Opinion ID: 1476684
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: IAC claims: Penalty Phase

Text: We now turn to the alleged errors in the performance of counsel during the penalty phase. Defendant asserts that each error cast[s] doubt on the integrity of the resultant death sentence, and that the cumulative effect of the errors nullified his entitlement to true advocacy of a life sentence.
Defendant makes several broad-based arguments in respect of the adequacy of the investigation of mitigating evidence related to his difficult childhood. He also points to specific deficiencies in the investigation performed. In respect of the latter, PCR counsel enlisted Lois Nardone, a social worker and mitigation specialist, to investigate the availability of mitigating evidence not found for trial. Nardone interviewed Sheila Fairchild, as well as persons who could have been called as penalty-trial witnesses, including defendant's father, stepfather, mother, brother, one of defendant's grammar school teachers, and Dr. Dougherty. Although the claims are addressed in turn, we note at the outset the State's repeated counter to each: the performance of penalty phase counsel Call was reasonable, and defendant has not produced any evidence that would have affected substantially the jury's deliberations. It bears repeating that we are considering defendant's claims de novo. In respect of each, although we must consider the testimony of Call and others at the PCR hearing, we note at the outset that we do not base our conclusion in respect of any claim on an assessment of Call's credibility. Defendant's ineffective assistance case does not hinge on an assertion that Call's PCR testimony was untruthful; defendant's ineffective assistance claims uniformly assert that Call's performance was objectively reasonable. The PCR record allows us to make that assessment.

We first dispense with PCR counsels' suggestion that Call's personal feelings about Harris interfered with his ability to fulfill his investigative duties. Despite PCR counsels' assertion that Call didn't trust Mr. Harris [from] the day [he] met him, and that Call described Harris as anti-social to the nth degree, we find this argument meritless. The reasonableness of counsel's assistance does not depend on his personal feelings about defendant. See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693-94. (reviewing court must evaluate the conduct  of counsel, in light of an objective standard of reasonableness) (emphasis added). Our attention is, and must be, fixed on evaluating counsels in respect of their performance, strategy, and investigation. The objective standard in Strickland guides our analysis.
As further support for his claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance, defendant points to Call's having had only ten months to prepare, during which time he was overburdened with another capital trial and a complex criminal case. There is no dispute that Call and Scully took over the case in the fall of 1994, [7] at which point prior counsel had not conducted an investigation. Jury selection began in October 1995, and the trial commenced in January 1996. According to Call, Fairchild never asked for more time for preparation of a social history for defendant, although she later told Nardone that there wasn't much time before trial was to begin and that she already had a full case load when assigned to Harris's case. Citing her workload, a serious health problem, and lack of assistance, Fairchild told Nardone that she definitely could have used more time. At the PCR hearing, Scully testified to being unimpressed with work done by Harris's previous attorneys when he received the file, but asserted that he and Call had adequate time. Call similarly testified that the defense team did have adequate time to prepare. In addition, the record reveals that Call did ask for an extension of time because of his other cases. However, Call's other burdens were lifted when one matter ended in a plea and he was removed from representation in the other because of a conflict. As noted, we must determine whether defendant received representation that was objectively reasonable. If Call's representation of defendant fell below objectively reasonable standards, then his inadequate time to prepare might be an explanation. However, that Call had only ten months to prepare is not outcome determinative in this application. The argument is analogous to defendant's previous argument. Defendant contends that Call's efforts were minimal because of his attitude towards defendant and inadequate time. However, the actual question that we must consider is whether Call's efforts, in fact, were so minimal that his performance fell below objective reasonableness. Accordingly, we turn to the alleged specific deficiencies in the penalty phase.
Defendant's mother, Mattie, did not testify for him, not even to plead for his life. Harris notes that Call met only once with his mother, and blames Call for ruin[ing] any chance for [her] cooperation by immediately confronting her with accusations of abuse. The State points to the fact that Call did meet with defendant's mother, and that she, as well as defendant's brother, refused to testify for defendant. The State also notes that Mattie similarly was uncooperative with Sheila Fairchild.
Call testified that when he met Mattie, her demeanor was hostile. She immediately announced her intention of not cooperating. Although she eventually did cooperate by providing biographical information, she refused to testify on defendant's behalf. Call stated that she had great concern about her church friends finding out about it, her name appearing in the paper, and eventually she terminated her cooperation with us. According to Call, Mattie stated, I know what you're going to do, you're going to paint me as the terrible mother, and she was intent on not letting that happen. Call tried to convince her otherwise, telling her that his goal at trial would be to emphasize defendant's problems and the family's lack of resources, but his argument met with no success. As Call stated, based on his experience, many mothers are willing to throw themselves on the sword and say, yes, I was a terrible mother in order to save their child; however in this instance, Mattie simply was unwilling to do so. As an alternative tactic, Call asked Mattie to submit to psychological testing, hoping to introduce those results at trial, and he retained both Dr. Sadoff and Dr. Cooke for that purpose. She refused that request as well. Further, when asked why he met personally with Mattie only once, Call stated that she made it abundantly clear that she had no intention of helping her son. His testimony revealed the shocking explicitness with which he put to Mattie defendant's need for her testimony (telling her, you might as well stick a needle in your son's arm right now if you're not going to help us).
This record contains abundant evidence that objectively demonstrates Mattie's difficult nature and steadfast refusal to assist in her son's defense of his life. In her penalty-phase testimony, Sheila Fairchild stated that Mattie became uncooperative after two interviews, refusing a third with Fairchild and refusing to meet with her son's attorneys. When asked if Mattie gave her a specific reason, Fairchild responded: No. She wouldn't tell me why. I asked her why. And when I pressed her, she got rather nasty on the phone. To the extent she was able to interview Mattie, Fairchild described her as very resistant during those [interviews], very reluctant to disclose, share herself with me. In Lois Nardone's certification, she states that she interviewed defendant's mother. However, although she details the content of her other interviews, she does not state what, if anything, Mattie told her, or that she even was successful in speaking with Mattie. We note that PCR counsel did contact defendant's biological father to see if he would have testified had trial counsel asked him. We presume that a similar inquiry would have been made of defendant's mother. Nonetheless, although PCR counsel asked the PCR court to hear testimony from numerous witnesses, there was no request that the court hear testimony from Mattie. Given Call's testimony about Mattie's refusals to help in the case, the corroboration of that refusal and her general lack of cooperation, we conclude that trial counsel did not provide deficient assistance in his efforts to secure testimony or other assistance from Mattie Williams.
Defendant submits evidence, through Lois Nardone, that his brother, Jerry Williams (a.k.a. James Harris) (hereinafter Jerry) was willing to testify on his behalf.
According to Nardone, Jerry (in prison) [8] told her that he would have been happy to testify on his brother's behalf during the penalty phase to tell the jury about defendant's zombie-like state when confined at the psychiatric hospital, about aspects of defendant's terrible childhood, and about how he loved his brother. Defendant's proofs in support of this claim are countered by Fairchild's testimony at the penalty phase, which was consistent with Call's PCR testimony, that Jerry had refused to help his brother's case. Fairchild testified that defendant's brother said, my mother and I will not testify for Ambrose. According to Fairchild, Jerry's explanation was that he did not want defendant to take the family down, an explanation that coincided with Call's testimony about Jerry's refusal to help in the defense.
In evaluating the worth of Jerry's potential testimony, as contained in Nardone's report, we note that its overall effect would have been cumulative because he previously had made similar statements to Fairchild and she conveyed them to the jury. Specifically, Jerry told Nardone that (i) their father was an embarrassing drunk; (ii) that when he visited his brother Ambrose in the psychiatric hospital, it was disturbing because he was with the adults and was in a zombie-like state from the medication; and (iii) that Ambrose experienced intense rejection from his peers. Fairchild conveyed all that information to the jury during defendant's penalty trial. The two things that Jerry told Nardone specifically that were not part of Fairchild's testimony were that Ambrose protected him against physical attacks when they were young, and that he very much loves his brother and desires to continue their relationship even in prison. We recognize the importance of such statements when made to a jury. They could convey that defendant has redeeming qualities in that he enjoys his brother's love and desire to continue a relationship. See State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 432, 680 A. 2d 677 (1996) (Handler, J., dissenting) ( Loftin I ) (the impact of potential execution on defendant's family is relevant to the uniqueness of defendant as an individual and [t]he contribution and connection the ... defendant makes to his or her family is... indicative of his or her character and relevant in mitigation.); accord King & Norgard, What About Our Families? Using the Impact on Death Row Defendants' Family Members as a Mitigating Factor in Death Penalty Sentencing Hearings, 26 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. 1119, 1146 (1999) (If ... mitigation evidence is to allow the jury to get a complete picture of the defendant, surely the way that he has impacted the people in his life is a relevant consideration to whether he deserves to live or die.). Even assuming that potential testimony from a brother would be helpful to a defendant, the question remains as to his willingness at the time of trial to provide such testimony. His present statement to Nardone aside, the record shows that at the time of trial Jerry declined to provide testimony for defendant. Besides Call's recollection of Jerry's unwillingness, Fairchild testified at the time of the penalty phase that Jerry refused to testify. It is difficult to import to Fairchild motivation to lie about Jerry's willingness to testify at the time of trial: she was there to help prepare the case for a life sentence for defendant. Defendant submits Nardone's report to show that Jerry would have testified at defendant's sentencing trial had he been asked. But, we regard Nardone's report as insufficient to undermine the 1996 testimony of Fairchild that Jerry was resistant to participating in the case. Call's present testimony is fully consistent with that recollection. Defendant has not shown that counsel were unreasonable in their efforts to mount a mitigation defense.
Defendant argues that neither defense counsel nor Fairchild interviewed his father, James Peter Harris, (Mr. Harris) in person. His father only received one brief phone call from the defense team. Defendant asserts that trial counsels' minimal efforts to obtain testimony from his father rendered their assistance ineffective.
