Opinion ID: 332331
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the findings of the district court

Text: 78 The court first found several violations of the Restrictive Covenants, previously enumerated: (1) the shredding operation was not 'itself self-contained'; (2) the development standards appropriate to classification I--5--U have not been met; (3) the property of appellant has not been properly landscaped; the buffer strip surrounding the operation has not been installed; (4) and industrial waste is generated beyond appellant's property. 79 We find ample support for the findings as to the landscaping of the property and the buffer strip, and on remand the court should give appellant a reasonable time to fully perform this obligation. But as to the standards required under classification I--5--U, there was substantial evidence that the appropriate authority, the Department of Development, found appellant to be in full compliance in issuing the license and under the facts here, we cannot go behind such a finding. The court's finding that the appellant's operation is not 'in itself self-contained' is of no moment here. We find no specific allegation or proof in the record on this. There is, of course, considerable proof that industrial waste is generated beyond the confines of the property, but this fact is not supportive of injunctive action since no injury to health, safety or welfare was shown. 80 Next, the court makes findings as to compliance with Ordinances Regulations, etc. Since the screening and landscaping requirements of the zoning ordinance are practically identical to the requirements of the Restrictive Covernants in this regard, the court's finding on the same is appropriate, and the appellant should be compelled to comply. But the findings as to violations of the city zoning ordinance as to the emission of particulate and of earth vibrations, sound and odorous matter in such quantities as to endanger the public health, safety and welfare appear to us to be clearly erroneous. The scientific tests all show compliance with the relevant ordinances. We assume that the finding as to a violation of fire and explosive requirements has to do with some isolated instances of explosions at the shredder during the trial on the merits. The cause of the explosion was found to be gasoline that was inadvertently left in the tanks of cars before being shredded. The record indicates that these mishaps have been remedied and no explosions occurred subsequently. All of the testimony as to appellant's violation of the regulations of the Division of Public Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, Indiana, and the Indiana State Board of Health has been negative. This finding is, therefore, clearly erroneous. Likewise the testimony of relevant public officials that appellant was not in violation of either state or local health and safety regulations, renders this finding clearly erroneous. 81 As the trial judge found in his colloquy at the end of the taking of testimony on the merits, 'the record indicates a great deal of change has been worked since the date of . . . the hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction.' The company showed that two additional stacks some 40 feet in height and three to four feet in diameter had been installed to draw off the dirt, dust, particulate, etc.; that covers had been installed over the conveyor belts; that water was induced into the shredder itself to wet down all of the non-ferrous material and reduce dust and dirt to the minimum and also prevent particles from flying into the atmosphere; that the walls of the collecting bins were raised 12 feet making the total height 22 feet; that a heavy rubber cover was inserted underneath the cutter bar in the shredder plant to eliminate noise when the bar hit the cutting plate; and that a modern street sweeper-water sprayer is used in the automobile stack area to remove the dust and mud that comes in with the discarded automobiles. And, finally, appellant dug a ditch 22 feet deep and 600 feet long during the Christmas recess of the trial to alleviate the earth vibrations. 82 The testimony of one witness was that the ditch reduced the vibration level 50 percent, that the pollution is 'a lot less than what it was,' and that the changes brought 'great improvement' in the 'smoke and stuff' coming from the shredder. The court based its final judgment on evidence produced at the October preliminary hearing on the injunction rather than giving consideration to these corrective improvements and conducting tests as to their effectiveness. 83 The evidence showed that the residence in the Irish Hill section were for the most part about one hundred years old--none being less than 50 years, and that present law prevents residential construction in the future. It showed that the area was near an interstate highway, a main line railroad and a community dumping ground. Previously a railroad roundhouse was occupying the spot where the shredder was located. The area had been zoned for industrial use for over half a century, and the rezoning of the company site for shredder use was three years before appellant began construction. The I--5--U zoning category specifically permits use of the property for metal operations. 84 Most significant was the fact that not a single expert or governmental official charged with enforcement duties testified to a single significant violation by appellant of any relevant zoning standard. Indeed, all of the testimony showed that the shredding operation was well within standards and that appellant obtained all governmental certificates and permits required of it. The appellant's use of the property was never challenged by any city, state or federal authority and every expert who testified concluded that the appellant's operations were in compliance with all relevant codes, ordinances, etc. 85 We can well appreciate and fully sympathize with the unhappiness of the appellees over their situation. However, the problem of zoning is a local one, governed by local law; it must be solved in local perspective. The appropriate local authority has zoned the property specifically for shredder use; and appellant has been issued a permit to so use the property. After careful and continued tests by reputable experts as well as public officials, appellant's operation has met all the required standards. Under these circumstances and in the absence of an imminent hazard to health or welfare--none of which was established or found present here, the appellant cannot be prevented from continuing to engage in the operation of its shredding. See Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). The national environmental policy, as announced by Congress, allows offending industries a reasonable period of time to make adjustments to conform to standards. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c--5 to 8 (1970); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970). Appellant is a new undertaking in Irish Hill; it too is entitled to a reasonable period of time to correct any defects not of imminent or substantial harm. If there is damage to property, of course, it is recoverable here as in any other case. 86 The trial court based its action on the existence of a common nuisance but even if such were present, the drastic remedy of closing down the operation without endeavoring to launder its objectionable features would be impermissible under our law. Accord Chicago v. Commonwealth Edison Company, 24 Ill.App.3d 624, 321 N.E.2d 412 (1974). In applying the test of the cases, we find no ground on which to base a permanent injunction here. 87 This is not to say that those features of the appellant's operation that are found to be offensive should not be remedied. We only say that the offender shall have time to correct the evil. If the appellant does not correct the infractions presently existing within a reasonable period, the district court may take action that will require the appellant so to do. Likewise, on remand, if the district court deems it advisable to have the appraisal of a neutral expert as to the air contamination, he may proceed to obtain one.