Opinion ID: 3153134
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Investigators Exceeded Scope of Rahman’s Con-

Text: sent The government argues that the search did not violate Rahman’s Fourth Amendment rights because Rahman gave written consent to all searches of the Café’s basement when he signed a form giving his consent to search the Café “to determine the origin and cause of the fire that occurred on 1/19/10.” Because a person may voluntarily waive his Fourth Amendment rights, no warrant is required where the defendant consents to a search. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974); United States v. James, 571 F.3d 707, 713 (7th Cir. 2009). Rahman, however, maintains that his written consent to search for the fire’s “origin and cause” was just that— a search to determine the fire’s origin and cause—and that it did not include consent to search for secondary and circumstantial evidence that could point to criminality, such as collecting evidence from the bank bags, his business receipts, and the like. “The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object,” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991), and the scope of the investigators’ search cannot exceed the 12 No. 13-1586 scope of a defendant’s consent, see United States v. Long, 425 F.3d 482, 486 (7th Cir. 1995). In determining the scope of a defendant’s consent, we apply an objectively reasonable standard. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251. Whether a search remained within the boundaries of consent is a factual question that is determined by the totality of the circumstances. Long, 425 F.3d at 486; United States v. Wesela, 223 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2000). Rahman’s consent to search the Café for the “origin and cause” of the fire did not encompass a search for secondary and circumstantial evidence of arson. Rahman argues that the term “origin and cause” is a legal term of art that carries a precise definition that is limited in nature, as opposed to the broader meaning that the government would like us to adopt, and that it was in that limited context that he gave consent. The government, on the other hand, contends that arson can be a cause of fire and that an objectively reasonable person, when asked if fire investigators could search for “origin and cause” of the fire, would assume that the officers would be looking for arson. There is some support for the government’s argument. See McDonald v. Vill. of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 997 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The cause of any fire may fall into one of three broad categories: accidental, incendiary [intentionally set fire] and undetermined.”). But if we look to guidance from the Supreme Court, the issue becomes a little clearer. In Michigan v. Clifford, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether evidence should be suppressed after it was collected by fire investigators without a warrant. 464 U.S. 287 (1984). The fire in that case began in the early morning hours and was extinguished a few hours later. Id. at 290. No. 13-1586 13 While the fire investigators waited for water to be pumped out of the house, they found a fuel can in the home’s driveway, seized it, and marked it as evidence. Id. After the water was pumped out of the basement, the investigators first searched the basement and quickly confirmed that the fire originated in the basement beneath the basement stairway. Id. The investigators continued their search and found two fuel cans beneath the basement stairway and a crock pot with attached wires leading to an electrical timer that was plugged into an outlet a few feet away. Id. at 290-91. After determining that the fire had originated in the basement, the investigators did not obtain a criminal warrant, but instead proceeded to search the remainder of the house looking for clues that pointed to arson. Id. at 291. The Court was confronted with deciding when, and under what circumstances, investigators needed to obtain a criminal warrant if they wanted to search for evidence of criminal activity. The Supreme Court’s task was made difficult by the fact that fire investigators are not on the scene to suppress the fire, but to determine how the fire was started, which in some cases means gather evidence that points to arson. The Court tried to address the matter of distinguishing between when fire investigators are on the scene to determine literally what spark caused the fire and where the fire first started, and whether criminal actions breathed life into a fire. In addressing the issue, the Court said, “[i]n many cases, there will be no bright line separating the firefighters’ investigation into the cause of a fire from a search for evidence of arson. The distinction will vary with the circumstances of the particular fire and generally will involve more than the lapse of time or the number of entries and reentries.” Id. at 298 n.9. Although the Court recognized the 14 No. 13-1586 ambiguity in determining the origin and cause of a fire, the Court made one thing clear: if the primary object of investigators is to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, investigators simply need an administrative warrant to conduct a valid search. Id. at 294. But if investigators’ primary object for conducting a search is to gather evidence of criminal activity, then they need a criminal search warrant. Id. Using the principle as its guide, the Court affirmed the exclusion of the two fuel cans found in the basement, the crock pot, the timer, and the cord that were found after fire investigators determined where the fire started. Id. at 299. Moreover, the Court found that once fire investigators had determined the cause of fire, the additional search of the upstairs portion of the home could only have been for the purpose of finding evidence of arson, and therefore excluded all evidence that was found after the investigators made their determination. Id. at 297, 299. As we understand Clifford, it is clear that the term “origin and cause” excludes any search whose primary object is to find information of criminal activity. Id. at 294, 298. As part of this exclusion is any search conducted in an area that is known not to be the origin of the fire, unless the evidence seized in this area helps investigators determine how the fire started. As the Court made clear, in many situations the primary object of a search conducted after the origin of the fire is determined is to gather evidence of criminal activity. Id. at 297. If no exception to the warrant requirement applies, the search must be conducted pursuant to a criminal warrant. Id. at 294. To be clear, “origin and cause” does not exclude evidence that points to criminality that is seized while investigators No. 13-1586 15 are conducting valid searches to determine where the fire was started and what literally sparked the fire. We know this to be true because the Court said as much. Id. at 294 (stating that evidence of criminal activity discovered during the course of a valid administrative search directed at determining the cause of a fire may be seized under the “plain view” doctrine). Applying the plain view doctrine, the Court did not exclude the first fuel can investigators seized before they determined where the fire started. Id. at 299. The analysis of Clifford helps us determine the parameters of the written consent