Opinion ID: 2782883
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cross-Examination About Crack Cocaine

Text: Defendant testified in his defense at trial. He admitted the existence of a prior felony conviction, but he did not state the nature of that conviction. When Defendant described his trips between Johnson City and Knoxville, defense counsel asked Defendant whether he saw “any cocaine base.” This exchange followed: Defendant: No, sir, not at all Counsel: Do you know what cocaine base is? Defendant: Yes, sir. On cross-examination, the United States inquired into Defendant’s prior felony conviction. Defense counsel objected, and the district court excused the jury. The court sustained the objection, determining that the nature of Defendant’s prior state conviction for possession with intent to sell cocaine posed a risk that the jury would draw an improper propensity inference. The court also addressed Defendant’s “somewhat problematic testimony” regarding his knowledge of crack cocaine. It held that the United States “would be allowed to ask some limited questions about the extent of [Defendant’s] knowledge” because Defendant “opened th[e] door.” When cross-examination resumed, the United States asked Defendant if he knew what crack cocaine looked like because he had previously handled and sold the drug. Defendant answered affirmatively. On appeal, Defendant argues that he “did not open any door” to further crossexamination about crack cocaine because his counsel “implicitly distinguished between base and powder cocaine.” Def.’s Br. 31. Defendant additionally claims that the basis for his knowledge about crack cocaine “never became relevant to anything but jurors’ prejudices,” converting prior conviction evidence into propensity evidence. Def.’s Br. 31. -14- No. 14-5430, United States v. Roberts “Cross-examination should not go beyond the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the witness's credibility.” Fed. R. Evid. 611(b). But the “subject matter of the direct examination” is “liberally construed to include all inferences and implications arising from such testimony.” United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215, 222 (6th Cir. 1990). The district court did not err in ruling that limited questions about “the extent of [Defendant’s] knowledge” about crack cocaine were within the permissible scope of crossexamination under Rule 611. The “elicited testimony [on cross-examination] . . . was reasonably related to the inferences drawn from . . . direct [examination] testimony.” Id. at 222. On direct examination, Defendant stated that he did not see crack cocaine at the Motel 6 and that he knew what crack cocaine was, which necessarily implied that he had seen crack cocaine at some point in his lifetime. The United States’ cross-examination about Defendant’s familiarity with crack cocaine was a logical extension of Defendant’s direct examination testimony. See id. (finding that cross-examination testimony implicating two co-defendants in a post office robbery did not exceed the scope of direct examination testimony that admitted general knowledge of a March 1987 post office robbery); see also United States v. Coleman, 453 F. App’x 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that “natural inferences” drawn from direct examination must be addressed to avoid juror confusion); United States v. Musick, 291 F. App’x 706, 728 (6th Cir. 2008) (determining that direct examination about a defendant’s juvenile detention opened the door to cross-examination about the search and evidence that precipitated the detention). Defendant also argues that the inquiry into whether he had previously sold crack was improper “propensity evidence” that was not probative of any issue “relevant to anything but jurors’ prejudices.” While Defendant is correct that the inquiry into his past sales of cocaine was not permissible under Rule 404(b), the error in this case was harmless. -15- No. 14-5430, United States v. Roberts The admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence is governed by a “three-step analysis.” United States v. Mack, 729 F.3d 594, 601 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Clay, 667 F.3d 689, 693 (6th Cir. 2012)). The first inquiry is whether there is sufficient evidence that the other act actually occurred. Id. Here, neither party disputes Defendant’s prior sales of crack. The second inquiry, which is a pure question of law, is “whether the evidence is probative of a material issue other than character.” Id. The third inquiry, reviewed for abuse of discretion, is “whether any unfair prejudice generated by the other act evidence is substantially outweighed by its probative value.” Id. We have insisted that the issue sought to be proven by a criminal defendant’s prior bad acts must be legally material before the evidence of other acts may be admitted under 404(b). United States v. Johnson, 27 F.3d 1186, 1191-92, 1194 (6th Cir. 1994). The government argues that the prior sales of crack cocaine were relevant to prove Defendant’s knowledge of its appearance and that establishing this knowledge could rebut a potential inference the jury might draw that he failed to recognize the substance as crack. This is not sufficient to create a legally material issue. Defendant stated outright that he knew what cocaine base looked like. Nothing in his testimony suggested that he failed to recognize the substance; rather, he testified that “only when the police found it” in their search of the hotel room did he see any crack during the group’s trip to Johnson City. Compare Johnson, 27 F.3d at 1194 (“Knowledge is a ‘material issue’ when the defendant claims he was unaware that he was committing a criminal act.”). Even setting aside the question of whether the evidence was probative of a material issue, it should have been excluded under the third inquiry, which coincides with Rule 403. The unfair prejudice of forcing Defendant to admit that he had previously committed the same crime he was now charged with unquestionably outweighed any residual probative value of clarifying for the -16- No. 14-5430, United States v. Roberts jury that Defendant truly knew, as he had already testified, what cocaine base looked like. “‘Probity in this context is not an absolute; its value must be determined with regard to the extent to which the [material issue] is established by other evidence, stipulation or inference.’” United States v. Jackson, 339 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1978)). Defendant’s own testimony had already established his knowledge of the drug’s appearance, and the issue was not otherwise significant in the case. The incremental probative value was negligible at best. On the other hand, the prosecution’s questioning invited the jury to conclude that Defendant had sold drugs before and therefore likely sold them here, precisely the inference forbidden by 404(b)(1). Johnson, 27 F.3d at 1193 (“When jurors hear that a defendant has on earlier occasions committed essentially the same crime as that for which he is one trial, the information unquestionably has a powerful and prejudicial impact.”). While the questioning should not have been allowed, we are convinced that the error was harmless in this case. The other evidence against Defendant, including the damning testimony by his co-conspirator and the evidence related to the discovery of crack in the hotel room, was so substantial as to be overwhelming.