Opinion ID: 1154894
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in refusing to change venue

Text: Approximately fifteen months before trial, Defendant filed his first motion to change the place of trial because of pretrial publicity. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 10.3. This motion summarized dozens of news items from June 1988 to February 1989. These items state, inter alia, that Defendant committed other crimes, failed a polygraph test, and attempted to escape, and refer to other evidence deemed inadmissible at trial. The court denied this change of venue motion more than a year before trial. Defendant later moved to reconsider and the court heard argument the day before trial began. That motion was denied without prejudice to renew if it became obvious that a fair trial could not be had. Defendant did not renew the motion. On appeal, Defendant claims that the judge erred in refusing to change venue. Because of the extensive pretrial publicity and the size of Flagstaff and Coconino County (respective populations of approximately 45,000 and 100,000), nearly all potential jurors had some knowledge of the case. On February 26, 1990, 187 potential jurors completed written questionnaires. Of these 187, almost all had read or heard about the case, approximately two-thirds had discussed the case, and approximately one-half had an opinion about Defendant's guilt. [3] Of the jurors that heard the case, all had read or heard something about the case, more than half were familiar with state investigators, half had discussed the case, and two jurors had a qualified opinion as to guilt at the time they answered the jury questionnaire.
Defendant argues that outrageous pretrial publicity dictates that prejudice requiring a change of venue should be presumed  making a showing of actual prejudice unnecessary. Juror exposure to information about an offense charged ordinarily does not raise a presumption that a defendant was denied a fair trial. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2036, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975). If, however, a defendant can show pretrial publicity so outrageous that it promises to turn the trial into a mockery of justice or a mere formality, prejudice will be presumed without examining the publicity's actual influence on the jury. See, e.g., id.; Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726-27, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 1419-20, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963); State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 631, 832 P.2d 593, 648 (1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1058, 122 L.Ed.2d 364 (1993); State v. Befford, 157 Ariz. 37, 39, 754 P.2d 1141, 1143 (1988). Clearly, there was extensive pretrial publicity; the record on appeal contains approximately 130 pretrial news stories. The frequency of these items, however, varied greatly. Approximately eighty-five items appeared from June to December 1988. From January 1989 to the beginning of trial (fourteen months) approximately fifty items appeared. [4] Thus, the frequency in 1988 was approximately three items per week while the frequency in 1989 and 1990 was less than one item per week. Some reports are duplicates, containing similar material published in different newspapers; some do not mention Defendant; and several state that Defendant was not a suspect or not a strong suspect. For the most part, the reports are factually based, and nearly all of the factual information reported in the articles was admitted at trial. Some items, however, discuss inadmissible evidence, are inaccurate, or approach the outrageous standard used in determining presumptive prejudice. For example, a June 10, 1988, article has the Sheriff stating that Defendant `flunked' a lie detector test. Defendant is described as a convicted child molester who committed child rape  incorrect descriptions of his 1981 sexual assault conviction. [5] A June 28, 1988, article reported a Phoenix-area legislator suggesting the death penalty for child molesters even if it means the execution `of a few innocent people.' The article, however, added that the suggestion prompted protests, that the proposal was unconstitutional, and contained another legislator's response criticizing the suggestion as `an affront and outrageous' and not reflecting appropriate legislative `wisdom and leadership.' A January 28, 1990, article has an inmate stating that Defendant admitted involvement in the victim's abduction. The article adds, however, that the inmate recanted and repeatedly changed his story. There are other articles that might have posed a serious threat to Defendant's fair trial rights. These items, however, were months apart and came months before trial began. Cf. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1034, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2890, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (That time soothes and erases is a perfectly natural phenomenon, familiar to all.). In addition, they are exceptions to the largely factual information in the great bulk of the news reports. See United States v. De La Vega, 913 F.2d 861, 865 (11th Cir.1990) (no presumed prejudice when jurors had knowledge of facts as 330 articles, with few exceptions, were largely factual), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2011, 114 L.Ed.2d 99 (1991); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1181 (1st Cir.) (Although the news coverage was extensive, it largely was factual in nature, summarizing the charges against the defendants and the alleged conduct that underlay the indictment.