Opinion ID: 2605808
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: holding appellants' claim of standard oil of indiana stock

Text: It is well established in this state that a district court's jurisdiction over probate matters is separate and distinct from its general jurisdiction. [2] In effect, the district court judge must wear two hats  one when sitting as a court of general jurisdiction; one when functioning as a court with exclusive jurisdiction of the probate of an estate. But, it is also clear that the judge may not wear the hats simultaneously. Matter of Estate of Frederick, Wyo. 1979, 599 P.2d 550. Thus, when a court is operating as one in probate, its jurisdiction is limited and special; it may only consider matters relating to the distribution and settlements of estates. If it decides issues unnecessary to accomplish those ends, then its determinations will be entitled to no binding res adjudicata effect and may be collaterally attacked. Church v. Quiner, 1924, 31 Wyo. 222, 224 P. 1073. Here, appellants contend that the probate court's decision in 1930 awarding Margaret Hewlett free title to the 6,000 shares of dividend in Standard Oil of Indiana exceeded the court's probate jurisdiction. We, like the federal court sitting in 1932, do not agree. District courts are entitled to the presumption of regularity when exercising their general jurisdiction. This presumption applies with equal force to proceedings conducted pursuant to the courts' probate jurisdiction. Rice v. Tilton, 1905, 14 Wyo. 101, 82 P. 577; Lethbridge v. Lauder, 1904, 13 Wyo. 9, 76 P. 682. Thus, the actions taken by the probate court with regard to the Burdick estate are entitled to a presumption of correctness. As a result, we will presume the disposition of the property was correct since this is a collateral attack, so long as the district court while sitting in probate had good jurisdiction over the property in dispute. In re Estate of Stevenson, Wyo. 1968, 445 P.2d 753. Since a probate court's jurisdiction is limited and over only that property which comprises an estate, the question here ultimately becomes whether the claimed shares of Standard Oil of Indiana were a part of the Burdick estate. In order to resolve this question, the language of the inter vivos trust must be analyzed and compared to that appearing in the will. The trust agreement provided: For a valuable consideration the grantor has set over, assigned, transferred and delivered to the trustee, her successors in trust and assigns, twenty four hundred (2,400) shares of capital stock of Midwest Refining Company. TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all and singular the said shares of stock, in trust nevertheless    and upon the death of the said grantor shall transfer, pay over and deliver the said shares of stock to the trustee or trustees of the estate of said grantor who have been or may be named and designated by said grantor in his Last Will and Testament. (Emphasis added.) Mr. Burdick's will also used the term joint trustees of my estate. Even the codicils used this terminology. The probate court appointed the persons who were named joint trustees of the estate as the executors, apparently having concluded that the terms were intended to be synonymous. Since the trust agreement was executed six months after the will, the conclusion follows that the term joint trustees of the estate as used in that agreement in all probability would have the same meaning the court determined was ascribed to it in the will. Therefore, under the trust agreement, upon Charles Burdick's death, the trust property passed to the executors and into the estate, and from there, in accord with the provisions of the will, it passed on into the testamentary trust. Since the property would have first become a part of the estate, the conclusion then follows that it was subject to the probate court's jurisdiction. It is clear that the probate court did attempt to exercise jurisdiction over the Standard Oil of Indiana stock. The law is such that it could only properly do so if it had construed the term joint trustees of the estate appearing in the trust agreement as meaning executors. Since a probate court's proceedings are entitled to the presumption of regularity, we will presume that such a finding of fact was made. This is consistent with the court's appointment of those named as joint trustees of the estate to be the executors. Further, our presumption is not impermissible bootstrapping of jurisdiction.    It is black letter law that a court of law or equity has the power to determine whether the necessary facts prerequisite to the exercise of its jurisdiction are present.    Leveto v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 1976, 243 Pa.Super. 510, 366 A.2d 270, 274. Thus, the probate court had jurisdiction to make the necessary findings of fact which are clearly entitled to res adjudicata effect. The only reason the door was not firmly closed is because the court never actually made the requisite finding on the record. However, appellants have presented no evidence refuting the presumption of regularity. Accordingly, we must agree with the district court's determination that it is too late for appellants to object to the transfer of the 6,000 shares of Standard Oil of Indiana to Margaret Hewlett. [3]