Opinion ID: 2817272
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voluntariness determination

Text: The state supreme court found various uncontested facts relevant to the voluntariness analysis. Detective Wheeles advised Ms. Sharp of her Miranda rights orally and in writing. She waived her rights and spoke with Detective Wheeles. Her detention was not unusually long—the video indicates Ms. Sharp was in custody for roughly five hours before her arrest. Detective Wheeles provided Ms. Sharp with water to drink, and she did not appear to be impaired. Each of these facts weighs in favor of voluntariness. Detective Wheeles’s assurance that Ms. Sharp would not go to jail for her role in the crime, however, was a critical and troubling moment in the interview. In the first thirty minutes of the interview, Ms. Sharp described witnessing Mr. Hollingsworth and Mr. Baker attack, threaten with an axe, hog-tie, gag, and beat Mr. Owens, and then drag him into the woods. She described the clothes Mr. Owen wore and detailed the personal items he carried. She also admitted she became angry with Mr. Owen and, most importantly, confessed to burning his belongings. Yet, when she asked if she was going - 29 - to jail, Detective Wheeles unmistakably insisted, “No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, [no, no].” Although Ms. Sharp’s initial statement that she helped burn Mr. Owen’s belongings may not have been enough on its own to support a conviction, it was nonetheless sufficient to make Detective Wheeles’s “no jail” promise at best misleading and probably false. After she admitted to evidence destruction in a murder investigation, Ms. Sharp immediately and anxiously asked if she was going to jail. Having elicited an incriminating statement and clearly wanting more, Detective Wheeles seemingly cleared the legal land mines with his immediate response of ten “no’s,” but instead left a primrose path. And Detective Wheeles’s response was no mere limited assurance of putting in a good word with the prosecutor. See United States v. Roman-Zarate, 115 F.3d 778, 783 (10th Cir. 1997) (concluding interviewing agents’ “limited assurances” to inform prosecutor about suspect’s cooperation are insufficient to render a confession involuntary). He flatly rejected Ms. Sharp’s concern about going to jail, without equivocation. He did not say the charging decision was in the prosecutor’s hands. He did not express uncertainty about her fate. After making the “no jail” promise, Detective Wheeles said, “You are a witness to this thing as long as you do not do something dumb and jam yourself.” App. Vol. I at 49. It is unclear what this meant other than Ms. Sharp would not be prosecuted and would be a witness as long as she cooperated with Detective Wheeles. He then instructed Ms. Sharp not to say “no” to his questions—further exhortation that she should respond to Detective Wheeles’s questions and cooperate with his investigation. - 30 - Ms. Sharp’s decision to continue providing details does not seem “to have been the result of calculation [instead of] coercion.” Roman-Zarate, 115 F.3d at 783. Detective Wheeles’s promise she would not go to jail induced her confessional statements because he made clear there would be no cost of disclosure. He gave Ms. Sharp a get-out-of-jail-free card, and she obliged by giving him more incriminating details. Ms. Sharp therefore did not simply “balance[] personal considerations with the possible cost of disclosure,” id., when making her subsequent confessional statements. Instead, his promise “[wa]s of the sort that may indeed critically impair a defendant’s capacity for self-determination.” Lopez, 437 F.3d at 1065. And despite Detective Wheeles’s assurance at the beginning of the interview—that he was “not going to lie to [Ms. Sharp] in this investigation”—his promise that she would not go to jail was false or misleading. See Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147, 1159 (holding promise of leniency coupled with misrepresentations about the evidence against the suspect were coercive enough to render statements involuntary). In isolation, Detective Wheeles’s comments about helping Ms. Sharp and her children might not appear coercive. He did not explicitly suggest that Ms. Sharp confess in exchange for his assistance with shelter. But he did mollify her concerns about finding shelter by saying “[w]e’ll work out some place for you to go,” App. Vol. I at 52, a promise inconsistent with a suggestion of arrest. And his willingness to cut short the interview to retrieve her children from the presence of a registered sex offender added weight to his “no jail” promise of leniency, which he had made only a few minutes earlier. - 31 - Ms. Sharp’s surprised and angry reaction when Detective Wheeles arrested her at the end of the interview indicated her incriminating statements were not the product of free will because they were given on the false premise she would not go to jail. She accused him of lying and trickery and thought her cooperation would make her a witness, not a defendant. Suppl. App. Vol. I, DVD clip B, at 5:25:16 p.m.-5:26:28 p.m. Having carefully reviewed the interview video and considered the totality of circumstances, we conclude Ms. Sharp’s will was overborne once Detective Wheeles promised her she would not go to jail after she admitted to participating in the crime. Once that promise was made, Ms. Sharp’s subsequent incriminating statements were involuntary because she had been told she would not go to jail for her involvement. The trial court therefore erroneously admitted those statements at trial in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Toles, 297 F.3d at 965. 