Opinion ID: 418010
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Texas' Wrong Court Tolling Statute

Text: 16 Griffen's broadest argument is that the entire claim is saved from the statute of limitations by Texas' wrong court tolling statute. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5539a (Vernon 1958) provides: 17 Limitations on dismissal for want of jurisdiction and refiling action in proper court 18 When an action shall be dismissed in any way, or a judgment therein shall be set aside or annulled in a direct proceeding, because of a want of jurisdiction of the Trial Court in which such action shall have been filed, and within sixty (60) days after such dismissal or other disposition becomes final, such action shall be commenced in a Court of Proper Jurisdiction, the period between the date of first filing and that of commencement in the second Court shall not be counted as a part of the period of limitation unless the opposite party shall in abatement show the first filing to have been in intentional disregard of jurisdiction. 19 Griffen's argument is that the action in state district court was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The present claim was filed in federal court within sixty days. Thus, the statute applies by its literal terms. 20 Big Spring makes two arguments in response. First, it argues that the state district court was not a court of improper jurisdiction. It was the right court, but the appeal was pursued in the wrong manner. Second, Big Spring argues that the proceeding in federal court under the civil rights statutes is a different cause of action from review of a state administrative action in a state court. We shall first note a few general points about the saving statute and then address Big Spring's two arguments. 21 1. Art. 5539a.--Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980), instructs us to apply state law as to tolling. This includes not only state statutes, but also state construction of state statutes. Thus, in interpreting article 5539a, we are guided by state construction. 22 Two general issues are relevant before proceeding to the merits of Big Spring's two arguments. First, we should consider whether the policies of the statute of limitations would be served by applying it to this case. In a recent Fifth Circuit case deciding whether article 5539a would apply when the first suit was in a court of a different state, the court stated: 23 Finally, we note that Dicker's suggested rule would not further the policies that ordinarily provide justification for the results otherwise created by statutes of limitations: 24 Statutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants. Such statutes promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitations and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them. 25 Burnett v. New York Central Railroad Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428, 85 S.Ct. 1050, 1054, 13 L.Ed.2d 941 (1965). It will virtually always be the case, as here, that a defendant who seeks a dismissal based on want of jurisdiction will have actual notice that the plaintiff intends to pursue a claim against him; given the extremely high probability that the plaintiff will refile in a proper court if the defendant is successful in obtaining the dismissal in the forum of the plaintiff's choice, the defendant has no one but himself to blame if evidence is lost, memories fade, and witnesses disappear. 26 Long Island Trust Co. v. Dicker, 659 F.2d 641, 647 (5th Cir.1981). Big Spring had ample actual notice that Griffen intended to pursue his claim, and like the court in Long Island we see no purpose of the statute of limitations that will be served by its application here. 27 The second general point has to do with the nature of article 5539a. Articles 5539a and 5539b, allowing for amending pleadings, are remedial, designed to protect a litigant from loss of his cause of action by a plea of limitation under circumstances under which that would otherwise occur. They should be liberally construed and applied to effect that purpose. Republic National Bank v. Rogers, 575 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex.Civ.App.--Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). It is manifest that the Act is remedial in its every essence. It should therefore be given a liberal construction with a view of effectuating its manifest objective--relief from penalty of limitation bar to one who has mistakenly brought his action 'in the wrong court.'  Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 186 S.W.2d 306, 310 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1944, no writ). 28 Thus, in considering the arguments regarding the statute of limitations, we must keep in mind that we are deciding a case in which application of the statute of limitations would serve no purpose other than allowing Big Spring to escape trial, and that we are construing a remedial statute designed to be liberally applied. 29 2. Wrong Court? --Big Spring's first argument is that the dismissal for want of jurisdiction in the state district court is not the kind of jurisdictional dismissal article 5539a was intended to cover. Instead, Big Spring claims, article 5539a was designed to reach only a wrong court sort of lack of jurisdiction. Big Spring argues that the district court in Travis County was the right court, but the appeal was taken in the wrong manner, so article 5539a should not apply. 30 We are not persuaded. First, the statute by its very terms applies: When an action shall be dismissed in any way ... because of a want of jurisdiction .... Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5539a (Vernon 1958) (emphasis added). The state district court plainly stated [t]his Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the claim of the Petitioner, James E. Griffen. Record at 15. Typically, a statute may be stretched a little bit beyond its literal terms to effectuate its policies. Here Big Spring asks us to constrict a remedial statute designed to be liberally construed, to narrow its scope in spite of its literal terms, when to do so would frustrate its purpose and would not promote the purposes of the statute of limitations. We are reluctant to do so. 31 Big Spring appears to rely on the language quoted above from Burford to support a theory that article 5539a applies only to some kind of intrinsic lack of jurisdiction making a court a wrong court. Burford itself negates that narrow reading. Burford involved review of a decision by the Texas Railroad Commission. The plaintiffs had initially pressed their claim in federal court on both state and fourteenth amendment grounds. The Supreme Court held, however, that the existence of substantial state administrative remedies suggested that the federal courts should stay the exercise of their equitable jurisdiction. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943). After dismissal in the federal courts the plaintiffs pressed their claim in the state courts. The defendants raised the statute of limitations and the plaintiffs responded that article 5539a tolled the statute. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals agreed. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 186 S.W.2d 306 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1944, no writ). 