Opinion ID: 1801839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedures for Determining Competence to Stand Trial

Text: Defendant contends the procedures by which the trial court found him competent to stand trial were constitutionally deficient in several respects. We find no error in the procedures employed. The question of competence to stand trial was first raised in pretrial proceedings, after defendant's first request to represent himself was denied. [2] In explaining its finding that defendant was not competent to represent himself, the trial court (Judge McCarville) observed: [W]hile the record, the written record, may reflect [defendant] has given articulate responses [to the court's questions regarding self-representation,] the court will note by his own facial expressions and by certain time delays from the time questions were posed by the court and his responses, and what I will call quizzical looks on his face, while he appeared to give intelligent responses, the court finds that it is not, in fact, the case. Defense counsel then made a 1368 motion based on some of the court's comments. [3] The trial court responded that its comments had been aimed only at the question of self-representation, but because counsel sought a determination of trial competence, the court suspended the criminal proceedings and ordered the appointment of two psychologists to examine defendant. On the form letter of appointment, the court clerk correctly informed the psychologists they were to examine defendant and report on his present mental competence pursuant to P.C. 1368. Boxes were checked on the form for that statute and for three subsidiary determinations to be made: Is the defendant presently able to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings taken against him? Is he presently able to cooperate in a rational manner with counsel in presenting a defense? and Is he presently able to prepare and conduct his own defense in a rational manner without counsel? In addition, although defendant had not entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the letter stated the examination was also under section 1026 of the Penal Code, which sets out the procedures for trying such a plea, and two question boxes relating to insanity were checked: Was the defendant sane at the time of the commission of the alleged offense? and Has the defendant `fully recovered his sanity' ... ? The appointed psychologists, Michael Kania and Christopher Flach, each examined defendant and submitted a written report. Kania, who interviewed defendant but administered no tests, concentrated his report on competence questions. He found defendant was able to accurately perceive events occurring around him, with no evidence of significant distortions due to severe psychopathology. Defendant's cognitive functioning is intact. Attention, concentration and comprehension are good. The defendant appears to be of average intellectual ability.... [¶] Diagnostically, the defendant does not appear to suffer from any severe psychological disorder at the present time. There are some features of a personality disorder, and there is also a history of cocaine abuse. Defendant knew the charges against him and the roles played by his attorney, the district attorney, the court and the jury. Kania concluded defendant understood the nature and purpose of the proceedings, was able to cooperate in a rational manner with counsel (though he expressed dissatisfaction with his current attorney), and would be able to conduct his own defense in a rational manner. Defendant was trial competent. Flach administered several tests, including two intelligence tests, and also interviewed defendant. He described his appointment as for a 1368 PC evaluation, but also purported to ascertain defendant's mental state to aid in diagnosis, treatment, and placement planning. He found defendant knew he faced a murder charge and could be sentenced to death, and knew the roles of the prosecutor, the judge and the defense counsel, though he distrusted his current attorney and had difficulty understanding his point of view. Flach found no acute psychotic thought disorders from his examination, but found defendant seemed somewhat grandiose at times, particularly as to courtroom strategies, and presented with an exaggerated degree of self-importance and entitlement, displaying a rather narcissistic perspective. Defendant had inflated ideas about his own accomplishments and an almost ... delusional conviction regarding the nature of his insight. He seems to believe that his needs are special, particularly within the courtroom situation. In part, this may explain his reason for doubting his own attorney or even trying to represent himself. Flach observed these personality traits could be related to defendant's long history of cocaine dependence. With regard to intellectual functioning, defendant's test results were in the borderline range (including a 75 verbal IQ score on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence ScaleRevised). In general, Flach found defendant's abilities borderline in understanding of the world, vocabulary and memory, and low average in math skills. Overall defendant had low average to borderline intelligence, with severe deficits noted in common sense reasoning and abstract thinking abilities. These deficits, which would [a]ffect his ability to effectively interact with others at times and to understand abstract problems, were consistent with defendant's history of substance abuse. Flach concluded defendant understood the nature and purpose of the proceedings, but may have difficulty in rationally cooperating with coun[sel], due to his tendency to become somewhat defensive and distrusting. Because of his low average to borderline intellectual functioning, defendant would have some difficulty in representing himself without an attorney. Addressing the insanity-related questions checked on the form letter of appointment, Flach observed that defendant appeared to be aware of the wrongful conduct he had admitted (breaking into an Oakland garage), but that his thinking at the time may have been affected by substance use, and that defendant had not fully recovered his sanity, in that the possibility of drug use made him a continuing danger to himself and others. After receiving the psychologists' reports, the trial court held a hearing to try the competence issue. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the question, and both parties submitted the question to the court without further evidence or argument. The court, based upon review of the reports, found defendant competent to stand trial and assigned the case to a trial department. (1) Neither the federal Constitution nor our statutes allow a person to be tried criminally while mentally incompetent. ( Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 378 [15 L.Ed.2d 815, 86 S.Ct. 836]; § 1367, subd. (a).) The constitutional test is whether the defendant `has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' ( Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402 [4 L.Ed.2d 824, 80 S.Ct. 788] ( per curiam) . ) Our statutes similarly forbid prosecution while the defendant, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, ... is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner. (§ 1367, subd. (a).) The federal Constitution further demands that state procedures ... be adequate to protect this right. ( Pate v. Robinson, supra, 383 U.S. at p. 378; accord, Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 172 [43 L.Ed.2d 103, 95 S.Ct. 896].) Our statutes provide for suspension of criminal proceedings when a doubt as to the defendant's competence arises in the trial judge's mind or when counsel informs the court of counsel's belief the defendant may be incompetent (§ 1368); the appointment of psychologists or psychiatrists to examine the