Opinion ID: 885426
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Incorrect valuations of marital assets and debts

Text: ¶ 34 Under this category of alleged errors, Virgil has essentially requested that we remand so that the District Court can do again that which it has already done. We are acutely mindful of the governing rule that a presumption exists in favor of a district court's judgment in such matters, which is accorded a great amount of deference upon review. See In re Marriage of Johnson (1987), 225 Mont. 404, 405-06, 732 P.2d 1345, 1346; In re Marriage of Garner (1989), 239 Mont. 485, 487-88, 781 P.2d 1125, 1127. Resorting to a summary approachwhich these particular issues clearly deservewe conclude that the evidence was not clearly erroneous, the court did not abuse its discretion, and any conclusion of law made was correct regarding the following: ¶ 35 Barbara's medical bills. It was well within the court's discretion to determine that these medical costs were marital debt that should be equally shared. This finding and conclusion is affirmed. ¶ 36 The equitable division of the ranch operation. Virgil states he is disabled and suffers from several physical ailments, including a bad shoulder, a bad back, a bad knee, and a heart condition. He further claims that the ranch is small and for his recreation, and that it is not a money-making concern. He then claims that Barbara could not have possibly contributed an equal share of labor to what he characterizes as a hobby because she worked until 3:00 p.m. each weekday. ¶ 37 We conclude that the District Court relied on substantial evidenceparticularly the testimony of friends and neighborsin concluding that the ranch operation was sustained by an equal contribution of both labor and resources by the parties. The evidence clearly shows that Barbara's partnership interest, of 8.44 percent, was for tax purposes only. The evidence further shows that her nursing income covered much of their living costs. Finally, aside from the period where her physical condition was weakened by her cancer treatment, she routinely contributed her share of labor to the ongoing operation of the ranch. Thus, the findings and conclusions pertaining to the equal division of the ranch are affirmed. ¶ 38 The home on Warren Street. There is substantial evidence that the home belonged to Virgil and not his father, and that it was properly included in the marital estate. Whatever motive prompted Virgil's transfer of this property to his father is immaterial. Although incorrectly stating that Virgil placed property in the name of his parents in order to protect it from his ex-wife and from Petitioner  (the record adequately demonstrates that Virgil's acts of deception were targeted at his first ex-wife only, and not Barbara, his second wife), the District Court's findings and conclusion, that the value of the home is part of the marital estate and should be equitably divided, are affirmed. ¶ 39 The $8,000 payment for Barbara's interest in Highway 48 property. The evidence indicates that Virgil paid Barbara $8,000 for her interest in the Highway 48 property that was valued at between $68,000 and $78,000virtually at the moment Barbara separated from him and left the ranch. The District Court concluded that this sum resulted from coercion, in that Virgil exploited Barbara's financial and emotional duress to his advantage. The court relied on this Court's decision in Best v. Best (1982), 202 Mont. 109, 656 P.2d 201, in determining that the transaction was unconscionable. We agree with the court's determination and affirm. ¶ 40 The record clearly shows that Virgil maneuvered Barbara into an untenable economic crisis, and then took advantage of her by making the proverbial offer that she could not refuse. Although not as severe as the circumstances described in Best, it was equally opportunistic. True, Barbara came to him requesting moneybut not in exchange for her interest in marital property. Further, her decision was not made with the advice of counsel. See also Stanley v. Holms, 1999 MT 41, ¶ ¶ 39-42, 293 Mont. 343, ¶ ¶ 39-42, 975 P.2d 1242, ¶ ¶ 39-42 (discussing Litten v. Jonathan Logan, Inc. (1971), 220 Pa.Super. 274, 286 A.2d 913, and noting that party must contribute to financial crises where unconscionability due to financial duress is alleged). ¶ 41 Barbara's PERS retirement account and the house in Opportunity. Why Virgil has chosen to quibble over these distributions is difficult to ascertain. The District Court, in its discretion, allowed each party to keep their respective sources of retirement. Additionally, Virgil's ranch account, which steadily increased in value, and which provides him with more than $3,000 in annual interest, was left undisturbed. Further, although Barbara was awarded her house in Opportunity, she was also awarded the privilege of paying off the mortgage. The foregoing determinations are, accordingly, affirmed.