Opinion ID: 3039321
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasoning of Leocal

Text: [6] In determining that DUI offenses requiring a mens rea of mere negligence or less cannot be “shoehorn[ed]” into the federal definition of a crime of violence, Leocal, 543 U.S. at 13, the Supreme Court emphasized that 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) requires the “ ‘use . . . of physical force against the person or property of another,’ ” Leocal, 543 U.S. at 9 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)). Whereas the word “use,” taken alone, could “in theory” connote the accidental employment of force, it would be “much less natural to say that a person actively employs [i.e., uses] physical force against another person by accident.” Id. Thus, the Court reasoned, 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)’s requirement that force be used “against” someone or something suggested that crimes of violence require “a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct.” Leocal, 543 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added). As further support for the conclusion that 18 U.S.C. § 16 does not reach merely accidental offenses, the Court looked 17864 FERNANDEZ-RUIZ v. GONZALES to the ordinary meaning of the term “crime of violence.” See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11. That term, the Court observed, naturally suggests a category of crimes more “violent” and “active” than DUI offenses. Id. The Court also remarked that, because courts must interpret 18 U.S.C. § 16 consistently in both criminal and noncriminal cases, the rule of lenity applies. Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11 n.8. Under this rule, to whatever extent 18 U.S.C. § 16’s definitions of a crime of violence lack clarity, courts should construe the ambiguous statutory language against the government. Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11 n.8.