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845, 111 S.Ct. 130, 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). The burden to show that pretrial publicity is presumptively prejudicial clearly rests with the defendant and is extremely heavy. Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1537 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 106 S.Ct. 2289, 90 L.Ed.2d 730 (1986). In varying procedural contexts, appellate courts have found that the issue of presumed prejudice is a question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact resulting in standards of review including manifest error, clearly erroneous, and others. See id. at 1537 & nn. 17, 18 (citing cases). Even were we to review the trial court's ruling de novo, however, this record does not lead us to conclude that prejudice must be presumed. Due in large part to the findings required, courts rarely presume prejudice due to outrageous pretrial publicity. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2800, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976) (Burger, C.J., opinion of the Court). To presume prejudice, we must necessarily disregard the results of voir dire examination as well as the circumstances surrounding pretrial proceedings and reach our own conclusion based on the totality of the circumstances from the entire record. See Pamplin v. Mason, 364 F.2d 1, 6 (5th Cir.1966). We must also find that the defendant has shown inflammatory and prejudicial pretrial publicity that so pervaded the community as to render virtually impossible a fair trial before an impartial jury. Coleman, 778 F.2d at 1540. In short, to presume prejudice, we must necessarily decide that the publicity was so unfair, so prejudicial, and so pervasive that we cannot give any credibility to the jurors' answers during voir dire affirming their ability to decide the case fairly. The circumstances in this case fall short of those rare and unusual cases where this difficult showing has been made. See, e.g., Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726-727, 83 S.Ct. at 1419-20 (televised confession seen by many potential jurors); Coleman, 778 F.2d at 1538-1543 (overwhelming publicity in county with population of 7000); Isaacs v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482, 1483-84 (11th Cir.1985) (companion case to Coleman ); United States v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364, 366-67, 372 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (6-3 decision) (extensive pretrial publicity including defendant's confession; [t]he publicity was in its nature highly inflammatory, in volume great, and accessibility universal.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978, 83 S.Ct. 1112, 10 L.Ed.2d 143 (1963); cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966) (overwhelming pretrial publicity, coupled with publicity at trial and outrageous trial conduct, required reversal). These cases show more in the way of inaccurate as well as extremely prejudicial pretrial publicity than does the totality of the record in this case. These cases also demonstrate the media's successful and sometimes relentless attempt to whip up hysteria and passion in the community  something the present case lacks. And at least Sheppard contains something else lacking in this case  the media successfully influencing law enforcement officers and court personnel as well as the court itself. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 337, 354-58, 362, 86 S.Ct. at 1518-20, 1522. Nor is the substance of the pretrial publicity in the present case comparable to that in Rideau, where a local television station thrice showed the defendant's confession. In Rideau the defendant had `confessed' under police interrogation to the murder of which he stood convicted. A 20-minute film of his confession was broadcast three times by a television station in the community where the crime and the trial took place. In reversing, the Court did not examine the voir dire for evidence of actual prejudice because it considered the trial under review `but a hollow formality'  the real trial had occurred when tens of thousands of people, in a community of 150,000, had seen and heard the defendant admit his guilt before the cameras. Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 631, 832 P.2d at 648 (quoting Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799, 95 S.Ct. at 2035-36); see also Coleman, 778 F.2d at 1491-1537. On this record, we cannot conclude that the trial was utterly corrupted by pretrial publicity, Murphy, 421 U.S. at 798, 95 S.Ct. at 2035, and therefore will not presume prejudice, see Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 631, 832 P.2d at 648; State v. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. 21, 34, 734 P.2d 563, 576, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 207, 98 L.Ed.2d 158 (1987); State v. Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. 150, 164, 624 P.2d 828, 842, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S.Ct. 364, 70 L.Ed.2d 191 (1981). [6] Accordingly, we turn to the issue of whether the record demonstrates actual prejudice.
