Opinion ID: 2602153
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Comparative Risk Evidence Was Admissible.

Text: The estate asserts that the trial court erroneously allowed Honda to introduce evidence comparing the risks of riding three-wheel ATVs to the risks of operating other vehicles like snowmachines and motorcyclesso-called comparative risk evidence. [6] The estate points out that the trial court had issued a protective order excluding the comparative risk evidence unless it was used to impeach certain Consumer Product Safety Commission reports. The estate argues that the evidence is irrelevant and that its admission amounted to reversible error. We disagree. The comparative risk evidence the estate complains of was relevant and admissible for two reasons. First, the estate made the evidence relevant when it introduced evidence of ATV-related emergency room admissions. The estate first mentioned the emergency room statistics in its opening statement. The estate's trial counsel stated in opening that [b]y 1984, over 100,000 people had been taken to emergency rooms as a result of injuries in 3-wheel accidents. Over 250 people had been killed.... [Honda] knew it had an unstable machine on its hands. It knew it from the [Consumer Product Safety Commission] statistics. Over Honda's objection, the estate later introduced the CPSC statistics as evidence that Honda had notice of injuries resulting from the use of its three-wheel ATVs. The estate also recounted the statistics in its closing argument. Honda asserts that it introduced the comparative risk evidence to explain the CPSC statistics and to prove that the statistics relied upon by [the estate's expert witness] were inaccurate and irrelevant. We agree that Honda's comparative risk evidence was relevant to refute the estate's statistical evidence and to impeach its expert's testimony regarding those statistics. As we recently stated, a party may open the door to evidence on a subject by putting that subject at issue in the case. [7] Here, the estate opened the door to a discussion of the statistical methodology behind the CPSC reports. [8] The emergency room statistics that the estate chose to present were relevant to establish notice only insofar as they suggested a disproportionally high rate of injury and, inferentially, a defective product. By offering the injury statistics as relevant evidence of notice, the estate necessarily asserted that they tended to show that ATVs were defectivethat Honda knew it had an unstable machine on its hands. How else, then, could Honda have contextualized the rates of emergency room admissions without comparing the ATV injury rates with similar products? The statistics of ATV-related emergency room admissions, standing alone, could not explain the reasons for the reported injuries or establish the need for a corrective response by Honda. Honda was therefore entitled to offer the comparative risk evidence in response to the estate's use of the CPSC statistics. Second, the comparative risk evidence was also admissible because it played an important role in connection with the issue of punitive damages. The estate's theory of punitive damages was that Honda continued to market three-wheel ATVs knowing that the three-wheelers had a high rate of injury. It based its theory in large part on the fact that Honda had notice of the CPSC emergency room statistics as early as 1984 but continued to market three-wheel ATVs. The estate asserted that the continued marketing in the face of the injury statistics showed that Honda's conduct was sufficiently reprehensible to support punitive damages. Honda's comparative risk evidence directly responded to the estate's theory of punitive damages. We conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the comparative risk evidence.