Opinion ID: 1951964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: Refusal to Instruct on Likely Aggregate Sentences

Text: Prior to the penalty-phase instructions, defense counsel requested the Court to instruct the jury on the maximum number of years and the maximum amount of parole ineligibility in the aggregate that Harris was exposed to by virtue of his convictions on the related non-capital offenses of, among others, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, and robbery. That parole ineligibility period could have been over sixty years. [8] The court declined, stating that it does not know that it would impose or could even rationally impose that many years. The jury is further informed that it is not to consider all of this when deciding on whether the death sentence should be imposed or a term of imprisonment. Consistent with this ruling, the court instructed the jury on the individual base sentence and the individual period of parole ineligibility on each charge that Harris could receive. The court explained concurrent and consecutive sentencing and told the jury that the court would decide whether those sentences will be consecutive or concurrent. The court also instructed the jury that [t]he possible sentences for the other convictions should not influence your decision regarding the appropriateness of a death sentence on the murder charge. Defendant contends that in refusing defense counsel's request for an instruction concerning Harris' aggregate sentence, including aggregate parole disqualifiers, and in instructing the jury not to consider these sentences, the court violated Harris' state and federal constitutional due-process right to a fair and reliable sentencing hearing and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment. Prior to our decision in Loftin, supra, 146 N.J. 295, 680 A. 2d 677, our capital punishment jurisprudence had emphasized a trial court's obligation in the penalty phase of a capital case to inform the jury of its responsibility in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty, to apprise the jury of the practical effect of a life sentence, and to inform the jury about a defendant's prior sentences in order to preclude speculation about a defendant's release from distorting a jury's decision to impose life or death. State v. Bey, 129 N.J. 557, 601-02, 610 A. 2d 814 (1992) ( Bey III ), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164, 115 S.Ct. 1131, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1093 (1995). Reflecting federal precedent concerning sentencing information that should be furnished to capital case jurors in the penalty phase, see Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 161-69, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 2192-96, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133, 141-46 (1994), we concluded in State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 619 A. 2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L. Ed. 2d 137 (1995), that in the penalty phase of a capital case when defense counsel or the jury requests instructions on the potential sentences a defendant will receive for convictions arising from the same trial as his capital-murder conviction, such information should be provided by the trial court. The jurors should be informed of the sentencing options available to the judge, and that the determination of sentence had not yet been made. In addition, the trial court should explain that the sentence may or may not run consecutively to that for murder, but that the determination is left to the court. Finally, the court should inform the jury that defendant's possible sentence for the other convictions should not influence its determination regarding the appropriateness of a death sentence on the murder count. Such instructions will assist in dispelling confusion on the part of the jury and will help to safeguard against improper sentencing determinations.