Opinion ID: 1160457
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Motion to Limit Physical Restraints

Text: Prior to trial, defendant moved the superior court to limit, inter alia, the physical restraints to which it would subject him in the presence of the jury. After a hearing on the motion, it granted his request not to be placed in fetters. It also stated its intention to cause him to sit in a security chair both at counsel table and on the witness stand, and to cause him to be put into, and removed from, such chair outside the jury's presence. The chair in question was generally similar to others in the courtroom; it was different only in that it allowed a chain encircling his waist to be attached at its back and prevented the chain from being seen so long as he placed his clothing properly. The superior court asked, Is there any objection to that procedure? Defense counsel responded, No. It commented that, in the absence of an objection, it is not necessary ... to specifically state good cause.... Nevertheless, it stat[ed] ... for the record that it had obtained information to the effect that, not two months earlier, defendant had been found in possession of an explosive device in jail, apparently consistent with what's commonly called a match bomb, which was, specifically, a device approximately four inches long wrapped tightly in plastic, containing match heads and several nitroglycerine pills, with a paperwrapped fuse protruding from one end of it. Defendant did not dispute the information. Subsequently, in the course of jury selection, the superior court ordered defendant placed in manacles that could be concealed in his lap. It did so because it impliedly determined that he might attempt to escape or at least might injure someone if he became displeased with events as they transpired. It based its determination on information such as the following: Defendant had attempted to saw through his waist chain; he had tried to take contraband into jail; he had drawings in his cell for the fashioning of a realistic gun out of soap; he had engaged in misconduct in jail on several occasions, including threatening officers, fighting with other inmates, starting fires, [and] possessing weapons of various sorts; he had exhibited little if any control over his emotions and little, if any, respect for authority or anyone's rules; and he had previously been convicted of an escape from prison, which, although executed without force or violence, had been somewhat elaborately planned. The superior court stated for the record that he had exposed his manacles to prospective jurors. It told him: [T]hat's your choice. If you don't care that they see that, that's fine. It reiterated: Again, it's your choice. If it doesn't bother you that they see that, then that's fine with the Court. Before long, it modified its order to allow his right hand to be free. Later, at the guilt phase, the superior court noted outside the presence of the jury that defendant, who was then on the witness stand, had made no attempt to conceal his waist chain at any point during the proceedings. It offered to give a curative admonition  such as a statement, which it acknowledged was not entirely true, that it was simply flat Court policy to so restrain a defendant at a death penalty trial. Defendant declined. On reconsideration, it determined that, because the waist chain had been visible, it was required to give an admonition under People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 292 [127 Cal. Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322, 90 A.L.R.3d 1], to the effect that such restraints should have no bearing on the determination of the defendant's guilt. It stated that it would in fact give an admonition of this sort unless defendant should object. It further stated that, in giving such an admonition, it would say something that is not the truth, such as, this is standard procedure in all homicide cases or in all death penalty cases, to so restrain the defendant. Defendant objected. Defense counsel expressed a view that an admonition that restraints should have no bearing on guilt draws undue attention to the restraints themselves. He stated that defendant would probably request an instruction on the matter. The superior court proceeded not to give an admonition. Finally, after defendant did in fact make a request, the superior court instructed the jury as follows: In your deliberations, the fact that a defendant has been subjected to physical restraints during the trial is not to be discussed or considered by you. There is no connotation of guilt of any kind because a defendant was restrained. Such restraints are a part of the normal procedures in a case of this nature and should have no bearing on your determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence. (8) Defendant now contends that the superior court erred by denying his motion to limit physical restraints. We reject the claim at the threshold. The superior court did not in fact deny defendant's motion. Rather, it granted what he sought. He asked it to limit physical restraints. It indeed limited such restraints. It ordered no fetters. It ordered only confinement to a security chair. It questioned whether he objected. Through defense counsel, he answered no. We would also reject the claim on the merits. An appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion to limit physical restraints for abuse of discretion. (See, e.g., People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 293.) Even if we were to deem that the superior court denied defendant's motion  which we do not  we could not conclude that it erred thereby. In view of the undisputed information it had obtained about such matters as his possession of a match bomb in jail, it could have determined, not at all unreasonably, that confinement to a security chair was appropriate. [7]