Opinion ID: 2163285
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The False Arrest Claim

Text: Weishapl's false arrest action is based upon claims that police officers, including appellee Officer Awkward, told him to leave his business establishment and threatened him with arrest if he returned. He contends that this deprivation of locomotion and freedom to move within the space of his own business premises established a prima facie case of false arrest and imprisonment and a reasonable jury could so find. `The gist of any complaint for false arrest or false imprisonment is an unlawful detention....' Dent v. May Dep't Stores, Co., 459 A.2d 1042, 1044 (D.C.1982) (quoting Clarke v. District of Columbia, 311 A.2d 508, 511 (D.C.1973)). The unlawful detention of a person without a warrant for any length of time whereby he is deprived of his personal liberty or freedom of locomotion ... by actual force, or by fear of force, or even by words constitutes false imprisonment.... In determining whether particular conduct constitutes false arrest or imprisonment it is not the subjective state of mind of the plaintiff but, rather, the actions or words of the defendant [which] must at least furnish a basis for a reasonable apprehension of present confinement. Id. (citations omitted). Rather than depending upon the subjective state of mind of the plaintiff, whether particular conduct amounts to false imprisonment depends upon the actions and words of the defendant, which must provide a basis for a reasonable apprehension of present confinement. Id. (citing Tocker v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 190 A.2d 822, 824 (D.C.1963)). Under District of Columbia law, a police officer may justify an arrest by demonstrating that `(1) he or she believed, in good faith, that his or her conduct was lawful, and (2) this belief was reasonable.' Gerry Scott v. District of Columbia, 322 U.S.App.D.C. 75, 81-82, 101 F.3d 748, 754-55 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1231, 117 S.Ct. 1824, 137 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1997) (citing District of Columbia v. Murphy, 631 A.2d 34, 36 (D.C.), aff'd on reh'g, 635 A.2d 929 (D.C.1993)). Although a police officer may justify the arrest on the basis of probable cause, the officer need not prove probable cause in the constitutional sense. Murphy, 631 A.2d at 36. It will be sufficient to defeat the claim if the officer can demonstrate that he had a good faith belief that his conduct was lawful and that such belief was reasonable. Id. (citing Sharon Scott v. District of Columbia, 493 A.2d 319, 322 (D.C.1985)) (other citations omitted). The fact finder must consider evidence of the officer's good faith from the perspective of the arresting officer, not of the plaintiff. Murphy, 631 A.2d at 36-37 (citing Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Kelly, 448 A.2d 856, 862 (D.C.1982) (other citation omitted)). Applying these principles, we consider whether Weishapl has a viable claim of false arrest or whether, at least, a genuine issue of material fact was raised as to the claim which precluded summary judgment in favor of appellees, Officer Awkward and the District. Weishapl argues that the police officer's admonition that he not go back in the premises or he could be arrested for unlawful entry constitutes a deprivation of freedom amounting to false arrest. We disagree. The undisputed evidence shows that during his police encounter with Officer Awkward, Sowers displayed papers to the officer, which Weishapl did not actually see, and that the officer refused to look at Weishapl's paper work or that Weishapl showed the officer documentation regarding his unsuccessful efforts to obtain a TRO related to the occupancy of the premises. [4] The officer told him that it was a civil matter and recommended that he stay out of the building. At some point the officer told him that he could be arrested for trespass if he entered the building. None of these actions constitute a restraint on Weishapl's liberty or freedom of movement such as to constitute a false arrest. Weishapl voluntarily complied with the officer's recommendation on those occasions, although he went back into the business establishment subsequently. Such voluntary actions are not a restraint or arrest of the person. See Bass v. Dunbar House, Inc., 161 A.2d 50, 51 (D.C.1960). They do not constitute force nor a threat of force which would support the claim of arrest. In Bass, a night clerk at a hotel was questioned about missing funds from the hotel by management personnel and the police at the hotel. Id. at 50-51. The police then requested Bass to go to police headquarters, and Bass drove himself there, where he was questioned by the police. At issue on appeal was whether a false arrest had occurred when the police requested Bass to go to police headquarters for questioning the day the financial loss was discovered. Id. at 54. This court held that he was not arrested in that he was under no warrant or other form of compulsion when he went to police headquarters. Id. There was no unlawful detention here. The police were confronted with two people claiming an interest in the same premises. A warning about a potential trespass charge to the one showing a failed attempt to regain possession is objectively reasonable from the perspective of the police officer. See Gerry Scott, supra, 322 U.S.App.D.C. at 81-82, 101 F.3d at 754-55. On this record, the trial court properly concluded that Weishapl failed to show any factual basis for a claim of false arrest. He failed to show that he was unlawfully detained or restrained against his will within boundaries fixed by the police. See District of Columbia v. Gandy, 450 A.2d 896, 900 n. 3 (D.C.1982). In Gandy, this court recognized that so long as the intrusion is reasonable, a claim for false arrest will not be actionable. See id. at 900. In light of the information with which Officer Awkward was presented, his conduct was reasonable as a matter of law. The police officers were confronted with two people claiming ownership to the establishment. According to Weishapl, Sowers was a con-artist who represented his ownership interest to everyone and who had the ability to make people believe him. Although Weishapl had a license and a lease, signed by him, but in the name of a corporation, he also presented the police officer with a court order denying his request for a TRO based on his claim to the right to occupy the building. The other person on the scene, Sowers, had called the police, was inside the building, and had at least some papers supporting his claim. In light of this conflicting information, the police imposed the most minimal restraint possible. They simply asked Weishapl not to return to the building until after the court had decided the matter. Therefore, on this record, the trial court properly granted summary judgment for Officer Awkward and for the District, since the District's liability was based upon respondeat superior. [5]