Opinion ID: 575863
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: bradford's confession

Text: 2 In his brief, petitioner asserts [t]he most damaging assault on Bradford's rights stems from the admission and use of an improperly obtained confession at trial--a confession he made while in custody at the police station following his arrest, and after he had twice asked to speak with an attorney as provided by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 2 Lafayette police twice read Bradford his Miranda rights; each time, the suspect told them he wanted to speak with an attorney. Nevertheless, following further conversations with the police, Bradford agreed to tape-record a confession. 3 Determining who initiated the conversation after Bradford invoked his right to counsel is essential to a Fifth Amendment inquiry. Edwards, a decision aimed at preventing police from pressuring defendants into waiving their previously asserted Miranda rights, recognized that it is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Edwards held that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. Id. at 484, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85. A suspect who requests an attorney, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Id. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1885 (emphasis added). 3 4 In this case, the state court, after a suppression hearing, declined to prevent introduction of Bradford's confession. The federal district court adopted a magistrate's finding, based on the state court record, that Bradford re-initiated the discussion with the police. See Plazinich v. Lynaugh, 843 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.1988). We decline, however, to pursue the question who initiated the conversation heading to Bradford's confession, because it was not introduced in the state's case in chief against Bradford. 5 While Edwards prevents the prosecution from using Bradford's confession as substantive evidence, it is well-settled that his statement may still be introduced to impeach his false or inconsistent testimony. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). In Harris, Chief Justice Burger explained: Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. Id. at 225, 91 S.Ct. at 645. See also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1221, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975) (Blackmun, J.) ([T]he shield provided by Miranda is not to be perverted to a license to testify inconsistently, or even perjuriously, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.). 6 Most recently, the Court held that the prosecution may use a defendant's post-arraignment statements for impeachment purposes even when those statements were obtained in contravention of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 1180, 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990). 4 Harvey recognized the need to safeguard the defendant's right to counsel while preventing him from committing perjury and thus undermining the integrity of the trial. When a defendant chooses to take the stand, he assumes an obligation to speak truthfully. That the government may have resorted to unconstitutional means to obtain a confession does not mean the defendant is justified in turning the illegality to his advantage, thereby preventing the prosecution from exposing his prior inconsistent statements at trial. Id. 7 Here, after Bradford chose to testify in his own defense, the state used the confession only for impeachment purposes on three occasions during cross-examination. When the prosecution completed its cross-examination, Bradford's attorney prevailed upon the trial judge to play a tape recording of Bradford's entire confession for the jury. 5 The trial record reveals that Bradford's counsel was concerned that the written transcript, which had been prepared by the state and which used the word INAUDIBLE at several points during the interrogation, was incomplete and might mislead the jury. By offering to play the tape of the confession following Bradford's direct testimony and cross-examination, Bradford's counsel hoped to persuade the jury, as he stated during his closing argument, that the defendant was tired, he was beat, he was talking low, he was scared, and he was just kind of giving out statements. For our purposes, the key point is that it was Bradford, and not the prosecution, that offered the confession into evidence. Under these circumstances, Harris, and not Edwards, is decisive.