Opinion ID: 528434
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Shifting the Burden of Proof (Claim 4)

Text: 82 Bertolotti argues that the jury was instructed to presume that a sentence of death was the appropriate penalty in his case unless the defense proved otherwise. See Jackson v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1469, 1474 (11th Cir.), reh. in banc den., 842 F.2d 339 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 2005, 100 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988). Review of the jury instructions shows that this was manifestly not the case. The trial judge properly fulfilled his constitutional duty of explaining to the jury the function of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. See Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479, 1494 (11th Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939, 107 S.Ct. 421, 93 L.Ed.2d 371 (1986). The judge instructed the jury as follows: 83 [I]t is your duty to follow the law that will now be given you by the court and render to the court an advisory sentence based upon your determination as to whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to justify the imposition of the death penalty and whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to outweigh any aggravating circumstances found to exist. 84 The judge then explained Florida's statutory aggravating circumstances to the jury. Following the explanation, the judge instructed the jurors: 85 If you find the aggravating circumstances do not justify the death penalty, then your advisory sentence should be one of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for twenty-five years. 86 Should you find sufficient aggravating circumstances do exist, it will then be your duty to determine whether mitigating circumstances exist that outweigh the aggravating circumstances. 87 The judge next explained the mitigating circumstances, concluding by informing the jury that it could consider in mitigation [a]ny other aspect of the defendant's character or record and any other circumstance of the offense. The judge further cautioned the jury that any aggravating circumstance must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, but that mitigating circumstances need not be so established. If the jury found an aggravating circumstance, it was to then consider all of the evidence tending to establish one or more mitigating circumstances and give that evidence such weight as you feel it should receive in reaching your conclusion as to the sentence that should be imposed. 88 The jury was not instructed that it should presume death to be the appropriate penalty once an aggravating circumstance was established. Cf. Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011, 1041-44 (9th Cir.1988) (in banc) (Arizona capital statute unconstitutional because it required defendant to establish the existence of a mitigating circumstance once an aggravating circumstance had been established, and defendant bore risk of non-persuasion that mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating circumstances); Jackson, 837 F.2d at 1473 (jury instructed that death is presumed to be the proper sentence unless aggravating factors are overridden by mitigating factors). Rather, Bertolotti's jury was instructed that it must find an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt before it need consider mitigating circumstances, and even then it need not look for mitigating circumstances if it found that the aggravating circumstances do not justify the death penalty. If the jury did find that the aggravating circumstances justified the death penalty, it was to determine whether any other aspect of Bertolotti's record or character or offense stood in mitigation of his crime. This set of instructions adequately described the plan of Florida's capital-sentencing statute, see Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248-51, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2965-66, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.), quite reasonably focused the jury's attention on the circumstances of the offense and the character of the offender, and adequately bridled the jury's discretion. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.). 20 89