Opinion ID: 1841669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ford motor credit company

Text: The judgment on the pleadings rendered in favor of FMCC requires a different scope of analysis inasmuch as the content of all the pleadings, including the answer, must be considered to determine whether there is a justiciable factual dispute. Rule 12(c), ARCP; Sims v. Lewis, supra , Jones v. Alabama Power Co., 362 So.2d 235 (Ala. 1978); McCullough v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 343 So.2d 508 (Ala.1977). In this case, the pleadings consist of Braggs's complaint and FMCC's answer asserting eight defenses, including the affirmative defense that the statute of limitations barred the action. FMCC's motion to dismiss the Truth in Lending Act claim, or in the alternative for a judgment on the pleadings, was based upon two grounds: (1) the processing fee was a documentary fee not within the purview of itsthe assignee'sduty to disclose under § 226.6 of Regulation Z; (2) the statute of limitations barred the action according to Sixth Circuit authority that the date of the alleged violation is to be included when computing whether the complaint was filed within one year. The lower court granted FMCC a judgment on the pleadings, presumably taking into consideration all of the pleadings rather than considering just the complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss. See e. g., Jones v. Alabama Power Co., supra . Procedurally, then, we treat this part of the case as a judgment on the pleadings, and on review we will peruse the pleadings in search of disputed facts. First, we find that the $81.20 processing fee presents a disputed factual controversy. Braggs alleged, in her complaint, that the fee constituted part of the amount of the finance charge and was improperly denominated as part of the amount financed; thus, the actual finance charge assessed exceeded the amount permitted by law to be charged. In its answer and motion, FMCC alleged that the processing fee was not within the purview of its relationship with the customer, and thus, it could not, by law, be held liable for any TILA violation based upon that item. A documentary fee has been defined as: a fee retained entirely by the dealer, which is intended to cover expenses incurred by the dealer in upkeep of the car prior to sale as well as fees for notarizing the various documents prepared in each transaction.... Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 539 F.2d 511, 519 n.18 (5th Cir. 1976); F.R.B. Letter No. 623 by G. Garwood, August 9, 1972, CCH CCG ¶ 30,872. In Childs v. Ford Motor Credit Company, 470 F.Supp. 708 (D.C.1979), a case appended to FMCC's motion, Judge Lynne granted Ford Motor Credit Company's motion for summary judgment finding that the undisclosed breakdown in the sales contract of the documents preparation charge, and the license, transfer, title and registration fees included in the cash price, were not fees within the purview of Ford's relationship with the customer, as the creditor and not as the seller. FMCC relies upon this case for its contention that the processing fee is a documentary fee, and that it is not a fee within the scope of its relationship with Braggs. However, in Childs, the fees were broken down and disclosed by the seller on the purchase order although not disclosed in the final sales contract, distinguishable from this case where there is no clarification in any of Braggs's purchase documents informing her as to what the processing fee represents. Without this factual resolution, either by the documents themselves or through discovery, we cannot categorically hold that this processing fee was one exacted solely by the dealer as a documentary fee. Moreover, the result in Childs should not be relied upon because a careful reading of that case reveals factual distinctions as well as a detailed legal analysis of 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(d), Regulation Z. In any event, based upon the face of the pleadings alone and these diametrically opposed suppositions as to what these fees represent, there are obviously disputed facts at issue and the judgment cannot be affirmed. There was no discovery conducted in this case; no exhibits are appended, and we are not apprised by the pleadings as to why the processing fee was exacted and for whose or what costs it defrays. We hold that the nature and extent of the processing fee is a disputed fact, and that based upon the pleadings alone, the lower court was in error. The jurisdictional statute for TILA claims states that [a]ny action under this section may be brought in any United States district court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). Appellees assert that the TILA claim was untimely filed, contending that § 1640(e) provides not only the jurisdictional time period, but also implicitly provides its own method for computing the time period without employing the procedural rules pertinent to the computation of time. They rely upon Rust v. Quality Car Corral, Inc., 614 F.2d 1118 (6th Cir. 1980), stating that jurisdiction is defined and circumscribed by the Act itself, in a temporal as well as a substantive sense, and that procedural rules will govern only when the action is properly before the court, but that they should not be consulted to