Opinion ID: 74353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unconstitutional Impediment

Text: Apart from equitable tolling, as adopted by the courts, the one-year limitation on a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion can run not only from the date of the final conviction, but also from the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action. Akins alleges that he was denied access to the courts by being placed in lockdown because he was unable to use the law library to prepare his motion. Although it is well established that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts, the Supreme Court has clarified its decision in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), stating that access to the law libraries is not required of prisons, but rather is one way of assuring the constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). The mere inability of a prisoner to access the law library is not, in itself, an unconstitutional impediment. The inmate must show that this inability caused an actual harm, or in other words, unconstitutionally prevented him from exercising that fundamental right of access to the courts in order to attack his sentence or to challenge the conditions of his confinement. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. Akins' failure to explain his inability to file the motion prior to lockdown, as discussed above, is also fatal to his claim of an unconstitutional impediment. The record does not support a finding of actual injury when Akins fails to explain why the seven months prior to lockdown were inadequate to complete and file his motion. 4 Assuming, however, that the lockdown caused an actual injury, Akins has the burden of showing that the lockdown was not  'reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,'  in order for the lockdown to be considered an unconstitutional impediment. Id. at 361 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987)); see Harris v. I.K. Ostrout, Co., 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that a prisoner challenging a prison security regulation must rebut the presumption of reasonableness attached to that regulation). In this case, Akins has failed to present any proof that the lockdown from October 1996 through March 1997 was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The record before the Court merely shows that Akins' lockdown was for disciplinary reasons. Akins' conclusory statements of an unconstitutional violation are not supported by any evidence in the record. Thus, he has failed to meet his burden. Akins also failed to suggest any reason why the lockdown in April 1997 was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Rather, the record shows that the prison was in lockdown status because of violent outbreaks in which a prisoner fatally stabbed a corrections officer and injured four others. The lockdown was reasonably related to the legitimate interest of prison safety and the safety of correction officers. We do not engage in a search for the existence of less restrictive alternatives to lockdown, as the Court gives great deference to prison officials.  '[S]trict scrutiny [by the courts] would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration.'  Id. (citations omitted). Thus, Akins' lockdown status does not, on either occasion, rise to the level of an unconstitutional impediment.