Opinion ID: 1196421
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Instruction on Intoxication

Text: (20) To inform the jury about the effect of intoxication and mental illness on defendant's mental state at the time of the crime, the jury was instructed largely in the language of CALJIC No. 4.21 as follows: In the crime charged in the Information and the lesser included offenses, a necessary element of the crime is the existence in the mind of the defendant of a specific intent or mental state. [¶] If the evidence shows that the defendant was intoxicated or had a mental disorder at the time of the alleged offense, the jury should consider his state of intoxication or mental disorder in determining if defendant had such specific intent or mental state. [¶] If from all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether defendant was capable of forming such specific intent or mental state, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and find that he did not have such specific intent or mental state. (Italics added.) The italicized phrase diverges from the text of the standard instruction, which instead states that If from all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant formed such specific intent or mental state, ... (Italics added.) Defendant argues this minor variation in the instruction injected the now-disapproved defense of diminished capacity into the proceedings (§ 28, subd. (b)), instead of informing the jury that intoxication or mental disorder could be taken into consideration whether defendant actually harbored a particular mental state (§ 28, subd. (a)). Defendant contends this variation prejudiced him by implying he, rather than the People, had the burden of proof of showing he did not actually harbor the requisite mental state. This is not a fair reading of the instruction, however, and no reasonable juror would so interpret the instruction. ( Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 U.S. 307, 315-316 [85 L.Ed.2d 344, 354, 105 S.Ct. 1965] [court interpreted instructions as would reasonable juror]; People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 471, 487 [247 Cal. Rptr. 172, 754 P.2d 218] [same].) The instructions clearly state, If the evidence shows ..., and, If from all the evidence.... These prefatory phrases cannot reasonably be interpreted as meaning defendant had the burden of proof, but instead mean the jury should consider the evidence presented from both sides. In addition, other instructions made clear that the jury should consider the instructions as a whole, that the People bear the burden of proof generally, and that no lack of testimony on the defendant's part will supply a failure of proof by the People so as to support a finding against him on any such essential element. Finally, the instructional error was slight and there was no argument from either side concerning diminished capacity. We conclude the error was manifestly harmless.