Opinion ID: 2586480
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Competency to Stand Trial and Right to Self-representation

Text: As set forth more fully below, defendant contends he was denied a meaningful competency hearing under section 1369 because the trial court failed to appoint two experts to evaluate him and failed to obtain a personal waiver of his right to a jury trial. In addition, defendant contends the trial court accepted an invalid waiver of his right to self-representation under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525] ( Faretta ) and erroneously denied his request for continuance made on the day of trial. The background and procedural history that follow are relevant to our discussion of each of these contentions. Between April 2, 1993, and February 14, 1994, defendant was represented by appointed counsel Jennifer Keller. During one of their initial meetings at Orange County jail, defendant admitted that he had committed the murder. After hearing his admission, Keller had no doubt that defendant lit Laborde on fire, and it wasn't a space heater that was responsible. Two weeks after this discussion, defendant changed his story, insisting the space heater spontaneously had ignited the fire and there was a conspiracy to convict him. On July 30, 1993, in denying defendant's first motion under Faretta, the court declared a doubt about defendant's competence to stand trial under section 1368. The court articulated no specific reasons for doubting defendant's competence, but stated it had a strong feeling that this defendant cannot cooperate with any counsel. Presumably, the court was referring to Keller's representations at the hearing that defendant had organic brain damage that caused him to, among other things, act impulsively and without reflection and that he was refusing to cooperate with Keller in the preparation of a mental health defense because he did not trust her and believed he was being framed. On September 2, 1993, after conducting a competency hearing, the trial court found defendant incompetent to stand trial and committed him to Patton State Hospital. On January 14, 1994, the court received and filed a certificate of restoration under section 1372 and an accompanying report from the medical director of the hospital that indicated defendant's competence had been restored. On February 14, 1994, defendant appeared in court with Keller, who declared a conflict of interest and was relieved as counsel of record. The following day, Paul Stark was appointed counsel of record. [10] On February 22, 1994, the trial court conducted a competency hearing, found defendant competent to stand trial, and reinstated criminal proceedings. (§ 1372.) On August 12, 1994, the trial court held a hearing on motions that defendant had filed under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44] ( Marsden ) and Faretta. Defendant told the court that what happened that day was an accident and that he wanted to represent himself because his attorneys did not want to pursue an accidental ignition defense. [11] The court then explained to defendant: But don't you understand that you, as the accused, ultimately does [ sic ] have the right to direct the direction in which your defense goes. The lawyers can advise you, they can tell you what is in your best interest, but when it gets right down to it you make the decision on what kind of defense you offer; and the lawyer either participates with it, or if he has an ethical conflict he can get off the case then. Defendant complained that his prior and present attorneys refused to pursue his defense theory and wanted to take the case in a different direction. The court denied both of defendant's motions. Defendant filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, challenging the trial court's rulings. While writ proceedings were pending, during a discovery hearing held on October 21, 1994, defendant became frustrated when he learned counsel had subpoenaed his jail records and the psychiatric records of two witnesses who sought treatment after the murder. Defendant stated, It's my wish[] that those records were never subpoenaed. How can [counsel] do that? I thought you told me last time that I was here that I had the final say, that they could only suggest, I had the final say; evidently not. After counsel explained to the court that he had consulted with defendant, defendant added, I thought you [the court] stated last time that I had the final say; apparently I don't, to which the court replied, Apparently not. On January 10, 1995, the Court of Appeal granted defendant's petition and issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to grant defendant's Faretta motion after obtaining a valid waiver of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. On January 23, 1995, the trial court advised defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, obtained a valid waiver of his right to counsel, and granted his Faretta motion. While representing himself, defendant took steps to develop an accidental ignition defense. On May 8, 1995, Robert Lowe of Lowe Fire Investigations agreed to work as a fire cause and origin consultant for defendant on a pro bono basis. [12] On July 28, 1995, the prosecutor represented to the trial court that Lowe had examined the space heater recovered from the crime scene. On September 25, 1995, the court granted defendant's request that the prosecutor release crime scene photographs to Lowe. On December 4, 1995, the court appointed Lowe to assist the defense. On December 8, 1995, the trial court appointed George Peters as advisory and standby counsel. On April 15, 1996, during a closed proceeding, Peters represented to the trial court that defendant wanted Peters to be his trial attorney and that they had discussed the subject extensively during the preceding week. Defendant told the court that he wanted Peters to present his defense because it might be a little better than [coming] directly from the horse's mouth. Peters