Opinion ID: 1957598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petitioner's License Revocations

Text: Petitioner urges that the intent of the Compact, i.e., to give the MVA clear authority to refuse to issue a driver's license to a person whose driver's license has been suspended, revoked, refused or canceled in another jurisdiction, can be honored by the MVA's giving effect to an out-of-state revocation for one year before a licensee can apply for a Maryland license. [7] In addition, petitioner contends that although his fourth DUI prompted permanent revocation of his driver's license in Florida, according to the language of the Compact Art. IV, [8] his DUI offenses, in respect to his application for licensure in Maryland, must be treated as if they occurred in Maryland. [9] He explains: [I]t is clear that the State of Maryland did not intend for out of state revocations to be mandatory in this State, for periods of time longer than would have been imposed had the crime occurred in Maryland. Such an argument is contrary to Maryland policy and the intent of the legislature. . . . The MVA has failed to show that the legislative intent was to give greater weight to the laws of foreign jurisdictions than to the laws of Maryland, by barring a Maryland citizen from obtaining a license in this State pursuant to a lifetime revocation in another state, when the same offense had it occurred in Maryland would have resulted in a much lighter sanction. In essence then, as described by the trial court, petitioner believes that [b]ecause § 16-103.1 broadly disqualifies any person who currently has a revoked license in another state without consideration of the comparable penalties in Maryland, the laws are in conflict. Thus, notwithstanding that a fourth DUI offense in Maryland leads to a minimum of two year's license revocation, petitioner would have us read § 16-103.1 as applying a less stringent penalty of one year's revocation, via the Compact's provisions, when an individual whose license has been revoked by another jurisdiction becomes a Maryland resident and seeks licensure in this State. [10] Petitioner relies extensively on Welch v. Alabama Dep't. of Pub. Safety, 519 So.2d 517 (Ala.1987), for the proposition that the Compact should take precedence over related state law. In Welch, the Supreme Court of Alabama examined whether Alabama, a Compact state, could issue a license before the expiration of a revocation period imposed by the State of an applicant's former residence. Id. at 517. Mr. Welch had his Florida license revoked for five years following his second DUI conviction. Upon moving to Alabama thirteen months after his Florida revocation, Welch's application for an Alabama driver's license was denied by the Alabama Driver License Division of the Department of Public Safety and Welch's attorney was informed that Welch would be required to obtain a letter of clearance from Florida before he would be granted a license. Welch brought suit, seeking an investigation to declare him a safe driver. The circuit court sided with the Division and Welch appealed. The intermediate appellate court looked to Ala.Code 1975 § 32-6-7, which states, `A driver's license shall not be issued to the following persons:. . . (3) Any person whose driving right or privilege is revoked. . . .' and interpreted Alabama's enactment of the Compact as incorporating extraterritorial revocations, a finding that the Supreme Court of Alabama found to be erroneous. Id. at 519. After considering Art. V(2) of the Compact addressing Application for New Licenses, the Supreme Court of Alabama determined that the Compact's language did not intend to incorporate extraterritorial revocations, which are entirely outside the control of the legislature of [Alabama]. [T]he reading applied . . . such an interpretation would make any revocation by a Compact state, however severe, binding on the licensing authority of [Alabama]. Welch, 519 So.2d at 519 (alterations added). In reversing the intermediate appellate court, the Alabama high court went on to determine that the phrase, if permitted by law, found in Article V(2), required the licensing authority to look to the revocation made by the former licensing state. If the revocation is still in force under its own terms, an application for a new license could never be permitted by law . . . until the original revocation expires. Id. at 519. In the case sub judice, petitioner offers Welch and several other cases [11] in support of his argument that the Compact requires a state's licensing bureau to issue a license to a driver who is revoked in another state. The MVA responds that the cases necessarily invoke the peculiarities of a particular state's law and are, therefore, inapplicable to the present case. We are not persuaded