Opinion ID: 3154164
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Neither of Teague’s exceptions applies.

Text: Petitioner contends, in the alternative, that Teague’s first exception—for substantive rules—applies.6 See Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 351 (“New substantive rules generally apply 5 “Constitutional law is not the exclusive province of the federal courts, and in the Teague analysis the reasonable views of state courts are entitled to consideration along with those of federal courts.” Caspari, 510 U.S. at 395. 6 The second exception applies to a “watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceedings.” Whorton, 549 U.S. at 417 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Petitioner does not argue that his proposed rule falls within that “extremely narrow” exception. Id. JONES V. DAVIS 27 retroactively.”). In particular, he argues that his proposed new rule is substantive because it would “prohibit imposition of a certain type of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status.” Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 241 (emphasis added). For example, the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a capital prisoner who is insane, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986), or intellectually disabled, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). Courts have held that those rules fall within the exception for substantive rules. E.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329–30 (1989), abrogated in other part by Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; Davis v. Norris, 423 F.3d 868, 879 (8th Cir. 2005). Petitioner does not assert that he fits into one of the traditionally recognized classes of persons whose “status” is an intrinsic quality, such as insanity or intellectual disability. Instead, Petitioner argues that he—and all California capital prisoners—belong to a class of persons with the “status as individuals whose sentence ‘has been quietly transformed’ from one of death to one of grave uncertainty and torture and one that ‘no rational jury or legislature could ever impose: life in prison, with the remote possibility of death.’” Pet’r’s Br. at 54 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1053). Petitioner’s expansive description of this exception finds no support in the cases. Nor is it supported by logic. Under Petitioner’s view, almost any procedural rule could be characterized as substantive merely by defining the petitioner as belonging to a class of persons with the “status” of those whose convictions or sentences were obtained through an unconstitutional procedural rule. We reject Petitioner’s unconventional interpretation of the exception for substantive rules. 28 JONES V. DAVIS