Opinion ID: 1160840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Doctrine of Transferred Intent

Text: As a general proposition, a person cannot be held criminally responsible for an offense unless the state proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the essential elements of that offense. Intent to kill a human being is an element of attempted murder. Ochoa contends he cannot be convicted of attempting to murder Smith since there is no evidence that he ever intended to kill Smith. The state argues that there was no need to present evidence of any intent to kill Smith because Ochoa's intent to kill Ortiz can be attributed to Smith applying the doctrine of transferred intent. The doctrine of transferred intent is a theory of imputed liability. It was developed to address situations where a defendant, intending to kill A, misses A and instead accidentally kills B. Without the doctrine, the individual responsible for B's death could not be charged with murder because there was never an intent to kill B. Rather than allow an individual who intended to commit murder to escape full responsibility for his conduct simply because he killed the wrong person, the doctrine of transferred intent was established. The intent to kill A would be transferred or imputed to victim B. The doctrine of transferred intent was created to avoid the specific intent requirement and thus hold the defendant accountable for the consequences of his behavior when he injures an unintended victim. State v. Wilson, 71 Wash.App. 880, 863 P.2d 116, 121 (1993), rev'd in part on other grounds, 125 Wash.2d 212, 883 P.2d 320 (1994). Ochoa stresses that this is not the traditional bad aim case where the perpetrator misses the intended victim and accidentally hits an unintended victim. Here Ochoa intended to kill, and did kill, Ortiz. Ochoa argues that since the intended victim was killed, the intent to kill cannot be transferred to the unintended victim, Smith. While imputed liability through transferred intent is most often seen in bad aim situations, the rationale of the doctrine need not be limited to such cases. Theoretically, the doctrine applies in any case where there is intent to commit a criminal act and the only difference between the actual result and the contemplated result is the nature of the personal or property injuries sustained. See P.H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 Yale L.J. 609 (1984). The doctrine of transferred intent is based upon a legal fiction that imposes criminal liability upon a person based upon his or her participation in a factual scenario which creates harm to persons or property. Direct proof of a particular element of a crime is not required because the requisite element is imputed from the conduct of the defendant. There are numerous applications of this concept in criminal jurisprudence. The felony-murder and co-conspirator culpability rules are prime examples of imputed liability because the conduct of one actor in a crime is imputed to all the participants of that crime. Id. at 611. Professor Robinson identifies four justifications for imputing an absent element of a criminal offense. One of these justifications, known as the equivalency theory, is the most commonly applied rationale for the transferred intent doctrine. Under this theory, if the actual harm or crime is the equivalent of the harm or crime intended to be committed, then liability for the intended harm should be imputed to the actual harm. Thus the culpability actually present should be equivalent to the culpability required by the charged offense. Id. at 648. The rationale supporting the equivalency theory applies to the instant case. When Ochoa fired shots at Ortiz, the actual culpability (i.e., intent to kill) is equivalent to the culpability of the charged crime, attempted murder (i.e., an intent to kill that fails to succeed). The actual result (two people harmed) differs from the contemplated result (one person harmed.) However, the culpable mental state (intent to kill) in the contemplated result remains unchanged in the actual result. The identity or number of persons injured is not relevant to the equivalency rationale. The fact that the equivalency theory of imputed liability can be used in this case to support the application of the transferred intent doctrine does not answer the question of whether, as a matter of public policy, the doctrine should be applied to any given situation. Other courts have addressed the issue of expanding the doctrine of transferred intent to cases where both the intended and unintended victims have been injured or killed. Ochoa urges the court to adopt the rationale of People v. Birreuta, 162 Cal.App.3d 454, 208 Cal.Rptr. 635 (1984). Birreuta held that the doctrine of transferred intent would not be applied where the intended victim was actually killed and a bystander was also accidentally killed. Since the perpetrator will be punished for the actual killing, and his intent to kill was directed at only one person, the perpetrator should not also suffer punishment for that single intent as a result of an accidental injury to third persons. In contrast to Birreuta, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the doctrine applies regardless of whether or not the intended victim was injured. In State v. Hinton, 227 Conn. 301, 630 A.2d 593, 603 (1993), the court noted that: When a defendant contemplates or designs the death of another, the purpose of deterrence is better served by holding that defendant responsible for the knowing and purposeful murder of the unintended as well as the intended victim. Hence, we reject defendant's argument that the successful killing of the intended victim prevents the transfer of that intent to an unintended victim. See also State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 569 A.2d 1314 (1990). We agree with the Hinton rationale. Although Birreuta and Hinton involved charges of murder, there is no reason not to apply the doctrine of transferred intent to other situations where the criminal charges relating to the intended and unintended victims differ but the specific intent required for the crimes remains the same. For example, in State v. Stringfield, 4 Kan.App.2d 559, 608 P.2d 1041 (1980), the Kansas Court of Appeals applied the doctrine in a case of aggravated battery. In Stringfield, the defendant fatally shot the intended victim while at the same time wounding a child in the vicinity of the shooting. Because the facts showed the defendant only had the intent to injure the intended victim, he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter as to the intended victim and aggravated battery [2] as to the unintended victim. The crimes differed, but the intent to injure was the same. Accordingly, the doctrine of transferred intent is applicable to all crimes where an unintended victim is harmed as a result of the specific intent to harm an intended victim whether or not the intended victim is injured. Since there was sufficient evidence that Ochoa intended to kill Ortiz, that intent may be transferred to the unintended victim, Smith. As Smith did not die, the appropriate charge was attempted murder. Having held that the transferred intent doctrine is applicable, we conclude, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of attempted murder beyond a reasonable doubt. See Hutchins v. State, 110 Nev. 103, 107-08, 867 P.2d 1136, 1139 (1994).