Opinion ID: 2586092
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Pre-Accusation Delay Test Places the Burden of Proof on the Defendant.

Text: A defendant's pre-accusation or pre-indictment rights are entitled to limited protection under the federal and Alaska Constitutions. [14] The right to a speedy trial is not implicated at all in such a case because that right attaches only upon either formal charges or arrest, [15] when the defendant experiences a restraint on his liberty or suffers the public obloquy that accompanies formal charges. [16] Instead, an individual's primary safeguard against undue pre-indictment delay is the statute of limitations set by the legislature. [17] Such statutes represent legislative assessments of relative interests of the State and the defendant in administering and receiving justice. [18] Gonzales does not dispute that his indictment fell within the statute of limitations. The remaining safeguard against stale indictments is provided by the due process clauses of both the Alaska and federal constitutions. [19] State due process challenges are analyzed under a two-part test which aims to protect[] the accused from improper or unreasonable conduct by the government in the bringing of a criminal charge. [20] The first part of the test inquires whether the delay was reasonable. [21] The second part examines the degree of prejudice resulting from the delay. [22] To establish an unconstitutional pre-indictment delay, the defendant must prove both that the delay was not reasonable [23] and that the defendant suffered actual prejudice from the delay. [24] If the defendant succeeds in meeting both parts of the test, the only sanction is dismissal. [25] Alaska case law requires that the defendant bears the burden of proof to demonstrate the absence of a valid reason for the delay. [26] However, once the issue of pre-indictment delay is raised, the state has the burden to come forward with reasons for the delay. [27] This intermediate burden is necessary because the reasons for the delay are normally within the exclusive knowledge of the state. [28] When the reasons are advanced, the defendant must show that they do not justify the delay. [29] The defendant also has the burden to prove actual prejudice. [30] In this case the lower courts did not properly assign the burden of proof to the defendant, instead placing the burden on the state not only to proffer reasons for the delay but also to justify why the delay was necessary. For example, the superior court asked, Wouldn't [Gonzales's fleeing the state] cut towards . . . let's indict him now in 1992[?] . . . I mean if that's when he fled, under those circumstances, why wait? In response to the state's argument that Gonzales's flight was a reasonable reason for the state to delay the superior court remarked, I don't think [Gonzales's flight] has anything to do with anything . . . and Detective Branchflower said as much. She could have brought the charge. (Emphasis added.) Later the superior court commented, I mean why didn't you go to a grand jury? I just, quite frankly, still don't understand. And so I think that's the real problem and I don't know the answer to it. The court of appeals's opinion characterizes the evidence in a way that likewise indicates that the state failed to meet its burden. The court summarized the factual conclusions that the superior court could reasonably have come to and concluded, the State presented no evidence justifying the delay. [31] In combination these statements indicate that the burden of proof was misapplied in the lower courts. When the facts of this case are reexamined under the proper burdens, we are compelled to reverse.