Opinion ID: 1384601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: constitutional challenges under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, united states constitution

Text: The plaintiffs claim that the Oklahoma school financing system violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Section 1 of that amendment provides that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. This clause is intended to safeguard the quality of governmental treatment against arbitrary discrimination. [28] Under equal protection analysis, legislative enactments ordinarily are presumed to be valid. [29] This presumption disappears when the statutory classification impacts upon a fundamental right or a suspect class or if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objective. [30] In these situations, a more scrutinizing review will be employed to determine the constitutionality of the legislation. The United States Supreme Court dealt with the constitutionality of financing public education in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, [31] which involved an equal protection challenge to the financing system in Texas. Under that system, apart from federal assistance, each school district received funds from the state and through local ad valorem taxation. The state's contribution under the Minimum Foundation Program was designed to provide an adequate minimal educational offering in every school in the state. In addition, the state made payments to each district for specific purposes such as teachers' salaries. Each district supplemented this aid through an ad valorem tax on property within its boundaries. In some districts, the local property tax contribution was insubstantial, whereas in others the local share may have exceeded the total Foundation grant. Although local differences were attributable in part to differences in the rate of taxation or in assessment practices, the greatest disparities resulted from differences in the amount of the assessable property within the districts. Local sources constituted approximately 41% of the revenues available for public education. The plaintiff brought an action on behalf of school children who resided in districts having a low property tax base, claiming that the system's reliance on local property taxation violated equal protection requirements because of substantial inter-district disparities in per-pupil expenditures. In determining the appropriate standard of review for purposes of equal protection analysis, the United States Supreme Court rejected the strict scrutiny test for such legislation. First, the Court held that no suspect classification based upon wealth had been shown. It is not sufficient to establish simply that (1) the burdens of paying are greater for some than for others, and (2) there are only relative differences in the quality of the benefits received rather than an absolute deprivation thereof. In short, the court stated, at least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. [32] The plaintiffs here do not claim that the children in districts having relatively low assessable property values are receiving no public education, but rather that they enjoy fewer educational opportunities than those available to children in districts having more assessable wealth. Nor does this case involve a fundamental right in the sense of one among the rights and liberties protected by the federal constitution. The Court in Rodriguez recognized the importance of education, acknowledging that it is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. [33] But the Court held that the importance of a service performed by the state does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause; rather, the issue is whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. [34] The Court found that education was not among the rights so guaranteed, especially where only relative differences in spending were involved and where no charge could be made that the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire at least the basic minimal skills necessary to enjoy constitutionally protected rights. [35] The Supreme Court also gave several other reasons why strict scrutiny was inappropriate for the Texas school finance system. First, this standard has been employed where the challenged legislation has deprived or interfered with the free exercise of some fundamental right or liberty. But the Texas system did not restrict or deny anyone the right to an education. To the contrary, the system was intended to extend public education and to improve its quality. Second, such a challenge is a direct attack on the way in which the state has chosen to raise and disburse state and local tax revenues. Third, the area of education presents a myriad of `intractable economic, social and even philosophical problems.' [36] In such a case, the Court reasoned, it is better to defer to the legislature's wisdom and to require only that the system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes. [37] The purpose behind the Texas system which the Supreme Court found to be legitimate was local control. The Texas system was responsive to the competing forces of (1) the desire by society to have educational opportunity for all children and (2) the desire of each family to provide the best education it can afford for its own children. While assuring a basic education for every child, the system permitted and encouraged a large measure of participation and control at the local level. In this regard the Texas system constituted a `rough accommodation' of interests in an effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions. [38] Although the system resulted in unequal expenditures between children residing in different districts, the Supreme Court held that the system was not so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory. Rather, the Texas system abundantly satisfied the traditional constitutional standard of rationally furthering a legitimate state purpose or interest. [39] The Court reaffirmed the Rodriguez decision in Plyler v. Doe. [40] In that case the Court struck down as unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause a Texas statute which barred from public education children who were not legally admitted into the United States. Once again stating that education is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, the Court held that where a state completely denies an education to a discrete group of innocent children, the state must show that this furthers some substantial state interest. [41] The present case does not involve a class-based denial of public education which would be incompatible with the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs