Opinion ID: 1671765
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: time between the 1964 mistrial and the 1990 reindictment

Text: ¶ 71. The period following the second mistrial in 1964 and continuing until the new indictment in 1990 is controlled by due process considerations and the applicable statutes of limitation, rather than speedy trial rights. The United States Supreme Court in United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1501, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982) held: [T]he Speedy Trial Clause has no application after the government, acting in good faith, formally drops charges. Any undue delay after charges are dismissed, like any delay before charges are filed, must be scrutinized under the Due Process Clause, not the Speedy Trial Clause. The Court in MacDonald also said: The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is thus not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time; that interest is protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by statutes of limitation. 456 U.S. at 8, 102 S.Ct. at 1502. See also United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 106 S.Ct. 648, 88 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986). ¶ 72. In United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2048, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), Justice Marshall, writing for an 8-1 majority, recognized that a lengthy pre-indictment delay, as far as the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment is concerned, is wholly irrelevant ... See also U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); U.S. v. Mize, 820 F.2d 118, 121 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943, 108 S.Ct. 328, 98 L.Ed.2d 355 (1987); U.S. v. Robinson, 767 F.2d 765 (11th Cir.1985); U.S. v. Hicks, 798 F.2d 446 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1035, 107 S.Ct. 886, 93 L.Ed.2d 839 (1987). ¶ 73. The nolle prosequi on March 10, 1969 dismissed the first indictment, thus formally ending the first prosecution. It was not a mere passing of the indictment to the files where the district attorney could move at any future term to withdraw it from the files and reactivate the prosecution. Rush v. State, 254 Miss. 641, 182 So.2d 214, 216 (1966). The end of the first indictment on the docket, under MacDonald, supra, and its progeny, closed out any Sixth Amendment speedy trial right. It did not, however, bar another prosecution for the same offense under a new indictment. [W]here a nolle prosequi is entered the particular case is at an end on the docket, ... this does not bar another prosecution for the same offense if commenced in the court where the case originated, as was done in the instant case. Walton v. City of Tupelo, 229 Miss. 193, 90 So.2d 193, 194 (1956). See also Smith v. State, 158 Miss. 355, 128 So. 891 (1930) (second prosecution not barred by nolle prosequi of previous indictment after a mistrial); State v. Kennedy, 96 Miss. 624, 50 So. 978 (1910); State v. Thornhill, 251 Miss. 718, 171 So.2d 308 (1965); Galloway v. State, 574 So.2d 1 (Miss. 1990). ¶ 74. Appellant cites as support for his argument Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520, (1992), but Doggett is a straight Sixth Amendment case. There was never a time from arrest to final disposition when charges were not pending against Doggett. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court in Doggett specifically left its prior decisions in MacDonald, supra, and Loud Hawk, supra, intact. ¶ 75. To determine whether Beckwith's due process rights were violated by the twenty-six year delay between the second mistrial and the return of the second indictment, we must first look at the applicable statute of limitations. There is no statute of limitations on murder. The legislature, in excepting certain crimes from the general statute of limitations imposed on criminal prosecutions by Sec. 99-1-5, Miss Code Ann. (1972), recognized that these crimes are so serious and the implications to public safety so great that prosecution should not be barred merely by the passage of time. ¶ 76. We find no arguable due process violations for the five year period from the second mistrial until entry of the nolle prosequi. The formal accusation had ended. Since no statutory limitations toll prosecutions for murder, and since the Sixth Amendment does not apply due to the absence of an indictment for 21 years, the only issue left is Beckwith's claim that he did not receive due process for the period following entry of the nolle prosequi until his reindictment in 1990. ¶ 77. We have stated in a pre-indictment analysis of due process violations that the burden of persuasion is on the defendant. Hooker v. State, 516 So.2d 1349, 1351, (Miss. 1987), citing United States v. Hendricks, 661 F.2d 38, 40 (5th Cir.1981). In order to prevail under Hooker, Beckwith must show that 1) the preindictment delay caused actual prejudice to him, and 2) such delay was an intentional device used by the government to obtain a tactical advantage over the accused. The Court's decision in Hooker followed the United States Supreme Court's standard as set out in Marion, supra, and Lovasco, supra . We rejected Hooker's due process argument, finding no proof in the record that the state deliberately delayed the indictment for six years in order to gain an advantage over the defendant. ¶ 78. Beckwith urges this Court to overturn Hooker, arguing that the intentional delay requirement has been misapplied by the federal courts. He asks the Court to balance the prejudice to the accused against the prosecution's reason for the delay, a test which was used by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Townley, 665 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1010, 102 S.Ct. 2305, 73 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1982) and by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1016, 111 S.Ct. 590, 112 L.Ed.2d 595 (1990). Beckwith admits that the Fifth Circuit returned to the intentional delay standard in United States v. Hooten, 933 F.2d 293 (5th Cir.1991), but argues that since Hooten did not expressly overrule Townley, it should be limited to the facts of that case. He claims that the deliberate delay dicta was mistakenly cited as precedent. ¶ 79. Beckwith ignores U.S. v. Beszborn, 21 F.3d 62 (5th Cir.1994), an even more recent case where the Fifth Circuit reiterated that in order to show a due process violation the defendant must show intentional delay for tactical advantage on the part of the prosecution. In addition to the lack of intentional delay, the Court also found a lack of actual prejudice in overturning a district court's dismissal of the charge against Beszborn. The district court had found prejudice in the fact that five potential witnesses had died and documents had been moved and could not be found, claims similar to those made in the present case. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court had misapplied the standard for a due process claim and that presumptive prejudice was not sufficient. Beszborn had shown nothing that the deceased witnesses would say which would have affected the case, nor did he show anything that could be proved by any missing or misplaced documents. Beckwith is in the same position. Witnesses for both the state and the defense had died in the interim between the trials, but testimony from previous trials was available and was read to the jury. Beckwith did not put into the record any facts he could have proved by these deceased witnesses that did not go to the jury through their prior testimony. Nor does his claim of memory loss fare any better. As the Fifth Circuit said, Vague assertions of lost witnesses, faded memories, or misplaced documents are insufficient to establish a due process violation from preindictment delay, citing United States v. Harrison, 918 F.2d 469 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109, 106 S.Ct. 1518, 89 L.Ed.2d 916 (1986). See also United States v. Delario, 912 F.2d 766 (5th Cir.1990) (showing of intentional delay for tactical purposes required for claim of violation of due process.) ¶ 80. We note that other Federal Courts of Appeal have applied the same standard of intentional delay. See Acha v. United States, 910 F.2d 28 (1st Cir.1990); United States v. Lash, 937 F.2d 1077 (6th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949, 112 S.Ct. 397, 116 L.Ed.2d 347; United States v. Ashford, 924 F.2d 1416 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 828, 112 S.Ct. 98, 116 L.Ed.2d 69 (1991); United States v. Anagnostou, 974 F.2d 939 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1050, 113 S.Ct. 1943, 123 L.Ed.2d 649 (1993); United States v. LeQuire, 943 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1223, 112 S.Ct. 3037, 120 L.Ed.2d 906 (1992). ¶ 81. We further note the similarities between this case and Stoner v. Graddick, 751 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir.1985). The state of Alabama brought charges against J.B. Stoner for the bombing of a black church nineteen (19) years after the crime. No reason was given by the state for the revival of the 19-year-old case. The Eleventh Circuit rejected Stoner's due process claim, holding that he had not met his burden of proving intentional delay for tactical advantage. The Court said that where there was no bar to prosecution by an applicable statute of limitations, the constitution places a heavy burden on the defendant to show that pre-indictment delay has offended due process. Id. at 1540. If the 19 years between Stoner's crime and conviction did not offend due process, neither did the 21 years between Beckwith's nolle prosequi and his conviction. ¶ 82. The question of whether the State intentionally delayed reindictment of Beckwith is again answered by newspaper articles cited by Beckwith. In an August 17, 1987 article in The Clarion Ledger, District Attorney Ed Peters was quoted as follows: There is no way under any stretch of the law that this case could be tried again. Anyone having the first class in law school ought to know that. As is further clarified by Mr. Peters' later statements in the previously mentioned December 18, 1990 article, the State never anticipated bringing new charges against Beckwith until the earlier involvement of the State Sovereignty Commission in Beckwith's defense was discovered. These statements establish satisfactorily that the State never intentionally delayed prosecution to gain tactical advantage. ¶ 83. We decline to reverse the intentional delay standard established by this Court in Hooker and followed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Beszborn. Due process is due process throughout both Mississippi and the Federal judicial systems. Beckwith has shown no due process violation which would justify overturning the jury's verdict in this case.
