Opinion ID: 2565043
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether second degree attempted murder or first degree assault is the lesser offense for double jeopardy purposes

Text: ¶ 22 The United States Constitution states that no person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Washington Constitution provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9. The federal and state [double jeopardy] provisions afford the same protections and are `identical in thought, substance, and purpose.' In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 142 Wash.2d 165, 171, 12 P.3d 603 (2000) (quoting State v. Schoel, 54 Wash.2d 388, 391, 341 P.2d 481 (1959)). The prohibition against double jeopardy `protect[s] against multiple punishments for the same offense, as well as against a subsequent prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction.' State v. Graham, 153 Wash.2d 400, 404, 103 P.3d 1238 (2005) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Orange, 152 Wash.2d 795, 815, 100 P.3d 291 (2004)). Division One of the Court of Appeals has held that the proper remedy for multiple punishments for the same offense is to vacate the lesser offense. In re Pers. Restraint of Burchfield, 111 Wash.App. 892, 899, 46 P.3d 840 (2002). ¶ 23 In a pretrial hearing before the trial court, the State conceded that if the jury convicted Weber of both the attempted murder and the assault charges, the convictions would constitute double jeopardy because both convictions would punish Weber for the same offense. VRP (June 11, 2003) at 62. The State promised that if the jury convicted Weber on both charges, it would ask the court to vacate the lesser offense. Id. After the jury found Weber guilty of both second degree attempted murder and first degree assault, the trial court vacated the assault conviction because the attempted murder conviction carried the greater seriousness level and required greater intent. VRP (Aug. 8, 2003) at 24. The Court of Appeals reversed, vacating the second degree attempted murder conviction and reinstating the first degree assault conviction because the assault conviction carried the longer sentence. Weber, 127 Wash.App. at 882, ¶ 3, 112 P.3d 1287. ¶ 24 Both Weber and the State agree that the remedy for double jeopardy is to vacate the conviction for the lesser offense, but they dispute which of Weber's two convictions constitutes the lesser offense in this case. Under Washington law, assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted murder. State v. Harris, 121 Wash.2d 317, 321, 849 P.2d 1216 (1993). The State argues that when neither offense is a lesser included offense, the lesser offense for double jeopardy purposes is the offense that carries the lesser sentence. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 23-27. The standard sentence range for first degree assault is slightly higher than the standard sentence range for attempted second degree murder. [6] Therefore, the State argues that second degree attempted murder is the lesser offense in this case. ¶ 25 Weber, on the other hand, asserts that the proper remedy for a double jeopardy violation is still to vacate the conviction for the crime that forms part of the proof of the other unless the Legislature has expressly stated its intent that the crimes be punished separately or the constituent offense stand. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 24 (citing Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 692, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980); State v. Freeman, 153 Wash.2d 765, 775, 108 P.3d 753 (2005)). However, Whalen guides only the determination of whether to impose multiple punishments, not the determination of which conviction a court should vacate once the court has determined that multiple punishments are improper, as is the case here. 445 U.S. at 692, 100 S.Ct. 1432. ¶ 26 Moreover, contrary to Weber's argument, Freeman supports the proposition that the length of sentence is an important consideration in determining which conviction to vacate. In Freeman, this court considered whether the legislature authorized separate punishments for assault and robbery. 153 Wash.2d at 771, 108 P.3d 753. In so considering, the court reasoned that the legislature would not have intended the double jeopardy doctrine to operate in a way that would allow the defendant to receive the lesser sentence. As the legislature is well aware, when a court vacates a conviction on double jeopardy grounds, it usually vacates the conviction for the crime that forms part of the proof of the other. This is because the greater offense typically carries a penalty that incorporates punishment for the lesser included offense. Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 Colum. L.Rev. 1, 28 (1995). But when a first degree assault raises a robbery to first degree robbery, the case is atypical. The standard sentence for first degree assault (in this case, 111 months) is considerably longer than the standard sentence for first degree robbery (in this case, 41 months). Given the fact of the current sentencing schema, it is unlikely the legislature intended this result. While this is not necessarily dispositive, it does weigh upon our analysis. Cf. Burchfield, 111 Wash.App. at 900, 46 P.3d 840 (considering the seriousness level assigned by the legislature when determining how the legislature intended two related crimes to be treated). Id. at 775-76, 108 P.3d 753 (citations omitted). ¶ 27 In Burchfield, Division One of the Court of Appeals similarly focused on length of sentence, in addition to seriousness level and degree of felony, in determining which offense to vacate as the lesser offense. 111 Wash.App. at 900, 46 P.3d 840. The court rejected Burchfield's argument that assault was the lesser offense because it results only in injury, whereas manslaughter results in death. Id. at 899, 46 P.3d 840. If we were to accept Burchfield's argument, resentencing for the `more serious' offense would require a reduction of his sentence from 135 months, the standard range for first degree assault with a weapon enhancement, to 53 months, the standard range for his first degree manslaughter conviction. Id. at 900, 46 P.3d 840. However, Burchfield does not present the same situation as this case because in Burchfield other factors, such as seriousness level and class of felony, also favored vacating manslaughter as the lesser offense. ¶ 28 Because second degree attempted murder and first degree assault are both Class A felonies, Weber argues that the lesser offense should consist of the offense that carries the lesser seriousness level and intent requirement. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 25-27. However, as the State notes, the seriousness level is only another, less direct way of examining which crime involves greater punishment because [u]nder the SRA, the sole purpose of a crime's seriousness level is to calculate the standard range. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 26 (citing RCW 9.94A.510; RCW 9.94A.520). Moreover, the sentencing guidelines do not provide a seriousness level for attempted offenses, making this comparison impossible. [7] Additionally, as the State notes, anticipatory crimes may necessarily require greater intent than a completed crime because they may include the element of intent to commit the completed crime. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 27. ¶ 29 Weber also points to State v. Valentine, 108 Wash.App. 24, 26-27, 29 P.3d 42 (2001), in which Division One of the Court of Appeals considered the remedy for double jeopardy involving the same convictions as in this casesecond degree attempted murder and first degree assault. Pet. for Review at 17-18. The Valentine court summarily vacated the assault conviction without any analysis as to why it constituted the lesser offense. 108 Wash.App. at 29, 29 P.3d 42. However, Valentine is distinguishable from this case because the standard sentence range for the attempted murder conviction was higher than the standard range for the assault conviction in that case. Id. ¶ 30 Other jurisdictions have also held that the lesser crime for double jeopardy purposes is the conviction that carries the lesser punishment. See, e.g., People v. Driggers, 812 P.2d 702, 704 (Colo.Ct.App.1991) (vacating crime with lesser punishment as remedy for double jeopardy); State v. Dillon, 2001 SD 97, 632 N.W.2d 37, 46-47 (2001) (vacating first degree rape conviction because it had lower minimum penalty); People v. Davis, 122 Mich.App. 597, 608-09, 333 N.W.2d 99 (1983) (holding that where lesser included offense provided for longer prison term, remedy for double jeopardy was vacation of greater offense); Landers v. State, 957 S.W.2d 558, 559-61 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (adopting the most serious punishment test in determining which conviction to retain). ¶ 31 Additionally, we note that if Weber had received concurrent sentences for his two convictions, he would be required to serve the longer of the two sentences. RCW 9.94A.589. Thus, retaining the offense that carries the greater sentence is the common sense approach. The facts of this case dictate that we follow the straightforward approach of vacating the offense that carries the lesser sentence as the lesser offense. As a result, we hold that the lesser offense for double jeopardy purposes in this case is second degree attempted murder and affirm the Court of Appeals decision to vacate the second degree murder conviction and reinstate the first degree assault conviction.