Opinion ID: 1421093
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Alleged Instructional Error

Text: The majority reverses this conviction by treating an alleged instructional error that was totally unpreserved in the record as plain error. This flies in the face of the recent very well-reasoned decision in State v. LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294, 470 S.E.2d 613 (1996), where we held that courts should be very cautious and conservative in recognizing plain error. Id. at 316-17, 470 S.E.2d at 635-36. West Virginia Code § 61-8D-2 (a) and (b) (1992) (emphasis added) provide as follows: (a) If any parent, guardian or custodian shall maliciously and intentionally cause the death of a child under his or her care, custody or control by his or her failure or refusal to supply such child with necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical care, then such parent, guardian or custodian shall be guilty of murder in the first degree. (b) If any parent, guardian or custodian shall cause the death of a child under his or her care, custody or control by knowingly allowing any other person to maliciously and intentionally fail or refuse to supply such child with necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical care, then such other person and such parent, guardian or custodian shall each be guilty of murder in the first degree. Thus, pursuant to statute, murder by the parent, guardian, or custodian can be proven either: (1) by intentionally and maliciously causing a child's death by failure to provide medical care or (2) by causing a death of a child by knowingly allowing another person to maliciously and intentionally refuse medical care. Instruction number six in the Appellant's trial provided as follows: The Court instructs the jury that the defendant, Julie Wyatt, stands charged in Count 3 of the Indictment with Murder of a Child by Failure to Provide Medical Care. A person is guilty of this offense when he or she is the custodian of a child and maliciously, intentionally, and with pre-mediation [sic] fails to supply said child necessary medical care, or knowingly allows another person to do so, causing the child's death. .... Therefore, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Julie Wyatt was the custodian of Derek Browning, a minor child, and that she maliciously, intentionally, and with mediation [sic] failed to supply the child necessary medical care, causing the child's death, then you should find her guilty of Murder by Failure to Provide Medical Care as charged in Count 3 of the Indictment. The only possible inconsistency between the statute and the instruction is that subsection (a) of the statute says maliciously and intentionally cause the death of a child by failure to provide care, while the instruction says maliciously and intentionally fails to supply care, causing the child's death. [1] Although no objection to what at best may be characterized as an arguable variance was made at trial, it constitutes the basis for the majority's determination of plain error. [2] As we recently reiterated in syllabus point eight of State v. Garrett, 195 W.Va. 630, 466 S.E.2d 481 (1995), `[t]he general rule is that a party may not assign as error the giving of an instruction unless he objects, stating distinctly the matters to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.' Syl. pt. 3, State v. Gangwer, 169 W.Va. 177, 286 S.E.2d 389 (1982). We determined in Garrett that the appellant had failed to preserve the issue for appellate review, citing the requirement in Rule 30 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure that `[n]o party may assign as error the giving or the refusal to give an instruction ... unless he objects thereto before the arguments to the jury are begun, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection[.]' Id. at 643, 466 S.E.2d at 494. Regarding our utilization of the plain error doctrine, we stated in syllabus point two of State v. Hutchinson, 176 W.Va. 172, 342 S.E.2d 138 (1986), that although we have authority under Rule 30 to notice plain error in the giving of an erroneous instruction (in the absence of a proper and timely objection at trial), this Court will not ordinarily recognize plain error under such circumstances, even of constitutional magnitude, where the giving of the erroneous instruction did not substantially impair the truth-finding function of the trial. In syllabus point seven of the very recent LaRock decision, we concisely delineated the contours of the plain error doctrine, as follows: An unpreserved error is deemed plain and affects substantial rights only if the reviewing court finds the lower court skewed the fundamental fairness or basic integrity of the proceedings in some major respect. In clear terms, the plain error rule should be exercised only to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The discretionary authority of this Court invoked by lesser errors should be exercised sparingly and should be reserved for the correction of those few errors that seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. 196 W.Va. at 299, 470 S.E.2d at 618 (emphasis added). While we reviewed the rationale for these conservative limits to the plain error doctrine in LaRock, the majority appears to have disregarded the parameters of the plain error doctrine set forth therein. In LaRock, we observed: `One of the most familiar procedural rubrics in the administration of justice is the rule that the failure of a litigant to assert a right in the trial court likely will result' in the imposition of a procedural bar to an appeal of that issue. [State v.] Miller, 194 W.Va. [3] at 17, 459 S.E.2d [114] at 128 [(1995)], quoting United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1196, 115 S.Ct. 1266, 131 L.Ed.2d 145 (1995). 196 W.Va. at 316, 470 S.E.2d at 635. We aptly recognized that in general, the law ministers to the vigilant, not to those who sleep on their rights. Id. While the plain error doctrine permits appellate correction of unpreserved error, we noted that appellate courts should use this tool sparingly, and only in the most egregious circumstances. Id. The LaRock opinion enumerated the prerequisites for the application of the plain error doctrine, as follows: To satisfy the plain error standard, a court must find: (1) there was error in the trial court's determination; (2) the error was plain or obvious; and (3) the error affected substantial rights in that the error was prejudicial and not harmless. 194 W.Va. at 18, 459 S.E.2d at 129, citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 730-732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776, 123 L.Ed.2d 508, 518 (1993). If these criteria are met, this Court may, in its discretion, correct the plain error if it `seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 736, 113 S.Ct. at 1776, 1779, 123 L.Ed.2d at 518, 521, quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555, 557 (1936). 196 W.Va. at 316-17, 470 S.E.2d at 635-36. We also instructed in LaRock that [e]ven when all three prerequisites are established, whether to correct error remains discretionary with the appellate court. Id. at 317, 470 S.E.2d at 636. Recognizing the instruction of the United States Supreme Court in Olano, on the issue of the exercise of such discretion, we concluded in LaRock that [w]e should correct error which caused a `miscarriage of justice,' that is, conviction of an innocent person. Id. That is clearly not what occurred here. Defense counsel acknowledged that the Appellant was present over an extended period of timeseveral daysof almost constant extreme abuse of this child and did not seek medical assistance. See infra note 3. We have established a significantly detailed standard for the utilization of the plain error doctrine. Yet, the majority seems unwilling to be bound by such cogent precedent. I certainly am unable to conclude that these instructions, as well as the fact that the Appellant was permitted to fully argue her theory of the case, resulted in a miscarriage of justice or an error seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Therefore, I vociferously dissent. It is my hope that the majority's decision in this matter does not represent a departure from the standards so correctly and cogently identified in LaRock and its predecessors. The plain error rule was never intended to be implemented as a curative device for every unpreserved error raised at the appellate level. The majority's use of the plain error device in the present case is grossly erroneous.