Opinion ID: 196749
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Cruz Appeal

Text: 11 Appellant Cruz contends that it was error for the district court to deny a pretrial motion for severance under Fed.R.Crim.P. 14, whereby he alerted the court that codefendant Carreras would deny ownership of the suitcases containing cocaine and point the finger at Cruz. On appeal, Cruz maintains that his fears were realized because he was unfairly convicted as a result of the antagonistic defenses presented at the joint trial. We review only for manifest abuse of discretion. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d at 325. 12 As we have noted in countless cases, significant benefits derive from joint trials in conspiracy cases involving identical substantive offenses. See, e.g., United States v. DiMarzo, Nos. 95-1441 & 1442, 1996 WL 159365, at  2 (1st Cir. Apr. 10, 1996). Cruz has not shown that the joint trial either jeopardized a specific trial right or risked an unreliable verdict. See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538-39 (1993) (discussing examples of prejudice). Neither the Carreras closing argument nor the Carreras cross-examination of a government witness generated a significant risk of unfair prejudice to Cruz. See United States v. Yefsky, 994 F.2d 885, 896-97 (1st Cir.1993). 13 The district court properly denied the motion for judgment of acquittal as well. The jury, employing its common sense in evaluating the circumstantial evidence, fairly could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Cruz knew the suitcases contained cocaine, see United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 711 (1st Cir.1992) (equating direct and circumstantial evidence), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1063 (1993), and that all essential elements of the crimes charged had been duly established, see DiMarzo, 1996 WL 159365, at  4-5 (rejecting mere presence defense). 14 Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, see id. at  4, the evidence showed that Carreras and Cruz were close associates who had agreed to meet in Puerto Rico and to transport a large quantity of cocaine to New York City for distribution on the mainland. Cruz played an active role in planning, financing, and carrying out the operation. Among other things, he supplied the ten suitcases in which the cocaine was carried and hired two women in Miami to travel with him to Puerto Rico, assist in checking the ten suitcases at the Airport, and fly on to New York. Cruz and these two female associates met Carreras at the Airport upon their arrival from Miami the day before their scheduled flight to New York City. Later that evening, Cruz guarded the fully-loaded suitcases in Carreras' hotel room while Carreras went out to dinner. Immediately prior to the scheduled flight to New York the next day, Carreras filled out luggage tags and placed bogus agricultural inspection stickers on the cocaine-laden suitcases to circumvent x-ray monitoring at the Airport. Significantly, since his name did not appear on the luggage tags, and he was traveling to New York under an assumed name, Cruz was able to avoid detection at the Airport even though the ten suitcases had been found to contain cocaine. 15 Finally, even though the trial record plainly discloses that he was afforded effective assistance by able trial counsel at sentencing, Cruz contends that the district court sentenced him in an unconstitutional manner by denying his last-minute request for a continuance of the sentencing hearing to permit new counsel, who apparently was handling other criminal matters against Cruz in Ohio, to represent him at sentencing in this case. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the late request for continuance. See United States v. Betancourt-Arretuche, 933 F.2d 89, 93 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 959 (1991). 16 The district court originally scheduled sentencing for February 3, 1995, but reset it for February 8 after Cruz requested a continuance on January 18. Despite this accommodation, for no apparent reason Cruz' stateside counsel failed to appear on February 8, nor did he ever enter an appearance in the case. Instead, at the February 8 sentencing hearing Cruz requested yet another continuance on the ground that his stateside counsel was unavailable. The district court acted well within its discretion in calling a halt to these cat and mouse tactics. See United States v. Torres, 793 F.2d 436, 440-41 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986). 17 The settled principle that the right of an accused to choose his own counsel cannot be insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct reasonable and orderly court procedure applies in full force here. Betancourt-Arretuche, 933 F.2d at 93 (citation omitted).  'Only an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay violates the right to the assistance of counsel,' and would amount to an abuse of [the district court's] discretion. United States v. Brand, No. 94-1350, 1996 WL 121716, at  3 (1st Cir. Mar. 26, 1996) (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983)). Cruz was given ample opportunity to secure stateside counsel but failed to explain his failure to do so. Consequent ly, denial of the second request for continuance, made at the rescheduled sentencing hearing and without any reasonable assurance to the district court that further delay was either warranted--since able trial counsel was available--or likely to ensure the appearance of stateside counsel, was eminently sound. 18 Affirmed.