Opinion ID: 857469
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tinker Applied to the Fetus Doll Distribution

Text: Plaintiffs’ distribution conveyed a political and religious message and would likely merit First Amendment protection outside the school context. Inside the school walls, however, we must consider whether the expression was, or was reasonably forecast to be, disruptive. Unlike in Tinker, the expression here was neither silent nor passive. It involved proactive contact with large numbers of other students. The items being distributed remained on school grounds in the hands of students throughout the school day. The sheer number of items also created strong potential for substantial disruption. Furthermore, these fetus dolls were made of rubber—a material that could easily be, and was, pulled apart, bounced against walls, and stuck to ceilings. The dolls’ small size made them tempting projectiles and toilet-clogging devices. This scenario carries more potential for disruption than the passive, silent act of wearing a t-shirt or a black armband. And that potential quickly came to fruition. The record is replete with reports of doll-related disruptions throughout the day on January 29, 2010, including substantial disruptions to classroom instruction, damage to school property (the ceilings and plumbing), and risks to student safety (the fire-starting and doll-throwing). -21- Plaintiffs note that most disruptions occurred only because of wrongful behavior of third parties and that no Plaintiffs participated in these activities. They argue that preventing their speech because of bad acts of others amounts to banning leafleting because of litterbugs. See Jews for Jesus v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 984 F.2d 1319, 1324-25 (1st Cir. 1993). This argument might be effective outside the school context, but it ignores the “special characteristics of the school environment,” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, where the government has a compelling interest in protecting the educational mission of the school and ensuring student safety. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 406-07; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985); PeTA v. Rasmussen, 298 F.3d 1198, 1205 (10th Cir. 2002).11 Plaintiffs also argue that the magistrate judge ignored disputes of material fact regarding the District’s reasons for shutting down the distribution. They stress Assistant Principal Luck’s statement to Plaintiffs at the time he confiscated the fetus dolls: “It’s time to shut this down . . . Some people are getting offended.” Aplt. Appx., Vol. IV at 11 Plaintiffs do not cite (and we have not found) case law holding that school officials’ ability to limit disruptive expression depends on the blameworthiness of the speaker. To the contrary, the Tinker rule is guided by a school’s need to protect its learning environment and its students, and courts generally inquire only whether the potential for substantial disruption is genuine. For example, in West, we upheld a school’s ban on the Confederate flag because the flag was associated with racial violence in the school environment, but we did not examine whether the student who had displayed the flag was actually advocating violence. 206 F.3d at 1365. Moreover, there is no indication in this case that the problematic student disruptions were aimed at stopping plaintiffs’ expression, and plaintiffs did not otherwise develop such an argument. -22- 996. They urge us to infer from this that Mr. Luck chose to stop the distribution solely because he was personally offended, or was worried that others would be offended, by Plaintiffs’ religious, anti-abortion message. The District says Mr. Luck was referring to the non-Relentless students’ dismemberment and throwing of the dolls, which he and other students found offensive. Plaintiffs reject this explanation, describing Mr. Luck’s testimony about the hallway disruptions and the students’ complaints as incredible. We agree that Mr. Luck’s statement lacked specificity, but we are not convinced Plaintiffs’ inference is reasonable. Plaintiffs provide no evidence to dispute Mr. Luck’s deposition testimony about the hallway disruptions or the complaints of the two female students. We see no reason to discount this testimony. Viewing evidence in light most favorable to Plaintiffs does not extend to ignoring undisputed evidence that undermines their position. Even if we accepted Plaintiffs’ interpretation of Mr. Luck’s statement, this claim would still fail. To survive summary judgment, a disputed fact must be material. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In assessing materiality, “[w]e are obligated to examine the record as a whole . . . and evaluate what the school actually did, as opposed to carving out an isolated statement from the record.” Fleming v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 931 (10th Cir. 2002). Any dispute as to the exact meaning of Mr. Luck’s statement is not material when viewed against the whole record. Plaintiffs argue that the District’s decision to stop the distribution was unjustified because the fetus dolls were confiscated before any substantial disruption had occurred. -23- But the District was not obligated to wait until a substantial disruption materialized, so long as its forecast was reasonable. The substantial disruptions that actually transpired show the forecast was reasonable. Finally, even if Mr. Luck initially stopped the distribution for impermissible reasons, Plaintiffs could not defeat summary judgment. At Roswell High, the dolls were not confiscated until security guards had observed actual disruptions. As for