Opinion ID: 2813282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Railroad companies or corporations availing themselves of the provisions of R.S. 45:352 and 45:353 shall maintain a domicile, and main and general offices in Louisiana, and are subject to the control and regulations of the laws of Louisiana and the Louisiana Public Service Commission. [Emphasis added.] The LPSC was created by former Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution of 1921, as the successor of the Railroad Commission, and the authority of the new commission was extended to also give it the power of supervision, regulation and control over local public utilities (specifically, street railways, gas, electric light, heat, power, and waterworks).27 Id. See also LSA-Const. Art. IV, § 21(B) (“The commission shall regulate all common carriers and public utilities and have such other regulatory authority as provided by law. It shall adopt and enforce reasonable rules, regulations, and procedures necessary for the discharge of its duties, and shall have other powers and perform other duties as provided by law.”) We further note 49 U.S.C.A. § 20106, which provides, in pertinent part: A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security until the Secretary of Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters), or the Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad security matters), prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement. A State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security when the law, regulation, or order-- (A) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety or security hazard; 27 The regulation of railroad companies operating in Louisiana is long-standing. We note that the Railroad Commission of Louisiana was the predecessor regulatory agency to the LPSC; however, the Railroad Commission‟s power was confined, by Article 284 of the Constitution of 1898 and of 1913, to railroads, steamboats and other water craft, sleeping cars, passenger and freight tariffs and service, express rates, and telephone and telegraph charges. See State v. City of New Orleans, 151 La. 24, 26, 91 So. 533 (La. 1922). Regulatory authority over railroad track crossings was also exercised by the Railroad Commission. See Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 151 La. 635, 639, 92 So. 143, 144 (La. 1922). 22 (B) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the United States Government; and (C) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce. Clearly, with respect to railroad crossings, Louisiana has a significant safety interest in keeping open crossings, the absence of which would result in the diversion of vehicular traffic onto public roadways, which presents an increased hazard when the traffic so diverted consists of over-sized, and often heavily loaded, farm equipment. Moreover, the “enforcement of uncompensated obedience to a regulation passed in the legitimate exertion of the police power is not a taking of property without due process of law.” See New Orleans Public Service v. City of New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682, 687, 50 S.Ct. 449, 450, 74 L.Ed. 1115 (1930) (wherein a New Orleans city ordinance, requiring the plaintiff street railway company to tear down a “viaduct” railway crossing and to replace it with a “grade” crossing, was upheld as being a reasonable exercise of the city‟s police power, in determining what safety precautions were necessary or appropriate under the circumstances). With respect to Senate Bill 243, which became LSA-R.S. 48:394, the purpose of the bill was stated by its author, Senator Joe McPherson, in testimony before the Senate Committee on Transportation, as providing: a procedure for closing or removal of private railroad crossings, an “orderly process for the closure of farm crossings . . . [, and] an orderly method of notification.” Senator McPherson stated that “[c]urrently, there is a posting of a notice on the closest light pol[e] or tree limb to the crossing and if the farmer or landowner happens to come by and sees it then that is their receipt of notification.” Citing the absence of any governing law on notification in such circumstances, Senator McPherson stated that the bill would “provide proper notification and a hearing process before that closure occurs” and would provide “a means . . . to protect the citizens of 23 Louisiana.”28 See Minutes, Committee on Transportation, Highways & Public Works, Louisiana Senate, 2008 Regular Session, S.B. 243, April 17, 2008 (testimony of Senator Joe McPherson). The federal appellate court‟s summation of the purpose of LSA-R.S. 48:394 (that it was enacted “to balance the rights of the railroad company and the owners of private crossings by ensuring that the railroad companies do not unilaterally close private crossings unless doing so is necessary for the railroads to continue operating free from substantial burdens” (see Faulk v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 576 Fed.Appx. at 347)) comports with the text of the statute and the articulated legislative purpose. Revised Statute 48:394 requires any railroad company desiring to close or remove a private crossing in Louisiana, to provide a written request, no less than 180 days prior to the proposed closing or removal, by registered or certified mail, to the LPSC and to the owner(s) of record of the private crossing(s) traversed by the rail line. The written request must state the manner in which the private railroad crossing “unreasonably burdens or substantially interferes with rail transportation.” See LSA-R.S. 48:394(A)(1).29 Then, the LPSC must publish the 28 Jim Harper, a farmer from Rapides Parish, producing sugar cane, rice, cotton, and corn, who was at that time vice president of the Louisiana Farm Bureau Federation, testified that the