Opinion ID: 2143637
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Conviction and Sentencing Issues

Text: The defendant first argues that the motion to suppress evidence, including statements taken upon his arrest, should have been granted because the arrest warrants outstanding at the time of arrest lacked probable cause on their face. At the time of his arrest, there was a complaint and outstanding arrest warrant in the circuit court of Cook County charging the defendant with the murder of Clorita Ladd. In addition, there was an Arizona complaint and warrant charging him and William Bracey with first-degree murder, and with attempted first-degree murder, kidnapping, armed robbery and burglary. The Cook County complaint later was dismissed at a preliminary hearing for lack of probable cause because the complaining witness failed to appear. The defendant argues that both arrest warrants were invalid on their face because the complaints failed to specify facts that could support a finding of probable cause. The defendant, however, misconstrues the requirements of the concerned Illinois statute. The requirements for arrest warrants are set out in section 107-9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, which provides: (a) When a complaint is presented to a court charging that an offense has been committed it shall examine upon oath or affirmation the complainant or any witnesses. (b) The complaint shall be in writing and shall: (1) State the name of the accused   ; (2) State the offense with which the accused is charged; (3) State the time and place of the offense as definitely as can be done by the complainant; and (4) Be subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. (c) A warrant shall be issued by the court for the arrest of the person complained against if it appears from the contents of the complaint and the examination of the complainant or other witness, if any, that the person against whom the complaint was made has committed an offense. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 107-9.) Section 107-9 does not require that the complaint or warrant articulate the probable cause but rather that the court, in making a determination of probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant, examine the complainant or any witness under oath. Therefore, in issuing the arrest warrant the judge is not bound by the four corners of the complaint, but may base a determination of probable cause upon his required examination of the complainant or witnesses. ( People v. Collins (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 413, 423.) Here, the trial judge that issued the warrant attested that, I have examined the above complaint and the person presenting the same and have heard evidence thereon, and am satisfied that there is probable cause for filing same. The defendant does not allege that the trial court judge failed to examine the complainant or that the issuance of the warrant was based only on the statements in the complaint. The Cook County case was not dismissed because of any defect in the warrant, but because, it appears, the complaining witness did not appear at the preliminary hearing. The defendant contends that the prosecutor made numerous inflammatory statements during closing argument that require reversal of his conviction. The evidence had shown that at the time of the defendant's arrest a shotgun was recovered. The prosecutor began closing argument by attacking various parts of the defendant's story. In doing so, he commented that it was absurd that the defendant could deny any knowledge of the shotgun and .32-caliber pistol found in the bedroom of the apartment where he was arrested. The prosecutor never argued or insinuated that the shotgun found there was used in the murders. He left the subject and went on to attack other parts of the defendant's story. Defense counsel, in closing argument, commented that the shotgun was not introduced into evidence, and was a red herring. These comments were part of a larger argument in which the defense contended that the State's case was designed to have the jury ignore the physical evidence and the other evidence and let [the jury's] emotions take over. Replying, the prosecutor stated: The shotgun that he talks about, the .32-caliber, you'll hear about that later, ladies and gentlemen. I can't go into that now, you will hear about the shotgun, I can't go into it now. The remark was objected to, and the court sustained the objection, stating, Objection sustained. Do not talk about anything that you can't go into now. The defendant argues that the prosecution's comment was reversible error, and that the court's statement in sustaining the objection only increased the harm. The prosecution's statement, however, was error invited by the defense argument that the shotgun was mentioned to mislead the jury. ( People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill.2d 237, 277; People v. Lyles (1985), 106 Ill.2d 373, 390; People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill.2d 329, 344.) Too, the objection was sustained by the court, and the prosecutor was instructed not to go into the subject. The court did not expressly instruct the jury to disregard the comment, but it was made apparent to the jury by the court that the remark was improper. The defendant did not request such an instruction and did not ask for a mistrial. The defendant cannot take comfort in his citation of People v. Emerson (1983), 97 Ill.2d 487. There, a motion to prohibit the State from bringing out that the defendant was in possession of a gun at the time of his arrest was allowed. The prosecutor stated in his closing: Well, ladies and gentlemen, we can't tell you everything he did after his arrest and he knows it. Maybe when this is over I will tell you what he did when he was arrested. This court held that it was error to suggest that evidence of guilt existed which, because of the defendant's objection, cannot be brought before the jury.    [T]he inference that defendant had been guilty of improper conduct at the time of the arrest left the jury free to speculate as to the nature of that misconduct. ( People v. Emerson (1983), 97 Ill.2d 487, 497.) Here, the jury already knew that the weapons were found at the time the defendant was arrested. We consider that the reference had no significant effect upon the jury. The defendant argues that it was error for the prosecutor to say that the defendant's story that he was told he would be used as a witness against Collins and was coerced into confessing was a ridiculous, absurd, obscene, defense. We consider this not an observation on the integrity of the defendant's attorney but a comment on the merit, likelihood and strength of the defense's story. The defendant complains of the prosecutor's comments regarding the testimony of Daretha Redmond. As stated, this witness testified that she picked out a photograph of the defendant and said he resembled one of the men she observed in the parking lot on the night of the murders. On cross-examination, she answered yes to the question whether she simply chose pictures of persons that she had seen around her neighborhood, and did say that the police had asked her to do that. On redirect examination, she admitted that she was testifying only because she had been subpoenaed, and that she did not want to be in attendance at the trial. She also admitted that the defense attorney and the defendant's brother had visited her on the day before the trial. Then she again testified that she had picked the defendant's photograph because he resembled one of the men she had seen the night of the murders. On re-cross-examination, she said that the officers who had visited her carried guns. She also said that she did not feel threatened by the visit of the defendant's brother and the defense attorney. In his closing argument, defense counsel argued that the police had coerced Redmond to pick out pictures of persons she knew from her neighborhood. In the prosecutor's rebuttal, he said: That's a gutsy lady, ladies and gentlemen, that is a lady that didn't want to be here, didn't like to be here, didn't like getting visited the day before she came to testify for me by this guy  DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection. She didn't say that. THE COURT: Well, we will rely on the jury's recollection. PROSECUTOR: Do you think that Daretha Redmond liked that little visit the Hooper family and Hooper's lawyer paid her? And didn't she tell you she gave O'Callaghan a picture of a man who resembled the person outside, didn't she testify to that? That is why we put her on the stand. The defendant maintains that the prosecutor improperly argued that the defense counsel and the defendant's brother intimidated witness Daretha Redmond. The defense counsel, however, had implied that the police had intimidated Redmond; he made the point in his examination of Redmond that the police who visited her had carried guns, which is, of course, what police are expected to do. The prosecutor, in response, said that he doubted that Redmond was pleased to be visited by defense counsel and Hooper's brother. The court instructed the jury to rely on the witness' testimony, and we consider that, under the circumstances, no error was committed. The credibility of a witness is for the jury to determine. The defendant cites instances in which he says the prosecutor attacked the integrity of the defense counsel and injected his own integrity and personal assurances in persuading the jury. The defense counsel had argued in closing that William Bracey and the defendant were virtually indistinguishable in appearance. The prosecutor attacked that characterization, saying that you think that maybe [defense counsel] just is misstating something for Mr. Hooper, who is a killer. In context, it is clear that this was not a personal attack, but a criticism of the defense counsel's characterization of the evidence. In response to defense counsel's argument that Officer O'Callaghan had abused the defendant, the prosecutor said, Dave O'Callaghan, ten years on the job, he's got to come in here and be humiliated and demeaned by [defense counsel]? It was clear to the jury that the statement was argument responding to the defendant's accusation of police brutality, which the officers had denied. Similarly, the defendant's complaint that the prosecutor accused the defense counsel of twisting the evidence and trying to hoodwink the jury, when read in the context of what the prosecutor was responding to, were comments on the evidence and the defense counsel's characterization of the evidence. The defendant complains of a comment that the prosecutor made regarding Dr. Shorter's testimony. She had testified that she treated a wound on the defendant's right leg. On cross-examination she stated that it could have been his left leg. The State's rebuttal witness, Harry Robertson, testified that he prepared a report stating that the injury was on the defendant's left leg. The prosecutor in argument later remarked, Do you think maybe [defense counsel] talked to Dr. Shorter and said he's got a scar on his right leg. The court sustained an objection to the comment, stating, I don't know what the inference is, but no inference can be drawn. The prosecutor's comment was ambiguous, and the court acted to dispel any improper inference. The jury was instructed that attorneys have the right to interview witnesses, and the jury was repeatedly instructed by the court to act only on the testimony of the witnesses. The defendant complains of the prosecutor's comment regarding the defendant's claim that he was promised he would be the star witness in the trial of Roger Collins. He stated: that I    I, as one of the prosecutors in charge of this case    would use Murray Hooper, a man who tells the police and the assistant State's Attorney, Larry Hyman, first, that he shot a guy on the passenger side on the ground, and