Opinion ID: 2629208
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: To Convict Instructions

Text: An omission or misstatement of the law in a jury instruction that relieves the State of its burden to prove every element of the crime charged is erroneous. Brown, 147 Wash.2d at 339, 58 P.3d 889. However, not every omission or misstatement relieves the State of its burden. Id. This court has adopted the rule that an erroneous jury instruction that omits an element of the charged offense or misstates the law is subject to harmless error analysis. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999); Brown, 147 Wash.2d at 339, 58 P.3d 889. [A]n instruction that omits an element of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence. Neder, 527 U.S. at 9, 119 S.Ct. 1827. The Neder test for determining the harmlessness of a constitutional error is: whether it appears `beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' Id. at 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).) As applied to omissions or misstatements of elements in jury instructions, the error is harmless if that element is supported by uncontroverted evidence. Brown, 147 Wash.2d at 341, 58 P.3d 889 (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 18, 119 S.Ct. 1827). Thus, in Brown, the error in the accomplice liability instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where there was sufficient evidence in the record indicating the particular defendant was a principal in certain of the charges. Id. at 341, 58 P.3d 889. The same logic used in Brown for accomplice liability instructions applies to erroneous to convict instructions. We may therefore uphold Thomas's underlying conviction for first degree murder if the errors in the accomplice liability and to convict instructions are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Weeks before the night of the murder and burglary, Thomas solicited friends to assist him in robbing his boss. Thomas twice voiced his commitment to having to shoot Geist if he had toboth to Ducharme and to Horyst. [3] Everyone declined his offer save Rembert, who accepted just days before. Thomas was the one who knew Geist and knew that Geist would be receiving a large paycheck for several thousand dollars on March 27, 1998, as Thomas was Geist's employee. In whole, Thomas was the one who conceived of the plan and came up with the strategy. There was evidence identifying Thomas as the one who placed several phone calls to Geist before Thomas and Rembert were dropped off at Geist's residence by Ducharme and Azevedo. Thomas, not Rembert, called Ducharme after the burglary and told her to come get them. Thomas, not Rembert, was driving Geist's van and asked Ducharme where they could burn it. Testimony at trial revealed that Thomas, not Rembert, set the van on fire. Both Thomas and Rembert were covered in blood, so much so that Ducharme testified that they sat on compact disc covers and whatever else was in her car to keep the blood off the upholstery. There is Rembert's excited utterance that Thomas had shot Geist. Thomas also directed Ducharme to Geist's body, the same place it was found the morning of March 28, 1998. As the State aptly summarizes: Under the evidence that was presented, it was [Thomas] who: devised the plan to rob; thought about killing Geist beforehand; was friends with the victim and could lure him out on false pretenses; brought his gun with him that evening; was known to the victim and thus, had to eliminate him as a witness; solicited others to help him in his plan. Br. of Resp't at 132-33 (emphasis omitted). We agree that [Thomas] was so entrenched as a major participant in the murder that his culpability cannot be lessened even if his accomplice pulled the trigger. Id. at 133. For purposes of upholding Thomas's conviction for first degree murder, we find the errors in the accomplice liability and to convict instructions to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We thereby affirm Thomas's conviction for first degree murder. Thomas next argues that his residential burglary conviction must be reversed by virtue of the error in the accomplice liability instruction. Instruction 33, the to convict instruction for residential burglary, allowed the jury to convict for that crime if it found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant or an accomplice entered or remained unlawfully in ... the dwelling of Richard Geist. CP at 1478. He contends that his intent to facilitate or promote the crime of burglary was not a required showing under the accomplice liability instruction. At trial, Ducharme testified that Thomas had told her he had heard someone knocking on Geist's door when he and Rembert were inside looking for the money. The error here is harmless for purposes of Thomas's burglary conviction, as it was for the first degree murder conviction, because there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas was a principal in the burglary. Thomas's residential burglary conviction is affirmed.