Opinion ID: 4525281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Residency in the District

Text: {¶ 12} R.C. 3513.05 required the board, after hearing Monk’s protest, to deem O’Neill’s petition valid unless it found that (1) O’Neill was not an elector of the district in which she sought a party nomination or (2) had not fully complied with R.C. Chapter 3513. R.C. 3513.05, paragraph 13. One provision of that chapter, R.C. 3513.07, required O’Neill to certify in her declaration of candidacy that “if elected to said office or position, [she] will qualify therefor.” {¶ 13} Article II, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution requires that “[s]enators and representatives shall have resided in their respective districts one year next preceding their election, unless they shall have been absent on the public business of the United States, or of this State.” (Emphasis added.) We read Article II, Section 3 in pari materia with R.C. 3503.02, which provides rules for determining the residence of a person offering to register or vote. State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-Ohio-5327, 915 N.E.2d 1215, ¶ 29. {¶ 14} R.C. 3503.02(A) states, “That place shall be considered the residence of a person in which the person’s habitation is fixed and to which, whenever the person is absent, the person has the intention of returning.” While the remainder of R.C. 3503.02 sets forth additional considerations that are applicable in some cases, “[the] statute emphasizes the person’s intent to make a 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO place a fixed or permanent place of abode,” State ex rel. Duncan v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 405, 2007-Ohio-5346, 875 N.E.2d 578, ¶ 11. {¶ 15} The board abused its discretion and clearly disregarded applicable law by concluding that O’Neill will not have resided in the 94th House District for one year next preceding the November 3, 2020 general election. Specifically, the board focused on when O’Neill became a resident of her Nelsonville apartment rather than when she became a resident of the 94th House District. It is true that the record contains some evidence supporting the board’s conclusion that O’Neill did not live in the apartment until November 4. However, Article II, Section 3 requires that O’Neill reside in the 94th House District for one year next preceding her election—not that she reside at a particular or single location within that district. And there is uncontroverted evidence that O’Neill began residing in the 94th House District on October 14, 2019. {¶ 16} On that date, O’Neill started living with a friend and working in Athens County while seeking a permanent home there, which she subsequently found and rented. She argues in her brief that her “subjective intention was to move permanently to Athens County in October 2019.” Two community members, Christine Hughes and Katherine Kay Jellison, testified before the board that they encountered O’Neill working and attending social functions in Athens during this time period. {¶ 17} We faced a similar fact pattern in State ex rel. Morris v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections, 143 Ohio St.3d 507, 2015-Ohio-3659, 39 N.E.3d 1232. The question in Morris was whether Tom Bernabei, an independent candidate for mayor of Canton, resided in that city on the date that he filed his nominating petition. One day prior to his filing, Bernabei had moved from his family home in Hills and Dales—outside Canton—into a house on University Avenue in Canton that was owned by a friend. He took some basic furniture with him, but his wife continued to live in Hills and Dales. Bernabei and his friend had executed a one-month lease, 6 January Term, 2020 but his plan from the outset was to reside in the University Avenue house only temporarily. Bernabei owned a house on Lakecrest Street in Canton that he had rented to a doctor and his family, and he planned to move into that house when the doctor vacated the premises, but it was unknown exactly when that would happen. Bernabei ended up sleeping in the University Avenue house for four nights— including the day he filed his nominating petition—then moving into his Lakecrest house with his wife. {¶ 18} We held in Morris that the temporary and open-ended nature of Bernabei’s tenancy at the University Avenue house did not mean that he did not reside in the city of Canton when he filed his petition. Id. at ¶ 25. Despite the fact that Bernabei’s wife remained in nearby Hills and Dales and R.C. 3503.02(D) provides that “[t]he place where the family of a married person resides shall be considered to be the person’s place of residence,” we held that the candidate’s intention to reside in the city of Canton was controlling, id. at ¶ 26. And we took note of the secretary of state’s determination that it was “ ‘of little significance’ ” that Bernabei later moved to a different home in Canton. Id. at ¶ 21. {¶ 19} As in Morris, the fact that O’Neill’s first abode in the district was temporary and her tenure at that home was of an open-ended duration pending the availability of a more permanent option does not mean that she was not a resident, given her intention to reside in Athens County. See also R.C. 3503.02(I) (“If a person does not have a fixed place of habitation, but has a shelter or other location at which the person has been a consistent or regular inhabitant and to which the person has the intention of returning, that shelter or other location shall be deemed the person’s residence   ”). {¶ 20} While the board points to evidence of O’Neill’s activities before October 14, 2019, such as attending law school in Vermont and forwarding her mail to her parents’ home in Geauga County after her house in Vermont burned down, it has identified no evidence in the record indicating that O’Neill resided or intended 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO to make her permanent home somewhere outside of the 94th House District after October 14. {¶ 21} The board emphasizes the fact that in October 2019, O’Neill was still registered to vote in Geauga County. However, registration for voting elsewhere is not one of the factors for determining the place of an elector’s residence under R.C. 3503.02, which furthers the primary purpose of R.C. 3503.02, to “determin[e] the residence of a person offering to register or vote.” It may be presumed that a person offering to register at a new home might, at that time, remain registered at a previous home. {¶ 22} The board has identified no other R.C. 3503.02 factors that it believes contradict O’Neill’s stated intention to make Athens County her residence. Moreover, even when various factors listed under R.C. 3503.02 do lead to conflicting conclusions, “great weight must be accorded to the person’s claimed voting residence.” Husted, 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-Ohio-5327, 915 N.E.2d 1215, at ¶ 27. {¶ 23} Because Article II, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution requires only that O’Neill reside in the 94th House District for one year next preceding the November 3, 2020 general election and because the undisputed evidence showed that O’Neill began working and living in that district in the middle of October 2019, the board abused its discretion and disregarded applicable law by upholding the protest to O’Neill’s candidacy. C. Voting Residence and Registration in the District {¶ 24} R.C. 3513.07 provides that the form of a declaration of candidacy and petition of a candidate for party nomination to office shall be substantially as set forth in that statute. The form in R.C. 3513.07 requires candidates to set forth their “voting residence” and to declare under penalty of election falsification that they are a qualified elector in the precinct in which their voting residence is located. 8 January Term, 2020 {¶ 25} The board granted the protest in part because O’Neill was not a registered voter in Athens County when she began circulating her part-petitions in November 2019. The board argues that (1) O’Neill’s failure to change her voterregistration address before circulating her first part-petitions means that her declaration of candidacy failed to accurately state her voting residence and (2) to be qualified to run for office, a candidate must be registered to vote in her election district when she signs her declaration of candidacy. The second point actually goes to the requirement that the candidate be a “qualified elector.” The board abused its discretion and clearly disregarded applicable law when it rejected O’Neill’s petition on these grounds.
