Opinion ID: 867480
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bad Faith/Late Disclosure of Witness

Text: ¶ 24 On the eve of trial, the State announced it had entered into a plea agreement with Medina, a condition of which required Medina to testify against Armstrong. Armstrong contends that Eazer proposed the agreement in bad faith, waiting until the last minute to offer Medina a plea to gain a tactical advantage over Armstrong's defense. Armstrong further contends that by failing to disclose the plea agreement sooner, Eazer committed a disclosure violation that the court should have sanctioned by precluding Medina's testimony. Armstrong argues that he suffered prejudice as a result of Eazer's actions and, given the alleged bad faith, the appropriate remedy is reversal.
¶ 25 Initially, Armstrong and Medina were to be tried together. In October 1999, Eazer sought to sever their trials in order to use Medina's post-arrest statement [2] against Armstrong at trial. The judge questioned whether Medina might receive a plea bargain. Medina's counsel, David Darby, acknowledged that the State had offered a plea of second degree murder, which Medina had rejected. She had countered with a plea to hindering prosecution, but the county attorney's homicide panel rejected it. The trial court set Armstrong's case for trial on November 2, 1999. The State filed a notice of intent to use all statements made by all three defendants. Armstrong objected to the use of Medina's post-arrest statement, claiming that the statement violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). ¶ 26 Over the next two months the court held numerous hearings and status conferences. On several occasions, the judge expressed skepticism that the State would proceed against Medina and questioned whether she might receive a plea. Each time both Eazer and Darby maintained that Medina refused to accept a second degree murder plea and the State was not willing to lower the plea to hindering prosecution. Meanwhile, Eazer moved to continue the trial to early January 2000, claiming she needed three to four weeks to address personal health matters. The judge granted the motion, and the trial was rescheduled for the first week of January 2000. On December 17, 1999, however, the court found that Medina's post-arrest statement was inadmissible. ¶ 27 On January 5, 2000, Eazer announced that Medina had agreed to a plea and would be called as a witness against Armstrong. The plea agreement required Medina to plead guilty to one count of trafficking in stolen property, a class 3 felony, and one count of facilitation to commit murder, a class 5 felony, with no probation available. The court questioned Eazer about the timing of the plea agreement due to its close proximity to the trial date. Eazer explained that after the December 17 ruling precluding the use of Medina's post-arrest statement, she began to reevaluate the strength of her case against Medina. Eazer discussed her concerns with her supervisor on December 20. At his suggestion, she met with a homicide panel on the next available date, December 27. The panel advised Eazer that before she continued with plea negotiations, she should seek an additional charge of trafficking in stolen property from the grand jury. Eazer spoke to Medina's counsel on Monday, January 3, and asked if Medina would be willing to plead to trafficking in stolen property and facilitation to commit murder. On the morning of Wednesday, January 5, Darby told Eazer that Medina would be willing to plead to those two felony counts. With this information, Eazer convened an impromptu homicide panel over the lunch hour and presented them with the proposed plea. The panel approved the plea offer, and Eazer called Darby early that afternoon to inform him that the State would offer Medina a plea in exchange for her testimony. ¶ 28 Armstrong contended that Eazer acted in bad faith in disclosing Medina at such a late date and sought, as possible sanctions, either preclusion of Medina's testimony or a continuance. Additionally, Armstrong sought to strike the venire panel because the statement of facts in the jury questionnaire had not contemplated Medina's testimony in the trial and included a defense that Armstrong might no longer use. ¶ 29 On January 6, the trial court held a hearing on Armstrong's motion and found no willful misconduct or bad faith. The judge based this finding on his belief that Eazer realistically needed to reevaluate her trial strategy after Medina's statement was found inadmissible. She knew the case against Armstrong was not as strong without the statement. The court proceeded with jury selection over the next few days, seated a twenty-person jury over Armstrong's objection, and continued the start date of the trial for two weeks. [3] After several hearings on the issue, the judge found no grounds for preclusion of Medina's testimony and denied Armstrong's motion.
