Opinion ID: 2180125
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Departure from Chase

Text: Since Znosko and Godette, we have adhered to and reaffirmed the principle that [t]he court's role [in a probation-revocation proceeding] is not to determine the defendant's criminal guilt or innocence with respect to the underlying conduct that triggered the violation hearing[,] State v. Piette, 833 A.2d 1233, 1236 (R.I.2003), but rather, to determine whether a defendant has breached a condition of his probation by failing to keep the peace or remain on good behavior. State v. Crudup, 842 A.2d 1069, 1072 (R.I.2004). See State v. Campbell, 833 A.2d 1228, 1230 (R.I.2003); State v. Dale, 812 A.2d 795, 798 (R.I.2002); Hampton v. State, 786 A.2d 375, 379 (R.I.2001). In light of these decisions, we are of the opinion that further adherence to our decision in Chase no longer is warranted. Because it is not appropriate for a hearing justice in probation-revocation proceedings to make factual determinations of guilt or innocence on the charges which form the basis of the alleged violation, we believe that our holding in Chase governing the preclusive effect of such findings and conclusions is inconsistent and confusing to both practitioners and criminal defendants alike. We are mindful that [a]lthough stare decisis serves a profoundly important purpose in our legal system,    overruling precedent is justified if the motivating purpose is to eliminate inconsistency and anomalous results. State v. Werner, 615 A.2d 1010, 1014 (R.I.1992). The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that `when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.' State v. Werner, 865 A.2d 1049, 1055 (R.I.2005) (quoting Santiago II, 847 A.2d at 254). For collateral estoppel to apply and bar a party from relitigating an issue, there must be '(1) an identity of issues, (2) the previous proceeding must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits, and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must be the same or in privity with a party in the previous proceeding.' Id. Because its application `is capable of producing extraordinarily harsh and unfair results[,]' however, we have held that we will not apply the doctrine `mechanically' in situations in which it would lead to inequitable results. Foster-Glocester Regional School Committee v. Board of Review, 854 A.2d 1008, 1017 (R.I.2004) (quoting Casco Indemnity Co. v. O'Connor, 755 A.2d 779, 782 (R.I.2000)). Considering this principle, we believe that further application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of a criminal charge, following a determination during a probation-revocation hearing that is adverse to the state, inequitably overlooks and misconceives the inherent and important differences between those proceedings and criminal trials. Moreover, we believe that continued application of the Chase doctrine runs contrary to certain overwhelming policy considerations that are central to the criminal justice system. [5] As a threshold matter, we note, as we did in Chase, that a probation revocation hearing is not part of a criminal prosecution and therefore does not give rise to the full panoply of rights that are due a defendant at trial. Chase, 588 A.2d at 122. A probation-revocation hearing is not a prosecution that seeks to convict the defendant for the alleged violation, but, rather, a continuation of the original prosecution for which probation was imposed. Id. Because the state need not prove a probation violation beyond a reasonable doubt, but only by reasonably satisfactory evidence, State v. Casiano, 667 A.2d 1233, 1237 (R.I.1995), probation-violation hearings are frequently held without the benefit of preparation that precedes a criminal trial, Commonwealth v. Cosgrove, 427 Pa.Super. 553, 629 A.2d 1007, 1011 (1993), and thus are properly conducted in a more informal manner than a trial    in the interest of determining whether probation has proven an effective vehicle to accomplish rehabilitation. Id. Due to the less formal nature of such proceedings, defendants consequently are afforded considerably less due process protection than that to which they are constitutionally entitled in a full-blown criminal trial. As we have held, [t]he minimum due process requirements of a violation hearing call [only] for notice of the hearing, notice of the claimed violation, the opportunity to be heard and present evidence in defendant's behalf, and the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against defendant. State v. Vashey, 823 A.2d 1151, 1155 (R.I.2003) (quoting Casiano, 667 A.2d at 1239). Indeed, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses during probation-revocation hearings is merely a conditional right, and need not be afforded to the defendant in those cases in which the hearing officer has found good cause for not allowing confrontation. Casiano, 667 A.2d at 1239. Furthermore, the rules of evidence are applied less stringently in a probation-revocation hearing