Opinion ID: 1060419
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Application of Holding Retroactivity

Text: We next must determine whether our conclusion that the execution of mentally retarded persons violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution constitutes a new rule warranting retroactive application. A case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal government. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1070, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (citations omitted). In other words, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. Id.; see also Meadows v. State, 849 S.W.2d 748, 751 (Tenn.1993). The United States Supreme Court has said that a new rule of federal constitutional law is to be applied in cases on collateral review only if it (1) places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe or (2) requires the observance of procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 307, 109 S.Ct. at 1073. We have adopted a somewhat different standard in Tennessee: a new state constitutional rule is to be retroactively applied to a claim for post-conviction relief if the new rule materially enhances the integrity and reliability of the fact finding process of the trial. Meadows v. State, 849 S.W.2d at 755; see also Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-222 (1997) (citing the Teague standard for retroactivity). In deciding Penry , the United States Supreme Court recognized that a holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of mentally retarded persons would be a new rule because it would `brea[k] new ground' and would impose a new obligation on the States and the Federal Government. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 329, 109 S.Ct. at 2952 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). The Court also said that such a rule would apply retroactively on collateral review: [T]he first exception set forth in Teague should be understood to cover not only rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct but also rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense. Thus, if we held ... that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons ... regardless of the procedures followed, such a rule would fall under the first exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity and would be applicable to defendants on collateral review. Id. at 330, 109 S.Ct. at 2953. We conclude that our holding under article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution likewise constitutes a new rule. This is an issue of first impression by this Court, and the result is in no way dictated by our existing precedent. See State v. Laney, 654 S.W.2d 383, 389 (Tenn.1983) (stating that a defendant's low intelligence was a mitigating factor but did not render the death penalty cruel and unusual punishment). Moreover, we agree with the observation in Penry that such a rule warrants retroactive application to cases on collateral review. In sum, our holding that article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits execution of those defendants who are mentally retarded materially enhances the integrity and the reliability of the fact finding process of the trial. See Meadows v. State, 849 S.W.2d at 755; Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-222 (1997).