Opinion ID: 803127
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Valley View’s Arguments

Text: Valley View argues that many of the alleged incidents were not directed at Ms. Hernandez. Although the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Hernandez, indicates most of them were directed at her individually or as part -16- of the Latino employees, we have held that derogatory comments need not be directed at or intended to be received by the victim to be evidence of a hostile work environment. See PVNF, 487 F.3d at 798. The “totality of the circumstances” is “the touchstone of [a hostile work environment] analysis.” Id. at 799; see also Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. “[E]vidence of a general work atmosphere, including evidence of harassment of other racial minorities may be considered in evaluating a claim, as long as [the plaintiff] presents evidence that [she] knew about the offending behavior.” Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2008) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). It is unclear from the record whether Ms. Hernandez heard or was aware of the racially offensive references to the black cook. She testified, however, that she heard all the other racially tinged comments and jokes. And, contrary to Valley View’s assertion, the cook references are relevant to her claim whether or not they were directed at her personally. See McCowan v. All Star Maint., Inc., 273 F.3d 917, 925, n.10 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that comments not directed at plaintiff, including a supervisor who called another worker the n-word, were relevant to the evaluation of hostile work environment claim). Valley View also argues that three of the incidents were not “racially motivated” and “cannot be considered” in the hostile work environment analysis. Aplee. Br. at 24-25. It characterizes Mr. Lillis’s accusation that Ms. Hernandez’s son or brother was a murderer was “nothing more than general teasing”; argues -17- that when Mr. Lillis asked Ms. Hernandez if her family paid for lunch, he might have been motivated simply by payment concerns; and asserts that Mr. Stillahn only “question[ed]” 5 Ms. Hernandez about the mess in the cafeteria because it was his job to ensure cleanliness. Id. Even if these incidents could be construed as racially neutral, Valley View’s argument fails. Hostile work environment “harassment must be racial or stem from racial animus.” Tademy, 614 F.3d at 1139 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). But Valley View misconstrues this circuit’s precedent in asserting these incidents should be excluded from our analysis. We have long held that “[f]acially neutral abusive conduct can support a finding of [racial] animus sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim when that conduct is viewed in the context of other, overtly [racially]-discriminatory conduct.” O’Shea, 185 F.3d at 1097; Penry v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 155 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Even where the motive behind the alleged conduct was not the plaintiff’s [race or national origin], the court may still consider that conduct relevant when evaluating whether ambiguous conduct was in fact 5 Valley View’s sanitized word choice falls short of conveying Ms. Hernandez’s evidence, which is that Mr. Stillahn said the “place looked like shit,” “was angry,” “started screaming,” “pushed the cart and kicked the door,” and that Ms. Hernandez “was afraid” and “tried to stay away from him.” Aplt. App. at 238. -18- [racially]-motivated or whether [racially]-motivated conduct was so severe [or] pervasive as to create Title VII liability.”). This is because what is important in a hostile environment claim is the environment, and [racially]-neutral harassment makes up an important part of the relevant work environment. Conduct that appears [racially]-neutral in isolation may in fact be [race]-based, but may appear so only when viewed in the context of other [race]-based behavior. Thus, when a plaintiff introduces evidence of both [race]-based and [race]-neutral harassment, and when a jury, viewing the evidence in context, reasonably could view all of the allegedly harassing conduct . . . as the product of [racial] hostility, then it is for the fact finder to decide whether such an inference should be drawn. Chavez v. New Mexico, 397 F.3d 826, 833 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that plaintiffs “can use a substantial amount of arguably [racially]-neutral harassment to bolster a smaller amount of [race]-based conduct on summary judgment”). Valley View’s argument that these three incidents were not based in racial animus “should take place before a jury that will have the opportunity to evaluate the evidence, demeanor, and candor of witnesses.” Tademy, 614 F.3d at 1146. Ms. Hernandez testified she was upset and offended by Mr. Lillis’s accusation that her family had not paid for lunch and that her son or brother was a murderer. She was so afraid of Mr. Stillahn’s anger when he blamed her for the kitchen mess that she tried to avoid him and was afraid to return. These incidents must be viewed in context and “cannot simply be discarded . . . but must be weighed on the side of reasonable inferences.” McCowan, 273 F.3d at 925 n.10. -19-