Opinion ID: 1660516
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Refusal to Follow Treatment.

Text: As previously indicated, skin grafting was performed on Brasted's foot on August 21, 1964. On August 26th he signed himself out of the hospital. He walked on his new grafts. On August 28th he returned to the hospital. On September 1st he again signed himself out of the hospital. From that date to December 29, 1964, the date of the second examiner's hearing, he was being treated by two doctors at their offices as an outpatient. Treatment was expected to continue. Dr. Gordon, in his report admitted into evidence, stated that Brasted's leaving the hospital on August 26th, and again on September 1st, was against medical advice. Dr. Mendeloff stated at the December 29, 1964, hearing that had Brasted followed medical advice, his foot would have stood a 60 to 70 percent chance of being completely healed by now .... Dr. Evans stated on the same date that Brasted's leaving the hospital delayed his recovery period very significantly. He also stated that the second departure was a delaying and complicating event. Sec. 102.42 (7), Stats., provides in part: ... no compensation shall be payable for the death or disability of an employee, if his death be caused, or insofar as his disability may be aggravated, caused or continued (a) by an unreasonable refusal or neglect to submit to or follow any competent and reasonable medical or surgical treatment .... The attorney general argued that such treatment is of the whole man. Brasted was hospitalized for eight weeks. He was depressed. He received no visits from his family. The attorney general argues that it was not unreasonable for Brasted to leave the hospital. He continued to receive medical treatment thereafter. This argument is amiss. The unreasonableness of a claimant's actions is judged by an objective standard. The employer may have to take an employee as he is in regard to his physical injury, but not as to his refusal or neglect to follow competent and reasonable medical treatment. In Kill v. Industrial Comm., [6] the claimant had injured his wrist. Against medical advice he engaged in a boxing match at a time when his wound was practically healed. The court denied him compensation for the complications resulting from the infection in his wound that ensued after the fight. Counsel therein argued that the original injury must still be regarded as the proximate cause. The court held: That injury had been healed and cured, sufficiently at least that had it not been for the bout voluntarily entered into with knowledge of the danger the injuries complained of would not have occurred.... The injury must be proximately caused by the accident and not self-inflicted. [7] Professor Larson has stated: If the claimant, instead of allowing his wound to heal, deliberately engages in conduct which presents a strong probability of reopening the wound, the re-injury is not compensable. [8] This is an instance, however, where the commission has made a finding of fact, which should be conclusive if any credible evidence may be found to support it. [9] The commission found that Brasted was temporarily totally disabled from July 4 to December 29, 1964. There was no specific testimony at the hearings as to when Brasted's wound would have healed had he not left the hospital. The testimony is only to the effect that his leaving delayed the ultimate recovery and that the wound probably (60-70 percent chance) would have been healed by December 29, 1964. The commission's finding of disability and reasonableness of expenses incurred up to December 29, 1964, does not seem to be so inherently unreasonable as not to be entitled to any weight. [10] However, it is manifest that Brasted was unreasonable in leaving the hospital and that his intentional action impeded his final cure. Any further claim for benefits after December 29, 1964, should be looked upon with strict and discerning scrutiny by the commission.