Opinion ID: 180076
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to disclose the details of Storch's deal

Text: At the time of trial, Storch maintained that his primary motivation for testifying was to do his civic duty, and Storch completely denied the existence of any deal with the prosecution. Storch did ultimately concede during cross-examination that he had received a reduced sentence of sixteen months for his pending cases in exchange for his testimony. Yet, Storch never revealed that his sixteen-month deal was the second deal he received and, more importantly, one he had negotiated independently from his public defender. In fact, when he was asked directly on cross-examination, Storch denied any prior deals and the prosecution never corrected this lie. At the evidentiary hearing, Arnold Lester, the public defender who represented Storch at the time of Maxwell's trial, testified that he had worked out a guilty plea deal to consolidate Storch's five pending cases into a combined total sentence of 36 months. Lester further testified that this was a reasonable sentence given the number of counts and Storch's prior record. Lester testified that Storch, however, proceeded to work out privately the sixteen-month sentence deal that he ultimately received. Maxwell was not informed before or at trial of the prior 36-month deal, and the prosecution never corrected Storch when he stated that there was no prior deal. Maxwell argues that the State violated Brady when it failed to disclose that the sixteen-month deal was Storch's second deal, one that he privately negotiated without the assistance of his public defender. In general, Brady requires prosecutors to disclose any benefits that are given to a government informant, including any lenient treatment for pending cases. See, e.g., Giglio, 405 U.S. at 150, 92 S.Ct. 763; Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1057 (9th Cir.2002). The question here is whether the prosecution's failure to disclose the details of the prior deal, specifically Storch's negotiation of a subsequent deal, was material. In Benn, we held that, among other evidence withheld by the prosecution, the prosecution's failure to disclose a subsequent dealeven where that deal resulted in minimal benefit to the informantprejudiced the defendant. Benn, 283 F.3d at 1057. The undisclosed benefits that [the informant] received added significantly to the benefits that were disclosed and certainly would have `cast a shadow' on [the informant's] credibility. Thus, their suppression was material. Id. at 1058. This case is different than Benn insofar as Benn concerned a failure to disclose a better (albeit only slightly) deal. Here, Maxwell was informed at trial of the deal that Storch ultimately received. Nonetheless, the fact that Storch pursued an additional benefit to himselfindependent of and subsequent to the agreement worked out by his public defenderwould have provided Maxwell with impeaching evidence relevant to Storch's motivation for testifying and of a different character than the other impeachment evidence which came to light. Storch testified that his initial contact with anybody about [testifying in the Maxwell case] was with the chaplain's office in terms of this . . . I was looking for guidance, more or less. When asked during cross-examination if he had any intention to lighten [his] load [i.e., sentence], Storch adamantly stated that his intentions were not to reduce his sentence: Initially, no, sir, and I will say strongly that way, initially no. Evidence that Storch had already secured a plea agreement and came forward to testify at Maxwell's trial for the sole purpose of working a new and better deal would have directly impeached Storch's testimony for why he came forward. As the Supreme Court noted in Napue, we do not believe that the fact that the jury was apprised of other grounds for believing that the witness. . . may have had an interest in testifying against petitioner turned what was otherwise a tainted trial into a fair one. 360 U.S. at 270, 79 S.Ct. 1173. Furthermore, the details of Storch's plea negotiations would have helped to establish Storch's sophistication and directly contradicted the naivete he professed at trial. The fact that Storch had worked a deal with Norris without his public defender would have been the only evidenceother than the evidence of Storch's informant past, which was also suppressedof Storch's informant sophistication. Such evidence differed substantially from Storch's other lies, which came to light during cross-examination. Storch was not some innocent inmate who happened to overhear his cellmate's confession and then had to struggle with the moral dilemma of whether to come forward, seeking religious guidance, as he represented. Storch knew that his testimony against Maxwell was bartering material. He used his know-how and connections to negotiate a better deal. In sum, the evidence the government withheld would not simply have been cumulative of the impeachment evidence brought out during cross-examination of Storch at trial. Rather, it would have created substantial doubt as to Storch's credibility, particularly with respect to his professed naivete. The details of Storch's own agreement with the prosecution, and the fact that Storch had negotiated the subsequent deal independent of his public defender, would have allowed defense counsel to discredit Storch on a novel basis. The prosecution's failure to correct Storch's false testimony about his prior deals was prejudicial.