Opinion ID: 485224
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Proper Scope of the Remand after Mallick I

Text: 32 The IBEW's next challenge to the District Court's decision is that it does not address the issue of whether Mr. Mallick satisfied his burden of proving 'just cause' sufficient to satisfy Section 201(c). Appellants' Brief at 38. The union, however, misreads Mallick I in arguing that on remand Mallick was required to introduce further evidence to establish just cause. Mallick I held that plaintiff had established what amounted to a prima facie right to inspect the IBEW's records relating to litigation expenses. Mallick I decided that when the union's LM-2 reports show abrupt and unexplained shifts, a union may not simply dig in its heels and refuse to explain what the change means. 749 F.2d at 781. Moreover, the court went on to say Mallick has clearly satisfied this principle.... [T]he 8% change in the balance of the [IBEW's Litigation] Defense Fund was far greater than changes in preceding years, and the significance of the change was entirely unclear. Id. at 783. Thus, from these facts alone, which were in the record at the time of Mallick I, plaintiff had established a presumption that he was entitled to examine the union records. The only question that remained was whether even if Mallick is otherwise entitled to inspect the records, the union could introduce sufficient evidence of harm to defeat Mallick's request for examination. Id. 33 The IBEW points to a sentence in Mallick I stating that plaintiff had gone a very long way to proving just cause. 749 F.2d at 784. The union reads this sentence as requiring plaintiff on remand to present additional evidence to go the rest of the way. Appellants' Brief at 49. This language, however, does not carry the implication ascribed to it by the union. Rather, this court meant simply that just cause is not conclusively established until after the union member's showing is evaluated together with the union's evidence of harm. 8 34 In this case, plaintiff was not required to offer any additional evidence establishing just cause unless the union introduced evidence of harm from disclosure that sufficiently negated plaintiff's initial showing. The correctness of this interpretation of Mallick I can best be demonstrated by the opinion's concluding sentences on the subject: 35 If the IBEW demonstrates that disclosure of this information would be comparable to, for example, a corporation's disclosure of trade secrets, ... then examination should be refused. If, however, the IBEW's fears prove speculative and remote, Mallick's request should be granted. 36 749 F.2d at 785 (emphasis added). The District Court properly understood and carried out the instructions of this court in focusing on this question on remand. Consequently, the union's claim that the District Court erred by not demanding additional proof of just cause lacks merit.