Opinion ID: 201989
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Tolling Statute and Interpretive Case Law

Text: 32 The tolling statute, which has deep roots in Maine history, was amended in the 1950s and applies to four categories: minors, the mentally ill, the imprisoned, and those outside the limits of the United States when the cause of action accrues. In such instances, the action may be brought within the times limited after the disability is removed. Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 853. In all of the other categories, save for the disability of mental illness, it will be fairly evident when the disability has been removed. The 1950s amendment substituted the phrase mental illness for the word insanity. See McCutchen v. Currier, 94 Me. 362, 47 A. 923 (1900) (quoting prior tolling statute). Neither side has provided us with any legislative history as to the reasons for this change. 33 The Maine Law Court has had little opportunity to address questions about the proper interpretation of the term mental illness in the tolling statute. It did adopt the McAfee test, stating that mental illness for the purposes of the tolling statute means an overall inability to function in society that prevents plaintiffs from protecting their legal rights. 6 McAfee, 637 A.2d at 466. There are no cases directly dealing with the configuration of facts that characterizes this case. 34 The tolling statute itself does not define mental illness, nor does it provide any measure for evaluating when the disability of mental illness has been removed. From case law, we know that the standards for determining mental illness for purposes of the tolling statute are not necessarily the same as when determining mental competence for the ability to marry and divorce, see Chasse v. Mazerolle, 580 A.2d 155, 157 (1990) (finding that the fact that a mentally retarded woman had married and divorced, standing alone, was not enough to show an absence of mental illness under the tolling statute), or to stand trial, cf. State v. Bowman, 681 A.2d 469, 471 (Me.1996) (A defendant may suffer from a mental disease or defect within the purview of [Maine's insanity defense statute] and remain competent to stand trial.), or to avoid appointment of a guardian, cf. Guardianship of Hughes, 715 A.2d 919, 925 (Me.1998) (finding appointment of a guardian was proper when mental illness prevent[ed] [person] from making responsible decisions in at least some areas of her life (emphasis added)). That is because, as Chasse says, the legal standard of competency varies for different purposes. 580 A.2d at 157. 35 When the test was articulated in McAfee, 637 A.2d at 466, the Maine Law Court drew on decisions from other states, citing Smith v. Smith, 830 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir.1987); Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 736 F.Supp. 1512, 1514 (S.D.Ind.1990); Hickey v. Askren, 198 Ga.App. 718, 403 S.E.2d 225, 229 (1991); and Yannon v. RCA Corp., 131 A.D.2d 843, 517 N.Y.S.2d 205, 206 (N.Y.App.Div.1987). The cases on which McAfee relies, to which we look for guidance, involve belated lawsuits alleging sexual abuse, where the plaintiffs sought to toll the statute of limitations based on repressed memories resulting from post-traumatic stress disorder caused by the sexual abuse. These other cases, however, interpret statutes providing for tolling only in cases of insanity or mental incompetence, and not with mental illness, the term used in the Maine statute. It turns out that this distinction does not help the party seeking tolling. 36 Smith, the lead case relied on by McAfee, involved whether the New York statutory tolling provision for insanity applied to a plaintiff alleging she had repressed her memories of childhood sexual abuse by her father. 830 F.2d at 12. The plaintiff's experts attributed the repressed memory to post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. Smith held that the term insanity did not apply to a person claiming a mere post traumatic neurosis, but applied only to those who are unable to protect their legal rights because of an over-all inability to function in society. Id. Smith, in turn, relied on McCarthy v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 543, 450 N.Y.S.2d 457, 435 N.E.2d 1072 (1982). 37 The term mental illness could easily have been read to be more generous toward tolling than the New York statute's insanity requirement. 7 Indeed, it was important to the McCarthy court in reaching its result that the New York Legislature had declined to broaden the term insanity by replacing it with the term mental illness. 435 N.E.2d at 1074-75. Since the Maine legislature, by contrast, did choose to replace the term insanity with mental illness, the Maine Law Court had a clear opportunity to interpret the amendment as being more liberal toward tolling. It has rejected such an interpretation. 38 Maine may have rejected a more liberal test for a reason articulated in McCarthy. McCarthy expressly worried that a more liberal interpretation might inappropriately expand the class of persons able to assert the toll for insanity and ... weaken the policy of the Statutes of Limitation as statutes of repose. Id. at 1075. This is the same theme sounded by the Maine Law Court in Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d 1331, 1334-35 (Me.1996) (denying equitable estoppel of statute of limitations in a repressed memory case). The choice of a more restrictive interpretation of the Maine statute belonged to the courts of Maine, and it binds us. 39 The parties have each relied on only one case applying the McAfee test, Bowden, 675 A.2d 968, but Bowden is of little assistance. In Bowden, the plaintiff filed suit three months after the statute of limitations had expired, seeking rescission of a deed she had conveyed to a relative soon after the death of her husband. Id. at 970. Applying the McAfee test, the Maine Law Court found sufficient evidence to uphold the trial court's finding after trial that the plaintiff's mental illness was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. 8 Id. at 971-72. This is a different question than what evidence suffices to get to a jury on the question of tolling. 40 In another case applying the McAfee rule, the Maine Law Court has stressed that there must be evidence of an overall inability to function in society, see Morris v. Hunter, 652 A.2d 80, 82 (Me.1994), 9 and that a person could not be said as a matter of law to meet the definition when plaintiff although perhaps unable to make complex decisions without assistance, can do so if provided with time and a careful explanation, id. at 82. The court gave as an example that the plaintiff had signed a settlement agreement for worker's compensation benefits in the relevant period. Id. This also reflects a narrow approach. 41