Opinion ID: 1708045
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether a defendant is denied a fair trial, due process of law and fundamental fairness when, after the evidence is closed and deliberations have begun, the trial judge, upon request by the jury, requires the defendant to parade in front of the jury, for a second view of him, where identification is the primary issue, and the jury retires again for further deliberations and returns a verdict of guilty.

Text: ¶ 13. Sturdivant contends that he was prejudiced by the trial court's allowing the jury to view him once deliberations had begun. The record indicates that the jury requested by hand-written note to view Sturdivant or a picture of him after deliberations had begun. The trial court offered to allow the mugshot photograph with the objectionable markings removed to go into the jury room or have the jury return to the box for a short viewing of Sturdivant. Defense counsel objected to both options, but the trial court decided to allow the jury a short viewing. The trial court explained, as follows: The jury's duty is to make a decision as to whether or not the evidence is sufficient to cause them to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that either or both of these defendants are guilty. Obviously, they are ... struggling with the issue of identification versus misidentification, and the jury has made a specific request to view Mr. Sturdivant in person. It's unambiguous and I think that during the course of the trial the jury was asked by counsel to look at the defendant and draw their own conclusions as to whether or not that is the person on the video. The videotape is in evidence, and the TV and VCR are in the jury room. I am going to acquiesce [sic] the jury request because I think they are struggling to do what they believe to be the right and correct thing under the evidence and they need some help in making that determination. What I intend to do is have the jury brought back in and sit in the jury box, and David ask you to have Sturdivant to stand up and walk out in front of the jury box and stand there for about ten seconds and turn around and walk back and have a seat next to you at the counsel table. Then I will issue the jury back into the jury room for further deliberations. ¶ 14. Sturdivant cites Perkins v. State, 253 Miss. 652, 178 So.2d 694 (1965), for the proposition that it is reversible error for the trial court to allow the jury to view the defendant once deliberations have begun. In Perkins, the trial court committed reversible error where it granted a jury request to view the victim's scars although they had seen them during the trial. 253 Miss. at 656, 178 So.2d at 695. ¶ 15. Furthermore, the Perkins Court said as follows: Ordinarily, the reopening of a case after it has been submitted to the jury and before verdict for the purpose of receiving further evidence is a matter addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court. Lee v. State, 201 Miss. 423, 29 So.2d 211 (1946)[(1947)], suggestion of error overruled in 201 Miss. 423, 30 So.2d 74 (1947); reversed on other grounds, 332 U.S. 742, 68 Sup. Ct. 300, 92 L.Ed. 330; mandate conformed to 203 Miss. 264, 34 So.2d 736 [(1948)]. This rule imports a requirement that a cogent reason be found to exist which demands reopening in order that justice may be done. Moreover, when a case is reopened for the reception of further evidence, it must be done in such a manner that the rights of all parties will be protected and ample opportunity afforded them for cross examination or rebuttal, and even for requesting additional instructions, if the matters introduced should reasonably require them. 253 Miss. at 655, 178 So.2d at 695-96 (emphasis added). Sturdivant argues that Perkins is indistinguishable from his case, and thus his conviction should likewise be reversed. ¶ 16. However, the Perkins Court ultimately found that under the circumstances in a prosecution for assault and battery with intent to kill and murder, [i]t is doubtful that it (the viewing of the victim's scars) had any probative value and was of a character peculiarly calculated to inflame and prejudice the jury. Riley v. State, 248 Miss. 177, 157 So.2d 381 (1963). 253 Miss. at 655-56, 178 So.2d at 696. Such a finding is distinguishable from the instant case because here the jury wanted to see the defendant Sturdivant in order to properly identify and not any victim or victim's scars. ¶ 17. Moreover, the trial court here followed the procedure outlined in Perkins by giving the defense an opportunity to be heard and finding that a cogent reason for the viewing. Specifically, the trial court found the proper identification of Sturdivant to necessitate the brief viewing. Thus, the viewing here was not peculiarly calculated to inflame and prejudice the jury. ¶ 18. In Lee v. State, 383 So.2d 821, 823 (Miss.1980), this Court allowed the state to reopen its case. Id. There, the jury retired and took into the jury room, along with other physical evidence, State's Exhibit A, an investigative report. The jury discovered that page 3 of the report was missing, and so informed the trial judge, who ordered the cause to be reopened to explain the omission. The agent testified that the page was inadvertently omitted. Lee's counsel was afforded an opportunity to cross-examine and did engage in lengthy cross-examination of the agent. This Court determined that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in reopening the case for this one purpose, and there was no indication that Lee was prejudiced by such action. Id. at 823. Similarly, here the trial court took into consideration defense counsel's objections before determining that the circumstances necessitated allowing the jury to view Sturdivant. ¶ 19. Finally, as to the alleged prejudice to Sturdivant, it should be noted that the central defense was one of mistaken identity. In its closing argument, the defense stated as follows: View the tape, listen to it carefully. Recall what has been testified to today and take it all into consideration. And we submit that after you do that, a lot of doubt as to whether or not these two young men were involved in a transaction that day and whether or not Josh Coleman was biased and possibly coached through this entire incident.       Henry (Sturdivant) has been sitting here, whatever that is, ten feet, fifteen feet from you the whole trial, as close to you as he can. You can look at him now. Look at the person on the video. It's not him. You know, some you get back and say well, it might be. Well once again, might be doesn't matter. The video is clear enough where you can definitely tell it isn't him, and once again, this isn't a question of sort of a foggy video, and you can't really exclude him and you-but you could include him. The State also invited the jury to determine for itself that the face on the video tape was Sturdivant. Look at the videotape, and that's all you need to do. ¶ 20. Therefore, the proper identification was the central issue in this case for the jury to decide. This Court has stated that considerable discretion is granted to a trial court in deciding if a case should be reopened. Meeks v. State, 604 So.2d 748, 755 (Miss.1992); accord, Smith v. State, 646 So.2d 538 (Miss.1994). We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court here. The brief viewing of Sturdivant could just as easily have created reasonable doubt and worked to his favor. Thus, as the trial court noted, there was sufficient evidence for finding that the jury was interested in resolving any questions about the identity of the suspect. Sturdivant's contention of error is therefore without merit.