Opinion ID: 2614608
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The 1992 Amendment to Section 496

Text: The Legislature amended section 496 in 1992 by adding the following two sentences: A principal in the actual theft of the property may be convicted pursuant to this section. However, no person may be convicted both pursuant to this section and of the theft of the same property. (Stats.1992, ch. 1146, § 1, p. 5374.) [11] Read together and in the light of the foregoing overview of the common law rule, the quoted two sentences bear a plain meaning. To more easily grasp that meaning, we take the sentences in reverse order. As noted in People v. Carr (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 109, 112, footnote 2, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 639, the second sentence of the 1992 amendment codifies the narrow application of the common law rule invoked in Jaramillo, supra, 16 Cal.3d 752, 757, 129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706. The second sentence declares that no person may be convicted both pursuant to this section and of the theft of the same property. (§ 496.) The sentence thus prohibits, as the narrow common law rule also prohibited, dual convictions of any person of both an offense pursuant to this section [§ 496]viz., buying, receiving, concealing, withholding, or selling stolen propertyand the offense of stealing the same property. The first sentence of the 1992 amendment addresses the broad application of the common law rule; but rather than codifying that application, the sentence effectively abrogates it. As noted, the first sentence declares that A principal in the actual theft of the property may be convicted pursuant to this section. (§ 496.) The sentence thus authorizes a conviction for receiving stolen property even though the defendant also stole the property, provided he has not actually been convicted of the theft. After the 1992 amendment, the fact that the defendant stole the property no longer bars a conviction for receiving, concealing or withholding the same property. ( People v. Strong (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 366, 373, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 494.) Indeed, evidence that the defendant is the thief cannot be exculpatory regardless of its strength: before the amendment, as noted above, we said he may be convicted of receiving although the evidence strongly suggests he is the thief ( Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th 324, 464, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610); after the amendment, the evidence of that fact may even rise to the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the first sentence of the 1992 amendment does not perpetuate the distinctions that the cases (e.g., Tabarez, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d 551, 554-555, 253 Cal.Rptr. 658) drew between the various acts by which a defendant may violate section 496, and instead provides simply that the thief may be convicted pursuant to this section [§ 496]. Because the thief may now be convicted under section 496 whether he bought, received, concealed, withheld, or sold the property, there is no longer any need forand hence the amendment also does not perpetuatethe limited case law exceptions authorizing such conviction only upon proof of a complete divorcement between the theft and later independent acts of receiving or concealment ( Tatum, supra, 209 Cal.App.2d 179, 184, 25 Cal.Rptr. 832). This being the case, it follows that the Tatum requirement of a `complete divorcement' between the theft and the possession of stolen property before the thief may be convicted of receiving stolen property has been abrogated by the 1992 amendment of section 496. ( People v. Hinks (1997) 58 Cal. App.4th 1157, 1165, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 440.) [12] Defendant contends the first sentence of the 1992 amendment does not wholly abrogate the broad application of the common law rule, but merely limits it. He argues in effect that the sentence allows the actual thief to be convicted of receiving the stolen property only if the statute of limitations has run on the charge of theft; if the statute has not run, the common law rule assertedly continues to prohibit a conviction of receiving. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the statute of limitations on the theft had not run by the time defendant was convicted of receiving stolen property. The contention is without merit. Defendant's proposed limitation does not appear on the face of the statute. He contends the limitation should nevertheless be read into the first sentence of the 1992 amendment because of an uncodified section of the bill that enacted the amendment. The section recited, It is the intent of the Legislature to provide for the prosecution of principals in the actual theft of the property who continue to possess that property after the statute of limitations has run on the theft of the property. (Stats.1992, ch. 1146, § 2, p. 5375.) [13] The decisions are in conflict on the effect of the quoted provision. Defendant relies on In re Kali D. