Opinion ID: 2570707
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: officer hansen's suspicion about the ownership of the vehicle

Text: ¶7 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.' State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App 262, ¶ 12, 988 P.2d 7 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always `the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular government invasion of a citizen's personal security.' Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). Accordingly, although the Fourth Amendment does not protect against all searches and seizures, it does protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985). Moreover, [c]itizens do not surrender the protections of the Fourth Amendment simply because they are in an automobile. In fact, stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute[s] a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief. State v. Biggs, 2007 UT App 261, ¶ 9, 167 P.3d 544 (quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994)) (second alteration in original) (internal citation omitted). ¶8 In determining the reasonableness of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, three constitutionally permissible levels of police stops have been outlined. State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991). A level one encounter occurs when a police officer approaches a citizen and asks questions, but the person is not detained against his will and remains free to leave. A level two encounter occurs when a police officer temporarily seizes an individual because the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. Finally, a level three stop occurs when a police officer has probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and effects an arrest of the suspect. Biggs, 2007 UT App 261, ¶ 10 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). ¶9 A brief, investigatory stop of a vehicle constitutes a level two encounter, for which only reasonable, articulable suspicion is required. Id.; see also State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶¶ 35, 37, 63 P.3d 650. To determine whether a level two stop is reasonable, we apply a two-part test. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994). The first step is to determine whether the police officer's action [was] justified at its inception. Id. at 1131-32 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the second step, we must determine whether the detention following the stop was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Id. at 1132. Because Applegate does not challenge the scope of the detention following the initial stop, we only address the first prong of the test. ¶10 Under the first prong, a routine traffic stop is justified at the inception if the stop is incident to a traffic violation committed in the officers' presence. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A police officer need not actually observe a violation. Instead, as long as an officer suspects that the driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic . . . regulations, the police officer may legally stop the vehicle. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, while an officer may not initiate a stop based merely on a hunch that an individual is violating the law, he also does not have to completely rule out innocent conduct prior to making the stop. See State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, ¶ 17, 112 P.3d 507. ¶11 In this case, Applegate argues that it was unreasonable for Officer Hansen to suspect that she was the owner of the vehicle. Moreover, she argues that because she was not the owner of the vehicleand therefore not required to have the vehicle registered in UtahOfficer Hansen lacked reasonable suspicion that she was in violation of the traffic laws, thus rendering the stop improper. In other words, because she was not in violation of the traffic laws at the time Officer Hansen initiated the stop, it was per se unreasonable. We disagree. ¶12 As it turned out, it is true that Applegate was not in violation of the traffic laws at the time Officer Hansen stopped her vehicle. Officer Hansen was not required, however, to rule out innocent conduct prior to the stop. Instead, he was only required to reasonably suspect that Applegate was violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic . . . regulations. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. Officer Hansen suspected that Applegate was violating the traffic laws because (1) he observed Applegate-and only Applegatedriving the vehicle for several months prior to the stop; (2) he observed that the plates on the car were from Colorado but knew that Applegate worked and resided in Moab; and (3) he believedcorrectlythat an individual who works and resides in Utah has an obligation to register their vehicle in the state within sixty days of their arrival. While there are rare circumstances to the contrary, it was reasonable for Officer Hansen to assume that as the only driver of the vehicle, Applegate was also the owner of the vehicle and was therefore required to properly register it. Indeed, the facts available to [Officer Hansen] at the moment of the [traffic stop] warrant[ed] a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly denied Applegate's motion to suppress.