Opinion ID: 611597
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sentence Enhancement Based on Obstruction of Justice

Text: 103 Orantes-Arriaga and Plancarte-Raya argue that the district court erred in enhancing their sentences based on their trial testimony pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, which provides for a sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice. Both 5 argue that the record does not justify the district court's finding that they committed perjury. 104 In United States v. Dunnigan, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993), the Supreme Court held that if a defendant objects to a sentence enhancement resulting from her trial testimony, a district court must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice, or an attempt to do so under the perjury definition we have set out. Id., --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1117. In defining perjury, the Court relied upon the traditional definition of perjury embodied in the federal criminal perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621. Id. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1116. A witness testifying under oath must therefore be found to give material false testimony with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as the result of confusion, mistake or faulty memory. Id. The Court determined that the generalized finding 6 at issue was sufficient because it encompassed all the factual predicates for a finding of perjury but noted that it is preferable for a district court to address each element of the alleged perjury in a separate and clear finding. Id. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1117. 105 Initially, we reject the contention that Dunnigan effectively overrules United States v. Barbosa, 906 F.2d 1366, 1369-70 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 961, 111 S.Ct. 394, 112 L.Ed.2d 403 (1990), in which we held that the district court was not required to make specific findings as to specific portions of a defendant's testimony it believes to be false. Indeed, the finding held sufficient by the Supreme Court in Dunnigan did not designate to any specific item of false testimony. See id. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1117. So long as the district court finds that a defendant's trial testimony satisfies the elements for perjury as set forth in Dunnigan, an enhancement for obstruction of justice is proper. 106 The district court found that Orantes-Arriaga testified untruthfully regarding the United States government's involvement in his Mexican arrest and generally found that he lied on the stand. This finding, similar to the finding in Dunnigan, indicates that Orantes-Arriaga's testimony was (1) false, (2) material and (3) willful. Because the record supports the district court's finding of perjury, it properly enhanced Orantes-Arriaga's sentence under section 3C1.1. 107 The district court found that Plancarte-Raya's testimony was solely for the purpose of obstructing justice. This finding sufficiently indicates, and the record further supports, that his testimony was false and willful. While the district court did not find that his false testimony was material, the record amply shows that Plancarte-Raya's testimony was relevant to the subsidiary issues under consideration at his trial. See United States v. Clark, 918 F.2d 843, 846 (9th Cir.1990). Despite the district court's failure to so find, Plancarte-Raya's testimony was clearly material. 108 Where the record allows us to make a determination regarding the district court's application of the sentencing guidelines, remand is unnecessary. Cf. United States v. Kemp, 938 F.2d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir.1991) (remanding because the state of the record did not allow for an appellate determination). Furthermore, whether a perjurious statement is material is an issue of law rather than an issue of fact, Clark, 918 F.2d at 846, and we therefore do not read Dunnigan as requiring remand to the district court solely for a determination of materiality. The district court thus properly enhanced Plancarte-Raya's sentence as well. 109