Opinion ID: 4115556
Heading Depth: 2
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Heading: Whether Goethel Was a Person Acting Under the

Text: Direction of a Physician When He Drew Kozel's Blood ¶33 Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305, known as the implied consent law, Village of Elm Grove v. Brefka, 2013 WI 54, ¶19, 348 Wis. 2d 282, 832 N.W.2d 121, amended by 2013 WI 86, 350 4 The State argues that suppression is not required even if Goethel did not comply with Wis. Stat. § 343.305(5)(b), as long as the blood draw that occurred was constitutionally reasonable. We need not resolve that issue in light of our conclusions today. See Walworth State Bank v. Abbey Springs Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 2016 WI 30, ¶13 n.7, 368 Wis. 2d 72, 878 N.W.2d 170 (Typically, an appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds. (quoting Maryland Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15)). This opinion should not be read to address the issue. 15 No. 2015AP656-CR Wis. 2d 724, 838 N.W.2d 87, governs the testing of a motorist's breath, blood or urine, for the purpose of determining the presence or quantity in his or her blood or breath, of alcohol, controlled substances, controlled substance analogs or other drugs, or any combination of alcohol, controlled substances, controlled substance analogs and other drugs. Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2). We examine a single, narrow aspect of the procedures set forth in the implied consent law, Brefka, 348 Wis. 2d 282, ¶19, namely the set of individuals authorized to draw blood under the statute. ¶34 Section 343.305(5)(b) provides in relevant part: Blood may be withdrawn . . . to determine the presence or quantity of alcohol, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog or any other drug, or any combination of alcohol, controlled substance, controlled substance analog and any other drug in the blood only by a physician, registered nurse, medical technologist, physician assistant or person acting under the direction of a physician. Wis. Stat. § 343.305(5)(b) (emphasis added).5 The State argues that this requirement is fulfilled because Goethel drew blood 5 The legislature recently amended the language at issue in this case. See 2013 Wis. Act. 224, § 3. The statute now reads, in relevant part: Blood may be withdrawn . . . to determine the presence or quantity of alcohol, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog, or any other drug, or any combination of alcohol, controlled substance, controlled substance analog, and any other drug in the blood only by a physician, registered nurse, medical technologist, physician assistant, phlebotomist, or other medical professional who is (continued) 16 No. 2015AP656-CR under the direction of Dr. Mendoza. Kozel contends that the evidence introduced by the State was insufficient to establish compliance with the statute. There appears to be no dispute, nor any reason to dispute, that Goethel is a person and that Dr. Mendoza is a physician within the meaning of § 343.305(5)(b). Thus, the only question is whether Goethel was acting under the direction of Dr. Mendoza when he drew Kozel's blood. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to show that Goethel was a person acting under the direction of a physician. Id. ¶35 [W]e have repeatedly held that statutory interpretation 'begins with the language of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.' Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citations omitted) (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659). The court of appeals below relied on a definition of direction taken from Webster's Third New International Dictionary: guidance or supervision of action, conduct, or operation. Kozel, unpublished slip op., authorized to draw blood, or person acting under the direction of a physician. Wis. Stat. § 343.305(5)(b) (2013-14) (emphasis added). 17 No. 2015AP656-CR ¶13 (quoting Direction, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 640 (1993)). This definition is adequate for our purposes. ¶36 The evidence below showed that Dr. Mendoza, the medical director of BDAS of at least seven years, specifically authorized a standing order for BDAS EMT intermediate technicians such as Kozel to perform blood draws when requested to do so by law enforcement. A standing order is an instruction or prescribed procedure in force permanently or until specifically changed or canceled. Standing order, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2224 (1993). Dr. Mendoza's authorization was formalized in a writing which also contained his confirmation that the EMTs had completed extensive training regarding the procedures and legalities of obtaining blood draws. Finally, Goethel was able to contact Dr. Mendoza if necessary when performing a blood draw. ¶37 This evidence demonstrates that BDAS EMTs are acting under Dr. Mendoza's direction. The concept of direction reasonably contemplates varying degrees of proximity between a director and the person whose actions he or she guides rather than a single, set relationship applicable in all cases. Had the legislature envisioned only one manner of direction, it would have spelled out the specific procedures that a physician and the person he or she directs must follow to meet that requirement. See State v. Penzkofer, 184 Wis. 2d 262, 266, 516 N.W.