Opinion ID: 787947
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Motions to Vacate Judgment and for Sanctions

Text: 84 Petrosino's final claim is that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to vacate the summary judgment order based on newly discovered evidence, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(2)-(3), and her motion to sanction Bell Atlantic for its failure to provide complete responses to pre-trial interrogatories that would have disclosed the evidence, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 37. In light of our decision reversing in part the district court's summary judgment order and remanding the case for trial, we conclude that the Rule 60(b) motion is moot. Accordingly, we vacate the district court judgment denying that motion. On remand, Petrosino may, of course, move to reopen discovery to explore the matters raised in the Rule 60(b) motion, but we leave it to the sound discretion of the district court whether to grant further discovery. 85 We further find no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that sanctions are not warranted in this case. See Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.2002). Petrosino has not shown, for example, that Bell Atlantic's failure to respond to her interrogatories was done either willfully or in bad faith, cf. Daval Steel Prods. v. M/V Fakredine, 951 F.2d 1357, 1365-67 (2d Cir.1991), or that its omission constituted a serious or total failure to respond to the interrogatories, Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 705 n. 2 (2d Cir.1974).