defendant (§ 1369, subd. (a)); and trial of the issue to a jury or to the court ( id., subds. (b)-(f)). The defense may waive a jury trial and may even, as here, submit the issue to the court on the written reports of psychologists or psychiatrists. ( People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131-132 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461]; People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1169 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146].) Defendant contends the procedures the trial court employed for determining his competence to stand trial were constitutionally inadequate, first, in that the court failed to pose the proper questions for the two psychologists. According to defendant, this resulted in the failure of one of the experts [Flach] to address the competency question at all. At the least, defendant argues, the resulting flaws in Flach's report required live testimony to be taken at the competence hearing. The record does not support this contention. The court's form letter of appointment requested evaluation of defendant's present mental competence pursuant to P.C. 1368, and a series of more specific questions aimed at that issue were checked on the form. That the letter also referred inappropriately to the issue of sanity, and two questions regarding that issue were also checked, does not establish any constitutionally significant error. Similarly, the record shows Flach's report did address the competence questions, though he refrained from giving a definitive opinion on the final issue. That he also discussed defendant's mental status more broadly and briefly addressed the checked insanity questions did not render his report ambiguous or misleading. Flach's superfluous conclusions therefore did not require the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing at which the expert could be cross-examined. Defendant's cited case, Matheney v. Anderson (7th Cir. 2001) 253 F.3d 1025, in which counsel requested a competence evaluation but the trial court's examination order and the experts' reports addressed only the sanity question, yet counsel failed to seek a hearing (see id. at pp. 1029-1032, 1040-1041), is clearly inapposite. Second, defendant contends the trial court was constitutionally obliged to hold an evidentiary hearing in order to resolve conflicts between the two psychologists' reports. On this point, we agree with the Attorney General that defendant's characterization of the conflict is exaggerated. Neither psychologist found that defendant suffered from any psychosis or other severe mental illness, and both noted defendant's history of substance abuse, which Flach found might have adversely affected defendant's intellectual functioning and personality. While Kania noted some features of a personality disorder, Flach's more detailed description of defendant's self-image as somewhat grandiose with an exaggerated degree of self-importance and a rather narcissistic perspective was not inconsistent. Although defendant's intellectual functioning was assessed as average by Kania and as low average or borderline by Flach, the experts agreed he was capable of understanding the nature of the proceedings against him. The only significant difference in the experts' conclusions with regard to trial competence was that Kania believed defendant was able to cooperate in a rational manner with counsel, though he was dissatisfied with his lawyers, while Flach believed that because of defendant's distrustful and defensive tendencies, he might have difficulty cooperating rationally with counsel. Flach's conclusion was consistent with the record of proceedings to that point, which showed defendant had indeed had difficulty cooperating with counsel, partly because of distrust arising from differences over defense strategy. (See fn. 2, ante. ) Notably, however, Flach did not opine that defendant's difficulties with counsel were due to mental illness. Nor did he state a conclusion defendant was unable to assist counsel in presentation of a defense or was incompetent to stand trial. [4] We conclude that as in People v. Lawley, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pages 130-132, where a court-appointed psychologist and one hired by the defense had reached different conclusions on the defendant's trial competence, the trial court here could, despite the differences between Kania's and Flach's reports, constitutionally undertake to resolve the competence question without holding an evidentiary hearing. [5] (See also People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 1168-1169 [submission on expert reports not an unconstitutional procedure where, though two current reports found the defendant competent, a past report by one of the experts found him incompetent].) There was no evidence before the trial court of psychosis or any severe thought disorder, and neither expert opined that defendant would be unable to assist counsel because of a mental illness. Defendant clearly had a history of conflict with his attorneys, but the court could reasonably conclude, without contradiction from either psychologist's report, that such conflicts were attributable to difficult aspects of defendant's personality rather than to a diagnosed mental illness. Third, defendant contends the trial court was obliged to have him examined by the regional center for the developmentally disabled (see § 1369, subd. (a)) because Flach's testing showed a verbal IQ score of 75. Flach's report, however, nowhere referred to any possibility of a developmental disability. Rather, Flach concluded defendant's relatively low intelligence might be related to his problems and history with substance dependence, and his difficulty with commonsense reasoning was consistent with his history of substance abuse. This was not an opinion that would cause the trial court to suspect[] the defendant is developmentally disabled (§ 1369, subd. (a)), and no referral was therefore required. Finally, defendant contends events during the guilt and special circumstances trial and at a hearing between the guilt and penalty phases should have led the trial court to reevaluate his trial competence before proceeding with the penalty trial. We conclude such reexamination was not required. (2) `When a competency hearing has already been held and defendant has been found competent to stand trial, however, a trial court need not suspend proceedings to conduct a second competency hearing unless it is presented with a substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence casting a serious doubt on the validity of that finding. [Citations.]' ( People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 542-543 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385].) Here, there was no such new evidence or changed circumstances. During the guilt phase of trial, to be sure, defendant displayed some of the deficits ... in common sense reasoning and abstract thinking abilities Flach had already noted, engaging in extensive unproductive questioning of witnesses and inarticulate arguments to the court and jury. But defendant points to nothing in his guilt phase efforts indicating he had lost the ability to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings. Defendant's attempts to defend himself at the guilt phase may have been, as he now says, disturbingly inept, but they were not of a character to cast serious doubt on the trial court's finding that he knew what he was charged with and the nature of the trial in which he took full part. Nor did defendant's mention, at a hearing before the penalty phase began, of the possibility that he might seek a new guilt trial on the basis of his own incompetence as an attorney [6] constitute changed circumstances or new evidence that undermined the trial court's original determination he was competent to stand trial.