Opinion ID: 4569226
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Standard as Applied to Deal’s Case

Text: Applying to Deal’s case the standards discussed above, we conclude that Deal is entitled to reversal of his conviction because the video was prejudicial based on specific circumstances of Deal’s case, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the video without engaging in the required analysis, and the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this error did not influence the jury’s verdict. With respect to the first step of the analysis, the trial court here failed to consider on the record whether playing this video was inherently prejudicial. In a conclusory way, it dismissed Deal’s requests to require the Commonwealth to present the audio version of his interview, or, at a minimum, offer some explanation for using the video instead of the audio. The trial court stated that it was expected—presumably saying unexpected by the average juror—that Deal would be in custody because he was accused of murder. The trial court’s statement, “that’s just routinely done, almost everybody’s in custody, eventually, especially after a murder investigation,” suggests that the trial court was echoing words from Davis that “it would be impossible as a practical 23 matter to conduct a trial without the jury seeing some sign that the defendant [is] not entirely free to come and go as [he] please[s].”75 But the facts of the present case are that the challenged video was a production by the principal investigating officer in testimony during the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief. The present facts are fundamentally different from Davis, a case in which jurors’ inadvertently viewed the defendant in handcuffs as he entered the courtroom at the commencement of trial.76 As indicated above, we believe that Deal’s video, as it was presented to the jury below, was prejudicial. Unlike the defendant in Taylor, Deal was depicted in the video wearing both jail clothing and shackles,77 and the video was 35 minutes, not merely 7. Also, the video of Deal was recorded two months after Deal was arrested on the present charge, and this fact was apparent to the jury because the date stamp appears prominently at the bottom of the video. With respect to the second step of the analysis, despite the circumstances present in Deal’s case, the trial court further failed to consider whether Deal’s video would nonetheless be prejudicial. There certainly could have been ways to minimize this risk, such as admitting the audio version of 75 Davis, 899 S.W.2d at 491. 76 Id. at 490. Recall that the Supreme Court in Deck explained that its prior decisions in 77 Estelle and Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343–44, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) “gave voice to a principle deeply rooted in the law” that it is inherently prejudicial to compel a defendant during the guilt phase of his trial to appear before the jury wearing shackles.” 544 U.S. at 629. 24 the same interview or admonishing the jury that Deal’s appearance in the video should not be considered in determining guilt.78 But there appears no indication of the trial court’s consideration of such alternatives or safeguards. And even if it had, the trial court should have then required the Commonwealth to explain how the video serves an essential state interest, which could have been accomplished by simply requiring the Commonwealth to explain how the audio version would not effectively present the intended evidence and why the evidence in video format was crucial for proving the Commonwealth’s case. Finally, as we consider the arguments before us, we conclude that the Commonwealth failed to argue the existence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s decision to allow the video did not prejudice Deal. The Commonwealth argues that any error committed by the trial court in admitting the video or failing to give an admonition was harmless because 78 See, e.g., Estep, 663 S.W.2d at 215 (explaining that it could not find that the trial court’s decision to admit a photograph even though it depicted the defendant, at the time of his arrest, wearing handcuffs prejudiced Estep because, among other things, the trial court “admonished the jury that the handcuffs had no significance” in determining Estep’s guilt). We agree with the Commonwealth and the Court of Appeals in this case that this Court has generally held that “a defendant who wants the court to admonish the jury must ask for such relief; otherwise, his failure to request it will be treated as a waiver or as an element of trial strategy.” Hall v. Commonwealth., 817 S.W.2d 228, 229 (Ky. 1991), overruled on other grounds in Commonwealth. v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1996). However, we do not agree with the insinuation that by failing to request a jury admonition regarding what purpose the video is to serve in determining guilt Deal waived any argument relating to the trial court’s failure to issue such an admonition. Deal’s failure to request an appropriate admonition when it objected to admitting the video of his police interview has no bearing on the trial court’s initial failure to properly analyze whether Deal’s constitutional rights were threatened by admitting the video. 25 there is “no substantial possibility that the result would have been different if the Commonwealth had played the audio recording of the interview.” In support of this argument, the Commonwealth makes the following assertions: (1) the investigating detective had already testified about Deal’s arrest, so the jury already knew that Deal had been taken into custody; (2) the video of Deal’s police interview was consistent with Deal’s defense; (3) and the video was only a “short portion of a multi-day trial” in which Deal was personally present in street clothes and maintaining a tidy appearance. In response, Deal argues that the Commonwealth could not prove that the challenged video did not impact the verdict because the evidence against Deal was not overwhelming. While we concede that the assertions made by the Commonwealth in support of its argument that the video did not prejudice Deal are relevant,79 the Commonwealth has not explained how these assertions prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the video did not prejudice Deal by influencing the jury’s verdict. Furthermore, the Commonwealth fails to discuss any relevant case 79 The Tennessee Supreme Court made similar assertions in support of its holding in Taylor. 240 S.W.3d at 795–97 (explaining that, because the defendant was not tried while dressed in jail attire; the jury only saw a brief videotape of defendant wearing jail attire; the video was not the cause of the potential prejudice arising from discovering that the defendant was jailed because the jury already knew before viewing the videotape that the defendant was in jail based on the informant’s testimony; and because the trial took place over 3 days, and the video was only seven-minutes long, the facts relied on by the Supreme Court in Estelle are distinguishable from Taylor’s case, and holding that “[u]nder these circumstances, . . . the brief videotape . . . did not serve as a ‘constant reminder’ to the jury that the Defendant had been previously jailed and it did not corrupt the presumption of innocence on which the jury was properly instructed”). 26 that supports its assertion that Deal was not prejudiced. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the Commonwealth satisfied its burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the practice did not impact the verdict. In sum, we conclude that while not “inherently prejudicial,” the video prejudiced Deal and the trial court failed to take any of the required steps to determine if the prejudicial nature of the video was justified by an essential state interest, or whether the risk posed to Deal’s constitutional rights could otherwise be minimized by some available alternative. On remand, if the Commonwealth again moves to allow the jury to view the videotape of Deal’s interview in the same format, the trial court should require the Commonwealth to prove that the video is necessary to serve an essential state interest. If, in the exercise of its discretion, the trial court believes the video is necessary to serve the asserted state interest and that interest could not be served by any available alternatives, it is within the trial court’s discretion to admit the video. But the trial court must still consider whether any additional steps should be taken to minimize the risk posed to Deal’s constitutional rights, which could include issuing an appropriate admonition to the jury.