Opinion ID: 1273939
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Asserted Error in Giving Conspiracy Instructions

Text: The majority hold ( ante, pp. 396-397) that the trial court committed prejudicial error in instructing on the law of conspiracy. This  to me  on any view of the record, is an erroneous and confusing holding. I think we would not permit it to stand in a District Court of Appeal published opinion. It is not contended that any such instruction was an incorrect statement of law; rather, it is said first that the question of conspiracy was not involved and conspiracy never did become an issue in this case, and hence that the giving of conspiracy instructions must have confused the jury (citing People v. Sanchez (1947) 30 Cal.2d 560, 572 [7] [184 P.2d 673]). To the contrary, the issue of conspiracy was indisputably very much involved in the evidence put before the jury. Were the defendants accomplices? Did they by agreement cooperate in committing the crimes charged? Hickman's testimony on the witness stand constituted ample direct evidence of such a conspiracy: he testified that he and Robinson and Drivers had discussed robbing the Fox Hills Country Club three or four times or more; that among the matters discussed was the question of what night it would be; that on the day of the crime Hickman told 'em [i.e., Robinson and Drivers] what time to come to the country club; that when Hickman saw Guliex in the car waiting in the parking lot, I figured that he would get his part and that there would be a four-way split of the loot; that when the others first met Hickman at 11 p.m. he told them in substance that We can't hold the robbery right now because there's a lot of people inside, and that it was agreed that Hickman would return to tell the others when The coast is clear; thereafter the robbery was attempted on Hickman's signal, culminating in the wounding of Morrissey and the murder of Grego. It cannot be seriously argued that the foregoing testimony did not constitute sufficient evidence upon which the jury could base a finding that Hickman, Robinson, and Drivers conspired to rob the Fox Hills Country Club on the night of February 3-4, 1962. Indeed, the majority appear to indirectly acknowledge this fact by referring to Robinson's refraining from naming his coconspirators ( ante, p. 380, fn. 3) and to Guliex's having placed himself in the conspiracy ( ante, p. 395). There being such evidence of conspiracy in the record, it was not error to instruct the jury on the law of conspiracy. It is immaterial that (as the majority emphasize) no separate crime of conspiracy was charged in the information and the prosecution did not amend its pleading in this regard. The state is not required to charge every crime which the defendants may have committed. (See People v. Pike (1962) 58 Cal.2d 70, 88 [15] [22 Cal. Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656]; People v. Ditson (1962) supra, 57 Cal.2d 415, 447 [22]; People v. Davis (1957) 48 Cal.2d 241, 250 [11] [309 P.2d 1]; People v. Tanner (1935) 3 Cal.2d 279, 299 [7] [44 P.2d 324]; People v. Wells (1960) 187 Cal. App.2d 324, 329-330 [12] [9 Cal. Rptr. 384].) The majority concede, as they must, the latter long-established principle, but point to the fact that the conspiracy instruction contained no admonition that a defendant may not be found to be a coconspirator on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice; from this premise the majority conclude ( ante, p. 397) that the conspiracy instructions as given were highly prejudicial because they constituted an invitation to the jury to find that Robinson and Drivers were members of a conspiracy, predicated solely on the uncorroborated testimony of Hickman, and so guilty of the charge of murder. But under the authorities cited hereinabove, we must presume that the jury followed the accomplice instructions given, and found (on evidence so clear that the majority hold Hickman to be an accomplice as a matter of law) that Hickman was in fact an accomplice; it follows that without violating their duty the jury could not have found Robinson and Drivers to be coconspirators on Hickman's testimony unless the latter was also found to be corroborated. That corroboration, as shown in detail hereinabove, was amply provided by the totality of the evidence put before the jury other than Hickman's testimony.