Opinion ID: 2638613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: under the facts presented, pre-judgment interest commenced from the date the cause was filed.

Text: ¶ 23 Ford argues that the trial court erred in awarding Johnson pre-judgment interest commencing from August 6, 1998, the date the initial petition was filed, rather than from January 21, 1999, the day the summons was mailed to Ford. Ford relies on Parker v. O'Rion Industries, Inc., 769 F.2d 647 (10th Cir.1985) in support of the proposition that it would be improper to hold it liable for pre-judgment interest during a delay that was entirely beyond its control. Johnson contends that pre-judgment interest is calculated from the date the petition was filed; and that Parker is distinguishable on its facts. ¶ 24 Pre-judgment interest is only awarded if authorized by statute. Heiman v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 1995 OK 19, ¶ 14, 891 P.2d 1252; Withrow v. Red Eagle Oil Co., 1988 OK 16, ¶ 10, 755 P.2d 622; Sisney v. Smalley, 1984 OK 70, ¶ 8, 690 P.2d 1048. Title 12 O.S. Supp.1998-727 authorizes pre-judgment interest in an action for personal injuries from the date the suit was commenced. [24] Title 12 O.S.1991-2003 provides that an action is commenced upon the filing of the petition. [25] The petition was filed in the district court on August 6, 1998. In Parker, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the application of § 727 to a lawsuit which was delayed by the plaintiff who filed a suit in federal court after a prior state court suit was filed. ¶ 25 Parker involved a plaintiff who filed suit in Oklahoma state court and subsequently initiated a suit in federal court, ceasing to pursue its state court action. After the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, she sought pre-judgment interest commencing from the date of the filing of her state court action. The district court granted the plaintiff's request and on appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded. It held that pre-judgment interest should have run only from the date on which the plaintiff filed her action in federal court, and that any delays resulting from the change in courts were the plaintiff's responsibility. ¶ 26 Parker is clearly distinguishable from the present cause on its facts. The Parker plaintiff filed one cause in state court, ceased to pursue it, and then filed another independent suit in federal court. The judgment awarding the plaintiff damages arose from the second suit. Here, there is only one lawsuit and any delays that occurred did not result from plaintiff's change of courts. Even if Parker were not distinguishable, on matters of state law we are not restrained by federal cases, but look first to our own decisions for authority. [26] Federal court decisions are not binding or controlling upon this Court when construing Oklahoma law. [27] ¶ 27 The record does not disclose why service was not accomplished earlier than January of 1999. Nevertheless, service of process is always timely if made within 180 days after the petition is filed. [28] The petition was filed on August 6, 1998, and service was mailed on January 21, 1999, and received on January 22, 1999. Service was timely made within 180 days after the petition was filed. The purpose of pre-judgment interest is to provide full compensation for the loss of use of money due as damages from the time the claim accrues until judgment is entered. [29] Under the facts presented, we are not convinced that the trial court's award of pre-judgment interest commencing from the date the cause was initially filed was erroneous.