Opinion ID: 77304
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contradictory Statements by Guilt-Phase and Penalty-Phase Counsel

Text: 33 In the guilt phase of Gamble's trial, counsel proceeded on a theory of theft-after-the-killing —which is to say that, notwithstanding other admissions as to Gamble's guilt, counsel declined to concede a pecuniary-gain aggravator. In the penalty phase, however, where it was the State's responsibility to prove aggravating factors sufficient to impose the death penalty, second chair defense counsel (a different attorney than guilt-phase counsel) told the jury that this murder . . . was committed for financial gain, there's no question about that, it was a robbery. Guy Gamble was involved in that robbery. You have heard all the testimony. Counsel further stated that Gamble's involvement in the planning of the robbery is not in dispute and never has been, and he conceded outright that an aggravator existed because it was for financial gain . . . . [T]he evidence you have before you is of a heightened premeditation for robbery. 34 Reviewing this claim, the Florida Supreme Court held that it would have been preposterous for penalty-phase defense counsel to argue that no facts in the record established pecuniary gain when the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it did . . . . [T]his is not a case where defense counsel conceded an aggravator that required proof of additional facts not established in the guilt-phase trial . . . . Id. at 716 (internal quotation marks omitted). We do not find that this determination was contrary to, or was an unreasonable application of, federal Supreme Court precedent—including Strickland. Again, counsel is ineffective under Strickland if his performance is both deficient and prejudicial. Even if contradictory statements might sometimes furnish a case for deficiency, see Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 191-92, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004), in this case, as the Florida Supreme Court observed, the jury had already discounted guilt-phase counsel's theft-after-the-killing theory when sentencing-phase counsel conceded the pecuniary gain aggravator. Such concession obviously could not have been prejudicial, nor could it have rendered counsel's performance deficient, as its content was beyond genuine dispute in the penalty phase. Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court's determination was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. 35 AFFIRMED.