Opinion ID: 2272555
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Entry of Judgment

Text: On appeal, defendant argues that the Superior Court clerk's office failed to properly enter and provide notice of the judgment in accordance with the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. First, defendant alleges that the judgment in the instant case was not properly entered pursuant to Rule 79(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure [6] because the docket does not reflect the December 11, 2007 entry of the judgment. The defendant further argues that the clerk's office did not comply with Rule 77(d) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure [7] because it failed to mail notice of entry of judgment to the parties. Rule 58(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure states, in part, that a judgment is effective and shall be deemed entered when so set forth and signed by the Clerk. Likewise, Rule 4(a) of our rules provides that a judgment, order, or decree is entered within the meaning of [Rule 4(a)] when it is set forth and signed by the clerk of the trial court in accordance with the applicable rules of the trial court. See generally Robert B. Kent, et al., Rhode Island Civil and Appellate Procedure § 58:2 at 41 (2006). Rule 4(a) provides that a notice of appeal must be filed within twenty days of the date of the entry of the judgment, order, or decree appealed from. Under the Superior Court rule, [u]ntil a judgment is entered, no appeal can be taken, and an appeal filed before the entry of judgment on a separate paper is premature and subject to dismissal. McClellan v. Thompson, 114 R.I. 334, 341, 333 A.2d 424, 428 (1975) (discussing Rule 58(a)). Although Rule 77(d) generally requires the clerk to serve notice of entry of judgment by mail upon each party not in default for failure to appear, the clerk's failure to comply with this requirement does not void the judgment. McClellan, 114 R.I. at 341, 333 A.2d at 428; see also Kent, § 58:4 at 41. In the case under review, it is undisputed that the hearing justice signed the final judgment on December 10, 2007, in the presence of attorneys representing all parties. The Superior Court clerk, however, signed the judgment outside the presence of the parties on December 11. Rule 77(d) authorizes a party to give notice of the entry of judgment by sending a copy of the judgment by mail to his adversary. Thomas v. Ross, 477 A.2d 950, 951-52 n. 2 (R.I. 1984). Here, an attested copy of the final judgment bearing both the hearing justice's signature and the December 10, 2007 time-stamp of the clerk's office was mailed by opposing counsel to defendant's attorney of record on December 10, 2007. Moreover, he manifestly believed that the appeal period had begun to run (or would soon begin to run) because he asked his associate to file a notice of appeal even before receiving the copy. The defendant cites this Court's decision in Kay v. Menard, 727 A.2d 665 (R.I.1999), in support of its contention that the appeal period never began to run because of the clerk's failure to mail the parties notice of entry of final judgment. The circumstances of the instant case differ from those presented in Kay in several vital respects, however. In Kay, the trial justice's clerk prepared and signed an order commemorating the denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial, apparently outside the presence of the parties. Id. at 666. Unlike the final judgment in the instant case, however, nothing noted upon the order [in Kay ] indicat[ed] the time when the order was prepared and signed by the court clerk, nor [did] it contain any file marking showing when it was entered. Id. The clerk's office apparently did not provide the parties with notice of entry of judgment. Id. The defendant's attorney subsequently prepared another order purporting to be a judgment and had it signed by the trial justice and the clerk. Id. Under those circumstances, this Court held that the original order was invalid because the parties lacked notice and knowledge of its entry. Id. Unlike the order at issue in Kay, the judgment in the instant case was dated by the clerk. Moreover, the parties had knowledge that entry of judgment was imminent because their respective attorneys were present when the hearing justice signed the judgment, and plaintiffs' attorney notified defendant's attorney of record that the judgment had been filed with the clerk's office on December 10. This Court has noted that [i]t is incumbent upon the party intending to appeal to be watchful for the entry of a valid judgment. Blais v. Beacon Mutual Insurance Co., 812 A.2d 838, 839 (R.I.2002) (mem.). Under the circumstances presented in this case, the clerk's failure to mail the parties notice of the entry of judgment did not invalidate that judgment. In addition, the clerk's erroneous recording of the date of entry of judgment on the docket pursuant to Rule 79(a) did not invalidate the judgment. Although Rule 79(a) requires that the clerk make an entry in the civil docket after signing a final judgment, it has been observed that this ministerial act is not essential to the effectiveness of the judgment. It is deemed entered and is effective when the clerk signs it. Kent, § 58:2 at 41. Moreover, we note that December 31, 2007 was the deadline for filing a notice of appeal regardless of whether judgment was entered on December 10 or December 11. Counting twenty days from December 10, 2007, the deadline for filing a notice of appeal would have fallen on Sunday, December 30, 2007. The defendants therefore would have had until the next business day (Monday, December 31, 2007) to file a notice of appeal under Article I, Rule 20(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure. Likewise, the deadline for filing a notice of appeal from the actual date of entry (December 11) was also December 31. Under these circumstances, the failure of the docket to reflect the fact that judgment properly was entered on December 11and not December 10did not toll the running of the appeal period.