Opinion ID: 2546413
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Defendant's Statements to Deputy Sheriff Munson

Text: Defendant next contends the trial court violated his Miranda rights ( Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ( Miranda )) when it admitted evidence regarding two sets of statements he made to Deputy Sheriff Janice Munson that bore on his guilt of stabbing inmate Price in county jail. The now familiar rule in Miranda relies on the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution to preclude the evidentiary use of statements made pursuant to a custodial interrogation unless the suspect has knowingly and intelligently waived the rights to remain silent and to the presence and assistance of an attorney, the latter provided at state expense for indigent suspects. (See People v. Storm (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1007, 1021, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 110, 52 P.3d 52.) `Interrogation' consists of express questioning, or words or actions on the part of the police that `are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.' ( People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 993, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519, quoting Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297.) Just as well established, however, is that [s]tatements volunteered when not in response to an interrogation are admissible against a defendant, even after an initial assertion of the right to remain silent. ( People v. McDaniel (1976) 16 Cal.3d 156, 172, 127 Cal.Rptr. 467, 545 P.2d 843.) An appellate court applies the independent or de novo standard of review, which by its nature is nondeferential, to a trial court's granting or denial of a motion to suppress a statement under Miranda insofar as the trial court's underlying decision entails a measurement of the facts against the law. ( People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 730, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) Applying this standard, we conclude the trial court correctly found defendant's statements to Deputy Munson were not made in response to interrogation, were instead gratuitously volunteered, and were thus admissible. In the first set of statements, Deputy Munson testified she had encountered defendant in the food line in county jail and he had addressed her, saying: `What's happening, Deputy Munson?' Recognizing him, she asked him if he was going to stay out of trouble. He responded: `Yeah, it was nothing. I don't know why they are bothering with all this court. I am guilty. I hit that guy in the yard.' By saying he hit someone, defendant used jail jargon meaning he had stabbed someone. Munson testified defendant appeared nonchalant. And he just spontaneously said it. I never questioned him about that particular day. I was just inquiring why he was back out [of the high security area]. In the second set of statements, Deputy Munson testified that that evening or the next day, she was transporting defendant back to a high security area. He asked her why he was being moved, and she replied it was for his own protection. He responded: `It is no big deal. I don't know why. I am probably going to face the death penalty anyway.' She agreed with the prosecutor that defendant made this statement just matter of factly. The trial court held neither set of statements was made in response to interrogation, but they were instead volunteered by defendant and thus their admission did not violate Miranda. The record amply supports this finding; hence, we conclude the statements were properly admitted into evidence. Defendant's further argument that the admission of Deputy Munson's testimony violated his Sixth Amendment rights under Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 was not preserved for appellate review by a timely objection on that ground. (See People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1007, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044 [reaching the Massiah claim although implying it was waived for failure to object].) We also deny it on the merits. In order to make out the Sixth Amendment claim, defendant had the burden of `demonstrat[ing] that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.' ( Ibid., quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986) 477 U.S. 436, 459, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 364.) Applying independent review, we conclude Deputy Munson did not deliberately elicit defendant's incriminating comments and thus did not violate his Massiah rights. [41]