Opinion ID: 621507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Existence of a Joint Defense Agreement

Text: Noting that we may affirm on any ground supported by the record, the government suggests that we need not reach the broader question of whether Paiz's section 2255 motion waived the joint defense privilege as to Gonzalez's communications. It contends Gonzalez has not even established the existence of a JDA. See United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir.2010) (party asserting the attorney-client privilege has the burden of establishing the existence of the relationship and the privileged nature of the communication). The government first characterizes the district court's decision as concluding that the actual record is too thin to support the contention that a JDA existed. 2010 WL 5399216, at . But the court went on to state that there was possibly an implied joint defense agreement, one arising from a course of conduct, and ultimately concluded that the JDA's existence was irrelevant because the main holding of this order is that no joint defendant agreement, no matter how plain and clear, should or can be allowed to bar discovery or use of pertinent communications to and from trial counsel in a later Section 2255 proceeding. Id. The district court thus made no express finding regarding the existence of an agreement and it is clear that the court instead assumed for the sake of argument that there was a joint defense agreement. Id. More importantly, it is clear that no written agreement is required, and that a JDA may be implied from conduct and situation, such as attorneys exchanging confidential communications from clients who are or potentially may be codefendants or have common interests in litigation. Cont'l Oil, 330 F.2d at 350 (privilege applies even without an express understanding that the recipient shall not communicate the contents thereof to others) (quotation omitted); In re Regents of Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1389 (Fed. Cir.1996) (it may reasonably be inferred from consultation among clients and counsel allied in common legal cause that disclosures are confidential); HSH Nordbank AG v. Swerdlow, 259 F.R.D. 64, 72 n. 12 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (noting joint agreement need not be in writing to protect a communication); Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Elecs., Inc., 516 F.Supp.2d 1199, 1203 (W.D.Wash.2007) (a written agreement is not required to invoke the joint defense privilege). Here, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the existence of a JDA, at least to a point. Gonzalez's counsel filed a declaration asserting: [A]s the case progressed, [Ms. Wilder and I] met and discussed confidential information related to trial preparation, sometimes in the presence of the clients and sometimes not. Although there was no written joint defense agreement, this communication among Mr. Gonzalez and Ms. Paiz and their counsel was for the purpose of preparing a joint defense strategy and involved the sharing of confidential information. The clear understanding was that such communications were privileged. At her deposition, Wilder testified similarly that the JDA started from the beginning of the case, and that it was an implied agreement. We understood between ourselves that everything we said would be confidential. She further stated: I think that the joint defense agreement was formed when we sat down and agreed to jointly strategize in the case and to share information. That's the basis we agreed to and [i]n our initial conversation we agreed to proceed jointly and share confidential information. Wilder acknowledged there was no written JDA or any emails about one to her knowledge, but that at some point we certainly discussed, and repeatedly, I think, at various points, talked about the fact that it was a joint defense agreement, that there was a joint defense, that we share confidential information, which is the whole point of the joint defense. The government argues that notwithstanding these assertions of a joint defense and strategy, the legal interests of Gonzalez and Paiz lacked sufficient commonality, especially at the point the trials were severed or, if not then, when Gonzalez announced a defense that was demonstrably adverse to the interests of Paiz by blaming her for the crime. The government acknowledges that parties to an asserted JDA need not have identical interests and may even have some adverse motives, see Hunydee, 355 F.2d at 185, but correctly points out that the attorneys do, at a minimum, need to be engaged in maintaining substantially the same cause on behalf of other parties in the same litigation. Cont'l Oil, 330 F.2d at 350; see also Hunydee, 355 F.2d at 185 (communications are privileged to the extent that they concern common issues and are intended to facilitate representation) (emphasis added). Here, even if Gonzalez and Paiz began as codefendants with aligned interests, they later moved simultaneously to sever their trials from one another; the government argues it is inherently contradictory simultaneously to claim to be in a joint defense agreement and also that a joint trial is legally prohibited. This is not necessarily true, however, as parties in separate actions might nonetheless have reasons to work together toward a common objective, and there is no requirement that actual litigation even be in progress. Cont'l Oil, 330 F.2d at 350; United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1392 (4th Cir. 1996) (unnecessary that there be actual litigation in progress for privilege to apply). For example, here the trials were initially severed so that Gonzalez could aid Paiz by testifying at her trial. In addition, attorney Wilder testified that she and Gonzalez's counsel continued to meet and discuss the cases after the severance was granted. However, Wilder also testified that the first time she learned of Gonzalez's plan to blame his wife for the insurance scam occurred shortly before trial and around the same time Gonzalez publicly disclosed the defense. She also testified she did not know at the time she filed the severance motion that Gonzalez would claim he had lied to federal agents to protect Paiz as the truly guilty party. The government contends that one party being kept in the dark about such crucial information is strong evidence that no true JDA existed. In addition, Gonzalez's defense was completely antagonistic to Paiz'sblaming her entirely for the crime while asserting his own innocence. It is debatable whether Gonzalez could have reasonably believed by this point that he and his wife were continuing to pursue a joint defense arrangement. See Schwimmer, 892 F.2d at 244 (common interest rule requires communication to be given in confidence and that the client reasonably understood it to be so given). Gonzalez maintains that notwithstanding his shift in defense theories, he remained consistently committed to Paiz's defense on the use-of-fire countthat she was guilty of fraud but had no knowledge that the car would be burned. If their mutual interest is defined more narrowly in this way, then it is possible that their other adverse positions did not undermine their joint defense privilege on this specific issue. As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the existence of a JDA is not necessarily an all-or-nothing proposition, and may be created (and ended) by conduct as well as express agreement. The timeline of events and the facts of this case could suggest that a JDA existed at the outset between the parties and their counsel, but that it had ended at least by the time Gonzalez decided to pursue his own defense and blame Paiz for the crime (thus ending their common legal interests). See In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333, 341 (4th Cir.2005) (affirming district court factual finding that common interest agreement did not exist prior to December 2001, so disclosures made prior to that time were not privileged); see also Gilson v. Sirmons, No. CIV-01-1311-C, 2006 WL 2320682, at  (W.D.Okla.2006) (noting trial court had conducted an in camera hearing and determined that a JDA existed at least prior to the severance of the cases, and that any information gained in confidence during the existence of those joint defense efforts remained protected by attorney-client privilege). Alternatively, it may also be that Paiz's and Gonzalez's joint defense strategy always related only to the use-of-fire charge and that they remained committed on this point notwithstanding other defense changes. The record at least establishes the existence of a JDA (either an express verbal agreement or one implied from conduct), but the court made no specific findings regarding the extent or duration of that JDA. We therefore remand to the trial court for an ( in camera ) evidentiary hearing to expressly determine: (1) if the JDA implicitly ended at some point, (2) if so, when, and (3) when the relevant communication here (the ultimate representation regarding what Gonzalez would testify to at Paiz's trial) was made. If the communication occurred during the existence of the JDA, then it remains protected, as discussed further below. On the other hand, if it was made after the joint defense efforts ended, and when Gonzalez was merely a potential trial witness for Paiz, then that specific communication to Paiz's counsel may not be privileged (though any prior statements made or communicated to her during the JDA would remain protected). See Schwimmer, 892 F.2d at 243 (only communications made in course of ongoing common enterprise and intended to further that enterprise are protected).