Opinion ID: 1730571
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's Batson Challenge

Text: The court of appeal found that the defendant's Batson challenge had merit because the evidence showed that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory strikes on two black prospective jurors solely because of their race. We now review this determination by the court of appeal. As a threshold matter, we note that the State has argued before this Court, both in brief and oral argument, that the defendant's Batson challenge was untimely, coming after the jury had been empaneled, sworn, and sequestered. The record is unclear on this point, revealing only that the jury had been removed from the courtroom at the time the defendant's objection was lodged. This Court has previously stated that the proper time to lodge a Batson challenge is prior to the jury being empaneled and sworn, because prior to the swearing of the jury the trial judge can readily correct any constitutional deficiency which might have crept into the jury selection process. State v. Williams, 524 So.2d 746 (La.1988). However, it is unnecessary for us to remand this case to develop the record further since the State waived its right to complain by not objecting to the timeliness of defendant's Batson challenge. See Note 5, supra.
The basis of the defendant's Batson challenge was that the prosecution had utilized eleven (11) of its arsenal of twelve (12) peremptory strikes to strike black prospective jurors from the panel. The defendant, noting that the jury finally selected was composed of eight (8) white and four (4) black jurors, alleged that the prosecutor had intentionally struck these black prospective jurors based solely upon their race, perhaps fearing that these jurors would be more sympathetic to the defendant, who is also black. The defendant argued that this was exactly the sort of practice forbidden by the Supreme Court's reading of the equal protection clause in Batson: Just as the Equal Protection Clause forbids the States to exclude black persons from the venire on the assumption that blacks as a group are unqualified to serve as jurors, so it forbids the States to strike black veniremen on the assumption that they will be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is black. The core guarantee of equal protection, ensuring citizens that their State will not discriminate on account of race, would be meaningless were we to approve the exclusion of jurors on the basis of such assumptions, which arise solely from the juror's race. Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 ( citation omitted ). In response to the defendant's challenge, the trial court immediately asked the prosecutor to explain his reasons for striking the eleven (11) black prospective jurors. The prosecutor, after taking a moment to consult his notes, proffered reasons to the trial judge for his exercise of peremptory strikes. The trial judge found those explanations acceptable race-neutral reasons for striking the black prospective jurors, that the exercise of the peremptory strikes by the prosecutor were not racially motivated, and accordingly overruled the defendant's objection. The defendant raised the Batson issue in the court of appeal; however, he only challenged the reasons given by the prosecutor for the exercise of six (6) of his peremptory strikes. The court of appeal deferred to the trial court's ruling as to four (4) of the peremptory strikes, but found that the prosecutor had acted out of improper discriminatory motive in striking two of the black prospective jurors. Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the appellate court's ruling regarding the four (4) peremptory strikes which it found to have been properly exercised for the reasons stated in the court of appeal's decision. We now turn to an examination of the facts surrounding the voir dire of the two prospective jurors who were the focus of the court of appeal's judgment sustaining the defendant's Batson challenge, Lisa Devezin (Juror No. 110) and Alfred Price (Juror No. 273).
Lisa Devezin sat on the second panel of prospective jurors to be subjected to voir dire. When asked about whether she could consider voting for the imposition of the death penalty, Devezin stated I can consider it; however, she noted that facts sufficient to show first degree murder would not be enough and that she would want to hear about the background of the defendant before voting to impose death. Devezin also stated that she thought the death penalty was severe, but had the same response when asked about the severity of life imprisonment. These responses regarding the death penalty mirrored those of several other members of her panel. Later in the course of voir dire, Devezin admitted that Dr. Armond Devezin, who works with juvenile offenders in Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, was her husband's uncle. Devezin denied ever discussing Dr. Devezin's work with him. When asked about the prospect of rehabilitating convicted criminals, Devezin stated that rehabilitation was possible if they want to change. Alfred Price sat on the sixth and final panel of jurors to be subjected to voir dire. Price testified that he was currently employed as a facility maintenance manager for the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO). He also stated that he had not had occasion to work in the Magnolia Project [16] in the last 20 years. In the trial court, the prosecutor offered the following reasons for striking Devezin: As to Lisa Devezin, No. 110, we have that both her uncle, her husband's uncle, treats juveniles I think over at Juvenile Detention, and also that she thought or made a comment that she thought death was too severe. [17] The prosecutor also offered fairly detailed reasons to support his exercise of a peremptory strike on Price: And Alfred Price, No. 273, oh, yes, he is a HANO employee, and there is some there is some evidence about [the Magnolia Project]. While he said he had not been out that way, he was employed with HANO for about 23 years. And he also he voted in a case in this Court, in J Court, the jury voted on a police case of a lesser charge. We now review the court of appeal's conclusion that these responses, in the light of this record, are insufficient to resist a Batson challenge.
