Opinion ID: 874154
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: While the District Court Prematurely Granted Summary Judgment on Drew's Unjust-Enrichment Claim, the Judgment of the District Court is Affirmed Because the Written Contracts Are Enforceable and Cover the Same Subject Matter as the Unjust-Enrichment Claim.

Text: Recovery cannot be had for unjust enrichment where there is an express contract covering the same subject matter. Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 1017, 829 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Ct.App.1991). The reason for this rule presently is that the remedies for breach of an express contract, whether by law or by express agreement, afford adequate relief. Triangle Min. Co., Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 753 F.2d 734, 742 (9th Cir.1985). However, an express contract cannot provide adequate relief when it is not enforceable. Thus, this Court has stated that only when the express agreement is found to be enforceable is a court precluded from applying the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment in contravention of the express contract. Wolford v. Tankersley, 107 Idaho 1062, 1064, 695 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1984) (emphasis added); see also Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 776-77, 203 P.3d 702, 706-07 (2009). Respondents argue that a federal case from the district of Maine, Ingram v. Rencor Controls, Inc., 256 F.Supp.2d 12 (D.Me.2003), should be applied here to preclude Drew's claim for unjust enrichment based on the existence of an express contract. In that case, an employee who began work with his employer in 1994 allegedly entered into an oral agreement with the employer in 1997 in which he was to receive a stock transfer, promotion, and 50% increase in salary in exchange for his staying with the corporation after the departure of one of its two shareholders. Ingram, 256 F.Supp.2d at 14. The employer argued that the stock transfer was not a part of the agreement. Id. In citing the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Terry Barr Sales Agency v. All-Lock Co., 96 F.3d 174 (6th Cir.1996), the court held that if the overall contract was found to be enforceable, [but] the parties `merely dispute [the] terms, scope or effect' of a particular provision, a claim could not be made for unjust enrichment. Ingram, 256 F.Supp.2d at 24 (quoting Terry Barr, 96 F.3d at 181). The court further reiterated that it could not allow recovery under unjust enrichment [w]here the parties have made a contract for themselves, covering the whole subject matter. Id. (citation omitted). The district court here never made a finding or determination that the express oral contract in Count I, regarding the oral promise to convey Thomas Motors, was enforceable. The district court found that Drew's assertions under his unjust-enrichment claim, that he provided a benefit to Respondents in reliance on the promise to transfer Thomas Motors, should stand or fall based upon the jury's determination of his express contract claim in Count I. However, the court never determined that the express contract in Count I was enforceable. In fact, it subsequently found in its second summary judgment that the contract was unenforceable. In the Ingram case cited by Respondents, the court relied on authority stating that only if the contract is found to be enforceable does it bar an unjust-enrichment claim. Ingram, 256 F.Supp.2d at 24 (quoting Terry Barr, 96 F.3d at 181). This is the rule in Idaho as well. Wolford, 107 Idaho at 1064, 695 P.2d at 1203 ([O]nly when the express agreement is found to be enforceable is a court precluded from applying the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment in contravention of the express contract.). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) allows a plaintiff to plead in the alternative. I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1) (Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.). As one court stated, had both Plaintiffs and Defendants . . . unequivocally admitted the existence and enforceability of all provisions of the [contract], the Court would have to dismiss Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim. Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Cola, 745 F.Supp.2d 588, 625 (E.D.Pa.2010). However, because the parties disputed the facts underlying the enforceability of the express oral contract in Count I, and the district court in fact later found the contract to be unenforceable in its second summary-judgment order, the district court was premature in dismissing the unjust-enrichment claim at the first summary judgment. See Ridgeline Constructors, Inc. v. Elmira Glass Tech. Corp., 183 A.D.2d 1041, 583 N.Y.S.2d 633, 635 (1992) (With respect to the unjust enrichment claim, because recovery is dependent upon how the contract claim is resolved, it is . . . not capable of disposition on a summary judgment motion.); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Westside Supply Co., 264 Ga.App. 240, 590 S.E.2d 224, 232 (2003) (same). Thus, because there was never any determination that the express oral contract in Count I was enforceable, and it was in fact found to be unenforceable in the second summary-judgment order, the district court erred in granting the first summary judgment based on the existence of an enforceable contract covering the same subject matter. However, we determine that the written contracts are enforceable as a matter of law, and thus we affirm the decision of the district court dismissing the unjust-enrichment claim on an alternative basis. Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 466, 210 P.3d 563, 574 (2009) (We may affirm the district court if we conclude that summary judgment on this cause of action would have been proper on an alternative basis.) The written contracts were entered into by the parties in 2000 and thereafter governed both Drew's salary and the promise to convey Thomas Motors. Drew disputes when and if these contracts were signed by his mother. Drew stated in his affidavit that when he signed the contracts in September 2000, there were no other signatures on the documents. Respondents state that Ron and Elaine signed and dated the contracts in September 2000, and the contracts reflect as much. The district court dismissed the claim Drew brought against the Respondents for breach of the written contracts, specifically the Purchase and Sale Agreement, determining that the contract was either unenforceable because it was not signed by Ron and Elaine as alleged by Drew, or there was no breach because Drew failed to satisfy a condition precedent to Ron's obligation to transfer Thomas Motors, that he obtain a franchise. The Management Contract and the Purchase and Sale Agreement entered into in September 2000, while not specifically considered by the district court in dismissing the unjust-enrichment claim, provide the terms and conditions of Drew's employment and the transfer of Thomas Motors. The Management Contract provides a set monthly salary of $5,000 and states that Drew's dividends will be applied toward the purchase price of the dealership as provided for under the conditions of the Purchase and Sale Agreement. [7] Because this Court finds the Management Contract and Purchase and Sale Agreement constitute enforceable agreements setting forth the conditions of Drew's employment, including his salary and the transfer of Thomas Motors, and those written contracts thus supercede the 1997 oral contract alleged by Drew in Count I, the Court affirms the decision of the district court dismissing the unjust-enrichment claim on an alternative basis, because an express enforceable agreement covers the same subject matter. Blaser, 121 Idaho at 1017, 829 P.2d at 1366. The Management Contract and Purchase and Sale Agreement superceded the prior oral contract because this Court has held a contract may be set aside by a subsequently executed contract which either deals with the subject matter of the prior contract so comprehensively as to raise the inference of substitution or is so inconsistent with the prior contract that the two cannot stand together. Walter E. Wilhite Revocable Living Trust v. Nw. Yearly Meeting Pension Fund, 128 Idaho 539, 548, 916 P.2d 1264, 1273 (1996). Each of the terms that Drew claims exist in the unjust-enrichment claimhis salary, employment duties, and the transfer of Thomas Motorsis covered in the written contracts. Further, Paragraph 24.1 of the Purchase and Sale Agreement provides, in pertinent part: There are no oral agreements or representations between the parties which affect this transaction, and this Agreement supercedes all previous negotiations, warranties, representations and understandings between the parties. True copies of all documents referenced in this Agreement are attached to this Agreement. Therefore, so long as the written contracts were validly executed, they supercede any oral agreements. Formation of a valid contract requires that there be a meeting of the minds as evidenced by a manifestation of mutual intent to contract. Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701, 702, 779 P.2d 15, 16 (1989). Formation of a contract is generally a question of fact for the trier of fact to resolve. Id. at 703, 779 P.2d at 17. Drew claims that the written contracts were never in effect because they were not signed by Ron and Elaine at the time Drew signed them in September 2000, and in October of 2000, Ron told Drew he was not going to sign the contracts because Ron had already promised to give the business to Drew. Drew claims he did not see the signed contracts until this litigation began, and thus given his father's statements that he was not going to sign or follow the contracts, and the fact that Drew never received a copy of the contracts signed by Ron and Elaine before litigation began, it is possible the contracts were not signed by Ron and Elaine until after this litigation began. He also alleges that Ron may have forged Elaine's signature. Respondents claim that Ron and Elaine signed the written contracts in September 2000, which is evidenced by the date (September 16, 2000) next to the signature on the contracts themselves. From a review of the record, it seems that Drew obtained an expert to conduct forensic testing on the original written contracts to determine the dates they were signed, the results of which were inconclusive as they related to identifying specific dates. Respondents had the burden to prove the absence of all material facts, but Drew may not rest upon bare allegations and denials in order to create an issue of fact. Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). Rather, Drew must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; I.R.C.P. 56(e). Drew provides no actual evidence that his mother's signature was forged or that she otherwise did not sign the contract on the date on the contract other than bare allegations. As such, he has not provided sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact regarding whether and when the contracts were signed. We therefore hold that the written contracts are valid and enforceable, supercede any oral agreement, and cover the same subject matter as the unjust-enrichment claim. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the unjust-enrichment claim.