Opinion ID: 2499059
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Witness Certainty When Considering Suppression of the Identification

Text: First, Mitchell relies on our decision in Hunt to argue that trial courts should no longer consider witness certainty when determining whether to suppress eyewitness identification evidence. Therefore, he reasons, the jury should not have been instructed to consider witness certainty. The State responds that Mitchell misconstrues this court's identification suppression caselaw and contends witness certainty is still a valid factor in the jury's analysis when considering the accuracy of an eyewitness identification. To decide the issue, we must revisit the standards applicable to suppression of eyewitness testimony, even though our concern in this case is limited to the jury instruction. District courts follow a two-step process when determining whether an eyewitness identification is admissible evidence. The first step examines whether the police procedure used to obtain the identification was impermissibly or unnecessarily suggestive. If so, trial courts move to the second step and consider whether there was a substantial likelihood of misidentification under the totality of the circumstances surrounding it. Corbett, 281 Kan. at 304, 130 P.3d 1179. Initially, Kansas trial courts looked to five criteria to determine whether there was a substantial likelihood for misidentification: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. See, e.g., State v. Ponds, 227 Kan. 627, 630, 608 P.2d 946 (1980); State v. Deffenbaugh, 217 Kan. 469, 471, 536 P.2d 1030 (1975). These are commonly called the Biggers factors because they derived from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). In Hunt, this court refined the Biggers factors by approving criteria recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991). Hunt, 275 Kan. at 817-18, 69 P.3d 571. The Hunt court held that the Ramirez factors improved the district court's analysis of whether the identification was reliable, but it emphasized that acceptance of the Ramirez model should not be considered a rejection of the Biggers factors. Hunt, 275 Kan. at 818, 69 P.3d 571. But confusion occurred in later cases because Hunt omitted the degree of certainty factor approved earlier in Biggers, which to some implied disapproval. And this interpretation was bolstered by the fact that the Utah Supreme Court had also omitted the witness certainty factor after holding certainty was a poor predictor of accuracy. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 ([W]e criticized this factor and essentially rejected it as an indicator of an identification's reliability.). But another explanation for our failure to address the factor could have been that no certainty evidence was admitted at Hunt's trial, so there was no need for that factor to appear in the analysis. Regardless, this court's next decision did not clarify whether trial courts should continue considering witness certainty when determining whether an eyewitness identification would be admissible. In State v. Trammell, 278 Kan. 265, 92 P.3d 1101 (2004), three witnesses identified the defendant from various photographic lineups, and the same eyewitness identification instruction at issue in Mitchell's case was submitted to the jury. Trammell argued for the first time on appeal that PIK Crim.3d 52.20 was erroneous because it included the degree of certainty factor, citing Hunt. This court declined to review the jury instruction issue, but we noted Hunt did not support Trammell's claim that the eyewitness instruction was erroneous because Hunt did not address the validity of PIK Crim.3d 52.20. Trammell, 278 Kan. at 269-70, 92 P.3d 1101. This dictum hinted that the factors for determining admissibility may be different than the factors that should be included in the cautionary jury instruction. The Trammell court did reach whether the trial court should have excluded the eyewitness identification. It described Hunt as adding the Ramirez factors to the Biggers factors, which implied the certainty factor remained valid. Trammell, 278 Kan. at 270, 92 P.3d 1101. But that issue was not expressly clarified until our Corbett decision. In Corbett, this court listed eight factors for trial courts to consider in the second step of the identification suppression analysis: (1) The witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) The witness' degree of attention; (3) The accuracy of the witness' prior description; (4) The level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; (5) The length of time between the crime and the confrontation; (6) The witness' capacity to observe the event, including his or her mental and physical acuity; (7) The spontaneity and consistency of the witness' identification and the susceptibility to suggestion; and (8) The nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember, and relate it correctly. 281 Kan. at 305, 130 P.3d 1179. These eight factors from Corbett have been cited in later cases involving district court identification suppression rulings. See, e.g., State v. Reed, 45 Kan.App.2d 372, 378-79, 247 P.3d 1074, rev. denied 292 Kan. 968 (2011); State v. Galyardt, 44 Kan.App.2d 729, 735-38, 240 P.3d 619 (2010), pet. for rev. filed October 21, 2010 (pending). Relying on Corbett, we find there is no merit to Mitchell's argument that Kansas courts no longer consider the witness certainty factor when determining if eyewitness identifications are admissible evidence. Therefore, his argument that the jury instruction should have been modified to conform to the same standard applied by district courts when deciding a suppression motion is wrong. But this finding does not answer the next question presentedwhether the jury should have been instructed to consider witness certainty. And to decide this, we must focus on whether the language of the instruction misled the jury.