Opinion ID: 37721
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: COA: Procedural Default

Text: Whether the trial court erroneously concluded that Shields procedurally defaulted on the majority of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We have always required that a habeas petitioner exhaust his claims in state court before proceeding to federal court on those claims: “[A] state prisoner seeking to raise claims in a federal petition for habeas corpus ordinarily must first present those claims to the state court and must exhaust state remedies.”16 “Under the procedural default doctrine, a federal court may not consider a state prisoner’s federal habeas claim when the state based its rejection of that claim on an adequate and independent 15 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 16 Martinez v. Johnson, 255 F.3d 229, 238 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)). 18 state ground.”17 If the petitioner fails to present his claims to the appropriate state court, his claims are procedurally defaulted. Defaulted claims “will not be regarded as a basis for granting federal habeas relief.”18 Nevertheless, a petitioner may overcome any procedural default “if he can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.”19 “‘Cause . . . requires a showing of some external impediment preventing counsel from constructing or raising the claim.’”20 To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must show “‘not merely that the errors at . . . trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.’”21 A petitioner may also overcome procedural default by 17 Martin v. Maxley, 98 F.3d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 1996). Shields also argues that Texas’s abuse-of-the-writ doctrine is not an adequate and independent state ground. For the reasons stated infra, see n. 70, we reject this argument. 18 Ogan v. Cockrell, 297 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Martinez, 255 F.3d at 239). 19 Id. 20 McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 497 (1991) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986)) (emphasis in original). 21 Murray, 477 U.S. at 494 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)) (emphasis in original). 19 demonstrating that “failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”22 To demonstrate a “fundamental miscarriage of justice,” the petitioner must “establish that under the probative evidence he has a colorable claim of factual innocence” —— or, “actual innocence.”23 A petitioner may demonstrate actual innocence during the guiltinnocence phase by showing that, in view of the identified constitutional error, “it is more likely than not that ‘no reasonable juror’ would have convicted him.”24 When the petitioner challenges a sentence of death, he must establish actual innocence by showing that “but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state law.”25 Shields contends that the district court erred when it held that he procedurally defaulted on the majority of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The district court held that Shields had procedurally defaulted on all of his claims except —— as numbered in this opinion —— 3(a), (9)(c), and (9)(d). Shields 22 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). 23 Sawyer v. Whitley, 503 U.S. 333, 339 (1992) (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986)). 24 Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995). 25 Sawyer, 503 U.S. at 336. 20 argues that during his state habeas proceeding, he filed in the TCCA an Emergency Motion to Abate Habeas Appeal and for Dismissal with Prejudice in which he (1) informed the court that habeas counsel was ineffective in failing to present numerous claims to the court; (2) asked the court to dismiss his habeas counsel; and (3) asserted his right to self-representation. Without providing reasons, the TCCA denied this motion outright. Shields maintains that the state court’s denial of his emergency motion —— which, he urges, was a denial of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation —— constitutes cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default. The State, on the other hand, contends that Shields merely asserts a claim for ineffective assistance of habeas counsel and that our precedent controls here.26 In Ogan v. Cockrell, the petitioner argued for the first time on appeal that the state court had denied him meaningful access to the courts, equal protection, and due process when it refused to “remedy its earlier error of appointing him ineffective [habeas] counsel.”27 While the application to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was pending, Ogan wrote a letter to the court, in which he asked the court to dismiss his habeas 26 Ogan v. Cockrell, 297 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2002) 27 Id. at 356. 21 counsel and appoint another attorney.28 The letter also included a pro se motion that requested the removal of Ogan’s appellate counsel and provided examples of counsel’s alleged incompetence.29 The district court rejected Ogan’s argument and dismissed several of Ogan’s claims as procedurally barred because Ogan’s appointed habeas counsel had failed to raise them before the state courts.30 We affirmed the district court and in so doing, reaffirmed our long-standing holding that an ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel claim does not constitute sufficient cause to overcome the procedural bar because there is no constitutional right to competent habeas counsel.31 On its face, Ogan clearly forecloses Shields’s arguments. Shields argues, however, that this matter is distinct from Ogan because he asserted his Sixth Amendment right to selfrepresentation to the TCCA, which denied him that right. Noting that “cause” requires a force external to the petitioner that prevents him from developing the record and from asserting his claims to the state courts, Shields argues that the “Texas Court 28 See id. at 365 n. 3. 