Opinion ID: 1337448
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counsel for the Plaintiff Violated a Motion In Limine Ruling by the Trial Judge

Text: Prior to the trial in this case, the circuit court granted a motion in limine tendered by Dr. Sakhai. The motion in limine precluded any evidence or discussion to the jury regarding punitive damages. As grounds for his cross-appeal, Dr. Sakhai argued that the motion in limine order was violated. Consequently, the trial court should have granted his motion for a new trial. The majority opinion, after distorting what took place at trial, concluded that no basis existed for granting a new trial on this ground. A review of the actual violation of the motion in limine order clearly established that a new trial should have been granted. The following occurred during closing argument by counsel for plaintiff. Counsel for Plaintiff: Do something in this case to compensate the Foster family. Do something to send a message Counsel for Defendant: Objection. Judge: Your objection? Counsel for Defendant: It is a send a message. Counsel for Plaintiff: May I finish? Judge: Yes, but if you're going to finish the sentence, don't pause in the middle of it quite so long. Counsel for Plaintiff: Do somethingCompensate the Foster family and do something [to] send the message to Dr. Sakhai. Counsel for Defendant: Objection, Your Honor. Judge: Sustained. That's improper. Clearly, counsel for plaintiff violated the motion in limine order by expressly suggesting to the jury to return a verdict that would send a message. On May 25, 2001, this Court filed the opinion of Honaker v. Mahon, 210 W.Va. 53, 552 S.E.2d 788 (2001). Honaker carved out principles of law relating to motions in limine. In Honaker, the plaintiff appealed an adverse jury verdict. One issue presented by the plaintiff on appeal was that the defendant introduced evidence in violation of the trial judge's ruling on a motion in limine. This Court crafted two syllabus points on the issue of a violation of a motion in limine order: 5. A deliberate and intentional violation of a trial court's ruling on a motion in limine, and thereby the intentional introduction of prejudicial evidence into a trial, is a ground for reversing a jury's verdict. However, in order for a violation of a trial court's evidentiary ruling to serve as the basis for a new trial, the ruling must be specific in its prohibitions, and the violation must be clear. 6. In deciding whether to set aside a jury's verdict due to a party's violation of a trial court's ruling on a motion in limine, a court should consider whether the evidence excluded by the court's order was deliberately introduced or solicited by the party, or whether the violation of the court's order was inadvertent. The violation of the court's ruling must have been reasonably calculated to cause, and probably did cause, the rendition of an improper judgment. A court should also consider the inflammatory nature of the violation such that a substantial right of the party seeking to set side the jury's verdict was prejudiced, and the likelihood that the violation created jury confusion, wasted the jury's time on collateral issues, or otherwise wasted scarce judicial resources. The court may also consider whether the violation could have been cured by a jury instruction to disregard the challenged evidence. Syl. pts. 5 & 6, Honaker. In Honaker, we applied the above principles and reversed the adverse jury verdict and granted the plaintiff a new trial. In the instant proceeding, Dr. Sakhai, as a defendant, now seeks the protection of Honaker. The majority opinion denied to Dr. Sakhai the well-reasoned principles of Honaker. Clearly, Dr. Sakhai has satisfied Honaker. The trial court issued a motion in limine order precluding evidence or argument to the jury on the issue of punishing Dr. Sakhai with a punitive verdict. Counsel for the plaintiff not only once, but twice, violated that order. The jury returned a verdict in an amount that can only be justified as punitive. In spite of this, the majority opinion has concluded that Dr. Sakhai, as a defendant, is not entitled to the benefits of Honaker. Our law must apply with equal force to both plaintiffs and defendants. We should not have two sets of rulesone set of rules for plaintiffs and a different set of rules for defendants.