Opinion ID: 853948
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proper Procedure

Text: Regester makes three arguments that the Board's orders do not comply with proper procedure: (1) the executive director issued orders rather than simply executing them at the request of the Board; (2) the Board's order does not rely upon specific findings of fact; and (3) the reviewing court's order does not rely on specific findings of fact. Regester contends that the executive director of the Health Professions Bureau acted outside the scope of her duties by issuing all the orders in the course of the agency proceeding, including the final order suspending Regester's license. While an executive director may execute orders on behalf of the Board when requested to do so, Ind.Code Ann. § 25-1-5-5(g) (West Supp. 1998) (emphasis added), Regester argues that the executive director here issued orders. We disagree. On their face, the orders indicate that the executive director was acting under the direction of the Board. (See R. at 77, 80, 91, 130 (orders contain an indication that they were issued by the Indiana State Board of Nursing)); R. at 78, 81, 93, 130 (orders signed INDIANA STATE BOARD OF NURSING BY: Laura Langford). As such, the Board, not the executive director, disciplined Regester. The orders were properly issued. Regester also challenges the Board's final order suspending her license, claiming that the findings that accompany the order are not specific enough to satisfy the procedural requirements of Indiana Code section 4-21.5-3-27(b). She argues that the findings fail to inform the parties of the evidentiary bases upon which the ultimate findings rest, and to allow for meaningful review by the courts. (Appellant's Br. at 12.) Again, we disagree. Indiana Code section 4-21.5-3-27(b) states: The order must include, separately stated, findings of fact for all aspects of the order.... Findings of ultimate fact must be accompanied by a concise statement of the underlying basic facts of record to support the findings. While this Court has never specified a particular method for determining the adequacy of findings under this section, we find merit in the Court of Appeals' observation that the findings must inform the parties of the evidentiary bases upon which the ultimate findings rest and must allow for meaningful judicial review. Glaser v. Indiana State Dep't of Public Welfare, 512 N.E.2d 1128, 1133 (Ind.Ct.App.1987). In this case, the Board made certain particular findings of fact (The prescriptions that Regester wrote for herself were for controlled substances that she admitted abusing, R. at 127-28), several broader findings (Regester did not have authorization for these prescriptions, R. at 127-28), and the ultimate finding (that Regester should be suspended, R. at 130). These were adequate. Finally, Regester challenges the reviewing court's order denying judicial review on the basis that the court failed in [its] statutory obligation to provide specific findings of fact. (Appellant's Br. at 13.) The judge's order stated: It is apparent from the Court's review of the transcript that the decision made by the Indiana State Board of Nursing was what may be characterized as a `close call.' The Board certainly did not act precipitously and, as evidenced by the record, gave considered judgment to its decision. The hearing was fair. Due process was observed. But in the final analysis this Court concludes that the Board had jurisdiction to make its decision, that all procedural requirements were adhered to, and that the resulting decision was in all regards legally entered. (R. at 60-61.) The Indiana Code gives courts slightly differing instructions when it comes to findings. On the one hand, the Code says that judicial review is largely confined to the agency record and that the court may not try the cause de novo or substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Ind.Code Ann. § 4-21.5-5-11 (West 1991). This seems consistent with the directive that relief may be granted only under fairly serious circumstances, such as arbitrary and capricious action or the absence of substantial evidence. Ind.Code Ann. § 4-21.5-5-14(d) (West 1991). Given these constraints, the command that a court makes findings of fact on every material issue, Ind.Code Ann. § 4-21.5-5-14(c) (West 1991), cannot be understood to require the same sort of findings of fact and conclusions of law that a trial court might enter to decide the merits of a matter on the civil plenary docket. Rather, judicial review findings must be adequate to demonstrate that the court has undertaken to assess the claims for judicial relief that are before it. The trial court's findings in this case are unusually brief, but they satisfy us, in light of the underlying record, that the court considered and ruled on the chief questions before it.