Opinion ID: 789998
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Chorney's and Carter's Identification Testimony

Text: 78 In addition to Petitioner Howard's due process challenge to Gapinski's testimony, Petitioner also makes a due process challenge to the identification testimony of Patrick Chorney and Thomas Carter, the two other men who accompanied decedent Hankinson on the June 9, 1989 repossession. As with his argument regarding Gapinski, Petitioner argues that the lineup conducted after the two men had seen him seated at the defense table in the courtroom fatally tainted their identifications. He further argues that the two men's identifications were not independently reliable such that they could overcome the unnecessarily suggestive confrontation and procedure. Supporting these claims, Howard points to the fact that just a few hours after the incident, the two witnesses were unable to pick Petitioner out of a photo lineup of suspects. He argues that each independently picked out the same suspect — someone other than Petitioner.
79 Because of procedural default, the Michigan state courts never addressed the merits of Howard's due process challenge to Chorney's and Carter's identification evidence. Howard failed to raise the claim before the Michigan Court of Appeals. He raised it for the first time in his direct appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. That court refused to entertain any of Petitioner's claims on appeal, including the challenge to Chorney's and Carter's identifications. Petitioner subsequently brought a state post-conviction petition for relief from judgment in the trial court. There, the state district court denied his motion on procedural grounds. The appellate courts affirmed on the same basis. Because this claim was never adjudicated on the merits, we review it de novo.
80 Because Petitioner failed to raise his challenge to Chorney's and Carter's identification testimony on direct appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals, we must first assess whether procedural default bars our review of Petitioner's claim on the merits. 81 Federal courts will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). As applied in the habeas context, this doctrine precludes federal courts from reviewing claims that a state court has declined to address, because of a petitioner's noncompliance with a state procedural requirement. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). In these cases, the state judgment rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730, 111 S.Ct. 2546. For purposes of procedural default, the state ruling with which the federal court is concerned is the last explained state court judgment. Munson v. Kapture, 384 F.3d 310, 314 (6th Cir.2004) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991)) (emphasis removed). 82 Before the district court, the Respondent argued that Howard had procedurally defaulted his due process challenge to Chorney's and Carter's identifications. While noting that Respondent asserted the defense, the district court never specifically ruled upon the issue. On appeal, Respondent Bouchard has now failed to re-assert the procedural default defense it raised below. 83 Procedural default is not a jurisdictional bar to review on the merits, and an appeals court is not required to address the issue sua sponte. Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89, 118 S.Ct. 478, 139 L.Ed.2d 444 (1997). We have previously held, however, that the court of appeals may raise the issue of procedural default sua sponte. Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 F.3d 416, 426 (6th Cir.2002); Elzy v. United States, 205 F.3d 882, 886 (6th Cir.2000). Like many of our sister circuits, we agree that appellate courts should not embrace sua sponte raising of procedural default issues as a matter of course. Flood v. Phillips, 90 Fed. Appx. 108, 114, 2004 U.S.App. LEXIS 1555, at  (6th Cir.2004) (citing Rosario v. United States, 164 F.3d 729, 732-33 (2d Cir.1998)). Here, however, we find it appropriate to do so. 84 The main concern with raising procedural default sua sponte is that a petitioner not be disadvantaged without having had an opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Lorraine 291 F.3d at 426 (stating importance of giving petitioner an opportunity to respond, before raising procedural default sua sponte). Here, that concern is not present. In its response to the habeas petition, Respondent raised procedural default as a defense at the district court level. In its initial response to the petition, Michigan argued Review of Petitioner's habeas claims [involving Chorney's and Carter's identifications] is barred by his procedural default. Habeas Resp. at 10. Howard received notice that procedural default was at issue and had an opportunity to address the issue. 85 District Judge Hood acknowledged that Michigan had raised procedural default as a defense. In her opinion allowing Howard to conduct discovery and submit additional briefing, Judge Hood identified the issues presented in the case. Among the issues that Judge Hood identified was whether cause and prejudice excused Howard's failure to exhaust state remedies: 86 I. Was petitioner denied the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel when counsel failed to challenge the admissibility of the identification testimony of Patrick Chorney and Thomas Carter at trial and in petitioner's appeal of right and does this ineffective assistance of counsel constitute adequate cause for petitioner's failure to present these claims in petitioner's appeal of right and show prejudice therefrom? 