Opinion ID: 853072
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other State Constitutional Sources

Text: As the majority notes, Indiana constitutional history sheds little light on the presence vel non of an absolute right to be present in a civil trial and Gage is the only relevant precedent in this state. Most states follow the federal rule in this respect and permit exclusion where communication is not possible. See Morley v. Superior Court of Ariz., 131 Ariz. 85, 638 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1981) (plaintiff was in a coma and unable to communicate); Dickson v. Bober, 269 Minn. 334, 130 N.W.2d 526, 529 (1964) (plaintiff unable to comprehend trial or express himself); Province v. Center for Women's Health & Family Birth, 20 Cal.App.4th 1673, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 667, 675 (1993) (noting infant unable to communicate); Green v. N. Arundel Hosp. Ass'n Inc., 366 Md. 597, 785 A.2d 361, 378 (Ct.App.2001) (plaintiff could not comprehend or participate in the proceeding). Often this result is reached without discussing what, if any, constitutional provision is relevant. The majority notes Oklahoma has found a right to be present to be grounded in its constitutional counterpart to the open courts provision found in Article I, § 12 of the Indiana Constitution. Cary v. Oneok, Inc., 940 P.2d 201 (Okla.1997). In my view, Cary does not support the notion that the right to be present is absolute. Indeed Cary itself states that the Oklahoma courts ha[ve] never held, nor do we hold here that a party's right to be present in the courtroom is absolute. Id. at 204. In addition, Cary found that the party could assist counsel. Id. at 205. Under those circumstances, I agree that the balance of fairness must tip in favor of permitting the party to attend, but I do not believe an Open Courts provision is a factor in that result. More generally, the Open Courts provision of the Indiana Constitution assures all litigants an opportunity to be heard but says nothing about the forum and manner in which that proceeding is to go forward. Nothing in the text or purpose supports any particular procedural right. Rather it guarantees a remedy by due course of law, but leaves it to the law to prescribe what course is due. See McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972 (Ind.2000). The case law from other jurisdictions finding a right to be present from other sources is equally distinguishable on various grounds. For example, Carlisle dealt with whether a party waives its right to be present by choosing competent counsel, and does not deal with whether the party could meaningfully assist counsel. Fla. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Jones, 60 So.2d 396 (Fla.1952), states that the court will not exclude a plaintiff because of physical appearance, but gives no constitutional basis for its decision. Rozbicki v. Huybrechts, 218 Conn. 386, 589 A.2d 363 (1991), concerns whether a person who has the right to be present at trial also has the right to be present during voir dire, and does not reach the question concerning whether the right to be present is absolute. In Mason v. Moore, 226 A.D.2d 993, 641 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1996), the party was not excluded because, in part, his presence was necessary to assist experts during their testimony. Moreover, Fla. Greyhound Lines, Inc., Bryant v. Kan. City Rys. Co., 286 Mo. 342, 228 S.W. 472 (1921), and Chicago Great W. Ry. Co. v. Beecher, 150 F.2d 394 (8th Cir.1945), all involved the review of the trial court's refusal to exclude the plaintiff. Because the discretion should be given to the trial court, decisions upholding a refusal to exclude do not support an absolute right to be present.