Opinion ID: 1388553
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Expert Opinion on the Death Penalty

Text: Dr. Haney gave extensive direct examination testimony about defendant's pedophilia, paranoid personality, borderline retardation, and past inappropriate care. On cross-examination, Dr. Haney revealed that he had testified many times in death penalty trials  always for the defense. Over defendant's relevance objection, the prosecutor asked Dr. Haney whether he was opposed to the death penalty. He said he did not oppose it per se. When the witness was asked whether he opposed it in this case, he said, yes. On redirect examination, defendant asked Dr. Haney to explain the last answer. The court sustained the prosecutor's relevance objection before an explanation was given. The prosecution eventually called Dr. Missett, a psychiatrist, in rebuttal. On direct examination, he testified that defendant was a predatory pedophile who suffered from no neurological disease or psychosis, showed signs of an antisocial personality disorder, and resisted legitimate treatment efforts. On cross-examination, defendant asked Dr. Missett whether he was in favor of the death penalty in this case. The court commented that the witness could answer yes or no and could explain his answer. Defendant objected, noting that Dr. Haney had not been allowed to give a similar explanation. The court overruled the objection. Dr. Missett testified that he did not oppose the death penalty here because defendant committed a vicious crime, had no mental disease, and rejected past treatment opportunities. The jury was excused for the day. Defendant immediately moved for a mistrial on grounds Dr. Haney should have been allowed to explain his answer and rebut any inference of personal bias about the death penalty. The prosecutor offered to prepare a jury instruction limiting consideration of expert testimony about the death penalty to its potential bearing on bias. Penalty phase instruction began the next morning. Before the jury entered the courtroom, defendant raised a minor objection to the prosecutor's proposed instruction concerning expert opinion on the death penalty. The court agreed to modify the instruction in the manner urged by defendant. It also offered either to strike Dr. Missett's explanation for favoring the death penalty, or to allow Dr. Haney to state the reasons underlying his contrary opinion. The prosecution said it had no objection in either case. After a brief recess, defendant said Dr. Haney could not be reached by phone. The court denied defendant's mistrial motion, and called the jury into the courtroom. It then instructed the jury, as promised, to completely disregard any of the reasons that Dr. Missett gave for favoring the death penalty. [41] The court also eventually read the instruction approved by both parties. It said that both experts had testified regarding their respective views on the death penalty. This testimony was not offered for the purpose of determining whether or not the death penalty is appropriate in this case. Rather, [it] was offered and may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining what, if any, bias the witness has for or against the death penalty, and the extent to which such bias ... bears on your evaluation of [the witness's] credibility. [¶] The question of which penalty to impose is a matter for your determination, and you may not take into account any opinion expressed by any expert witness as to which penalty should be imposed. (33) Defendant first argues that the court erred in allowing any questions about the death penalty. He views all such testimony as incompetent expert opinion on the ultimate issue. We disagree. Questions seeking to elicit a partisan expert's philosophical views on capital punishment might disclose some bias bearing on the expert's credibility as a witness at the penalty phase. (See Evid. Code, §§ 210, 780, subd. (f).) Here, the instruction approved by both parties allowed the jury to consider expert opinion on the death penalty only for this limited purpose. Nevertheless, we disapprove questions posed to each expert about whether and/or why they favored or opposed death  in this case.  (Italics added.) Detailed testimony on this issue might lead the jury to confuse expert opinion on a pertinent mental condition with an opinion on the appropriate punishment. At a minimum, direct testimony on the latter issue would not assist the jury in making its normative, individualized penalty determination. (See Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) In future cases, trial courts should preclude examination of an expert witness on the appropriateness of death in a particular case. Nevertheless, any impropriety here was clearly harmless. Counterbalancing testimony was given by each expert  one favored death and the other opposed it in this case. The jury was also told that such testimony could not be considered in determining the appropriate penalty for defendant's crimes, and that it was relevant only on the limited question of bias. Finally, the penalty jury heard overwhelming graphic evidence in aggravation and extensive conflicting evidence about defendant's psychological history and condition. There is no reasonable possibility that competing experts' predictable views on sentencing could have affected the jury's verdict. (34) Defendant also contends the trial court erred in allowing only the prosecution's expert, Dr. Missett, to state the reasons underlying his opinion about the death penalty in this case. However, no one-sided rehabilitation occurred. We can only assume the jury followed the court's first instruction and  completely disregard [ed] this portion of Dr. Missett's testimony. (Italics added.)