Opinion ID: 390265
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Presence of the Jury.

Text: 15 First, Seifert and Ehrlich argue that the court erred in not requiring that Saka's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege be before the jury. 16 In deciding this question, we put aside cases rejecting a defendant's attempt to call a co-defendant to the stand for the purpose of having the co-defendant assert his privilege before the jury. E.g., United States v. Espinoza, 9 Cir., 1978, 578 F.2d 224, 228. A defendant has an absolute right not to take the stand. 17 On the other hand, a non-party witness cannot refuse to take the stand. His privilege arises only when he asserts it as to a question put to him, and it is for the court to say whether he is entitled to the privilege. United States v. Bautista, 9 Cir., 1975, 509 F.2d 675, 678 (dictum). See also J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 3 Weinstein's Evidence, P 611(04) at 611-49 (1978). We have held that a non-party witness cannot be called solely to have him claim his privilege before the jury. United States v. Licavoli, 9 Cir., 1979, 604 F.2d 613, 624; United States v. Espinoza, 9 Cir., 1978, 578 F.2d 224, 228 (dictum). But we have not decided the question here presented. 18 In United States v. Gay, 9 Cir., 1978, 567 F.2d 916, 920, we said in dictum that a non-party who testifies can be required to invoke the privilege before the jury. Judge Weinstein agrees, see Weinstein, supra, at p. 611-53. He cites no authority for this proposition, however, and we have found none. 19 We conclude that the judge should have allowed counsel to put the question to Saka before the jury. Doing so does not burden Saka's privilege. He is not on trial, and his invoking the privilege is not being used against him. If he were later indicted and tried, his invocation of the privilege could not be used against him. Nor would his invocation of the privilege be the sort of major event, to which the jury might give undue weight, that the complete refusal of a witness to testify might be. Here, Saka had answered every other question put to him. His refusal to answer the one question about the identity of the lender would be a form of impeachment. See United States v. Hearst, 9 Cir., 1977, 563 F.2d 1331, 1341-1342; Caminetti v. United States, 1917, 242 U.S. 470 at 493-495, 37 S.Ct. 192, 197, 61 L.Ed. 442; United States v. Brannon, 5 Cir., 1977, 546 F.2d 1242, 1247; United States v. Weber, 3 Cir., 1970, 437 F.2d 327, 334-335. These cases involved defendants who took the stand thereby waiving the privilege, but invoked it as to certain questions. The impeachment rationale, however, is applicable to this case. 20 However, we would not reverse on this ground in this case. The defendants had ample opportunity in the course of their lengthy cross-examination of Saka and in their examination of other witnesses to impeach Saka's testimony. Further impeachment by having Saka refuse to answer before the jury would have been merely cumulative. 21