Opinion ID: 774021
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Common Law Right to Inspect and Copy Judicial Records

Text: 17 While [t]he existence of the common law right to inspect and copy judicial records is beyond dispute, Myers, 635 F.2d at 949, it is equally clear that that right is not absolute, Warner Commun., 435 U.S. at 598. As we noted in Myers, our approach with respect to the common law right in the criminal context is shaped both by our responsibility to ensure that criminal defendants are not deprived of their right to a fair trial and by our recognition that [w]hat transpires in the court room is public property. Myers, 635 F.2d at 951 (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)). Thus, as we proceed, we must keep in mind both the singular importance of protecting the rights of criminal defendants and the particular interest of the public in scrutinizing the operation of our criminal justice system. As the Supreme Court stated in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), and as we reiterated in Myers, it is difficult to single out any aspect of government of higher concern and importance to the people than the manner in which criminal trials are conducted. Myers, 635 F.2d at 951 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575. 18 In Myers, we held that there was a strong presumption in favor of allowing the public to inspect and copy any item entered into evidence at a public session of a trial. Myers, 635 F.2d at 952. In so holding, we reasoned that [o]nce the evidence has become known to the members of the public, including representatives of the press, through their attendance at a public session of court, it would take the most extraordinary circumstances to justify restrictions on the opportunity of those not physically in attendance at the courtroom to see and hear the evidence, when it is in a form that readily permits sight and sound reproduction. Id. We noted, however, that this presumption would not apply to evidence submitted under seal, because, with respect to that item of evidence, the session of court was not public. Myers, 635 F.2d at 952 n.4. 2 19 We subsequently articulated a somewhat more context-specific understanding of the weight to be given to the presumption in favor of access to judicial records, finding that the weight to be given the presumption of access must be governed by the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article III judicial power and the resultant value of such information to those monitoring the federal courts. United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) (Amodeo II); see United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers, 160 F.3d 853, 857 (2d Cir. 1998) (considering the appropriate weight to be given to the presumption of public access with respect to settlement documents). Generally, we stated, the information will fall somewhere on a continuum from matters that directly affect an adjudication to matters that come within a court's purview solely to insure their irrelevance. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049. 20 In Amodeo II, we noted that the presumption had been given great weight by this and other courts where the requested documents had been introduced at trial (as in Myers and Salerno) or had otherwise been material to a court's disposition of a case on the merits. See id. (also citing Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. City Trust v. Joy, 460 U.S. 1051 (1982) (vacating a protective order entered with respect to a report that was material to the district court's grant of summary judgment)); FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408-09 & n.5 (1st Cir. 1987) (favoring public access to documents submitted in connection with a consent decree that were material and important to the district court's decision to approve the settlement). In each of these cases, we found, the strong weight to be accorded the public right of access to judicial documents was largely derived from the role those documents played in determining litigants' substantive rights - conduct at the heart of Article III - and from the need for public monitoring of that conduct. See id. Conversely the presumption of access to documents that do not serve as the basis for a substantive determination - such as documents submitted on a motion for summary judgment which is denied, thus leaving a decision on the merits for another day - is appreciably weaker. See id. at 150. The weakest presumption is given to documents such as preliminary settlement documents, which have not yet been submitted to a court for ratification. See Glens Falls Newspapers, 160 F.3d at 857. Such documents play a 'negligible role' in the trial judge's exercise of Article III judicial power until they are merged into a tentative final agreement for court action, thereby becoming public. See id. 21 Discerning the weight of the presumption with respect to judicial documents falling between these extremes on the continuum is a matter of judgment. That judgment can be informed in part by tradition. Where such documents are usually filed with the court and are generally available, the weight of the presumption is stronger than where filing with the court is unusual or is generally under seal. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050. 22