Opinion ID: 1058852
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Strike Certain Jurors for Cause

Text: Juniper assigns error to the trial court's failure to strike four potential jurors: Henry, Colander, Ashby, and Molinaro. Code § 8.01-358 and Rule 3A:14 facilitate an accused's constitutional right to be tried by an impartial jury by providing that members of the venire must stand indifferent in the cause. A prospective juror must be able to give [the accused] a fair and impartial trial. Upon this point nothing should be left to inference or doubt. All the tests applied by the courts, all the enquiries made into the state of the juror's mind, are merely to ascertain whether [the juror] comes to the trial free from partiality and prejudice. Wolfe, 265 Va. at 211, 576 S.E.2d at 482 (quoting Wright v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 941, 943 (1879)). On appeal, this Court generally gives deference to the trial court's decision whether to strike a potential juror for cause. Vinson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459, 467, 522 S.E.2d 170, 176 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1218, 120 S.Ct. 2226, 147 L.Ed.2d 257 (2000). We do so [b]ecause the trial judge has the opportunity, which we lack, to observe and evaluate the apparent sincerity, conscientiousness, intelligence, and demeanor of prospective jurors first hand .... Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 123-24, 360 S.E.2d 352, 358 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1015, 108 S.Ct. 1489, 99 L.Ed.2d 716 (1988) (citing Calhoun v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 256, 258-59, 307 S.E.2d 896, 898 (1983)). Consequently, unless manifest error appears in the record, the trial court's decision will not be disturbed. Id. In reviewing whether a potential juror should have been removed from the venire, we consider the prospective juror's entire voir dire, not just isolated portions. Jackson, 267 Va. at 191, 590 S.E.2d at 527. Guided by these principles, we review the entire voir dire of the four prospective jurors Juniper argues should have been stricken for cause.
Juniper moved to strike prospective juror Henry for the bias and prejudice shown in his responses to whether he would consider life imprisonment without parole as an alternative to the death penalty. Juniper asserts that prospective juror Henry was not successfully rehabilitated from his statement that he would more likely favor the death penalty. Juniper contends Henry's voir dire demonstrated the type of preconceived opinion that the process of voir dire is designed to ferret out. The Commonwealth submits that the totality of Henry's voir dire indicates an open mind to consideration of a sentence of life imprisonment. In particular, the Commonwealth notes that Henry stated that he did not know whether there were mitigating factors that would affect his decision and agreed that he would consider all the alternative punishments prior to reaching a decision. The record contains the following exchange: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: [You] are able to consider life imprisonment without parole as an alternative to the death penalty in this case? MR. HENRY: Yes sir. It's possible, but I would more likely favor the death penalty. . . . . . THE COURT: You could consider life imprisonment without parole? MR. HENRY: It's within the realm of possibility, but not likely. . . . . . [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Dr. Henry, would you restate what you said a moment ago? DR. HENRY: I said it's within the realm of possibility that I wouldcould see a sentence of life imprisonment, but most likely I would favor the death penalty based on what you've told me so far. I don't know if there are other mitigating factors that could come up, but in general, I would favor the death penalty. . . . . . [COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]: So, Dr. Henry ... you know at the end when it comes time for a jury to deliberate the Court will give you instructions setting out the law, giving you guidance as to [how to] conduct your deliberations and you could follow the Court's instructions including if the Court instructed the jury to consider all the alternative punishments prior to reaching a decision? Is that fair to say? [DR. HENRY]: Yes. In denying Juniper's motion to strike Henry, the trial court stated, I gleaned from his answer he said he would be inclined to the death penalty if that is proven and the defendant is guilty of capital murder, but he could consider the other one. ... I think Dr. Henry's voir dire in its entirety [reflects] he'd be open to consider both penalties. Henry's overall responses to voir dire questions relevant to this particular issue reveal that he could stand indifferent in the cause and would consider both the prosecution and defense's evidence when determining the appropriate sentence for Juniper. He unequivocally responded yes when asked if he would conduct deliberations as a juror according to the trial court's instructions, and he mentioned that mitigating factors would play a role in determining Juniper's sentence. As we have previously stated, [t]he standard to be applied by a trial court in deciding whether to exclude or retain a prospective juror is whether the prospective juror's views `would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Breard, 248 Va. at 77, 445 S.E.2d at 676 (quoting Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 246, 397 S.E.2d 385, 391 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 824, 112 S.Ct. 88, 116 L.Ed.2d 60 (1991)); see also Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 139-41, 547 S.E.2d 186, 195-96 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1094, 122 S.Ct. 840, 151 L.Ed.2d 719 (2002). Henry satisfied this test by indicating that he could consider sentences both of life or death in accord with the evidence. We also afford deference to the trial court's observation that Henry's responses showed he would be open to consider both penalties. Therefore, we find no manifest error in the trial court's decision refusing to strike this juror for cause.
Juniper claims the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike prospective juror Colander from the venire because she had stated that it would cause hardship to be away from her position as a public school principal for the duration of the trial. The Commonwealth counters Juniper's assertion by observing that difficulty finding a replacement at work is irrelevant to any disqualifier under § 8.01-358. When refusing to strike Colander from the venire, the trial court expressed confidence that the Norfolk public school system could accommodate her absence. Juniper has not cited, nor does the record reflect, any basis for removing Colander for cause. Decisions of the trial court regarding whether to retain or excuse potential jurors are entitled to great deference on appeal. As such, we find no manifest error in the trial court's decision rejecting Juniper's motion to strike Colander as a juror.
Juniper contends that prospective juror Ashby should have been struck for cause because her answers indicated that she [could not] sit fairly and impartially as she [had] already formed opinions regarding Juniper and the evidence before the commencement of the trial. Specifically, Juniper cites Ashby's statement that it's hard when kids are involved and her knowledge of the case through media coverage to support this assertion. The Commonwealth responds that Ashby's statements plainly show she had not formed an opinion and would fairly contemplate the evidence and instructions presented at trial. The Commonwealth also relies on the trial court's observation that although [Ashby's] answers at least regarding capital punishment were somewhat inconsistent, her responses did not provide a reason to strike. The following colloquy occurred after Ashby indicated she had heard something about the case from media reports: [COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]: Has what you heard about it or the seriousness of the allegations made you to [sic] form an opinion about the guilt or innocence of the person who's accused? [MS. ASHBY]: No. It haven't [sic] made me form an opinion or nothing, but it's hard when kids is involved. I'll put it that way. So I can't say. I can't form an opinion until all evidence is heard or what. [COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]: So you would base your decision on the evidence that you will hear in the courtroom which may include the deaths of children andbut make your decision on what you hear in the courtroom? You're nodding your head yes? [MS. ASHBY]: Yes. . . . . . [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Ms. Ashby, based upon what you have heard or read, have you formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of Mr. Juniper? MS. ASHBY: No. No. The totality of Ashby's voir dire reflects that she would not rely on any information she had read or heard about the case and that she had not formed an opinion regarding Juniper's guilt or innocence. As such, she would be able to stand indifferent in the cause and fairly and impartially perform the duties of a juror. Mere exposure to media coverage does not disqualify a potential juror as long as that individual can still fairly and impartially weigh the evidence presented at trial. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 430, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991); see also Wolfe, 265 Va. at 209-12, 576 S.E.2d at 480-82; Bell v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172, 192-94, 563 S.E.2d 695, 709-10 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1123, 123 S.Ct. 860, 154 L.Ed.2d 805 (2003). Consequently, we find that the trial court did not err in refusing to strike this potential juror.