PCR counsel have submitted an affidavit from Mr. Harris, which contains what he told Lois Nardone. Mr. Harris now attests that he would have testified if asked. Specifically, he says he would have informed the jury that he and Mattie had a very troubled marriage, that she would leave her young children alone during the day, and that he had reason to believe that [she] was prostituting herself to make up gambling losses. He attests that his son complained to family members about abuse he received from his stepfather. And, defendant's father states that he would have asked the jury to spare [his] son's life because [he] love[s] his son and [doesn't] think he ever had a chance at a normal life. Defendant thus argues that that his father's testimony would have engendered sympathy for [defendant], revealed him to be a person loved by his family and likely `substantially affected the jury's deliberations.' On this issue, the State relies primarily on testimony by Call, whose recollection was refreshed by his notes. Call essentially read from his notes. They indicated that he spoke with Mr. Harris in March and April 1995, and that Mr. Harris informed Call that he suspected his son was abused, but that he had no first-hand knowledge of it. Mr. Harris also told Call that his doctor had advised him not to get involved in the case because of his heart problems, and that, essentially, he did not want to testify.

Accepting Call's testimony at the PCR hearing, defendant's claim fails. Call testified: A: ... Peter Harris was the defendant's natural father who left the home at agewhen [defendant] was three, and had little to no significant contact with him after that. During a conference with [defendant] on February 26, 1995, he indicated that his father, James Peter Harris. Was in town, so to speak, and that he wascould be contacted through his sister, Christine Hellams. ... I spoke to Mr. Harris [defendant's father] on that date, this was March 9th, and when I asked him how he was, and he indicated not so good. I have heart problems, gout, diabetes, about every problem in the world, and he would have been about 63 as of our conversation. When asked, Mr. Harris indicated to Call that he did not have first-hand knowledge of abuse. Call's testimony continued: And during [a] telephone conference on April 19 of 1995, [defendant's father] indicated that he really didn't wish to be involved in the case. He indicated he had a bad heart, and had been advised by his doctor that he shouldn't get involved since it would be too upsetting. And it was abundantly clear at that point, that ... [defendant's father] simply did not wish to testify. Furthermore, Call testified that Mr. Harris did not show up for any day of defendant's almost fifty-day trial, bolstering Call's opinion of Mr. Harris's lack of interest. We note that the PCR court found Call credible, but even without granting the PCR court's finding any deference, we reach the same conclusion because defendant provides no reason to doubt Call's testimony. Call clearly is reading from his notes during the PCR hearing, and there is no suggestion being advanced that Call fabricated those notes. Call's decision not to pursue Mr. Harris any further was reasonable given what he knew about the relationship between defendant and his father. Contrary to defendant's argument, Mr. Harris would not have been able to engender sympathy for [defendant] and reveal[] him to be a person loved by his family. Mr. Harris would have been subject to cross-examination about abandoning his family when defendant was three, and his lack of relationship with defendant. Numerous records, as well as Fairchild's interviews with Mattie, defendant, and defendant's brother portray Mr. Harris as an alcoholic who did not care about his family, and the documents submitted by defendant confirm that depiction. In addition, Call had other reasons to doubt the potential worth of testimony from Mr. Harris. If Mr. Harris testified that he loved his son, trying to reveal [defendant] to be a person loved by his family, the State could have cross-examined Mr. Harris about his absence from defendant's life, and thus, brought out that his feelings for his son do not themselves reveal anything positive about defendant given the absence of a relationship between them. See Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 432, 680 A. 2d 677 (Handler, J., dissenting) (noting that family testimony is helpful if it demonstrates defendant's bond with family members); accord State v. Stevens, 319 Or. 573, 879 P. 2d 162, 168 (1994) (impact of execution on family shows that defendant has the capacity to be of emotional value to others. In that inference, a juror could find an aspect of defendant's character or background that could justify a sentence of less than death.); King & Norgard, supra, 26 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. at 1146 (If ... mitigation is to allow the jury to get a complete picture of the defendant, surely the way that he has impacted the people in his life is a relevant consideration to whether he deserves to live or die.). Further, the records submitted by the defense in this PCR proceeding, albeit not known to Call at the time, objectively demonstrate that Mr. Harris would not have been able to provide compelling testimony. Institutional records convey that defendant and his mother did not know the whereabouts of defendant's father at least through 1969. Also, Mr. Harris's neglect of his family and defendant undermine the argument that Mr. Harris's testimony had the potential to be effective. He could not have shown that defendant had a positive impact on his life. Finally, we find it of little import that the defense did not talk to Mr. Harris in person. Mr. Harris communicated to Call his strong desire not to be involved. That he did so during a telephone call that Call placed to him does not transform Call's interaction with him into ineffective assistance. Moreover, defendant cannot show prejudice for the same reasons counsel had to doubt the value of Mr. Harris's testimony: Mr. Harris had no significant relationship with defendant. In conclusion, defendant has failed to satisfy either prong of Strickland in respect of counsels' decision not to pursue further the involvement of his father.
Defendant faults defense counsel for not contacting his stepfather (Walter) simply because counsel anticipated a denial of abuse allegations.
Harris told Fairchild during preparation for the penalty phase that he was afraid of his stepfather, who frequently engaged in fights with his wife, Mattie. Harris said that he and Walter never really talked, but he knew that Walter didn't like him. He added that his mother had instructed his stepfather to beat defendant daily, thus Walter too was responsible for defendant's childhood abuse. Mattie, on the other hand, told Fairchild that Walter was not really involved with the boys.
At the PCR hearing, Call was asked why he never spoke with Walter. Call's explanation focused on defendant's accusation that his stepfather was involved in the abuse defendant received as a child. Call stated that by the time he learned from the institutional records of the possible abuse defendant suffered when growing up, Mattie had already told us, you know thatin fact, I think she actually spoke with the press at one point and said that Ambrose was not abused, something along that line. He continued: But neither Mattie Williams, nor do I suspect that Walter Williams would have, either one of them, would they have substantiated a history of abuse. At the penalty phase, on cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Fairchild about whether she interviewed Walter: Q: You also interviewed Walter Williams, did you not? A: No, I did not. Q: You never spoke to him? A: No. I asked to speak with him. Q: Did he refuse? A: No, he didn't refuse. I asked Mattie if I could speak with her husband, and she said, he doesn't want to talk to you. Q: Now, Miss Fairchild, how old was Mr. Williams at the time that you wanted to talk to him? ... A: I don't know his age. I would imagine he's close to Mattie's age, which would be sixty. ... Q: And you thought that in a matter of this importance that you needed Mattie Williams' permission to speak to Walter Williams about a matter that involved his stepson's life? A: Yes. Q: So you never made an attempt to speak to Walter Williams yourself? A: No. On redirect, defense counsel tried to elicit from Fairchild why she did not make any visit to the Williams household to talk with Walter despite Mattie's refusal to allow her to do so. The prosecutor objected because he believed that defense counsel wanted Fairchild to admit believing Mattie could be violent, knowing of her conviction for murder in the late 1970's. Such testimony would have circumvented the trial court's ruling prohibiting the jury from being informed of that conviction without opening up the time limitation the defense had imposed on itself for its mitigation strategy. That aside, Mattie's past is relevant to judging her propensity for violence in assessing whether Fairchild, or defense counsel, should have shown up, unwelcome, at Mattie and Jerry's door. Call also testified that Jerry told Fairchild that Walter did not abuse his stepsons. In fairness, the role that Walter played in punishing his stepsons is unclear. A 1964 report by a school psychologist, obtained by PCR counsel, indicates that Harris called Walter a harsh disciplinarian and that Mattie confirmed that Walter participated in punishing defendant. On the other hand, Mattie conveyed pride during an interview with Fairchild that she was the one who disciplined her children, and that Walter had very little to do with them. For our purposes, it is most significant that defendant has failed to submit any evidence to show what Walter was willing to say on the stand so we could assess whether it would have substantially affected jury deliberations. Nardone's report of her interview with Walter is uninformative. It says only that Walter would have been happy to have spoken with either or both Mr. Call/Mr. Scully and Ms. Fairchild. Finally, as in the case of defendant's mother, PCR counsel did not ask the PCR court to hear testimony from Walter Williams, according to counsels' brief. In sum, there is no evidence that trial counsel acted unreasonably in not pursuing Walter after their discussion with Mattie. Furthermore, defendant has not provided any information to the Court about how Walter's participation in the case would have substantially affected jury deliberations.
In the last of this series of issues raised, defendant alleges various deficiencies in Call's interactions with defense experts that limited the usefulness of those experts.
Defendant complains that Call did not meet with his experts in person and, moreover, that he did not permit the mitigation expert, Sheila Fairchild, to meet alone with Harris because he feared defendant's dangerousness. The State responds that Call did meet with the penalty phase experts prior to their testimony and that he recorded the dates on which he spoke with Dr. Greenfield. Scully testified about Fairchild attending meetings that occurred with counsel. Indeed, that Fairchild interviewed Harris only with counsel present is further evidence of counsels' meetings with Fairchild. Finally, the State contends that there was good reason for counsels' decision not to allow a one-on-one meeting between Fairchild and Harris: defendant is a violent, unpredictable person, even when incarcerated. During one meeting with Fairchild (with Call present), defendant pulled his pants down to show her a scar, allegedly because he wanted to see if Fairchild was cool.
PCR counsel emphasized at the PCR hearing that trial counsel did not meet in person with their retained experts, citing Dr. Greenfield as an example. The record reflects that Call documented his numerous communications with experts, which include conference calls and written correspondence. Defendant never explains why we should conclude that trial counsels' method of communication with the experts rendered counsels' performance deficient. Moreover, defendant does not show how the jury's deliberations would have been substantially affected had Call and Scully met in person with Dr. Greenfield and Dr. Gruen, thus falling short also on the prejudice prong of Strickland. Furthermore, trial counsels' performance was not deficient because they did not have Fairchild meet alone with Harris. Call testified that he found Harris especially dangerous to women. Defendant had a significant criminal history, and only ten days after the Huggins murder, he was arrested for four separate incidents of aggravated sexual assault and kidnapping. Given his violent character and the incident in which he tested Fairchild, counsels' decision does not render their defense unreasonable.
