Opinion ID: 1494025
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Use of the Guidelines to determine child support when the child is in the custody of a government agency.

Text: Appellant argues that a juvenile court exercising jurisdiction in a CINA case may not use the Guidelines to calculate child support, where the child is in the custody of a government agency rather than in the custody of one of the parents. We find appellant's argument to be unpersuasive and hold that courts in CINA proceedings may apply the Guidelines as codified in §§ 12-101 et seq. of the Family Law Article even when the child support monies will go towards the reimbursement of State care. Md.Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol., 2004 Supp.), § 3-819( l ) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article expressly provides authorization for courts to order a parent to reimburse the State for the costs of a CINA child's commitment: [14] After giving the parent a reasonable opportunity to be heard, and determining the income of the parent, the court may order either parent or both parents to pay a sum in the amount the court directs to cover wholly or partly the support of the child under this subtitle. This provision applies in CINA and non-CINA cases. [15] See 2001 Md. Laws, ch. 415. One of the main purposes of the Guidelines is to `improve the consistency, and therefore the equity, of child support awards.' Voishan, 327 Md. at 322, 609 A.2d at 321. Applying the Guidelines across the board, regardless of whether a child is in the care of one of their parents or the State helps to ensure this consistency. A parent that meets the Guidelines should not benefit by being released of their obligation to pay child support just because it is determined that their child is a CINA and removed from parental custody. The Court of Special Appeals addressed the situation of child support being paid to the State in In re Joshua W., 94 Md.App. 486, 617 A.2d 1154 (1993). In re Joshua W. concerned a number of children that, like Katherine in the case sub judice, were adjudicated CINA and placed under the protective custody of the State. Id. at 488-89, 617 A.2d at 1155. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County held a hearing to determine if the mother and father of the children (at that time divorced) should pay support for the children. Id. at 489, 617 A.2d at 1155-56. The court determined and ordered that the father should pay $300 per week in child support on behalf of the children to the Anne Arundel County Department of Social Services (DSS). Id. at 489, 617 A.2d at 1156. The focus of the appeal was whether the circuit court erred in ordering [the father] to reimburse DSS for the support of [the children]. Id. at 490, 617 A.2d at 1155. Judge Motz, writing for the Court of Special Appeals, first set out to determine whether the trial court was obliged to use the Guidelines as set forth in Md.Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol., 2004 Supp.), §§ 12-101 et seq. of the Family Law Article. In re Joshua W., 94 Md.App. at 494, 617 A.2d at 1158. The court looked at the predecessor statute to § 3-8A-29, Md.Code (1973, 1989 Repl.Vol.), § 3-830 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Section 3-830 states that, [a]fter giving the parent a reasonable opportunity to be heard, the court may order either parent or both parents to pay a sum in the amount the court directs to cover the support of the child in whole or in part. [16] The court found that nothing in the language of § 3-830 or in its legislative history placed a limit on the amount the court could direct a parent to pay based on the Guidelines. In re Joshua W., 94 Md.App. at 495, 617 A.2d at 1158. Rather, the court looked to the Guidelines themselves to determine their applicability: The guideline legislation does specifically provide, in pertinent part, that `in any proceeding to establish or modify child support, whether pendente lite or permanent, the court shall use the child support guidelines set forth in this subtitle.' Id. (quoting § 12-202(a) of the Family Law Article). The Court of Special Appeals, however, recognized that the facts in In re Joshua W., as with the case sub judice, are not like most actions for child support. In re Joshua W., 94 Md.App. at 495, 617 A.2d at 1158. In most cases of child support actions one custodial parent is seeking child support from the non-custodial parent. In contrast, both In re Joshua W. and the case sub judice involve two non-custodial parents and a third party, the State. In both cases the circuit courts ordered a parent to pay child support to the State for reimbursement of custodial care. Id. The court in In re Joshua W. examined the development of the Guidelines and found that the language of the Guidelines emphasized custodial and non-custodial parents, failing to directly address the factual situation at hand. In re Joshua W., 94 Md.App. at 496-97, 617 A.2d at 1159. The court, however, elucidated that: Despite this emphasis on custodial and noncustodial parents and sole and shared physical custody in the guidelines, there is nothing in the statute or its legislative history to suggest that the General Assembly intended that the child support guidelines only be applied to the usual child support cases.... Rather, as noted above, Fam. Law. § 12-202(a) expressly provides that the guidelines `shall' be used `in any proceeding to establish child support.' In re Joshua W., 94 Md.App. at 497-98, 617 A.2d at 1159-60. The Court of Special Appeals found further support for the conclusion that the Guidelines are to be, or may be, used in all child support cases, by referencing the federal legislation [17] that spurred the creation of Maryland's Guidelines as well as Maryland's foster care regulations. [18] In re Joshua W., 94 Md. App. at 498, 617 A.2d at 1160. Ultimately, based on the above factors, the court in In re Joshua W. concluded that the General Assembly intended that these child support guidelines be used in all child support cases, including those, like the one at hand, involving government financed child care and no custodial parent. In re Joshua W., 94 Md.App. at 500, 617 A.2d at 1161. That finding is consistent with the State of Maryland's policies regarding child support and children generally. A parent has both a common law and statutory duty to support his or her minor children. See Md.Code (1984, 2004 Repl.Vol.), § 5-203(b) [19] of the Family Law Article; Drummond v. Drummond, 350 Md. 502, 520, 714 A.2d 163, 172 (1998); Garay v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 368-69, 631 A.2d 429, 432 (1993); Middleton v. Middleton, 329 Md. 627, 632-33, 620 A.2d 1363, 1365 (1993); Carroll County Dept. of Social Servs. v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150, 170-71, 577 A.2d 14, 23 (1990). As the Court discussed in Drummond: We previously have noted the rationale underlying a parent's obligation of support: `[T]he duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children, is a principle of natural law; an obligation laid on them not only by nature herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into the world: ... By begetting them therefore they have entered into a voluntary obligation to endeavor, as far as in them lies, that the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved.' Knill v. Knill, 306 Md. 527, 531-32, 510 A.2d 546, 548 (1986) (quoting 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries  447). See also Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 629, 650 A.2d 252, 257 (1994) (quoting Knill ). To relieve a parent entirely of his or her support obligation because the child receives a benefit to which he or she is entitled from some other source would not ordinarily be consistent with this fundamental principle of family law. Drummond, 350 Md. at 520, 714 A.2d at 172. It is evident that parents have an obligation to support their children. In a case such as the one sub judice, that obligation does not disappear when a child is adjudicated CINA and removed from parental custody and care. The parents of the child, jointly and severally, have a responsibility and obligation to provide child support if they are capable of doing so. § 5-203(b). The proper method for a court to use in determining the amount of child support normally is the application of the Guidelines. As § 12-202(a) provides, in any proceeding to establish or modify child support, whether pendente lite or permanent, the court shall use the child support guidelines set forth in this subtitle. (Emphasis added). Therefore, a juvenile court exercising jurisdiction in a CINA case may (or under some circumstances should) use the Guidelines to calculate child support even where the child is in the custody of a government agency, but, in such cases, the amount of the total payment from the parents to the governmental agency cannot exceed the actual costs to the agency, [20] even if the guideline calculations might require a greater sum had the child been in the custody of a non-governmental entity.
Appellant argues further, that if a child support order may be entered at a permanency plan review hearing, it may only be entered subject to a pleading being filed by one of the parties requesting the entry of a child support order and adequate notice being provided to the parties. We find that adequate notice appropriate to the nature of the case was not provided to appellant that the matter of child support would be addressed at the March 21, 2005, hearing. Thus, we direct our attention to the due process concerns of appellant relating to lack of notice. In a case such as the one sub judice, the trial court must provide reasonable notice to the parties concerning when the matter of child support will be addressed. This Court has stated previously that: Generally, due process requires that a party to a proceeding is entitled to both notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issues to be decided in a case. Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 281, 32 S.Ct. 406, 56 L.Ed. 760 (1912); Armstrong Cork Co. v. Lyons, 366 F.2d 206 (8th Cir.1966); see also Ottenheimer Pub. v. Employ. Sec. Adm., 275 Md. 514, 520, 340 A.2d 701 (1975); Accrocco v. Splawn, 264 Md. 527, 534, 287 A.2d 275 (1972); Travelers v. Nationwide, 244 Md. 401, 409, 224 A.2d 285 (1966); Balto. County v. White, 235 Md. 212, 220, 201 A.2d 358 (1964). Blue Cross of Maryland, Inc. v. Franklin Square Hospital, 277 Md. 93, 101, 352 A.2d 798, 804 (1976); In re Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. 