Opinion ID: 4202919
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The property owners’ first proposition of law

Text: {¶ 25} The property owners contend that the PUCO misinterpreted R.C. 4905.20 and 4905.21 by permitting Columbia Gas to withdraw natural-gas service without filing an abandonment application. Before addressing this contention, however, we must first determine whether the property owners forfeited it by failing to raise it below.
is properly before the court {¶ 26} Columbia Gas asserts that the property owners forfeited their abandonment argument by not timely raising it before the PUCO. This assertion is without merit. The PUCO found that the issue of unlawful abandonment was clearly set forth in the complaints filed by Seneca Builders and Roth and was implied in the complaint by Ms. Lycourt-Donovan, and it further found that the issue had been contested at the hearing. Pub. Util. Comm. Nos. 12-2877GA-CSS, 13-124-GA-CSS, and 13-667-GA-CSS, 2015 Ohio PUC LEXIS 39, at -7 (Jan. 14, 2015). The record supports this finding. Roth’s complaint alleged that Columbia Gas had “effectively abandoned the service to [his property] in violation of Ohio law.” The appendix to Lycourt-Donovan’s complaint alleged that 8 January Term, 2017 Columbia Gas had “abandoned the neighborhood.” And Seneca’s complaint alleged that Columbia Gas had “ceased” to provide service. Even if Seneca did not use the optimal term of art to describe its grievance, Columbia Gas cannot claim that it lacked notice. Moreover, the briefs submitted to the PUCO contained a thorough discussion of the issue. Thus, the issue was timely raised. 2. The Miller Act does not apply to Columbia Gas’s actions {¶ 27} The property owners’ abandonment argument is based on the Miller Act, R.C. 4905.20 and 4905.21. R.C. 4905.20 provides: [N]o public utility    furnishing service or facilities within this state, shall abandon or be required to abandon or withdraw any    main pipe line [or] gas line    or any portion thereof    or the service rendered thereby that has once been    used for public business, nor shall any such facility be closed for traffic or service    except as provided in section 4905.21 of the Revised Code. And R.C. 4905.21 provides: [A]ny public utility    desiring to abandon or close, or have abandoned, withdrawn, or closed for traffic or service all or any part of any line    referred to in section 4905.20 of the Revised Code, shall make application to the public utilities commission in writing. The commission shall thereupon cause reasonable notice of the application to be given, stating the time and place fixed by the commission for the hearing of the application. 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 28} These provisions “protect[] existing utility customers from having their service terminated without commission approval.” State ex rel. Toledo Edison Co. v. Clyde, 76 Ohio St.3d 508, 513, 668 N.E.2d 498 (1996). Under the act, the mere “whims of a public utility” cannot justify the termination of service. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 109, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). {¶ 29} The Miller Act does not define the word “abandon.” In the absence of a controlling definition, we construe the word according to the rules of grammar and common usage, paying heed to any technical or particular meaning it has acquired. R.C. 1.42. See also Union Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 52 Ohio St.3d 78, 80, 555 N.E.2d 641 (1990). Various sources agree on the meaning of “abandon.” By rule, the PUCO has defined “abandoned” pipe as “pipe that was not intended to be used again for supplying of gas or natural gas, including a deserted pipe that is closed off to future use.” Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-1305(A)(3)(d). We have defined “abandon” as “ ‘[t]o relinquish or give up with intent of never again resuming one’s right or interest.    To give up absolutely; to forsake entirely; to renounce utterly; to relinquish all connection with or concern in; to desert.’ ” (Ellipsis sic.) Fulmer v. Insura Property & Cas. Co., 94 Ohio St.3d 85, 95, 760 N.E.2d 392 (2002), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 2 (6th Ed.1990). Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “abandon” as “to cease to assert or exercise an interest, right, or title to esp. with the intent of never again resuming or reasserting it.” Id. at 2 (2002). {¶ 30} Taking these definitions together, it is plain that in order to abandon, there must be a relinquishment coupled with an intent to never again assert a right or interest. Columbia Gas’s actions clearly do not fit within the meaning of “abandon.” {¶ 31} The PUCO made a factual determination that Columbia Gas intended to continue to serve the property owners after remedial measures were completed. Record evidence supports this finding. Columbia Gas’s manager of 10 January Term, 2017 communications and community relations testified, “[throughout] the entire course of this process our desire was to have [the property owners] have their natural gas service restored.” In written correspondence dated May 31, 2012, June 15, 2012, and August 23, 2012, Columbia Gas repeatedly affirmed its intention to restore service once the stray-gas issue was remedied. Columbia Gas’s Toledo-area operations-center manager explained that even though the line that provided service to the property owners had been disconnected from the rest of Columbia Gas’s system, it could be “tied back in at any time.” {¶ 32} Moreover, the PUCO’s order emphasized that Columbia Gas maintained an obligation to provide service once the property owners remedied the situation. Columbia Gas’s intention to restore service, coupled with its continuing obligation to provide service upon remediation, negates the property owners’ assertion that Columbia Gas abandoned service and was required to file an abandonment application. {¶ 33} Indeed, R.C. 4905.21 speaks of a utility “desiring” to abandon. It is clear from the record that Columbia Gas did not desire to abandon service to the property owners. All else equal, there seems to be no economic benefit for a utility to stop