Opinion ID: 1366019
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Plaintiff Joe Webster was severely injured in 1984 while riding his horse on the defendant-landowner's property. [1] He ran into a fence of unmarked barb wire which defendant had strung across the wash at her property line. Plaintiff sued for personal injuries, and the defendant defended on the ground that plaintiff was a trespasser to whom she owed only the duty of refraining from willful or wanton injury. In the trial court, the defendant moved for summary judgment. In response, plaintiff claimed that there was sufficient evidence of willful or wanton injury to defeat the motion but that, in any event, § 335 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (hereafter Restatement) entitled Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Constant Trespassers on Limited Area applied. The trial court granted summary judgment, ruling that § 335 did not apply, and that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of willful or wanton injury. On motion for rehearing, the trial court considered and rejected plaintiff's additional contention that § 337 of the Restatement entitled Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Known Trespassers applied. The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment. 158 Ariz. 156, 761 P.2d 1060 (1986). We granted review to decide whether § 337 of the Restatement applies in Arizona and, if so, whether factual issues preclude summary judgment on a § 337 theory. An alternative issue is whether the evidence will support a finding of willful or wanton conduct. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3); Rule 23, Ariz.R.Civ.App.P. 17B A.R.S.