Opinion ID: 1057701
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 69

Heading: Admission of the Appellant's Statement

Text: The Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in permitting introduction of statements made by the Appellant without first ruling on the Appellant's motion to suppress those statements. The State responds that the issue is waived because the Appellant failed to pursue the motion to suppress. The record before this court reflects that the Appellant filed a motion to suppress his statements on July 16, 2003, alleging that his statements were involuntarily given as he was under duress at the time the statements were made. A hearing was conducted on July 25, 2003, during which time the Appellant requested and was granted a continuance until October 31, 2003. As the State correctly asserts, the record is silent as to whether the Appellant actively pursued the motion to suppress after this point. The record does indicate that on April 4, 2005, before voir dire of the jury panel commenced, the Appellant's counsel made the following remarks: Judge, I looked through the court jacket this morning, making sure since I was not on this case originally or at the time the motions were heard and I believe that all motions that have been filed have been discussed and ruled upon except for the 608, 609 motion that Your Honor took under advisement. [2] During the State's case-in-chief, the Appellant's statements to law enforcement officers were admitted without any objection by the Appellant. Additionally, the Appellant, in his motion for new trial, raised the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress, supporting the conclusion that the motion was in fact denied. It is clear from the record before this court that, at the trial level, the Appellant proceeded under the assumption that the trial court had denied his motion to suppress. The Appellant, however, now maintains on appeal that he did not abandon the suppression issue. He adds that the fact that the trial court failed to state its findings on the record violated his constitutional rights to due process and to a fair jury trial, in addition to violating Tenn. R.Crim. P. 12(e). From the actions of the parties and the trial court during the trial, including the failure of the Appellant to object to the introduction of the statements, it appears that all parties believed that the motion to suppress had been denied. Most notably, the trial court's admission of the statements during the trial suggests that the trial court was under the assumption that it had overruled the Appellant's motion. While the record presently before this court does not contain an order of the trial court reflecting its ruling upon the motion, we cannot conclude that its absence is dispositive. It is the burden of the Appellant to prepare a full and complete record for appellate review. See Tenn. R.App. P. 24(b). Moreover, the record clearly reflects that no objection was made by the Appellant to the admission of his statements at trial. Even assuming for argument's sake that no ruling was ever made by the trial court, it was the Appellant who failed to obtain a ruling on that motion and failed to object when the evidence was introduced at trial. Accordingly, we agree with the State that the Appellant has abandoned the motion by failing to call to the trial court's attention the lack of a ruling on his suppression motion and by failing to object to the admission of the statements at trial. See Tenn. R.App. P. 36(a). If a motion is not acted upon, the litigant should renew it. He may not lull the judge into thinking that it has been abandoned and then, after he has lost, pull a rabbit out of his pocket in the form of a forgotten motion. United States v. Taglia, 922 F.2d 413, 416-17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 927, 111 S.Ct. 2040, 114 L.Ed.2d 125 (1991). As noted, the Appellant failed to renew his motion or ask for a ruling prior to voir dire. Later, when the State sought introduction of his statements, the Appellant remained silent and made no objection. A similar issue was addressed by the Court of Appeals in Grandstaff v. Hawks, 36 S.W.3d 482 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000). In Grandstaff , the trial court did not unequivocally overrule a motion in limine. The Court of Appeals determined that the motion in limine should have been renewed by objection and that the failure to renew the motion in limine had waived the issue. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals held: Objections to the introduction of evidence must be timely and specific. See Overstreet v. Shoney's, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 702 (Tenn.Ct.App.1999). An evidentiary objection will be considered timely either if it is made in a motion in limine or if it is made at the time the objectionable evidence is about to be introduced. See Wright v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 789 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Tenn. Ct.App.1990). A party who files an unsuccessful motion in limine need not renew the motion when the evidence is introduced as long as the trial court clearly and definitively overruled the motion in limine when it was made. See State v. Brobeck, 751 S.W.2d 828, 833-34 (Tenn.1988); State v. McGhee, 746 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tenn.1988); Wright v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 789 S.W.2d at 914. If, however, the trial court has not clearly and definitively acted on the motion, the moving party must renew the motion contemporaneously with the introduction of the objectionable evidence. Failure to renew the motion will preclude the moving party from taking issue on appeal with the admission of the evidence. Grandstaff, 36 S.W.3d at 488. Tennessee law is well-established that a party who invites or waives error, or who fails to take reasonable steps to cure an error, is not entitled to relief on appeal. See Tenn. R.App. P. 36(a). Moreover, if waived, this court will not consider the issue on appeal unless it is clear from the record that plain error was committed. The motion to suppress filed by the Appellant on July 15, 2003, presented two allegations in support of his contention that the statements were taken in violation of his constitutional rights, namely that: 1. The [Appellant] did not freely, knowingly and voluntarily give said statements. 2. The [Appellant] made said statements while under duress. No additional facts or argument were presented in support of the motion. At the July 25, 2003 motion to suppress hearing, Sergeant Mark Miller testified that the Appellant was advised of his rights and signed a waiver of rights form. The Appellant informed Sergeant Miller that he had an eleventh grade education. Sergeant Miller stated that the Appellant understood English and could read and write. In addition to the written waiver, the Appellant verbally indicated that he understood and waived his constitutional rights. Sergeant Miller testified that, at no time, did he threaten, coerce, or make promises to the Appellant. Sergeant James Fitzpatrick testified that, one day after the Appellant's initial statement, the Appellant informed law enforcement officials that he wanted to change some facts related in his initial statement. Sergeant Fitzpatrick permitted the Appellant to make corrections to the statement. Sergeant Fitzpatrick observed that the Appellant had no problems communicating and appeared to be of sound mind. The Appellant never requested an attorney. Sergeant Fitzpatrick testified that, at no time, did he threaten, coerce, or make promises to the Appellant. He also recalled that the Appellant was permitted to use the restroom during the interview and that the Appellant stopped to eat on two occasions. Inherent in the admissibility of the written statement is that the statement was voluntarily given by a defendant knowledgeable of his constitutional rights and accompanied by a valid and knowing waiver of those rights. State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d 549, 577 (Tenn.2004) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 326 (Tenn.1992), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 124, 114 S.Ct. 651, 126 L.Ed.2d 555 (1993)). In determining the admissibility of a confession, the particular circumstances of each case must be examined as a whole. Berry, 141 S.W.3d at 577 (citing State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn.1996)). A defendant's subjective perception alone is not sufficient to justify a conclusion of involuntariness in the constitutional sense. Id. (citations omitted). The primary consideration in determining the admissibility of the evidence is whether the confession is an act of free will. Id. at 578 (citing State v. Chandler, 547 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tenn. 1977)). A confession is not voluntary when the behavior of the state's law enforcement officials was such as to overbear the will of an accused and bring about confessions not freely self-determined. Id. (citing State v. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn.1980)). The testimony revealed that the Appellant's communication skills appeared adequate and that he was capable of reading, writing, and comprehension. The Appellant was advised of his constitutional rights and, without coercion or force, voluntarily waived his rights and provided an inculpatory statement. Neither officer indicated that the Appellant was under duress at the time he made his two statements. The officers provided the Appellant with food and restroom breaks during the interview process, and the Appellant never asked for an attorney. Therefore, we conclude that the Appellant knowingly waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily provided the statements to the police. Thus, the Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue.