Opinion ID: 2513926
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Emergency Aid

Text: We also conclude, as did the trial court, that the People failed to prove that an immediate crisis existed and that the probability that police assistance would be helpful, either of which would be sufficient to invoke the emergency aid exception. Although the police are not required to have probable cause under this exception, they must have a reasonable basis approximating probable cause to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched. Hebert, 46 P.3d at 479. No such reasonable basis existed here. First, there was no evidence of an immediate crisis in Pate's home. The police responded to a call about a burglary in progress at an address that was not Pate's address. The call did not include any report of violence or any other situation that might suggest an armed or dangerous perpetrator. Cf. Thompson, 770 P.2d at 1284 (domestic violence call); People v. Mascarenas, 972 P.2d 717, 719 (Colo.App. 1998)(same). After responding to the area, the police found no observable evidence of a burglary or any other criminal activity at the original address. It was not until twenty minutes after the dispatch call that they encountered the injured Wonza coming from a different apartment. See Hebert, 46 P.3d at 480 (holding that significant lag time indicates that there was no immediate crisis justifying warrantless entry). When the police encountered Wonza, the trial court found that the only reliable information they had was that Wonza was bleeding and that he had come from the nearby apartment where someone named Ben remained inside. The officers testified that they did not know anything about what had occurred to Wonza or the person who remained in the apartment. Before entering the apartment, the officers did not ask about the extent of anyone's injuries, whether anyone required medical attention, or whether the injuries actually occurred in the apartment. The officers also did not seek or receive any information that any illegal activity was ongoing or that any suspects, dangerous or otherwise, remained in the apartment. The officers here had no reliable or credible evidence that connected an immediate crisis or an emergency threatening someone's life or safety with Pate's specific apartment. Cf. Thompson, 770 P.2d at 1284, 1286 (holding that the police could invoke the emergency aid exception to enter a house without a warrant when the officers observed several spent bullet casings in the driveway; blood all over the outside of the house; the front door ajar several inches; shattered glass in the front door; and the woman answering the door after the police knocked had blood on her face and held an ice pack to her head). Although it remained in the realm of possibilities that an injured victim was in Pate's residence, this claim, as found by the trial court, was unsubstantiated by any reliable facts. See Hebert, 46 P.3d at 481. Thus, the officers in this case had no reasonable basis approximating probable cause to believe that an immediate crisis or emergency existed to justify their entry into Pate's home without a warrant or without seeking his permission to do so. Even if we were to hold that the officers had a reasonable basis to believe that someone's life or safety was in danger in Pate's home, there exists no evidence to show that the officers entered the home to provide emergency assistance consistent with that belief. The officers made no attempt to knock on the door to obtain permission to enter and determine if anyone actually needed emergency assistance. As the trial court found under the circumstances of this case, the officers' entry into the apartmentguns drawn, without knocking first, and without any information about Pate's well-being or what was occurring insidewas exceedingly dangerous to all involved. Indeed, had the officers knocked first and questioned Pate before entering his apartment, they may have obtained his consent to enter or information to provide them with a reasonable basis to believe an emergency situation existed that would allow them to enter his residence to provide assistance without such consent or a warrant. See, e.g., Thompson, 770 P.2d at 1284; Mascarenas, 972 P.2d at 720. Instead, without any information as to Pate's well-being or what was occurring inside, the officers went into the apartment and pointed guns at the injured and bleeding Pate who had just been assaulted and robbed. At no time inside the apartment did the officers inquire about Pate's injuries, whether he required medical assistance, or whether he had been the victim of a crime. After searching the apartment, the first question that the officers asked Pate was not whether he required their assistance, but whether he had drugs or weapons. Indeed, as supported by the officers' testimony and found by the trial court, the purpose of the officers' warrantless entry into Pate's home was not to provide emergency assistance, but rather to investigate. During his direct examination, Officer Good never stated that the officers entered the apartment with the intent to render medical aid to the injured occupant. Officer Good only mentioned the topic of emergency assistance during cross-examination. Instead, Officer Good testified repeatedly that they were trying to figure out what was going on, a task that is more consistent with the officers' duties as investigators. Because the trial court found as a fact that the officers entered Pate's home to investigate, and not because they reasonably believed that someone's life or safety was in danger, they were not authorized to enter without a warrant under the emergency aid exception. Hebert, 46 P.3d at 479. In sum, the trial court's findings of historical fact in this case are amply supported by the record and thus must be given deference. Under our de novo review, we conclude that such facts support the trial court's legal conclusion that neither the exigent circumstances exception nor the emergency aid exception authorized the police officers to enter Pate's home without a warrant. Thus, we hold that the police officers' conduct in this case violated Pate's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and any evidence obtained as a result of such a search must be suppressed.