Opinion ID: 1248685
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Elimination of Other Possible Causes

Text: Defendant argues that plaintiff must eliminate the possibility that he incorrectly charged the batteries before he can establish by inference a defect in the batteries. We do not adopt this suggestion, but instead adopt the holding in Dansak v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. as follows: [I]n plaintiff's case-in-chief, plaintiff [need not] negate every theoretically conceivable secondary cause for the malfunction. Rather ... the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case only if the plaintiff does not negate evidence of other reasonable, secondary causes or abnormal use that is actually introduced during plaintiff's case-in-chief. Dansak v. Cameron Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 703 A.2d at 497 (quoting Schlier v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 835 F.Supp. 839, 841 (E.D.Pa.1993)) (alterations in original). Indeed, [s]ummary judgment is not warranted simply because the defendant hypothesizes (or even presents evidence of) reasonable secondary causes. Id. Accordingly, a plaintiff need not look to actively `eliminate' the possibility of reasonable secondary causes. He is merely required to present a case-in-chief that either contains no evidence of reasonable secondary causes or negates any such evidence that was initially present. Hamilton v. Emerson Elec. Co., 133 F.Supp.2d at 366. Plaintiff's deposition testimony does not present evidence of a secondary cause of the leakage unrelated to defendant. Instead, defendant suggests that an error plaintiff may have committed led to plaintiff's injury. This suggestion does not rise to the level requiring the trial court to conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff failed to negate a reasonable secondary cause.