Opinion ID: 2221972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mobil as an Operator.

Text: This case presents the same issue we addressed in Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 606 N.W.2d 359 (Iowa 2000) ( Mobil I ). In this case, however, there are facts not presented in Mobil I which require us to separately consider whether Mobil falls outside the definition of an operator as a matter of law. In Mobil I, we found a wholesaler who merely had the ability to discontinue the supply of gasoline and debrand a station for placing another brand of gasoline in a tank or for failing to pay for the gasoline did not fall within the definition of an operator of the tank under the Tank Fund Act. In this case, not only did Mobil maintain the control identified in Mobil I, but the distributorship agreement identified additional grounds to refuse to deliver petroleum or debrand the station. These grounds included unclean tanks, hoses, and connectors. Furthermore, Mobil had the ability to request testing to be performed on the tanks, hoses, and connectors, and was permitted to receive copies of the test results. The distributorship agreement clearly gave Mobil additional grounds to terminate its relationship with the station, and to require testing of the tank systems. Yet, this type of control, as in Mobil I, does not relate to the daily operation of the tank system. Instead, the control relates to general quality assurance standards or expectations of performance necessary in the sale of brand name products to the public. Thus, the additional facts of this case do not amount to control over the daily operation of the tanks and are outside the scope of the Tank Fund Act. The Board also argues Mobil was aware of the contamination and potential contamination from the underground storage tank during the time it owned and operated the gas station, but took systematic steps to insulate itself from the problem by establishing the jobber system. It argues Mobil should not be permitted to profit from creating the problem and escaping responsibility for the damage to the environment. This policy argument, however, is not derived from the language or history of our statute. Our Tank Fund Act does not reveal an industry approach to the remediation of petroleum contamination. Instead, the legislature chose to tie liability for the recovery of corrective costs to the control of or responsibility for the daily operation of the tanks. If the legislature intended to impose liability on all suppliers of petroleum, including the major oil companies, it would not have limited liability to activities which the oil companies no longer pursue. We are required to construe our statutes to conform to the legislative intent, not a policy which was not within the collective judgment of our legislature. See State v. Wagner, 596 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Iowa 1999) (ascertaining legislative intent is goal in interpreting statutes, not imposing what the court thinks the law should be).