Opinion ID: 181375
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: CIPA Protective Orders

Text: In his final challenge, Abu-Jihaad contends that the district court erred not only in granting the government's motions for protective orders pursuant to Section 4 of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. app. 3, §§ 1-16, but also in considering ex parte whether the classified materialssubmitted and reviewed in camera were discoverable. The district court set forth its reasons for issuing the challenged orders in two opinions. See United States v. Abu-Jihaad, No. 07 Cr. 57, 2008 WL 346121 (D.Conn. Feb.4, 2008); United States v. Abu-Jihaad, No. 07 Cr. 57, 2008 WL 596200 (D.Conn. Feb.22, 2008). Nevertheless, because neither Abu-Jihaad nor his counsel has had access to the government's submissions or the transcripts of the ex parte conferences, all of which have been maintained under seal, defendant submits that he is in no position to present factual arguments that th[e] procedure [adopted by the district court] resulted in any prejudice. Appellant's Br. at 63. His CIPA challenge can thus be understood as a general request for this court to examine the sealed records and to assess the propriety of the district court's decision to grant protective orders. We review for abuse of discretion a district court's decision to issue a protective order pursuant to Section 4 of CIPA, including its determination whether evidence is helpful or material to the defense and whether unclassified summaries or admissions are properly substituted for classified information. See United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d at 131; United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir.2008). We detect no such abuse here. CIPA, which establishes certain procedures for the handling of classified information in criminal cases, is designed to protect[ ] and restrict[ ] the discovery of classified information in a way that does not impair the defendant's right to a fair trial. United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d at 78 (alterations in original; internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 799 (2d Cir.1996) (observing that purpose of CIPA is to establish procedures to harmonize a defendant's right to obtain and present exculpatory material upon his trial and the government's right to protect classified material in the national interest (internal quotation marks omitted)). CIPA defines [c]lassified information as any information or material that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Executive order, statute, or regulation, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security. 18 U.S.C. app. 3, § 1(a). In regulating the discovery of such information, Section 4 of CIPA instructs as follows: The court, upon a sufficient showing, may authorize the United States to delete specified items of classified information from documents to be made available to the defendant through discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to substitute a summary of the information for such classified documents, or to substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend to prove. The court may permit the United States to make a request for such authorization in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the court alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the statement of the United States shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. Id. app. 3, § 4. As we have recently observed, [t]his section clarifies district courts' power under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1) to issue protective orders denying or restricting discovery for good cause, which includes information vital to the national security. United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d at 130 (internal quotation marks omitted). To be clear, CIPA does not confer on the government a privilege to refrain from disclosing classified information; it merely presupposes one. See id. The privilege it presupposes has its origins in the common-law privilege against disclosure of state secrets, see id.; United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d at 78, which allows the government to withhold information from discovery when disclosure would be inimical to national security, Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir.1991). Although applicable in criminal cases, the state-secrets privilege mustunder some circumstancesgive way . . . to a criminal defendant's right to present a meaningful defense. United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d at 131 (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining when a defendant's right to present a defense displaces the state-secrets privilege, we apply the test announced in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), asking first, whether the material in dispute is discoverable, and if so, whether the state-secrets privilege applies; and second, if the privilege applies, whether the information is helpful or material to the defense, i.e., useful to counter the government's case or to bolster a defense, United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d at 131 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Roviaro ). [33] For purposes of this test, the state-secrets privilege applies if (1) there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose . . . matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged, and (2) the privilege is lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d at 80 (ellipsis in original; internal quotation marks omitted).
Having carefully reviewed the classified materials that are the subject of the challenged protective orders, we reach the same conclusion as the district court: that the government has demonstrated a reasonable danger that disclosure would jeopardize national security. Again, our discussion of the classified information is necessarily circumspect. Nevertheless, we conclude that the affidavits submitted by government officials satisfactorily identify specific facts that (a) render the materials here at issue classified and (b) support the conclusion that disclosure of those materials would pose a risk to national security. [34]
We further conclude that the challenged protective orders did not deny Abu-Jihaad evidence that was either helpful or material to his defense. Although this court had not yet issued its decision in United States v. Aref at the time the district court considered this question, that court did rely on a test, similar to that announced in Aref, identified by one of our sister circuits. See United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 2008 WL 346121, at -4 (citing United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 622-25 (D.C.Cir.1989)); United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 2008 WL 596200, at  1 (referring to standards governing discovery of classified information under CIPA set forth in prior CIPA ruling). [35] Applying that test, the district court concluded that none of the materials at issue in the government's first motion for a protective order were discoverable under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), or Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. [36] In particular, it noted that (a) [m]ost of the information ha[d] nothing whatsoever to do with any issue in th[e] case or any criminal activity at all; (b) none of the information could be deemed helpful or beneficial to the defense, let alone exculpatory or impeaching; and (c) because Abu-Jihaad already had knowledge and/or possession of much of the information, its production would have been duplicative. United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 2008 WL 346121, at . While the district court concluded that four of the six categories of information at issue in the government's second motion for a protective order were either undiscoverable or not helpful or favorable to the defense, it determined that the remaining two categories contained discoverable information. United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 2008 WL 596200, at -4. Nevertheless, because one of the categories was cumulative of information already provided to Abu-Jihaad in the course of discovery, the district court determined that the government had no obligation to disclose such information. See id. at . As for the second category, the district court found the government's disclosure obligation satisfied by its production of various letters, FBI reports, and other discovery to the defense. See id. at -3. Upon our own in camera review of the underlying materials and the sealed records preserved for appeal, including a detailed comparison of original discoverable documents with the unclassified summaries approved by the district court, we conclude that the district court's rulings with respect to the discoverable nature of the classified materials and the government's compliance with any extant discovery obligations manifest no abuse of discretion. Indeed, we commend the district court's careful discharge of its CIPA obligations, particularly its effective protection of Abu-Jihaad's rights despite the defense's limited ability to participate in the CIPA proceedings.
Insofar as Abu-Jihaad faults the district court for entertaining the government's motions for protective orders ex parte, his argument is unconvincing. Abu-Jihaad does not dispute that Section 4 of CIPA and Rule 16(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure both authorize ex parte proceedings. Accordingly, his contention that such submissions are improper [a]bsent a showing of exceptional circumstances, Appellant's Br. at 63, amounts to a challenge to the district court's exercise of discretion to proceed ex parte. The argument fails in light of our decision in United States v. Aref , in which we recognized that where the government moves to withhold classified information from the defense, an adversary hearing with defense knowledge would defeat the very purpose of the discovery rules. 533 F.3d at 81 (internal quotation marks omitted). In such circumstances, a district court's decision to conduct ex parte hearings manifests no abuse of discretion. See id.; see also United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d at 132 (identifying no error in district court's ex parte, in camera review of materials subject to CIPA motion because such a method for protection of classified material is necessary, and CIPA procedures have been established by Congress and held to be constitutional); United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1261 (9th Cir.1998) (concluding that while [e]x parte hearings are generally disfavored, in a case involving classified documents,  ex parte, in camera hearings in which government counsel participates to the exclusion of defense counsel are part of the process that the district court may use in order to decide the relevancy of the information). In sum, because we conclude that the government's submissions fully support the district court's entry of the challenged CIPA orders, that the district court acted well within its discretion in reviewing those submissions ex parte and in camera, and that the orders did not deny Abu-Jihaad any information helpful or material to his defense, we identify no basis in CIPA for vacating the conviction.