Opinion ID: 1990002
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Consideration of Parental Support

Text: The husband argues next that the court impermissibly considered the prospect that he would continue to receive support, particularly housing, from his parents in arriving at its alimony award. We agree with the husband that the court may have presumed that he would receive free housing in the future when it calculated his ability to pay alimony. Moreover, we agree with the husband that the court gave at least some weight to its belief that he will be cared for financially by his parents. At issue, therefore, is whether it was proper for the court to consider the mere potentiality for receipt of such future support in its analysis. Resolution of this question requires us to interpret the language and intent of the alimony statute, RSA 458:19. In so doing, we will ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used and discern the legislative intent from the statute as written. ElderTrust of Fla. v. Town of Epsom, 154 N.H. 693, 697, 919 A.2d 776 (2007). We will not consider what the legislature might have said, or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. However, we are the final arbiters of the legislature's intent as it is expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. State v. Doyle, 156 N.H. 306, 308, 940 A.2d 245 (2007). At least facially, neither RSA 458:19, I, nor IV(b) grants a trial court explicit authority to consider a party's potential for receiving future gifts in determining alimony. The wife argues, implicitly, that we should nevertheless uphold the trial court by reading such considerations into RSA 458:19, IV(b), which permits a trial court to consider the opportunity of each [party] for future acquisition of capital assets and income. We decline to adopt such a broad interpretation of RSA 458:19, IV(b). By factoring in the husband's mere expectancy of future gifts, the court anticipated, indeed counted on, continuation of a state of affairs beyond the control of the affected spouse, . . . and even impinged on the freedom of his [parents], who [were] not party to the proceeding, to use and dispose of [their] property as [they] see[ ] fit. Gassaway v. Gassaway, 489 A.2d 1073, 1077 (D.C.1985) (holding that the potential receipt of future gifts cannot be considered in dividing marital assets). Such an approach is problematic because, as the Supreme Court of Connecticut aptly observed: The expectancy may never be realized because of diminution of the donor's wealth or a change in the planned disposition of his property. . . . Relying upon such an [expectancy], a court may assume that adequate provision has been made for a needy spouse and neglect to provide more dependable means of support, such as a sufficient periodic alimony order or a greater share of assets owned at the time of the decree. . . . Any prediction of what justice between the parties may require when a future event may occur is likely to be less well considered than a determination made after the event, when speculation as to the circumstances involved has been supplanted by actuality. Rubin v. Rubin, 204 Conn. 224, 527 A.2d 1184, 1189-90 (1987). For these reasons, we concur with those courts that have held that a party's mere expectation of receipt of a future gift cannot be considered when making an alimony award. See id.; Scott v. Scott, 645 S.W.2d 193, 198 (Mo.Ct.App. 1982) (holding that a trial court is not required to consider such an uncertain source of funds as future gifts in making an alimony award); Mumma v. Mumma, 280 A.2d 73, 76 (D.C.1971). Of course, if the legislature disagrees with our construction of its statutory scheme, it is free to amend the statutes as it sees fit. Marceau v. Concord Heritage Life Ins. Co., 149 N.H. 216, 221, 818 A.2d 1264 (2003). Therefore, to the extent that the court considered the husband's potential receipt of future gifts from his parents, it was in error. The wife asserts, alternatively, that the court did not consider the housing as a gift, but rather as a wage supplement. See Thayer v. Thayer, 119 N.H. 871, 409 A.2d 1326 (1979), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated by In the Matter of Clark & Clark, 154 N.H. 420, 425, 910 A.2d 1198 (2006). Admittedly, this is at least a plausible interpretation of the court's order, in light of its statement that the husband's effective income is higher than he reports, given that he receives the benefit of housing from his parents. However, the court did not make findings on the value of the housing or explain in what way, or to what extent, the husband's reported income was increased. Indeed, the court only stated that the $900 which [the husband] claims he is paying as rent c[an] be applied towards alimony for [the wife]. We are unable to reconcile these two findings, as one suggests the housing was treated as a credit to the husband's income (or a wage supplement), and the other suggests the housing was treated as a debit to the husband's reported expenses. Moreover, our confusion is further exacerbated by the court's discussion of the reasonableness of the wife's beliefs that the husband's parents would have continued to provide housing at no expense for the duration of the parties' lives and that the husband expects to be cared for financially by his parents. Because we are unable to determine from this record precisely in which way the court considered the housing provided to the couple, we must remand for the trial court to make specific findings on this issue. See Calderwood v. Calderwood, 114 N.H. 651, 653, 327 A.2d 704 (1974) (explaining how the husband's ability to pay is a vital factor to be considered by the court).