Opinion ID: 1779869
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: denial of culp's motion to suppress evidence.

Text: ¶ 10. In determining whether the issuance of a search warrant is proper, an appellate court will review the trial judge's decision to determine whether there was a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Petti v. State, 666 So.2d 754, 757 (Miss.1995) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). The reviewing court will overturn the trial court if there is an absence of substantial credible evidence to support the issuance of the search warrant. Magee v. State, 542 So.2d 228, 231 (Miss.1989). ¶ 11. Culp asserts that the search warrant for a blood sample violated his rights in three ways: (1) it was based on an illegal arrest made in Culp's home without an arrest warrant or exigent circumstances; (2) by surrendering his clothes, he was required to make a statement in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); and (3) the search warrant was based on evidence which did not amount to probable cause. Our review of the record reveals otherwise.
¶ 12. Culp relies on Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984), in support of his illegal arrest argument. His reliance is misplaced, however, because Welsh is clearly distinguishable on its facts. Police officers entered Welsh's home, without a warrant or consent, and found him lying naked in his bed. They placed him under arrest for driving while under the influence of an intoxicant. The Supreme Court held that a nighttime entry into Welch's home to arrest him for a civil traffic offense was clearly prohibited by the special protection afforded the individual in his home by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 754, 104 S.Ct. 2091. ¶ 13. We have found that arrest means the taking into custody of another person by an officer . . . for the purpose of holding him to answer an alleged or suspected crime. Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1202 (Miss.1996). Someone who voluntarily accompanies the police to another location for questioning has not been arrested. Id. We have also held that the test for determining when a person is in custody is whether a reasonable person would feel that they were going to jail and not just being temporarily detained. Godbold v. State, 731 So.2d 1184, 1187 (Miss.1999). Ultimately this means whether a reasonable person felt they had the freedom to refuse police demands. Id. The United States Supreme Court has held that one does not have to be affirmatively told that they had the right to refuse for their actions to be voluntary. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 234, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2051, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). This Court has held that the voluntariness of an accused's consent is based on the totality of the circumstances including among other things: the location of the encounter, any overt coercion, the display of weapons, experience of the defendant with the criminal justice system, and the defendant's age. Jones v. State ex rel. Miss. Dep't of Pub. Saf'y, 607 So.2d 23, 27 (Miss.1991). ¶ 14. Culp's assertion that he was arrested at his home is not borne out by the record, which clearly indicates that the officers were there to speak to him because he and Lowe were the last people seen with the victims. The officers did not arrest Culp at that time, and in fact, told Culp's mother that they merely wanted to question him. [4] Culp agreed to accompany the officers to the police station. ¶ 15. When the officers asked Culp to go with them to the police station, they were doing so to further a general investigation and not to hold Culp to answer for a specific crime. It was not until later that the evidence against Culp indicated his involvement in the assault of one victim and the assault and rape of the other. At all times Culp remained free to refuse to go with the officers. Although they did not tell Culp that he had the right to refuse, under Schneckloth they were not obligated to do so. Further, the fact that the two officers were armed does not make Culp's consent involuntary. They did not display their weapons or indicate that they were present at Culp's home for the purpose of arresting him, or that force would be used against him. Officer Harrison merely asked Culp to come to the police station to answer questions regarding his relationship with the victims. In Jones, we clearly illustrated that the presence of armed police does not itself make consent involuntary, but is rather part of the totality of the circumstances to be considered. Jones, 607 So.2d at 27. Also, Culp had experience with police investigations, because he had previously been indicted for another crime.
