Opinion ID: 1299986
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stokes-Craven's Appeal

Text: Stokes-Craven argues the trial judge erred in qualifying John Disher and Ray Morris as expert witnesses. Reversal of a trial judge's qualification of an expert witness requires the complaining party to prove both an abuse of discretion and prejudice. See Jenkins v. E.L. Long Motor Lines, Inc., 233 S.C. 87, 94, 103 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1958) (recognizing that the trial judge's ruling on the qualification of an expert would not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion); Ellis v. Davidson, 358 S.C. 509, 526, 595 S.E.2d 817, 826 (Ct.App.2004) (demonstrating that there must be both error on the part of the trial judge, as well as prejudice to the complaining party to warrant reversal). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision of the trial judge is unsupported by the evidence or controlled by an error of law. Ledford v. Pa. Life Ins. Co., 267 S.C. 671, 675, 230 S.E.2d 900, 902 (1976). In order to demonstrate prejudice, there must be a reasonable probability the jury's verdict was influenced by the challenged evidence or the lack thereof. Fields v. Reg'l Med. Ctr. Orangeburg, 363 S.C. 19, 26, 609 S.E.2d 506, 509 (2005). All expert testimony must satisfy the Rule 702 criteria, and that includes the trial court's gatekeeping function in ensuring the proposed expert testimony meets a reliability threshold for the jury's ultimate consideration. State v. White, 382 S.C. 265, 270, 676 S.E.2d 684, 686 (2009). Rule 702 provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Rule 702, SCRE. The test for qualification of an expert is a relative one that is dependent on the particular witness's reference to the subject. Wilson v. Rivers, 357 S.C. 447, 452, 593 S.E.2d 603, 605 (2004). To be competent to testify as an expert, a witness must have acquired by reason of study or experience or both such knowledge and skill in a profession or science that he or she is better qualified than the jury to form an opinion on the particular subject of his or her testimony. Gooding v. St. Francis Xavier Hosp., 326 S.C. 248, 252-53, 487 S.E.2d 596, 598 (1997); see State v. Goode, 305 S.C. 176, 178, 406 S.E.2d 391, 393 (Ct.App.1991) (There is no abuse of discretion as long as the witness has acquired by study or practical experience such knowledge of the subject matter of his testimony as would enable him to give guidance and assistance to the jury in resolving a factual issue which is beyond the scope of the jury's good judgment and common knowledge.). Austin presented Disher, the owner and general manager of an auto body shop, as an expert in the field of auto body repair. Disher, who had thirty-five years' experience in auto-body repair, testified Austin's counsel hired him to inspect Austin's truck. After his inspection, Disher confirmed that the truck had been in an accident and had sustained extensive mechanical and body repairs to correct the damage. Due to the condition of the vehicle, Disher opined that in the right circumstances that could very definitely be a safety issue. When Disher explained his safety concerns, Stokes-Craven's counsel requested the trial judge clarify the scope of Disher's qualifications. The trial judge asked Austin's counsel to rephrase his question and limited Disher's testimony to any safety issues that resulted from body collision repair or body repair. Disher then testified that the only big issue that I would have would be the frame alignment issue and the wheel alignment. Disher believed that anybody that had their eyes open and was looking ... could tell that there'd been a massive amount of repairs done to the vehicle. Counsel for Stokes-Craven objected to Disher's testimony regarding the ease with which someone could have assessed the damage on the ground such testimony constituted speculation. The trial judge sustained the objection and counsel then began his cross-examination of Disher. On appeal, Stokes-Craven contends Disher was not qualified to: (1) give an opinion as to any potential safety issues that may have been created by the prior accident, and (2) testify as to how anyone could tell the vehicle had been repaired. Initially, we find Stokes-Craven failed to preserve any challenge to the admissibility of Disher's testimony. First, when Austin moved to qualify Disher as an expert witness in the field of auto body repair, counsel for Stokes-Craven did not question Disher and made no objection to his qualifications. Secondly, the trial judge sustained the objection interposed by counsel during Disher's testimony. Accordingly, we hold this argument was not properly preserved for appellate review. See Cogdill v. Watson, 289 S.C. 531, 537, 347 S.E.2d 126, 130 (Ct.App.1986) (The failure to make an objection at the time evidence is offered constitutes a waiver of the right to object.); see also State v. Sinclair, 275 S.C. 608, 610, 274 S.E.2d 411, 412 (1981) (recognizing that when a trial judge sustains an objection there is no issue for the appellate court to decide given the objecting party received the relief he sought). Even if properly preserved, we find Stokes-Craven cannot establish that it was prejudiced by the admission of Disher's