Opinion ID: 485224
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The IBEW's Assertion of Harm

Text: 37 The IBEW's final argument is that on remand it proffered a sufficient showing of harm to defeat plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. We disagree. The District Court was correct in concluding that the IBEW failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact because the harm asserted by the IBEW in its submissions was not one which would outweigh the union member's interest in disclosure. J.A. at 15. Therefore, summary judgment against the defendants was proper. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 38 In Mallick I, we held that the strong [congressional] policy favoring access to [records] for union members who have otherwise satisfied the statutory requirements for examination requires that the harm from disclosure be genuine and significant. 749 F.2d at 785. As examples of cases in which the union would meet this burden we observed that the information requested should not be revealed if doing so would lead to the public dissemination of a union's organizing strategy or negotiating plan. We also stated that the harm to a union's financial interests, which allegedly would result from disclosure of the requested information, would have to be comparable to the harm to a corporation caused by disclosure of its trade secrets or confidential earnings protections. In remanding the case to the District Court, we instructed that the specific harm alleged by the union must outweigh the specific interest asserted by the union member. 39 In this case, the union members' interest in disclosure is basic to the entire purpose of the LMRDA. Members of the IBEW have observed a precipitous drop in the union's legal defense account, as listed in its LM-2 report, and seek to examine relevant union records in order to substantiate or refute their belief that this drop reflects their union's policy of defending LMRDA lawsuits without regard to cost or the interests of the membership. See Mallick I, 749 F.2d at 774, 776. The Boswell case, we recall, involved a union member's claim under the free speech provision of the LMRDA. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 411(a)(2). If the IBEW spent substantial--even excessive--sums of money to litigate the Boswell case, this information may reflect costly intransigence on the part of the union leadership simply to discourage members from bringing such [LMRDA] lawsuits. 749 F.2d at 774. How the union leadership responds to LMRDA claims is obviously a valid concern to the union's rank-and-file members. Since the LMRDA specifically grants union members union democracy rights like the free speech right at issue in the Boswell case, the policy of the Act obviously favors disclosure of information to verify an indication in an LM-2 report that the union is hostile to, or at least unsolicitous of, these LMRDA rights. 40 Once again we refer to passages from the House Report, which we quoted extensively in Mallick I, 749 F.2d at 780: 41 The members of a labor organization are the real owners of the money and property. Because such union funds belong to members they should be expended only in the common interest.... 42