Opinion ID: 1159233
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: rental value

Text: Wife argues that the district court erred in failing to assess any interest or rental value against husband in the district court's division and award of the Corrales residence because husband had control of and lived in the community residence during the eighteen months between the date of the divorce and the entry of the judgment. We agree. The parties were divorced on December 31, 1979. The district court, however, did not issue its final judgment dividing the community assets until June 26, 1981. The district court did not order husband to pay any amount to wife for a return on her interest in the property. Husband asserts that we should be bound by Williams v. Sinclair Refining Co., 39 N.M. 388, 47 P.2d 910 (1935), because wife presented no evidence of ouster by husband. In Williams v. Sinclair Refining Co., supra at 392, 47 P.2d at 912 (quoting Hamby v. Wall, 48 Ark. 135, 2 S.W. 705, 706 (1887)), we stated: [I]t is a well-settled principle of the common law that the mere occupation by a tenant of the entire estate does not render him liable to his co-tenant for the use and occupation of any part of the common property. The reason is easily found. The right of each to occupy the premises is one of the incidents of a tenancy in common. Neither tenant can lawfully exclude the other. The occupation of one, so long as he does not exclude the other, is but the exercise of a legal right. If, for any reason, one does not choose to assert the right of common enjoyment, the other is not obliged to stay out; and if the sole occupation of one could render him liable therefor to the other, his legal right to the occupation would be dependent upon the caprice or indolence of his co-tenant, and this the law would not tolerate. (Citations omitted.) [Emphasis added.] While we continue to recognize this principle, we nevertheless find that if one of the parties in a divorce case remains in possession of the community residence between the date of the divorce and the date of the final judgment dividing the community assets, then there may be a form of constructive ouster, exclusion, or an equivalent act which is created as to the right of common enjoyment by the divorced spouse not in possession. See § 42-4-8, N.M.S.A. 1978. This exclusion may render the divorced spouse in possession of the community residence liable to the divorced spouse not in possession for the use and occupation of the residence between the date of the divorce and the date of the final judgment. See § 42-4-9, N.M.S.A. 1978. To hold otherwise would mean that both divorced spouses should have continued to live with each other during the eighteen month interim or that both should have abandoned the property. It would also mean that wife may be deprived of a fair return on her community interest in the property. Therefore, on remand the district court shall determine if there was a constructive ouster or exclusion, and if so, the district court shall determine a fair return to wife for her one-half interest in the residence, considering the fair rental value of the property for the time between the divorce and the award of her interest in the property, as well as the payments made and the husband's separate property lien against the property.