Opinion ID: 3090871
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: False Registration of a Domain Name (Simpson)

Text: Simpson next argues that his conviction for false registration of a domain name under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(g), a penalty enhancement provision, is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause and the statute of limitations, or was not supported by sufficient evidence. Section 3559(g) provides that if a defendant convicted of a felony offense “knowingly falsely registered a domain name and knowingly used that domain name in the course of that offense,” the maximum term of imprisonment shall be increased by 7 years or doubled, whichever is less. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(g)(1). Simpson’s conviction under this section was predicated on his registration of a domain name, camophone.com, which he first registered in October 2004 under the false name of “Stan Brown,” using a false address. The domain name was 13 Case: 12-10574 Document: 00512501580 Page: 14 Date Filed: 01/15/2014 No. 12-10574 renewed in October 2005. Section 3559(g) was not enacted until December 2004. See Intellectual Property Protection and Courts Amendments Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-482, § 204, 118 Stat 3912 (2004). Thus, Simpson argues that a conviction based on the registration in October 2004 violates ex post facto principles. He also argues that the indictment was untimely because it was returned in January 2010, outside the five-year statute of limitations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (providing the five-year statute of limitations). The government argues that his conviction was based on the October 2005 renewal of the registration, which was after the effective date of the statute and within the statute of limitations. We need not reach the parties’ arguments concerning whether the October 2005 renewal constituted another false registration under the statute, because there is no evidence showing that camophone.com was used in the course of the conspiracy after the October 2005 renewal. Section 3559 was not yet in effect when Simpson registered camophone.com in October 2004. Even assuming that the renewal can be a false registration under the statute, it stands to reason, and statutory construction, that the government is required to prove that camphone.com was used in the course of the conspiracy after it was fraudulently registered, as defined by § 3559(g), i.e. after October 2005. However, the only record evidence the government cites to prove that camophone.com was used in the course of the conspiracy is prior to October 2005. While an AT&T employee referenced testing camophone.com for routing spoofed calls using its toll-free line “into 2005,” all the relevant communications occurred between November 2004 and February 2005. In supplemental briefing, in response to our specific question about the use of camophone.com after October 2005, the government points only to a web page archive indicating that camophone.com was still in operation for existing customers (though it had stopped taking new customers) up to 2006. This is 14 Case: 12-10574 Document: 00512501580 Page: 15 Date Filed: 01/15/2014 No. 12-10574 no evidence at all that camphone.com was “knowingly used . . . in the course of” the conspiracy, as required by § 3559(g)(1), after October 2005. Thus, we reverse Simpson’s conviction on Count Seven due to insufficient evidence. In a post-argument brief, the government asserted that even if there was insufficient evidence on this count, it was harmless error because § 3559(g) is a penalty enhancement statute, the 480-month sentence was a downward departure from the statutory maximum of fifty years, and the district court could still have sentenced Simpson to the same 480-month sentence without the § 3559 conviction. The parties did not address whether erroneous conviction of a penalty enhancement provision can be harmless error, and we do not reach the issue because we find that the error was not harmless. “[T]he harmless error doctrine applies only if the proponent of the sentence convincingly demonstrates both (1) that the district court would have imposed the same sentence had it not made the error, and (2) that it would have done so for the same reasons it gave at the prior sentencing.” United States v. IbarraLuna, 628 F.3d 712, 714 (5th Cir. 2010). Here, the district court calculated the statutory maximum at 50 years, and then downwardly departed from that point. It is not clear from the record that the district court would not have given Simpson a lower sentence if his statutory maximum were lower. We do not find “evidence in the record that will convince us that the district court had a particular sentence in mind and would have imposed it, notwithstanding the error.” Id. at 718 (quoting United States v. Huskey, 137 F.3d 283, 289 (5th Cir. 1998)).