In Batson the Supreme Court adopted a three-step analysis to determine whether the constitutional rights of prospective jurors have been infringed by impermissible discriminatory practices: [18] First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. [19] Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) ( citations omitted ). For a Batson challenge to succeed, it is not enough that a racially discriminatory result be evidenced; rather, that result must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose. Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S.Ct. at 1721, quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2048, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). Thus, the sole focus of the Batson inquiry is upon the intent of the prosecutor at the time he exercised his peremptory strikes.
The first step in this process places a burden of production or of going forward on the defendant. If the defendant is unable to make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination, then the Batson challenge fails and it is not necessary for the prosecutor to articulate race-neutral explanations for his strikes. The defendant may offer any facts relevant to the question of the prosecutor's discriminatory intent to satisfy this burden. Such facts include, but are not limited to, a pattern of strikes by a prosecutor against members of a suspect class, statements or actions of the prosecutor which support an inference that the exercise of peremptory strikes was motivated by impermissible considerations, the composition of the venire and of the jury finally empaneled, and any other disparate impact upon the suspect class which is alleged to be the victim of purposeful discrimination. [20] See State v. Collier, 553 So.2d 815 (La.1989); State v. Thompson, 516 So.2d 349 (La.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 180, 102 L.Ed.2d 149 (1988), re'hg denied, 488 U.S. 976, 109 S.Ct. 517, 102 L.Ed.2d 551 (1988). Regarding this first step of the Batson analysis, the trial court below did not expressly rule on whether the defendant had made out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination; rather, he immediately moved to the second step and ordered the prosecutor to justify his use of peremptory strikes against black prospective jurors with race-neutral reasons. The court of appeal found this to be a tacit finding by the trial court that the defense had met its burden of going forward, since there would have been no need for the prosecutor to explain his challenges if the trial judge had not found a prima facie case of discrimination. Green, supra, 634 So.2d at 509. We agree with the court of appeal that a trial judge's demand that a prosecutor justify his use of peremptory strikes is tantamount to a finding that the defense has produced enough evidence to support an inference of discriminatory purpose. In any case, [o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot. Hernandez, supra, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. at 1866.
Once the defendant has made out his prima facie case, the burden of production or going forward shifts to the prosecutor, who must offer a race-neutral explanation for his exercise of peremptory strikes. Given the nature of the Batson challenge in this case, the prosecutor was obligated to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. At this stage of the Batson analysis, the sole burden which falls upon the prosecutor is to articulate reasons for his challenges that are unrelated to race or other suspect classifications; [t]he second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. Purkett v. Elem, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). Such an explanation, while it need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause, [21] must do more than merely affirm the prosecutor's good faith in making individual selections. Id, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-1724. [22] Essentially, the burden on the prosecutor at this stage is to articulate reasons unrelated to impermissible classifications such as race for striking certain prospective jurors. Alternative classifications articulated by the prosecutor to justify his use of peremptory strikes cannot, however, be practically synonymous with the suspect classification allegedly being discriminated against; were we to permit such explanations to satisfy the prosecutor's burden, we would only be legitimating the practice of impermissible discrimination by proxy or pretext. See J.E.B., supra , ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1429 (gender simply may not serve as a proxy for bias). It must be remembered that in this, the second stage of the Batson analysis, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation; ... [u]nless discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral. Hernandez, supra, 500 U.S. at 363, 111 S.Ct. at 1866. The reasons given by the prosecutor for striking Devezin and Price are quoted supra. The stated reasons for striking Devezin were that her husband's uncle worked with juveniles and that she showed some weakness in her willingness to apply the death penalty. The stated reasons for striking Price were that he worked for HANO for over twenty (20) years and that he previously sat on a jury which voted on a police case of a lesser charge. Without belaboring the point we find that these reasons are facially race-neutral. They contain none of the cultural, geographic, or linguistic classifications which, due to the case with which such classifications may serve as a proxy for an impermissible classification, invite particularly exacting scrutiny. Compare Hernandez, supra, 500 U.S. at 357, 111 S.Ct. at 1868 (prosecutor's striking of Spanish-speaking jurors raised a plausible, though not a necessary, inference that language might be a pretext for what in fact were race-based peremptory challenges). In short, we conclude that none of the reasons articulated by the prosecutor, e.g. employment with a governmental agency, are readily associated with the suspect class which is alleged to be the object of the prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory strikes, i.e. prospective black jurors. For these reasons, we find that the State sustained its burden of articulating race-neutral reasons for the exercise of its peremptory strikes. Whether these reasons are substantial, and more importantly whether they are substantiated by the record, is a question to be determined in the third stage of the Batson analysis.
