Opinion ID: 1204963
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Defendant's waiver of his right to testify

Text: Defendant did not testify at the guilt phase of his trial. Nor did he inform the court, prior to the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, that he sought the opportunity to testify on his own behalf. Following his conviction, defendant sought removal of his counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44]. In support of defendant's motion, he alleged, inter alia, that his attorneys had failed to advise him adequately regarding the relative benefits and disadvantages of a decision not to testify. Defendant asserted that this failure effectively prevented him from exercising his right to testify in his own defense. The trial court denied defendant's Marsden motion, as well as defendant's concurrent motion for mistrial submitted on the same grounds, observing: (1) defendant's failure to testify involved defense tactics and strategies; (2) defense counsel performed within acceptable standards and the defendant received a fair trial; and (3) defense counsel were prepared to provide a vigorous and proper defense in the penalty phase and to relieve [defense counsel] at this time would be an error.... [35] (25) On appeal, defendant contends he was improperly prevented from testifying, although there is no evidence in the record supporting this assertion. Defendant therefore invites us to adopt a rule requiring that trial courts obtain an affirmative waiver on the record whenever a defendant fails to testify at trial, and reversing any conviction obtained in the absence of such a waiver. In previous decisions, we have rejected similar proposals. (See People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 592-594 [238 Cal. Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350]; People v. Murphy (1972) 8 Cal.3d 349, 366-367 [105 Cal. Rptr. 138, 503 P.2d 594]; see also People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 671 [280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351] [`[A] trial judge may safely assume that a defendant, who is ably represented and who does not testify is merely exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and is abiding by his counsel's trial strategy; otherwise, the judge would have to conduct a law seminar prior to every criminal trial.' (Quoting People v. Mosqueda (1970) 5 Cal. App.3d 540, 545 [85 Cal. Rptr. 346])].) When the record fails to disclose a timely and adequate demand to testify, a defendant may not await the outcome of the trial and then seek reversal based on his claim that despite expressing to counsel his desire to testify, he was deprived of that opportunity. ( People v. Hayes (1991) 229 Cal. App.3d 1226, 1231-1232 [280 Cal. Rptr. 578]; People v. Guillen (1974) 37 Cal. App.3d 976, 984-985 [113 Cal. Rptr. 43].) Defendant's citation to our decision in People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 833-843 [254 Cal. Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460], in support of a requirement for an affirmative waiver, is misplaced. In Bonin, we held the trial court erred in permitting the substitution of counsel who had a conflict of interest, without the court first obtaining a personal, on-the-record waiver from the defendant. ( Id., at pp. 838-839.) Nothing in the present case indicates defense counsel had a conflict of interest. Thus, defendant's right to conflict-free representation was not implicated. (Compare Wood v. Georgia (1981) 450 U.S. 261, 271 [67 L.Ed.2d 220, 230, 101 S.Ct. 1097].)

(26) Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error in excusing for cause four potential jurors who expressed their inability to impose the death penalty under any circumstances. The jurors properly were excluded. (See Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844]; Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38, 45 [65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589-590, 100 S.Ct. 2521]; Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522-523, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 784-786, 88 S.Ct. 1770]; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 679-681 [286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84]; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 808-809 [281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865]; People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 415-418 [243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279].)
(27) Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his personal request, not joined in by counsel, to present evidence that innocent persons in other cases have been convicted of capital offenses. Defendant's argument fails to recognize that an attorney representing a criminal defendant has the authority to control the presentation of the defense, except that such authority may not be exercised to deprive a defendant of certain fundamental rights, such as the right to testify in one's own behalf. ( People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 214-215 [85 Cal. Rptr. 166, 466 P.2d 710].) Defendant's argument is without merit for an additional reason  and would have to be rejected even if the request to present such evidence had come from his attorney  because a capital defendant has no right to demand jury consideration of such evidence at the penalty phase. The jury's focus at that proceeding must be directed to the defendant's character and prior record, and the circumstances of the charged offense. ( Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988) 487 U.S. 164, 172-175 [101 L.Ed.2d 155, 164-167, 108 S.Ct. 2320]; see also Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 605, fn. 12 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 990, 98 S.Ct. 2954] [upholding the trial court's traditional authority to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character or prior record, or the circumstances of the offense].) Evidence of third persons' having been wrongfully convicted of capital offenses is irrelevant to the jury's function in the case before them and is therefore inadmissible. (See Evid. Code, § 350; People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 56-57, fn. 31 [252 Cal. Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249] [individualized nature of jury's sentencing determination renders inappropriate the consideration of sentences imposed in similar cases]; People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 69-71 [246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1] [upholding the trial court's rejection of the defendant's attempt to introduce evidence of lesser sentences imposed on codefendants].) The trial court's exclusion of such improper evidence did not prevent defendant from introducing relevant evidence regarding the circumstances of Robin's death, in an attempt to create a lingering doubt. Indeed, defendant's own testimony at the penalty phase, denying the commission of any offense against Robin, attempted to create such a doubt. Defendant also presented testimony which sought to undermine the prosection's theory regarding the gold ball earrings found in the Seattle storage locker. Moreover, the jury in the present case was instructed at the penalty phase to consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case. The jury was further instructed pursuant to a catchall mitigation instruction derived from section 190.3, factor (k), allowing the jury to consider the following: any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any other aspect of the defendant's character, record, background or emotional makeup, which is offered as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial. You are not limited as to the matters which you may consider as the basis for a sentence less than death and you may consider pity or sympathy for the defendant as one of those factors. You may, in addition, take into consideration the possibility or probability, if you should so determine, that the defendant has in the past and will in the future successfully adjust to life in prison in such manner as to make a worthwhile contribution thereto. These instructions were sufficient to advise the jury of the full range of mitigating evidence. ( People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1244-1245 [283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163]; People v. Howard, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 434.)