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1994) ([T]he legislature could have chosen to require the test to be taken by or taken in the presence of a 18 No. 2015AP656-CR physician, but it did not.); cf., e.g., Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissing petition for review) (Had Congress intended a more general meaning, it would have used more general words.). ¶38 If Dr. Mendoza had trained the BDAS EMTs himself, ordered each blood draw on a case-by-case basis, and personally observed each individual blood draw, there would likely be no dispute that the EMTs were acting under Dr. Mendoza's direction. But blood draws are routine affairs, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 n.13 (1966) (quoting Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957)), and nothing in Wis. Stat. § 343.305(5)(b) prevents a physician from supervising such standard procedures in a more streamlined fashion. Thus, instead of training the EMTs on his own, Dr. Mendoza satisfied himself that the EMTs had completed extensive training regarding the procedures and legalities of obtaining blood draws and made that fact known to others in his writing. Instead of ordering each blood draw on a case-by-case basis, Dr. Mendoza issued a standing order authorizing EMTs to draw blood when requested to do so by law enforcement. And instead of personally observing each individual blood draw, Dr. Mendoza allowed EMTs to perform blood draws on their own, but made himself accessible by telephone should any problems arise. ¶39 The testimony below leaves no doubt that it is Dr. Mendoza who is in charge of blood-drawing activities conducted by BDAS EMTs. To require more evidence than what the State provided below to establish that Goethel was acting under 19 No. 2015AP656-CR the direction of Dr. Mendoza would be to require a specific type or degree of direction where the statute at issue does not so specify. We will not read into the statute a limitation the plain language does not evidence. Cty. of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶33, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571. The court of appeals erred in concluding otherwise. B. Whether Kozel's Blood Was Drawn in a Constitutionally Reasonable Manner ¶40 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states though the Fourteenth Amendment, e.g., State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶18, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)), provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV.6 Virtually any 'intrusio[n] into the human body' will work an invasion of 'cherished personal security that is subject to constitutional scrutiny.' Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013) 6 We have historically interpreted the Wisconsin Constitution's [Article I, § 11] protections in this area identically to the protections under the Fourth Amendment as defined by the United States Supreme Court. State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶14, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97 (citing State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶18, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598). We will reference only the Fourth Amendment in this opinion. 20 No. 2015AP656-CR (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770; then quoting Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973)). Consistent with this principle, the taking of a blood sample . . . is a search under the Fourth Amendment. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016). ¶41 Nevertheless, [t]he Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1969 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768). ¶42 In Schmerber the Supreme Court assessed the constitutional reasonableness of a blood draw of a drunk driver, characterizing the applicable issues as whether the police were justified in requiring petitioner to submit to the blood test, and whether the means and procedures employed in taking his blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758-59, 768. After concluding that a warrant was not required in that case, id. at 768-71, the Supreme Court briefly examined the State's means of testing the defendant's blood-alcohol content and manner in which the test was performed. Id. at 771-72. With regard to the State's means of testing, the Supreme Court explained: Extraction of blood samples for testing is a highly effective means of determining the degree to which a person is under the influence of alcohol. Such tests are a commonplace in these days of periodic physical examination and experience with them teaches that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for 21 No. 2015AP656-CR most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain. Id. at 771 (citation omitted). In a footnote, the court remarked: The blood test procedure has become routine in our everyday life. It is a ritual for those going into the military service as well as those applying for marriage licenses. Many colleges require such tests before permitting entrance and literally millions of us have voluntarily gone through the same, though a longer, routine in becoming blood donors. Id. at 771 n.13 (quoting Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 436). With regard to the manner in which the test was performed, the Court concluded: [T]he record shows that the test was