Opinion ID: 1823510
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A dominant and controlling relationship

Text: For Pirtle and Prchal to survive a summary-judgment motion, there must be substantial evidence indicating that Tucker's influence over Miller was dominant and controlling in the relationship. In considering what evidence satisfies this requirement, this Court has held on numerous occasions that the fact that a beneficiary controls the personal, business, and household affairs of a testator is evidence of a dominant and controlling influence. Hayes v. Apperson, 826 So.2d at 804 (reversing judgment for proponent of will). The evidence shows that Tucker provided Miller's sole means of transportation at the end of his life and that Miller was dependent on Tucker for two meals and his medicine each day. Tucker helped Miller pay his bills, ultimately gained power over Miller's financial affairs, and used that power to transfer certificates of deposit worth over $200,000, which benefited himself. Tucker accompanied Miller into his doctors' examination rooms and cared for Miller when he was released from the hospital. During the month preceding the execution of his will, Miller was hospitalized twice; during the first hospitalization, he exhibited signs of confusion, disorientation, and an unwillingness to comply with the hospital staff. Miller had poor eyesight in the months preceding his death and had difficulty reading. Tucker's wife prepared Miller's will and a power of attorney for Miller in Tucker's favor. Tucker did not always inform Miller's family members when he was hospitalized, and after the will was executed, Tucker used the power of attorney to issue a do-not-resuscitate order and to instruct the hospital staff to notify only him when Miller was admitted or released. The evidence thus shows Tucker's control over Miller's financial and numerous of his personal affairs. When that evidence is coupled with the evidence of Miller's diminished mental state during his hospitalization the month preceding the execution of the will, a jury could determine that Tucker's influence in the relationship was dominant and controlling. See, e.g., Hayes, 826 So.2d at 804; Allen v. Sconyers, 669 So.2d at 117. Furthermore, although the events occurred after Miller signed the will, we note that the transfer of the certificates of deposit and the do-not-resuscitate order certainly show a controlling influence by Tucker. This Court has recognized that whether the beneficiary was the dominant party in the relationship is usually a question of fact for the jury, and the jury may review the often circumstantial evidence as to whether there were controlling influences over the testator's behavior. Sconyers, 669 So.2d at 117; see also Ex parte Helms, 873 So.2d 1139, 1148 (Ala.2003). Accordingly, although no single piece of evidence in this case is alone sufficient to withstand summary judgment, when taken together the evidence constitutes substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tucker had a dominant and controlling influence in his relationship with Miller. Thus, summary judgment was not appropriate.