Opinion ID: 1704088
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: March 16, 1953, 24 Adv. S. 43, 61 So.2d

Text: HOLMES, J. This is a motion by the appellee to correct the judgment of affirmance heretofore rendered in this cause so as to provide for the allowance of interest at the rate of six per cent per annum and five per cent damages on the judgment of the Circuit Court, from which the appeal in this cause was prosecuted.  The suit arose out of a claim of the appellee for compensation under the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act for the loss of his leg. Pursuant to a hearing, the Attorney-referee, on July 16, 1951, made the following award, after setting forth his findings: It is therefore ordered and adjudged that Western Casualty & Surety Company, insurance carrier for M.T. Reed Construction Company in this cause, pay compensation to claimant, Robert E. Martin, in the amount of $25.00 per week for a period of 175 weeks, payable semi-monthly, beginning as of August 28, 1950, less and except therefrom the amount of $413.50 aggregating the sum that has already been paid to claimant and the sum that he has earned in his efforts to return to gainful employment, which payment in the amount of $400.00 was made to him upon the assumption that he was entitled to receive ten per centum of loss of use of right leg, and that such payment should be and it is hereby ordered to be applied upon the payments that shall be due to him by virtue of this order, all of which payments to be made in compliance with Section 8, Paragraph C, Sub-section 2 and Subsection 18, and other sections of the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Law of 1948, as amended, and this order. Upon a review by the Commission on October 29, 1951, the Commission modified the award of the Attorney-referee so as to fix the amount of compensation on the basis of twenty per cent disability. On appeal to the circuit court, a judgment was rendered on December 20, 1951 reversing the decision of the Commission and reinstating the award of the Attorney-referee. The appeal here is from the judgment of the circuit court which is, in effect, that rendered by the Attorney-referee. The judgment of the circuit court was affirmed by this Court on November 24, 1952. M.T. Reed Construction Company, et al. v. Martin, 9 Adv. S. 56, 61 So.2d 300. A suggestion of error was filed by the appellants and  overruled on January 12, 1953. The judgment of affirmance made no provision for the allowance of interest or damages. It is the contention of the appellee on this motion that the judgment of the circuit court reinstating the award of the Attorney-referee is a money judgment for the total award of $25.00 per week for the full period of 175 weeks, and that the appellee is entitled to the allowance of interest thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of rendition, and to five per cent damages on the total amount of the award. We have recently held in the case of J. & B. Manufacturing Company, et al. v. Cochran, 17 Adv. S. 18, 62 So.2d 378, that each weekly installment of an award of compensation should bear interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from its due date until paid, and we reaffirm this holding. Such right as the appellee has to the allowance of five per cent damages on the affirmance of the judgment of the circuit court is governed wholly by statutory enactment, and such damages can only be awarded in the cases expressly provided for by statute. Vicksburg Bank v. Wirt Adams, State Revenue Agent, 74 Miss. 179, 21 So. 401. The applicable statutes are Sec. 1971 of the Mississippi Code of 1942, and the amendment of Sec. 20, Chap. 354 of the Laws of 1948, appearing in Sec. 20 of Chap. 412 of the Laws of 1950. The amendment found in Sec. 20, Chap. 412 of the Laws of 1950, approved April 6, 1950, and in effect at the time of the entry of the judgment of the circuit court and in effect at this time, provides as follows: Any award of compensation made by the Circuit Court and appealed to the Supreme Court shall bear the same interest and penalties as do other judgments awarded in the circuit court. The applicable part of Sec. 1971 of the Mississippi Code of 1942 provides as follows: In case the judgment or decree of the court below be affirmed, or the appellant fail to prosecute his appeal to effect, the Supreme Court shall render judgment  against the appellant for damages, at the rate of five percentum and costs as follows: If the judgment or decree affirmed be for a sum of money, the damages shall be upon such sum. The effect of the aforesaid amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act is to place awards of compensation made by judgment of the circuit court in the same category as other judgments of the circuit court, and to provide that in the event of an affirmance of an appeal therefrom to the Supreme Court, the same shall bear the same interest and penalties as do other judgments of the circuit court. The language of this amendment is plain and unambiguous, and it would do violence to its language to interpret it to mean that judgments for awards of compensation are to be placed in a more favored or different class than other judgments of the circuit court. Sec. 1971 of the Mississippi Code of 1942 fixes the penalties to be allowed on the affirmance of other judgments of the circuit court by providing that if the judgment or decree affirmed be for a sum of money, the damages shall be upon such sum. We have consistently held that this statute must be strictly construed against the claim of the successful party, Canal Bank and Trust Company v. Brewer, 147 Miss. 920, 114 So. 127; Firestone T. & R. Co. v. Fried, 202 Miss. 372, 32 So.2d 454. We have recently held in workmen's compensation cases that the five percentum damages can not be allowed unless the judgment affirmed awards a definite or fixed sum of money. Mills, et al. v. Jones' Estate, 213 Miss. 680, 57 So.2d 496; Stephens et al. v. Moore, et al., 1 Adv. S. 2, 60 So.2d 391; J. & B. Manufacturing