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 381, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 581 (Kali D.). The Kali D. court concluded that the uncodified statement of legislative intent indicates a more limited repeal of the common law so that ... the actual thief can be convicted of the greater offense of receiving stolen property only when the limitations period has expired with respect to the underlying theft. ( Id. at p. 386, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 581.) To reach this conclusion, the court relied first on the rule that courts should give statutory words their plain or literal meaning unless that meaning is inconsistent with the legislative intent apparent in the statute. (E.g., Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299.) In determining that intent, the court in Kali D., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th 381, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 581, apparently read the quoted statement's positive declaration of intenti.e., allowing prosecutions for receiving stolen property to be brought against thieves who continue to possess the property after the statute of limitations has run on the theft of the propertyas implying an additional and negative intent to disallow such prosecutions of thieves before the statute of limitations has run. ( Id. at p. 386, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 581.) Although the court did not say so, its reasoning was in effect an application of the canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius. (See, e.g., Grupe Development Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 4 Cal.4th 911, 921, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 226, 844 P.2d 545.) The court then invoked the rule that courts should construe related provisions of a statute together and harmonize them if possible. (E.g., Lungren v. Deukmejian, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 735, 248 Cal. Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299.) The court harmonized the provisions before it by subordinating the plain meaning of the first sentence of the 1992 amendment to the negative inference that the court drew from the uncodified statement of legislative intent: thus the court held, the Legislature intended the statute to be applied only to thieves who continue to possess the stolen property after the statute of limitations has expired on theft. ( Kali D., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 386, 43 Cal. Rptr.2d 581.) Directly to the contrary is the reasoning of People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39 ( Reyes) . That court began, like Kali D., supra, 37 Cal. App.4th at page 386, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 581, with the rule that courts should give statutory words their plain or literal meaning unless that meaning is inconsistent with the legislative intent. But in determining that intent, the Reyes court declined to apply the expressio unius canon and to draw the negative inference that Kali D. drew from the statement of legislative intent; instead, the Reyes court read that statement to imply no more than it said on its face. Thus the court reasoned: Under the plain language of [the first sentence of the 1992 amendment], a thief may be convicted of receiving the property he stole, without regard to whether a theft charge is time barred. We are constrained to literally interpret the statute, unless doing so would violate the Legislature's intent to avoid the situation where a thief could retain possession of stolen property with impunity, because the statute of limitations on the theft had expired. We conclude it would not, as there is no indication the Legislature intended to limit prosecution of a thief under section 496 to situations in which a theft charge was no longer an option. (52 Cal.App.4th at p. 987, 61 Cal. Rptr.2d 39, italics in original.) The Reyes court then reinforced its conclusion by invoking the rule that courts must avoid a construction that would render related provisions nugatory. (E.g., Lungren v. Deukmejian, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299.) Applying that rule, the Reyes court reasoned that the Kali D. construction of the statement of legislative intent would render meaningless the provision's second sentence, which states: `However, no person may be convicted both pursuant to this section and of the theft of the same property.' A person could only be convicted of both crimes if (1) he or she was the actual thief of the property, and (2) the statute of limitations on a theft charge had not expired. (52 Cal.App.4th at p. 987, 61 Cal. Rptr.2d 39, italics added.) Under the reasoning of the Reyes court, accordingly, the 1992 amendment allows the actual thief to be convicted of receiving the stolen property whether or not the statute of limitations has run on the theft charge. Although the court discussed the point solely for the guidance of the superior court on retrial, its reasoning was adopted and its conclusion elevated to a holding in People v. Hinks, supra, 58 Cal. App.4th 1157, 1164-1165, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 440. In the case at bar the Court of Appeal likewise adopted the Reyes reasoning and conclusion. We, too, agree with the reasoning and conclusion of Reyes, supra, 52 Cal, App.4th at page 987, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39. We reiterate that the Legislature did not incorporate its statement of intent into the text of the statute itself, but relegated it to an uncodified plus section of the bill that enacted the legislation. (See fn. 13, ante.) This fact suggests