Opinion ID: 1478467
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of Description.

Text: In the light of what has just been said our initial problem is whether the patent claims comply with R.S. § 4888, 35 U.S. C.A. § 33, requiring a full, clear, concise and exact description so that the process can be utilized by those skilled in the art. [5] The Supreme Court has been concerned with the same general problem on other occasions and has said enough about it to furnish a guide. Three things should be borne in mind, however, before turning our attention to the decisions themselves. First, we are dealing with a factual matter [6] hence prior decisions can only aid us in setting up the tests by which to evaluate the determination of fact. Second, a word may be sufficiently precise in describing one process or product and insufficient for another. Thus while substantial is regularly permitted as a descriptive word in most circumstances, [7] it has been regarded as insufficient in other circumstances. [8] Third, as science and art advance, words that once may have had sufficient particularity and precision have a tendency to become too loose and more specific descriptive terms are needed. This means that the illustrative value of the holding in a patent case on this point decreases with the span of years and with the rate of advance of science, though the rationale of the holding may continue to be valid. The public policy of § 4888 has been clearly expressed by the Supreme Court. The limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the inventive genius of others, and the assurance that the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public. The statute seeks to guard against unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others arising from uncertainty as to their rights. The inventor must `inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may be known which features may be safely used or manufactured without a license and which may not.' The claims `measure the invention.'    In a limited field the variant must be clearly defined. General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp. et al., 1938, 304 U.S. 364, 369, 58 S.Ct. 899, 902, 82 L.Ed. 1402. The same language is used in United Carbon Co. et al. v. Binney & Smith Co., 1942, 317 U.S. 228, 232, 63 S.Ct. 165, 168, 87 L.Ed. 232. The latter decision goes on to point out that The courts    no less than the parties-litigant, need and may insist upon the precision enjoined by the statute. The public policy behind the statute may be seen to be as strongly grounded in the necessity for adequate notice [9] as it is in the necessity to teach. The burden is on the inventor to say precisely what he has done. He must speak so clearly that he does not shift that burden to others who because of his failure to be more explicit may unwittingly invade the field covered by the patentee. [10] The most immediate test of sufficiency of precision in description following from the policy just outlined is that no inventor may compel independent experimentation by others to ascertain the bounds of his claims. This Court in the Standard Brands case [11] so ruled before and the Supreme Court in the same case [12] agreed. Equally necessary in derivation is the rule that difficulty in securing exactness does not mean a description may fall short of the requirements of the statute. In the General Electric case, supra, the Supreme Court said, The Circuit Court of Appeals below suggested that `in view of the difficulty, if not impossibility of describing adequately a number of microscopic and heterogeneous shapes of crystals, it may be    the best disclosure possible   .' But congress requires, for the protection of the public, that the inventor set out a definite limitation of his patent; that condition must be satisfied before the monopoly is granted. A caveat contained in a note [13] may have raised some doubts but if so they have since been resolved by the language of the United Carbon case, supra, Whether the vagueness of the claim has its source in the language employed or in the somewhat indeterminate character of the advance claimed to have been made in the art is not material. An invention must be capable of accurate definition, and it must be accurately defined, to be patentable. Cf. General Electric Co. v. Wabash Corp., 304 U.S. [364] at pages 372, 373, 58 S.Ct. [899] 903, 82 L.Ed. 1402. In a recent decision, [14] where determination of an infringement issue turned on the construction to be given the words, `without substantial vaporization', [15] as they are used in the claim, the Supreme Court said, We are of the view that `without substantial vaporization' as used in the patent means    cracking as nearly as may be in the liquid phase. [16] No independent experimentation was necessary to determine the liquid phase of the process. The claim description was thus sufficiently clear despite its use of a word that taken superficially lacked precision. The use of the language not substantially less than 66° Baumé. in referring to acid concentration in the instant case is not on its face bad for lack of clarity, therefore. This alone cannot establish or deny the compliance with the statute. We must examine the descriptions as a whole. The District Judge found as a fact that the claims here involved