by Welch and the other cited cases. The Alabama statute in Welch regarding license disqualification lacks the explicit language in this or any other state that is found in Md.Code § 16-103.1 and which clearly encompasses extraterritorial revocations. As we have discussed, the in this or any other state qualifier was added to § 16-103.1 in 1993 in order to dispel any uncertainty as to the MVA's authority to refuse to license an applicant whose driving privileges are suspended, revoked, refused or canceled in another jurisdiction. In addition, petitioner concedes that licensure in Maryland would not terminate his permanent Florida revocation. The MVA urges that petitioner's interpretation of the interplay of § 16-103.1 and § 16-703 is incomplete. The trial court summarized the MVA's position as follows: [T]he words `if permitted by law' are intended to harmonize Maryland requirements for a license with the uniformity efforts made by states entering the Compact. . . . [W]hen a driver has his license revoked in another jurisdiction, only after one year may he apply in Maryland, and only if Maryland law permits such an application. In this case, § 16-103.1 unambiguously prohibits issuance of a license to a person whose license is presently revoked in another state. The MVA also claims this has been the long-standing interpretation of the two statutes. It concludes, suggesting that its position is more accurate because it compels drivers with blemished out-of-state records to clear those records before applying in Maryland; such a preliminary cleansing of out-of-state driving records was an intention of the drafters of the Compact. The parties to the instant appeal propose our acceptance of competing views of statutory intent. Accordingly, we must examine the statutes before us, the Driver License Compact, § 16-703, as well as § 16-103.1, in terms of the larger statutory scheme, namely, the promotion of safety through the recognition of both our State's and extraterritorial motor vehicle laws. Neither the Compact, nor § 16-103.1, stands on its own and we do not read particular language in a statute in isolation or out of context; rather, we construe statutory language in light of the Legislature's general purpose and in the context of the statute as a whole. State v. Crescent Cities Jaycees Found., Inc., 330 Md. 460, 468, 624 A.2d 955, 959 (1993); GEICO v. Insurance Comm'r, 332 Md. 124, 132, 630 A.2d 713, 717 (1993). [W]here statutes relate to the same subject matter, and are not inconsistent with each other, they should be construed together and harmonized where consistent with their general object and scope. Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 1, 10, 497 A.2d 142, 146 (1985), Crescent Cities Jaycees, 330 Md. at 468, 624 A.2d at 959. We accept the presumption that the Legislature intended that which it enacted and [n]either statute should be read . . . so as to render the other, or any portion of it, meaningless, surplusage, superfluous or nugatory. GEICO, 332 Md. at 132, 630 A.2d at 717; Gillespie v. State, 370 Md. 219, 222, 804 A.2d 426, 428 (2002); Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 524, 636 A.2d 448, 452 (1994); Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992); D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 538, 578 A.2d 1177, 1179 (1990); State v. 149 Slot Machines, 310 Md. 356, 361, 529 A.2d 817, 819 (1987); Kindley v. Governor of Md., 289 Md. 620, 625, 426 A.2d 908, 912 (1981); Moberly v. Herboldsheimer, 276 Md. 211, 217, 345 A.2d 855, 858 (1975). Our interpretation of a statute should seek to avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense. Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994); Comptroller of Treasury v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 303 Md. 280, 288, 493 A.2d 341, 345 (1985). Moreover, principles of statutory construction dictate that where the language of a statute is clear, courts may not insert or omit words to make the statute express an intention not evident in its original form. Bridges, 304 Md. at 10-11, 497 A.2d at 147. We observed in Toler v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 373 Md. 214, 817 A.2d 229 (2003) (finding that a licensed driver for whom driving constituted a significant part of employment may accumulate sixteen points before the MVA may suspend that individual's license) that `if the true legislative intent cannot readily be determined from the statutory language alone,' we may look to other indicia of that intent, including the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws, its legislative history, its general purpose, and the `relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions.' Id. at 220, 817 A.2d at 233 (quoting Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 