Opinion ID: 2515
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion in Granting Dismissal

Text: Accommodating Lewis's concerns, first raised after the jury was sworn, would have required that the trial [be] adjourned and then rescheduled to be tried out in Syracuse. Trial Tr. at 16. Such an adjournment would have delayed proceedings a few weeks or a month. Id. at 15. It would, moreover, have required the declaration of a mistrial and the dismissal of the sworn jury. Under these circumstances, the first relevant inquiry is not, as in Drake, whether the delay would have been temporally significant, 375 F.3d at 254, but rather whether the district court's decision to deny the requested adjournment was itself an abuse of discretion. This court's precedent instructs us to be particularly solicitous of a district court's ruling on a motion to adjourn the scheduled start of a trial proceeding. Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 147-48 (2d Cir.1998). We will not disturb such a ruling absent a showing of clear abuse. Id. [T]o make that showing, the complaining party must establish both that the denial of the adjournment was arbitrary, and that it substantially impaired the presentation of his case. Id.; accord Farias v. Instructional Sys., Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 99-100 (2d Cir.2001) (identifying no abuse where, on first day of trial, court denied continuance to obtain absent witness and noting that decisions regarding trial adjournments rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be overturned only where there is showing both of arbitrariness and of prejudice to the defendant); cf. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964) (The matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge, and it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates due process even if the party fails to offer evidence or is compelled to defend without counsel.). Applying these principles to this case, we conclude that when a party requests a trial adjournment of several weeks after a jury has been sworn, under circumstances that will require that jury to be dismissed and a new one empaneled, a district court acts well within its discretion in requiring strong justification for the adjournment. See United States v. Cusack, 229 F.3d 344, 349 (2d Cir.2000) (identifying no abuse where district court denied two to three week[] continuance requested [i]n the middle of trial to obtain expert witness); cf. Moffitt v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 236 F.3d 868, 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming Rule 41(b) dismissal after jury was sworn where plaintiff, `the only one ... that [could] testify to matters alleged in the complaint,' was not available to testify and noting that a court faced with an eleventh-hour request to postpone a trial is entitled to a more detailed showing than [plaintiff] and her counsel supplied to the district court in this case). The only such justification suggested by the record is Lewis's fear that he would be abused if housed during trial at Great Meadow, the site of the alleged assault by the defendants, some of whom were still employed at the facility at the time of trial. On the record presented here, this justification was not sufficiently strong to remove denial of the requested continuance from the range of permissible decisions. The district court observed that it could understand [Lewis's] discomfort. Trial Tr. at 15. We construe this statement to reflect the court's recognition of the subjective genuineness of Lewis's professed fear. The court did not find, nor was it asked to find, that Lewis's fears were objectively reasonable. Rather, the court referenced a presumption that Lewis would be treated properly and lawfully at any state correctional facility in which he was housed during trial, including Great Meadow. Id. [8] We identify no error in the district court's reliance on such a presumption in the absence of objective evidence to the contrary. To hold otherwise would place an enormous burden on district courts hearing prisoners' complaints, because if an incarcerated plaintiff's subjective fear of abuse in a particular penal facility were enough to mandate a transfer out of that facility during trial, then why not also during depositions, during all phases of discovery, or, indeed, as soon as the complaint is filed? This is not to suggest that district courts should afford anything but careful review to incarcerated litigants' claims that fears of retaliation hamper their presentation of evidence in cases against prison officials. Depending on the circumstances, we expect that any number of steps might be taken to mitigate such fears, including the accommodation suggested by the defendants here, namely, placement in a special-housing unit during the course of trial. See N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, §§ 301.5, 330.1 (2009) (providing for inmates in protective custody to be housed in SHU to maximize the safety and security of both the inmates and the facility). [9] Indeed, had the district court decided that in this case it was, in fact, appropriate to grant an adjournment and transfer