Opinion ID: 3159960
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Define Mr. Walwyn’s Ethical Duty

Text: Mr. Walwyn first asserts that the Hearing Panel failed to define the ethical duties he owed to each of his three clients prior to determining that his conduct violated an ethical duty. Mr. Walwyn further asserts that, with respect to the Hunt and Lara cases, his ethical duty “never vested” because neither Mr. Lara nor Mr. Hunt directed him to file an appeal.10 Finally, Mr. Walwyn argues that the Hearing Panel erroneously relied on the Court of Criminal Appeals‟ contempt orders. The Board responds that Mr. Walwyn owed an ethical duty to his clients and to the legal system and that there is ample evidence in the record to establish Mr. Walwyn‟s continued representation of all three clients in the appellate process. With regard to the Court of Criminal Appeals‟ contempt orders, the Board points out that Mr. Walwyn did not object to their admission into evidence and that, in any event, the Hearing Panel made its own independent finding based upon the evidence introduced at the disciplinary hearing and was not constrained by the Court of Criminal Appeals‟ orders. Having reviewed the record under the applicable standard of review, we conclude that Mr. Walwyn‟s arguments are without merit. The Board‟s initial and supplemental petitions for discipline specified the Rules of Professional Conduct that Mr. Walwyn allegedly violated in his appellate representation of Mr. Lara, Mr. Matthews, and Mr. Hunt. In rendering judgment, the Hearing Panel made specific findings as to which Rules of Professional Conduct Mr. Walwyn had violated in each case. Thus, the Hearing Panel did not fail to define the ethical duties that Mr. Walwyn owed to his clients. 10 Mr. Walwyn appears to limit this argument solely to the Lara and Hunt cases and does not challenge the existence of his duty in the Matthews case. -15- Mr. Walwyn‟s contention that his ethical duty never “vested” in the Lara and Hunt cases is equally without merit and belied by the evidence in the record. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3 states that “a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Comment four to this Rule provides that, “Unless otherwise required by law, whether the lawyer is obligated to prosecute the appeal for the client depends on the scope of the representation the lawyer has agreed to provide to the client.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.3 cmt. 4 (emphasis added). However, the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provide additional duties for counsel on appeal. Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(e) provides as follows: (1) Counsel Retained for Trial But Not Appeal. An attorney retained by the defendant to represent the defendant for the trial but not for appeal, shall timely advise the trial court of this fact at the hearing on the motion for a new trial. Thereupon, such counsel will be permitted to withdraw as counsel of record, except as provided in Rule 37(e)(2). (A) Appellate Counsel for Non-Indigent Defendant. If the defendant is not indigent at the time counsel is permitted to withdraw, the court shall advise the defendant of the right of appeal and the time for filing the notice of appeal. (B) Appellate Counsel for Indigent Defendant. If the defendant is indigent at the time counsel is permitted to withdraw, the court shall appoint appellate counsel for the defendant. (2) Retained Counsel Filing Notice of Appeal. Retained counsel— whether or not fully paid—who files a notice of appeal shall represent the defendant on appeal. Such retained counsel shall fully comply with all appellate rules as to timely filing and appearances. Retained counsel shall be allowed to withdraw as counsel of record only for good cause and only if application is made when not delinquent in his or her duties. (3) Appointed Counsel for Indigent Defendant. Pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. Rule 13, § 1(e)(5), counsel appointed in the trial court to represent an indigent defendant shall continue to represent the defendant throughout the proceedings, including any appeals, until the case has been concluded or counsel has been allowed to withdraw by a court. (Bolding in original.) -16- Mr. Walwyn filed a notice of appeal in the Lara case, and there is no indication in the record that he filed a subsequent motion to withdraw. Moreover, even if Mr. Walwyn had filed a motion to withdraw, it likely would have been denied, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(e)(2), because he was delinquent in his duties as counsel, having failed to comply with multiple Court of Criminal Appeals‟ orders. Thus, in the Lara case Mr. Walwyn‟s duty of diligence involved continued representation of Mr. Lara on appeal, which Mr. Walwyn