Opinion ID: 2557897
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court's Error

Text: The government concedes that the trial court erred to some degree by limiting Washington's cross-examination. Defense counsel is entitled to cross-examine a government witness to show his bias based upon a motive to curry favor with the government not only if [the government witness] had a relationship with the court, ... at the time of trial but also if he had such a relationship when the government was in touch with him during investigation of the crime. Artis v. United States, 505 A.2d 52, 54 n. 2 (D.C.1986) (citing Tabron v. United States, 444 A.2d 942, 943 (D.C. 1982)). Such a witness may make statements to an investigator ... in order to curry favor, and then be called to testify after the relationship is ended, but still be subject to the same bias motivation. Artis, supra, 505 A.2d at 54 n. 2 (citation omitted). It is not a prerequisite to cross-examination on a basis of a motive to curry favor for there to be a deal already in place; it is rather the witness' subjective belief of the potentially beneficial effects that his testimony may have upon his own situation that provides the basis for such inquiry on cross-examination. See Blunt v. United States, 863 A.2d 828, 832 (D.C. 2004) (holding that defendant was entitled to cross-examine government witness as to his bias resulting from a charge in a different jurisdiction even though the prosecutor in the case at trial could not affect that charge). The trial court thus erred by implying that until a deal between Washington and the government was more imminent, cross-examination as to his motive to curry favor with the government was too speculative to permit cross-examination. Washington had a relationship with the government at the time he discussed Lewis' case with police, and Lewis was entitled to cross-examine him about the manner in which that relationship may have influenced his testimony. Having found that the trial court erred, we must now determine whether that error is subject to review under the constitutional harmless error standard or under the abuse of discretion standard. This depend[s] upon the scope of cross-examination permitted by the trial court measured against [this court's] assessment of the appropriate degree of cross-examination necessitated by the particular situation. See ( Melvin) Brown v. United States, 952 A.2d 942, 950 (D.C.2008). Only by examining the facts can a court determine whether the alleged error was of constitutional magnitude, and it is only when the Sixth Amendment ... is satisfied that [this Court] will review more leniently for abuse of discretion. Id. As discussed below, we hold that the error did not amount to a constitutional one and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by curtailing Washington's cross-examination in the manner that it did.