Opinion ID: 203232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motions to Suppress and Dismiss

Text: We apply a mixed standard of review to the district court's denial of a suppression motion, reviewing the court's findings of fact for clear error and the application of the law to those facts de novo.  Bravo, 489 F.3d at 8 (citing Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1116). Vilches argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the USCG lacked reasonable suspicion to search the Babouth. Vilches further argues that Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were violated because it took five days for the USCG to get the Babouth to port in San Juan. [9] Vilches further contends that he was erroneously denied a suppression hearing and that this error unconstitutionally precluded him from properly developing and supporting his motion to suppress. Vilches also argues that the district court erred in holding that he lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the stop and seizure. Vilches further argues that the warrantless detention of his person for several days constituted a de facto arrest and that the scope of the detention was unreasonable. We are unconvinced by any of Vilches's arguments and take them in turn.
As we have said before, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to activities of the United States against aliens in international waters. Bravo, 489 F.3d at 8; see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquídez, 494 U.S. 259, 267, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990) (There is... no indication that the Fourth Amendment was understood by contemporaries of the Framers to apply to activities of the United States directed against aliens in foreign territory or in international waters.). Vilches is Chilean, and he was not residing in the United States. He was in international waters when he was approached by the USCG. The district court properly dismissed Vilches's Fourth Amendment claim pertaining to the USCG's actions in international waters. The district court also properly extended the same reasoning when it dismissed Vilches's Fourth Amendment claim based on the search of the Babouth at the port in San Juan. In Verdugo-Urquídez, the Supreme Court held that the defendant did not have constitutional rights based on his presence in the United States because constitutional protections only attach to aliens who come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country. Verdugo-Urquídez, 494 U.S. at 271, 110 S.Ct. 1056. Vilches can claim no such substantial connections. Like Verdugo-Urquídez, who was imprisoned in California and had no previous significant voluntary connection to the United States, id., Vilches was brought to the United States for the sole purposes of conducting a safe search of the vessel he captained. [T]his sort of presence  lawful but involuntary  is not of the sort to indicate any substantial connection with our country. Id. In this case, we are unable to say that Vilches's presence at the port in San Juan was completely involuntary because he consented to the search and the USCG's docking the Babouth in San Juan. But even if Verdugo-Urquídez does not apply, Vilches lacks standing to challenge the search. It is well settled that a defendant who fails to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or the item seized will not have `standing' to claim that an illegal search or seizure occurred. United States v. Mancini, 8 F.3d 104, 107 (1st Cir.1993) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-48, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)). In order to make such a showing, Vilches must show that he had both a subjective expectation of privacy and that society accepts that expectation as objectively reasonable. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988); cf. United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 928 (1st Cir.1992). The burden of proving a reasonable expectation of privacy lies with Vilches. United States v. Sánchez, 943 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir.1991). Vilches must demonstrate an expectation of privacy in both the item seized and the place searched. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 93, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980). Vilches cannot make that showing here. [T]he circumstances and exigencies of the maritime setting afford people on a vessel a lesser expectation of privacy than in their homes, obviating the usual fourth amendment requirements of a warrant. United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 53 (1st Cir.1982). As the Government argues, Vilches had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the secret compartment in which the drugs were found. Cf. United States v. Cardona-Sandoval, 6 F.3d 15, 22 (1st Cir.1993) (distinguishing substantial vessels such as cargo ships and freighters from a small pleasure craft used for fishing where captain had reasonable expectation of privacy). Even if Vilches had a subjective expectation of privacy, it was not an objectively reasonable expectation. The district court rightly noted that society would not recognize a justifiable expectation of privacy in a hidden compartment created for the express purpose of hiding illicit contraband. To hold otherwise would grant smugglers standing under the Fourth Amendment solely because they were careful in hiding their illicit