Opinion ID: 4266371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reese’s Bane Act Claim

Text: Reese also claims that the district court erred when it granted post-verdict summary judgment to Defendants on his claim under California Civil Code section 52.1, known as the Bane Act. Reese asserts that the district court properly rejected the Defendants’ proposed jury instruction on his Bane Act claim and therefore Defendants are not entitled to a new trial. We disagree. The Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, 1987 Cal. Stat. 4544, was enacted in 1987 to address hate crimes. The Bane Act civilly protects individuals from conduct aimed at interfering with rights that are secured by federal or state law, where the 1 We also agree with the district court that the jury’s negative answer to Question 14 (“At the time Deputy Rose fired his shot, did it appear that Plaintiff posed an immediate threat of death or serious physical injury to Deputy Rose?”) was unhelpful to the judge’s legal question of whether any “reasonable” officer would have understood that the use of deadly force was at that time proscribed by clearly established Fourth Amendment excessive force law. As the district court noted, the question does “not specify from whose perspective it did appear that Reese posed an immediate threat of death or serious physical injury to Rose.” (Doc. 216 at 11). REESE V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 17 interference is carried out “by threats, intimidation or coercion.” See Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 741, 742 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). Section 52.1 “provides a cause of action for violations of a plaintiff’s state or federal civil rights committed by ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion.’” Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1).2 Claims under section 52.1 may be brought against public officials who are alleged to interfere with protected rights, and qualified immunity is not available for those claims. See Venegas, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 753. Reese alleged a Bane Act violation based upon the same facts as his Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. Before trial, Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that a Bane Act claim required a showing of threats, intimidation or coercion in addition to the elements required to establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district judge who ruled on the motion (who was not the trial judge) denied the motion based on Chaudhry, which held that section 52.1 “does not require proof of discriminatory intent” and “that a successful claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment provides the basis for a successful claim under § 52.1.” 751 F.3d at 1105. Likewise, at the conclusion of trial, the district court rejected Defendants’ proposed alternative California Civil 2 Chaudhry relied on Cameron v. Craig, 713 F.3d 1012, 1022 (9th Cir. 2013) for the proposition that “the elements of [an] excessive force claim under § 52.1 are the same as under § 1983.” Id. 18 REESE V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO Jury Instruction [CACI] 30663 on the Bane Act. In re-urging their position, Defendants argued that Reese’s proposed instruction eviscerates the requirement in CACI 3066 that additional elements are necessary to prove a Bane Act claim because his instruction is “essentially amounting to a passthrough where there’s a Fourth Amendment violation saying that if there’s a Fourth Amendment violation, there’s also a Bane Act violation.” The district court summarily explained that Defendants’ argument had previously been rejected on summary judgment and “I’m going to reject it too.” Therefore, the district court instructed the jury as follows: “If you determine that Plaintiff prevails on his Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Brown and/or Defendant Rose, then Plaintiff also prevails on his Bane Act claim against that Defendant or Defendants.” The jury found for Reese and against Deputy Rose and the County on the Bane Act claim. 3 The applicable 3066 instruction reads: [Plaintiff] claims that [defendant] intentionally interfered with [or attempted to interfere with] [his/her] civil rights by threats, intimidation, or coercion. To establish this claim, [plaintiff] must prove all of the following:
[plaintiff]/ [and][ plaintiff]’s property] [to prevent [him/her] from exercising [his/her] right [insert right]/to retaliate against [plaintiff] for having exercised [his/her] right [insert right]];]

factor in causing [plaintiff]'s harm. REESE V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 19 In their request for a new trial, Defendants claimed that the trial court erred when it declined to give their CACI 3066 instruction. In addition to reasserting the arguments made in their summary judgment motion, Defendants also attempted to distinguish Chaudhry from this case stating “contrary to Defendants in this case ‘[t]he City defendants [in Chaudhry] conceded in their brief . . . that a successful claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment provides the basis for a successful claim under § 52.1.’” The Defendants bolstered their position with several district court cases that held that the Bane Act does not apply to an allegation of excessive force without a showing that the act was done to interfere with a separate state or federal constitutional right. Thus, Defendants asserted that Chaudhry “does not equate to a correct application of § 52.1” and a new trial with a CACI 3066 instruction was required. Convinced by the Defendants’ arguments, the district court changed its mind. The court concluded that the Defendants were correct in their argument that their proposed instruction should have been given. The court pronounced that because the evidentiary record is complete on the Bane Act claim, rather than granting a new trial, the court would issue an amended judgment in favor of Defendants on the Bane Act claim. In explaining its ruling the district court stated that “California Appellate Court authority reveals: The Bane Act ‘requires a showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in [constitutional violation] itself.’” The district court found that the evidence in this case did not, therefore, support this Bane Act element. The court relied on Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles, which held that “where coercion is inherent in the constitutional violation alleged, 20 REESE V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO i.e., an overdetention in County jail, the [Bane Act] statutory requirement of ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion’ is not met” and that “[t]he statute requires a showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention itself.” 