Opinion ID: 1301352
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the dissent's analysis

Text: The complaint states ultimate facts that defendants have trespassed upon the private property of the Center. Additionally, the facts show that defendants are trespassers. Thus, I would analyze this case under trespass law. [12] A primary attribute of the possessory interest in property is the power to exclude others from using it. 5 Powell on Real Property ¶ 706[4] (1989). Accordingly, this court has defined trespass as any intrusion [upon the land of another] which invades the possessor's protected interest in exclusive possession, whether that intrusion is by visible or invisible pieces of matter or by energy which can be measured only by the mathematical language of the physicists. Martin et ux v. Reynolds Metals Co., supra, 221 Or. at 94, 342 P.2d 790. Clearly, an unauthorized physical intrusion by a person onto the land of another constitutes trespass because it interferes with the owner's protected interest in exclusive possession, and thereby use, of his land. Furthermore, it should be stressed that `[e]very unauthorized entry on land of another is a trespass even though no damage is done.' Kesterson v. California-Oregon Power Co., 114 Or. 22, 31, 228 P. 1092 (1925) (quoting 38 Cyc. 995). Thus, actual damage need not be shown in making out an actionable invasion in trespass. Martin et ux v. Reynolds Metals Co., supra, 221 Or. at 98, 342 P.2d 790. Because a landowner is entitled to exclusive possession of his land, he decides the use of his land, subject to legal limitations, [13] which in turn determines the extent of his exclusive possession of his land. In other words, a landowner has the power to define the scope of his exclusive possession of land. A landowner who invites persons onto his land for designated purposes does not waive his right to exclusive possession; contrariwise, intrusions upon his land outside the scope of his invitation constitute trespass. Here plaintiff has invited the public onto the Center only for purposes related to the business of plaintiff and plaintiff's tenants, e.g., browsing, shopping or obtaining services. Plaintiff has not extended an invitation for the public to enter the Center for any other purpose. By merely inviting the public onto the Center property for these limited purposes, plaintiff did not thereby lose its right to exclusive possession. Because defendants personally intruded upon the Center for a purpose outside the scope of plaintiff's invitation, defendants interfered with plaintiff's exclusive possession, and thereby use, of its land. Accordingly, defendants' conduct constitutes trespass. Furthermore, defendants' conduct constitutes a continuing trespass because they informed plaintiff that they would continue to trespass unless enjoined. See Seufert Bros. v. Hoptowit et al., 193 Or. 317, 237 P.2d 949 (1951), cert. den. 343 U.S. 926, 72 S.Ct. 759, 96 L.Ed. 1337 (1952); Chapman v. Dean, 58 Or. 475, 115 P. 154 (1911). To be sure, [i]n a trespass case the social value of defendant's conduct, its efforts to prevent the harm and other circumstances that tend to justify an intrusion cannot be considered by the trier of the facts in determining whether defendant's intrusion constitutes trespass. Davis v. Georgia-Pacific, 251 Or. 239, 243, 445 P.2d 481 (1968). Stated differently, trespass does not involve a weighing process; if an unprivileged intrusion invades the possessor's protected interest in exclusive possession, strict liability for trespass results. See id. Therefore, any social value produced by or effort which minimized the impact of defendants' intrusion onto the Center does not change the fact that defendants' conduct constituted trespass. