Opinion ID: 78389
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The District Court Erred When It Reduced Gupta's Offense Level for Acceptance of Responsibility.

Text: The Sentencing Guidelines provide a reduction in a defendant's offense level by two points [i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). The reduction is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse. Id. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.2. When a defendant exercises his constitutional right to a trial without denying essential factual elements of his guilt, the reduction may apply. Id. Application of the reduction will not be overturned unless it is without foundation[,] United States v. Castillo-Valencia, 917 F.2d 494, 500 (11th Cir.1990), but [Gupta] bears the burden of clearly demonstrating acceptance of responsibility. United States v. Sawyer, 180 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir.1999). The government argues that the reduction is egregious ... because Gupta never requested the reduction, and the Probation Office did not recommend it. The government argues that there is no record of what responsibility Gupta accepted and Gupta contested every aspect of the prosecution[,] including two essential factual elements of guilt: intent and control. Gupta argues that he raised the issue of the reduction in his objections to the presentence investigation report, and that [he] through counsel accepted responsibility for his crimes at sentencing. Gupta argues that the reduction applies because he attempted to resolve the Allegheny management fees on the basis of actual costs during administrative proceedings before the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, his criminal conduct ended over a decade ago, and he stopped participating in any Medicare businesses. Gupta also argues that any error is harmless because the district court could have imposed a less severe sentence even if the reduction does not apply. The district court clearly erred when it reduced Gupta's sentence for acceptance of responsibility. Gupta put the government to its burden at trial, contested two essential elements of his guilt, moved to vacate his conviction, and then appealed the reinstatement of the jury verdict. Gupta could not have made clearer that he thought he was innocent. Nothing in the record supports an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. Gupta allegedly accepted responsibility when the district court prompted him by stating that [h]e ha[d] no other place to go, but Gupta's acceptance was explicitly based on the conclusions of our Court. Gupta's counsel stated, I mean, in hindsight now, since there has been a determination by the jury and by the 11th Circuit... that they were related parties, then I think it's fair to say he accepts responsibility for that. That statement does not even make clear for what Gupta accepted responsibility or that he is remorseful.
Although the presentence investigation report recommended it, restitution was not an issue in previous appeals because the district court found zero loss. The government has raised the issue now that the district court has found some loss but declined to order restitution on the ground that the issue would be decided by the Provider Reimbursement Review Board. The government argues that restitution is required by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, and is not before the Provider Reimbursement Review Board. Gupta argues that restitution is within the discretion of the district court and that the Provider Reimbursement Review Board is in a better position than the district court to order restitution. The district court must order restitution. Gupta's conduct is covered by the Mandatory Act, which requires district courts to order restitution without regard for a defendant's ability to pay when an identifiable victim suffers a pecuniary loss. Id. Although the Mandatory Act ordinarily does not apply to offenses that occurred before it became effective on April 24, 1996, United States v. Siegel, 153 F.3d 1256, 1258-60 (11th Cir.1998), the Act applies to conspiratorial offenses that began before that date but concluded after it. United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1290 (11th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (The ongoing nature of the conspiracy enables application of the new statute without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause.). The conspiracy in which Gupta was convicted of participating began before April 24, 1996, and continued beyond that date. Three counts of the indictment charged conduct that continued after April 24, 1996. The first count, the Medicare fraud count, charged conspiracy to submit false claims, 18 U.S.C. § 286, between May 1991 and September 22, 1997. The second and third counts charged mail fraud, id. §§ 2, 1341, between September 1991 and September 22, 1997. The government also proved that specific instances of conspiratorial conduct occurred after April 1996. The government proved that Gupta paid a straw owner in July 1996 after selling one of the dismissed corporate defendants to a hospital at a profit. On remand, the district court must determine how much is owed and order Gupta to pay restitution.