Opinion ID: 3003412
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Leave to File Brief Out-of-Time

Text: This court reviews the BIA’s decision to reject a late brief for abuse of discretion. Gutierrez-Almazan v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 341, 343 (7th Cir. 2007). The BIA may reject a 6 No. 08-2554 tardy brief, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(c)(1) (“In its discretion the Board may consider a brief that has been filed out of time.” (emphasis added)), but it must provide an explanation showing that it considered the petitioner’s arguments and did not merely react to them. GutierrezAlmazan, 491 F.3d at 343-44. The BIA denied the Dakajs’ motion for leave to file a late brief because it disbelieved their claim that they had not received notice of the briefing schedule for their appeal. The Dakajs submitted, along with their motion for leave to file a late brief, affidavits in which they declared under oath that they never received the briefing schedule that was sent by regular mail to their house. The BIA declined to accept the Dakajs’ claims; in its decision denying the motion, the Board wrote: “[A] review of the record indicates that the briefing schedule and hearing transcript were mailed to the respondents at their current mailing address . . . and there is no indication that they were returned to the Board as undeliverable by the United States Postal Service.” Petitioners’ Br. App. 37. Later, in its decision affirming the IJ’s decision, the Board expanded on its determination not to accept the late-filed brief. There, the Board explained that “[t]he respondents’ self-serving claim that they did not receive the briefing schedule, standing alone, is insufficient without any objective evidence to overcome the presumption of regular delivery of the mail and the lack of any evidence in the record that this Board’s briefing schedule was not delivered.” A.R. 53. The Dakajs submit that the BIA’s decision to deny them leave to file a late motion should be reversed; they No. 08-2554 7 contend that the Board did not explain adequately its reasons for rejecting their sworn assertions that they did not receive the briefing schedule. The Government submits that the Board’s explanation was sufficient; it notes that the Board explained, in its initial decision on the motion, that there was no evidence in the record to indicate that the briefing schedule had been returned by the Post Office as undeliverable. The Government also points to the Board’s final decision on the Dakajs’ appeal, in which the Board stated that the Dakajs’ “self-serving claim” of non-receipt was “insufficient without any objective evidence to overcome the presumption of regular delivery of mail . . . .” Resp. Br. 15 (quoting A.R. 2- 3, 336-37, 353-54). Whether an asylum applicant received notice of his asylum proceedings is a question of fact. See Joshi v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 732, 735 (7th Cir. 2004). The BIA is entitled to presume that a notice sent via regular mail was delivered to the recipient to whom it was addressed. See, e.g., Vincent v. City Colls. of Chi., 485 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Evidence of mailing is evidence of delivery.”). The BIA itself has recognized, however, that the presumption of delivery of regular mail is a weaker one than the presumption that accompanies certified mail and may be rebutted with evidence that the alien did not receive the notice. See Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 665, 673-74 (BIA Oct. 31, 2008). We have said in the past that “a bare, uncorroborated, self-serving denial of receipt, even if sworn, is weak evidence.” Joshi, 389 F.3d at 735. See also Derezinski v. 8 No. 08-2554 Mukasey, 516 F.3d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The petitioner’s sworn denial was the only evidence of nonreceipt, and it was weak evidence” where the petitioner had been a fugitive for eleven years before finally being apprehended during a traffic stop.). We also have made clear, however, that such a denial must be evaluated in light of all of the relevant circumstances present in the case; if other evidence exists that supports the alien’s claim, then the Board must weigh that evidence as well. In Joshi, for example, the Board had rejected an asylum applicant’s sworn assertion of non-receipt as “uncorroborated.” Joshi, 389 F.3d at 735. We reversed because the BIA had failed to consider the applicant’s claim in light of her conduct after the notice was mailed. We wrote: [I]t isn’t true that the claim [of non-receipt] was not corroborated, or, what amounts to the same thing, was not supported by “objective” evidence. The fact that before the date of the hearing she sent two certified letters to the immigration service inquiring about the status of her proceeding is some “objective” evidence, some corroboration, that she hadn’t received notice of the hearing. It is inconclusive evidence, but as it was not even mentioned by the Board we cannot tell whether the Board thought it out- weighed by the statistical likelihood that correctly addressed U.S. mail is delivered to the addressee, or simply overlooked it. A decision that resolves a critical factual question without mention