Opinion ID: 6536626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Robin's Challenge To The 2017 Protective Order Is Moot.

Text: Robin also challenges the 2017 long-term protective order, asking that we reverse it. But because the superior court has already dissolved that order, the claim is moot. A claim is moot if it is no longer a present, live controversy, and the party bringing the action would not be entitled to relief, even if it prevails. 12 We have noted that [i]n most cases, mootness is found because the party raising an appeal cannot be given the remedy it seeks even if [the court agrees] with its legal position. 13 Mootness concerns are particularly acute in cases seeking a declaratory judgment, as we may only grant declaratory relief where the controversy is definite and concrete, ... a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief ... as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 14 Typically, we will refrain from deciding questions where events have rendered the legal issue moot. 15 But we may entertain moot claims under  several exceptions, including the public interest exception and the collateral consequences doctrine. 16 In this case, because the superior court already dissolved the 2017 protective order, there is no effective relief we can grant. Robin's challenge is therefore moot unless one of these exceptions applies.
Robin argues that we should hear her challenge to the dissolved 2017 protective order under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. When deciding whether to apply this exception, we consider three factors: (1) whether the disputed issues are capable of repetition, (2) whether the mootness doctrine, if applied, may cause review of the issues to be repeatedly circumvented, and (3) whether the issues presented are so important to the public interest as to justify overriding the mootness doctrine. 17 Protective orders are common remedies, but we have already addressed the legal merit of Robin's particular challenge: whether a court may issue a second longterm protective order based solely on conduct that provided the basis for an earlier order. The superior court properly relied on our decision in Whalen v. Whalen 18 when it dissolved the 2017 order. The legislature has now clarified the law we addressed in Whalen , and orders such as the 2017 order will be lawful as of the amendments' effective date. 19 We see little public interest in having us again address an issue that is now of largely historical concern. We conclude that the public interest exception does not apply.
Robin also argues that her appeal is not moot because the adverse effects ... of the wrongfully issued but now dissolved long[-]term protective order have not magically disappeared. She asserts that her reputation is adversely affected by the existing court record and that she has a legitimate interest in clearing her name .... One way to do this is to obtain a definitive statement from this court that the protective order was wrongfully issued against her. As explained above, courts generally avoid giving definitive statements about parties' rights and responsibilities in the absence of a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. 20 The superior court granted Robin both specific relief and a definitive statement ... that the protective order was wrongfully issued against her, and no one has appealed from that order, which is final. We further construe Robin's argument, however, as a request that we apply the collateral consequences doctrine, which allows us to hear an otherwise moot appeal if the judgment carries indirect consequences such as limiting employment opportunities, creating social stigma, or affecting other legal proceedings. 21 Robin claims that she experiences increased social stigma because of the two protective orders in the public record, and she asks us - as she asked the superior court - to expunge her record. The superior court denied the request, finding that Alaska Rule of Administration 40(a)(9) applies only to an ex parte petition, and that because the longterm protective order at issue was not granted ex parte, the remedy of expungement was unavailable. Rule 40 has since been amended, 22 but it still applies only  in narrow circumstances, and its express language does not authorize the expungement of the record of this case. 23 Hearing this moot appeal on the merits will therefore not resolve Robin's reputational concerns to the extent they are based on public access to a court record of the dissolved order. We recognize, however, that the language of Rule 40(a)(9) leaves a narrow class of litigants, including Robin, in an anomalous position. Domestic violence protective order cases that are dismissed for insufficiency of evidence are excluded from the public version of the court system's case index, but the rule does not give the same level of confidentiality to domestic violence protective order cases in which an order is issued and then dissolved as unlawfully granted. We refer this matter to the Court Rules Attorney for consideration whether the rule should be amended to provide for the limited class of individuals who were subject to orders unlawfully issued before Whalen . Future amendment of the rule may provide Robin a remedy; we express no view on whether it should or will.