Opinion ID: 769263
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Marsalis' Motion for a New Trial

Text: 23 Turning to Marsalis' claim that the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 provides that [o]n a defendant's motion, the court may grant a new trial to that defendant if the interests of justice so require. We review a court's decision to deny a new trial for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1437 (7th Cir. 1996). 24 Specifically, Marsalis contends that he was entitled to a new trial because the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to turn over all of the phone records that were subpoenaed in a timely fashion. In order for the defendant to be entitled to a new trial as a result of an alleged Brady violation, he must establish that: (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence allegedly suppressed was favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence was material to an issue at trial. See United States v. Hartbarger, 148 F.3d 777, 786 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1117 (1999). Under the third prong, evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that the disclosure of the allegedly suppressed evidence would have changed the result of the trial. United States v. Silva, 71 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1995). A reasonable probability exists if the suppression of evidence undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. See id. Because we conclude that the third step of the analysis is dispositive, we turn our attention to whether there is a reasonable probability that timely disclosure of the missing phone records would have changed the result of Marsalis' trial. 25 Here, Marsalis has failed to establish how the timely disclosure of the missing phone records relating to the unsolved ATM theft impacted his trial because the records became immaterial at the moment the judge excluded any evidence that related to the government's investigation into the unsolved ATM theft. But even if the missing phone records could properly be classified as material (i.e., exculpatory evidence), these records were turned over on the morning of the second day of trial, well before the prosecution had finished presenting its case. In spite of Marsalis' claim that he was harmed by the government's delayed production, it is interesting to note that he failed to move for either a continuance, an adjournment or a mistrial. See, e.g., United States v. Higgins, 75 F.3d 332, 335 (7th Cir. 1996) (Disclosure even in mid-trial suffices if time remains for the defendant to make effective use of the exculpatory material. . . . If counsel needed more time, she had only to ask; yet she did not seek a continuance. Nothing more need be said.); United States v. Williams, 738 F.2d 172, 178 (7th Cir. 1984) ([O]ur standard of review limits us to determining whether the government's disclosure came so late as to prevent appellant from receiving a fair trial. We cannot say that disclosure came too late in this case. After appellant's counsel viewed the reports at trial, he could have asked for a continuance to contact the other owners and call them to testify, or he could have asked the court to make the reports part of the record.) (citations omitted). Thus, we are of the opinion that the government's delayed disclosure of the remaining phone records did not come so late as to deny Marsalis of the evidence's effective use at trial, had he chosen to do so. 26 Accordingly, we are not convinced that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial was prejudiced by the government's alleged delayed production of the immaterial phone records. We conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Marsalis' motion for a new trial based on the alleged Brady violation. 27