Opinion ID: 1669438
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the trial court err in precluding the testimony or account of witness Ann Maddox?

Text: ¶ 20. Ann Maddox is Clein's mother-in-law. On August 7, 1998, Maddox called Dr. Blake, approximately one year after the law suit had been filed. Dr. Blake's nurse prepared a written record of the conversation. Later, Maddox voluntarily visited Dr. Blake's attorney's offices. Subsequently, the Defendants sought to depose Ann Maddox regarding her knowledge of relevant evidence. On June 16, 1999, the parties appeared at Ann Maddox's home to take her deposition. According to Dr. Blake, before the deposition was commenced, Maddox produced two letters from physicians, one which stated that she could participate in a deposition in her home, and one that stated that she could not due to her emotional state. Defendants assert that Maddox appeared calm at her home before she was confronted by Clein and her daughter, Clein's wife, then also a plaintiff. Plaintiffs objected to the deposition, and a telephonic hearing was held, wherein the court ordered suspension of the deposition until a hearing could be held before the court. ¶ 21. The hearing was held on July 9, 1999, regarding the resumption of the deposition. The court reviewed conflicting opinions from Dr. Troy Caldwell. In a letter dated February 19, 1999, Dr. Caldwell opined that Maddox's ability to travel is limited. A deposition should be held at her home. Subsequently, on May 20, 1999, less than a month before the deposition was to take place, Dr. Caldwell issued a second letter opining that the stress of a deposition may cause worsening of her already unstable state. Much regression could be potentially lethal for this already depressed lady. In the strongest way possible, I advise to not pursue this deposition. The trial judge also referred to a letter by Dr. William G. Munn, dated February 5, 1999, which opined the following: This lady has a long standing diagnosis of multiple sclerosis. She suffers from chronic anxiety and depression. She takes multiple medications including Klonopin, Prozax, and Thorazine. She should not be placed in stressful situations due to the danger of having an exacerbation of her MS. She should not be subjected to the stress of testifying in court in my opinion. The court denied the defendants' Motion to Resume Deposition and ruled that the defendants could not conduct an oral deposition. However she instructed the defendants to submit written questions as provided in M.R.C.P. 31 to Maddox and that the court would determine at a later date what to do about her testimony. The written deposition was taken on, July 19, 2000, without counsel present. ¶ 22. The trial began over one and a half years later, on February 11, 2002. The defense subpoenaed Ann Maddox for trial. At trial the defendants' counsel advised the court that the defendants had subpoenaed Maddox and that they had received a fax purportedly from Maddox containing a letter from Dr. Munn opining that Maddox would be unable to serve on a jury because of her health. ¶ 23. The trial judge, on her own initiative, and without a motion to quash the subpoena pending, called Dr. Munn and conducted an ex parte discussion about his opinion. In this discussion, the judge determined that Dr. Munn had neither seen Maddox or physically examined her for more than a year. The judge asked if Maddox was mobile, to which Dr. Munn replied in the affirmative. Dr. Munn privately opined to the judge that she could give testimony for thirty minutes. He further opined that it would aggravate her multiple sclerosis and other problems that would do more damage to her if she were to take the stand as opposed to her not taking the stand. According to the judge, the doctor also opined that he did not think that Maddox was emotionally stable enough to take the stand. The court then sua sponte released Maddox from honoring the subpoena and ruled that the written deposition could be introduced into evidence subject to her review. Clein was asked if he had any objections to the deposition being read into evidence, to which he did not. However, objections were reserved to some of the questions and answers. ¶ 24. Later during the trial, the court reviewed Maddox's written deposition. The court noted that at the beginning of the deposition, Maddox stated that she was under the influence of drugs and that she could not be accurate. However, a complete reading of the deposition belies this assertion and the witness's responses to some questions appear quite lucid, albeit other responses evidence evasiveness. The basis of the evasiveness is supported by Puckett's notes of the telephone call to Dr. Blake's office wherein Maddox expressed a desire for confidentiality for more than one reason, including the relationship with the Clein's children. Additionally, defendants assert that during the attempted taking of the oral deposition on June 16, 1999, Maddox was confronted by both her daughter and son-in-law. Unfortunately, the judge failed to require the physical presence of Maddox in order to make a judicial determination on the record under the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure as to the witness's competency, or require testimony of any physicians to make a judicial determination on the record of the validity of Maddox's alleged unavailability. ¶ 25. To compound these errors, the judge incorrectly excluded Maddox's Rule 31 deposition in its entirety, from being heard by the jury. ¶ 26. Therefore, the jury was precluded from hearing any testimony, by deposition or otherwise, of Ann Maddox. This was clearly erroneous. Under Mississippi law, if the evidence has any probative value at all, the rule favors its admission. Miss. R. Evid. 401, cmt. See also Holladay v. Holladay 776 So.2d 662, 676 (Miss.2000). [T]he threshold for admissibility of relevant evidence is not great. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to prove a consequential fact. Whitten v. Cox, 799 So.2d 1, 15 (Miss.2000). Any witness is competent to testify who has evidentiary facts within his personal knowledge, gained through any of his senses. Dennis v. Prisock, 221 So.2d 706, 710 (Miss.1969). Portions of Maddox's testimony should have been admitted as it was clearly relevant and had probative value.
