Opinion ID: 1636806
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Prosecutorial Comment During Closing Arguments

Text: The Appellant argues that the trial court erred by overruling defense counsel's objection to the prosecution's statement during closing argument that the Appellant's foot was the same size as shoe prints left at the scene. Specifically, the Appellant contends that the comment was prejudicial because the prosecutor's comments constituted a misstatement of the evidence on a crucial matter. Closing arguments are an important tool for the parties during the trial process. Consequently, the attorneys are usually given wide latitude in the scope of their arguments, see State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 809 (Tenn.1994), and trial judges, in turn, are accorded wide discretion in their control of those arguments, see State v. Zirkle, 910 S.W.2d 874, 888 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995). Notwithstanding such, arguments must be temperate, based upon the evidence introduced at trial, relevant to the issues being tried, and not otherwise improper under the facts or law. Coker v. State, 911 S.W.2d 357, 368 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995). To justify a reversal on the ground of improper argument of counsel, it must affirmatively appear that the improper conduct affected the verdict to the prejudice of the defendant. Harrington v. State, 215 Tenn. 338, 385 S.W.2d 758, 759 (1965); State v. McBee, 644 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tenn.Crim.App.1982). Furthermore, the following factors must be considered by this court in making such a determination: 1) the conduct complained of, viewed in light of the facts and circumstances of the case; 2) the curative measures undertaken by the court and the prosecutor; 3) the intent of the prosecutor in making the improper statement; 4) the cumulative effect of the improper conduct and any other errors in the record; and 5) the relative strength or weakness of the case. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d at 809; State v. Buck, 670 S.W.2d 600, 609 (Tenn.1984). In the present case, Agent Littlejohn testified that the unidentified shoe print found at the crime scene was within the range of the length of shoes seized from the Appellant's residence. She also testified that it is common for the same shoe sizes to vary in length based upon the brand name and manufacturer of the shoe. Accordingly, Agent Littlejohn declined to specifically identify the shoe print as being a particular size. Because the shoes taken from the Appellant's apartment ranged in length from 11 and 13/16 inches to 12 and ½ inches, Agent Littlejohn testified that she had no doubt that the shoe print found at the scene, which measured 12 and 3/8 inches in length, fell within the range of length of shoes taken from the Appellant's apartment. Thus, the Appellant could not be excluded from having left the print. During closing arguments of the guilt/innocence phase, the prosecution made the following three comments with respect to the Appellant's shoe size: More than likely, it was the killer, and could that print have excluded [the Appellant] if it [sic] was the killer? Of course, if it was a size 7 or a size 8 or a size 9, but it fit in the size of the shoe [the Appellant] wears.    The footprint could have excluded him. The same size of [the Appellant].    Who has a footprint the same size as the one left at the crime scene? [The Appellant]. (Emphasis added). The Appellant argues the above comments made by the prosecution were prejudicial and misrepresented the proof. We disagree. The prosecutor never referred to the unidentified shoe print as being a particular size. While it might have been more preferable for the prosecution to use the terminology within range of length of [the Appellant's] shoes instead of same size, it is clear from the record before us that the prosecution was simply referring to Agent Littlejohn's testimony where she explained that the crime scene shoe print fell within the range of shoes seized from the Appellant. As the trial court correctly noted, the State did nothing more than argue its position that, because the length of the unknown print was not inconsistent with the length of the [Appellant's] shoes, the [Appellant] could not be excluded as the perpetrator. Moreover, we note that the trial court also cautioned the jury that Statements, arguments, and remarks of counsel are intended to help you in understanding the evidence and applying the law, but they are not evidence. If any statements were made that you believe are not supported by the evidence, you should disregard them. As such, we find no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, nor do we find error which prejudiced the Appellant. Thus, this issue is without merit.