Opinion ID: 615207
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Materials Prepared by a Paralegal

Text: Colón also asserts that the district court committed reversible error when it admitted pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 1006 statements, charts, and computerized reports that had been prepared by a paralegal belonging to the law firm representing the Municipality in this case. We review the court's admission of an exhibit, like summary charts, for abuse of discretion. United States v. DeSimone, 488 F.3d 561, 576 (1st Cir.2007). We find no error in the district court's admission of the summary graphs. Rule 1006 provides that [t]he contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation. Fed.R.Evid. 1006. The summary charts and graphs at issue consisted of a condensed presentation of Colón's extensive record of work attendance over her near two-decade period of employment. Thus, the charts served as an appropriate presentation of voluminous writings that cannot conveniently be examined in court, as required by Rule 1006. Further, the underlying materials on which the summary evidence was based were admissible in evidence pursuant to Fed. R.Evid. 803(6), as they consisted of attendance records kept in the course of the Municipality's regularly conducted business, according to a regular procedure, and for a routine business purpose. See United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 42 n. 37 (1st Cir.2001) (noting that for summary evidence to be admissible, the materials on which it is based also must be admissible in evidence); see also United States v. Loney, 959 F.2d 1332, 1341 (5th Cir.1992). Colón has two main arguments as to why the district court should not have considered the summary charts: (1) the summary graphs were never produced to Colón during the discovery process; and (2) an appropriate foundation to the charts was not properly laid because the individual who prepared the charts (i) was never announced as a witness in the case, (ii) prepared the charts in anticipation of litigation, and (iii) was a paralegal who lacked the requisite expertise to testify in support of their admission. Colón's arguments are non-starters. [13] Regarding Colón's first argument, Rule 1006 provides that only the underlying documents, not the summaries themselves, must be produced to the opposing party. See Fed.R.Evid. 1006 (The originals [of the contents of the writings], or duplicates, shall be made available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at reasonable time and place.). The circuits recognize this well-settled principle. Air Safety, Inc. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, 94 F.3d 1, 7 & n. 14 (1st Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 736 (4th Cir.1991) (The language of [Rule 1006] . . . simply requires that the [original voluminous] material be made available to the other party.); Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 550 (7th Cir.1985) (Rule 1006 requires that only the underlying documents, and not the summaries, must be made available to the opposing party). Thus, Colón's first argument as to the summary charts is incorrect: the Municipality had no obligation to provide the charts to Colón. Turning to Colón's multi-faceted second argument, we first note that the paralegal who prepared the charts was announced to Colón. The same day on which the Municipality submitted its exhibits in support of its summary judgment motion, September 1, 2009, it also submitted the name and position of the paralegal who prepared the summary charts. Thus, Colón had ample notice of the paralegal's identity and position, her role in relation to the chart preparation, and the likelihood that she could serve as a witness at trial. See United States v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1247 (10th Cir.2002) (finding that testimony from witness who summarized business records was not a surprise to defendants who had been notified of the witnesses and the substance of their testimony during the pretrial phase). Second, the district court specifically acknowledged that the summary charts were prepared in anticipation of litigation, and factored this into its consideration, stating: The Court understands that the summary materials were prepared by the Municipality's counsel for trial purposes and will consider the credibility and weight of the prepared attendance charts and graphs with due knowledge of that and of the fact that the paralegal worked only with the documents available to her. For that reason, the Court views the percentages of attendance as approximations. Colon-Fontanez, 671 F.Supp.2d at 312 n. 15 (emphasis added); Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 575 F.2d 564, 575-76 (5th Cir.1978) (court rejected defendant's objection to summary exhibits on grounds that they had been prepared in anticipation of litigation because summary was offered under and complied with Fed. R.Evid. 1006 and underlying records were made available to opposing counsel). Third, for summary evidence to be admitted into court, there must be, like all evidence, a proper foundation laid for its admission. In the context of a summary exhibit, the proponent of the exhibit should present the testimony of the witness who supervised its preparation. United States v. Bray, 139 F.3d 1104, 1110 (6th Cir.1998). Here, the Municipality offered the testimony of the paralegal who prepared the exhibits summarizing Colón's attendance record. The fact that the paralegal could testify as to her method of preparing and summarizing the exhibits does not an instant expert of her make. See United States v. Milkiewicz, 470 F.3d 390, 401 (1st Cir.2006) (finding no merit to appellant's argument that witness who prepared summary exhibits lacked the expertise to summarize the financial information represented in the charts, and noting that creating summaries of the data took patience but not expertise  (emphasis added)); see also S.E.C. v. Franklin, 265 Fed. Appx. 644, 646 (9th Cir.2008) (finding no error in allowing the preparer of the [summary exhibits] to testify because no expert opinions or conclusions were offered) (citation omitted); Caballero, 277 F.3d at 1247 (noting that witnesses who summarized business records and client lists and presented them in condensed form . . . expressed neither a lay nor an expert opinion). Moreover, the fact that she was a paralegal employed by defendants' counsel, and not by the Municipality itself, does not, in this case, affect the admissibility of the charts. See Coates, 756 F.2d at 550 (finding that court properly admitted summary evidence prepared by a paralegal employed by defendants' counsel because underlying records consisted of memoranda memorializing employee performance prepared in the regular course of defendant's business and were prepared in a trustworthy manner). Further, Colón's argument that the paralegal was not qualified to review and analyze Colón's attendance records holds little force. As the district court noted, [t]he sworn statement of the paralegal who prepared the summary charts and graphs goes into great detail about the documents relied upon and methodology used to develop the materials submitted to the Court. Colon-Fontanez, 671 F.Supp.2d at 312 n. 15. Colón offers no argument or explanation as to what qualifications or expertise should have been required of the preparer of her attendance record charts, nor does she ever contest the content of the summary charts. We thus fail to see how the district court's admission of the paralegal's summary charts constituted an abuse of discretion warranting reversal. See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, LLC, 284 F.3d 47, 67 (1st Cir.2002) (noting that [i]t is hard to imagine an issue on which a trial judge enjoys more discretion than as to whether summary exhibits will be helpful). In sum, we find no error in how the district court handled the summary exhibits.