Opinion ID: 470011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Regarding Evidentiary Rulings

Text: 22 Lyubarsky and Zonenashvili contend that the trial judge unfairly limited their right to show, through cross-examination and by introduction of extrinsic evidence, that Zubok was heavily in debt. They sought to introduce such evidence for purposes of impeachment as well as in support of their defense that the insurance fraud scheme charged in the indictment was not the scheme they had in mind. 23 The broad rule is that the permissible scope and extent of cross-examination are generally within the sound discretion of the trial court. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694, 51 S.Ct. 218, 220, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931); United States v. Pedroza, 750 F.2d 187, 195 (2d Cir.1984). Moreover, the trial court has discretion regarding the mode ... of interrogating witnesses to make the presentation effective for the ascertainment of truth and to avoid needless consumption of time. Fed.R.Evid. 611(a); See United States v. Bari, 750 F.2d 1169, 1178 (2d Cir.1984); United States v. Singh, 628 F.2d 758, 763 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034, 101 S.Ct. 609, 66 L.Ed.2d 496 (1980). Here, the district judge's rulings were within his discretion and subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. 24 Zubok testified on direct examination for approximately two days. He was then cross-examined for approximately two and a half days. However, appellants contend that the court erred in limiting their inquiry regarding the details of certain specific aspects of Zubok's financial situation. Questioning was allowed regarding Zubok's financial relationship with Lyubarsky and Zonenashvili. Some questioning also was allowed regarding Zubok's financial condition during the period of the alleged illegal activities, e.g., evidence concerning a loan Zubok obtained to purchase a taxi cab. However, the district court limited cross-examination regarding an alleged civil action involving the purchase of the taxi. Relying upon Rule 608(b) of the Fed.R.Evid., the court held that the line of questioning was not sufficiently relevant to the issue of credibility. 25 Appellants contend that the court's limitation upon their questioning of Zubok about this and other loans and debts allegedly owed to merchants in the jewelry business, the financial condition of Zubok's jewelry store, and the contents of his income tax return was error. We disagree. Appellants sought to inquire for purposes of impeachment and in an attempt to show that Zubok was the type of individual who borrows money but does not repay it, and hence that he was likely to have acted similarly with regard to his financial relationship with them. However, Zubok's financial position had little, if any, relevance to his credibility. Further, while we note that the failure to pay debts is not a crimen falsi, under Rule 404(b) of the Fed.R.Evid., evidence of bad acts is, in any event, inadmissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. We conclude that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in this ruling. 26 Appellants also attempted unsuccessfully to present evidence about Zubok's finances by offering to call three witnesses to whom Zubok was allegedly indebted. This evidence did not relate to any debts owed to appellants, was not probative of Zubok's credibility and, hence, was subject to the limits of Rules 404(a), (b), and 608(b) of the Fed.R.Evid.; we conclude that these rulings were not erroneous.