Opinion ID: 210094
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Insert Limitation

Text: Relying upon our prior discussion of the term insert in Hillerich, the district court held that [t]he term `insert' does not possess a particular meaning in the field of art encompassed by the '398 patent, and that [g]iven its ordinary and customary meaning, `insert' means `something inserted or intended for insertion.' Summary Judgment Opinion at 11 (quoting Hillerich, 442 F.3d at 1330). Although not discussed by the district court in this case, we had also previously addressed the insert limitation in DeMarini. In that case, we accepted the ordinary and uncontested definition proffered by the then-owner of the '398 patent as anything put or fit into something else. DeMarini, 239 F.3d at 1330. We also noted that the bat frame, which includes the impact portion and the handle, completely surrounds and is separate from the `insert.' Id. Wilson contends that the insert limitation is purely structural, and that it does not matter whether an insert is placed into a pre-existing frame or whether a frame is built around it. Wilson argues that by holding that the carbon bats do not contain an insert within the meaning of the claims because the internal component is not inserted into anything, the district court committed the claim construction error of importing a process limitation into claims directed to a product. See Hazani v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 126 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed.Cir.1997) (distinguishing between product and product-by-process claims). Miken responds that construing the term insert to encompass any separate, internal, independently moveable structural element would impermissibly broaden the scope of the claims and would read out the insert limitation entirely. Miken further argues that Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1142-46 (Fed.Cir.2005) (limiting the term board to wood cut from a log), demonstrates that how a product is made can be dispositive evidence of noninfringement of a product claim. We are not persuaded by Wilson's arguments regarding the insert limitation. To the extent that these arguments are relevant to claim construction, we address them here; to the extent they relate to the second step of the infringement analysis, however, we address them below. We note first that nothing in the claims or specification indicates, explicitly or implicitly, that the inventor used the term in a novel way or intended to impart a novel meaning to it. To the contrary, the claims and written description of the '398 patent consistently use the term insert in the sense of its ordinary meaning as something inserted or intended for insertion. Webster's II New College Dictionary (3d ed.2005); see also Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged (1993) (defining insert as something that is inserted or is for insertion); '398 patent col.3 1.5 (the insert is inserted into the tubular frame 11); id. col.4 11.24-28 (the insert 18 is coated with the lubricant before being inserted into the tubular frame 11). Had the patentee, who was responsible for drafting and prosecuting the patent, intended something different, it could have prevented this result through clearer drafting. Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 951 (Fed.Cir. 1993). Moreover; the parties have presented no evidence to suggest that the term insert in the context of the patent has a particular meaning differing from the ordinary and customary meaning in the field of art encompassed by the '398 patent. The term insert is a common term used to denote structure. To contend, however, as Wilson does, that it does not matter whether an insert is placed into a pre-existing frame or whether a frame is built around it ignores that ordinary and customary meaning, notwithstanding Wilson's attempts to categorize the term insert as purely structural. The issue would have been different if the claims contained the language argued in Wilson's briefs; to wit, internal structural member, Wilson Br. at 31, 38, or multi-wall product, Reply Br. at 3, but they do not. It is the language of the claims not the argument that governs. As for Wilson's contention that the district court impermissibly imported a process limitation into a product claim, we disagree. As we have discussed, the district court merely adopted an ordinary meaning of the term insert. Summary Judgment Opinion at 11. That this ordinary meaning has functional attributes does not change the fact that the claim recites a structural component, albeit one possessed with certain understood characteristics. Cf. Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed.Cir. 1996) (noting that structural elements can be expressed in functional terms and citing examples such as `filter,' `brake,' `clamp,' `screwdriver,' [and] `lock'). Miken further supports its argument by relying on Nystrom. We agree that Nystrom supports Miken's position but for a reason different from the one presented. In Nystrom, we held that the [b]roadening of the ordinary meaning of a term in the absence of support in the intrinsic record indicating that such a broad meaning was intended violates the principles articulated in [ Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.2005) (en banc) ]. Nystrom, 424 F.3d at 1145-46. Based on Phillips, a claim term should not be read to encompass a broader definition in the absence of something in the written description and/or prosecution history to provide explicit or implicit notice to the public  i.e., those of ordinary skill in the art  that the inventor intended a disputed term to cover more than the ordinary and customary meaning revealed by the context of the intrinsic record. Id. at 1145. Here, Wilson has not identified any such notice in the intrinsic record of the '398 patent. Accordingly, and because we discern no claim construction error in the district court's treatment of the insert limitation, we affirm this aspect of the judgment. []