Opinion ID: 67472
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Spears’s other theories of pretext

Text: Spears offers several other theories that suggest that Patterson’s given 7 No. 09-10048 reason is a pretext for discrimination. He argues that Patterson’s reason–Spears’s crew’s slowness in “nippling up”–is false because it was not the reason originally given to Spears for his discharge. He also points out that Gallegos and a supervisor disagreed about who first recommended the termination. Evidence that an employer has given a false reason for terminating employment may contribute to a determination that the reason was pretext for discrimination. Haun v. Ideal Indus., Inc., 81 F.3d 541, 546 (5th Cir. 1996). This does not aid Spears, however, because he fails to offer evidence that the given reason was false. See Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir. 1995). In fact, the evidence confirms that on two occasions this procedure took longer than expected. Spears also argues that Patterson’s reason raises a suspicion of pretext because Patterson did not take required steps prior to the final termination decision. He claims that Patterson’s disciplinary policy requires a written reprimand before termination. Patterson never issued a written reprimand to Spears and Patterson did not launch an investigation into the reason the “nipple up” procedure took longer than ususal. While departure from normal company procedure might contribute to a finding of pretext, Spears must provide evidence that the given reason was false or that his termination was motivated by a discriminatory purpose to survive summary judgment. See Richardson v. Monitronics Int’l., 434 F.3d 327, 336 (5th Cir. 2005). Spears failed to provide evidence that demonstrates either a false reason or a discriminatory motive. Patterson fired Spears’s entire crew, which was made up of members of several racial groups without previous written reprimands or an investigation into the reason for slow performance. Also, all members of Spears’s crew, including the other African American member, have returned to work for Patterson. Spears never reapplied. He alleges the other African American member was rehired after the suit began in order to defeat his claim. The district court dismissed 8 No. 09-10048 this allegation as baseless because Spears was unable to provide the date that the other African American crew-member recommenced work with Patterson. Spears fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact which suggests that Patterson’s given reason is a pretext for discrimination. C. Spears’s Challenge of the “Same Actor Inference” Spears also questions the district court’s conclusion that the “same actor inference” weighs against his evidence of discrimination. The same actor inference creates a presumption that animus was not present where the same actor responsible for the adverse employment action either hired or promoted the employee at issue. Gallegos was involved with both Spears’s promotion and discharge. Spears correctly argues that the presumption created by the same actor inference is not irrebuttable. Haun, 81 F.3d at 546. The district court did not, however, use the “same actor inference” as mandatory in noting that the inference weighs against Spears in his claims that Patterson only rehired his African American crew-member in retaliation for the commencement of this case. That allegation was not supported by evidence. There is no error in the district court’s application of the “same actor inference.”