Opinion ID: 1795596
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Disclose Defendant's Comments

Text: Defendant next argues that the state committed a discovery violation when it failed to disclose in discovery two comments that Mr. Edwards made to Detective Brady when interviewed at approximately 5 a.m. on the morning of August 24, 2000. After Detective Brady testified that he told defendant that his ex-wife was dead, the detective was asked: Q: What did you observe when he was told that? A: Very nonchalant, had a smile on his face, carefree. Q: Did not seem to be distressed by the news? A: Not at all. Q: Did you say anything to him? A: At one point I did. Q: What did you say? A: I told him I couldn't understand how he could just sit there and be so relaxed and have such a carefree attitude knowing that his ex-wife, the mother of his daughter, was killed. Q: Did he have any response? A: Shook his head with a smile, said it's not his business. He had nothing to do with it. At this point, defense counsel approached the bench and asked for a mistrial because the state had failed to disclose in discovery that defendant had said it's none of his business and he had nothing to do with it. The trial court agreed that this violated Rule 25.03, which requires the state to disclose defendant's own statements to him upon request of counsel. Counsel had made such a request. But, determining that the prejudice could be cured by an instruction, the court instructed the jury that it should disregard the last statement of Detective Brady regarding any words that were uttered by Mr. Edwards. Defendant requested that the court also grant a mistrial. The court refused. Defendant now argues that this constituted reversible error. This Court disagrees: The sanction to be imposed for a violation of Rule 25.03 lies within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Kilgore, 771 S.W.2d 57, 66 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 211, 107 L.Ed.2d 164 (1989). A trial court's denial of a requested sanction is an abuse of discretion only where the admission of the evidence results in fundamental unfairness to the defendant. Id. Fundamental unfairness exists where there is a reasonable likelihood that the failure to disclose the evidence affected the result of the trial. Id. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 843. Defendant argues that the lack of disclosure did affect the result of the trial, because it enabled the prosecutor to repeatedly emphasize defendant's coldness and lack of caring about his ex-wife's death. However, defendant has not cited this Court to any point at which the prosecutor repeated either of the two statements that the court ordered stricken. At the points in the transcript cited by defendant, the prosecutor did emphasize defendant's coldness. But, he did so by reminding the jury that the detective had described defendant's attitude as nonchalant, that it was a contract killing, that this indicated cool reflection, that he had shown no remorse, and was cold and dispassionate about the death. It was not just a mistake, it was a business decision. Defendant, however, did not object to any of the detective's testimony about defendant's nonchalance, about his smiling when he was told of his wife's death, about his lack of caring. His only objection was to the detective's statements that defendant said his ex-wife's death was none of his business and that he had nothing to do with it. The statement that defendant said he had nothing to do with it is, if anything, an exculpatory statement, not an inculpatory one. Moreover, it was cumulative, for defendant said a number of times that he was not involved in his ex-wife's death. Admission of this statement involved no prejudice of any kind. The only objected-to statement from which any prejudice could have arisen was the detective's statement that defendant said his ex-wife's death was not his business. In light of the unobjected to testimony that defendant smiled and acted nonchalant and uncaring when he was told his ex-wife had been murdered, the fact that he had said the murder was none of his businessa statement that also could be considered simply to be a denial of involvement in her deathcould not have affected the outcome of the trial. Nonetheless, the trial court ordered the jury to disregard the statements. This was a reasonable sanction to impose for the discovery violation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling.