Opinion ID: 8866
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency Of The Evidence Presented.

Text: 70 In responding to the merits of the City's insufficient evidence claims, Polanco argues that he presented more than enough evidence to support the jury's finding that his nationality prompted the firing. Polanco claims that the record portrays McDonald's conduct as being far more worthy of discipline than his actions. Additionally, he alleges that the City's justification for the disparate treatment was not believable. Further, Polanco claims that he presented evidence of discrimination other than evidence regarding the disparate treatment that he and McDonald received. 71 We must evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence in an employment discrimination case using the three-tier McDonnell Douglas analysis: (1) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, (2) the burden shifts to the defendant to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, and (3) the burden returns to the plaintiff to prove that the reason was a pretext for discrimination and that the real reason was to discriminate. Marcantel v. Louisiana Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 37 F.3d 197, 199 (5th Cir.1994) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)). 72 The City concedes, and we agree, that Polanco has established a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden of production then shifted to the City to present a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. 73 Accordingly, we must determine whether the City satisfied its burden of production by articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for the disparate disciplines imposed on McDonald and Polanco. The employer satisfies the burden of production regardless of the persuasive effect of the proffered reason. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515-17, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2752, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). The City presented evidence that McDonald and Polanco were not similarly situated and that the differences warranted different charges. 4 The City portrayed Polanco as a very good investigator, who had an excellent record and an extraordinary memory. The evidence suggested that Polanco's memory regarding the written false confession should have been clear because it was the only murder that Polanco investigated during the relevant time period. Further, it was an homicide investigation on which he worked while assigned to another division. On the other hand, McDonald was an average policemen with a poor memory. McDonald usually had to rely on notes to trigger his memory and had to be coached extensively before testifying. Further, McDonald could have confused the investigation with other murder investigations in which he participated during the relevant time period. Additionally, there was testimony that Polanco was considered an expert investigator and possessed the duties of a supervisor, whereas McDonald was being closely supervised in his investigations because of his amateur status in the homicide division. We find that the City's evidence, demonstrating that the varying experience levels of the men prevented them from being similarly situated and warranted different charges for virtually the same offense, is sufficient to satisfy the City's burden of production. 74 Thus, the issue of sufficiency in this case rests entirely on whether Polanco has proven that the City's reasons for the disparate treatment was a pretext for discrimination against him and that the City discriminated against him. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515-17, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2752, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). The Supreme Court in Hicks explained that a plaintiff must prove both that his employer discriminated against him and that discrimination was a motivating factor in the treatment the plaintiff received. 75 The defendant's production (whatever its persuasive effect) having been made, the trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question: whether plaintiff has proven that the defendant intentionally discriminated against [him] because of his race.... The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and ... upon such rejection [n]o additional proof of discrimination is required.... 76 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. If the factfinder's verdict apparently rejects the defendant's proffered reason, enough evidence must exist in the record for the factfinder to infer that discrimination was the true reason for the disparate treatment. See Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir.1995) (en banc). 77 Accordingly, in the present case, the jury first had to reject the City's reason that McDonald and Polanco were not similarly situated. The evidence had to contradict the legitimacy of the City's explanation that the differences between Polanco and McDonald justified the different charges and penalties, such that the factfinder could reject the proffered reason. See EEOC v. Louisiana Office of Community Serv., 47 F.3d 1438, 1443-44 (5th Cir.1995). 78 Here, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the differences in memory capacity and experience were not as exaggerated as the City contended. McDonald began working on the APD in 1974, two years before Polanco. Even assuming that McDonald's memory was not as keen as Polanco's memory, his memory most certainly should have been jogged by the questions he answered during the trial of the first suspect (Jose Flores) in the Redman murder. A jury could believe that it was inexcusable for McDonald to have given a different answer to virtually the same line of questioning in the second suspect's trial (Ernest Perez), just twenty-one days later. A reasonable factfinder could find implausible the argument regarding the incompetence of McDonald's memory in light of the surrounding circumstances. 