Opinion ID: 2089571
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Wards of the tribal court

Text: [¶ 22.] Although she testified to the contrary at the December 2000 evidentiary hearing, Mother claims on appeal that her children remained wards of the tribal court following that court's return of her children to her in May 1998. The tribal court's order dated May 7, 1998 was a trial exhibit and is part of the settled record of this case. In no way does it appear to be anything other than a final order, returning custody to Mother, finding her home is no longer contrary to the best interests of the children, and releasing DSS from service and ordering that the case be closed. There is no reference to continuing jurisdiction over these children. This order stands in contrast to the temporary custody order of a tribal court we examined in In re D.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278, 282 (S.D.1980) and held to be a continuing order. Mother's reliance on that case is misplaced. [¶ 23.] As the children were not wards of the tribal court and were not domiciled on the reservation at the time these proceedings were initiated, the state trial court did not err in finding that the tribal court did not have exclusive jurisdiction. [¶ 24.] 2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Oglala Sioux Tribe's motion to transfer jurisdiction to the tribe. [¶ 25.] The trial court found that although there was concurrent jurisdiction between the state and tribal courts, there was good cause to deny the tribe's motion to transfer jurisdiction to the tribe because of the advanced stage of the proceedings at the time the tribe filed its motion. By this date, December 20, 2000, the case had already been pending for fourteen months and Mother's parental rights had actually been terminated for over two months. The tribe had had notice of these proceedings since the beginning of this case, in October 1999. No explanation was offered in its motion to transfer to explain why it waited until this case had been disposed of by final order before requesting the transfer. [¶ 26.] In In re A.L., 442 N.W.2d 233 (S.D.1989), we quoted BIA guidelines on the issue of what constituted good cause not to transfer, noting that ICWA does not provide a statutory definition of good cause: Good cause not to transfer the proceeding may exist if any of the following circumstances exists: (i) The proceeding was at an advanced stage when the petition to transfer was received and the petitioner did not file the petition promptly after receiving notice of the hearing. 44 FedReg at 67591. The timeliness of a petition language is `designed to encourage the prompt exercise of the right to petition for transfer in order to avoid unnecessary delays.' Id. at 236. The legislative history of the ICWA states that the term was designed to provide state courts with flexibility in determining the disposition of a placement proceeding involving an Indian child. Id. at 235 (citing SRep No.597, 95th Cong., 1stSess. 17 (1977)). [¶ 27.] In A.L., we held that notice by certified mail to the tribe constituted substantial compliance with ICWA notice requirements and that the tribe had actual notice one year before it requested transfer. [4] We held the transfer request in that case was untimely. In In re Wayne R.N., 107 N.M. 341, 757 P.2d 1333 (N.M.Ct.App. 1988), cited in A.L., a motion for transfer filed six months after notice was received by the tribe, and on the morning of the hearing to determine parental rights, was held to be untimely. [W]hether a petition is timely must be made on a case-by-case basis. A.L., 442 N.W.2d at 236. In neither of these cases had the action proceeded to the stage in this case, the entering of a final dispositional order by the court. [¶ 28.] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying, for good cause, to transfer this matter to the tribal court where the motion to transfer was filed fourteen months after the tribe received notice and over two months after a final dispositional order had been entered terminating Mother's parental rights. [¶ 29.] 3. Whether the trial court erred in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that serious emotional or physical damage would likely result if the children were returned to Mother. [¶ 30.] During the pendency of these proceedings, the children were placed in five different foster homes due to their behaviors. [5] The younger child cries easily and has frequent tantrums. She has a stealing problem and admitted to having two imaginary friends she can call upon whenever she wants. The older daughter is intolerant of others, refuses to apologize for anything, and tries to get others in trouble. One foster parent noted she does not seem to have an emotional connection with anyone and relationships are only superficial. Both girls have had hurtful arguments with one another and have disowned each other as sisters, deciding they do not wish to live together. [¶ 31.] Psychological evaluations on both children were completed and they were found to have serious psychological symptoms and were diagnosed with major depression. These symptoms and diagnoses were determined to be consistent with an impoverished early childhood. The younger daughter, harbors a very negative, angry attitude toward the environment while the older daughter is detached and represses her emotions. Both conditions were considered chronic and significantly impacted the girls' psychological functioning. Testimony was presented that both children would benefit from a stable environment. As the conditions which led to their removal continued to exist due to Mother's failure to complete FSA requirements and put her children's interests ahead of her own, the trial court did not err in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that serious emotional or physical damage would likely result if the children were returned to Mother. [¶ 32.] 4. Whether the trial court erred in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that termination of Mother's parental rights was the least restrictive alternative and in the children's best interests. [¶ 33.] We have always recognized that the needs of the children are paramount and that their best interests must prevail. In re A.H., 421 N.W.2d 71 (S.D. 1988); In re R.Z.F., 284 N.W.2d 879 (S.D. 1979). Mother had fourteen months to put her children's best interests first. She admitted at the final dispositional hearing that she often put their needs last. She demonstrated this a month before the court terminated her parental rights by marrying a man her children did not know after promising them she would wait until they were together again. She did not tell DSS she was married. She did not comply with the requirements of her FSA despite the court's repeated warnings, admonitions and orders to do so. In short, there is no indication that the situation existing at the time the children were removed from Mother's custody had been alleviated or that Mother was interested in making the permanent changes necessary for her children to be returned. [¶ 34.] The termination order is affirmed. [¶ 35.] MILLER, Chief Justice, and SABERS, AMUNDSON, KONENKAMP and GILBERTSON, Justices, participating.