Opinion ID: 2584187
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fibre violated RCW 49.60.180(1) and WAC 162-30-020(3)(a)(i) when it refused to hire Hegwine because of her pregnancy

Text: ¶ 17 Hegwine contends that Fibre refused to hire her because of her pregnancy in violation of RCW 49.60.180(1) and WAC 162-30-020(3)(a)(i). [6] RCW 49.60.180(1) provides, in relevant part, that [i]t is an unfair practice for any employer . . . [t]o refuse to hire any person because of . . . sex . . . unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification. WAC 162-30-020(3)(a)(i) provides: It is an unfair practice for an employer, because of pregnancy . . . to . . . [r]efuse to hire . . . a woman. The sole exception to this latter prohibition is business necessity. WAC 162-30-020(3)(b). Together, the plain language of these laws establishes that refusing to hire a person because of her pregnancy constitutes unlawful sex discrimination, unless the refusal is based upon a business necessity or the employer proves a valid bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). ¶ 18 Hegwine's claim that Fibre violated RCW 49.60.180(1), as construed by WAC 162-30-020(3)(a)(i), is a disparate treatment claim [7] based on circumstantial evidence. Disparate treatment claims based on circumstantial evidence are evaluated according to the three-step, burden-shifting protocol articulated by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); see also Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 144 Wash.2d 172, 180, 23 P.3d 440 (2001). First, the employee bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of discrimination. Hill, 144 Wash.2d at 181, 23 P.3d 440. If this burden is met, then a `legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption' of discrimination temporarily takes hold, and the evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant to produce admissible evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for the adverse employment action sufficient to `raise[] a genuine issue of fact as to whether [the defendant] discriminated against the plaintiff.' Id. (citation omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 & n. 7, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). If the employer meets this intermediate production burden, the presumption established by having the prima facie evidence is rebutted and `having fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant to come forward with some response, [the presumption] simply drops out of the picture.' Id. at 182, 23 P.3d 440 (alteration in original) (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)). Once the presumption is removed . . . the plaintiff [is] then . . . `afforded a fair opportunity to show that [defendant's] stated reason for [the adverse action] was in fact pretext.' Id. (alterations in original) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817). ¶ 19 We may assume, without deciding, that Hegwine has made a prima facie showing that Fibre refused to hire her because of her pregnancy. Fibre has conceded this point for purposes of appeal. Hegwine, 132 Wash.App. at 556, 132 P.3d 789 ([T]he parties agree that . . . the evidence is clear that (1) [Hegwine] belongs to a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) the adverse employment action was due to her pregnancy.). The burden then shifted to Fibre to produce a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action through demonstrating a business necessity.
¶ 20 Fibre might have justified its refusal to hire Hegwine because of her pregnancy on the ground of business necessity. See WAC 162-30-020(3)(b). The term business necessity is not defined in the WAC or the RCW. However, this court has previously discussed the meaning of business necessity in the employment discrimination context. Specifically, in Shannon v. Pay `N Save Corp., 104 Wash.2d 722, 709 P.2d 799 (1985), this court held that to establish a business necessity defense an employer must prove . . . that the [challenged employment practice] utilized . . . significantly correlates with the fundamental requirements of job performance. Id. at 731, 709 P.2d 799. [8] Further guidance as to the proper application of the business necessity defense is provided by the text of the regulation. In particular, WAC 162-30-020(3)(b) includes the following example of business necessity: [A]n employer hiring workers into a training program that cannot accommodate absences for the first two months might be justified in refusing to hire a pregnant woman whose delivery date would occur during those first two months. ¶ 21 The Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that business necessity, under WAC 162-30-020(3)(b), is an affirmative defense of which the employer bears both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. Hegwine, 132 Wash.App. at 566, 132 P.3d 789 (citing CR 8(c)). The characterization of the business necessity justification as an affirmative defense conflicts with the analysis applicable to disparate treatment claims and the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme. It also conflicts with this court's decision in Kastanis v. Education Employees Credit Union, 122 Wash.2d 483, 859 P.2d 26, 865 P.2d 507 (1993). In Kastanis, we specifically rejected that the contention that an employer's claim of a business necessity in a disparate treatment case was an affirmative defense, reasoning that [s]ince the ultimate burden of proving discrimination rests