Opinion ID: 486564
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 48 We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and affirm if substantial evidence supports the convictions, that is, if a reasonable jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680, 704 (1942); United States v. Loalza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d 153, 158 (5th Cir.1984). Evidence may support a conviction even though it does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc), aff'd 462 U.S. 356, 103 S.Ct. 2398, 76 L.Ed.2d 638 (1983). We must reverse if a reasonable jury must have had a reasonable doubt about guilt. United States v. Moreno-Hinojosa, 804 F.2d 845, 847 (5th Cir.1986). 49 The defendants claim that insufficient evidence supports their convictions on all counts. Specifically, each defendant argues that the evidence did not show (1) that the bonds were in interstate commerce and (2) that the defendants knew that the bonds were stolen. We address these claims in turn. 50 a. Interstate Quality of the Bonds 51 Whether the bonds were in interstate commerce is a fact question for the jury. United States v. Tobin, 576 F.2d 687, 693 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051, 99 S.Ct. 731, 58 L.Ed.2d 711 (1978); United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935, 100 S.Ct. 2151, 64 L.Ed.2d 787 (1980). The case before us involves two statutes: 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2314, which proscribes transportation of stolen property in interstate commerce, and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2315, which makes it a crime to receive, possess, sell, or dispose of stolen property that is part of interstate commerce. 52 Count seven of the indictment charged that Deborah Williams violated Sec. 2314 by transporting stolen bonds in interstate commerce. David Collins testified that Deborah mailed the bonds from Houston to California, and these bonds bore the deposit stamp of Collins' California bank. Obviously, this use of the mails between two states would satisfy the interstate commerce requirement of Sec. 2314. 53 Section 2315 requires a lengthier analysis. The district court instructed the jury that the bonds were part of interstate commerce 54 if they moved from one state into another state as a result of a transaction or series of related transactions which have not been fully completed at the time of the ... acts alleged in the indictment. 55 .... 56 In determining whether the interstate movement of a stolen article has come to an end, [you] may consider the nature of the article and the manner in which it must be disposed of. 57 This instruction properly charged the jury. See Licavoli, 604 F.2d at 625; Tobin, 576 F.2d at 693 (famous art objects remained in interstate commerce while they cooled off for two years after being stolen before they could be sold without suspicion.). 58 Evidence showed that the bonds were stolen in New York, traveled to Texas, and had to be returned to New York to be cashed by Manufacturers Hanover Trust. The government did not show when the bonds arrived in Texas, but Chase recovered most of the stolen bonds outside of New York state. Officer Muldoon explained that the media publicized the theft in the New York area, which might have hindered attempts to cash the bonds in New York. The jury could believe that the defendants tried to cash the bonds far from the scene and time of the theft to avoid detection and that the bonds traveled within Texas as a continuation of their interstate movement. Cf. United States v. Block, 755 F.2d 770, 775 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming a similar jury finding). 59 Moreover, the defendants caused the bonds to be deposited in banks and savings associations in Texas and California, and these institutions had to send the bonds to New York for redemption. The defendants could not help but know the bonds would move in interstate commerce for redemption. In Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 9, 74 S.Ct. 358, 363, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954), the Supreme Court ruled that depositing a check drawn on a California bank in a Texas bank account constituted interstate transportation for purposes of Sec. 2314, because the check must be sent to the [out of state] bank for collection. Before handing the bonds to Stewart, Lusk, Creswell, or Katherine Livingston, the defendants possessed the bonds as part of interstate commerce because the bonds were worthless absent redemption in interstate commerce. In general, then, sufficient evidence supports the finding that the bonds were part of interstate commerce. We now examine each count of the indictment individually. 60 b. Count Two: Sec. 2315 61 Count two charged Julia Williams for the Lusk transaction in June 1984. The bond that Julia gave to Lusk declared on its face that it matured on November 1, 1982. This fact might have alerted Julia that the bond was stolen, because one who possesses a bearer bond may redeem it for cash and reasonably does so upon or soon after maturity. Rather than cashing the bond herself, Julia went through Lusk, a near stranger. Julia also paid or promised to pay Conway and Lusk $1,500, or 30 percent of the bond's value, to cash the bond. The jury could believe that no legitimate purpose justified such a high payment, just as selling property for less than market value may be evidence that the seller knew the property was stolen. See United States v. Smith, 502 F.2d 1250, 1255 (5th Cir.1974) (defendant sold engines at 50 percent discount); United States v. Meltzer, 590 F.2d 607, 609 (5th Cir.1979); United States v. Ranzoni, 732 F.2d 555, 559 (6th Cir.1984) (defendant sold $100 cases of liquor for $25). In addition, according to Agent Tunnell, Julia falsely confessed that she dealt only with the two bonds she gave to Stewart, but on further questioning she admitted that she also used Lusk to cash another bond. A jury may consider a false exculpatory statement as evidence of consciousness of guilt. See United States v. Brown, 604 F.2d 347, 351 n. 2 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962, 100 S.Ct. 1649, 64 L.Ed.2d 237 (1980). 