87 J.A. 636 (order granting evidentiary hearing). 88 Indeed, Howard's own habeas petition reflects his knowledge that procedural default would be an issue in the district court habeas case. In Ground One of his habeas petition, Howard argued: Appellate counsel's omissions of obvious and significant issues . . . constituted `cause' for stronger claims not being raised on the appeal of right and/or by prior motion, resulting in `actual prejudice' . . . J.A. 14. 89 The district court never explicitly ruled on the procedural default issue. The Respondent did not explicitly renew the procedural default argument before us. However, given that Petitioner was aware of the issue, and in the interest of comity, federalism, and judicial efficiency, see Scott v. Collins, 286 F.3d 923, 930 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir.1998)), we think it appropriate to determine whether Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on his claims. In finding it appropriate to review the procedural default issue, we raise no issue that Howard was not previously aware of. 90 We have articulated a four-part test to determine whether a habeas claim has been procedurally defaulted: (1) whether there is a state procedural rule that is applicable to the petitioner's claim; (2) whether the petitioner failed to comply with that rule; (3) whether the procedural rule was actually enforced in the petitioner's case; and (4) whether the state procedural forfeiture is an adequate and independent state ground on which the state can rely to foreclose review of a federal constitutional claim. See Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir.1986); Clinkscale v. Carter, 375 F.3d 430, 440 (6th Cir.2004); Munson v. Kapture, 384 F.3d 310, 314 (6th Cir.2004). 91 In this case, prongs (1), (3), and (4) are readily met. Mich. Ct. Rule 6.508 is an applicable state procedural rule that was actually enforced in Petitioner's case. Under that Michigan procedural rule: The court may not grant relief to the defendant if the motion . . . (3) alleges grounds for relief, other than jurisdictional defects, which could have been raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence or in a prior motion under this subchapter, unless the defendant demonstrates (a) good cause for failure to raise such grounds on appeal or in the prior motion, and (b) actual prejudice from the alleged irregularities that support the claim for relief. M.C.R. 6.508(D)(3) (emphasis added). 3 92 The Wayne County Circuit Court, reviewing Petitioner's motion for relief from judgment, denied the motion on grounds that Petitioner had not demonstrated the good cause and actual prejudice required by M.C.R. 6.508(D)(3). People v. Howard, No. 92-010743 (Mich.Crim. Ct, Wayne Cty. July 20, 1998). Both the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the denial, rejecting Petitioner's application for leave to appeal on grounds that he had failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508. People v. Howard, No. 89-011438 (Mich.Ct.App.10-13-99); People v. Howard, No. 89-011438 (Mich. Sup.Ct. Aug 22, 2000). Thus, prongs (1) and (3) of the Maupin 4-part test for procedural default are met. 93 Prong (4) is also satisfied. It is well-established in this circuit that the procedural bar set forth in Rule 6.508(D) constitutes an adequate and independent ground on which the Michigan Supreme Court may rely in foreclosing review of federal claims. See Simpson v. Jones, 238 F.3d 399, 407-08 (6th Cir.2000); Munson, 384 F.3d at 315. 94 Whether prong (2) — failure to comply with the rule — was satisfied requires somewhat more analysis. M.C.R. 6.508 stops the grant of post-conviction relief grounded upon issues which could have been raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence or in a prior motion under this subchapter, unless the defendant demonstrates [cause and prejudice]. Clearly, Petitioner Howard failed to raise the due process challenge to Chorney's and Carter's identifications on appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals. The question is whether he showed adequate cause and prejudice. The federal district court, reviewing the habeas petition, made no explicit determination as to this prong, but noted that the state court had found procedural default without addressing petitioner's allegations that ineffective assistance had caused the default and prejudiced him. Howard v. Bouchard, No. 00-cv-73961, at  (E.D. Mich., June 10, 2003) (order granting evidentiary hearing). The district court held an evidentiary hearing to develop the factual basis for Petitioner's ineffectiveness claim. See id. at  (order granting evidentiary hearing). 95 We note that M.C.R. 6.508(D)(3) derives its cause-and-prejudice standard from Supreme Court case law that articulates the constitutional standard for reviewing procedural default more generally. