Opinion ID: 1752541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: issues regarding prosecutor's closing argument

Text: Appellant asserts that the court erred in overruling his objection to the prosecutor's victim impact argument during the penalty phase. Appellant asserts that Article I, § 21 of the Missouri Constitution creates a per se prohibition against victim impact argument. Appellant also asserts that the prosecutor's victim impact argument violated his rights to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The federal constitution does not impose a per se bar against victim impact evidence or argument. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989)). The Missouri Constitution's limitation on victim impact evidence and argument is coextensive with the federal constitution. Under both, victim impact evidence and arguments may be relevant and admissible at the penalty phase. Payne, 501 U.S. at 827, 111 S.Ct. at 2609 (A State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Mo. banc 1992). Victim impact evidence and argument violates the constitution if it is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S.Ct. at 2608. The prosecutor's references to victim impact here were brief, light, and general. The prosecutor did not delve into the victim's personal characteristics or relative worth. No family members testified as to their loss or emotional distress. The statements did not remove reason from the sentencing process, nor did they inject caprice and emotion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant's objection. Appellant asserts that the trial court plainly erred in allowing the prosecutor to make various improper arguments during closing. Appellate review of assertions of plain error in a prosecution's closing argument pressures trial courts into the situation of uninvited interference with summation and a corresponding increase in the risk of error by such intervention. State v. Clemmons, 753 S.W.2d 901, 907-08 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948, 109 S.Ct. 380, 102 L.Ed.2d 369 (1988); see also State v. Kempker, 824 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Mo. banc 1992) (A holding that would require the judge to interrupt counsel presents myriad problems.). Because appellant did not object, any errors are deemed waived. State v. McMillin, 783 S.W.2d 82, 98 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 225, 112 L.Ed.2d 179 (1990). Gratuitous review reveals no plain error.