Opinion ID: 2690404
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: conclusion

Text: {¶ 11} We acknowledge that R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a) is, like most sentencing statutes, complex, but “the mere possibility of clearer phrasing” will not defeat the most natural reading of the statute. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1670, 1682, 182 L.Ed.2d 678 (2012). Nor must the General Assembly draft a law with “scientific precision” before we will enforce it. State v. Anderson, 57 Ohio St.3d 168, 174, 566 N.E.2d 1224 (1991). We hold that there is only one reasonable construction of R.C. 2929.14(D)(3)(a): a mandatory ten-year prison term is required “if the court imposing sentence upon an offender for a felony finds that the offender is guilty of corrupt activity with the most serious offense in the pattern of corrupt activity being a felony of the first degree.” Because Willan fell squarely within 6 January Term, 2013 the scope of this provision, the trial court correctly imposed the mandatory tenyear prison term. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment. Judgment reversed. HALL, O’DONNELL, and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. PFEIFER, ACTING C.J., and LANZINGER and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. MICHAEL T. HALL, J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting for O’CONNOR, C.J. ____________________ PFEIFER, ACTING C.J., dissenting.