closure of railroad crossings by Union Pacific affected him personally, preventing him from accessing his fields. Mr. Harper related that a closure was posted on his property, and he subsequently met with a railroad representative, informing the representative that he had no other access to his fields other than the railroad crossing; however, the crossing on his property was closed nonetheless. Mr. Harper stated that, after the crossing was closed, he had to travel over a mile down the public highway, through the town of Cheneyville, a significant number of times per day with his farm equipment and harvested crops to get to his “loading site.” See Meeting, Committee on Transportation, Louisiana House of Representatives, 2008 Regular Session, May 19, 2008, S.B. 243, available at http://house.louisiana.gov/H_Video/2008/May2008.htm; Minutes, Committee on Transportation, Highways & Public Works, Louisiana Senate, 2008 Regular Session, April 17, 2008, S.B. 243 (testimony of Jim Harper). 29 Louisiana Revised Statute 48:394 provides in full: A. (1) Any railroad company operating in this state which desires to close or remove a private crossing shall, no less than one hundred eighty days prior to the proposed closing or removal, provide a written request by registered or certified mail to the Louisiana Public Service Commission and to the owner or owners of record of the private crossing traversed by the rail line. The written 24 railroad‟s written request in its official bulletin for no less than 25 days. See LSA- R.S. 48:394(A)(2). Following publication of the railroad‟s request, LSA-R.S. 48:394(B) requires publication of a 15-day advance notice of hearing and an attempt by the LPSC to directly notify affected record landowners. See LSA-R.S. 48:394(B). Thereafter, a public hearing is held by the LPSC, during which “parties in interest” have an opportunity to be heard. The public hearing is required to be held not less than 60 days after receipt of the railroad‟s closure request. See id. If, after the public hearing, the LPSC determines that the private railroad crossing “unreasonably burdens or substantially interferes with rail transportation,” the LPSC is required to publish a notice stating the manner of the crossing closure in the official journal of the parish where such crossing is located and in the LPSC‟s official bulletin. See LSA-R.S. 48:394(C). An appeal from a decision of the LPSC is provided for by LSA-Const. Art. request shall state the manner in which such private railroad crossing unreasonably burdens or substantially interferes with rail transportation. (2) The Louisiana Public Service Commission shall publish the written request from the railroad company in the commission‟s official bulletin for no less than twenty-five days. B. No private crossing shall be closed or removed by any railroad company until after a public hearing by the Louisiana Public Service Commission at which parties in interest have had an opportunity to be heard. Notice of the time and place of the hearing shall be published in the official journal of the parish and the commission‟s official bulletin and at least fifteen days shall elapse between the publication and the date of the hearing. In addition to notice by publication, and at least ten days prior to the hearing, a good faith attempt to notify the owner or owners of record of the property where the private crossing is located shall be made by the commission by sending an official notice by registered or certified mail of the time and place of the hearing to the address or addresses indicated in the mortgage and conveyance records of the parish. The public hearing shall be held not less than sixty days after receipt of request of the railroad company as provided in Subsection A of this Section. C. If, after such public hearing, the commission determines that the private railroad crossing unreasonably burdens or substantially interferes with rail transportation, the commission shall publish in the official journal of the parish where such crossing is located and in the commission‟s official bulletin a notice stating the manner in which such closure or removal shall be made and the date of such. D. The provisions of this Section shall not apply when a private landowner or landowners and a railroad company enter into a consensual or negotiated written agreement or agreements to close a private railroad crossing. 25 IV, § 21(E),which states: Appeal may be taken in the manner provided by law by any aggrieved party or intervenor to the district court of the domicile of the commission. A right of direct appeal from any judgment of the district court shall be allowed to the supreme court. These rights of appeal shall extend to any action by the commission, including but not limited to action taken by the commission or by a public utility under the provisions of Subparagraph (3) of Paragraph (D) of this Section. Article IV, Section 21(E) makes it clear that “any action” of the LPSC may be appealed to the district court, and any judgment of a district court sitting in review of an LPSC action is directly appealable to the Louisiana Supreme Court. See Louisiana Power and Light Company v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 369 So.2d 1054, 1058 (La. 1979). In light of these considerations, it cannot seriously be disputed that investing the LPSC with the authority to apply the relevant law, as stated in LSA-R.S. 48:394, to requests for private railroad crossing closures, is an exercise of this state‟s police power. Nevertheless, LSA-R.S. 48:394 did not become effective until after the instant suit had been filed. Therefore, we will examine whether application of the statute could be retroactively applied in the instant case. In the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only. Procedural and interpretative laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary. LSA-C.C. art. 6. Concomitantly, LSA-R.S. 1:2 (“No Section of the Revised Statutes is retroactive unless it is expressly so stated.”) is construed as being co-extensive with LSA-C.C. art. 6. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Kennedy, 04-1089 (La. 6/29/05), 914 So.2d 533, 543. Louisiana‟s prohibition against legislation having retroactive effect applies 26 to substantive laws only.30 Procedural and interpretive laws may be applied retroactively, subject to the caveat that such laws may not operate to disturb a vested right. Ebinger v. Venus Construction Corporation, 10-2516 (La. 7/1/11), 65 So.3d 1279, 1285. Laws may not be applied retroactively if contractual obligations would be impaired or vested rights would be disturbed. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 29-30. This court has interpreted the retroactivity provisions of LSA-C.C. art. 6 and LSA-R.S. 1:2 to require a twofold inquiry: (1) we must ascertain whether the legislature expressed in the enactment its intent regarding retrospective or prospective application - if the legislature did so, our inquiry is at an end; (2) but, if the legislature did not, we must classify the enactment as substantive, procedural, or interpretive. See id., 998 So.2d at 29. See also Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Kennedy, 914 So.2d at 543; Unwired Telecom Corp. v. Parish of Calcasieu, 030732 (La. 1/19/05), 903 So.2d 392, 404; Cole v. Celotex Corporation, 599 So.2d 1058, 1063 (La. 1992). The Louisiana Legislature made no statement in 2008 La. Acts, No. 530, regarding the retroactivity of LSA-R.S. 48:394. However, upon examination of its provisions and the legislative history referred to hereinabove, we conclude that the effect of LSA-R.S. 48:394 is procedural and therefore may be applied retroactively. See Dripps v. Dripps, 366 So.2d 544, 548 (La. 1978) (“Some changes in the law are applicable to all situations, past, present and future. Laws which determine jurisdiction and procedure are applicable, from the date of their promulgation, to all law suits, even to those which bear upon facts and acts of a prior date. They even apply to pending lawsuits . . . . These laws are remedial in 30 Although LSA-R.S. 1:2, unlike LSA-C.C. art. 6, does not distinguish between substantive, procedural, and interpretive laws, the jurisprudence has consistently construed the two provisions as being co-extensive, with LSA-R.S. 1:2 having limited applicability to substantive legislation. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 29. 27 character concerned with procedure, not substantive rights. They do not impair the obligations of contracts.”) (citing Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law, at No. 258, pp. 182-83). Furthermore, there is no provision in LSA-R.S. 48:394 authorizing the LPSC to render an opinion relative to the substantive property rights of parties involved in a private railroad crossing closure dispute. The purpose of LSA-R.S. 48:394 is merely to ensure that all affected parties receive sufficient notice of an impending private railroad crossing closure, so that interested parties have an opportunity to be heard at a public hearing. The LPSC‟s adjudicatory responsibility at the time of the public hearing is to determine whether or not federal preemptive law mandates closure of the private railroad crossing, by application of the standard set forth in the statute. The LPSC must determine whether a particular “private railroad crossing unreasonably burdens or substantially interferes with rail transportation”; if it does, then closure must be ordered.31 The legislature‟s insertion of the non-discretionary standard into LSA- R.S. 48:394 resulted from, and was in accord with, the U.S. Fifth Circuit‟s holding that federal law preempts state regulation of private crossings that “unreasonably burden[s] or interfere[s] with rail transportation.” See Faulk v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 576 Fed.Appx. at 346-47; Franks Investment Company v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 593 F.3d at 414. As previously noted, a method of appealing any decision of the LPSC is set forth in LSA-Const. Art. IV, § 21(E), which encompasses an LPSC decision resulting from an action instituted pursuant to LSA-R.S. 48:394. Further, the provisions of LSA-R.S. 48:394 do not prohibit interested parties from litigating 31 We agree with the federal district court that “the legislative policy of La.Rev.Stat. 48:394 is clear. The legislative policy is to prevent railroads from closing private railroad crossings when there is no substantial need for the closure.” See Faulk v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 2011WL777905 at p.11, supra. 28 any substantive issues arising out of their respective property rights in another forum;32 a railroad company is only required to submit to regulatory review prior to closure of a private railroad crossing. An order of closure is automatic under the statute, if the railroad company can establish that the private railroad crossing unreasonably burdens or substantially interferes with rail transportation. We conclude that LSA-R.S. 48:394 is procedural, as it merely directs the steps that must be taken, and the forum that must first approve, the closure of a private railroad crossing. There has been no showing that giving this procedural law retroactive effect in the instant case impairs contractual obligations or disturbs vested rights. Although Union Pacific has argued that it had the right to close the crossings at its discretion before the enactment of LSA-R.S. 48:394 and that LSA-R.S. 48:394 now impairs this right, the Louisiana property law discussed herein does not support the exclusivity of use over the landowners‟ property sought by Union Pacific. Therefore, we find no merit in Union Pacific‟s contention. We further note that federal jurisprudence recognizes that compensation may be required when a government regulation of private property is so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster.33 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536-37, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 2080, 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005). Except to the extent that background principles of nuisance and property law independently restrict an owner‟s intended use of property, two categories of 32 See LSA-Const. Art. V, § 16 (vesting district courts with original jurisdiction of all civil matters); Moore v. Roemer, 567 So.2d 75, 79 (La. 1990) (holding that the legislature cannot divest district courts of original jurisdiction over civil matters). 