Opinion ID: 791867
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The CERCLA Cost Recovery and Contribution Framework

Text: 8 CERCLA is a comprehensive federal law governing the remediation of sites contaminated with pollutants. Two of its primary goals include encourag[ing] the timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites, and plac[ing] the cost of that [cleanup] on those responsible for creating or maintaining the hazardous condition. Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 935-36 (8th Cir.1995) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted); see also Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 n. 13, 114 S.Ct. 1960, 128 L.Ed.2d 797 (1994) (`CERCLA is designed to encourage private parties to assume the financial responsibility of cleanup by allowing them to seek recovery from others.') (quoting FMC Corp. v. Aero Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 842, 847 (1993)); H.R.Rep. No. 96-1016(I), at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120 (stating that CERCLA's purposes include furthering the recovery of costs for cleanup of hazardous waste sites from persons liable therefor and inducing those persons voluntarily to pursue appropriate environmental response actions). 9 In order to achieve these goals, CERCLA, in three separate and different provisions, authorizes parties to recoup money spent to clean up and prevent future pollution at contaminated sites or to reimburse others for cleanup and prevention at contaminated sites: (1) section 107(a), which permits the general recovery of cleanup and prevention costs; (2) section 113(f)(1), which creates a contribution right for parties liable or potentially liable under CERCLA; and (3) section 113(f)(3)(B), which creates a contribution right for parties that have resolved their liability by settlement. 10 Section 107(a) states that various persons, including the owner or operator of a facility, may be held liable for, among other things, all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State ... not inconsistent with the national contingency plan. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). Pursuant to this provision, the government routinely brings suits to obtain reimbursement for the costs—also known as response costs—of cleaning up and preventing future contamination at a site. See, e.g., United States v. LTV Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 999 (2d Cir.1991). In addition to permitting these suits by the federal government and the states, section 107(a) also permits private parties to pursue such cost recovery actions, as it makes specified entities liable for any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added); see also Key Tronic Corp., 511 U.S. at 818, 114 S.Ct. 1960 (noting that section 107(a) unquestionably provides a cause of action for private parties to seek recovery of cleanup costs); Prisco v. A & D Carting Corp., 168 F.3d 593, 602 (2d Cir.1999) (stating that section 107(a) provides a private right of action for the recovery of [response] costs in certain circumstances). 11 Section 113(f)(1) expressly creates a contribution right for parties liable or potentially liable under CERCLA. It states that [a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under [section 107(a)], during or following any civil action under [section 106] or under [section 107(a)]. 5 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). In Cooper Industries, the Supreme Court considered whether a private party who has not been sued under section 106 or section 107(a) may nevertheless obtain contribution under section 113(f)(1) from other liable parties. See Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 125 S.Ct. 577, 580, 160 L.Ed.2d 548 (2004). The Court concluded, as we will discuss further below, that the natural meaning of section 113(f)(1) is that contribution may only be sought subject to the specified conditions, namely, `during or following' a specified civil action. Cooper Industries, 125 S.Ct. at 583 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1)). Consequently, the Court held that section 113(f)(1) does not support the suit of a party that has not been the subject of judicial or administrative measures to compel cleanup. Id. at 582, 586. 12 Finally, section 113(f)(3)(B) creates contribution rights for settling parties. It provides that [a] person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in an administrative or judicially approved settlement may seek contribution from any person that has not itself settled with the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B). 13 For subject matter jurisdiction to exist in this case, Con Ed's claims must have arisen under one of the above provisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (granting the federal district courts jurisdiction of civil actions arising under the ... laws ... of the United States); see also Barbara v. New York Stock Exch., 99 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir.1996). Con Ed effectively concedes that, in the wake of Cooper Industries, it cannot bring its suit under section 113(f)(1) because it has not been sued in a civil action as specified in that section. Con Ed contends, however, that its claims arise, and that the court, therefore, has subject matter jurisdiction, under section 113(f)(3)(B). We disagree, but hold that subject matter jurisdiction exists pursuant to section 107(a). 14