Opinion ID: 6498223
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plaintiff’s Procedural Due Process Rights

Text: Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied C.G. procedural due process in his suspensions and expulsion. Aplt. App. 63–65. Defendants argue that C.G. demands process beyond what the Constitution requires. Aplee. Br. at 29–33. We assess C.G.’s initial, five-day suspension under Goss v. Lopez. 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975). For suspensions of one to ten days, a student must “be given oral or 16 Appellate Case: 20-1320 Document: 010110706275 Date Filed: 07/06/2022 Page: 17 written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” Id. Opportunity under Goss must be meaningful to be considered actual opportunity. West, 206 F.3d at 1364. Plaintiff alleges that C.G. was removed from his first-period class and taken to Dean Thomas’s office, where he remained for hours. Aplt. App. 48–49. The Complaint further claims that CCSD “officials . . . decided to suspend [him]” “[b]efore hearing anything from C.G.” Aplt. App. 48; see also Aplt. Br. at 41. We consider it axiomatic that an opportunity for C.G. “to present his side of the story,” Goss, 419 U.S. at 581, could not have been meaningful and satisfied Goss if a disciplinary decision had already been made. Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985). Taking, as we must, these well-pled allegations as true and construing reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Reznik, 18 F.4th at 1260,10 it is certainly plausible that C.G. was not given a meaningful opportunity to explain his side of the story before officials made a disciplinary decision. This is all Plaintiff needs to survive a motion to dismiss on this claim. 10 The district court relied upon the Complaint’s allegations that C.G. was notified of the suspension and that he was in the Dean’s office for hours to conclude that he had sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard. C1.G., 477 F. Supp. 3d at 1212. Defendants argue that “[i]t does not take an inferential leap . . . to conclude from these allegations that [C.G.] had ample opportunity to tell his side of the story.” Aplee. Br. at 30. But on a motion to dismiss in this context, we cannot draw factual inferences against the plaintiff. Therefore, we cannot draw the inference that C.G. had an opportunity to present his side of the story while he was in the Dean’s office. See Pace v. Swerdlow, 519 F.3d 1067, 1073 (10th Cir. 2008). 17 Appellate Case: 20-1320 Document: 010110706275 Date Filed: 07/06/2022 Page: 18 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of this claim. Goss also governs analysis of the five-day extension of C.G.’s suspension. See 419 U.S. at 581. The district court found no due process violation here because it held that Defendants complied with due process requirements in meting out C.G.’s initial suspension. Cl.G., 477 F. Supp. 3d at 1212. Our determination that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Defendants violated C.G.’s procedural due process rights with the initial suspension affects that rationale and conclusion. On remand, the district court must reconsider whether Defendants provided C.G. with a meaningful opportunity to present his side of the story. We note some concern with the fact that C.G.’s mother — after being notified of the both the five-day and the 11-day suspension extensions — asked for a meeting with the school and was denied because there would be an expulsion hearing. Aplt. App. 52–55. The final suspension extension that stretched C.G.’s suspension to 21 days and C.G.’s expulsion are governed by the three-factor test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Watson ex rel. Watson v. Beckel, 242 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2001). This suspension extension “allow[ed] for completion of the expulsion review process,” Aplt. App. 53, which had been under way since CCHS officials began a push for expulsion review when Plaintiff was removed from class for his initial suspension. Aplt. App. 49, 52. Following Mathews, we weigh: (1) C.G.’s interest in returning to school and avoiding further reputation harm; (2) the likely value of additional or substitute 18 Appellate Case: 20-1320 Document: 010110706275 Date Filed: 07/06/2022 Page: 19 procedure to allow C.G. to protest further disciplinary action and/or obtain further consideration of his First Amendment rights; and (3) the administrative and fiscal burden of such procedure for Defendants. See Watson, 242 F.3d at 1240. Plaintiff admits that “C.G. had the opportunity to present his side of the story” at the expulsion hearing but maintains that this “cannot sanitize the repeated constitutional violations that came before it.” Reply Br. at 15. Further, Plaintiff argues that Defendants needed to consider C.G.’s First Amendment rights but ignored them. Aplt. Br. at 45–47; Reply Br. at 15. Defendants claim that they provided C.G. with all required due process. Aplee. Br. at 29–34. Defendants assert that they considered C.G.’s First Amendment rights, despite the fact that “the hearing officer did not make findings on that as a matter of law.” Aplee. Br. at 32. According to Defendants, “factual findings are enough” because CCSD’s policies reflect the proper legal standard for regulating student speech. Aplee. Br. at 32. Plaintiff’s proper pleading of a due process violation, Defendants’ possible misconceptions of their ability to regulate student speech under the First Amendment, and the district court’s consequent inquiry on remand may affect the Mathews analysis. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of C.G.’s further procedural due process claims for reconsideration. The district court may also address claims of qualified immunity for individual Defendants, see, e.g., Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1171 (10th Cir. 2011); Aplee. Br. at 24–25, 34–35, and in Superintendent Siegfried’s case, absolute immunity, Aplee. Br. at 35. 19 Appellate Case: 20-1320 Document: 010110706275 Date Filed: 07/06/2022 Page: 20 V. Plaintiff’s Facial Challenge to CCSD’s Policies for Fourteenth Amendment Violations The district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s facial challenge here because he abandoned it by not addressing it in his response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Cl.G., 477 F. Supp. 3d at 1215; see also Aplt. App. 114–30. Additionally, Plaintiff’s briefing of the issue on appeal is inadequate. See Bronson, 500 F.3d at 1104.