the trial, we would view such a ruling as also falling within the court's broad discretion. Nevertheless, mindful of the ease with which § 1983 claimants may assert subjective fears of abuse, as well as the considerable challenges that confront penal authorities in ensuring the lawful confinement, transportation, and transfer of thousands of inmates, some of whom, like Lewis, have demonstrated records for violence (even in custody) that demand maximum-security placement, we decline to hold that the district court was required to grant such an adjournment. Finally, in upholding the district court's denial of the continuance requested here, we note that Lewis has not demonstrated good cause for failing to alert the district court to his concerns about Great Meadow in a timely fashion. Lewis's assertion that he did not know that he would be housed at Great Meadow until 10:00 a.m. on the morning of trial is hardly convincing. Lewis may not have known for a fact that he would be so housed, but neither he nor his counsel can claim surprise in light of the totality of the circumstances. Lewis was a violent criminal serving, in effect, a life sentence for multiple murders. He also had a record for violence in prison. [10] Lewis could hardly have expected to be confined during the pendency of his civil trial in anything but a maximum-security facility. [11] Moreover, neither he nor his counsel could reasonably have thought that Lewis would continue to be housed at Auburn during trial and transported daily to the federal courthouse in Albany, a driving distance of more than 150 miles each way. Thus, the very real probability that Lewis would be detained during trial at Great Meadow should have been apparent to him and his lawyer well before jury selection. If Lewis feared detention in that facility and wished to ensure his confinement elsewhere, he or his counsel should have made a motion before the day of trial. Even if Lewis could not have anticipated his transfer to Great Meadow before the morning of trial, the transcript indicates that Lewis was in contact with his attorney both before and during jury selection and, according to Lewis, both were aware of Lewis's impending transfer before the morning's proceedings began. However, rather than bring these concerns to the district court's attention promptly, Lewis and his counsel waited until moments before opening statements were to be made. Although the delay was short  just over an hour  in that brief time, a pretrial conference was held, during which the parties were specifically asked to raise any issues requiring resolution before the trial began. More important, a jury was selected and sworn. In denying the requested continuance, the district court could have properly considered plaintiff's failure to raise his concerns about Great Meadow housing or to seek an adjournment during this critical time. In sum, because Lewis (1) failed to demonstrate that his fear of confinement at Great Meadow during trial was objectively reasonable so as to warrant his refusal to testify at trial, and (2) unreasonably delayed in moving to avoid trial confinement at Great Meadow, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in refusing to grant an adjournment and to transfer the trial to another courthouse within the Northern District.
We proceed to consider the district court's related, yet analytically distinct decision to dismiss Lewis's case with prejudice in light of his refusal to testify in the absence of an adjournment and transfer. It is beyond dispute under our precedent that a district court may dismiss a case under Rule 41(b) when the plaintiff refuses to go forward with a properly scheduled trial. Zagano v. Fordham Univ., 900 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir.1990); see generally 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2370, at 389-95 & nn. 35-36 (3d ed. 2008) (An action may be dismissed under Federal Rule 41(b) if the plaintiff, without offering some explanation that is satisfactory to the court, is not ready to present his or her case at trial or if the plaintiff refuses to proceed at the trial.). Our sister circuits agree. One naturally expects the plaintiff to be present and ready to put on her case when the day of trial arrives. A litigant's day in court is the culmination of a lawsuit, and trial dates  particularly civil trial dates  are an increasingly precious commodity in our nation's courts. Moffitt v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 236 F.3d at 873. Thus, where a district court is confronted with a plaintiff's unwillingness to proceed on the date scheduled for trial, as opposed to the more typical failure to comply with her discovery obligations on time, or to meet some other pre-trial deadline, it is not unreasonable to consider treating such unwillingness more severely. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see Knoll v. AT & T Co., 176 F.3d 359, 365 (6th Cir.1999) (Where a plaintiff does not appear at the trial date or, as in this case, is inexcusably unprepared to prosecute the case, Rule 41(b) dismissal is particularly appropriate. Indeed, such behavior constitutes the epitome of a `failure to prosecute.'); Owen v. Wangerin, 985 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir.1993) (The remedy [of dismissal for failure to prosecute] is usually applied when the plaintiff is not ready for trial or fails to appear.); cf. Brock v. Unique Racquetball & Health Clubs, Inc., 786 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir.1986) (recognizing in context of Rule 55 that trial judge must have broad latitude to impose the sanction of default for non-attendance occurring after a trial has begun. (citations omitted)). [12] This reasoning applies with no less force where, as here, a party's expressed unwillingness to proceed to trial follows the denial of a request for a continuance. See, e.g., Knoll v. AT & T Co., 176 F.3d at 365 (affirming Rule 41(b) dismissal where attorney, inter alia, attempted to force the court to grant a continuance by refusing to proceed on the day of trial); Lopez v. Aransas County Indep. Sch. Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir.1978) (holding that trial court's denial of plaintiff[s'] eleventh-hour oral motion for a continuance was well within its discretion and that, faced with ... plaintiffs' refusal to proceed, [district court] did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the cause with prejudice for want of prosecution); Ali v. A & G Co., 542 F.2d 595, 596-97 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that Rule 41(b) dismissal was not abuse of discretion where court previously denied plaintiffs' request to delay trial due to incomplete discovery and plaintiffs and their attorney were not ready to proceed on day of trial); Hooper v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 325 F.2d 321, 322 (5th Cir.1963) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion where case was dismissed with prejudice by the District Court when [plaintiff] declined to go to trial after denial of his motion for continuance). To the contrary, where a plaintiff refuses to proceed with trial following a district court's unfavorable ruling on a request for continuance or in limine motion, we have noted that a district court ha[s] no real choice but to dismiss the case. Palmieri v. Defaria, 88 F.3d at 140; see also Zagano v. Fordham Univ., 900 F.2d at 15 (observing that, upon denial of plaintiff's motion to dismiss action without prejudice, plaintiff was obliged to go to trial, failing which involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute [was] appropriate (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original)). [13] But see Merker v. Rice, 649 F.2d 171, 174-75 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that district court abused its discretion in dismissing action following plaintiff's refusal to proceed without expert witness where such refusal was not arbitrary or unreasonable). The concerns underlying these decisions are only heightened once a civil jury has been selected and sworn. [T]he right to a jury trial is too precious to permit its effectiveness to be destroyed by non-utilization of jurors drawn caused by unnecessary delays in preparation, lack of attention to the case, or undue procrastination by party or counsel or both. Theilmann v. Rutland Hosp., Inc., 455 F.2d at 856 (internal citation omitted). Therefore, where a party fails to appear or refuses to proceed with trial  after the jury ha[s] been drawn, dismissal with prejudice may be particularly appropriate. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Michelsen v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 429 F.2d 394, 395-97 (2d Cir.1970) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion where, after jury was selected, court denied renewed motion for continuance to obtain presence of plaintiff and expert, and dismissed case for failure to prosecute). See generally Judith S. Kaye, Jury Reform: A Work in Progress, 86 Judicature 147, 147 (2002) ([W]e must be concerned with the quality of the jury experience for each person summoned to serve. We want jurors to experience a court system that works well, respects their time and their lives, and values their performance of this most vital civic duty.). Again, we recognize that Lewis's refusal to testify without an adjournment and transfer was grounded in a professed concern for his personal safety if housed during trial at Great Meadow. We reiterate that such concerns warrant careful district court consideration. In this case, despite the fact that Lewis waited until a jury was empaneled before raising his detention concerns, the district court explored various options with the detaining officials and the parties, the most promising of which was Lewis's detention in the video-monitored Great Meadow SHU for the brief trial. The court took a number of recesses, the last of which afforded Lewis and his attorney an opportunity to consider the SHU option. While our review task would be easier if, upon receiving Lewis's refusal to accept the SHU option, the district court had provided a fuller explanation for its decision not to adjourn and transfer the casean option first identified by the court itselfand to order dismissal with prejudice, we nevertheless conclude that the decision manifests no abuse of discretion.