testimony. First, the testimony was innocuous given it was extremely limited in duration and general in nature. Secondly, Stokes-Craven extensively cross-examined Disher regarding his qualifications and the fact that only someone with significant training or experience in the auto body repair industry would have discovered the extent of the repairs to the truck. Through cross-examination, Stokes-Craven's counsel also established Disher could not say with a reasonable degree of certainty that the prior damage would create a safety issue. As his second expert witness, Austin sought to introduce Ray Morris as an expert in the automotive industry who would testify to the appraisal and valuation process regarding Austin's truck. In terms of his training, Morris testified that he began in the automotive industry in 1973 when he was hired at a Honda motorcycle dealership. After a year, Morris became employed as a salesman at another automotive dealership. Subsequently, Morris then worked at Champion Spark Plug Company for six years during which time he worked directly with automobile dealerships. After Champion's sales dropped, Morris was forced to change jobs. At that point, Morris became employed with Rick Hendrick Honda where he worked as a salesperson as well as a finance and insurance manager. After he left Rick Hendrick Honda, Morris remained in the automotive industry in different capacities, primarily in sales of accessories, within Isuzu motors. For the next ten years, Morris worked at his family's business which was not within the automotive industry. When Morris and his wife retired to Charleston, Morris resumed his automotive interests through employment with the Rick Hendrick Jeep/Chrysler dealership. Due to health reasons, Morris left this position for a year. In 2000, Morris established a consulting business in which he provid[ed] assistance with buying cars and understanding the process. Following his cross-examination, Stokes-Craven's counsel objected to Morris being qualified as an expert. Over the objection of counsel, the trial judge found Morris qualified to testify regarding the value of Austin's truck. In terms of assessing the value of Austin's truck, Morris testified that he inspected the truck and identified parts on the truck that had evidently been damaged and repaired. He characterized the damage as extensive. Following his inspection, Morris discussed his assessment with Disher. Based on these data points, Morris ultimately testified to a reasonable degree of certainty that Austin's truck had a zero retail value on June 1, 2002, the day that Austin purchased the vehicle. Morris explained that this value was based on the damage that had been done to the vehicle plus potential safety issues that were created by this damage. [4] After this testimony, Austin sought to question Morris regarding his opinion as to whether a used car manager could have easily seen the wreck damage. The trial judge sustained Stokes-Craven's counsel's objection to this testimony. When questioned on cross-examination as to how he determined the retail value of Austin's truck, Morris testified that Austin, as the retail buyer, would not have purchased the vehicle had he known it had been wrecked. Based on this assessment, Morris stated that the vehicle was worth nothing to Austin. Although Morris acknowledged the truck had a salvage value, he discounted this value as to Austin given he would not have purchased a damaged vehicle. On appeal, Stokes-Craven contends Morris was not qualified to testify as to the concept of retail value and his testimony did nothing to assist the jury. Thus, Stokes-Craven claims the trial judge abused his discretion in qualifying Morris and that this error warrants a new trial. We find the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in qualifying Morris as an expert witness. As his direct examination testimony revealed, Morris had extensive experience in several sectors of the automotive industry which included the appraisal of vehicles. Notably, Morris had also been qualified as an expert witness on four or five other occasions. Thus, any defects in Morris's experience regarding the valuation of automobiles went to the weight and not the admissibility of his testimony. See Peterson v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 365 S.C. 391, 399, 618 S.E.2d 903, 907 (2005) (Defects in an expert witness' education and experience go to the weight, not the admissibility, of the expert's testimony.). However, even if the trial judge erred in qualifying Morris as an expert witness, we find Stokes-Craven was not prejudiced by the admission of his testimony. As previously stated, Stokes-Craven thoroughly cross-examined Morris regarding his lack of experience and qualifications. Furthermore, it appears that the testimony that Stokes-Craven primarily challenges on appeal was that produced by its own cross-examination of Morris. Finally, the testimony provided by Morris regarding the retail value was cumulative to other testimony. Specifically, Austin testified he believed the truck was worth nothing given he would not have bought it had he known that it had been wrecked. Additionally, Disher testified regarding the extensive damage to the vehicle and the potential safety issues created by this damage.
