Opinion ID: 2232272
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Imposition of 60-year Consecutive Sentence

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court improperly enhanced his murder sentence by relying on aggravating factors that were material elements of the charged offenses. He also claims that a murder conviction occurring after the murder charged herein was improperly used as an aggravating circumstance. In its sentencing order stating the reasons for enhancement of the presumptive sentence for murder, the trial court noted the defendant's conviction of another murder in Fulton Circuit Court on May 9, 1980, and found that any lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime, specifically discussing multiple aspects of the defendant's conduct in the course of the murder. Record at 207. Among the aggravating circumstances authorized by statute to support the imposition of enhanced and consecutive sentences are [t]he person has a history of criminal or delinquent activity and [i]mposition of a reduced sentence ... would depreciate the seriousness of the crime. Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(2), (4). We first observe that the defendant inaccurately sets forth the date of his Fulton County murder conviction. He contends that it did not exist until May 9, 1990, which is after the instant offenses were committed. Brief of Appellant at 14. The Fulton County murder conviction was identified in the present sentencing order as occurring May 9, 1980. Record at 208. In 1981 we decided a direct appeal of that same conviction. Williams v. State (1981), Ind., 426 N.E.2d 662. As to this matter, the defendant's claim is invalid. The defendant is correct that a fact which comprises a material element of a crime may not also constitute an aggravating circumstance to support an enhanced sentence, but the particularized individual circumstances may be considered as a separate aggravating factor. Townsend v. State (1986), Ind., 498 N.E.2d 1198, 1201; Rust v. State (1985), Ind., 477 N.E.2d 262, 265. In urging that the enhanced sentence improperly rests upon material elements of the charged offenses, the defendant identifies four of the aspects noted in the trial court's discussion of aggravating circumstances and argues that these four factors constitute elements of the offense of conspiracy to commit armed robbery for which the defendant was convicted. [2] In addition to these four aspects of the offense, however, the trial court also identified several other particulars of the defendant's conduct in the course of the murder: stabbing the victim several times with a kitchen knife, attempting to slit the victim's throat, using a pipe repeatedly to strike the defendant to the floor upon his attempts to arise, striking the fallen victim with a whiskey bottle, and encouraging his accomplice to shoot the victim. The articulation of specifics in the trial court's sentencing statement merely provides a description of its reasons for finding that any lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime. These individual specific aspects of conduct do not each constitute an independent aggravating circumstance upon which the enhanced sentence is based. Even assuming arguendo that the four noted aspects of conduct cited by the defendant consist solely of the material elements of the other offenses, we decline to invalidate the court's resulting finding of seriousness of the crime. The trial court's determination remains well-supported by its consideration of other noted particulars of the defendant's conduct in the course of the offense. There is no error in the imposition of an enhanced sentence.