Opinion ID: 2708442
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Submitting the Magnuson-Moss Claim to the Jury

Text: Finally, Thoroughbred argues that the district court erred by submitting the federal Magnuson-Moss claim to the jury. It is undisputed that Burzlaff abandoned any request for monetary damages under that statute before the case was submitted to the jury. Thoroughbred contends that submitting the claim to the jury amounted to “an invitation to jury lawlessness.” See Eastern Trading Co. v. Refco, Inc., 229 F.3d 617, 621–22 (7th Cir. 2000) (unsupported defense should not be submitted to jury, but error cannot be presumed to have been prejudicial). To show that a trial court has committed a 16 No. 13-2520 reversible error by submitting a question to the jury, Thoroughbred must show (1) that the issue or claim was so weak that submission to the jury was error and (2) prejudice to the appellant through “‘a showing that the jury probably was confused.’” Tammi v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc., 536 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2008), quoting Eastern Trading, 229 F.3d at 622. The requirement of prejudice is critical. As a matter of sound case management, a trial court will often find it prudent to ask a jury to decide an issue even though one party may have a strong or even an ultimately successful argument why it should prevail on the issue as a matter of law. Sending such an issue to the jury will often avoid the need for a new trial if the trial court has not correctly predicted the appellate court’s (or its own) later decision on the same issue. See Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 405–06 (2006) (endorsing this procedure), quoting 9A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2533. The court did not err in this case by submitting the Magnuson-Moss claim to the jury. The jury was instructed that the elements of the Magnuson-Moss claim were: (1) a defect, (2) covered by warranty, (3) a reasonable opportunity for the manufacturer to repair, and (4) the manufacturer’s failure to repair within a reasonable time. Those elements overlapped substantially with the Lemon Law claim. The evidence was clearly sufficient to support a verdict as to liability, which was the only issue presented to the jury. The MagnusonMoss claim also was not irrelevant because the court might have awarded equitable relief available only under federal law. Also, Burzlaff might still have recovered attorney fees and costs under his federal claim even if the jury had found No. 13-2520 17 for Thoroughbred on the Lemon Law claim. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2). The availability of equitable relief is relevant even though Burzlaff did not specifically request it beyond the generic prayer for “all such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable” in his complaint. The district court should award the prevailing party any relief to which he is entitled, whether or not he has asked for it in his complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). Even if it had been an error to submit the Magnuson- Moss claim to the jury, which it was not, Thoroughbred also failed to show prejudice in the form of jury confusion or otherwise. The special verdict form kept the questions on the Wisconsin Lemon Law separate from those on the Magnuson-Moss Act. Our decision in Tammi v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc., 536 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008), provides a useful comparison. Porsche challenged an instruction that mixed three issues together, making it difficult to tell if the two issues unsupported by evidence had influenced a permissible finding on the third issue. We affirmed, nevertheless, because jury confusion remained only a possibility and because Porsche could have mitigated any confusion by requesting separate questions on the special verdict but did not. Id. at 708–09. In this case, the district court properly presented the two claims as distinct inquiries. Thoroughbred thus had the benefit of separate questions like those that Porsche should have requested in Tammi. We see no serious prospect of jury confusion, let alone a probability. See Eastern Trading Co., 229 F.3d at 622. The submission of the Magnuson-Moss claim to the jury was neither error nor prejudicial. 18 No. 13-2520 The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Burzlaff may pursue a supplemental award of appellate attorney fees before the district court.