Opinion ID: 3064899
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: We may affirm the dismissal on any ground supported by the record.29 We do so on the ground that the Skokomish Tribe has not pleaded facts that would entitle it to application of the doctrine of equitable apportionment. Because dismissal was proper on this ground, and our precedents compel us to conclude that the district court had jurisdiction,30 we need not consider the remaining issues. 29 Aronson v. Resolution Trust Corp., 38 F.3d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 1994). 30 E.g., Muckleshoot Tribe v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 141 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Lower Elwha Tribe, 642 F.2d 1141, 11438668 UNITED STATES v. WASHINGTON [1] This claim by one tribe against others to allocate fish is, as the district court said, far afield from the treaty dispute between the United States on behalf of the Indian tribes and the State of Washington in which the underlying decree issued, and is not an interpretation of the Hood Canal Agreement. There is no treaty and no agreement of any kind between the tribes to be construed and applied. The claim is more analogous to a claim for equitable allocation of fish between states, which the Supreme Court confronted in Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon.31 In that case, the State of Idaho sought apportionment of anadromous fish between itself, Oregon, and Washington. The Court held that “the doctrine of equitable apportionment is applicable to this dispute.”32 Such “apportionment is based on broad and flexible equitable concerns rather than on precise legal entitlements.”33 [2] When one state seeks equitable apportionment against another under the doctrine of equitable apportionment, the Court held that it “must prove by clear and convincing evidence some real and substantial injury or damage.”34 In Idaho ex rel. Evans, the Court declined to exercise its equitable jurisdiction to make an apportionment, because Idaho had not proved “that Oregon and Washington are now injuring Idaho by overfishing the Columbia or that they will do so in the future.”35 The Court concluded that, “[a]lthough it is possible 44 (9th Cir. 1981), aff’g Decision II, 459 F. Supp. at 1066-68 (determining the primary right claims of the Makah and Lower Elwha Klallam Tribes, and stating that if disputes concerning their joint fishery should be referred to the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission, whose decision “may be reviewed by the court”). 31 462 U.S. 1017 (1983). 32 Id. at 1024. 33 Id. at 1025. 34 Id. at 1027. 35 Id. at 1028; see also id. at 1028 n.12 (stating that “the Court must look to factors such as disproportionate reductions in Idaho’s normal harvest, or reductions in the total fish in the runs” in order to establish “the need for a decree”). UNITED STATES v. WASHINGTON 8669 that Washington and Oregon will mismanage this resource in the future, Idaho has not carried its burden of demonstrating a substantial likelihood of injury.”36 This high burden for pleading and proof differs from ordinary standing doctrine, because suits between sovereigns require restraint by the courts, and because equitable remedies are discretionary. The Supreme Court has long held that “[t]he governing rule is that this Court will not exert its extraordinary power to control the conduct of one State at the suit of another, unless the threatened invasion of rights is of serious magnitude and established by clear and convincing evidence.”37 [3] Like states, Indian tribes are sovereign entities, albeit, “domestic dependent” sovereigns.38 We held in Moore v. Nelson39 that, under Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,40 “[t]he same considerations of federal non-interference in the affairs of other sovereigns that influenced us in Edmunds [to limit habeas review of state convictions] apply to our review of the actions of Indian tribes.”41 [4] The district court properly dismissed the Skokomish tribe’s claim for equitable apportionment, because even accepting that the tribe could prove what it pleaded, that would not “prove by clear and convincing evidence some real and substantial injury or damage.” The Skokomish tribe pleaded that “[f]rom 1976 through the present, Skokomish has and continues to harvest up to 90% of certain species of the Hood Canal finfish fishery . . . . [and] up to 80% of certain 36 Id. at 1029. 37 Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669 (1931). 38 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 39 270 F.3d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 2001). 40 436 U.S. 49, 62-63 (1978). 41 Moore, 270 F.3d at 791 (discussing Edmunds v. Won Bae Chang, 509 F.2d 39, 41 (9th Cir. 1975)); see also Solomon v. Interior Regional Hous. Auth., 313 F.3d 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002). 