Absent presumed prejudice, the focus is whether the potential jurors could not judge impartially the guilt of the defendant. Yount, 467 U.S. at 1035, 104 S.Ct. at 2891. When a motion to change venue is based on actual prejudice resulting from pretrial publicity, the defendant must show that the prejudicial material will probably result in the [defendant] being deprived of a fair trial. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 10.3(b); see also LaGrand, 153 Ariz. at 34, 734 P.2d at 576. The purpose of this rule is to ensure an impartial jury as guaranteed by the United States and Arizona Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. VI, XIV; Ariz. Const. art. II, §§ 4, 24; Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2277, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988); Befford, 157 Ariz. at 39, 754 P.2d at 1143. Our review of this issue is for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 406, 844 P.2d 566, 573 (1992); cf. Mu'Min v. Virginia, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 1906, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991) (deference to trial court's decision is particularly appropriate when objective trial judge sits in the locale where the publicity is said to have had its effect, and brings to his evaluation of any such claim his own perception of the depth and extent of news stories that might influence a juror.). Although almost all of the potential jurors had heard something about the case, the relevant inquiry is the effect of publicity on a juror's objectivity, not the mere fact of publicity. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. at 34, 734 P.2d at 576; see also State v. Smith, 160 Ariz. 507, 512, 774 P.2d 811, 816 (1989). After the court excused 111 potential jurors, less than twenty-five percent of the sixty-one member venire left had a qualified opinion regarding guilt and only two such individuals served on the trial jury, no member had an unqualified opinion, and all indicated that they could set aside their qualified opinions and decide the case based on evidence produced at trial. These responses undercut Defendant's prejudice claim. See Simmons v. Lockhart, 814 F.2d 504, 510 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1015, 108 S.Ct. 1489, 99 L.Ed.2d 717 (1988). The trial took place nearly two years after the crime and the largely factual pretrial publicity abated during the year preceding trial, circumstances supporting the court's ruling. See Murphy, 421 U.S. at 802, 95 S.Ct. at 2037; Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 631, 832 P.2d at 648. In the past, we also have relied on a fully developed oral voir dire record in deciding whether pretrial publicity actually prejudiced a jury. See, e.g., Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 632, 832 P.2d at 649; Befford, 157 Ariz. at 40, 754 P.2d at 1144; LaGrand, 153 Ariz. at 34, 734 P.2d at 576. In this case, as discussed more fully below, see infra § A(3)(a), oral voir dire was not extensive. This lack of extensive oral voir dire, however, cannot be equated with prejudice in this case. Although the court denied Defendant's request for individualized voir dire, defense counsel agreed with questions the court proposed to raise with the potential jurors in order to clarify the law, to rehabilitate, and to discover additional information. Defendant repeatedly had neither additions nor objections to the proposed questions. When the court indicated that it would not take much time to qualify the panel, the prosecutor stated [t]hat sounds appropriate, and defense counsel added I would ask the Court to follow that. After voir dire, Defendant passed the panel. Thus, we do not have an extensive oral voir dire record. Defendant had the burden of establishing that pretrial publicity would likely deprive him of a fair and impartial jury. LaGrand, 153 Ariz. at 34, 734 P.2d at 576. Given the questionnaire answers and the record before us, Defendant has not shown actual prejudice. Accordingly, we reject his claim that pretrial publicity caused actual prejudice requiring a change in venue. 2. Did the atmosphere at trial, coupled with the pretrial publicity, deprive Defendant of a fair trial? In an argument closely related to his claim of presumed prejudice resulting from pretrial publicity, see supra § A(1)(b), Defendant argues that the conduct of his trial, coupled with the pretrial publicity, presumptively deprived him of a fair trial, thus violating his due process rights. News articles indicate that during trial the victim's parents and friends wore small pink bows in memory of the victim. Another article states that [s]everal of the 14 jurors hearing the case wept as both parents [of the victim] talked. Judge Richard K. Mangum also wept as he listened. The sheriff reportedly came close to weeping when testifying. Other articles detail an outburst by the victim's father. Defendant argues that these in-court occurrences, coupled with the pretrial publicity discussed above, created a circus or carnival atmosphere thereby denying him a fair trial. [7] A fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the United States and Arizona Constitutions. See Ariz. Const. art. II, §§ 4, 24; Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1692, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562, 85 S.Ct. 476, 479-80, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965); State v. Neil, 102 Ariz. 110, 112, 425 P.2d 842, 844 (1967). Included in this right is the guarantee that the jury determine guilt or innocence based solely on the evidence admitted at trial. