Opinion ID: 1162670
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Substantive Due Process Analysis.

Text: [6, 7] Even if a regulation is not susceptible to a taking challenge because it does not deny a fundamental attribute of property ownership and is purely an exercise of the police power designed to protect the public health, safety and welfare from harm, the regulation is still subject to substantive due process scrutiny for reasonableness. The inquiry here must be whether the police power (rather than the eminent domain power) has exceeded its constitutional limits. Presbytery, at 330. The 3-prong due process test is applied, which inquires: (1) whether the regulation aims to achieve a legitimate public purpose, (2) whether the means adopted are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose, and (3) whether the regulation is unduly oppressive on the property owner. Presbytery, at 330; see also West Main Assocs. v. Bellevue, 106 Wn.2d 47, 52, 720 P.2d 782 (1986). The first and second parts of this test are often easily met by challenged government action. The third part is a more difficult determination. Accordingly, in Presbytery, this court adopted the following set of guidelines for the third inquiry for a determination that a regulation was unduly oppressive: The unduly oppressive inquiry lodges wide discretion in the court and implies a balancing of the public's interest against those of the regulated landowner. We have suggested several factors for the court to consider to assist it in determining whether a regulation is overly oppressive, namely: the nature of the harm sought to be avoided; the availability and effectiveness of less drastic protective measures; and the economic loss suffered by the property owner. Presbytery, at 331 (citing Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wn.2d 621, 655 n. 24, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987) ( Orion II), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988). This court also has noted a set of nonexclusive factors for guidance in performing the unduly oppressive balancing test: On the public's side, the seriousness of the public problem, the extent to which the owner's land contributes to it, the degree to which the proposed regulation solves it and the feasibility of less oppressive solutions would all be relevant. On the owner's side, the amount and percentage of value loss, the extent of remaining uses, past, present and future uses, temporary or permanent nature of the regulation, the extent to which the owner should have anticipated such regulation and how feasible it is for the owner to alter present or currently planned uses. Presbytery, at 331 (citing Stoebuck, San Diego Gas: Problems, Pitfalls and a Better Way, 25 Wash. U.J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 3, 33 (1983)). If the regulation fails to meet any of the three prongs of the substantive due process analysis, then it is subject to invalidation. Under Presbytery, [n]o compensation (which properly belongs with a `taking' analysis) is warranted in the face of a due process violation. Presbytery, at 332. We repeat that a violation of a plaintiff's rights to substantive due process (that is, reasonable regulation) may under limited circumstances form the basis for independent federal statutory relief through a section 1983 action, which affords a damages remedy. The measure of these damages may differ from the just compensation measure.