Opinion ID: 2639525
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The Denial of Defendant's Motion for a Separate Trial

Text: Prior to trial, Winston requested severance from codefendant Tatum under K.S.A. 22-3204. He argued that he would be prejudiced by evidence admissible against codefendant Tatum that would not be admissible against him if he were tried separately. The trial court denied the motion, finding that none of the bases for granting severance were shown to exist, and further, that any prejudice would be cured by instructing the jury that each defendant must be judged solely on the evidence admissible as to that particular defendant. Winston renewed his arguments in his motion for new trial, which was denied. Severance of jointly charged codefendants is governed by K.S.A. 22-3204, which states: When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any crime, the court may order a separate trial for any one defendant when requested by such defendant or by the prosecuting attorney. Severance lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and should occur when a defendant has established there would be actual prejudice if a joint trial occurred. State v. White, 275 Kan. 580, 589, 67 P.3d 138 (2003) (citing State v. Butler, 257 Kan. 1043, 1062, 897 P.2d 1007 [1995], modified on other grounds 257 Kan. 1110, 916 P.2d 1 [1996]); State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 633, 740 P.2d 559 (1987). A trial court's denial of severance will be reversed only when a clear abuse of discretion is shown. State v. Davis, 277 Kan. 231, 239, 83 P.3d 182 (2004.) The party claiming error in the denial of severance has the burden to establish the claim and must establish that there was clearly an abuse of discretion. White, 275 Kan. at 589. It must be noted that the defendant argues that the severance statute, K.S.A. 22-3204, states that severance should be granted when it appears necessary to avoid prejudice and insure a fair trial. That language is not in the statute, but, rather, is found in Davis, 277 Kan. at 239, where this court said: When applying K.S.A. 22-3204, this court has stated that severance should be granted when it appears necessary to avoid prejudice and ensure a fair trial to each defendant. [Citation omitted.] Although the defendant cites the correct standard of review, he relies on the Davis language to argue that it is not necessary to show with absolute certainty that prejudice will occur, implying that the standard for severance is the mere possibility of prejudice. This is contrary to the well-recognized requirement that severance requires a showing that actual prejudice will result. See State v. Aikins, 261 Kan. 346, 360, 932 P.2d 408 (1997). The factors to be considered in determining whether there is sufficient prejudice to mandate severance are: `(1) that the defendants have antagonistic defenses; (2) that important evidence in favor of one of the defendants which would be admissible on a separate trial would not be allowed on a joint trial; (3) that evidence incompetent as to one defendant and introducible against another would work prejudicially to the former with the jury; (4) that the confession by one defendant, if introduced and proved, would be calculated to prejudice the jury against the others; and (5) that one of the defendants who could give evidence for the whole or some of the other defendants would become a competent and compellable witness on the separate trials of such other defendants.' Butler, 257 Kan. at 1063 (quoting State v. Martin, 234 Kan. 548, 549, 673 P.2d 104 [1984] [quoting 75 Am. Jur. 2d, Trial § 20]). See Davis, 277 Kan. at 240. Winston's argument on appeal is based solely on the third factor. He argues that gang evidence would not have been admissible if he had been tried separately because, unlike Tatum, he was not specifically identified as a gang member. With respect to the gang affiliation evidence, the State contends that if the gang evidence is held to have been properly admitted, then Winston's argument on this point fails. The defendant's argument that gang evidence would not have been admissible against him in a separate trial is based on the contention that he was not identified as a gang member. His argument is without merit. First, Detective Babcock testified Winston was associated with the Hilltop gang, and contrary to the defendant's argument, in this case, there is no meaningful distinction between gang members and gang associates. As the detective's testimony at the pretrial hearing made clear, his use of the term gang associate equates to the term gang member because it more accurately reflects the relationship than the term member, given that gangs do not have membership rosters, nor do people who associate with gangs carry membership cards. Second, Detective Babcock's testimony and Walls' testimony established that Winston was affiliated with Hilltop. Third, Winston's argument ignores the fact that it was the statements made by Winston and Tatum, acting in concert at the mall, that provided the gang-related motive for this crime, and opened the door to evidence about the Hilltop-Tre Wall feud and Messy Marvin's murder. Thus, as discussed above, the gang evidence was properly admitted against Winston and would have been admissible even if he had been tried separately. The defendant also contends that evidence of Tatum's inculpatory statements made after Tatum was arrested was prejudicial to him and would not have been admitted at a separate trial. Officer Hernandez testified that while Tatum was in a holding cell after his arrest, he yelled, snitches get snitches and they got no witnesses, I leave no witnesses, and something to the effect as to how he was going to beat a case in Wyandotte County. The defendant is correct that Tatum's statements would not be admissible against him if he were tried separately. The next question then is whether the admission of the statements caused actual prejudice to Winston. Before the evidence of Tatum's statements was presented, the trial judge instructed the jury that the evidence applied only to codefendant Tatum: It's my understanding that what Officer Hernandez is going to testify to doesn't have anything to do with Mr. Winston, and so you just simply need to be aware that this is evidence that applies apparently to Mr. Tatum only. The jury instructions also included PIK Crim. 3d 52.07, instructing the jury to give separate consideration to each defendant and that any evidence limited to one defendant should not be considered as to the other. This court has held that such a limiting instruction is sufficient to minimize any prejudice to codefendants. See State v. Smith, 268 Kan. 222, 235, 993 P.2d 1213 (1999) (no prejudice from refusal to sever where trial court instructed jury before evidence of co-defendant's prior bad acts, that such evidence was admissible only as to that defendant); State v. Falke, 237 Kan. 668, 677, 703 P.2d 1362 (1985), disapproved of on other grounds State v. Walker, 252 Kan. 279, 845 P.2d 1 (1993). In summary, Winston has not shown that the trial court's refusal to sever the cases resulted in actual prejudice. The gang evidence would have been admissible against Winston even if he were tried separately, and the jury was instructed that Tatum's inculpatory statements were admitted only against Tatum. Thus, the defendant has not shown the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to sever the codefendants' trials.