Opinion ID: 4550285
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: In re B.Y.

Text: ¶189 The majority also claims support for its approach in In re Adoption of B.Y., 2015 UT 67. Citing B.Y., the majority says that our substantive due process analysis opens the door to scrutiny of the “fairness” of a “procedural bar or limitation” in a statute “on the ground that the right foreclosed is so fundamental or important that it is protected from extinguishment.” Supra ¶¶ 31, 98. Because the mother’s right to parent her child is concededly fundamental, the majority says that B.Y. establishes a basis for substantive scrutiny of the fairness of the procedures set forth in the Adoption Act—and thus a basis for concluding that the mother in this case __________________________________________________________ 218 J.S. admittedly involved the rights of a putative father. And the substantive rights of an unmarried father are concededly only inchoate—“merely provisional.” See supra ¶¶ 84, 86. But the majority misses a key point in resting its decision on the fact that a mother’s parental rights are automatically fundamental. While this is true, it leaves unanswered the question of whether and to what extent a party with rights that are concededly fundamental may ignore existing procedures for the assertion of those rights without suffering the consequence of a default. The answer to that question cannot be the bare assertion that the underlying right is fundamental. That is circular. And it overrides the strict standard set forth in the case law. 83 IN RE K.T.B. Lee, A.C.J., dissenting has a right to retain her parental rights despite her failure to comply with required procedures. Supra ¶¶ 31, 98. But the B.Y. opinion is consistent with Quilloin, J.P., and J.S—it comes nowhere close to establishing a substantive due process right to retain parental rights despite a procedural default. ¶190 In B.Y. a putative father sought to challenge the Adoption Act’s mandate of “strict compliance” with the procedural requirements of the statute—specifically, the requirement of filing a paternity action prior to the mother’s consent or relinquishment of the child for adoption. 2015 UT 67; UTAH CODE § 78B-6-121(3) (The “consent of an unmarried biological father is not required unless, prior to the time the mother executes her consent for adoption or relinquishes the child for adoption, the unmarried biological father . . . initiates proceedings . . . to establish paternity . . . .”). Despite the failure to fulfill this procedural requirement, the father in B.Y. asserted that he “did enough to ‘grasp’ his ‘opportunity . . . to develop a relationship with his offspring’” to perfect a fundamental parental right under United States Supreme Court precedent. 2015 UT 67, ¶ 42 (omission in original). And he asserted that the strict compliance requirement infringed his substantive due process rights as a parent. ¶191 We acknowledged the possibility of a substantive due process claim in this realm, but we rejected it on its merits. We noted that “[a]n unwed father’s rights are merely provisional,” emphasized that he “must comply with legal prerequisites established by the state” to perfect such rights, and concluded that “[f]ailure to do so leaves the father’s parental rights without any substantive protection—except in the narrow circumstance in which the prerequisites established by the state are arbitrary.” Id. ¶ 43. In so doing we emphasized that “[t]he Due Process Clause . . . is not a license for courts to second-guess the prerequisites established by the legislature for a putative father to perfect his parental rights.” Id. ¶ 44. “Instead,” we said that “the well-settled standard yields substantial deference to the state’s chosen prerequisites.” Id. And we explained that “[i]t does so in light of the state’s important interest in ‘immediate and secure adoptions for eligible newborns.’” Id. We held that the putative father’s claim “fail[ed] under this standard.” Id. ¶ 46. ¶192 The majority seeks to distinguish B.Y. and to claim support for its approach in that opinion. It says that B.Y. supports the application of a standard of strict scrutiny in assessing the “fairness” of the procedure set forth in the Adoption Act—the 84 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Lee, A.C.J., dissenting requirement of filing a motion to intervene. Supra ¶¶ 31, 98. And it bases that determination on the fact that this case involves the parental rights of a mother, which are automatically “fundamental,” while B.Y. involved the rights of a putative father, which are “merely provisional.” Supra ¶ 35. The point is correct as far as it goes. But until today, no court has ever extended it in the manner endorsed by the majority. The majority is of course right to say that a biological mother’s rights are inherently and automatically “fundamental” under the law. And the court is equally correct in its observation that the parent’s alleged right in B.Y. was inchoate or “merely provisional.” This was, moreover, a key basis for our decision in B.Y. The substantive due process claim in B.Y. was deficient because a putative father’s provisional right required additional acts on the father’s part before the right could be perfected as fundamental. And we had no trouble rejecting the father’s substantive due process right in light of the cited premises in our case law—the need for “substantial deference” to the state’s chosen procedural “prerequisites” to the establishment of a parental right, and the substantial basis for protecting “the state’s important interest in ‘immediate and secure adoptions for eligible newborns.’” B.Y., 2015 UT 67, ¶ 44. ¶193 But the majority’s analysis assumes that a fundamental right once acquired is therefore insulated against forfeiture through procedural default. The court cites no case law in support of its decision to establish a new substantive right to retain a fundamental parental right despite procedural default. And such a right does not at all follow from the fact that the underlying right is itself protected as a matter of substantive due process. Again, a mother’s parental rights are automatically fundamental in the sense that she is not required to jump through the procedural hoops to perfect those rights required of fathers under our case law. See J.S., 2014 UT 51, ¶ 2 (explaining requirements for fathers to file paternity petitions and present evidence regarding their support of the child to make a threshold showing of parentage and perfect their parental rights). But the connection between procedural compliance and the initial perfection of parental rights is beside the point here. Here the parental right at issue is admittedly perfected (and was so without the need for the procedural compliance required of fathers), so the question is whether that concededly perfected right can later be forfeited through procedural default. By holding that it cannot, the majority establishes a new right of substantive due process. 