Opinion ID: 761821
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: purity of heroin

Text: 51 Mikaelian stipulated in the plea agreement to the distribution of over one kilogram of a substance containing a detectable amount of heroin. Later, in his objections to the PSR, he described the substance as an unusually im pure mixture, only 4% heroin, and also expressed a recently-derived, good-faith doubt whether the amounts and purities are as reported. Mikaelian requested the appointment of an expert to testify that the drug was unusually impure, and moved for production of the narcotics for defense testing under Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Mikaelian submitted recent articles about mistakes and problems at the FBI crime laboratory in Washington, D.C., and called for an independent drug analysis because he no longer blithely believes in federal labs. Although the press reports focused on the Washington, D.C. FBI laboratory, Mikaelian contended that Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) lab results such as those in his case were suspect as well. The district court denied the motion for appointment of experts and production of the narcotics, and Mikaelian appeals.
52 We review de novo the district court's ruling on the Brady motion. United States v. Amlani, 111 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir.1997); United States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir.1991). 53 In Brady, the Supreme Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194; see United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1028 (9th Cir.1998) (applying Brady to sentencing); United States v. Nagra, 147 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir.1998) (some degree of disclosure required under Brady even when defendant pleads guilty). Evidence is material under Brady if 'there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'  United States v. Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901, 904 (9th Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). 54 There is no indication in the record that the heroin recovered was in a smaller amount, or less pure than four percent. See Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 935-36 (9th Cir.1998) (record must show that evidence is exculpatory for defendant to establish Brady violation). In fact, when he pleaded guilty, Mikaelian stipulated to the amounts of heroin found in the government's original testing. Stipulations as to material facts ... will be deemed to have been conclusively established. United States v. Houston, 547 F.2d 104, 107 (9th Cir.1976). 55 Mikaelian does not allege that the government has withheld any evidence favorable to him. The district court thus did not err in denying his Brady motion. See United States v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 1108, 1118 n. 5 (9th Cir.1986) (for colorable Brady claim, defendant must show that evidence sought is favorable to him and material to his innocence or applicable punishment).
56 More on point is Mikaelian's motion for inspection of the heroin under Fed R.Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(C), which provides: 57 Upon request of the defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect ... tangible objects ... which are within the possession, custody, or control of the government and which are material to the preparation of the defendant's defense or are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial.... 58 This court reviews de novo the district court's rulings on the scope of its authority to order discovery under Rule 16. United States v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir.1996). 59 Rule 16 governs pretrial discovery and imposes on the government a continuing duty to disclose evidence prior to or during trial. Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(c). Mikaelian did not move for discovery until February 1997, nine months after his guilty plea. The district court denied the discovery motion because the heroin was neither material to the preparation of Mikaelian's defense nor intended by the government for use at trial. [ER p. 347] See United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir.1997) (motion during suppression hearing to examine equipment under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) is too late; rule gives right to inspect objects prior to trial). Because Mikaelian pled guilty, however, there was no trial or formal defense. Not only was the motion untimely, as it was made nine months after the guilty plea, but Mikaelian stipulated to the amount of the heroin, and as stated below he has not made an adequate showing that testing would show such a low purity as to create a possible issue affecting his sentence. There is thus no evidence that the denial of the motion prejudiced him. See Amlani, 111 F.3d at 711 (no reversal for discovery violation unless district court abused its discretion and the error resulted in prejudice to substantial rights).
60 Mikaelian argues that the relatively low purity of the heroin he distributed could be a basis for downward departure. On that assumption, he made a motion for a forensic chemist to test the drug and testify regarding its impurity. The district court concluded that it was without legal authority to depart downward on the basis of the heroin's low purity. This court reviews the district court's departure decision for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Mendoza, 121 F.3d 510, 513 (9th Cir.1997) (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 99, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996)). Whether a factor is a permissible ground for departure is a matter of law, although '[l]ittle turns on whether ... we label review of this particular question an abuse of discretion or de novo, for an abuse of discretion standard does not mean a mistake of law is beyond appellate correction.'  United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d 556, 559 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc) (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035) (brackets and ellipsis in original). 61 Mikaelian urges us to conclude that just as the high purity of a drug may justify an upward departure, a low purity may justify a downward departure. In the alternative, he contends that such a departure is possible when the extremely low purity of the drug constitutes a mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); Koon, 518 U.S. at 109, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (if the Commission did not categorically proscribe a factor for downward departure, a sentencing court may depart downward if the factor, as occurring in the particular circumstances, takes the case outside the heartland of the applicable Guideline); Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d at 560 (we cannot categorically forbid a district court from departing downward on any basis except for those specifically proscribed in the Guidelines). We agree that the low purity of heroin involved in a crime cannot be categorically excluded as a basis for a downward departure. 62 In this case, however, Mikaelian has not established that a downward departure was warranted. Mikaelian has filed to allege that the heroin he distributed was of such low purity that it took his case outside the heartland of the applicable Guideline. Although he characterizes four percent heroin as very im pure or junk heroin, he presented no evidence that heroin of four percent purity is unusually impure, nor did he even indicate that the expert witness he requested would so testify. See United States v. Martinez-Duran, 927 F.2d 453, 456 (9th Cir.1991) (upward departure for high purity of heroin not justified when no evidence adduced as to what level of purity is unusually high). 2
63 The district court declined to exercise its discretion to depart downward based on Mikaelian's mental condition, including his severe headaches. Such a discretionary refusal to depart is not reviewable on appeal. United States v. Webster, 108 F.3d 1156, 1158 (9th Cir.1997).