Opinion ID: 198329
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proof of the Employer's Intent

Text: 15 Davis & Geck argues that the imposition of objectively oppressive work conditions should not suffice to establish a constructive discharge without proof that the employer created the intolerable work conditions with the specific intent of forcing the employee to resign. Such a requirement of proof of employer intent would plainly be at odds with our settled precedent: We have long applied an 'objective standard' in determining whether an employer's actions have forced an employee to resign. Serrano-Cruz, 109 F.3d at 26 (citing Calhoun, 798 F.2d at 561). The test is whether a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign Calhoun, 798 F.2d at 561 (emphasis added), irrespective of employer intent. 3 16 Davis & Geck cites language in our Calhoun opinion in arguing for consideration of the employer's intent. In Calhoun, we used an extended quote from a Fourth Circuit opinion which reads in part: An employee is protected from a calculated effort to pressure him [or her] into resignation through the imposition of unreasonably harsh conditions, in excess of those faced by his [or her] coworkers. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir.1985)). Although this reference to a calculated effort may suggest that proof of the employer's intent is an element of the constructive discharge, we articulated the constructive discharge standard in Calhoun as an objective one and we have not required proof of employer intent in subsequent cases. 4 See id.; Serrano-Cruz, 109 F.3d at 26; Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 3 F.3d 476, 481 (1st Cir.1993). 17 Indeed, such a requirement would be inconsistent with the purpose of the constructive discharge doctrine to protect employees from conditions so unreasonably harsh that a reasonable person would feel compelled to leave the job. The doctrine reflects the sensible judgment that employers charged with employment discrimination ought to be accountable for creating working conditions that are so intolerable to a reasonable employee as to compel that person to resign. One can imagine an employer who subjectively desires an employee to remain, so long as the employee is willing to accept unreasonable, oppressive conditions. Such an employer commits a constructive discharge. In this case, the jury was free to find that a constructive discharge had occurred without proof of Davis & Geck's intent to cause such a discharge.