Opinion ID: 2376602
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Did the court err in imposing three concurrent life sentences?

Text: In the past New Jersey has resolved questions of this sort by resort to two tests, i.e., (1) single transaction test or (2) same evidence test. If the separate convictions arise out of a single transaction only one sentence may be imposed. State v. Mowser, 92 N.J.L. 474 ( E. & A. 1919); State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496 (1956) (minority opinion), affirmed 356 U.S. 464, 78 S.Ct. 829, 2 L.Ed. 2 d 913 (1958); State v. Greely, 30 N.J. Super. 180 ( Hudson Cty. Ct. 1954) affirmed 31 N.J. Super. 542 ( App. Div. 1954); State v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 9 N.J. 194 (1952). Also, where the evidence necessary to sustain one conviction is identical to that needed to sustain the other only one sentence may be imposed. State v. Hoag, supra, 21 N.J., at p. 502; State v. DiGiosia, 3 N.J. 413 (1950). We need not be here concerned with which is the correct test if indeed one may speak of a correct test at all, see State v. Currie, 41 N.J. 531, pp. 537-9 (1964) since obviously the three deaths here resulted from but one criminal transaction  i.e., one act of arson  and the proof necessary to convict defendant of one of the homicides would not vary from that needed to convict on either of the other two. The imposition of three sentences  even though to run concurrently  is therefore improper. See State v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., supra, 9 N.J., at 194. When more than one sentence has been imposed where only a single sentence was proper, relief from the improper sentence has been variously granted. In People v. Lyons, 50 Cal. 2 d 245, 324 P. 2 d 556 (1958) the California Supreme Court was faced with determining the correct procedure to be applied to an appellant who had been convicted on two counts of receiving stolen property and sentenced to concurrent terms. The court determined that only one sentence was proper and concluded: In a situation such as this, if any substantial objective of justice would be served thereby, this court could reverse [both judgments], order such counts consolidated, and remand the cause for rearraignment of the defendant for sentence and for sentence on the consolidated count. Inasmuch, however, as it does not appear that here either the state or the defendant will be prejudiced by a simple reversal as to one count and affirmance as to the other, and as finality of adjudication will thereby be expedited, we conclude that the latter procedure is the more desirable. (324 P. 2 d, at p. 573) See also State v. Schlenger, 13 Ill. 2 d 63, 147 N.E. 2 d 316 ( Sup. Ct. Ill. 1958) Other jurisdictions have achieved the same result by applying other rationales. For example in O'Keith v. United States, 158 F. 2 d 591 (5 Cir. 1946) the court merely ordered the additional sentence expunged, while in Green v. United States, 274 F. 2 d 59 (1 Cir. 1960) affirmed 365 U.S. 301, 81 S.Ct. 653, 5 L.Ed. 2 d 670 (1961), rehearing denied 365 U.S. 890, 81 S.Ct. 1024, 6 L.Ed. 2 d 201 (1961), the court refused to grant a defendant the paper satisfaction (for which he has not asked) of having the sentences under Counts 1 and 2 vacated leaving him only with the single sentence under Count 3. The court treated the impropriety of the sentences as a technical matter and refused to correct it on the grounds that the defendant had not been harmed. It is obvious in the present case that defendant has not been prejudiced by the imposition of three concurrent life sentences. The three sentences shall be deemed, for all purposes, as one sentence imposed on a single conviction. Affirmed and modified consistent with the foregoing. For affirmance and modification  Chief Justice WEINTRAUB and Justices FRANCIS, PROCTOR, GOLDMANN, SCHETTINO and HANEMAN  6. For reversal  None.