Opinion ID: 1743425
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timeliness of the Postjudgment Motion

Text: Williams argues that the trial court erred in denying her postjudgment motion on the basis that it was untimely filed. She maintains that the copy of the motion that the clerk's office received on January 7, 1999, was a sufficient filing and was timely. Williams argues that Ex parte Tuck, on which BIC relies, does not support the trial court's conclusion that her motion was untimely filed. We agree. The facts of this case are distinguishable from those of Ex parte Tuck. In Tuck, the defendant Herbert D. McKay sent a copy of a notice of appeal by fax to the Talladega County courthouse. The Court of Civil Appeals held that McKay's notice of appeal, transmitted by fax within 14 days, satisfied the requirement of § 12-12-70(a), Ala.Code 1975, that an appeal from the district court to the circuit court be filed within 14 days. McKay v. Tuck, 622 So.2d 926, 928 (Ala.Civ.App.1992). However, Judge Robertson pointed out in his special writing that, because there was no facsimile machine in the circuit clerk's office, McKay's attorney sent a copy of the notice of appeal and security for costs by fax to another office in the Talladega County courthouse, with a cover sheet asking the recipient to take the document to the circuit clerk's office. 622 So.2d at 928 (Robertson, P.J., concurring in the result). McKay advised the circuit clerk's office that he was mailing the original motion the same day. Id. at 927. This Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' holding that a faxed copy of a notice of appeal would be accepted as a properly filed notice of appeal, but it held that McKay's facsimile filing would be considered as timely, but for purposes of that particular appeal only. Ex parte Tuck, 622 So.2d at 930. The Court ruled that after July 31, 1993, it would not recognize facsimile filings except as they might be specifically authorized by rule or statute. Id. Citing Ex parte Tuck, BIC contends that the trial court correctly held that Williams's motion was not timely filed, relying on the contention that she transmitted the motion to the court by fax. BIC maintains that the court received Williams's actual motion 31 days after the trial court had entered its judgment on the jury's verdict, one day beyond the 30 days allowed under Rule 59(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. The Supreme Court of Tennessee also has refused to accept filings by facsimile transmission. In Love v. College Level Assessment Servs., Inc., 928 S.W.2d 36 (Tenn.1996), that court examined several factors in determining that a facsimile transmission of a notice of appeal is not sufficient to constitute a filing. Scarlett Love sued Nursing Careers and College Level Assessment Services, Inc. (the assessment program), seeking, among other things, rescission of a contract between her and the assessment program. Id. at 37. The trial court entered a judgment for Love. Id. On the last day allowed for an appeal, the assessment program sent the trial court a copy of a notice of appeal, by fax. Id. Love filed a motion to dismiss the assessment program's appeal, arguing that the assessment program did not file a notice of appeal with the trial court during the statutorily required period. Id. Apparently the trial court clerk had assured the assessment program that the faxed copy of the notice of appeal would be treated as an original. Nevertheless, the trial court denied Love's motion to dismiss the appeal. Id. In determining that the facsimile transmission of the notice of appeal was not sufficient to perfect an appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reasoned that counsel should refrain from using facsimile transmissions for filing court documents until uniform rules and procedures had been established to govern the use of facsimile transmissions. Id. at 38-39. The court agreed with Love's arguments that facsimile filing should not be allowed in the absence of a specific rule. Id. at 38. The court listed a number of reasons for not accepting filings by fax. Id. First, the court stated that Love was correct in stating that timely perfecting of an appeal is no mere technical formality. Id. Second, the court noted that, although facsimile transmission is a common, reliable method of transmitting information, a number of problems could arise if the courts allowed facsimile filings. Id. For example, the court questioned whether a facsimile transmitted after the normal closing time of the clerk's office should be deemed as filed that day or as filed the next day. Id. The court also noted that problems could arise when the facsimile machine had mechanical difficulties and it questioned whether the transmitting party should be required to present a transmittal sheet, whether the clerk's office should charge a transmittal fee, and whether a party should be allowed to file by fax a document that requires a filing fee. Id. While the Supreme Court of Tennessee raised legitimate questions about facsimile filing that could pose problems, none of those problems is an issue in this case. Williams filed a postjudgment motion, not a notice of appeal. Most important, Williams did not send the motion to the Talladega County circuit clerk's office or some other office in the courthouse by facsimile. Her attorney sent a copy of her postjudgment motion to a Talladega attorney, who hand-delivered a paper copy of the motion to the circuit clerk's office. Therefore, questions regarding mechanical difficulties, a transmittal sheet, and the business hours of the clerk's office are irrelevant in this situation. In addition, a postjudgment motion does not require a filing fee, unlike a notice of appeal. It is undisputed that Williams did not send a copy of her motion to the Talladega County circuit clerk's office by facsimile transmission, but, instead, had a local attorney physically deliver and file a paper copy of it. The filing of that paper copy on January 7, 1999, was timely.