62 Taken as a whole, the evidence is sufficient to support Julia's conviction for count two, selling or disposing of the bond knowing it to be stolen. 63 c. Counts Three and Four: Sec. 2315 64 Counts three and four involved the two bonds that Julia gave to Samuel Stewart as rent for the second floor offices in his building. As with the Lusk transaction, Julia did not try to cash the bonds herself but rather gave them to Stewart to cash. The bonds, like the Lusk bond, matured about two years before Julia gave them to Stewart. In addition, Julia repaid Stewart only $2,000 of the over $6,000 she owed him, thereby netting a benefit from the bonds of over $4,000. The jury could infer that Julia used Stewart to avoid her own detection. 65 According to Julia, she received the Lusk bond from car-buyer Anthony Sane and the two Stewart bonds from real estate-buyer Yusef Israel. The jury could disbelieve this remarkable coincidence--that Julia received three stolen bonds within a short period from two distinct business customers. 66 Finally, although we discuss each count of the indictment separately, the jury could consider the evidence as a whole when deliberating over any single count. Thus, for example, in deciding whether Julia knew that the Stewart bonds were stolen, the jury could consider the evidence that Julia knew the Lusk or Creswell bonds were stolen. 67 We conclude that the evidence supports Julia's convictions for counts three and four for selling or disposing of the bonds knowing them to have been stolen. 68 d. Count Five: Sec. 2315 69 Count five charged Julia Williams and Willie Livingston with possessing the seven bonds that Creswell cashed, knowing them to have been stolen. These bonds, like the others, matured on November 1, 1982. According to Creswell's testimony, Livingston introduced him to Julia, Julia asked him to open the two Gibraltar accounts, and Livingston gave him the cash and bonds for the initial deposits. Creswell received $4,000--Julia promised $5,000--for his simple services. Sufficient evidence supports the convictions under count five. 70 e. Counts Six and Eight: Sec. 2315 71 Counts six and eight charged Willie Livingston with possessing the stolen bonds he gave to his wife, Katherine, in November 1984 and January 1985. Katherine cashed them and kept about $2,000. This fact alone could not support a finding that Willie knew the bonds were stolen, because Katherine was his wife. In addition, however, the bonds obviously matured on November 1, 1982, and this would arouse Livingston's suspicion. Finally, the critical evidence is that Livingston knew the Creswell bonds were stolen. Given all the evidence, we affirm the convictions for counts six and eight. 72 f. Count Seven: Sec. 2314 73 Count seven charged Deborah Williams with transporting stolen bonds to David Collins. She received these bonds after Stewart returned them to Julia and told Julia that they were stolen. The bonds matured on November 1, 1982. Deborah offered Collins $3,000 to cash them for her and then told Collins to lie about where he received the bonds. In addition, she refused to surrender to Agent Tunnell, and Tunnell eventually found her hiding in Ken Tyler's closet. See United States v. Mesa, 660 F.2d 1070, 1077 (5th Cir.1981) (evidence of concealment may be evidence of guilt). This evidence supports the jury's finding that Deborah knew the bonds were stolen. 74 g. Count One 75 Count one charged all three defendants with conspiracy. Although count one charged a conspiracy to violate both Sec. 2314 and Sec. 2315, the government had to prove only that the defendants conspired to violate either one of the statutes. United States v. Lyons, 703 F.2d 815 (5th Cir.1983); United States v. Acosta, 763 F.2d 671 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 179, 88 L.Ed.2d 148 (1985). 76 Sufficient evidence was introduced at trial to prove a conspiracy to violate Sec. 2315 by the defendants. Livingston occupied one of the offices that Julia rented. He introduced Julia to Larry Creswell. Julia asked Creswell to open the Gibraltar accounts, and Livingston gave Creswell the cash and bonds to deposit. Livingston and Julia shared in the proceeds from the Creswell bonds. Sufficient evidence supports their conviction under count one. 77 The evidence linking Deborah Williams to the conspiracy is less direct but supports her conviction. The fact that Deborah and Julia are sisters alone does not justify the inference that they conspired together. See United States v. Forrest, 620 F.2d 446, 451 (5th Cir.1980). Other evidence, however, shows that Deborah joined the conspiracy. Deborah received $1,500 of the proceeds from the Creswell transactions, and the jury could consider such payments as evidence of her involvement in a conspiracy. If the bonds were legitimate, there was no reason at all for her to be paid such a sum. The most critical evidence to establish that Deborah was a co-conspirator, however, was the fact that she sent bonds to Collins in California in suspicious circumstances for him to cash them. These were the same bonds that Stewart had returned to Julia. The jury hardly could avoid finding that Deborah received the bonds from Julia. 78 In sum, the evidence supports all of the convictions in the case before us.