Opinion ID: 3050782
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Resisting arrest is a class 6 felony.

Text: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2508. The panel must determine whether any crime encompassed by § 13-2508 falls outside the 18 U.S.C. § 16 statutory definition of crime of violence:
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or
its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. 16864 ESTRADA-RODRIGUEZ v. MUKASEY 18 U.S.C. § 16. By the plain language of the statutes, all conduct that might violate § 13-2508(A)(1) would also fall within 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). The argument on appeal focuses on the relationship between § 13-2508(A)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). B. PHYSICAL FORCE UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) [2] The Supreme Court clarified the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10 (2004). According to the Court, this section: covers offenses that naturally involve a person acting in disregard of the risk that physical force might be used against another in committing an offense. The reckless disregard in § 16 relates not to the general conduct or to the possibility that harm will result from a person’s conduct, but to the risk that the use of physical force against another might be required in committing a crime. Id. The Court illustrated its point by commenting in dicta that a burglary constitutes a crime of violence because “burglary, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that the burglar will use force. . . .” Id. In contrast, the DUI at issue in Leocal did not constitute a crime of violence because such crimes must have “a higher mens rea than [ ] merely accidental or negligent conduct. . . .” Id. at 11. [3] Violation of § 13-2508(A) requires intentional action, which satisfies the mens rea requirement of Leocal. Additionally, resisting arrest naturally involves the risk that physical force may be used against an officer. In State v. Womack, 847 P.2d 609, 613 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992), an Arizona appellate court decided that nonviolent flight from an attempted arrest did not constitute resisting arrest under § 13-2508(A)(2). The court favorably quoted the Arizona Criminal Code Commission’s commentary that “[n]either [nonviolent] nonsubmission nor flight are covered” by resisting arrest statutes. Id. at 612. ESTRADA-RODRIGUEZ v. MUKASEY 16865 The court cited the proposition that “[t]here must be actual opposition or resistance, making necessary, under the circumstances, the use of force.” Id. at 613 (quoting State v. Avnayim, 185 A.2d 295, 298-99 (Conn. App. Ct. 1962)). [4] When persons undertake resisting arrest under § 132508(A)(2), they take the chance that the incident will escalate and that “the use of physical force against another might be required in committing [the] crime.” Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10. Under this reasoning, § 13-2508(A) comports with the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) advanced by the Supreme Court in Leocal.