Opinion ID: 1350553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: constitutional rights to discovery

Text: [3] Gonzalez also argues that he has a constitutional right to take the complaining witness's deposition. In some situations, a criminal defendant does have a constitutional right to discovery. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). Nevertheless, this right has limits. The Supreme Court has held that [a defendant] cannot establish a violation of his constitutional right to compulsory process merely by showing that [he was deprived of certain] testimony. He must at least make some plausible showing of how [the] testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense. (Italics ours.) United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, supra at 867. The Court reiterated this standard in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 94 L.Ed.2d 40, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1002 n. 15 (1987). This court has twice set out a similar standard, holding that `[t]he mere possibility that an item of undisclosed evidence might have helped the defense or might have affected the outcome of the trial ... does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense.' State v. Bebb, 108 Wn.2d 515, 523, 740 P.2d 829 (1987) (quoting State v. Mak, 105 Wn.2d 692, 704-05, 718 P.2d 407, cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 599 (1986)). In this case, Gonzalez has not made a plausible showing that the complaining witness's sexual history would be material to his defense. He has presented no indication that the current case even approaches the extraordinary case where such evidence would become material. Gonzalez also contends that he has a right under the state constitution to question the complaining witness about her sexual history. He bases this argument on the observation that the due process clause of our state constitution can be interpreted to provide greater rights than does the federal due process clause, even though they are similarly phrased, citing State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wn.2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984). It is true that Bartholomew holds that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment does not control our interpretation of the state constitution's due process clause. Bartholomew, at 639. However, the cases relied on in Bartholomew for this proposition more fully state that because of the identity in textual language, `the federal cases while not necessarily controlling should be given great weight in construing our own due process provision.' Olympic Forest Prods., Inc. v. Chaussee Corp., 82 Wn.2d 418, 422, 511 P.2d 1002 (1973) (quoting Petstel, Inc. v. County of King, 77 Wn.2d 144, 153, 459 P.2d 937 (1969)). In the context of the instant case, we see no reason to construe our state due process clause differently than that of the federal clause. Even if we were to hold that the state provision provided extra protection, we would not extend those protections to the facts of this case, in light of the speculative nature of the defendant's showing of materiality.