Opinion ID: 676118
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Travel Act Violation

Text: 10 Patel argues that his conviction for violating the Travel Act (Count VII) cannot stand because it is inconsistent with the jury's verdict acquitting him of bribing Neighbors. The government contends that giving a gratuity to a public official constitutes bribery within the meaning of the Travel Act, see United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 101-02 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052, 109 S.Ct. 1312, 103 L.Ed.2d 581 (1989), 2 but the jury instructions did not make this point. 3 Rather than delving into the problematic issue of whether the verdicts were actually inconsistent, we choose to affirm because it is clear that [a] defendant convicted by a jury on one count cannot attack that conviction because it is inconsistent with the jury's verdict of acquittal on another count. United States v. Suppenbach, 1 F.3d 679, 681 (8th Cir.1993); see also United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65-67, 105 S.Ct. 471, 476-478, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). 11 Patel also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict as to the Travel Act violation. His argument relies heavily on the fact that the jury acquitted him of the bribery charge, but we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, United States v. Loftus, 992 F.2d 793, 796 (8th Cir.1993), independent of the fact that the jury acquitted Patel of bribery. Powell, 469 U.S. at 67, 105 S.Ct. at 477. Under this standard, there was ample evidence to support the jury's verdict that Patel violated the Travel Act by traveling across state lines in order to give Neighbors a down-payment on a bribe.