Opinion ID: 2162844
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: error to respond to jury inquiry in absence of counsel.

Text: The defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in answering, in the absence of counsel, the first question posed by the deliberating jury. The court of appeals held that it was error for the trial court to respond to the jury's question in the absence of defense counsel, but that the error was harmless since the trial court correctly answered the question. In State v. Stewart, 56 Wis.2d 278, 201 N.W.2d 754 (1972), the jury, while deliberating, wrote out a question and sent it to the trial judge. Neither the defendant nor his counsel was present in court at the time. Without notifying counsel or the defendant, the judge responded to the question by writing a short note to the jury. As here, it was claimed that reversible error occurred because of the exchange of a written communication between the judge and the jury in the absence of the defendant and his counsel. The court, without deciding whether there was waiver, rejected the claim of error and stated the rules regarding communications between the judge and jury in the absence of counsel as follows: . . . Our rule provides that counsel has a right and a duty to be present when additional instructions are requested by the jury. State v. Russell (1958), 5 Wis.2d 196, 92 N.W.2d 210. However, this right may be waived by the absence of counsel from the courtroom during the regular session of the court. State v. Ritchie (1970), 46 Wis.2d 47, 174 N.W.2d 504, and State v. White (1972), 53 Wis.2d 549, 193 N.W.2d 36. When defense counsel is absent from the courtroom the judge can presume it was voluntary and a waiver on his part unless the judge has been informed to the contrary or the judge has personally taken the responsibility to see that counsel is notified. This responsibility cannot be cast upon the court by counsel to be called or to be searched out when counsel knows the court is in session. State v. Ritchie, supra . Counsel must assume the risk as to his own arrangements with the court in being notified when the jury seeks additional instructions during deliberations. State v. Russell, supra . Further, even if there was no waiver and the defense counsel was present in court, this court has held that a communication with the jury would still not be sufficient to warrant a new trial or reversal in the absence of prejudice  that is, the communication to the jury by the judge must constitute prejudicial error. Wegner v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1952), 262 Wis. 402, 55 N.W.2d 420; State v. Sawyer (1953), 263 Wis. 218, 56 N.W.2d 811; Seitz v. Seitz (1967), 35 Wis.2d 282, 151 N.W.2d 86; and State v. White, supra .  Id. at 284, 285. There was no waiver of counsel's right to be present when the jury made its inquiry in the instant case. Before he left the courtroom the defense counsel informed the trial court where he would be while the jury was deliberating. The record reflects that the trial court voluntarily undertook the responsibility of notifying counsel but admittedly did not do so. Upon returning to court and being informed of the communications between the judge and jury in his absence, defense counsel entered an objection. He emphasized the fact that he had notified the court of his whereabouts so he could be reached if he were needed. The trial court advised counsel that they were not notified as to the first inquiry from the jury because he was of the opinion that no consultation or presence was necessary. This case must be distinguished from State v. Russell, 5 Wis.2d 196, 92 N.W.2d 210 (1958), where it was held that no reversible error occurred when the trial court reinstructed the jury in the absence of defense counsel. There the defense counsel informed the trial court that he wished to be present when the jury came in and stated that he would be in his office and could be reached by phone. However, the trial judge did not receive his request or understood the request to mean that counsel wished to be present when the jury came in with a verdict. [1, 2] Since there was no waiver in this case, counsel should have been given the opportunity to confer with the court about the appropriate response to be given to the jury's question. It was error for the trial court to answer the question without notifying counsel. However, the communication between the judge and jury did not result in prejudice to the defendant because the judge correctly answered the jury's question No. The jury in essence asked the trial court whether any person who withdraws from a conspiracy thereby also withdraws from aiding and abetting. Under the provisions of sec. 939.05, Stats., [1] a person is a party to a crime 1) if he directly commits the crime, or 2) if he intentionally aids and abets its commission, or 3) if he is a party to a conspiracy with another to commit it. Conspiracy and aiding and abetting are alternative ways in which a person may be a party to a crime. A conspiracy requires (1) an agreement between two or more persons to direct their conduct toward the realization of a criminal objective and (2) each member of the conspiracy individually consciously intends the realization of the particular criminal objective. Bergeron v. State, 85 Wis.2d 595, 606, 271 N.W.2d 386 (1978); State v. Nutley, 24 Wis.2d 527, 556, 129 N.W.2d 155 (1964), cert. denied 380 U.S. 918 (1965). Aiding and abetting requires that a person (1) undertake conduct (either verbal or overt action) which as a matter of objective fact aids another person in the execution of a crime and (2) he consciously desires or intends that his conduct will yield such assistance. Frankovis v. State, 94 Wis.2d 141, 149, 287 N.W.2d 791 (1980); Krueger v. State, 84 Wis.2d 272, 285, 267 N.W.2d 602 (1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 874 (1978); State v. Asfoor, 75 Wis.2d 411, 427, 249 N.W.2d 529 (1977). If a person is not a party to a crime as a conspirator, either because he never conspired or because prior to its commission he withdrew from the conspiracy, as provided by sec. 939.05(2) (c), he still is a party to the crime if he either directly commits it or if he intentionally aids and abets in its commission. Viewed in the context of this case, the trial judge correctly told the jury that a person who withdraws from a conspiracy does not remove himself from aiding and abetting. Therefore, the communication between the judge and jury did not constitute prejudice to the defendant and the error was harmless by any standard.