Opinion ID: 1746564
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: We begin by discussing a category of claims that we will not address. Smith raises five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. [5] Under the two-pronged standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), a defendant must point to specific acts or omissions of counsel that are so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment, id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, and establish prejudice by show[ing] that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. Claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are usually presented in a postconviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Under that rule, the circuit court can be specifically presented with the claim, and apply the Strickland standard with reference to the full record and any evidence it may receive in an evidentiary hearing, including trial counsel's testimony. Thus, ineffective assistance claims are not usually presented to the judge at trial, and we have repeatedly stated such claims are not cognizable on direct appeal. E.g., Martinez v. State, 761 So.2d 1074, 1078 n. 2 (Fla.2000) (With rare exception, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not cognizable on direct appeal.); McKinney v. State, 579 So.2d 80, 82 (Fla.1991) (Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally not reviewable on direct appeal but are more properly raised in a motion for postconviction relief.); Kelley v. State, 486 So.2d 578, 585 (Fla.1986) (same); State v. Barber, 301 So.2d 7, 9 (Fla.1974) (holding that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot properly be raised for the first time on direct appeal because the trial court has not previously ruled on the issue). We recognize that [t]here are rare exceptions where appellate counsel may successfully raise the issue on direct appeal because the ineffectiveness is apparent on the face of the record and it would be a waste of judicial resources to require the trial court to address the issue. Blanco v. State, 507 So.2d 1377, 1384 (Fla.1987); see also Gore v. State, 784 So.2d 418, 437-38 (Fla.2001) (A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised on direct appeal only where the ineffectiveness is apparent on the face of the record.); Mansfield v. State, 758 So.2d 636, 642 (Fla.2000) (same). Thus, in the rare case, where both prongs of Strickland the error and the prejudiceare manifest in the record, an appellate court may address an ineffective assistance claim. Not one of Smith's five claims meets these criteria, however. We therefore decline to address these claims now. Smith is free to raise them in an appropriate postconviction motion.