Opinion ID: 2344370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Objections to the State's Opening Statement.

Text: In the course of his opening statement to the death penalty jury, the prosecutor stated that [t]he State does not seek the death penalty on a routine basis. It is not something that we do lightly. The State seeks the death penalty when the State believes the facts call for it. Defendant claims that [t]his is a textbook example of prohibited vouching, in that it amounts to the prosecutor invoking the authority and presumably superior knowledge and experience of the State to provide the jury with reasons, above and beyond the evidence, to arrive at the verdict desired by the State: death. The State remarks that the contextual basis for defendant's objection is important because the statements were made on the heels of an extensive jury voir dire during which the death penalty phase jurors were subjected to a number of disturbing questions concerning the death penalty. Thus, the reason for that comment, the State asserts, was to explain the link between the lengthy and rigorous jury selection process to which each of those jurors had been subjected and the decision making task the selected jurors were being asked to perform. The State further notes that [t]he prosecutor did not lead the jury to believe that he had a personal or official belief that defendant deserved a sentence of death based on something beyond the evidence[,] and that he focused the jury's attention on the proofs to be adduced in the trial, saying that the jury was to determine the matter based upon what you hear in this courtroom. Finally, the State observes that the trial court denied defendant's motion for a mistrial based on the prosecution's opening statement, explaining that: With respect to a motion for mistrial, I would deny it at this point in time. I do feel that in light of what was said, either for purposes of clarity as to what is or is not an issue, for purposes of a curative instruction[ ], some curative instructions are necessary as a result of the opening. I would start with RPC 3.4 [7] and it [is] the Court's estimation that both counsel ran afoul of 3.4 in their openings stating their beliefs. I will probably give an instruction with respect to that . . . . I will before we proceed further deal with the 3.4 issue. The trial court then immediately instructed the jury as follows: If during the course of either opening any counsel referred to their personal opinion or personal belief, that is not a proper aspect of presentation and counsel's belief or counsel's opinion is not evidence and is indeed not proper argument either. So to the extent there was any such argument or presentation made, it should be disregarded by you and you should allow that to play no role in any determination which you make. Applying the test set forth above, we agree with the trial court's appraisal and handling of defendant's objection to the State's opening statement. Because they had the potential of injecting an element that was factually outside the jury's ken, the prosecutor's comments trod close to the prohibited expression of a personal opinion, raising matters irrelevant to the death penalty phase jury's task. However, although the State's comments may have stretched the bounds of relevance, the trial court promptly and effectively dealt with those comments via a curative instruction. Thus, when we consider the tenor of the trial and the responsiveness of counsel and the court to the improprieties when they occurred[,] State v. Papasavvas (I), supra, 163 N.J. at 625, 751 A. 2d 40 (quoting State v. Timmendequas (I), supra, 161 N.J. at 575, 737 A. 2d 55 (citation omitted)), we conclude that, even if the prosecutor's comments could be termed questionable, they were not sufficiently severe, and the potential prejudicial effect on defendant's right to a fair trial was so slight, the relief requested by defendant is unwarranted. We find no basis for reversal in respect of defendant's claim that the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for the State's request for the imposition of the death penalty in the course of its opening statement. That said, we again emphasize our long-standing rule that it is improper for the prosecutor to declare his individual or official opinion or belief of a defendant's guilt in such manner that the jury may understand the opinion or belief to be based upon something which he knows outside the evidence. State v. Thornton, 38 N.J. 380, 398, 185 A. 2d 9 (1962) (citation omitted). The rationale supporting that rule is straightforward: in the minds of jurors such statements may add the weight of the prosecutor's official and personal influence and knowledge to the probative force of the evidence adduced, and such added weight may creat[e] the possibility that the jurors consciously or unconsciously might adopt the prosecutor's view without applying their own independent judgment to the evidence. Ibid.
