Opinion ID: 2636693
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: The Sam Stone Research Study and suggestibility

Text: For Wells' first claim that the trial court erred in disallowing expert testimony on how certain procedures and techniques could adversely affect the reliability and accuracy of a child's statement, he contends Nichols should have been allowed to testify about the Sam Stone Research Study. In this study of preschool-aged children, 72% of the children attributed to an individual, Sam Stone, negative behavior that they had not observed but was based upon information they had been told prior to seeing him. Their mistaken attribution was elicited by leading questions after he left. Wells argues that most laypersons are not aware that preschool-aged children can and do make totally false reports under suggestive or leading questions. He alleges that [m]ost lay persons would not recognize that questions that required a yes or no answer are in fact, as applied to young children, considered to be leading or suggestive. He acknowledges that Nichols was allowed to testify that a suggestive question is different from a leading question and that both types of improper questions were present in all three of the videotaped interviews she watched: C.B., C.H., and B.H. However, Wells complains that Nichols was not allowed to give specific examples or explain how these types of questions can produce inaccurate results. The State points not only to these Wells acknowledgments but also to the fact that Nichols was allowed to testify about accepted interview protocols from five different professional associations: the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development; the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry; the American Medical Association; the American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children; and the American Psychological Association. The State further emphasizes that Nichols was allowed to testify generally about the problems she perceived with the interviewing techniques used here, e.g., that the professionally accepted protocols from these organizations were not followed. Specifically, she opined that Runyan's interviews were more like interrogations. They were short, and rapport with the children probably was not established; Runyan interrupted the children; the children were not first allowed to tell their story, followed by directed questions by Runyan to tease out details that weren't given; and Runyan made no assessment of each child's knowledge of the difference between truth and lying. In specific response to Wells' argument about the improper limitations on Nichols' testimony regarding suggestibility, the State argues that she was allowed to opine that the suggestibility of children is a concern, without getting into the reasons. It also argues that she was additionally allowed to testify about the effects of coercive or suggestive questioning techniques in general. Even though Nichols was not allowed to testify about the Sam Stone Research Study on suggestibility, we agree with the State that the jury was allowed to hear Nichols testify about the specific problems with Runyan's interviews in this case. In particular, it heard her opinion of how he inappropriately used suggestive and leading questions in all the interviews. We observe that Nichols was allowed to explain that a suggestive question usually has a yes or no answer because the interviewer is suggesting that the inquiry actually constitutes a statement of fact. She was also allowed to explain that, on the other hand, a leading question leads to a story that may not actually have been told by the child. Most important, she was further allowed to testify that Runyan's leading questions tend to provide information to the children that they did not know which contaminates the interviews. In short, on these facts there was no abuse of trial court discretion in disallowing evidence about the Sam Stone study.