Opinion ID: 1206820
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 34

Heading: Two refuse to enter pleas in slaying of Caldwell man

Text: CALDWELL  The two defendants in the murder last month of a Caldwell man refused to enter pleas at their 3rd District Court arraignment Friday. District Judge Edward J. Lodge entered innocent pleas for Donald K. Fetterly and Karla Y. Windsor, and set a tentative trial date of Dec. 12. Fetterly, 26, and Windsor, 27, are charged in the Sept. 7 slaying of Sterling G. Grammer of Caldwell. A trial was tentatively scheduled for Dec. 12. I'm just gonna take the Fifth on that, I'm not sayin' nothin, Fetterly said when 3rd District Judge Edward Lodge asked for his pleas to charges of first-degree murder, first-degree burglary and grand theft. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution protects a defendant from self-incrimination. Canyon County authorities say they obtained confessions from Fetterly and Windsor shortly after their arrest. Fetterly also refused to give a plea to a related but separate charge of use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime. Grammer, 45, was found floating in the Snake River on Sept. 9, his body bound with duct tape. Fetterly and Windsor were arrested the following day. Fetterly and Windsor were returned to the Canyon County Jail after the arraignment. In connection with the foregoing, the actions of the magistrate who conducted the preliminary hearing are to be noted. He held a closed hearing. When it was concluded he ordered the proceedings sealed. The only document to surface from his office was the order filed in district court binding over Fetterly and Windsor for trial in district court. Meanwhile, the prosecutor had begun his move toward obtaining a well-informed people to sit as jurors. While I do not disagree with Justice Bakes wherein, relying on State v. Bainbridge, 108 Idaho 273, 698 P.2d 335 (1985), he declares that the Court will consider affidavits giving opinion as to prejudice created by pretrial publicity, I do not agree that affidavits are in fact mandated, if such be the tenor of his argument. One could, it might be supposed, also require opinion affidavits as to prejudice that would or might result to a defendant when in a joint trial at which his nontestifying co-defendant's confession is admitted in evidence, much of which implicates the defendant. For those who would so consider, I invite attention to State v. Beam, ___ Idaho ___, 710 P.2d 526 (1985). Just as the United States Supreme Court remarked in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1622-23, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), on the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extra-judicial statements in determining petitioner's guilt, just as the same court in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), held that a defendant is entitled to have the trial judge first determine whether a confession was made voluntarily before handing it to the jury to assess its credibility, the proper rule here for those interested in fair trials but not perfect trials ( Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 73 S.Ct. 481, 97 L.Ed.2d 593 (1953)) should be that the substantial risk that a juror, despite assurances to the contrary, may have already decided upon the defendant's guilt from what he has read, from the mouth of the prosecutor himself and other law enforcement officers in a position to know, militates in favor of resolving the issue by a change of venue. This is, indeed, exactly where I differ from the majority, and where most legal minds will differ from the majority. Unlike Bainbridge, unlike Needs, unlike Brooks, unlike Thomas, unlike Bitz, unlike McLennan (cited in the Brooks opinion), unlike any Idaho cases which I have reviewed, this is not a case where the pervasive influence of the free press in our daily lives was at work by having ferreted out that which was reported  seemingly the situation in Brooks. This is a case where the free press was handed the prosecutor's statements which were reported. It is not a matter to be lightly glossed over  as the majority has done. The prosecutor's charge against the defendant was first degree murder. First degree murder is punishable by death. An essential element necessary of proof in this case on the charge of first degree murder was that the prosecution prove premeditation, and/or that it prove that the murder was committed during the perpetration of a felony, here the charged burglary. To prove premeditation was difficult, absent some direct evidence thereof. To connect the murder with the burglary was also a somewhat difficult proposition. That the defendant had killed Mr. Grammer was, however, a leadpipe cinch. The prosecutor did have the confession which he had reported having in talking to the media. It generally appears that the prosecutor had not misrepresented anything in his statements to the media. He did have the iron-clad murder case which he said he had. He was a man to be believed. But he did not necessarily have a first degree murder case. Hence, because he had been found credible, it is understandable that the jury would accept the truth in his final argument when he told them as to charge of felony murder: The reason that the defendant is guilty of murder while attempting to perpetrate this burglary is that the statute that defines first-degree murder states that when a person commits a crime of this gravity, that is, a burglary, that that crime, the crime of burglary, is so offensive to society that should death result to someone from the commission of that burglary, that by operation of law, he will be deemed or the intent of premeditation or deliberation will be inferred to the perpetrator of that crime. That's what we have here. We have the defendant perpetrating a burglary. We have a situation arising where the victim of the burglary was killed, and by operation of law, because of the crime of burglary is so offensive to society, that the law will infer that the defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation. The law will also infer that the act of the defendant was malicious in attempting to perpetrate the burglary. He planned the crime, and that malicious act in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate that crime is justly regarded as the causative antecedent of the homicide. Hence, the person is guilty of first-degree murder by operation of the law, because the requisite intent is referred. It is imputed to him. That is what that instruction is really all about, having to do with committing a burglary in the context or perpetration of a burglary. I submit to you that has been proven by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Tr., Vol. 2, pp. 331-32 (emphasis added). Likewise, the prosecutor's credibility should have convinced the jury when he explained how premeditation had been proven: Under the instructions that you have received, deliberate simply means the act was formed or arrived at or was determined as a result of a thought process. That he thought about it, then did it. The length of time he thought about it does not really matter that much. All of us are familiar with the way the thought process works. A thought process can go through your mind as quick as a