Opinion ID: 2336320
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: appellant's reaction upon hearing of the murders

Text: Appellant's next claim of error concerns the trial court's refusal to allow the testimony of Candie Bray regarding Appellant's reaction to hearing of the victims' deaths. Candie was permitted to testify that there was a reaction by Appellant but she was not permitted to specify what that reaction was. On avowal, Candie testified that when she told Appellant of the deaths, he let out a bloodcurdling scream, and said oh my God, not Audrey. He maintains that his reaction and statement show that he was genuinely shocked upon hearing about the deaths. Appellant contends that this testimony falls within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. KRE 803(2) defines an excited utterance as a statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the condition. In Jarvis v. Commonwealth, [12] this Court set out eight factors to use for guidance when determining which utterances fall within the rule. These factors are: (i) lapse of time between the main act and the declaration, (ii) the opportunity or likelihood of fabrication, (iii) the inducement to fabrication, (iv) the actual excitement of the declarant, (v) the place of the declaration, (vi) the presence there of visible results of the act or occurrence to which the utterance relates, (vii) whether the utterance was made in response to a question, and (viii) whether the declaration was against interest or self-serving. [13] The Commonwealth argues that the testimony is inadmissible under the Jarvis factors. It argues that the event or condition was the death of Audrey not the statement by Candie of Audrey's death. Therefore, there was a two day time lapse between the startling event and the statement by Appellant. Also, the Commonwealth argues that Appellant did not sustain his burden of proving that the testimony falls within a hearsay exception. Applying the Jarvis factors, we hold that the proffered testimony should have been admitted pursuant to KRE 803(2). While there was a two day lapse between the time of the deaths and the time Appellant was told of them, the deaths were not the event to which the rule refers. The event is the statement made by Candie to Appellant that the victims were dead. The event could not be the murders because Appellant is presumed to be innocent and therefore is presumed not to have known of the murders until he heard from Candie. The trial court is entitled to great deference especially where, as here, the admissibility is debatable. We need not decide whether exclusion of the excited utterance testimony, standing alone, would require reversal or whether its exclusion could be viewed as harmless error. Upon retrial, the evidence should be admitted.