Opinion ID: 793418
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tina Cortez's Excessive Force Claim

Text: 87 Pursuant to the analytical framework outlined in the majority opinion, the only way that Ms. Cortez could recover for a claim of excessive force is if she was lawfully subjected to an investigative detention. I have already explained the problems I perceive in adopting the majority's approach to excessive force claims, but even pursuant to that approach, I believe the officers' alleged conduct violated Ms. Cortez's clearly established constitutional right to be free from excessive force. 88 In order to overcome the defendants' claim of qualified immunity, Mr. and Ms. Cortez must show that the defendants' actions violated a specific constitutional right and that the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. See Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir.2000). The Tenth Circuit has held that, in order for the right to be clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains. Medina v. City of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992). Recently, however, the Supreme Court explained that officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). The salient question . . . is whether the state of the law [at the time of the incident] gave the [defendants] fair warning that their conduct was unconstitutional. Id. 89 The right to make a lawful investigatory detention necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Any claim that an officer used excessive force in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other `seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its `reasonableness standard.' Id. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865. In the context of a Terry stop/investigative detention, the Tenth Circuit has held that police officers may `take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo.' United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985)). 90 With respect to Ms. Cortez, the officers involved should have known that they were permitted to use only as much force as was necessary to secure their own safety and maintain the status quo. Under prior case law in the Tenth Circuit, officers are required to articulate specific justifications for uses of force during an investigative detention, such as locking a person in a police cruiser. See, e.g., Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1464 (explaining that historically, the maximum level of force permissible in a standard Terry stop fell short of placing the suspect in `custody' for the purposes of triggering Miranda,  but that if circumstances indicate a suspect is armed or dangerous, then it is permissible for officers to use other measures of force more traditionally associated with the concepts of `custody' such as placing suspects in police cruisers [or the] drawing of weapons); United States v. Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062, 1064 (10th Cir.1993) (permitting the display of firearms and the use of handcuffs during a Terry stop when officers had reason to believe the suspect was dangerous). 91 The defendants assert that if they had left Ms. Cortez in her home alone, she could have destroyed evidence related to her husband's alleged child molestation, but they have provided no particularized facts on which to base this claim. Moreover, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Cortez, the level of force the defendants used against Ms. Cortez was unreasonable in relation to the threat that she presented. Although it is generally permissible to hold a person by the arm during an investigative detention, defendants have not articulated any reasonable safety concerns or flight concerns that would justify the extra force that they used against Ms. Cortez—escorting her from her bedroom in the middle of the night and keeping her in a locked police vehicle for nearly an hour. Therefore, despite the fact that Ms. Cortez's claim may present a novel issue of fact for this circuit, the officers had fair warning that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional under clearly established precedent in the Tenth Circuit.