Opinion ID: 2539099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: If a Blakely -type error is subject to harmless error analysis under state law, were the errors harmless here?

Text: ¶ 60 A constitutional error is harmless when `it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' Brown, 147 Wash.2d at 341, 58 P.3d 889 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824)). When applied to an element omitted from, or misstated in, a jury instruction, the error is harmless if that element is supported by uncontroverted evidence. Id. (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 18, 119 S.Ct. 1827). We have held errors in jury instructions as to firearm enhancements are harmless where the record leaves no reasonable doubt as to whether the jury based its special verdict on a finding that the defendant was armed with a firearm during the commission of the crime. Claborn, 95 Wash.2d at 633, 628 P.2d 467; Hall, 95 Wash.2d at 540, 627 P.2d 101. ¶ 61 The circumstances in Williams-Walker indicate that if there was a jury trial violation at sentencing, it was clearly harmless. The State charged Williams-Walker with being armed with a firearm during the commission of first degree robbery and felony murder. The only weapon of any kind at issue was a firearm. No other weapon was involved. The State provided evidence that a firearm was used during the commission of the robbery and homicide by presenting the bullet recovered from the body of Gene Chamberlin and the casing recovered from the scene, photographs of the entry wound and the bullet lodged in Chamberlin's body,.22 caliber cartridges recovered from inside Williams-Walker's apartment, testimony by eyewitnesses to the shooting, and testimony from Carlos Fuentes claiming that he was armed with a .22 caliber pistol and shot Chamberlin. Williams-Walker did not contest the use of a firearm. In closing, the State further emphasized the use of a firearm in the two crimes stating, [t]he lethal force that was used in this particular case was a .22 caliber gun pointed at Gene Chamberlin from a short distance away and then fired, VIII Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Williams-Walker) at 1527, and Chamberlin died as a result of that bullet that travelled through his ribs, through his heart and eventually rested on the other side, id. at 1529. ¶ 62 The record leaves no doubt that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict as to the special verdict if the form and instruction had correctly instructed them to determine whether Williams-Walker was armed with a firearm. As was the case in Claborn, Hall, and Taylor, there is no dispute that a gun was seen and used, that a bullet was fired into Chamberlin's body, and that no other weapons were seen or used. Under these circumstances, I have no doubt that, given an opportunity to do so, the jury would have found beyond a reasonable doubt Williams-Walker was armed with a firearm during the commission of the murder and robbery of Chamberlin. I would, therefore, hold that failure to specify a firearm in the deadly weapon special verdict form in Williams-Walker was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 63 I would affirm the Court of Appeals in Graham and Ruth, and reverse the Court of Appeals in Williams-Walker. I would hold the sentencing courts in Graham and Ruth did not violate Blakely when they imposed firearm sentencing enhancements supported by specific jury findings that Graham and Ruth were armed with firearms beyond a reasonable doubt. I would hold the sentencing court in Williams-Walker violated Blakely by imposing a firearm sentencing enhancement that was not supported by a specific jury finding that Williams-Walker was armed with a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt, but that the error was harmless. WE CONCUR: JAMES M. JOHNSON and TOM CHAMBERS, JJ.