Opinion ID: 790557
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Albillo-DeLeon's Motion to Reopen Was Timely

Text: 48 The government asserts that Albillo-DeLeon's motion to reopen is untimely because he first learned that he had received ineffective assistance in September 1999 but failed to file his motion to reopen until August 2000. 49 In tolling statutes of limitations, courts have typically assumed that the event that `tolls' the statute simply stops the clock until the occurrence of a later event that permits the statute to resume running. Socop-Gonzalez, 272 F.3d at 1195. Equitable tolling will be applied in situations where, despite all due diligence, [the party requesting equitable tolling] is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of the claim. Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir.1995) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 50 Albillo-DeLeon first became concerned with Mendez's performance in September 1999. But Albillo-DeLeon did not definitively learn that Mendez failed to file his motion until April 3, 2000, when Albillo-DeLeon received a copy of his court file pursuant to his FOIA request. Only when Albillo-DeLeon received his court file on April 3, 2000, did he finally obtain vital information bearing on the existence of the claim. Id. 51 Nor was Albillo-DeLeon's September 1999 to April 2000 delay in obtaining this vital information due to any lack of diligence on his part. Further, once he became suspicious, Albillo-DeLeon acted diligently in making his FOIA request and retaining new counsel. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir.2003) (recognizing equitable tolling on motion to reopen during periods when petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error); Rodriguez-Lariz, 282 F.3d at 1225 (finding due diligence where petitioners, after learning conclusively that they had been misled by a non-attorney, promptly retained new counsel and filed a motion to reopen). Once Albillo-DeLeon became suspicious of Mendez's performance, he promptly contacted the Immigration Court and filed his FOIA request. Accordingly, we find that Albillo-DeLeon's deadline for filing his motion to reopen was tolled to April 3, 2000, the date he conclusively learned of Mendez's deficient representation. 52 Section 203(c) provides aliens with 238 days to file a motion to reopen proceedings. See NACARA § 203(c) (recommending to the Attorney General that the period for filing a motion to reopen not exceed 240 days); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.43(e)(1) (allowing aliens to file a motion to reopen from January 16, 1998 to September 11, 1998-238 days). In this case, Albillo-DeLeon filed his motion to reopen on August 2, 2000, 121 days after he received his FOIA response. Because Albillo-DeLeon filed his motion to reopen within 121 days of learning that Mendez failed to file his motion to reopen—well under the 238 days afforded by section 203(c)—we find that it was timely filed.