Opinion ID: 201760
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: October 2001 motion to proceed pro se

Text: 37 Gómez first argues that the district court erred in handling his October 2, 2001 motion to remove his then-counsel McGiverin 8 and to proceed pro se. Specifically, Gómez maintains that the court did not comply with its duty to determine whether the motion constituted a valid waiver of his right to counsel and that, instead, the court effectively ignored the motion, failing to conduct a hearing on it for more than six months and then rejected the motion out of hand. 38 Gómez's account of these proceedings does not square with the record. The court did not effectively ignore[ ] Gómez's motion to proceed pro se. To the contrary, the court scheduled a hearing on the motion for October 15, 2001, two weeks after it had been filed. The hearing had to be rescheduled, however, after the United States marshals informed the court that Gómez was out of control, exhibiting violent behavior and expressing ill will toward his mother and his lawyer. Faced with this information, together with the fact that McGiverin was the fifth attorney that Gómez fired or sought to have removed, the court concluded that it had no other alternative but to order [Gómez's] psychiatric evaluation immediately. Such an evaluation was entirely appropriate under the circumstances, see Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (noting that a court must determine that a defendant seeking to waive counsel is competent), and Gómez does not contend otherwise. 39 The sealed psychiatric examination was filed with the court on February 1, 2002. On February 15, 2002, the court issued a sealed order finding the defendant competent to stand trial. The court subsequently granted a motion by Gómez to discuss his legal representation, scheduling a hearing for April 12, 2002. At the April 12 hearing, the court expressed concern about Gómez's ability to represent himself effectively, noting that he had fill[ed] this record with totally incoherent motions, which are contradictory and taken totally out of context. Nevertheless, the court granted Gómez's motion to proceed pro se, subject to a requirement that he have standby counsel. 9 40 A court may appoint standby counsel even over the defendant's objections. See United States v. Kneeland, 148 F.3d 6, 13 (1st Cir.1998) (noting that a trial court may appoint standby counsel against a defendant's wishes). Thus, the requirement that McGiverin act as standby counsel in this case was not inconsistent with Gómez's pro se status. Cf. United States v. Walsh, 742 F.2d 1006, 1007 (6th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (holding that standby counsel did not eviscerate the defendant's right to self-representation where the defendant was required to submit his motions to advisory counsel for review). Indeed, Gómez represented himself at a bail hearing within days of the court granting his motion for self-representation. Although McGiverin also participated in the bail hearing by delivering a final argument, he did so only in response to an explicit request by Gómez. 10 41 In short, Gómez's claims that the court rejected his October 2, 2001 motion for self-representation out of hand and that [a]t no time did the [district court] allow [him] to represent himself are flatly incorrect. The court did not err in handling the motion to proceed pro se. 2. May 22, 2003 screening order 42 Gómez next faults the court's handling of his motion to have his counsel — this time, his sixth attorney, Linda George — withdraw and to proceed pro se. Emphasizing that Gómez's previous pro se motions had been incomprehensible, the court ruled on May 22, 2003 that Gómez could represent himself only if George filtered and approved his motions before they were filed. On appeal, Gómez asserts that this ruling violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. We disagree. 43 Gómez first contends that the court's May 22 order denied his request to proceed pro se and therefore violated his Sixth Amendment right of self—representation. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525. The record does not support this claim. The court did not deny Gómez's request to proceed pro se. Rather, as we have described, it granted the request but imposed one limitation on Gómez's self-representation—namely, a requirement that George, as standby counsel, screen Gómez's motions. Gómez was permitted to represent himself in other areas, including at jury selection. As the court explained during a hearing on August 27, 2003, the May 22 order left Gómez free to speak to the court, just not to file motions on your own. We therefore reject Gómez's claim that the court denied his request to represent himself out of hand. 44 Perhaps anticipating this result, Gómez also asserts that George's unwelcome participation as standby counsel — i.e., her screening of the motions — so interfered with his right of self-representation as to effectively render[ ] his right to self-representation meaningless. Armant v. Marquez, 772 F.2d 552, 558 (9th Cir.1985). We consider this claim under the standards set forth in McKaskle v. Wiggins, which dealt with the role that standby counsel, present at trial over the defendant's objections, may play without eviscerating the Faretta right of self-representation. The McKaskle Court identified two criteria as being central to its analysis: 45 First, the pro se defendant is entitled to preserve actual control over the case he chooses to present to the jury. . . . If standby counsel's participation over the defendant's objection effectively allows counsel to make or substantially interfere with any significant tactical decisions . . . or to speak instead of the defendant on any matter of importance, the Faretta right is eroded. 46 Second, participation by standby counsel without the defendant's consent should not be allowed to destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself. 47 465 U.S. at 178, 104 S.Ct. 944. 48 Gómez first asserts that as a result of the court's screening order, he was unable to submit motions that counsel did not approve of. Because this contention pertains solely to George's participation in Gómez's motions practice, which occurred outside the presence of the jury, only the first prong of the McKaskle analysis is relevant to our inquiry. See id. at 179. (Participation by standby counsel outside the presence of the jury engages only the first of these two limitations.). Gómez has not demonstrated that his Faretta right was eroded according to this standard. 49 Although it is true that he could not submit a motion without George's approval, Gómez has not identified on appeal any motions that George prevented him from filing. Indeed, the record includes a number of pro se motions that were drafted by Gómez and filed by George after the court's May 22 order. Moreover, George's ability to block Gómez from filing motions that were irrelevant or totally out of bounds cannot be said to constitute either interference with a significant tactical decision or a preemption of Gómez's ability to speak on a matter of importance. