Opinion ID: 2359155
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hartwell v. State[14]

Text: In 1967 we addressed the following question: [W]hat effect does the death of the appellant, pending disposition of his appeal from a criminal conviction, have on the proceedings. [15] Robert Hartwell was found guilty by a jury of the crime of incest and sentenced to seven years in prison with five years suspended. [16] He appealed his conviction and sentence to this court but died before his appeal was heard. We requested briefing from the parties on the effect of Hartwell's death. The State submitted a three-page brief requesting that we abate Hartwell's criminal proceedings, a position different from the one it takes today, and describing abatement ab initio as the universal rule absent a statute to the contrary. Hartwell's attorney submitted a one-page letter requesting that we resolve the appeal, noting that Hartwell's reputation while alive is important to his three remaining children. We adopted the doctrine of abatement ab initio, holding that all proceedings are permanently abated as to appellant by reason of his death pending the appeal. [17] We gave three reasons for our holding: (1) A majority of the federal and state courts where the question has arisen had adopted the doctrine of abatement ab initio; (2) maintaining the conviction did not serve either of the two underlying principles of penal administration in Alaska[:] . . . reformation and protection of the public; and (3) [d]eath ha[d] removed the appellant from the jurisdiction of this court. [18] When Hartwell was decided, a criminal defendant had a right to appeal his conviction and sentence to the supreme court. [19] In 1980, the Alaska Legislature created the court of appeals to hear criminal appeals. Now criminal defendants can appeal to the court of appeals as a matter of right, rather than to the supreme court. [20] Supreme court review of decisions by the court of appeals is discretionary, thus leaving criminal defendants with only one appeal as a matter of right. [21] Carlin, like Hartwell, died while his appeal as a matter of right was pending. Therefore, our ruling in Hartwell controls in State v. Carlin unless Hartwell is overruled. In contrast, Dale's appeal to the court of appeals was resolved, and his conviction affirmed. Dale died after we agreed to hear Dale's discretionary appeal. For this reason, the State argues that Hartwell is not controlling. It urges us to follow the vast majority of courts that have addressed this issue and have held that abatement ab initio does not apply when a criminal defendant dies during discretionary review. [22] But as Dale's counsel notes, the cases cited by the State involve criminal defendants who died before the higher court acted on their request for discretionary review. There is a substantive difference between those cases and cases where, as here, the court has granted the request for discretionary review prior to the defendant's death. In one case directly on point, People v. Mazzone , the Illinois Supreme Court applied the doctrine of abatement ab initio to a criminal defendant whose petition for discretionary review had been granted, but who died before the appeal was completed. [23] The court found the matter [to be] closely analogous to initial appeals as of right, and the reasons justifying abatement [ a ] b initio there apply equally here. [24] The State seeks to distinguish Mazzone by arguing that unlike in Illinois, where the discretionary nature of the petition process ends with the grant of the petition, in Alaska we retain the right to dismiss a petition as improvidently granted. This attempted distinction lacks merit: In Illinois, as in Alaska, the supreme court can dismiss a petition as improvidently granted. [25] While Dale, unlike Carlin, already had the benefit of appellate review, in granting his petition we decided that his case was one that warranted further appellate review. [26] By granting Dale's petition for hearing, we gave Dale a right to present his appeal. Once that right has been conferred, there is no obvious basis for distinguishing between Dale's position and that of a criminal defendant who has filed an appeal as a matter of right. Thus, Hartwell, while not strictly controlling, is persuasive and should be applied unless it is overruled. We now turn to the question of whether there are grounds for overruling Hartwell before examining whether such a departure from the doctrine of abatement ab initio is warranted and what alternatives are available.