¶ 30 Armstrong contends the trial court erred when it found that Eazer did not act in bad faith in negotiating a plea agreement with Medina. Armstrong asserts that [a] plea agreement with Medina should have been reached much sooner, if the prosecutor was acting in good faith. ¶ 31 In Pool v. Superior Court, this court noted that a trial judge's finding with respect to prosecutorial intent must be based primarily upon the objective facts and circumstances shown in the record. 139 Ariz. 98, 106-07, 677 P.2d 261, 269-70 (1984); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 680, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring). ¶ 32 Armstrong contends the trial judge applied a subjective, rather than objective, standard in determining Eazer's intent. However, the objective facts in the record and the circumstances under which the State entered into the last-minute plea agreement with Medina support the trial judge's finding that Eazer did not act in bad faith or engage in willful misconduct. Instead, Eazer justifiably reevaluated her strategy after receiving the adverse ruling regarding the admissibility of Medina's post-arrest statement. Armstrong asserts that Eazer knew nine months before trial that Medina was willing to accept a plea in exchange for testimony. However, Medina's attorney told the court on several occasions that Medina would not accept the specific terms of plea agreements previously offered. ¶ 33 The trial judge's finding is further bolstered by his reliance on State v. Dickens, 187 Ariz. 1, 926 P.2d 468 (1996). There, the issue was whether the trial court erred when it allowed the State to reopen its case-in-chief to present the testimony of a codefendant who agreed to testify against the defendant in exchange for a plea. Id. at 12, 926 P.2d at 479. Dickens was charged with felony murder. Four months before trial, the State had disclosed all significant information it had on Dickens' co-perpetrator, Amaral, anticipating that he would be testifying against Dickens. Id. at 11, 926 P.2d at 478. Less than two weeks before trial, Amaral signed a plea agreement in which he agreed to testify. A few days later, Amaral changed his mind and withdrew from the agreement. The State presented its case without Amaral's testimony. After the State rested, but before Dickens presented any evidence, Amaral approached the prosecutor and offered to testify in exchange for the original plea agreement. The following morning the State moved to reopen its case so that Amaral could testify. The judge granted the motion and ordered a one-week recess to allow Dickens to take Amaral's deposition and prepare for his testimony. Id. Dickens was convicted and sentenced to death. Id. at 8, 926 P.2d at 475. ¶ 34 On appeal to this court, Dickens argued that the trial court erred when it granted the State's motion to reopen because his defense had been structured on the belief that the co-perpetrator, Amaral, would not testify. Id. at 12, 926 P.2d at 479. Specifically, Dickens argued that the [S]tate acted in bad faith by advising the defense at the beginning of the trial that Amaral would not testify and then waiting until the end of the trial to offer a deal once the prosecutor decided that Amaral's testimony was needed for a conviction. Id. ¶ 35 This court held that the record did not support Dickens' allegations of intentional misrepresentation or bad faith. Id. While the prosecutor's decision to present the co-perpetrator's testimony certainly hurt Defendant's case, ... such damage does not equate to bad faith. Id. The court emphasized that [t]he [S]tate gained no unfair tactical advantage when it moved to reopen because the defense had not yet presented any evidence in reliance on the [S]tate's case-in-chief. Id. The one-week continuance provided ample time to prepare for [the co-perpetrator's] testimony. Id. ¶ 36 Similarly, while Medina's last-minute plea agreement affected Armstrong's trial strategy, such damage does not of itself signal prosecutorial bad faith. Cf. State v. Dumaine, 162 Ariz. 392, 401, 783 P.2d 1184, 1193 (1989) ([N]o prosecutorial misconduct occurs where the prosecutor merely arranges a favorable plea agreement with one of the several witnesses testifying against the defendant.). Moreover, the prosecutor's actions here had less potential to do harm than in Dickens because neither side had presented evidence, the trial court granted a two-week continuance, and the State agreed to cooperate in finding necessary witnesses to help defense counsel prepare. We therefore conclude that the trial judge was within his discretion in finding that Eazer did not act in bad faith or engage in willful misconduct.
