Opinion ID: 184660
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Joinder of Local Threats Charge with Federal Weapons Charges

Text: 15 Appellant argues that the joinder of the threats charge with the firearm and ammunition counts was improper under Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(a), and, accordingly, that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the threats charge. 10 16 The district court possesses jurisdiction over a D.C.Code offense only if the 'offense is joined in the same information or indictment with [a] Federal offense.'  United States v. Koritko, 870 F.2d 738, 739 (D.C.Cir.1989) (quoting 11 D.C.Code Ann. § 502(3) (1981)). Joined means properly joined in accordance with Rule 8(a), Fed.R.Crim.P. Id. See also United States v. Jackson, 562 F.2d 789, 793 (D.C.Cir.1977). To be properly joined under Rule 8(a), offenses must be of the same or similar character or based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. 17 Admittedly, Rule 8 has generally been construed liberally in favor of joinder. See United States v. Gibbs, 904 F.2d 52, 56 (D.C.Cir.1990) ([J]oint trials may be preferred, given the heavy and increasing criminal case load in our trial courts.). However, joinder under Rule 8 is not infinitely malleable: it cannot be stretched to cover offenses, like those here, which are discrete and dissimilar and which do not constitute parts of a common scheme or plan. Moreover, joinder in this case has jurisdictional implications: in contrast to joinder cases involving two or more federal offenses, where a court need only determine whether to conduct one or several trials, in this case the court lacked jurisdiction altogether over the threats charge if it was not properly joined with the federal offenses. See Jackson, 562 F.2d at 797. And, as the Jackson court noted, because Congress has determined that D.C. crimes should generally be tried in the D.C. courts, 11 the joinder provisions of Rule 8 should not be strained to uphold federal jurisdiction over local crimes. Id. 18 We believe that Rule 8 was strained beyond tolerable limits to provide jurisdiction over the local threats charge. In order for offenses discrete and dissimilar on their faces to be properly joined under Rule 8, there must be some logical relationship between them. See United States v. Perry, 731 F.2d 985, 990 (D.C.Cir.1984). The government argues that these offenses are logically connected in a but for sequential relationship: but for the arrest of appellant on the weapons charges, he would not have been motivated to threaten Officer Creamer. We disagree. Offenses do not become logically related solely by way of an intervening arrest; that is, the fact that an intervening arrest brings preceding and succeeding offenses together temporally or precipitatively simply does not suffice to create the logical relationship contemplated by Rule 8 which requires that they be connected together or constitut[e] parts of a common scheme or plan. 19 Also militating against joinder in this case is the fact that there was no overlap of issues or evidence between the weapons and threats offenses, thus one of the primary purposes behind Rule 8 joinder, judicial economy, never came into play: In determining whether offenses are based on 'acts or transactions connected together,' the predominant consideration is whether joinder would serve the goals of trial economy and convenience; the primary purpose of this kind of joinder is to insure that a given transaction need only be proved once. Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 971 (D.C.Cir.1968). Where there is substantial overlap in evidence between two offenses, joinder eliminate[s] the need to prove substantially the same evidence twice over, thus realizing precisely the kind of economy envisaged by Rule 8(a). Blunt v. United States, 404 F.2d 1283, 1288 (D.C.Cir.1968). Where there is no substantial overlap in evidence and particularly where the evidence necessary to prove each of the offenses would be inadmissible in a trial of the other, judicial economy does not favor joinder. Cf. United States v. Leonard, 445 F.2d 234, 236 (D.C.Cir.1971) (The critical element of the case ... is the simple fact that [evidence surrounding the joined offense] would have been admissible in evidence in a [separate] trial.... In this situation the joinder of offenses promotes the kind of efficiency of administration of criminal justice that is the objective of Rule 8.). In the instant case, there was no evidence necessary to prove the threats offense which was also necessary--or even admissible, see discussion below--to prove the weapons offenses. Judicial economy did not favor joinder in this case. 20 In sum, we find that the D.C.Code threats charge was not properly joined with the federal weapons charges under Rule 8(a) and that the district court therefore erred in failing to dismiss it as requested by appellant in pretrial motion. Accordingly, we reverse the threats conviction and dismiss the charge for lack of jurisdiction.