Opinion ID: 176428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The May 12, 2008 district court ruling

Text: Negron first appeals the district court’s dismissal of the May 2005 Rule 60(b) motion that the district court converted nunc pro tunc to a section 2255 petition. In general, we review a district court’s decision to grant or deny an equitable remedy for abuse of discretion, see Abrahamson v. Bd. of Educ. of Wappingers Falls Cent. Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 2004), and it is well-established that “the doctrine of nunc pro tunc is a[n] . . . equitable remedy,” Iouri v. Ashcroft, 464 F.3d 172, 182 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. McCarthy v. Doe, 146 F.3d 118, 123 n.4 (2d Cir. 1998). “A district court abuses its discretion 4 when it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or makes an error of law.” Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 2010). Nunc pro tunc, Latin for “now for then,” refers to a court’s inherent power to enter an order having retroactive effect. Black’s Law Dictionary 1100 (8th ed. 2004). In Iouri, we wrote: When a matter is adjudicated nunc pro tunc, it is as if it were done as of the time that it should have been done. It is a far-reaching equitable remedy applied in certain exceptional cases, typically aimed at rectifying any injustice to the parties suffered by them on account of judicial delay. Iouri, 464 F.3d at 182 (brackets, citations, and internal quotations marks omitted). It is also often used as a remedy for adjudicative error. See id. In this case, it cannot be said that the district court committed error in adjudicating the initial Rule 60(b) motion in the manner in which it did in May 2005. The court had the choice of either converting the motion or addressing it on its own terms. It initially chose the latter option as, indeed, we have stated is perfectly appropriate. See Gitten v. United States, 311 F.3d 529, 534 (2d Cir. 2002). Finally, in denying Negron’s Rule 60(b) motion, the district court expressly indicated that Negron could file a section 2255 petition to pursue the relief he sought. As noted above, this Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Negron’s Rule 60(b) motion in January 2006, stating that “the district court correctly dismissed the motion because Negron sought relief unavailable under Rule 60(b).” Negron, 164 F. App’x at 158-59. Because there appears to have been no adjudicative error or judicial delay, we conclude that the situation is not properly labeled an “exceptional case” justifying the use of the “far- 5 reaching remedy” of nunc pro tunc conversion. See Iouri, 464 F.3d at 182. Consequently, there was no basis for the district court to convert the 2005 Rule 60(b) motion into a petition under section 2255 as the court did in May 2008. We therefore vacate the court’s May 12, 2008 judgment insofar as it converted Negron’s original Rule 60(b) motion that had already been thoroughly and properly adjudicated and was not eligible to be converted, nunc pro tunc, into a section 2255 motion.