Opinion ID: 748182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: termination because of pregnancy

Text: 95 An employer can not insulate itself from the reach of Title VII by an action that appears neutral, yet has the functional effect of disparately treating an individual based upon a protected trait. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430, 91 S.Ct. at 853. Carnegie's action is the functional equivalent of terminating Rhett because she was pregnant. See Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir.1991). 96 In Teahan, an employee suffering from alcoholism brought an action against his employer alleging that his discharge for excessive absenteeism was in violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, because his absences had been caused by that disease. Summary judgment was entered in favor of the employer because the district court concluded that there was no issue of material fact as to whether Teahan was terminated 'solely by reason of' his handicap. Id. at 514. The district court concluded that the employer had not relied on Teahan's handicap ... [and had] a nondiscriminatory reason for firing him (excessive absenteeism). Id. Teahan appealed. 97 On appeal, Teahan argued that because the ground upon which he was terminated was his excessive absenteeism, and since his absenteeism was 'caused by' his substance abuse problem, the district court improperly shifted the burden to him to present evidence of pretext. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, stating that it does not inevitably follow that termination for conduct resulting from a handicap is not termination 'solely by reason of' that handicap. 5 Id. at 515. Indeed, an employer 'relies' on a handicap when it justifies [its employment decision] based on conduct caused by that handicap. 6 Id. Because the district court erred in concluding that Teahan had not established that he was fired solely by reason of his handicap, his employer never had to satisfy its burden of demonstrating that[Teahan's handicap] was relevant to the job qualifications. Id. at 515. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for further proceedings. 7 Similarly, in Cushing v. Moore, 970 F.2d 1103, 1108 (2nd Cir.1992), the court stated that the key determination becomes the factual issue of whether an employee's conduct (such as absenteeism), which forms the articulated basis for a job termination, is actually caused by a handicap (such as substance abuse) (citing Teahan, 951 F.2d at 517; Hogarth v. Thornburgh, 833 F.Supp. 1077, 1085 (S.D.N.Y.1993)) ([I]f a handicap manifests itself in certain behavior, and an employee is discharged because of that behavior, he has been terminated 'solely by reason of' the handicap.); and Ambrosino v. Metropolitan Life Insur. Co., 899 F.Supp. 438, 444 (N.D.Cal.1995) (The court chose to follow the line of cases holding that termination based on conduct caused by chemical dependency and status which results from the dependency and/or the conduct caused by the dependency is termination based on the disability of chemical dependency.). However, that consideration is not present here, and I believe that this matter should be remanded for a determination of whether Rhett would have been selected for termination based upon factors other than her absence. Although it is for the employer, and not a court, to determine how best to select those positions that will be eliminated in a reduction in force, Title VII requires this employer to adopt criteria that put Rhett's pregnancy-related absence aside and allow for an individualized determination driven by her own capabilities.