Opinion ID: 691401
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 113 Appellants argue that the evidence is insufficient to establish liability. We disagree and hold (1) that the district court and jury's findings are not clearly erroneous, and (2) that the findings are based upon evidence sufficient to impose liability against the Department pursuant to Title VII, and against Horsley, Poundstone, and Stricklin in their individual capacities pursuant to section 1983. 114 (1) Title VII 115 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1) (1981). The Act defines the term employer as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of such a person. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b) (1981). When the work place is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,' that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment,' Title VII is violated. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 367, 370, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (citations omitted). 116 A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees' psychological well being, can and often will detract from employees' job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers. Moreover, even without regard to these tangible effects, the very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of their ... gender ... offends Title VII's broad rule of work place equality. 117 Harris, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 114 S.Ct. at 370-71. Appellees presented sufficient evidence for the finding that Stricklin discriminated against them because of their gender, and that such discrimination created a work environment abusive for female employees. 118 As to Horsley and Poundstone, the law requires appellees to establish that Horsley and Poundstone knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt action to remedy the violation. The employee can show that the employer had knowledge of the harassment by proving that she complained to higher management of the problem or by demonstrating that the harassment was so pervasive that an inference of constructive knowledge arises. Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 904 (11th Cir.1988). Here, also, appellees presented sufficient evidence for the finding that Horsley and Poundstone knew or should have known of Stricklin's discriminatory treatment of female employees, yet failed to take prompt action to remedy the hostile work environment Stricklin's conduct created. Appellants fail to undermine the nearly overwhelming record evidence that Horsley and Poundstone knew or should have known of Stricklin's discriminatory treatment of female employees. 119 We also conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the finding that Cross, Stalnacher, O'Quinn, Weltin, and Thacker involuntarily resign[ed] in order to escape intolerable and illegal employment requirements Stricklin created through sexual harassment of them. E.g. Henson, 682 F.2d at 907. 120 In sum, appellees presented sufficient evidence to support Title VII liability against the Department. 121 (2) Section 1983 122 Appellees also alleged a violation of their equal protection rights under the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, based upon Stricklin's sexual harassment. Appellees have a constitutional right to be free from unlawful sex discrimination and sexual harassment in public employment. E.g. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 235, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2271, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979). 123 In order to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, appellees must prove discriminatory motive or purpose. Whiting v. Jackson State University, 616 F.2d 116, 122 (5th Cir.1980). The court in Whiting held that such intent should be inferred in the same manner as [the Supreme Court] said it is inferred under [42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5]. Whiting, 616 F.2d at 121. When section 1983 is used as a parallel remedy for violation of section 703 of Title VII [42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2], the elements of the two causes of action are the same. Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1369 n. 16 (11th Cir.1982) (citing Whiting, 616 F.2d at 123). We hold that appellees presented sufficient evidence to substantiate their section 1983 equal protection claim, and Stricklin failed to present evidence sufficient to convince the finder of fact that his motives were non-gender related. 124 As to Horsley and Poundstone, liability under section 1983 125 must be based on something more than a theory of respondeat superior. Supervisory liability occurs either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation. The causal connection can be established when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so. 126 Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir.1990) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 933, 111 S.Ct. 2056, 114 L.Ed.2d 461 (1991). Stricklin discriminated against female employees and created a hostile work environment. Stricklin's conduct was obvious, flagrant, rampant, and of continued duration. Brown, 906 F.2d at 671. We hold that the record supports the finding that Horsley and Poundstone were on notice of the need to correct Stricklin's discrimination of female employees, and yet failed to do so. The record is sufficient to support section 1983 liability against Horsley and Poundstone. 127