Opinion ID: 543072
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Garcia's statements

Text: 9 Appellant avers that any statement made by him was the product of the inherent coercion present in any airport encounter with officials. He also alleges that under the circumstances, his statements before or after the waiver were neither spontaneous nor voluntary. He further contends that the government failed to prove that appellant voluntarily signed the waiver form. Finally, he avers that the court's failure to suppress appellant's post arrest statements was not harmless error. 10 The evidence presented at trial established that the initial questioning was conducted as a routine Customs Service stop after deplaning. It is undisputed that once appellants interrogation proceeded to the point of seeking incriminating evidence, the customs officials read him his rights in Spanish, his native language, and made an effort to ensure that he understood them. We agree that the record is devoid of any suggestion that the agents resorted to physical or psychological pressure and/or that they asked appellant the amount of cocaine inside the amplifiers. The district court committed no reversible error. 11 Even if we were to find that the court erred, Rule 52(a) provides that any error which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). The rest of the evidence presented against appellant is so overwhelming that even if error were to have been committed, it would be deemed harmless. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Owens v. Treder, 873 F.2d 604 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Alexander, 835 F.2d 1406 (11th Cir.1988).