Opinion ID: 578165
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mandatory or Discretionary

Text: 31 We must determine whether consideration of illegally seized evidence is mandatory, discretionary or prohibited. Obviously, we reject the latter. Instead of compelling the consideration of all evidence at sentencing, we could leave the decision to the judgment of the district courts. The argument supporting this position asserts that district judges would gain greater discretion if we were to allow them to disregard illegally seized evidence. By not considering suppressed items, a judge could impose a more lenient sentence. 32 We have given this argument serious consideration and, while we do not disagree with its underlying premise, we conclude that it represents a fundamental misunderstanding of our task. The Guidelines evince a clear desire for uniformity, and ad hoc determinations would create disparities in sentences in the absence of differences in conduct. To allow judges to decide whether to consider illegally seized evidence at sentencing without factoring in the Fourth Amendment--by excluding evidence only where a systemic remedy of substantial deterrence will ensue--would sidestep Congress and violate Separation of Powers principles. We will not overstep the proper bounds of our judicial role. 33 We conclude that the benefits of providing sentencing judges with reliable information about the defendant outweigh the likelihood that allowing consideration of illegally seized evidence will encourage unlawful police conduct. Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Consistent with our holding are the recent decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit and the Third Circuit holding that district judges normally should consider illegally seized evidence at sentencing. See United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226 (11th Cir.1991) (district judge should consider illegally seized evidence at sentencing), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63 (D.C.Cir.1991) (same), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992); United States v. Torres, 926 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.1991) (same); but see United States v. Jewel, 947 F.2d 224, 238-40 (7th Cir.1991) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). We believe that to avoid disparity in sentencing, which is one of the goals of the Guidelines, sentencing judges must consider relevant illegally seized evidence. 34
35 Tejada argues that even if Schipani remains good law, Judge Walker acted mistakenly when he stated that he had to consider the gun at sentencing. The argument is premised on the assumption that Judge Walker ignored Schipani 's exception for cases where evidence was seized expressly for the improper purpose of influencing the sentencing judge. We disagree with the foundation of this argument. Although Judge Walker did state that I must consider the gun under Schipani, we interpret his statement as evincing his compulsion to consider the evidence in light of the circumstances. The record makes clear that Judge Walker properly familiarized himself with Schipani. 36 Judge Martin, on the other hand, made it clear that he did not consider Schipani valid in light of the Guidelines. On remand, he should consider whether the NYDETF acted with the intent of enhancing sentencing rather than under the misinformed assumption that Cabrera had consented to the search. If the illegal search was not motivated by a desire to enhance sentencing, then Judge Martin must consider the gun at sentencing. 37