Opinion ID: 2010647
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Applying the Test to Solers' Subpoena

Text: There is an interesting factual difference between this case and many of those to which we have referred. Here, John Doe did not post his accusations on an internet bulletin board for thousands or perhaps millions of persons to see. Cf. Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F.Supp.2d at 251 (The website where the defendants posted their messages draws between 800,000 and one million visitors per month. Anyone who can access the internet can access [the website] and view the messages posted on its discussion boards.); Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr.3d at 237 (The poster's message not only is transmitted instantly to other subscribers to the message board, but potentially is passed on to an expanding network of recipients, as readers may copy, forward, or print those messages to distribute to others.). Instead, he apparently followed the instructions on SIIA's website and used the internet to report his allegations directly and more privately. For all that we know at this point, the transmission of his accusations was not substantively different from dropping a letter into the mail, making a phone call, or slipping a note under the door. A similar point was addressed in Cahill, where the court drew no distinction between communications made on the internet and those made through other traditional forms of media in determining the standard to be applied. 884 A.2d at 465. The court decided that, whenever a defamation plaintiff seeks to unmask an anonymous defendant, [it would] apply the summary judgment standard regardless of the chosen medium of publication. Id. In this case, we need not, and do not, decide whether the test we have adopted should apply to all other forms of communication. Nevertheless, we will apply it to various uses of the internet, recognizing that the factual differences we have highlighted surely are relevant to assessing the proof of defamation, including the elements of publication and harm. Solers argues that it is unfair to require production of evidence at this early stage of the proceedings, pointing out that, in more typical litigation, substantial discovery would occur before a party would need to file or defend against a motion for summary judgment. It is important to emphasize in response that we do not expect Solers to demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment in its favor. Rather, Solers merely must show that it has a viable claim of defamationthat there is a genuine issue of material fact on each element of the claim that does not depend on knowing the defendant's identity. Moreover, this is a test for deciding whether to enforce or quash the subpoena. If the court decides to quash, it will have to determine after a separate inquiry whether to prolong the litigation or to dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute. Recognizing Solers' dilemma, the trial court may choose to allow some discovery before deciding whether to order disclosures that will reveal the identity of Doe. Here, for example, Solers does not know the exact statements made by John Doe (although one may fairly infer their nature from the accusations made in the demand letter sent by SIIA's attorney). It might be useful as a preliminary step to order SIIA to disclose those statements, if that can be done without revealing Doe's identity. Or, perhaps, the court could allow limited discovery to determine whether the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Doe. [16] The court need not decide at the very outset of the litigation whether to compel SIIA to disclose the identity of John Doe. It should be obvious that a key issue on remand will be determining what types of evidence the court reasonably may expect Solers to proffer without knowing the identity of John Doe. Applying this aspect of the test will require sensitivity to the unique circumstances of each case. It may, for example, be difficult for Solers to discern the defendant's motiveand thus his state of mindwithout knowing his identity. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 464 (holding that the public figure plaintiff need not produce evidence showing that the defendant acted with actual malice because, [w]ithout discovery of the defendant's identity, satisfying this element may be difficult, if not impossible.); Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 723 n. 12 (stating that knowledge of Doe's intent depends on his identity). Nevertheless, in this context, a plaintiff must do more than simply plead his case. Solers acknowledges that it did not present evidence to support its allegations of damage, but claims it did not know it was expected to do so at this stage of the proceedings. In other words, Solers believed that the trial court was applying a motion to dismiss standard and would focus only on the allegations in its complaint. See In re Curseen, 890 A.2d at 193 (The filing of a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) does not call upon the plaintiff to offer his proof.). We think this is a fair point. At the time the parties were litigating this issue in the trial court, no test had yet been established in this jurisdiction for enforcing a subpoena of this nature. It would be unfair to assess Solers' proffer (or lack thereof) under the standard we have announced today. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and remand this case to give Solers an opportunity to present evidence supporting its claim of defamation. [17] So ordered.