Opinion ID: 1180819
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: deference to legislature

Text: The majority would be correct in deferring to the Legislature if the Legislature had in fact spoken on the issue of social host liability or immunity. However, our Legislature has not determined whether to grant immunity to social hosts for injuries caused by providing alcohol to intoxicated guests and then failing to take reasonable measures to deter their guests from driving. Because it is the traditional role of the courts to develop the common law of tort liability, the Legislature's inaction in this area is no deterrent to this court. We are competent to rule on this, or any other issue in which we must consider both the rights of the parties and public policy. If each change in society occasioned by technological and other developments involving potential negligent harm to individuals requires legislation before tort liability results, justice would have been and would continue to be unnecessarily illusory in too many instances. Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wn.2d 759, 768, 458 P.2d 897 (1969) (Finley, J., dissenting). The majority attempts to infer a legislative intent from the absence of a statute penalizing social hosts for their furnishing liquor to persons under the influence of liquor. Majority, at 387. [8] Determination of legislative intent, to the extent that the diverse members of our Legislature can be said to have a single intent, is a proper inquiry in the context of statutory interpretation. E.g., Grant v. Spellman, 99 Wn.2d 815, 818, 664 P.2d 1227 (1983) (duty of the court is to ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of the Legislature, as expressed in the act ). (Italics mine.) In the absence of a statute, we do not decide cases before us by inquiring of the Legislature how it would rule. Although legislative intent is irrelevant in the absence of a controlling statute, the Legislature can guide us on issues of public policy to assist in the development of common law. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 390-93, 26 L.Ed.2d 339, 90 S.Ct. 1772 (1970). A court may look to statutes not only as mandates on issues directly addressed but also as sources of `establishment of policy [that] carries significance beyond the particular scope of each of the statutes involved.' W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 3, at 20 (5th ed. 1984) (quoting Boston Housing Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831, 840 (1973)). The Legislature has stated: The legislature finds and declares: (1) There is a need to reduce the incidence of drivers on the highways and roads of this state who, because of their use, consumption, or possession of alcohol, pose a danger to the health and safety of other drivers; RCW 46.20.710. Besides this unambiguous declaration, we can easily infer from the legislative acts listed by the majority and statutes such as RCW 46.20.710-.750 that the Legislature has determined public policy supports using every traditional and creative means available to deter drunk driving. See majority, at 390. It is not only the Legislature that is concerned about the tragedies and waste associated with drunk driving. The attitudes of society have matured to the point that very few would find that social pleasures of mutual imbibing, combined with the enjoyment of driving, are more important to society than the risk to potential innocent victims caused by drunk driving. As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted when it imposed liability on social hosts: Unlike those cases in which the definition of desirable policy is the subject of intense controversy, here the imposition of a duty is both consistent with and supportive of a social goal  the reduction of drunken driving  that is practically unanimously accepted by society. Kelly, at 545. The decision to defer the issue of social host liability to the Legislature, majority, at 388, is not a meaningful choice. [W]here relevant legislation does not exist, courts must by necessity decide a controversy without legislative guidance. In doing so within a common law system in which each decision is precedent, they necessarily make law. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 3, at 18 (5th ed. 1984). There is no need to reiterate that the Legislature may overturn our decision today by enacting legislation on the subject of social host liability. Given the narrow facts of this case, the majority's asserted decision to defer to the Legislature is not binding on future action of this court and is, in addition, erroneous as a matter of law and policy.