(28) Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury that it could impose the death penalty only if it found the aggravating circumstances so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life [in state prison] without parole. In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury: It is now your duty to determine which of the two penalties, death or confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole, shall be imposed on the defendant. [¶] After having heard all of the evidence, and after having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which you have been instructed. [¶] If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you may impose a sentence of death. However, if you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole. [¶] The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere technical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale. You are free to assign whatever weight you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors upon which you have been instructed. By weighing the various circumstances you must determine which penalty is justified. This instruction was not erroneous. (See People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 761 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741] [upholding an instruction that allowed the jury to assign any weight to each factor]; People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1203-1206 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301] [upholding an instruction stating that if the jury found the aggravating circumstances to outweigh the mitigating circumstances, the jury may (rather than shall) impose the death penalty].)
(29) Defendant contends imposition of the death penalty in this case constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution because his conviction rests in part on circumstantial evidence. This argument is without merit. ( People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 556 [247 Cal. Rptr. 729, 754 P.2d 1306].)
Defendant submits six claims of constitutional error that he acknowledges have been recently rejected by this court. They are: (1) that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could not impose the death penalty unless the jury unanimously agreed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, and in failing to instruct that the jury could not impose the death penalty unless it agreed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that death was appropriate ( People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 170; People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 189 [246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629]; People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 143 [246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37]); (2) that the court erred in admitting evidence of defendant's alleged commission of offenses (against Julie J.) that had not resulted in a conviction ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 490); (3) that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on the elements of the unadjudicated offenses, and in failing to instruct that they must agree unanimously that defendant committed each unadjudicated offense before considering those offenses in aggravation ( People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 99 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127]); (4) that the court erred in admitting evidence regarding defendant's other crimes that had resulted in conviction, and that were subject to proof by judgment of conviction ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 754; People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1203); (5) that the 1978 death penalty statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied, due to its lack of procedural safeguards ( People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1251-1252; see also Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 110 S.Ct. 1190]); and (6) that the death penalty is arbitrary, discriminatory, and disproportionate in light of the facts of this case and defendant's personal characteristics ( People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 848-849; People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 771-772). (30) We adhere to our previous decisions, observing that the latter contention  the purported disproportionality in imposing the death penalty on this particular defendant  invites additional comment. The defense's penalty-phase evidence suggesting the appropriateness of mercy was less than compelling: prison guards testified that defendant was a good clerk and a cooperative inmate, and defendant's mother testified that he had been a good boy. The defense also called other witnesses in an attempt to cast lingering doubt upon the incident involving Julie J. and upon a pretrial statement, made by Robin's mother to a Huntington Beach detective, Richard Butcher, that she had purchased locally the earrings worn by Robin. In contrast, the evidence in support of a death sentence comprised a haunting montage. Tali S., Julie J., Monique H., and Robin Samsoe were young girls, three of whom were on their way to class, when defendant coaxed them into his automobile. Their average age was 12 years. After encountering each of the first three girls, defendant sought a further young victim, and, after committing his offenses in the present case, he planned, as he had accomplished before, a flight from justice. Defendant's acts of extreme cruelty toward children culminated in his abduction and murder of Robin Samsoe while he awaited trial for the offenses which he had committed against Monique H. The overwhelming weight of the evidence presented at the penalty phase established that defendant had a lengthy history of preying upon children  individuals particularly vulnerable to defendant's subterfuge. In view of these circumstances, there is absolutely no merit in defendant's argument that his death sentence was arbitrary, discriminatory, and disproportionate. (See People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787.)
Defendant contends the cumulative impact of the errors he has alleged requires reversal or, at a minimum, that the judgment be set aside insofar as it imposes the death penalty. We disagree. Our review of the record persuades us that defendant received a fair and untainted trial. The Constitution requires no more. ( People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1082.)