Opinion ID: 1330634
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Refusal to Permit Justus to Make Opening Statement to the Jury in Penalty Phase.

Text: On July 29, 1980, Justus filed a written motion asking leave to participate in his trial as co-counsel. The court granted the motion although in the earlier trial Justus had not requested self-representation and he had failed to articulate an adequate reason for the motion in the second trial. In the second trial, Justus did not participate in the guilt phase, but at the outset of the penalty phase, he gave the opening statement. The Commonwealth objected because the nature of Justus' statements was testimonial. [3] The court upheld the Commonwealth's objection. The trial judge observed that Justus' motion for self-representation was a ploy for the defendant to testify without the safeguard of an oath or the risk of cross-examination or impeachment. The United States Supreme Court recently stated in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834, n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, n. 46, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), that the right of selfrepresentation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. In Williams v. State, 549 S.W.2d 183, 187 (Tex.Crim.App.1977), the court said [t]he rules of evidence, procedure, and substantive law will be applied the same to all parties in a criminal trial whether that party is represented by counsel or acting pro se.See Annot. 77 A.L.R.2d 1233 (1961). The trial court, in its discretion, could permit Justus to act as co-counsel, but this status conferred no privilege upon him to ignore settled rules of evidence and procedure. We hold that the trial court did not err in sustaining the Commonwealth's objection to Justus' opening statement.