Opinion ID: 169770
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Filing a charge

Text: Title I of the ADA requires a plaintiff to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit. MacKenzie v. City & County of Denver, 414 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir.2005). In the Tenth Circuit, exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. See id. ; Shikles v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 426 F.3d 1304, 1317 (10th Cir.2005). The first step to exhaustion is the filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See Jones v. Runyon, 91 F.3d 1398, 1399 n. 1 (10th Cir.1996) (noting that, although a timely filing is not jurisdictional in nature, the filing itself is a jurisdictional requirement under this Court's precedent). UPS contends that Mr. Jones failed to meet this requirement because, although he filled out an intake questionnaire, he never filed a formal charge of discrimination. The District Court concluded that, even though Mr. Jones only submitted an intake questionnaire, he fulfilled the requirement of filing a charge. We review the court's findings of jurisdictional facts for clear error and its determination of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. McBride v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 281 F.3d 1099, 1104-05 (10th Cir.2002). As we explain below, we conclude that Mr. Jones fulfilled the filing requirement because the questionnaire satisfied the EEOC's minimum requirements for a charge, the circumstances of the case indicate that Mr. Jones intended to activate the administrative process, and the EEOC ultimately treated the questionnaire as a charge. First, we agree with the District Court that Mr. Jones's questionnaire satisfied the EEOC's minimum requirements for a charge. Under the relevant statutory provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), the EEOC has broad discretion to determine the content and form of a charge. See id. (Charges shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the [EEOC] requires.). In addition to requiring that a charge be written, signed, and verified, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.9, EEOC regulations state that a charge should contain particular information, id. at § 1601.12(a). [2] But even if a charge fails to contain the specified information, it may still be sufficient, provided it is a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of. Id. at § 1601.12(b). Mr. Jones's intake questionnaire clearly satisfies these minimum requirements for the content of a charge, in addition to meeting the EEOC's formal requirements that a charge be written, signed, and verified, id. § 1601.9. [3] Moreover, the record supports the District Court's finding that Mr. Jones intended the questionnaire to serve as a charge. In addition to asking whether a document meets the EEOC's requirements for a charge, other circuits ask whether the charging party manifested an intent to activate the administrative process. See Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1319-20 (11th Cir.2001) (holding, in accordance with other circuits, that an intake questionnaire may serve as a charge of discrimination if the circumstances of the case demonstrate that the charging party manifested the intent to activate the administrative process); see also Holowecki v. Fed. Express Corp., 440 F.3d 558, 566-67 (2d Cir.2006) (ADEA), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2914, 168 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007); Whitmore v. O'Connor Mgmt., Inc., 156 F.3d 796, 799 (8th Cir.1998) (Title VII); Philbin v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 929 F.2d 321, 324-25 (7th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (Title VII); Bihler v. Singer Co., 710 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir.1983) (ADEA). As the District Court noted, the evidence supports the conclusion that Mr. Jones manifested an intent to activate the administrative process. Mr. Jones testified that he wanted the questionnaire to serve as a charge and that the EEOC told him it would treat it as a charge. The document itself lends credence to Mr. Jones's assertion that he intended the questionnaire to serve as a charge: the questionnaire contains an express statement that, if no other written statements are filed, the EEOC will treat it as a charge. See Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1320-21 (considering questionnaire's language, which indicated it could serve as a charge, as evidence supporting the charging party's intent to activate the administrative process). Indeed, a senior EEOC investigator testified that the EEOC did, in fact, treat Mr. Jones's questionnaire as a charge and that the EEOC routinely treats such questionnaires as charges. See id. (considering EEOC's treatment of questionnaire as a factor in determining whether a charging party manifested intent to activate the administrative process). UPS contends, however, that the EEOC did not actually treat Mr. Jones's questionnaire as a charge. It notes that the EEOC twice told Mr. Jones that it was not treating the questionnaire as a charge of discrimination and that it never notified UPS that a charge had been filed, which it ordinarily must do within ten days of the filing of a charge, see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14(a). But the EEOC later sent Mr. Jones a dismissal and notice of his right to sue, which indicates it ultimately treated the questionnaire as a formal charge. See Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1321 (holding that the EEOC's ultimate response, combined with ... other relevant facts, would convince a reasonable person that [plaintiff] manifested her intent to activate the administrative machinery). Even though the EEOC ultimately treated the questionnaire as a charge, UPS contends that it may not serve as a charge because the purposes of exhaustion have not been fulfilled. As we have previously recognized, the purposes of exhaustion are: 1) to give notice of the alleged violation to the charged party; and 2) to give the EEOC an opportunity to conciliate the claim. Ingels v. Thiokol Corp., 42 F.3d 616, 625 (10th Cir.1994), abrogated on other grounds, Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir.2003). Because UPS did not receive notice that a charge of discrimination had been filed against it until it received the notice of dismissal and right to sue, it maintains that the questionnaire is insufficient to constitute a charge of discrimination. If we were to make notice to the employer a determining factor for exhaustion, the plaintiff would bear the burden of the EEOC's failure in handling a charge. But it is the EEOC's, not the plaintiff's, duty to provide the charged party with notice within ten days after a charge is filed, see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14(a); a plaintiff should not be penalized for the EEOC's negligence in handling a charge. See Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1321 ([A]ny deficiency in the EEOC's performance of its duties should not adversely affect a plaintiff's right to sue. (alteration in original) (quotation omitted)); Bihler, 710 F.2d at 99 n. 7 (noting that a rule conditioning a court's jurisdiction on the EEOC's actions in response to a charge would establish a prerequisite to suit beyond a prospective plaintiff's control and therefore would be contrary to the spirit and purpose of the [ADEA]). In sum, because Mr. Jones manifested his intent to activate the administrative process by filing a statement satisfying the EEOC's minimum requirements, see 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.9, 1601.12(b), and the EEOC ultimately treated the statement as a charge, we conclude that he has fulfilled the administrative filing requirement. [4]