Opinion ID: 890164
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether application of Montana's venue statutes violates Johnson's right to equal protection of the law.

Text: ¶ 18 Johnson asserts that this application of the venue statutes would violate his right to equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution because it treats resident defendants differently depending on whether they are sued with a non-resident defendant. Ward argues Johnson is prohibited from asserting this constitutional claim because Johnson did not notify the Attorney General pursuant to M.R.App. P. 27. Under that rule, a party who challenges the constitutionality of any act of the Montana legislature. . . must give notice to the supreme court and to the Montana attorney general of the existence of the constitutional issue. Ward contends Johnson's failure to provide notice denied the State an opportunity to advance a legitimate governmental interest in maintaining the current venue statutes. For the reasons that follow, we do not rely on Ward's notice argument but conclude that Johnson's constitutional rights are not violated by application of the statutes in question. ¶ 19 We have analyzed a party's constitutional arguments absent compliance with the notice requirement in cases where the challenging party was not asserting the statute itself was unconstitutional. Polasek v. Omura, 2006 MT 103, ¶ 20, 332 Mont. 157, 136 P.3d 519. Here, Johnson is not asserting the plain language of § 25-2-122, MCA, is unconstitutional; rather, it is this Court's application of the statute in multiple-defendant cases that allegedly violates his right to equal protection. It is also unclear whether M.R.App. P. 27 applies when, as here, the constitutional issue is raised by the appellee in defense of a district court's ruling on non-constitutional grounds. Our previous cases rejecting the constitutional claim for noncompliance with the rule did not consider this unique situation. Boettcher v. Mont. Guaranty Fund, 2006 MT 127, ¶ 12, 332 Mont. 279, 140 P.3d 474; Weinert v. City of Great Falls, 2004 MT 168, ¶ 13, 322 Mont. 38, 97 P.3d 1079; Russell v. Masonic Home of Mont., Inc., 2006 MT 286, ¶ 20, 334 Mont. 351, 147 P.3d 216. Given the lack of clear application of the rule in this instance, we consider Johnson's constitutional argument on its merits. ¶ 20 Johnson asserts that our application of § 25-2-122(2), MCA, violates his right to equal protection because he is compelled to defend this action in Ward's county of residence simply because she named a nonresident defendant in her complaint. The principal purpose of the Equal Protection Clause, Article II, Section 4, of the Montana Constitution, is to ensure that persons who are citizens are not subject to arbitrary and discriminatory state action. Timm v. Mont. Dept. of Pub. Health & Human Servs., 2008 MT 126, ¶ 30, 343 Mont. 11, 184 P.3d 994. ¶ 21 The right to equal protection does not prevent a state from adjusting its legislation to differences in situation or forbid classification in that connection, it merely requires that those classifications are not arbitrarily made and have a reasonable relation to the subject of that particular legislation. Ford v. Burlington N. R.R., 250 Mont. 188, 193, 819 P.2d 169, 173 (1991) (quoting Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 493, 47 S.Ct. 678, 679, 71 L.Ed. 1165 (1927)). If the classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon real differences and some reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no denial of the equal protection of the law. Powder River Co. v. State, 2002 MT 259, ¶ 79, 312 Mont. 198, 60 P.3d 357. Our review of these classifications is not confined to the purposes advanced by the legislature or litigants, but extends to any possible purpose of which the court can conceive. Satterlee v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 2009 MT 368, ¶ 34, 353 Mont. 265, 222 P.3d 566. This standard reflects the notion that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2567, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976). ¶ 22 In Ford, the plaintiff was injured while working as a locomotive engineer and filed suit in Yellowstone County against an out-of-state corporation under the Federal Employers Liability Act. 250 Mont. at 189, 819 P.2d at 170. Burlington argued our application of the venue statutes in FELA cases violated its right to equal protection by permitting actions against a foreign corporation in any county, while actions against a domestic corporation could only be brought in the county where it had its principal place of business. 250 Mont. at 190, 819 P.2d at 171. We disagreed, noting the United States Supreme Court's observation that a state's directive as to one proper forum over another can have no tendency to violate the guarantee of the equal protection of the laws where in both the forums equality of the law governs and equality of administration prevails. Ford, 250 Mont. at 192, 819 P.2d at 171 (quoting Cincinnati Street Ry. Co. v. Snell, 193 U.S. 30, 37, 24 S.Ct. 319, 321, 48 L.Ed. 604 (1904)). We declined to address whether there was a rational basis for treating out-of-state corporations differently due to a national policy allowing railroad workers to sue their employer at any location where the employer does business. 250 Mont. at 195, 819 P.2d at 174. ¶ 23 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. It held that Montana's venue laws satisfied rational basis review because, in adjusting the warring interests of parties with different forum preferences, states may have a number of choices, each of them passable under the standard tolerating some play in the joints of governmental machinery. Burlington N. R.R. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651, 112 S.Ct. 2184, 2186-87, 119 L.Ed.2d 432 (1992). It concluded that Montana rationally could have decided that a nonresident defendant's interest in convenience is too slight to outweigh the plaintiff's interest in suing in the forum of his choice. 504 U.S. at 652, 112 S.Ct. at 2187. The Court explained that states must be afforded some liberty in striking a balance between these competing interests; thus, a State would act within its constitutional prerogatives if it were to give so much weight to the interests of plaintiffs as to allow them to sue in the counties of their choice under all circumstances. 504 U.S. at 651-52, 112 S.Ct. at 2187. Finally, the Court acknowledged that while Montana could have implemented its policy judgment with greater precision, the distinctions withstood rational-basis review because rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude. 504 U.S. at 653, 112 S.Ct. at 2187 (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2517, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976)). ¶ 24 We conclude, as in Ford, that there is a rational basis for a legislative determination to expand a plaintiff's venue options when there are both resident and nonresident defendants. The legislature could have presumed that, because the nonresident defendant will be inconvenienced regardless of where the suit is brought, the resident defendant, rather than the plaintiff, should bear any additional burdens associated with venue. This is not an arbitrary distinction, as a plaintiff's interest in filing suit in the forum of her choice is likely greater when there are multiple defendants involved in the litigation residing both in and outside of Montana. We also note that the statute at issue in Ford was amended by the legislature so that plaintiffs in tort actions now are afforded only two more options for proper venuetheir place of residence or where the tort was committedrather than any county of their choice. Section 25-2-118(2), MCA. Accordingly, a plaintiff is not permitted to simply choose the venue farthest away from the resident defendant and, in many instances, one of the two additional locations also will be where the defendant resides. While a different scheme would have been permissible, the legislature's policy choice in this instance is not constitutionally invalid. ¶ 25 We conclude that the statute permitting Ward to file her action in the county of her residence does not deprive Johnson of the equal protection of the laws. Ward filed her complaint in a proper county. The District Court's order granting Johnson's motion to change venue is reversed. We concur: PATRICIA COTTER, JAMES C. NELSON, MICHAEL E. WHEAT and JIM RICE, JJ.