Opinion ID: 1757496
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether under these circumstances the city of jackson's acts are proprietary or governmental under municipal sovereign immunity; whether the city's officials are protected by qualified immunity; and whether sovereign immunity violates state or federal constitutional principles.

Text: A. Sovereign immunity cloaks all governmental functions a city performs. Webb v. Jackson, 583 So.2d 946, 952 (Miss. 1991). This Court defines governmental functions as those which the city is required to undertake. Anderson v. Jackson Mun. Airport Auth., 419 So.2d 1010, 1014 (Miss. 1982). [1] This Court has determined that the operation of a fire department is a governmental function. Jones v. City of Amory, 184 Miss. 161, 167, 185 So. 237, 238 (1939); City of Hattiesburg v. Geigor, 118 Miss. 676, 685, 79 So. 846, 847 (1918). More specifically, this Court has determined that the supply of water to combat fires, and fire fighting in general, is a governmental function. City of Columbus v. McIlwain, 205 Miss. 473, 487, 38 So.2d 921, 923 (1949). This principle holds regardless of whether the same supply provides drinking water, which is a proprietary activity. City of Columbus, 205 Miss. at 487, 38 So.2d at 923. In Mississippi, the governmental/proprietary distinction for cities still exists. As a result, Mississippi maintains sovereign immunity for its municipalities' fire protection, since governmental function immunity still protects that service. Westbrook also raises the question of a city losing sovereign immunity through negligence per se. [2] Wall v. City of Gulfport, 252 So.2d 891, 893 (Miss. 1971), stands for the proposition that a city's failure to follow its own ordinance may convert a governmental function into a proprietary action. The City of Gulfport was made liable because the ordinance specifically directed the city to place a traffic control light or sign at a certain spot, which it failed to do. Wall, 252 So.2d at 893. The annexation ordinance in this case is distinguishable, because it does not require the specific placement of water lines or mains in a certain point. Negligence per se is not applicable here. B. The next question is whether the City of Jackson's officers have immunity in this case. Governmental officers are immune from personal liability if the decision to provide water lines to a property, or certain aspects of fire protection to a property, is a discretionary matter involving public policy decisions. Sullivan v. Sumrall, 618 So.2d 1274, 1276 (Miss. 1993). Westbrook argues that the annexation ordinance required the City of Jackson to provide municipal level fire protection, making its provision ministerial in nature, as there was no choice but to provide that protection. Furthermore, Westbrook asserts that the City of Jackson's failure to provide service in the face of this ordinance was an intentional tort. Either assertion would serve to remove the public officials' qualified immunity. Grantham v. Department of Corrections, 522 So.2d 219, 225 (Miss. 1988). Westbrook's problem is that the annexation ordinance does not require the installation of water lines to his house. The ordinance reads: That the City of Jackson shall ... [i]stall water lines, sewer lines and street lighting where necessary and economically feasible.  (emphasis added). Furthermore, the ordinance, even though it mandates fire protection, does not require the City of Jackson to install water lines to Westbrook's property for fire protection. The very fact that the City of Jackson had the option to determine the placement of water lines on grounds of feasibility makes this action a discretionary process. See Poyner v. Gilmore, 171 Miss. 859, 865, 158 So. 922, 923 (1935). The question of feasibility involves an assessment of the optimum allocation of resources and is therefore, a question addressed to the discussion of the officials involved. Moreover, the ordinance's mandate of fire protection does not specify what constitutes adequate fire protection. The City of Jackson's fire units responded to this call. Because the ordinance does not specifically designate the conditions for provision of fire protection, the function of determining how to provide fire service to an area is discretionary, barring personal liability for that role. Poyner, 171 Miss. at 865, 158 So. at 923. C. The next question involves whether the principle of sovereign immunity is unconstitutional. This Court has held that sovereign immunity does not protect a political subdivision where the individual's constitutional rights have been violated. Tucker v. Hinds County, 558 So.2d 869, 872 (Miss. 1990). On this issue, the Court reviews constitutional claims arising from the provision of fire service itself. First, the federal claims, and then the state claims, are examined. Judge Tom S. Lee addressed the federal issues in this litigation. Westbrook v. City of Jackson, 772 F. Supp. 932, 935-43 (S.D.Miss. 1991). [3] It is clear that Westbrook does not have a federally protected property interest in fire protection by a city. Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443, 1446 (7th Cir.1984). The United States Supreme Court recognized this point when it stated, the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 196, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1003, 103 L.Ed.2d 249, 259 (1989). As for equal protection, Westbrook's claim must be scrutinized under a rational basis test, since he does not allege either that he is a member of a suspect class, or that a fundamental right is violated. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, ___, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d 257, 270 (1993). Westbrook must demonstrate that the City of Jackson's choices in providing protection were unreasonable. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161-1162, 25 L.Ed.2d 491, 501-502 (1970). A state may confer benefits on some and not others under equal protection, so long as its decision is rational. Doe v. Gaughan, 808 F.2d 871, 883 (1st Cir.1986). In apportioning limited resources, governments need not provide the same level of benefits to all recipients. Baker v. City of Concord, 916 F.2d 744, 748 (1st Cir.1990). Westbrook fails to show the City of Jackson's provision of fire service was irrational since the demonstration of infeasibleness in providing water lines, absent significant cost, is a legitimate reason not to run a line into Westbrook's home. Baker, 916 F.2d at 748. The next section reviews whether this case involves a violation of the state constitution. This Court has not determined whether an individual has a protected property interest in police and fire protection sufficient to trigger state due process analysis. This Court has held that an individual has a protected property interest in electrical power. Tucker v. Hinds County, 558 So.2d 869, 873 (Miss. 1990). However, more generally, this Court finds persuasive the federal court's interpretation of due process analysis, since the Tucker Court stated that both the state and federal due process clauses contain the same guarantee. Tucker, 558 So.2d at 873. Federal due process interests in property arise only from an independent source, such as state law statutory guarantees. Once found, the analysis shifts to whether the interest is constitutionally protected. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 1560, 56 L.Ed.2d 30, 39 (1978). Where a plaintiff fails to show a property interest through an independent source, due process considerations are not implicated. Reedy v. Mullins, 456 F. Supp. 955, 957-58 (W.D.Va. 1978). Westbrook has failed to demonstrate how the annexation ordinance, granting municipal level fire protection, gave him a property interest. The ordinance did not extend that protection to Westbrook personally. General guarantees of fire protection do not create protected property rights for an individual. Coffman v. Wilson Police Dept., 739 F. Supp. 257, 265 (E.D.Pa. 1990). Since Westbrook's only state law ground is the ordinance, which did not personally guarantee a water line to his property, no property interest arises under the United States or Mississippi Constitutions regarding due process. Applying similar logic to state equal protection rights, this Court holds that under the rational basis test, Westbrook fails to demonstrate how the City of Jackson's use of financial costs, as a criteria for the location of water lines, violates equal protection guarantees. Townsend v. Estate of Gilbert, 616 So.2d 333, 337 (Miss. 1993).