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). Thus, in assessing whether the second prong of the procedural default analysis is satisfied, and in assessing whether Petitioner was excused from the default, we make only one inquiry. 96 In this case, Petitioner raised ineffective assistance of counsel — both trial and appellate — as cause for not raising his due process challenge to Chorney and Carter. Counsel's deficient performance may constitute cause for procedural default, but only if it is constitutionally ineffective under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-89, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). Thus we must determine whether Petitioner's trial and appellate counsel's performances fell below prevailing professional norms, and whether, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the outcome would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 97 Because Petitioner Howard did not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, however, we must also determine whether Petitioner defaulted that claim under M.C.R. 6.508(D), and in doing so, determine whether cause and prejudice excused his failure to raise the issue on appeal. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 450-51, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000) (A procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim can serve as cause to excuse the procedural default of another habeas claim only if the habeas petitioner can satisfy the cause and prejudice standard with respect to the ineffective-assistance claim itself.). We conduct this inquiry, not only to determine whether Petitioner has defaulted his challenge as to Chorney's and Carter's identifications, but also to determine whether he has defaulted his claim of ineffective assistance itself, as his third claim on this appeal. 98 Ineffectiveness of appellate counsel can suffice to show sufficient cause and prejudice for failure to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Thus, we discuss below: (a) whether Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the admission of Chorney's and Carter's identifications; (b) whether Petitioner's appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a challenge to those identifications on appeal; and (c) whether Petitioner's appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 99 The right to the effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000). In order to prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a petitioner must satisfy a two-prong test. First, the petitioner must show that the performance of counsel fell below the objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In so doing, the petitioner must rebut the presumption that counsel's challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (internal quotation marks omitted). The objective standard of reasonableness is defined in terms of prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 100 The second prong requires that the defendant show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 101 In this case, the district court held an evidentiary hearing for the express purpose of assessing trial counsel's shortcomings. In analyzing Howard's ineffective assistance claims, we consider the totality of the evidence — both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding [s]. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 536, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397-98, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)) (emphasis omitted); Clinkscale v. Carter, 375 F.3d 430, 436 (6th Cir.2004). We will defer to the findings adduced by the district court's hearing, yet make an independent judgment about the application of the facts to the law. We first examine the performance of trial counsel, then examine the performance of appellate counsel.
102 Petitioner Howard argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in three respects: first, for failing to challenge the admission of Chorney's and Carter's identification testimony prior to trial; second, for failing to cross-examine Carter regarding Carter's identification of a suspect other than the Petitioner at the June 10, 1989 photo lineup; third, for failing to object to the in-court identifications of the witnesses. Petitioner argues that these failings prejudiced him, because without the two identifications, there would have been little reliable direct evidence to convict him. 103 Anthony Walton, Petitioner's trial counsel, failed to challenge Chorney's and Carter's live lineup identifications. As determined at the evidentiary hearing, Walton challenged Gapinski's identification because he thought that was the most significant or the strongest within the people's case. J.A. 751. As to the other two witnesses, he testified, I guess I can't really justify at this particular point in time why the motion was only filed towards one of those witnesses. J.A. 756. When pressed further, Attorney Walton indicated that had he been able to establish a tainted identification with regard to the strongest witness, Gapinski, he would have then moved to exclude the identifications of the other two. When the trial court seemed undisposed to grant the motion with regard to Gapinski, Walton chose not to challenge Chorney and Carter because he thought it would be fruitless — the arguments would have been cumulative . . . and I was under the opinion that the court would probably rule the exact same way. J.A. 766. Although he could not remember most of the details of his representation at the evidentiary hearing, Walton testified that he probably believed that it would have served his client better to save the cross-examination for the jury trial, and let the jury decide whether the identifications were credible. He might not have wanted to give the witnesses an opportunity to be prepared for the kinds of questions he might ask on cross-examination at trial. 