Opinion ID: 155821
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: admission of inculpatory statements

Text: 48 Petitioner next asserts he was denied his constitutional right to a full and fair hearing on the issue of the voluntariness of his inculpatory statements because the trial court made its voluntariness determination without allowing petitioner to testify. He further asserts that his inculpatory statements were made involuntarily, and therefore the trial court's admission of the statements violated his Fifth Amendment rights. 49 During petitioner's trial, the trial court conducted a voir dire hearing concerning the admissibility of petitioner's inculpatory statements to the police. Detective Miller testified as to the inculpatory statements made by petitioner and the circumstances under which petitioner made those statements. His testimony during voir dire was substantially the same as his testimony before the jury. 50 After Miller testified, defense counsel requested that the court permit petitioner to testify concerning the voluntariness of his inculpatory statements. The trial judge denied his motion, stating that he believed [t]hat goes farther than the voir dire examination that's been requested. The trial judge also stated that defense counsel had filed a motion to suppress the statements on voluntariness grounds months before and that counsel was way outside the time limit for putting on proof of this nature. 51 [A] defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession, and even though there is ample evidence aside from the confession to support the conviction. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Janoe, 720 F.2d 1156, 1164 (10th Cir.1983). Whether a confession is involuntary is a question of law which this court reviews de novo. See United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1466 (10th Cir.1993). 52 In Jackson v. Denno, the Supreme Court held that a defendant who objects to the admission of a confession on voluntariness grounds has a constitutional right to a fair hearing and an independent and reliable determination of voluntariness before the confession is allowed to be heard by the jury. See 378 U.S. at 376-77, 84 S.Ct. at 1780-81. At this hearing, both the underlying factual issues and the voluntariness of [the] confession [must be] actually and reliably determined. Id. at 380, 84 S.Ct. at 1782. 53 The usual remedy for failing to hold a hearing consistent with the requirements of Jackson v. Denno is to remand to the trial court for a new hearing on the issue of voluntariness. See id. at 393-94, 84 S.Ct. at 1789-90. A habeas petitioner is not, however, automatically entitled to a new hearing merely because he can point to shortcomings in the procedures used to decide the issue of voluntariness in the state courts. Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 451, 91 S.Ct. 485, 488, 27 L.Ed.2d 524 (1971). Instead, to be entitled to a new hearing on the voluntariness issue, petitioner must also show his version of events, if true, would require the conclusion that his confession was involuntary. Id. 54 A defendant's confession is involuntary if the government's conduct causes the defendant's will to be overborne and 'his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.'  United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1101 (10th Cir.1996) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2046-47, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1699, 137 L.Ed.2d 825 (1997). In determining whether the defendant's will was overborne in a particular case, the court examines 'the totality of all the surrounding circumstances--both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.'  Id. (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. at 2047). Relevant factors include the age, intelligence, and education of the suspect; the length of the detention and questioning; the use or threat of physical punishment; whether Miranda safeguards were administered; the accused's physical and mental characteristics; and the location of the interrogation. Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1466. In addition, the court must consider the conduct of the police officers. Id. 55 Our independent review of the record does not establish that petitioner's inculpatory statements were involuntarily given. Petitioner was advised of his constitutional rights before making the statements, and he initialed and signed a written statement and waiver of those rights. There was no suggestion that the police used violence or improper threats or promises to elicit petitioner's inculpatory statements. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, 18 S.Ct. 183, 186-87, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897) (holding confession may not be obtained by threats or violence, direct or implied promises, or improper influence); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1493, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964) (same). Although Detective Miller admitted to making false statements about fingerprint evidence found in Lori Lambert's home, such misrepresentations, without more, do not render an otherwise voluntary confession involuntary. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1424-25, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (holding interrogator's misrepresentation to suspect that his co-suspect had already confessed did not render suspect's subsequent confession coerced); see also Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1070 (6th Cir.1994) (holding officer's false statements that police had matched defendant's fingerprints to prints found in victim's van and that two witnesses had identified defendant did not render defendant's confession involuntary, and stating [a] defendant's will is not overborne simply because he is led to believe that the government's knowledge of his guilt is greater than it actually is); Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1051 (7th Cir.1992) ([O]f the numerous varieties of police trickery ... a lie that relates to a suspect's connection to the crime is the least likely to render a confession involuntary.). 56 Further, petitioner has not alleged any additional facts which, if proven true, would require the conclusion that his statements were made involuntarily. In suggesting that a new hearing would show that his statements were made involuntarily, petitioner raises a number of unanswered questions about the circumstances in which the statements were made. Petitioner asserts that his trial testimony concerning the [voluntariness] issue ... indicates a far more complicated and conflicting picture surrounding [his] statements than that described by Detective Miller. Petitioner suggests there was no satisfactory explanation as to why the police questioned him about the rapes when he went to the police station about an unrelated charge, nor is there an explanation in the record as to how petitioner came to be driven by Detective Miller in a police car to the scene of one of the rapes. Petitioner also suggests as additional grounds for his involuntariness claim the fact that the written statement was transcribed by Miller in [petitioner's] jail cell after [petitioner] had been incarcerated for the night [and] the fact that these statements occurred over a period of two days while [petitioner] was in custody. Petitioner finally states that he was a young man with limited education and no experience with the criminal justice system, trying to do the right thing by turning himself in on a breaking and entering charge.Petitioner's suggestion that, based on unanswered questions about the circumstances in which the statements were made, there may be facts to support an involuntariness claim is insufficient to establish his right to a new hearing on the voluntariness issue. In addition, the matters he does reference, even if taken as true, do not require the conclusion that his inculpatory statements were made involuntarily. We therefore conclude that petitioner is not entitled to a new hearing on the issue of the voluntariness of his inculpatory statements and that the statements were properly admitted at trial.