Opinion ID: 1955771
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the tendered $1,000,000 post-judgment in-court deposit.

Text: The trial court reduced the jury's damages award of $3.7 million to $1 million, over Sander's objections, and entered judgment against Clinical Lab for that amount. See Part II, infra. Shortly thereafter, Sander refused Clinical Lab's offer to pay the judgment for satisfaction. Sander then filed this appeal and Clinical Lab moved, pursuant to SDCL 15-6-67(a), for an order allowing it to deposit with the court the judgment amount so that interest on the judgment under SDCL 54-3-5.1 shall cease to accrue as of the date of deposit, with the deposit to be paid to [Sander] only in the event that a judgment in favor of [Sander] is upheld by the South Dakota Supreme Court. Sander resisted the motion; briefs were submitted and a hearing was held. During the hearing, Clinical Lab requested that it also be allowed to deposit costs and an additional amount of $27,333.06, which represented the total accumulated interest on the judgment to the date of the hearing. The trial court denied the proposed deposit holding it was not unconditional. Clinical Lab asserts the trial court was mistaken in its view of the law. Sander, though agreeing with the trial court's rejection of the tendered deposit, argues that SDCL 15-6-67(a) is not even available to Clinical Lab, in that the statutory scheme in this state prescribes the only course of conduct for Clinical Lab to follow if it desires to delay satisfying the judgment pending the outcome of an appeal. Before we may address the correctness of the trial court's holding that Clinical Lab's tendered deposit was not unconditional, we must address Sander's threshold question of whether SDCL 15-6-67(a) is even available to Clinical Lab. We begin our determination by recalling that construction of a statute is a question of law and thus, the decision below is fully reviewable without deference to the decision of the trial court. Reid v. Huron Bd. of Educ., 449 N.W.2d 240, 242 (S.D.1989). Moreover, when the question is which of two enactments the legislature intended to apply to a particular situation, `terms of a statute relating to a particular subject will prevail over general terms of another statute.' Nelson v. School Bd. of Hill City, 459 N.W.2d 451, 454 (S.D.1990) (quoting Meyerink v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 391 N.W.2d 180, 184 (S.D.1986)). The rules of procedure in the circuit courts, and the rules of appellate procedure relevant to this appeal, are rules promulgated by this Court and, although codified, are not legislative enactments. We are, therefore, uniquely situated to determine the intent and application of our own rules. It is provided that the procedure to be followed by a party who seeks a stay of execution on a judgment upon appeal shall be as provided in chapter 15-26A. SDCL 15-6-62(d). The chapter therein referred to contains our Rules of Appellate Procedure. Those rules contain two sections relevant to our discussion. The first reads: An appeal from a judgment or order shall not stay enforcement of proceedings in the circuit court [other than for certain exceptions not here relevant] unless the appellant executes a supersedeas bond in the amount and form approved by the circuit court or otherwise complies with the provisions of this rule. SDCL 15-26A-25. Although this statute appears only to apply to an appellant, under the facts of this case, there can be no serious dispute as to whether the terminology in fact is addressed to Clinical Lab. In the usual case, the appellant will be the party against whom the judgment was entered. Here, although it is Sander who appeals, we note Sander appeals only the reduction of the jury's award of damages and the resultant judgment as entered. Sander, unlike Clinical Lab, does not dispute its entitlement to even the minimum amount reflected in the judgment, while Clinical Lab, by a notice of review, appeals entitlement to, and the amount of, the judgment. Therefore, even though it is Sander who is the appellant here, we view the word appellant under these facts to refer to the party appealing entitlement to the judgment entered, in this case, Clinical Lab. The other relevant section of our Rules of Appellate Procedure sets the terms of the supersedeas bond referred to above: If the appeal is from a judgment directing the payment of money, the conditions of the bond required by § 15-26A-25 shall be the payment of the judgment or that part of the judgment which is affirmed together with interest thereon from the date of the judgment. SDCL 15-26A-26. We interpret statutes according to its manifest intent as derived from the statute as a whole, as well as other enactments relating to the same subject. Meyerink, 391 N.W.2d at 184. Therefore, we note that while our procedural rules use the word interest, it is the legislature which has defined that term and set the rates. Interest is the compensation allowed by law for the use, or forbearance, or detention of money or its equivalent[,] SDCL 54-3-1, and is payable on all judgments, other than certain exceptions not here relevant, at the Category B rate of interest as established in § 54-3-16 from and after the date of judgment[.] SDCL 54-3-5.1. The Category B rate of interest is twelve percent per annum. SDCL 54-3-16. We conclude the procedure outlined in the statutes is complete in