Opinion ID: 1232120
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: establishing the requisite showing under bangert

Text: ¶ 50. The third issue concerns a defendant's burden to make a showing that will require the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. Is the circuit court required to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a defendant's motion to withdraw his plea when the motion points to the court's failure in the plea colloquy to advise the defendant personally that the court was not bound by the plea agreement, and the defendant also alleges that he did not understand the court was not bound by the plea agreement? We conclude the answer is yes. ¶ 51. The State asserts that Hampton should not be entitled to an evidentiary hearing despite the circuit court's failure to advise him personally that the court was not bound by the plea agreement, because his motion did not contain sufficient evidentiary facts, which, if true, would have entitled him to withdraw his plea. The State relies on a line of cases highlighted by State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996); see also Levesque v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 412, 217 N.W.2d 317 (1974); Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 195 N.W.2d 629 (1972). However, Bangert controls the facts of this case because Bangert -type cases are confined to alleged defects in the record of the plea colloquy. Bentley is inapposite because it applies to allegations less susceptible to objective confirmation in the record. ¶ 52. We begin our discussion with Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d 489, and Levesque, 63 Wis. 2d 412, two cases that serve as the foundation for Bentley. In Nelson, the defendant was denied an evidentiary hearing to withdraw his guilty plea after alleging that his plea was not made voluntarily after proper advice from counsel and with a full understanding of the consequences of said plea but rather it was obtained unfairly to the ignorance and fear of said affiant. 54 Wis. 2d at 493. On appeal, the defendant argued that the court is obligated to hold a hearing whenever a non-frivolous motion to withdraw or vacate a plea is filed. Id. at 495. We rejected that argument, and concluded instead that after the plea is entered, it is within the discretion of the trial court whether or not to grant a hearing on the motion. Id. at 496. We went on to hold that: [when] a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after judgment and sentence alleges facts which, if true, would entitle the defendant to relief, the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing. However, [1] if the defendant fails to allege sufficient facts in his motion to raise a question of fact, or [2] presents only conclusionary allegations, or [3] if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the trial court may in the exercise of its legal discretion deny the motion without a hearing. Id. at 497-98. ¶ 53. Two years later, the defendant in Levesque also sought to withdraw his guilty plea because, first, the facts allegedly did not support the defendant's guilt, and, second, because the court allegedly did not ascertain that the defendant understood the nature of the charged offense. According to the defendant, both deficiencies were a result of the court's misconstruction of the elements of burglary. 63 Wis. 2d at 418. We first concluded that the court correctly interpreted the elements of burglary. Id. at 415, 418. We then turned our attention to the defendant's claim that, at the time of the plea hearing, he was unable to understand the proceedings due to mental disease or defect. Relying on Nelson, we reasoned that the [defendant] cannot stand on conclusory allegations, hoping to supplement them at a hearing. Id. at 421. Because the defendant failed to allege more than ultimate facts, we held that the circuit court properly denied the defendant an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 421-22. ¶ 54. The State's assertion that courts are not required to hold an evidentiary hearing when a defendant merely alleges that he or she does not understand important information when entering a plea might be dismissed if it relied solely on these two cases. Both Nelson and Levesque are distinguishable on the basis that they predate the advent of the burden-shifting framework announced in Bangert. However, this court relied on both Nelson and Levesque in Bentley when it rejected a defendant's argument that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 306. Consequently, additional analysis is required. ¶ 55. In Bentley, the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea on grounds that his attorney erroneously advised him about the minimum eligibility date for parole. Id. at 307. In assessing the viability of the defendant's claim, we employed the test from Nelson in order to determine whether the court was required to hold a hearing on the plea withdrawal motion. Id. at 309. We interpreted Nelson to provide a two-part test which necessitates a mixed standard of appellate review. Id. at 310. If the motion on its face alleges facts which would entitle the defendant to relief, the circuit court has no discretion and must hold an evidentiary hearing. Id. (citing Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 497). However, if the motion fails to allege sufficient facts, the circuit court has the discretion to deny a postconviction motion without a hearing based on any one of the three factors enumerated in Nelson.  