Opinion ID: 558968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Copyright and Trademark Law

Text: 52 We now focus our attention on the district court's denial of Ford's Rule 59 motion for a new trial, which followed a jury verdict in favor of Altran on claims that it infringed Ford's copyright and trademark rights. A denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed only for abuse of discretion unless the court's denial of the motion is based on the application of a legal precept, in which case our review is plenary. Honeywell v. American Standards Testing Bureau, Inc., 851 F.2d 652, 655 (3d Cir.1988). See also Levinson v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 868 F.2d 558, 562 (3d Cir.1989); Link v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, 788 F.2d 918, 921 (3d Cir.1986). Such denials are improper only if the record is critically deficient of that minimum quantity of evidence from which a jury might reasonably [decline to] afford relief. Wagner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 890 F.2d 652, 656 (3d Cir.1989) (citation omitted). Our duty is to uphold the jury's award if there exists a reasonable basis to do so. Motter v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 883 F.2d 1223, 1230 (3d Cir.1989). This scope of review has been described as highly deferential. Id. at 1229. 53 Before evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we first look at the legal principles governing this case. Our analysis is divided into two parts. First, we will examine what Ford would need to show in order to prove a copyright violation, and second, what evidence would be required to establish a trademark violation. 54 (1) Copyright Infringement 55 Copyright infringement is established if the plaintiff proves that it owned the copyrighted material and that the copyrighted material was copied by the defendant. Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Industries, Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 667 (3d Cir.1990); Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d Cir.1986); Major League Baseball Promotion Corp. v. Colour-Tex, Inc., 729 F.Supp. 1035, 1039 (D.N.J.1990). 56 Certificates of registration issued by the U.S. Copyright Office constitute prima facie evidence of the validity and ownership of the material. Andrien v. Southern Ocean County Chamber of Commerce, 927 F.2d 132, 134 (3d Cir.1991); Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 873 (3d Cir.1982). Copying is a shorthand reference to the act of infringing any of the copyright owner's five exclusive rights set forth at 17 U.S.C. Sec. 106, Paramount Pictures v. Video Broadcasting Systems, 724 F.Supp. 808, 819 (D.Kan.1989), including the rights to distribute and reproduce copyrighted material. Because direct evidence of copying is rarely available, it may be inferentially proven by showing that the defendant had access to the allegedly infringed work, ... that the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work, Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d at 1232, and, of course, that one of the rights guaranteed to copyright owners by 17 U.S.C. Sec. 106 is implicated by the defendant's actions. 57 Substantial similarity can be broken down into two tests, both of which must be met. The first, termed the extrinsic test, is whether there is sufficient similarity between the two works in question to conclude that the alleged infringer used the copyrighted work in making his own. Id. In making this determination, expert testimony and a visual comparison between the copyrighted work and the allegedly infringing work are frequently utilized. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir.1975). A second test of substantial similarity, called the intrinsic test, is whether, from a lay perspective, the copying was an unlawful appropriation of the copyrighted work. Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d at 1232; Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d at 907. Unlawful appropriation has been defined as a taking of the independent work of the copyright owner which is entitled to the statutory protection. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d at 908. Several factors should be considered when determining if an appropriation occurred, including the reciprocal relationship between creativity and independent effort, 16 the nature of the protected material, and the setting in which it appears. Id. In short, copying is demonstrated when someone who has access to a copyrighted work uses material substantially similar to the copyrighted work in a manner which interferes with a right protected by 17 U.S.C. Sec. 106. 17 58 (2) Trademark Infringement 59 Trademark infringement is established if the plaintiff proves that (1) the marks are valid and legally protectable; (2) the marks are owned by the plaintiff; and (3) the defendant's use of the marks to identify goods or services is likely to create confusion concerning the origin of the goods or services. Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir.1990). 60 If the mark at issue was federally registered and had become incontestable, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Secs. 1058 and 1065, validity, legal protectability, and ownership are proved. Id. at 194. Where a mark has not been federally registered or has not achieved incontestability, validity depends on proof of secondary meaning, unless the unregistered or contestable mark is inherently distinctive. A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 296 (3d Cir.1986); 1 McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition (2d ed. 1984) at Secs. 11:16, 15:1. 