Opinion ID: 3012591
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Griffin and Yates

Text: As we noted above, the prosecution has presented alternative theories of guilt to support each count in the _________________________________________________________________ required to do so.' The Court should exercise its discretion to order such a correction only if the error, `seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'  United States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734) (internal citations omitted). The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that plain error occurred. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. 16 indictment. Each count rests on two or more of the four main theories that the government presented: the Pennsylvania rate theory, the medical necessity theory, the destination theory, and the treatment theory. See supra at 9. When a criminal defendant appeals a conviction in which the prosecution presented more than one theory of guilt and the jury returned a general verdict, we apply the holding of Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991). Griffin restated the longstanding rule that if the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction on one alternative theory in a count but sufficient to convict on another alternative theory that was charged to the jury in the same count, then a reviewing court should assume that the jury convicted on the factually sufficient theory and should let the jury verdict stand. Id. at 49-50. However, under Griffin, if one of two or more alternative theories supporting a count of conviction is either (1) unconstitutional, or (2) legally invalid, then the reviewing court should vacate the jury verdict and remand for a new trial without the invalid or unconstitutional theory. Id. at 56 (citing Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-68 (1930) (reversing a conviction where one of the alternative guilt theories was unconstitutional), and Yates v. United States , 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957) (reversing a conviction where one of the possible grounds was legally invalid because it was time-barred)). The rationale for this distinction is that a jury is presumed to be able to distinguish factually sufficient evidence from factually insufficient evidence. That function is central to its role as fact finder. The jury is not presumed, however, to be able to distinguish accurate statements of law from inaccurate statements. Id. at 59; Tenner v. Gilmore, 184 F.3d 608, 611 (7th Cir. 1999). And Griffin made it clear that claims regarding the insufficiency of evidence do not fall into the categories of a legally invalid or an unconstitutional basis for conviction. The Court explained: In one sense legal error includes inadequacy of evidence -- namely, when the phrase is used as a term of art to designate those mistakes that it is the business of judges (in jury cases) and of appellate courts to identify and correct. In this sense legal error 17 occurs when a jury, properly instructed as to the law, convicts on the basis of evidence that no reasonable person could regard as sufficient. But in another sense -- a more natural and less artful sense -- the term legal error means a mistake about the law, as opposed to a mistake concerning the weight or the factual import of the evidence . . . . [W]e are using legal error in the latter sense. 502 U.S. at 58-59. The question of which side of Griffin's line the present challenge to the Pennsylvania rate theory falls -- whether it is a claim about the sufficiency of the evidence presented on this theory, or (as Syme contends) an argument that the theory is legally invalid (he does not argue that it is unconstitutional) -- is dispositive of Syme's challenge to the theory as a basis for conviction. If we find that the Pennsylvania rate theory was, at most, unsupported by the facts presented at trial, then we will let the challenged counts of conviction stand, because each one rests on at least one other fraud theory that Syme does not challenge. If we find that the Pennsylvania rate theory, as it was alleged in the indictment and charged to the jury, constituted an error of law, then we must reverse Syme's conviction on the counts in which the theory was alleged and remand these counts for a new trial. A theory upon which a criminal charge rests is legally invalid under Griffin if the indictment or the district court's jury instructions are based on an erroneous interpretation of law or contain a mistaken description of the law. This invalid legal theory exception to the longstanding rule that general verdicts will stand even if one of the possible grounds for conviction was unsupported by the evidence, comes from Griffin's attempt to rationalize Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), with the bulk of the Court's precedents. Prior to Yates, the only exception that the Court had applied to the rule of presuming that general verdicts rest on permissible grounds was that, whenany of the [grounds] in question [was] invalid under the Federal Constitution, the conviction cannot be upheld. Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 368. The Court applied this exception in many cases involving general-verdict convictions that may have rested on an unconstitutional ground. Griffin, 502 U.S. at 18 55 (listing cases). In Yates, the Court extended the exception to cover grounds that were not unconstitutional, but rather were legally invalid. Yates held that the statute of limitations had already run on the charge that the defendants had cause[d] to be organized units of the [Communist] Party. 354 U.S. at 302. Thisorganizing offense was one of two theories that were the basis for a conspiracy charge. Id. The question whether the statute of limitations had run turned on the meaning of the statutory term to organize. Id. at 303-304. The lower courts had construed the term to organize to connote[ ] a continuing process which goes on throughout the life of an organization, but the Supreme Court rejected this definition, finding that to organize meantto enter[ ] into the creation of a new organization Id. at 310. Because the Supreme Court held that the term organize referred to the initial establishment of the Communist Party, and it was undisputed that the three-year statute of limitations had run between the time the Communist Party was initially organized and when the defendants were indicted, it held that the organizing charge was timebarred. Because it was impossible to tell which ground the jury selected, either the organizing charge, or the alternative charge, the Court set aside the jury verdict and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 312. It did so, however, based on a finding that the lower courts had erred on a purely legal question, i.e., the construction of a statutory term. There does not appear to have been any dispute in Yates over the factual issue of when the Communist Party was initially organized. It was not as if the prosecution in that case simply failed to present sufficient evidence that the establishment of the Communist Party took place within three years prior to the indictment. If that were the case, then the jury would have been capable of determining that the facts were insufficient to show that the statute of limitations had not run and the Court would have presumed that the jury rested its general verdict on one of the factually supported grounds. However, because the lower court misinterpreted the meaning of the statutory term to organize, erroneously permitting theorganizing 19 charge to go to the jury, the jury was faced with a potential ground for conviction that was based on an invalid interpretation of the statute. Because the jury is not assumed to be able to distinguish between correct and incorrect legal interpretations, the Yates Court reversed the jury's general-verdict conviction. Griffin, in addition to referencing a claim that was time barred as an example of a legally inadequate ground for conviction, also cited the example of a theory of conviction that fails to come within the statutory definition of a crime. 502 U.S. at 59. Again, this situation presents a strictly legal question -- the interpretation of whether the scope of a statutory definition of a crime extends to acts alleged in an indictment.