Opinion ID: 1944998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was Brown denied his Sixth Amendment Right to the effective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial?

Text: ¶ 8. Brown contends he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel during the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial. Brown argues his counsel had a duty to investigate and present mitigating evidence and that counsel's failure to present a defense in the guilt-innocence phase of the trial as well as during the sentencing phase was deficient performance which prejudiced Brown. ¶ 9. Brown alleges there was an abundance of relevant, significant and material mitigating evidence to have been obtained from Brown's family members, but defense counsel failed to take the time to investigate or interview any of them. Brown contends his counsel's investigation and preparation for the guilt-innocence and sentencing phases of the trial fell short of the standards set forth in the American Bar Association (ABA) Guidelines for Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (Revised Edition, February 2003). ¶ 10. Brown argues that his counsel's deficiency resulted in the trial court never having the opportunity to consider evidence that Brown was a good student while he was enrolled in school, that he earned his GED, and that he entered the military and received an honorable discharge. Brown contends his trial counsel's failure to investigate and interview family members, as well as other witnesses, did not constitute a sound trial strategy. ¶ 11. Brown first asserts his counsel's performance fell below the objective standard of reasonableness. Brown argues his defense counsel had a duty to investigate and present mitigating evidence during the trial, but counsel failed to fulfill this duty. Brown claims he therefore suffered prejudice when counsel failed to conduct an adequate and sufficient investigation for purposes of mitigation and present mitigation evidence, resulting in Brown suffering from ineffective assistance of counsel that satisfies the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). ¶ 12. Second, Brown contends his trial counsel failed to present a defense during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, and failed to subject the prosecution's case to a meaningful adversarial test. Brown mentions that the defense did not call a single witness, nor was he called to testify. Brown argues that if the decision to stand trial has been made, counsel must hold the prosecution to its heavy burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. [I]f counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2047, 80 L.Ed.2d 657, 668 (1984). ¶ 13. In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court held the defendant must first show that counsel's performance was deficient, and the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Brown acknowledges that this standard has been refined further in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. See also Williams, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495. ¶ 14. However, Brown failed to raise this issue at trial or on direct appeal. Accordingly, review of this issue is governed by Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21, which states: (1) Failure by a prisoner to raise objections, defenses, claims, questions, issues or errors either in fact or law which were capable of determination at trial and/or on direct appeal, regardless of whether such are based on the laws and the Constitution of the state of Mississippi or of the United States, shall constitute a waiver thereof and shall be procedurally barred, but the court may upon a showing of cause and actual prejudice grant relief from the waiver. (2) The litigation of a factual issue at trial and on direct appeal of a specific state or federal legal theory or theories shall constitute a waiver of all other state or federal legal theories which could have been raised under said factual issue; and any relief sought under this article upon said facts but upon different state or federal legal theories shall be procedurally barred absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice. (3) The doctrine of res judicata shall apply to all issues, both factual and legal, decided at trial and on direct appeal. (4) The term cause as used in this section shall be defined and limited to those cases where the legal foundation upon which the claim for relief is based could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence at the time of trial or direct appeal. (5) The term actual prejudice as used in this section shall be defined and limited to those errors which would have actually adversely affected the ultimate outcome of the conviction or sentence. (6) The burden is upon the prisoner to allege in his motion such facts as are necessary to demonstrate that his claims are not procedurally barred under this section. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21. ¶ 15. In order to overcome this procedural bar, Brown must show cause and actual prejudice as defined by Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(4) & (5). Cause refers to cases where the legal foundation upon which the claim for relief is based could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence at the time of trial or direct appeal. Actual prejudice is limited to those errors which would have actually adversely affected the ultimate outcome of the conviction or sentence. ¶ 16. The legal foundation for Brown's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is the lack of presentation of mitigating evidence by his counsel at trial, and his counsel's lack of investigating Brown's past character, and his counsel's failure to present a defense at trial. However, in the Response to Petition for Post Conviction Relief with Exhibits, the State includes excerpts of trial testimony which shows defense counsel made a record at trial that Brown instructed him not to call witnesses during the sentencing phase of trial. These are the same witnesses that Brown now asserts would have informed the trial court of the evidence Brown offers to support his claim of ineffective assistance. ¶ 17. The excerpt of trial record is as follows: MR. THOMAS E. SCHWARTZ: . . . Following the verdict of the jury last night, I've