Opinion ID: 2584655
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: Implementation problems

Text: Our colleagues acknowledge the probability that presenting juries with collateral source evidence reflecting payments under an insurance policy will require trial court diligence and limiting instructions to prevent the jury from considering that plaintiff's insurance paid the medical bill when calculating damages. They suggest limiting instructions, such as those used in criminal cases under K.S.A. 60-455, may avoid prejudice, confusion, mistrials, and reversals. Our case law already foreshadows the difficulties such a system creates. In Zak v. Riffel, 34 Kan.App.2d 93, 115 P.3d 165 (2005), the Court of Appeals addressed a trial court's failed attempt at a limiting instruction after the trial judge permitted collateral source evidence to be admitted to impeach an expert witness regarding his damages calculations. After admitting the evidence, the trial court admonished the jury as follows: `Members of the jury, these two exhibits that we have just been talking about... were received in evidence by me earlier this afternoon for the limited purposes that I have talked about before. They are merely being introduced for the purpose of laying a foundation to determine some calculations that have been made by an expert witness who will testify tomorrow. They are not received for the purpose of presenting evidence to diminish the amount of economic loss, if any, that the plaintiff has suffered as a result of the defendant's negligence.' 34 Kan.App.2d at 107-08, 115 P.3d 165. The Court of Appeals reversed, saying, The jury could only have been confused by the limiting instruction. 34 Kan.App.2d at 108, 115 P.3d 165. It found the evidentiary presentation insufficient to permit the jury to understand any purpose to the admission of the collateral source evidence, except for diminishing the plaintiff's recovery by making the jury aware of the insurance payment at issue. Furthermore, admission of other crimes evidence has not proven to be a simple issue in criminal cases. The comments to PIK Crim.3d 52.06, the K.S.A. 60-455 limiting instruction, recognize other crimes evidence has proven to be one of the most troublesome areas in the trial of a criminal case. This is reflected by the volume of appeals filed each year on this issue. We find the suggestion that limiting instructions will cure whatever ills result from our colleagues' approach is unfounded based upon the known complications demonstrated in our case law and the likelihood a jury will infer the existence of insurance. As noted above, this court traditionally has viewed the injection of insurance coverage into a trial as highly prejudicial to the insured party. See Rose II, 279 Kan. at 529, 113 P.3d 241; Rose I, 276 Kan. at 544, 78 P.3d 798; Allman v. Holleman, 233 Kan. 781, 789, 667 P.2d 296 (1983); Rexroad v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 192 Kan. 343, 355, 388 P.2d 832 (1964); Davis v. Kansas Electric Power Co., 159 Kan. 97, 109, 152 P.2d 806 (1944); Berry v. Dewey, 102 Kan. 593, 598, 172 P. 27 (1918); and Lewark v. Parkinson, 73 Kan. 553, 555-56, 85 P. 601 (1906). This view has been advantageous for both defendants, whose insurance coverage will pay any adverse verdict, as well as plaintiffs, whose collateral source benefits from insurance are similarly shielded from the jury. Harrier v. Gendel, 242 Kan. 798, 801, 751 P.2d 1038 (1988). We agree with our sister jurisdictions that have considered the problem in the context presented here and believe the risk is simply too great that the jury will improperly subtract collateral payments from the plaintiff's recovery in violation of the collateral source rule. Aumand, 611 F.Supp.2d at 91; Goble, 848 So.2d at 410; Wills, 229 Ill.2d at 418, 323 Ill.Dec. 26, 892 N.E.2d 1018; Covington, 359 S.C. at 104-05, 597 S.E.2d 142; Leitinger, 302 Wis.2d at 134-36, 736 N.W.2d 1. We also are concerned that, in cases where the only evidence presented will be the original amount billed and the amount paid, juries will be lured into simply splitting the difference between those two points on the evidentiary continuum. In that likely occurrence, the verdict will have to be thrown out and a mistrial declared since there would be no evidence upon which the jury could have based its compromise verdict. See State ex rel. Stephan v. Wolfenbarger & McCulley P.A., 236 Kan. 183, 188, 690 P.2d 380 (1984) (holding that `[i]n order for the evidence to be sufficient to warrant recovery of damages there must be some reasonable basis for computation which will enable the jury to arrive at an approximate estimate thereof.') (quoting Venable v. Import Volkswagen, Inc., 214 Kan. 43, 50, 519 P.2d 667 (1974)). We appreciate that defendants have long sought to be able to introduce collateral source evidence on any alternative basis in order to do indirectly what they have not before been able to do directly. See, e.g., Zak, 34 Kan.App.2d 93, 115 P.3d 165. We cannot help but think our colleagues' approach is better seen as a solution looking for a problem to justify its existence. But it is a solution with a high risk factor for prejudice, mistrials, appeals, and delays in justice. Given that defendants have other evidentiary alternatives to present to the jury regarding health care provider discounts and the reasonable value of a plaintiff's medical care, we believe our adherence to existing collateral source case law is required.