Opinion ID: 1742206
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statements of Mother, Sister, and Officer Glau as Excited Utterances.

Text: [2, 3] ¶ 12. The State contended at trial that Jeri's statements to these three parties were admissible either as an excited utterance under Wis. Stat. § 908.03(2), or under the general residual hearsay exception set forth in Wis. Stat. § 908.03(24). [5] The circuit court and court of appeals agreed, and held that the statements to Jeri's mother and sister and Officer Glau fell within the excited utterance exception. [4] ¶ 13. The excited utterance exception. . .is based upon spontaneity and stress which, like the bases for all exceptions to the hearsay rule, endow such statements with sufficient trustworthiness to overcome the reasons for exclusion of hearsay. Martinez, 150 Wis. 2d at 73 (quoting Christensen v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 77 Wis. 2d 50, 56-57, 252 N.W.2d 81 (1977)). Accordingly, the excited utterance exception has three requirements. First, there must be a startling event or condition. Muller v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 450, 466, 389 N.W.2d 570 (1980). Second, the declarant must make an out-of-court statement that relates to the startling event or condition. Finally, the related statement must be made while the declarant is still under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. Id. Essentially, [i]t must be shown that the statement was made so spontaneously or under such psychological or physical pressure or excitement that the rational mind could not interpose itself between the spontaneous statement or utterance stimulated by the event and the event itself. Martinez, 150 Wis. 2d at 73 (quoting Wilder v. Classified Risk Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 2d 286, 292, 177 N.W.2d 109 (1970)). [5] ¶ 14. This court has also recognized that there is a compelling need for admission of hearsay arising from young sexual assault victims' inability or refusal to verbally express themselves in court when the child and the perpetrator are sole witnesses to the crime. Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 243. Accordingly, in some cases, where a child has made an allegation of sexual abuse that does not immediately follow the incident, Wisconsin appellate courts have liberally construed the excited utterance exception to hold such statements sufficiently contemporaneous and spontaneous to fall within the exception. See Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 244-45; Moats, 156 Wis. 2d at 97; see, e.g., State v. Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d 501, 515, n.21, 326 N.W.2d 744 (1982); State v. Padilla, 110 Wis. 2d 414, 420, 329 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Ct. App. 1982). [6] ¶ 15. This application is consistent with the view that time is measured by the duration of the condition of excitement rather than mere time elapse from the event or condition described. Moats, 156 Wis. 2d at 97 (quoting Muller, 94 Wis. 2d at 467). It is supported by the theory that the immature emotional and psychological characteristics of children extend the time in which statements are likely not the result of conscious fabrication. Gerald L. C., 194 Wis. 2d at 556-57 (citing 2 McCormick on Evidence § 272.1, at 224 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)). ¶ 16. Allegations of sexual abuse by children are not, however, pro forma guaranteed admission as excited utterances in proceedings against their abusers. In Gerald L. C., the court of appeals rejected the State's offer of a 14-year-old's statement to a police officer that accused the defendant of sexual assault as neither an excited utterance nor sufficiently trustworthy to invoke the residual hearsay exception. In surveying the law of this state for application of the excited utterance exception to child abuse cases, the Gerald L. C. court distilled three common factors arguing for its application: (1) the child is under ten years old; (2) the child reports the sexual abuse within one week of the last abusive incident; and (3) the child first reports the abuse to his or her mother. See Gerald L. C., 194 Wis. 2d at 557. ¶ 17. The defendant points to the failure of the facts of this case to comport with the factors enunciated in Gerald L.C., and asks us to apply the factors as a bright-line rule. The victim in this case was nine or ten when the abuse allegedly occurred, but did not report the abuse to her mother until the day after her eleventh birthday. She reported the abuse within two weeks of the last event, not one. Finally, while the victim's hysterical description of the abuse to her mother was the factor initiating this case, the victim had at an undetermined earlier time mentioned the abuse to a cousin and to someone's aunt. Neither prior instance is developed in the record. [7] ¶ 18. Such reliance by the defendant on Gerald L. C. is misplaced. As the Gerald L. C. court explicitly conceded, [o]f course, these factors by themselves are not dispositive, and the statements may be admissible if the declarant was still under the stress or excitement caused by the event at the time he or she made the statement. Gerald L.C., 194 Wis. 2d at 558-59. Factual scenarios may exist that deviate from the Gerald L.C. factors, yet which allow a circuit court to reasonably determine that a child was still under the stress of excitement of the abuse. See Moats, 156 Wis. 2d at 98 (statement of five-year-old to mother more than one week after incident admissible); State ex rel. Harris v. Schmidt, 69 Wis. 2d 668, 230 N.W.2d 890 (1975) (statement of five-year-old child to defendant's probation officer 15 days after incident admissible). Accordingly, we decline to declare the Gerald L.C. test a bright-line rule. Even though Jeri's hearsay statements do not fall within the three factors, the statements could still demonstrate sufficient trustworthiness to be admitted under the excited utterance exception. ¶ 19. Jeri first related her allegations of sexual abuse against the defendant to her mother and sister approximately two weeks after the last alleged incident. As noted above, we have allowed an interim period to exist between the abuse and report of abuse in child sexual assault cases. See Moats, 156 Wis. 2d at 97. At the time of Jeri's statement to her mother and sister relating the abuse, Jeri was alternatively described as crying, hysterical, guilt-ridden, and scared. While the record is devoid of any information concerning Jeri's conduct in the two weeks after the last incident and preceding her report, there are indications that she had just discovered that she would be spending two weeks alone with the defendant. [8] ¶ 20. After acknowledging familiarity with Wisconsin case law on applying the excited utterance exception to child sexual assault cases, the circuit court found Jeri's statements to her mother, sister, and Officer Glau to be an excited utterance under all the facts and circumstances in this case. Because we conclude that the circuit court reached a reasonable conclusion concerning the statements to the mother and sister after application of the proper standard of law, we do not believe that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion. Because a reasonable basis exists for the admission of the mother and sister's testimony about Jeri's statements under the excited utterance exception, we determine that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion. ¶ 21. The admissibility of Jeri's statement to Officer Glau under the excited utterance exception is a closer call. The statements to Officer Glau were made after telling the mother and sister of the abuse and were made as part of an abuse investigation. Nevertheless, the facts suggest a child still under the stress or excitement caused by the event at the time he or she made the statement. Gerald L.C., 194 Wis. 2d at 558-59. ¶ 22. Shortly after reporting the abuse to her mother, Jeri met with Officer Glau. During that two-hour period she continued to be in a state of emotional distress and was described as crying, hysterical, and scared. Officer Glau stated that during his interview she would cry and he repeatedly had to stop the interview to allow Jeri to regain her composure. Because Jeri continued to exhibit indications of emotional distress relating to her abuse during her interview with Officer Glau, her prior rendition of her abuse to her mother and sister does not defeat application of the excited utterance exception to her statements to Officer Glau. Accordingly, we determine that the circuit court also correctly exercised its discretion when holding Jeri's statement to Officer Glau to be an excited utterance.