Opinion ID: 1799262
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The central issue in this case has always been whether Southerland was terminated by Hardaway in violation of the KEOA; for otherwise, she was terminable at will and had no cause of action for wrongful discharge. Production Oil Co. v. Johnson, Ky., 313 S.W.2d 411 (1958); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., Ky.App., 551 S.W.2d 811 (1977); cf. Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, Ky., 666 S.W.2d 730, 731 (1983). The operative language of KRS 207.150(1) is that which provides that an employer cannot discriminate against a person because of a disability unless the disability restricts that individual's ability to engage in the particular job or occupation for which he or she is eligible. Hardaway contends that Southerland's job required her to move equipment and furniture, including stoves and refrigerators, dig ditches, suction water out of flooded apartments, trim trees and bushes, plant flowers, sweep, mop and clean the laundry room, paint and wallpaper walls, install carpet, clean windows, remove storm windows, scrub tile floors on her hands and knees, and mow grass. Southerland acknowledged that she did, indeed, occasionally perform all of these functions on a voluntary basis prior to her injury. However, she steadfastly claimed and the jury obviously believed that these duties were not requirements of her job as apartment manager. In support of her claim, Southerland introduced into evidence a written job description prepared and furnished to her by Hardaway, which describes her duties as manager in great detail, but does not include any of the tasks described above. A fair reading of the job description indicates that the manager's job was to supervise and inspect others who actually performed those tasks. Southerland also produced two other former Hardaway apartment managers who testified that they were never required to and never did perform the tasks in question. In short, Southerland introduced evidence that although she performed the additional tasks on a volunteer basis, they were not within her job description; and although she could no longer perform those additional tasks after her injury, she could perform the tasks set forth in the job description. This evidence sufficed to avoid a directed verdict. Lovins v. Napier, Ky., 814 S.W.2d 921, 922 (1991). It also sufficed to satisfy the cold hard facts test set forth in Harker v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville, Ky, 679 S.W.2d 226 (1984), although Harker specifically limited that test as a special rule for age discrimination summary judgments. Id. at 229.