Opinion ID: 1197829
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interference in Church Governance

Text: As applied by this Circuit, the doctrine precludes subject matter jurisdiction over claims involving the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministerial employees, based on the institution's constitutional right to be free from judicial interference in the selection of those employees. Id. See generally Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the United States & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976); Lewis v. Seventh Day Adventists Lake Region Conference, 978 F.2d 940 (6th Cir. 1992). As the Fifth Circuit noted in McClure v. Salvation Army , one of the first cases to analyze the ministerial exception, [t]he relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose. 460 F.2d at 558-59. See also Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167-68 (4th Cir.1985) (The right to choose ministers without government restriction underlies the well-being of religious community ... for perpetuation of a church's existence may depend upon those whom it selects to preach its values, teach its message, and interpret its doctrine both to its own membership and to the world at large.). While the ministerial exception was first applied in the context of suits brought against religious employers under Title VII, see McClure, 460 F.2d at 560, the exception has been extended to suits brought against religious employers under the ADA. [6] See, e.g., Hollins, 474 F.3d at 225; Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1100 (9th Cir.2004); Starkman, 198 F.3d at 175. For the ministerial exception to bar an employment discrimination claim, two factors must be present: (1) the employer must be a religious institution, and (2) the employee must be a ministerial employee. Hollins, 474 F.3d at 225. To qualify as a religious institution under the first prong, the employer need not be a traditional religious organization, such as a church, diocese, or synagogue, nor must it be an entity operated by a traditional religious organization. Id. Rather, a religiously affiliated entity is considered a religious institution if its mission is marked by clear or obvious religious characteristics. Id. at 226 (citing Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 310 (4th Cir.2004)). This Circuit has applied the ministerial exception to a religiously affiliated hospital, and it has explicitly approved of applying the doctrine to religiously affiliated schools and corporations. Id. at 225. To determine whether an employee is ministerial under the second prong, this Circuit has instructed courts to look at the function, or primary duties of the employee. [7] Id. at 226 (applying the exception to a resident in a Methodist Hospital's clinical pastoral education program). As a general rule, an employee is considered a minister if the employee's primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship. Id. (quoting Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1545 (1979)). See also Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169. In extending the ministerial exception beyond ordained ministers, this Circuit has instructed courts to look at the function of the plaintiff's employment position rather than the fact of ordination. Hollins, 474 F.3d at 226. Other circuits have further instructed that courts must determine whether a position is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church. See, e.g., Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169. The parties in the instant case do not dispute that religious institutions include religiously affiliated schools and that Hosanna-Tabor meets this requirement. Thus, the first requirement under the ministerial exception is present, and the primary issue is whether Perich served as a ministerial employee. The question of whether a teacher at a sectarian school classifies as a ministerial employee is one of first impression for this Court. However, the overwhelming majority of courts that have considered the issue have held that parochial school teachers such as Perich, who teach primarily secular subjects, do not classify as ministerial employees for purposes of the exception. See, e.g., Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F.Supp.2d 211, 221-222 (E.D.N.Y.2006) (holding that a teacher at a Seventh Day Adventist elementary school does not classify as a ministerial employee because her teaching duties were primarily secular and her daily religious duties were limited to only one hour of Bible instruction per day); Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 42 F.Supp.2d 849, 854 (S.D.Ind.1998) (holding that a fifth grade teacher who taught at least one class in religion per term and organized Mass once a month at a religious elementary school was not a ministerial employee); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 172 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that applying the ADEA to a math teacher at a religious high school would not result in excessive entanglement under the Establishment Clause); Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1392, 1397 (4th Cir.1990) (holding that teachers at a religious school who integrated biblical material into traditional academic subjects should be considered lay teachers for purposes of the ministerial exception); EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1370 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that teachers at a church owned and operated school do not fulfill the function of a ministerial employee). But see Clapper v. Chesapeake Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists , No. 97 CV 2648, 1998 WL 904528, at , 7 (Dec. 29, 1998) (holding that a former elementary school teacher at a school whose primary purpose was the salvation of each student's soul through indoctrination into Seventh Day Adventist theological beliefs classified as a ministerial employee). By contrast, when courts have found that teachers classify as ministerial employees for purposes of the exception, those teachers have generally taught primarily religious subjects or had a central role in the spiritual or pastoral mission of the church. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 463-65 (D.C.Cir.1996) (holding that a nun whose primary duties were to teach canonical law at Catholic University and who was entrusted with instructing students in the `fundamental body of ecclesiastical laws' that governs the Church's sacramental life, defines the rights and duties of its faithful and the responsibilities of their pastors, and guides its administration was a ministerial employee); Sw. Baptist, 651 F.2d at 283-84 (holding that seminary faculty were ministerial employees given that they served as intermediaries between the [Baptist] Convention and the future ministers of many local Baptist churches, instructed the seminarians in the `whole of religious doctrine,' and [taught] only religious oriented courses). The district court's factual determinations concerning Perich's primary duties throughout her work day were not clearly erroneous. The record supports the finding that Perich's employment duties were identical when she was a contract teacher and a called teacher and that she taught math, language arts, social studies, science, gym, art, and music using secular textbooks. Furthermore, the record indicates that Perich taught a religion class four days per week for thirty minutes and that she attended a chapel service with her class once a week for thirty minutes. Perich also led each class in prayer three times a day for a total of approximately five or six minutes. The record also indicates that Perich seldom introduced religion during secular discussions. Approximately twice a year, Perich led the chapel service in rotation with other teachers. However, teachers leading chapel or teaching religion were not required to be called or even Lutheran, and, in fact, at least one teacher was not. In all, the record supports the district court's finding that activities devoted to religion consumed approximately forty-five minutes of the seven hour school day. However, given these factual findings relating to Perich's primary duties, the district court erred in its legal conclusion classifying Perich as a ministerial employee. Perich spent approximately six hours and fifteen minutes of her seven hour day teaching secular subjects, using secular textbooks, without incorporating religion into the secular material. Cf. Clapper, 1998 WL 904528, at  (finding that an elementary school teacher's primary duties were religious where he taught the Bible's story of creation in science class and the influence of religion on the events of history in social studies class). Thus, it is clear that Perich's primary function was teaching secular subjects, not spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship. Hollins, 474 F.3d at 226. (internal citation omitted) See also EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir.1980) (The College's faculty and staff do not function as ministers. The faculty members are not intermediaries between a church and its congregation. They neither attend to the religious needs of the faithful nor instruct students in the whole of religious doctrine.). The fact that Perich participated in and led some religious activities throughout the day does not make her primary function religious. See Guinan, 42 F.Supp.2d at 852 (finding that although the teacher did participate in some religious activities, it cannot be fairly said that she functioned as a minister or a member of the clergy). This is underscored by the fact that teachers were not required to be called or even Lutheran to conduct these religious activities, and at least one teacher at Hosanna-Tabor was not Lutheran. See at 852-53 (the secular nature of [the teacher's] position is underscored by the fact that [the church] did not require teachers at [the school] to be Catholic, and, as a matter of fact, some were not Catholic). In addition, that Hosanna-Tabor has a generally religious characteras do all religious schools by definitionand characterizes its staff members as fine Christian role models does not transform Perich's primary responsibilities in the classroom into religious activities. See Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d at 485 (That faculty members are expected to serve as exemplars of practicing Christians does not serve to make the terms and conditions of their employment matters of church administration and thus purely of ecclesiastical concern.). This is underscored by the fact that Perich can only recall twice in her career when she introduced the topic of religion during secular discussions. [8] Cf. Clapper, 1998 WL 904528, at  (finding that an elementary school teacher's primary duties were religious where the academic curriculum in traditionally secular subjects incorporate[d] the teachings of the Seventh-day Adventist Church whenever possible). Similarly, Perich's extra religious training as a result of completing her colloquy did not affect the duties she performed in the classroom on a daily basis. See Guinan, 42 F.Supp.2d at 850 (finding that a teacher whose training as a Catechist permitted her to teach religion classes was not a ministerial employee). In finding that Perich was a ministerial employee, the district court relied largely on the fact that Hosanna-Tabor gave Perich the title of commissioned minister and held her out to the world as a minister by bestowing this title upon her. However, the title of commissioned minister does not transform the primary duties of these called teachers from secular in nature to religious in nature. See Sw. Baptist, 651 F.2d at 285 (holding that certain employees, though considered ministers by the Seminary, are not ministers under the ministerial exception). The governing primary duties analysis requires a court to objectively examine an employee's actual job function, not her title, in determining whether she is properly classified as a minister. In this case, it is clear from the record that Perich's primary duties were secular, not only because she spent the overwhelming majority of her day teaching secular subjects using secular textbooks, but also because nothing in the record indicates that the Lutheran church relied on Perich as the primary means to indoctrinate its faithful into its theology. See Clapper, 1998 WL 904528, at  (warning that courts should examine not only the relative quantity of time an employee spends on religious versus secular activities, but also the degree of the church entity's reliance upon such employee to indoctrinate persons into its theology). By contrast, in Clapper, the defendant schools envisioned their teachers as having a primarily religious role. The teachers were required to be tithe paying members of the Seventh-day Adventist Church and are expected to participate in church activities, programs, and finances. See Clapper, 1998 WL 904528, at . The Fourth Circuit observed that [t]he purpose of this requirement is obviousthe Chesapeake Conference desires to insure that the minds of its youth are shaped by model members of the Seventh-day Adventist faith. Id. at . Furthermore, the district court in the instant case found that the primary duties of called teachers are identical to those of contract teachers, who do not have the title of minister, and at least one contract teacher who taught at the school was not Lutheran. Given the undisputed evidence that all teachers at Hosanna-Tabor were assigned the same duties, a finding that Perich is a ministerial employee would compel the conclusion that all teachers at the schoolcalled, contract, Lutheran, and non-Lutheranare similarly excluded from coverage under the ADA and other federal fair employment laws. However, the intent of the ministerial exception is to allow religious organizations to prefer members of their own religion and adhere to their own religious interpretations. Thus, applying the exception to non-members of the religion and those whose primary function is not religious in nature would be both illogical and contrary to the intention behind the exception.