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839, 849 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). We find that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the Defendants. We note that at the time that the district court issued its sua sponte summary judgment order, it observed that “no California Appellate Court decision addressed whether excessive force alone - ‘the use of excessive force during an otherwise lawful arrest,’ - is sufficient to sustain a Bane Act violation[.]” (Doc. 216 at 27). Thus, the district court relied on what it determined were persuasive decisions, including Shoyoye, that explain that more is required. The district court’s reliance on Shoyoye is misplaced, however. First, Shoyoye is distinguishable from Reese’s excessive force claim because it involved a claim of wrongful detention. Chaudhry, upon which the prior court relied when it initially denied Defendants’ summary judgment motion, is an excessive force case. Moreover, Chaudhry was decided two years after Shoyoye and since the Chaudhry decision, district courts have largely interpreted it to mean that section 52.1 does not require a showing of “threats, intimidation and coercion” separate from an underlying constitutional violation. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 96 F. Supp. 3d 990, 999 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (distinguishing Shoyoye by interpreting it to apply only when the constitutional violation is unintentional); Boarman v. County of Sacramento, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1287 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (applying Chaudhry and holding that the plaintiff’s Bane Act claim based on excessive force survived summary judgment because the elements of such a claim REESE V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 21 under section 52.1 are the same as under § 1983); Barragan v. City of Eureka, No. 15-cv-02070-WHO, 2016 WL 4549130, at  (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2016) (agreeing with Chaudhry that the elements of an excessive force claim under § 1983 establish the elements of a Bane Act claim and that no additional elements are required). Although there are ample federal district court cases that interpret Chaudhry in a way that is contrary to the district court’s decision here, to be sure, the district court is not bound by those decisions. However, where “there is relevant precedent from the state’s intermediate appellate court, the federal court must follow the state intermediate appellate court decision unless the federal court finds convincing evidence that the state’s supreme court likely would not follow it.” Ryman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 505 F.3d 993, 994 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis omitted). Until recently, California’s appellate court guidance had not squarely addressed whether in an excessive force case the Bane Act requires a separate showing of coercion beyond that inherent in the use of force. Reese’s supplemental authority however, provides us with that guidance which we are now bound to apply. In Cornell v. City and County of San Francisco, the California Court of Appeal recognized that Bane Act claims are routinely alleged in Section 1983 claims under federal pendent jurisdiction and that “[t]he Bane Act’s requirement that interference with rights must be accomplished by threats[,] intimidation or coercion ‘has been the source of much debate and confusion.’” 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 356, 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (citations omitted). Thus, the court announced its endeavor to provide clarity. In so doing, the court examined Shoyoye’s conclusion that the section 52.1 22 REESE V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO claim required a showing of coercion independent of the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention at issue in that case. Concluding that Shoyoye was limited to cases involving mere negligence, the court in Cornell ruled that “[n]othing in the text of the statute requires that the offending ‘threat, intimidation or coercion’ be ‘independent’ from the constitutional violation alleged.” Cornell, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 383. The court agreed “that the use of excessive force can be enough to satisfy the ‘threat, intimidation or coercion’ element of Section 52.1.’” Id. at 382. Cornell also makes clear, however, that the Bane Act imposes an additional requirement beyond a finding of a constitutional violation. Cornell explained that “[p]roperly read, the statutory phrase ‘threat, intimidation or coercion’ serves as an aggravator justifying the conclusion that the underlying violation of rights is sufficiently egregious to warrant enhanced statutory remedies, beyond tort relief.” Id. at 383. Accordingly, Cornell held that “the egregiousness required by Section 52.1 is tested by whether the circumstances indicate the arresting officer had a specific intent to violate the arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable seizure.” Id. at 384. In so holding, Cornell adopted the specific intent standard established in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), for assessing criminal violations of federal civil rights.4 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 384–85. 4 Cornell acknowledged that Section 52.1 is civil, while the federal laws to which Screws applies, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, are criminal. 