Opinion ID: 155016
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: s ufficiency of the i ndictment

Text: “The sufficiency of an indictment is a question of law which we review de novo.” United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522, 1526 (10th Cir. 1995). An indictment need only meet minimal constitutional standards, and we determine the sufficiency of an indictment by practical rather than technical considerations. United States v. Dahlman, 13 F.3d 1391, 1400 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1045 (1994). An indictment is sufficient if it sets forth the elements of the offense charged, puts the defendant on fair notice of the charges against which he must defend, and enables the defendant to assert a double jeopardy defense. United States v. Poole, 929 F.2d 1476, 1478 (10th Cir. 1991). - 16 - In this case, Dashney appeals his conviction on the ground that the indictment did not charge him with knowledge of illegality or mention “willfulness.” Count 1 of his indictment states: On or about December 14, 1989, in the State and District of Colorado, DAVID A. DASHNEY, for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of 31 U.S.C. 5313(a) and Title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 103.22(a)(1), knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully structured or attempted to structure a transaction or transactions or knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully induced, counseled, or commanded Sandra Jarrett to structure or attempt to structure a transaction or transactions, to wit: the purchase with cash on the same business day of $99,999.93 of cashiers checks payable to the order of DAVID A. DASHNEY, with one or more domestic financial institutions in metropolitan Denver, to wit: [alleging transactions with eleven financial institutions] . . . or knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully procured or caused the structuring or attempted structuring of a transaction or transaction, to wit: the purchase of cash on the same business day of $99,999.93 of cashier's checks payable to the order of DAVID A. DASHNEY, with one or more domestic financial institutions, to wit: those transactions described above in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324(3), 5322(a), all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. (Emphasis added). We hold that the indictment adequately informed Dashney of the charge against him. When reviewing a post-verdict challenge to an indictment asserting the absence of an element of the offense, the indictment is sufficient if it contains “words of similar import” to the element in question. United States v. Brown, 995 F.2d 1493, 1505 (10th Cir. 1991). “The indictment is not insufficient merely because it fails to recite the precise language of the statute.” Poole, 929 F.2d at - 17 - 1479. Instead, “[a]n indictment that sets forth the words of the statute generally is sufficient so long as the statute itself adequately states the elements of the offense.” United States v. Darrell, 828 F.2d 644, 647 (10th Cir. 1987). Moreover, a verdict against the defendant will generally cure mere technical defects unless it is apparent that they have resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Clay v. United States, 326 F.2d 196, 198 (10th Cir. 1963). Although the indictment did not contain the word “willful,” the indictment did charge the defendant with knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully structuring. These are words of similar import sufficient to adequately inform Dashney of the charge against him. Moreover, the indictment specifically cited 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a), which requires the “willful” structuring of a currency transaction. See United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 400 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding an indictment in part because it specifically cited the statute at issue), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 966 (1996). Although Dashney argues that he was prejudiced by the wording of the indictment because he was not allowed to present his theory of defense, this argument is without merit as we discussed above. Dashney was permitted to pursue a defense that he did not know that his structuring was illegal. The jury simply did not believe his story. Under these circumstances, we hold that the - 18 - indictment is not jurisdictionally defective such that Dashney did not have fair notice of the charges against him.