Opinion ID: 2575997
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims relating to the admission of evidence

Text: Defendant challenges four evidentiary rulings by the trial court.
Defendant contends the trial court should not have overruled his hearsay objection to certain testimony by prosecution witness Doreen Westbrook. On direct examination, Westbrook testified without objection by the defense that she had lied to the police when she was first questioned in Colusa County a couple of days after her apprehension. In that interview, she said that a person named Billy Jinks had committed the murder. She explained she had lied because defendant had called her from the Colusa County jail and told her to say that Billy Jinks had taken her car and to lie to the police. On cross-examination, the defense sought to impeach Westbrook by, among other things, suggesting that her statements implicating defendant were the result of threats of prosecution, that she could not remember what she said when she made statements the night she was arrested because she was intoxicated on drugs at the time, and that her trial testimony was influenced by the immunity order. On redirect examination, the prosecution asked Westbrook to tell what she said to her friend Debbie Matthews and to Matthews's husband. When Westbrook started to say that she told them defendant had called her on the telephone, the defense objected on the ground of hearsay and the prosecution responded that the testimony was admissible as a prior consistent statement. The trial court overruled the objection. Westbrook then said she told Matthews and her husband that defendant had telephoned her and told her that she was to put it off on Billy Jinks, it would be better off for [her] health if [she] did. A prior consistent statement is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule if it is offered after admission into evidence of an inconsistent statement used to attack the witness's credibility, and the consistent statement was made before the inconsistent statement; or when there is an express or implied charge that the witness's testimony was recently fabricated or influenced by bias or improper motive, and the statement was made before the fabrication, bias, or improper motive. (Evid.Code, งง 791, 1236.) Defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing Westbrook's testimony on redirect examination because the defense did not imply in cross-examining Westbrook that her testimony about the telephone call was fabricated. We disagree. As the Attorney General points out, Evidence Code section 791 permits the admission of a prior consistent statement when there is a charge that the testimony given is fabricated or biased, not just when a particular statement at trial is challenged. (E.g., People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 210-211, 260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285; People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1208-1209, 249 Cal.Rptr. 71, 756 P.2d 795.) On cross-examination, defendant attacked Westbrook's credibility by suggesting that her testimony on direct examination implicating defendant was biased or fabricated because of threats of prosecution made by the police and the district attorney, because she was intoxicated, and because she was granted immunity. Accordingly, Westbrook's prior consistent statements were admissible to rehabilitate her and to support her credibility.
The trial court admitted testimony by Doreen Westbrook of what George Westbrook, her brother-in-law, told her before she went to the City of Colusa to be interviewed by the police. Defendant contends the testimony was irrelevant. We disagree. Three days after the police apprehended Doreen at a convenience store, the police in Colusa County interviewed her. At that time she gave the police two different statements regarding the murder. In the first of these statements, she identified one Billy Jinks as the killer. In the second statement, made that same day, she told the police that defendant was the killer. At trial, after testifying on direct examination by the prosecution about the telephone call she received from defendant telling her to identify Billy Jinks as the killer, Doreen was asked what her brother-in-law George Westbrook said to her before her interview by the police in Colusa County. The defense objected on the ground of hearsay. The prosecutor replied that the testimony was being offered to show Doreen's state of mind when she made the first statement to the police identifying Billy Jinks and not defendant as the killer. At defendant's request, the trial court instructed the jury that it could not consider the testimony for its truth but only to understand Doreen's conduct based on what she had been told by her brother-in-law George Westbrook. She then testified that after George stripped all of my jewelry off me, he told her, `If you don't ride the manslaughter you're not coming out of Colusa alive.' She said this scared her. Defendant contends this testimony was irrelevant and thus inadmissible. Because defendant did not object on this ground, he is now precluded from asserting this claim. (Evid.Code, ง 353.) In any event, the evidence was relevant. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact of consequence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness. (Evid.Code, งง 210, 780.) The testimony in question was relevant to establishing Doreen's credibility. It tended to show that her statement to the police identifying Billy Jinks as the killer instead of defendant was false and that her testimony at trial that defendant was the killer was true. The trial court therefore did not err in admitting the testimony.
Detective Clinton Troughton read from his police report a statement by Doreen Westbrook's brother, Robert Duclos (also known as Robert Lenore), as to defendant's explanation about his possession of the murder victim's credit cards. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing this testimony as a prior consistent statement, an exception to the hearsay rule. We reject defendant's challenge, for the reasons given below. After the killing, defendant and Doreen Westbrook drove from the Maxwell Rest Stop to Rancho Tehama, where they visited her brother (Robert Duclos) and his girlfriend (Rochelle Hendricks). During direct examination by the prosecution, Robert Duclos said that he saw defendant going through a wallet while they were in Rancho Tehama. Defendant told Duclos a guy pinched my sister in the butt and [defendant] beat him up for it and took his wallet. On cross-examination, Duclos testified that although he was not promised immunity, the prosecutor had shown him letters from the surrounding counties stating that the counties were not interested in prosecuting him. The defense re-called Detective Troughton as a witness. On cross-examination, the prosecution asked Troughton to read from his report as to what Duclos had told him about defendant's explanation to Duclos as to the source of the credit cards. When the defense objected, the prosecution pointed out that the defense had questioned Detective Troughton about the accuracy of the report and the statement by Duclos to Troughton. Defense counsel responded that Duclos had made different statements in his testimony. After the prosecution explained that its question to Detective Troughton sought to elicit a prior consistent statement by Duclos, the court overruled the defense objection. Troughton then read a statement by Duclos that, in referring to the victim, defendant said: Don't worry about him, he's not a problem. I hurt him so bad that an ambulance came and took him away. Defendant claims that the trial court's evidentiary ruling was wrong because the prosecution failed to show that Duclos made the statement at issue to Detective Troughton before making any inconsistent statement. As discussed above, a prior consistent statement is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule if offered after an express or implied charge of bias or fabrication, and the prior consistent statement was made before the bias or motive for fabrication arose. (Evid.Code, งง 791, 1236.) Here, the defense in its examination of Duclos asserted bias and a motive for fabrication by Duclos when it suggested that his testimony was influenced by promises from the counties surrounding Colusa County that they would not prosecute Duclos. Duclos's statement to Detective Troughton was consistent with his testimony at trial and was made before any promises not to prosecute him. Thus, the testimony was admissible as a prior consistent statement.
Ron Woods testified about a March 19, 1993, gunfight at his apartment that occurred a few days after defendant's arrest. Defendant claims that the testimony identifying the participants in the gunfight was irrelevant and prejudicial. The police arrested defendant and Ron Woods at the latter's apartment on Dawn Court in Sacramento. Woods, who was in custody when he testified, stated on direct examination by the prosecution that defendant and Doreen Westbrook brought the murder victim's credit cards and defendant's gun to Woods's apartment. Woods also testified that defendant told him he had shot someone and had taken the victim's credit cards. On cross-examination, the defense sought to impeach Woods by showing that he had received favorable treatment from the prosecution. The defense also elicited testimony by Woods that he was not charged with anything relating to the murder or arising out of his detention at his apartment, and defendant's arrest there, although drugs were found at his apartment and he had committed the offense of being a felon in possession of guns. On redirect examination by the prosecution, Woods testified that two men, John Hancock and Richard Kiyoka, were involved in the shoot-out at his apartment during which time they shot at him and he shot at them; neither Hancock nor Kiyoka reported the incident to the police. Defendant did not object to Woods's testimony identifying Hancock and Kiyoka as participants in the shoot-out. He thus has not preserved this issue for appeal. (Evid.Code, ง 353.) In any event, admission of this testimony by Woods did not prejudice defendant. The testimony concerning the shoot-out and the identity of the participants was not linked to defendant in any way. It arose in the context of an attempt by the defense to impeach Woods by showing that Woods received favorable treatment from the prosecution in connection with the shooting incident that was not related to the murder charge against defendant.