Opinion ID: 399011
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Government's Appeal from Order of Suppression

Text: 28 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), represents the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement regarding the elements necessary to support a warrantless entry to a suspect's home for arrest purposes. Payton holds that, absent exigent circumstances, probable cause by itself is insufficient to support a warrantless entry into a private residence for arrest. Although the facts of the instant case occurred nearly half a year prior to Payton, the trial judge applied Payton's standard in ruling on the defendants' motion to suppress. 29 In our view, however, the established criteria for determining the retroactivity of a new constitutional rule, consisting of 30 (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards; (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards 31 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), militate resoundingly against retroactive application of Payton. We note first that the purpose to be served by applying Payton retroactively is that of the exclusionary rule itself: deterrence of police activity violative of the fourth amendment. Since police could not have known of a future interpretation of the fourth amendment's mandate at the time the instant facts occurred, no possible deterrence of conduct in contravention of that future rule could ensue. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 2320, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1974); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2365, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1973). Indeed, police conduct in the instant situation reflected no less than justifiable, good faith reliance on what they reasonably believed to be the existing constitutional standard governing warrantless home arrests, recognized by the Supreme Court itself in Payton to be a longstanding nationwide practice. 445 U.S. at 598, 100 S.Ct. at 1386. Finally, the burden on the administration of justice were Payton to be applied retroactively would be massive. Since the practice of warrantless entry has been widespread, id., 7 clearly many convictions would be subject to reversal. Such reversal would be mandated despite the fact that the evidence suppressed would be highly probative. Indeed, the exclusion of reliable evidence seized prior to Payton would impair rather than enhance the pursuit of truth at trial. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490-91, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3050-3051, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067; United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 348, 350 (5th Cir. 1978). 32 In recognition of precisely these concerns, the Supreme Court of the United States has refused to apply retroactively new standards established in analogous fourth amendment contexts: 33 It is indisputable ... that in every case in which the Court has addressed the retroactivity problem in the context of the exclusionary rule, whereby concededly relevant evidence is excluded in order to enforce a constitutional guarantee that does not relate to the integrity of the factfinding process, the Court has concluded that any such new constitutional principle would be accorded only prospective application. 34 United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 2316, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975) (holding not retroactive the rule in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973), which requires probable cause to justify automobile searches conducted by roving border patrols). The Supreme Court has noted additionally that 35 (i)f the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 36 422 U.S. at 542, 95 S.Ct. at 2320. See also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), (holding not retroactive the rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), which mandates application of the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule to state criminal proceedings); United States v. Corcione, 592 F.2d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 1979). 37 In light of the above analysis, we hold that the balance of relevant considerations weighs heavily against retroactive application of the Payton standard. 38 The trial judge further indicated that pre-existing fifth circuit law was identical to Payton in requiring both probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify warrantless home arrests; that, as the trial judge found, exigent circumstances were not present here; and that, therefore, the warrantless entry must be deemed illegal even if Payton were held not retroactive. Our review, however, reflects that prior fifth circuit law was far from such a model of clarity. 39 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Payton appeared to have interpreted fifth circuit law as not requiring exigent circumstances, when it specifically contrasted United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1978) with Payton-like decisions of other circuits. 445 U.S. at 575, n.4, 100 S.Ct. at 1374. United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1978), decided four months after Williams, compounds the confusion. While asserting that a warrantless arrest of an individual at home grounded on probable cause and exigent circumstances would certainly be constitutional, it offers no insight as to whether such a combination is necessary to validate such an arrest: 40 (I)t seems clear to us that, most assuredly, the Supreme Court (in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967)) was saying that officers do not always have to have a warrant to enter a house for the arrest of a felon. If they have probable cause to arrest for a felony and the exigencies of the situation make it imperative that they proceed without waiting to obtain a warrant the arrest is not constitutionally invalid. This is certainly the law as it exists in the Fifth Circuit. 41 581 F.2d at 1146. See also United States v. Savage, 564 F.2d 728, 733 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding a warrantless search of motel room immediately following arrest based on probable cause alone), United States v. Hofman, 488 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1974) (upholding warrantless entry and search of motel room on basis of probable cause alone); United States v. Wysocki, 457 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 859, 93 S.Ct. 145, 34 L.Ed.2d 105 (1972) (upholding warrantless arrest in motel room based on probable cause and exigent circumstances, without discussion of whether exigent circumstances necessary). 42 We therefore reject the trial judge's conclusion that Payton represented no more than a re-articulation of what already was the established law in this circuit. 43 The court in Gaultney did find exigent circumstances in a situation closely analogous to the one at hand. One Francis Gilmere had offered to sell cocaine to undercover DEA agents. During police surveillance of the apartment from which Gilmere was observed carrying the drugs, three individuals were seen entering and departing. After Gilmere's arrest, police entered the apartment without a warrant and arrested three men found inside. A protective sweep was then conducted during which contraband was found in plain view. On these facts, the warrantless arrest and ensuing search were upheld: 44 The officers had good reason to believe that as much as ten pounds of cocaine was in the house. They saw, too, that considerations of privacy ordinarily attributable to a home were present in only minimal form. Gilmere had visited the house and quickly left with a package which he had not carried there. A woman soon left. Two men drove up in another vehicle and entered. The place was a beehive of activity, involving a comparatively large number of people who did not appear to be members of the family group. The officers could reasonably infer that those within the house were momentarily expecting the return of Gilmere, with $20,000 from the intended transaction at the restaurant; his failure to return would likely raise flags for people immersed in so dangerous an activity as the cocaine traffic. 45 581 F.2d at 1147. 46 Likewise, in the instant case, officers maintained surveillance of an apartment belonging to arrested co-conspirator Bennett's source. Having previously listened to a taped conversation between Bennett and his source, Brock, in which the latter had assured Bennett that he would obtain more drugs later that night or the next morning for another deal, the police's observation, as in Gaultney, of two individuals entering and leaving the apartment carrying packages gave rise to their reasonable belief of ongoing criminal activity within. Moreover, given Brock's instruction that Bennett should return to the apartment that night, Bennett's failure to do so, like Gilmere's failure to show in Gaultney, would surely have aroused Brock's suspicion. These circumstances, coupled with the relative ease with which narcotics may be disposed of, clearly meet, if not surpass, the requisite level of exigency found in Gaultney. See also United States v. Tolliver, 665 F.2d 1005, 1007-1008 (11th Cir. 1982). As the fifth circuit noted in Gaultney, drug dealers are likely to be armed and dangerous. 581 F.2d at 1147. We consequently find that police effectuating Brock's arrest possessed both the right and the obligation to secure the apartment by conducting a protective sweep. See United States v. Quigley, 631 F.2d 415, 418-19 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1168-69 (5th Cir. 1977). Hence, even assuming arguendo the accuracy of the appellee's interpretation of pre-Payton fifth circuit law, we find, finally, that exigent circumstances were present in the instant situation and, on that basis, no justification existed for excluding the contraband found in plain view.