Opinion ID: 768715
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Proceedings as to Bonnet-Grullon

Text: 15 The presentence report (PSR) prepared on Bonnet-Grullon concluded that, in light of his criminal history category and his total offense level, the Guidelines range of imprisonment applicable to him was 70 to 87 months. Bonnet-Grullon did not contest the PSR computations, but he moved for a downward departure pursuant to Guidelines §5K2.0, contending that a departure was necessary in order to avoid imposing on him a sentence that was harsher than the sentences routinely imposed on similarly situated illegally reentering aliens in certain other judicial districts. 16 Bonnet-Grullon pointed out that the United States Attorney's Office in the Southern District of California had adopted a policy (SDC Policy) pursuant to which aliens who reenter the United States without permission after having been deported following their convictions for aggravated felonies, and who agree to plead guilty to the charges against them, are charged not under 8U.S.C. §1326 but rather under 8 U.S.C. §1325(a) (1994). The latter section applies to any alien who enters the United States at an improper time or place or by willful concealment or misrepresentation of a material fact; it applies to such an alien whether or not he has previously been deported or convicted of an aggravated felony; and it provides a maximum prison term of six months for a first offense (a misdemeanor) and two years for a subsequent offense (a felony). Bonnet-Grullon argued that under the SDC Policy, [d]efendants prosecuted in San Diego ... are permitted to plead guilty to two counts (one felony count and one misdemeanor count) of violating 8U.S.C. §1325, and thereby face a total maximum prison term of 30 months. (Letter from Legal Aid Society Attorneys John P. Curley and Edward S. Zas to Judge Kaplan dated March 8, 1999, at 1 (Bonnet-Grullon Letter).) Bonnet-Grullon argued that 17 [h]ere in this District, in contrast, similarly situated illegal re-entrants are routinely prosecuted for the more serious crime of violating 8U.S.C. §1326(b)(2). They are not permitted to plead to a lesser count. Violating §1326(b)(2) carries a statutory maximum penalty of 20 years in prison and a typical guideline range of 70 to 87 months, with variations depending on the defendant's criminal history and other variables. 18 In short, illegal re-entrants prosecuted in this District systematically receive sentences far in excess of those received by defendants prosecuted elsewhere, even though the conduct and the defendants' backgrounds are essentially identical. 19 (Bonnet-Grullon Letter at 2.) 20 Bonnet-Grullon argued that the existence of the SDC policy required a downward departure in his case because the unwarranted sentencing disparity resulting from the government's uneven charging decisions creates a 'mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines.' (Id. at 1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §3553(b)); see id. at 8 (failure to depart would lead to a disparate sentence in a manner not contemplated by the Sentencing Commission).) He argued, inter alia, that this Court's decision in United States v. Tejeda, 146 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam), while holding that a sentencing court has no authority to depart to avoid a disparity between the sentences of codefendants, had suggested that a departure would be permissible in a case such as Bonnet-Grullon's, as Tejeda referred to Congress's objective of 'eliminating disparity on a national level' (Bonnet-Grullon Letter at 4 (quoting United States v. Tejeda, 146 F.3d at 87) (emphasis in letter)). 21 The government, although opposing Bonnet-Grullon's motion, generally agreed with his characterization of the SDC Policy. It noted that in the mid-1990s, prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), the Southern District of California had sought to expedite prosecution of defendants accused of illegal reentry by employing what might be described as a bifurcated 1326 policy. It offered most such defendants the opportunity, on certain conditions, to plead guilty only to a charge under subsection (a) of §1326, on the theory that subsection (a), with its two-year maximum prison term, and subsection (b)(2), with a 20-year maximum, created separate crimes. In Almendarez-Torres, however, the Supreme Court held that subsection (b)(2) of §1326 does not create a separate crime but is merely a penalty provision that may be applicable to a defendant whose conduct is described in §1326(a). See 523 U.S. at 235. Thus, as the government noted, insofar as the prior practice in the Southern District of California was concerned, the Supreme Court's ruling in Almendarez-Torres eliminated the guaranty of a two-year statutory maximum sentence for an early plea to violating section 1326(a). (Letter from Assistant United States Attorney Jay K. Musoff to Judge Kaplan dated April 5, 1999 (Government Letter), at 3 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted).) As a result, the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District of California abandoned its bifurcated 1326 policy; instead, it offered illegally returning aliens who had no history of serious violence the opportunity to plead guilty to two counts under 8U.S.C. §1325(a), which limits imprisonment to 2 years, rather than under §1326: 22 The first [§1325(a)] count is a six-month misdemeanor and the second is a two year felony. Thus, the combined cap is 30 months, a six-month increase in sentence over the now-unavailable 1326(a) plea. 23 (Government Letter at 3 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted).) 