Opinion ID: 345148
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Heading: The Prejudicial Publicity and Its Consequences.

Text: 4 Mastrian argues that massive publicity in the news media attending both the Thompson trial 2 and his own prevented the impanelling of an impartial jury and otherwise denied him of a fair trial. Mastrian raises three subarguments: first, that massive pretrial publicity made it impossible to impanel an impartial jury and prevented him from receiving a fair trial; second, that publicity before and during trial was such that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sequester the jury; and third, that remarks by the court during the course of the trial aggravated damage done by the prejudicial publicity and required the accused to prove his innocence. 5 Before addressing these subarguments, we acknowledge the importance of arriving at a fair balance between the constitutional right of the accused to be tried only on the evidence and argument presented at trial, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250 (1959); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 27 S.Ct. 556, 51 L.Ed. 879 (1907), and the constitutional guaranty that the press be allowed to report what transpires in the courtroom. Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra; Craig v. Harvey, 331 U.S. 367, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 91 L.Ed. 1546 (1967); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192 (1941). A democratic society is served by an active and aggressive press which subjects the police, prosecutors and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra. For this reason, courts have been unwilling to impose any direct limitations on the press's reportorial function. But when excesses in press coverage of controversial trials have threatened the accused's right to an impartial jury, courts have been quick to grant appropriate remedies. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975). See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963). With this in mind, we turn to Mastrian's contention regarding pretrial publicity. 6 (a) The impact of pretrial publicity. 7 The record before this Court demonstrates that there was substantial pretrial publicity in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. Thompson was tried there and his trial generated considerable publicity. Mastrian was scheduled to be tried there before his change of venue motion was granted. The record also reveals that information respecting Mastrian's prior convictions and arrests was released to the Twin Cities media by law enforcement officials, along with statements as to his guilt. 8 Mastrian's first argument is that the quantity and nature of pretrial publicity denied him a fair trial as a matter of law. He also claims that both the release of prior convictions and arrest information and the published statements on his guilt by enforcement officials violated ABA standards relating to fair trial and free press. 3 He urges that we condemn such practices by the giving the standards the force of law and granting him a new trial. 9 In our view, adequate steps were taken to mitigate the potentially harmful effects of each of the violations Mastrian alleges. Media coverage in the Duluth community was restrained in comparison to other cases in which the Supreme Court has granted new trials. Compare Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra; Estes v. Texas, supra. See also Marshall v. United States, supra; Bridges v. California, supra. The record reveals that the bulk of the unfavorable media attention occurred in the Twin Cities area. Most of this publicity occurred between April and September of 1963. Jury selection was delayed until February, 1964. This time lapse probably helped dissipate the impact of some unfavorable publicity. But of far greater significance is the fact that the trial venue was changed to Duluth, Minnesota, some 150 miles from the Twin Cities area and substantially outside of its media coverage. This factor alone serves to distinguish Mastrian's situation from that of Dr. Sheppard in that the latter's trial was held in the same location where the unfavorable publicity occurred. 10 The same can be said with respect to the statements of enforcement officials and the release of prior conviction and arrest information. While we think law enforcement officials should prospectively adhere to the quoted ABA standards, we cannot at this time fault them or the press for failing, in 1963 and 1964, to follow standards not yet articulated. Such violations as might have occurred do not so offend constitutional due process that we should hold as a matter of law that these violations require the voiding of Mastrian's conviction. By and large, the statements were made by enforcement officials in Ramsey County and were released to the Twin Cities media. Their impact was mitigated by the same steps the trial court took to deal generally with adverse pretrial publicity. 11 Mastrian's next argument is that the Duluth area itself was so infected by pretrial publicity that an impartial jury could not be chosen. He points to the fact that forty-two percent of those examined for jury duty admitted to having an opinion as to his guilt and that all twelve jurors chosen had read about the case. The existence of prejudice among some voir dire examinees or the fact that many have read about the case is not conclusive evidence that an impartial jury cannot be found. It is not necessary that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. Irvin v. Dowd,supra, 366 U.S. at 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639. With our present methods of communication, it is unlikely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case. Irvin v. Dowd, supra at 722-723, 81 S.Ct. at 1642. The test is whether a prospective juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Murphy v. Florida, supra 421 U.S. at 800, 95 S.Ct. at 2036, quoting with approval from Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. at 732, 81 S.Ct. at 1643. See United States v. Woods, 486 F.2d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. McNally, 485 F.2d 398, 403 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978, 94 S.Ct. 1566, 39 L.Ed.2d 874 (1974). Although we may not set aside the trial court's finding on the issue of juror impartiality unless error is manifest, we are required to independently evaluate the voir dire testimony of the impanelled jurors. Murphy v. Florida,supra, 421 U.S. at 800, 95 S.Ct. 2031; Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. at 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639. 12 The record shows that nearly half of the ninety-two veniremen called for duty either had not formed an opinion as to Mastrian's guilt or claimed they could remain impartial. Each of those chosen for jury duty claimed during voir dire to have no present opinion as to Mastrian's guilt. Thus, the facts of this case are readily distinguishable from those in Dowd where eight of the twelve jurors chosen admitted during voir dire that they thought the defendant was guilty. Moreover, we think it of some import that Mastrian's counsel did not exercise all of his peremptory challenges during voir dire and did not move to dismiss the chosen jurors either after jury selection was completed or during trial. Compare Murphy v. Florida, supra, 421 U.S. at 800, 95 S.Ct. 2031. 13 In summary then, we do think that adequate steps were taken to mitigate the effects of both the extensive publicity in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area and the violations of the incipient ABA standards. That these steps were successful is reflected by the fact that each of the twelve jurors stated that he had no opinion as to Mastrian's guilt. 14 (b) Sequestration issue. 15 Our holding that an impartial jury was impanelled at the commencement of petitioner's trial does not determine the issue of whether those jurors were infected by prejudicial publicity during the course of the trial. Mastrian argues that the trial court should have sequestered the jury and that its failure to do so denied the petitioner a fair trial. 16 The decision to sequester lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. United States v. McNally, supra; Margoles v. United States,407 F.2d 727 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833, 90 S.Ct. 89, 24 L.Ed.2d 84 (1969); Koolish v. United States, 340 F.2d 513 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 951, 85 S.Ct. 1805, 14 L.Ed.2d 724 (1965). We find no abuse of that discretion here. Mastrian directs our attention to no offensive or inflammatory publicity during trial that would require implementation of this rare procedure. 4 See United States v. Woods, supra at 174; United States v. McNally, supra at 404. Although a pretrial request for sequestration was made, that request was not renewed during trial nor did defense counsel bring prejudicial stories to the court's attention and ask that the jury be polled with respect to them. 5 Compare Sheppard v. Maxwell,supra, 384 U.S. at 345-349, 86 S.Ct. 1507. Moreover, the trial court repeatedly admonished the jurors to ignore all publicity they might encounter during trial and to avoid talking about the trial with anyone. We approved this approach in the Koolish case. Koolish v. United States, supra at 528-529. 17 The procedure of sequestration is one of the most burdensome tools of the many available to assure a fair trial. It necessarily narrows the cross section from which a jury is drawn by eliminating those persons for whom a lockup would be prohibitive. In this case, the steps taken to mitigate adverse pretrial publicity, together with the trial court's cautionary instruction, were adequate to protect Mastrian's right to an impartial jury. 18 (c) The court's pretrial instruction. 19 After jury selection was completed but before any evidence was taken, the trial judge instructed the jury to avoid any publicity which they might encounter during the trial. During the course of this instruction, the court made the following statement: 20 This is a sad commentary, that 92 people were brought in here and only 14 of you were selected. It is a sad commentary of our judicial system that a man can be convicted or acquitted of a charge before the evidence is produced in court. And God help any of us that may find ourselves in a position and be innocent, that because of the undue publicity, that we would be convicted of something before we have had a chance to enter the court and tell our side of the story. 21 Mastrian argues that this statement violated his right against self-incrimination, both because it implied that he would take the stand and because it shifted the burden of proof to the defense. These are several reasons why we must reject each of these contentions. First, counsel for Mastrian raised no objection at the time this particular statement was made or at the conclusion of the court's instruction. No motion for mistrial was made. Furthermore, we are satisfied that each juror understood that it is the government's burden to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The record shows that Mastrian's counsel questioned each juror extensively on his or her understanding of the presumption of innocence and burden of proof. Finally, we believe the quoted passage, when read in conjunction with the rest of the court's cautionary instruction, is not misleading. It is highly unlikely that the jury isolated this particular passage from the court's lengthy instruction and drew the inferences Mastrian suggests.II. Illegal Arrest. 