Opinion ID: 2108792
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unlawful Discharge

Text: The Superior Court, in determining whether substantial evidence existed in the record to support the Board's decision, applied what is loosely termed the in part test. Under this test, the discharges in this case were held unlawful because they were motivated at least in part by the unit clarification decision. The city contends that the discharges were unlawful only if the Board could have found that the discharge would not have occurred in the absence of the protected activity. We review the decision of the Board rather than the Superior Court, where the court did not receive any evidence other than what was presented to the Board. Driscoll v. Gheewalla, Me., 441 A.2d 1023 (1982). Therefore, on appeal this court is limited to reviewing for clear error the Board's finding that the discharges were entirely motivated by the employee's efforts to be included in the bargaining unit. See 26 M.R.S.A. § 968(5)(F)(1981); Baker Bus Service v. Keith, Me., 428 A.2d 55 (1981). Since we find that there exists substantial evidence in the record to support this finding, we need not address plaintiff's concern with the Superior Court's application of the in part test. Baker Bus Service v. Keith, Me., 428 A.2d 55, 56 (1982) (Court had no occasion to choose between the in part and dominant motive tests where the Board's finding that interference with union activity was significant reason for discharge was not clearly erroneous.) The only reasonable conclusion which the Board could have drawn from this record was that the city's motive for firing the seasonal workers was to avoid having additional permanent employees on the payroll who would have to be paid union wages and benefits. The Personnel Director himself said that if the union (and some city employees) had not taken action the laborers would not have lost their jobs. The city's conduct seems to us to constitute the most egregious form of unlawful labor practice sought to be prevented by the Maine Municipal Public Labor Relations Law: discharge because of the employees' attempts to obtain the benefits of membership in the labor organization. The Board was unquestionably justified in finding that the city violated section 964(1)(A) and (B) by discharging these employees. See, e.g., Century Printing Co., 242 N.L.R.B. 659 (1979), Flasco Mfg. Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 611 (1967). We find no evidence in the record to support the employer's belated claim that business necessity was the motive for the discharge. In fact, there is evidence indicating that some permanent positions were available and that funds existed to hire other employees to do the work which these employees had been performing.