Opinion ID: 2581706
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence Seized in Search of Blumhagen's Residence

Text: Blumhagen contends that the trial court erred by allowing the physical evidence recovered during the April 1998 search of his residence to be admitted because the physical evidence was obtained in a search conducted nearly five months after the November 1997 drug sales and was, therefore, not relevant and the trial court did not follow the proper procedure in admitting the evidence under W.R.E. 404(b). The state argues that Blumhagen is precluded from claiming on appeal that the trial court's admission of the evidence was erroneous because he withdrew his objection to the evidence. We agree with the state. The police searched the Cribbon Avenue residence on April 10, 1998, seizing drugs and drug paraphernalia. Prior to the trial, the prosecution filed a notice of its intent to introduce evidence at the trial under W.R.E. 404(b). The evidence listed in that notice, which is pertinent to our resolution of this issue, included evidence describing two sales of cocaine by Blumhagen in March and April 1998 and physical evidence retrieved during the search of the Cribbon Avenue residence. At the trial, the prosecution attempted to introduce physical evidence seized from the Cribbon Avenue residence. The defense objected, claiming that the physical evidence was not relevant because the search was too remote in time from the November 1997 drug transactions. The prosecution argued that the evidence was relevant and, taking into account the on-going nature of the investigation, the search was not too remote in time from the charged transactions. It offered to establish the relevancy of the physical evidence by calling the confidential informant to testify about the details of March and April 1998 drug sales. The defense objected to evidence of 1998 drug deliveries being admitted, asserting that such evidence would be highly prejudicial to Blumhagen. Blumhagen withdrew his objection to the physical evidence, and the evidence was admitted. Evidence of March and April 1998 drug transactions was not, however, presented to the jury. We conclude that any error which resulted from the trial court's failure to require the prosecution to establish the relevancy of the physical evidence was invited by the defense. We thoroughly discussed the invited error doctrine in Schott v. State, 864 P.2d 38, 39 (Wyo.1993): In appellate practice, the principle of `invited error' is that if, during the progress of a cause, a party requests or moves the court to make a ruling which is actually erroneous, and the court does so, that party cannot take advantage of the error on appeal or review. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 487 (5th ed. 1979). The doctrine of `invited error' embodies the principle that a party will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which he himself induced or provoked the court or the opposite party to commit. 5 AM.JUR.2D Appeal and Error § 713 at 159 (1962). By withdrawing his objection to the physical evidence, Blumhagen induced the trial court to admit the evidence without requiring the prosecution to prove its relevancy. If Blumhagen had not made the tactical decision to withdraw his objection, presumably the prosecution would have presented evidence of March and April 1998 deliveries to establish that the investigation into Blumhagen's illegal activities was on-going and to tie the April 1998 search to the November 1997 drug sales. We will not allow Blumhagen to profit on appeal from a situation he created. Blumhagen also claims that the trial court erred by failing to make findings concerning the admissibility of the other bad acts evidence seized during the search as required by Dean v. State, 865 P.2d 601 (Wyo.1993). The Dean case articulated a five-step analysis for determining the admissibility of other bad acts evidence. 865 P.2d at 606. Of course, the Dean holding was superseded by this Court's decision in Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 356 (Wyo.1996), wherein we adopted the four-part test set out by the United States Supreme Court in Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). A trial court is not, however, obligated to conduct a hearing to determine whether other-bad-acts evidence is admissible when the defendant does not object to the evidence. Rigler v. State, 941 P.2d 734, 738 (Wyo.1997); Beintema v. State, 936 P.2d 1221, 1223-24 (Wyo.1997). In this case, the trial court did not err by failing to conduct a Vigil analysis because Blumhagen withdrew his objection to the evidence. Blumhagen contends that the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a limiting instruction concerning the other-bad-acts evidence. A criminal defendant is entitled, upon making a proper request, to have a jury instruction given which sets forth the limited purpose for which the evidence is being admitted. Rigler, 941 P.2d at 738. The trial court is not obligated to give a limiting instruction, however, when the defendant does not request it. Id. Blumhagen did not request a limiting instruction, and he may not, therefore, complain on appeal about the trial court's failure to give one.