Goddard High, Plaintiffs’ reading of Mr. Luck’s statement shows at most that the school’s decision to stop the distribution was unjustified for some short period of time—likely a few minutes, but no more than one or two hours. Because Plaintiffs seek only injunctive relief, any claim they could have under this fact interpretation became moot once actual substantial disruptions occurred. In short, there is ample undisputed evidence that the District had permissible reasons for stopping the distribution. Plaintiffs’ free speech rights were therefore not violated. C. Facial Challenge to the District’s Preapproval Policies A facial challenge involves “an examination of whether the terms of the [policy] itself measured against the relevant constitutional doctrine, and independent of the constitutionality of particular applications, contain a constitutional infirmity that invalidates the [policy] in its entirety.” Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1127 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted). -24- Plaintiffs assert that District policies are unconstitutional on their face as prior restraints and for reasons of vagueness and overbreadth. We begin our analysis by defining the scope of our review, which is limited to considering Plaintiffs’ prior restraint and vagueness arguments as applied to relevant portions of Policy 5195. We next consider Plaintiffs’ prior restraint argument. Finally, we address vagueness.
As a preliminary matter, we must consider the scope of Plaintiffs’ facial challenge. For reasons we discuss below, our review is limited in two ways. First, the only District policy properly before us is the portion of Policy 5195 relevant to Plaintiffs’ desired speech. This includes Policy 5195’s preapproval requirement and accompanying procedural safeguards, together with the substantive restriction included in subsection 2.a. Second, because Plaintiffs have not adequately developed an overbreadth argument, our review is limited to their prior restraint and vagueness arguments. a. Policies Included in Our Facial Review Plaintiffs attempt a facial attack on every District policy that could potentially govern student speech, including all of Policy 5195, Policy 7110, and the unwritten standard practice that preceded Policy 5195. This sweeping scope of review would be excessive. “Facial challenges are strong medicine, and thus we must be vigilant in applying a most exacting analysis to such claims.” Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1157 (10th Cir. 2006) (considering facial challenge on prior restraint and vagueness grounds). -25- “Facial challenges are disfavored for several reasons” including the risk of “premature interpretation” because such challenges “often rest on speculation.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) (upholding a state election law over political party’s facial challenge that the law violated its constitutional right to free association). Additionally, broad facial challenges “run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts should neither anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” Id. (quotations omitted). Plaintiffs do not cite, and we have not encountered, binding or persuasive case law allowing, much less requiring, a court to entertain expansive facial challenges to whole collections of laws or policies like the challenge they attempt here. We therefore decline to perform such a sweeping review. Our inquiry concerns those portions of the District’s policies that pertain to the particular speech in which Plaintiffs wish to engage. Formal adoption of Policy 5195 subsumed the unwritten standard practice, rendering it moot with respect to our facial analysis.12 For similar reasons, we do not consider the facial constitutionality of Policy 7110. Although the record indicates that, before the adoption of Policy 5195, some school officials believed Policy 7110 applied to the rubber fetus distribution, the promulgation of Policy 5195, if 12 Policy 5195 was promulgated largely in response to the rubber fetus controversy. -26- upheld here, renders Policy 7110 immaterial to future student distributions like those Plaintiffs wish to conduct. Finally, our facial review includes only relevant portions of Policy 5195. The District refused permission for the rubber fetus distribution because it believed the distribution was disruptive. This justification is covered by subsection 2.a., which allows school officials to restrict any distribution that “[w]ould cause a substantial disruption or a material interference with the normal operation of the school or school activities.” Aplt. Appx., Vol. I at 186. Other bases for restriction covered by subsections 2.b through 2.f—for example, because the material is obscene or illegal, are irrelevant here. Our review is therefore limited to the Policy 5195’s preapproval requirement and accompanying procedural safeguards, together with the substantive Tinker restriction in subsection 2.a.13 13 The question of which policies are relevant to Plaintiffs’ desired speech (and are therefore appropriately included in our review) should not be confused with the idea of prudential or third-party standing. Generally speaking, “a person to whom a [policy] may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that [policy] on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others . . .” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973). But “within the context of the First Amendment,” courts have recognized “a lessening of prudential limitations on standing,” which allows a plaintiff to facially challenge a law or policy even if the plaintiff’s own expression is not constitutionally protected. ACORN v. City of Tulsa, 835 F.2d 735, 738 (10th Cir. 1987). This is known as an overbreadth challenge, which, as we explain below, has not been adequately raised and argued in this appeal. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610. -27- b. Arguments Included in Our Facial Review Plaintiffs assert that the District’s policy is facially unconstitutional as a prior restraint and for reasons of vagueness and overbreadth. Although they develop prior restraint and vagueness arguments by addressing the legal standards and case law specific to these theories, they fail to do the same for overbreadth. The overbreadth doctrine is an alternative facial challenge theory similar to, but distinct from, vagueness. See Jordan v. Pugh, 425 F.3d 820, 827 (10th Cir. 2005) (“The Supreme Court has traditionally viewed vagueness and overbreadth as logically related and similar doctrines.” (quotations omitted)); see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497-98 (1982); West, 206 F.3d at 1367-68. A law or policy “may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010) (quotations omitted). Although Plaintiffs make several conclusory statements that the District’s policy is overbroad, they do not address—or even acknowledge—the legal standard for overbreadth. Nor do they explain why they believe the policy is overbroad.14 14 Although we do not consider overbreadth, it is unlikely such a theory would succeed. To prevail on an overbreadth theory, a plaintiff must show that a challenged policy prohibits a “broad range of protected conduct,” and there must be “a realistic danger that the [policy] itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court.” City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796, 800-01 (1984). “The possibility of an impermissible Continued . . . -28- “[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant's opening brief.” Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007). Our review of Plaintiffs’ facial challenge is therefore limited to their prior restraint and vagueness arguments. 2. Policy 5195 is Not an Unconstitutional Prior Restraint The magistrate judge upheld the preapproval requirement because it sets reasonable limits on student speech and has adequate procedural safeguards. We agree. We note at the outset that Policy 5195’s preapproval requirement does not affect all private student expression. It does not apply to spoken communication. For example, the policy does not require Relentless students to seek preapproval for many of the expressive activities in which they routinely engage on school grounds, such as sharing their religious and anti-abortion views with other students or praying silently and out loud on school grounds and in the classroom. The preapproval requirement also does not affect symbolic expression. Students are not required, for example, to obtain permission before wearing black armbands, ______________________________________ Cont. application of a [policy] does not in itself mean the [policy] is substantially overbroad.” ACORN, 835 F.2d at 744. As we will explain, the substantive restriction at issue, subsection 2.a, restates the Tinker standard. Tinker represents the most speech-protective standard articulated by the Supreme Court in school speech cases. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 417-419 (Thomas, J., concurring). It is doubtful that Plaintiffs could demonstrate that a majority of applications of the Tinker standard would be unconstitutional. -29- carrying or displaying signs or posters, engaging in silent or non-silent protests, or circulating a petition. There may be circumstances under which school officials could, subject to Tinker’s limitations, constitutionally restrict these expressive activities during or after the fact, but the preapproval requirement does not apply. The only type of expressive activity for which students must seek preapproval is the distribution of non-school-sponsored materials, and even then preapproval is required only if students intend to distribute more than 10 items on school grounds. We begin our analysis of Plaintiffs’ prior restraint argument by explaining where the preapproval requirement fits in a prior restraint analysis. We then analyze the policy, concluding that it is constitutionally permissible in light of its procedural protections, its substantive standard, and the special context of the school environment. a. What Is a Prior Restraint? Generally, a “prior restraint” restricts speech in advance on the basis of content and carries a presumption of unconstitutionality. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992); Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 978-79 (4th ed. 2011); see also United States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A prior restraint on speech is a law, regulation or judicial order that suppresses speech . . . on the basis of the speech’s content and in advance of its actual expression.”) (citing Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993)). Prior restraints generally take one of two classic forms: judicial injunctions and administrative licensing schemes. See Chemerinsky, supra, at 978-79. -30- A judicial injunction is usually a court order forbidding specific speakers from specific expression. A well-known example comes from Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), where the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state court injunction preventing the media from publishing certain information about a preliminary hearing in an ongoing murder prosecution. Id. at 561. In contrast, an administrative licensing scheme does not usually target a particular speaker or instance of speech. Rather, it requires a speaker to obtain approval before engaging in certain forms of speech in a given forum, sometimes based on the volume or scale of the intended speech. A typical example comes from Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992), in which a local ordinance required citizens to obtain a permit before holding a parade or assembly on public property. Id. In the present case, the District’s preapproval requirement resembles an administrative licensing scheme because it requires preapproval for student speech that is non-school-related and involves distribution of more than 10 items of literature on school grounds. Licensing restrictions that are content neutral and restrict only the time, place, and manner of speech are not subjected to the most rigorous prior restraint scrutiny. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (upholding licensing restriction on sound amplification in city park as a content neutral time, place, and manner restriction -31- without applying prior restraint analysis).15 The District’s preapproval requirement appears to be content neutral on its face. But although it includes content neutral time, place, and manner restrictions, it allows officials to use discretion in deciding whether to allow speech, and nothing in the policy prevents officials from considering the subject matter of the speech when predicting whether it will cause substantial disruption. See Forsyth Cnty., 505 U.S. at 134 (“Listeners’ reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation.”). This element of discretion calls for prior restraint scrutiny. See id. at 130. b. The Preapproval Requirement Is Valid Administrative pre-approval prior restraints can survive First Amendment review only when they meet very high standards established by the Supreme Court. Two considerations save the pertinent portions of Policy 5195 from facial constitutional attack. First, the policy contains procedural safeguards, including the opportunity to bring two 15 A policy is content neutral if its restrictions do not hinge on either the viewpoint or the subject manner of the speech. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000); see R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391 (example of a viewpoint restriction in the form of an ordinance prohibiting expression of racist messages while allowing speech in favor of racial tolerance and equality); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 532 (1980) (example of a subject matter restriction in the form of a statute prohibiting utility companies from discussing controversial issues of public policy in inserts included in customer bills). Subject matter regulation is “not as obnoxious as viewpoint-based regulation,” but either form of content regulation raises constitutional concerns. Hill, 530 U.S. at 723. Content-neutral “time, place, and manner” restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and must leave open ample alternative channels for communication. Id. at 725-26. -32- appeals. Second, the policy imposes substantive constraints on official discretion that are constitutionally sufficient in the special context of a public school, where students enjoy free speech rights but not to the same extent as they would in the public square. Additionally, we note that our conclusion is consistent with the trend of decisions of our sibling circuits on this issue.
In non-school settings, an administrative licensing process can overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality only if it contains “procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system,” i.e., content discrimination. City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, 541 U.S. 774, 779 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Freedman v. State of Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1964)); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000) (discussing the dangers of content discrimination, which includes both viewpoint and subject matter discrimination). The Supreme Court first emphasized the importance of procedural safeguards in Freedman v. State of Maryland, where it considered a challenge to a statute requiring a film to receive advanced approval before public screening. 380 U.S. at 52. The statute included no provision to ensure applicants would receive a timely decision from the “censorship board,” and it made the board’s decision final with no option to appeal a denial without undertaking a time-consuming lawsuit. Id. at 54. The Court rejected the -33- statute because it contained no “procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system.” Id. at 58.16 Several decades later, the Court decided Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, which involved a licensing scheme that regulated use of public property for expressive activity. 505 U.S. at 133. A county ordinance allowed officials to vary the fee imposed for a parade or assembly permit based on the estimated cost for law enforcement at the event. Id. The Court overturned the ordinance because it lacked procedural safeguards to prevent viewpoint discrimination: the ordinance did not require officials to explain their decisions or to render a decision in any particular timeframe, and it provided no process for appealing an adverse decision. Id. The ordinance also lacked criteria to guide official discretion and prevent arbitrary decision making. Id. at 133-34. In short, “[n]othing in the [Forsyth County] law or its application prevent[ed] the official from encouraging some views and discouraging others.” Id.; see Nationalist Movement v. City of New York, 481 F.3d 178, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2007) (upholding nondiscretionary permit application fee but striking down provision requiring applicants to provide security deposit for potential damage to city property with amount set based on content of planned speech); see also Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002). 