Opinion ID: 2576319
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Traditional Sexual Mores and Development

Text: Limon counters this theoretical justification by arguing that the State's moral disapproval of homosexuality is an illegitimate justification for discrimination. The Lawrence decision rejected a morality-based rationale as a legitimate State interest. The Court recognized that many people condemn homosexuality as immoral: [T]he Court in Bowers was making the broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives. 539 U.S. at 571. However, the Court continued by stating: These considerations do not answer the question before us. 539 U.S. at 571. The Court framed the issue as whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law. `Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.' Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 [, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674, 112 S. Ct. 2791] (1992). 539 U.S. at 571. Thus, when Texas argued that its anti-sodomy law furthered the promotion of morality (539 U.S. at 582 [O'Connor, J., concurring]), the Court in Lawrence rejected the argument and adopted the following reasoning from Justice Stevens' dissent in Bowers : `[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.' 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 [Stevens, J., dissenting]). This holding followed the precedent of Casey, Eisenstadt, Romer, and other cases. The Court in Romer explained that our laws are often morality-based which, in and of itself, is not objectionable if the laws are applied fairly to all. However, the right to equal protection of those laws is offended when legal classifications are drawn for the purpose of invoking moral disapproval with the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. The Court of Appeals majority would dismiss this analysis in Lawrence because of the due process context in which the discussion was made. The Lawrence majority, however, signaled application of the principles to equal protection analysis: Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests. 539 U.S. at 575. In essence, the Lawrence decision recognized that the substantive due process analysis at issue in that case and the equal protection analysis necessary in this case are inevitably linked. This court has described this link as follows: The difference between the constitutional concepts of due process and equal protection is that due process emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation are treated, while equal protection emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable. The test in determining the constitutionality of a statute under due process or equal protection concepts weighs almost identical factors.  (Emphasis added.) Chiles v. State, 254 Kan. 888, Syl. ¶ 10, 869 P.2d 707 (1994). Thus, we are directed in our equal protection analysis by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Lawrence that moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest.