Opinion ID: 1170873
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hearsay Statements by the Victim

Text: The court admitted into evidence the statements that Schmidt-Till made to Officer Strigotte at the scene of the crime and a tape recording of statements Schmidt-Till made by telephone to the police dispatcher. These are, of course, hearsay, and may not be admitted into evidence unless they come under one of the exceptions to the rule. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) The court found the statements admissible both as spontaneous utterances and as dying declarations. Defendant attacks this ruling.
To come within the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule, an utterance must first purport to describe or explain an act or condition perceived by the declarant. (Evid. Code, § 1240, subd. (a).) Secondly, the statement must be made spontaneously, while the declarant is under the stress of excitement caused by the perception. ( Id., subd. (b).) (1a) (See fn. 1.), (2a) Defendant disputes that the utterances were spontaneous. [1] When the dispatcher called Schmidt-Till, the following dialogue, played back at the trial, ensued: Schmidt-Till: Hello. Dispatcher: Erich? Schmidt-Till: Yeah. Dispatcher: This is the police department. Schmidt-Till: Uh-huh. (Affirmative.) Dispatcher: Have you been shot? Schmidt-Till: Three times. Dispatcher: Who shot you? Schmidt-Till: I'm not sure. I'm hurting. Dispatcher: Okay. There's an officer and an ambulance on the way. What did the guy look like? Schmidt-Till: I'll tell you when you get here. .... .... .... .... .... Dispatcher: No. You tell me now so we know who we're looking for. Schmidt-Till: I can't talk. I've been shot in the mouth. Dispatcher: Erich, where were you shot? Schmidt-Till: In the mouth and in the stomach. .... .... .... .... .... Dispatcher: Was it a white male or a black male? Schmidt-Till: White. Dispatcher: A white male? How  Schmidt-Till: I know his name. Dispatcher: You know him? Schmidt-Till: I just can't remember his name. .... .... .... .... .... Dispatcher: How old is he? Schmidt-Till: About 35. .... .... .... .... .... Dispatcher: Was it a handgun? Schmidt-Till: Yes. (Groaning.) Also admitted into evidence was the subsequent conversation between Officer Strigotte and Schmidt-Till. Strigotte testified that he found the victim bleeding but conscious and talking on the telephone. He questioned Schmidt-Till regarding the incident, but from moment to moment had to halt the questioning because of the victim's obvious pain. Schmidt-Till reiterated that he knew his assailant but could not remember his name. In response to specific questions, he described the man's race, weight, height, and age. Strigotte also asked about the assailant's clothing, hair color, tattoos, scars, and facial hair, but Schmidt-Till could not remember these features. He did say that Reed was his roommate but was not the one who shot him; the gunman, he asserted, was a customer of Reed. In addition, he gave an account of how the shooting occurred. Strigotte conjectured that the questioning lasted approximately five minutes. He elicited the information through a series of questions, each of which was answered separately. In one sense, a spontaneous utterance is one that is voluntary and is initiated by, or at least not elicited from, the speaker. Under this literal interpretation of spontaneity, few of Schmidt-Till's statements would qualify. The dispatcher urged him to answer her questions, refusing to let him wait until help arrived. While his answers to Strigotte were more voluntary, none of the information was given on his own initiative, but likewise was elicited by specific questions. But spontaneous may also be used in a slightly different sense: to describe actions undertaken without deliberation or reflection. This is what is intended by Evidence Code section 1240, which codifies the earlier common law exception to the hearsay rule ( People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1170, 1176 [81 Cal. Rptr. 5, 459 P.2d 259, 39 A.L.R.3d 541]). As this court stated in Showalter v. Western Pacific R.R. Co. (1940) 16 Cal.2d 460, 468 [106 P.2d 895], the basis for the circumstantial trustworthiness of spontaneous utterances is that in the stress of nervous excitement, the reflective faculties may be stilled and the utterance may become the instinctive and uninhibited expression of the speaker's actual impressions and belief. (3a) The crucial element in determining whether a declaration is sufficently reliable to be admissible under this exception to the hearsay rule is thus not the nature of the statement but the mental state of the speaker. The nature of the utterance  how long it was made after the startling incident and whether the speaker blurted it out, for example  may be important, but solely as an indicator of the mental state of the declarant. The fact that a statement is made in response to questioning is one factor suggesting the answer may be the product of deliberation, but it does not ipso facto deprive the statement of spontaneity. Thus, an answer to a simple inquiry has been held to be spontaneous. (See, e.g., People v. Washington, supra, 71 Cal.2d at pp. 1176-1177; In re Damon H. (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 471, 475 [211 Cal. Rptr. 623]; People v. Bernalley (1960) 185 Cal. App.2d 326, 329-330 [8 Cal. Rptr. 375].) More detailed questioning, in contrast, is likely to deprive the response of the requisite spontaneity. (See, e.g., People v. Keelin (1955) 136 Cal. App.2d 860, 866-870 [289 P.2d 520, 56 A.L.R.2d 355]; cf. Dolberg