Opinion ID: 2594806
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Defendant's Letter to Eva Petersen

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 when it admitted a letter from defendant to Eva Petersen in 1982, while defendant was in prison, in the course of which he wrote: But, of course, I'll try to get hold of your big breasts under your nightie. I would love to feel them and suck their nipples until they get big and round and hard. I would never go down below your waist, but I am going to make them free game, O.K.? The prosecution argued the letter was evidence of defendant's sexual intent toward Petersen as to whom rape and sodomy special circumstances were alleged. Defense counsel argued the probative value was weak in comparison to the prejudicial nature of the letter. [6] The trial court overruled the defense objection. The court observed that it expected the defense to argue that, notwithstanding defendant's tape-recorded account of his sexual assault on Eva Petersen, there was no sexual intent or actual sexual contact. I think the probative value of this particular note is extremely high, and that the probative value is not outweighed by the probability that the admission of the note will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice. The trial court acknowledged that the fact the letter was written nine years before the murders would ordinarily be an important factor in weighing its probative value against its potential prejudicial impact but agreed with the prosecutor that this is the first opportunity the defendant would have had to carry out those desires because of his imprisonment. [A]n appellate court applies the abuse of discretion standard of review to any ruling by a trial court on the admissibility of evidence, including one that turns on the relative probativeness and prejudice of the evidence in question [citations]. Evidence is substantially more prejudicial than probative (see Evid.Code, § 352) if, broadly stated, it poses an intolerable `risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome' [citation]. ( People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 724, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) Here, defendant's expression of a prurient sexual interest in his mother-in-law was relevant to issues in dispute at his trial, namely, the truth of the sodomy and rape special circumstances. The time lag between when the letter was written and when the offenses occurred was substantial, but the trial court factored this into its analysis and concluded, not unreasonably, that defendant would have been unable to act on his desires any sooner than he did because he was in prison. And, although distasteful, the letter was not so repellent as to have engendered against defendant the particular type of prejudice with which Evidence Code section 352 is concerned. ( People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1125, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 592, 88 P.3d 498 [Prejudice for purposes of Evidence Code section 352 means evidence that tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant].) We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the letter.