Opinion ID: 695144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the strike converted to an unfair labor practice strike?

Text: 29 The proper characterization of a strike depends upon its cause: a work stoppage is an unfair labor practice strike only if the employer's violations of the labor laws are a 'contributing cause' of the strike. General Indus. Employees Union, Local 42, 951 F.2d at 1311; accord Teamsters Local Union No. 515 v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 719, 723 (D.C.Cir.1990). For a strike that starts out as an economic dispute to be converted into an unfair labor practice strike, it must appear that the [unfair labor] practice prolonged the strike. Allied Indus. Workers, AFL-CIO Local Union No. 289 v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 868, 883 (D.C.Cir.1973). Absent evidence of such prolongation, an employer's unfair labor practice does not ipso facto convert [an economic strike] into an unfair labor practice strike. C-Line Express, 292 N.L.R.B. 638, 1989 WL 223807 (1989); see also Soule Glass and Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1079-80 (1st Cir.1981). The General Counsel has the burden of proving that the employer's unfair labor practice prolonged the strike, and we review for substantial evidence the Board's determination that the strike was indeed prolonged thereby. Soule Glass and Glazing Co., 652 F.2d at 1080. 30 In this case, the Board concluded (1) that the Company committed an unfair labor practice at the meeting convened by the mediator on May 15, and (2) that the strike was prolonged as a result. 310 N.L.R.B. at 1288-89. These determinations, if correct, would mean that any striking employee who had not by then been permanently replaced would be entitled to reinstatement. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. at 50-51, 93 S.Ct. at 76-77; General Indus. Employees Union, Local 42, 951 F.2d at 1311. In fact, however, neither determination is supported by the record. 31 At the May 15 meeting, the Company informed the Union that it believed the CBA was still in effect and that the strike was therefore unlawful. The ALJ concluded that the Company's contractual position was patently false, and therefore that its demands were made in bad faith, in violation of Sec. 8(a)(5). The ALJ further held that the Company's insistence on the bad-faith demands interrupted bargaining from May 15 through May 30. 310 N.L.R.B. at 1311. The Board affirmed these findings after further clarifying that the ALJ 32 found that at the May 15 meeting [the Company] made it clear that it would not bargain over the terms of the [CBA] until the Union acceded to either ... [the] demand[ ] that what [the Company] contended was an illegal strike be called off or the Union sign what amounted to a written waiver of any right to characterize [the Company's] continued participation in the negotiations as an abandonment of its illegal strike contention. 33 Id. at 1288. 34 Both the ALJ and the Board were hopelessly confused about the chronology of events reflected in the record. The Company did not demand at the May 15 meeting that the Union end the strike, nor did it make any statement that could be construed as a demand that the Union agree not to characterize the Company's participation in negotiations as an abandonment of its argument that the strike was unlawful. The record indicates that these demands were not made until the May 21 meeting. Hence, the Board's determination that the employer violated Sec. 8(a)(5) on May 15 rests upon a factual finding that is not supported by any, let alone substantial, evidence. 35 Although the Board did not directly address the issue, the Company's demands at the May 21 meeting may have constituted at least a technical violation of Sec. 8(a)(5). See Teamsters Local Union No. 515, 906 F.2d at 723 n. 3 (Insistence upon matters not within the scope of mandatory bargaining as a condition to any agreement constitutes a refusal to bargain in good faith, in violation of section 8(a)(5)). If that was a violation, however, it did not prolong the strike because the Union promptly provided the assurance that the Company sought and the parties immediately proceeded to negotiate about the Union's proposed strike settlement agreement. 36 In its opinion the Board correctly notes that the parties did not negotiate about the terms of a new CBA until May 30, but the Board incorrectly infers that the Company's May 21 demands interrupted all substantive negotiations until then. Implicit in the Board's conclusion is the assumption that negotiation over the terms of a strike settlement agreement does not count as substantive bargaining. On the contrary, strike settlement agreements involve mandatory subjects of bargaining, Teamsters Cannery Local 670 v. NLRB, 856 F.2d 1250, 1259 (9th Cir.1988), and negotiating about a strike settlement agreement therefore counts as substantive bargaining. Because the Union and the Company were negotiating about a mandatory subject of bargaining on May 21, the Board's finding that negotiations were stalled until May 30 is not supported by substantial evidence. 37 The Board also states in passing in its opinion that the Company's May 21 demands tainted the bargaining climate and impeded opportunities for settlement of the strike. 310 N.L.R.B. at 1288. Although this factual assertion, if true, again might support a conclusion that the employer committed an unfair labor practice that prolonged the strike, the Board points to no evidence in the record to support its assertion, and our review of the record indicates that there is no such evidence. 38 The Board's determination that the strike began as an economic strike is not challenged. As can readily be seen from an accurate account of the facts of record, the Company's May 21 demands did not prolong the strike and therefore did not convert it into an unfair labor practice strike. We conclude, therefore, that the work stoppage was an economic strike from start to finish. Hence, any strikers that were permanently replaced at any time before they unconditionally offered to return to work are entitled only to be placed upon a preferential hiring list for the purpose of reinstatement as positions become available. See Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enf'd, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir.1969). 39