Opinion ID: 853190
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bite Mark Evidence

Text: The defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing bite mark evidence from a forensic odontologist to be admitted into evidence. Dr. Edwin Parks testified that the bite mark on the victim was more likely than not caused by the defendant. The defendant claims a proper foundation of this evidence's reliability was not laid pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 702. [5] In determining reliability ... there is no specific `test' or set of `prongs' which must be considered in order to satisfy Indiana Evidence Rule 702(b). McGrew v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1289, 1292 (Ind.1997). It is well established that the trial court's determination regarding the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 is a matter within its broad discretion, and will be reversed only for abuse of that discretion. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Manuilov, 742 N.E.2d 453, 459 (Ind.2001); Cook v. State, 734 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. 2000); McGrew, 682 N.E.2d at 1292. In 1977 this Court could find no reason why [bite mark] evidence should be rejected as unreliable.... Niehaus v. State, 265 Ind. 655, 661, 359 N.E.2d 513, 516 (1977). The analysis of bite mark evidence was a relatively new procedure in 1977, id., and the defendant does not argue that it has become less reliable. He argues instead that Niehaus is not controlling because it preceded Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), in which the United States Supreme Court construed Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Niehaus also preceded our adoption of the Indiana Rules of Procedure, including Ind. Evid. Rule 702(a) and (b), which differs from FED.R.EVID. 702, but coincidentally announced an analytical framework for Indiana procedure akin to the federal analysis declared shortly thereafter in Daubert. We noted in McGrew that: [F]ederal case law interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence is not binding upon the determination of state evidentiary law.... Contrary to the arguments made by the defendant, when analyzing Indiana Evidence Rule 702(b) the adoption of which preceded Daubert we find Daubert helpful, but not controlling. Id. at 1290; see also Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 498 (Ind.1995). The defendant also urges that Steward and McGrew were both decided before Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), and that Kumho Tire applied Daubert to all types of expert testimony. He argues that state standards cannot drop below the minimum standards set by the federal Constitution. We reject this argument because Kumho Tire represented only an interpretation of federal evidence law, specifically the construction and application of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The United States Supreme Court did not hold that Rule 702 was a requirement of the Federal Constitution. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is not a minimum constitutional requirement applicable to the states. We acknowledge that the United States Supreme Court unanimously held in Kumho Tire that a federal trial judge's gate keeping obligation under Daubert applies not only to scientific evidence but also to technical and other specialized knowledge. The issue before us, however, is not whether to modify Indiana's procedural jurisprudence or to replace the language of our Evidence Rule 702 with the different language of its federal counterpart to embrace the rationale of the United States Supreme Court in Kumho Tire. The defendant does not seek such relief here, arguing instead without elaboration that Kumho Tire is binding on Indiana state court practice. It is not. We found no error in McGrew, which involved hair comparison analysis, and noted: Inherent in any reliability analysis is the understanding that, as the scientific principles become more advanced and complex, the foundation required to establish reliability will necessarily become more advanced and complex as well. The converse is just as applicable.... Id. at 1292. Like McGrew, which involved hair comparison analysis, the bite mark method of identification in Niehaus [was] simply a matter of comparison of items of physical evidence to determine if they are reciprocal. Niehaus, 265 Ind. at 661, 359 N.E.2d at 516; cf. Jervis v. State, 679 N.E.2d 875, 881 (Ind.1997) (observations of a witness with specialized knowledge, and the physical evidence related to it, are not scientific principles governed by Ind. Evid. Rule 702(b)). We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the bite mark evidence to be sufficiently reliable to allow its admission. The defendant also argues that the probative value of the bite mark evidence was outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudicial effect under Indiana Rule of Evidence 403. The evidence of the bite mark was highly probative to rebut the defendant's contention that he was not a participant in the beating or murder of the victim but was merely present. While the evidence is prejudicial toward the defendant in that it supports a finding that he was an active participant, the evidence does not present a danger of unfair prejudice. As we noted in Richmond v. State, 685 N.E.2d 54 (Ind.1997), all relevant evidence is `inherently prejudicial' in a criminal prosecution, so the inquiry boils down to a balance of probative value against the likely unfair prejudicial impact the evidence may have on the jury. Id. at 55-56. When determining likely unfair prejudicial impact, courts will look for the dangers that the jury will substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or that the evidence will arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury. Evans v. State, 643 N.E.2d 877, 880 (Ind.1994). The defendant seems to claim that the jury substantially overestimated the value of the bite mark evidence basing its finding of guilt on the bite mark evidence alone. As seen by our discussion above of the sufficiency of the evidence, the risk that the jury overly relied on the bite mark evidence is miniscule. Such matters are within the sound discretion of the trial court. The trial court clearly did not err in finding the bite mark evidence admissible.