Opinion ID: 2509517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issues Relating to the Admissibility and Use of Evidence of Mental Illness by the Prosecution

Text: A brief overview: clinical psychologist Dr. Chris Hatcher testified that crimes such as those committed in this case are generally committed by sexual sadists who derive sexual pleasure from carrying out a fantasy involving restraint and molestation of a child victim. He did not testify that defendant was such a sadist. Defendant argues that the introduction of Dr. Hatcher's testimony was an improper attempt by the prosecution to use extreme mental illness as an aggravating factor, contrary to People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 654, 274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849, and other cases. (Defendant first raised this issue in an in limine motion before Dr. Hatcher testified, but raised the same issue in connection with defense objections to other testimony, the jury instructions, and the prosecutor's closing argument.) Defendant further contends that admission of Dr. Hatcher's testimony violated his rights under California's death penalty law and under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Attorney General responds that the testimony was admissible under section 190.3, factor (a), which allows the evidence of the circumstances of the crime, and that evidence admitted under factor (a) may be either aggravating or mitigating. (See, e.g., People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 640, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081.) Thus we face this question: Can the prosecution introduce evidence of a defendant's mental illness as an aggravating consideration if that mental condition relates to the circumstances of the crime? Based upon the precedents of this court, we conclude that it can.

At trial, defendant moved in limine to exclude Dr. Hatcher's testimony on the ground that evidence relating to mental illness was mitigating character evidence and thus could not be introduced by the prosecution in its case-in-chief and that the prejudicial effect of that evidence outweighed its probative value. After extensive argument, the trial court ruled that Dr. Hatcher's testimony would be admissible on the nature of the things that are involved in the crime.
Dr. Hatcher, a clinical psychologist, specializes in crimes involving the abduction of children. He has interviewed many persons who have committed such crimes, has conducted research on the subject, and is familiar with other studies. Dr. Hatcher testified that people who commit crimes such as those involved here  the murder of a child accompanied by sexual abuse  go through a developmental process beginning with a fantasy at puberty of being sexually aroused by an image of someone tied up, restrained, or tortured. Over time, the fantasy becomes more serious and more detailed. Although some individuals can resist the impulse to carry out the fantasy, those that go forward still have a sense of right and wrong. They are able to plan, and they can defer acting until they get the right victim. The drive and the need to realize the fantasy overcomes any consideration of what might happen to the victim. According to Dr. Hatcher, the perpetrator will gather instruments of restraint, such as handcuffs. During the crime, the victim is usually restrained and gagged. Unlike ordinary child molesters, sadistic pedophiles are not satisfied with mere sexual contact, but are sexually aroused by the suffering and the discomfort of the child. Sodomy, strangulation, and disfigurement are common characteristics of this kind of crime. Dr. Hatcher reviewed various exhibits found in defendant's apartment, including two newspaper articles about a notorious child molestation case in which the defendants were acquitted, and another article about a father who set fire to his young son. He also noted a highlighted list of names found in defendant's residence, photographs of young children also found in defendant's residence, and the rope and duct tape found in defendant's car. He concluded that all of these were consistent with the typical fantasy of persons who commit crimes such as the crime here. Finally, with respect to the crime here, Dr. Hatcher found a degree of planning, foresight, the development of a period of preparation over a substantial period of time, the focusing of a particular type of fantasy ... regardless of the effect upon others. [5]

Section 190.3, factor (a) permits both the prosecution and the defense to introduce evidence of [t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding. In People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436, this court adopted an expansive reading of this language. Edwards explained: The word `circumstances' as used in factor (a) of section 190.3 does not mean merely the immediate temporal and spatial circumstances of the crime. Rather it extends to `[t]hat which surrounds materially, morally, or logically,' the crime. ( Id. at p. 833, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) We therefore held that factor (a) authorized evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant, including the impact on the family of the victim. ( Id. at p. 835, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) We also held that evidence of the massive five-day air and ground search for the defendant after the crime was discovered was admissible under factor (a). ( Id. at pp. 831-832, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) In other cases we have held that characteristics of the crime fall within the scope of section 190.3, factor (a). People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 714-715, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248, held a photograph of the victim when alive was admissible because it portrayed the victim as seen by the defendant before the murder. People v. Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th 529, 640, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081, said that factor (a) included the method of killing or evidence of extensive planning. People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 581, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893, held evidence of the defendant's hatred of his wife's religion was admissible as bearing upon the defendant's motive for the crime. (See also People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 708, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640 [motive as part of circumstances of crime].) In light of these precedents, we conclude here that Dr. Hatcher's testimony was admissible under section 190.3, factor (a). It explained the motivation for the crime, and the history and mental condition that produced such motivation. It explained the significance of the methods used to commit the crime  the handcuffs and duct tape, the act of sodomy, the post mortem burning of the body. It also explained how evidence found in defendant's home and car showed that he premeditated the crime, and related to the manner in which it was committed. In short, Dr. Hatcher's testimony was evidence relating to the circumstances of the crime.