the provision may have been meant simply as an aid to construction, i.e., to ensure that the broad language of the amended statute be construed to apply at least to the special case of the thief who secretes the stolen property rather than selling it and is caught when the statute of limitations has run on theft but not on a violation of section 496. [14] In any event, whatever the purpose of the statement in question, nothing in its text or its legislative history suggests an intent that the 1992 amendment be construed not to apply to the far more common case of the thief who is caught with the stolen goods before the statute of limitations on theft has run. Such cases are far more common because, rather than hiding the stolen goods for three years, most thieves fence their loot as soon as possible, [15] especially the many who promptly spend the resulting cash to support an illegal drug habit. For example, that appears to have been both the motive and the modus operandi of defendant in the case at bar. We conclude the 1992 amendment was not intended to bar prosecution in such a case: as the court correctly reasoned in Reyes, supra, 52 Cal. App.4th at page 987, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39, there is no indication the Legislature intended to limit prosecution of a thief under section 496 to situations in which a theft charge was no longer an option. (Italics in original.) It follows that the primary rule of construction quoted at the outset applies, i.e., that we must give the statutory words their plain meaning because it is not inconsistent with the legislative intent apparent in the statute. As explained above, the plain meaning of the first sentence of the 1992 amendment is that the actual thief may be convicted of violating section 496 whether or not the statute of limitations on theft has run. We so hold. [16]
Defendant next contends the statutory and common law prohibition against dual convictions of receiving stolen property and theft also bars dual convictions of receiving stolen property and burglary, at least where, as here, the burglary in question was an entry with intent to commit theft. He points out that the burglary statute (Pen.Code, § 459) defines that crime as an entry into a house or other listed enclosure with intent either to commit grand or petty larcenyin short, theftor to commit any felony. He stresses that in the case at bar the information charged him only with burglaries by entry with the intent to commit theft, and that the jury instructions on the intent element of burglary were likewise limited to the intent to commit theft. He further notes the Court of Appeal found the evidence supported the inference that defendant had possession of the loot because he had taken it himself from the burglarized homes. (Italics added.) He concludes that in these circumstances each of his burglary convictions was the functional equivalent of a conviction of a theft offense, and hence barred his convictions of receiving the property stolen in that offense. The contention has a superficial appeal, but does not withstand analysis. Defendant begins by invoking the second sentence of the 1992 amendment. As we have seen, however, that sentence provides only that no person may be convicted both pursuant to this section [§ 496] and of the theft of the same property. (Italics added.) Apparently recognizing that the sentence speaks of theft rather than burglary, defendant contends the word theft in the 1992 amendment should be expansively read to mean the unlawful acquisition of propertya general description that defendant argues would include burglary. The contention is refuted by the legislative history. The 1992 amendment originated as Assembly Bill No. 3326 in the 1991-1992 Regular Session of the Legislature (hereafter Bill No. 3326). As first introduced on February 20, 1992, Bill No. 3326 addressed only the broad common law rule, and proposed to abrogate that rule by allowing a principal in the unlawful acquisition of the property to be convicted of receiving that property. We may assume arguendo that the quoted phrase would indeed have included a burglary. But the Legislature rejected the phrase: on March 31, 1992, the Assembly amended Bill No. 3326 by deleting the quoted phrase and substituting the more specific term, the actual theft of the property, and by adding a second sentence prohibiting dual convictions of receiving stolen property and of the theft of the same property. [17] There were no further amendments and the bill passed both houses unanimously, becoming the 1992 amendment we construe herein. Because the Legislature thus expressly removed the general description, the unlawful acquisition of property, from its proposed amendment to section 496, we cannot read the phrase back into the resulting statute. We have no reason to believe, therefore, that when the Legislature used the term theft in the 1992 amendment, it intended any meaning broader than the meaning the term has in the general theft statute (Pen.Code, § 484), i.e., theft committed by means of larceny, embezzlement, or false pretenses. (See, e.g., People v. Davis (1998) 19 Cal.4th 301, 304, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 965 P.2d 1165.) Conspicuous by its absence from that list is burglary. [18] Lacking a statutory basis for the claimed bar against dual convictions of burglary and receiving stolen property, defendant