Defendant claims ineffective assistance as a result of counsels' failure to obtain records that were later discovered by PCR counsel. He contends that the newly discovered records would have assisted in his mitigation presentation.
At defense counsel's request, Fairchild undertook to find all that she could in respect of defendant's formative years. She compiled 115 pages of documents, overcoming numerous obstacles in securing and identifying records from long ago. Defendant now criticizes the defense team investigation because PCR counsel has secured a complete set of records from Trenton State Hospital that were not obtained by Fairchild. PCR counsel argue that those records indicate that defendant was civilly committed as `insane' when he was twelve years old. In addition, another newly found childhood record documents scars on defendant's body, corroborating the defense contention that Harris was abused as a child. And finally, PCR counsel found documentation that Mattie was diagnosed with scabies a week before defendant's birth, indicating the filthy conditions in which defendant's family lived. Additional records found reflect that Mattie had been arrested during Harris's childhood for drunk, disorderly, and assaultive conduct. In response, the State notes that many of the documents were dated after the defense's self-imposed cut-off date for its mitigation case. Beyond that, the State argues that the documents would not have enhanced substantially the mitigation presentation. Many records are illegible or irrelevant, and regardless, the documents found by Call and Scully adequately depicted Harris's home life without the newly-found documents. They would be simply cumulative.

We turn first to the question of deficient performance: does counsels' failure to discover the complete set of documents imply that their investigation was objectively unreasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed. 2d 471, 485 (2003) (`[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.') (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674). As noted, trial counsel told Fairchild to find everything she could. It is not surprising that Fairchild experienced difficulty finding records about defendant from 1952 through 1965. Mattie pointed Fairchild in the direction of the Child Guidance Clinic, which Fairchild learned is now the Family Guidance Clinic in Princeton. Also, there were gaps in the record-keeping. According to Fairchild, some records at Mercer County Hospital were either gone, on microfilm, or on small cards. She testified that she asked Mercer Hospital for records of medical treatment, but was told that there were none. As for the Trenton Psychiatric Hospital records that feature in PCR counsels' argument, the PCR transcript reflects that Call had a letter from that institution stating that the records forwarded were the ones it had of Ambrose Harris. Although that letter, dated May 18, 1995, is not part of the record, Call testified that he had reason to believe he had all of defendant's records from that hospital. PCR counsel disputed the reasonableness of that belief by Call. When Call was asked, Why did you think you had the complete hospital records ... if there were no physician orders in there, nurses' notes, medication records, anything, he responded that he relied on Fairchild and assumed those were the records that were available, given the lapse in time. We find it significant that Call showed Drs. Gruen and Greenfield the file from the State Hospital. Neither mentioned that there appeared to be records missing, a point not lost on Call, who testified: I believe if either Dr. Gruen or Dr. Greenfield had indicated there might be additional records, . . . I would have probably sent Ms. Fairchild and one of the public defender's investigators to determine whether or not there were any additional records. Indeed, Gruen testified that the notes from the Guidance Center were very exhaustive. We find two other points noteworthy. First, Nardone's report does not criticize at all Fairchild's attempts to locate relevant records. Second, the certification submitted on behalf of defendant by David Glazer, offered as an expert on death penalty defense, does not criticize Fairchild or trial counsel for failing to obtain the documents. In fact, before PCR counsel found the documents, Glazer certified that he reviewed the institutional records submitted to the jury, and he did not indicate that he found the reports lacking in completeness. Later Glazer submitted another certification, after PCR counsel uncovered more documents. In that second certification, Glazer refrained from criticizing trial counsel for not finding them, stating instead that counsel overlooked that evidence and discussed the impact he believed such evidence would have had. We are not informed why defendant's PCR attorneys were able to find these documents when Fairchild could not. Other than the fact that the documents were found, there is no evidence that Call or Fairchild made any unreasonable decisions. Fairchild was not permitted to testify at the PCR hearing because PCR counsel did not provide an affidavit attesting to the content of her testimony. Our decision does not hinge on that ruling, however, because Fairchild was interviewed by Nardone and Nardone's report does not criticize Fairchild's investigation into the documents nor does it offer any insight into the need for Fairchild's testimony. On the present record, we conclude that defendant has failed to show deficient performance by Call for his failure to uncover all of the documents now submitted by PCR counsel.
Because we have concluded that defendant has not satisfied his responsibility to demonstrate deficient performance by counsel, we need not reach Strickland's prejudice prong. We comment on the documents worth only for purposes of completeness in this de novo review. We address them by category. First, many of the new documents have no relevance to defendant's mitigation case. In this category, we include countless uninformative correspondence and requests for records, basic forms, unreadable photocopies, permission slips to exit the hospital, drug and treatment records, and medical records about defendant's hammer toe that needed surgery. The evidence that Mattie had scabies before giving birth to defendant is not dispositive of defendant's assertion about growing up in squalor and filth. Indeed, other of the newly found documents are reports from health care providers recording that defendant had a clean appearance and habits. Second, the jury knew much of the information contained in other documents. A February 1965 letter from a doctor at the State Hospital indicates that Harris engaged in many fights, choked one boy and stabbed another with scissors, but like information was conveyed to the jury by Dr. Gruen and by Fairchild. An April 1964 document reports the opinion of Dr. Litkey, a Guidance Center psychiatrist, that Harris was a severely ill child mentally and needed institutionalization. But Dr. Gruen testified to recalling a document very much like this one. In May 1964, the director of the Child Guidance Center wrote that defendant's mother realized her son had problems, but would not take an active role in helping; she hoped her son would just outgrow his problems. Fairchild similarly testified that reports indicated Mattie's passivity towards defendant and her resistance to being involved with him. In general, many of the new documents note Mattie's failures as a mother. But Gruen testified that the documents at trial were very complete about Mattie's poor mothering. The defense had ample evidence portraying Mattie's failure as a mother. Finally, reports from the State Hospital, dated April and June 1965, state that defendant had no psychosis, no delusions, and no hallucinations, but did have a sociopathic personality disturbance. Drs. Gruen and Greenfield disagreed with other diagnoses in the records, but their assessments of Harris as a child agreed with those evaluations. Last, PCR counsel emphasizes two Certificates of Insanity dating from October 1964. Presented with them, Call testified that he was not sure whether he would have submitted them to the jury. Because the certificates reveal that Harris was sniffing glue and had sexual relations with a ten-year old girl, Call said he would have considered adjusting the cut-off date of the defense presentation to have the certificates fall outside the range. PCR counsel faults Call's present day evaluation by pointing out that the jury knew about the glue sniffing and about Harris's relations with the young girl, but that argument is an acknowledgment that the jury already knew of those behaviors. The Certificates of Insanity are not compelling in and of themselves as the prosecutor undoubtedly would have informed the jury that the documents did not mean that defendant literally was insane. The defense experts testified that defendant was not psychotic, and other documents found by PCR counsel stated that defendant did not suffer from psychosis, delusions, or hallucinations. The most the Certificates of Insanity convey was the signator's belief that others needed protection from defendant's aggressive behavior because the basis given for the finding of insanity was defendant's bad behavior, about which the jury was told. As for the other new documents pertaining to physical abuse suffered by defendant as a child, we note Fairchild's testimony that Harris received beatings from his mother and stepfather. Also the jury learned that one social worker described Mattie in 1962 as very punitive with defendant. However, the prosecutor was effective at calling into doubt the allegations of abuse by exposing Fairchild's lack of basis for concluding that Harris had any tremendous scars. The medical records produced at trial showed no evidence of scars except on defendant's arms, which could have come from fights. Yet, on this question multiple medical records discovered by PCR counsel document many scars in many other parts of his body. PCR counsel also highlight another document that supports the abuse allegations. In 1964, a school psychologist reported Harris's attitudes of resentment and revenge against those in the home who beat him, and his feel[ing] that he might like to get even with them when he was older. When the psychologist confronted Mattie with defendant's claim that his father was a harsh disciplinarian, Mattie said that Ambrose must have been referring to his stepfather. That last document is not newly discovered, as it is from the Trenton Public Schools and recounts the same choking and scissor-stabbing incidents previously presented to the jury during the testimony of Dr. Gruen and Fairchild. In sum, the only documents that contained any new information were those that supported the abuse allegations by providing evidence of extensive scarring, which the prosecutor said was lacking. On this record, with the extensive mitigation case presented by defendant, it is not likely that the failure to present the additional evidence constituted prejudice sufficient to overturn this verdict. However, as noted, because defendant has not proven deficient performance, we do not reach and determine prejudice. Indeed, aside from producing the documents, defendant has not offered an affidavit from Gruen, Greenfield, or any other expert about how the new documents could have changed their testimony to the jury.
Because defendant has not shown that counsel or Fairchild were unreasonable in their investigations, we conclude that defendant has not demonstrated the first prong necessary to his allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Defendant asserts that he informed his trial counsel that he was raped when he was twelve years old by an adult patient at the Trenton State Psychiatric Hospital, but that trial counsel never relayed that information to his mitigation consultant, Fairchild, and therefore the jury never learned about it. Similarly, he says he informed counsel that his mother asked his uncle to drown him while on a fishing trip, and the jury never learned of that allegation either.