29 See id. 30 See id. at 356. 31 See id. at 357. 22 of Criminal Appeals’ denial of Shields right to selfrepresentation was the ‘external force’ and interference that made compliance not only impractical but impossible.” Shields’s argument, although novel, is meritless. First, neither we nor the Supreme Court has established a federal constitutional right to self-representation on collateral review. Further, in Martinez v. Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court explicitly held that there is no federal constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction.32 It is implausible, therefore, that there would exist such a right on collateral review. Accordingly, the TCCA’s denial of Shields’s right to self-representation on collateral review does not demonstrate a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right sufficient to support the granting of a COA or to excuse his procedural default. Accordingly, we are barred from considering those claims that Shields failed to raise before the Texas courts and which the TCCA later dismissed as an abuse of the writ. Notwithstanding this bar, however, our independent review of the record demonstrates that the district court held that Shields had procedurally defaulted on one claim that we find he raised in his state petition. 32 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000). 23 In his reply brief, Shields specifically argues that he did not procedurally default on claims (6) through (11).33 Claim (11) charges that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors prejudiced him and deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. Shields specifically raised this issue in his state habeas application and thus has not waived it. Less clear is whether Shields raised claims (6) through (10) in his state habeas petition. Shields argues that these five claims specifically challenge trial counsel’s performance at the punishment phase and are not procedurally barred because his state habeas application specifically challenged trial counsel’s performance during the punishment phase. In effect, Shields argues that because his state habeas application challenged trial counsel’s performance at his punishment phase, he did not 33 Shields also asserts that he preserved the other claims in his federal habeas petition before the district court that challenge errors at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. Shields’s state habeas petition belies this assertion. The only aspects of the trial challenged in Shields’s state habeas application were the failure of trial counsel to object to (1) the testimony of Lang as to the credit card purchase of the suit two hours after the murder, and (2) the admission of the hammer and the knives. Whether on purpose on through inadvertence of counsel, Shields does not seek a COA on the failure to object to Lang’s testimony at the guilt/innocence phase (although, as we discuss below, he does challenge the inclusion of this extraneous offense in the hypotheticals posed to Dr. Gripon at the punishment phase). As noted below, Shields has properly preserved his challenge to the hammer and the knives. 24 procedurally default on any claims that he raises in his federal petition that concern his punishment phase. We do not read Shields’s state habeas petition so broadly. Claim (6) alleges that trial counsel was ineffective during the punishment phase of the trial because he failed to require the state to prove the extraneous offenses, and allowed incompetent witnesses to testify. The substance of claim (6) challenges the testimony of John Hernandez, the probation officer, who testified that: (1) Shields committed car theft (for which he was never charged or prosecuted); (2) Shields had been institutionalized and had not continued his counseling when released; and (3) Shields’s own family did not like him. Further, Claim (6) challenges the testimony of Chastain, Holt, and Matzelle. Shields mentioned none of these witnesses in his state habeas application. Neither did Shields mention the extraneous offenses. Although Shields, in his state habeas application, mentions trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in allowing testimony on the extraneous offenses at the guilt-innocence phase, the only witness (and extraneous offense) that the state habeas application challenged was Lang, who testified as to the purchase that Shields made after the murder using Mrs. Stiner’s credit card. Lang did not testify during the punishment phase of the 25 trial. Accordingly, to the extent that Shields now challenges any “extraneous offense” evidence at his punishment phase, Shields did not fairly present this claim to the state court and has procedurally defaulted on it. Shields also asserts that he did not procedurally default on claim (7), which contains eight sub-claims. With the exception of sub-claim (7)(f), we find no mention of the other claims in Shields’s state habeas petition. Shields specifically argued in his state habeas application that his trial counsel failed to present evidence on Shields’s alleged brain defects during the punishment phase of his trial.34 In his federal petition, however, Shields alleges in sub-claim (7)(f) that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present a viable insanity defense and evidence on Shields’s alleged diminished capacity during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. We find no mention in Shields’s state habeas petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to produce evidence of diminished capacity or insanity at the guilt/innocence phase, which, Shields argues, would have provided him with an affirmative defense to murder. Accordingly, Shields did not fairly present this claim 34 In his state habeas petition, Shields raised this claim of error with respect to the testimony of Fran St. Peter, who testified only during the punishment phase of the trial. 