Opinion ID: 2127545
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Material Change of Circumstances

Text: Hunt's final argument is that he sufficiently demonstrated two changes justifying termination of Perry's visitation rights: (1) the change in the constitutional landscape of the Grandparent Visitation Act since entry of the court's visitation order based on Seagrave and Linder ; and (2) proof of sexual abuse by Perry. He also maintains that the circuit court erroneously relied upon the Arkansas State Police investigation and report which were improperly admitted into evidence. Perry was not charged, but he asserts that the report and the investigation were conducted looking toward the standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas all he needed to prove for a material change of circumstances is that sexual abuse occurred by a preponderance of the evidence. He further takes issue with the fact that the trial court permitted Terry Ward to testify in the place of Renae Tisdale, who was the investigator for the State Police. This court has previously rejected Hunt's argument that a change in circumstances warranting a modification of visitation occurred due to the change in legal viability of the grandparent-visitation statute following the Seagrave and Linder decisions. In Hunt I , this court observed: We again reiterate that Greg's argument that the legal changes to the GPVA following our decisions in Linder and Seagrave are not the type of changed circumstances that warrant modification of the visitation order. 355 Ark. at 315, 138 S.W.3d at 663. Accordingly, this point has already been decided. With regard to the allegations of Perry's sexual abuse of Seth, this court applied the following standard for reviewing Hunt's claims of a change in circumstances in Hunt I : In reviewing chancery cases, we consider the evidence de novo, but will not reverse a trial court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Hamilton v. Barrett, 337 Ark. 460, 989 S.W.2d 520 (1999); Jones v. Jones, 326 Ark. 481, 931 S.W.2d 767 (1996). We give due deference to the superior position of the trial court to view and judge the credibility of the witnesses. Noland v. Noland, 330 Ark. 660, 956 S.W.2d 173 (1997). This deference to the trial court is even greater in cases involving child custody, as a heavier burden is placed on the trial judge to utilize to the fullest extent his or her powers of perception in evaluating the witnesses, their testimony, and the best interest of the children. Hamilton, 337 Ark. 460, 989 S.W.2d 520. 355 Ark. at 315, 138 S.W.3d at 663. Using this standard and evaluating the testimony, we cannot say that the circuit court's findings were clearly erroneous. Prior to the entry of its order, the circuit court ruled orally from the bench and said: I can't believe that Ms. Perry would fight as hard as she's fought for as long as she has fightand has fought to this point and two months later engage in sexual misconduct with these children. I simply find that to be highly incredible, especially given Dr. Shry's testimony, the examinations that were made; the MMPI's done, examination of her and the children some two months before. If somebody had such sexual deviants Iin their personality I think that that would have clearly been revealed and to say that it suddenly surfaced in two or three months, I simply don't find to be very credible. I think that Dr. Lowitz as well, and his testimony was, that he really hadn't examined the child enough toto come to any sort of opinion, you know, I canI can mitigate a little bit the March denial, but April I can't. We had the report of the state police. They simply say it's unsubstantiated and at that point we deny it and, then, even after denial wait to go see an expert to try [to] find something else. Every time we come up with something, something else is thrown up to deny the visitation. So, I canI can grant some leeway on the March, but I can't on the April. I just don't find that that's in good faith at all. We have no allegations as to the female child whatsoever and I can't find that it's in good faith on either month in that regard. You know, I think some of the testimony that was there that influenced the court was simply that, you know, that Dr. Lowitz's testimony is that the efforts of Mr. and Mrs. Hunt areare designed towards uniting their family and that to the exclusion of Ms. Perry andand others that they see are thwarting their efforts to unite these five as a group. You know, thisthis young child, everybody knows, we brought him in yesterday and for a five-year old there's no way that I can allow him to testify. I don't think he's near competent enough to do that in a court of law. When asked what would happen if he didn't tell the truth in court he said I would spank him, you know, granted he may get spankings at home, but that'sdoesn't show any near comprehension of the seriousness of what we're here for. So, I don't think that wewe needed to hear from him.... It is obvious that the weight given to most of the testimony presented to the circuit court turned on the credibility of the witnesses. Again, this court gives due deference