Opinion ID: 2641518
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Record-Keeping Citation

Text: Section 1904.29(b)(3) requires employers to record an employee’s “injury or illness on the OSHA 300 Log and 301 Incident Report within seven (7) calendar days of receiving information that a recordable injury or illness has occurred.” The parties do not contest that mercury toxicity is a recordable illness and that Shaw did not record any alleged mercury-related illness reported by Stanfield in its record-keeping logs. Therefore, the only issue is whether Shaw “receiv[ed] information that a recordable injury or illness ha[d] 3 Case: 12-60834 Document: 00512432611 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/06/2013 No. 12-60834 occurred” that would require Shaw to record Stanfield’s alleged injury in its logs. See § 1904.29(b)(3). Shaw argues that the Commission applied an incorrect legal standard in interpreting § 1904.29(b)(3) because the regulation requires recording only when the employer “make[s] a reasonable judgment based on the information and expertise available to it” that the employee experienced a recordable injury or illness. See Amoco Chems. Corp., 12 BNA OSHC 1849, at  (No. 78-0250, 1986). Conversely, according to the Secretary of Labor (the “Secretary”), the recording requirement is triggered whenever an employer receives information sufficient to put it on notice that a recordable injury or illness has occurred, irrespective of the employer’s judgment of whether recording is necessary. We normally defer to the Secretary’s interpretation of an OSHA regulation when it “is consistent with the regulatory language and is otherwise reasonable.” Trinity Marine Nashville, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 275 F.3d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted) (citation and quotation marks omitted). However, we need not decide if a recording obligation is triggered only when the employer makes a reasonable judgment that recording is necessary because the Commission concluded that Shaw’s decision not to record Stanfield’s alleged illness was “plainly unreasonable” under Amoco Chemicals in light of the information available to it. As a result, even employing Shaw’s interpretation of § 1904.29(b)(3), we must affirm the Commission’s decision. “We are bound by the [Commission’s] findings on questions of fact and reasonable inferences drawn from them if they are supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole even if this court could justifiably reach a different result de novo.” Trinity Marine, 275 F.3d at 426-27. Moreover, we will not disturb the Commission’s legal conclusions unless “they 4 Case: 12-60834 Document: 00512432611 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/06/2013 No. 12-60834 are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with [the] law.” Id. at 427 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Based on the testimony and exhibits presented during a three-day hearing before the ALJ, the Commission found that Shaw was aware that Stanfield worked in an environment that could have exposed him to mercury and that his urinalysis result suggested he had been exposed to mercury. Further, the Commission found that both Stanfield and his parents informed Shaw that he was undergoing treatment for mercury toxicity and that Shaw’s safety manager admitted visiting Stanfield because he was being treated for mercury toxicity. Based on these findings, the Commission concluded “that Shaw had sufficient information to determine that a recordable illness had occurred.” The Commission also concluded based on its findings that “Shaw’s decision not to record was plainly unreasonable,” especially in light of the fact that Shaw’s safety manager admitted to visiting Stanfield in the hospital because he was being treated for mercury toxicity. Shaw argues that its decision not to record was reasonable because it did not have an opportunity to review Stanfield’s medical records. Although Shaw understandably desired to review Stanfield’s medical records, we cannot conclude that the absence of medical records rendered the Commission’s conclusion arbitrary or capricious in light of its findings concerning the information in Shaw’s possession suggesting Stanfield had experienced a recordable illness. 2 Therefore, 2 Shaw further asserts that it made a reasonable judgment that recording of Stanfield’s alleged illness was unnecessary because: (1) Stanfield’s mercury levels were below the level the CI considers dangerous; (2) Stanfield was allegedly diagnosed over a month after working in the cell room; and (3) no other employees who worked in the cell room presented with mercury toxicity symptoms. Although these facts may suggest that Stanfield did not experience a recordable illness, they do not establish that the Commission arbitrarily or capriciously concluded that Shaw’s decision not to record was “plainly unreasonable” in light of the significant amount of evidence suggesting that Stanfield experienced mercury toxicity. 5 Case: 12-60834 Document: 00512432611 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/06/2013 No. 12-60834 applying the reasonable judgment standard of Amoco Chemicals—the standard that Shaw advocates on appeal should be applied—the Commission concluded that the citation for Shaw’s failure to record pursuant to § 1904.29(b)(3) was proper. See Amoco Chems., 12 BNA OSHC 1849, at . Therefore, even under Shaw’s interpretation of the record-keeping requirement, the Commission’s decision that Shaw’s failure to record was “plainly unreasonable” was not arbitrary or capricious, and its order must be affirmed.