Opinion ID: 77737
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Tampas challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on all four counts of conviction. At the close of the government's evidence, Tampas moved for acquittal, which the district court denied. We review de novo the denial of a motion for acquittal and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of the jury's verdict. United States v. Evans, 344 F.3d 1131, 1134 (11th Cir.2003). The jury is free to choose among alternative reasonable interpretations of the evidence, United States v. Arbane, 446 F.3d 1223, 1226 n. 1 (11th Cir.2006), and the government's proof need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, United States v. Young, 906 F.2d 615, 618 (11th Cir.1990). We affirm if a reasonable juror could have concluded that the evidence established Tampas's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Hasson, 333 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2003).
To prove that Tampas engaged in a conspiracy to embezzle funds from the YMCA, the government had to prove: 1) the existence of an agreement to achieve an unlawful objective, 2) Tampas's knowing and voluntary participation in the agreement, and 3) the commission of an act in furtherance of the agreement. 18 U.S.C. § 371; United States v. Cure, 804 F.2d 625, 628 (11th Cir.1986). Tampas argues that no reasonable juror could have convicted him of conspiracy because the government failed to prove a meeting of the minds between him and Patrick. We conclude, however, that the government produced substantial circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer that Tampas and Patrick agreed to embezzle funds from the YMCA. Tampas arranged for the YMCA to pay Patrick's employees directly without seeking board approval, and he issued such payments with no more documentation of work from Patrick than a handwritten sheet of paper listing workers' names and amounts due. At the same time, Patrick's company performed major home improvement work at Tampas's house with scant record of payment from Tampas. Tampas points out that Patrick's employees testified that they never dealt with Tampas, but this is largely beside the point where the kickback scheme was between Patrick and Tampas, not Tampas and Patrick's employees. Tampas also emphasizes Patrick's employees' testimony that Patrick insisted they keep accurate client records, but the jury was free to draw the inference that any such admonition was not followed with respect to the handwritten time slips Patrick submitted to Tampas and the YMCA. Substantial circumstantial evidence supports Tampas's conspiracy conviction. See United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1194 (11th Cir. 2006) (conspiracy can be proven by circumstantial evidence), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2446, 167 L.Ed.2d 1132 (2007).
Next, Tampas challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the embezzlement conviction based on his kickback arrangement with Patrick. To convict Tampas of embezzlement, the government had to prove: 1) Tampas converted property from the YMCA, 2) that property was valued at $5,000 or more, and 3) the YMCA received in excess of $10,000 each year in federal funds. 18 U.S.C. § 666. In challenging the first embezzlement conviction, Tampas points out that Patrick's employees frequently worked on the YMCA grounds, implying that Patrick's bills were legitimate, not padded, and thus no reasonable juror could conclude that Tampas converted YMCA funds by paying those bills. The jury was not required to accept Tampas's theory, however, where the government's substantial evidence of guilt showed that the payments issued to Patrick and his workers far exceeded the value of the work they did at the YMCA, Tampas arranged for Patrick's employees to receive payment directly from the YMCA without board approval, and Tampas and Fillyaw always handled Patrick's timesheets, which deviated from the standard procedure for processing bills at the YMCA. Meanwhile, Patrick and his employees performed extensive home improvement services at Tampas's home, and Tampas had no record of payment for most of those services. This is sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that Tampas embezzled YMCA funds by paying padded bills Patrick submitted to the YMCA.
