Opinion ID: 217729
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Oh and Liadov

Text: This is the odd case where an agency whose decisions we review has overruled one of our decisions. We must decide whether the proper level of deference to the agency's interpretation of the law requires that we accept its legal view, and also whether Supreme Court decisions since, distinguishing jurisdictional from claim-processing rules, require a new interpretation. We start with the statute and regulation. The statute provides that the Attorney General shall issue regulations with respect to ... the time period for the filing of administrative appeals in deportation proceedings.... [6] The regulation issued pursuant to this statute says the notice of appeal shall be filed directly with the Board of Immigration Appeals within 30 calendar days. [7] The Executive Office of Immigration Review provides in an online publication that the only way to accomplish this filing is by physical delivery to the BIA's Falls Church, Virginia office. [8] Neither the statute nor the implementing regulation uses the word jurisdiction. We had occasion to construe the filing requirement in a case like this one in Oh v. Gonzales . [9] In Oh, as here, the petitioner delivered her papers for overnight delivery so that they should have arrived in Falls Church on time, but the express delivery service erred and delivered her papers past the deadline. We held that the BIA's position, that it had no authority to accept the late filing because the deadline was jurisdictional, was erroneous as a matter of law. We noted that the regulation upon which the BIA relied there (and here), 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38, did not say that it was jurisdictional. Because the BIA, despite its jurisdictional argument, claimed authority to excuse late filings in rare circumstances, and our prior authorities likewise had held that in unique circumstances lateness was excusable, the BIA's denial of Oh's motion for reconsideration was an abuse of discretion. We held that the BIA jurisdiction position was a misconstruction of the jurisdictional nature of its own filing deadline, amounting to legal error rendering its discretionary decision arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. The Second Circuit decided the same question the same way in Zhong Guang Sun v. U.S. Department of Justice . [10] That was another late filing despite timely drop off at an overnight delivery service. There too the BIA claimed lack of authority to extend the time. And in Zhong, as we had in Oh, the Second Circuit held that the Board was mistaken as a matter of law. Zhong noted that the Service itself strongly encouraged aliens and their lawyers to use overnight delivery services. [11] Zhong adopted our view that the BIA's jurisdictional argument was a misconstruction of its deadline. Then the BIA went the other way in Matter of Liadov, [12] which the government urges us to follow. Liadov too was a timely drop off for guaranteed timely delivery, but delivery service error resulted in one day late arrival at the BIA's Falls Church office. The BIA expressly rejected Oh and Zhong, for two reasons. First, the Board emphasized the importance of timely filings, [13] and that [m]eaningful filing deadlines are as critical to the smooth and fair administration of the Board as they are to the courts. [14] And second, the Board noted that [n]either the statute nor the regulations grant us the authority to extend the time for filing appeals. [15] Nevertheless, the Board noted, the Board may certify a case to itself in exceptional circumstances, even though the appeal was filed late. [16]