Opinion ID: 201947
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fajardo's liability

Text: 27 Fajardo argues that the district court erred in concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the city had been deliberately indifferent to the rights of its citizens. Fajardo disputes the court's interpretation of the police commissioner's testimony, and the significance of the mayor's and Whitfield's testimony. Moreover, Fajardo contends that the plaintiffs' theory, that Fajardo failed to properly train its police, was proven false by Fajardo's uncontested evidence demonstrating the training that Lebrón and Mangomé had received. Given this undisputed evidence, Fajardo additionally argues that the plaintiffs failed to prove that a deficient training program caused Whitfield's injuries. We agree that the evidence was insufficient to establish a deficient training program in Fajardo. 28 A city may only be held liable under § 1983 for its own unconstitutional action. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). This means that, under § 1983, a municipal government will only be held liable when the execution of [the municipal] government's policy or custom ... inflicts the injury. Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. 29 A city's policy of inadequately training its police force can serve as a basis for § 1983 liability if the city's failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). In this context, deliberate indifference will be found where the municipality fails to provide adequate training notwithstanding an obvious likelihood that inadequate training will result in the violation of constitutional rights. Id. at 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197. The plaintiff must also prove that the deficiency in training actually caused the police officers' indifference to the public's constitutional rights. Id. at 391, 109 S.Ct. 1197. A generalized showing of a deficient training program is not sufficient. The plaintiff must establish that the particular officers who committed the violation had been deprived of adequate training, and that this specific failure in training was at least a partial cause of the ultimate injury. See Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 4, 26 (1st Cir.2005). 30 The parties agree that the Puerto Rico Police Department had promulgated regulations governing the proper use of deadly force and that these regulations were applicable to the municipal police as well as to the Commonwealth police. 5 The district court, however, found that there was a factual dispute as to whether Fajardo had adopted these regulations and trained police officers in accordance with them. The plaintiffs' primary evidence establishing this claim was testimony by the mayor and the police commissioner to the effect that there were no municipal regulations concerning the use of deadly force. According to the court, the jury could infer from this evidence, and from Whitfield's testimony concerning the officers' conduct in violating his constitutional rights, that the officers had not been properly trained in the use of deadly force. 31 Such an inference was not warranted on the undisputed facts of this case. The undisputed evidence is that both officers were in fact trained by the Puerto Rico Police according to the policies of the Puerto Rico Police Department. General Order 95-13, a Puerto Rico Police regulation enacted pursuant to the Municipal Police Act, 6 provided guidance concerning the use of deadly force consistent with Tennessee v. Garner. 7 The defendants' evidence included diplomas certifying that both officers had successfully completed the intensive preparatory course administered by the Puerto Rico Police Department, certificates of training received by both officers establishing that they had participated in ongoing training in the proper handling and use of firearms, and the testimony of Mangomé and Lebrón that they had been trained concerning the constitutional standard for employing deadly force. Lebrón and Mangomé specifically testified that they had been trained that a police officer may only use deadly force when the officer's life or the life of another person is in danger. 8 None of this evidence was disputed or impeached. 9 32 Given this evidence of training, the plaintiffs bore the burden of establishing a material factual issue with respect to whether the training received did not include adequate instruction on the proper use of deadly force. The plaintiffs' evidence failed to raise such a dispute. Whether Fajardo promulgated its own regulations is irrelevant to the lack of training claim, and the plaintiffs' evidence does not otherwise rebut or contradict the evidence that Lebrón and Mangomé were trained in accordance with the Municipal Police Act and the related Police Department regulations governing the use of force. 33 The testimony of the mayor and the police commissioner does not create a factual dispute as to whether Fajardo had actually adopted or enforced these regulations. The police commissioner's testimony, which consisted of a portion of his deposition testimony that was read into evidence, is insufficient on its face to rebut the evidence of training in the record: 34 Q. Aside from the regulations is there any written guideline for police officers ... by which they're given guidelines on the excessive use of force or on the usage of a firearm aside from the regulations ? 35 A. The regulation does not specify telling a person when it is going to be used and when it is not going to be used. ... In other words, this is a matter ... for the police officer to determine himself at that time he finds himself in a situation. In other words, there's nothing in writing. There is no kind of guideline that tells a police officer when to use the force and when he is not going to use it. 36