Opinion ID: 1196196
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Overbreadth Standard

Text: We now turn to the People's argument that the trial court erred in holding that section 18-8-706 was unconstitutionally overbroad. We determine that, given a sufficiently limiting definition of the term threat, the statute is not substantially overbroad to the extent that it prohibits certain threats against persons protected by the statute. We also hold that the phrase act of harassment is overbroad and strike it from the statute. We begin our analysis by reviewing the constitutional principles of overbreadth. A statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if it includes within its proscriptions a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982); Baer, 973 P.2d at 1231. If a statute meets this description, the statute must be invalidated unless the court can supply a limiting construction or partial invalidation that narrows the scope of the statute to constitutionally acceptable applications. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935, 940 (Colo.1991). The criterion of `substantial overbreadth' precludes a court from invalidating a statute on its face simply because of the possibility, however slight, that it might be applied in some unconstitutional manner. Baer, 973 P.2d at 1231 (citing Secretary of State of Maryland v. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 964-65, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984)). The substantial overbreadth doctrine applies to constitutional challenges of statutes that prohibit pure speech as well as conduct plus speech. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 771, 102 S.Ct. 3348 (applying substantial overbreadth doctrine to pornography statute); see also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 466-67, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987) (using substantial overbreadth doctrine in case involving verbal criticism of police officer). If a statute encompasses protected speech but is not substantially overbroad, then whatever overbreadth may exist should be resolved on a case-by-case basis. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16, 93 S.Ct. 2908; Ryan, 806 P.2d at 939-40. The court must weigh the degree to which protected speech may be deterred under the statute against the scope of the unprotected speech being regulated. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773, 102 S.Ct. 3348 (finding that legitimate reach of child pornography statute dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications, and that such applications were a tiny fraction of the materials within the statute's reach); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969) (upholding statute that reaches protected speech because of a valid, even an overwhelming interest in protecting the President from threats). If a person engaged in protected speech is prosecuted under the statute, the court should deem the particular prosecution invalid, not invalidate the entire statute. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773-74, 102 S.Ct. 3348 (upholding statute even though statute might conceivably be applied to protected communications); Watts, 394 U.S. at 707-08, 89 S.Ct. 1399 (upholding statute but overturning conviction under the statute because the particular speech was protected). The purpose of the overbreadth doctrine is to protect persons whose speech or conduct is constitutionally protected but who may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 768, 102 S.Ct. 3348 (quoting Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634, 100 S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980)). As we discussed in note 4, supra, we allow persons to bring overbreadth attacks even when the person's conduct is clearly unprotected and could be proscribed by a statute drawn with the requisite specificity. See also Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769, 102 S.Ct. 3348. Because of the effects of striking down a statute on its face as a result of a challenge by a person whose own conduct may not be protected by the First Amendment, courts recognize the overbreadth doctrine as strong medicine, and the doctrine is applied only as a last resort. Id. at 769, 102 S.Ct. 3348; Ryan, 806 P.2d at 939. If a limiting construction or partial invalidation that confines the statute to sufficiently narrow applications can be applied, the court should construe the statute in light of that limiting construction. See Whimbush, 869 P.2d at 1248. Summarizing the relevant caselaw, we conclude that overbreadth analysis involves two questions. First, the court must determine if the statute at issue encompasses constitutionally protected communications. Second, if the statute extends to protected communications, the court must determine whether the statute extends to a substantial amount of protected communication such that the statute is unconstitutional, or whether unconstitutional applications of the statute should be cured on a case-by-case basis. A court has the responsibility to apply a limiting construction or partial invalidation if doing so will preserve the statute's constitutionality.