Even if we were to review the challenged dismissal by reference to the five factors identified in Drake, we would reach no different conclusion. While a delay of several weeks in prosecuting a case is not always significant, see, e.g., Shannon v. Gen. Elec. Co., 186 F.3d 186, 194 (2d Cir.1999), it is more likely to be so when it occurs after a jury has been sworn because of the risk of a mistrial. Cf. Peart v. City of New York, 992 F.2d at 461-62 (holding that, while delay caused by plaintiff's counsel's failure to appear at trial might be said to be minimal in view of her offer to begin trying the case ten days later ..., we have upheld a dismissal for failure to prosecute where a plaintiff's refusal to proceed to trial was of much shorter duration). In this case, Lewis's refusal to testify unless his case was adjourned and transferred not only risked a mistrial, it demanded it. Under these circumstances, the first Drake factor supports the district court's decision to dismiss. The second factor yields the same conclusion because the record demonstrates that Lewis and his counsel were given both clear notice that Lewis's continued refusal to testify could result in dismissal and multiple opportunities to confer to determine whether to change course to avoid that result. See United States ex rel. Drake v. Norden Sys., Inc., 375 F.3d at 254; cf. LeSane v. Hall's Sec. Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d at 210 (holding that brief and technical warning of dismissal to pro se plaintiff was insufficient). While a delay of several weeks would not have prejudiced defendants in challenging the merits of Lewis's claim, it would have prejudiced the entity bearing their costs, the State of New York, insofar as it had expended resources to arrange for the presence of the eight defendants, an additional witness, and Lewis himself in Albany on the day of trial. While the need to duplicate these expenses might not, by itself, warrant dismissal, the factor lends some support to the district court's decision. Cf. Al-Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir.1996) (Failure to appear for trial, without excuse, prejudices an adversary and interferes with the court's docket about as much as any procedural default can. The other side is likely to have spent thousands of dollars getting its lawyers ready to try the case and arranging for witnesses and exhibits to be available. If the trial does not proceed, the money and effort will have been wasted. The judge is likely to have gone to considerable trouble to clear out time from criminal cases, motion hearings, work in chambers, and other matters, for the civil trial. In many cases ... jurors and witnesses will have been put to great inconvenience.); Johnson v. Kamminga, 34 F.3d 466, 469 (7th Cir.1994) (observing, in case requiring transportation of incarcerated witnesses, that the costs associated with a delay in proceeding with a trial are likely to be more burdensome than those occasioned by delays in discovery, and [c]onsequently, it is not unreasonable to treat a failure to attend trial more severely than a failure to comply with discovery orders in a timely fashion). Finally, while the district court did not, at least on the record, carefully balance the need to alleviate court calendar congestion against plaintiff's right to his day in court, nor assess the efficacy of lesser sanctions, it is not clear how these final two factors would be weighed in this case. Defense counsel did propose one compromise solutionhousing Lewis in Great Meadow's SHU during trial, where his safety could be monitored by videothat Lewis rejected. No party suggested that Lewis's evidence might be offered in a form other than live testimony, see generally Muhammad v. Warden, Baltimore City Jail, 849 F.2d 107, 111-13 (4th Cir. 1988) (discussing potential alternatives where inmate-plaintiff cannot be present at trial), [14] nor does such a possibility seem likely given the critical need for a jury to assess his credibility, see id. at 111 (observing that where credibility assessment is critical [n]ot only the appearance but the reality of justice is obviously threatened by [inmate witness's] absence); see also Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 736 (7th Cir.1976) (discussing factors relevant to determining whether inmate-plaintiff should be permitted to testify in person, including whether ... the prisoner is the only person who can render testimony consistent with the allegations of his complaint). [15] Accordingly, we view these two factors as neutral, neither supporting nor undermining the challenged dismissal decision. Thus, although we do not think the Drake factors are particularly useful to our analysis of the dismissal judgment in this case, because three of those factors support the dismissal, while two of the factors are neutral, we conclude that, even on such review, the judgment should be affirmed.