Opinion ID: 2804365
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Principal vs. Aider And Abettor

Text: The government is correct that § 2251(a) itself contains no mens rea requirement as to the victim's age, and the majority of courts that have addressed the issue have held that knowledge of the age of the victim is not required to convict a principal under the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Fletcher, 634 F.3d 395, 400 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Pliego, 578 F.3d 938, 943-44 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Malloy, 568 F.3d 166, 172-73 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Deverso, 518 F.3d 1250, 1257 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Griffith, 284 F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 2002); see also United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 77 (1994) (stating that Congress intended to exclude a scienter requirement from § 2251(a)); but see United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534, 538-43 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that while [t]he defendant's awareness of the subject's minority is not an element of [a § 2251(a)] offense, the First Amendment requires reading a reasonable mistake of age affirmative defense into the statute). However, even assuming that a principal of a § 2251(a) offense can be held strictly liable (that is, convicted without -15- knowing that the victim was a minor),6 the government's argument that an aider and abettor must also be held liable without fault has been rejected by longstanding law.7 See 2 LaFave § 13.2(f) (Under the general principles applicable to accomplice liability, there is no such thing as liability without fault.). In other contexts, courts have consistently found a mens rea requirement for aiders and abettors of strict liability crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 872 F.2d 179, 181 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding conviction after finding that aider and abettor 6 Again, we make no judgment here on that proposition. Because the dissent argues that Encarnación pleaded guilty as a principal, it chooses to address the question of whether a principal of a § 2251(a) offense can raise a mistake of age defense and concludes that a principal cannot raise such a defense. However, that issue is not even in dispute in this appeal. Encarnación concedes that a principal is not entitled to a mistake of age defense. See Appellant's Supp. Br. at 3 n.1 (stating that Encarnación has always argued that [he] was entitled to knowledge evidence as an aider and abettor while the principal was not). 7 The dissent similarly argues that because the offense in Rosemond was not a strict liability crime, it does not support our conclusion that an aider and abettor of the production of child pornography must have knowledge that the victim was a minor even if the principal does not require such knowledge. The dissent claims that the takeaway from Rosemond is that an aider and abettor must have the same amount of knowledge as does the principal about the scope of the contemplated crime. However, Rosemond never makes such a claim. Instead, the Supreme Court recognized that the mens rea requirement for aiders and abettors may be different from that of principals of the underlying offense. See 134 S. Ct. at 1251 n.10 (noting that Rosemond's holding is grounded in the distinctive intent standard for aiding and abetting someone else's act). Therefore, even when there is no knowledge requirement for a principal, the government still must prove that an aider and abettor intended to facilitate the specific and entire crime charged. Id. at 1248. -16- knew that [principal's] possession of the unregistered guns would be illegal under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(c)); United States v. Baumgarten, 517 F.2d 1020, 1027 (8th Cir. 1975) (stating that aider and abettor of 26 U.S.C. § 5861 offenses must have a purposeful attitude to be found guilty (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Bowman, 656 S.E.2d 638, 651 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that government must prove that aider and abettor of statutory rape acted with knowledge that the [victims] were under the age of sixteen); id. at 650 (Although statutory rape is a strict liability crime, aiding and abetting statutory rape is not.) (citing People v. Wood, 56 Cal. App. 431, 205 P. 698 (1922)). Professor LaFave explains that in the situation where an alleged accomplice is aiding another with intent to do so, but the aid is given without knowledge of the facts which make the principal's conduct a crime, the argument that the accomplice may be held on a liability-without-fault basis if the crime committed by the principal is of the strict liability variety . . . has been rejected [and] is not sound. 2 LaFave § 13.2(f). LaFave adds,the special circumstances which justify the imposition of liability without fault on certain persons who themselves engage in the proscribed conduct are not likely to exist as to those rendering aid. Id. LaFave's analysis is directly applicable to the § 2251(a) charge in this case. Encarnación admits that he aided Vilanova in -17- producing pornography, but his aid was given without knowledge of the only fact which makes Vilanova's conduct a crime, namely that one of the participants was a minor.8 Criminalizing non-obscene adult pornography would violate the Constitution's right to free speech. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002); United States v. Hilton, 386 F.3d 13, 14 (1st Cir. 2004). If the government's argument were correct, individuals could be convicted of aiding and abetting the production of child pornography even when they had only a fleeting connection to the crime. For example, a set decorator who believes he is working on the production of a legal adult pornographic film could be held liable as an aider and abettor even if he had no knowledge that one of the participants in the film was underage. This outcome would be possible, because, as Rosemond explains, a defendant can be convicted as an aider and abettor without proof that he participated in each and every element of the offense . . . even if that aid relates to only one (or some) of a crime's phases or elements. 134 S. Ct. at 1246. Therefore, as long as the set 8 As the dissent points out, LaFave acknowledges that, in the situation where the crime is not totally of a strict liability type, but no awareness is required as to some attendant circumstance to convict either the principal or the accomplice then no mens rea may be required to convict both the principal and aider and abettor as to that attendant circumstance. 2 LaFave § 13.2(f). The attendant circumstance exception does not apply to this case. As stated above, the element that the victim was a minor is not simply an attendant circumstance of a § 2251(a) charge. It is the reason why producing child pornography is illegal. -18- decorator participated in any aspect of producing the child pornography, he would meet aiding and abetting's affirmative act requirement. Principals, the argument goes, may be convicted under § 2251(a) without proof they had knowledge of [the victim's] age because they confront[] the underage victim personally and may reasonably be required to ascertain that victim's age. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 76 n.5, 72 n.2. The same justification would not apply to a set decorator or other similarly situated aider and abettor, who may never even see the victim, much less interact with him or her. To be sure, in this case, the government alleges that Encarnación had a previous relationship with KMV, including repeated sexual activity, and, as a main actor in the film, saw her face-to-face. At this juncture, however, these alleged facts are irrelevant. The government decided to proceed against Encarnación as an aider and abettor, even though it arguably would have been justified charging him as a principal. As we just discussed, this decision meant the government had to prove Encarnación knew the victim's age in advance. That the evidence strongly points to such knowledge means nothing until the government convinces a jury — not us — of this fact. -19-