8670 UNITED STATES v. WASHINGTON species of shellfish.” The tribe does not plead any impingement on its ability to obtain whatever fish it claims under the treaty. All it alleges is that if the court does not make an equitable allocation, its “share will remain uncertain” and other tribes with greater rights in other areas may at some time impinge on Skokomish’s fishery. [5] Intertribal allocations of the fisheries have historically been a matter for the tribes to resolve amongst themselves, as sovereigns.42 The Hood Canal Agreement was just such an act. For that reason, both the trial court and the Supreme Court in this case disclaimed any responsibility for allocating the tribal portion of fisheries shared by multiple tribes.43 Assuming that our precedents are correct in holding that the district court has jurisdiction to make these allocations, it nevertheless retains its discretion under the equitable allocation doctrine to decline to do so. As in the Idaho ex rel. Evans case, nothing has happened to the Skokomish that would justify the exercise of jurisdiction in the face of the high fence the Court has erected against its exercise.44 The Skokomish tribe pleads no “real and substantial injury or damage.” And Skokomish pleads that it is taking as much fish now as in the past. The Skokomish Tribe has argued that if it cannot obtain allocations from the district court, then there may be a race for the fish among the tribes, and there will be no way to regulate the race. The need for equitable allocation in this case, it 42 See, e.g., United States v. Lower Elwha Tribe. 642 F.2d 1141, 114344 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1981); Decision III, 626 F. Supp. at 1490-91 ¶¶ 355-57, 1528 ¶¶ 362-67. 43 See Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. at 671; Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 407 ¶ 17, 410 ¶ 12. But see Decision III, 626 F. Supp. at 1470-71 ¶ 4. 44 See Idaho ex rel. Evans, 462 U.S. at 1028 n.12 (stating that “the Court must look to factors such as disproportionate reductions in Idaho’s normal harvest, or reductions in the total fish in the runs” in order to establish “the need for a decree”) UNITED STATES v. WASHINGTON 8671 argues, arises from the sovereign immunity of the tribes. Were it to file a new lawsuit, instead of hanging onto the coattails of the 1970 case enforcing the tribes’ treaty rights against the State of Washington, then, Skokomish argues, any tribe it sued could assert its sovereign immunity against suit. That may be so. But not all problems have judicial solutions. And for disputes among Indian tribes, there is something to be said for a private dispute resolution procedure among themselves, such as the Point No Point Treaty Council or the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission, because of their greater familiarity with and sensitivity to the details of the problem and any cultural factors that may bear on the solution, if there is one.45 We are puzzled, but need not reach the question, about why the equitable decree in this case remains in force at all. The point of the lawsuit the United States filed was to protect Indian treaty rights from state infringement, not to sort out competing tribal claims. That goal was achieved,46 and has nothing to do with the continuing exercise of jurisdiction as far as we can tell from the record. The goal of “provid[ing] a volume of fish sufficient to the fair needs of the tribes”47 seems similarly to have been achieved, as this dispute demonstrates.48 45 Cf. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59, 72 (1978) (expressing the need for caution before subjecting disputes arising between Indians to a federal forum). 46 See Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. Moos, 603 P.2d 819, 822-824 (Wash. 1979) (overruling past Washington Supreme Court decisions which had precluded Washington agencies’ attempts at compliance with the decree, and recognizing that the agencies have the authority to manage the fishery in a manner that gives full force and effect to the treaty rights of the Indians). 47 Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 401 ¶ 20. 48 See also Wash. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 2008-9 Co-Managers’ List of Agreed Fisheries, http://wdfw.wa.gov/fish/tribal/2008-09agreement.pdf (Apr. 17, 2008) (describing allocation of fisheries for the 2008-09 harvest). 8672 UNITED STATES v. WASHINGTON The original injunction, entered 35 years ago, was intended to resolve the treaty right fishing disputes once and for all.49 Yet this case has become a Jarndyce and Jarndyce, with judges dying out of it and whole Indian tribes being born into it.50 The district court accurately stated fifteen years ago that “the court has become a regulatory agency perpetually to manage fishing.” Judges in the Western District of Washing- ton have now been regulating fishing in the Puget Sound for 35 years, with the aid of a Fishery Advisory Board that the court created.51 The Constitution does not establish the district courts as permanent administrative agencies. [6] Now that treaty enforcement is no longer at issue, it is hard to see why the court still displaces state and federal fish management agencies. As the Supreme Court held in Frew v. Hawkins, “[t]he federal court must exercise its equitable powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is promptly returned to the State and its officials.”52 The Court 49 See Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 330 (“The ultimate objective of this decision is to determine every issue of fact and law presented and, at long last, thereby finally settle, either in this decision or on appeal thereof, as many as possible of the divisive problems of treaty right fishing which for so long have plagued all the citizens of this area, and still do.”). 