Opinion ID: 2025994
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: The Case for Repleading

Text: The applicable principle in this case is that a defendant cannot benefit from his own wrongdoing ( see Chiappa, supra ). Unlike Zumpano (decided today), many perpetrators were involved in Estate of Boyle and the alleged abuse involved more than 40 plaintiffs over a 25-year period. Given the extent and breadth of the alleged abuse, defendants should not benefit from the running of the statute of limitations. Defendants allegedly retained a number of unscrupulous priests for a long period of time. The facts and circumstances alleged, if true, demonstrate affirmative wrongdoing. While it is insufficient for the plaintiffs to make only general allegations of deception and misrepresentation, plaintiffs have asserted sufficient facts to permit another pleading that may permit this case to proceed. First, in paragraph 115 of the amended complaint, plaintiffs quote Bishop Wilton D. Gregory, former President of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, who stated: We are the ones, whether through ignorance or lack of vigilance, or  God forbid  with knowledge, who allowed priest abusers to remain in ministry and reassigned them to communities where they continued to abuse. We are the ones who chose not to report the criminal actions of priests to the authorities, because the law did not require this. We are the ones who worried more about the possibility of scandal than in bringing about the kind of openness that helps prevent abuse. And we are the ones who, at times, responded to victims and their families as adversaries and not as suffering members of the Church. Second, the amended complaint alleges sexual abuse by specifically named priests and alleges that these priests were transferred from place to place to avoid detection that they were sexual abusers. Third, while the allegations of a secret fund and payments to persons to prevent their publicizing abuse are not specific as to names, enough has been shown to permit a further pleading and perhaps discovery concerning these issues. Fourth, the claims of breach of a fiduciary duty cannot be ignored. Plaintiffs maintain that defendants had a fiduciary relationship with them and, thus, had a duty to protect them from sexual molestation ( see Wende C. v United Methodist Church, N.Y. W. Area, 4 NY3d 293, 299 [G.B. Smith, J., dissenting in part, 2005]). The majority concludes that it is not necessary to determine that question here. It further concludes that even if such a fiduciary duty existed, it would not prevent plaintiffs from making timely claims against the defendants. A claim of a breach of a fiduciary duty has been upheld against clergy persons in other jurisdictions ( F.G. v MacDonell, 150 NJ 550, 555, 696 A2d 697, 700 [1997]; Sanders v Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F3d 331 [5th Cir (Tex) 1998]; Destefano v Grabrian, 763 P2d 275, 284 [Colo 1988]). These cases all involved adults. In a proper case, however, a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty can be made against a person in a position of trust involving children. The issue of the fiduciary relationship between plaintiffs and defendants is an issue of fact to be determined at trial ( see EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]). A fiduciary relationship `exists between two persons when one of them is under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation' ( see id., quoting Restatement [Second] of Torts § 874, Comment a ). Whether or not a fiduciary relationship existed, coupled with whether or not the defendants were actively concealing abuse, are central to determining whether or not plaintiffs are prevented from pursuing claims against defendants. Defendants were the keepers of all information on the priests and were in the best position to provide the plaintiffs with the facts relevant to the abuse of the children, and to act on the abuse. Plaintiffs should not be barred from pursuing their claims if defendants had a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiffs, and misrepresentations and concealment are shown to be the reason for the delay in pursuing their claims. Finally, this is a case where anyone would wish the allegations did not exist. Since they have been made, the question is whether they are sufficient to permit the lawsuit to proceed. The allegations are sufficient to permit additional pleading. For all of the above reasons and specifically because there is alleged evidence of wrongdoing which would equitably estop defendants from asserting the defense of the statute of limitations, plaintiffs should be allowed to replead to demonstrate that defendants engaged in a pattern of deception, fraud, and misrepresentation which prevented them from filing a complaint within the statute of limitations period. In Zumpano v Quinn: Order affirmed, with costs. Chief Judge KAYE and Judges ROSENBLATT, GRAFFEO and R.S. SMITH concur with Judge CIPARICK; Judge G.B. SMITH dissents in part in a separate opinion; Judge READ taking no part. In Estate of Boyle v Smith: Order affirmed, with costs.