Opinion ID: 2058346
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Jury Instruction on the Kidnapping Charge

Text: This Court has held that under Delaware's kidnapping statute, 11 Del.C. § 783A, the requirement that the defendant `interfere substantially' with the victim's liberty insures that where movement or restraint is entirely incidental to the underlying crime, there cannot be a kidnapping conviction. Burton v. State, Del. Supr., 426 A.2d 829, 834 (1981). Coleman contends that the Superior Court committed plain error when it failed to instruct the jury that the element of restraint in the kidnapping statute, 11 Del.C. § 783A [20] , requires proof of substantial interference, i.e., interference that is independent of and not incidental to the underlying crimes. The underlying crime in this case was unlawful sexual contact. Coleman asserts that the only evidence of restraint presented by the State in support of the kidnapping charge was entirely incidental to the sexual assault. [21] Coleman argues that a specific jury instruction was not only necessary but mandatory to assure him a fair trial on both charges. Coleman relies on this Court's decision in Weber v. State, Del.Supr., 547 A.2d 948 (1988). In Weber, this Court held that in every case when a defendant is charged with kidnapping in conjunction with an underlying crime, a specific instruction requiring the jury to find that the movement and/or restraint is independent of and not incidental to the underlying crime is mandatory. Id. at 959. The Weber decision does not support Coleman's argument, however, because the jury instruction in kidnapping cases which was made mandatory in Weber operates prospectively only. Id. [22] Cases, like Coleman's, which were tried preceding Weber, must be reviewed according to the plain error standard which was applied by this Court in Burton v. State, Del.Supr., 426 A.2d 829 (1981) and Scott v. State, Del.Supr., 521 A.2d 235 (1987). In Burton, the kidnapping occurred after the victim was first raped when her liberty was substantially interfered with by detaining her for the purpose of raping her again. Weber v. State, 547 A.2d at 958. In Burton, we concluded that the record ... manifestly support[ed] a finding of `substantial' interference with the victim's liberty. Burton v. State, 426 A.2d at 835. Therefore, we held that no specific jury instruction was required. Id. However, subsequent to Burton, under different circumstances, this Court held that a specific instruction requiring the jury to find proof of more interference than is ordinarily incident to the underlying crime of rape was necessary to assure the defendant a fair trial on both charges. Scott v. State, 521 A.2d at 243. In Scott, the defendant, Mr. Scott, was a motorist who was stranded by the roadside when his car would not start. The victim voluntarily agreed to drive Mr. Scott several miles to his home to get some jumper cables. The victim waited outside in her car when Mr. Scott went into his house. When Mr. Scott returned from his house without the jumper cables, he demanded the victim's car keys, told her that he was going to assault her sexually, and ordered the victim to get into the back seat of the car. [T]he victim conceded at trial that until she was forced to move from the front to the back seat of the car, she had remained voluntarily with [Mr. Scott]. Id. This Court held: So viewed, the facts arguably do not support a finding of substantial interference. Under the circumstances, the Trial Court was obliged to instruct the jury that a conviction of kidnapping would require proof of more interference than is ordinarily incident to the crime of rape. In our view, such an instruction was necessary to enable a jury intelligently to perform its duty when returning a verdict as to both rape and kidnapping. The failure to give such an instruction was reversible error. Id. (citation omitted). In Coleman's case, the victim's actions were involuntary ab initio. Coleman told the victim that he intended to assault her sexually when they were behind the bank. Coleman forced the victim to the front of the bank and into her car, under a threat of death. Coleman then forced the victim to drive her car under the same threat of death and repeated his intention to assault the victim sexually. The record reflects that Coleman did have unlawful sexual contact with the victim during the ride in her car. However, the facts of this case also clearly establish that the restraint imposed on the victim by Coleman was substantial interference with the victim's liberty in excess of the restraint ordinarily incident to the underlying crime of unlawful sexual contact, of which he was also charged. Burton v. State, 426 A.2d at 835. The Superior Court's failure to specifically instruct the jury that to convict Coleman of kidnapping, it had to find substantial interference with the victim's liberty, independent of and not incidental to the underlying crime of unlawful sexual contact, was not plain and reversible error. Id. Cf. Scott v. State, 521 A.2d at 242-43. Under the facts of this case, such an instruction was not necessary to assure Coleman of a fair trial on both charges. Burton v. State, 426 A.2d at 835. We are satisfied, under the facts in the record before us, that in the absence of a specific instruction, the jury was able to perform its duty when deliberating its verdicts as to the separate charges for kidnapping and unlawful sexual contact. Id.