Opinion ID: 41795
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Race and gender

Text: Crawford argues that white and female employees were granted certain benefits when these were denied him. Title VII states that “[federal employees] shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). A plaintiff may prove a claim of disparate treatment by establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Jones v. 5 Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1538 (11th Cir. 1989). To set out a prima facie case, the plaintiff may show that: “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) he was replaced by a person outside his protected class or was treated less favorably than a similarly-situated individual outside his protected class.” Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of the Univs. of the Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003). After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Gerwens, 874 F.2d at 1538. “[T]he plaintiff then must establish that the employer’s articulated reason was a pretext for discrimination . . . the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of purposeful discrimination.” Id. at 1538-39. Here, the only prima facie element at issue was whether Crawford was treated less favorably than comparators. We have held that “the most important variables in the disciplinary context, and the most likely sources of different but nondiscriminatory treatment, are the nature of the offenses committed and the nature of the punishments imposed.” Id. at 1539-40. “[T]o meet the comparability requirement a plaintiff is required to show that he is similarly situated in all relevant aspects to the non-minority employee.” Silvera v. Orange County School 6 Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). Here, Crawford failed to provide any evidence that he was similarly situated to or similarly treated as any other individuals, and , therefore, has failed to make a prima facie claim of either race or gender discrimination. Assuming arguendo that Crawford made a prima facie case of race or gender discrimination, his claim is still without merit. OSHA gave four legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for Crawford’s termination. Specifically OSHA claimed that Crawford (1) failed to follow procedure when requesting leave, (2) intentionally falsified his time and attendance record, (3) had a lack of candor with management, and (4) was absent without leave. The burden then shifted to Crawford, and he had to prove that these reasons were pretextual. “To survive summary judgment, the plaintiff must then present concrete evidence in the form of specific facts which show that the defendant’s proffered reason is mere pretext. Mere conclusory allegations and assertions will not suffice.” Earley v. Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court has held that “a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. V. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2752, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (emphasis in the original) (internal quotations omitted). Here, OSHA gave four legitimate nondiscriminatory 7 reasons, and Crawford failed to present any evidence that these reasons were false and that they were not the real reasons for his termination. Therefore, Crawford has failed to show that OSHA’s reasons were pretextual.