Opinion ID: 2395712
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The trial court's authority as parens patriae.

Text: For almost his entire young life, T.W. has been in institutional foster care. His biological parents have not cared for him. Although he is now five years old, T.W. has never had a permanent parental figure in his life. Both DHS and the trial court have recognized that placing T.W. in a permanent home and providing him with a loving family are goals that should be accorded high priority and energetically pursued. In In re Application of L.L., 653 A.2d 873, 888 (D.C.1995), this court described in some detail [l]egislation on the federal and local levels [which] has been enacted to counteract the dangers inherent in the consignment of neglected children for an indefinite period to temporary expedients such as foster care. The Supreme Court has recognized, and so have we, that protracted stays in [foster] care... may deprive [neglected] children of positive, nurturing family relationships and have deleterious effects on their development into responsible, productive citizens. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 835-36 n. 37, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977); L.L., supra, 653 A.2d at 887-88 (quoting Smith ). [N]o child can grow emotionally while in limbo. L.L., supra, 653 A.2d at 887 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If reunification with a biological parent is not feasible, and if a child is adoptable, then adoption is the statutorily preferred plan, for the goal of permanency planning is to end the uncertainty of foster care and allow the dependent child to form a longlasting emotional attachment to a permanent caretaker. Id. at 888 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To wait and see is rarely, if ever, an acceptable option when so much time has already passed. Id. at 887-89. In this case, DHS initially attempted to work towards T.W.'s reunification with his mother, but revised the goal to adoption when the mother failed to cooperate. With the appearance of the father, DHS is appropriately exploring the feasibility of placing T.W. with his paternal grandmother or with some other relative. The prospects for such a disposition are uncertain, however, and DHS is quite properly continuing to pursue adoption outside the family if no family member is available. But T.W. is no longer an infant. He is afflicted with health problems and has special needs. Finding a family willing to adopt T.W. may not be easy, and the prospects of success will obviously be enhanced if DHS is able to reach as many prospective adoptive parents as possible. Exposure on the Wednesday's Child program, which is viewed by a large audience, can therefore be expected to improve T.W.'s chances of adoption. DHS has legal custody of T.W., and by asking the court to permit an appearance by T.W. on Wednesday's Child, the agency acted in T.W.'s interest and made it more likely that he can be removed from institutional foster care and placed in a permanent adoptive home, if this is the course of action that is ultimately selected. In the District of Columbia, as in most or all jurisdictions, the paramount consideration in this type of dispute is the best interest of the child. See L.L., supra, 653 A.2d at 880 (citations omitted). The trial court, as parens patriae, has the obligation to protect the child's welfare. See, e.g., In re O.L., 584 A.2d 1230, 1233 (D.C. 1990). The District's civil neglect statute, which codifies the best interest standard, is a remedial enactment designed to protect the welfare of neglected and abused children, and it must be liberally construed to achieve that end. Id. (citation omitted). The neglect statute vests the judges of the Superior Court with broad authority to protect the safety and welfare of neglected children. See generally D.C.Code § 16-2320(a) (1997). In addition to authorizing the Family Division of that court to issue a wide variety of remedial orders, including, inter alia, termination of parental rights, D.C.Code § 16-2320(a)(6), the statute provides that the Division may make such other disposition as is not prohibited by law and as the Division deems to be in the best interests of the child. § 16-2320(a)(5). The Division is further authorized to order any public agency of the District of Columbia to provide any service the Division determines is needed and which is within such agency's legal authority. § 16-2320(a)(5)(i). If DIIS has the right and duty to introduce neglected children to prospective adoptive parents so as to facilitate adoptionand the existence of that right and duty cannot reasonably be questionedthen the court may surely authorize that agency to undertake any lawful measure reasonably calculated to achieve that end. Accordingly, unless the father can show that the limited disclosures regarding T.W. which the trial judge authorized in her order are prohibited by law, D.C.Code § 16-2320(a)(5), that order, in our view, falls well within the judge's authority as parens patriae.