Opinion ID: 1780646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: A party is entitled to a summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Ala. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). This Court reviews a summary judgment de novo, subject to the caveat that it must review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve any reasonable doubts against the moving party. University of South Alabama v. Progressive Ins. Co., 904 So.2d 1242, 1246 (Ala. 2004); Southeast Cancer Network, P.C. v. DCH Healthcare Authority, Inc., 869 So.2d 452, 456 (Ala.2003). The moving party has the burden of making a prima facie showing that the movant is entitled to a summary judgment. American Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Underwood, 886 So.2d 807, 811 (Ala.2004). If the movant satisfies this burden of production, the nonmovant then bears the burden of producing substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. 886 So.2d at 811. `Substantial evidence' is `evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.' Hess v. Market Inv. Co., 917 So.2d 140, 142 (Ala. 2005) (quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989)).
In this action, ECO contends that the Commission acted improperly in denying the second permit. To determine whether the summary judgment for the Commission was appropriate, we must first define the standard applicable to a court's review of a county commission's discretionary decision when, as here, the county commission acts to grant or to deny a permit to use a right-of-way. ECO argues that the relevant inquiry is whether the Commission's decision to deny the permit was arbitrary or capricious. [7] We agree. Our cases have consistently held that local governments may not arbitrarily exercise their discretionary powers, including the power to grant or to deny a permit to use a right-of-way. In Mobile County v. City of Saraland, 501 So.2d 438 (Ala. 1987), we issued a writ of mandamus to compel a city council to grant such a permit to Mobile County. We based that decision on our conclusion that the city's denial of the permit was arbitrary and capricious. 501 So.2d at 440. A county commission is subject to the same standard. See Etowah County Comm'n v. Hayes, 569 So.2d 397, 398 (Ala.1990)(judicial review of county commission's decisions extends to conduct so arbitrary or capricious as to contravene lawfully constituted authority); Black v. Pike County Comm'n, 375 So.2d 255 (Ala.1979)(analyzing denial of liquor license under arbitrary-or-capricious standard). [8] Although our cases have not always used the words arbitrary or capricious, we have consistently applied that standard in practice when reviewing a county's decision to grant or deny a license or permit. [9]