Opinion ID: 2806771
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Acme’s Claims Are Properly Before this Court

Text: LTS next argues that Acme failed to “challenge the rejections over Bourgoin in combination with other art, i.e., [r]ejections 3–5.” Appellee’s Br. 18. In its Initial Decision, in addition to its rejection of claims 9 and 20–22 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b) and 103(a) as anticipated and obvious in light of Bourgoin, the Board also rejected the claims as obvious over Bourgoin in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,115,114 (“Berg”). The Board rejected claims 9 and 20 as obvious over Bourgoin in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,983,883 (“Riddling”) and claim 10 as obvious over Bourgoin in view of Berg and U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2004/0102870 (“Andersen”). LTS contends that because [t]hese rejections have not been challenged by Acme[,] . . . even if this [c]ourt were to grant the ACME SCALE CO. v. LTS SCALE CO. 9 relief sought by Acme in this [a]ppeal by reversing [r]ejections 1 and 2 . . . all of claims 9–10 and 20– 22 would still remain rejected under one or more of [r]ejections 3–5. Appellee’s Br. 18. Acme claims that because Bourgoin does not anticipate claims 9, 10 or 20–22, “it . . . cannot be applied on its own or used in combination with other references because it does not teach that element . . . and therefore, would not be combined with other references under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in order to render the claims obvious.” Reply Br. 8– 9. The three other prior art reference bases for rejection which Acme does not challenge on appeal do not rely on Bourgoin to disclose a material handling vehicle, but instead appears to combine Bourgoin with a forklift disclosed in Berg, Ridling, and Anderson. Although the Board cited these prior art references, neither the Initial nor the Rehearing Decision ground the obviousness rejections of claims 9, 10, and 20–22 on these secondary references in combination with Bourgoin. Accordingly, Bourgoin is the only reference before this court. We now address whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Bourgoin discloses or teaches a material handling vehicle within the meaning of that terminology in the ’946 patent. III. Bourgoin Does Not Anticipate Claims 9 and 20–22 of the ’946 Patent Because It Does Not Disclose a Material Handling Vehicle “During reexamination, as with original examination, the [Board] must give claims their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification.” In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Thus, this court re10 ACME SCALE CO. v. LTS SCALE CO. views the Board’s interpretation of disputed claim language to determine whether it is “reasonable.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In this case, no factual findings underlie the Board’s interpretation. See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) (in litigation context, only factual findings underlying claim construction call for deferential review). “Anticipation is a question of fact reviewed for substantial evidence.” In re Morsa, 713 F.3d 104, 109 (Fed. Cir. 2013). A reference is anticipatory under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) when the reference discloses each and every element of the claimed invention, whether it does so explicitly or inherently. See Eli Lily & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Although those elements must be “arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claims,” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test, In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Additionally, the reference must “enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make the invention without undue experimentation.” Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharms. Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Finally, as long as the reference discloses all of the claim limitations and enables the “subject matter that falls within the scope of the claims at issue,” the reference anticipates. