Opinion ID: 2638992
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Volunteers under the IIA

Text: We first consider the scope of coverage the IIA provides to certain volunteers and whether employers of such volunteers are entitled to statutory immunity under the IIA. The Town asserts that a liberal construction of the IIA requires the inclusion of all workers or employees unless expressly excluded and that giving injured volunteer fire fighters the benefit of the doubt, they should be classified as workers since the IIA does not expressly exclude them. [2] Pet. for Review at 11-12. Doty counters that, generally, volunteers are not ... considered to be covered employees with comprehensive coverage under the Act. Ans. to Pet. for Review at 10 (citing In re Wissink, 118 Wash.App. 870, 877, 81 P.3d 865 (2003)). The IIA provides statutory definitions for crucial terms, which are controlling in our analysis. See Cockle, 142 Wash.2d at 808, 16 P.3d 583. The IIA instructs that `[e]mployee' shall have the same meaning as `worker' when the context would so indicate, and shall include all officers of the state, state agencies, counties, municipal corporations, or other public corporations, or political subdivisions. RCW 51.08.185. It then goes on to define `[w]orker' as every person in this state who is engaged in the employment of an employer ... [and] every person in this state who is engaged in the employment of or who is working under an independent contract, the essence of which is his or her personal labor for an employer under this title.... RCW 51.08.180. As we have stated, the IIA provides [i]njured workers [with] a swift, no-fault compensation system and provides [ e ] mployers [with] immunity from civil suits by workers.  Birklid, 127 Wash.2d at 859, 904 P.2d 278 (emphasis added). For an injured person to fall within the statute's protection, they must in fact be a worker. In contrast to employees and/or workers, the IIA recognizes a class of persons who are separate and distinct from employees and/or workers  volunteers. While not addressed in depth in the IIA, one relevant section which provides a limited allowance for medical aid benefits for volunteers, instructs that, volunteers may be deemed employees and/or workers, as the case may be, for all purposes relating to medical aid benefits under chapter 51.36 RCW at the option of any city, county, town, special district, municipal corporation, or political subdivision of any type, or any private nonprofit charitable organization, when any such unit of local government or any such nonprofit organization has given notice of covering all of its volunteers to the director prior to the occurrence of the injury or contraction of an occupational disease. A volunteer shall mean a person who performs any assigned or authorized duties for any such unit of local government, or any such organization, except emergency services workers as described by chapter 38.52 RCW, or fire fighters covered by chapter 41.24 RCW, brought about by one's own free choice, receives no wages, and is registered and accepted as a volunteer by any such unit of local government, or any such organization which has given such notice, for the purpose of engaging in authorized volunteer services: PROVIDED, That such person shall be deemed to be a volunteer although he or she may be granted maintenance and reimbursement for actual expenses necessarily incurred in performing his or her assigned or authorized duties.... RCW 51.12.035(2). The IIA allowance that volunteers may be deemed employees and/or workers (RCW 51.12.035 (emphasis added)), for purposes relating to medical aid benefits under chapter 51.36 RCW, strongly implicates that outside section .035, volunteers are not employees and/or workers under the IIA. Id. The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (BIIA) has previously addressed the issue of whether a volunteer is covered under the IIA. See In re Ronald D. Meyer, No. 42,576, 1975 WA Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 4 (Bd. Indus. Ins. Appeals Oct. 10, 1975). In Meyer, the BIIA addressed whether the IIA covered a police informant who was injured while assisting the Seattle Police Department. Id. The City of Seattle, pursuant to city ordinance, paid the informant's related medical and hospital expenses, and further the Seattle Police Department provided the informant with cash to cover expenditures related to his informant efforts. Id. In spite of the payment of medical expenses and various monies advanced to the informant, the BIIA found that the informant was a volunteer and not an employee of the City of Seattle, and as such, the IIA did not cover his injuries. Id. Significantly, the BIIA squarely rejected the argument posited by the Town here: [O]ne further legal argument is advanced by claimant which we