Opinion ID: 1989352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proportionality of Statutory Minimum Sentences

Text: The argument proffered by amicus, and suggested by the trial court's ruling, is that minimum sentences are disproportionate per se and thereby violate the Vermont Constitution. Vt. Const. ch. II § 39. When this issue was raised sua sponte by the trial court, it did not suggest on what basis the statute is disproportionate. Amicus refers to the fact that some crimes, considerably more heinous than driving with a suspended license, have no required jail sentence. [2] See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3010, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) (federal disproportionality test includes consideration of other sentences imposed within the jurisdiction). We do not take that fact, alone, as evidence that the statutes are unconstitutional. The legislature is entitled to make incremental changes in the statutes of this state, including the sentencing structure. See State v. Ludlow Supermarkets, Inc., 141 Vt. 261, 265, 448 A.2d 791, 793 (1982) (regulatory legislation is not unconstitutional where unbalanced impact is ... a necessary consequence of the most reasonable way of implementing that policy). The peace of the State and the welfare of [the] community often require the Legislature to create new offenses and to prescribe fines for their punishment, and to alter fines already prescribed. State v. Constantino, 76 Vt. 192, 196, 56 A. 1101, 1101 (1904). [3] The severity of the sentence for any given crime is meant to be an amalgam of public attitudes ... history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the response of [previous] juries. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 2866, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977). Furthermore, this claim seems not to fall squarely under the tripartite federal test for gross disproportionality. See State v. Venman, 151 Vt. ___, ___, 564 A.2d 574, 581 (1989) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S.Ct. at 3010) (gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; sentences for same crimes in other jurisdictions). The court in Smith v. Municipal Court, 78 Cal.App.3d 592, 596, 144 Cal.Rptr. 504, 506 (1978), specifically noted the misconception that disproportionality considerations require the judiciary [to act as] supervisors of penological symmetry, and upheld California's mandatory minimum sentence for use of controlled substances because it is of such short duration that it cannot be deemed substantially excessive to fulfill the legitimate penological objectives of deterrence and isolation, considering the seriousness of the problem.... Id. at 598, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 507. Much the same statement might be made regarding the magnitude of the penalties at issue here in comparison to the severity of the problems of drunken driving and assault on police officers. We have noted that the legislature has broad latitude to make changes in the penal code which address the community's concerns with lawless behavior. See id. at 596, 144 Cal.Rptr. at 506 (mandatory minimum ninety-day sentence for use of heroin was not  so disproportionate as to shock the conscience and offend fundamental notions of human dignity ) (emphasis in original); People v. Gomez, 120 Ill.App.3d 545, 548, 76 Ill.Dec. 165, 167, 458 N.E.2d 565, 567 (1983) (mandatory minimum four years incarceration for residential burglary not disproportionate under state constitution where legislation would not shock the moral sense of the community); Norris v. State, 271 Ind. 568, 575-76, 394 N.E.2d 144, 150 (1979) (mandatory life sentence for habitual criminal not grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime). The dissent contends that minimum sentencing standards are inconsistent with Vermont's tradition of evaluating punishment for proportionality with the crime, referring to the Council of Censors which prevented such eighteenth-century atrocities as mutilation of the convict. While we appreciate the tradition, we feel the analogy is somewhat out of scale. Furthermore, we note that the suggestions of the Council were given force and effect only through adoption by the legislature, much as sentence reforms are currently made through committee study and suggestion to the General Assembly. [4] Moreover, the penalties imposed under these statutes are of the same magnitude as minimum penalties previously imposed for these crimes. See 23 V.S.A. § 674 (present subsection (a), rewritten in 1981, sets penalty for the first DLS offense at thirty days and/or $500); 13 V.S.A. § 1024(c) (physical injury caused with intent to prevent law officer from performing lawful duty, penalty set at five years and/or $5000). We infer from the trial court's ruling that it did not feel that sentences of two days' imprisonment for DLS based on a DUI conviction and thirty days for aggravated assault of a police officer were of unconstitutional magnitude. Instead, its concern appears to be that the sentences are required, with no room for the trial court to decide to not impose it. Mandatory minimum statutes narrow the court's discretion. Viewed in this way, the issue becomes one of whether the legislature has wrongly usurped the prerogative of the trial courts to determine sentences. This issue, framed as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, [5] is squarely raised on appeal by amicus curiae; we will consider it because it is adequately briefed and no factual development is necessary to aid our determination of the legal issue.