Opinion ID: 2540510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the districts from the 2002 reapportionment plans must remain in place for the upcoming elections.

Text: The LRC asks this Court to dissolve the trial court's temporary injunction because it is predicated upon an erroneous conclusion of law. On February 17, 2012, this Court entered an order denying this same request in the LRC's motions to stay enforcement and seeking interlocutory and emergency relief. We now reiterate that the LRC's motions to dissolve the temporary injunction are denied. [51] Until the General Assembly passes redistricting legislation that complies with Section 33 of the Constitution, the terms of the injunction entered by the Franklin Circuit Court remain in place. This means that the 2012 elections will be conducted using the districts as enacted in the 2002 Ky. Acts and codified in KRS 5.200, et seq. The LRC argues that it is inappropriate to hold the upcoming 2012 elections using the 2002 districts because they violate Section 33 of the Kentucky Constitution. According to the LRC, House District 60, under the 2002 reapportionment plan, deviates from the ideal House district by 42.7 percent; and Senate District 11 deviates from the ideal Senate district by 22.2 percent. Instead, the LRC posits that the districts established by House Bill 1 should take effect until the General Assembly passes new redistricting legislation. Although we do not doubt the LRC's population deviation numbers among the 2002 districts, these are the only legislative districts capable of implementation at this juncture. As an unconstitutional statute, House Bill 1 is null and void. The Bill no longer exists and cannot be implemented. Subject to exceptions that are inapplicable here, [t]he general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, whether federal or state, though having the form and name of law, is in reality no law but is wholly void and ineffective for any purpose. Since unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactment and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it, an unconstitutional law, in legal contemplation, is as inoperative as if it had never been passed and never existed; that is, it is void ab initio. [52] We recognized as much in Int'l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth [53] when we stated that as a general rule, ... a decision by a court of last resort that a statute is unconstitutional has the effect [of] rendering such statute absolutely null and void from the date of its enactment[] and not from the date on which it is judicially declared unconstitutional. [54] Although we have not clearly enunciated this rule in our redistricting precedent, our decisions have been consistent on this point. In Ragland, the appellants argued that if the redistricting plan of 1906 was found unconstitutional, then the existing 1893 Act must also be declared so because it created unequal representative districts. [55] The high court rejected this contention, stating that the [A]ct of 1893 has gone into effect[;] and the government has been organized under it. To hold it void would be to throw the government into chaos[,] and this no court is required to do. It is now too late to question its validity. [56] The Court did not leave the unconstitutional 1906 law in effect. The Stiglitz court upheld the trial court's ruling that the 1930 redistricting plans were unconstitutional and void. [57] The necessary result was to reinstate the redistricting plan of 1918, which the high court held would continue in force until the [l]egislature enact[ed] a law in compliance with [S]ection 33 of the Constitution. [58] And, in Fischer II, the trial court had not enjoined the 1991 redistricting plan, which it found constitutional. [59] This Court found the plan unconstitutional. But during the appeal of the lower court's decision, the election machinery progressed under the 1991 Act. So immediate effectiveness of the Court's opinion, finding the Act unconstitutional, would disrupt the orderly process of the 1994 elections. [60] To prevent this disruption and to avoid leaving in effect an unconstitutional law, we postponed the effective date of the decision until after the 1994 elections. [61] So the 1991 reapportionment Act was not deemed unconstitutional, void, and invalid until after the elections. Unlike Fischer II, the interest of an efficient election process does not compel us to postpone the effective date of our opinion or dissolve the trial court's temporary injunction. Here, the trial court enjoined the Secretary of State and Board of Elections from implementing the districts established under House Bill 1. While the LRC pursued appellate relief, the 2012 elections proceeded under the districts established by the 2002 redistricting plan, not under the unconstitutional 2012 reapportionment plan. To reverse course now would disrupt the orderly process [62] of the upcoming elections. The Secretary of State asserts that enormous problems would arise in administering the May 22, 2012, primary elections if conducted under House Bill 1. According to the Secretary of State's brief, February 27, 2012, was the deadline by which she was required to certify to all 120 county clerks the name, place of residence, and party affiliation of each candidate running in the 2012 primary election. Were this Court to order implementation of the districts drawn by House Bill 1, the Secretary asserts she would be required to recertify the candidates and conduct another drawing for ballot positions. And the Secretary of State asserts on brief that many counties would likely require substantial time to redraw precinct boundaries, transfer voter registration records, and notify voters of precinct changes. The Secretary of State also suggests that the filing deadline would have to be extended again to ensure candidates have time to withdraw, obtain the necessary signatures, and re-file in the appropriate district according to the new plan. So not only is House Bill 1 void ab initio, practically speaking, it is now too late to conduct the 2012 elections under the Bill's districts. [I]t is within the province and the power of the courts to declare void and ineffective for any purpose all [A]cts of the General Assembly in violation of an express provision of the Constitution. [63] The trial court properly found House Bill 1 unconstitutional and enjoined the Secretary of State from implementing the districts contained in the Bill. And despite the resulting temporary imbalanced representation, ensuring the orderly process of the 2012 elections requires the 2002 redistricting plan remain in effect, as ordered by the trial court.