Opinion ID: 1386737
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Counsel's Alleged Conflict of Interest

Text: Fautenberry next contends that one of his trial counsel labored under a conflict of interest, which rendered his assistance per se ineffective and violated Fautenberry's Sixth Amendment rights. Fautenberry argues that attorney Michael Walton had a conflict of interest because he was a trustee for Anderson Township, the township in which Daron's body was found; as a trustee, Walton had a fiduciary duty to the citizens of that township to ensure that the criminal laws were upheld; township conflicted with his duty to Fautenberry. The state trial court addressed this claim, contained in Fautenberry's petition for post-conviction relief, and found the following facts: (1) No evidentiary documents demonstrate that Anderson Township or the Anderson Township Trustees had an interest in the outcome of [Fautenberry's] dial; and (2) No evidentiary documents demonstrate that service as a Township Trustee hampered [Fautenberry's] attorneys in any way. The state appellate court determined that, absent evidence of an actual conflict, there is no presumption of prejudice arising from the mere fact that defense counsel also serves in some capacity as a public official. Fautenberry, 1998 WL 906395, at . The court then rejected Fautenberry's claim, finding that Fautenberry had not presented any evidence to support the conclusion that Walton's position on the board [of trustees] in any way influenced his ability to defend Fautenberry at trial. Id. A habeas petitioner asserting an ineffective-assistance claim generally must show that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency resulted in prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. But a habeas petitioner can establish an ineffective-assistance claim without having to show prejudice if he demonstrates that his counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (Prejudice is presumed only if [the petitioner] demonstrates that counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.) (quotations omitted). An `actual conflict,' for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's performance. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 n. 5, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002). Fautenberry has not established an actual conflict. He does not challenge the state court's factual findings that [n]o evidentiary documents demonstrate that . . . the Anderson Township Trustees had an interest in the outcome of [his] trial or that [n]o evidentiary documents demonstrate that service as a Township Trustee hampered [his] attorneys in any way. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (providing that a determination of a factual issue made by a[s]tate court shall be presumed to be correct unless the habeas petitioner rebut[s] the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence). After independently reviewing the record, we find that Fautenberry has failed to demonstrate that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests or that any alleged conflict adversely affected his lawyer's performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Accordingly, we find this claim baseless.