Opinion ID: 1477292
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Current Laws Rights and Limits

Text: In order to determine whether Maryland's marriage law is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, it is first necessary to review how the Maryland statutory, regulatory, and case law has evolved to expand rights to gays and lesbians. It is highly significant that throughout this State, based on statutes and ordinances, discrimination against gays and lesbians is not tolerated or acceptable. As I will outline, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is against the law in this State. This context is important for analyzing whether the State's proffered interest is legitimate, and whether the State's means fit sufficiently the ends sought by the statute.
Over the past decade, Maryland has sought to eliminate discrimination based on sexual orientation and to reduce the disparate treatment of people based on sexual orientation, particularly in the areas of family law, criminal law, and anti-discrimination legislation. Starting in the mid-1990's, Maryland appellate courts rejected the notion that homosexual individuals should be treated differently than heterosexual individuals when determining parental rights. Specifically, Maryland courts have rejected the notion that a person is unfit for visitation rights because of his or her sexual orientation. Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 237-238, 721 A.2d 662, 678 (1998); North v. North, 102 Md.App. 1, 15-17, 648 A.2d 1025, 1032-33 (1994). In North, the Court of Special Appeals, en banc, held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a homosexual father overnight visitation rights by focusing on the perceived harms of exposing his children to his homosexual lifestyle instead of focusing on the proper question of whether visitation was in the best interests of his children. North, 102 Md.App. at 15-17, 648 A.2d at 1032-33. This Court has held subsequently that the sexual preference of the non-custodial parent whose visitation is being challenged is not relevant, and that restrictions on visitation should be reviewed under the best interests of the child standard. Boswell, 352 Md. at 236-238, 721 A.2d at 678. Indeed, we noted in Boswell that the only relevance that a parent's sexual conduct or lifestyle has in the context of a visitation proceeding of this type is where that conduct or lifestyle is clearly shown to be detrimental to the children's emotional and/or physical well-being. Id. at 237-38, 721 A.2d at 678. Maryland appellate courts have not considered sexual orientation as a factor when determining third party custody rights. In a custody dispute between two homosexual women, the Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court was required to exercise jurisdiction over a child visitation lawsuit brought by the biological mother's former same-sex partner under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, even if Tennessee was the more convenient forum. Gestl v. Frederick, 133 Md.App. 216, 244-45, 754 A.2d 1087, 1102-03 (2000). The court noted that the former partner, who was not a biological parent, would lack standing to bring an action in Tennessee absent a finding that parental custody would result in substantial harm to the child, whereas Maryland law entitled the third party an opportunity to show that exceptional circumstances existed that would make it in the child's best interests to grant her custody. [9] Id. The sexual orientation of the individuals raising the custody claim was not a relevant factor in the court's holding  the former same-sex partner was viewed as any other third party who had a role in the child's life and could show exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., Shurupoff v. Vockroth, 372 Md. 639, 814 A.2d 543 (2003) (affirming grant of custody to grandparents); Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 116, 43 A.2d 186 (1945) (denying father's petition for custody when child had been living with foster parents for five years); Pastore v. Sharp, 81 Md.App. 314, 322, 567 A.2d 509, 513 (1989), cert. denied, 319 Md. 304, 572 A.2d 182 (1990) (finding exceptional circumstances when child had been in custody of third party for two of his five years, child had become attached to third party, and his future would lack stability and certainty if placed with the natural mother); Newkirk v. Newkirk, 73 Md.App. 588, 595, 535 A.2d 947, 950-51 (1988) (finding exceptional circumstances in awarding custody of teenage children to half-brother, rather than natural father). Although the issue of same-sex adoption has not been addressed by this Court, Maryland law does not appear to preclude same-sex couple adoptions. The plain language of Family Law § 5-3A-29 permits any