Opinion ID: 1233826
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Residual Hearsay Exception, Minn. R. Evid. 803(24)

Text: The residual hearsay exception admits statements not specifically covered by any of the foregoing [hearsay] exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. Minn. R. Evid. 803(24). The state relies on our decision in State v. Ortlepp, where we cited four reasons for affirming the substantive admission of a police confession by the defendant's co-conspirator who recanted at trial because he said his statement was coerced and thus not true. 363 N.W.2d 39, 42, 44 (Minn.1985). The state seems to interpret this as establishing a four-factor test for admissibility of any evidence under Rule 803(24). We have made clear that the proper analysis under the residual exception is to use the `totality of the circumstances' approach, looking to all relevant factors bearing on trustworthiness to determine whether the extrajudicial statement has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the other Rule 803 hearsay exceptions. See State v. Byers, 570 N.W.2d 487, 492 (Minn.1997) (interpreting the catch-all provision under Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(5)); see also State v. Edwards, 485 N.W.2d 911, 915 (Minn.1992) (examining the circumstances of the statement admitted under Rule 803(24)); Ortlepp, 363 N.W.2d at 44 (explaining that Rule 804(b)(5) and 803(24) are identical). The four factors test we cited in Ortlepp was an application of the totality of the circumstances approach to satisfy the equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness element of Rule 803(24). Robinson points out that the district court specifically ruled F.T.'s statements were not admissible under the residual exception. Robinson argues that we should give deference to this determination. But the only factor that the district court mentioned as a consideration bearing on trustworthiness was that the testimony by the neuroradiologist supported F.T.'s extrajudicial version of how the injury occurred. The district court believed that it could not consider this corroborating evidenceas distinguished from evidence of trustworthiness surrounding the making of the statementsbecause of the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990). The Confrontation Clause does not apply here because, unlike the declarant in Wright, F.T. testified and was subject to cross-examination. See id. The district court determined that Wright is controlling even when the declarant testifies because [c]onfrontation arises whenever you have a statement that was not confronted at the time it was originally made. But this reasoning has been rejected by the Supreme Court. [W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (holding Confrontation Clause was not violated if declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination); Oliver v. State, 502 N.W.2d 775, 778 (Minn.1993) ([T]here is no confrontation problem presented by the admission of the prior statement as substantive evidence because [the declarant] testified.); Ortlepp, 363 N.W.2d at 44 (same); State v. Gustafson, 266 N.W.2d 878, 879 (Minn.1978) (same). Thus, the Confrontation Clause poses no barrier to our consideration of evidence corroborating F.T.'s statements. [4] Because the district court incorrectly determined that it could not consider the evidence corroborating F.T.'s statements of identification and failed to identify or consider any other relevant factors bearing on trustworthiness, we afford no deference to its decision on the residual exception. In the ordinary course, we could remand the issue to the district court to exercise discretion. But, because the facts relevant to trustworthiness are undisputed and the applicability of the residual exception arises in the context of a harmless error analysis, it is appropriate for us to determine admissibility of the statements under Rule 803(24) as a legal issue. See Oliver, 502 N.W.2d at 778-79 (holding defendant had no ground for complaint about admission of a prior inconsistent statement to impeach a recanting witness because the statement was admissible substantively under the residual exception); Edwards, 485 N.W.2d at 915 (holding even if the district court was correct that the extrajudicial statements were not admissible under the excited utterance exception, it abused its discretion in excluding them because they were admissible under the residual exception). Our independent review of the record persuades us that F.T.'s statements contain sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to conclude that they were admissible under the residual exception. First, F.T. volunteered her statement to the nurse without suggesting or leading questions. Second, F.T.'s identification of Robinson as the person who caused her injury is reliable because it remained consistent throughout both of F.T.'s versions of what happened. Only the mechanism of injury changed. Third, F.T. had no motive to lie to the nurse. Her stated reason for lyingto get Robinson in troubleis questionable because she did not call the police; the hospital did. And there is no evidence that F.T. knew that identifying her abuser to a nurse would start the chain of events that led to police involvement. Fourth, F.T. repeated consistent versions of her statement to two different nurses within a short period of time. Fifth, there are at least three factors that strongly discredit her recanted version: (1) the uncontradicted medical testimony that F.T.'s eye injury could not have been caused by the edge of a door; (2) F.T.'s admission at trial that she has reconciled with Robinson and that she needs him to help raise their two children (i.e., she had a motive to falsely recant); and (3) an inconsistency in F.T.'s recanted version. [5] Finally, F.T.'s extrajudicial statement was strongly corroborated by four other items of evidence: (1) F.T.'s trip to obtain information on getting an order for protection 10 days after the alleged assault; (2) F.T.'s agreement to sign the medical release form for purposes of a police investigation; (3) the neuroradiologist's testimony supporting F.T.'s first version of how her eye was injured; and (4) F.T.'s consistent statement to police 10 days after the incident. Because F.T.'s statements were admissible under the residual exception, the district court's error in adopting a categorical rule of admissibility for statements of identification by domestic abuse victims under the medical diagnosis exception was harmless. Affirmed.