Opinion ID: 2757661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disqualification, Discovery, and Sanctions

Text: In this issue on appeal, Blake contends that the postconviction court should have granted his motion to disqualify Assistant State Attorney John Aguero and the Office of the State Attorney for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, his motion for discovery as it pertained to Aguero, and his motion for sanctions. The postconviction court did not err in denying these motions.
A ruling on a motion to disqualify is reviewed for abuse of discretion. McWatters v. State, 36 So. 3d 613, 636 (Fla. 2010). “Under the abuse of discretion -7- standard of review, a ruling will be upheld unless the ruling is ‘arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.’ ” Banks v. State, 46 So. 3d 989, 997 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Lugo v. State, 2 So. 3d 1, 19 (Fla. 2008)). “Disqualification of a state attorney is appropriate ‘only to prevent the accused from suffering prejudice that he otherwise would not bear.’ ” McWatters, 36 So. 3d at 636 (quoting Farina v. State, 680 So. 2d 392, 395-96 (Fla. 1996)). In other words, disqualification is a prophylactic remedy for likely future prejudice, not a punishment for past wrongdoing. Moreover, “[a]ctual prejudice is ‘something more than the mere appearance of impropriety.’ ” Downs v. Moore, 801 So. 2d 906, 914 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119, 1129 (Fla. 2000)). In this case, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying Blake’s motion to disqualify. In September 2011, Aguero served a subpoena on Rosa Greenbaum, who at the time was working as an investigator for Blake’s defense team. The subpoena, which required Greenbaum to appear before a grand jury, appeared to be related to Greenbaum’s interview with Teresa Jones (Teresa), who the defense hoped would testify at the postconviction evidentiary hearing. Although Aguero agreed to withdraw the subpoena and reissue it after Blake’s evidentiary hearing, Greenbaum resigned from Blake’s case and refused to testify at the evidentiary hearing. -8- In October 2011, Blake filed a motion to disqualify Aguero and the Office of the State Attorney. First, Blake alleged that Aguero acted in an unethical manner designed to prevent Greenbaum from testifying. Blake explained that he was prejudiced because Greenbaum had a familiarity with the case and a rapport with the witnesses that a new investigator would not be able to duplicate. Second, Blake alleged that Aguero should be disqualified because he had caused “undue interference on the ability to produce [Teresa] as a witness.” Blake asserted that Aguero communicated with Teresa and that as a result of those communications, Teresa became unwilling to speak to the defense. Third, Blake alleged that disqualification was necessary because Aguero “injected himself into the litigation and will undoubtedly be a witness in Mr. Blake’s postconviction case.” In December 2011, Blake supplemented his motion to disqualify, alleging that Aguero’s effort to have Teresa brought to Florida for her deposition was an attempt to curry favor with Teresa by enabling her to visit a sick relative. In June 2012, the postconviction court denied Blake’s motion to disqualify. The postconviction court concluded that Aguero’s “actions were intended to drive Ms. Greenbaum . . . from the witness stand.” State v. Blake, No. CF02-05203AXX at 1 (Fla. 10th Cir. Ct. Jun. 18, 2012). The postconviction court also concluded, however, that because the defense was given a nine-month delay in which to obtain and work with a new investigator, Blake was not actually -9- prejudiced. After reviewing Teresa’s deposition that was taken in January 2012 and her June 2012 testimony, the postconviction court concluded that there was no evidence that Teresa was driven from the witness stand by Aguero. The postconviction court correctly concluded that Blake has not demonstrated actual prejudice. In Huggins v. State, 889 So. 2d 743, 768 (Fla. 2004), this Court determined that disqualification of the prosecutor was not required where the defendant was retried due to a Brady violation by the prosecutor at the original trial. This Court concluded that disqualification was unnecessary because Huggins would not bear any actual prejudice caused by the prosecutor’s continued participation. This Court explained that the grant of a new trial corrected the prejudice caused by the prosecutor’s misconduct and that if “[the prosecutor] had been disqualified, another prosecutor simply would have replaced him.” Id. at 768-69. As a result, “disqualification would not have provided any further remedy.” Id. at 768. In contrast, disqualification is appropriate where the disqualification will prevent actual prejudice from occurring. For example, in Reaves v. State, 574 So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla. 1991), this Court concluded that the trial court should have granted a motion to disqualify a prosecutor where the prosecutor previously represented the defendant. The Court explained that disqualification was necessary - 10 - because the prior representation involved or likely involved confidential communications that were relevant to the new case. Id. Blake’s allegations relating to Greenbaum’s resignation and Teresa’s reluctance to testify are more similar to the allegation of prejudice in Huggins than to the allegation of prejudice in Reaves. Even if Aguero acted in bad faith when communicating with Greenbaum and Teresa, Blake did not demonstrate that if Aguero were disqualified, Greenbaum would return or Teresa would become willing to testify for the defense. Blake’s argument that Aguero should have been disqualified because Aguero was likely to be called to testify about Greenbaum and Teresa is also without merit. This Court previously concluded that disqualification is not required in such a circumstance. See Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 666 (Fla. 2000) (“Thompson argues that the trial court should have granted defense counsel’s motion to disqualify the Assistant State Attorney so that the defense could call him as a witness concerning the availability of witness Savage. However, the trial court is not required to grant a motion to disqualify just because the defense would like to call the State as a witness.”).
