Opinion ID: 1548268
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Elopement

Text: We next consider whether elopement is an affirmative or general defense to the law of necessaries. As stated above, the trial court ruled that elopement is an affirmative defense, and barred Anthony from presenting evidence that Karen eloped, finding that Anthony had failed to give adequate notice of his intention to rely upon that defense. We conclude that elopement is no longer a defense to the doctrine of necessaries. Cf. Chisholm, 467 S.E.2d at 91. As noted above, the necessaries doctrine developed during a time when married women were severely restricted in their ability to contract, sue, or be sued, or to exercise control over their property, services, or earnings. See Kieft, 578 N.W.2d at 269; Chisholm, 467 S.E.2d at 90; Steiner, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 892. To defend on the grounds of elopement, the non-debtor spouse had to prove that the debtor spouse left the non-debtor spouse, escaped his or her control and committed adultery. See Cogswell, 3 N.H. at 42. Such a defense does not comport with the modern status of marriage. We have rejected such antiquated and obsolete notions concerning women by modernizing the common law necessaries doctrine to impose liability on a gender-neutral basis and, thereby, making either spouse responsible for the necessary services provided to the other. Chisholm, 467 S.E.2d at 90-91; see Holbrook, 140 N.H. at 190, 663 A.2d 1344. Given that the historical purposes underlying the [elopement] exception to the necessaries doctrine are incompatible with current mores and laws governing modern marital relationships in [New Hampshire], we find that the elopement exception has no place in the common law. Chisholm, 467 S.E.2d at 91. But see Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 9-10 (Ind.1993) (reasoning that common law defenses to application of doctrine of necessaries remain applicable). Rather, we conclude that, under the third prong of the prima facie case that we have outlined above, the creditorin this case, the hospital must show more than the legal fact of marriage to demonstrate that the parties are married for the purposes of liability under the necessaries doctrine. See Roach v. Mamakos, 196 Misc.2d 456, 764 N.Y.S.2d 539, 541 (2003); National Account Systems, Inc. v. Mercado, 196 N.J.Super. 133, 481 A.2d 835, 837 (1984). [P]roof of an undissolved marriage does not in itself provide the basis for liability to a creditor supplying a spouse with necessaries, as in some circumstances a marriage will cease to [exist] for purposes of liability under the necessaries doctrine. Mercado, 481 A.2d at 837. This is a fact-specific, and case-specific, inquiry. See Nichol v. Clema, 188 Neb. 74, 195 N.W.2d 233, 235 (1972) (noting that each decision with respect to liability under necessaries doctrine must necessarily be largely governed by the facts existing in the particular case in which it is rendered). The non-debtor spouse's liability under the necessaries doctrine depends on a mutual expectation that the spouses will share assets, expenses, and debts. Accordingly, factors to consider in determining whether the marriage is no longer viable for the purposes of the necessaries doctrine might include whether the parties were separated, when they separated, whether they are living apart, and whether they share their living expenses and debt. See Mercado, 481 A.2d at 837 (factors to consider in determining liability under necessaries doctrine include whether the parties are separated and have been financially supporting each other). If a marriage has broken down to the extent that spouses are no longer sharing assets or debts, it makes little sense to hold a non-debtor spouse liable for the medical expenses of the other. See id. at 837. But see Kagawa, 967 P.2d at 699-700 (non-debtor spouse liable for necessaries until divorce finalized); Bartrom, 618 N.E.2d at 9 (holding that duty of spousal support continues at least until the marriage relationship is dissolved). For the reasons described above, elopement is no longer a defense to the application of the necessaries doctrine; rather, the third party seeking to impose liability on the non-debtor spousein this case, SNHMCretains the burden to demonstrate that the parties were married for the purposes of liability under the necessaries doctrine. Because we hold today that elopement is not an affirmative defense, we reverse and remand to the trial court for a new trial on the merits.