32 Burford, as the source of the wrong court phrase relied upon by Big Spring, can give us some insight into what was meant by the phrase. Burford points out, id. at 310, that the phrase originates in the caption of the article as it was enacted: An Act to extend the period of limitation because of filing of any action in the wrong Court, unless opposite party shows intentional disregard of jurisdiction; and declaring an emergency. The text of the article does not mention wrong court. It speaks of a want of jurisdiction. Thus, the legislature appears to have thought the wrong court was one that wanted jurisdiction. 33 The Burford court was primarily struggling with the question whether a discretionary dismissal by a federal court that clearly has subject matter jurisdiction would count as a dismissal for want of jurisdiction under article 5539a: 34 And we think clearly the judgment of the Supreme Court was tantamount to a dismissal because of a want of jurisdiction within the meaning of Art. 5539a. The word jurisdiction is used in the sense of venue, even in cases where venue is not fundamentally jurisdictional and is subject to waiver. A dismissal on the ground of improper venue (before our present statutes governing transfer of such cases) would be for want of jurisdiction. The dismissal in the Sun case [Burford in the Supreme Court] was clearly because the action was not brought in a proper court. Art. 5539a was clearly designed to apply to such dismissal. To hold otherwise would give controlling effect to form and not to substance. The appellees brought their suit in the Federal Court. It was dismissed because the State courts were the proper courts or courts of proper jurisdiction in which to bring the suit. Manifestly the dismissal was because the Federal Court was a wrong court, an improper court, and therefore in effect a court of improper jurisdiction. 35 Id. at 315. 36 The use of the wrong court language in Burford was for a very different purpose from that urged by Big Spring. The court in Burford certainly saw the key statutory test as whether the first court was a court of improper jurisdiction. In Burford the problem was whether the statutory language would be stretched to cover a court of proper jurisdiction that chose not to exercise that jurisdiction because an alternate forum was preferable. In other words, Burford was concerned with whether a wrong court could count as an article 5539a court of improper jurisdiction. 37 We have no question that the dismissal of Griffen's case by the state court was for want of jurisdiction. But Big Spring attempts to turn Burford topsy-turvy and have us read want of jurisdiction as some narrower kind of euphemism for wrong court. We will not employ such an unnatural construction, especially when wrong court was so clearly used to mean a court of improper jurisdiction. Rather, we hold that a dismissal specifically denoted a dismissal for want of jurisdiction is in fact a dismissal for want of jurisdiction within the meaning of article 5539a. 38 3. Same Action? --Big Spring's second argument against the applicability of article 5539a is that article 5539a applies only when an action is dismissed for want of jurisdiction and such action is filed in a court of proper jurisdiction. Although Big Spring took precisely the opposite position before the district court to support its res judicata argument, 2 before this Court Big Spring argues that the action in state court was for review of a state administrative decision, whereas the action in federal court was for violation of federal civil rights statutes. We believe that this argument would give controlling effect to form and not to substance, Burford, 186 S.W.2d at 315, and we reject it. 39 The essence of both actions was that Griffen claimed he had been dismissed for racially discriminatory motives in violation of his right to be free from racial discrimination. The opinion of the hearing officer and the decision of the Texas Commissioner of Education specifically cited Griffen's constitutional right to be free from discrimination. In both state and federal courts the relief Griffen requested was reinstatement and back pay. The substance of the two actions is certainly the same. The sole difference between them--one involved review of the claim by a state administrative agency and one involved review of the claim under federal civil rights statutes--is nothing more than a difference in form. The underlying cause of action is the same. We will not adopt Big Spring's reading of a remedial statute intended to be liberally construed when the result would be to elevate form over substance. 40 The Texas case most on point supports our view of article 5539a. Republic National Bank v. Rogers, 575 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.Civ.App.--Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.), involved a dispute over whether land had been adversely possessed. The suit was initially filed in federal court in diversity, and the owner of record initially requested money damages for the trespass and injunctive relief granting title. The injunctive aspect of the suit required joinder of a party that would destroy diversity, so the complaint was amended to delete that claim. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the resulting monetary claims were below the federal court's jurisdictional amount; consequently, the suit was dismissed. The plaintiffs then brought a suit to try title in state court. The defendants argued that the suit to try title was a different action from the suit for damages for trespass in the federal court. The state court rejected the defendant's argument: 41 Defendant argues that because plaintiff dropped the issue of title from its pleadings in the Federal Court, and because that issue was not before the Court when the case was dismissed, it was effectively abandoned and not brought forward in the case at bar under the provisions of Article 5539a. Defendant emphasizes the words such action dismissed in the statute. We reject that argument. Under the statute, the case before us is a continuation of the suit originally filed in Federal Court. The action brought forward was the one pleaded there, and any permissible amendments to it under Article 5539b. As we have previously stated, the pleadings in Federal Court contained all the allegations necessary to try title to the property simply by tacking on a prayer for that relief. 42 Id. at 647. 43 In the instant case Griffen does not even need to tack on a prayer for different relief, because the relief requested was the same in both cases. The pleadings in the state proceedings contain all of the allegations necessary to establish a violation of the federal civil rights statutes. The relief requested is the same. We refuse to read article 5539a as holding that actions are not the same merely because the same facts can support the same relief for violation of the same rights under two different enforcement schemes. 44 In summary, we hold that a dismissal for failure to satisfy a jurisdictional prerequisite for judicial review of an administrative decision is a dismissal for want of jurisdiction within article 5539a. Furthermore, a federal section 1983 action to vindicate the same rights underlying the claim for review of the administrative decision constitutes the same action as review of the administrative decision for purposes of article 5539a. Thus, Griffen's claim is not barred by the statute of limitations because article 5539a tolled the statute.