Opinion ID: 2211910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Respondents initially presented a plethora of arguments which amounted to nothing more than attempts to raise a smoke screen and avoid the consequences of their deplorable conduct. The sole legal issue in this case is whether the juvenile court's jurisdiction was properly invoked. The Court of Appeals decision in this case held that, under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), Indiana was not the child's home state and thus not the proper state to determine further custody matters. In re Lemond, (1979) Ind. App., 395 N.E.2d 1287, 1291. As stated earlier, the law of the case was established in that decision and if there had been a change in circumstances warranting a change in the divorce decree, this was for a Hawaii court to decide. This is not to say that an Indiana court under proper circumstances could never exercise emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJA. The emergency provision of that act, Ind. Code § 31-1-11.6-3 (Burns 1979 Supp.), provides in pertinent part: (a) a court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matter has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if: ..... (3) The child is physically present in this State and (A) the child has been abandoned or (B) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected or dependent. The Supreme Court of Indiana recently addressed the narrow nature of the emergency powers under subsection (a)(3) of the UCCJA in State ex rel. Marcrum v. Marion Superior Court, (1980) Ind., 403 N.E.2d 806. The Court in Marcrum stated: The only jurisdictional prerequisite under this subsection is presence of the child in this state. However, `When there is child neglect without emergency or abandonment, jurisdiction cannot be based on this paragraph.' National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Note to U.C.C.J.A. § 3 (1968), 9 U.L.A. 123, 124 (1979). We have no evidence before us indicating abandonment or an emergency, and we note that the father's self-serving statements alone are not sufficient to confer jurisdiction under this provision. Young v. District Court, (1977) 194 Colo. 140, 570 P.2d 249. Id. 403 N.E.2d at 808. These Courts will not tolerate the attempted use of emergency jurisdiction to reopen a fully litigated and decided custody battle, which is precisely what occurred here. Only where there is substantial evidence, not simply conclusory assertions, of an emergency, can emergency jurisdiction under § 31-1-11.6-3(a)(3) be invoked. In the case before us, the evidence clearly demonstrates nothing more than conclusory CHINS petitions initiated at the behest of the father, respondent Lemond, and his attorney, respondent Gray. In fact, the hearings on these CHINS petitions demonstrated a total lack of evidence to support respondent Arthur's findings and conclusions. One express purpose of the UCCJA is to avoid the continued controversies and abductions, and the repeated relitigation of custody matters. Additionally, it is the intent of the legislature that proper custody decrees from other jurisdictions be enforced. Ind. Code § 31-1-11.6-1 (Burns 1979 Supp.); State ex rel. Marcrum v. Marion Superior Court, supra . For these reasons, trial court judges must in all cases take a close look to determine if they should invoke emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJA. Here, however, respondents did not even purport to act under the emergency jurisdiction section of the UCCJA; instead they allegedly acted under the Child in Need of Services Statutes, Ind. Code § 31-6-4-3 et seq. (Burns 1979 Supp.), and the Emergency Medical Treatment sections of the Juvenile Code, Ind. Code §§ 31-6-7-12-14. In any event, to have attempted to act under the emergency sections of the UCCJA under the facts of this case would have been clear error. Respondents next contend that jurisdiction existed and was properly invoked under the CHINS statutes. Of course, in a true emergency situation, a juvenile court does have subject matter jurisdiction under the CHINS statutes. However, that jurisdiction must be invoked properly, and a court does not acquire jurisdiction over a particular juvenile case where the jurisdictional prerequisites are completely ignored. [15] Clearly, Ind. Code § 31-6-2-1 (Burns 1979 Supp.) gives a juvenile court exclusive original jurisdiction over CHINS cases. However, the exclusive original jurisdiction may only be obtained by the juvenile court as set forth above and unless such preliminary statutory procedural steps are taken there is no jurisdiction established. Summers v. State, (1967) 248 Ind. 551, 557, 230 N.E.2d 320, 323. [16] An examination of the CHINS statutes shows the following statutory prerequisites to jurisdiction. First, Ind. Code § 31-6-4-3(a)(1), (6) (Burns 1979 Supp.) provide the definitions of child in need of services under which respondents ostensibly proceeded: (a) A child is a child in need of services if before his eighteenth birthday: (1) his physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of his parent, guardian or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision; ..... or (6) he substantially endangers