Opinion ID: 1685227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Waiver of Right to Object to Closed Session

Text: Wasikowski attended the Board's November 25, 1996, meeting and did not object to its convening a closed session; the district court concluded that her failure to object waived her ability to do so at a later date. This court has stated that any person who has notice of a meeting and attends the meeting must object specifically to the lack of public notice at the meeting, or that person will be held to have waived the right to object on that ground at a later date. See, Otey v. State, 240 Neb. 813, 485 N.W.2d 153 (1992); Witt v. School District No. 70, 202 Neb. 63, 273 N.W.2d 669 (1979). A timely objection will permit the public body to remedy its mistake promptly and defer formal action until the required public notice can be given. Id. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 84-1414(3) (Reissue 1999) states that [a]ny citizen of this state may commence a suit ... for the purpose of requiring compliance with or preventing violations of [the public meetings laws], for the purpose of declaring an action of a public body void.... In Otey, supra, and Witt, supra, this court considered a lack of sufficient public notice pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 84-1411 (Cum. Supp.1998); the present case deals with objection to a closed session under Neb. Rev.Stat. § 84-1410 (Reissue 1999). Both sufficient notice and closed sessions, however, relate to § 84-1414, under which citizens may commence lawsuits regarding compliance with or violations of the public meetings laws. Thus, despite the difference in grounds for objection, the logic in Otey, supra, and Witt, supra, applies equally to this case: If a person present at a meeting observes an alleged public meetings laws violation in the form of an improper closed session and fails to object, that person waives his or her right to object at a later date. Contrary to the district court's conclusion, however, Wasikowski's failure to object should not be imputed to the other plaintiffs in this caseto do so would eviscerate the language of § 84-1414, in that [a]ny citizen of this state may commence a suit for public meetings laws violations. The public interest mentioned in § 84-1410 is that shared by citizens in general and by the community at large concerning pecuniary or legal rights and liabilities. Grein v. Board of Education, 216 Neb. 158, 343 N.W.2d 718 (1984). If we were to conclude that Wasikowski's failure to object at the meeting waived the right of the other plaintiffs to object, the unintended result would be that Wasikowski's failure to object waived the right of all potential plaintiffs to do so. The statute does not support that result. In the absence of anything to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Haber v. V & R Joint Venture, 263 Neb. 529, 641 N.W.2d 31 (2002). Additionally, public meetings laws are broadly construed so as to obtain the objective of openness in favor of the public. See Rauert v. School Dist. 1-R of Hall Cty., 251 Neb. 135, 555 N.W.2d 763 (1996). Thus, although Wasikowski may have waived her individual right to object to the closed session, the other plaintiffs' rights to object are intact. The district court erred in concluding otherwise.