525-26, 801 A.2d 160, 165 (2002)). Finally, [i]n our endeavor to harmonize the provisions of all of the relevant statutes, this Court will prefer an interpretation that allows us to avoid reaching a constitutional question. Bank of America v. Stine, 379 Md. 76, 86, 839 A.2d 727, 733 (2003); see East Prince Frederick Corp. v. County Board of Comm'rs, 320 Md. 178, 182, 577 A.2d 27, 29 (1990). Our reading of the Compact and of § 16-103.1 compels us to agree with the MVA's assessment of the two statutes. That is, § 16-103.1 authorizes the State of Maryland to recognize non-Maryland issued suspensions, revocations, refusals or cancellations by refusing to issue licenses for persons in those statuses, and to so recognize such suspensions, etc., does not create a conflict with the provisions of the Driver License Compact. The MVA states: No conflict exists between [ ] § 16-103.1(1) and the Compact when the savings clause, `if permitted by law,' in [] § 16-703 V(2) is given effect and interpreted to say what it clearly says: that a driver revoked in one party state will be eligible for licensure in a different party state one year after the revocation took effect, so long as he is otherwise permitted to do so by the laws of that party state. Giving effect to the words in V(2) `if permitted by law' carries out the presumption that the legislature intended both statutes to be harmonized to give full effect to each. Indeed, ignoring the modifying terms `if permitted by law' renders that language meaningless and superfluous. [Alterations added.] This Court finds nothing in the wording of § 16-103.1 to indicate that it was intended to be subordinated to the Compact, nor do we find any statement in the language of the Compact found at § 16-703 to evidence an intent that the Compact was intended to supercede what may be viewed as more stringent state motor vehicle laws. Moreover, it is illogical to presume that the Legislature intended with its entry as a Compact state to make Maryland a safe harbor for extraterritorial drivers who have incurred harsh penalties in their home state for motor vehicle violations. The MVA echoes this sentiment, observing that the Compact was not intended to encourage the worst and most dangerous drivers to avoid the consequences of their conduct by simply moving into another party state. As the trial court observed, the Legislature's intent in specifically inserting into § 16-103.1 the phrase, in this or any other state: was to recognize and respect extraterritorial revocations. This language serves two rational purposes. First, it provides recognition of extraterritorial revocations beyond that which the Compact recognizes. Second, the language of § 16-103.1 provides the MVA with a mechanism to recognize revocations of non-Compact states and deny issuance of a license on that basis. Under [petitioner's] interpretation of these statutes, revocations from Compact states would have no prohibitive force and effect in Maryland after one year, while revocations from non-Compact states would have force and effect for a period of time consistent with the statute in the non-[C]ompact state. This was not the intent of the General Assembly in adopting the Compact. [Alteration added.] We are likewise persuaded of the viability of the MVA's interpretation in light of two other provisions found in the Compact. First, § 16-703, Art. I, articulates an express intent that an applicant's out-of-state driving record be considered prior to licensure. Article I(b)(2) reads, in relevant part: (b) It is the policy of each of the party states to: (1) Promote compliance with the laws, ordinances, and administrative rules and regulations relating to the operation of motor vehicles by their operators in each of the jurisdictions where such operators drive motor vehicles. (2) Make the reciprocal recognition of licenses to drive and eligibility therefor more just and equitable by considering the overall compliance with motor vehicle laws, ordinances and administrative rules and regulations as a condition precedent to the continuance or issuance of any license by reason of which the licensee is authorized or permitted to operate a motor vehicle in any of the party states. In addition, § 16-703, Art. VI, addresses the Applicability of Other Laws: Except as expressly required by provisions of this Compact, nothing contained herein shall be construed to affect the right of any party state to apply any of its other laws relating to licenses to drive to any person or circumstance, nor to invalidate or prevent any driver license agreement or other cooperative arrangement between a party state and a nonparty state. This language indicates that the Compact is not intended to supercede the application of other  possibly more stringent  motor vehicle laws.