Opinion ID: 2976348
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appropriate employer response

Text: Because we have determined that Anheuser-Busch’s knowledge of the harassment is a question for the jury, the appropriateness of summary judgment in Cunningham’s and Hill’s cases hinges on whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the brewery responded reasonably to their allegations of harassment. As we discussed earlier, employer liability in cases of coworker harassment is not derivative, but instead depends on the employer’s “own acts or omissions.” Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs. Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir. 1997). An employer’s response is unreasonable if it “manifests indifference or unreasonableness in light of the facts the employer knew or should have known.” Id. at 873; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. A response is generally No. 07-3235 Hawkins et al. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. Page 14 adequate, however, if it is “reasonably calculated to end the harassment.” Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 663-64 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the employer failed to prove that its actions were “a reasonable attempt to prevent and correct the problem of racially harassing behavior”). Cunningham and Hill contend that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to them, raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Anheuser-Busch responded reasonably to their allegations of sexual harassment given that the brewery had reason to believe that Robinson was a serial harrasser. Anheuser-Busch counters by asserting that liability is precluded on both Cunningham’s and Hill’s claims because (1) the brewery had in place a well-publicized antiharassment policy that both women acknowledged having copies of, and (2) its response to each individual complaint was sufficient. Although the brewery’s sexual harassment policy, which includes procedures for reporting harassment, is relevant to the question of whether Anheuser-Busch reasonably attempted to prevent harassment in the first instance, it does not absolve the brewery from liability if it knew or should have known about the harassing conduct yet failed to respond appropriately. An employer’s responsibility to prevent future harassment is heightened where it is dealing with a known serial harrasser and is therefore on clear notice that the same employee has engaged in inappropriate behavior in the past. See Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 2001) (refusing to grant summary judgment to the employer where a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the company’s failure to warn other employees was negligent due to its knowledge of the harrasser’s prior violent act); Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 931-32 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming a jury finding that a company was liable for failing to adequately supervise a harrasser where the company has constructive knowledge of past complaints). As one treatise aptly explains, “[t]he best anti-discrimination policy in the world will not help the employer who, rather than fulfill its duty to act on complaints about a serial harrasser, lets the known harrasser continue to injure new victims.” Elizabeth Jubin Fujiwara & Joyce M. Brown, Causes of Action for Post-Ellerth/Faragher Title VII Employment Sexual Harassment Claims, § 53, (2008), available at 27 COA2d 1 (Westlaw). Because Robinson was a known serial harrasser, the brewery is liable if its response to Cunningham’s or Hill’s complaints demonstrates an attitude of permissiveness and was not reasonably calculated to end Robinson’s pattern of harassment. See Jackson, 191 F.3d at 663, 666.
Anheuser-Busch asserts that it had no knowledge that Cunningham was being harassed, so it had no responsibility to remedy the harassment. It also claims that, because of what it did know, it acted appropriately by removing Cunningham from line 75. A jury could find, however, that the brewery had constructive knowledge that Cunningham was being harassed. A genuine issue of material fact therefore exists as to whether, given that Anheuser-Busch knew that Robinson had previously harassed another female employee, its failure to investigate that harassment or to take additional steps designed to prevent future harassment manifested “indifference or unreasonableness in light of the facts.” See Blankenship, 123 F.3d at 873. Summary judgment was therefore inappropriate as to Cunningham’s claim.