his own health or the health of another; and needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that he is not receiving, that he is unlikely to accept voluntarily, and that is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court. Cf. Ind. Code § 31-6-4-3 (Burns 1980 Supp.) (effective October 1, 1980). It is highly questionable whether Michelle Lemond fitted within either of these definitions. There was no substantial evidence that either parent failed to discharge his or her duties, [17] or that Michelle had substantially endangered her own health or that of another. Ind. Code § 31-6-4-8 (Burns 1979 Supp.) establishes the next steps to be followed in acquiring or establishing jurisdiction in a CHINS proceeding. That section provides: (a) Any person may give an intake officer written information indicating that a child is in need of services. If the intake officer has reason to believe that the child is a child in need of services, he shall make a preliminary inquiry to determine whether the interests of the child require further action. (b) A preliminary inquiry is an informal investigation into the facts and circumstances reported to the court. Whenever practicable, it should include information on the child's background, current status, and school performance. (c) The intake officer shall send to the prosecutor or the attorney for the county department a copy of the preliminary inquiry. He shall recommend whether to file a petition, informally adjust the case, refer the child to another agency, or dismiss the case. (d) The person representing the interests of the state and receiving the preliminary inquiry and recommendations shall decide whether to request authorization to file a petition. This is final only as to the office of the person making it. Cf. Ind. Code § 31-6-4-8 (Burns 1980 Supp.) (effective October 1, 1980). If the prosecutor or county attorney determines that a petition should be filed, he must obtain authorization for such filing from the juvenile court. This procedure is clearly spelled out in § 31-6-4-10: (a) The prosecutor or the attorney for the county department may request the juvenile court to authorize the filing of a petition alleging that a child is a child in need of services; that person shall represent the interests of the state at this proceeding and at all subsequent proceedings on the petition. (b) The juvenile court shall consider the preliminary inquiry and the evidence of probable cause. The court shall authorize the filing of a petition if it finds probable cause to believe that the child is a child in need of services. (c) The petition shall be verified and be entitled `In the Matter of ____, a Child Alleged to be a Child in Need of Services,' must be signed and filed by the person representing the interests of the state, and must contain the following information: (1) A citation to the section of this article that gives the juvenile court jurisdiction in the proceeding. (2) A citation to the section of this article that defines a child in need of services. (3) A concise statement of the facts upon which the allegations are based, including the date and location at which the alleged facts occurred. (4) The child's name, birth date, and residence address, if known. (5) The name and residence address of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, if known. (6) The name and title of the person signing the petition. The concise statement of facts called for in subsection (c)(3) contemplates a substantial recitation of specific facts which demonstrates that a child may be in need of services. Moreover, just as the UCCJA emergency jurisdiction subsection, § 31-1-11.6-3(a), requires substantial non-conclusory, non-self-serving facts to be alleged, so it is with § 31-6-4-10(c)(3). See State ex rel. Marcrum v. Marion Superior Court, supra . However, in examining the facts of this case, we find virtually a total failure to abide by and follow these clear statutory procedures. Specifically, the evidence before these Courts reveals, first of all, that the Pike County Welfare Department was conspicuously missing from the entire procedure; no written preliminary inquiry was submitted by the Welfare Department to respondent McGaughey, the prosecutor. Second, McGaughey did not initially seek the necessary authorization to file the petition; further, neither respondent Richardson nor respondent Arthur even purported to make the necessary finding of probable cause. Third, while the statute permits only the prosecutor or county attorney (persons representing the interests of the State) to sign-and seek the filing of-a CHINS petition, here, the school nurse, respondent Earl Lemond, and Michelle Lemond, by her attorney respondent Gray, each filed a CHINS petition. Fourth, these CHINS petitions, contrary to the statute's demand for a concise statement of the facts on which the allegations are based, were merely conclusory in form and content. Further, in light of these glaring defects and the apparent lack of substance of the allegations presented, it is relevant that respondent Arthur was, in fact, presented with several requests to examine the petitions and see the case as it really was-a sham