Stokes-Craven asserts the trial judge erred in failing to grant its motions for a directed verdict, JNOV, or new trial given Austin offered no evidence as to the fair market value of the actual condition of the truck. Stokes-Craven contends Austin's testimony that the truck was not worth anything to him and Morris's testimony that the truck had a zero retail value was insufficient to satisfy Austin's burden of proving his entitlement to actual damages. When we review a trial judge's grant or denial of a motion for directed verdict or JNOV, we reverse only when there is no evidence to support the ruling or when the ruling is governed by an error of law. Creech v. South Carolina Wildlife & Marine Res. Dep't, 328 S.C. 24, 29, 491 S.E.2d 571, 573 (1997). As a preliminary matter, Austin contends this issue was not preserved for appellate review for several reasons, including the fact that Stokes-Craven never used the term fair market value during its presentation of its directed verdict motion or JNOV motion. Admittedly, Stokes-Craven only used the term fair market value on one occasion during Austin's testimony. However, we believe the lack of reference to this term is not fatal to Stokes-Craven's appellate argument. Given Stokes-Craven's counsel moved for a directed verdict and filed a detailed memorandum on its post-trial motions, we find this argument was sufficiently preserved for this Court's review. I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mount Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 422, 526 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2000) (acknowledging that an issue raised to and ruled upon by the lower court is preserved for appellate review). Having concluded this issue is properly before this Court, we now address the merits. This Court has stated: A plaintiff induced to enter a contract by fraud must elect between two remedies: he can elect to affirm the contract and bring an action to recover damages sustained by reason of the fraud or, alternatively, he may elect to rescind the contract and recover the consideration paid plus incidental damages which were foreseeable and were incurred in reliance on the fraudulent misrepresentation. Fields v. Yarborough Ford, Inc., 307 S.C. 207, 211, 414 S.E.2d 164, 166 (1992). The measure of damages for the sale of a defective vehicle is the difference in fair market value between the car, having been wrecked, and the value of the car had it not been wrecked at time of sale. Barton v. Superior Motors, Inc., 309 S.C. 491, 494, 424 S.E.2d 524, 526 (Ct.App.1992); see Mazloom v. Mazloom, 382 S.C. 307, 321, 675 S.E.2d 746, 753 (Ct.App.2009) (recognizing the following definitions of fair market value: (1) [t]he price that a seller is willing to accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open market and in an arm's length transaction; (2) the price which a willing buyer will pay a willing seller, neither being under compulsion to buy or sell). Generally, in order for damages to be recoverable, the evidence should be such as to enable the court or jury to determine the amount thereof with reasonable certainty or accuracy. Whisenant v. James Island Corp., 277 S.C. 10, 13, 281 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1981). While neither the existence, causation nor amount of damages can be left to conjecture, guess or speculation, proof with mathematical certainty of the amount of loss or damage is not required. Id. Ordinarily a property owner, who is familiar with his property and its value, may give his estimate of its value or the damage inflicted upon it even though he is not an expert. Barton, 309 S.C. at 494, 424 S.E.2d at 526; Whisenant, 277 S.C. at 13, 281 S.E.2d at 796 (noting that ordinarily a property owner, who is familiar with his property and its value, may give his estimate