Opinion ID: 1025139
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: John Murray

Text: John Murray was a 31-year-old African-American male. When the State peremptorily challenged Murray, seven jurors were seated, one of whom was an African-American. The State to that point had used eleven challenges, four of which were used to strike African-Americans. During voir dire, the State's questioning brought the following facts to light: Murray was formerly with the Air Force and held top secret security clearance; he had overheard two white jurors in the courtroom stating [t]he defendants should have never made it out of the woods [alive], (J.A. at 443); he believed those jurors weren't giving much consideration to due process, (J.A. at 443); hearing such statements would not in any way prejudice him against the State; he was an advocate of both punishments, that is, life imprisonment and the death penalty, because they are deterrents and they do work, (J.A. at 455); his father was convicted of robbery when he was a child and spent four to six years in jail; he was convicted of a DUI several years prior to the trial; and that he was familiar with reggae music but not familiar with Rastafarianism as a religion. Murray also had an aunt who served as a Deputy Sheriff in Buncombe County, North Carolina. Following voir dire, the State moved to strike Murray. Tilmon's counsel raised a Batson objection, noting that, to that point, almost one-third of the State's challenges had been made to strike African-American jurors. The State responded that it struck Murray for the cumulative effect of three things. (J.A. at 474.) One, he has a prior conviction himself for driving while impaired. Two, his father has a prior conviction for robbery for which he served, if I remember correctly, six years in the Department of Corrections. And three, Mr. Murray's statement that he attributed to a male and a female white juror in the courtroom with respect to what he viewed as a challenge to the due process rights of the defendants. The cumulative effect of that we contend makes him challengeable by the state from our point of view peremptorily. (J.A. at 474.) The State then added the following bits of information: that Murray did not refer to the Court with any deferential statement; that, in relation to his demeanor, Murray had a gold earring in his left ear; and, that the prosecutor noted and perceived from [his] point of view a rather militant animus with respect to some of his answers. (J.A. at 475.) Explaining this last point, the prosecutor continued, He elaborated on some things. Other things, he gave very short, what I viewed as sharp answers and also noted that, when he spoke to the Court, . . . [he][d]id not address the Court as Your Honor. He just simply gave rather short, cryptic answers. (J.A. at 475.) Defense counsel countered that a white male in the same age range as Murray, Michael Covington, had a past conviction but was not challenged and that another white juror, Virginia Broderick, had a DWI conviction. Moreover, counsel noted the State did not question Murray about his father's conviction and what impact that would have upon him as a juror and argued that the comments of the white jurors could not reflect upon Murray's fitness to serve. The trial court denied the Batson motion. It explained as follows: I would just like to note for the record that I did not perceivesince this has been raised, I did not perceive any conduct of the juror to be less than deferential to the Court. I think that the juror did demonstrate a consistent reticence to elaborate on questions, but all of his responses were appropriate to the specific questions asked. And probably thatthere was a substantial degree of clarity and thoughtfulness in the juror's responses. And the Court will note for the record that it is primarily relying upon the [juror's] prior record, specifically which it involved an interaction with a traffic law enforcement officer, and the potential empathy that might be engendered from a father who was a criminal defendant as the basis for the exercise of the peremptory challenge. I would note further I am not relying upon the impact of the incident in the courtroom as providing a basis for this and frankly is notI do not consider it to be appropriate for even the exercise [of] a peremptory challenge. (J.A. at 477-78.) The Supreme Court of North Carolina found that this offering from the State constituted a race-neutral reason: With regard to Murray, we perceive no inherent discriminatory intent in the State's explanation that Murray had been convicted of driving while impaired and that his father had a prior conviction for robbery for which he had served six years in the Department of Correction. Defendants did not show the State's explanation to be pretextual. While defendants pointed to two other Caucasian prospective jurors who had criminal convictions and were accepted by the State, those other prospective jurors did not also have a parent who was convicted of robbery for which he or she was incarcerated. There is no evidence of pretext, as the State sought to exclude Murray because he might empathize with defendants because of his own experience with traffic law enforcement and his father's incarceration in the Department of Correction. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding the State's reasoning to be race-neutral. Golphin, 533 S.E.2d at 214 (citations omitted). To support his argument that the peremptory strike of Murray was pretextual, Tilmon points out that the State did not strike at least six white jurors with criminal records or relatives with criminal records. In particular, Tilmon directs our attention to Virginia Broderick, a white female who was passed by the State and whose sister and brother-in-law were drug addicts who had recently been arrested for passing bad checks. Broderick had custody of their 15-year-old daughter. When asked about her sister and brother-in-law, however, Broderick stated that [w]e don't have any contact with them. (J.A. at 358.) Broderick had also been convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol, for which her driver's license was suspended for one year. Broderick stated that her own conviction, which had occurred about four years earlier, would not impact her ability to serve as a juror. She had, in fact, served as a juror in a civil case in 1996. Tilmon additionally supports his argument that the strikes of Holder and Murray were pretextual by noting that the State questioned two African-American jurors, Murray and Phillip Barnhill, about Rastafarianism but did not question white jurors on that topic. Tilmon also points us to the statistical evidence regarding the jury's composition. The 95-person venire panel included thirteen African-Americans. Of the thirteen prospective African-American jurors, six were excused for cause, five were peremptorily struck by the State, one was struck by Kevin's counsel, and one served on the jury. Thus, the State struck 5 of the 7 eligible black jurors, or 71%. [7] In total, the State struck 14 of 31 eligible white jurors, or 45%. The Supreme Court of North Carolina offered the following analysis in ultimately rejecting Tilmon's Batson claim: As the State provided race-neutral reasons for its peremptory challenges of Holder and Murray, we move to the third prong of Batson. In light of the factors we consider in evaluating whether there is purposeful discrimination, we note that this case may be one susceptible to racial discrimination because defendants are African-Americans and the victims were Caucasian. See White, 349 N.C. at 548-49, 508 S.E.2d at 262. However, the State did not exhaust the statutory number of peremptory challenges allowed for the first twelve jurors, nor did it exhaust its challenges in selecting the four alternate jurors. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1217; White, 349 N.C. at 548-49, 508 S.E.2d at 262. In addition, based on the discussion which occurred at the time the State challenged Holder, the State had exercised nine peremptory challenges, only three of which were against African-Americans; the next day, when Murray was challenged, the State had exercised eleven peremptory challenges, only four of which were against African-Americans, one being Holder. The State had accepted six prospective jurors, one of whom was African-American. This constituted a higher percentage of African-Americans accepted by the State than were in the jury pool. In selecting the twelve jurors and four alternates, the State exercised twenty-seven peremptory challenges, only four of which were against African-Americans. This ratio represents a percentage of African-Americans equivalent to the percentage of African-Americans in the jury pool. Moreover, during jury selection, the State made no comments which would support an inference of discrimination in the instant case. From our review of the transcript in the instant case, it is apparent the trial court gave great consideration to the arguments by all parties with regard to these two Batson challenges before concluding the State did not purposefully discriminate against Holder or Murray. We give great deference to the trial court's rulings. See Bonnett, 348 N.C. at 433, 502 S.E.2d at 575. Given the foregoing, we are convinced the State did not discriminate on the basis of race in exercising its peremptory challenges against Holder and Murray. See Kandies, 342 N.C. at 434-35, 467 S.E.2d at 75. Defendants' assignments of error are overruled. Golphin, 533 S.E.2d at 214-15.