Opinion ID: 2515784
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Excusal of Prospective Juror G.B.

Text: Defendant contends the trial court either used an incorrect standard or abused its discretion in determining that a prima facie case of group bias had not been established as to the excusal of Prospective Juror G.B. Assuming without deciding that the court's decision is not entitled to deference (see ante, pt. II.C.3.b.), we are able to resolve the legal question whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused G.B. on the basis of group bias. We conclude the record does not support such an inference. Prospective Alternate Juror G.B., who identified herself as Black, indicated in the written questionnaire that she was a psychiatric nurse, had a degree in psychology, and valued the opinions of psychologists or psychiatrists most of the time, as she worked closely with them in her job as a nurse in a psychiatric ward. She had an unpleasant experience with a law enforcement officer. G.B. also did not strongly support the death penalty. On her written questionnaire, G.B. indicated she would consider the death penalty and wrote: [E]ach circumstance is individual to me. She had no opinion on whether the death penalty was used too often, not often enough, or too randomly. She [s]omewhat agreed with the statement that any person who intentionally kills another person, except in cases of self-defense or defense of another, deserved the death penalty, and she was neutral on whether convicted murders should be swiftly executed once they were convicted. She did not believe in the adage An eye for an eye. Although G.B. had given the issue of the death penalty much thought prior to being called as a prospective juror on this case, she did not answer the question on the questionnaire asking whether, regardless of the evidence and because of her conscientious objections to the death penalty, she would in every case automatically vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. [39] Some of G.B.'s answers on the questionnaire also were not fully and directly responsive to the questions. For example, although G.B. indicated that her opinion on the death penalty had changed over the years, when asked to explain how and why it changed, she answered in general terms, Its [ sic ] a moral issue and depends on where you are in your own life at the time you are thinking about it. Similarly, on the question asking about her general feelings regarding life imprisonment without parole, G.B. wrote, Is there rehabilitation would be my question. Thus, based on the questionnaire as a whole, there were many reasons other than racial bias for any prosecutor to challenge her, including but not limited to her negative experience with a law enforcement officer, her background as a nurse in a psychiatric ward where she worked closely with and valued the opinions of psychologists and psychiatrists, and her nonresponsive answers to some questions about penalty in this case. G.B.'s responses to oral voir dire further support this view. At one point, the prosecutor asked G.B. whether she could apply the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in the guilt phase of trial, regardless of her thoughts on penalty, and G.B. answered yes. When the prosecutor further asked, [I]s there a subjective side to that answer, G.B. answered, You're asking me to follow the law, and I said yes, I can follow the law. My  my answer would be yes. G.B. further stated that she did not have any subjective feelings as of that point but that, as human beings, everyone had a subjective side. The suggestion of tension between counsel and the juror is one good reason for any prosecutor to challenge her. Moreover, when G.B. was excused, W.H., who was Black, remained as a prospective alternate juror and eventually served as a juror for the guilt and penalty phases. (See People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 69-70, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622 [evidence that the prosecutor challenged one of two African-American prospective jurors is insufficient to establish a prima facie showing, particularly in view of the circumstance that the other African-American prospective juror ultimately sat on the jury].) After examining the totality of the relevant facts, we conclude that the record fails to support an inference that the prosecutor excused G.B. on the basis of race. Defendant argues, however, that because the trial court had found a prima facie showing in an earlier Wheeler motion responding to the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror V.J., he was not required to make a prima facie showing in a subsequent motion objecting to the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror G.B. We disagree. A prima facie showing at one point in the proceedings does not require a statement of reasons for excusal of all subsequent members of the same cognizable group. ( Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 198-199, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) In any case, as discussed, the record does not support an inference of discriminatory purpose.