22 On April 19, 1963, at approximately 3:00 A.M., Mastrian was placed under arrest at his Spring Lake Park residence by officers of the St. Paul Police Department. This arrest was accomplished by forcible entry into his home after the officers had identified themselves and been refused entry. No warrant was issued for his arrest. At a hearing the same day in St. Paul Municipal Court, Mastrian attacked the legality of the officers' warrantless arrest, but his motion was denied on the ground that he had failed to carry his burden of proving lack of probable cause. 6 On May 8, he was indicted by a Ramsey County jury. 23 Mastrian asserts that his warrantless arrest was illegal 7 and that this Court must decide whether the adverse consequences flowing from that arrest were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 24 Mastrian admits, and the state court found, 8 that no evidence or incriminating statements obtained as a consequence of the arrest were admitted at trial. Thus, his conviction was not prejudiced in this way. See Collins v. Swenson, 443 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Turner, 442 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1971); Sewell v. United States, 406 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1969); Theriault v. United States, 401 F.2d 79 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1100, 89 S.Ct. 898, 21 L.Ed.2d 792 (1969). The question remains whether other adverse consequences flowed from the alleged unlawful arrest. Mastrian claims the following adverse consequences: first, the nighttime arrest generated considerable prejudicial publicity; second, the incarceration which resulted from the arrest prevented him from adequately preparing his defense; and third, conferences with his attorney while incarcerated were overheard by a fellow inmate. 25 We believe the preceding discussion on prejudicial publicity adequately dispenses with Mastrian's first contention. Neither the publicity caused by the unlawful arrest nor the coverage that continued throughout the pretrial period denied Mastrian a fair trial. 26 In regard to Mastrian's second contention, we note that his illegal detention, assuming it was illegal, lasted only nineteen days. 9 The strength and thoroughness of his defense, as reflected in the trial record, belies the argument that this delay in some way prejudiced the preparation of his case. Mastrian identifies no way specifically in which his preparation was hindered. Absent such a showing, we conclude that any injury Mastrian suffered was harmless. 27 Mastrian's final arrest-related assertion, that conversations with his attorneys were monitored by another inmate, presents a more serious constitutional claim. The Sixth Amendment secures for the accused the right to have the assistance of counsel in his defense. It is clear that an accused does not enjoy the effective aid of counsel if he is denied the right of private consultation with him. Coplon v. United States, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 103, 191 F.2d 749, 757 (1951). See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213 (2nd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950, 94 S.Ct. 3080, 41 L.Ed.2d 672 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960, 94 S.Ct. 1490, 39 L.Ed.2d 575 (1974); Caldwell v. United States, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 355, 205 F.2d 879 (1953). Evidence that a party monitored the accused's conversations with his attorney does not necessarily establish a Sixth Amendment violation. Rather, the accused must show, in addition, that the substance of the overheard conversation was of some benefit to enforcement officials. 10 Absent this proof, a monitoring allegation must be denied. 11 28 During the trial of this case, two witnesses testified that they saw Sheldon Morris 12 eavesdrop on conversations between Mastrian and his attorneys at the Ramsey County Jail. There was no evidence in the record, however, showing that Morris was acting as an agent for enforcement authorities or that he ever communicated the substance of those conversations to them. Mastrian merely alleges that Morris communicated frequently with officials in the Ramsey County Attorney's office. Without more, this showing is insufficient to establish the required nexus between Morris's actions and some benefit to the prosecuting authorities. Therefore, we must deny Mastrian's claim. 29 III. The Claim that Delay by the District Court in Hearing His Petition Violated His Right to Habeas Corpus. 30 Although nearly two years passed before Mastrian's petition was decided, we cannot agree that his constitutional right to habeas corpus was violated. Several factors contributed to the delay; some were within Mastrian's control. Mastrian attempted, without success, to have the petition heard in a district other than Minnesota. His appeal of that unsuccessful effort was denied by this Court, Mastrian v. Cudd, Civil No. 74-8162 (8th Cir. Oct. 25, 1974), and by the United States Supreme Court, Mastrian v. Cudd, 420 U.S. 945, 95 S.Ct. 1340, 43 L.Ed.2d 432 (1975). Furthermore, the judge originally assigned to the case resigned from it shortly thereafter. The next judge assigned to the case removed himself at Mastrian's request. At the time of this removal, no other judge in the District of Minnesota was available to hear the case. The Chief Judge had recently decided Thompson's habeas corpus petition and properly refused to hear Mastrian's petition because of the potential prejudice to the latter's claims. The fourth judgeship in the district was vacant, awaiting the confirmation and swearing in of a new appointee. After this position was filled and the case assignment completed, the time taken to decide it was not inordinate in light of the number of issues raised and the complexity of the proceedings at the state court level. 31