¶ 27. It was error for the judge to order a written deposition based solely on conflicting doctor's notes or letters, especially when they only raise potential health problems, not probable. A written deposition is certainly not as effective as an oral deposition, and the defendants should not have been denied an oral deposition solely based on conflicting and otherwise inadmissible evidence. [I]t has long been recognized that there are far greater advantages in obtaining the facts and circumstances involved in a confronting examination than in a written one. Goldberg v. Raleigh Manufacturers, Inc., 28 F.Supp. 975, 976-77 (D.Mass.1939). Furthermore, an oral deposition has the advantage of allowing cross examination of an evasive, recalcitrant, or hostile witness. 8 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure Civil 2d § 2039 at 512-13 (1994) (footnote omitted). See also Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 428 (N.D.Ill.1976). The court should have held an evidentiary hearing regarding Maddox's condition, with the doctors testifying under oath, under cross-examination regarding their opinions and the basis of same. The letters were insufficient, by themselves, to disallow an oral deposition. Furthermore, the letters which would be inadmissible in a hearing, were insufficient in fact.
¶ 28. The testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally and in open court. M.R.C.P. 43. Other rules provide when depositions may be used in lieu thereof, subject to certain qualifications. M.R.C.P. 32. Of course in certain circumstances, the court does have the authority to quash a subpoena, but it was error for the judge to do so in the manner that occurred. According to M.R.C.P. 45, on timely motion, the court can quash a subpoena if it subjects a person to undue burden. However, neither party filed a motion to quash. The judge based her decision on a fax from Dr. Munn and an ex parte conversation, without notice to either party, without the benefit of observing witnesses, without the defendants having the right to confront the witness or the doctors advocating her unavailability as a witness. The judge erred when she called the doctor on her own initiative, without informing either party of her intentions to do so, and without allowing either party to explore the basis of the doctor's opinion. A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding. . . . Miss.Code of Jud. Conduct Canon 3B(7). A hearing should have been held giving each party the ability to obtain an accurate portrayal of Maddox's ability to testify vel non. ¶ 29. Furthermore, the judge's inexplicable reliance on a physician's assessment who had not seen or physically examined the witness in over a year, was clear error. There should have been an in-court inquiry as to the actual present status of Maddox's ability to testify, especially with Dr. Munn's opinion that Maddox was still mobile and could give testimony for 30 minutes. The trial court erred in quashing Ann Maddox's subpoena.