85 IN RE K.T.B. Lee, A.C.J., dissenting ¶194 The majority repeatedly insists otherwise. Citing cases establishing a mother’s lack of need for procedural compliance at the perfection stage, it says that the mother must likewise have no obligation to comply with another set of procedures (for preservation) at a later stage. Supra ¶¶ 36–37; 79–91. But this is a big step. The fact that a mother need not jump through procedural hoops to perfect her parental rights not only bears on a different stage of procedural compliance; it also has no bearing on procedural default generally. ¶195 The mother is not required to jump through procedural hoops to establish her parental rights in the first instance. But that is not because her fundamental parental rights encompass a right to flout procedural requirements generally. It is because there is an established tradition—framed in narrow, specific terms—of respecting a mother’s rights without any requirement of any procedural act aimed at perfecting those rights. That tradition is reflected in the fact that the law does not extend the requirement of compliance with this procedure to mothers. See UTAH CODE § 78B-6-121(3). ¶196 None of these premises apply to the procedures at issue here. The procedural rules of preservation assuredly do apply to both mothers and fathers. And in the absence of evidence of an established tradition allowing a mother to retain her rights despite a failure to comply with those rules, the court has no basis to establish the existence of such a right. ¶197 By focusing on the difference between mothers’ and fathers’ rights at the threshold stage of perfection and importing that distinction to any later instance of procedural default, the majority also ignores the fact that the state’s interest in procedural compliance at these later stages is the same for both mothers and fathers. The fact that the mother’s rights are automatically fundamental does not mean that she can blithely avoid any need to follow state procedure in an adoption proceeding. ¶198 The Adoption Act’s procedural requirements are not aimed only at putative fathers. They are also aimed at mothers. See UTAH CODE § 78B-6-110(6)(a) (requiring that a mother, or any other party who receives notice of adoption, must file motion to intervene in adoption proceeding within 30 days); id. § 78B-6-110(6)(b) (stating that a mother who fails to “fully and strictly comply” with this requirement “forfeits all rights in relation to the adoptee”). And the legislature has articulated substantial interests that are advanced by requiring a mother to intervene as a 86 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Lee, A.C.J., dissenting party and assert her position regarding any claimed basis for termination of her rights (such as unfitness, abandonment, or neglect). The legislature has expressly found, for example, that “the state has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner, in preventing the disruption of adoptive placements, and in holding parents accountable for meeting the needs of children.” Id. § 78B-6-102(5)(a). It has also concluded that “adoptive children have a right to permanence and stability in adoptive placements.” Id. § 78B-6-102(5)(c). These are important concerns. And they are obviously furthered by a requirement that a mother intervene as a party in a timely fashion and assert any proffered challenge to termination of her parental rights. Failure to do so results in a forfeiture of those rights. Neither the mother nor the majority has identified any basis in the law of forfeiture by procedural default or in the Adoption Act to contradict that conclusion. ¶199 The state’s interests in assuring “stable and permanent homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner” and “preventing the disruption of adoptive placements” thus remain intact whether the parental rights at stake are those of a biological mother or a putative father. See id. UTAH CODE § 78B-6-102(5)(a). And it is in this sense that the question of perfection is irrelevant. It is not—as the majority suggests—a threshold question that can obviate the need to establish a historical basis for noncompliance with governing procedure. The historical inquiry is not aimed at finding a basis for whether the parent’s right is fundamental or not. The historical inquiry is aimed at finding a basis for noncompliance with procedure despite holding fundamental parental rights. It bears repeating that no court has ever established a substantive due process right of a mother to retain her parental rights despite defaulting those rights under governing procedure. We certainly didn’t establish such a right in B.Y. In fact, B.Y. left intact the standard put forth in J.S.—a standard that requires much more than a mere challenge to the “unfairness” of procedure for preserving parental rights, and that instead requires a deeply rooted historical basis for a fundamental right to retain parental rights despite failing to comply with the governing procedure. And, again, the mother has not come close to carrying that burden here, as discussed in more detail below. ¶200 J.S., admittedly, is not a case involving a biological mother’s forfeiture of parental rights through procedural default. So it is true that my proposed disposition would be an extension of J.S. insofar as that case did not involve a substantive due process 87 IN RE K.T.B. Lee, A.C.J., dissenting challenge to forfeiture of a mother’s parental rights. But this only buttresses my point that this a case of first impression. And J.S. is our most relevant precedent, both bearing on forfeiture of parental rights through procedural default and suggesting a position in the levels of generality debate discussed above. See supra ¶¶ 179–88. The J.S. plurality advocated for a specific framing of the new right proposed to be established as a matter of substantive due process. And because the framing question is independent of whether a parent is a father