Opinion ID: 2017278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: commonwealth of massachusetts

Text: SUFFOLK, ss. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT No. 1425 IN THE MATTER OF AN INFORMATION  HONORABLE ROBERT M. BONIN RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF FORMAL PROCEEDINGS Now comes the Respondent, Robert M. Bonin, Chief Justice of the Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and answers the formal charges against him as follows: First Charge 1. and 2. The Respondent admits the allegations in Paragraphs 1 and 2 except that he believed that he was attending a lecture and not a meeting. Further, the Respondent states that the article calling the lecture to his attention stated as follows (appearing in the April 2, 1978 edition of the Boston Sunday Globe): Author Gore Vidal will discuss `Sex and Politics in Massachusetts' Wednesday evening at the Arlington Street Church. Admission is $5 and the funds will be used to benefit the Boston/Boise Committee. 3. Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 3. Further, the Respondent states that subsequent to April 5, 1978, he was informed and believes and therefore avers that no funds of the Boston/Boise Committee have in fact or will in fact be used for the benefit of any individual defendants and that the Boston/Boise Committee is not a defense committee, but a civil liberties and educational group. WHEREFORE, the Respondent demands that this charge be dismissed. Second Charge 4. No further answer required. 5. Respondent denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 5. 6. Respondent denies that he knew prior to attending the lecture that any cases would be discussed. The transcripts of the speakers at the lecture is a matter of record and the respondent does not deny the accuracy of those transcripts as reflecting what was actually said. Since the Respondent admits the accuracy of the transcripts, they will speak for themselves. There is no averment that Respondent heard any discussion. Further, the Respondent states that his sole purpose in attending the event was to hear Author Gore Vidal and that his attention was not fully directed to the remarks of other speakers who preceded Mr. Vidal. Since the Respondent has admitted the accuracy of transcripts of the event, the characterizations as to what was said are so vague and imprecise as to be not capable of more specific response. WHEREFORE, the Respondent demands that this charge be dismissed. Third Charge 7. No further answer required. 8. The Respondent has admitted the accuracy of the transcripts of the remarks of the several speakers at the lecture on April 5, 1978 in paragraph 6 of this answer and again asserts that they correctly reflect what was actually said. The Respondent states, however, that materials contained in sections a., b., c., d., e., and f., are characterizations and conclusions as to what was said as interpreted by the drafters of the charges. The true characterization of statements made at the event are matters for the court to determine. The Respondent further points out that there is no allegation in the Third Charge that the remarks and statements of all of the speakers were heard and understood. (Reference is made to Respondent's answer to Paragraph 6) Respondent specifically denies that he heard and understood any matters requiring him to leave prior to the conclusion of the event. 9. Respondent admits that he did not leave the event prior to its conclusion and states that he did not hear any remarks which imposed upon him any duty to leave. In addition, the Respondent states that a reading of the entire transcript of the event does not reveal any material that would under the law have imposed upon him any duty to leave. WHEREFORE, the respondent demands that this charge be dismissed. Fourth Charge 10. No further answer required. 11. Respondent admits to being introduced to author Gore Vidal at the conclusion of the meeting and to having engaged in a very brief conversation lasting less than a minute. 12. Prior to meeting with Mr. Vidal, the Respondent did not know that such meeting would likely be photographed or publicized. The Respondent further states that under the circumstances it was not improper for him to be introduced to and meet a noted author and lecturer. Under no circumstances should such a meeting be termed improper conduct or an endorsement of any views of Mr. Vidal or other speakers. Further, the Respondent says that this charge is repugnant to basic fundamental rights of any person. 13. Respondent admits the allegations of Paragraph 13. WHEREFORE, the Respondent demands that this charge be dismissed. Fifth Charge 14. No further answer required. 