Defendant insists, however, that Dr. Hatcher's testimony falls under factors (d) and (k) of section 190.3, and that such evidence can only be mitigating. Factor (d) authorizes the penalty jury to consider evidence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. We have held in previous cases that such evidence can only be mitigating. (E.g., People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 944, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277; People v. Whitt, supra, 51 Cal.3d 620, 654, 274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 776, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250.) In People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330, we said that no reasonable juror could believe that extreme mental or emotional disturbance ... were circumstances in aggravation, and hence a jury instruction to that effect was unnecessary. ( Id. at p. 802, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330; see People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 675, 280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351.) Factor (k) of section 190.3 authorizes consideration of [a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. Under factor (k), the jury must consider any `aspect of [the] defendant's character or record ... that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' ( People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878-879, fn. 10, 196 Cal.Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813, quoting Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973.) Consequently, even though factor (d) refers to extreme emotional or mental disturbance, evidence of mental disorder of less extreme character is admissible under factor (k). (See, e.g., People v. Whitt, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 655, 274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849.) Evidence admitted under factor (k), like that admitted under factor (d), is mitigating. (See People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 672, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392; People v. Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 944, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1033, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1.) The Attorney General argues that Dr. Hatcher's testimony does not implicate the principle that evidence of mental illness is mitigating because Dr. Hatcher testified only that a murder such as the one here is usually committed by a sadistic pedophile, not that defendant himself was a sadistic pedophile. The inference, however, is unmistakable: if the nature of the crime shows it was probably committed by a sadistic pedophile, and defendant admits committing the crime, then defendant is probably a sadistic pedophile. [6] Dr. Hatcher's testimony, moreover, acquires relevance only to the extent that it does describe defendant. As the trial judge observed: [I]t's irrelevant unless you want to argue to somebody that he is a sexual sadist. Otherwise it's meaningless.
