Opinion ID: 151053
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Royal & Sun's Contractual Arguments

Text: In addition to arguing that Carmack applies to the defendants of its own force, Royal & Sun claims that various defendants contracted into Carmack liability. We reject these arguments also.
Royal & Sun first asserts that OWL contracted into Carmack liability by virtue of clause 5(B)(2) of its bill of lading. That clause states that OWL's liability for loss or damage to the cargo shall be determined [b]y the provisions contained in any ... national law, which provisions cannot be departed from by private contract to the detriment of the Merchant, and would have applied if the Merchant had made a separate and direct contract with the Carrier in respect of the particular stage of the carriage where the loss or damage occurred and received as evidence thereof any particular document which must be issued in order to make such ... national law applicable[.] J.A. 87. Because its provisions can be departed from by private contract, the Carmack Amendment, however, is not such a national law. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 14101(b)(1), 14706(c)(1)(A); see also Sompo, 456 F.3d at 59-60 (discussing parties' ability to contract out of the Carmack Amendment in the rail context). OWL, therefore, did not contract into Carmack liability.
Royal & Sun's second contractual argument is that clause 7(2)(B) of Yang Ming's waybill renders Yang Ming subject to Carmack. But clause 7(2)(B) begins with the words, In the event clause 7(1) is held inapplicable to such Multimodal Transportation. J.A. 183. That is, clause 7(2)(B) applies only if clause 7(1), the Clause Paramount, is invalidated. Because no such invalidation has occurred, Yang Ming did not agree to Carmack liability.