Opinion ID: 1421686
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Gross Negligence Standard

Text: As the above analysis reflects, Officer Kelly's actions are not governed by N.C.G.S. § 20-145; his conduct in the instant case should instead be evaluated under an ordinary negligence standard. That is, Officer Kelly's negligence in this simple response activity is evidenced by his omission of the duty to exercise due care. Hanes v. Shapiro & Smith, 168 N.C. 24, 30, 84 S.E. 33, 36 (1915). However, if the instant case were a pursuit situation, N.C.G.S. § 20-145 is clear and unambiguous in its terms. The statute does not protect law enforcement officers acting in the chase or apprehension of law violators from the consequence of a reckless disregard of the safety of others. N.C.G.S. § 20-145. [6] This Court has clearly interpreted N.C.G.S. § 20-145 as establishing a standard of care for law enforcement officers, rather than an exemption from the statute. Parish v. Hill, 350 N.C. at 238, 513 S.E.2d at 551. Contrary to this Court's well-reasoned earlier precedent, the decision in Young v. Woodall violated the basic tenet of stare decisis in departing from the well-established, applicable, ordinary negligence standard of care when it adopted a higher gross negligence standard regarding N.C.G.S. § 20-145. 343 N.C. at 462, 471 S.E.2d at 359 (It seems clear to us that the standard of care intended by the General Assembly involves the reckless disregard of the safety of others, which is gross negligence.). [7] Most telling of this Court's disregard for the principle of stare decisis in Young was the authoring justice's acknowledgment that the application of the earlier precedent by the Court of Appeals was certainly reasonable. Id. Further, this abrupt departure lacked any comprehensive analysis or reason; nevertheless, gross negligence is now the applicable standard under N.C.G.S. § 20-145, though I would submit this interpretation is contrary to public policy. Correspondingly, our analysis thus turns upon the seamless web of the facts of the case sub judice and the corpus juris of gross negligence. While the majority confidently states the definition of gross negligence is reckless disregard of the safety of others, as stated in N.C.G.S. § 20-145, a survey of this Court's precedent, of various jurisdictions in the United States, and of persuasive scholarly analysis reveals the enigmatic nature of gross negligence. The difficulty in defining gross negligence is that it is a term so nebulous with no generally accepted meaning. W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984). The Supreme Court of South Carolina most recently defined gross negligence as [T]he intentional conscious failure to do something which it is incumbent upon one to do or the doing of a thing intentionally that one ought not to do. Gross negligence is also the failure to exercise slight care and is a relative term and means the absence of care that is necessary under the circumstances[,] which reflects the elusive nature of a workable gross negligence definition. Clark v. S.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 362 S.C. 377, 383, 608 S.E.2d 573, 576-77 (2005) (holding the question of whether a law enforcement officer's pursuit activities constituted gross negligence was for the jury) (citations omitted). Our Court has defined gross negligence as `wanton conduct done with conscious or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others.' Yancey v. Lea, 354 N.C. 48, 52, 550 S.E.2d 155, 157 (2001) (quoting Bullins, 322 N.C. at 583, 369 S.E.2d at 603); Parish, 350 N.C. at 239, 513 S.E.2d at 551. In defining willful and wanton conduct, this Court stated: An act is done wilfully when it is done purposely and deliberately in violation of law, or when it is done knowingly and of set purpose, or when the mere will has free play, without yielding to reason.... An act is wanton when it is done of wicked purpose, or when done needlessly, manifesting a reckless indifference to the rights of others. Foster v. Hyman, 197 N.C. 189, 191, 148 S.E. 36, 37-38 (1929) (citations omitted). We note this Court has often used the terms `willful and wanton conduct' and `gross negligence' interchangeably to describe conduct that falls somewhere between ordinary negligence and intentional conduct. Yancey, 354 N.C. at 52, 550 S.E.2d at 157. Finally, [a]n act or conduct rises to the level of gross negligence when the act is done purposely and with knowledge that such act is a breach of duty to others, i.e., a conscious disregard of the safety of others. Id. at 53, 550 S.E.2d at 158. When a law enforcement officer is engaged in a high speed vehicle operation under N.C.G.S. § 20-145, the law enforcement officer must conduct a balancing test, weighing the interests of justice in apprehending the fleeing suspect with the interests of the public in not being subjected to unreasonable risks of injury. Parish, 350 N.C. at 236, 513 S.E.2d at 550; see also Haynes v. Hamilton Cty., 883 S.W.2d at 613 ([P]ublic safety is the ultimate goal of law enforcement, and ... when the risk of injury to members of the public is high, that risk should be weighed against the police interest in immediate arrest of a suspect.). [8] Considering the precedent of this Court, I believe gross negligence can be found on the spectrum of liability beyond ordinary negligence while not reaching recklessness. The Supreme Court of the United States noted gross negligence and recklessness often share the same characteristics. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 n. 4, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (Between the poles [of negligence and purpose or knowledge] lies `gross negligence' too, but the term is a `nebulous' one, in practice typically meaning little different from recklessness as generally understood in the civil law....). However, in North Carolina, recklessness is distinguished from negligence by the degree of certainty that a bad outcome will occur as a result of defendant's misconduct and the ease with which it could have been avoided. The more certain the bad outcome and the easier it is to avoid, the more likely the defendant is guilty of heightened culpability. David A. Logan & Wayne A. Logan, North Carolina Torts, § 6.20, at 159 (2d ed. 2004). Specifically, reckless disregard of safety is defined as: [A]n act or intentional[] fail[ure] to do an act which it is [the actor's] duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 500, at 587 (1965). However, the Restatement also relates that reckless misconduct differs from that negligence which consists in intentionally doing an act with knowledge that it contains a risk of harm to others, in that the actor to be reckless must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater in amount than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. Id. § 500 cmt. g. [T]hat negligence referenced in the above passage is gross negligence, meaning negligent behavior beyond ordinary negligence but not satisfying the definition of recklessness. Unfortunately, the majority's attempted clarification of gross negligence jurisprudence in the instant case leaves gross negligence analysis more confusing than ever before. In relying upon a punitive damages statute which is completely inapplicable to the instant case, this Court has once again departed from precedent as to the definition of gross negligence. Gross negligence in North Carolina now encompasses actions which do not necessarily reach the level of willful and wanton conduct. The majority then blurs gross negligence further by evaluating Officer Kelly's actions using the supposedly discarded terms wicked purpose [9] and wanton conduct. Where this places the already elusive definition of gross negligence remains a question unanswered by the majority in the instant case. I, therefore, submit gross negligence in North Carolina is meant to encompass actions well beyond ordinary negligence and that nearly reflect a conscious disregard for the safety of others, which is apparent in the instant case by Officer Kelly's operation of his vehicle. [10]