Opinion ID: 2718900
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plain meaning analysis

Text: “The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341; Sierra Club, 421 F.3d at 1143; S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 620 F.3d at 1238. As applied to this case, we (i) examine the Extender Statute’s language, (ii) review various sources to identify the ordinary meaning of the term “statute of limitations” at the time Congress enacted the Extender Statute, (iii) consider the surrounding language in the statute (specific context), - 20 - and (iv) look to how the term is used in surrounding provisions of FIRREA (broader context).
The Extender Statute extends “the applicable statute of limitations” for “any action brought by” NCUA on behalf of a failed credit union. 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14)(A) (emphasis added). Application of the Extender Statute is mandatory. Id. (“the applicable statute of limitations . . . shall be . . .” (emphasis added)). See Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 302 (1989) (use of “shall” indicates a statutory instruction is “compulsory” and “mandatory”). “By using these words, Congress precluded the possibility that some other limitations period might apply to claims brought by [NCUA] as conservator [or receiver].” UBS Am. Inc., 712 F.3d at 142 (discussing the FHFA extender statute, which is identical to the NCUA Extender Statute). Thus, the plain meaning of the statute indicates that it applies to NCUA’s Securities Act claim and that it supplants all other time limits, including Section 13’s repose period. We therefore agree with the Second Circuit that this is the natural and correct reading of this language. Id. at 141-42. Defendants argue that the term “statute of limitations” in the Extender Statute does not include statutes of repose. It follows, they say, that the Extender Statute replaces only Section 13’s one-year period and not its three-year period. But Defendants misread the Extender Statute. - 21 - The term “statute of limitations” is phrased in the singular—it follows the word “the” and uses the word “statute,” not “statutes.” 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14)(A) (emphasis added). This term refers to the time limits in the Extender Statute itself—subparagraphs (A) and (B)—not the time periods in other statutes that the Extender Statute replaces, such as those in Section 13. And it applies to “any action brought by [NCUA].” Id. Although Defendants contend that their reading of the Extender Statute is plain and unambiguous, it is the opposite—at best a strained reading that may be plausible only if the term “statute of limitations” in the Extender Statute can be (1) understood narrowly and (2) somehow refers to time restrictions contained in statutes other than the Extender Statute. Rather than stop here and conclude, as the Second Circuit did in UBS, that the Extender Statute is plain and unambiguous in NCUA’s favor, we assume for the sake of discussion that the Defendants’ reading based on the text alone is at least plausible. We therefore examine the term “statute of limitations” more closely. The following contextual analysis further demonstrates the weakness of the Defendants’ interpretation of the Extender Statute—and the correctness of the district court’s conclusion that the Extender Statute governs NCUA’s Securities Act claims and supplants other limitations frameworks. (ii) Ordinary meaning of “statute of limitations” When interpreting a statute, we must “giv[e] all undefined terms their ordinary meaning.” UBS Am., 712 F.3d at 141; Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. - 22 - Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2011). We first assess the way the term is used. Because words do not have “intrinsic meanings. . . . [i]t is only through custom, usage, and convention that language acquires established meanings.” Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45:2, at 14-15 (7th ed. 2007). “Importantly, the proper inquiry focuses on the ordinary meaning of the [term] at the time Congress enacted it.” BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 184 (2004). “[T]he terms ‘statute of limitations’ and ‘statute of repose’ have seen considerable development in their usage and meaning.” Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 2013 WL 3455775, at , -- F.3d -- (4th Cir. 2013). “[A] historical analysis reveals that both scholars and courts have often used the terms interchangeably.” Id. (citing McDonald v. Sun Oil. Co., 548 F.3d 774, 781 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A]lthough some cases recognized the differences between statutes of limitation and repose [in 1986], a number of cases confused the terms or used them interchangeably . . . [and] considerable uncertainty about the distinction existed.”); id. at 781 nn.3-4 (collecting historical examples of inconsistent and overlapping use of the two terms)). A review of sources published before and shortly after Congress enacted the Extender Statute indicates that “statute of limitations” did not have a consistent, clearly distinct meaning in 1989. See UBS Am., 712 F.3d at 142-43 & n.3; Waldburger, 2013 WL 3455775, at , -- F.3d at --. Courts often begin an ordinary meaning analysis by consulting contemporary dictionary definitions. See, e.g., Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 127 S. Ct. 2352, 2356 (2007) (consulting the - 23 - fourth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary to interpret a federal statute adopted in 1976); Limtiaco v. Comacho, 127 S. Ct. 1413, 1418 (2007) (consulting the fourth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary published in 1951 to