Opinion ID: 1133883
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: McNew

Text: The Nesbitts argue that McNew misrepresented the structural condition of the house in the appraisal report. The Nesbitts also argue that under Fisher v. Comer Plantation, Inc., 772 So.2d 455 (Ala.2000), the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment for McNew. McNew argues, on the other hand, that the summary judgment was proper, because, she says, she owed no duty to the Nesbitts. Even if the Nesbitts could show that McNew owed them a duty, the Nesbitts failed to present any evidence indicating that they did, in fact, rely on the appraisal in deciding to purchase the house. See Moore, 849 So.2d at 923 (holding that reasonable reliance is an essential element of a fraudulent-misrepresentation claim). McNew presented the following undisputed evidence to show that the Nesbitts did not rely on the appraisal: the Nesbitts signed the sales contract before the appraisal was completed; both Johnny and Jan testified that they did not rely on the appraisal in making the decision to purchase the house; the Nesbitts did not have any contact with McNew before the closing; Johnny testified that he did not read the appraisal before closing; and Jan testified that she only glanced at the appraisal report at closing. The Nesbitts argue that they met the reasonable-reliance requirement because, they say, as a condition to obtaining the loan for the purchase of the house, Countrywide, the mortgage lender, should have been informed about the structural condition of the house. Therefore, the Nesbitts essentially argue that they indirectly relied upon the appraisal report, through Countrywide. However, the Nesbitts have failed to cite any authority to show that indirect reliance, through Countrywide, is sufficient to meet the reasonable-reliance standard. This Court has stated: `Where an appellant fails to cite any authority for an argument, this Court may affirm the judgment as to those issues, for it is neither this Court's duty nor its function to perform all the legal research for an appellant. Rule 28(a)[(10)], Ala. R.App. P.; Henderson v. Alabama A & M Univ., 483 So.2d 392 (Ala.1986). Sea Calm Shipping Co., S.A. v. Cooks, 565 So.2d 212, 216 (Ala. 1990).' Kyser v. Harrison, 908 So.2d 914, 917 (Ala.2005) (quoting Spradlin v. Birmingham Airport Auth., 613 So.2d 347, 348 (Ala.1993)). Furthermore, Countrywide could not have reasonably relied upon the appraisal report as a guarantee of the structural quality of the house. The appraisal report stated that [t]he purpose of the appraisal is to estimate the market value of the real property that is the subject of this report. An addendum attached to the appraisal stated that the purpose and the scope of the appraisal was to provide an estimate of the fair market value of the property. Lastly, the appraisal stated that the appraiser did not warrant, guarantee or make any representation to structural stability. . . . Given the limiting language in the appraisal, any reliance by Countrywide upon the appraisal as a guarantee of the structural integrity of the house would have been unreasonable. See Brushwitz v. Ezell, 757 So.2d 423, 430-31 (Ala.2000) (holding that a buyer's reliance on an appraisal report in deciding whether to purchase a house would be unreasonable given that the appraisal contained limiting language that it was not an evaluation of the condition of the house).