Opinion ID: 2555342
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sena

Text: The parties to the present case rely heavily on this Court's decision in SENA to support their respective positions. [1] In explicating its decision, however, the Majority opinion exerts little effort to analogize, distinguish, or explain this case. The issue in SENA, similar to the issue in the present case, was whether the requirement that the local government must determine that a public road is no longer needed for any public use [2] prior to conveying public property, prohibits the local government from conveying public property to a private person or entity if a limited minority of [the] public uses the public property for convenience. SENA, 387 Md. at 476-77, 876 A.2d at 64. In SENA, Easton's Town Council decided to close Adkins Avenue and transfer the land upon which the street laid to a local hospital for an expansion project and to a religious temple. See SENA, 387 Md. at 482, 876 A.2d at 66. Relying on several findings of fact, the Town Council determined ultimately that the road was no longer needed for any public use. Id. These facts were incorporated in Ordinance No. 466 and included: 1) Adkins Avenue is used as a convenience by area residents in lieu of Wye Avenue; [and] 2) SHS would maintain a means of access of transit between [two streets] in the event that an emergency would close access.... Id. Further, the Town Council found that closing a portion of Adkins Avenue was in the best interest of the public in providing improved emergency medical services to the Town, and that there was no benefit to retaining public ownership of the portion to be closed. Id. The citizens proposed an absolute no-use threshold before the sale of publicly-used land may occur, arguing that because the road was traveled onalbeit only infrequentlythe Town Council could not transfer the land. See SENA, 387 Md. at 495, 876 A.2d at 74. The Court dismissed this argument as ignoring unreasonably two principles of statutory interpretation: (1) it replaces needed with used, thereby changing the plain meaning of the statute; and (2) it would produce absurd results by foreclosing any conveyance regardless of any legislative determinations. See id. The Court also dismissed the citizens' argument that it was not clear from the record that the Town determined that the road was no longer needed for public use because Ordinance No.466 did not use those exact words, explaining that the Ordinance went through several levels of approval without so much as a suggestion for any other future public use. See SENA, 387 Md. at 495, 876 A.2d at 74-75. The facts of SENA are distinguishable readily from the present case in several ways. For one, the road in SENA was such that it was rarely used and citizens had other reasonable alternatives to circumnavigate the area. See SENA, 387 Md. at 479-80, 876 A.2d at 64-65. The water and wastewater facilities in the present case, on the other hand, are the sole source of water for residents in each facility's service area. Continuous use and need is further emphasized by Sections 6.1 and 4.5(c) of the Asset Purchase Agreements, [3] which state that the County will operate the facilities as normal on the date immediately preceding the transfer, and, on the date of transfer, Artesian will begin operation seamlessly. These provisions also reinforce the conclusion that there is neither an alternative to the specific facilities in the franchise area, nor a parallel alternative that would give the same service and rate guarantees as if the facilities had not been privatized. See SENA, 387 Md. at 485, 876 A.2d at 68 (the finding of an adequate parallel alternative may support the determination that the public use is no longer needed). As the frequency of use and availability of alternatives for the water treatment facilities at issue in the present case differ greatly from those of the road in SENA, the two cases are distinguishable in a meaningful way. Much like a road is operated by a Town or County for the benefit of the public at large, water conveyance and treatment facilities operated by the County are for the benefit, use, and convenience of the public. See Inlet Assocs., 313 Md. at 430, 545 A.2d at 1305 (applying principles of public roads with publicly-owned riparian land). Whether to close or sell a publicly owned facility or street, therefore, necessarily turns `upon considerations of public benefit, and not by barter and sale of private interests....' Inlet Assocs., 313 Md. at 431, 545 A.2d at 1305 (quoting Perellis v. Mayor of Baltimore, 190 Md. 86, 95, 57 A.2d 341, 346 (1948)); see also Rescue Fire Co. of Cambridge v. County Comm'rs of Dorchester County, 188 Md. 354, 357, 52 A.2d 733, 735 (1947) (counties, incorporated towns, and cities are public corporations with political powers, to be exercised for purposes connected with the public good and are the sole trustees of the public interest); Van Witsen v. Gutman, 79 Md. 405, 411, 29 A. 608, 610 (1894) (The Legislature has the power to direct that private property shall be taken for the public use). The Town in SENA noted that the benefit of closing the road outweighed the benefit of retaining public ownershipi.e., the increased quality of medical care projected from the proposed use is more important than the convenience vel non of a small number of residents. SENA 387 Md. at 482, 876 A.2d at 66-67. In the present case, however, the opposing benefits are not weighed as easily as in SENA. On the one hand, the Board claims that the County will save nine million dollars, as well as the twenty-seven million dollars required to make capital improvements to the facilities. On the other hand, Appleton contends that the franchises will lead to rate increases and high density development in the franchise areas. As a private company, Artesian is held accountable to its investors and not necessarily the citizens using the facilities; therefore, as the argument goes, increasing profits may outweigh maintaining reasonable rates. Another arguable potential negative effect of privatization is that, eventually, Artesian may be unable to maintain the facilities to the proper standards or could go bankrupt. The Board included reversionary provisions in the Asset Purchase Agreement to safeguard against any service stoppage, which evidences the Board's emphasis on ensuring continuous operation of the facilities as an essential service to County residents. Accordingly, it is not clear whether the benefit to the County outweighs the costs that the citizens may bear, unlike the tradeoff in SENA where the potential benefits outweighed clearly the potential costs. In the present case, the public use of the facilities forecloses conveyance of the facilities. This outcome, however, does not foreclose any transfer of the water or wastewater facilities, nor does it mandate an absolute no-use standard, as the Board suggests. Section 3D(b) authorizes county commissioners to grant one or more franchises for water and sewerage systems. Section 8(a) then provides county commissioners with discretion to sell or transfer publicly owned property that is no longer needed for public use. It is still possible, therefore, to transfer facilities, at the discretion of the Board, in the first instance (under § 3D(b))when the facilities are not yet in public useor after a finding that already in use facilities are no longer needed for public use (under § 8(a)). For example, the Original Elkton West Service Area, where no County-owned or operated facilities were located, could be sold to Artesian as the service area is not yet needed for public use. When the County expanded the franchise area to include service areas that had existing service facilities, however, pursuant to § 8(a), the option to sell the entire franchise area was unavailable. In this way, the two sections may be harmonized to avoid rendering the phrase no longer needed for public use nugatory, while giving the Board discretion (if exercised properly) to sell public facilities.