Opinion ID: 175117
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Criminal Information and Abstract of Judgment

Text: The criminal information and abstract of judgment, taken together, do not establish that Espinoza was necessarily convicted of using force that would render his convictions crimes of violence. In the section 243.4(a) sexual battery count, the information charged Espinoza with willfully and unlawfully touch[ing] an intimate part of Jane Doe, while said person was unlawfully restrained by said defendant(s) Arvin Espinoza Morales, against the will of said person and for the purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, and sexual abuse. The abstract of judgment shows only that Espinoza was convicted by jury of this crime. Neither the information nor the abstract of judgment clarifies the type of unlawful restraint used, and neither document even mentions any use of force. The information and abstract of judgment therefore cannot establish that the jury necessarily convicted Espinoza of violating section 243.4(a) based on conduct involving the use of force. In the section 289(a)(1) penetration by a foreign object count, the information charged Espinoza with accomplishing the unlawful penetration by force, violence, duress, menace and fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another. [11] (emphasis added). Even though the state charged Espinoza in the conjunctivewith accomplishing the penetration by means of force, violence, duress, menace and fearthis charge could have supported a conviction based on duress alone. Under California law, a jury could have convicted Espinoza if it found that he had accomplished the penetration by any one of the alleged means. See In re Bushman, 1 Cal.3d 767, 83 Cal.Rptr. 375, 463 P.2d 727, 732 (1970) (Merely because the complaint is phrased in the conjunctive ... does not prevent a trier of fact from convicting a defendant if the evidence proves only one of the alleged acts.), overruled in part on other grounds by People v. Lent, 15 Cal.3d 481, 124 Cal. Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545, 548 n. 1 (1975). The jury instructions in the state court casewhich Espinoza submitted after oral argument and of which we take judicial notice [12] confirm this. These instructions directed the jury that it must be proved that the penetration was accomplished by [the use of force, violence, duress, menace or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to [the alleged victim]. (brackets in original; emphasis added). These instructions thus permitted the jury to convict Espinoza if it found that he accomplished the penetration by means of duress alone. The abstract of judgment provides no additional information, but rather simply reflects that the jury convicted Espinoza of violating section 289(a)(1). The criminal information and abstract of judgment, taken together, therefore do not establish that Espinoza was necessarily convicted of using force that would render his conviction a crime of violence for purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)'s enhancement.