believe is clearly not well taken. This is the argument that all volunteers are covered by the Act and that the only volunteers who are partially excluded from coverage are those who are volunteers for state agencies who, by virtue of RCW 51.12.035, are entitled only to the medical aid benefits under the Act. We cannot agree with this argument, because the premise on which it is based, namely, that volunteers or gratuitous workers are the same as employees for mandatory coverage purposes, is wrong. For the reasons we have heretofore discussed, volunteers are not employees inasmuch as the very basis of the employee-employer relationship is the performance of service in return for some kind of remuneration therefor, whereas volunteers by definition are rendering service for which remuneration is not received or expected to be received. It was in recognition of the obvious fact that no volunteers are covered by the normal employment criterion, that the Legislature in 1971 (Chapter 20, Laws of 1971) decided to pass the special statute, now codified as RCW 51.12.035, providing that volunteers for state agencies only should be deemed to be employees or workmen, for the limited purpose of medical aid benefits under the Act. It was necessary that they be deemed employees, since otherwise under normal legal principles they do not have employee status. Id. Thus, the BIIA has taken the position that but for RCW 51.12.035, volunteers or gratuitous workers are not otherwise covered by the IIA. While the Board's interpretation of the Act is not binding upon this court, it is entitled to great deference. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Tri, 117 Wash.2d 128, 138, 814 P.2d 629 (1991). Here, the BIIA's interpretation of the IIA, with respect to volunteers and the effect of RCW 51.12.035, is a sound reading that gives effect to the plain language of the section in the context of the IIA. Division Three has also addressed the issue of volunteers under the IIA. In re Wissink, 118 Wash.App. 870, 81 P.3d 865. In Wissink, a prison inmate was injured while volunteering as an inmate worker in Stevens County jail. Id. at 872, 81 P.3d 865. The Department of Labor and Industries (L & I) rejected the county's claim for reimbursement of medical expenses and the BIIA affirmed that rejection. Id. at 872-73, 81 P.3d 865. The question on appeal was whether the inmate qualified for IIA medical benefits under RCW 51.12.035(2). Id. at 873, 81 P.3d 865. The Court of Appeals concluded that the clear terms of RCW 51.12.035(2) provide that a volunteer entitled to medical aid benefits is a person who (1) performs assigned or authorized duties for the local government or nonprofit organization (2) by his or her own free choice (3) without pay and (4) is registered as a volunteer. Wissink, 118 Wash.App. at 875, 81 P.3d 865. Finding that the inmate performed duties for the county jail, by his own free choice, and without pay, the Court of Appeals held that the inmate was a volunteer. Id. at 877, 81 P.3d 865. The Wissink case reflects the IIA's codification of a distinction, in Washington, between employees and/or workers and volunteers. Compare RCW 51.08.180.195 with RCW 51.12.035, .140, .170. While the parties do not dispute that volunteer fire fighters, as separately covered under the VFFA, are specifically excepted from RCW 51.12.035(2)'s provisio for limited medical benefits for volunteers, the Wissink case nevertheless reinforces that generally, volunteers are not provided comprehensive coverage under the IIA. A person who performs duties by his or her own free choice and without pay is not an employee and/or worker under the IIA and thus coverage does not attach. In sum, while the IIA includes within its broad scope all employments within the legislative jurisdiction of the state, it does not purport to cover volunteers. RCW 51.12.010. Cf. RCW 51.12.035 (permitting volunteers to be deemed employees and/or workers for limited medical aid benefits); WAC 296-17-930 (same). The very existence of RCW 51.12.035 presupposes the notion that absent such a provision, volunteers would be entitled to no IIA benefits. As the IIA reads, volunteers may be brought under the IIA only for all purposes relating to medical aid benefits under chapter 51.36 RCW. RCW 51.12.035(2). This provision is unambiguous and limited on its face. First, absent this provision, volunteers are not entitled to any IIA benefits. Second, if a volunteer does qualify under RCW 51.12.035, it only provides eligibility for medical aid benefits. Coverage is not comprehensive, and immunity from liability does not attach. As such, we hold, based on the plain language of the applicable statutes, that, generally, the IIA does not provide coverage to volunteers, and the employers of such volunteers are not entitled to immunity from civil suit.