Opinion ID: 2433487
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues asserted by felts.

Text: 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. Felts was accused of intentionally permitting Sabrina to be abused on the night of May 20-21, 1994. Felts asserts there was insufficient evidence from which a jury could have concluded that she intentionally permitted that abuse to occur. However, as indicated supra, intent can be gleaned from knowledge, and there was ample evidence from which a reasonable juror could have concluded that Felts knew Sabrina was being abused whenever she was left alone with Davis. Commonwealth v. Benham, supra . 2. Separate trials. The trial judge did not err in overruling Felts's motion for a separate trial. RCr 9.16. Joinder under RCr 6.20 is appropriate where, as here, the defendants are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 670 S.W.2d 828, 834 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1111, 105 S.Ct. 791, 83 L.Ed.2d 784 (1985). Even if the defendants attempt to cast blame on each other, severance is not required. United States v. Arthur, 949 F.2d 211, 217-18 (6th Cir.1991). The essence of the charges against these co-defendants was that Davis abused and ultimately killed Sabrina and Felts permitted him to do it. Obviously, evidence of the abuse perpetrated by Davis against Sabrina would have been admissible in a separate trial of Felts to prove that she permitted the abuse to occur. Ware v. Commonwealth, Ky., 537 S.W.2d 174 (1976). 3. Instruction on first-degree criminal abuse. Although the motion to delete references to torture and cruel confinement as elements of first-degree criminal abuse was granted with respect to the charge against Davis, it was denied with respect to the charge against Felts. Dr. Nichols testified that except for the injury to Sabrina's lip, which was inflicted on another occasion, all of the injuries observed during the autopsy of the child's body occurred simultaneously with the fatal skull fractures. There was no evidence of either torture or confinement. The trial judge initially concluded that these alternative elements of the offense should be deleted from the Commonwealth's tendered instruction, but changed his mind when the prosecutor advised him that Canler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 870 S.W.2d 219 (1994) holds that severe spanking resulting in serious physical injury may constitute torture, cruel confinement or cruel punishment. In fact, Canler states only that the appellant in that case argued that severe spanking does not constitute torture, cruel confinement or cruel punishment. Id. at 221. The holding in Canler was that spanking may constitute cruel punishment. Id. at 222. (The prosecutor's misstatement of this holding may have resulted from the fact that the holding is also misstated in the headnote prepared by the West Publishing Company.) Nothing less than a unanimous verdict is permitted in a criminal case. KRS 29A.280(3); Wells v. Commonwealth, Ky., 561 S.W.2d 85 (1978). Unanimity becomes an issue when the jury is instructed that it can find the defendant guilty under either of two theories, since some jurors might find guilt under one theory, while others might find guilt under another. If the evidence would support conviction under both theories, the requirement of unanimity is satisfied. Barbour v. Commonwealth, Ky., 824 S.W.2d 861 (1992); Ice v. Commonwealth, Ky., 667 S.W.2d 671 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 860, 105 S.Ct. 192, 83 L.Ed.2d 125 (1984). However, if the evidence would support a conviction under only one of two alternative theories, the requirement of unanimity is violated. Hayes v. Commonwealth, supra; Boulder v. Commonwealth, supra . Since the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of abuse causing torture or cruel confinement, the requirement of unanimity was violated in this case and Felts is entitled to a new trial. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the convictions and sentences imposed upon Appellant Davis are affirmed; and the conviction and sentence imposed upon Appellant Felts is reversed and remanded to the Jefferson Circuit Court for a new trial in accordance with the contents of this opinion. STEPHENS, C.J., and JOHNSTONE and STUMBO, JJ., concur. WINTERSHEIMER, J., files separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, with GRAVES and LAMBERT, JJ., joining that opinion.