Opinion ID: 1263550
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of the Baby's Prior Injury

Text: Appellant argues the trial judge erroneously admitted evidence the baby suffered a broken leg at age ten-weeks when Appellant removed her from a swing-seat. We agree. During the sentencing phase of Appellant's trial, the State introduced evidence that in October, 2000, nearly two months prior to the baby's death, Appellant accidentally injured her while removing her from a swing-seat. The baby was diagnosed with and treated for a spiral fracture of the leg. The diagnosis of such an injury at a hospital is a red flag for possible child abuse; however, the treating physician did not refer the matter to DSS, the logical inference being the physician ruled out child abuse after treating the baby and meeting the parents. [4] The State argued the fact Appellant caused the injury was sufficient to warrant the introduction of the evidence as relevant to the issue of his character and his relationship with his baby. Appellant argued the jury would interpret an accident that could have happened to anybody as child abuse through the distorting lens of hindsight. The admission of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge whose decision will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. McDonald, 343 S.C. 319, 540 S.E.2d 464 (2000). The trial judge abused his discretion in admitting evidence of the prior injury because it unfairly prejudiced Appellant. Not only is such evidence arguably irrelevant, it is highly prejudicial and should have been excluded pursuant to Rule 403, SCRE. Further, the error in admitting evidence the baby had suffered this injury was not harmless. The State's purpose in introducing the evidence was to shed light on Appellant's relationship with the baby and to highlight the family tension that ensued during the two months prior to the baby's death. The baby's prior injury was, under all accounts, an accident. However, in light of Appellant's outburst of violence against his baby two months after this injury, the jury likely misperceived the evidence resulting in unfair prejudice to Appellant. The erroneous admission of this evidence requires reversal of Appellant's death sentence. State v. Locklair, 341 S.C. 352, 535 S.E.2d 420 (2000) (in order for an error to warrant reversal, the error must result in prejudice to the appellant).