Opinion ID: 2604379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discretionary Immunity Under ORS 30.265.

Text: City contends that, in the event ORS chapter 401 emergency agency immunity is not available, then discretionary immunity under ORS 30.265(3)(c) prevents liability of city for the acts of its sewer plant operator that discharged its sewerwater on plaintiffs' lands. ORS 30.265(1) in part provides: Subject to the limitations of ORS 30.260 to 30.300, every public body is subject to action or suit for its torts and those of its officers, employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties, whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function or while operating a motor vehicle in a ridesharing arrangement authorized under ORS 276.598. ORS 30.265(3) in part provides: Every public body and its officers, employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties,    are immune from liability for:      (c) Any claim based upon the performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion is abused. The fact that a decision is made, choosing between available alternatives, does not yet demonstrate that the type of discretion that is entitled to immunity has been exercised. Lowrimore v. Dimmitt, 310 Or. 291, 296, 797 P.2d 1027 (1990) (mere fact of a choice among two or more courses of action does not make the choice a policy judgment as is required before discretionary immunity will apply). In Lowrimore, this court explained that: A traffic officer's decision to pursue a vehicle such as the Dimmitt vehicle, though discretionary in the sense that it involves the exercise of judgment and choice by the officer, is not one that qualifies its maker to immunity under ORS 30.265(3)(c). The making of the decision to pursue does not create any departmental policy and was not made by a person `with governmental discretion.' Little v. Wimmer, [303 Or 580, 588, 739 P2d 564 (1987)]. Although the decision to pursue may have been made pursuant to a county departmental policy, the decision itself is not a policy judgment within the meaning of McBride v. Magnuson, [282 Or 433, 578 P2d 1259 (1978)] and Stevenson v. State of Oregon, [290 Or 3, 619 P2d 247 (1980)]. 310 Or. at 296, 797 P.2d 1027. In Stevenson v. State of Oregon, supra , this court pointed out that [t]he burden is on the state to establish its immunity. 290 Or. at 15, 619 P.2d 247. In Little v. Wimmer, supra , plaintiff alleged negligence for failure to install signs that warned of a dangerous highway intersection and for failure to remedy the dangerous condition of that intersection. The case was brought by motorists who were injured in collisions at the dangerous intersection. This court reversed summary judgments grounded on discretionary immunity, stating: In the absence of evidence that the decision was made as a policy judgment by a person or body with governmental discretion, the decision is not immune from liability. As we said in Miller v. Grants Pass Irrigation, 297 Or 312, 320, 686 P2d 324 (1984), `[i]f there is a legal duty to protect the public by warning of a danger or by taking preventive measures, or both, the choice of means may be discretionary, but the decision whether or not to do so at all is, by definition, not discretionary.'  303 Or. at 588-89, 739 P.2d 564. In cases decided before enactment of the Oregon Tort Claims Act, this court also denied governmental immunity in situations analogous to that present here. See, e.g., Levene v. City of Salem, 191 Or. 182, 190-92, 196, 229 P.2d 255 (1951) (holding that periodic flooding of plaintiffs' building by city's redirection of standing water to promote health of city inhabitants was ground for trespass liability from which governmental immunity did not protect); Wilson v. City of Portland, 153 Or. 679, 686, 58 P.2d 257 (1936) (answering negatively the question [c]an it be that a city is acting for the public welfare when it dumps putrid and foul smelling garbage and refuse within 300 feet of a person's home, rendering it an unfit place in which to live?). When the city's functionary made the specific decision to release untreated effluent into the slough, it did not create any future governmental or departmental policy, Lowrimore v. Dimmitt, supra, 310 Or. at 296, 797 P.2d 1027, and was not a policy judgment entitling the city to discretionary immunity. As an aid to determining whether a given choice is one of policy, this court has also commented that policy discretion is more likely to be found at or near the level of political responsibility. McBride v. Magnuson, supra, 282 Or. at 438, 578 P.2d 1259. City's functionary, charged with the duty of safe operation of the sewer plant and apprised of the unusually high volume of effluent being received at city's sewer ponds, initially did nothing either to reduce the inflow or to increase discharge of the effluent by the approved method. Later he decided to spill the untreated effluent into an adjacent flooded slough and thereby onto plaintiffs' properties without warning. The city has not demonstrated, as it must to prevail, that the act of releasing effluent was conduct for which the city was entitled to discretionary immunity.