¶ 84. Beckwith alleges that the trial court erred in its rulings on discovery violations regarding several witnesses. These allegations are discussed in turn below in the order in which they are raised in Beckwith's brief.
¶ 85. Martha Jean O'Brien was an employee of Joe's Drive-In who was on duty the night of Medgar Evers' murder. Soon after the murder, Ms. O'Brien gave a statement to police that she had seen a man in a white Plymouth Valiant pull into the drive-in on the night of the murder. She described the man as in his early twenties, slender, tall, and with dark curly hair and a full mustache covering his lip, which description did not match that of Byron De La Beckwith. Because there were no discovery rules in place at the time, the defense was unaware of this statement during Beckwith's 1964 trials. In her testimony during the first trial, Ms. O'Brien described the man she saw as being in his early twenties, very good looking and about six feet four inches tall. ¶ 86. Pursuant to discovery requests prior to the 1994 trial, the prosecution provided defense counsel with a copy of Ms. O'Brien's police statement and a transcript of her 1964 testimony. Being unable to locate Ms. O'Brien through all available means, including searches by investigators appointed by the trial court, the defense moved to have her 1964 testimony read to the jury. The prosecution stipulated that Ms. O'Brien could not be found, and her testimony was read to the jury. The trial judge denied defense counsel's request to read Ms. O'Brien's police statement to the jury. ¶ 87. On February 3, 1994, after the defense had rested and on the evening before closing arguments were to begin, defense counsel received a telephone call from Ms. O'Brien. She apparently called Mr. Kitchens because she had seen on television that the trial was almost over. Ms. O'Brien told Mr. Kitchens that she had gone to the District Attorney's office on August 11, 1993, at which time she was given an outstanding subpoena. She said the District Attorney's office never called her back, so she called and spoke to Mr. DeLaughter the night before the trial started. According to Ms. O'Brien, Mr. DeLaughter told her that Mr. Crisco would contact her when she was needed. When she saw on television that the trial was almost over, she decided to call Mr. Kitchens. Apparently, however, her address and telephone number had changed, for she told Mr. Kitchens that the District Attorney's office did not know where she was. She said that on the two occasions when she spoke to prosecutors, she had contacted them, and they did not have her address or telephone number. When Mr. Kitchens asked her if she still went by the name Martha Jean O'Brien, she said she did not and hung up without giving her name, address or telephone number. This conversation was recorded by Mr. Kitchens. ¶ 88. The following morning, defense counsel moved to call Mr. DeLaughter and Mr. Crisco to testify, outside the presence of the jury, regarding these troubling incidents. The trial judge ruled that defense counsel could present this matter after closing arguments. When called to testify after closing arguments, Mr. DeLaughter admitted that he had spoken to Ms. O'Brien on the two occasions which she described to Mr. Kitchens. He testified that when defense counsel informed him that the defense intended to have Ms. O'Brien's prior testimony read to the jury because she could not be found, Mr. DeLaughter went to his office to call the telephone number he had for Ms. O'Brien to see if he could find her. Upon calling the number, he reached a business, American General Finance, and so he returned to the courtroom and stipulated to Ms. O'Brien's transcript testimony being introduced because she could not be found. Mr. DeLaughter testified that the first indication he had that the defense was looking for Ms. O'Brien was when defense counsel sought to introduce her prior testimony, and that prior to that, [a]bsolutely it was not mentioned. ¶ 89. The defense then called Charlie Crisco, an investigator with the District Attorney's office, who testified that he had had Ms. O'Brien's address and telephone number since August of 1992, which was the last time he spoke with her. The record is unclear whether this address and phone number were current as of the time of trial. ¶ 90. The defense then called defense attorney Merrida Coxwell, who testified that on August 3, 1992, when the trial court heard Beckwith's motion to dismiss the case as a violation of his speedy trial right, Mr. Coxwell argued to the court that the defense was prejudiced by its inability to locate Martha Jean O'Brien. Mr. Coxwell testified that Mr. DeLaughter and District Attorney Peters were both present in the courtroom that day. At the close of this testimony, the defense moved for a mistrial, which motion the trial court took under advisement until after the jury completed its deliberations, at which time the judge overruled the motion. Defense counsel subsequently located Ms. O'Brien, and submitted with Beckwith's post-trial motions an affidavit by her detailing her aforementioned contact with the District Attorney's office. ¶ 91. Beckwith argues that the trial court erred both in refusing to hear this matter before closing arguments, when the defense could have moved to reopen its case, and in later overruling Beckwith's motion for a mistrial. ¶ 92. In preparation for trial, the defense submitted a comprehensive Rule 4.06 discovery request to the prosecution. We have held, Our general discovery rule requires that, upon defense request, the prosecution disclose the names and addresses of all material witnesses. The rule extends to witnesses who may not be called at trial, where the witness may be reasonably expected to be helpful to the defense. Gowdy v. State, 592 So.2d 29, 34 (Miss. 1991). There is no question that the whereabouts of Ms. O'Brien, whose prior testimony described a man in a white Plymouth Valiant at Joe's Drive-In on the night of the murder and whose description did not match that of Byron De La Beckwith, may reasonably have been expected to be helpful to the defense. It is also clear that the prosecution had been in contact with Ms. O'Brien and, at least at some point, knew her address and telephone number. The prosecution claims to have been unaware that the defense was searching for Ms. O'Brien until the defense moved to have her prior testimony read to the jury. In fact the prosecution received notice of this matter when the defense argued at the pre-trial hearing that it was prejudiced by its inability to locate Ms. O'Brien. The prosecution's ignorance of the search for Ms. O'Brien may well have been a genuine oversight, but the failure to provide Ms. O'Brien's address and telephone number to the defense was a violation of Beckwith's due process rights if the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Cummins v. State, 515 So.2d 869, 876 (Miss. 1987) (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1197, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)). The question, therefore, is whether the evidence was material to Beckwith's guilt. The test for materiality of evidence not disclosed to the defense is as follows: The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Cummins, 515 So.2d at 876 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). ¶ 93. Of great significance in this case is that Ms. O'Brien's prior testimony was read to the jury. In it she described a man in a white Plymouth Valiant at Joe's Drive-In on the night of the murder who did not fit the description of Byron De La Beckwith. There is nothing to suggest that had she been found by the defense and called to testify, she would have testified any differently. Even if she had been found and testified differently, the prosecution likely would have impeached her credibility with the use of her prior testimony. As it happened, however, Ms. O'Brien's testimony was read to the jury and she was unavailable for impeachment purposes. The defense may in fact have profited from her unavailability. ¶ 94. Certainly, live testimony is always preferable to transcript testimony, but we do not find that Ms. O'Brien's prior testimony being read to the jury rather than her being available to testify is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. We find no reasonable probability that, had the prosecution provided Ms. O'Brien's address and telephone number to the defense prior to trial, Beckwith would not have been convicted. Therefore, the trial judge did not err in overruling Beckwith's motion for a mistrial. Because he did not err in this regard, any error in his refusal to hear the matter until after closing arguments did not prejudice the defense, and thus was only harmless.