In challenging the embezzlement conviction that was based on his personal charges on the YMCA's American Express card, Tampas argues that the government failed to prove that the charges were improper, the government failed to prove that he was the individual who made the allegedly improper charges, and the summary charts put together by FBI Analyst Lockhart cannot support his conviction because they never should have been admitted under Fed.R.Evid. 1006. We reject Tampas's argument that the government produced insufficient evidence that he converted the requisite amount of funds. Tampas argues that his charges were proper under the bona fide salary exception of 18 U.S.C. § 666(c), where YMCA board members and employees testified that Tampas was expected to use the card for travel expenses and to purchase things like food for large-scale YMCA events and ordinary business meetings. However, the testimony of these employees and board members does not show that the charge account was part of Tampas's salary under 18 U.S.C. § 666(c); salary is a budgetary matter for official vote of the board, and Tampas produced no evidence that the board voted to give him a YMCA American Express account to use for personal expenses as part of his compensation package. Tampas also argues that no reasonable juror could find his charges improper where the charges had been classified under various categories of the YMCA budget, and the YMCA's auditor testified that the expenditures were within budgetary limits. That the expenditures were within the budget means little, because even over-budget expenditures would not have constituted embezzlement as long as they were for YMCA business rather than Tampas's personal use. By the same token, unauthorized personal expenditures do not become proper just because they are susceptible of classification within budgetary limits. A reasonable juror could have concluded that Tampas's position of control over the YMCA's finances allowed him to disguise personal charges as business expenditures within the YMCA budget so that his use of the credit card would not raise any alarms. Next, Tampas argues that the government failed to prove he was the person who made the allegedly improper charges, citing a YMCA board member's testimony that multiple people used each YMCA card, Lockhart's testimony that some of the charging activity on the card was consistent with use by more than one person, and evidence that no one reviewed the charge slips to verify that Tampas signed them. We conclude that the government produced sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that Tampas was responsible for the improper charges, where witnesses testified that Tampas used the card, the statements were addressed to him, and in an FBI interview he admitted that he used the card to make $5,000 to $6,000 in personal purchases. The evidence is sufficient to support Tampas's second embezzlement conviction without regard to Lockhart's summary charts of the improper charges, and we reject Tampas's contention that he was improperly convicted in a trial by charts, see United States v. Richardson, 233 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir.2000).
Tampas also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on his conviction for misleading conduct. To prove that Tampas engaged in misleading conduct, the government had to show: 1) Tampas knowingly and willfully engaged in misleading conduct toward another person, 2) with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the communication of information to a federal law enforcement officer, 3) about the commission or the possible commission of a federal crime. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b); United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1253 (11th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1147, 119 S.Ct. 2024, 143 L.Ed.2d 1035 (1999). This charge was based on Tampas's actions in asking Arambula to make a spreadsheet attributing two years' worth of Patrick's hand receipts to jobs Patrick's company performed at the YMCA. See Veal, 153 F.3d at 1247 (misleading conduct statute encompasses a wide range of conduct that thwarts justice, including us[ing] unwitting third parties to conceal the truth). Tampas contends that the evidence shows only that he asked for a spreadsheet organizing legitimate financial documents, and no reasonable juror could conclude his conduct was misleading because Fillyaw had left the YMCA's books in disarray and everyone, including Tampas, was sorting through various receipts in an organization-wide effort to straighten out the financial records. The government produced sufficient evidence, however, from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Tampas's superficially benign request was really an effort to mislead Arambula into creating a record that would hide the scheme Tampas had undertaken with Patrick. A reasonable juror could conclude that the receipts Tampas tendered to Arambula were not legitimate business records, but fraudulent, padded bills, in light of the government's evidence that Patrick's employees frequently received paychecks issued by the YMCA for time they spent at other clients' sites. It is also reasonable to infer that Tampas's goal was to create a record justifying the YMCA's inflated payments to Patrick, which the YMCA treasurer and auditor both had begun to question. In light of this evidence and Arambula's testimony on the great disparity between the vague receipts and the value of the jobs Tampas asked him to reconcile, the jury was free to reject Tampas's innocent explanation for his conduct. Tampas also challenges the government's proof on the misleading conduct count as varying from the allegations set forth in the indictment, which alleged that he asked Arambula to create backdated records. It is true that Arambula did not testify that Tampas asked him specifically to backdate the records, but this does not give rise to reversible error. The government proved the statutory elements of misleading conduct, the offense alleged in the indictment, and Arambula's testimony does not so materially diverge from the allegations in the indictment that Tampas has suffered substantial prejudice. See United States v. Weissman, 899 F.2d 1111, 1114 (11th Cir.1990) (variance between indictment and evidence is reversible error only if facts proved diverge materially from those alleged and the defendant suffers substantial prejudice). Thus, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Tampas's convictions on all counts.