3. The State Supreme Court’s Error was not Harmless a. Legal background A trial court’s erroneous decision to admit an involuntary confession into evidence is subject to harmless error analysis. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 295. “[I]n § 2254 proceedings a court must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a statecourt criminal trial under the ‘substantial and injurious effect’ standard” articulated in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121 (2007). Under Brecht, “an error is harmless unless it ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Id. at 116 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631). “‘The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, - 32 - apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather whether the error itself had substantial influence.’” Crease v. McKune, 189 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)) (alterations omitted). “When a federal judge in a habeas proceeding is in grave doubt about whether a trial error of federal law had ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,’” the error is harmful and the court must grant the writ. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995); see also id. at 435 (“By ‘grave doubt’ we mean that, in the judge’s mind, the matter is so evenly balanced that he feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error.”). Analyzing harmlessness under Brecht, “does not involve a judge who shifts a ‘burden’ to help control the presentation of evidence at a trial, but rather involves a judge who applies a legal standard (harmlessness) to a record that the presentation of evidence is no longer likely to affect.” Id. at 437 (quoting R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 26 (1970)). The State was required to prove Ms. Sharp’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We must decide whether we have grave doubt that the State would have met its burden if the inadmissible evidence had been properly suppressed. b. Brecht analysis Ms. Sharp was convicted for felony murder under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3401(b) (2006) (repealed 2011), which stated, “Murder in the first degree is the killing of a human being committed: . . . (b) in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3436(a)(1) (2006) (repealed 2011) defined inherently dangerous felonies to include kidnapping. Kansas law defined - 33 - kidnapping as “the taking or confining of any person, accomplished by force, threat or deception, with the intent to hold such person: . . . (c) to inflict bodily injury or to terrorize the victim or another.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3420 (2006) (repealed 2011). We must therefore consider whether the trial court’s admission of Ms. Sharp’s involuntary statements had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s determination that Ms. Sharp aided in the crime of taking or confining Mr. Owen with the intent to inflict bodily injury or terrorize him.
Until Detective Wheeles promised Ms. Sharp would not go to jail, all of her statements were voluntary and admissible. And up to that point, Ms. Sharp had already described many details of the crime. She had described witnessing Mr. Hollingsworth and Mr. Baker hog-tie and beat Mr. Owen, and then drag him into the woods. She had explained Mr. Cornell had burned Mr. Owen’s belongings, including his phone, notebooks, wallet, glasses, shoes, and socks. Each of these statements indicated she had only witnessed and had not participated in the attack on Mr. Owen. She did, however, implicate herself by confessing to a minor participatory role by saying she “helped burn” Mr. Owen’s belongings. Mr. Cornell testified for the prosecution. He had been charged with felony murder and kidnapping for his role in Mr. Owen’s death, but he pled guilty to lesser charges— involuntary manslaughter and kidnapping—in exchange for his testimony. According to his account, Ms. Sharp threw Mr. Owen’s belongings into an incinerator before Mr. Owen was tied and beaten. He explained Ms. Sharp was angry with Mr. Owen for - 34 - destroying homeless camp sites, and she yelled at Mr. Owen, “How do you like someone destroying your stuff?” State App. Vol. IX at 53. Mr. Cornell testified that after he gave Mr. Hollingsworth the rope used to hog-tie Mr. Owen, Ms. Sharp said, “[w]e’re not gonna kill him, we’re going to tie him up,” id. at 64, and “we’re gonna make [Mr. Owen] sleep out, tie him to a tree, make him sleep out with the mosquitos, show him how it feels to sleep outside without a tent or blankets,” id. at 62. Mr. Cornell also testified Ms. Sharp asked him to dump the incinerator in a nearby camp. On cross-examination, Mr. Cornell conceded his trial testimony conflicted with his prior statements to the police in which he denied having any role in Mr. Owen’s death. For example, Mr. Cornell initially told the police he had not participated in tying up Mr. Owen. He instead told them Mr. Owen was already tied up when Mr. Cornell first walked into the camp site. He also had attempted to minimize his role in helping burn Mr. Owen’s belongings. At first he claimed he did not help burn. He then admitted to helping burn but claimed Ms. Sharp was already burning Mr. Owen’s belongings when Mr. Cornell first walked into the camp site. At trial he testified he arrived at the camp site before any of Mr. Owen’s belongings were burned. Mr. Cornell also testified that he expected a lighter sentence because he was testifying for the prosecution.
