Opinion ID: 357975
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: feasible measures petitioner could have taken

Text: 43 Petitioner has argued that, given the impossibility of mass-producing titanium without creating some dust and fines and given the absence of a precise standard establishing what level of accumulation is likely to cause death or serious physical harm, affirming the Commission's order in this instance would require petitioner to render its plant free of any accumulations and in so doing impose a standard of strict liability inconsistent with OSHA's intent. 44 Nothing of the sort would be proper; nor does this Court's decision impose such a standard. OSHA was never designed, nor could it have been, to eliminate all occupational accidents. Rather, it is designed to require a good faith effort to balance the need of workers to have a sale (sic) and healthy work environment against the requirement of industry to function without undue interference. Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1971) at 435 (Remarks of Senator Williams), Quoted in Anning-Johnson Co. v. OSHRC, 516 F.2d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 1975). 45 We have held that (t)he employer's duty, . . . under the general duty clause, must be one which is Achievable. Brennan v. OSHRC (Hendrix d/b/a Alsea Lumber Co.), 511 F.2d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 1975) (emphasis supplied). Accord, National Realty, supra, 489 F.2d at 1265-66 (Congress intended to require elimination only of preventable hazards). 46 In National Realty the court reversed a finding of a violation of the general duty clause, holding that such finding was not supported by substantial evidence in the absence of a showing by the Secretary of particular steps the employer should have taken to avoid the citation, and of the feasibility and likely utility of those measures. Id. at 1267-68. Having first noted the elements of a § 5(a)(1) violation, Id. at 1265 (see Supra slip opinion at 540), and having found the Commission's findings with respect to the last two elements supported by substantial evidence, Id., the court nevertheless found that the Secretary had failed to satisfy his Burden of going forward with respect to the first element and consequently substantial evidence to support the violation was necessarily lacking. The court emphasized in so holding that the hearing record is barren of evidence describing, and demonstrating the feasibility and likely utility of, the particular measures which National Realty should have taken to improve its safety policy. Having the burden of proof, the Secretary must be charged with these evidentiary deficiencies. Id. at 1267. Accord, General Electric Co. v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d 67, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1976). 47 Unlike the case in National Realty, in this instance the Secretary offered ample evidence concerning what steps were open to petitioner which could and should have been taken to eliminate or substantially reduce the hazard of fires emanating from or fueled by accumulations of titanium dust and fines. Block, the Secretary's metallurgy expert, testified that the best way to minimize the possibility of fires is to keep the particles isolated because, whereas small amounts of burning reactive metal can be controlled, a fire can spread very rapidly wherever dust and fines have accumulated. 48 The administrative law judge found, and the record viewed as a whole contains substantial evidence to support his findings, that (1) there were heavy and extensive accumulations in and around the splitter in Unit 11 on October 24, 1974, and for many days before; (2) this fact had been reported to petitioner's foreman in charge of Unit 11; (3) there were several ignition sources (e. g., the T-bar wrench and the tote bin latch assembly (not made out of non-sparking materials); oil spillage near the press in Unit 11) which could have been eliminated or substantially reduced; (4) the most recent of two washdowns of the area in 1974 had occurred six to eight weeks prior to October 24; (5) sweepdowns of the decks of the splitter and surrounding floor area required at the end of each shift (but not of the beams and other surfaces, which were not swept at all) typically were not supervised or inspected and were not always done, at least not in a thorough manner; and (6) the only means of escape from the top level of the splitter required an operator to walk down a flight of stairs which passed beneath the duct of the rotocomb dust collector system. He concluded: 49 (T)he hazard present here, the excessive accumulation of titanium dust and fines, could have been eliminated by better housekeeping, particularly by more frequent wash downs (sic). The record indicates that (petitioner's) officials did not insist upon a thorough sweeping at the end of each shift. But more important, wash downs were not carried out as frequently as they should have been. How often a wash down should be performed will, of course, necessarily vary depending on the operation of the splitter and the resulting accumulation. There was testimony that a wash down could, and should, have been carried out once each week. This is a reasonable requirement in the interest of job safety when the splitter is in regular use, even though it may well interfere with the production of titanium.It may not be possible to manufacture titanium without some dust and occasional fines, but it is possible to restrict the accumulation so there will not be fuel for a larger fire. 50 (Emphases supplied.) 51 On March 17, 1978, this case was argued orally and ordered submitted for decision. Thereafter, on May 23, the Supreme Court held that the Occupational Safety and Health Act is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to authorize inspections without warrant or its equivalent . . . . Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978). 52 No constitutional issue was raised before the agency or here concerning the inspection of petitioner's premises made by an agent of OSHA on the day following the accident. We consider the holding in Marshall to have no application to the record before us. 53 Having determined that the findings of the Commission are supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole, 29 U.S.C. § 660(a), and having determined that its order affirming the citation was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), we affirm the order of the Commission.