Opinion ID: 1960124
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Application of 404(b) Factors

Text: Aggravated rape is a general intent crime. La.Rev.Stat. 14:41; La.Rev.Stat. 14:42; see Moore, 278 So.2d at 784 (interpreting former article 15:444)(on rehearing). Thus, the State must establish that the defendant voluntarily did the act to prove intent. [7] In the circumstances of this case, the defendant has not claimed accident or mistake; he has admitted his presence at the scene immediately before and after the alleged rape, but denies his participation in the crime. The defendant, in his statements to police at the scene of the crime and in subsequent statements to police during their investigation, has maintained that a neighbor on a bike committed the aggravated rape of the victim. [8] The victim corroborated the defendant's statements in the initial police investigation. Thus, unlike the facts in Ledet and Moore, the State has not relied on a mere guilty plea and credit[ed] the accused with a fancy defense in order to rebut them at the outset ... 345 So.2d at 478. In adult cases involving aggravated rape, the issue generally revolves around consent, and thus, no one disputes that sexual intercourse, however slight, was perpetrated by the defendant. Because the act is established by both parties admitting that it occurred, intent is generally not at issue. See 2 Wigmore on Evidence, § 357, at 334 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). The victim's testimony, standing alone, can prove that the act occurred, and thus, no further evidence of intent is necessary. See Ledet, 345 So.2d at 478; Acliese, 403 So.2d at 670 (Dixon, J., dissenting)(discussing Moore ). [9] On the other hand, in cases involving aggravated rape of children, consent is moot. Rather, in the typical scenario, the defendant denies any act of intercourse occurred at all. In contrast, in this case, both the defendant and the child victim agree that a rape occurred, however, the parties dispute who committed the act. Unlike the adult rape cases discussed in Moore and Ledet, the participation of the defendant in this crime is at issue. [10] In State v. Hatcher , this Court discussed the unusual circumstances, such as those presented in this case, in which the issue of whether the defendant committed a crime justifies the admissibility of the other crimes evidence: It may be argued that proof of a design, plan, system or scheme is completely foreclosed except where continuity of the offense, knowledge or intent is a material issue in the case. La.R.S. 15:446 provides that where the offense is one of a system, evidence is admissible to prove the continuity of the offense, and the commission of similar offenses for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge and intent, but not to prove the offense charged. However, it appears more likely that the legislature intended to prohibit the introduction of evidence of a design or scheme in cases in which the evidence has no substantial relevance other than to demonstrate criminal propensity. Since the Occurrence of a crime is not genuinely at issue in most prosecutions, evidence of design, plan, system or scheme usually will be inadmissible except to show knowledge and intent. But in the few cases in which the actual occurrence of crime is genuinely at issue, the design evidence has relevance independent of the defendant's propensity and should be admitted if it meets all of the other tests. In accord with general authority, Louisiana courts have admitted other crimes evidence for purposes other than those listed in the statutes. See State v. Sutfield, 354 So.2d 1334 (La.1978). For many of the same reasons that the evidence meets the first four tests, the trial judge was not clearly erroneous in his determination that the probative value of the other crimes evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. It was not manifestly wrong to conclude that the likelihood that the jury would consider the evidence as tending to prove the very doing of the sexual act in question by virtue of inference from the existence of a general design or scheme manifested by peculiarly distinctive modus operandi was greater than the risk that the jury would short circuit the process and convict the defendant because of bad character or propensity toward crimes against nature. Our opinion today is in some respects inconsistent with the language, but not the holdings, of State v. Frentz, 354 So.2d 1007 (La.1978); State v. Jackson, 352 So.2d 195 (La.1977); and State v. Ledet, 345 So.2d 474 (La.1977). Some of the statements in those opinions suggest that a defendant's design, scheme, plan or system may be relevant to prove identity or intent, when either is an issue in the case, but that it is never relevant to prove the very doing of the act charged. These statements were too broad in light of the well established principles set forth above. In an unusual case, such as the present one, in which the defendant causes the very doing of the act to become a genuine issue, his design, scheme, etc., may be relevant to that issue. Nevertheless, Frentz, Jackson, and Ledet were each decided correctly and remain solid precedent for the application of the basic principles undergirding the decisions. 372 So.2d at 1035 (emphasis added). While acknowledging the varying degrees of similarity necessary to prove intent, identity, or occurrence of a crime, the similarities between the charged offense and prior offenses in this case warrants the admissibility of other crimes evidence to show system, design, and plan. As this Court has previously stated, the jurisprudence of our state and of the majority of other jurisdictions appears to define crimes of a `system' as those acts and offenses which are of a like nature and exhibit like methods or plans of operation. State v. Spencer, 257 La. 672, 243 So.2d 793 (1971), overruled on other grounds, 347 So.2d 221 (La.1977). In a rape case, the other crimes evidence should indicate, by common features, a plan or design which tends to show that it is carried out by doing the very act charged ... a single, previous act, even upon another woman, may, with other circumstances, give strong indication of a design (not a disposition ) to rape.... Wigmore, § 357, at 335. Ms. Logan, the defendant's godchild, testified that the defendant raped her on three occasions when she was in the defendant's temporary custody during the summer of 1984. According to Ms. Logan, she was eight or nine years old at the time of the rapes which occurred while she and the defendant were alone in his house or while other people in the house were asleep. The State then called the victim of the charged crime who testified that before the offense at issue, the defendant, her stepfather, had raped her in the bathroom of their house while her younger brother was asleep. She also indicated that the defendant had raped her in her bedroom and in her mother's bedroom when they were alone in the house. Accordingly, the instant offense and the prior offenses both occurred in the defendant's home while the young victims were in the defendant's custody and while other family members were absent or sleeping. Although these similarities appear to be common characteristics of most sex offenses given that cases involving the sexual abuse of children frequently occur in secret, the commonality does not destroy their relevance when the crux of the case depends on the credibility of a child. See Miller, 718 So.2d at 962. In addition, we note the particularities put forth in this case. Both children were directed to bathe after an alleged rape that caused bleeding in the genital area. Both children were raped with the same clothing configuration; shirt on, shorts off. Both children were withdrawn or kept out of school to accomplish one of the rapes and directed to lie to cover up the alleged incident. These similarities show a plan or system that the defendant developed to systematically engage in nonconsensual relations with prepubescent young girls in his custody or control. See Jackson, 625 So.2d at 150.