Opinion ID: 1776404
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standard of review

Text: The trial court based its judgment on the evidence presented to it. A trial court's judgment, when based upon findings of fact drawn from ore tenus evidence, is presumed correct and should be reversed only if the judgment is found to be plainly and palpably wrong, after a consideration of all of the evidence and after making all inferences that can logically be drawn from the evidence. The trial court's judgment will be affirmed if there is credible evidence to support it. Martin v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Andalusia, 559 So.2d 1075, 1078 (Ala.1990). However, there is no presumption where the trial court has misapplied the law to the facts. [T]here is a presumption in favor of the findings of fact of the trial court where testimony is [presented] ore tenus. However, such a presumption does not exist where the trial court erroneously applies the principles of law involved. Collier v. Brown, 285 Ala. 40, 43, 228 So.2d 800, 802 (1969).
When reviewing a preliminary injunction, this Court accords wide discretion to the trial court hearing the motion, and the injunction will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. The trial judge's discretion is a legal or judicial one, subject to review for abuse or improper exercise, as where there has been a violation of some established rule of law or principle of equity, or a clear misapprehension of the controlling law. Martin, 559 So.2d at 1078. In order to show an abuse of discretion, the appellant must show that the trial judge committed a clear and palpable error which, unless corrected, will constitute manifest injustice. Id. In Martin, Justice Houston set forth the established tests for the trial court's review of a preliminary injunction: A preliminary injunction will not issue unless without it the plaintiff would suffer immediate and irreparable injury and unless the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. The burden is on the complainant to satisfy the trial court that there is at least a reasonable probability of ultimate success on the merits of the case. In Howell Pipeline Co. v. Terra Resources, Inc., 454 So.2d 1353, 1356 (Ala. 1984), we noted the development of a three-pronged test by which the trial court can review a motion for a preliminary injunction: `1. ... if [the trial judge] finds that the party has presented a fair question as to the existence of the right to be protected, and further finds that temporary interference to preserve the status quo is convenient and expedient, then he may exercise his discretion and grant the injunction. `2. ... An injunction should not be granted unless it is necessary to prevent irreparable injury. `3. Injunctions ... will not be granted merely to allay apprehension of injury; the injury must be both imminent and irreparable in a court of law.' ... In applying these standards, the trial court, in its discretion and given the facts and circumstances of each case, may consider and weigh the relative hardships that each party may suffer against the benefits that may flow from the grant of the preliminary injunction. Id. at 1078-79 (citations omitted).
The parties contend that this case is controlled by Delaware law. The established rule of conflicts law is that the internal corporate relationship is governed by the law of the state of incorporation. See P. John Kozyris, Corporate War and Choice of Law, 1985 Duke L.J. 1, 15. Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 309 (1971) states the proposition as follows: The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine the existence and extent of a director's or officer's liability to the corporation, its creditors and shareholders, except where, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the parties and the transaction, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied. Comment (c) to § 309 states: Issues relating to the liability of the directors and officers for acts [such as seizing a corporate opportunity or causing the making of a contract or the commission of a tort] can practicably be decided differently in different states. It would be practicable, for example, for a director to be held liable for a given act in one state and to be held not liable for an identical act in another state. Nevertheless, in the absence of an applicable local statute, the local law of the state of incorporation has usually been applied to determine the liability of the directors or officers for acts such as these to the corporation, its creditors and shareholders. This law has usually been applied even in a situation where it might be thought that some other state had a greater interest than the state of incorporation in the issue to be determined. The local law rule of a state other than the state of incorporation is most likely to be applied in a situation where this rule embodies an important policy of the other state and where the corporation has little contact with the state of its incorporation.