Opinion ID: 2401609
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impairment of Contract Issue

Text: This issue is raised only by the implication that on January 1, 1966 plaintiff had contractual relations with clients which the requirement of license, denied him, impaired. The record does not establish that such contracts in fact existed, but, if so, the law is not unconstitutionally defective in this respect. See In re Guilford Water Company (1919) 118 Me. 367, 372, 108 A. 446, where appears (t)he rule is general that every contract touching matters within the police power must be held to have been entered into with the distinct understanding that the continuing supremacy of the state, if exerted for the common good and welfare, can modify the contract when and as the benefit of that interest properly may require. Also Baxter v. Waterville Sewerage District, 146 Me. 211, 218, 79 A.2d 585. This rule is reiterated and applied in American Budget Corp. v. Furman, 67 N.J.Super. 134, 170 A.2d 63, [9] 69, affirmed by the court of last resort (1961) 36 N.J. 129, 175 A.2d 622, against an attack on a statute in substance outlawing the business of debt adjusting. The plaintiff, never having been licensed, can base no challenge of the statute upon the false premise that the relationship between the State and him, as a licentiate, is contractual, which contract the statute impairs. 33 Am.Jur., Licenses § 21, and see Hughes v. State Board of Medical Examiners (1926) 162 Ga. 246, 134 S.E. 42, [4] 47. Due Process, Equal Protection and Unjust Discrimination Issues There is case law in abundance recording unsuccessful attacks founded upon these constitutional issues upon licensing statutes. The majority in number of these cases arose by reason of the complainant's license having been revoked on account of disqualifying conduct. The minority in number have arisen by virtue of the licensing board's denial of license because of disqualifying conduct. We consider that the constitutional issues here raised have equal application to each situation. The constitutional validity of denying a license rests upon the same ground as the constitutional validity of revoking a previously granted license. In each case constitutional due process as to hearing is implicit. The salient point of concern here is the statutory provision by which the disqualifying conduct is measured. Many cases turn upon disqualification expressed in general terms, the interpretation and application of which rests with the board of licensure. Revocations: See as to medical doctors, unprofessional conduct (including by definition acts mala prohibitum or mala in se and mental incompetency) Hubbard v. Washington State Medical Disciplinary Board (1960) 55 Wash.2d 546, 348 P.2d 981; gross immorality Meffert v. State, supra (Kan.1903); misconduct Ladrey v. Commission on Licensure to Practice The Healing Art in The District of Columbia (1958) 104 U.S.App.D.C. 239, 261 F.2d 68; conviction of crime involving moral turpitude Hughes v. State Board of Medical Examiners (1926) 162 Ga. 246, 134 S.E. 42. See as to dentists, immoral or dishonorable conduct South Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Breeland (1946) 208 S.C. 469, 38 S.E.2d 644, 167 A.L.R. 221; moral turpitude Brun v. Lazzell (1937) 172 Md. 314, 191 A. 240, 109 A.L.R. 1453. See as to osteopath, Unprofessional and dishonorable conduct (including by definition, drug addiction, knowingly making false documents in connection with practice) Rose v. State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts (Mo. 1965) 397 S.W.2d 570. See as to druggists, abuse of (professional) trust Straight v. Crawford (1888) 73 Iowa 676, 35 N.W. 920. See as to suspension of Attorney at Law, commission of `any act contrary to honesty, justice or good morals' In re Morris (1965) 74 N.M. 679, 397 P.2d 475; as to disbarment for lack of good moral character Sanborn v. Kimball (1875) 64 Me. 140; and Ex parte Wall (1882) 107 U.S. 265, 2 S.Ct. 569, 27 L. Ed. 552. Denials of license: Requirement that applicant be without infirmity of body or mind, and criminal record to be considered Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, Baltimore City Police Department (1964  Applicant for taxi license) 236 Md. 476, 204 A.2d 521; conviction of misdemeanor for dispensing drugs without prescription, Thomas v. Board of Pharmacy (1910  druggist) 152 N.C. 373, 67 S.E. 925; requirement of good moral character and fitness and propriety to engage in the proposed business, McDonough v. Goodcell (1939  bail bonding) 13 Cal.2d 741, 91 P.2d 1035, 123 A.L.R. 1205; requirement of good moral character and non-advocacy of violent overthrow of state or federal