Opinion ID: 202005
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpretation of the Guidelines

Text: 51 We doubt that Byrne has preserved on appeal his objections to the guideline calculations, but out of an abundance of caution and because it does not change the result, we have addressed his arguments. The district court ruled that the base offense level for a civil rights violation involving force, committed by one person acting alone, is the greater of ten or the base offense level for the underlying crime. U.S.S.G § 2H1.1(a). Here, the district court concluded that the underlying crime was aggravated assault — assault causing serious bodily injury — a base level fifteen offense. U.S.S.G § 2A2.2(a). The district court then applied twelve levels of enhancements: four because the aggravated assault involved serious bodily injury, U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(3)(B), see United States v. Newman, 982 F.2d 665, 671-675 (1st Cir.1992), six because the defendant was a public official or acted under color of law, U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(b), and two because the defendant obstructed justice, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. These calculations netted a base offense level of 27 and, given the defendant's lack of a criminal record, a guideline range of 70 to 87 months of imprisonment. The court imposed the shortest sentence within that range. 52 The defendant objected to the guideline calculations on three principal grounds. Two of these are easily dispensed. The defendant's suggestion that the assault on Trombly did not cause serious bodily injury is preposterous. As a result of the defendant's assault on him, Trombly required emergency surgery and then had his jaw wired shut. Similarly unavailing is the defendant's argument that the evidence did not support the two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice because the guidelines require that the obstruction occur in the course of an investigation, rather than, as the obstruction statute allows, in contemplation of a communication. We doubt that there can be a situation in which the evidence is sufficient to support an obstruction of justice conviction but not an obstruction of justice enhancement. Even so, there was plentiful evidence that an investigation into the defendant's conduct commenced before he obstructed justice. 53 The defendant is also incorrect that the cross-referencing provision of U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(a)(1), which fixes the base offense level at the higher of ten or the base offense level for the underlying crime, should not apply in cases where U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(a)(3), which governs civil right violations involving the use or threat of force, might be applicable. Section 2H1.1(a)(3) provides a floor, not a ceiling. The logic of the provision can be inferred from civil rights violations involving underlying offenses such as sexual assault and murder, which the cross-referencing provision ensures carry far higher base offense levels than civil rights violations involving only minor force or the threat thereof. The Sentencing Commission intended that crimes like the defendant's be punished at least as severely as if they had occurred under federal jurisdiction but not during a civil rights violation. 8 Courts of appeals have applied § 2H1.1(a)(1) accordingly. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 341 F.3d 870, 894-95 (9th Cir.2003) (approving cross reference to aggravated assault for base offense level); United States v. Webb, 252 F.3d 1006, 1010 n. 6 (8th Cir.2001) (concluding that it would be an error of law to fail to apply higher base level of cross-referenced offense); United States v. Velazquez, 246 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir.2001) (discussing cross-referencing to homicide offenses in civil rights sentencing of prison guard who killed inmate).