Opinion ID: 1786005
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Pre-trial Motion for Disclosure and Production of Evidence Favorable to Defendant

Text: Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion entitled Motion to Compel Disclosure and Production of all Evidence Favorable to Defendant. In the motion, defense counsel sought to have the court order the State to produce for inspection and copying all evidence in the possession of the State favorable to the defendant, including but not limited to the following: The statements, memorandums or summaries of statements, stenographic recording or transcription of oral statements referred to in the oath in support of a search warrant signed by Carl Gregory and Laymon Godwin on September 17, 1971, and filed of record in Ouachita Parish, Louisiana, on the same day. [1] At the hearing on the motion, the defendant argued that the State had written statements from several witnesses that the victim ran into the highway in front of the passing automobile at a time when the defendant was with Billie Bonner and could not have pushed, chased or caused the decedent to enter the highway. He contended that he was entitled to the production of these statements prior to trial, citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The State took the position that the defendant was not entitled to the pre-trial discovery of the State's evidence, but added: The State is not attempting in this case to suppress any evidence that would be favorable to the defendant. Now I have no objection whatsoever to the Court, an impartial party, taking these statements and reading them and, if the Court finds them favorable to the defendant, letting him know what is in them but I respectfully contend that the statements do not contain anything that will relieve the defendant of the charge against him. The trial judge declined to examine the statements, as suggested by the District Attorney. After pointing out to defense counsel that a prior statement, if contradictory, could be used for impeachment of a witness at the trial, the judge overruled the motion. It is well established that a defendant is not entitled to the pre-trial discovery of the written statements of prosecution witnesses in the District Attorney's files. State v. Martin, 250 La. 705, 198 So.2d 897 (1967); State v. Hunter, 250 La. 295, 195 So.2d 273 (1967); State v. Johnson, 249 La. 950, 192 So.2d 135 (1966); State v. Vallery, 214 La. 495, 38 So.2d 148 (1948). [2] It follows that unless there is an overriding constitutional principle that required the pre-trial production of the statements in the present case, the ruling of the trial judge was correct. In Brady v. Maryland, supra, the petitioner brought a postconviction proceeding to set aside his conviction of murder and death sentence. At his original trial, he had admitted he was an accomplice. He sought, however, to show that his companion had actually killed the victim, as a basis for a jury verdict without capital punishment. Defense counsel requested from the State's attorney the companion's confession to establish this. The State delivered all of the companion's statements except one, in which the companion admitted the actual homicide. The prosecution withheld this statement. The United States Supreme Court, considering the statement admissible only on the issue of punishment, granted a new trial as to punishment only. The Court stated: In Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215, 216, 63 S.Ct. 177, 87 L.Ed. 214, 216, we phrased the rule in broader terms: `Petitioner's papers are inexpertly drawn, but they do set forth allegations that his imprisonment resulted from perjured testimony, knowingly used by the State authorities to obtain his conviction, and from the deliberate suppression by those same authorities of evidence favorable to him. These allegations sufficiently charge a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and, if proven, would entitle petitioner to release from his present custody. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791.' The Third Circuit in the Baldi Case construed that statement in Pyle v. Kansas to mean that the `suppression of evidence favorable' to the accused was itself sufficient to amount to a denial of due process. 195 F.2d 815 at 820. In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217, 1221, we extended the test formulated in Mooney v. Holohan when we said: `The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.' And see Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 78 S.Ct. 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 9; Wilde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S. 607, 80 S.Ct. 900, 4 L.Ed.2d 985. Cf. Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 285, 76 S.Ct. 806, 100 L.Ed. 1178, 1185, (dissenting opinion). We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Significant in that case, we think, is the suppression of the confession after request, its favorable content for the defense, and its materiality to the issue of punishment to be fixed by the jury in the capital case. Thus, the withholding of the confession rose to a constitutional dimension. In Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 92 S. Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972), the United States Supreme Court stated: The heart of the holding in Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, is the prosecution's suppression of evidence, in the face of a defense production request, where the evidence is favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt or to punishment. In the light of these two decisions, upon the stipulation of the State and defense, we have examined the statements in controversy. The statements are not in narrative form. Rather, they are in the form of a transcript of the police interrogation of the witnesses during the investigation. Although some of the witnesses were most reluctant to give information, we find that none of them stated that the victim ran into the highway and was killed by the automobile without participation by the defendant. Since the complete trial transcript is not included in the appellate record, we cannot of course determine whether or not the statements are entirely consistent with the trial testimony of the witnesses. It is well settled, however, that a prior inconsistent statement is not admissible on the substantive issue of guilt. State v. Ray, 259 La. 105, 249 So.2d 540 (1971) and the authorities therein cited. Unlike the prosecution in Brady v. Maryland, a capital case, the statements here are immaterial to the punishment, for the jury had no responsibility to assess punishment. A prior written statement is admissible to impeach the credibility of a witness only if it is inconsistent with his trial testimony and then only if the witness denies the prior statement. LSA-R.S. 15:493; State v. Jackson, 248 La. 919, 183 So.2d 305 (1966).