Anheuser-Busch argues that it responded appropriately to Hill’s allegations by separating her from Robinson, launching a prompt investigation that included interviewing numerous employees, and sending Hill a letter at the conclusion of the investigation stating that retaliation would not be tolerated. The brewery points out that there were no witnesses who observed Robinson harassing Hill, that Robinson denied harassing Hill, and that Cunningham, who originally claimed that she herself had been harassed by Robinson, later recanted her allegations. Anheuser-Busch further notes No. 07-3235 Hawkins et al. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. Page 15 that the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the brewery requires good cause for termination and, in light of its unsuccessful attempt to have Robinson terminated after his harassment of Chiandet, management reasonably believed that it had insufficient evidence to discipline Robinson at the time of Hill’s complaints. The brewery finally argues that the failure to discipline an employee with a prior record of harassment is not necessarily an inappropriate response, and that it satisfied its duty to respond when it moved Hill off of line 75. Notwithstanding Anheuser-Busch’s arguments, a jury could find that, in light of the brewery’s knowledge that Robinson was a serial harrasser, management acted inappropriately by repeatedly removing the victims of harassment from line 75 while failing to undertake more fundamental action, such as training, warning, or monitoring Robinson. Although some courts have indeed found that simply removing a harrasser from the victim’s work environment is sufficient to preclude liability, none of the cases cited by the brewery involved a serial harrasser such as Robinson or the type of threatening behavior at issue in the present case. See, e.g., Scarberry v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp., 328 F.3d 1255, 1259-60 (10th Cir. 2003) (discussing an employer’s response to first-time harrassers); Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1195-98 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the employer fulfilled its obligation to take prompt corrective action by separating the plaintiff and a first-time harrasser). Anheuser-Busch particularly relies on Scarberry for the proposition that separating the alleged harrasser and the victim is sufficient to meet an employer’s obligation to remedy the harassment. See Scarberry, 328 F.3d at 1259-60. But the company in Scarberry was far more proactive in dealing with alleged harrassers than Anheuser-Busch. See id. The Scarberry court noted that ExxonMobil “took progressively more serious remedial action that not only ended harassment by specific employees, but was also reasonably calculated to demonstrate to all employees that its policy against sexual harassment would be enforced.” Id. at 1256. Like Robinson, one accused harrasser in Scarberry denied the allegations. ExxonMobil nonetheless took care to “individually counsel[]” the first-time offender regarding “inappropriate behavior and company policy regarding harassment” and to sternly warn him “that ExxonMobil would not tolerate harassment in the workplace nor retaliation as a result of the investigation.” Id. at 1259. Management in Scarberry also sent a letter to another employee accused of harassment that clearly “reinforced the company’s policies and concerns about harassment, warned him that supervisors would be closely monitoring his behavior, and informed him that he would be disciplined if other harassing acts could be substantiated and that notes pertaining to the investigation would be maintained on file.” Id. at 1260. Contrary to Anheuser-Busch’s assertion, Scarberry does not stand for the proposition that simply separating the harrasser and his victim is sufficient to preclude liability. Rather, it demonstrates that companies that take affirmative steps reasonably calculated to prevent and put an end to a pattern of harassment—such as personally counseling harrassers, sending them letters emphasizing the company’s policies and the seriousness of the allegations against them, and threatening harrassers with serious discipline if future allegations are substantiated—are more likely to be deemed to have responded appropriately. See Scarberry, 328 F.3d at 1259; see also Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 664 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that reprimanding a supervisor who had a reputation for discriminating against African-Americans was insufficient by itself to prove that the company took reasonable steps to “prevent and correct” the harassment); Fenton v. HiSAN, Inc., 174 F.3d 827, 831 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the employer’s response was sufficient when, after the first complaint, the employer separated the parties, sternly warned the offending employee that he was to stop making offensive comments, and informed him that his failure to comply would result in disciplinary action); Blankenship, 123 F.3d at 870-71, 874 (holding that an employer’s response was sufficient when, after the first complaint, management not only separated the employees, but (1) formulated an “observation network” designed to monitor the harrasser, (2) checked with the victim daily to ensure that she had not been further bothered by the harrasser, and (3) after further complaints, met with the harrasser the next day to give him written notice that this was his “one and No. 07-3235 Hawkins et al. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. Page 16 only” warning, that further harassment would result in immediate termination, and that harassment “absolutely will not be tolerated”). The record before us does not reflect that the brewery took any remedial steps other than removing Hill from line 75. Anheuser-Busch alleges that “company policy” is to counsel alleged harrassers, so it likely counseled Robinson “as a matter of course.” As Hill points out, however, there was no evidence in the brewery’s employment files that anyone from Anheuser-Busch ever met with Robinson after the investigation was completed, let alone provided him with counseling or training. And deposition testimony from several managers at the plant contradicts Anheuser-Busch’s assertions that Robinson was counseled after each allegation of harassment. Manley, the manager in charge of harassment investigations, admitted that there were no records of any meeting with Robinson and that brewery files on Robinson were “not in the condition” he expected them to be. Daniel Brown, a manager with overall responsibility for employees at the brewery, stated in his deposition that Robinson did not receive any counseling on sexual harassment as part of the investigation into Hill’s complaints and that Robinson never received training “any different than every other employee receives.” There is also no evidence in the record that the management at Anheuser-Busch took any other corrective action reasonablely calculated to end Robinson’s pattern of harassment—such as warning him that sexual harassment would not be tolerated or monitoring his behavior to ensure that he did not harass either Hill or other women at the plant. Strangely enough, the only letter in the record that expressed disapproval of Robinson’s harassment was sent to Hill, not to Robinson, which obviously had no deterrent effect on the harrasser. Anheuser-Busch defends the steps it took by asserting that management could not have taken additional steps to discipline Robinson because he denied that he had ever harassed Hill. The brewery knew, however, that Robinson had a history of lying about harassing women. During its investigation into Robinson’s harassment of Chiandet, Robinson denied authoring the threatening notes to her. He admitted writing the notes only after the brewery confronted him with evidence that he had been identified by a handwriting expert. This history calls into question Anheuser-Busch’s assertion that Robinson’s denial was entitled to significant weight and supports Hill’s assertion that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the appropriateness of Anheuser-Busch’s response. The brewery also argues that it did not take further action against Robinson because, under the collective bargaining agreement, it did not have free reign to fire him at will. Anheuser-Busch notes that it had attempted to fire Robinson after he harassed Chiandet, but was thwarted by the union grievance process. The brewery’s inability to permanently discharge Robinson the first time that he sexually harassed an employee, however, does not excuse its failure to take appropriate action in response to subsequent incidents. Even if the brewery’s determination that it had insufficient evidence to sustain a charge of harassment against Robinson in Hill’s case was reasonable, that does not mean that it had no responsibility to take other remedial steps to ensure that Robinson did not harass other women. The remedies of Title VII would be rendered impotent if employers dealing with serial harrassers were allowed to throw up their hands after their first effort to deal with the harrasser proved unsuccessful. A company faced with a pattern of harassment must both respond appropriately and take increasingly effective steps designed to end the harassment. The failure to do so suggests indifference and permissiveness on the part of management. This is not to say that a jury will necessarily determine that Anheuser-Busch’s responded inappropriately. But Hill has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the act of removing her from line 75 was by itself a reasonable remedy under the circumstances of this case. No. 07-3235 Hawkins et al. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. Page 17 E. Hawkins We need not address whether the harassment alleged by Hawkins was sufficiently severe or pervasive to survive summary judgment because we agree with the district court that Hawkins did not establish the other elements of her prima facie case. Although there is no question that AnheuserBusch had actual notice that Robinson harassed Hawkins when she reported the incident to her manager at the first opportunity, Anheuser-Busch promptly launched an investigation, suspended Robinson, and then fired him. The brewery’s response to Hawkins’s complaint was markedly different from its response to the earlier complaints of Cunningham and Hill. We therefore agree with the district court’s conclusion that the remedial steps taken by Anheuser-Busch after learning of Hawkins’s harassment complaint were sufficient to preclude employer liability as to her claims. F. Hill’s and Jackson’s retaliation claims In addition to Hill’s hostile-work-environment claim, she asserts, along with Jackson, that Anheuser-Busch is liable for Robinson’s alleged retaliation against them under Ohio Revised Code § 4112. Hill alleges that Robinson set fire to her car in retaliation for her filing a sexual harassment complaint against him. Jackson alleges that Robinson set fire to her house in retaliation for her participation in the investigation into Hawkins’s complaint of harassment. Both women also allege that other coworkers were rude to them after they filed their complaints. The district court dismissed Hill’s and Jackson’s retaliation claims after concluding that this circuit does not recognize employer liability for coworker retaliation. Applying the prima facie test for retaliation, the court also found that both women failed to allege any act by Anheuser-Busch that rose to the level of an adverse employment action. The court specifically noted that neither Hill nor Jackson presented any evidence that the brewery “condoned or encouraged” retaliatory acts by coworkers. 1. Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under this court’s Title VII caselaw, an employee must establish that (1) he or she engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer knew of the exercise of the protected right, (3) an adverse employment action was subsequently taken against the employee, and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Ct., 201 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006), however, made clear that the scope of Title VII’s retaliation provision is broader than that of Title VII’s discrimination provision. Id. at 2412-14; see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 703(a), 704(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a). In contrast to Title VII’s discrimination provision, the “adverse employment action” requirement in the retaliation context is not limited to an employer’s actions that solely affect the terms, conditions or status of employment, or only those acts that occur at the workplace. See Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2412-14. The retaliation provision instead protects employees from conduct that would have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 2415 (internal quotation marks omitted). 2. Coworker-retaliation claims This circuit has not previously recognized a claim for coworker retaliation under Title VII. We have not, however, foreclosed the existence of such claims. See Swanson v. Livingston County, 121 F. App’x 80, 85 (6th Cir. 2005) (recognizing a cause of action for supervisor retaliatory harassment, but noting that this circuit has not “recognized co-worker retaliatory harassment as a valid cause of action”); Little v. BP Exploration & Oil Co., 129 F. App’x 260, 262 (6th Cir. 2005) (same); see also Patton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 234 F.3d 1269, 2000 WL 16181017, at  n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision) (noting that cases from other circuits holding an employer No. 07-3235 Hawkins et al. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. Page 18 liable for coworker retaliatory harassment were “persuasive,” but having no need to decide the issue in the case before it). The majority of our sister circuits to address this issue have determined that Title VII protects against coworker retaliatory harassment that is known to but not restrained by the employer. See Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 349 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that an employer may be liable under Title VII for coworker retaliatory harassment); Fielder v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973, 98485 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing a claim for coworker retaliation based on the principle that employers are liable for coworker retaliation on grounds similar to the grounds on which they are liable for coworker harassment), vacated on other grounds in light of Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002); Richardson v. New York Dep’t of Corrective Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that “sufficiently severe” and “unchecked” retaliatory coworker harassment may constitute an adverse employment action); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 126465 (10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing claims for coworker retaliatory harassment if the conduct is “sufficiently severe,” the company had knowledge of the acts, and the company orchestrated, condoned, or encouraged them); Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding a jury verdict after recognizing that a company may be held liable for retaliation through their acquiescence in a coworker’s campaign of retaliatory harassment); Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1994) (explaining that an adverse employment action includes “toleration of harassment by other employees”). In contrast, the Fifth and the Eighth Circuits have rejected coworker retaliation claims by narrowly defining what constitutes an “adverse employment action” under Title VII. See Manning v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997) (refusing to recognize coworker retaliation “[a]bsent evidence of some more tangible change in duties or working conditions that constituted a material employment disadvantage”); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that an “adverse action” must be an “ultimate employment decision,” such as hiring, compensating, promoting, granting leave, or firing, and that “[h]ostility from fellow employees, having tools stolen, and resulting anxiety, without more, do not constitute ultimate employment decisions, and therefore are not the required adverse employment actions”). But the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern specifically abrogated the reasoning in both Manning and Mattern, holding that the application of Title VII’s retaliation provision is not limited to a narrow definition of an “adverse employment action” that includes only actions affecting the terms, conditions or status of employment. See 126 S. Ct. at 2414. Nothing in the language of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision indicates that the principle of employer responsibility does not extend to claims for retaliation by coworkers. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334, the Seventh Circuit held that there was no reason “why a different form of retaliation—namely, retaliating against a complainant by permitting her fellow employees to punish her for invoking her rights under Title VII— does not fall withing this statute.” We agree. To hold otherwise would allow an employer to recruit or permit employees to carry out retaliatory acts with impunity. We therefore join the majority of our sister circuits that have addressed this issue in recognizing that, in appropriate circumstances, Title VII permits claims against an employer for coworker retaliation. What remains to be determined is what those “appropriate circumstances” are. A review of the relevant caselaw in other circuits is helpful. In one of the first cases to address the issue, the Tenth Circuit determined that employers may be held liable for the retaliatory acts of coworkers if supervisory or management-level personnel “orchestrated, condoned, or encouraged” a coworker’s actions, and management actually knew about the coworker retaliation. Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1265. The Eight Circuit, one of the two circuits that has addressed coworker retaliation after Burlington Northern, stated in dicta that the circuit may adopt a more stringent standard for coworker No. 07-3235 Hawkins et al. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. Page 19 retaliation. Although the court dismissed a coworker retaliation claim on other grounds, the court suggested that, in order to hold an employer liable for coworker retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer’s failure take sufficient remedial action was motivated by the fact that the plaintiff engaged in protected activity. Carpenter v. Con-Way Cent. Express, Inc., 481 F.3d 611, 619 (8th Cir. 2007). The Third Circuit, the other circuit to address coworker retaliation postBurlington Northern, has taken a different approach. That court determined that an employer will be liable “if the prima facie case is satisfied and if there is a basis for employer liability for the coworker’s conduct.” Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 349 (3d Cir. 2006). To determine employer liability, the Third Circuit then looked to its coworker harassment caselaw as a model. It determined that, as with harassment, there is a basis for company liability for coworker retaliation “where supervisors knew or should have known about the [co-worker] harassment, but failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action” to stop the abuse. Id. at 350 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The standard for employer liability regarding coworker harassment in this circuit is similar to the standard employed by the Third Circuit. In Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 123 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 1997), we held that when coworker harassment is at issue, an employer is liable “if its response manifests indifference or unreasonableness in light of the facts the employer knew or should have known.” Id. at 873. This test seeks to advance the goals of Title VII while ensuring that employers are held liable for only their own indifferent or unreasonable behavior. See id. We see no reason why this standard will not prove equally effective in the context of coworker retaliation. As Burlington Northern made clear, however, the tests for harassment and retaliation are not coterminous. The courts must evaluate whether the retaliatory act would “dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination” when determining whether an employer’s response to coworker retaliation is indifferent or unreasonable. Burlington Northern, 126 S.Ct. at 2409. Taking into account our caselaw and the guidance provided by Burlington Northern, we hold that an employer will be liable for the coworker’s actions if (1) the coworker’s retaliatory conduct is sufficiently severe so as to dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination, (2) supervisors or members of management have actual or constructive knowledge of the coworker’s retaliatory behavior, and (3) supervisors or members of management have condoned, tolerated, or encouraged the acts of retaliation, or have responded to the plaintiff’s complaints so inadequately that the response manifests indifference or unreasonableness under the circumstances. See Burlington Northern, 126 S.Ct. at 2415; Blankenship, 123 F.3d at 872-73. We must now determine whether Hill’s and Jackson’s claims survive summary judgment under this standard. As the district court noted, there is no question that both women engaged in protected activity. There is also no question that they allege that Robinson set the two fires in question in order to retaliate. We therefore turn our attention to evaluating whether (1) Robinson’s actions were sufficiently severe to dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination, (2) Anheuser-Busch had knowledge of Robinson’s retaliatory actions, and (3) management either condoned Robinson’s actions or failed to adequately respond to the allegations of retaliation. a. Hill’s retaliation claim We conclude that Hill has alleged facts sufficient to survive summary judgment on her retaliation claim. There is no question that a jury could find that management at Anheuser-Busch knew about the allegations that Robinson had set fire to Hill’s car in retaliation for her reporting him. Hill directly reported the fire to her supervisors, and senior management at the brewery knew about the anonymous letter specifically alleging that Robinson had not only set fire to Hill’s car, but that he had threatened to “kill the bitch” if he lost his job. No. 07-3235 Hawkins et al. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. Page 20 Testimony given during a Licking County Prosecutor’s Office investigation into the fire at Jackson’s home is also telling. During the investigation, Eric Steinberg, Hill’s and Robinson’s supervisor at the brewery, acknowledged that around the time that Hill’s car was set on fire, Robinson had insinuated to Steinberg that he had caused the fire. Steinberg’s statements also reveal that he knew that Robinson was dangerous and that he feared that Robinson might harm him. He recounted that during one conversation with Robinson about Steinberg’s marital problems, Robinson told Steinberg that he “ought to kill the bitch” and then offered to help Steinberg kill his wife. When Steinberg was later asked by the prosecutor’s office if he would participate in an investigation into Robinson, he declined, stating that he did not want to get involved because Robinson might try to retaliate against him. Manley, a member of senior management at the brewery and the only manager involved in all three of the investigations into Robinson’s behavior prompted by Chiandet’s, Cunningham’s, and Hill’s allegations, revealed in his deposition that he was aware of rumors that Robinson had set fire to Hill’s vehicle and that he knew that Hill had told supervisors that she believed that Robinson set fire to her car in retaliation for her complaint of harassment. The same investigation also revealed that Robinson had told both Hawkins and Hudson that he was responsible for setting fire to Hill’s vehicle. Although Steinberg, Hawkins, and Hudson did not relay this information to senior management, their testimony gives rise to an inference that Robinson’s threatening behavior and violent acts of retaliation were common knowledge to both coworkers and supervisors at the brewery. Hill’s allegations might therefore have been substantiated by a more complete investigation. Although the brewery correctly points out that Hill did not present direct evidence that Robinson was responsible for setting the fire, the deposition testimony from Steinberg is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether management had knowledge of Robinson’s involvement. This precludes summary judgment on that ground. Anheuser-Busch has also failed to show that it responded to Hill’s complaint of retaliation in any meaningful way. The two members of management to whom Hill reported the fire—Davidson and Schlarman—allegedly not only failed to investigate Hill’s allegation that Robinson had retaliated against her, but chided her for attempting to make a report. The brewery never bothered to investigate the incident, monitor Robinson, or create a safe environment for harassment complaints. A jury could find that, given what management knew about the fire, the brewery had an obligation to investigate the incident. Anheuser-Busch argues that its response was sufficient because it fully investigated Hill’s allegations of harassment and notified her by letter that it would not tolerate retaliation. But the brewery fails to acknowledge that Hill’s allegation that Robinson had set fire to her car in retaliation for reporting him was separate from her initial allegations of harassment on line 75. And despite the language in the letter to Hill stating that Anheuser-Busch did not tolerate retaliation, the brewery never bothered to investigate Hill’s allegation that Robinson was continuing to harass her in retaliation for her report. The serious nature of Hill’s allegation could lead a jury to find that failing to investigate the incident and issuing a letter solely to Hill, as opposed to Robinson, was an insufficient response. There are, therefore, sufficient facts in the record upon which a jury could find that AnheuserBusch’s failure to investigate the complaint of Robinson’s violent act of retaliation was both indifferent and unreasonable. See also Patton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 234 F.3d 1269, 2000 WL 1681017, at -5 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding a jury verdict for retaliation in part because the company failed to follow up and investigate the plaintiff’s complaints of retaliation or to condemn coworker retaliatory harassment); 3 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Employment Discrimination § 87.20, at 17-101 (1994) (including the “toleration of harassment by other employees” as an example of a retaliatory adverse employment action). Summary judgment on Hill’s claim of retaliation was therefore inappropriate. No. 07-3235 Hawkins et al. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. Page 21 b. Jackson’s retaliation claim Jackson claims that Robinson retaliated against her for her participation in Anheuser-Busch’s investigation into his harassment of Hawkins. Her claim raises the initial question of whether Jackson’s participation in an internal company investigation regarding another employee is even protected by Title VII. We recognize that the scope of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provisions remains unsettled postBurlington Northern and post-Ellerth/Faragher. The Supreme Court, in fact, has recently granted certiorari to address whether retaliation against an employee who participates in an internal investigation into the harassment of another employee, prior to any litigation or governmental involvement, is protected by Title VII. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 21 F. App’x 373, 375-77 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 75 U.S.L.W. 3663 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2008) (No. 06-1595) (holding that participation in an internal investigation into the alleged harassment of other employees without more does not give rise to protection under Title VII). Because Jackson’s claim would fail even if the protections of Title VII are determined to be applicable to her, we decline to address the scope of Title VII here. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Title VII applies, the brewery’s handling of the threat of future retaliation against Jackson was sufficient to preclude liability. Anheuser-Busch undertook proactive steps to protect both Jackson and Hawkins from retaliation when it decided to fire Robinson, including coordinating with law enforcement to monitor Robinson, hiring a security guard to follow him, and offering Jackson the protection of a security guard at her home, which she refused. Robinson’s death unfortunately left Jackson with limited remedies for the damage that she suffered from the fire. This turn of events, however, does not alter the fact that summary judgment in favor of Anheuser-Busch was justified on Jackson’s retaliation claim.