Opinion ID: 1160147
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Language of the Federal Statute

Text: Turning first to the plain language of the statute, the stated purpose of UMTRCA is to clean up and stabilize uranium processing sites to alleviate the danger to the public posed by radiation emitted from mill tailings and other radioactive waste at such sites, 42 U.S.C. § 7901. To this end, the federal government shall pay 90 per centum of the actual cost of such remedial action, including the actual costs of acquiring such site (and any interest therein) ... and the state shall pay the remainder of such costs from non-Federal funds. § 7917(a). The act addresses two possible cleanup scenarios: cleanup with the consent of the property owner, section 7913(c), and cleanup accomplished after the acquisition of the site by the state in which the property is located, section 7914(a). In deciding whether to proceed by one method or the other, the sole factor enumerated in the statute to which the federal Secretary of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission must give consideration is the prevention of windfall profits to the property owner. Id. If the cleanup will result in a windfall to the property owner, the state will be directed to acquire the site, id., with the option to sell the decontaminated property back to the original owner at fair market value. § 7914(e)(2). If the state is not directed to acquire the site, the state may enter into a consent agreement with the property owner which will releas[e] the United States of any liability or claim thereof and hold [ ] the United States harmless against any claim ... arising out of the performance of any such remedial action. § 7913(c)(2). UMTRCA thus distinguishes between property owners to whom a windfall benefit would accrue and property owners to whom a windfall would not accrue in determining which cleanup scenario to follow. The Mill argues that [t]he perceived `windfall' is the cost associated with the remedial action undertaken by DOE which otherwise could have been borne by the property owner. However, [UMTRCA's] specific purpose is to obligate DOE to absorb these costs, since `but for' the Federal contracts which gave rise to the tailings which contaminate these sites, the properties would likely be free from uranium contamination. According to The Mill, the admonition against windfall profits in section 7914(a) is merely an attempt to limit costs. It does not mandate differential treatment of property owners whose property is remediated by consent and those whose property is acquired by the state before remediation. UMTRCA does not define windfall profits. Neither the Department of Energy nor the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued regulations enunciating the factors on which it bases its determination to require a state to acquire a processing site, or elaborating how windfall profits may be identified. Thus, we must interpret the term without statutory or regulatory guidance. In reading a statute we are required to adopt an interpretation that gives consistent, harmonious and sensible effect to all of the statute's provisions. Colorado State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Saddoris, 825 P.2d 39, 42 (Colo.1992) (citation omitted). Furthermore, the court must give words their commonly accepted and understood meaning. East Lakewood Sanitation Dist. v. District Court, 842 P.2d 233, 235 (Colo.1992). The Mill's interpretation fails to sensibly and harmoniously construe the statute. First, if the windfall profit addressed by UMTRCA is merely the cost of remedial action, including acquisition costs, then it would be impossible to consider prevention of windfall profits as required by section 7914, since all cleanup effort would result in some windfall to the property owner. The Secretary of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission could only consider limitation of windfall profits. Second, to treat windfall profits as the cost of cleanup, as The Mill recommends, would read consensual cleanup under section 7913(c) out of the statute. Since all remedial action would result in some windfall profit, prevention of which is the sole enumerated factor for consideration under section 7914(a), presumably the Secretary of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would require acquisition of most, if not all, sites. Finally, The Mill's interpretation also fails to acknowledge that property owners may benefit not only from avoiding the cost of cleanup (including future liability arising from on-site pollution), but also from the increased value of the property after the government-funded cleanup is complete. While the statute clearly is designed to require federal and state government to bear the cost of cleanup, there is no evidence that it was intended to provide these secondary benefits to landowners as well. Accordingly, we must identify a satisfactory alternative construction. A windfall is commonly understood to mean an unexpected or sudden gain or advantage. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2619-20 (1986). Profit, in the context of financial matters such as these, generally means the the excess of returns over expenditure in a transaction or series of transactions. Id. at 1811. Thus, windfall profit must occur where a transaction produces some unexpected excess of returns over expenditures. In the context of this statute, the transaction in question must be the acquisition of property by the state since, under section 7914(a), it is [i]n determining whether to require the State to acquire a designated processing site or interest therein, [that] consideration shall be given to the prevention of windfall profits.  § 7914(a) (emphasis added). Under this definition, windfall profits would accrue to a property owner as a result of cleanup only where the property owner purchased the property in its contaminated state at a price which reflected the presence of contamination and then, without making any expenditures for cleanup, could resell the property, or interest therein, at a price reflecting an increase in value due to the cleanup. Such an increase in market value due to cleanup would necessarily be unexpected, and thus a windfall, because if government-funded cleanup plans had been publicly known, the market price of the property in a contaminated state would have been comparable to that of similar, uncontaminated property. Not all cleanups would result in such a windfall to the property owner. For example, where the property owner purchased the tract in an uncontaminated state before the milling operations took place pursuant to federal contracts, cleanup of the property merely returns the property to its state at the time of initial purchase. [13] The same would be true where the property owner purchased the tract after the decision to take remedial action had been made or after remedial action had begun, so that the purchase price reflected the decontaminated value of the property. Presumably, in these circumstances the Secretary of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would not require the state to acquire the processing site prior to performing remedial action. The rule against enhanced value is not inconsistent with UMTRCA's policy of preventing windfall profits to the property owner. In fact, the rule furthers UMTRCA policy. If the property owner were allowed to collect the value of the property in its decontaminated state, the property owner would not only be spared the expense of the cleanup, but would also receive the increase in market value resulting from the cleanup. While the statute does not require property owners to pay for the cleanup itself, as indicated by placing the full cost on the federal and state governments in section 7917(a), the rule against enhanced value assures that the property owner cannot collect through condemnation proceedings the windfall profits that state acquisition of the property was intended to prevent. 2.