39, 57, 591 A.2d 468, 477 (1991). [21] An important Supreme Court case discussing reasonable notice is Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). [22] The facts of Mullane revolved around the judicial settlement of a bank's accounts as trustee of a common trust fund. The bank attempted to provide statutory notice by publishing notice in a newspaper, which set[] forth merely the name and address of the trust company, the name and the date of establishment of the common trust fund, and a list of all participating estates, trusts or funds. Id. at 310, 70 S.Ct. at 655. The Court found that, while such notice was sufficient for those beneficiaries that could not be ascertained, the notice was insufficient with respect to known beneficiaries because under the circumstances it [was] not reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other means at hand. Id. at 319, 70 S.Ct. at 660. Discussing due process, the Court found that the abstract words of the Due Process Clause ... at a minimum [ ] require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. Id. at 313, 70 S.Ct. at 656-57. The Court found that the judicial settlement of the bank's accounts could deprive some beneficiaries of property rights and hence notice and hearing must measure up to the standards of due process. Id. at 313, 70 S.Ct. at 657. The Court in Mullane balanced the interest of the State in the finality of the settlement against the individual interests of the beneficiaries as protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court stated: This is defined by our holding that `The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.' Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394, 34 S.Ct. 779, 783, 58 L.Ed. 1363. This right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest. Id. at 314, 70 S.Ct. at 657. In the case sub judice, appellant received notice of a hearing, but not reasonable notice appropriate to the nature and facts of this particular case. Examining how to determine whether notice is reasonable or not, the Court in Mullane opined: An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278, 132 A.L.R. 1357; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 34 S.Ct. 779, 58 L.Ed. 1363; Priest v. Board of Trustees of Town of Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604, 34 S.Ct. 443, 58 L.Ed. 751; Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 20 S.Ct. 410, 44 L.Ed. 520. The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, Grannis v. Ordean, supra , and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance, Roller v. Holly, supra , and cf. Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 29 S.Ct. 580, 53 L.Ed. 914. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S.Ct. at 657 (emphasis added). The Mullane Court continued, stating:  But when notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected, compare Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091, with Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 48 S.Ct. 259, 72 L.Ed. 446, 57 A.L.R. 1230, or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 70 S.Ct. at 657-58 (emphasis added). Maryland courts have held similarly to Mullane. We addressed notice in the context of due process rights in Phillips v. Venker, 316 Md. 212, 557 A.2d 1338 (1989). Phillips concerned a personal injury action in which the judge ruled on a motion for summary judgment during a telephone conference hearing. The facts surrounding the telephone conference gave rise to the lack of notice. Plaintiff's counsel had called the court to determine whether any action had been taken on his request for a continuance. Id. at 214, 557 A.2d at 1339. Somehow the call was directed to the judge assigned to hearing the motion for summary judgment, who arranged an immediate telephone conference between the parties. Id. at 215, 557 A.2d at 1339. The judge expressed a reluctance to postpone the scheduled hearing and, even though this telephone call was not scheduled for that purpose, the judge immediately conducted a hearing on the motion for summary judgment over the phone. Id. The Court found that under the circumstances of the telephone conference, the notice was not adequate. Id. at 221-22, 557 A.2d at 1343. The Court concluded, that it is axiomatic that [the parties] were entitled to adequate notice of the time, place, and nature of that hearing, so that they could adequately prepare. Id. at 222, 557 A.2d at 1343; (citing Sullivan v. Insurance Comm'r, 291 Md. 277, 283-85, 434 A.2d 1024 (1981); Glading v. Furman, 282 Md. 200, 205-07, 383 A.2d 398 (1978); Bernstein v. Bd. of Education, 245 Md. 464, 473, 226 A.2d 243 (1967)). Based on the lack of notice of when the hearing would take place, Counsel for the plaintiffs was not given any meaningful opportunity to review his file, collect his thoughts, or otherwise prepare for oral argument, and the fact [t]hat he was able to participate in some fashion in the argument the trial judge insisted be held does not suggest that he was able to participate effectively. Phillips, 316 Md. at 222, 557 A.2d at 1343. The Court of Special Appeals addressed due process rights in relation to notice in Van Schaik v. Van Schaik, 90 Md.App. 725, 603 A.2d 908 (1992). In Van Schaik, a case about custody modification, the court-appointed attorney for the child in question requested a hearing `with regard to visitation and other issues.' Id. at 730, 603 A.2d at 910. The trial court scheduled the hearing and provided notice to the parents that stated: HEARING ON VISITATION AND CHILD'S POSSESSIONS has been scheduled for March 18, 1991 from 9:00 a.m. to 11 a.m. Id. The parents attended the hearing without counsel, presumably because they didn't contest the visitation and property issues, and the only attorney present was the child's counsel. Id. The hearing transpired, and at its culmination the court terminated the father's joint custody rights. Id. at 730, 603 A.2d at 911. The court took this action even though neither of the parties, nor the child's attorney, had requested a change in custody. Id. at 730 n. 4, 603 A.2d at 911 n. 4. The Court of Special Appeals found that the father was not given proper notice that matters relating to custody were to be the subject of the hearing at issue. Id. at 738, 603 A.2d at 914. The court stated that [t]he notice in the case at bar did not notify either parent that the court was contemplating making a custody decision. Id. at 738-39, 603 A.2d at 915. In support of this holding, the court relied