admittedly did not diligently pursue. Furthermore, Mr. Walwyn‟s actions in the Lara case belie his current assertions that he did not believe he had a duty to represent Mr. Lara on appeal. Mr. Walwyn admitted receiving multiple orders from the Court of Criminal Appeals regarding his failure to file a transcript or a brief in the Lara case. Instead of responding that he no longer represented Mr. Lara or seeking to withdraw properly from the case, Mr. Walwyn filed two separate motions with the Court of Criminal Appeals, in which he described himself as counsel for Mr. Lara and asked for additional time to file a brief on Mr. Lara‟s behalf. At no point during the disciplinary hearing did Mr. Walwyn testify that he did not have a duty to act as appellate counsel for Mr. Lara or that he believed he was no longer representing Mr. Lara on appeal. Furthermore, Mr. Walwyn in his answer admitted violating certain Rules of Professional Conduct, and in the pretrial brief he filed before the Hearing Panel, he admitted violating Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3, 1.4, and 3.2 in his representation of Mr. Lara. Implicit in this admission is Mr. Walwyn‟s recognition that he was acting as Mr. Lara‟s attorney on appeal. With respect to the Hunt case, Mr. Walwyn filed a motion for new trial, which was ultimately denied by the trial judge. Notably, Mr. Walwyn did not notify the trial judge at the hearing on the motion for new trial that he would not be representing Mr. Hunt on appeal, as Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(e)(1) required him to do if in fact he did not intend to represent Mr. Hunt on appeal. Although Mr. Walwyn testified that Mr. Hunt‟s family informed him that they were seeking a new attorney to represent Mr. Hunt on appeal, Mr. Walwyn never asked Mr. Hunt‟s family to sign a disengagement letter. Instead, Mr. Walwyn took no action. He filed neither a notice of appeal nor a motion to withdraw from the case. Inaction, however, did not relieve Mr. Walwyn of his duty to his client under the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, in his complaint to CAP, Mr. Hunt indicated that Mr. Walwyn was still representing him in his appeal and stated that he was unhappy with Mr. Walwyn‟s representation. In his response to CAP, Mr. Walwyn did not deny representing Mr. Hunt on appeal. Instead, he admitted that he had not filed a notice of appeal for Mr. Hunt, explained that it was his “clerical error” that had “thrown off” the “timing of the appeal,” and advised that “a Motion to Accept a Late Filed Appeal is going to be filed and an appeal to follow.” Both Mr. Hunt‟s complaint to CAP and Mr. Walwyn‟s response -17- establish that Mr. Walwyn recognized he had a duty to represent Mr. Hunt on appeal at the time of the CAP complaint and thereafter. Finally, Mr. Walwyn argues that the Hearing Panel failed to determine independently whether Mr. Walwyn had violated the Court of Criminal Appeals‟ orders. The Hearing Panel‟s judgment included detailed factual findings as to each of the three complaints. Regarding the Lara and the Matthews cases, the Hearing Panel made its own specific and independent findings that Mr. Walwyn had knowingly violated court orders. The trial court below found that the Hearing Panel had “properly reviewed [the Court of Criminal Appeals‟ orders] the same as any other evidence presented.” The record supports the trial court‟s conclusion, and Mr. Walwyn‟s argument is without merit. B. Refusal to Compel Disclosure of Comparative Sanctions Mr. Walwyn next asserts that the Hearing Panel acted arbitrarily or abused its discretion by denying his untimely discovery request for “comparative sanctions that have been imposed against respondent attorneys for the same [or] similar conduct in the last ten years.” We disagree. The applicable standard of review for pretrial discovery decisions is abuse of discretion. Benton v. Snyder, 825 S.W.2d 409, 416 (Tenn. 1992). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court applies incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employs reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party. State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 116 (Tenn. 2008). West v. Schofield, 460 S.W.3d 113, 120 (Tenn. 2015). The deadline for discovery requests was May 1, 2013, and the deadline for discovery responses was June 1, 2013. Although the Hearing Panel granted Mr. Walwyn a continuance of the July 10, 2013 hearing date and set additional scheduling deadlines for deposing witnesses, the Hearing Panel did not extend the expired deadlines for requesting and answering written discovery. Given the untimeliness of Mr. Walwyn‟s second discovery request and his failure to provide any explanation for why he had not propounded his discovery request before the deadlines expired, we