Opinion ID: 540010
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Convictions of the Torres Brothers and Flores under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848(b).

Text: 81 The Torres brothers and Flores challenge the application of the super kingpin statute, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848(b) (1988), 3 pursuant to which all three were sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Section 848(a) permits the imposition of a life sentence upon a defendant convicted of its violation. Section 848(b) requires the imposition of a life sentence upon a defendant convicted under Section 848(a) if, in addition, the requirements of subsection (b) are satisfied. Section 848(e) precludes the suspension of, or grant of probation with respect to, any sentence imposed under section 848. As stated at the outset of this Discussion, because we agree with these appellants that the jury should have been instructed that the Torres brothers and Flores had to function as principal administrators, organizers or leaders of the Torres Organization after section 848(b) became effective, and therefore vacate their convictions thereunder and remand for resentencing under section 848(a), we do not consider herein their other challenges to their convictions under section 848(b). 82 Section 848, as applicable here, see supra note 3, read as follows: Continuing criminal enterprise 83 (a) Penalties; forfeitures 84 Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years and which may be up to life imprisonment, to a fine not to exceed the greater of that authorized in accordance with the provisions of title 18, or $2,000,000 if the defendant is an individual or $5,000,000 if the defendant is other than an individual, and to the forfeiture prescribed in section 853 of this title; except that if any person engages in such activity after one or more prior convictions of him under this section have become final, he shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 20 years and which may be up to life imprisonment, to a fine not to exceed the greater of twice the amount authorized in accordance with the provisions of title 18, or $4,000,000 if the defendant is an individual or $10,000,000 if the defendant is other than an individual, and to the forfeiture prescribed in section 853 of this title. 85 (b) Life imprisonment for engaging in continuing criminal enterprise 86 Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be imprisoned for life and fined in accordance with subsection (a) of this section, if-- 87 (1) such person is the principal administrator, organizer, or leader of the enterprise or is one of several such principal administrators, organizers, or leaders; and 88 (2)(A) the violation referred to in subsection (d)(1) of this section involved at least 300 times the quantity of a substance described in subsection 841(b)(1)(B) of this title, or 89 (B) the enterprise, or any other enterprise in which the defendant was the principal or one of several principal administrators, organizers, or leaders, received $10 million dollars in gross receipts during any twelve-month period of its existence for the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a substance described in section 841(b)(1)(B) of this title. 90 (d) 4 Continuing criminal enterprise defined 91 For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if-- 92 (1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter the punishment for which is a felony, and 93 (2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter-- 94 (A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management, and 95 (B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources. 96 (e) Suspension of sentence and probation prohibited 97 In the case of any sentence imposed under this section, imposition or execution of such sentence shall not be suspended, probation shall not be granted, and the Act of July 15, 1932 (D.C.Code, secs. 24-203 to 24-207), shall not apply. 98 Section 848(b) was added by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-570, Sec. 1253, 100 Stat. 3207, and became effective upon the President's approval of that statute on October 27, 1986. 99 The district court originally addressed the ex post facto questions posed by the October 27, 1986 effective date of section 848(b) in its pretrial opinion, stating: 100 Defendants claim that their indictment under Sec. 848(b) also violates the Ex Post Facto clause of the Constitution, since the continuing criminal enterprise alleged in the indictment began before October 27, 1986, the effective date of Sec. 848(b). For the reasons stated below, the Court denies this motion. 101 Defendants in their brief fail to discuss the clear and consistent holdings of many courts that in the case of continuing offenses, such as the operation of a continuing criminal enterprise, the Ex Post Facto clause is not violated by application of a statute to an enterprise that began prior to, but continued after, the effective date of that statute. United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170, 1175 (4th Cir.1976); United States v. Ferrara, 458 F.2d 868, 874 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 931, 92 S.Ct. 2498, 33 L.Ed.2d 343 (1972). Since the indictment alleges the continuation of a criminal enterprise beyond the effective date of Sec. 848(b), the Court denies this motion. The Court reserves decision on whether income received by the alleged drug enterprise prior to the effective date of the statute may be used to satisfy the requirements of Sec. 848(b)(2)(B). By necessity, the resolution of this issue must await the government's proof at trial and may be handled with in [sic] an appropriate instruction to the jury. 102 United States v. Torres, 683 F.Supp. 56, 62 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (footnote omitted). 