Opinion ID: 1058818
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refusal to Admit Deposition Testimony

Text: The facts pertinent to this assignment of error concern the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Jones, who was Thornton's treating physician at the time of trial. Dr. Jones testified ore tenus that the prior surgeries performed by Dr. Glazer caused the deformities in the lesser toes of Thornton's left foot. Upon completion of Dr. Jones' testimony, he was released from his subpoena and permitted to leave. During the defendant's case-in-chief Dr. Charles M. Zelen testified that the deformity on the lesser toes of the left foot was caused by walking on the heel and the side of [the] foot for a period of eleven months after the surgery performed by Dr. Glazer. For rebuttal, Thornton sought to introduce a portion of Dr. Jones' deposition wherein he testified that the deformity could not have been self-imposed by use of the foot. Although Dr. Jones testified earlier in the trial, he had been released and was no longer subject to a subpoena. The trial court denied Thornton's motion on the basis that Rule 4:7 did not permit introduction of the deposition testimony. The trial court stated from the bench that Rule 4:7 applies only to circumstances in which the witness is unavailable at all. Does not attend trial. Once they have attended the trial and been released, I am not sure any of these apply ... Rule 4:7(a)(4) in pertinent part provides: (4) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose in any action upon a claim arising at law ... if the court finds: ... (E) that the witness is a judge, or is a superintendent of a hospital for the insane more than 30 miles from the place of trial, or is a physician, surgeon, dentist, chiropractor, or registered nurse who, in the regular course of his profession, treated or examined any party to the proceeding, or is in any public office or service the duties of which prevent his attending court provided, however, that if the deponent is subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the court may, upon a showing of good cause or sua sponte, order him to attend and to testify ore tenus ... (Emphasis added.) When applying our rules, we adhere to the plain language used in the rule. Lifestar Response of Md., Inc. v. Vegosen, 267 Va. 720, 724, 594 S.E.2d 589, 591 (2004); Mechtensimer v. Wilson, 246 Va. 121, 122, 431 S.E.2d 301, 302 (1993). Rule 4:7(a)(4)(E) applies to deposition testimony by a physician who either treated or examined any party to the proceeding. Contrary to other subsections in Rule 4:7(a)(4) that specifically require unavailability of the witness, the application of subsection (E) is based entirely upon the witness falling within one of the listed categories. Consequently, a party is entitled to offer into evidence the deposition testimony of a treating physician even if the physician is available, unless the trial court finds good cause under subsection (E) to order attendance to testify ore tenus. This conclusion is directly supported by our prior holding in Henning v. Thomas, 235 Va. 181, 191, 366 S.E.2d 109, 115 (1988), where we said: First, Rule 4:7(a)(4)(E) does not make lack of availability a prerequisite for the use of a deposition of a treating or examining physician. Second, the last phrase of the rule ... provides a mechanism for determining when in-person testimony will be required. In Henning, the treating physician (whose deposition was admitted) was deemed available in the jurisdiction where the trial was held, but we held that admission of the deposition testimony was not error under the plain terms of this rule, and while the option for the opponent to show good cause for requiring testimony ore tenus exists under the rule, [t]he defendants never sought to avail themselves of this mechanism. Id. When announcing its interpretation of Rule 4:7, the trial court cited King v. International Harvester Co., 212 Va. 78, 181 S.E.2d 656, as supporting its view of Rule 4:7. However, our holding in King is inapposite to the facts presented in this case. There, we analyzed Rule 4:1(d)(3)(2), a predecessor to the current Rule 4:7(a)(4)(B), and the sole question we addressed was whether a party deponent had procured his own absence from the trial within the meaning of the Rule. 212 Va. at 80, 181 S.E.2d at 658. We held that `the absence' of the witness as used in the second condition of the rule means absence from the trial. Id. at 84, 181 S.E.2d at 660 (emphasis added). The second condition referred to is the current Rule 4:7(a)(4)(B), which requires that a deponent be located farther than 100 miles from the place of the trial or hearing in order for deposition testimony to be used. Clearly, that is not the issue in this case because here the deponent is a treating physician, not a party, and it was never argued that he was located outside 100 miles from the trial. As a result, our prior interpretation of what is now subsection (B) is not relevant to these facts, but subsection (E), which pertains to treating physicians, is dispositive. Pursuant to Rule 4:7(a)(4)(E), Thornton was entitled to use the deposition testimony of his treating physician for any purpose, so long as it met the conditions for admissibility, without regard to availability or prior attendance for testimony ore tenus at trial. The trial court erred by denying Thornton's motion to use the deposition testimony in rebuttal.