Opinion ID: 896905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) Motion

Text: [¶ 12] Rule 60(b) motions are left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision whether to vacate the judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court has abused its discretion. Kopp v. Kopp, 2001 ND 41, ¶ 7, 622 N.W.2d 726. A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner. Id. In turn, a trial court [a]cts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner when its decision is not the product of a rational mental process by which the facts and law relied upon are stated and considered together for the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable determination. Id. [¶ 13] Rule 60(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a trial court to provide relief from a final judgment or order under circumstances specified in the rule. Irene alleges two of these circumstances are present in this case. [¶ 14] Irene contends relief is due her under either part (v) or part (vi) of N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Rule 60(b)(v) provides for relief when the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a previous judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application. Rule 60(b)(vi) permits a court to provide relief from a final judgment for any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The trial court may, upon a finding of either of the above reasons, grant a Rule 60(b) motion. [¶ 15] But Rule 60(b) attempts to strike a proper balance between the conflicting principles that litigation must be brought to an end and that justice should be done, and accordingly ... should be invoked only when extraordinary circumstances are present. Kopp v. Kopp, 2001 ND 41, ¶ 9, 622 N.W.2d 726. Thus, such motions must be made within a reasonable time. Id. at ¶ 7. What constitutes a reasonable time varies from case to case and must be determined in each instance from the facts before the court. Avco Financial Services v. Schroeder, 318 N.W.2d 910, 912 (N.D.1982). [¶ 16] Here the trial court held that the delay between judgment and motion, nearly twenty-one years, was well beyond any standard of case law that would allow the reopening. Irene, however, urges that she acted within a reasonable time because she filed her motion within a year of learning she may have had an interest in the pension by virtue of the change in federal law. The trial judge, however, correctly observed that one is presumed to know the law, e.g., Diegel v. City of West Fargo, 546 N.W.2d 367, 373 (N.D.1996), and Irene is thus presumed to have known of the change in federal law from the time the change was made and published, which was apparently sometime in the 1980s. Accordingly, in light of the circumstances of this case, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found twenty-one years to be an unreasonable time to grant relief from a judgment.