26 to the state court and is procedurally barred from bringing it now. Claim (8) of Shields’s federal petition alleges that trial counsel was ineffective at the punishment phase because he failed to present a coherent defense to the state’s case on future dangerousness. Specifically, Shields contends that trial counsel failed to familiarize themselves “with the methods of risk assessment of future dangerousness” and failed to cross-examine Dr. Gripon “on the erroneous correlations in his analysis.” In his state habeas application, Shields challenged the State’s hypothetical questions posed to Dr. Gripon and trial counsel’s failure to object to Dr. Gripon as an expert. Neither of these claims —— properly preserved in federal sub-claims (9)(c)-(d) —— challenged trial counsel’s failure to present a “coherent defense.” Accordingly, Shields has procedurally defaulted on this claim.35 Federal sub-claims (9)(a)-(b) contend that trial counsel was ineffective because he (a) opened the door to the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Gripon by introducing psychiatric records produced by the State’s mental health expert, and (b) introduced into evidence exhibits that suggested an affirmative answer to 35 In any event, the arguments in this claim are somewhat preserved in federal sub-claims (9)(c)-(d). 27 the special issues. Shields has procedurally defaulted on these two sub-claims. Nowhere in his state habeas petition did he challenge the introduction of exhibits at the punishment phase. Accordingly, Shields procedurally defaulted on these claims. Federal claim (10) alleges that trial counsel was ineffective at the punishment phase in that he failed to object to the state’s comment during closing argument that Shields lacked remorse. Specifically, Shields alleges that the State violated Griffin v. California36 because the comment that Shields lacked remorse indirectly commented on Shields’s refusal to testify, which is protected by the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. After careful review of Shields’s state habeas petition, we find no mention —— direct or indirect —— of this claim. It is, therefore, procedurally barred from our review. Accordingly, we conclude that jurists of reason would not disagree with the district court’s conclusion that Shields is procedurally barred from asserting the majority of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We agree with the district court that Shields properly preserved claims (3)(a), (9)(c), and (9)(d). We disagree with the district court that 36 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 28 Shields procedurally defaulted on claim (11), his cumulative error claim. We hold that jurists of reason could disagree whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling on this claim.37 Because Shields must also demonstrate the denial of a constitutional right on this claim,38 however, we resolve below whether Shields is entitled to a COA on the four claims that he has properly preserved. V. COA: Preserved Claims (3)(a), (9)(c), (9)(d), and (11)
To be entitled to relief under the AEDPA, a habeas petitioner must show that the state court resolution of his case was either “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”39 Our review on a request for a COA is similarly circumscribed by the AEDPA, and “our duty is to determine not whether [Shields] is entitled to relief, but whether the district court’s conclusion 37 See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. 38 See id. at 485 (“Section 2253 mandates that both showings be made before the court of appeals may entertain the appeal.”). 39 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 29 (that the state court adjudication was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law) is one about which jurists of reason could disagree.”40 As all of Shields’s preserved claims relate to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, he must show both (1) that counsel’s representation was deficient, and (2) that trial counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him.41 If Shields fails to carry his burden on either element, we may reject his claim.42 To establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, Shields must show that “counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’”43 Although no specific guidelines exist to evaluate attorney conduct, “[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”44 To show that a deficient performance by trial counsel was 40 Thacker v. Dretke, —— F.3d ——, 2005 WL 18542, at  (5th Cir. Jan. 5, 2005); see Williams v. Puckett, 283 F.3d 272, 277 (5th Cir. 2002). 41 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 42 See id. at 697. 43 Soffar v. Dretke, 368 F.3d 441, 472 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 44 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 30 prejudicial, Shields must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”45 “An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.”46 Rather, we must determine whether “there is a reasonable probability that counsel’s errors affected the outcome of the trial.”47 “A reasonable probability need not be proof by a preponderance that the result would have been different, but it must be a showing sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”48
