Opinion ID: 1955138
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior Caselaw and Legislative History

Text: The analysis of this case necessarily follows from our prior decisions in State v. Lee, supra, 96 N.J. at 156, 475 A. 2d 31, and State v. Harmon, supra, 104 N.J. at 189, 516 A. 2d 1047. Lee upheld the constitutionality of section 5d, and Harmon addressed the issue of when self-defense may be used under the sections of Chapter 39, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3, -4 and -5, that regulate the use and possession of various weapons. In Lee, we affirmed the section 5d conviction of a defendant who taped a pair of scissors to form a stiletto. [1] We held that section 5d was constitutional. Both cases define section 5d as proscribing possession of weapons regardless of the possessor's intent. Lee and Harmon make clear that allowing anticipatory self-defense as a justification for a section 5d offense is inconsistent with the carefully constructed scheme for the criminalization of possession of weapons in various situations outlined by the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3, -4, and -5. State v. Lee, supra, 96 N.J. at 160, 475 A. 2d 31. N.J.S.A. 2C:39 regulates firearms as well as other dangerous weapons and instruments of crime. Sections 3, 4, and 5 define offenses that could arise as a result of the possession of weapons and devices. Section 3 makes the mere possession of certain weapons such as sawed-off shotguns a per se offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3b. That section also prohibits possession of instruments such as dirks, daggers, and stilettos unless a defendant can offer a legitimate explanation for such possession. State v. Lee, supra, 96 N.J. at 160, 475 A. 2d 31. Section 4 prohibits possession of a weapon with the purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or property of another. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a to 4d. Section 5 makes the possession of certain unlicensed weapons, such as machine guns, handguns, rifles, or shotguns, a per se offense. That offense is punishable as a crime of the third degree or fourth degree, regardless of the intent of the possessor or circumstances surrounding the possession. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5a to 5c; State v. Lee, supra, 96 N.J. at 161, 475 A. 2d 31. In addition, section 5d prohibits possession of any other weapon under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful uses as it may have. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5d. Sections 5 and 3 are similar in that they both prohibit certain weapons regardless of the legitimacy of the possessor's purpose or intent. They differ because section 3 prohibits the possession of some inherently dangerous devices such as sawed-off shotguns, silencers, and armor piercing bullets, whereas section 5 prohibits a narrower class of weapons such as machine guns, and allows possession of those devices to be sanctioned by permit or license. Ibid. Section 4, in contrast, punishes only offenders who have a purpose to use the device unlawfully against the person or property of another. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4. Violations under section 4 are, for the most part, second degree offenses that carry a presumption of incarceration, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d), and trigger the parole-ineligibility provisions of the Graves Act. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c). Violations under sections 3 and 5 constitute third and fourth degree offenses and carry a presumption under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(e) of non-incarceration for first-time offenders. State v. Harmon, supra, 104 N.J. at 197-98, 516 A. 2d 1047; State v. Lee, supra, 96 N.J. at 161, 475 A. 2d 31. Those three sections reveal that the Legislature carefully constructed a comprehensive, statutory design for law enforcement. State v. Lee, supra, 96 N.J. at 160, 475 A. 2d 31; State v. Harmon, supra, 104 N.J. at 196-97, 516 A. 2d 1047; State v. Ingram, 98 N.J. 489, 499, 488 A. 2d 545 (1985). They reflect a careful mix of possessory offenses that combine purely regulatory proscriptions requiring no wrongful intent with more serious crimes requiring criminal culpability on the part of the accused. State v. Harmon, supra, 104 N.J. at 198, 516 A. 2d 1047. They are however not mutually exclusive. The possession of a particular weapon can be prohibited under one or more of the categories, depending upon the intent of the possessor or the circumstances surrounding the possession. State v. Lee, supra, 96 N.J. at 161, 475 A. 2d 31. In Lee, we held that intent to use a weapon for an unlawful purpose is not an element of section 5(d), id. at 164, 475 A. 2d 31, because [t]he criminalization of the possession of a weapon with intent to use it unlawfully against another is carried forward in 2C:39-4d. Hence, reading a requirement of an unlawful intent into 2C:39-5 would render that section superfluous. Id. at 162-63, 475 A. 2d 31. As a possessory offense, section 5d does not require a purpose to use a weapon unlawfully. Section 5d is part of a legislative scheme tailored to address different aspects of weapon possession. Section 5d punishes possession, without considering intent, in contrast to section 4d, which includes intent as an element of the offense. In Harmon, defendant was convicted of violating N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a, possession of [a] firearm with a purpose to use it unlawfully, for drawing a BB gun during an argument with another person and threatening to use it. 104 N.J. at 191, 516 A. 2d 1047. The defendant alleged that his only purpose in arming himself was precautionary and that he never intended to commit an illegal act. We held that although intent was an element of a section 4a offense, it was largely