Opinion ID: 1624043
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: riverside's liability under the deceptive trade practices act.

Text: The alleged deceptive acts in this case occurred during May, 1975. Accordingly, the statutory provisions that govern this case are those that were in effect at the time that the alleged deceptive acts occurred. See Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex.1977). At the time of these actions, the pertinent parts of the Act read as follows: Sec. 17.44. Construction and Application. This subchapter shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of warranty and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection. Sec. 17.45. Definitions. As used in this subchapter: (1) Goods means tangible chattels bought for use. (2) Services means work, labor, and services for other than commercial or business use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods. (3) Person means an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other group, however organized. (4)  Consumer  means an individual who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services. . . . . . . (6) Trade and commerce mean the advertising, offering for sale, sale, lease, or distribution of any good or service, of any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal, or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value, wherever situated, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this state. . . . . . . Sec. 17.46. Deceptive Trade Practices Unlawful. (a) False, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful. . . . . . . Sec. 17.47. Restraining Orders. (a) Whenever the consumer protection division has reason to believe that any person is engaging in, has engaged in, or is about to engage in any act or practice declared to be unlawful by this subchapter, and that proceedings would be in the public interest, the division may bring an action in the name of the state against the person to restrain by temporary or permanent injunction the use of such method, act, or practice. . . . . . . Sec. 17.50. Relief for Consumers. (A) A consumer may maintain an action if he has been adversely affected by any of the following: (1) the use or employment by any person of an act or practice declared to be unlawful by Section 17.46 of this subchapter .... Texas Laws 1973, chapter 143, section 1, at 322-326. The Act thus differentiates between the remedies available to correct violations of the Act. A person may have engaged in a deceptive act by presenting any misleading information concerning any item of value. See sections 17.46(a), 17.45(6). Any person engaging in such deceptive practices may be subjected to a suit by the Consumer Protection Division of the Attorney General's Office, under section 17.47. But, one who engages in deceptive acts may not be subjected to a private suit for damages under the Act unless the aggrieved party is a consumer. Section 17.50 expressly declares, in its caption: Relief for Consumers. Furthermore, section 17.50 provides that a consumer may maintain a cause of action if aggrieved by deceptive practices. The Legislature granted no such remedy by means of a private cause of action for any person ; one must be a consumer. It has been argued that any person ought to be permitted to sue if aggrieved by a deceptive act. This contention relies on the broad definition of trade and commerce and the liberal interpretation of the DTPA that is promoted by section 17.44. We disagree with this position for two reasons. First, the scope of trade and commerce defines the acts that are illegal ; it does not purport to say who may maintain a private cause of action. Rather, it is the definition of consumer that delineates the class of persons that may maintain a private cause of action. Second, the rule of liberal interpretation should not be applied in a manner that negates the statutory definition of the word consumer. To ignore the Legislature's definition of consumer, and permit any aggrieved person to maintain a private cause of action under the DTPA, ignores the well established presumption that legislative choice of words is such that every word has meaning. See Jessen Associates, Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593 (Tex.1975). To read the Act in such a manner that trade and commerce define the class of persons who are consumers would constitute a judicial deletion of section 17.45(4), which defines consumer in terms of a purchaser of goods and services, and not in connection with trade and commerce. This we cannot do. Thus, we hold that a person who brings a private lawsuit under section 17.50 must be a consumer, as defined in section 17.45(4). The other courts that have considered this issue have been in accord. See, e. g., Hi-Line Electric Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co., 587 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Civ.App.  Dallas 1979), writ ref'd n. r. e., 593 S.W.2d 953 (1980) (per curiam); Russell v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., 548 S.W.2d 737 (Tex.Civ.App.  Austin 1977, writ ref'd n. r. e.). In his transaction with Riverside Bank, Lewis sought only to borrow money in an effort to avoid repossession of his car. He sought to pay for the use of money over a period of time. Other than Lewis' payment for the use of money, there was nothing else for which he paid, or which he sought to acquire. In order to determine whether Lewis was a consumer entitled to maintain a private cause of action under section 17.50 of the DTPA, we must determine whether, in this transaction, Lewis sought or acquired by purchase or lease, any goods or services.