Opinion ID: 553323
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 44 At the outset we summarize the elements of a RICO conspiracy. 14 A RICO conspiracy requires proof of an agreement to violate a substantive RICO provision. Here the substantive provision charged was participation in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. 15 For our purposes the important concept here is the pattern, which in turn requires two predicate acts. 16 This Court has in many respects been in the forefront in the judicial interpretation of these RICO terms, and particularly the RICO conspiracy offense. 45 In the seminal case, United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 900-902 (5th Cir.1978), our predecessor circuit explained the then new concept of RICO conspiracy as enterprise conspiracy, and distinguished it from the traditional wheel and chain theories. The object of the RICO enterprise conspiracy was simply to participate in the affairs of the enterprise in the requisite manner. That the many defendants and predicate crimes were different, or even unrelated, was now irrelevant, so long as it could be reasonably inferred that each crime was intended to further the enterprise. Id. at 902. 46 In United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S.Ct. 2965, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354 (1982), an important point was made. Phillips held that under a RICO conspiracy no actual acts of racketeering need occur; there need only exist a conspiracy to perform the necessary acts.... Id. at 1038. 47 One of the most influential cases in RICO conspiracy law, and the keystone to analysis in this case was United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819, 105 S.Ct. 89, 83 L.Ed.2d 36 (1984). The Carter court, with an analysis and conclusion that has been widely followed in a number of circuits, 17 found that it is not necessary that the defendant agree to personally commit two predicate acts for the required pattern of racketeering activity. This rule was applicable when a defendant agreed to participate in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs with the object of violating a substantive RICO provision. Id. at 1531. In contrast though, if the defendant agreed to participate in a single objective conspiracy, the pattern requirement is met [o]nly by demonstrating that the defendant agreed to personally commit two or more predicate acts. Id. 48 Finally United States v. Valera, 845 F.2d 923 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1046, 109 S.Ct. 1953, 104 L.Ed.2d 422 (1989), offers guidance into how to determine that a defendant had agreed to participate in the affairs of the enterprise. The key is agreement on an overall objective, which can be proved by circumstantial evidence showing that 'each defendant must necessarily have known that others were also conspiring to participate in the same enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity'. Id. at 929, citing United States v. Manzella, 782 F.2d 533, 585 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1123, 106 S.Ct. 1991, 90 L.Ed.2d 672 (1986). 49 With this overview of RICO conspiracy in this Circuit, we turn to each of the appellants' sufficiency arguments regarding the pattern requirement.
50 Gonzalez argues that his conviction should be overturned because the pattern of racketeering activity has not been proved in his case. Gonzalez makes two claims with regard to the proof against him. First he contends that the evidence shows multiple conspiracies and that he was associated with the Herrera organization, not the LeQuire enterprise. This is allegedly shown by his role in investigating the theft of the Sylvania cocaine to be sure the LeQuire organization was not itself involved. Alternatively, he claims that the evidence proved he was involved in a single object conspiracy, concerning only the Sylvania importation and thus his personal participation in two racketeering acts must be shown. These arguments fail to consider important points made in the RICO conspiracy cases summarized above. 51 The notion of enterprise conspiracy described in Elliott has made much of the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to RICO conspiracy charges. 571 F.2d at 900. Agreement to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity brings a defendant within the conspiracy regardless of the unrelatedness of the acts of other members of the conspiracy. Gonzalez's claim that he was technically a member of the Herrera organization rather than LeQuire's enterprise fails to the extent that it relies upon the multiple conspiracy defense. 52 Further, Gonzalez's role in these events, even if categorized as Herrera's man, brings him squarely within LeQuire's enterprise. The Herrera organization was described as a regular customer of LeQuire's importation services, and evidence was introduced that the lost May 23 importation into Sylvania and a mid-July importation into Alabama were shipments designated for Herrera and/or Gonzalez. This organization, even as a customer, clearly participated in LeQuire's enterprise under this court's holding in Valera, 845 F.2d at 929. In Valera, we affirmed a defendant's conviction on almost similar facts, i.e., an individual utilizing the services of a drug importation ring, stating that mere 'customers' can indeed engage in a pattern of racketeering activity in furtherance of the affairs of the enterprise. Id. at 929 citing United States v. Manzella, 782 F.2d at 538 (Ruling a customer was participating in the affairs of the enterprise on similar facts). See also United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017, 105 S.Ct. 3476, 87 L.Ed.2d 613 (1985) (Best buyers'  close working relationship with drug ring brought them within RICO enterprise). 18 53 With these contentions of Gonzalez removed, the evidence presented to the jury was clearly sufficient to show his agreement on the overall objective of the LeQuire enterprise. Gonzalez is seen investigating the ripoff of the Sylvania May 23rd load; at the Holiday Inn during delivery of a mid-July load; doing debugging work for LeQuire; often at LeQuire's house over the course of the period in the indictment, and involved in escape preparations for LeQuire. Of these incidents, both the May 23rd importation and the mid-July importation are listed as predicate events. 19 This is evidence of more than an agreement to a single objective conspiracy and Gonzalez is hence not entitled to the Carter exception calling for proof of agreement to personally commit two predicate crimes.
