Opinion ID: 1498881
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Collateral Proceedings Initiated by Next Friend

Text: In applying federal habeas corpus procedures, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that a next friend may appear in court on behalf of detained prisoners who are unable, usually because of mental incompetence or inaccessibility, to seek relief themselves. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 162, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990). The Court explained that a next friend does not become a party to the habeas corpus action. . . but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in interest. Id. at 163, 110 S.Ct. 1717. The Court emphasized, however, that there are two prerequisites for standing as a next friend: First, a next friend must provide an adequate explanationsuch as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disabilitywhy the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action. . . . Second, the next friend must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate . . ., and it has been further suggested that a next friend must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest. Id. at 163-64, 110 S.Ct. 1717 (citations omitted); see also Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966) (establishing standard for allowing petitioner to withdraw petition for certiorari). In Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 110 S.Ct. 2223, 109 L.Ed.2d 762 (1990), the Court concluded that an additional hearing was not required to determine that an inmate's parents failed to establish next friend status based on mental incompetency. There, the inmate filed but then withdrew a state post-conviction petition after testifying that he elected to withdraw the petition even though he knew he would be executed. After several mental health professionals testified that the inmate was mentally competent, the state post-conviction court concluded that the inmate had made a voluntary and intelligent decision to withdraw his petition. Id. at 732-33, 110 S.Ct. 2223. Although the inmate's parents then filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief as the inmate's next friend, the only additional evidence filed with the petition was an affidavit of a psychiatrist who stated there is reason to believe this person may not be competent to waive his legal remedies. Id. at 735-36, 110 S.Ct. 2223. The United States Supreme Court held that the District Court properly denied the request for additional competency proceedings because the additional evidence was conclusory and there was an absence of any `meaningful' evidence of incompetency. Id. at 736, 110 S.Ct. 2223. The principles in Whitmore and Demosthenes have been applied in numerous federal cases similar to the case before us. In West v. Bell, 242 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2001), for instance, attorneys who represented a death-row inmate in state post-conviction proceedings tried to initiate federal habeas corpus proceedings by filing a motion for appointment of counsel and a motion to stay the execution. Although the inmate twice answered No, Sir, when asked if he wanted to file a habeas corpus petition, the attorneys sought permission to conduct further investigation into the inmate's mental competency. Id. at 340-41. After emphasizing that the inmate had not himself initiated proceedings, the Sixth Circuit held that the attorneys had not demonstrated standing under next friend principles because they had not shown that the inmate was mentally incompetent: At most, counsel have shown some conceivable difficulties in [the inmate's] mental health, but no evidence that . . . the prisoner does not have capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or . . . suffer[s] from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises. Id. at 341 (quoting Rees, 384 U.S. at 314, 86 S.Ct. 1505). Although not in the same procedural context, this Court cited West with approval in an unpublished order filed on April 22, 2003. State v. Reid, No. M1999-00803-SC-DDT-DD (filed April 22, 2003. In that order, a majority of this Court denied a motion for stay of execution filed by defense counsel on behalf of Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., after Reid indicated that he wanted to withdraw his post-conviction petition in Davidson County. We stated that Reid clearly indicated that he has no desire to pursue any post-conviction remedies and that the motion filed by counsel, which included the affidavit of a psychologist, did not present any truly new factual assertions that call into doubt Mr. Reid's present capacity to understand his legal position and options or to make a rational choice among these options. Id. at 3 (citing West, 242 F.3d at 342-43). As noted earlier, however, the Davidson County case with regard to Reid's mental competency is before this Court in a separate appeal. Similarly, in Brewer v. Lewis, 989 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir.1993), the Court held that an inmate's mother had failed to demonstrate next friend status because the evidence failed to present `meaningful evidence that [the inmate] was suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect that substantially affected his capacity to make an intelligent decision.' Id. at 1026 (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 166, 110 S.Ct. 1717)). The Court emphasized that the evidence consisted of affidavits of mental health experts who had never met with or evaluated the inmate and one expert who stated that the inmate's mental condition may have worsened while incarcerated. Id. at 1026-27. The Court also emphasized that four mental health experts had found the inmate mentally competent in the prior two and onehalf months. Id. State supreme courts have reached similar conclusions with respect to next friend status. In Ross , for example, the Connecticut Supreme Court applied Whitmore and Demosthenes in concluding that a public defender was not entitled to participate as next friend in pursuing collateral review on behalf of an inmate. In that case, the defendant tried to waive collateral review of his convictions and death sentence. The trial court held an extensive hearing and concluded that the defendant had made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. The public defender tried to appear as next friend and participate in the competency hearings by asserting additional allegations of mental incompetency. The Court said: We conclude that the [public defender] has not presented any meaningful evidence that the defendant is incompetent. . . . In the absence of such evidence, the [public defender] is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing at which it may attempt to establish the defendant's incompetence and its standing to appear as the defendant's next friend under Whitmore . . . . Ross, 863 A.2d at 673 (citations omitted); see also Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181, 754 S.W.2d 839, 840-41 (1988) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Robbins, 339 Ark. 379, 5 S.W.3d 51, 55 (1999) (adopting two-prong test for proceeding as next friend); Haag, 809 A.2d at 278-79 (adopting Whitmore for proceeding as next friend).