Opinion ID: 1195354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: decisions applying daniels

Text: According to the majority, our post Daniels cases are unhelpful in determining the issue in this case. (Maj. opn., ante, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 181, 997 P.2d at p. 496.) I disagree; our decisions actually applying Daniels to determine whether the evidence sustains a conviction under section 209 strongly support the conclusion that a substantially increased risk of psychological harm does not satisfy the second Daniels requirement. Our first significant decision in this regard was People v. Timmons (1971) 4 Cal.3d 411, 93 Cal.Rptr. 736, 482 P.2d 648 ( Timmons ), which we decided only 15 months after Daniels. The sole issue in Timmons was whether the evidence showed that the defendant committed conduct proscribed by ... section 209 as we construed it in Daniels.  ( Timmons, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 414, 93 Cal.Rptr. 736, 482 P.2d 648.) Applying the Daniels two-part test, we first found that the five-block movement of the defendant's victims was `incidental to the commission of the robbery.' [Citation.] ( Timmons, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 414, 93 Cal.Rptr. 736, 482 P.2d 648.) Applying the second branch of the Daniels test, we explained: [W]e recognize that ... the movement of the car also increased the likelihood that the victims would be robbed. But that risk is not what we meant in Daniels [citation] when we spoke of movements which `substantially increase the risk of harm' beyond that inherent in the underlying crime. Rather, we intended to refer to an increase in the risk that the victim may suffer significant physical injuries over and above those to which a victim of the underlying crime is normally exposed. ( Timmons, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 414, 93 Cal.Rptr. 736, 482 P.2d 648, italics added, fn. omitted.) Applying this standard, we concluded in Timmons that the defendant's conduct did not meet the Daniels test. ( Timmons, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 415-416, 93 Cal.Rptr. 736, 482 P.2d 648.) We reached this conclusion even though the defendant moved his victims to a place where it would be more difficult for them to raise an immediate alarm and he could rob them with less danger of detection ( id. at p. 414, 93 Cal.Rptr. 736, 482 P.2d 648), which surely substantially increased the risk they would suffer psychological harm. In subsequent decisions, we have consistently applied Daniels as we did in Timmons, i.e., as requiring that the movement substantially increased the risk of physical harm. In People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 636, 105 Cal.Rptr. 681, 504 P.2d 905, we rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a section 209 conviction, explaining: In People v. Timmons [citation] we stated that the Daniels risk-of-harm test referred `to an increase in the risk that the victim may suffer significant physical injuries over and above those to which the victim of the underlying crime is normally exposed.' [Citation.] There was present here by reason of the abduction a material increase in the risk that the victim would suffer significant physical injuries.... In People v. Milan (1973) 9 Cal.3d 185, 192, 107 Cal.Rptr. 68, 507 P.2d 956, we again quoted Timmons 's statement that an increased risk of `significant physical injuries' is necessary for a section 209 conviction. We then affirmed the defendant's conviction because the asportation gave rise to dangers, not inherent in robbery, that a traffic collision would occur and that as a result of the motion of the car the gun [held to the victim's head] would accidentally discharge. ( People v. Milan, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 193, 107 Cal. Rptr. 68, 507 P.2d 956.) In In re Crumpton (1973) 9 Cal.3d 463, 467, 106 Cal.Rptr. 770, 507 P.2d 74, we overturned a section 209 conviction in part because the movement of the victim did not substantially increase the risk of physical harm or physical assault. In People v. Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 598, 114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058, disapproved on another ground in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 237, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512 ( Martinez ), we reversed a conviction under section 209, applying the Timmons formulation of the Daniels test and finding no evidence the asportation substantially increased the risk ... [the victim] would suffer physical harm. (11 Cal.3d at p. 598, 114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058, italics added.) In In re Earley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 122, 120 Cal.Rptr. 881, 534 P.2d 721 ( Earley ), we applied Daniels in considering a habeas corpus petition challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a section 209 conviction. We explained that in this context, the