Opinion ID: 1250281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State's failure to call all the hostages as witnesses.

Text: Wagner next asserts several issues grounded on the State's decision to call as witnesses only three of the eight guards taken hostage during the uprising. The reason behind the State's decision to limit the record is evident. All eight hostages, with the exception of one who was released separately because of heart problems, were treated similarly by the inmates. To utilize the testimony of all eight would have been cumulative in nature. Wagner first contends that because five guards did not testify there was no substantial evidence in the record from which the jury could find these guards did not consent to being taken hostage. See Iowa Code § 710.1 (1981). We reject this argument. In Iowa, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence. State v. Doss, 355 N.W.2d 874, 878 (Iowa 1984). If under all the evidence, both circumstantial and direct, the jury reasonably could conclude the State established the element of nonconsent beyond a reasonable doubt, substantial evidence of guilt exists and we are bound by the jury's verdict. See State v. Blair, 347 N.W.2d 416, 419 (Iowa 1984). Here, although five hostages did not give direct testimony of nonconsent, the undisputed evidence shows these non-testifying hostages were treated like the hostages who did present evidence. According to Wagner's own testimony, the eight hostages were never free to leave during the uprising. We conclude this evidence was sufficient to permit the jury reasonably to find all the guards had not consented to being held hostage by the inmates. Wagner next asserts the State's failure to call five of the hostages justified an instruction that the jury might draw an inference the non-testifying hostages would have presented testimony adverse to the State's case. Trial court rejected Wagner's requested instruction. To be entitled to an instruction allowing a negative inference to be drawn from the State's failure to call a witness, there must be some factual basis in the record independent of the failure itself that would tend to support such an inference. State v. Langlet, 283 N.W.2d 330, 335 (Iowa 1979). This rule simply mirrors the well-established principle trial court should submit to the jury only those issues supported by substantial evidence, and it is error to submit an issue having no support in the record. Hoekstra v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 382 N.W.2d 100, 107 (Iowa 1986). No inferences will be supported when the witness is equally available to both sides or when the testimony that could be elicited would be cumulative in nature. Prestype, Inc. v. Carr, 248 N.W.2d 111, 120 (Iowa 1976). Here, the record contains nothing to suggest the five non-testifying hostages would have given testimony adverse to the State's case. The possibility they would have testified adversely to the State is purely speculative. We hold trial court properly rejected Wagner's request for an instruction allowing a negative inference to be drawn. Wagner next attacks trial court's denial of his motion to sever and his motion in limine. By pretrial motion Wagner sought severance of the five counts of kidnapping for which the State did not intend to call the victims. He then sought, by motion in limine, to exclude all State testimony relating to the thoughts, mental impressions, or nonconsent of the non-testifying hostages. Trial court properly rejected Wagner's motion to sever because it was untimely. Absent a showing of good cause, motions to sever counts must be filed no later than forty days after arraignment. Iowa R.Crim.P. 10(4). Wagner was arraigned May 10, 1983. He did not file his motion to sever until October 25, 1984. He made no attempt to demonstrate good cause for his failure to file the motion within the required time. Thus, Wagner's right to file a motion to sever was waived. Iowa R.Crim.P. 10(3). Even absent waiver, Wagner was not entitled to a severance. Rule 6 of the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure allows multiple counts to be prosecuted together when the counts arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. Iowa R.Crim.P. 6(1). Applying this test, we have ruled that joinder should occur when in light of the time, place, and circumstances `the facts of each charge can be explained adequately only by drawing upon the facts of the other charge.' State v. Bair, 362 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Iowa 1985) (quoting State v. Boyd, 271 Or. 558, 566, 533 P.2d 795, 799 (1975)). A criminal defendant, of course, may in all cases attempt to prove that joinder, even if otherwise permissible, will in some way prejudice his or her right to a fair trial. See Iowa R.Crim.P. 6(1). Here, the eight alleged kidnappings occurred at the same time, in the same place, and under identical circumstances. As a result, the facts supporting each of the eight kidnapping counts necessarily overlap and involve details central to each of the other counts. Joinder therefore was permissible. Further, Wagner has presented no evidence to support his claim that failure to sever would prejudice his right to a fair trial. Nothing in this record suggests Wagner's relationship with the non-testifying hostages was any less antagonistic than with those who testified. Trial court likewise properly denied Wagner's motion in limine. Ordinarily, the State has the right to present evidence concerning all the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. That this showing may necessarily include evidence of other crimes or unfavorable circumstances does not render the evidence inadmissible. State v. Drake, 219 N.W.2d 492, 494 (Iowa 1974); see also State v. Duncan, 312 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Iowa 1981). Wagner finally asserts the State's failure to present five of the kidnapping victims stripped him of his sixth amendment confrontation right. We disagree. In State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1986), we recently reiterated the important function served by the right of confrontation. We note here that Wagner was allowed to cross-examine all witnesses against him, in the presence of the jury, while these witnesses were under oath. Id. at 733-34. [3] Thus, as traditionally understood, Wagner's right of confrontation was satisfied. Wagner asserts, however, that the confrontation right should be expanded to require the State to present as witnesses all individuals involved in the crime regardless of the relevancy of their testimony or its cumulative nature. As the Supreme Court in a similar situation stated, this contention... [is] absolutely devoid of merit. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 n. 2, 87 S.Ct. 788, 791 n. 2, 17 L.Ed.2d 730, 734 n. 2 (1967). The right of confrontation guarantees a criminal defendant the right to face and cross-examine those who testify against him or her. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, ___, 106 S.Ct. 292, 294, 88 L.Ed.2d 15, 18 (1985) (per curiam). It does not require the State to produce witnesses who do not testify at trial. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1000 n. 10, 94 L.Ed.2d 40, 55 n. 10 (1987) (plurality); United States v. Morgan, 757 F.2d 1074, 1076 (10th Cir. 1985). There was no violation of Wagner's confrontation right with respect to these non-testifying victims.