Opinion ID: 2390579
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Charge Self-Defense and Passion/Provocation Sua Sponte

Text: Perry contends that plain error occurred because of incomplete jury instructions prior to the guilt-phase deliberations. On the murder count the trial court charged the jury on knowing murder, aggravated manslaughter, and reckless manslaughter. Defendant argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court's failure to charge sua sponte passion/provocation manslaughter and self-defense violated his right to due process. We disagree. From the evidence, principally the statement of Arthur Perry, we cannot say plain error occurred when the court failed to charge the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter and self-defense. The facts of this case did not `clearly indicate' the appropriateness of th[ose] charge[s]. State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 295, 298, 486 A. 2d 833 (1985) (quoting State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 318, 419 A. 2d 406 (1980)). Because Perry's statement bears no indication that the defendant was reasonably provoked or subjectively impassioned, and offered only weak potential support for self-defense, the court did not err in failing to charge those sua sponte.
Murder is reduced to manslaughter if committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4b(2). Unlike aggravated assault or reckless manslaughter, which involve mental states different from knowing murder, passion/provocation involves mitigation of intentional murder because of the existence of objectively-reasonable provocation. State v. Grunow, 102 N.J. 133, 506 A. 2d 708 (1986). Passion/provocation manslaughter has four elements: the provocation must be adequate; the defendant must not have had time to cool off between the provocation and the slaying; the provocation must have actually impassioned the defendant; and the defendant must not have actually cooled off before the slaying. LaFave & Scott, [ Substantive Criminal Law ] § 7.10 at 255. The first two criteria are objective, the other two subjective. If a slaying does not include all of those elements, the offense of passion/provocation manslaughter cannot be demonstrated. [ State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402, 411, 568 A. 2d 879 (1990)]. Perry's statement could not support a finding that each of the four elements of passion/provocation manslaughter existed. Although we acknowledge and embrace the trend away from the usual practice of placing the various types of provocatory conduct into pigeon-holes, State v. Mauricio, supra, 117 N.J. at 414, 568 A. 2d 879 ( citing 2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 7.10 at 256), we nonetheless fail to see a clear basis in the record that would indicate that a reasonable person could have been provoked to murder under these circumstances. The victim, visibly agitated perhaps, spoke harshly to Perry. As he walked toward defendant, he pointed at him. The victim's exposed hands, pointing at Perry, held no weapon. However disturbing or irritating Redd's interruption of Perry's drug use was under those circumstances, it could not reasonably have provoked passion. Perry's statement, which details what occurred in his encounter with Redd, provided no basis for a passion/provocation manslaughter charge. In that statement, he recognizes relevant emotions, e.g., pump enough fear into [Redd] to make him shut up and wait, Redd's little rage, and his self-description as scared and panicked after Redd's death. Yet, nowhere does he describe any rage of his own nor would his careful application of a take-down and throttle lead to a conclusion that he lost control of his emotions and reason. State v. Crisantos (Arriagas), 102 N.J. 265, 278-80, 508 A. 2d 167 (1986) (absence of any evidence in the record of passion or extreme emotional disturbance coupled with very slight evidence of provocation consisting of verbal abuse and an attempt to strike the defendant warranted denial of passion/provocation jury charge). In State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 618-19, 562 A. 2d 1320 (1989), the Court noted the correctness of giving a passion/provocation instruction where defendant had given relevant testimony supporting it and counsel had argued it, even though the jury had ample basis in the record to reject that alternative. The converse is presented here in that no argument or evidence was proferred by defendant. The court had no basis in the record to accept such a charge. Sifted or otherwise, State v. Choice, supra, 98 N.J. at 298, 486 A. 2d 833, the record here could not support a finding by the jury or a charge by court, that Perry had killed Redd in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation. See State v. Crisantos (Arriagas), supra, 102 N.J. at 273, 508 A. 2d 167 (a court is not obligated, and indeed should not, instruct a jury to return a verdict that would clearly be unwarranted by the record).
