Opinion ID: 167382
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Post-Release Condition

Text: 30 Mr. Teague argues that the district court erred in requiring, as a special condition of supervised release, that he not contact the court except through counsel. This condition, he urges, violates his constitutional right of access to the courts. We hold that he waived this right and cannot claim error on appeal. 31 At the sentencing hearing the prosecutor, Richard Watts, suggested that one of Mr. Teague's supervised-release conditions be that he have no contact with the United States Attorney's Office or the FBI, unless through a lawyer, and Mr. Teague's counsel, Steven Ryan, agreed: 32 MR. WATTS: Your Honor, Mr. Teague has written letters to various people. I'd ask that a condition be that he not write me or the U.S. Attorney's Office any correspondence, nor the FBI, unless it's through a lawyer. 33 THE COURT: Mr. Ryan? 34 MR. RYAN: Certainly. And I think that it's appropriate to include in the list, also, any courts, including this Court and the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. 35 R. Vol. VI at 21-22. At this point, Mr. Teague chimed in as well: 36 THE DEFENDANT: And, for the record, I never meant, in that letter that I wrote to you, any—I didn't intend for that to be threatening; that was not what I was going for at all. I think you know what letter I've been talking about. 37 THE COURT: Yes. There has been some correspondence from Mr. Teague to me, as well. While I didn't feel terribly threatened by it, I thought I was being fairly even tempered in just suggesting that wasn't a good way to start a letter to a judge, talking about threats to his family. You probably ought to limit your contact with people involved in this case or the legal system to that which is through your counsel— 38 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 39 THE COURT:—that would probably be best. And unless there's anything else? 40 R. Vol. VI at 22. The district court's judgment included the following special condition of supervision: No contact with the victims and no contact with agencies or the court unless through counsel. R. Vol. I Doc. 61 at 4. 41 Mr. Teague now argues that the restriction on contact with the court imposes a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary, and violates his constitutional right of access to the courts. Aplt. Br. at 22. Mr. Teague concedes that he did not object in the district court and urges us to review the condition under a plain-error standard. But not only did his counsel not object, he proposed the very limitation (indeed, a broader limitation) to which Mr. Teague now objects. As is clear from the sentencing transcript, Mr. Teague's counsel was the one who suggested that the originally proposed condition be expanded to include any courts. R. Vol. IV at 22. 42 We therefore consider whether under these circumstances Mr. Teague's claimed right was waived below. Whether a particular right is waivable; whether the defendant must participate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and whether the defendant's choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at stake. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770. 43 To begin the analysis, we must describe the right denied Mr. Teague. He is not totally deprived of all access to the courts. First, he may communicate through an attorney, which, even today, is the typical means of accessing the courts. Second, he is not forbidden from communicating with all courts. Although his attorney suggested restricting communications to any courts, including [the sentencing] Court and the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court, R. Vol. VI at 22, the conditions imposed stated only No contact with ... the court unless through counsel. R. Vol. I Doc. 61 at 4. The condition thus restricts communication only with the sentencing court. 44 We see no reason why this limited right cannot be waived. Nonwaivable rights are rare. The most basic rights of criminal defendants are ... subject to waiver. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936, 111 S.Ct. 2661, 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991). Accord United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201, 115 S.Ct. 797, 130 L.Ed.2d 697 (1995). Waivable constitutional rights include protection against double-jeopardy, Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 10, 107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987); the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); the right to jury trial, id.; the right to confront one's accusers, id.; and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). 45 When waiver has not been allowed, it has been because of the need to protect a public interest beyond that of the defendant or because of concern that undue, and unprovable, pressure may have been brought to bear on the defendant. In Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988), the Supreme Court held that, despite the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to counsel and the presumption in favor of counsel of choice, id. at 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692, a district court may reject a defendant's waiver of his counsel's conflict of interest, see id. at 162, 108 S.Ct. 1692. The Court explained: 46 Federal courts have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.... Not only the interest of a criminal defendant but the institutional interest in the rendition of just verdicts in criminal cases may be jeopardized by unregulated multiple representation. 47 Id. at 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692 (internal citations omitted). 48 Similarly, in explaining the nonwaivability of the right to a unanimous jury, which we have declared to be a right so fundamental that it may not be waived, United States v. Morris, 612 F.2d 483, 489 (10th Cir.1979), courts have pointed to the societal interest in a unanimous verdict. Then-Judge Kennedy wrote: 49 A rule which insists on unanimity furthers the deliberative process by requiring the minority view to be examined and, if possible, accepted or rejected by the entire jury.... Both the defendant and society can place special confidence in a unanimous verdict, and we are unwilling to surrender the values of that mode of fact-finding. 50 United States v. Lopez, 581 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir.1978). In addition, the Second Circuit has justified not permitting waiver because of its doubts about the bona fides of any such waiver: 51 Waiver of unanimity was prohibited [by Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(a)] in response to concern that a defendant would inevitably be under pressure to accede to the suggestion of a trial judge that he accept a non-unanimous verdict and the difficulty of ascertaining a defendant's true motivation under such circumstances. 52 United States v. Pachay, 711 F.2d 488, 493 (2d Cir.1983). Neither consideration would preclude waiver here. No special societal interest is offended by requiring a defendant to employ an attorney to communicate with the sentencing court; and there would be no particular reason to fear that waiver of the right to proceed pro se was improperly induced by the court. We have recognized waivers of the rights to appeal and collaterally attack a conviction and sentence (even when represented by counsel). See United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1318 (10th Cir.2004) (en banc) (appeal); United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir.2001) (collateral attack). And we have approved orders restricting court filings by those who have repeatedly abused the right of access to the courts. See Werner v. Utah, 32 F.3d 1446, 1448 (10th Cir.1994) (per curiam). In light of those precedents limiting the right at issue on this appeal, we are confident that the right can be waived. 53 There may be greater doubt regarding whether counsel could waive this right for Mr. Teague. But that question is not before us because Mr. Teague was present when his attorney suggested the condition and he immediately pitched in affirmatively, apologizing for his prior letter to the court and responding okay to the court's agreement with Mr. Teague's counsel. This constituted unambiguous approval of his counsel's suggestion. 54 Finally, there can be no question that Mr. Teague's waiver was voluntary and knowing. Although those elements of waiver would ordinarily be in doubt when a party is silent or is responding to a request from another party or the court, when a party invites an error by suggesting that the court take particular action, we can presume that the party has acted voluntarily and with full knowledge of the material consequences. Nothing before us suggests otherwise in this case. Perhaps if the court had imposed in full the condition suggested by Mr. Teague's counsel and had precluded him from even filing pro se pleadings in unrelated litigation, we may have doubted that Mr. Teague knew what he was agreeing to. But that is not what happened here. His statement immediately following his counsel's suggestion of the limitation clearly shows that he knew that he would not be permitted to send a personal communication to the court concerning this case. 55 We conclude that Mr. Teague waived the right of access to the courts denied by his conditions of release, and we will not review his challenge on appeal.