Opinion ID: 729792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tucker Act Jurisdiction of Claims Under 19 U.S.C. Section(s) 1619

Text: 7 We accord complete and independent review to the question of whether Appellant's claim for a reward under section 1619 comes within the Court of Federal Claims' jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. Gould, Inc. v. United States, 67 F.3d 925, 928 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The Tucker Act provides jurisdiction over any claim founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. 28 U.S.C. Section(s) 1491(a)(1) (1994). For jurisdiction to lie under the Tucker Act, the allegation must be that the particular provision of law relied upon grants the claimant, expressly or by implication, a right to be paid a certain sum. Eastport Steamship Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. Cl. 1967). The question is therefore whether section 1619 can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976) (quoting Eastport, 372 F.2d at 1009). 3 8 Prior to 1986, the federal moiety statute read in relevant part: 9 Any person not an officer of the United States who . . . furnishes to a United States attorney, to the Secretary of the Treasury, or to any Customs officer original information concerning any fraud upon the customs revenue, or a violation of the customs laws or the navigation laws, perpetrated or contemplated, which detection and seizure leads to a recovery of any duties withheld, or of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture incurred, may be awarded and paid by the Secretary of the Treasury a compensation of 25 per centum of the net amount not to exceed $50,000. 10 19 U.S.C. Section(s) 1619 (1980); Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. No. 361, Section(s) 619, 46 Stat. 590, 758. In Tyson v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 135 (Ct. Cl. 1940), a suit for the informer's fee provided under the Act, the Government argued that because the statute provided that the Secretary may, rather than shall, make an award when statutory conditions for recovery are met, the Secretary's decision to deny an award was final and conclusive. As a consequence, the statute would not be money mandating and the court would be without Tucker Act jurisdiction to review the decision. Id. at 136. The Court of Claims, this court's predecessor, disagreed. The court reasoned: 11 Congress did not intend to leave to the caprice or whim of the Secretary an informer's right to the award. It intended to confer upon the informer an absolute right to demand the payment of the award when he had met the conditions precedent thereto laid down by Congress . . . . [W]hen the information was the first information which the Secretary had had, and when that information led to the recovery of duties, or of a fine, penalty, or forfeiture, then the informer was entitled as of right to the payment of the award, and if the Secretary of the Treasury arbitrarily or capriciously refused to pay it, the informer had the right to file suit in court to compel that payment. This is a Government of laws, not of men. 12 Id. (citations omitted). The court held that Congress conferred on the Secretary jurisdiction to determine the facts, and the Secretary's determination was final and conclusive subject only to review by the courts to determine whether or not there was any evidence to support his findings or whether or not the proceedings were regular. Id. at 137. Thus, [i]f the Secretary's determination against the claim was supported by no evidence, if it was arbitrary or capricious, or if the proceedings were fatally defective, because, for instance, no opportunity for a hearing had been given the plaintiff, we think a suit would lie in this court to review his determination and to recover the award . . . . Id. 13 Subsequent cases in the Court of Claims continued to recognize and reflect jurisdiction over section 1619 claims. E.g., Cornman v. United States, 409 F.2d 230 (Ct. Cl. 1969); see also id. at 237 n.2 (Collins, J., dissenting); Lacy v. United States, 607 F.2d 951 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Allen v. United States, 229 Ct. Cl. 515 (1981) (A claim under 19 U.S.C. Section(s) 1619 is within our jurisdiction.); Wilson v. United States, 135 F.2d 1005, 1009-10 (3d Cir. 1943) (construing facially permissive language of pre-1986 version of section 1619 to mandate payment of award when claimant met statutory conditions, and therefore to support Little Tucker Act claim; citing Tyson, 32 F. Supp. 135); Taylor v. United States, 550 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1977) (same); Rickard v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 874 (1987) (same). 14 In concluding that section 1619 was money mandating, the cases have emphasized that Congress intended an award to be made when a claimant met the statutory conditions. Tyson, 32 F. Supp. at 137; Wilson, 135 F.2d at 1009. Clearly, the purpose of section 1619 is to establish an incentive for persons with information useful to law enforcement to cooperate with the authorities, and as the Third Circuit observed in Wilson, [a]n informer would have little incentive to give original information upon occasions at considerable personal risk to officers of the United States if his compensation rested in the absolute discretion, almost one might say, in the whim, of an executive officer. Wilson, 135 F.2d at 1009. Accordingly, judicial review was available to ensure that award determinations furthered Congressional policy.