Opinion ID: 796946
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ramírez Testimony

Text: 52 Misla next argues that the district court should have struck the testimony of Alvin Ramírez, one of the CAS principals, on the grounds that he lacked personal knowledge. Because this was an evidentiary ruling to which Misla objected, our review is for abuse of discretion. United States v. Brown, 450 F.3d 76, 78 (1st Cir. 2006). Even if the court erred, we will not reverse if the error is harmless. Id. at 79; see United States v. Garcia-Morales, 382 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir.2004) (error is harmless if it is highly probable that the error did not influence the verdict). 53 Ramírez testified about seeing checks from HAOL to Ramos that ultimately ended up in the hands of Cruz and Misla. Ramírez testified several times, however, that he did not know at the time about the intended use of these specific checks, but only found out when the government showed him the evidence that they had gathered during their investigation. Defense counsel objected, but the district judge allowed the testimony, saying that Misla was free to cross-examine Ramírez about the source of his knowledge. 54 Misla's argument is thinly developed, and he cites to no particular rule of evidence or cases supporting the proposition that to have allowed this testimony is reversible error. 9 We decline now to explore all the possible interpretations of the argument since, in any event, any potential error was harmless. Despite not knowing the specific purpose of the funds, Ramírez testified — based on his personal knowledge — that he saw the checks; that he knew that Ramos intended to pay Misla; that Ramos told him that nothing in life is free and everything costs money, tr. 11/25/02 at 16; and that he assumed that the meeting they were able to secure with Misla was [not] a favor that was done just to help us, id. at 61. Furthermore, the jury heard explicitly about the source of his knowledge, whether it came during the events in question or only during later litigation, and thus had a sufficient basis to judge his credibility. Finally, the other evidence against Misla was substantial. Given this, even if it were error to allow the testimony, any error was harmless. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). 55