Opinion ID: 1449797
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the trial court committed instructional error in responding to the jury's inquiry

Text: The issue presented in defendant's case, unlike that posed in Dellinger, supra, 49 Cal.3d 1212, does not turn on that portion of the implied-malice definition relevant to defendant's state of mind. Rather, the present controversy relates to the nature of the act (as the term is used in CALJIC No. 8.31) that can give rise to a conviction on a theory of implied malice. As noted above, the jury in the present case asked the trial court to define the term intentional act as used in CALJIC No. 8.31. (2)(See fn. 9.) The court responded by informing the jury that the pulling of a handgun in the manner described and/or the shooting of the handgun in the manner described are possible acts for your consideration.... [9] The People contend the trial court properly instructed the jury, and assert that brandishing a loaded firearm in a threatening manner, when viewed in context, may constitute a sufficiently dangerous act to support a finding that defendant acted with implied malice. In reply, defendant contends that the trial court's response permitted the jury to imply malice from defendant's act of pulling a handgun, an offense punishable as a misdemeanor under section 417, subdivision (a)(2). (See fn. 8, ante. ) Defendant's contention rests on parallel assertions: (1) because the act of brandishing a firearm is not inherently dangerous, it was insufficient to support a finding that defendant acted with implied malice; and (2) because (as noted by the Court of Appeal majority) the killing was involuntary and occurred in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony (i.e., while defendant brandished a firearm), the death that resulted from defendant's act involved, at most, a manslaughter pursuant to section 192, subdivision (b), and not a murder. Defendant also contends, in an argument unrelated to the propriety of the trial court's response to the jury's inquiry, that CALJIC No. 8.31 misstates the law. We agree with the People that the trial court properly instructed the jury and, for the reasons set forth below, conclude that defendant's assertions are without merit.
(3a) Defendant contends his act of brandishing a firearm cannot supply the implied malice necessary to support a murder conviction. In advancing this argument, defendant seeks to focus attention on the nature of the underlying act in the abstract, rather than on defendant's specific course of conduct in the present case. As we shall explain, however, defendant's argument is based upon a distinct body of law that interprets the felony-murder rule and is thus inapplicable in the present context. (4) Where the felony-murder rule is applicable, a court looks to the underlying felony in the abstract in order to determine whether the underlying felony was so inherently dangerous that malice can be ascribed to the defendant without reference to the particular facts of the case. (See, e.g., People v. Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615, 622-626 [262 Cal. Rptr. 195, 778 P.2d 549] [furnishing cocaine]; People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 829-833 [201 Cal. Rptr. 319, 678 P.2d 894] [practice of medicine without a license]; People v. Henderson (1977) 19 Cal.3d 86, 93-96 [137 Cal. Rptr. 1, 560 P.2d 1180] [aggravated false imprisonment]; People v. Phillips, supra, 64 Cal.2d at pp. 582-585 [chiropractor's misrepresentations]; People v. Williams (1965) 63 Cal.2d 452, 458 [47 Cal. Rptr. 7, 406 P.2d 647] [conspiracy to possess Methedrine].) `The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally, by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit' during the course of enumerated felonies. ( People v. Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 185; People v. Washington, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 781.) For certain felonies deemed inherently dangerous to human life, the rule operates to render irrelevant any evidence of actual malice or of the lack thereof. ( People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 43 [98 Cal. Rptr. 33, 489 P.2d 1361, 50 A.L.R.3d 383]; People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 475 [194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697].) (5) In contrast, a murder committed with implied malice requires that the prosecution demonstrate the defendant in fact acted with malice. (See People v. Protopappas, supra, 201 Cal. App.3d at pp. 162-164.) The concept of implied malice has both a physical and a mental component. ( People v. Patterson, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 626.) The physical component is satisfied by the performance of `an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life.' ( Ibid., quoting People v. Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 300.) The mental component, as set forth earlier, involves an act `deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life....' ( People v. Dellinger, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 1218-1219.) Whether a defendant's underlying acts are inherently dangerous in the abstract is not dispositive in the jury's determination as to whether a defendant acted with malice. Thus, the analytical approach applicable to murder committed with implied malice differs significantly from that applicable to felony murder. (See People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 476-477; see also People v. Patterson, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 629 [Notions of implied malice have never before been imported into felony murder....] (conc. and dis. opn. of Lucas, C.J.).) Nevertheless, by arguing that misdemeanor brandishing of a firearm is not inherently dangerous, defendant attempts to borrow from the analysis applicable to felony murder in order to escape the applicability of the principles involved in the concept of implied malice. Defendant's contention lacks support. Numerous cases have held that even where the felony-murder rule is inapplicable because the underlying felony is not inherently dangerous, the defendant still may be tried on a theory of implied malice. (See, e.g., People v. Satchell, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 43 [ex-felon's possession of concealed firearm]; People v. Lopez (1971) 6 Cal.3d 45, 53 [98 Cal. Rptr. 44, 489 P.2d 1372] [escape from county jail]; see also People v. Fuller (1978) 86 Cal. App.3d 618, 628-629 [150 Cal. Rptr. 515]) [upholding application of felony-murder rule in case involving high-speed automobile chase, and observing that defendants also could be prosecuted on a theory of implied malice]; 1 Witkin & Epstein, supra, Crimes Against the Person, § 494, pp. 558-559.) (3b) By asserting that the jury, in considering the matter of implied malice, should have limited its inquiry to the inherent dangerousness of the offense of brandishing a firearm, defendant seeks to diminish the significance of the circumstances surrounding his own conduct. The very nature of implied malice, however, invites consideration of the circumstances preceding the fatal act. (See People v. Goodman (1970) 8 Cal. App.3d 705, 708 [87 Cal. Rptr. 665] [conviction of murder with implied malice upheld where underlying intentional act was assault with a deadly weapon], disapproved on other grounds, People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 451-452 [99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1]; see also CALJIC No. 8.11.) The natural consequences ( People v. Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 300) of a person's act in brandishing a firearm necessarily relate to the context in which the act was committed: for example, the brandishing (and subsequent discharge) of a firearm during a heated dispute justifiably could lead a jury to reach a verdict different from one which might be reached in a case involving an accidental shooting during a friendly hunt for wild game. Thus, in determining in the case at bar whether defendant intentionally committed an act the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life ( ibid. ), the jury was entitled to consider all of the events leading up to the shooting  defendant's dispute with, and threats directed toward, the victim, as well as defendant's retrieval of a loaded handgun and extra ammunition, his prompt return to the scene of the argument, his initiation of the final confrontation, and his drawing of the loaded handgun with his finger on the trigger as the victim lunged toward him. (6)(See fn. 10.) For the foregoing reasons, we reject defendant's assertion that the trial court erred in not limiting the jury to consideration of the underlying offense in the abstract. [10]
(7a) Defendant contends the jury's finding that he acted with implied malice suggests that the shooting was accidental. Defendant further contends that an unlawful killing resulting from the accidental discharge of a firearm, even one brandished in violation of section 417, is, at most, manslaughter. In support of this argument, defendant relies on the provisions of section 192, subdivision (b), which define manslaughter to include an unlawful killing of a human being without malice [¶]... [¶] ... in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony.... (8) Defendant's argument rests on a misinterpretation of section 192, subdivision (b). The statute does not classify all killings resulting from the commission of a misdemeanor as manslaughter. Rather, the statute's threshold provision  ignored by defendant  is that only those unlawful killings committed without malice are defined as manslaughter. (§ 192.) It is well established that a defendant who commits an unlawful killing with malice, but whose underlying offense is classified as a misdemeanor, is not insulated by that classification from liability for murder. In People v. Hubbard (1923) 64 Cal. App. 27 [220 P. 315], the defendant's pistol discharged during a dispute in which he had attempted to eject the victim, an intruder, from