50 See United States v. Washington, 394 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2005) (allowing the Samish tribe to reopen previous proceedings finding that it lacked a treaty right due to its federal recognition as a tribe); Charles Dickens, Bleak House 3 (1853) (“Jarndyce and Jarndyce drones on. This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of time, become so complicated, that no man alive knows what it means. The parties to it understand it least; but it has been observed that no two Chancery lawyers can talk about it for five minutes, without coming to a total disagreement as to all the premises. Innumerable children have been born into the cause; innumerable young people have married into it; innumerable old people have died out of it.”). Compare McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, No. 2007-5111, 2009 WL 1515777, at  (Fed. Cir. June 2, 2009) (calling an 18 year old case an “American version of Jarndyce and Jarndyce“). 51 See Decision II, 459 F. Supp. at 1061-63. 52 Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 442 (2004); see also Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth., 564 F.3d 1115, 1123 UNITED STATES v. WASHINGTON 8673 has repeatedly reminded us that institutional reform injunctions were meant to be temporary solutions, not permanent interventions, and could be kept in place only so long as the violation continued.53 Most recently, the Court stated this term that “[i]f a durable remedy has been implemented, continued enforcement of the order is not only unnecessary, but improper.”54 No one alleges that the State of Washington’s violations of the Indian tribes’ treaty rights continue. In Freeman v. Pitts, the Court listed several factors to consider in determining whether to modify, withdraw supervision over, or terminate ancient equitable decrees: “whether there has been full and satisfactory compliance with the decree . . . ; whether retention of judicial control is necessary or practicable . . .; and whether the [defendant] has demonstrated . . . its good-faith commitment to the whole of the court’s decree and to those provisions of the law . . . that were the predicate for judicial intervention in the first instance.”55 Horne v. Flores, Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, and Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell all held that a district court must consider whether the purpose of the decree has been substantially achieved and whether the public interest favors modification or termination.56 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Our decision is consistent with the principle that federal court intervention in state institutions is a temporary measure and may extend no longer than necessary to cure constitutional violations . . . . In this case, as the district court found, perhaps every last wish and hope of the decree was not achieved, but the decree accomplished its essential purposes and the situation improved greatly.”) (citations omitted). 53 Frew, 540 U.S. at 442; Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 87-89, 102 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489-92 (1992); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 380-93 (1992); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247-48 (1991). 54 Horne v. Flores, No. 08-289, slip op. at 13 (U.S. June 25, 2009). 55 Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491. 56 Horne, No. 08-289, slip op. at 13, Rufo, 502 U.S. at 381, 384, 387, 392; Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247-49. 8674 UNITED STATES v. WASHINGTON It is hard to see what we achieve in our continuing adjudications. We pretend to be able to read the mind of the long deceased district judge who initially issued the decree on mat- ters of which he did not speak. And we pretend to determine what the Indian tribes did 150 years ago at a time for which there is no evidence of especially high reliability and little evidence of any kind.57 This exercise is not law, and is not a reliable way to find facts, so it is hard to see why courts are doing it and how it could be preferable to the Indian tribes working some dispute resolution system out for themselves. [7] We need not in this case decide whether the 1974 decree should now be released, modified, or dissolved, because no party has asked us to. Such a motion, if made, would be directed to the discretion of the district court, as would sua sponte consideration.58