Opinion ID: 3134810
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of Defendant’s Sentence

Text: Defendant contends in the alternative that his sentences must run concurrently, rather than consecutively. While this case was pending on appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). This court allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the constitutionality of defendant’s consecutive sentence pursuant to section 5–8–4(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code) (730 ILCS 5/5–8–4(b) (West 1994)) in the wake of Apprendi . Before addressing its merits, the State contends that defendant has waived his argument by failing to raise it at trial, even though Apprendi was not decided until more than two years after defendant’s trial. The State contends that the recent vintage of Apprendi is irrelevant because “the cases which were the precursors to Apprendi  addressed the same general issue of enhanced penalties based upon facts presented at sentencing.” The State further contends that defendant should not be allowed to rely upon the rule that a party may challenge the constitutionality of a statute at any time because “the statute under which defendant was sentenced has not been declared unconstitutional on its face. Therefore, the void ab initio [ sic ] doctrine  is inapplicable. At worst, section 5–8–4(b) may be unconstitutional only as applied to a particular case, but the void ab initio [ sic ] doctrine has never been applied to such situations.” (Emphasis in original.) Defendant’s argument is not waived. First, a party may challenge the constitutionality of a statute at any time. See, e.g. , People v. Wright , 194 Ill. 2d 1 (2000). We reject the State’s argument, made without benefit of authority, that defendant falls outside of this rule because the statute “has not been declared unconstitutional on its face.” The State appears to contend that a party may only challenge a statute which has already been declared facially unconstitutional. We decline to so hold. Additional support for the conclusion that defendant has not waived the argument may be found in People v. Williams , 179 Ill. 2d 331 (1997). There, a defendant challenged on appeal a sentence imposed pursuant to a guilty plea. The State contended that defendant should be barred from challenging his sentence on appeal because he had not moved to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court. We found the argument was not waived, because the defendant was arguing that the court had imposed a sentence for which it lacked statutory authority, rather than merely that his sentence was excessive. We held that the rule requiring a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea before arguing that a sentence was excessive would not “bar defendant’s claim that his sentence was void because it does not conform with the statute.” Williams , 179 Ill. 2d at 333. See also People v. Wilson , 181 Ill. 2d 409, 413 (1998) (defendant’s argument that his sentence “violated statutory requirements” could be considered regardless of whether defendant had moved to withdraw his guilty plea). Accordingly, we will address the merits of defendant’s due process claim. Section 5–8–4(b) of the Code allows the trial court to impose consecutive sentences in certain cases. At the time of defendant’s offenses, it provided: “The court shall not impose a consecutive sentence except as provided for in subsection (a) unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the defendant, it is of the opinion that such a term is required to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant, the basis for which the court shall set forth in the record.” 730 ILCS 5/5–8–4(b) (West 1994). The parties agree that the trial court imposed consecutive sentences on defendant pursuant to section 5–8–4(b), based on a finding that consecutive sentences were required to protect the public from defendant. Defendant contends that his sentence is void because he was entitled, as a matter of due process, to have a jury, rather than the court, make this finding. He relies, as previously noted, on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Apprendi . In Apprendi , the Court considered three New Jersey statutes. One statute classified the possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose as a “second degree” offense. Another statute provided that a second degree offense was punishable by imprisonment for “between five years and 10 years.” A third statute, which the New Jersey Supreme Court labeled a “hate crime” statute, authorized an extended term of between 10 and 20 years’ imprisonment for a second degree offense if the trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that “[t]he defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.” The defendant was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment for possession of a firearm because the trial court found that defendant had violated the hate crime statute. The Court found that the “hate crime” statute violated due process. Specifically, the Court extended to state statutes its prior holding that in federal statutes “ ‘any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 476, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 446, 120 S. Ct. at 2355, quoting Jones v. United States , 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311, 326 n.6, 119 S. Ct. 1215, 1224 n.6 (1999). See also Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63 (“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”). The State contends that Apprendi does not apply to this case because no additional factual findings beyond the facts of defendant’s convictions were required for defendant’s sentences to be made consecutive. The State relies on section 9–3.1 of the Criminal Code, which defines the offense of concealment of homicidal death, the second of the two offenses of which defendant was convicted. Subsection (b) of that statute provides: “Nothing in this Section prevents the defendant from also being charged with and tried for the first degree murder, second degree murder or involuntary manslaughter of the person whose death is concealed. If a person convicted under this Section is also convicted of first degree murder, second degree murder or involuntary manslaughter, the penalty under this Section shall be imposed separately and in addition to the penalty for first degree murder, second degree murder or involuntary manslaughter.” 