government, Konigsberg v. State Bar of California (1961  applicant for admission to bar) 366 U.S. 36, 81 S.Ct. 997, 6 L.Ed.2d 105. Our statute differs from those involved in the cases just cited, in that the responsibility of the licensing board to determine quasi-judicially whether or not the alleged conduct falls within the statutory proscription is substantially obviated. By express terms of Section 575: No license shall be granted to an applicant    if such applicant   , has been convicted    of the crime of   , embezzlement,   , of which the record of conviction    shall be conclusive evidence. This expression of disqualification is even more specific than that in those cases in which a license has been revoked for conviction of a felony. Page v. Watson (1938  physician) 140 Fla. 536, 192 So. 205, 126 A.L.R. 249; United States v. Goodloe (D.C. of D.C.1964  physician) 228 F.Supp. 164; and conviction of a crime Munkley v. Hoyt et al. (1901  pharmacist) 179 Mass. 108, 60 N.E. 413. Of particular significance is the holding in DeVeau v. Braisted (1960) 363 U.S. 144, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1109, in which the State of New York disqualified ex-felons from waterfront union offices, and in upholding the statute, plurality of the Court said in [3] at page 1154: Barring convicted felons from certain employments is a familiar legislative device to insure against corruption in specified, vital areas. Federal law has frequently and of old utilized this type of disqualification. [3]    State provisions disqualifying convicted felons from certain employments important to the public interest also have a long history. See, e. g., Hawker v. People of State of New York, 170 U.S. 189, 18 S.Ct. 573, 79 L.Ed. 1311,   . The question in each case (page 1155) where unpleasant consequences are brought to bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation, such as the proper qualifications for a profession. See Hawker   . Paraphrasing DeVeau from page 1155 of 80 S.Ct., No doubt is justified regarding the legislative purpose of the Maine statute. The law is not to punish ex-felons, but to devise what was felt to be appropriate regulation for an activity in the public interest. The rationale of DeVeau was later applied in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435. While in general we have equated the principle concerned in revocation of a license with those concerned in denial of a license, plaintiff urges that his disqualification occurred prior to the effective date of the licensing statute and that that is a fact of controlling significance, apart from its claimed ex post facto nature. Not so. The statute speaks in the present and only declares that past conduct is to be considered in determining present fitness for engagement in the proposed activity, a praesenti or in futuro. See under denials of license McDonough v. Goodcell (1939), 13 Cal.2d 741, 91 P.2d 1035, [19, 20] 1041, 123 A.L.R. 1205 and Hawker, supra, 170 U.S. at page 200, 18 S.Ct. 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002. An attack upon an habitual criminal statute which was applied to a conviction occurring before the statute became effective, upon constitutional grounds, was summarily held to be without merit in State v. Chamineak (Mo.1941) 343 S.W.2d 153, [20] 163, and Lawrence v. Commonwealth (1965) 206 Va. 51, 141 S.E.2d 735, [1] 736. A challenge to a Federal Firearms Act which prohibited one previously convicted of a crime of violence to possess firearms was upheld in Cases v. U. S. (1 CCA, 1942) 131 F.2d 916, [5, 6] 921 where the Court said legality of present conduct may depend upon past behavior even behavior before the passage of the regulatory act. Attacks upon identical grounds by complainants who purport to engage in business involving the financial community have been no more successful. See American Budget Corp. v. Furman (1961  debt adjusting) 67 N.J.Super. 134, 170 A.2d 63, [9] 69, affirmed by Court of last resort (1961) 36 N.J. 129, 175 A.2d 622; Ferguson v. Skrupa (Kan.1963  debt adjusting) 372 U.S. 726, 83 S.Ct. 1028, 10 L.Ed.2d 93; State ex rel. Clark v. Brown (1965  budget counseling) 1 Ohio St.2d 121, 205 N.E.2d 377; Hankins v. Spaulding (1957  collection agency) 78 Idaho 533, 307 P.2d 222. Examination of the cases cited negatives the validity of plaintiff's constitutional contentions, including that which labels our statute as unjustly discriminating. In this respect the principles reviewed in Associated Hospital Service of Maine v. Mahoney et al., 161 Me. 391, 409, 213 A.2d 712, apply and support the collection agency classification as valid. Our statute is valid, and injunctive relief is denied. So ordered.