103 In their subsequent request to charge, appellants sought the following instruction: 104 [E]ven if you find that the enterprise grossed $10 million in receipts during a 12-month period and that a defendant was a principal administrator, organizer or leader of that enterprise, this $10 million allegation has not been proven unless you further find that the defendant you are considering was a principal administrator, organizer, or leader of the enterprise during the entire period that it took to gross the $10 million. You may not consider the $10 million allegation proven if you find that the defendant was a principal administrator, organizer or leader for any period of time less than that which it took to gross $10 million. Thus, if the defendant joined the enterprise as a principal administrator, organizer or leader during the twelve month period at issue, you may not find this allegation proven as to that defendant. Also, if the defendant was associated with the enterprise in some subordinate capacity part of the time that the $10 million dollars was being grossed and then eventually assumed the rank of principal administrator, organizer or leader, you may not find this allegation proven as to that defendant. 105 In addition, you are not entitled to take into consideration any monies received by the enterprise prior to October 27, 1986. Rather, you must focus on a single 12 month period beginning after that date. Consequently, if you find that the enterprise only received $10,000,000 throughout the course of its entire existence rather than within a specific 12 month period which began after October 27, 1986, then you must find this element not proven. 106 Emphasis partially added. Flores' counsel reiterated in the charging conference the position that for Mr. Flores to be found guilty under 848(b) he has to have been a principal ... administrator, organizer or leader for the entire time it took the enterprise to earn the ten million dollars. 107 The district court rejected this request, and charged: 108 The second of these additional allegations is that the enterprise described in Counts Two through Four earned at least $10 million in gross receipts from the sale of heroin during a one-year period of its existence--specifically, the one year period from June 24, 1986 to June 23, 1987, that immediately preceded the arrest of the defendants on June 24, 1987. 109 For this element to be satisfied, the government must have also proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant you are considering was a principal administrator, organizer or leader of that enterprise sometime during the 12-month period that the enterprise received at least $10 million in gross receipts. 110 Emphasis added. 111 In addition, the verdict forms provided to the jury included the following questions with respect to the application of section 848(b) to the Torres brothers and Flores: 112 If your verdict on [the count charging the particular defendant with a violation of section 848(a) ] is Guilty, answer the following question: 113 1. Was [the particular defendant] a principal administrator, organizer or leader of the continuing criminal enterprise at some time during the one-year period from June 24, 1986 to June 23, 1987? 114 If your answer to Question One is Yes, answer the following question: 115 2. Did the continuing criminal enterprise earn at least $10 million in gross receipts during the one-year period from June 24, 1986 to June 23, 1987 ? 116 Emphasis added. 117 Clearly, both the instruction to the jury and the verdict form answered the question posed in the district court's pretrial opinion by allowing evidence of receipts prior to October 27, 1986 to be included in the ten million dollar calculation of gross receipts under section 848(b)(2)(B). Whatever the merits of this determination, we regard as dispositive the fact that both the instruction and the verdict form allowed the application of section 848(b)(1) to the Torres brothers and Flores if they were principal administrators, organizers or leaders of the Organization sometime during the 12-month period [from June 24, 1986 to June 23, 1987], in the language of the instruction, or at some time during the one-year period from June 24, 1986 to June 23, 1987, as the verdict form stated the question. 118 The district court correctly stated in its pretrial opinion that in the case of continuing offenses, such as the operation of a continuing criminal enterprise, the Ex Post Facto clause is not violated by application of a statute to an enterprise that began prior to, but continued after, the effective date of [section 848(b) ]. United States v. Torres, 683 F.Supp. at 62 (citing United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170, 1175 (4th Cir.1976); United States v. Ferrara, 458 F.2d 868, 874 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 931, 92 S.Ct. 2498, 33 L.Ed.2d 343 (1972)). Further, [i]t is well established that a statute increasing a penalty with respect to a criminal conspiracy which commenced prior to, but was continued beyond the effective date of the statute, is not ex post facto as to that crime. United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 365 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050, 96 S.Ct. 777, 46 L.Ed.2d 638 (1976). 119 The problem presented here, however, is that both the pertinent instruction and the verdict form allowed the Torres brothers and Flores to be subjected to the enhanced, mandatory life sentence imposed by section 848(b) if they acted as principal administrators, organizers or leaders of the Organization at any time between June 24, 1986 and June 23, 1987, although section 848(b) did not become effective until October 27, 1986. Accordingly, the instruction and verdict form permitted the application of section 848(b) to these defendants even if they did not engage in the specified conduct at any time after that section's enactment. 