Opinion ID: 1163237
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Correct Test

Text: In State v. Meyer, 78 Hawai`i 308, 893 P.2d 159 (1995), we stated that [b]oth the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution [6] and article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution [7] ensure that an individual's legitimate expectations of privacy will not be subjected to unreasonable governmental intrusions.... The basic purpose of these constitutional provisions is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials. Id. at 311-12, 893 P.2d at 162-63 (citations, internal quotation marks, internal brackets, and some ellipses omitted) (emphases added). As illustrated by the aforementioned language, the purpose of the fourth amendment and article I, section 7 is to protect individuals against intrusions by the government. See also Furuyama, 64 Haw. at 120, 637 P.2d at 1102 (The Fourth Amendment['s] protection applies to governmental action. (Citation omitted.)). Thus, if Mrs. Kahoonei was acting as a private individual, any evidence she obtained may be properly admitted. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2048-49, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (holding that, if private persons act wholly on their own initiative, evidence turned over to police is admissible), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874, 92 S.Ct. 26, 30 L.Ed.2d 120 (1971); People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378, 292 N.Y.S.2d 874, 239 N.E.2d 625, 628 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1057, 89 S.Ct. 698, 21 L.Ed.2d 699 (1969) ([S]ince the evidence in this case was seized without the participation or knowledge of any governmental official, it is admissible in a criminal prosecution.). However, if Mrs. Kahoonei was acting as an agent of the government, the proscriptions of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution would apply. See Furuyama, 64 Haw. at 120, 637 P.2d at 1102; see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 614, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1411-12, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) ([The Fourth] Amendment protects against [searches and seizures] if [a] private party acted as an instrument or agent of the Government.). In deciding Mrs. Kahoonei's role, the ICA, as previously stated, relied on Boynton and enumerated four factors that it believed required examination in determining whether a symbiotic relationship existed between the police and Mrs. Kahoonei. The Boynton court, however, specifically stated that, [i]n defining a private search, the Supreme Court has stated that the fourth amendment applies only if the private party, in light of all circumstances of the case, must be regarded as having acted as an instrument or agent of the state. Application of this definition will frequently require a careful factual analysis. Boynton, 58 Haw. at 536, 574 P.2d at 1334 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). By limiting its analysis to the four Boynton factors and relying heavily on the motivation of the private individual, the ICA misinterpreted the correct test to be applied in determining whether Mrs. Kahoonei acted as a private individual or as a government agent. We recognize that, when determining whether a private individual is a government agent under article I, section 7 or the fourth amendment, there is no bright-line rule of application. Instead, we must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the governmental involvement is significant or extensive enough to objectively render an otherwise private individual a mere arm, tool, or instrumentality of the state. In so doing, we focus on the actions of the government, because, as discussed infra, the subjective motivation of a private individual is irrelevant. Our decision in Boynton remains good law to the extent that it enumerates some of the relevant factors that may be considered in a totality of the circumstances inquiry. However, because Kahoonei I may potentially mislead other courts and because we recognize that in retrospect our pronouncements are sometimes more enigmatic than we would wish, State v. Schroeder, 76 Hawai`i 517, 524, 880 P.2d 192, 199 (1994), we now explicitly hold that the correct test for determining whether a private individual is a government agent is the totality of the circumstances test. Requiring a private individual's search and seizure of evidentiary items to be subject to a totality of the circumstances inquiry calls for an examination of all relevant government actions. State courts in other jurisdictions have also determined that an examination of all attendant circumstances is the most accurate method of determining whether a private individual acted as a government agent. For example, in State v. Knudsen, 500 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa.Ct.App.1993), the Iowa Court of Appeals observed that the Iowa Supreme Court [has] set out some guidelines for determining whether a private citizen should be considered an agent of the state: Whether a private citizen has become an agent or instrument of the state depends on the total circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct. Id. at 86 (emphasis added). In Knudsen, there was testimony that, inter alia, the police officer was unaware of the private citizens' conduct at issue, did not anticipate their actions, and was completely removed from the area. The court held that, [c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not err in finding [that the private citizens] had not acted as an instrument. . . of the state[.] Id. (emphasis added). See also People v. Aguilar, 897 P.2d 84, 85 (Colo.1995) (The resolution of whether an individual becomes such an `agent' of the police is determined by the totality of the circumstances. (Citations omitted.)); Burk v. State, 848 P.2d 225, 234 (Wyo.1993) (holding that a private individual's actions were voluntary in light of all of the circumstances); State v. Sanders, 327 N.C. 319, 395 S.E.2d 412, 422 (1990) ([W]e conclude that determining whether a private citizen's search or seizure is attributable to the State and therefore subject to constitutional scrutiny demands a totality of the circumstances inquiry.).