54 Roundy's contentions are similar to those of Gonzalez. Appellant Roundy argues that the government proved at trial only his involvement with the May 23rd load into Sylvania, Georgia. Roundy maintains that the government's evidence at trial proved only his transportation of Newcomb and Johnson from Maine to Florida on August 1, and his introduction of them to Jerry LeQuire. Roundy thus argues that he has only been shown to have agreed to one predicate act, the August 3rd importation, and that therefore the requisite pattern is missing. As had Gonzalez, Roundy also makes the argument that this shows only an agreement to a single objective conspiracy, in this case, that of the August 3rd importation into Montgomery. Roundy alleges that his agreement to only a single objective conspiracy entitles him to the benefit of the Carter exception, and the government must therefore prove agreement to personally commit two predicate acts. As in Gonzalez's case above, Roundy's points must also fail. 55 The evidence concerning Roundy overwhelmingly indicates his agreement to participate in the affairs of the LeQuire enterprise through the requisite pattern of racketeering. Testimony given at trial proves the extent of Roundy's role in the organization. Roundy checked out Omar Mahdi as a pilot on behalf of LeQuire; he flew numerous smuggling flights to Colombia; he was seen constantly at both LeQuire's Fort Lauderdale home, and Maierhoffer's fixed base operation; he recruited Newcomb in Maine for LeQuire's enterprise (and, by reasonable inference, also recruited Sweeton, his nephew, and Johnson, a fellow pilot) and he transported Newcomb and Johnson to Florida and introduced them to LeQuire just prior to the August 3rd importation. A reccurring phrase in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses is that Roundy worked for LeQuire at Maierhoffer's. 20 This degree of involvement was clearly sufficient for the jury to infer Roundy's agreement to the numerous activities of the enterprise. His transporting of Newcomb and Johnson from Maine to Florida, his introduction of them to LeQuire and Lee Curry just prior to the August 3rd flight into Montgomery provide proof of his agreement to at least three predicate crimes: the August 3rd importation violation; his own August 1st Travel Act violation, and Curry's August 1st Travel Act violation in connection with the same importation.
