Opinion ID: 441741
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Highsmith

Text: 65 The final objection to the court's jury instructions is raised by Highsmith, who challenges the trial judge's refusal to charge the jury as follows: 66 With respect to Defendant Gary Highsmith, if you determine that he prepared or submitted the Medicare claims alleged and described in the indictment in the counts pertaining to him and that he did so as instructed by his employers and superiors obeying their orders and instructions and following their standard office procedure, then you must find him not guilty. 67 The only authority Highsmith can produce in support of this rather novel view of the law is a casual statement in United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998, 97 S.Ct. 523, 50 L.Ed.2d 608 (1976), where the court found that the appellant's counsel had a possible conflict of interest because there was a probability of conflicting and inconsistent defenses based upon corporate and individual liability, since as an employee of ESC Behar could well take the stand and present a defense that her employers were the guilty ones because she was only obeying the orders of her superiors and following standard office procedure. Id. at 788. What Highsmith has failed to understand, however, is that following orders can only be a defense where a defendant has no idea that his conduct is criminal--a critical limitation that Highsmith's proposed instruction does not reflect. If Highsmith was aware of the illegality of his conduct, the fact that it was authorized by a superior clearly cannot insulate him from criminal liability. McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 1506, 47 L.Ed.2d 761 (1976); United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755, 764 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076, 94 S.Ct. 593, 38 L.Ed.2d 483 (1973); Susnjar v. United States, 27 F.2d 223, 224 (6th Cir.1928). If, on the other hand, Highsmith was genuinely ignorant of the criminal nature of his actions, then he was not guilty because he lacked the knowledge and specific intent necessary to be convicted under the applicable statutes. Since the trial court carefully instructed the jury that they must find that the defendants had acted knowingly and willfully in order to convict them, we conclude that there is no merit to appellant Highsmith's objection.