then he changed and said he shot a guy in the back seat. That we would use him, a confessed killer, as the star witness in a case against Roger Collins  let me assure you, ladies and gentlemen, we never promised him anything. We never will, we won't have to. Read in the context of the prosecutor's closing argument, the assistant State's Attorney was not, as defendant argues, personally assuring the jury that the defendant was lying. He was attacking the credibility of the defendant's story that he would be given the role of the star witness in exchange for confessing to one of the killings. It was clear to the jury that Assistant State's Attorney Hyman testified to the defendant's confession and the lack of any promises, and that the prosecutor was not giving testimony during his closing argument; rather he was commenting on the believability of the defendant's story. The jury was instructed that closing arguments are not evidence. Too, the prosecutor's remarks about the testimony of Morris Nellum, Harry Robertson, David O'Callaghan and Larry Hyman were not personal assurances that they were testifying truthfully, but argument on the absence of motives for them to testify falsely and the unlikelihood of a conspiracy to falsely accuse the defendant. The defendant complains that there were several prosecutorial comments not based on the evidence, but they were not objected to and will not be considered. ( People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill.2d 237, 275; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill.2d 564, 577.) The defendant did, however, object to this comment in argument: Stateville, that is where Bracey and Hooper hooked up, and from there they continued their life of crime in our cities. That the defendant and Bracey met in Stateville penitentiary was in the record, as was the defendant's extensive criminal record. The comment was based on evidence in the record. The defendant's last complaint of prosecutorial misconduct is that the State improperly referred to evidence of an inadmissible prior consistent statement of Nellum in order to bolster his testimony. During Nellum's testimony, he identified the transcript of the tape-recorded statement he made to police on February 21, 1981, and his signature on the transcript. The defense did not object to the identification of the transcript. The contents of the statement were not revealed, and the transcript was not given to the jury. The defendant did not seek to impeach Nellum by use of the transcript. The prosecutor, in his argument, stated that Nellum was shown to have lied only about the guns, which falsehood has been described above. The prosecutor went on to say that Nellum's tape-recorded statement and his grand jury testimony were not inconsistent with his testimony at trial. At this point the defendant objected. The court overruled the objection, but the prosecutor did not return to the subject of consistency. We do not consider that under the evidence there was significant error or prejudice to the defendant. The jury was aware that Nellum had made a tape-recorded statement to the police following his arrest, and that he had appeared before a grand jury the following day. Too, the jury knew that he admitted to lying about the guns, and that he had not been impeached by any prior contradictory statements. From that the jurors might already have inferred that Nellum's prior statements were not inconsistent with his trial testimony. For the prosecutor to say directly that Nellum's tape-recorded statement and grand jury testimony were not inconsistent with his testimony at the trial was improper, but, on the record, we judge that the prosecutor's comment did not result in prejudice to the defendant. The defendant also complains that the prosecutor, in referring to Nellum's prior statement, erroneously stated that not once in these thirteen pages did you hear him [Nellum] ever say anybody but Hooper, Collins and Bracey were the shooters. The defendant says that Nellum did not say in the statement that he actually saw the defendant shoot anyone. However, the defendant did not object to this statement of the prosecutor, and review of the statement has been waived. ( People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill.2d 237, 275; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill.2d 564, 577.) In any event, it seems that the statement should be interpreted to mean that Nellum never implicated anyone other than Collins, Bracey and the defendant. Nellum never testified at trial that he actually saw the defendant shoot anyone. While these comments of the prosecution relative to the statement and grand jury testimony should not have been made, we consider on this record they did not result in substantial prejudice to the accused. People v. Caballero (1989), 126 Ill.2d 248, 273; People v. Baptist (1979), 76 Ill.2d 19, 29; see also People v. Skorusa (1973), 55 Ill.2d 577, 585. The defendant next argues that the questioning of witness Morris Nellum by the trial court amounted to an abandonment of a judicially neutral position and served to rehabilitate the witness' credibility. On cross-examination, Nellum stated that he had lied to police initially about his knowledge of where the guns were located. On redirect examination, he stated that he lied only to the police about the guns, and had not lied at trial or before the grand jury. On re-cross-examination, Nellum answered yes to the question of whether every time it had been necessary to lie to save himself, he had done so. On further redirect examination, he stated that he had lied only about the guns. On further cross-examination, he denied that everything he had testified to at trial was false. At this point, the trial court addressed the witness: Q. Mr. Nellum, when you say every time it is necessary for you to lie in this case, you have lied, what do you mean by that? A. Well, there were questions they questioned me about. I lied about where the guns