Opinion ID: 523609
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intent to Defraud Instruction

Text: 21 Defendant next argues that it was erroneous for the district court to refuse to instruct the jury that the defendant must intend to deprive the victim of money or property (Br. 13). However, this argument overlooks the following instruction that Judge Nordberg gave previously: 22 A scheme means some plan or course of action intended to deceive another and to deprive another of something of value by means of false pretenses, representation or promises. (Tr. 917). 23 Such an instruction was approved in United States v. Wellman, 830 F.2d 1453, 1463 (7th Cir.1987). In view of this instruction and the above-quoted three requisite instructions, it is futile for defendant to assert reversible error based on the result phrase in the following intent to defraud instruction: 24 The phrase intent to defraud means that the acts charged were done knowingly, with the intent to deceive the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, which resulted in depriving the Chicago Mercantile Exchange of money. (Tr. 917). 25 Taken together with the other instructions, the jury plainly was told that in order to convict defendant of mail fraud, it had to find that he intended to defraud CME of money. Thus in the context of the court's complete instructions as well as the evidence and arguments presented at trial, the jury was required to find that defendant intended to and did defraud CME in order to obtain money. The only plan charged in the indictment was that Wilkus schemed to obtain more than $350,000 from CME and converted the money to his personal use. This theory of the government's case never varied. Moreover, the evidence showed that defendant did act with an intent to defraud CME of money. 26 Considering the allegations of the indictment, the complete instructions, and the evidence, the jury must have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Wilkus acted with the requisite intent to defraud. If there was any error in the intent to defraud instruction, 5 it was certainly harmless under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), and Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 576-579, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3105-07, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986).