Opinion ID: 1663665
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Per Se Exclusion of Jurors with Immediate Family Members Who are Potential Class Members

Text: Defendants argue in favor of a per se rule excluding any prospective jurors who have immediate family members who are potential class members. Defendants reason that if the jury finds in favor of plaintiffs, such a finding will result in the availability of medical monitoring and smoking cessation assistance for these jurors' relatives. Under such circumstances, defendants suggest it is impossible for the district court not to reasonably believe that the juror's relationship with the immediate family member would not influence the juror in coming to a verdict, mandating that the challenge for cause be granted under La.Code Civ. P. art. 1765(3). Despite defendants' argument to the contrary, there is nothing in La.Code Civ. P. art. 1765(3) which would suggest the legislature intended a bright line rule which would automatically exclude a prospective juror for cause merely because that prospective juror may be influenced by a family relation. Rather, that article, which is phrased in permissive language, provides that a juror may be challenged for cause if the juror's blood relations are such that it must be reasonably believed that they would influence the juror in coming to a verdict: A juror may be challenged for cause based upon any of the following:    (3) When the relations whether by blood, marriage, employment, friendship, or enmity between the juror and any party or his attorney are such that it must be reasonably believed that they would influence the juror in coming to a verdict.... While this court has never addressed the precise issue presented in this case, we have never held that a juror should be automatically disqualified because of a relationship. For example, in State v. Gray, 351 So.2d 448, 455 (La.1977), the defendant argued the trial court should have excused three jurors because one juror was acquainted with the prosecuting and defense attorneys and was in business with the relative of a prosecuting attorney, one juror was a social friend of the prosecuting attorney and the third juror was the nephew of the sheriff of the parish where the prosecution was taking place. We found no error in the trial court's refusal to excuse these jurors, stating: A trial judge is granted much discretion in determining the composition of the jury. The mere existence of personal acquaintances between a prospective juror and the trial participants does not, without more, demonstrate a lack of fitness to serve as a juror. In the present case all three of the prospective jurors stated on voir dire that the relationship involved would not prevent their impartial service on the jury. We cannot say that the failure to excuse these jurors was an abuse of the trial judge's discretion. Similarly, courts have held the existence of a physician-patient relationship between a juror and the defendant was not sufficient to create a presumption that the juror could not render a fair verdict. Cobb v. Kleinpeter, 95-271 (La.App. 3rd Cir.10/4/95), 663 So.2d 236, writ denied, 95-2683 (La.1/12/96), 666 So.2d 323; Seals v. Pittman, 499 So.2d 114 (La.App. 1st Cir.1986). In Savoie v. McCall's Boat Rentals, Inc., 491 So.2d 94 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied, 494 So.2d 334 (La.1986), the defendant argued there should be an automatic prohibition against a husband and wife serving together on the same jury. The court of appeal rejected this argument, finding the trial court inquired as to whether they could exercise independent judgment, and was satisfied they could do so. In sum, we are convinced there is no legislative or jurisprudential support for defendants' position that all jurors with family members who are potential class members must be excluded from the jury on a per se basis. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err in refusing to excuse such persons from serving on the jury on this basis alone.