At the PCR hearing, PCR counsel asked Call whether he submitted a mitigating factor based on Harris's allegation of being raped in Trenton State Hospital. Call said he did not, and he testified about a meeting he had with Harris: [Defendant] recounted his exposure, experience with anal intercourse, you know, extensively [during that meeting] making no reference to the fact that he had been a victim himself, characterizing himself as, each and every time, as the aggressor. [The next day], I think it was a phone call, and I did an internal memo indicating that he called and said that he had been raped when he was in the hospital, and at that point, . . . I provided that memo to Ms. Fairchild. Mr. Harris never brought it up with Ms. Fairchild when she spoke with him. Again, I know in her affidavit, she remembersI think she says that she thinks she was told at some point, but she would have received all of those internal memos. That testimony is disputed in Nardone's report. Nardone reports that Fairchild did not know about Harris's rape allegation when the two social workers spoke. Fairchild surmised to Nardone that perhaps Harris would have talked about being raped if she had interviewed him alone. If the defense could have shown that defendant had been raped, perhaps it could have evoked more sympathy from jurors. However, the lack of corroboration was a problem for the defense. The State undoubtedly would have pointed out the absence of documentation of a rape in the institutional records and would have stressed the self-serving motivation Harris would have had to tell such a story. A bare allegation of being raped from this defendant, without documentation, could be received with great skepticism and, perhaps, itself cause negative juror feelings towards defendant. Defense counsels' decision not to present that bare allegation did not render their assistance objectively unreasonable.
PCR counsel did not question Call about Harris's allegation that his mother asked his uncle to drown him but did ask Scully about the allegation the day after Call testified. Scully could not remember the allegation, although he remembered Call asking Harris questions about going to the lake with his uncle: I know that [Call] questioned him about going to the lake with his uncle. I'm not certain, I don't recall whether it was to drown him. I don't, I don't recall that.... I say, John, Mr. Call conducted this interview. This was the portion of the trial that he was preparing. This was follow-up discussions he had had with or meetings that he had had with Ambrose. So, you know, that is a question better asked of Mr. Call than I. Nardone reports that Fairchild did not interview defendant's uncle, Walter Gross, to discuss with him defendant's allegation. Fairchild told Nardone that she possibly heard defendant's story, but did not recall from whom. The purpose of such evidence would have been to show that Mattie rejected defendantthat she even wanted him to die. From any objective standpoint, the trial transcript reveals that defense counsel clearly achieved that goal. Their performance was not deficient for failing to put on one uncorroborated allegation made by defendant about his mother wanting him drowned. Furthermore, defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice from this alleged deficiency. The jury had ample evidence of Mattie's strong negative feelings towards her son. The defense submitted 180 mitigating circumstances to the jury, and at least eighty-four of them directly described some kind of significant failing of Mattie as a mother, including numerous claims about her disdain for defendant. The defense supported those mitigating circumstances with the recorded observations of professionals who witnessed the relationship between defendant and his mother, as well as with the interviews conducted by Sheila Fairchild.
We conclude that defendant has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel in respect of either of these claims.
As an additional claim of IAC, Harris asserts that his counsel neither explained to him the allocution process nor assisted him in preparing a statement, and that his borderline IQ heightened the importance of receiving counsels' assistance. He contends that that deficiency constitutes ineffective assistance because prejudice, he says, surely befell him as a result. He now claims that even a simple statement of sorrow at the death of Ms. Huggins would have `substantially affected' the penalty jury's deliberations. The State's first response to this claim is that Harris has no remorse, and his behavior during trial evidenced his lack of compunction, something that our Court recognized during proportionality review. See Harris II, supra, 165 N.J. at 313, 757 A. 2d 221. Defendant went so far as to insult Huggins's family during his tirade. In any event, the State submits that Call did confer with Harris regarding allocution. Call stated on the record that he reviewed the judge's notice about allocution with defendant, and that they discussed the matter on prior occasions. Moreover, defendant was aware of his right: The trial court advised him and explained the scope of an allocution statement. The judge offered to read a draft of his statement and, when asked by the court if he had questions about allocution, defendant replied, no.
There is no question about the importance of an allocution. The right of allocution reflects our commonly-held belief that our civilization should afford every defendant an opportunity to ask for mercy. State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 478, 645 A. 2d 734 (1994) ( DiFrisco II). In State v. Zola, the common law right of allocution was extended to capital defendants so they too could address their jury directly. 112 N.J. 384, 429-30, 548 A. 2d 1022 (1988). Exercising that right would allow the jury to hear from the defendant's voice that he is `an individual capable of feeling and expressing remorse and of demonstrating some measure of hope for the future.' Id. at 430, 548 A. 2d 1022 (quoting J. Thomas Sullivan, The Capital Defendant's Right to Make a Personal Plea for Mercy: Common Law Allocution and Constitutional Mitigation, 15 N.M.L.Rev. 41, 41 (1985)). The decision whether to make an allocution belongs to the defendant. Bey, supra, 161 N.J. at 277, 736 A. 2d 469 (describing right to allocute as personal to defendant). However, as we specified in Bey: as with the right to testify, defense counsel should consult with their clients so the clients can make their own informed decisions. It follows that defense counsel should inform the defendant of the right of allocution or ensure that the trial court apprises the defendant of this right. Moreover, . . . counsel must advise the defendant on the issue whether to submit a statement of allocution to the jury and to explain the tactical advantages or disadvantages of doing so or not doing so. Counsel's responsibility includes advising a defendant of the benefits inherent in exercising that right and the consequences inherent in waiving it. . . . Indeed, counsel's failure to do so will give rise to a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel. [ Id. at 278, 736 A. 2d 469 (quoting State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 630-31, 577 A. 2d 455 (1990)).] In this matter there appears to be no doubt that defendant was informed of his right to allocute, the only question is whether counsel left the ultimate determination to defendant. Bey, supra, 161 N.J. at 277, 736 A. 2d 469 (Defense counsel should not make an independent strategic decision whether defendant should exercise that right.). Indeed, the trial court specifically addressed him about his right to allocute. On the second day of the penalty-phase hearings, the court stated: Before the Court adjourns for today, it should inform Mr. Harris of his right of allocution, that is, a right, in effect, to ask the jury to spare his life. The rules regarding allocution are set forth in a two-page document which the Court will provide to counsel and to Mr. Harris. In short, what Mr. Harris will be permitted to do, if he wishes to do so, is to ask the jury to spare his life. And he may explain, if it is true, his remorse, and he may express his hope for rehabilitating himself if his life is spared. He will be permitted to speak briefly, but he will not be given a prolonged period of time to speak.... Mr. Harris, if you wish to do so, you may write out in advance what it is you wish to say, and the Court will read it and tell you if it is approved. You are not required to do that. The choice is yours. But if you speak beyond the rules, the Court may interrupt and explain to the jury the rules, and the fact that you are speaking beyond the confines of what is permitted. The next day, the following colloquy took place: COURT: The Court has spoken with counsel for the defense. It has advised Mr. Harris yesterday that he has a right of allocution. It has handed to counsel for the defense a notice of right of allocution, setting forth, again, the very rules which the Court enunciated yesterday. Mr. Call, is Mr. Harris going to exercise his right of allocution? CALL: Your Honor, I've had an opportunity to review with Mr. Harris the notice of right of allocution which the Court provided. I've also had an occasion to discuss it with him on prior occasions. Mr. Harris just executed in open court the notice of right of allocution, and it would be Mr. Harris' decision at this point that he does not wish to exercise that right, fully understanding the nature and the limitations that would be placed upon him. COURT: Mr. Harris, do you have any questions about your right of allocution? You have to give me a verbal response for the record. DEFENDANT: No. Thus, separate and apart from defendant's discussions with counsel about allocution, the above exchange demonstrates that the trial court asked defendant whether he wished to allocute and whether he had any questions in respect of that right. Even if we assume that trial counsel did not leave to defendant the ultimate decision about allocution, defendant must show prejudice to succeed in his ineffective assistance claim. The mere denial of the right of allocution does not result in fundamental injustice. Bey, supra, 161 N.J. at 276, 736 A. 2d 469. Both prongs of Strickland/Fritz must be satisfied. Despite defendant's assertions that he would have given an allocution that would have substantially affected jury deliberations, his actions and words at the time of trial betray his claims. See id. at 277, 736 A. 2d 469 ([W]e do not review the denial of the right of allocution in a vacuum[,]... [but] `in the context of the entire trial record and of the grave offenses of which defendant was convicted.') (quoting State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 252, 690 A. 2d 1 (1997)). As we noted in our review of defendant's capital conviction, we recall again the painful image of Harris mocking the pain endured by Huggins's father in open court. Call testified that when Mr. Huggins was testifying about the last time his daughter left home, he started to cry. In the jury's presence, Harris withdrew his handkerchief from his pocket, leaned forward and dabbed under both eyes. Call continued, [L]ooking over at the jurors at that time, I mean, Mr. Harris may very well have signed his own death warrant, and, the dabbing of the eyes was the most reprehensible thing I've ever seen a defendant do in a courtroom. When Harris did exercise his right to make a statement before being sentenced on the non-murder counts, he did not remotely express remorse. Harris exhibited a tirade that included arguments why he could not have been the one who committed those crimes, and why this crime paled in comparison to those committed by others, such as Jeffrey Dahmer. He continued with other remarks of a similar ilk: · I'm saying this to the Huggins family, that I did not kidnap your daughter, nor did I rape your daughter, nor did I shoot your daughter in the head. · I want the Huggins family to be man enough and woman enough to come up in my face and apologize to me. It will be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Ambrose Harris did not rape or kidnap and kill that girl. · You ain't found shit because Ambrose Harris didn't kill that woman. I might take something from a woman. I might rape a mother-f____g woman, but I will be goddamned if I would kill a woman. Call stated that during discussions with defendant, Harris expressed delight in some of the great tragedies of mankind. The Oklahoma City bombing delighted him. The Holocaust, he thought that was a good thing. Harris's behavior and statements give credence to Call's belief that Harris was incapable of expressing either sincere or feigned remorse. Nor did PCR counsel try to rebut the character portrait of Harris painted during the PCR hearing. They did not ask to put defendant on the stand to testify about his remorse or the kind of remorse he would have conveyed during an allocution. The PCR record does reveal, however, that Harris's DOC records report an incident during which defendant became angered when a prison guard stepped on his shoe and he stated words to the effect that, you are the one with the family, not me, and when I get back to GP ... I'll kill you like that white bitch Kristin Huggins. Further, Call explained that he knew [Harris] was ... incapable of not using that opportunity to be at center stage in the courtroom to say something that would undo everything that we tried to do during the penalty phase. As evidenced by defendant's statement to the court prior to his non-capital sentencing, Call's concerns appear justified. Thus, there was a significant danger that Harris would have been reprimanded in front of the jury for going beyond the permissible scope of an allocution. See Bey, supra, 161 N.J. at 275-76, 736 A. 2d 469 (citing Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 430, 548 A. 2d 1022.) (A defendant, however, may not use allocation to rebut facts in evidence or to deny his guilt, and if he does, the court may strike the offending portions, allow the State to respond, or permit limited cross-examination of the defendant).