¶ 95. James Hobby was a defense witness who was prepared to testify that he owned a white Plymouth Valiant matching the description of the car seen at Joe's Drive-In on the night of Evers' murder. According to Mr. Hobby, he parked his car at the drive-in on the night of the murder, and his was the only white Valiant parked at the drive-in. He was prepared to testify also that he heard a gunshot coming from the nearby woods at the time of the murder. ¶ 96. When the defense called Mr. Hobby to testify, the prosecution objected and moved to exclude his testimony on the grounds that defense counsel had not provided Mr. Hobby's name as a witness until midway through the trial when the State had rested its case in chief. The trial court adjourned for the day and ordered that the prosecution be allowed to interview the witness. ¶ 97. When the court reconvened the next day, the prosecution, having interviewed Mr. Hobby the previous evening, renewed its objection. The prosecutor stated that Mr. Hobby's name was not on the list of witnesses provided by defense counsel prior to trial, and pointed out that when the State read this list to the jury during voir dire, defense counsel did not point out the omission of Mr. Hobby's name. The prosecutor argued that the State had absolutely no notice until the defense began putting on evidence that Mr. Hobby would be called to testify. The prosecutor pointed out that one of the State's witnesses, Barbara Holder, had worked at the drive-in and knew Mr. Hobby well. [1] Had the prosecution known of Mr. Hobby's identity as a witness and the substance of his testimony, the prosecutor argued, the State would have called Ms. Holder to rebut Mr. Hobby's testimony. As it stood, however, Ms. Holder had been excused after testifying and had returned to Texas. ¶ 98. Defense counsel responded that he had discussed with Mr. DeLaughter the names of all defense witnesses and I had no reason to hide Mr. Hobby's name. Mr. DeLaughter countered that he had never been furnished with Mr. Hobby's name. After hearing the arguments, the trial court ruled: Well, gentlemen, the problem is that you place the court in the unenviable position of having to sit here and decide on the representations of the attorneys, and it  it  when that circumstance confronts the Court, the only proper resolution of that dispute is that the Court must fall back upon the strict letter of the law, and the law requires that the state and defense both reveal the witnesses that are to be called by the respective parties. I'm satisfied that it requires that that be done in writing, and it's, I think, admitted by all sides that that was not done in this instance. So the Court is going to deny this witness the opportunity to testify. Defense counsel then proffered for the record a statement of Mr. Hobby's testimony. ¶ 99. In this situation, we are called upon to revisit the procedural guidelines which we established for trial courts to follow when addressing undisclosed evidence issues. At the time of this trial, discovery requirements and remedies for violations were governed by Uniform Criminal Rule of Circuit Court Practice 4.06, which provided in relevant part: If during the course of trial, the prosecution attempts to introduce evidence which has not been timely disclosed to the defense as required by these rules, and the defense objects to the introduction for that reason, the court shall act as follows: (1) Grant the defense a reasonable opportunity to interview the newly discovered witness, to examine the newly produced documents, photographs or other evidence; and (2) If, after such opportunity, the defense claims unfair surprise or undue prejudice and seeks a continuance or mistrial, the court should, in the interest of justice and absent unusual circumstances, exclude the evidence or grant a continuance for a period of time reasonably necessary for the defense to meet the non-disclosed evidence or grant a mistrial. (3) The court shall not be required to grant either a continuance or mistrial for such a discovery violation if the prosecution withdraws its efforts to introduce such evidence. The court shall follow the same procedure for violation of discovery by the defense. These provisions are currently contained in Uniform Circuit and County Court Rule 9.04. ¶ 100. In the case of Box v. State, 437 So.2d 19, 23-24 (Miss. 1983), Justice Robertson in a specially concurring opinion proposed a set of guidelines for trial courts to follow when addressing Rule 4.06 violations. The guidelines were later adopted by this Court and have since been frequently cited by the Court when disposing of undisclosed evidence issues. In Traylor v. State, 582 So.2d 1003, 1006 (Miss. 1991), we enumerated those guidelines as follows: 1. Upon defense [or State] objection, the trial court should give the defendant [or prosecution] a reasonable opportunity to become familiar with the undisclosed evidence by interviewing the witness, inspecting the physical evidence, etc. 2. If, after this opportunity for familiarization, the defendant [or State] believes he may be prejudiced by lack of opportunity to prepare to meet the evidence, he must request a continuance. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the issue. 3. If the defendant [or State] does request a continuance the State [or defendant] may choose to proceed with trial and forego using the undisclosed evidence. If the State [or defendant] is not willing to proceed without the evidence, the trial court must grant the requested continuance. Beckwith argues that because the prosecution did not request a continuance as required by the Box guidelines, the trial court erred in excluding Mr. Hobby's testimony. We disagree. ¶ 101. While it is true that a continuance must be sought before a party can complain of the admission of previously undisclosed evidence, a request for a continuance is not a prerequisite to the exclusion of such evidence, and the failure to request a continuance does not waive an objection that has been sustained. Although, under Box, a surprised party should ordinarily request a continuance when confronted with undisclosed evidence, the failure to do so does not abrogate the trial court's discretion to exclude such evidence in certain circumstances. It would demean the high purpose of the Compulsory Process Clause to construe it as encompassing an absolute right to an automatic continuance or mistrial to allow presumptively perjured testimony to be presented to the jury. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 416, 108 S.Ct. 646, 656, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). Indeed, Justice Robertson himself proposed the guidelines in the form of flexible guidelines that ought generally be followed, not rigid rules the letter of which must always be obeyed. Box, 437 So.2d at 23 (Robertson, J., specially concurring). Accordingly, we have previously sanctioned a trial court's departure from a strictly literal adherence to the Box guidelines in unusual circumstances. See Glaskox v. State, 659 So.2d 591, 594 (Miss. 1995); McCaine v. State, 591 So.2d 833, 836 (Miss. 1991). ¶ 102. In the case sub judice, after having interviewed Mr. Hobby, the prosecution did not request a continuance, but rather sought the exclusion of his testimony, an option well within the trial court's discretion when confronted with evidence not timely disclosed by the defense. Houston v. State, 531 So.2d 598, 611 (Miss. 1988); Coates v. State, 495 So.2d 464, 466-68 (Miss. 1986). Helpful to our determination of whether such a sanction was appropriate in this case is Taylor, supra . ¶ 103. In Taylor, the trial court excluded a defense witness whose name was not produced until the second day of trial after the prosecution's two principal witnesses had completed their testimony. 484 U.S. at 403, 108 S.Ct. at 650. After the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed and the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, holding that refusal to allow an undisclosed witness to testify is not prohibited by the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment and that such a sanction was appropriate under the facts of the case. Id. at 402, 108 S.Ct. at 649. While the Court recognized that lesser sanctions would be adequate and appropriate in most cases, the Court stated: [I]t is equally clear that they would be less effective than the preclusion sanction and that there are instances in which they would perpetuate rather than limit the prejudice to the State and the harm to the adversary process. One of the purposes of the discovery rule itself is to minimize the risk that fabricated testimony will be believed. Defendants who are willing to fabricate a defense may also be willing to fabricate excuses for failing to comply with a discovery requirement. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 413, 108 S.Ct. at 655. The Court held, and we agree, that if the omission was willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage that would minimize the effectiveness of cross-examination and the ability to adduce rebuttal evidence, it would be entirely appropriate to exclude the witness' testimony. Id. at 415, 108 S.Ct. at 656. ¶ 104. In the case sub judice, there is no question that the defense knew for some time prior to trial of Mr. Hobby's identity and the substance of his testimony. Although defense counsel claimed to have discussed all defense witnesses with the prosecution prior to trial, Mr. Hobby's name was not produced in writing as required by the rules, and the defense did not point out the omission of Mr. Hobby's name on the list of defense witnesses read to the jury during voir dire. As we are bound by the record in this case, which reflects no prior disclosure of Mr. Hobby's name, we must assume that it was not until after the State had rested that the defense notified the prosecution of Mr. Hobby's identity as a witness. It is reasonable to presume that there is something suspect about a defense witness who is not identified until after the 11th hour has passed. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 414, 108 S.Ct. at 655. Furthermore, the defense was aware of Mr. Hobby's testimony when the State called and examined Barbara Holder, an employee at Joe's Drive-In on the night of the murder who knew Mr. Hobby and who may have been used by the State to rebut Mr. Hobby's testimony. Because the prosecution was unaware of Mr. Hobby's testimony, however, Ms. Holder was excused after testifying and returned to Texas. It is therefore reasonable to presume as well that the defense was motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage that would minimize the effectiveness of cross-examination and the ability to adduce rebuttal evidence. Although a continuance admittedly would have allowed the prosecution to retrieve Ms. Holder to rebut Mr. Hobby's testimony, we find that [r]egardless of whether prejudice to the prosecution could have been avoided in this particular case, it is plain that the case fits into the category of willful misconduct in which the severest sanction is appropriate. Id. at 417, 108 S.Ct. at 657. The defense's conduct in this instance gives rise to a sufficiently strong inference that `witnesses are being found that really weren't there,' to justify the sanction of preclusion. Id. ¶ 105. Beckwith argues that the trial court did not evenhandedly enforce the discovery rules against the prosecution as well as against the defense. The record belies this assertion. The trial court in fact excluded State witness Bowen Johnson for precisely the same reason it excluded Mr. Hobby, i.e., Mr. Johnson's name was not timely disclosed to the defense. This argument is without merit. ¶ 106. We hold the prosecution's failure to request a continuance in this instance in no way diminished the authority of the trial court to exclude Mr. Hobby's testimony, and that such sanction was appropriate under the circumstances.
