Opinion ID: 1934942
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the city of council bluffs, iowa

Text: From the Office of: City Council November 11, 1974 Bernadine Stark 808 South 21st, Lot # 8 Council Bluffs, Iowa 51501 Dear Ms. Stark: I would like to apologize for not getting back to you sooner. I have contacted our Public Safety Director, Mr. Jack Chappell, and this matter is currently under investigation. I will have to wait for the results of that investigation before I can give you any answers. Sincerely, Ronald E. Cleveland COUNCILMAN The question is whether the letter prepared by the women and signed by Bernadine Stark satisfies § 613A.5 in the present case. Substantial compliance with the notice requirement of that section is required. Vermeer v. Sneller, 190 N.W.2d 389, 394 (Iowa) (We have been liberal in not requiring more than substantial compliance with the terms of the notice statute and its predecessor enactments.). The purpose of the notice requirement is to enable a city to investigate an alleged incident while the facts are fresh. Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa). That purpose was fulfilled here; Councilman Cleveland's response discloses that the matter was under investigation. Defendants contend however that the letter to the councilman was fatally deficient in several respects. One contention is that the letter does not specify the time, place, and circumstances of the incident. We cannot agree with this contention on the facts. The letter gives the date, states that the happening was in the mobile home the address of which is given, and relates the circumstances in great detail much more than necessary. The letter also states regarding plaintiff, Woodbury grabbed her and brutally threw her on the floor & put the handcuffs on her, with his knee in her back holding her down. They had the handcuffs on crooked to where they were cutting her arms. I turned and said `Please, undo the handcuffs & let her up, as we think she is pregnant.' Also, My daughter has been seen by two doctors about the black and blue marks on her arms, armpits, Legs & severe back pains, where Woodbury put his knee in her back & acted brutal to her. A second contention by defendants is that the compensation or relief demanded is not stated. But § 613A.5 does not require this unless the city demands it. No demand was made. A third contention by defendants is that the letter does not sufficiently identify Sylvia Cook as a plaintiff claiming damages. At this point we note that notices of this kind to municipalities may not necessarily be drafted by attorneys; they may, as here, be written by the offended individuals themselves, and nothing in the statute prohibits the offended individuals from writing and giving the notices. We can hardly demand from laymen the legal precision required of, say, conveyancers. A fair reading of this letter, composed and written by two women obviously untrained in law, indicates in substance they claimed they were wronged by the police in entering in a large number, in taking over without Bernadine Stark's consent, and in arresting Sylvia Cook unlawfully and brutally. We think a municipality upon receipt of such a communication would at once see potential lawsuits by the women, and would investigate. In connection with this contention defendants rely on Goodwin v. City of Bloomfield, 203 N.W.2d 582 (Iowa), and Rush v. Sioux City, 240 N.W.2d 431 (Iowa). The facts here, however, are considerably different from those cases. The brief letter from an insurance adjuster in Goodwin bears little resemblance to the descriptive letter here. Moreover, after the Goodwin decision the legislature amended § 613A.5 by adding the following words which we have italicized: Failure to state time or place or circumstance or the amount of compensation or other relief demanded shall not invalidate the notice . . . . 65 G.A. ch. 1263, § 5. Rush involved a routine accident report by a policeman. An analogy here would be if Officer Woodbury had returned to the station and made his report, and plaintiff now relied on that report as notice under § 613A.5. Another contention of defendants is that the letter avails plaintiff nothing because Bernadine Stark, not plaintiff, signed the letter. Section 613A.5 contains no requirement that the plaintiff sign the letter. The statutory language is said person shall cause to be presented.  (Italics added.) Contrast rule 49(c), R.C.P. (The original notice shall be signed by the clerk italics added). We think both plaintiff and her mother caused the letter to be presented. They prepared it together and indeed plaintiff actually did the writing, and they described therein the alleged indignities and maltreatment each of them sustained. Next defendants contend the letter was not presented to the city's governing body. This contention cannot stand against the rationale we adopted in Vermeer v. Sneller, supra, 190 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Iowa): The general rule is that the principal is chargeable with, and bound by, the knowledge of or notice to his agent received while the agent is acting as such within the scope of his authority and in reference to a matter over which his authority extends. . . . It will not be assumed the agent failed to inform his principal of the notice presented. Section 613A.5 does not provide that a notice be served in a particular way or be mailed or handed to a specified person. Under the statute the individual shall cause written notice to be presented to the governing body. To the ordinary layman, very likely an elected councilman is a person who represents the city. We think it quite natural and proper for a layman, or his attorney for that matter, to notify a councilman, in the expectation that the councilman will carry the matter forward from there. Such a course of action is well calculated to bring the matter to the city's attention for investigation. That is the object of the notice statute and is exactly what happened here. Mihalovich v. Appanoose County, 217 N.W.2d 564 (Iowa); Blackmore v. City of Council Bluffs, 189 Iowa 157, 176 N.W. 369; Klingman v. Madison County, 161 Iowa 422, 143 N.W. 426; Perry v. Clarke County, 120 Iowa 96, 94 N.W. 454; Kummer v. Bonarek, 351 F.Supp. 141 (N.D.Ill.); Seifert v. City of Minneapolis, 298 Minn. 35, 213 N.W.2d 605; Peterson v. City of New York, 73 Misc.2d 618, 341 N.Y.S.2d 834; Ware v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority, 49 Misc.2d 704, 268 N.Y.S.2d 519; Dennis v. City of Albemarle, 242 N.C. 263, 87 S.E.2d 561; Farr v. City of Rocky Mount, 10 N.C.App. 128, 177 S.E.2d 763; Penny v. City of Texarkana, 400 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.Civ.App.); Anno. 23 A.L.R.2d 969; 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 926 at 371. Finally, defendants contend the letter was not a notice of claim but rather a report of police misconduct. We have already dealt with the city's similar contention that the letter does not identify plaintiff as a claimant seeking damages. As we there stated, the detailed letter certainly would alert a municipality receiving it of the potentiality of lawsuits by the women enough to cause the municipality to investigate as it actually did. The statute contains no requirement that the notice state the person is presenting a claim. Rather it must state the time, place, and circumstances [of the wrongful death, loss or injury] and the amount of compensation or other relief demanded. A notice is not even defective for failure to state the time or place or circumstances or the amount or other relief demanded if such information is furnished within 15 days of demandleaving only the statement of the wrongful death, loss, or injury and the identity of the damaged party or parties as essential to the notice originally. Cf. Savory v. City of Haverhill, 132 Mass. 324 (It is further objected that the notice does not allege that the stone was a defect, nor that the party giving it intended to claim damages; but neither of these allegations is required by statute.). The letter sufficiently informed the city of the claimed loss or injury and of the identity of the women, and it alerted the city to potential claims by them. We conclude that the letter satisfied § 613A.5 and that the trial court should have overruled the motion for summary judgment. REVERSED. MOORE, C. J., and LeGRAND, REYNOLDSON, HARRIS and McCORMICK, JJ., concur in Division I; and MASON, RAWLINGS and REES, JJ., dissent from Division I. MASON, REYNOLDSON, HARRIS, and McCORMICK, JJ., concur in Division II and the result, and REES, J., MOORE, C. J., and RAWLINGS and LeGRAND, JJ., dissent from Division II and the result.