Opinion ID: 1430751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: appellant's inculpatory statements

Text: At trial, Rodney Englert, an Oregon law enforcement officer, testified that when he informed appellant that Jo had been found, appellant had responded, Fine, I have nothing to hide. I didn't kill her. According to this testimony, Englert then replied, Who said she was dead? This conversation was recounted as well by the prosecutor during his opening remarks. Appellant contends, for the first time on appeal, that the admission of these statements into evidence was error since they were obtained from him in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). Appellant further contends that the lower court should have conducted, on its own motion, a voluntariness hearing regarding those statements in accordance with Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). Appellant, however, did not object to the admission of these statements. Nor did appellant move to suppress them either before trial, see NRS 174.125(1) and (3)(a), or during the trial, see NRS 174.125(3)(b). Appellant did not request a voluntariness hearing, nor did he request that the jury be instructed on the voluntariness issue. Nor can appellant now claim that he was surprised by the admission of these statements. The prosecutor's opening remarks and Englert's testimony conformed to the evidence adduced at appellant's preliminary examination. Moreover, the district judge, prior to trial, made sure that appellant had copies of all his alleged admissions, and specifically inquired of appellant's counsel whether any suppression motions would be filed concerning these statements. As a general proposition, the failure to follow statutory procedures for challenging the admissibility of evidence, as well as the failure to raise a proper objection below, will preclude appellate review of the disputed evidence. Smithart v. State, 86 Nev. 925, 928-29, 478 P.2d 576, 579 (1970). While this Court may, at times, review questions of constitutional dimension even in the absence of a proper objection, it will not do so unless the record is developed sufficiently both to demonstrate that fundamental rights are, in fact, implicated and to provide an adequate basis for review. Id. Based on the instant factual record, we cannot even tell whether the interrogation of appellant by Officer Englert was a part of a pre-custodial investigation or of a custodial or inherently coercive interrogation. Compare Schnepp v. State, 84 Nev. 120, 122, 437 P.2d 84, 85 (1969). Thus, appellant's failure to raise a timely objection to the admission of these statements constitutes, in this case, a waiver of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims. In addition, a trial court is not obligated to conduct a Jackson v. Denno hearing on its own motion; rather, the onus is on the defendant to challenge the voluntariness of his admissions or confessions and to request the appropriate hearing. Guynes v. State, 92 Nev. 693, 695, 558 P.2d 626, 627 (1976). Appellant's failure to request a voluntariness hearing below precludes appellate consideration of this matter as well. Id.