Opinion ID: 3180361
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instructions and Jury Award

Text: The district court instructed the jury it could award damages based on the following: 1. The grief of Michael Hill; 2. The loss of companionship and parental care, training, guidance, or education that would have been forthcoming from Jimmy Hill to Michael Hill, and the loss of companionship of Jimmy Hill by Michael Hill; 3. The pain and suffering of Jimmy Hill; 4. The medical and burial expenses of Jimmy Hill. App. at 381. The jury awarded Mr. Hill $3.4 million. It found Mr. Gentry 2% at fault and Hunt 98% at fault. It therefore awarded Mr. Hill $3.332 million payable by Hunt. 3. Analysis We affirm the district court’s denial of Hunt’s motion for a new trial based on the jury award or remittitur. Hunt challenges the district court’s decision on two grounds. First, it contends the jury granted an excessive award because the court refused to compel Mr. Ford’s - 30 - attendance or admit his deposition testimony. We reject this argument for the reasons explained above. The court acted within its discretion in declining to issue a bench warrant, and any error it committed in excluding the deposition did not affect Hunt’s substantial rights. Second, Hunt contends the jury award was excessive, even assuming the district court committed no error regarding Mr. Ford. We disagree. Mr. Hill offered ample evidence from which the jury could assess Jimmy’s pain and suffering, his medical bills, his burial expenses, and Mr. Hill’s grief and loss of companionship. Hunt does not contest the admissibility of any of this evidence, nor does it challenge the court’s damages instructions. It only argues the jury award was generally excessive. We find this argument unconvincing. The jury had wide latitude to choose an award based on the evidence. See Prager, 731 F.3d at 1063 (“The jury, who has the first-handed opportunity to hear the testimony and to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, is clothed with a wide latitude and discretion in fixing damages . . . . ” (quotations omitted)); West, 273 P.3d at 32 (explaining Oklahoma law only “supports the granting of a new trial” where a jury award is “beyond all measure unreasonable and outrageous”). And the district court had broad discretion to accept it. See Hynes, 211 F.3d at 1206 (“In order to establish an abuse of discretion, the party that moved unsuccessfully for a new trial on the basis of an excessive verdict carries the heavy burden of demonstrating that the verdict was clearly, decidedly, or overwhelmingly against the weight of the evidence.” (quotations omitted)); see also West, 273 P.3d at 36 (“The judge who presides at the trial[;] hears the testimony; observes the witnesses; and has full knowledge of the proceedings during the trial process - 31 - . . . . is in the best position to know whether substantial justice has been done.”). In only suggesting the award was excessive, Hunt fails to carry its burden. Finally, Hunt suggests the award was excessive in light of damages awarded in a variety of other cases, most of which are from other states and circuits. We are unpersuaded. Both this court and Oklahoma courts discourage comparisons to awards from other cases.14 Such comparisons “yield no insight into the evidence the jurors heard and saw or how they used it during their deliberations.” Smith, 214 F.3d at 1252. They also “detract from the appropriate inquiry, which is whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” Id. We have made exceptions where a previous case is similar enough to serve as a meaningful benchmark. See Prager, 731 F.3d at 1063 (comparing the jury award to a previous award where the facts of the two cases were “strikingly similar”); Kelly v. Cann, 136 P.2d 896, 901 (Okla. 1942) (explaining a previous award is only “worthy of consideration when sufficiently similar”). The cases cited by Hunt do not fall within this narrow category.