¶ 37 Armstrong contends that the last-minute disclosure of Medina as a witness was a discovery violation and that the trial court erred when it did not preclude Medina from testifying. We find, however, that Medina's eleventh-hour decision to accept a plea and testify does not present a discovery issue and, even assuming there was a violation, Armstrong cannot claim surprise or prejudice. ¶ 38 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.1(a)(3) (2003) requires that, as part of pretrial discovery, the prosecutor shall supply to the defendant the names and relevant written or recorded statements of all persons whom the prosecutor will call as witnesses in its case-in-chief. The purpose of this rule is to give full notification of each side's case-in-chief so as to avoid unnecessary delay and surprise at trial. State v. Dodds, 112 Ariz. 100, 102, 537 P.2d 970, 972 (1975). If a party fails to comply with this disclosure provision, the court may impose any remedy or sanction it finds just under the circumstances, including but not limited to granting a continuance and precluding a party from calling the witness. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 15.7 (2004). ¶ 39 We conclude the State did not violate Rule 15.1. The belated disclosure of Medina as a witness was a result of her last-minute decision to enter into a plea agreement in exchange for her testimony. Where, as here, a codefendant is listed as a co-indictee and the codefendant agrees to a plea arrangement in exchange for her testimony, as long as the prosecutor takes reasonable steps to notify the defendant quickly of the new witness there is no disclosure violation under Rule 15.1. Accord Lingerfelt v. State, 238 Ga. 355, 233 S.E.2d 356, 360 (1977); People v. Schutz, 201 Ill.App.3d 154, 147 Ill.Dec. 289, 559 N.E.2d 289, 293 (1990). ¶ 40 Even assuming arguendo a disclosure violation, the court would have to determine the appropriateness of the remedy. This court previously has held that [i]mposing sanctions for non-disclosure is a matter to be resolved in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and that decision should not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Hill, 174 Ariz. 313, 325, 848 P.2d 1375, 1387 (1993) (citing State v. Martinez-Villareal, 145 Ariz. 441, 448, 702 P.2d 670, 677 (1985)). We will not find that a trial court has abused its discretion unless no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances. State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n. 18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983). ¶ 41 Armstrong argues that preclusion of Medina's testimony would have been the appropriate sanction for the State's disclosure violation. However, in State v. Schrock, this court cautioned against preclusion of witness testimony: The trial court, however, should seek to apply sanctions that affect the evidence at trial and the merits of the case as little as possible, since the Rules of Criminal Procedure are designed to implement, and not to impede, the fair and speedy determination of cases. Prohibiting the calling of a witness should be invoked only in those cases where other less stringent sanctions are not applicable to effect the ends of justice.... We, therefore, hold that prior to precluding either party's witnesses, as a discovery sanction, the court must make an inquiry into the surrounding circumstances. Failure of the trial court to do so constitutes error. The inquiry should determine if less stringent sanctions can be used. The court should also consider how vital the precluded witness is to the proponent's case, whether the opposing party will be surprised and prejudiced by the witness' testimony, whether the discovery violation was motivated by bad faith or willfulness, and any other relevant circumstances. 149 Ariz. 433, 436-37, 719 P.2d 1049, 1052-53 (1986) (citing State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, 252, 599 P.2d 199, 208 (1979)). ¶ 42 In light of Schrock, the trial judge in the instant case did not abuse his discretion in declining to preclude Medina's testimony. There is no doubt that preclusion would have been detrimental to the State's case; Medina provided corroborating testimony about Armstrong's actions before, during, and after the homicides. Additionally, the late disclosure was not motivated by bad faith or willfulness. ¶ 43 Armstrong also cannot complain of surprise or prejudice. Medina was a codefendant whose name was included in Armstrong's indictment. See Anderson v. State, 141 Ga.App. 249, 233 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1977) (finding no surprise or prejudice where codefendants testified at trial in exchange for a plea because codefendants' names were listed in defendant's indictment). Armstrong also knew what Medina's testimony would be because he previously had been supplied copies of Medina's post-arrest statement and was immediately provided with a copy of her April 1999 free talk when the State announced she would testify. [4] See id.; People v. Schutz, 201 Ill.App.3d 154, 147 Ill.Dec. 289, 559 N.E.2d 289, 293 (1990) (finding no surprise where defendant had been supplied copies of codefendant's statement). Finally, the judge's use of a two-week continuance to handle the delayed disclosure was reasonable and cured any prejudice Armstrong may have suffered. Cf. State v. Hill, 174 Ariz. 313, 325, 848 P.2d 1375, 1387 (1993) (allowing defendant to postpone his cross-examination of witness whom prosecution had failed to disclose during discovery was reasonable method of handling nondisclosure). Thus, even assuming a discovery violation, Armstrong suffered no prejudice. There was no error when the trial court declined to preclude Medina's testimony.