defendant could obtain relief only if as a matter of law his conduct did not violate section 209 as construed in Daniels. ( Earley, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 125, 120 Cal.Rptr. 881, 534 P.2d 721.) Thus, we had to consider the exact nature of the Daniels test. ( Earley, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 126, 120 Cal.Rptr. 881, 534 P.2d 721.) As to the increased risk of harm requirement, we quoted Timmons in stating that this requirement `refers to the risk created by the victim's movements that he will suffer significant physical injuries over and above those to which a victim of the underlying crime is normally exposed; ... [Citation.]' [Citation.] ( Earley, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 131, 120 Cal.Rptr. 881, 534 P.2d 721.) Applying this rule, we upheld the conviction, finding that the asportation gave rise to dangers, not inherent in robbery, that an auto accident might occur or that the victim might attempt to escape from the moving car or be pushed therefrom by [the defendant]. ( Earley, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 132, 120 Cal.Rptr. 881, 534 P.2d 721.) We also expressly endorsed both a 1973 CALJIC instruction that used the `significant physical injuries' formulation ( Earley, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 128, fn. 8, 120 Cal.Rptr. 881, 534 P.2d 721) and a statement from Justice Mosk's dissent in an earlier decision that the movement must `substantially increase[] the risk of physical harm to the victim....' ( Id. at p. 128, fn. 7, 120 Cal.Rptr. 881, 534 P.2d 721 & accompanying text.) Finally, in People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369 ( Rayford) , we applied section 209's asportation requirement in an appeal from a conviction under section 208 for kidnapping with the intent to commit rape. We first held that section 209's asportation requirement governs in prosecutions under section 208. ( Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 20-21, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369.) We then rejected the defendant's argument that the evidence failed to establish this requirement, stating: The jury here applied the Daniels test to find that defendant moved [the victim] a `substantial distance' and that this movement `substantially increased' her risk of physical injury `over and above those to which such person is normally exposed in the commission of the crime of rape.' Applying the same test, we conclude that the evidence of asportation in this case was sufficient to support the kidnapping conviction. ( Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 23, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369, italics added.) These decisions demonstrate that under Daniels, a substantially increased risk of physical harm is necessary to sustain defendant's section 209 conviction, and that a substantially increased risk of only psychological harm is insufficient. In each of them, we had to determine whether the evidence satisfied the Daniels requirements for a conviction under section 209 (or a statute incorporating its asportation requirement). In each of them, we specifically referred only to an increased risk of physical harm. In none of them did we look to the risk of psychological harm, even though doing so might have resulted in affirmance rather than reversal. Thus, the majority's conclusion is inconsistent with our subsequent construction and application of Daniels. Although citing some (but not all) of these decisions, the majority, with little analysis, declines to follow them. Instead, the majority asserts that because Timmons did not address the precise question of whether a substantially increased risk of psychological harm is alone sufficient under Daniels, its unequivocal statement of the need for an increased risk of physical injury was unnecessary ... and, thus, dicta. (Maj. opn., ante, 95 Cal. Rptr.2d at p. 182, 997 P.2d at p. 497.) Similarly, in a footnote, the majority summarily casts aside the other decisions I have cited, asserting that the question of physical versus psychological harm was not posed in them. (Maj. opn., ante, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 183, fn. 2, 997 P.2d at p. 497, fn. 2.) The majority is incorrect. As I have explained, in Timmons and the other cited cases, we had to decide whether the evidence at trial actually established the Daniels requirement that the movement substantially increased the risk of harm. Were the risk of psychological injury relevant to this question, we certainly would have discussed that risk, especially before reversing convictions for insufficient evidence. But we never even mentioned the risk of psychological injury, and instead focused exclusively on the increased risk of physical harm. Thus, even were the majority correct that none of the decisions I have cited directly mention[s] the point we are considering here, each, on its facts, necessarily stands as a direct authority