Opinion ID: 2607620
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: Excusal of Black Jurors.

Text: (23) Relying on what he calls the rule of Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) 479 U.S. 314 [93 L.Ed.2d 649, 107 S.Ct. 708], defendant contends it was prejudicial error to try a Black defendant with an all White jury. The contention is patently unmeritorious. Griffith holds that newly declared constitutional rules are applicable to criminal cases pending on appeal. The rule in question in Griffith was the holding in Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 S.Ct. 1712], that a state criminal defendant can establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment based on the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to strike members of the defendant's race from the jury venire and that, once the defendant has made the prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the prosecution to come forward with a neutral explanation for those challenges. (See People v. Murtishaw (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1001, 1013 [258 Cal. Rptr. 821, 773 P.2d 172]; People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 326-327 [261 Cal. Rptr. 348, 777 P.2d 121].) The prosecution here peremptorily challenged Mr. Cummings, one of two Black jurors on the panel. Defense counsel made no objection to the excusal of Cummings. Later, both the prosecution and the defense stipulated to the excusal of the second Black juror, Mr. Ash. Absent an objection at voir dire, we have no Batson/Griffith problem here. Insofar as establishing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object on Wheeler grounds ( People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748]), the record does not affirmatively reveal that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for failing to object ( People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 581.)