16 The Freedman Court held that the censorship statute must include three procedural safeguards: (1) “[a]ny restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits must . . . be limited to preservation of the status quo,” 380 U.S. at 59; (2) “the procedure must . . . assure a prompt final judicial decision,” id.; and (3) the government must carry burden of proving that the expression at issue is unprotected, id. at 58. -34- This circuit has similarly relied on the Forsyth County procedural standards—explanation of decisions, timeframe restrictions, and appeals process—in reviewing challenged licensing schemes. See Doctor John’s, 465 F.3d at 1162 (upholding a licensing scheme in part because it satisfied procedural safeguards outlined in Forsyth County). Our careful review of Policy 5195 convinces us that the policy contains adequate procedural safeguards consistent with what Forsyth County requires. For example, the policy ensures prompt and transparent decision making, requiring officials to approve or deny a student’s request within five school days and to provide written explanation of any denial. Students are entitled to appeal an unfavorable decision, first to Superintendent Gottlieb and then to the Board of Education, which must provide a hearing within 10 school days and provide a decision at its next regular meeting. These safeguards are designed to prevent viewpoint discrimination in the vast majority of circumstances. In short, we find the policy contains adequate procedural safeguards to pass constitutional muster. ii. Substantive Constraints on Discretion in the School Context Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has specifically addressed the constitutionality of preapproval requirements in the school context. Our review of the District’s policy is guided by general First Amendment case law, which requires substantive constraints to limit official discretion to “obviate the dangers of . . . censorship.” Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58. But we must account for the Supreme Court’s clear direction that students’ “First Amendment rights [are] circumscribed ‘in light of the -35- special characteristics of the school environment.’” Morse, 551 U.S. at 405 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). Outside the school context, preapproval requirements that permit broad official discretion—for example, in the issuance of a parade or assembly permit—often run afoul of the First Amendment. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (“Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.”). But in the school context officials may use more discretion in addressing student speech. “If the schools are to perform their traditional function of ‘inculcat[ing] the habits and manners of civility,’ they must be allowed the space and discretion to deal with the nuances. The touchstone is reasonableness.” Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1543 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted) (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681). “[S]chools may regulate some speech ‘even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school.’” Morse, 551 U.S. at 406 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266).17 We are constrained by the Court’s instructions in this area. 17 Even outside the First Amendment arena, the Court has emphasized that “special needs inhere in the public school context.” Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (quotations omitted) (addressing Fourth Amendment issue). Students’ constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments are therefore “different in public schools than elsewhere; the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995). -36- Turning to Roswell District’s Policy 5195, Section 2 constrains official discretion by providing a finite list of grounds on which officials may refuse approval for a student distribution. These “articulated standards” serve to prevent “censorship through uncontrolled discretion.” Forsyth Cnty., 505 U.S. at 133. As we explained above, the portion of section 2 that is relevant to Plaintiffs’ facial challenge is subsection 2.a, which allows the school to disallow a student distribution if the distribution “[w]ould cause a substantial disruption or a material interference with the normal operation of the school or school activities.” Aplt. Appx., Vol. I at 186. The policy language mirrors the Tinker standard. See 393 U.S. at 505-06. Our earlier analysis of Plaintiffs’ as-applied First Amendment challenge employed the Tinker standard to review the District’s decision to stop a distribution that was under way. Here, the language of subsection 2.a incorporates that standard to cabin official discretion and guide decision makers in determining whether a particular distribution should be allowed. See Forsyth Cnty., 505 U.S. at 133. Plaintiffs assert that subsection 2.a is subjective and argue that it therefore does not limit official discretion or prevent arbitrary decision making. But Plaintiffs’ argument ignores that this part of the policy embodies the Tinker standard, which evaluates the exercise of school discretion based on objective reasonableness. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. The inclusion of the Tinker standard in subsection 2.a instructs decision makers that distributions should not be prohibited unless they would substantially disrupt or materially interfere with school operations or activities. In other words, minor or immaterial disruptions do not justify withholding approval. -37- Moreover, we note that in Tinker itself, the action under review was a form of prior restraint. Two days before the students planned to wear the armbands to school to protest the war in Vietnam, the school principals “met and adopted a policy that any student wearing an armband to school would be asked to remove it, and if he refused would be suspended until he returned without the armband.” 393 U.S. at 504. When the students arrived at school wearing the armbands, the school sent them home and suspended them “until they would come back without their armbands.” Id. The school officials suppressed the students’ speech for the most part before it occurred, which fits the general definition of prior restraint. The Supreme Court in Tinker held that the school could not take such action in the absence of “facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities.” Id. at 514. The Court thereby articulated a standard that the school could use to restrict, in advance, student speech that could be reasonably forecast to cause substantial disruption. That is what the District’s policy does here. We therefore conclude, based on Tinker and its progeny, that the policy constrains official discretion sufficiently for the school context. We emphasize, however, that district officials must take care to apply the policy in a viewpoint-neutral manner to avoid its unconstitutional application. In particular, we note the District’s procedural requirement that a school must provide a written statement of its reasons for denying permission for a particular distribution. In stating such reasons, officials must do more -38- than simply parrot the Tinker-based policy language. They must provide a fact-based explanation for why officials reasonably forecast that a particular distribution will cause a substantial disruption. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (“[T]he prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible.”); Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 565 (reviewing a judicial injunction and discussing the importance of making clear, fact-based findings to support the need for prior restraint of speech). iii. Other Circuits’ Decisions on School Preapproval Policies The foregoing conclusion finds support in the decisions of other circuits that have considered school preapproval policies. Our review of these cases serves to place the present case in context and to demonstrate that our decision fits comfortably in the trend of decisions in this area. Nearly all circuits that have addressed this issue have concluded that the First Amendment permits school preapproval policies in some form. Although courts have not taken a uniform approach in analyzing particular policies, the clear trend is one of upholding policies that contain adequate procedural safeguards and place reasonable limits on official discretion. We discuss our sibling circuit decisions in two groups, beginning with early decisions issued in the decade immediately after the Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker, followed by a review of more recent cases. Shortly after Tinker, the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits concluded that schools -39- could require students to submit student-authored literature for approval before distributing it on a school campus. “[T]here is nothing per se unreasonable about requiring a high school student to submit written material to school authorities prior to distribution.” Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973). “[S]chool authorities may exercise reasonable prior restraint upon the exercise of students’ first amendment rights,” but any policy “must contain precise criteria sufficiently spelling out what is forbidden,” and must provide for “[p]rompt approval or disapproval . . . [;] [s]pecification of the effect of failure to act promptly; and . . . [a]n adequate and prompt appeals procedure.” Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 382 (4th Cir. 1975) (quotations omitted); see also Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 80607 (2d Cir. 1971) (analyzing whether public school setting is an “exceptional case” under Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), and concluding that a school preapproval policy was constitutionally permissible). Although these courts concluded that school preapproval policies were constitutionally permissible as a general matter, they rejected specific policies that lacked procedural safeguards and/or failed to set substantive limits on official discretion. See Nitzberg, 525 F.2d at 383-84; Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1351 (4th Cir. 1973); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 60 (4th Cir. 1971); Eisner, 440 F.2d at 810; see also Riseman v. Sch. Comm. of City of Quincy, 439 F.2d 148, 149-50 (1st Cir. 1971) (rejecting preapproval policy that was vague, overbroad, and did not “reflect any effort to -40- minimize the adverse effect of prior restraint”).18 These early cases’ insistence that school preapproval policies be clearly defined and contain adequate procedural safeguards remains relevant to our analysis. As we have already discussed, the District policy at issue in the present case contains the necessary procedural safeguards lacking in the policies rejected in cases like Eisner and Nitzberg. But other aspects of these early cases are time bound. They were decided without the benefit of the more recent Supreme Court guidance we rely on in this case. In particular, the Fourth Circuit in Nitzberg rejected a provision authorizing officials to ban any distribution that would “reasonably lead the principal to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities.” 