Opinion ID: 1731912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Meritless Claims

Text: We find that the remainder of Blanco's claims are meritless. First, we reject Blanco's claim that counsel told him he was not permitted to testify on his own behalf during the second penalty phase. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). According to Strickland, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show (1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The record makes clear that counsel made Blanco aware, in open court, of his right to testify. Blanco's claim therefore fails the first prong of the Strickland test. We reject Blanco's claim that penalty phase counsel failed to adequately investigate psychological and psychiatric mitigation evidence. The record clearly demonstrates that two mental health experts presented testimony on Blanco's behalf during the second penalty phase. We also reject Blanco's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to present certain statutory and nonstatutory mitigators during the second penalty phase. The record reflects that the mitigators Blanco argues should have been presented at his penalty phase are inconsistent with his theory of the case: that he is innocent of Mr. Ryan's murder. We therefore find that counsel's performance was not deficient. Blanco also argues that his second penalty phase counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of a plea deal the State offered, and that upon Blanco's rejection of the deal the State acted vindictively in seeking the death penalty. These claims are meritless because the record clearly indicates the State never offered Blanco any plea deal. Blanco's claims that the trial court erred in failing to develop a record from which it could conduct a proportionality review and that, in affirming his conviction, this Court failed to include an indepth study of its proportionality review, are also meritless. Proportionality is inherently reviewed on direct appeal, regardless of whether such review is mentioned in this Court's published opinions. Patton v. State, 878 So.2d 368, 380 (Fla. 2004). We conducted a proportionality review of Blanco's case in Blanco v. State, 706 So.2d 7 (Fla.1997). We find no deficiency in the record that would have precluded an effective review at that time. Blanco also argues that since the time of his trial DNA testing technology has undergone considerable development, but fails to claim what evidence should be submitted for further testing. To the extent that Blanco appears to present a newly discovered evidence claim, such claims are governed by Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512, 521 (Fla.1998). According to Jones, in order to obtain relief on a claim of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must establish that (1) the evidence was not known at the time of trial and could not have been discovered through the use of due diligence, and (2) the newly discovered evidence is of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. Blanco's claim fails the second prong of the Jones test because he fails to demonstrate how improved DNA testing procedures would probably lead to an acquittal on retrial. This claim is therefore legally insufficient and meritless. Id. We also reject Blanco's claim that the trial court failed to cite the record in addressing each of his claims. The trial court addressed each claim in its order by directly citing the record or by adopting portions of the State's response. We find no error. Because we affirm the trial court's denial of Blanco's twenty-two individual claims, his claim based on the cumulative effect of these errors must also fail. A claim of cumulative error is without merit where each of the underlying claims is without merit. Wright v. State, 857 So.2d 861, 871 (Fla.2003). For the foregoing reasons we affirm the trial court's summary denial of Blanco's postconviction motion. It is so ordered. LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.