Opinion ID: 2118368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Delegation of Powers.

Text: It is also plaintiffs' contention that the 1955 ordinance is invalid because it delegates to the superintendent of waterworks and sewerage powers and duties which are by law vested in the city council. Under the ordinance it is the duty of the superintendent to report to the city treasurer the amounts to be charged the users of the facilities or the individual parcels of land within the district. These amounts are to be represented by service charges, special assessments, or any special charges which may have been imposed by any such sanitary district in connection with the issuance of any obligations thereof, which such amounts shall be sufficient to meet the requirements for the categories set forth in the ordinance. In the instant case the only special assessment involved was the original $2 per foot levy. That levy is not here in issue. Thus, interpreting the ordinance in light of the instant facts, we construe it to mean that the specified categories of financial requirements must be met from the service charges and special charges imposed. The only charges imposed on plaintiffs' property for 1952 and 1953 by the former Joint Sanitary District No. 7 were the $30 yearly charge and the three and one-half mill tax. Under the ordinance these same charges were levied for 1956, resulting in the $76.55 item here in dispute. Thus, the superintendent merely computed this amount under the formula of the former district. We deem this merely a ministerial act, rather than an unlawful delegation of the discretionary power vested in the city council. From the language of the ordinance it is not clear whether the superintendent could have reported to the city treasurer an amount which differs from or exceeds the charges imposed by the former district. The actual result in 1956 was that the amount realized from the special charges levied for that year was insufficient to cover the specified financial requirements, and the city absorbed a portion of the operation and maintenance expense from its general funds. The ordinance is silent as to what is to occur if the special charges previously levied are insufficient to cover the items specified in the ordinance. However, this possibility is not before us in the instant case, as here the superintendent merely reported the amount computed by the existing formula. Clearly, that was merely a ministerial act. It is our duty only to determine the constitutionality of the ordinance under the particular facts here before us. Under these facts there was no unconstitutional delegation of power to the superintendent. By the Court. Judgment affirmed.