Opinion ID: 4114125
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Primarily Engaged in Selling or Servicing

Text: Automobiles” A service advisor clearly is not a “salesman . . . primarily engaged in selling . . . automobiles.” That category encompasses salesmen selling a particular good—cars. It does not cover salesmen selling other goods and, critically, it does not cover salesmen selling services. Service advisors may be salesmen of a sort, but they do not qualify as salesmen primarily engaged in selling cars because they do not sell cars. We turn, then, to whether service advisors are “primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles.” We begin with the contemporary meaning, in 1966, of the statute’s terms. “Primarily” means “essentially; mostly; chiefly; principally.”6 “To be engaged in” an activity means “to occupy oneself; become involved” in the activity.7 In the context of an automobile dealership, to “service” means to “supply[] 6 Random House at 1142; accord 8 OED at 1358 (“In the first place, first of all, pre-eminently, chiefly, principally; essentially.”); see also American Heritage at 1039 (“Chiefly; principally”). 7 Random House at 473; accord 8 OED at 174 (“to enter upon or employ oneself in an action”); Webster’s Third at 751 (“to employ or involve oneself”; “to take part”); see also American Heritage at 433 (“To involve oneself or become occupied; participate”). 14 NAVARRO V. ENCINO MOTORCARS maintenance and repair.”8 Thus, to be “primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles” means to “occupy oneself principally in maintaining and repairing cars.” Whether we look to the contemporaneous dictionary definitions or to the terms of the phrase itself, the phrase most naturally encompasses only those who are actually occupied in the repair and maintenance of cars—the partsmen and mechanics who, for example, repair defective brakes or flush the transmission. A service advisor neither performs any repairs nor provides any maintenance. Instead, a service advisor “wait[s] on customers who bring their automobiles in for maintenance and repairs.” OOH at 314. The service advisor “confers with the customer to determine his service needs, and arranges for a mechanic to do the work.” Id. Accordingly, service advisors are not primarily engaged in servicing automobiles.9 Defendant suggests that we adopt a more expansive definition, one that encompasses all employees who are “integral” to the customer’s overall experience of having a car serviced. Supp. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 14 (filed Aug. 16, 2016). The statutory text is arguably flexible enough to accommodate Defendant’s suggestion. Using the dictionary definitions most favorable to Defendant, the exemption encompasses those principally “involved” in 8 Random House at 1304; accord Webster’s Third at 2075 (“to repair or provide maintenance for”); see also American Heritage at 1185 (“To make fit for use; adjust; repair; maintain”). 9 Service advisors may occasionally perform simple repairs or maintenance tasks before the mechanic takes over. But Defendant does not contend that Plaintiffs spend a significant amount of time on those minor tasks. NAVARRO V. ENCINO MOTORCARS 15 “supplying maintenance and repair.” If one interprets “supplying” to mean “the overall process of supplying,” then service advisors can be said, in a general sense, to be “primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles.” But the fact “[t]hat a definition is broad enough to encompass one sense of a word does not establish that the word is ordinarily understood in that sense.” Taniguchi, 132 S. Ct. at 2003. Defendant’s interpretation represents a considerable stretch of the ordinary meaning of the statute’s words. We usually do not say that we primarily engage in an activity that we do not perform personally (and that we may lack the skills to perform). We typically say that we primarily engage in an activity only if we actually undertake the activity, at least in part. For example, a receptionistscheduler at a dental office fields calls from patients, matching their needs (e.g., a broken tooth or jaw pain) with the appropriate provider, appointment time, and length of anticipated service. That work is integral to a patient’s obtaining dental services, but we would not say that the receptionist-scheduler is “primarily engaged in” cleaning teeth or installing crowns. Similarly, an automobile salesman who sells custom-made cars is integral to a purchaser’s receiving a specialized car, but we ordinarily would not say that the salesman is primarily engaged in manufacturing cars. Defendant nevertheless asserts that we must adopt its broad definition because a narrower interpretation would read “partsman” out of the statute. Defendant contends that, because partsmen do not actually perform the repairs and maintenance, Congress must have intended to include all employees involved in the overall process of providing repair and maintenance services. We are unpersuaded. 16 NAVARRO V. ENCINO MOTORCARS The Occupational Outlook Handbook described the position of an “automobile parts counterman” who is employed by automobile dealers. OOH at 312–14. Parts countermen may spend some time selling parts to customers. Id. at 312. But parts countermen “employed by automobile and truck dealers . . . may spend most of their time supplying parts to mechanics employed by the dealer.” Id.; see also Brief for Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents in Encino Motorcars, 2016 WL 1388060, at  (“A partsman generally works at one of two counters: the back counter, which opens to the shop where the mechanics work or the front counter, which opens into the dealership to an area where customers may purchase accessories or parts that will not be installed by the dealership.”). “By knowing how to use parts catalogs and by knowing the layout of the stockroom, he can readily find any one of several thousand items.” OOH at 312. A parts counterman also uses specialized equipment to test parts, to determine interchangeability of parts, and to repair parts. Id. at 312–13. Accordingly, Defendant’s premise is wrong: Partsmen “may repair parts, using equipment such as brake riveting machines, brake drum lathes, valve refacers, and engine head grinders.” OOH at 313. Under any definition, fixing a defective part qualifies as servicing a car. Partsmen also “may use micrometers, calipers, fan-belt measurers, and other devices to measure parts for interchangeability. They may also use coil-condenser testers, spark plug testers, and other types of testing equipment to determine whether parts are defective.” Id. at 312–13. Those hands-on tasks are qualitatively indistinguishable from—if not identical to—the work of a mechanic. Similarly, partsmen use their expert knowledge of parts, parts catalogs, and the stockroom to NAVARRO V. ENCINO MOTORCARS 17 determine an appropriate replacement part and locate it for a mechanic—tasks that contribute directly to the actual repair of a car. Because most of the common tasks of a partsman easily meet the ordinary meaning of primarily engaging in servicing, we are not compelled to accept Defendant’s broad interpretation of the exemption.10 In sum, we conclude that the phrase “primarily engaged in selling . . . automobiles” encompasses only those who are actually and primarily occupied in selling cars, and we conclude that the phrase “primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles” encompasses only those who are actually and primarily occupied in the repair and maintenance of cars. Because service advisors meet neither definition, the FLSA does not exempt service advisors. Our interpretive task could end here, with the words of the statute as commonly understood in 1966. But, to ensure that we have not overlooked a relevant way of reading § 213(b)(10)(A), we will examine that provision in light of applicable principles of statutory construction.