Opinion ID: 48739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Locke's remaining challenges

Text: 13 Locke next argues that the probation condition prohibiting him from possessing any form of pornography is impermissibly vague as applied. Locke, however, did not object to the imposition of this condition, nor did he ever request guidance as to its meaning. Moreover, the terms of Locke's probation, the record, and the statute of conviction provided sufficient notice that the pornographic material that Locke possessed was prohibited by the probation condition. The forty-nine images captured from Locke's computer depicted erotic behavior intended to cause sexual excitement; they depicted various nude persons, both male and female, engaging in a variety of sexual activity. Locke pleaded guilty to one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), which prohibits, inter alia, possessing visual pictures of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. That term is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) as actual or simulated . . . sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex. The original indictment charging Locke alleged that he had possessed multiple images depicting minors engaging in oral/genital sexual intercourse. Under these circumstances, Locke had sufficient notice that the pictures he downloaded to his wife's computer were pornography within the meaning of his probation condition. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) ([E]ven if the outermost boundaries of [the statute] may be imprecise, any such uncertainty has little relevance here, where appellants' conduct falls squarely within the `hard core' of the statute's proscriptions and appellants concede as much.); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 490-92 (2d Cir.2006) (rejecting an as applied vagueness challenge to a criminal statute using the term pornography). Lastly, Locke argues that the probation condition denying his access to the Internet imposed a greater deprivation of his First Amendment rights than was reasonably necessary. Again, Locke did not object to this condition when imposed, and, as applied, the probation condition was constitutional. Locke used the Internet in a manner which was entirely proper to proscribe. See United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 168-69 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that an Internet prohibition was reasonably related to the defendant's child pornography offense). Locke attempts to distinguish Paul because the Paul defendant had, in addition to possessing child pornography, used the Internet to encourage exploitation of children. See id. at 169. However, the Internet prohibition in Paul, just like the one here, served the dual purpose of protecting the public and discouraging recidivism. See id. That Locke did not encourage others to exploit children in no way lessens the harm caused by the images of child pornography.