Opinion ID: 15640
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: such failure caused a constitutional injury

Text: to the student. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 454 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Thus, in order to survive summary judgment, Plaintiffs must put forth evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on each of these issues. Patrick first contends that Plaintiffs have failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she had notice of “facts or a pattern of inappropriate sexual behavior by a subordinate pointing plainly toward the conclusion that the subordinate was sexually abusing . . . student[s].” Id. Plaintiffs argue that Patrick was aware of McGrew’s actions. In support of their claim, they offer the deposition testimony of several children that McGrew molested, but the majority of the victims testified that they either told no one about the abuse or that they told only a teacher, a teacher’s aide, or a parent. They offered no evidence linking the information to Patrick. Therefore, these depositions do not support the claim that Patrick was aware of the abuse.7 However, in the Spring of 1986, 7 However, the evidence regarding two of the boys bears brief discussion. First, Plaintiff D.D.P. stated in a 1988 affidavit and in a 1996 deposition that McGrew had fondled him. In the affidavit, he claimed that he “told Ms. Patrick . . . about what happened.” In his deposition testimony, however, he clarified his report of the incident, stating that he actually told two women who worked in Patrick’s office. While he stated that he thought Patrick probably could hear what he was saying, he admitted that she was in another room on the telephone and that he could only see her through a partially open door. He denied ever having spoken to Patrick herself. As D.D.P.’s 14 plaintiff J.H. told his mother and Patrick that McGrew had fondled him when he delivered a note to McGrew’s classroom. Patrick does not dispute that J.H. and his mother discussed the incident with her. Thus, we conclude that Patrick had notice as of the Spring of 1986 of an allegation that McGrew fondled J.H. Given that Patrick had notice of an allegation of sexual abuse by McGrew, we next consider whether Plaintiffs have created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Patrick acted with deliberate indifference when informed of J.H.’s allegations. The parties agree that upon hearing J.H.’s accusation, Patrick met with J.H., his mother, and McGrew to discuss the issue. Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that Patrick’s failure to reprimand McGrew formally or to transfer him indicates that she was deliberately indifferent to the rights of J.H. We disagree. statement that he was “pretty sure [Patrick] could have heard” him telling the women in the office about the incident is entirely speculative, it is not sufficient to raise a question of fact as to whether Patrick was aware of the incident. See Ruiz v. Whirlpool, Inc., 12 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Testimony based on conjecture or speculation is insufficient to raise an issue of fact to defeat a summary judgment motion . . . .”). Second, plaintiff W.J.H. testified that Patrick may have asked him whether McGrew had touched him, stating, “I think [Patrick] asked all of us, I think, but I can’t remember though.” However, W.J.H. stated that when Patrick asked him about McGrew, he denied that any improper touching had taken place. Assuming, for purposes of summary judgment, that Patrick did ask W.J.H. about any sexual abuse by McGrew, the fact that W.J.H. denied it indicates that this incident was not sufficient to put Patrick on notice of the abuse. 15 The deliberate indifference standard is a high one. Actions and decisions by officials that are merely inept, erroneous, ineffective, or negligent do not amount to deliberate indifference and thus do not divest the official of qualified immunity. In Taylor, we explained, We can foresee many good faith but ineffective responses that might satisfy a school official’s obligation in these situations, e.g., warning the state actor, notifying the student’s parents, or removing the student from the teacher’s class. Id. at 456 n.12. This is just such a case. Patrick testified that following her meeting with J.H., his mother, and McGrew, she determined that J.H.’s allegations were not true. Nevertheless, she warned McGrew to examine his behavior closely and to ensure that he was not doing anything that could be misinterpreted by a child. The fact that Patrick misread the situation and made a tragic error in judgment does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she acted with deliberate indifference toward J.H.’s constitutional rights. As Plaintiffs have failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to (1) whether Patrick was aware of other allegations of abuse or (2) whether she acted with deliberate indifference toward J.H.’s constitutional rights upon being informed of his allegation, we conclude that Patrick was entitled to summary judgment in her favor on the issue of qualified immunity. 16