Opinion ID: 450560
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Frappier-Minnig Agreement

Text: 10 Frappier and Minnig signed virtually identical written plea agreements. They cover many drug smuggling ventures and charges brought in Maine, Massachusetts, and Oregon. Paragraph 5 of each agreement, the primary provision at issue on appeal, reads as follows: 11 The defendant agrees to fully cooperate, as defined in Paragraph 2. If, at the time of sentencing on the Maine indictment, the defendant has fully cooperated with the United States, as defined in Paragraph 2, the Government will recommend a specific term of imprisonment which does not exceed twenty (20) years and, depending principally upon the value to the Government of the defendant's cooperation, the Government, in its sole discretion, may recommend a sentence of ten (10) years; the defendant may argue for a sentence less than the Government's recommendation; in any event, the Court shall impose a sentence no greater than that recommended by the Government. If, at the time of sentencing on the Maine indictment, the Government presents evidence and the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has not fully cooperated, as defined in Paragraph 2, then the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment of thirty-five (35) years. The Court shall not sentence the defendant to pay a fine on either the Maine or Oregon indictment. 12 Full cooperation is defined in Paragraph 2 of each agreement as: (1) the disclosure of all criminal activities known to the defendant, whether undertaken by the defendant or others; (2) the provision of all records, receipts, etc., which tend to corroborate the occurrence of such criminal activities; and (3) the giving of complete and honest testimony at any and all proceedings concerning such activities. 13 The district court read Paragraph 5 to mean that failure to fully cooperate would result in a sentence of 35 years, complete and honest cooperation would result in a sentence of 20 years, and cooperation that is of value to the government, or, as the district court rephrased the matter, which results in the success of the underlying prosecution, would result in a sentence of 10 years. 589 F.Supp. at 564. So viewing the contingent nature of the ultimate sentence, the district court found that the plea agreements on their face impose a subjective pressure on the accomplices to testify as the government wants rather than truthfully and that the creation of such an inducement to lie necessitates excluding all their testimony. Id. 14 On appeal, the government notes that the plea agreements do not make the ultimate sentences contingent upon the prosecution or conviction of anyone, and that neither Frappier nor Minnig, according to their testimony in the Caruana trial, understood the agreements to intend such a contingency. In addition, the government disagrees with the district court's isolation of the value to the Government provision from the rest of the agreement. The government contends that what was intended and understood by the parties was that this provision effectively promised that complete and honest cooperation would result in a sentence which could range from ten to twenty years, depending upon the extent and quality of the information that Frappier and Minnig provided. 15 Among the circumstances cited by the government as requiring it to set a range of years rather than choose a specific number are the following: the fact that, although Frappier and Minnig were very high level drug smugglers and probably knew a great deal, it was impossible to determine the extent of their knowledge before they signed plea agreements and felt free to talk; the fact that what they knew and could honestly report had to be factored into the ultimately recommended sentence in order for both the public and the pleading parties to obtain a just and proper quid pro quo in the exchange of a specific reduction in sentence for information of a particular value in terms of achieving valid law enforcement ends; and the fact that the government anticipated a number of prosecutions in a number of jurisdictions extending over a number of years, which created a need to leave the ultimate sentence somewhat open and dependant upon the extent to which Frappier and Minnig continued to cooperate over time. 3 The government contends that if the agreements are viewed in this light, they cannot be seen as creating an impermissible inducement to lie.