Opinion ID: 868638
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Stop and Arrest

Text: The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable government search and seizure. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. An officer may briefly detain a person if she has a reasonable and articulable suspicion based on objective facts that criminal activity is afoot. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). See also United States v. Powell, 222 F.3d 913, 917 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Under Terry, law 7 Case: 11-15840 Date Filed: 05/22/2013 Page: 8 of 15 enforcement officers may detain a person briefly for an investigatory stop if they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion based on objective facts that the person has engaged in, or is about to engage in, criminal activity.”). A determination of reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances and may be formed even if the conduct is ambiguous or can be given an innocent explanation. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000); Powell, 222 F.3d at 917-18. “[I]f a flyer or bulletin has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has committed an offense, then reliance on that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to check identification, to pose questions to the person, or to detain the person briefly while attempting to obtain further information.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985) (internal citations omitted). Here, the officers were permitted to question and briefly detain Mr. Akinlade to obtain additional information because he matched the description of the suspect in the BOLO. See id. The officers arrived in response to a dispatch call announcing that a male with active warrants for identity fraud was believed to be at the bank. Both officers testified that, after comparing the photograph in the BOLO to Mr. Akinlade, they believed him to be the suspect in the BOLO. Moreover, Mr. Akinlade was “fidgety” during the pat down, providing a reasonable belief that he might flee because he may have been engaged in criminal activity. See Wardlow, 8 Case: 11-15840 Date Filed: 05/22/2013 Page: 9 of 15 528 U.S. at 124 (“Our cases have also recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.”); Transcript of Suppression Hearing at 74 (Officer Von Behren testified that Mr. Akinlade acted “fidgety” almost “from the time we came in, he became nervous and increased in nervousness as our contact continued, culminating with his attempted escape”). Under the totality of these circumstances, the officers had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Akinlade had engaged in the fraudulent identity theft scheme described in the BOLO and had the right to momentarily detain him so they could complete their investigation. See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232. See also Transcript of Suppression Hearing at 76 (Officer Von Behren testified that the decision to detain Mr. Akinlade was based “on a number of factors,” including the “information we had received at dispatch, the bolo we scanned, the pictures and then what he stated his purpose being there was,” which he and Officer Kelley “believed . . . warranted further investigation”). When Mr. Akinlade attempted to leave the bank and resisted, the officers had additional reason to believe he was the suspect referenced in the BOLO. And when Mr. Akinlade actively struggled with the officers, kicking and crawling in an attempt to flee, the officers acquired probable cause to arrest him for obstruction. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-24 (“Obstruction of Officers”); Spence v. State, 672 9 Case: 11-15840 Date Filed: 05/22/2013 Page: 10 of 15 S.E. 2d 538, 540 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for obstruction once he fled from sergeant).