Opinion ID: 183244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Pretrial Motion and Letters

Text: 2 At the beginning of trial, the district court dismissed three counts of the indictment at the government’s request. 8 De La Cruz Suarez argues that the district court erred when it admitted at trial a copy of his motion for authorization to take foreign depositions and the six attached letters. De La Cruz Suarez argues that the motion and letters were highly prejudicial and should have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.3 Relevant evidence ordinarily is admissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Nonetheless, under Rule 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “The term ‘unfair prejudice,’ as to a criminal defendant, speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.” 3 Ordinarily, we review a district court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Suarez, 601 F.3d 1202, 1215 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3532 (2010). However, in the district court, De La Cruz Suarez objected to this evidence based on relevance and lack of foundation. De La Cruz Suarez did not raise a Rule 403 objection. Therefore, our review is only for plain error. See United States v. Walther, 867 F.2d 1334, 1343 (11th Cir. 1989) (reviewing for plain error whether admission of testimony was unduly prejudicial under Rule 403 where defendant objected at trial only on grounds of relevancy and hearsay). Under plain error review, we may reverse only if: (1) there was error, (2) that was plain, (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights and (4) seriously affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003). We add, however, that De La Cruz Suarez has not shown the district court abused its discretion under Rule 403 in any event. 9 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S. Ct. 644, 650 (1997). The question is “not whether the evidence itself is prejudicial, but rather whether its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Consequently, the balancing test prescribed by Rule 403 militates in favor of admissibility.” United States v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Here, the letters were highly probative of the rescue narrative that was the basis of De La Cruz Suarez’s defense and, to the extent there were inconsistencies, the credibility of the witnesses who recounted it in their live or videotaped testimony. Additionally, evidence of the falsity of the letter purportedly written by Fabelo further called into question the credibility of De La Cruz Suarez’s witnesses and tended to show that De La Cruz Suarez intended to bring aliens from Cuba into the United States. De La Cruz Suarez argues that the letters were prejudicial because they tended to undermine his defense.4 However, this type of prejudice is not unfair. As we have explained, “[t]he nature of the government’s evidence against a defendant is meant to be prejudicial.” Id.; see also United States v. King, 713 F.2d 4 De La Cruz Suarez also argues that the government’s presentation of Fabelo’s rebuttal testimony before he put on his case hindered his defense. We do not address this alleged error because it was invited by De La Cruz Suarez when his counsel told the district court that he had no objection to the government presenting Fabelo’s testimony out of turn and preferred that it be presented before he began his defense. See United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1327 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that a party cannot challenge an error or ruling invited by that party). 10 627, 631 (11th Cir. 1983) (“[I]n a criminal trial relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial; it is only when unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value that the rule permits exclusion.”). Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Accordingly, the district court did not err in admitting the motion and letters.