Opinion ID: 836206
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Title Analysis

Text: Defendant next contends that SB 936 is unconstitutional under that part of Article IV, section 20, requiring that every act shall have a title and that the one subject of the act shall be expressed in the title. As this court explained in McIntire, the second sentence of Article IV, section 20,    prescribes a consequence when all or part of the body of an act is not expressed in the title. An act `shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title.' The second sentence thus expressly ties the title of an act to the one-subject requirement. 322 Or. at 438, 909 P.2d 846. As we already have noted, the purpose of the title requirement is to provide fair notice to legislators (and to others) of the contents of a bill. Id.; see also Warren, 222 Or. at 321, 353 P.2d 257 (to same effect). Accordingly, [i]f the subject of the enactment is so expressed in the title as to give reasonable notice of the contents of the law, it is sufficient. Lovejoy v. Portland, 95 Or. 459, 467, 188 P. 207 (1920). Courts do not review titles hypertechnically. This court has stated that a title is sufficient if it afforded sufficient warning of the subject. Warren, 222 Or. at 323, 353 P.2d 257. [A]ny expression in the title which calls attention to the subject of the bill, although in general terms, is all that is required. Calder et al. v. Orr et al., 105 Or. 223, 231, 209 P. 479 (1922) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Tompkins v. District Boundary Board, 180 Or. 339, 349, 177 P.2d 416 (1947) (not necessary that the legislature adopt that which the courts may regard as the most appropriate or expressive title (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State ex rel. Pierce v. Slusher, 119 Or. 141, 151, 248 P. 358 (1926) (To entertain the notion that a better title might have been written is not sufficient reason for holding a title invalid.). We turn to the title of SB 936. As this court has explained, the relating clause of an act serves as the title. McIntire, 322 Or. at 445, 909 P.2d 846. The relating clause of SB 936 provides: Relating to implementation of victims' rights initiative; creating new provisions; amending ORS 10.030, 10.050, 40.170, 40.175, 131.007, 135.230, 135.240, 135.245, 135.432, 135.970, 136.001, 136.450, 136.619, 137.106, 137.281, 137.540, 137.550, 144.108, 144.343, 419C.270, 419C.450, 421.508 and 423.478; repealing ORS 133.585 and 133.683; and declaring an emergency. The title of SB 936 states that it implement[s] an initiative relating to victims' rights. All those words are important. Determining what victims' rights initiative the title refers to is not difficult. Article IV, section 1(2)(a), of the Oregon Constitution, provides: The people reserve to themselves the initiative power, which is to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and enact or reject them at an election independently of the Legislative Assembly. An initiative, then, is a law or an amendment to the Constitution that the people propose. As noted, SB 936 became effective on June 12, 1997. At the previous general election in November 1996, the voters had adopted Measure 40. Or. Laws 1997, v. 1, at ix-x. The ballot title caption for Measure 40 provided: Amends Constitution; Gives Crime Victims Rights, Expands Admissible Evidence, Limits Pretrial Release. Id. at x. Of the 23 measures on the ballot in November 1996, only the ballot title caption for Measure 40 contained the words victims and rights. Id. at ix-x. The reference to victims' rights initiative thus provided notice to legislators and to the public that SB 936 was an effort to place into statute legislative versions of as many of the provisions of Measure 40 as could be placed there without a constitutional amendment. Having determined what the title of SB 936 means, we must consider whether it sets out the subject of the act. We conclude that it does. As we have explained, every substantive provision of SB 936 is related to or paraphrases one or another of the provisions of Measure 40. Defendant does not cite to us, and we have not located, any substantive provision of SB 936 that is not related to the implementation of Measure 40. Logically, if derivatively, it follows that what we said in the abstract of the subject of the act also could be said of Measure 40, viz., its subject is the prosecution and conviction of persons accused of crime. Thus, the title is valid under Article IV, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution. Defendant contends that the title renders SB 936 invalid because it states that the act is the implementation of Measure 40. Once Measure 40 was declared unconstitutional, defendant argues, SB 936 no longer was capable of implementing it. Defendant's argument is based on too restrictive a view of what SB 936 was intended to accomplish. As the title portrays, SB 936 amends certain statutes and creates others. The substantive content of its provisions is, as we have pointed out earlier, a legislative paraphrase of certain provisions of Measure 40. Implement is defined as: to carry out: ACCOMPLISH, FULFILL   . Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 1134 (unabridged ed 1993). Considered in light of that definition, SB 936 truthfully may be said to implement, i.e., carry out, accomplish, or fulfill, certain of the ideas found in certain of the provisions of Measure 40. That is all that is necessary to justify the use of the word implementation in the title. Defendant contends that the title of SB 936 was deceptive because legislators and others, skimming that title, might have concluded that victims' rights meant that the statute related only to granting rights to victims. That argument refuses to recognize that the words, victims' rights, are part of a phrase, viz., victims' rights initiative. That phrase is a sufficient cross-reference to the recently passed constitutional amendment that dealt, inter alia, with the same topics with which SB 936 deals. Put differently, Article IV, section 20, requires only that the title carry certain information; it does not relieve the reader of the obligation to read the title accurately. An observation that this court made over a century ago remains apt: [I]f parties interested in the matter had no other source of information than that imparted by the title[ ]   , they would have sufficient [information] to put them upon inquiry, and could easily ascertain what provisions had been adopted, if desirous of observing them. State of Oregon v. Phenline, 16 Or. 107, 111, 17 P. 572 (1888). Defendant presents a number of arguments to the effect that Measure 40 actually did not grant rights to victims. Defendant notes, for example, that certain of the rights granted by both Measure 40 and SB 936 would apply even in cases in which there was no victim. But those criticisms miss the point: All substantive sections of SB 936 address either its subject or matters properly connected with the subject. That is all that is required. See Lovejoy, 95 Or. at 466, 188 P. 207 (It is the `subject' of the act and not `matters properly connected therewith' that must be expressed in the title   .). Defendant also argues that SB 936 is invalid because it somehow depends on Measure 40, and this court held Measure 40 unconstitutional in Armatta. That argument need not delay us long. As explained, Measure 40 was declared unconstitutional because it contained multiple amendments in violation of Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution. SB 936 does not have that problem, because it is not a constitutional amendment. The constitutionality of SB 936 under Article IV, section 20, turns on its own merits. Even if Measure 40 was not itself valid, defendant does not explain why it may not serve as a permissible referent for some other enactment, and we do not perceive any reason for so holding. Defendant next contends that SB 936 partakes of the constitutional defects of Measure 40. We disagree. SB 936 did not depend on any power granted to the legislature by Measure 40, and there is nothing in SB 936 that is conditioned on the existence of Measure 40. Finally, defendant contends that Article IV, section 20, required the title of SB 936 to disclose all the purposes of the act; that the title disclosed only the purpose of giving effect to certain of the provisions of Measure 40, not the purpose of preserving much of the essence of Measure 40 against the possibility that it might be held unconstitutional; and that the title therefore is constitutionally inadequate. Defendant's argument fails because his premise is faulty: There is no constitutional requirement that legislation promote only one end. In conclusion, we hold that SB 936 embraces a single subject and matters properly connected therewith, and that none of the provisions of the act exceed the scope of the title. The act is valid under Article IV, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution. We turn to defendant's next contention, viz., whether application of the terms of the act to defendant's particular case was unconstitutional.