Opinion ID: 657319
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rosenthal's Right to Indictment by Grand Jury

Text: 22 Count Eight of the indictment, prior to redaction by the district court, provided: 23 36. From in or around December 1985 through in or around October 1986 ... the defendant ALAN E. ROSENTHAL ... unlawfully, willfully and knowingly gave and offered and promised to give and offer, directly and indirectly, fees, kickbacks, commissions, gifts, loans, money and things of value, to officers, counsel, agents and employees of an organization which provided benefit plan services to, and to agents, counsel, and custodians of, employee pension and welfare benefit plans which were subject to title [sic] I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act because of or with intent to influence their actions, decisions, and other duties related to questions and matters concerning such plans, namely, false and fraudulent tax losses through the 1985 Tax Trades, to David B. Solomon in connection with the investment by him of monies on behalf of employee pension and welfare benefit plans that were clients of SAM. 24 (Title 18, United States Code, Section 1954 and 2). 25 As noted above, before charging the jury, the district court deleted the words false and fraudulent from the count. Rosenthal contends that because the indictment departed from the statutory language of Sec. 1954 and undertook to define and specify an essential element of the offense, to wit, the thing of value, that specification became a part of the charging terms of the offense and had to be proved by the Government. According to Rosenthal, the district court deleted the words false and fraudulent from the indictment because the Government failed to prove that Solomon's 1985 losses were fraudulent, and, thus, the charging terms of Count Eight were altered and an impermissible amendment occurred. We are not persuaded that the indictment herein was impermissibly amended. Even if it were appellant's contention that there was a variance between the pleading and proof at trial, he would not prevail on that claim since he would have to show that he suffered prejudice, see United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777, 787 (2d Cir.) (claim of variance is subject to the harmless error rule and require[s] a showing of prejudice to the defendant), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944, 106 S.Ct. 308, 88 L.Ed.2d 285 (1985). Appellant stated in his reply brief, at page 7, that [t]he issue is not whether [his] defense was prejudiced by the redaction of Count Eight, but whether that redaction altered the 'charging terms' of Count Eight before it was given to the jury. We focus our discussion, therefore, on whether the subject count was constructively amended. 2 26 An indictment is constructively amended when the proof at trial differs from that which was charged in the indictment. See United States v. Patino, 962 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 354, 121 L.Ed.2d 268 (1992). A variation between the charges in the indictment and the evidence at trial that broadens the basis of conviction beyond that charged in the indictment, is an impermissible constructive amendment. Id. at 265 (citing United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 144-45, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985)). For example, in Stirone v. United States, the appellant was charged with violating the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951. See 361 U.S. 212, 213, 80 S.Ct. 270, 271, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960). The indictment charged interference with interstate shipments of sand to Pennsylvania, id. at 214, 80 S.Ct. at 271, but the proof at trial was broadened to include shipments of steel out of Pennsylvania. Id. This was found to be an impermissible broadening of the indictment. Id. at 219, 80 S.Ct. at 274. 27 It is well settled that a [c]onstructive amendment of an indictment is a per se violation of the grand jury clause of the Fifth Amendment. Patino, 962 F.2d at 265-66. 3 If such an amendment occurs without resubmission to the grand jury, the [d]eprivation of such a basic right is far too serious to be ... dismissed as harmless error. Stirone, 361 U.S. at 217, 80 S.Ct. at 273 (citation omitted). We have stated previously, however, that the challenged alteration must affect an essential element of the offense, Patino, 962 F.2d at 266 (citing Weiss, 752 F.2d at 787), and we have 'consistently permitted significant flexibility in proof, provided that the defendant was given notice of the core of criminality to be proven at trial.'  Id. (citing United States v. Heimann, 705 F.2d 662, 666 (2d Cir.1983)) (other citations omitted). 