on the question. ( Bank of Italy etc. Assn. v. Bentley (1933) 217 Cal. 644, 650, 20 P.2d 940; see also Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 734-735, 257 Cal.Rptr. 708, 771 P.2d 406 [`the language of an opinion must be construed with reference to the facts presented by the case, and the positive authority of a decision is coextensive only with such facts'].) The majority, therefore, errs in characterizing the statement in Timmons as dictum and in declining to follow Timmons and the other cases I have discussed. Of course, even under the majority's mistaken view that our statement in Timmons was dictum, it does not follow that the statement should necessarily be discarded. ( San Joaquin etc. Irr. Co. v. Stanislaus (1908) 155 Cal. 21, 28, 99 P. 365.) We often follow dicta, especially dicta in which courts have long acquiesce[d]. ( In re Garner (1918) 179 Cal. 409, 411, 177 P. 162, disapproved on another ground in In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424, fn. 15, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921.) The majority offers no persuasive reason for declining to follow our decisions that for almost 30 years have construed and applied Daniels to require a substantially increased risk of physical harm. Indeed, as I explain in this opinion, those decisions are, in fact, consistent with both Daniels and section 209's history. The majority's conclusion is consistent with neither. The majority is correct, however, in declining to rely on People v. Laursen (1972) 8 Cal.3d 192, 104 Cal.Rptr. 425, 501 P.2d 1145 ( Laursen) , which the Attorney General cites. There, we stated: In People v. Daniels [citation], we held `that the intent of the Legislature in amending ... section 209 in 1951 was to exclude from its reach not only standstill robberies [citation omitted] but also those in which the movements of the victim are merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and do not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself.' [Citation.] Thus, the primary purpose of the statute is to impose harsher criminal sanctions to deter the carrying away of persons during the commission of a robbery in a manner which substantially increases the risk that someone will suffer grave bodily or psychic injury or even death. ( Laursen, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 198, 104 Cal.Rptr. 425, 501 P.2d 1145.) For several reasons, the Attorney General's reliance on Laursen is unpersuasive. First, as the majority correctly explains, the statement the Attorney General cites was unnecessary to the Laursen decision. (Maj. opn., ante, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 182, 997 P.2d at pp. 496-497.) The defendant in Laursen contended that for a section 209 violation, an intent to kidnap must exist before the robbery begins and the movement of the victim must occur before the robbery's completion. ( Laursen, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 198, 104 Cal.Rptr. 425, 501 P.2d 1145.) To resolve this contention, we did not need to considerand, in fact, did not considerwhether an increased risk of psychological harm satisfies section 209's asportation requirement. In this crucial regard, Laursen is different from the cases I have discussed above, in which we had to determine whether the evidence satisfied section 209's asportation requirement. Second, Laursen offered no analysis for its statement about section 209's purpose; it analyzed neither Daniels nor the statute's legislative history. Third, other statements in Laursen support the conclusion that a substantially increased risk of psychological harm is not sufficient under Daniels to sustain a section 209 conviction. After concluding that section 209 applies to kidnappings committed to effect a robber's escape, Laursen cited our holding[ ] in Timmons with approval in stressing that the Daniels two-part asportation test applies to all section 209 prosecutions. ( Laursen, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 200, 104 Cal.Rptr. 425, 501 P.2d 1145.) And, in explaining the logic of interpreting section 209 consistently with the law on felony murder, Laursen stated: Through the imposition of harsher penalties, both seek to deter an aggravation of the risks to which persons involved in a robbery would otherwise be exposed. And to this extent both are reflections of the skeptical, though sensible, belief that a transgressor's intention to avoid physical injury at the time he embarks upon the ... robbery serves as no reasonable safeguard that death or physical injury will not result before he finishes. ( Laursen, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 200, fn. 6, 104 Gal. Rptr. 425, 501 P.2d 1145, italics added.) These considerations no doubt explain why in the almost 30 years since we decided Laursen we have never applied or even mentioned the statement the Attorney General now cites. Indeed, to the extent Laursen is relevant, it is, for the most part, consistent with my conclusion.