interpret a Guam statute enacted in 1950); Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 125-26 (2003) (consulting law dictionaries published in 1856 and 1859 to interpret a statute adopted in 1863). The fifth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary was published in 1979 and was current when FIRREA was enacted. It did not provide a definition for statutes of repose. Instead, the entry for “Repose statutes” redirected the reader to the entry for “Limitation (Statute of limitation).” Black’s Law Dictionary 1169 (5th ed. 1979). The entry for “Statute of limitations” in the same edition referred twice to statutes of repose. First, it stated that “[s]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose, and are such legislative enactments as prescribe the periods within which actions may be brought upon certain claims or within which certain rights may be enforced.” Id. at 835. Second, the final sentence of the entry stated: “Also sometimes referred to as ‘statutes of repose.’” Id.13 13 The next edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, published in 1994, provided a separate entry for “Statute of repose” that addressed the distinctions between repose and limitations periods. Black’s Law Dictionary 1411 (6th ed. 1994). Nevertheless, the entry for “Statute of limitations” begins with a broad definition: “Statutes . . . setting maximum time periods during which certain actions can be brought or rights enforced.” Id. at 927. Later in the same entry is a note with the subheading “Statute of repose compared.” That note begins with the sentence, “While statutes of limitation are sometimes called ‘statutes of repose’ . . . ” and proceeds to explain the distinctions we already have discussed. Id. at 927. - 24 - Beyond dictionary definitions, the Supreme Court used the terms “statute of limitations” and “statute of repose” synonymously in cases published before the Extender Statute’s enactment. E.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (referring to statutes of limitations generally as “statutes of repose”); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938) (referring to a statute of limitations: “The statute of limitations is a statute of repose . . . .”). A 1991 treatise on limitations of actions described five definitions for statute of repose: (1) in the most general sense, statute of repose is synonymous with statute of limitations; (2) [it] is a general term that encompasses various statutes, including statutes of limitations . . . ; (3) it is merely one type of statute of limitations . . . ; (4) [it] is considered distinct from a statute of limitations because it begins to run at a time unrelated to the traditional cause of action, that is, from the date of the act of injury regardless when discovered; and (5) it is synonymous with the “useful safe life” provisions of products liability statutes. Calvin W. Corman, 1 Limitation of Actions § 1.3.2.1, at 30-31 (1991). Applying these definitions to the term “statute of limitations” in the Extender Statute, only the fourth definition supports Defendants’ narrow reading, while the first, second, and third definitions support a broader reading and the fifth definition is irrelevant. - 25 - The foregoing discussion supports the broader meaning of “statute of limitations.” But it also shows that, standing alone, the words “statute of limitations” may be ambiguous.14 (iii) Specific context: surrounding language The Extender Statute set a new limitations framework that displaced pre-existing limitations frameworks for “any action” brought by NCUA. 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14) (“[T]he applicable statute of limitations with regard to any action . . . shall be . . . ”). In defining the new limitations framework, the Extender Statute provides this instruction: (B) Determination of the date on which a claim accrues [T]he date on which the statute of limitation begins to run . . . shall be the later of— (i) the date of the appointment of [NCUA] as conservator or liquidating agent; or
14 Courts have noted the historically ambiguous and overlapping use of these terms. E.g., FHFA v. UBS Am. Inc., 712 F.3d 136, 140, 142-43 & n.3 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[C]ourts . . . have long used the term ‘statute of limitations’ to refer also to statutes of repose.” (referring, inter alia, to Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 (1976))); Fields v. Legacy Health Sys., 413 F.3d 943, 952 n.7 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose is often blurred.”); Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 952 F.2d 1215, 1218, n.2 (“Although the statute is titled as a ‘Statute of limitations,’ we refer to it as a statute of repose. . . . Both types of statutes are often referred to as statutes of limitations.”); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 939 F.2d 1420, 1434 n.17 (10th Cir. 1991), vacated on other grounds by Dennier v. Trippet, 503 U.S. 978 (1992) (“Although the two concepts differ,” the terms statute of limitations and statute of repose “have become interchangeable.”). - 26 - Id. § 1787(b)(14)(B) (emphasis added). The statute uses the word “accrues” two additional times in defining the length of the new limitations period. See id. § 1787(b)(14)(A)(i)(I) & (ii)( I). As the language quoted above shows, the Extender Statute’s new limitations framework includes the concept of accrual. As Defendants argue, accrual is generally associated with the narrow meaning of “statute of limitations.” But the Extender Statute also includes the concept of repose. Subsection (B) provides that the limitations period begins to run either (i) on “the date of the appointment of [NCUA] as conservator or