Opinion ID: 2446
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Level of Deference Due to the Agency's Interpretation of the Penalty Statute

Text: Once we determine that a statute is ambiguous, we then consider the level of deference warranted by an agency's interpretation of the statute. Kruse, 383 F.3d at 55. The BIA Rule warrants Chevron deference. The BIA interprets the Penalty Statute to mean that the issuance of certain post-arrival waiversspecifically, those which explicitly provide that a visa is not required if the waiver is issued, see, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 212.1(g) (1995)results in the carrier avoiding a basis for being fined. This interpretation of the Penalty Statute by the BIA, while not evolved through a traditional notice-and-comment period, is still worthy of our deference. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 317 n.4 (2d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Katzmann, J. , concurring) ([T]he BIA should be accorded Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication. (internal quotation marks omitted)). To the extent the BIA Rule includes an interpretation of a regulation, similar deference is warranted. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (An agency's interpretation of its own regulations is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (internal quotation marks omitted)). Applying Chevron deference, we conclude that the BIA Rule is reasonable. The BIA Rule conditions the application of the Penalty Statute on whether the regulations entirely exempt from visa requirements the transported aliens who are in receipt of a waiver. This interpretation, while not compelled by the statutory and regulatory scheme, is certainly plausible and rational: the Penalty Statute provides for the imposition of a fine if a visa were required pursuant to regulations, and the regulations at issue in turn provide that a visa is not required if a waiver were granted. Moreover, we note that neither party disputes that the BIA has for decades interpreted the Penalty Statute and corresponding INS regulations to exempt carriers from liability when the alien is granted certain post-arrival waivers. The BIA's consistency in applying the BIA Rule has particular force because it is a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the [individuals] charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 390 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). It might therefore carry the day against doubts that might exist from a reading of the bare words of a statute. Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 414 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Congress's repeated amendment of the relevant provisions of the statute without expressing any disapproval reinforces the strength of the BIA's interpretation, because it is persuasive evidence that the [Agency's] interpretation is the one intended by Congress. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 376 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 551 U.S. 158 (2007). Since 1952, Congress has amended the section containing the statutory waiver provisions for non-immigrants, 8 U.S.C. § 1182, at least four times (in 1965, 1976, 1980, and 1990). Congress has also amended the Penalty Statute four times, and none of those amendments modified the language at issue in this case. The difficulty with the BIA rule concerns the counterintuitive analysis by which a post-arrival determination by an INS officer to grant a waiver may retroactively modify the alien's pre-arrival need to present a visa. This, however, does not lessen the reasonableness of the BIA's interpretation of the Penalty Statute. Retroactivity is not particularly unusual in regulatory law nor in the immigration context. See Orr v. Hawk, 156 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir. 1998) (So long as a change in a regulation does not announce a new rule, but rather merely clarifies or codifies an existing policy, that regulation can apply retroactively.). If the INS finds that application of the BIA Rule creates a disincentive for airlines to make a reasonable, good faith effort to ensure that every alien has a visa prior to arrival in the United States, it may amend the regulations so that a post-arrival waiver does not nullify the visa requirement. In sum, we conclude that the language of the Penalty Statute is ambiguous, and the agency's interpretation of the statute is reasonable. Accordingly, we defer to the agency's interpretation under Chevron and uphold the BIA Rule.