conclude that the Hearing Panel did not abuse its discretion in denying the request. -18- Furthermore, comparative public discipline in Tennessee was at all times accessible to Mr. Walwyn through the published decisions of this Court and through the public informational releases available on the Board‟s website. The Hearing Panel‟s appropriate denial of his untimely discovery request did not prevent Mr. Walwyn from using traditional legal research techniques to locate comparable discipline through these publicly available sources. C. Appropriateness of the Sanction Mr. Walwyn asserts that the sanction the Hearing Panel imposed is arbitrary and capricious because the Hearing Panel improperly relied upon ABA Standards 4.42, 7.2, and 8.2. The trial court concluded that the Hearing Panel improperly relied upon ABA Standard 7.2 in determining the appropriate sanctions, and the Board does not challenge the trial court‟s conclusion on appeal. Therefore, we decline to address Mr. Walwyn‟s arguments regarding the applicability of ABA Standard 7.2. With respect to ABA Standard 4.42, Mr. Walwyn asserts that the Board presented no evidence of injury or potential injury. Mr. Walwyn also argues that the Board failed to prove that he “knowingly” failed to comply with the Court of Criminal Appeals‟ orders, as the term is defined in the ABA Standards. Additionally, he argues that the Hearing Panel failed to give sufficient weight to the mitigating factors he presented when determining the appropriate sanction. The Board responds that the sanctions Mr. Walwyn received are appropriate under the applicable ABA Standards. A hearing panel must consider the applicable provisions of the ABA Standards when imposing discipline. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 8.4; see also Sneed v. Bd. of Prof‟l Responsibility, 301 S.W.3d 603, 617 (Tenn. 2010). ABA Standard 3.0 establishes four factors to consider regarding the severity of a sanction: “(a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer‟s mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer‟s misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.” See also Sneed, 301 S.W.3d at 617. ABA Standard 4.42 provides that suspension is generally appropriate when: “(a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to the client, or (b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a client.” The ABA Standards define “injury” as “harm to a client, the public, the legal system or the profession which results from a lawyer‟s misconduct. The level of injury can range from „serious‟ injury to „little or no‟ injury; a reference to injury alone indicates any level of injury greater than „little or no‟ injury.” “Potential injury” is defined as “harm to a client, the public, the legal system or the profession that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the lawyer‟s misconduct, and which, but for some intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the lawyer‟s misconduct.” -19- Although Mr. Walwyn admitted in his pretrial brief before the Hearing Panel that his “past disciplinary history” suggested that suspension would be an appropriate sanction under the ABA Standards, he now asserts that the sanction was inconsistent with the ABA Standards because the Board failed to show that his conduct caused injury or potential injury. Primarily, Mr. Walwyn points to the fact that the Board did not call any of Mr. Walwyn‟s clients as witnesses at his disciplinary hearing. Further, Mr. Walwyn points out that Mr. Lara eventually voluntarily dismissed his appeal, because he was soon to be released on parole, and Mr. Hunt eventually received a delayed appeal through postconviction proceedings. Despite Mr. Walwyn‟s assertions to the contrary, the record contains ample evidence of injury or potential injury as those terms are defined in the ABA Standards. Mr. Walwyn‟s conduct in all three cases caused potential injury to his clients. In the Lara and Matthews cases, Mr. Walwyn admitted receiving multiple orders requesting status updates and establishing filing deadlines. Mr. Walwyn ignored each and every order. At the time Mr. Walwyn received these orders and decided to take no action, it was reasonably foreseeable that Mr. Lara‟s and Mr. Matthews‟ appeals were in jeopardy. Mr. Walwyn‟s failure to meet the filing deadlines could easily have resulted in dismissal of their appeals. Mr. Lara decided to voluntarily dismiss his appeal only because he had been jailed for twenty-one months since the notice of appeal was filed and had served enough time to be released on parole. Likewise, in Mr. Hunt‟s case, Mr. Walwyn‟s failure even to file a notice of appeal for many months after Mr. Hunt‟s conviction jeopardized Mr. Hunt‟s ability to pursue an appeal. Mr. Hunt received a delayed appeal only after complaining to CAP, obtaining new counsel, and prevailing in the trial court on his post-conviction claim for a delayed appeal. Moreover, Mr. Walwyn‟s actions caused both injury and potential injury to the legal system. The Court of Criminal Appeals was forced to expend time and resources monitoring these three cases and issuing multiple orders that sought to compel Mr. Walwyn to fulfill his ethical and legal obligations to his clients. Mr. Walwyn received these orders, yet did not respond and did nothing to remedy the situations. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 8.4 cmt. 9 (“Normally, a lawyer who knowingly fails to obey a court order demonstrates disrespect for the law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(e). Mr. Walwyn next asserts that he did not “knowingly” fail to comply with the orders of the Court of Criminal Appeals, citing his failure to understand the orders themselves and his belief that if he took no action these appeals would simply be dismissed. The ABA Standards define “knowledge” as “the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.” Each order of the Court of Criminal Appeals contained clear language that required Mr. Walwyn to take some action by a specified -20- deadline. Each order contained clear language warning Mr. Walwyn of the consequences of failing to comply. Mr. Walwyn admitted receiving each and every Court of Criminal Appeals‟ order. Thus, his attempt now to deny knowledge that the orders required action on his part is dubious at best. Turning to ABA Standard 8.2, Mr. Walwyn contends that this Standard is inapplicable because it only applies to misconduct that is a direct result of the violation of a prior disciplinary order. This argument is without merit as it is based on an inaccurate interpretation of the ABA Standards. While it is true that the introduction to Standard 8.0 states that “[s]evere sanctions should be imposed on lawyers who violate the terms of prior disciplinary orders,” these are not the only situations in which to consider prior disciplinary orders. For example, ABA Standard 8.1(b) states that disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer has been suspended “for the same or similar misconduct, and intentionally or knowingly engages in further similar acts of misconduct . . . .” Likewise, ABA Standard 8.2 states that “[s]uspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer has been reprimanded for the same or similar misconduct and engages in further similar acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system or the profession.” Mr. Walwyn had already received a public censure in 2004 for conduct nearly identical to the conduct in this case for which he has been suspended. Thus, the Hearing Panel did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by applying ABA Standard 8.2 when determining the appropriate sanction in this case. Finally, Mr. Walwyn asserts that the Hearing Panel failed to give proper weight to the applicable mitigating factors in his case. In addition to finding that Mr. Walwyn‟s conduct violated ABA Standards 4.42 and 8.2, under which suspension is the appropriate punishment, the Hearing Panel found the following mitigating factors: (1) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (2) personal or emotional problems; (3) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude; and (4) character and reputation. Standard 2.3 of the ABA Standards states that a suspension is generally “for a period of time equal to or greater than six months . . . .” Here, however, the Hearing Panel imposed an active suspension of only thirty days and allowed the remaining five months to be served on probation with a practice monitor. In light of Mr. Walwyn‟s numerous infractions, the Hearing Panel‟s imposition of a sanction of only thirty days‟ active suspension reflects the Hearing Panel‟s consideration of Mr. Walwyn‟s mitigating circumstances and is neither arbitrary nor capricious nor an abuse of discretion. It is, in fact, a more lenient sanction than could be sustained under the proof in the record. -21- D. Constitutionality of the Tennessee Attorney Disciplinary System Mr. Walwyn finally raises a number of constitutional challenges to Tennessee‟s attorney discipline system. Although this portion of Mr. Walwyn‟s brief is rambling and borders on incomprehensible, these challenges may be broken down into two broad categories. First, Mr. Walwyn challenges the constitutionality of using the preponderance-of-evidence standard of proof in attorney disciplinary proceedings, instead of the heightened clear-and-convincing-evidence standard used by the majority of states. Second, Mr. Walwyn raises a number of due process challenges to the disciplinary system. Having reviewed Mr. Walwyn‟s contentions, we find them to be without merit but will briefly address each issue in turn.
