Opinion ID: 2369836
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Use of the movie, 10 to Midnight

Text: At trial, the State sought to introduce into evidence portions of the film 10 to Midnight. The relevancy proffered by the State was related to the statement attributed to defendant by the Hempstead police officers that the killing was like in the movie `10 to Midnight.' That film has been described in a review as a police and murder thriller and a propaganda piece that argues against laws that let brutal slayers escape with insanity pleas. N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1983, § 1, at 62, col. 5. The record includes the two clips from the film that were admitted into evidence. The trial court viewed the film with counsel and concluded that those two clips, which involved stabbings of women, might aid the jury in three respects: (1) to establish what defendant was talking about or what he meant by the reference; (2) by demonstrating that there was indeed such a movie, which would give credibility to the officers' accounts; and, finally, (3) to establish the motive that defendant had stabbed the victim because she was screaming. The court relied, in its preliminary ruling, on Evidence Rule 7(f), the keystone of the Rules of Evidence, which provides that unless evidence is specifically excluded elsewhere, it is admissible if relevant. Relevant evidence is defined as evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact. Evid.R. 1(2). Defense counsel objected to the admission of the evidence on the basis that it was not relevant, and that even if it were relevant, it should be excluded under Evidence Rule 4, which allows courts to exclude evidence if it finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or misleading the jury. The court ruled that the evidence was admissible. When the clips were shown, the court told the jury that the evidence may aid or assist you in corroborating or believing whether the defendant ever made reference to [the movie `10 to Midnight'], and may give you some flavor as to what he had in mind. Obviously in some cases there might be a marginal relevance between an extrinsic reference in a statement and a material fact at issue in a trial. Probably the most notable example is the case of John Hinckley, in which Hinckley's defense psychiatrist proffered that he had been influenced by the movie Taxi Driver to attempt to assassinate President Reagan in order to ingratiate himself with a woman. See L. Caplan, The Insanity Defense in the Trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr., 77 (1984). Another such incident occurred in the Charles Manson trial in which his bizarre interpretation of the Beatle song Helter Skelter may have contributed to the overall motivation for his conduct. People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 278 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 986, 97 S.Ct. 1686, 52 L.Ed. 2d 382 (1977). The problematic use of such an evidentiary device, at least by the State, is compounded in a capital case by the bifurcated nature of the proceedings. Any relevance that type of evidence might have in the guilt phase of a capital trial would be so overwhelmed by prejudice in the sentencing phase by extraneous factors irrelevant to capital sentencing that the admission of such evidence would almost inevitably require reversal of a death sentence. See State v. Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 451, 550 A. 2d 1172 (jury may not base death sentence on considerations that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process); State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988) (admission of repetitive and highly-inflammatory evidence of defendant's past conduct without careful and precise limiting instruction compelled reversal of death sentence). For even if the jury is instructed, as here, to use the portions of the film shown only for purposes of establishing (1) that defendant used those words, and (2) what he had in mind when he was making the reference, there is no realistic way for the jury to separate the voyeuristic aspects of the film from the evidentiary purpose. The character referred to in the movie is a psychopathic serial killer who repeatedly engages in sadistic killings of young women. He and his victims are depicted in the nude. The final message of the film is that the only way to protect society from such people is for the Charles Bronson-type character to shoot them to death lest the law afford them some defense. Given the structured nature of capital sentencing, we have repeatedly emphasized that juries are not to be subjected to extraneous factors that may influence a jury's verdict in a way neither contemplated nor authorized by statute. The subliminal message of the film here surely tainted the penalty phase. With respect to the guilt phase of the trial, however, given that the two most objectionable inferences cited by defendant, what is he like, how can we protect society from this type, have so little relevance to the guilt-phase issues, we find that the potential for prejudice from the film clips is so slight as not to warrant a reversal. The background evidence (the reference to the movie) was of such marginal significance that it was not even in the written notes of the Hempstead police officer who took down the statement. Its anecdotal value is peripheral to the State's case. We might be inclined to reverse the guilt convictions if this were a case of less-than-overwhelming evidence of guilt. See Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533 (D.N.J. 1985) (introduction of evidence of racial animus into case was so potentially prejudicial that it affected outcome of case), aff'd, 826 F. 2d 1299 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011, 108 S.Ct. 711, 98 L.Ed. 2d 661 (1988). It is the very marginality of the evidence that establishes the lack of prejudice. We find it inconceivable that this evidence would have swayed a jury from the essential facts of the case and the overwhelming evidence of guilt  multiple disinterested eyewitnesses, physical evidence in the form of shoeprints, fibers, and blood, and, finally, the confession of defendant.