Opinion ID: 3134054
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Civil-Lawsuit Testimony

Text: As his first point on appeal, Edison asserts that the circuit court erred in sustaining the State’s objection to his questions posed to Thomas during his trial regarding her hiring of an attorney to pursue a civil suit against him and Sbarro.2 He contends that the colloquy he intended to engage in would have shown Thomas’s bias against him and that he was prejudiced by the circuit court’s ruling. The State counters that the circuit court only limited Edison’s cross-examination, on the State’s objection, after Edison’s defense counsel had elicited testimony from Thomas that she and her family had hired an attorney and that she was unsure if a lawsuit would be filed. It avers that the circuit court did not err in doing so when Thomas had already answered his questions, defense counsel repeated the same question for a third time, and the line of questioning was irrelevant. This court has stressed the importance of allowing wide latitude with respect to the admission of evidence relevant to the bias of the witness; by the same token, it has always given wide discretion to the circuit court in evidentiary rulings. See Jones v. State, 336 Ark. 191, 984 S.W.2d 432 (1999). Further, the scope of cross-examination, we have held, extends to matters of credibility. See Jones v. State, 349 Ark. 331, 78 S.W.3d 104 (2002). With respect to proof of bias, we have observed that it is “almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence 2 While Edison’s brief also cites to questions posed to Thomas at a pretrial hearing, those questions were not posed to her by Edison’s counsel, but by counsel for his codefendant, Bryant. We therefore limit our review to the questioning and objections made at Edison’s trial. 3 Cite as 2015 Ark. 376 which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness’s testimony.” Fowler v. State, 339 Ark. 207, 219, 5 S.W.3d 10, 16–17 (1999) (quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984)). In the instant case, Edison asserts that he was precluded from pursuing his line of questioning regarding Thomas’s intentions to sue him civilly; however, our review of the record reveals that Edison was successful in placing his allegations of bias in front of the jury, as evidenced by the following colloquy: DEFENSE COUNSEL: But you hired an attorney, correct, while you were in the hospital? THOMAS: Yes. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Did you hire an attorney or did your family? THOMAS: My family did. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. But did you never talk to them about any of this, what happened? THOMAS: Talked to who? DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your family. THOMAS: Afterwards, yes. DEFENSE COUNSEL: When you are in the hospital? THOMAS: Yes. DEFENSE COUNSEL: And so, but you hired an attorney and – correct? THOMAS: Yes. .... 4 Cite as 2015 Ark. 376 DEFENSE COUNSEL: And was this attorney there – did you talk to [t]his attorney about what happened? THOMAS: My sister did. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Did you ever talk to this attorney? THOMAS: Yes. DEFENSE COUNSEL: About what happened? THOMAS: Yes. DEFENSE COUNSEL: And your attorney was there when the police came to talk to you? THOMAS: Yes. DEFENSE COUNSEL: And the – was your plan to file a lawsuit in this – in regard to this, what happened? THOMAS: No, a lawsuit hasn’t been filed. DEFENSE COUNSEL: But is it – it is your plan to? THOMAS: I don’t know. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Is that – was your plan – [State’s objection.] Thomas clearly admitted that she had an attorney, who had been present when she was questioned by police, and stated that she did not know if she planned to file a civil suit. Merely because one is allowed wide latitude to inquire as to bias does not mean that one is permitted to do so without limit. To the contrary, once the main circumstances showing bias have been admitted, a circuit court does have the discretion to determine how far the 5 Cite as 2015 Ark. 376 examiner may delve into the details. See Billett v. State, 317 Ark. 346, 877 S.W.2d 913 (1994). When the evidence reaches this posture, the circuit court may impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about harassment, prejudice, waste of time, unnecessary duplication of testimony, confusion of issues, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. See Gilcrease v. State, 2009 Ark. 298, 318 S.W.3d 70; Newman v. State, 327 Ark. 339, 939 S.W.2d 811 (1997). The circuit court’s discretion to limit these details will not be reversed absent a showing of abuse. See Billett, 317 Ark. 346, 877 S.W.2d 913. In light of the fact that Edison had already put before the jury the possibility that Thomas might file a civil suit, we cannot say that Edison has made such a showing. It is not an abuse of discretion to interfere with or limit cross-examination of a witness when it appears the matter has been sufficiently developed and clearly presented to the jury. See Birchett v. State, 294 Ark. 176, 741 S.W.2d 267 (1987). Accordingly, the circuit court’s ruling is affirmed.