Opinion ID: 2599013
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lummi Nation Has Sovereign Authority and U.S. Treaty Obligation To Stop and Detain Lawbreakers on the Reservation

Text: ¶ 10 Tribal police officers are often first responders when problems arise on reservations, but it is not always apparent during the investigation stage whether the tribe possesses jurisdiction over the offender. [7] In recognition of this problem the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed tribal police have authority to detain non-Indian offenders until they can be turned over to authorities with jurisdiction. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697, 110 S.Ct. 2053, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 n. 11, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997) (citing Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d at 390, 850 P.2d 1332). ¶ 11 This court  along with the Ninth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals  has also held tribal police have inherent authority to stop non-Indians who violate the law on public roads within the reservation and detain them until they can be turned over to state authorities. See, e.g., Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d at 396, 850 P.2d 1332; Ortiz-Barraza, 512 F.2d at 1180 (holding tribal officer was authorized to stop and search non-Indian driver on the reservation); United States v. Terry, 400 F.3d 575, 579-80 (8th Cir.2005) (upholding overnight detention of a non-Indian in a tribal jail when state law enforcement officials could not take custody until the next morning). [8] The superior court therefore correctly looked to this court's analysis in Schmuck as a starting point. ¶ 12 As in Schmuck the Lummi Nation does not assert authority to arrest and prosecute Eriksen for DUI but merely claims the power to stop and detain her until she could be turned over to Whatcom County officials. Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d at 379, 850 P.2d 1332. The Nation is asserting a sovereign interest in the act of stopping and detaining any person who violates the law while on the Lummi Reservation, even if the tribal police officer cannot complete the stop until after the motorist has driven beyond the Reservation boundaries. Br. of Amicus Curiae Lummi Nation at 5. ¶ 13 Absent a controlling congressional statute, tribes retain jurisdiction over events in Indian country: Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, supported by a host of decisions, is that those powers lawfully vested in an Indian nation are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather `inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.' COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.01[1][a] at 206 (2005) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978)). Therefore Congress may constitutionally execute provisions of a treaty even if so doing affects state interests. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 203-05, 95 S.Ct. 944, 43 L.Ed.2d 129 (1975) (absence of State as party to hunting and fishing agreements did not detract from validity). Congress's authority over Indian affairs is plenary and exclusive, which refers to supremacy of federal over state law. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-71, 99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979). In Schmuck we recognized that tribes retain their existing sovereign powers until Congress acts. 121 Wash.2d at 380, 850 P.2d 1332. ¶ 14 In 1855 the Lummi Nation and the United States entered into the Treaty of Point Elliott, which established the Lummi Reservation. 12 Stat. 927 (1855). [9] Article 9 of the treaty expressly provides that the tribes shall turn over to government authorities anyone who violates United States law: [T]he said tribes agree not to shelter or conceal offenders against the laws of the United States, but to deliver them up to the authorities for trial. Thus the Lummi Nation is obliged by treaty to turn over lawbreakers rather than create safe havens for them to act with impunity. Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d at 385, 850 P.2d 1332 (noting Article 9 reflected concern that non-Indians would attempt to avoid prosecution by hiding out on reservations (citing H.R.Rep. No. 474, 23rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 98 (1834))). ¶ 15 As sovereigns, tribes exercise at least concurrent jurisdiction over all crimes committed by Indians in Indian country. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 328-29, 98 S.Ct. 1079. Tribes have an inherent power of self-governance, which includes the power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws. Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d at 381-82, 850 P.2d 1332 (citing Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326, 98 S.Ct. 1079). Given the inherent mobility of a driving offense, the fresh pursuit doctrine is a necessary means of cooperatively enforcing traffic laws to ensure public safety. Vance v. Dep't of Licensing, 116 Wash.App. 412, 416, 65 P.3d 668 (2003) (emphasis added) (citing City of Tacoma v. Durham, 95 Wash. App. 876, 881, 978 P.2d 514 (1999)). It follows the fresh pursuit doctrine must apply to tribes because the doctrine is a necessary means of actualizing the tribe's inherent power to enforce its internal laws. The power to regulate is only meaningful when combined with the power to enforce. Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 238 (9th Cir. 1974); accord Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d at 382, 850 P.2d 1332 (holding [f]undamental to enforcing any traffic code is the authority by tribal officers to stop vehicles violating that code. ...). [10] ¶ 16 In Schmuck we looked to Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981) to determine whether a tribe had inherent sovereign power over non-Indians. 121 Wash.2d at 391, 850 P.2d 1332. Montana held the Crow Tribe could not prohibit fishing and hunting by non-Indians because those activities did not so threaten the Tribe's political or economic security as to justify tribal regulation; the non-Indians owned the land in fee and were fishing from land owned by the State. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566-67, 101 S.Ct. 1245. The Court asserted as a general proposition the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe but also announced two exceptions to this proposition: A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. Id. at 565-66, 101 S.Ct. 1245 (citations omitted). Strate, 520 U.S. at 456, 117 S.Ct. 1404, held this test also applies to a tribe's inherent authority over nonmembers' conduct on state highways on the reservation. ¶ 17 Applying Montana to this case, we conclude pursuing those who break traffic laws on the reservation bears a clear relationship to tribal self-government or internal relations and is therefore part of the Lummi Nation's inherent sovereign authority. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564-65, 101 S.Ct. 1245. This inherent power to pursue lawbreakers does not reach `beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.' Strate, 520 U.S. at 459, 117 S.Ct. 1404 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564, 101 S.Ct. 1245). To the contrary, the right to pursue and detain those who break civil and criminal traffic laws on the reservation is needed to preserve `the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.' Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959)). The alternative would put tribal officers in the impossible position of being unable to stop any driver for fear they would make an unlawful stop of a non-Indian. Such a result would seriously undercut the Tribe's ability to enforce tribal law and would render the traffic code virtually meaningless. Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d at 383, 850 P.2d 1332. Such a situation clearly fits within the second exception in Montana because it would threaten the health and welfare of the tribe: Allowing a known drunk driver to get back in his or her car, careen off down the road, and possibly kill or injure Indians or non-Indians would certainly be detrimental to the health or welfare of the Tribe.[ [11] ] Id. at 391, 850 P.2d 1332. Here, Officer McSwain suspected Eriksen was driving under the influence after she drifted across the center line and came within two feet of his patrol car. McSwain testified that he ascertained Eriksen was a non-Indian only after he stopped her because he had no way of learning such information without stopping her. In Schmuck we discuss the absurd result of holding tribal officers need to release all non-Indian offenders: To hold that an Indian police officer may stop offenders but upon determining they are non-Indians must let them go, would be to subvert a substantial function of Indian police authorities and produce a ludicrous state of affairs which would permit non-Indians to act unlawfully, with impunity, on Indian lands. Id. at 392, 850 P.2d 1332 (quoting State v. Ryder, 98 N.M. 453, 456, 649 P.2d 756, aff'd, 98 N.M. 316, 648 P.2d 774 (1982)). Indeed, if we were to hold Officer McSwain and other officers cannot detain non-Indians who elude their authority by crossing reservation boundaries, we would enable similarly absurd results. Although Schmuck involved a DUI detention within the reservation, the court contemplated the possibility of drivers simply refus[ing] to stop if pulled over by a tribal officer, when it rejected equating the tribal officer's authority to that of a citizen's arrest. [12] Id. at 392, 850 P.2d 1332. ¶ 18 The superior court correctly extended Schmuck to the facts at hand; if non-Indians could elude tribal officers' inherent authority to stop and detain simply by beating them across reservation boundaries, it would effectively gut this court's holding. To determine whether tribes retain their sovereign powers, we must look[] to the character of the power that the tribe seeks to exercise, not merely the location of events. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 752 (Alaska 1999).