Opinion ID: 2625838
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: mrs. campbell's fraud claim

Text: ¶ 101 State Farm argues that there was no basis for the jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that State Farm had an intent to defraud Mrs. Campbell. When considering challenges to jury verdicts based on insufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most supportive of the verdict, and assume that the jury believed those aspects of the evidence which sustain its findings and judgment. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 467 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the verdict supports the verdict, we will affirm. Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995). ¶ 102 To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Crookston I, 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). Comparing the evidence State Farm marshals in its opening and reply briefs to the evidence the trial court summarizes in its order denying State Farm's motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial regarding Mrs. Campbell's fraud claim, it is clear that all State Farm has done in this appeal is to argue selected evidence favorable to its position. Id. at 800. As we held in Crookston I, [t]hat does not begin to meet the marshalling burden [State Farm] must carry. Id. State Farm's failure to meet its marshalling burden is grounds to reject [its] attack on the fraud finding. Id. ¶ 103 The entirety of State Farm's summary of the evidence is contained in one paragraph of its brief. By contrast, the jury, having listened to weeks of trial testimony, and having been properly instructed on the elements of fraud, found in favor of both plaintiffs. Furthermore, in its Order Denying State Farm's Motions for Judgment NOV and New Trial Regarding Fraud, the trial judge noted: The evidence at trial supporting each of the elements of fraud is extensive, and it is not practical to set forth all of the evidence in this Order. However, the following summary highlights some of the evidence. There follow in the Order fourteen paragraphs (four-and-a-half pages) of factual summary detailing the fraud evidence. The summary ends with this paragraph: n. Most of the misrepresentations and non-disclosures were also made to Inez Campbell, with the intent that Mrs. Campbell would rely thereon, which she did. Even where misrepresentations were made only to Mr. Campbell, it was apparent that they would be passed on to and relied upon by Mrs. Campbell. The evidence also established that Mrs. Campbell was present with her husband, Curtis, when Wendell Bennett misrepresented that there was no need to hire separate counsel. Mr. Campbell testified that he would gladly have hired personal counsel if he had known of a risk of an excess judgment. There was ample evidence that the Campbells were working together in making decisions in the case, that Mrs. Campbell had strong influence on Curtis Campbell's decisions with respect to the case, and that had she appreciated that there was a substantial likelihood of losing the case, she would have insisted that it be settled and she would have had a terrific bearing on Curtis' demanding that the case be settled. There is ample evidence that the misrepresentations made in Mrs. Campbells' presence induced her inaction, to her detriment. Accordingly, there is ample evidence to support a claim of fraud by Mrs. Campbell. ¶ 104 We conclude that State Farm has entirely failed to meet its burden of marshalling the evidence on its challenge to the finding of fraud against Mrs. Campbell, and we sustain the jury's verdict and the trial court's denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial. ¶ 105 The trial court limited the judgment on the fraud count to $911.25, which the Campbells paid in attorney fees after the original verdict and which was the total pecuniary loss suffered by plaintiffs. It relied in doing so on Turner v. Gen. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62 (Utah Ct. App.1992), cert. denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992), which held that a fraud claim may not support emotional distress damages because fraud is an economic and not a dignitary tort. Id. at 68. We disagree with the holding in Turner, as is reflected by our opinion in Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991), where we held that all damages awarded by the jury can be sustained upon the finding of fraud. Id. at 798. We note that there is scholarly and caselaw support for this view that was apparently not considered when Turner was decided. See Nelson v. Progressive Corp., 976 P.2d 859, 867-68 (Alaska 1999) (holding that emotional distress damages are permitted under fraud theory if severe damages); Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 219 Conn. 314, 593 A.2d 478, 484-85 (1991) ([W]e concur with those jurisdictions that allow the recovery of emotional damages that are the natural and proximate result of fraud.); Osbourne v. Capital City Mort. Corp., 667 A.2d 1321, 1328 (D.C.1995) (We hold that, upon proof of intentional misrepresentation, a plaintiff may recover `emotional damages that are the natural and proximate result' of the defendant's conduct. (citation omitted)); Andrew L. Merritt, Damages for Emotional Distress in Fraud Litigation: Dignitary Torts in a Commercial Society, 42 Vand. L.Rev. 1, 10-12, 23-32 (1989) ([A]s a general rule, emotional distress damages should be awarded in fraud actions.). ¶ 106 We therefore overturn Turner 's holding on the availability of general and emotional distress damages for fraud. In light of Crookston I and in view of the fact that we may sustain a trial court on a ground not relied on by the trial court, see Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Constr. Co., 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984) (citations omitted), we affirm not only the pecuniary damages assessed in this case, but also Mrs. Campbell's general damages, as well as the punitive damages, on the basis of the fraud verdict.