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). In extremely limited and outrageous cases, prejudice is presumed when the record reveals that the trial lacked the solemnity and sobriety appropriate to a judicial proceeding. Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. at 164, 624 P.2d at 842. To presume prejudice, in-court proceedings must be `so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to [defendant's] right to a fair trial.' Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 633, 832 P.2d at 650 (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 572, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 1347, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986)). The court examines the pretrial publicity in combination with the conduct at trial, Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 354-55, 86 S.Ct. at 1518, to determine whether the trial was improperly held in a circus atmosphere, Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799, 95 S.Ct. at 2036, or carnival atmosphere, Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358, 86 S.Ct. at 1520. Presuming prejudice in such cases reflects a fundamental and essential element of our criminal justice system: that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). Although many cases discuss the doctrine, very few cases have actually presumed prejudice due to a carnival or circus atmosphere at trial. The two most noted cases actually presuming prejudice are Sheppard and Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965): The trial in Estes had been conducted in a circus atmosphere, due in large part to the intrusions of the press, which was allowed to sit within the bar of the court and to overrun it with television equipment. Similarly, Sheppard arose from a trial infected not only by a background of extremely inflammatory publicity but also by a courthouse given over to accommodate the public appetite for carnival. The proceedings in these cases were entirely lacking in the solemnity and sobriety to which a defendant is entitled in a system that subscribes to any notion of fairness and rejects the verdict of a mob. Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 631, 832 P.2d at 648 (quoting Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799, 95 S.Ct. at 2036); see also Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 342-49, 86 S.Ct. at 1512-15 (describing defendant's trial). These cases reflect trials fundamentally different from the picture painted by the record here. Unlike Estes, there is no suggestion that the media took over the proceedings. And distinguishable from Sheppard, there is no indication that the court so accommodated the public that the proceedings were constitutionally unfair. Nor is this a case where any improper trial conduct, and any corresponding jury impact, accurately may be gleaned from the transcript. See Scala v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 149 A.D.2d 327, 539 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (1989) (finding carnival-like atmosphere where transcript revealed language used at trial was so inflammatory and vituperative as to be more appropriate for a barroom than a courtroom). Some news articles of record describe disturbing events that, given an adequate showing of prejudice, might result in reversible error. In the abstract, however, they do not require that we presume prejudice. The mere fact, if it is a fact, that spectators wore ribbons to trial does not mandate reversal. See Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 634, 832 P.2d at 651. Absent a record, we cannot speculate that such conduct occurred or, if so, that it was so inherently prejudicial that despite the lack of objection it posed an unacceptable threat to Defendant's right to a fair trial. See Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 572, 106 S.Ct. at 1347-48; cf. Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 831 (9th Cir.1990) (spectators wearing Women Against Rape buttons, which the record revealed jurors saw and read, impermissibly constituted a continuing reminder that various spectators believed [defendant's] guilt before it was proven). Similarly, on the record before us, the crying and the outburst by the victim's father do not mean that we must presume that Defendant did not receive a fair trial. See infra § L; see also State v. Naucke, 829 S.W.2d 445, 460 (Mo.