Opinion ID: 196480
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: law of the case and standard of review

Text: 28 Our review of the facts found by the trial judge is normally deferential; findings are not to be set aside unless clearly erroneous, with due regard ... given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); see Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 278 (1st Cir.1993). Knapp argues that our review should be less deferential in this case, drawing attention to paragraph 49 of the magistrate judge's findings of fact and its accompanying footnote. 29 [Paragraph 49] With respect to all lines of shoes which Knapp requested be manufactured by Sylvania, one finding is unmistakenably [sic] clear: By their express negotiations, by their express understandings, by their demonstrated conduct, and by their express course of dealings, Sylvania promised Knapp that, in the event that shoes were defectively manufactured, Knapp's remedy, and sole remedy, would be the replacement of [or credit for] those shoes shown to be defective and returned--nothing more, and nothing less. 30 [Footnote] This finding is not made and reported to suggest that Knapp waived its rights under Sections 2-601, 2-608, and 2-609 of the Uniform Commercial Code (M.G.L., ch. 106, Secs. 2-601, 2-608 and 2-609). Although it was and is clear to this court--then and now--that that was the sole understanding of the parties in terms of remedies and relief, and that it was clear (then and now) to all parties that the defense of waiver loomed throughout, and that plaintiff could not--then or now--establish any legal prejudice (that is, plaintiff could not--then or now--make any showing that the case would have been tried differently), our Court of Appeals, in the context of an interlocutory appeal relating to the dissolution of an injunction, has concluded otherwise. 31 Nevertheless, this finding and conclusion bear heavily on the credibility of the witnesses called by Knapp, and other issues to be determined herein. 32 Knapp argues that this discussion violates the law of the case by contradicting our holding in Knapp that Sylvania had waived any such limitation of remedies defense, that the issue of limitation of remedies had not been litigated at trial, and that it was now out of the case. 15 F.3d at 1227. Knapp further insists that this error by the magistrate judge tainted his other factual findings, requiring us to subject these findings to heightened scrutiny. Paragraph 49 has certainly complicated matters on this appeal, but we conclude that Knapp has somewhat exaggerated its import and consequences. 33 The law of the case doctrine has more than one dimension and certain complexities, but as applied to the problem before us, the doctrine provides that when a court of appeals makes a ruling of law, whether on appeal of a final judgment or in an interlocutory appeal, that ruling becomes the law of the case in any subsequent proceedings in the trial court. Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463 (1st Cir.1984). Such a ruling is [a] mandate [that] is completely controlling as to all matters before the appellate court and disposed of by its decree. Id. at 465. 34 We agree with Sylvania that the magistrate judge did not contradict our legal ruling in Knapp that the defense of limitation of remedies was waived and now out of the case. He did not rest any of his own legal rulings on the proposition that Knapp had limited its remedies by contract to credit for returned shoes; indeed, he awarded Knapp damages for defective shoes still in its possession (although he found the number of such shoes to be very small). To that extent, Knapp's law-of-the-case claim is something of a diversion. 35 At the same time, on an intermediate proposition of fact a direct conflict exists between our earlier opinion and the most recent decision of the magistrate judge. The magistrate judge repeats in the footnote to paragraph 49, quoted above in text, his earlier conclusion that Knapp and Sylvania did agree in fact to limit Knapp's remedies; and he recognizes that this court on the prior appeal concluded otherwise. Our actual conclusion was slightly narrower--we said that the parties had not purported to litigate the issue and we could find no evidence of such an agreement--but the fact remains that the magistrate judge has reasserted his view that such agreement has been proved. 36 All this might matter little if the magistrate judge's disagreement with us played no role in his decision, but he goes on to say that this finding and conclusion bears heavily on the credibility of the witnesses called by Knapp, and other issues to be determined herein. No resort to law of the case doctrine is required for us to determine that his finding and conclusion that such an agreement existed limiting remedies is clearly erroneous. The very same defect--the lack of evidence to show such an agreement--identified in our earlier decision remains, utterly unaltered. 37 We explained in our earlier opinion why we were not persuaded of such an agreement by the magistrate judge's reliance on Esser's testimony that a return remedy existed--testimony that did not even purport to address the exclusivity of the remedy--and also why we saw no course of dealing by the parties that could prove such a limitation. 15 F.3d at 1226-27. No new evidence was taken on remand to prove this limitation; no additional support for it is mustered by the magistrate judge out of the pre-existing record. 38 About the best we can do in this disturbing situation is to defer to the usual extent as to those findings of the magistrate judge that we are confident have not been infected by his belief in the supposed agreement limiting remedies; and, on all other findings, to consider them in the knowledge that the magistrate judge has credited or discredited certain witnesses based (at least in part) on a premise that we have already held to be mistaken. Sorting out findings in this way, and deciding how to treat infected findings, is something of a task but better than an outright remand on all issues to a new judge.