Opinion ID: 1351510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Dissatisfaction With Counsel

Text: At the July 13, 1981, trial setting conference, defendant first broached the subject of his dissatisfaction with defense counsel. Noting that the book he was reading (Behind Charles Manson) advised that the worst thing to get was an overworked PD, defendant asserted that he was not getting along with counsel and that he wanted at least a state appointed attorney. Although defendant did not make a clear and unequivocal request to proceed in propria persona, he made this statement: And I feel like this  like me and he can't get along. If I got to go down, let me go down by myself because I really don't need no overworked PD trying to help me fight my case when he not [ sic ] going to do nothing for me. Counsel responded that he had been getting along with defendant until that morning, when counsel told defendant he was too busy to make defendant a copy of the charges against him for his own use. In addition, counsel refused to exchange some money for defendant, saying that was not one of his functions. The matter ended when the trial court advised defendant that his attorney was competent and experienced, and that he stood a better chance of acquittal with counsel's representation than without it. Defendant next expressed his dissatisfaction with counsel over a year later, on August 16, 1982. He complained at that time about counsel's suggestion that he consider pleading guilty, and alleged that counsel was advising him to plead guilty because he wanted to avoid looking silly at trial, thereby damaging his professional reputation. To punctuate his claim that counsel was not competent, defendant noted he had done some checking and discovered that defense counsel is just a deputy public defender from the public defender's office, and it states, you know, in law on the special circumstances case you're entitled by law to two attorneys and right now I'm facing the special circumstances case and I ain't even got one lawyer, not even one and it says by law you're entitled to two.... The trial court thereupon informed defendant that his counsel was indeed an attorney. When the court next tried to determine whether defendant had discussed these matters with counsel, defendant began discussing another subject. The trial court interjected: Wait a minute.... [¶] You have to tell me certain things now that I need to know in order for me to make a decision as to whether to relieve [counsel] ... and let you go pro per. Defense counsel reported he had told defendant that the evidence of guilt was very strong and that a guilty plea might save his life. He added that he told defendant a strong argument at the guilt phase would not be presented in order to preserve counsel's credibility with the jury at the penalty phase. The trial court informed defendant his attorney knew much more about the case than anyone else, and opined that counsel's initial suggestion that he plead guilty was not a face-saving maneuver, but rather tactical advice based on an appraisal of the strength of the People's evidence. In the course of this discussion, the trial court commented that counsel is a person who has tried several cases similar to this before, cases involving the possibility of a death penalty in a murder trial. a. Faretta Error Defendant first claims his right to self-representation under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525] was violated. He argues that the trial court's statement concerning counsel's experience in capital cases was false, thereby preventing him from making an informed decision whether to assume the responsibility of his own defense. To support his claim that the court's comment was a misrepresentation, he directs our attention to an April 6, 1982, pretrial hearing at which counsel told the trial judge, outside the earshot of defendant and the jury, that defendant's case was the first special-circumstances murder case he had ever tried. (See Discussion, ante, at p. 390.) Even assuming the accuracy of defendant's factual premises, no Faretta error is established. (21) [I]n order to invoke the constitutionally mandated unconditional right of self-representation a defendant in a criminal trial should make an unequivocal assertion of that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial. ( People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 127-128 [137 Cal. Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187], italics added; see People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1219-1220 [259 Cal. Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698].) Here, defendant failed to clearly indicate at the August 16, 1982, hearing that he desired to have counsel relieved and to proceed pro se. The record, read as a whole, reveals that defendant was unhappy for two reasons: because he believed counsel was not a real attorney, and because at one point counsel advised him to consider pleading guilty. The only possible reference in the record to defendant's desire to proceed without an attorney  a tangential one at that  came at the very early stages when, at the trial setting conference a year earlier, defendant commented: If I got to go down, let me go down by myself.... And while the trial court mentioned more than a year later, on August 16, 1982, that it was trying to determine whether to relieve counsel and let defendant proceed in propria persona, that comment was made in response to a Marsden motion ( People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44]; see Discussion post, at p. 410), and was directed to defendant's apparent dissatisfaction with defense counsel on that later date. On this record we conclude that the trial court did not violate defendant's constitutional right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806, since defendant never made a timely, unequivocal assertion of that right. b. Marsden Error Defendant also contends that these same alleged misrepresentations by the trial court regarding counsel's previous experience with capital trial work demonstrate that the court failed to conduct a proper Marsden hearing. (22) In Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, we held that the right of an accused to the effective assistance of counsel may, under appropriate circumstances, include the right to have present counsel discharged and substitute counsel appointed. In order to thoughtfully exercise its discretion whether to discharge present counsel, a trial court is required to listen to a defendant's complaints about his attorney. ( Id. at pp. 123-124.) [A] judge who denies a motion for substitution of attorneys solely on the basis of his courtroom observations, despite a defendant's offer to relate specific instances of misconduct, abuses the exercise of his discretion to determine the competency of the attorney. ( Id. at p. 124.) It is apparent here that the alleged misrepresentations did not implicate defendant's Marsden rights. The record reveals that the trial court patiently listened to defendant's complaints about counsel, [12] asked counsel for his side of the story, and resolved the matter  we might add, to defendant's apparent satisfaction  by explaining that public defenders were indeed real attorneys, and that counsel's suggestion that defendant should consider pleading guilty was not a face-saving measure, but an honest appraisal of the strength of the People's case. The record further reflects that defendant never directly requested appointment of substitute counsel, but instead merely expressed some unhappiness with certain aspects of counsel's handling of his case. [13] On this record no Marsden error is established. c. Keenan Error Defendant next urges reversal is required because the trial court failed to properly consider appointment of a second attorney to assist defense counsel. (23) Although we have held that appointment of a second attorney in a capital case is authorized under section 987.9 (see Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424 [180 Cal. Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108]), the record in this case shows defendant never actually moved for appointment of such counsel. Instead, we interpret defendant's reference to the possibility of second counsel as an attempt to underscore his argument that since he was merely represented by an overworked PD, he had not been afforded the competent services of a single attorney, let alone two. We noted in Keenan, supra, 31 Cal.3d 424, that in assessing the need for [a second] attorney the court must focus on the complexity of the issues involved, keeping in mind the critical role that pretrial preparation may play in the eventual outcome of the prosecution. ( Id. at p. 432.) Defendant made no showing of the complexity of issues involved here. Indeed, the mention of second counsel first surfaced on August 16, 1982, the day on which counsel announced his readiness for trial. Voir dire commenced only two days later. We deem it unlikely a sufficient showing of the need for second counsel could have been made on this record. Even had a timely and proper request for appointment of second counsel been tendered, on this record the trial court would not have abused its discretion in denying it.