Opinion ID: 2510525
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Discharge Counsel

Text: The defendant first argues the district court erred in refusing to consider his pro se motion for discharge of court-appointed counsel. It is the task of the district judge to insure that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is honored. [Citation omitted.] State v. Taylor, 266 Kan. 967, 975, 975 P.2d 1196 (1999). Where a trial court becomes aware of a possible conflict of interest between an attorney and a defendant charged with a felony, the court has a duty to inquire further. 266 Kan. at 979 (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272, 67 L. Ed. 2d 220, 101 S. Ct. 1097 [1981]). Likewise, where the trial court is advised of the possibility of a conflict by either the defendant or the State, the court is required to initiate an inquiry to insure that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not violated. State v. Jenkins, 257 Kan. 1074, 1083-84, 898 P.2d 1121 (1995). A trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to inquire further after becoming aware of a potential conflict between an attorney and client. State v. Carver, 32 Kan. App. 2d 1070, 1078, 95 P.3d 104 (2004) (citing Taylor, 266 Kan. at 978). The defendant argues the district court failed to safeguard his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because it was aware of his allegations of a conflict of interest but failed to conduct any inquiry or investigation. He contends the trial court's refusal to consider his pro se motion because he was represented by counsel was inappropriate because it shifted the decision about whether to pursue the motion to defense counsel. The State responds that the trial court was not made aware of the pro se motion for discharge of court-appointed counsel and motion to proceed pro se, and the defendant waived these motions by failing to bring them to the court's attention and by acquiescing in his attorney's actions. It relies upon State v. Boyd, 27 Kan. App. 2d 956, 965, 9 P.3d 1273, rev. denied 270 Kan. 900 (2000), in support of its argument. In Boyd, the defendant filed a pretrial pro se motion to dismiss counsel. The defendant attended the pretrial motions hearing with counsel, but his pro se motion was not discussed. He argued on appeal that the trial court's failure to dispose of the motion violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but the panel rejected this argument, reasoning: There is nothing in the record to indicate that Boyd ever objected to the appearance of his trial counsel. Boyd appeared with his attorney at the motions hearing, the jury trial, the motion for new trial, and at sentencing. He had ample opportunity to object to the presence of his attorney. Also, an issue not presented to the trial court, as is the case here, will not be considered for the first time on appeal. 27 Kan. App. 2d at 965. This case is distinguishable from Boyd in that the defendant raised the issue of his pro se motion for new counsel on repeated occasions before the district court. While the defendant failed to raise his pro se motions at the preliminary hearing or at the motions hearing on the first day of trial, the defendant did send the clerk of the district court a letter requesting that his motion for discharge of court-appointed counsel be granted the day after the preliminary hearing. Judge Burdette's knowledge of this motion is evidenced by his letter to defense counsel concerning the defendant's pro se motions and letter to the clerk seeking to discharge his attorney. At the pretrial motions hearing, Judge Duncan acknowledged that he had seen the pro se motions in the file and Judge Burdette's letter, but he focused only on the motions for discovery and did not inquire about the motion or the letter's allegations of a conflict of interest between the defendant and defense counsel. The judge did not address the defendant or inquire about his motion to discharge counsel but rather left it up to defense counsel to state whether there were any additional motions. Following trial, the defendant again raised the issue of a conflict of interest between defense counsel and himself at both the motion for new trial and sentencing hearings, and he explained that he had been advised not to bring up the motion at the pretrial motion hearing. Despite these repeated complaints, the district court failed to inquire or conduct any further inquiry, simply telling the defendant that he would receive new appellate counsel following sentencing. As such, Boyd provides little guidance on this issue. Rather, this case is more analogous to State v. Simpson, 29 Kan. App. 2d 862, 32 P.3d 1226 (2001). In Simpson, Simpson informed the court that he was having disagreements on certain issues with his attorney. 29 Kan. App. 2d at 865. Although the trial court allowed Simpson to explain why he believed a certain piece of evidence should have been admitted, the trial court did not ask Simpson whether the evidentiary issue was the extent of his problem. Citing Taylor, the panel found the trial court did not give Simpson an adequate opportunity to explain the perceived problems with his attorney. It found the trial court reasonably should have known that Simpson's conflict with defense counsel had not been resolved when Simpson announced that he had a question. Rather than addressing Simpson, the trial court swiftly referred him to defense counsel. The trial court's failure to more fully inquire into Simpson's alleged problems with defense counsel was an abuse of discretion. 29 Kan. App. 2d at 871-72. Cf. State v. Richardson, 256 Kan. 69, 82, 883 P.2d 1107 (1994) (inquiry into conflict of interest was not insufficient where the trial court asked the defendant to explain why he was unsatisfied with his counsel and afforded the defendant and counsel time to try to come to an understanding so the attorney-client relationship could be maintained). In this case, the Court of Appeals' decision rests on the fact that the defendant did not orally assert his motion prior to trial and that his posttrial assertion of the motion was simply too late. Vann, slip op. at 8. However, the record demonstrates that the district court was aware of the defendant's pretrial pro se motion to discharge his attorney and the defendant's corresponding letter seeking to fire his attorney prior to trial, despite the defendant's failure to bring the motion to the court's attention prior to trial; yet, the court conducted no inquiry into the matter. Likewise, while the timing of the defendant's decision to raise the issue again at the motion for new trial and sentencing hearings may not have been ideal, this court has specifically rejected a test utilized by the Court of Appeals in previous cases which considers as a factor the timeliness of the motion in determining whether the trial court abused it discretion in failing to discharge a court-appointed attorney at the request of the defendant. See State v. Jasper, 269 Kan. 649, 653-54, 8 P.3d 708 (2000). Moreover, the defendant specifically asked for a new attorney at sentencing, but the trial judge brushed this request aside with no inquiry by telling the defendant that he would appoint different appellate counsel following sentencing. In this case, the district court's knowledge of the defendant's pro se motion to discharge his attorney alleging a conflict of interest, followed by the defendant's corresponding letter referring to the motion, the defendant's subsequent motion seeking to proceed pro se, and the defendant's posttrial assertions of a conflict of interest, coupled with the court's failure to conduct any inquiry whatsoever, constituted an abuse of discretion. Ordinarily, the appropriate remedy, in the absence of a suitable record on appeal concerning the alleged conflict of interest, is to remand to the trial court for a determination of whether the defendant can establish that the conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel's performance. State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624, 653-54, 88 P.3d 218 (2004) (quoting Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 174, 152 L. Ed. 2d 291, 122 S. Ct. 1237 [2002]). However, our conclusion in the next issue requires that we reverse the defendant's convictions and remand for new trial.