Opinion ID: 792547
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Purported Prosecutorial Misconduct

Text: 56 Lore contends that he is entitled to a new trial because of the prosecutor's pervasive ... misconduct during his summation and rebuttal arguments. See Lore Br. at 40. Specifically, Lore claims: (1) that the prosecution misrepresented the contents of a stipulation; (2) engaged in improper vouching; (3) impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to him; and (4) gratuitously attacked defense counsel. 57 In reviewing the statements underlying Lore's claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we are mindful of the Supreme Court's admonition that: 58 a criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial. 59 United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1044, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Accordingly, we review the district court's ruling on any contemporaneous objections for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir.2003). If an appellate court finds that there has been prosecutorial misconduct, it should reverse unless the error is harmless. Id. (citing United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir.1995) (en banc)). An error is deemed harmless if the court possesses a sure conviction that [it] did not prejudice the defendant. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 1265 (internal quotation marks omitted). Any non-contemporaneous objections are subject to plain error review. 18 Brennan, 326 F.3d at 182. After our review, we find Lore's various challenges to the prosecution's summation and rebuttal unpersuasive.
60 Lore claims that the prosecution misrepresented the contents of a stipulation related to the 1990 civil RICO action that the government brought against Local 1588. The parties agreed on the stipulation after defendants' counsel sought to impeach G'Sell and Angelone with inconsistent deposition testimony in connection with the RICO action that alleged a background of organized crime and corruption in Local 1588. The government asserted that this impeachment opened the door to the underlying subject matter of the civil RICO action. In lieu of evidence concerning the civil suit, the parties agreed on a stipulation which the prosecutor read to the jury. But before the prosecutor read it, the district court explained to the jury that: 61 [A stipulation] is a long word that means that the parties have agreed that a certain fact or facts exist. So, the Government and each of the defendants have entered into this as a stipulated fact. And you may, therefore, regard these facts that [the prosecutor] is going to read to you as proven in the case. 62 J.A. at 3735. The prosecutor then read the following stipulation to the jury: 63 The parties hereby stipulate in 1992 and thereafter, the Executive Board of Local 1588 agreed with the Federal Government that the officers and employees of the Local were not permitted to associate with Joseph Lore who was neither a member nor an employee of the Local with regard to any business of the Local. The Board further agreed that it would not prohibit purely social contact between Denise Bohn, who was then an employee of the Local[,] and Mr. Lore. As long as that contact did not occur in or about the waterfront, including the Local's offices. 64 J.A. at 3735-36. Defendants aggressively cross examined G'Sell concerning his prior deposition testimony in the civil RICO litigation in which he denied that Lore had been involved in the affairs of Local 1588. At trial, G'Sell explained that he lied during his depositions to protect Lore. 65 Lore moved for a mistrial based on the prosecution's representation in summation that the stipulation supported the inference that Lore had been involved in the affairs of Local 1588. This challenge lacks merit. As the court explained to the jury, it could regard the facts contained in the stipulation as proven in the case. Defendants do not point to limitations that the parties placed on the stipulation. Absent limitations, it was not improper for the prosecution to draw fair inferences from the stipulation. United States v. Sullivan, 803 F.2d 87, 91 (3d Cir.1986) ([T]he prosecution may ask the jury to draw permissible inferences from anything that appears in the record.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It was reasonable and permissible to infer that Lore's participation in the affairs of Local 1588 precipitated its agreement with the government to bar Lore from its affairs. Moreover, even if there had been an error stemming from the prosecutor's argument, it would have been harmless under even the most exacting standard in light of the extensive testimony that defendants elicited from G'Sell that he lied in connection with the civil RICO investigation to obscure Lore's involvement in union affairs. 66 Lore also challenges certain remarks from the rebuttal summation relating to the stipulation. However, contrary to Lore's argument, it does not appear that any defendant contemporaneously objected to the purported misrepresentations he now cites in his brief. Accordingly, we review these comments for plain error. Brennan, 326 F.3d at 182 (Any non-contemporaneous objections are subject to plain error review.). Our review of these remarks in the context of the full trial does not reveal egregious error or a manifest miscarriage of justice necessary to support a finding of plain error, or indeed any error at all, warranting a new trial. Rather, as with its original summation remarks, the prosecution was asking the jury to draw inferences from the stipulated facts in evidence that were entered without limitation.
