Opinion ID: 1233365
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: mandamus and remand issues

Text: On November 6, 1989, as part of petitioner's reply to respondent's response, petitioner requested that in the event of a remand of any of the issues in this case to the circuit court, that this Court direct that such remand be to some other circuit judge. As the basis for this motion, petitioner cites the joint response of Judge Hey and Rodney R., its allegations of facts relating to the underlying case and its consequent appearance of impropriety. No response to the motion nor denial of its allegations was ever filed by the respondent circuit judge. In addition, on November 13, 1989, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to have the respondent circuit judge ordered to refrain from making public comment on this case and related matters still pending in the circuit court. This petition, to which no answer or denial was filed by the circuit court judge, alleged inter alia that the respondent circuit judge had made several comments to the press and had appeared on Crossfire, a national television network program on November 8, 1989, to discuss the specific facts and issues in this case, including not only the matters before this Court but also those left unresolved in the circuit court. Petitioner further alleged that the circuit judge on that program made conclusory statements as to the child's educational performance and church attendance and the mother's fitness and character, matters upon which no evidence was taken below and which the lower court had apparently accepted based upon hearsay outside any judicial setting. [3] The judge is alleged to have made, and did not deny making, comments on Crossfire adverse to petitioner's reputation, character, and motivations, again for which there was no evidentiary basis whatsoever and which seem to indicate a bias and prejudice against the petitioner. [4] Since no evidence was taken as to any of these matters, one is left to wonder where the judge came into possession of this information. As we have previously held, it is a general rule in prohibition proceedings (that) any person whose rights may be affected by the issuance of a writ must be made a party and must be given notice of the proceedings. State ex rel. Hanley v. Hey, 163 W.Va. 103, 107, 255 S.E.2d 354, 356, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 928, 100 S.Ct. 269, 62 L.Ed.2d 185 (1979). Certainly a judge has a right to respond to a rule to show cause why he should not be prohibited from judicial actions. Furthermore, it is not unusual for the respondent judge and the party adverse to the petitioner in a prohibition action to file a joint response, because in this context [t]he interests of the respondent judge and the probationer are identical as both seek to preclude issuance of the writ of prohibition. The interests are the same, but only to the extent that both the judge and the adverse party contend that the judge did not exceed his legitimate powers in making the ruling which is the subject of the prohibition. Most certainly, however, the interests cannot be said to be the same as to the merits of the issues in the underlying case, for in that context the judge must remain neutral and unbiased. The problem with the joint answer filed by the circuit judge and Mr. R. is that it clearly reflects much more than a mere community of interest as to the circuit court's jurisdiction and authority to enter the order at issue. In that joint response, the circuit judge alleges inter alia: that the petitioner is attempting to perpetrate a fraud against her ex-husband and the circuit court; facts adverse to the petitioner that are dehors the record (i.e. information relating to the child's academic performance and school attendance record; and hearsay concerning the mother's and child's church attendance); that petitioner and her paramour are violating criminal and moral law on a daily basis. Again, this conclusion is drawn by the court without ever having heard any evidence. sexual promiscuity on the petitioner's part, again without any evidentiary basis for such finding, and in the face of a specific denial of such conduct by petitioner; that the cohabitation of petitioner with another person is an illegal and reprehensible activity which is obviously occurring in the presence of and affecting a teen-age daughter who should be receiving lessons in morality and chastity rather (than) a home study course in promiscuity. the child's emotional problems resulted from the mother's illicit misconduct. These are the types of issues that should properly be heard and considered in an evidentiary setting, but which the circuit court apparently accepted and alleged in his response without ever having heard or even reviewed any evidence relating thereto. It is obvious that Judge Hey has exceeded the role he could properly take in defending his ruling, and is acting in his response as a partisan. It is also obvious he has formed opinions on factually disputed issues without ever having heard or reviewed any evidence in a judicial setting. The judge's appearance on television further substantiates his bias against the petitioner. We found in syllabus point 2 of Judicial Inquiry Comm'n v. McGraw, ___ W.Va. ___, 299 S.E.2d 872 (1983) that [t]he public expression of a judge as to a legal issue does not automatically require his later disqualification when the issue is presented to him in a specific case. Similarly, we held in syllabus point 5 of State v. Ellis 161 W.Va. 40, 239 S.E.2d 670 (1977): A trial judge's public statements that he believes sound public policy requires persons convicted of drug-related offenses be sentenced to the penitentiary do not create such a bias or prejudice against a particular defendant to justify disqualification of the judge. Furthermore, Canon 4(A) of the Judicial Code of Ethics provides that a judge may speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in other activities concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice. But Canon 3(A)(6) of the Judicial Code of Ethics states that a judge should abstain from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any court,.... An analogous case arose in the Connecticut case of Papa v. New Haven Feder'n of Teachers, 186 Conn. 725, 444 A.2d 196 (1982). In that case, a judge in the Judicial District of New Haven was the subject of two recusal motions in a case involving contempt proceedings against striking teachers. The first motion to recuse was made on the basis of a speech given by the judge in which he discussed teacher strikes. The second motion to recuse was made on the basis of a newspaper interview given by the judge. In the speech, the general theme of which involved the obligation to obey the law, the judge criticized illegal teacher strikes, but his remarks were not generated by or made in reference to the impending teachers' strike. The newspaper interview, however, dealt quite specifically with the case pending before the judge. Amongst other comments, the judge was quoted as saying that he was ready to jail more teachers if the strike was not settled by Monday; that teachers aren't fooling anybody. The vast majority of the people recognize they are striking for more money; that of all people, teachers shouldn't strike. They are inviting further disciplinary problems in the schools. 444 A.2d at 208. The Supreme Court of Connecticut determined that the speech did not require the judge's disqualification. In the course of their duties, judges frequently express opinions about specific laws, the obligation to obey the law and the consequences of disobedience. Given that such judicial expressions of opinion do not disqualify judges from sitting on later cases involving the same legal issues, it is difficult to perceive why judges' general, extrajudicial comments concerning legal issues disqualify them from hearing later cases involving those issues. Id. at 206. Conversely, however, the court determined that the newspaper interview the judge gave concerning the specific proceeding pending before him was a clear violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Id. at 208. Furthermore, the court concluded that the judge's comments had, in effect, made him an unsworn witness without allowing the defendants an opportunity to offer testimony to refute the judge's assertions. His comments raised a reasonable question about his ability to remain fair and impartial, and constituted sufficient grounds for his recusal. Id. at 210. Judge Hey's acceptance of facts not in the record, together with the scurrilous aspersions he casts upon the petitioner's character both in his response to the petition and on the public airways, goes far beyond the acceptable realm of comment as to the law or judicial philosophy. Although a judge shares a community of interest with a party in a proceeding before him in defending his jurisdiction and authority when the other party seeks to limit such authority in a prohibition action, that community of interest is strictly limited to the issue of whether the judge exceeded his legitimate powers in making the ruling of which the party complains. A judge who demonstrates a bias and prejudice against the other party on the underlying issues will be precluded from presiding over the case upon remand. We find that Judge Hey has departed from his neutral role on the underlying case. Therefore, upon remand, we direct the court administrator of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit to assign this case to another judge in the circuit. [5] Based on the foregoing, we grant petitioner's request for writ of prohibition and direct the circuit court to reinstate child support and alimony. Writ of prohibition granted. Writ of mandamus denied.