Opinion ID: 3168557
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Ryder’s Habeas Claims

Text: In his habeas petition, Mr. Ryder raised eleven claims for habeas relief. On appeal, he argues at least two of these claims would benefit from his assistance. Specifically, he relies on habeas claims one and two, the same two claims for which we granted a COA. These claims assert: (1) Mr. Ryder was incompetent to stand trial, trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issue of competency prior to trial, the retrospective competency hearing violated his due process rights, and appellate counsel was ineffective at the retrospective competency hearing; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to timely raise the issue of competency and by inadequately presenting Mr. Ryder’s mitigation case.6 Mr. Ryder contends these claims depend in large part on facts outside 6 Mr. Ryder has not expressly relied on his other nine habeas claims in requesting a competency-based stay. Our review of these claims demonstrates that none provide a sufficient basis for granting a stay. Of the nine additional claims, the OCCA adjudicated seven on the merits, either on direct appeal or through postconviction proceedings. See Ryder ex rel. Ryder v. Trammell, No. CIV-05-0024JHP-KEW, 2013 WL 5603851, at , , –36, 38 (E.D. Okla. Oct. 11, 2013). 18 the record, namely, facts regarding his communications and interactions with trial and appellate counsel, his understanding of the various mental health experts’ reports, and whether he knew of additional mitigation information. But the OCCA adjudicated the merits7 of these claims either on direct appeal or postconviction review. Ryder v. State, No. PCD-2002-257, slip. op. at 3–15 (Okla. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2004); Ryder v. State, 83 P.3d 856, 875–78 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004). They are therefore subject to the limitations 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes on the habeas record such that “any evidence [Mr. Ryder] might have would be inadmissible.” Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. at 708. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Ryder’s request for a competency-based stay. Habeas review of these claims is therefore limited to the record that was before the state court, and any additional evidence a competent Mr. Ryder might possess would be inadmissible. With respect to the remaining two habeas claims, the first asserts that Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol is unconstitutional. Id. at . But Mr. Ryder has not suggested that facts exist outside the record that would differentiate his challenge from those which the Supreme Court rejected in Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 20 (2015). The second remaining claim argues Mr. Ryder is incompetent to be executed, Ryder, 2013 WL 5603851, at , which Mr. Ryder acknowledges is not ripe for review, see Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945–48 (2007) (explaining that a claim of incompetency to be executed is not ripe until an execution date has been set). We are therefore satisfied that none of these claims would benefit from Mr. Ryder’s competent assistance. 7 As we explain more fully below, the OCCA was less than thorough in its analysis of Mr. Ryder’s first habeas claim. See infra Part III.B.1. But it nonetheless disposed of the claim on the merits, and therefore our review is limited to the record that was before the OCCA. See Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Since we have an adjudication on the merits, we must consider what it means to defer to a decision which does not articulate a reasoned application of federal law to determined facts. We conclude . . . that we owe deference to the state court’s result, even if its reasoning is not expressly stated.”). 19