Opinion ID: 1758839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Evidentiary Errors at Sentencing Hearing

Text: The appellants were tried in a bifurcated proceeding. During the sentencing phase, the prosecutor made this remark in the rebuttal portion of his closing argument: they got up here and they tried to give you this song and dance because they don't want to go to prison. I can assure you I would have let them go to prison and I want them to go to prison. The appellants moved for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor was making reference to a plea offer. The trial judge denied the motion. The appellants claim this purported reference to a negotiated plea violates A.R.E. Rule 410. That rule prohibits the mention of, inter alia, offers to plead to the crime charged or any other crime. The evil to be avoided by Rule 410 is the use of a plea offer against a defendant as an admission against interest. Brown v. State, 288 Ark. 517, 707 S.W.2d 313 (1986). Even if the prosecutor's remark can be characterized as a reference to a plea offer, and there is some doubt that it can, the remark was made during the sentencing phase of the trial. The appellants had already been convicted. We cannot say that they were so prejudiced that they were entitled to a mistrial. Judy Owens raises an additional argument regarding an occurrence during the sentencing phase. During cross-examination of court clerk Janice Morris, the prosecutor asked, Do you have knowledge that [the appellants] have been tried on possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and that they've been found guilty of that? The appellants asked for a mistrial, asserting that the prosecutor was making a reference to the first trial. The prosecutor explained that he was talking about this trial. They have been found guilty today. The judge denied the mistrial motion and asked the prosecutor to make it clear that he was referring to the present trial. The prosecutor then asked Ms. Norris, Are you familiar with the jury's decision today on the trial we've had? A mistrial is an extreme remedy that should only be granted when justice cannot be served by continuing the trial. Clayton v. State, 321 Ark. 602, 906 S.W.2d 290 (1995). Such an extreme remedy was not warranted in this instance. Nothing in the prosecutor's first question expressly or impliedly referenced the first trial. In his second question, the prosecutor made it clear that he was referring to the verdict just handed down. Finally, in the conclusion to his brief, Gary Dean Owens urges us to consider the cumulative error in the record as a basis for reversal. As we have found no errors, there is no need to address that point.