Opinion ID: 2975286
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Hypothetical Federal Felony” Approach

Text: Under the “hypothetical federal felony” approach, a state drug conviction is an aggravated felony if it would be punishable as a felony under the Controlled Substances Act, regardless of whether the conviction is a felony or a misdemeanor under state law. Garcia-Echaverria, 376 F.3d -8- No. 06-3467 Mendieta-Robles v. Gonzales at 512; Gerbier, 280 F.3d at 299. This approach “‘require[s] a comparison between the elements of the [state] drug offense and [the elements of] a federal drug provision referenced in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) . . . .’” Steele, 236 F.3d at 136 (quoting Matter of Davis, 20 I. & N. Dec. 536, 541, 1992 WL 443920 (BIA 1992)). In making this determination, the BIA “looks to what the convicting court must necessarily have found to support the conviction and not to other conduct in which the defendant may have engaged in connection with the offense.” Id. The Attorney General argues that, as the BIA found, Mendieta-Robles’s state conviction is analogous to a felony conviction under two sections of the Controlled Substances Act: 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. We hold that neither are analogous. As an initial matter, § 841(a)(1) is not analogous to ORC § 2925.03(A)(1). Section 841(a)(1) makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally “manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance[.]” “The term ‘distribute’ means to deliver . . . a controlled substance . . . .” 21 U.S.C. § 802(11). Because ORC § 2925.03(A)(1) encompasses convictions where the individual neither possessed nor transferred a controlled substance, it is difficult to see how 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) is analogous to the Ohio statute. It would mean that offering to sell cocaine is the same as delivering cocaine. Moreover, the relevant documents and judicially noticeable facts fail to establish that Mendieta-Robles had the requisite mens rea to commit a distribution crime. To be convicted under ORC § 2925.03(A)(1), an individual need only intend to offer to sell a controlled substance. Chandler, 846 N.E.2d at 1236-37; see also State v. Mughni, 514 N.E.2d 870, 872 (Ohio 1987) (holding that an offense is complete under ORC 2925.03(A)(1) when a person knowingly offers to -9- No. 06-3467 Mendieta-Robles v. Gonzales sell a controlled substance); State v. Scott, 432 N.E.2d 798, 799 (Ohio 1982) (“The proscribed conduct is offering to sell a controlled substance, not offering the controlled substance. Therefore, our analysis of the statute should not turn on whether appellant transferred a controlled substance.”). On the other hand, under § 841(a)(1), an individual must intend to or knowingly distribute a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally . . . distribute . . . a controlled substance . . . .”); accord, e.g., United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 670 (6th Cir. 1977) (“The ‘intent to distribute’ is an essential element of § 841(a)(1). . . . 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) requires both general criminal intent and the specific ‘intent to distribute’ before a violation is proven.”). Thus, the mens rea elements of each crime are substantially different. That is, an individual may be convicted under § 2925.03(A)(1) without having any intent to distribute a controlled substance. Cf. United States v. Garza, 410 F.3d 268, 274–76 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that offers to transport, sell, furnish, administer or give away a controlled substance do not fall within the definition of “drug trafficking offense” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2); United States v. Foster, No. 93-50402, 1994 WL 201201, at  (9th Cir. May 23, 1994) (“ORC § 2925.03(A)(4) falls short of the federal definition of a controlled substance offense. It does not require the State to prove an intent to distribute.”). The Attorney General’s argument that Mendieta-Robles’s Ohio conviction is analogous to a conviction under § 846 must fail for the same reason. To be convicted of attempted distribution, the Government must prove that (1) the defendant acted “with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the crime which he is charged with attempting,” and (2) the defendant “engaged in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the crime . . . .” - 10 - No. 06-3467 Mendieta-Robles v. Gonzales United States v. Stone, 960 F.2d 426, 433 (5th Cir.1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also, e.g., United States v. Pratt, 351 F.3d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 2003) (“An attempt to commit a crime, which is recognized as a crime distinct from the crime intended by the attempt, punishes conduct that puts in motion events that would, from the defendant’s point of view, result in the commission of a crime but for some intervening circumstance.”). Because, here, a hypothetical conviction under § 846 would require the government to prove that Mendieta-Robles acted with the same mens rea as a conviction under § 841, and because, as already noted, the mens rea elements of § 841 and ORC § 2925.03(A)(1) are substantially different, Mendieta-Robles’s Ohio conviction would also not be punishable as a felony under § 846.