Opinion ID: 2086392
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reason to believe and clear and convincing evidence.

Text: Section 23-1325(a) provides that a defendant charged with murder in the first degree or with AWIKWA may be detained without bond pending trial if the judicial officer has reason to believe that no one or more conditions of release will reasonably assure that the [defendant] will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the community. The statute does not define the term reason to believe. Prior to our en banc decision in Lynch, this court construed this phrase as permitting detention if the government established probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed the offense. See DeVeau v. United States, 454 A.2d 1308, 1315 (D.C.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1087, 103 S.Ct. 1781, 76 L.Ed.2d 351 (1983). In Lynch, however, we overruled DeVeau in part, and held that [t]he trial court, in making a finding of dangerousness under D.C.Code § 23-1325(a), must employ the standard of clear and convincing evidence. 557 A.2d at 581. The requirement of clear and convincing evidence was based on the Supreme Court's then-recent decision in Salerno. We emphasized in Lynch that this standard applies to the ultimate determination of dangerousness which the trial court must make, not to each individual fact on which the court relies. Lynch, supra, 557 A.2d at 582. We stated that [i]n making a finding as to the commission of the offense, the trial court must continue to employ the probable cause standard. Id. (citations omitted).