Opinion ID: 1101055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the lower court erred by finding the child victim unavailable as a witness.

Text: ¶ 27. Hennington claims the lower court committed reversible error by finding A.R. unavailable as a witness. He asserts two arguments to support his claims. First, Hennington claims the actions by the State caused A.R. to refuse to testify in contravention of the second paragraph of Miss. R. Evid. 804(a). A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying. Miss. R. Evid. 804(a) (emphasis added). He argues that A.R. was promised anonymity by Mangold and that the child felt victimized by the system. Hennington argues that the testimony by Joseph A. Fernald, Jr., A.R.'s attorney, proves the child felt embarrassed, victimized and a little intimidated, due to the media coverage surrounding the charges against Hennington. ¶ 28. There is simply no substantiated proof in the record before this Court that the State was responsible for the media coverage. The only suggestion comes from Fernald's testimony where he commented as to what A.R.'s understanding was. While it is true Fernald's testimony indicated the child was intimidated and felt victimized, the record is void of any proof to substantiate any wrongdoing on the part of the State. Fernald testified that A.R. told him that he was told he would be able to retain anonymity, and he would not be  his name would not become public. When asked who had told A.R. these things, Fernald could not provide an answer sufficient to implicate the State or any of its agents. Q. Who was it  excuse me. Who was it that made those representations to him; do you know? A. Well, in my conversations with him, we've not gotten into the actual incidents. He has a lot of questions about process, but we've never gotten into who promised what to who. He just saw his name in the newspaper or he saw in the newspaper a story which led people to believe that he had been the victim, and it affected him. We've examined that newspaper article when I was retained. Q. Is it not correct that the anonymity you mentioned was what was offered to him or promised by Mr. Mangold when he first talked to him? A. Well, the child has never come right out and told me in so may words that. I've discussed it with his mother, his natural parent, and that's what his understanding is. ¶ 29. No where in the record before this Court is there evidence that Mangold informed the media of the facts in this case. There is only speculation on the part of the child and the defense. The appellant is responsible for bringing to this Court's attention and presenting a record of trial proceedings sufficient to undergird his assignments of error. Winters v. State, 473 So.2d 452, 457 (Miss. 1985); Queen v. Queen, 551 So.2d 197, 199 (Miss. 1989). See also Wallace v. State, 607 So.2d 1184, 1189 (Miss. 1992)(assertions in the brief without support in the record are without merit). The record is void of any direct proof that Mangold was responsible for A.R. refusing to testify. Mere speculation does not rise to the level of proof required to prohibit the lower court from finding a witness unavailable under Miss. R. Evid. 804(a). ¶ 30. Second, Hennington states that the lower court did not find A.R. unavailable under the correct subsection of Miss. R. Evid. 804(a). The court found the child unavailable under Miss. R. Evid. 804(a)(2) after he refused to testify. Hennington argued before the lower court and now on appeal before this Court that the correct subsection under which to find the child unavailable is Miss. R. Evid. 804(a)(6). The State contended, and the lower court agreed, that if a child witness is found unavailable under Miss. R. Evid. 804(a)(2), there is no need to address Miss. R. Evid. 804(a)(6). ¶ 31. Miss. R. Evid. 804(a)(2) and (6) provide: Unavailability as a witness includes situations in which the declarant:       (2) Persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement despite an order of the court to do so; or       (6) In the case of a child, because of the substantial likelihood that the emotional or psychological health of the witness would be substantially impaired if the child had to testify in the physical presence of the accused. ¶ 32. The child, with his attorney present, was interviewed in chambers by the trial judge. Although the State and Defense were not present during these proceedings, a record was made and played back to both sides prior to the judge making a ruling on the child's availability. The following are excerpts from those proceedings: THE COURT: ... And that means that you'll have to come into court and tell the ladies and gentlemen on the jury what you know about this case. And I have to make you do that, A.R. I know you probably don't want to, do you? A.R.: (Shakes head negatively.)       A.R.: Yes. No, I don't want to go into court. THE COURT: You don't want to go in the courtroom? A.R.: No. THE COURT: ... As the judge, I have to make people do things sometimes that they don't want to do. And I have to do that in this case. I have to order that you go in the courtroom and tell what you know about this. So will you do that? A.R.: I don't want to, though. THE COURT: I understand. Will you do it? I know you don't want to. A.R.: No. THE COURT: You won't do that? A.R.: No. THE COURT: Well, [A.R.], it's my job to order you to do that, and if you don't do what I tell you to do, it's not easy for me being the judge, but it's  you could be in trouble if you don't do what I ask you to do. I'm going to have  I'm going to have to order you to go in there and testify. Will you do it now? Either you will or you won't, [A.R.]