Opinion ID: 4536899
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proper interpretation of Circuit City

Text: We start with Eastus’ two arguments construing Circuit City. First, Eastus contends the district court erroneously based its decision on a misinterpretation of Circuit City. Specifically, Eastus says the district court incorrectly read Circuit City as if the Court itself defined a transportation worker as a worker “actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce.” Second, Eastus follows the first argument by identifying the three times the word “goods” appears in Circuit City and by then arguing that “[a]t no time did the Supreme Court use the term ‘goods’ with the intent to limit the application of the Transportation Worker Exemption to workers who are engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce.” The district court here seemed to quote Circuit City as if the Court itself defined transportation worker as opposed to stating the definition used by a majority of courts of appeals. That interpretation, though, is not legal error. The district court based its ruling on this court’s standard in Rojas. As noted earlier, we have already held that the pre–Circuit City transportation-worker standard in Rojas remains operative. Brown, 339 F.3d at 394. Further, 6 Case: 19-20258 Document: 00515429429 Page: 7 Date Filed: 05/27/2020 No. 19-20258 regardless of the context in which Circuit City used the word “goods,” it did not disapprove of the Rojas standard. We stay on course, then, to determine if Eastus herself was engaged in the movement of goods. IV. Whether Eastus was engaged in the movement of goods First, we reject Eastus’ urging that we adopt a multiple-factor test used in another circuit. See Lenz v. Yellow Transp., 431 F.3d 348, 352 (8th Cir. 2005). 1 No other circuit has adopted this test, and in our view, it unduly adds to the complexity of the analysis. Eastus also argues that even under the Rojas standard, she engaged in the movement of goods. To support this argument, Eastus broadly defines “goods” in two ways. Eastus contends she was engaged in the movement of goods because “[e]very passenger who gets on an airplane brings some form of goods with them whether they be in a purse, pocket, bag, backpack, briefcase or luggage.” She also relies on a recent Third Circuit decision that held transportation workers who transport passengers instead of goods may still be excluded from the FAA under the residual clause. See Singh, 939 F.3d at 226. The district court did in part rely on a distinction between passengers and 1 The non-exclusive factors include: first, whether the employee works in the transportation industry; second, whether the employee is directly responsible for transporting the goods in interstate commerce; third, whether the employee handles goods that travel interstate; fourth, whether the employee supervises employees who are themselves transportation workers, such as truck drivers; fifth, whether, like seamen or railroad employees, the employee is within a class of employees for which special arbitration already existed when Congress enacted the FAA; sixth, whether the vehicle itself is vital to the commercial enterprise of the employer; seventh, whether a strike by the employee would disrupt interstate commerce; and eighth, the nexus that exists between the employee’s job duties and the vehicle the employee uses in carrying out his duties (i.e., a truck driver whose only job is to deliver goods cannot perform his job without a truck). Lenz, 431 F.3d at 352. 7 Case: 19-20258 Document: 00515429429 Page: 8 Date Filed: 05/27/2020 No. 19-20258 goods, but we may affirm on “any ground supported by the record, even if it is different from that relied on by the district court.” Holtzclaw v. DSC Commc’ns Corp., 255 F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir. 2001). Important to us is that though the passengers moved in interstate commerce, Eastus’ role preceded that movement. At least two courts since Circuit City have held that workers who load or unload goods that others transport in interstate commerce are not transportation workers. See Saxon v. Sw. Airlines Co., No. 19-CV-0403, 2019 WL 4958247, at  n.2,  (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2019) (holding airline ramp supervisor whose job duties presumably included loading and unloading luggage to and from airplanes was not a transportation worker); Furlough v. Capstone Logistics, LLC, 2019 WL 2076723, at  (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2019) (holding warehouseman whose job duties included “loading, unloading, and handling freight; communicating with drivers; and monitoring conditions on the docks” was not a transportation worker). Of course, these opinions have no precedential effect, but we identify them as examples of how federal judges have analyzed similar issues. Further, there is a distinction between handling goods and moving them in Section 1 of the FAA’s enumeration of seamen and not longshoremen, who are the workers who load and unload ships. The FAA does not apply to longshoremen. That conclusion comes first from the Supreme Court’s holding that whether defined “under the Jones Act or general maritime law, seamen do not include land-based workers.” McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 348 (1991). The other step is that this court uses the Jones Act’s definition of “seaman” to determine Section 1 exemption from the FAA. See Brown, 339 F.3d at 395. Eastus properly conceded during oral argument that longshoremen and delivery-truck loaders are not transportation workers under Section 1. Loading or unloading a boat or truck with goods prepares the goods for or 8 Case: 19-20258 Document: 00515429429 Page: 9 Date Filed: 05/27/2020 No. 19-20258 removes them from transportation. In this context, Eastus’ duties could at most be construed as loading and unloading airplanes. She was not engaged in an aircraft’s actual movement in interstate commerce. The exemption in the FAA does not apply to her, and arbitration was validly ordered to resolve her dispute. AFFIRMED. 9