Shield’s first properly-preserved claim alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial because he failed to object to the admission into evidence of the hammer and knives found at the scene of the crime. With regard to both weapons, Shields specifically argues that he merits a COA on this claim because no evidence connected 45 Id. at 694. 46 Id. at 691. 47 Soffar, 368 F.3d at 478. 48 Williams v. Cain, 125 F.3d 269, 279 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 31 the weapons to the crime, or, stated differently, no witness testified and no testing revealed that the weapons introduced by the prosecution were the weapons used during the crime. Citing Texas Rule of Evidence 403, the district court rejected this claim on the grounds that the probative value of the hammer and the knives outweighed their prejudicial effect, and trial counsel need not raise a meritless objection. Agreeing with the state court, the district court found that if trial counsel had objected to the admission of this evidence, the state trial court would not have been wrong to overrule the objection. We agree. Under both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Texas Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.49 The advisory committee’s notes to Rule 403 define “unfair prejudice” as “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly though not necessarily, an emotional one,” and we have adopted this definition.50 When a defendant challenges evidence on the basis of Rule 403, we require courts to “look at the ‘incremental probity’ of the evidence in question in analyzing the offering party’s need to 49 FED. R. EVID. 403; TEX. R. EVID. 403. 50 FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note; see also Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1334 (5th Cir. 1985). 32 make this form of proof and the tendency of the questioned evidence to invite an irrational decision.”51 Viewing the hammer and the knives within this rubric, we find that their admission neither suggested a decision on an improper basis nor invited an irrational decision. The hammer and the knives were highly probative of the state’s case. Tracy Stiner discovered the hammer on the floor of his home when he discovered his wife’s body. He testified that this hammer was his and that it was in the garage when he left for work that morning. Detectives called to the scene found the hammer in the breakfast room together with an overturned chair, a purse, a checkbook, and an X-Ray folder from the doctor’s office.52 In addition, the medical examiner, Dr. Korndorffer, testified that Paula Stiner suffered a laceration on the top of her head and a contusion on her forehead consistent with blunt force trauma. Dr. Korndorffer testified further that these wounds were consistent with the hammer found at the scene. He also testified that Paula Stiner suffered blunt force trauma to her hands, which bent and damaged her rings and knocked the stone out of one of 51 Jackson, 750 F.2d at 1334 (citing United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc)). 52 Evidence presented at trial showed that Paula Stiner left work early on the 21st to visit the doctor’s office and, when she left, she was carrying a folder of X-Rays. 33 them. Dr. Korndorffer testified additionally that the knife wounds to Paula Stiner’s body were caused by a knife with a blade that was five inches long and three-fourths of an inch wide. Tracy Stiner testified that a knife with a blade of five inches length and a width of three-fourths of an inch was missing from the knife set on the counter, and the prosecution introduced the set of knives from the Stiner home to show that the missing one fit the descriptions of Dr. Korndorffer and Tracy Stiner. We conclude that the probative value of the hammer and the knives is not outweighed by unfair prejudice. The record clearly demonstrates that the hammer was the one found at the scene. Record evidence regarding the knives belies Shields’s assertion that they were irrelevant, given Mr. Stiner’s testimony that the one knife missing from the set fit the description of the weapon that caused the stab wounds to Paula Stiner’s body. More importantly, because Shields specifically argues that no testimony or evidence proved that these were the weapons used to perpetrate the crime, we view Shields’s claims of error to the admissibility of the weapons as a challenge to their “chain of custody.” As we have explained, “[i]n cases where the defendant questions whether the evidence offered is the same as the items actually seized, the role of the district court is to determine 34 whether the government has made a prima facie showing of authenticity.”53 A “break in the chain of custody simply goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.”54 The abovenoted record evidence establishes that the State made out a prima facie case of authenticity. Consequently, any possible break in the chain of custody would only go to the weight the jury accorded the hammer and the knives. We cannot say that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the hammer and the knives. Shields has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right with regard to his evidentiary challenge. Thus, we decline to issue a COA on this claims.