... . Either you will or you won't. Can you do that today? A.R.: (Shakes head negatively.)       A.R.: I don't want to testify. THE COURT: Well, I know you don't want to, but I have to order you to because it's important. What I need to know is if I order you to, which I'm doing right now, will you do that? A.R.: No. THE COURT: Sir? A.R.: No. THE COURT: All right. Is there any way I could get you to go out there and testify? A.R.: No. THE COURT: There's nothing I could say or do to you that would make you testify today? A.R.: No. THE COURT: You're not going to do it regardless of what I say; is that right? A.R.: Right. THE COURT: Sir? A.R.: Right. ¶ 33. The trial judge's determination on the availability of a witness will not be disturbed on appeal unless this Court finds the trial judge abused his discretion. Russell v. State, 670 So.2d 816, 827 (Miss. 1995). Clearly the record before this Court indicates the judge did all he could to persuade the child to testify. His repeated attempts were met with a flat refusal by the child. He simply did not want to go into court and testify about what had happened to him. We hold that the trial judge correctly found the child unavailable as a witness under Miss. R. Evid. 804(a)(2). ¶ 34. Hennington contends that because the witness was a child the only way to have found him unavailable was under Miss. R. Evid. 804(a)(6). He bases his argument on a very expansive reading of this Court's prior decisions in Griffith v. State, 584 So.2d 383 (Miss. 1991) and Quimby v. State, 604 So.2d 741 (Miss. 1992). Those cases involved child witnesses in trials that took place prior to the adoption of Miss. R. Evid. 804(a)(6) by this Court. Both cases were remanded with instructions from this Court that the trial judge consider the testimony in light of the new Miss. R. Evid. 804(a)(6). ¶ 35. Those two cases are factually distinguishable from the case sub judice. In Griffith and Quimby neither witness was found unavailable under the existing subsections of Miss. R. Evid. 804(a). In the case before this Court presently on appeal, the child witness simply refused to testify and was found unavailable under Miss. R. Evid. 804(a)(2). The trial judge never had to analyze the availability of the child under Miss. R.Evid. 804(a)(6). ¶ 36. A plain reading of the Rules of Evidence provides the answer to this issue. Miss. R. Evid. 601 provides who is competent to testify as a witness. Every person is competent to be a witness except as restricted by the following: (a) In all instances where one spouse is a party litigant the other spouse shall not be competent as a witness without the consent of both, except as provided in Rule 601(a)(1) or Rule 601(a)(2): (1) Husbands and wives may be introduced by each other in all cases, civil or criminal, and shall be competent witnesses in their own behalf, as against each other, in all controversies between them; (2) Either spouse is a competent witness and may be compelled to testify against the other in any criminal prosecution of either husband or wife for a criminal act against any child, for contributing to the neglect or delinquency of a child, or desertion or nonsupport of children under the age of sixteen (16) years, or abandonment of children. (b) A person convicted of perjury or subornation of perjury shall not be a competent witness in any case, even though pardoned or punished for the same. (c) A person appointed by a court as required by state law to make an appraisal in an eminent domain proceeding for the immediate possession of land shall not be eligible to testify in the trial of such case, and the report of such court appointed appraiser shall not be admissible in evidence during such trial. Miss. R. Evid. 601. No where in the above language is there an exception for children. They are treated as all other witnesses, and not distinguished from adult witnesses. ¶ 37. The language in Miss. R. Evid. 804(a) begins `[u]navailability as a witness' includes situations in which the declarant... . There is no limiting language as to who a witness or declarant might be. The rule simply lists the different situations in which a witness might be found unavailable. Each subsection is joined with the conjunction or. This literally means that a witness might be found unavailable under any of the subsections. There is no requirement that a witness meet the requirements of two subsections prior to being found unavailable. ¶ 38. The factual situation determines which subsection applies by beginning with the first subsection and continuing down the list until there is a match. The language of the first five subsections do not exclude child witnesses. They include all witnesses. However, if a child cannot be found unavailable under the first five, the last subsection allows a special exception for children that have not been found otherwise unavailable. The argument made by Hennington that a child witness may only be found unavailable by Miss. R. Evid. 804(a)(6) is without merit. Simply put, the first five subsections of Miss. R. Evid. 804(a) allow a finding of unavailability of any witness. But if a child cannot be found unavailable under the first five subsections, there is another option exclusively for child witnesses. Miss. R. Evid. 804(a)(6) allows child witnesses to be found unavailable who have not otherwise been found unavailable under Miss. R. Evid. 804(a)(1-5). ¶ 39. The trial court was correct in finding A.R. unavailable under Miss. R. Evid. 804(a)(2). Having correctly found A.R. unavailable, there was no need for a separate finding under Miss. R. Evid. 804(a)(6). The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding A.R. unavailable. Therefore, Hennington's arguments as to this issue are without merit.