Opinion ID: 2157140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: State v. Mark Luciana

Text: On the evening of June 27, 1987, nineteen-year-old Mark Luciana attended a party with a fifteen-year-old female and three other friends. Later the group left to go swimming at a nearby wooded area. When they arrived, Luciana and the fifteen-year-old walked into the woods, where Luciana sexually assaulted her and strangled her. Afterward, Luciana rejoined his friends and told them that the victim had left to go to the bathroom. Eventually, Luciana drove two of the friends home, and one friend remained in the car passed out. Luciana then drove back to the crime scene, put the victim's body in the trunk, and drove to a hotel. When Luciana's friend awoke the next morning, Luciana showed him the body in the trunk. Because the car would not start, Luciana and his friend left it at the hotel and returned home. Within a few days, Luciana's friend told police about the body and Luciana turned himself in. Police received information that further implicated Luciana's involvement in the murder. His ex-girlfriend stated that Luciana became violent after drinking and being refused sex. Luciana's cellmate also indicated that Luciana indicated that he received sexual gratification from the murder of the fifteen-year-old, as well as from inflicting pain upon other partners during sexual encounters. Luciana was charged with purposeful or knowing murder, felony murder, aggravated sexual assault, hindering apprehension and endangering the welfare of a child. The State asserted aggravating factors c(4)(c) (extreme suffering), c(4)(f) (escape detection), and c(4)(g) (concurrent felony). The defense asserted mitigating factors c(5)(a) (emotional disturbance), c(5)(c)(age), c(5)(d) (mental disease or defect or intoxication), c(5)(f) (no significant criminal history), and c(5)(h) (catch-all). A jury found Luciana guilty on all counts. At the penalty phase, the defense presented evidence that Luciana dropped out of high school after ninth grade, but later received his GED and attended classes at a community college. At the time of the murder, he was employed in his step-father's paving business. There was evidence that Luciana had both an alcohol and drug problem and was subject to physical and emotional abuse as a child. A defense psychologist suggested that Luciana was very immature for his age and had an anti-social personality disorder stemming from neglect as a child. Luciana testified, as did the psychologist, that he was intoxicated from eighteen beers and marijuana at the time of the killing, although this was not consistent with other witnesses' testimony. Luciana also stated that he feels little empathy for those around him. Yet, he tearfully testified that he could not undo the terrible thing he did, that he did not mean to kill the victim, that he was truly sorry, and asked the jury to spare his life. Luciana has one prior conviction from 1986 for drug possession and receiving stolen property. The jury found aggravating factors 4(f) and 4(g) and mitigating factors 5(c), 5(d), 5(f) and 5(h). They were unable to reach a decision regarding the weighing of those factors, so Luciana was sentenced to life imprisonment with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility for the murder. He received an aggregate consecutive sentence of nineteen years imprisonment for the remaining charges. J. State v. Rasheed Muhammad On the afternoon of April 1, 1995, Jakiyah McClain, an eight-year-old, went to visit a friend, Ah-Tavia Maxey, who lived a few blocks away. As Jakiyah and Ah-Tavia were walking upstairs to Ah-Tavia's apartment, Muhammad entered the apartment building and volunteered to walk Jakiyah upstairs. Muhammad knew Ah-Tavia's mother. Ah-Tavia did not go upstairs, but instead watched as Muhammad took Jakiyah's hand and led her upstairs. Shortly thereafter, Ah-Tavia heard someone kicking and banging, and she also heard Jakiyah's screams. When Jakiyah never returned home that night, her mother began searching for her, and eventually filed a missing person report. The next day, the police discovered that Muhammad was granted permission to stay in an abandoned apartment of the building where Jakiyah was last seen alive. The police knocked on the door of that apartment and Muhammad let them enter. The police found the little girl's body in the bedroom closet of the apartment, curled in a fetal position with her underpants around one ankle. Ah-Tavia identified Muhammad as the person last seen with Jakiyah. Muhammad confessed to kidnaping, sexually assaulting and murdering Jakiyah. The cause of death was determined to be asphyxiation. An autopsy confirmed that she had been sexually assaulted. Muhammad was charged with capital murder, kidnaping, burglary, two counts of aggravated sexual assault and felony murder. The burglary charge was dismissed. A jury convicted him of the remaining charges. During the penalty phase, the State alleged that the following aggravating factors were present: c(4)(f) (avoid detection), c(4)(g) (murder committed during the course of a sexual assault and a kidnaping), c(4)(k) (victim was less than fourteen-years old). Muhammad alleged that nineteen separate c(5)(h) (catch-all) factors were present. Evidence was presented concerning his childhood years during which he was