Opinion ID: 3045124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Insurance recovery

Text: First American argues that, based on “a misapplication of Florida’s collateral source rule,” which — First American asserts — applies only to a tort action, not to a contract action, the district court failed to account for the FDIC’s insurance benefits. However, the collateral source rule “appl[ies] . . . to causes of action in contract, as well as to actions in tort.” Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Hamilton, 43 So. 3d 746, 751 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (Kahn, J.). Because the collateral source rule “prohibit[s] both the introduction of evidence of collateral insurance benefits received[] and the setoff of any collateral source benefits from the damage award,” Citizens Prop., 43 So. 3d at 751, the district court correctly held that “the FDIC’s damages shall not be offset by the insurance benefits.” 7. Standing In response to First American’s defense that under the purchase agreement the FDIC no longer “owns” the closing protection letters, the FDIC argues that First American enjoys no “standing” to contest the contracting parties’ interpretation of the purchase agreement. The district court agreed that, because First American was a stranger to the purchase agreement between the FDIC and New Bank, First American lacked “standing” to contest the contracting parties’ interpretation of the purchase agreement. The district court characterized the perceived defect in First American’s defense as “lack of standing” because of 25 Case: 13-15058 Date Filed: 04/28/2015 Page: 26 of 27 Interface Kanner, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 704 F.3d 927 (11th Cir. 2013), which holds that, if a plaintiff is not an intended third-party beneficiary of a contract, the plaintiff lacks “standing” to sue under the contract and that, consequently, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. But First American advances an interpretation of the purchase agreement not as a plaintiff in pursuit of a claim but as a defendant in defense against a claim. A defendant’s putative lack of “standing” to assert a defense presents no bar to a district court’s exercising subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, whether First American can assert a defense under the purchase agreement is not an issue of “standing” in the same sense that the term “standing” is used in resolving a challenge to the plaintiff’s “standing” to maintain a claim. And the presence or absence of a defense is not a matter with a jurisdictional consequence. 4 4 In Excel Willowbrook, L.L.C. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 758 F.3d 592, 603–04 (5th Cir.