Opinion ID: 2085191
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Date Platz Last Performed Architectural Services

Text: [¶ 12] The date on which Platz last performed services is a material fact here because many of the statutory provisions governing liens impose time limits. For example, a lien will be dissolved unless the person claiming the lien files a lien certificate in the office of the register of deeds within 90 days after ceasing to labor, furnish materials or perform services. 10 M.R.S. § 3253(1)(A) (2008). In addition, in order to preserve and enforce a lien already filed, an action must be filed with the Superior Court or District Court clerk... within 120 days after the last of the labor or services are performed. 10 M.R.S. § 3255(1) (2008). [¶ 13] Here, the lien certificate for the architectural services Platz provided was recorded on June 22, 2006, and the complaint to enforce the lien was filed on August 1, 2006. Platz's statement of material facts asserts that architectural services provided by Platz last occurred on April 6, 2006. [¶ 14] In support of its statement of material fact that April 6, 2006, was the last date on which it performed services, and in conformance with M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(4), Platz cites to the affidavit of Bruce Allen. [5] In his affidavit, Allen states that he is the vice president of Platz Associates; he has under his custody and control records relating to the contractual transaction between Platz Associates and Solo Properties LLC; the records were made and kept in the ordinary course of business; and his statements are based on his personal knowledge of the transaction and from said records. Allen states further that the architectural services Platz provided began with the signing of the contract and continued through April 6, 2006. [¶ 15] Finley argues that apart from the Allen affidavit, there is no evidence that April 6, 2006, is the date Platz last provided services. [6] He qualifies Platz's statements of material fact by stating that April 6, 2006, is not the last day work or services were provided, but offers no evidence or documentation to support this statement. Rather, Finley cites to his own affidavit which states [u]pon information and belief, Platz Associates ceased doing any work on the 3 Mill Street property more than ninety (90) days prior to the filing of the mechanics lien against the 3 Mill Street, Lewiston, Maine property. [¶ 16] Summary judgment practice provides for the use of affidavits, but the affidavits must be made on personal knowledge, must set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and must show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. M.R. Civ. P. 56(e). Parties are permitted to rely on the affidavits of interested witnesses, including themselves, see Stanley v. Hancock County Comm'rs, 2004 ME 157, ¶ 19, 864 A.2d 169, 175, but only if the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit. M.R. Civ. P. 56(e). [¶ 17] The affidavit used by Platz affirmatively shows that it is based on Allen's personal knowledge, and that Allen had personal knowledge of the date on which Platz last provided services. See Peoples Heritage Sav. Bank v. Pease, 2002 ME 82, ¶ 25, 797 A.2d 1270, 1277. The statement of material fact that April 6, 2006, was the last day services were provided is therefore properly supported. [¶ 18] In contrast, Finley's affidavit demonstrates that he is not competent to testify regarding the dates Platz provided services. Finley states that he did not request that work be completed, did not authorize such work, and had no knowledge of the work. He can only aver that upon information and belief Platz ceased doing any work on the property in question more than ninety days prior to the filing of the lien. Such a statement is not based on personal knowledge, and does not properly controvert Platz's statement of material fact on the issue. By failing to controvert that Platz last performed services on April 6, 2006, Finley has admitted this fact. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(4); see also Stanley, 2004 ME 157, ¶ 18, 864 A.2d at 175. Thus, there is no genuine issue that the lien was filed within ninety days as required by 10 M.R.S. § 3253(1)(A), and that the enforcement action was filed within 120 days as required by 10 M.R.S. § 3255(1).