of the principal evidence cannot be considered adequately reasoned. No. 08-2554 9 Joshi, 389 F.3d at 736-37 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we vacated the Board’s order of removal and remanded the case for reconsideration of the applicant’s claim in light of all relevant information available. Accord SilvaCarvalho Lopes v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he presumption of receipt in regular mail cases does no more than to shift a tie-breaking burden of proof to the alien claiming non-receipt.”); Kozak v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 2007); Ghounem v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 740, 744-45 (8th Cir. 2004); Salta v. INS, 314 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Where a petitioner actually initiates a proceeding to obtain a benefit, appears at an earlier hearing, and has no motive to avoid the hearing, a sworn affidavit from Salta that neither she nor a responsible party residing at her address received the notice should ordinarily be sufficient to rebut the presumption of delivery and entitle Salta to an evidentiary hearing to consider the veracity of her allegations.”). In Derezinski, on the other hand, we approved the Board’s disbelief of the alien’s denial where no such corroborating evidence was present. 516 F.3d at 622. Indeed, the BIA itself, in two cases decided after the Dakajs’, has acknowledged the necessity of a plenary review of the circumstances surrounding an alien’s claim of non-receipt of notice. In Matter of M-R-A-, the Board set forth an extensive, non-exclusive list of relevant factors: (1) the respondent’s affidavit; (2) affidavits from family members or other individuals who are knowledgeable about the facts relevant to whether notice 10 No. 08-2554 was received; (3) the respondent’s actions upon learning of the in absentia order, and whether due diligence was exercised in seeking to redress the situation; (4) any prior affirmative application for relief, indicating that the respondent had an incentive to appear; (5) any prior application for relief filed with the Immigration Court or any prima facie evidence in the record or the respondent’s motion of statutory eligibility for relief, indicating that the respondent had an incentive to appear; (6) the respondent’s previous attendance at Immigration Court hearings, if applicable; and (7) any other circumstances or evidence indicating possible nonreceipt of notice. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 674; accord Matter of C-R-C-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 677, 679-80 (BIA Oct. 31, 2008). Contrary to its later recognition of the need to consider all relevant information, the Board in the Dakajs’ case does not appear to have considered anything other than the affidavits and the fact that the United States Postal Service did not return the notice as undeliverable. As the Board has acknowledged, however, the Postal Service will not necessarily know when a piece of mail has been misdelivered. See Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 667 (noting that “if the United States Postal Service mistakenly delivers the notice to the wrong address, the person who actually received it might not return it”). More importantly, there is no indication that the Board gave any consideration to any of several facts that support the Dakajs’ claim that they never received noNo. 08-2554 11 tice. The Dakajs initiated these proceedings all the way back in 2002, when Gezim filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. The Dakajs’ application was an affirmative invocation of the procedural and substantive protections of the immigration-law process—not merely a reaction to removal proceedings instituted by the Government, as claims for asylum often are. Furthermore, the Government does not claim that the Dakajs ever missed any other deadline or hearing date at any point in the proceedings; to the contrary, they attended their hearing before the IJ and promptly filed a notice of appeal of the IJ’s decision. Finally, it is clear that the Dakajs took quick action in an attempt to cure their default. The Dakajs were served with the Government’s motion for summary affirmance “on or about” October 20, 2007. App. 18. They promptly hired counsel, who submitted a brief and a motion to file it out-of-time on November 5. These facts, taken together, could be read to confirm the Dakajs’ claim of non-receipt by establishing that they had a demonstrated commitment to the asylum process and a strong interest in setting forth their position in their brief to the Board. From this it could be inferred that if the Dakajs had known that an appellate brief was due on September 27, they would have filed one on or before that date. We do not hold that the Board was required to reach that conclusion; that determination is within the Board’s province, at least in the first instance. We do hold, however, that the Board was required to consider these relevant factors, along with any others of which it might be aware, and to explain its decision in light of them. 12 No. 08-2554 Accordingly, we must vacate the Board’s decision and remand the case for reconsideration of the Dakajs’ motion to file their brief out-of-time.