Shields advances that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to the hypothetical questions on future dangerousness that the State posed to Dr. Gripon at the punishment phase of the trial. The prosecutor posed three such questions to elicit Dr. Gripon’s opinion on Shields’s future dangerousness: I would like to go over a hypothetical question 53 United States v. Sparks, 2 F.3d 574, 582 (5th Cir. 1993). 54 Id. (citing United States v. Shaw, 920 F.2d 1225, 1229-30 (5th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Dixon, 132 F.3d 192, 197 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Sparks). 35 with you, Doctor: Assume with me that the murder was committed, the murder of Paula Stiner was committed by a 19-year-old male who burglarized her home and who laid in wait for his victim, Paula Stiner, for 5 ½ hours. And during that time he used the phone, he gathered up items that he wanted to steal, he fixed himself some food in a skillet, he selected his weapons which were a hammer and a knife. Assume further with me the victim entered the house who was immediately assaulted with the hammer, then the knife, struck some 27 or more times; and during her horrific struggle to survive, was overcome and died 10 to 15 minutes after the initial assault began. Assume with me further that immediately after the assault on the victim that the Defendant went over to the victim’s purse which was only a very short distance away from her body, rummaged through the purse, taking what he wanted, including credit cards, [and] the keys to her car, which was parked in the garage. Assume that the person drove to a shopping mall in Paula Stiner’s car. Within about an hour and a half of having committed the murder, he was at the mall. He purchased items of clothing. He was described as cool, polite, calm. He said that the card was his mother’s credit card. Tell us, Doctor, what does that behavior tell you as a psychiatrist? Assume further that the man, about two hours or so later, met with some friends of his at a fast food restaurant and again acted normal; was not intoxicated, according to them; claimed that the car he was driving was borrowed from a friend, that it was even for sale. Assume further that later that evening he went out with one of his friends to a nightclub in the Montgomery County area, acted normal, had some beers, just had a good time. What does that behavior tell you, Doctor, about that person? Assume that during the year prior to the murder that the man stole from his parents, he burglarized his 36 parents’ home. What does that tell you? What does that behavior tell you, Doctor? In response to these hypothetical examples, Dr. Gripon testified that the described behavior demonstrates premeditation, viciousness, and a lack of concern for the victim shown by “the going about [of] the normal activities of life as if nothing had actually happened.” He stated that “[a] person who can do that has little concern for their fellow man, if any.” Dr. Gripon also stated that such behavior demonstrates a lack of responsibility and a “rather callous, very hard nature.”55 Shields asserts that the hypothetical scenarios exaggerated and mischaracterized the facts of the crime. Shields also contends that the extraneous offenses —— such as the credit card purchase —— should not have been included in the hypothetical questions. Shields’s arguments are meritless. He does not explain how the hypothetical examples mischaracterize or exaggerate the facts that the State presented at trial. Based on our review of the record, the hypothetical presentations neither mischaracterized 55 Shields relies heavily on this argument because in the affidavit of an investigator who interviewed the jurors after the jury imposed the death penalty —— attached to his state habeas application —— one of the jurors stated that Dr. Gripon made a better presentation on future dangerousness than the defense witnesses and that “[s]he believe[d] that all of the other jurors felt the same way about Dr. Gripon.” 