than during a trial proceeding. Chase, 588 A.2d at 123. The use of hearsay in such proceedings is not precluded. Casiano, 667 A.2d at 1239. Mindful of the critical differences in both the purposes of and procedures employed during probation-revocation hearings and criminal trials, we are of the opinion that further application of the Chase doctrine would strongly counteract the significant public interest in the preservation of the criminal trial process as the intended forum for ultimate determinations as to guilt or innocence of newly alleged crimes. Lucido v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.3d 335, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223, 1230-31 (1990). We join the majority of courts that have addressed this issue, and we concur in the opinion that [p]ractical public policy requires that new criminal matters, when charged in the criminal justice system, must be permitted to be there decided, unhampered by any parallel [probation-revocation proceeding]. State v. Dupard, 93 Wash.2d 268, 609 P.2d 961, 965 (1980). [6] It is our considered opinion that this policy promotes the best interests of both defendants, who are entitled to a full trial for alleged criminal misconduct, and prosecutors, who are charged with the responsibility of trying those accused of such crimes. To conclude otherwise would, as the California Supreme Court cogently observed, undesirably alter the criminal trial process by permitting informal revocation determinations to displace the intended factfinding function of the trial. Lucido, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d at 1229. See also Byrd v. People, 58 P.3d 50, 58 (Colo.2002) (To apply issue preclusion to bar a trial would undermine the basic and fundamental functions of a criminal trial  to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused using a panoply of procedures and protections designed and developed over many years to ensure a fair search for the truth.); Teague v. State, 169 Ga.App. 285, 312 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1983) ([T]he trial court is authorized the same discretion in refusing to revoke probation. The exercise of such discretion in declining to revoke probation should not be viewed as, and is in no way an adjudication of, the allegations sufficient to constitute an acquittal in a criminal prosecution or any form of final judgment which would act as a bar to a subsequent prosecution.). In that it is neither the purpose nor the intended function of probation-revocation hearings to serve as a final arbiter of an individual's guilt or innocence of criminal charges[,] Cosgrove, 629 A.2d at 1011, we share in the opinion that [t]o cede this responsibility to a setting that does not adhere to the procedural safeguards necessary for a fair adjudication of guilt, such as a probation revocation hearing, would result in a perversion of the criminal justice system. Id. The practical impact of the Chase doctrine further justifies our departure from it today. As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized, [t]he government is not statutorily or constitutionally obligated to put forth all its evidence at a probation revocation hearing   . United States v. Miller, 797 F.2d 336, 342 (6th Cir.1986). However, application of collateral estoppel to probation-revocation hearings inevitably thwarts this principle of criminal jurisprudence by forcing the state to expedite discovery and present any and all of its evidence and witnesses well in advance of trial. This is especially problematic when, as in some complicated cases, the charges raised at a revocation hearing are only a small part of a larger, ongoing criminal investigation. Id. As a result, it is evident to us that requiring the state to complete its entire investigation before seeking to revoke an individual's probation can effectively hinder its ability to carefully strategize the prosecution of criminal suspects and, consequently, provide for public safety. In Chase, we concluded that the application of collateral estoppel in these circumstances would encourage the state to initiate future probation-revocation proceedings with more concern for judicial economy. Chase, 588 A.2d at 123. Alternatively, we noted, the state could elect to bring a defendant to trial first and to institute the probation-revocation hearing after. Id. Blessed with the improved vision of hindsight, we conclude that those purported interests of judicial economy which so impacted our analysis fourteen years ago are outweighed by the significant policy interests set forth and explained herein. Accordingly, we abrogate Chase to the extent that it conflicts with this opinion. Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that the hearing justice made additional findings of fact relieving the defendant of criminal responsibility for the murder of Jeffrey Indellicati after our decision in Gautier I, it would in no way preclude the state from indicting and prosecuting defendant for the alleged murder.