The question before us, therefore, is whether on the facts of this case the prosecution could present evidence in its penalty case-in-chief from which the jury could infer that defendant is a sadistic pedophile and argue that inference as an aggravating consideration. Defendant contends that under People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782, evidence of mental illness cannot be presented as aggravating evidence. Defendant's assertion misstates the import of Boyd, which does not bar the admission of evidence of defendant's mental condition as aggravating evidence if it is relevant to the circumstances of the crime. Boyd held that the 1978 law prevents the prosecution from introducing, in its case-in-chief, aggravating evidence not contained in the various factors listed in section 190.3. ( People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 774, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782; see People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 56, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 554; People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 963, 248 Cal.Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917.) As we have noted, some of those listed factors, including factor (d) (extreme mental or emotional disturbance) and factor k (any aspect of defendant's character offered as a basis for a sentence less than death) can only be mitigating. Because evidence of mental illness under factors (d) and (k) of section 190.3 cannot be considered aggravating, such evidence cannot be introduced by the prosecution as part of its case in chief at the penalty phase. ( People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1135, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 438-439, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000; People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 149, 255 Cal.Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32.) But in this case the evidence of defendant's mental illness is pertinent not only to factors (d) and (k), but also to another listed factor  factor (a), the circumstances of the crime. Evidence of the circumstances of the crime is admissible as aggravating evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief, even though that evidence would have been inadmissible as prosecution evidence if offered only under factors (d) or (k). This conclusion is supported by two decisions of this court that discuss the scope of prosecutorial argument. In People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708, the prosecutor argued that factor (j) of section 190.3  whether the defendant was an accomplice  was aggravating because the defendant acted alone. We observed that even if factor (j) could only be mitigating, the jury could certainly consider that defendant acted alone as a circumstance of the crime. It mattered little whether the jury considered it in relation to factor (j) or factor (a). ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 414-415, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) In People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1185, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353, the prosecutor argued that the defendant's lack of remorse as he fled the scene of the crime was an aggravating factor. Our prior decisions had stated that the presence of remorse is mitigating, but its absence is generally not aggravating. (See People v. Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 992, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214.) Pollock, however, drew a distinction: Absence of remorse at the crime scene or when the defendant is fleeing the scene is admissible as aggravating evidence because it relates to the circumstances of the crime. ( People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1185, 13 Cal. Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353.) Although both Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th 312, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708, and Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1153, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353, involved prosecutorial argument, it is reasonable to infer that if the prosecutor is permitted to argue that evidence is aggravating, that evidence can be introduced as part of the prosecutor's case-in-chief. People v. Avena, supra, 13 Cal.4th 394, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000, also supports this conclusion. There the defendant protested that prosecution evidence of defendant's previous violent crimes, offered under section 190.3, factor (b), should have been excluded because the prosecution cannot introduce evidence of defendant's bad character (factor (k) evidence) in its case in chief. We replied: The fact that evidence of defendant's previous violent crimes was also indicative of his character or mental condition does not render the evidence inadmissible. ( People v. Avena, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 439, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000.) We distinguish two decisions in which prosecution evidence of mental illness or bad character was held inadmissible in the prosecution penalty case in chief. In People v. Coleman, supra, 48 Cal.3d 112, 255 Cal.Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32, a prosecution psychologist testified that the defendant had a passive-aggressive, antisocial personality and was criminally oriented, immature, and defensive. The psychologist did not relate his observations to the crime, but instead used them as a basis to recommend that defendant was dangerous and should not be released. We said that this expert evidence was inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief because it was not relevant to any of the statutory aggravating or mitigating factors other than section 190.3, factor (k). ( People v. Coleman, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 149, 255 Cal.Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32.) We continue to hold that general evidence regarding a defendant's mental state is not admissible in aggravation at the penalty phase. Here, by contrast, Dr. Hatcher's testimony, when considered with the evidence regarding defendant's bizarre behavior while committing the crime, provided evidence from which the jury could infer defendant acted with sexual sadism. This specific evidence of the motivation behind the killing was relevant as a circumstance of the crime. In People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d 983, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1, we said the prosecution acted improperly in arguing that evidence of the defendant's background and history  evidence that did not relate to the circumstances of the crime  showed `that he's had all the breaks' ( id. at p. 1033, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1) so the crime could not be blamed on childhood deprivation or hardship. Character evidence relevant only to factor (k), we said, cannot be used affirmatively as a circumstance in aggravation. ( People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1033, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1.) These cases show that evidence of mental illness or bad character is admissible in the prosecution's case in chief only if, as here, it relates to an aggravating factor listed in section 190.3. But if the evidence does relate to an aggravating factor, it is admissible as part of the prosecution's penalty case-in-chief, even if it also bears upon a mitigating factor listed in that section.
Defendant asserts that admitting evidence of his mental illness as an aggravating consideration violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendant, however, did not raise these contentions in the trial court. Seeking to avoid the conclusion that his constitutional claims have been forfeited (see People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 250, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710), defendant cites People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th 93, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166, which said: [N]o useful purpose is served by declining to consider on appeal a claim that merely restates, under alternative legal principles, a claim otherwise identical to one that was properly preserved.... ( Id. at p. 117, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166.) But here defendant's constitutional claim is not identical to his properly preserved claim based on California decisions and statutes. His state law claim is based on decisions interpreting section 190.3 and asserting that factors (d) and (k) can only be mitigating. There are, however, no federal decisions preventing the jury from treating factor (d) or factor (k) evidence as aggravating. (See Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976-979, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750.)
