Opinion ID: 1058768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hayward's Plea in Bar

Text: Baker also contends the trial court erred in granting Hayward's plea in bar because it found Baker's action was barred by the five-year statute of repose in Code § 8.01-250. The statute provides, in relevant part: No action to recover for . . . bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property . . . shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, surveying, supervision of construction, or construction of such improvement to real property more than five years after the performance or furnishing of such services and construction. The limitation prescribed in this section shall not apply to the manufacturer or supplier of any equipment or machinery or other articles installed in a structure upon real property. . . . Baker contends that under the statute's plain language, Code § 8.01-250 is inapplicable to claims, such as his, against manufacturers of defectively-designed products that are installed in improvements to real property. Baker further contends the Court's extra-statutory `ordinary building materials' doctrine does not follow the text of Code § 8.01-250 and has caused considerable confusion. Consequently, Baker urges the Court to reconsider the ordinary building materials doctrine applied in Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum Co., 229 Va. 596, 331 S.E.2d 476 (1985), and later cases, which Baker asserts has expanded the provisions of Code § 8.01-250 to persons not expressly covered by the text of the statute. In the alternative, Baker argues that even under the Court's ordinary building materials doctrine, Code § 8.01-250 does not apply to Hayward. Baker asserts the Cape Henry Towers line of cases affords manufacturers the benefit of Code § 8.01-250 when the product at issue has been designed, not by the manufacturer itself, but by a member of the class of defendants identified in the statute. In so much as Hayward alone, without any input from the architect or engineer of the spa, designed the flat drain cover at issue here, Baker contends the ordinary building materials doctrine does not cover Hayward. In addition, Baker asserts the Cape Henry Towers line of cases affords manufacturers the benefit of Code § 8.01-250 when the product at issue is `incorporated into' the structure of an improvement to real property [as opposed to] merely [being] affixed to a structure. Baker distinguishes Hayward's drain cover[, which] was not a structural component of the spa; [instead,] the spa was a freestanding, completed structure before the drain cover was attached to its floor. Hayward responds that the trial court properly applied Code § 8.01-250 and this Court's decisions in Cape Henry Towers and its progeny, to determine the drain cover was an ordinary building material and thus covered by the statute of repose. It contends that Baker's limited interpretation of Code § 8.01-250 would require this Court to overrule or radically restrict two decades of this court's jurisprudence interpreting the statute. Furthermore, Hayward claims from Cape Henry Towers forward, the Court has consistently held that manufacturers of 'ordinary building materials' are part of the 'class of defendants' protected by the statute of repose. Hayward thus asserts the trial court did not err in finding the statute of repose applied to Hayward because the drain cover was a fungible component, mass-produced as a generic material to be included in swimming pools and spas and was therefore an ordinary building material. We agree with Hayward. A plea in bar is a defensive pleading that reduces the litigation to a single issue, which if proven, creates a bar to the plaintiff's right of recovery. Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Melendez, 260 Va. 578, 594, 537 S.E.2d 580, 590 (2000) (quoting Kroger Co. v. Appalachian Power Co., 244 Va. 560, 562, 422 S.E.2d 757, 758 (1992); Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 480, 468 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1996)). The party asserting the plea in bar bears the burden of proof. Id. When, as here, the trial court heard evidence ore tenus and the trial court decided the issue rather than submitting it to a jury, the trial court's findings are entitled to the weight accorded a jury verdict, and these findings should not be disturbed by an appellate court unless they are plainly wrong or without evidence to support them. Id. at 595, 537 S.E.2d at 590. Our jurisprudence applying Code § 8.01-250 traces back over two decades, from shortly after the General Assembly enacted the statute in its present form. The arguments now advanced by Baker as to the construction of Code § 8.01-250 were analyzed and rejected in Cape Henry Towers, 229 Va. at 600-03, 331 S.E.2d at 479-81. We have approved the ordinary building materials doctrine in three unanimous decisions since Cape Henry Towers: Grice v. Hungerford Mechanical Corp., 236 Va. 305, 374 S.E.2d 17 (1988); Luebbers v. Fort Wayne Plastics, Inc., 255 Va. 368, 498 S.E.2d 911 (1998); and Cooper Industries. Under the principle of stare decisis, we reject Baker's argument that the Court should not follow its well-settled approach to examining whether a particular material falls within the protections provided by Code § 8.01-250. The doctrine of stare decisis plays a significant role in the orderly administration of justice by assuring consistent, predictable, and balanced application of legal principles. And when a court of last resort has established a precedent, after full deliberation upon the issue by the court, the precedent will not be treated lightly or ignored, in the absence of flagrant error or mistake. Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 233 Va. 260, 265, 355 S.E.2d 579, 581 (1987). What we said nearly a century ago in Kelly v. Trehy, 133 Va. 160, 112 S.E. 757 (1922), is as valid now as when it was written: It is to the interest of the public that there should be stability in the laws by which they regulate their conduct. It may be that this [C]ourt, as at present constituted, would not, as an original proposition, have construed [the statute] as it was construed in the cases cited, but the construction of statutes ought not to vary with every change in the personnel of the appellate court. The construction was a fair and reasonable one, made after full deliberation by courts of very able judges, for whose opinion and judgment we entertain the highest respect. [T]his construction [has been] repeated three times by a unanimous court . . . and cannot now be repudiated by this [C]ourt. Id. at 169, 112 S.E. at 760. We see no flagrant error or mistake in the ordinary building materials doctrine and consider it part of the settled jurisprudence of the Commonwealth. The Cape Henry Towers line of cases recognizes that the statute applies to those who furnish ordinary building materials, which are incorporated into construction work outside the control of their manufacturers or suppliers. Luebbers, 255 Va. at 372, 498 S.E.2d at 913 (quoting Cape Henry Towers, 229 Va. at 602, 331 S.E.2d at 480). The equipment exclusion contained in the second paragraph of Code § 8.01-250 is distinguished from ordinary building materials on the ground that unlike ordinary building materials, . . . equipment [is] subject to close quality control at the factory and may be made subject to independent manufacturer's warranties, voidable if the equipment is not installed and used in strict compliance with the manufacturer's instructions. Id. (quoting Cape Henry Towers, 229 Va. at 602, 331 S.E.2d at 480). Based on these principles, we held in Cape Henry Towers that exterior wall panels used in the construction of condominium units were ordinary building materials and not equipment within the meaning of Code § 8.01-250. Id. And in Grice, we held that an electrical panel box and its component parts received from the manufacturer without instructions for their use and installation were ordinary building materials and not equipment within the meaning of the statute. 236 Va. at 308-09, 374 S.E.2d at 18-19. Most recently, we held in Luebbers, that steel panels, braces, and vinyl liners used in the construction of a swimming pool were ordinary building materials and not equipment under Code § 8.01-250. In Luebbers, we explained that the pre-fabricated structural component materials were clearly fungible. . . . [i]ndividually, these items served no function other than as generic materials to be included in the larger whole and are indistinguishable, in this context, from the wall panels we addressed in Cape Henry Towers.  255 Va. at 373, 498 S.E.2d at 913. The evidence before the trial court clearly supported the finding that the drain cover at issue is indistinguishable from the materials found to be ordinary building materials in our prior cases. Baker does not contest that the spa to which the drain is affixed was an improvement to real property under Code § 8.01-250. Hayward mass-produced the drain cover for installation into swimming pools and spas. It sold the drain cover primarily, if not exclusively, to distributors. Hayward had no role designing the swimming pools and spas into which the drain covers were installed, nor did it participate in the installation of the drain cover. The drain cover was as much incorporated into the spa as an improvement to real estate as were the wall covers in Cape Henry Towers and the pool liner in Luebbers. Indeed, the drain cover in the case at bar is indistinguishable from the fungible component parts of the swimming pool found to be ordinary building materials in Luebbers. Here, as in Cape Henry Towers, the material[ ] manufactured by [Hayward] and incorporated into the finished [spa is] clearly [a] fungible component of that [spa]. Individually, [the drain cover] served no function other than as generic material[ ] to be included in the larger whole and [is] indistinguishable, in this context, from the wall panels we addressed in Cape Henry Towers. As such, these materials were ordinary building materials and not equipment within the meaning of Code § 8.01-250. Luebbers, 255 Va. at 373, 498 S.E.2d at 913. Lastly, we reject Baker's claim that Code § 8.01-250 only applies to manufacturers when the product at issue has been designed, not by the manufacturer . . . but by an individual who perform[ed] or furnish[ed] the design, planning, surveying, supervision of construction, or construction of the improvement to real property. All of the products we have found to be ordinary building materials in the Cape Henry Towers line of cases were designed by someone other than the designer of the improvement into which those products were incorporated. Thus, Code § 8.01-250 applies to manufacturers even when the manufacturer, rather than a person identified in the statute, designs the ordinary building material in question. As a fungible component part of an improvement to real property, the drain cover is ordinary building material and is not excluded from the protection of Code § 8.01-250 as equipment or machinery or other articles. Hayward is thus entitled to the protection of the statute of repose. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in granting Hayward's plea in bar.