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 427, 121 L.Ed.2d 348 (1992); State v. Grice, 109 N.J. 379, 537 A.2d 683, 687 (1988). The information before us is essentially no more than a series of newspaper articles purporting to generally describe what happened in the courtroom. These articles do not permit us to reach any conclusion about events that actually occurred in the courtroom. Indeed, they do no more than establish that the articles were printed. We do not, and cannot, accept as conclusive any statement contained in the articles. The record does not show that the trial court failed to control the courtroom, and we will not speculate about what may have occurred. To establish what actually occurred in the courtroom, applicable procedural and evidentiary requirements must be met. In both Estes and Sheppard, the convicted defendant submitted evidence of what had occurred at trial. The record in this case, however, contains no evidence establishing what happened in the courtroom or what jurors might have seen or understood. We cannot know or presume to know what was conveyed to the jurors from sources other than witnesses or what effect any of this might have had on the jurors. We cannot accept as fact descriptions contained in news articles. Trial counsel made no record about the courtroom events through statements or affidavits by spectators, lawyers, or reporters  save the news articles. On this record, or, to be more precise, in its absence, we entertain no presumption that Defendant was denied a fair trial. See Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 633-34, 832 P.2d at 650-51; State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 534-35, 633 P.2d 335, 343-44 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S.Ct. 180, 74 L.Ed.2d 147 (1982); Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. at 164, 624 P.2d at 842. On the other hand, we cannot make any finding as to a lack of prejudice. Given the judge's order forbidding the lawyers from speaking to the jurors after trial, [8] coupled with the lack of other evidence, we are left in the dark as to the events that actually took place. We must leave it to post-conviction relief proceedings to ascertain these events and their possible effect on the trial. By rejecting Defendant's allegations, we do not signify our approval of the conduct alleged. A trial foreseeably engendering deep passions is no place for publicizing the emotions of the population. Trial judges are to take measures to ensure that those who come to see the trial are spectators, not advocates, and that in the courthouse spectators carry no pamphlets, hold no signs, and do nothing to pressure, or stir the emotions of, the jurors. In our justice system, the public has the right to watch the trial  not participate in it or indicate a desired outcome. The trial judge must do whatever is necessary to control the courthouse and protect the jury from emotional reactions by spectators or witnesses. The judge should strictly forbid tactics that may influence the jury and, in the strongest manner possible, deal with those who attempt to do so. We hold only that, on this record, we cannot tell what happened or what effect any occurrence had. We refuse to speculate. Thus, on this record, we find no error. [9] 3. Did the trial court err in the manner in which voir dire was conducted? Defendant claims that voir dire should have been individualized and in camera; that oral voir dire was inadequate; and that his rights to be present and to counsel were violated during voir dire. We address these claims in turn. a. Voir dire and jury selection methods used in this case Months before trial, the parties suggested that voir dire initially be conducted by a written questionnaire. Defendant later argued that a questionnaire would be helpful. Defense counsel wrote the questionnaire and submitted it to the prosecutor and the court. The court ultimately used Defendant's questionnaire as submitted with no changes. The questionnaire contained fifty-six questions with numerous subparts covering a total of thirty pages. The questions searched the potential jurors' knowledge of the case and the source of such information. Questions addressed the news media and perceptions of media accuracy, law enforcement, scientific testing, and the death penalty, as well as familiarity with Defendant and potential witnesses. The questionnaire also discussed the standard of proof and the jurors' frame of mind if they were to sit in judgment. Each potential juror filled out and signed their individual questionnaire under oath and in the court's presence. Defense counsel had no objection to the Judge deciding who should be removed for cause. After reviewing the completed questionnaires, the trial court, sua sponte, struck 106 of the 187 venire members for cause. On the parties' motions, the court struck several other venire members for cause. Fifteen additional venire members were excused for personal reasons or did not show up, leaving sixty-one individuals for jury selection. The court ruled that, absent good cause, the court would conduct oral voir dire. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 18.5(d). Before oral voir dire, the judge met with counsel to discuss the questions he proposed asking the potential jurors. Defense counsel did not object to the court's proposals. The court conducted a brief, general oral voir dire of the panel of sixty-one. A panel of thirty-four then was drawn. This panel answered the court's voir dire questions; both parties passed the panel and exercised their peremptory strikes. Selecting the panel of thirty-four, oral voir dire, and peremptory strikes took forty-six minutes. With this background, we address Defendant's arguments.