Opinion ID: 1958228
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the strike case.

Text: The matter of allowances in the strike case presents much greater difficulty. There can be no doubt that the suit was within the scope of the Anti-Injunction Act and that the interlocutory injunction was thereafter reversed by an appellate court  the triggering element in the language of N.J.S. 2A:15-53 relating to costs and counsel fees. In this respect our statute goes beyond the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 107) and seemingly most other state anti-injunction laws in which the condition of the bond is limited to a final denial of relief by the trial court only. These statutes in this respect follow the general equity practice in ordinary injunction suits. The question is whether costs and counsel fees must be allowed whenever there is a reversal for any reason or only when it is based on a finding that the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction on the actual events which prompted the suit. We should first dispose of plaintiff's contention that the issue has been settled by the Appellate Division's express disallowance of costs to defendant in that court on the main appeal. 59 N.J. Super., at p. 285. That ruling clearly has no such effect. No application for costs under section 53 had been made to the court and, although the opinion indicates it was cognizant of the bond and the cost and counsel fee provisions of the act, it cannot be said that the determination as to appellate costs was made in the light of the statute. If the court had remained silent costs would have automatically followed, R.R. 1:9-2. Therefore it seems to have said that if it had any discretion on the subject as in a non-labor injunction litigation, costs would be disallowed. By the same token it is to be inferred that it would have denied counsel fees if that matter had been before it on a similar basis. We can only surmise that this point of view was reached because, while defendants won on procedural grounds, plaintiff was entitled to an injunction on the merits. There is a complete absence of authority elsewhere on the precise question we have to decide. This is quite understandable when it is recalled that New Jersey seems to be the only jurisdiction which authorizes mandatory costs and counsel fees when an injunction is reversed on appeal as well as in the case of dissolution before final judgment in the trial court. Cases like Dinny & Robbins, Inc. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union, 41 N.Y.S. 2 d 375 ( Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1943), relied on by defendants, therefore have no decisive significance. Defendants principally urge that the answer is dictated in their favor by certain language of this court in Westinghouse, supra (23 N.J. 170), our only decision bearing on the problem. We agree that the rationale of Westinghouse points the way this case should go, but that way runs in a different direction than defendants would have us take. They place reliance on the sentence of the opinion which reads: Its [ section 53] plain meaning and fairest interpretation is that the defendants restrained by such a suit shall be entitled to costs and counsel fees if the suit is ultimately unsuccessful. (Emphasis added) (23 N.J., at pp. 175-176). While these words are undoubtedly broad, their fair meaning must depend on both the context of the facts and of the balance of the opinion. The very next sentence  The intendment of the statute clearly covers the present plaintiff's failure to obtain relief  evidences that the statutory language and the court's paraphrase thereof were not considered to be unyielding as to intention with respect to the particular situation. In Westinghouse, the plaintiff had previously obtained an ex parte temporary restraint which, on contested hearing, was dissolved because plaintiff then failed to establish its right to injunctive relief. A supplemental complaint was thereafter filed and proceeded to trial. The court ordered certain of plaintiff's officers to be produced for examination with respect to the statutory prerequisite ( N.J.S. 2A:15-54) of prior reasonable effort to settle the dispute, an element which the defendants were vigorously contesting. Plaintiff subsequently moved to dismiss its complaint voluntarily rather than comply with the order to produce and the action was dismissed with prejudice. Since the plaintiff had abandoned its case and so had not proved a right to injunctive relief on the merits, the award of costs and counsel fees to the defense was held to be mandatory and within the intendment of the statute in the light of the factual situation. Our case is vastly different and each case must be considered in its own peculiar setting. The two paragraphs in Westinghouse immediately after the sentences previously quoted indicate the court's view that the cost and counsel fee provisions of section 53 have to be construed to warrant an award only when there was no merit to the action and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. So it was said: The basic principle is part of a scheme to secure the right of labor to use all legal means in urging its position upon the employer. The Legislature apparently thought that if the employer were not subject to such liability for wrongful or unsuccessful attempts at restraint, by virtue of his superior capital position he could render impotent labor's efforts to defend itself with presumably limited resources against suits which might be designed to harass and embarrass. The legislative idea was to guarantee a fairly equal legal position to labor by providing for counsel fees and costs when the effort made against it was unsuccessful. Thus, if industry were right, labor would receive nothing under the enactment, but if industry were wrong, labor would be protected through compensation, at least to the extent of the counsel fees and costs necessary to defend the suit adjudicated to have been wrongfully brought. (23 N.J., at p. 176) (Emphasis added) In the instant case it is clear that the suit was not wrongfully brought or designed to harass and embarrass. The Appellate Division held that defendants' behavior, on the totality of the proofs, was such as to have afforded a substantive basis for injunctive relief. (59 N.J. Super., at p. 263.) The reversal was grounded upon procedural violations only, principally the delay of the trial court in deciding the case, for which plaintiff was not responsible. The transgressions pointed out by the court were not the basis of defense either at the trial or appellate levels until the reviewing tribunal raised them on its own motion. While the policy behind the Anti-Injunction Act without more may well require a plaintiff to suffer the sanction of dissolution of the relief to which he was meritoriously entitled despite absence of personal culpability, we do not think the provision for costs and counsel fees can fairly be construed also to impose upon him that additional burden, which, as witness the amount requested in this case, can be a very substantial one. We therefore hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court was correct in denying costs and counsel fees to defendants. The judgments of the Chancery Division are affirmed. Costs to respondent in the arbitration case only. For affirmance  Chief Justice WEINTRAUB, and Justices JACOBS, FRANCIS, PROCTOR, HALL, SCHETTINO and HANEMAN  7. For reversal  None.