Defendant contends that Dr. Chris Hatcher's testimony should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352, which permits the trial court, in its discretion, to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. In People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th 1153, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130, we rejected the Attorney General's contention that Evidence Code section 352 did not apply to evidence offered under factor (a) of Penal Code section 190.3. Box explained: [T]he trial court lacks discretion to exclude all factor (a) evidence on the ground it is inflammatory or lacking in probative value. (23 Cal.4th at pp. 1200-1201, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) It retains, however, its traditional discretion to exclude `particular items of evidence' by which the prosecution seeks to demonstrate either the circumstances of the crime (factor (a)), or violent criminal activity (factor (b)), in a `manner' that is misleading, cumulative, or unduly inflammatory. ( Id. at p. 1201, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130; see People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 534-535, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032.) Here the issue of the admissibility of Dr. Hatcher's testimony under Evidence Code section 352 is simply another way of looking at the question whether that evidence can be admitted as aggravating evidence. Prejudice in section 352 does not refer simply to evidence that is damaging to the defendant. Instead, `[t]he prejudice referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues. ' ( People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638, 250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189, italics added.) Dr. Hatcher's testimony provides a basis from which the jurors could infer that defendant is a sadistic pedophile, and premeditated and committed the crime for the sexual pleasure of the act, an aggravating consideration. If that is a permissible inference, as we have concluded, then the evidence is highly probative.
Defendant argues that Dr. Hatcher's testimony amounted to the improper use of profile evidence. Profile evidence, however, is not a separate ground for excluding evidence; such evidence is inadmissible only if it is either irrelevant, lacks a foundation, or is more prejudicial than probative. ( Id. at pp. 868-869, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 229.) In arguing the evidence here was inadmissible, defendant relies on two Court of Appeal decisions, People v. Walkey (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 268, 223 Cal. Rptr. 132 and People v. Robbie (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1075, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 479. In Walkey, the prosecution introduced expert evidence that the most important factor in the profile of a child abuser was that he had himself been abused as a child, elicited an admission from the defendant that he had been abused as a child, then argued that the defendant was guilty because he fit the profile of a child molester. ( People v. Walkey, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at pp. 276-277, 223 Cal.Rptr. 132.) The Court of Appeal held the evidence inadmissible and the prosecution's argument improper. ( Id. at p. 279, 172 Cal.Rptr. 612.) In People v. Robbie, supra, 92 Cal. App.4th 1075, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 479, a prosecution expert testified that many rapists use only minimal force, and described in detail a scenario in which the rapist is in effect acting as if he thinks of the sexual acts as consensual. ( Id. at pp. 1082-1084, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 479.) Not coincidentally, the behavior the expert described matched the testimony of the alleged victim. The expert conceded that the same behavior would be consistent with a truly consensual encounter. The Court of Appeal in Robbie characterized this evidence as inadmissible profile evidence. It explained: [The evidence] implies that criminals, and only criminals, act in a given way. In fact, certain behavior may be consistent with both innocent and illegal behavior, as the People's expert conceded here. ( Id. at p. 1085, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 479.) Other cases excluding profile evidence include People v. Castaneda (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1072, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 395 (drug dealer profile), People v. Martinez (1992) 10 Cal. App.4th 1001, 1006, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 838 (truck thief profile), and U.S. v. Beltran-Rios (9th Cir.1989) 878 F.2d 1208, 1210 (drug courier profile). The evidence here is quite different. Profile evidence is objectionable when it is insufficiently probative because the conduct or matter that fits the profile is as consistent with innocence as guilt. The evidence here, however, does not have this problem. Defendant has pled guilty, and the circumstances of Paul Bailly's murder themselves suggest a pathological cause. Dr. Hatcher's testimony did not suggest that this type of crime is committed with any frequency, or at all, by persons who do not have the pathology he described. Defendant's own penalty phase evidence emphasized his mental retardation, but it offered no alternative explanation why defendant would sodomize and kill an eight-year-old boy.