In light of our conclusion that Ms. Sharp’s statements were involuntary after Detective Wheeles promised she would not go to jail, the following evidence should not have been admitted at trial. - 35 - 1. “Don’t kill him here.” The State presented the video recording of Ms. Sharp guiding Detective Wheeles around the camp site, re-enacting the incident, and providing detail about her observations. At one point, Ms. Sharp showed Detective Wheeles where she saw Mr. Hollingsworth threatening Mr. Owen with an ax. At the police station, she had told Detective Wheeles that she thought Mr. Hollingsworth was going to kill Mr. Owen with the ax, and claimed she said, “[N]o, don’t do that, don’t do that. I can’t be an accessory to this shit, you know. I can’t do that.” App. at 42. But during the reenactment, Detective Wheeles asked her, “Did you say, ‘No, don’t kill him,’ or did you say, ‘No, don’t kill him here?’” Sharp, 210 P.3d at 596. She responded, “Don’t kill him here.” Id. (emphasis in original). The State relied heavily on this statement at trial. During opening arguments, the State told the jury, “As [Mr. Hollingsworth] left the camp, Kim Sharp followed him. When she got there, David Owen was on the ground. Charles Hollingsworth had this hatchet above David Owen’s head. Kim said, ‘Don’t kill him here.’” State App. Vol. IX at 10. Shortly thereafter, the State again highlighted her statement, explaining that she initially told Detective Wheeles she only said, “Don’t kill him,” before admitting during the re-enactment that she had said, “I told him not to kill him here.” Id. at 11-12. Ms. Sharp’s trial testimony indicates both she and the State believed this statement would influence the jury’s verdict. On direct examination, she claimed, in contradiction to her videotaped statement, she had not said “Don’t kill him here.” State App. Vol. XI at 69. The State focused on the statement during Ms. Sharp’s cross-examination: - 36 - [The State]: [Mr. Owen is] beggin’ for his life. You told [Mr. Hollingsworth]-- this is what you told [defense counsel], “No, don’t kill him.” Is that what you said? [Ms. Sharp]: Yes, I did. .... [The State]: In fact, what you told Detective Wheeles was, “Don’t kill him here”; is that correct? [Ms. Sharp]: That is correct. But may I speak on that? [The State]: No, your counsel can ask you further questions. That’s what you told Detective Wheeles on the video reenactment, wasn’t it? [Ms. Sharp]: Yes. [The State]: You didn’t add anything else? He asked you. Did you say, “Don’t kill him,” or, “Don’t kill him here?” That’s a choice; right? [Ms. Sharp]: Yes. [The State]: And if you did say any one of those things, there was nothing to prevent you to say I didn’t say that? [Ms. Sharp]: Right. Id. at 92-94. On redirect, Ms. Sharp again attempted to rebut the statement she made during the re-enactment: [Defense counsel]: When Detective Wheeles asked you did you say don’t kill him or don’t kill him here, what can you-- did you respond to him? [Ms. Sharp]: I said, “Don’t kill him. Don’t kill him.” [Defense counsel]: Okay. Now, that’s what you said that day or is that what you said to Detective Wheeles? [Ms. Sharp]: I said to Detective Wheeles, I said, “Don’t kill him here.” [Defense counsel]: You had never said that before; correct? [Ms. Sharp]: No. [Defense counsel]: You had already given Detective Wheeles your statement at the Law Enforcement Center before you went into the reenactment? [Ms. Sharp]: Yes. .... [Defense counsel]: Did you understand the impact of what Detective Wheeles was asking you when he said, don’t kill him or don’t kill him here? [Ms. Sharp]: No. Id. at 104-05. And on recross examination, the State again discussed the statement: - 37 - [The State]: You didn’t want David Owen to be killed? [Ms. Sharp]: No, I did not. [The State]: And you told [Mr. Hollingsworth], don’t kill him here? [Ms. Sharp]: I said, “Don’t kill him.” [The State]: Right? [Ms. Sharp]: Yes. .... [The State]: Did you-- but you told [Mr. Hollingsworth], don’t kill him here, and he didn’t, did he? [Ms. Sharp]: No. [The State]: Nothing prevented you from writing out as much information as you wanted to in your own handwritten statement, did it? [Ms. Sharp]: I was nervous, plus I had my kids with me. Id. at 105-06. The State repeatedly focused the jury’s attention on the statement during