Opinion ID: 2203364
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Evidence Was Sufficient to Support the Trial Court's Order Terminating K.B.'s Parental Rights.

Text: The Indian Child Welfare Act provides in part: No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceedings in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1912(f). K.B. contends that the evidence submitted at the dispositional hearing fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that K.B.'s continued custody is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to P.B. We do not agree. Suffice it to say that K.B. is simply incapable of providing the type of environment necessary to meet P.B.'s developmental needs. Granted that it is not within K.B.'s power to improve her intellectual capacity (who of us by taking thought can add one cubit to our height?), but her parental rights are not being terminated because of her less-than-average intelligence. It is K.B.'s chronic use of alcohol and inhalants, coupled with her severe borderline personality disorder, that makes the danger of serious emotional or physical harm to P.B. not only likely but inevitable. A mother cannot provide an adequately nuturing environment for a young child when the mother herself is in need of intensive, long-term treatment and therapy. It is to be hoped that K.B. will profit from such treatment and therapy, but hope for her improvement is not an adequate substitute for the guarantee of P.B.'s safety. K.B. also contends that Department failed to make active efforts to provide medical services and rehabilitative programs to prevent the break-up of this family, citing that portion of the Indian Child Welfare Act which provides: Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1912(d). Again, we do not agree. True, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it has complied with this requirement of the Act. People in Interest of S.R., supra . From what we have outlined above, however, it is clear that Department has satisfied this burden. It attempted to educate K.B. in the rudiments of child-caring techniques even before P.B.'s birth. Department continued these efforts after P.B.'s birth, only to have K.B. spurn them by returning to the deleterious environment of her mother's home, from which Department had tried to insulate her. After P.B.'s removal from that environment, Department persisted in its efforts to assist K.B. in developing her maternal skills and to overcome her alcohol and chemical addictions, to no avail. K.B. is not responsible for her less than average intelligence or her psychological impoverishment, but neither is Department charged with the duty of persisting in efforts that can only be destined for failure. Finally, K.B. contends that the trial court erred in finding that termination of her parental rights was the least restrictive alternative, again charging Department with failing to provide sufficient assistance to her in the way of providing housing and parenting skills. Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children. See, e.g., People in Interest of S.L.H., 342 N.W.2d 672 (S.D.1983). This fundamental interest is neither absolute nor unconditional. Id.; In re N.J.W., 273 N.W.2d 134 (S.D.1978); In re K.D.E., 87 S.D. 501, 210 N.W.2d 907 (1973). The best interest of the child is the paramount consideration in determining whether to terminate parental rights. SDCL 26-8-36; see, e.g., People in Interest of S.L.H., supra ; In re M.S.M., 320 N.W.2d 795 (S.D.1982). In entering a dispositional order, the trial court must apply the least restrictive alternative. See, e.g., People in Interest of S.L.H., supra ; In re S.H., supra, In re N.J. W., supra . The least restrictive alternative test means just that, for not every conceivable form of assistance must be attempted and found wanting before termination of parental rights is justified. Termination of parental rights is not conditioned on exhaustion of every possible form of assistance.... In the event counseling and therapy fail to improve parenting skills, termination of parental rights is justified.... Social Services cannot implement its plans and programs without the client's participation and cooperation.... When all Social Services attempts and assistance fail for lack of cooperation, no narrower or less restrictive alternative remains. Matter of D.H., 354 N.W.2d 185, 191 (S.D. 1984). See also In re J.S.N., 371 N.W.2d 371 (S.D.1985); In re A.L.P., 368 N.W.2d 617 (S.D.1985); People in Interest of C.L., 356 N.W.2d 476 (S.D.1984). Also, it must be remembered that the least restrictive alternative is viewed from the child's perspective. In re J.S.N., supra ; People in Interest of C.L., supra . As we held in J.S.N., supra, The best interests of children require that some certitude and stability enter their lives. 371 N.W.2d at 364. See also In Matter of S.S., 334 N.W.2d 59 (S.D.1983). When viewed in the light of the foregoing principles, the evidence presented to the trial court fully justified its decision to terminate K.B.'s parental rights. Granted, the conditions that resulted in the adjudication of dependency and neglect had not existed for a lengthy period, but those conditions would only have continued or worsened, notwithstanding Department's best efforts. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in entering the order terminating K.B.'s parental rights. The order of adjudication and the dispositional order are affirmed.