Opinion ID: 1997565
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jury instructions on punitive damages

Text: Devaney argues that the Superior Court erred in instructing the jury on punitive damages because it included references to evil, ill will and malicious conduct. The test for determining the appropriateness of jury instructions is well settled: `A trial court's instructions will not be the basis for reversible error if they [correctly state the law and] are reasonably informative and not misleading, judged by common practices and standards of verbal communication.' Sirmans v. Penn, Del.Supr., 588 A.2d 1103, 1104 (1991) (quoting Haas v. United Technologies Corp., Del.Supr., 450 A.2d 1173, 1179 (1982)). Jury instructions do not need to be perfect, Dawson v. State, Del.Supr., 581 A.2d 1078, 1105 (1990), and no one statement may be viewed in a vacuum. The entire charge must be read as a whole. Probst v. State, Del.Supr., 547 A.2d 114, 119 (1988). Devaney objects to the trial court's repeated references to evil, hatred, and ill will during the instructions on punitive damages. He argues that his claim was not based on any such motives. Devaney attempted to prove only that Nationwide acted outrageously or recklessly, and the trial court's inclusion of other possible bases for the award of punitive damages misled or confused the jury. The relevant portions of the jury instructions were: [I]f an insurer's breach of contract is particularly egregious and rises to the level of willful, wanton or malicious conduct, punitive damages may be awarded. If Mr. Devaney's contention is that Nationwide's conduct was unintentional, punitive damages can only be allowed in a situation where the conduct has been outrageous or particularly reprehensible. ... Mr. Devaney bears the burden of proving ill will or hatred or intent to cause injury or reckless indifference to the plight of the insured, that is, himself, before he is entitled to receive punitive damages. Mr. Devaney has the burden of proving only one of these elements. Therefore, if you find that Mr. Devaney carried his burden of proving ... that Nationwide's [conduct] amounted to a willful, evil or, if malicious, particularly reprehensible, conduct ... Mr. Devaney may be entitled to an award of punitive damages. However, if you find ... that Nationwide's [conduct] did not rise to the level of evil or malicious conduct, you may not award punitive damages. Those instructions correctly stated the law governing the award of punitive damages. See Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins., Del.Supr., 653 A.2d 254, 265-66 (1995). The jury was clearly told that it could award punitive damages based on a finding of outrageous or reckless conduct without finding that Nationwide harbored any evil motives or ill will toward Devaney. Accordingly, we find Devaney's argument to be without merit.