Opinion ID: 409619
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standing Under Title III

Text: 28 Apart from their Fourth Amendment argument, the nonparties also contend that they have a separate right under Title III to contest the legality of the interceptions of their conversations and to suppress illegally seized communications. This argument presents a complex statutory question, one apparently of first impression. Thus we analyze it at some length. 29 Title III provides a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of wiretapping and electronic surveillance. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 46, 92 S.Ct. 2357, 2360, 33 L.Ed.2d 179 (1972). The statute: (1) authorizes the interception of wire communications in limited circumstances with prior judicial approval, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518; (2) limits the circumstances in which intercepted communications may be used or disclosed, 18 U.S.C. § 2517; (3) imposes a criminal penalty for unauthorized interceptions and for disclosure or use of information obtained through such interceptions, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1); and (4) creates a damage remedy for a person whose wire or oral communication is unlawfully intercepted, disclosed, or used, 18 U.S.C. § 2520. The statute also creates a suppression sanction. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 provides: 30 Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter. 31 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a), in turn, provides the means for invoking that sanction: 32 Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that- 33
34 (ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or 35 (iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval.... 36 Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) defines the class of persons entitled to invoke the sanction through the motion to suppress: 37 (A)ggrieved person means a person who was a party to any intercepted wire or oral communication or a person against whom the interception was directed. 38 The nonparties in this case were all participants in conversations intercepted under the court authorizations in question. Further, their conversations are to be used in a trial ... before ... (a) court ... of the United States. 13 Thus under a literal reading of the statute they are aggrieved persons in a position to move for suppression pursuant to Section 2518(10) (a). The district court refused to accord them that status, however, on the ground that they fail to meet the standing requirement-adopted from Fourth Amendment law-that a movant must be a person against whom the challenged evidence is to be used. We must determine whether such a requirement is in fact implied in the statute. 39 The district court's no-standing decision was based on the premise that Title III does not grant a suppression remedy broader than that encompassed in general Fourth Amendment law. As a general characterization that maxim has some credence. The legislative history of Title III indicates that the statutory suppression sanction was meant largely (to) reflect() existing law. S.Rep.No.1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 96, reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2112, 2185. It was not intended generally to press the scope of the suppression role beyond present search and seizure law. Id. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1724, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). Further, consistent with general Fourth Amendment law, the definition of aggrieved person was limited so that only one whose conversation was intercepted or against whom the interception was directed would have standing to move for suppression. S.Rep.No.1097, supra, at 106, reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 2180. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 175 & n.9, 89 S.Ct. at 967-68 & n.9. A practical reluctance unduly to disrupt ongoing proceedings also militates in favor of treating Section 2515 as embodying the limitations of the traditional exclusionary rule. Cf. In re Vigorito, 499 F.2d 1351, 1354 (2d Cir.), certiorari denied, 419 U.S. 1056, 95 S.Ct. 640, 42 L.Ed.2d 654 (1974) (grand jury proceeding). Finally, consistent with general Fourth Amendment law, a person who alleges that his rights have been violated has additional criminal and civil remedies beyond the suppression sanction. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1), 2520; cf. United States v. Kember, supra, 648 F.2d at 1366 (alternative remedies under the Fourth Amendment). Focusing on the specific issue raised in this case, however, we are reluctant to hold that this parallel between Title III and the Fourth Amendment is sufficient ground on which to base a broad rule that a nonparty (even if he is aggrieved) can never invoke the Section 2515 suppression remedy in an ongoing proceeding, or at least in an ongoing criminal trial. Although Title III's suppression remedy has its roots in the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, it is not simply coextensive with that rule. 40 The Supreme Court has observed that Title III (and particularly Section 2515) is the result of a congressional effort to afford special safeguards against the unique problems posed by misuse of wiretapping and electronic surveillance. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S., supra, at 355 n.11, 89 S.Ct. at 623 n.11 (emphasis added). One marked difference between the statutory suppression sanction and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is that the former bars the use of illegally seized evidence not just in a criminal trial but rather in any trial, hearing or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof.... 18 U.S.C. § 2515. A second difference, of particular importance in this case, relates to the scope of the respective purposes of the safeguards. This difference was explained in the Supreme Court's decision in Gelbard v. United States, supra. 41 In Gelbard the Court held that grand jury witnesses ... are entitled to invoke the prohibition of § 2515 as a defense to contempt charges brought against them for refusing to testify. 408 U.S. at 43, 92 S.Ct. at 2359. In reaching that conclusion the Court, after surveying the legislative history of Title III, emphasized that s 2515 serves not only to protect the privacy of communications, but also to ensure that the courts do not become parties in illegal conduct.... Id. at 51, 92 S.Ct. at 2362 (footnote omitted). This point is critical because under Title III, unlike the Fourth Amendment, the invasion of privacy is not simply over and done with when an unlawful intrusion has been effected. Rather, the disclosure or use of information obtained through such an intrusion amounts to a separate injury to the victim's privacy interest. Id. at 51-52, 92 S.Ct. at 2362-63. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1), 2517; cf. United States v. Calandra, supra, 414 U.S. at 354, 89 S.Ct. at 623 (A subsequent use of illegally seized evidence works no new wrong under the Fourth Amendment.). Thus the Court recognized that Section 2515-beyond serving the traditional exclusionary rule function of deterring future unlawful interceptions-also plays a role in protecting against the use or disclosure of communications that have been illegally seized. The significance of this additional purpose of Section 2515 in terms of nonparty standing is demonstrated in the Tenth Circuit's decision in Anthony v. United States, 667 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1981), certiorari denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 2959, 73 L.Ed.2d 1350 (1982). 42 In Anthony the defendant was convicted of unlawful interception of the wire communications of several individuals, among them, Dr. Vernon S. Sisney. After entry of the verdict the defendant moved (1) for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, and (2) for discovery of the contents of tapes of intercepted communications (including some of Dr. Sisney's) that the defendant had made and that the government had subsequently seized. In response, Dr. Sisney filed a motion to intervene for purposes of opposing the discovery and to suppress the contents of the tapes under Section 2515. The district court denied Dr. Sisney's motion, reasoning that he did not have standing to suppress the information. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Dr. Sisney was in fact an aggrieved person entitled to invoke the sanction of Section 2515 through the motion prescribed in Section 2518(10)(a). Id. at 878. 43 Although the Tenth Circuit did not explicitly discuss the significance of Dr. Sisney's status as a nonparty in terms of his standing to suppress, 14 it is clear from the Court's overall discussion that its decision was motivated by a concern to protect Dr. Sisney's privacy interest in nondisclosure of the admittedly illegally intercepted communications. 15 44 In the present case the district court acknowledged this privacy interest in nondisclosure, yet failed to account for the risk to that interest in denying the nonparties' motions. Instead the court imposed an absolute bar (at least in criminal trials) to nonparty standing under the statute. 16 We do not think that such a broad prohibition is necessarily dictated by the language or purpose of Title III. Rather, a no-standing decision based on a movant's nonparty status must be responsive in some way to the risk of disclosure of unlawfully seized communications. 17 A comparison of the relative risks in Anthony and this case, however, convinces us that despite the gap in the district court's analysis, its no-standing decision was in fact correct. 45 In Anthony, absent Dr. Sisney's involvement, there would have been no one in a position to contest the use or disclosure of the intercepted communications. The only other party to the proceeding, the government, clearly was not an aggrieved person as to the challenged conversations. Thus, had the court denied Dr. Sisney standing, his privacy interest in nondisclosure would have been left totally unprotected. 18 In contrast, in the present case, even without the involvement of the nonparties, the defendants were able to test the legality of the interceptions of all the communications that the government intends to use at trial. United States v. Dorfman, supra, at 393 n.56. 19 Denying the nonparties standing in this context did not deny the court an opportunity to evaluate the legality of the underlying interceptions. 20 Rather, it simply foreclosed the nonparties from separately retesting the legality of the interceptions of their conversations. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. at 135 n.10, 98 S.Ct. at 1722 n.10. 21 Thus on the facts presented in this case, the nonparties' interests in nondisclosure have been adequately safeguarded. A no-standing decision is not inconsistent with the legislative purpose of Title III. 46 Accordingly, the orders of the district court are affirmed.