Opinion ID: 2633509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Refusal of Jury Instruction on Claim of Right

Text: The defense requested the following special instruction be given to the jury: A belief in the right to reclaim one's property negates the specific intent necessary to constitute robbery. If such specific intent is not present at the time of the alleged offense then the special circumstance of robbery, or attempted robbery, is not proved. The trial court refused this request, apparently because of counsel's failure to present the court with published authority for the special instruction. Defendant now cites People v. Butler (1967) 65 Cal.2d 569, 55 Cal.Rptr. 511, 421 P.2d 703, as supporting the requested instruction. In People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 622, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152, we explained that Butler had been overruled to the extent it allowed a claim-of-right defense to robbery where the alleged robber's intent was to collect a claimed debt, rather than to recover specific property taken from him. ( People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 956, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 143, 987 P.2d 168.) We also held, however, that [a]pplication of that holding to conduct preceding Tufunga's finality ... would constitute an unforeseeable retroactive expansion of criminal liability, in violation of due process. ( Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964) 378 U.S. 347, 353, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894.) ( Ibid. ) At oral argument, the Attorney General suggested defendant's testimony did not support a claim-of-right instruction even under the law at the time of his trial because defendant testified that he went to Miller's room with the intent of peacefully collecting the $40 debt, not with the intent of retaking his money by force, and insisted that he used force only in response to Miller's attack. In the abstract, however, the possibility existed the jury could believe defendant about the existence of the debt, but not about his intent to collect it peacefully. Belief in this factual theory was, as explained below, very unlikely, but its theoretical possibility arguably supported the giving of a claim-of-right instruction under People v. Butler, supra, 65 Cal.2d 569, 55 Cal.Rptr. 511, 421 P.2d 703. Even assuming the instruction should have been given, we agree with the Attorney General that any error was harmless even under the standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705. (See People v. Creath (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 312, 320, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 336 [applying Chapman standard without discussion].) Although not given the proposed claim-of-right instruction, the jury was instructed on the element of specific intent to take property from another and deprive the other person permanently of that property necessary for a finding of robbery, and hence murder in the commission of a robbery, as well as on the specific intent to rob necessary to find attempted robbery. Defense counsel argued the special circumstance was not proved because the evidence showed that Greg Demetrulias was in Mr. Miller's room over a debt, not a robbery. And that Greg Demetrulias acted in self-defense when Mr. Miller came at him with a knife. The prosecutor did not suggest to the jury that collection of a debt could constitute robbery, but rather argued defendant had simply invented the $40 debt to explain his demand for Miller's money, which he knew had been overheard by witnesses. As defense counsel's argument indicates, the claim defendant went to Miller's room merely to collect a debt was closely tied to the claim of self-defense. The jury had many reasons to reject defendant's self-defense claim, as it clearly did, and the same reasons, by and large, suggested rejection of defendant's claim he was only trying to collect a debt. Defendant's self-serving testimony regarding the debt was completely uncorroborated; whether he and Miller were even acquainted was disputed, but no evidence other than defendant's testimony existed to show Miller had borrowed money from defendant. Miller's fellow tenants heard his killer demand, Give me your wallet, not Give me the $40 you borrowed. Circumstantial evidence suggested defendant took the knife he used to kill Miller from the Mar Mac Manor kitchen on his way to Miller's room; he would have had no reason to take a knife if he had come simply to ask for his $40. The number and severity of the stab wounds defendant inflicted on Miller strongly suggested defendant's intent was not limited either to repelling an attack from the older man or recovering his loan. Defendant fled from the scene, indicating consciousness of guilt, and later falsely denied any knowledge of the events. Shortly after killing Miller, defendant assaulted Wissel, who had not borrowed any money from him, and stole more than $1,000 and much additional property from Wissel. If defendant's intent with Miller were simply to seek re-payment of a $40 debt, why would he come armed with a kitchen knife, stab Miller four times, flee the scene, and shortly thereafter attack an even more vulnerable victim and take from him many times the amount of Miller's supposed debt? The jury, by its first degree murder verdict, necessarily rejected defendant's testimony that he acted in self-defense (perfect or imperfect). We see no reasonable basis on which a jury could have rejected self-defense but accepted a claim-of-right claim. Both defense theories rested solely on defendant's testimony, and no reason appears in the evidence for a trier of fact to believe defendant as to the debt collection but not as to Miller's asserted attack on him; indeed, as discussed above, the evidence casting great doubt on defendant's version of events applies to both defense theories. The jury was instructed generally on the need to find specific intent to rob or steal, and neither party's argument to the jury suggested that collection of a debt could be robbery. Under all these circumstances, any error in failing to give the requested claim-of-right instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24, 87 S.Ct. 824.)