Opinion ID: 1826951
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Forensic Evidence, Inculpatory Admissions, and Impeachment of Witnesses

Text: This claim actually incorporates a number of claims regarding counsel's handling of testimony and evidence, including the testimony of Shana Wright about admissions made by Evans, information about the ownership of the murder weapon, and alleged admissions by other participants in the crime. At trial Shana Wright testified about encountering Evans on a bus the day after the victim was killed. Evans told Wright that he had to get a new suit because he got [the victim's] brains all over it. This admission was reinforced by the medical examiner's testimony that it was possible for the triggerman to get blood and brain matter on his clothing. Codefendants Gervalow Ward and Edward Francis also testified at trial that all three men had been splattered with blood on their pants and shoes when Lewis was shot in the head. Evans argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to dispute this testimony with forensic evidence. At the evidentiary hearing, Evans' defense counsel admitted that she did not consult a blood spatter expert or ballistics expert to counter the brain spatter admission by Evans. Forensic expert Kenneth Zercie also testified at the evidentiary hearing that the evidence of the crime scene and the victim was not consistent with blood and brains splattering back on the shooter. Zercie based his opinion on the following facts: the wounds to the victim were not contact wounds because there was no gunshot residue on the victim; the .22 caliber ammunition would not necessarily cause an explosion on contact; the concise nature of the victim's wounds and the lack of seepage from the wounds; and the victim's tight nappy hair that would have retained matter close to the wound. However, on cross-examination Zercie admitted that the use of a homemade silencer on the gun would have inhibited the discharge of gunshot residue on the victim even if the shooting was from close range. Zercie also admitted that research shows that back spatter can occur with .22-caliber weapons. In denying relief on this claim, the lower court noted that even had a crime scene reconstruction expert such as Zercie testified at trial, it would not have eliminated the possibility that Mr. Evans did get blood on his clothes during the commission of the crime [when the victim was beaten in the apartment], blood that he mistakenly characterized as brain matter. Further, the court concluded, the testimony of an expert such as Mr. Zercie would not have discounted the impact of Shana Wright's testimony that Mr. Evans admitted getting rid of his suit because he got brains all over it. Thus, we agree with the trial court that even if counsel's performance was deficient in this regard, no prejudice can be shown from the failure. Evans also presented testimony from his mother on this claim at the evidentiary hearing. Evans' mother testified that he has a tendency to brag about things, but that she had never discussed this with trial counsel because she was never asked about it. Evans claims that had his mother testified about his bragging at trial, it would have cast doubt on his admission to Wright. We conclude that even if counsel were deficient in not presenting the mother's testimony, there is no reasonable probability that based on her testimony the result of the trial would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Evans further claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Wright's testimony that she initially did not tell the police about her conversation with Evans because she was scared. Evans claims that counsel's failure left the jury with the erroneous impression that Wright was afraid of Evans. We agree with the lower court that this claim is refuted by the record. Wright made this statement in her direct examination by the State. However, during cross-examination and redirect questioning Wright clarified that she was afraid of being charged with something. Defense counsel also elicited that Wright voluntarily visited Evans just days after the murder in response to a phone call from him and that she had not sought protection from anyone. During closing argument, defense counsel specifically argued that Wright was motivated to testify as she did because she was afraid of being charged in the crime. Thus, the jury was not misled about Wright's motivation in initially concealing this conversation from the police. Evans also claims that counsel was ineffective in failing to present information about the murder weapon, namely that the gun belonged to codefendant Edward Francis and that Francis had used this weapon to shoot another victim just weeks before Lewis's murder. Evans contends that had this evidence been introduced at trial, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt that he was involved in Lewis's murder and would have acquitted him. In denying relief on this claim, the lower court concluded that there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had counsel introduced additional evidence regarding the technical ownership of the weapon. We agree. At trial, codefendant Gervalow Ward testified that Francis normally carried the .22-caliber gun. However, Ward also testified that Evans took the .22-caliber gun from the victim Lewis when Lewis arrived at the apartment, fashioned a silencer for the gun from an empty shampoo bottle stuffed with plastic bags, and shot Lewis in the head with the gun. Francis gave similar testimony about Evans' use of the gun in the murder. During closing argument, defense counsel reminded the jury that most of the witnesses testified that the .22-caliber gun belonged to Francis. At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Francis testified that the .22-caliber murder weapon was among a number of weapons stolen from Mark Quinn's employer. Francis also testified that while he considered the .22-caliber to be his gun, he was not allowed to actually keep the gun and Evans kept control of the gun. Francis admitted that he used the .22-caliber gun to shoot another individual several weeks before Lewis's murder. Francis also testified that Evans kept the .22-caliber gun after Lewis's shooting, but ordered Francis to get rid of the shampoo bottle that had been used as a silencer. When asked about the failure to introduce this evidence at trial, counsel explained that she was aware of Francis's possession and use of the murder weapon, but felt it would harm Evans because it would open the door to his participation in another violent crime. Based on the evidence actually presented at trial about the ownership of the gun and the possible damage of introducing evidence about Evans' participation in another crime, we conclude that counsel made a strategic decision and was not deficient in her representation of Evans on this issue. Finally, Evans claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to call Mark Quinn, an uncharged participant in the crime, to testify at trial about inculpatory statements he heard Ward and Francis make after the shooting. At the evidentiary hearing, Quinn testified that he did not accompany the other men to the back of the apartment complex where Lewis was shot and that he did not hear a gunshot. When the men returned to the front of the apartments, Quinn saw Ward and Francis with the .22-caliber gun and saw Ward put it inside his jacket. Quinn testified that Ward and Francis bragged about shooting Lewis when the group went to a convenience store shortly after the shooting. He heard them make similar statements later at a downtown bus stop. [7] However, Quinn's postconviction testimony also placed Evans at the scene of the murder, which Evans had denied throughout trial. Further, Quinn testified that Evans thought the victim was going to rob Wright, which gave Evans a motive for the killing. On cross-examination at the evidentiary hearing, the State impeached Quinn with two earlier depositions. In a 1998 deposition, Quinn stated that Evans dominated the younger members of the gang and used his martial arts skills to inflict pain and control them. In a deposition two weeks before the evidentiary hearing, Quinn stated that Evans had admitted that he was the first to shoot the victim; that Quinn never saw the .22-caliber gun when the group returned from the back of the apartment complex, that he never saw Ward or Francis with a gun, and that Evans was also bragging about the shooting at the convenience store. If Quinn had testified at trial, as Evans contends he should have, the jury would have heard that Quinn did not see the murder weapon in Evans' hands. However, they would also have heard that Evans was at the scene, had a motive for killing the victim, and had bragged about his participation. Further, Quinn's testimony was impeached by the damaging statements in his previous depositions. Thus, we agree with the trial court that there was no prejudice demonstrated by counsel's failure to use Quinn as a witness at trial. Thus, Evans is not entitled to postconviction relief on the claim of ineffective assistance relating to the forensic evidence, inculpatory admissions, and the impeachment of witnesses.