Opinion ID: 2623217
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Generally

Text: Prior to 1993, the widely accepted standard for admitting novel scientific evidence in both federal and state courts was the standard articulated in Frye. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (noting that, In the 70 years since its formulation in the Frye case, the `general acceptance' test has been the dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence at trial.). This standard requires that the thing from which [expert testimony is deduced] be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. Applying this standard, the Frye court concluded that the systolic blood pressure deception test had not yet gained enough recognition among scientific authorities to warrant admission of its results. Id. Most courts have interpreted Frye as requiring general acceptance of both (1) the underlying theory supporting the scientific conclusion and, (2) the techniques and experiments employing that theory. [3] The court in People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1989), however, held that a third requirement should apply in the complex area of DNA identification: that the actual testing procedures employed properly apply the accepted scientific techniques in analyzing the forensic samples at issue. Other courts have held that questions concerning testing procedures and the accuracy of particular test results go to the weight, rather than admissibility of the evidence. See, e.g., Chischilly, 30 F.3d at 1154; United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 563 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Shea, 957 F.Supp. 331, 341 (D.N.H.1997), aff'd, 159 F.3d 37 (1st Cir.1998). In 1993, the United States Supreme Court held in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc . that Frye 's general acceptance test had been superseded by the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. [4] 509 U.S. at 587, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Court reasoned that Frye 's rigid general acceptance requirement is at odds with the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion testimony. Id. at 588, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Daubert Court held that admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence requires that the trial judge ensure that the evidence be both relevant and reliable. Id. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Court thus held that under Rule 702, the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony must be scientifically valid, and that such reasoning or methodology may properly be applied to the facts of the case. Id. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Court then set forth a non-exclusive list of factors, including general acceptance, to guide a trial court in making this determination. Id. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Court concluded its analysis by noting that the inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is ... a flexible one, and that the focus of the inquiry should be scientific validity as it pertains to evidentiary relevance and reliability. Id. at 594, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Recently, the United States Supreme Court expanded Daubert 's general holding concerning the trial judge's gatekeeping function to testimony based not only on scientific knowledge, but also to testimony based on technical and other specialized knowledge. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). The Court stressed, however, that the inquiry was a flexible one, and held that the factors listed in Daubert were neither exclusive nor mandatory. Id.