Opinion ID: 179980
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Puiatti's Constitutional Right to an Individualized Sentencing Determination

Text: We start with Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), where the Supreme Court vacated a death sentence because the Ohio statute narrowly limited the type of mitigating factors the sentencer could consider. [21] A Supreme Court plurality discussed the concept of individualized sentencing, stressing [t]he need for treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual. Id. at 602, 605, 98 S.Ct. at 2963, 2965. The Supreme Court plurality noted the historical repudiation of mandatory death sentences for certain crimes, and how the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties. Id. at 604-05, 98 S.Ct. at 2964-65. The Supreme Court plurality concluded that in capital cases, the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death. Id. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion)) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court plurality conclude[d] that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Id. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964-65 (emphasis omitted). To meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors. Id. at 608, 98 S.Ct. at 2967. The Supreme Court held the Ohio statute invalid because it permitted consideration of only three mitigating factors. [22] Id. A few years later, a Supreme Court majority followed Lockett in Eddings v. Oklahoma, where a capital defendant presented mitigating evidence about his troubled childhood and emotional disorders, but the Oklahoma courts ruled that the sentencer could not consider that mitigating evidence. 455 U.S. 104, 105-10, 102 S.Ct. 869, 872-74, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). [23] The Oklahoma statute provided that evidence may be presented [in sentencing] as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in this act. Id. at 106, 102 S.Ct. at 872. The sentencing judge, however, stated he could not consider the fact of this young man's violent background. Id. at 109, 102 S.Ct. at 873. The Oklahoma appellate court affirmed, effectively excluding family history as a factor excusing or mitigating the capital defendant's behavior. See id. at 109-10, 102 S.Ct. at 874 (citing Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159, 1170 (Okla.Crim.App.1980)). The Supreme Court in Eddings found that the limitations placed by these [Oklahoma] courts upon the mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule in Lockett. Id. at 113, 102 S.Ct. at 876. The Eddings Court described Lockett as the product of considerable history reflecting the law's effort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the uniqueness of the individual. Id. at 110, 102 S.Ct. at 874 (emphasis added). The Eddings Court reasoned that [j]ust as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence. Id. at 113-14, 102 S.Ct. at 876-77. Further, the sentencer may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence, but may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration. Id. at 114-15, 102 S.Ct. at 877. Next came the capital sentencing case of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), overruled on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), where the Supreme Court vacated Penry's death sentence, stating, To provide the individualized sentencing determination required by the Eighth Amendment,... the sentencer must be allowed to consider mitigating evidence. 492 U.S. at 316, 109 S.Ct. at 2945. Texas's statute directed that the jury would decide Penry's sentence by answering three questions, called special issues. [24] The Supreme Court previously had upheld that statute, concluding that the special issues would be interpreted broadly enough to permit the sentencer to consider all of the relevant mitigating evidence a defendant might present in imposing sentence. Id. at 315, 109 S.Ct. at 2945. Although Penry presented mitigating evidence of mental retardation, organic brain damage, and a childhood of deprivation and physical abuse, the jury was given only the three questions and was never instructed that it could consider and give effect to Penry's mitigating evidence in imposing sentence. [25] Id. at 320, 322, 109 S.Ct. at 2947-48. The Penry Court stressed that [u]nderlying Lockett and Eddings is the principle that punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant. Id. at 319, 109 S.Ct. at 2947. In Lockett, Eddings, and Penry, the constitutional defect lay in the fact that relevant mitigating evidence was placed beyond the effective reach of the sentencer. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 366, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 2668, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993) (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 475, 113 S.Ct. 892, 902, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993)). Recently, the Supreme Court again examined a Texas death penalty statute in Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 127 S.Ct. 1654, 167 L.Ed.2d 585 (2007). [26] The trial court instructed the jury to decide only two special issues: (1) whether the defendant's conduct that caused the victim's death was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result; and (2) whether there was a probability that the defendant ... would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Id. at 238, 127 S.Ct. at 1660. The Texas statute mandated a death sentence if the jury answered yes to both special issues. [27] Id. at 239, 127 S.Ct. at 1660. Abdul-Kabir presented mitigating evidence from his mother, aunt, and mental health experts. Id. at 239-40, 127 S.Ct. at 1660-61. The trial court refused Abdul-Kabir's requested jury instructions that would have authorized a negative answer to either of the special issues based on mitigation evidence. Id. at 242, 127 S.Ct. at 1662. The jury answered yes to both special issues, and Abdul-Kabir was sentenced to death. Id. The Supreme Court observed that the sentencing process is fatally flawed when the jury is not permitted to give meaningful effect or a `reasoned moral response' to a defendant's mitigating evidencebecause it is forbidden from doing so by statute or a judicial interpretation of a statute. Id. at 264, 127 S.Ct. at 1675. Abdul-Kabir's mitigating evidence had relevance to his moral culpability beyond the scope of the two special questions in the Texas statute, and the denial of his requested instructions provided the jury with no vehicle for expressing its `reasoned moral response' to that evidence. Id. at 252-53, 256-57, 127 S.Ct. at 1668, 1670 (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 185, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2333, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). [S]entencing juries must be able to give meaningful consideration and effect to all mitigating evidence that might provide a basis for refusing to impose the death penalty on a particular individual. Id. at 246, 127 S.Ct. at 1664. In summary, Lockett and its progeny establish that Puiatti has a constitutional right under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments not only (1) to present any relevant mitigating evidence as to his unique, individual background, character, and record and the circumstances of his crime, but also (2) to have the sentencing jury or judge give meaningful consideration and effect to his mitigation evidence without such restrictions by state statute, judicial interpretation, or jury instructions. [28] Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 264-65, 127 S.Ct. at 1675; Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112-15, 102 S.Ct. at 875-77; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05, 98 S.Ct. at 2964-65. The core substantive ingredient in the constitutional right to an individualized sentencing is mitigation evidence relevant to the capital defendant as an individual or unique person (whether his background, character, mental health record, or circumstances of his crime), which a jury may consider to assess personal moral culpability and to determine an individualized sentence. None of these Supreme Court cases mentions joinder or severance. The constitutional right involved is not based on, or tied to, a separate trial. Rather, the constitutional right stems from the need for a presentation of, and consideration of, mitigation evidence relevant to the defendant as a unique individual. With this background, we turn to Puiatti's claims about his joint trial.