Opinion ID: 6328600
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “Riparian Owner”

Text: [¶6] The Diolis contend that DMR exceeded its authority by adopting a definition for “riparian owner” that conflicts with the plain language of 12 M.R.S. § 6072(7-A)(A) and is illogical in the context of the broader statutory scheme. That definition, the Diolis argue, led DMR to improperly disregard their concerns when considering whether MPOC’s proposed lease would unreasonably interfere with the ingress and egress of riparian owners. Though DMR’s regulatory definition is inconsistent with 12 M.R.S. § 6072(7-A)(A), we affirm because the agency’s decision ultimately complied with the statute. [¶7] We begin our review of an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute by determining de novo whether the plain meaning of the underlying statute is ambiguous. NextEra Energy Res., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2020 ME 34, ¶ 22, 227 A.3d 1117. Section 6072(7-A) establishes conditions that a proposed lease must meet before DMR may grant an aquaculture lease application, including the following: 5 A. The lease will not unreasonably interfere with the ingress and egress of riparian owners. B. The lease will not unreasonably interfere with navigation. C. The lease will not unreasonably interfere with fishing or other uses of the area. . . . D. The lease will not unreasonably interfere with significant wildlife habitat and marine habitat or with the ability of the lease site and surrounding marine and upland areas to support existing ecologically significant flora and fauna. E. The applicant has demonstrated that there is an available source of organisms to be cultured for the lease site. F. The lease does not unreasonably interfere with public use or enjoyment within 1,000 feet of a beach, park or docking facility owned by the Federal Government, the State Government or a municipal governmental agency or certain conserved lands. . . . G. The lease will not result in unreasonable impact from noise or light at the boundaries of the lease site. 12 M.R.S. § 6072(7-A). The statute does not define the scope of “riparian owner,” but the meaning of section 6072(7-A)(A) is clear: DMR cannot approve a lease that will unreasonably interfere with the ingress and egress of any riparian owner. [¶8] Although our review of agency action generally ends by applying an unambiguous statute’s plain meaning, NextEra Energy Res., LLC, 2020 ME 34, ¶ 22, 227 A.3d 1117, our inquiry in this case continues because section 6 6072(7-A) also authorizes DMR to make rules further defining the conditions a proposed lease must meet, including what constitutes unreasonable interference with the ingress and egress of riparian owners. 12 M.R.S. § 6072(7-A); see also id. § 6072(13)(F) (authorizing DMR to make rules for “defining [lease] application requirements, an application review process and decision criteria”). But DMR’s rulemaking authority is not limitless; the agency cannot adopt a rule that “is not in accord with the underlying statute.” Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 458 A.2d 739, 741 (Me. 1983). Pursuant to its statutory authority, DMR defines “riparian owner” for all purposes under section 6072 as a “shorefront property owner whose property boundaries are within 1000 feet of the proposed lease boundaries.” 13-188 C.M.R. ch. 2, § 2.05(1)(C). [¶9] The Legislature used the term “riparian owner” (and, alternatively, “owners of riparian land”) throughout section 6072,3 often with explanatory or limiting language. Indeed, there are several instances in which the statute expressly limits the class of riparian owners to those within 1,000 feet of a lease 3 The Legislature amended this statute after MPOC submitted its application, but we apply the version in effect at the time of the application and decision. See P.L. 2021, ch. 52, §§ 1-9 (effective Oct. 18, 2021) (to be codified at 12 M.R.S. § 6072(6)(A)-(C), (11), (12), (12-A), (12-A)(C), (12-C), (13), (15)). 7 site. See, e.g., 12 M.R.S. § 6072(5) (notice to riparian owners when an application is complete and a hearing is scheduled); id. § 6072(11-A)(D) (notice to riparian owners before DMR assigns a lease); id. § 6072(12-A) (notice to riparian owners when an application for a lease transfer is complete). Applying DMR’s “riparian owner” definition to these provisions is redundant.4 [¶10] In other parts of section 6072, DMR’s “riparian owner” definition is superfluous because the statutory language itself limits the class of riparian owners to which it applies. See 12 M.R.S. § 6072(4)(F) (requiring lease applications to include written permission from every riparian owner whose land to the low-water mark will be used); id. § 6072(12-C)(A)(3) (same with respect to applications for lease expansion); id. § 6072(8)(C), (E) (establishing an order of preference when multiple applicants seek to lease the same area, including “[f]ourth, to the riparian owner of the intertidal zone in which the leased area is located” and “[s]ixth, to the riparian owner within 100 feet of leased coastal waters”). 4 Other provisions in section 6072 refer to “known riparian owners.” See 12 M.R.S. § 6072(4)(G) (requiring lease applications to identify “known riparian owners as listed in the municipal tax records”); id. § 6072(6)(A) (requiring DMR to personally notify “known riparian owners” of hearings on lease applications); id. § 6072(12-C)(A)(4) (requiring that applications to expand a lease identify “known riparian owners as listed in the municipal tax records”). We do not decide whether DMR’s “riparian owner” definition conflicts with those statutory provisions; it is possible that some limitation or definition may be appropriate in parts of the statute other than section 6072(7-A)(A). 8 [¶11] In contrast, DMR’s rule limiting the class of riparian owners to those within 1,000 feet of the proposed lease site is inconsistent with the plain language of the statutory provision central to the Diolis’ appeal: 12 M.R.S. § 6072(7-A)(A). A property’s distance from a proposed lease site has little bearing on the question of whether a lease will unreasonably interfere with the ingress and egress of riparian owners. The class of riparian owners to whom the statute could apply is finite but could easily include owners whose shorefront property is more than 1,000 feet from the lease site. For example, if a proposed lease were located near the entrance to a long but narrow inlet, the lease, if granted, could effectively block ingress and egress for any riparian owner in the inlet regardless of the distance between the lease site and the shorefront properties. The Legislature did not say that DMR must consider whether the lease will unreasonably interfere with the ingress and egress of only some riparian owners, and DMR cannot do so by rule. See Cent. Me. Power Co., 458 A.2d at 741 (“[R]ules promulgated by subordinate authority [that] tend to contravene the provisions of controlling law . . . are of no effect and will be promptly declared invalid.” (quotation marks omitted)). [¶12] Relying on its definition of “riparian owner,” DMR found that MPOC’s proposed lease would not unreasonably interfere with the ingress and 9 egress of any riparian owners solely because no one, including the Diolis, owned property within 1,000 feet of MPOC’s proposed lease boundaries. Nonetheless, DMR’s ultimate decision complied with section 6072(7-A) even if its “riparian owner definition” was inconsistent with the statute. See Kurzon v. U.S. Postal Serv., 539 F.2d 788, 796 (1st Cir. 1976) (“While agency decisions must be sustained, if at all, on their own reasoning, this principle does not mechanically compel reversal when a mistake of the administrative body is one that clearly had no bearing on . . . the substance of the decision reached.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); cf. Me. Motor Rate Bureau, 357 A.2d 518, 527 (Me. 1976) (limiting judicial review of administrative action solely to whether the agency’s grounds for decision were proper). [¶13] Specifically, despite finding that no individuals fit its “riparian owner” definition, DMR addressed the concerns that the Diolis and other shorefront property owners on Mere Point raised “about their ability to navigate to their docks and moorings” when the agency analyzed whether the lease would unreasonably interfere with navigation. See 12 M.R.S. § 6072(7-A)(B); 13-188 C.M.R. ch. 2, § 2.37(1)(A)(2). Those concerns prompted DMR to move the proposed lease site one hundred feet westward to “provide[] additional navigable area between the proposed site and Merepoint 10 Neck.”5 DMR concluded that the adjusted lease site would not unreasonably interfere with navigation even though “the proposed site may prompt some vessels to alter their traditional course.” [¶14] Because the lease decision reflects that DMR specifically considered how the proposed lease would affect the Diolis’ ingress to and egress from their property, albeit in the context of analyzing the lease’s effects on navigation, DMR complied with section 6072(7-A)(A)’s substantive requirements. See 13-188 C.M.R. ch. 2, § 2.37(1)(A)(1) (directing DMR to “examine whether the riparian owners can safely navigate to their shore” when determining whether a proposed lease would unreasonably interfere with the ingress and egress of riparian owners (emphasis added)). In other words, DMR’s reliance on its “riparian owner” definition did not ultimately affect its analysis.