Opinion ID: 2056690
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: SORNA of 1999 Imposes a More Burdensome Punishment Regardless of Whether it is Included in the Sentencing Statute

Text: [¶ 73] I agree with the majority that if a law establishes a more burdensome punishment and applies it retroactively, it makes no difference whether that burden is labeled civil or criminal or whether the burden is characterized as remedial or punitive. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 46, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990) (holding that labeling a law as procedural does not immunize it from scrutiny for an ex post facto violation). For this reason, I disagree with the Court's suggestion, set forth in its discussion of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, that a distinction should be drawn between a burden imposed as part of a sentence and one imposed as a regulatory requirement parallel to sentencing. [¶ 74] As the Court notes, the statutory history reflects that, beginning in 1996, the SORNA of 1995 registration requirements were imposed as part of a sentence. P.L. 1995, ch. 680, § 4 (effective July 4, 1996) (codified at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1152(2-C) (Supp.1996)). The statute at that time stated that [a]s part of a sentence, the court shall order convicted offenders to register. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1152(2-C) (Supp.1996). In 2003, the statute was amended to state that [a]t the time the court imposes a sentence, the court shall order convicted offenders to register. P.L. 2003, ch. 711, § B-13 (effective July 30, 2004) (codified at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1152(2-C) (Supp.2004)). That SORNA requirements were historically part of the sentencing process, beginning in 1996, indicates that SORNA of 1999 is punitive, as the majority holds, but it is also important to note that the 2003 amendment did not, in itself, make the registration requirements less punitive or otherwise remove the constitutional infirmity.