Opinion ID: 491447
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Guidance to District Court on Retrial

Text: 49 Our decision to reverse the convictions in this case because of the discharge of juror Spriggs may well lead to a retrial of the appellants. In a retrial, the district court will almost certainly confront four of the many issues that the appellants have raised on appeal. We have received the benefit of full briefing and argument on these four issues, and we believe it appropriate to discuss them briefly. We hope these precatory words will promote an equitable, orderly, and efficient retrial, if a retrial indeed takes place. 50 The appellants have argued to this court that the government's decision to join the offenses that were not chargeable as RICO predicate acts to the other offenses in the indictment violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b), which controls joinder of offenses in indictments that charge two or more defendants. The appellants appear to take the view that offenses not chargeable as RICO predicate acts may never be joined to an indictment alleging RICO offenses and offenses chargeable as RICO predicate acts. We presume that the appellants will press this argument below in an attempt to sever some of the offenses. The argument, however, has no merit. Rule 8(b) allows the joinder of offenses when they arise out of a single series of acts or transactions. This court has stated a series of acts or transactions is two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. United States v. Perry, 731 F.2d 985, 990 (D.C.Cir.1984). Thus, an offense that is chargeable as a RICO predicate may be joined to an offense that is not chargeable as a RICO predicate so long as the two offenses satisfy this test of logical relationship. Id. We think that all of the offenses charged in this indictment are related in such a way as to make joinder appropriate. The offenses that were not chargeable as RICO predicates were committed at the same times, by the same persons, in accordance with the same general methods, and in pursuance of the same broad schemes as the offenses chargeable as RICO predicates. All of the offenses charged, in other words, arose out of the same series of acts or transactions; the offenses were therefore properly joined in a single indictment. 51 The appellants also have contended that the district court erred in admitting the tape-recorded telephone conversations into evidence at the trial. The government garnered these recordings by placing wiretaps on four telephones in the District of Columbia area. A district court judge had authorized these wiretaps on the basis of an FBI agent's affidavit. Under the federal wiretap-authorization statute, a judge may authorize a wiretap only if the government has made a particularized showing that traditional investigative procedures have been tried and failed or ... reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(1)(c), (3)(c) (1970). The appellants concede that the government made such a showing with respect to the Chicago defendants (.e., Brown, Stone, and Bethea); traditional investigative techniques had failed to uncover these defendants' activities. The appellants aver, however, that the government failed to make such a showing with respect to the Washington-area defendants. In these circumstances, appellants claim, the court reviewing the affidavit could lawfully have authorized the government to tap the phones of the Chicago defendants, but had no authority to permit the government to tap the phones of the Washington-area defendants. The appellants conclude that the trial court should therefore have suppressed the evidence derived from the four wiretaps. 52 We believe that this argument misconstrues both the government's affidavit and the relevant case law. The affidavit did indicate that traditional investigative techniques had yielded some evidence against the Washington-area defendants. But the affidavit also showed that these techniques had failed--and would likely continue to fail--to disclose the full nature and extent of the conspiracy of which the Washington-area defendants were a part. This circuit already has held that a court may authorize the wiretap of the phone of a member of an operation if traditional investigative techniques have proved inadequate to reveal the operation's full nature and scope. United States v. Williams, 580 F.2d 578, 590 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 832, 99 S.Ct. 112, 58 L.Ed.2d 127 (1978); see id. at 590 n. 73; see also United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 850 (3d Cir.1976) (stating that when necessary, wiretaps may be employed to discover the full extent of ... conspiracies). The appellants' attempt to bifurcate the Chicago defendants from the Washington-area defendants thus fails. The government made a particularized showing that the Washington-area defendants were members of a conspiracy whose full extent could be determined only through wiretapping. This showing was sufficient to allow the district court to authorize the government to tap the phones of the Washington-area defendants. The trial court therefore acted correctly in admitting the evidence derived from the taps. 53 Another of the appellants' arguments focuses on the response of the trial court to the requests of several of the appellants to discharge their counsel and proceed pro se. Criminal defendants, of course, have a constitutional right to defend themselves. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2532, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Courts must ensure, however, that a defendant's decision to represent himself is knowing and intelligent. See id. Thus, the Supreme Court has required trial courts to make defendants aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Id. In addition, this court has stated that trial courts must engage defendants in a short discussion on the record regarding these dangers and disadvantages. United States v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 1292, 1300 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 853, 103 S.Ct. 119, 74 L.Ed.2d 104 (1982). The appellants contend that the trial court in this case failed to warn them adequately of the hazards of self-representation. The appellants concede that the court informed them in general terms of the dangers of proceeding pro se; the appellants' argument rests entirely on the failure of the court to discuss the especially complex nature of RICO cases and the difficulties of preparing an unaided defense while incarcerated. We think this argument must fail. The record discloses that the trial court engaged in a full discussion with the appellants regarding the dangers of self-representation. The judge informed the appellants of the seriousness of the charges against them, warned them that he could not assist in their defense, told them that he would have to conduct the trial in accord with the Federal Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure, and stated that it is a distinct handicap to be engaged in a serious criminal matter without any legal training or background and without the active assistance of a trained lawyer. I J.A. at 1487. In addition, the judge asked the appellants many times whether they understood his comments and whether they had any questions. We regard this colloquy as a model. Neither case law nor common sense supports the position that a trial court must advise a defendant of each and every difficulty he might encounter in a particular case. If the appellants again elect to proceed pro se, the trial court need do no more than it did in the initial trial. 54 The last of the appellants' arguments that we take up concerns the Pinkerton doctrine. In Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-48, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 1183-84, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946), the Supreme Court held that a conspirator could be found guilty of the substantive offenses of other conspirators if the offenses were committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. The government attempts to support the conviction of appellant Bethea on several counts by reference to the Pinkerton doctrine; the government contends that notwithstanding the absence of evidence that Bethea participated directly in certain offenses, he was properly convicted of the offenses because he was a member of the conspiracy and his co-conspirators committed the offenses in furtherance of the conspiracy. Bethea replies that a conviction may be upheld under Pinkerton only if the court has instructed the jury of that doctrine. We agree. The Supreme Court has stated specifically that the Pinkerton doctrine will not support a conviction unless the court has given the jury a Pinkerton instruction. See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618, 69 S.Ct. 766, 769, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949); see id. at 621, 69 S.Ct. at 770 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). If the government wishes to rely on the Pinkerton theory on retrial, the government must request and receive the appropriate instruction.