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Both Acme and LTS agree Bourgoin discloses a table fitted with rollers having a system equipped with scales which serves as a dimensioning device to measure the characteristics of an object. The precise issue on reexamination and before this court on appeal is whether the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification of the term “material handling vehicle” encompasses a table with fitted rollers as disclosed in Bourgoin. ACME SCALE CO. v. LTS SCALE CO. 11 In its Rehearing Decision, the Board concluded that Bourgoin anticipates claims 9, 10, and 20–22 of the ’946 patent because it “discloses a material handling vehicle.” Rehearing Decision at . The ’946 patent defines the term “material handling vehicle” to “broadly include transportation vehicles such as, for example, but not limited to, a fork lift truck, a flatbed truck, or a pallet truck.” ’946 patent col. 2 ll. 39–41 (emphasis added). In its Initial Decision, the Board concluded that “[w]hile the ’946 Patent may contemplate a forklift, pallets, pallet trucks, lift trucks, and flatbed trucks, as exemplary forms of a ‘material handling vehicle,’ that is insufficient to imbue the term with a special meaning disassociated from its ordinary and customary meaning.” Initial Decision at 11. The Board reiterated this finding in the Rehearing Decision when it found that “Acme [did] not cite to a specific definition of the term ‘material handling vehicle.’” Rehearing Decision at . Acme contends that “Bourgoin does not include each and every element of independent claims 9 and 20” because “[t]he table with rollers in Bourgoin is not a material handling vehicle.” Appellant’s Br. 16–17. Acme also argues that “[w]hile the Bourgoin table is fitted with rollers, the purpose of the ‘rollers’ is ‘so that it can be displaced to suit the user’s needs’ or ‘the machine may be moved in workshops or other sites.’” Id. at 17 (citing Bourgoin col. 3 ll. 42–43, col. 2 l. 6). Finally, Acme claims Bourgoin “teaches that one of its ‘severe constraints’ is that it must be protected ‘against excessive vibration during transport in alleys or between different sites.’” Id. at 17–18 (citing Bourgoin col. 2 l. 6). LTS asserts that absent a patentee’s ‘“intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction representing a clear disavowal of claim scope,’” patent “claims are to be given their plain meaning and thus given the broadest reasona12 ACME SCALE CO. v. LTS SCALE CO. ble interpretation consistent with the specification.” Appellee’s Br. 23 (quoting Am. Acad., 367 F.3d at 1365. LTS argues that the sentence in the ’946 patent that aims to define the term material handling vehicle, “does not . . . constitute an expression of ‘manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope’ that would demonstrate that a meaning other than the plain meaning was intended from the outset.” Id. at 24 (quoting Am. Acad.,367 F.3d at 1365). Rather, because the definition employs “broad, inclusive, and non-limiting expressions like ‘broadly’, ‘include’, ‘such as’, ‘for example’, and ‘but not limited to,’” the inclusion of devices such as forklifts, flatbed trucks and pallet trucks do not suggest that the ’946 patent was intended to be limited strictly to these devices. Id. The ’946 patent’s specification, in defining the term “material handling vehicle,” states that it “broadly include[s] transportation vehicles such as, for example, but not limited to, a fork lift truck, a flatbed truck, or a pallet truck.” ’946 patent col. 2 ll. 38–41. The ’946 patent identifies only commercial transportation vehicles as exemplary forms of a “material handling vehicle.” Although the term “broadly” suggests the patent encompasses a wide range of devices which can be considered vehicles, the attachment of a roller to a table, without more, does not render the table a vehicle in light of the subspecies of material handling transportation vehicles identified in the ’946 patent. The broadest reasonable construction of the term “material handling vehicle” is limited to a device that is capable of moving and whose function is to transport the material to be measured. Bourgoin satisfies the first aspect of this definition; when equipped with rollers, it is capable of movement. However, unlike the dimension detection device in the ’946 patent, the device in Bourgoin was not intended to be “positioned to move with the vehicle.” Id. col. 6 ll. 14–15. ACME SCALE CO. v. LTS SCALE CO. 13 Bourgoin urges users to protect “against excessive vibration during the transport[ation] [of the table] in alleys or between different sites,” thus suggesting it is not intended for transport. Bourgoin col. 2 ll. 7–8. The inclusion of rollers makes movement easier (the table need not be lifted); and the movement can take place with items on the table. However, it stretches the bounds of any reasonable interpretation to say that, by virtue of those facts, the table is a “vehicle.” If this court were to adopt the Board’s interpretation, any object capable of holding items and made more easily movable by attachment of rollers, would constitute a vehicle, irrespective of the fact that the object is primarily intended to be stationary. Such a reading would render the claim language of the ’946 patent overly broad. Therefore, even under the most expansive construction rubric, such an interpretation is unreasonable and inconsistent with the specification of the ’946 patent.