104 In addition to failing to challenge Chorney's and Carter's identifications in a Wade hearing, Walton failed to make a contemporaneous objection to the in-court identifications at trial. At the evidentiary hearing, Walton testified that he was not familiar with the general principle that if counsel fails to raise an objection at the trial court, a defendant faces a more difficult standard of review on appeal. When questioned, he stated that he was not familiar with the contemporaneous-objection rule. 105 Finally, at the evidentiary hearing, Attorney Walton was questioned as to his alleged failure to cross-examine one of the witnesses, Carter, on Carter's earlier identification of a different suspect in a photo spread. Walton admitted that failure to cross-examine on that point would be a significant omission. 106 The district court found that Walton's failure to challenge Chorney's and Carter's pretrial lineup identifications was objectively unreasonable, based on prevailing professional standards. The court focused on Walton's initial inability to justify why he had failed to file a motion to suppress the two witnesses' identifications, as well as his later testimony that a witness's earlier failure to pick out the defendant in a photo spread was significant when that witness later identified the defendant in a live lineup. The district court also found, however, that the ineffectiveness did not prejudice Petitioner Howard, because the state trial court would have been unlikely to grant the motion and there was sufficient evidence to convict Howard even apart from the two identifications. We agree with the district court on both counts.
107 We agree with the district court that, considered as a whole, Walton's failure to challenge these two identifications fell below an objectively reasonable standard of representation. We start with Walton's failure to object to the in-court identifications at trial. This failure does not appear to have been based on any tactical decision, but, rather, arose from trial counsel's ignorance of the law. By his own testimony, Walton was unaware that if he failed to raise an objection at trial, his client would face a stricter standard of review on appeal. He was not familiar with the contemporaneous-objection rule. We agree with the district court that this failure falls short of prevailing professional norms. To preserve issues on the record is one of the most basic duties of a trial lawyer, not to mention a criminal defense attorney. See ABA Standard 4-7.1(d) (1979) (stating that criminal defense attorney has a duty to have the record reflect adverse rulings or judicial conduct which the lawyer considers prejudicial to his or her client's legitimate interests). We therefore find that Walton's failure to object at trial amounted to objectively unreasonable representation. 108 We also agree that Walton's failure to make a pretrial motion to suppress Chorney's and Carter's identifications fell below reasonable professional standards. We recognize that trial counsel's strategic decisions are accorded strong deference. See, e.g., McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1311 (6th Cir.1996), overruled on other grounds, Abdur'Rahman v. Bell, 392 F.3d 174 (6th Cir.2004). In this case, however, Walton's failure to file a motion to exclude all three identifications, as opposed to only the one that he did, appears not to have been based on any tactical thinking. As he testified, I guess I can't really justify at this particular point in time why the motion was only filed towards one of those witnesses. J.A. 756. Although Walton testified that he may have planned to move to suppress the two witnesses' testimony if the trial court granted the motion with regard to the state's strongest witness — Kenneth Gapinski — this is insufficient justification. 109 When faced with the possibility of removing two out of three eyewitnesses, a professionally competent defense attorney would at least raise the motion in order to preserve it for appeal. By his own testimony, Walton did not even know that he needed to raise an objection to preserve the issue. We find this performance fell below prevailing professional norms. See, e.g., ABA Standard 4-3.6 (1979) (stating that [m]any important rights of the accused can be protected and preserved only by prompt legal action, and that defense counsel should consider all procedural steps which in good faith may be taken, including ... moving to suppress illegally obtained evidence). 110
