Opinion ID: 1189282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Alleged improper comments by the prosecutor during closing argument

Text: Hoffecker next argues that the prosecutor made improper comments during closing argument by becoming a trier of fact, misstating trial testimony, and alluding to criminal conduct not analogous to the charged crimes. Appellant's Br. at 56. We review a district court's decision not to grant a mistrial on the grounds that the prosecutor made improper remarks in closing argument for abuse of discretion. United States v. Dispoz-O-Plastics, Inc., 172 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir.1999) (citation and quotation marks omitted). First, Hoffecker contends that the prosecutor repeatedly took on the role as trier of fact. Appellant's Br. at 56. He points to the following remarks the prosecutor made during rebuttal: (1) when discussing testimony concerning Amitex's financing program, the prosecutor said, I don't know whether folks were asleep or whatever, and then, I don't know what other kind of proof somebody might expect; (2) in response to defense counsel's distinction between El Houri having an office and having representations, the prosecutor said, I guess they were what, personal friends of Mr. Walid El Houri or what? (3) addressing the businesses attributable to El Houri, the prosecutor stated, I still haven't heard any explanation for the lie that there were billions of dollars in business with respect to which Mr. Pedro Rolle said that there was absolutely no evidence of; (4) discussing the Amitex representations in documents, the prosecutor stated, If that's not fraudulent intent, telling people one thing and then doing something else, I don't know what is; (5) the prosecutor stated, All right, we know that Amitex lied to its customers; (6) responding to defense counsel's argument regarding Amitex storage, the prosecutor said, Are we on the same planet? Did we sit through the same two plus months of evidence? (7) the prosecutor stated, Last time I checked, `held' means in English  of course, I don't know about the Twilight Zone  holding on to something; (8) the prosecutor stated, We're still looking for that magic word hedging. It's like searching for the Holy Grail. Look at all these documents, look for the word hedging. There's going to be a reward out for that; and (9) when discussing a Government's witness's analysis of hedging, the prosecutor stated, So if this doesn't prove beyond any reasonable doubt that the whole song and dance with respect to hedging is a charade, I'm not sure what would. App. vol. 51 at 108-28. As the District Court found, the above-quoted comments were mere rhetorical devices or throw-away comments and there is not the prosecutor standing in front of evidence or no evidence or trying to create evidence by saying, `you have to find this because I say so,' or `this is what this says' in the face of no argument or no exposition of what the so-called evidence is. App. vol. 52 at 16-17. The court concluded that these remarks all constituted proper argument, and we cannot find that the court abused its discretion in reaching this conclusion. A prosecutor is permitted  indeed, expected  to comment on the evidence that was presented at trial and connect the dots for the jury by explaining what each piece of evidence means and how it all fits together to prove his or her case. Such comments are particularly helpful after a long trial such as that here, particularly when the indictment charges offenses committed in a complex, sophisticated business context. The prosecutor's comments were not improper injections of personal opinion or facts not in evidence. Next, Hoffecker argues that the prosecutor misstated the trial testimony of defense expert Ed Strongin. During rebuttal summation, the prosecutor quoted from the transcript of the defense closing in which Myers's attorney twice stated that, according to Strongin, Hoffecker and Myers sent over one million dollars to the Phoenix hedge fund. The prosecutor then compared defense counsel's claim to evidence admitted at trial that showed that less than one million dollars actually went to Phoenix. Defense counsel then requested a side bar conference and explained to the court that while the evidence showed that less than one million dollars went to Phoenix, additional money went to a different hedge fund called Peregrine. Defense counsel stated that he had misspoken during his closing argument and meant to say that over one million dollars went to Phoenix and Peregrine together. The District Court ruled that the prosecutor neither had misquoted defense counsel nor misstated Strongin's testimony regarding how much money actually was sent to Phoenix. We agree with the District Court, and find that this ruling rather than being the product of an abuse of discretion was absolutely appropriate. After all, it would be quite remarkable to hold that the prosecutor made an improper comment when he accurately referred to a defense attorney's argument. In fact, it was the defense attorney who misstated the testimony, not the prosecutor. Finally, Hoffecker argues that during rebuttal, the prosecutor twice alluded to violent crimes not analogous to the charged offenses. First, in response to Hoffecker's closing argument that Field should have intervened as a lawyer to advise him that Amitex was fraudulent, the prosecutor pointed out that Field was a government informant who was infiltrating the fraud, and analogized his role to that of an undercover informant infiltrating a drug gang: that's like saying when the government sends in an undercover into a drug gang, the undercover is supposed to come in and approach the gang leader ... and say, `no, no, no, no, you're a bad boy, you shouldn't sell drugs.' App. vol. 51 at 104-05. Second, in response to Hoffecker's closing argument that Amitex was a legitimate operation because it had an office and employees, the prosecutor stated, [i]f you're running a sophisticated scam or you're hoping to scam people the second and third and fourth and fifth time as these folks did, of course, you have to have an operation. This isn't like running down the street and grabbing somebody's pocketbook. Frauds are ongoing. This fraud was ongoing. Id. at 107. The District Court found that the prosecutor properly had rebutted Hoffecker's closing argument without implying that he had committed a violent crime. First, the court found that the prosecutor's reference to a drug gang was not a specific reference to violence but, instead, was an attempt to analogize Field's situation to a more common or familiar context for undercover activity. Moreover, the court noted that it was not Jack Field's job at the time to make Hoffecker's recorded conversations less incriminating, and that the prosecutor's statement properly rebutted Hoffecker's closing argument to that effect. App. vol. 52 at 10-11. In any event, Hoffecker's argument that Field should have told him that he was engaging in a fraudulent operation is nothing short of bizarre. If one thing is obvious it is that Hoffecker's activities were not technically illegal as being in violation of some intricate regulation but, as the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated, were a complete scam which is exactly what Hoffecker intended that they be. We cannot find that the court abused its discretion in this instance. Furthermore, the prosecutor's reference to purse-snatching explicitly contrasted Hoffecker's own crimes with that offense. This statement clearly did not imply that he had committed a violent act. Moreover, the jury surely knew that this case did not involve violence. Hoffecker cites United States v. Moore, 375 F.3d 259 (3d Cir.2004), to support his argument. In Moore we reversed the defendant's convictions when, on the eve of the first anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the prosecutor referred to the defendant as a terrorist because, according to evidence of other bad acts that improperly had been admitted at trial, he was a violent drug dealer who inflicted terror upon his girlfriend and her family. Id. at 264. We noted in Moore that we have reversed convictions where `[t]he object, or at least effect, of this disproportionate emphasis by the prosecution ... was to portray [the defendant] as ... violence-prone ... [and] a danger to society and who needed to be removed for the protection of the public.' Id. (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 786 (3d Cir.1994)). In this case, by contrast, the prosecutor did not suggest that Hoffecker engaged in any violent conduct. Instead, he alluded to non-violent criminal conduct to rebut directly Hoffecker's closing argument. The prosecutor did not disproportionately emphasize an uncharged violent crime to portray him as violence-prone or a danger to society who needed to be removed for the protection of the public. [5] Id. We conclude that the District Court correctly found that the prosecutor's rebuttal was appropriate.