¶ 107. During the trial, on Friday, January 28, 1994, the District Attorney's office received a telephone call from Mark Reiley, who was calling from Chicago, Illinois, and who said he had seen news coverage of the Beckwith case on CNN. Mr. Reiley's name was not reflected in the records of either party. He told the prosecutors that while he was guarding Byron De La Beckwith at Angola State Penitentiary in Louisiana in 1979, Beckwith confessed to killing Medgar Evers. [2] The prosecution immediately related this information to the trial court and defense counsel, and informed defense counsel that Mr. Reiley would be flying into Jackson the next day and would be available for questioning. On Sunday, January 30, District Attorney Peters notified defense counsel that Mr. Reiley had arrived and would be available for questioning the next day. Defense counsel was able to interview Mr. Reiley during lunch on Monday, January 31. ¶ 108. When the State called Mr. Reiley to testify, defense counsel objected on the grounds that the defense had had no opportunity to investigate Mr. Reiley's testimony. Defense counsel argued that more time was needed in order to retrieve records from Angola State Penitentiary and question other guards. The trial judge overruled the objection and allowed Mr. Reiley to testify. ¶ 109. The decision whether to admit the testimony of a witness whose name was not timely disclosed to the defense rests largely within the discretion of the trial court. Overstreet v. State, 369 So.2d 275, 277 (Miss. 1979). We note that Mr. Reiley was by no means the only witness to testify that Beckwith had bragged about killing Medgar Evers. The jury had already heard from four other witnesses that Beckwith had proclaimed his involvement in Evers' assassination. We find that because Mr. Reiley's testimony was merely cumulative to similar testimony by numerous other witnesses, any error in its admission was only harmless. See Overstreet, 369 So.2d at 277 (finding no abuse of discretion in admitting testimony of undisclosed witness where defense counsel had interviewed witness and witness' testimony was similar to other eyewitness testimony).
¶ 110. Delmar Dennis, an ex-FBI informant and former member of the Ku Klux Klan, testified for the State regarding an incriminating statement made by Byron De La Beckwith at a Klan meeting in 1965. Mr. Dennis testified that he related this statement to the FBI agent he worked with, although he could not remember at trial which agent it was. On cross-examination, defense counsel established that the statement attributed to Beckwith by Mr. Dennis was not recorded in the FBI files containing information reported by Mr. Dennis. The State then called ex-FBI agent Tom Van Riper to testify that Mr. Dennis had related Beckwith's statement to him. Defense counsel objected to the calling of Van Riper because Van Riper's name as a witness had not been provided to the defense until the first day of trial. ¶ 111. The prosecution apparently did not become aware that Van Riper was the recipient of this information from Mr. Dennis until the day before testimony began when, on his way back from jury selection in Batesville, Mr. DeLaughter read a book about Beckwith written by Reed Massengill. The next day, Mr. DeLaughter provided defense counsel with Van Riper's name and telephone number, together with a photocopy of the passages in the book about which Van Riper would be questioned at trial. ¶ 112. Upon defense counsel's objection to the calling of Van Riper, the trial court called a recess to grant defense counsel's request for an opportunity to question the witness. When the court reconvened, defense counsel renewed his objection to any testimony by Van Riper as improper bolstering and a discovery violation. Defense counsel argued he had no opportunity in the throes of the trial to conduct any investigation of Van Riper's possible testimony. The trial court overruled the objection and allowed Van Riper to testify. ¶ 113. The admission of Van Riper's testimony calls for the same analysis as applied above to the testimony of Mark Reiley. We note that Van Riper was called merely to corroborate the testimony of one of several witnesses who had knowledge of alleged inculpatory statements made by Beckwith. Furthermore, once its objection to Van Riper's testimony was overruled, the defense did not request a continuance. Because the trial judge in his discretion allowed defense counsel to interview Van Riper before he took the stand, and due to the relative insignificance of Van Riper's testimony in light of other more direct evidence against Beckwith, we find that the defense was not unfairly prejudiced by the admission of Van Riper's testimony. See Gallion v. State, 396 So.2d 621, 622-25 (Miss. 1981) (holding defense not prejudiced by testimony of three undisclosed witnesses where trial court called recess to allow defense counsel opportunity to interview them).
¶ 114. Mary Ann Adams, called by the State, testified that in September of 1966, she met Byron De La Beckwith in a restaurant outside Greenwood, Mississippi. She testified that Beckwith was introduced to her as the man who killed Medgar Evers. Ms. Adams testified that when so introduced, Beckwith stuck out his hand to shake hers and was smiling and nodding. She testified that she told Beckwith he was a murderer and refused to shake his hand. Ms. Adams then testified that Beckwith became angry and told her he had not killed a man, but a damn chicken-stealing dog, and you know what you have to do with a dog when  after it's tasted blood. This testimony about what Beckwith told Ms. Adams was not included in her recorded statement taken by the prosecution and provided to defense counsel during discovery. ¶ 115. On cross examination, defense counsel questioned Ms. Adams about this alleged statement by Beckwith. She testified that she did not mention this comment when the prosecution took her taped statement on November 26, 1990, but that she told the prosecution of this comment in a second interview some months later. She could not remember whether anyone took her statement during the second interview. Ms. Adams admitted that in her first interview, she stated that she did not remember what Beckwith said to her when she met him. ¶ 116. After cross-examination and outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved for a mistrial due to the prosecution's discovery violation in failing to supplement Ms. Adams' statement with this additional information. Assistant District Attorney DeLaughter responded that he had provided defense counsel with the only statement he had taken from Ms. Adams and that, although he had spoken with her several times, he did not keep notes and dates every time someone came to talk to him about the case. The trial court cautioned both sides to timely supplement their discovery disclosures as required by the rules, and overruled the motion for a mistrial. ¶ 117. Beckwith argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a mistrial due to the prosecution's failure to supplement Ms. Adams' statement, since the purpose of the requirement to supplement discovery is to avoid `ambush' or unfair surprise to either party at trial. McCaine v. State, 591 So.2d 833, 836 (Miss. 1991). For several reasons, we agree with the State that this argument must fail. ¶ 118. Defense counsel himself first elicited testimony about the statement on crossexamination. [BY MR. COXWELL:] And you said Mr. Beckwith said what? What was the statement you claim  A. He  it wasn't a man he killed, but a damn chicken-stealing dog, and you know what you have to do to a dog once they've tasted blood. That's what he said. Q. You sure about that? A. Yes, sir. Counsel impeached Ms. Adams' testimony by establishing that she did not mention Beckwith's comment in her recorded statement, but instead stated that she could not remember what Beckwith said. Therefore, even assuming arguendo that the prosecution was previously informed by Ms. Adams of Beckwith's statement, Beckwith suffered no prejudice because his attorneys were able to attack Ms. Adams' credibility in front of the jury. ¶ 119. Beckwith cites several cases wherein this Court found discovery violations to constitute reversible error. However, the cited cases all involve situations where the prosecution failed to provide defense counsel with written statements, reports or tapes. McCaine, 591 So.2d at 835-36 (tape recording of incriminating statements); Tanner v. State, 556 So.2d 681, 682-84 (Miss. 1989) (police offense report which contradicted defendant's trial testimony); Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45, 55-56 (Miss. 1985) (defendant's written statement and photocopies of footprints found in victim's carport). The situation below, on the other hand, involves an oral, unrecorded statement, not tangible evidence as in the cited cases. Fuselier, 468 So.2d at 56. See also Moore v. State, 508 So.2d 666, 667-68 (Miss. 1987) (finding State's nondisclosure of oral inculpatory statement by defendant was not reversible error). Snelson v. State, 93-DP-00023-SCT (Nov. 6, 1997), cited in a supplemental filing with this Court by Beckwith, stands for the proposition that it is reversible error for the prosecution to knowingly fail to inform the defense of unrecorded culpable statements. Snelson is distinguishable from this case on two primary points. First, the prosecution had no knowledge of Ms. Adams' statement prior to trial. Her statement was as much a surprise to the State as it was to Beckwith. Second, Snelson was a death penalty case. We review trial court proceedings in death penalty cases with heightened scrutiny. [3] ¶ 120. We are cognizant of the inclination of witnesses to be more truthful and open on the witness stand, than when enduring a pretrial interview. We do not find reversible error for every inconsistent, non-recorded statement made in open court. Such inconsistences are better dealt with by searching cross examination and the determination whether to admit such evidence is better left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. ¶ 121. Because defense counsel was allowed to fully impeach Ms. Adams' testimony on cross-examination, any error committed by the prosecution in failing to supplement her recorded statement was harmless. Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit.