had an occasion to confer with Scott and my client, my client's grandmother, Ms. Herrington [sic], my client's ex-wife concerning their possible testimony in mitigation in the mitigation phase of the sentencing hearing. I have likewise counseled and advised Xavier Brown with regard to his right to testify at the sentencing phase as well as his right to merely rise before the jury and ask that they spare his life, under my appreciation of the rules and current law, without subjecting him to further cross-examination. Mr. Brown has instructed me and directed me as his attorney THE COURT: Mr. Brown, you need to listen to what your attorney is saying because I'm going to ask you some questions about this. . . . . [SCHWARTZ]: My client's instructions to me as his attorney is that he wishes to not call, has directed me to not call his grandmother, his ex-wife. And he further advises me that he elects to not make any statement of any type or kind to the jury. As an officer of the court, Your Honor, I wanted to make this record, and it is my opinion that Xavier is competent mentally, he is competent intellectually. I truly believe he understands what I've explained to him and that these are his decisions. And I've explained to him the consequences of them. So I felt it incumbent on me to address the Court with this situation since we're at the most serious portion of the proceeding. . . . . [SCHWARTZ]: Just one other thing. And I think that Xavier will acknowledge that both Scott and I, it would have been our advice and opinion that he do make those statements and have those witnesses testify in mitigation. We do have one witness in mitigation that we intend to call, Your Honor, as I've made known to the Court. Nonfamily member. Thank You. . . . . THE COURT: Mr. Brown, would you stand up please. . . . Mr. Brown, the Court has observed you and, in fact, talked with you through these four days and have observed that you're obviously a competent, intelligent man. And you have interacted with your attorneys. You know, I've seen that. You have talked with them. There have been questions that have been posed to you regarding different decisions. And I think your attorneys have kept you advised. There have been times when we took breaks to allow the attorneys to consult with you about different things that were critical stages in the trial. And you have obviously participated and have on the record participated. You certainly have a right to have an attorney, or two attorneys, and you've had very competent attorneys, and they've worked hard for you. You have a right to participate or even to conduct your own defense, and I am just very grateful that you have allowed your attorneys to conduct it because they've done a good job. If you choose to disregard your attorneys' advice, that is your choice. You've heard your attorneys state that they recommend that you do these things. But the ultimate decision apparently is going to be your, and I think in this case it should be. You may be, by your decisions, increasing the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome, and I just want you to understand that. Do you understand what I've been saying? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Do you have any questions you want to ask me, Mr. Brown? THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: All right. I'm not going to ask you for a final decision now. I'm going to proceed with the State's case and then let you again consider and give you time to talk with your attorneys concerning the ramifications of what's going on, and we'll proceed. THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor. [SCHWARTZ]: Judge, one other thing, and while Xavier is on his feet, the remarks that I've made to the Court this morning, that we, in fact, discussed those things this morning. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. ¶ 18. Brown first argues his counsel entirely failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence at trial, however a review of this excerpt shows otherwise. The record shows Brown's trial counsel intended to call Brown's grandmother and ex-wife as witnesses during the sentencing phase of trial in order to present mitigating evidence, but was instructed not to do so by Brown. The State argues that Brown's defense counsel cannot be held at fault for the lack of presentation of any mitigation evidence during sentencing because they followed Brown's instructions. Brown refused to change his mind on this issue even after being informed by his counsel and the judge that this decision could be detrimental to his case. The trial record states as follows: [SCHWARTZ]: It is final decision time. He's not changing his mind, but I want to put on the record that I've given him another opportunity to reconsider. THE COURT: All right. I'll let you ask it first, Mr. Schwartz. . . . . [SCHWARTZ]: . . . Xavier, I explained to you that this is basically the last opportunity we will have. I've explained to you your rights. Your grandmother and ex-wife are here and available. Is it still your decision THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [SCHWARTZ]:to not call them as witnesses as well as your decision to not testify? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Mr. Brown, you have any questions you want to ask this Court? THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: You understand this is your call. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir THE COURT: Your lawyer's making his recommendation and you're going against your lawyer's recommendations. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. ¶ 19. The previous excerpts not only show that Brown's first assignment of error to his counsel of not investigating and presenting mitigating evidence is incorrect, but it ultimately establishes the lack of cause in Brown's claim of ineffective assistance. ¶ 20. The State argues Brown's claim that he was a good student while enrolled in school, that he earned his GED, and that he entered the military and received an honorable discharge is not newly discovered evidence, as required by this Court's ruling in Crawford v. State, 867 So.2d 196 (Miss.2003), and that such evidence is negative and weak and would not have mitigated against the aggravating factors and clear evidence of Brown's guilt. ¶ 21. We find that the legal foundation for Brown's claim of ineffective assistance is not newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence at the time of Brown's trial or direct appeal. Brown includes affidavits from his grandmother, ex-wife and Darwin Brown, but each of these individuals were available at the time of trial and direct appeal. Since Brown did not submit to this Court any newly discovered evidence or evidence that could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence at the time of trial or direct appeal, Brown's claim of ineffective assistance is without cause. ¶ 22. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(2), also allows this Court to grant a petitioner relief from the waiver if actual prejudice is also shown. Actual prejudice is limited to those errors which would have actually adversely affected the ultimate outcome of the conviction or sentence. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(6) states: The burden is upon the prisoner to allege in his motion such facts as are necessary to demonstrate that his claims are not procedurally barred under this section. ¶ 23. Brown has identified a lack of investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence, and counsel's failure to present a defense in the guilt-innocence phase of the trial as errors that would have actually adversely affected the ultimate outcome of his conviction and sentence. Therefore, in order to show error by his trial counsel. Brown bears the burden of identifying evidence which would have been discovered as a result of an investigation by defense counsel that could establish a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different. In Woodward v. State, 843 So.2d 1 (Miss. 2003), this Court held, that [a] defendant who alleges that trial counsel's failure to investigate constituted ineffectiveness must also state with particularity what the investigation would have revealed and specify how it would have altered the outcome of trial . . . or `how such additional investigation would have significantly aided his cause at trial.' Id. at 18. ¶ 24. Consequently, Brown has the burden of showing how his claims concerning that he was a good student while enrolled in school, that he obtained a GED, and that he entered the military and received an honorable discharge would stand as mitigating evidence to outweigh the aggravating evidence used to convict him at trial. Brown simply states that this evidence could have been discovered if his counsel investigated his past and interviewed his family and presented such evidence during the guilt-innocence phase of trial. ¶ 25. This Court held on direct appeal that evidence presented during trial was sufficient to support Brown's conviction. Brown has not stated with specificity how a school record ending in 1981, which shows grades ranging from S's and A's to D's and F's, from first to ninth grade, could have altered the outcome of his trial. Brown has not produced evidence showing he obtained a GED. Brown has not shown how a military record that not only shows he was honorably discharged, but first reduced in rank and pay and then discharged, would have altered the outcome of his trial. Brown has not shown his defense counsel erred in not presenting such evidence during the guilt innocence phase of the trial, nor has he demonstrated how such evidence would have actually adversely affected the ultimate outcome of his conviction or sentence. Therefore, Brown's claim of ineffective assistance is without actual prejudice. ¶ 26. Furthermore, the trial record shows that Brown was well-informed by his counsel during his trial and Brown participated in his trial. Brown had a clear opportunity to object to what he now contends is a lack of investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence during the trial. Brown could have made this assertion when the trial judge asked Brown if he had any questions. The trial judge made sure to ask Brown this question after Brown made the decision himself to not testify nor allow his family members to testify on his behalf. Brown made no objections at this point, nor during his direct appeal to this Court. Brown has not identified newly discovered evidence, but uses evidence he readily admits was available during trial and direct appeal to support his claim of ineffective assistance. Overall, Brown has not identified errors which would have adversely affected his conviction or sentence. Brown claims his counsel did not investigate or interview any witnesses, nor was his counsel's assistance effective, but the trial record shows otherwise. Therefore Brown has not shown cause or actual prejudice and is procedurally barred from asserting this claim. ¶ 27. In reference to the guilt-innocence phase of trial, the trial court judge stated to Brown, after his counsel made an on-the-record statement regarding Brown's decision not to testify during sentencing nor allow other family members to testify, [Y]ou've had very competent attorneys, and they've worked hard for you. You have a right to participate or even to conduct your own defense, and I am just very grateful that you have allowed your attorneys to conduct it because they've done a good job. ¶ 28. The trial judge made a clear statement that Brown's defense counsel had provided him with adequate representation during the guilt-innocent phase of the trial. This Court reiterated in Underwood v. State, 919 So.2d 931 (Miss.2005), that [j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. . . . A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Id. at 937. ¶ 29. Given a review of the evidence submitted by Brown, we conclude that Brown's counsel exercised sound trial strategy during the guilt-innocence phase of trial. In Cronic, 466 U.S. at 657, 104 S.Ct. at 2046, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. . . . If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade. Id. at n. 19. ¶ 30. In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [t]he focus of the inquiry is on whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. Manning v. State, 929 So.2d 885, 901 (Miss.2006). Based upon the facts of this case and the information presented in the trial record, defense counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all of the circumstances. Therefore, Brown's arguments are without merit.