Opinion ID: 172539
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Protection of Ideas (Functionality and Merger Doctrines)

Text: E3 argues on appeal that Beck's claim must fail because it is an attempt to protect ideas rather than expression. E3 relies on § 102(b) of the Copyright Act, which states: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. E3 contends that Beck cannot protect [t]he ideas of disclaimer, qualification of assumptions and identification of risk factors that appear in Beck's reports. Aplee. Br. at 24. Applying the so-called merger doctrine, E3 argues that because these ideas may only be expressed in a limited number of ways, id. at 25, the ideas merge with the manner of expression so that the latterthe actual words used are not protected by the Copyright Act. Beck's words, says E3, are merely functional and unprotectable. Id. at 22. We will briefly discuss the legal concepts on which E3 relies. As will be apparent from that discussion, there is considerable force in E3's argument. Nevertheless, we are not persuaded that we should affirm its summary judgment on this ground. In fairness, Beck should have an opportunity to respond further in district court. We begin with functionality. When a work describes how to perform a task (a function), there is no copyright protection for the knowledge (the useful art) thereby conveyed. See Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes From the Scope of its Protection, 85 Tex. L.Rev. 1921, 1923, 1944-52 (2007) (discussing congressional intent that § 102(b) limit the scope of copyright protection in functional works). For example, using a bookkeeping method described in a text does not infringe the text's copyright. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 25 L.Ed. 841 (1879). Implicit in Baker is a recognition that excluding systems, methods, and useful arts from the scope of copyright's protection not only promotes the ongoing progress of science (that is, knowledge creation and dissemination), but also promotes ongoing innovation and competition in the marketplace. Samuelson, supra, at 1934. Protection for progress in the useful arts is through the patent process. See Baker, 101 U.S. at 102; Samuelson, supra, at 1932. What copyright protects is the language that an author uses to explain, describe, or express whatever ideas or useful arts she may have discovered or created ..., along with the artistic way in which an author draws or illustrates those ideas or useful arts.... Samuelson, supra, at 1936. The merger doctrine, however, limits even the protection for specific language. As stated in a leading treatise, when a given idea is inseparably tied to a particular expression, the convention is that there is merger between the two. 4 Nimmer on Copyright, supra § 13.03[B][3], at 13-86. In such instances, rigorously protecting the expression would confer a monopoly over the idea itself, in contravention of the statutory command. Id. This court has explained: The merger doctrine is applied as a prophylactic device to ensure that courts do not unwittingly grant protection to an idea by granting exclusive rights to the only, or one of only a few, means of expressing that idea. If protection were granted to these expressions, it would so increase the cost of creation for others who seek to build on the work that it would impede progress in the arts. Such a result is contrary to the goals of copyright as embedded in the Constitution. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir.1993) (citation omitted). As we understand E3's argument, it is combining the notions of functionality and merger to say (1) that Beck's complaint relates only to an alleged copying of functional elements of its reportsthe concepts of disclaiming liability, qualifying assumptions, and identifying standard risk factors with respect to the reported findings and conclusions, Aplee. Br. at 24, and (2) that there are only so many ways to express a disclaimer of liability, etc., [3] so that Beck's form of expression is not protected. We note that other circuits have denied protection to similar writings. See Veeck v. S. Bldg.Code Congress Int'l, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc) (denying copyright protection to local building code); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir.1967) (denying copyright protection to rules in a promotional sweepstakes contest). Nevertheless, we believe the better course is to decline to rule on whether the language in Beck's reports is protected. Although E3 raises the issue in its appellate brief and the district court's ruling devoted a sentence to the issue, see Aplt.App., Vol. II at 606 (Utilitarian statements disclaiming liability, qualifying assumptions, or identifying risk factors in a consulting engineer's report are not protected by copyright.), E3 did not make this argument in district court. Indeed, E3's motion to dismiss contained one footnote expressly stating that it was not relying on any idea rather than expression argument. Id., Vol. I at 40-41 n. 7. And a second footnote stated that some language in the Beck reports appeared to be functional but, for the purposes of its motion, E3 presumed that the language was protected. Id. at 41 n. 8. Given E3's statements, Beck had no reason to present evidence or argument relevant to this protectability issue in district court. As a general matter, we do not consider issues that were not raised below. See Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 495 F.3d 1162, 1170 (10th Cir. 2007); cf. Hoiles v. Alioto, 461 F.3d 1224, 1236 (10th Cir.2006) (court has discretion to affirm on any ground supported by record if doing so is fair to appellant).