Opinion ID: 71762
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Age Discrimination under the ADEA and the TCHRA

Text: Only four appellants present properly exhausted age discrimination claims: Davis, Jacobs, Jefferson, and Potier. The district court concluded after extensive analysis that appellants’ age discrimination claims failed for two independent reasons: 1) termination of older employees to cut costs and prevent the vesting of pension benefits does not constitute age discrimination under the ADEA and TCHRA as a matter of law; and 2) appellants could not make out a prima facie case on the record before the district court. We agree with the district court’s first ground of decision and, therefore, need not address whether appellants could make out a prima facie case or the attendant discovery issues advanced in the appellate briefing. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993), holds that an employer’s decision to take an adverse employment action because of an employee’s seniority or because an employee’s pension is about to vest does not, in itself, 9 Case: 09-20410 Document: 00511048299 Page: 10 Date Filed: 03/11/2010 No. 09-20410 violate the ADEA. Applying Hazen, we have subsequently held that “the ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age, not salary or seniority.” Armendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co., 58 F.3d 144, 152 (5th Cir. 1995). The testimony cited by appellants as grounds for reversal does not change, and in part directly supports, the outcome dictated by Hazen and Armendariz. c. Race and National Origin Discrimination under Title VII, the TCHRA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Turning next to appellants’ race and national origin claims, the district court concluded below that all of appellants’ claims under all of the applicable statutes failed because 1) appellants’ could not make out a prima facie case as to any of their claims and 2) none of the appellants’ eight attempts to demonstrate pretext in response to appellees’ proffer of a legitimate reason for termination had merit. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that appellants’ fail to make out a prima facie case as to any of their race or national origin discrimination claims, and, again, we do not reach the question of pretext. To establish a prima facie case of race or national origin discrimination, a plaintiff must show she: 1) is a member of a protected class; 2) was qualified for the position at issue; 3) was subjected to an adverse employment action; and 4) was replaced by someone outside the protected class, or that other similarly situated persons were treated more favorably. McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007).9 Only the fourth element – treatment of similarly situated employees – is in dispute. Appellants have failed to adduce or cite any evidence in the record demonstrating that other similarly situated employees were treated differently by appellees. In their briefing, appellants point to the following items as 9 Appellants’ assert on appeal without citation that only the first three elements discussed in McCoy are required to make out a prima facie case. As McCoy itself demonstrates, this argument is wholly without merit. McCoy, 492 F.3d at 556. 10 Case: 09-20410 Document: 00511048299 Page: 11 Date Filed: 03/11/2010 No. 09-20410 summary judgment evidence satisfying the fourth element of the prima facie case: 1) the Smilex Proctored Tests List; 2) the Smilex RSP Training System Summary Report; 3) excerpts of Willman’s deposition testimony; and 4) Keith Moffitt’s affidavit.10 As noted above, appellants’ have failed to appeal the district court’s exclusion of Keith Moffitt’s affidavit. The citations to Willman’s deposition either do not support appellants’ argument or misrepresent her testimony. As such, the only items of competent summary judgment evidence advanced by appellants are the Proctored Test List and the Summary Report. Neither of these items, however, make out a prima facie case. First, the Proctored Test List actually cuts against appellants in that it shows appellees’ retest policy was applied to at least one non-minority individual, Keith Moffitt. Second, the Summary Report, as explained by the district court, does not contain sufficient information to make out a prima facie case. Appellants have repeatedly relied upon a chart created by their counsel using the Summary Report to demonstrate appellees’ disparate treatment of white employees. Yet the Summary Report does not include any information regarding the race or national origin of these supposed comparators. Appellants attempt to identify the races 11 of these comparators using the Moffitt Affidavit 12 notwithstanding 10 We note that these four items were not the only parts of the record cited by appellants. Instead, appellants included numerous citations that either failed to support the contention advanced or misrepresented the contents of the record. Appellants also alleged new arguments to support their disparate treatment claims in their appeal. Specifically, appellants argue for the first time on appeal that: 1) they were passed over for promotions in favor of white employees and 2) appellees allowed white employees, their families, and their pets to seek shelter in Christus’s facility during Hurricane Rita but refused similar treatment to black employees. Arguments such as these, presented for the first time on appeal, are waived. LeMaire v. Louisiana, 480 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[A]rguments not raised before the district court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). 11 Appellants make no effort in any of their briefing to identify the national origins of the alleged comparators or explain their failure to do so. 12 Appellants appear to concede in their reply brief that the Moffitt Affidavit is the only source of the missing comparator information when they assert that: “The allegations were 11 Case: 09-20410 Document: 00511048299 Page: 12 Date Filed: 03/11/2010 No. 09-20410 the fact that it is not before the court.13 Accordingly, appellants have failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of race or national origin discrimination as to all appellants. 2. Appellants’ 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Retaliation Claims The district court granted summary judgment on appellants’ § 1981 retaliation claims for two reasons: 1) appellants failed to state a plausible claim for relief as to retaliation in their Third Amended Complaint; and 2) appellants failed to advance competent summary judgment evidence demonstrating they had engaged in protected activity. Appellants’ address the merits of this claim only in their reply brief. Accordingly, any claimed error as to the grant of summary judgment on appellants’ § 1981 retaliation claims has been waived. See Tharling v. City of Port Lavaca, 329 F.3d 422, 430 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief). 3. Appellants’ Hostile Work Environment and Disparate Impact Claims Finally, we address appellants’ claim that the district court erred in dismissing their hostile work environment and disparate impact claims. Appellants’ Third Amended Complaint does not reference either a hostile work environment claim or a disparate impact claim. The facts included in the complaint do not describe a hostile work environment claim or a disparate based also in part on the evidence in the declaration of Keith Moffitt . . . who identified the races of the employees listed on the Smilex summary report below.” (emphasis in original). 13 Though appellants also claim they were afforded insufficient discovery, they failed to move for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) and therefore have waived this argument on appeal. United States v. Bloom, 112 F.3d 200, 205 n.17 (5th Cir. 1997) (failure to move under Rule 56(f) waives a party’s complaint that the district court ruled after inadequate discovery); Potter v. Delta Air Lines, 98 F.3d 881, 887 (5th Cir. 1996) (failure to seek relief under Rule 56(f) “foreclose[s] [a party] from arguing that [it] did not have adequate time for discovery”); see generally 11 JAM ES WM . MOORE ET AL ., MOORE ’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.10(8)(b) (2010) (discussing the appellate consequences of failure to make a Rule 56(f) motion). 12 Case: 09-20410 Document: 00511048299 Page: 13 Date Filed: 03/11/2010 No. 09-20410 impact claim. Neither of these claims are discussed anywhere in appellants’ 61page response to appellees’ original motion of summary judgment. The first time appellants in any way suggest they are advancing either claim appears in their improperly filed sur-reply. As the district court correctly explained below, a plaintiff may not rely on new claims raised for the first time in a response – let alone a sur-reply – to a motion for summary judgment. See Cutrera v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 113 (5th Cir. 2005) (“A claim which is not raised in the complaint, but, rather, is raised only in response to a motion for summary judgment is not properly before the court.”). Additionally, “[c]onclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy the nonmovant’s burden in a motion for summary judgment,” Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted), much less make out a claim. Accordingly, we agree with the decision below that the appellants’ hostile work environment and disparate impact claims were not properly before the court.