neglected by his parents, exposed to his parents' drug and alcohol problems and sexually abused. He also witnessed his father stabbing his mother. He was abused by his parents and his mother's paramour. He also was institutionalized because neither parent would take custody of him. He began abusing drugs by age twelve and suffered several head injuries. There was documentation of two suicide attempts. The jury found the c(4)(g) and c(4)(k) aggravating factors were present, as well as each mitigating factor. The jury could not unanimously agree on punishment. Muhammad was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment with no parole. He received a consecutive fifty-year sentence for the kidnaping charge, with a twenty-five-year term of parole ineligibility. The remaining convictions were merged. K. State v. Walter B. Norris On March 26, 1996, an apartment complex security guard called the police to report that he had discovered a naked woman lying on the ground bleeding. Prior to discovering that, the guard had noticed a man kicking the woman. When the guard approached, the man ran away. When the police arrived, they found a condom located near the scene of the crime. From marks on her body, police could tell that she had been dragged to the location where she was sexually assaulted and beaten. She was immediately transported to a hospital, but she died at the hospital because of multiple injuries and bruises to her face and head. Based on the security guard's description, police arrested Norris. He was charged with murder and three counts of aggravated sexual assault. A jury convicted him of aggravated manslaughter and he was sentenced to a thirty-year term with fifteen years of parole ineligibility. The remaining charges were dismissed for sentencing purposes. Norris was twenty-eight years old at the time of the offense. He lived with his mother and worked as a security guard and deliveryman. He had a history of mental illness and had been institutionalized in 1995 for two weeks. The AOC coded as present the c(4)(g) (contemporaneous felony) aggravating factor and the c(5)(d) (mental disease or defect or intoxication) and c(5)(h) (catch-all) mitigating factors. L. State v. Gerald Williams  On April 13, 1994, the victim's mother was notified by the victim's place of employment that she had not reported to work that day. She went to her daughter's apartment and found her lying on her stomach. She was nude and her right wrist and left ankle were tied with a rope. She called the police. The autopsy revealed that the victim died from strangulation and that she was sexually assaulted both vaginally and anally. A small white vase and a bottle of body oil were used to assault the victim. Williams' thumbprint was found on the bottle. He also had an unusual gene that matched semen samples taken from a sock found at the scene of the crime. Williams, a thirty-eight-year-old male, had been employed in the victim's apartment building for approximately four months. He was fired in February 1994 and began living in vacant apartments and stairwells in the complex. Williams claimed that he had had an affair with the victim. He also asserted and that he was not involved in the murder. He had prior convictions for robbery and assault. He also had a history of depression. At the time of his arrest, he claimed to have been daily using cocaine and alcohol for fifteen years. Williams was charged with murder, felony murder, burglary, two counts of aggravated sexual assault, criminal restraint, unlawful possession of a weapon and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. He was convicted by a jury on all counts. Williams received a life sentence with no parole for the murder count. Williams also was sentenced to a consecutive fifty-year term with a twenty-five-year term of parole ineligibility for the kidnaping charge. The remaining convictions were merged for purposes of sentencing. COLEMAN, J., dissenting. I voted previously to set aside the capital conviction and sentence of death because of pretrial and mid-trial publicity. State v. Harris, 156 N.J. 122, 211-230, 716 A. 2d 458 (1998). The AOC has assigned this case to the D-2 sub-category for non-aggravated sexual assault killings because, in its view, this case does not contain extreme brutality, when viewed in the relative context of other sexual assault killings. The victim was over the age of 14 and suffered only a single fatal wound with no contributing injuries except the second shot that was fired after obtaining the shovel. There are eleven other cases in the D-2 category. Defendant is the only one to get the death penalty. Even prosecutors deem the D-2 cases less death-worthy. Given those facts, I dissent from the Court's holding and conclude that defendant's sentence of death was influenced by the pretrial and mid-trial publicity and is, therefore, aberrational. Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 319, 731 A. 2d 1121; Cooper II, supra, 159 N.J. at 115, 731 A. 2d 1000. I would vacate the sentence of death and remand for a new penalty trial. LONG, J., dissenting. I believe that because Ambrose Harris's death sentence was impermissibly influenced by extensive, adverse publicity prior to and during his trial, meaningful proportionality review is impossible to conduct. Because the majority holds otherwise, I dissent.