determine whether the action was timely filed. Rust held that [t]he phrase `within one year from the date of occurrence' is straightforward. Nothing in that language supports judicial implication of a lapse in time between the `occurrence' and the date the statute of limitations begins to run. Accordingly, it was decided that the date of the violation is to be included when computing the one year period within which a TILA claim must be filed, and filing on the one year anniversary date is too late. Braggs, on the other hand, contends that § 1640(e) sets the statute of limitations period, but that the statutory scheme in itself does not provide a guide for computing the time period. Therefore, procedural rules, referring to the computation of time must be consulted. She relies upon Rule 6(a), ARCP, and Lawson v. Conyers Chrysler, Plymouth, Etc., 600 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1979), for her contention that the date of the violation is to be excluded when computing the timely filing of TILA claims, and that filing on the one year anniversary date is timely inasmuch as the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the day after the occurrence. It is not contested that the date of the TILA violation occurred, if at all, on the date the contract was consummated. Darrow v. Beneficial Finance Co., 370 So.2d 1001 (Ala.Civ.App.1979); Hagler v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 367 So.2d 468 (Ala.Civ. App.1978); Hewlett v. John Blue Employees Federal Credit Union, 344 So.2d 505 (Ala.Civ.App.1976). The contract as between Braggs and Skinner Ford was consummated on January 29, 1979, and both parties use that date as the date of the occurrence of the alleged violation. The issue, then, is whether we accept appellees' position to include January 29th when computing the within one year period, making the one year anniversary date beyond the deadline, or, whether we follow Braggs's argument to exclude January 29th, resulting in the anniversary date falling within the statutory time limit. We hold, in accordance with the great weight of authority, that the federal statute does not provide its own guide for computing timeliness the procedural rules must be used for computation purposesand as such, the date of the TILA violation is not to be included when figuring whether the complaint was filed within one year. We find that Mary Braggs's claim is not time barred. From a patent reading of the federal statute, we do not find any language indicating how the one year time period is to be computed. We are unpersuaded by the attempt in Rust to discard the use of procedural rules to determine from what date the statute of limitations shall begin to run. We follow, instead, the holding in Lawson, that the procedural rules must be employed to determine from what focal point the one year time period is to be computed. In Lawson, the court stated: While there is some disagreement over whether the method of computing time prescribed in Rule 6 should be used for computing time periods contained in federal statutes of limitations, most courts have followed Rule 6's computation method. C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed. Practice & Procedure § 1163. This court has consistently used Rule 6(a)'s method for computing federal statutory time limitations. J. Aron & Co., Inc. v. S/S Olga Jacob, 527 F.2d 416, 417 (CA 5, 1976); Wilkes v. U. S., 192 F.2d 128, 129 (CA 5, 1951); Rimmer v. U. S., 172 F.2d 954, 958-59 (CA 5, 1949). Although none of our cases deals with the time limitations in the Truth in Lending Act we see no reason to depart from the general rule in this case. Indeed, Rule 6(a) is particularly appropriate in light of the remedial purpose of the Act, see Mourning v. Family Publications Service, 411 U.S. 356, 363-65, 93 S.Ct. 1652, 1657-1659, 36 L.Ed.2d 318, 326-27 (1973). (footnote omitted) Construing the language of Rule 6(a), Lawson held that the date of the transaction is to be excluded when computing the within one year time frame specified in § 1640(e) of the Truth in Lending Act. Alabama has two compatible codifications referencing the computation of time. Code 1975, § 1-1-4 provides in pertinent part: Time within which any act is provided by law to be done must be computed by excluding the first day and including the last. In align with this section, Rule 6(a), ARCP, states inter alia: In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the local rules of any circuit court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the date of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. We find that the wording of these authorities unambiguously concludes that the date of the occurrence of the violation, i. e., the act, event or default, shall be excluded when figuring whether the statute of limitations has expired. Therefore, Mary Braggs timely filed her TILA claim on January 29, 1980the one year anniversary date of the alleged violation. Based upon the foregoing analysis, the order dismissing Jim Skinner Ford, Inc., and the judgment on the pleadings rendered in favor of Ford Motor Credit Company are reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. All other issues raised in the briefs are pretermitted for review. REVERSED AND REMANDED. TORBERT, C. J., and ALMON, EMBRY, and ADAMS, JJ., concur.