Opinion ID: 594395
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Per Se Takings Doctrine

Text: 60 Where the government authorizes a physical occupation of property, or actually takes title, the Takings Clause requires compensation. Yee v. Escondido, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 1526, 118 L.Ed.2d 153 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 3176, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 850 F.2d 694, 706 (D.C.Cir.1988). The rationale for the per se rule is that actual occupation of property obviates an in-depth factual inquiry to determine whether one's economic interests have been sufficiently damaged as to warrant compensation. 61 The Government argues that the per se takings doctrine applies only to the physical occupation of real property. This argument fails for want of authority or logic. First, to support its proposition that the per se takings doctrine does not apply to personal property, the Government reiterates the Supreme Court's oft-repeated admonition that the holding of Loretto is a narrow one. See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441, 102 S.Ct. at 3179; Yee, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1534; FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 251, 107 S.Ct. 1107, 1111, 94 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987). While this is indisputably true, the actual holding of Loretto makes no mention of a distinction between real and personal property, nor was any rationale given in the opinion that might justify such a distinction. See 458 U.S. at 441, 102 S.Ct. at 3179 (Our holding today is very narrow. We affirm the traditional rule that a permanent physical invasion of property is a taking.). Subsequent Supreme Court cases have reaffirmed the per se doctrine without mention of any such distinction. See, e.g., Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. at 252, 107 [298 U.S.App.D.C. 265] S.Ct. at 1112 (defining the category of cases to which the per se doctrine applies as those where a seizure of property involves required acquiescence to a permanent invasion of the property). In short, the narrowness of the Supreme Court's holding in Loretto does not address the Government's contention; it advances that argument not at all. 62 Second, the Government places great emphasis on the fact that the Court has not applied the per se doctrine in a case involving personal property. 32 The Court has in dicta, however, expressly included personal property within the category of property that might be subject to per se taking. See United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n. 9, 110 S.Ct. 387, 395 n. 9, 107 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (distinguishing between money, which is not subject to the per se doctrine because it is fungible, and real or personal property). Indeed, in Loretto the Court based the per se takings rationale on a passage from Professor Michelman's seminal article on takings: 63 The one incontestable case for compensation (short of formal expropriation) seems to occur when the government deliberately brings it about that its agents, or the public at large, 'regularly use', or 'permanently' occupy, space or a thing which theretofore was understood to be under private ownership. 64 458 U.S. at 427 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. at 3171 n. 5 (quoting Michelman, supra note 17, at 1184). Under Michelman's construct, thing encompasses any discrete, identifiable (even if incorporeal) vehicle of economic value which one can conceive of as being owned. Michelman, supra note 17, at 1184 n. 37. Hence, the Government's inference that the per se doctrine must be limited to real property is without basis in the law, and we see no reason to give it one. One may be just as permanently and completely dispossessed of personal property as of real property. Any distinction along these lines would be purely artificial.