Opinion ID: 1236953
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is Section 85300 Reasonably Related and Narrowly Tailored to the Resolution of a Matter of Statewide Concern?

Text: Petitioners cite nothing to support the proposition that section 85300's ban on public funding of political campaigns advances in any way the goal of enhancing the integrity of the electoral process. In fact, the opposite appears to be true. As the high court observed in Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. 1, concerning the federal matching funds program for Presidential candidates, It cannot be gainsaid that public financing as a means of eliminating improper influence of large private contributions furthers a significant governmental interest. S. Rep. No. 93-689, pp. 4-5 (1974) [1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 5590-5591]. In addition, the limits on contributions necessarily increase the burden of fundraising, and Congress properly regarded public financing as an appropriate means of relieving major-party Presidential candidates from the rigors of soliciting private contributions. (424 U.S. at p. 96 [46 L.Ed.2d at p. 731-732]; see also Republican Nat. Committee v. Fed. Elec. Com'n (S.D.N.Y. 1980) 487 F. Supp. 280, 285-286, 289.) [21] The Court of Appeal below agreed: [T]he use of public funds for campaign financing will not, almost by definition, have a corrupting influence. [Instead] ... it seems obvious that public money reduces rather than increases the fund raising pressures on public office seekers and thereby reduces the undue influence of special interest groups.... [Moreover], the goals of campaign reform and reduction of election costs, including the reduction of the influence of special interest groups and large contributors, is in no way embarrassed by public financing. To the contrary, those goals can only be furthered.... To these observations we add the following. As explained above, the drafters of the Los Angeles charter amendment sought to create a measure that regulated not only campaign contributions (like Proposition 73), but that also imposed limits on spending by candidates. The drafters apparently realized that under Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. 1, spending limitations may not be imposed unless public financing is offered to and accepted by a candidate. ( Id., at pp. 54-59 [46 L.Ed.2d at pp. 707-710]; see especially id., at p. 57, fn. 65 [46 L.Ed.2d at p. 709].) Accordingly, it appears the drafters provided for partial public financing of campaigns so that they could impose spending limitations consistently with Buckley v. Valeo, supra . It follows that, assuming spending limitations may enhance the integrity of the electoral process, a ban on public funding would actually frustrate achievement of that goal. For all of the above reasons, we conclude section 85300 is not reasonably related to the statewide concern of enhancing the integrity of the electoral process. Having reached this conclusion, we need not address whether the statute is also narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary incursion into legitimate areas of local concern.