Opinion ID: 1160402
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Collateral Misconduct

Text: After the robbery, and after Irvin's arrest, a search was conducted of the premises where he was arrested which were occupied by Larry Wall, and a firearm which was similar to the one used in the robbery was discovered and seized. A witness for the State then was called to identify the firearm by serial number. She also identified Irvin as the person who had obtained the firearm from the store at which she worked. The record discloses the following sequence of testimony: Q. And what, if anything, happened at that time and place? A. It was about a quarter to six, six o'clock, and this gentleman came into the store and he wanted to know where we kept our guns, he wanted to take a look at a pistol. I showed him where we kept our pistols and  do you want me to go into detail? Q. Yes, please. A.O.K. And he said that he was a truck driver and he wanted to buy a pistol for his wife because he would be traveling a lot. So I showed him the pistols that we had and he asked he [sic] several questions about different ones of them, and this one in particular gun I showed it to him  took it out and showed it to him  and he looked it over and said that he thought maybe this was the particular one he would take, and he did. And he ran out the building and I went chasing after him and when he got in the alley I turned around and went back in the store. Q. When you say he took it, did you sell it to him? A. No. Q. Did he pay for it? A. No. MR. MAGEE [public defender]: Your Honor, may we approach the bench at this point? THE COURT: Yes. (The following proceedings had at the bench between the court, Mr. Carroll [county attorney] and the defendant, outside the hearing of the jury.) DEFENDANT: Move for a mistrial on the evidence of another crime. THE COURT: The motion for a mistrial will be denied. You will not pursue that, Mr. Carroll. MR. CARROLL [county attorney]: Your Honor, what we are doing in this instance, it ties into the same gun which they identified this defendant by the same gun that was found at the arrest. THE COURT: She may identify the gun, and if she believes it to be the same, without saying whether he stole it or not. You won't pursue that any further. MR. CARROLL: Yes, Your Honor. The State did not pursue further the circumstances under which the firearm was obtained. The situation was alluded to by Irvin in his cross-examination, however, when he asked the witness about the person that supposedly stole this gun, and went on to interrogate her as to whether that person ever had been convicted of stealing the gun. When Irvin presented his closing argument he again talked about the witness saying that he stole the pistol, and inquired of the jury rhetorically why he was not convicted of it if he stole it. The State made no attempt to exploit the testimony beyond the proposition that the firearm found in the premises searched had been obtained by Irvin in the manner in which the witness testified. The record from the previous trial discloses that there was an arrangement pursuant to which the prosecution agreed to and did not at that trial delve into the circumstances under which the firearm was obtained. At argument the appellant suggested that this approach was the product of a granting by the district judge of a motion in limine. The earlier order of the district judge, however, was premised upon the agreement of the State to so proceed. In this trial Irvin did not recall this arrangement to the court, and the prosecuting attorney who interrogated the witness in the second trial was a different person from the attorney who interrogated the witness at the prior trial. There is, therefore, no clear violation of an inhibition imposed by the court in the form of a prior restraint. Furthermore, the violation of any such agreement or order was not a basis for the objection made at the trial. It well may be that by emphasizing the matter himself Irvin could be charged with waiver of his claim of error. We conclude, however, that the matter need not be premised on that ground but instead adopt the recognized exception to the general rule that evidence of collateral offenses is error, which exception, in effect, states that such evidence is admissible to prove the identity of the defendant as the person who committed the crime with which he is charged. See Dorador v. State, Wyo., 520 P.2d 230 (1974); Valerio v. State, Wyo., 429 P.2d 317 (1967); State v. Lindsay, 77 Wyo. 410, 317 P.2d 506 (1957); State v. Mitchell, 112 Ariz. 592, 545 P.2d 49 (1976); Miles v. State, Okl.Crim., 554 P.2d 1200 (1976); Junior v. State, 89 Nev. 121, 507 P.2d 1037 (1973); State v. Aguirre, 84 N.M. 376, 503 P.2d 1154 (1972). We conclude that there has been shown no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to appoint substitute counsel or in refusing to grant Irvin a continuance when he elected on the morning of trial to represent himself. The evidence of collateral conduct was admissible under a recognized exception to the general rule. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.