Opinion ID: 199606
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Second Question Presented

Text: 59 A second question concerns the district court's decision to split the five counts among three groups according to each primary victim. While we ultimately conclude that dividing the counts into three groups was correct, we are not persuaded that grouping by victim fits within the guidelines' rationale. Contrary to its position below, the government similarly now contends that grouping by victim, when doing so results in splitting counts as it does here, is a mistaken interpretation of the guidelines. The government nevertheless urges that we affirm the judgment below on the theory that application of the proper alternative grouping method will result in the same number of groups (three) and the same combined sentencing range (twenty-seven to thirty-three months). Reviewing the district court's legal interpretation of the guidelines de novo, see United States v. Nicholas, 133 F.3d 133, 134 (1st Cir. 1998), we agree with the government that any methodological error by the district court was harmless. 60 The grouping rules come into play only with respect to multi-count indictments. See U.S.S.G. § 3D (Multiple Counts). They are not written so as to apply to a single count indictment. Nor, even in the case of multi-count indictments, would it be consistent to split single counts therein among several groups. The same prohibition against grouping within a single count indictment would apply to multiple grouping within any given single count of a multi-count indictment. Supporting this view is the fact that where the guidelines wish to split a single count among two or more groups according to individual victims, they give specific directions on the matter. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2N1.1(d)(1) (Tampering or Attempting to Tamper Involving Risk of Death or Bodily Injury) (If the defendant is convicted of a single count involving (A) the death or permanent, life-threatening, or serious bodily injury of more than one victim, or (B) conduct tantamount to the attempted murder of more than one victim, Chapter Three, Part D (Multiple Counts) shall be applied as if the defendant has been convicted of a separate count for each such victim.); U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1(d)(1) (Promoting Prostitution or Prohibited Sexual Conduct) (If the offense involved more than one victim, Chapter Three, Part D (Multiple Counts) shall be applied as if the promoting of prostitution or prohibited sexual conduct in respect to each victim had been contained in a separate count of conviction.); U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(c)(1) (Sexual Exploitation of a Minor) (If the offense involved the exploitation of more than one minor, Chapter Three, Part D (Multiple Counts) shall be applied as if the exploitation of each minor had been contained in a separate count of conviction.). Moreover, were a district court permitted without special guideline instruction to split a single count among two or more groups, several purposes of the grouping rules might arguably be jeopardized, e.g., to provide only incremental punishment for significant additional criminal conduct and to prevent multiple punishment for substantially identical offense conduct, see U.S.S.G. § 3D, introductory cmt. 61 But while, as said, splitting individual counts by victim is therefore problematic, bundling counts according to those that contain the exact same primary victims -- the approach now urged by the government -- seems appropriate in circumstances like the present. 62 In taking this approach, we note the following breakdown of the counts of the indictment by number, date of threat and victim. 63 Count Date Victim I 10/14/99 Richard II 11/30/99 Richard, Andrea, Chantelle III 12/4/99 Richard, Chantelle IV 12/6/99 Richard, Andrea, Chantelle VI 10/18/99 Richard, Chantelle 64 Looking at this breakdown, we observe that the guideline commentary relevant to the crimes at issue instruct that multiple counts involving different victims are not to be grouped. U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1, cmt. n. 2. This commentary strongly suggests that counts with different primary victims, such as Counts I and II (Count II names Andrea and Chantelle and Count I does not), should not be grouped together. The fact that Counts I and II share a common primary victim, Richard, does not alter this effect of the commentary's prohibition. We also observe that the grouping rules themselves instruct a district court to group counts involving substantially the same harm, harm being defined as the same victim and the same act or transaction or the same victim and two or more acts or transactions connected by a common criminal objective or constituting part of a common scheme or plan. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(a), (b). 65 In light of these considerations, a group would form of Counts II and IV, as they both contain all three Carpenters as primary victims and both consist of identical acts committed on different days, that is, threatening behavior toward the same victims over the phone. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b). Similarly, a group would form of Counts III and VI, as they both contain Richard and Chantelle as primary victims and both consist of acts connected by the common objective of harassment and stalking. See id. 7 This leaves Count I as a single count in its own group, being the only count naming Richard Carpenter alone as a primary victim. We find the above to be the appropriate grouping methodology here. 66 Defendant complains that this grouping analysis has the potential of punishing worse conduct less severely and thus for reasons of common sense cannot be the correct grouping scenario. For example, defendant points out that, under this analysis, a defendant who threatens Person A on Day 1 and Person B on Day 2 (scenario one) will be sentenced based on the calculation for two groups, whereas a defendant who threatens Persons A, B and C on Day 1, Persons A, B and C on Day 2, and Persons A, B and C on Day 3 (scenario two) will be sentenced based on the calculation for only one group (assuming that all three persons are primary victims) and will therefore receive a lesser sentence than the defendant in scenario one. Defendant argues that the scenario two is worse, however - threatening three people three times - and should result in a higher sentence than scenario one - threatening only a total of two people, each on one day only. 67 While there is some force to this argument, it is flawed in several respects. First, we decide questions presented to us based primarily on the factual circumstances of the particular case. While answering hypotheticals may provide useful insight into the overall cogency of a particular rationale, we need not and cannot resolve satisfactorily every imaginable hypothetical before reaching a result in the case at hand. Second, in future cases, other factors not now before us may point the way to a just and perhaps diverging result. For example, were a defendant to threaten the same three people on three different days, his sentence, although based on only one grouping, could be lengthened (via a higher base offense level) to account for the repeated instances of the same offense, see U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(b)(2) (If the offense involved more than two threats, increase by 2 levels.), or the repeated instances against the same victim, see U.S.S.G. § 2A6.2(b)(1)(C) (If the offense involved . . . a pattern of activity involving stalking, threatening, harassing, or assaulting the same victim, increase by 2 levels.). It is not necessarily the case, therefore, that defendant's hypothetical scenario two would not be subject to the same or greater punishment than scenario one. Lastly, we note that a multi-group indictment, such as that posed by defendant's scenario one, does not inevitably lead to a higher punishment than that mandated by a single-group indictment. For example, in a two-group indictment, if one group has an offense level nine levels below the other group, that lower-level group is not factored into the sentencing calculation at all. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(c). 68 We recognize that the grouping analysis proposed by the government requires us to read into the grouping rules the possibility that the word victim in subsections (a) and (b) of § 3D1.2 could also represent its plural victims. But this interpretation seems entirely reasonable under relevant guideline policy considerations. 69 We must recognize, also, that the drafters of the guideline rules may not themselves have provided for every contingency. Here the drafters may not have focused fully on a situation involving multiple primary victims listed in a single count that forms but one of several in an indictment describing an on-going campaign of harassment and threatening violence. See United States v. Adelman, 168 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1999) (The Guidelines do not provide for consideration of harm to multiple victims of threatening communications.). Courts must do the best they can within the less than perfect legal landscape. 70 Finally, we note that had the charging document been more fully itemized and differentiated, structured by individual victim and date and charging nine instances of interstate threats instead of four, under the government's proposed grouping method, the district court could have appropriately still found only three groups. This confirms that although grouping by victim when that method results in splitting counts may not be contemplated by the guidelines, grouping multiple counts when they contain the exact same primary victim or victims and the same act or transaction, U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(a), or two or more acts or transactions connected by a common criminal objective or constituting part of a common scheme or plan, U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b), is prescribed by the language and purpose of the grouping rules. 71 Had the district court applied the analysis we now endorse to the facts of this case, it would have reached the following conclusion based on its finding of three primary victims: (1) the indictment is properly divided into three groups, here being Count I, Counts II/IV, and Counts III/VI; (2) the group with the highest offense level (18) controls, that being the group naming both Richard and Chantelle victims, Counts III/VI, see U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4; (3) this results in a combined offense level of 21, see U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(a); and (4) with a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the total offense level becomes 18, which, at a criminal history category I, corresponds to a sentencing range of twenty-seven to thirty-three months. This is the same range as that reached by the district court under the application of the guidelines it adopted. The error was therefore harmless and the judgment below is affirmed.