Defendant points to ten separate instances during the prosecution's opening statement that defendant claims constituted improper argument. Highlighting the specific language defendant claims is particularly improper, those are:  This aggravating factor recognizes the evil of killing a witness to a crime. A person, a criminal makes a decision that his freedom, his liberty is more important than the life of his victim or of a witness he is subject or eligible for the death penalty.  The Hazards aren't here to tell us how they were victimized, so the crime scene tells us how that occurred.  You're going to hear his trying to bring in Clemmons in [what] was the first of many, many lies he told through the course of this investigation. [8]  Stolen property was only found on [defendant]. The Hazards[']s blood, their DNA was found on his clothes. No other evidence suggests anybody else was involved in these crimes. This was an attempt by defendant to minimize his role, his responsibility for these crimes.  From [the fast-food restaurant] he goes to a store . . . and I'm not making this up, the reason he goes there is because he can't drive, doesn't like to drive without listening to music so he goes to the [store] to try to get some music.  In his first statement the only thing the defendant says he does is act as a lookout, pours some alcohol to help accelerate the fire. He never claims that he inflicted any injuries upon Mr. or Mrs. Hazard. This is his first self-serving statement.    [The police] are concerned about his self-serving statements because he tells the police how scared he was, but the next thing he is doing is going on a shopping spree, so the police want to talk to him some more.  The defendant has trouble keeping his lies straight about the involvement of Gary Clemmons.  The police then move on to speaking about what had occurred in relation to the crime, and the defendant, again, volunteers to write, and he draws some diagrams for the police. He draws diagrams of what happened in the house. He draws things about outside the house where he actually checks where he was standing three or four houses down, not really being the look out and being unfamiliar with the area he doesn't realize that there's no he is not being honest, but, again, they don't confront him in the interview, they just let him tell his story.  Now the policeconsidering this is a double murder and they want to find out everybody who is responsiblelook for Gary Clemmons. It's not like they just decided that they're not going to do anything, and within 20 seconds Gary Clemmons voluntarily walks into the Major Crimes Unit in Northfield and indicates that he was picking up his children in Atlantic City at 4:20 on the day of the crime. The police go down to Atlantic City and talk to two of the daycare workers, speak to them and they remember Mr. Clemmons, they remember him interacting well with his children, so they did investigate when he told them about Clemmons. According to defendant, those statements exceeded the proper scope of opening statements and, hence, require that defendant's death sentence be vacated. The trial court twice instructed the jury that the parties' opening statements were not evidence. The State explains that the majority of the comments objected to by defendant constituted representations of what the State intended to, and in fact did, prove at the penalty phase trial and that, in any event, none of the comments made by the prosecutor in his opening statement require reversal. The scope of the State's opening statement is limited to the facts he intends in good faith to prove by competent evidence. State v. Hipplewith, 33 N.J. 300, 309, 164 A. 2d 481 (1960) (citing State v. Haines, 103 N.J.L. 534, 138 A. 203 (Sup.Ct.1927)); State v. Ernst, 32 N.J. 567, 577, 161 A. 2d 511 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 943, 81 S.Ct. 464, 5 L.Ed. 2d 374 (1961) (holding that, in opening statements, [a] prosecutor should, as the trial court ruled, limit himself to a statement of what he will prove and not anticipate his final argument.); see also State v. Walden, 370 N.J.Super. 549, 558, 851 A. 2d 758 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 148, 862 A.2d 56 (2004) (`A prosecutor's opening statement should provide an outline or roadmap of the State's case. It should be limited to a general recital of what the State expects, in good faith, to prove by competent evidence.' (quoting State v. Torres, 328 N.J.Super. 77, 95, 744 A. 2d 699 (App.Div. 2000)). Therefore, we gauge prosecutorial misconduct or error thusly: [T]he test for determining whether prosecutorial misconduct constitutes reversible error is whether the misconduct was so egregious that it deprived defendant of a fair trial. The goal that rule seeks to foster is that juries [will] . . . reach a verdict and impose a penalty without inordinate exposure to unduly prejudicial, inflammatory commentary. Although we impose a greater burden on prosecuting attorneys than defense attorneys on that issue, [i]t is well-established that prosecuting attorneys, within reasonable limitations, are afforded considerable leeway in making opening statements and summations. [ State v. DiFrisco (II), 137 N.J. 434, 474, 645 A. 2d 734 (1994) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).] So informed, we address defendant's contentions of improper argument constituting prosecutorial misconduct or error in respect of the prosecution's opening statement. The highlighted comments fairly can be characterized as a recital, albeit with some limited yet permissible rhetorical leeway, of the aggravating factors the State intended to prove. Those comments also responded to the implausibility of the excuses defendant tendered in his various statements to the police, statements the prosecution intended to introduce in its case-in-chief. Thus, those comments do not, whether singly or in the aggregate, suffice to satisfy defendant's burden of demonstrating that the conduct [by the prosecutor] was so egregious that it deprived defendant of a fair trial[,] State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 322, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987), particularly in light of the curative instruction provided by the trial court at the close of opening statements. We therefore reject defendant's challenge that the prosecution's opening statement contained impermissible argument.