Opinion ID: 700482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Wealth

Text: 24 Evidence of unexplained wealth is probative and therefore admissible if it creates a reasonable inference of the defendant's involvement in the drug conspiracy or trafficking. United States v. Davis, 789 F.Supp. 1130, 1132 (D.Kan.1992); see also United States v. Marrinson, 832 F.2d 1465, 1472 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Figueroa, 976 F.2d 1446, 1454 (1st Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1346, 122 L.Ed.2d 728 (1993); cf. United States v. Hogan, 886 F.2d 1497, 1507 (7th Cir.1989) (holding in bribery context that evidence of wealth may be admissible to establish that a person engaged in a cash-intensive criminal enterprise, even if there is another explanation for the extra money); United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 390 (7th Cir.1989) (holding in forfeiture context that where a defendant's verifiable income cannot possibly account for the level of wealth displayed and where there is strong evidence that the defendant is a drug trafficker, then there is probable cause to believe that the wealth is either a direct product of the illicit activity or that it is traceable to the activity as proceeds). The prosecution may present the wealth evidence as long as other evidence, mainly that the wealth was not derived from legitimate sources, is presented to support the charge of narcotics distribution. Davis, 789 F.Supp. at 1132. This evidence, however, must relate to wealth acquired during the period in which the narcotics trafficking occurred. United States v. Towers, 775 F.2d 184, 187-88 (7th Cir.1985); see Marrinson, 832 F.2d at 1472; cf. United States v. Zarintash, 736 F.2d 66, 71-72 (3d Cir.1984). 25 Mr. Penny submits that evidence of his accumulated wealth was erroneously admitted at trial because the evidence presented was of assets acquired before the time that he allegedly distributed narcotics. Specifically, Mr. Penny alleges that the majority of the evidence of wealth introduced by the government concerned assets acquired previous to 1987, the date when, Mr. Penny submits, his trafficking activities began. We review this claim for plain error because Mr. Penny failed to assert this claim at the trial court. Under such a standard, Mr. Penny must demonstrate that there was error, that the error was plain, that the error affected his substantial rights, and that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776-79, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); see United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 1393, 1407 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 250, 130 L.Ed.2d 171 (1994); United States v. Carroll, 871 F.2d 689, 692 (7th Cir.1989). Mr. Penny cannot meet this burden. 4 26 In this case, the government presented clear evidence that Mr. Penny had purchased and sold narcotics beginning in 1984. For example, Mr. Penny related to Andre Jackson in 1983 or 1984 that his significant increase in income was attributable to the heroin sales he was conducting. Also, in 1984, Mr. Penny had related to his cell mate in East Moline Correctional Center, William Bauer, that he made a great deal of money selling cocaine and heroin. In fact, while incarcerated with Bauer, Mr. Penny arranged a drug deal using one of his dealers he had consistently employed in the past, LaVada Davis. Thus, the evidence of the accumulated wealth of Mr. Penny was properly admitted, and no error was committed. 5 The record supports the conclusion that Mr. Penny had sold narcotics prior to 1984, and had been involved in a conspiracy to distribute narcotics since, at the latest, 1984.