Opinion ID: 1861054
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Limitation on the Cross-Examination of Detective Brumley

Text: In Evans' fourth point, he asserts that the trial court erred in limiting cross-examination of Detective Brumley to exclude hearsay after the State allegedly opened the door by eliciting hearsay statements on direct examination. During the State's direct examination of Detective Brumley, he testified about the police investigation of the Pfeiffers' trailer after the murder, stating: We got out more detectives to start neighborhood canvasses and backgrounds on the deceased, and we followed up whatever leads we had from the neighborhood canvass and followed up the background on the deceased and the financial aspect of him. Moreover, the following inquiry took place during the State's direct examination of Detective Brumley: Q: Now, in regards to the overall crime scene, and we've already talked about that as far as the investigation, how did y'all proceed? Or how did you proceed? A: Well, we followed up whatever leads we had from the neighborhood canvass and followed up thehad a detective follow up the background on the deceased and the financial aspect of him. The defense did not object to the State's question. During the defense's cross-examination of Detective Brumley, the State made a motion in limine, which the trial court granted, to prevent the defense from eliciting from Detective Brumley whether or not there were any other individuals who heard a gunshot at 10:30 p.m., on the grounds that it would constitute a hearsay statement. We hold that the State's questioning of Detective Brumley on direct examination neither constituted hearsay nor opened the door to allow the defense to ask about specific leads on cross-examination. Section 90.801(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2001), defines hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, Detective Brumley stated several times that the police followed up leads and had a detective follow up on the victim's background and finances. However, this testimony does not constitute a statement ... offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Rather, Detective Brumley provided testimony concerning the police department's conduct after the investigation. Even under the definition of a statement that provides nonverbal conduct of a person if it is intended by the person as an assertion, section 90.801(1)(a)2., Detective Brumley's statements do not qualify as hearsay. Detective Brumley did not state with specificity who he or other detectives spoke to in following up on leads. Moreover, Detective Brumley did not allude to any conversations he or other detectives had with leads or how these leads contributed to the investigation. Therefore, we conclude that Detective Brumley's testimony did not constitute hearsay. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting the State's motion in limine to exclude the defense from asking about whether any of the leads heard gunshots at 10:30 p.m. on the night of the murder. The defense concedes that its inquiry as to whether any leads heard gunshots at 10:30 p.m. constitutes hearsay. However, the defense contends that because the State opened the door by eliciting hearsay on direct, the defense was entitled to ask follow-up questions that elicited hearsay. This Court rejected a similar contention in Crump v. State, 622 So.2d 963 (Fla. 1993). In Crump, the trial court limited the defendant's questioning of a detective's testimony concerning interviews the detective conducted during the investigation. Id. at 969. Over the State's objection, the trial court permitted the defendant to question the detective about whether the police interview focused on other suspects during the investigation. See id. However, the trial court refused to allow the detective to testify about the substance of his interview. See id. The defendant argued that because the detective's interviews tended to show that another suspect may have killed the victim, the trial court improperly limited this evidence. See id. This Court rejected the defendant's argument, explaining: The evidence here concerning the detective's interviews is hearsay that does not fall within one of the hearsay exceptions. The substance of the interviews does not constitute reverse Williams rule evidence because it would not have been admissible had the other suspect been on trial for the present offense. Thus, the trial court properly excluded these statements. Id. Therefore, we conclude that the State did not open the door to the defense's eliciting of hearsay on cross-examination in this case. Cf. Keen v. State, 775 So.2d 263, 273-76 (Fla.2000) (explaining that mistrial should have been granted where inference from detective's hearsay testimony was that the police investigation had produced evidence that defendant was the murderer). Finally, we reject Evans' reliance upon Sweet v. State, 693 So.2d 644 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), Williams v. State, 689 So.2d 393 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), and Johnson v. State, 653 So.2d 1074 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), for the proposition that the rule of completeness demands that Evans be allowed to elicit hearsay in cross-examination based upon the statements made in the direct examination. The purpose of the rule of completeness is to avoid the potential for creating misleading impressions by taking statements out of context. Williams, 689 So.2d at 398 (quoting Larzelere v. State, 676 So.2d 394, 401 (Fla.1996)). Moreover, [t]he admission of such testimony is subject to a judicial determination that the statements `in fairness ought to be considered contemporaneously with the introduction of the partial statements.' Id. at 398 (quoting Larzelere, 676 So.2d at 402); see § 90.108(1), Fla. Stat.; Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568, 580 (Fla.1999). In this case, it does not appear that the jury was misled or left confused by Detective Brumley's testimony. Detective Brumley did not testify about a partial statement a specific witness gave him that required further clarification. Further, Detective Brumley did not testify about the results or actions he took in response to the canvass. In fact, on cross-examination the defense asked extensive questions about the canvassing by the police, including which specific leads the police followed up and which leads went into the police report. The trial court precluded the defense from eliciting hearsay only with regard to what a single lead's actual statements were. Therefore, we reject Evans' fourth claim on appeal.