Once the prosecutor has satisfied the second stage of the Batson procedure, [t]he trial court ... then [has] the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. In reaching a decision the trial court should examine all of the evidence available; essentially, this involves a comparison of the arguments and facts in support thereof posited in the defendant's prima facie offering with the race-neutral reasons articulated by the prosecutor to determine whether the prosecutor engaged in purposeful discrimination. [23] This comparison must be made in light of the record; although reviewing courts owe the trial judge proper deference in assessing the credibility of in-court testimony, we have already stated in this opinion that simple assertions of good faith by the prosecutor are insufficient to counter a valid Batson challenge. See Collier, supra, 553 So.2d at 818. Before we proceed, however, we note that the court of appeal clearly erred in assigning the ultimate burden of persuasion on the question of the existence of purposeful discrimination to the State. In rendering its decision as to jurors Devezin and Price, the court of appeal stated that in both instances [t]he State did not rebut defendant's prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Green, supra, 634 So.2d at 511. Batson, however, made it clear that the burden which shifts to the State after the defendant has made a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination is a burden of production; it is the defendant, as [t]he party alleging that he has been the victim of intentional discrimination, [who] carries the ultimate burden of persuasion. Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 94 n. 18, 106 S.Ct. at 1722 n. 18. Accord, State v. Thompson, 516 So.2d 349, 354 (La.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 180, 102 L.Ed.2d 149 (1988); re'hg denied, 488 U.S. 976, 109 S.Ct. 517, 102 L.Ed.2d 551 (1988) (the ultimate burden of persuasion is on the defendant). The fact that a defendant has met his initial burden of making a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination does not mean that the defendant's arguments and evidence are sufficient to carry his ultimate burden of persuading the trial judge of the existence of such discriminatory intent; rather, a defendant's prima, facie showing only raises a necessary [24] inference of purposeful discrimination, an inference which the trial judge is free to accept or reject based upon the credibility of the State's proffered reasons and how those reasons play against the facts and circumstances surrounding the voir dire. Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 95, 106 S.Ct. at 1722. Thus, the proper inquiry in the final stage of the Batson analysis is not whether the State has disproved the existence of purposeful discrimination suggested by the defendant's prima facie case; rather, the question is whether the defendant's proof, when weighed against the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral reasons, is strong enough to persuade the trier-of-fact that such discriminatory intent is present. Any other approach violates the principle that the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. Purkett, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1770. With a proper understanding of the respective burdens in this case, we turn now to the specific reasons the court of appeal found that juror Devezin had been improperly struck from the panel. The prosecutor gave two reasons for striking Devezin, that her husband's uncle worked with juveniles and that she was weak on the death penalty. The court of appeal found these reasons insubstantial, noting that Devezin had denied her relative's work with juveniles would affect her as a juror and that her responses to queries about the death penalty do not indicate weakness. Although it is a close call, we agree with the court of appeal that the prosecutor's death-penalty related reason for striking Devezin, when viewed in the context of the record, was insubstantial. Devezin stated that she considered both the death penalty and life sentence to be severe, not too severe as the prosecutor recalled it. In addition, it is instructive that Devezin's responses to this line of questioning followed verbatim that of several jurors prior to her who were asked the same question, some of whom were removed and some of whom ended up on the jury. It may be that the prosecutor simply forgot what Devezin had actually said; this is, however, immaterial, since a mere assertion of prosecutorial good faith is insufficient in the context of a Batson challenge. We disagree with the court of appeal regarding the validity of the other reason the prosecutor gave for striking Devezin. The court of appeal relied upon Devezin's assertion that she had not spoken with