proceeding. Val Fleig, Mrs. McCormack's counsel, called these defects to Arthur's attention and asked that the proceeding be dismissed. Respondent McGaughey evidently recognized these defects himself, for he subsequently argued that the State was also proceeding under the emergency treatment statutes, Ind. Code §§ 31-6-7-12, 31-6-7-14. [18] Respondent Arthur then interpreted the statements that had been made as a statutory request by McGaughey that he be allowed to file the petition. McGaughey made no specific request of this sort, and Arthur made no specific finding of probable cause, as required by § 31-6-4-10(b). After the prerequisites for filing are met, the CHINS statutes call for additional jurisdiction steps. The juvenile court is to hold an initial hearing and advise the parents of their rights and possible dispositional alternatives. Ind. Code § 31-6-4-13.5 (Burns 1979 Supp.). Thereafter, where the facts of the case are not admitted, a fact-finding hearing is to be held, at which evidence is to be taken. § 31-6-4-14. However, in the present case, it does not appear that respondent advised the parents of their rights and the dispositional alternatives. Additionally, respondent Arthur specifically found Michelle to be in need of services at the close of the first CHINS hearing on June 6, wherein no evidence was taken. Such a finding is clearly not contemplated until the fact-finding hearing is held pursuant to § 31-6-4-14. As noted earlier, respondents attempt, alternatively, to justify the juvenile court's jurisdiction upon the basis of the emergency treatment provisions of the juvenile code, Ind. Code §§ 31-6-7-12, 31-6-7-14. Section fourteen states in pertinent part: (a) Upon its own motion or upon the motion of the child, the child's parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem, a probation officer, caseworker, the prosecutor, the attorney for the county department, or any person providing services to the child or his parent, guardian, or custodian, the juvenile court may, for good cause shown upon the record issue an injunction: (1) to control the conduct of any person in relation to the child; (2) to provide a child with an examination or treatment under Ind. Code § 31-6-7-12; or (3) to prevent a child from leaving the court's jurisdiction. Further, section twelve provides: (a) If the procedures under Ind. Code § 31-6-7-14 are followed, the juvenile court may authorize mental or physical examinations or treatment under the following circumstances: (1) Where the court has not authorized the filing of a petition, but where a physician certifies that an emergency exists, the court may order medical or physical examination or treatment of the child and may order the child detained in a health care facility while the emergency exists. ... . In the case before us, respondent McGaughey requested a protective order and mental examination pursuant to section twelve. As this section clearly establishes, such orders are proper only where a physician has certified that an emergency exists. The record reveals that, prior to the filing of these petitions, no physician ever examined Michelle relative to this case, and no physician ever certified that an emergency existed which warranted an examination or detention. Nevertheless, respondent Arthur ordered these procedures. Again, for emergency jurisdiction to be invoked under these statutes, the facts presented must be substantial, non-conclusory, and non-self-serving. Thus, in addition to the overwhelming evidence showing respondents' bad faith, it is clear from the record that few, if any, jurisdictional prerequisites were met. Therefore, respondent Arthur actually had nothing before him, and the obviously sham CHINS proceedings should have been dismissed. The brief by amicus curiae questions whether the result of this contempt proceeding will be an unwillingness in trial judges to act, even in emergency case, where there is a valid and enforceable foreign custody decree. Of course, when probative, substantial and specific evidence of a clear emergency is presented to a juvenile court, the court should not hesitate to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the appropriate statutes. Additionally, such jurisdiction could be properly exercised where, as here, an appellate court has found that a foreign custody decree should be enforced. On the other hand, the facts and circumstances of this case do not even remotely approach the point at which jurisdiction could be rightfully and legitimately exercised. In a case such as this, where: (1) after protracted and lengthy manoeuvering and litigation, these Courts each finally determine that a foreign custody decree should be honored; (2) an information is filed with these Courts wherein, by specific and substantial allegations, it appears that there has been a wilful and intentional effort to circumvent or thwart orders of these Courts; and (3) the evidence does, in fact, show that there was no emergency and that there has been a deliberate and bad faith violation, circumvention or frustration of those orders, these Courts will not hesitate to cite attorneys or judges before these Courts and find them in indirect criminal contempt.