28 Rosenthal relies upon a number of constructive amendment cases to support his contention that the deletion of the words false and fraudulent from Count Eight violated the fifth amendment. We are not persuaded that the trial judge impermissibly amended Count Eight and thus improperly broadened the basis for conviction on that count. We believe that Rosenthal was adequately apprised of the core of criminality--the essential elements--of the Sec. 1954 charge, to wit, that he gave a thing of value to one of the enumerated fiduciaries with intent to influence that individual's actions or decisions concerning an employee welfare benefit or pension benefit plan. 29 In each of the cases Rosenthal cites, the defendant was convicted on proof of transactions different from those identified in the indictment. For example, in United States v. Weissman, 899 F.2d 1111 (11th Cir.1990), a RICO indictment charged that the enterprise was a  'group of individuals associated in fact known as the DeCavalcante Family of La Cosa Nostra.'  Id. at 1112. During jury deliberations, the jury asked,  'Are enterprise and DeCavalcante Family synonymous?'  Id. at 1113. The district judge instructed the jury in response that they were not, and that the jury could convict the defendants if it found that any enterprise existed, even if it was not the DeCavalcante Family. Id. The Eleventh Circuit reversed because under the judge's supplementary instruction, the jury may well have convicted these defendants of being involved with an enterprise other than the one charged in the indictment. Id. at 1116. To the same effect is United States v. Zingaro, 858 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.1988). Zingaro involved, inter alia, a series of unlawful gambling debt collections at various Yonkers social clubs. Id. at 97. At trial, the Government introduced proof of the unlawful collection of a debt that was not mentioned in the indictment and that was unrelated to the activities of the identified social clubs. Id. We found that this amounted to a constructive amendment of the indictment because this uncharged collection of a debt fell entirely outside the criminal 'scheme' alleged in the indictment, and the defendant had no inkling that he was charged with this criminal act. Id. at 103. The danger, in all of these cases, was that the defendant could have been convicted for conduct entirely different from that charged in the indictment. 30 In contrast, Rosenthal seems merely to fault the Government for alleging in the indictment more than was necessary to charge him with a violation of Sec. 1954. In Miller, the Supreme Court distinguished Stirone from the case where, as here, the offense proved was fully contained within the indictment. 471 U.S. at 137, 105 S.Ct. at 1816. The Court held that the grand jury clause of the fifth amendment was not violated when the defendant's complaint was not that the indictment failed to charge the offense for which he was convicted, but that the indictment charged more than was necessary. Id. at 140, 105 S.Ct. at 1817. Relying upon Miller, this Court rejected the proposition that  'it constitutes an unconstitutional amendment to drop from an indictment those allegations that are unnecessary to an offense that is clearly contained within it.'  Helmsley, 941 F.2d at 92 (quoting Miller, 471 U.S. at 144, 105 S.Ct. at 1819). 31 We also said as much in United States v. Sindona, 636 F.2d 792 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 1984, 68 L.Ed.2d 302 (1981), wherein the appellant raised a claim similar to the one now raised by Rosenthal, and which was based upon a similar set of facts. In Sindona, the indictment charged the defendant with unlawfully failing to disclose that certain monies were fraudulently and illegally obtained. Id. at 796. The court instructed the jury that it could convict even if it determined that the monies were in fact legally obtained. Id. On appeal, we determined that the indictment had not been constructively amended because the core of the charged scheme was wrongly concealing information relating to the source of the funds, and not whether the funds had been fraudulently and illegally obtained. Id. at 797. Similarly, the core of criminality set forth in the charged count herein was the giving of tax benefits to Solomon with intent to influence his actions as a pension fund manager, in violation of Sec. 1954, regardless of whether those tax benefits were fraudulent, and it is clear to us that Rosenthal had sufficient notice of the elements of the offense charged in Count Eight. 32 While it is the Government's burden to prove the essential elements of a charged crime, allegations in an indictment that go beyond the essential elements which are required for conviction do not increase the Government's burden. As is discussed in greater detail, infra, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Rosenthal gave Solomon a thing of value and that he acted with the requisite intent. Such evidence was required to be offered if the Government was to obtain Rosenthal's conviction. Deletion of the words false and fraudulent from Count Eight did not alter an essential element of the charged offense since nothing in Sec. 1954 requires that the thing of value be unlawful itself. The words did not, by their averment, become an essential element of the offense required to be proved at trial. We, therefore, affirm the district court's conclusion that Rosenthal's fifth amendment right was not violated by the deletion of the words false and fraudulent from Count Eight of the indictment. 33