Opinion ID: 1846581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: verdict supported by the weight of the evidence

Text: ¶ 25. The other issue raised by appellate counsel is that the verdict of murder was not supported by the evidence and if the jury was justified in finding Givens guilty of any crime, it should have found him guilty of manslaughter. Appellate counsel admits sufficient evidence was presented at trial to show that Givens acted in the heat of passion, taking his acts out of the realm of murder. Specifically, appellate counsel states that the record supports the argument that Givens thought Cooper had set him up. Investigating officers for the State testified that Givens received a citation for his possession of marijuana and began yelling that he was set up and hitting a wall. ¶ 26. The standard of review for determining whether a jury verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence is well-settled. We will not order a new trial unless convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that, to allow it to stand, would be to sanction an unconscionable injustice. McLendon v. State, 945 So.2d 372, 385 (Miss.2006) (citing Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss. 1983)); see also Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 844 (Miss.2005) (citing Herring v. State, 691 So.2d 948, 957 (Miss.1997)). ¶ 27. To support his argument that the jury's verdict of murder is not supported by the weight of the evidence, and at best, the evidence would support a guilty verdict for manslaughter, appellate counsel cites several cases, including Tait v. State, 669 So.2d 85 (Miss.1996); Dedeaux v. State, 630 So.2d 30 (Miss.1993); and, Clemons v. State, 473 So.2d 943 (Miss.1985). Both Dedeaux and Clemons relied, in part, on this Court's prior decision in Wells v. State, 305 So.2d 333 (Miss.1974). However, Tait, Dedeaux, Clemons, and Wells are all clearly distinguishable from today's case. We will briefly discuss these cases in chronological order, based on the dates of the decisions. ¶ 28. In Wells, there were no eye witnesses to the killing, but the defendant stated that he confronted an intoxicated man at a juke joint about cursing his (the defendant's) wife, whereupon the man hollered, Come on, I am going to get you, and then grabbed the defendant by his throat. The defendant reacted by pulling his knife and putting the knife to the aggressor's throat to scare him, but, according, to the defendant, he accidentally cut the man's throat, killing him. On appeal, this Court found that the murder conviction was not supported by the evidence, but that the evidence did support a manslaughter conviction; therefore, the case was remanded for resentencing for the crime of manslaughter. Wells, 305 So.2d at 337, 340. ¶ 29. Clemons involved another juke joint killing where there was considerable consumption of alcohol. The defendant was found guilty of murder; however, on appeal, this Court stated that there were so many contradictory versions of what occurred on the night in question, it was virtually impossible for the jury to reasonably extrapolate enough competent facts from the many versions of the story to sufficiently support the finding of murder. Clemons, 473 So.2d at 945. Therefore, consistent with Wells and other cited cases, this Court found that the evidence has established guilt of [manslaughter] beyond a reasonable doubt, and the case was remanded for resentencing for the crime of manslaughter. Id. ¶ 30. The setting in Dedeaux involved yet another juke joint killing where a married woman's lover killed the woman's highly intoxicated husband. This Court found that while the intoxicated husband was most likely the aggressor, the confrontation between the defendant and his girlfriend's husband was arguably initiated by [the defendant]. Dedeaux, 630 So.2d at 31. In due course, several shots were fired and the intoxicated husband was killed. The defendant was convicted of murder and on appeal, this Court found that the case was weak as to murder; therefore, consistent with Wells and Clemons, this Court reversed and remanded for resentencing for the crime of heat-of-passion manslaughter. Id. at 33. ¶ 31. Finally, in Tait, the defendant and his friend had been playing in the yard with a pistol for most of the day, when the defendant put the pistol to his friend's head and the pistol fired, killing the defendant's friend. The defendant immediately fell to the ground and began crying. When a police officer responded to the scene, he entered an apartment, finding one male with a serious head wound, and the other male (the defendant), holding his friend's head, sobbing and saying, `I killed him. Oh my God, I killed him. I shot him.' Tait, 669 So.2d 85. Relying on Wells, Clemons, and Dedeaux, this Court found that the evidence did not support a conviction for depraved heart murder or for heat-of-passion manslaughter, but that the evidence did support a conviction for manslaughter by culpable negligence; therefore, the case was remanded for resentencing for the lesser offense of culpable negligence manslaughter. Id. at 91. ¶ 32. All these cases are readily distinguishable from today's case since Wells, Clemons, and Dedeaux involved emotionally-charged environments brought about by a combination of alcohol consumption and jealousy, and Tait involved the unfortunate killing of a friend by a person who became immediately distraught over what he had done. In today's case, although Givens may have been upset with Cooper for being allegedly set up for the marihuana possession charge, eyewitness testimony from Hampton and Foman reveals that while Cooper was sitting on his bicycle talking to them, Givens came up from behind and repeatedly hit Cooper in the head with a brick. According to Foman, even after Cooper fell off his bicycle, Givens kept picking up bricks and hitting Cooper in the head. According to Hampton, after the incident, Givens told Hampton and Foman y'all don't see nothing. According to Foman, Givens told them, y'all see anything, you say I didn't. ¶ 33. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we cannot say that the verdict of guilty of depraved heart murder was so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would be an unconscionable injustice. Further, this Court is unable to say that the evidence against Givens was insufficient to uphold his murder conviction. In Mullins v. State, 493 So.2d 971, 974 (Miss.1986), we defined heat of passion as follows: In the criminal law, a state of violent and uncontrollable rage engendered by a blow or certain other provocation given, which will reduce a homicide from the grade of murder to that of manslaughter. Passion or anger suddenly aroused at the time by some immediate and reasonable provocation, by words or acts of one at the time. The term includes an emotional state of mind characterized by anger, rage, hatred, furious resentment or terror. Id. (citing Black's Law Dictionary, 650 (5th Ed.1979)). ¶ 34. When considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational juror could conclude that Givens acted not out of the heat of passion, but with deliberate design to kill Cooper. The evidence showed that Givens repeatedly hit Cooper with multiple bricks; that he stopped during the attack to tell Hampton and Foman that it would be best for them if they had not seen anything; that Givens struck Cooper from behind; and that Cooper had no defensive wounds on his hands. While Givens was possibly angry because he thought that the drug bust was a set-up by Cooper, Givens did not act in a violent and uncontrollable rage. . . . Mullins, 493 So.2d at 974. Several officers testified that Givens had walked away yelling. Givens had plenty of time to contemplate hitting Cooper; and thus, a jury could find that Givens acted with deliberate design. The jury had all the evidence before it and made an informed decision based on the facts before it. Thus, this issue lacks merit.