Opinion ID: 2517672
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was Evidence of Third Party Culpability Outside the Scope of Our Reference Order?

Text: In response to the referee's report in Hardy I, respondentbefore this court issued its order to show cause in Hardy II filed his exceptions to the report. Respondent raises among those exceptions an important threshold question: Was evidence of Boyd's possible guilt of the murders outside the scope of our order of reference in Hardy I? Recalling that our order to show cause in Hardy I concerned the penalty phase only, respondent, as he did before the referee, argues that nothing in the habeas corpus petition [in Hardy I] or the supplemental pleadings thereto filed by petitioner set forth a claim of factual innocence [and] this Court obviously did not have a factual innocence claim before it for consideration when it filed the amended reference order in July of 1994. As we explain, we conclude the referee did not err in ruling the issue was within the scope of our reference order. At the outset of the evidentiary hearing in Hardy I, respondent objected to third party culpability evidence he anticipated petitioner would present, arguing that such evidence was not within the terms of our amended reference order. The referee declined to rule on the motion, wishing to see the direction the evidence would take, but later raised the issue sua sponte, essentially having respondent renew his objection. After hearing from both sides, the referee ruled he would not strike the evidence, explaining: I am going to deny [respondent's] motion to strike [the evidence] because I think it [is] relevant to the lingering doubt issue. The referee stated, however, that the evidence of third party culpability was beginning to appear cumulative and he reserved the right to control the evidence on that ground. Petitioner in Hardy I alleged his trial attorney was ineffective at the penalty phase for failing to present available mitigating evidence. He claimed Demby should have presented evidence that he engaged in an act of heroism, coming to the aid of a bus passenger being robbed, at great peril to himself, and evidence of his Outward Bound experience as a teenager. After referencing those issues, this court's order asked the referee to determine Demby's reasons for not presenting this available mitigating evidence and whether his reasons were supportable. In order for the referee to decide whether Demby's reasons were supportable, the referee was required to assess the overall strength of the mitigating evidence available to counsel. If strong mitigating evidence was available (e.g., family history, mental illness), counsel's decision to forgo it was more likely unreasonable. Similarly, if the available evidence supporting lingering doubt was weak, Demby's tactical decision to rely solely on that defense at the penalty phase would be questionable. On the other hand, if persuasive evidence of third party culpability was reasonably available, Demby's failure to discover and present such evidence would tend to suggest his strategic decision to rely solely on a lingering doubt defense was an ill-considered choice, unsupported by a reasonable investigation. Accordingly, we conclude evidence of third party culpability was properly admitted and considered by the referee, as it was within the scope of our order of reference. We turn now to petitioner's allegations in this proceeding and an assessment of the referee's findings following the contested evidentiary hearing in Hardy I.