Opinion ID: 677459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testimony Regarding 1980 Scam

Text: 13 Prior to trial and in accordance with Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), the government submitted written notice of its intent to introduce evidence of Mr. Flanagan's involvement in 1980 in a scam similar to the Fidelity conspiracy. (R.Vol. I Doc. 26.) Mr. Flanagan filed a Motion in Limine seeking to exclude such evidence. The district court denied Mr. Flanagan's Motion in Limine except to the extent that the evidence might be in the form of hearsay. (R.Vol. I Doc. 69 at 3-7.) In so ruling, the court made clear that the evidence was admissible solely for the purposes of showing motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, rather than for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith. Id. at 4 (quoting R. 404(b)). 14 At trial, government witness Kenneth Childress testified on cross-examination as follows: 15 Q [by Mr. Flanagan's counsel]: Now, I want to ask you a question I alluded to in the past. Would you say that Tom Flanagan is a salesman's salesman? 16 A: Yes, sir. 17 Q: Now why? 18 A: He has been very successful over the years in selling. 19 Q: Made a lot of money at it? 20 A: Yes, sir. 21 Q: Feast and famine, is that the kind of deal it is? 22 A: Always in sales, yes, sir. 23 Q: Travels all over the country? 24 A: Yes, sir. 25 (R.Vol. VI at 580-81.) After this testimony, the government asked to approach the bench, at which point the government argued that through his question about Mr. Flanagan being a salesman's salesman, Mr. Flanagan's counsel had put Mr. Flanagan's character at issue and had thus opened the door to impeachment on that issue by introduction of testimony regarding Mr. Flanagan's involvement in the 1980 scam. Mr. Flanagan's counsel vehemently objected, arguing that the question only referred to the fact that Mr. Flanagan had been in sales for much of his life, and was a good salesman. (R.Vol. VI at 581-84.) The judge concluded that [f]or the fact of his being a salesman have [sic] any relevance whatsoever, it implies to the jury that he is an honest man and I believe that the door has been opened and I will allow the 404(b) evidence. (R.Vol. VI at 582.) After a recess during which the judge further researched the issue, this ruling was reaffirmed. Id. at 588-89. The subsequent testimony was as follows: 26 Q [by the prosecution]: Have you heard that defendant--or do you know that defendant Flanagan was involved with defendant Krueger in the Southern Medical Supply medical supply distributorship scam which occurred in Mobile, Alabama, in 1980? 27 A: No, sir, I don't recall any Southern Medical. That's the first I ever heard of that was when the FBI asked me about it. 28 Q: Do you know or have you heard that as a result of his involvement with Krueger in the Southern Medical Supply scam in Mobile, Alabama in 1980 that defendant Thomas Alfred Flanagan was convicted on 12 felony counts in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi on the offenses of mail and wire fraud and conspiracy? Did you know that or have you heard that? 29 MR. POINTER [Defendant's counsel]: To which I would object, Your Honor, as hearsay. 30 THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer. 31 A: I was under the impression Mr. Flanagan had went to jail at one time years ago for mail fraud, yes, sir. 32 (R.Vol. VI at 592-93.)Mr. Flanagan argues on appeal that the salesman's salesman testimony did not open the door to examination on his character, and that the district court accordingly erred in allowing the government to introduce the evidence of Mr. Flanagan's involvement in the 1980 scam. We agree that, taken in context, the salesman's salesman testimony did not constitute a reference to Mr. Flanagan's good character so as to put his character in issue. The statement has no connotations with respect to Mr. Flanagan's truthfulness. Rather, as reflected in the witness's explanation of his answer, the term salesman's salesman referred only to Mr. Flanagan's success in his occupation. Id. at 581; see also id. at 592-93. While the court may have been correct that Mr. Flanagan's success as a salesman was not relevant, there was no objection based on relevancy, and the possible irrelevance of the testimony does not transform the nature of the testimony into character evidence. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in permitting the government to introduce evidence of Mr. Flanagan's involvement in the 1980 scam to impeach Mr. Flanagan's character. 33 Having concluded that the district court erred in admitting the testimony about Mr. Flanagan's involvement in the 1980 scam, we now turn to the question whether that error was harmless. In conducting a harmless error review, we review the record de novo. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1469 (10th Cir.1992). Where an error is harmless, reversal is not mandated. As the error in admitting the evidence of Mr. Flanagan's involvement in the 1980 scam was not of constitutional dimensions, the error is deemed harmless unless it had a 'substantial influence' on the outcome or leaves one in 'grave doubt' as to whether it had such effect. United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). In making this determination, the government has the burden of proving that the non-constitutional error was harmless. Id. at 1469 n. 4. 34 Mr. Flanagan's prior involvement in a medical supply company scam similar to the Fidelity scam was referenced several times during the trial. For example, during the direct examination of codefendant Krueger, Mr. Krueger testified that he had cooperated with the FBI in its investigation of Mr. Flanagan's activities in the Southern Medical Supply scam. (R.Vol. VIII at 1157.) Similarly, Mr. Krueger testified during the government's cross-examination that Mr. Flanagan was one of his partners in the Southern Medical scam. Id. at 1182-83. In response to an objection by Mr. Flanagan's counsel to the testimony by Mr. Krueger, the district court ruled that the testimony by Mr. Krueger was more probative than prejudicial (a conclusion not contested on appeal) and would be admitted, subject to a limiting instruction that the evidence could not be used as evidence of Mr. Flanagan's guilt in the Fidelity scam but only to prove lack of mistake, plan, preparation, or motive, in accordance with Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). That instruction was given to the jury twice during the government's cross-examination of Mr. Krueger. Id. at 1183 and 1194. Thus, the only evidence that was erroneously admitted as a result of the Childress testimony was that Mr. Flanagan was actually convicted for his involvement in the 1980 scam; the evidence of his extensive involvement in the scam was properly admitted at other times during the trial. 35 Notwithstanding the fact that [e]xcept possibly for minor, technical errors for which there is no reasonable possibility that the verdict could have been affected, the government ordinarily has the burden of proving that a non-constitutional error was harmless, Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1469 n. 4, we note that the government has presented no arguments in its brief as to why the admission of the testimony--assuming we were to conclude it was erroneous, as we have--would be harmless. Nevertheless, we must perform our harmless error analysis by judging the evidence in the context of all of the evidence presented at trial. In light of our review of the record demonstrating that the evidence of Mr. Flanagan's involvement in the 1980 scam was properly admitted elsewhere in the record, we do not believe that Mr. Childress's testimony had a substantial influence on the outcome; nor are we left in grave doubt as to whether it had such an effect. We therefore conclude that the erroneous admission of Mr. Childress's testimony was harmless error. 3 36 AFFIRMED. 37 Before KELLY and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and BRIMMER, District Judge. ORDER ON REHEARING Nov. 21, 1994 38