Opinion ID: 1092213
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Quash for Improper Venue

Text: The defendant argues that the State is unable to prove he committed a crime in Jefferson Parish, therefore Jefferson is a place of improper venue. He contends that none of the alleged elements of the crime were committed in Jefferson Parish. The State on the other hand maintains that the distribution of the drug should be viewed as a continuous crime and that it is not complete until delivery has been made. The defendant alleges that the State has not proven it was Gentry who deposited the package with Associated. La.Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 611 provides: All trials shall take place in the parish where the offense has been committed, unless the venue is changed. If acts constituting an offense or if the elements of an offense occurred in more than one place, in or out of the parish or state, the offense is deemed to have been committed in any parish in which any such act or element occurred. La.Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 615 provides: Improper venue may be raised by motion to quash, and in such case the motion shall be tried by the judge alone. Even if the issue of venue has been passed upon by the judge prior to trial, the State on the trial shall have the burden of proving proper venue beyond a reasonable doubt. If an offense is continuing in the sense that part of the offense is committed in one parish and another part in another parish, it falls within the scope of this article. La.Code Crim.Proc. Art. 611, comment (d). This comment is referring particularly to the second sentence of Art. 611 whereby action against the defendant can be brought in any parish where it has been determined that the elements of the crime were committed. The court of appeal was correct in their conclusion that the transfer of possession or control, i.e. distribution, is not limited to an actual physical transfer between the culpable parties. State v. Lewis, 328 So.2d 75 (La.1976). Rather, distribution may be accomplished by the imposition of a third party. In the instant case, the defendant delivered a controlled dangerous substance through the help of the third party, Associated. They in turn transferred the package for Gentry to DHL within Jefferson Parish. The trial court could reasonably conclude that the delivery to and the presence of the cocaine in Jefferson Parish constituted a continuing crime, thus Jefferson had venue. LSA-CCrP Article 611. Jurisprudence has held that although venue must be proved by the State to the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt, on a pre-trial motion the trial judge is not required to find that the crime was committed by this evidentiary standard, but only that venue is proper by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Frank, 355 So.2d 912 (La.1978). Here, the State has satisfied its burden in proving venue in this pre-trial motion by a preponderance of the evidence. It is logical to conclude that a person is still committing and carrying out the act and intent of distribution, when he deposits contraband with a courier for transport overseas. It is impractical and legally unsound to limit the State's prosecution only to the two geographic points of shipment and arrival. The fact that the courier is or is not aware that his actions are aiding criminal activity does not exculpate the distributor. His intent to distribute the illegal material is still developing and his guilt is not neutralized simply because he is not in physical possession of the drugs. Thus the crime is a continuous one and is not complete until the drugs reach their final destination. If the package is intercepted and inspected and drugs are discovered, it is also logical to conclude that jurisdiction or venue is proper for this continuing crime at the point of interception. U.S. v. Brunty, 701 F.2d 1375 (11th Cir.1983); U.S. v. Davis, 666 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.1982); U.S. v. Godwin, 546 F.2d 145 (5th Cir.1977); U.S. v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907 (9th Cir.1973); U.S. v. Jackson, 482 F.2d 1167 (10th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1159, 94 S.Ct. 918, 39 L.Ed.2d 222 (1974). The activities in the above cited cases all involved importation of a narcotic drug. In the present case we have exportation. This is simply a distinction without a difference. Under the reasoning of these federal cases, the alleged distribution of cocaine by Gentry from New Orleans to France was a continuing offense that would not be completed until it reached its final destination in France. Thus venue would be proper in this case in Orleans Parish, where it was placed for delivery, and in Jefferson Parish, a distribution point along the way to its place of final destination.