Opinion ID: 2279957
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proffered Reputation Testimony

Text: During a pretrial conference defense counsel proffered the testimony of Eleanor Chagnon (Chagnon) pursuant to Rule 608(a) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence for the purpose of establishing that Jane had a reputation in the community of Chepachet as untruthful. Defense counsel asserted in an offer of proof that Chagnon had known Jane for over fifteen years, was aware of her reputation in the community for questionable veracity, and was prepared to testify that Jane's reputation for truthfulness was poor. The trial justice expressed the opinion that the testimony was inadmissible but reserved final determination of the matter until a later time. Defense counsel made a second attempt to introduce Chagnon's reputation testimony at the close of the state's case. Preceding this attempt, the trial justice advised counsel that pursuant to this court's decision in State v. James, 557 A.2d 471, 473 (R.I.1989), it is improper for one witness to comment on the credibility of another witness. Thereafter the following colloquy took place between the trial justice and defense counsel: [Defense counsel]: Judge    if allowed    Mrs. Chagnon would testify she has known    [Jane] for a number of years, over fifteen years. [Jane]  is a friend of her daughter. They grew up together. [Jane] in this tight-knit community they live in  Ms. Chagnon is aware of a number of people who know [Jane] in the community, and is aware of their opinion of [Jane]. And, as far as truthfulness is concerned she will testify that their opinion is that she is a person who does not tell the truth. This is the entire gist of her testimony concerning [Jane]. [The court]: So, she's going to come here and tell us what other people think of [Jane's] character for truthfulness? [Defense counsel]: Exactly. [The court]: All right. I'm not going to permit it. Simple as that. [Defense counsel]: Note my objection. [The court]: Yes. Objection may be noted.    But, since that is in the nature of a motion in limine I am telling you now that she cannot get here and testify that she knows lots of people in Chepachet    [and] all those people    think that [Jane] doesn't tell the truth. Does that complete everything? Before resting his case, defense counsel sought for a third time to present Chagnon's reputation testimony to the jury. The trial justice denied the request. The defendant contends on appeal that the refusal of the trial justice to admit Chagnon's testimony concerning Jane's reputation for untruthfulness constituted reversible error. The record does not enable this court to determine Chagnon's competency to testify concerning Jane's reputation for truthfulness. It has long been recognized that testimony of a character witness called for the purpose of establishing another witness's reputation in the community for veracity is generally admissible. State v. Sepe, 122 R.I. 560, 568-69, 410 A.2d 127, 131-32 (1980); Kolb v. Union Railroad Co., 23 R.I. 72, 75-78, 49 A. 392, 393-94 (1901). Chagnon's testimony was tendered pursuant to this common-law doctrine, now codified in Rule 608(a) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. [3] Rule 608(a) is an exception to the general prohibition against character evidence proffered for the purpose of proving that a person acted in conformity with his or her character on a particular occasion. See R.I. R. Evid. 404(a)(3). Notwithstanding the relevance of reputation evidence in cases such as the present one, a witness may not testify to the reputation of another witness unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. R.I. R. Evid. 602. As was noted by Justice Jackson in an analogous setting: the witness must qualify to give an opinion by showing such acquaintance with the defendant, the community in which he [or she] has lived and the circles in which he [or she] has moved, as to speak with authority of the terms in which generally he [or she] is regarded. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 478, 69 S.Ct. 213, 219, 93 L.Ed. 168, 175 (1948). Similarly in State v. Di Noi, 59 R.I. 348, 361-62, 195 A. 497, 503 (1937), a defendant sought to put his character at issue by presenting a witness to say he had no reputation in the community as being quarrelsome. This court acknowledged the competency of negative-reputation evidence when the character witness is sufficiently familiar with the defendant's residence or circle of acquaintances. However in Di Noi we upheld the exclusion of the proffered testimony because the character witness had no knowledge of the defendant's reputation. Id. In fact the witness had only known the defendant for eight months and had never discussed his reputation with anyone. Id. We see no reason to apply a lower standard of reliability, as demonstrated by personal knowledge, in the context of Rule 608(a) than did the court in Di Noi. In addition to the requirement of personal knowledge, this court has indicated that [t]he crucial time when the character of the witness under attack has its influence on his [or her] truth-telling is the time when he [or she] testifies. Sepe, 122 R.I. at 568, 410 A.2d at 132 (quoting McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 44 at 92 (2d ed. Cleary 1972)). Testimony concerning a witness's reputation for truthfulness as of any time before trial is admissible if the trial justice determines the evidence not too remote to be significant. 122 R.I. at 568, 410 A.2d at 132; cf. Vaughn v. Clarkson, 19 R.I. 497, 498, 36 A. 1135, 34 A. 989, 989 (1896) (per curiam) (a woman's reputation for virtue in another country in other circumstances five years before the commencement of an action is too remote to be admissible). [4] The state contends that the trial court properly excluded Chagnon's reputation testimony because defense counsel had failed to make a sufficient offer of proof to enable the court to receive the testimony into evidence. The purpose of an offer of proof is to enable the court to determine the materiality, relevance, and competence of the evidence. State v. Almeida, 111 R.I. 566, 570, 304 A.2d 895, 898 (1973). This court examines the offer of proof to determine whether the trial justice's rejection of the proffered testimony prejudiced the defendant's case. Id. In the case at bar the offer of proof was insufficient to establish a foundation for the admissibility of reputation evidence. It was the burden of the proponent of the evidence to satisfy the requirements of knowledge of the witnesses' reputation in the community, the timeliness of that knowledge and its proximity to the time of trial. Cf. Atlantic Paint & Coatings, Inc. v. Conti, 119 R.I. 522, 527, 381 A.2d 1034, 1036 (1977) (proponent bears the burden of showing that proposed evidence was material and its exclusion prejudicial). An examination of the colloquy between the trial justice and defense counsel discloses that these elements were not satisfied. Her awareness of a number of people was not identical to establishment of a general reputation in the community. Moreover, we note from the limited record on this subject that Jane had left the community of Chepachet to live in the community of North Smithfield sometime prior to the commencement of trial in November of 1994. There is also an indication in the record that she had moved from defendant's home to another nearby location during her last year of high school. The many questions concerning the association of Chagnon with Jane, the duration of that association, and the circles within which they had common acquaintance among the members of the Chepachet community are left open to the merest of speculation. We concede that the trial justice did not directly address the adequacy of a foundation for the admission of reputation evidence but seemed to concentrate on the proposition that one person should not be allowed to testify on the credibility of another person. Nevertheless it remained the obligation of defendant either to provide all the necessary elements of foundation in his offer of proof or to have requested a voir dire examination of Chagnon outside the presence of the jury. In this case counsel fulfilled neither obligation. Since the offer of proof was inadequate, we cannot fault the trial justice for having rejected it. In instances when the offered testimony suggests or poses a question about its materiality or competency, the offer of proof must indicate the facts on which relevancy or admissibility of the testimony depends. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rahill, 121 R.I. 31, 35, 394 A.2d 690, 692 (1978) (no abuse of discretion in excluding proffered evidence where offer of proof omitted facts establishing witness's qualifications to testify); Manning v. Redevelopment Agency of Newport, 103 R.I. 371, 379, 238 A.2d 378, 382-83 (1968) (the offer [of proof] should be reasonably specific, rather than general, should include a statement of the facts to which the witness would testify, should indicate the purpose and object of the proof offered, and should establish that the evidence sought to be elicited is admissible) (citations omitted); see also John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence, § 51 at 73 (4th ed. 1992).