37 nor exaggerated the facts of Paula Stiner’s murder. Rather, they paralleled the evidence that the state introduced at trial. If trial counsel had objected, his objection would have been meritless. The failure to raise meritless, futile objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.56 As for Shields’s “extraneous offenses” argument, he fails to point to an extraneous offense in the hypothetical examples. Our review of Shields’s state habeas petition does reveal, however, that he referred to Mark Lang’s testimony about the credit card purchase of the suit that occurred two hours after the murder. The record clearly reflects that Lang testified to the facts that the prosecutors included in the hypothetical questions. Further, we reject any possible argument that Shields makes with regard to the admissibility and use of such testimony. Tracy Stiner testified that when he arrived home on the day of the murder, he found his wife’s purse and its contents scattered around on the floor of their breakfast area. He also testified that Mrs. Stiner carried several credit cards in her purse. Lang testified that on that same day, Shields used a credit card to purchase $271.71 in clothing from DeJaiz’s. The name on the card 56 See Clark v. Collins, 19 F.3d 959, 966 (5th Cir. 1994); Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Murray v. Maggio, 736 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)). 38 was Paula Stiner. Shields, identified by Lang, signed the charge using the name Tracy Stiner, the victim’s husband. Lang’s testimony tied Shields to the scene of the crime —— where he stole the credit card —— and to the attack itself. Such testimony is clearly admissible. Any objection to this testimony under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), as Shields appears to urge, would have been futile. Under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.”57 The prosecution did not use the testimony of Lang —— or any corroborating evidence —— to prove the character of Shields. This evidence had relevance apart from any possible tendency to prove Shields’s character.58 Further, under our and Texas law, “[f]ruits of the same crime are admissible and do not constitute an extraneous offense.”59 Shields’s use of Paula Stiner’s credit card 57 TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). This language tracks that of federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). 58 See United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 871 (5th Cir. 1998); Alba v. State, 905 S.W.2d 581, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). 59 Skidmore v. State, 530 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); see also United States v. Price, 877 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Where evidence is inextricably intertwined with the charged offense, it is relevant and not extraneous. If the challenged extraneous evidence is inseparable from the evidence of the charged offense, it is unnecessary to consider its 39 constituted fruits of his crime. We are satisfied that jurists of reason would not debate the district court’s ruling in this regard, and we deny a COA on this claim.
Shields insists that his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to (1) object to Dr. Gripon’s testimony based on the inadmissible reports on which Dr. Gripon based it,60 and (2) challenge Dr. Gripon under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 702. Specifically, Shields emphasizes that trial counsel failed to voir dire Dr. Gripon under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 705(b) to determine the foundations of his opinion. Shields also contends that trial counsel failed to challenge Dr. Gripon’s qualification as an expert under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 702. We reject Shields’s arguments and decline to issue a COA on this claim. Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 705(b) “allows counsel to voir dire expert witnesses outside the presence of the jury to admissibility under Rule 404(b).”) (citations and quotations omitted). 60 Contrary to the state’s argument and the district court’s finding, Shields explicitly argued in his state habeas petition that Dr. Gripon testified on the basis of reports that were never admitted at trial. 40 learn what facts the expert is basing his or her opinion on.”61 “[N]either the rule nor the case law creates a presumption of error if counsel fails to request voir dire.”62 Texas courts have often held that the rule is not violated when nothing in the record indicates that counsel did not know on what facts the expert witness based his opinion.63 In other words, when defense counsel knows the basis of the expert’s opinion, there is no need to invoke this rule.64 Here, the record confirms beyond cavil that defense counsel was cognizant of the reports on which Dr. Gripon based his opinion. Although Shields points to no specific reports in his federal petition, in his state habeas petition, he challenged Dr. Gripon’s reliance on the reports of Drs. Felthous, Barrett, Hungerford, Franke, and Freedman. If Shields knew of the basis of Dr. Gripon’s opinion, his counsel must have. Further, Dr. Gripon explicitly testified at trial that he based his opinion on these reports. It is thus clear that because defense counsel knew of the basis of Dr. Gripon’s opinion, it would have been 61 Saenz v. State, 103 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); see Brown v. State, 974 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998). 