Mr. Walwyn objects to “any adjudication against him upon any standard of proof other than clear and convincing evidence.” He further asserts that Tennessee is among a minority of states that utilize the preponderance-of-evidence standard of proof and that this standard violates his due process rights. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 8.2 (requiring the Board to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence). Although Mr. Walwyn is correct that the majority of other states utilize the clear-and-convincing standard of proof, use of the preponderance-of-evidence standard did not deprive Mr. Walwyn of his right to due process. In Santosky v. Kramer, the United States Supreme Court determined that “in any given proceeding, the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.” 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982). While this Court has not previously considered whether the balancing of those interests in attorney disciplinary proceedings requires adoption of an elevated standard of proof, several other jurisdictions have addressed this issue. In In re Barach, the United States Court of Appeals considered whether an attorney suspended by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court should receive reciprocal discipline in federal court. 540 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 2008). Before the federal court, Mr. Barach argued that the preponderance-of-evidence standard of proof used in Massachusetts “rendered the state court proceedings fundamentally unfair, and, thus, violated his due process rights.” Id. at 85. In finding that Mr. Barach‟s due process rights had not been violated, the federal court weighed Mr. Barach‟s interests and those of the public at large, explaining: -22- Admittedly, the Due Process Clause applies to disciplinary proceedings. But the Due Process Clause does not demand that a state devise an ideal set of procedures for attorney discipline. It suffices to satisfy due process if a state adopts procedures that collectively ensure the fundamental fairness of the disciplinary proceedings. In other words, the Due Process Clause imposes a floor below which a state cannot descend, not a level of perfection that a state must achieve. We understand the importance of a lawyer‟s right to practice law and agree that, once granted, that right cannot be taken away in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Yet the Due Process Clause is flexible, and reasonable minds can differ as to the need for elevated levels of proof in particular situations. Viewed in this light, the use of a preponderance of the evidence standard in bar disciplinary proceedings does not offend due process. After all, many types of important property rights typically rest, in contested proceedings, on proof by preponderant evidence. Moreover, other jurisdictions besides Massachusetts use a preponderance standard in attorney disciplinary matters. Although there is something to be said on policy grounds for requiring a more sturdy quantum of proof, the use of a preponderance standard is not so arbitrary or irrational as to render state disciplinary proceedings that use it fundamentally unfair. Id. at 85-86 (internal citations omitted); see also Disciplinary Matter Involving Walton, 676 P.2d 1078, 1085 (Alaska 1983) (“Under all of these circumstances, we are unwilling to hold that the risk of an incorrect factual determination in a bar disciplinary proceeding should be placed primarily on the public. Because there are substantial interest[s] on both sides, the risk of error should be borne equally. That is accomplished by use of the preponderance of the evidence standard. Due process demands no more.” (footnote omitted)); Ligon v. Newman, 231 S.W.3d 662, 667 (Ark. 2006) (upholding the preponderance-of-evidence standard and rejecting the lawyer‟s assertion that the appropriate standard of proof should be clear-and-convincing evidence); In re McDonald, 162 S.W. 566, 567 (Ky. 1914) (upholding the preponderance-of-evidence standard and rejecting the lawyer‟s assertion that the standard should be proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Posler, 213 N.W.2d 133, 133-34 (Mich. 1973) (explaining that the preponderance-of-evidence standard has applied since March 1, 1970); In re Howard, 912 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Mo. 1995) (observing that the preponderance-of-evidence standard applies in disciplinary proceedings); Curtis v. Comm‟n for Lawyer Discipline, 20 S.W.3d 227, 230 n.1 (Tex. App. 2000) (recognizing that preponderance-of-evidence, not clearand-convincing evidence, is the burden of proof in an attorney disciplinary proceeding). -23- The reasoning of In re Barach is persuasive. We are mindful that attorneys are entitled to procedural due process and have an interest in avoiding suspension of their law licenses by which they earn their livelihood. Moncier v. Bd. of Prof‟l Responsibility, 406 S.W.3d 139, 156 (Tenn. 2013). However, we are equally mindful of the rights of Mr. Walwyn‟s clients and the public at large to ethical and diligent representation from lawyers licensed to practice in this state. This, too, is a weighty interest that must be protected.11 Weighing these interests, we conclude, as other courts addressing the appropriate standard of proof have concluded, that use of the preponderance-of-evidence standard satisfies Mr. Walwyn‟s right to procedural due process.12
