Opinion ID: 2384363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: manslaughter conviction

Text: The Commonwealth's position at trial was that even though McFadden was not the actual killer, nonetheless, he counselled, aided or abetted therein, and hence, was criminally responsible for the homicide the same as the principal felon. See the Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 1105, as amended, 18 P.S. § 5105. See also, Commonwealth v. Coyle, 415 Pa. 379, 203 A. 2d 782 (1964); and, Commonwealth v. Grays, 380 Pa. 77, 110 A. 2d 422 (1955). If the trial evidence were sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that McFadden did counsel, aid or abet Washington in the commission of the killing, the Commonwealth's position would be correct and this particular conviction should be sustained. However, we are not so convinced. To aid or abet in the commission of a crime, one must be an active partner in the intent to commit it. Commonwealth v. Strantz, 328 Pa. 33, 195 A. 75 (1937); and, Commonwealth v. Jackson, 187 Pa. Superior Ct. 2, 144 A. 2d 249 (1958). Therefore, to convict McFadden as an aide or abettor in the killing, it was necessary for the Commonwealth to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he was an active partner in Washington's lethal purpose. This is the deficiency in the Commonwealth's case. There was no direct evidence to establish the rifle was transported to the death scene in the McFadden automobile or that McFadden knew of its presence in his vehicle. But, assuming these are reasonable inferences from the proof, they are not sufficient in our view to establish McFadden knew Washington intended violence or that he joined in such an intent. Such conclusions depend too much on conjecture and a criminal conviction based wholly on inference, suspicion and conjecture may not stand. See Commonwealth v. Simpson, 436 Pa. 459, 260 A. 2d 751 (1970); and, Commonwealth v. Bausewine, 354 Pa. 35, 46 A. 2d 491 (1946).