seeks support in the case law. The effort fails for several reasons. Although this court has not previously determined whether dual convictions of burglary and receiving stolen property are permissible, numerous Court of Appeal decisions have addressed the issue. That case law, however, has recently experienced a striking evolution. The earlier decisions, which defendant relies on, held dual convictions of burglary and receiving stolen property impermissible. The first was People v. Taylor (1935) 4 Cal.App.2d 214, 218-219, 40 P.2d 870 ( Taylor) . But that court simply invoked the common law rule against dual convictions of theft and receiving stolen property, without explaining why the same rule should apply to a conviction of burglary. At least three Court of Appeal decisions followed Taylor without further analysis. ( People v. Morales (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 211, 214, 69 Cal.Rptr. 553; People v. Lohman (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 760, 767-768, 86 Cal.Rptr. 221; People v. Perez (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 795, 800, 115 Cal.Rptr. 405.) We then decided Jaramillo, supra, 16 Cal.3d 752, 129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706. Although Jaramillo did not purport to change the common law on this point (see id. at p. 757, 129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706) and had nothing to do with burglary, nevertheless at least six Court of Appeal decisions proceeded to rely on Jaramillo as the primary support for their holding that the common law barred dual convictions of burglary and receiving stolen property. ( People v. Lawrence (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 630, 638-639, 169 Cal.Rptr. 245; People v. Garcia (1981) 121 Cal. App.3d 239, 247, 175 Cal.Rptr. 296; People v. Stewart, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d 197, 203, 229 Cal.Rptr. 445; People v. Hines (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 945, 952, 259 Cal.Rptr. 128; People v. Vallejo (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 746, 748-751, 270 Cal.Rptr. 582; People v. DeRouen (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 86, 93, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 842.) Even while this chain of authority was being forged, however, weak links began to appear. In People v. Stewart, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d 197, 229 Cal.Rptr. 445 ( Stewart), the Third Appellate District Court of Appeal held that dual convictions of burglary and receiving stolen property were impermissible, finding ample appellate authority for that view ( id. at p. 203, 229 Cal.Rptr. 445, indiscriminately citing cases of burglary and receiving together with cases of theft and receiving). But the court then expressed serious doubts about its holding, stating that Were we to write upon a clean slate we might consider a different approach. ( Id, at p. 203, fn. 2, 229 Cal.Rptr. 445.) The court stressed that theft is not an element of the crime of burglary, then reasoned (ibid.), It would seem to follow that where a defendant has committed burglary, and has also committed acts which fulfill all of the elements necessary for a conviction [of receiving stolen property], it would be permissible to convict him of both violations but to stay the punishment for one offense. The court also correctly noted (ibid.) that Although the Jaramillo opinion did not deal with the crime of burglary and only asserted that a person cannot be convicted `of stealing and of receiving the same property,' the Courts of Appeal have extended its rationale to bar dual convictions of burglary and receiving. The court reluctantly felt bound by stare decisis to follow the Court of Appeal cases cited above. (Ibid.) Next, in People v. Hines, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d 945, 259 Cal.Rptr. 128, the First Appellate District joined the Third District in expressing serious doubts about the same holding. The court asserted that the Jaramillo rule against dual convictions of theft and receiving does not present an impediment to dual convictions of burglary and receiving because theft is not an element of burglary ( id. at p. 952, fn. 3, 259 Cal.Rptr. 128). Again, however, the court felt bound by stare decisis to follow the foregoing Court of Appeal cases. ( Ibid.) The chain was weakened still further by the decision on a related issue in People v. Bernal (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1457, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 839 ( Bernal) . There the issue was whether dual convictions of burglary and theftrather than burglary and receivingwere permissible. Although no court had expressly discussed the question, Bernal observed that other decisions (e.g., People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 760-763, 26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449) had upheld such dual convictions provided they did not result in multiple punishment in violation of Penal Code section 654. [19] The Bernal court then reasoned: Logically, this appears to be the correct approach since a burglary can be committed without committing a theft. Theft is not a lesser included offense of burglary. We could follow the line of authorities referred to in Stewart, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d [at page 203, 229 Cal.Rptr. 445,] holding a defendant