¶ 122. Beckwith argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence various items for the sole purpose of inflaming and prejudicing the jury against the defendant.
¶ 123. Reed Massengill was the nephew of Byron De La Beckwith's wife of twenty years, Mary Louise Williams. From 1986 to 1992, Mr. Massengill corresponded with Beckwith in an effort to write a book about Beckwith's life. To aid Mr. Massengill, Beckwith sent him letters Beckwith had written, racist propaganda, and a manuscript of a book about Beckwith written by another author who had collaborated with Beckwith. Mr. Massengill also received documents and materials from his aunt, Ms. Williams. During Mr. Massengill's testimony, and over defense objections, the trial court admitted into evidence three of the letters and a page from the book manuscript. ¶ 124. The documents admitted into evidence expressed support for segregation and hostility towards the black race and the NAACP, spoke with favor of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and proclaimed involvement with the Ku Klux Klan. The manuscript page contained a letter submitted by Beckwith in 1957 to a newspaper editor for publication. It reads in part: Believe it or not, the NAACP, under the direction of its leaders, is doing a first class job of getting itself in a position to be exterminated! In an undated letter To a Friend, Beckwith wrote: The Negro in our country is as helpful as a boll weevil to cotton. Some of these weevils are puny little runts, and can't create the volume of damage that others can. Some are powerful, becoming mad monsters, snapping and snarling and biting the cotton. They must be destroyed, with their retched remains burned, lest the pure white cotton bolls be destroyed. In a November, 1963 letter to his son, Beckwith wrote: And it looks like the country's politics are gradually going to get straight now pretty soon since Kennedy was assassinated. Whoever shot Kennedy sho did some fancy shooting, to be sure. No need for us to make much fuss over it except to say, to me it came as no surprise. ... Well, I guess when a few more of our enemies are gone then this will be a real fine world to live in  wonder who will be next? I bet ole Medgar Evers told Kennedy when he got down there, I thought you'd be along pretty soon. Haw. Haw. Haw. Now its best to keep this letter out of sight and don't let anyone see it. Oh, what a load off the country's back  what a relief. When a few more Reds bite the dust we can live in peace once more. In a 1976 letter to Ms. Williams, Beckwith wrote: So when you think of me, you see a man in deep debt, facing five years in prison, living like a nigger and as far in global, not state or county, Klan work as a 56-year-old man can be, and happy at it. ¶ 125. Beckwith argues that because none of these documents contained an admission to the murder of Medgar Evers, they were irrelevant to the crime charged in this case. He contends the documents constituted character evidence used to prove that he acted in conformity therewith in violation of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b). Even if the evidence was permissible under Rule 404(b), Beckwith argues, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and thus the documents were inadmissible under Rule 403. The State argues that the documents were not other crimes, wrongs, or acts within the meaning of Rule 404(b), and thus the rule was inapplicable. The State also contends that the evidence was relevant under Rule 401 and thus was admissible under Rule 402. Even if Rule 404(b) was applicable, the State urges, the evidence was admissible because it was introduced to show motive. The State argues, finally, that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We agree with the State. ¶ 126. Beckwith urges us to hold that any evidence not amounting to an admission is irrelevant to show motive. There is nothing in our Rules of Evidence, however, that even remotely suggests such a principle. Clearly, the rules do not intend such an unlikely result, for Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of other acts, while not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith, may nonetheless be admissible for other purposes, including proof of motive. ¶ 127. We are asked here to determine whether Beckwith's letters constituted other crimes, wrongs, or acts under Rule 404(b). If the letters did constitute other crimes, wrongs, or acts, then our analysis turns on whether the trial judge abused his discretion under Rule 403 in admitting the evidence despite the danger of unfair prejudice. However, even if the letters do not fall under Rule 404(b), our analysis is still essentially the same, since the letters could still be relevant under Rules 401 and 402 to show intent or motive. May v. State, 524 So.2d 957, 965 (Miss. 1988). In either scenario, the question of remoteness enters the analysis as a question of relevancy. May, 524 So.2d at 965. ¶ 128. In the case of Kolb v. State, 542 So.2d 265 (Miss. 1989), the defendant was arrested and charged with sexual battery of a child. While in jail following his arrest, the defendant wrote two letters in which he indicated that he had sexual urges toward small children, which letters were admitted into evidence over the defendant's relevancy objection. On appeal, this Court affirmed, holding the letters were relevant to show that the defendant did have such sexually deviant tendencies in conjunction with the issue of whether he in fact engaged in the act with which he was charged. Kolb, 542 So.2d at 269. The weight to be given to the letters was entirely up to the jury. Id. Although the Court determined the admissibility of the letters under a Rule 401/402 analysis, we noted that federal courts have held such evidence to be admissible under Rules 403 and 404 as well. Id. (citing McGahee v. Massey, 667 F.2d 1357 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943, 103 S.Ct. 255, 74 L.Ed.2d 199 (1982); U.S. v. Free, 574 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 873, 99 S.Ct. 209, 58 L.Ed.2d 187 (1978); Oliphant v. Koehler, 594 F.2d 547 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 877, 100 S.Ct. 162, 62 L.Ed.2d 105 (1979)). ¶ 129. Likewise, we believe that Beckwith's expressions of violent animosity towards the black race, the NAACP and civil rights leaders were relevant to establish his motive for killing Medgar Evers, the black leader of the NAACP's Mississippi chapter. As for the remoteness of the letters, such determination was one for the sound discretion of the trial judge. Edlin v. State, 533 So.2d 403, 407 (Miss. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1086, 109 S.Ct. 1547, 103 L.Ed.2d 851 (1989); May v. State, 524 So.2d 957, 965 (Miss. 1988). We do not believe the judge abused his discretion in this instance, given that the letters were not isolated and were written both before and after Medgar Evers was killed. As in Kolb, the weight to be given the letters was entirely up to the jury. ¶ 130. Finally, these documents were particularly probative since there was no evidence that Beckwith ever met Mr. Evers face to face. Beckwith's views, which he expressed in these documents, offered the only explanation of his motive for killing Mr. Evers. Although the prosecution is not required to show motive, it is certainly entitled to do so in order to paint a clearer picture of the crime. To be sure, this evidence prejudiced Beckwith's defense, but we do not believe the prejudice was so unfair as to outweigh its probative value. Beckwith himself provided these documents to Mr. Massengill in order to aid the effort to write a book about Beckwith's life. Beckwith's intent apparently was to express to the world his hostile views towards the black race in America and its leaders. We do not find it unfair that these views were presented to the jury so that it could determine whether such views led Beckwith to murder Medgar Evers. We hold the trial court did not err in finding that this evidence was relevant to show motive, and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
¶ 131. Dick Davis was an FBI informant who infiltrated the Ku Klux Klan. He was allowed to testify, over defense objection, that on October 21, 1969, he met and had a conversation with Byron De La Beckwith. He testified that although Beckwith neither admitted nor denied killing Medgar Evers, Beckwith discussed selective killings as a partial solution to the right wing's problem. Mr. Davis testified that Beckwith said he would never ask anyone to do anything that he hadn't already done himself. ¶ 132. Beckwith here raises the same objection as to the letters above, i.e., the evidence was irrelevant since it contained no admission to the killing of Medgar Evers, and any probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Using the same analysis as above, we find the evidence was relevant to show that Beckwith had violent tendencies towards his perceived political/social enemies in conjunction with the issue of whether he engaged in the selective killing of Medgar Evers. The question of remoteness is not a problem here, for although Beckwith did not directly admit to killing Evers, his statement that he would never ask anyone to do what he hadn't already done himself certainly suggested that he had killed before, and Evers may have been the victim to which he was referring. We believe that such determination was one for the jury. We find the probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and thus the evidence was properly admitted.