While searching defendant's residence on March 24 and 25, 1990, the police discovered copies of three newspapers. Two contained articles about a notorious child molestation case in which the defendants were acquitted. The third contained an article about a father who had set fire to his young son. The prosecution argued that the articles were admissible to show that defendant had been fantasizing about child molesting and had been planning such a crime. Dr. Hatcher testified that persons who commit such crimes almost always [have] a collection of newspaper or magazine articles that have direct relevance to the fantasy and to the subsequent assault that's committed. The defense objected to the admission of the newspaper articles as irrelevant and as more prejudicial than probative. The articles were relevant, both as indicia of defendant's mental condition that led to the crime, and as evidence that defendant was planning, or at least contemplating, such a crime. If defendant's sadistic purpose was an admissible aggravating circumstance, as we concluded earlier in this opinion ( ante, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d at 568-569, 107 P.3d at 240-242), then there is no improper prejudicial effect from the evidence of the newspaper articles.
Defendant's expert witnesses testified that defendant was mentally retarded, that he was a moral imbecile incapable of appreciating the social context and impact of his behavior, and that he had brain damage. In rebuttal, the prosecution called Dr. Jeffrey Schaeffer. He did not diagnose defendant, but testified over defendant's objection that in defendant's case the four diagnostic categories he would consider were antisocial personality, pedophilia, sexual sadism, and specific developmental disorders. He further testified that there is no correlation between brain damage and committing a premeditated crime of violence. There is also no correlation between learning disabilities or mental retardation and violent crime. Defendant argues that Dr. Schaeffer's testimony was improper rebuttal because defendant's own experts had never discussed sexual sadism. We disagree. When, as here, a mental health expert offers a diagnosis, this opens the door to rebuttal testimony questioning that diagnosis or suggesting an alternative diagnosis. (See People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 406, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) Defendant also contends that his evidence of brain damage and retardation was proper mitigating evidence even if those conditions did not cause the murder of Paul Bailly. (See Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 113-114, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1; Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954.) We agree with defendant's premise. But rebuttal tending to show that the brain damage and retardation are not related to the crime remains relevant to the jury's evaluation of the defense evidence as it bears upon the appropriateness of the death penalty. `The admission of rebuttal evidence rests largely within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of palpable abuse.' ( People v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 965, 275 Cal.Rptr. 160, 800 P.2d 516.) We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling admitting the testimony of Dr. Schaeffer.
As noted earlier, Dr. Chris Hatcher testified about the kind of person who would commit the crimes charged in this case. We concluded that the jury could infer that defendant was such a person. ( Ante, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d at 569-570, 107 P.3d at 242.) In his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor asked: Now, what were the inferences we can draw from Dr. Hatcher's testimony about the defendant's motive? (Italics added.) He then made a series of assertions prefixed with the phrase we know: we know that defendant handcuffed and gagged the victim for sexual pleasure; we know that he enjoyed seeing the victim struggle for life; we know that he sodomized and strangled the victim for purposes of sexual pleasure and to produce both terror and struggle. Defendant objected, pointing out that Dr. Hatcher had described a hypothetical perpetrator. The trial court overruled the objection. The prosecutor then resumed his argument by asking the jury again what inferences could be drawn from Dr. Hatcher's testimony. Literally speaking, the prosecutor's argument may have misstated the evidence. We  a term that presumably encompassed at least the prosecutor and the jurors  did not know defendant's motivation and feelings. We could only infer them from Dr. Hatcher's testimony. But this overstatement of the evidence is insignificant, because the prosecutor's argument, taken as a whole, made it clear that he was not talking about proven facts, but about inferences that the jury could draw from Dr. Hatcher's description of the kind of person who commits crimes such as those here. Thus, even assuming that the trial court should have sustained defendant's objection, any error in not doing so would be harmless.

