Opinion ID: 1998744
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Defendant's Attempted Waiver of All Sentences Other Than Natural Life in Prison

Text: Defendant contends that his rights to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment were violated when the trial court refused to allow defendant to waive lesser prison sentences and face only the alternative of natural life in prison if the jury should determine that he was not eligible for death. Defense counsel offered the trial court a written waiver, signed by defendant, to any sentence less than natural life in prison, and argued that upon acceptance of such a waiver the jury could be instructed, under this court's ruling in People v. Gacho, 122 Ill.2d 221, 119 Ill.Dec. 287, 522 N.E.2d 1146 (1988), that the only alternative to a sentence of death would be a sentence of natural life in prison without parole. In defendant's brief to this court, defendant states that he perceived the Gacho natural life instruction as a positive advantage in his effort to defeat the death penalty. To make that instruction valid, he would have to waive all lesser sentences. This he was willing to do. In rejecting defendant's proffered waiver, the trial court judge ruled that [defendant] can't waive himself into a specific sentence. Defendant asserts that the trial court's ruling constitutes reversible error. We are not persuaded by defendant's arguments. In People v. Simms, 168 Ill.2d 176, 198, 213 Ill.Dec. 576, 659 N.E.2d 922 (1995), the defendant argued, as does defendant in the matter at bar, that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury that the defendant would be sentenced to natural life in prison if he did not receive a sentence of death. In Simms we rejected the defendant's argument and held that a natural life jury instruction is available only under the circumstances stated in Gacho, specifically, where the sentencing options for a particular defendant are limited to either natural life or the death penalty. Simms, 168 Ill.2d at 199, 213 Ill.Dec. 576, 659 N.E.2d 922. Such an instruction is unavailable where, as here, the defendant is statutorily eligible for a sentence less than natural life in prison. Simms, 168 Ill.2d at 199, 213 Ill.Dec. 576, 659 N.E.2d 922. Our ruling in the instant cause additionally comports with the general principle that sentencing is a matter within the sound discretion of the court. See People v. Wilson, 143 Ill.2d 236, 250, 157 Ill.Dec. 473, 572 N.E.2d 937 (1991). In the cause at bar, if the jury had determined that death was not an appropriate sentence for defendant, the trial court would have possessed sole discretion in sentencing defendant to a term of imprisonment for the murder. Allowing defendant to execute a waiver would usurp the court's sentencing function, and defendant offers no rationale why he should be afforded the authority to remove the sentencing decision from the trial court. Further, we do not condone a defendant's attempt to choose a sentence that suits him, and, by so doing, manipulate the sentencing process in order to obtain a Gacho instruction. Finally, acceptance of such a waiver could engender additional litigation challenging the waiver's validity. Accordingly, the trial court did not violate defendant's constitutional rights nor did it abuse its discretion in refusing to accept defendant's tendered waiver of sentence. Defendant also contends that a jury's sentencing decision is denied the requisite level of constitutional reliability under the eighth amendment if the jury is unaware of other viable sentencing options. We have previously rejected this argument. People v. Simms, 143 Ill.2d 154, 181-82, 157 Ill.Dec. 483, 572 N.E.2d 947 (1991) (it is not error to refuse to instruct the jury of the possible terms of imprisonment which the defendant might receive if not sentenced to death). In a related argument, defendant contends that his rights to due process, equal protection, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment were violated when the trial court denied his request to inform the sentencing jury that one of the sentences available was life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Defendant contends that he was constitutionally entitled to this instruction because the State argued that defendant's future dangerousness was a reason to impose a sentence of death. In support of this argument, defendant relies upon the 1994 United States Supreme Court decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), and argues that without such sentencing information, the jury could have considered him too dangerous for any sentence other than death, especially if the jury believed that defendant might, as an alternative to death, receive a parole-eligible prison sentence. At the outset, we note that defendant never argued his equal protection claim below. It is well established that [o]bjections at trial on specific grounds waive all other grounds of objection. People v. Miller, 173 Ill.2d 167, 191, 219 Ill.Dec. 43, 670 N.E.2d 721 (1996). Therefore, defendant's equal protection challenge to the trial court's ruling has been waived. Defendant argues that the United States Supreme Court decision in Simmons compelled the trial court to instruct the jury on the alternative sentences the defendant could serve if he was not sentenced to death. As we held in People v. Simpson, 172 Ill.2d 117, 152, 216 Ill.Dec. 671, 665 N.E.2d 1228 (1996), the Simmons holding addresses those situations where state law mandates that if the defendant is not sentenced to death, the only alternate sentence is natural life imprisonment. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in its ruling.