56 Sweeton's case presents more difficulty than does Gonzalez's or Roundy's. Sweeton also argues that RICO's pattern element has not been proven by the government. He alleges that the prosecution has linked him, by means of Sweeton's wallet being found at the scene of the Sylvania ripoff and other testimony concerning the shooting, to only that incident. Sweeton contends that no other evidence has been offered sufficient to show his involvement or agreement to other acts, particularly predicate crimes, committed by the LeQuire group. Sweeton presents his agreement, if any, as one to join a single objective conspiracy and thus within the Carter exception. Sweeton further challenges the government's level of proof regarding the second of the predicate acts he was specifically charged with; that of travelling from Florida to Georgia in connection with the Sylvania importation. Sweeton argues that the only proof put in evidence regarding his travel, a government agent's testimony that four people got off a Lear Jet rented by LeQuire which flew from Florida to Georgia on the day of the Sylvania unloading, is insufficient to support a Travel Act violation. 57 We agree with Sweeton's characterization that he was involved in a single objective conspiracy as defined in Carter. If the Carter language and holding is to mean anything, it must apply in a case of this sort. It may be in fact true that Sweeton knew of, and agreed to, a conspiracy with an overall objective of violating RICO, i.e., the LeQuire enterprise's entire drug smuggling activities. However, it simply cannot be said that the government has proven such a wide agreement as this. The government's evidence shows only a more limited agreement on Sweeton's part. Its evidence, that of Sweeton's wallet at the site of the shooting, his story to the GBI agent regarding the shooting, while in the hospital, and the testimony of other conspirators that they had heard of Sweeton being shot, is accurately characterized by Sweeton's brief: He is not heard of prior to his appearance in Georgia on May 23, 1983 and, once he is shot and almost killed on May 23, Sweeton is neither seen nor heard about again. (Sweeton Brief at 48). Equally important as what the government did prove through its witnesses, is what it was unable to prove. In response to the prosecutor's own questions, no witness could remember seeing Sweeton, or hearing of his name, prior to the news that something had gone wrong at Sylvania. In contrast to the other defendants, he is not seen, or known of, at or around LeQuire's home or Maierhoffer's fixed base operation. A defendant must be convicted on the basis of his own proven conduct, association is not enough. RICO does not punish mere association with conspirators or knowledge of illegal activity; its proscriptions are directed against conduct, not status. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 903. The government has simply not presented sufficient evidence concerning Sweeton's agreement to the overall conspiracy. It is not enough, as the government seeks to do, to argue that LeQuire closely ran his own operations and that, thus anyone involved in one importation would hear of, know of, and hence have agreed to the enterprise's other activities. 21 In Sweeton's case, evidence to support this sort of theory is simply lacking. 58 Given that the government has not proven an agreement to join a conspiracy with an overall RICO objective, we must analyze Sweeton's case under the single objective conspiracy rule of Carter: proof of agreement to personally commit two predicate acts is needed. Because we find that the government has satisfactorily met this standard by proving Sweeton's personal participation in two predicate crimes, we nevertheless find that Sweeton's conviction is supported by sufficient evidence to meet the pattern requirement. 22 As noted above, Sweeton has conceded that the evidence is adequate to show his agreement to one predicate offense: the May 23rd importation at Sylvania. The other predicate act charged to Sweeton is his travel from Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to Savannah, Georgia, on May 23rd to participate in the Sylvania importation. Sweeton argues that the government's proof of this act is insufficient to prove his commission of the predicate act of traveling. The government relies upon the testimony of DEA Agent Parks as to the fact that six individuals got on a Lear jet rented by LeQuire in Fort Lauderdale the day of May 23rd and four got off in Savannah, Georgia. We find, however, that the whole of the evidence will support charging Sweeton with a Travel Act violation under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1952. 59 In weighing the evidence, we begin by remarking that by appellant Sweeton's own admission he traveled in interstate commerce prior to the Sylvania load. Sweeton's story in the hospital to GBI Agent Stone was that he had come from Fort Lauderdale the day before. The jury could properly conclude that Sweeton was telling the truth to Agent Stone when he said he traveled from Florida to Georgia, even if it did not believe the rest of his story as to why he was at the Plantation Park Airport. Even assuming, arguendo, that Sweeton may have had other, not unlawful, reasons for his travel, for Sec. 1952 the evidence need only show that the unlawful purpose was one of the purposes of travel, not necessarily the sole or dominant purpose. United States v. Schultz, 855 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir.1988). Furthermore, Agent Park's testimony regarding the Lear jet flight and its passengers is useful to prove travel, despite that fact that the exact identities of the passengers is not known. Evidence in quality similar to this was sufficient for a Travel Act conviction in United States v. Puntillo, 440 F.2d 540 (7th Cir.1971), where the fact that defendant was seen in Chicago driving an automobile with Wisconsin license plates and that he lived in Wisconsin was enough to infer travel in or about the time of the indictment. Id. See also United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847, 106 S.Ct. 139, 88 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (Travel properly inferred where facts showed barrels containing contraband chemical were found in Nevada, plant producing this chemical did business only in California, and a truck bearing imprints of barrels could be traced to defendant.). 60 The evidence is clear in this case that Sweeton was a member of the load crew and that a Lear jet was apparently used to transport some or all of the load crew members from Florida to Georgia. In total, and particularly in light of Sweeton's own admission of travel, there is sufficient evidence to show his personal participation in two predicate acts necessary to fulfill the pattern requirement.