Opinion ID: 1172684
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Facts Relating to Search and Seizure Issues

Text: At 5:28 a.m., approximately one hour after police arrived at his home on the day of the murders, Defendant Stenson signed a document entitled Permission to Search. The document states that Stenson understood his constitutional right to refuse to consent to a search of his property and that he voluntarily, without threat or promise of any kind, was giving written permission to the officers to conduct a complete search of his property and to take from the premises any letters, papers, materials, or any other items or things, which they require as evidence for criminal prosecution in the case or cases under investigation. Exhibit 5 (admitted March 14, 1994, at CrR 3.5/3.6 hearing). The permission to search form was explained and given to Defendant Stenson. He read it and filled out the form in his own handwriting before signing it. Near the time that this consent to search was signed, police also asked Defendant Stenson for the clothes he was wearing at the time of the shootings. Stenson voluntarily gave the officers his clothing at 6:35 a.m. A few hours later, at 10:50 a.m., police telephonically applied for the first of 11 search warrants. [2] The testimony given to the judge in support of the warrant included the following information:  The officers were investigating a multiple shooting that resulted in critical injury to Denise Stenson and in the death of Frank Hoerner. The shootings occurred at Dakota Farms, the home and business of Darold Stenson and Denise Stenson. Darold Stenson was at Dakota Farms when Frank Hoerner and Denise Stenson were shot.  Frank Hoerner and his wife and Darold Stenson and his wife were friends and had dined together on the evening before the shootings. Frank Hoerner and his wife reportedly had marital sex problems and Frank Hoerner and Denise Stenson reportedly had an unspoken physical attraction to each other.  Frank Hoerner and Darold Stenson were business partners in an exotic bird venture located at the Stenson property. Frank Hoerner had invested heavily in the business. It appeared that Darold Stenson was planning to dissolve the partnership.  At the request of Darold Stenson, Frank Hoerner telephoned the Stenson home at 3:30 on the morning of the shootings and then went to the Stenson property to sign some insurance papers. Hoerner reportedly brought $10,000 in a black briefcase with him that morning. The shootings apparently occurred within 30 minutes of Frank Hoerner's arrival at Dakota Farms.  There were inconsistencies between the officers' initial observations and Darold Stenson's story of the shootings. For example, Darold Stenson had said he believed Frank Hoerner shot Mrs. Stenson and then shot himself. However, there appeared to be blood spatters in the entryway near the front door and near the stairs. Stenson reported that he called police immediately after discovering the bodies. However, it appeared the entryway to the body of Frank Hoerner had been cleaned. The judge determined there was probable cause to believe a crime had been committed and issued a warrant authorizing a search of Dakota Farms, including all buildings and outbuildings as well as all vehicles. The evidence to be seized is described in Addendum B to search warrant 561, as follows: The body of Frank HOERNER, all firearms, bullets, other ammunition, all clothing of Mr. and Mrs. STENSON and Frank HOERNER wearing when the incident occurred. Trace evidence to include hair and fiber samples, gun powder residue, latent fingerprints, blood spatter evidence, carpet and floor samples, paint chips, the cleaner and sponge, evidence of a business relationship and financial records, cash brought to the location by Mr. HOERNER in a black brief case, personal records, correspondence, photographs and film which may indicate a relationship or association between the STENSONS and HOERNERS, bedding where the incident occurred, any other latent evidence that may be found during the forensic examination of the scene. Exhibit 6. [3] The following day, police requested an addendum to search warrant 561 to expand the search to include a travel trailer on the property and an Apple MacIntosh computer that was found in the office at Dakota Farms. The officers requested permission to open the computer files to see if they contained information showing a business, financial or personal association between Stenson and Hoerner. This addendum is not challenged by the Defendant. On March 30, 1993, five days after the initial warrant was issued, police officers requested another expansion of the scope of search warrant 561. The information submitted to the judge in support of this second addendum was based on the results of the search to that date and on the autopsy reports of Frank Hoerner and of Denise Stenson, who died March 26, 1993. The affidavit in support of the expanded warrant requests that the court [i]ncorporate this addendum with those search warrants previously filed in this case. The affidavit, contained in exhibit 6, includes the following information:  The autopsy of Frank Hoerner showed that Mr. Hoerner had been assaulted before he was shot. He had been struck on the head with a rectangular shaped blunt instrument. The head injury would have rendered him unconscious or stunned. The autopsy report also noted that bits of gravel were embedded in Mr. Hoerner's back and buttocks. The gravel appeared to be from the driveway at the Stenson residence. The autopsy showed that Mr. Hoerner did not commit suicide but was killed by a single bullet wound to the head.  