Opinion ID: 1407547
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Statements by the Victim.

Text: Detective Smit testified during redirect examination as to statements made to him by the victim, Singley. Singley had said that he was afraid that if he told on [appellant] on the Montgomery Ward robbery, that [appellant] would kill him. Robert Howard later testified that, on an outing with Singley, Howard was told by Singley that somebody was going to waste him. The trial court permitted Smit's testimony stating that defense counsel had opened the door as to fear by the victim. But the fear to which defense counsel had alluded regarded Singley's fear about being a witness in a case in Virginia. The state had not objected to the testimony. The trial court allowed Howard's testimony stating that there was sufficient corroboration of the conversation under NRS 48.064. [3] The admission of these statements constituted error. This court has allowed hearsay statements of a victim in a criminal case when such statements were corroborated under NRS 48.064. Bails v. State, 92 Nev. at 100, 545 P.2d at 1158. But there the victim had mentioned a two-dollar bill collection, appellant was seen with two such bills on the day of the homicide, and the victim's collection and failure to place it in a safe deposit box was corroborated by other witnesses. In the instant case, the hearsay testimony relates to the victim's fear of appellant and the state argues that each statement independently corroborates the other thereby making them admissible under NRS 48.064. We cannot agree. We have recently held that, in a pandering prosecution under NRS 201.300, [w]itnesses whose testimony requires corroboration may not corroborate each other. Sheriff v. Gordon, 96 Nev. 205, 206, 606 P.2d 533, 534 (1980). In that case, the victim's testimony required corroboration under NRS 175.301 and the accomplice's testimony required corroboration under NRS 175.291. We believe that a similar holding is required in the present case where there is a real danger of unreliability and due to the fact that a victim's statement of his fear of a defendant is so injurious. Moreover, the state of mind hearsay exception under NRS 51.105(1) gives no solace to the state. First, the victim's state of mind was not in issue. Appellant was not claiming self-defense, accidental death or suicide. As such, the statement had little relevancy except toward providing the strong inference of appellant's intent, actions or culpability. See United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 766 (D.C. Cir.1974). In order for the state of mind exception to be applicable, the victim's state of mind must be a relevant issue, the relevance must be weighed against prejudice, and a proper limiting instruction must be given or objectionable testimony deleted. Id. at 773-78. See People v. Lew, 68 Cal.2d 774, 69 Cal. Rptr. 102, 441 P.2d 942 (1968). Although appellant offered no limiting instruction, the potential damage incidental to the testimony and the fact that an objection was made warrant our consideration of the issue as plain error. NRS 178.602. Although the trial court erred in receiving this evidence, the evidence of guilt in the instant case is incredibly strong. Indeed, it is overwhelming. See Abram v. State, 95 Nev. 352, 356, 594 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1979). We conclude that the error in admitting the complained of declarations did not effect the substantial rights of the appellant. See NRS 177.255. The remaining contentions are without merit. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. MOWBRAY, C.J., and THOMPSON, GUNDERSON and BATJER, JJ., concur.