v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co. (1954) 126 Cal. App.2d 487, 488-490 [272 P.2d 527].) But ultimately each fact pattern must be considered on its own merits, and the trial court is vested with reasonable discretion in the matter. ( Showalter v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., supra, 16 Cal.2d at pp. 468-469.) (2b) On the record before us we conclude that the court did not err in admitting both conversations. It is true that we have rarely held the answers to such extensive questioning to be spontaneous utterances. (But see also People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 317-320 [246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082].) Nonetheless, there is no doubt that Schmidt-Till was excited, or perhaps more accurately, distraught and in severe pain. He was not merely an uninjured witness whose excitement might wane  and would thus be in a position to fabricate answers  through the sobering interrogation of an investigator. His responses were not self-serving. (Cf. People v. Keelin, supra, 136 Cal. App.2d at pp. 870-871.) Nor were the questions suggestive. (Cf. Wiley v. Easter (1962) 203 Cal. App.2d 845, 855 [21 Cal. Rptr. 905].) While he was being questioned, the intense pain of his gunshot wounds and the concern he rightfully had about his survival no doubt preoccupied him so that he could not have contemplated spinning a false tale. In sum, he had so little opportunity and incentive to deliberate that under these unusual circumstances we can dispense with the testimonial requirements of an oath and cross-examination. (Accord, People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 319-320.) The mental state of the declarant, however, is but one of the two elements required for a spontaneous utterance. In addition, the statement must purport to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant.... (Evid. Code, § 1240, subd. (a).) (4a) Defendant contends that Schmidt-Till's statements that his assailant was acquainted with his roommate Reed, that defendant had purchased drugs from Reed, and that defendant's name was on the telephone list did not narrate, describe, or explain the shooting. We disagree. Although not independently admissible under this exception for their truth, these statements help describe the event by identifying the perpetrator. The claim that the assailant was one of Reed's customers not only helped identify him, but also aided in explaining the event as potentially drug-related. Defendant also stresses the requirement that the declarant must have perceived what he describes or explains. This, he suggests, rules out Schmidt-Till's comment that he believed his assailant entered the apartment to steal his roommate's drugs. But the statements regarding drug dealing, while they do not describe the attack, do help to explain an event perceived by the declarant and are, therefore, admissible. Since we hold that the admission of Schmidt-Till's statements as spontaneous utterances was not error, we need not decide whether they were also admissible as dying declarations.
(5a) Even if Schmidt-Till's statements come within an exception to the hearsay rule, defendant argues that their admission violates his right to confront a witness against him. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) The confrontation clause is not just a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common law. ( California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149, 155-156 [26 L.Ed.2d 489, 495-496, 90 S.Ct. 1930].) (6a) Rather, the United States Supreme Court has identified two factors for determining whether a hearsay exception violates the confrontation clause. First, the state must produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant. That requirement is easily met here. Second, if the declarant is not available, the statement must bear sufficient indicia of reliability. ( Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 [65 L.Ed.2d 597, 608, 100 S.Ct. 2531].) (5b) In our assessment of whether indicia of reliability underlie a specific hearsay exception, we essentially determine whether the historical reasons for believing that a particular type of statement is inherently reliable have withstood the test of time. The spontaneous utterance exception, in general, meets this test. Where the declarant is truly excited and makes a statement about a concurrently or recently perceived event before having the opportunity to think through the possible consequences of his utterance, it is likely to be a reliable statement. Several cases have held that admission of spontaneous utterances does not violate the confrontation clause. (See, e.g., People v. Jones (1984) 155 Cal. App.3d 653, 664 [202 Cal. Rptr. 289]; People v. Orduno (1978) 80 Cal. App.3d 738, 748 [145 Cal. Rptr. 806]; McLaughlin v. Vinzant (1st Cir.1975) 522 F.2d 448, 450-451; Shaffer v. Field (9th Cir.1973) 484 F.2d 1196, 1197.) Defendant does not dispute that spontaneous statements, as a general proposition, are reliable. Rather, he asserts that the statements made in this case lack the requisite indicia of reliability. We conclude otherwise. When Schmidt-Till responded to the dispatcher's and Officer Strigotte's questions, he was gravely wounded and in intense pain. It is improbable that he had either the capacity or the motivation to relate anything but the truth. As another court has stated: The remark followed hard upon an event  a shooting  likely to produce the utmost in excitement and shock and to ensure the utterance's spontaneity and, presumably, its truthfulness. ( McLaughlin v. Vinzant, supra, 522 F.2d at p. 450.)