525 F.2d at 383. The Nitzberg court recognized that this language was drawn from Tinker, but nevertheless found it vague and overbroad as a preapproval standard. Id. Drawing on current Supreme Court law that was unavailable to the Fourth Circuit in 1975, we uphold language in the Roswell District policy that is similar to the Tinker-based language rejected by Nitzberg. Our conclusion differs from that in Nitzberg for two reasons.19 18 The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Sullivan is an example of a policy that met constitutional muster. The Sullivan court upheld a school preapproval policy after concluding that it contained reasonable and good faith protections. 475 F.2d at 1076. The policy established time frames for official review, specific provisions governing disciplinary procedures, and an appeals process. Id. at 1073-74. It allowed the school to withhold permission only in specific circumstances, for example, if the publication was libelous or obscene or advocated violation of laws or school rules. Id. at 1073. 19 In addition to the reasons discussed here, we also note that the Nitzberg court failed to recognize that, as discussed previously, the school actions in Tinker were taken Continued . . . -41- First, Nitzberg labeled the policy at issue as vague and overbroad without defining the legal standards it was applying to those terms or providing further analysis. Id.20 In 1992, Forsyth provided a clear analytical framework for preapproval policies that is distinct from issues of vagueness. The relevant part of this analytical framework requires us to ask whether the policy provides sufficient guidance to decision makers to prevent “censorship through uncontrolled discretion.” Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 123. Second, and perhaps even more important, as we have already explained, the Supreme Court’s post-Tinker school speech cases grant school officials more discretion in restricting student speech than would be permitted outside the school context. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 405-06; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682; see also Muller, 98 F.3d at 1543. More recent circuit court decisions, including our decision today, have recognized this.21 We now turn to the second, more recent, group of circuit cases addressing school preapproval policies. In the past three decades, the school preapproval policies considered in circuit decisions have for the most part contained procedural safeguards and decision making criteria. As a result, circuits have generally upheld the challenged ______________________________________ Cont. pursuant to a school policy and the Tinker Court articulated the substantial disruption standard as a guide for officials in deciding whether to allow student speech to proceed. 20 We address the issue of vagueness as applied to the Roswell District policy in the next section of this opinion. 21 “In more recent years [since Tinker], however, the Court has been much less protective of speech in school environment and much more deferential to school authorities.” Chemerinsky, supra, at 1194. -42- policies they considered. The Eighth Circuit upheld a high school’s preapproval policy in Bystrom ex rel. Bystrom v. Fridley High School, Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 14, 822 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987), rejecting “the view that prior restraints are per se unconstitutional in the high-school context.” Id. at 750. The Bystrom court specifically upheld a provision in the policy that was “intended to codify the rule of Tinker.” Id. at 754. The provision allowed the school to restrict speech on the basis that it could “cause a material and substantial disruption to the proper and orderly operation and discipline of the school,” so long as there were “specific facts upon which the likelihood of disruption [could] be forecasted.” Id. at 754. The Seventh Circuit upheld preapproval policies in two cases. In Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse School, it upheld a preapproval policy at an elementary school, concluding the policy contained “adequate procedural safeguards.” 98 F.3d at 1541.22 In Hedges v. Wauconda Community Unit School District No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295 (7th Cir. 1993), the same court considered a junior high school preapproval policy that allowed school officials to restrict materials if they were deemed obscene or libelous, would invade the privacy of others, or would “cause substantial disruption of the proper and orderly operation of the school.” Id. at 1296. The policy also banned outright any distribution of religious materials. Id. The court overturned the blanket restriction on 22 The Muller court declined to apply Tinker, relying instead on Hazelwood, because the policy at issue was in an elementary school. The court reasoned that the “marketplace of ideas” theme reflected in Tinker was “less appropriate” in an elementary school of “five through thirteen-year-olds.” Id. at 1538. -43- religious materials, but upheld the remainder of the policy and its preapproval requirement. Id. at 1297-1303.23 Most recently, the Sixth Circuit upheld a policy strikingly similar to Policy 5195. M.A.L. ex rel. M.L. v. Kinsland, 543 F.3d 841 (6th Cir. 2008). Like the Roswell District policy, the Kinsland policy required students to submit materials to school officials in advance and allowed the school to designate the time, place, and manner of distribution. Id. at 845. The Kinsland policy contained procedural safeguards similar to the Roswell policy. It designated strict time frames for official decision, required written explanation for any denial, and guaranteed students at least two appeals. Id. at 844-45. Additionally, like the Roswell District policy, the Kinsland policy allowed a school to deny approval if the principal “reasonably determine[d]” that it “[w]ould cause a substantial disruption of or a material interference with the normal operation of the school or school activities.” 