Opinion ID: 4513192
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motions to Transfer

Text: Plaintiffs argue on appeal, as they did below, that their cases must be transferred pursuant to the terms of the agreed order of dismissal in the 2013 Rorick lawsuit. That order provides that any subsequent lawsuit stemming from the 2013 dispute between Rorick and defendants “must be re-filed in the Untied States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Covington Division.”4 Plaintiffs take this to mean that “only the Covington Division of the Eastern District of Kentucky possesses both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over this case and the named parties.” Having carefully considered the record on appeal and the briefs of the parties, we are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiffs’ motions to transfer their cases from the Central Division to the Northern Division of the Eastern District of Kentucky. See Newberry v. Service Experts Heating & Air Conditioning LLC, No. 5:17-cv-131, 2018 WL 4101508 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 28, 2018); Rorick v. Service Experts Heating & Air Conditioning, LLC, No. 5:17-cv-132, 2018 WL 4495467 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2018). Because the district court fully 4 The agreement’s use of the term “Covington Division” likely refers to the Northern Division, which encompasses both the Ashland and Covington dockets. See Rule 3.1(a) of the Joint Local Rules for the Eastern District and Western District of Kentucky. -22- Nos. 18-6028/19-5110, Newberry, et al. v. Service Experts Heating & Air Conditioning, et al. articulated the reasons why transfer was improper, a detailed opinion by this court would be duplicative and serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, we adopt the analysis and conclusions of the district court and affirm its orders denying plaintiffs’ motions to transfer. J. Motion to Continue In addition, Rorick complains that the district court abused its discretion by denying her third motion for extension of time to (1) respond to defendants’ motion to dismiss and (2) to retain new counsel. Rorick’s argument lacks merit. The record reveals that the district court granted two separate motions for extension of time, giving Rorick a total of six additional weeks to find counsel and respond to defendants’ motion. The district court appears to have struck a balance between Rorick’s desire to be accommodated and its need to process cases in a timely manner. Thus, the district court’s actions do not leave a “definite and firm conviction” that it committed a clear error of judgment. See Arban v. West Publ’g Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 404 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Byers, 151 F.3d 574, 578-79 (6th Cir. 1998)). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rorick’s motion for yet another extension of time. Rorick also contends that the district court abused its discretion by considering the defendants’ motion to dismiss without the benefit of her response brief, which was filed within the time permitted under the rules for pro se litigants. This argument is also unavailing. The issues the court decided in the motion to dismiss Rorick’s complaint had already been briefed by both parties in the parallel Newberry action. See Newberry, 2018 WL 1701316 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 5, 2018). Further, Rorick’s “response,” once it was filed, did not add anything to the already briefed arguments, as it consisted merely of a two-paragraph statement lacking any citation to authority. Therefore, any error (if there was one) was harmless and does not constitute a ground for “vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing” the district court’s judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. -23- Nos. 18-6028/19-5110, Newberry, et al. v. Service Experts Heating & Air Conditioning, et al. K. Request for Remand and Evidentiary Hearing Finally, we decline to require, as suggested in Newberry’s appeal brief, a hearing based on his statement that he was diagnosed with an illness on November 1, 2018, one month after he appealed the district court’s orders. Newberry alludes to the fact that this illness made him more susceptible to believing defendants’ allegedly fraudulent statements and asks the court of appeals to “remand for an evidentiary hearing on facts of Appellant’s recently diagnosed illness.” Newberry has not demonstrated how his illness would affect the merits of his claims at this stage of the litigation. For purposes of a motion to dismiss, his assertions that he actually relied on defendants’ fraudulent statements are taken as true. In addition, the test for whether Newberry should have been aware of his claims for statute-of-limitations purposes is objective, not subjective. See Greywolf v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington, No. 2010-CA-814-MR, 2011 WL 3361342, at  (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2011) (citing Adams, 249 S.W.2d at 793). Nor has Newberry suggested that his illness caused him to have an unsound mind that tolled the statute of limitations under Kentucky Revised Statute § 413.170(1). Of course, Newberry is permitted to provide evidence of his mental state on remand to the extent he feels it helps his case.