Opinion ID: 2053481
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: proof required under the civil rights act

Text: At oral argument, the defendant argued that the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green [4] burden-shifting test does not apply because, in a reduction-in-force situation, there is no replacement. However, the defendant is incorrect that the burden-shifting test just doesn't work under the facts of this case. As this Court stated in Town v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 455 Mich. 688, 568 N.W.2d 64 (1997), a plaintiff does not have to prove she was discharged and replaced to prove a prima facie case. Indeed, we stated: The ... prima facie approach requires an employee to show that the employee was (1) a member of a protected class, (2) subject to an adverse employment action, (3) qualified for the position, and that (4) others, similarly situated and outside the protected class, were unaffected by the employer's adverse conduct. [ Id. at 695, 568 N.W.2d 64.] However, as a tangential issue, the difficulty is determining what amount of proof is necessary to survive summary disposition. The problem is that each case comes with its particular facts and circumstances, making it difficult to set a formula for determining what evidence is necessary in each case. I believe that, as a practical matter, applying McDonnell Douglas to any case should not make it any easier or any more difficult for a plaintiff to show an issue of fact for the jury, than it would be if the test never existed. I believe proper application of McDonnell Douglas supports this, as does this Court's opinion in Town. Once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case, and the defendant has articulated its legitimate business reason for the adverse employment action, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists whether the plaintiff was fired because of discrimination. All plaintiff's evidence should be considered at this final stage, including her prima facie evidence. The proofs offered in support of the prima facie case may be sufficient to create a triable issue of fact that the employer's stated reason is a pretext, as long as the evidence would enable a reasonable factfinder to infer that the employer's decision had a discriminatory basis. [ Id. at 697, 568 N.W.2d 64.] As is required of any case, the evidence must create a material issue of fact on which reasonable minds could conclude that the employer's stated reason is a pretext for discrimination for summary judgment to be precluded. Id. at 698, 568 N.W.2d 64.