67 Lore submits that the prosecution improperly vouched for the credibility of the government's key witnesses, G'Sell and Angelone. A prosecutor improperly vouches when he (1) assures the jury that the testimony of a government witness is credible, and (2) he bases his assurance on either his claimed personal knowledge or other information not contained in the record. Brennan, 326 F.3d at 183 (citing United States v. Walker, 155 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir.1998)). But when we determine whether statements to the jury improperly vouched for a witness's credibility we consider them in the context in which they were given. Id. at 186. In the context of this case we conclude that the challenged remarks did not constitute improper vouching. 68 The first statement to which Lore points arose during the prosecution's summation. The prosecutor framed his comment as a response to a particular remark made by the defense in its opening that the prosecutor perceived as suggesting impropriety in using G'Sell and Angelone as prosecution witnesses: 69 And I suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that that particular remark indicates that not only — not the Government is stupid, but the Government was corrupt in putting up these witnesses just to win the case. 70 So corrupt or stupid or both, in order to win, would the Government suborn perjury? Or am I simply stupid because I didn't bother to corroborate what Mr. G'Sell said in any of his disclosure of this story or bother to check on the story that Mr. Angelone told subsequent to Mr. G'Sell? But as we go along, ladies and gentlemen, you'll see that not only was the story that Mr. G'Sell told with regard to this embezzlement corroborated by Mr. Angelone, but it was also corroborated by other witnesses, other documentation and other physical evidence. And that the case was presented to you not as a collection of lies, perjured testimony and fabricated documents, but in fact was simply the truth based upon the testimony and based upon the evidence that was presented. 71 J.A. at 4676-77 (emphasis added). Although the prosecutor asked rhetorical questions implying that he would not suborn perjury and that G'Sell was credible, he did not base his assurance on claimed personal knowledge or evidence outside the record. On the contrary, following the rhetorical question the prosecutor explained that he based his assertion on the evidence of record, namely corroborat[ion] by Mr. Angelone... [and] by other witnesses, other documentation and other physical evidence. Rather than invoke information not contained in the record, the prosecutor urged the jury to consider the evidence that was presented. 72 Lore also points to selected references by the prosecution to the fact that the government had subpoenaed business records of Local 1588 prior to G'Sell's cooperation, thus eliminating any opportunity to fashion his testimony to the business records. Notably, as the district court explained, the fact that the government had obtained business records by subpoena was before the jury. Viewed in context, these comments amounted to nothing more than an attempt to dismiss the suggestion that G'Sell could have fabricated the version of events that he recounted at trial, particularly because his version of events was consistent with the documentary evidence the government obtained through its subpoena. Moreover, throughout the comments Lore cites, the prosecutor referenced the corroborating evidence of record. Overall, there was no suggestion in the prosecutor's comments that he had material personal knowledge or other information not contained in the record. 73 Finally, Lore points to the prosecution's comment that [S]tupid or not, the Government might like blind squirrel [sic] might have found a flaw in [G'Sell's version of events], maybe over the course of seven or eight years. Lore Br. at 52 (citing J.A. at 4680). But considered in context, this statement merely called attention to the absence of evidence contradicting G'Sell's version of events and to the intricacies of the testimony that he was incapable of fabricating. It is significant that the prosecutor followed immediately with specific examples drawn from the evidence relating to the participation of the co-defendants to buttress the notion that G'Sell was incapable of fabricating the particulars of the conspiracy. Thus, considering that defendants vigorously challenged G'Sell's and Angelone's testimony, the prosecutor's remarks should be understood as an argument that any suggestion that G'Sell was lying was not supported by the evidence of record an argument that does not amount to vouching. See United States v. Walker, 155 F.3d at 187 (A prosecutor may argue in the negative that the assertions made by defense counsel that a witness is lying are not supported by the testimony in the record.).
74 According to Lore, the prosecutor impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defense in his summation by stating that the defense has several dilemmas that they are burdened with here and referring to various dilemmas the defendants faced after the presentation of evidence. This argument lacks merit. As we have explained, there is nothing improper about a prosecutor attempt[ing] to focus the jury's attention on holes in the defense's theory. United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 441 (3d Cir.1996). Such a comment does not implicate any of the burden-shifting concerns that are raised when a prosecutor points to a defendant's failure to testify or improperly suggests that the defendant has the burden of producing evidence. Id. Such is the case here the prosecutor's references to dilemmas that burdened the defense were attempts to focus the jury's attention on perceived deficiencies in the defendants' theory in light of the evidence presented at trial. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this challenge.
75 Lore contends that the prosecutor made a gratuitous personal attack on defense counsel by posing a rhetorical question during rebuttal summation asking whether the cross-examination of G'Sell was disingenuous or clever lawyering. Lore Br. at 55-57. Though personal attacks on the character of defense counsel in some instances can rise to the level of misconduct, the single remark here regarding defense tactics falls far short of that level. See United States v. Millar, 79 F.3d 338, 343-44 (2d Cir.1996) (holding that prosecution's reference to defense as hog wash and a smoke screen did not warrant new trial); United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 892 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that there was no error in permitting prosecution comments that defense was devaluing the victim and dirtying up witnesses); United States v. Hartmann, 958 F.2d 774, 785 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that there was no error in allowing prosecution remark that defense told a whopper and tried to mislead the jury); cf. United States v. Friedman, 909 F.2d 705, 709 (2d Cir.1990) (holding that it was plainly improper for prosecutor to remark, [w]hile some people ... prosecute drug dealers and try to see them brought to justice, there are others who defend them, try to get them off, perhaps even for high fees). Hartmann is particularly instructive for, as the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has explained, there is a distinction between comments directed at the tactics and arguments advanced by defense counsel and those aimed at the character of the attorneys themselves, with nothing inherently improper about the former. See Hartmann, 958 F.2d at 785. Our review of the transcript convinces us that the comments at issue here amount to the former. 76 Moreover, when Lore's counsel's earlier remarks are considered, it is evident that the prosecutor's summation demonstrates that the prosecution was only meeting the defense on a level of the defense's own choosing. United States v. LaSorsa, 480 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir.1973). After all, prior to the rebuttal summation he now challenges, counsel for Lore implied that the prosecution may have suborned perjury or willfully permitted the prosecution witnesses to testify falsely. See Supp.App. at 88-89 (This idea of suborning perjury....). In this context, the prosecution's criticism of defense tactics appears to be more of a defensive response rather than an affirmative attack. See United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1126-27 (3d Cir.1990) (explaining the invited response doctrine, whereby a prosecutor may neutralize improper defense arguments but may not rely on them as a `springboard' for the launching of affirmative attacks upon the defendants.). Thus, the remark about disingenuous or clever lawyering mildly inappropriate, at worst-does not rise to the level of severity sufficient to require reversal.