Opinion ID: 784431
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdictional Defects and Procedural Default

Text: 11 Ratigan was convicted of armed bank robbery pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d). An element of that crime as alleged in the indictment requires proof that the bank in question was a federally-insured financial institution at the time of the relevant conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(f) ([T]he term `bank' means any member bank of the Federal Reserve System... and any institution the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.). 12 Ratigan asserts as the foundation of his argument that the government failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove the essential element of the bank's FDIC insurance. See United States v. Ali, 266 F.3d 1242, 1244 (9th Cir.2001) (Testimony is insufficient ... when stated only in the present tense at trial, years after the relevant time period.); United States v. Allen, 88 F.3d 765, 769 (9th Cir.1996) (vacating convictions for making false statements to federally insured financial institutions because government failed to provide sufficient proof of FDIC status). It follows, he contends, that the district court had no power to hear the case, or, in other words, that the court had no subject-matter jurisdiction as to the bank robbery charge. 13 In Allen, as in Ali, this court found that present tense testimony that the bank in question is insured by the FDIC is not sufficient as evidence to prove that the financial institution was insured at the time of the defendants' alleged conduct. Allen, 88 F.3d at 769. The court found that such testimony falls short of the quantum of evidence necessary to prove an element of a crime. Id. Ratigan asserts that the government presented similarly insufficient evidence at trial in his case. 14 The government's evidence at trial included testimony by Richard Beyl, Vice President and Regional Manager for U.S. Bank who stated that the bank was insured at the time of trial. He also identified certificates of insurance for dates other than the date of the robbery. Ratigan asserts that because the government failed to show that the bank was insured on the date of the robbery, the government failed to meet its burden as established by Allen and Ali. 15 The government responds that Ratigan cannot now challenge the sufficiency of the government's proof because Ratigan has procedurally defaulted on this claim by not raising the issue either at trial or on direct appeal. A § 2255 movant procedurally defaults his claims by not raising them on direct appeal and not showing cause and prejudice or actual innocence in response to the default. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998); see also Medrano v. United States, 315 F.2d 361, 361-62 (9th Cir.1963) (finding petitioner's challenge of evidentiary sufficiency for jurisdictional fact of drug possession in federal narcotics conviction was procedurally defaulted). Ratigan does not dispute that he failed to raise the issue of the sufficiency of the government's evidence of the federally-insured status of U.S. Bank at trial or on direct appeal. Instead, Ratigan attempts to avoid procedural default by asserting that his claim now raises the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. 16 In every federal criminal prosecution, subject-matter jurisdiction is conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3231. That section provides that [t]he district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States. Id. The bank robbery crime of which Ratigan stands convicted is unquestionably such an offense. Ratigan argues, however, that in a federal bank robbery case, subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking when the government fails to present sufficient evidence that the bank was FDIC insured. Specifically, he contends that proof of federal insurance is a jurisdictional requirement for a conviction pursuant to § 2113, and because it implicates the court's power to hear a case, his challenge to that proof cannot be procedurally defaulted. See, e.g., United States v. Nukida, 8 F.3d 665, 668-69 (9th Cir.1993) (Jurisdictional issues will ordinarily be considered on appeal regardless whether they are raised in the trial court.). Ratigan must show, however, that his challenge presents a true jurisdictional question, and not merely one of the sufficiency of the government's evidence. 17 As support for his assertion that § 2113's jurisdictional element necessarily implicates the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, Ratigan relies on United States v. Cotton, where the Court held that subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court's power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived. Consequently, defects in subject-matter jurisdiction require correction regardless of whether the error was raised in district court. 