Opinion ID: 1970714
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the admission of trowbridge's 1979 juvenile adjudication.

Text: The trial court admitted Trowbridge's 1979 juvenile adjudication under D.R.E. 404(b) after an analysis of the standards established by this Court in Getz v. State, Del.Supr., 538 A.2d 726 (1988). In Getz, this Court held that the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts under D.R.E. 404(b) should be determined based on the following guidelines: (1) The evidence must be material to an issue or ultimate fact in dispute; (2) the evidence must be introduced for a purpose sanctioned by D.R.E. 404(b) or another purpose not inconsistent with the basic prohibition against such evidence; (3) the evidence proving the prior crime must be plain, clear, and conclusive; (4) the prior crime(s) must not be too remote in time; (5) the probative value of the evidence must be balanced against its unfairly prejudicial effect; and (6) the jury must be instructed regarding the limited purpose for the introduction of the evidence. Id. at 734. The trial judge found that the 1979 juvenile conviction, and particularly Trowbridge's statement that he did not know why he started the fire, was material to the issue of Trowbridge's motive, or lack thereof, for killing Chad. In addition, the trial judge concluded that the evidence was not too remote in time and that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. Trowbridge's 1979 juvenile adjudication occurred 12 years prior to the crimes with which he is presently charged. The substantial time interval between the two events raises a fundamental concern as to the relevance of the earlier incident. In discussing the remoteness guideline of Getz, this Court recently explained that: The degree of similarity between the two incidents necessary to prove [a permissible purpose under D.R.E. 404(b)] is thus inversely proportional to the time span between the two crimes. Commonwealth v. Shively, Pa.Supr. [492 Pa. 411], 424 A.2d 1257, 1259 (1981). [A] lengthy time lapse can render the evidence legally irrelevant. Temporal remoteness depreciates or reduces the probative value of the evidence. [Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 9:70, at 8-16 (1992)]. Allen v. State, Del.Supr., 644 A.2d 982, 988 (1994). We hold that the Superior Court abused its discretion by ruling that Trowbridge's 1979 juvenile adjudication was not too remote in time. As we observed in Allen: An act committed 12 years earlier is not as relevant as one committed more recently, and may not be relevant at all. While there is no bright line for determining whether an act is too remote, courts tend to analogize to the 10 year time limit contained in Rule 609(b) governing impeachment by evidence of conviction of a crime. Allen, 644 A.2d at 988. See also Loper v. State, Del.Supr., No. 580, 1992, order at 17, Moore, J., 1994 WL 10820 (Jan. 3, 1994) (ORDER) (holding that D.R.E. 609(b) was violated where over 10 years had passed since the prior convictions occurred and the State had failed to ask the trial court to determine whether their probative value of the convictions outweighed their prejudicial effect and had failed to give sufficient written notice of the State's intent to use the evidence). The passage of 12 years has completely eliminated the relevance of Trowbridge's 1979 juvenile adjudication, and the statement he made in connection therewith, to the offenses with which he is currently charged. Accordingly, the Superior Court's failure to consider the effect of the substantial time lapse on the relevance of Trowbridge's 1979 juvenile adjudication constitutes reversible error. We therefore REVERSE Trowbridge's convictions and REMAND the case for a new trial consistent with this opinion.