Opinion ID: 1711397
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶ 9. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not have authority to grant the out-of-time appeal because a request to reopen the time to appeal is to be filed with the trial court within 180 days of entry of the judgment or order or within seven days of receipt of such notice [of entry of judgment], whichever is earlier. Deloach, 856 So.2d at 389, citing M.R.A.P. 4(h). ¶ 10. The Court of Appeals also held that there was a second bar to its jurisdiction. The trial court granted Deloach thirty days to perfect the out-of-time appeal by an order signed by the trial judge on July 19, 2001. The notice of appeal was not filed until August 24, 2001. The Court of Appeals stated: We do not understand how the attorney knew she was appointed yet did not know the out-of-time appeal had been granted since the two orders were signed on the same day and filed the same day. Even if the trial judge had authority to grant an out-of-time appeal, the deadline for perfecting the appeal had passed when the notice of appeal was filed. 856 So.2d at 389. ¶ 11. In a recent opinion by this Court, it was recognized that: Whether a trial court has authority to remedy the failure to file timely a notice after the time set by the rules for filing a notice of appeal had expired is doubtful. Coleman v. State, 804 So.2d 1032, 1037 (Miss.2002). However, we may grant an out-of-time appeal `where a person is convicted of a crime and through no fault of his own is effectively denied his right to perfect his appeal within the time prescribed by law by the acts of his attorney or the trial court.' Jones v. State, 355 So.2d 89, 90 (Miss.1978). We may suspend Rules 2 and 4 `when justice demands' to allow an out-of-time appeal in criminal cases. Fair v. State, 571 So.2d 965, 966 (Miss.1990). McGruder v. State, 886 So.2d 1, 2 (Miss.2003). ¶ 12. In McGruder, this Court found that McGruder had done nothing to delay the perfection of his appeal. Id. at 2. His trial counsel was untimely in the filing of McGruder's Motion for JNOV. Once his new counsel was appointed, all post-trial filings and the perfection of the appeal were timely. This Court found that justice demanded that the out-of-time appeal filed by McGruder's new counsel be considered on the merits. Id. (citing Fair, 571 So.2d at 967). We reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment to dismiss as untimely and remanded the case for a decision on the merits. Id. ¶ 13. In the instant case, the record is not clear as to why no formal appeal was ever filed after Deloach's May 20, 1997, conviction. The trial court's July 20, 2003, order, which granted the out-of-time appeal, gives some insight that there may have been an agreement to drop Deloach's remaining charges if Deloach agreed not to appeal the Count I conviction. ¶ 14. What is clear from the record is that the same day Deloach's conviction and sentence were entered, he filed an affidavit of indigency stating that he was unable to pay the costs of the Supreme Court Clerk and that he wanted to prosecute an appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi, of said conviction.... The motions Deloach filed in this Court seeking the appointment of appellate counsel and the status of his appeal further indicate his desire for an appeal. These facts, coupled with the trial court's correct finding that no in-court waiver of appeal had been made, are enough to determine from the record that Deloach was not at fault for failing to file a formal notice of appeal from his May 20, 1997, conviction. ¶ 15. The Court of Appeals was not wrong in its analysis of this case under M.R.A.P. 4(h). However, this Court, as well as the Court of Appeals, may suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a particular case ... on its own motion and order proceedings in accordance with its direction; provided, however, in civil cases the time for taking an appeal as provided in Rules 4 and 5 may not be extended. M.R.A.P. 2(c) (emphasis added). This case involves a direct appeal in a criminal case, and we are not precluded from extending the time for a direct appeal. ¶ 16. In light of this Court's previous ruling in McGruder, and the extraordinary circumstances encountered by Deloach, we hold that M.R.A.P. 2 and 4 are suspended in this case to allow Deloach an out-of-time appeal.