Opinion ID: 751803
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Ostrich Jury Instruction

Text: 43 The defendant next contends that the trial judge abused his discretion in giving the following ostrich, or conscious avoidance, instruction to the jury, over the defendant's objection: 44 You may infer knowledge from a combination of suspicion and indifference to the truth. If you find that a person had a strong suspicion that things were not what they seemed or that someone had withheld some important facts, yet shut his eyes for fear of what he would learn, you may conclude that he acted knowingly as I have used the term in these instructions. 45 This ostrich instruction, named so because of the inference that the defendant negligently buried his head in the sand, is given in cases like this one, 2 where the defendant is prosecuted pursuant to a criminal statute requiring proof that he acted knowingly, but he pleads a lack of knowledge as to facts and circumstances that are evident. This court has held that an ostrich instruction is appropriate when the defendant claims a lack of guilty knowledge and there are facts and evidence that support an inference of deliberate ignorance. Caliendo, 910 F.2d at 433. 46 Although the trial court has wide latitude to instruct the jury on proper statements of relevant law, jury instructions, to be effective, must treat the issues fairly and adequately. United States v. Strickland, 935 F.2d 822, 826 (7th Cir.1991). In determining the correctness of jury instructions, a reviewing court must determine from looking at the charge as a whole, whether the jury was misled in any way and whether it had understanding of the issues and its duty to determine those issues. United States v. Abdelkoui, 19 F.3d 1178, 1182 (7th Cir.1994) (citation and internal quotation omitted). 47 Fawley argues that the ostrich instruction was improper in this case not only because it is a perjury case, but also because the use of the  'ostrich instruction' improperly asks the jury to determine whether [Fawley] knowingly gave a false statement [during Klehm's grand jury proceedings] to an ambiguous question based on what he 'should have known.'  48 We agree with the trial judge's decision to give the ostrich instruction to the jury, and hold that it was not an abuse of discretion. The facts and circumstances clearly demonstrate that Fawley had knowledge of the fact that Klehm was harboring illegal aliens, that he had knowledge that a number of the aliens were using aliases, that they were living in squalor, and that Fawley, as Klehm's right-hand-man, necessarily had knowledge as he was generally involved in Klehm's shady dealings. Four witnesses testified at trial that the defendant was aware that Klehm employed illegal aliens. 3 For example, Rivera, one of Klehm's illegal workers, testified that during a discussion with Klehm and Fawley in 1994, Fawley was told that Rivera did not have good papers to work legally in the United States. Fawley was told that Rivera's false immigration documents were printed under the assumed name, Juan Fabuz. In the same vein, Torres testified that Fawley had delivered a payroll check to him nearly every weekend in 1994 and 1995, and that the checks bore an assumed name, and in spite of this, Fawley continued to address Torres by his real name. Fawley's knowledge of the illegal status of Klehm's employees is further evidenced by the fact that Fawley himself instructed Phillips not to distribute paychecks to the aliens until they had paid their rent. When Phillips questioned Fawley regarding the legality of withholding paychecks until the aliens had paid for their housing, Fawley responded that the aliens would not protest due to the fact that they were in the country illegally. Phillips testified that Fawley was aware that sixteen people were living in one of Klehm's filthy, roach-infested duplexes. When asked by Phillips why the workers were forced to live in such miserable conditions, Fawley allegedly responded that Mexicans were used to living this way and that the workers would not complain because they were illegally in the country. Finally, going to Fawley's knowledge of Klehm's employees, Fawley stated under oath that only four of the 25 employees working at the nursery with him actually spoke English. 4 Despite the overwhelming incriminating evidence in the record, Fawley denied any knowledge as to the fact that Klehm's Mexican employees were illegal aliens at least 15 times during his grand jury testimony. 49 The defendant's second argument concerning the ostrich instruction is that the prosecutor's use of the word knowledge at Klehm's grand jury proceeding was ambiguous. As such, Fawley contends that the use of the ostrich instruction was improper because, in effect, it asked the jury to determine whether Fawley knowingly gave false answers to ambiguous questions. The defendant argues that before the jury in this case can determine whether Fawley knew he was committing perjury, it must first determine the defendant's understanding of the words any knowledge, as used by the prosecutor in questioning Fawley during Klehm's grand jury. 50 Initially, it is surprising that Fawley, a graduate of the University of Illinois, would make this ludicrous argument that the meaning of the common term knowledge was ambiguous to him. The word knowledge is in common English usage and is understood by the average U.S. citizen. Fawley's direct and clear responses to the questions proposed to him during the grand jury proceeding suggest he understood them. In fact, Fawley was asked several times if he had any knowledge that Klehm's employees were illegal aliens; he answered in unequivocal language no each time. Fawley never said during the grand jury proceeding that he did not understand the use of the term knowledge. We agree with the Third Circuit's holding in United States v. Reilly: we do not believe that in the context of the questions, the term 'knowledge,' without further definition is inherently ambiguous. 33 F.3d 1396, 1415 (3d Cir.1994). Contrary to the defendant's claims, we hold that the wording of the prosecutor's questions was clear and unambiguous, was not subject to various meanings, and did not constitute a basis to defeat the ostrich instruction. 5 51 Fawley also has failed to provide legal authority in support of his argument that the ostrich instruction is inappropriate in a perjury case. As the Government notes, the use of the ostrich instruction was upheld by this Court in a prosecution of a charge of conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud in United States v. Strickland, where we held that knowingly was the operative mental state in both the bank fraud and wire fraud statutes. 935 F.2d at 826. Knowingly is operative in the perjury statute as well. In our opinion, the district judge did not abuse his discretion in giving the jury an ostrich instruction during the defendant's perjury trial. 52