Opinion ID: 613242
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CWA Claims

Text: Kendall next appeals the district court’s dismissal of Counts 1 and 2 of the complaint, claims under the CWA. Congress enacted the CWA in 1972 in order to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251; S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 102, 124 S. Ct. 1537, 1541 (2004). The CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants into United States waters, except as authorized by the statute. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The statute expressly allows citizens to serve the public as private attorneys general when they have suffered injuries in violation of the Act. See Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea 1 Notably, Defendants fail to respond to Kendall’s claim that he possesses standing to sue as the occupier of the property. 6 Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 16-17, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2624 (1981). A party need not be an owner of property to have standing to bring a citizen suit under the CWA. In the instant case, Kendall alleges that he was injured in his capacity as an occupant of the property. All that is required for standing under the CWA is that the plaintiff suffered injury in violation of the Act. Thus, Kendall’s complaint included sufficient facts to establish standing to bring a citizen suit under the CWA, even without the support of his claim to ownership of the property. As stated above, under Twombly and Iqbal, the appropriate response to the incorrect assertion of ownership was to strike that legal conclusion from the complaint, rather than dismissing the entire complaint. Accepting the remaining allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to Kendall, Kendall’s complaint satisfied Iqbal and Twombly on the issue of standing. The CWA requires citizen plaintiffs to notify alleged violators of their intent to sue at least sixty days before filing a complaint. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). We review the sufficiency of such pre-suit notice de novo. Nat’l Parks and Conservation Ass’n v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 502 F.3d 1316, 1328 (11th Cir. 2007). This pre-suit notice must contain: sufficient information to permit the recipient to identify the specific 7 standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been violated, the activity alleged to constitute a violation, the person or persons responsible for the alleged violation, the location of the alleged violation, the date or dates of such violation, and the full name, address, and telephone number of the person giving notice. 40 C.F.R. § 135.3 (emphasis added). “The notice requirements are strictly construed to give the alleged violator the opportunity to correct the problem before a lawsuit is filed.” Nat’l Parks, 502 F.3d at 1329. “If a plaintiff fails to comply with [the] notice requirement where it is applicable, the district court is required to dismiss the action.” Nat’l Envtl. Found. v. ABC Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1096, 1097-98 (11th Cir. 1991). The district court’s finding that the notice to sue letter was defective on its face was erroneous. A notice of intent to sue letter need not include every party that might conceivably wish to join a suit; it only needs to identify the parties bringing suit. See 40 C.F.R. § 135.3. Here, the notice of intent to sue letter specifically identified Kendall and his wife, Angela Y. Dawson. Defendants Thaxton Road, Hathaway Development Company, and Elite Engineering had notice that Kendall and Dawson intended to bring suit, and the letter included the plaintiff’s names, addresses, and telephone numbers. Kendall’s erroneous claim of ownership of the property did not prevent Defendants from having clear notice of 8 who was alleging the violations of the CWA. Likewise, it did not prevent Defendants from taking steps to alleviate the alleged injury. Accordingly, both the spirit of the statute and its technical requirements were met. We vacate and remand the district court’s dismissal of Counts 1 and 2 of Kendall’s complaint as to Thaxton Road, Hathaway Development Company, and Elite Engineering. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Counts 1 and 2 as to Smith and Wilcox, as the notice letter was defective as to them. “[W]e may affirm a decision by the district court on any adequate ground, even if it is other than the one on which the district court actually relied.” Whitaker v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 285 F.3d 940, 947 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). The notice letter was not sent to Smith or Wilcox personally and nowhere mentioned Smith or Wilcox as possible defendants in a lawsuit brought pursuant to the CWA. Consequently, they were not given sufficient notice to correct the alleged problem or identify the possibility of a lawsuit against them. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Counts 1 and 2 as to Smith and Wilcox. We also affirm the district court’s dismissal of Counts 1 and 2 as to Atlantic Southern Bank and RBC Centura Bank, because, even if notice was proper, the only allegation in Kendall’s complaint as to these defendants is that they loaned money for the Bedford Estates development. Kendall has provided this Court with 9 no law in support of the proposition that a CWA claim may be pursued against a party that has merely provided financing to an alleged polluter. Thus, Kendall has failed to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face under the CWA against the banks.