Opinion ID: 347435
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: suppliers

Text: 16 Appellants Grunsfeld, Williamson, Ingle, Bommarito and Phillips supplied equipment, chemicals and machinery to the main conspirators. Generally they contend that the mere sale of these materials to the main conspirators, was not legally sufficient to constitute participation in the overall conspiracy. They rely primarily on the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 61 S.Ct. 204, 85 L.Ed. 128 (1940). 17 In Falcone, involving a scheme for the illegal production of liquor, the Supreme Court held that where the evidence showed the defendants sold sugar, yeast and cans, knowing the materials would be used for an illegal purpose, but where it could not be inferred that they had knowledge of the conspiracy itself, the convictions could not be sustained. In the absence of such additional evidence, the simple sale to a conspirator was not sufficient. Three years later, however, the Supreme Court decided Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 63 S.Ct. 1265, 87 L.Ed. 1674 (1943), in which the defendant was a mail order drug corporation selling large quantities of morphine sulfate. Conspiracy convictions were affirmed where the sales had been in such quantities and for such a length of time to warrant the inference that the drug supplier had knowledge of and intended to promote the purposes of a drug conspiracy. The company's granting of large discounts on quantity purchases and its refusal to heed warnings by the government that certain doctors were purchasing large amounts of drugs for illegal purposes also suggested complicity in the scheme. The Court explained: 18 Petitioner obviously misconstrues the effect of the Falcone decision in one respect. This is in regarding it as deciding that one who sells to another with knowledge that the buyer will use the article for an illegal purpose cannot, under any circumstances, be found guilty of conspiracy with the buyer to further his illegal end. The assumption seems to be that, under the ruling, so long as the seller does not know there is a conspiracy between the buyer and others, he cannot be guilty of conspiring with the buyer, to further the latter's illegal and known intended use, by selling goods to him. 19 The Falcone case creates no such sweeping insulation for sellers to known illicit users. That decision comes down merely to this, that one does not become a party to a conspiracy by aiding and abetting it, through sales of supplies or otherwise, unless he knows of the conspiracy; and the inference of such knowledge cannot be drawn merely from knowledge the buyer will use the goods illegally. 319 U.S. at 709, 63 S.Ct. at 1268. 20 Here there was evidence before the jury from which it could infer that each of the defendant suppliers did in fact have knowledge of the conspiracy's existence. Grunsfeld was a chemist, involved in three or four large purchases of materials over a period of time. He made large profits in the sale of chemicals to Bert and, in fact, the profit on two such sales exceeded the cost of the chemical itself. Like the corporate defendant in Direct Sales, he promoted the very purposes of the conspiracy rather than merely supplying it. Unlike Falcone, the materials which Grunsfeld obtained for the conspiracy were hard-to-get items which are often used in the production of illegal drugs. 21 The evidence regarding Donald Ingle and John Bommarito amply shows their knowledge of the conspiracy. Bert had contacted Ingle to inquire if he could obtain specific chemicals for the production of PCP. Ingle responded that he would, but apparently never actually obtained the chemicals. The second tableting machine was purchased in 1973 through Ingle from Bommarito for a price of $6,500. Ingle and Bert had gone to Phillips' residence on Rouge Court in Redford, Michigan, to examine the machine. There they met Bommarito who showed the machine to Bert and explained its proper functioning. When Bert described its intended use, Bommarito said that he was willing to purchase all the tablets produced from the machine, thus providing incentive and encouragement for the conspiracy, even though time expired before the machine could be put into production. 22 The evidence against Gerald Phillips is primarily circumstantial and relates to the same negotiations for the sale of the tableting machine in which Ingle and Bommarito were involved. Phillips owned the residence on Rouge Court in Redford visited by Bert and Ingle. Bert identified him as being present in the house during the discussion of the machine, which was being kept in the garage. Subsequent testimony by witness Michael Budnor revealed in more detail the continuing and extensive relationship between Phillips and Bommarito and showed that Phillips was well aware of the role of the machinery in the manufacture of PCP. While this testimony related to a later negotiation for the purchase of a tablet-making machine not employed in the conspiracy, it also revealed that Bommarito asserted, in Phillips' presence, that the two of them were business partners. This was an admission by silence, United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 261-62 (6th Cir. 1967), which occurred during the period of the conspiracy. A permissible inference would be that a business relationship between the men had also existed at the time of the earlier sale of a machine to Bert. 23 Likewise Lawrence Williamson knowingly advanced the purposes of the conspiracy by selling a tableting machine to Bert in the fall of 1972 for $8,000. Further, he demonstrated its use to Bert and Flowers and instructed them in cutting the PCP. His involvement is not unlike that in United States v. Yaniz-Cremata, 503 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1974). There three co-conspirators had smuggled cocaine into the country and went to the defendant's barber shop where he supplied them with milk, sugar and bicarbonate, instructed them on how to cut cocaine and warned that Miami was too hot for operating. The Fifth Circuit concluded that while mere association with others is not enough evidence to support a guilty verdict, the defendant did more in the case at hand. He supplied materials to cut the cocaine. 24 This aided materially in the distribution of the cocaine. From this act, coupled with the contacts appellant had with Rodriguez, Breeden and Anteparra . . . and his advice that the Miami area was hot, the jury could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly became a participant in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. No more was required. 503 F.2d at 964.