Opinion ID: 221380
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Extension

Text: Despite knowing that the summons for Officer Gallegos was returned unserved, the Plaintiffs undertook no service-related efforts until well after the 120-day deadline had passed. Perhaps because of this unexplained lapse, they renounce any argument that they had good cause for their lack of service and that they were entitled to the resulting compulsory extension. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m); Panaras v. Liquid Carbonic Indus. Corp., 94 F.3d 338, 340 (7th Cir.1996). Instead, the second prong of the Plaintiffs' argument is that the district court erred in its refusal to grant them a discretionary extension of time in which to serve Officer Gallegos. They allege that the district court abused its discretion because it failed to take the relevant factors into consideration and because the balance of hardships militated an extension. They ask us to reverse its decision and reinstate their claims now that Officer Gallegos has been served with process. The district court declined to extend the deadline for service and chose instead to dismiss the claims against Officer Gallegos. In doing so, it acknowledged that the expiration of the statute of limitations would bar refiling of the suit, but correctly noted that this factor alone neither required nor justified an extension. See Panaras, 94 F.3d at 341; Kurka, 628 F.3d at 959. The district court ultimately determined that the fault for the profound delay rested squarely on Plaintiffs' counsel's shoulders: Counsel made no other attempts at service, though it should have been aware that it would face serious consequences if it ultimately failed to serve an essential party. The Court sees no reason to allow Counsel more time to accomplish what it should have done several months ago. Cardenas v. City of Chicago, 2010 WL 610621, at  (N.D.Ill. Feb. 15, 2010). On appeal, the Plaintiffs argue that the district court was required to balance the parties' hardships in exercising its discretion by considering five factors they distill from various cases: (1) whether the expiration of a statute of limitations during the pending action would prevent refiling, (2) whether the defendant evaded service, (3) whether the defendant's ability to defend would be prejudiced by an extension, (4) whether the defendant had actual notice of the lawsuit, and (5) whether the defendant was eventually served. The Plaintiffs are correct that district courts should consider the relative hardships of the parties in arriving at its discretionary choice between dismissal and extension of time. See Coleman, 290 F.3d at 934; Zapata v. City of New York, 502 F.3d 192, 197 (2d Cir.2007). Rule 4(m) does not specify which factors the district court must consider in exercising its discretion, see United States v. McLaughlin, 470 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that the rule specifies no criteria for the exercise of mercy), but the Plaintiffs correctly identify some factors that the district court may consider in its decision. See, e.g., Coleman, 290 F.3d at 934 (harm to defendant's ability to defend, receipt of actual notice, expiration of statute of limitations); McLaughlin, 470 F.3d at 701 (evasion of service, admission of liability, windfall to defendant); Troxell v. Fedders of N. Am., Inc., 160 F.3d 381, 383 (7th Cir.1998) (actual notice and eventual service). Yet the Plaintiffs propose only those factors they believe favor their chances of securing an extension, overlooking other acceptable considerationssuch as whether they ever requested an extension from the court due to difficulties in perfecting service (they did not) and whether they diligently pursued service during the allotted period (they did not). Further, even if the balance of hardships appears to favor an extension, the district court retained its discretion to hold the Plaintiffs accountable for their actionsor, more accurately, inactionby dismissing the case. Coleman, 290 F.3d at 934. A district court should, of course, consider the arguments and factors advanced by the plaintiff, see id., and it should pay particular attention to a critical factor such as the running of a statute of limitations, see Panaras, 94 F.3d at 341. But while we encourage courts to do so as a matter of practice, no authority requires a district court to explain on the record its detailed reasoning for each plaintiff-proposed factor. And certainly nothing forbids its consideration of factors plaintiffs tellingly ignore. The district court's order in this case does not show its explicit consideration of all the potentially applicable factors, but the order specifically addresses the statute of limitations and rejects it as a basis for extension under the circumstances. The district court also notes those factors it regarded as dispositive: Plaintiffs' lack of diligence, a year's delay in service even after being informed of the proper method, and counsel's inaction in the face of the known serious consequences of his failure to serve an essential party. Finally, in its disposition of the Plaintiffs' motion to amend the judgment, the district court indicated it had already evaluated the factors advocated and the cases presented by the Plaintiffs in opposition to dismissal. Ultimately, the district court recognized its discretion in applying Rule 4(m), evaluated the circumstances of the Plaintiffs' failure to serve Officer Gallegos, and determined that the Plaintiffs' counsel had only himself to blame. If a district court properly sets out the relevant law and makes no factual findings that are clearly erroneous, an abuse of discretion exists only if its decision was arbitrary and unreasonable. Troxell, 160 F.3d at 383. The Plaintiffs have offered us no reason to think that the district court was completely off base in deciding not to rely exclusively on the factors they propose. Id. The district court could have excused the lack of timely service, but we cannot call its choice not to grant an extension unreasonableespecially given both that Plaintiffs' counsel made no attempt to serve Officer Gallegos in the 483 days between removal and the filing of the motion to dismiss and also that another 42 days elapsed before counsel finally served the Office of Legal Affairs. Indeed, it strikes us as eminently reasonable to hold the Plaintiffs accountable for their unexplained inaction in the face of their crucial burden to timely serve Officer Gallegos with process. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting Officer Gallegos's motion to dismiss.