Opinion ID: 23590
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: racial and age discrimination under title vii, the adea, and the tchra

Text: 12 The district court first addressed the Title VII claims, evaluating Evans's racial discrimination allegation pursuant to the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See id. at 802. The district court found that, to do so, a plaintiff must show (1) that she belongs to a racial minority; (2) that she applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that, despite her qualifications, she was rejected; and (4) that, after her rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of the complainant's qualifications. See id. 13 The court held that Evans could not meet the third prong of the test, finding that simply because she had the requisite educational qualifications for the promotion and simply because she received a letter of commendation from her supervisor, she had not made a prima facie showing that she was rejected despite her qualifications. The court held further that Evans failed to make a prima facie showing on prong four of the McDonnell Douglas test, finding that she had not addressed the issue in anything other than in a conclusory fashion. By determining that Evans had failed to make out even a prima facie case of discrimination, the district court decided that there was no need to address the remainder of the McDonnell Douglas framework. 14 The district court then evaluated Evans's age discrimination claim under the ADEA, employing this court's analytical framework as announced in Meinecke v. H & R Block, 66 F.3d 77 (5th Cir. 1995). According to the district court, to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must show (1) that she was a member of the protected class (being over forty years old); (2) that she was qualified for the position; (3) that she was discharged; and (4) that she was either replaced by someone outside the protected class, replaced by someone younger (but nevertheless over forty), or otherwise discharged because of her age. See id. at 83. The district court held that Evans failed to meet prongs two, three, and four. The court found that Evans had not shown that she was qualified for the Nurse III position. 1 The court also held that, as a matter of law, a demotion could not satisfy the third prong of the prima facie showing because only an actual discharge would suffice. Lastly, the court found that Evans had failed to provide any evidence on the fourth prong of the test. 15 Finally, the district court examined Evans's claim of employment discrimination under the TCHRA. The court first found that Evans exhausted her administrative remedies, as is required under the TCHRA. The court then held that the TCHRA is coextensive with Title VII and the ADEA. Cervantez v. Bexar County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 99 F.3d 730, 734 n.6 (5th Cir. 1996); Schroeder v. Tex. Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Tex. 1991). The court referenced its earlier findings and holdings with respect to Evans's Title VII and ADEA claims and granted summary judgment for the City.
16 We conclude that the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the City on Evans's discrimination claims. Claims of racial discrimination under Title VII, 2 age discrimination under the ADEA, 3 and racial and age discrimination under the TCHRA 4 are all evaluated within the same analytical framework. See LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 1996) (Title VII); Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1993) (ADEA); Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex. 1996) (TCHRA). The district court correctly identified the framework as the one announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 17 The Supreme Court developed the McDonnell Douglas scheme to deal with cases in which discrimination can be proved only by circumstantial evidence. In such cases, a plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case of discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000); see also Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000). In this case, Evans can establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination by showing (1) that she was a member of a protected class, i.e., a member of a racial minority for her Title VII and TCHRA claims; (2) that she was qualified for the position of Nurse III; (3) that she was demoted despite her qualifications; and (4) that after the demotion, the job remained open, and applications were accepted. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Russell, 235 F.3d at 223-24. Furthermore, for a prima facie case of age discrimination, the factors essentially remain the same; however, a plaintiff must show for the first factor that she was over the age of forty when the discrimination occurred, and the fourth factor requires that the plaintiff demonstrate that she was replaced by someone outside her protected class, someone younger, or was otherwise discharged because of age. See Russell, 235 F.3d at 223-24. 18 If a plaintiff is successful in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the defendant to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for its actions. See Russell, 235 F.3d at 222. If the defendant can articulate a reason that, if believed, would support a finding that the action was nondiscriminatory, the 'mandatory inference of discrimination' created by the plaintiff's prima facie case 'drops out of the picture' and the factfinder must 'decide the ultimate question: whether [the] plaintiff has proved [intentional discrimination].' Id. (alterations in original) (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511-12 (1993)). In making her showing on this ultimate question, the plaintiff can rely on evidence that the employer's reasons were a pretext for unlawful discrimination, id., and the factfinder may still consider the evidence establishing the plaintiff's prima facie case 'and inferences properly drawn therefrom[.]' Id. (quoting Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2106). 19 The Supreme Court has recently stated that [i]n appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2108. Thus, a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated. Id. at 2109; see also Russell, 235 F.3d at 224 (finding Russell provided sufficient evidence to create a jury issue that [the employer's] justification was pretextual). 20 In the instant case, we need not address the issue whether the district court erred in finding that Evans had not satisfied the prima facie showings for discrimination claims under Title VII, the ADEA, and the TCHRA, because even if she had established a prima facie case of discrimination, we find that Evans has produced no substantial evidence to support her contention that the City's legitimate nondiscriminatory justification 5 for her demotion was, in fact, a pretext for racial or age discrimination. In the context of a claim of discrimination, a plaintiff must adduce evidence that the justification was a pretext for racial and age discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805 (In short, on the retrial respondent must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision. (emphasis added)). Instead, the summary judgment evidence advanced by Evans goes solely to her claim of retaliation. Evans has submitted no evidence that the true reason behind the City's decision to demote Evans was that of racial or age discrimination. Therefore, we agree that summary judgment should have been granted against Evans on these claims. 21