¶ 30. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a)(3)(C) provides that: The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, illness, infirmity, or imprisonment The trial judge abused her discretion in excluding Maddox's written deposition in the entirety. Admission or suppression of evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Church of God Pentecostal, Inc. v. Freewill Pentecostal Church of God, Inc., 716 So.2d 200, 210 (Miss.1998) (citations omitted). The reviewing court may reverse a case only if, the admission or exclusion of evidence . . . results in prejudice and harm or adversely affects a substantial right of a party. K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy, 735 So.2d 975, 983 (Miss.1999). It is self evident that a defendant loses a substantive right when he is prohibited from examining a close family member regarding his or her firsthand knowledge of plaintiff's physical and mental condition both before and after the alleged injury was incurred, as well as the plaintiff's post-surgical condition and activities, and any acts or statements contrary to those espoused in court. ¶ 31. Defendants allege that Maddox's testimony would raise compelling questions regarding the legitimacy of plaintiff's claims and specifically wanted to confirm Maddox's phone call to Dr. Blake and meeting with the Defendants' attorneys and to offer evidence to support their theory of the case. The trial judge excluded the deposition in its entirety based on Maddox's statement that she was under the influence of drugs and that she could not guarantee the truthfulness of her answers. ¶ 32. This Court has found that drug and alcohol abuse does not render a witness incompetent per se. Carter v. State, 743 So.2d 985 (Miss.1999). In Carter, this Court found that an eye witness who had drug and alcohol problems was competent to testify and recognized a general trend to reject rigid rules of incompetence in favor of admitting the testimony and allowing the triers of fact judge the weight to be given such evidence. Id. at 989 (citing United States v. Killian, 524 F.2d 1268, 1275 (5th Cir.1975) (trial court did not abuse discretion in allowing witness to testify despite contention that he was a heavy user of drugs and suffered time to time from hallucinations)). It was error for the trial court to exclude Maddox's deposition on the basis of drug use. Furthermore, other portions of the deposition clearly bear out the lucidity of the witness. ¶ 33. After improperly quashing Maddox's subpoena to testify live, the judge should have minimally allowed relevant testimony to be introduced into evidence. The fact that Maddox was taking medications alone cannot be the sole basis for exclusion. If that was the sole test, injured plaintiffs taking medication would never be allowed to testify. [T]his court consistently holds that decisions as to the weight and credibility of a witness's statement are the proper province of the jury, not the judge. Doe v. Stegall, 757 So.2d 201, 205 (Miss.2000). The jury should have been allowed to reach their own conclusions about Maddox's testimony and whether or not it was reliable or credible. If evidence has any probative value at all, the rule favors its admission. Miss. R. Evid. 401 cmt. Excerpts from the written deposition of Ann Maddox include the following: Q: What was the purpose for calling Dr. Blake's office? AM: I think it was something concerning  about Alex walking on his foot. Q: What did you intend to discuss with Dr. Blake? AM: That.    Q: And at the time you called Dr. Blake's office, a lawsuit had been filed by your daughter and son-in-law against Dr. Blake? AM: I believe it had. I don't know for sure whether it had been filed or not. I don't know the dates. Q: You attempted to call Dr. Blake, a man whom you had never met, about a lawsuit your daughter and son-in-law had filed? AM: Yes Q: Because you did not believe it was right for Dr. Blake to be blamed for Mr. Clein's problems? A: I'm no doctor. I don't know that. Q: You also told the person you spoke to at Dr. Blake's office that you did not want your name brought into this? AM: We just wanted some information, and we just preferred that it wouldn't be told, because we wanted it  to know for ourselves. That's what I can remember right now. Q: You felt that Dr. Blake needed to know what was going on insofar as the lawsuit your daughter and son-in-law filed against him? AM: I can't remember clearly now. But to the best of my knowledge at this time, I believe we were going to ask him whether he should walk on his foot or not. Q: You told the person with whom you spoke that you thought that Dr. Blake needed to know what was going on? AM: I don't know whether it would have hurt if he walked on it or not. Q: Why did you feel Dr. Blake needed to know what was going on concerning the lawsuit? AM: I don't understand that. At the present time, I don't understand. Q: You did not feel the lawsuit filed by your daughter and son-in-law was right? AM: Oh, I don't know. Q: In fact, you told the person with whom you spoke: This lawsuit is just not right? AM: I don't remember that at this time. I don't remember. Q: And that was because you knew that Mr. Clein, your son in law, did not take care of his leg before the surgery performed by Dr. Blake? AM: I don't know the instructions that he gave him about taking care of it. Q: In other words, you believed Mr. Clein was blaming Dr. Blake for problems that existed before the surgery performed by Dr. Blake? AM: I know he said he had an accident, but I thought that was the reason he went to the doctor, you know, because he needed treatment. I don't know. I can't think. Q: Was your visit concerning the lawsuit your son-in-law and daughter filed against Dr. Blake? AM: We were concerned about him walking on his foot, if it would hurt it or not. And Iat this time I can't remember just what was said. ¶ 34. Maddox's testimony was relevant because Maddox raised issues regarding the legitimacy of plaintiff's claims, and she had firsthand information regarding plaintiff's physical and mental condition both before and after Dr. Blake's treatment. While Maddox did frequently answer questions by saying that she did not know, or that she was not sure, importantly she confirmed the phone call to Dr. Blake's office, which was documented by another excluded witness, Elaine Puckett. She confirmed that the phone call had something to do with Clein walking on his foot. She confirmed he needed treatment. This testimony should have come before the jury by way of Maddox's in-court testimony. However had a hearing been held regarding her ability to attend court due to illness or infirmity, and she was declared unavailable, then minimally, in the alternative, the judge should not have excluded the written deposition in its entirety.
