Opinion ID: 1934913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: improper comment

Text: Appellant also focuses on an allegedly improper remark by the prosecutor. It is not urged that the district attorney's remark was an impermissible comment on appellant's constitutional right not to incriminate himself, since appellant voluntarily chose to testify in his own behalf. Rather, appellant claims that he was deprived of a fair trial because the district attorney, with knowledge that Stolzfus was a co-defendant and therefore if called as a witness could have refused to testify, mentioned to the jury that appellant had not called Stolzfus to verify his version of what happened in the early morning of August 13. In these circumstances, appellant argues, the Commonwealth's attempt to exploit an inference that Stolzfus, if called, would not corroborate appellant's testimony constituted a denial of due process. We disagree; both the trial court's immediate instruction and his later charge to the jury satisfactorily remedied any prejudice. The assertedly improper observation occurred during the Commonwealth's closing argument. The record discloses the following: Mr. Van Hoove [District attorney]: Going on to Martinolich's testimony, if in fact the events occurred as Robert Martinolich said, you may consider the absence of Leroy Stolzfus, because Leroy Stolzfus could have verified for you in this case Robert Martinolich's tale. Mr. Cassidy [Defense counsel]: Objection, Your Honor, and I call for a mistrial. The Court: Mr. Van Hoove, you know as well as I do that Mr. Stolzfus is under other charges and is being tried at this time. He can't be called to testify. I don't think you should comment on his not being here. I will tell the jury in my charge to definitely not consider that. The motion for a mistrial is refused, with the correction I have made. The jury should in no way consider Leroy Stolzfus' absence in this case. Whatever possible prejudice towards appellant may have been generated as a result of the prosecutor's comment was immediately neutralized by the trial court's admonition to the jury. See Commonwealth v. Lowery, 440 Pa. 361, 365-66, 269 A.2d 724, 726 (1970). Not only did the judge instantaneously instruct the jury to disregard Stolzfus' absence, but he later gave a full and adequate charge on the subject. Now I believe this is the first time I have injected Stolzfus' name into the case. As was indicated to you during the speeches of counsel, when it was intimated he could have been here as a witness, he stands charged also for some aspects of this case and I said then that he couldn't be here and I instructed the jury they should in no way consider adversely to the defendant the statement that `Why wasn't he called?' because in this case he would have had certain rights and he is not on trial. In fact, I am going to go further at this point and say that in this case you are required to pass upon the guilt or innocence of one individual, Robert Martinolich, and no others. The defense made no objection to the charge in whole or in particular part. [10] We completely agree with the assessment of this incident by the court en banc. It is clear from the record . . . that the trial judge politely chastised the district attorney and emphatically, at the time of the remarks and in the charge, instructed the jury not in any way to consider the absence of Stolzfus. As we view the record, the trial judge by his remarks was more harmful to the Commonwealth's case than was the district attorney to the defendant's case. 65 Berks County L.J. at 102-03. Moreover, this remark was the sole improper reference by the prosecution in an eleven-day trial. We conclude that the trial court properly refused to grant appellant a new trial on the basis of the district attorney's comment. [11]