Relying on In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968), Mr. Walwyn asserts that the attorney disciplinary process is “quasi-criminal” in nature, and therefore, he is entitled to the same due process rights afforded criminal defendants. We addressed and rejected this argument in Moncier, 406 S.W.3d at 156, explaining that, “[r]ead as a whole, In re Ruffalo stands for the proposition that a lawyer subject to discipline is entitled to procedural due process, including notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Id. We concluded in Moncier that “Tennessee‟s disciplinary process affords lawyers notice and an opportunity to be heard, as well as other protections, including the right to have counsel present, the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to present evidence.” 406 S.W.3d at 156. We reaffirm our holding in Moncier that the Tennessee attorney disciplinary system comports with due process. Mr. Walwyn next asserts that Tennessee‟s attorney disciplinary process improperly combines investigative and adjudicatory functions. This argument has also been thoroughly considered and rejected in prior decisions. In Moncier, we considered and rejected the contention that hearing panel members are biased and must recuse themselves because of the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions of the Board. 406 S.W.3d at 161. We reaffirmed this holding in Long v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, 435 S.W.3d 174, 186 (Tenn. 2014), explaining that, “[a]ttorney disciplinary proceedings are not criminal proceedings, and to 11 We note that disciplinary proceedings against medical licensees in Tennessee are conducted in accordance with the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6- 216. The standard of proof in such proceedings is “substantial and material [evidence] in light of the entire record.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(5)(A). This standard has been described as “something less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a scintilla or a glimmer.” Ware v. Greene, 984 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); see also McEwen v. Tenn. Dep‟t of Safety, 173 S.W.3d 815, 821 n.10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that the “preponderance of the evidence” standard is harder to satisfy than the “substantial and material evidence” standard). 12 Even if the clear-and-convincing standard applied, the overwhelming proof contained in the record on appeal would have satisfied that standard. -24- prove a risk of bias that would give rise to a due process violation, a litigant must point to more than a simple combination of functions within the Board.” Mr. Walwyn also asserts that “the interrelated functions of the [B]oard and [D]isciplinary [C]ounsel related to the receipt and disbursement of funds creates an intolerable financial incentive within this adjudicatory system.” Additionally, he contends that “[t]he functionality of the Board and Disciplinary Counsel is compensated only when the petition approved by the Board and prosecuted by Disciplinary Counsel is sustained.” In Long, we recognized that Hearing Panel members “receive no compensation, other than reimbursement for travel expenses, for sitting as the adjudicatory body in a disciplinary matter.” 435 S.W.3d at 188. Since reimbursement of travel expenses is afforded, regardless of the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding, it appears the real “financial incentive” to which Mr. Walwyn refers is the assessment of costs against attorneys who are adjudged to have violated ethical rules. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 24.3. Again, we upheld the constitutionality of this system of assessing costs in Moncier, explaining: The attorney disciplinary process is a costly endeavor. A large portion of the registration fees paid by attorneys who strive each day to follow ethical guidelines is now used to pay for the disciplinary mechanism necessary to police those attorneys who do not comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct. Shifting the financial burden of formal disciplinary proceedings to those directly responsible for the costs is equitable and “serves the additional function of deterring other lawyers from engaging in unprofessional conduct.” In re Shannon, 876 P.2d 548, 575 (Ariz. 1994). 406 S.W.3d at 150. Finally, Mr. Walwyn submitted as supplemental authority North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. F.T.C., _____ U.S. _____, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). Although this supplemental authority is purportedly provided “in support of [Mr. Walwyn‟s] challenge of [the] unconstitutional and anti-trust nature of the Tennessee disciplinary system[,]” Mr. Walwyn did not allege any antitrust violation in any of the proceedings below. Thus, one of the arguments to which the supplemental authority purportedly relates was not raised below and is waived. See Powell v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 312 S.W.3d 496, 511 (Tenn. 2010) (“It is axiomatic that parties will not be permitted to raise issues on appeal that they did not first raise in the trial court.”). Additionally, the supplemental authority provides no support for Mr. Walwyn‟s constitutional claims because it does not address any issue regarding the constitutionality of professional disciplinary processes. -25- IV. Conclusion For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, which upheld the Hearing Panel‟s judgment. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Paul J. Walwyn, for which execution, if necessary, may issue. ________________________________