¶ 133. Mark Reiley was prepared to testify that while he was guarding Byron De La Beckwith in the hospital ward at Louisiana's Angola State Penitentiary in 1979, Beckwith admitted to killing Medgar Evers. Prior to Mr. Reiley's testimony, the defense objected to any mention being made of the circumstances of Beckwith's alleged confession, because the five-member jury conviction for which Beckwith was incarcerated at Angola had subsequently been declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court and had been vacated. The trial judge ruled that Mr. Reiley could testify as to where his conversation with Beckwith took place, but not as to aspects of Beckwith's confinement. During his testimony, Mr. Reiley stated that while a sergeant at Angola State Penitentiary, he was assigned to guard Bryon De La Beckwith at the prison ward of Earl K. Long Hospital. ¶ 134. Beckwith argues that the admission of this testimony was error because under Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 483, 92 S.Ct. 1014, 1019, 31 L.Ed.2d 374 (1972), prior void convictions may not be used for impeachment purposes. See also Signer v. State, 536 So.2d 10, 12 (Miss. 1988) (finding that admission for impeachment purposes of prior conviction that had been set aside violated Mississippi Rule of Evidence 609(c)). Beckwith also contends the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 404(b), which prohibits the admission of other crimes, wrongs or acts to prove a person's character in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. ¶ 135. In Loper, cited by Beckwith, the U.S. Supreme Court phrased the issue as follows: Does the use of prior, void convictions for impeachment purposes deprive a criminal defendant of due process of law where their use might well have influenced the outcome of the case? Loper, 405 U.S. at 480, 92 S.Ct. at 1018. In that case, the defendant was charged with statutory rape of his eight-year-old stepdaughter. In finding the admission of the prior void convictions to be error, the Supreme Court noted that the issue of innocence or guilt turned entirely on whether the jury would believe the testimony of an 8-year-old girl or that of [the defendant]. And the sole purpose for which the prior convictions were permitted to be used was to destroy the credibility of [the defendant's] testimony in the eyes of the jury. Id. at 482, 92 S.Ct. at 1019. ¶ 136. In the case sub judice, Mr. Reiley's testimony regarding the circumstances of his relationship with Beckwith was not introduced for impeachment purposes, nor was it so vital to the central issue in the case as to have influenced the outcome of the case. Loper is therefore inapplicable. Regarding Rule 404(b), it is true that evidence of other crimes is generally not admissible against an accused. Gray v. State, 351 So.2d 1342, 1345 (Miss. 1977). Although there are certain recognized exceptions to the rule, the use of Mr. Reiley's testimony in this instance does not appear to fall within any of the exceptions. See Gray, 351 So.2d at 1345. The question remains, however, whether the trial judge's abuse of discretion in admitting this testimony was prejudicial to Beckwith. Parker v. State, 606 So.2d 1132, 1137 (1992). ¶ 137. In Parker, we ruled that because the improper other crimes evidence was of a different type than that with which the defendant was currently charged, the prejudicial effect, if any, was minimal, and thus the trial court's abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence did not necessitate a reversal. Parker, 606 So.2d at 1137. Later, in Duplantis v. State, 644 So.2d 1235, 1248 (Miss. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 1990, 131 L.Ed.2d 876 (1995) we stated: This is not a case where the other crimes evidence is similar or identical to the crime with which the defendant is currently charged, thereby making it likely that the jury would find him guilty this time simply because he had done it before. Consequently, the risk of unfair prejudice is minimal. Furthermore, in Duplantis, [n]o details of the other crimes were offered. 644 So.2d at 1246. ¶ 138. In the case sub judice, Mr. Reiley made no reference to the details of the crime for which Beckwith was incarcerated. Mr. Reiley merely explained his duties at the prison in order to give the jury a rational and coherent picture of his relationship with Beckwith and the circumstances of Beckwith's confession. We do not feel the jury was more likely to convict based on this testimony, the primary effect of which was not to show that Beckwith had committed another crime, but rather was to lay the foundation for much more incriminating evidence, i.e., a confession. Although trial courts generally should avoid admitting testimony which alludes to other crimes committed by the defendant, we find that the trial court's failure to do so in this instance did not amount to reversible error.
¶ 139. Peggy Morgan was prepared to testify that sometime in the late 1960's or early 1970's, she and her husband gave Byron De La Beckwith a ride from Greenwood, Mississippi, to Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman, during which ride Beckwith confessed to killing Medgar Evers. According to Ms. Morgan, Beckwith was going to Parchman to visit an inmate, Cecil Sessums, who had been convicted of bombing the home of civil rights activist Vernon Dahmer in Hattiesburg. Before she took the stand, the defense objected to any testimony regarding bombings or the identity of the inmate whom Beckwith was going to visit. The trial judge sustained the objection, ruling that Ms. Morgan could testify about those portions of her conversation with Beckwith that involved Medgar Evers and the offense charged, but she could not testify regarding the identity of the inmate or the charges against him. Assistant District Attorney DeLaughter responded, She won't get into that unless I ask her, which I won't ask her. When defense counsel requested that the record reflect that the prosecution did not undertake to caution the witness before she took the stand, Mr. DeLaughter responded that he would talk to her. ¶ 140. During Ms. Morgan's direct examination, the following exchange took place: Q. All right. Now, at any time on this trip, Ms. Morgan, would you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what, if any, statements that this defendant made concerning the murder or killing of Medgar Evers? A. Yes, sir. He started talking about some bombings  At this point, the defense objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial judge overruled the objection, but told the prosecutor to move along. Nothing more was said regarding bombings. Beckwith argues that Ms. Morgan's comment about bombings constituted improper other crimes evidence under Rule 404(b). ¶ 141. This situation is virtually identical to that in Watson v. State, 521 So.2d 1290 (Miss. 1988). In that case, the following exchange occurred during the prosecution's direct examination of a witness: Q. Have you had any contact with [Watson] lately? A. He's come by the office where I work, but we didn't really talk. He was just telling me he was out of jail  Watson, 521 So.2d at 1293. The defense objected at this point and moved for a mistrial, which objection and motion the trial court overruled. Id. On appeal, this Court affirmed, holding: The answer of [the witness] was not responsive to the question and there was no purposeful effort or intent on the part of the State to elicit such information from the witness. Assuming arguendo that the answer constituted error, certainly it was harmless error under the facts of this case. Id. at 1294. Similarly, in Craft v. State, 656 So.2d 1156, 1165 (Miss. 1995), we held that a witness' reference to another possible crime committed by the defendants did not warrant a reversal where the witness alluded to the other crime only once and the prosecution did not deliberately ask or infer about whether the defendants had been involved in any other offenses. See also United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 336 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1106, 105 S.Ct. 2340, 2341, 85 L.Ed.2d 855, 856 (1985) (holding that fleeting, unexplained reference to other crime was obviously not reversible error). ¶ 142. In the case sub judice, the prosecutor did not ask Ms. Morgan about any comments made by Beckwith regarding bombings, but instead asked her about comments regarding Medgar Evers, to which question Ms. Morgan's answer was unresponsive. The prosecutor thereafter directed Ms. Morgan's testimony towards matters involving Medgar Evers, and the bombings were never again mentioned. Clearly, the prosecution did not deliberately elicit testimony regarding other crimes. There is also some doubt as to whether the naked reference to bombings, without any indication as to who may have perpetrated them, could be considered testimony of other crimes committed by Beckwith. As in Watson, however, even assuming arguendo that the answer constituted error, the error was harmless. We therefore find no reversible error under this assignment.