¶ 35. Defendants argue that one of Dr. Blake's nurses, Elaine Puckett, should have been allowed to testify to the substance of the aforementioned phone conversation with Ann Maddox and/or her written memo of the conversation made at or near the time of the phone call should have been admitted into evidence. Portions of Elaine Puckett's memorandum concerning the phone call, on August 7, 1998, include the following: I answered a telephone call at about 10:15, and the lady asked to speak to Dr. Blake. I told her he was talking on another phone call and asked if she would like to leave a message. She said she had called yesterday and he wasn't in and she called back today to try to reach him. She said this is personal and I need to talk to him. `This is about legal stuff.' I asked her to leave her name and telephone number and I would ask him to return her call. She said this is about a lawsuit and she didn't want her name in it. `I think Dr. Blake needs to know what is happening.'    `This is my son-in-law and he is suing Dr. Blake. Dr. Blake needs to know this before he gives his deposition.'    `This is just not right. He is not taking care of his leg and did not before this. They are blaming Dr. Blake and he never took care of his leg.'    `He is seeing a psychiatrist and they are saying this is because he is upset because of what happened to his leg but he was having problems before all this and seeing a psychiatrist.'    `This is my daughter and what they are doing isn't right. Dr. Blake needs to know this. I have two grandchildren and if my daughter knew I was calling they would get mad at me.'    `my husband and I have talked this over and don't think it is right for them to blame Dr. Blake.'    `My son-in-law never took care of his foot. He is saying now that he wishes they would take it off up higher, but I told him that that is the last thing he should be wishing for.' The trial court erred in excluding this testimony. ¶ 36. Furthermore, because the trial court excluded Maddox's testimony and written deposition, she then became an unavailable witness as described in Miss. R. Evid. 804. According to Rule 804(4), unavailability includes situations where the witness is unable to testify due to then existing physical or mental infirmity. Defendants argue that this hearsay evidence should be admitted under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5) as having circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. ¶ 37. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5) reads in pertinent part: (b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:    (5) Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will be best served by admission of the statement into evidence. . . . This Court finds that the conditions for admissibility under Rule 804 were satisfied with respect to Maddox's statements to Puckett. Maddox's statements made to Puckett were admissible only if Dr. Blake could show (1) necessity for the evidence, and (2) adequate indicia of reliability. Jones v. Hatchett, 504 So.2d 198, 202 (Miss.1987). The statement was offered because Maddox raised questions regarding the legitimacy of the plaintiff's claims and had information regarding Clein's physical and mental state before and after the surgery performed by Dr. Blake. All other avenues to elicit testimony from Maddox had been denied or excluded, and this was the only probative evidence of the information known by Maddox about Clein's injuries and about the legitimacy of his claims. From the information obtained in Maddox's written deposition, there is no dispute that Maddox called Dr. Blake's office. What Maddox allegedly failed to remember was the reason for the call and most of what she related. Puckett's testimony would have provided the jury with probative information concerning this phone call. This Court finds that Maddox's statements made to Puckett had circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, and Puckett should have been allowed to testify as to the content of their conversation. ¶ 38. Additionally, Rule 613(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence provides for the admissibility of prior statements of witnesses. The rule reads as follows: Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. If Ann Maddox had testified live and subsequently agreed to the contents of Puckett's memo, then this rule would not come into play. However, if her live testimony contradicted the contents of the memo, then Elaine Puckett's testimony would have been admissible. Had Maddox's written deposition been introduced into evidence, then Rule 613 would also apply to Elaine Puckett's testimony, as Maddox had admitted to making the call but denied remembering why.