irrelevant in the context of a 5d offense. Because section 5d is a strictly possessory offense, the Court found that self-defense rarely constitutes a defense to such a charge. After reviewing various cases from other jurisdictions involving attempts to excuse gun possession under regulatory offenses that require no criminal intent or purpose on the part of the accused, the Court explained the distinction between section 4a and section 5d offenses: We ... do not believe that [under section 4a] the Legislature intended to subject to the second-degree offense and to the mandatory imprisonment required by the Graves Act the individual who concededly possesses a weapon, but does so for a precautionary, sporting, or otherwise benign purpose. In such circumstances, the structure of the Code suggests a legislative judgment that the less-culpable state of mind be punished as a regulatory offense under sections 39-3 or 39-5.b. [ State v. Harmon, supra, 104 N.J. at 200, 516 A. 2d 1047 (emphasis added).] And footnote 6 to that quote is particularly pertinent: Contrary to the suggestion made by the State, our holding here will not encourage a wholesale arming of the populace. Individuals who arm themselves with firearms anticipatorily on the apprehension of future danger would quickly find that they could not do so with impunity. Although their asserted precautionary purpose might insulate them from conviction under section 39-4(a), they would still be exposed to criminal liability under the regulatory provisions of sections 39-3 and -5. [ Id. at 200 n. 6, 516 A. 2d 1047 (emphasis added).] Further in Harmon, we stated: We agree wholeheartedly that in such cases the policies embodied in our gun control laws, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3 and -5, would not allow self defense as an excuse or justification to a charge of unlawful possession under a regulatory offense when a person arms himself prior to a danger becoming imminent. Only in those rare and momentary circumstances where an individual arms himself spontaneously to meet an immediate danger should the justification afforded by N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4 be considered. [ Id. at 208-09, 516 A. 2d 1047 (emphasis added).] Accordingly, the carefully instructed legislative plan embodied in N.J.S.A. 2C:39, together with a review Lee and Harmon establishes that a jury charge on self-defense is largely inapplicable in the context of section 5d offenses. If a person possesses an instrument for a legitimate purpose and makes immediate use of that instrument as a weapon in order to fight off an impending threat, then, and only then, is self-defense a justification to a section 5d offense. In such a case, the person would not have possessed the implement to use it as a weapon but for its proper purpose. Absent possession of the implement as a weapon, a person has not committed a section 5d offense. In Lee we recognized the Legislature's intent in enacting section 5d as follows: The obvious intent of the Legislature was to address a serious societal problem, the threat of harm to others from the possession of objects that can be used as weapons under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful uses as those objects may have. Some objects that may be used as weapons also have more innocent purposes. For example, a machete can be a lethal weapon or a useful device for deep sea fishing. See State v. Hay, 153 N.J. Super. 346, 349 [379 A. 2d 858] (App.Div. 1977). A steak knife is appropriate, at the dinner table, but is sinister when concealed in a car with a BB gun. See In re T.E.T., 184 N.J. Super. 324 [446 A. 2d 177] (App.Div. 1982). The underlying problem is protecting citizens from the threat of harm while permitting the use of objects such as knives in a manner consistent with a free and civilized society. The statute addresses the problem of outlawing the possession of various weapons in circumstances when they pose a likely threat of harm to others. In striking a balance, the Legislature recognized that an otherwise innocent object can become a threat. See Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 Yale L.J., 609, 626 (1984) ([p]ossession offenses seek to prohibit and punish not possession itself, but harmful conduct, past or future, that is evidenced by the possession.). [96 N.J. at 161-62, 475 A. 2d 31]. The fact that many instruments have both legal and illegal uses explains the legislative purpose underlying section 5d. The statutory design of section 5d implicitly avoids the pitfalls of relying solely on a statutory list of prohibited weapons. A statutory list would potentially fail to filter out makeshift weapons or objects that may be used as weapons or for more innocent purposes. In using general language, the legislature intended to allow juries and judges to define, through the use of their own community standards and through an evaluation of the relevant facts and circumstances, what constitutes manifestly inappropriate possession of an object in each individual case. Section 5d allows for this interstitial interpretation because it is impossible to provide a detailed statutory catalogue of every rudimentary object that could be put to baleful use, or of the myriad of circumstances that could give rise to such inappropriate possession. State v. Lee, 96 N.J. at 166, 475 A. 2d 31 (It is doubtful that a legislator, no matter how meticulous would have thought of including scissors taped into a stiletto on a list of prohibited weapons.); State v. Colon, 186 N.J. Super. 355, 452 A. 2d 700 (App.Div. 1982) (section 5d was not unconstitutionally vague because it gave sufficient notice that conduct charged was criminal). Thus, the Legislature adopted a general provision, section 5d to permit the lawful use of objects such as razors, while anticipating the ingenuity that can turn everyday objects into weapons.