adult to adopt. [10] Md.Code (1984, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 5-3A-29 of the Family Law Article. Thus, the statute does not appear to distinguish between the adoption of children by homosexuals or same-sex couples. [11] Individuals in a same-sex relationship may adopt, even though currently they are not allowed to marry under Maryland law, because there is no requirement that an adult seeking to adopt a child be married. Md.Code (1984, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 5-349(b) (stating that a petition for adoption may not be denied solely because the petitioner is single or unmarried.). In traditional adoptions and single-person adoptions, a child is adopted by one or two new parents and all legal relationships with prior parents are terminated. Maryland also recognizes second-parent adoptions, where a child with one parent is adopted by a second parent without severing the prior-existing parental relationship. [12] Id. § 5-331(b)(2) (adoption without prior termination of parental rights). Maryland's trial courts have granted same-sex couples second-parent adoptions and have noted that such adoptions are in the best interests of the child. See In re Petition of D.L.G. & M.A.H., No. 95-179001/CAD, 2 MFLM Supp. 21 (1997) (Cir. Ct. Balt. City, June 27, 1996); Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of the Att'y Gen., Sharon Grosfeld, Delegate, Maryland Gen. Assemb. (June 9, 2000). Thus, sexual orientation is not a factor in adoption proceedings in Maryland, and the children adopted by same-sex couples are treated under Maryland law in the same way as children adopted by a heterosexual or married couple. Maryland has acted to protect gays and lesbians in the area of criminal law. The General Assembly has amended Maryland's hate crime statutes to prohibit committing a crime upon a persons or property because of sexual orientation. See Md. Code (2002, 2006 Cum.Supp.), §§ 10-301 to 10-306 of the Criminal Law Article. Maryland has addressed the decriminalization of sexual acts for both heterosexual and homosexual couples. In Schochet v. State, 320 Md. 714, 580 A.2d 176 (1990), this Court held that Maryland's statute criminalizing unnatural or perverted sexual practices did not encompass private, consensual, noncommercial, heterosexual activity between adults. [13] See Md.Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 554. In 1998, a Maryland circuit court extended the Schochet ruling to hold that the unnatural or perverted sexual practices statute, § 554, did not encompass consensual, noncommercial, heterosexual or homosexual activity. See Williams v. Glendening, No. 98036031/CL-1059, 1998 WL 965992 (Md.Cir.Ct. Oct. 15, 1998). It is worth noting that the defendant State of Maryland specifically argued that § 554 should be construed so as not to apply to private, consensual, non-commercial homosexual activity because any other interpretation gives rise to an equal protection question. Id. at . The Circuit Court held that [i]t cannot be doubted . . . that there would be an equal protection violation if acts, considered not criminal when committed by a heterosexual couple, could be prosecuted when practiced by a homosexual couple. There is simply no basis for the distinction. [14] Id. at . Thus, four years prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003), which invalidated Texas' homosexual sodomy law, Maryland's courts and executive branch had already determined that private, consensual, non-commercial sex is non-criminal. [15] Maryland public policy prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in public accommodation, housing, and employment. See Anti-discrimination Act, 2001 Md. Laws Chap. 340. The Anti-discrimination Act of 2001 bans discrimination based on sexual orientation, defined as the identification of an individual as to male or female homosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality. [16] Id. The Act states that it, may not be construed to authorize or validate a marriage between two individuals of the same-sex and it may not be construed to require or prohibit an employer to offer health insurance benefits to unmarried domestic partners, but the Act as a whole firmly establishes that Maryland's public policy prohibits adverse treatment based on sexual orientation. Id. There are a multitude of other state-wide laws and regulations that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation in a variety of categories. It is unlawful for social workers, judges, and the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, for example, to discriminate based on sexual orientation. Md.Code (1981, 2005 Repl. Vol, 2006 Cum.Supp.), § 19-311 of the Health and Occupations Article; Md. Rule 16-813 Canon 3A (A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office . . . impartially, and without having or manifesting bias or prejudice, including bias or prejudice based on . . . sexual orientation. . . .); Md.Code (1957, 2002 Repl. Vol), Art. 29, § 1-107. Maryland has regulated several other areas to further the goal of sexual orientation equality. [17] Many Marylanders are similarly and further protected by county or municipal laws. Howard County, Prince George's County, Baltimore City, Montgomery County, and Anne Arundel County have ordinances that, in some form, prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Howard County Code § 12.200 (2007) (prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation generally); Id. § 12.207 (prohibiting housing discrimination); Id. § 12.208 (prohibiting employment discrimination); Id. § 12.209 (prohibiting discrimination by law enforcement personnel); Id. § 12.210 (prohibiting public accommodation discrimination); Id. § 12.211 (prohibiting financing discrimination); Id. § 19.513 (prohibiting discrimination in use of open space areas); Prince George's County Code § 2-210 (2003) (prohibiting housing discrimination); Id. § 2-231.01 (prohibiting commercial real estate discrimination); Id. § 5A-117 (prohibiting cable service discrimination); Id. § 10A-122 (prohibiting discrimination in award of contracts); Id. § 16-101 (prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in the personnel system of the County); Baltimore City Code art. 4, § 3-1 (2000) (prohibiting employment discrimination); Id. § 3-2 (prohibiting public accommodations discrimination); Id. § 3-3 (prohibiting education discrimination); Id. § 3-4 (prohibiting health and welfare agency discrimination); Id. § 3-5 (prohibiting housing discrimination); Id. art. 5, § 31-3 (providing for an annual review of licensed medical service providers to certify that they do not deny service on the basis of sexual orientation); Id. art. 19, § 23-2 (providing for the tracking of hate crimes motivated by the victim's sexual orientation); Montgomery County Code § 27-1 (2004); Id. § 8A-15 (prohibiting cable service discrimination); Id. § 27-11 (prohibiting public accommodations discrimination); Id. § 27-12 (prohibiting housing discrimination); Id. § 27-16 (prohibiting commercial real estate discrimination); Id. § 27-19 (prohibiting employment discrimination); Id. § 27-22 (prohibiting discrimination through intimidation); Id. app. D, § 6.19 (prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination by licensees granted licenses by the Board of Licensing Commission); Code of Montgomery County Regulations § 21.02.18.04 (2004) (prohibiting discrimination by fire rescue personnel); Id. § 27.26.01.01 (including crimes committed against a person because of their sexual orientation as hate crimes); Id. § 33.07.01.05 (prohibiting employment discrimination in county operations); Anne Arundel County Code § 10-8-111 (2005) (prohibiting cable service discrimination). Amongst these counties, Montgomery County is unique because it has extended certain employment benefits to the same-sex domestic partners of County employees  rights previously only enjoyed by heterosexual couples through the civil contract of marriage. [18] See Employee Benefits Equity Act of 1999 (the Act), Montgomery County Code § 33-22 (2004) (providing certain insurance and financial benefits to same-sex domestic partnerships); Id. § 52-24 (extending tax exemption for property transfers to same-sex couples). The Act, generally, extends benefits, such as health, leave, and survivor benefits comparable to those afforded the spouses of County employees, to the domestic partners of County employees, including those benefits available under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), the federal Family and Medical Leave Act, and other federal laws that apply to County employment benefits. Id. at § 33-22(b). This Court upheld the constitutionality of the Montgomery County Act. See Tyma v. Montgomery County, 369 Md. 497, 801 A.2d 148 (2002) (holding that a home rule county does not exceed its local lawmaking authority or otherwise undermine State and federal law by providing benefits to the domestic partners of its employees). We held that the Act did not implicate Maryland's marriage laws. Id. at 514-15, 801 A.2d at 158. Instead, we determined that the County had demonstrated a valid public purpose for extending employment benefits, namely recruit[ing] and retain[ing] qualified employees and . . . promot[ing] employee loyalty. Id. at 512, 801 A.2d at 157. Thus, under this State's home rule authority, Montgomery County was within its right to provide for the health and welfare of the County not already provided for by the public general law. Md.Code (1957, 1985 Repl.Vol., 2001 Cum.Supp.), Art. 25A, § 5(S).