of its value or the damage inflicted upon it even though he is not an expert); Abercrombie v. Abercrombie, 372 S.C. 643, 647, 643 S.E.2d 697, 699 (Ct.App.2007) (recognizing general rule in South Carolina that a property owner is competent to offer testimony as to the value of his property); Hawkins v. Greenwood Dev. Corp., 328 S.C. 585, 598, 493 S.E.2d 875, 881 (Ct.App.1997) (The rule that a property owner is competent to present an opinion as to the property's value is well recognized.). Unless the property owner's lack of knowledge of the value of his property is so complete so as to render it worthless, it is for a jury to assess the probative value of his testimony. Barton, 309 S.C. at 494, 424 S.E.2d at 526. Turning to the merits of this issue, we find there is evidence to support the jury's award of actual damages in the amount of $26,371.10, the purchase price of the vehicle retained by Austin. Initially, we note the unique facts of the instant case. Normally, a property owner who seeks damages for a defective vehicle rescinds the contract, i.e., returns the vehicle, and files suit to recover damages. See Sparrow v. Toyota of Florence, Inc., 302 S.C. 418, 421-22, 396 S.E.2d 645, 647 (Ct.App.1990) (In an action for fraud in the sale of goods, the plaintiff may elect to return the goods and recover the consideration paid or retain the goods and sue for damages. If he retains the goods, the measure of actual damages is the difference between the value the purchaser would have received if the facts were as represented and the value the purchaser actually received.). Here, Austin repeatedly offered to return the truck to Stokes-Craven in exchange for the purchase price. Given Stokes-Craven adamantly declined Austin's offers, we do not believe Austin should be penalized or limited in his ability to recover damages due to the fact that he has retained the vehicle. Thus, the question becomes whether Austin offered sufficient proof to establish the fair market value of the truck to support the jury's award of actual damages in the amount of $26,371.10. Austin, who was indisputably familiar with the truck, testified that the value of the vehicle was worth nothing on the date of sale given he would not have bought it had he known that it had been wrecked. Morris similarly testified that the vehicle had a zero retail value on June 1, 2002, the date of sale. In light of this testimony, it is evident the jury accepted Austin's and Morris's valuations and assessed the fair market value of the truck when it awarded Austin actual damages in the amount of $26,371.10, the differential of the purchase price less the zero retail value. See South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Grant, 265 S.C. 28, 32, 216 S.E.2d 758, 759-60 (1975) (The basis for allowing a landowner to testify as to the value of his property is that he should not be deprived of his property without an opportunity of expressing his own view to the jury . . . The jury is the tribunal to determine the weight to be accorded to the testimony of the witnesses and accept or reject the valuations placed thereupon.); Dixon v. Besco Eng'g, Inc., 320 S.C. 174, 181, 463 S.E.2d 636, 640 (Ct.App. 1995) (affirming trial judge's award of actual damages for fair market value of plaintiff's lost tools where plaintiff testified to the amount it would cost to replace them and the amount awarded was comparable to the testimony). Based on the foregoing, we find the amount of actual damages awarded by the jury was supported by the testimony. Because Austin offered sufficient evidence to support the award of actual damages through his own testimony and expert witness testimony, we find the cases cited by Stokes-Craven to be distinguishable in that in those cases the plaintiff failed to offer specific evidence as to the value of the vehicle.
