Opinion ID: 1678139
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: evidence of the victim's character

Text: At the hearing on the motion for postconviction relief, counsel testified that in preparing for trial, their theory of the case was that the victim was attempting to sexually assault Escamilla and that Escamilla had stabbed the victim in self-defense. Lead counsel testified that they were looking into the victim's history of molesting children. A law clerk was assigned to interview witnesses, and she spoke with the principal of Hartley Elementary School and to a number of children who had some knowledge of the victim. Counsel learned that there had been complaints about the victim over the years and that children at the school had been told to avoid his house. Some of the children stated that the victim attempted to entice children into his home. This was consistent with counsel's inspection of the crime scene, where they found that the victim had a number of toys. Counsel stated that they had received phone calls from several different people who volunteered information in regard to the victim. One of the callers told them that the victim gave candy and his name and address to children who rode the Glad Tidings bus and that he was barred from the bus. The caller gave counsel the name of a nun at Sacred Heart School who told children not to go near the man's house. She also gave them the name of a pastor, the Glad Tidings busdriver, teachers, and others who evidently had knowledge of the victim's past behavior. Another caller told them that the victim was an old man who was always luring children into his house and once he got them in his house, he tried to fool around with them. Counsel testified that his file did not indicate that any further investigation was undertaken because of these calls. On August 14, 1986, Escamilla reported to his counsel that he heard that the victim had a homosexual lover who had been at the victim's residence the morning of the killing. Lead counsel testified that he did not recall doing any followup on that report. In March 1987, Escamilla also told his counsel that he had received information that the victim's son was in the regional center and that the son had been the victim of a sexual assault by his father. Counsel stated that it was likely he had not pursued that allegation. Counsel had also received a police report from the county attorney's office which dealt with the victim's inviting young girls into his home and lying on the bed with them. Lead counsel testified that he had hoped to find that the victim had criminal convictions. He stated: There weren't any of those. I mentioned the one incident. It was like we had these leads but they weren't taking us as far as to the point where I thought there was anything we could use as similar acts-type of evidence with respect to the victim. I mean, I thought that his behavior was somewhat consistent with our defense but we were struggling with how to get it into evidence. When lead counsel was asked if he had failed to inform his client about this area of investigation, he responded: I'm trying to recall specifically. I guess specifically I can't recall any conversations that we had about it. I was thinking that we had talked about it but I can't specifically recall that we had. In State v. Domingus, 234 Neb. 267, 450 N.W.2d 668 (1990), this court held that in order to secure postconviction relief on the basis of ineffective counsel, a defendant must show that (1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) such deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A plea of guilty will be found to be freely and voluntarily entered upon the advice of counsel if that advice is within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. State v. Domingus, supra . In any effectiveness of counsel case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. State v. Williams, 234 Neb. 890, 453 N.W.2d 399 (1990); State v. Domingus, supra . In order to satisfy the prejudice requirement in the context of a plea, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pled and would have insisted upon going to trial. Id. The issue as to the failure to investigate the allegations of homosexuality on the part of the victim as argued by Escamilla is two-pronged in nature. On the one hand is the argument that such evidence would have supported Escamilla's claim of self-defense. The other argument, and the one on which the trial court seemed more solidly to rely, was that evidence of the victim's aggressive sexual advances toward young people would have been highly relevant to Escamilla's state of mind, and while not providing a defense absolving him of all criminal culpability, such evidence certainly could have persuaded a jury to convict him of a lesser degree of murder. We must then address the probable admissibility of this type of evidence. We have confronted this issue only obliquely in State v. Lowe, 244 Neb. 173, 505 N.W.2d 662 (1993). In that case, the defendant claimed that the murder victim had assaulted him while he, the defendant, was asleep and that in self-defense, the defendant had struck the man with a large flashlight. Although we stated that [e]vidence of a murder victim's homosexuality may be admissible as corroborative of a defendant's claim of self-defense from a homosexual assault, provided such evidence as tendered is probative of that defense, id., 244 Neb. at 183, 505 N.W.2d at 669, we found that the evidence tendered fell far short of being probative of that issue. The court in Williamson v. State, 692 P.2d 965 (Alaska App.1984), held that testimony of a proffered witness who would testify as to a homosexual experience he had with the victim should have been admitted, as it would tend to corroborate the defendant's claim that he, the defendant, was acting in self-defense. In the case at bar, the only evidence of the assault resulting in the victim's death came from Escamilla himself in his statement to the police officer (Escamilla did not testify during the postconviction proceedings in the district court). In his description of the events which resulted in the victim's death, there was nothing that suggested Escamilla was trying to ward off an aggressive homosexual assault. Without any evidence of self-defense coming from Escamilla or someone or something in his behalf, the fact, if such be the case, of the victim's homosexuality would not be material and therefore not be relevant. Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. State v. Lowe, supra . Materiality looks to the relation between the propositions for which the evidence is offered and the issues in the case. Id. A victim's homosexuality, without some evidence that the defendant was resisting a homosexual assault, is not material and therefore not relevant. In State v. Escamilla, 195 Neb. 558, 239 N.W.2d 270 (1976), this court held that although in a homicide case a defendant may show the dangerous and turbulent character of the victim, this may be done only after laying a foundation by evidence tending to show self-defense. See, State v. Jacoby, 260 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 1977); Dupree v. State, 615 So.2d 713 (Fla.App.1993). No such evidence appears in the record. Would such evidence have been admissible on the issue of the absence of premeditation on Escamilla's part so as possibly to persuade the jury to convict him of a lesser degree of murder, as found by the trial court in its order? Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-404 (Reissue 1989) provides: (1) Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he or she acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: .... (b) Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor.... .... (2) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he or she acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Several cases are cited in State v. Lowe, supra , of which some support and some oppose the introduction of evidence of a victim's homosexuality in corroboration of a defendant's claim of self-defense. It could be supposed that one should be permitted to advance the same theory in support of the presence or absence of premeditation. Escamilla cites us to Kagebein v. State, 254 Ark. 904, 496 S.W.2d 435 (1973) (Fogleman, J., dissenting). In that case, the defendant, Kagebein, was charged with first degree murder. He attempted to call witnesses to testify as to prior homosexual acts by the victim, which attempts were rebuffed by the trial court. The defense which Kagebein tried to establish is revealed by the following statements from the court's opinion: The appellant's defense, even though he was being tried as an accessory before-the-fact to a charge of first degree murder, was that the death of Wampler came about not as a part of a pre-arranged plan to rob and kill him, as argued by the State, but out of resistance to his homosexual advances. Appellant does not argue that the evidence of homosexuality justifies homicide but does insist that he should have been permitted to introduce evidence tending to corroborate the claim that homosexual activities preceded the killing. He urges this was important at least to the jury's consideration of the degree of homicide committed. Id., 254 Ark. at 909, 496 N.W.2d at 439. The judgment of conviction in Kagebein was reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial specifically because of a violation of the defendant's right to remain silent; however, the court considered the claimed error as to evidence of homosexuality because, in the words of the opinion, [s]ome of the appellant's other points for reversal should be mentioned, for they may arise upon a retrial. Id. The Arkansas court then went on to address the question before us, and it cites with favor the following from Evans v. United States, 277 F.2d 354 (D.C.Cir.1960): `We think that, in the circumstances of this case, almost any evidence showing what kind of man the decedent was would be highly relevant in helping the jury to determine whether appellant's story of a sexual assault was truthful, and would therefore serve the interests of justice.... `Finally, but equally important, even if it convincingly appeared that the excluded testimony could not induce the jury to acquit, evidence suggesting that he [the victim] was the aggressor might well have induced the jury to convict appellant for the lesser included offense of manslaughter, instead of second-degree murder.' Kagebein v. State, 254 Ark. at 910-11, 496 S.W.2d at 440. In a separate opinion in Parisie v. Greer, 705 F.2d 882, 893 (7th Cir.1983) (en banc), cert. denied 464 U.S. 950, 104 S.Ct. 366, 78 L.Ed.2d 326, Judge Richard Posner wrote: Parisie wants the evidence [testimony of three witnesses] admitted in order to bolster his defense of homosexual panic, which is the idea that a latent homosexualand manifest homophobecan be so upset by a homosexual's advances to him that he becomes temporarily insane, in which state he may kill the homosexual. It is no business of mine whether the State of Illinois chooses to recognize a defense of homosexual panic as a subcategory of the insanity defense, but I cannot believe that the Constitution of the United States requires a state to allow defense counsel in a murder case to defame the murderer's victim as a homosexual without satisfying the normal prerequisite to admitting evidence of reputationthat the evidence `be based upon contact with the subject's neighbors and associates rather than upon the personal opinion of the witness. ' (Emphasis supplied.) See State v. Lowe, 