120 This is impermissible, in our view, because such an application of section 848(b) would  'make[ ] more onerous the punishment for crimes committed before its enactment.'  Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 435, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2454, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 968, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)). Congress is barred from enacting legislation which imposes such a result by the ex post facto clause of U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 3, and states are so barred by the ex post facto clause of id. art. I, Sec. 10, cl. 1. Since  'the principle on which the [ex post facto] clause is based--the notion that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties--is fundamental to our concept of constitutional liberty,'  United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 419 (5th Cir.1977) (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191, 97 S.Ct. 990, 992, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977)), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 1448, 55 L.Ed.2d 494 (1978), courts are similarly constrained by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, id. 121 The government does not contest these settled principles. Rather, it contends that (1) appellants failed to object to the challenged instruction (and consistent verdict form), stating distinctly the matter to which [they objected] and the grounds of the objection as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 30, with the result that (2) we may reverse only if that instruction constituted plain error, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b), which (3) it did not. The government also maintains that under any conceivable view of the evidence consistent with the jury's verdict, the Torres brothers and Flores functioned as principal administrators, organizers or leaders of the Organization after October 27, 1986, so that any error in the instruction and verdict forms was harmless. We are unpersuaded by these arguments. 122 It is true that the Torres brothers and Flores did not request an instruction that they could be found in violation of section 848(b)(1) only if they served the Torres Organization as principal administrators, organizers or leaders after October 27, 1986. Rather, they twice sought an instruction that any such determination had to encompass the entire period during which the Organization grossed the $10,000,000 required to satisfy section 848(b)(2)(B). The district court sensibly responded to this request in the charging conference, observing that the ten million dollars in the court's view is a description of the kind of organization rather than a predicate to a particular defendant's punishable conduct. 123 Thus, appellants' request, and their related request for an instruction requiring satisfaction of the $10,000,000 requirement exclusively by proof of gross receipts after October 27, 1986, did not seek with the precision that rule 30 requires an instruction that these appellants had to be found to occupy the leadership roles specified by section 848(b)(1) on or after October 27, 1986 in order to be found in violation of section 848(b). This is not exactly the situation to which Fed.R.Crim.P. 30 is, by its explicit terms, directed, since appellants stat[ed] distinctly the matter to which [they] object[ed] and the grounds of [their] objection, id., but stated a ground different from that which they urge on appeal. As in the case of an inexplicit objection, however, this does not suffice to preserve an objection for appeal, absent plain error (which we shall presently consider). See United States v. Jackson, 569 F.2d 1003, 1010 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 3096, 57 L.Ed.2d 1137 (1978); Marbs v. United States, 250 F.2d 514, 516-17 (8th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 919, 78 S.Ct. 703, 2 L.Ed.2d 715 (1958). 124 These requests did, however, bring the general ex post facto matter before the court. As indicated earlier, the district court had previously devoted a portion of its pretrial opinion to this subject. Further, during the argument of appellants' rule 29 motions at the close of the prosecution's case, counsel for the government stated: 125 [A]ll that [the] ex post facto clause requires is that the offender be on notice that if he continues his activity past the effective date of the statute he will subject himself to liability for offense.... 126 So long as the earning of money continues past October 27, 1986 it clearly satisfies the ex post facto clause. 127 Emphasis added. 128 As a general rule, failure to make an objection with adequate specificity to satisfy rule 30 may be disregarded under the plain error provision of rule 52 where failure to reverse would result in a miscarriage of justice which denied the defendant a fair trial. United States v. Civelli, 883 F.2d 191, 194 (2d Cir.) (citing United States v. Kallash, 785 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir.1986) (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1592, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982))), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 409, 107 L.Ed.2d 374 (1989). In making this assessment, we are reminded that errors of constitutional magnitude will be noticed more freely under the plain error rule than less serious errors, and that a closer scrutiny may also be appropriate 'when the failure to preserve the precise grounds for error is mitigated by [an objection] on related grounds.'  