Co., et al. v. Cochran, 17 Adv. S. 18, 62 So.2d 378. In the Cochran case, supra, it was held that damages are allowable under a judgment of this court only when a fixed amount of compensation is awarded in the lower court, and continuing, the Court said: Neither the order of the Commission nor the judgment of the circuit  court awards any definite or fixed sum of money ... thus it is seen that the amount to be paid him is not at this time a definite and fixed sum, even though it is established that the weekly payments are $25.00 each. Can it be said that the amount to be paid appellee under the judgment in question is at this time a definite and fixed amount? The answer to this question must be determined by appellee's rights under the judgment as governed by our workmen's compensation laws. It is to be noted that the judgment in question does not unqualifiedly award to the appellee compensation at the rate of $25.00 per week for the full period of 175 weeks. It adds the proviso that such payments shall be made in compliance with Section 8, paragraph (c), Subsection 2 and Subsection 18, and other sections of the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Law of 1948, as amended, and this order. This proviso qualifies the award of weekly benefits and renders appellee's rights thereto subject to the provisions of our workmen's compensation laws. What then are these rights? Has the appellee a vested property right in the award which can survive in favor of his heirs, or will the weekly benefits terminate upon his death? There is no provision in our workmen's compensation law vesting in a claimant a property right in an award such as was made in this case which can survive in favor of his heirs. On the contrary, the act provides payment to the employee and defines compensation as the money allowance payable to an injured worker. Further, it is the general rule adhered to in most jurisdictions that no such property right is vested in the claimant to the entire award in the absence of a provision in the act to the contrary. The rule is stated in Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 2, pages 51-53, as follows: In the opening portion of the book, it was pointed out that one of the features distinguishing a compensation award from a tort recovery is the absence of any  property right in an award which can survive in favor of heirs. The problem most frequently arises in connection with schedule or other permanent partial awards, when an employee who has been awarded, say, 312 weeks' benefits for loss of an arm dies at the end of 12 weeks. In the absence of a special statute to the contrary, it has been held in most jurisdictions that his heirs have no claim upon the unaccrued 300 weeks' payments, since the award is a personal one, based upon the employee's need for a substitute for his lost wages and earning capacity. We think that the foregoing rule is sound and that its application is in furtherance of the purpose of the workmen's compensation law to provide a substitute for lost wages and earning capacity. We are of the opinion, therefore, that under our workmen's compensation law, the appellee has no vested right in the entire award made to him which can survive in favor of his heirs. The judgment must be construed in the light of appellee's rights under our workmen's compensation law, and when so construed, the amount of the award can not be said to be a fixed sum except as to the accrued and unpaid weekly installments. It is otherwise an award which terminates upon his death, a contingency indeterminate in point of time. We are, therefore, further of the opinion that the judgment is not so definite and certain as to constitute a money judgment on which the five per cent damages can be calculated except as to the weekly installments which have already accrued and remain unpaid to the date of the entry of the judgment of affirmance. It would seem that to hold otherwise would be to impose a penalty for the non-payment of installments which have not yet accrued and become payable, and which may never become payable. We do not think that the statute contemplates damages on installments of an award which may never become payable. The appeal has not superseded installments which are to  accrue in the future, and which may never become payable, and neither the employer nor the insurance carrier under its contract has become obligated to pay installments of the award before they accrue and become due. If the five per cent damages should be allowed on this appeal on the total amount of $25.00 per week for 175 weeks, and after the final termination of this suit, an action should be brought for accrued installments in default, resulting in a judgment in favor of the claimant and affirmance thereof by this Court, then the allowance of five per cent damages on such judgment would follow, thus resulting in the imposition of double damages on the amount of installments so involved. We do not think that such result should be made possible. Since appellee was present in person at the original hearing, and no suggestion of his death has been made in this suit, the presumption is indulged that he was alive at the time of the rendition of the judgment of affirmance, and we are of the opinion that the judgment affirmed is definite and certain as to the amount of the weekly installments accrued and unpaid to the date of affirmance, and we are further of the opinion that the motion to correct the judgment of affirmance should be and it is hereby sustained to the extent only that the judgment of affirmance heretofore entered in this cause be corrected so as to provide for the allowance of five per cent damages on the total amount of weekly installments accrued and unpaid to the date of the judgment of affirmance heretofore entered, and so as to further provide that each weekly installment shall bear interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from its due date until paid. Motion to correct judgment sustained in part. Lotterhos, J., took no part. All other Justices concur.