Opinion ID: 682427
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Scope of Dickman's Authority

Text: 95 An agent has only as much authority as the principal has either expressly or impliedly conferred. 116 The extent of an agent's authority is determined in light of all surrounding circumstances, including, inter alia, the parties' relations to one another, the undertaking in which the parties are engaged, and the general usages and practices of those engaged in such undertakings. 117 96 The district court found that Dickman acted as Thornburgh's general agent, or, [a]t the very least, Dickman had apparent authority to act on Thornburgh's behalf with respect to the campaign and, specifically, the agreement with Rove. 118 Thornburgh counters that even if Dickman did act as Thornburgh's agent, he was authorized only to run the political side of the campaign, not to enter into contracts making Thornburgh personally liable. 97 Although we recognize that there is some evidence and authority to support the district court's conclusion that Dickman was acting as Thornburgh's general agent, authorized to enter into the September Contract for Thornburgh personally, 119 we need not go that far to hold Thornburgh liable here. The record makes clear that Dickman acted as Thornburgh's agent to the Committee and was authorized to represent Thornburgh in all Committee activities, including whether to enter into the September Contract. This finding alone is sufficient to hold Thornburgh personally liable, given Thornburgh's acknowledgement that Dickman authorized and assented to that Committee's contract with Rove & Company. 98 As discussed earlier, for Thornburgh to be liable for the September Contract, Rove & Company had only to prove that Thornburgh authorized, assented to, or ratified the Committee's decision to enter into the agreement. Thornburgh could manifest his authorization or assent personally or through an agent. In the instant case, the record is clear that Dickman, as Thornburgh's representative to the Committee, authorized or assented to the September Contract. 99 Much of the same evidence that establishes that Dickman acted as Thornburgh's agent also supports the district court's findings that Dickman was Thornburgh's primary point of contact with the Committee 120 and that Dickman's role in the Committee was obviously to assure Thornburgh's interests would best be served and to be Thornburgh's voice. 121 There is no indication that these findings by the district court were clearly erroneous. We also note that Thornburgh testified that it is customary during a political campaign for a candidate to rely on others, such as Dickman, to manage the day-to-day operations of the campaign--which operations would include such things as the purchase of services necessary to support the candidacy. As it is customary to rely on others for such services, and as the district court found that Dickman was the primary person upon whom Thornburgh relied during his senatorial campaign, we are led to but one conclusion: Dickman, as Thornburgh's representative to the Committee, had either actual or apparent authority to bestow Thornburgh's blessings on Committee activities, which included the Committee's decision to contract with Rove & Company. As Dickman had such authority, and as Thornburgh concedes (and the record substantiates with uncontroverted evidence) that Dickman authorized and assented to the September Contract, Thornburgh can also be found liable for the September Contract as a result of Dickman's authorization and assent to the Committee's decision to enter into that agreement. 122 Consequently, we need not, and do not, reach the issue whether Thornburgh also is personally liable because Dickman acted as Thornburgh's general agent vis-a-vis Rove & Company, vested with authority to enter into pacts such as the September Contract and bind Thornburgh personally.C. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER DIMUZIO 100 Guarding against the possibility that we might reverse the district court's decision holding Thornburgh personally liable for the September Contract, Rove & Company filed a cross appeal in the alternative, contesting the portion of the district court judgment holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Dimuzio. As we conclude that Thornburgh is liable on the contract, we do not reach this jurisdictional issue. 101 In addition to urging affirmance of the dismissal of the suit against him, however, Dimuzio as cross-appellee seeks double costs as a sanction against Rove & Company for filing a frivolous appeal of the district court's ruling dismissing Dimuzio for lack of personal jurisdiction. Although we agree with Dimuzio that Rove & Company provided no authority and little argument in the section of its brief designated as addressing its cross appeal, we believe that, when read in its entirety, Rove & Company's brief adequately explains the basis upon which it believed that Dimuzio could be held amenable to the district court's jurisdiction and liable for the Committee's debt. Thus, Rove & Company's cross appeal was not so baseless as to constitute frivolousness for purposes of sanctions. Accordingly, in the exercise of our discretion, we elect to consider Rove & Company's cross appeal non-frivolous in the context of the entire case and in light of the content of Rove & Company's entire brief. We thus deny Dimuzio's request for sanctions. III