(7a) Defendant's final contention regarding Schmidt-Till's statements is that the court abused its discretion in admitting the tape recording of his telephone call to the dispatcher. He claims the recording was both irrelevant and highly inflammatory. The exclusion of relevant but prejudicial evidence is governed by Evidence Code section 352, which provides in part that the court may in its discretion exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will ... create substantial danger of undue prejudice. (8a) Failure of the court to weigh the probative value of challenged evidence against its prejudicial effect is an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 801 [388 P.2d 892].) The weighing must be made explicit in the record. ( People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 526 [224 Cal. Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251]; People v. Montiel (1985) 39 Cal.3d 910, 924-925 [218 Cal. Rptr. 572, 705 P.2d 1248]; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 24-25 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) Silence in the record does not allow the inference that the court understood and performed its duty; the court must affirmatively articulate the fact that it has weighed probative value against prejudice. ( People v. Green, supra, at p. 25; People v. Frank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 711, 732 [214 Cal. Rptr. 801, 700 P.2d 415]; People v. Leonard (1983) 34 Cal.3d 183, 187-188 [193 Cal. Rptr. 171, 666 P.2d 28].) (7b) In the case at bar, the few comments the court made do not show affirmatively that it had engaged in a weighing process: I don't believe the tape is that emotional. You know, we get more emotional things presented to us through the media every day. It's a horrible thing, but I wouldn't in no way equate it to a photograph of a girl, for example, who has been brutalized and raped and murdered. It's nothing like that. The court's analysis is sufficient as far as it goes, but fails to mention the other side of the balance: the probative value, which might be so slight that even a modestly prejudicial piece of evidence should be excluded. Because the court did not make explicit its weighing process, the admission of the tape recording was error. (9a) To determine prejudice we must inquire whether the trial court would have reached a different result if it had weighed the relevant considerations and stated that fact on the record. (7c) The recording surely had some prejudicial effect  the passions of the jury must have been aroused by it, creating a danger that the jurors' desire to see someone brought to justice for this crime might interfere with their duty to meticulously appraise the evidence. The People make several arguments regarding the probative value of the tape recording. They suggest that the tape was useful in allowing the jury the rare ... benefit of hearing the last words of a murder victim. This is hardly probative of any relevant issue. They also point to its description of the assailant. But the information on the tape was minimal and cumulative; Officer Strigotte's recitation was far more useful and subsumed all relevant descriptions on the tape. To the extent this information was probative, it could as easily have been admitted in the form of a transcript, thus avoiding inflaming the passions of the jury by so vividly recreating the aftermath of the shooting. Absent a good reason there was no need to fill the courtroom with [the victim's] groans. ( People v. Love (1960) 53 Cal.2d 843, 857 [3 Cal. Rptr. 665, 350 P.2d 705].) The People also contend, however, that the tape was probative because it allowed the jury to determine that Schmidt-Till was relatively lucid despite his injuries. This was a crucial issue in the case, and listening to Schmidt-Till's voice on the tape is persuasive evidence that while he was frightened and in intense pain, his mental faculties had not yet been seriously impaired by his wounds. The jury was entitled to hear his confident tone when he described his assailant and declared that he knew the man even though he could not remember his name. The probative value of the recording in this respect outweighed any prejudice to defendant, and the court's failure to make its balancing of these factors explicit was thus harmless.