Opinion ID: 1281029
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: apparent inconsistencies

Text: The State urges that to the extent that Skalberg requires a weighing of competing inferences deducible from circumstantial evidence, this court is usurping the jury's role as fact finder. The State argues that when there is conflicting evidence presented by multiple witnesses, the jury's resolution of an issue turns upon a credibility determination. Likewise, the State argues that when evidence is conflicting and competing inferences are deducible, an appellate court must make a credibility determination in order to assign a relative weight to each of the competing inferences as Skalberg requires. This court has consistently and repeatedly held for over 100 years that on review of a criminal conviction, an appellate court will not pass on the credibility of witnesses. In reviewing a criminal conviction, an appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. Such matters are for the finder of fact, and a conviction will be affirmed, in the absence of prejudicial error, if the properly admitted evidence, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the conviction. (Emphasis supplied.) State v. One 1985 Mercedes 190D Automobile, 247 Neb. 335, 337, 526 N.W.2d 657, 660 (1995). See, also, Murphy v. State, 15 Neb. 383, 19 N.W. 489 (1884) (no standard by which to weigh or measure the testimony of witnesses can be established by the court). If Skalberg were read to require an appellate court to assign a relative weight to inferences deducible from circumstantial evidence (the inference of guilt being stronger, equal to, or weaker than an inference of nonguilt) and require a credibility determination when the testimony of various witnesses conflicts, it would be inconsistent with our longstanding rule against making credibility determinations. See, State v. One 1985 Mercedes 190D Automobile, supra ; Murphy v. State, supra . Additionally, if Skalberg were read to permit a directed verdict of acquittal when circumstantial evidence is reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, one of guilt and the other of nonguilt, it would be contrary to our decisions which hold that a directed verdict is proper only where reasonable minds cannot differ and can draw but one conclusion from the evidence, where an issue should be decided as a matter of law. (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Hirsch, 245 Neb. 31, 45, 511 N.W.2d 69, 79 (1994). Likewise, this court has stated,  It is neither for the trial court nor for this court on appeal to draw conclusions of fact when two reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence.  (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Rowe, 210 Neb. 419, 426, 315 N.W.2d 250, 256 (1982). Finally, as previously noted in State v. Covarrubias, 244 Neb. 366, 507 N.W.2d 248 (1993), the rule requiring that reasonable inferences be taken most favorably to the accused when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence appears inconsistent with the rule in numerous other cases that an appellate court take the view of circumstantial evidence most favorable to the State.