Opinion ID: 471701
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Habitual Offender Charge.

Text: 27 The New Mexico Habitual Criminal Act, N.M.Stat.Ann. Secs. 31-18-17 to 31-18-20 (1978 & Supp.1981), provides for longer, mandatory sentences to be imposed on repeat felony offenders. The statute does not create a new offense but merely provides a proceeding for enhancing sentences. State v. Nelson, 96 N.M. 654, 634 P.2d 676, 677 (1981). And, the proceeding itself is a sentencing procedure and not a trial of an offense. Id.; see also State v. Knight, 75 N.M. 197, 402 P.2d 380 (1965); State v. Tipton, 77 N.M. 1, 419 P.2d 216 (1966); Linam v. Griffin, 685 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983). From that proposition, defendant argues that the habitual offender proceeding in this case was part of his burglary prosecution. Therefore, he argues the enhancement sentencing was also delayed for at least fifteen months. If so, this argument is resolved by our holding with respect to delayed sentencing on the burglary charge. 28 Defendant next argues that if the habitual offender proceeding was separate for Sixth Amendment purposes, then there was unconstitutional delay in bringing that charge to trial. He reasons that his speedy trial right attached at the hearing where he pleaded guilty to the burglary charges, because the prosecutor publicly announced ... his intention to file.... Appellant's Brief at 17. Defendant points to his continued incarceration in the county jail instead of the penitentiary as  'the actual restrains [sic] [of] arrest' on the forthcoming supplemental information, Appellant's Brief at 17 (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. at 307; United States v. Pino, 708 F.2d 523, 527 n. 5 (10th Cir.1983); United States v. McLemore, 447 F.Supp. 1229, 1234-36 (E.D.Mich.1978)). None of those cases stands for the proposition that speedy trial rights attach when the government expresses an intention to file charges, or that continued imprisonment in the county jail instead of removal to the penitentiary amounts to an arrest on a charge not yet filed. 29 Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights do not apply to preindictment or preinformation delay. Events which trigger Sixth Amendment protection are the formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge.... United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. at 320, 92 S.Ct. at 2187; United States v. Pino, 708 F.2d at 527 n. 5; United States v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d at 854 n. 4. It is not necessary for us to decide whether the habitual offender charge in this case was a separate proceeding for purposes of the Sixth Amendment speedy trial guarantee. 11 If it were a separate proceeding, defendant's rights did not attach until the supplemental information was actually filed on April 2, 1982, unless his continued imprisonment in the county jail, instead of the penitentiary, amounted to an arrest on the habitual offender charge. We hold that it did not. The restraints referred to in Marion are restraints on liberty, not restraints on a choice of prisons. Defendant had no liberty to be restrained. He was in jail because of his arrest and conviction on the burglary charges, not on the habitual criminal charge. There was no prospect that his liberty during the time periods in question depended upon the outcome of an habitual offender proceeding. It is evident that he would have remained incarcerated for the period of time in question whether or not that proceeding had been brought. Thus, the many cases cited to us by defendant, dealing with speedy trial rights in a pre-trial situation, are inapplicable. The habitual offender proceeding was not commenced until the supplemental information was filed on April 2, 1982, and defendant was tried on that charge on August 24 and 25, 1982. As to that interval of time, defendant raises no objection. 30 Accordingly, we hold that defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial with respect to the habitual offender proceeding. DUE PROCESS CLAIM 31 Defendant's alternate theory is that the delay in bringing the habitual offender information was a violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights. The Supreme Court has held that although a defendant's primary protection against the government's prosecution of overly stale claims is the statute of limitations, the Fifth Amendment's due process clause does have a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay. United States v. Lavasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977); see also United States v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d at 854 (10th Cir.1983). Our discussion in the previous section applies here. If the habitual offender proceeding was a separate charge, it did not begin until the supplemental information was actually filed on April 2, 1982. The interval prior to that would fall in the preindictment category. And, preindictment delay is not a violation of the Due Process Clause absent a showing of actual prejudice and that the delay was purposefully caused by the government to gain tactical advantage or to harass. United States v. Vigil, 743 F.2d 751, 758 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 600, 83 L.Ed.2d 709 (1984); United States v. Jenkins, 710 F.2d at 854; United States v. Comosona, 614 F.2d 695, 696 (10th Cir.1980). A defendant bears the burden of proof that the delay caused substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial and that the delay was for the purpose of gaining a tactical advantage over him. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. at 324, 92 S.Ct. at 465; United States v. Vigil, 743 F.2d at 758. No such proof has been advanced by defendant in this case, and none is disclosed in the record. We find that there was no violation of defendant's rights to due process. 32 The district court's judgment dismissing defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby affirmed.