111 Having found that trial counsel's conduct fell short of prevailing professional norms, we turn to the second prong of the Strickland inquiry — put simply, whether Attorney Walton's conduct prejudiced Petitioner Howard. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In order to satisfy this second prong, Howard must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome. Id. If we find that Howard's counsel had not deprived him of any substantive or procedural right to which the law entitled him, ... his claim did not satisfy the prejudice component of the Strickland test. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 392-93, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993)). We find that Howard was not prejudiced. Having found that his counsel's performance did not prejudice him under the Strickland inquiry, we also find that Howard has failed to establish cause to excuse procedural default. 112 Howard cannot establish prejudice under Strickland, because he cannot show that a motion to exclude Chorney's and Carter's identifications would have succeeded. Nor can he show that counsel's error had a significant impact upon his finding of guilt. In order to establish that a motion to exclude the identifications would have succeeded, Howard must establish that his claim had merit. He must show both that the lineup procedure was unnecessarily suggestive and that, under the totality of the circumstances, the witnesses' identifications were not otherwise reliable. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243. This he cannot do. Simply described, the lineup procedure was only minimally suggestive. Neither Chorney nor Carter had significant opportunity to be influenced by their short exposure to Howard at the preliminary hearings. As important, their identifications were independently reliable of any suggestive lineup procedure. 113 As discussed above, we first assess whether the identification procedure used with Chorney and Carter was unnecessarily suggestive, then whether the identifications were nonetheless reliable. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243. We begin with the suggestiveness inquiry. Chorney gave limited testimony regarding his ability to observe Howard during the first and second scheduled preliminary hearings. He testified that he had no contact with the case between the shooting and the September 20, 1989, scheduled preliminary hearing. While acknowledging that he came to the proceeding with his family, Chorney was never asked if he saw Howard being brought into the court room. He testified that he spent a lot of time in the hall and was out in one of the rooms smoking a cigarette. J.A. 243. Regarding the September 27, 1989, scheduled preliminary hearing that preceded the lineup, Chorney testified that he was not in the courtroom when Howard was brought in. He testified that as soon as he entered the courtroom, he was immediately asked to leave. At that point, Howard was seated at the defense counsel table and Chorney seen the back of him. J.A. 244. 114 The record presented with the petition is not clear regarding what, if any, contact witness Carter had with Howard at the time of the preliminary hearings. Carter had not seen Howard between the June shooting and the September court proceedings. Carter's total testimony regarding his observation of Howard at the September 20, 1989, hearing was: I seen him, the back of him sit down. J.A. 266. On September 27, 1989, Carter returned to court for the rescheduled preliminary hearing. Carter testified that on that date, he saw Howard being brought from the rear of the court room to the defense table. The preliminary hearing quickly adjourned to allow the lineup. Thomas Carter had only a limited opportunity to observe Howard at the time of the preliminary hearings. 115 Using the standard of unnecessary suggestiveness described earlier, we find that Howard fails to establish that the techniques associated with Chorney's and Carter's identifications were unnecessarily suggestive. Chorney and Carter observed Howard for only a very brief period. Nothing suggests they got a good look at his face during the September 20 and 27 hearings. Law enforcement officials made no statement to them. While observing a defendant in police custody has some suggestion that police had focused on Howard, we do not find the procedures associated with the identifications unnecessarily suggestive. 116 Moreover, Chorney's and Carter's identifications were independently reliable. As described above, in judging reliability, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including the following factors: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the defendant at the initial observation; (2) the witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the defendant; (4) the level of certainty shown by the witness at the pretrial identification; and (5) the length of time between the initial observation and the identification. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375. We must weigh these factors against any corrupting effect of the suggestive identification. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243. 