Opinion ID: 164099
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sustained Objections

Text: First, Ms. Gray claims the trial court erred in sustaining Roche’s “asked and answered” objections. Ms. Gray described two specific warnings she believes Roche should have issued, and asked Dr. McCauley whether he would have followed them. Dr. McCauley responded, “it depends.” He went on to explain: -4- “[W]e don’t rotely just follow instructions from drug companies. There are a lot of other things that go into evaluation of drugs with known and unknown side effects. So we would have taken this into account, but we also temper it with the experience that the patient is relating to us; also in regards to what other, what our own experience is with other patients.... And also in regard to other literature that we may be reading, and the experiences that we have, our shared experiences that we had with colleagues. So we don’t just rote do what the drug companies tell us. We do it, we take this certainly into consideration, and we put it into the rest of the equation in regards to the information that we visit with our patients about and also counsel them in regards to the medications. Apparently dissatisfied with his response, Ms. Gray immediately repeated her question. Roche objected on grounds the question had been asked and answered, and the trial court sustained. Throughout the remainder of her examination of Dr. McCauley, Ms. Gray repeatedly asked slight variations of this same question. The trial court sustained a number of Roche’s objections on grounds the question had been asked and answered. 2 Trial courts may prohibit litigants from asking witnesses repetitive 2 In the instances the trial court allowed Dr. McCauley to respond to Ms. Gray’s question, he indicated he “may or may not have done anything differently,” he was “not sure that at this particular point it would have made any difference in the way that [he] would have advised [Ms. Gray],” and he “may or may not have acted upon this any differently.” -5- questions. Fed. R. Evid. 611(a) (instructing courts to “exercise reasonable control ... so as to ... avoid needless consumption of time”); Fed. R. Evid. 403 (recognizing courts’ discretion to exclude evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed ... by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence”). See, e.g., Bragg v. Foretravel, Inc., 652 F.2d 39, 40 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding a “trial court properly exercised its discretion in order to prevent repetitive questioning and needless consumption of judicial time”). Here, Dr. McCauley obviously did not provide the answer Ms. Gray hoped to elicit. However, he did reply to the question with an appropriate answer. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting the repetitive questions. Ms. Gray next complains the trial judge should have permitted her to ask Dr. McCauley, in regard to part of a warning she asserts Roche should have issued, “what those two sentences mean to him.” The sentences state: “Followup visits during Accutane treatment should include specific questioning regarding psychiatric signs and symptoms. Patients should be specifically warned to immediately discontinue Accutane use and seek medical evaluation if depression -6- or mood change occurs.” 3 The district court excluded the question on the ground it called for Dr. McCauley to interpret the sentences. We have held, “where ... expert testimony is offered on an issue that a jury is capable of assessing for itself, it is plainly within the trial court’s discretion to rule that testimony inadmissible.” Thompson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 34 F.3d 932, 941 (10th Cir. 1994). Although Dr. McCauley testified as a lay witness, the same reasoning applies here. Lay opinions, like expert opinions, are only admissible if they are helpful to the jury. Fed. R. Evid. 701, 702. The sentences Ms. Gray asked Dr. McCauley to interpret were not technical or confusing; the jury was capable of understanding them without Dr. McCauley’s assistance. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining Roche’s objection. 3 Ms. Gray also asked Dr. McCauley whether he disagreed with these two sentences. Dr. McCauley responded he would like to see the rest of the document to view the sentences in their context. Ms. Gray immediately repeated the question, and the trial court sustained Roche’s objection on the ground it had been asked and answered. Ms. Gray believes the court erred in sustaining the objection because Dr. McCauley did not answer her question. Again, we see no abuse of discretion. Although Dr. McCauley may not have provided the answer Ms. Gray hoped for, his response was within the realm of appropriate answers. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining Roche’s objection. -7- Ms. Gray next argues the trial court improperly interrupted her when she asked Dr. McCauley if he would have altered her treatment had he “received a warning from Roche that he considered to constitute a significant change in the warnings involving side effects for Accutane.” Troubled by the word “significant,” the trial court ruled it would only allow Dr. McCauley to answer if Ms. Gray clarified “what changes.” Ms. Gray argues “[i]t is up to the witness to inform the Court if he cannot answer the question.” We disagree. Trial courts bear the responsibility of “mak[ing] the interrogation ... effective for the ascertainment of the truth.” Fed. R. Evid. 611(a)(1). Here, the court found Ms. Gray’s question vague, thus not helpful to the jury. We see no abuse of discretion in its sua sponte interruption. See, e.g., United States v. Head, 697 F.2d 1200, 1210 (4th Cir. 1982) (noting trial court’s prerogative to interrupt witness examinations sua sponte). Moreover, the court gave Ms. Gray the opportunity to clarify her question. Finally, Ms. Gray complains the trial court erroneously limited her redirect examination of Dr. McCauley, finding her questions unrelated to Roche’s crossexamination. She points out Roche had asked whether Dr. McCauley’s other patients taking Accutane reported depression. Accordingly, Ms. Gray argues the -8- court should not have prevented her from asking if “whether [his] patients report psychiatric side effects ... [has] anything to do ... with whether the patient understands that Accutane might cause the psychiatric side effects,” because this question was related to Roche’s questioning on reported depression of other patients. “The scope of redirect examination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court” and is normally limited to the scope of cross-examination. United States v. Hodges, 480 F.2d 229, 233 (10th Cir. 1973). Here, the trial court reasonably determined Ms. Gray’s question went beyond the scope of crossexamination. Roche’s inquiry was limited to whether any of Dr. McCauley’s other Accutane patients reported depression. Ms. Gray’s question, on the other hand, delves into what factors might motivate his patients to report side effects. The trial court acted within its discretion by curtailing this line of questioning.