Opinion ID: 1159011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: constitutionality under united states constitution.

Text: Protestants first two challenges to the legal sufficiency of the Petition involve assertions the proposed constitutional addition is facially unconstitutional. They first contend the proposal is unconstitutional because it attempts to add, by State law, qualifications a person must have to be a member of the United States House or Senate when, protestants allege, the qualifications contained in the United States Constitution for these offices are exclusive. [5] Their contention is that only through the process contained in the United States Constitution itself for amendments of that document [U.S. CONST. Art. V] can term limits be imposed on Representatives and Senators. Protestants secondly allege the proposed amendment is facially unconstitutional because it restricts voters' rights to make their own choices as to who should represent them in Congress in violation of their free speech and associational rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. Amend. I; U.S. CONST.Amend. XIV. In our view, neither of these constitutional challenges are appropriate for determination at this pre-election stage and in the circumstances of this case the voters' basic right to vote on changes to the Oklahoma Constitution should not be abridged. We have recognized that the people's right to institute change through the initiative process is a fundamental characteristic of Oklahoma government. In re Initiative Petition No. 348, 820 P.2d at 775. The initiative process is precious to the people and courts are zealous to preserve it to the fullest tenable measure. Oliver v. Tulsa, 654 P.2d 607, 613 (Okla. 1982). All doubt as to the construction of pertinent provisions are to be resolved in favor of the initiative [ Id. ] and the initiative power should not be crippled, avoided, or denied by technical construction by the courts. Ruth v. Peshek, 153 Okla. 147, 5 P.2d 108, 111 (1931). We have recognized, however, the right of initiative is not absolute and there are both constitutional and statutory limitations on the process. In re Initiative Petition No. 348, 820 P.2d at 775; In re Initiative Petition No. 344, 797 P.2d 326, 330 (Okla. 1990). We may reach a facial constitutional attack in a pre-election setting, when raised, if in this Court's opinion to do so could prevent a costly and unnecessary election. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1, 8 (Okla. 1992) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1028, 122 L.Ed.2d 173 (1993); In re Initiative Petition No. 315, 649 P.2d 545, 548 (Okla. 1982); In re Supreme Court Adjudication of Initiative Petitions in Norman, Oklahoma No. 74-1 & No. 74-2, 534 P.2d 3, 8 (Okla. 1975). In addition to a determination by this Court that reaching such an issue could or may prevent the holding of a costly and needless election, we have limited such pre-election review to clear or manifest facial constitutional infirmities and have noted we will not reach challenges to the interpretation, implementation or application of an initiative proposal because such challenges present only abstract questions which will not be reviewed at a pre-election stage. In re Initiative Petition No. 358, 870 P.2d 782, 785-786 (Okla. 1994). In essence, our cases set out our discretionary authority to reach clear and manifest facial constitutional challenges at the preelection stage if, in our opinion, to do so will prevent the holding of a costly and unnecessary election. Although we have used this discretionary authority on numerous occasions we must not forget it is of a discretionary character and, in our view, we must always keep in mind, before exercising such authority, the fundamental basis of the people's right to institute change and express their will through the initiative process. Only in the clearest cases do we believe it is essential to use the discretionary authority, and only in the clearest cases do we believe it is warranted to interfere with the people's basic right to vote on important issues by a holding of constitutional infirmity. Based on the submissions in this case, we are unconvinced both that the constitutional infirmities lodged by protestants are clear or manifest, or that reaching the merits of those challenges would prevent the holding of a costly and unnecessary election. Accordingly, we decline to reach the constitutional challenges lodged by protestants in this case. At least three courts have decided questions similar to those raised by protestants based on arguably similar term limit provisions. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 316 Ark. 251, 872 S.W.2d 349 (1994) cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2703, 129 L.Ed.2d 832 (1994); Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.Wash. 1994); Stumpf v. Lau, 108 Nev. 826, 839 P.2d 120 (1992). In each case these courts found the provision seeking to limit the terms of federal Representatives and Senators unconstitutional based on the argument the states did not have authority to add qualifications (i.e. term limits) to the qualifications set forth in the United States Constitution. [6] However, only in one was the decision made at the preelection stage. Stumpf v. Lau, supra . In Stumpf, however, the decision was by a 3-2 majority only and a cogent dissent by Justice Steffen, joined by Justice Young, recognized the highly complex nature of the question presented, necessitating an in-depth analysis of the available history of the framers' intent in enacting the qualification clauses of the United States Constitution. 839 P.2d at 128-130 (Steffen, J. dissenting). Justice Steffen also recognized potentially valid arguments that the qualifications specified in Art. I of the United States Constitution were merely a floor or minimum set of qualifications, but that the states retained power to add qualifications or conditions for the election of our federal representatives, although he did not deem it necessary to decide the matter definitively at the pre-election stage. 839 P.2d at 129-130. Further, in Stumpf, although the majority there held the proposed measure unconstitutional on grounds a state had no right to enact term limits on United States Representatives or Senators in view of the exclusivity of the qualification clauses in Art. I of the United States Constitution, they also held the proposal was not fit for submission to the voters of that State because the majority could not discern whether the measure was meant to enact a statutory law or amend its constitution, in violation of Nevada initiative law [839 P.2d at 123-124] and they found an insufficiency of signatures to place the measure on the ballot. Id. 839 P.2d at 124-125. Neither of these latter deficiencies are involved in the Petition before us. The Petition here clearly proposes an addition to the Oklahoma Constitution and no protest is made to the validity or numerical sufficiency of the signatures accompanying the Petition. [7] The Arkansas case also contained a cogent dissent by Justice Hays to the effect the qualification clauses of Art. I were intended by the framers only to be the minimum requirements rather than the exclusive ones and that the United States Constitution did not prohibit additional qualifications for Representatives and Senators. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 316 Ark. at 268-270, 872 S.W.2d at 366-368 (Hays, J. concurring in part; dissenting in part). [8] In reading these cases and considering the arguments presented by the protestants we simply cannot say they have carried their burden to show a clear and manifest facial unconstitutionality which in our view would be sufficient to interfere with the peoples' right to vote on this important question. Furthermore, we believe another reason militates against deciding definitively the constitutional issue based on the exclusivity of the qualification clauses of Art. I of the United States Constitution. On June 20th of this year the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the U.S. Term Limits, Inc. case. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton and Hill, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2703, 129 L.Ed.2d 832 (1994). The questions presented include the qualification clause arguments advanced by protestants in this case. ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2703. If in this case, we were to agree with protestants' arguments on this issue and later the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Arkansas provision a situation would arise where a new Petition would presumably have to be circulated to obtain a vote on the measure. In our view, in light of the United States Supreme Court's pending determination of this issue and a recognition the people have the right to vote on proposed changes to their fundamental law unless the changes are clearly or manifestly unconstitutional, it is the better practice to allow a vote on the issue to go forward, rather than to interfere with the initiative process at the pre-election stage. To rule otherwise would thwart the initiative process without any real determination that it would prevent a costly and needless election. [9]