Opinion ID: 1363787
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: political discrimination

Text: The appellants contend their political affiliations were a substantial and motivating factor in Poling's decision not to retain them as deputies. They rely on Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980), and Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), which held it unlawful to discharge government employees in nonsensitive positions on the basis of their political affiliations. Furthermore, they rely on Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), which held that once a showing is made that an employee's exercise of First Amendment rights was a substantial or motivating factor in his discharge from government employment, the burden shifts to the appellee to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employee would have been discharged regardless of his constitutionally protected conduct. See also Orr v. Crowder, ___ W.Va. ___, 315 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 384, 83 L.Ed.2d 319 (1984). The appellants claim they submitted prima facie evidence of political discrimination, but the circuit court failed to shift the burden of proof contrary to the requirements of Mt. Healthy and Orr. Instead, the court weighed all the evidence submitted by both parties before it reached its conclusion that the appellants' political affiliations were not a substantial or motivating factor. We believe the appellants' position to be unsound. It is not clear as yet whether the Mt. Healthy rule will be applied by the United States Supreme Court to political firings under Elrod and Branti. Even if it is applied, the Mt. Healthy test is primarily a burden shifting device utilized at trial to protect an injured plaintiff against a summary judgment or a directed verdict. E.g., Daulton v. Affeldt, 678 F.2d 487 (4th Cir.1982); Tanner v. McCall, 625 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir.1980); Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021, 102 S.Ct. 1719, 72 L.Ed.2d 139 (1982); Douglas v. Galloway, 568 F.Supp. 966 (S.D.W.Va.1983). Here the appellants were accorded a full evidentiary hearing before the trial court without a jury. The court under its findings based on the entire record concluded that the plaintiffs/appellants had not proven a case of political firing. Because the case was not summarily disposed of by way of a summary judgment, directed verdict, or judgment notwithstanding a jury verdict, there is no issue with regard to the Mt. Healthy test. Rather, we use our customary standard for reviewing a trial court's findings sitting in lieu of a jury, as stated in Syllabus Point 1 of McElwain v. Wells, ___ W.Va. ___, 322 S.E.2d 482 (1984): `A finding of fact made by a trial chancellor or by a trial court sitting in lieu of a jury will be given the same weight as the verdict of a jury and will not be disturbed by this Court on appeal unless the evidence plainly and decidedly preponderates against such finding. Syllabus Point 8, Sanders v. Roselawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 152 W.Va. 91, 159 S.E.2d 784 (1968).' Syllabus Point 1, Trenton Construction Company, Inc. v. Straub, W.Va., 310 S.E.2d 496 (1983). We find no error in the circuit court's finding. The appellants did not meet their burden of showing Poling's decision was motivated by the appellants' membership in the Republican Party. Appellant Biller was a Democrat, so clearly, as to him, political discrimination is not an issue. As evidence of political motivation, the appellants showed there were thirteen employees in the sheriff's department at the end of Semmelman's term. Of those, seven were Republicans, five were Democrats, and one was Independent. Poling terminated four Republicans and one Democrat and replaced them with five Democrats. According to the appellants, the other three Republicans and the one Independent were reappointed by Poling only because she thought she could not terminate them because two were covered by civil service, and the other two were employed with federal funds under the CETA program, which allows termination only for cause. Furthermore, the appellants rely on the fact that Poling said she did not retain the appellants because she wanted to bring in people of her own and from that they infer she meant Democrats. The circuit court balanced those facts against other evidence that showed Poling was not motivated by political party affiliations. The court found that Poling did not retain Biller, a Democrat and that she kept one Republican because she had known him all his life. The court noted even after the civil service system was declared invalid she did not replace the Republicans with loyal Democrats. Furthermore, one Republican CETA worker was retained after her CETA funding had expired. The court also found that Poling did not know or make inquiries about the political affiliations of three of the Democrats she hired to replace the appellants. A finding was also made that she based her employment decisions on private interviews, her own knowledge of the employees selected, and recommendations of friends and advisors, one of whom was a Republican. The circuit court assessed the evidence and Poling's credibility as a witness and found no political motivations on her part. We are satisfied that the circuit court's finding of fact on this issue is consistent with the evidence and certainly it is not plainly and decidedly against a preponderance of the evidence. The appellants failed to make a prima facie showing of political motivation. Finally, the appellants argue that because the circuit court's factual findings were prepared for the court by defense counsel and adopted without significant changes, those findings should not receive the usual degree of appellate deference. In Syllabus Point 1 of South Side Lumber Co. v. Stone Construction Co., 151 W.Va. 439, 152 S.E.2d 721 (1967), we said that [u]nder Rule 52(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure it is the duty of the trial court to make its findings of facts and it should not surrender or delegate that important function by any mechanical adoption of the findings prepared by counsel. However, in that case, we ultimately held the court's adoption of counsel-prepared findings did not constitute error and such findings of facts, as so found by the court, should not be rejected, vacated or disturbed for that reason. 151 W.Va. at 442, 152 S.E.2d at 723. In Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518, 527 (1985), the United States Supreme Court recognized the potential for overreaching and exaggeration on the part of attorneys preparing findings of fact, but held even when the trial judge adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous. After careful scrutiny of the record, we do not find the findings of the circuit court in this case to be clearly erroneous. The record shows appellants made no objection, either before or after the trial court's approval of the findings. For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Barbour County. Affirmed.