15. Respondent admits that on April 11, 1978 he testified under oath. a. Respondent states that the specific language is not set forth and a fair reading of the transcript does not justify the assertion and conclusion of section a. b. Respondent admits the allegations of section b. and states that the statements are true. c. Respondent states that the specific language is not set forth and a fair reading of the transcript does not justify the assertion and conclusion of section c. d. Respondent admits the allegation of section d. and states that he recalls hearing no such reference. e. Respondent states that the specific language is not set forth and a fair reading of the transcript does not justify the assertion and conclusion of section e. As to the remaining allegations of Paragraph 15, the Respondent denies that he made any statement which he knew was false and states that he testified in good faith to the best of his recollection. 16. Respondent admits issuing the press release dated April 7, 1978 and admits that Paragraph 16 correctly summarizes a portion of the contents of such release but denies that any statement in such release was false. WHEREFORE, the Respondent demands that this charge be dismissed. Sixth Charge 17. No further answer required. 18. Respondent denies the allegations in Paragraph 18. WHEREFORE, the Respondent demands that this charge be dismissed. Seventh Charge 19. Respondent admits the allegations of Paragraph 19. 20. Respondent admits the allegations of Paragraph 20. 21. Respondent admits that the reception was held although the cost was not personally known to the Respondent. The Respondent further states that neither the Conboy Agency nor anyone affiliated with it was listed as a host or sponsor and therefore no prestige attached thereto, nor was any impression of special influence conveyed. 22. Respondent admits that the dinner was held although the cost was not personally known to the Respondent. The Respondent further states that neither the Conboy Agency nor anyone affiliated with it was listed as a host or sponsor and therefore no prestige attached thereto, nor was any impression of special influence conveyed. 23. Respondent admits the allegations of Paragraph 23 but states that the cost was charged to individual officials of Conboy as set forth in Paragraph 25. Respondent further states that he reported this gift together with all other matters required by him to be reported and that there was no impropriety in connection with the allegations of the Seventh Charge. WHEREFORE, the Respondent demands that this charge be dismissed. Eighth Charge 24. No further answer required. 25. Respondent admits the allegation in Paragraph 25. 26. Respondent admits the allegation in Paragraph 26. 27. Respondent admits the allegations in Paragraph 27 and Respondent further states that when Ms. Downey was appointed there was a valid opening for the position and that the appointment was made strictly upon the basis of merit and respondent's familiarity with the work and capabilities of Ms. Downey. WHEREFORE, the Respondent demands that this charge be dismissed. Ninth Charge 28. No further answer required. 29. Respondent admits the allegations of Paragraph 29. 30. Respondent admits the allegations of Paragraph 30. 31. Respondent admits the allegations of Paragraph 31. 32. Respondent admits the allegations of Paragraph 32 except that the Respondent states that the work was done on a voluntary basis. 33. Respondent admits the allegations of Paragraph 33 except that the Respondent states that the work was done on a voluntary basis. 34. Respondent admits the allegation in Paragraph 34 and Respondent further states that when Ms. Mastronadi and Ms. Stanton were appointed there were valid openings in the positions and that the appointments were made strictly upon the basis of merit and Respondent's familiarity with the work and capabilities of Ms. Mastronadi and Ms. Stanton. WHEREFORE, the Respondent demands that this charge be dismissed. ROBERT M. BONIN Chief Justice, Superior Court Commonwealth of Massachusetts Counsel: PAUL R. SUGARMAN DAVID J. SARGENT QUIRICO, J. (concurring). I concur with the opinion in so far as it states the facts found, and with the discipline imposed on the basis of those facts. However, as indicated below, on the basis of the entire evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom, I would find facts in addition to those found by the court in that part of the opinion identified as B. Charges Related to the Events at the Arlington Street Church on April 5, 1978. Findings of Fact. Finding 2. I would insert before the last two sentences of the first paragraph of this finding an additional finding that the ticket seller's answer to the Chief Justice's question about what Boston/Boise was all about was heard and understood by the Chief Justice. Finding 4. I would insert after the first two sentences of the first paragraph of this finding an additional finding that as part of the conversation described in the first two sentences Mr. Orfanello told the Chief Justice that Mr. McMenimen represented a defendant in the Revere cases and that the meeting at the Arlington Street Church was to be a fund raiser in connection with those cases. Finding 5. Based on the two additional findings