Opinion ID: 2629938
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Public Nuisances and Permits

Text: ¶ 37 The majority contends the public nuisance claims are not properly before the court because Thurston County is not a party to this appeal. Majority at 1092. I agree when a public nuisance action is premised on the alleged illegality of a permit, the issuing authority may be a necessary party. [3] However, Thurston County is respondent in this action and filed an appellate brief. [4] The majority also states that the trial court did not determine the legality of the exemption the county issued to the Bracks. Majority at 1092. The record clearly belies this statement. ¶ 38 Grundy's failure to attack the underlying permit in a LUPA action was a central issue at oral argument on the motion for summary judgment. RP at 5, 10, 23, 29. The trial court specifically stated: The Court will hold the following: the failure to challenge the decision of a granted permit under LUPA, under the time stated of the seawall, constitutes what I consider summary judgment and order; I specifically reject the fact the bulkhead was built pursuant to an invalid permit; and I grant summary judgment for the Bracks to continue [to] have the seawall. However, I deny summary judgment to Thurston County as to whether or not the permit is illegal. RP at 33. ¶ 39 These statements must be viewed in light of the claims Grundy made in her first amended complaint and the circumstances of summary judgment. The County did not seek summary judgment, only the Bracks. See CP at 14; [5] RP at 15 (where the attorney for Thurston County states We didn't provide any materials. It's not our summary judgment.). As the majority noted, Grundy only sought abatement against the Bracks. But Grundy also sought a declaration that the permit was null and void as contrary to law and attorney fees on the grounds of the bad faith of the county in issuance of the permit. First Amended Complaint (CP at 12). The trial court granted the Bracks' motion for summary judgment dismissing the nuisance claims but withheld any decision regarding the illegality of the permit as to the claims against the county. [6] RP at 33, 35; CP at 94. ¶ 40 The trial court clearly dismissed the public nuisance claims on the ground that Grundy could not collaterally attack the permits absent a timely challenge under LUPA. I fail to see how the county's status in this appeal is at all relevant. The majority fails to explain how the determination that the permits should be deemed valid because their issuance was not challenged rests on whether the issuing authority is party to an appeal. I see no connection, but the county is a respondent in any event. ¶ 41 The majority continues, Whether the county illegally issued an administrative shoreline exemption to the Bracks was not decided by the trial court, so it is not properly before us. Majority at 1093. But the reason the trial court didn't reach the illegality of the administrative shoreline exemption was because Grundy didn't challenge the exemption, or the building permit linked to the exemption, under LUPA! And Grundy's appeal rests largely on the assertion that this determination by the trial court was in error. If Grundy was right that LUPA does not foreclose her collateral attack on the legality of the permit, she would likely be entitled to relief. ¶ 42 Grundy deserves her day in court, by which I mean consideration of all the legal arguments she advances. I give her the analysis she is due.