Opinion ID: 182445
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Prosecution's Failure to Correct False Testimony

Text: This issue, like the previous one, arises out of Garcia's immunity deal and her testimony about it. Hayes argues that the prosecution did not correct testimony from Garcia about her immunity that it knew was false. He asserts that Garcia lied about (1) when she received immunity and (2) whether she actively sought immunity through her lawyer Wiles, and that Garcia's false testimony made her appear more credible than she really was. The Supreme Court has long and repeatedly held that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of false evidence is incompatible with `rudimentary demands of justice' and thus violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). The same result obtains when the government allows false evidence to go uncorrected when it appears as when it solicits false evidence directly. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). Napue's rule covers falsehoods that bear only on a witness's credibility as much as it covers falsehoods pertinent to a defendant's guilt. Id. at 269-70, 79 S.Ct. 1173. Hayes's contentions that Garcia lied about her immunity agreement, uncorrected by the prosecution, in ways that bolstered her credibility are therefore cognizable under Napue. To succeed on a Napue claim, a defendant must show that (1) the testimony (or evidence) [presented by the prosecution] was actually false, (2) the prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was actually false, and (3) that the false testimony was material. United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir.2003). False testimony is material in this context if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc). Hayes fails to meet the first two requirements: he has not demonstrated that either falsehood he attributes to Garcia was actually false, or that the prosecution knew as much. As noted above, Garcia's testimony about precisely when she received immunity was mostly equivocal. Garcia's understanding that she received immunity [b]efore the preliminary hearing, I believe in 1982 was consistent with a reasonable assumption that she did not officially have immunity until the court formally granted it before the preliminary hearing in November of 1982. The defense's different understandingthat she effectively had immunity earlier, as soon as the prosecution agreed to it with her lawyeris not definitive, regardless of the prosecution's later agreement with it in a settled statement on appeal. Garcia never claimed to be certain of when she received immunity. On the contrary, she said she thought it was a lot later than [the defense suggested],... just before the preliminary, but that she could be mistaken. The prosecution had no obligation to correct Garcia's qualified testimony about her own reasonably held belief, because it was not actually false. Neither did Garcia testify falsely about whether she actively sought immunity through her lawyer Wiles. She was asked, Do you recall whether or not it came from you or anyone hired by you, associated with you in any way, to ask for any kind of a deal, bargain, benefit, anything other than protection? She answered No. That answer proved nothing useful to Hayes because it simply denied recalling who introduced the idea of immunity. Hayes attempts to contradict Garcia's denial of seeking immunity with (1) evidence of conversations between Garcia and Wiles (as detailed above, in connection with Hayes's confrontation claim) and (2) the fact that Wiles supposedly negotiated for immunity on Garcia's behalf. On the first point, the prosecution had no way of knowing of Garcia's motivation to seek immunity as revealed in confidential communications with her lawyer. The government could not, and was not required to, correct a supposed misstatement that it did not know was false. See Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d at 889. On the second point, the prosecution's position was that Wiles did not negotiate for immunity before the preliminary hearing, because the prosecution had already agreed to grant Garcia immunityconsistent with the theory that it was the prosecution's ideabefore the first conversation between Wiles and the prosecution took place. Wiles's discussion with the prosecutor was limited to ensuring that the in-court grant [of previously-agreed-to immunity] was done in proper form. As no testimony by Garcia was proven to be false, or false in a way that the prosecution knew or should have known about, the district court correctly denied this claim.