Opinion ID: 1057895
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Presumption of Validity v. Void ab initio/Statute of Limitations

Text: Because the zoning ordinance has been in effect over a long period of years, the Defendants argue that a presumption of validity should apply. Under the presumption of validity theory, an ordinance is deemed to have effect until invalidated by a court of competent jurisdiction. Nullification of the ordinance is prospective only. A basic rationale for the presumption of validity appears to be the avoidance of personal liability after good faith reliance upon a facially valid legislative enactment. See 1 J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 2:7 (N. Singer 6th ed.2000). By comparison, under the void ab initio doctrine, an invalid statute or ordinance is treated as though it never existed. O. Field, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute, 4-5 (1935); see Cumberland Capital Corp. v. Patty, 556 S.W.2d 516, 538 (Tenn.1977). The void ab initio doctrine possibly originated in the case of Marbury v. Madison, in which Chief Justice Marshall wrote that a law repugnant to the constitution is void. 1 Cranch 137, 5 U.S. 137, 180, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). The case of Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 6 S.Ct. 1121, 30 L.Ed. 178 (1886), however, is considered [t]he progenitor of the `void ab initio ' approach in American jurisprudence. Cumberland Capital, 556 S.W.2d at 538. As explained in Norton, our General Assembly reorganized the City of Memphis, transferring powers from a county court to a newly created board of commissioners; that legislation allowed the board to purchase bonds in a railroad company. 118 U.S. at 436, 6 S.Ct. 1121. On appeal from the trial court, this Court declared the legislation unconstitutional and ruled that the board had no legal existence. See Id. at 439, 6 S.Ct. 1121. After the grant of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a subscriber who sought to collect a money obligation under the authority of the invalidated statute had no rights. The high Court held that [a]n unconstitutional Act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Id. at 442, 6 S.Ct. 1121. The void ab initio doctrine is still recognized as valid in other jurisdictions. For example, in Glen-Gery Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Dover Twp., a case in which the plaintiff alleged violation of due process in the enactment of an ordinance, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the action was not barred by a statute of limitations because the procedural infirmities, if proven, would render the ordinance void ab initio. 907 A.2d 1033, 1035 (Pa.2006). In Kole v. City of Chesapeake, 247 Va. 51, 439 S.E.2d 405, 408-09 (1994), the high court of Virginia ruled that the limitations period would not bar the Landowners' claims that the rezoning ordinance is void ab initio upon the several grounds alleged. [2] Other state courts have concluded that the declaration of a statute or ordinance as void ab initio may cause injustice or inconvenience. See G. Gunther, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 34-36 (9th ed.1975). Based upon considerations of public policy, other jurisdictions have refused to permit attacks upon long-standing zoning provisions and have declined to implement the void ab initio remedy. To illustrate, in Struyk v. Samuel Braen's Sons, a New Jersey court found as follows: The ordinance has been in effect for ten years and [p]ublic policy forbids an attack based upon informalities and irregularities in the procedure which led to the adoption of the ordinance, when it has been accepted as a valid enactment for a long period of time, and property owners affected by it have conformed to its provisions, and have fixed their status accordingly. 17 N.J.Super. 1, 85 A.2d 279, 282-83 (App. Div.1951) (quoting W. Essex Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Borough of Caldwell, 112 N.J.L. 466, 171 A. 671, 672 (App.Div.1934)). The Michigan Court of Appeals in Northville Area Non-Profit Housing Corp. v. City of Walled Lake, adopted a similar posture: In the orderly process of handling real estate transactions where they are affected by provisions of zoning ordinances and amendments, it is essential that the members of the general public and the people buying or selling real estate must be able to rely on the validity of the public record, to-wit: a zoning ordinance and the zoning map issued in accordance with such zoning ordinance, without the necessity of poring over musty files and searching newspaper morgues, going back years in order to avoid a claim by other persons that there was a failure to comply with some technical requirement of the law in the adoption of the ordinance in question. To hold otherwise would bring about chaotic conditions beyond all comprehension in