¶ 143. Beckwith alleges several instances of improper comments by the prosecution, his objections to which were overruled.
¶ 144. During voir dire questioning of the jury panel by defense counsel regarding Beckwith's presumption of innocence, panel member Christine Butts made the following comments: A. I said I cannot judge him by just setting [sic] here looking at him. I want to hear his saying and maybe I could, you know, judge him by what he saying. I can't judge him just looking at him. Q. In other words, you would have to hear what he said? A. That's right. Q. Okay. And you would require that before you could make a decision? A. That's right. Later, the prosecution requested individual voir dire in chambers of Ms. Butts regarding this matter, during which examination the following exchange occurred: [BY MR. PETERS:] Ms. Butts, I think that you misunderstood, but maybe you didn't, and I need to know. We talked to you a lot about what the law was and could you follow the law, and that sort of thing. One of the laws is that a defendant doesn't have to testify. Do you recognize that? Do  now  A. I didn't recognize it. Now, since you, you know  Q. If I tell you that's the law, would that be all right with you? A. Yes, sir. Q. Would you require the defendant to take the stand and testify if the law doesn't require him to take the stand and testify? A. No, I wouldn't require  BY MR. KITCHENS: Your honor. Excuse me, Ms. Butts. We wish to interpose an objection to the District Attorney asking that particular question on the basis of Hines v. State. BY THE COURT: Be overruled. Q. So if the state didn't prove the defendant guilty, would you require any other proof? A. (Ms. Butts nodded negatively.) Q. That's all you  if we didn't prove our case, you wouldn't require them to do anything? A. No, sir. Beckwith argues the trial court erred in overruling his objection. ¶ 145. In Hines v. State, 339 So.2d 56, 57 (Miss. 1976), the prosecutor asked the jury panel during voir dire, Do each of you realize that the defendant has the right not to testify in this case? You are not to draw any inference as to guilt or innocence of the defendant whether he does or does not take the stand. The defense immediately objected and moved for a mistrial, which objection and motion the trial court overruled. On appeal, this Court reversed, holding that the prosecutor's remarks, coupled with the defendant's decision not to testify, were tantamount to an improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify. Hines, 339 So.2d at 57. Hines, however, is distinguishable from the instant case. ¶ 146. In the case sub judice, the prosecutor's comment was not made to the entire jury panel, but rather was addressed to an individual juror in chambers. Thus, the entire panel was not tainted by any prejudice occasioned by the prosecutor's remarks. Furthermore, the prosecutor's comments were an attempt to dispel Ms. Butts' misunderstanding of the presumption of innocence which she expressed in response to questioning by defense counsel. Ms. Butts had indicated in no uncertain terms that she would not feel comfortable determining Beckwith's guilt or innocence unless he took the stand and testified. This is exactly the misconception that our prohibition of comments on the defendant's failure to testify is intended to prevent. We cannot say the prosecutor's remarks to Ms. Butts caused such a misconception when she clearly already had it. If anything, the prosecutor's explanation cleared up Ms. Butt's misunderstanding, as is apparent from her responses. If the defense felt that Ms. Butts was in any way prejudiced against Beckwith, then the defense was certainly free to challenge her for cause or peremptorily. We find that the prosecutor's voir dire comments made in chambers to an individual juror in response to that juror's clear misunderstanding of the law did not amount to an improper comment on Beckwith's failure to testify. ¶ 147. Beckwith also assigns as error the following comment made by the prosecutor during closing argument: [BY MR. PETERS:] And he took this gun, his gun  doesn't deny that  his scope  doesn't deny that  BY MR. KITCHENS: Object to improper argument about the defendant not denying it and move for a mistrial. BY THE COURT: All right. The objection will be overruled. BY MR. PETERS: His fingerprint, no evidence to the contrary. No evidence to the contrary whatsoever. His gun, his scope, his fingerprint. Beckwith argues the prosecutor's comment that Beckwith did not deny ownership of the gun or the scope constituted an improper comment on Beckwith's failure to testify. ¶ 148. When there is a question as to the prosecution's comment on the defendant's failure to testify, each case must be considered individually on the facts of that particular case. Conway v. State, 397 So.2d 1095, 1099 (Miss.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826, 101 S.Ct. 88, 66 L.Ed.2d 29 (1980); Peterson v. State, 357 So.2d 113, 117 (Miss. 1978). Taken in context, it appears that the remarks sub judice were not a comment on Beckwith's failure to testify but rather they were a comment on the defense's failure to produce any evidence to refute the State's evidence. We have held that it is not error to comment on the defense's failure to offer any evidence to contradict the State's evidence. Lee v. State, 435 So.2d 674, 678 (Miss. 1983); Conway, 397 So.2d at 1100 (citing Johnson v. State, 109 Miss. 622, 68 So. 917 (1915)). Even if error, such comment is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the evidence of guilt is so overwhelming that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict in spite of the prosecutor's comment. Lee, 435 So.2d at 678; Conway, 397 So.2d at 1100 (citing Chatman v. State, 244 Miss. 659, 145 So.2d 707 (1962); Lambert v. State, 199 Miss. 790, 25 So.2d 477 (1946)). This is especially true in cases in which the defendant does not face the death penalty. See West v. State, 485 So.2d 681, 688 (Miss. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 983, 107 S.Ct. 570, 93 L.Ed.2d 574 (1986)(stating overwhelming proof of guilt might have rendered comment on defendant's failure to testify harmless had defendant been charged with murder instead of capital murder). ¶ 149. In the case sub judice, the evidence of guilt included, among other things, the following: (1) Beckwith was seen in Jackson three days before the murder asking where Medgar Evers lived; (2) a white Plymouth Valiant matching the description of Beckwith's car was seen parked at Joe's Drive-In near Ever's home on the night of the murder; (3) Beckwith's rifle was found at the scene of the murder with his fingerprint on the scope; and (4) Beckwith confessed to at least five different people that he killed Medgar Evers. In light of such overwhelming evidence of guilt, any error occasioned by the prosecutor's comments was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, there is an additional reason to deny relief from this alleged error. ¶ 150. We have held such comments to be harmless error where the trial court instructed the jury not to consider the fact that the defendant did not testify. Jackson v. State, 440 So.2d 307, 310 (Miss. 1983); Barnes v. State, 230 Miss. 299, 92 So.2d 863 (1957). In the instant case, the defense requested and was granted Instruction D-9, which provided, The Court instructs the Jury that the defendant has an absolute right under the law not to testify in this case, and the Jury shall draw no inference whatever from Mr. Beckwith's not having done so. We have reasoned that such an instruction probably brought to the attention of the jurors, and impressed them, the fact that [the defendant] did not testify, more than the argument of the district attorney. Jackson, 440 So.2d at 310. For this and the aforementioned reasons, we find that the prosecutor's comments during closing argument did not amount to reversible error.
