Opinion ID: 497986
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inmate Classification Status

Text: 13 Magistrate Burgess correctly concluded that a prisoner has no constitutional right to a particular classification status. In Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 97 S.Ct. 274, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1976), the Supreme Court, in a footnote, expressly rejected a claim that prisoner classification and eligibility for rehabilitative programs in the federal system invoked due process protections. 429 U.S. at 88 n. 9, 97 S.Ct. at 279. 14 The Court's reading of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in Moody leads to a similar conclusion under the Fourteenth Amendment in this case. Nor is such a right created by Washington state law. Wash.Rev.Code Ann. Chapter 72.13, which governs classification, does not impose particularized standards or criteria sufficient to satisfy Baumann, 754 F.2d at 844. The Supreme Court of Washington, analyzing analogous statutory and regulatory provisions, has held that a state prisoner does not have a liberty interest in a particular classification status. In re Dowell, 100 Wash.2d 770, 773-74 674 P.2d 666, 668 (1984) (en banc). 15 A different question might be presented if a prisoner's classification adversely affected his eligibility for parole or good time credits. We expressly decline to decide that issue.