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin defendants' repeated trespass. A trespass will not be enjoined if there is an adequate remedy at law. See, e.g., Oregon-Wash. R. & N. Co. v. Reed, 87 Or. 398, 417, 169 P. 342, 170 P. 300 (1918); Garrett v. Bishop, 27 Or. 349, 354-55, 41 P. 10 (1895). It is well-settled, however, that an injunction is the proper remedy in the case of a repeated trespass. See, e.g., Seufert Bros. v. Hoptowit et al., supra, 193 Or. at 328, 237 P.2d 949; Columbia Fishermen's Union v. St. Helens, 160 Or. 654, 664, 87 P.2d 195 (1939); Central Oregon Irr. Co. v. Whited, 76 Or. 255, 266, 142 P. 779, 146 P. 815 (1915); Stotts v. Dichdel, 70 Or. 86, 91-93, 139 P. 932 (1914); Anderson v. Miami Lumber Co., 59 Or. 149, 160, 116 P. 1056 (1911); Chapman v. Dean, supra, 58 Or. at 479-80, 115 P. 154. Where a continuing trespass is at issue, an action at law is inadequate because a multiplicity of actions would be required to vindicate the plaintiff's rights in damages. Stated differently, the rationale for allowing an injunction stopping a repeated trespass is to prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a judicial merry-go-round in a court of law. Renken v. Harvey Aluminum (Incorporated), 226 F. Supp. 169, 174 (D.Or. 1963) (applying Oregon law). [14] An injunction in the instant case clearly is an appropriate remedy in light of the fact that defendants told plaintiff that they would continue to trespass unless enjoined. See Seufert Bros. v. Hoptowit et al., supra, 193 Or. at 328, 237 P.2d 949; Chapman v. Dean supra . Furthermore, an injunction is appropriate here because damages may be uncertain and difficult to prove. See Minto v. Salem Water etc. Co., 120 Or. 202, 220, 250 P. 722 (1926). It is important to note that a continuing trespass analysis does not involve the comparative injury doctrine; that is, the parties' injuries are not balanced. [15] Public interest, however, is considered in continuing trespass, but only in a very limited manner. The applicable rule is stated in Minto. In Minto, the defendant was a company which contracted to supply the inhabitants of Salem with water. The defendant had an easement to use plaintiff's land for certain filtering systems, but made use of plaintiff's land in such a way as to exceed the scope of its easement. The plaintiff claimed defendant's use of his land beyond the scope of the easement constituted a continuing trespass and, accordingly, plaintiff sought an injunction. The court stated:    Even though there has been a continuing trespass and a multiplicity of actions would result if the plaintiff were obligated to seek redress at law, equity will not raise its restraining arm if, by so doing, great and irreparable injury might result to the public.    We are not convinced that the present filtration system used by the defendant is the only way in which an adequate amount of pure water can be supplied. As a matter of economy and convenience it may excel any other plan, but such reasons    should [not] cause a court of equity to refuse the equitable relief sought. Minto v. Salem Water etc. Co., supra, 120 Or. at 219, 250 P. 722. (Emphasis added.) See also Bennett v. City of Salem, 192 Or. 531, 546-47, 235 P.2d 772 (1951); Fraser v. Portland, 81 Or. 92, 98, 158 P. 514 (1916); Booth-Kelly Lumber Co. v. Eugene, 67 Or. 381, 384-85, 136 P. 29 (1913). When a plaintiff seeks to enjoin a continuing trespass and a public interest is involved, Minto makes it clear that an injunction will be denied only where the issuance of the injunction would cause great and irreparable injury to the public, and that where those seeking to serve the public interest have an alternative means to meet the public interest, matters of economy and convenience will not prevent the injunction from issuing. The public interest at issue is facilitating public participation in the law-making process. The question, then, is: If defendants are enjoined from their continuing trespass upon plaintiff's private property, will great and irreparable injury result to this public interest? Defendants state that they want compelled access to plaintiff's property for two reasons: (1) because plaintiff's private property provides shelter from the weather; and (2) because, in terms of the number of signatures obtained per hour, defendants find using plaintiff's private property more effective than using the traditional public forums surrounding plaintiff's property. This evidence shows that if defendants were denied compelled access to plaintiff's private property, defendants, and likewise the public interest served by defendants, would only sustain marginal inconvenience. Thus, the relevant public interest would not suffer great and irreparable damage. [16] Furthermore, the inconvenience caused by relegating defendants to traditional public forums will not bind the arm of an equity court. Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to an injunction to stop defendants' trespass upon its private property.
