Opinion ID: 2455522
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Storts

Text: An employee may be specially employed as a consulting-only expert. See Barker v. Dunham, 551 S.W.2d 41, 43-44 (Tex.1977, orig. proceeding). Nevertheless, all employees do not necessarily qualify as consulting-only experts. The rules provide requirements that a consulting-only expert must meet. See TEX.R.CIV.P. 166b(3)(b). Rule of Civil Procedure 166b(3)(b) provides: 3. Exemptions. The following matters are protected from disclosure by privilege: b. Experts. The identity, mental impressions, and opinions of an expert who has been informally consulted or of an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial ... Id. (emphasis added). Under this rule, a consulting-only expert must be informally consulted or retained or specially employed in anticipation of litigation. An employee who was employed in an area that becomes the subject of litigation can never qualify as a consulting-only expert because the employment was not in anticipation of litigation. On the other hand, an employee who was not employed in an area that becomes the subject of litigation and is reassigned specifically to assist the employer in anticipation of litigation arising out of the incident or in preparation for trial may qualify as a consulting-only expert. In any event, a party may discover facts known by an employee acting as a consulting-only expert. In this case, evidence presented to the trial court suggested that Storts was doing a combination of both working on the well and consulting. Storts was hired to work as a petroleum engineer and he worked on Key Well 1-11 before, during and after the blowout. After litigation began Apache asserted that Storts was a consulting-only expert and resisted all discovery of Storts' mental impressions, opinions and facts. On the record before him, the trial judge abused his discretion in denying discovery of Storts' mental impressions, opinions and facts because Storts did not qualify as a consulting-only expert. Policies previously enunciated by this court support the decision we reach today. This rule aims to effectuate the ultimate purpose of discovery, which is to seek truth, so that disputes may be decided by those facts that are revealed, rather than concealed. Jampole, 673 S.W.2d at 573. Additionally, although Apache and El Paso are defendants in this case, they are pursuing a cross claim and cannot use one hand to seek affirmative relief in court and with the other lower an iron curtain of silence around the facts of the case. Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tex.1985, orig. proceeding).