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 385. But given their structural similarities, Cornell concluded that, though “the burden of proof is fundamentally different in these two arenas . . . we see no reason why the applicable mens rea element ought to differ.” Id. REESE V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 23 Thus, based on the weight of this new state authority, and our obligation to consider the California Court of Appeal’s thorough analysis of its own law, we draw two conclusions as to the necessary showing for an excessive force claim under the Bane Act. First, the Bane Act does not require the “threat, intimidation or coercion” element of the claim to be transactionally independent from the constitutional violation alleged. Cornell, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 382–83. Second, the Bane Act requires a “a specific intent to violate the arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable seizure.” Id. at 384. We see no “convincing evidence that the state’s supreme court likely would not follow” Cornell in reaching these two conclusions. Ryman, 505 F.3d at 994. As to the requirement of coercion independent from the constitutional violation, Cornell correctly notes that the plain language of Section 52.1 gives no indication that the “threat, intimidation, or coercion” must be independent from the constitutional violation. See Cornell, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 383. Moreover, in the two California Supreme Court cases to apply Section 52.1 in the Fourth Amendment context, neither gave any indication of an independent coercion requirement. In Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, the California Supreme Court, in holding that a Section 52.1 plaintiff need not be a member of a protected class, found that plaintiffs had “adequately stated a cause of action under section 52.1” where they alleged warrantless, unconsented searches and unlawful detention. 87 P.3d 1, 3–4, 14 (Cal. 2004). In Jones v. Kmart Corp., the court held that the plaintiff could not bring a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against a private security guard because the lack of a state actor meant there was no constitutional violation, but did not suggest that some coercion independent 24 REESE V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO of the alleged excessive force was required. 949 P.2d 941, 942, 944 (Cal 2004).5 Similarly, the specific intent requirement articulated in Cornell is consistent with the language of Section 52.1, which requires interference with rights by “threat, intimidation or coercion,” words which connote an element of intent. This is also reflected in California’s model jury instruction, CACI 3066, which characterizes a Bane Act claim as one by the plaintiff that the defendant “intentionally interfered with [or attempted to interfere with] [his/her] civil rights by threats, intimidation, or coercion.” CACI 3066 (emphasis added); see also Cornell, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 387 (approving use of CACI 3066 because it “properly focused the jury on intentional violation of Cornell’s right to be free from unreasonable seizure”). As above, we observe that the Fourth Amendment claims asserted in Venegas and Jones are not inconsistent with Cornell’s approach. Though we have previously stated that “the elements of the excessive force claim under § 52.1 are the same as under § 1983,” Chaudhry, 751 F.3d at 1105 (quoting Cameron, 713 F.3d at 1022), we do not read those cases as contradicting the intent requirement articulated in Cornell. In Cameron, we noted that the plaintiff “assert[ed] no California right different from the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment,” 713 F.3d at 1022, and so concluded that the 5 To the extent that we previously followed Shoyoye in concluding that “a plaintiff in a search-and-seizure case must allege threats or coercion beyond the coercion inherent in a detention or search,” Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178, 1196 (9th Cir. 2015), we are now guided by Cornell to interpret Shoyoye’s holding as limited to cases involving mere negligence, see Cornell, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 381–82. REESE V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25 elements of the excessive force claim were the same, citing our prior observation in Reynolds v. County of San Diego that “[s]ection 52.1 does not provide any substantive protections; instead, it enables individuals to sue for damages as a result of constitutional violations.” Cameron, 713 F.3d at 1022 (quoting Reynolds, 84 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds, Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997)). Thus, Cameron was concerned with the nature of the elements of the predicate constitutional violation asserted under § 1983 and the Bane Act, but did not address whether the Bane Act required some showing of intent in addition to showing the constitutional violation. Chaudhry had no occasion to address the issue either, as the defendants there conceded that the elements were the same. 751 F.3d at 1105. Applying these principles here, we conclude that the district court’s jury instructions were erroneous. The district court instructed the jury that if Reese prevailed on his Fourth Amendment claim, then he also prevailed on his Bane Act claim. But the jury did not consider Deputy Rose’s intent in its finding that he violated Reese’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (“[T]he ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is . . . whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”). As we have explained in applying the Screws specific intent standard to an excessive force violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242,6 “a mere 6 In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 242 applies to “Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to 26 REESE V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO intention to use force that the jury ultimately finds unreasonable—that is, general criminal intent—is insufficient.” United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 885 (9th Cir. 1993). Rather, the jury must find that the defendants “intended not only the force, but its unreasonableness, its character as ‘more than necessary under the circumstances.’” Id. But it is not necessary for the defendants to have been “thinking in constitutional or legal terms at the time of the incidents, because a reckless disregard for a person’s constitutional rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of those rights.” Id. Because the district court’s Bane Act jury instruction did not require this inquiry into Deputy Rose’s intent, it was incorrect. The district court’s post-trial order correctly recognized that Defendants’ proposed jury instruction, CACI 3066, should have been given, see Cornell, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 