Opinion ID: 1107764
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sanchez-Velasco Affidavit

Text: The trial court denied the Sanchez-Velasco claim without an evidentiary hearing because it rests entirely on an affidavit containing inadmissible hearsay. In the affidavit, Sanchez-Velasco stated that Omer and Drew argued about money several days before the killing and that Omer stated immediately after the murder that he had fucked up. The affidavit further reflects that Sanchez-Velasco spent the entire day of the murder playing cards with Baez and that neither Williamson nor Omer approached Baez and asked him for a knife. The affidavit also contains Baez's statements that prison officials offered and gave him rewards in exchange for testifying against Williamson and told him what to say in his testimony. In the order denying relief, the trial court stated that it authorized a deposition to perpetuate Sanchez-Velasco's testimony before he was executed on October 2, 2002, but Sanchez-Velasco declined to testify. The court concluded that [a]lleged newly discovered evidence that would not be admissible at trial is not `evidence' and cannot `be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.' Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(f)(5)(B) permits denial of a successive motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing [i]f the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief. As noted above, a trial court ruling on a newly discovered evidence claim must consider all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible. Jones, 709 So.2d at 521. The Sanchez-Velasco affidavit would not be admissible during a retrial because it does not meet any of the criteria for admission of a prior statement by an unavailable witness under section 90.804, Florida Statutes (2006). In Randolph v. State, 853 So.2d 1051 (Fla.2003), this Court affirmed the exclusion from a postconviction evidentiary hearing of an affidavit by a witness who died before the hearing. In concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we noted that the affidavit fell outside the four hearsay exceptions for a statement by an unavailable declarant: (1) former testimony; (2) statement under belief of impending death; (3) statement against interest; and (4) statement of family or personal history. Id. at 1062; see also Lightbourne v. State, 644 So.2d 54, 56-57 (Fla.1994) (concluding that affidavits and letter from inmates unavailable to testify in postconviction hearing constituted inadmissible hearsay). Likewise, the contents of the Sanchez-Velasco affidavit are inadmissible hearsay by an unavailable declarant. Williamson asserts that Baez's statement to Sanchez-Velasco that neither Williamson nor Omer approached Baez and asked for a knife on the day of the killing, that he was offered inducements to testify, and that he was told what to say during his testimony could all be used to impeach Baez in a retrial. The trial court did not address the use of the affidavit for impeachment, however, and Williamson does not explain how it could be used to impeach Baez under the rules of evidence. In theory, the Sanchez-Velasco affidavit could be introduced under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2006), to impeach Baez through prior inconsistent statements (assuming he would deny that he was given money and a transfer in exchange for testifying and told what to say) and to show his bias in favor of the State. [3] See Breedlove v. State, 413 So.2d 1, 6 (Fla.1982) (Merely because a statement is not admissible for one purpose does not mean it is inadmissible for another purpose.); Dias v. State, 812 So.2d 487, 495 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (A statement inadmissible as hearsay can still be admissible for another reason, such as for impeachment purposes.). However, even assuming the admissibility for impeachment purposes of the hearsay (by Sanchez-Velasco) and double hearsay (by Omer and Baez via Sanchez-Velasco) contained in the affidavit, its effect would have been negligible given Sanchez-Velasco's refusal to testify, the substantial impeachment of Baez at trial through prior inconsistent statements, and the other evidence against Williamson. Finally, the argument between Omer and Drew about money overheard by Sanchez-Velasco and Omer's statement after the killing that he had fucked up and had no money to pay Sanchez-Velasco would not have impeached Omer's trial testimony. The evidence at trial already reflected that the killing was prompted by a money dispute between Omer and Drew. Omer admitted at trial that he had decided not to pay Drew a $15 debt. Williamson suggested killing Drew because he thought Drew would stab Omer if Omer confronted Drew without a weapon. Therefore, the information in the Sanchez-Velasco affidavit would have been merely cumulative on the financial motive for the killing. In sum, the Sanchez-Velasco affidavit would be inadmissible during a retrial as substantive evidence, would have little effect on Williamson's premeditation if admitted to impeach Baez, and would have been cumulative if admitted to impeach Omer. Thus, the motion, files, and record conclusively show that the affidavit is not such that it would probably produce an acquittal or conviction of a lesser included offense on retrial.