Opinion ID: 1058243
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Instruction Regarding Permissible Inference of a Defendant's Intent to Cause the Natural Consequences of Their Acts

Text: The jury was instructed that: You may infer that every person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts. Thomas maintains that such an instruction is the functional equivalent of a directed verdict, and shifts the burden of proof regarding a defendant's criminal intent. We have previously addressed this question in Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 145, 547 S.E.2d 186, 198-99 (2001). In Schmitt, we approved a jury instruction stating that [i]t is permissible to infer that every person intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts and that such an inference did not establish an improper presumption but merely stated a permissive inference. Id. We further explained that [u]nlike conclusive or burden shifting presumptions regarding a defendant's criminal intent, which are constitutionally invalid, the present instruction did not require the jurors to draw any inference or alter the Commonwealth's burden of proving [the defendant's] criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 145, 547 S.E.2d at 199. Here, the concert of action instruction, Number 16, read: You may infer that every person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts. This jury instruction is almost identical to the jury instruction given in Schmitt. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting Instruction Number 16 on concert of action and permissible inferences.