Opinion ID: 4453185
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: AFSCME acted “under color of” state law

Text: The next question is whether AFSCME acted under color of state law. Unions generally are private organizations. See, e.g., Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, private actors some‐ times fall within the statute. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935. Indeed, the “color of law” requirement for section 1983 is more expan‐ sive than, and wholly encompasses, the “state action” require‐ ment under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. For our purposes, the analysis is the same—if AFSCME’s receipt from CMS of the fair‐share fees is attributable to the state, then the “color of law” requirement is satisfied. A “procedural scheme created by … statute obviously is the product of state action” and “properly may be addressed in a section 1983 action.” Id. at 941. “[W]hen private parties make use of state procedures with the overt, significant assis‐ tance of state oﬃcials, state action may be found.” Tulsa Prof’l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988); see also Apos‐ tol v. Landau, 957 F.2d 339, 343 (7th Cir. 1992). Here, AFSCME was a joint participant with the state in the agency‐fee ar‐ rangement. CMS deducted fair‐share fees from the employ‐ ees’ paychecks and transferred that money to the union, which then spent it on authorized labor‐management activi‐ ties pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. This is suﬃcient for the union’s conduct to amount to state action. We therefore conclude that AFSCME is a proper defendant under section 1983.