244 Neb. 173, 505 N.W.2d 662 (1993). Nebraska does not specifically allow the defense of homosexual panic, and there is no evidence in the record to support a finding that such a diagnosis was or could be made. Expressing a view of some judges comprising the minority of the Parisie en banc court, Judge Luther Swygert wrote: There is no consensus even in the medical and psychiatric communities whether homosexuality is a character trait (which would generally be provable under Illinois law only by evidence of reputation ...) or a medical condition (which would surely be directly provable by evidence of symptoms). In either case, however, evidence of Jackson's homosexuality would be relevant under the Illinois standard of relevancy... (relevant evidence is that which tend[s] to make the proposition at issue more or less probable) ... because his homosexuality made it likelier that he made a homosexual advance toward Parisie. Parisie v. Greer, 705 F.2d at 900-01. Again, Judge Swygert seems to be addressing a claim of self-defense. In Evans v. United States, 277 F.2d 354 (D.C.Cir.1960), the appellant's conviction of second degree murder was reversed because the trial court refused the proffer of testimony by the deceased's wife that the deceased was mentally ill and that when he was drinking, he would become psychotic and would act in a belligerent manner. This evidence was intended to bolster the appellant's claim that she was assaulted by the victim, who shouted obscenities at her, grabbed her, and ripped some of her clothing. In addition to holding that the rejection of the proffered evidence was prejudicial error, the court went on to say: Finally, but equally important, even if it convincingly appeared that the excluded testimony could not induce the jury to acquit, evidence suggesting that he was the aggressor might well have induced the jury to convict appellant for the lesser included offense of manslaughter, instead of second-degree murder. Id. at 356. In the dissenting opinion, Judge Charles Fahy stated: The defense offered was the need to kill deceased in resisting a sexual assault. In my view the proffered testimony was too tenuous in corroborative relationship to this particular defense to justify reversal because of rejection of the proffer, especially when all the evidence as to the manner in which the homicide occurred is considered. It follows from this view that I attach no significance to the circumstance that the jury could convict of manslaughter. Id. Based on the foregoing authorities and logic, we hold that where a defendant claims that the act of killing a victim was the result of a violent and overriding reaction to a homosexual approach by the victim, evidence of the victim's prior similar homosexual activities may be admissible under certain circumstances as corroborative of the defendant's claim that there was a lack of deliberation or premeditated malice on his or her part necessary to convict of first degree murder. In this case, with two exceptions, the only evidence suggested to exist is that the victim was a pedophile. We fail to see any relevancy between pedophilic behavior and Escamilla's claim that he received a homosexual proposal. There was no scientific testimony offered by Escamilla which supported his claim of homosexual panic. In an unsuccessful first attempt at postconviction relief pro se, Escamilla appeared before the trial court on September 21, 1990, and during a colloquy with the court in answering a question by the court, Escamilla said: [T]o me, I told him [the legal aid assistant] if the lawyer was insufficient in not relating to me that the deceased had a record for pedophilic behavior which if I would have known, I wouldn't have pled guilty, and I told him that, and I stayed on that, and he didn't write that down. However, there is no sworn testimony in the record to this effect, by Escamilla or anyone on his behalf, and his petition for postconviction relief makes no allegation that had he known of the victim's background, he would not have pled guilty, thereby making his plea neither voluntary nor informed. It is true that when a defendant pleads guilty on advice of counsel, the defendant's attorney has the duty to advise the defendant of the available options and possible consequences. Hawkman v. Parratt, 661 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir.1981); People v. Riley, 187 Colo. 262, 529 P.2d 1312 (1975); People v. Russell, 47 Mich.App. 320, 209 N.W.2d 476 (1973). We consider the admitted knowledge of Escamilla of the alleged character of the victim and the information along that line possessed by his counsel, but also recognize that counsel were primarily concerned with avoiding the death penalty for their client, which was a real possibility considering Escamilla's confession and the brutal facts of this killing. Under the facts of the case, there is no reasonable probability that a jury would not have returned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder. Counsel's decision to proceed with dispatch to pursue the result they sought cannot be said to have been unreasonable, applying the heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgment. See State v. Domingus, 234 Neb. 267, 450 N.W.2d 668 (1990). We hold that the findings of the district court in this regard were clearly erroneous. However, Escamilla has raised two other issues. He first claims that the trial court failed to find that counsel's neglect to file a motion to suppress his statement given to the police was erroneous so as to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. He also claims that the in-court identification of Escamilla was unduly suggestive and that his counsel were deficient in convincing him to plead guilty without attempting to suppress the suggestive identification.