Opinion ID: 2367165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: validity of the death penalty imposed pursuant to section 9711 of the sentencing code

Text: In Commonwealth v. Bradley, 449 Pa. 19, 295 A.2d 842 (1972), this Court recognized that under Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), Pennsylvania's then existing capital punishment statute was unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and so declared invalid the Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872  701, as amended 18 P.S.  4701. In apparent response to the void in Pennsylvania law regarding imposition of a death penalty engendered by Bradley, the General Assembly in 1972 adopted section 1102 of the Crimes Code which merely stated [a] person who has been convicted of murder of the first degree shall be sentenced to death or to a term of life imprisonment. Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 435, 383 A.2d 174, 178 (1978). As it was manifest that in no way could  1102 have been designed to cure the constitutional infirmities of the Act of 1939 . . ., it seemed that  1102 had no purpose other than to provide some legislative authority for the imposition of a death sentence until the General Assembly could formulate an adequate response to the implications of the Furman decision. Id. In 1974, the legislature enacted section 1311 of the Sentencing Code, 18 Pa.C.S.A.  1311, Act of March 26, 1974, P.L. 214, No. 46, in an attempt to comply with the Furman and Bradley decisions. This attempt failed. While section 1311 did provide sentencing procedures intended to channel the jury's discretion (and thus avoid the danger of the death penalty being imposed in a wanton and freakish, arbitrary and capricious manner, Furman v. Georgia, supra 408 U.S. at 310, 92 S.Ct. at 2762 (Stewart, J., concurring), at 313, 92 S.Ct. at 2764 (White, J., concurring), and at 256-57, 92 S.Ct. at 2735-2736 (Douglas, J., concurring)), it went too far in excluding from jury consideration evidence pertaining to the individual history and character of the offender. Commonwealth v. Moody, 476 Pa. 223, 231, 382 A.2d 442 (1977). Accordingly, this Court held, based upon Furman and the 1976 quintet of same-day United States Supreme Court decisions, [10] that: [I]n our view, in order to protect a defendant from cruel and unusual punishment in a capital case, it is now necessary both that the aggravating circumstances that will justify the imposition of the death penalty be clearly defined for the sentencing authority, and that the sentencing authority be allowed to consider whatever mitigating evidence relevant to his character and record the defendant can present. On September 13, 1978, in yet another attempt to adopt a constitutionally valid procedure by which capital punishment could be inflicted, the General Assembly enacted the current sentencing procedures set forth at section 9711 of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A.  9711, [11] pursuant to which appellant was sentenced to death. These procedures retain the split-verdict provisions of the previous acts by which, if a jury returns a verdict of murder of the first degree, a separate sentencing proceeding is then held before the same jury panel at which both sides may present arguments and additional evidence relative to the circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the defendant.  9711(d). [12] The court then instructs the jury on the aggravating circumstances specified in subsection (d) [13] , mitigating circumstances specified in subsection (e) [14] , the respective burdens of proof as to these circumstances, and the weighing process to be performed.  9711(c). The jury must return a verdict of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, or unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances.  9711(c)(1)(iv). In all other cases, the jury must return a verdict of life imprisonment. In either event, the jury is required to set forth its findings in writing on a form designated by the court.  9711(f). Automatic review by this Court is provided.  9711(h)(1). In addition to our authority to correct errors at trial, the statute also requires this Court to review the sentence of death, which shall be affirmed unless it is determined that the sentence was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor, that the evidence fails to support the finding of an aggravating circumstance, or that the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases considering both the circumstances of the offense and the character and record of the defendant.  9711(h)(3)(i-iii). It is apparent that, by this Act, the General Assembly has diligently attempted to perform the delicate balance required by the federal and state constitutions as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court and by this Court. Section IIB will discuss the success of these efforts. Section IIA addresses appellant's non-constitutional arguments concerning the validity of his sentence.