Opinion ID: 2682632
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Felony Classifications

Text: ¶48 Bokenyi argues that the prosecutor materially and substantially breached the plea agreement when, after reciting the maximum penalties applicable to Bokenyi's convictions, he stated, I think the felony classifications obviously indicate the extreme seriousness of these offenses that night. But to be honest, I don't think they really do them justice in terms of how serious this was. ¶49 As an initial matter, we note that a discussion of the seriousness of the defendant's conduct, even in harsh terms, is entirely appropriate. Liukonen, 276 Wis. 2d 64, ¶10 (citing Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d at 319-20, 325). In fact, we have stated that probation is presumed to be the appropriate disposition of a given case unless the circuit court makes findings indicating that confinement is necessary to protect the public, the offender needs correctional treatment available only in confinement, or [probation] would unduly depreciate the 17 No. 2012AP2557-CR seriousness of the offense. Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶44 (citing Bastian v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 240, 248-49 n.1, 194 N.W.2d 687 (1972)). Thus, because the State needed to overcome the presumption of probation in arguing for a sentence at the high end range of the PSI, the State was compelled to address why a prison term was warranted. ¶50 The prosecutor in the case at issue explicitly tied his sentencing argument to the sentencing factors discussed in Gallion. He also explicitly stated that his discussion of the maximum penalties and felony classifications went to the seriousness or gravity of Bokenyi's offenses. ¶51 In attempting to overcome the presumption in favor of probation, the maximum penalties associated with a particular crime are clearly relevant information. The State is therefore free to discuss them, so long as that discussion does not undermine the plea agreement. See Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d at 324 (citation omitted) (noting that [a] plea agreement which does not allow the sentencing court to be apprised of relevant information is void as against public policy). ¶52 Bokenyi concedes that the prosecutor was free to recite the maximum penalties and further concedes that he was permitted to discuss the seriousness of Bokenyi's offenses. In coupling his recitation of the maximum penalties with his comment regarding the classifications, however, Bokenyi contends that the prosecutor covertly suggested that the agreed upon sentence was insufficient given Bokenyi's conduct. In making this argument, Bokenyi asserts that Wisconsin's felony 18 No. 2012AP2557-CR classification system exists only to specify the maximum penalties for a given offense, and so a reference to the classification of a crime is essentially the same as a reference to the maximum penalty applicable to that crime. We disagree. ¶53 Bokenyi is correct that the classification system exists to ensure the imposition of more serious penalties for more serious crimes. See Wis. Stat. § 939.50(2). The structure of the classification system, however, reflects the gravity of the crimes. As the Legislative Council notes following § 939.50 state: [T]he Act classifies the criminal offenses based on the degree of actual or potential harm involved in their commission. Legislative Council Note, 1977, Wis. Stat. § 939.50. The fact that more serious crimes generally warrant more serious penalties is without question. It is also generally understood that within that structure there is room for a court to exercise its discretion. See Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶17. In fact, it is incumbent upon a court to create a record detailing the reasons for selecting the particular sentence imposed and stating why it is appropriate. Id., ¶24. Finally, the State did not recommend a sentence anywhere close to the maximum allowable penalties. ¶54 In light of these considerations, we conclude that the prosecutor's comment regarding the felony classification system referred to the seriousness of Bokenyi's conduct in this particular case as it related to the crimes charged and overcoming the presumption of probation. Thus, the prosecutor did not imply that the court should disregard the State's 19 No. 2012AP2557-CR sentencing recommendation and instead impose a sentence at or near the maximum allowable for Bokenyi's offense. ¶55 In sum, the prosecutor discussed the seriousness of Bokenyi's offenses as a proper factor for the court to consider at sentencing. See Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶44. The felony classification discussion was one way to communicate the State's position regarding the seriousness of the offenses. This prosecutor did not breach the plea agreement, either explicitly or implicitly, by emphasizing the seriousness of the crimes committed by the defendant. See Liukonen, 276 Wis. 2d 64, ¶10. The plea agreement called for the prosecutor to recommend a sentence consistent with the high end range of the PSI. The high end called for a significant prison sentence. Thus, under the plea agreement, the prosecutor was obliged to argue that this was a serious offense that warranted prison time. ¶56 Our conclusion is in accord with the circuit court's finding at the postconviction hearing that [the prosecutor is] not talking about the 26 years not doing justice to the crimes. He's talking about . . . the A through I classification system not doing justice to how serious the conduct was in this particular case.5 We agree with the circuit court.6 5 Judge GaleWyrick presided over both the sentencing and postconviction hearings, and so was personally present for the prosecutor's sentencing argument. 20 No. 2012AP2557-CR ¶57 Thus, the prosecutor's emphasis on the seriousness of Bokenyi's crimes, considered in the full context of his sentencing argument, did not constitute a material and substantial breach of the plea agreement.