79 Similarly, a reasonable juror could have disregarded the City's arguments that the men were not similarly situated because Polanco had a motive to lie. The record shows that McDonald was no less culpable than Polanco. McDonald had begun taking a statement from Salazar. McDonald had possession of the false confession. McDonald should have supplemented the Redman file; he was in charge of the investigation, and he actually had the document. That McDonald probably had custody of Salazar's confession since it was obtained is a conclusion the jury could easily have reached. The envelope containing the confession bore McDonald's handwriting. McDonald found the envelope in his office. A jury reasonably could conclude that McDonald's harboring the false confession prevented him from wearing a badge of innocence. A reasonable and fair-minded juror could reach the conclusion that the alleged differences between the two men could not mask the fact that both men testified inaccurately and, therefore, committed the same offense. Thus, the jury could have properly rejected the nondiscriminatory reason articulated by the City that McDonald and Polanco were not similarly situated. A fact issue therefore existed regarding the City's true reason for treating Polanco and McDonald differently. See Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 994. 80 Having concluded that a reasonable jury could have rejected the City's nondiscriminatory reason, we still must evaluate the entire record to determine whether Polanco presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the City intended to discriminate against Polanco because of his national origin. Polanco had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the City's reasons were actually a pretext for discrimination. Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 958 (5th Cir.1993). In Rhodes, this court clarified the plaintiff's burden to produce sufficient circumstantial evidence to overcome judgment as a matter of law after the record reasonably allows the jury to reject the employer's proffered reason: 81 To sustain a finding of discrimination, circumstantial evidence must be such as to allow a rational factfinder to make a reasonable inference that age was a determinative reason for the employment decision. The factfinder may rely on all the evidence in the record to draw this inference of discrimination. In tandem with the prima facie case, the evidence allowing rejection of the employer's proffered reasons will often, perhaps usually, permit a finding of discrimination without additional evidence. Thus, a plaintiff can avoid summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law if the evidence taken as a whole (1) creates a fact issue as to whether each of the employer's stated reasons was what actually motivated the employer and (2) creates a reasonable inference that age was a determinative factor in the actions of which plaintiff complains. 82 Id. at 994. This court indicated that, under Hicks, the evidence in the record (taken as a whole) must create a fact issue regarding the reason for the employment action and must raise an inference of discrimination. If the evidence is such that fair-minded jurors would reach the same conclusion (i.e., that a fact issue is raised and that discrimination was the true reason), then the plaintiff has satisfied his burden even though he does not present any additional evidence on rebuttal. It is within these parameters that we will evaluate Polanco's evidence of discrimination. 83 We find that the record raises the necessary fact issue (as discussed above) and also allows a permissible inference of discrimination. Polanco testified that he did not intentionally testify inaccurately. Polanco said that he testified truthfully according to the information and beliefs he possessed at the time of trial. Further, he testified that he often refreshed his memory regarding a case by reading the case file shortly before testifying. Polanco said that he would not have testified the way he did if the confession had appeared in the case jacket with all the other information regarding the Redman case. 5 84 Additionally, evidence adduced at trial minimized the significance of the fact that the confession was false, and demonstrated that the falsity of a confession does not guarantee that it will be remembered. Polanco presented testimony from Officer Robert Martinez, who is the most decorated officer on the APD, that during his tenure in homicide he had taken confessions that turned out to be false. Similarly, Sergeant Gary Flemings, who handled the internal affairs investigation of Polanco, testified that he has taken between twenty-five and thirty confessions that he later discovered were false. Sergeant Michael Kimbro also testified that getting an untrue confession does not happen every day, but it happens. 85 Polanco's testimony that he did not independently recollect taking Salazar's statement was bolstered by testimony elicited on cross examination from defense witness Sergeant Michael Huckabee. Huckabee obtained the false written confession from Alex Briones in the highly publicized yogurt shop murders investigation. Polanco and a fellow officer had obtained a confession from Briones on tape; however, Huckabee reduced the confession to writing and had obtained Briones' signature. Despite the publicity, the falsity of the confession, and Huckabee's direct participation in eliciting the confession, he testified that he did not recall whether he had gotten a completed statement because he did not remember Briones signing the confession. Briones had, in fact, signed the false confession. Defense witness Huckabee made credible Polanco's story that he misremembered. A jury was, therefore, free to find that Polanco's testimony was inaccurate, but was not intentionally untrue. Further, Sergeant Gary Flemings clarified that inaccurate testimony is not synonymous with perjured testimony. 86 Polanco also exposed deficiencies in the evaluations conducted by the Disciplinary Review Board and Polanco's supervisors regarding McDonald's testimony. Polanco specifically sought explanations regarding McDonald's inaccurate testimony in the Perez trial, which was given twenty-one days after the Flores' trial. The following testimony was read repeatedly to the jury: 87 Q. Sergeant, did you take a written statement from Mr. Salazar? 88 A. No, sir. 89 Q. You just listened to what he had to say; is that right? 