Opinion ID: 2786086
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Strategy

Text: At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel acknowledged that she had failed to request a facilitation instruction, not for strategic purposes, but because of her inexperience in the practice of criminal defense. On direct examination, trial counsel explained her failure to request a facilitation instruction as follows: AI don=t know why I didn=t ask for facilitation. . . . Thinking back, I=m sure I should have. I don=t know if I was real familiar with facilitation at that time. . . . I was sort of . . . new in the law.@ She further testified that lesser included offenses were Aunfamiliar to [her], . . . back at that time.@ On cross-examination by the State, counsel testified that she did not remember any conversation between the trial court and the prosecution about the inclusion of a facilitation instruction. Finally, on re-direct examination, counsel was specifically asked whether it was Astrategy on [her] part to fail to request a facilitation instruction,@ to which she replied, ANo, it was no strategy.@ She also admitted that prior to trial neither she nor any of the other attorneys involved in the case had researched or discussed the possible lesser included offenses. second and third transactions by calling the supplier of the pills, meeting with Knowles to await the arrival of the drug dealer, approaching the drug dealer=s vehicle to obtain the pills, transferring the pills to Knowles in exchange for money, and then handing the money to the drug dealer in the vehicle. Moreover, there was a complete lack of evidence that the Petitioner somehow benefitted from the transactions; he even gave Knowles change during the second transaction. In summary, while the Petitioner may not have testified using the exact words of the facilitation statuteCwhich is understandable considering his counsel=s lack of knowledge on this issueCthe evidence nonetheless supported a facilitation instruction. 7 The post-conviction court did not discredit any portion of trial counsel=s testimony. For this reason alone I would find that counsel=s failure to request a jury instruction on facilitation was not a strategic decision and amounted to deficient performance. 5 See Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089 (2014) (AAn attorney=s ignorance of a point of law that is fundamental to his case combined with his failure to perform basic research on that point is a quintessential example of unreasonable performance under Strickland.@). The majority, however, implies that counsel must have been untruthful at the post-conviction hearing because her Aactions at trial contradict her statements.@ According to the majority, counsel=s Afailure to request [a facilitation] instruction was not an oversight@ because to request such an instruction would have undermined the defense theory of entrapment. Respectfully, I cannot agree. Aside from the uncontroverted testimony of trial counsel that she did not make a strategic decision to forgo a facilitation instruction, there is no reason why counsel could not have argued both entrapment and facilitation, just as she had argued both entrapment and simple possession or casual exchange. In fact, the transcript reflects that trial counsel did make an argument that would have supported a finding of facilitation when she told the jury, A[The Petitioner] profits nothing. . . . He=s the middleman. He=s the middleman. When that UPS truck pulls up and rings the doorbell and gets a package and gives it to someone else it belongs to in the house, that person=s the middle person. They didn=t . . . sell.@ While these facts are irrelevant to an argument based on simple possession or casual exchange, they fit closely with the definition of facilitation. Compare Tenn. Code Ann. ' 39-17-418(a) (defining simple possession and casual exchange without reference to any person other than the person charged with the offense), with Tenn. Code Ann. ' 39-11-403(a) (defining facilitation to include one person=s knowledge that another person intends to commit the charged offense). The theory of an entrapment defense is that a person would not have committed a crime but for inducement by the police. Here, trial counsel had an evidentiary basis to argue that the Petitioner would not have facilitated the drug transactions but for inducement by Knowles, a confidential informant. Because these theories are not inconsistent, the fact that counsel argued the defense of entrapment at 5 The majority correctly states that Athe post-conviction court neither accredited nor discredited trial counsel=s testimony,@ implying that the court was silent on this point, because Athe [post-conviction] court had an independent basis for finding no deficient performance.@ In other words, the majority acknowledges that the post-conviction court did not deny relief based on a finding that counsel for the Petitioner was not credible. Instead, as discussed above, the court denied relief on the mistaken basis that Athe proof in this case fail[ed] to establish the . . . existence of >another person= who participated in the commission of the crime[s].@ Bryant, 2013 WL 4401166, at . Because counsel was not discredited, and the post-conviction court=s denial of relief was based upon an inaccurate statement of the evidence, I can only conclude that counsel was deficient. 8 trial does not establish that she was untruthful about her strategy, or lack thereof, at the post-conviction hearing. Of greater importance, the presentation of various defense theories is not a bar to an instruction on a lesser included offense so long as Athe record contains any evidence which reasonable minds could accept as to the lesser included offense,@ Tenn. Code Ann. ' 40-18-110(a) (emphasis added). See, e.g., State v. Brown, 311 S.W.3d 422, 431 (Tenn. 2010) (A[T]he trial court=s duty to instruct on a lesser-included offense is not contingent upon the lesser-included offense being consistent with the theory of the State or the defendant . . . .@). The evidence is what drives the consideration of lesser included offenses. The majority implies that the theories of the State and defense counsel dictate how the evidence is to be construed by the jury. In my view, however, trial theories and arguments by counsel are not relevant to whether Athe record contains any evidence which reasonable minds could accept as to the lesser included offense.@ In this instance, because the proof at trial was sufficient to support an instruction on facilitation as a lesser included offense, 6 and counsel candidly admitted that her failure to request such an instruction was not a strategic decision, the Petitioner was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.