Opinion ID: 3009775
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: At the time of the Supreme Court's decision in

Text: Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), sentencing juries had almost complete discretion in determining whether a given defendant would be sentenced to death . . . . Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (1993). The guiding principle that 18 emerged from Furman was that the States were required to channel the discretion of sentencing juries in order to avoid a system in which the death penalty would be imposed in a `wanto[n]' and `freakis[h]' manner. Id. (citation omitted) (brackets in original). Since then, the Supreme Court has repeatedly said that a state's capital sentencing scheme must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. Zant, 462 U.S. at 877; see also Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2634 (1994); Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1542 (1993); Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29. This narrowing is typically achieved by permitting the imposition of a death sentence only if the trier of fact finds at either the guilt or penalty phase that at least one statutorily specified aggravating circumstance has been proven. See Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2634; Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1990). Such a finding makes a defendant `eligible' for the death penalty. See Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2634; Lewis, 497 U.S. at 774. Because the aggravating factors listed in a state's capital sentencing statute perform this critical narrowing function, the Supreme Court has insisted that these factors be defined with some precision, for if they are too vague they can leave the kind of open-ended discretion which was held invalid in Furman. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988). As previously explained, it was for this reason that the Court held 19 that the circumstance at issue in Godfrey -- whether the murders were outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman -- was inadequate to channel the jury's eligibility determination. In Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 362, the Court subsequently reached the same conclusion with respect to the circumstance of whether the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Although the statutorily defined aggravating circumstances at issue in Godfrey and Maynard refer to underlying considerations that may properly be taken into account in deciding whether a death sentence should be imposed, their flaw is that they do not adequately narrow the factfinder's discretion in determining whether a defendant should be found to be eligible for a death sentence. See Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361-62; Zant, 462 U.S. at 885-89. Once the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, a state is free to allow the jury . . . to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 (1983). A state must permit the factfinder to consider all mitigating evidence. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978). But a state has considerable leeway with respect to the role of aggravating factors at this stage. One permissible method is exemplified by the Georgia sentencing scheme at issue in Zant v. Stephens. Another permissible method is exemplified by the scheme discussed in Clemons v. Mississippi. 20 C. Zant, as previously noted, involved the Georgia capital sentencing scheme. Under that scheme, as described by the Georgia Supreme Court in response to a question certified from the Supreme Court of the United States, the factfinder at the penalty phase was first required to determine whether at least one of the aggravating circumstances enumerated by statute was present. See 462 U.S. at 870-72. If the factfinder found at least one of these circumstances, the factfinder was then required to `consider[] all evidence in extenuation, mitigation and aggravation of punishment.' Id. at 871 (quoting 297 S.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1982)). In Zant, after the defendant, Stephens, was found guilty of murder, the state requested that the jury impose the death penalty and argued that the following aggravating circumstances listed in the Georgia statute were present: (1)(a) that the defendant had a prior record of conviction for a capital felony or (b) a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions; (2) that the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery to the victim; and (3) that the defendant had escaped from lawful custody or confinement. Id. at 865 n.1. The jury imposed the death penalty and stated that it had found the presence of the aggravating circumstances labeled above as (1)(a) (that the defendant had a prior conviction for a capital felony), (1)(b) (that he had a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal 21 convictions), and (3) (that he had escaped from lawful custody or confinement). Id. at 866-67. The Georgia Supreme Court subsequently held in another case, Arnold v. State, 224 S.E.2d 386, 541-42 (Ga. 1976), that circumstance (1)(b) -- a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions -- was unlawfully vague for Eighth Amendment purposes. In light of this decision, the Georgia Supreme Court considered whether the jury's finding of this improper aggravating circumstance rendered Stephens's death sentence invalid. The court concluded that it did not, because the other circumstances found by the jury adequately supported Stephens's sentence. See Stephens v. State, 237 S.E.2d 259, 26162, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986 (1978); Stephens v. Hopper, 247 S.E.2d 92, 97-98, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991 (1978). The Fifth Circuit, however, held that the jury's consideration of this circumstance rendered Stephens's sentence unconstitutional. Among other things, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the reference to this factor in the jury instructions may have unduly directed the jury's attention to [Stephens's] prior convictions. Stephens v. Zant, 648 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit added that it could not be determined with the degree of certainty required in capital cases that the instruction did not make a critical difference in the jury's decision to impose the death penalty. Id. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted that the finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance played a limited role under the Georgia scheme. Such a finding narrow[ed] the 22 class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty but did not thereafter play any role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion. 462 U.S. at 874. Concluding that this scheme sufficiently structured the sentencer's discretion, the Court wrote: Our cases indicate . . . that statutory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the stage little difference between such an instruction and the one actually given. Id. The Court thus commented that [t]he effect the erroneous instruction may have had on the jury is tactors in the process of selecting, from among that class, those defendants who will actually be sentenced to death. Id. at 878 (emphasis added). The Court then considered whether, under this scheme, the jury's finding of one vague statutory aggravating circumstance necessitated the reversal of Stephens's death sentence even though other valid statutory aggravating circumstances were also found. The Court held that it did not. After noting that the jury had found aggravating circumstances that were valid and legally sufficient to support the death penalty, id. at 881, the Court rejected Stephens's argument that reversal was necessary because the trial judge's instructions concerning the invalid statutory aggravating circumstance may have affected the jury's deliberations, id. at 885. The Court wrote: In analyzing this contention it is essential to keep in mind the sense in which that aggravating circumstance is `invalid.' It is not invalid because it authorizes the jury to draw adverse inferences from conduct that is 23 constitutionally protected. . . . Georgia [has not] attached the `aggravating' label to factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, such as for example the race, religion, or political affiliation of the defendant, . . . or to conduct that actually should militate in favor of a lesser penalty, such as perhaps the defendant's mental illness. Id. at 885 (citations omitted). Rather, the Court observed, the circumstance in question had been found to be invalid because it failed to provide an adequate basis for distinguishing a murder case in which the death penalty may be imposed from those cases in which such a penalty may not be imposed. Id. at 886. But the Court pointed out that [t]he underlying evidence [was] nevertheless fully admissible at the sentencing phase. Id. Responding to the Fifth Circuit's statement that the judge's instruction may have unduly directed the jury's attention to [Stephens's] prior conviction, the Supreme Court assumed that the instruction had in fact induc[ed] the jury to place greater emphasis upon the [defendant's] prior criminal record than it would otherwise have done. Id. at 888. The Court held, however, that this emphasis had not violated Stephens's constitutional rights. The Court stated that it would have been constitutional for the trial judge to instruct the jury that it would be appropriate to take account of a defendant's prior criminal record in making its sentencing determination, id., and the Court saw little difference between such an instruction and the one actually given. Id. The Court thus commented that [t]he effect the erroneous instruction may have 24 had on the jury is therefore merely a consequence of the statutory label `aggravating circumstance.' Id. While [t]hat label arguably might have caused the jury to give somewhat greater weight to [the defendant's] prior criminal record than it otherwise would have given, the Court observed, any possible impact cannot fairly be regarded as a constitutional defect in the sentencing process. Id. at 888-89 (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court withheld opinion concerning the possible significance of a holding that a particular aggravating circumstance is `invalid' under a statutory scheme in which the judge or jury is specifically instructed to weigh statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in exercising its discretion whether to impose the death penalty. Id. at 890. D. The Court considered a sentencing scheme of this latter type in Clemons v. Mississippi, supra. Under the Mississippi scheme, like the Georgia scheme, the factfinder at the penalty phase of a capital case was first required to find the presence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance. See 494 U.S. at 744-45. But the two schemes differed with respect to the next step that the factfinder was instructed to perform. Whereas the Georgia scheme called for the factfinder to consider all aggravating evidence, the Mississippi scheme required the factfinder to consider only those aggravating elements enumerated in the statute and to weigh those elements against the mitigating circumstances. See id. at 743 n.1, 745 25 n.2. The Clemons Court -- employing terminology that can be quite misleading in the context of the cases now before us -- described Mississippi as a weighing state because its statute called for the jury to weigh the statutory aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances. See id. at 748-49. In Clemons, the jury found the presence of two statutorily defined aggravating factors -- that the murder was committed during a robbery for pecuniary gain and that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Id. at 742. Concluding that these factors outweighed any mitigating circumstances, the jury imposed a sentence of death. Id. The second of the statutory aggravating factors was later held to be unconstitutionally vague for Eighth Amendment purposes. See Maynard, 486 U.S. at 362. Noting that Mississippi was a weighing state and that the jury had weighed this statutory factor in imposing a death sentence, the Court vacated that sentence and remanded for the Mississippi Supreme Court to determine whether the remaining valid statutory aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances or to conduct a harmless error review. See 494 U.S. at 741. In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has provided explanations of the reasoning on which the holding in Clemons rests. For example, in Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2119 (1992), the Court explained:0 0 Similarly, in Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 231 (1992), the Court observed that [i]n a nonweighing state, so long as the 26 In a weighing state . . . there is Eighth Amendment error when the sentencer weighs an invalid aggravating circumstance in reaching the ultimate decision to impose a death sentence. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1450, 108 L.ed.2d 725 (1990). Employing an invalid aggravating factor in the weighing process creates the possibility . . . of randomness, Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. ____, _____, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1139, 117 L.ed.2d 367 (1992), by placing a thumb [on] death's side of the scale, id. at ______, 112 S. Ct. at 1137, thus creat[ing] the risk [of] treat[ing] the defendant as more deserving of the death penalty, id. at _____, 112 S. Ct. at 1139. Even when other valid aggravating factors exist as well, merely affirming a sentence reached by weighing an invalid aggravating factor deprives a defendant of the individualized treatment that would result from actual reweighing of the mix of mitigating factors and aggravating circumstances. Clemons, supra, 494 U.S. at 752, 110 S. Ct. at 1450 . . . . sentencing body finds at least one valid aggravating factor, the fact that it also finds an invalid aggravating factor does not affect the formal process of deciding whether death is an appropriate penalty. In a weighing state, however, the Court observed: [W]hen the sentencing body is told to weigh an invalid factor in its decision, a reviewing court may not assume it would have made no difference if the thumb had been removed from death's side of t260 ( (_ the death penalty. On the other hand, those juries that concluded that the standard had not been met could not consider the defendant's prior convictions at all, andreceived an individualized sentence. Id. 27 E. In order to illustrate the reason for the distinction that the Supreme Court has drawn between nonweighing states like Georgia and weighing states like Mississippi, it is helpful to compare how the effect of the invalid aggravating circumstance in Zant would differ at the selection step in the two types of states. As previously noted, the invalid statutory aggravating circumstance in Zant was a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions. Due to its vagueness, this standard created a serious danger that different juries would reach different conclusions based on identical facts. If, for example, a defendant had two prior convictions, one for a mugging and one for a barroom fight, some juries might well conclude that these convictions satisfied the standard, while others might well reach the opposite conclusion. At the selection step in a non-weighing state, however, this possibility would not carry with it an unacceptably high risk of altering the jury's ultimate sentencing decision. This is so because, whether or not the jury found that the standard had been met, it would still consider the same underlying facts, i.e., that the defendant had one prior conviction for a mugging and one for a barroom fight. By contrast, in a weighing state, this vague standard would create an unacceptably high risk of affecting the jury's decision at the selection step. Those juries that concluded that the standard had been met could consider the defendant's prior convictions, and this factor might well tip the balance in favor of the death penalty. On the other hand, those juries that 28 concluded that the standard had not been met could not consider the defendant's prior convictions at all, and this might well tip the balance against the death penalty. Accordingly, as the Supreme Court has put it, [e]mploying an invalid aggravating factor in the weighing process `creates the possibility . . . of randomness,' . . . thus `creat[ing] the risk of treat[ing] the defendant as more deserving of the death penalty.' Sochor, 112 S. Ct. at 2119 (citations omitted; brackets in original). F. With this background in mind, it seems quite clear that Delaware is a non-weighing state. Under the Delaware scheme, the jury at the selection step of the penalty phase is free to consider all relevant evidence in aggravation. The jury is not restricted to the statutory aggravating factors. In this critical feature, the Delaware scheme mirrors the Georgia capital sentencing scheme discussed in Zant and contrasts sharply with the Mississippi capital sentencing scheme discussed in Clemons. We therefore agree with the analysis of the Delaware Supreme Court and the district court judges who denied the petitions that are now before us. See Flamer v. Chaffinch, 827 F. Supp. at 1095; Bailey v. Snyder, 826 F. Supp. at 822; Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d at 135. Flamer's and Bailey's argument that Delaware is a weighing state is no more than a play on the use of the word weigh in the Delaware statute. Flamer and Bailey argue that Delaware is a weighing state because the Delaware statute states that in the selection step the jury must [u]nanimously 29 recommend[], after weighing all relevant evidence . . . that a sentence of death be imposed. Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 §4209(d)(1)(b) (emphasis added). They distinguish the Georgia statute on the ground that it provided that the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence . . . . See Zant, 462 U.S. at 865 n.1. (emphasis added). Flamer and Bailey argue that Delaware is a weighing state simply because the Delaware statute instructs the jury to weigh (not consider) aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See Flamer Br. at 74; Bailey Br. at 64. We reject these arguments. [T]he difference between a weighing State and a non-weighing State is not one of `semantics.' Stringer, 503 U.S. at 231. The Supreme Court's weighing/non-weighing distinction does not turn simply on whether or not the word weighing appears in a state's statute. Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1456, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). The fact that the Delaware statute employs the term weigh rather than the term consider is inconsequential for present purposes. The term weigh is defined as meaning consider or examine for the purpose of forming an opinion or coming to a conclusion and consider carefully esp[ecially] by balancing one . . . thing against another in order to make a choice, decision or judgment, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2593 (1973) (emphasis added); similarly, a synonym of consider is weigh. 30 Id. at 483. Thus, the Delaware legislature's choice of the word weighing rather than considering is of no Eighth Amendment significance.