Opinion ID: 1718159
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Krinhop Matter

Text: Nancy Krinhop retained Brehmer to represent her in an eviction/unlawful detainer proceeding begun by Dennis Strid in July 1999, and also in a related civil matter. Brehmer failed to properly serve the parties involved, and on February 16, 2000, the housing court ordered that issuance of a writ of restitution allowing Strid to evict Krinhop would be stayed for 20 days to allow Krinhop to properly serve Strid. If Krinhop properly served Strid within the 20-day period, the court would extend the stay until final resolution of the separate civil matter. On March 15, 2000, the day after the court's 20-day deadline, Brehmer called the court and told the judge's law clerk that Strid's attorney consented to service by mail and Brehmer mailed the complaint within the 20-day period. Brehmer's statement was false, but the court relied on his false statement and voided the writ. On March 28, 2000, Brehmer had Strid properly served. The court conducted a hearing on March 30, 2000 and ordered Brehmer to provide proof that he properly served Strid within the original 20-day period. Brehmer did not respond, and the court vacated the March 16 order and allowed Strid to enforce the writ of restitution allowing Strid to evict Krinhop. At the referee's July 28, 2000 hearing, Brehmer presented evidence that he suffers from depression. He testified that since before 1980 he has frequently been in therapy for depression. Brehmer's psychologist, Robert Subby, testified that he was Brehmer's therapist off and on since 1992. Subby testified that he currently sees Brehmer individually once each week, and Brehmer also attends an every-other-week men's support group. Subby characterized Brehmer's two psychological disorders as a dysthemic disorder and a generalized anxiety disorder. Subby defined Brehmer's dysthemic disorder as an overshadowing sense of blueness, downness, glum. Subby defined Brehmer's generalized anxiety disorder as anxiety, a general sense of fear, of difficulty concentrating, reactivity,    and a general fear that, you know, things are not going to go away. Subby recommended psychiatric care and medication for Brehmer. Subby then testified that Brehmer began improving after he began taking antidepressant and anxiety medication. Subby also testified that Brehmer's condition was never at the level of a disability as a category of diagnosis, and that Brehmer's condition was also never chronic depression. On cross-examination, Subby again testified that Brehmer was affected by his psychological disorder, but his disorder was not disabling. Subby also testified that Brehmer continues to blame his misconduct on the stressors in his lifethe dissolution of his marriage, the custody battle over his daughter, and the current professional misconduct investigationand still has not accepted responsibility for his actions. Stubby also testified that Brehmer's problems with timeliness began improving sometime in April 2000. In addition to Subby's psychological testimony, Dr. Lee Beecher offered psychiatric testimony. Beecher conducted a psychiatric evaluation of Brehmer and then testified for Brehmer. After discussing Brehmer's marital, family, financial, and professional problems, Beecher concluded that Brehmer suffered from dysthymia or a chronic, moderately severe depression, which probably I felt was being partially treated with the medications, but the quality of his psychotherapy generally was pretty good. Beecher testified that he rated Brehmer as a 65 on the standardized Global Assessment of Functioning Scale (GAF). Beecher explained that a GAF score of 65 indicated moderate severity. Beecher testified that he gave Brehmer a GAF score of 65 because Brehmer is able to function pretty well, but he is having some dysfunction. He's probably able to get along. He's sort of a walking wounded. He's not down and out. He's not in the hospital. On the other hand, he's not functioning as well as he might. On cross-examination, Beecher again testified that when he examined Brehmer, Brehmer's dysthymia was moderately severe, which meant that he was functioning well and his symptoms were mild with some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning. Beecher further testified that Brehmer's medication was appropriate for the symptoms Brehmer exhibited. The only adjectives Beecher used to describe Brehmer's condition were significant and chronic, which Beecher defined as long lasting. After considering all the testimony, but before recommending an appropriate disciplinary sanction, the referee considered Brehmer's three mitigation arguments. The referee found that Brehmer's first argument that his workload and secretarial turnover led to his misconduct was without merit. The referee also found that Brehmer's divorce and child custody proceedings were not sufficient to mitigate his misconduct. In addition, the referee found that Brehmer did not meet his burden of proof to show that his psychological disorder mitigated his misconduct because Brehmer did not prove by clear and convincing evidence each of the four elements of the test we articulated in In re Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn.1983). The referee next considered certain aggravating factors, including the fact that Brehmer's misconduct was consistent with misconduct for which he had previously been sanctioned. The referee found that Brehmer's misconduct had been ongoing over an extended period of time, and Brehmer had committed multiple acts of misconduct. In addition, the referee found that Brehmer's misconduct continued after the petition for disciplinary action was filed, after Brehmer was represented by counsel in this matter, and after the referee was appointed. Finally, the referee found that Brehmer has not kept his probation supervisor completely informed of the cases he was handling, and he has not consistently implemented his probation supervisor's recommendations. On August 10, 2000, the referee issued his recommendation for discipline, and Brehmer ordered a copy of the hearing