Opinion ID: 147683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rosario's Claim

Text: In defending the district court's ruling in their favor, the defendants point to the Supreme Court's assertion that 'simple teasing,' offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) do not amount to a hostile work environment. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82, 118 S.Ct. 998). They contend that most of the comments and actions highlighted by Rosario were intended to address the issue of appropriate office attire, and they emphasize that no witness stated that Arroyo ever made any sexual advances toward Rosario or said he was sexually interested in her. Even if Arroyo's alleged behaviors could reasonably be viewed as offhand comments or isolated episodes, some of which were motivated by legitimate workplace concerns, that view is certainly not the only one that could reasonably be drawn from the record. As described above, Rosario's allegation that she was subjected to constant harassment from Arroyo over an extended period of time was substantiated by the testimony of multiple witnesses at the EEO hearing, including Arroyo's immediate supervisor, Maldonado. The record contains evidence that, throughout a two-year period, Arroyo complained about Rosario's appearance on a daily basis, regularly drew the attention of her co-workers to her body and undergarments, shadowed her closely when she interacted with patients, challenged her decisions, mocked her when she spoke to him and, on occasion, described her as a street woman to other employees and criticized her to doctors and patients. The validity of the primary justification offered for Arroyo's frequent interactions with Rosarioher attirewas undermined by Maldonado's, Hernández's and Cournier's testimony that they considered Rosario's clothing to be appropriate and by Arroyo's own testimony that he found no problem with her clothing after March 2002. Moreover, the conduct began when Arroyo was Rosario's co-worker, rather than her supervisorwhen he presumably had no authority to challenge her manner of dress. Later, when he became her supervisor, he admitted that no dress code existed for civilian employees at the clinic, yet he continued to make an issue of her clothing. He initiated a counseling report in the fall of 2002 and was still questioning her attire the following spring. Although the sexually oriented jokes reported by Cournier may not have amounted to much on their own and were of uncertain frequencyindeed, Rosario did not cite them in the report attached to her administrative complaintthey nonetheless suggest a lack of respect by Arroyo for his female colleagues, lending weight to the inference that his behavior toward Rosario was inappropriately motivated by gender. That was not, however, the only evidence that his conduct was because of. . . sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Maldonado testified that Arroyo treated other females who worked at the clinic similarly, observing that [h]e'd just intimidate them. Maldonado named Private Carter in particular and stated that Arroyo drove her nuts. Arroyo's repeated conversations with others about Rosario's underwear and especially her panties (as reported by Hernández), as well as his references to her as a woman of the streets in conversations with Maldonado and other guys, provides additional support for a finding that his behavior toward Rosario was sex-based. The defendants' focus on the absence of evidence showing that Arroyo was attracted to Rosario is, as an initial matter, misdirected. [H]arrassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80, 118 S.Ct. 998; see also O'Rourke, 235 F.3d at 729. Moreover, while there is no direct evidence that Arroyo was sexually interested in Rosario, Hernández testified that Arroyo's treatment of Rosario prompted him to ask if Arroyo had a crush on her. Hernández said he explained to Arroyo that that's what it looks like. That it's so personal that you're just having a frustration about that woman. Although other cases may present more explicit evidence of sex-based motivation, see, e.g., Marrero, 304 F.3d at 19 (noting humiliating sexual remarks and innuendos, such as the redhead is really hot and the redhead is on fire); Hernandez-Loring v. Universidad Metropolitana, 233 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that the head of the academic committee considering plaintiff's promotion repeatedly asked her for dates and used suggestive language toward her), the record here contains ample circumstantial evidence for a jury to conclude that Arroyo's behavior was triggered by Rosario's gender. See EEOC v. NEA, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir.2005) ([T]here is no legal requirement that hostile acts be overtly sex- or gender-specific in content, whether marked by language, by sex or gender stereotypes, or by sexual overtures.). The fact that certain of the complained-of conduct appeared to have no sex-based connotation at allfor example, throwing her food away and removing items from her deskdoes not diminish the force of the evidence indicating gender-based animus. Indeed, as we have noted, such acts may be added to the mix in assessing a hostile work environment claim. O'Rourke, 235 F.3d at 730 (noting the reality that incidents of non-sexual conduct. . . can in context contribute to a hostile work environment); see also Marrero, 304 F.3d at 20. Nor is Rosario's claim defeated by evidence that male employees experienced some of the same mistreatment by Arroyo. The evidence does not show any male employee enduring Arroyo's criticism and offensive behaviors on virtually a daily basis for an extended period of time, as did Rosario. The record as a whole would thus permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Rosario was exposed to harassment that differed in both kind and degree from that imposed on male employees. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80, 118 S.Ct. 998 (`The critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.' (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 25, 114 S.Ct. 367 (Ginsburg, J., concurring))); NEA, Alaska, 422 F.3d at 845 ([T]he ultimate question under Oncale is whether [the supervisor]'s behavior affected women more adversely than it affected men.). We thus conclude that Rosario adduced sufficient evidence for a jury to find that she was subjected to conduct that was so severe or pervasive that it altered the terms or conditions of her employment. Pomales, 447 F.3d at 83. The behaviors she alleges go well beyond the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (quoting Barbara Lindemann & David D. Kadue, Sexual Harassment in Employment Law 175 (1992)). She presented evidence of longstanding harassment that interfered with her work on a daily basis and ultimately caused harm to her emotional stability and health. This case is thus a far cry from Lee-Crespo v. Schering-Plough Del Caribe, Inc., 354 F.3d 34, 46 (1st Cir.2003), cited by the defendants, where the complained of conduct was episodic, but not so frequent as to become pervasive; was never severe; . . . and significantly, was never . . . an impediment to [the plaintiff's] work performance. Rather, our observation in Marrero, where the harassment was more or less constant for some nineteen months, is apt here: [T]his case is easily distinguished from those in which courts have refused to find a hostile work environment based solely on sexual comments that are few and far between. 304 F.3d at 19. In sum, a jury reasonably could find that Rosario met her burden to show conduct that created a hostile work environment within the meaning of Title VII. Hence, we vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants and remand the case for further proceedings. [13] Costs are awarded to appellant. So ordered.