Opinion ID: 1855796
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Evidence of Appellant's History of Mental Illness

Text: Next, appellant asserts that the trial court ruling excluding reference to appellant's documented history of mental illness denied her a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. [7] California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2532, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984). Minnesota does not recognize the defense of diminished responsibility and this court has further held that psychiatric evidence is not relevant to establishing intent or premeditation. State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 705-06 (Minn. 1982). As such, psychiatric opinion testimony is generally not admissible during the guilt phase of a    trial. State v. Persitz, 518 N.W.2d 843, 847 (Minn.1994) (citation omitted). Psychiatric evidence may be admissible however, where the defendant has a past history of mental illness: If the past history includes a clinical record wherein psychiatric opinions appear   , it may be that such evidence would be admissible.    This evidence is in the nature of factual background to explain the whole man as he was before the events of the crime and before the miasma of after-the-crime rationalizations. State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 103-04 (Minn.1992) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929, 113 S.Ct. 1306, 122 L.Ed.2d 694 (1993). In determining whether to admit such evidence, the trial court should require an offer of proof on the admissibility of the evidence and carefully weigh the relevancy and probative value of the proffered evidence against the likelihood of prejudice or confusion. Id. at 104. Appellant argues that the evidence regarding her psychiatric history was not offered to prove lack of premeditation or intent but rather to show the person she is and whether she was, in fact, controlling Mr. Lattu. We agree with the trial court however, that, given the myriad of different diagnoses appellant had received over the years, introducing evidence of her mental history would have shed little light on who was the whole person. Further, while Lattu did claim that appellant took charge of certain aspects of the murder, it made little difference to the prosecution's theory of the case who was controlling whom, given the fact that both appellant and Lattu were convicted of aiding and abetting the murder and there was ample evidence that they worked together in its commission. The trial court's concern that the introduction of the appellant's mental history would have created a substantial danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury was well founded, as the jury could have improperly viewed appellant's psychiatric problems as providing a defense or mitigating her culpability. We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of appellant's psychiatric history. Appellant also asserts that statements she made to Deputy Sanders while in jail should have been admitted under the rule of completeness [8] but, because those statements also fell under the trial court's general exclusion of evidence relating to appellant's psychiatric history, they were properly excluded. Nor do appellant's statements to Deputy Sanders relating to her history of mental illness become admissible under the principle that the opponent, against whom a part of an utterance has been put in, may in his turn complement it by putting in the remainder, in order to secure for the tribunal a complete understanding of the total tenor and effect of the utterance. 7 J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2113 at 653 (Chadbourne rev.1978). As we have stated, [t]he theory that inquiry into part of a conversation opens the door for the admission of all the conversation may be an appropriate theory in some instances because admission of a part of some conversations taken out of context may require that all the conversation be gone into to give the court and jury a correct understanding of the facts. It is not a rule that should be applied in all cases. State v. Whelan, 291 Minn. 83, 88, 189 N.W.2d 170, 174 (1971) (emphasis added). The statements appellant sought to introduce were hearsay, not qualifying for admission under an exception to the hearsay rules, and were properly excluded under the trial court's broad prohibition of evidence relating to appellant's earlier mental illness.