Given defendant's outbursts against the court and even towards the victim's family, it was not objectively unreasonable for counsel to conclude that defendant was incapable of exhibiting honest or feigned remorse. Furthermore, the trial court informed Harris of his right and asked him in open court if he had any questions. Harris affirmed that he did not and never asked to make an allocution. PCR counsel provided no evidence that defendant could have or would have expressed an allocution that would have substantially affected the jury's deliberations. Moreover, all evidence was to the contrary, supporting Call's opinion that defendant was incapable of expressing real or feigned remorse, particularly in respect of the crimes committed against Huggins. Assuming for purposes of defendant's argument that defendant did not make the ultimate decision about whether to make an allocution, we conclude that defendant has not satisfied Strickland's requirement that he demonstrate that he was prejudiced.
Defendant contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because they did not submit two statutory mitigating factors, found at N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(d) (5a and 5d, respectively). Mitigating factor 5a states that the jury may consider whether the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution. Factor 5d states that the jury may consider whether the defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired as the result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, but not to a degree sufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution.
Defendant's trial counsel submitted to the jury 180 mitigating circumstances under the catch all factor at N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h), many of which concerned his emotional and mental problems as a child but defendant now argues that jurors probably would have given substantial weight to 5a and 5d, particularly because those factors are set forth explicitly by the Legislature as mitigating. In support of his claim, defendant highlights the mitigating circumstances that trial counsel did submit and that reference his childhood mental and emotional problems. He contends that the effects of those problems certainly still linger, and by submitting 5a and 5d as mitigating factors, his counsel could have insured a jury discussion about his mental and emotional state on December 17, 1992. Therefore, because counsel did not submit those statutorily-prescribed factors, defendant's resultant death sentence [is] suspect. The State counters that submitting those mitigating factors would have been inconsistent with the defense strategy of excluding all evidence related to the defendant's life between the ages of thirteen and forty-two. The State emphasizes that [d]efendant's horrific record of convictions and DOC infractions had to be kept from the jury at all costs, including the cost of not submitting 5a and 5d. If defendant introduced testimony about his emotional and mental disturbance in December 1992, the State would have been able to impeach that evidence with other examples of his dangerous conduct.
The focus of 5a and 5d clearly is the mental and emotional state of a capital defendant at the time of his crime. To provide evidence in support of those factors, defendant's trial counsel would have had to seek an examination of defendant by mental health experts who would have had to develop a psychological profile of him as he was in 1992, at forty years of age. Therefore, defendant's argument implies the claim that it was constitutionally unreasonable for his trial counsel to limit their investigation and defendant's mitigation case to evidence of his childhood before October 1965. We disagree. Once again, strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. [ Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 695.] Defendant's counsel fulfilled their duty. Their strategy, in limiting the scope of the mitigation case, was based on a proper investigation and was a professionally reasonable approach to take in persuading the jury to sentence defendant to life imprisonment. Call specifically stated that he chose the strategy because he thought it was defendant's best chance for a life sentence. Defendants have a right to a reasonable strategy based on reasonable investigation; they may not claim ineffective assistance merely because the strategy did not produce the result counsel sought. Bey, supra, 161 N.J. at 251, 736 A. 2d 469 (1999) (citing Davis, supra, 116 N.J. at 357, 561 A. 2d 1082.) (Merely because a trial strategy fails does not mean that counsel was ineffective.). If trial counsel had enlisted mental health experts to develop a psychological profile of defendant at the time of his crime in the hope that such testimony would support 5a and/or 5d, they would have created an opportunity for the State to inform the jury of defendant's atrocious adult record and prison conduct. The State would have had a right to use its own psychologist to interview defendant, and would have been entitled to provide its expert with defendant's records. See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(d) (The State and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any evidence presented by the other party at the sentencing proceeding and to present argument as to the adequacy of the evidence to establish the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factor.). The prosecutor also would have been able to cross-examine a defense expert with questions about defendant's records and their relevance to any diagnosis. Call's decision to limit the mitigation case was based on a reasonable investigation. He testified that before limiting psychological expert testimony to defendant's early years, he reviewed approximately thirty-five files, two or three crates of materials which represented [defendant's] history in the correctional system and on parole. Defendant's prison records indicate 100-plus infractions, including assaulting inmates, threatening to kill guards, sexually assaulting an inmate, and stabbing another prisoner in the neck with a fork. In describing the content of those records, Call stated, To say that his behavior was abyssal [sic] would be like saying the Titanic was stopping for ice. Call continued: [W]e felt that by limiting our presentation to his formative years, as was done successfully by Judge Scully in [ State v. ] Biegenwald [, 106 N.J. 13, 524 A. 2d 130 (1987)] and myself in State v. Williams, we would be able to preclude the prosecutor's office from coming forth with all of this information which would have been, in my opinion, and Judge Scully's opinion, and again, we consulted with Dale Jones who was then head of the capital litigation section, still is, Steven Kirsch who was the appellate counsel assigned to the matter, it was, it was not a tough question to decide that if those DOC records were available to the state and used during the penalty phase, the result would have been a foregone conclusion. Call reasonably opined that information in defendant's DOC records would have been insurmountable to overcome. For example, defendant told a prison guard, who stepped on his foot, something to the effect of, you are the one with the family, not me, and when I get back to GP ... I'll kill you like that white bitch Kristin Huggins. According to his testimony, Call did consider the possible counterweighing benefits of having defendant interviewed by a mental health expert. In response to questioning by PCR counsel, Call stated that he did confer with Dr. Greenfield about any possible mitigating explanation for Harris's records in prison. Call testified that Dr. Greenfield did not suspect that a psychological examination of defendant would yield beneficial diagnoses. After learning of defendant's correctional and other records, Dr. Greenfield was fairly certain as to what his findings would be with regard to Mr. Harris in terms of antisocial personality disorder. . . . Call's testimony conveys that Dr. Greenfield, in his professional judgment, did not anticipate finding that defendant, on December 17, 1992, was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(a), or had an impaired capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(d). Call also considered the potential harm of calling Dr. Greenfield and Dr. Gruen to testify only about defendant's childhood. He knew it was a problem from a cross-examination perspective to allow the State to elicit from the experts that the defense instructed them not to form opinions about defendant's mental condition after the age of thirteen. But Call and Scully reasoned that limiting the scope of the mitigation case nevertheless represented their best strategy. In Call's words, to allow the State to cross-examine a mental health expert about defendant's records, which were simply fraught with violence and racism and every ... other God awful thing, the verdict would have been a fiat [sic] accompli. Trial counsel reasonably feared that if the State cross-examined psychologists with defendant's records, they would be unable to convince the jury that defendant could live a productive or even a non-destructive life in prison: Unfortunately, Mr. Harris' record reflected that whether he was on the street or in a maximum security facility, he represented an ever present danger to everyone around him, be they inmates or correctional staff.... Trial counsels' decision to limit psychological evidence to defendant's childhood and, consequently, their non-submission of the 5a and 5d mitigating factors, was based on reasoned strategic judgment. Wiggins, supra, 539 U.S. at 526, 123 S.Ct. at 2537, 156 L.Ed. 2d at 487 (2003). Call's PCR testimony demonstrated that he did balance the pros and cons of his penalty phase strategy, and in his words, it wasn't even a close issue as to whether the defense should risk informing the jury of defendant's past conduct. And even if defendant's correctional records had presented counsel with a close question, their tactical decision was unquestionably reasonable. See DiFrisco III, 174 N.J. at 232, 804 A. 2d 507 (Counsel also made decisions, understandable at the time, to avoid the presentation of evidence that may have led to the revelation of damaging information about defendant.). [T]he mere existence of alternativeeven preferable or more effectivestrategies does not satisfy the requirements of demonstrating ineffectiveness under Strickland. Marshall VI, supra, 307 F. 3d at 86.
In our view, trial counsels' strategy appears more than reasonable when the following is considered: jurors very well may have supposed that Harris's severe mental and emotional disturbances stayed with him throughout life, past adolescence. Although counsel restricted the evidence to defendant's life before October 1965, given the extent of his childhood problems and his courtroom behavior, counsels' strategy allowed jurors to conjecture that Harris's problems continued. Defendant's PCR brief, in fact, acknowledges that, [b]ased on his inappropriate conduct during the trial, it is a fair inference that he ha[d] not spontaneously recovered from those maladies and, if he murdered Ms. Huggins, was so afflicted at the time of the crime. [9] We agree; but that acknowledgement undercuts defendant's argument that he was prejudiced by trial counsels' failure to submit the 5a and 5d mitigating factors. Counsels' strategy allowed jurors to have some insight into defendant's adult character and disturbances, and helped to humanize him, see Marshall VI, supra, 307 F. 3d at 86 (The purpose of [mitigation] investigation is to find witnesses to help humanize the defendant.); it simultaneously kept from the jury evidence demonstrating the danger Harris presented to inmates and correctional guards. Cf. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 186, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2474, 91 L.Ed. 2d 144, 160 (1986) (stating that there were several reasons why counsel reasonably could have chosen to rely on a simple plea for mercy from petitioner where [a]ny attempt to portray [him] as a nonviolent man would have opened the door for the State to rebut with evidence of petitioner's prior convictions). Indeed, defendant's criminal and prison records, including many statements made to officers, depict a man who disdains the legal system and a society that he perceives as racist and without legitimate authority to place restrictions on his behavior, and who expresses his contempt by intentionally flouting our most fundamental moral rules. Defendant has not overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, [not submitting 5a and 5d can] be considered sound trial strategy. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 694-95 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, we reject his claim.
