Opinion ID: 1854001
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Submission of issue of robbery in the first degree.

Text: As previously stated, defendant was charged with robbery in the first degree, which is committed when the perpetrator of a robbery purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious injury or is armed with a dangerous weapon. § 711.2, The Code 1979. It is under the latter definition that defendant was charged. Defendant moved for dismissal and judgment of acquittal and objected to certain instructions, contending the State's evidence was insufficient to permit the jury to find he was armed with a dangerous weapon. The term dangerous weapon is defined as follows: A dangerous weapon is any instrument or device designed primarily for use in inflicting death or injury upon a human being or animal, and which is capable of inflicting death upon a human being when used in the manner for which it was designed. Additionally, any instrument or device of any sort whatsoever which is actually used in such a manner as to indicate that the defendant intends to inflict death or serious injury upon the other, and which, when so used, is capable of inflicting death upon a human being, is a dangerous weapon. Dangerous weapons include, but are not limited to, any offensive weapon, pistol, revolver, or other firearm, dagger, razor, stiletto, or knife having a blade of three inches or longer in length. § 702.7, The Code 1979 (emphasis in original). Defendant contends that a revolver is not a dangerous weapon unless it is capable of inflicting death. He argues that trial court's submission of the issue of first degree robbery constituted error in light of the absence of evidence introduced by the State that the revolver used in the commission of the present offense was capable of being fired. We do not agree. Initially we note that the last sentence of the statutory definition expressly provides that dangerous weapons include revolvers. Moreover, we have previously observed that this definition of dangerous weapon goes to the character of the instrument utilized. See State v. Nichols, 276 N.W.2d 416, 417 (Iowa 1979). Thus, working condition should never be an issue where the instrument employed has the character of a dangerous weapon. Finally, we note that the capability requirement is that the weapon be capable of inflicting death upon a human being when used in the manner for which it was designed. As we stated in Nichols, [n]o one could seriously contend that a pistol lacks this characteristic. Id. That reasoning is equally applicable here. In short, we hold the State was not required to demonstrate that the revolver used in the robbery was operable. Trial court did not err in submitting the issue of robbery in the first degree to the jury.