24 The government contended, however, that Bonnet-Grullon's motion should be denied because differing circumstances in different judicial districts may warrant different charging practices. It argued that prosecutors have broad discretion as to 'what, if any, charges to bring against a criminal suspect' and that the exercise of that 'discretion is an integral feature of the criminal justice system, and is appropriate, so long as it is not based upon improper factors.' (Government Letter at 5 (quoting United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 762 (1997)) (emphasis in letter).) Further, the government noted that the Guidelines state as a matter of policy that a sentencing 'court may accept an agreement calling for dismissal of charges or an agreement not to pursue potential charges if the remaining charges reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior,' but that that policy statement explicitly warns that '[t]his requirement does not authorize judges to intrude upon the charging discretion of the prosecutor.' (Government Letter at 9 (quoting Guidelines §6B1.2 (Policy Statement) Commentary (emphasis in letter)).) The government argued that the Guidelines thus displayed full awareness and consideration of the discretion inherent in prosecutors' charging power. The government noted also that this Court had concluded in Valtsakis v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 801 F.2d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1986) (per curiam), that differences in prosecutorial policies in different geographical areas generally do not implicate equal protection concerns unless those differences are irrational. The government argued that the disparity challenged by Bonnet-Grullon was both rational and justified. 25 In an opinion dated May 25, 1999, reported at 53 F.Supp.2d 430, the district court, though expressing concern for purely fortuitous sentencing disparities resulting solely from the accident of the judicial district in which the defendant happens to be arrested, 53 F.Supp.2d at 435, denied Bonnet-Grullon's motion for a departure. The court noted that a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit, which includes California, had ruled that a departure would be permissible to avoid disparities between defendants sentenced to no more than two years' imprisonment in the Southern District of California pursuant to the (by-then-superseded) bifurcated 1326 policy, and defendants sentenced more severely under §1326, as written, in the contiguous Central District of California. See United States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 173 F.3d 741, 744 (9th Cir.) (Banuelos-Rodriguez) (Guidelines did not take into account the fact that sentencing disparity for §1326 violations might occur among federal districts because of different plea-bargaining practices of U.S. Attorneys), vacated pending reh'g en banc, 195 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1999). In rejecting Bonnet-Grullon's motion, however, the district court concluded that this Court would reject the holding of the Banuelos-Rodriguez majority and adopt the dissenter's position that a departure is not warranted where the defendant's offense conduct falls squarely within the heartland of the relevant guideline, Banuelos-Rodriguez, 173 F.3d at 747 (Wexler, D.J., dissenting). 26 In arriving at that conclusion, the district court referred in particular to this Court's decision in United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 845 (1991), which held that sentencing disparities created by a prosecutor's noninvidious plea-agreement practices provided no legitimate basis for a departure. The district court reasoned that 27 [t]he Circuit's fundamental point in Stanley was that no departure was permissible because the Sentencing Commission considered the fact that plea bargaining practices result in sentencing disparities, but elected to make no substantial changes in the practice in favor of a more cautious and incremental approach. The Commission, broadly stated, decided to accept the sentencing disparities that come from the traditional exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 28 53 F.Supp.2d at 435 (footnote omitted). The district court concluded as follows: 29 The goal of the Sentencing Reform Act, as defendant argues, was to eliminate unwarranted sentencing disparities. This case illustrates the fact that the regime that it enacted is an imperfect means to that end -- it is difficult to imagine a sentencing disparity less warranted than one which depends upon the accident of the judicial district in which the defendant happens to be arrested.... Nevertheless, in view of this Court's inability to distinguish Stanley on any principled basis, it holds that the sentencing disparity that results from the different charge bargaining practices employed in the Southern Districts of California and New York, respectively, does not permit this Court to depart downward under the Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly, defendant's motion for a downward departure is denied. 30 Id. at 435-36 (footnote omitted). 31 Judgment was entered sentencing Bonnet-Grullon principally to 70 months' imprisonment, the bottom of the Guidelines range applicable to him.