Opinion ID: 1141299
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the weight attached to the various factors

Text: In determining which adoption would serve the best interests of N.P.S., the superior court considered a number of factors.
Even assuming that A.S. wanted Xavier to have custody of N.P.S., Jenny argues, the superior court did not weigh that fact appropriately: Mr. Medley is required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the preference of A.S. is sufficient to override the statutory preference for placement in a Native home. The superior court judge, according to Jenny, did not apply this standard  he merely held that it was in fact appropriate to consider A.S.'s desires. Review of the record persuades us that the superior court gave appropriate weight to A.S.'s preference. Whether one factor outweighs another is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Although the superior court apparently gave A.S.'s preference substantial weight, it did not abuse its discretion in doing so.
Jenny's arguments concerning the weight attached to cultural needs are unpersuasive. She argues that to find good cause [to deviate from the preferences mandated by ICWA] in visitation by Native relatives and a one-month trip to the village would make a mockery of the preference, for such terms could be used at any time to deny a Native relative his or her preferential right to adopt a Native child. The superior court found that N.P.S. could maintain contact with his culture even if he lived with Xavier, not that this fact constituted good cause to deviate from the adoptive preferences provided for in ICWA. On the other hand, the superior court concluded that other factors did constitute good cause to deviate, notwithstanding the cultural advantages of N.P.S.'s living with Jenny Sims in Toksook Bay. What Jenny Sims is really arguing is not that any finding regarding N.P.S.'s cultural needs was clearly erroneous, but that the court abused its discretion in determining that there was good cause notwithstanding its own finding that N.P.S. would learn more about his culture living in Toksook Bay with his grandmother. Given the advantages of living with Xavier Medley discussed above, we conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that good cause had been shown to deviate from the ICWA preferences in adoption matters.
The real question, according to Jenny, is not which [emotional] bond is more `important,' but whether a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the bond between Mr. Medley and N.P.S. was so much more significant to N.P.S.'s emotional wellbeing than that between N.P.S. and Jenny and his brother that there is good cause to override the ICWA preference. The preponderance of the evidence language is inappropriate here. It is a distortion to treat the question of N.P.S.'s emotional needs as if it were the only factor in Xavier's favor. In view of the total picture, we find no abuse of discretion.
The superior court's application of ICWA to this case was entirely proper. None of its factual determinations is clearly erroneous, and it did not abuse its discretion when weighing the various factors, most of which support granting Xavier's petition. Xavier Medley has been a de facto father to N.P.S. for almost all of N.P.S.'s life, and that weighs heavily in favor of allowing Xavier to become N.P.S.'s de jure father. We are satisfied that the superior court did not err when it found that living with Xavier would be in the best interests of N.P.S.