Opinion ID: 1107735
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the quo warranto action properly prosecuted?

Text: Reed's second argument relates to the method by which the quo warranto action was prosecuted. Reed contends that Judge Johnson's December 13, 2005, directive to the district attorney to bring a quo warranto action against Reed was in error or, alternatively, that it was not binding because of Judge Johnson's subsequent recusal from hearing the action. Section 6-6-591(b) provides that the circuit judge may direct the action to be commenced when he believes that any of the acts specified in subsection (a) of this section can be proved and it is necessary for the public good. This directive is to be given to the district attorney before the action is commenced and may be entered by any circuit judge with jurisdiction. There is no statutory requirement that the circuit judge who has given the directive to take action be the same judge to whom the case is assigned for trial. There is also no statutory authority, and Reed has cited no other authority, for his contention that Judge Johnson's directive to the district attorney was, as a matter of law, made void, or became voidable, as a result of his subsequent recusal. As this Court has previously stated, it is not the duty of an appellate court to perform a party's legal research, Spradlin v. Birmingham Airport Auth., 613 So.2d 347 (Ala.1993), nor is this Court obligated to make and address legal arguments for a party based on undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient authority or argument. Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So.2d 248, 251 (Ala.1994). Reed also contends that Judge Johnson did not make an affirmative finding that the filing of the action was necessary for the public good. This argument is without merit. The statute provides that the circuit judge may direct commencement of the action when he believes the action necessary for the public good. Judge Johnson, in his order of December 13, 2005, demonstrated familiarity with the facts upon which he based his order directing the district attorney to proceed against Reed. Judge Johnson's order of December 13, 2005, stated, in part, as follows: The Court having been informed that the Russell County District Attorney's office is in possession of certain documents indicating that Russell County Commissioner Ronnie Reed is a convicted felon, and upon examination of those documents, the Court is of the opinion that it can be proven that Ronnie Reed is a convicted felon and unlawfully holding office. Pursuant to Alabama Code Section 6-6-591 et seq. the District Attorney for Russell County is ordered to file an action in the nature of Quo Warranto against Russell County Commissioner Ronnie Reed. (Emphasis added.) There is no requirement in the statute for a specific finding that the filing of an action is necessary for the public good, and the facts as stated in Judge Johnson's order certainly show Judge Johnson's awareness and belief that bringing such an action was necessary for the public good. Moreover, Judge Mendheim, in an order dated February 14, 2006, found that Judge Johnson's order necessarily implies a judicial determination that the `public good' is at issue. Ala.Code [1975,] § 6-6-591(b). The allegation in the present case that a public office is held by a person not entitled to that office clearly involved the `public good. ' (Emphasis added.) Reed argues that the entry of Judge Johnson's December 13, 2005, order deprived him of his right to confront witnesses against him. Reed argues that he was not able to rebut the finding of probable cause implicit in the order. The determination required of the judge before commencement of a quo warranto action represents a preliminary determination of a factual basis of public necessity for commencing the quo warranto action. Judge Mendheim, in his order removing Reed from office, stated: The clear language of § 6-6-591(b) states that the determination of the `public good' rests with the judge at the initiation of a quo warranto proceeding. It is a preliminary determination by the judge that the case is not a wholly private concern. . . . The `public good' is not an element of the claim for the [State] to prove at trial. Judge Mendheim correctly determined that the finding of public good is not part of any element of the offense to be tried. The proof the State was required to produce at trial to remove Reed from office is set forth in Ala.Code 1975, § 6-6-600, which states: When a defendant, whether a natural person or corporation, against whom such action has been commenced, is adjudged guilty of usurping or intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising, any office or franchise or unlawfully practicing any profession, judgment must be entered that such defendant be excluded from the office. . . .  The State was thus required to prove that Reed usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held a public office. Reed does not contend, and the record does not demonstrate, that he was prevented from presenting a defense as to each element of the State's case as set forth in § 6-6-600. Reed also argues that the quo warranto action against him was, in fact, a private action. Reed's contention is without merit. The State, at the direction of the trial court, intervened in the private action brought by Kite. Kite was dismissed as a party, and the State then filed an amended complaint. The case proceeded solely as a State action against Reed. Reed had notice of the allegations against him and, as evidenced by the record, mounted a vigorous defense, with the aid of able counsel.