Opinion ID: 1847325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 34

Heading: jerome smith's right to counsel was violated when the trial judge refused to appoint the attorney who had represented him throughout the pretrial stage, and instead substituted new lawyers one month before trial.

Text: ś 206. According to Jerome, when at a hearing on May 24, 1993, a month before trial, his retained attorney Solomon Osborne made a motion to withdraw as Jerome's counsel or in the alternative, to be appointed, the trial court erred in not appointing Osborne as counsel. Jerome argues that since Osborne had been working on the case for several months and the two had obviously developed an attorney-client relationship, Osborne should have been appointed to handle the case instead of reappointed attorneys Jones and Gandy a mere month prior to trial when they had forgotten what little they had known of the case. ś 207. The record simply does not bear out Jerome's view of the circumstances surrounding Osborne's withdrawal from the case and the reappointment of Jones and Gandy. Upon Jerome's indictment for capital murder on November 12, 1992, the lower court appointed Leland Jones and Leman Gandy to represent him in the case. Subsequently, Jerome's mother and sisters retained attorney Solomon Osborne to represent Jerome. On January 13, 1993, Jerome informed Jones and Gandy that an attorney had been retained for him, and on January 19, 1993, the two filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. January 20, 1993, Osborne entered an appearance and Jones and Gandy were allowed to withdraw and Osborne was substituted as counsel. ś 208. On May 24, 1993, there was a hearing on a motion for continuance by the defense scheduled. At the commencement of that hearing the transcript reveals the following occurrence: BY THE COURT: 22, 161, Clyde Wendell Smith. Mr. Osborne, I expect we can take up your motion a lot quicker than we can these others. Let's take your's up. What are the grounds for your continuance? BY MR. OSBORNE: Your Honor, this is a case in which I was retained afterâ well I have another motion that I want you to consider first before we get to the continuance. If you grant it there will be no need for a continuance. This is a case in which two attorneys were appointed to represent Jerome Smith and after that his mother and sisters came to me and retained me to represent him. They ... they paid me a portion of the fee in March of this year and sub ... and in April, about April the 26th, they came to my office and told me that they didn't long... they didn't want me to represent Mr. Smith any longer and that they were not going to pay the balance of the fee, and based on that I filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. BY THE COURT: Have you ... have you done enough work on it to earn the fee they've paid you? BY MR. OSBORNE: Yes, sir, I have, but I advised them that I just couldn't withdraw unless I got permission from the Court. BY THE COURT: Well, Mr. Osborne, I'm notâ I hadn'tâ it has not been my practice, and I'm not going to start now, to require attorneys to work for nothing where people haven't paid them, and obviously he's indigent; is that correct? BY MR. OSBORNE: Yes, sir. BY THE COURT: This was his family paying this? BY MR. OSBORNE: This was his mother and sisters. BY THE COURT: I will release you. BY MR. OSBORNE: All right. .... BY MR. CROOK: Excuse me, Your Honor. In his motion he has asked to be allowed to withdraw as retained counsel, as I understand it, and his motion has listed in the alternative to appoint him. BY THE COURT: Well I'm not going to appoint him, no, sir. I will appoint someone else. BY MR. OSBORNE: All right, well thank you. BY DEPUTY SHERIFF TINDALL: They had two appointed attorneys before they hired Mr. Osborne. They just told them they didn't want them. BY THE COURT: They didn't want them? Well it'll be the same two. BY MR. CROOK: That was Mr. Jones... They didn't want Leman. BY MR. STUCKEY: Yeah, I'll call them and tell them they got thirty days to get ready. BY THE COURT: Yes, sir, thatâ it'll be his original appointed attorneys, we're not going to have attorney shopping between indigents. ś 209. The record shows that at no time during this hearing did Osborne ask to be appointed as Jerome's counsel, but instead indicated he wished to withdraw because Jerome's mother and sisters, who had retained him, informed him they were no longer going to pay his fee. The trial court did the appropriate thing in allowing Osborne to withdraw and reappointing Jones and Gandy, who were already familiar with the case, and who, immediately upon being reappointed, filed a motion for severance. Had the trial court appointed Osborne it would have sent out a message to other indigent defendants that all they had to do to obtain the attorney of their choice was to retain him and then not pay. ś 210. None of the cases cited by Jerome in his argument of this issue are directly on point, as all involve different factual situations. McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d 18 (Alaska 1974), for example, involved a situation where on the day set for trial, the trial court removed the public defender from the case against the client and attorney's wishes, because the trial judge felt the attorney and the public defender's office were incompetent. Jerome cites Martin v. State, 312 So.2d 5 (Miss.1975), to support his proposition that Osborne should have been appointed because one month was not sufficient time for Jones and Gandy to prepare for trial. In Martin, a young attorney was appointed on Thursday to represent a defendant scheduled to go to trial the following Monday. Clearly there is a big difference between the weekend given the attorney in Martin and the month given the attorneys in this case, especially since they were already familiar with the case. Furthermore, all of the cases cited by Jerome note that an indigent defendant does not have an absolute right to the appointed attorney of his choice. See United States v. Mills, 895 F.2d 897, 904 (2d Cir.1990) (citing Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983)). ś 211. In the case at bar Jerome's appointed attorney made a motion to withdraw, or in the alternative to be appointed, and at no time did he object to the trial court removing him from the case. Furthermore, Jerome never made it known to the trial court that he wanted Osborne to be appointed, or that he was unhappy with his appointed counsel. This issue is without merit.