Opinion ID: 2304074
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Misconceptions within the Bench and Bar

Text: Adams relies on dicta in Walker to support the proposition that a relevant and contemporary misconception by a large segment of the bench and the bar concerning the [law] may constitute special circumstances excusing waiver. Walker, 343 Md. at 648, 684 A.2d at 438. In Walker, a petitioner sought post-conviction review of his waived allegations of error to the jury instructions regarding the intent element of the offense for which Walker was convicted, arguing that mistake as to the law by a large segment of the bench and bar excused his waiver. Walker argued, and the post-conviction court found, that prior to Jenkins, [33] many trial judges and lawyers [mistakenly] believed that a jury instruction like that given at Walker's trial was a correct statement of the law. Walker, 343 Md. at 634, 684 A.2d at 431. The `special circumstances' found by the circuit court were that, at the time of Walker's trial, the law concerning the intent element of assault with intent to murder was misunderstood by trial judges and lawyers, and that the law was not finally clarified until this Court's opinion in State v. Jenkins ... after Walker's conviction became final. Walker, 343 Md. at 635, 684 A.2d at 432. Eschewing substantive analysis of the legal validity of the petitioner's argument, we rejected his argument because the alleged erroneous instruction regarding intent was simply not an issue at all at Walker's trial. Walker, 343 Md. at 650, 684 A.2d at 439. For the sake of argument, however, we, in dicta, assume[d] that, if the circumstances in [Walker's] case [nonetheless had presented an issue regarding intent], the circuit court's decision excusing Walker's waiver of the jury instruction issue would have been warranted. [34] Walker, 343 Md. at 648-49, 684 A.2d at 438. There is some facial justification for Adams's argument that, prior to Stevenson, there appeared to be some level of misconception afield among some contingent of the Bench and Bar regarding the proper role of the jury in criminal cases. The Court of Special Appeals noted such confusion on at least two occasions. In Allnutt v. State, 59 Md.App. 694, 701, 478 A.2d 321, 324 (1984), the intermediate appellate court stated, Until Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 179, 423 A.2d 558, was decided on December 17, 1980, it was generally believed by bench and bar that a judge's comments as to the law in a criminal case were advisory and not binding on the jury. A jury-twelve lay persons-was to determine not only the evidence but the law of the case. In Petric v. State, 66 Md.App. 470, 478, 504 A.2d 1168, 1172 (1986), our appellate colleagues noted, Ere Stevenson, it was generally thought by bench and bar alike that jurors in criminal cases were judges of the law and fact. Stevenson made clear that such was not the situation, but that a jury's judicial role was limited to the `law of the crime.' Furthermore, at the time of Adams's trial, Maryland Rule 757(b) stated that [i]n every case in which instructions are given to the jury the court shall instruct the jury that they are the judges of the law and that the court's instructions are advisory only. See Guardino, 50 Md. App. at 701 n. 2, 440 A.2d at 1105 n. 2 (We note that Rule 757 b requires the court `(i)n every case in which instructions are given' to instruct the jury that the instructions are advisory only. Under the dictates of Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 437 A.2d 654 (1981), this is manifestly not correct.). Those indicia, together with an analysis of the actual state of the law prior to Adams's trial ( supra at 325-32, 958 A.2d at 349-51), suggest a certain degree of perceptible schizophrenia within the Maryland legal community regarding the proper role of the jury. As the Court of Special Appeals in Guardino recognized, the Court of Appeals consistently had limited the power of the jury to determine law outside of the law of the crime, however, these teachings were not recognized in practice by many of the trial courts. Guardino, 50 Md.App. at 702, 440 A.2d at 1105. Despite the potential confusion within the bench and bar over the issue, we shall not exercise our discretion to excuse Adams's waiver. As in Oken, Hunt, and Walker, the petitioner's argument shall be deemed waived and unexcused. Oken provides a particularly apt comparison. In Oken, the defendant [35] argued that his waiver should be excused. We rejected that argument: Oken's argument to excuse the waiver, however, is without merit. The reverse Witherspoon[v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968)] right to exclude jurors for cause was established by the Supreme Court in 1988 in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988). We recognized this right in Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 583 A.2d 218 (1990). Oken, 343 Md. at 273, 681 A.2d at 38. Thus, because the law upon which the defendant relied in the post-conviction proceeding to support his issue waived at trial was established at the time of his trial, and hence available to form the basis for a valid objection at trial, we declined to exercise our discretion to excuse the waiver. In the present case, as discussed supra, the basis for a valid objection regarding the advisory jury instructions was available in Maryland law at the time of Adams's trial. Although Stevenson was decided after Adams's trial, Stevenson, by its express terms, only described what already was the law, based upon cases decided well before Adams's trial. We also decline to exercise our discretion because of the potential for unfair prejudice to the State. In deciding whether to exercise discretion to consider unpreserved arguments, the appellate court should consider whether the exercise of its discretion will work unfair prejudice to either of the parties. Jones v. State, 379 Md. 704, 714, 843 A.2d 778, 784 (2004); see also State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 189, 638 A.2d 107, 113 (1994) (noting that this discretion should be exercised only when it is clear that it will not work an unfair prejudice to the parties or to the court). A delay of twenty-four years before asserting his waived arguments (which were based on two cases decided in 1980 and 1981, respectively) may be a testimonial to patience, but the delay poses a real potential for serious hardship and prejudice to the State's ability to mount a new prosecution. This delay is particularly inexcusable because [a]s originally enacted in 1958, the [Post-Conviction Procedure] Act did not place any limit on the number of post conviction petitions which a petitioner was entitled to file. Mason v. State, 309 Md. 215, 217-18, 522 A.2d 1344, 1345 (1987). [36] Dicta in Creighton v. State, 87 Md.App. 736, 744, 591 A.2d 561, 565 (1991), is particularly apt to the fairness considerations regarding our exercise of discretionIt is not right for a prisoner to sit back and wait for memories to fade, for records to disappear, for crucial witnesses to die or otherwise become unavailable to rebut allegations of incompetence or procedural irregularity before filing his or her petition. The same analysis applies to the second consideration in deciding whether to exercise discretion, that the appellate court should consider whether the exercise of its discretion will promote the orderly administration of justice. Jones v. State, 379 Md. 704, 715, 843 A.2d 778, 784. To do so in this case would not. As noted by the Court of Special Appeals in Guardino, where the jury instruction occurred before Stevenson was handed down: We appreciate that both the bench and the bar are charged with having knowledge of the law. But in light of Rule 757 h, the failure of the trial judge to recognize that the Court of Appeals had consistently interpreted Art. 23 as restraining the jury's law deciding power, limiting it to the law of the crime, cannot excuse the failure of defense counsel to recognize that restraint and interpose a timely objection when the trial judge failed to abide by it. Guardino, 50 Md.App. 695, 702, 440 A.2d 1101, 1106 (1982). C.