Opinion ID: 2528840
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reasonableness of the Discovery Sanction

Text: ¶ 41 The State contends that the discovery sanction imposed by the trial court was too harsh for the circumstances presented in this case and, therefore, amounted to an abuse of discretion. According to the State, the sanction was effectively a dismissal of the charges as it prevented the officer from testifying about all of the relevant facts showing that defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. We reject the State's contentions. ¶ 42 The correct sanction to be applied for a discovery violation is a decision appropriately left to the discretion of the trial court, and its judgment shall be given great weight. People v. Morgan, 112 Ill.2d 111, 135, 97 Ill.Dec. 430, 492 N.E.2d 1303 (1986). The trial court is in the best position to determine an appropriate sanction based upon the effect the discovery violation will have upon the defendant. People v. Koutsakis, 255 Ill. App.3d 306, 314, 194 Ill.Dec. 272, 627 N.E.2d 388 (1993). As stated, an abuse of discretion exists only where the decision of the trial court is fanciful, arbitrary, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Ortega, 209 Ill.2d at 359, 283 Ill.Dec. 530, 808 N.E.2d 496. ¶ 43 The record clearly establishes that the discovery sanction imposed by the trial court did not preclude the State from prosecuting defendant. The court's sanction ruling was narrowly tailored, and provided that [t]he video may not be used for any purpose from five seconds prior to the lights going on at the time that the defendant was stopped getting out of the car until she was taken away via the arrest. Notably, the court also clearly specified that any driving or actions of defendant prior to the start of the recording were admissible, as were any of her actions after she was placed under arrest. ¶ 44 Accordingly, under the court's ruling, Officer Gaske was not barred from testifying; rather, his testimony was limited to observations regarding events other than those captured on the purged recording. Thus, the State could have questioned Officer Gaske concerning any erratic driving on the part of defendant prior to her being stopped. Gaske could also have been questioned about defendant's behavior after he deactivated the lights and placed her in his squad car to transport her back to the police station, which occurred immediately after defendant performed the field sobriety tests. Gaske could have offered any observations of indications of intoxication at that time, including whether defendant exhibited bloodshot and glassy eyes, slurred speech or an odor of alcohol. He also could have testified to any problems with balance or dexterity defendant may have had as she arrived at the police station for processing. Thus, contrary to the State's assertion that the court's sanction removed all possible proof that defendant had been driving under the influence of alcohol, the State could have questioned Gaske on any of these points. It declined to do so. ¶ 45 As stated, the authority to impose reasonable sanctions for discovery violations lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Here, the court properly exercised its discretion in choosing from the spectrum of available options and narrowly tailoring its sanction to bar the State from introducing testimony regarding what was contained in the video recording. Contrary to the State's assertion that the sanction was disproportionate to the discovery violation because it excluded all evidence that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the record establishes that the State made the conscious decision not to participate in the trial and to forgo the opportunities available to present evidence apart from that which was barred under the sanction. ¶ 46 Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing this sanction against the State. We therefore affirm the sanction order entered by the trial court against the State. We remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings on the State's prosecution of defendant's misdemeanor DUI case.