Police officers were informed that Denise Stenson's autopsy revealed marks on her wrists consistent with being tied or bound. [4]  The life of Denise Stenson had been insured for more than $400,000 (including mortgage insurance). Statements from Mrs. Hoerner and documents reviewed at Dakota Farms indicated that Mr. Stenson had realized in excess of $100,000 some years earlier in an apparent insurance fraud. This previous insurance claim was based on the sinking of a large marine vessel, the Dragon Weyr. Items that had been reported missing, along with the ship, included an Apple MacIntosh computer and scuba gear. A seemingly identical computer and scuba gear matching the description of that lost on the ship, as well as other nautical equipment, were found at Dakota Farms.  Business records indicated that Dakota Farms may have been in financial trouble. Other records, business cards, credit cards and legal papers indicated that Darold Stenson was currently or had been involved in several other unrelated businesses. Further, he used other names, was in debt, and had filed for bankruptcy in the past. Documents and interviews with Mrs. Hoerner indicated that Frank Hoerner had paid Stenson tens of thousands of dollars for exotic birds and had not realized any return on his money. The relationship between Frank Hoerner and Darold Stenson had recently been strained.  Illegal drugs also were found in the home, as well as criminal information papers describing charges against Darold Stenson for possession of cocaine. The federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) had interviewed Stenson, and a DEA affidavit apparently referred to in the information states that Stenson described a method for laundering profits from drug sales.  Statements made by Darold Stenson were inconsistent with the results of the investigation. The affidavit requesting the addendum stated the officers believed the relationship between Frank Hoerner, Dakota Farms and the Stensons was a key in identifying the motive behind these killings and, further, that it appeared that financial gain from the death of his wife could have been a prime motive for the double homicide. The judge found there was probable cause to believe that the crime of homicide had been committed. He also said: It is certainly also possible to believe that other crimes may have been committed... and that the homicide is directly related to them either by means of a cover-up or by means of a motive and therefore, it would be appropriate to attempt to ... examine and/or seize materials which might relate directly to those crimes. Exhibit 6. The addendum was granted and warrant 561 was expanded to authorize seizure of the following evidence: All business records written and on computer, insurance policies, records of financial judgments, bank records, loan records, indebtedness and income records, and any other financial records pertaining to the STENSONS and/or Dakota Farms. Lists of the STENSON'S associates, phone records for XXX-XXX-XXXX, and bank records held by financial institutions relating to the STENSON'S and or Dakota Farms. Blunt instruments and binding material (ropes, wire, cord, etc.). Exhibit 6. The affidavit in support of the addendum is attached to the warrant addendum and incorporated therein by reference. The Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized pursuant to his consent and pursuant to the warrants issued in the case. The trial court denied the motion. Particularity of Warrant 561 The Defendant first argues that the initial search warrant issued in this case violated rights guaranteed him under the Fourth Amendment because search warrant 561 did not specifically describe the things to be seized. The Fourth Amendment provides that no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. One of the purposes of the search warrant particularity requirement is to prevent the issuance of a general warrant which would authorize an unlimited search for and seizure of any evidence of any crime. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-80, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 2748, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976); United States v. Holzman, 871 F.2d 1496, 1508 (9th Cir.1989); State v. Perrone, 119 Wash.2d 538, 545, 834 P.2d 611 (1992). General warrants, of course, are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. [T]he problem [posed by the general warrant] is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings.... [The Fourth Amendment addresses the problem] by requiring a `particular description' of the things to be seized. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467[, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038-39, 29 L.Ed.2d 564] (1971). Andresen, 427 U.S. at 480, 96 S.Ct. at 2748. See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.6(a), at 550-61 (3d ed.1996). Whether a warrant meets the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is reviewed de novo. Perrone, 119 Wash.2d at 549, 834 P.2d 611. To comply with the mandate of the Fourth Amendment particularity clause, a search warrant must be sufficiently definite so that the officer executing the warrant can identify the property sought with reasonable certainty. LAFAVE, supra, § 4.6(a), at 551 (citing State v. Muldowney, 60 N.J. 594, 292 A.2d 26 (1972)). Thus, search warrants are to be tested and interpreted in a common sense, practical manner, rather than in a hypertechnical sense. Perrone, 119 Wash.2d at 549, 834 P.2d 611. In general, the degree of specificity required varies according to the circumstances and the type of items involved. Perrone, 119 Wash.2d at 546, 834 P.2d 611. A description is valid if it is as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity, or crime, under investigation permits. Perrone, 119 Wash.2d at 547, 834 P.2d 611; State v. Riley, 121 Wash.2d 22, 27-28, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993). The fact that a warrant lists generic classifications, such as business records