Opinion ID: 853223
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasonableness of This Roadblock

Text: States that have held, as we do today, that sobriety checkpoints do not violate their state constitutions per se have focused on reviewing the implementation of specific roadblocks. See R. Marc Kantrowitz, Annotation, Validity of Police Roadblocks or Checkpoints for Purpose of Discovery of Alcoholic Intoxication Post-Sitz Cases, 74 A.L.R. 5th 319, § 2a (2001). These states have identified a variety of factors pertinent to assessing the constitutionality of specific checkpoints. [8] Id. We review the Mishawaka roadblock in light of some factors we consider significant. Neutral Plan Approved by Appropriate Officials. Some states have looked more favorably upon roadblocks staged pursuant to formal guidelines adopted at an appropriate policy-making level. For example, in Boisvert, 671 A.2d at 837, a Connecticut court noted with approval that the roadblock complied with state police guidelines promulgated by the public safety commissioner. These guidelines required, among other things, advance approval by ranking officers; a careful choice of location, date and time after considering many factors, including the safety of the public and those conducting the operation and the potential inconvenience to the public; advance publicity; and assurance to drivers that the stop was routine. Id.; see also Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 483 N.E.2d 1102 (roadblock that complied with state police guidelines was a reasonable seizure). We agree that a properly approved, neutral plan would help support the reasonableness of the sobriety checkpoint. Here, Sergeant Gary Coffie, the officer in charge for the State Police, testified that he followed written federal and state police guidelines. (R. at 85-86, 100-01.) Those guidelines are not part of the record, however, so we cannot assess their efficacy. Objective, Location and Timing. A seizure is not reasonable unless it is well calculated to effectuate its purpose. Garcia, 500 N.E.2d at 167 (Shepard, J., dissenting). Here, the connection between the vehicular threat of OWI and the objectives, location and timing of the roadblock is tenuous at best. A press release indicated that this checkpoint was intended to catch drunk drivers, seat belt and child restraint violations, and other violations. (R. at 181.) Corporal Timothy Williams, the officer in charge for the Mishawaka Police Department, indicated that the site selection was intended to reduce speeding and cruising. (R. at 146.) He said, [I]t's a good way to kind of slow traffic down, make sure everybody is doing what they're supposed to. ( Id. ) Williams also said that another goal was [t]o make sure ... everybody's got all the proper information with them, including [l]icense, registration, insurance information. (R. at 146.) The Vermont Supreme Court once noted, and we agree, that [t]he thought that an American can be compelled to `show his papers' before exercising his right to walk the streets, drive the highways or board the trains is repugnant to American institutions and ideals. Record, 548 A.2d at 426 (quoting State v. Kirk, 202 N.J.Super. 28, 493 A.2d 1271, 1285 (App.Div.1985)). Here, the State has offered a montage of objectives, including the generic law enforcement goal of mak[ing] sure everybody is doing what they're supposed to. (R. at 146.) This sounds more like a generalized dragnet than a minimally intrusive, neutral effort to remove impaired drivers from the roadways before they hurt someone. The evening's statistics reinforce this conclusion. Seventy stops produced fourteen traffic arrests and thirty-four warnings. (R. at 177.) Only two citations were for OWI. [9] ( Id. ) The location's selection casts further doubt on whether this roadblock was sufficiently related to the public danger of drunk driving. The officers in charge sensibly chose a well-lighted, reasonably busy area that was amenable to traffic control. (R. at 145-46.) They chose this particular site partially because they had conducted a checkpoint in the same location the previous winter and wanted to compare results. (R. at 136.) When asked the reasons for the site selection, however, neither officer indicated that drunk driving had been a particular problem at this location. (R. at 103-04, 145-46.) Corporal Williams said only that a high volume of general traffic violations occurred in the area. (R. at 145-46.) The officers operated the roadblock from 11:30 p.m. until 1:30 a.m. because traffic is easier to handle; it's not exactly that we were going to get a lot of [OWI] arrests. (R. at 107-08.) Also, businesses were closed at that hour and shoppers were no longer out, but it was still early enough for a substantial amount of traffic. (R. at 108.) Finally, the timing was convenient based upon officer shift changes. ( Id. ) As with location, the State did not link the timing to the danger being addressed. To be constitutionally reasonable, the location and timing of sobriety checkpoints should take into account police officer safety, public safety, and public convenience. The roadblock should also effectively target the public danger of impaired driving. Here, the State did not offer any evidence of objective considerations such as an unusually high rate of OWI-related accidents or arrests in the chosen area. The State has therefore not shown that this roadblock was sufficiently related to the legitimate law enforcement purpose of combating drunk driving. Police Discretion. Many states consider the degree of discretion exercised by field officers conducting the roadblock a critical factor. See, e.g., Downey, 945 S.W.2d at 111-12 (requiring that Tennessee roadblocks be established and operated in accordance with predetermined guidelines and supervisory authority that minimize the risk of arbitrary intrusions