Opinion ID: 2365258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether a Cause of Action was Pled for Humiliation

Text: Here, ALPA argues that summary judgment was not properly granted by the trial court because the insurance policy issued by Twin City covered actions for discrimination or humiliation, and Zumbrun's action sought damages from ALPA and Delta for embarrassment, humiliation and mental anguish. Twin City responds that Zumbrun's complaint did not allege a personal injury cause of action covered by the policy. In this case, the Twin City policy provided personal injury liability coverage for ALPA. The policy lists covered offenses that constitute personal injury, of which discrimination or humiliation is one. The Special Broad Form of the policy provides coverage for [d]iscrimination or humiliation that results in injury to the feelings or reputation of a natural person.... As explained, Zumbrun's complaint alleged two causes of action against ALPA: 1) breach of duty of fair representation and 2) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Specifically, Zumbrun alleged that ALPA's representation of him was unfair, tepid, hesitant, unprepared and incompetent and that ALPA and Delta had conspired to deny his grievance.... The gist of the complaint concerns the inadequate representation provided by ALPA, not any type of humiliation suffered as a result. We conclude that Virginia law does not require coverage in these circumstances. Although Virginia construes insurance policies liberally in favor of coverage, the courts have consistently held that an insurance company's duty to defend is based on the substantive cause of action specifically plead in the complaint. In American & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Church Schools, 645 F.Supp. 628 (E.D.Va.1986), a middle school student complained that her art teacher had squeezed her buttocks in a sexually suggestive manner. Id. at 630. She and her mother alleged that when they reported the incident to the director and headmaster of the school, the school engaged in a cover-up without fairly investigating the incident. They further claimed that they were humiliated and harassed at a meeting, and that the school humiliated [the student] at a schoolwide assembly by giving a sermon about how a jealous little school girl had ruined the life of a schoolteacher by falsely claiming sexual abuse. Id. The student and her mother filed a claim for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the private school and certain teachers and staff members. In an amended complaint, while adding no new counts to their previous claims, they did add further allegations of negligent improper sexual contact and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Church Schools contended that these claims were covered under the personal injury section, which covered injuries arising out of a publication or utterance of a libel, slander, or other defamatory or disparaging material, or which was in violation of an individual's right of privacy. Id. at 631. In that case, the court held that even if the complaint contained allegations of libel, slander, defamation, or disparagement, the mere fact that the factual allegations of a complaint contain the words `libel' or `disparaging' cannot form the basis for coverage under this provision ... [C]overage must be determined based on the claims under which relief is sought. Id. at 634. The court further stated that although the complaint did contain factual allegations relating to an invasion of privacy claim, those allegations merely supported their assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims (which were not covered), since the complaint raised no independent substantive claim for invasion of privacy. See id. at 634-35. Another case that addressed this issue was Town Crier, Inc. v. Hume, 721 F.Supp. 99, 104-05 (E.D.Va.1989), aff'd, 907 F.2d 1140 (4th Cir.1990). In that case, Town Crier, a corporation engaged in the real estate business, acted as a broker for the sales of apartments in a real estate cooperative. The state plaintiffs, who had ownership interests in various apartments in the cooperative, filed a claim against Town Crier and seven others, seeking relief for various intentional acts, including fraud, unconscionability, and conspiracy to injure their business, trade or profession. In their complaint, the state plaintiffs alleged that they were lured into buying the cooperative apartments by misrepresentations made by the defendants. Once served, Town Crier notified its insurance provider of the state suit. The insurance provider denied any duty to defend because the policy covered only negligent acts, errors, or omissions, while the state suit alleged intentional acts. In response, the insured argued that some allegations in the complaint included elements of unintentional torts. Specifically, they argued that the allegations of fraud included the elements of the tort of negligent misrepresentation. The court ruled in favor of the insurance provider, stating that [o]nly claims or causes of action give rise to relief and then only if all the elements of a claim are proved. Allegations are components of claims or causes, but are not, by themselves, a basis for relief. Id. at 104. That court further noted that a plaintiff's relief in a civil action is limited to his complaint; he can only recover a judgment for the claims set forth in his complaint. The fact that some of the allegations in the case at bar could establish a case for negligent misrepresentation is immaterial because that claim is not made. Id. at 105. ALPA claims that the policy itself does not offer a definition of offense, and certainly does not describe offense as a cause of action. ALPA asserts that Zumbrun's complaint clearly alleges that ALPA committed the offense of humiliation because the complaint alleges that ALPA engaged in certain acts (failure to fairly represent him and intentional infliction of emotional distress) that caused him to suffer the injury of humiliation. Virginia courts, however, as we have seen, hold that coverage under a policy is determined only by the legal claims or causes of action that have been plead in a complaint. Here, the only time Zumbrun's complaint mentions humiliation is in the ad damnum clause, where he requests compensatory damages for losses resulting from embarrassment, humiliation, mental anguish, and emotional distress. Indeed, not only does the complaint not assert a cause of action for humiliation, the complaint does not even allege facts describing how Zumbrun was humiliated by ALPA. The underlined case here arises from allegations of breach of contract and unfair representation; this is not a defamation case where the facts make it somewhat obvious how the plaintiff may have been humiliated. However, even if there were facts in the complaint detailing a possible claim for humiliation, pursuant to Church Schools and Town Crier, ALPA's argument still fails because factual [a]llegations are components of claims or causes, but are not, by themselves, a basis for relief. See Town Crier, 721 F.Supp. at 104. If we view the offense of humiliation more broadly ( i.e., the resulting emotion from any non-covered tort), we would seem to obligate coverage for any act committed by an insured, although not specified as a substantive offense covered by the policy. Such a conclusion collides with the Virginia court's past decisions requiring that a cause of action be specifically pled for the covered offense. Our interpretation that the complaint's mention of humiliation was a description of injuries suffered, as opposed to a recognized tort claim, may appear to render the coverage provision for humiliation a nullity. Admittedly, the contract provision that states discrimination or humiliation, and not discrimination and humiliation, does cause some confusion. We think, however, that a common sense reading of the language in the contract makes sense when humiliation, which is not a known tort, is read in the context of discrimination, which can be pled as a substantive claim. Thus, the boiler plate language in the ad damnum clause requesting damages for humiliation is insufficient under the pleading standards of Virginia law to give rise to an obligation under the insurance policy to defend against an offense of discrimination or humiliation.