Opinion ID: 874253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the District Court Err in Awarding Attorney Fees against the Land Board and the Transportation Department?

Text: Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117, the district court awarded judgments against the Land Board and Transportation Department for court costs and attorney fees totaling $23,128.51. Both entities challenge that award on appeal. The version of Idaho Code § 12-117(1) that was in effect when the district court awarded court costs and attorney fees provided: Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency . . . and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. [5] The statute requires that the person and the state agency be adverse parties. The Land Board first argues it was not an adversary to the Applicants below; instead, the Land Board, through IDL, merely provided a forum for the Applicants and the objectors to present their cases. If the agency does not participate in the merits of the appeal to the district court, then it and the person are not adverse parties, even if the agency made the decision being appealed. Neighbors For Responsible Growth v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 173, 177, 207 P.3d 149, 153 (2009); Galli v. Idaho County, 146 Idaho 155, 161, 191 P.3d 233, 239 (2008). In this case, the Lands Department did participate in the appeal seeking to defend its actions on the merits. Therefore, it was a party adverse to the Landowners. To be subject to an award of attorney fees, the party adverse to the prevailing party must also have acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. I.C. § 12-117(1). The Land Board's decision certainly has the appearance of being arbitrary and capricious. In a two mile stretch of shoreline that included the locations of the Landowners' proposed docks, there were thirty other private docks. In addition, about two months earlier the Land Board had approved, over the objection of the Transportation Department, a dock permit for a property that had previously been part of the same parcel as the Landowners' properties. However, we have not previously expressly ruled that an easement for a public road that extends down to the ordinary high water mark does not extinguish the littoral rights of the servient estate. Therefore, we hold that the Land Board and Transportation Department did not act without a reasonable basis in fact or law in arguing against the Landowners' appeals to the district court. We have held that I.C. § 12-117 provides the exclusive basis upon which to seek an award of attorney fees against a state agency. State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc. (HWRO), 130 Idaho 718, 723, 947 P.2d 391, 396 (1997). Because that statute also applies to the award of witness fees and reasonable expenses, it would also provide the exclusive basis for awarding court costs. We therefore reverse the district court's award of court costs and attorney fees against the Land Board and Transportation Department.