to the superior position of the trial court to view and judge the credibility of the witnesses. See Hunt I, supra . This is especially true in custody determinations, as a heavier burden is placed on the circuit judge to utilize his or her powers of perception to the fullest extent in evaluating the witnesses, their testimony, and the best interest of the children. See Hunt I, supra . Here, the circuit court evaluated the testimony and made a credibility determination. After our review, we disagree with Hunt that the circuit court's denial of Hunt's petition to terminate grandparent visitation was clearly erroneous. As to Hunt's assertions of evidentiary error, this court reviews evidentiary errors under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Huff, 347 Ark. 553, 65 S.W.3d 880 (2002). The circuit court has broad discretion in its evidentiary rulings; hence, the circuit court's findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. See id. Hunt first challenges the circuit court's admission of testimony regarding the Arkansas State Police report, which was made following the Hunts' call to the sexual abuse hotline. Upon objection to the testimony by Terry Ward regarding the report, the circuit court allowed the testimony: Here's what we're going to do. I'mI'm going to let her testify to what's in the report. I have several basis [sic] for that. Number one is she is the supervisor, she's responsible, as she has said, it's part of her job training, duties, additives, expertise is to do this. It's a normal function of her office in the department of the state police of which she is employed. So, I think she's qualified to do that. She does it on a regular basis. As well I think this isfalls, to some extent, under the exception of [the] hearsay rule of records of regularly conducted business activity, although the state police is not a business, they-this particular unit is in the area of investigating these crimes and these are allegations of crimes and this is how they normally go about it and these are the reports generated in the normal course of those investigations and, then, reviewed and-by the supervisor with that authority she has done that and it would be admissible on that basis, as well. So, I'm going to let her testify.... Regarding the circuit court's second reason, Arkansas Rule of Evidence 803(8) permits the admission of public records and reports as exceptions to the hearsay rule, even when the declarant is available as a witness. The same subsection, however, specifically provides that neither police investigative reports nor factual findings resulting from a special investigation of a particular complaint are within the public records exception to the hearsay rule. The question then is whether the circuit court erred in receiving into evidence Renae Tisdale's investigative report through the testimony of her supervisor, Terry Ward. Certainly, the report itself would not pass muster for admissibility under the rule. Despite Rule 803(8), the circuit court also allowed Ms. Ward to testify about the Tisdale report for a second reasonher supervisory status. In Hess v. Treece, 286 Ark. 434, 693 S.W.2d 792 (1985), we said that the circuit court has considerable latitude under Ark. R. Evid. 803(24) to admit evidence that the court feels meets the spirit of the rule. Here, Ms. Ward testified that she was Ms. Tisdale's supervisor and that in her capacity as supervisor, she assigns investigative projects to staff and then reviews their work once it is completed. She stated that she review[s] the interviews, the summary of the interviews that [the investigator's] done and any other pertinent information that she obtains during the investigation prior to reaching a determination on the case. We note that Hunt had the opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Ward and did so. We further note that the circuit court only alluded to the state police's conclusion that the allegations were unsubstantiated in its oral findings at the end of the hearing. It did not refer to the investigation itself. Testifying to a report's conclusion over which Ms. Ward was integrally involved and has supervisory control does not run afoul of our hearsay rule. For this reason, we hold that the circuit court's admission of the testimony regarding the report did not constitute reversible error. As to Hunt's claim that the circuit court erred in not ordering Ms. Tisdale to appear in court, a review of the record reveals that Perry's counsel informed the court of Ms. Tisdale's absence due to the fact that she had previously received a subpoena for another hearing that same day. Perry's counsel then told the court that Ms. Ward had come in place of Ms. Tisdale. At the time counsel informed the court of this, counsel for Hunt did not object to Ms. Tisdale's absence. This court has routinely held that an appellant must object at the first opportunity to preserve the matter for appeal. See Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Foote, 341 Ark. 105, 14 S.W.3d 512 (2000). Because he failed to do so, this matter is not preserved for our review. See id. Affirmed. CORBIN and THORNTON, JJ., concur.