or certain kinds of documents, does not necessarily result in an impermissibly broad warrant. Riley, 121 Wash.2d at 28, 846 P.2d 1365. A search warrant for documents generally is given closer scrutiny than one for physical objects because of the potential for intrusion into personal privacy. Andresen, 427 U.S. at 482 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. at 2749 n. 11; LAFAVE, supra, § 4.6(d), at 569. However, where the precise identity of items sought cannot be determined when the warrant is issued, a generic or general description of items will be sufficient if probable cause is shown and a more specific description is impossible. Perrone, 119 Wash.2d at 547, 834 P.2d 611; Andresen, 427 U.S. at 480, 96 S.Ct. at 2748; State v. Scott, 21 Wash.App. 113, 118, 584 P.2d 423 (1978) (warrant authorizing a search for and seizure of employment and business records was not impermissibly broad); United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 653 (9th Cir.1984) (search of records relating to international travel not impermissibly broad as it related to crimes under investigation). Defendant Stenson argues that search warrant 561 was broadly phrased and contained no limit upon officers in their search of Mr. Stenson's business records and personal papers and, thus, was a general warrant allowing officers to search for and to seize any evidence of any crime. However, the warrant does contain limiting language. The warrant states, in pertinent part: The evidence to be seized is described as follows: [E]vidence of a business relationship and financial records, cash brought to the location by Mr. HOERNER in a black brief case, personal records, correspondence, photographs and film which may indicate a relationship or association between the STENSONS and HOERNERS .... Exhibit 6 (emphasis added). The Defendant claims the warrant's limiting language (which may indicate a relationship or association between the STENSONS and HOERNERS) applied only to the search of the Stensons' photographs and film. The Defendant appears to concede that if the warrant is interpreted as limiting the search of business and personal papers to those indicating a relationship or association between the Stensons and the Hoerners, then a meaningful limitation would have been placed on the scope of the warrant. A practical, commonsense interpretation of the warrant language, keeping in mind the circumstances of the case, is that the limiting phrase related to all of the evidence contained in the business, financial and personal records of Darold and Denise Stenson. Here there was probable cause to believe a crime had been committed and that evidence of the relationships between the Hoerners and the Stensons related to the crime. There was probable cause to seize (1) evidence associated with the shooting of Denise Stenson and of Frank Hoerner, and (2) evidence indicating relationships between the Hoerners and the Stensons. The description of documents to be seized was limited to those evincing a relationship between those who appeared to be involved in the crime. We conclude search warrant 561 was not impermissibly broad, as it limited the search for, and seizure of, business, financial and personal records to those indicating a relationship between the Hoerners and the Stensons. The Scope of the Search Under Warrant 561 The Defendant argues that even if the court determines that search warrant 561 did not violate the Fourth Amendment particularity clause, the search conducted under the warrant was made without regard to the limitation set forth in the warrant. In support of his argument, the Defendant states the record shows the police officers looked at records and documents that did not indicate a relationship between the Hoerners and the Stensons. These records and documents included life insurance policies on the life of Denise Stenson, records pertaining to possible insurance fraud, records indicating debt on the part of the Stensons, and records indicating possible involvement of Darold Stenson, Dakota Farms and others in illegal drug trade. Before seizing any of the documents that did not obviously and specifically indicate a relationship between the Stensons and the Hoerners, officers sought an expanded warrant. The United States Supreme Court recognized that officers executing a search warrant for documents related to certain transactions would, out of necessity, have to examine to some extent documents not specifically listed in the warrant. In Andresen, 427 U.S. at 482 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. at 2749 n. 11, the Court stated: We recognize that there are grave dangers inherent in executing a warrant authorizing a search and seizure of a person's papers that are not necessarily present in executing a warrant to search for physical objects whose relevance is more easily ascertainable. In searches for papers, it is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized. Similar dangers, of course, are present in executing a warrant for the seizure of telephone conversations. In both kinds of searches, responsible officials, including judicial officials, must take care to assure that they are conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy. In this case, the officers necessarily looked at documents to determine whether those documents indicated a relationship between the Stensons and the Hoerners. Under Andresen, that viewing of documents was not unreasonable or illegal. Where officers executing a warrant find evidence not described in the warrant and not constituting contraband or instrumentalities of crime, the officers may seize the evidence if it will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction, or has a sufficient nexus with the crime under investigation. State v. Terrovona, 105 Wash.2d 632, 648, 716 P.2d 295 (1986); State v. Turner, 18 Wash.App. 727, 729, 571 P.2d 955 (1977). When the officers searching the Stenson records found documents tending to show prior insurance fraud on the part of Mr. Stenson, and life insurance policies on Mrs. Stenson's life, they reasonably could believe these documents might relate to a motive for the shooting death of Denise Stenson. Similarly, documents tending to show that Darold Stenson was involved in illegal drug transactions and that he and Dakota Farms were in debt also could relate to motive or intent to murder Frank Hoerner. It thus appears the documents would aid in the investigation and conviction or that they had a sufficient nexus with the crime under investigation to justify the search. These documents were properly searched under Terrovona. We conclude the officers executing search warrant 561 did not exceed the lawful scope of the search. The Sufficiency of the Expanded Warrant The Defendant argues that because the limitation contained in the original warrant was not repeated in Addendum E, the entire warrant was converted into a general warrant. The expanded warrant was based on a 14-page affidavit which is incorporated into the warrant. The affidavit specifically relates the documents requested to the double homicide under investigation. It does not indicate that police were interested in searching for evidence of any other crime, except to the extent that additional crimes might show a motive for the murders. The trial court's ruling on the request for the expanded search warrant also related the evidence sought to the murders under investigation. An overbroad warrant may be cured for the purposes of meeting the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment where the affidavit and the search warrant are physically attached, and the warrant expressly refers to the affidavit and incorporates it with suitable words of reference. Riley, 121 Wash.2d at 29, 846 P.2d 1365; State v. Kelley, 52 Wash.App. 581, 585, 762 P.2d 20 (1988). Here, the affidavit was both physically attached to the warrant and incorporated into the warrant by reference. That affidavit limited the scope of the search for and seizure of documents and records to those related to the double homicides. We conclude the addendum to search warrant 561 was sufficiently limited to satisfy the requirements of the particularity clause of the Fourth Amendment. The Consent to Search The State argues that the searches here were conducted pursuant to both a valid consent to search and constitutionally valid search warrants. The Defendant did not assign error to the trial court's findings and conclusions with respect to the consent to search. The unchallenged findings of fact include the following: 9. At approximately 5:28 a.m., the Defendant executed a permission to search form, admitted as Exhibit 5 at this hearing. Deputy Fuchser and Detective Sgt. Monty Martin, CCSO, who had arrived at the scene at about 4:50 a.m. explained the form to the Defendant and witnessed his signature. The Defendant was not emotional, agitated, or excited. He appeared oriented, alert, and intelligent. 10. At about 6:30 a.m. Sgt. Martin asked for and received the Defendant's clothing that he had been wearing prior to the arrival of law enforcement personnel. No other physical items of evidence were taken at that time. Clerk's Papers at 177. Because the Defendant fails to challenge any of the findings of fact entered after the suppression hearing, they are treated as verities on appeal. State v. Gentry, 125 Wash.2d 570, 605, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995). Additionally, the trial court's findings are supported by the evidence. The Defendant did not testify at the suppression hearing. The only evidence, from police officers, was to the effect that the request for permission to conduct a broad search and the request for Defendant Stenson's clothing were separate requests. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court determined that Defendant Stenson's permission to search was voluntary. The trial court's reasons and conclusions relating to this determination included the following: 5. Prior to signing the consent, Deputy Fuchser told the Defendant to carefully read the permission to search, which the Defendant did. The Defendant also filled in the blanks provided in the form before signing it. The Defendant asked no questions concerning his rights and there was no misunderstanding of the terms. 6. The form itself contains a clear statement that the Defendant had the lawful right to refuse to consent to such a search. . . . . 8. The Defendant displayed little emotional distress. What distress he did display was not so profound as to impair his ability or capacity for self determination or understanding of what the investigators were seeking by way of permission to search. Accordingly, the Court finds the consent was given freely and voluntarily by the Defendant with a full understanding of the nature of the question and of his right to refuse consent. 9. At the time of the request for the clothing, the Defendant had been fully informed of his right to refuse consent. With this knowledge, the Defendant freely consented to the seizure of his clothing. There was no coercion, threats, or intimidation of any kind. Clerk's Papers at 184-85. The consent to conduct a complete search of the premises and to take any letters, papers, materials, or any other items or things required as evidence for criminal prosecution of the cases under investigation is a valid and broad consent. The State did not rely on the consent for the search, however, and additionally sought the warrants before any evidence was seized. The trial court's CrR 3.6 rulings with respect to search and seizure were correct, and we affirm the trial court rulings on the search and seizure issues.