Opinion ID: 2512667
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdictional Preemption

Text: (2) Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: [A]ny person who is under the age of 18 years when he or she violates any law of this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of this state defining crime . . . is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court. (Italics added.) Thus, as a matter of state law, the Legislature has granted juvenile courts the authority to declare juveniles wards of the court on the basis of acts that violate state or federal criminal law. Jose C. contends this jurisdictional grant is necessary but not sufficient; that under the supremacy clause (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2), state court jurisdiction depends as well on whether Congress has withdrawn from state courts the power to exercise jurisdiction. As a constitutional matter, it has long been settled that Congress has the power to constrict state court jurisdiction, at least with respect to federal matters. ( Howlett v. Rose (1990) 496 U.S. 356, 368, fn. 15 [110 L.Ed.2d 332, 110 S.Ct. 2430]; Claflin v. Houseman, Assignee (1876) 93 U.S. 130, 137 [23 L.Ed. 833]; The Moses Taylor (1866) 71 U.S. 411, 429-430 [18 L.Ed. 397]; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee (1816) 14 U.S. 304, 337 [4 L.Ed. 97].) Relying on title 18 United States Code section 3231 (hereafter section 3231), Jose C. argues that Congress has done so here and thereby expressly preempted the instant proceeding. The first sentence of section 3231 provides: The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States. This portion of the statute establishes two general principles: first, federal district courts may exercise jurisdiction over federal criminal offenses, and second, state courts may not do so. At a minimum, therefore, section 3231 displaces state court jurisdiction over the direct prosecution, conviction, and imposition of federal criminal punishment for violations of federal criminal statutes. Jose C. contends section 3231 goes further and precludes state courts from interpreting and adjudicating in any proceeding whether a federal criminal statute has been violated. In contesting whether the language of the statute bars adjudication of federal criminal conduct in the context of a state wardship petition, the People and Jose C. debate at length whether a state wardship petition gives rise to a civil or criminal proceeding. Wardship proceedings have at different times, and for different purposes, been characterized as de facto criminal (e.g., In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 27-31, 36-37 [18 L.Ed.2d 527, 87 S.Ct. 1428]; In re Kevin S. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 97, 108-109 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 178]; In re Gregory K. (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 164, 168 & fn. 2 [165 Cal.Rptr. 35]) and as genuinely civil (e.g., In re Derrick B. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 535, 540 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 13, 139 P.3d 485]; People v. Sanchez (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 216, 218 [216 Cal.Rptr. 21]; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 203). In truth, they are hybrid proceedings, and the question whether a wardship proceeding is de facto criminal or civil has no single answer; rather, it depends on the purpose for which the question is asked. Here, faced with a preemption question, we conclude the precise characterization is immaterial because, whether characterized as civil or criminal, wardship proceedings that determine whether a federal criminal statute has been violated are not preempted by section 3231.
Taking first the view that wardship proceedings are properly characterized as civil, we follow the United States Supreme Court's lead in Tafflin v. Levitt (1990) 493 U.S. 455 [107 L.Ed.2d 887, 110 S.Ct. 792] and find no preemption. In Tafflin, the Supreme Court considered whether state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over civil violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968). Civil RICO is an unusual statute, in that a civil RICO claim may depend upon proof that one of an enumerated list of federal criminal laws has been violated. ( Id., §§ 1961(1), 1962, 1964(c); Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 909 [221 Cal.Rptr. 575, 710 P.2d 375].) Thus, to adjudicate whether a civil RICO claim has been established, a court or jury may need to determine whether a federal criminal violation has occurred. The Tafflin plaintiffs, arguing for exclusive federal court jurisdiction over such claims, contended permitting a state court to make this predicate determination would violate section 3231's grant of exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction and thus be incompatible with federal interests. The United States Supreme Court found no incompatibility. [C]oncurrent jurisdiction over [18 U.S.C.] § 1964(c) suits, it explained, is clearly not incompatible with § 3231 itself, for civil RICO claims are not `offenses against the laws of the United States,' § 3231, and do not result in the imposition of criminal sanctionsuniform or otherwise. ( Tafflin v. Levitt, supra, 493 U.S. at p. 464.) It went on to conclude that state courts interpreting and applying federal criminal law posed no threat to federal interests, as state courts would be bound by federal precedent and their interpretations would be subject to direct review in the United States Supreme Court. ( Id. at pp. 465-466; see also id. at p. 468 (conc. opn. of White, J.) [opining that federal misapplication of state law under RICO posed greater risk than the reverse].) The Tafflin court asserted its full faith in the ability of state courts to handle the complexities of civil RICO actions ( Tafflin, at p. 465) and declined to denigrate the respect accorded coequal sovereigns by concluding jurisdiction must be withheld ( id. at p. 466). (3) In short, though a civil proceeding such as civil RICO may require adjudication of whether a federal criminal law has been violated, that determination does not of itself convert the civil proceeding into an offense[] subject to the exclusive jurisdictional bar of section 3231. Rather, Tafflin makes clear, a proceeding involves adjudication of an offense only if, at a minimum, it also involves the imposition of criminal sanctions. ( Tafflin v. Levitt, supra, 493 U.S. at p. 464.) Assuming, as we do at present, that a state wardship proceeding involves only civil sanctions and is, like civil RICO, primarily remedial rather than punitive ( Tafflin, at p. 464; see In re Charles C. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 952, 955 [284 Cal.Rptr. 4]), the identical reasoning applied here demonstrates that adjudication of federal criminal violations in the course of a state wardship proceeding does not convert those proceedings into offenses and render jurisdiction preempted by section 3231. [1]
