Opinion ID: 522032
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Dual Capacity Doctrine

Text: 12 Wilder argues that we should apply the so-called dual capacity doctrine adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Wright v. United States, 717 F.2d 254 (6th Cir.1983). The doctrine is described as follows: 13 That doctrine treats the employer as a third party outside the protections of the workmen's compensation statute under certain conditions. The test is as follows: An employer may become a third person, vulnerable to tort suit by an employee, if--and only if--he possesses a second persona so completely independent from and unrelated to his status as employer that by established standards the law recognizes it as a separate legal person. See 2A Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 14-229, Section 72.81 (1982). 14 Id. at 259. 15 As a threshold matter, we are not entirely sure how the doctrine would be applied in the context of employees of nonappropriated fund instrumentalities, who are specifically designated not to be employees of the United States for purposes of workmen's compensation under FECA. In any event, we note that the Sixth Circuit is alone in applying the doctrine in the context of federal workmen's compensation, and its position has been persuasively criticized. See Vilanova v. United States, 851 F.2d 1, 7 n. 24 (1st Cir.1988); Schmid v. U.S., 826 F.2d 227, 229-30 (3d Cir.1987); Balancio, 267 F.2d at 138. We adopt those criticisms in declining to apply the doctrine to the facts of this case. Whatever the merits of the doctrine as a matter of workmen's compensation law generally, its application in this case would effectively circumvent the comprehensive scheme of federal workmen's compensation established by Congress via statutes such as the LHWCA and the FECA. In the absence of any indication that Congress established the FTCA with a view towards allowing such a result, we decline to apply the doctrine to permit Wilder's FTCA claim.