Opinion ID: 6348829
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Commutation

Text: Next, we consider the proper legal framework under which to consider Westray’s claim of ineﬀective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, we examine how the commutation of Westray’s sentence from death to life imprisonment aﬀects how we apply the legal standard. To prevail on an ineﬀective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must show both deficient performance and result‐ ing prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A petitioner needs to demonstrate that: (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 20 No. 20‐3260 reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been diﬀerent.” Id. at 687–88, 694. “A petitioner is entitled to habeas relief only if he satisfies both of Strickland’s prongs.” Karr v. Sevier, 29 F.4th 873, 880 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Thill v. Richardson, 996 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir. 2021)). Importantly, “there is no reason for a court deciding an ineﬀective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insuﬃcient showing on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. In keeping with this precedent, we assess whether Westray can satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong. Before that, though, we must understand how the commutation of his sentence impacts the applicable legal standard. In a death penalty case, prejudice occurred if “there is a reasonable prob‐ ability that, but for [the] counsel’s ineﬀectiveness, the jury would have made a diﬀerent judgment about whether [the petitioner] deserved the death penalty as opposed to a lesser sentence.” Andrus v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1875, 1885–86 (2020) (ci‐ tations omitted). The question for us then is whether a commutation alters the prejudice inquiry. The State argues that when a “death sentence is subsequently commuted to life imprisonment,” a petitioner “must show not only a reasonable probability that the jury would not have found death to be the appropriate sentence, but also a reasonable probability that the judge would have then sentenced him to a term more favorable than life imprisonment.” To do so the State relies on pair of cases from this court: Richardson v. Lemke, 745 F.3d 258 (7th Cir. 2014), and Mertz v. Williams, 771 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 2014). No. 20‐3260 21 Westray, on the other hand, argues that under the prejudice prong he need show only that “but for counsel’s unprofes‐ sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been diﬀerent.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. He relies on an earlier case from this court, Griﬃn v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2010), to argue that despite the commutation, he needs to show only that but for his counsel’s ineﬀective assistance, he would have been sentenced to less than death. In Griﬃn, this court considered a petitioner’s claim that “his counsel was ineﬀective for failing to investigate and pre‐ sent” several pieces of “mitigation evidence” at sentencing. Id. at 838. The petitioner was sentenced to death after being con‐ victed for murder, solicitation to commit murder, and con‐ spiracy to commit murder. Id. at 833. But his sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment. Id. at 837. The court ruled that the commutation did “not moot the habeas peti‐ tion” because the petitioner still could have sought “a lower sentence.” Id. How the commutation aﬀects the prejudice analysis was never squarely presented to the court in Griﬃn. When evalu‐ ating prejudice, Griﬃn determined that the Illinois Supreme Court had unreasonably applied Strickland because “[t]he question is not whether a particular judge would have im‐ posed a diﬀerent sentence, but rather whether there was a ‘reasonable probability’ that the sentence would have been diﬀerent.” Id. at 845–46. After identifying several errors—in‐ cluding counsel’s failure to investigate and to proﬀer evi‐ dence, and the Illinois Supreme Court’s failure to properly evaluate the totality of the mitigation evidence—the court re‐ versed the district court’s denial of the habeas petition. Id. at 844–46. 22 No. 20‐3260 Four years later in Richardson, this court addressed the question more directly. There, a petitioner appealed, among other things, the “district court’s denial of his claim that he received ineﬀective assistance of counsel during the sentenc‐ ing phase.” Richardson, 745 F.3d at 276. As in Griﬃn, the peti‐ tioner’s sentence had been commuted to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Id. This court noted that the commu‐ tation did not necessarily render the petitioner’s claim moot because the petitioner was still “entitled to relief if adequate representation would have resulted in a sentence to a term of years.” Id. The court aﬃrmed the “denial of [the petitioner’s] claim because a reasonable jurist could certainly conclude, as did the Illinois Supreme Court, that the introduction of the evi‐ dence [the petitioner] sought would not have changed the sentence handed down by the trial court.” Id. at 277 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Griﬃn, 622 F.3d at 844). In doing so, the court noted that “due to the commuting of his sentence, [the petitioner] would not be entitled to relief unless the trial court would have handed down a sentence to a term of years.” Id. at 277 n.9. Under Strickland’s prejudice prong, the court reasoned, the petitioner would need to show he would have received less than life imprisonment had his counsel ef‐ fectively assisted him. See id. Later that year in Mertz, this court considered another Strickland claim from an Illinois prisoner whose sentence had been commuted to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 771 F.3d at 1037. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the habeas claim because the petitioner “could not show the necessary prejudice” under Strickland. Id. Relying on the recent decision in Richardson, this court No. 20‐3260 23 decided that the “district court correctly used a term of years sentence as the benchmark for Strickland prejudice in Mertz’s case.” Id. at 1044. Once again, the court applied Strickland’s prejudice prong in this commutation context to require that a petitioner show he would have received a sentence of less than life imprisonment but for the ineﬀectiveness of his coun‐ sel. Richardson and Mertz provide the proper framework to ap‐ ply the prejudice analysis following a commutation. These cases are more recent than Griffin and they directly address the question at hand. Westray contends the State’s position fails as a matter of constitutional first principles and that Grif‐ fin is binding precedent that “displace[s]” our more recent case law. Although Griffin focused on Strickland’s prejudice prong, it never expressly considered the effect a commutation might have on the prejudice evaluation. At best, Griffin can be read to imply that any sentence other than death satisfies the prejudice prong. Richardson and Mertz, on the other hand, ex‐ pressly considered the effect of a commuted death penalty. Together, those cases hold that to establish prejudice, the pe‐ titioner must prove there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the petitioner would have received less than the commuted sentence. We reaffirm that rule today. A defendant whose death sentence is commuted to life imprisonment must show not only a reasonable probability that the jury would not have found death to be the appropriate sentence, but also a reason‐ able probability that the judge would have sentenced him to a term more favorable than life imprisonment. 24 No. 20‐3260