Opinion ID: 2040312
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Albers contends:

Text: The jury's verdict here is clearly excessive. It may be directly attributable to counsel's improper remarks. Of significance, the jury returned a verdict which coincided with the prayer for relief, further evidencing that the jury was swayed by passion and prejudice and disregarded the evidence. A review of the medical testimony indicates that there is no permanancy [sic] to any of Evelyn's complaints and that she had recovered. A trial court may grant a new trial where it appears that excessive damages have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. Rule 59(b)(5), N.D.R. Civ.P. The trial court may also grant a new trial if the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict. Rule 59(b)(6), N.D.R. Civ.P. Albers asserted both these grounds in its motion for a new trial. In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's award of damages, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Our review is limited to a consideration of whether or not there is substantial evidence to sustain the verdict. Roberts, 358 N.W.2d at 780. We find from viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict that the jury could reasonably have found that as a result of the accident Evelyn sustained a long-term, if not permanent, partial disability or reduction in the motion of her cervical spine, and experienced severe headaches and pain in the neck and back. She tires very easily and experiences discomfort when engaged in activity requiring significant movement. The jury could have reasonably concluded that her injuries from the collision with the cement block aggravated her previously existing arthritic condition to such an extent that she can no longer participate as she was accustomed to doing in the farm work, house work, and yard work, and that her social and family life is also now consequently restricted. We said in Cook v. Stenslie, 251 N.W.2d 393, 397 (N.D.1977), that, as in any personal injury case where excessive damages are alleged, no precise limit can be placed on the amount of damages recoverable. Human pain and suffering cannot be measured by a fixed formula, and are best left to the judgment and sound discretion of the jury. In appraising such verdicts, courts must be guided by the peculiar circumstances of each case. We conclude that there was substantial evidence presented at trial to sustain the jury's award of damages. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Albers' motion for a new trial on this issue. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Albers' motion for a new trial on the ground that excessive damages were given under the influence of passion and prejudice. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude it is not excessive nor was it actuated by passion and prejudice. See Roberts, 358 N.W.2d at 781; Jim's Hot Shot Service, Inc. v. Continental Western Insurance Company, 353 N.W.2d 279, 281-82 (N.D. 1984); Skjonsby v. Ness, 221 N.W.2d 70, 76-77 (N.D.1974); Julson v. Loyal Order of Moose Number 822, 140 N.W.2d 39, 45-46 (N.D.1966). In conclusion, we find nothing unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable about the trial court's denial of Albers' motion for a new trial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. GIERKE, VANDE WALLE and LEVINE, JJ., and PEDERSON, Surrogate Justice, concur. PEDERSON, Surrogate Justice, sitting in place of MESCHKE, J., disqualified.