suggested above, I would change the first sentence in the second paragraph of this finding to read as follows: The Chief Justice knew before he went to the meeting at the Arlington Street Church that it would at least in part be a partisan rally in the interest of criminal defendants in cases pending in the Superior Court, that the Revere cases were likely to be discussed, and that the proceeds of ticket sales might be used in part for the benefit of the defendants in those cases. Finding 8. I would insert after the first sentence in the second paragraph of this finding an additional finding that as a part of the same conversation described in the first sentence the Chief Justice showed Mr. Orfanello one of the tickets to the Gore Vidal lecture, said that it did not say it was for a defense fund, and that it was important to the Chief Justice that he knew only that the meeting was for a gay group or a gay affair; whereupon Mr. Orfanello said that if that was what the Chief Justice wanted him to say, he would say that. Finding 9. I would add to the second paragraph of this finding an additional finding that the two sentences quoted from the Chief Justice's press release of April 7, 1978, were false and misleading. Finding 10. As to question (a) and the answer thereto, quoted from the transcript of April 11, 1978, I would find that when purchasing the tickets at the Arlington Street Church on April 3, 1978, the Chief Justice made inquiry as to the nature of the Boston/Boise Committee, and that therefore his answer to question (a) is false. As to question (b) and the answer thereto quoted from the same transcript, I would find that before attending the meeting at the Arlington Street Church the Chief Justice had been informed by Mr. Orfanello in effect that the meeting was to be a fund raiser for the benefit of defendants in the Revere cases. I would therefore also find that his answer of I did not to question (b) was false. I recognize that the additional findings which I have suggested above depend on preliminary decisions concerning the credibility of the oral testimony of witnesses. Those are decisions which must be made by each of the Justices in his or her capacity as a finder of the facts in this proceeding. I respect the preliminary decision reached by my fellow Justices, but I differ from them to the extent stated above. If the additional findings which I propose were made, the disposition of this proceeding would, in my opinion, require that Chief Justice Bonin be suspended as a member of the bar of this Commonwealth, and probably would warrant consideration of even more severe discipline. BRAUCHER, J. (concurring). In order to achieve consensus among views which inevitably differ in detail, the court has omitted from its opinion facts that seem important to me. Since others feel compelled, in good conscience, to record their differences, I state mine. I join in the court's opinion, as far as it goes. Mr. Orfanello appeared before us as an honorable, loyal and reliable public servant, but as a witness whose memory was not always accurate. He had been appointed administrative assistant by the Chief Justice's predecessor in office, who had vigorously opposed and publicly denounced the appointment of Chief Justice Bonin. The Chief Justice did not have a high regard for the administrative assistant he had inherited, and Mr. Orfanello was aware of that fact and was concerned about his tenure. The two did not communicate easily and freely. On the morning of Thursday, April 6, 1978, both men saw the front page news story with the headline Bonin at benefit for sex defendants. The Chief Justice was under investigation on a variety of charges, most of which have since been dropped, and he had for several months been the subject of violent public criticism. He doubtless felt unfairly pursued and persecuted. On Wednesday he had treated friendly attempts to warn him as invasions of his privacy, reacting with the kind of stubborn resistance that produces self-inflicted wounds. In this situation the Chief Justice made an attempt, with the aid of counsel, to reconstruct the events of Wednesday and to issue a press release that would square with what he could remember and with what he could ascertain. His reconstructed memory, based in part on Mr. Orfanello's written statement made on Friday morning, was more positive than it should have been, and some of his failures of memory seem too convenient. But I cannot make a finding of deliberate falsehood on the basis of his own testimony. Meanwhile, Mr. Orfanello had told at least three people on Thursday morning that he had warned the Chief Justice on Wednesday that the Gore Vidal meeting was a fund raiser for Superior Court criminal defendants. Later on Thursday and on Friday morning he gave two quite different accounts to counsel for the Chief Justice. I have no doubt that his Thursday morning statements were honest, but there is little to corroborate them. He now says his Thursday afternoon and