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002). Ratigan thus argues that if the government did not establish that the relevant bank was insured by the FDIC at the time of the robbery, then the jurisdictional nexus for the federal crime is missing. Ratigan's reliance on Cotton, although not outlandish, is misplaced. In Cotton, the Court determined that defects in an indictment do not deprive a federal court of its power to adjudicate a case. In fact, the court cited Justice Holmes in concluding that a district court `has jurisdiction of all crimes cognizable under the authority of the United States ... [and][t]he objection that the indictment does not charge a crime against the United States goes only to the merits of the case.' Id. at 630-31, 122 S.Ct. 1781 (quoting Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65, 36 S.Ct. 255, 60 L.Ed. 526 (1916)). 18 Moreover, courts have consistently determined that the jurisdictional element of federal crimes does not present a pure question of the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hugi v. United States, 164 F.3d 378, 380 (7th Cir.1999) (concluding that defects in government's proof of a jurisdictional element do not deprive court of jurisdiction); United States v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1047-48 (11th Cir.1987) (concluding that jurisdictional challenge involving question of the sufficiency of the government's evidence in a federal drug possession case involves determination of issues of fact going to merits), superseded by statute, as explained in United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088 (11th Cir.2002). In Hugi, a case involving a federal crime of wire fraud, the nexus with interstate commerce, which courts frequently call the `jurisdictional element' is simply one of the essential elements of [the offense].... It is not jurisdictional in the sense that it affects... a court's constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate a case.... Hugi 164 F.3d at 380-81 (quoting United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529, 531-32 (7th Cir.1998)); see also Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 91-92, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (explaining that the failure of a cause of action does not produce a failure of jurisdiction). As we explained in De La Maza v. United States, [A]fter an offense of the laws of the United States was set forth and returned in the indictment, the district court had jurisdiction of ... the subject matter.... 215 F.2d 138, 140 (9th Cir.1954). 19 Similarly, defects in the government's evidence regarding a bank's federally-insured status in a bank robbery case go to the merits of the case. See United States v. Ali, 266 F.3d 1242, 1243 (9th Cir.2001) (concluding that proof of FDIC insurance constitutes an element of the substantive crime) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Holloway, 259 F.3d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir.2001) (concluding that evidence of credit union's federal insurance constituted an essential element of the [federal] crime of bank robbery); United States v. Mitchell, 172 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir.1999) (stating that proof of FDIC insurance in a bank robbery case involves a jurisdictional fact). 20 Here, Ratigan cannot claim that the government presented no evidence of the bank's FDIC status. Nor does he assert in the form of a claim of actual innocence that the government could not show that the bank was FDIC insured. Rather, he claims that, at trial, the government failed to present sufficient proof of the FDIC-insured status of U.S. Bank on July 12, 1996. As we see it, this question concerns a basic question of evidentiary sufficiency and not the court's jurisdiction. Our approach in Ali illustrates this understanding of Ratigan's claim. In that case, appellant Ali contended that the evidence introduced at his trial was insufficient to prove ... beyond a reasonable doubt the federally insured status of the bank. 266 F.3d at 1244. We examined the government's evidence and found it wanting, id. at 1244, and because the evidence was insufficient, we reversed his conviction. See also United States v. Dennis, 237 F.3d 1295, 1304-05 (11th Cir.2001) (reversing conviction for bank fraud when evidence insufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that bank was federally insured); United States v. Key, 76 F.3d 350, 353 (11th Cir.1996) (concluding that, for the crime of bank fraud, the jurisdictional element of the bank's FDIC-insured status is measured by the sufficiency of the evidence standard); United States v. Mathews, 833 F.2d 161, 164 (9th Cir.1987) (concluding defendants' guilty plea in interstate kidnapping case, establish[ed] the factual basis for jurisdiction, but not jurisdiction itself). 21 Because proof of FDIC insurance is an element of the crime of bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113, we conclude that any challenge claiming that the government failed to prove at trial that essential element does not thereby undermine the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, or its power to hear the case. Ratigan's assertion that the government's evidence did not adequately prove that the bank in question was FDIC insured at the time of the robbery is a simple question of the legal sufficiency of the government's evidence of one element of the charged offense. We conclude that the district court was correct in deciding that Ratigan's claim is barred by procedural default. 2