Opinion ID: 2633475
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Statute of Limitations for Contract Claims

Text: [¶ 12] Having concluded that the two-year statute of limitations applies to licensed outfitters and professional guides, we must now turn to the question of whether the limitation period applies to contract claims as well as tort claims. While we have referred to section 1-3-107(a) as the professional malpractice statute, and we have recognized that the premise of professional malpractice is usually based in tort, see Richardson Assocs. v. Lincoln-Devore, Inc., 806 P.2d 790, 800 (Wyo.1991), we have not limited malpractice actions to tort claims. For example, in legal malpractice actions, we have recognized that claims may be based upon breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty theories. Peterson v. Scorsine, 898 P.2d 382, 387 (Wyo.1995); Jackson State Bank v. King, 844 P.2d 1093, 1096-97 (Wyo. 1993). [¶ 13] Section 1-3-107(a) states that the two-year statute of limitations applies to [a] cause of action arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering of licensed or certified professional . . . services. This language does not specifically refer to malpractice or tort actions, but rather applies to causes of action arising from the rendering of services. To conclude that it did not apply to breach of contract claims would defeat the purpose of the statute, essentially subjecting licensed professionals to a longer statute of limitations when they perform services pursuant to a contract. [1] [¶ 14] In Thunderbasin Land, Livestock & Inv. Co. v. Laramie County, 5 P.3d 774, 782 (Wyo.2000), we recognized that a specific statute controls over a general statute on the same subject. (citing Rock Springs Ford Nissan v. State Bd. of Equalization, Wyoming Dept. of Revenue, 890 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Wyo.1995)). Other courts have applied this rule of statutory preference in the context of statutes of limitations. That is, when there is a specific statute of limitations for professionals, that statute governs over more general statutes of limitations. In Reinke Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Hayes, 256 Neb. 442, 590 N.W.2d 380, 387-88 (1999), the Supreme Court of Nebraska explained: Section 25-205 is a general statute of limitations for written contract claims. See Kratochvil v. Motor Club Ins. Assn., 255 Neb. 977, 588 N.W.2d 565 (1999). Additionally, we have held that § 25-222 is a special statute of limitations for professional negligence. Swassing v. Baum, 195 Neb. 651, 240 N.W.2d 24 (1976). In Kratochvil v. Motor Club Ins. Assn., supra , we stated that, generally, absent a more specific statute, actions on written contracts may be brought within 5 years pursuant to § 25-205. We explained, however, that `[a] special statute of limitations controls and takes precedence over a general statute of limitations because the special statute is a specific expression of legislative will concerning a particular subject.' Kratochvil v. Motor Club Ins. Assn., 255 Neb. at 986, 588 N.W.2d at 573(quoting Murphy v. Spelts-Schultz Lumber Co., 240 Neb. 275, 481 N.W.2d 422 (1992)). Therefore, if Reinke's claims arise from its professional relationship with Hayes, then § 25-222 is the applicable statute of limitations and § 25-205 is not more direct or equally applicable to Reinke's breach of contract claim. By alleging various theories of recovery, Reinke attempts to parse its claims in order to obtain the advantage of longer periods of limitation and avoid the statutory bar of § 25-222. If all of Reinke's claims are based on a single professional relationship, however, they may not be separated into various parts to allow different periods of limitation to be applied. See Maloley v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 246 Neb. 701, 523 N.W.2d 27 (1994). In Swassing v. Baum, 195 Neb. at 657, 240 N.W.2d at 28, we explained that we do not believe that the Legislature in adopting the special statute of limitations for professional negligence, section 25-222, R.S.Supp., 1974, intended that the various aspects of the whole professional relationship should be separated. . . . Therefore, if Reinke's claims are for professional malpractice, whether pled in tort or contract, the statute of limitations for professional negligence contained in § 25-222 applies. See, Witherspoon v. Sides Constr. Co., 219 Neb. 117, 362 N.W.2d 35 (1985); Lincoln Grain v. Coopers & Lybrand, 215 Neb. 289, 338 N.W.2d 594 (1983). (Second emphasis added.) [¶ 15] We find this rationale to be persuasive. If all of the claims against a licensed outfitter or professional guide arise from services provided as a result of the professional relationship, the claims may not be separated to provide a longer statute of limitations for the contract claim. The more specific statute of limitations for professionals governs the relationship.