Opinion ID: 2438465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Actions of the Advisory Committee

Text: There is another reason why the proceeding should be terminated without discipline. The Advisory Committee sought to bring the matter to an end after the formal hearing by tendering the respondent a written admonition pursuant to Rule 5.13. This tender necessarily indicated that the Committee was of the opinion that his conduct did not require either suspension or disbarment. Had it concluded that a temporary or permanent separation from the practice was required in the public interest, its offer of a mere admonition would be manifestly irresponsible. The respondent refused the admonition in a courteous letter stating that I ... feel strongly that my conduct was not only professional, but appropriate. This he had the perfect right to do. [9] An admonition is not a trivial matter. It could be used in future disciplinary proceedings. [10] The respondent might believe that, if he accepted the admonition, he would be considered a prior offender whose every utterance respecting the judicial system and its personnel would be scrutinized by the bar disciplinary authorities. He should not, at the very least, be subjected to additional sanctions for refusing it. The most that he should risk is a formalization of the charges, with no sanction in excess of a public reprimand. An admonition is not an invitation to plea bargain, designed in part to cut down on the burdens of the prosecutor. Its sole purpose is advisory and remedial, in a case in which the respondent's fitness to practice is not questioned. After the admonition was refused the Committee filed an information praying that the respondent be disbarred, that his right and license to practice law be canceled and terminated, and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys in this state. The message was loud and clear. If a lawyer doesn't say uncle when the Advisory Committee offers an admonition, then they'll throw the book. Many accused lawyers would accept admonitions they consider unwarranted rather than subjecting themselves to public prayers for disbarment. Next, at the hearing before the master, the informants made a highly publicized recommendation for a suspension of three years. This recommendation was confirmed in their brief, and, in oral argument, they asked for a substantial suspension. The Committee's recommendation can only be regarded as further attempt at punishment for rejecting the admonition. [11] But this is not all. The informants argued in their brief, and also before us, that the Court could consider additional charges of rule violation, of which the respondent had no notice, in support of the enhanced sanction they sought. It was then asserted that the respondent's criticism of the original Bullock jury after the verdict violated Rules 3.6(a) and 3.8(e). [12] Neither of these rules was mentioned in the information. This approach is not only in conflict with our rules; it violates the elementary principles of due process of law. The principal opinion properly states that these additional charges are not being considered, but we should go further. We should tell the Advisory Committee in no uncertain terms that an information in a disciplinary action must set out all of the rule violations the Committee relies on in support of the discipline it seeks. If additional charges are sought an amended information should be tendered. This attempt to proffer additional charges is a further example of chilling tactics. The tactics of the Committee are appropriate for comment in this case, in which the respondent is being charged for what he said. The principal opinion suggests that the relationship between the First Amendment and lawyer disciplinary proceedings has not been well defined in the case law. If this is so, we should respect those who invoke the First Amendment when they are drawn into court because of what they say. We should not forget the blood that has been shed in defense of free speech. Some defenders may turn out to be wrong and may ultimately suffer sanctions, but they should not be placed in additional jeopardy for seeking judicial determination of their rights as they view them. The Advisory Committee's conduct has a strong potential for chilling freedom of expression. The Court should abate the proceedings, drawing an analogy from findings of prosecutorial misconduct in criminal cases. There is a further chilling in the intimation in the master's report and in the principal opinion that the respondent should have made some sort of apology on the record, after the filing of the information. The opinion refers to his private statement of confidence in the judge's integrity and his apology at the formal hearing, but then asserts that he has continually and steadfastly refused to deviate from his original position. I do not understand this at all. After the formal hearing his license was in jeopardy. He should be entitled to make his defense, and public statements outside of the proceedings should surely be discouraged. He explained that he meant no criticism of the judge's integrity. Is the Court suggesting that he should have announced a change in his view of the court of appeals opinion? We have no right to browbeat him in this manner. The opinion presents a further problem by its repeated suggestions that the respondent has not laid an adequate research foundation for his criticisms of the Karohl opinion. [13] It faults him for pointing only to the long and tortuous history of armed criminal action in Missouri, and for his not suggesting precedent or logic that he believes would constitute an `honest' opinion.... It says that he failed to investigate to determine whether Judge Karohl has participated in any cases involving the armed criminal action rule, overlooking his participation in the issuance of the preliminary rule. These comments belie the finding of false statement of fact.