closing argument. For example, the prosecutor reiterated the statement and urged the jury “to reflect back to the reenactment tape in this case, her voice, the way she said that, and the way that she pointed, ‘Don’t kill him here.’” State App. Vol. XII at 36-37. The prosecutor continued, “[Ms. Sharp] told you she told [Detective Wheeles], ‘Don’t kill him here, I can’t be an accessory to this.’” Id. at 37. In her closing arguments, Ms. Sharp’s attorney described, at length, how Ms. Sharp had rebutted the statement. For example, You heard when [Ms. Sharp] said that she said, “I told him, don’t kill him. Don’t hurt him. Don’t use the axe.” She made a written statement. . . . She wrote, “Don’t kill him. Don’t hurt him. Don’t use the axe.” It wasn’t until they were out in the field, they were doing this reenactment, when Detective Wheeles said, “Tell me what happened.” . . . . She’s standing here, and she said, “I said, don’t kill him. No baby. Don’t do it. Don’t do it.” He says, “Did you say, ‘don’t kill him or don’t kill him here?’” “Here,” from his mouth, not her mouth, what she did. She said, “Don’t kill him here.” And he says-- he tells you-- this was my clarifying question. He just repeated it, “Did you say ‘don’t kill him here’?” One word. Did he ask the question that would have cleared everything up? Oh my God. - 38 - You’ve been saying-- you said, “don’t kill him,” all morning, all afternoon-- your oral, at the same time, your written statement. When you just told me what happened, did you mean, don’t kill him here? Kill him where else? If that one question would have been asked, we wouldn’t be sitting here today. She would have had the chance to say, no, God no. What I meant is, “Don’t hurt him. Don’t kill him. Don’t kill him here.” “Here.” There’s so many reasons that word could have been said. She actually said it when she was repeating it back to him. She was paraphrasing herself. She couldn’t remember what she actually said. When I asked her, did you understand what his question was? Well, no, she certainly didn’t understand the impact of what he was asking her. And if he was trying to lead that question, he certainly did a good job. Id. at 52-54. She also explained the re-enactment tape was the only piece of evidence indicating Ms. Sharp said, “Don’t kill him here.” Other than that tape, the evidence uniformly indicates she said, “Don’t kill him.” Id. at 54. The prosecutor’s rebuttal closing arguments again focused on the statement. Id. at 61-63. 2. Burning the belongings. During the re-enactment, Ms. Sharp showed Detective Wheeles where she burned Mr. Owen’s belongings and explained it was her idea to burn them: “I said we have to burn it ‘cause I don’t need the evidence. I don’t want to be tied to this.” Sharp, 210 P.3d at 596. Unlike her uncoerced prior confession that she merely “helped” burn Mr. Owen’s belongings, this later confession indicates she devised the plan and took the lead to burn Mr. Owen’s belongings to destroy evidence of the crime. During opening arguments, the State said, “[Ms. Sharp will] tell you it was her idea to burn David Owen’s property because they had to destroy any of the evidence that would link them to this crime.” State App. Vol. II at 12. During her testimony, she attempted to rebut the assertion that she burned Mr. Owen’s belongings to destroy evidence of his murder. She explained she instead burned his belongings because she - 39 - believed Mr. Owen would have destroyed her property if he had the opportunity. And during the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor reminded the jury that Ms. Sharp “decided they had to burn everything else up so the crime couldn’t be connected back to them.” State App. Vol. XII at 63. 3. The interview videotape. The State presented the video recording of Ms. Sharp’s police-station interview. After Detective Wheeles promised she would not go to jail, Ms. Sharp provided more detail about burning Mr. Owen’s belongings. Ms. Sharp confessed she and Mr. Cornell destroyed Mr. Owen’s belongings in two separate fires, and she personally burned Mr. Owen’s two cell phones and notebooks. 4. Written statement. The State also admitted into evidence Ms. Sharp’s written statement about the crime, which she prepared after her children were retrieved from the camp site, and which she had moved to suppress.
