Opinion ID: 2321964
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The character of governmental action

Text: The first major factor under Penn Central involves the character of the government's action. As appellants concede, the general rule is that delay following a government's announcement of an intent to take property does not result in a taking. A government's pre-condemnation activities generally do not constitute a taking [e]ven if the appellants' ability to sell their property was limited during the pendency of the condemnation proceeding and even if its fair market value declined. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980) (citations and quotations omitted). Indeed, formal initiation of condemnation proceedings, though it affects the owner's ability to profitably use or sell the land, generally does not cause inference with the owner's property interests that is severe enough to give rise to a taking. Kirby Forest Industries v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 15, 104 S.Ct. 2187, 81 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984). At least in the absence of an interference with an owner's legal right to dispose of his land, even a substantial reduction of the attractiveness of the property to potential purchasers does not entitle the owner to compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Id.; see First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 320, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987) (discussing the unexceptional proposition that . . . depreciation in value of the property by reason of preliminary activity is not chargeable to the government). The announcement of government planning, like legislation for or the beginning of a project, long before any condemnation activities, may have an effect on value of lands involved, sometimes a beneficial, sometimes an adverse effect, but any decreases in value `are incidents of ownership' and `cannot be considered as a taking in the constitutional sense.' Reservation Eleven Associates v. District of Columbia, 136 U.S.App. D.C. 311, 420 F.2d 153, 157, 158 (1969) (quoting Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285, 60 S.Ct. 231, 84 L.Ed. 240 (1939)). The general rule that post-announcement delay does not ordinarily result in a taking, however, is not absolute, and the character of the government's delay may give rise to a taking claim under Penn Central. Delay in the regulatory process cannot give rise to takings liability unless the delay is extraordinary and [i]f the delay is extraordinary, the question of temporary regulatory takings liability is to be determined using the Penn Central factors. Appolo Fuels v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1351 (Fed.Cir.2004); see Agins, 447 U.S. at 263 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. 2138 (extraordinary delay may give rise to a taking claim). Whether delay is extraordinary depends on its length and the reasons for it. [T]he duration of the restriction is one of the important factors that a court must consider in the appraisal of a regulatory takings claim. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 342, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d 517 (2002). No categorical rule establishes how long governmental action must preclude use of property before a taking occurs. See id. at 335, 122 S.Ct. 1465. Delays that qualify as extraordinary typically last for a substantial length of time. Bass Enterprises Production Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed.Cir.2004) (citations omitted). However, [t]he question of whether a delay is extraordinary is not a simple matter of the number of months or years taken by the Government to make its decision. . . . Id. (citing Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 535 U.S. at 333, 337-38, 122 S.Ct. 1465). Instead of such an easy guidepost, courts must evaluate a number of factors to determine whether the delay is extraordinary, including the reasons for the delay and whether the delay is proportionate to the nature of the government process. Bass Enterprises Production Co., 381 F.3d at 1366. Courts recognize that delay is inherent in complex regulatory . . . schemes and that they therefore must examine the nature of the . . . process as well as the reasons for any delay. Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1098 (Fed. Cir.2001). In assessing the reasons for the delay, courts may consider whether the government acted in good faith, and some courts have been reluctant to find extraordinary delay in the absence of bad faith by the government. See id. Government action of an arbitrary or abusive character may also give rise to a de facto taking claim. See Acorn Land, LLC v. Baltimore County, 402 Fed.Appx. 809 (4th Cir.2010) (per curiam) (regulatory taking occurred where a court found that a local government's refusal to take action to permit development was arbitrary, and the government then effectively sidestepped the court's order by rezoning the property); Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789, 797 (6th Cir.1983) (de facto taking occurred when the city chose not to invoke its condemnation powers, but, rather, elected to engage in a deliberate course of conduct to force the sale of private property at reduced value as part of redevelopment plan); Archer Gardens v. Brooklyn Center Dev. Corp., 468 F.Supp. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (taking occurred through abuse of legitimate condemnation powers where the government tried to appropriate private properties through tax foreclosure proceedings instead of the previously announced condemnation proceeding in which it agreed to pay a substantially higher price).