serving numerous customers. And the PUCO did not find that Columbia Gas’s actions were financially motivated. The mere “whims of a public utility” did not deprive the property owners of their natural-gas service, Grafton, 77 Ohio St.3d at 109, 671 N.E.2d 241; rather, the culprit was a hazardous condition unassociated with Columbia Gas’s system. This set of circumstances does not put Columbia Gas’s actions within the scope of the Miller Act. {¶ 34} The property owners challenge the PUCO’s factual determinations, pointing to other evidence in the record that they believe shows that Columbia Gas abandoned service. For example, they cite Columbia Gas’s disconnection of the main line serving Oakside Road, Columbia Gas’s removal of the customers’ accounts from its system, and e-mails among Columbia Gas personnel regarding 11 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO whether to pursue abandonment if the stray-gas problem could not be fixed. But in making this argument, the property owners are essentially asking us to overturn the PUCO’s factual finding that Columbia Gas intended to restore service once remedial measures were complete. {¶ 35} Our function on appeal is not to reweigh the evidence or secondguess the PUCO on questions of fact. Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 114 Ohio St.3d 340, 2007-Ohio-4276, 872 N.E.2d 269, ¶ 29. Mindful of our role, it suffices that probative evidence in the record supports the PUCO’s finding that Columbia Gas intended to reestablish service to the property owners upon the completion of remedial measures. Luntz Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 79 Ohio St.3d 509, 511, 684 N.E.2d 43 (1997) (We will not “reweigh evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the commission on factual questions where there is sufficient probative evidence in the record to show that the commission’s decision is not manifestly against the weight of the evidence and is not so clearly unsupported by the record as to show misapprehension, mistake, or willful disregard of duty”). {¶ 36} The interests of safety underscore the problems with the home owners’ interpretation of the Miller Act. The PUCO’s “broad” authority to act in the interest of safety is well established. Akron v. Pub. Util. Comm., 149 Ohio St. 347, 359, 78 N.E.2d 890 (1948). And we have previously noted the potential hazards involving natural gas: “[N]atural gas is dangerous unless it is handled properly. It is noxious, flammable, invisible, and naturally odorless. Natural gas is potentially lethal to persons and destructive of property. We have long recognized its dangers.” Util. Serv. Partners, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 124 Ohio St.3d 284, 2009-Ohio-6764, 921 N.E.2d 1038, ¶ 14 (collecting cases). {¶ 37} This case involves the verifiable safety hazard of stray gas from an unknown source present around the foundations of the homes at issue. Fortunately, 12 January Term, 2017 the stray gas at the Oakside Road properties did not result in a tragedy. But other communities have not been so lucky. {¶ 38} A March 21, 2015 explosion caused by a release of natural gas in Upper Arlington serves as a powerful reminder that situations like the one presented here should be taken very seriously. A PUCO staff report on that incident found that a natural-gas release caused a home to explode.2 And a newspaper reported that the explosion was felt and heard “as far as a mile away,” the home was reduced to a “few sticks of wood” and a partial chimney column, “[d]ebris rained down,” “[f]lames shot into the air,” and “[a]s many as 30 houses may have been damaged.”3 {¶ 39} Given the fluid nature of the situation and the threats posed to people, animals, and property under the facts presented here, we cannot endorse a reading of the Miller Act that faults a utility for taking reasonable steps to protect the safety interests of its customers. We agree with the PUCO that the General Assembly could not have intended the result urged by the property owners, which would subordinate safety to the convenience of the property owner. {¶ 40} The PUCO and Columbia Gas also persuasively argue that Columbia Gas’s actions fell within other safety-related provisions in the law. Under R.C. 4933.122(A) and (B), “[n]o natural gas, gas, or electric light company shall terminate service, except for safety reasons    at any time to a residential consumer, except pursuant to procedures that provide for” such things as reasonable prior notice and a reasonable opportunity to dispute the service termination. 2 Staff of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, In re the Investigation of Columbia Gas of Ohio Relative to its Compliance with the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Standards and Related Matters at 1, Case No. 15-1351-GA-GPS (Aug. 28, 2015), https://dis.puc.state.oh.us/TiffToPDf/ A1001001A15H28B42038H04086.pdf (accessed Aug. 15, 2017). 3 The Columbus Dispatch, House Explodes in Upper Arlington (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2015/03/21/House_explosion.html (accessed Aug. 15, 2017). 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO (Emphasis added.) And under Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1-18-03(D), a natural-gas utility may discontinue service to residential customers [w]hen supplying    natural gas creates a safety hazard to consumers or their premises [or] the public    or where, because of conditions beyond the consumer’s premises, disconnection of the supply of    natural gas is reasonably necessary. The company shall not restore service until the hazardous condition(s) has been corrected. {¶ 41} Here, the PUCO determined, “The evidence of record reveals that the levels of methane gas recorded around the foundations of [the property owners’] residential dwellings, albeit varying from time to time, represents a verifiable safety hazard that warrants the interruption of natural gas service until such time as remediation occurs.” This hazard posed a threat, at the very least, to the residents of Oakside Road. The property owners offer no argument to dispute that the conditions satisfied the elements of the statute and the rule.