Opinion ID: 2196439
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: `Additional Drivers' named on the front of this Agreement.

Text: 3) USE RESTRICTIONS: The Vehicle will not be used or operated by anyone: A. who is not an Authorized Driver   . On the front of the rental agreement in the space provided for Additional Drivers, there was none listed. Therefore, we must now decide whether Barnes possessed constructive permission to operate the vehicle. In Spratt v. Forbes, 705 A.2d 991 (R.I.1997), this Court vacated summary judgment because the rental agreement contained no express prohibition as to who could operate the vehicle. Therefore, the owner-lessor was deemed to have given its constructive permission when the renter-lessee gave a third party permission to operate the vehicle. Id. at 991-92. The instant case is distinguishable. Here, the rental agreement contained certain prohibitions  only Authorized Drivers had Budget's permission to operate the vehicle, and they were expressly limited to the renter, the renter's spouse, employees, employer, or co-workers, or any additional drivers listed on the front of the rental agreement. No additional drivers were so listed. The plaintiffs assert that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Barnes was either James's employer, employee, or co-worker, and that defendant bears the burden of proving that he was not. [2] The plaintiffs contend that G.L. 1956 § 31-33-7 places the burden of proving a lack of consent to operate the vehicle on defendant, and that Budget has not satisfied its burden. [3] To the extentthat § 31-33-7 may be applicable to the instant case, we disagree with plaintiffs that defendant has not met its burden. The defendant raised lack of consent in its answer, and the rental agreement provided the requisite proof. Furthermore, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment carries the burden of proving by competent evidence the existence of a disputed material fact and cannot rest on the allegations or denials in the pleadings or the conclusions or on legal opinions. Macera Brothers, 740 A.2d at 1264. The next step for the Court, then, is to determine whether, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, a genuine issue of material fact exists. The plaintiffs have offered no evidence that Barnes may have been an employer, employee, or co-worker of James. In support of their argument that a genuine issue of material fact exists, plaintiffs rely on the divergent and contradictory testimony of James and Barnes about how Barnes came into possession of the vehicle. Specifically, they cite portions of Barnes's testimony in which he states that he found the keys under the mat of the car, and James's testimony in which he states that Barnes came into his bedroom and took the keys while he was sleeping. The plaintiffs make further reference to Barnes's testimony, in which he states that someone by the name of Chicken told him that the car had to be returned to Budget. Also, in a signed statement, Barnes stated that he was with James the night before and knew that the car had to be returned. While the contradictory testimony suggests a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether James gave Barnes his permission to take the car, defendant's liability under § 31-34-4 is predicated upon whether Barnes was an authorized driver of the vehicle. After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that there was competent evidence to suggest that he was not. During James's deposition, plaintiffs' attorney elicited the following information: Q. And where are you employed, sir? A. Talone Construction.    Q. How long have you worked for them? A. I worked for Talone Construction about  over three years now.    Q. How long have you known [Barnes]? A. About seven, eight years. Q. And how is it you first met him? A. Through a friend. Q. Was that a friend through work or school or family or an organization you belong to or anything like that? A. No, just someone I met outside, and I got introduced to him one way or the other, that was it.    Q. And how long a period was that where you would hang around together? A. Well, I wouldn't call it  I wouldn't say we hung around weekly. I didn't make it part of my hobbies to go hang out with him   . He's somebody I seen out there and I just  that was about it. This testimony indicates that Barnes was no more than a casual acquaintance of James, and certainly not a co-worker, employee, or employer. In addition, James submitted an affidavit asserting that Barnes did not have permission to operate the vehicle. It is well-established that in order for a rental-car company to be vicariously liable for the negligent operation of its vehicle, § 31-34-4 requires the owner to give permission to the operator. See Burke v. St. Pierre, 642 A.2d 671, 672 (R.I.1994); Diaz, 618 A.2d at 1263; DiQuinzio, 612 A.2d at 43. In Burke, 642 A.2d at 672, the automobile in question had been loaned to the operator by an employee of the rental-car company without previous approval or authorization by the rental-car company and without a formal rental contract. This Court found that the rental-car company could not be held responsible for the negligence of the operator or the act of the employee in lending the vehicle tothe operator. See id. Under this reasoning, we conclude that the defendant is not responsible for Barnes's negligent operation of the vehicle because he took the car without Budget's actual or constructive permission. Consequently, the trial justice did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Budget. The plaintiffs' appeal is denied, and the judgment of the Superior Court is hereby affirmed. The papers in the case may be remanded to the Superior Court.