Opinion ID: 169649
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Narrowing construction

Text: The Secretary maintains that if we hold that the major purpose test survives McConnell, then § 2(12)'s definition of political committee as applied to CRLC is readily susceptible to a narrowing construction that will remedy any constitutional infirmity presented by the omission of the major purpose test. See Aplt's Br. at 39 (citing Citizens for Responsible Gov't State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1194 (10th Cir. 2000)). He avers that because Colorado's definition of political committee is substantially similar to the federal definition, and Colorado has used federal campaign law as a template for its campaign laws, § 2(12) should withstand constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 39. Generally, we consider the application of a narrowing construction in the context of a facial challenge. See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988) (It has long been a tenet of First Amendment law that in determining a facial challenge to a statute, if it be `readily susceptible' to a narrowing construction that would make it constitutional, it will be upheld.); Citizens for Responsible Gov't State Political Action Comm., 236 F.3d at 1194. As we later discuss, we decline to reach CRLC's facial challenge to § 2(12). However, regardless of whether we characterize the Secretary's argument as addressing a facial or as-applied challenge, we agree with the district court that the statute does not lend itself to a narrowing construction. To be readily susceptible to a narrowing construction, such a construction must be reasonable and readily apparent. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 944, 120 S.Ct. 2597, 147 L.Ed.2d 743 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). [W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988). Thus, we will not rewrite a state law to conform it to constitutional requirements. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. at 397, 108 S.Ct. 636. Here, importantly, we note that Article XXVIII's definition of issue committee includes the very major purpose test at issue, suggesting that the legislature was well aware of Buckley 's requirements when it drafted Article XXVIII. See id. § 2(10)(a) (`Issue committee' means any person, other than a natural person, or any group of two or more persons, including natural persons . . . [t]hat has a major purpose of supporting or opposing any ballot issue or ballot question. . . .). The inclusion of the major purpose test in § 2(10)(a) indicates that the decision not to include this requirement in the definition of political committee was deliberate and consistent with the state citizenry's intent. Because we cannot re-write state laws to conform with constitutional requirements where doing so would be inconsistent with legislative, or here, the state citizenry's intent, we hold that the district court properly concluded that § 2(12) as applied to CRLC could not saved by incorporating a narrowing construction. See Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 712-13 (4th Cir.1999) (striking down North Carolina campaign finance statute as facially vague and overbroad, noting that the court was unable to excise the word incidental from a statute because [t]o accept [North Carolina's] proffered interpretation would read the references to influencing elections (a classic form of issue advocacy) right out of the statute).