23 Muller and Hedges implicitly reversed the Seventh Circuit’s previous position in Fujishima v. Board of Education, 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972), which rejected school preapproval policies as an unconstitutional prior restraint. Id. at 1557-59. Neither Muller nor Hedges mentioned Fujishima, but other cases and courts have noted the shift. E.g., Wernsing v. Thompson, 423 F.3d 732, 748 (7th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging inconsistency between Muller and Fujishima); Harless v. Darr, 937 F. Supp. 1339, 1344-45 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (questioning the continued validity of Fujishima given subsequent Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit case law); Hedges ex rel. Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 118, 807 F. Supp. 444, 457 n.14 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (noting that the Seventh Circuit has departed from Fujishima’s analytical framework), rev’d on other grounds by Hedges, 9 F.3d at 1303; see also Pounds v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 517 F. Supp. 2d 901, 918 (S.D. Texas 2007) (noting that the Seventh Circuit allows prior-review requirements in schools under Muller without mention of Fujishima). -44- Id. at 845.24 We are aware of only one circuit opinion in the past three decades to reject a school preapproval policy. In Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988), high school students distributed copies of a non-school-sponsored student newspaper at a school-sponsored barbecue on school grounds. Id. at 1150. They were reprimanded for not seeking preapproval for the distribution, as required by school policy. Id. at 1150-51. Although the newspaper was “generally critical of school administration policies,” the principal did not find any content objectionable or any problem with the manner of the distribution. Id. at 1150-51. Among other things, the policy allowed the school to ban materials based on evidence that would reasonably support “a judgment that significant or substantial disruption of the normal operation of the school” could result. Id. at 1151. The policy provided certain types of expression could be considered evidence of potential disruption, including material criticizing school officials. Id. The school “admitted that if the students had submitted [the newspaper] for prior review, [the school] would have allowed distribution without change.” Id. Finding itself “confronted with a unique and ironic situation in which a school . . . punished students for distribution of material which both 24 Our analysis differs from that in Kinsland because the Sixth Circuit applied Hazelwood, rather than the more speech-protective Tinker standard. Id. at 847, 849. As we explain in our discussion of the Plaintiffs’ as-applied free speech claim, the Supreme Court recently clarified that Tinker governs claims involving private (non-schoolsponsored) student speech. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 405-06. -45- sides acknowledge could not be suppressed under the first amendment,” the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to dismiss the students’ First Amendment claim. Id. at 1151-52. The opinion states that the policy was based on “undifferentiated fears,” id. at 1159, and concludes that “a policy which subjects all non-school sponsored communications to predistribution review . . . violates the first amendment,” id. at 1157.25 We agree that the student speech in Burch was entitled to First Amendment protection and that portions of the policy were probably unconstitutional on their face, such as the provision making criticism of school officials a ground on which to deny permission for distribution. But Burch’s broad statement suggesting that no preapproval policy could pass constitutional muster runs counter to every school speech case we have cited in this opinion. It is even difficult to square with the Supreme Court’s rulings concerning licensing schemes outside the school context. Moreover, Burch’s persuasive force is diminished after 25 years of Supreme Court and various circuit court school speech decisions upholding school officials’ discretion to maintain a nondisruptive school environment. For these reasons, we do not find Burch persuasive and do not follow it here. 25 Parts of the Burch opinion read like an analysis of an as-applied challenge to the policy, for example, by stating, “[t]here was no evidence that [the newspaper] had interfered with the operation of the high school or impinged upon other students’ rights.” 861 F.2d at 1151. Yet the court’s conclusion seems to address a facial challenge: “There is . . . no justification for this policy, which conditions all distribution of student writings on school premises upon prior school approval.” Id. at 1159. -46- In sum, our reading of Supreme Court case law leads us to conclude, along with a majority of our sibling circuits, that a school may enact a preapproval policy subject to the constitutional requirements we have described. The District’s policy meets these requirements.