Opinion ID: 21517
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Language and Construction of the TCHRA

Text: 17 We find support for this conclusion not only in the Supreme Court's guidance, but also in the TCHRA itself. Section 21.254 of the Texas Labor Code (the relevant provision of the TCHRA) is undeniably somewhat ambiguous; indeed, its ambiguity forms the basis of this dispute. Section 21.254 provides that [w]ithin 60 days after the date a notice of the right to file a civil action is received, the complainant may bring a civil action against the respondent. As the district court rightly observed, this section does not specify which notice will trigger the sixty-day period; it lacks a clear modifier, such as notice from the commission. There are, however, several factors that militate strongly in favor of construing section 21.254 to refer only to a right to file a civil action letter issued by the TCHR. 18 First, the language of the statute supports this reading. When the terms of a statute are ambiguous, we will employ cannons of statutory construction to discern the legislature's intent. See Estate of Padilla v. Charter Oaks Fire Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied). Section 21.254 refers not merely to a notice, but to a notice of the right to file a civil action. Section 21.252 employs the same term: it provides that acomplainant who receives notice that her complaint has not been either dismissed or resolved is entitled to request from the commission a written notice of the complainant's right to file a civil action. In the absence of some indication to the contrary, we interpret words or phrases that appear repeatedly in a statute to have the same meaning. See Boriack v. Boriack, 541 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ dism'd) (When a word or a phrase is used in different parts of a statute, a clear meaning appearing in one instance will be attached to it elsewhere.). There is no indication that the legislature intended section 21.254 to refer to anything other than the TCHR right to file a civil action letter, and this Court thus should give the language in section 21.254 the same meaning as the identical language in section 21.252: that a notice of right to file a civil action signifies the TCHR right to file a civil action letter only. The presence of the indefinite article a, which thedistrict relied upon to support its reading of section 21.254, gives way to this narrower reading in light of the statute's repeated use of the particular phrase right to file a civil action. This interpretation thereby gives meaning to all the words in the statute, while still retaining the same meaning for the recurring term. See Padilla, 843 S.W.2d at 198 (We give full effect to all the statute's language and not just one word or phrase.). 19 Second, we note in passing that this term also appears as the heading of the TCHR right to file a civil action letter, Notice of Right to File a Civil Action. Moreover, the letter itself states that it was issued pursuant to both sections 21.252 and 21.254. Though the letter is not part of the statute, its use of the same language that appears in sections 21.254 and 21.254 marginally lends further credence to the interpretation that section 21.254's reference to a notice in fact means a letter from the TCHR. 20 Third, and more importantly, the earlier version of the TCHRA stated unambiguously that only the letter from the TCHRA would start the sixty-day filing period. Before the recodification of the Texas statutes began, section 7.01(a) of the TCHRA provided in relevant part: 21 If the complaint filed with the commission pursuant to [the TCHRA] is dismissed by the commission, or if within 180 days after the date of filing of the complaint the commission has not filed a civil action under this section or has not successfully negotiated a conciliation agreement between the complainant and respondent, the commission shall so notify the complainant in writing by certified mail. Within 60 days after the date of receipt of the notice, a civil action may be brought by the complainant against the respondent named in the charge . . . . Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stat. art. 5221k, § 7.01(a) (Vernon 1983) (emphasis added). 22 In that version of the statute, the notice clearly referred to the letter from the TCHR; there was no need to repeat that point (that is, to insert from the commission after the notice). Two cases interpreting the TCHRA before recodification reached the same conclusion. In Schroeder, the Texas Supreme Court discussed the TCHR notification letter and stated that [a]fter receipt of this notice, the complainant has 60 days in which to bring a civil action against the respondent. See 813 S.W.2d at 486 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals in Eckerdt also considered the TCHR letter to be the lone trigger for the 60 day filing period: [t]he language of this section states simply that a complainant may bring suit within 60 days of receiving notice from the commission. 802 S.W.2d at 71. 23 The only changes to the TCHRA since the legislature recodified it in the Texas Labor Code are that the notice of dismissal and the right to file a civil action letter are now two separate pieces of correspondence and that in section 21.254the has been changed to a. The first difference is of no relevance to the triggering of the sixty-day period, and the second, as noted above, does not evince an intent to broaden the category of notice to include receipts of federal right to sue letters as mechanisms that start that period. [W]hen the wording and the language in the recodification is substantially the same and the functions of the [topic at issue] are identical to that of the former article . . . , it should be held that they convey the same intent and meaning. Deep E. Texas Reg'l Health and Mental Retardation Servs. v. Kinnear, 877 S.W.2d 550, 562 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, no writ). In this case, the recodified TCHRA retains language that has been varied only slightly and the functions of the TCHRA letter and the triggering period are the same. Accordingly, we find that the interpretations by Schroeder and Eckerdt of the TCHRA remain sound. 24 Finally, the two unreported decisions relied on by the district court do not persuade us to the contrary. In Dean v. Xerox Corp., 1997 WL 756574 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 1997), the district court held that the plaintiff's TCHRA claim was time-barred under section 21.254 because he did not file suit within sixty days of receipt of the EEOC letter. Dean's analysis of this issue is fairly cursory, however: the district court merely recites the language of section 21.254, observes that the defendant had received an EEOC letter, and deems that fact sufficient to trigger his right to sue period for purposes of the TCHRA. See id. at . The other case, Battee v. Eckerd Drugs, Inc., 1997 WL 340941 (N.D. Tex. June 12, 1997), is similarly opaque. In Battee, the district court dismissed the plaintiff's TCHRA claims because he failed to file suit within sixty days of receipt of the EEOC letter. The entirety of the Battee court's analysis amounts to a citation of TCHRA section 21.254 in a footnote for the proposition that claims in this situation are time-barred. See id. at  n.3. Neither opinion discusses the structure of the TCHRA or the possible complications involved in the relationship between the EEOC and TCHR; they simply assume that the notification letters from the EEOC and the TCHR are interchangeable.