Dr. Devezin about his work and that it would not affect her deliberations as a juror. However, the prosecutor in this case obviously perceived that this connection could consciously or unconsciously affect the juror's deliberations, a view perhaps supported in some part by Devezin's view of penal rehabilitation, and he was entitled to strike the juror on that ground alone. The trial judge, who was able to see and hear Devezin during voir dire, obviously felt that the prosecutor had a reasonable basis for making this call, and we find that the record, although scant, supports that determination. Juror Price was struck because of his employment with HANO, including his employment in the Magnolia Project over twenty (20) years before the time of trial, and a prior jury vote. The court of appeal found that the relationship of Price to the Magnolia Housing Project, and indeed the involvement of any Project residents with the case, was tangential. In addition, the court of appeal found that the statement about prior jury service is contradicted by the record. Green, supra, 634 So.2d at 511. Regarding the statement of prior jury service, while we disagree with the court of appeal's strong pronouncement that it is contradicted by the record, we do find that it is not supported by the record. There is nothing in the record demonstrating how the prosecutor became aware of Price's prior jury vote; the question was never asked of Price during voir dire, and the prosecutor never articulated or presented documentary evidence showing the basis of his knowledge of Price's vote. Although the State during oral argument was able to present a plausible, and possibly satisfactory, answer to our concerns, the statements of counsel during oral argument are not part of the official record which we review in this case. While we recognize that the defendant has the ultimate burden of persuasion in this case, we find that such an unsupported assertion, which has the appearance of being pulled out of thin air, is simply too insubstantial to resist the prima facie case offered by the defense. This leaves us with the second justification given by the prosecutor for striking Price, his employment with HANO and his relationship with the Magnolia Housing Project. The record refutes the court of appeal's conclusion that the evidence dealing with the Magnolia Project was tangential. See Note 16, supra. The recanted confession of Joseph Davis, a Magnolia resident, and the circumstances surrounding this confession took up much of the testimony at the first day of Green's trial. Davis's arrest and initial statement all occurred within the Magnolia Project's boundaries. Furthermore, Davis and several of his companions testified at trial and were identified in-court by other State witnesses. This testimony was presented by the State in an apparent attempt to defuse what the prosecutor anticipated would be the linchpin of the defense theory of the case, i.e. that another group of men had murdered Pamela Block. We find that evidence related to the Magnolia Housing Project and its residents comprised the vehicle by which Melvin Green sought to exculpate himself, and therefore cannot be considered tangential to the issue of his guilt. When the prosecutor's work-related reasons for excluding Price are viewed in light of the evidence the prosecutor legitimately (and correctly) anticipated would be discussed at trial, we find that the defendant's Batson challenge must fail. Melvin Green's trial offered the prospect of a great deal of evidence involving police activity in a housing project of just the sort Price had worked in and around for over twenty (20) years. In addition, Price's connections with the Magnolia Project, while dated, still offered the possibility that Price might be familiar with some of the personalities discussed in the case, and that this familiarity might in some way influence his deliberations in the jury room. Significant factors in our view are the long period of Price's employment, the specific on-site nature of his work (facility maintenance manager), and his former connection with the particular project involved in this case. While any of these factors alone would probably be insufficient to warrant the exercise of a peremptory strike, even in the face of the relatively weak showing made by the defendant in this case, together they support the trial court's determination that the prosecutor was not acting out of discriminatory motive when he exercised a peremptory challenge against Alfred Price.
For these reasons, we find that the court of appeal erred when it sustained the defendant's Batson challenge to the striking of jurors Devezin and Price. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he found that the prosecutor did not strike these prospective jurors because of their race.