Opinion ID: 811035
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adverse-Credibility Finding

Text: Maison argues that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the BIA’s adverse-credibility determination based on the BIA’s findings that (1) his father’s declaration about the July 1999 incident contradicted Maison’s testimony that he was alone when he was attacked, and (2) it was “implausible” that his father, a journalist and opposition reporter, did not write an article in the newspaper regarding the July 1999 attack on Maison. Further, the contradiction from the credible-fear interview regarding whether Maison had a brother should not, by itself, sustain an adverse-credibility finding because giving false information to immigration authorities to avoid deportation can be consistent with 4 Case: 12-10858 Date Filed: 10/31/2012 Page: 5 of 9 a fear of persecution. We review credibility determinations under the substantial-evidence test. Chen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1228, 1230-31 (11th Cir. 2006). The trier of fact determines credibility, and we may not substitute our judgment for that of the BIA with respect to credibility findings. D-Muhumed v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 388 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2004). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Agency’s decision and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that decision. Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). In fact, we will reverse the IJ’s credibility findings “only if the evidence compels a reasonable fact finder to find otherwise.” Chen, 463 F.3d at 1231 (internal quotation marks omitted). When the BIA issues a decision, we review only that decision, except to the extent that the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s decision. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). “Insofar as the Board adopts the IJ’s reasoning, [this Court] review[s] the IJ’s decision as well.” Id. Thus, to the extent that the BIA agreed with the IJ’s reasons for its adverse-credibility determination, we review both the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions. See id. An applicant for asylum must meet the INA’s definition of a refugee. INA § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). The definition of “refugee” includes: 5 Case: 12-10858 Date Filed: 10/31/2012 Page: 6 of 9 any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Thus, in order to meet the definition of a refugee, the applicant must, “with specific and credible evidence, demonstrate (1) past persecution on account of a statutorily listed factor, or (2) a well-founded fear that the statutorily listed factor will cause future persecution.” Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a)). Under the REAL ID Act of 2005, credibility determinations are based upon the totality of the circumstances, which may include inaccuracies or falsehoods that do not go to the “heart of the applicant’s claim.” See INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). An applicant must establish eligibility for relief from removal by offering credible, direct, and specific evidence. Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2005). We have held that the BIA may base an adverse-credibility determination upon credible-fear interviews. See, e.g., Shkambi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 584 F.3d 1041, 1049-52 (11th Cir. 2009) (upholding BIA’s adverse-credibility finding based upon inconsistencies in applicant’s 6 Case: 12-10858 Date Filed: 10/31/2012 Page: 7 of 9 testimony and his credible-fear interviews). We have also held that the resulting credibility finding must be supported by the record rather than “personal perceptions” or speculation and conjecture. Tang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 578 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009). As an initial matter, the BIA declined to address any of Maison’s arguments relating to the merits of his persecution claims in light of its credibility determination. (“Counsel has not established that the credibility finding contains clear error . . . . Consequently, the respondent is not eligible for asylum or withholding of removal.”). Accordingly, his arguments on appeal as to whether he demonstrated past or a well-founded fear of future persecution, are outside the scope of our review and will not be addressed. See Chen, 463 F.3d at 1231 n.4 (refusing to address the merits of a persecution claim because the IJ’s decision was based on an adverse-credibility determination). In this case, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s adverse-credibility determination. Specifically, the BIA found no clear error in the adverse-credibility determination based on the following findings by the IJ: (1) a discrepancy between Maison’s testimony and his father’s declaration regarding who was present during the July 1999 attack, (2) a discrepancy between Maison’s statement in the credible-fear interview that he had a brother and his testimony before the IJ that he 7 Case: 12-10858 Date Filed: 10/31/2012 Page: 8 of 9 had a sister and not a brother, and (3) the implausibility that his father did not write a newspaper article, when he was a reporter, about the July 1999 attack. As to Maison’s claim regarding his father’s declaration, the record supports the inconsistency because both parties agreed that the declaration stated that Maison’s father was present when Maison was attacked, whereas Maison testified that he was alone. The record also supports the BIA’s finding that there was a discrepancy between Maison’s statement in the credible-fear interview that he had a brother who left Guyana in fear and fled to Trinidad, and his testimony before the IJ that he had a sister, still living in Guyana, and not a brother. To the extent that the BIA’s and IJ’s finding with regard to the newspaper article is speculative, we “must affirm the BIA’s decision if it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Mehmeti v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 572 F.3d 1196, 1199 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a whole, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s and IJ’s adverse-credibility determination because the record supports both the discrepancy between Maison’s testimony and his father’s declaration, and the inconsistency between Maison’s testimony during his credible-fear interview and his testimony before the IJ. Therefore, Maison did not meet his burden of showing that the record compels reversal of the adversecredibility determination. See Chen, 463 F.3d at 1231. 8 Case: 12-10858 Date Filed: 10/31/2012 Page: 9 of 9 After reviewing the entire record, and after consideration of the parties’ appellate briefs, we dismiss in part, and deny in part, the petition for review. PETITION DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART. 9