Opinion ID: 4561242
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Original Complaint & Motion to Dismiss

Text: The same day Earles dismissed her first lawsuit, she filed a second lawsuit in Oklahoma state court against the same defendants named in the amended complaint she had just dismissed. Her factual allegations were mostly taken verbatim from that complaint as well. She added, however, that she “was . . . denied [the right] to freely associate with Fair Board [members] or other public or private persons as to the alleged basis for her termination.” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 28–29. She similarly alleged that she “was discriminated against because of her . . . desire to free[ly] associate with the Fair Board members and[/]or other public or private persons regarding Fair Board business.” Id. at 29. And, in support of her procedural and substantive due process allegations, she added that she had been “deprived of her employment 2 The defendants named in this amended complaint are the same that Earles eventually sued in her second lawsuit, which is the lawsuit on appeal before us. 5 opportunities and benefits of her long[-]standing agreement with the Fair [Board].” Id. But, by way of claims for relief, Earles repeated the claims from her previous lawsuit, mostly verbatim. Defendants removed this second lawsuit to federal court and jointly moved to dismiss. As in their previous motions, they argued that Title VII cannot apply to individuals. Defendants further argued that Earles had not plausibly pleaded any of her claims. Earles said nothing in her response brief about the argument that Title VII does not apply to individuals. Regarding plausible pleading, however, Earles focused on her procedural due process claim, asserting for the first time “a limited property right to the procedures provided by the [Oklahoma] Open Meetings Act.” Id. She explained that “the statutory procedures of the Open Meetings Act create an enforceable implied contract which was breached when the Open Meetings Act was violated.” Id. at 148. She also added that defendants “jointly participated in stigmatizing [her] good name and reputation either in the media and[/]or before the Fair Board members and members of the attending public.” Id. Earles nonetheless concluded with a request for leave to amend. The district court granted defendants’ motion with prejudice as to certain state-law claims, but granted the remainder of the motion without prejudice to amendment.