Opinion ID: 1190748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: as concerning the decree of divorce awarded plaintiff.

Text: As stated above both parties asked in their pleadings for a divorce from the other on the same general ground, to-wit: that each had offered such indignities to the other as to render his or her condition intolerable. Under the previous decisions of this court commencing with Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 403, 429; 49 P. (2d) 670, it has been often said that:    it must be borne in mind that the appellate court must assume that the evidence in favor of the successful party is true, leave out of consideration entirely the evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give to the evidence of the successful party every favorable inference which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it. See also subsequent decisions to the same effect listed in Jacoby v. City of Gillette, 62 Wyo. 487-494, 174 P. (2d) 505. With this rule in mind we have reviewed the evidence appearing in the record and as set forth herein. What should be regarded as indignities under the statute (§ 3-5905 W.C.S. 1945) has been very well discussed in the text Keezer, Marriage and Divorce (3rd Ed.) pp. 483, 4, Section 436 where this language appears: It is impossible to lay down a general rule as to what constitutes such indignities as will justify a divorce, as this necessarily depends upon all the circumstances of the particular case, the position in life, and the character and disposition of the parties. In actions for divorce on this ground each case should be determined on its own individual merits. The Supreme Court of Missouri has aptly said: `It is impossible to lay down any rules that will apply to all cases, in determining what indignities are grounds of divorce, because they render the condition of the injured party intolerable.    The legislature chose to leave the subject at large, and by the general words employed, evidently designed to leave each case to be determined according to its own peculiar circumstances.' and (2) Schouler's Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations (6th Ed.) p. 1863 § 1649 has language also substantially to the same effect: As to `offering indignities,' whether it be to a wife's person, `so as to render her condition intolerable and her life burdensome,' or, in a reciprocal sense, so that either spouse may complain when aggrieved, the object of our numerous local statutes which specify this cause of divorce appears to be to punish conduct which produces, strictly speaking, no apprehension of bodily harm in the complainant, and yet is, so to speak, cruel and unkind. Publicity seems to be reckoned an important element in this class of cases, where apprehension of danger was not immediate, so that the offended spouse must have been wounded by being disgraced in the eyes of others. The author last mentioned also says on page 1865 that the:    refusal to send away defendant's son, with whom plaintiff could not get along, or that the wife insists on her relatives living with her, are not indignities. Section 3-5905 supra insofar as pertaining to the particular ground of divorce pleaded by the parties hereto reads: A divorce from the bonds of matrimony may be decreed by the district court of the county where the parties, or one of them reside, on the application of the aggrieved party by petition, in either of the following cases:    Eighth  When either party shall offer such indignities to the other, as shall render his or her condition intolerable. The fourth sub-division of said section is as follows: When either party has wilfully deserted the other for the term of one year. 27 C.J.S. section 44 page 589 while indicating that desertion is not an indignity generally remarks however that: Desertion is not an indignity, although desertion, insufficient alone to constitute a ground for divorce, may, as one element, go to make with other elements a ground of divorce on account of indignities. While it is generally true that: The time consumed by the pendency of a suit for divorce, annulment, or separate maintenance ordinarily may not be computed as part of a period of desertion. (C.J.S. 27 page 601, § 56). yet it has been held that where one of the spouses has wilfully deserted the other, the institution of a suit for divorce by the injured party will not be sufficient to convert the desertion into justifiable separation from the time of the pendency of the suit and that time should not be deducted from the period of separation so as to reduce the desertion period to less than the statutory requirement. Hitchcock v. Hitchcock 15 App. (D.C.) 81. It can hardly be said that the defendant's conduct as delineated above and which extended over a considerable period of time was not cruel and unkind. Wilful desertion of his wife by Haydn for months at a time and refusal on his part to speak to her and wholly ignore her in the presence of others would seem to have wounded and disgraced her in the eyes of others who were present on such occasions. The trial court judge evidently thought so, and he saw these parties on the witness stand; heard them giving their testimony and was in a far better position than we are to determine whether the conduct of the husband rendered her condition intolerable. Even the cold record before us indicates that the wife tried to make the marriage a success. She attended to his business and financial affairs while he was working; handled his salary checks and saved money for him from them, put her own property in joint ownership with his, and ran his household affairs satisfactorily. It is apparent that these people could not live together without publicly quarrelling. His resort to violence  which he admitted and for which he says he was sorry  indicates that he had a hot temper and that it was not kept under control as it should have been. If this decree of divorce were reversed it would very probably only delay the final separation of the parties; consequently in view of what has been said above we are not inclined to disturb that part of the decree which awarded the wife the divorce and separation she and he both sought. On the date of the decree herein they had lived apart from each other longer than the statutory period fixed as the basis for a divorce on the ground of wilful desertion.