Opinion ID: 3210008
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Public’s Right to Observe Criminal Trials

Text: [¶16] Similarly, the public, sometimes represented by the media, has its own right to observe criminal trials. See In re Me. Today Media, Inc., 2013 ME 12, ¶ 6, 59 A.3d 499. Unlike the defendant’s right to a public trial, this right is not founded in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution; instead, the First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the public’s right, which is also derived from the longstanding tradition of opening criminal proceedings to the public.7 Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1980). [¶17] When the court is called upon to balance these disparate rights, the purpose of the rights at issue must be considered. The primary reasons for the right of the public and the press to observe criminal trials are twofold: first, the watchful eye of the public is understood to ensure a fair trial for the defendant; and 7 It is primarily for this reason that courtrooms and courthouses must be open throughout a criminal trial, except in unusual circumstances not applicable here. 10 second, the public’s right to observe criminal trials is expected to enhance public confidence in the courts and criminal justice system. Press-Enter. Co., 464 U.S. at 508. Noting that the defendant’s right to a public trial is not always coextensive with the public’s right to be present during criminal proceedings, the United States Supreme Court has addressed the balance of these interests: For present purposes, how we allocate the ‘right’ to openness as between the accused and the public, or whether we view it as a component inherent in the system benefiting both, is not crucial. No right ranks higher than the right of the accused to a fair trial. But the primacy of the accused’s right is difficult to separate from the right of everyone in the community to attend the voir dire which promotes fairness. Id. (emphasis added). 3. Defendant’s Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel [¶18] An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney who can adequately ensure that the accused receives a fair trial. Laferriere v. State, 1997 ME 169, ¶ 5, 697 A.2d 1301; see U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV. An accused’s right to assistance of counsel is not satisfied by virtue of the fact that “a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). Pertinent to the matter before us, the accused has a right to be represented by counsel who is able to focus on the proceedings and is not unduly distracted by extraneous matters. 11 4. The Parties’ Right to an Attentive Jury [¶19] The accused and the State have a right to an attentive, nondistracted jury. See U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Roberts, 2014 ME 125, ¶ 33 n.5, 103 A.3d 1031. The ability of the jury to attend to the presentation of evidence, to the arguments of counsel, and to the instructions of the court is critical to ensuring a fair trial. Given that the defendant’s right to a fair trial is paramount, protecting the jury from distraction is a fundamental responsibility of the court. See Press-Enter. Co., 464 U.S. at 508; Roberts, 2014 ME 125, ¶ 33, 103 A.3d 1031; see also Walls v. Konteh, 490 F.3d 432, 439 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that “concern about the jury’s ability to focus on the evidence before it” is a “legitimate consideration” in the calculation of whether to grant a mistrial); cf. State v. Hoffstadt, 652 A.2d 93, 96 (Me. 1995) (noting that, when addressing evidentiary challenges, “[i]t is the court’s duty to see that the jury is not distracted by collateral matters”). 5. Balancing the Rights
[¶20] In the matter before us, the various rights described above were in potential conflict with each other. The spectator’s presence and conduct during Frisbee’s trial threatened Frisbee’s right to effective counsel and placed at risk Frisbee’s and the State’s right to an attentive and nondistracted jury. In 12 counterbalance, as the court recognized, excluding the individual implicated the public’s right to an open trial. [¶21] The rights of the public and the defendant to an open trial are not absolute, however, and they may be overridden by other rights or interests. Roberts, 2014 ME 125, ¶ 24, 103 A.3d 1031.8 “[T]he right to an open trial may give way in certain cases to other rights or interests, such as the defendant’s right to a fair trial or the government’s interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information. Such circumstances will be rare, however, and the balance of interests must be struck with special care.” Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984); see also Roberts, 2014 ME 125, ¶ 24, 103 A.3d 1031. When such circumstances arise, it is within the authority of the trial judge to fashion remedies that strike a reasonable balance in ensuring that a defendant receives a fair trial. See Roberts, 2014 ME 125, ¶ 33, 103 A.3d 1031; Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 1-3 at 1-10 (2016 ed.). 8 See, e.g., United States v. Laureano-Pérez, 797 F.3d 45, 76-78 (1st Cir. 2015) (upholding a trial court’s exclusion of a defendant’s wife from criminal trial proceedings because a witness had seen her “moving her lips at the witness with great distaste” (quotation marks omitted)); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 154, 167-75 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation when a trial court closed the courtroom while the minor victim testified during a criminal trial based on over fifty-eight counts of sexual misconduct committed by the defendant against that minor victim, who was also his step-granddaughter); Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that multiple defendants’ rights were not violated when the courtrooms were closed to protect various undercover officers who testified regarding undercover activities that were expected to continue in the future). 13
[¶22] Because of the presumption that criminal proceedings are to be open to the public, the decision to fully close a courtroom during criminal proceedings must involve an “overriding interest,” and the court must narrowly tailor the closure, both temporally and specifically. Waller, 467 U.S. at 45 (quotation marks omitted). Thus, before a trial court may fully close a courtroom during a criminal proceeding, the court must assure the following: (1) the party seeking to close the hearing has advanced an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, (2) the closure is no broader than necessary to protect that interest, (3) reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding have been considered, and (4) adequate findings have been made to support the closure. Id. at 48.
[¶23] When a party is seeking a partial closure of the courtroom only, or when the trial court determines that a limited restriction is necessary, we will apply a less stringent standard “provided the essential purposes of the ‘public trial’ guarantee are served and the constitutional rights of defendants are adequately 14 protected.”9 United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 1998). Thus, when the closure or restriction of the public is only partial, “a ‘substantial reason,’ rather than an ‘overriding interest,’ may warrant a closure.” Id. (citations omitted). [¶24] The ejection of a single spectator from a courtroom, or the brief exclusion of a small group of disruptive spectators, is, at most, a partial closure. Cf. United States v. Smith, 426 F.3d 567, 569 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the requirement that court visitors show photo identification constituted “at most a partial closure”); Massachusetts v. Ray, 4 N.E.3d 221, 229-31 (Mass. 2014) (holding that requiring attendees to provide identification and sign in with the court officers before entering the courtroom did not constitute a partial closure). To assure a fair trial, the trial court is authorized to restrict the presence of a nonparty spectator when a substantial reason is presented, such as the potential for the distraction of a witness, the attorneys, or the jury. See United States v. Laureano-Pérez, 797 F.3d 45, 76-78 (1st Cir. 2015).10 In such circumstances, 9 Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet opined on the standard to be used in evaluating a partial closure of the courtroom, most federal circuit courts have applied a less stringent standard to partial closures than the standard for complete closures announced by the United States Supreme Court in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984). See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 797 F.3d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 99 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Farmer, 32 F.3d 369, 371-72 (8th Cir. 1994); Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1992); Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 753 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Sherlock, 865 F.2d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 1989); Douglas v. Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531, 533 (11th Cir. 1984). 10 See also Osborne, 68 F.3d at 96-99 (upholding a trial court’s partial closure of the courtroom during a trial on the defendants’ kidnapping charges while the twelve-year-old victim testified); Woods, 977 F.2d at 76-78 (upholding a trial court’s decision to exclude a defendant’s family members during an 15 which may arise without warning and will require prompt judicial action to preserve the defendant’s right to a fair trial, the court’s announcement of the necessity for the limited exclusion is sufficient to create a record for review. See id. at 78.
[¶25] In the matter before us, the court made specific findings regarding the nature and extent of the distraction presented by the spectator, and the potential for significant distraction should the spectator remain in the courtroom. Acknowledging the different interests at stake, the court made an effort to balance those interests and engaged in an escalating series of responses to the distraction. The court considered alternatives to exclusion of the spectator, such as moving the spectator to a different spot in the courtroom and having him go through security screening before entering the courtroom. After learning more information regarding the seriousness of the potential distraction for defense counsel and juror 116, however, the court concluded that those alternatives would not be sufficient to protect the right to effective assistance of counsel and to trial before a adversary witness’s testimony because the court believed that the family members were intimidating the witness); Boyd v. United States, No. 00-612-ML, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16690, at -6 (D.R.I. 2009) (reaffirming the validity of a trial court’s restrictions on courtroom ingress and egress by spectators during a criminal trial based on security considerations and efforts to “limit interruptions and minimize distraction”); New York v. Jones, 750 N.E.2d 524, 530 (N.Y. 2001). 16 nondistracted jury, and the court appropriately excluded the individual. Cf. DeLuca, 137 F.3d at 35. [¶26] Because the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the nature and effect of a distraction in the courtroom, the court has broad discretion to fashion a remedy when the court has determined that a spectator is disruptive or distracting during any aspect of a trial. The process employed here, including the entry of specific findings regarding the nature and significance of the distraction, the attempts at less restrictive alternatives to exclusion, the consultation with counsel, the voir dire of the jurors, and the additional security screening, demonstrates that substantial interests were at stake and that the court used “special care” in balancing those interests. The court acted well within its authority when it ultimately excluded the spectator from any further proceedings and did not violate the United States or Maine Constitutions in selecting this remedy.