Opinion ID: 1210655
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: APPEAL BY GEORGE ALBERT McNEILL

Text: This defendant has two assignments of error, the first of which is to the denial of his motion for a separate trial. He states in his brief that he abandons this assignment of error. His second assignment of error is: The court below erred in its findings of fact and ruling that the alleged confession by him was free and voluntary on his part, and that he was not being illegally detained at the time of the confession, and in admitting into evidence over his objection the alleged confession. When the admissibility of a purported extrajudicial confession by George Albert McNeill was challenged by him, the trial judge had the jury to leave the courtroom and conducted in the absence of the jury a lengthy preliminary inquiry showing the circumstances under which the purported confession was made. The State offered the testimony of Deputy Sheriffs W. D. Chalk and K. W. O'Neal, and defendant George Albert McNeill testified in his own behalf, all of whom were examined and cross-examined at length by counsel for the State and for defendant George Albert McNeill. The State's evidence was to this effect: Between 8 and 9:30 p. m. on 25 February 1965 Deputy Sheriffs Chalk and O'Neal went to the home of George Albert McNeill in the city of Raleigh and asked him to go with them to the detective bureau so they could talk with him. McNeill did not object to going. The officers had information a felony had been committed, and they picked McNeill up as a suspect for questioning. They handcuffed him and went to the detective bureau. Upon arrival at the detective bureau, Chalk, before McNeill made any statement, told him he did not have to tell him, Chalk, anything, that if he said anything it could be used for or against him, and that he had a right to call a lawyer if he wanted one. A telephone was in the room. McNeill said nothing about calling a lawyer. He did not ask for permission to call his mother. P. R. Gulley came and looked at McNeill. McNeill was not told what he was suspected of having committed when picked up. Before he made a confession he was told he could be arrested for armed robbery of Gulley. In answer to the officers' questions, McNeill made the confession set forth above. After McNeill confessed, a warrant was sworn out against him, and he waived a preliminary hearing that night. Defendant McNeill's testimony is in substance: He is 21 years old. When officers Chalk and O'Neal came to his home and said they wanted to carry him uptown, they did not tell him why they wanted to do so. He asked the reason why, and O'Neal replied, I'll tell you when I get you uptown. They handcuffed him. They did not mention there his constitutional rights. On the way uptown, O'Neal asked him did he know those boys. They carried him to the police station and put him in a little room. He asked to use a telephone to call his mother, and they would not let him. He did not ask for a lawyer. Nothing was said to him about having a lawyer. After the officers questioned him, he telephoned his mother. He never told the officers he robbed Gulley or participated in the robbery of Gulley. John Thomas Alston had him to carry him to Garner to see his, Alston's, grandmother. At Gulley's store he had a flat tire and fixed it. He brought Alston back to Raleigh. Alston paid him $12 for the trip. He does not know where Alston got the money. He did not confess to anything. Jimmy Lawrence McNeill, James Leak, and John Thomas Alston were with him on the trip. He did not say Rudolph Hines was with them. No officer told him he did not have to answer questions, and that if he said anything it could be used for or against him in court. He testified: I went to school to the tenth grade. No one threatened me that night not as I recall. They were real nice to me. The trial judge made the following findings of fact in respect to his extrajudicial confession: On the night in question prior to any interrogation by the officers and prior to discussing the matter with him, they warned the defendant that he did not have to make a statement, but that if he did make a statement it could be used for or against him later. He was also advised that he could use the telephone if he wished. That defendant made no request to call any of his people at that time or to call an attorney at that time. The warrant was served on him within a matter of a few hours, and thereupon he waived a hearing and bond was set. Prior to that time defendant made certain statements to Deputy Sheriffs Chalk and O'Neal, and that on all occasions there were no threats made to said defendant of any kind, either physical or mental, and neither was he physically or mentally punished at any time prior or during the making of such statements, and that there was no hope of reward or threat of punishment. He was permitted to call his mother at least thirty minutes to an hour prior to his waiving a hearing in the magistrate's court. Defendant is a person of substantial education, having completed the tenth grade. The court concludes that the statements made by defendant to officers Chalk and O'Neal were free and voluntary in every respect. Since State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. 259, this Court has uniformly held that voluntary statements made by a defendant are admissible in evidence. State v. Rogers, 233 N.C. 390, 64 S.E.2d 572, 28 A.L.R.2d 1104; State v. Painter, 265 N.C. 277, 144 S.E.2d 6. The mere presence of officers does not render a confession incompetent. 1 Strong's N.C.Index, Criminal Law, § 71, p. 733. This Court said in State v. Barnes, 264 N.C. 517, 142 S.E.2d 344: In the establishment of a factual background by which to determine whether a confession meets the tests of admissibility, the trial court must make the findings of fact. When the facts so found are supported by competent evidence, they are conclusive on appellate courts, both State and Federal. State v. Outing, 255 N.C. 468, 121 S.E.2d 847; State v. Davis, 253 N.C. 86, 116 S.E.2d 365; certiorari denied, 365 U.S. 855, 81 S.Ct. 816, 5 L.Ed.2d 819; Watts v. State of Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347, 93 L.Ed. 1801; Lyons v. State of Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 64 S.Ct. 1208, 88 L.Ed. 1481; Lisenba v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 219, 62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166. Of course, the conclusions of law to be drawn from the facts found are not binding on the reviewing courts. In Watts, the principle is stated concisely: `(I)n all the cases that have come here    from the courts of the various States in which it was claimed that the admission of coerced confessions vitiated convictions for murder, there has been complete agreement that any conflict in testimony as to what actually led to a contested confession is not this Court's concern. Such conflict comes here authoritatively resolved by the State's adjudication.' The trial judge's findings of fact are amply supported by the evidence. Defendant himself testified: No one threatened me that night not as I recall. They were real nice to me. And upon his findings of fact his Honor properly drew the legal conclusion that this defendant's extrajudicial confession was made freely and voluntarily. Consequently, the extrajudicial confession of guilt by this defendant was properly admitted in evidence against him. State v. Warren, 235 N.C. 117, 68 S.E.2d 779, and Gallegos v. State of Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325, 87 A.L.R.2d 614, relied on by defendant, are factually distinguishable. Defendant contends the trial judge erred in concluding as a matter of law that this defendant was not illegally held at the time he made the extrajudicial confession. Defendant contends he was illegally held at the time he made the confession because of the provisions of G.S. § 15-47. Even if this defendant was being illegally held at the time he made the confession, which we do not admit, that fact taken singly, under the facts here, is not sufficient to render his confession, otherwise voluntary, involuntary as a matter of law and incompetent as evidence. The statute does not so provide. State v. Exum, 213 N.C. 16, 195 S.E. 7; State v. Brown, 233 N.C. 202, 63 S.E.2d 99. Defendant's second and last assignment of error is overruled. In the trial of George Albert McNeill, we find No error.