Opinion ID: 786794
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: This Court's Decision in Kerman II

Text: 12 Kerman appealed virtually all of the district judges' rulings, and in Kerman II we affirmed most of those decisions, including the dismissals of all claims against the officers other than Crossan. However, with respect to Kerman's detention and involuntary hospitalization after the officers had searched for and failed to find a gun, we reversed Judge McKenna's grant of summary judgment dismissing the First and Fourth Amendment claims against Crossan for, respectively, retaliation and unlawful seizure, as well as the state-law claims against Crossan and the City for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We also reversed Judge Patterson's qualified-immunity-based grant of JMOL in favor of Crossan on Kerman's claim for use of excessive force after the officers failed to find a gun. 13 In reversing Judge McKenna's immunity-based grant of summary judgment dismissing the claims relating to involuntary detention and hospitalization, we noted that although the police may be entitled to hospitalize a person if his conduct or the condition of his apartment demonstrate[s] a dangerous mental state, an officer who orders a warrantless seizure and detention for psychiatric evaluation cannot escape liability if his decision is outside the bounds of both the Fourth Amendment and the qualified immunity standards of objective reasonableness. Kerman II, 261 F.3d at 241. The officer is not free to disregard plainly exculpatory evidence. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We noted defendants' contention that Crossan's order for Kerman's hospitalization was privileged under state-law provisions that allow a police officer to detain or hospitalize `any person who appears to be mentally ill and is conducting himself or herself in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to the person or others.' Id. at 240 n. 8 (quoting N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 9.41). We interpreted this provision as imposing the same objective reasonableness standard that is imposed by the Fourth Amendment. Kerman II, 261 F.3d at 240 n. 8. We held that the evidence as to the period after the officers entered the apartment, restrained Kerman, and found no gun created several disputed issues of material fact that made summary judgment dismissing the unlawful seizure claim on the ground of qualified immunity inappropriate, see id. at 240-41, and made summary dismissal of the false imprisonment claims on the basis of state-law privilege equally inappropriate, see id. at 244. 14 First, there was an issue as to whether Crossan — who alone made the decision that Kerman should be sent to the hospital, see 261 F.3d at 241 — made any reasonable effort to inquire into the need for that action. For example, while the officers were in the apartment Landau called the apartment and identified herself as the person who had called 911. According to Kerman, the officers gave her short shrift, not bothering to ask her any questions about Kerman's condition or his earlier statements or behavior. Id. More importantly, the officers had had the opportunity to question Dr. Malone. According to Kerman, one of the paramedics, Larry Pontrelli, telephoned Dr. Malone at Kerman's request and held the phone up so that Kerman-still handcuffed — could speak to the doctor. Kerman spoke briefly with Dr. Malone and asked the doctor to get these goons out of here, whereupon Crossan grabbed the phone from Pontrelli and hung up on the doctor without speaking to him or making any effort to ascertain whether Kerman presented a threat to himself or others. Id. No officer asked Dr. Malone about Kerman's mental health. 15 We recognized in Kerman II that police officers often must make instant assessments with regard to a person's mental health and must be accorded considerable latitude as to the judgments they reach. From the above evidence, however, a jury could find that, after the officers' initial entry, restraint of Kerman, and search for a gun, Crossan had had an unhurried opportunity to consult a medical professional familiar with the patient's condition, had forgone that opportunity, and indeed had deliberately ignored two opportunities to confirm the seriousness of Kerman's condition. 261 F.3d at 241. Plainly, a jury could find that this conduct was unreasonable, see id. (We cannot see the reasonableness of hanging up on a doctor in such a situation.), thereby impeding Crossan's defense of qualified immunity, see id. (a fact-finder crediting Kerman's account of the facts could well find that the police acted outside the bounds of both the Fourth Amendment and the qualified immunity standards of objective reasonableness in placing Kerman in restraints for his eventual transport to Bellevue); see also id. (in Kerman's version, the police not only failed to reasonably investigate his mental state, they also grossly misjudged the situation as it unfolded before them). 16 Factual disputes also existed with respect to Kerman's demeanor and conduct over the course of his encounter with the police. Although the officers' testimony characterized Kerman as ranting, screaming and acting unstable, Kerman testified that he was calm and cooperative during most of the incident. Id. Further, there was a dispute as to the condition of Kerman's apartment. Though the officers portrayed it as a proverbial Augean stable, Kerman said it was, at worst, untidy. Id. 17 Accordingly, we remanded for trial of Kerman's constitutional and state-law claims against Crossan and the City for unlawful detention and involuntary hospitalization, as well as for the manner in which Kerman was treated after his initial seizure and handcuffing, including the alleged retaliation and use of excessive force. We stated as follows: 18 Kerman's allegations are serious and given his account Judge McKenna's summary judgment for Officer Crossan on qualified immunity grounds was not appropriate .... However, defendants tell a different story, and given the disputed accounts, a jury should decide what transpired between the officers and Kerman. Once the outstanding factual questions are answered, there will remain for decision in the district court the issues of whether officer Crossan violated the Fourth Amendment and, if so, whether he is nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity. 19 261 F.3d at 241 (emphases added). We ruled that the resolution of Kerman's state-law false imprisonment claims and defendants' claims of state privilege likewise required further factfinding. See id. at 244.