The trial court gave this limiting instruction: The testimony of Dr. Chris Hatcher was received in evidence and may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of explaining, if it does, the meaning of certain pieces of evidence offered in this case, to explain the general phenomena of sexual fantasies and to provide information on the subject of the behavior and mental processes of children who are abducted for the purpose of violent sexual assault and persons who commit such crimes. He testified to a generalized body of knowledge. However, should you find that there are facts in this case which are or may be explained by such testimony you may consider the testimony for that purpose. However, such evidence was not received and may not be considered by you, to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit crimes. Further, Dr. Hatcher did not examine [defendant] nor did he express any opinion about the defendant or how the crime actually occurred. (Italics added.) Defendant correctly observes that the inclusion of the italicized phrase permitted the jurors to consider Dr. Hatcher's testimony as information relevant to defendant's mental processes. But this observation simply returns us to the issue previously discussed: May the jury consider, as aggravating evidence under section 190.3, factor (a), evidence of defendant's mental illness insofar as it relates to the circumstances of the crime? Our conclusion that it may do so resolves the controversy over the jury instruction; if the jurors can consider Dr. Hatcher's testimony as evidence relating to defendant's mental processes, it cannot be error to tell them they may do so.
Defendant proposed five jury instructions relating to mental illness and mitigation. The trial court was not obliged to give any of these instructions, but exercised its discretion to give defendant's proposed special instruction No. 6. Special instruction No. 6 read, in pertinent part: You have been instructed that you may consider, as mitigation, any circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any sympathetic or other aspect of the Defendant's character or record as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not those circumstances or aspects of the Defendant's character are related to the offense. Circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime which you should consider include, but are not limited to, the following: 1. Whether the Defendant acknowledged responsibility for the crime; 2. Whether the crime involved a single victim; 3. Whether the Defendant committed the offense while under the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance, which disturbance need not be extreme nor amount to legal insanity or an inability to form a specific intent. This includes, but is not limited to whether [defendant] has low self-esteem, or suffers from a brain dysfunction, that has affected his ability to learn and may affect his judgment or perception. Mitigating factors also include any sympathetic, compassionate, merciful, or other aspect of Defendant's background, character, record, or social, psychological or medical history, that the Defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.... Defendant argues that the trial court erred in rejecting defendant's special instructions Nos. 7 and 8. Defendant's proposed special instruction No. 7 read: The term `mental or emotional disturbance' as used in these instructions includes any violent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion including, but not limited to, fear, revenge, and the emotion induced by and accompanying or following any intent to commit a felony. [¶] The presence of mental or emotional disturbance may only be considered by you as a factor in mitigation, and may not be considered as an aggravating factor. The trial court correctly rejected this instruction. Defendant's assertion that any emotion that accompanies an intent to commit a felony constitutes a mental or emotional disturbance and cannot be considered as a factor in aggravation is incorrect. As we have explained, the presence of mental or emotional disturbance may be considered as an aggravating factor if admitted as relevant to the circumstances of the crime. Defendant's proposed special instruction No. 8 read: The term `mental disease or defect' as used in these instructions is not limited to evidence which excuses the crime or reduces defendant's culpability, but includes any degree of mental defect, disease or impairment which you may determine is of a nature that death should not be imposed. Such a mental disease or defect may be considered by you as a mitigating factor whether or not the mental condition caused the defendant to commit the offense, and whether or not the condition was operative at the time of the offense. The presence of mental disease or defect may only be considered by you as a factor in mitigation, and may not be considered as an aggravating factor. The first two paragraphs of this instruction correctly state the law. (See Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, 455 U.S. at pp. 113-114, 102 S.Ct. 869; People v. Whitt, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 655, 274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849.) The third paragraph, however, is inconsistent with our conclusion ( ante, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d at 567-569, 107 P.3d at 240-241) that the jury can consider evidence of mental disease or defect as aggravating when that evidence is admitted under section 190.3, factor (a). The trial court therefore correctly rejected the proposed instruction.