Opinion ID: 2175766
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The prosecutor's assurance.

Text: Identity was and was not a critical issue at McCall's trial. On the one hand, all of the witnesses who were involved in the September 14, 1988 incident testified both that McCall was one of the back seat passengers in Arnold Robles' car and that he was present at the conclusion of the chase, when Michael Daly was assaulted by his pursuers and stripped of his boots. On the other hand, the involved witnesses agreed that McCall was merely standing by, watching, when Daly was assaulted, and that it was Grimes, acting on his own, who struck Daly in the head, kicked him as he lay on the sidewalk, and ordered him to remove his boots. All three of the defendants' companionsDeirdre Ford, Mary Cabrera, and Arnold Roblesidentified Grimes as the primary and, indeed, the only assailant. Ms. Ford and Ms. Cabrera gave testimony which was strongly exculpatory as to McCall and consistent with a defense of mere presence; Robles stated that McCall (like Hyder, who was acquitted) was merely standing close by when Grimes struck his victim from behind. If the three witnesses who knew McCallMs. Ford, Ms. Cabrera and Robleshad been the only identifying witnesses at the trial of this case, McCall might well have been acquitted of all charges, including simple assault. McCall's mere presence defense was seriously undermined, however, by the courtroom identifications by Daly and Vagnette. He was, of course, a stranger to both of these witnesses, but each identified him at trial as the man who first set upon Daly, knocked him to the ground, and proceeded to kick him into submission. These in-court identifications were devastating to McCall, for they undermined his claim that he was a mere bystander who followed Grimes to the scene of the crime but did not participate in or assist in any way the ensuing robbery and assault. McCall had a ready arsenal with which to combat Daly's in-court identification. Daly had previously seen him in a photo array and lineup video, and, on those occasions, had either eliminated him as a suspect or, in the case of the photo array, selected his picture but indicated that Grimes, not McCall, was definitely the primary assailant. McCall was in a position to argue quite plausibly that Daly's in-court identification of him as the main assailant was erroneous and that his trial testimony, given nearly a year after the offense, was less reliable than his earlier statements. In the case of Vagnette, however, McCall had no such ammunition. The prosecutor, who had a photo array, lineup photo, and lineup videotape readily at hand, had not bothered to show any of these materials to Vagnette. Rather, he effectively ambushed McCall by securing an in-court identification after Vagnette was already on the witness stand, at which time it was too late to arrange a fair confrontation. The ensuing identification by an uninvolved bystander witness whose testimony the jury was likely to credit was a devastating blow from which McCall never recovered. McCall argues that Vagnette's in-court identification of McCall should have been excluded, not because the surrounding circumstances were impermissibly suggestive, but because the prosecutor had assured McCall's counsel before trial that no such identification would be elicited. [A]ll members of the court appear to agree that a criminal defendant is entitled to all available information necessary to make an informed decision whether a[n] ... identification is subject to effective challenge. In re F.G., 576 A.2d 724, 728 (D.C.1990) (en banc). [11] Although McCall concedes that the prosecutor was not strictly obliged under Super.Ct.Crim.R. 16 to tell defense counsel what identifications he intended to elicita concession that might reasonably be questioned in light of the quoted pronouncement in F.G., he contends that, once the prosecutor chose to reveal such information, he had an obligation not to mislead but to provide accurate information. I agree. McCall's counsel had the right to rely on the prosecutor's representation. Rosser v. United States, 381 A.2d 598, 605 (D.C.1977). Although McCall accuses the prosecutor of deliberate wrongdoing, I have no reason to believe that the prosecutor intentionally deceived defense counsel. It appears more likely that he made an improvident commitment which he later regretted. [12] In any event, he proceeded quite correctly by seeking the judge's permission to ask his proposed final question instead of proceeding without the judge's consent. There can be no doubt, however, that the prosecutor, at the very least, threw defense counsel ... off the track. Id. The government suggests that the prosecutor did not violate any agreement because there was no agreement per se, and suggests that defense counsel should have prepared for the possibility of a courtroom identification by Vagnette in any event. I think that a more generous and expansive view of a prosecutor's obligation is called for in circumstances such as these. We cannot agree that defense counsel was obliged to doubt, and thus test, the prosecutor's word.... Rosser, supra, 381 A.2d at 608. But for the prosecutor's assurance that he would not seek an in-court identification by Vagnette, the defense's trial preparation and strategy might well have been different. Smith v. United States, 491 A.2d 1144, 1149 (D.C.1985) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). [13] Although the trial judge made no specific finding as to whether the prosecutor had provided an assurance as claimed by McCall's attorney, [14] he based his ruling on the absence of any showing of prejudice. Cf. Lee v. United States, 385 A.2d 159, 164 (D.C.1978) (government's failure to make discovery requires reversal only if it is substantially prejudicial to the appellant's rights). The judge implicitly recognized that if the identification would substantially prejudice McCall, it should be excluded. I therefore turn to the issue of prejudice.