Opinion ID: 2301891
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Weapons Training Question

Text: The defendant's second assertion of error is that it was improper for the trial justice to permit the state, on cross-examination, to ask Smith whether he had received any weapons training in the military. The record discloses that defendant had testified on direct examination that he was a member of the National Guard. On cross-examination, the state asked, Were you trained with any weapons? to which defendant replied, M-16. Defense counsel objected on relevancy grounds, and the trial justice overruled the objection. On appeal, defendant avers that the trial justice's decision to allow defendant's answer to stand constituted prejudicial error and violated Rule 403 because, he contends, the inquiry was not only irrelevant, it was highly prejudicial. This Court has held that a trial justice's discretion to exclude evidence under Rule 403 must be used sparingly.    It is only when evidence is marginally relevant and enormously prejudicial that a trial justice must exclude it. State v. DeJesus, 947 A.2d 873, 883 (R.I.2008). Rule 401 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. When overruling defendant's objection, the trial justice noted that the state's question about weapons training was relevant background information about defendantwho already had testified about his career in the National Guard. Furthermore, when Rachel testified that Smith had threatened to kill her if she disclosed the molestation, defense counselin an effort to discredit her assertion that she was in fear of Smithpressed Rachel on the fact that she had never seen Smith with a firearm in the home. The state's inquiry about Smith's training in firearms was appropriate rebuttal evidence tending to show that Rachel's fear of Smith was reasonable. We are satisfied that defense counsel's cross-examination of Rachel opened the door to this question, which clearly was relevant to the issues at trial. Before this Court, defendant seeks to demonstrate the prejudicial nature of the state's single question by comparing it to the evidence presented in several other cases in which the state introduced evidence pertaining to a defendant's use or possession of firearms in situations unrelated to the crime on trial. The defendant's reliance on these cases is misplaced. The defendant points to State v. Souza, 110 R.I. 261, 269, 292 A.2d 214, 219 (1972), in which the Court ruled that the admission into evidence in criminal cases of weapons that are not alleged to be the weapon used in the commission of a crime is fraught with the probability of error. In that case, the state entered into evidence a firearm that was similar to the one used in the commission of the crime with which the defendant was charged. See id. The Court in Souza expressed concern that admitting a firearm that was intended to serve as a model of the weapon used in the crime could leave the jury with the mistaken impression that the firearm in evidence had actually been used in the crime. See id. Conversely, in this case, no weaponry was introduced into evidence, and there was no likelihood of such confusion. The defendant also cites State v. Sfameni, 115 R.I. 18, 21-22, 24, 339 A.2d 742, 744, 746 (1975), for the proposition that a new trial is warranted when prejudicial information is placed before the jury. In Sfameni, this Court vacated the defendant's assault conviction because the jury had been allowed to hear irrelevant and prejudicial evidence about the defendant's illicit drug use. See id. at 21-22, 339 A.2d at 744. In contrast, at Smith's trial, the sole question at issue merely asked defendant whether he had received weapons training as a member of the National Guarda form of training that most people would consider standard for members of the military. The state's question was relevant and carried no implication that Smith had engaged in illegal or improper conduct with a weapon, and was not of a type that would inflame the passions of the jury. See State v. Rushlow, 32 A.3d 892, 897 (R.I.2011) (A statement is held to be sufficiently prejudicial when it is `extraneous to the issues before the jury and tend[s] to inflame the passions of the jury.' (quoting State v. Rosario, 14 A.3d 206, 215 (R.I.2011))). [8] The defendant has failed to demonstrate that the inquiry into whether he received weapons training as a member of the National Guard was so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. We are of the opinion that the trial justice properly exercised his discretion under Rule 403 in weighing the probative value of the evidence against any potential prejudicial effect in overruling the defendant's objection. We reject the defendant's assertions of error.