Opinion ID: 149229
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proof of the Grand Jury's Purpose

Text: Mr. Hasan first argues, pointing to Gaudin, that there was not sufficient evidence to establish materiality because the petit jury was not adequately informed of the nature of the grand juries' investigations. The premise underlying this argument is simple: without information about the purpose of the grand juries' inquiries, no reasonable jury could decide if statements were material to those inquiries. See Finn, 375 F.3d at 1040. Because Mr. Hasan did not raise this objection before the district court, we review it only for plain error. To evaluate Mr. Hasan's claim, it is necessary to review the evidence before the petit jury going to the purpose of the grand juries' inquiries. First, the jury heard and received copies of Mr. Hasan's testimony from each grand jury appearance. The transcripts indicated that before the April grand jury the prosecutor stated: Mr. Hasan, this is a Federal Grand Jury that is investigating possible violations of the Federal Criminal Law involving violations of Title 18, U.S.Code, Section 1001. Aplt. Addendum of Exs., Ex. 6, at 2-3. And before the November grand jury the transcripts show that the prosecutor told Mr. Hasan [t]his is a Federal Grand Jury that's investigating possible violations of the Criminal Law. Id., Ex. 7, at 2. The petit jury also received a copy of the indictment against Mr. Hasan, which stated: It was material to each of the [grand jury] proceedings . . . to determine whether the Defendant, HASAN ALI HASAN, had given truthful answers to federal agents during an interview conducted on October 20, 2004, concerning answers he had previously given in 1997 to federal immigration agents in order to remain in the United States under asylum. It was material to the November 7, 2005, Grand Jury inquiry whether the Defendant had committed perjury in his April 5, 2005, Grand Jury answers. R., Vol. I, Doc. 2, at 1-2 (Indictment, filed Dec. 6, 2005). The federal law enforcement agent who interviewed Mr. Hasan in October 2004 testified at length about the subjects they covered. See R., Vol. 4, Pt. 1, at 32-100 (Trial Tr., dated May 16, 2006). And a copy of the agent's notes from his interview with Mr. Hasan were admitted as an exhibit at trial. See Aplt. Addendum of Exs., Ex. 5. Mr. Hasan argues that this was not enough to establish the purpose of the grand jury proceedings beyond a reasonable doubt. He points to a Ninth Circuit case that states that the government may prove materiality by introducing the complete transcript of the prior proceeding, by presenting testimony from persons who witnessed the proceedings, or by presenting testimony from a member of the grand jury. Aplt. Br. at 23 (quoting United States v. Leon-Reyes, 177 F.3d 816, 819-20 (9th Cir.1999)) (citations omitted). Reasoning inductively, Mr. Hasan argues that, because the government did not do any of these things in his case, it must have failed to introduce sufficient evidence of materiality. Mr. Hasan has not established that any deficiencies in the government's evidence would have rendered clear or obvious error the district court's decision to uphold the jury's verdict. There was direct and indirect evidence of the grand jury's purpose, and by the plain terms of the perjury statute, there is no need for the government to rely on the specific means or proof that Mr. Hasan suggests. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623(e) (Proof beyond a reasonable doubt under this section is sufficient for conviction. It shall not be necessary that such proof be made by any particular number of witnesses or by documentary or other type of evidence.). The case relied on by Mr. Hasan, Leon-Reyes, is inapposite (even if it were binding on us, which obviously it is not), for it discusses in general terms the kinds of evidence that may be used to establish materiality, but does not mention the issue herethe quantum of evidence required for the petit jury to determine the purpose of the grand juries' inquiries. [6] Our own independent review of the law also turns up no cases suggesting that it would have been clear or obvious error under current law for the district court in this case to conclude that a reasonable jury could have discerned the purpose of the grand juries. See Finn, 375 F.3d at 1038-40; cf. United States v. Ostertag, 671 F.2d 262, 264-65 (8th Cir. 1982) (discerning the scope of the grand jury's inquiry from the appellant's testimony before the grand jury). Therefore, we discern no plain error and must reject Mr. Hasan's claim that there was insufficient evidence to establish the investigatory purposes of the grand juries.