Opinion ID: 1784340
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Step One: Was Holland's Question Ambiguous?

Text: The first step will require a determination of whether Holland's question constituted an ambiguous invocation of his right to an attorney. The constitutional principles governing custodial interrogation are well-established. One principle dictates that custodial interrogation must be preceded by advice to the putative defendant (hereinafter defendant) regarding the Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1639, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726. If the right to remain silent is invoked, the interrogation must cease. If the right to have an attorney present is invoked, the interrogation must cease until [one] is present. Id., quoted in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 (1981); see also Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 492, 83 L.Ed.2d 488, 493-94 (1984) ( per curiam ) (This is a rigid prophylactic rule.). Under either circumstance, interrogation may commence or resume in the absence of an attorney if the defendant: (1) initiated further discussions with the police; and (2) knowingly and intelligently [and voluntarily] waived the right ... invoked. Smith, 469 U.S. at 95, 105 S.Ct. at 492, 83 L.Ed.2d at 494; United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 976 (2d Cir.1988). The right to have an attorney present must be specifically invoked. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482, 101 S.Ct. at 1884, 68 L.Ed.2d at 385. This may be accomplished in any manner and at any stage of the process. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 86 S.Ct. at 1612-13, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706-07. And courts must give a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation to a defendant's request for counsel, and this principle applies whether the defendant's request is explicit or equivocal. Towne v. Dugger, 899 F.2d 1104, 1106 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1406, 89 L.Ed.2d 631, 640 (1986)). If a defendant makes equivocal or ambiguous utterances which could be interpreted as an invocation, then the trend is to require cessation of interrogation except for strictly-limited inquiry for clarification purposes. Gotay, 844 F.2d at 974 (The trend ... is to adopt that when a suspect makes an equivocal statement that can arguably be construed as a request for counsel, interrogations must cease except for narrow questions designed to clarify the earlier statement and the suspect's desire for counsel.); see Towne, 899 F.2d at 1106; United States v. Porter, 776 F.2d 370 (1st Cir.1985), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048, 107 S.Ct. 2178, 95 L.Ed.2d 835 (1987); United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124, 1130-31 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056, 107 S.Ct. 932, 93 L.Ed.2d 983 (1987); United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1405 (9th Cir.1985). [3] This Court has joined the trend by permitting an interrogator to clarify ambiguous utterances. See, e.g., Kirkland v. State, 559 So.2d 1046, 1048 (Miss. 1990); Berry v. State, 575 So.2d 1, 5-8 (Miss. 1990). Precedents do not establish a bright line rule for determining what sorts of statements amount to equivocal requests for an attorney. Towne, 899 F.2d at 1106; see Robinson v. Borg, 918 F.2d 1387, 1391 n. 4 (9th Cir.1990) (The totality of circumstances test, which is used to determine whether an accused has `knowingly and voluntarily' waived his Miranda rights, has no role in the determination of whether an accused's request for counsel is clear or equivocal.) (quoting Owen v. Alabama, 849 F.2d 536, 539 (11th Cir.1988)). This determination is critical, though, because incriminating information is inadmissible evidence if elicited after ambiguous utterances and prior to clarification. Gotay, 844 F.2d at 975; Fouche, 776 F.2d at 1405 (citing cases); Anderson v. Smith, 751 F.2d 96, 104 n. 9 (2d Cir.1984). In the case sub judice, the trial judge found that Holland had asked the detectives: Don't you think I need a lawyer? The judge then applied the law to this fact-finding and seems to have concluded that Holland's question constituted a declination of his right to have an attorney present. This conclusion is inconsistent with case law. As noted, precedents do not establish a bright-line rule for determining whether an utterance is ambiguous, and the United States Supreme Court has twice expressly declined to address the issue. Towne, 899 F.2d at 1106; see Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. 828, 832 n. 3, 93 L.Ed.2d 920, 928 n. 3 (1987); Smith, 469 U.S. at 96, 105 S.Ct. at 493, 83 L.Ed.2d at 494; see also Gotay, 844 F.2d at 974-75 (The Supreme Court has not defined `ambiguity' in this context or ruled on the consequences thereof.). Precedents do, however, establish that questions such as the one posed by Holland are ambiguous and require clarification. The recent case  Towne v. Dugger, 899 F.2d 1104 (11th Cir.1990)  is particularly instructive. In Towne, the Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant's question  Officer, what do you think about whether I should get a lawyer?  was ambiguous and required clarification. Id. at 1107-08 (citing cases in which an interrogating officer was asked by the defendant for advice on whether he should exercise his right to get an attorney). The Court explained that [s]uch questions reveal to the interrogating officer that the defendant is contemplating exercising his right to have an attorney present, and under [established case law], the officer should clarify the defendant's wishes before proceeding further. Id. at 1109 (citing cases); see Norman v. Ducharme, 871 F.2d 1483, 1486 (9th Cir.1989) (defendant's question  [Do you think I] should see a lawyer?  deemed ambiguous); U.S. v. Fouche, 833 F.2d 1284 at 1286-87 (9th Cir.1987) (defendant's question  What should I do?  deemed ambiguous). [4] Questions like Holland's are not only to be characterized as ambiguous  not only as a matter of law  but also as a matter of definition. Accord Knight v. State ex rel. Moore, 574 So.2d 662, 668 (Miss. 1990) (disposition of the issue ... require[s] comprehension of the `popular use of the word as shown by the dictionaries') (quoting O.W. Holmes' opinion in Commonwealth v. Wright, 137 Mass. 250, 251-52 (1884)). Definitionally, a question is [a]n expression of inquiry that invites or calls for a reply or a subject or point open to controversy [or] under discussion or being considered. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1015 (2d ed. 1985). Conversely, a declaration is [a]n explicit or formal statement or announcement). Id. at 372. Thus, when a suspect poses a question, interrogators should be permitted to respond for purposes of clarification; this plain-English or common-sense approach is consistent with the sound law pronounced in Towne and numerous other cases. [5] See, e.g., Robinson v. Borg, 918 F.2d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir.1990) (In analyzing a defendant's request for counsel, we take a defendant's words `understood as ordinary people would understand them.') (quoting Barrett, 479 U.S. at 529, 107 S.Ct. at 832, 93 L.Ed.2d at 928). In sum, Holland's question constituted an ambiguous invocation as a matter of law and as a matter of definition. [6] With the foregoing in mind, this Court must now determine whether the police detective responded to Holland's ambiguous invocation within constitutional parameters. That is, did the detective tailor his response solely for the purpose of clarifying the ambiguity?