with the plaintiff . . . the burden of proof on the issue of business necessity also rests with the plaintiff. Id. at 492, 859 P.2d 26. Although the burden of production shifts to the employer to produce evidence of a business necessity, the burden of persuasion always remains with the employee to show intentional discrimination. ¶ 22 Fibre met its intermediate burden of production by asserting that its decision to withdraw its offer of employment was based on Hegwine's inability to meet an essential function of the position she applied for, i.e., a weight-lifting requirement. The presumption that arose from prima facie evidence was thus rebutted, and dropped from the case. The ultimate burden was on Hegwine to show that the proffered weight-lifting requirement was pretextual and that Fibre intentionally discriminated against her because of her pregnancy. Hegwine succeeded in meeting her burden. As the Court of Appeals explained: [T]he record contains evidence sufficient to show that [Fibre's facially discriminatory reason for not hiring Ms. Hegwine] was a pretext to avoid hiring a pregnant woman: (1) the job advertisement listed no lifting requirements; (2) in the interview only 25 pounds was mentioned as a lifting requirement; (3) Hegwine never suggested any pregnancy related limitations to Fibre or its doctor; (4) when Fibre learned Hegwine was pregnant through its mandatory physical, it immediately assumed she had restrictions that her doctor would have to identify; (5) when Hegwine's doctor's permission exceeded the 25 pound lifting requirement, Fibre changed the requirement and told her it was 40 pounds; (6) when Hegwine's doctor submitted a second form responding to the new 40 pound lifting requirement, Fibre's doctor talked to Hegwine's doctor and obtained a third form, still allowing lifting adequate to do the job as explained by Fibre; (7) Fibre then told Hegwine to leave its premises and not return until the alleged situation all sorted out; (8) only after Hegwine was removed did Fibre undertake a job analysis that resulted in an even greater lifting requirement  60 pounds; (9) Fibre did not communicate this new requirement to either Hegwine or her doctor; (10) instead, it told Hegwine that her availability precluded her from performing the job and therefore rescinded her job offer; and finally (11) Fibre altered its position and argued at trial that it rescinded its offer, not because of Hegwine's availability, but because she could allegedly not perform an essential function of the job that was determined after it rescinded its offer. Hegwine, 132 Wash.App. at 565-66, 132 P.3d 789. Reasonable minds could not differ given this evidence, and therefore, as a matter of law, Hegwine established that Fibre's claim of business necessity was pretextual. ¶ 23 Because Hegwine established that Fibre's business necessity claim was clearly pretextual, we hold that Hegwine has proved sex discrimination in violation of RCW 49.60.180(1) and WAC 162-30-020(3)(a)(i), as a matter of law.
¶ 24 A legal defense for refusal to hire Hegwine based on her pregnancy would exist if not being pregnant were a valid BFOQ for the clerk/order checker position. See RCW 49.60.180(1). WAC 162-16-240 is the primary interpretive regulation dealing with BFOQs in the context of employment discrimination claims. It provides that: Under the law against discrimination, there is an exception to the rule that an employer . . . may not discriminate on the basis of protected status; that is if a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) applies. The commission believes that the BFOQ exception should be applied narrowly to jobs for which a particular quality of protected status will be essential to or will contribute to the accomplishment of the purposes of the job. WAC 162-16-240 (emphasis added). This regulation indicates that to establish a valid BFOQ, an employer must show that excluding members of a particular protected status group is essential to . . . the purposes of the job. Id. This court articulated a similar standard in Franklin County Sheriff's Office v. Sellers, 97 Wash.2d 317, 646 P.2d 113 (1982). Specifically, in that case, this court indicated that the correct BFOQ standard requires an employer to establish that all or substantially all persons in the excluded class would be unable to efficiently perform the duties [of the position at issue], and the essence of the operation would be undermined by hiring anyone in that excluded class. Id. at 326, 646 P.2d 113 (internal citation omitted). Thus, to succeed with a BFOQ defense here, Fibre must have introduced sufficient evidence to establish that excluding pregnant women was essential to . . . the purposes of the clerk/order checker position, WAC 162-16-240, or that all or substantially all pregnant women would be unable to efficiently perform the duties of the position, such that hiring them would undermine Fibre's operations. Id. ¶ 25 Fibre has not met this burden; indeed, Fibre offered no evidence that excluding pregnant women was essential to the clerk/order checker position or that substantially all pregnant women are incapable of meeting the position's lifting requirement. Cf. Blanchette v. Spokane County Fire Prot. Dist. No. 1, 67 Wash.App. 499, 836 P.2d 858 (1992) (indicating that even documented medical standards developed as guidelines for determining fitness for fire fighter duty are insufficient to establish a valid BFOQ). Thus, Fibre cannot succeed with a BFOQ defense.