Opinion ID: 1451125
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The right to appeal standing

Text: Establishing that a contested case took place does not end the inquiry into justiciability. The Appellees must also show that they are entitled to request a review of the agency determination. Mahuiki, 65 Haw. at 513, 654 P.2d at 879. Notwithstanding the liberalization of rules regarding a litigant's standing to assert claims based on alleged environmental harms, the fundamental standing requirements must still be applied. Specifically, the Appellees must demonstrate [that] their interests were injured and [that] they were involved in the administrative proceeding that culminated in the unfavorable decision. Mahuiki, 65 Haw. at 514-15, 654 P.2d at 879-80 (emphasis added). First, we shall address the requirement of specially affected interests, or injury in fact. We have stated that a member of the public has standing to enforce the rights of the public even though the individual's injury is not different in kind from the public's generally, if that person suffers an injury in fact. Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. Anderson, 70 Haw. 276, 283, 768 P.2d 1293, 1299 (1989) (citing Akau v. Olohana Corp., 65 Haw. 383, 388-89, 652 P.2d 1130, 1134 (1982)) (emphasis added). Before the circuit court, the Appellees alleged that allowing PGV's activities to proceed under the authority of the ATC permits would expose the Appellees to potential harm including diminished property values, deterioration of air quality, odor nuisance, and possible physical injury resulting from the permitted operations. If this were an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, [13] we could simply conclude that the pleadings... contain a sufficient showing of individualized harm ... [so that] it cannot be said that [Appellees] sought `to do no more than vindicate their own value preferences through the judicial process.' Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1369, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972)); see also Waianae Model Neighborhood Area Ass'n v. City & County, 55 Haw. 40, 44, 514 P.2d 861, 864 (1973). The instant case, however, was filed as an agency appeal under which judicial review is confined to the record. See HRS § 91-14(f) (confining the court's review on appeal to the record); HRS § 91-14(e) (providing a procedure for supplementing the record prior to the date set for hearing, which Appellees failed to do). Based on our review of the record, Appellees Perry, Petricci, Phillips, and Martinovitch each clearly demonstrated an injury in fact as discussed in Hawaii's Thousand Friends: (1) an actual or threatened injury, (2) traceable to the challenged action, which is (3) likely to be remedied by favorable action. Id. [14] See infra notes 15, 16 and accompanying text (discussing the current state of the record with respect to the other Appellees). The remaining element of our analysis requires involvement or participation in a contested case. The Appellees must, therefore, demonstrate ... [that] they were involved in the administrative proceeding that culminated in the unfavorable decision. Mahuiki, 65 Haw. at 514-15, 654 P.2d at 879-80; see also Bush, 76 Hawai`i at 134, 870 P.2d at 1278 (holding that appellants must have participated in a contested case). In the Appellees' original pleadings before the circuit court, they apparently concede that only certain Appellees requested contested case hearings pursuant to the procedures set forth by the DOH. [15] See supra subsection II.B.2.b. It is not clear, however, whether any evidence in the record would support an allegation that any member of PDF suffered potential harm constituting an injury in fact. [16] In any event, it is clear that certain Appellees `contested the issue of whether the permits should be granted before the agency' in a manner suggested by the Planning Commission, and thereby satisfied the requirement of `adversary participation'. Mahuiki, 65 Haw. at 516, 654 P.2d at 880. The mere fact that these Appellees did not formally intervene in a contested case is not dispositive of the question whether they were involved in a contested case. Id. at 515, 654 P.2d at 880 (citing Jordan v. Hamada, 62 Haw. 444, 449, 616 P.2d 1368, 1371 (1980)). In Jordan, the court stated that [p]articipation in a hearing as an adversary without formal intervention has been held sufficient to give rise to appeal rights. Jordan, 62 Haw. at 449, 616 P.2d at 1371. In a footnote to this statement, the court cautioned that one who has not participated in some phase of a contested case can [not] appeal merely because he has been `aggrieved'. Id. at 449 n. 8, 616 P.2d at 1371 n. 8. Although the facts in Jordan are distinguishable from the instant case, [17] the four cases that the court relied upon for its ruling are on point. [18] These cases are consistent with our analysis of Simpson and formed an integral part of this court's legal analysis in Mahuiki. See supra section II.B.2.b. Of particular significance to this case is the court's reasoning in East Diamond Head that Appellants, having comported with all board procedural dictates, could not formally intervene as the trial court mistakenly demanded. Manifestly, all appellants here have done everything possible to perfect an appeal. That the public hearing was not a contested case [under HRS § 91-1(5)] is without merit. East Diamond Head, 52 Haw. at 524, 479 P.2d at 799 (citation omitted and emphasis added). Notwithstanding the fact that the DOH Rules of Practice and Procedure do not provide for formal intervention, Appellees Martinovitch, Petricci, and Phillips did everything possible to establish and preserve a right to appeal.