Opinion ID: 1059512
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: roadblock

Text: Burns asserts that the roadblock that Sheriff Green set up on the evening of September 21st did not pass constitutional muster because the roadblock was established at the sole discretion of law enforcement officers at the crime scene, there was no plan regarding the particular time and place of the roadblock, and there were no neutral criteria for carrying out the roadblock. The Commonwealth disagrees and contends that Burns' argument is flawed because Burns voluntarily stopped his vehicle before he reached the roadblock rather than actually being stopped at the roadblock. Alternatively, the Commonwealth argues that, if Burns was stopped, the roadblock satisfied the three-prong test enunciated in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), as adopted by this Court in Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 337 S.E.2d 273 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084, 106 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed.2d 720 (1986). While we believe that the circumstances under which Burns stopped his vehicle as he approached the roadblock was a stop and thus a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, see id. at 349, 337 S.E.2d at 275, we agree with the Commonwealth that the roadblock did not violate Burns' constitutional rights. The constitutional legitimacy of a roadblock, such as the one in this case, is determined by weighing (1) the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, (2) the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and (3) the severity of the interference with individual liberty. Id. at 350, 337 S.E.2d at 276. A roadblock is not an unconstitutional infringement on an individual's privacy if it is carried out pursuant to a plan or practice which is explicit, contains neutral criteria, and limits the conduct of the officers undertaking the roadblock. Simmons v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 200, 203, 380 S.E.2d 656, 658 (1989). The roadblock at issue satisfies these requirements. Sheriff Green decided to establish the roadblock because a brutal homicide had been recently committed in the area of the roadblock, and because law enforcement officials did not know the identity of the perpetrator or whether that person was still in the area. According to Sheriff Green, the purpose of the roadblock was to canvas drivers who were passing through the area, to see whether they had seen anything or heard anything during the time period when the crime had probably been committed the previous day. Certainly, the fact that a murder had occurred was a matter of grave public concern, and the roadblock advanced that concern by aiding in the investigation of the crime. Additionally, Sheriff Green chose the location of the roadblock and directed that it be conducted between the hours of 7:00 p.m. on September 21st until approximately 11:30 a.m. on September 22nd because he believed that the crime had been committed between those hours on September 20th-21st. He also directed that all vehicles be stopped and that the operators be asked if they were through that section during those times, and if they were, did they see anything of a suspicious nature in or around [the victim's house]. If the drivers inquired about what had pened, they were to be told only that an incident had occurred; they were not to receive specific information about the crime. Thus, the roadblock was carried out pursuant to an explicit plan that contained neutral criteria, and limited the discretion and conduct of the law enforcement officers actually stopping vehicles at the roadblock. However, our analysis of this issue does not end here. Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States considered the constitutional propriety of a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to discover and interdict illegal narcotics. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, ___, 121 S.Ct. 447, 450, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000). After discussing several of its prior decisions, see e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), the Court stated that each of the checkpoint programs that we have approved was designed primarily to serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety. Edmond, 531 U.S. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 454. Thus, the Court concluded that the narcotics checkpoint program contravened the Fourth Amendment because its purpose was to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court decline[d] to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes. Id. at 455. However, the Court recognized that there are circumstances that may justify a law enforcement checkpoint where the primary purpose would otherwise, but for some emergency, relate to ordinary crime control. Id. The primary purpose of the roadblock that Sheriff Green established obviously was not related to policing the borders or ensuring road safety. Nor was its purpose simply to investigate ordinary criminal wrongdoing as was the checkpoint in Edmond. Instead, the roadblock in this case was specifically designed to investigate a particular murder that had recently occurred in the area where the roadblock was placed. When Sheriff Green decided to set up the roadblock, the perpetrator's identity and whereabouts remained unknown. Law enforcement officers were not stopping vehicles merely to discover evidence of crimes in general. Thus, we conclude that the roadblock in this case falls within the exigent circumstances recognized by the Supreme Court in Edmond and that it, therefore, did not contravene the Fourth Amendment. [11]