Opinion ID: 1943617
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Must a Judge Examine All Witnesses a John Doe Complainant Produces?

Text: ¶ 18 This case requires us to make sense of a statute that is not a model of clarity. On the one hand, Wis. Stat. § 968.26 provides that the judge shall examine the complainant under oath and any witnesses produced by him or her.  (Emphasis added.) On its own, this provision manifestly requires that any witnesses produced shall be examined. But the statute also provides a significant qualifier: The extent to which the judge may proceed in the examination is within the judge's discretion. Id. The question, then, is whether this statute requires a judge to examine all witnesses produced by the complainant, or whether the judge's discretion over the scope of the examination includes the authority to decide which witnesses will be heard. ¶ 19 Robins contends that once a judge determines the complaint supports a reason to believe a crime has been committed, the judge is required to examine not only the complainant, but also all witnesses produced by the complainant at the hearing. The statute's use of the word shall, according to Robins, is both straightforward and unalterable. He maintains that this mandatory examination clause stands on its own, and therefore must be interpreted independently of the judicial discretion clause. While the judge retains considerable discretion under Robins' approach, that discretion applies only to the scope of each witness's examination, not to which witnesses will be called. While Robins acknowledges that this interpretation may lead to some inefficiencies, he insists the statute is clear. ¶ 20 Judge Madden, on the other hand, argues that though examination of the complainant is required, examination of witnesses must be viewed in the context of the judicial discretion clause. To see it otherwise, Judge Madden asserts, opens the court up to all manner of abuses. Judges, for example, would be required to call an irrelevant but nevertheless produced witness, only to ask the witness nothing of substance. Judge Madden maintains that this formalistic interpretation would force judges to waste considerable time and resources by requiring them to call irrelevant and repetitive witnesses. Thus, the only reasonable way to interpret the statute, according to Judge Madden, is to view the discretion clause as controlling the whole examination. The only person who must be examined if the reason to believe standard is met is the complainant. ¶ 21 Our interpretation of this passage is ultimately guided by our obligation to view the text as a whole, and in particular with a view to avoiding absurd or unreasonable results. See Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 46, 681 N.W.2d 110. Requiring John Doe judges to examine all produced witnesses makes no sense. Such a requirement does not comport with: (1) the general principles of judicial oversight and discretion; (2) the purpose of a John Doe hearing; and (3) leads to absurd and unreasonable results. Therefore, Robins' interpretation must be rejected. ¶ 22 As we have previously noted, [t]he John Doe judge is a judicial officer who serves an essentially judicial function. State v. Washington, 83 Wis.2d 808, 823, 266 N.W.2d 597 (1978). A John Doe judge has authority to issue subpoenas, examine witnesses, adjourn the proceedings, take possession of subpoenaed records, adjudicate probable cause, and issue and seal warrants. In re John Doe Proceeding, 2003 WI 30, ¶ 54, 260 Wis.2d 653, 660 N.W.2d 260. As to all aspects of the conduct of the judicial function, the judge is the governor of the proceedings, and as such is responsible for maintaining the good order, dignity, and insofar as it is compatible with the administration of justice, efficiency of those proceedings. See id., ¶¶ 52-54 (discussing the broad powers of a John Doe judge to oversee the hearing and exercise the authority inherent in the judicial office). ¶ 23 The goal of a John Doe hearing is to allow the judge to determine whether it appears probable from the testimony given that a crime has been committed and who committed it, and then whether to file a complaint. See Wis. Stat. § 968.26. The whole of the hearing must be seen in this light. See Washington, 83 Wis.2d at 823, 266 N.W.2d 597 (The John Doe judge should act with a view toward issuing a complaint or determining that no crime has occurred.). As we have previously said, the John Doe hearing is primarily an investigative device, the scope of which is essentially limited to the subject matter of the complaint. Id. at 822, 266 N.W.2d 597. The John Doe judge has a mandate, and he or she is to exercise his or her discretion toward this end. Requiring the judge to call all produced witnesses to the stand, without regard to the competence, relevance, or repetitive nature of the witness's testimony, does not advance this goal. ¶ 24 Robins' interpretation calls forth the specter of absurdities that are as numerous as they are wasteful. Under his approach, a complainant could produce all of his neighborsbe they fellow residents of a tree-lined neighborhood or fellow inmates of a prison cell blockand require the judge to clear the court's calendar for however many hours or days it might take to call and perfunctorily examine each witness. [10] Similarly, Robins' approach means the John Doe judge would have discretion over non-produced witnesses and over witnesses the complainant wishes to subpoena, but not over witnesses brought to the hearing. Such a distinction makes little sense. Or, if, for example, after the testimony of only one or two witnesses, the John Doe judge determined that probable cause exists, the judge would still be required to examine all of the remaining witnesses the complainant produced (if the complainant does not wish to excuse them). See id. at 824, 266 N.W.2d 597 (noting that when the facts make clear that a person is probably guilty of an offense, it would not be proper to continue the John Doe hearing). ¶ 25 Such an approach removes control of the courtroom from the hands of the judge and places it into the hands of the John Doe complainant. This cannot be squared in any way with either common sense or the statute's language that the judge retains discretion over the extent of the examination. This approach would divorce the examination from the goal of the proceedings and waste the time of the complainant, the court, and the witnesses themselves. ¶ 26 Just as it is unreasonable to force a judge to call all witnesses once an affirmative probable cause determination has been made, it is equally unreasonable to force a judge to examine all witnesses once a determination has been made that probable cause does not exist. We see no danger in allowing a judge to determine prior to examination that the produced witness or witnesses are not competent to testify, do not have relevant testimony, have testimony that is cumulative or repetitive, or any other such factors making examination of the witness inappropriate or unnecessary. The John Doe judge may accomplish this in a variety of ways, including eliciting an offer of proof from the complainant as was essentially done here, receiving brief written witness summaries from the complainant, a combination of oral and written offers of proof, or some similar procedure reasonably calculated to allow the judge to exercise his or her discretion with regard to the testimony he or she will hear. ¶ 27 A judge is to oversee a John Doe hearing in such a way as to ensure that the proceeding is conducted in an orderly and expeditious manner. Id. The only way the judge can do this is to limit not only the scope of an individual witness's examination, but also which witnesses may testify. Wisconsin Stat. § 968.26 cannot be reasonably interpreted otherwise. John Doe judges must not be shackled to a process that frustrates the goal of ascertaining probable cause in an expeditious manner. The statute, then, is susceptible to but one reasonable construction: Wis. Stat. § 968.26 when read as a whole preserves the circuit court's discretion as to which witnesses it will examine in a John Doe proceeding.