Rahman gave to fire investigators “to determine the origin and cause of the fire that occurred on 1/19/10.” Relying on Clifford, we find that based on the totality of the circumstances, an objective reasonable person would conclude that when investigators asked Rahman for consent to determine the origin and cause of the fire, they would understand the request to be for consent to determine where the fire occurred and what sparked the fire, not for a search whose primary object is to look for criminal activity. Although the government argues that a lay person could possibly think that the term “origin and cause” included arson, we do not think it wise to allow the government to benefit from a layperson’s misconception of a phrase with legal significance, especially when investigators can clear up any misconception by informing the consenter in writing that investigators are looking for evidence of criminal activity and that such evidence could be used against him. Allowing investigators to benefit from a layperson’s misconception would create perverse incentives for the government in drafting consent forms. Our conclusion fits within the broader meaning of the Fourth Amendment, which allows 16 No. 13-1586 people to be “secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,” and prevents that right from being undermined by the public’s potential misconception of legal terms. Based on our interpretation of Clifford, we may now decide what, if any evidence, should have been suppressed. Rahman argues that the alarm box that Hankins seized on January 20 should have been suppressed because it would have only yielded secondary evidence connected to arson. We do not agree. There is no indication in the record that Hankins sought the alarm box in order to determine whether criminal activity occurred. Based on the surveillance tape from Chubby’s Cheese Steaks, the investigators suspected that the fire started at 3:31 a.m. and that the origin of the fire was in or above the Café. It appears as though Hankins wanted the alarm box because it might contain information that would tell investigators what time the fire started, which might help pin down the fire’s cause and origin. Rahman argues that Hankins ruled out the alarm box as the source of the fire because neither the alarm box, nor the area immediately surrounding it, was damaged by the fire. While that is true, Hankins had not ruled out the basement as the origin of the fire until the 21st, the day after he seized the alarm box. Given the potential useful nature of the information obtained from the alarm box that would help firefighters determine the cause and origin of the fire, the fact that Hankins had not yet ruled the basement out as the origin of the fire, and that there is no indication that Hankins’s primary object for seizing the box was to obtain information related to criminal activity, we conclude that the alarm box was properly admitted. No. 13-1586 17 The same cannot be said about most of the remaining evidence seized from the basement. According to Hankins’s own testimony, he ruled out the basement as the origin of the fire on January 21. Following the logic of Clifford, the presumption is that once the basement was ruled out as the origin of the fire, the search that Hankins conducted in the basement after he reached his conclusion was done for the purpose of searching for criminal activity, even if the theory had not yet been confirmed. Clifford, 464 U.S. at 297 (stating that “[b]ecause the cause of the fire was [] known, the search of the upper portions of the [defendant’s] house … could only have been a search to gather evidence of the crime of arson”). Therefore, unless it can be demonstrated that items seized after Hankins reached his conclusion regarding the basement were seized for the purpose of establishing how the fire started elsewhere in the building, any evidence collected from the basement after Hankins reached his conclusion about the origin of the fire, including the closed bank bags, receipts, and a tray from a cash register were illegally seized and should have been excluded. The surveillance DVR seized in the basement on January 21 is admissible because investigators indicated that they were searching for videos of the business to help determine how the fire started, and the surveillance DVR could have helped investigators reach that goal. Moreover, any evidence collected from the basement on January 22, including the fire investigators’ observations regarding the absence of a computer and safe in the basement, should be excluded. Rahman told investigators that a safe, laptop, bank bags and receipts were located in the basement office of the Café, but after conducting a search they found no traces of a laptop or safe. On direct examination, Hankins 18 No. 13-1586 testified that one of the reasons he looked for the presence of those items was to determine whether someone might have intentionally set the fire to cover up a burglary. Based on Hankins testimony, it is clear that the primary reason he searched the basement on January 22 was to find evidence of criminal activity. However, observations made on January 22 about the basement door between the Café and the Grecian Delight are admissible. Hankins stated that the goal for breaking the lock on the door was to secure a surveillance video or system that the owner of the Cush Lounge indicated would be located in the basement of the Cush Lounge. According to Hankins, the reason why the investigators went through the basement of the Café to gain access to the Grecian Delight was because that was the only safe way to get the Cush Lounge’s surveillance video. Since the investigators had not yet determined the cause and origin of the fire, the surveillance video would have been helpful in assisting investigators in their search. Although Hankins also admitted that investigators were trying to determine whether someone had broken into the Café from the Grecian Delight to set the fire, it is clear from the record that the primary object for breaking down the door was not to collect criminal evidence. That was simply a by-product of knocking down the door to secure the Cush Lounge’s surveillance system, but rather to gain one more piece of information that could help infirm where and how the fire started. On January 23, investigators seized the door to Rahman’s office located in the basement as well as the back door of the Café. According to Hankins’s testimony, while he was collecting samples to send to the laboratory to determine if igNo. 13-1586 19 nitable liquid was present, he smelled gasoline. It was at this moment that he and other investigators leaned towards arson as the cause of the fire. Hankins testified that he collected these doors after they reached that conclusion. Based on the record, we conclude that both doors should be excluded because at the moment investigators seized the doors, they were collecting evidence based on a theory that the fire in the Café was intentionally set. Moreover, observations made on the 26th about the basement door between the Café and the Grecian Delight should also be suppressed. As we previously stated, Hankins ruled out the basement on the 21st and there is no evidence in the record that indicates that the door was taken for the purpose of discovering the origin and cause of the fire. Therefore, it must have been seized for the purpose of determining whether arson occurred.