386–87. In addition to giving an incorrect jury instruction, the district court erred when it issued its post-trial grant of summary judgment to Defendants on the Bane Act claim. The district court’s decision was based on an erroneous conclusion that the Bane Act required coercion independent from the constitutional violation. Although there was no evidence of coercion independent from Deputy Rose’s use of objectively unreasonable force, we cannot conclude from the record that, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Reese, no reasonable jury could find that Deputy Rose had a specific intent to violate Reese’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Nozzi v. Housing Auth. of City of L.A., 806 F.3d 1178, the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. . . .” REESE V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 27 1199–200 (9th Cir. 2015). The decision is therefore reversed and Reese’s Bane Act claim is remanded for a new trial.7 II. Defendants’ Cross-Appeals A. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) does not bar Reese’s claims. Prior to trial, Reese entered a “no contest” plea to a misdemeanor charge that he violated California Penal Code § 417(a)(1) for drawing or exhibiting a deadly weapon, other than a firearm, “in a rude, angry, or threatening manner,” thus disposing of his original charge of Assault with a Deadly Weapon.8 Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), “[w]hen a plaintiff who has been convicted of a crime under state law seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, ‘the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.’” Hooper v. County of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). If it would, the civil action is barred. Id.; see also Yount v. City of Sacramento, 183 P.3d 471, 484 (Cal 2008) (extending Heck to California state law claims). Defendants argue that Reese’s misdemeanor conviction bars his claims 7 The jury also found the deputy and County liable for battery under state law, and the damages award was therefore unaffected by the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the Bane Act claim, other than a reduction of $21,175.00 for past medical expenses that had already been paid on Reese’s behalf under the County Indigent Program. Because we do not reinstate the jury verdict on Reese’s Bane Act claim, we do not reconsider the district court’s denial of his motion for attorney’s fees and costs. 8 California Penal Code § 245(c). 28 REESE V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO because the claims necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. Reese counters that Defendants did not produce evidence at trial to show the factual basis for Reese’s no contest plea. Defendants rely upon Reese’s trial testimony, which they characterize as stating that he “displayed/brandished the knife when he opened the door, but denied it was angry or threatening, and could not say whether the manner of display was ‘not polite.’” Reese points out, however, that there are other instances of conduct that could have formed the factual basis for his misdemeanor conviction including evidence that he exhibited a knife to Brittany Shurtleff in an angry or threatening manner before the Deputies arrived. The district court found that even if Reese’s misdemeanor conviction was based on a finding of “rudeness,” his trial testimony did not invalidate that conviction finding.9 In addition, the district court found that Defendants failed to show that the victim or victims of the conviction were any of the officers involved in Reese’s action. We agree. Defendants have not demonstrated that Reese’s claims in this action are barred by Heck. Defendants have identified nothing in the record that shows the specific factual basis for Reese’s misdemeanor conviction. Without such information, this Court cannot determine that Reese’s claim of excessive force in this case would call into question the validity of his misdemeanor weapon conviction. See Smith, 394 F.3d at 698–99. The district court’s ruling is affirmed. 9 Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, that Reese denied raising the knife to Shurtleff in his civil trial testimony does not necessarily mean that this was not the basis for his criminal conviction. REESE V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 29 B. The jury’s award of $150,000.00 for future non- economic loss was supported by substantial evidence. Defendants challenge the district court’s ruling that upheld the jury’s award of $150,000.00 to Reese for future non-economic loss. They contend there was no evidence at trial of future non-economic losses. They argue that “[a]t most, the jury was shown a visible physical scar, but there was no testimony that future care was needed, no testimony that the scar caused any sort of anxiety, mental disturbance or other non-economic loss.” The district court cited two district court cases and a California Supreme Court case in determining that “[a]wards for non-economic damages, which included pain and suffering, can be supported by a finding of permanent scarring.” The district court then found that “[i]n light of Reese’s scarring, an inference can reasonably be drawn that he will continue to endure suffering” and that Defendants failed to show this portion of the judgment should be amended. “A jury’s verdict, including a damages award, must be upheld if supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 537 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1323 (2007). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion even if it is possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence.” Landes Const. Co. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833 F.2d 1365, 1371 (9th Cir. 1987). Substantial deference is afforded to a jury’s finding of the appropriate amount of damages. United States v. CB & I Constructors, Inc., 685 F.3d 827, 839 (9th Cir. 2012). 30 REESE V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO Reese showed the jury multiple scars on his body that resulted from the surgeries he underwent after being shot. Even if the only evidence in support of Reese’s noneconomic damages was his multiple scars and any inferences drawn therefrom, Defendants have not demonstrated it was error for the district court to conclude that was sufficient to uphold the amount awarded for non-economic damages. The district court’s decision on this issue is affirmed.