720 ILCS 5/9–3.1(b) (West 1994). The State contends that the last sentence of this section requires the trial court to impose consecutive sentences when a defendant is convicted of both concealment of a homicidal death and first degree murder, second degree murder, or involuntary manslaughter. To construe the statute otherwise, the State contends, would render the phrase “in addition to” mere surplusage. Thus, the State argues, there is no Apprendi issue in this case because the trial court did not have to make any factual findings in order for the sentences to be consecutive. We disagree. The State’s position has been unanimously rejected by our appellate court, which has held that the “separately and in addition to” language is simply intended to clarify that a conviction for concealment of a homicidal death does not merge into a murder conviction. See, e.g. , People v. Dover , 312 Ill. App. 3d 790 (2000); People v. Gil , 125 Ill. App. 3d 892 (1984); People v. Schlemm , 82 Ill. App. 3d 639 (1980). We agree with this construction. As these cases have noted, section 5–8–4 of the Code of Corrections governs whether sentences are to be served consecutively. Moreover, section 5–8–4 shows that the legislature uses the word “consecutive,” rather than the more ambiguous phrase “in addition to,” when it intends that the sentences be served consecutively. Although this construction can be understood as rendering the “in addition to” language redundant, we note that the legislature has twice amended section 9–3.1 since the decisions in Gil and Schlemm (see Pub. Act 84–1308, art. III, §23, eff. August 25, 1986; Pub. Act 84–1450, §2, eff. July 1, 1987), but has left intact the “separately and in addition to” language. “[T]his court presumes that the legislature knew of the prior interpretation placed on its language by judicial decision,” and “[w]here terms used in a statute have acquired a settled meaning through judicial construction and are retained in subsequent amendments, they are to be understood as previously interpreted by the courts unless the legislature clearly indicates a contrary intention.” Carver v. Bond/Fayette/ Effingham Regional Board of School Trustees , 146 Ill. 2d 347, 353 (1992). We find that section 9–3.1 does not mandate consecutive sentences. However, we affirm defendant’s sentence in this case. Our appellate court is sharply divided on the question of whether Apprendi concerns are raised by consecutive sentencing, where the sentences for the individual crimes remain within the statutory range. Compare People v. Lucas , No. 1–99–2623, slip op. at 6-7 (March 21, 2001); People v. Hayes , 319 Ill. App. 3d 810, 820 (2001); People v. Maiden , 318 Ill. App. 3d 545, 550 (2001); People v. Primm , 319 Ill. App. 3d 411, 428 (2000); People v. Sutherland , 317 Ill. App. 3d 1117, 1131 (2000) (all finding section 5–8–4(a) of the Code constitutional and affirming defendants’ consecutive sentences thereunder), with People v. Mason , 318 Ill. App. 3d 314, 320 (2000); People v. Harden , 318 Ill. App. 3d 425, 428 (2000); People v. Waldrup , 317 Ill. App. 3d 288, 300 (2000); People v. Carney , 317 Ill. App. 3d 806, 813 (2000); People v. Clifton , Nos. 1–98–2126, 1–98–2384 cons., slip op. at 55 (September 29, 2000) (all finding section 5–8–4(a) unconstitutional and vacating consecutive nature of defendants’ sentences thereunder). Those decisions which have struck down section 5–8–4(a) of the Code have focused on the fact that consecutive sentencing increases the actual amount of time a defendant will spend in jail, and reasoned that Apprendi commands that any fact which in reality increases the amount of time spent in jail should be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority of the decisions upholding the statute have reasoned that Apprendi concerns are not raised unless “the [maximum] penalty for a crime ” (emphasis added) ( Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63) is increased, and since consecutive sentences remain discrete sentences, none of the penalties for any individual crime has been increased. Initially, we note that Apprendi explicitly disclaimed any holding regarding consecutive sentencing. There the State noted that defendant had pled guilty to two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm, as well as a single count of unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb. The State argued that defendant could have been given consecutive sentences on the two convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm, and thus received the same 12-year term of imprisonment as he in fact received on the single unlawful possession count under the hate crime statute. The Court refused to address this argument, stating: “The constitutional question, however, is whether the 12-year sentence imposed on count 18 [the unlawful possession of a firearm count which was found to be a hate crime] was permissible, given that it was above the 10-year maximum for the offense charged in that count. The finding is legally significant because it increased–indeed, it doubled–the maximum range within which the judge could exercise his discretion, converting what otherwise was a maximum 10-year sentence on that count into a minimum sentence. The sentences on [the other two convictions] have no more relevance to our disposition than the dismissal of [several other charges against the defendant].” Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 474, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 445, 120 S. Ct. at 2354. Thus, it is clear that the decisions holding that consecutive sentencing triggers Apprendi concerns are extending that case beyond its facts, as indeed the seminal case in that line acknowledged. See Clifton , Nos. 1–98–2126, 1–98–2384 cons., slip op. at 51-52 (rehearing pending). The decisions of our appellate court finding that consecutive sentencing does not raise Apprendi concerns are supported by the only reported United States circuit court decision on this topic. See United States v. Cruz , ___ F.3d ___, ___ (2d Cir. February 13, 2001) (“[t]he district court’s use of section 5G1.2(d) [of the United States Sentencing Guidelines to sentence defendant consecutively] did not result in a sentence on any one count above the maximum available on that count  and so did not violate Apprendi ”). Accord United States v. Moreno , No. S3 94 Cr. 0165 (S.D.N.Y December 14, 2000) (holding that Apprendi did not prohibit consecutive sentencing even though court, not jury, made finding prerequisite to consecutive sentencing regarding quantity of drugs involved). See also United States v. Henderson , 105 F. Supp. 2d 523, 536-37 (S.D.W.V. 2000). Several other federal circuits have implicitly reached the same conclusion by finding no plain error in sentencing even though individual sentences exceeded the maximum allowable sentence based on the facts found by the jury–in violation of Apprendi –because on remand the sentences could be made consecutive to reach the same total sentence. See United States v. Parolin , 239 F.3d 922, 930 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Sturgis , 238 F.3d 956, 960 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Page , 232 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2000). We find that Apprendi concerns are not implicated by consecutive sentencing. It is a settled rule in this state that sentences which run consecutively to each other are not transmuted thereby into a single sentence. People v. Jones , 168 Ill. 2d 367, 371-72 (1995); People v. Kilpatrick , 167 Ill. 2d 439, 446-47 (1995); Thomas v. Greer , 143 Ill. 2d 271, 278-79 (1991). (footnote: 2) Because consecutive sentences remain discrete, a determination that sentences are to be served consecutively cannot run afoul of Apprendi , which only addresses sentences for individual crimes. Accordingly, section 5–8–4(b) of the Code passes constitutional muster. We recognize that Apprendi contains isolated statements which on their face might appear to support the conclusion that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt each and every fact which might have any real-world impact on the length of time the defendant might spend in prison. For instance, the Court stated: “If a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by statute when an offense is committed under certain circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant should not–at the moment the State is put to proof of those circumstances–be deprived of protections that have, until that point, unquestionably attached.” Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 484, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 451, 120 S. Ct. at 2359. See also Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 494, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 457, 120 S. Ct. at 2365 (“the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect–does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?”). However, these statements cannot be taken out of context. The issue in Apprendi was “whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added.) Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 469, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 442, 120 S. Ct. at 2351. See also Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63 (“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt” (emphasis added)). The Court specifically stated that consecutive sentencing was “not relevant” to the “narrow issue” under consideration. Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 474, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 445, 120 S. Ct. at 2354. We are bound to follow the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. People v. Gersch , 135 Ill. 2d 384, 398 (1990); People v. Loftus , 400 Ill. 432, 436 (1948). See also Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee , 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 4 L. Ed. 97 (1816). But we are not bound to extend the decisions of the Court to arenas which it did not purport to address, which indeed it specifically disavowed addressing, in order to find unconstitutional a law of this state. This is especially true where, as here, to do so would require us to overrule settled law in this state. See Jones , 168 Ill. 2d at 371-72; Kilpatrick , 167 Ill. 2d at 446-47; Thomas , 143 Ill. 2d at 278-79 (sentences retain their discrete character even if they are to be served consecutively). Each of defendant’s individual sentences was within the statutory range established by the legislature. This is all that Apprendi requires.