I now turn to defendants' claims that they have constitutional rights to solicit signatures upon the Center's premises. [17] They do not. By way of background, the United States Supreme Court has decided the issue in this case under the United States Constitution. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 92 S.Ct. 2219, 33 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972), the plaintiffs, three anti-war activists, sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction restraining Lloyd Corporation from interfering with their distribution of anti-war literature within the Lloyd Center, coincidentally the same shopping center involved in the instant case. The plaintiffs claimed they had a right to distribute such literature in the Center under the First Amendment; no state constitutional or statutory provision was at issue. The Court noted that the purpose of the mall in the Lloyd Center is `to make shopping easy and pleasant, and to help realize the goal of maximum sales   . Here the shopper is isolated from the noise, fumes, confusion and distraction which he normally finds along city streets, and a controlled, carefree environment is provided,' 407 U.S. at 554, 92 S.Ct. at 2221, and that there was a considerable effort being made to attract shoppers and prospective shoppers, and to create `customer motivation' as well as customer goodwill. 407 U.S. at 555, 92 S.Ct. at 2222. The Court concluded that the argument of those seeking constitutionally compelled access to private property of the Center then existing    misapprehends the scope of the invitation extended to the public. The invitation is to come to the Center to do business with the tenants.    There is no open-ended invitation to the public to use the Center for any and all purposes, however incompatible with the interests of both the stores and the shoppers whom they serve. 407 U.S. at 564, 92 S.Ct. at 2226. The Court noted that the public property adjacent to the Center afforded the plaintiffs an alternative forum to convey their message, and that in fact the plaintiffs had moved to these public areas and continued distribution of their handbills after being requested to leave the interior malls. 407 U.S. at 567, 92 S.Ct. at 2228. The Court then stated that [i]t would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to require them to yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist. Id. The Court also stated that property does not lose its private character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes, and that [t]he essentially private character of a store and its privately owned abutting property does not change by virtue of being large or clustered with other stores in a modern shopping center. 407 U.S. at 569, 92 S.Ct. at 2229. The Court, therefore, held that the Center had not been dedicated to public use as to entitle [the plaintiffs] to exercise therein the asserted First Amendment rights. 407 U.S. at 570, 92 S.Ct. at 2229. Accordingly, the Court denied the plaintiffs access to the Center for the purpose of distributing handbills. The case at bar involves trespass. Common-law courts have, for centuries, protected the right of an owner of real property to the exclusive use and possession of his property. Over those centuries, courts developed strict and severe rules of the action of trespass as a means of enforcing that right, for it has been a fundamental principle that [i]n the bundle of rights, privileges, powers, and immunities that are enjoyed by an owner of real property, perhaps the most important is the right to the exclusive `use' of the realty. Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts 67, § 13 (5th ed 1984). The power and duty of the courts of this state to protect that right by means of the common-law trespass action have never been questioned and are illustrated in dozens of this court's opinions, from French v. Cresswell, 13 Or. 418, 422, 11 P. 62 (1886), to Koos v. Roth, 293 Or. 670, 690, 652 P.2d 1255 (1982). More particularly, the right of retail shopkeepers to ask particular individuals to leave their premises is a firmly established principle of common law. Thus, this court's statement that [t]he implied license or invitation to enter a store or restaurant may be revoked at any time as to any individual, Penn v. Henderson, 174 Or. 1, 16, 146 P.2d 760 (1944), is consistent with what appears to have been the settled rule at common law. See, e.g., Silas v. Bowen, 277 F. Supp. 314, 317-18 (D.S.C. 1967); Ramirez v. Chavez, 71 Ariz. 239, 226 P.2d 143, 145 (1951); Shramek v. Walker, 152 S.C. 88, 149 S.E. 331, 335-36 (1929); Johanson v. Huntsman, 60 Utah 402, 209 P. 197, 201 (1922). This historic common-law right on the part of retail shopkeepers (and other landowners) has been confirmed and reinforced by the legislature, in the form of criminal laws which make trespass a crime. Simple trespass  that is, the unlawful failure to leave premises after being directed to do so  has been a misdemeanor in Oregon at least since 1882, see 1 General Laws of Oregon § 1794, p 921 (Hill 1887), and it still is, ORS 164.245. [18] In short, the right of a retail shopkeeper to revoke his invitation to particular members of the public at any time is a principle of Oregon law, both by statute and by common law. [19] Not once since Oregon became a state has this court intimated that sections 8 and 26, of Article I, somehow limit this historic right, or that they supersede the law of trespass and prevent it from operating against trespassers who wish to engage in conduct  including conduct constituting expression or assembly  that the landowner does not wish to have carried out upon his premises. In Tanner, the United States Supreme Court stated that Although accommodations between the values protected by [the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth] Amendments are sometimes necessary, and the courts properly have shown a special solicitude for the guarantees of the First Amendment, this Court has never held that a trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general rights of free speech on property privately owned and used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only. 407 U.S. at 567, 92 S.Ct. at 2228. Likewise, this court has never granted such rights to trespassers such as defendants, and I perceive no reason to do so in the present case. As discussed above, Tanner held that when a shopping center owner opens its private property to the public for the purpose of shopping, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution does not thereby bestow upon the public a right to use the shopping center for expressive purposes. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution protect certain private property rights. Although the First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard certain rights of free speech and assembly, they simply do not affirmatively grant a right to exercise free speech or assembly rights upon the private property of another. Oregon's constitutional scheme is similar. Sections 10 and 18, of Article I, of the Oregon Constitution create certain private property rights. Although sections 8 and 26, of Article I, reserve certain free speech and assembly rights, these sections also do not expressly establish a privilege of compelled access to the privately owned property of another for the exercise of these rights. Because the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not verbalize a right to exercise free speech rights upon another's privately owned property, and because free speech rights were at odds with private property rights in Tanner, the Court was faced with the decision whether to make private property rights subordinate to free speech rights. This court, likewise, is confronted with a similar decision under Oregon constitutional analysis. The Tanner Court, however, did not decide that case upon a freewheeling judicial policy declaration concerning which right it thought was superior. Rather, the Court simply focused upon whether, under the facts presented, property rights had to give way to free speech rights. The Court determined that such an accommodation was unnecessary. The Tanner Court's approach is sound. This court need not impose its personal view of which of the Oregon constitutional rights at issue should control because an accommodation of the competing rights is not necessary. This court should not announce public policy because declaration of public policy is a legislative function. This court recently said:    Some courts    have taken the further step that in the absence of statutory sources of public policy, a court should articulate and justify rules of law in terms of policy (described a bit self-servingly as `public' or `social' policy), in other words, adopt a legislative mode of making policy rather than a judicial search for policy made by others or for the implications of existing principles.    We    have not embraced freewheeling judicial `policy declarations'   . Donaca v. Curry Co., 303 Or. 30, 35, 734 P.2d 1339 (1987). (Footnote omitted.) While it is true that the legislature has been asked at least twice to create a statutory right on the part of members of the public to use private shopping center premises for the purpose of gathering petition signatures ( see SB 800, 1985 Legislative Session, and SB 532, 1981 Legislative Session), the legislature has yet to announce public policy on this issue. Of course, the failure of the legislature to act does not determine or set policy. I would adopt the Tanner Court's approach, and thereby allow the legislature to consider and accommodate the competing public policy rights and interests at issue. If the legislature enacts legislation allowing compelled access to privately owned property for signature-gathering, this court, when presented with the proper case testing the constitutionality of such legislation, would fulfill its judicial role of determining whether the legislature exceeded constitutional bounds in enacting such legislation. As noted above, the Tanner Court's decision turned on several factual determinations  that alternative means of communication existed and that Lloyd's privately owned property had not been dedicated to public use as to entitle the plaintiffs to exercise expressive rights thereon. Because Tanner involved the same shopping center with substantially the same facts and issues involved in this case, I find Tanner uniquely helpful to the disposition of the case at bar. I now return to the facts in discussing plaintiff's claims. Has plaintiff dedicated its privately owned property to the public for the purpose of gathering initiative petition signatures? If plaintiff so dedicated his privately owned property, this analysis would end because there would be no conflict between free speech and assembly rights and private property rights. The Center was built and is operated purely for commercial purposes. As alluded to in Tanner, the public is invited into the Center only for purposes related to the business of plaintiff and plaintiff's tenants, e.g., browsing, shopping or obtaining services. Plaintiff has not extended an invitation for the public to enter the Center for any other purpose. The Center simply did not lose the private character and become the functional equivalent of a town square merely because plaintiff invited the public to use the facilities for designated commercial purposes. This conclusion is not at all affected by the fact that the Center has parking areas and interior walkways that contain gardens, art, benches, directories, information booths and other facilities for the convenience of business patrons. Therefore, there has been no dedication of plaintiff's privately owned and operated shopping center to public use as to entitle defendants to exercise Article I, sections 8 and 26, rights thereon. [20] In explaining defendants' constitutional claims, I return to the question whether adequate alternative avenues of obtaining initiative petition signatures exist. Similar to the circumstances in Tanner, the record in the instant case reveals that compelled access to plaintiff's private property is not necessary for defendants to gather initiative petition signatures. On the contrary, as previously set forth, if defendants are relegated to the traditional public forums ( e.g., public sidewalks and streets) surrounding plaintiff's private property, defendants will be only marginally inconvenienced in their signature-gathering process. This process will only be slowed down, not blocked. Accordingly, it would be an unwarranted infringement of plaintiff's property rights to require plaintiff to yield to the exercise of Article I, sections 8 and 26, rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of obtaining initiative petition signatures exist. [21] Although this court interprets its own state laws and constitution independent of the holdings of federal decisions, the approach and reasoning of Tanner is sound and there is no reason to carve out a different solution under Oregon law. Because plaintiff's privately owned property had not been dedicated to public use as to entitle defendants to exercise free speech and assembly rights thereon and because alternative means of gathering initiative petition signatures exist, I conclude that defendants may not exercise the free speech and assembly rights protected by Article I, sections 8 and 26, of the Oregon Constitution on property privately owned and used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes.
