Opinion ID: 795965
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: A particularly serious crime

Text: 22 Ali next argues that the BIA erred when it found he committed a particularly serious crime, a finding that made him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. The immigration statutes give the Attorney General—by extension, the BIA—discretion to determine whether aliens are eligible to receive asylum and withholding of removal. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) and 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). 2 As we have noted, courts generally lack jurisdiction to review the Attorney General's discretionary immigration decisions, but § 1252(a)(2)(D) authorizes us to address the questions of law raised by Ali's challenge to the BIA's finding that he committed a particularly serious crime. 23 Ali's appeal presents questions of law because he challenges the BIA's interpretation of the term particularly serious crime in the asylum and withholding statutes. He argues that the plain language of those statutes should have precluded the BIA from holding that his conviction for substantial battery with a dangerous weapon constituted a particularly serious crime. Where, as here, we are asked to review `an agency's construction of the statute which it administers,' we apply the principles of deference described in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources, Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778). 24 If the statute at issue speaks clearly and directly to the question at hand, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. But when the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 843 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 2778. An agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute may be permissible even if it differs from the construction the reviewing court would have given the statute if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding. Id. at 843 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 2778. We give considerable weight . . . to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, id. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, and deference to the executive is especially appropriate in the immigration context where officials `exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.' Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439 (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988)). 25 Ali urges us to hold that the asylum and withholding statutes are unambiguous, that his crime of conviction is not a particularly serious crime within the meaning of §§ 1158(b)(2) and 1231(b)(3), and that the BIA's interpretation of these statutes is not entitled to judicial deference. The asylum statute says that an alien is ineligible for asylum if the Attorney General determines that . . . (ii) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii). Neither § 1158 nor any other section of the immigration code offers a definition of the statutory phrase particularly serious crime, but § 1158 does list two categories of crimes that are per se particularly serious: (1) aggravated felon[ies] and (2) other crimes that the Attorney General designate[s] by regulation. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(B). Ali would have us read subparagraph (b)(2)(B) to mean that only aggravated felonies and other crimes specifically designated by regulation may be considered particularly serious. 3 26 We do not think § 1158 so cabins the Attorney General's discretion to determine whether an alien has been convicted of a particularly serious crime for purposes of ineligibility for asylum. Congress named two categories of per se particularly serious crimes, but it did not say these were the only categories of crimes that would bring an alien's case within the statutory bar. Nowhere does § 1158 purport to prohibit the Attorney General from determining in a given case that an alien's nonaggravated felony is particularly serious unless he had the foresight to explicitly itemize that particular crime by regulation. The statutory language simply is not susceptible to such a limited interpretation. We therefore reject Ali's argument that the BIA misinterpreted an unambiguous statute. Alternatively, to the extent there is any ambiguity, the BIA's interpretation is entitled to considerable deference. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778. 27 In this regard, the BIA's construction of § 1158(b)(2) is entirely permissible, particularly considering the vast array of crimes defined by each of the fifty states' criminal codes. An interpretation that requires the Attorney General and his agents to sift through each state's code and prospectively identify by regulation every single crime that would qualify as particularly serious would impose an onerous burden. Nothing in the statute's text suggests a requirement that the Attorney General must engage in such an anticipatory task. Section 1158(b)(2) does not prohibit the Attorney General from determining on a case-by-case basis that an asylum applicant has committed a particularly serious crime, even though the crime is neither an aggravated felony nor a crime expressly designated by regulation as particularly serious. 28 We reach the same conclusion with respect to the withholding of removal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). That statute says an alien is ineligible for withholding of removal if the Attorney General decides that . . . (ii) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime is a danger to the community of the United States. Subparagraph (b)(3)(B) adds the following about the particularly serious crime exclusion: 29 For purposes of clause (ii), an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony (or felonies) for which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at least 5 years shall be considered to have committed a particularly serious crime. The previous sentence shall not preclude the Attorney General from determining that, notwithstanding the length of sentence imposed, an alien has been convicted of a particularly serious crime. 30 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). 31 Ali reads this language to mean that only aggravated felonies count as particularly serious crimes for purposes of withholding of removal ineligibility. He notes that the statute makes aggravated felonies resulting in prison terms of at least five years per se particularly serious. The next sentence gives the Attorney General discretion to decide that a crime is particularly serious even if the alien was not sentenced to at least five years in prison. But, Ali observes, that same sentence says nothing about giving the Attorney General discretion to call a crime particularly serious when it is not an aggravated felony. Ali invokes the canon of construction that says the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other. See, e.g., Dersch Energies, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 314 F.3d 846, 861 n. 15 ( expressio unius est exclusio alterius ). He reasons that because the statute expressly grants the Attorney General discretion to find aggravated felonies particularly serious regardless of the length of an alien's sentence but does not explicitly provide any similar discretion for crimes that are not aggravated felonies, § 1231(b)(3)(B) precludes the Attorney General from finding any crimes particularly serious other than aggravated felonies. 32 The problem with this argument is that § 1231 does not state a general rule that only aggravated felonies can be considered particularly serious crimes. The designation of aggravated felonies producing sentences of at least five years' imprisonment as per se particularly serious creates no presumption that the Attorney General may not exercise discretion on a case-by-case basis to decide that other no-naggravated-felony crimes are also particularly serious. Congress specified that the Attorney General may extend the particularly serious designation to aggravated felonies producing prison terms of less than five years. But the absence of a similar provision for nonaggravated-felony crimes does not imply that only aggravated felonies can qualify as particularly serious crimes. Again, to the extent that § 1231(b)(3)(B) is ambiguous on this point, the BIA's reasonable interpretation is entitled to deference. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778. 33 The BIA acted in accordance with §§ 1158 and 1231 and did not apply an incorrect legal standard when it determined that Ali committed a particularly serious crime for purposes of ineligibility for asylum and withholding of removal. We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA's exercise of discretion when the agency operates under the proper legal standard. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) and (C). We therefore do not address Ali's argument that the BIA misapplied its own precedent— Matter of Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 1982 WL 190682 (1982) 4 —in its analysis of Ali's offense of conviction. Reviewing the BIA's determination in this regard would require an improper assertion of jurisdiction over the BIA's exercise of its statutorily conferred discretion. But see Afridi v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 1212, 1218-20 (9th Cir. 2006) (asserting jurisdiction then granting petition for review and remanding alien's withholding of removal claim because BIA did not fully engage the Frentescu factors when deciding alien's crime was particularly serious).