Opinion ID: 2233809
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Petition to Vacate.

Text: While we have not previously addressed the question whether rules 252 and 253 apply in a small claims action, we have held that there is no procedure in a small claim case for granting a new trial under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 244. See Barnes Beauty College, 279 N.W.2d at 259-60. Some of the language of that case is pertinent here: For these small claims suits, the legislature thought it was in the public interest to provide a simpler, easier, and less expensive procedure than was afforded in district court under the Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the plan an action can be brought by filing a form provided by the clerk of court. § 631.3. The clerk can help fill out the form. § 631.3(2). According to § 631.7(1) no formal written pleadings or motions are required although the court may allow them. Barnes Beauty College, 279 N.W.2d at 259. This court in Barnes Beauty College also noted that relief was available to a losing party in the form of an appeal to district court. We then noted: On the basis of the foregoing we think the legislature's omission of any provision for new trial motions was deliberate. Providing such a motion would be a step toward formalism, expense, and delay in obtaining final judgment. And new trial motions are incompatible with the legislature's desire that any party wishing so could appear without counsel. Id. at 260. We find these same considerations persuasive here and militate against a recognition by us of a proceeding under rules 252 and 253 for vacation of a judgment in small claims court. No hint is given in chapter 631 of any such post-trial motions. Also, because the grounds for vacation of judgment are fairly complex, recognition of such procedure would almost certainly require the assistance of an attorney, a step toward the formalism sought to be avoided in small claims actions. It could, in effect, make a federal case out of a small claims action. The Seversons, however, point to a potential problem involving fraud. They argue that, unless a petition to vacate is permitted in a small claims action, fraud in the judgment may go unremedied. We do not agree. In the first place, no fraud is alleged here. Moreover, while our holding today prevents the application of rules 252 and 253 in a small claims action, this would not necessarily preclude an independent action if the judgment is actually procured by fraud. There is a uniformly recognized independent action, aside from rule or statutory provisions, for vacation of certain judgments procured by fraud. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 64-68, at 137-75 (1982). See also Sorenson v. Sorenson, 254 Iowa 817, 824-25, 119 N.W.2d 129, 133-34 (1963); City of Chariton v. J.C. Blunk Construction Co., 253 Iowa 805, 817-24, 112 N.W.2d 829, 835-39 (1962); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 655, at 810-11 (1969); 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 269, at 486-89 (1947). In view of this principle, it is not necessary to recognize the statutory petition to vacate in order to avoid the effect of fraud, as contended by the Seversons. We conclude that the magistrate, and the district court, correctly held that the petition to vacate was not an available proceeding in small claims court.