18 Secondary meaning is demonstrated where, in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the product itself. Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor Co., 731 F.2d 148, 152 (3d Cir.1984) (citation omitted). Although there are numerous cases determining secondary meaning, there is no consensus on its elements. American Scientific Chemical, Inc. v. American Hospital Supply Corp., 690 F.2d 791, 792 (9th Cir.1982). A non-exclusive list of factors which may be considered includes the extent of sales and advertising leading to buyer association, length of use, exclusivity of use, the fact of copying, customer surveys, customer testimony, the use of the mark in trade journals, the size of the company, the number of sales, the number of customers, and actual confusion. See CIBA-GEIGY Corp. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 747 F.2d 844, 852 (3d Cir.1984); 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 90 (2d Cir.1984); Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor Co., 731 F.2d at 152; American Scientific Chemical, Inc. v. American Hospital Supply Corp., 690 F.2d at 792-93; Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1228 (3d Cir.1978); 1 McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition at Secs. 15:10-21. 61 With respect to ownership of unregistered marks, the first party to adopt a trademark can assert ownership rights, provided it continuously uses it in commerce. Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College District, 889 F.2d 1018, 1022-23 (11th Cir.1989) (actual and continuous use is required to acquire and retain a protectible interest in a mark, while the first to use a mark on a product ... in a ... market acquires rights in the mark in that market); Hydro-Dynamics, Inc. v. George Putnam & Co., Inc., 811 F.2d 1470, 1473 (Fed.Cir.1987) (trademark rights in the United States are acquired by ... adoption and use, not by registration); Kohler Mfg. v. Beeshore, 59 F. 572, 576 (3d Cir.1893) (there must be an intention to adopt [the mark] as a trademark); Caesar's World, Inc. v. Caesar's Palace, 490 F.Supp. 818, 822 (D.N.J.1980) (Common law rights are acquired in a ... mark by adopting and using the mark....). 62 Besides validity and ownership, a plaintiff must also prove likelihood of confusion, which is said to exist when the consumers viewing the mark would probably assume that the product or service it represents is associated with the source of a different product or service identified by a similar mark. Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d at 1229. Proof of actual confusion is not necessary; likelihood is all that need be shown. Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d at 195. The likelihood of confusion analysis requires the evaluation of a number of factors, among them: 63 (1) the degree of similarity between the owner's mark and the alleged infringing mark; (2) the strength of owner's mark; (3) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and attention expected of consumers when making a purchase; (4) the length of time defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion arising; (5) the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; (6) the evidence of actual confusion; (7) whether the goods, though not competing, are marketed through the same channels of trade and advertised through the same media; (8) the extent to which the targets of the parties' sale efforts are the same; (9) the relationship of the goods in the minds of the public because of the similarity of function; (10) other facts suggesting that the consuming public might expect the prior owner to manufacture a product in the defendant's market. 64 Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d at 1229. 65 Perhaps the most important of these factors is the first on the Scott Paper list: the degree of similarity between the two marks. We recently held that if the overall impression created by marks is essentially the same, 'it is very probable that the marks are confusingly similar.'  Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d at 195 (quoting 2 McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition at Sec. 23:7). 66 One other point with regards to likelihood of confusion merits discussion. It is well-established that likelihood of confusion should be determined by viewing the two marks from the perspective of an ordinary consumer of the goods or services. Dominion Bankshares Corp. v. Devon Holding Co., Inc., 690 F.Supp. 338, 345 (E.D.Pa.1988). See 2 McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition at Secs. 23:27-29. The degree of caution used by these ordinary consumers (or reasonably prudent buyers, as they are often called) depends on the relevant buying class. That is, some buyer classes, for example, professional buyers, or consumers of very expensive goods, will be held to a higher standard of care than others. Where the buyer class consists of both professional buyers and consumers then the issue will center on the consumers, for confusion within the lowest stratum of 'reasonably prudent buyers' may give rise to liability even if professional buyers in the market are not confused. Worthington Foods, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 732 F.Supp. 1417, 1448 (S.D.Ohio 1990). See 2 McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition at Sec. 23:28 (if the relevant buyer market consists of both discriminating and casual purchasers, the court must give consideration to likely confusion of the casual, ordinary buyers.). Thus, when a buyer class is mixed, the standard of care to be exercised by the reasonably prudent purchaser will be equal to that of the least sophisticated consumer in the class.