here have not alleged that they have been absolutely denied a free public education, nor that they are not receiving an adequate one. Instead, they claim only that they are not able to provide as much money per pupil as do other districts. Under the decisions in Rodriguez and Plyler, such distinction does not constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs apparently acknowledge that Rodriguez is the controlling authority in this area. But they claim that before the application of Rodriguez can be determined, factual devedopment is necessary to show (1) whether there is a legitimate, articulated state purpose to the Oklahoma system, and (2) whether there is any rational relationship between such purpose and the present method of financing public education. They also allege that the Oklahoma system is unconstitutional even under the Rodriguez standard because this system differs from that of Texas. Article 18 of the School Code, 70 O.S. 1981 §§ 18-101 et seq., provides for the present State Aid program. Section 18-101 contains a declaration of legislative intent, policies and principles relative to that article. This section provides in pertinent part: The Legislature hereby declares that this act is passed for the general improvement of the public schools in the State of Oklahoma; to provide the best possible educational opportunities for every child in Oklahoma; and to have a more beneficial use of public funds expended for education; and this act shall be liberally construed to attain these goals within the purview of the following principles and policies:    Following this text is a series of ten principles and policies by which the public school support system should be guided. Among those enumerated in § 18-101 are (1) that the school system be designed to strengthen and encourage local responsibility for control of public education, with the maximum public autonomy and responsibility remaining at the local level; (2) that the system assure that state and local funds are adequate for the support of a realistic foundation program; and (3) that state support be extended to all local districts regardless of their wealth, thereby developing a sense of broader responsibility and permitting the exercise of local initiative through flexible taxation. In short, § 18-101 creates a partnership between the state and the local districts in support of education, with a strong emphasis on local control. The plaintiffs claim that the purpose of State Aid is to provide the best possible educational opportunities for every child in the state, and that the present system of financing public education fails to achieve this purpose because it does not equalize per-pupil expenditures for each district. This purpose is but one among several enumerated in § 18-101. Moreover, although equalization of funding may be a desirable objective, there simply is nothing in the statute to suggest that this is necessary beyond the requirements of the Foundation Program. The plaintiffs also claim that local control is not the purpose of the school finance system but was raised by the defendants because it was held to be a legitimate state purpose in Rodriguez. There is simply no doubt that local participation and control are an objective of the Oklahoma scheme, because these are expressly mentioned in 70 O.S. 1981 § 18-101. It is well established that where the legislature explicitly states its intentions, that statement of intent is not open to question. [42] In addition, this statute was enacted in 1971, almost two years before the Rodriguez decision. Because the objective of local control over education is one which is both constitutionally legitimate and explicitly intended by the Legislature, there is not a factual issue to be determined in this regard. The plaintiffs also assert that there is doubt as to whether the Oklahoma system actually furthers local control of education. They argue that the system does not provide the same degree of fiscal flexibility to all districts and that local control could be preserved under other systems that would result in great equality in educational expenditures. The Court acknowledged these arguments in Rodriguez but found them insufficient to support a constitutional challenge there. While admitting that reliance on local taxation for school revenues provides less freedom of choice regarding expenditures for some districts, the Court held that a system may not be struck down simply because other methods may involve lesser disparities. [43] The relative desirability of a system, as compared to alternative methods, is not constitutionally relevant as long as there is some rational basis for it. The plaintiffs next argue that Rodriguez is not applicable here because of differences in the Texas and Oklahoma systems. We agree that Rodriguez does not automatically foreclose an examination of the Oklahoma financing system and that differences in each state's system may be considered. We do not find that the two systems are so dissimilar that a different result should be reached here. Despite the similarities described above, there is a clear difference between the Texas and Oklahoma systems. Article 10 § 9 of the Oklahoma Constitution limits the amount of ad valorem tax which may be levied for a school district's general operating fund, and Article 10 § 10 limits the amount which may be raised by ad valorem taxes for a building fund. In addition, Article 10 § 26 limits the amount of indebtedness which a school district may incur in any one year to an amount, including existing indebtedness, up to ten percent of the valuation of the taxable property within the district. The plaintiffs allege that they have imposed upon themselves the full amount of these taxes but still are unable to raise as much money as can wealthier districts. The Court recognized this problem in Rodriguez. Since the ceiling there did not bar any desired tax increase in any district at that time, the Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of such limitations. [44] We do not believe that these restrictions render the present financing system unconstitutional. The purpose of the limitations on incurring indebtedness is to require school boards to conduct their operations on a cash basis and to prevent their pledging future revenues; and the United States Supreme Court previously has held that such limitations are valid. [45] It is also reasonable and proper for the people of a state to limit the degree of taxation to which they will subject themselves. In sum, we find no requirement under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution that a state's school financing system guarantee equal expenditures per child.