Opinion ID: 1374541
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Cross-examination About Drug Use and Psychiatric Treatment

Text: (1) Appellant contends he was deprived of his right to cross-examination by the court's refusal to allow his counsel to interrogate Klaess concerning her history of drug use and psychiatric treatment. Klaess was born September 30, 1960. At appellant's preliminary hearing she testified as follows: She first used PCP, or angel dust, when she was about 14 and last used it at age 15 when she had a really bad experience with it. She was hospitalized three times, for overdoses of PCP, at a private hospital for teenagers with drug problems and running away problems. She denied experiencing any further effects of PCP, though her doctor told her it could possibly come back sometime. She saw a psychiatrist during her involvement with PCP at age 15. At age 14 she was taken twice to another psychiatrist who talked to her about her running away from home. In Orange County Juvenile Hall, she was counseled by a family psychologist to improve understanding between her and her family. When she first met appellant, in early 1978, she used some crystal meth, or speed, while traveling from Sacramento to Southern California and had the illusion that they were moving at a time when they were actually stopped. At trial, appellant sought to elicit the same testimony of Klaess's psychiatric history as had been introduced at the preliminary hearing. The trial court refused to allow such cross-examination, ruling that it was not relevant. Appellant claims the ruling was reversible error. He points out that [c]ross-examination to test the credibility of a prosecuting witness in a criminal case should be given wide latitude. ( Curry v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 707, 715 [87 Cal. Rptr. 361, 470 P.2d 345].) He relies in particular on People v. Newton (1966) 244 Cal. App.2d 82 [52 Cal. Rptr. 727], where one of two grounds for reversal was the cutting off of the defendant's cross-examination of the prosecuting witness concerning her consultations with a psychiatrist. The witness there had admitted one or two consultations two years before trial, and the cross-examination was intended to establish consultations for emotional problems at a later date. Here, however, appellant sought only to elicit the testimony that Klaess had given at the preliminary hearing concerning her experience with drugs and psychiatric consultations. Her only experience, shown by that testimony, with long-range effects of drugs (as distinct from effects immediately after use) was in connection with her hospitalization for use of PCP at age 15. She had seen a psychiatrist at that time in connection with her PCP problems and had had psychiatric counseling at ages 14 and 15 concerning her relations with her family. That evidence did not have sufficient bearing upon the credibility of her testimony at the trial, when she was 20, to make its exclusion an abuse of discretion under Evidence Code section 352.