Opinion ID: 1813007
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hearsay Testimony of Victim's Telephone Call

Text: Hudson first argues that the trial court erred in allowing Peller's friend, Robert Pritchard, to testify about the telephone call he received from Peller on the night of the murder. Pritchard, a married man with children, testified that he had known Peller for about four years and had worked with him at a Midas shop until sometime in August 2001. Pritchard was an assistant manager there and Peller had helped him manage the office. Although they no longer worked together, they had remained in contact by telephone and Peller would visit him at the Midas shop a few times a month. Pritchard testified that he last spoke to Peller by telephone on the night Peller was shot at about 7 p.m. or 7:30 p.m., when Peller called Pritchard on his cell phone at home. Pritchard could see by caller ID that it was Peller and, because he had known Peller for four years, recognized his voice. Although Peller sounded calm, he told Pritchard that he needed a gun because someone was there to kill him. Peller was trying to tell [him] who was in the room without saying any names and would only say that it was the same person Peller had called Pritchard about some weeks earlier, asking how to bond someone out of jail. [6] Peller also explained to Pritchard that the problem arose because he was underselling a drug dealer. In the background, Pritchard could hear something that sounded like a bathroom vent fan running during their conversation. When Peller said the man was there to kill him, Pritchard told him to call the police but Peller responded, he's not going to because it's a friend and that everything would be okay. Pritchard did not call the police. We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Williams v. State, 967 So.2d 735, 747-48 (Fla.2007), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1709, 170 L.Ed.2d 519 (2008); Johnston v. State, 863 So.2d 271, 278 (Fla.2003). That discretion, however, is limited by the rules of evidence. Johnston, 863 So.2d at 278. The State contends on appeal, as it did below, that Peller's statements made during the telephone call to Pritchard qualified as either spontaneous statements or excited utterances under section 90.803, Florida Statutes (2004). The trial court admitted the testimony without indicating on which evidentiary basis. Section 90.803(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (2004), sets forth the two pertinent exceptions to the rule prohibiting hearsay evidence: (1) SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT.A spontaneous statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter, except when such statement is made under circumstances that indicate its lack of trustworthiness. (2) EXCITED UTTERANCE.A statement or excited utterance relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. The excited utterance exception contained in section 90.803(2) requires that the statement or excited utterance relate to a startling event or condition and be made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. We have explained that to qualify as an excited utterance, the statement must be made: (1) regarding an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement; (2) before there was time to contrive or misrepresent; and (3) while the person was under the stress or excitement caused by the event. Henyard v. State, 689 So.2d 239, 251 (Fla.1996). This Court has observed that [i]f the statement occurs while the exciting event is still in progress, courts have little difficulty finding that the excitement prompted the statement. State v. Jano, 524 So.2d 660, 662 (Fla. 1988) (quoting Edward W. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 297 at 856 (3d ed.1984)). While an excited utterance need not be contemporaneous to the event, it must be made while the declarant is under the stress of the startling event and without time for reflection. Hutchinson v. State, 882 So.2d 943, 951 (Fla.2004); see also Rogers v. State, 660 So.2d 237, 240 (Fla.1995). Time for reflective thought is significant because it also provides time to contrive or misrepresent. See Evans v. State, 838 So.2d 1090, 1093 (Fla.2002) (citing Stoll v. State, 762 So.2d 870, 873 (Fla. 2000)). This is well illustrated in Hutchinson, in which we found that statements made by the victim in a telephone conversation to a friend some undetermined period of time after she had a heated argument with the defendant did not qualify as an excited utterance. 882 So.2d at 951-52. We explained, [W]e can only speculate as to whether [the victim] engaged in reflective thought. However, this was a long enough time interval to permit reflective thought. Id. at 951. Similarly, in Mariano v. State, 933 So.2d 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), the declarant, sounding hysterical, called the witness some thirty to ninety minutes after the declarant and the defendant argued in a car, and related the evening's events including the defendant's attempt to stab the declarant and his threat to run her down. Id. at 116-17. The court refused to admit the statement as an excited utterance because the statement took the form of a narrative of the events, which in and of itself indicates that the victim is reflecting upon the events of the evening. Id. at 117. The [f]actors that the trial judge can consider in determining whether the necessary state of stress or excitement is present are the age of the declarant, the physical and mental condition of the declarant, the characteristics of the event and the subject matter of the statements. Williams, 967 So.2d at 748 (alteration in original) (quoting Jano, 524 So.2d at 661). The circumstances in this case are distinguishable from those seen in Hutchinson and Mariano, and more comparable to those found in Viglione v. State, 861 So.2d 511 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). In Viglione, the Fifth District held that telephone calls the victim made to several witnesses while he was kidnapped and was forced to try to get money to pay for his release were admissible as either a spontaneous statement or an excited utterance. Id. at 513. A review of the circumstances surrounding Peller's call to Pritchard in this case demonstrates that Peller's statements meet the requirements for the excited utterance exception. The fact that he called Pritchard and said he needed a gun was a direct reaction to the presence of a gunman who announced he was there to murder Peller. The presence of Hudson with a gun and an announced intent to kill Peller, as described by Peller in his telephone call to Pritchard, was a sufficiently startling condition or event to meet the requirements of section 90.803(2). The statements were made while the event was ongoing, rather than being related after the event, negating the likelihood that Peller had time to contrive or misrepresent; and the statements were made while Peller was under the continuing stress or excitement caused by the event. See Henyard, 689 So.2d at 251. The fact that Peller expressed the belief that he probably would not be killed by a friend does not lessen the obvious anxiety that death was a possibility because he was underselling another drug dealer. Nor is the fact that Peller's voice did not sound excited determinative of whether his statements meet the requirements of section 90.803(2) as an excited utterance. Section 90.803(2) allows admission of either a statement or excited utterance so long as the statement is made  relating to a startling event or condition and is made while the declarant is under the stress of excitement caused by the event. § 90.803(2), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphases supplied). As the court noted in Tucker v. State, 884 So.2d 168 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), `excitement' for purposes of an utterance is not a matter that is determined exclusively by tone of voice. Some people remain calm of voice when under stress; others can be excited of voice when fully capable of misrepresentation. Id. at 175. Pritchard testified that Peller did not name the person who was present, but went to some lengths to give identifying information by telling Pritchard it was the man Peller had contacted Pritchard about several weeks earlier, asking about how to bond someone out of jail. Pritchard also heard a bathroom fan running, which indicated that Peller might have been attempting to avoid being overheard. These facts indicate the possibility that Peller did not sound excited because he was consciously attempting not to be overheard in his telephone call. We conclude that Peller's statements to Pritchard meet the requirements of section 90.803(2) for statements relating to a startling event or condition while under the stress or excitement of the event or condition. [7] Because the statements related in Pritchard's testimony were admissible under subsection (2) of section 90.803 as an excited utterance, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Pritchard's testimony.