Given the attention paid to Ms. Sharp’s involuntary confessional statements during the trial, we question whether she would have taken the stand to rebut them and open herself to cross-examination if they had been properly suppressed. See Wolfe v. Clarke, 691 F.3d 410, 425-26 (4th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s grant of § 2254 petition because a Brady violation tainted two of defendant’s convictions, and affirming district court’s decision to vacate all three of defendant’s convictions because third conviction relied significantly on defendant’s testimony at trial, and the government could not prove defendant would have testified without the improperly admitted evidence). Cf. Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 224 (1968) (“It is, of course, difficult to unravel the many - 40 - considerations that might have led the petitioner to take the witness stand at his former trial. But, having illegally placed his confessions before the jury, the Government can hardly demand a demonstration by the petitioner that he would not have testified as he did if his inadmissible confessions had not been used.”). But she did testify, and on cross-examination she admitted that “in a way” it was her idea to burn Mr. Owen’s belongings to destroy all evidence that he had been in the camp site. State App. Vol. IV at 90-91. The State highlighted this statement during closing arguments. State App. Vol. XII at 63 (“She decided they had to burn everything else up so the crime couldn’t be connected back to them.”).
We conclude the trial court’s decision to deny Ms. Sharp’s motion to suppress and to admit her statements was not harmless error under Brecht and “had substantial influence” on the result. Crease, 189 F.3d at 1193. The untainted evidence against Ms. Sharp included only her vague statement that she had “helped burn,” and Mr. Cornell’s testimony that Ms. Sharp burned Mr. Owen’s belongings out of anger before he was tied up, and knew of Mr. Hollingsworth’s and Mr. Baker’s intention to drag Mr. Owen into the woods and tie him to a tree. This evidence did not establish the extent of her role or her intent. Her involuntary confessional statements, on the other hand, were detailed and probative of her specific role in the crime and her state of mind, and the State’s case against her depended significantly on them. As the Supreme Court said in Fulminante: - 41 - A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, the defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him. . . . In the case of a coerced confession . . . a reviewing court [must use] extreme caution before determining that the admission of the confession at trial was harmless. 499 U.S. at 296 (quotations omitted). The jury could have interpreted Ms. Sharp’s “Don’t kill him here” statement from the re-enactment video as evidence that she influenced the commission of the crime and knew Mr. Owen would be killed. Further, in the re-enactment video, Ms. Sharp detailed her role in burning Mr. Owen’s belongings, and claimed it was her idea to burn them to destroy evidence of the crime. The jury could have found this evidence showed Ms. Sharp acted with a culpable state of mind and aided in concealing the crime. At trial, the parties paid great time and attention to these statements from the re-enactment video, and both statements featured prominently in opening and closing arguments. Given the State’s repeated reliance on these statements, we are convinced the statements played a large role in the jury’s verdict. Moreover, we are troubled that Ms. Sharp might not have testified if her involuntary confessional statements had been suppressed. By testifying, she exposed herself to cross-examination and admitted that “in a way” it was her idea to burn Mr. Owen’s belongings to destroy evidence of the crime. This damaging admission also could have significantly affected the jury’s verdict. In summary, although Mr. Cornell’s testimony supported the prosecution’s case, we have grave doubt whether the trial court’s erroneous admission of Ms. Sharp’s incriminating statements from the interview, re-enactment, and written statement, and Ms. Sharp’s decision to testify on her behalf to attempt to rebut her involuntary - 42 - confessional statements combined to have substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Under Brecht, we therefore must grant relief.