Opinion ID: 2268496
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Testimony of Convictions

Text: [¶ 20] In the State's case-in-chief, the prosecutor elicited testimony from Ott that he had been convicted of grand larceny and armed robbery. Similarly, the prosecutor elicited testimony from Hodges regarding the fact she had pled guilty to the crime of robbery. Hodges testified that her conviction stemmed from a robbery that occurred on September 10 in which Roden was a participant. Roden contends it was reversible error for the prosecutor to elicit such testimony from Ott and Hodges. According to Roden, the testimony impermissibly suggested to the jury that it could infer his guilt on the charged crimes because his confederates had been convicted of offenses arising out of the same circumstances. [¶ 21] Roden acknowledges he did not object to the challenged testimony and, consequently, bears the burden of demonstrating plain error to succeed on his claim. As previously discussed, plain error requires Roden to show, by reference to the record, a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law and material prejudice. Miller, ¶ 15, 127 P.3d at 797-98; see also Capshaw v. State, 11 P.3d 905, 911 (Wyo. 2000); Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 535 (Wyo. 2000). In order to show the error was prejudicial, warranting reversal of his convictions, Roden must demonstrate he was not allowed a trial on its own merits. Mazurek, 10 P.3d at 536. [¶ 22] We need spend little time on the first prong of the plain error test as the record clearly reflects the testimony alleged as error. As to the second prong, Roden finds the clear and unequivocal rule of law he claims was violated in Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo. 1979). The rule in Kwallek upon which he relies states that when two persons are indicted for separate offenses growing out of the same circumstance, the fact that one has pleaded guilty is inadmissible against the other. Id. at 1375. The rationale for the rule is that evidence of a witness' guilt for an offense arising out of the circumstances leading to the defendant's trial implies the defendant is also guilty. Such an implication violates a defendant's right to a trial on its own merits. Id. at 1375-76. In short, the Kwallek rule precludes the State from presenting in its case-in-chief evidence of a co-conspirator's/accomplice's guilty plea or conviction on a related offense as circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt. [¶ 23] In this case, we have no trouble concluding Hodges' testimony violated the clear and unequivocal rule set forth in Kwallek. Her testimony explicitly linked her robbery conviction to the same robbery for which Roden was on trial. However, we cannot reach the same conclusion about Ott's testimony. His testimony, as elicited by the prosecutor, merely indicated he had been convicted of grand larceny and armed robbery. Ott did not testify on direct examination that his convictions were related to, or stemmed from, the same circumstances underlying the charges Roden was defending against at trial. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude a clear transgression of the Kwallek rule occurred with respect to Ott's testimony. [¶ 24] Regardless of the propriety of both Ott's and Hodges' testimony, applying the factors set forth in Mazurek, 10 P.3d at 539, we agree with the State that Roden has not shown material prejudice resulting from its admission. The testimony was not extensive, and proof of Roden's guilt was substantial. We find the strength of the State's evidence would have sufficed even in the absence of the challenged testimony. Additionally, we can plainly gather from the record that the conviction evidence was not introduced for an improper purpose or deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to extraneous matters. We also note the convictions were not improperly emphasized by the prosecutor or otherwise used as substantive evidence of Roden's guilt. [3] Consequently, we find it unlikely that the jury took undue notice of that evidence in assessing Roden's guilt or innocence on the charged crimes. [¶ 25] Further, we recognize, as we did in Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d 965, 970 (Wyo. 1996), that, because the jury's attention was not inordinately directed to the improper evidence, this case is distinguishable from Kwallek. See also Pendleton v. State, 2008 WY 36, ¶¶ 29-30, 180 P.3d 212, 221-22 (Wyo. 2008); Adams v. State, 2003 WY 152, ¶ 30, 79 P.3d 526, 535 (Wyo. 2003); Black v. State, 2002 WY 72, ¶ 42, 46 P.3d 298, 306 (Wyo. 2002). In Kwallek, we concluded prejudice resulted because the trial court twice overruled the defendant's objection concerning the admission of his co-conspirator's guilty plea and, consequently, the jury may have been left with an improper impression by the judge's rulings. We concluded it was probable the jury was left with the impression that, since the total evidence connected the defendant with [his co-conspirator] in the altercation with [the victim], the court must have wanted the jury to understand that, since [the co-conspirator] had pleaded guilty, it must be that the defendant is also guilty. Kwallek, 596 P.2d at 1376. Obviously, such did not occur in this case, as no objections were posed by Roden to the admission of Ott's and Hodges' testimony. [¶ 26] After careful consideration of all the evidence, we are convinced the error asserted by Roden was harmless. We therefore hold no plain error occurred in this instance warranting reversal of Roden's convictions.