liquidating agent” or (ii) when “the cause of action accrues.” Option (i) invokes repose language. Defendants argue that the Extender Statute’s reference to accrual means that it may only apply if the time limit being displaced is also subject to accrual—that is, when the displaced time limit falls within the narrow meaning of “statute of limitations.” But this argument confuses what the Extender Statute does—sets an all-purpose time frame for NCUA to bring enforcement actions on behalf of failed credit unions—with what it replaces—the preexisting time frames to bring “any action.” The references to accrual appear in the portion of Extender Statute that defines its own new limitations framework—what it does. The references do not expressly limit what time limits the statute replaces. The mere fact that the new time period in the Extender Statute could be subject to accrual does not prevent it from displacing a time limit that is not, i.e., a repose period. - 27 - Thus, the statute is most reasonably interpreted to govern “any action” NCUA may bring—and to displace all “statutes of limitations” in the broad sense of the term, which encompasses both ordinary statutes of limitations and statutes of repose. (iv) Broader context: Surrounding provisions of FIRREA By itself, the ordinary meaning of the term “statute of limitations” is ambiguous. “Statutory construction, however, is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme.” United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988); see also UBS Am., 712 F.3d at 141 (“[C]ourts are not to construe each phrase . . . in isolation.” (quotations omitted)). We therefore look to the surrounding provisions of FIRREA to see if this context makes the meaning clear. FIRREA is codified in Title 12, Chapter 14 of the U.S. Code. Section 1752 provides general definitions for the chapter, but “statute of limitations” is not among the terms defined. Even when a statute does not explicitly define a particular term, we might gain understanding of the term from how it is used elsewhere in the statute. Defendants define “statute of limitations” as a period that commences on the date a cause of action accrues. And they argue that any time limit that is “triggered by an arbitrary event unrelated to the accrual of the cause of action” is plainly inconsistent with this narrow definition. Aplt. Br. at 29-31 (quotations omitted). If they are correct that the term has an unambiguous, narrow meaning in the Extender Statute, then we would expect to find the term used narrowly in other parts of the statute. But this is not the case. - 28 - Section 1787 of FIRREA includes the Extender Statute. This section, inter alia, defines NCUA’s powers and duties as conservator or liquidating agent, governs the process of winding up a failed credit union (including claims against the credit union), and provides for payment of claims on insured deposits. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1787. Section 1787 refers to “statute of limitations” or “statute of limitation” in six provisions, including the Extender Statute.15 The word “repose” does not appear. Two references to statutes of limitations in § 1787 could arguably meet Defendants’ narrow definition. These two provisions provide for tolling of “any applicable statute of limitation” when an external claimant files a claim with NCUA against a failed credit union, see 12 U.S.C. §§ 1787(b)(5)(F)(i), (b)(8)(E). As noted previously, the availability of tolling distinguishes ordinary statutes of limitations from statutes of repose. These provisions are consistent with the broad definition of “statute of limitations” because the broad encompasses the narrow, but they do not foreclose the narrow definition. 15 Besides the Extender Statute, the term “statute of limitation(s)” appears in the following provisions: 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(5)(F)(i) (tolls “any applicable statute of limitations” on external claims against a credit union when the claimant files a claim with NCUA); id. at § 1787(b)(6)(B) (sets a 60-day “[s]tatute of limitations” for federal court review or administrative appeal of external claims denied by NCUA); id. at § 1787(b)(8)(D) (sets 30-day “[s]tatute of limitations” for federal court review or administrative appeal of external claims denied by NCUA under expedited claims process); id. at § 1787(b)(8)(E) (allows tolling of “any applicable statute of limitations” on external claims against a credit union when claimant files a claim with NCUA under expedited claims process); id. at § 1787(d)(4) (sets a “[s]tatute of limitations” of “not later than 60 days” for filing a federal court challenge to NCUA’s denial of claim for payment of an insured deposit). - 29 - Other § 1787 provisions, however, use the term in a way that is inconsistent with the Defendants’ narrow definition. Three subsections set deadlines for appealing NCUA’s denial of a claim, without allowing for accrual or tolling—yet all are clearly labeled “statutes of limitations.” See id. §§ 1787(b)(6)(B), (b)(8)(D), (d)(4). One of these deadlines, § 1787(d)(4), is “not later than 60 days after the date on which” NCUA’s decision is issued. Id. Like the three-year repose period in Section 13, this 60-day period sets a fixed time limit and commences from the date of the challenged event—not the date of discovery or accrual, as is the case with ordinary statutes of limitations, such as Section 13’s one-year period. In short, Congress’s use of “statute of limitations” throughout § 1787 does not support Defendants’ argument that the term’s meaning is unambiguously narrow. To the contrary, some of the § 1787 references suggest a broader meaning that would encompass statutes of repose.