Opinion ID: 2185565
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plain View Doctrine

Text: The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures (US Const 4th Amend). The seizure of an individual's property without obtaining a warrant is per se unreasonable, subject to several narrow, well-defined exceptions ( see, People v Diaz, 81 NY2d 106, 110; see also, Thompson v Louisiana, 469 US 17, 19-20). One such exception is the plain view doctrine, a judicially formulated concept first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Coolidge v New Hamphsire (403 US 443, supra; see generally, Twenty-Ninth Review of Criminal Procedure, Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 88 Geo L J 912, 934 n 174). The doctrine rests on the premise that police should be able to seize incriminating evidence in plain view if they had the right to be where they were when they saw it. Critically, such a seizure involves no invasion beyond what the warrant (or some other exception to the warrant requirement) allows ( see, People v Diaz, supra, at 111; see also, Blasich, 73 NY2d 673, 677). As we stated in People v Diaz ( supra, at 110), law enforcement officers may properly seize an item in plain view without a warrant if (i) they are lawfully in a position to observe the item; (ii) they have lawful access to the item itself when they seize it; and (iii) the incriminating character of the item is immediately apparent ( see also, Horton v California, 496 US 128, 136-137). Defendant argues that the first requirement of the plain view doctrine has not been satisfied. He asserts that because they were executing an unconstitutional general warrant the police were not lawfully on his property when they encountered the guns and blasting caps. We disagree. Although the warrant was partially invalid, that defectas we have concludeddid not strip the police of the authority to enter upon defendant's premises to search for the particularized items. Once the overbroad portion is severed from the warrant, we adjudge the propriety of the search and seizure based on a straightforward application of the plain view doctrine. The constitutionality of a plain view seizure must turn on the legality of the intrusion that enables [police] to perceive and physically seize the property in question ( Texas v Brown, 460 US 730, 737). The valid portion of the warrant determines the permissible scope and intensity of the search ( see, United States v George, supra, 975 F2d 72, 80 [In determining whether the (plain view) doctrine applies in the case of a redacted warrant the trial court must therefore ask if, when the officers came upon the item found in plain view, they were in a place where the redacted warrant    authorized them to be.]). [5] Focusing on when and where the plain view item was seized, the suppression court is able to determine whether the seizure occurred within the scope of the valid portion of the warrant. To prevail, the People must establish that the executing officers (i) found the item in a place where one reasonably would have expected to look while searching for an object particularly described and (ii) found it before they found all the objects described in the valid portion of the warrant ( see, United States v Fitzgerald, supra, 724 F2d 633, 637; United States v George, supra, 975 F2d, at 80; see generally, 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure, supra, § 4.6 [f], at 582-583). [6] This is largely a factual determination involving the size and character of the enumerated object and where one would reasonably look for it. The police, to put it graphically, may not open dresser drawers searching for a stolen piano. If the People fail to meet these conditions, the police were necessarily searching beyond the scope and intensity of the valid portion of the warrant and the evidence must be suppressed. Here, the warrantto the extent it authorized a search for and seizure of the tractor ignition key and the VIN plate provided the executing officers lawful access to defendant's home and anything in it that might contain either item. Accordingly, we have no basis to disturb Supreme Court's determination that the police discovered the guns and blasting caps in plain view within the scope of the valid portion of the warrant. Defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. Order affirmed.