Opinion ID: 4522448
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Protection from Removal under CAT

Text: We now turn to Melgar’s CAT claim. Under CAT, the applicant bears the burden of establishing “that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” Dutton-Myrie v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 855 F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)). For an act to be “torture,” it must be an intentional, unlawful act causing severe physical or mental pain or suffering “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official who has custody or physical control of the victim.” Id. (quoting Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 151 (3d Cir. 2005)). There is no question that rape, credible “threats to rape,” and “other forms of sexual violence” can be torturous acts. Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 472-73 (3d Cir. 2003) (collecting cases and other authorities). The issue is whether Melgar’s claim was properly denied on the grounds that he failed to present enough evidence to establish that 16 it was more likely than not that he would be tortured by or with the acquiescence of the Salvadoran government. For a government to acquiescence in the torturous conduct of private actors, a public official must have been “aware of [the activity] and thereafter breached the legal responsibility to intervene and prevent it.” Dutton-Myrie, 855 F.3d at 516 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7)). An official does not need to have actual knowledge of the specific torturous acts if there is “evidence that the government [ ] is willfully blind to such activities.” Id. (quoting Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 473 F.3d 58, 65 (3d Cir. 2007)). “Circumstantial evidence may establish acquiescence to targeted acts of violence even when the government has an official policy or is engaged in a campaign of opposition against the entity the applicant fears.” Id.; accord Quinteros v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 945 F.3d 772, 788 (3d Cir. 2019); see Quinteros, 945 F.3d at 793 & n.31 (McKee, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the conduct of public officials at any level may entail responsibility, even if the highest levels would disapprove (citing Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 510 (9th Cir. 2013)); Rodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1134, 1139 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The petitioner did not have to show that the entire Mexican government is complicit in the misconduct of individual police officers.”). To perform this analysis, the IJ must first make factual findings as to “how public officials will likely act in response to the harm the petitioner fears” and then determine “whether the likely response from public officials qualifies as acquiescence under the governing regulations.” Dutton-Myrie, 855 F.3d at 516. Here, the IJ found that it was “abundantly clear” that the Salvadoran government has not acquiesced in Melgar’s 17 situation based solely on the letter from Melgar’s hometown mayor noting his “plight and difficulties.” AR40. The BIA added that Melgar had “not submitted any evidence” establishing the Salvadoran government’s acquiescence. AR4. That analysis is wanting. The sympathetic views of one mayor are not dispositive of the entire Salvadoran government’s willingness to protect LGBTI individuals from private acts of torture, especially given Melgar’s credible testimony and other evidence to the contrary. Recall that Melgar testified that he and his friends reported some of the instances of sexual abuse to the police, but they responded dismissively by saying that gay men are “looking for it,” AR371, meaning that they are asking to be raped and sexually assaulted. When his gay friend was brutally raped and murdered, the police picked up the body but did nothing to investigate or prosecute the perpetrators. Melgar explained: “[T]he government doesn’t do anything for the gay society. The police doesn’t cooperate with the gay society, . . . because over there, gays, we are very discriminated by the whole society.” AR90. Melgar submitted third-party reports to support his assertion that law enforcement turns a blind eye to the specific dangers afflicting the LGBTI community. InSight Crime reported that human rights workers collected data identifying both gang members and police officers as “the principal perpetrators of violence against members of the LGBTI communities in El Salvador[.]” AR392. Human rights workers had to investigate these incidents, “because there is no public agency in El Salvador that registers the sexual orientation or gender identity of homicide victims.” AR393. The report noted that crimes against LGBTI persons “go systematically unprosecuted.” Id. The Berkeley 18 Human Rights Report also documented “rape, abuse, and physical attacks carried out by police officers against gay men,” and echoed “concerns regarding lack of investigation and prosecution of violence against the LGBTI community.” AR394. Other evidence raises questions about the Salvadoran government’s commitment to protecting the LGBTI community from targeted violence. The Salvadoran Attorney General told CNN en Español that his office recently launched “several investigations” into crimes against LGBTI persons but “did not specify an exact number of cases.” AR403-04. His office acknowledged that the responsible parties have not yet been found and that the success of these investigations depends on the cooperation of other institutions such as the National Civil Police. While there are contradictory reports as to whether Salvadoran law distinguishes between random crimes and crimes motivated by a victim’s sexual orientation, one theme seems consistent throughout the record: whatever laws exist to protect LGBTI persons are not enforced. These are but a few snippets of the favorable evidence that the IJ and the BIA ignored or failed to address. It is simply not true that Melgar did “not submit[] any evidence” showing government acquiescence. AR4. Again, if the BIA intended to disregard or reject this evidence, we need to know why to perform a meaningful review of its decision. See Fei Yan Zhu, 744 F.3d at 272. Lastly, to decide whether Melgar is more likely than not to be tortured, the IJ should have ascertained factually “what is likely to happen to [Melgar] if removed,” and then determine whether what is likely to happen “amount[s] to the legal definition of torture.” Dutton-Myrie, 855 F.3d at 516 (quoting Kaplun v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010)). Even though the IJ did not make these findings, the BIA 19 independently concluded that Melgar’s claim was too “speculative” to meet the “more likely than not” standard, without elaborating as to why. AR4. When determining likelihood of future torture, the BIA must consider evidence of past torture, the possibility of relocation, evidence of mass human rights violations, and relevant country conditions. Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 671 F.3d 303, 313 (3d Cir. 2011). A failure to perform that task is error. Id. at 314. We remind the BIA that its role is to review “[f]acts determined by the immigration judge,” not make factual findings in the first instance. Alimbaev v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 872 F.3d 188, 196 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)). “If further factfinding is needed, the [BIA] must remand the proceeding to an immigration judge.” Id. In short, on remand, the BIA must also reconsider Melgar’s CAT claim.