Opinion ID: 2765457
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiff=s Race Discrimination Claim

Text: Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of a statutorily protected characteristic such as race.1 42 U.S.C. ' 2000eB2(a)(1). Where, as in this case, a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to prove discrimination, we apply the familiar burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima case of discrimination. Id. If the plaintiff meets her burden, the employer can rebut the resulting presumption of discrimination by articulating a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its challenged employment action. Id. Plaintiff then has an opportunity to produce evidence that the proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. Id. 1. Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The available methods of establishing a prima facie case Aare flexible and depend on the particular situation.@ Id. As relevant to this case, Plaintiff can meet 1 The same analysis applies to Plaintiff=s Title VII and FCRA claims. See Jones v. United Space Alliance, L.L.C., 494 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (AFlorida courts apply Title VII caselaw when they interpret the FCRA@). Plaintiff also references 42 U.S.C. ' 1981 in the opening paragraph of her amended complaint. To the extent Plaintiff intended to assert a discrimination claim under ' 1981, that claim is also governed by the Title VII analysis. See Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that Title VII and ' 1981 claims have the same requirements and are governed by the same analytical framework). 6 Case: 14-11963 Date Filed: 12/30/2014 Page: 7 of 14 her burden with evidence that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position that she held, (3) she was terminated from that position, and (4) in terminating her employment, Defendants treated Plaintiff less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside of her protected class. Smith v. LockheedBMartin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2011). Defendants concede that Plaintiff has shown the first three elements. As to the fourth element, Plaintiff contends that Defendants treated her less favorably than Tiffany Aderholt, a white dispatcher who was suspended rather than terminated for allegedly similar misconduct. We agree with the district court that Aderholt is not a proper comparator because she was not Asimilarly situated@ to Plaintiff. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining that employees are Asimilarly situated@ for purposes of establishing a prima facie case if they are Ainvolved in or accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways@). Based on the record evidence, Aderholt was disciplined for (1) cursing at a deputy in front of other employees at the Communications Center and (2) subsequently refusing to answer a call from the same deputy and abandoning her work station. Aderholt=s misconduct was classified by the County disciplinary policy as Group I offenses involving discourtesy and warranting suspension, which is the discipline that 7 Case: 14-11963 Date Filed: 12/30/2014 Page: 8 of 14 Aderholt received for both incidents.2 Plaintiff, on the other hand, was terminated for lying and making false accusations against Latimer. Plaintiff=s misconduct was classified by the policy as a Group III offense involving lying, falsification of documents, or other dishonesty. The policy recommended termination for a first Group III offense. Plaintiff=s attempt to reframe Aderholt=s misconduct as an offense similar to her own is not supported by the record. Contrary to Plaintiff=s suggestion, there is no evidence that Aderholt falsified documents or asserted fabricated misconduct allegations against another employee. Moreover, Plaintiff=s own assessment that Aderholt=s conduct was Amuch worse@ than her own, because it occurred twice and while Aderholt was on duty, is irrelevant. See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1266-67 (emphasizing that discriminatory intent must be gauged from the employer=s perspective); Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty., Fla., 447 F.3d 1319, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006) (A[d]ifferent types and degrees of misconduct may warrant different types and degrees of discipline@). Although Plaintiff relied solely on a comparator theory in the district court, she argues on appeal that there is other evidence of intentional discrimination sufficient to establish a prima facie case. As Plaintiff correctly notes, her Afailure to 2 Aderholt was terminated in March 2012 for poor work performance. 8 Case: 14-11963 Date Filed: 12/30/2014 Page: 9 of 14 produce a comparator does not necessarily doom@ her discrimination claim. Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328. Even in the absence of a comparator, summary judgment is inappropriate if the plaintiff Apresents circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the employer=s discriminatory intent.@ Id. However, Plaintiff has failed to present such evidence in this case. As an example of other evidence, Plaintiff cites a warning Waschek allegedly received from an unidentified person in the Sheriff=s Office not to discipline Plaintiff because she would go to the NAACP. Assuming this warning occurred, it is not indicative of intentional discrimination. If anything, Waschek=s neutral enforcement of the County=s disciplinary policy in spite of the warning undercuts any inference of racial discrimination. Plaintiff also relies on a statement by Major Kitchings, during his investigation concerning the rebuttal statement, that this was not Plaintiff=s Afirst incident.@ Plaintiff does not explain, and we do not see, how this statement could possibly indicate racial animus. The only other evidence Plaintiff presents is her own unsubstantiated belief that Defendants Ahad their minds made up about Plaintiff from the beginning.@ Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a plausible inference of intentional discrimination. Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371, 1376 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Ellis v. 9 Case: 14-11963 Date Filed: 12/30/2014 Page: 10 of 14 England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (Amere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion@). 2. Plaintiff failed to rebut the legitimate reason offered by Defendants to explain her termination. Assuming Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Defendants still are entitled to summary judgment. Defendants contend that Plaintiff was fired because she lied and fabricated allegations against Latimer in her rebuttal statement, an offense that warrants immediate termination under the County=s disciplinary policy. Defendants argue further that Plaintiff=s false statements called into question her trustworthiness: an essential quality for a dispatcher. These explanations constitute legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for Plaintiff=s termination. See Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1564 (describing the employer=s intermediate burden as Aexceedingly light@); see also Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that Athe employer=s burden is merely one of production@). At this stage, Plaintiff must present some evidence of pretext to withstand summary judgment. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024-25. A plaintiff may show pretext A>either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer=s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.=@ Jackson v. State of Ala. Tenure Comm=n, 10 Case: 14-11963 Date Filed: 12/30/2014 Page: 11 of 14 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Tex. Dep=t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1095 (1981)). Whichever method is used, the plaintiff=s pretext evidence must permit a reasonable inference that the challenged employment action was motivated by unlawful discriminatory animus. Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1266. The district court correctly held that Plaintiff failed to meet this burden. Plaintiff=s pretext argument primarily consists of her denial that she ever was dishonest, and her insistence that the information provided in her rebuttal was truthful and accurately described her perception of Latimer=s conduct. This argument does not account for the numerous and obvious discrepancies between the video and audio recording of Latimer=s conduct and Plaintiff=s description of his conduct in the rebuttal. Given the recorded evidence, Plaintiff=s unsupported denial of misconduct is insufficient to establish pretext. Id. (A[t]he inquiry into pretext centers on the employer=s beliefs, not the employee=s beliefs@). The only other evidence Plaintiff cites to establish pretext is the more favorable treatment allegedly received by white dispatcher Aderholt. According to Plaintiff, the inconsistent application of discipline creates doubt about the proffered reasons for Plaintiff=s termination and demonstrates hostility towards Plaintiff. As discussed, the record shows that Aderholt did not engage in the same type of 11 Case: 14-11963 Date Filed: 12/30/2014 Page: 12 of 14 misconduct as Plaintiff. Thus, the fact that Aderholt did not receive the same discipline as Plaintiff does not demonstrate pretext. See Kragor v. Takeda Pharm. Am., Inc., 702 F.3d 1304, 1308 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2012) (AThe opportunity provided to a plaintiff to show pretext is simply an opportunity to present evidence from which the trier of fact can find unlawful discrimination.@).