Opinion ID: 1324254
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: The Applicability of RLUIPA

Text: The majority's second misstatement is that RLUIPA does not apply to suits brought under RFRA. It writes: For two reasons, RLUIPA is inapplicable to this case. First, RLUIPA, by its terms, prohibits only state and local governments from applying regulations that govern land use or institutionalized persons to impose a substantial burden on the exercise of religion.... Subject to two exceptions not relevant here, RLUIPA does not apply to a federal government action, which is not at issue in this case. ... Second, even for state and local governments, RLUIPA applies only to government land-use regulations of private land, not to the government's management of its own land. Maj. op. at 1077. From this, the majority concludes that RLUIPA cases finding a substantial burden on the exercise of religion are irrelevant to RFRA cases. It is true that much of RLUIPA applies specifically to state and local zoning decisions and to actions by prison officials. But it is demonstrably not true that RLUIPA is inapplicable to this case, and that cases decided under RLUIPA may be disregarded in RFRA cases. Not only did RLUIPA amend the definition of exercise of religion contained in RFRA, RLUIPA also applies the same substantial burden test that is applied in RFRA cases. Prior to the passage of RLUIPA in 2000, RFRA provided that the term `exercise of religion' means the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution. Pub.L. No. 103-141, § 5, 107 Stat. at 1489 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (1994) (repealed)). RLUIPA changed the definition of exercise of religion in RFRA. RLUIPA §§ 7-8, 114 Stat. at 806-07. As a result of RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 now provides,  As used in this chapter ... (4) the term `exercise of religion' means religious exercise, as defined in section 2000cc-5 of this title.  (emphasis added). The chapter to which 2000bb-2 refers is Chapter 21B of Title 42. Chapter 21B is the codification of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Section 2000cc-5, to which § 2000bb-2 refers, provides, The term `religious exercise' includes any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief. RFRA and RLUIPA not only share the same definition of exercise of religion, they also share the same analytic framework and terminology. Under both statutes, the imposition of a substantial burden on a person's exercise of religion may be justified only by a compelling governmental interest and a showing that such interest is furthered by the least restrictive means. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (RFRA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1-2) (RLUIPA). The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ... allows federal and state prisoners to seek religious accommodation pursuant to the same standard as set forth in RFRA[.] O Centro, 546 U.S. at 436, 126 S.Ct. 1211 (emphasis added). Because RFRA and RLUIPA cases share the same analytic framework and terminology and are, in the words of the Court in O Centro, governed by the same standard, RLUIPA cases are necessarily applicable to RFRA cases.