The fundamental question here is whether an injunction consistent with this dissent would restrain defendants' rights provided in Article I, sections 8 and 26. It would not. Although the United States Supreme Court appears to have glossed over a state action analysis in Tanner, [22] I must squarely face the issue whether the issuance of an injunction consistent with this dissent would implicate Article I, sections 8 and 26, of the Oregon Constitution. Sections 8 and 26 apply only if a law has been passed. The question, then, is whether a court-ordered injunction is a law which has been passed. A plain reading of the phrase [n]o law shall be passed suggests that it is a restriction upon lawmakers other than courts, because courts do not pass laws, courts issue opinions. State v. Spencer, 289 Or. 225, 228, 611 P.2d 1147 (1980), stated that [Article I, section 8,] is a prohibition on the legislative branch. It prohibits the legislature from enacting laws restraining the free expression of opinion or restricting the right to speak freely on any subject. The issuance of an injunction is not the equivalent of the passage of law by the legislature. It does not follow, however, that courts are not subject to the restrictions of Article I, sections 8 and 26, of the Oregon Constitution. In Crouch v. Central Labor Council, 134 Or. 612, 293 P. 729 (1930), the plaintiff obtained an injunction barring certain picketing activities by labor unions in front of the plaintiff's restaurants. The court eliminated a portion of the injunction which prohibited the Oregon Labor Press from displaying to the public a copy of the Oregon Labor Press containing any reference whatsoever to plaintiff or his said places of business. In narrowing the injunction to comply with Article I, section 8, the court stated: The courts are as much subject to the Constitution of the state as is the legislature of the state. The courts should not make an order in violation of said [A]rticle I, section 8, of the Constitution, though that section itself refers only to a law. 134 Or. at 622, 293 P. 729. Two other cases support the proposition that courts should not act in violation of Article I, section 8. In Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 593 P.2d 777 (1979), the court held that Article I, section 8, prohibits the award of punitive damages in defamation cases. This holding was extended to prevent an award of punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress by verbal means in Hall v. The May Dept. Stores, 292 Or. 131, 637 P.2d 126 (1981). Both Wheeler and Hall impliedly rest upon the proposition that a court may not infringe upon the free speech and expression rights contained in Article I, section 8. [23] In short, a court may not make an order in violation of Article I, sections 8 and 26. Accordingly, I would not follow the decisions in Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 188, 378 N.W.2d 337 (1985), and Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis.2d 492, 407 N.W.2d 832 (1987), which rest upon the proposition that an injunction prohibiting political activity does not constitute state action. But the foregoing conclusion does not determine the matter. This court's recent decisions repeatedly make the point that section 8 is implicated only when a law is directed at speech. See, e.g., State v. Moyle, 299 Or. 691, 705 P.2d 740 (1985); State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 649 P.2d 569 (1982). If a law is directed at conventional crimes or torts, sections 8 and 26 are not implicated, even though words may be uttered in connection with the crime or tort. In contrast, State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510, 732 P.2d 9 (1987); Crouch v. Central Labor Council, supra ; Wheeler v. Green, supra ; and Hall v. The May Dept. Stores, supra , all focused upon speech, not conduct or any other forbidden result. [24] Henry struck a statute that created and defined the crime of disseminating obscene material specifically because it was directed at speech. Obscene speech, writing or equivalent forms of communication are `speech' nonetheless, 302 Or. at 525, 732 P.2d 9, and a statute aimed at suppressing such speech therefore directly implicated section 8. Crouch upheld an injunction against picketing by a labor union, eliminating only that part of the injunction that barred defendants from publishing material concerning plaintiff in its newspaper. 134 Or. at 620-21, 293 P. 729. That part of the injunction was aimed squarely and exclusively at the defendant's speech, not at any conduct, and, therefore, clearly implicated section 8. Similarly, Wheeler and Hall held that punitive damages awards are prohibited by section 8 in tort cases where speech was the gravamen of the tort. Wheeler v. Green, supra, 286 Or. at 117-19, 593 P.2d 777; Hall v. The May Dept. Stores, supra, 292 Or. at 146-47, 637 P.2d 126. [25] In the circumstances of the instant case, an injunction consistent with this dissent would not violate defendants' constitutional rights under sections 8 and 26, because the injunction would be aimed at preventing a trespass rather than at speech or assembly.
