Opinion ID: 1293219
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Admissibility of Phillips's Testimony

Text: (17a) Defendant asserts the court committed reversible error by allowing Kathy Phillips to testify, over his objection, that in 1979 (three years before the subject murders) she participated in a photo session at defendant's furniture refinishing shop during which defendant photographed her in the nude while she was bound and gagged. The next month, Phillips went for a ride with defendant during which he asked her if she wanted to make more money (Phillips was using heroin at the time). According to Phillips, defendant told her that he wanted to take some more pictures of other women and take them out in the desert and make what he  what he referred to as a snuff flick or movie.... Phillips stated that defendant told her he wanted to drug the girls in connection with the photography sessions, have sex with them and be really brutal and that he would just make a movie and it would be a lot of bondage and sadistic-type things.... In addition, Phillips testified that she and defendant had discussed burying bodies so that they could not be discovered. Finally, Phillips told the jury defendant had mentioned to her that he would eventually sell the snuff movies to the Mafia in the United States and Canada. Defendant argues that Phillips's testimony should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), which bars use of character evidence to prove conduct. Defendant relies primarily on People v. Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d 604, 630-631, and People v. Tassell (1984) 36 Cal.3d 77, 89 [201 Cal. Rptr. 567, 679 P.2d 1], to support his first argument that the evidence was too remote to bear on the crimes for which he was charged. As the People note, however, neither Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), nor the cases cited by defendant, bars the evidence. Of course, evidence that a defendant committed other offenses or bad acts is inadmissible if offered solely to prove his criminal disposition. ( People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 990 [244 Cal. Rptr. 905, 750 P.2d 794].) On the other hand, when evidence of other criminal activity is relevant to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, prior criminal activity evidence may properly be used. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) (18) In People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 315 [165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883], we determined that [a]s with other types of circumstantial evidence, ... admissibility [of other-crimes evidence] depends upon three principal factors: (1) the materiality of the fact sought to be proved or disproved; (2) the tendency of the uncharged crime to prove or disprove the material fact; and (3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring the exclusion of relevant evidence. (Italics in original; see also Wade, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 990.) (17b) Phillips's testimony tended to prove logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference the existence of a contested issue  identity  to which defendant's prior acts were relevant. The issue of identity was contested throughout the trial. Defendant consistently maintained, in contrast to Hernandez's testimony, that he was out of town on the day of the murders, and that it was Hernandez and Lee who actually committed the murders. Thus, Phillips's testimony was relevant not only to prove a disputed fact  that defendant committed the crimes in question  but also to corroborate Hernandez's testimony implicating defendant as the perpetrator of the murders. Accordingly, the relevancy of Phillips's testimony to prove the disputed material issue was sufficiently substantial to raise an inference of identity. ( People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 21 [252 Cal. Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249].) Thus, the trial court properly concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. ( Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 314, 321.) Finally, we do not find the three-year time lag between the time defendant committed the acts testified to by Phillips and defendant's 1982 murders of Jones and Kreuger so significant as to render Phillips's testimony too remote or unreliable. The remoteness of evidence goes to its weight and not to its reliability. ( People v. Archerd (1970) 3 Cal.3d 615, 639 [91 Cal. Rptr. 397, 477 P.2d 421]; cf. People v. Thomas (1978) 20 Cal.3d 457, 466 [143 Cal. Rptr. 215, 573 P.2d 433] [evidence of molestations occurring more than 10 years earlier deemed too remote and potentially prejudicial].) In any event, any error was not prejudicial. Considering Hernandez's account of the events surrounding the murders along with the other corroborating evidence presented, we believe it is highly unlikely that but for Phillips's testimony, defendant would not have been convicted. (See Wade, supra, 44 Cal.3d 975, 990.)