Opinion ID: 2085558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Double Enhancement: Sentencing

Text: Next, the State argues that the appellate court erred in concluding that the imposition of consecutive sentences in this case constituted an improper double enhancement. We agree. Defendant was found guilty of aggravated kidnapping and heinous battery. The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of 15 years for the aggravated kidnapping and 30 years for the heinous battery. In imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court relied upon section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections, which provides: The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, unless, one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury    in which event the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1996). On appeal, defendant argued that he was subjected to an improper double enhancement because the factor relied upon to impose consecutive sentencesthe infliction of severe bodily injuryis already an element of the offenses for which he was convicted. The appellate court agreed and modified defendant's sentences to run concurrently. 329 Ill.App.3d at 12, 263 Ill. Dec. 408, 768 N.E.2d 168. Generally, a factor implicit in the offense for which the defendant has been convicted cannot be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing for that offense. People v. Ferguson, 132 Ill.2d 86, 96, 138 Ill.Dec. 262, 547 N.E.2d 429 (1989). Stated differently, a single factor cannot be used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed. People v. Gonzalez, 151 Ill.2d 79, 83-84, 175 Ill.Dec. 731, 600 N.E.2d 1189 (1992). Such dual use of a single factor is often referred to as a double enhancement. Gonzalez, 151 Ill.2d at 85, 175 Ill.Dec. 731, 600 N.E.2d 1.189. The prohibition against double enhancements is based on the assumption that, in designating the appropriate range of punishment for a criminal offense, the legislature necessarily considered the factors inherent in the offense. People v. Rissley, 165 Ill.2d 364, 390, 209 Ill.Dec. 205, 651 N.E.2d 133 (1995). The double-enhancement rule is one of statutory construction ( Rissley, 165 Ill.2d at 390), 209 Ill.Dec. 205, 651 N.E.2d 133), and the standard of review therefore is de novo ( People v. Robinson, 172 Ill.2d 452, 457, 217 Ill.Dec. 729, 667 N.E.2d 1305 (1996)). A textbook example of double enhancement is found in People v. White, 114 Ill.2d 61, 101 Ill.Dec. 879, 499 N.E.2d 467 (1986). In White, this court held that, although it is a statutory aggravating factor, the victim's age cannot form the basis for an extended-term sentence where the defendant is convicted of aggravated battery of a child. White, 114 Ill.2d at 66, 101 Ill. Dec. 879, 499 N.E.2d 467. As White explained, in establishing aggravated battery of a child as a statutory offense separate from aggravated battery, the legislature included the victim's age as an element of the offense. As importantly, the legislature attached a higher penalty to aggravated battery of a child (then a Class 2 felony) than it did to mere aggravated battery (a Class 3 felony). Thus, the victim's age formed not only an element of the offense but also the basis for an enhanced penalty. By then using the victim's age yet again as the basis of an extended-term sentence, the trial court did exactly what the double enhancement rule is designed to preventsubjected the defendant to a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed. White, 114 Ill.2d at 66, 101 Ill.Dec. 879, 499 N.E.2d 467. Double enhancement also occurs when the same factor is used twice to elevate the severity of the offense itself. For example, in People v. Haron, 85 Ill.2d 261, 52 Ill.Dec. 625, 422 N.E.2d 627 (1981), the defendant committed a battery, which ordinarily is a Class A misdemeanor. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 12-3(b). However, because the defendant used a deadly weapon in the course of committing that battery, the State elevated the charge to aggravated battery, a Class 3 felony. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 12-4(e). The State then used the deadly weapon again to elevate the aggravated battery charge to armed violence, a Class X felony that occurs when a person commits a felony while armed with a dangerous weapon. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, pars. 33A-2, 33A-3(a). In reviewing the propriety of these charges, this court explained that the General Assembly did not intend that the presence of a weapon serve to enhance an offense from misdemeanor to felony and also to serve as the basis for charge of armed violence. Haron, 85 Ill.2d at 278, 52 Ill.Dec. 625, 422 N.E.2d 627. Accordingly, the dismissal of the armed violence charge was affirmed. Haron, 85 Ill.2d at 280, 52 Ill.Dec. 625, 422 N.E.2d 627. Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that defendant's consecutive sentences do not constitute a double enhancement. Defendant's heinous battery charge alleged that, in the course of committing a battery, defendant knowingly caused P.H. to suffer severe and permanent disability by means of a flammable substance. Thus, the infliction of severe and permanent disability was used once to enhance battery, a Class A misdemeanor punishable by less than a year in prison, to heinous battery, a Class X felony punishable by 6 to 45 years in prison. Once defendant was convicted of heinous battery, however, no further enhancements occurred. Defendant stood convicted of a Class X felony punishable by 6 to 45 years in prison, and he was sentenced to a nonextended term of 30 years in prison. Likewise, defendant's aggravated kidnapping charge alleged that, in the course of kidnapping P.H., defendant inflicted great bodily harm upon her. Thus, the infliction of great bodily harm was used once to enhance kidnapping, a Class 2 felony punishable by 3 to 7 years in prison, to aggravated kidnapping, a Class X felony punishable by 6 to 30 years in prison. Once defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, however, no further enhancements occurred. Defendant stood convicted of a Class X felony punishable by 6 to 30 years in prison, and he was sentenced to a non-extended term of 15 years in prison. Thus, the severity of each offense was enhanced only once. The fact that the trial court ordered defendant to serve his sentences consecutively does not change this outcome. To be sure, the consecutive sentencing order was premised on the fact that defendant inflicted severe bodily injury (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1996)), an element of both aggravated kidnapping and heinous battery. Nevertheless, no double enhancement' occurred because consecutive sentencing is not a sentencing enhancement. Again, a double enhancement occurs when a single factor is used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed. Gonzalez, 151 Ill.2d at 83-84, 175 Ill.Dec. 731, 600 N.E.2d 1189. In People v. Carney, 196 Ill.2d 518, 256 Ill. Dec. 895, 752 N.E.2d 1137 (2001), this court specifically held that a defendant subject to consecutive sentencing is not exposed to punishment beyond that authorized by the jury's verdict, provided that the sentence for each separate offense does not exceed the maximum permitted by statute for that offense. Carney, 196 Ill.2d at 532, 256 Ill.Dec. 895, 752 N.E.2d 1137. This is because consecutive sentencing determines only the manner in which a defendant will serve his sentences for multiple offenses. Carney, 196 Ill.2d at 532, 256 Ill.Dec. 895, 752 N.E.2d 1137. Thus, even When subject to consecutive sentencing, [e]ach conviction results in a discrete sentence that must be treated individually. (Emphases added.) Carney, 196 Ill.2d at 530, 256 Ill.Dec. 895, 752 N.E.2d 1137. In the preceding paragraph, we treated defendant's discrete sentences individually and concluded that no double enhancements occurred. Under Carney, no further inquiry is warranted. We note that, even if defendant's consecutive sentences did constitute a double enhancement, the appellate court still erred in modifying those sentences to run concurrently. The general prohibition against double enhancements is merely a rule of statutory construction, premised on the assumption that the legislature considered the factors inherent in the offense in fashioning the appropriate range of punishment for that offense. People v. Rissley, 165 Ill.2d 364, 390, 209 Ill.Dec. 205, 651 N.E.2d 133 (1995). Consequently, where the legislature clearly intends to enhance the penalty based upon some aspect of the crime, and such an intention is clearly expressed, there is no prohibition. Rissley, 165 Ill.2d at 390, 209 Ill.Dec. 205, 651 N.E.2d 133. In determining whether the legislature intended a double enhancement, we look to the statute itself as the best indication of the legislature's intent. Rissley, 165 Ill.2d at 390-91, 209 Ill.Dec. 205, 651 N.E.2d 133. The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill.2d 469, 479, 203 Ill.Dec. 463, 639 N.E.2d 1282 (1994). Under section 5-8-4(a), consecutive sentencing is mandated where one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1996). In People v. Whitney, 188 Ill.2d 91, 241 Ill.Dec. 770, 720 N.E.2d 225 (1999), this court was asked to construe this provision and decide whether, in order to qualify for consecutive sentencing, the defendant must inflict great bodily harm in the course of committing the actual Class X or Class 1 felony. This court held that he must. Whitney, 188 Ill.2d at 98-99, 241 Ill.Dec. 770, 720 N.E.2d 225. Significantly, the next question was not whether consecutive sentencing applied even to those Class X and Class 1 felonies for which severe bodily harm is an element. Rather, the question was whether consecutive sentencing applied only to those Class X and Class 1 felonies for which severe bodily harm is an element. Whitney, 188 Ill.2d at 99, 241 Ill.Dec. 770, 720 N.E.2d 225. In holding that the statute was not so narrowly drafted, this court explained that any Class X or Class 1 felony that results in severe bodily injury being inflicted on the victim of that felony triggers consecutive sentences. (Emphasis added.) Whitney, 188 Ill.2d at 99, 241 Ill.Dec. 770, 720 N.E.2d 225. Thus, in Whitney, this court took it as a given that consecutive sentencing was intended to apply to Class X and Class 1 felonies for which severe bodily harm is an element. The only question was what additional Class X and Class 1 felonies are subject to consecutive sentencing. Again, where the legislature clearly intends to enhance the penalty based upon some aspect of the crime, and such an intention is clearly expressed, there is no prohibition. Rissley, 165 Ill.2d at 390, 209 Ill.Dec. 205, 651 N.E.2d 133. As Whitney teaches, the legislature clearly intended to make consecutive sentencing applicable to Class X and Class 1 felonies for which severe bodily harm is an element. Even assuming, then, that defendant's consecutive sentences did constitute a double enhancement, they constituted a perfectly lawful double enhancement. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the appellate court's opinion modifying defendant's sentences to run concurrently.