Juniper's final challenge is that prospective juror Molinaro should have been struck for cause because she was an acquaintance of the Commonwealth's Attorney. Juniper asserts that when asked if it would affect her ability to sit fairly and impartially[, Molinaro] responded, `[I]'ve been thinking that since nine o'clock this morning, and I don't think so.' This exchange, Juniper contends, reflects Molinaro's clear inability to give an unequivocal answer in light of her familiarity to the prosecutor and illustrated her inability to be a qualified juror for Juniper. The Commonwealth initially notes that Juniper misquotes Molinaro's response to the question regarding her impartiality in such a way that suggests equivocation on Molinaro's part that her actual response does not. The record demonstrates Molinaro's complete response was, I've been thinking about that since nine o'clock this morning, and I don't think so. (Emphasis added.) From Molinaro's actual response, the Commonwealth asserts that far from equivocation, her answers show conscientious introspection with respect to possible bias before reaching the conclusion that she could be fair. In light of this showing of truthfulness and frankness, the Commonwealth contends the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike Molinaro. The record shows the following colloquy during Molinaro's voir dire: THE COURT: [W]hat's the nature of your acquaintance with [the Commonwealth's Attorney]? . . . . . MS. MOLINARO: I know his wife from my work at Sentara. I didam I allowed to say I did put some signs up in yard[s] in the neighborhood when he was running for Commonwealth['s] Attorney. THE COURT: Do you believe your acquaintance with Mr. Doyle would in any way prejudice you in favor of the prosecution or impair your ability to give a fair and impartial trial to MS. MOLINARO: I've been thinking about that since nine o'clock this morning, and I don't think so. . . . . . [COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]:... I just wanted to be sure we brought that all out. In fact, you may be acquainted with [Defense Counsel] as well. [MS. MOLINARO]: I know of [Defense Counsel] through soccer. . . . . . [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Can you be certain [that you would not be inclined or partial to the Commonwealth in this case]? [MS. MOLINARO]: I feel certain that knowing him the little that I do, that I would be an impartial juror just because I have faith in myself, but the reason I have been asking is because I don't do this very often and so I do not know, but I do not think. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You threw me off. [MS. MOLINARO]: Yeah. Okay. Well, you're more experienced with screening jurors, but I think that I am an impartial juror. In rejecting Juniper's motion to strike Molinaro, the trial court stated: I think she said she'd been thinking about it all morning. The impression I got from observing her demeanor was I imagine she made up her mind she can be fair in this case. ... If people who knew the Commonwealth's attorney were disqualified from being on a jury, in most rural areas in this state you'd never have a criminal trial. Our previous decisions have generally held that relationship does not automatically disqualify a potential juror from being fair and impartial. Wise v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 322, 325, 337 S.E.2d 715, 717 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1112, 106 S.Ct. 1524, 89 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986) (citing Calhoun, 226 Va. at 263, 307 S.E.2d at 900). The overarching consideration is whether the trial court erred in determining that the prospective juror would fairly and impartially decide the accused's case. See, e.g., Jackson, 255 Va. 625, 640-41, 499 S.E.2d 538, 548 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067, 119 S.Ct. 796, 142 L.Ed.2d 658 (1999) (upholding trial court's refusal to strike a juror for cause when the juror's husband was a first cousin of the Commonwealth's attorney); Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 343, 468 S.E.2d 98, 109, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 951, 117 S.Ct. 365, 136 L.Ed.2d 256 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds by Morrisette v. Warden of the Sussex I State Prison, 270 Va. 188, 202, 613 S.E.2d 551, 562 (2005) (upholding retention of juror when the Commonwealth's attorney in a capital case formerly represented prospective juror in a matter and the prospective juror still regarded him as his personal attorney); Wise, 230 Va. at 325, 337 S.E.2d at 717 (upholding retention of prospective juror who was the Commonwealth's attorney's golfing buddy and long standing friend). The voir dire of Molinaro demonstrates that after carefully considering her association with the Commonwealth's Attorney, she could be impartial as a juror. We do not find manifest error in the trial court's conclusion that Molinaro would stand indifferent in the cause and act as an impartial and fair juror.