Opinion ID: 1721671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the statistical aberration which resulted in nine members of the venire who had had a close relative murdered require ameliorative action by the trial court?

Text: Under Shell's first assigned error, he claims a statistical aberration [1] in the venire from which the jury was drawn prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Mhoon is factually distinguishable from the case at bar, and as a consequence, there is no merit to this assignment of error. Of the forty-two (42) members of the regular and special venire panels, nine (9) of them had relatives who had been murdered. These relatives included brothers, brothers-in-law, first cousins, fathers-in-law, grandparents and uncles. The State argues on appeal that Shell is barred from assigning this as error because defense counsel failed to object to the composition of the venire and/or jury at trial. Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713, 718-19 (Miss. 1984). [2] Although not objected to at trial, this assigned error has no merit. Of the nine (9) members of the venire who had had relatives murdered, seven (7) of them did not serve on the jury at all. When voir dire was completed, the defense had two peremptory challenges that had not been used. Therefore, if the defense had objected to the two (2) remaining members of the venire who actually served on the jury and had relatives who had been murdered, none of the original nine would have served. The defense had sufficient peremptory challenges remaining to remove the jurors if they so desired. See Gilliard v. State, 428 So.2d 576, 580 (Miss. 1983); Rush v. State, 278 So.2d 456, 458 (Miss. 1973). Shell relies heavily on Mhoon, supra, to support his claim that the venire, and consequently the jury, were tainted by the presence of nine (9) venirepersons who had relatives that had been murdered. This Court disagrees, because the facts surrounding Mhoon are distinguishable from those in this case. In Mhoon, twelve (12) of the thirty-nine (39) venirepersons were either policemen or related by blood or marriage to a current or former police officer ... Id. at 80. Of this number, six (6) served on the jury, and the jury foreman was a policeman in uniform. Finally, defense counsel in Mhoon exhausted all of his peremptory challenges during jury selection. Id. This Court held that the statistical aberration, which produced such a venire/jury, mandated a reversal of Mhoon's conviction for a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 81-82. The Court was careful to point out, however, that the mere presence of law enforcement officials in a jury pool was not per se improper, provided the prospective juror was otherwise qualified and was not peremptorily struck by either party. Id. at 81. In the case sub judice, the trial court questioned each member of the venire about their ability to be impartial, and defense counsel asked each member of the venire if those relationships would prevent them from being fair and impartial toward the defendant, Robert Shell. Neither juror Sherrod, whose uncle had been killed, nor juror Goss, whose brother had been killed, indicated they would find it difficult to fulfill their obligations in a fair and impartial manner. Neither juror was peremptorily challenged or challenged for cause. Cases from other jurisdictions, both federal and state, have held that the presence on a jury of a crime victim, or the relative of a crime victim, is not per se improper. The fact that a juror or his relative has been the victim of some crime, unrelated to the offense being tried, is, we think, only minimally relevant to the question of that juror's impartiality. Indeed, if the mere fact that a juror or his relative had been the victim of some crime unrelated to that being tried constituted grounds for discharge, it would become difficult, if not impossible, to assemble a jury panel. U.S. v. Jones, 608 F.2d 1004, 1007 (4th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1086, 100 S.Ct. 1046, 62 L.Ed.2d 773 (1980). In Jones, supra, the Court summarized the issue thusly: We decline to establish a per se rule of disqualification where a juror is related to a victim of a similar crime. Id. at 1008. See also, Williams v. U.S., 521 A.2d 663, 665 (D.C.App. 1987); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 299 Pa.Super. 172, 445 A.2d 509, 514 (Pa.Super. 1982). After reviewing Mhoon and case law from various other jurisdictions, this Court concludes that there is no merit to this assignment of error.