Opinion ID: 2171561
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legality of the Motel Room Search

Text: The second error raised by Caldwell concerns the search of the motel room that revealed the murder weapon. Caldwell charges that his constitutional and statutory rights were violated when the trial court judge failed to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless entry and search by police. He alleges that the police also failed to obtain proper informed consent from any person authorized to allow a search. When a search is conducted without a warrant, the State bears the burden of justifying the search by proving that one of several exceptions to the warrant requirement applied. In this case, the State argues that the search was legal because it was conducted subject to Anderson's consent. Defendant responds that Anderson could not properly consent to the search of the room because the room had been rented by Caldwell in Caldwell's name. Generally, warrantless searches are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. Such restrictions are not applicable, however, when voluntary consent has been obtained, either from the individual whose property is to be searched, see Schnecklolh v. Bustamonte (1973), 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, or from a third party who possesses common authority over the thing to be searched, see U.S. v. Matlock (1974), 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242. Common authority ... rests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the cohabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. at 993 n. 7, 39 L.Ed.2d at 250 n. 7. Caldwell rented the room in his name. He invited Anderson to stay with him. By consenting to Anderson's access to and use of the room, Caldwell created in Anderson a legitimate expectation of privacy. Jones v. U.S. (1960), 362 U.S. 257, 267, 80 S.Ct. 725, 734, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 706, overruled on other grounds United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980). Anderson possessed the requisite common authority necessary to give valid consent to search the room. Because consent was properly given in this case, a warrantless search of the room was not improper. Consequently the evidence was not tainted and it was not error to allow its introduction into the trial. The jury heard and saw the witnesses, examined the exhibits, received proper legal instructions and returned its verdict of guilty. No legal error having been demonstrated, the judgment entered on that verdict is hereby affirmed. SHEPARD, C.J., and DeBRULER, GIVAN and DICKSON, JJ., concur.