Opinion ID: 2780756
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Right to Be Free from State-Created Danger

Text: Villanueva, advancing the district court’s interpretation of her claims, argues Moreno’s failure formally to report her claim of domestic abuse and the department’s failure to respond to her claims of harassment denied her due process. “As a general matter, . . . a State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197; accord Beck v. Wilson, 377 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 2004). One exception to this principle is the “state-created-danger theory” under which “‘the state owes a duty to protect individuals if it created the danger to which the individuals are subjected.’” Fields v. Abbott, 652 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hart v. City of Little Rock, 432 F.3d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 2005)). To establish such a duty, Villanueva must show: “(1) that she was a member of a limited, precisely definable group, (2) that the municipality’s conduct put her at a significant risk of serious, immediate, and proximate harm, (3) that the risk was obvious or known to the municipality, (4) that the municipality acted recklessly in conscious disregard of the risk, and (5) that in total, the municipality’s conduct shocks the conscience.” -6- Montgomery, 749 F.3d at 694-95 (quoting Fields, 652 F.3d at 891). There is no evidence in this record indicating the department’s and Moreno’s failures to respond to Villanueva’s complaints “put her at a significant risk of serious, immediate, and proximate harm.” Id. at 694. In support of her claim, Villanueva points to her inability to receive a protection order against Alvaro because there were no documented complaints upon which a court could base such an order. Villanueva’s inability to obtain a protection order did not “render [her] more vulnerable to risks created by others,” S.S. v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc), but rather left her in the same situation as before she sought the protection order. Absent some increased danger due to the defendants’ inaction, there is no due process violation. Finally, the challenged conduct was not so egregious as to “shock the conscience.” Montgomery, 749 F.3d at 695. “To shock the conscience, . . . an official’s action must either be motivated by an intent to harm or, where deliberation is practical, demonstrate deliberate indifference. . . . Mere negligence, or even gross negligence, is not actionable.” Id. Villanueva’s evidence shows Moreno failed formally to report one complaint of domestic violence—although he informally met with Alvaro to address Villanueva’s complaint—yet the department did respond to other complaints and generated at least one written report. Similarly, Villanueva’s other complaints of domestic violence did not always result in Alvaro’s arrest, but did on at least one occasion. As to the later harassment complaints, officers always were dispatched in response to Villanueva’s complaints—and these officers generated two written reports—but chose not to initiate investigations or make any arrests. “[D]iscretion is essential to the criminal justice process,” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987), and officers cannot be expected to make an arrest or initiate a formal investigation in response to every complaint, see, e.g., Ricketts, 36 F.3d at 780 (“A municipality which, in order to protect itself against the kind of claim brought -7- by the plaintiffs here, directed its officers to arrest every person against whom an allegation of spousal abuse was made would undoubtedly find itself facing Section 1983 claims of unconstitutional arrest without probable cause.”). The officers’ conduct here was a valid exercise of police discretion, not a conscience-shocking disregard of Villanueva’s complaints or her constitutional rights.