¶ 151. During closing argument, in reference to the defense's cross-examination of Peggy Morgan on her history of family problems, the District Attorney made the following comments: Whenever a defense attorney says, and gets sugar-tongued, Now, I don't wanna hurt your feelings, and I  I don't mean to ask this, but I gotta know, grab your throat because he's fixing to slit it... . And he would do that to get a back-shooting murderer turned loose. The defense objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing the prosecutor was improperly denigrating defense counsel. The trial court overruled the motion and instructed the prosecutor to move along. The prosecutor later stated, That's the reason people won't  like Mark Reiley won't come forward because of what happened to Ms. Morgan. The defense again objected, which objection was overruled. The prosecutor later argued, Don't let him walk out of here and continue to brag about it, and say, `I got twelve more. Twelve more. And I fooled them. And I can say it to whoever I want to.' After another defense objection was overruled, the prosecutor continued: I can say it to whoever I want to. I've already proven that. I can say it to IRS workers; I can say it to FAA workers. I can say it to FBI informants. I can say it to whoever I want to, because they can't convict me. I am Byron De La Beckwith from Greenwood, Mississippi, and they can't convict me, and I'll just brag all I want to, just like I have in the past, because, remember this, a verdict of not guilty gives him the absolute freedom to say whatever he wants. The defense again objected, which objection was overruled. Beckwith argues these comments were highly prejudicial and warrant a reversal. ¶ 152. We have always allowed counsel considerable latitude in the argument of cases. He may draw whatever deductions seem to him proper from these facts, so long as he does not use violent and abusive language, and even in many cases invectives may be justified and even called for... . Shell v. State, 554 So.2d 887, 900 (Miss. 1989) (quoting Nelms & Blum Co. v. Fink, 159 Miss. 372, 131 So. 817 (1930)), rev'd on other grounds, 498 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 313, 112 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). With regard to Ms. Morgan, the prosecutor apparently was trying to bolster her credibility in light of the defense's vigorous cross-examination of her. As for the comments regarding Beckwith, the prosecutor was drawing the jury's attention to the abundant evidence that Beckwith had bragged about killing Medgar Evers. Although some of the prosecutor's comments may have bordered on impropriety, the question on appeal is whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument of the prosecuting attorney is to create an unjust prejudice against the accused as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created. Davis v. State, 530 So.2d 694, 701 (Miss. 1988). We cannot say, in light of the overwhelming evidence against Beckwith, that the jury's verdict was likely influenced by any prejudice that may have been occasioned by the prosecutors remarks.
¶ 153. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 804(b) provides that a witness' former testimony is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the witness is unavailable. Rule 804(a) provides that a witness is unavailable if he [t]estifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement, or [i]s unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity. Beckwith argues that because he was over 73 years old at the time of trial, had several serious physical problems, was on numerous medications that affected his mental abilities, and had testified at his speedy trial hearing to the effect of his memory loss, the trial court erred in overruling his motion to have the transcript of his 1964 testimony read into evidence. ¶ 154. In Parker v. State, 514 So.2d 767, 773 (Miss. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014, 108 S.Ct. 1487, 99 L.Ed.2d 715 (1988), this Court set out the requirements of the former testimony exception. Those requirements are (1) the former testimony must have been given under oath; (2) the party against whom the testimony is offered must have had a reasonable opportunity for cross-examination; (3) there must have been an identity of the parties in the former trial and in the trial in which the testimony is offered; (4) there must have been an identity of the issues; and (5) the witness must be unavailable at the time of the second proceeding. Parker, 514 So.2d at 773 (citing Jolly v. State, 269 So.2d 650, 654 (Miss. 1972)). In Parker, because the trial at issue was a retrial of the same charges of the earlier trial, we held the witness' former testimony was admissible. Id. Beckwith argues that likewise, because the 1994 trial was a retrial of the same charges tried in 1964, his former testimony was admissible. In Parker, however, because the witness was in West Germany at the time of trial, there was no issue as to his unavailability. Id. In the case sub judice, on the other hand, although there was no issue as to the identity of the parties and issues, Beckwith was present at the trial. ¶ 155. The party offering the former testimony bears the burden of proving the unavailability of the witness, and the determination of unavailability is a judicial exercise reviewable on appeal only for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Amaya, 533 F.2d 188, 191 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101, 97 S.Ct. 1125, 51 L.Ed.2d 551 (1977). In the case sub judice, although the trial court overruled Beckwith's motion to have his former testimony read into evidence, the court ruled: The Court will, however, allow the defense the latitude of presenting evidence which was recorded at the previous trial through the  through the deposition or the transcript in the event the defendant's testimony reveals that he fails  his memory fails him in that  in that respect. In McDonnell v. United States, 472 F.2d 1153, 1155 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 942, 93 S.Ct. 2785, 37 L.Ed.2d 402 (1973), the Eighth Circuit held that such a ruling was supported by textwriters and case law. Beckwith, however, declined the court's offer and invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, which indicates that his allegation of unavailability was motivated by his desire not to take the witness stand. While a defendant clearly has the right not to testify, he may not invoke that right and avoid cross-examination while claiming the right to have his former testimony put before the jury. United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 54 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925, 97 S.Ct. 327, 50 L.Ed.2d 293 (1976). Under the circumstances of this case, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Beckwith's former testimony could be read to the jury in the event his testimony revealed a lack of memory as to a portion of the subject matter.
¶ 156. On February 3, 1994, after the parties had finally rested and before the jury retired for deliberations, the trial judge instructed the jurors that when preparing to leave their rooms the next morning, they could pack up your belongings and have those ready to load on the bus or the facility that they have for you in the morning so that  that you can go ahead and be transported back to your hometown, in the event that we reach a verdict tomorrow. After the jury left the courtroom, Beckwith moved for a mistrial, arguing the judge's comments improperly impressed the jury that they were expected to reach a quick verdict. The trial court overruled the motion, but offered to have the bailiffs instruct the jury to wait until after they have reached a verdict before preparing to go home, to which offer defense counsel responded that the harm has been done, and it would be impossible to unring that bell. Beckwith argues the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a mistrial. ¶ 157. It is true, as Beckwith asserts, that the trial court should not make it known to anyone, especially the jurors, how long he plans to allow the jury to deliberate. Wade v. State, 155 Miss. 648, 124 So. 803 (1929). The instant situation, however, is very similar to that in Jackson v. State, 551 So.2d 132, 147 (Miss. 1989), in which the trial judge allowed the jurors to return to their hotel rooms to collect their belongings before retiring to deliberate upon their verdict. On appeal, we denied the defendant/appellant's assignment of error, holding: The record reflects no contemporaneous objection to the Circuit Court's pack up your stuff suggestion. To obtain review of such remarks, the point ordinarily must be called to the court's attention when made, and corrections thereof requested, or proper objection made, at that time unless the court's conduct, on the entire record, was so reprehensible and prejudicial as to deny fair trial or due process. Jackson Yellow Cab Co. v. Alexander, 246 Miss. 268, 148 So.2d 674 (1963). There is no showing that the Circuit Court so abused its discretion in the premises, nor does any contemporaneous objection appear in the record. Jackson, 551 So.2d at 147. ¶ 158. In the case sub judice, Beckwith did not contemporaneously object to the trial court's pack up your stuff suggestion, nor did he request correctional action. He instead waited until the jury left the courtroom and then moved for a mistrial. Furthermore, when the trial judge offered to correct any error, the defense responded that it was too late to unring that bell. Also, the judge had informed the jurors that they could go home in the event that we reach a verdict tomorrow. The court's conduct, on the entire record, was not so reprehensible and prejudicial as to deny a fair trial or due process. Under Jackson, Beckwith's failure to contemporaneously object and request corrective action bars this assignment of error.