Opinion ID: 1898396
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The court committed error in affirming the decision of the school board which violated the statutory and constitutional rights of the appellant, Michael J. Spradlin.

Text: Mr. Spradlin contends that the school board proceedings violated his right to due process. He first argues, correctly, that he has a property interest in his employment with the school district. He was still under contract pursuant to state law when he was dismissed, and had an understanding with the school board that his contract would be renewed for the upcoming school year. Thus, he has established an expectancy in his continued employment which should be safeguarded by procedural due process. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Stewart v. Bailey, 556 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.1977); Roane v. Callisburg Independent School District, 511 F.2d 633 (5th Cir.1975); Cantrell v. Vickers, 495 F. Supp. 195 (Northern District Miss. 1980). What process is due has been explicitly set out in Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-111 (1972 & Cum.Supp. 1986). Mr. Spradlin makes no claim that the statute is unconstitutional or that the statutory procedure was not complied with. Rather, his argument is that he was denied due process because he was denied a fair and impartial hearing. This is so, he argues, because the school board had already determined to dismiss him when it informed him of his right to a public hearing, and because even though the board conducted the hearing through a hearing officer, the ultimate decision rests with the board based on the record, pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-111 (1972 & Cum.Supp. 1986). However, Mr. Spradlin requested a board hearing and agreed to the hearing-officer format. He made no complaint at the time of the hearing about the possibility of impartiality of the school board. This situation falls squarely under the case of Dampier v. Lawrence County School District, 344 So.2d 130 (Miss. 1977). In Dampier, a teacher made the same argument, and this Court first held that failure to make such objection at the hearing waives the point. Dampier at 131. Second, this Court analyzed the constitutional issue involved where a board acts both investigatively and adjudicatively. Citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975), this Court first established a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators. Dampier at 132. Next, the Court said that in order to rebut the presumption, the teacher must show that the board members had a personal or financial stake in the decision, or that there was some personal animosity toward the teacher. Id., quoting Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Educational Association, 426 U.S. 482, 96 S.Ct. 2608, 49 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976). Finally, this Court found that a showing that a board was involved in the events preceding the termination is not enough, absent a showing of either personal animosity, personal stake or financial stake in the decision, to overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity of board members in conducting the hearing and rendering the decision. Id. Accord Megill v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 541 F.2d 1073, 1079 (5th Cir.1976); Duke v. North Texas State University, 469 F.2d 829, 834 (5th Cir.1972). Mr. Spradlin makes no allegations that the board members had a personal or financial stake in their decision, nor does he show that there was any personal animosity towards him by board members. Therefore, we do not find that Mr. Spradlin's constitutional right to due process has been violated.