Opinion ID: 2822800
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Open Courts Provision is Inapplicable

Text: The Phillipses ask this Court to apply strict scrutiny to the statute of repose at issue here even though they do not fall within any traditional suspect class, nor do they assert a right this Court previously has recognized as fundamental. They argue that an expansion of what constitutes a fundamental right to bring their claims is required by the open courts provision of the Missouri Constitution, which guarantees that “the courts of justice shall be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character, and that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.” Mo. Const. art. I, § 14. The Phillipses argue that, because the 11 statute of repose bars their cause of action before it even vests or accrues, it denies them their guaranteed right under article I, section 14 of access to the courts and a certain remedy for the wrong committed against them by defendant. The dissenting opinion agrees. This argument misconstrues the open courts provision. It is well-settled that “[a]n open courts violation is established upon a showing that: (1) a party has a recognized cause of action; (2) … the cause of action is being restricted; and (3) the restriction is arbitrary or unreasonable.” Snodgras v. Martin & Bayley, Inc., 204 S.W.3d 638, 640 (Mo. banc 2006). In other words, as this Court held in Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58, 62 (Mo. banc 1989), the right of access to the courts set out in the open courts provision of the Missouri Constitution “means simply the right to pursue in the courts the causes of action the substantive law recognizes.” Artificial barriers, such as the requirement that one appear before a medical review board prior to filing suit, violate this provision for they bar a plaintiff from bringing a valid and recognized claim. State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Mem’l Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107, 109-10 (Mo. banc 1979). Statutes of repose do not bar the bringing of a valid cause of action. As this Court noted in Blaske in considering whether the open courts provision was violated by the 10-year statute of repose for builders and designers set out in section 516.097, RSMo 1986, the failure to bring suit within 10 years extinguishes the cause of action. Therefore, because the substantive statutory law had extinguished any right to sue at the end of 10 12 years, the plaintiffs had no cause of action to bring by the time they discovered the wrong at a later point. 821 S.W.2d at 833. The principles set out in these cases apply here. The open courts guarantee applies only to recognized causes of action; it does not guarantee access to the courts once the statute of repose extinguishes the cause of action. If the Phillipses’ right to sue had accrued prior to the time the statute of repose applied, then the open courts provision would be applicable and this Court would examine whether the statute unreasonably restricted their right to bring suit. Cf. Laughlin, 432 S.W.2d at 314 (statute of limitations must allow reasonable time to bring suit). Similarly, if the legislature had prohibited recovery for personal injury, the due process principles recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1885), and relied on by the dissent certainly would be implicated. But, here, the legislature provided a reasonable, 10-year period in which to sue. That period concluded before the Phillipses discovered the wrong; as a result, the Phillipses’ right to sue never accrued and, therefore, never vested. 8 8 The principal non-Missouri cases that the Phillipses argue reach a contrary result either involve a differently worded constitutional provision or involve a statute of limitations rather than a statute of repose and, therefore, are not persuasive. For example, Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961 (Ariz. 1984), involved a statute of limitations, not a statute of repose. It found strict scrutiny applied to medical malpractice claims under the Arizona Constitution’s unique “non-abrogation” clause, which protects an existing cause of action from abrogation by the legislature. See id. at 966-67. While this is similar to (but differently worded from) Missouri’s open court’s provision, Kenyon’s reasoning does not apply when the issue is whether the legislature can enact a statute of repose, not an allegedly unreasonable statute of limitations. Further, Baker v. University Physicians Healthcare, 296 P.3d 42, 51-52 (Ariz. 2013), recently clarified that, under the federal and the Arizona equal protection clauses, medical malpractice claimants are not in a suspect 13 As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the effect of a statute of repose is to extinguish an existing cause of action, and it has applied such statutes. See CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2187-88. A statute of repose is not inconsistent with due process. The open courts provision is inapplicable to the Phillipses’ claim, for it applies only to causes of action that have accrued, not to one that, like that of Ms. Ambers-Phillips, was barred before it had a chance to arise under a statute that otherwise allows a reasonable period in which to bring suit. B. Equal Protection Clause Inapplicable As Fundamental Right Not Violated Absent the ability to rely on the open courts provision, the Phillipses are unable to support their argument that the right to bring a medical malpractice action is fundamental. To the contrary, fundamental rights normally include free speech, freedom of travel, the right to personal privacy, and other rights that are “objectively, deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 842 (Mo. banc 2006). That is why this Court previously has rejected nearly identical arguments that the right to sue for medical malpractice can fit within this narrow category of fundamental rights. class, nor is the right to bring a medical malpractice action a fundamental right. Therefore, the court held, statutory restrictions on bringing such claims will be analyzed under a rational basis test. Id. at 52-53. White v. State, 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983), also relied on by the Phillipses, similarly has been limited; Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 491-92 (Mont. 1989), noted that Montana’s open courts provision allows suit only for recognized common law or statutory claims, and there is no independent fundamental right to full legal redress. 14 For instance, in Adams ex rel. Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hospital, 832 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. banc 1992), overruled in part by Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers, 376 S.W.3d 633, 645-46 (Mo. banc 2012) (overruling unrelated portion of Adams approving statutory caps), this Court specifically rejected the argument that the open courts provision guarantees victims of medical malpractice an unlimited time to sue. This aspect of Adams was reaffirmed in Batek v. Curators of University of Missouri, 920 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. banc 1996). Batek involved a suit by a woman who had experienced malpractice when 20 years old. She argued that it violated equal protection not to toll the running of the statute of limitations as to her until she was 21 when it was tolled until age 21 for minors under the age of 18 who were the victims of malpractice. Id. at 898. In rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that strict scrutiny should be applied to the statute of limitations that otherwise barred her claims, the Court found that the statute did not “impinge upon Ms. Batek’s fundamental rights” because those rights include “only basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the United States Constitution.” Id. at 898; see also Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 903. This Court applied the reasoning of Adams and Batek to the 10-year statute of repose for architects, engineers, and builders at issue in Blaske under section 516.097. Blaske upheld the statute of repose after reaffirming that persons claiming personal injury or property damage due to defects in improvements on real property do not allege violation of a fundamental right. 821 S.W.2d at 829. The Court found that the statute of repose easily met the rational basis test. Id. at 829-30. 15 The Phillipses alternatively argue that, even if their right to bring suit is not otherwise fundamental, medical malpractice victims generally are a suspect class. But, as this Court noted in Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Services, Inc.: [A] suspect classification is one whose purpose or effect is to create classes based on certain characteristic[s] that are inherently suspect in a constitutional sense. They are classes, such as those based upon race, national origin or illegitimacy, which because of historical reasons, “‘command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.’” 807 S.W.2d 503, 512 (Mo. banc 1991) (internal citations and emphasis omitted). For these reasons, Mahoney rejected the argument that medical malpractice claimants were a suspect class entitled to strict scrutiny analysis. Id. Blaske similarly held that: Neither a “suspect class” nor a “fundamental right” is at issue in this case. … a suspect classification is one that is inherently suspect in a constitutional sense. These are classes such as those based upon race, national origin, or illegitimacy which, because of historical reasons, need special protection from a political process controlled by the majority. Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Services, 807 S.W.2d 503, 512 (Mo. banc 1991). Blaske, 821 S.W.2d at 829; accord Batek, 920 S.W.2d at 898 (“Further, this Court has previously and repeatedly rejected the argument that victims of medical malpractice are members of a suspect class”). 9 This Court reaffirms that medical malpractice victims do 9 In Crane v. Riehn, this Court rejected a similar claim that the wrongful death act discriminates against a decedent’s minor children and spouse when the decedent’s parents also survive. The Court explained how narrow the suspect class analysis is, stating: It should be emphasized that the classification of those entitled to sue under the wrongful death statute does not involve interference with the exercise of a “fundamental” right nor discriminate as to classes having the “traditional indicia of suspectness” for equal protection considerations. The designated classes are “not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history 16 not fall into a class of persons who command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process and, hence, do not constitute a suspect class. The Phillipses argue that medical malpractice victims, nonetheless, should be considered a suspect class because the application of the statute of repose disproportionately affects the poor, disabled, and elderly because they are less likely to have good or frequent medical care and so are less likely to discover the foreign object within the 10-year repose period. Yet the Phillipses do not develop this argument by citing to any case holding that the elderly or poor are a suspect class in any context, much less in regard to their right to bring medical malpractice actions. Moreover, Ms. AmbersPhillips herself does not claim she was unable to learn of the foreign objects left in her body because she was poor, elderly, or disabled. This argument is of no assistance. For these reasons, the Phillipses have failed to show that they fall within a traditionally suspect class or that they are burdened with disabilities or a history of discrimination that entitles them to extraordinary protection. Neither have they shown that the right of access to open courts guarantees them the right to bring suit free of the limitations imposed by a statute of repose. Consequently, as in Blaske, Adams, Batek and similar cases, this Court applies a rational basis test in determining whether the statute of repose contained in section 516.105 violates their equal protection rights. The rational of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majorit[a]rian political process.” 568 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Mo. banc 1978); see also Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 903. 17 basis test “is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state’s objective.” Mahoney, 807 S.W.2d at 512. Under the rational basis test, this Court will uphold the law if it is “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Id.; accord Batek, 920 S.W.2d at 898-99. The Phillipses argue that the statute of repose does not pass the rational basis test because it arbitrarily and irrationally discriminates against certain victims of medical malpractice. 10 If the legislature entirely eliminated the right to bring suit for medical malpractice, or left them an unreasonably short period in which to bring suit, their argument might have merit. But, here, the 10-year statute of repose reflects a reasonable balance struck by the legislature between the right of those injured by medical malpractice to discover their injuries and the concern that medical defendants should be free from worry about liability for past acts after a reasonable period of time. CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2183. In that light, the statute of repose set out in section 516.105 is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Accordingly, it does not violate the Missouri Constitution’s equal protection clause or open courts provision.