Opinion ID: 2465631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ortiz

Text: The Ortiz exceptions recognize that an untimely appeal may be allowed in the direct appeal from a conviction and sentence if a criminal defendant either (1) was not informed of the right to appeal at sentencing or by counsel, (2) was indigent and not furnished counsel to perfect an appeal, or (3) was furnished counsel for that purpose who failed to perfect and complete an appeal. Ortiz, 230 Kan. at 735-36, 640 P.2d 1255; see State v. Phinney, 280 Kan. 394, Syl. ¶ 3, 122 P.3d 356 (2005). Ortiz does not directly support Albright's argument, however, because, under its facts, the holding applies to direct appeals of a criminal defendant. The decision does not answer the question of whether an exception applies if an untimely notice is filed in a collateral attack on a criminal conviction that is brought by a civil petitioner, such as in this 60-1507 action. Hence, for the Ortiz exceptions to apply, we must extend the exceptions to 60-1507 actions in which counsel has been appointed to represent [a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of general jurisdiction claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States, or the constitution or laws of the state of Kansas, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack. K.S.A. 60-1507(a). Albright suggests that, like a defendant in a criminal case, a prisoner who seeks relief from a criminal judgment is entitled to effective assistance of appointed counsel and, if appointed counsel fails to meet this obligation, the prisoner has a due process right to continue an appeal. Albright's argument highlights a divide that is created by K.S.A. 22-4506(b) and Supreme Court Rule 183(m), the provisions authorizing the appointment of counsel for some 60-1507 movants but not others. K.S.A. 22-4506(b) limits the right to appointed counsel to those cases in which the district court finds that the 60-1507 motion presents substantial questions of law or triable issues of fact and if the petitioner or movant has been or is thereafter determined to be an indigent person. Rule 183(m) extends that right to an appeal from a 60-1507 judgment, stating: If a movant desires to appeal and contends he or she is without means to employ counsel to perfect the appeal, the district court shall, if satisfied that the movant is an indigent person, appoint competent counsel to conduct such appeal. (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 257). Albright argues the extension of the Ortiz exceptions to cases in which a 60-1507 movant has appointed counsel was recognized in Brown, 278 Kan. 481, 101 P.3d 1201.