Opinion ID: 692071
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: application of the immediate cause or motivating factor test

Text: 17 Davis also argues that he did not violate the anti-retaliation provisions of the FLSA because the filing of the claim was not the reason he fired Smiley and Fellows. The record establishes without dispute, however, that Davis did list the filing of the claim (i.e., the conspiracy ... to file a false claim) as one of the reasons he fired the two employees. To the extent that the district court's rather cryptic opinion finds to the contrary, that finding is clearly erroneous. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (despite substantial deference due trial court's factfindings based upon credibility determinations, appellate court may find clear error where the story of the witness credited by trial court is contradicted by documentary evidence). One of the reasons Davis gave for firing Smiley and Fellows, the filing of the claim, was an improper reason. However, our analysis does not end here. 18 Alternatively, Davis argues that the improper reason was not a but for cause of Reich's and Fellows's discharge. It is possible that the district court agreed with him on this ground. In other words, the district court may have decided that Davis truly had been planning to fire Smiley and Fellows on September 23, 1988, and that they would have been discharged on that date even if no complaint had been filed. There is some evidence in the record to support Davis's factual premise. For the reasons below, we do accept Davis's legal premise: that retaliation must be the but for reason for Smiley's and Fellows's termination before they are entitled to any relief under Sec. 15(a)(3) of the FLSA. 19 We reach our decision based upon our interpretation of this circuit's precedent and the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision. The FLSA makes it unlawful for an employer to fire an employee because the employee asserted rights protected under the statute. In deciding what meaning we should apply to the term because, and whether Smiley's and Fellows's discharge fell within that meaning, we are guided by Goldberg v. Bama Mfg. Corp., 302 F.2d 152 (5th Cir.1962), where we stated: 20 There is no doubt in our minds that the record fully supports the district court's finding that there were half a dozen reasons why [the employee] should have been discharged. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the immediate cause of her discharge was the assertion of a statutory right, the exercise of which is protected from reprisals. 21 Id. at 154. Thus despite the existence of legitimate business reasons for discharging one who we agreed was an incompetent, dishonest employee, id. at 156, we held in Goldberg that a violation of the FLSA occurs when the immediate cause of discharge is retaliation. Other circuits have similarly applied an immediate cause or motivating factor test to determine whether an employer who later produces legitimate business reasons for the discharge nonetheless violated Sec. 15(a)(3). See Martin v. Gingerbread House, Inc., 977 F.2d 1405, 1408 n. 4 (10th Cir.1992); Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir.1984); Brennan v. Maxey's Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir.1975). 22 In Goldberg, we applied the motivating factor test in a but for way. The Tenth Circuit has followed the same approach, holding that the discharge is unlawful only if it would not have occurred but for the retaliatory intent. Martin, 977 F.2d at 1408 n. 4. In Martin, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a ruling that the discharge was not retaliatory, despite the employer's statement that people who are loyal don't call the labor department, because other valid reasons would have led to the same result. Id. at 1408-09. The but for interpretation still serves the statutory purpose of encouraging employees to report violations of the FLSA. Only those employees who would have suffered exactly the same adverse action even if they had not engaged in FLSA activities will be unprotected under the but for test. We therefore hold that the motivating factor test is equivalent to a but for standard. 23 Applying the Goldberg motivating factor or but for test to this case means that Smiley and Fellows are entitled to relief only if they establish that the filing of the complaint with the Wage and Hour Division, or their cooperation in the ensuing investigation, caused them to suffer adverse action that they otherwise would not have suffered. The relief to which they are entitled is commensurate with the extent of the adverse action they suffered as a result. If they establish that they would not have been fired at all but for their protected activities, then they are entitled to reinstatement and full back pay. 24 By contrast, if the evidence establishes that Smiley and Fellows eventually would have been fired anyway, but not as soon as they were, then they are not entitled to reinstatement; they are entitled only to back pay for the period of time that they would have been employed but for their protected activity. 1 Fitting the relief to the consequences of the employees' participation in protected activity balances the important interest of protecting employee participation in protected activity against the employer's interest in not being saddled with unsatisfactory employees, who would have been fired anyway, just because they engage in protected activities. 25 A remand is necessary in this case. To the extent that the district court found that Smiley's and Fellows's participation in protected activities was not a reason Davis terminated them, that finding is clearly erroneous. On the state unemployment compensation form, Davis listed their activities in relation to the Wage and Hour claim--which proved to be valid--as a reason they were terminated. On remand, the district court is to take that fact as established and proceed to a factual determination of whether Fellows and Smiley would have been fired anyway and, if so, when. If the district court finds that either or both of them would not have been fired, or would not have been fired as soon as they were, but for their participation in protected activities, the court is to grant commensurate relief to them and such additional appropriate injunctive relief as the Secretary is entitled to receive.