Opinion ID: 1235129
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Mixed-Motive Summary Judgment Framework to White's Case

Text: Having determined the appropriate pretrial legal framework to apply to mixed-motive Title VII cases, we now proceed to consider whether Baxter is entitled to summary judgment on White's downgraded performance evaluation claim. To survive Baxter's motion for summary judgment, White must be able to point to evidence in the record on which a jury could reasonably conclude that (1) Baxter's took an adverse employment action against White, for which (2) White's race was a motivating factor. Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to White, we find that White is able to meet this minimal burden of production, and thus that Baxter is not entitled to summary judgment.
As indicated in the above framework, in order to present a claim, either mixed-motive or single-motive, under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered an adverse employment action. See White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry., 364 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir.2004) (en banc), aff'd in relevant part, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). An adverse employment action is an action by the employer that constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998). In general, a negative performance evaluation does not constitute an adverse employment action unless the evaluation has an adverse impact on an employee's wages or salary. Tuttle v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, 474 F.3d 307, 322 (6th Cir.2007); see also Holt v. Morgan, 79 Fed.Appx. 139, 141 (6th Cir.2003) (unpublished); Primes v. Reno, 190 F.3d 765, 767 (6th Cir.1999); Hollins v. Atlantic Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir.1999). Thus, to characterize a negative performance evaluation as an adverse employment action the plaintiff must point to a tangible employment action that she alleges she suffered, or is in jeopardy of suffering, because of the downgraded evaluation. Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 789 (6th Cir. 2000). In the instant case, we find that White's allegedly downgraded performance evaluation constitutes an adverse employment action. While the performance evaluation is not nearly as negative as White's characterization of it suggests, we find that there is sufficient evidence in the record for a jury to reasonably conclude that White has suffered negative employment consequences as a result of the performance evaluation. In particular, the record indicates that by receiving a Meets Minus ranking, White did not receive as a high of a pay increase as he would have if he had received the Meets evaluation to which he claims he was entitled. Baxter's own 2004 PMO Grid clearly indicates that a TCS with a Meets Minus evaluation will receive only a two percent or less pay raise whereas a TCS with a Meets evaluation will receive a three percent pay raise. See J.A. at 673. Moreover, at his deposition, White testified that he did not receive as high of a pay raise as he should have for the 2004 fiscal year: Q: What are the financial consequences if you get a does not meet [on your performance evaluation]? A: There's no increase [in your salary]. Q: And if you get a meets, what happens? A: You get an increase. Q: If you get a meets minus, what happens, do you get an increase? A: I believe you get less of an increase that you would if it was a meets. Q: Did you get an increase from 2004  A: I did get an increase. Q: I'm sorry, you did? A: I did, but not the increase if it would have been a meets outside those extenuating circumstances that affected my territory. J.A. at 137. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to White suggests that, while White did receive an increase in his salary based upon his 2004 job performance, the increase was not as large as it would have been if White had received a better performance evaluation. We find this evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable jury that White's allegedly downgraded performance evaluation caused him to suffer a significant change in benefits. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257. By receiving a lower salary increase than he would have without the more negative evaluation, White was denied an increase in pay to which he allegedly was entitled. Under our precedent, such a deprivation of increased compensation does constitute an adverse employment action. See Clay, 501 F.3d at 710 (holding that deprivation of increased compensation as the result of a failure to train constitutes an adverse employment action); Jordan v. City of Cleveland, 464 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir.2006) ([D]enial of money would more than amply qualify as a materially adverse action to any reasonable employee for Title VII purposes.); Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 565 (6th Cir.2000) (accepting that the denial of the proper pay increase with the plaintiff's promotion constituted an adverse employment action); see also Fierros v. Texas Dept. of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 193 (5th Cir.2001) (finding that denial of a pay increase can constitute an adverse employment action). Thus, White's evidence does suggest that he has suffered a tangible employment action as a result of his downgraded performance evaluation. Morris, 201 F.3d at 798. At minimum, White has produced enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the downgraded performance evaluation in this case had an adverse impact on his receipt of wages or salary. Tuttle, 474 F.3d at 322. Accordingly, we hold that White has produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that he suffered an adverse employment action in the form of his downgraded 2004 performance evaluation.
