Opinion ID: 6971608
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Attorney’s Fees Under the Lanham Act

Text: Next, Tosch argues that the district court should not have imposed attorney’s fees on him, because the district court improperly found his infringement to be “willful” or “deliberate.” This Court has held that, pursuant to § 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117, attorney’s fees may be awarded in “exceptional cases.” Hindu Incense v. Meadows, 692 F.2d 1048, 1051 (6th Cir.1982). Thus, we review a district court’s decision to award attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act in the same way as its decision to award attorney’s fees under any discretionary provision; ie., for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Wynn Oil Co. v. American Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 607 (6th Cir.1991). A case should be considered “exceptional” only when the infringement is “malicious, fraudulent, willful, or deliberate.” Hindu Incense, 692 F.2d at 1051. Tosch quotes ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., for the proposition that “willful” or bad faith infringement, so as to justify an award of attorney’s fees, “usually means passing off a product or service as another seller’s better established one, or some other deliberate theft of a marketholder’s goodwill.” 913 F.2d 958, 964 (Fed.Cir.1990). We could not agree more. As discussed above, there is no doubt that Tosch wished to pass Johnson’s work off as his own. In doing so, Tosch gained a veritable cornucopia of benefits. The design was obviously a good one, or neither Tosch nor Jones would have wanted to use it. Tosch spent no time creating the design, but he earned gross revenues of $16,-560 by using it. In addition, submitting Johnson’s design to the city for approval saved valuable time, because the plans, having already been approved when they bore Johnson’s name, were approved the same day they were submitted. This benefit should not be underestimated, as the record clearly shows that time was of the essence to Jones in the completion of her dream home. Moreover, Tosch received the benefit of countless subcontractors’ seeing Johnson’s excellent work and thinking that it was actually the work of Tosch. Indeed, any potential home-buyer who liked Jones’ house would, upon searching the city’s public records, be led to believe that Tosch, and not Johnson, was the architect who designed the home. As noted above, the typical case of deliberate “passing off’ involves a defendant’s passing off his own product as that of the plaintiff. This, however, is the quintessential “reverse passing off’; here, the defendant is deliberately passing off the plaintiffs product as his own. If anything, this variety of “deliberate theft of a marketholder’s goodwill” is more egregious than ordinary passing off, as it involves actual theft. This is an “exceptional case,” because Tosch literally stole Johnson’s plans. In his defense, Tosch asserts that he relied on Stoepker’s advice in using the drawings. He relied on the advice of counsel, he argues, and was therefore not acting in bad faith. This'argument fails to pass the “smell test.” Tosch has worked as an architect for 25 years. Moreover, he has his own attorney and that attorney is not Stoepker. Tosch claims that he did not seek the advice of his own attorney because his attorney had no experience .in copyright matters. We find this argument troubling for a number of reasons. First, it seems odd, bordering on obtuse, for an architect to retain counsel wholly inexperienced in copyright matters, especially given the fact that every AIA contract contains provisions about copyright ownership. Second, Stoepker admitted that he, like Tosch’s lawyer, had no experience in copyright. So, Tosch cannot claim that he sought the more experienced opinion of a specialist. Third, the nature of the “advice” Tosch received from Stoepker does not suggest that it could reasonably be relied upon. Tosch admits that he knew there were copyright problems, but claims to have been assured by Uznis that Stoepker said there were no copyright problems. Tosch testified that Stoepker’s advice was based on preliminary research and that Stoepker promised him a final letter of confirmation. The record contains no evidence that any such letter was ever sent. The district court concluded that Tosch’s reliance on a preliminary answer and an unfulfilled promise of future confirmation from Stoepker was wholly unreasonable. We agree. For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that this was an “exceptional case” warranting the award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.