¶ 16. At the police station, Chief Eskridge escorted Culp into his office, where they talked while waiting for Sheriff March to arrive. While they were talking, Culp asked the Chief, without being prompted, whether he should remove his clothing and surrender it to the police. Eskridge responded that he probably should do so, but did not compel Culp to surrender his clothing. ¶ 17. Eskridge did not know that Sheriff March, while en route from the crime scene to the station, had spoken to someone and suggested that Culp's clothes needed to be examined. [5] After the Sheriff arrived at the police station, he took the clothes which Culp had removed, and placed them into an evidence bag. While doing this, he noticed red spots which appeared to be blood on them. At trial, the Sheriff acknowledged that Culp would not have been free to leave until he had an opportunity to speak with him and that Culp was represented by counsel. The record is silent as to whether Culp did, or did not, ask to leave. ¶ 18. The Fifth Amendment secures the right to have an attorney present if requested by individuals subject to custodial interrogation. Godbold, 731 So.2d at 1187 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)). If the right to an attorney is denied or questioning continues without an attorney present after the accused has requested one, then the prosecution is prohibited from using any resulting statements. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. ¶ 19. To be subject to custodial interrogation one must be both in custody and undergoing interrogation. One is in custody if a reasonable person would find their ability to freely leave restricted. Id. Interrogation does not mean only questioning but rather questioning and its functional equivalent. Pierre v. State, 607 So.2d 43, 52 (Miss.1992). The United States Supreme Court has defined functional equivalent to mean words or actions that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1690, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). ¶ 20. In order for statements from a custodial interrogation to be admissible under the Fifth Amendment they must be preceded by proper Miranda warnings. Godbold, 731 So.2d at 1188. The use of statements given in response to police questioning will violate the Fifth Amendment if conducted in the absence of an attorney after the accused has specifically invoked the right to have one. Holland v. State, 587 So.2d 848, 856 (Miss. 1991). ¶ 21. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial evidence and not to real or physical evidence. Upshaw v. State, 350 So.2d 1358, 1364 (Miss.1977). In Upshaw, this Court held that clothing is not testimonial evidence and therefore the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination will not bar its introduction at trial. Id. Use of Culp's clothing did not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because it was not testimonial. Clothing, as we stated in Upshaw, is physical evidence and not a statement. Further, at the time that Chief Eskridge told Culp that he should probably surrender his clothing, Culp was not under custodial interrogation. The exchange between Culp and Eskridge was initiated by Culp and not by the police, and lasted only long enough for Eskridge to reply to Culp's direct inquiry. It did not result in Eskridge asking any questions of Culp or taking any statements from him. ¶ 22. The facts indicate that Culp voluntarily surrendered his clothing to Chief Eskridge without police compulsion. Voluntary consent eliminates the warrant requirement. Morris v. State, 777 So.2d 16, 26 (Miss.2000). When the State relies on consent to justify a seizure, the State must prove that it was voluntarily given and not the product of coercion or duress. Jackson v. State, 418 So.2d 827, 830 (Miss.1982). The Jones Court stated that the trial court must look at the totality of the circumstances to determine if consent was voluntary. Jones, 607 So.2d at 27. ¶ 23. Looking at the circumstances, it is clear that Culp's consent was voluntary. At the time he removed his clothing he was not confronted with police coercion. He did not object, but quietly sat by while the Sheriff placed his clothes in a bag. In the absence of coercion, Culp's voluntary behavior and silence means that he consented to the taking, and thus there was no violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.
¶ 24. If the police require an accused to submit a blood sample, probable cause must exist to prove that the accused committed a crime. McDuff v. State, 763 So.2d 850, 854 (Miss.2000). In order for the police to be granted a search warrant they must demonstrate to the judge evidence of underlying facts and circumstances necessary to provide a substantial basis for finding probable cause. Petti, 666 So.2d at 757. ¶ 25. In the present case the police presented Judge Lewis with the following evidence: 1) an aggravated assault of two victims occurred in Holmes County leaving both in critical condition and unconscious; 2) a large amount of blood was present at the crime scene; 3) a police officer saw defendants Culp and Lowe talking with the victims earlier that evening; 4) Sheriff March had observed spots on Culp's clothes and on Lowe's shoe that appeared to be blood; and 5) the crime scene had an imprint of tennis shoe similar to Lowe's shoe. Such evidence gives rise to a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause exists. The trial judge did not err in issuing a warrant to have a sample of Culp's blood taken.