Opinion ID: 559043
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency Of The Evidence To Convict Restrepo Of Conspiracy.

Text: 16 Restrepo argues that there is insufficient evidence that he agreed to distribute cocaine. The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Dorotich, 900 F.2d 192 (9th Cir.1989). 17 Restrepo argues that because he speaks only Spanish, there is no evidence in the record that he understood the June 6, 1989, conversation concerning the sale of cocaine to the agents. Restrepo also asserts that since there is no proof in the record that he received any money from the Special Agents or that he was present when the cocaine was delivered to them, the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that he agreed to sell cocaine or was a member of the conspiracy. Restrepo maintains that the evidence produced by the Government shows mere association with Arman and McGinley. He asserts that, at most, the record demonstrates that he acquiesced in their illegal activity. We disagree. 18 [I]t is clear that mere association with members of a conspiracy, or simple knowledge, approval, or acquiescence in the object or purpose of the conspiracy, without intention and agreement to accomplish a specific illegal objective, is not sufficient to make one a conspirator. 19 United States v. Melchor-Lopez, 627 F.2d 886, 891 (9th Cir.1980). 20 The record shows more than mere association and acquiescence. Restrepo was present at the June 6, 1989, meeting at which the arrangements were made to deliver cocaine to Special Agents Couchman and Jones. He told Special Agent Jones that he was Harold's partner and could provide significant quantities of cocaine. During these negotiations Restrepo quoted the price of cocaine and discussed the quantity he could deliver. Restrepo speculates that Arman could have created this conversation out of whole cloth because he translated the negotiations from Spanish to English. This contention finds no support in the record. The Special Agents testified regarding what Restrepo told them at their meeting. They testified that he talked with them. There is nothing in the record to support the contention that Arman acted as an interpretor for Restrepo. This same argument was presented to the jury by Restrepo's trial counsel. The jury rejected it. 21 Restrepo left the breakfast meeting on June 25 in the car in which the cocaine was later delivered. Restrepo watched the transaction from across the street and attempted to escape from the DEA agents. 22 The prosecution is not required to show that a conspiracy agreement was explicit; the agreement may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. United States v. Hernandez, 876 F.2d 774, 777 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 179, 107 L.Ed.2d 135 (1989). Circumstantial evidence, and proper inferences drawn therefrom, may sustain a conviction. United States v. Hernandez, 876 F.2d 774, 777 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 179, 107 L.Ed.2d 135 (1989). Once the conspiracy is established, evidence of even a slight connection to it is sufficient if shown beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094, 107 S.Ct. 1309, 94 L.Ed.2d 164 (1987). The evidence was sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that Restrepo knowingly agreed to participate in a conspiracy to sell cocaine. 23