Opinion ID: 104229
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Applicability of the Articles of War.

Text: The Court's opinion puts the proceeding and the petitioner, in so far as any rights relating to his trial and conviction are concerned, wholly outside the Articles of War. In view of what has taken place, I think the decision's necessary effect is also to place them entirely beyond limitation and protection, respectively, by the Constitution. I disagree as to both conclusions or effects. The Court rules that Congress has not made Articles 25 and 38 applicable to this proceeding. I think it has made them applicable to this and all other military commissions or tribunals. If so, the commission not only lost all power to punish petitioner by what occurred in the proceedings. It never acquired jurisdiction to try him. For the directive by which it was constituted, in the provisions of ง 16, [28] was squarely in conflict with Articles 25 and 38 of the Articles of War [29] and therefore was void. Article 25 allows reading of depositions in evidence, under prescribed conditions, in the plainest terms before any military court or commission in any case not capital,  providing, however, that testimony by deposition may be adduced for the defense in capital cases.  (Emphasis added.) This language clearly and broadly covers every kind of military tribunal, whether court or commission. It covers all capital cases. It makes no exception or distinction for any accused. Article 38 authorizes the President by regulations to prescribe procedure, including modes of proof, even more all-inclusively if possible, in cases before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commissions, and other military tribunals. Language could not be more broadly inclusive. No exceptions are mentioned or suggested, whether of tribunals or of accused persons. Every kind of military body for performing the function of trial is covered. That is clear from the face of the Article. Article 38 moreover limits the President's power. He is so far as practicable to prescribe the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the district courts of the United States, a clear mandate that Congress intended all military trials to conform as closely as possible to our customary procedural and evidentiary protections, constitutional and statutory, for accused persons. But there are also two unqualified limitations, one that nothing contrary to or inconsistent with these articles [specifically here Article 25] shall be so prescribed; the other that all rules made in pursuance of this article shall be laid before the Congress annually. Notwithstanding these broad terms the Court, resting chiefly on Article 2, concludes the petitioner was not among the persons there declared to be subject to the Articles of War and therefore the commission which tries him is not subject to them. That Article does not cover prisoners of war or war criminals. Neither does it cover civilians in occupied territories, theatres of military operations or other places under military jurisdiction within or without the United States or territory subject to its sovereignty, whether they be neutrals or enemy aliens, even citizens of the United States, unless they are connected in the manner Article 2 prescribes with our armed forces, exclusive of the Navy. The logic which excludes petitioner on the basis that prisoners of war are not mentioned in Article 2 would exclude all these. I strongly doubt the Court would go so far, if presented with a trial like this in such instances. Nor does it follow necessarily that, because some persons may not be mentioned in Article 2, they can be tried without regard to any of the limitations placed by any of the other Articles upon military tribunals. Article 2 in defining persons subject to the articles of war was, I think, specifying those to whom the Articles in general were applicable. And there is no dispute that most of the Articles are not applicable to the petitioner. It does not follow, however, and Article 2 does not provide, that there may not be in the Articles specific provisions covering persons other than those specified in Article 2. Had it so provided, Article 2 would have been contradictory not only of Articles 25 and 38 but also of Article 15 among others. In 1916, when the last general revision of the Articles of War took place, [30] for the first time certain of the Articles were specifically made applicable to military commissions. Until then they had applied only to courts-martial. There were two purposes, the first to give statutory recognition to the military commission without loss of prior jurisdiction and the second to give those tried before military commissions some of the more important protections afforded persons tried by courts-martial. In order to effectuate the first purpose, the Army proposed Article 15. [31] To effectuate the second purpose, Articles 25 and 38 and several others were proposed. [32] But as the Court now construes the Articles of War, they have no application to military commissions before which alleged offenders against the laws of war are tried. What the Court holds in effect is that there are two types of military commission, one to try offenses which might be cognizable by a court-martial, the other to try war crimes, and that Congress intended the Articles of War referring in terms to military commissions without exception to be applicable only to the first type. This misconceives both the history of military commissions and the legislative history of the Articles of War. There is only one kind of military commission. It is true, as the history noted shows, that what is now called the military commission arose from two separate military courts instituted during the Mexican War. The first military court, called by General Scott a military commission, was given jurisdiction in Mexico over criminal offenses of the class cognizable by civil courts in time of peace. The other military court, called a council of war, was given jurisdiction over offenses against the laws of war. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (2d ed., reprinted 1920) []1298-1299. During the Civil War the two jurisdictions of the earlier commission and council respectively . . . [were] united in the . . . war-court, for which the general designation of `military commission' was retained as the preferable one. Winthrop, supra, at []1299. Since that time there has been only one type of military tribunal called the military commission, though it may exercise different kinds of jurisdiction, [33] according to the circumstances under which and purposes for which it is convened. The testimony of General Crowder is perhaps the most authoritative evidence of what was intended by the legislation, for he was its most active official sponsor, spending years in securing its adoption and revision. Articles 15, 25 and 38 particularly are traceable to his efforts. His concern to secure statutory recognition for military commissions was equalled by his concern that the statutory provisions giving this should not restrict their preexisting jurisdiction. He did not wish by securing additional jurisdiction, overlapping partially that of the court-martial, to surrender other. Hence Article 15. That Article had one purpose and one only. It was to make sure that the acquisition of partially concurrent jurisdiction with courts-martial should not cause loss of any other. And it was jurisdiction, not procedure, which was covered by other Articles, with which he and Congress were concerned in that Article. It discloses no purpose to deal in any way with procedure or to qualify Articles 25 and 38. And it is clear that General Crowder at all times regarded all military commissions as being governed by the identical procedure. In fact, so far as Articles 25 and 38 are concerned, this seems obvious for all types of military tribunals. The same would appear to be true of other Articles also, e.g., 24 (prohibiting compulsory self-incrimination), 26, 27, 32 (contempts), all except the last dealing with procedural matters. Article 12 is especially significant. It empowers general courts-martial to try two classes of offenders: (1) any person subject to military law,  under the definition of Article 2, for any offense made punishable by these articles; (2) and any other person who by the law of war is subject to trial by military tribunals,  not covered by the terms of Article 2. (Emphasis added.) Article 12 thus, in conformity with Article 15, gives the general court-martial concurrent jurisdiction of war crimes and war criminals with military commissions. Neither it nor any other Article states or indicates there are to be two kinds of general courts-martial for trying war crimes; yet this is the necessary result of the Court's decision, unless in the alternative that would be to imply that in exercising such jurisdiction there is only one kind of general court-martial, but there are two or more kinds of military commission, with wholly different procedures and with the result that the commander in the field will not be free to determine whether general court-martial or military commission shall be used as the circumstances may dictate, but must govern his choice by the kind of procedure he wishes to have employed. The only reasonable and, I think, possible conclusion to draw from the Articles is that the Articles which are in terms applicable to military commissions are so uniformly and those applicable to both such commissions and to courts-martial when exercising jurisdiction over offenders against the laws of war likewise are uniformly applicable, and not diversely according to the person or offense being tried. Not only the face of the Articles, but specific statements in General Crowder's testimony support this view. Thus in the portion quoted above [34] from his 1916 statement, after stating expressly the purpose of Article 15 to preserve unimpaired the military commission's jurisdiction, and to make it concurrent with that of courts-martial in so far as the two would overlap, so that the military commander in the field in time of war will be at liberty to employ either form of court that happens to be convenient, he went on to say: Both classes of courts have the same procedure, a statement so unequivocal as to leave no room for question. And his quotation from Winthrop supports his statement, namely: Its [i.e., the military commission's] composition, constitution and procedure follow the analogy of courts-martial. At no point in the testimony is there suggestion that there are two types of military commission, one bound by the procedural provisions of the Articles, the other wholly free from their restraints or, as the Court strangely puts the matter, that there is only one kind of commission, but that it is bound or not bound by the Articles applicable in terms, depending upon who is being tried and for what offense; for that very difference makes the difference between one and two. The history and the discussion show conclusively that General Crowder wished to secure and Congress intended to give statutory recognition to all forms of military tribunals; to enable commanding officers in the field to use either court-martial or military commission as convenience might dictate, thus broadening to this extent the latter's jurisdiction and utility; but at the same time to preserve its full preexisting jurisdiction; and also to lay down identical provisions for governing or providing for the government of the procedure and rules of evidence of every type of military tribunal, wherever and however constituted. [35] Finally, unless Congress was legislating with regard to all military commissions, Article 38, which gives the President the power to prescribe the procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commissions, and other military tribunals, takes on a rather senseless meaning; for the President would have such power only with respect to those military commissions exercising concurrent jurisdiction with courts-martial. All this seems so obvious, upon a mere reading of the Articles themselves and the legislative history, as not to require demonstration. And all this Congress knew, as that history shows. In the face of that showing I cannot accept the Court's highly strained construction, first, because I think it is in plain contradiction of the facts disclosed by the history of Articles 15, 25 and 38 as well as their language; and also because that construction defeats at least two of the ends General Crowder had in mind, namely, to secure statutory recognition for every form of military tribunal and to provide for them a basic uniform mode of procedure or method of providing for their procedure. Accordingly, I think Articles 25 and 38 are applicable to this proceeding; that the provisions of the governing directive in ง 16 are in direct conflict with those Articles; and for that reason the commission was invalidly constituted, was without jurisdiction, and its sentence is therefore void.