Opinion ID: 629125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The proposed Guidelines amendment

Text: 20 On April 29, 1993, the Sentencing Commission submitted to Congress the following amendment to the commentary to section 2D1.1(c): 21 Cocaine base, for the purposes of this guideline, means crack. Crack is the street name for a form of cocaine base, usually prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride and sodium bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy, rocklike form. 22 58 Fed.Reg. 27,156 (1993). The proposed amendment will become effective November 1, 1993, absent action by Congress to the contrary. In its discussion of the amendment, the Commission clearly indicates its preference for the Ninth Circuit's interpretation in Shaw of the term cocaine base, as used in the Guidelines, to our interpretation in Jackson. See id. 23 If the amendment becomes effective, we will be bound, for purposes of interpreting section 2D1.1 of the Guidelines, by the commentary's definition of cocaine base; the Commission's interpretation does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute and is not inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, the guideline. See Stinson v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 1915, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993). Thus, the sentencing range under the Guidelines for defendants who possess cocaine base that is not crack will be significantly lowered. For example, after the amendment becomes effective, the base offense level for a defendant like Palacio will be 28, resulting in a sentencing range of 78 to 97 months, compared with a current base offense level of 38, resulting in a sentencing range of 235 to 293 months. 24 Although the Commission's interpretation of section 2D1.1 in the amended commentary will be authoritative with respect to the Guidelines, the amendment cannot revise the statutory interpretation we have already made in Jackson. Even if the Commission's pending view of the term cocaine base in the Guidelines might have influenced us to adopt a congruent interpretation of the statutory term as an original matter, once we have construed the statute, we will not reinterpret it in the absence of new guidance from Congress. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 841, 847-48, 117 L.Ed.2d 79 (1992); Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 130-31, 110 S.Ct. 2759, 2768, 111 L.Ed.2d 94 (1990). At least that is so when our initial construction of a statute is solely the result of an independent judicial interpretation of a statutory term, rather than deference to the reasonable interpretation adopted by an agency. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); Mesa Verde Construction Co. v. Northern California District Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124, 1129-31 (9th Cir.1988) (in banc). Indeed, unless the Sentencing Commission is construing its own authority as an agency, see United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 420-22 (8th Cir.1992) (in banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1420, 122 L.Ed.2d 790 (1993), its view of the substantive meaning of a criminal statute is unlikely to be entitled to any deference. See Smith v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2055, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993) (assumption that Commission's guidelines are relevant to construction of sentencing statute termed dubious). Thus, Palacio's sentence at the statutory mandatory minimum for cocaine base would be unaffected by the proposed amendment to the guideline commentary. 25 Because of the difference in the definitions of cocaine base in the statute and the Guidelines after the amendment, defendants like Palacio, who are sentenced for less than five kilograms of a mixture or substance containing a cocaine base that is not crack, often will be sentenced under the statutory mandatory minimum to a higher sentence than would have been imposed under the Guidelines. Though this gap between the mandatory minimum and the guideline range is unusual, we welcome the Commission's demonstration of its independent judgment. 26 Heretofore, for most drug sentences, the Commission has chosen to calibrate the drug quantity table so that the sentencing ranges for defendants dealing in the quantities designated in section 841(b) will equal or even exceed the mandatory minimums set by Congress, see U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1, comment. (n.10), with the sentencing ranges for those who deal in larger quantities even higher than the mandatory minimums. The mandatory minimums have thus become a floor for the guideline ranges. 27 After the effective date of the amendment to the commentary to section 2D1.1(c), however, a different method of calibration will exist for defendants who deal in cocaine base that is not crack. Perhaps unintentionally, the Commission has in this instance indicated its own view of the culpability of those defendants and has left the statutory minimum to override this view when applicable. Whatever one may think of statutory mandatory minimums, the Commission is to be commended for exercising its own judgment as to the appropriate penalty in this instance, leaving the onus squarely on Congress for requiring a higher sentence. Perhaps in time if more such independent judgments are expressed by the expert body Congress has established to determine normal sentencing ranges, Congress will temper its statutory minimums to accord with the judgments of the Commission.