Opinion ID: 163583
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the district court stated its reasons for departure with specificity.

Text: 16 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2), a district court must set forth, in a written order of judgment, its reasons for departure with specificity. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). In this case, in its October 8, 2002, judgment, the district court concluded that Jones' conduct fell outside the heartland of involuntary manslaughter cases sufficient to warrant an upward departure. The district court based its conclusion on the following three factors: (1) the significant danger to public safety created by Jones' conduct, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.14; (2) the multiple deaths, all within a single family, that resulted from Jones' criminal conduct, pursuant to the background commentary to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4; and (3) the extreme recklessness of Jones' conduct. Thus, the district court satisfied section 3553(c)(2)'s requirement of a written order and judgment setting forth the specific reasons for departure. 17 2. Whether the district court relied on impermissible factors in concluding that Jones' conduct fell outside the heartland of involuntary manslaughter cases. 18 In determining whether to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines, a district court must determine whether the case falls within the heartland of cases embodying the conduct contemplated by each guideline, or whether some aggravating or mitigating circumstance renders the case atypical or unusual. United States v. Whiteskunk, 162 F.3d 1244, 1248 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 93, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996)). As the Supreme Court noted in Koon: 19 The Guidelines ... place essentially no limit on the number of potential factors that may warrant a departure. The Commission set forth factors courts may not consider under any circumstances but made clear that with those exceptions, it does not intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case. 20 518 U.S. at 106, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In addition to the restrictions set forth in the Guidelines, we must also consider whether the factors the district court relied upon advance the objectives set forth in section 3553(a)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(B)(i). 21 With this in mind, we proceed to consider the three factors the district court relied upon in making its heartland determination. 22 a. The district court's factors advance the objectives set forth in section 3553(a)(2) and do not violate any restriction set forth in the Guidelines. 23 First, with respect to the district court's reliance on the significant danger to public safety created by Jones' conduct, U.S.S.G. § 5K2.14 specifically provides that if [public] safety was significantly endangered [by the defendant's conduct], the court may increase the sentence above the guideline range to reflect the nature and circumstances of the offense. Consistent with section 5K2.14, we have previously recognized that, in determining whether a case falls within the heartland of involuntary manslaughter cases, a district court may properly consider the degree of danger to public safety created by the defendant's conduct. Whiteskunk, 162 F.3d at 1251-52. The degree of danger reflects on the seriousness of the offense, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 24 Second, with respect to the extreme recklessness exhibited by Jones' conduct, we held in Whiteskunk that a sentencing court may properly consider the varying degrees of recklessness in making its heartland determination. 10 See 162 F.3d at 1251-52. Indeed, [a]n extra measure of criminal depravity is precisely the type of factual circumstance the departure mechanism is designed to address, United States v. Smith, 133 F.3d 737, 751 (10th Cir.1997), inasmuch as the degree of recklessness bears heavily on the seriousness of the offense, accord 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 25 Further, in Whiteskunk, we expressly sanctioned the district court's reliance on the defendant's blood-alcohol level and prior conviction for drunk driving in considering the degree of recklessness exhibited by the defendant's conduct. 162 F.3d at 1252. In this case, as in Whiteskunk, Jones' blood-alcohol level was more than twice the legal limit. 11 In addition, Jones had five previous drunk-driving convictions, putting him on notice of [his] propensity to drink and drive and the dangerousness of such conduct. Id. at 1252-53; accord id. at 1251 n. 2 (citing cases). Thus, the district court properly considered these two specific facts in concluding that Jones' conduct exhibited extreme recklessness and created a significant danger to public safety. 26 Finally, we consider the district court's third basis for departure: the multiple deaths, all within a single family, that resulted from Jones' criminal conduct. We have previously noted, in dicta, that [m]ultiple deaths resulting from [a] defendant's conduct ... presents a permissible ground for departure from the standard involuntary manslaughter Guideline range. Whiteskunk, 162 F.3d at 1250; cf. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.1 (recognizing multiple deaths as an appropriate factor). In this case, however, Jones was convicted on three separate counts for the three deaths that resulted from his conduct, and the district court considered these counts in determining Jones' adjusted offense level. Thus, the fact that multiple deaths occurred, standing alone, cannot support the district court's decision to depart in this case. 27 The district court concluded, however, that, in killing a mother, father, and infant child, Jones' conduct was extraordinary, and that the multiple counts attributed to the [three] deaths ... do[ ] not contemplate the tragedy that occurred here. As the district court noted, [t]he normal tragedy of multiple deaths was worsened by the complete elimination of one branch of [two] different families. We find the district court's reasoning persuasive. Cf. