Opinion ID: 3010614
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Language of the IDEA

Text: Unlike many cases that raise issues of statutory construction, we deal here not with a particular statutory phrase, but with language scattered throughout the statute. The Collinsgrus point to a number of words or phrases that, they argue, evidence Congress's intent to treat parents as parties in interest. First, they rely on language in S 1415 that provided attorneys' fees to the parents or guardian of a handicapped child or youth who is the prevailing party. S 1415(e)(4)(B) (1988). However, in 1997 Congress amended this section to read, . . . to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party, which suggests that it is the child who should be considered the prevailing party. Id. S 1415(i)(3)(B) (1997). Second, they point to S 1415(e)(4) (1988), which prohibits attorneys' fees for services performed after settlement offers. However, 15 S 1415(e)(4)(E) (1988) allows for the award of attorneys' fees to a parent or guardian who is the prevailing party if he was substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer. (This section is now S 1415(i)(3)(E) (1997) and refers to a parent who is the prevailing party.) The plaintiffs contend that these subsections make clear that an IDEA suit is the parents' own case for 28 U.S.C. S 1654 pro se representation purposes. However, it is just as logical to read this language simply as a reference to the procedural cases in which parents clearly have standing as parties. Third, the Collinsgrus point to another discussion of attorneys' fees that states, [W]henever the court finds that . . . the attorney representing the parent did not provide to the school district the appropriate information in the due process complaint . . . the court shall reduce . . . the amount of attorney's fees. Id. S 1415(i)(3)(F)(iv) (emphasis added). However, in the same section, the statute places the notice requirement either on the parent of a child with a disability, or the attorney representing the child. Id. S 1415(b)(7). While the former language may be read to suggest that it is the parent's case, the latter language suggests that it is the child's case. Fourth, the Collinsgrus invoke the IDEA's introductory language, which states that one purpose of the IDEA is to assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardians are protected. Id.S 1400(c) (1988) (emphasis added) (now S 1400(d)(1)(B), which states that one purpose is to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected). However, as noted earlier, it is undisputed that parents do possess rights under the IDEA; indeed, they possess explicit rights in the form of procedural safeguards. The Collinsgrus argue that the IDEA draws no clear distinction between procedural and substantive rights, and cite Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1992), for this proposition. In Heldman, the court stated that the procedural rights, in and of themselves, form the substance of IDEA. Id. at 155. However, the Supreme Court has distinguished quite clearly between substantive and procedural rights under the Act. In Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), the Court stated: 16 When the elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards embodied in S 1415 are contrasted with the general and somewhat imprecise substantive admonitions contained in the Act . . . [i]t seems to us no exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process . . . as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive standard. Id. at 205-06. In short, the language of the IDEA is unclear on its face. Some of its language can be read to suggest that Congress intended parents and children to share the underlying substantive right -- that is, that Congress meant both to give children a substantive right to an appropriate education and to give their parents the substantive right to have their children receive an appropriate education. But it is equally logical to read the IDEA the other way. Under these circumstances, in which the Collinsgrus have not made out their case convincingly, we turn to the legislative history of the Act for further guidance.