Opinion ID: 2567623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: The Montez letter

Text: The referee found that Larry Montez wrote and signed the Montez letter and that the information contained in the letter is credible in two respectsit is credible that Saucedo told Montez that he had killed Hosey, as Montez reported in the Montez letter [and] Saucedo's confession to the Hosey murder is credible. The Montez letter satisfies all the Brady requirements. (See Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215.) Clearly it is favorable to petitioner, involving as it does the primary penalty phase witness's detailed admissions, inconsistent with his trial testimony inculpating petitioner, of the witness's own actions in killing Robert Hosey, destroying evidence, and developing a false alibi to deflect suspicion. It also is material. As the referee found, counsel could have used the letter to effectively impeach Saucedo's testimony on cross-examination, to investigate and present evidence of Saucedo's guilt, and to obviate or refute the trial prosecutor's closing argument urging the jury to believe that if evidence existed that Saucedo had killed Hosey, the defense would have presented it. Had it been provided, Montez would have been available as a witness to the defense and would have testified in the penalty phase of petitioner's capital trial, credibly and in conformity with what he asserted in the Montez letter. Respondent does not deny that had they been properly placed before the jury, Saucedo's admissions would have met the Brady materiality standard. Respondent argues, rather, that the Montez letter was not material within the ambit of Brady because it was inadmissible hearsay. (Evid.Code, § 1200.) In this connection, respondent misquotes Wood v. Bartholomew (1995) 516 U.S. 1, 5-6, 116 S.Ct. 7, 133 L.Ed.2d 1 as stating that evidence that is inadmissible at trial is not `evidence' at all, for Brady purposes. As we previously have observed, in Wood the United States Supreme Court ultimately found inadmissible polygraph evidence not material under Brady. However, Wood was not based on a per se rejection of inadmissible evidence as a basis for a Brady claim. Wood found the evidence not material because, even based on the assumption that this inadmissible evidence might have led respondent's counsel to conduct additional discovery leading to admissible evidence, the evidence's influence on the outcome of the case was speculative. ( People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 919, fn. 28, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 162 P.3d 528.) Accordingly, as Wood did not establish that inadmissible evidence can never be material for purpose of a Brady claim, it does not support respondent's position here. We need not decide in this case when, if ever, the prosecution's duty to disclose evidence favorable to a criminal defendant may extend to inadmissible evidence, because it is clear that the undisclosed evidence here, including the Montez letter, would have been admissible at petitioner's capital trial. As long as a witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny his or her prior inconsistent statements (see Evid.Code, § 770), such statements are admissible for the truth of the matter asserted as an exception to the hearsay rule ( id., § 1235). At petitioner's trial, Saucedo would have had that opportunity and the Montez letter therefore would have been admissible. Similarly, once Saucedo testified, the other undisclosed evidence, including the testimony of the undisclosed declarants, would have been admissible as well. In accordance with the foregoing, we conclude that a reasonable probability that is, a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding ( United States v. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375) exists that if the Montez letter had been disclosed prior to petitioner's trial, the outcome of the penalty phase would have been different. In the end, the trial judge, not the prosecutor, is the arbiter of admissibility, and the prosecutor's Brady disclosure obligations cannot turn on the prosecutor's view of whether or how defense counsel might employ particular items of evidence at trial. It is not the role of the prosecutor to decide that facially exculpatory evidence need not be turned over because the prosecutor thinks the information is false. It is `the criminal trial, as distinct from the prosecutor's private deliberations' that is the `chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about criminal accusations.' ( U.S. v. Alvarez (9th Cir.1996) 86 F.3d 901, 905, quoting Kyles v. Whitley, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 440,115 S.Ct. 1555; see also People v. Hoyos, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 919-920, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 162 P.3d 528 [In deciding whether asserted Brady evidence is material to defendant's case, it is therefore appropriate to examine the effect of the evidence on the actual joint proceeding in which defendant was tried].) To the extent the prosecutor is uncertain about the materiality of a piece of evidence, `the prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.' ( Alvarez, at p. 905, quoting United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342.)