Opinion ID: 2972169
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Review of Supreme Court Law

Text: Warden Birkett first argues that the district court’s decision to grant the writ of habeas corpus was improper because “[a]lthough the [Supreme] Court has commented on the constitutionality of restraining criminal defendants during trial, there is no Supreme Court case directly addressing a case in which a criminal defendant was tried while wearing visible leg irons.” A brief review of Supreme Court cases related to prejudicial trappings at trial is thus warranted. In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), the Court held that where a prisoner was intentionally disruptive at trial, and where he was informed that he could remain in the courtroom as long as he ceased his disruptions, his constitutional right to be present throughout his trial was waived when he chose to continue disrupting the proceedings. In so holding, Justice Black noted for the Court that: [t]rying a defendant for a crime while he sits bound and gagged before the judge and jury would to an extent comply with that part of the Sixth Amendment’s purposes that accords the defendant an opportunity to confront the witnesses at trial. But even to contemplate such a technique, much less see it, arouses a feeling that no defendant should be tried while shackled and gagged except as a last resort. Not only is it possible that the sight of shackles and gags might have a significant effect on the jury’s feelings about the defendant, but the use of this technique is itself something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold. Id. at 344. Nonetheless, the Court held that in some situations, binding and gagging a defendant might be appropriate, due to safety or security concerns for all parties involved in the trial. Id. In Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), the Court noted that when a defendant who was not incarcerated on some other charge was forced to appear before a jury in prison clothing, the “clothing is so likely to be a continuing influence throughout the trial that . . . an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play.” Id. at 504. However, because the defendant had failed to object at trial to being forced to wear prison garb, the Court held that “although the State cannot, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes, the failure to make an objection to the court . . . is sufficient to negate the presence of a compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation.” Id. at 512-13. Again, the Court implied how prejudicial it believed the defendant’s appearance to be, but its holding cannot fairly be said to involve specifically the binding of a defendant. But see McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984) (describing Estelle as recognizing “that [defendants] may not normally be forced to appear in court in shackles or prison garb”). Finally, in Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986), the Court considered “whether the conspicuous, or at least noticeable, deployment of security personnel in a courtroom during trial is the sort of inherently prejudicial practice that, like shackling, should be permitted only where justified by an essential state interest specific to each trial.” Id. at 568-69. While considering the stationing of numerous security officers near the front of a courtroom during a criminal trial, the Court held, in a pre-AEDPA context, that: [a]ll a federal court may do in such a situation is look at the scene presented to jurors and determine whether what they saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to defendant’s right to a fair trial; if the challenged practice is not found inherently prejudicial and if the defendant fails to show actual prejudice, the inquiry is over.” No. 04-1826 Ruimveld v. Birkett Page 5 Id. at 572. The Court thus affirmed the conviction, finding that the defendant had not shown either that the row of security officers was prejudicial or that his case was actually prejudiced thereby. These are the only three Supreme Court cases that discuss directly how shackling or other “indicia of guilt” at trial could potentially prejudice a defendant’s case.2 The Michigan state appellate court clearly found that “[f]reedom from shackling is an important component of a fair trial,” and that “there is no record evidence that defendant presented any of the risks that shackling is intended to prevent.” Ruimveld, 2001 WL 793872, at . Accordingly, it concluded that “the trial court abused its discretion by ordering [Ruimveld] to remain shackled during trial.” Id. However, it affirmed Ruimveld’s conviction on the grounds that “any error in the present case regarding defendant’s shackling was . . . harmless” because “[t]he jury was aware . . . that defendant was not only the accused in a criminal trial, but was currently incarcerated . . . on an unrelated charge. Id. While this fact did not justify defendant’s shackling,” the court held that “precisely because of this fact, the jury did not place any unfair importance on defendant’s being shackled during trial.” Id. Before our Court, the State does not dispute that Ruimveld’s shackling was error, but instead argues, as did the majority on the state appellate court, that any such error was harmless. The parties do agree that Ruimveld had neither a criminal history nor a prison disciplinary record that would warrant any additional or unusual protections in the courtroom during trial. As a result, we need not determine whether Ruimveld’s shackling constituted constitutional error, since the state court clearly found that it did. Ruimveld, 2001 WL 793872, at  (applying Michigan state cases which state conclusions effectively equivalent to those in Allen, regarding when shackling is permitted); cf. Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 110-11 (6th Cir. 1973) (detailing factors to consider when determining whether or not shackling constitutes constitutional error); United States v. Waagner, 104 Fed. Appx. 521, 526-27 (6th Cir. Jul. 14, 2004) (unpublished opinion) (applying Kennedy factors in recent case). Rather, this Court effectively must answer two questions, based on its review of applicable Supreme Court precedent. First, we must determine whether constitutionally erroneous shackling is so inherently prejudicial that it could never be found to be harmless. If so, then the state court’s conclusion that Ruimveld’s shackling constituted harmless error was contrary to established Supreme Court law, and the district court’s grant of the writ should be upheld. However, if shackling can sometimes constitute harmless error, we must then determine whether the state court’s determination that Ruimveld’s shackling constituted harmless error was unreasonable. If clearly established Federal law as enunciated by the holdings of the Supreme Court would have us answer “yes” to either of these questions, this Court must affirm the district court’s grant of the writ.