Opinion ID: 169447
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Differential Treatment of Swackhammer and Winters

Text: We turn next to Swackhammer's attempt to establish pretext by showing that Castanon treated her differently than he treated Winters under similar circumstances. The district court rejected this argument because it found that, assuming that the two were similarly situated, [11] the disparity in treatment was caused by Castanon's close friendship with Winters and therefore did not allow for an inference of gender discrimination. Swackhammer, 2005 WL 1319058 at . We agree with the district court's result, if not the entirety of its reasoning: while Swackhammer's evidence may have established differential treatment, the record conclusively revealed two nondiscriminatory explanations for the discrepancy and left no room for an inference of discrimination, thus requiring summary judgment for Sprint. Castanon testified that he treated Winters more leniently than Swackhammer because the former's misconduct was of a less serious nature than the latter's. During her deposition testimony, Swackhammer contested this explanation and stated her belief that Castanon treated Winters favorably because of their long friendship: SWACKHAMMER: Now, why would they do that [terminate Swackhammer but not Winters]? There was some ulterior motive. What was it? Well, it looks like Tony [Castanon] was covering for himself and for Alan [Winters]. I mean, they were also under investigation. Tony had been interviewed by Corporate Security just a couple of days before I was terminated. I don't even know if they had made a decision on him yet. It was clear to me that I was being offered up as a sacrifice so that he and his buddy Alan would not have any adverse action taken against them. . . . Q: Did you think Paul Garcia was also being offered up as a sacrifice to protect Tony Castanon's job? SWACKHAMMER: I believe that they looked at my case and Paul's case as an opportunity to take action to save themselves. . . . And the only thing I have is that Tony and Alan were best friends, and that Alan was a man, and he was treated differently than I was, as was Tony. Sprint, in its motion for summary judgment, seized upon this testimony and argued that Swackhammer had conceded that any differential treatment resulted from Castanon's close relationship with Winters, rather than providing evidence of underlying gender discrimination. [12] Additional record evidence also supported this explanation; both Kissinger and Castanon testified that Castanon and Winters had long been close personal friends and that Castanon had been known to treat Winters differently than any of his other direct reports, male or female; for instance, Castanon hosted and paid for a birthday party for Winters, something he had not done for any other Sprint employee. Swackhammer responded by denying that she conceded a nondiscriminatory explanation for her termination, arguing that her statement the only thing I have is that Tony and Alan were best friends, and that Alan was a man, and he was treated differently than I was, as was Tony supported her continuing belief that gender played a role in her termination. She also noted Castanon's testimony in which he denied that his friendship with Winters affected his decisionmaking and claimed to have held Winters to the same standards as any other Sprint employee. From this evidence and argument, the district court concluded that Castanon's different treatment of Winters clearly stems from their close friendship. Winters benefited from Castanon's favoritism toward him. Swackhammer, 2005 WL 1319058 at . As a finding of fact upon a motion for summary judgment, this conclusion is erroneous. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Swackhammer, see Bryant, 432 F.3d at 1124, there existed a genuine issue of fact as to whether the differential treatment was due to the difference in severity between Swackhammer's and Winters' ethical violations, or instead due to Castanon's friendship with Winters and his desire to protect his and Winters' job. Thus, the district court should not have taken it upon itself to determine which of these was the true explanation. However, we conclude that this error was harmless because, whichever evidence the factfinder might have chosen to credit, neither version permits an inference of gender discrimination. If one credits Castanon's testimony, then his differential treatment of Swackhammer and Winters was nondiscriminatory, based on his conviction that Swackhammer's misconduct was more serious than Winters'. If, alternatively, the factfinder credited the evidence of Castanon's favoritism towards Winters, then the differential treatment, while perhaps unfair, was similarly nondiscriminatory. Neal, 349 F.3d at 1251 ([A]n employer's actions based on loyalty to a friend . . . are not considered `discriminatory,' even where they benefit the non-protected friend . . . at the expense of a more qualified, protected person.). [13] In the latter scenario, Castanon's explanation for the differential treatment would have been proven unworthy of beliefbut only because it concealed an equally nondiscriminatory explanation. The record contains no independent evidence, beyond Swackhammer's mere conjecture, that would allow a reasonable factfinder to disbelieve both explanations and thereby to infer that gender discrimination was the actual motivation for her termination. See Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768, 772 (10th Cir.1988) ([P]laintiffs' mere conjecture that their employer's explanation is a pretext for intentional discrimination is an insufficient basis for denial of summary judgment.). Thus a reasonable factfinder could not, based on the record in this case, infer a discriminatory motive from the difference in treatment between Swackhammer and Winters. Before concluding, we address a final argument upon which Swackhammer places considerable emphasis on appeal. She argues that our precedent in Neal and Randle supports summary judgment based on a nondiscriminatory explanation for differential treatment only if the plaintiff has expressly conceded that explanation and advances no other possible explanation before the court. She contends that she never made such a concession, but at all times asserted her belief that gender played a role in her termination, and therefore that the district court's reliance on the nondiscriminatory explanation arising from her testimony was erroneous. We do not, however, read Neal which relied upon and interpreted footnote 14 from Randle, 69 F.3d at 451as requiring a plaintiff to concede that a nondiscriminatory motive was the only motivation for the employer's actions in order to justify summary judgment for the employer; indeed, the Neal plaintiff did not do so, making several arguments concerning pretext including attempts to show that her race played a role in her termination. Neal, 349 F.3d at 1248-49. Rather, we held in Neal that the plaintiff conceded a nondiscriminatory motive because she provided arguments in her summary judgment materials as a part of her position before the court that supported such a nondiscriminatory motive, and because her other evidence was insufficient to permit an inference of any discriminatory motive. Id. at 1251, 1252-53. The facts in this case are similar. Swackhammer did not merely mention Castanon and Winters' relationship in her deposition testimony, but actually argued to the district court that Castanon and Winters were long-standing personal friends whose families vacationed together and that Castanon was terminated, in part, because he failed to deal with a personal conflict of interest with [his] close personal friend, Alan Winters. The only evidence she presented that tended to undermine this motive, aside from her own conjecture, was Castanon's original explanation that he had terminated Swackhammer for violating Sprint's ethical policies evidence which, if believed, supports only another nondiscriminatory explanation. In any case, contrary to Swackhammer's assertions, the district court did not rely solely on Neal 's interpretation of Randle 's footnote 14 for its grant of summary judgment, and we do not do so here. Neal and Randle 's footnote 14 present one example of circumstances where the record undermined a plaintiff's claim of discrimination by supplying a convincing nondiscriminatory motive for the employer's actions which the plaintiff failed to overcome; this case simply presents another. To paraphrase the Supreme Court, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence of differential treatment, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Thus, Swackhammer failed to carry her burden at the pretext phase of the McDonnell Douglas analysis to create an inference of discrimination, and the district court properly granted summary judgment for Sprint. See id. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097 ([T]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. (quotation omitted)).