on individuals and limit the discretion of law enforcement officers at the scene). We agree. Here, Sergeant Coffie flagged in five vehicles at a time, then allowed other traffic to flow through. (R. at 90-91.) As soon as all five vehicles were cleared, Coffie flagged in five more, without regard to vehicle type. (R. at 91, 122-24.) This procedure satisfied the Fourth Amendment in Garcia, 500 N.E.2d at 161, and it seems a reasonably neutral and consistent method. Other procedures, however, were not as carefully controlled. Aside from being told to be professional and courteous, officers received no specific directive on how to approach and screen motorists. (R. at 115, 150.) Each individual officer was therefore allowed to decide whether to immediately request license, registration, and/or insurance information from all drivers or only from some of them based on an appearance of impairment or other grounds. (R. at 119, 136, 150.) No standardized instructions were given to ensure that officers addressed drivers in a consistent manner. [10] (R. at 119-20.) Furthermore, each officer had the discretion to decide how many and what type of sobriety tests to perform if he or she detected alcohol. (R. at 96, 150.) The State has therefore not shown that it provided sufficiently explicit guidance to ensure against arbitrary or inconsistent actions by the screening officers. This very important factor weighs against the reasonableness of the roadblock. Degree of Intrusion. If the officer approaching a car did not detect any violations, the length of detention averaged four minutes. (R. at 130.) In Garcia, stops approximating two to three minutes satisfied the Fourth Amendment. 500 N.E.2d at 162. In Sitz, the average detention period was only twenty-five seconds. 496 U.S. at 448, 110 S.Ct. 2481. The reasonableness of this detention period is questionable. Four minutes could certainly seem like a very long time to a law-abiding citizen pulled off the road for observation and questioning by the police. In light of other similar cases where the intrusion has been much briefer, it is not clear that a well-trained officer needs this much time to assess driver sobriety. See id.; see also Trumble, 483 N.E.2d at 1105. In evaluating the degree of intrusion, we also consider whether the roadblock was avoidable. The more avoidable a roadblock is, the less it interferes with the liberty of individual drivers. A roadblock need hardly be altogether voluntary, however, or it would have little enforcement or deterrent value. Because the checkpoint was near an intersection and only cars coming from the direction of the intersection were stopped, drivers could have theoretically turned and avoided the checkpoint. (R. at 184.) Sergeant Coffie testified, however, that a six-by-five-foot sign announcing the sobriety checkpoint was illuminated only when headlights hit it. (R. at 112.) The sign was propped against a squad car that blocked the left lane where the checkpoint began, so as to channel cars into single file in the right lane. (R. at 111-13, 184.) Sergeant Coffie conceded that because the only signage was past the roadblock's entry point, approaching drivers may not have realized the activity ahead (red lights and flares) was a checkpoint until the point of no return, especially if larger vehicles blocked their view. (R. at 113-14.) The lack of demonstrated avoidability therefore weighs slightly against the State. [11] Safe Conditions. The State offered testimony that the checkpoint was located in a well-lighted area, where vehicles could be pulled off the roadway into an adjacent parking lot without impeding traffic. This weighs in favor of constitutionality. Effectiveness. The officers stopped seventy of the 198 cars funneled through the checkpoint. (R. at 127.) Fourteen arrests resulted, of which two were for OWI. [12] (R. at 129.) This seems a fairly low percentage, especially considering that officers administered a dozen preliminary breath tests. [13] (R. at 178.) Both Sergeant Coffie and Corporal Williams conceded that roving patrols produce more OWI arrests than do roadblocks. (R. at 105, 148.) Apprehension rates are not, however, the end of the question. As Tennessee's experience proves, roadblocks can effectively deter OWI, such that even a modest arrest rate may simply reflect the fact that advance publicity scared those who would drink and drive off the roads. See Lowe, 337 S.E.2d at 277 ([T]he deterrent effect... is obvious; such a visible project is bound to increase the perceived risk of arrest in the minds of those drunk drivers who are never arrested.). [14] Here, however, we have no evidence from which to infer that the low apprehension rate was the effect of a successful media blitz. Sergeant Coffie sent a press release to four television stations two days before the checkpoint date, (R. at 94-95), but sent nothing to radio stations, local newspapers, or other print media, (R. at 106-07). No one ever determined whether the pending roadblock was actually reported by the four stations notified. (R. at 107.) Law enforcement agencies cannot control what the media chooses to report, of course, and may not have funds to pay for publicity. Here, however, some major news sources received no notification at all, and we do not know if television stations carried stories on the planned roadblocks. We cannot infer, absent any proven publicity, that this checkpoint effectively deterred potential offenders. [15] Summary. In light of the above factors, with particular emphasis on the high level of officer discretion and the very weak link between the public danger posed by OWI and the objectives, location and timing of the checkpoint, the State did not meet its burden to show that this roadblock was constitutionally reasonable under Article 1, Section 11. The trial court therefore correctly suppressed the fruit of this seizure.