or a mother, it bears directly on today’s case and I would apply it. ¶201 The majority charges me with mischaracterizing the right at issue. It complains that I am “mark[ing] a fundamental departure from the way courts have traditionally defined parental rights.” Supra ¶ 55. I am puzzled by this charge. I concede that there is a lot of novelty in this case. But the novelty comes from the majority’s extension of the law of substantive due process—from its reframing of the alleged new right at the highest level of generality. ¶202 The cases I have cited admittedly deal only with the rights of putative fathers. But it does not at all follow that a mother’s rights are insulated from procedural default. The mother, as noted, is not required to jump through procedural hoops to protect her rights at the outset. But the majority is seizing on a false procedural equivalence in insisting that that means she can never be subject to any procedure at any stage. The majority is accordingly right to highlight the novelty of this case. The novelty, however, is entirely in the majority opinion. C. Application of the Governing Standard ¶203 For the above reasons there is no basis in existing case law for the establishment of a substantive due process right for a mother to avoid the usual effect (forfeiture) of a procedural default. Certainly that does not follow from the premise that a mother’s rights are unquestionably “fundamental.” Much more analytical work is required under the above precedent. To sustain a right to preserve parental rights despite the failure to comply with established procedure, the mother should be required to make a showing at a specific level of generality based on firmly rooted history and tradition. See In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51, ¶ 57 (plurality opinion). She should have to show not just the general notion of a fundamental right as a mother, but a right to preserve her rights without complying with established statutory procedure. 88 Cite as: 2020 UT 51 Lee, A.C.J., dissenting ¶204 The mother has made no effort at such a showing. Instead she claims only (a) that mothers generally have rights that are automatically fundamental, and (b) that the procedure required by the Adoption Act is generally “unfair.” The majority opinion’s analysis is to the same effect. See supra ¶ 37 (asserting that “[a] right of a mother not to be deprived of parental rights without a showing of unfitness, abandonment, or substantial neglect is . . . fundamental” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).219 ¶205 This falls far short under our law. And the mother’s substantive due process claim should be rejected on the ground that she has failed to carry the heavy burden set forth in our cases— __________________________________________________________ 219 The majority also claims support for its view in the dictum in New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 116 (2000)—the notion that forfeiture “is not appropriate when it is inconsistent with the provision creating the right sought to be secured.” Supra ¶ 98 n.174. In the majority’s view this means that a decision allowing forfeiture “to defeat Mother’s substantive due process claim in this case would be inconsistent with the Due Process Clause.” Supra ¶ 98. But that is entirely circular. The court is asserting that the Due Process Clause prohibits forfeiture in this case because such forfeiture is inconsistent with the Due Process Clause. That does not follow from Hill. That case, for one thing, deals with express waiver, not forfeiture by procedural default. And one of the two cases cited in support of the quoted statement is also an express waiver case. See Hill, 528 U.S. at 116 (citing Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959)). The other case, emphasized by the majority, is admittedly a forfeiture case. See supra ¶ 98 n.174 (citing Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 258–59 (1993)). Crosby held that a criminal defendant’s right to be present at trial cannot be forfeited by failure to appear. 506 U.S. at 258–59. But the Crosby court based its holding on well-established case law finding that specific right to be unwaivable. 506 U.S. at 259. In other words, the right to exemption from the normal consequence of procedural default (forfeiture) was both narrowly framed and supported by history and tradition as shown by the long line of case law establishing that right. And that is surely not the case here—the majority cites not a single case establishing the right to avoid forfeiture in this context. The court’s cited case law is accordingly unhelpful to it. Hill (and the cases it cites) are by no means a general license for a right to avoid forfeiture despite a procedural default, and on the contrary supports the approach I advocate for here. 89 IN RE K.T.B. Lee, A.C.J., dissenting a burden that the majority distorts in its decision today. Contrary to the majority’s claim, I am not saying that the substantive due process right at issue is defined by “referencing the form of governmental interference.” Supra ¶ 65. I am simply saying that the established procedures determine how and whether such a right is preserved. ¶206 It is tempting to see a technical defect in procedural compliance as a matter that should lightly be excused. But procedural rules are always two-edged. There is always an interest on the other side of the equation. And the procedural requirements of the Adoption Act are no exception. ¶207 The adoption arena is one where strict procedural compliance is at a premium. The state has a compelling interest in “providing stable and permanent homes for adoptive children in a prompt matter” and “preventing the disruption of adoptive placements.” UTAH CODE § 78B-6-102(5)(a). To serve the interest of protecting “the welfare of the child, a determination that a child can be adopted must be final as well as immediate.” Wells v. Children’s Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 203 (Utah 1984). And statutory procedures for natural parents to participate in and assert their rights in adoption proceedings are a core element of this system. ¶208 We have long respected the interests advanced by the procedural requirements of the Adoption Act. We should continue do so here. The state’s interests in stability and finality are no less substantial here—in a case involving a biological mother. And the majority has identified no legal basis for avoiding this conclusion.