33 Although we do not apply U.S. Supreme Court decisions mechanically to state law issues, even when the state and federal constitutions are similarly or identically worded, such decisions serve as guideposts, and we use them “if they are found to be logically persuasive and wellreasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees.” See Price v. U-Haul Company of Louisiana, 98-1959 (La. 9/8/99), 745 So.2d 593, 598 (citing State v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and Protections of Individual Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489, 502 (1977)). 29 regulatory action have generally been deemed to be per se takings or “total regulatory takings,” requiring compensation: (1) when government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of property, however minor; and (2) when a regulation completely deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use of property. See id., 544 U.S. at 538, 125 S.Ct. at 2081 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992)). See also Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S.Ct. 511, 517, 184 L.Ed.2d 417 (2012); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702, 713, 130 S.Ct. 2592, 2601, 177 L.Ed.2d 184 (2010). Furthermore, in general, temporary government action may give rise to a takings claim if permanent action of the same character would constitute a taking. Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. U.S., ___ U.S. at ___, 133 S.Ct. at 517. However, no magic formula enables a court to judge, in every case, whether a given government interference with property is a taking. In view of the nearly infinite variety of ways in which government actions or regulations can affect property interests, the courts have recognized few invariable rules in this area. Most takings claims turn on situation-specific factual inquiries. Id. Some considerations for determining whether a taking has occurred include: the character of the land at issue; the property owner‟s distinct investment-backed expectations, a matter often informed by the law in force in the state in which the property is located; and the degree to which the invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of authorized government action. See id., ___ U.S. at ___, 133 S.Ct. at 517. Nevertheless, Supreme Court regulatory takings jurisprudence instructs that 30 when a complainant has not yet obtained a final administrative decision, the economic impact of the challenged action and the extent to which it interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulatory law at issue to the particular property in question. See Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 190-91, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3118-19, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985). A property owner may not establish a taking before the regulatory agency charged with the decision-making authority has the opportunity, using its own reasonable procedures, to decide and explain the reach of a challenged regulation. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620-21, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 2459, 150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001). Under the “ripeness” doctrine, a “taking” claim based on a law or regulation that is alleged to go too far in burdening property depends upon the landowner having first followed reasonable and necessary steps to allow the regulatory agency to exercise their full discretion in considering the matter at issue, including the opportunity to grant any variances or waivers allowed by law. Id. As a general rule, until these ordinary processes have been followed, the extent of the restriction on property is not known, and a regulatory taking has not yet been established. Id. In the instant case, Union Pacific failed to submit the matter to the regulatory authority designated by the governing statute, LSA-R.S. 48:394, the LPSC, depriving the LPSC of the opportunity to grant Union Pacific the right to close the railroad crossings at issue. If Union Pacific‟s request is granted, there can be no claim of a regulatory “taking.” Until the LPSC rules on Union Pacific‟s intent to close the private crossings at issue, Union Pacific‟s “taking” claim, as to LSA-R.S. 48:394, is not ripe for adjudication. 31 Having found that Union Pacific failed to establish that a constitutionally prohibited taking has occurred, either in the continued existence of the private crossings at issue or in the regulatory procedure before the LPSC established by LSA-R.S. 48:394, we find it unnecessary to address the final prong (whether any alleged regulatory taking occasioned by LSA-R.S. 48:394 is for a public purpose) of the three-prong analysis set forth in State, Department of Transportation and Development v. Chambers Investment Company, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that LSA-R.S. 48:394, as applied to the instant case, has not effected an unconstitutional taking under LSA-Const. Art. I, § 4.