Opinion ID: 2709484
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Spousal Testimonial Privilege

Text: The second marital privilege, the spousal testimonial privilege, applies to any adverse testimony one spouse might provide as a witness against the other in a criminal case. It is both broader and narrower than the marital communications privilege. It is broader in that it covers testimony on any adverse facts, no matter how they might have become known to the witness- spouse. It is narrower in that it applies only to adverse testimony in a criminal case, and it applies only during the marriage. See Byrd, 750 F.2d at 590–91; United States v. Fisher, 518 F.2d 836, 838 (2d Cir. 1975). Until the Supreme Court’s decision in Trammel, either spouse could invoke the spousal testimonial privilege, so that a defendant could prevent his spouse from testifying against him, even willingly. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 78–79 (1958). In Trammel v. United States, however, the Court modified the privilege so that 12 No. 11-3473 only the witness-spouse can invoke the privilege to refuse to testify adversely. 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980). In Mr. Brock’s trial, the spousal testimonial privilege could have applied to any of Mrs. Brock’s testimony. The district court found that Mrs. Brock had also waived this privilege by testifying in the detention hearing. Mr. Brock appeals that ruling, but the government counters that he lacks standing to raise the issue since this privilege belonged only to his wife. We said as much in United States v. Lofton, 957 F.2d 476, 477 n.1 (7th Cir. 1992), where the district court similarly found that the defendant’s wife had waived the spousal testimonial privilege for purposes of trial by testifying at a pretrial suppression hearing without objecting or claiming the privilege. Relying on Trammel, we concluded that because the defendant-spouse could not invoke the privilege, he also could not appeal a rejection of the privilege. Accord, United States v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 331, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds, Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999); Grand Jury Subpoena of Ford v. United States, 756 F.2d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1985). In view of Trammel and our decision in Lofton, Mr. Brock has no standing to raise this issue. We recognize that there are several consequences of this rule. Our circuit’s rule on this issue makes it especially important for defense counsel to stay alert. Nothing should stop counsel for the defendant-spouse from raising an objection to the witness-spouse’s testimony to ensure that she knows she cannot be required to testify against the defendant-spouse. No. 11-3473 13 We also recognize that a consequence of the Lofton rule on standing to invoke the privilege is that when a trial court rejects a witness-spouse’s claim of privilege, appellate review of that decision may require the witness-spouse to refuse to comply with the court’s order to testify and to be found in contempt of court. An emergency appeal of such matters in the middle of the defendant-spouse’s criminal trial could be highly disruptive, of course, but we agree with the government that the logic of the Trammel limit on who can invoke the privilege leads to that path for appellate review. See, e.g., Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951) (on appeal from contempt order, reversing sentence for justified refusal to testify). By resolving the issue here nearly a week before trial, Judge McKinney handled the issue well, so that there would have been time for emergency consideration before the trial began. Given the importance of the spousal testimonial privilege, it would also be entirely appropriate and often prudent for the court, even in the absence of an objection, to make sure that the testifying spouse understands that she cannot be required to testify against her spouse, especially if she does not have her own counsel. See United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239, 1244 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lewis, 433 F.2d 1146, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 N.E.2d 87, 96 n.9 (Mass. 1978) (“as a matter of good trial practice the judge should satisfy himself, outside the presence of the jury, that the spouse who is about to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding knowingly waives his or her statutory privilege”). Cf. United States v. Thompson, 14 No. 11-3473 454 F.3d 459, 464 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Defendants point to no case law that suggests that a witness must be affirmatively warned of the right not to testify against his or her spouse.”). The bottom line, however, is that under the logic of Trammel and the precedent of Lofton, Mr. Brock does not have standing to appeal the district court’s finding that his wife waived the spousal testimonial privilege. Since he cannot prevail on either of his challenges to his wife’s testimony at trial, his convictions are affirmed.