62 Saenz, 103 S.W.3d at 546; Brown, 974 S.W.2d at 292. 63 Saenz, 103 S.W.3d at 546; Brown, 974 S.W.2d at 292. 64 Saenz, 103 S.W.3d at 546; Brown, 974 S.W.2d at 292. 41 futile to invoke Rule 705(b). In addition, we note that Shields provides no explanation as to why any of the reports on which Dr. Gripon based his testimony would have been inadmissible. In any event, under Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 703, an expert “can . . . base his opinion partially on facts or data which is inadmissible, if such information is commonly relied upon by experts within his field.”65 We perceive no ineffective assistance in counsel’s failure to challenge Dr. Gripon’s reliance on, inter alia, the autopsy report of Dr. Hungerford and psychiatric reports on Shields from 1993. In addition, our review of the trial transcript convinces us that defense counsel cross-examined Dr. Gripon, including questioning him at the opening of his testimony with regard to the validity of his expert opinion. There is no merit to this claim. Shields also insists that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to Dr. Gripon on the basis of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.66 Specifically, Shields argues that “the methodology used by Dr. Gripon was inadequate and unreliable under the Daubert test because he based his 65 Joiner v. State, 825 S.W.2d 701, 707-08 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (citing Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686, 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). 66 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 42 assessment of future dangerousness entirely on his judgment, not on any empirical data concerning base rates of violence of lifesentenced prisoners convicted of capital murder, nor on any other data that the science of violence risk assessment recognizes.” As noted, though, Dr. Gripon based his psychiatric opinion on future dangerousness on the records that related to Shields and Paula Stiner’s murder. Even though we are somewhat troubled by the absence of a personal interview of Shields by Dr. Gripon,67 we cannot say that counsel was ineffective in failing to make a Daubert objection to Dr. Gripon’s testimony. Our review of the record demonstrates that Dr. Gripon adequately established his expert credentials, which included prior testimony as to the future dangerousness of a perpetrator on between twelve to eighteen occasions. We have also noted our awareness of no clearly established law that prevents a psychiatrist from basing his opinion on the records of the case and the psychiatric records of the perpetrator. Shields has established no prejudice here. Although trial counsel did not object to the testimony of Dr. Gripon, the defense did put on its own expert witnesses during the punishment phase to rebut Dr. Gripon’s testimony. Dr. 67 See Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 458 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., specially concurring). 43 Fason testified as to the possible unreliability of future dangerousness testimony, and Dr. Marquart testified that studies reveal that capital inmates are no more likely to commit future violent acts than any other inmates. Trial counsel was not ineffective when he elected to rely on rebuttal witnesses to discredit Dr. Gripon’s testimony instead of futilely filing a Daubert objection. We reject Shields’s arguments and deny a COA on this claim.
In his final properly-preserved claim of error, Shields argues that he deserves a COA on his claim that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s error denied him ineffective assistance of counsel. As we conclude that there was no such error, however, there can be no cumulative error.68
For the foregoing reasons, we deny a COA on Shields’s properly-preserved claims. We hold that jurists of reason would not debate the district court’s rulings. The district court did not err when it denied Shields a COA on these claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the State. 68 See United States v. Moye, 951 F.2d 59, 63 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Because we find no merit to any of Moye’s arguments of error, his claim of cumulative error must also fail.”). 44