Opinion ID: 2517832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Application of Leon

Text: We agree with these authorities and conclude that, by refusing to apply the good faith exception in all cases where the search warrant was based on an affidavit that failed to provide a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause, the Doile and Longbine courts misconstrued Leon. It is incorrect to apply the substantial basis test to both the determination of whether the warrant was valid and to the determination of whether the good faith exception applied. This automatic nullification of Leon does not appear to have been intentional; indeed, the cases rely on Leon. Nonetheless, it was effectiveand error. We must then ask, would we depart purposefully from Leon? Although some other states have declined to follow Leon on state law grounds, Kansas has never expressed such grounds or an intent to invoke them to do so. See, e.g., State Patrol v. State, Dept. of Public Safety, 437 N.W.2d 670, 676 (Minn. App.1989) (stating that Minnesota has not adopted good faith exception); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 157-58, 519 A.2d 820 (1987) (exclusionary rule, unmodified by good faith exception, is integral part of state constitutional guarantee that search warrants will not be issued without probable cause); State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171, 598 A.2d 119 (1991) (state exclusionary rule not limited by Leon good faith exception). In past cases, we have stated that the scope of § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights is identical or is usually identical to the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Compare State v. LeFort, 248 Kan. 332, 334, 806 P.2d 986 (1991) (is identical), and State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, Syl. ¶ 1, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983) (scope is identical in any particular factual situation), with State v. Lambert, 238 Kan. 444, 446, 710 P.2d 693 (1985) (is usually considered to be identical), and State v. Fortune, 236 Kan. 248, Syl. ¶ 1, 689 P.2d 1196 (1984) (same). Although this court has recognized that it could extend state constitutional protections of § 15 beyond the federal guarantees provided by the Fourth Amendment, it has declined to do so. See State v. Schultz, 252 Kan. 819, 824, 850 P.2d 818 (1993); Comment, Interpreting the State Constitution: A Survey and Assessment of Current Methodology, 35 Kan. L.Rev. 593, 618 n. 151 (1987). The only reason we would deviate from this practice and impose a more restrictive reading on the good faith exception would be because the doctrine of stare decisis would constrain our departure from Longbine and Doile. However, as the United States Supreme Court has stated repeatedly, stare decisis, which is at its weakest in the field of constitutional law where legislative bodies cannot correct our mistakes, should not constrain a court from disapproving its own holdings when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, reh. denied 501 U.S. 1277, 112 S.Ct. 28, 115 L.Ed.2d 1110 (1991). Especially since it does not appear that this court intentionally deviated from the Leon holding, it would not be appropriate to blindly adhere to our precedent in Doile and Longbine in light of those cases' misapplication of the United States Supreme Court decision. We, therefore, conclude that the holding in Leon applies in Kansas without modification: the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not be applied to bar the use of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be invalid, except where: (1) the magistrate issuing the warrant was deliberately misled by false information; (2) the magistrate wholly abandoned his or her detached or neutral role; (3) there was so little indicia of probable cause contained in the affidavit that it was entirely unreasonable for the officers to believe the warrant was valid; or (4) the warrant so lacked specificity that officers could not determine the place to be searched or the items to be seized. The Leon good faith exception applies when an affidavit does not supply a substantial basis for the determination of probable cause but does provide some indicia of probable cause sufficient to render official reliance reasonable. We disapprove any language in State v. Longbine, 257 Kan. 713, 721-22, 896 P.2d 367 (1995), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Hicks, 282 Kan. 599, 147 P.3d 1076 (2006), State v. Ratzlaff, 255 Kan. 738, 754-55, 877 P.2d 397 (1994), and State v. Doile, 244 Kan. 493, 495, 769 P.2d 666 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990), applying the test of whether there is a substantial basis for the determination of probable cause to the determination of whether the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies. Finally, we must determine whether the good faith exception applies in this case. When reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court reviews the factual underpinnings of a district court's decision by a substantial competent evidence standard and the ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts by a de novo standard. State v. Fisher, 283 Kan. 272, 280, 154 P.3d 455 (2007). Application of the principles we have enunciated today to the allegations and record before us on interlocutory appeal leads to the conclusion that the good faith exception applies. Although the trial court found that the affidavit failed to provide the magistrate with a substantial basis to find probable cause for issuance of a warrant to search Hoeck's residence, there were no findings and no allegations that any of the four circumstances enunciated in Leon for the suppression of the evidence exists. There was no evidence that the magistrate was deliberately misled by false information or that the magistrate completely abandoned his neutral and detached role. And there were no circumstances where it was reasonable for the officers executing the warrant to override the probable cause determination found by the magistrate and refuse to execute the warrant; this is not a circumstance where there was so little indicia of probable cause contained in the affidavit that it was entirely unreasonable for the officers to believe the warrant was valid. Nor was the warrant so lacking in specificity that the officers could not determine the place of the search or the items to be seized. In short, there was no bad faith or wrongdoing shown in the issuance or execution of the warrant and, thus, no need to deter any police misconduct. Under the reasoning in Leon, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to the facts of this case, at least based upon the allegations and evidence in the record of this interlocutory appeal. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded. JOHNSON, J., not participating. LARSON, S.J., assigned. [1]