The second issue we must consider with regard to Baxter's summary judgment motion is whether White has presented evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that White's race was a motivating factor in the issuance of his downgraded 2004 performance evaluation. As Phillips was the Baxter supervisor responsible for evaluating White's 2004 performance, the question becomes whether there is sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Phillips' decision to give White a Meets Minus rating was motivated by the fact that White is an African-American. We find that White has satisfied his minimal burden of production on this issue. At the outset, we note that White has produced sufficient evidence to suggest that Phillips harbors a discriminatory animus toward African-Americans. Indeed, the record reflects that Phillips has made several comments  such as his statement that nobody wants to be around a black man  that a jury could reasonably find to be indicative of racial bias. J.A. at 106. The more difficult question, however, is whether White has produced evidence from which a jury can logically infer that Phillips' racial animus was a motivating factor in his evaluation of White's 2004 job performance. White's evidence in support of such a conclusion stems from his claim that Phillips applied the wrong standard to evaluate his 2004 performance. White argues that he was entitled to have his performance evaluated under the 2004 PMO Grid, as opposed to the criteria in the Gold E-Mail, which Phillips claims he used to evaluate White's performance. White alleges that, while the 2004 PMO Grid was applied across the board to Baxter's other employees, the Gold E-Mail was exclusively applied to him. From Phillips' failure to apply the allegedly correct standard (the 2004 PMO Grid) and his decision to apply a harsher standard (the Gold E-Mail), White argues, a jury can reasonably infer that Phillips was motivated, at least in part, by racial animus when issuing White a Meets Minus rating. We agree with White that a jury could draw such an inference from the evidence presented. White correctly contends that under the terms of the 2004 PMO Grid, which was issued in November of 2004, he was entitled to a Meets evaluation. This 2004 PMO Grid specifies that achievement of one hundred percent of the sales target in two of four products, one of which must be Suprane or Brevibloc, equals a Meets rating. J.A. at 672 (emphasis added). In 2004, White's year end sales numbers were the following: Suprane, 92%; Brevibloc, 105%; TDS, 101%; and PSA, unknown. Thus, White did achieve over one hundred percent in two of four products, one of them being Brevibloc. Under the plain terms of the 2004 PMO Grid, White should have received a Meets evaluation. Accordingly, a jury could reasonably find Phillips' failure to issue such an evaluation suspect, and thus indicative of the presence of an improper motivation  such as racial animus  for the performance evaluation decision. However, Baxter contends that the 2004 PMO Grid must be read in light of the Gold E-Mail which was circulated to all Regional Managers, including Phillips, on October 22, 2004. The Gold E-Mail emphasized the importance of increasing sales numbers for Suprane and directed that if certain sales representatives, including White, did not bring their numbers up to a minimum of 95% to plan by the end of the year then they would receive a `DOES NOT MEET' on their PMO, receive a `0' and be placed on a [Performance Improvement Plan]. Evaluated under this standard, as Baxter claims it should be, White's 2004 performance would have merited a Does Not Meet rating because White ended the year only ninety-two percent to plan on his Suprane sales. Nevertheless, in response to Baxter's position, White has introduced evidence which might reasonably convince a jury that the 2004 PMO Grid, and not the Gold E-Mail, was the standard Phillips was supposed to use to evaluate the performance of Baxter sales representatives. First, White points to the testimony of Kunz, who explained that the PMO Grid matrix is used to produce a rating for a sales representative's performance evaluation. [11] J.A. at 603. Next, White emphasizes that the 2004 PMO Grid was created after the Gold E-Mail and thus should be viewed as controlling. Finally, White provides examples of other Baxter employees whose performance appears to have been evaluated pursuant to the 2004 PMO Grid. In particular, White points to the performance evaluations of Linda Assoey, Stacey Hord, Peter Moe, Theodore Quinn, Carey Redd, Lawrence Rome, and Melissa Slyvester, who were all supervised by regional managers other than Phillips. [12] Like White, each of these sales representatives achieved less than ninety-five percent of their Suprane goal. However, rather than being given a Does Not Meet rating for failing to achieve more than ninety-five percent of their Suprane goal, as would be required under the terms of the Gold E-Mail, these sales representatives received Meets Minus ratings. White correctly observes that, in each case, the Meet Minus rating given was consistent with the 2004 PMO Grid. [13] Such evidence reasonably suggests that the 2004 PMO Grid, rather than the Gold E-Mail, was the standard actually applied for these performance evaluations. Considering all of this evidence in the light most favorable to White, as we must, we find that there is a genuine issue of fact concerning which standard  the 2004 PMO Grid or the Gold E-Mail  Phillips should have used to evaluate White's 2004 performance. If the jury were to conclude, as it reasonably could based on the evidence presented, that the 2004 PMO Grid was the appropriate standard, then it could legitimately infer from Phillips' failure to apply this correct standard that an impermissible factor  namely White's race  served as at least a partial motivation for his decision to issue White a Meets Minus performance evaluation. Thus, we find this disputed issue of fact to be material, and we hold that Baxter is not entitled to summary judgment on White's downgraded performance evaluation claim. Because White has produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude in his favor on both his single-motive and mixed-motive race discrimination claims, we find that he is entitled to present these claims to a jury and accordingly remand the case to the district court for trial. As the issue of what damages White may be entitled to should he prevail on his claims at trial has not been briefed by the parties and is not presented in this summary judgment challenge, we express no view with regard to it. [14]