Opinion ID: 3188713
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Multiple Punishments for Same Offense

Text: The petitioner argues that he has been subjected to multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the double jeopardy clause through the circuit court’s entry of the jointly submitted second amended sentencing order. The petitioner contends that the second amended sentencing order is illegal because it directs counts one through six to run consecutively, whereas the earlier sentencing orders directed counts one through five to run consecutively. Having begun to serve his sentence at the time the second amended sentencing order was entered, the petitioner contends that his sentence was impermissibly increased by two years because he should have been sentenced to a total of fifteen, rather than seventeen, years. 47 Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163, syl. pt. 3, supra. 35 Citing Rule 35(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the State acknowledges that the trial court was obligated to correct the petitioner’s sentence by reducing the sevenyear recidivist sentence imposed in the first amended sentencing order to the five years imposed in the second amended sentencing order. To compensate for this two-year reduction in the recidivist sentence given the trial court’s express intent to impose a total period of incarceration of seventeen years, the State asserts that the jointly proposed second amended sentencing order directed counts one through six, rather than one through five, to be served consecutively. Because the petitioner’s total sentence did not increase through the court’s entry of the second amended sentencing order, the State argues that there has been no violation of double jeopardy. Importantly, the double jeopardy clause does not relieve a defendant from the consequences of his voluntary choice to invalidate his original punishment. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99 (1977) (“the Double Jeopardy Clause, which guards against Government oppression, does not relieve a defendant from the consequences of his voluntary choice.”).48 Indeed, we are unpersuaded that the double jeopardy clause is violated when a 48 In Commonwealth v. Cumming, 995 N.E.2d 1094, 1097 (Mass. 2013), the court addressed a defendant’s double jeopardy challenge concerning the trial court’s restructuring of the lawful portions of his sentencing during re-sentencing. The defendant argued that only the unlawful portion of his sentence could be modified. The Massachusetts court disagreed, finding that the “restructuring [of] the ‘final’ lawful portions of the defendant’s sentences under rule 30(a) . . . [had] not placed [the defendant] twice in jeopardy.” 995 N.E.2d at1097. (continued...) 36 court restructures the lawful portions of a defendant’s sentence when correcting the unlawful portions pursuant to a Rule 35(a) motion where, as here, the sentence is within statutory limits and the aggregate sentence has not increased. It is axiomatic that sentencing is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Syl. Pt. 1, in part, State v. Lucas, 201 W.Va. 271, 496 S.E.2d 221 (1997) (finding that sentencing matters are generally reviewed “under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, unless the order violates statutory or constitutional commands.”). Moreover, “[s]entences imposed by the trial court, if within statutory limits and if not based on some [im]permissible factor, are not subject to appellate review.” Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Goodnight, 169 W.Va. 366, 287 S.E.2d 504 (1982). Inasmuch as the circuit court expressed its intent in the second amended sentencing order to impose an aggregate period of incarceration of seventeen years, as it had done in the first amended sentencing order, and because the sentences imposed in the second amended sentencing order are within statutory limits49 and are not based upon an impermissible factor, we find no double jeopardy violation. 48 (...continued) The court further observed that “[b]y filing a motion to correct his unlawful sentence . . . the defendant knowingly exposed himself to the possibility that his entire sentencing scheme might be restructured.” Id. at 1098. 49 See supra note 13; see also W.Va. Code § 61-11-18 (2010). 37 E. Right to be present at sentencing The petitioner asserts that the trial court erred and violated his due process right to be present at every stage of his trial by entering the submitted second amended sentencing order outside his presence. Alleging that the first two sentencing orders were void because the court misapplied the recidivist enhancement, he argues that it was necessary for him to be present at the critical stage when the circuit court entered the jointly proposed second amended sentencing order. He further argues that the error is not harmless. The State responds that there is no error in this regard. Citing the petitioner’s two prior sentencing hearings, the State argues that there was no need for any further factual development prior to the circuit court’s entry of the second amended sentencing order, which was jointly proposed by the parties to correct a technical issue of law on the recidivist sentencing. We have long held that “[t]he defendant has a right under Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution to be present at all critical stages in the criminal proceeding; and when he is not, the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that what transpired in his absence was harmless.” Syl. Pt. 6, State v. Boyd, 160 W.Va. 234, 233 S.E.2d 710 (1977); see also W.Va. R. Crim. P. 43 (a) (“The defendant shall be present . . . 38 at every state of the trial including . . . at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule.”). Here, the parties jointly proposed the second amended sentencing order, which was “unrelated to the underlying truth-finding process . . . and only correct[ed] the improper [recidivist] sentence.” State ex rel. McMannis v. Mohn, 163 W.Va. 129, 142, 254 S.E.2d 805, 812 (1979). Further, “[a] defendant need not be present . . . [a]t a conference or argument upon a technical question of law not depending upon facts within the personal knowledge of the defendant.” W.Va. R. Crim P. 43(c)(3); see also State v. Conley, 168 W.Va. 694, 697 n.2, 285 S.E.2d 454, 456 n.2 (1981) (“Federal courts and the courts of sister states have laid down the rule that the right of a defendant to be present does not extend to post-trial hearings where only questions of law are determined.”). In the instant matter, the appendix record reflects that the petitioner requested a hearing in his pro se Rule 35(a) motion filed in January 2014. However, [i]n correcting an illegal sentence under Rule 35(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court has discretion to correct the sentence without holding a de novo resentencing hearing. This Court will not reverse the denial of a request for a de novo resentencing hearing on a trial court’s correction of a sentence under Rule 35(a) absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. 