Opinion ID: 2508126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err in Denying the Defendant's Request for a Jury Instruction on the Lesser Included Offense of Unintentional Second-degree Murder?

Text: As his first claim of error, Cavaness argues the trial court should have granted his request for an instruction on the lesser included offense of unintentional second-degree murder. Cavaness requested instructions on both second-degree murder as defined by K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-3402(a) (intentional) and K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-3402(b) (killing of a human being committed . . . unintentionally but recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life). The trial court granted the request for an instruction on intentional second-degree murder and instructed the jury on voluntary intoxication as a defense. Regarding the request for an instruction on unintentional second-degree murder, the trial court denied the request, noting there was no basis in the record for that particular instruction. A trial court must instruct the jury on a lesser included offense where there is some evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of the lesser offense. K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 22-3414(3). If the defendant requests the instructions, the trial court has a duty to instruct the jury regarding all lesser included crimes that are established by the evidence, regardless of whether the evidence is weak or inconclusive. State v. Hoge, 276 Kan. 801, 805, 80 P.3d 52 (2003). On review, the appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. State v. McClanahan, 254 Kan. 104, 109, 865 P.2d 1021 (1993). However, the duty to so instruct arises only where there is evidence supporting the lesser crime. State v. Spry, 266 Kan. 523, 528, 973 P.2d 783 (1999). In support of his argument that the trial court should have instructed the jury on unintentional second-degree murder, Cavaness points to his sister's testimony that Cavaness did not continue participating in the beating after the victim was brought back into the house and that it was Buehler-May who stated he had broken the victim's neck and killed him. The defendant also points to his own testimony that he never intended to kill the victim and could not form an intent because he was high on cocaine. Finally, Cavaness cites the testimony of the forensic pathologist who could not identify a single injury as the killing blow. Neither the pathologist's nor Gray's testimony provides any evidence that Cavaness' actions were reckless; nor does his own testimony. At most, his testimony establishes that death was an unintended consequence of his intentional act of striking Wheeler with the baseball bat. The same argument has been rejected in State v. Jones, 267 Kan. 627, 984 P.2d 132 (1999); State v. Bailey, 263 Kan. 685, 952 P.2d 1289 (1998); State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 931 P.2d 664 (1997); and State v. Pierce, 260 Kan. 859, 927 P.2d 929 (1996). The court in Jones discussed each of the other cases extensively as well as other authority which Jones argued supported his position that he was entitled to an instruction on unintentional second-degree murder because he had just snapped and did not intend to kill his victim. The Jones court first discussed Pierce in which the defendant stated that he did not intend to kill the victim but was only defending himself when he shot the victim in the leg after the victim pulled a knife. The court stated: There is no evidence of recklessness. The defendant's actions were intentional . . . . At best the evidence on behalf of the defendant suggested that he did not intend to kill the victim but only defended himself by [intentionally] shooting the victim in the leg. 260 Kan. at 867. Next, the Jones court discussed Clark. Clark was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder of his girlfriend and attempted premeditated first-degree murder of a friend. Clark told police officers that he did not intend to kill his girlfriend when he placed a gun to her temple and fired. In rejecting Clark's argument that he was entitled to an instruction on reckless second-degree murder, the court stated that [t]he only evidence . . . of an accidental shooting was the statement Clark made after arrival of the law enforcement officers . . . . Clark's self-serving statement alone does not support a finding of recklessness. 261 Kan. at 466. The court in Jones then discussed the holding in Bailey. Bailey was charged with premeditated first-degree murder and was convicted of intentional second-degree murder. In rejecting Bailey's argument that the jury should have been instructed on reckless second-degree murder on the theory that his intentional shooting was done without regard to the consequences and, therefore, was reckless, the court stated: We find Pierce controlling in the present case. Bailey cites Pierce but ignores its clear messagea defendant's actions in pointing a gun at someone and pulling the trigger are intentional rather than reckless even if the defendant did not intend to kill the victim. 263 Kan. at 691. The court also examined the legislative history of K.S.A. 21-3402(b) explaining that it was intended to cover so-called depraved heart situations and concluding that the legislature did not contemplate the provision applying to the situation of the defendant's singling out an individual seated only a few feet away, pointing a gun directly at his head, and then firing. 263 Kan. at 691. The Jones court also discussed but distinguished State v. Robinson, 261 Kan. 865, 934 P.2d 38 (1997), in which the defendant was convicted of reckless second-degree murder after he killed Richard Crowley, who was the initial aggressor, by hitting Crowley in the head with a golf club. Crowley, angry about his sons being threatened by some boys, armed himself with a baseball bat, chased the boys, and swung the bat at them. The boys grabbed golf clubs out of someone's conveniently located bag and turned the tables on Crowley, who began to use the bat defensively. When one of the boys fell, Crowley hit him with the bat. The other boys closed in on Crowley, and Robinson hit Crowley in the head, killing him. Robinson testified that he was attempting to get Crowley to stop hitting the boys and had no intention of hitting Crowley in the head with the golf club but was trying to hit him in the arms. Under those circumstances, the court concluded that a rational factfinder could have found Robinson guilty of reckless second-degree murder. 261 Kan. at 878, 882. The Jones court distinguished Robinson on the grounds that Jones did not claim to have acted in self-defense. 267 Kan. at 633. The Jones court concluded that, as in Pierce, Clark, and Bailey, Jones' self-serving statement that he did not intend to kill the victim was insubstantial and insufficient to support a theory of a reckless second-degree murder when Jones used his hands to grip her neck hard enough to break pliable bone and cartilage structures and long enough4 to 6 minutesto fatally deprive her of oxygen. His actions were intentional and not reckless. 267 Kan. at 633. Jones further argued that he was incapable of forming the intent to kill the victim because of his use of alcohol and cocaine. The court rejected this argument, stating: What Jones' argument does not take into account is that an intoxicated defendant's being incapable of forming the intent to kill does not transform his or her conduct into conduct so reckless in the circumstances as to manifest extreme indifference to the value of human life. In other words, intoxication can eliminate intent to kill so that the killing is unintentional under the law, but it may not supply the extreme recklessness element of unintentional second-degree murder. Thus, evidence of voluntary intoxication alone will not justify an instruction on reckless second-degree murder as a lesser [included] offense of premeditated first-degree murder. 267 Kan. at 634. Cavaness makes the same arguments that were rejected in Jones. By his own admission, Cavaness struck the victim several times, called the neighbor for something to use to tie up the victim, and discussed with the other men the fact that they could not let the victim leave for fear of retaliation. The evidence demonstrated that Cavaness participated in the acts which resulted in Wheeler's death and did so intentionally. Even though Cavaness' testimony provided evidence that he did not intend to kill Wheeler by hitting him with a baseball bat, none of the evidence, even the defendant's own testimony, indicated reckless rather than intentional conduct. Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to give an instruction on unintentional second-degree murder as defined in K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-3402(b).