Opinion ID: 1885999
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Words of Provocation Uttered by the Victim Shortly Before the Crime

Text: During the course of the opening statement on behalf of defendant, hearsay objections were sustained as to what the deceased, Ida Baudoin, had told defendant during the course of their relationship. During trial, the same testimony was excluded. Glen testified he talked to Ida Baudoin shortly before her murder. After Glen refused a reconciliation, Ida allegedly got violent and angry, telling him I never.... [21] At both stages of the bifurcated trial, the testimony as to what Ida said was excluded by the trial court as hearsay. A proffer of the statement was made. It was that's all right. I never loved you anyway. I was just using you to get my children back. [22] Utterances which circumstantially indicate a particular state of mind are not hearsay because the truth of the statement is not at issue. See 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1790. State v. Raymond, 258 La. 1, 245 So.2d 335 (1971) recognizes that an out-of-court statement offered to prove circumstantially the declarant's emotional attitude toward a defendant is not hearsay, pointing out that this type of evidence is particularly essential in a homicide case where the victim is unavailable to testify. In State v. Shoemaker, 500 So.2d 385 (La.1987), defendant was not allowed to testify as to what a criminal deputy had told him, evidence which supported his entrapment defense, and the conviction and sentence were reversed. [A]n essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 507-508, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394, 34 S.Ct. 779, 783, 58 L.Ed. 1363 (1914). That opportunity would be an empty one if the state were permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence.... In the absence of any valid state justification, exclusion of this kind of exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's case encounter and `survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.' United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2045, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). See also Washington v. Texas, supra, 388 U.S. [14], at 22-23, 87 S.Ct. [1920], at 1924-1925 [18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967)]. Crane v. Kentucky, ___ U.S.___, at ___, 106 S.Ct. 2142 at 2146-2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 at 645 (1986). It is well established that the defendant in a capital case must be allowed to place before the sentencing jury all relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Skipper v. South Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); Crane, supra. [E]xclusion by the state trial court of relevant mitigating evidence impeded the sentencing jury's ability to carry out its task of considering all relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender. Skipper, supra, ___ U.S. at___, 106 S.Ct. at 1673, 90 L.Ed.2d at 9. Testimony as to Ida's statement shortly before the homicide was critical to this defendant's manslaughter defense. By restricting evidence bearing on that defense, the trial court clearly erred and the erroneous ruling deprived defendant of a fair trial. Shoemaker, supra.