Opinion ID: 1931235
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appealability of Permanency Plan Orders

Text: Appeals may only be taken from a final judgment of the trial court pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which states that, a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil ... case ... [whether] entered ... in the exercise of original, special, limited, or statutory jurisdiction, unless ... expressly denied by law. Smith v. Taylor, 285 Md. 143, 146, 400 A.2d 1130, 1132 (1979) (internal citations omitted). For the trial court's ruling to be a final judgment it must either determine and conclude the rights of the parties involved or deny a party the means to prosecut[e] or defend[] his or her rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding. Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41, 566 A.2d 767, 773 (1989). In considering whether a particular court order or ruling constitutes an appealable judgment, we assess whether any further order is to be issued or whether any further action is to be taken in the case. See Rohrbeck, 318 Md. at 41-42, 566 A.2d at 774. There are instances when a trial court's order constitutes a final appealable judgment even though the order fails to settle the underlying dispute between the parties. See Ferrell v. Benson, 352 Md. 2, 6, 720 A.2d 583, 585-86 (1998) (holding that order transferring case to district court was a final and appealable judgment), and cases cited therein; Moore v. Pomory, 329 Md. 428, 432, 620 A.2d 323, 325 (1993) (determining that trial court's order dismissing complaint without prejudice was a final judgment); Horsey v. Horsey, 329 Md. 392, 401, 620 A.2d 305, 310 (1993) (concluding that trial court's order dismissing former husband's contempt petition against former wife and directing arbitration of alimony dispute was a final appealable order because it had the effect of putting the parties out of court). Clearly, in this case, however, court orders arising from a periodic review hearing that maintain the permanency plans for the children do not constitute final judgments. See In re Samone H., 385 Md. at 302-03, 869 A.2d at 382; In re Damon M., 362 Md. 429, 434, 765 A.2d 624, 627 (2001). An order that is not a final judgment may qualify as an interlocutory order, but ordinarily is not appealable unless it falls within one of the statutory exceptions set forth in Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), Section 12-303 of the Court and Judicial Proceedings Article. [8] See In re Samone H., 385 Md. at 316, 869 A.2d at 390; In re Damon M., 362 Md. at 434, 765 A.2d at 626-27. In In re Samone H., we scrutinized whether an appeal would lie from an order entered after a permanency plan review hearing where the order continuing the permanency plan did not adversely affect the parental rights or change the terms of the permanency plan to the parent's detriment. In that case, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City previously had implemented permanency plans of adoption for two children, Samone H. and Marchay E., both of whom had been adjudicated children in need of assistance, based upon allegations of neglect by their mother, Katina M. Id. at 313, 869 A.2d at 388. After several periodic review hearings, Katina M. filed a request for a bonding study to have the children evaluated by a psychiatrist to provide an assessment of her relationship with her children. She also had the children subpoenaed to testify at another pending review hearing. During that hearing, the trial judge denied both requests and maintained the extant permanency plans for adoption, from which Katina M. appealed. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and this Court after granting certiorari, dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court's order denying the motion for [bonding] study [was] not an appealable final judgment and [did] not constitute an interlocutory order under Section 12-303(x). Id. at 316, 869 A.2d at 390. [9] In reaching that conclusion, we explained that, [b]ecause the order continuing the permanency plan did not adversely affect Katina M.'s parental rights or change the terms of the permanency plan to Katina M.'s detriment, the trial judge's actions [were] not reviewable by this Court. Id. at 317, 869 A.2d at 391. We further noted that the court's order was not appealable under the collateral order doctrine because the order did not conclusively determine whether the permanency plans should have been changed, was not separate from the merits of the action, and would be reviewable on appeal if the denial had affected the mother's parental rights. Id. at 315 n. 13, 869 A.2d at 390 n. 13. Thus, to be appealable, court orders arising from the permanency plan review hearing must operate to either deprive Tammy B. of the care and custody of her children or change the terms of her care and custody of the children to her detriment. Id. at 299, 869 A.2d at 380; In re Damon M., 362 Md. at 438, 765 A.2d at 628. Analogous to the circumstances in In re Samone H., the orders continuing the permanency plans for all four children in the case sub judice, are not appealable because the orders did not detrimentally affect Tammy B.'s custody rights or visitation with the children, even though Tammy B. had sought full custody. As in In re Samone H., we conclude once again, that in the absence of a detrimental change in Tammy B.'s care and custody of the children, her parental rights have not been adversely affected to permit an appeal of the lower court's orders maintaining the extant permanency plans. In re Samone H., 385 Md at 315-16, 869 A.2d at 390; In re Damon M., 362 Md. at 438, 765 A.2d at 628. Likewise, the orders are not appealable as collateral orders because the orders are subject to review and change; do not conclusively determine the custody of the children; and do not adversely affect Tammy B.'s custodial rights. See In re Samone H., 385 Md. at 315 n. 13, 869 A.2d at 390 n. 13. During oral argument before this Court, Tammy B. asserted that our decision in Frase v. Barnhart, 379 Md. 100, 840 A.2d 114 (2003), should control decisions affecting the appealability of court orders arising from permanency plan review hearings. The circumstances of Frase involved a custody dispute between a mother and her child's caretakers, who, during part of the mother's incarceration, volunteered to care for the child and then sought custody. Id. at 102, 840 A.2d at 115. The trial court resolved the dispute by granting custody to the mother, but imposing various conditions upon the terms of her custody including: that she vacate her existing housing, that she apply to and obtain new housing at a specific place where the mother did not want to live, and that the child spend every other weekend with the caregivers. Id. at 120, 840 A.2d at 125. The trial court left open the prospect of changing the mother's custody if the mother did not meet the conditions. This Court determined that the custodial order was appealable under Section 12-303(x) because the court's order operated as a substantial, albeit partial, deprivation of her custody. Id. at 119-20, 840 A.2d at 125. Similarly, to be appealable in CINA cases involving the biological parent and the State, a court order must operate to deprive a parent of the care and custody of his or her child, or change the terms of custody to the parent's detriment. The present case, nonetheless, is dissimilar from Frase in that Tammy B.'s custodial rights had been abrogated when the children were declared in need of assistance and committed to DSS's custody, but not when the trial court maintained the permanency plans for the children, which did not adversely affect Tammy B.'s parental rights. As a result, we conclude that this case is controlled by our decision In re Samone H., and that the trial court's permanency plan orders emanating from the November 10, 2003, hearing are nonreviewable. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS VACATED, AND CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DISMISS APPEAL; PETITIONER TO PAY COSTS.