Opinion ID: 790169
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness of the Rate

Text: 76 1. Fees in M.S.'s, M.L.'s, and A.R.'s cases. As we have noted, the district court credited the affidavits submitted on behalf of M.S., M.L., and A.R. in which special education lawyers represented that they charged fees of $300 to $350 per hour in the Southern District. M.S., 2002 WL 31556385, at  & n. 2, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22220, at - & n. 2. The district court also observed that in 1998, the Southern District awarded attorneys' fees at an hourly rate of $375 for representation at an IDEA hearing and subsequent litigation in federal court. M.S., 2002 WL 31556385, at , 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22220, at  (citing Mr. X v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 20 F.Supp.2d 561, 565 (S.D.N.Y.1998)). It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to credit evidence submitted by the plaintiffs instead of countervailing evidence submitted by the defendant. See I.B. ex rel. Z.B. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., 336 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir.2003) (per curiam). 77 The district court found unpersuasive the affidavits and arguments submitted by the DOE indicating that the prevailing rate should be $125 to $175 per hour. See M.S., 2002 WL 31556385, at , 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22220, at -. Similarly, the district court found irrelevant the two lawyers' declarations supporting the DOE's assertion that a lower hourly rate was appropriate. See M.S., 2002 WL 31556385, at  n. 4, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22220, at  n. 4. The court also found unpersuasive the DOE's records of the amounts that it previously paid to lawyers for representation at IDEA administrative hearings. See M.S., 2002 WL 31556385, at , 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22220, at -. The court noted that these figures did not accurately represent market figures because many of these payments involved settlements for amounts substantially less than the requested attorneys' fees. See id. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined, based on the evidence before it, that a range of $300 to $350 was reasonable for representation at the administrative hearings. 78 Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in awarding the LSC lawyers fees at the top end of this range based on their experience. 18 Even though much of the lawyers' careers was spent practicing in areas other than education law, their overall legal experience merited a higher hourly rate because most important legal skills are transferrable. I.B., 336 F.3d at 81. Indeed, we have observed that Mr. Hampden, who is one of the lawyers in the instant case, possesses considerable experience in education law despite having spent much of his career focusing on different kinds of law. Id. 79 2. Fees in S.W. and M.M.'s case. In S.W. and M.M.'s case, the district court awarded fees for representation during the administrative hearing at the rate of $350 per hour. S.W., 257 F.Supp.2d at 604-05. S.W. and M.M.'s child, N.W., attended school in Manhattan. Their administrative proceedings appear to have taken place in Brooklyn. In awarding them fees at an hourly rate of $350 for the administrative hearings, the district judge relied upon the decisions in M.S., 2002 WL 31556385, at  n. 2, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22220, at  n. 2, and Mr. X, 20 F.Supp.2d at 563-64, that such a rate was reasonable for services of this type in the Southern District. S.W., 257 F.Supp.2d at 604. The district court also relied on its decision in R.E. ex rel. Z.E. v. New York City Board of Education, District 2, No. 02 Civ. 1067, 2003 WL 42017, at , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58, at - (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2003), in which it concluded that $350 per hour in 1998 and $365 per hour in 1999 were reasonable hourly rates for Mayerson for representation in IDEA administrative hearings. S.W., 257 F.Supp.2d at 604-05. For the reasons stated above, the district judge in S.W. and M.M.'s case had the discretion to consider the Southern District as the relevant community in setting fees. Because we affirm the court's decision in M.S., we also find here that awarding fees at a rate of $350 was not an abuse of discretion. 80 The district court awarded S.W. and M.M. attorneys' fees at a rate of $375 per hour for their fee application in the district court. Id. at 607. The district court awarded a higher rate for the fee application because it found that attorney Mayerson's expertise, experience, and fees had increased from the time of the administrative hearings. Id. The DOE contends that the hourly rate for the fee dispute in the district court should, as a matter of law, be the same as the rate for representation for the earlier administrative representation because the fees application is ancillary to the administrative proceeding. Appellant's Br. at 38, S.W. ex rel. N.W. v. Bd of Educ. (Dist.Two). We disagree. An award of attorneys' fees under the lodestar [method] should be based on prevailing market rates, and current rates, rather than historical rates, should be applied in order to compensate for the delay in payment. LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 764 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A district court awarding attorneys' fees for both administrative proceedings and a subsequent fee dispute therefore need not determine the fees for the later action on the basis of the earlier administrative proceeding. 81