was thrown. I didn't want them to think I wouldn't lie, because I have. You know, anybody would. Q. About the guns. A. Yes, I did lie about  Q. When you were first asked? A. Yes, I did lie about the guns. Q. Well, did you lie about anything else? A. No, sir. Q. Oh, well, all right. All right. After the taking of testimony was completed, the defendant moved for a mistrial, but the motion was denied. It is clear that a trial judge has the right to question witnesses in order to elicit the truth or to bring enlightenment on material issues which seem obscure. ( People v. Palmer (1963), 27 Ill.2d 311, 314; see also People v. Nevitt (1988), 174 Ill. App.3d 326, 341; People v. Bradley (1984), 128 Ill. App.3d 372, 382.) Here, the court asked questions to clarify what it perceived to be confusion as to what Nellum admitted to lying about. In doing so, we consider that the court did not exceed the limits of impartiality or prejudice the defendant in any way. People v. Santucci (1962), 24 Ill.2d 93, does not support the defendant's claim. There the court interrogated every witness at length and emphasized the testimony which pointed to the defendant's guilt. The defendant contends that the trial judge improperly admitted hearsay testimony, and in overruling the defendant's objection, expressed his personal belief that the defendant was in the apartment at 2240 South State Street (with Bracey) as Nellum had testified. Even if the testimony of Nellum that the defendant had requested a gun from Bracey and had been assured he would obtain one is regarded as hearsay, there was no prejudice to the defendant. The connection of the defendant with the weapon was established by other evidence. Nellum testified that he saw Bracey give the defendant a.38-caliber revolver in October 1980, at the same apartment. Nellum identified the .38-caliber revolver recovered from Lake Michigan as the gun the defendant received from Bracey. He also identified the same revolver in a picture he took that showed the defendant holding the revolver. The defendant's link to this gun was established through proper testimony, and if the court erred, it did not prejudice the defendant. And the judge did not, as the defendant claims, express a personal belief that the defendant was present in the apartment that night. The judge remarked the defendant was present in the context of ruling on the hearsay objection. Nellum testified that the defendant was present in the apartment. The court ruled on the objection according to the scene the witness had described, and it obviously was not referring to the credibility of the witness' testimony. The defendant contends that his confessions should have been suppressed because of evidence that he was injured while in custody. It is, of course, for the trial court to judge the voluntariness of a confession and, thus, its admissibility. ( People v. Britz (1986), 112 Ill.2d 314, 319-20; People v. Kincaid (1981), 87 Ill.2d 107, 119.) The voluntariness of a confession depends upon whether it has been made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or whether the accused's will was overborne at the time he confessed. ( People v. Kincaid (1981), 87 Ill.2d 107, 116-17; People v. Hester (1968), 39 Ill.2d 489, 497.) Certainly, a confession obtained by use of force or brutality is inadmissible, and this court has held that where it is conceded or clearly established that the defendant received injuries while in police custody, the burden is on the State to establish by clear and convincing evidence the cause of the defendant's injury. ( People v. Wilson (1987), 116 Ill.2d 29, 40; People v. Davis (1966), 35 Ill.2d 202, 206; People v. La Frana (1954), 4 Ill.2d 261, 267; People v. Thomlison (1948), 400 Ill. 555, 561-62.) The defendant argues that he had shown his injury, and that the State failed to meet its burden of explaining the injury. Here, it was not established that the defendant was injured while in police custody. Marks of the blows to the head that he claims he received were not visible in photographs taken upon his arrest. His general appearance was not that of one who had been thrown to the ground. The infected cut on the inside of defendant's ankle for which he received treatment could have been received, according to testimony, as long as five days before the defendant's arrest. It was also possible that the cut might not have been the same wound as the one on his right leg that he displayed to the jury. We consider that the trial court did not abuse discretion in denying the motion to suppress the confession. The defendant also says that his confession should be suppressed on the ground that his right to counsel under the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution was violated. (U.S. Const., amend. VI.) As the defendant acknowledges, this question was not raised in the trial court, and it has been waived for purposes of review. People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill.2d 237, 275; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill.2d 564, 577. The defendant contends that he was not proven guilty of armed robbery beyond reasonable doubt. It is axiomatic that a court of review will not set aside a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so unsatisfactory that a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt is created. ( People v. Jimerson (1989), 127 Ill.2d 12, 43; People v. Brisbon (1985), 106 Ill.2d 342, 360; People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill.2d 329, 342; People v. Yarbrough (1977), 67 Ill.2d 222, 227.) The defendant stated in his confession that it was decided that the victims were to be robbed instead of selling them narcotics, and that he wanted a piece of the action. He said that he was given $300 by Collins. The defendant also admitted to the possession and use of a gun. Nellum testified that he saw Bracey give the gun to the defendant. Nellum stated that he was given $125 by Bracey upon their return to the parking lot. We have no reasonable doubt regarding the jury's verdict of guilt of armed robbery. The defendant's contention that he was improperly sentenced to three concurrent terms of 60 years for aggravated kidnapping is correct. As in People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill.2d 237, 285-86, the aggravated kidnapping was not for ransom and thus was punishable only as a Class 1 felony, which carries a maximum sentence of 15 years. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 10-2(a)(3), 10-2(b)(2), 1005-8-1(a)(4).) Under Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (107 Ill.2d R. 615(b)(4)), we reduce the defendant's sentence for each of the aggravated kidnapping convictions to 15 years. The defendant also contends that the prosecutor, at the second phase of the death penalty hearing, made improper and severely prejudicial arguments. He says that it was grave error for the prosecutor to argue that if the jurors did not impose the death penalty, they would have lied to the judge and to God. He argued: Every one of you on this jury raised your right hand and you swore to your Maker that you would follow the law. You were asked specifically a question by that judge, would you consider the imposition of the death penalty under certain circumstances. And the reason you twelve people are here today is because you said yes, because you said you would follow the law, the law of the State of Illinois that's written in our statutes. If you were truthful and you were being honest when you raised that right hand and swore to do your duty, and when you said, `Yes, I would consider it under certain circumstances,' what other circumstances are there that could be worse than this? If this is not the case, what case are you looking for? We aren't going to have Adolph Hitler in here. We've got a mass murderer who sits in front of you.    [If these are] not the circumstances you were saying that you would consider, then I don't know any that you ever would and you lied to the judge and to all of us here.    And more than us, because we don't count. You lied to Somebody up there because you took an oath just like I took an oath, and I live up to my oath every day that I walk into a courtroom. The defense attorney objected several times to the argument, but the objections were overruled. The trier of fact, which here was the jury, has the duty to weigh relevant aggravating and mitigating factors and determine whether any mitigating factors are sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9-1(d).) The jurors agreed to follow the law, and they were instructed as to the law. The purpose of the prosecutor was, of course, to persuade the jurors that under the evidence this case was an appropriate one for imposition of the death penalty, but he went too far. We consider that to say that the jury would be branded with lying to the judge and lying to God if it did not vote for the death sentence could well have had the effect of diverting the jury's attention from its consideration of the aggravating and mitigating factors. ( Cf. People v. Gacho (1988), 122 Ill.2d 221, 257; People v. Brisbon (1985), 106 Ill.2d 342, 367-70; People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill.2d 327, 366-67.) The jury has the responsibility of weighing these factors; the jurors do not lie if they find a mitigating factor sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty. The State's defense for the comments is that they were invited because the defense attorney personally begged the jury not to impose the death penalty. That may explain, but does not justify, the argument. The defendant complains next of the State's argument at the sentencing hearing: How else do we defend people from people like Murray Hooper? Oh, put them in the penitentiary for life. What if he kills a guard?    What do we do with him then, ladies and gentlemen? Then what do we do with him there? What if he kills a chaplain in the prison? The court sustained objections to these remarks, calling them unnecessary speculations. This court has consistently held that commenting on the possibility of the defendant's obtaining parole in order to persuade the jury to impose the death penalty is improper and prejudicial. ( People v. Gacho (1988), 122 Ill.2d 221, 257; People v. Brisbon (1985), 106 Ill.2d 342, 367; People v. Walker (1982), 91 Ill.2d 502, 515.) Similar to speculating on the possible parole of the defendant and the possibility of his committing future crimes if not executed, commenting that the defendant may kill while in prison may cause the jury to focus upon a speculative possibility that may or may not occur, and that is immaterial to the jury's consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors. ( People v. Walker (1982), 91 Ill.2d 502, 515.) Speculating that the defendant, if not executed, might kill a prison guard or chaplain was inflammatory and we consider could not be cured by the court's sustaining of the objection. See People v. Gacho (1988), 122 Ill.2d 221, 259; People v. Yates (1983), 98 Ill.2d 502, 538. The same improper appeal was later made to the jury by the prosecution: Fill our prisons up with Murray Hoopers, and then the people, the juries of this state, they can be responsible for what happens there.    You know, even animals, animals when they are about to be killed fight desperately not to be killed, every human thing does. He had no respect for anybody's life. Do you want to take a chance? Do any of you want to take the chance in the future? Objection to these remarks was overruled. Considering all of the improper arguments at the sentencing hearing, we hold that the sentence of death must be vacated. (Prior to releasing an opinion announcing inter alia the vacatur of the death sentence, the Supreme Court, as stated hereafter, replaced the discrimination test of Swain with the Batson test. As a result, this court remanded the cause for a hearing under the standard announced in Batson. )