Opinion ID: 1958884
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Permitting the plaintiffs' expert to testify as to the cause of the August 25 accident.

Text: At his deposition, Ternent attributed the cause of the August 25 accident to mechanical failure of the right front wheel. He stated the basis for his opinion as follows: [O]n the fact that all of the bolts were loose in thethat hold the brake backing plate on the steering spindle on the right hand front wheel, and this would permit cocking of the brake assembly to binding up the wheel. He opined that the cocking, referring to the braking plate being pulled away from the spindle toward the axle and hub, resulted in the high torque which pulled the truck to the right. At the end of the deposition, he stated that he planned further investigation to determine if something other than cocking ... might explain lockup or severe retardation of that wheel. The following colloquy took place at the deposition: (Defense counsel): And depending upon the outcome of that study, that's an area of opinions that you mayI mean that's the area where you may come up with additional opinions? Is it fair to say that if he does come up with (Plaintiff's counsel): We will let you know. (Defense counsel): I appreciate that, but I would appreciate also not only hearing that opinion, but an exhausted detail of how he arrived at the opinion so I can effectively conduct cross-examination at trial in the detail that I went in today. The defendant now argues that Ternent was allowed to change his opinion in his trial testimony, despite the plaintiffs' failure to inform the defendant of any change in testimony. At trial, Ternent testified, as he did at his deposition, that the brake assembly on the right front wheel cocked: My opinion is that the brake assembly had become loose on the steering spindle and there was a cocking action which multiplied the normal brake force and caused the right wheel to brake much more severely than the left wheel and pull the truck to the right. Later, he testified that: It's my opinion that that very light brake application expanded the wedges, set the brakes lightly, and then as the drum rotated, and this entire assembly moved and mechanically cocked, mechanically cocked so that there was heavy interference between the lining and the brake drum and resulted in heavier braking on the right wheel while the left wheel of course was perfectly proper with eight bolts solidly tight while on the right wheel only two bolts were described as anywhere near tight. The implication being that they were not fully tightened, and that is my explanation of why that right front wheel pulled the truck off the road on August 25th. On cross-examination, Ternent stated that he had changed his opinion regarding the planing of the cocking, but he remained convinced that cocking caused the accident. Defendant asserts that the change in testimony violated discovery and evidentiary rules, foreclosed effective cross-examination, and unfairly prejudiced his case. See M.R.Civ.P. 26(e)(1) and (2) (duty to disclose substance of expert's testimony and amendment thereof); M.R.Evid. 705. Besides arguing that any change in testimony was minor because Ternent continued to testify that some variant of cocking caused the accident, plaintiffs contend that defendant failed to object in a timely fashion to the witnesses' testimony. Only after concluding cross-examination, which included an attack on his change of opinion from the time of the deposition, did defense counsel object on the basis of changed testimony. During direct examination, defense counsel objected in the following manner to the admissibility of Ternent's opinion on the cause of the August 25 accident: Same objection, your honor. Tracing the same objection to its source, the objection could only logically refer to a prior objection to an anticipated expression of an opinion based on industry wide experience with the 121 anti-locking system, or to a prior objection based on a lack of foundation. We conclude that defense counsel failed to preserve the objection that is now being pressed. The difference in testimony does not rise to the level of obvious error affecting substantial rights.