snap of the fingers. Caveat is that it be a careful, deliberate thought. Premeditation. That is another word that is along with deliberate; premeditation simply means it occurred beforehand. What is the evidence that has been shown that indicates deliberation and premeditation? First of all, the crime was planned in advance. The crime was planned in advance. I suppose we could say physically the killing itself may not have been planned in advance, but there is something in my mind that says it was at least thought about. But the burglary was planned in advance. It was thought about. One of the comments that the defendant made in his statement during that time they were thinking about this, neither one of us wanted to hurt him, so we were going to tie him up. What does this tell you? What it tells me, at least, is that in this planning stage of this burglary, it had crossed the defendant's mind. Well, something may come up and we might hurt this guy. We might do something to him. Their thought was in order to prevent that from happening, we'll tie him up. But it crossed their minds before they ever went in the house that something might happen to hurt the guy. When they got there and they did accost Grammer, they did hurt him. You will remember when Dr. Donndelinger testified, and he testified to the injuries that Grammer had received. I am not sure which eye it was at this time, but there was a cut under the eye, and apparently that cut came after he had died, because there was no blood pressure or blood diffused out into the tissue. The other side of the face, at about this location, as I recall, it is in the photograph and you can look at the photograph and see it, but somewhere in that location there was a rather severe bruise. That occurred prior to death. And more significantly, he testified that he had received a blow to the back of his head. That blow to the back of his head was of such nature or was severe enough as to likely cause unconsciousness. Now, they hurt him, irregardless of the stab wounds. Then what did they do? They said they bound his hands with duct tape and his hands are bound in back with his wrists together. Then they said they laid him down on the bed, and they bound his feet together with duct tape. Then I believe the third thing in sequence you will recall the testimony of Officer Appleton, wherein they went back over to the house on Sunday and had the defendants walk them through what happened. The third thing they did was take the duct tape and place it around Grammer's face and attach it all the way around with the straps going clear around. Then they stabbed him. Now, let's look at it from this argument. When the stabbing occurred, Grammer was incapacitated. He could not defend himself. He posed absolutely no threat to the safety or well being of the defendants. There was no way in that incapacitated state he could provoke the defendant in the legal sense to doing something other than what Fetterly was inclined to do of his own will. He was not provoked. Fetterly stabbed the guy because that was what he was inclined to do, and he did it. He stated that Grammer began struggling; that he became unglued, or something to that effect. Why do you suppose Grammer became unglued. And going back through this sequence of events, the wrapping of the wrists, the wrapping of the feet, the wrapping of the face, you will recall the testimony of Dr. Donndelinger. That tape that was wrapped around the face was put on in such a way that it sealed off the air, the nose and mouth. The guy couldn't breathe. If he had not died of stab wounds, or the stab wound in the aorta, he would have died of asphyxiation. That is what Dr. Donndelinger said. If somebody taped your face with duct tape in the manner in which this defendant taped the face of Sterling Grammer, I think we would come unglued. At some point in time you would begin to thrash around. You would begin to struggle because you were not getting any air. You were not breathing at this point in time. They were trying to hold him down on the bed and keep him down on the bed. His head came up and knocked Mr. Fetterly's head, and they tried to hold him on the bed. Then Mr. Fetterly said, I reached across the headboard of the bed, grabbed the knife, already opened, they had opened the knife to cut the duct tape, he grabbed the knife, and he started stabbing him in the chest. Now, let's talk about this deliberation and premeditation for a moment. The guy is on the bed. He is struggling. The defendant can remember that he reached for the knife. He didn't reach for the knife with his left hand, but he reached for it with his right hand. He realized that the knife was already opened. Then he came back and began to stab the guy, in his words, I stuck him. When you don't have the knife in your hand and the knife is located elsewhere, and the fact that you reach across and get the knife, put it in your hand, and stab with it, that involves the thought process. That involves deliberation. That involves premeditation. To get the weapon that you don't have in your hand, to obtain that weapon, then use that weapon to stab the guy with. I submit that the act of doing that involved deliberation. It involved premeditation. It involved malice aforethought. It involved a wanton disregard for the life of another person. Tr., Vol. 2, pp. 334-38 (emphasis added). That the prosecutor was able to convince the jury of defendant's guilt as to premeditated first degree murder is not surprising. But he was not on sound ground in advising the jury that the law infers premeditation, and that it infers deliberation. Felony first degree murder is defined by I.C. § 18-4003(d), which states that with regard to the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, certain felonies, and burglary is enumerated, any murder committed is murder of the first degree. Premeditation is not a required element in felony murder. Similarly, it is not an element where the person murdered is a peace officer, executive officer, officer of the court, fireman, judicial officer, or prosecuting attorney, § 18-4003(b), or where a convict murders a prison or jail employee, another inmate, or a visitor, or committed in attempting an escape. The conviction of premeditated first degree murder is highly suspect. The trial court's instructions on felony murder were correct, and the jury undoubtedly followed them. But the verdict on premeditated murder clearly became clouded by the prosecutor's incorrect statements. All considered, I think that a new trial should be had, which would be predicated primarily on the prosecutor's trying of the case to the media in advance of trial. If there is a better way to prevent such future occurrences, I do not know of it. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Such a decision should emanate from, at best, a unanimous vote from this Court, and at the least, from a majority, which will not happen. Accordingly, I concur in the Court's judgment affirming the jury verdicts. I do not concur in the trial court's judgment imposing the death penalty, not because it is not merited, but on the basis of my views heretofore expressed as to the unconstitutionality in failing to involve the jury in the capital sentencing process, which remain not only unchanged, but fortified.