Opinion ID: 1855634
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Wiley's appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to inform the court of record evidence of improper comments by the State regarding the possibility of parole?

Text: ¶ 55. As stated earlier, Wiley contends that defense counsel referred to the possibility of parole during cross-examination of defense witnesses and during closing arguments. On direct appeal, however, Wiley's counsel only assigned error to the mention of parole during voir dire. As previously noted, this Court affirmed, and distinguished the comments made during voir dire in this case from other cases, which had been reversed for similar reasons. Wiley now argues thatif the other alleged instances of the mention of parole had been brought to this Court's attention then this case could not be distinguished from the cases which have condemned the mention of parole. ¶ 56. However, as stated earlier, the possibility of parole was not mentioned in any of the portions of the record cited by Wiley. Therefore, this argument is not supported by the record. Moreover, even if the performance of Wiley's counsel could be considered deficient on this point, Wiley has not proven any resulting prejudice. Thus, this argument is without merit. See Hodgin, 702 So.2d at 116-17 (Miss.1997) (reiterating that burden is on petitioner to prove both prongs of the Strickland test).