Opinion ID: 1272597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: best interests of chance j.

Text: Having concluded that the State met its burden to show the requisite statutory grounds under § 43-292, we move next to the question of whether the termination of Andrew's parental rights is in the best interests of Chance. The State argues that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the juvenile court's finding that termination of Andrew's parental rights was in the best interests of Chance. Again, we agree. A court may not properly deprive a parent of the custody of his or her minor child unless the State affirmatively establishes that such parent is unfit to perform the duties imposed by the relationship, or has forfeited that right. [16] It is always the State's burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit and that the child's best interests are served by his or her continued removal from parental custody. [17] We have noted that the term unfitness is not expressly used in § 43-292, but the concept is generally encompassed by the fault and neglect subsections of that statute, and also through a determination of the child's best interests. [18] The evidence establishes that Andrew has forfeited his parental rights relating to Chance and that termination of Andrew's parental rights is in the best interests of Chance. First, the record clearly shows that Andrew's only pre-petition contact with Chance, ever, was immediately following his birth in April 2006. Andrew has not provided Chance any financial support and has not provided any cards, gifts, or letters to Chance. Andrew's failure to contact Chance, let alone parent him, has caused Chance to be placed in foster care for more than 3½ years. Chance also has several special needs, including developmental delays that require significant time and appropriate services. Evidence presented at the termination hearing indicates that Chance's second foster mother has provided appropriate care and that the foster home is a suitable placement for Chance. When Chance first came to live with the second foster parent, he was barely walking, was unable to communicate, and just sat there. In less than a year, Chance has improved. Andrew testified that he was unaware Chance had special needs until hearing the second foster mother's testimony, but thought he could get services for Chance, because in every state of the United States there is [sic] all types of services for kids with needs. Andrew's lack of knowledge about Chance's needs, and Andrew's unpreparedness to provide for them, demonstrates the consequences of a willful failure to be involved with his son's life. In addition, Watson testified that in her opinion, it was in Chance's best interests that Andrew's parental rights be terminated. In making that determination, Watson considered Andrew's lack of involvement, Chance's special needs, and the stability of Chance's current situation. Watson placed great emphasis on the fact that Chance has been able to get stable, permanent love and affection; education; speech development; and the occupational and physical therapy that he has needed. While the availability of better circumstances for Chance is in no way dispositive, the attention provided to Chance in his foster home provides a persuasive contrast with Andrew's failure to do the same and demonstrates the value to Chance of stability. We conclude Andrew forfeited his parental rights concerning Chance and terminate Andrew's parental rights.