Opinion ID: 2363417
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: writ of attachment distinguished from writ of execution

Text: The writ here in question is a writ of attachment. However, it was upon the basis of D.C.Code 1973, §§ 15-302, -305, that the Superior Court judge suspended the writ. Section 15-302 states in pertinent part: (a) A writ of execution on a judgment in a civil action may be issued within three years after:       (2) it first might have been issued under applicable provisions of law or rules of court. Section 15-305 states: A writ of execution not issued within the time allowed therefor, may not be issued until the judgment has been revived. The same rule applies to the order of revival in relation to the issuance of a writ of execution as to the original judgment. The writ in question is titled writ of attachment rather than writ of execution, to which both of the above sections refer. The writ does not purport to disburse the wages to the judgment creditor, but requires the garnishee to pay certain wages to the Clerk of the Family Division of the Superior Court. It, therefore, maintains the status quo pending a decision by the court as to whether to disburse the funds into the hands of the awaiting judgment creditor. [1] Accordingly, the writ in issue is not a writ of execution, governed by §§ 15-302 and -305, but a writ of attachment, governed, inter alia, by D.C.Code 1973, § 16-543, which provides: Attachment may be issued at any time during the life of the judgment, without issuing an order reviving the judgment previously thereto. Therefore, the three-year period relating to the issuance of a writ of execution is irrelevant to the issue of whether the writ of attachment properly issued. [2] While the above paragraph alludes to the distinction between a writ of execution and a writ of attachment, an appreciation of the origins of the two writs is essential to a firm understanding for the basis of our ruling. The sections quoted above date back to the first code adopted by the Congress for the District in 1901. See D.C. Code 1901, §§ 1074, 1078, 1087 (31 Stat. 1358-59). As the Code has been updated, the essence of the sections has been preserved, although the wording and positioning within the Code have been somewhat altered. [3] A view of the law as it appeared to the courts and writers of the time provides the key to our understanding now. At early common law, apart from the original writ as a means of compelling the appearance of the defendant, [4] various judicial processes were employed. One such process was the writ of attachment, then called a writ of pone per vadium. [5] By this writ the sheriff was commanded to secure the appearance of the defendant by two alternative means. He could seize the defendant's goods (gage), which would be forfeited upon non-appearance, or require the defendant to find sureties (safe pledges), who would be fined upon the defendant's failure to present himself as directed. [6] Obedience to the court dissolved the writ; the writ did not secure any debt resulting from a judgment. [7] From this beginning, the writ of attachment evolved to a point where its main purpose is to secure the debt or anticipated debt. [8] Under the forerunner of the 1901 District of Columbia Code, plaintiffs in the District's courts were allowed the option of attaching the defendant's credits or goods following judgment, rather than immediately executing on the judgment. [9] Whereas a writ of execution following a default judgment and a pre-judgment writ of attachment required an undertaking, [10] a post-judgment writ of attachment required no security. [11] Because a writ of attachment ordered the marshal to notify the defendant of the attachment of his property and of the defendant's duty to appear in court and show why the property should not be condemned, and execution thereof had been made, [12] an additional opportunity was afforded the defendant to demonstrate that any execution would be a mistake. [13] Under the current code, property is attached to provide assurance that the judgment will be satisfied. The attachment guarantees the judgment creditor security while significantly reducing the potentiality for liability due to wrongful execution. In contrast to a writ of attachment, which freezes or seizes property to maintain the status quo, a writ of execution is the means by which a judgment is satisfied. By execution, a judgment debt is discharged. The parties are placed in the position mandated by the judgment. As explained by a scholar who published contemporaneously with the original enactment of the code provisions presently in dispute: Upon judgment, the successful party is, generally, entitled to execution, to put in force the sentence that the law has given. For this purpose he sues out a writ, addressed to the sheriff, commanding him, according to the nature of the case, either to give the plaintiff possession of the lands, or to enforce the delivery of the chattel which was the subject of the action, or to levy for the plaintiff the debt or damages and costs recovered, [and] in some cases, upon his body, lands, and goods . . . . [14] While D.C.Code 1973, § 15-302 is written in terms of [a] writ of execution, there were at common law, and are today, several writs of execution. [15] While particular writs may have been modified in form and purpose, [16] the purpose of the writs, to place the parties in the relative positions mandated by the judgment, has endured the modifications. A writ of execution is to discharge the judgment. Through the morass of the Latin phrases and the obtuseness of the antiquated sentence structure, the point to be gleaned is the difference between a writ of attachment, by which assets are frozen, and a writ of execution, by which assets are transferred from the judgment debtor to the judgment creditor. As the functions of the writs are different, so are there differences in the time limitation, relative to the judgment, governing their issuance.
A writ of attachment may be issued before judgment or at any time while the judgment is in force. [17] Thus, a person having a claim, whether or not reduced to a judgment, may reasonably assure himself of satisfaction by freezing property. For example, a writ of attachment may be obtained under D.C.Code 1973, § 16-501(d)(3), where a defendant is about to remove . . . his property from the District. The same principle holds true following a judgment: so long as the judgment is in force, a writ of attachment may issue on it. The delay required to revive a judgment so that a writ of execution may issue, [18] may be of sufficient length to allow the defendant ample opportunity to secrete or dispose of his assets. See, e. g., Harper v. Cunningham, 8 App.D.C. 430 (1896) (second reported appeal in proceeding begun in 1890 to revive a judgment). Therefore, essentially no limit is fixed on the time for attachment in anticipation of satisfying a viable claim. The time period following a judgment during which a writ of execution may issue is shorter than that during which a writ of attachment may issue. The basis for the restriction is the presumption that following a certain amount of time after judgment, the judgment has been satisfied. [19] At common law, the period of time was a year and a day. The period was codified and in force from the formation of the District in 1801 until the adoption of the 1901 code. [20] With the adoption of the 1901 code, the period became: within three years from the judgment or, if the right to execute is suspended, within three years after the removal of the suspension. [21] Thus, unless the presumption that the judgment has been satisfied has been rebutted by the revival of the judgment, a judgment creditor may have an enforceable judgment. [22] The prima facie conclusion is also rebutted by a writ of execution having been issued and returned unsatisfied within the three-year period. [23]
In short, there is a distinct difference between a writ of execution and a writ of attachment. The time periods governing the issuance of each are of different length by design. Surprise is often the key to a successful attachment, whereas notice is the touchstone to execution. The writ here in question is a writ of attachment because it maintains the status quo. It directs the appellee's employer to divert certain of the appellee's wages to the clerk of the Superior Court. This diversion does not satisfy the judgment. The writ does not direct the wages to be paid to the appellant. Therefore the writ is in aid of execution, [24] but not a writ of execution. (Emphasis added.)