Stokes-Craven contends the trial judge erred in failing to grant its motion for a directed verdict or JNOV as to Austin's claim under the Federal Odometer Act. Initially, Stokes-Craven asserts there was no technical violation of the Federal Odometer Act because: (1) the truck was not titled in Stokes-Craven's name, and (2) the odometer disclosure was properly made on a document used to reassign the truck's title to Austin. Even if its failure to disclose the odometer reading to Austin constituted a violation of the Act, Stokes-Craven claims this violation was not sufficient to support a recoverable claim given there was no specific intent to defraud Austin with respect to the truck's mileage. As a preliminary matter, we question whether Stokes-Craven's first argument was properly preserved for this Court's review. At trial, Stokes-Craven's counsel appears to admit that the truck was titled in Stokes-Craven's name at the time Austin purchased the vehicle. Secondly, Frierson, the Stokes-Craven salesman involved in Austin's purchase, admitted that he had never shown a title to a customer in his twenty-five years of experience. Thus, any argument regarding the lack of title in Stokes-Craven's name or its failure to disclose the title to Austin would not be preserved for appellate review. See TNS Mills, Inc. v. South Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 331 S.C. 611, 617, 503 S.E.2d 471, 474 (1998) (An issue conceded in a lower court may not be argued on appeal.). However, even if Stokes-Craven's failure to disclose the truck title to Austin constituted a violation of the Act, [5] we find Austin did not prove Stokes-Craven violated the Act with the requisite intent to defraud. The Federal Odometer Act (the Act) provides for a private cause of action where a defendant violates the Act with intent to defraud. 49 U.S.C.A. § 32710. [6] Thus, the question becomes whether Austin proved Stokes-Craven violated the Act with the requisite intent to defraud. To satisfy this burden, Stokes-Craven claims Austin was required to establish that it violated the Act with a specific intent to defraud regarding the truck's mileage. In contrast, Austin construes the Act broadly and believes that a general intent to defraud is sufficient to satisfy this element in a civil action. In order to answer this question, we believe a review of the legislative history of the Act is instructive. The purpose of this Act has been explained as follows: In passing the Odometer Act, and its predecessor, Congress sought (1) to prohibit tampering with motor vehicle odometers; and (2) to provide safeguards to protect purchasers in the sale of motor vehicles with altered or reset odometers. 49 U.S.C. § 32701(b). To accomplish these express goals, the Act imposes various requirements on persons transferring motor vehicles. In addition to flat prohibitions on tampering with odometers, a transferor of a motor vehicle [must] give the transferee a written disclosure (A) of the cumulative mileage registered by the odometer; or (B) that the mileage is unknown if the transferor knows that the mileage registered by the odometer is incorrect. 49 U.S.C. § 32705(a)(1). Transferors are prohibited from making false statements in these disclosures. See 49 U.S.C. § 32705(a)(2). Furthermore, Congress provided for criminal and civil penalties for violations of the Act, including a private civil action. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 32709-32710. Section 32710 states: A person that violates this chapter or a regulation prescribed or order issued under this chapter, with intent to defraud, is liable for 3 times the actual damages or $1,500, whichever is greater. 49 U.S.C. § 32710(a). Based on a Congressional delegation of authority in § 32705, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) promulgated regulations which provide the way in which information is disclosed and retained under the Act. 49 U.S.C. § 32705. The scope of these regulations is limited to rules requiring transferors . . . of motor vehicles to make written disclosure to transferees . . . concerning the odometer mileage and its accuracy as directed by [the Act]. 49 C.F.R. § 580.1. Further, the purpose of the regulations is to provide purchasers of motor vehicles with odometer information to assist them in determining a vehicle's condition and value by making the disclosure of a vehicle's mileage a condition of title. . . . 