Opinion ID: 1859858
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: inapplicable aggravators

Text: Jones next argues that this Court, in light of Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), erred in upholding the death sentence even though the advisory jury was instructed upon two aggravators that later were either not found by the trial judge [15] or struck by this Court on direct appeal. [16] We find this claim to be procedurally barred. In Espinosa, the Supreme Court held that in capital cases neither sentencing authority (advisory jury or trial judge) may weigh an invalid aggravator. See id. at 1082, 112 S.Ct. 2926. There, the Supreme Court held that the especially wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel aggravator was unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 1081, 112 S.Ct. 2926. In this habeas petition, Jones does not claim that the two aggravators were unconstitutionally vague or otherwise invalid; rather, Jones argues that instructing the jury on aggravators later found to not be supported by the evidence is impermissible. Thus, there is no Espinosa error. In Foster v. State, 679 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1996), this Court made clear that a jury is presumed not to have weighed properly instructed aggravators that subsequently are found not to exist. See id. at 754. Clearly, Jones's argument concerning Espinosa error is merely an attempt to use habeas to reargue the wisdom of the death sentence in this case. This issue was adversely decided against Jones on direct appeal; thus, this issue is procedurally barred. See Parker v. Dugger, 550 So.2d 459, 460 (Fla.1989).