39 Syl. Pt. 2, in part, State v. Tex B.S., 236 W.Va. 261, 778 S.E.2d 710 (2015).50 Inasmuch as the petitioner had two sentencing hearings, and given that the parties jointly submitted the proposed second amended sentencing order for entry to “correct technical question of law not depending upon facts within the personal knowledge of the defendant,”51 we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s adoption and entry of the jointly proposed order without holding a third sentencing hearing. Id. F. Sentencing under Amended Statute Through this Court’s administrative order entered on February 4, 2015, we directed the parties to address whether the petitioner “may elect to be sentenced under the revised version of W.Va. Code § 61-8C-3 that mitigated the punishment for possessing multiple images of materials depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.” Although the petitioner assigned as error the issue of whether he should have been sentenced under West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3, as amended in 2014, in his notice of appeal filed on June 5, 2015, he did not specifically address this issue in his appellate brief. The State followed the Court’s directive and addressed the issue in its appellate brief. 50 “‘As a general rule, judicial decisions are retroactive in the sense that they apply both to the parties in the case before the court and to all other parties in pending cases.’ Crowe v. Bolduc, 365 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir. 2004).” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 225 W.Va. 128, 156, 690 S.E.2d 322, 350 (2009). 51 See W.Va. R. Crim. P. 43(c)(3). 40 In 2014, the Legislature made significant changes to West Virginia Code § 61­ 8C-3, which now provides, as follows: (a) Any person who, knowingly and willfully, sends or causes to be sent or distributes, exhibits, possesses, electronically accesses with intent to view or displays or transports any material visually portraying a minor engaged in any sexually explicit conduct is guilty of a felony. (b) Any person who violates the provisions of subsection (a) of this section when the conduct involves fifty or fewer images shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned in a state correctional facility for not more than two years or fined not more than $2,000 or both. (c) Any person who violates the provisions of subsection (a) of this section when the conduct involves more than fifty but fewer than six hundred images shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned in a state correctional facility for not less than two nor more than ten years or fined not more than $5,000, or both. (d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section any person who violates the provisions of subsection (a) of this section when the conduct involves six hundred or more images or depicts violence against a child or a child engaging in bestiality shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned in a state correctional facility for not less than five nor more than fifteen years or fined not more than $25,000, or both. (e) For purposes of this section each video clip, movie or similar recording of five minutes or less shall constitute seventy-five images. A video clip, movie or similar recording of a duration longer than five minutes shall be deemed to constitute seventy-five images for every two minutes in length it exceeds five minutes. 41 W.Va. Code § 61-8C-3 (2014). The State argues that the petitioner cannot elect to be sentenced under the 2014 version of the statute because (1) his offense, indictment, convictions, and sentencing all occurred well prior to the effective date of the amended statute, and (2) the Legislature gave no indication that the revised version of the statute was retroactive. Notwithstanding our decision in State v. Cline, 206 W.Va. 445, 525 S.E.2d 326 (1999), which would impel a contrary result, we agree with the State. In Cline, the defendant was arrested for driving on a suspended or revoked license in violation of West Virginia § 17B-4-3(a) (1994). Upon his trial and conviction, he was sentenced by order dated August 10, 1998, to forty-eight hours in jail and fined $250.00 pursuant to the mandatory provisions of West Virginia Code § 17B-4-3(a) (1994). On appeal, Mr. Cline argued that he should not receive a jail sentence for his conviction because the Legislature amended West Virginia Code § 17B-4-3, effective April 7, 1999, so as to eliminate the incarceration penalty for this crime. In reliance upon West Virginia Code § 2­ 2-8 (2013),52 the general savings statute, Mr. Cline asserted that because the “‘penalty or 52 West Virginia Code § 2-2-8 provides, as follows: The repeal of a law, or its expiration by virtue of any provision contained therein, shall not affect any offense committed, or penalty or punishment incurred, before the repeal took effect, or the law expired, save only that the proceedings thereafter had shall conform as far as practicable to the laws in force at the time such proceedings take place, unless otherwise specially provided; and that if any penalty or (continued...) 42 punishment’” imposed by the 1994 statute is “‘mitigated by the new law[,]’” he was entitled to choose to be sentenced under the 1999 amendment. Cline, 206 W.Va. at 451, 525 S.E.2d at 332. This Court agreed and remanded the matter for resentencing. While there were no new points of law expressly set forth in Cline, the opinion effectually expanded our prior precedent, which we now take the opportunity to address. Indeed, we are persuaded that the separate opinion penned by Justice Davis in Cline reached the correct result. Justice Davis expressed grave concern that “the unwarranted and unprecedented interpretation given by the majority to W. Va. Code 2-2-8 sets the stage for voiding countless criminal sentences.” Cline, 206 W.Va. at 452, 525 S.E.2d at 333 (Davis,