Opinion ID: 431092
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reinstatement of Previously Dismissed Indictment

Text: 48 On August 7, 1980, after the jury had returned a guilty verdict on the gun possession count against Smith and a mistrial was declared as to the other three counts, the government moved for leave to dismiss the indictment. The district court granted the motion, dismissing all four counts. Three days later, the government, upon realizing that all four counts had been dismissed, moved the court to vacate its prior order and to issue a new order dismissing all counts except the firearms count on which Smith had been convicted. The district court granted the motion and modified its order, reinstating Count XVIII. 49 Smith objected to sentencing on the grounds that the district court lost jurisdiction to reinstate the indictment when it dismissed all counts. The government responds that dismissal was based on an inadvertent mistake, in that its intent was to dismiss only those counts upon which a conviction had not been obtained. We hold that the district court had jurisdiction to reinstate the indictment and that it did not abuse its discretion in doing so. 50 We note that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contain no counterpart to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), which provides for relief from final judgments, orders, and other proceedings for, among other reasons, mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that [e]very court must be presumed to exercise those powers belonging to it which are necessary for the promotion of public justice; and we do not doubt that this court possesses the power to re-instate any cause dismissed by mistake. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 10, 6 L.Ed. 531, 534 (1827). 51 Most early courts arbitrarily held the reinstatement of a mistakenly dismissed indictment to be a proper exercise of their inherent jurisdiction to correct errors only if it was done during the same term at which the dismissal was entered. E.g., United States v. Rossi, 39 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir.1930); Annot., 112 A.L.R. 386 (1938). More recently, this court has reviewed district courts' correction of erroneous orders by treating them as responses to motions for reconsideration, which are timely presented if filed within the original period for review. United States v. Jones, 608 F.2d 386, 390 (9th Cir.1979) (quoting United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 78, 84 S.Ct. 553, 555, 11 L.Ed.2d 527, 531 (1964)). Accord United States v. Emens, 565 F.2d 1142, 1144-45 (9th Cir.1977). 52 In Emens, this court applied the foregoing principles to hold that a district court, during the time for appeal, holds jurisdiction to vacate its previous pretrial order dismissing an indictment. United States v. Emens, at 1145. Our decision in Emens is dispositive of this issue. As we said there, the finality of the order of the District Court dismissing the indictment was stayed by the timely filing of a petition for rehearing, [and] a fortiori such order was stayed pending resolution of the petition. Id. Although we are presented here with a post-trial dismissal and reinstatement of an indictment, we discern, on these facts, 6 no basis in reason or justice for distinguishing Emens. We cannot conceive that Congress intended, by failing to provide a criminal counterpart to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), to strip a court of its inherent jurisdiction to vacate or modify an order inadvertently made through mistake in a criminal proceeding. This is a matter within the trial judge's discretion, subject only to review by this court for abuse thereof, and we are of the opinion that on the showing made before him, the trial judge properly reinstated the indictment.