Opinion ID: 771682
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 103(7) and (11): Do CRG and CRLC Make Independent Expenditures for Political Messages?

Text: 65 Because the definition of independent expenditure incorporates the definition of political message, we begin our analysis with the definition of political message. Under 103(11), a political message is a message delivered by telephone, any print or electronic media, or other written material which advocates the election or defeat of any candidate or which unambiguously refers to such candidate. Colorado urges us to adopt its reading of 103(11). Under the state's construction, the disjunctive phrase advocates the election or defeat of . . . or . . . unambiguously refers to . . . is read as if it were written in the conjunctive, thereby rendering the statute inapplicable to organizations -- like CRLC and CRG -- who do unambiguously refer to candidates, but do not expressly advocate their election or defeat. See Colo. Answer Br. at 16, 19 (Jan. 14, 2000). In other words, Colorado asks as to construe the fourth or in the definition as signifying and. We are unable to do so. 66 We interpret state laws according to state rules of statutory construction. Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1071 n.23 (10th Cir. 1995). The goal of Colorado courts in interpreting the meaning or scope of any statutory term . . . is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. People v. McCullough, 6 P.3d 774, 778 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) (citations omitted). [W]e look first to the language of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent. Id. at 778. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous on its face, there is no need to apply rules of statutory construction because it may be presumed that the legislature meant what it clearly said. In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause & Summary for 1999-2000 No. 219, 999 P.2d 819, 820 (Colo. 2000) (en banc). Although 103 was originally proposed via ballot initiative, Colorado courts employ the general rules of statutory construction when interpreting citizen-initiated measures. Bickel v. City of Boulder, 885 P.2d 215, 228 n.10 (Colo. 1994) (en banc). 67 The definition of political message in 103(11) is clear and unambiguous. In re 1999-2000 No. 219, 999 P.2d at 820. We may therefore presume[] that the legislature meant what it clearly said, i.e., that all four uses of the word or in 103(11) were intended to signify or -- not sometimes or and sometimes and. Id.; cf. Foutz v. United States, 72 F.3d 802, 805 (10th Cir. 1995) (The word or . . . is not a fertile word which is subject to varied constructions.). We need not look to the State's construction for assistance with this interpretation; our inquiry ends with the plain language of the statute. We hold that the use of the disjunctive term or in 103(11) renders the definition of political message applicable to messages which unambiguously refer to a candidate, even if such messages do not also advocate the election or defeat of that candidate. In sum, to qualify as a political message under 103(11), a message need only: (1) be delivered by telephone, any print or electronic media, or other written material, and (2) either (a) advocate the election or defeat of any candidate or (b) unambiguously refer to such candidate. 68 Colorado's next argument focuses on the definition of independent expenditure in 103(7). The first sentence of the definition provides that a payment is an independent expenditure when it is (1) made for the purpose of advocating the election or defeat of a candidate, and (2) not controlled by, or coordinated with, any candidate or any agent of such candidate. The second sentence provides that '[i]ndependent expenditure' includes expenditures for political messages which unambiguously refer to any specific public office or candidate for such office. Colorado argues that the second sentence does not expand upon the first, but merely clarifies its meaning. Colo. Answer Br. at 16 (Jan. 14, 2000). Again, we disagree. 69 Colorado is among the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that read the word includes as a term of extension or enlargement when used in a statutory definition. Colo. Common Cause v. Meyer, 758 P.2d 153, 163-64 (Colo. 1988) (en banc). Therefore, [t]he use of 'includes' in the statutory definition . . . connotes that something else is encompassed by the definition beyond what was previously covered by the immediately preceding language. Id. at 164 (citation omitted, emphasis added). In this case, that something else is expenditures for political messages which unambiguously refer to any specific public office or candidate for such office. 70 As noted above, our standard of review requires us to accept as true the factual allegations underlying Plaintiffs' challenges. See Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1231-32; Apple, 183 F.3d at 479. In their complaint, CRLC and CRG each allege that 71 [the organization's] purposes are to educate the public on issues relating to abortion, to restore protection of the life for [sic] unborn children, and to promote the sanctity of all innocent life. Its major purpose is not to nominate, elect, or defeat candidates, or to pass or defeat ballot measures, and it does not engage in express advocacy. As part of its issue advocacy, CRLC distributes voter guides prior to state elections which educate the voting public on the positions of candidates on issues of public concern. CRLC's voter guides unambiguously refer to specific candidates but do not expressly advocate the election or defeat of any candidate. 72 CRLC et al. Compl. at 9 (Dec. 10, 1996), attached to CRLC et al. Br. at A166 (Dec. 16, 1999); see also id. at 10 (same allegations with respect to CRG). Accepting these allegations as true, as we must, we hold that the voter guides distributed by CRLC and CRG clearly constitute political messages, as defined in 103(11). CRLC and CRG also allege that they are not associated with any political candidate, political party, or campaign committee. Id. at 9-10. In light of our obligation to accord CRLC and CRG the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we infer from this allegation of independence that the distribution of voter guides is not controlled by, or coordinated with, any candidate or any agent of such candidate. Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-103(7). We therefore conclude that the funds expended by CRLC and CRG to produce and disseminate voter guides are subject to regulation as independent expenditures, as the term is defined in 103(7). 73