{¶ 26} “ ‘Voting residence’ means that place of residence of an elector which shall determine the precinct in which the elector may vote.” R.C. 3501.01(P). The board argues that because O’Neill was registered to vote in Geauga County when she executed her first declarations of candidacy, her parents’ home was her true voting residence. The board has it backward: where a person resides determines where they may register and vote; where the person is registered to vote does not determine where they reside. R.C. 3503.02. The board’s conclusion would have required O’Neill to state that her voting residence was a location where she did not reside and to which she did not intend to return. This was an abuse of discretion.
{¶ 27} The board alludes to a requirement that a candidate must be registered in the election district at the time he or she signs a declaration of candidacy. However, the board’s argument is rooted in a statutory scheme that the General Assembly significantly altered in 1994. The board cites a passage from Morris that addresses R.C. 3513.261, which requires independent candidates to state in the declarations of candidacy on their nominating petitions, “I am an elector 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO qualified to vote for the office I seek.” R.C. 3513.07’s form declaration of candidacy for partisan candidates does not include this statement, but both statutes require the candidate to make the similar statement, “I am a qualified elector in the precinct in which my voting residence is located.” {¶ 28} With respect to R.C. 3513.261’s requirement that the candidate state that he or she is qualified to vote for the office sought, Morris said, “To be qualified to vote for the office, the prospective candidate must be registered to vote at an address within the election district at the time he or she signs the statement.” Morris, 143 Ohio St.3d 507, 2015-Ohio-3659, 39 N.E.3d 1232, at ¶ 22. However, as O’Neill points out, this statement was dicta in Morris because the candidate there had provided the board with a change of address before signing his declaration. Id. at ¶ 10-16. More importantly, however, the statement in Morris relied on State ex rel. Walsh v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Elections, 65 Ohio St.3d 197, 203-204, 602 N.E.2d 638 (1992), a case decided under the statutory scheme that was significantly altered in 1994. {¶ 29} When Walsh was decided in 1992, R.C. 3503.11(A) provided that any change of address made less than 29 (or 30, depending on whether the change was made at a temporary or permanent registration office and on the type of election) days before the election was invalid for that election. The General Assembly removed that language from the statute in 1994, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 300, 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2516, 2529. At the same time, it enacted provisions allowing registered voters to change their address on election day and cast a provisional ballot in that election—even if moving from one county to another. R.C. 3503.16(A) and (C), 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 2536-2539; R.C. 3503.19(A), 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 2541-2543. {¶ 30} R.C. 3501.01(N) provides, “ ‘Elector’ or ‘qualified elector’ means a person having the qualifications provided by law to be entitled to vote.” Article V, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 3503.01(A) set forth the applicable 10 January Term, 2020 qualifications, and together, they provide that a qualified elector is someone who (1) is a United States citizen, (2) is 18 or over, (3) has been an Ohio resident for 30 days immediately preceding the election, (4) is a resident of the county and precinct in which he or she offers to vote, and (5) has been registered to vote for 30 days. O’Neill, who registered to vote in Ohio on October 4, met all of these requirements. {¶ 31} Because O’Neill met the above requirements, she was a qualified elector. And because she was a registered voter who resided in the 94th House District in November 2019 and was therefore eligible to vote there, she was a qualified elector in that district at the time she signed her first declarations of candidacy. The board therefore abused its discretion by rejecting O’Neill’s petition. D. Laches {¶ 32} In its answer, the board asserted the affirmative defense of laches. The elements of laches are “(1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party.” State ex rel. Save Your Courthouse Commt. v. Medina, 157 Ohio St.3d 423, 2019-Ohio-3737, 137 N.E.3d 1118, ¶ 17. Despite invoking the doctrine in its answer, however, the board presents no argument regarding laches in its brief and has therefore waived the defense. See, e.g., State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor Council v. Cleveland, 114 Ohio St.3d 183, 2007-Ohio-3831, 870 N.E.2d 1174, ¶ 83 (claim raised in complaint is waived if not addressed in merit brief). {¶ 33} Moreover, while it is true that O’Neill filed her complaint four weeks after the board issued written notice of its decision, the board has identified no prejudice resulting from this delay. This case would have been expedited under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.08 regardless of any delay. And O’Neill’s name is already on the prepared ballots; the only question is whether votes cast for her unopposed 11 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO candidacy will be counted after the conclusion of absentee voting, which has been extended to April 28. Laches does not preclude us from issuing the writ.