may not be convicted of both burglary and receiving stolen property obtained during the burglary. However, we feel the more sound analysis is to permit conviction of both crimes and apply Penal Code section 654 to avoid multiple punishment. (22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1458, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 839.) [20] The Bernal decision appears to have broken the self-imposed shackles that the earlier Court of Appeal cases found in Jaramillo. Thus in People v. Landis (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1255, 59 Cal. Rptr.2d 641, the court cited Bernal and reasoned: In our view, it is plainly inconsistent to permit dual convictions for burglary and theft [i.e., as Bernal held] but bar dual convictions for burglary and receiving stolen goods. The Jaramillo reasoning appears to be inapplicable to dual convictions for burglary and receiving stolen goods because burglary, unlike [taking a vehicle with intent to steal it], does not require [actual theft of any property]. [Citations.] Accordingly, we find the reasoning in Bernal and in the Stewart footnote persuasive, and we decline to follow [the above cited cases prohibiting dual convictions of burglary and receiving]. The Landis court accordingly held dual convictions of burglary and receiving permissible. Finally, the matter recently came full circle in People v. Carr, supra, 66 Cal. App.4th 109, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 639. There the defendant was convicted of burglary and receiving property he stole in the burglary, but the trial court stayed sentence on the receiving count. The defendant appealed to the Third District, the same court that had held such dual convictions impermissible in People v. Stewart, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d 197, 203, 229 Cal.Rptr. 445, and People v. DeRouen, supra, 38 Cal. App.4th 86, 93, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 842. But rather than following its own precedents, the Carr court declared that the contrary decisions in Bernal and Landis freed it from the compulsion of stare decisis. (66 Cal.App.4th at p. 113, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 639.) The Carr court then reviewed the latter two decisions and squarely held: We conclude that Bernal and Landis are correctly decided and that the analysis set out in our footnote in Stewart [ (supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 203, fn. 2, 229 Cal.Rptr. 445)] should govern the issue. The rule in Jaramillo says a defendant may not be 'convicted ' of stealing and receiving the same property. ( People v. Jaramillo, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 757, 129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706.) A defendant who is convicted of burglary is not convicted of stealing any property at all. Jaramillo 's prohibition on dual conviction is thus inapplicable. We therefore hold that a defendant may lawfully be convicted of burglary and of receiving property that he stole during the burglary. We disavow our holdings in Stewart and DeRouen insofar as they reach a contrary conclusion. (66 Cal.App.4th at p. 114, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 639, fn. omitted.) Again our task is to resolve this conflict of decisions. We find more persuasive the reasoning quoted above from People v. Landis, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at page 1255, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 641, and People v. Carr, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at page 114, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 639. For those reasons we hold, as they do, that a defendant may be convicted both of burglary and of violating section 496 with respect to property he stole in the burglary. [21] We so hold, moreover, for an additional reason not discussed in the Court of Appeal cases, but which we find no less compelling: such dual convictions are authorized by Penal Code section 954 (hereafter section 954). Section 954 is an important statute of general application which provides, insofar as relevant here, that (1) a defendant may be charged in a single pleading with two or more different offenses connected together in their commission; (2) the prosecution need not elect between those offenses; and (3) the defendant may be convicted of any number of the offenses charged.... When, as here, a defendant is charged with burglary and with a violation of section 496 with respect to property he stole in the burglary, he has plainly been charged with two or more offenses connected together in their commission within the meaning of section 954. By its terms, therefore, section 954 likewise authorizes the defendant to be convicted of [both] of the offenses charged.... [22] In the case at bar defendant was convicted, inter alia, of three counts of burglary and two counts of violating section 496 with respect to property he stole in those burglaries; the jury found him guilty on all counts; and the trial court convicted him on all counts, but stayed execution of sentence on both counts of violating section 496. This disposition was correct, satisfying both section 954 (allowing multiple convictions) and section 654 (barring multiple punishment). The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. GEORGE, C.J., KENNARD, J., BAXTER, J., WERDEGAR, J., CHIN, J., and BROWN, J., concur.