49 C.F.R. § 580.2. Accordingly, each title, at the time it is issued to the transferee, must contain the mileage disclosed by the transferor when ownership of the vehicle was transferred. . . . 49 C.F.R. § 580.5(a). Additionally, transferors are required to disclose the mileage to the transferee in writing on the title. See 49 C.F.R. § 580.5(c). Nabors v. Auto Sports Unlimited, Inc., 475 F.Supp.2d 646, 649-50 (E.D.Mich.2007). With respect to the question of whether the intent to defraud requirement for a civil action involves a specific intent to defraud as to mileage of the vehicle or a general intent to defraud, [t]here is a split of authority on this issue, with the vast majority of courts concluding that the intent to defraud for the purposes of the Odometer Act is a specific intent to defraud as to mileage. Nabors, 475 F.Supp.2d at 650; see Ioffe v. Skokie Motor Sales, Inc., 414 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir.2005) (analyzing the Federal Odometer Act and concluding [s]ection 32710 does not create a private right of action for all violations of the Act and regulations that are accompanied by any `intent to defraud.' Rather, where a plaintiff alleges a violation of 49 C.F.R. § 580.5(c), he must prove intent to defraud as to a vehicle mileage.); see generally Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Odometer Requirement Provisions of Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (49 U.S.C.A. §§ 32701 to 32711), 198 A.L.R. Fed. 255 (2004 & Supp.2009) (analyzing cases involving the Federal Odometer Act and discussing requisite elements including the intent to defraud). Applying the foregoing to the facts of the instant case, we hold the trial judge erred in failing to grant Stokes-Craven's motion for a directed verdict or post-trial motion for JNOV. At trial, Austin's counsel conceded the claim under the Act did not arise out of a dispute regarding the mileage. Significantly, Austin never asserted that Stokes-Craven misrepresented the mileage of the truck or tampered with its odometer. Instead, Austin's claim under the Act was essentially based on Stokes-Craven's failure to disclose the title to the truck prior to Austin's purchase. Throughout the trial, Austin maintained that he would not have purchased the truck had he seen the title listing Bailey, not Bud Knight, as the previous owner. Had he been aware that Bailey was the previous owner, Austin claimed he would have been able to discover the extensive wreck damage. In view of this evidence and Austin's arguments, we find his claim under the Act failed as a matter of law because he did not establish that Stokes-Craven's violation of the Act was coupled with a specific intent to defraud him regarding the truck's mileage. Thus, we find the trial judge should have granted Stokes-Craven's motions for a directed verdict or JNOV with respect to this cause of action. See Bodine v. Graco, Inc., 533 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir.2008) (holding purchaser of used vehicle failed to state a claim under the Act when she alleged that the vehicle's sellers violated the Act by deliberately withholding the vehicle's title to conceal that the vehicle had been severely damaged in an earlier collision given the absence of the requisite allegation that the sellers intended to defraud her as to the vehicle's mileage); Nabors, 475 F.Supp.2d at 653-54 (finding used automobile dealer was entitled to summary judgment on purchaser's claim under the Act where purchaser failed to present evidence indicating the dealer intended to defraud purchaser as to the vehicle's mileage even though there was evidence that purchaser may not have been notified that the vehicle was salvaged or that dealer may have used fabricated documents for the purposes of the lawsuit); Ioffe, 414 F.3d at 713-14 (recognizing that the Odometer Act is concerned specifically with fraud related to the vehicle's mileage rather than with all types of fraud that might involve the withholding of a vehicle's title). Accordingly, we reverse the trial judge's award of $1,500 in actual damages and $4,500 in attorney's fees to Austin under this cause of action.
