Opinion ID: 4470975
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 2014 Recording

Text: The government presented at trial a recording of a telephone call that Omelyan 5 At oral argument, counsel for Mykhaylo chose to rest on his briefing on the issue of extraterritoriality. He admitted that he does not have any case for the principle of law that, just because his client did not allegedly commit an act in the United States, the RICO conspiracy provision could not apply. 6 made in 2014 (from prison) to Yashuk.6 In short, during the call “Omelyan asked Yashuk to tell her son [Victor Shakhmarova] and daughter-in-law [M.S.1] to change their stories about him and help him.” (Appellee’s Brief at 17 n.7.) “Yashuk reminded Omelyan about the threats he [had] made to her in the past, and he admitted [or at least did not deny] that he made those threats [or someone who called in his name had done so] but claimed he would never have acted on them.”7 (Id.) Specifically, Yashuk testified about a series of threatening interactions with Omelyan, including several incidents that occurred within the statute of limitations period. She testified that, in late 2002, Omelyan called her in Ukraine. He told her that her son and daughter-in-law had escaped. If she did not tell him where they were, “he will have to deal with us, with me and with the granddaughter,” and he would travel to Ukraine so that “our unashamed blood will cover us.” (A366.) She subsequently received another call from someone using a Georgian accent (possibly Omelyan himself) who threatened to stab her and her granddaughter. Omelyan called Yashuk again, saying that “I will come and your unashamed blood will cover both you and your granddaughter.” (A369.) Beginning in 2015, Omelyan visited Yashuk’s home in the Ukraine (and on one occasion claimed his brother “Misha” (Mykhaylo) was sitting in the car). Omeylan urged Yashuk to testify for him in a Ukrainian investigation and offered 6 We generally review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion while exercising plenary review to the extent such rulings are based on an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 768 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000). Whether a statement constitutes hearsay is a question of law subject to plenary review, and the application of a hearsay exception is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 458 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2006). 7 Omelyan raped M.S.1. 7 her money to do so. If she did not, “maybe your granddaughter won’t make it to school one day or there might be an accident.” (A369.) “He said that if it doesn’t happen, then maybe [there would be] an accident or he might give the granddaughter to the prostitution house to make money to pay off the debt of the parents.” (A370.) According to Yashuk, Omelyan approached her in 2007 at a bus stop in Ukraine. He asked her about her son’s whereabouts and said he hoped the son was still healthy so “I can handle him, deal with him.” (A374.) Appellants vigorously attacked the credibility of the government’s witnesses including Yashuk, characterizing them as liars who simply sought visas to remain in the United States. The District Court properly overruled Mykhaylo’s hearsay objection, and it appropriately determined that this recording was admissible for the limited purpose of responding to the defense’s attack on Yashuk’s credibility. In any event, we believe that, even if the District Court erroneously admitted this piece of evidence, its error was harmless. Mykhaylo argues that the recording constituted inadmissible hearsay on the grounds that it was offered for the truth of the matters asserted in the recording, did not fall within any one of the delineated hearsay exceptions, and did not qualify as nonhearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., Fed R. Evid. 801(c)(2) (defining hearsay as, inter alia, “a statement” that “a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement”), Fed. R. Evid. 801(d) (setting forth categories of statements that are not hearsay), Fed. R. Evid. 802 (stating hearsay is not admissible unless federal statute, Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules prescribed by Supreme 8 Court provides otherwise), Fed. R. Evid. 803 (“Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay— Regardless of Whether the Declarant is Available as a Witness”); Fed. R. Evid. 804 (“Hearsay Exceptions—When the Declarant is Unavailable as a Witness”). In particular, he insists that the evidence did not rise to the level of an admissible co-conspirator statement under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) (statement is not hearsay if made by opposing party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy). However, the District Court ultimately indicated that the recording was not admissible as a statement by a co-conspirator. The recording accordingly could not be considered as evidence that the conspiracy itself continued into the limitations period. Instead, the District Court indicated that the recording was admissible as “a [purportedly] consistent statement confirming the existence of the prior conversation, which you[, the defense,] said never happened, but they’re both talking about it.”8 (A1567.) In other words, it was admitted—not for the truth of the matters asserted—but simply to support Yashuk’s credibility. For his part, Mykhaylo does not cite to any case law stating that it would be error to admit this sort of evidence for such a limited purpose. In fact, the District Court offered to give a cautionary instruction as part of its final charge to the jury regarding the 8 The government also appropriately observes that the recording has certain “builtin” elements of reliability. After all, it was Omelyan who called Yashuk, she did not know the conversation was being recorded, and she was confronting the person who she claimed had repeatedly threatened her and her family. Omelyan’s statements also would appear to be inconsistent with his penal interest. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). Although Omelyan claimed that Yashuk’s son and daughter-in-law had lied to get their green cards, he still wanted Yashuk to ask them to change their testimony. When Yashuk confronted Omelyan with the various threats he had made, he did not deny he (or someone speaking in his name) had made them (and instead essentially said he did not mean it (e.g., “You know to say it is one thing, to do it is something else.” (A1665))). 9 evidentiary value of the recording. But defense counsel for both Appellants declined the invitation. As Mykhaylo acknowledges, erroneously admitted evidence is harmless if “it is highly probable that the improperly admitted evidence did not contribute to the jury’s judgment of conviction.” United States v. Sallins, 993 F.2d 344, 348 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Gov’t of the V.I. v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284 (3d Cr. 1976)). We again note that a RICO conspiracy conviction does not require proof of any overt act (whether within the limitations period or not). See, e.g.¸ Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63. The government presented extensive evidence establishing a continuing pattern of threatening behavior—which closely resembled the incidents described by Yashuk and continued after March 17, 2015. In short, if the Botsvynyuks were unable to discover the location of an escaped victim through the remaining workers, Omelyan would threaten the victim’s relatives in Ukraine in order to discover the victim’s location or to recoup the debt that the victim purportedly owed them. Accordingly, “the government presented evidence of an alleged 2009 incident during which Omelyan . . . visited the home of Olga [H]aramita but was turned away.” (Mykhaylo’s Brief at 14-15.) Although Omelyan said nothing and Haramita testified that she did not know what he would have said, she also claimed that he had made repeated threats in the past after her daughter’s escape, e.g., threatening that he would find her daughter if she did not return and then either kill her or force her into prostitution. Omelyan called victim Taras Petrunyk’s mother (Svitlana Zaiats) more than once, telling her she would never again see her son alive. According to Zaiats, Omelyan threatened to rape Zaiats and burn her house down unless she disclosed her son’s 10 location. He threatened to kidnap her youngest son and send her one finger at a time until she complied. Given these circumstances, we believe “‘that the judgment was not substantially swayed by [the admission of the 2014 recording].’” United States v. Lopez, 340 F.3d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Toto, 529 F.2d at 283).