Opinion ID: 626941
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Likelihood of Dilution

Text: Alternatively, the district court held that Rosetta Stone failed to satisfy the fourth and final element of its trademark dilution claim requiring that the plaintiff show defendant's use is likely to impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark or likely to harm the reputation of the famous mark. Id. at 265. The court based its conclusion solely on the fact that Rosetta Stone's brand awareness ha[d] only increased since Google revised its trademark policy in 2004. Rosetta Stone, 730 F.Supp.2d at 551. On the strength of this evidence, the district court concluded that the distinctiveness of the Rosetta Stone Marks has not been impaired and therefore that Rosetta Stone cannot show that Google's trademark policy likely caused dilution by blurring. Id. To determine whether the defendant's use is likely to impair the distinctiveness of the plaintiff's famous mark, the FTDA enumerates a non-exhaustive list of six factors that are to be considered by the courts: In determining whether a mark or trade name is likely to cause dilution by blurring, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following: (i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark. (ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark. (iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark. (iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark. (v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association with the famous mark. (vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). Although [n]ot every factor will be relevant in every case, and not every blurring claim will require extensive discussion of the factors[,] . . . a trial court must offer a sufficient indication of which factors it has found persuasive and explain why they are persuasive. Louis Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 266. The district court addressed only one factorthe degree of recognition of Rosetta Stone's markand did not mention any other remaining statutory factor. The court's reliance on Louis Vuitton for the proposition that no claim for dilution by blurring exists when there is evidence that public recognition of the defendants' product increased was error. Louis Vuitton addressed a far different fact pattern, where the defendant's fair use claim was based on parody, which Congress expressly included as a protected fair use under the FTDA so long as the mark being parodied is not being used as a designation of source for the person's own goods or services. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii). We concluded that a successful parody might actually enhance the famous mark's distinctiveness by making it an icon. The brunt of the joke becomes yet more famous. Louis Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 267 (4th Cir.2007) (emphasis added). We disagree, therefore, the district court's reading of Louis Vuitton. Under the FTDA, Rosetta Stone must show only a likelihood of dilution and need not prove actual economic loss or reputational injury. See id. at 264 n. 2. The decision below employed a truncated analysis that placed a very heavy emphasis upon whether there had been any actual injury suffered by Rosetta Stone's brand. On remand, the court should address whichever additional factors might apply to inform its determination of whether Google's use is likely to impair the distinctiveness of Rosetta Stone's mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).