Opinion ID: 1412151
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: arguments against a wrongful life action

Text: Twenty-seven states, by judicial opinion, statute, or both, have either refused to recognize or limited a wrongful life action. [3] Three states, discussed below, have allowed such a cause of action. Twenty-one jurisdictions, including South Carolina, have not addressed the issue. Most courts refusing to recognize a wrongful life action have done so primarily for two reasons. First, these courts reason being born is not a legally cognizable injury, regardless of the severity of the defective condition afflicting the infant or child. Such courts believe it is asking too much to expect any court or jury to weigh the fact of being born with a defective condition against the fact of not being born at all, i.e., non-existence. Therefore, it is legally and logically impossible to calculate damages allegedly suffered by the child. E.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So.2d 546, 548 (Ala.1978); Walker by Pizano v. Mart, 164 Ariz. 37, 790 P.2d 735, 740 (1990); Lininger by Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1209-10 (Colo.1988) (en banc); Garrison v. Medical Center of Delaware, Inc., 581 A.2d 288, 293-94 (Del.1989); Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415, 423 (Fla.1992); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ill.2d 230, 111 Ill.Dec. 302, 512 N.E.2d 691, 697-700 (1987); Cowe by Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630, 634-35 (Ind.1991); Bruggeman by Bruggeman v. Schimke, 239 Kan. 245, 718 P.2d 635, 639-42 (1986); Grubbs ex rel. Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Center, 120 S.W.3d 682, 689 (Ky.2003); Kassama v. Magat, 368 Md. 113, 792 A.2d 1102, 1114-24 (2002); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Mo.1988); Greco v. U.S., 111 Nev. 405, 893 P.2d 345, 347-48 (1995); Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 513 A.2d 341, 352-55 (1986); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528, 532-33 (1985); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924-25 (Tex.1984). The reasoning of these courts often is expressed along the following lines: This judicial reticence [to recognize a wrongful life action] stems partially from the fact that the theory amounts to a repudiation of the value of human life. The contention of wrongful life plaintiffs is not that they should not have been born without defects, but rather, that they should not have been born at all. The essence of such claims is that the childs very life is wrongful. We . . . decline to adopt the doctrine which would recognize such a cause of action. Basic to our culture is the precept that life is precious. As a society therefore, our laws have as their driving force the purpose of protecting, preserving and improving the quality of human existence. To recognize wrongful life as a tort would do violence to that purpose and is completely contradictory to the belief that life is precious. The fact that Dessie Blake will live in a severely disabled condition is unquestionably a tragedy; nevertheless, we agree with the New Jersey Supreme Court in that life  whether experienced with or without a major physical handicap  is more precious than non-life. Thus, because Dessie Blake has suffered no legally cognizable wrong by being born, she has no cause of action. Even if we were to hold that wrongful life were a legally cognizable injury in Idaho, the impossibility of measuring damages would in any event preclude recognition of the cause of action. . . . The primary purpose of tort law is that of compensating plaintiffs for the injuries they have suffered wrongfully at the hands of others. As such, damages are ordinarily computed by comparing the condition plaintiff would have been in, had the defendants not been negligent, with plaintiffs impaired condition as a result of the negligence. In the case of a claim predicated upon wrongful life, such a computation would require the trier of fact to measure the difference in value between life in an impaired condition and the utter void of nonexistence. Such an endeavor, however, is literally impossible. As Chief Justice Weintraub noted, man, who knows nothing of death or nothingness, simply cannot affix a price tag to non-life. Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315, 321-22 (1984) (citations and quotes omitted). Whether it is better never to have been born at all than to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be left to the philosophers and the theologians. Surely the law can assert no competence to resolve the issue, particularly in view of the very nearly uniform high value which the law and mankind has placed on human life, rather than its absence. Not only is there to be found no predicate at common law or in statutory enactment for judicial recognition of the birth of a defective child as an injury to the child; the implications of any such proposition are staggering. Would claims be honored, assuming the breach of an identifiable duty, for less than a perfect birth? And by what standard or by whom would perfection be defined? Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (1978). The second reason some courts reject a wrongful life action is that the physician did not actually cause the congenital impairment or defect, which would make it improper under established tort principles to hold the physician liable for alleged damages. E.g. Walker, 790 P.2d at 740; Lininger, 764 P.2d at 1212; Garrison, 581 A.2d at 293; Azzolino, 337 S.E.2d at 536. Some courts rejecting both wrongful life and wrongful birth actions have concluded the decision on whether to adopt such a cause of action is better left to the legislature. E.g. Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 260 Ga. 711, 398 S.E.2d 557, 560 (1990); Gale v. Obstetrics & Gynecology of Atlanta, P.C., 213 Ga.App. 614, 445 S.E.2d 366 (1994); Siemieniec, 111 Ill.Dec. 302, 512 N.E.2d at 702; Cowe, 575 N.E.2d at 635; Azzolino, 337 S.E.2d at 537.