transcript. Brehmer appeals arguing only that the referee failed to consider mitigating factors, including Brehmer's history of depression and various other personal issues that affected Brehmer's ability to practice law within the bounds of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct. The Director has the burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings and must meet a clear and convincing evidence standard. See In re Complaint Concerning Miera, 426 N.W.2d 850, 853 (1988). In determining whether the Director has met the burden of proof, we afford great weight to a referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law. See In Matter of Application for Discipline of Schmidt, 402 N.W.2d 544, 545 (1987). Because we deemed the allegations in the Director's March 2000 petition admitted, and because Brehmer did not appeal, he has no right to challenge those findings. But, because Brehmer has ordered a transcript of the disciplinary hearing, the referee's findings regarding the matters asserted in the Director's supplemental petition and the matters asserted by Brehmer as mitigating factors are not conclusive. See Rule 14(e), RLPR. The referee's conclusions of law are also not conclusive. See Rule 14(e), RLPR; see also In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Harry N. Ray, 610 N.W.2d 342, 345 (2000). Brehmer challenges the referee's conclusion that his psychological disorder and personal problems do not mitigate his sanctions. An attorney who raises a psychological disability as a mitigating factor to sanctions for professional misconduct has the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the elements outlined by the court in Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d at 279. In Weyhrich, we examined the relationship between the misconduct and the psychological disorder to determine whether the disorder was such that it mitigated Weyhrich's misconduct. See id. at 279. The referee considered the test we articulated in Weyhrich and determined that Brehmer's disorder was not serious and therefore did not mitigate his misconduct. Our examination of the record indicates that the referee's determination is supported by facts in the record. However, we must determine the appropriate sanction in light of the referee's and the Director's recommendation of indefinite suspension for a minimum of 2 years and compliance with Rule 24, RLPR and Rule 26, RLPR. Although we afford great weight to the referee's recommendation, we alone bear the final responsibility to determine what discipline is appropriate. See In re Klein, 442 N.W.2d 317, 321 (1989). For guidance in determining the appropriate sanction, we have consistently turned to cases involving similar misconduct. See In re Petition for Disciplinary Action Against Madsen, 426 N.W.2d 434, 436 (1988). We determine the appropriate sanction in light of the purpose of attorney discipline to protect the public and the legal profession and to guard the administration of justice by considering: (1) the nature of the misconduct; (2) the cumulative weight of the rule violations; (3) the harm to the public; and (4) the harm to the legal profession. Id. Mitigating and aggravating circumstances are also considered. See In re Petition for Disciplinary Action Against Marlon O. Haugen, 543 N.W.2d 372, 375 (1996). In similar attorney discipline cases we have balanced the equities and imposed an indefinite suspension for a minimum of 1 or 2 years and have required compliance with Rule 18, RLPR and Rule 24, RLPR. See In re Petition for Disciplinary Action Against James T. Hanvik, 609 N.W.2d 235, 242 (2000); In re Petition for Disciplinary Action Against Bradley K. Anderson, 569 N.W.2d 923, 928 (1997); In re Petition for Disciplinary Action Against Scott E. Selmer, 568 N.W.2d 702, 705 (1997). Brehmer's misconduct is not as egregious as the misconduct in Hanvik or the misconduct in In re Petition for Disciplinary Action Against Pyles, 421 N.W.2d 321, 323-24 (1988). Both Hanvik and Pyles involved similar medical and psychological mitigation issues, but those cases had numerous or substantial misappropriations of funds, among other allegations, warranting a 2-year suspension. See Pyles, 421 N.W.2d at 325; Hanvik, 609 N.W.2d at 240-42. Also, in Hanvik, we held that because Hanvik suffered from a moderate psychological disorder, his disorder did not mitigate his misconduct. See Hanvik, 609 N.W.2d at 240. While not being the sole cause of the misconduct, some, but not all, of Brehmer's behavior can be associated with his psychological disorder, which was diagnosed as being significant, chronic, and moderate to severe. Uncontradicted testimony indicated Brehmer was having some significant dysfunction and difficulty in social and occupational settings. There was further evidence that since resuming therapy and taking prescribed medications, Brehmer was making progress but had not yet reached the level he was at several years ago. According to Brehmer's therapist, the next 18 months will be crucial to his recovery. The record thus indicates that Brehmer's disorder is something more than moderate in severity. However, the nature of Brehmer's misconduct and the cumulative weight of the related public rule violations over many years has caused harm to the public and to the legal profession. Accordingly, based on all of the facts presented, we indefinitely suspend Brehmer from the practice of law in Minnesota for a minimum of 1 year. We will not consider reinstatement until Brehmer provides adequate psychological or other medical evidence establishing that he has no physical or psychological problems that would impair his ability to practice law competently, diligently, and within the rules of conduct for attorneys. In addition, we will not consider reinstatement until Brehmer completes the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam with a passing examination score. Brehmer must comply with Rule 24, RLPR and pay to the Director $900 in costs plus disbursements. Finally, Brehmer must also comply with the requirements for reinstatement under Rule 18, RLPR. So ordered.