We now consider the contrary characterization, that for purposes of preemption under title 18 United States Code section 3231, a state wardship proceeding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 is properly viewed as fundamentally criminal. This characterization changes our reasoning, but not our conclusion that section 3231 does not preempt state wardship proceedings. (4) First, it has always been understood that the several states are independent sovereigns possessing inherent police power to criminally punish conduct inimical to the public welfare, even when that same conduct is also prohibited under federal law. [2] The Constitution leaves in the possession of each State `certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power.' ( Heath v. Alabama (1985) 474 U.S. 82, 93 [88 L.Ed.2d 387, 106 S.Ct. 433], quoting Hamilton, The Federalist No. 9 (Cooke ed. 1961) p. 55.) Foremost among the prerogatives of sovereignty is the power to create and enforce a criminal code. ( Heath, at p. 93.) This understanding is at the root of the dual sovereignty exception to the United States Constitution's double jeopardy clause, which recognizes that because individual states and the United States are two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory, each may punish the same act without offending double jeopardy principles. ( United States v. Lanza (1922) 260 U.S. 377, 382 [67 L.Ed. 314, 43 S.Ct. 141].) [3] Thus, Congress may pass a law barring a particular act and imposing a specific punishment, and a state Legislature may pass a state law barring the same act and imposing a different specific punishment, as well as vesting jurisdiction over violations of the state law in its state courts, without encroaching upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts to adjudicate violations of the federal law and impose the federal punishment. [4] (5) Section 3231 embraces these settled principles. It provides in its second sentence: Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the laws thereof. (Italics added.) Thus, while the section grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over the prosecution of federal offenses, it does not do so over the punishment of acts criminalized by federal law; to the extent state law also establishes sanctions for those acts, state courts retain jurisdiction under their own state laws to hear cases and impose punishment. (See In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 764 [264 P.2d 513].) [5] Second, whether a state Legislature exercises its sovereign power to impose independent state criminal punishment for an act by writing its own statute prohibiting it, or by writing a statute incorporating an existing federal criminal prohibition, is immaterial. The distinction is a purely formal one. A state or territory that elects to incorporate portions of federal criminal law into its own criminal code may establish state jurisdiction to try violations as state crimes without offending section 3231. ( U.S. v. Lee (9th Cir. 2006) 472 F.3d 638, 642-643; cf. People v. Tilehkooh (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1446 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 226] [acknowledging that while a state cannot directly enforce federal criminal law, it can reach conduct subject to the federal criminal law by incorporating the conduct into the state law].) [6] (6) This is, in essence, what Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 does. It incorporates by reference federal criminal law, rendering it a basis for the imposition of independent state sanctions, and grants state courts authority to adjudicate such matters. It recognizes the independent state interest in rehabilitating juveniles within this state who are unable to conform their conduct to the requirements of the lawwhether that law be local ordinance, state statute, or federal enactment. [7] Section 3231 does not deprive state courts of jurisdiction granted under their own state laws to impose independent state sanctions. Jose C. objects that under this interpretation of section 3231, states may augment federal criminal statutes in any way they please, adding on various civil or criminal piggyback remedies or sanctions that might conflict with federal dictates. But whether Congress has preempted state court jurisdiction is not to be confused with whether it has preempted state legislative action. The former involves only the question whether a state court has the power to entertain a particular cause; the latter involves the further question whether a state may enact substantive legislation governing the subject matter of the particular cause. (See Houston v. Moore, supra, 18 U.S. at pp. 24-25 [drawing the identical distinction in the course of concluding that state regulation, but not state jurisdiction, was preempted].) Section 3231, as interpreted in Tafflin v. Levitt, supra, 493 U.S. 455, does not preempt jurisdiction over a proceeding that entails adjudication of the elements of an underlying federal criminal statute. Whether it preempts the substantive state enactment imposing an additional civil (or criminal) remedyhere, the authorization of state juvenile sanctions upon a finding a federal crime has been committedis a discrete question we deal with separately below. (See pt. II.B., post. ) Jose C. also relies on two sister-state decisions that have addressed this issue and concluded section 3231 does in fact preempt state court jurisdiction. In State v. Tidwell (1982) 32 Wn.App. 971 [651 P.2d 228], a juvenile was convicted in state juvenile court of violating title 18 United States Code section 241, a federal civil rights statute, after burning a cross on an African-American family's lawn. The Washington Court of Appeals concluded the state court lacked jurisdiction, even in a juvenile proceeding, to determine whether someone had violated federal law. It reasoned that because section 3231 granted federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over federal offenses, it preempted the Washington statute granting state juvenile courts jurisdiction over violations of federal law. Violations of title 18 United States Code section 241 were offenses only against the federal sovereign and could not be punished by the state. Instead, the state court could consider only a state criminal trespass charge. ( Tidwell, at pp. 230-232.) In Matter of Welfare of J.J.T. (Minn.Ct.App. 1997) 559 N.W.2d 714, 715-716, the Minnesota Court of Appeals followed Tidwell and without any independent reasoning concluded a state court could not declare a juvenile a delinquent based on a petition alleging federal criminal violations. State v. Tidwell, supra, 651 P.2d 228, predates Tafflin v. Levitt 's determination that state courts are competent to decide whether a federal criminal law has been violated, section 3231 notwithstanding, if the proceeding is not itself a criminal prosecution. ( Tafflin v. Levitt, supra, 493 U.S. at pp. 464-466.) It also fails to consider whether the Washington Legislature had made, or could make, offenses against federal sovereignty into matters of independent state concern by incorporating federal law into its state juvenile delinquency scheme. Accordingly, we do not find it persuasive. (7) In sum, whether characterized as civil or criminal, wardship proceedings that entail adjudication of whether a federal criminal statute has been violated are not expressly preempted by section 3231. [8]