Opinion ID: 2100131
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unfair Bargain

Text: Against this backdrop, we may readily dismiss a running theme in Walker's argument: namely, her complaint the settlement agreement she signed eight years ago is unfair because she ended up working more than she anticipated when she signed it. The district court concisely and correctly dismissed this argument when it found: [W]hen these parties were negotiating, neither of them could know with any certainty how much time would be required to resolve the cases. The [settlement a]greement provides that the fees are to be divided based on a ratio of time spent before the split to total time spent. The parties also negotiated a range of percentages, obviously intended to protect both parties by providing some maximum and minimum division. In negotiating these provisions, the parties certainly brought to the bargaining table their best guesses about the cases and what would be required to resolve them. Both parties accepted the risk inherent in contingent fee cases that no fees would be payable. Both assumed the proportional division with protective maximum and minimum percentages would guard against an unfair result. The fact that one [(or both)] of the parties was wrong does not provide a basis for overturning a settlement agreement that was entered into as a result of arms-length negotiations by parties who are not only attorneys themselves but who were both also represented throughout the negotiations by other attorneys.... Walker must live with the bargain she freely entered into. .... Walker wants now to renegotiate the Agreement. This court will not entertain that effort. She made a bargain. Even if it was a bad bargain, under general principles of contract law, she lives with that bargain. (Emphasis added.) We agree with this assessment. Uncertainty is a powerful incentive for parties to accept a compromise settlement agreement. See Wright, 410 N.W.2d at 249. Much was uncertain when the parties signed the settlement agreement; such is the very nature of cases taken on a contingency-fee basis. The parties in this case assessed the situation and made their choices regarding the time and effort Walker would have to expend in the future to bring the overtime-pay cases to a successful resolution. They also gave up other claims against each other and each received some benefits. We will not interfere with their agreement  fully performed with the exception of the payment of the fees  simply because one party got the better end of the bargain. It is ... well settled that to vitiate a settlement, a mistake must be mutual, material, and concerned with a present or past fact.  Id. (emphasis added, internal quotation omitted). Parties to contracts should not look to courts to rescue them from their bad bargains. Smith v. Harrison, 325 N.W.2d 92, 94 (Iowa 1982). Courts should ... support agreements which have for their object the amicable settlement of doubtful rights by parties.... [S]uch agreements are binding without regard to which party gets the best of the bargain or whether all the gain is in fact on one side and all the sacrifice on the other. Id. (internal quotation omitted). The courts can have no concern with the wisdom or folly of ... a contract. Bjornstad v. Fish, 249 Iowa 269, 279, 87 N.W.2d 1, 7 (1957) (citations omitted). To the extent Walker's claim should be understood as a complaint she received a bad bargain, we decline to void the contract as requested.