Opinion ID: 1191215
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the propriety of the special interrogatories

Text: Although Holiday Inns alleges that it objected to the proposed interrogatories in chambers because of their compound and legal nature, it waived any objections at trial when counsel stated: I have no objection to the interrogatories in their present form, Your Honor. Civil Rule 51 (a) provides in part: No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury, by excusing the jury or hearing objections in chambers. [5] This court has consistently held that the purpose of Rule 51(a) is to give the trial judge the opportunity to correct any errors in the instructions. Thus, we have refused to review such alleged errors where there was no specific objection at trial. [6] However, we have also recognized that if the alleged error is plain error that is likely to result in a miscarriage of justice, we will consider such error even though not raised below. [7] We do not consider this to be an appropriate case to apply the plain error rule. First, there is a distinct difference between failing to make a formal objection as occurred in Malvo v. J.C. Penney and affirmatively stating that there is no objection to the instruction. An affirmative waiver is more likely to mislead the trial judge. Second, we find that the interrogatories, if erroneous, did not result in a miscarriage of justice. With regard to the compound nature of the interrogatories, although it is true that a judge who tries a case without a jury must make findings of fact that specifically support his conclusions of law, [8] there is no comparable rule with respect to juries. Rather, Civil Rule 49(c) [9] merely allows a judge to submit written interrogatories to the jury and provides that when the answers to the interrogatories are harmonious with the general verdict, the court shall direct the entry of the appropriate judgment. It is only when the answers to the interrogatories are inconsistent with each other or with the general verdict that the verdict may be set aside and a new trial ordered. The interrogatories asked whether Peck knew of the May 1, 1968 deadline and was bound by it and, similarly, whether he knew of and was bound by the extension of the deadline to July 1, 1968. Both interrogatories having been answered in the negative, they are subject to the same construction. The questions were phrased in the conjunctive, so that a negative answer could indicate either an absence of knowledge of the respective deadlines or that Peck was not bound by them. Since Peck would have been entitled to recover in either event, the answers are harmonious with the general verdict. Holiday Inns argues that it was reversible error for the court to suggest to the jury that they make the legal determination that Peck was not bound by the deadline or extension thereof; but the real issue as to whether Peck was bound by the deadline was whether there was an alteration of the contract by Holiday Inns after Peck signed it. The trial judge told the jury: You are instructed that any material alteration of a written instrument after the execution thereof, by one having a beneficial interest therein, without the consent of the other party or parties, renders such alteration void as between such nonconsenting party or parties and the person responsible for the alteration or those claiming under him. Rather than being asked to make a general legal conclusion as to whether Peck was bound by the purported deadline if he knew of it, the jury was accordingly given specific guidance as to how the alteration issue would affect the deadline. Thus, while it appears at first blush that the bound by clause called for a legal conclusion, the presence of the instruction indicates that the jury was simply being asked to determine whether factual circumstances (material alteration) existed which would release Peck from the purported deadline. In view of the instruction given, the jury could have determined that Peck knew of the deadline after the alteration had been made without his authority, but that he was not bound by it. In any event, the submission of an interrogatory of a legal nature does not create a miscarriage of justice so as to invoke the plain error rule. It is only where an erroneous instruction creates a high likelihood that the jury followed an erroneous theory resulting in a miscarriage of justice that we would apply the plain error rule in a civil suit. [10] Holiday Inns merely asserts that the legal nature of the interrogatories might have suggested to the jury that they could, for reasons of their own, find that Peck was not bound by the construction commencement deadline; that is, we are in effect asked to speculate that the jury might have adopted some erroneous theory despite the clear guideline provided by the trial court's instruction as to the requisite facts which would excuse performance before the alleged deadline. Whatever might be the merits of this argument, this is not a situation where it is highly likely that the alleged error led the jury astray, and we therefore refuse to find that the submission of the interrogatories constituted plain error. [11]