consented to the arrangement but said nothing about presenting defendant's accidental ignition defense. He represented to the court that defendant wanted to retain his in propria persona status in jail and question trial witnesses about his janitorial business practices, if necessary. The court granted defendant's requests and appointed Peters as counsel. It informed defendant that it was leaving [him] pro per for all purposes at the jail, so far as the jail is concerned you're still pro per; however, [the court] expect[ed] Mr. Peters [to] conduct the voir dire of the jury and ... [to] be lead counsel and ... [to] conduct the trial. The court further informed defendant that it would continue to accept motions from him. The court then told defendant that he was appointing Peters as counsel of record with some reluctance because it questioned whether one of defendant's prior court-appointed attorneys should be reappointed. Defendant acknowledged he previously had disagreed with his former counsel, Paul Stark and Jennifer Keller, over the theory of the case and explained that, because they believed he set Laborde on fire, they wanted to present a mental defense. Defendant then explained that Peters had interviewed Lowe and reviewed discovery. Defendant told the court, [Peters] has come to the position, I believe, that he thinks that it's possible [the fire] could have been an accident ... and it seems that if he's willing to argue that position, as well as some other issues that I brought forth to him, I don't see where there's a conflict. [¶] Again, with Mr. Stark and Ms. Keller, there was a conflict. The court did not respond to defendant's remarks but confirmed Peters's appointment as counsel of record. On October 25, 1996, at a hearing that had been scheduled to address defendant's Marsden and Faretta motions filed three days earlier, the trial court addressed instead the issue of defendant's competence based on two letters Peters had received from defense forensic psychologists Drs. Edward Fischer and Veronica Thomas. Dr. Fischer informed Peters that defendant was competent to represent himself at trial but could not cooperate with counsel because counsel was the central object of defendant's paranoia. Dr. Thomas likewise reported to Peters that he (counsel) was the focus of defendant's paranoia, and advised that defendant was incompetent to stand trial. Based on this information, the court appointed Psychiatrist Kaushal Sharma, M.D., to examine defendant and report on the issue of his competence. It suspended criminal proceedings and set the matter for a hearing under section 1368. The hearing took place on November 13, 1996. Peters called Drs. Fischer and Thomas. Dr. Fischer testified that defendant suffered from a paranoid personality disorder and that his mental state fluctuates. Defendant did not trust his attorney and believed Peters was unwilling to present his accidental ignition defense theory. Because of his paranoia, defendant also was convinced there was a government conspiracy against him that included the court system, Peters, other attorneys, and investigators. Defendant's unwillingness to acknowledge his mental problems hindered defense team members' work on his behalf. Dr. Fischer opined that defendant would cooperate only with an attorney who would present his accidental ignition defense theory. Dr. Thomas testified that defendant suffered from a paranoid disorder and possibly from organic brain damage. In Dr. Thomas's opinion, because defendant was mentally ill and had fixed false beliefs, he was unable to cooperate with counsel. Dr. Sharma testified that defendant was competent to stand trial. In his opinion, defendant understood the charges against him and knew he faced the death penalty, but simply refused to cooperate with counsel. In other words, defendant's lack of cooperation with counsel was volitional and not the result of a mental illness. In ruling that counsel had not sustained his burden, the court found that defendant is able to understand the nature and purpose in [ sic ] this proceeding, understand his role in the nature of the proceedings and is able to rationally cooperate with counsel in presenting a defense. He may choose not to cooperate but he is able to cooperate. After a brief recess and private conference with Peters, defendant withdrew his Faretta motion, filed October 22, 1996. Defendant agreed to allow Peters to present the defense he believed was appropriate and indicated he would go on a hunger strike. The court accepted the withdrawal of defendant's motion and set trial for November 18, 1996. On the first day of trial, before the jury selection process commenced, the court conducted a closed proceeding to address defendant's oral complaints about his representation by Peters. Defendant had been on his hunger strike for five days. He complained that Peters had told him he would not present an accidental ignition defense at trial even though Peters had agreed to do so when he was appointed counsel of record on April 15, 1996. Defendant said he needed access to Peters's investigators so he could interview 60 witnesses. He also wanted Peters to provide Dr. Fischer with additional records and reports the psychologist had requested that purportedly would show defendant was experiencing a psychotic episode at the time of the murder and thus did not form the intent to torture. Defendant accused counsel of acting in bad faith, but said he did not believe counsel was incompetent. He felt he had been tricked and told the court, I don't really want to fire Mr. Peters. I think he's competent and he's come this far. What I would like for him to do is finish the work. And if you won't allow more time, I want to ... get new counsel. But I don't want new counsel. I want to go to trial. The court construed defendant's motion as one for a continuance, denied it as untimely, and terminated his cocounsel status based on his hunger strike, which it deemed a violation of any counsel's responsibility to the court.