Opinion ID: 1795815
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: residential property owners

Text: [4] Whether a legal duty exists for actionable negligence is a question of law dependent on the facts in a particular case. [28] The district court held that Kramer had no duty to maintain the meter pit because it was situated on a utility easement belonging to a public utility and because it was not located on Kramer's property. Although it found that the pit was situated on Kleinjan's property, the district court held that Kleinjan had no duty to maintain it because she had no right or authority to exercise control over the manhole cover. The district court relied upon this court's decision in Harms v. City of Beatrice [29] in concluding that neither property owner owed a duty. In that case, a pedestrian was injured when she fell through the defective cover on a meter box located on a service line which connected the city's water system with private property. The meter box was between the sidewalk and the lot line, a part of the area occupied as a street, [30] but there is no indication as to whether it was situated in a utility easement. The meter box, including its ring and cover, was purchased by the city and furnished to the property owner at cost. The sole issue presented in Harms was whether the city had a duty to keep the meter box in repair, given the fact that the property owner was required to pay the cost of materials and installation. This court held that the city could not delegate the duty it owes the public to maintain the water-works system in a safe condition [31] and therefore concluded that the petition stated a cause of action against the city. The case did not address the question of whether the property owner served by the meter box would also have a duty to keep the meter box in good repair. Subsequently, in Crosswhite v. City of Lincoln, [32] we considered the question of whether a city and property owner could be jointly liable for an injury caused by public utility equipment. In that case, a pedestrian tripped on a stop box which protruded above the concrete surface of a public sidewalk. [33] The stop box was part of a municipal water system. Ordinances required the property owner to install the stop box and keep it in good repair at the property owner's expense. Other city ordinances required that sidewalks be kept free of obstructions. Relying on Harms, this court held that the city could not delegate the duty it owed to the public to keep its water system in good repair. But because the stop box and the water system of which it was a part benefited the property owner and the stop box's placement within a public sidewalk served a use independent of and apart from the ordinary and customary use for which sidewalks are designed, [34] this court concluded that both the city and the property owner owed an independent duty to the traveling public to maintain the stop box in a reasonably safe condition. [35] We held that where persons are injured by a dangerous sidewalk condition created and maintained subject to the joint control of the city and an abutting landowner, and where the condition is maintained for the benefit of a proprietary business operated by the city, and is also for the benefit of the property of the abutting landowner, the city and the abutting landowner are joint or concurrent tort-feasors and each is directly liable for his own wrong. [36] Neither Harms nor Crosswhite addresses the question of whether a utility customer may be liable to an employee of the utility for injury caused by a component of the utility which is situated on the private property of the consumer. A more pertinent case is Fitzpatrick v. U S West, Inc., [37] in which an employee of an electrical utility was injured by an explosion in an underground vault where she was working. The vault was situated on private property, but the owner of the property had given the utility an easement to build, maintain, and repair the vault. All of the equipment located within the vault was owned by the utility. The injured utility employee brought an action against the property owner, alleging negligence and strict liability. Focusing on the question of control, we held that the property owner owed no duty to the utility company employee because it had no right or opportunity to control the employee's work activities within the vault. Kleinjan and Kramer argue that Fitzpatrick supports the district court's determination that they owed no duty to maintain the meter pit because it was situated in a utility easement. However, our review of the record discloses no utility easement granted to the City or Hastings Utilities. In support of Kleinjan's motion for summary judgment, her attorney offered an exhibit identified as the operative deed by which Kleinjan obtained title to her property and two other exhibits which were identified as copies of deeds . . . which established the easement in question. The latter two exhibits are 1919 deeds from J.O. Rohrer to George B. Blackstone and Floyde H. Eldredge which purport to convey the property now owned by Kleinjan and adjacent property located immediately to the north, subject to a common driveway easement. The Eldredge deed recites, Common and perpetual rights and privileges also granted and reserved hereby to and for the use of the water and sewer service to the main, and the Blackstone deed refers to the common sewer and water privileges referred to in the Eldredge deed. While these documents reflect rights shared by adjoining landowners, neither conveys an easement to the City or any municipal utility. From this record, we cannot determine whether or not the meter pit was situated on a utility easement belonging to a public utility. In its discussion of such easement, the district court noted that by ordinance, the duty to maintain watermeters is the obligation of the City. But we note that a city ordinance also provides that meter pits are to be kept in good repair and free of water, oil, grease and trash at the consumer's own cost and expense. [38] Hofferber's injury was caused not by the meters, but, rather, by the cover on the pit which contained the meters. [5] We conclude that the existence of a duty on the part of Kleinjan and Kramer depends upon their knowledge and control with respect to the apparently defective manhole cover which caused Hofferber's injury. As one commentator notes, the person in possession of property ordinarily is in the best position to discover and control its dangers, and often is responsible for creating them in the first place. [39] And we have recognized the general rule that [o]rdinarily a person who is not the owner and is not in control of property is not liable for negligence with respect to such property. [40] The record includes evidence that the meter pit was not located on Kramer's property and that for at least 15 years prior to Hofferber's accident, she did not exercise any form of control over the meter pit or its cover. Based upon these uncontroverted facts, we conclude that Kramer owed no duty to Hofferber and that the district court did not err in entering summary judgment in her favor. [6,7] It is likewise uncontroverted that the meter pit was situated on, and the accident occurred on, property owned by Kleinjan. A possessor of land is subject to liability for injury caused to a lawful visitor by a condition on the land if (1) the possessor defendant either created the condition, knew of the condition, or by the exercise of reasonable care would have discovered the condition; (2) the defendant should have realized the condition involved an unreasonable risk of harm to the lawful visitor; (3) the defendant should have expected that a lawful visitor such as the plaintiff either (a) would not discover or realize the danger or (b) would fail to protect himself or herself against the danger; (4) the defendant failed to use reasonable care to protect the lawful visitor against the danger; and (5) the condition was a proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff. [41] The party moving for summary judgment has the burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and must produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [42] Giving Hofferber the benefit of all favorable inferences as our standard of review requires, we conclude that Kleinjan did not make a prima facie showing sufficient to negate her potential liability for injury caused by a dangerous condition on her property so as to entitle her to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in sustaining her motion for summary judgment, and we reverse, and remand for further proceedings as to this claim.