Defendant complains of trial counsels' failure to object to aspects of the State's penalty summation that defendant claims were inflammatory and provided an argument in support of non-statutory aggravating factors. Defendant also claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.
The prosecutor's comments to which defense counsel should have objected, according to Harris, are as follows:  he said Harris intended to get that bitch;  he stated that Huggins was a virgin before he raped her;  he described Harris's sodomy of Huggins as an act of power. An act of cruelty. An act of contempt for Kristin Huggins. It was an act of dominion and control;  he argued that Harris, with cruel deliberation,. . . planned the killing of Kristin;  he asked the jury to imagine Kristin in the trunk of the car: You have all seen the trunk of that car. When you think about why murder in the course of a kidnapping is a powerful aggravating factor in this case, imagine what it must have been like for Kristin Huggins to have been driven around stuffed into that dark, cramped, airless trunk, worrying about what was going to happen to her next. According to defendant, none of those statements were probative of any aggravating factor and all constituted an attempt to inflame the jury. The State counters that neither trial counsel nor appellate counsel were ineffective because the prosecutor's summation was proper. The prosecutor was entitled to talk about the terror Huggins experienced because that went to the weight of the (4)(g) aggravating factor (murder while engaged in robbery sexual assault, kidnapping, arson, or burglary). The prosecutor tried to show how Harris chose and controlled the events on that fateful day to balance the mitigating effect of the `childhood' mitigating factor. Finally, as to prejudice, the State argues that even if defense counsel lodged an objection during the summation, it would have been unavailing.
We note at the outset that, on direct appeal, we rejected defendant's claims that the prosecutor's summation was improper and impermissibly ranged beyond the scope of the evidence. See Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 192-95, 716 A. 2d 458. That said, we do not regard defendant's arguments as procedurally barred by Rule 3:22-5 because the alleged grounds of prosecutorial misconduct underlying defendant's IAC claim are different from the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct he put forth on direct appeal. Defendant's IAC claim springs from the assertion that the prosecutor's comments were improper because they aimed to inflame the passions or emotions of the jurors. Appeals to emotion are not disallowed per se, but [i]t is constitutionally required that juries in capital trials reach a verdict and impose a penalty without inordinate exposure to unduly prejudicial, inflammatory commentary, and thus those excesses will not be permitted. State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 453-54, 550 A. 2d 1172 (1988). We forbid attempts to inflame the jury to impose the death penalty based on factors that the law deems to be irrelevant. State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 570, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Brunson, supra, 132 N.J. at 392, 625 A. 2d 1085. The inquiry then turns on the proper scope and subject matter of prosecutorial comments. Prosecutors are expected to make a vigorous and forceful closing argument to the jury ... and are afforded considerable leeway in that endeavor. Nelson II, supra, 173 N.J. at 460, 803 A. 2d 1 (citations omitted). They are, though, generally limited to commenting on the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences from the proofs presented. Id. at 472, 803 A. 2d 1; see also State v. Reynolds, 41 N.J. 163, 176, 195 A. 2d 449 (1963) (stating that comments must remain within the four corners of the evidence) (citation omitted). Prosecutors may characterize the evidence, unless, of course, they cross into the inflammatory or pejorative. See Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 576-77, 575 A. 2d 816 (holding that prosecutor's references to defendant as coward, liar, and jackal in capital case were inappropriate and could not be considered a characterization of the evidence). In a penalty-phase summation, the prosecutor's commentary on the evidence should be confined to the aggravating and mitigating factors that the legislature has specified. State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 231, 574 A. 2d 951 (1990) (citing State v. Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 521, 548 A. 2d 1058). And, in addition to arguing that the evidence establishes the aggravating factors, [t]he prosecutor is entitled to argue the weight to be accorded an aggravating factor. Nelson II, supra, 173 N.J. at 474, 803 A. 2d 1. Thus, it is proper in a penalty-phase summation for the prosecutor, in characterizing and commenting on the evidence, to argue the weight of an aggravating factor even if such comments arouse jurors' emotions. That amount of latitude is justified, given the kind of moral decision that jurors are asked to make based on the weighing of factors. As the Eleventh Circuit aptly noted, [t]he gravity of the crime is a crucial factor in the jury's decision, and arguments about the gravity of a murder will always be emotional. Tucker v. Zant, 724 F. 2d 882, 888 (11th Cir.1984); see also id. at 886-89 (noting also that appeals to emotion are generally prohibited but are permissible when directed at circumstances of [the] particular offense for purposes of assessing penalty) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed. 2d 944, 961 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 179, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987) (agreeing that capital punishment is, in part, an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct) (quoting Gregg, supra, 428 U.S. at 183-84, 96 S.Ct. at 2929, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 880 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). Thus, we turn to the specific comments made by the prosecutor. `To justify reversal, the prosecutor's conduct must have been `clearly and unmistakably improper,' and must have substantially prejudiced [the] defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his [or her] defense.' Papasavvas, supra, 163 N.J. at 625, 751 A. 2d 40 (quoting State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 625, 737 A. 2d 55 (1999) (citation omitted)).
This claim is readily resolved. Examination of the statement in context reveals that the prosecutor was repeating a statement that Dunn attributed to Harris during her testimony: Finally, in the vicinity of the Trenton Club, Kristin Huggins and her little red car had the tragic misfortune to be spotted. Question: What happened when you saw the little red car? Answer: As the car was pulling in the driveway, it was this girl in there in the car. It stopped for other cars to go by. And it was pulling in. And we saw the little car coming in. And he said, there's a car, there. I'm going to get that bitch. And she was coming in the driveway. She went down and we both seen her come in. He said to wait, wait, wait, I'll be right back. And he drove down there on his bike after the car. He didn't have to do that. Even then he could have called it off, left Kristin to paint her mural, start her career, get on with her life. But instead, he chose to get that bitch. He controlled the gun. He controlled the situation. He controlled Kristin's life. Not only did the prosecutor, in fact, not step outside the four corners of the evidence, he specifically referenced Dunn's testimony, which he had just read. In addition, Dunn testified that Harris directly called Huggins a bitch and referred to her as a bitch several times. Defense counsel did not have a duty to object to the prosecutor's reference when the prosecutor plainly was staying within the bounds of the evidence, and legitimately could strive to show, as the State argues, the coldness, the total unconcern for the plight of Kristin Huggins exhibited by defendant.
Defendant claims that counsel should have objected when the prosecutor referred to Huggins's virginity. We note at the outset that the prosecutor never commented on Dunn's testimony that Huggins made pleas to Harris based on her virginity. He simply read Dunn's testimony: Question: What happened? ... He told her to take her clothes off. He told me to stand in front of the car. I was turned around, watching Kristin. She didn't take her clothes off right then. She was nervous, was shaking. She was talking, she saying what are you going to do. He just said, shut up, bitch, and take your clothes off. She said I'm a virgin. Question: What happened when she said that? He didn't care. He justhe grabbed her. He grabbed her and she start pulling on her clothes, trying to take them off, nervous and shaking, and he was unfastening his pants. ... And I heard her crying, and I turned around and she was telling him she was a virgin and stuff. And she said, no. I seen him having sex with her. [(Emphasis added).] There was no legal basis for defense counsel to object to the prosecutor's reading this admissible testimony to the jury, and thus there was no ineffective assistance due to a failure to make a baseless objection.
The prosecutor, during summation, read back Dunn's testimony regarding Harris's actions leading up to the rape. He then commented on that testimony. The prosecutor stated, Why did he sexually assault Kristin Huggins? Surely nobody believes that standing under the Southard Street Bridge on that rainy, foggy day, Ambrose Harris was suddenly overcome with sexual passion. No, the sodomy here was an act of power. An act of cruelty. An act of contempt for Kristin Huggins. It was an act of dominion and control.... And then with cruel deliberation, he planned the killing of Kristin. Defendant now complains that his counsel should have objected to those comments. In our assessment, the prosecutor's comments were a fair characterization of the State's evidence and were relevant to the appropriate weight of the (4)(g) aggravating factor (murder in the course of a sexual assault or other specified crime) in the circumstances. The State's evidence depicted a lengthy terrorization by defendant, Harris II, supra, 165 N.J. at 322, 757 A. 2d 221, of which the sexual assault was a part. The prosecutor's words are not so distinct from our own characterization of the crime: The cold-bloodedness and brutality of defendant are evidenced by the fact that defendant specifically asked Dunn to watch him kill Huggins.... Huggins did not provoke defendant to a sudden intemperate act. Nor did he kill her in the midst of violent sexual frenzy. To the contrary, for two hours she was a helpless victim of a cool and deliberate carjacker.... Defendant was aware of how helpless Huggins felt. [ Ibid. ] Whether described as cold-blooded and brutal, or as an act of cruelty and power, the words are apt to the evidence and pertinent to the aggravating factor under consideration by the jury. The prosecutor's comments were proper. Because they were relevant to defendant's blameworthiness, the weight of the (4)(g) aggravator, and were a characterization of the evidence, defense counsel did not have grounds to object.
