Opinion ID: 1784340
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Step Two: Did the Detectives Clarify Holland's Question?

Text: As discussed, an ambiguous utterance means that any subsequent interrogation must be limited to attempts to clarify and must not coerce or intimidate the suspect into waiving his rights. Fouche, 833 F.2d at 1287 (citing Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 517-18 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981, 100 S.Ct. 485, 62 L.Ed.2d 409 (1979)); see Owen, 849 F.2d at 539 (When a defendant makes an equivocal request for an attorney during a custodial interrogation, `the scope of the interrogation is immediately narrowed to one subject and one only. Further questioning thereafter must be limited to clarifying that request until it is clarified.') (quoting Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 771 (5th Cir.1979) (emphasis omitted); Terry v. LeFevre, 862 F.2d 409, 412 (2d Cir.1988) (`[W]hen a suspect makes an equivocal statement that arguably can be construed as a request for counsel, interrogation must cease except for narrow questions designed to clarify the earlier statement and the suspect's desire for counsel.') (quoting Gotay, 844 F.2d at 975); accord United States v. Pena, 897 F.2d 1075, 1081-82 (11th Cir.1990) (discussing analogous law pertaining to ambiguous invocation of right to remain silent) (citing cases); Delap v. Dugger, 890 F.2d 285, 290 (11th Cir.1989) (same). Of utmost import, an interrogator's behavior must not exceed the limits of permissible clarification. Courts have concluded that determining the propriety of such behavior is essentially a factual issue that requires review under a clearly erroneous standard. See, e.g., Fouche, 833 F.2d at 1286; United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200-02 (9th Cir.) ( en banc ), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). The critical factor in determining the validity of the government's behavior is whether a review of the whole event discloses that the interviewing agent has impinged on the exercise of the suspect's continuing option to cut off the interview. Fouche, 833 F.2d at 1287 (quoting Nash, 597 F.2d at 518); see Butzin v. Wood, 886 F.2d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir.1989) (An officer's attempt to seek clarification of an ambiguous statement is not generally construed as interrogation for Miranda purposes if the question does not `enhance the defendant's guilt or raise the offense to a higher degree.') (quoting W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 514 (1984)); Christopher v. State of Florida, 824 F.2d 836, 842 (11th Cir.1987) (Clarification may not include questions that, though clothed in the guise of `clarification,' are designed to, or operate to, delay, confuse or burden the suspect in his assertion of his rights.) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1077, 108 S.Ct. 1057, 98 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1988). In the case sub judice, the trial judge did not reach the clarification issue because he found that Holland's question or utterance constituted an unambiguous waiver of rights. The judge did, however, make a relevant fact-finding with which Holland does not dispute: The officer responded [to Holland's question] by again advising him of his right to an attorney  his constitutional right to an attorney; and that, if he did not want to talk to them he did not have to; that there were two sides to every story, they had heard one side and they wanted to hear his side. The Defendant responded, Ok he would talk to them. Vol. I, at 75-77. Immediately following Holland's decision to waive his rights and talk to them, the officers again advised Holland of his rights  which he again waived before confessing. Thus, the officers did not overreach or wander into un constitutional territory. They merely clarified Holland's ambiguous question by twice explaining his option to exercise his Miranda rights or to relate his side of the story. The latter option prevailed; Holland decided he would talk to them. [7] In sum, Detectives Payne and Terrell's response, which culminated in Holland's decision to waive his rights, did not exceed constitutional parameters. With the foregoing in mind, this Court must finally determine whether Holland knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights.