Opinion ID: 197798
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal and State Due Process Claims

Text: 31 The plaintiff asserts that his property and liberty interests were violated when he was allegedly deprived of his license without due process. We assume arguendo that his claim accrued at the latest possible date, December 28th, 1992, the day the plaintiff's license was permanently revoked, allegedly without due process. Because the plaintiff did not file his complaint in federal court until May 2, 1995, these claims are also time barred by the statute of limitations unless the statute was tolled under Puerto Rico law. 32 Unlike the search and seizure, illegal detention, and privacy claims discussed above, the plaintiff asserted in his motion for reconsideration, and allegedly in his negotiations with OCFI, that the administrative proceedings failed to afford him due process. In his motion he argued that his license was a right and not a privilege, and that he was not accorded due process of law in the administrative proceedings because the burden of proof was inappropriately shifted to him. The plaintiff's argument can, if read liberally, be understood to assert that the plaintiff was deprived of his property and liberty interests without due process of law. However, despite the plaintiff's assertion of these claims in the administrative proceeding, they are not preserved by the Puerto Rico tolling statute. 33 As we held in Torres, if a party seeks a remedy in an extrajudicial claim that is different from the remedy later sought in a judicial proceeding, the statute of limitations is not tolled. In Torres, the plaintiffs had been discharged from their positions as police officers. See 893 F.2d at 406. They filed an administrative action within the statute of limitations seeking reinstatement. After their administrative claim proved unsuccessful, they filed a § 1983 action in federal district court seeking damages, reinstatement, and the expunging of photographs and fingerprints filed with the police. By this time, the statute of limitations for their federal claim had expired. 34 In Torres, we found that because the remedies sought by the plaintiffs in the district court were not the same as they were in the administrative proceeding, there was no tolling of the statute of limitations by their extrajudicial assertion in the administrative action. In concluding that the § 1983 claim was time barred, we stated in Torres: 35 [T]he district court correctly held that the extrajudicial claim must claim the same relief later requested in the federal suit. The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claim [sic] is not tolled if the remedy requested in both suits is different.... The record supports the district court's finding that the plaintiff requested two distinct remedies.... Given that these remedies were not identical, there was no tolling and the prescription period expired.... 36 Id. at 407. The case at hand presents similar facts. Here, the plaintiff asserted constitutional claims before the administrative agency, which could have functioned as an extrajudicial claim under Puerto Rico law, tolling the statute of limitations. However, the plaintiff failed to seek the same remedies in the district court as he had sought in the administrative proceedings. In the administrative proceedings he sought only the reinstatement of his license, while in the district court he sought declaratory and monetary relief, as well as the reinstatement of his license. 8