Opinion ID: 2631067
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: group defamation

Text: ¶ 49 We now turn to whether the group defamation rule precludes the Pratts from pursuing their defamation claim. Generally, the group defamation rule precludes defamation suits based solely on statements made referring to groups or classes of people. We hold in this case that the Pratts, who were specifically named in the Kingston Complaint, are not precluded from pursuing their defamation claim.
¶ 50 Because the Kingston Complaint lost its privileged status through excessive publication, it may properly be considered for alleged defamation alongside the other statements made by the Nelsons. Thus, the Nelsons' combined statements made and distributed at the press conference may provide a sufficient basis for a defamation claim.
¶ 51 In order to establish a claim for defamation, a party must show that [the] defendants published the statements concerning [the party], that the statements were false, defamatory, and not subject to any privilege, that the statements were published with the requisite degree of fault, and that their publication resulted in damage. [101] We must determine whether the Nelsons published statements concerning the Pratts. ¶ 52 Before defamatory statements may be regarded as actionable, a party must show that the statements refer to some ascertained or ascertainable person. [102] A party may show this by directly being named, or so intended from the extrinsic facts and circumstances. [103] Where defamatory statements appear to apply to a particular class of individuals, and are not specifically defamatory of any particular member of the class, an action can [still] be maintained by any individual of the class who may be able to show the words referred to himself. [104] Ultimately, a party must satisfy the jury that the words referred especially to himself. [105] ¶ 53 On the other hand, a party may defend itself from allegations of defamation with the group defamation rule. If the defamatory matter has no special application and is so general that no individual damages can be presumed, and the class referred to is so numerous that great vexation and oppression might grow out of a multiplicity of suits, no private suit can be maintained. [106] Furthermore, section 564(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides the following: One who publishes defamatory matter concerning a group or class of persons is subject to liability to an individual member of it if, but only if, (a) the group or class is so small that the matter can reasonably be understood to refer to the member, or (b) the circumstances of publication reasonably give rise to the conclusion that there is particular reference to the member. ¶ 54 We agree with the court of appeals that without the aid of the Kingston Complaint, the [Nelsons'] statements at the press conference cannot be reasonably understood to refer, with any particularity, to the Pratts. [107] Indeed, [w]ithout the Kingston Complaint, the Pratts can only point to the [Nelsons'] group references and argue that such statements defame them as individuals. [108] [N]one of [the Nelsons'] allegedly defamatory statements ever directly mentioned the Pratts by name and, aside from the Kingston Complaint, none of the extrinsic facts and circumstances demonstrated that the statements were intended to specifically refer to the Pratts. [109] The Nelsons' statements merely referred generally to large groups of people [such as] `the Kingston Polygamist Family,' `leaders of the Kingston Organization,' [110] and the people we are bringing this lawsuit against. ¶ 55 We also acknowledge, as the court of appeals noted, that under the right circumstances the references to a group such as `the Kingston Polygamist Family' might reasonably be understood to refer to an individual surnamed Kingston. [111] In fact, if the Pratts were widely known as members of `the Kingston Polygamist Family,' the Pratts might very well be able to maintain an action on such statements, even without referring to the Kingston Complaint. [112] But in this case, as the court determined, the statements made outside of the Kingston Complaint, including the Prepared Statement, do not lend themselves to any reasonable understanding that they have personal application to the Pratts. [113] ¶ 56 Yet the Kingston Complaint, which we may now consider for defamation purposes, specifically named the Pratts on two occasions. In its opening caption, the Kingston Complaint named the Pratts among nearly 400 other defendants. Further, the Kingston Complaint named the Pratts in a list with 240 other defendants known as Order Individuals, and referred to these Order Individuals as Order Members. The Kingston Complaint then accuses these Order Members of negligence and assisting, encouraging, conspiring, or knowing of and failing to prevent or report the abuses alleged to have been committed by Mary Ann's father and uncle. There is no question that the Kingston Complaint specifically refers to ascertainable persons, including the Pratts. Additionally, it is now arguable that the Nelsons' other statements, in light of the Kingston Complaint and given the extrinsic circumstances, may have also made reference to the Pratts.
¶ 57 The Nelsons argue that, under the group defamation rule, the large size of the groups referenced in their statements, including in the Kingston Complaint, precludes a defamation claim. [114] We disagree. In the Kingston Complaint the Pratts were specifically named. As a result, even the Nelsons' other statements might be viewed as referring to the Pratts as well. When statements explicitly refer to individuals by name, regardless of whether the individuals are part of a general group or larger listing of names, a party cannot rely on the group defamation rule as a defense. For example, if a party generally refers to a group of people that happens to include 400 individuals, then the group defamation rule may have application; but to the extent that a party identifies people in that group by their individual names, the group defamation rule no longer applies.