Opinion ID: 2639377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The State's use of psychological evidence garnered by a defense expert

Text: Before trial, Floyd filed a supplemental notice that he might call neuropsychologist David L. Schmidt as an expert witness. Floyd opposed reciprocal discovery, but the district court ordered him to provide the State with Schmidt's report on his examination of Floyd, which included the results of standardized psychological tests administered to Floyd. The defense later unendorsed Schmidt as a witness, and Schmidt did not testify. During the penalty phase of trial, Floyd called a different psychologist, Edward J. Dougherty, Ed.D., to testify regarding Floyd's mental health. In rebuttal and over Floyd's objection, the State called psychologist Louis Mortillaro, Ph.D., who provided his opinion on Floyd's mental status, relying in part on the results from the standardized tests administered by Schmidt. The district court did not permit the State to use anything from Schmidt's report other than the raw test data. Floyd argues that Mortillaro's testimony violated his constitutional rights, relevant Nevada statutes, and his attorney-client privilege. NRS 174.234(2) provides that in a gross misdemeanor or felony prosecution, a party who intends to call an expert witness during its case in chief must, before trial, file and serve upon the opposing party a written notice containing: (a) A brief statement regarding the subject matter on which the expert witness is expected to testify and the substance of his testimony; (b) A copy of the curriculum vitae of the expert witness; and (c) A copy of all reports made by or at the direction of the expert witness. NRS 174.245(1)(b) similarly provides in part that the defendant must allow the prosecutor to inspect and copy any [r]esults or reports of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests or scientific experiments that the defendant intends to introduce in evidence during the case in chief of the defendant. Furthermore, resolution of discovery issues is normally within the district court's discretion. [15] Addressing first the claim that Schmidt's report and test results were privileged work-product, we conclude that it has no merit. `At its core, the work-product doctrine shelters the mental processes of the attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his client's case.' [16] NRS 174.245(2)(a) apparently codifies this privilege, providing that [a]n internal report, document or memorandum that is prepared by or on behalf of the defendant or his attorney in connection with the investigation or defense of the case is not subject to discovery. [17] Floyd has failed to show that Schmidt's report or the test results were internal documents representing the mental processes of defense counsel in analyzing and preparing Floyd's case. We conclude that they were discoverable as [r]esults or reports of physical or mental examinations that Floyd originally intended to introduce in evidence. [18] Next Floyd argues that the State's discovery and use of the Schmidt materials was improper because in his view he did not introduce those materials or any psychological evidence during his case in chief. NRS 174.234(2) and 174.245(1)(b) require discovery from the defendant only where he intends to call an expert witness or to introduce certain evidence during his case in chief. Floyd introduced psychological evidence only in the penalty phase, not in the guilt phase, and he assumes that in a capital murder trial case in chief refers only to the guilt phase of the trial, not the penalty phase. He offers no authority or rationale for this assumption, and we conclude that it is unfounded. Black's Law Dictionary defines case in chief as [t]hat part of a trial in which the party with the initial burden of proof presents his evidence after which he rests. [19] The statutes in question refer to the case in chief of the defendant as well as of the state, even though a criminal defendant normally has no burden of proof. It is clear that the statutes use the term case in chief to refer to either party's initial presentation of evidence, in contrast to either's presentation of rebuttal evidence. This meaning is consistent with the context of discovery: before trial a party should know and be able to disclose evidence it expects to present in its case in chief, whereas the need for and nature of rebuttal evidence is uncertain before trial. This meaning is also consistent with the use of the term in this court's case law. [20] The State has the burden of proof in both phases of a capital trial: first, in proving that a defendant is guilty of first-degree murder; and second, if such guilt is proven, in proving that aggravating circumstances exist and are not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances. In both phases, the defense has the choice of presenting its own case in response to the State's. Therefore, we conclude that the term case in chief in NRS 174.234(2) and 174.245(1)(b) encompasses the initial presentation of evidence by either party in the penalty phase of a capital trial. Floyd nevertheless maintains that it was improper for the State's expert, who testified in rebuttal, to use the test results obtained by Schmidt after the defense had decided not to call Schmidt as a witness. We conclude that the use of the evidence here was permissible. A United States Supreme Court case provides some guidance. In Buchanan v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court considered whether the admission of findings from a psychiatric examination of petitioner proffered solely to rebut other psychological evidence presented by petitioner violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights where his counsel had requested the examination and where petitioner attempted to establish at trial a mental-status defense. [21] The Court concluded that it did not. [22] At his trial, petitioner Buchanan had attempted to establish the affirmative defense of `extreme emotional disturbance.' [23] He introduced evidence from various evaluations of his mental condition done after an earlier burglary arrest. [24] In response and over Buchanan's objection, the prosecution introduced evidence from a psychological evaluation of Buchanan done at his and the prosecution's joint request after his arrest for the murder in question; Buchanan had not introduced any evidence from the evaluation. [25] The Court reasoned that if a defendant presents psychiatric evidence, then, at the very least, the prosecution may rebut this presentation with evidence from the reports of the examination that the defendant requested. [26] The Court noted that Buchanan presented a mental-status defense and introduced psychological evidence, that he did not take the stand, and that the prosecution could respond to this defense only by presenting other psychological evidence. [27] The prosecution therefore introduced excerpts from the evaluation requested by Buchanan, which set forth the psychiatrist's general observations about the mental state of petitioner but had not described any statements by petitioner dealing with the crimes for which he was charged. [28] The Court concluded: The introduction of such a report for this limited rebuttal purpose does not constitute a Fifth Amendment violation. [29] Also, since defense counsel had requested the psychological evaluation and was on notice that the prosecution would likely use psychological evidence to rebut a mental-status defense, the court concluded that there was no violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. [30] We conclude that under the circumstances of this case the State's use of evidence obtained from Floyd by his own expert did not violate Floyd's constitutional rights. We rely on a number of factors in reaching this conclusion. First, similar to Buchanan, the evidence was used only in rebuttal after Floyd introduced evidence of his mental status as a mitigating factor. Second, the district court restricted the State's use of evidence contained in the defense expert's report to the standardized psychological test results. Like Buchanan, this evidence did not describe any statements by Floyd dealing with his crimes which could incriminate him or aggravate the crimes, nor did it include any conclusions reached by the defense expert. Third, the jury was not informed that the source of the evidence was originally an expert employed by the defense, avoiding the risk of undue prejudice inherent in such information. [31]