Opinion ID: 2775233
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Age and Public Reliance

Text: ¶34 In determining how firmly a precedent has established itself in Utah law, we look to a variety of considerations. Supra ¶ 22. First, we look to the age of the precedent, since newer precedents are likely to be less firmly established. See Laney, 2002 UT 79, ¶ 46 9 ELDRIDGE v. JOHNDROW Opinion of the Court (plurality opinion). The doctrine at issue here was adopted thirtytwo years ago in Leigh Furniture, without any significant precursors in Utah law. See Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 304. While thirty-two years is more than enough time for a precedent to become firmly established if it is regularly used and relied on, we note that unlike the precedent we upheld in Laney, improper-purpose liability is not based on a legal principle established in “the earliest days of statehood.” Laney, 2002 UT 79, ¶ 46 (plurality opinion). ¶35 Second, we consider the extent to which people’s reliance on the precedent would create injustice or hardship if it were overturned. As we recently stated in Cope v. Utah Valley State College, [W]e consider whether overturning a precedent would undermine the public’s substantial reliance upon an established legal principle. . . . [P]eople should know what their legal rights are as defined by judicial precedent, and having conducted their affairs in reliance on such rights, ought not to have them swept away by judicial fiat. 2014 UT 53, ¶ 19, ___ P.3d ___ (internal quotation marks omitted); accord 20 AM . JUR. 2D Courts § 132 (2014) (“[E]ven if the earlier precedent was wrongfully decided, the court will not overrule the precedent where . . . it has remained standing for a significant period and many have relied on it . . . .” (emphasis added)). ¶36 When a doctrine has not been necessary to the outcome of many cases, it is unlikely that the public has relied on it in any substantial way. Cf. Cope, 2014 UT 53, ¶ 26 (“[When a case] has not become a well-entrenched or frequently applied precedent, the public’s reliance upon [the case] is not as strong.”). That is certainly the case here. ¶37 This court, the court of appeals, and Utah’s federal courts have quoted Leigh Furniture’s “improper purpose” language in dozens of tortious interferences cases, but they have found evidence of improper purpose only three times. The first time was in Pratt, in which half the Court might have rejected the doctrine entirely if a party had asked it to do so. 885 P.2d at 789 n.3. The second time was ProMax Development Corp. v. Mattson, in which the court of appeals affirmed a trial court’s finding of improper purpose in circumstances similar to Pratt. ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 254–55 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). And the third time occurred in 2008, when the federal district court of Utah concluded that there was enough evidence of improper purpose for the issue to go to a jury. Peterson 10 Cite as: 2015 UT 21 Opinion of the Court v. Luna Bronze, L.C., No. 2:07CV00054DS, 2008 WL 4130021, at  (D. Utah Aug. 14, 2008). ¶38 Far more common are the cases in which courts have rejected allegations of improper purpose. We have analyzed and rejected improper-purpose claims five times,6 the court of appeals has done so once,7 and the District of Utah has done so more than half a dozen times.8 Often the improper-purpose doctrine has not been applied at all, either because parties have declined to raise the issue or because courts have chosen not to consider it.9 Given the difficulty of winning claims under the improper-purpose doctrine, it would have been foolhardy for people to rely on it in their private dealings. 6 Keith v. Mountain Resorts Dev., LLC, 2014 UT 32, ¶¶ 44–47, 337 P.3d 213 (“Ms. Keith failed as a matter of law to establish improper purpose . . . .”); Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49, ¶ 42, 221 P.3d 205 (“Protecting the legitimate interests of a firm’s client, without evidence of predominating ill will, is not an improper purpose.”); Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 2008 UT 55, ¶¶ 18–19, 192 P.3d 858 (“Overstock has failed to present a material fact that would satisfy the second prong of the Leigh test.”); St. Benedict’s Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict’s Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 201 (Utah 1991) (“The development company has not . . . established that defendants acted with an improper purpose in this case.”); Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 307–08 (“[W]e must conclude that the evidence in this case would not support a jury finding that the Corporation’s predominant purpose was to injure or ruin Isom’s business merely for the sake of injury alone.”). 7 U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, ¶¶ 45–49, 990 P.2d 945 (“Garco cannot establish improper purpose . . . .”). 8 E.g., Soundvision Techs., LLC v. Templeton Grp. Ltd., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1194–95 (D. Utah 2013) (“These reasons are not indicative of a predominate purpose of harming [the plaintiff] as the standards require . . . .”); Wilcox v. Career Step, LLC, 929 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1172 (D. Utah 2013) (“Plaintiff’s allegations and evidence are not sufficient to create a disputed issue of fact . . . of an improper purpose . . . .”). 9 E.g., ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc. v. Chiang, No. 2:07–CV–37 TC, 2008 WL 3925219, at  (D. Utah Aug. 20, 2008) (court did not address improper purpose); SliceX, Inc. v. Aeroflex Colo. Springs, Inc., No. 2:04–CV–615 TS, 2006 WL 1699694, at  (D. Utah June 15, 2006) (party alleged only improper means); CDC Restoration & Constr., LC v. Tradesmen Contractors, LLC, 2012 UT App 60, ¶ 55, 274 P.3d 317 (party declined to appeal unfavorable improper-purpose ruling). 11 ELDRIDGE v. JOHNDROW Opinion of the Court ¶39 The improper-purpose doctrine’s vagueness further supports this conclusion. In order to rely on their rights under the improper-purpose doctrine, the Eldridges would have needed to know what those rights were. But as we explain below, knowing one’s rights under the improper-purpose doctrine is impossible because the doctrine is so poorly defined. See infra ¶¶ 46–54. 2. Other Factors Determining Whether a Precedent is Firmly Established ¶40 We use two more considerations to determine whether a precedent has become firmly established. First, we ask how well it has worked in practice. Laney, 2002 UT 79, ¶ 46 (plurality opinion) (citing Menzies, 889 P.2d at 400); see also People v. Hernandez, 896 N.E.2d 297, 304 (Ill. 2008) (“Good cause to depart from stare decisis also exists when governing decisions are unworkable . . . .”). Second, we ask whether the precedent has become inconsistent with other principles of law. Cf. 20 AM . JUR. 2D Courts § 132 (2005) (“Another formulation of the grounds for deviation from precedent states that the court must consider . . . whether the principles of law have developed to such an extent as to leave the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine . . . .”). ¶41 These considerations will be addressed in Part III, during our discussion of the merits of the improper-purpose prong. Neither of them, however, will alter the conclusion we reach based on the considerations above. Far from being firmly established, our improper-purpose doctrine has had little influence on litigation in this state.