Opinion ID: 308266
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: As far as I was concerned it was an ultimatum.

Text: 48 Q. That was it, the Company wasn't going to go any further, right? 49 A. That's right. 50 Q. And there were going to be no changes? 51 A. Yes. 52 On the next day, the 24th, the Company's Mr. Loper called Mr. Fatta to arrange a meeting on the 25th. At that meeting Mr. Loper presented Mr. Fatta with the letter which announced the Company's withdrawal from the Association and its intention thenceforth to bargain with the Union on an individual basis. See Note 2, supra. The trial examiner found that at this meeting Mr. Loper told Mr. Fatta that he knew the Association would shortly reach an accord with the Union because it was weakkneed and susceptible to the Union's demands, which he regarded as being unreasonable. The trial examiner concluded the Company was dissatisfied with the trend of the negotiations and broke from the Association at that time in order to avoid being bound by an inevitable and distasteful agreement. 53 It is the Board's position that an impasse never in fact existed on the 23rd. It argues that only two days after the alleged impasse Mr. Loper himself acknowledged that the parties were approaching an agreement and, furthermore, less than two weeks following that conversation, the Union and the Association, after resuming negotiations, completed and executed a contract. 54 But crediting Mr. Fatta's testimony to the full extent that the trial examiner explicitly attached to it, and upon a review of the entire record, we think it apparent that the Association and the Union had indeed on the 23rd reached a deadlock, an impasse. Mr. Fatta himself characterized the Association's last offer as an ultimatum and stated that he did not expect any changes to be made; the Union, on the evening of the 23rd, elected to strike the Association members; and even the Federal mediator saw no point in scheduling another meeting because of the hopelessness of the situation. 3 From the Company's standpoint it was unfortunate that Mr. Loper chose to make the remarks he did to Mr. Fatta. But those comments simply do not comport with the facts as reflected by the record as a whole, especially when considered against the background of Mr. Fatta's description of the posture of the negotiations on the 23rd. Neither are they in agreement with the words the Company chose to use in its July 25 letter: 55 This is to inform you that as Local 550 Sign and Pictoral [sic] Painters [the Union] and the Houston Sign Manufacturers Assn. has reached an impasse concerning labor contracts . . 56 The language which Mr. Loper used to Mr. Fatta on the 25th was the only instance of its kind. This is the sole testimony in the record carrying the least intimation that the Company was breaking away from the Association solely to avoid a particular contract. While we defer to the Board's expertise in these matters, we will not abdicate our responsibility to determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence in support of the finding of a violation of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Brown, 1965, 380 U.S. 278, 291, 85 S.Ct. 980, 988, 13 L.Ed.2d 839, 849; Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 1950, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456. 57 It is our conclusion that the language Mr. Loper used to Mr. Fatta was an isolated instance which will not support a conclusion of the absence of an impasse existing between the Union and the Association on the 23rd. To argue that the fact a new contract was agreed to between the Union and the Association sans the Company less than two weeks after the events of the 25th is proof of the absence of an impasse on the 23rd itself we view as no more than an afterthought. 58 Convinced as we are that a genuine impasse in the bargaining was reached by the Association and the Union immediately prior to the Company's withdrawal from the multi-employer bargaining unit, we are without an opinion as to the legal consequences of that fact. This is because we have not had the benefit of a considered discussion of that issue by both parties herein subsequent to a decision on the question by the NLRB. Accordingly, we remand this case to the NLRB so that it may be given the first opportunity to decide whether an impasse such as found here excuses the Company from withdrawing from the multi-employer bargaining unit. 59 Finally, the Company argues that the fact of an impasse may be irrelevant where the Union negotiates with the employer after that employer has withdrawn from the multi-employer bargaining unit. This doctrine of implied consent, which would work to excuse the Company from withdrawal irrespective of an impasse on the theory that the Union retroactively acquiesced to the Company's action, may be of significance in another case, but not here. The facts of this case are clear that, just as the Company was unambiguous in its withdrawal from the Association, the Union was unequivocal in its objection to that action. The NLRB found that the post-July 25 contact between the Union and the Company here was not individual bargaining, but simply an attempt to persuade the Company to sign the Association agreement. We find no error in that decision and, therefore, do not decide here the fate of the implied consent doctrine in cases of this type. 60 Remanded for further Board proceedings consistent with this opinion.