Opinion ID: 197861
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The 30-Day Limit.

Text: 8 Before turning to the merits, we iron out a wrinkle created by the AEDPA amendments to habeas corpus procedure. In pertinent part, those amendments direct that the court of appeals shall grant or deny the authorization to file a second or successive application not later than 30 days after the filing of the motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D). Rodriguez filed his application on October 3, 1997, and thus section 2244(b)(3)(D) directs us to rule no later than November 2, 1997. Because we obviously have missed that deadline, we must evaluate the effect, if any, of this failure on Rodriguez's aspirations. 9 The Sixth Circuit recently pondered this issue and held that section 2244(b)(3)(D) is hortatory or advisory rather than mandatory. In re Siggers, 132 F.3d 333, 336 (6th Cir.1997). We agree. Before operating as a mandate, a statutory time limitation addressed to a public official generally must contain both an express command that the official act within a given temporal period and a consequence attached to noncompliance. See id.; see also St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Brock, 769 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.1985); Usery v. Whitin Mach. Works, Inc., 554 F.2d 498, 501 (1st Cir.1977). Although section 2244(b)(3)(D) invokes the vocabulary of obligation--it states that a court of appeals shall grant or deny a request to file a second or successive petition within 30 days--it specifies no consequence for the court's failure to honor this obligation. Moreover, there is nothing in the nature of the power to which the temporal limitation appertains, or in the manner of its conferment, that would justify an inference that Congress intended the specified period of time to operate as a limitation on judicial authority. Hence, we construe the statute as precatory, not mandatory. While section 2244(b)(3)(D) directs the courts of appeals to work within a specified time frame--a charge consonant with AEDPA's broader attempts to streamline the habeas process--it operates as a guideline, not as an imperative. 10 Let us be perfectly clear. When presented with an application for leave to file a second or successive petition, we will, of course, make a diligent, good-faith effort to comply with the 30-day time limit. We anticipate little difficulty doing so in the ordinary mine-run of cases. Yet, certain applications will present issues that are sufficiently complex or novel to demand more time. In some instances, additional documents must be gathered; in others, supplemental briefing and/or oral argument will be desirable. If circumstances counsel against issuing a ruling within 30 days, we must retain the flexibility to bring the appropriate quantum of attention to bear. See In re Siggers, 132 F.3d at 336 (noting that interpreting section 2244(b)(3)(D) as advisory alleviates separation of powers and due process concerns); see also Galtieri v. United States, 128 F.3d 33, 36-37 (2d Cir.1997). 11 This is an exceptional case. AEDPA's successive petition provisions are relatively new and Rodriguez's application raises important questions about them. It was thus impracticable to comply with AEDPA's 30-day time limit. Notwithstanding this necessary delay, we retain jurisdiction to rule on Rodriguez's application. 12