Opinion ID: 1868410
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Sufficiency of Standard Jury Instructions

Text: We must also determine whether the jury instructions on guilty knowledge were sufficient. A defendant has the right to have a court correctly and intelligently instruct the jury on the essential and material elements of the crime charged and required to be proven by competent evidence. Gerds v. State, 64 So.2d 915, 916 (Fla.1953). When an instruction excludes a fundamental and necessary ingredient of law required to substantiate the particular crime, such failure is tantamount to a denial of a fair and impartial trial. See id. At trial, the judge instructed the jury on count one, in pertinent part, as follows: Certain drugs and chemical substances are by law known as controlled substances. Cocaine is a controlled substance. Before you can find Mr. Chicone guilty of possession of cocaine, the State of Florida must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt. One, Mr. Chicone possessed a certain substance. Two, the substance was cocaine. Three, Mr. Chicone had knowledge of the presence of the substance. To possess means to have personal charge of or exercise the right of ownership, management or control over the thing possessed. Possession may be actual or constructive. If a thing is in the hand of or on the person or in a bag or container in the hand of or on the person or is so close as to be within ready reach, it is under the control of the person, it is in the actual possession of that person. If a thing is in a place over which the person has control or in which the person has hidden or concealed it, it is in the constructive possession of the person. If a person has exclusive possession of a thing, knowledge of its presence may be inferred or assumed. If a person does not have exclusive possession of a thing, knowledge of its presence may not be inferred or assumed. That is as to count one, possession of cocaine. (Emphasis added.) As to count two, the judge instructed the jury, in pertinent part, as follows: Before you can find Mr. Chicone guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia, the state must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt. One, that Mr. Chicone used or had in his possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia. Two, that Mr. Chicone had knowledge of the presence of the drug paraphernalia. To possess means to have certain charge of or to exercise the right of ownership, management or control over the thing possessed. Possession may be actual or constructive. If a thing is in the hand of or on the person or in a bag or container in the hand of or on the person, or is so close as to be within ready reach and is under the control of the person, it is in the actual possession of that person. If a thing is in a place over which the person has control or in which the person has hidden or concealed it, it is in the constructive possession of that person. If a person has exclusive possession of a thing, knowledge of its presence may be inferred or assumed. If a person does not have exclusive possession of a thing, knowledge of its presence may not be inferred or assumed. (Emphasis added.) These are the standard jury instructions on these offenses. We stated earlier that the State must prove guilty knowledge to establish the defendant's possession of a controlled substance or drug paraphernalia. At trial, Chicone proffered instructions that required the jury to find that the substance he possessed was known to him to be cocaine and that the object he possessed was known to him to be drug paraphernalia in order to convict him. The trial court denied these instructions and gave the standard jury instructions set out above along with the standard jury instructions on reasonable doubt, which the trial judge read twice. While the existing jury instructions are adequate in requiring knowledge of the presence of the substance, we agree that, if specifically requested by a defendant, the trial court should expressly indicate to jurors that guilty knowledge means the defendant must have knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance allegedly possessed. [14] We hold that the defendant was entitled to a more specific instruction as requested here.