Opinion ID: 712987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Duplicative Aggravating Factors

Text: 115 Mr. McCullah contends that the district court erred in submitting duplicative and cumulative aggravating factors to the jury. We agree. 116 The district court submitted to the jury both the § 848(n)(1)(C) statutory aggravating factor, intentionally engaged in conduct intending that the victim be killed or that lethal force be employed against the victim, which resulted in death of the victim, and the non-statutory aggravating factor, committed the offenses as to which he is charged in the indictment. These two factors substantially overlap with one another. In order for the jury to find that Mr. McCullah committed the offenses with which he was charged, the jury necessarily had to conclude that Mr. McCullah did intentionally kill an individual, or did intentionally counsel, command, induce, procure, or cause the killing of an individual, and such killing did result or happen. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(e). 117 The district court also submitted to the jury both the Section 848(n)(1)(C) and (n)(1)(D) statutory aggravating factors. The (n)(1)(D) factor requires that the defendant intentionally engages in conduct which he knows creates a grave risk of death and that such death results. 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(1)(D). This substantially overlaps with the (n)(1)(C) factor which refers to intentional conduct intending that the victim be killed. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(1)(C). Any intentional conduct aimed at producing death is by definition conduct done with knowledge of grave risk of death. While the factors are not identical per se, the (n)(1)(C) factor necessarily subsumes the (n)(1)(D) factor. 118 Such double counting of aggravating factors, especially under a weighing scheme, has a tendency to skew the weighing process and creates the risk that the death sentence will be imposed arbitrarily and thus, unconstitutionally. Cf. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 230-32, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1137, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992). As the Supreme Court of Utah pointed out, when the same aggravating factor is counted twice, the defendant is essentially condemned 'twice for the same culpable act,'  which is inherently unfair. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 529 (Utah) (quoting Cook v. State, 369 So.2d 1251, 1256 (Ala.1979)), cert. denied, U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 431, 130 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994). While the federal statute at issue is a weighing statute which allows the jury to accord as much or as little weight to any particular aggravating factor, the mere finding of an aggravating factor cannot but imply a qualitative value to that factor. Cf. Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 89 (Wyo.1991). When the sentencing body is asked to weigh a factor twice in its decision, a reviewing court cannot assume it would have made no difference if the thumb had been removed from death's side of the scale. Stringer, 503 U.S. at 232, 112 S.Ct. at 1137. In Stringer the Supreme Court made it clear that: 119 When the weighing process itself has been skewed, only constitutional harmless-error analysis or reweighing at the trial or appellate level suffices to guarantee that the defendant received an individualized sentence. 120 Id. We hold that the use of duplicative aggravating factors creates an unconstitutional skewing of the weighing process which necessitates a reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors. 121 To the extent that Congress wants a particular aggravating factor to receive enhanced weight in the sentencing process, it can provide for such enhancement in the statute itself. However, Congress elected not to do so, and the prosecutor cannot attempt to circumvent Congress's inaction by introducing the same factor in a different guise a second time.