Id. at 310-11; see also Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 497-98; ¶ 52, supra. ¶ 56. We conclude that Bangert and Bentley, although different, are not inconsistent. They are not inconsistent because they apply to different fact situations. Both cases deal with a defendant's motion to withdraw a plea. Both deal with requests for an evidentiary hearing. Both assign to the defendant the burden of making a showing that an evidentiary hearing is required. ¶ 57. We see several distinctions in the Bangert -type case. First, the defendant must point to a specific defect in the plea hearing which constitutes an error by the court. The defendant will not satisfy this burden merely by alleging that the plea colloquy was defective or the court failed to conform to its mandatory duties during the plea colloquy. The defendant must make specific allegations such as at no point during the plea colloquy did the court explain that it was not bound by the plea bargain and was free to disregard the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation. In addition, the defendant must allege that he did not in fact understand that the court was not bound by the plea agreement because that information/explanation was not provided. We think a motion of this nature passes the test of Nelson and Bentley: a motion to withdraw a plea that alleges facts which, if true, would entitle the defendant to relief. The allegation that the defendant did not understand is, admittedly, conclusory; but the allegation raises a question of fact and perhaps law that requires resolution. ¶ 58. The allegation that a defendant did not understand something is qualitatively different from the allegation of a legal conclusion such as counsel's performance was deficient and resulted in prejudice to the defendant, or the defendant's plea was not voluntary. These legal conclusions cry out for supporting facts, and these supporting facts must be alleged to satisfy the defendant's burden for an evidentiary hearing. ¶ 59. The nature and specificity of the required supporting facts will necessarily differ from case to case. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 314. For instance, in the case of a White violation, it is relatively easy to point to the discussion of the plea agreement in the plea hearing transcript and show that there was no reference to the fact that the court is not bound by the terms of the plea agreement. It would be considerably more difficult to expand on an allegation that the defendant did not understand information that was not conveyed to him. ¶ 60. By contrast, the Bentley court explained that normally a defendant is entitled to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing only upon a showing of manifest injustice by clear and convincing evidence. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 311. When, for example, the basis for this injustice is an allegation that defendant involuntarily entered a plea because of the ineffective assistance of counsel, his claim raises questions about both deficient performance and prejudice. Id. at 311-12. To establish deficient performance, a defendant must necessarily provide the factual basis for the court to make a legal determination. To show prejudice, a defendant must do more than merely allege that he would have pleaded differently but for the alleged deficient performance. He must support that allegation with objective factual assertions. Id. at 313. ¶ 61. Bangert -type violations should be apparent from the record. Bentley -type allegations will often depend on facts outside the record. To ask the court to examine facts outside the record in an evidentiary hearing requires a particularized motion with sufficient supporting facts to warrant the undertaking. ¶ 62. There is a second distinction between Bangert -type cases and Bentley -type cases. In Bangert -type cases, the defendant has the initial burden of showing the basis for a hearing; but if he succeeds, the burden shifts to the state to show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274. ¶ 63. In Bentley -type cases, the defendant has the burden of making a prima facie case for an evidentiary hearing, and if he succeeds, he still has the burden of proving all the elements of the alleged error, such as deficient performance and prejudice. The defendant must prove the linkage between his plea and the purported defect. The defendant's proof must add up to manifest injustice. ¶ 64. Consequently, the requisite specificity required for establishing a prima facie case mirrors the defendant's ultimate burden of proof. It also reflects the substantive basis for this court's shift of the burden of proof. ¶ 65. Finally, if the Bangert -type case requires something less to support the defendant's allegation of his understanding at the time of plea, it must be remembered that the court can head off the problem with a sufficient plea colloquy. For instance, the best defense against an allegation that the defendant did not understand the court's role in sentencing in the wake of a plea agreement, is an explicit colloquy in the transcript of the plea hearing establishing that the defendant understood the court was not bound by the terms of the plea agreement. In sum, the court has the means to virtually eliminate this ground for plea withdrawal. Requiring an evidentiary hearing in the face of a supported allegation that the plea colloquy was defective is an effective means of enforcing the court's plea taking obligations.