Friday statements were false. By Sunday, contrary to his testimony, he must have realized that he could be blamed if he had failed to warn the Chief Justice adequately, and he consulted counsel. As counsel, he chose the former Chief Justice. Thereafter, he resolved his dilemma, and told counsel for Chief Justice Bonin that if he testified under oath he would bury the Chief Justice. We must be careful to distinguish large sins from small ones. Particularly dangerous is the escalation of misunderstanding, difference of recollection, and public clamor into charges of deliberate falsehood, false swearing and the like. On the record before us, I cannot sustain such charges on the basis of Mr. Orfanello's testimony. Without that testimony, such charges are baseless. Apart from the charges that are not proved, there is sufficient proof of actual impropriety, as distinguished from appearance of impropriety, to warrant the court's decision. The injunction of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct against appearance of impropriety must not be read to require that a judge cater to popular misunderstanding or prejudice in his extrajudicial conduct. His duty to the public should never be subordinate merely because the full discharge of his obligation may be misunderstood or may tend to subject him or the legal profession to criticism. American Bar Association, Ethical Consideration 9-2, accompanying Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, S.J.C. Rule 3:22, 359 Mass. 829 (1972). I should be reluctant to join in censure based solely on appearance of impropriety, and do not read Matter of Morrissey, 366 Mass. 11, 16 (1974), as so based. WILKINS, J. (concurring, with whom Abrams, J., joins). Although I agree with the disposition proposed in this matter and with most of the factual conclusions expressed in the opinion of the court, I believe that certain allegations were proved which some Justices of this court have not found to have been established. Specifically, I believe that Mr. Orfanello told the Chief Justice in their brief conversation in the afternoon of April 5, 1978, in some form of words, that the gay benefit at the Arlington Street Church was intended to raise funds to aid in the defense of certain criminal defendants. I am satisfied that the reference to the defense fund was brief and that its full import escaped the attention of the Chief Justice, who seemed concerned about how Mr. McMenimen learned that he was going to attend the meeting and about others advising him not to attend an event sponsored by a gay group. I agree with Justice Braucher's characterization of the Chief Justice's reaction to these friendly attempts to warn him. On the following morning, the Chief Justice was acutely aware of the significance of what Mr. Orfanello told him the previous afternoon concerning a defense fund. I am persuaded that Mr. Orfanello told the Chief Justice about the use of ticket proceeds for he defense of criminal cases because on the next day the Chief Justice did not question Mr. Orfanello about, or challenge him for, not telling him that a defense fund was involved. When the Chief Justice answered certain questions under oath in the course of his April 11 deposition, his testimony was incorrect. He had inquired what the Boston/Boise Committee was and had been told. He had been told that the meeting was intended to raise funds to assist in the defense of certain criminal defendants. In this respect, the Chief Justice was plainly mistaken. However, considering the form and context of the specific questions asked of the Chief Justice, and considering the Chief Justice's very literal approach to questions, I conclude that he did not intentionally misrepresent facts when he testified under oath on April 11, 1978. He had heard something of the nature of the Boston/Boise Committee before attending the meeting but may well not have remembered his inquiry concerning it at the Arlington Street Church when he purchased the tickets. Although Mr. Orfanello told him that the meeting was a fund raiser for criminal defendants, I do not find that the Chief Justice received information concerning the use of the ticket proceeds of the precise character described in the applicable question put to him on April 11. I believe that the press release of April 7, 1978, although literally true, was knowingly misleading. Perhaps, as he said, the Chief Justice did not learn of the intended use of these funds until reading it in the press on April 6, 1978, the day following the lecture, but he did hear one representative of the Boston/Boise Committee say at the meeting most of this money will be going ... to the National Jury Project which has entered these cases in order to see that a fair trial can possibly exist. The press release may have been, as the opinion of the court states, a measure taken to moderate the public reaction. It was, however, less than a frank and complete statement of what the Chief Justice had been told and what he knew.