Opinion ID: 3134569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: A jury in the circuit court of Macoupin County convicted petitioner of, inter alia , murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping and robbery and sentenced petitioner to death. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his convictions, but vacated his death sentence and ordered a new sentencing hearing. People v. Turner , 128 Ill. 2d 540 (1989). Petitioner waived his right to be sentenced by a jury, and the trial court once again sentenced petitioner to death. This court affirmed petitioner’s sentence on direct appeal ( People v. Turner , 156 Ill. 2d 354 (1993)), and the United States Supreme Court denied petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari ( Turner v. Illinois , 510 U.S. 1013, 126 L. Ed. 2d 570, 114 S. Ct. 606 (1993)). Defendant subsequently filed a pro se post-conviction petition in which he alleged the following constitutional claims. First, petitioner alleged that the State violated his right to due process by failing to seize and disclose to the defense a pair of boots and a knife owned by petitioner’s brother Michael Turner. Second, petitioner alleged that the State failed to disclose that it promised Michael Turner favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony against petitioner at trial. Third, petitioner alleged his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to discover and impeach Michael Turner with the evidence withheld by the State and statements Michael Turner made to undisclosed family members and prisoners at the Macoupin County jail. Petitioner’s final claim alleged that the Illinois death penalty statute was unconstitutional. The circuit court appointed David Grigsby as defendant’s post-conviction counsel. Grigsby did not file an amended post-conviction petition. No affidavits were attached to the post-conviction petition. The circuit court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing, holding the claims in the post-conviction petition were barred by res judicata or waived because petitioner could have raised the claims on direct appeal but failed to do so. Following the dismissal of petitioner’s post-conviction petition, this court granted petitioner’s motion to remove Grigsby as his attorney and appointed the office of the State Appellate Defender, Capital Litigation Division, to represent petitioner in this appeal.