Opinion ID: 1721462
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Damages for Emotional Injury/Mental Suffering.

Text: The Nichols contend that damages for mental distress should be awarded when it can be shown that the owner's bonding with his or her pet is such that the owner deems the pet to be a member of the owner's family. In most cases, it is held that the sentimental attachment of an owner to his or her dog has no place in the computation of damages for the dog's death or injury and that no award can be made for the value of the plaintiff's mental suffering. See generally J.A. Connelly, Annotation, Measure and Elements of Damages for Killing or Injuring Dog, 1 A.L.R.3d 997 (1965) [hereinafter Annotation]. The Nichols cite two cases in which damages for mental distress were allowed in actions for the killing of a dog. See La Porte v. Associated Indep., Inc., 163 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1964); Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, Etc., 63 Haw. 557, 632 P.2d 1066 (1981). Both cases are distinguishable. In Campbell, the Hawaii Supreme Court allowed recovery for serious mental distress resulting from the negligent destruction of plaintiffs' dog despite the fact plaintiffs did not witness the tortious event. In Iowa, however, plaintiffs must actually witness a tortious event in order to recover damages for emotional distress. Compare Campbell, 632 P.2d at 1069 with Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1981). Moreover, under Iowa law a plaintiff could not recover for mental distress caused by witnessing a tortious event unless the plaintiff and victim were husband and wife or were related to within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity. Barnhill, 300 N.W.2d at 108. Thus, at least two elements for recovery of damages for mental distress in Iowa are not required in Hawaii. In La Porte the court held that damages for mental suffering may be recovered when there is a malicious destruction of a dog. La Porte, 163 So.2d at 269. Here, however, there was neither a claim, nor evidence, that the injury to Yawbus was malicious. We find that La Porte is distinguishable on its facts and Campbell distinguishable on the law. Moreover, although we are mindful of the suffering an owner endures upon the death or injury of a beloved pet, we resolve to follow the majority of jurisdictions that do not allow recovery of damages for such mental distress. See generally Annotation, 1 A.L.R.3d 997, at 1010. We conclude the district court correctly denied the Nichols damages for mental distress.