117 Both Patrick Chorney and Thomas Carter had good opportunities to view the perpetrator. Chorney, seated in the passenger's seat of the tow truck, was three feet from the shooter during the time Hankinson argued with the man on the porch. He testified that this exchange lasted a moment, long enough for [ ] each [to get] their views across, J.A. 234, and that he looked at the person long enough to see what was going on. The shooter also turned the gun on Chorney, and told him to put the phone down. As Chorney testified, he saw the perpetrator [o]nce or twice for a few minutes ... long enough for him to tell me to put the phone down and watch him argue with Ted. J.A. 208, 209. 118 After the truck had proceeded down the driveway and Hankinson had been shot, Chorney looked back once and saw the shooter still standing on the porch, picking up shell casings. Chorney testified that at that point, he was about 15-20 feet away from the porch and the perpetrator. Thus, Chorney had an excellent chance to observe the shooter. 119 Similarly, Carter had a good opportunity to observe the shooter, although for less time than Chorney and Gapinski had. Carter, who was sitting in the back end of the pickup truck, testified that he saw the person [w]hen he first came out on the porch. J.A. 252. When the truck pulled along side the house, Carter was not even 10, 12 feet from the people on the porch. J.A. 249. He testified that as the tow truck proceeded down the driveway, he saw the perpetrator, who had begun to fire: A couple of shots came out and Kenny got up and I told Kenny to get back down ... and I got back down with him and he got back down. J.A. 251. When he seen me and Kenny getting back up ... he did level [his gun] at us and that's when we had to get back down `cause I said he's going to shoot us. J.A. 254. Although Carter testified that he could not see the person's facial features at the time the shooter aimed at him, he also testified that he could see the perpetrator's face after Hankinson got shot, when the shooter was picking up shell casings. Thus, we find that Carter had a good chance to see the shooter. 120 Both Chorney and Carter were also attentive to the shooter. Beginning with the repossession itself, both were on heightened alert. This heightened attention became greater when the shooter began to fire shots. See United States v. Meyer, 359 F.3d 820, 826 (6th Cir.2004) (finding heightened degree of attention where witness spoke with robber and studied his features while looking for an opportunity to escape); United States v. Crozier, 259 F.3d 503, 511 (6th Cir.2001) (finding heightened degree of attention where robber confronted the witnesses with a gun). Everything suggests that both Chorney and Carter were alert to the shooter. 121 The third Biggers/Manson factor directs us to consider the accuracy of the witnesses' prior descriptions. In this case, neither Carter nor Chorney earlier gave detailed descriptions of the shooter. Carter described the killer: Black/male/20s, light complx [sic], short hair, thin mustache I think, he was dressed in underwear (boxer shorts). J.A. 509. Chorney described the shooter to the police as: Black male. I only seen him from the chest up, he was a smaller build. I would say he had real short hair but I only seen him for like a couple of seconds. J.A. 514-15. 122 Carter's description of Petitioner as having a light complexion contradicts other evidence, produced by Petitioner Howard, showing that Howard had a dark complexion and long nose. At trial, however, testimony suggested that the yellow porch light at the scene of the repossession gave the perpetrator a lighter hue. Thus, while the earlier description makes the identification somewhat less reliable, it is not fatal. As discussed above, our cases have found identifications otherwise reliable even when there are discrepancies in an earlier description. See, e.g., United States v. Meyer, 359 F.3d 820 (6th Cir.2004). 123 Next we consider the level of certainty shown by the witness at the pretrial identification. Carter attended the lineup and, out of the presence of Chorney and Gapinski, identified Howard as the killer. Carter testified that he was very sure of the identification. Chorney also identified Howard as the killer without equivocation. The certainty of witnesses Chorney and Carter supports the reliability of the identifications they made. 124 Finally, we consider the length of time between the shooting and the identifications. Here, the lineup followed the shootings by about three months. As we determined above, three months between the initial observation and the challenged identification is not a long period of time. See United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1277, 1286 (6th Cir.1987) (A three to four-month delay between the crime and the identification does not render the identification inherently unreliable). 125 Most damaging for the reliability of Chorney's and Carter's identifications is their prior failure to identify the Petitioner in a photo lineup. Just hours after the incident, Chorney and Carter went to the police station to place a report. While there, they were each shown a photo lineup, with black and white photographs, which included Petitioner Howard as suspect No. 1. However, Chorney and Carter failed to identify the Petitioner. Instead, Chorney and Carter each appear to have picked out a different suspect, one placed at No. 4. 