Opinion ID: 1350430
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Absolute Coemployee Immunity Issue.

Text: The coemployee immunity provision is found in Iowa Code section 85.20, which provides in pertinent part: The rights and remedies provided in this chapter ... for an employee on account of injury, ... for which benefits under this chapter ... are recoverable, shall be the exclusive and only rights and remedies of such employee ... at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, ... against: 1. the employee's employer; or 2. any other employee of such employer, provided that such injury ... arises out of and in the course of such employment and is not caused by the other employee's gross negligence amounting to such lack of care as to amount to wanton neglect for the safety of another. Iowa Code § 85.20. One treatise writer explains the rationale for coemployee immunity this way: The reason for the employer's immunity is the quid pro quo by which the employer gives up its normal defenses and assumes automatic liability, while the employee gives up his or her right to common-law verdicts. This reasoning can be extended to the tortfeasor coemployee, who also is involved in this compromise of rights. Perhaps, so the argument runs, one of the things the coemployee is entitled to expect in return for what he or she has given up is freedom from common-law suits based on industrial accidents in which that coemployee is at fault. 6 Arthur Larson and Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 111.03[2], at 111-11 (2001) [hereinafter Larson]; see also Seivert v. Resnick, 342 N.W.2d 484, 485 (Iowa 1984) (citing this language). As he did in the district court, Ries contends here that section 85.20(2) automatically applies and because no gross negligence was involved, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In support of his contention, Ries suggests a literal interpretation of the statutory language in section 85.20(2). He points out that for immunity to apply, (1) the third party must be an other employee of the employer, (2) the injury must not be caused by gross negligence, and (3) the injury ... arises out of and in the course of the injured coemployee's employment. As to the latter requirement, Ries asserts that the actions of the coemployee seeking immunity need not arise out of and in the course of his or her employment. Applying this interpretation of section 85.20(2) to this case, Ries concludes immunity must apply because (1) Ries is an other employee of Swiss Valley, (2) no allegation of gross negligence has been made, and (3) Meade's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with Swiss Valley. Like the district court, we are thus faced with the following question: when does the section 85.20(2) coemployee immunity provision apply? In other words, what is the proper test to determine whether a coemployee is immune from suit under section 85.20(2)? In analyzing this issue, the district court explained that to qualify for workers' compensation benefits, an employee's injury must arise out of and in the course of employment. See Iowa Code § 85.3(1). The immunity provisions of section 85.20 do not apply unless benefits under the chapter are recoverable. Therefore, the district court reasoned, before immunity can apply, the injury must arise out of and in the course of employment. The district court then examined the language of sections 85.20(1) and (2). It pointed out that while eligibility for benefits is the only prerequisite to employer immunity, coemployee immunity requires something more. In particular, the injury must arise out of and in the course of employment, and gross negligence must not be involved. See Iowa Code § 85.20(2). Next, the district court looked at the arising out of and in the course of employment language of section 85.20(2). The court noted that this identical language appears in section 85.3(1) (providing that workers' compensation is exclusive remedy for employee against employer where injury arises out of and in the course of employment). Given this fact and the fact that both sections appear within close proximity within the same chapter, the court reasoned that the legislature intended that the phrases be given the same meaning. The court then concluded: Since the arising out of and in the course of language already fully applied to the injured worker and the employer by reason of section 85.3, it is obvious the legislature had something more in mind when it repeated the same phrase in section 85.20(2). All the language is assumed to have meaning. The only actor to whom the language had not already been applied is the other employee. Before a co-employee can benefit from immunity, his or her conduct must arise out of and in the course of employment. (Emphasis added.) We agree with the district court's interpretation and conclusion. For immunity to apply, the conduct of the coemployee seeking immunity must arise out of and in the course of employment. Ries's contrary interpretation leads to an absurd result. See State v. Byers, 456 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Iowa 1990) (the court seeks a reasonable interpretation that will best effect the legislative purpose and avoid absurd results). We do not think the legislature intended to provide the blanket immunity that Ries suggests. On this point, one court aptly observed: Suppose one employe[e] is engaged in his employer's business at some distance from his employer's premises; if he is injured by a co-employee who is on vacation, could it be seriously contested that a tort action could not be maintained? The legislature intended no such result. Helmic v. Paine, 369 Mich. 114, 119 N.W.2d 574, 576 (1963). Our conclusion is consistent with the test Larson suggests: It must be observed that the immunity attaches to the coemployee only when the coemployee is acting in the course of employment. This is consistent with the justification for the immunity just described, since the coemployee's employment status does not increase the risk of his causing nonindustrial injuries to his or her fellow-workers. Larson § 111.03[3], at 111-13 (emphasis added).