Opinion ID: 1190445
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prospective juror Harry Kreisler

Text: (21a) Defendant has waived his objection to the exclusion of Harry Kreisler. The record reflects the following colloquy between the court and counsel immediately after Mr. Kreisler was excused for cause: The court: I just wanted to make the record clear by their actions that both sides felt that was something where probably he should be excused. Mr. Selvin [defense counsel]: Yes. Mr. Anderson [prosecutor]: For the record, I did impose the challenge. I don't know if it was picked up for the record but I did. Mr. Levy [defense counsel]: Think of the great arguments he could have had with the other jurors. (Italics added.) The record is unequivocal. Defense counsel joined in the request to excuse Mr. Kreisler for cause. The objection comes too late. Even if the objection were timely, we would reject it. (22) [A] defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to an impartial jury is not compromised by the excusal of a prospective juror whose views about capital punishment give the `definite impression' that those views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instruction and his oath.' ( People v. Visciotti, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1, 45, quoting Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-852].) More specifically, the determinant is whether the juror's views about capital punishment would prevent or impair the juror's ability to return a verdict of death in the case before the juror.  ( People v. Visciotti, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1, 45, fn. 16, italics added.) (21b) After extensive questioning, and being informed of the nature of the crimes in this case, Mr. Kreisler was pressed by the prosecutor for an unequivocal position. You're going to have to have [ sic ] a situation where if you are either not the foreman but on the jury panel you're going to be asked by the court, is this your true and original verdict. You're going to have to look at the lawyer and the defendant, and maybe the defendant's family in the face, and say, yeah, I'm condemning you to die. That's the bottom line. You are dying by my verdict. Now, could you do that? A: I don't know. You want me to decide right now, I guess. Q: Either for my question or Judge Byers' question. A: Well, I guess I couldn't. The trial court then pursued the matter a bit longer, concluding with this question: Could you impose the death penalty verdict and if need be, state, yes, that is my true and individual verdict knowing that it will mean that this person will be put to death? Mr. Kreisler responded, No, I don't think I could. Mr. Kreisler made clear that his views would impair his ability to impose the death penalty in this case. There was no error. ( People v. Visciotti, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1, 45, fn. 16.) Even viewed most generously to defendant, the best that could be said of Mr. Kreisler's answers is that they were conflicting and equivocal. The trial court's determination to excuse him is therefore binding on this court. ( People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1224 [255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047]; People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 186, fn. 4 [279 Cal. Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949].)