Opinion ID: 751894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Was Edwards properly sentenced?

Text: 97 Appellant Edwards argues that the district court erred in not granting her request for a minor participant sentence reduction. She also argues that the district court erred in imposing a sentence enhancement for physical restraint of a victim. 98 Section 3B1.2(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a decrease of two offense levels if the defendant was a minor participant in the criminal activity. The district court found that Edwards neither played a minor role nor a leadership role in the July 11 robbery. The district court found that Edwards participated in the robbery, was present in the jewelry store, helped put the jewelry in the pillowcase, and was present during the planning of the robbery. Based on these findings, we hold that Edwards' culpability is at best equivalent to that of the other robbers inside the store. See United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d at 557 (holding that the district court was not clearly erroneous in determining that appellant was not a minor participant where his participation was equal to that of the other [co-defendants]). 99 Section 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a sentence enhancement if any person was physically restrained to facilitate commission of the offense. The commentary to § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) states that: The guideline provides an enhancement for robberies where a victim was forced to accompany the defendant to another location, or was physically restrained by being tied, bound, or locked up. Edwards argues that this commentary provides the only examples of physical restraint. 100 This court rejected just such an argument in United States v. Thompson, 109 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir.1997) (noting that the commentary's examples are merely illustrative). In Thompson, this court held that [w]hen a dangerous weapon is used to force a person to move about, that person has been physically restrained just as surely as if he was grabbed by the collar and pulled along. Id. (also holding that physical contact with the victim is unnecessary). In this case, it is uncontroverted that Lott ordered a jewelry store employee and customer to the back room at gunpoint. This constitutes physical restraint. Thus, the district court's sentence enhancement is not clearly erroneous. 101 Edwards also claims that the upward adjustment for physical restraint amounts to double-counting because she also received a sentence for a firearms violation under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). In United States v. Duran, 4 F.3d 800, 804 (9th Cir.1993), this court held that a sentence enhancement for an express threat of death was inappropriate when the defendant was also convicted of a firearms violation under § 924(c). The court based its holding on the fact that the Sentencing Guidelines: (1) viewed an express threat of death as the equivalent of possession, use, or discharge of a firearm during a robbery, and (2) prohibited such an equivalent from being used to enhance a sentence. Id. However, the physical restraint of the victims is not the equivalent of the possession, use, or discharge of a firearm. Thus, the district court did not err in adjusting Edwards' sentence for physical restraint.