Irrespective of whether their activities are protected by Article I, sections 8 and 26, defendants maintain that they may not be inhibited in attempting to obtain signatures at the Center because of the initiative power provided by Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution. Article IV, section 1, reserves to the people initiative power which is to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and enact or reject them at an election independently of Legislative Assembly. Defendants contend (1) that when they seek to implement Article IV, of the Oregon Constitution by obtaining signatures upon the privately owned parts of the Center, they are exercising a legislative function; (2) that it is self-evident that the legislature could itself enact a law which provides that persons engaged in acquiring initiative petition signatures may do so in private shopping centers; and (3) that while exercising this function they are entitled to something like the prerogatives of a legislature, and can therefore gather signatures upon privately owned parts of the Center. I do not find defendants' arguments persuasive. Initially, I note that defendants' analogy is misplaced. The signature-gatherers' function is like the proponent of a bill in the legislature. The voters of the state act like the legislature as they pass judgment on any measure that has enough strength to reach the state ballot. Defendants' interpretation of Article IV, section 1, stretches too far as it presumes that section 1 is concerned with protecting an individual's right to gather signatures and that section 1 implicitly confers a right of access to private property over the objection of its owner. [26] The initiative provision set forth in section 1 is not expressed in terms of an individual right, but is reserved to the people collectively. This section of Article IV is not concerned with protecting the individual right to solicit signatures, that right is protected by Article I, sections 8 and 26. Unless and until the prerequisites of Article IV, section 1, have been complied with, [27] the initiative power is not invoked. If Article IV, section 1, was intended to include a substantive right to gather signatures, it would have been expressed, especially if it were intended to afford greater individual rights in this regard than are already protected under Article I. See Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, supra, 378 N.W.2d at 349. Moreover, Article IV, section 1, is silent as to the means of securing signatures, State v. Campbell/Campf/Collins, 265 Or. 82, 90, 506 P.2d 163, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 803, 94 S.Ct. 132, 38 L.Ed.2d 39 (1973), and therefore does not affirmatively grant a right of compelled access to private property. This court should decline defendants' invitation to imply such a right. In sum, I reject defendants' arguments and hold that Article IV, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution does not create a right to gather signatures upon private property.
The majority should, and I would, hold that defendants' signature-gathering activities upon the Center are trespassory and should be enjoined. Defendants do not have a constitutional right under Article I, sections 8 and 26, to gather signatures upon the Center. Sections 8 and 26, of Article I, are not directly implicated when a court issues an injunction, because those sections apply only when a law has been passed. However, courts in this state are subject to the Oregon Constitution, and, therefore, may not issue orders which violate Article I, sections 8 and 26, of the constitution. An injunction enjoining defendants from soliciting signatures upon the privately owned parts of the Center does not violate Article I, sections 8 and 26, because the injunction is aimed at continuing trespass and stopping a nuisance rather than at prohibiting speech or assembly. Article IV, section 1, does not expressly bestow a substantive right to gather signatures, nor a right of compelled access to private property. Article IV, section 1, does not provide a right of access to private property to gather signatures over the property owner's objection. Accordingly, defendants' rights under the Oregon Constitution have not been violated. Plaintiff is entitled to a limited injunction prohibiting defendants from gathering petition signatures at the Center. Therefore, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for entry of an appropriate injunction. PETERSON, C.J., joins in this dissenting opinion.