Also in October 2011, Blake filed a motion for discovery in which he sought leave to depose Teresa and Aguero “in relation to the contacts between [Teresa] - 11 - and the State since March, 2011” and to obtain “all notes, memorandum, e-mail or recordings of the contacts between the State and [Teresa].” The motion was granted as to Teresa but denied as to Aguero. “A trial court’s determination with regard to a discovery request is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” Overton v. State, 976 So. 2d 536, 548 (Fla. 2007). In Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1279 (Fla. 2005), this Court addressed a postconviction court’s discretion to grant a motion to depose a judge or prosecutor and explained: [I]t is within the trial judge’s inherent authority to allow limited prehearing discovery during postconviction proceedings. We set forth the following parameters for such discovery: the motion seeking discovery must set forth good reason; the court may grant limited discovery into matters which are relevant and material; the court may set limits on the sources and scope of such discovery; and on review of orders limiting or denying discovery, the moving party has the burden of showing an abuse of discretion. In deciding whether to allow this limited form of discovery, the trial judge must consider the issues presented, the elapsed time between the conviction and the postconviction hearing, any burdens placed on the opposing party and witnesses, alternative means of securing the evidence, and any other relevant facts. (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In this case, the record of the hearing on Blake’s motion demonstrates that the postconviction court considered the factors identified in Rodriguez and considered the relative burdens placed on the parties. Specifically, the postconviction court recognized that Blake had a right to investigate whether there were inappropriate contacts between Aguero and - 12 - Teresa but also recognized Aguero’s work product privilege. In addition, the postconviction court considered whether the evidence regarding Aguero’s communications with Teresa could be secured by “alternative means”—such as by deposing Teresa. This record demonstrates that the postconviction court applied the correct legal standard when ruling on Blake’s motion, and Blake has not demonstrated that it was unreasonable for the court to conclude that the defense could obtain the relevant information from Teresa. Accordingly, Blake has not demonstrated that the postconviction court abused its discretion in denying his motion.
Blake also filed a motion for sanctions. Based on the conduct outlined in the motion to disqualify, Blake argued that the State should provide immunity to Greenbaum and Teresa, and that if the State refused, the postconviction court should grant Blake a new trial. The State refused to grant the potential witnesses immunity, and the postconviction court denied Blake’s motion for a new trial. Again, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying Blake’s motion. See Lightbourne v. State, 438 So. 2d 380, 390 (Fla. 1983) (applying abuse of discretion standard to trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to impose sanctions as a result of a discovery violation). - 13 - Blake relies on Hendrix v. State, 82 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), and Lee v. State, 324 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Those cases are not comparable to the instant case. Hendrix and Lee, both decisions on direct appeal, addressed preserved objections to improper prosecutorial conduct that occurred at the time of trial. In Blake’s case, the alleged threatening of a witness occurred during the postconviction period. Thus, the analogous remedy—if warranted—would be to restart the postconviction proceeding, not to grant a new trial for a defendant who has not shown that his convictions were unreliable. In addition, Florida’s rules and statutes do not support Blake’s motion for sanctions. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(n)(1) provides that upon violation of a discovery rule or order, the court may order the offending party to comply with the rule, grant a continuance, grant a mistrial, prohibit the introduction of undisclosed evidence, or enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. Rule 3.220(n)(2) provides that upon finding a “[w]illful violation,” the court may impose sanctions such as, but not limited to, contempt proceedings and the assessment of costs. Section 914.22, Florida Statutes (2011), sets out criminal sanctions for interfering with a witness’s appearance or testimony. Neither the rule nor the statute contemplates that a trial court presiding over a postconviction proceeding could grant the convicted defendant a new trial as a result of the prosecutor’s interference with a postconviction witness. - 14 -