United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 420 (5th Cir.1977) (quoting United States v. Meadows, 523 F.2d 365, 368 n. 3 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 970, 96 S.Ct. 1469, 47 L.Ed.2d 738 (1976)) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 1448, 55 L.Ed.2d 494 (1978). 129 As the Civelli formulation makes clear, however, the plain error doctrine is to be used sparingly. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); Kallash, 785 F.2d at 29; United States v. Wilkinson, 754 F.2d 1427, 1432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3482, 87 L.Ed.2d 617 (1985); United States v. London, 753 F.2d 202, 205 (2d Cir.1985). Despite the inclination to invoke the doctrine more freely where constitutional error might otherwise pass without correction, furthermore, it is established that an ex post facto challenge to a jury instruction can be waived. See United States v. Calabrese, 825 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Todd, 735 F.2d 146, 149-51 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189, 105 S.Ct. 957, 83 L.Ed.2d 964 (1985); United States v. Panebianco, 543 F.2d 447, 453-54 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103, 97 S.Ct. 1128, 1129, 51 L.Ed.2d 553 (1977). 130 We are left with a very close question, especially in view of the evidentiary posture of this case. As the government strenuously contends, it is quite unlikely that the jury would have found a significant difference in the character of these appellants' relationship to, and leadership of, the Torres Organization before and after October 27, 1986. In this connection, the government points out that section 848(d)(2) requires the commission of a continuing series, (i.e., three or more, see United States v. Jones, 763 F.2d 518, 525 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 981, 106 S.Ct. 386, 88 L.Ed.2d 339 (1985)) of narcotics violations for a violation of section 848. The government further points out that the jury was instructed that the only offenses which they could consider in this regard were those either specified in the indictment or reflected in the wiretap conversations you have heard or the various records that were seized. The government then notes that all such violations occurred in 1987, compelling the conclusion that the defendants ... in fact continued to operate past October 26, 1986. 131 The factual premises of the government's position are generally unassailable, 5 and the jury determinations of guilt as to the various counts of the indictment lead inescapably to the conclusion that the Torres brothers and Flores were found guilty of at least three narcotics violations occurring after October 26, 1986. We do not accept, however, the government's position that this disposes of the requirement stated in section 848(b)(1) that these defendants act as principal administrators, organizers or leaders of the Organization after October 26, 1986. 132 The definition of a continuing criminal enterprise in section 848(d), which includes the continuing series requirement to which the government points, provides the basis for a determination under section 848(a) that a defendant has engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, subjecting a first offender to a ten year minimum mandatory sentence and the possibility of life imprisonment. The requirements of section 848(b) are additional to those specified in section 848(a), and result in mandatory life imprisonment if they are satisfied. The government's position reduces to an equation of the sections 848(a) and 848(b) requirements, on the theory that the jury, if properly instructed that section 848(b) must be satisfied by proof as to conduct occurring on or after October 26, 1986, would surely have found for the government. Cf. Brennan v. United States, 867 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.) (RICO conviction upheld, despite invalidation of wire fraud convictions as predicate acts, where convictions as to other predicate acts would rationally have required conviction on RICO count), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1750, 104 L.Ed.2d 187 (1989). 133 We cannot accept this position. It is clear that (1) it was the government's burden to prove all the elements of section 848(b) beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the instruction and verdict form allowed a resolution of this issue against the Torres brothers and Flores whether or not they met the requirements of section 848(b)(1) on or after October 27, 1986; (3) the ex post facto rule requires such conduct on or after October 27, 1986, as a constitutional matter, as a basis for a conviction under section 848(b); and (4) as a result of the resolution of this issue adversely to them, these defendants were subjected to the mandatory life sentence imposed by section 848(b), rather than the ten years to life sentence which would otherwise have been applicable under section 848(a). 134 Under these circumstances, whatever the likelihood that a properly instructed jury would have ruled against the Torres brothers and Flores as to their violation of section 848(b)(1) on or after October 26, 1986, it is inappropriate to impose a mandatory life sentence upon them where there was an ex post facto violation in the instruction actually given, and the defendants brought the general ex post facto question to the attention of the district court, although without the precision that Fed.R.Crim.P. 30 requires with respect to the specific contention ultimately advanced on appeal and providing the basis for our decision. We therefore conclude that the conviction of the Torres brothers and Flores under section 848(b) must be vacated, and that they must be resentenced under section 848(a). 135