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4 (recognizing that, in unusual circumstances, the Guidelines' approach for determining the base offense level for multiple counts could produce adjustments for the additional counts that are inadequate). Thus, we hold that the district court properly considered the unusual circumstance of killing an entire family in making its heartland determination. Accord 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (noting the need for the sentence imposed to provide just punishment). 28 b. The district court did not engage in impermissible double counting in basing its decision to depart vertically, in part, on Jones' prior drunk-driving convictions. 29 Jones argues, however, that the district court engaged in impermissible double counting, insofar as the district court increased his criminal-history score based on his prior criminal convictions and increased his offense level, based, in part, on his prior criminal convictions for drunk driving. We disagree. 30 We have previously held that a district court may consider prior criminal convictions in determining both the appropriate criminal-history level and offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Alessandroni, 982 F.2d 419, 423 (10th Cir.1992). In reaching this conclusion, we focused on the distinct purposes furthered by the two categories. Id. Whereas the offense level reflects the seriousness of the offense, the criminal history score reflects an assessment of the individual and the need to increase the sentence incrementally to deter the defendant from further criminal activity. 12 Id.; see also United States v. Campbell, 967 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir.1992) ([I]t may be appropriate to count a single factor both in assessing the defendant's criminal history category and in calculating the applicable offense level since the two measure different things.). 31 We recognize that Alessandroni is distinguishable from the instant case, in that the court in Alessandroni found that Congress expressly provided for consideration of the prior felony conviction in both the criminal-history category and the offense-level calculation. 13 Nevertheless, the court's rationale is equally applicable to the district court's dual use in the present case. Under Alessandroni, a prior criminal conviction is relevant in determining the proper criminal-history category, insofar as it bears on the likelihood of recidivism, and it is also relevant, in certain circumstances, in determining the seriousness of the offense, 982 F.2d at 423, for example, as it relates to the defendant's scienter, see Whiteskunk, 162 F.3d at 1252-53. 32 Here, the district court found that [Jones'] conduct was excessively reckless and so disrespectful of human life that [it] approache[d][a] deliberate or intentional act[ ]. Thus, with respect to the district court's use of Jones' prior criminal convictions in determining the appropriate offense level, the district court relied on Jones' prior drunk-driving convictions as evidence of the deliberateness of his conduct. 14 As in Whiteskunk, Jones' five previous drunk-driving convictions placed him on notice of [his] propensity to drink and drive and the dangerousness of such conduct. Id. at 1252-53. Accordingly, the district court logically concluded that Jones' prior drunk-driving convictions increased the seriousness of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A); see Alessandroni, 982 F.2d at 423. 33 Based on the above, we reject Jones' contention that the district court's reliance on his prior criminal convictions in deciding to depart vertically constituted impermissible double counting. 15 34 c. Summary 35 In conclusion, all three factors the district court relied upon were permissible, insofar as the factors advanced the objectives set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), see 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(B)(i), and did not run afoul of any specific prohibition in the Guidelines, Koon, 518 U.S. at 106, 116 S.Ct. 2035. 36 3. Whether the district court erred in concluding that, based on the aforementioned factors, Jones' conduct fell outside the heartland of involuntary manslaughter cases. 37 We must next consider whether the factors the district court relied upon in making its heartland determination were authorized under section 3553(b) and justified by the facts of the case. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(B)(ii)-(iii). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), a district court may depart if there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. 38 In this case, the district court concluded that Jones' case was outside the heartland of involuntary manslaughter cases, based on the factors discussed in section II.B.1, supra. In reaching its conclusion, the district court relied on the factual similarity between the present case and Whiteskunk, a prior Tenth Circuit case in which we upheld the district court's decision to depart. Based on Whiteskunk, we agree with the district court that the departure factors ... remove[d] [Jones' conduct] from the applicable Guideline heartland [sufficient to] warrant[ ] a departure. Collins, 122 F.3d at 1303. Thus, the district court based its departure determination on factors authorized under section 3553(b). 