Opinion ID: 1418276
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Prior conviction of unrepresented defendant for traffic offense as basis for collateral estoppel in subsequent personal injury case.

Text: The 1975 Oregon Legislature adopted a statute, which became effective July 1, 1975, and which provides that [a] judgment of conviction    of a person charged with a traffic offense is not admissible in the trial of a subsequent civil action arising out of the same accident    to prove or negate the facts upon which such judgment was rendered. [7] This statute, in effect, overruled the decision of this court in Meyers v. Burwell, supra . [8] As previously stated, under the rule of Meyers v. Burwell, supra , the trial court erred in excluding the record of the judgment of defendant's conviction for failure to yield the right-of-way as substantive evidence for the purpose of collateral estoppel (as well as for purposes of impeachment). Because of the adoption of this statute, however, it follows that upon a possible retrial of this case following the reversal of the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings, the record of that conviction will then be not admissible as substantive evidence in such an action. For these reasons we need not consider whether, aside from that statute, defendant's prior conviction could be offered as substantive evidence on retrial of this case for purposes of collateral estoppel if it is established that he was not represented by counsel at that time. We note, however, that this statute is limited to the use of a conviction of a traffic offense as substantive evidence to prove or negate the facts and that it does not bar the use of such a conviction for purposes of impeachment of a witness, in a subsequent civil action, whether or not such witness is a party to such an action. As previously noted, the separate statute adopted by the 1975 Legislature which will forbid the use of a conviction of a traffic infraction for purposes of impeachment of a witness in a criminal or civil action does not become effective until July 1, 1976. For reasons previously stated, the judgment in this case is reversed and it is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.