Opinion ID: 2511832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Even if error occurred, it was harmless

Text: ¶ 62 But even assuming there was error, it was not reversible error. Initially, as mentioned, the majority's approach to the harmless error issue is confusing. The majority first observes that decisions on discovery are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. Majority at 174-75. Then the majority decides, erroneously, that the trial courts issuing the discovery and protective orders and denying reconsideration of those orders abused their discretion by applying CrR 4.7(e). Id. at 175. Then the majority states that error in a trial is not grounds for reversal unless the defendant was prejudiced, and this standard generally applies to questions of court rule violations, which usually are not considered constitutional error. Id. at 175. Then the majority says that Grenning did not receive adequate representation of counsel, which is of constitutional magnitude. Id. at 175. ¶ 63 But then the majority says that the constitutional harmless error standard should not apply because it would often result in vacation of convictions where no actual prejudice occurred. Id. at 176. Then the majority applies the constitutional harmless error standard anyway, deciding that the proper test is whether there is `overwhelming untainted evidence' that necessarily leads to guilt. Id. (citing State v. Flores, 164 Wash.2d 1, 186 P.3d 1038 (2008)); see State v. Guloy, 104 Wash.2d 412, 425-26, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985) (adopting overwhelming untainted evidence test for constitutional error). ¶ 64 I believe that the majority is correct in concluding that the constitutional harmless error test does not apply. Accordingly, I would not apply the overwhelming untainted evidence test. Further, I would not apply the constitutional harmless error standard that applies in the case of due process violations resulting from the government's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. As the State points out, due process requires the State to disclose evidence that is both favorable to the accused and `material to either guilt or punishment.' United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)). ¶ 65 There was no such due process violation in this case. If the defendant, using reasonable diligence, could have obtained the information, there is no Brady violation. In re Pers. Restraint of Benn, 134 Wash.2d 868, 916, 952 P.2d 116 (1998). Because Grenning had a retained expert and the expert never said he could not conduct a forensic evaluation at the State facility, using reasonable diligence Grenning could have obtained the evidence via the copied hard drives. ¶ 66 Further, the evidence must be material, which means that if the evidence had been disclosed, there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Benn, 134 Wash.2d at 916, 952 P.2d 116. Since Grenning never availed himself of the opportunity to examine mirrored copies of the hard drives, there is no basis for concluding that the evidence was material, i.e., that the failure to disclose the evidence undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. Also, the trial judge denying Grenning's motion for reconsideration of the discovery and protective orders told the defense to inform the court if the protective order was unworkable. The defense never advised the court that it was unworkable. In State v. Dictado, 102 Wash.2d 277, 298-99, 687 P.2d 172 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Harris, 106 Wash.2d 784, 725 P.2d 975 (1986), the court rejected the defendant's claim that he was constitutionally entitled to police rough notes because the trial judge had directed defense counsel to discuss with the prosecution the matters involved and if not satisfied to further inform the court. Because [n]o additional requests for information were made, this court determined that the [d]efendant has not shown that constitutionally material information remained undisclosed. Id. at 299, 687 P.2d 172. ¶ 67 Nor do I believe that Boyd 's discussion of the right to effective representation requires any heightened standard of review because the defendant here was in fact provided the opportunity to access mirror copies of the hard drives and therefore cannot legitimately complain about inadequate representation. ¶ 68 The appropriate standard for the assumed error in this case, a violation of CrR 4.7(a)(1)(v), is whether the defendant suffered prejudice, which is the standard that applies to a rule violation, as the majority says. Majority, at 175. The question is whether the outcome of the trial would have been materially affected if the error had not occurred. ¶ 69 Mr. Grenning does not claim he was prejudiced, and he makes no attempt to show that in the absence of error the outcome of the trial would have been different. He instead contends that reversal is automatically required. I agree with the majority that his requested remedy is improper. Having failed to even allege prejudice, Greening clearly has not shown prejudice and he is not entitled to reversal of his convictions on 20 counts of possession of depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.