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178, 104 S.Ct. 944. Rather, the court designated George as standby counsel, and defined her role, to ensure the defendant's compliance with basic rules of courtroom protocol and procedure, a practice that does not infringe on a pro se defendant's Faretta rights. Id. at 183. 50 Basic rules of courtroom protocol and procedure impose an obligation, both on counsel and on individuals acting as their own counsel, to comply with court rules and not file frivolous motions. Federal courts possess discretionary powers to regulate the conduct of abusive litigants. Cok v. Family Court of Rhode Island, 985 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir.1993). This power includes the ability to enjoin a party — even a pro se party — from filing frivolous and vexatious motions. Sires v. Fair, No. 96-1454, 1997 WL 51408 (1st Cir. Feb.10, 1997) (unpublished); Castro v. United States, 775 F.2d 399, 408 (1st Cir.1985) (abrogated on other grounds by Stevens v. Dep't of the Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 1562, 114 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991)). This court reviews such orders for abuse of discretion. Castro, 775 F.2d at 408. In fact, in a parallel situation, we upheld a district court order which enjoined a pro se litigant from filing any motions, pleadings or papers . . . without prior leave of the Court, Hart v. United States, No. 92-1801, 1994 WL 89442, at  (1st Cir. Mar.22, 1994), where the defendant had deluged the court with at least sixty-six different motions, most of them pro se.  Id. (quoting United States v. Hart, 933 F.2d 80, 81-82 (1st Cir.1991)). 51 Gómez nevertheless maintains that George's screening role was inconsistent with his right of self-representation. His argument relies on the Court's statement in McKaskle that 52 Faretta rights [to self-representation] are adequately vindicated in proceedings outside the presence of the jury if the pro se defendant is allowed to address the court freely on his own behalf and if disagreements between counsel and the pro se defendant are resolved in the defendant's favor whenever the matter is one that would normally be left to the discretion of counsel. 53 McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 179, 104 S.Ct. 944. Gómez asserts that as long as George was screening his motions, he was unable to address the court freely and that by allowing George, rather than Gómez, to decide which motions to file, the court failed to resolve disagreements in favor of the defendant, all in contravention of McKaskle. 54 The statement from McKaskle on which Gómez relies cannot be read in isolation. That statement was a reiteration of the first prong of the test set forth earlier in the opinion, namely the requirement that standby counsel's unwelcome participation not substantially interfere with any significant tactical decisions or result in counsel speak[ing] instead of the defendant on any matter of importance. Id. at 178, 104 S.Ct. 944 (emphasis omitted). This formulation informs the meaning of the reiteration relied upon by Gómez. Moreover, that reiteration must also be read in conjunction with the Court's subsequent statement that there is no significant interference with the defendant's actual control over the presentation of his defense, and thus no infringement of his Faretta rights, when `counsel merely helps to ensure the defendant's compliance with basic rules of courtroom protocol and procedure.' McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183, 104 S.Ct. 944. The McKaskle Court also emphasized that [t]he trial judge may be required to make numerous rulings reconciling the participation of standby counsel with a pro se defendant's objection to that participation; nothing in the nature of the Faretta right suggests that the usual deference to `judgment calls' on these issues by the trial judge should not obtain here as elsewhere. Id. at 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944. 55 Taken together, these explanations of permissible participation by standby counsel indicate that the pro se defendant's right to address the court freely is not absolute. Rather, the court may use standby counsel to facilitate the orderly functioning of the proceedings so long as the defendant retains control over significant tactical decisions and on any matter of importance. George's screening role was consistent with that standard. In light of Gómez's long history in this case of filing irrelevant and frivolous motions, George's responsibility for preventing the filing of such motions did not deprive Gómez of control over his defense. Cf. United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 627 (10th Cir.1990) (noting that an attorney may be dismissed for pursuing frivolous theories); United States v. Masat, 896 F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir.1990) (same); Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.1 (2003) (noting that [a] lawyer shall not . . . assert. . . an issue . . . unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous). 56 Gómez also asserts that George's unwelcome standby participation violated the limits set forth in McKaskle because it left him unable to call witnesses who would have corroborated a certain aspect of his testimony. Gómez's argument appears to rely on the following logic: the court's May 22 order regarding George's screening role led him to believe that he would not be permitted to proceed pro se at trial; Gómez therefore arrived at trial unprepared to represent himself; although the trial judge agreed to let Gómez proceed pro se, Gómez's lack of preparation forced him to ask George to take over his representation before his opening statement; 11 this relinquishment of his pro se status meant that George, rather than Gómez, chose which witnesses to present. In short, Gómez contends that, but for George's screening role, he would have represented himself at trial and called witnesses that George chose not to call. 57 It is true that the judge presiding over Gómez's second trial initially was confused as to whether the court's May 22 order restricted Gómez's pro se status only with regard to motions, or with regard to his self-representation more generally. Given Gómez's claim on appeal that he was unprepared because he did not believe he would be allowed to represent himself, however, it is Gómez's understanding of the pre-trial record, rather than the trial judge's understanding, that is relevant. As we have already observed, Gómez told the trial judge that he was supposed to represent himself and that the previous district court judge had decided for me to be represented by myself with Linda George as helping counsel. I was permitted to address the court. These statements indicate that Gómez thought that he had been granted pro se status prior to the trial, undermining his claim that he interpreted the court's May 22 screening order to preclude him from representing himself at trial. Gómez's lack of preparation at the outset of the second trial was his own fault. His decision to relinquish his pro se status as a result of that lack of preparation was entirely voluntary. The claim that George's screening role prevented Gómez from representing himself at trial and calling particular witnesses is therefore without merit. 12