Opinion ID: 1226896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Motion to Exclude Photographs

Text: Prior to trial, defendant moved for a hearing to determine the admissibility of certain photographs that the People intended to introduce into evidence. The photographs included what were referred to as items 33A, 33B, 33C, 33D, 33E, and 33F  which depicted Hanson's body at the crime scene  and items 36A, 36B, 36C, 36D, 36E, and 36F  which depicted Blount's body at the same place. At the hearing, defendant argued that items 33A, 33B, 33C, 33D, 36D, and 36E should each be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 as substantially more prejudicial than probative, specifically, as overly gruesome or merely cumulative or both. The People agreed as to item 33C  expressly conceding that it was cumulative to other photographs  but disagreed as to the others. The trial court reviewed each of the photographs defendant sought to exclude. Thereupon, it granted the motion with regard to item 33C, but denied it with regard to items 33A, 33B, 33D, 36D, and 36E. At trial, the People sought to introduce the five nonexcluded photographs, among others. Defendant renewed his motion. The court denied the request again. It then received items 33A, 33B, 33D, 36D, and 36E into evidence as exhibits 33-A, 33-B, 33-D, 36-D, and 36-E. (16) Defendant now contends that the trial court's ruling was erroneous as to item 33D/exhibit 33-D. The decision comprises a determination as to undue prejudice. The appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion. ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 786 [speaking specifically of photographs].) No abuse appears. We have ourselves reviewed the photograph in question, which shows Hanson's upper body and the wound to his throat. The court could have reasonably concluded that the evidence was not substantially more prejudicial than probative. It was relevant to the crucial issues bearing on defendant's conduct and mental state at the time of the crimes. Moreover, it was not overly gruesome  at one point during the hearing below defense counsel conceded as much  nor was it merely cumulative to other evidence. Defendant claims that the trial court did indeed err. His first attack is procedural. It fails. Of course, on a motion invoking [Evidence Code section 352] the record must affirmatively show that the trial judge did in fact weigh prejudice against probative value.... ( People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 25 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], citing authorities; accord, People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 582 [217 Cal. Rptr. 212, 703 P.2d 1106].) The record here does so. Contrary to defendant's implication, no more is required. Certainly, the trial judge need not expressly weigh prejudice against probative value  or even expressly state that he has done so (see People v. Johnson (1987) 193 Cal. App.3d 1570, 1576 [239 Cal. Rptr. 190]). Defendant's second attack is substantive. For the reasons stated above, it fails as well.