his residence. The defendant in that case testified that he neither removed the safety device nor pulled the trigger, but instead had waved the pistol in an effort to bluff the intruder. He testified further that the weapon fired accidentally during the ensuing fracas. The appellate court reversed a judgment of second degree murder based on the trial court's failure to give a requested instruction regarding the defendant's right to use reasonable force to eject the intruder. The court observed, however, that even if the defendant's underlying act of waving the pistol were found to constitute a violation of the law (a misdemeanor), the unintentional killing still could be murder if the jury determined that the natural consequences of the unlawful act were dangerous to human life. ( Id. at pp. 37-38.) In such a situation, malice is implied. ( Id. at p. 38.) In People v. Curry (1961) 192 Cal. App.2d 664 [13 Cal. Rptr. 596], the defendant initially fired his rifle at a construction crew working in a nearby apartment building. The police were notified and, as they encircled the defendant's residence, he fired his rifle again, killing one of the officers. In affirming the defendant's conviction of second degree murder on an implied-malice theory, the appellate court rejected the defendant's challenge to the following jury instruction: `Murder may be committed without a specific intent to take human life. To be so committed, however, the defendant must intend to commit acts that are likely to cause death and that show a conscious disregard for human life. [¶] Thus if the natural consequences of an unlawful act be dangerous to human life, then an unintentional killing proximately caused by such act will be murder in the second degree, even though the unlawful act amounted to no more than a misdemeanor. In such case, the malice aforethought is implied from the wanton recklessness.' ( Id. at pp. 674-675.) The appellate court upheld the instruction as a correct statement of the law. ( Id. at p. 675.) More recently, in People v. Benson (1989) 210 Cal. App.3d 1223 [259 Cal. Rptr. 9], the defendant entered the bedroom of an acquaintance, brandishing a pistol and demanding that the acquaintance return defendant's makeup bag. An argument ensued, the gun fired, and the acquaintance died from the resulting gunshot wound. The defendant argued at trial that the gun fired accidentally when the victim's sister charged into the bedroom. In affirming defendant's conviction of second degree murder on a theory of implied malice, the appellate court determined that the defendant's conduct  entering an acquaintance's bedroom while brandishing a loaded handgun  supported the jury's finding of implied malice. ( Id. at pp. 1228-1231.) (9) Other authority also supports the People's contention that, where the defendant obtains a lethal weapon and then engages the victim in an argument, malice may be implied  from the circumstances leading to the killing  to support a conviction of second degree murder. (See, e.g., People v. Rosenkrantz (1988) 198 Cal. App.3d 1187 [244 Cal. Rptr. 403] [defendant, incensed that his younger brother and an acquaintance had discovered defendant's homosexuality, purchased a semiautomatic weapon, went to the acquaintance's residence armed with the weapon, engaged him in an argument, and then fatally shot him]; In re Russell H. (1987) 196 Cal. App.3d 916 [242 Cal. Rptr. 488] [minor's retrieval of a handgun for the purpose of coercing a drug seller to give him drugs, followed by an argument and discharge of the weapon, resulting in unintentional death of victim]; People v. Summers (1983) 147 Cal. App.3d 180 [195 Cal. Rptr. 21] [defendant's efforts in locating intended victim, making a special trip to arm himself with a concealed weapon, and then producing the weapon in a threatening fashion in victim's presence provided ample evidence of defendant's implied malice to support second degree murder conviction]; People v. Love (1980) 111 Cal. App.3d 98 [168 Cal. Rptr. 407] [following argument between defendant and victim over use of victim's vehicle, defendant placed gun near victim's head and, after victim continued to argue, pulled the trigger].) (7b) Thus, the classification of the underlying offense as a misdemeanor does not in itself preclude a resulting death from constituting murder. The circumstance that an act may be punishable as a misdemeanor does not render it incapable of being performed in a manner that, under the circumstances, is sufficiently dangerous to human life to support a jury's finding of implied malice. (10)(See fn. 11.) Even if the act results in a death that is accidental, as defendant contends was the case here, the circumstances surrounding the act may evince implied malice. (See People v. Hubbard, supra, 64 Cal. App. at p. 38; People v. Benson, supra, 210 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1228-1230; In re Russell H., supra, 196 Cal. App.3d at pp. 919-923; see also People v. Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 296-301.) [11]