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(B)(ii). Further, the factors the district court relied upon were justified by the facts of the case. Id. § 3742(e)(3)(B)(iii). 39 4. Whether the district court's degree of departure was reasonable. 40 Finally, we must consider whether the district court's sentence depart[ed] to an unreasonable degree from the applicable guidelines range. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(C). In determining whether the degree of departure is reasonable..., `the appellate court should afford the trial court some discretion, as we should not lightly overturn determinations of the appropriate degree of departure.' Goldberg, 295 F.3d at 1138 (quoting United States v. Flinn, 987 F.2d 1497, 1504 (10th Cir.1993)). In reviewing the reasonableness of the district court's degree of departure, we consider the following factors: `the seriousness of the offense, the need for just punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, correctional treatment, the sentencing pattern of the Guidelines, the policy statements contained in the Guidelines, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.' Collins, 122 F.3d at 1308-09 (quoting United States v. White, 893 F.2d 276, 278 (10th Cir.1990)) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). As we noted in United States v. Jackson: 41 Although formulas of mathematical exactitude are neither required nor possible, the district court should articulate the objective criteria used as a basis for determining the actual sentence imposed. In many instances, this will consist of an extension of or extrapolation from other guideline levels or principles, or use of an analogy to other closely related conduct or circumstances that are addressed by the guidelines. 42 921 F.2d 985, 990-91 (10th Cir.1990). 43 In this case, the district court departed upward one level based on the significant danger to public safety created by Jones' conduct. As the district court's degree of departure — one level — represents the minimum upward departure the court could have imposed, and in light of the Guidelines' express sanction of this departure factor, see U.S.S.G. § 5K2.14, we find that the district court's departure was reasonable. 16 With respect to the upward departure for the multiple deaths within a single family unit, we reach the same conclusion. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4 (recognizing that, in unusual circumstances, the Guidelines' approach for determining the base offense level for multiple counts could produce adjustments for the additional counts that are inadequate); cf. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.1 (recognizing multiple deaths as an appropriate departure factor). 44 Regarding the five-level upward departure for the extreme recklessness of Jones' conduct, however, we have some concerns with the district court's analogy to brandishing a firearm under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1. Although [a] sentence imposed based upon either extrapolation or analogy from the guidelines will ordinarily meet the requirements of proportionality and uniformity, United States v. Kalady, 941 F.2d 1090, 1101 (10th Cir.1991), we have indicated that the methodology must be `reasonable,' Collins, 122 F.3d at 1309. 45 The provision upon which the district court relied, section 2B3.1, distinguishes between a firearm and other types of dangerous weapon[s]. Thus, even assuming 17 that the district court's reliance on section 2B3.1 was appropriate in this context, the district court, in analogizing a drunk driver in a Ford Bronco to a firearm, as opposed to a dangerous weapon, proceeded in direct contravention of the Guidelines' express language. See Kalady, 941 F.2d at 1101 ([T]he task of ... the sentencing court ... is to attempt to predict what the Sentencing Commission would have established as a guideline range had it adequately considered the circumstances justifying the departure.). Thus, in relying on section 2B3.1, the district court should have, at most, imposed a four-level increase (based on the use of a dangerous weapon), rather than a five-level increase. 46 That said, we do not impose [the use of an analogy] as a mechanical formula. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 993. Further, under Williams v. United States, we should not remand if we are satisfied, as we are, that the district court would have imposed the same sentence had it not relied upon the improper analogy. 503 U.S. 193, 203-04, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992). A sentence ... can be `reasonable' even if some of the reasons given by the district court to justify the departure from the presumptive guideline range are invalid, provided that the remaining reasons are sufficient to justify the magnitude of the departure. Id. at 204, 112 S.Ct. 1112. 47 Insofar as the district court's methodology would have been reasonable had it analogized Jones' conduct to the use 18 of a dangerous weapon 19 — rather than the brandishing of a firearm — we may reduce the district court's five-level increase accordingly, resulting in a four-level increase for Jones' extreme recklessness. Accord U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 (providing for a four-level increase where a dangerous weapon was used in an aggravated assault). Further, the district court concluded that Jones' offense level should be increased at least two levels, based on the presence of the other two factors; we agree, and find that a three-level increase would have remained within the boundaries of reasonableness. 48 In light of the above, we conclude that the district court's seven-level upward departure was reasonable despite the use of an improper analogy; thus, we need not remand to the district court for resentencing. See United States v. O'Dell, 965 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir.1992).