Opinion ID: 1348457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Disparate Impact Theory

Text: Plaintiffs also assert that the emphasis AT & T Technologies places on education has a disparate impact upon them because persons 40 years of age and older are less likely to possess post high school educations than are younger persons. By so urging, plaintiffs attempt to bring themselves within the principles announced in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribes not only overt discrimination, but also practices which are fair in form but discriminatory in operation. Accordingly, it found violative of that act a policy which required a high school diploma and satisfactory performance on two professionally prepared aptitude tests as necessary prerequisites for employment and promotion not shown to have any relation to job performance. One of the theories of discrimination growing out of Griggs has been designated the disparate impact theory. Federal courts have defined this theory as involving employment practices which facially appear to treat different groups neutrally but which in fact fall more harshly on one group than another, Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, Ark., 722 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1983), and which cannot be justified by business necessity, Akins v. South Cent. Bell Telephone Co., 744 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir.1984). Some courts have phrased this theory of discrimination in terms of having the plaintiff isolate `clearly identifiable employment requirements or criteria,' which results in a less favorable impact on the protected group. Hawkins v. Bounds, 752 F.2d 500, 503 (10th Cir.1985). See, also, Am. Fed. of S., C., & Mun. Emp. v. State of Wash., 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985). Unlike the situation in a disparate treatment case, proof of a discriminatory motive is not required to establish a disparate impact case. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). To prove a prima facie case of disparate impact in an age discrimination suit under the federal act, the plaintiff must show `(1) the occurrence of certain outwardly neutral employment practices, and (2) a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on persons of a particular [age] produced by the employer's facially neutral acts or practices.' Palmer v. United States, 794 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir.1986). The burden then shifts to the employer to show that the employment practice is related to job performance or justified by business necessity. Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, Ark., supra . See, also, Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir.1985) (employer forced to prove job relatedness of employment practices); Hawkins v. Bounds, supra (once burden shifts to employer, employer must prove practice mandated by business necessity; necessity connotes that exclusionary practice be of great importance to job performance to rebut prima facie case). Although pretext implies a state-of-mind concept, and, as noted earlier, intent is irrelevant in a disparate impact case, the plaintiff may nonetheless rebut the defendant's reason of business necessity by showing that an alternate practice lacking a discriminatory effect would satisfy the employer's legitimate interests. Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, Ark., supra . We adopt the same method of analysis for a disparate impact case brought under the provisions of the subject act. AT & T Technologies suggests that a disparate impact analysis is inapplicable where the selection criteria are subjective or where an employer uses a multifaceted selection process. E.g., Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 651 F.2d 609 (8th Cir.1981) (concludes subjective evaluation systems cannot alone form the foundation for disparate impact cases); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.1982) (states disparate impact analysis inappropriate to challenge multiple employment practices simultaneously). There are other federal jurisdictions, however, which hold to the contrary. E.g., Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183 (5th Cir.1983), and Hawkins v. Bounds, supra (state disparate impact analysis applies to subjective criteria); Griffin v. Carlin, supra (concludes disparate impact theory can be used to challenge multicomponent promotion process). In view of the state of the record, we need not, and therefore do not, determine which of those two conflicting views is to become the law of Nebraska. In order to recover under the disparate impact theory, plaintiffs must do more than merely prove circumstances raising an inference of a discriminatory impact; they must prove the discriminatory impact at issue. Palmer v. United States, supra . That is, they must point to a clearly identifiable practice and prove its impact. Hawkins v. Bounds, supra . Whether evaluating the evidence de novo on the record or whether reviewing the record to determine whether the district court's finding is clearly wrong, the conclusion which is compelled is that plaintiffs have failed to make even a prima facie showing that AT & T Technologies' use of the education factor in evaluating candidates for promotion has had a disparate adverse impact upon them. Even assuming for the purpose of this analysis, but not deciding, that the evidence raises an inference of a discriminatory impact, plaintiffs have failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the use of the education factor prevented any one of them from being promoted. That is to say, there is no evidence from which any fact finder could conclude that but for the lack of a higher education any plaintiff would have been promoted. Such a failure to show a causal connection between the factor at issue and the lack of promotion defeats recovery under the disparate impact theory.