Opinion ID: 218644
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Phillis’s Age Discrimination Claim

Text: Phillis argues that the District Court erred by granting summary judgment on her ADEA claim, and asserts that she demonstrated the existence of a disputed material fact as to each element of her prima facie case. We disagree. An ADEA plaintiff can make her prima facie case by putting forth direct and/or indirect evidence of discrimination. Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 183-84 (3d Cir. 6 2005). Where a plaintiff relies on indirect evidence, we follow the burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Phillis points to a handful of instances that she contends provide direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination. They are: 1) that Bankus commented that Phillis’s basement classroom had a “musty but[t]” smell, and that “musty butt” is “an Ebonics term used to refer derogatorily to older people,” Appellant Br. at 29; 2) that Kimber made a negative comment about “veteran” teachers; 3) that older teachers were given undesirable work assignments and storage areas; and 4) that both Phillis and another older teacher successfully grieved “unsatisfactory” evaluations in 2005. Even evaluated collectively, we hold that this evidence is insufficient to meet Phillis’s initial burden. At the outset, we note that, despite a voluminous appendix in this case, Phillis primarily relies on her own unsworn declaration in order to establish the existence of disputes of material fact. Unsworn declarations are permissible at the summary judgment stage if they conform to 28 U.S.C. § 1746’s requirement that declarants state that the contents of their declarations are true, subject to penalty of perjury. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Woloszyn v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 323 (3d Cir. 2005). Phillis’s declaration does not comply with this requirement, and thus the District Court was free to disregard it. Even considering that declaration, Phillis’s evidence of age discrimination falls short. First, she provides no citation for her “proffer” that “musty butt” is an “Ebonics term used to refer derogatorily to older people,” Appellant Br. at 29, and this is not the 7 sort of “fact” of which we could take judicial notice. Nor does the withdrawn 2005 evaluation, which rated as unsatisfactory Phillis’s performance in maintaining personal hygiene, help Phillis’s case in this regard. Second, even drawing all inferences in Phillis’s favor, Kimber’s negative statements about “veteran and returning” teachers generally, and about one particular teacher (Ms. Withers), do not evidence discrimination. It is not clear from the record how old the returning teachers are; presumably many of them were significantly younger than 40, and some new teachers (like Phillis herself) were older than 40 when they started with the School District. The second statement appears to be directed at Ms. Withers’s behavior, and not all teachers or even all older teachers. Likewise, Phillis’s unsworn statements that she was assigned undesirable work and storage areas and that “the atmosphere was like a workhouse, with some older female teachers pushing carts full of materials great distances,” App. 211, are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. These statements do not establish that similarly situated younger teachers received better treatment, and therefore do not evidence discrimination. Finally, that Phillis and another older teacher—among approximately 1,300 School District employees—received unsatisfactory evaluations, which they then successfully grieved, does not suggest age discrimination absent more information about the total number of unsatisfactory evaluations issued and the age of the teachers who received them. Nor does it help Phillis’s cause that the evaluations were later withdrawn on procedural grounds. 8 Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment on Phillis’s discrimination claim.6