the’187 reissue patent. See Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (observing that, unless assigned under 35 U.S.C. § 261, the “initial ownership of a patent vests in the inventor by operation of law”). As Bellehumeur’s counsel conceded at oral argument, no subsequent assignment is in the record to contravene this understanding. However, Bellehumeur sued in his own right and did not join the other co-inventors of the ’187 reissue patent, Nehmens and Haarlammert, as parties to the lawsuit. 04-1258 7 At oral argument, Bellehumeur’s counsel asserted that the three named coinventors, Bellehumeur, Nehmens, and Haarlammert, intended in the January 1, 1996 assignment to transfer rights to the ’161 patent (and thus the’187 reissue patent) to the RHI Partnership along with the ’410 patent. Thus, Bellehumeur’s counsel argues that because the ’410 patent was eventually assigned back to Bellehumeur and his wife, the ownership of the ’161 patent was also transferred. However, the January 1, 1996 assignment only assigns the invention claimed in the issued ’410 patent, and the pending counterpart foreign applications. It lists no continuing or related domestic applications based on the ’410 patent. At oral argument, Bellehumeur’s counsel conceded that the ’161 patent was not expressly mentioned in the January 1, 1996 assignment. Because patent rights must be transferred by written instrument, 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000), any alleged intention by the named inventors of the ’410 patent to transfer rights to the ’161 patent is ineffective and is insufficient to establish Bellehumeur’s standing. Moreover, even if the chain of title of the ’161 and ’187 patents was determined by the assignments of the ’410 patent, there would still be a standing question due to the absence in these proceedings of Bellehumeur’s wife. Because Bellehumeur has utterly failed to satisfy us that he was the exclusive owner or assignee of rights in the ’187 patent, we remand this case for the district court to examine the issue of prudential standing in the first instance.