After reciting Dunn's testimony about Harris forcing Huggins into the car's trunk, the prosecutor asked the jurors to imagine what Huggins's experience was like: You have seen the trunk of that car. When you think about why murder in the course of a kidnapping is a powerful aggravating factor in this case, imagine what it must have been like for Kristin Huggins to have been driven around stuffed into that dark, cramped, airless trunk, worrying about what was going to happen to her next. Defendant claims that defense counsels' performance was deficient because they did not object to these remarks. Again, although these comments were aimed at invoking some emotion from the jury, they do not exceed proper comment. The prosecutor did not go beyond the parameters of the evidence, and he was entitled to argue the weight to be accorded an aggravating factor. Nelson II, supra, 173 N.J. at 474, 803 A. 2d 1. Kidnappings can be conducted in different ways, some more terrorizing than others. Here, the prosecutor was describing in graphic terms the terrible reality of a cold and sadistic kidnapping. The comments may have invoked emotion, but they were relevant to the determination of the weight of the aggravator and thus within the considerable leeway prosecutors are permitted. Id. at 472, 803 A. 2d 1. See Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 570, 575 A. 2d 816. For completeness, we add that there is no merit to defendant's claim that appellate counsel rendered IAC by failing to raise on direct appeal trial counsel's failure to object to the State's summation. Appellate counsel would not have been successful had they raised the issue because the prosecutor's remarks were not `clearly improper.' Timmendequas, supra, 161 N.J. at 588, 737 A. 2d 55 (quoting Williams, supra, 113 N.J. at 452, 550 A. 2d 1172).
Defendant presents four arguments based on a mid-trial telephone call made to jurors by a newspaper reporter and possible contact between jurors and an ex-employee of the Public Defender's Office. The telephone calls made by the reporter are relevant only to the penalty phase because they occurred around February 28, 1996, more than a week after the guilt-phase verdicts were read in court. Defendant argues: (1) the PCR court erred by denying defendant's motion to conduct post-verdict interviews of jurors about any possible extraneous influences; (2) the trial court erroneously conducted an ex parte investigation of the phone calls, when it was required to conduct an open questioning of the jurors and the reporter; (3) trial counsel rendered IAC in failing to request a hearing regarding the reporter's telephone calls to jurors at their homes; and (4) Rule 1:16-1, which prohibits reconvening a jury for interviews absent a showing of good cause, is unconstitutional.

The concern associated with the juror contacts by the reporter and ex-assistant public defender is that the contacts provided extraneous, prejudicial information to jurors. We must assess that concern in context, understanding the threat that existed throughout defendant's trial that jury deliberations might be tainted by inflammatory publicity. Indeed, defendant argues that the Court should assess this issue in light of the presumptively prejudicial media coverage of his case. As this Court recognized, [t]here can be no doubt that this case was accompanied by widespread, inherently prejudicial pretrial media coverage. Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 145, 716 A. 2d 458. The trial court understandably accused the Trentonian of embarking on a `vengeance seeking crusade' against defendant in publishing a `constant,' `prolonged,' and `sensationalized' `stream of invective.' Ibid. Dramatically prejudicial headlines referred to Harris as a monster, a beast, a maggot, and satan in disguise. Id. at 145, 151, 716 A. 2d 458; id. at 214, 716 A. 2d 458 (Handler, J., dissenting). That paper quoted local citizens as stating: No trial. . . Just get on with it and fry him; Why don't we have a public hanging on Trenton High's Football Field? ... I'll pay for the rope! Id. at 214, 716 A. 2d 458 (Handler, J., dissenting); Most people figure the jury would think, `We'll have lunch on the county, and we'll squirt himthis afternoon.' Id. at 151, 716 A. 2d 458. Other quoted opinions referred to Harris's extensive criminal record and offered various modes of execution. Id. at 216, 716 A. 2d 458 (Handler, J., dissenting). To protect defendant's rights, the trial court ordered the empanelment of a foreign jury; however, the inflammatory publicity continued throughout the trials. After the jury convicted defendant, defense counsel moved to sequester the jurors and to conduct an individualized voir dire. Id. at 150, 716 A. 2d 458. The court denied both motions, opting instead to conduct a collective voir dire in open court. This Court affirmed those denials, id. at 150-54, 716 A. 2d 458, holding that the collective voir dire was sufficient to show that no prejudicial exposure had occurred in the particular circumstances. Id. at 153, 716 A. 2d 458. We noted that whenever defense counsel requested a voir dire on the prejudicial media coverage, the court did ask the jurors to acknowledge by a show of hands if they had seen or read any news accounts of the trial and that on each of these occasions it received no response. Id. at 151, 716 A. 2d 458. The negative response received on each occasion disclosed that jury exposure [to media coverage] did not occur and supported the court's discretionary decision that individual voir dire was unnecessary. Id. at 153, 716 A. 2d 458.
On February 29, 1996, before counsels' summations to the jury, the court placed on the record, in the presence of counsel, defendant, and the jury, that the sergeant-at-arms had informed him that some jurors had reported receiving a phone call at home from a newspaper reporter. The court stated: Sergeant Petro informs the Court that some of you have informed him that you received a telephone call of inquiry from a newspaper reporter. The Court has spoken with the reporter. You should know this, that the reporter who called you is new to courthouse coverage. She was unaware of the rules that govern. She apologizes for contacting you. The Court has been informed that no one discussed anything with the reporter. The reporter informed this Court that all of you were polite, that is, all of you who were contacted, and all of you declined to make any comment. Please understand that it was a simple misunderstanding on the reporter's part, and that it just grew out of a lack of experience. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court will discuss with you media contact, but for the moment I think we've covered what has occurred in the past day or so. The referenced meeting between the court and the reporter happened in camera and not on the record. There is no documentation of the reporter's name or employer. In fact, it is unclear whether counsel was present at the meeting between the court and the reporter. At the PCR hearing, defendant's counsel stated that, according to trial counsels' notes, neither Call nor Scully learned of the reporter's calls until the trial court spoke about it in the presence of the jury. When PCR counsel spoke with trial counsel privately before the PCR hearing, neither Call nor Scully recalled the reporter's contact with jurors. Michael Priarone, defendant's PCR counsel, submitted an affidavit stating that he tried to ascertain the reporter's identity, but could not. In addition to speaking with Call and Scully, Priarone interviewed Prosecutor Zarling, and contacted the Trentonian, Trenton Times, and Channel 12. No one was aware of a reporter who called jurors. There is no record on whether Priarone tried to contact the trial court. Priarone asked Investigator Dolan from the Public Defender's Office to interview Sergeant Petro. Petro told Dolan that he did not know who the reporter was, but did recall Audrey Bomse, a former staff attorney for the Public Defender, talking with jurors during trial. The record reveals that at the time of defendant's trial, Bomse had a suit pending against the Public Defender regarding her discharge from that office. Petro explained that Bomse used her former Public Defender ID card to enter the Mercer County Jail on the day she was seen talking with jurors. She was attempting to interview inmates regarding Harris's case; however, Sheriff's personnel discovered that Bomse was working in North Jersey as a legal aide and not the Public Defender at that time, and removed her from the prison. The State reports that in March 2002, an assistant prosecutor from Mercer County and a Sergeant Dispoto interviewed Petro about defendant's case. Reportedly, Petro indicated that he did not witness any ... communication between Bomse and the jurors during defendant's trial. In fact, Petro denied ever telling Investigator Dolan of such an incident. Defendant's PCR counsel moved for post-verdict interviews of jurors regarding their contact with the newspaper reporter and Bomse. Counsel requested that the PCR court hear related testimony from the trial court, Bomse, Petro, Dolan, Call, Scully, and the prosecutors. The PCR court denied both the request to hear testimony and to conduct post-verdict interviews of the jurors.
