Opinion ID: 78393
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: In light of the general fair, adequate and reasonable standard, did the district court abuse its discretion in barring Scrushy's contractual claim against HealthSouth for advancement of legal fees?

Text: Applying the general fair, adequate and reasonable standard to Scrushy's argument, we readily conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. We noted above our rejection of Scrushy's argument that his claim is a truly independent claim, our conclusion that public policy arguments do not support Scrushy's challenge, and our conclusion that Scrushy received adequate compensation for barring his claim for advancement of fees. We now inquire whether other factors indicate that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the Bar Order was fair, adequate and reasonable. As suggested above in weighing the conflicting public policy considerations, a very preliminary peek at the merits might be appropriate. [15] Scrushy proffered or adduced no evidence in the district court indicating that he was merely an innocent bystander with respect to the violations. Nor did he adduce any evidence of his inability to fund a full and adequate defense to any claims against him by the underlying plaintiffs. Finally, the fact that Scrushy failed to make this particular objection to the Bar Order until his reply in the district court (in other words, the fact that Scrushy raised the issue as an afterthought) provides a strong indication that barring his claim for advancement of fees would not prejudice his ability to defend himself. It may also provide support for the view that even Scrushy himself entertained little hope that he would be viewed as an innocent bystander. In sum, we cannot conclude that the district court committed either legal error or an abuse of discretion in permitting the bar to Scrushy's claim against HealthSouth for advancement of legal fees.