Opinion ID: 1297188
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Evidence of the Plastic Bag

Text: (11a) Two of the eyewitnesses, Urone and Ratterman, testified that defendant placed the property he stole from the robbery victims into a plastic small garbage bag (Urone) or a [w]hite plastic garbage bag (Ratterman). Without objection, Officer Boga testified that he found a white plastic garbage bag in a car Horton said belonged to defendant. Strellis elicited on cross-examination testimony that the Berkeley Police Department had lost the bag. It should have been placed in the central property room but Officer Boga could not locate it. Implicitly recognizing that because there was no objection to the testimony about the bag, he cannot directly challenge its admission (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a)), defendant contends the district attorney committed misconduct by eliciting the evidence, his attorneys were ineffective in not objecting, and the trial court should have stricken the testimony on its own motion. The claim of misconduct has been waived by the failure to object. ( People v. Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 976.) The trial court also has no sua sponte duty to exclude evidence or to remedy misconduct. ( People v. Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 918.) We also find no misconduct and no incompetence. Because the decision whether to object is inherently tactical, the failure to object to evidence will seldom establish incompetence. ( People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 772 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250]; People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 158 [158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587].) Defendant claims the evidence of the bag in the car was irrelevant because no one identified it as the bag used in the robbery, and an infinite number of people must possess such common, unremarkable articles as plastic bags in their cars. We disagree. (12) Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action. (Evid. Code, § 210.) While there is no universal test of relevancy, the general rule in criminal cases might be stated as whether or not the evidence tends logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference to establish any fact material for the prosecution or to overcome any material matter sought to be proved by the defense. [Citation.] Evidence is relevant when no matter how weak it may be, it tends to prove the issue before the jury. ( People v. Slocum (1975) 52 Cal. App.3d 867, 891 [125 Cal. Rptr. 442].) (11b) Evidence that defendant possessed a plastic garbage bag shortly after the crime, coupled with the evidence that the shooter in the bar used a plastic garbage bag, tended to show that defendant was the shooter, which is a material fact in the case. Standing alone the inference may have been weak, but that does not make the evidence irrelevant. The fact that many persons may similarly have possessed such bags may diminish the strength of the evidence, but it does not make it irrelevant. In People v. De La Plane (1979) 88 Cal. App.3d 223 [151 Cal. Rptr. 843], the court admitted over a relevance objection evidence of a sawed-off axe handle found in the bathroom of the house in which the defendant was arrested. No evidence connected the handle to the crimes of that case except for expert testimony that it could have caused the victim's wounds. ( Id. at p. 239, italics in original.) The Court of Appeal upheld admission of the evidence: If a victim's wound could have been caused by a specific type of weapon or instrument, such a weapon or instrument found in defendant's possession is admissible in evidence. Such a weapon or instrument is considered relevant on the theory that a trier of fact may reasonably draw an inference from defendant's possession of the weapon or instrument to the fact that he used the weapon or instrument to commit the offense  a disputed fact of consequence in the action. ( Ibid., italics in original.) Similarly, here the jury may reasonably infer that defendant used the bag in the robbery, and thus was the shooter, a disputed fact of consequence in the action. Contrary to defendant's contention, the inference was not speculative, but was based on the similarity of the bag used in the robbery to the one found in defendant's car. In People v. De La Plane, supra, 88 Cal. App.3d at page 240, the appellate court suggested the trial court could have excluded the evidence of the axe handle under Evidence Code section 352 because of its prejudicial nature. Here, there was nothing prejudicial about the plastic bag. No reason appears to have excluded it. Defendant assumes Strellis was unaware the bag had been lost before his cross-examination of Officer Boga, and therefore that he had not adequately investigated the facts. Nothing in the record supports such an assumption. On the contrary, Strellis's focused cross-examination suggests that he knew the situation exactly, and carefully elicited precisely the testimony he wanted in an attempt to discredit the investigation into this crime. (13) Defendant argues the evidence should have been excluded, or sanctions should have been imposed, because the bag was later lost. In order to obtain sanctions for the loss of evidence, the defendant must show that it possessed an exculpatory value that was apparent before it was destroyed, and that the police acted in bad faith. ( People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 519 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 779, 862 P.2d 779].) Defendant can show neither. It is hard to imagine how the bag could have had an exculpatory value or how that value could have been apparent to the police. There is also no suggestion of bad faith. The jury heard all the facts surrounding the bag and its loss, and could draw its own conclusions. That was sufficient to protect defendant. ( People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 811-812 [281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865].) Defendant also suggests the issue regarding the bag was somehow related to an earlier Hitch motion ( People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal.3d 641 [117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 527 P.2d 361]) defendant made pro se, and argues that his attorneys acted ineffectively regarding that motion. The motion, handwritten by defendant, was labeled Notice of motion and motion to dismiss (Hitch motion), and requested the charges be dismissed based upon the suppression and/or failure to preserve evidence. The motion was couched entirely in general terms; it never specified what evidence was supposed to have been suppressed or not preserved, and does not mention the plastic bag. The closest the motion came to being specific was a statement that the prosecutor must provide names of all informants. When the motion was first filed, Strellis had not yet read it. As he stated, It's in pro per. I'm not entitled not to file the motion. He asked to put the motion over so he would be in a position to argue it. When the motion was considered on the merits, Strellis stated in general terms that defendant was only asking for what he was entitled to, that the district attorney provide him with all exonerating evidence. The district attorney stated there was none that had not already been provided. When the defense presented no evidence to the contrary, the motion to dismiss was denied. The court properly denied the motion. Defendant made no showing whatsoever that any evidence had been withheld, and did not even specify what he was complaining about. As the trial court noted, it appeared the motion was copied from a form book. Defense counsel was not incompetent in not pursuing the motion more vigorously.