Opinion ID: 1363816
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sandstrom v. Montana

Text: Sandstrom was convicted under Montana law of deliberate homicide. Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-102. Under this Montana statute, criminal homicide constitutes deliberate homicide if it is committed purposely or knowingly. At trial, Sandstrom admitted that he had killed the victim, but he argued that he did not do so purposely or knowingly due to a personality disorder aggravated by alcohol consumption. At trial, the trial judge charged the jury that, `(t)he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.' 442 U. S. at p. 513. The defense objected to this charge on the ground that it had the effect of shifting the burden of proof on the issue of purpose or knowledge to the defense in violation of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (95 SC 1881, 44 LE2d 508) (1975) and Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (97 SC 2319, 53 LE2d 281) (1977). On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the complained-of instruction only required the defendant to produce some evidence that he did not intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, but did not require the defendant to disprove that he acted purposely or knowingly. Montana v. Sandstrom, 176 Mt. 492 (580 P2d 106) (1978). On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous vote, reversed. The Court held that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction, that the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, in either of two impermissible ways. First, it was held that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction as an irrebuttable direction by the court to find intent once convinced of the facts triggering the presumption. 442 U. S. at p. 517. Under the Court's view, this would constitute a mandatory or conclusive presumption which would relieve the state of the burden of proving an element of the crime, i.e., that the homicide was committed purposely or knowingly; it would thereby conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and it would invade the factfinding function of the jury, in violation of Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246 (72 SC 240, 96 LE 288) (1952) and United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422 (98 SC 2864, 57 LE2d 854) (1978). Second, the Supreme Court in Sandstrom held that the jury may have interpreted the instruction as a direction to find intent upon proof of the defendant's voluntary actions (and their `ordinary' consequences), unless the defendant proved the contrary by some quantum of proof which may well have been considerably greater than `some' evidence  thus effectively shifting the burden of persuasion on the element of intent. (Emphasis in original.) 442 U. S. at p. 517. Thus, the Court indicated that it would not be constitutionally impermissible merely to require the defendant to come forward with some evidence contrary to the presumption, i.e., to place on the defendant a burden of producing evidence or a burden of production. However, the Supreme Court held that the jury in Sandstrom's case could have interpreted the presumption referred to in the complained-of instruction as meaning that upon proof by the State of the slaying, and of additional facts not themselves establishing the element of intent, the burden was shifted to the defendant to prove that he lacked the requisite mental state. 442 U. S. at p. 524. Such a presumption, said the Court, is constitutionally infirm under Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, and Patterson v. New York, supra, as well as In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (90 SC 1068, 25 LE2d 368) (1970). Importantly, in Sandstrom the Court also held that instructions to the jury, that the accused was presumed innocent until proven guilty and that the state had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the death of the deceased purposely or knowingly, were not rhetorically inconsistent with the complained-of instruction. 442 U. S. at p. 518, n. 7. Thus, the Court held that the other jury instructions did not alter the possibility that the jury could have interpreted the complained-of instruction as creating a mandatory presumption or shifting the burden of persuasion with respect to an element of the crime to the defendant. As stated by the Court, [t]he jury could have interpreted the two sets of instructions as indicating that the presumption was a means by which proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to intent could be satisfied. For example, if the presumption were viewed as conclusive, the jury could have believed that, although intent must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, proof of the voluntary slaying and its ordinary consequences constituted proof of intent beyond a reasonable doubt. 442 U. S. at p. 518, n. 7. Finally, in Sandstrom it was also argued that any error in the charge was harmless under Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (87 SC 824, 17 LE2d 705) (1967). Since this issue, as well as other issues, was not considered by the Montana Supreme Court, the case was remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the Montana Supreme Court, noting that intent was the main issue at trial, held that it could not assert that the erroneous instruction could not reasonably have contributed to the jury verdict. Montana v. Sandstrom, 184 Mt. 391 (603 P2d 244) (1979).