are not sufficiently definite to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the teachings of the patent. As would be expected, the plaintiff attacks this conclusion; the defendant supports it. We think it correct and will endeavor to state why we do. In the instant case, experimentation is the only means for ascertaining the claims. When Mr. Graves, plaintiff's chemist, was asked what he meant in stating the desired ends could be achieved under the process without laboratory analysis or testing he indicated that this was possible only by assuming a typical cracked distillate. [17] But as the District Court pointed out, the variation in gasoline stocks is of paramount significance. [18] Hence, the assumption is one that does not fit the facts. As already pointed out, [1] the amount of acid needed is described as [a] of such strength and quantity as to have the capacity at low temperatures of selectively removing a part of the sulphur bodies and to polymerize a further part of said bodies and [b] to effect a material rise of temperature of reaction unless restrained. Part [a] simply talks in terms of effects. It requires that amount of acid, whatever it may be, that will achieve the results of selective action and polymerization under refrigeration. Such a statement is void for want of particularity just as a functional description of a product patent would be. [19] Part [b] is also deficient on its face. [20] It is insufficient in still another respect i.e. as a suggested temperature range, for reasons to be discussed presently. The refrigerative method is described as [2] by absorbing heat of reaction, [a] at a maximum temperature of treatment sufficiently low to permit a part of the sulphur bodies to be selectively removed by said acid and a part thereof to be polymerized and [b] below the temperature at which the non-sulphur bearing unsaturated hydrocarbons readily polymerize. Again it will be seen that part [a] speaks in terms of results; it specifies a temperature low enough to achieve selective action and polymerization. It must fail for the same reasons that part [a] of the acid description failed. [21] Part [b] brings us directly to the question of temperature range which part [b] of the acid description tacitly suggested. Mr. Halloran, plaintiff's research and development department head, could not establish an upper limit of temperature range for the process, [22] and Mr. Day, a skilled refinery technician appearing as witness for plaintiff, could not set out the lower limit of temperature range for the process. [23] It is obvious that precision is completely lacking. [24] There are no critical limits which set off the new results claimed. [25] We may obtain the same kind of results outside the limits as within. [26] The temperature range is neither clear nor concise. [27] Not even Dr. Hampton himself, one of the inventors, could add particularity or render the situation more concise and clear as his testimony shows. [28] After what has been said, it is not necessary to do more than mention in passing that the record also reveals instances where the same conclusions are reached on the actual mathematics of given situations. The variant factors presented by the instant compositions of the cracked distillate are the only determinants [29] and these clearly require experimentation in each specific case. Perhaps this is the best that could be done under the circumstances. But as pointed out before, this is not enough when the requirements of the statute are not met. Notice to the industrial public is manifestly lacking here; and the teaching help furnished is of the type that aids him who aids himself. The language of the patent claims becomes conveniently inexact and lacking in clarity at the exact point of novelty. To put the matter as to this phase of the case in nontechnical language, it seems to us to come to about this: The patentee says to the petroleum industry and the public: Refrigeration of cracked distillate before sulphuric acid treatment will largely solve the problem of getting rid of sulphur compounds without losing the valuable unsaturated hydrocarbons. That will give you the solvent action of the acid upon some of the sulphur and the polymerization of most of the remainder. We cannot tell you how cold to make and keep your distillate for that depends upon a number of factors. Strength of acid is one: as to this we recommend it be not less than 66° Baumé. Quantity of acid is another factor. As to this we make no specification at all beyond such amount as the circumstances indicate. Length of exposure of distillate to acid is also a factor; likewise the chemical composition of your cracked distillate. Within limits, the more rigidly you confine your temperature rise, the smaller your loss of the valuable hydrocarbons will be. But, of course, your refrigeration costs will also be higher. You must decide which is the more advantageous to you, less end product but less refrigeration cost or more hydrocarbons and greater expense for ice. Here are some tables which show results under some of the conditions which have been met. But our patent is not to be limited in its application to conditions set out in this data. We think the District Judge was correct in concluding that the description was insufficient to meet the statutory requirements.