Opinion ID: 2571564
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Inquire into and Discharge Juror for Sleeping

Text: Bonilla contends he was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial and due process by the trial court's alleged failure to adequately investigate and act on allegations that two jurors were sleeping during the penalty phase. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, งง 7, 15, 16.) We discern no abuse of discretion; to the contrary, the trial court promptly and fully investigated, and granted the only motion for discharge supported by the evidence. The trial court has the authority to discharge jurors for good cause, including sleeping during trial. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1348-1349, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259; ง 1089.) When the trial court receives notice that such cause may exist, it has an affirmative obligation to investigate. ( Bradford, at p. 1348, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259; People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 520-521, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251.) Both the scope of any investigation and the ultimate decision whether to discharge a given juror are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. ( Bradford, at p. 1348, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) Here, the court received a written note from Juror No. 12, filed October 17, 1994, which advised the court that due to an extended night shift work schedule, he had drifted off to sleep a couple of times this past week. The juror requested a note reprimanding him for falling asleep during the trial, in the hope that his employer, presented with the note, would accommodate him with a more manageable night work schedule. The trial court held a hearing the next day, October 18, to address both Juror No. 12 and another juror, Juror No. 6, who Nichols's counsel believed had also been sleeping. Beginning with Juror No. 12, the court and counsel inquired into the extent of his sleeping and its impact on his functioning as a juror: THE COURT: First of all, I did not notice [you sleeping]. I talked to the court reporter and she said she didn't notice it. So, you are telling us that you did drift off to sleep? [JUROR NO. 12]: Yeah, a couple times last week. [ถ] See, my company went through a down-sizing and as of last Monday I had normally worked between four and six hours at night. THE COURT: That part we have in the letter, but are you saying that you missed a portion of the trial? [JUROR NO. 12]: Well, not necessarily missed it. I mean, I just nodded ... off and came back up. THE COURT: So you didn't miss anything? [JUROR NO. 12]: No, I don't think so. [ถ] ... [ถ] THE COURT: Anybody else have any questions to him? [BONILLA'S COUNSEL]: I guess I have just one for my record.... [W]hen you say you don't think so, I mean, my reaction is once I'm asleep I can't tell how long I have been asleep except by external things, so are you [JUROR NO. 12]: Wellโ [BONILLA'S COUNSEL]: What are you saying, I guess is what I'm asking? [JUROR NO. 12]: It is kind of hard to explain. It was just the fact that I would feel my head go down and then I came back up. [BONILLA'S COUNSEL]: Okay. THE COURT: So you didn't miss anything? [JUROR NO. 12]: I don't think so. THE COURT: You were listening to all the witnesses and what have you. [JUROR NO. 12]: Right (Italics added.) The inquiry thus established that, insofar as could be determined, Juror No. 12 had caught himself nodding off and promptly alerted the court, but had not yet missed any of the trial; neither the trial judge, nor the court reporter, nor apparently counsel had ever noticed him sleeping. After further inquiry into Juror No. 6's sleeping, Bonilla and Nichols moved for a mistrial and in the alternative moved that both jurors be excused. The trial court declined to immediately dismiss the jurors, but invited defense counsel to follow up with a written motion supported by additional evidence. Thus, if in fact the problem was greater than this inquiry showed, defense counsel could submit declarations from other courtroom observers establishing that fact. Nichols, joined by Bonilla, filed a motion with supporting declarations seeking a mistrial or in the alternative the dismissal of Juror Nos. 6 and 12. Notably, the declarations contained statements from witnesses that Juror No. 6 had been sleeping, but no additional evidence that Juror No. 12 had been sleeping. The trial court held a further hearing on October 31, at which each side submitted live testimony and cross-examined witnesses. Asked whether they had seen any jurors sleeping, each of the defense witnesses identified only Juror No. 6; defense counsel elicited no additional evidence suggesting Juror No. 12 had been sleeping in trial or that there was an ongoing problem. The next day, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss Juror No. 6. The trial court's handling of concerns about Juror No. 12's sleeping was well within the scope of its discretion. It held an immediate hearing at which it allowed both sides to question Juror No. 12, it satisfied itself regarding the extent of any problem, and it afforded counsel the opportunity to present additional evidence if they were dissatisfied and concerned that the scope of any sleeping problem might affect their clients' rights. Given that opportunity, defense counsel presented no additional evidence that might cause the trial court to revisit its original denial of requests for a mistrial and for dismissal of Juror No. 12. Bonilla contends the trial court erred in failing to further inquire into Juror No. 12's sleeping after October 18. To the contrary; if the trial court was satisfied with Juror No. 12's answers, as it reasonably could have been, there was no need to inquire further absent additional evidence suggesting an ongoing problem. Bonilla's and Nichols's witnesses, courtroom observers, offered no testimony indicating they ever witnessed Juror No. 12 sleeping. Nor was this omission the result of the trial court in any way limiting further inquiry; [17] if counsel had additional evidence that might have raised concerns about Juror No.12, they could have presented it by declaration or at the October 31 hearing. In the absence of additional evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in either conducting no further independent inquiry or in refusing to dismiss Juror No. 12.