Opinion ID: 1058342
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: redacted statement of defendant

Text: Prior to the testimony of State's witness Jim Porter, the prosecution discussed the manner in which the defendant's confession would be introduced and the problems with redacted portions of the statement. A typed transcript was used, and the trial court permitted, over defense objection, copies of the transcript to be passed to jurors to read along with Investigator Porter. The trial court observed that the record needed to reflect that there is a recorded statement ... written statement that we have [that] has been redacted to take out any reference to any crime other than this particular Ray Patterson crime. It was understood that the redacted portion of the statement would not be read to the jury. The defendant now complains that Investigator Porter was improperly permitted to read into evidence the following redacted portions of Thacker's statement: DEFENDANT: And after he ran the credit card number through,  he got through and pretty much know what happened from there. PORTER: Well, I want you to tell me. DEFENDANT: Well, he wasn't gonna give my credit  my card back `cause I couldn't pay the bill'. PORTER: Okay. DEFENDANT: And I knew I was wanted in other states, so I just stabbed him and took off. . . . PORTER: Camping? Okay. Okay, where did you get this Oldsmobile Cutlass, Steve? DEFENDANT: From Boyd. That was his Cutlass. PORTER: You take anything from that house  his house? DEFENDANT: Just some camping gear, and that's where the knife came from that I stabbed Patterson with. (Emphasis added.) The defendant submits that the error of the trial [c]ourt in allowing the improperly redacted statement to be read in open [c]ourt to the jury, and the prosecutorial misconduct of the District Attorney General in presenting and eliciting the harmful testimony from Investigator Porter, constitute harmful, reversible error. The defendant further complains that the prosecution's use of these statements during closing argument also constitutes reversible error. In this regard, the defendant maintains that the use of these statements are in contravention of Rule 404(b), Tennessee Rules of Evidence. The State initially responds by asserting that any objection thereto is waived for failure to enter a contemporaneous objection to the introduction of the statements. See Tenn. R.App. P. 36(a). The defendant's failure to raise a contemporaneous objection to this testimony as being a prior bad act effectively waives this issue. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 36 S.W.3d 102, 108 (Tenn.Crim.App.2000), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Mar. 17, 2000); State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 635 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1994). Notwithstanding waiver, we elect to address the issue on its merit. As a general proposition, evidence of a defendant's prior crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove that he committed the crime in question. Tenn. R. Evid. 404. The rationale underlying the general rule is that admission of such evidence carries with it the inherent risk of the jury convicting the defendant of a crime based upon his bad character or propensity to commit a crime, rather than the conviction resting upon the strength of the evidence. State v. Rickman, 876 S.W.2d 824, 828 (Tenn.1994). The risk is greater when the defendant's prior bad acts are similar to the crime for which the defendant is on trial. Id.; see also State v. McCary, 922 S.W.2d 511, 514 (Tenn.1996). While such evidence usually does not come in the form of statements or confessions made by the defendant, there exists no valid reason to make an exception to the requirements for prior bad act evidence disclosed in a defendant's confession. Evidence of a defendant's prior crimes, wrongs or acts may be admissible where it is probative of material issues other than conduct conforming with a character trait. Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b). Thus, evidence of a criminal defendant's character may become admissible when it logically tends to prove material issues which fall into one of three categories: (1) the use of motive and common scheme or plan to establish identity, (2) to establish the defendant's intent in committing the offense on trial, and (3) to rebut a claim of mistake or accident if asserted as a defense. McCary, 922 S.W.2d at 514. In order for such evidence to be admitted, the rule specifies three prerequisites: (1) The court upon request must hold a hearing outside the jury's presence; (2) The court must determine that a material issue exists other than conduct conforming with a character trait and must upon request state on the record the material issue, the ruling, and the reasons for admitting the evidence; and (3) The court must exclude the evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b). A fourth prerequisite to admission is that the court find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the other crime. Tenn. R. Evid. 404, Advisory Comm'n Comment; State v. DuBose, 953 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tenn.1997); State v. Parton, 694 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Tenn.1985). In reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence, an appellate court may disturb the lower court's ruling only if there has been an abuse of discretion. DuBose, 953 S.W.2d at 652; State v. Baker, 785 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tenn.Crim. App.1990). Where the trial court has been called to pass upon the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts under Rule 404(b), its determination is entitled to deference when it has substantially complied with the procedural requisites of Rule 404(b). See DuBose, 953 S.W.2d at 652. In the present case, we first acknowledge that the trial court was unable to conduct a jury-out hearing due to the defendant's failure to object. Notwithstanding, we are cognizant that the trial court stated that the confession had been redacted to take out any reference to any crime other than the instant offense.
This statement is relevant to explain the defendant's motive for the murder of the victim and that the murder was committed premeditatively. The statement that he was wanted in other states did not reveal the nature of the offenses for which he was wanted. Moreover, the statement proved a relevant non-character purpose, i.e., his motive, for stabbing the victim with the requisite mental state. Motive is a relevant circumstantial fact that refers to why a defendant did what he did. Evidence of motive is often pertinent as the basis to infer that the act was committed, to prove requisite mental state, or to prove the identity of the actor. See 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure Evidence § at 479 (1978). Indeed, the defendant's possession of a motive strengthens the inference that the death of the victim was caused by an intentional act rather than by a natural accident. There is sufficient evidence to show that the defendant's wanted status was relevant to show motive and that motive was a relevant noncharacter purpose in this case. The State did not seek its introduction for propensity purposes. Finally, in making a risk versus benefit analysis in this case, we cannot conclude that the prejudicial impact of the statement outweighed its probative value. Accordingly, the admission of the statement was not error nor was the fact that the prosecutor referred to the admission during closing argument.
During his confession, the defendant responded that he got the Oldsmobile Cutlass from Boyd and that he had taken camping equipment from Boyd's house. We cannot conclude that this statement is evidence of prior bad acts. There is no reference to any theft on behalf of the defendant, and there is no reference to the murder of Forrest Boyd. Accordingly, there was no error in the admission of the statement referring to property taken from Forrest Boyd. Any claim that the admission or reference to this statement was error is without merit.