Stokes-Craven asserts the trial judge erred in failing to grant it a new trial on the ground the jury verdicts were inconsistent. Given the jury found in favor of Austin as to his claims for fraud and in favor of Stokes-Craven as to the UTPA claim, Stokes-Craven contends these verdicts are irreconcilable and, thus, warrant a new trial. Whether to grant a new trial is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge, and this decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is unsupported by the evidence or is controlled by an error of law. Vinson v. Hartley, 324 S.C. 389, 403, 477 S.E.2d 715, 722 (Ct.App.1996). Verdicts which are irreconcilably inconsistent should not stand, and a new trial should be granted, because the parties and the judge should not be required to guess as to what a jury sought to render. Prego v. Hobart, 287 S.C. 116, 118, 336 S.E.2d 725, 726 (Ct.App.1985). However, [i]t is the duty of the court to sustain verdicts when a logical reason for reconciling them can be found. Rhodes v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 249 S.C. 526, 530, 155 S.E.2d 308, 310 (1967). To recover in an action under the UTPA, the plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive act in the conduct of trade or commerce; (2) the unfair or deceptive act affected public interest; and (3) the plaintiff suffered monetary or property loss as a result of the defendant's unfair or deceptive act(s). Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 23, 640 S.E.2d 486, 498 (Ct.App.2006); S.C.Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10 to -560 (1976 & Supp.2009). In contrast, [t]o establish a cause of action for fraud, the following elements must be proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence: (1) a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) either knowledge of its falsity or a reckless disregard of its truth or falsity; (5) intent that the representation be acted upon; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) the hearer's reliance on its truth; (8) the hearer's right to rely thereon; and (9) the hearer's consequent and proximate injury. Schnellmann v. Roettger, 373 S.C. 379, 382, 645 S.E.2d 239, 241 (2007). The failure to prove any element of fraud or misrepresentation is fatal to the claim. Id. A review of the elements of these two claims reveals that different proof is required to recover under each cause of action. For example, the jury could have found the elements of fraud were sufficient to satisfy the deceptive act prong of an UTPA claim; however, it may have concluded the deceptive act was confined to Austin's transaction and did not affect the public interest, i.e., satisfy the public interest prong of the UTPA claim. Thus, we find the verdicts of the jury were not necessarily inconsistent.
Stokes-Craven asserts the judge erred in affirming the jury's award of $216,600 in punitive damages. In support of this assertion, it contends the award: (1) cannot stand because the award of actual damages was improper; (2) was based upon the improper closing arguments of Austin's counsel; and (3) is excessive and unconstitutional. Having found there was evidence to support the jury's award of actual damages to Austin in the amount of $26,371.10, we focus our analysis on Stokes-Craven's two remaining arguments regarding the award of punitive damages. In the instant case, Stokes-Craven challenged the award of punitive damages during trial and in its post-trial motions. Prior to the jury's deliberations, a sealed statement regarding Stokes-Craven's net worth was submitted to the jury with the instruction that they only open it in the event punitive damages were awarded. In the course of his closing argument, Austin's counsel indicated that he had not seen this net worth statement and, thus, could only rely on the testimony at trial to estimate the profits of Stokes-Craven. Specifically, counsel referenced the testimony of Dennis Craven wherein he testified regarding the average number of vehicles sold per year and the average profit per vehicle. Extrapolating from this testimony, Austin's counsel stated [t]he total profit for 2005, based on Mr. Craven's testimony is one million three hundred and sixty-five thousand dollars profit. Throughout this portion of Austin's counsel's closing argument, counsel for Stokes-Craven interposed objections which were partially sustained by the trial judge. In its post-trial motion, Stokes-Craven challenged the award of punitive damages on several grounds which included the alleged improper closing remarks of Austin's counsel and the excessiveness of the award. In his order affirming the jury's award of punitive damages, the trial judge specifically identified and found evidence in the record to support each of the factors outlined in Gamble. Turning to Stokes-Craven's remaining two arguments, we find any complaint regarding improper closing arguments is inconsequential given both the jury and the trial judge relied upon the sealed statement of Stokes-Craven's net worth in assessing whether Stokes-Craven had the ability to pay. [7] This statement reflected that Stokes-Craven's net worth was $1,444,561 as of December 31, 2005. Accordingly, Stokes-Craven's second argument is without merit. We now turn to Stokes-Craven's final argument in which it challenges the amount of the award of punitive damages. Because punitive damages are quasi-criminal in nature, the process of assessing punitive damages is subject to the protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. James v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 371 S.C. 187, 194, 638 S.E.2d 667, 670 (2006). Recently, this Court articulated the guideposts to be applied in conducting a post-judgment review of punitive damages awards. Mitchell v. Fortis Ins. Co., 385 S.C. 570, 