performed in a reasonable manner. Petitioner's blood was taken by a physician in a hospital environment according to accepted medical practices. We are thus not presented with the serious questions which would arise if a search involving use of a medical technique, even of the most rudimentary sort, were made by other than medical personnel or in other than a medical environment——for example, if it were administered by police in the privacy of the stationhouse. To tolerate searches under these conditions might be to invite an unjustified element of personal risk of infection and pain. Id. at 771-72. ¶43 Kozel argues that certain material differences between the blood draw that occurred in this case and the blood draw that occurred in Schmerber require suppression of evidence. Specifically, Kozel simply maintains that the State failed to establish that the manner in which the State drew his blood——by an EMT in a jail rather than by a physician in a hospital 22 No. 2015AP656-CR environment according to accepted medical practices, id. at 771——was constitutionally reasonable. We reject this argument.7 ¶44 First, it was not unreasonable for an EMT, as opposed to a physician, to draw Kozel's blood. We need not resolve the parties' dispute over whether Goethel technically qualifies as a medical professional or a paraprofessional. The important point for constitutional purposes is that the evidence demonstrated that Goethel was thoroughly trained and experienced in properly drawing blood. Additionally, if any medical issues arose for which Goethel was not equipped, Goethel had access to physicians who could assist. The Schmerber Court explained with regard to blood testing that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain. Id. at 771. Its concern——though it did not decide the issue——was that procedures made by other than medical personnel . . . might . . . invite an unjustified element of personal risk of infection and pain. Id. at 772. We fail to see how performance of such an everyday 7 Kozel does not argue that other differences between the circumstances in Schmerber and those in this case require suppression, and we do not comment on them. See generally Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760-63 (2013) (discussing the list of items considered by the Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), as relevant to the constitutionality of the blood test that occurred in that case, including the ordinary requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the extent to which the procedure may threaten the safety or health of the individual, the extent of intrusion upon the individual's dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity, and the community's interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence). 23 No. 2015AP656-CR procedure by a licensed, certified EMT unjustifiably increases such a risk. The evidence presented showed the opposite. Nor do we conclude that the State's failure to introduce specific protocols for drawing blood mandates a different result, where Goethel testified as to his training in drawing blood, the specific procedures he was taught to follow, and the fact that he followed those procedures in this case. The circuit court's finding that Kozel's blood was drawn in accordance with medically accepted procedures is not clearly erroneous. ¶45 Second, it was not unreasonable for the blood draw to occur in the non-medical setting of the jail. As the trial court explained, the evidence indicated that the room in which Kozel's blood was drawn was clean and as clean as a hospital emergency room. Further, Goethel used a new blood draw kit containing a sterile needle. While some non-medical settings—— indeed, some jails——might invite an unjustified element of personal risk of infection and pain, Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772, the evidence presented by the State dispelled any such fears as to the particular room in the particular jail at issue. See State v. Daggett, 2002 WI App 32, ¶14, 250 Wis. 2d 112, 640 N.W.2d 546 ([W]e reject Daggett's assertion that blood draws must take place in a hospital setting in order to be constitutionally reasonable. Although Schmerber urged caution, it did not categorically reject the possibility that a blood draw could take place in a non-medical setting. (citation omitted)). 24 No. 2015AP656-CR ¶46 Finally, we would be remiss if we failed to mention the lack of evidence that Kozel ever objected to the particular circumstances of the blood draw. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 (Petitioner is not one of the few who on grounds of fear, concern for health, or religious scruple might prefer some other means of testing . . . .); cf. Tullberg, 359 Wis. 2d 421, ¶31 (A warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw of a suspected drunken driver complies with the Fourth Amendment if: . . . (4) the suspect did not reasonably object to the blood draw.). ¶47 In sum, the blood draw that occurred in this case was constitutionally reasonable. See, e.g., State v. Johnston, 336 S.W.3d 649, 651-53, 655, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (blood draw in blood-draw room at police station by police officer certified as an intermediate EMT assisted by police officer certified as a basic EMT held constitutionally reasonable), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 212 (2011).