Opinion ID: 2622503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: THE SCOPE OF THE PROTECTION AFFORDED BY UTAH CODE SECTION 78-14-12(1)(d)

Text: ¶ 11 Defendants argue that Utah Code section 78-14-12 protects the documents and evidence submitted to prelitigation panels, permanently rendering them confidential and privileged for all purposes thereafter. We disagree. The plain language of the statute, common law notions of confidential and privileged communications, and policy considerations all dictate that the protections afforded by the statute apply only to the actual proceedings before such panels. ¶ 12 First, the plain language of the statute does not extend to material submitted to the panel. When interpreting a statute, we look first to its plain language. See Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, ¶ 13, 160 P.3d 1041. The plain language of section 78-14-12(1)(d) extends only to the proceedings conducted by prelitigation panels; it does not protect documents or other evidence submitted to such panels. While both the notice of intent and opinion letter were submitted to the prelitigation panel, they were actually created by Munson's counsel and her expert consultant outside of the actual proceedings before the panel. ¶ 13 Because Munson had previously authored and served the notice of intent according to Utah Code section 78-14-8, she had access to that document independent of the proceedings described in Utah Code section 78-14-12. Munson also had independent access to the opinion letter because she acquired it directly from Dr. Kane. In short, while both the notice of intent and the opinion letter were submitted to the panel, Munson had access to them independent of her participation in the proceedings. [2] Because she had independent access to the materials, their use in the pretrial proceedings did not render them confidential. ¶ 14 Second, the common law traditionally interprets privileges narrowly. We previously have concluded that because a privilege has the undesirable effect of excluding relevant evidence, the term privileged should be `strictly construed in accordance with its object.' Gold Standard, Inc. v. Am. Barrick Res. Corp., 801 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1990) (quoting Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 27 Utah 2d 310, 495 P.2d 1254, 1257 (1972)). We have accordingly construed the scope of privileged communications narrowly to protect only the communications themselves rather than their contents. ¶ 15 This approach is consistent with the one taken by the United States Supreme Court in addressing the scope of the attorney-client privilege, where it stated: The protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not to facts. A fact is one thing and a communication concerning that fact is an entirely different thing. The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, What did you say or write to the attorney? but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Jackson, 495 P.2d at 1255, 1257 (holding that a smelting facility that regularly forwarded emissions data to its legal counsel cannot foreclose the discovery process by the simple expedient of funneling the matter into its counsel's custody); cf. Utah R. Evid. 408 (noting that even though evidence of settlement negotiations is inadmissible in Utah courts, [t]his rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations). ¶ 16 This same analysis supports our conclusion that the privilege should extend only to the proceedings themselves, not to the facts, documents, and other evidence submitted to prelitigation panels. An overly broad application of the confidentiality requirement  extending it to documents and evidence that would otherwise be available through independent sources  would unfairly influence future litigation by allowing parties to use prelitigation proceedings as a device to strategically obscure relevant facts, expert opinions, and other legal documents through the simple expedient of presenting them to a prelitigation panel. Prelitigation proceedings were never intended to be a trap for the unwary whereby a party could lose her ability to utilize otherwise available evidence or her attorney's or expert's own work product. ¶ 17 Finally, the public policies behind the prelitigation panels and their attendant confidentiality requirement similarly support a narrow interpretation of the confidentiality provision. The stated purpose of the prelitigation panel proceedings is to encourage the early evaluation and settlement of [malpractice] claims. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (2002). But precluding the future use of all opinion evidence and other documents submitted to a prelitigation panel would discourage parties from submitting this material to the panel, thereby severely limiting the panel's and the parties' ability to honestly evaluate the potential claim. In short, an overly broad application of Utah Code section 78-14-12(1)(d) would undermine the very purpose of prelitigation panel review. ¶ 18 We conclude that documents and information obtained by a party solely through participation in proceedings before a prelitigation panel are confidential, privileged, and immune from civil process pursuant to Utah Code section 78-14-12(1)(d). A party is free, however, to share materials created by that party or obtained by that party independent of the proceedings before the panel. Because the items at issue in this appeal were, in fact, created by Munson's own counsel and consulting expert, Munson's counsel was free to disclose them to Munson's testifying expert and defendants were then free to use them as a basis for cross-examining that expert. [3]