its outline concerning the handling of funds which are the subject of a judgment. This includes a legislative determination that the interest to be paid on judgments is that rate as set out in the statutes. Thus, statutory enactments appear to preclude an in-court deposit of judgment funds which are subject to fluctuating market rates of interest. However, it is necessary to examine the procedural rule found at SDCL 15-6-67(a) to determine how, if at all, that rule fits into the scheme as outlined. In an action in which any part of the relief sought is a judgment for a sum of money or the disposition of a sum of money or the disposition of any other thing capable of delivery, a party, upon notice to every other party, and by leave of court, may deposit with the court all or any part of such sum or thing. Money paid into court under § 15-6-67 shall be deposited and withdrawn as ordered by the court. SDCL 15-6-67(a). A plain reading makes it apparent that it is not directed by its terms to an application to a particular stage of a proceeding or to a particular participant in a proceeding. In light of the complete statutory scheme in South Dakota as outlined above, we are inclined to agree with Sander that Clinical Lab cannot use the general deposit provision found at SDCL 15-6-67(a) to toll the accumulation of post-judgment interest at the statutory rate of twelve percent per annum. Nevertheless, we address Clinical Lab's assertion that SDCL 15-6-67(a) provides an alternate method for a judgment debtor to delay paying to the judgment creditor the judgment, to which he is otherwise entitled, while at the same time tolling the accumulation of post-judgment interest. Clinical Lab finds ample federal authority to support its position and refers us to Fassbinder v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 233 F.Supp. 574 (W.D.Pa. 1964), to have us find that SDCL 15-6-67(a) is certainly broad enough to authorize the payment into court of a judgment and costs in order to stop the running of interest thereon if such is desired. Id. at 576. South Dakota has generally adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 67, upon which SDCL 15-6-67(a) is based. Though federal interpretations of federal civil and appellate procedural rules are not binding on us in an interpretation of like rules in our State's courts, it is appropriate to turn to the federal court decisions for guidance in their application and interpretation. Wilson v. Great N. Ry. Co., 83 S.D. 207, 211, 157 N.W.2d 19, 21 (1968); Brasel v. Myers, 89 S.D. 114, 116, 229 N.W.2d 569, 570 (1975). We believe Clinical Lab has misplaced its reliance on Fassbinder. That defendant had not attempted to avail itself of Clinical Lab's argument and was found to be liable for post-judgment interest. We also note that Clinical Lab supports its argument with only that portion of a single sentence which is favorable to it. The complete sentence reads:  Rule 67, Fed.R.Civ.P., when read in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 2041, is certainly broad enough to authorize the payment into court of a judgment and costs in order to stop the running of interest thereon if such is desired. Fassbinder, 233 F.Supp. at 576 (emphasis added). 28 U.S.C. § 2041 specifically authorizes the deposit into federal court of money in adjudicated cases. Unlike Fassbinder, we have not been directed to a comparable statute in the South Dakota Code which we too can read in conjunction with SDCL 15-6-67(a) to authorize the in-court deposit proposed by Clinical Lab. We are of the opinion that Clinical Lab's federal authorities do not support its argument that Federal Rule 67, standing alone, authorizes even a federal court to accept a post-judgment in-court deposit of funds which are subject to a judgment. Therefore, Clinical Lab's authorities do not support its argument that the South Dakota counterpart to Rule 67, standing alone, authorizes a South Dakota court to accept a post-judgment in-court deposit of funds which are subject to a judgment. Moreover, Schmidt v. Iowa Beef Processors, 347 N.W.2d 897 (S.D.1984), which represents our limited opportunity to comment on the application of SDCL 15-6-67(a), was applied only in the context of prejudgment interest. In view of the complete statutory scheme outlined above, we hold SDCL 15-6-67(a) is not properly available in the first instance to Clinical Lab, or any other defendant in South Dakota, for a post-judgment in-court deposit of funds subject to a judgment. Therefore, the trial court erred when it looked to SDCL 15-6-67(a) for guidance in the disposition of funds subject to a judgment. Therefore, we need not decide whether the trial court was correct in its determination that Clinical Lab's tender was not unconditional pursuant to SDCL 15-6-67(a). It is clear, nevertheless, that the trial court's determination is correct. Further, the conditions sought to be imposed by Clinical Lab are substantial. The trial court reached a correct result when it refused the proposed tender. Consequently, we affirm the trial court's result even though it is based on a wrong reason. Seymour v. Western Dakota Voc. Tech. Inst., 419 N.W.2d 206, 209 (S.D.1988). In sum, we affirm the trial court in its conduct of the trial. [11] We turn now to a discussion of the issues raised by the trial court's application of SDCL 21-3-11 to limit the damages awarded by the jury in this medical malpractice action.