Opinion ID: 490911
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Wiretapped Conversations.

Text: 8 Defendants raise two grounds for excluding the intercepted conversations. First, they challenge the adequacy of the affidavits submitted in support of the authorizing orders on the basis that they did not establish that other, normal investigative techniques had been tried or would be futile, as required by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(1)(c). Second, they argue that the federal crimes with which defendants were charged are offenses other than those specified in the state wiretap orders and that 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2517(5) therefore required advance judicial approval for use of the wiretaps in the federal grand jury. 9
10 The first ground requires little comment. Defendants argue that the supporting affidavits prepared and submitted to procure the necessary court orders did not show that normal investigative techniques had been tried or were likely to fail. Such a showing is required both by federal law, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(1)(c), and by state law, New York State Criminal Procedure Law, Sec. 700.15(4). 11 The district court, which is entitled to deference, see United States v. Puglisi, 790 F.2d 240, 241 (2d Cir.) (per curiam ), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 106, 93 L.Ed.2d 55 (1986), found that the requirements of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(1)(c) were met and refused to suppress the evidence. We see no reason to disturb this decision. A reading of the affidavit submitted by Detective Sergeant Fargione of the Albany Police Department makes clear that in fact several normal investigative techniques had been tried unsuccessfully, and that other such techniques were likely to fail. As the affidavit pointed out, surveillance of George's residence would have been impractical, since such surveillance in a residential neighborhood is likely to be conspicuous and draw attention to the assigned officers. See United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 152 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996, 96 S.Ct. 426, 46 L.Ed.2d 371 (1975). Similarly, surveillance of his place of business, an office on the seventh floor at a state office building, would have been unsuccessful, because surveillance of the building from the outside would have given little information regarding who had gone to see George, and for what purpose, and interior surveillance of George's office would have been too conspicuous and highly likely to reveal the fact of an on-going investigation. 12 Techniques other than direct surveillance would also have been unavailing. The Fargione affidavit stated that there were no informants available to infiltrate an undercover police officer into the conspiracy for the purpose of making a controlled buy. Use of a pen register and acquisition of telephone toll records, neither of which identify the participants to a telephone conversation, would have been unavailing since they would be unlikely to uncover [George's] partners in crime. United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 868 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, Miller v. United States, 458 U.S. 1110, 102 S.Ct. 3493, 73 L.Ed.2d 1373 (1982). In fact, telephone toll records for George's home phone were pulled for December 1984, but proved useless. 13 While it is true that other techniques, used in combination, might have borne some fruit, there is no requirement that any particular investigative procedures be exhausted before a wiretap may be authorized. United States v. Lilla, 699 F.2d 99, 104 (2d Cir.1983). We have previously noted that wiretapping is particularly appropriate when the telephone is routinely relied on to conduct the criminal enterprise under investigation. United States v. Steinberg, 525 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971, 96 S.Ct. 2167, 48 L.Ed.2d 794 (1976). 14
15 Defendants further argue that the intercepted conversations should not have been admitted into evidence because the government failed to comply with the terms of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2517(5), which requires judicial approval before wiretap evidence can be used in a criminal or grand jury proceeding relating to offenses other than those specified in the initial wiretap order. Section 2517(5) provides: 16 When an investigative or law enforcement officer, while engaged in intercepting wire, oral, or electronic communications in the manner authorized herein, intercepts wire, oral, or electronic communications relating to offenses other than those specified in the order of authorization or approval, the contents thereof, and evidence derived therefrom, may    be used under subsection (3) of this section when authorized or approved by a judge of competent jurisdiction where such judge finds on subsequent application that the contents were otherwise intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. 17 Defendants contend that the federal charges on which they were tried were other offenses from the state law offenses described in the original wiretap order, and that judicial approval was therefore necessary before the evidence could be used against them in the instant federal prosecution. We reject defendants' contention, because the federal offenses charged were not other offenses within the meaning of the statute. It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether, as the government alternatively contends, it was sufficient to obtain the judicial approval prior to defendants' trial, but after they had been indicted by the grand jury. 18 The state-law crimes for which the wiretap authorization was sought were identical to the federal crimes for which defendants were indicted and convicted. The district attorney's applications for wiretaps on George's business and home telephones alleged probable cause to believe that JUAN J. GEORGE and others yet unknown    are committing and are about to commit offenses involving sale of and possession with intent to sell controlled substances, attempt to and/or conspiracy to commit those offenses and use of a telephone to facilitate the commission of those offenses, in violation of Articles 220, 110 and 105 of the Penal Law of the State of New York, and it was for a violation of those sections that County Judge Joseph Harris found sufficient probable cause to justify issuance of the wiretap orders. The state Penal Law sections, of course, correspond exactly to the federal offenses of which defendants were convicted. 19 Where the only difference between the offenses described in the wiretap authorization and those for which defendants are indicted is that the former are state offenses and the latter are federal offenses, we hold that they are not other offenses within the meaning of Sec. 2517(5). Thus, as to substantially identical offenses--ones described in the same language and containing the same essential elements--subsequent judicial authorization is unnecessary. 20 We agree with the view of the first circuit in United States v. Smith, 726 F.2d 852, 864-66 (1st Cir.1984) (in banc), that this holding raises no possibility of subterfuge searches and will neither frustrate the purpose nor undermine the effects of the statute. Indeed, we perceive our holding as less an exception to, than a definition of, the phrase other offenses. The purpose of Sec. 2517(5) is to prevent subterfuge searches, which involve the government [using] a warrant authorizing seizure of one type of evidence as a license to collect evidence of an offense not covered by the authorization. Smith, 726 F.2d at 865. See S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2112, 2188-89. This goal is in no way compromised by allowing the use of conversations intercepted via a wiretap authorized upon the showing of probable cause to believe that there exists a violation of state law, the elements of which do not in any meaningful way differ from the corresponding federal crimes. 21