90 A. Yes, sir. 91 When questioned about McDonald's testimony in the Perez trial, some APD officials indicated that the testimony was not considered at all, while others gave ambivalent answers to explain why McDonald had not perjured himself by giving inaccurate testimony regarding information with which he should have been very familiar. When Darla Espinoza met with McDonald before the Flores trial, they discussed the incomplete statement that McDonald began. Further, McDonald testified about the partial statement just twenty-one days prior to the Perez trial. McDonald was well aware that he had done more than listen to Salazar when interviewing him. A reasonable factfinder could have rejected the less than satisfactory explanations regarding McDonald's inaccurate testimony. In sum, the evidence allowed a reasonable jury to conclude that the City's reason for charging Polanco with aggravated perjury while charging McDonald with bringing discredit, although both men were guilty of giving inaccurate testimony, was merely a pretext for discrimination. Both offenses warranted similar charges and penalties. The failure to give equal treatment to the same offense allowed the jury to assume the presence of mendacity. 92 Not only does the record contain evidence that the City's reason was a pretext for discrimination, Polanco also presented evidence of national origin discrimination from other officers. First, Polanco introduced testimony from Sergeant Carlos Botello, who worked in internal affairs for fourteen years, that the internal affairs investigation process is a biased procedure tainted by discrimination. Botello also identified aspects of the Polanco investigation that deviated from other investigations. For example, Botello said it was extremely unusual that internal affairs conducted an investigation of Polanco, who already had been investigated, after he was terminated. Botello also found suspicious the close investigation that took place between the district attorney's office and internal affairs. Normally, simultaneous investigations by the two entities remain completely separate, while in this case the district attorney and internal affairs coordinated their efforts. 93 Second, Polanco presented testimony regarding a pervasive discriminatory attitude toward Hispanic officers in the APD. He explained that this attitude was particularly exhibited by some of the men involved with the decision to suspend him. 6 Martinez testified that Lieutenant David Parkinson was very prejudiced against Hispanics. Parkinson treated Hispanic officers differently from Anglo officers and used racial slurs involving Mexicans. Martinez also testified that Robert Gross mishandled some disturbances involving Hispanics and treated Hispanic officers differently than Anglo officers. Further, Martinez testified that Deputy Chief Ken Muennick treated Hispanic officers differently than Anglo officers. Sergeant Rodrigo Herrera testified that Parkinson hid his prejudices against Hispanics. Herrera also said that Captain Bobby Shirley was prejudiced and suspended Herrera for five days because of his Hispanic heritage. Captain Juan Gonzalez also believed that he received a harsher discipline because of his ethnicity. 94 Finally, Polanco demonstrated that discrimination against Hispanics pervaded the quality and length of homicide investigations involving Hispanic victims. Officer Martinez discussed Lieutenant Parkinson's use of the term misdemeanor murders. He testified that Parkinson said, This Mexican here, this is a misdemeanor murder. And we don't need no overtime on this. We'll get on it tomorrow. Similarly, Parkinson instructed officers that they had only twenty-four hours to solve a minority's murder. Martinez explained: I have observed [Parkinson] not paying attention to Hispanic victims getting murdered, several times, and assigning detectives just for 24 hours and then giving them something else to do. In other words, I've heard him say that any time a Hispanic or black gets killed, it's misdemeanor murder, especially if they get killed in a bar room fight. For these reasons, the murders of minorities often remained unsolved. 95 The record demonstrates that there were two sides to this discrimination case. The jury heard both sides and chose to believe Polanco's view of the evidence. See Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1146 (5th Cir.1991). The jury has spoken. It is not within the province of this court to disturb a jury's finding which is supported by the record, even if this court would have been inclined to rule differently had the matter been presented to it in the first instance. This court explained in Wilson that when the jury chooses between two clearly identifiable factual stories in a discrimination case, the jury's verdict must be affirmed: 96 The jury heard both sides and the jury spoke. That is about all there is to say about age discrimination liability in this case. There were clearly two sides to this case. The jury chose to believe Wilson and his evidence; it did not believe Gozon and Monarch. Consequently, the jury's verdict on age discrimination is affirmed. 97 Id. We are, therefore, obligated to affirm the jury's verdict, provided that the record before us supports the jury's finding. 98 After a thorough review of the record, we are confident that sufficient evidence existed for the jury to reach the conclusion that the City's disparate treatments of McDonald and Polanco emanated from a discriminatory motive. See Purcell v. Seguin State Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950, 957 (5th Cir.1993) (noting that it is not unusual for a discrimination case to consist mostly of circumstantial evidence); and Ray v. Iuka Special Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 51 F.3d 1246, 1251 (5th Cir.1995) (acknowledging that even when the evidence is less than compelling, it is not the appellate court's role to weigh the evidence). 99 We reach this conclusion even though a significant amount of Polanco's evidence involved proof of discriminatory practices in the workplace. Evidence of the APD's hostile treatment of and attitude toward Hispanics is probative of whether Polanco was terminated because of his nationality. See Kelly v. Boeing Petroleum Servs., 61 F.3d 350, 358-59 (5th Cir.1995) (acknowledging the probative value of an atmosphere of discrimination). The APD's discriminatory treatment of Hispanic officers and victims has significant bearing on the issue of whether the same discriminatory motive affected the decisions concerning Polanco. Evidence of the discriminatory atmosphere and the biased investigation combined with the rejection of the City's proffered reason support the jury's finding of discrimination. Because sufficient evidence existed for reasonable, fair-minded factfinders to reach the same conclusion, we hold that the district court did not err in denying the City's motion for judgment as a matter of law. We, therefore, will not disturb the jury's determination that the City terminated Polanco because of his nationality. 100