the transfer and usage of real estate in any community having a zoning ordinance affecting such land. 43 Mich.App. 424, 204 N.W.2d 274, 280 (1972). Nevertheless, Tennessee cases have long recognized the doctrine of void ab initio. In re Boyd, 189 F.Supp. 113, 116 (M.D.Tenn.1959) (citing general rule); State ex rel. Barker v. Harmon, 882 S.W.2d 352, 356-57 (Tenn.1994) (applying holding in Franks v. State, 772 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Tenn.1989)); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Nashville, Inc. v. McWherter, 817 S.W.2d 13, 15-16 (Tenn.1991) (discussing general rule); Franks v. State, 772 S.W.2d at 431 (citing general rule but then finding it was appropriate to apply the principle that the unconstitutional act was voidable until condemned by judicial pronouncement); State v. Driver, 598 S.W.2d 774, 776 (Tenn.1980) (void ab initio from date of enactment); Leech v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 582 S.W.2d 738, 755 (Tenn. 1979) (finding Obscenity Act of 1978 void and of no force and effect); Capri Adult Cinema v. State, 537 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tenn.1976) (discussing general rule); State v. Dixon, 530 S.W.2d 73, 74 (Tenn. 1975) ([A]n unconstitutional Act . . . was void from the date of its enactment); State v. Collins, 528 S.W.2d 814, 818 (Tenn.1975) (applying the rule that an unconstitutional statute is not a law, does not confer any rights and is void ab initio); Bd. of Educ. of Memphis City Schs. v. Shelby County, 207 Tenn. 330, 339 S.W.2d 569, 584 (1960) ([E]xistence of unconstitutional legislation, for any length of time, even after parties have accepted the same and had rights determined thereunder by the courts, cannot clothe such invalid laws with the mantle of validity.); O'Brien v. Rutherford County, 199 Tenn. 642, 288 S.W.2d 708, 710 (1956) (citing general rule); State v. Hobbs, 194 Tenn. 323, 250 S.W.2d 549, 553 (1952) (citing general rule); Henry County v. Standard Oil Co., 167 Tenn. 485, 71 S.W.2d 683, 684 (1934) (citing general rule); Roberts v. Roane County, 160 Tenn. 109, 23 S.W.2d 239, 243 (1929) (citing general rule); Faust v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 206 S.W.3d 475, 493 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2006) (board had no authority to take actions in violation of Metro Code and actions were void ab initio); In re Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 989 S.W.2d 726, 729 (Tenn.Crim. App.1998) (to the extent that a local rule or order conflicts with substantive law, it is null and void ab initio); Gay v. City of Somerville, 878 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tenn.Ct. App.1994) (recognizing general rule); General Portland Inc. v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Air Pollution Control Bd., 560 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tenn.Ct.App.1976) (board without authority to act and action declared null and void ab initio). In summary, these cases demonstrate that the doctrine is alive and well in this state. In the zoning context, however, our Court of Appeals has carved out an exception to the general rule of application. `[A]fter long . . . acquiescence in the substance of an ordinance, public policy does not permit such an attack on the validity of the ordinance because of procedural irregularities.' Hutcherson, 11 S.W.3d at 134 (quoting Trainor v. City of Wheat Ridge, 697 P.2d 37, 39 (Colo.Ct.App.1984)) (citing Edel v. Filer Twp., 49 Mich.App. 210, 211 N.W.2d 547 (1973)). In Hutcherson, the evidence established that there was extensive public reliance that immunized the ordinance from a belated attack on various procedural grounds. 11 S.W.3d at 135. Additional support for the exception is found in Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County v. Hudson, 148 S.W.3d 907 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003), a case in which the Court of Appeals, following Hutcherson, precluded a homeowner's challenge to the zoning commission's failure to comply with procedural notice requirements enumerated in the metropolitan code. Even though the notices by newspaper and mail were inadequate, the court ruled that a delay of more than ten years barred relief and declined to declare the reclassification as void ab initio. Id. at 911. The modern trend is to find that the void ab initio approach fails when there has been reliance on an ordinance that has given rise to vested rights. See 1 J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 2.07 (C. Sands 4th ed.1985); Note, State v. Douglas: Judicial Revival of an Unconstitutional Statute, 34 La. L.Rev. 851, 852-53 (1974). In Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940), the United States Supreme Court questioned its prior holding in Norton, observing that a retreat from the general rule of void ab initio was sometimes essential for an equitable result: The actual existence of a statute, prior to [a determination of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects,  with respect to particular relations . . . and particular conduct. . . . Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified. Id. at 374, 60 S.Ct. 317. Over thirty years ago, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 93 S.Ct. 1463, 36 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973), the United States Supreme Court all but overruled Norton : However appealing the logic of Norton may have been in the abstract, its abandonment reflected our recognition that statutory or even judge-made rules of law are hard facts on which people must rely in making decisions and in shaping their conduct. Id. at 199, 93 S.Ct. 1463. In Cumberland Capital, decided shortly after Lemon, this Court declared the Industrial Loan and Thrift Act unconstitutional and announced a new rule regarding the calculation of interest rates. 556 S.W.2d at 534. The discussion of the void ab initio doctrine occurred in the limited context of the prospective versus retroactive application of the declaration of unconstitutionality. This Court, motivated by our concept of fundamental fairness, outlined the controlling considerations to utilize in the retrospective versus prospective context: (1) the history of the enactment and its purpose and effect; (2) whether retrospective operation furthers its operation; (3) whether retrospective operation produces inequitable results; (4) whether there has been reliance on the enactment; (5) whether a declaration of unconstitutionality was foreseeable; and (6) the effect on the administration of justice. 556 S.W.2d at 541 (citations omitted). In Cumberland Capital, this Court ruled that the presumption of validity may often be the better, more equitable and more realistic rule, id. at 540, particularly in the event of detrimental reliance and inequitable results, but the Court also recognized that the void ab initio doctrine continues to have at least limited validity in Tennessee, id. at 539. We note that our sister state of Kentucky, recognizing the potential harm in the application of the void ab initio doctrine, has mitigated the requirement of procedural compliance by statute: [N]o . . . zoning regulation . . . shall be invalidated in its entirety for failure to strictly comply with any procedural provision of this chapter or . . . in making any publication required to be made under this chapter, unless a court finds that the failure to strictly comply . . . results in material prejudice to the substantive rights of an adversely affected person and that such rights cannot be adequately secured by any remedy other than invalidating the . . . zoning regulation . . . in its entirety. Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 100.182 (2005). As indicated, this case is before this Court as a result of the chancellor's grant of the Defendants' Rule 12.02(6) motions to dismiss for the failure by the Plaintiffs to state a claim for relief. The allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Before we can resolve the statute of limitations issues raised in the Rule 12.02(6) motions, our first responsibility is to determine the validity of the 1992 resolution by the Rutherford County Board of Commission. The two issues are inextricable. In the matter before us, it is undisputed that the Jacksons dedicated only ten acres to their shooting range until 1999. Although the facts available are limited, it appears that there was a general lack of awareness that the ordinance addressed ninety acres rather than ten until Loveless sought to expand the operation. There was no presentation of proof by either side. This record, therefore, does not establish the requisite public or private reliance for an exception to the application of the void ab initio doctrine. There has been no indication of either long-standing acquiescence or extensive public reliance on the ordinance at issue. In order to invoke the exception to the doctrine, equitable principles must favor the party relying upon the validity of the ordinance. That reliance must be apparent and the expense must be significant. The circumstances must justify the exercise of . . . equitable powers to ameliorate the doctrine's sometimes harsh results. Perlstein v. Wolk, 218 Ill.2d 448, 300 Ill.Dec. 480, 844 N.E.2d 923, 933 (2006); See also Ziegler, § 65:29. In consequence, no public policy considerations are involved that would immunize the ordinance from attack. Because the altered amendment was substantial and was not returned to the planning commission for further consideration, the Rutherford County Board of Commission had no jurisdiction to rezone ninety acres when the public notice described ten. Under these circumstances, the general rule must apply. Because the ordinance is void ab initio, a statute of limitations is no defense.