Opinion ID: 198984
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Withdrawal of the Firearm Seized From Merced-Morales' Vehicle

Text: 95 Merced-Morales argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial. Merced-Morales moved for a mistrial when the court withdrew from evidence a revolver seized from his vehicle at the time of his arrest. We review a trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial for abuse of discretion; absent a clear showing of prejudice, we will uphold the lower court's ruling. See United States v. Zanghi, II, 189 F.3d 71, 82 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Gomes, 177 F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir. 1999). 96 We briefly review the facts relevant to this argument. The police arrested Merced-Morales at his residence. After the authorities had properly informed him of his constitutional rights, Merced-Morales consented to a search of his house and vehicle. Pursuant to this search, the police seized a revolver. At trial, the court initially admitted the weapon into evidence. However, at the close of the prosecution's case, the trial judge requested additional information. At that time, the prosecution requested that the firearm be withdrawn from evidence. The court agreed, and the trial judge reversed his prior admissibility ruling. Merced-Morales then moved for a mistrial, but the court denied the motion. Before Merced-Morales' trial counsel began his deferred opening statement, the judge instructed the jury that rulings on the admissibility of evidence could change during the course of trial and that the jury could not consider excluded evidence. With respect to the revolver, the judge stated: 97 [T]he gun will not be in evidence any further, since I have now found that the possession of this particular revolver is too remote in time to the conspiracy as to be related to the conspiracy . . . . [Y]ou cannot consider this gun as evidence, and I instruct you to disregard that particular revolver that was seized in his car at the time of his arrest. 98 We have previously stated that [t]rials are expected to be fair, but not necessarily perfect; and appeals courts are slow to insist on mistrials, even in cases where [improper evidence] may actually convey prejudicial information. Gomes, 177 F.3d at 82. Where, as here, a curative instruction is promptly given, a mistrial is warranted only in rare circumstances implying extreme prejudice. United States v. Torres, 162 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Magana, 127 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997) (Jurors are presumed to follow [curative] instructions, except in extreme cases.). Here, the judge instructed the jury on the inadmissibility of the revolver prior to the deferred opening statement of counsel for Merced-Morales. This allowed the jury to connect the judge's revised ruling on this one piece of evidence directly with Merced-Morales. The revolver, moreover, has little significance: the record contains ample evidence of appellant's guilt, including the testimony of two cooperating eyewitnesses. See Rivera-Gomez, 67 F.3d at 999 ([T]he strength of the government's overall case is frequently a cardinal factor in evaluating the denial of a mistrial motion.). Under these circumstances, we conclude that Merced-Morales has not demonstrated extreme prejudice, and therefore this argument fails. See Torres, 162 F.3d at 12. 99 XII. Delayed Disclosure that a Government Witness Failed to Identify Rios-Rios in a Pre-Trial Photograph Array 100 Rios-Rios alleges that the district court should have sanctioned the prosecution for failing to timely disclose that Hidalgo-Melendez failed to identify Rios-Rios in a pretrial photograph array. A district court's decision on how to handle delayed disclosure of Brady material is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Catano, 65 F.3d 219, 227 (1st Cir. 1995). 101 Prosecutors have an obligation to furnish exculpatory and impeachment information to the defense in a timely fashion. SeeBrady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Where the defense is confronted not with complete suppression, but rather with delayed disclosure, the test is whether defendant's counsel was prevented by the delay from using the disclosed material effectively in preparing and presenting the defendant's case. United States v.Ingraldi, 793 F.2d 408, 411-12 (1st Cir. 1986); see also Catano, 65 F.3d at 227. In United States v. Ayres, 725 F.2d 806, 811 (1st Cir. 1984), we held that there was no prejudice when disclosure of a failed photograph identification attempt, although delayed, was sufficiently timely for cross-examination of the witness. 102 Here, Hidalgo-Melendez testified that Rios-Rios was someone who once delivered cocaine to Santiago-Lugo. The day after this testimony was given, the prosecution belatedly disclosed that Hidalgo-Melendez had failed to identify Rios-Rios in a pretrial photo array. The judge concluded that although the government should have informed Rios-Rios at the time of the in-court identification, it would not preclude the government from eliciting the information during Hidalgo-Melendez's direct examination. Thereafter, the failed identification attempt was introduced first by the prosecution on direct examination, and then again by defense counsel on cross-examination. In addition, the judge instructed the jury that (1) a prior failure to identify was relevant to a witness' credibility, and (2) the prosecution had the burden of proving the identity of the defendant. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Rios-Rios cannot show prejudice from the delayed disclosure. Therefore, this argument fails. See, e.g., Ayres, 725 F.2d at 811. 103