Opinion ID: 1278599
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appointment of Second Counsel

Text: (1) Our decision in Keenan, supra, 31 Cal.3d 424, 430, clearly forecloses Corenevsky's claim that Penal Code section 987.9 contemplates appointment of second counsel. Moreover, our recent decision in Sand v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 567 [194 Cal. Rptr. 480, 668 P.2d 787], explicitly holds that [i]n those murder cases ... in which the death penalty will not be sought, even though the offense charged is statutorily punishable by death, section 987.9 is inapplicable. ( Id., at p. 572.) Any further issues arising from the granting of Attorney Sheela's motion to be relieved are foreclosed by waiver: as the People observe, one of Corenevsky's former public defender counsel, by letter to opposing counsel and the trial court on December 8, 1982, made an apparently deliberate tactical decision not to challenge the trial court's early December rulings (1) relieving second counsel, (2) removing the possibility of the death penalty, and (3) denying Corenevsky's motion to dismiss. Contrary to vehement protestations by Corenevsky's new counsel, we cannot construe former counsel's statements as anything but a plain and intentional waiver of those issues.