Opinion ID: 585038
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Marrese's Burden on Summary Judgment

Text: 42 Both parties agree that our review of the record in this case will focus on evidence of malice and the defendants' efforts to ascertain the facts, but to guide our review, we must keep in mind how the Act allocates the burden of proof on the issue of good faith. In a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). However, [there is] no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Id. (emphasis original). Therefore, in order to obtain summary judgment, the defendants in this case need not negate Marrese's allegations of malice. Furthermore, in a motion for summary judgment, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. The Act states that good faith [is] presumed, and malice [is] required to be proven by the person aggrieved. Ind.Code 34-4-12.6-1(f). Marrese, as the person aggrieved, would bear the burden at trial of proving that the defendants did not act in good faith. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law if Marrese has not pointed to specific facts on the record that tend to support his allegations of the defendants' bad faith. 43 We will consider Marrese's opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment with two principles in mind. First, to the extent that Marrese has opposed the defendants' motions by merely repeating the allegations of malice in his complaint, he has not fulfilled the requirements of Rule 56 and has failed to show the court that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Powers v. Dole, 782 F.2d 689, 695 (7th Cir.1986) (conclusory allegations that have no factual support are insufficient). Second, to the extent that Marrese has set forth facts, we will draw only reasonable inferences from those facts. To overcome a motion for summary judgment, Marrese must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In short, we are not going to divine malice from Marrese's allegations but will review carefully any facts that Marrese offers to determine whether a trier of fact could reasonably infer malice from those facts.