Opinion ID: 389939
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Decision on Liability

Text: 36 Following the submission of such supplementary evidence as was allowed, the district court made detailed findings of fact and set forth its conclusions of law. 37 The court found that, even had there been no additional evidence of discrimination, the statistical evidence alone would have established a prima facie case of discriminatory impact. In 1975, when black and hispanic persons comprised approximately 41% of the labor force, the City's fire department had 427 whites, one hispanic, and no blacks. In its entire history prior to 1975, the City had employed only two minority firefighters, one of them hired in 1938. Following the institution of the present suit, the City had, pursuant to the two orders permitting interim hiring, hired 84 firefighters; 81 of them were white. The court noted that the City's hiring of minorities approached the  'inexorable zero.'  479 F.Supp. at 109 n.9, quoting International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1858 n.23, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). 38 Not surprisingly, the court found, the City had a strong reputation for discrimination in employment. Indeed, its reputation for employment discrimination against black and hispanic persons was 'by far the worst' of all cities in Connecticut. 479 F.Supp. at 106. The court found that the City's reputation, as well as certain of its actions, described below, deterred minority persons from even applying for City employment: This reputation created the attitude in the black community that '(i)f you're black, just don't apply because you won't get the job.'  Id. 39 As to the merits of the 1975 test, the court found again that it was not job related and that it had a disparate impact on minority candidates. The court expressly incorporated its original findings with respect to the invalidity of the test, see Part I. C. supra. In addition the court found that certain parts of the exam were significantly discriminatory against blacks, and that certain of the test score data were improperly used. If adjustments were made for the improperly used data, using the 1975 test as a predictor of job performance would be  'about as good as tossing a coin.'  Id. at 110 n.10, quoting testimony of Dr. John Peck. 40 In answer to one of the questions posed by this Court on the first appeal, Judge Daly found that merely reducing the passing level on the 1975 exam from twelve to six would not spare the City liability for unlawful discrimination. First, the court concluded, on the basis of testimony from experts on both sides, that such a reduction would decrease, but not eliminate, the disparity between the pass rates of whites and minorities; and the resulting disparity would still prove discriminatory impact. The court also concluded that it would be inappropriate for the court to order hiring on the basis of, and to undertake administration of, an employment test that had been proven to have no relation to job skills. Finally, the court found that even if the disparate effects of the 1975 test could be eliminated by lowering the passing level, the City could not avoid liability for employment discrimination, because it had engaged in a policy and practice of discrimination extending well beyond the 1975 exam. Id. at 109-10 n.10. 41 The court found that the City had made little or no effort to recruit minority persons for the fire department. Noting that, despite its awareness of its discriminatory policies and reputation, the City had not adopted any affirmative action program until it was forced to do so in order not to lose some $7 million in federal funds, the court found that (n)o voluntary efforts have been made by the City to comply with its own affirmative action goals for the Fire Department. Id. at 113 n.12. The court found that (a)bsolutely no attempts were made to recruit minority applicants for fire department examinations prior to 1972, id. at 106, and that no significant recruiting efforts were made by the City thereafter. Id. at 107. The court found that the City's pre-1972 failure to recruit minority persons for the fire department was deliberate. 42 Indeed, the court found that the City had engaged in a continuing pattern and practice of actively deterring minority persons who have sought to become firefighters. Id. at 104-05. For example, it found that, while a coalition of community minority groups, coordinated by a local official of the United States Labor Department, was attempting to recruit minority candidates for the fire department, the City probably impeded these efforts. The City Civil Service Commission's personnel director furnished the coalition with a notice of the 1975 examination, and stated that familiarity with fire department tools, knowledge of first aid and knowledge of the geography of Bridgeport would be covered on the test. The coalition then, in sessions open to anyone, regardless of race, gave applicants training in these subjects. But the subjects covered by the 1975 test bore no resemblance to these areas; there were no questions involving geography, or first aid, or the use of firefighting equipment. Id. at 107-08. The understandable reaction of the minority applicants who had studied these rather pertinent subjects, only to be confronted with a test that did not mention them, was,  '(t)he City has fooled us again.'  Id. at 108. 43 The court found that the City had also engaged in several acts of discrimination against individual minority candidates. Plaintiff Ismael Pomales, for example, took the 1975 exam and passed it. However, he did not receive any notification that he had passed until he was informed that his name was being removed from the eligible list because he had not appeared for the physical agility test that those who passed the written exam were required to take. Other candidates were prevented from even taking the written test. One such candidate, class member Elias Castro, an hispanic with four years' experience as a firefighter in the United States Air Force, attempted to file his application with the Civil Service Commission in the middle of the afternoon on the last day for filing applications. He was told that it was too late. He was not allowed to speak to the superior of the person who told him it was too late, and he was not informed of any means by which he could appeal or lodge an official complaint. He did not get to take the 1975 exam. Another candidate, plaintiff Harmin Linares, filed his application before the deadline and was told that a notice would be mailed to him stating the date and time of the exam. He never received such a notice, and he did not get to take the exam. 44 Finally, the court found that the City's discrimination against minorities was of long duration. It reviewed the written firefighter exams that the City had given in 1965, 1968, and 1971. It found that none of these tests was job related and that all had had a disparate impact on minority applicants. For all these pre-1975 tests combined, those identified as nonminority candidates 8 had passed at the rate of better than one out of every three; of eighteen identified minority applicants, only one had passed. Id. at 108 n.9. 45 Thus, the court concluded that the City had engag(ed) in a policy and practice of discrimination against black and hispanic persons relative to entry-level hiring in the Bridgeport Fire Department, id. at 111; see id. at 111-12; and that its pattern of discrimination was  'clear-cut (,) long-continued and egregious.'  Id. at 112. 46 On the basis of these findings the court concluded that the City had violated Title VII, which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race. Noting that the Title VII had not become applicable to municipalities until March 24, 1972, the court found that the combination of the statistical evidence, the City's use after that date of the results of the discriminatory examination held in 1971, and the City's policy and history of discrimination, including its deliberate failure to recruit minority applicants, compelled the conclusion that the City's violation of Title VII dated back to March 24, 1972. 47 Relying on many of the above findings, the court concluded also that the City's discriminatory policies and practices violated Title VI, dating back to January 1, 1971. Stating that Title VI prohibits such discrimination in  'any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,'  id. at 111, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), the court held that the City's receipt of such funds had been adequately proven. 48 Finally, the district court found that the City had received revenue sharing funds in every year since 1973, and that it had expended these funds, in part, for the operation of its Fire Department. The court concluded that the City's discriminatory practices had therefore violated the Revenue Sharing Act since January 1, 1973.