The use of force against another in self-defense is justifiable when the actor reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion. N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4a. Self-defense requires an actual, honest, reasonable belief by a defendant in the necessity for using force. See State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 198, 478 A. 2d 364 (1984). In State v. Bowens, 108 N.J. 622, 532 A. 2d 215 (1987), the Court said: Generally, in order for a killer to have a perfect self-defense to homicide, he or she must: (1) be free from fault in bringing on the conflict with his or her adversary; and (2) reasonably, though not necessarily correctly, believe (a) that his adversary will, unless forcibly prevented, immediately inflict upon him or her a fatal or serious bodily injury, and (b) that the deadly force must be used upon the adversary to prevent him or her from inflicting such an injury. [ Id. at 628, 532 A. 2d 215 (quoting W. LaFave and A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law 583 (1972)).] Whether Perry's statement, the principal evidence on self-defense, clearly indicates that the victim exhibited any unlawful force toward defendant so as to cause defendant to have any reason to believe that his life was in danger presents a difficult question. See N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4a. After defendant and the victim had exchanged some heated words, the victim walked toward defendant with his finger pointed at him. Defendant found no weapon on the victim's body, and although defendant thought that the victim might have a gun, at no time did defendant ever say that he saw, or even thought he saw, the victim pull out a weapon. Defendant never stated that the victim struck him or tried to strike him prior to or during the struggle. Defendant, not the victim, started the fight. Defendant stated that because the room was narrow, he let the victim get close enough so that when he pointed at me, he was able to grab him; he threw the victim back over himself in a method he had learned in the Marine Corps. It was at that point that they scuffled for a few. The scuffle, it appears, was the result of the victim trying to break loose from defendant's stranglehold. He got limp for a few minutes, then he broke out into a rage as if he was trying to really get loose. I guess that's when he was losing his life. And I held him for another minute or so and he just collapsed; he died. See State v. Crisantos (Arriagas), supra, 102 N.J. at 274-75, 508 A. 2d 167 (to reduce murder to manslaughter, contest must have been waged on equal terms and no unfair advantage taken of deceased). The State further alleges that any belief defendant may have had that he was in immediate danger when the victim partially revived was unreasonable. The medical testimony revealed that the victim would have been pretty incapacitated and disoriented at that point. Defendant himself stated that he thought the victim had passed out shortly after initially being grabbed. We find it difficult to conclude that a jury reviewing all the evidence could find that defendant had reasonably believed that he had to strangle the victim to protect himself from unlawful force. Nonetheless, there are other statements in defendant's confession, such as the reason he applied the death grip (he thought it was either him or me, and [h]e came at me as if he had something) that might support a self-defense claim. Had defense counsel requested such an instruction or objected to its absence, we might conclude that the trial court should have charged self-defense. See State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 480, 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988) (noting that different levels of review will be used depending on whether the instruction was requested, citing Crisantos (Arriagas), or was not, citing Choice ). However, defendant did not request a self-defense charge. Under those circumstances in the face of non-compatible defense strategy, we cannot conclude that the trial court committed plain error in not charging self-defense sua sponte. Trial courts must carefully refrain from preempting defense counsel's strategic and tactical decisions and possibly prejudicing defendant's chance of acquittal. The public interest, while important, may not overwhelm defendant's interest in pursuing a legitimate defense in the complex setting of a criminal trial. Choice, supra, 98 N.J. at 300-01, 486 A. 2d 833. In Choice, we explained that although tactical decisions to forego such lesser-included-offense charges do not minimize the public's interest in the appropriate charge, a trial court nonetheless should be sensitive to the potential that such charges might prejudice a defendant's case with respect to a greater crime (as, for example, because additional evidence may then become relevant to the State's case), and make defendant's conviction for the greater crime more likely. We explained the distinction: In the former case [where the court should charge sua sponte ] defendant is concerned that by positing the manslaughter option, the court will allow a jury that might have acquitted defendant to choose a manslaughter conviction. In the latter case [where perhaps such a charge should not be given] defendant's concern is not that the introduction might preempt the possibility of acquittal, but that it will  because of the evidence it will engender  assure conviction of murder. [ Id. at 301, 486 A. 2d 833]. The same problems exist here. Defense counsel's strategy was to highlight the contradictions in defendant's statement and the paucity of corroborating evidence, and to argue to the jury that the State had not proven its case that defendant was present or participated in any way in the death of Jerome Redd. Hence, despite the arguable appropriateness of the self-defense charge, such a charge would have been directly contrary to defendant's position at trial, could have prejudiced his chances of being acquitted of knowing murder by emphasizing his presence at the murder scene, and would have forced counsel to have foresaken or altered his chosen strategy. In a close case, forcing counsel to incorporate defenses that pre-suppose the existence of the very fact his main method of defense contests destroys the credibility and coherence of the defense entirely. Our analysis of the duties of a trial judge must be seasoned by a degree of deference to defense counsel's strategic decisions. State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 92, 586 A. 2d 85 (1991). In sum, we re-affirm our position in State v. Choice, supra, 98 N.J. at 300, 486 A. 2d 833, that a trial court must be sensitive to the potential that charging lesser-included offenses could prejudice a defense to the more serious charges. Despite the public interest in offering such charges when appropriate, the trial court's failure to include a self-defense charge was not plain error, but rather fit into that latter case [where] defendant's concern is not that the introduction might pre-empt the possibility of acquittal, but that it will  because of the evidence it will engender  assure conviction of murder. Id.