686 S.E.2d 176 (2009). [8] In Mitchell, we explained that a trial judge shall review the constitutionality of a punitive damages award by determining whether the award was reasonable under the following guideposts: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual and potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the amount of the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Id. at 587-88, 686 S.E.2d at 185-86 (citing BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996)). We further emphasized that an appellate court reviews de novo the trial judge's application of these guideposts. Id. Based on our review of the record in the context of the Mitchell test, we find the amount of punitive damages awarded to Austin was not grossly excessive. In reaching this conclusion, we address each of the factors enunciated in Mitchell. In terms of reprehensibility, we should consider whether: (1) the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; (2) the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard for the health or safety of others; (3) the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; (4) the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and (5) the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, rather than mere accident. Id. at 587, 686 S.E.2d at 185 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003)). Considering the above-outlined factors, we find Stokes-Craven's conduct can only be construed as exhibiting an extremely high degree of reprehensibility. Admittedly, the harm caused to Austin was economic. However, this factor alone does not minimize the reprehensibility of Stokes-Craven's conduct given the dealership procured Austin's purchase of the truck through its employees' affirmative misrepresentations regarding the condition of the vehicle. Significantly, Stokes-Craven employees failed to disclose that the truck had been wrecked and the lack of a power train warranty. There is also evidence that Stokes-Craven forged Austin's signature on the Buyer's Guide in an effort to legitimize the lack of a power train warranty. We believe these misrepresentations, particularly as to whether the vehicle had been wrecked, evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health and safety of Austin and the general public that would share the road with the potentially unsafe vehicle. Finally, there is evidence that Stokes-Craven's mistreatment of Austin, a financially vulnerable customer, was not an isolated incident as Frierson testified that he had not shown a title to a customer in his twenty-five years of experience. Next, we find the ratio of punitive damages to actual damages does not warrant reversal. In determining the reasonableness of the ratio we may consider: the likelihood that that the award will deter the defendant from like conduct; whether the award is reasonably related to the harm likely to result from such conduct; and the defendant's ability to pay. Id. at 588, 686 S.E.2d at 185. Admittedly, an 8.21 ratio is high considering the type of injury underlying Austin's claims. However, it is a single-digit ratio and there is evidence of Stokes-Craven's ability to pay. Furthermore, given the extent of the wreck damage and the resultant safety issues, we believe there was a potential for Austin or his passengers to be subjected to serious injury. We also find the amount of the award of punitive damages will inevitably serve as a deterrent to Stokes-Craven from engaging in future misconduct. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 582, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (stating low awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages); Mitchell, 385 S.C. at 594, 686 S.E.2d at 188 (concluding a 9.2 to 1 ratio satisfied due process and comported with South Carolina law); Atkinson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 361 S.C. 156, 170, 604 S.E.2d 385, 392-93 (2004) (stating `few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process' (quoting Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425, 123 S.Ct. 1513)); cf. James, 371 S.C. at 196, 638 S.E.2d at 672 (concluding, in a case involving an insured's bad faith claim against his insurer, punitive damage award of $1,000,00 which was 6.82 times the amount of actual damages was reasonably related to the actual harm suffered). Finally, we must consider the difference between the punitive damages awarded to Austin and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Because the jury awarded punitive damages pursuant to Austin's fraud cause of action, we are compelled to review factually-similar cases. [9] Based on our review of these cases, we conclude the award of punitive damages in the instant case is consistent with those of comparable cases. See, e.g., Krysa v. Payne, 176 S.W.3d 150 (Mo.Ct.App.2005) (affirming jury verdict of $18,449.53 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages awarded to purchasers of a used vehicle against dealership where dealership: did not provide title to purchasers at the time of purchase; failed to disclose that the vehicle had thirteen prior owners; affirmatively misrepresented the condition of the vehicle; and failed to disclose that the vehicle had sustained significant wreck damage); Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 331 Or. 537, 17 P.3d 473 (2001) (affirming award of $11,496 in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages where the defendant car dealership sold the plaintiff a vehicle that had been previously involved in a serious accident and was missing several pieces of emission control equipment). In conclusion, having carefully considered the Mitchell guideposts, we hold the jury's award of punitive damages was not grossly excessive in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.