Opinion ID: 2807113
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Refusal to Set Aside the Default Judgment

Text: On appeal, McDonald Transit renews its arguments for setting aside the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and (b)(6). 8 We address these arguments in turn. 1. Rule 60(b)(1) Grounds for Setting Aside the Judgment “In determining whether good cause exists to set aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) we examine the following factors: ‘whether the default was willful, whether setting it aside would prejudice the adversary, and whether a meritorious defense is presented.’” Jenkens & Gilchrist v. Groia & Co., 542 F.3d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Dierschke, 975 8 McDonald Transit says that it maintains its objections to the district court’s ruling on the grounds of fraud under Rule 60(b)(3) and lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 60(b)(4), but it fails to argue these points in its brief. We therefore deem these arguments abandoned on appeal. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993). 13 Case: 13-11035 Document: 00513074575 Page: 14 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 No. 13-11035 F.2d at 183); accord In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods., 742 F.3d at 594. “A finding of willful default ends the inquiry, for ‘when the court finds an intentional failure of responsive pleadings there need be no other finding.’” Lacy, 227 F.3d at 292 (quoting In re Dierschke, 975 F.2d at 184). The defendant has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that its neglect was excusable, rather than willful, In re ChineseManufactured Drywall Prods., 742 F.3d at 594, and we review the district court’s corresponding factual determination for clear error, In re Dierschke, 975 F.2d at 184. Here, the district court concluded that McDonald Transit willfully defaulted. It reached this conclusion based on two facts: (1) Wooten properly executed service of process on McDonald Transit and (2) McDonald Transit offered no answer or other defense. McDonald Transit contends that the district court misapplied the standard for willfulness under Rule 60(b)(1). McDonald Transit cites Jenkens & Gilchrist, 542 F.3d at 123, for the proposition that “perfection of service is not determinative—the defendant’s knowledge of the perfected service, and the defendant’s actions post-service also play a role in measuring the willfulness of a defendant’s default.” By this standard, McDonald Transit argues, it presented post-service evidence that it did not default willfully. We are unpersuaded. If McDonald Transit is to be believed, its failure to answer or defend even after supposedly proper process amounts to mere mistake or inadvertence. But the company offers no explanation for what happened between its presumed receipt of process and the date on which it retained counsel to try to vacate the default judgment. It only reasserts that service was not properly executed. Without any explanation from McDonald Transit, the company has encroached on the sort of behavior we have decried 14 Case: 13-11035 Document: 00513074575 Page: 15 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 No. 13-11035 as “‘play[ing] games’ with the court.” See In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods., 742 F.3d at 595 (holding that the foreign defendant willfully defaulted when it did not contest that it was served with the complaint and did not provide any explanation for its default even when pressed at oral argument); In re Dierschke, 975 F.2d at 183–84 (holding that the defendant willfully defaulted when he admitted that he had received the complaint, but explained that he had failed to respond because he was involved in another suit and did not understand that he was being served in a new case). All McDonald Transit can say is that it rushed to court as soon as it learned the district court had entered a default judgment against it. Yet this latebreaking diligence pales in comparison to the kind of post-service conduct that we have found to foreclose a finding of willfulness. See, e.g., Lacy, 227 F.3d at 292–93 (holding that the defendant’s default was not willful when its counsel “made repeated contacts with [the plaintiff] in an attempt to resolve the suit” and “made plain its intention not to agree to waiver of service and its belief that service therefore had not yet been effected”). Indeed, despite being served with process on two separate occasions nearly seven months apart, there is no evidence that McDonald Transit made any effort to resolve the matter before the entry of default judgment. Accordingly, we hold that McDonald Transit has not borne its burden to show that its default was excusable, and we cannot say, on this record, that the district court’s factual finding of willfulness was clearly erroneous. 2. Rule 60(b)(6) Grounds for Setting Aside the Judgment Under Rule 60(b)(6), a court may vacate a judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Though a “grand reservoir of equitable power,” we exercise this power sparingly, granting 15 Case: 13-11035 Document: 00513074575 Page: 16 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 No. 13-11035 relief only in “extraordinary circumstances.” Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 642 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). McDonald Transit attempts to flood this reservoir with points of error. It collects all of its other claims for relief and asserts that together they make it “inequitable” to impose a judgment awarding damages against it. This argument fails because a movant must show any reason justifying relief “other than the more specific circumstances set out in Rules 60(b)(1)–(5).” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529 (2005) (emphasis added). All of McDonald Transit’s claims are claims it has brought or is bringing under a different Rule 60(b) base. Therefore, we hold that McDonald Transit has failed to establish “extraordinary circumstances” justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6), Hesling, 396 F.3d at 642, let alone an abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal to set aside the judgment, Lacy, 227 F.3d at 292.