Opinion ID: 589992
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: liability under michigan civil rights act

Text: 71 The jury responded to specific interrogatories (called the jury roll) on the issue of Wayne's liability under Michigan law for alleged racial discrimination and retaliation. It found that Wayne denied neither plaintiff his civil rights (question 8) nor discriminated against either because of his race (question 9). The jury then found that Wayne did retaliate against both by taking ... adverse action ... because [they] filed this lawsuit (after March 15, 1985). Michigan's law proscribes retaliation or discrimination against a person because the person has opposed a violation of this act, or because the person has made a charge, [or] filed a complaint.... Mich.Stat.Ann. § 3.548(701) [M.C.L.A. § 37.2701]. The retaliation charge was made under the Michigan Act, not a federal civil rights act. 72 The district court instructed the jury, and we find no error in these instructions, that to find retaliation under the state law it must find, after the filing of this lawsuit, that Wayne acted against plaintiffs through some sort of adverse job consequence, and that the filing was the likely reason for any adverse conduct or consequence. Under the statute, retaliation is the wrongful consequence imposed upon a person for pursuing a claim of employment discrimination. This is similar to retaliation under Title VII and the standard[ ] of liability ... appear[s] to be identical. Kitchen v. Chippewa Valley Schools, 825 F.2d 1004, 1014 (6th Cir.1987) (citing Jenkins v. Southeastern Mich. Chapter, Amer. Red Cross, 141 Mich.App. 785, 369 N.W.2d 223, 227 n. 2 (1985); Clark v. Uniroyal Corp., 119 Mich.App. 820, 327 N.W.2d 372, 374 (1982)). 73 Under Michigan law, however, unlike Title VII retaliation, there may be a recovery for discrimination or retaliation related thereto: It is well established that victims of discrimination may recover for humiliation, embarrassment, outrage, disappointment and other forms of mental anguish.... Jenkins, 369 N.W.2d at 230. The jury found the retaliatory actions, arising out of racial discrimination claims, were not the proximate cause of damages. While giving a general damages instruction on all causes of action, the district court did not instruct the jury specifically as to the nature of mental and personal embarrassment elements of retaliation damages under Michigan law. The jury's decision not to award any damages under the circumstances, once it had found some sort of adverse job consequence due to the filing of this suit, is inconsistent and seems unjust, particularly since the court failed to apprise the jury specifically of non-economic (emotional) consequences that might be attributable to the retaliation. While we do not adopt a rule requiring a separate recitation of the elements of damages as to each claim in a jury instruction, a complicated and complex case of this kind indicates that the jury may have been confused about the relationship between this particular claim and the emotional injury aspect of damages on the other causes of action. There is some question also concerning when the retaliation took place and when, at the earliest, it may have commenced. We find that plaintiffs' failure to object to the instruction as to the time frame (March 15, 1985), present also in the jury interrogatory, precludes our setting aside the jury decision on no damages with respect to the use of this date as a beginning point for retaliation. 74 On the other hand, we believe it appropriate to remand, in the interests of justice, although we dislike the prospect of a second remand in this case on a damages issue, for a new trial on the issue of non-economic damages resulting from retaliation. On remand, the district court should give a specific retaliation instruction dealing with humiliation, embarrassment, outrage, disappointment and other forms of mental anguish ..., particularly since the retaliation arose following a finding of a false and malicious libel by Ford who allegedly was acting with the authority of defendant Wayne. 75 Elliott-Larsen forbids retaliation or discrimination against a person because the person has opposed a violation of this act, or because the person has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this act. Mich.Comp.Laws § 37-2701(a). It was enacted some ten years subsequent to Title VII and was intended to provide similar protections. Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1311 (6th Cir.1989). Michigan courts look to Title VII in order to resolve questions under Elliott-Larsen, and section 37.201 at issue here clearly tracks section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. Booker, 879 F.2d at 1311-12. Thus, section 37.2701 should be construed in the same manner as its federal counterpart. Id. at 1312. 76 Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 415 n. 1 (6th Cir.1992). 77 As we have indicated, the Elliott-Larsen Act concept of retaliation is intended to provide protection and relief in the employment context above and beyond damages for retaliation under Title VII; the elements of a finding of substantive retaliation under Title VII have, until 1991, brought about only affirmative forms of equitable relief for the offended plaintiffs. 10 The Michigan law, to the contrary, grants a jury trial and damages for mental and emotional distress brought about by retaliation. 11 On remand, the district court may conclude that in any event plaintiffs are entitled to at least nominal damages for the retaliation found on the part of Wayne, although the verdict would deny any economic damages, as such. We AFFIRM the verdicts against both plaintiffs for Wayne as to economic damages for retaliation.