Opinion ID: 1899017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: discussion: warner analysis

Text: Section 1933 of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933, sets forth the following instruction concerning statutes that govern similar subject matter: § 1933. Particular controls generally Whenever a general provision in a statute shall be in conflict with a special provision in the same or another statute, the two shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both. If the conflict between the two provisions is irreconcilable, the special provisions shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision shall be enacted later and it shall be the manifest intention of the General Assembly that such general provision shall prevail. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933. Two statutes conflict when the same facts which would constitute one offense, also constitute another offense. Commonwealth v. Brown, 346 Pa. 192, 29 A.2d 793 (1943). We applied and refined this rule in Commonwealth v. Warner, 504 Pa. 600, 476 A.2d 341 (1984). In Warner, the Commonwealth charged the defendant with a general offense, theft by deception, [4] and a specific offense, welfare fraud. [5] The defendant filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss the general theft charge because it prohibited the identical activity as the welfare fraud statute. The trial court agreed and held that the Commonwealth could only prosecute Warner pursuant to the specific statute and the Superior Court affirmed. We examined the two statutes in Warner and concluded that, depending on the specific facts of the case, the statutes could be interpreted as either governing the same behavior or not. Thus, we held that any actual conflict between the two statutes could only be established after the facts of the case are fully developed at trial. At the conclusion of the case, a court could properly determine if the general statute had an additional element in comparison with the specific statute so as to give effect to both or to eliminate the charge pursuant to the more general offense. Id. We will apply the Warner analysis here to determine whether the Commonwealth committed error in prosecuting Parmar pursuant to the general statute in the Crimes Code, bribery in official and political matters, instead of the more specific statutory crimes set forth in SEA and SAIA. We begin with an analysis of whether Section 4701 irreconcilably conflicts with either SEA or SAIA by prohibiting the same conduct. The General Assembly recodified the general bribery statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4701 to prohibit bribery in official and political matters. [6] Section 4701 states the following: § 4701. BRIBERY IN OFFICIAL AND POLITICAL MATTERS (a) Offenses defined.  A person is guilty of bribery, a felony of the third degree, if he offers, confers or agrees to confer upon another, or solicits, accepts or agrees to accept from another: (1) any pecuniary benefit as consideration for the decision, opinion, recommendation, vote or their exercise of discretion as a public servant, party official or voter by the recipient; .... (3) any benefit as consideration for a violation of a known legal duty [7] as public servant or party official. 18 Pa.C.S. § 4701 (emphasis added). The General Assembly enacted SAIA in 1957, to strengthen public confidence in the integrity of State employees by prohibiting advisors, consultants, officers and employees of the Commonwealth from having adverse interests in certain contracts and circumstances. See 71 P.S. § 776.1. The specific sections of SAIA pertinent in this case provide as follows: No State advisor or State consultant having recommended to the State agency which he serves, either the making of a contract or a course of action of which the making of a contract is an express or implied part, shall, at any time thereafter, have an adverse interest in such contract. No State employe shall influence, or attempt to influence, the making of or supervise or in any manner deal with any contract in which he has an adverse interest. No State employe shall have an adverse interest in any contract with the State agency by which he is employed. .... No State employe, except in the performance of his duties as such employe, shall, for remuneration, directly or indirectly, represent any other person upon any matter pending before or involving any State agency. 71 P.S. §§ 776.4-776.7 (emphasis added). SAIA defines an adverse interest as being a party to a contract, or being a stockholder, partner, member, agent, representative or employe of such a party. 71 P.S. § 776.2. A contract is defined as an arrangement for the acquisition, use or disposal by a State agency of services or of supplies, materials, equipment, land or other personal property. 71 P.S. § 776.2. Similarly, the General Assembly enacted SEA in 1978, to strengthen the faith and confidence of the people of the State in their government by declaring that public office is a public trust and that any attempt by a public officer or employee to realize personal financial gain through a public office is a violation of the public trust. 65 P.S. § 401. SEA provides in relevant part as follows: § 403. Restricted activities. (a) No public official or public employee shall engage in conduct that constitutes a conflict of interest. (b) No person shall offer or give to a public official, public employee . . . anything of monetary value . . . based on the offeror's or donor's understanding that the vote, official action or judgment of the public official or public employee or nominee or candidate for public office would be influenced thereby. (c) No public official, public employee . . . shall solicit or accept, anything of monetary value . . . based on any understanding of that public official, public employee or nominee that the vote, official action, or judgment of the official, public employee or nominee or candidate for public office would be influenced thereby. 65 P.S. § 403. [8] SEA defines a conflict of interest as [u]se by a public official or public employee of the authority of this office or employment or any confidential information received through his holding public office or employment for the private pecuniary benefit of himself.... 65 P.S. § 402. Parmar argues that these three statutes prohibit the same behavior and therefore conflict; we disagree. Where the provisions of two statutes are in conflict, but the conflict is not irreconcilable, they shall be construed to give effect to both statutes. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933; Warner. To determine whether the conflict between these statutes is irreconcilable, we must apply the Warner rule, which states that when two statutes have identical elements such that the general statute wholly subsumes the specific statute, but the general statute contains an additional element when compared with the specific statute, then the Commonwealth may properly prosecute a defendant pursuant to the more general statute. Warner. Here, we must consider whether bribery has an additional element when compared with SEA and SAIA within the facts of this case as established at trial. We hold that the Commonwealth had to prove additional elements to convict Parmar under the bribery statute when compared with both SEA and SAIA; therefore, the Commonwealth did not violate the Warner rule. Here, the jury found Parmar guilty of violating Section 4701(a)(3) of the bribery statute, bribery by violation of a known legal duty, which requires proof that a state employee intentionally, knowingly or recklessly violated a known legal duty. 18 Pa.C.S. § 4701. SEA does not require that the Commonwealth prove the state employee's adverse interest violated a known legal duty. Likewise, SAIA does not require proof that the employee knew that having an adverse interest in a state contract violated a known legal duty. Consequently, the general Crimes Code statute in this case required proof of an additional element when compared with the specific statutory offenses SEA and SAIA, and the Commonwealth did not violate the Warner rule in prosecuting Parmar. We therefore agree with the Superior Court that the trial court erred in arresting judgment and that the judgment of sentence should be reinstated. We reach this conclusion, however, based on grounds different from the Superior Court. E.J. McAleer and Co., Inc. v. Iceland Products, Inc., 475 Pa. 610, 381 A.2d 441 (1977)(this Court may affirm decision below on other grounds). The Superior Court held that bribery contains an additional element of culpability that is not found in SAIA or SEA. We disagree with the Superior Court's conclusion that SAIA and SEA are not subject to culpability requirements, and thus address the question of whether SAIA and SEA impose absolute criminal liability.