Opinion ID: 1158185
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: References to Extrinsic Matters

Text: (25a) Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly referred to a number of matters outside the record. (i) First, he argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by urging the jury to make a statement, to do the right thing, and to restore confidence in the criminal justice system by returning a verdict of death. [20] Relying on People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, defendant claims that the statements improperly deflected the jurors' attention from the facts of the case to external considerations about the community-at-large. We have stated that [i]solated, brief references to retribution or community vengeance ..., although potentially inflammatory, do not constitute misconduct so long as such arguments do not form the principal basis for advocating the imposition of the death penalty. ( Id. at p. 771; see also People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453, 479-480 [276 Cal. Rptr. 356, 801 P.2d 1107].) The prosecutor's remarks here were not particularly inflammatory, nor did they constitute the principal basis of his argument in favor of the death penalty. Accordingly, any conceivable error was harmless. (ii) Defendant also claims the prosecutor improperly referred to two psychologists who did not testify at trial. In his testimony at the penalty retrial, defendant denied that he went to the ranch with the intent to rob, rape and murder the victims. He explained the inconsistent admissions in his taped confession by stating that at the time of the interrogation he wanted to seem as guilty as possible, that he wanted to die. The prosecutor scorned this explanation during closing argument, stating: Doesn't that sound like a psychiatrist or a psychologist could kind of say: Now, Jeff, isn't there some reason that you told them that? [¶] And you know, we've had a couple of guys lurking around in the background on this case, Dr. Rosenthal and Dr. Seligman. They were out talking to people, and then we never heard from them. [¶] And in this day and age in California, you know, where these guys are making a killing coming in charging the exorbitant fees testifying, it's kind of remarkable the only ... Defense counsel interposed an objection at that point which the trial court sustained, admonishing the jury that there was no evidence of anyone charging exorbitant fees. Shortly thereafter, however, the prosecutor returned to the subject, observing: There's nothing wrong with him [defendant]; what have you heard that's wrong with him? [¶] There has been no ... psychiatric or psychological testimony; even though people have been contacted from his family about that. Defense counsel's objection to this remark was overruled. Inasmuch as neither expert testified at trial, their names should not have been invoked by the prosecutor during closing argument. (26) However, prosecutorial comment upon a defendant's failure to introduce material evidence or to call logical witnesses is not improper. ( People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 34 [171 Cal. Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213]; People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 691 [224 Cal. Rptr. 705, 715 P.2d 665].) (25b) Thus, we do not find the prosecutor erred on the whole in observing that defendant had failed to adduce expert psychiatric testimony to support the claim that he was depressed and suicidal when he confessed to the crimes. (iii) Defendant next asserts that the prosecutor improperly belittled the testimony of defendant's family and referred to matters outside the record by making several comments to the effect that, There is not a death penalty case that goes on where members of the family won't come in. The trial court sustained defendant's objections and admonished the jury to disregard references to matters outside the record. We presume that the jury heeded the admonition and any error was cured. ( People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 29.) We discern no impropriety in the prosecutor's subsequent statement, It shouldn't be surprising that a man's family could come in and beg you for his life.... The statement was confined to defendant's own family, and was within the broad range of permissible comment on the evidence. ( People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 748 [280 Cal. Rptr. 440, 808 P.2d 1197].) (27) Defendant raises a similar complaint about the prosecutor's reference to the mother of Erin King. Before describing the crimes, the prosecutor told the jurors, I want you to realize one thing when I explain what I've proven. Erin's mother has never heard what happened to her daughter. This is going to be the first time she's heard what this man subjected her to. Although he now complains there was no record evidence of what the victim's mother knew of the crimes, defendant failed to object on this ground at trial. Accordingly, the issue is not cognizable on appeal. ( People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 335.) Nor did the prosecutor impermissibly refer to matters outside the record or exceed the bounds of permissible comment in asking the jury to think about what what was going through [the] mind of the victim, Erin King; did she think about Ruth, her mother, to whom she had just talked.... Did she think about her brother's undelivered birthday present? [¶] You know it was right there on the bed. As we explained in People v. Lewis, supra, 50 Cal.3d 262, rejecting a similar claim: To the extent that the argument was inviting the jurors to put themselves in the shoes of the victim, we have found such an appeal appropriate at the penalty phase because there `the jury decides a question the resolution of which turns not only on the facts, but on the jury's moral assessment of those facts as they reflect on whether defendant should be put to death.... In this process, one of the most significant considerations is the nature of the underlying crime. [Citation.] Hence assessment of the offense from the victim's viewpoint would appear germane to the task of sentencing. [Citations.] ( Id. at pp. 283-284.) Moreover, we do not read the prosecutor's argument, taken as a whole, as urging the jury to subordinate reason to emotion. ( Id. at p. 284.) There was no misconduct. (iv) Defendant next complains that the prosecutor referred to certain irrelevant aspects of his personal life which the trial court had earlier excluded, including the fact that he was in and out of juvenile custody, had been stabbed and hospitalized, had been ejected from a work-release program for drinking, and had violated parole. As noted earlier, the trial court excluded only the information relating to defendant's juvenile record. Moreover, all of the comments in question were sufficiently innocuous that a timely objection and request for admonition could have cured any possible harm. ( People v. Visciotti, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 83; People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 335.) (28) (v) At the end of his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that life without possibility of parole was insufficient punishment because defendant would always have a hope of release: As long as you are alive, there is hope. If you gave him life without parole, there'd always be hope in his mind[,] hope that there'd be a revolution and we free all the prisoners. Defense counsel objected and the prosecutor explained: I'm not suggesting that the ... possibility of life without parole means he might get out. [¶] I'm talking about what impact it will have on him in his mind. [¶] So any suggestion like the judge or [defense counsel] thought I was doing, that I'm trying to tell you that he might get out, that's not my point. The trial court responded, All right, and the prosecutor repeated his plea to deny defendant any hope that there will be a revolution and that all the prisoners will be freed, hope that this would all be a bad dream. Defendant contends the prosecutor's remarks introduced irrelevant and prejudicial factors into the jury's consideration by referring to the possibility that defendant could be released on parole if he were not sentenced to death. (See People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136 [207 Cal. Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430].) Although in some respects the prosecutor's remarks are similar to those which we recently held to be improper in People v. Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th 959, there are differences here which make them even more clearly harmless than in Hill. There, the prosecutor referred to the defendant's hopes of a presidential pardon, as well as such unlikely scenarios as earthquakes, social revolutions, wars and fantastical movie plots. ( Id. at p. 1009.) A defense objection was overruled, and the impression that defendant might somehow be released was not immediately dispelled. Here, in response to a defense objection the prosecutor immediately made clear that he was not suggesting that the ... possibility of life without parole means he might get out. Furthermore, as in People v. Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at page 1011, any lingering uncertainty was later dispelled by the trial court's specific instruction to assume that life without possibility of parole means that `the Defendant will be imprisoned for the rest of his life.... For you to conclude otherwise would be for you to rely on conjecture and speculation, and that would be a violation of your oath as trial jurors.' Thus, we discern no possibility that the prosecutor's remarks affected the verdict.