on the Phillips Court's holding, as discussed supra. The Court of Special Appeals more recently addressed this issue in Burdick v. Brooks, 160 Md.App. 519, 864 A.2d 300 (2004), which, like Van Schaik, concerned child custody. In Burdick, the trial court sent the mother notice of a status conference, that was to last fifteen minutes. Id. at 527, 864 A.2d at 304. At the conference, however, the trial court announced a modification of custody, changing custody of three of the children from the mother to their father. Id. at 523, 864 A.2d at 303. The Court of Special Appeals, relying on the Van Schaik holding, found that the notice letter sent to Burdick [the mother] failed to inform her that the court could make a custody determination at the conference. Burdick, 160 Md.App. at 527, 864 A.2d at 305. In order to determine whether adequate notice was provided in the case sub judice it is necessary to re-examine some of the factual circumstances leading up to the March 21, 2005, hearing. The court first addressed the issue of child support at the July 22, 2004, hearing. The resulting order, entered August 5, 2004, as discussed supra, directed the father to pay $700.00 per month retroactive to October 1, 2003 through December 31, 2004. Per the order,  subject to further review and/or Order of this Court, [Katherine's] Mother, [appellant], shall not be obligated to pay child support, either in arrears or prospectively because of her marginal income.... [Emphasis added]. In addition, the order provided that the matter of the parents' respective child support obligations on behalf of the child shall be subject to further review by this Court after December 31, 2004. The schedule for the next hearing was stated as:  Next Hearing: Permanency Planning hearing on September 22, 2004, at 11:30 a.m. in Courtroom 19 The permanency planning hearing was held on September 22, 2004, [23] and there is no evidence that the child support issue was addressed. [24] The resulting Permanency Planning Hearing and Order for Continued Commitment did not address the subject of child support at all. The order simply changed the permanency plan to Another Planned Permanent Living Arrangement (AAPLA), with Independent Living Services. At the end of this order the schedule for the next hearing was stated as: NEXT HEARING: March 21, 2005, 8:30 a.m., Courtroom # 19 This was the last notice that appellant received prior to the March 21, 2005, hearing, concerning any hearing involving her daughter, Katherine. It did not provide any notice that the issue of child support would be addressed at that March 21, 2005, hearing. As evidenced by the subject matter (permanency planning) of the September 22, 2004, hearing and resulting order, the March 21, 2005, hearing was scheduled to be a permanency plan review hearing pursuant to § 3-823(h) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The transcript from the March 21, 2005, hearing indicates the confusion resulting from the child support issue being raised without prior notice. Counsel for the father raised the issue of child support because the State still had not distributed the money from the August 5, 2004,  Pendente Lite Order. After a long, convoluted, discussion between the court, the father's counsel and the State, [25] the court determined that the father's child support contribution as per the August 5, 2004, order would satisfy his obligation and that he would have no further obligation to pay child support due to his incarceration, which would last beyond Katherine turning twenty-one. The court then addressed appellant's counsel, asking whether appellant was in a position to pay child support at the time. Counsel for appellant stated that appellant was not in a position to pay child support, but after addressing appellant personally, the court determined that she would be able to pay child support per the Guidelines. As we have indicated, counsel for appellant objected, stating that  we weren't scheduled to be here to determine whether she has a child support obligation.  (Emphasis added). The court then entered the order over counsel's continuing objection. Finally, on April 13, 2005, the court denied appellant's March 24, 2005, Motion for Reconsideration of the order to pay child support. It is evident from the facts in the case sub judice, that appellant was not given adequate notice, appropriate to the facts and nature of the case, that the matter of child support would be addressed at the March 21, 2005, permanency plan review hearing. Appellee argues that appellant's July 21, 2004, Motion for Establishment of Child Support and the August 5, 2004,  Pendente Lite Order provide adequate notice that child support would be addressed. We disagree. The fact that appellant filed a Motion for Establishment of Child Support on July 21, 2004, does not put her on notice that the issue would be addressed at the March 21, 2005, hearing. That particular motion was addressed and disposed of at the July 22, 2004, hearing. In fact, the August 5, 2004, order indicates that the court found that subject to further review and/or Order of this Court, [Katherine's] Mother, [ appellant ], shall not be obligated to pay child support, either in arrears or prospectively because of her marginal income...  and that the matter of the parents' respective child support obligations on behalf of the child shall be subject to further review by this Court after December 31, 2004. (Emphasis added). A court is required to provide adequate and sufficiently specific notice of when the matter of child support will be reviewed. It failed to do so in this case. That the order was pendente lite does not, in and of itself, provide notice ad infinitum.