Opinion ID: 2454063
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Permanent Order Lacked a Finding of Likelihood of Future Domestic Violence

Text: ¶ 28 The order states, THE ORDER FOR PROTECTION IS PERMANENT [&check;] If the duration of this order exceeds one year, the court finds that an order of less than one year will be insufficient to prevent further acts of domestic violence. CP at 133. This language merely states an order of less than one year is insufficient to prevent further acts of violence; it does not, however, address whether domestic violence is likely to resume after one year. This abbreviated finding does no more than state why the order is being issued in the first place, to prevent future acts of domestic violence for a period of one year. It does not establish the need for an order that exceeds one year. Moreover, this finding is conditional; it is not an affirmative statement the court has entered a finding. Rather, the finding is effective only if the duration of the order exceeds one year; the court did not actually find upon expiration of the order acts of domestic violence were likely to resume. At best, this language glosses over the threshold requirement and treats it like a formality. At worst, this boilerplate language appears to be an anticipatory attempt to justify every order that exceeds one year. ¶ 29 The Court of Appeals, relying on Spence, held this boilerplate language, though not a positive statement that domestic violence would likely resume after one year, was sufficient to show the trial court had made the required finding. May, 151 Wash.App. at 695, 213 P.3d 945. That reliance is misplaced. Spence was a direct appeal challenging an order issued pursuant to chapter 26.50 RCW. Spence challenged the order on several constitutional grounds, but the primary question before the court was whether due process requires the court to find a recent act of domestic violence before issuing a protection order. Spence, 103 Wash.App. at 328, 12 P.3d 1030. The section relied on by the Court of Appeals holds the language on the preprinted form in Spence  which is nearly identical to the boilerplate language used in this casesufficiently stated findings to support the issuance of the order. But Spence is distinguishable because the order in that case contained additional handwritten findings that supported the issuance of a permanent order. [5] Id. at 329, 12 P.3d 1030. Spence does not control here because that trial court complied with the statutory mandate; the court made the requisite finding and the evidence in the record supported that finding. ¶ 30 But the order here is ambiguous and so does not satisfy statutory requirements: the boilerplate language is not an adequate finding that a permanent order was necessary to prevent May from engaging in future acts of domestic violence. ¶ 31 The jurisdiction of courts in cases involving domestic violence protection orders is derived from the statute, chapter 26.50 RCW. RCW 26.50.020(5); Puget Sound Navigation Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 152 Wash. 417, 423-26, 278 P. 189 (1929). In Pearce, this court held an order void, as being in excess of a court's jurisdiction, when a trial court exceeds its statutory authority. Pearce v. Pearce, 37 Wash.2d 918, 922-23, 226 P.2d 895 (1951); Davidson v. Ream, 97 Misc. 89, 113-14, 161 N.Y.S. 73 (1916) (`In its most general sense the term jurisdiction, when applied to a court, is the power residing in such court to determine judicially a given action, controversy, or question presented to it for decision. If this power does not exist with reference to any particular case, its determination by the court is an absolute nullity ....' (quoting 1 John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence § 129, at 153-54 (4th ed. 1918))), aff'd by Davidson v. Ream, 178 A.D. 362, 164 N.Y.S. 1037 (1917). Because a permanent protection order cannot issue without this required finding, the issuing court exceeded its statutory authority when it issued this permanent protection order. [6] The failure to make such a finding is fatal to the validity of the order. State v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 164 Wash. 237, 242, 2 P.2d 686 (1931). Thus, the protection order issued against May was void, and it was error for the trial court to admit it. Absent a valid domestic violence protection order, leaving a voicemail and sending an e-mail are not criminal; consequently, no violation of law occurred. [7]