126 Some evidence suggests that Chorney and Carter failed to choose anyone in the early photo lineup. Sergeant Harvel, the police officer who conducted the initial photo lineup, testified at the district court's evidentiary hearing that the phrase No I.D. written at the bottom of an identification record, as was the case with Chorney's and Carter's records, meant that no suspect had been identified. Harvel stated that the X`s marked next to suspect No. 4 might mean the suspect was someone else whom the police thought was a viable suspect. Harvel's testimony, however, contradicted the earlier trial testimony of Chorney, which suggested that Chorney had identified someone. Chorney's and Carter's records were identical. 127 Chorney's and Carter's inability to identify Petitioner in a 6-person photo lineup just hours after the incident somewhat undermines the reliability of an identification they made three months after the incident. It is not, however, fatal. To our eyes, the picture of suspect No. 4 is very similar to Howard's picture, positioned at No. 1. J.A. 715-16. Further, an earlier failure to identify, or even a positive identification of a different suspect, does not require exclusion of an in-court or pretrial identification, if otherwise reliable. See, e.g., United States v. Meyer, 359 F.3d 820 (6th Cir.2004) (allowing in identification despite earlier failure to identify defendant in a photo array); United States v. Black, 412 F.2d 687, 689 (6th Cir.1969) (same); United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1277 (6th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Hamilton, 684 F.2d 380, 383 (6th Cir.1982) (same); United States v. Dobson, 512 F.2d 615, 616 (6th Cir.1975) (in pre- Manson case, allowing in-court identification testimony despite witness's selection of a different person earlier in his testimony). 128 An earlier failure to identify can be considered in judging the weight of the in-court identification and may be considered as one factor affecting the reliability of the earlier identification. Standing alone, it does not make the earlier identification unreliable under the Biggers/Manson due process inquiry. 129 Under the totality of the circumstances, then, Chorney's and Carter's identifications were sufficiently reliable to present them to the jury, even if the identification procedure had been suggestive. Because we find that Chorney's and Carter's identifications were properly admitted, we find that any challenge to their admissibility would not have succeeded. We thus find that trial counsel's failure to raise the challenge did not prejudice Petitioner. See Keller v. Larkins, 251 F.3d 408, 419 (3d Cir.2001) (concluding that counsel's alleged failure to object to admission of incriminating evidence was not prejudicial because evidence would have been admitted anyway, since under state law, testimony was admissible).
130 In reviewing whether Petitioner's appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective, we need not analyze both prongs of the Strickland inquiry, because we find that the claim fails on the second prong. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (directing that courts need not address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one). Because we find that no prejudice attended trial counsel's errors, we also find that Petitioner was not prejudiced by any failure on the part of appellate counsel to raise the due process challenge on appeal. In addition, we find that appellate counsel's failure to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim did not prejudice Petitioner. 131 Counsel's failure to raise an issue on appeal is ineffective assistance only if there is a reasonable probability that inclusion of the issue would have changed the result of the appeal. Greer v. Mitchell, 264 F.3d 663 (6th Cir.2001). In this case, the due process challenge, not having been raised at trial, would likely have been reviewed for plain error. As we have described, such a challenge would not itself have changed the result. There was not a reasonable probability that the Michigan Court of Appeals would have been more persuaded by the challenge to the more vulnerable identifications by Chorney and Carter, than the challenge to Gapinski's testimony. 132 Similarly, a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel would not have changed the result of the appeal, because, as we have found, Petitioner did not have a valid ineffective assistance claim. Because we find insufficient evidence of resulting prejudice, we conclude that Howard has not met the Strickland standard. 133 Having found that neither Howard's trial counsel's performance nor his appellate counsel's performance prejudiced him under the Strickland inquiry, we thus find that Howard has failed to establish cause to excuse procedural default. Although we need not reach the prejudice prong of the cause and prejudice test, we note that Howard's failure to establish prejudice under Strickland also obviates his claim of prejudice under that standard. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982) (holding that habeas petitioner has the burden of showing, not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions) (emphasis omitted); Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 161-62 (6th Cir.1994) ([T]he prejudice component of the cause and prejudice test is not satisfied if there is strong evidence of a petitioner's guilt and a lack of evidence to support his claim.).