Opinion ID: 1057584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 32

Heading: Destruction of Urine and Blood Samples

Text: The defendant claims that his rights to a reliable sentencing determination, as well as his rights to confrontation, due process, and to present a defense, were violated by the State's destruction of urine and blood samples. The defendant asserts that the question of premeditation and issues regarding sentencing and mitigation were directly affected by his mental state and involved what effects alcohol and drugs could have had on that mental state. The defendant contends as constitutional error the fact that the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation destroyed the blood and urine samples which rendered them unavailable for further testing and made it impossible to accurately judge his alcohol and blood content through separate analysis. In State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912, 914 (Tenn.1999), the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the issue as to what factors guide the determination of the consequences that flow from the State's loss or destruction of evidence which the accused contends would be exculpatory. The supreme court answered that the critical inquiry was whether a trial, conducted without the destroyed evidence, would be fundamentally fair. Id. In reaching its decision, the Ferguson court noted that its inquiry was distinct from one under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2401, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), because those two cases addressed plainly exculpatory evidence, while Ferguson addressed a situation wherein the existence of the destroyed videotape was known to the defense but where its true nature (exculpatory, inculpatory, or neutral) can never be determined. 2 S.W.3d at 915. The court went on to explain that the first step in the analysis is determining whether the State had a duty to preserve the evidence. Id. at 917. Generally speaking, the State has a duty to preserve all evidence subject to discovery and inspection under Tenn. R.Crim. P. 16, or other applicable law. Id. (footnote omitted). However, [w]hatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. Id. (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2533-34, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984)). Only if the proof demonstrates the existence of a duty to preserve and further shows that the State has failed in that duty must a court turn to a balancing analysis involving consideration of the following factors: 1. The degree of negligence involved; 2. The significance of the destroyed evidence, considered in light of the probative value and reliability of secondary or substitute evidence that remains available; and 3. The sufficiency of the other evidence used at trial to support the conviction. Id. (footnote omitted). The record reflects that the defendant's blood and urine samples were taken on January 11, 2005, and destroyed on January 3, 2006. Between the offense date and the time the samples were destroyed, the defendant failed to file a motion to preserve the evidence. During the trial, the defense presented the testimony of Special Agent John W. Harrison, an analytical toxicologist with the TBI. Special Agent Harrison testified that the result of the defendant's urine test was .17, a reading reflecting the consumption of alcohol. TBI Agent Kelly Hopkins testified that the defendant's urine was positive for Citalopram and Benzodiazepines. Special Agent Harrison also testified extensively as to the metabolism of alcohol. First, the State is not required to preserve samples taken for the limited purpose of determining the defendant's blood-alcohol level. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 491, 104 S.Ct. at 2535. It is common knowledge that human blood is perishable, and specimens of blood can only be maintained for a short period of time. Also, such evidence would not be expected to play a significant role in the accused's defense. Id. Moreover, it appears from the record that the TBI acted in good faith and apparently destroyed the blood specimen in conformity with the established procedures of the laboratory. State v. Brownell, 696 S.W.2d 362, 363-64 (Tenn.Crim.App.1985); State v. Dowell, 705 S.W.2d 138, 141-42 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1985). The evidence did not possess any exculpatory value that was apparent prior to its destruction, as the test results were available. Accordingly, the TBI had no duty to preserve the evidence beyond its established procedures. Moreover, even if the State had a duty to preserve the blood sample and failed to do so, the defendant has failed to demonstrate that his right to a fair trial was affected by the destruction of the evidence. See Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 917. [T]he mere loss or destruction of evidence does not constitute bad faith. Edward Thompson v. State, No. E2003-01089-CCAR3-PC, 2004 WL 911279, at  (Tenn.Crim.App. Apr. 29, 2004), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Oct. 4, 2004). The second factor is the significance of the missing evidence. The defendant has not offered any proof that the State acted improperly in collecting or testing his blood. It is undisputed that the defendant consented to have his blood drawn and the specimen provided to the officer for the purpose of drug and alcohol testing. At trial, the defendant presented the testimony of Special Agent Harrison, as we have stated, and there was no evidence of tampering prior to testing. The defendant has failed to offer any evidence that the test results reported by Agent Harrison do not accurately reflect the contents of his blood and urine. Finally, because there is no indication that additional testing of the defendant's blood and urine would have yielded results different from those found by the TBI, it cannot be said that evidence critical to the defense was excluded. Moreover, as it was the defendant who introduced the test results at trial, he cannot complain that he was deprived of his right to present a defense. The defendant is not entitled to relief on this claim.