merchandise. Vilches-Navarrete, 413 F.Supp.2d at 73-74; see also United States v. Sarda-Villa, 760 F.2d 1232, 1235 (11th Cir.1985) ([W]e are not willing to say that society is prepared to recognize a justifiable expectation of privacy solely on the basis of appellants' efforts to secret the contraband. Drug smugglers cannot assert standing solely on the basis that they hid the drugs well and hoped no one would find them.). As the Supreme Court said in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), a Fourth Amendment search does not occur ... unless `the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search,' and `society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.' Id. at 33, 121 S.Ct. 2038 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986)). The search was valid in any event because the USCG's authority under 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) to stop and board a vessel on the high seas is quite broad. [10] Cardona-Sandoval, 6 F.3d at 23 (internal footnotes omitted). In the instant case, the USCG had consent from Honduras, the vessel's flag country, to board the Babouth and to take it to a U.S. port to complete the search. The USCG also possessed the requisite reasonable and articulable grounds for suspecting that the vessel or those on board [we]re engaging in criminal activity. Green, 671 F.2d at 53. As the USCG's monitored the Babouth, it observed smaller vessels coming into contact with it the night before the USCG boarded the vessel. The following day the USCG detected rub marks along the port side of the Babouth but not its starboard, confirming their belief in suspicious activity. On board, the USCG's found even more evidence of suspicious activity. For example, there was a discrepancy between the number of pallets that the Babouth was carrying and those that were slated for delivery, and the GPS and navigational charts had been erased. Each step of the USCG's search was based on a corresponding level of suspicion supported by specific facts. Cardona-Sandoval, 6 F.3d at 23. In United States v. Berryman, 717 F.2d 651 (1st Cir.1983), we said that although some encounters [with the Government] do not implicate fourth amendment concerns at all, more intrusive encounters short of arrests must be justified by reasonable suspicion proportional to the degree of the intrusion. That suspicion cannot be inchoate, but must be based on `specific and articulable facts ... together with rational inferences from those facts' in order to establish a basis for review of the police actions. Id. at 653 (internal citations omitted). The USCG had the requisite reasonable suspicion. Furthermore, as the district court found, Vilches gave his permission to the boarding team `to access any space on the vessel.' Vilches-Navarrete, 413 F.Supp.2d at 72. Both at sea and at the port in San Juan, Vilches consented to the USCG's boarding of the Babouth and the search of the vessel. At no point did he object to the boarding of the vessel, the search of the vessel, or the taking of the vessel to San Juan. It is ... well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the [Fourth Amendment] requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); see also United States v. Meléndez, 301 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir.2002). Additionally, as mentioned above, Honduras, under whose flag the Babouth sailed, consented to the search of the boat both at sea and in U.S. territory. Accordingly, the denial of the motion to suppress is affirmed.
The test for granting an evidentiary hearing in a criminal case [is] substantive: did the defendant make a sufficient threshold showing that material facts were in doubt or dispute? United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267, 1273 (1st Cir.1990). Vilches made no such showing. A hearing was not necessary to address the suppression issues because in support of his motion, Vilches merely presented the same statements by the USCG as the Government had. Vilches did not dispute the Government's version of events and instead relied upon then. This makes an evidentiary hearing unnecessary since there were no material facts that were in dispute. See id. at 1273-74; United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 225 (1st Cir.1993) ([E]videntiary hearings on motions are the exception, not the rule.).
Vilches's challenge to his arrest is without merit. There was no unreasonable delay between the arrest and Vilches's initial appearance before a magistrate judge. Vilches was arrested the same day that the USCG discovered the drugs on the Babouth, February 7, 2005. He was taken before a magistrate judge the following day. Furthermore, the short interval between when the USCG first boarded and inspected the Babouth and the travel time before the Babouth arrived in San Juan did not result in a custodial detention. See United States v. Baker, 641 F.2d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir.1981) (routine Coast Guard boarding of vessels does not create a custodial situation); cf. United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 535 n. 3 (1st Cir.1985) (It is well recognized that a routine inspection and boarding of an American flagship vessel on the high seas does not give rise to a custodial detention.). The one day between the time Vilches was arrested and when he was brought before the magistrate judge was reasonable, and the district court properly denied his motion to dismiss.