Opinion ID: 1551335
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whitman's Pachisi A Game of India

Text: Thereupon, plaintiff filed its amended complaint asking that the defendant be restrained from such manufacture and sale, and the preliminary injunction was extended to cover the proposed use. At the hearing it appeared that the defendant was threatening to sell its game, which would retail at twenty-five cents, in competition with plaintiff's game which retailed at one dollar. There was a deceptive likeness between the appearance of the game which defendant originally manufactured and distributed to the trade and the plaintiff's dollar game. However, at the trial it was satisfactorily established that defendant had withdrawn from the trade the game which was similar in appearance to plaintiff's dollar game. The evidence further showed that plaintiff had distributed to the trade a twenty-five cent game of Parcheesi as early as February 1939, and that this game had an entirely different outside dress and appearance from either plaintiff's dollar game or defendant's twenty-five cent game. Further evidence disclosed that plaintiff had been selling games which retailed at two dollars and five dollars respectively, and each had a different appearance from either of the games presented at the hearing for the injunction. Defendant first contended that the trademark was invalid because of the manner of its registration, in that it was fraudulently obtained through misrepresentation. It further contended that plaintiff had abandoned its trademark by operation of law. Both of these contentions were decided adversely to the defendant, and we think the court, under the evidence and findings, did not err in either of these rulings. Prior to the passage of the 1905 Act, trademark registration under the federal statutes had been denied to words which consisted of a name of a party, or which were generic or descriptive of goods with which they were used, or which were merely geographical names, or which indicated the place of origin. Under section 5 of the 1905 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 85, which included what is referred to as the ten year clause, that disability was removed with respect to trademarks such as had been used by appellant or its predecessors, in foreign or interstate commerce, and which had been in actual and exclusive use as trademarks for ten years next preceding the passage of the Act. In Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U.S. 461, 34 S.Ct. 648, 58 L.Ed. 1046, it was held that the Act of 1905 was not intended to change the common law principles of trademarks. The courts have held that the only rights given to the owner of a mark registered under the ten year clause which he did not have at common law are the right to institute suits for infringement in the federal courts irrespective of diversity of citizenship, and without the necessity of showing wrongful intent on the part of the defendant. The District Court therefore concluded that the applicable tests in this case were the old common law rules of unfair competition with the exception of the requirement of proof of an attempt to defraud. See Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 59 S.Ct. 191, 83 L.Ed. 195. The ruling of the District Court in this respect, we think, was proper, and the only question left for determination is whether the plaintiff is entitled under the common law to exclude the defendant from the use of the word Pachisi. Under the ruling of Selchow v. Chaffee & Selchow Co., C.C., 132 F. 996, the defendant had the right to use the name Pachisi, which was the correct name for a game in the Hindu language, unless by so doing it worked fraud upon the purchasing public by palming off on them something which they believed to be the product of plaintiff. There is no substantial evidence in this case to prove that there was any fraud or palming off with respect to the defendant's product unless it can be said that the word Parcheesi has acquired a secondary meaning, that is to say that in the minds of the purchasing public, it means the producer rather than the product. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 59 S.Ct. 109, 83 L.Ed. 73; Steem-Electric Corp. v. Herzfeld-Phillipson Co., 7 Cir., 118 F.2d 122. The District Court was of the opinion that that word had not acquired a secondary meaning. That court very properly said: Not one purchaser in a thousand would know or care whether Selchow and Righter Company was the manufacturer. The fact is that the public in general knows `Parcheesi' as a game and not as an article made by the plaintiff. 47 F.Supp. 322, 326. The court further stated, As defendant discontinued the use of the name `Parchesi' prior to the time of the trial and has indicated that it had no intention of using that name in the future, the temporary injunction heretofore entered may be vacated, and judgment in this action will go for the defendant. We find no error in the court's rulings. Affirmed.