Opinion ID: 778214
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant Alderete-Monsivais's appeal

Text: 16 Alderete-Monsivais argues that pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b), the District Court was required to run his 60-month federal sentence concurrently with his previously discharged 19-month state sentence; consequently, he maintains that the District Court should have sentenced him to 41 months on his federal sentence. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) states: 17 If subsection (a) does not apply, and the undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from offense(s) that have been fully taken into account in the determination of the offense level for the instant offense, the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to his undischarged term of imprisonment. 18 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5G1.3(b) (2000) (emphases added). By its terms, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) only applies to a defendant serving an undischarged term of imprisonment at the time of his federal sentencing. United States v. Otto , 176 F.3d 416, 418 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Turnipseed , 159 F.3d 383, 386 (9th Cir.1998); United States v. Rizzo , 121 F.3d 794, 800 (1st Cir.1997); United States v. McHan , 101 F.3d 1027, 1040 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Brassell , 49 F.3d 274, 279 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Ogg , 992 F.2d 265, 266 (10th Cir.1993). Therefore, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 does not, as Alderete-Monsivais argues, require the District Court to run his 60-month federal sentence concurrently to his previously discharged 19-month state sentence. 19 Alderete-Monsivais argues that, even if the District Court could not run the sentences concurrently under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b), the discharged term of imprisonment provides a basis for the District Court to depart downward in sentencing him. United States v. O'Hagan , 139 F.3d 641, 657-58 (8th Cir.1998). A district court's departure decisions for sentencing purposes is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Koon v. United States , 518 U.S. 81, 98, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). Given Alderete-Monsivais's extensive criminal history, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to depart downward from his 60-month sentence. 20 Lastly, Alderete-Monsivais argues that U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) violates the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it mandates credit for undischarged sentences, but not for discharged sentences. We reject his argument. In the absence of a suspect classification based on race or other forbidden grounds, a legislative distinction, such as the distinction between a discharged and an undischarged sentence, requires only a rational basis to survive a challenge that the classification violates the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Otto , 176 F.3d 416, 418 (8th Cir.1999). The rational basis justifying a statute against an equal protection claim need not be stated in the statute or in its legislative history; it is sufficient that a court can conceive of a reasonable justification for the statutory distinction. Estate of Kunze v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue , 233 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir.2000) (citing McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago , 394 U.S. 802, 809, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969)). We find that there is a reasonable justification for U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)'s distinction between discharged and undischarged state sentences. That distinction ensures that if two defendants who are convicted of identical state law crimes are subsequently convicted on a federal charge for the same conduct that formed the factual basis of their state convictions, then those two defendants will serve an equal term of imprisonment upon their federal conviction, regardless of whether their state sentence had been fully discharged. If, as Alderete-Monsivais advocates, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) did not make this distinction and credited defendants for time served on discharged as well as undischarged state sentences, then a defendant with a previously discharged state sentence would serve a shorter term of imprisonment upon his subsequent federal conviction than would a defendant with an undischarged state sentence. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) serves to prevent this potential inequity. Because there is a rational basis for U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)'s distinction between discharged and undischarged state sentences, we reject Alderete-Monsivais's equal protection argument. 21 For these reasons, we conclude that the District Court correctly sentenced Alderete-Monsivais to 60 months in prison.