Opinion ID: 1305204
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: purpose of contempt proceeding

Text: Essential to the majority's opinion is its premise that the purpose of a section 1209 proceeding is to benefit a private party. Briefly stated, the majority's argument progresses in the following manner: (1) the basis of the instant proceeding is to vindicate private rights; (2) it is therefore a civil action; (3) statutes exist specifically authorizing the district attorney to intervene in enumerated civil actions; (4) the inclusion of these specific statutory powers to the district attorney excludes all others; (5) thus, the district attorney has no authority to bring this action. The majority's vital premise  that the purpose of enforcing an order by contempt is to benefit private litigants  is false. Under our Code of Civil Procedure, contempt of court is a specific criminal offense. ( Hotaling v. Superior Court (1923) 191 Cal. 501, 504 [217 P. 73, 29 A.L.R. 127]; Ex parte Gould (1893) 99 Cal. 360, 362 [33 P. 1112]; Ex parte Hollis (1881) 59 Cal. 405, 408; Killpatrick v. Superior Court (1957) 153 Cal. App.2d 146, 149 [314 P.2d 164]; Lapique v. Superior Court (1924) 68 Cal. App. 407, 411 [229 P. 1010]; Perkins on Criminal Law (2d ed. 1969) p. 533.) The primary purpose of the contempt proceeding is to punish for disobedience of a court order. ( Foust v. Foust (1956) 47 Cal.2d 121, 124 [302 P.2d 11]; Ransom v. Superior Court (1968) 262 Cal. App.2d 271, 276 [68 Cal. Rptr. 507]; Little v. Superior Court (1968) 260 Cal. App.2d 311, 316 [67 Cal. Rptr. 77].) `Although the alleged misconduct of the defendants occurred in the progress of a civil action, the proceeding to punish them for such misconduct is no part of the process in the civil action. ...' ( Killpatrick v. Superior Court, supra, 153 Cal. App.2d 146, 149; quoting Ex parte Gould, supra, 99 Cal. 360, 362; italics added.) Nor is it of consequence that the contempt proceeding is brought in the name of the civil litigants. ( Bridges v. Superior Court (1939) 14 Cal.2d 464, 477 [94 P.2d 983]; Ex parte Ah Men (1888) 77 Cal. 198, 200 [19 P. 380].) [A] contempt proceeding is not a civil action but is of a criminal nature even though its purpose is to impose punishment for violation of an order made in a civil action.... ( Bailey v. Superior Court (1956) 142 Cal. App.2d 47, 53 [297 P.2d 795]; see also, City of Culver City v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 535, 541 [241 P.2d 258].) While the contempt proceeding may have the ancillary effect of vindicating or enforcing private rights, this is not its purpose. Thus, in H.J. Heinz Co. v. Superior Court (1954) 42 Cal.2d 164, 175 [266 P.2d 5], the court explains: In 39 California Law Review, at page 560, the author states that `California has no provision for compensatory contempt proceedings. Civil damages may be collected in an ordinary civil action for an act otherwise a contempt.' The enforcement of an order of contempt in this state is not for the vindication of a private right but is for the maintenance of the dignity and authority of the court, and to preserve the peace and dignity of the people of the State of California. (See also, e.g., American Fire etc. Service v. Williams (1959) 171 Cal. App.2d 397, 402 [340 P.2d 644]; Bailey v. Superior Court, supra, 142 Cal. App.2d 47, 54.) The majority cites no authority supporting its departure from the well-defined purpose of contempt. Instead, the majority now interprets the purpose of contempt as benefiting private litigants  from which it derives the conclusion that the present proceeding is civil. The majority then attempts to support its conclusion by relying exclusively on civil statutes. [2] This cannot go uncriticized. Strong public policy dictates allowing the district attorney to prosecute actions for contempt. The contempt power stands as an essential pillar of our legal system. As often recognized by this court, the power `is a necessary incident to the execution of the powers conferred upon the court, and is necessary to maintain its dignity, if not its very existence.' ( In re Buckley (1973) 10 Cal.3d 237, 247-248 [110 Cal. Rptr. 121, 514 P.2d 1201]; quoting In re Shortridge (1893) 99 Cal. 526, 532 [34 P. 227].) Respect for the courts is as essential to our society as is respect for the law itself. Once judicial resolution is reached, disregard of the judgment by a dissatisfied litigant cannot be condoned. The delicate balance of our individual freedoms cannot survive limitless demands of individual interests. Liberty can only be exercised in a system of law which safeguards order. ( Cox v. Louisiana (1965) 379 U.S. 559, 574 [13 L.Ed.2d 487, 498, 85 S.Ct. 476].) Rather than limiting prosecution of contempt to the private party and imposing its burden on the individual litigant  the resulting effect of the majority's holding  a public official should be permitted to go forward. First, because the purpose of the prosecution is to secure an important public interest, its economic burden should be borne by the public. (Cf. Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1964) 60 Cal.2d 716, 719 [36 Cal. Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720, 20 A.L.R.3d 353]; Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 247, 255-256 [28 Cal. Rptr. 718, 379 P.2d 22].) Second, the duty of enforcement must not be left solely to the whim or desire of private litigants. The burden of prosecution usually outweighing any incidental benefit to the private litigant, economic realism dictates he will not pursue the important public policy of protecting the court's dignity. In this case, the grower no doubt was more concerned with harvesting his crop than with vindicating the authority of the California courts. In response to such concerns and based on the important functions being fulfilled, this court has allowed persons not parties to the original action to prosecute actions for contempt. (See, e.g., Bridges v. Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.2d 464, 477; McFarland v. Superior Court (1924) 194 Cal. 407, 423 [228 P. 1033].) The proceeding being criminal in nature for the maintenance and dignity of the court, and no reason existing to carve an exception from his normal prosecutorial responsibilities, the district attorney, subject to the court's regulation, is the appropriate public official to prosecute these contempts.