Defendant's motion for post-verdict juror interrogation is governed by Rule 1:16-1, which states: Except by leave of court granted on good cause shown, no attorney or party shall directly, or through any investigator or other person acting for the attorney interview, examine, or question any grand or petit juror with respect to any matter relating to the case. [(Emphasis added).] It is a high bar that defendant must hurdle to show good cause: Calling back jurors for interrogation after they have been discharged is an extraordinary procedure which should be invoked only upon a strong showing that a litigant may have been harmed by jury misconduct. State v. Athorn, 46 N.J. 247, 250, 216 A. 2d 369 (1966). We have reaffirmed repeatedly our adherence to that high bar. See, e.g., DiFrisco III, supra, 174 N.J. at 241, 804 A. 2d 507; Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 154, 716 A. 2d 458; State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 289-90, 548 A. 2d 939 (1988) (citing Athorn, supra, 46 N.J. at 247, 216 A. 2d 369). By allowing post-verdict interviews for good cause, a remedy is provided for extraordinary circumstances to prevent an injustice. However, the Rule also balances defendant's interests against other crucial concerns. The requirement that a defendant make such a strong showing is intended to prevent juror harassment and avoid chilling jury deliberations. DiFrisco III, supra, 174 N.J. at 241, 804 A. 2d 507 (citing Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 154, 716 A. 2d 458). Privacy and secrecy must attach to the process, not only to promote the finality of jury verdicts but also to aid the deliberative process itself, allowing each juror the freedom to discuss his or her thoughts. Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 154, 716 A. 2d 458. See also State v. Loftin, 287 N.J.Super. 76, 109, 670 A. 2d 557 (App.Div.1996) (stating that Rule protects free debate in cases to come, and prevent[s] the unsettling of verdicts after they have been recorded) (citations omitted). Thus, good cause for post-verdict interviews would exist if a defendant makes a strong showing that a juror inform[ed] (or misinform[ed]) his colleagues in the jury room of facts about the case, based on his personal knowledge, which facts were not introduced into evidence. Athorn, supra, 46 N.J. at 251-52, 216 A. 2d 369. But defendant in this case has not uncovered any evidence that jurors considered inappropriate information or that he was harmed by juror misconduct in any way. Id. at 250, 216 A. 2d 369. Similarly, bald accusations in Koedatich were held insufficient to generate a basis for juror interviews post-trial. Supra, 112 N.J. at 289, 548 A. 2d 939. In Koedatich, supra, the defendant submitted a newspaper article that quoted two deliberating jurors and one alternate juror, who indicated that jurors knew that the defendant was linked to another murder, although that information was not in evidence. 112 N.J. at 286, 548 A. 2d 939. We nonetheless denied Koedatich's motion to conduct post-verdict interviews because contents of a single newspaper article, indisputably hearsay, cannot be the sole basis for the extraordinary procedure of a post-trial jury interrogation. Id. at 289, 548 A. 2d 939; see also State v. Freeman, 223 N.J.Super. 92, 120-21, 538 A. 2d 371 (App.Div.1988) (holding that hearsay would clearly not provide good cause for post-verdict interrogation of jurors). In finding no evidence that the defendant may have been harmed, we noted that Koedatich never asserted that any juror impermissibly considered [other crimes evidence] in reaching a decision. Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 290, 548 A. 2d 939. The Court added that no member of the jury ever came forward to the court or counsel for the State or the defense and informed anyone of possible taint. Ibid. See also DiFrisco III, supra, 174 N.J. at 241, 804 A. 2d 507 (denying a motion for post-verdict interviews and highlighting that affidavit submitted by alternate juror did not suggest that jurors actually considered inappropriate evidence during deliberations). In the present matter, there is evidence that a reporter contacted some of the jurors, as reported to the State and to defendant and his counsel in open court in the presence of the jury members. The trial court's in-court statement signaled his satisfaction that extraneous information had not been conveyed by the reporter to those jurors who had been called in a contact of inquiry for comment. Indeed, no juror came forward during or after trial to say that he or she, or any other member of the jury, considered extraneous information provided by the reporter, or by Audrey Bomse for that matter. As was lacking in Koedatich, there is no affidavit indicating that jurors considered improper information. There is not even hearsay evidence of improper jury deliberations. Nor do we draw any negative inference from the jurors' reaction to the court's comments. The tenor of the court's comments in open court effectively informed the jurors that the reporter erred in contacting them and that the proceeding would continue. Implicitly reflected in the trial court's address to the jury was that the court was not aware of anything that jeopardized the fairness of defendant's trial. We note the jurors' lack of any response or apparent reaction upon hearing the court's remarks about the reporter's contact. We have no reason to think that they were concerned after hearing the trial court's statement. The trial court apparently saw no reason to dwell further on the subject. Thus, in that context, as hearsay cannot provide the necessary good cause under Rule 1:16-1, Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 289, 548 A. 2d 939, then, certainly, neither can no evidence at all. Calling back jurors for interrogation is an extraordinary step and a compelling reason to do so is necessary. Defendant has not carried his burden.
Defendant argues in this application that his conviction and sentence should be vacated because the trial court failed to interview the contacted jurors and to have an open hearing on the potential harm to his rights caused by the reporter's phone calls. He urges this Court to presume that he was prejudiced by the reporter phone calls, relying on Remmer v. United States, in which the United States Supreme Court stated: In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties. The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. [347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 451, 98 L.Ed. 654, 656 (1954).] Remmer created a prophylactic rule whose purpose was to protect the impartiality of the jury. It does not follow that any deviation from its suggested measures constitutes a violation of a defendant's right to an impartial jury. If that right remains protected, the alleged violation is harmless. Thus, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's statement about the steps a trial court should take to preserve a jury from polluting influences, the key here is to determine whether defendant was harmed by either the court's, or counsels', handling of the reporter contact issue at the time it arose. That is the ultimate question. We note, in that respect, that questions have arisen concerning the ongoing viability of the Remmer presumption. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1780, 123 L.Ed. 2d 508, 522 (1993) (There may be cases where an intrusion should be presumed prejudicial ..., but a presumption of prejudice as opposed to a specific analysis does not change the ultimate inquiry: Did the intrusion affect the jury's deliberations and thereby its verdict?); United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F. 3d 490, 496-97 (D.C.Cir.1996) (noting that the cases no longer treat the presumption as particularly forceful, and approving the Fourth Circuit's view that `while a presumption of prejudice attaches to an impermissible communication, the presumption is not one to be casually invoked' (quoting Stockton v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 852 F. 2d 740, 745 (4th Cir. 1988))). In our view, the trial court should have interrogated the reporter on the record in the presence of trial counsel. Although the trial court's handling of the juror contact by the reporter was not appropriate, it does not constitute grounds for reversal. It does make review more difficult. We have consistently required trial courts to protect both jurors and their deliberations from illegitimate influences that threaten to taint the verdict. Bey, supra, 112 N.J. at 75, 548 A. 2d 846. Trial courts must seek out and expose outside factors impinging upon the jury's freedom of action and its impartiality and essential integrity. In re Kozlov, 79 N.J. 232, 239, 398 A. 2d 882 (1979). Moreover, an adequate inquiry on the record is necessary for the purposes of appellate review. State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. 363, 488, 694 A. 2d 196 (App.Div.1997) (citations omitted). The context in which this juror-contact issue arose is very important. The court and counsel were highly sensitized about the possible contaminating effect of juror exposure to noxious trial publicity. The jurors who were subjected to extensive screening about newspaper contact, were keenly aware of the intense press interest. Indeed, the out-of-county jurors received extraordinary transportation to and from the courthouse to minimize the risk of exposure to media coverage of the trial. Regular showings of hands were taken of jurors each time counsel were concerned about a particularly egregious news account that had entered the public domain. The court's and counsels' concerns thus were made known to jurors through numerous interactions between the court and the jurors in this multiple-week-long trial, then in its second segment (penalty). Against that backdrop, we find it significant that it was the jurors who volunteered promptly the information about the reporter's phone calls. Several of them approached Sergeant Petro to report the contact. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that a juror would have told Sergeant Petro if the contact was more than simply thata contact, or inquiry, as the court phrased it, seeking unsuccessfully a juror comment. Although we do not approve the way the trial court handled the matter, we can make use of the measures the court did take in our assessment of whether defendant suffered any harm. The trial court spoke with the reporter in camera. On the record, before the jury and parties, the court did not convey any concern that juror taint occurred. The trial court described the reporter's contact merely as a telephone call of inquiry,  and no juror raised any further issue. Moreover, its characterization of the phone call as merely one of inquiry was echoed in the notes of the defense investigator, Tim Dolan, who wrote that the reporter called jurors to solicit comments. We are not moved by unsupported suggestions that jurors would have felt intimidated by the reporter or unprotected by the court, regardless of what the reporter said. Under these circumstances, we are satisfied that no harm befell the defendant as a result of the trial court's handling of this contact by a reporter new to the courtroom.
As mentioned, PCR counsel represented that trial counsel learned of the juror contact when the trial court directly addressed the jurors in court about the reporter's phone calls. Defendant argues that his trial counsel failed to provide reasonable assistance because they did not request a hearing once they learned of the phone calls. The PCR court did not allow PCR defense counsel to question Call and Scully on the circumstances surrounding the juror contact, and it did not permit testimony from other related witnesses, such as the trial judge, who presided over defendant's trials. Nevertheless, defendant's PCR counsel represented that he spoke with Call and Scully privately. Neither recalled that the trial court addressed in court the occurrence of the reporter's phone calls. Again, this claim of deficiency must be examined in context. We do not divorce our evaluation of counsels' performance from the overall conduct of this trial. Specifically, we are mindful of the atmosphere created by the tremendous amount of publicity focused on the trial's progress, as well as the overall efforts and strategies of defendant's trial counsel, including their vigilance in asking the court to protect the jury from the press coverage. Call and Scully were very aware of the threat to defendant's right to a fair trial posed by the media. They repeatedly asked the court to ask jurors whether they were exposed to any of it. Furthermore, Call and Scully were in the courtroom and witnessed the jurors' reactions to the court's statements about the phone calls. They would have been able to perceive whether any jurors appeared surprised or dismayed in any way by the court's statements about and characterizations of the phone calls, or its determination as to how to proceed based on the information it had disclosed. We often have interpreted a counsel's lack of objection to reflect a judgment that the complained-of error was not significant in the context, State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 333, 273 A. 2d 1 (1971); here, given trial counsels' efforts to keep out extraneous influences, we find reason to assume they did not find the reporter phone calls significant in the context. In light of all that counsel and the court had done to preserve defendant's right to a fair trial and an impartial jury, we will not presume prejudicial contact in hindsight. Viewed in its context at the time, it was but a harmless blemish on the broad landscape of this tumultuous proceeding that involved numerous, overt efforts by counsel and the court to protect the jury from extraneous influences. See Koskovich, supra, 168 N.J. at 540-41, 776 A. 2d 144. We conclude that defendant has not demonstrated that defense counsel's performance, in light of all the circumstances of the case, was outside the wide range of professionally competent performance because a more extensive proceeding was not requested on the juror contact issue.
For completeness, we address defendant's argument that Rule 1:16-1 is unconstitutional because, in requiring good cause for juror interviews, it leaves the exposure of prejudicial influence on jurors to chance. That is, defendant argues that his ability to show good cause is impermissibly made to depend on the sheer luck, that the wrongful event [during jury deliberations] somehow comes to light. State v. LaFera, 42 N.J. 97, 107, 199 A. 2d 630 (1964). Defendant also argues that by interpreting Rule 1:16-1 as setting a high burden for defendants, this Court has not given appropriate weight to a defendant's rights. He claims the rule violates his rights to free speech, to a fair and public trial, to conduct a defense, and to a reliable capital sentence. In 1996, this Court addressed similar constitutional attacks on Rule 1:16-1, and held that they were without merit. Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 382, 680 A. 2d 677 (citing Loftin, supra, 287 N.J.Super. at 108-09, 670 A. 2d 557). We adhere to our holding in Loftin, and add only that we already have discussed the sound reasons justifying the rule and its application to motions for post-verdict interrogations of jurors. See supra at 502-03, 859 A. 2d at 430.