Opinion ID: 2182646
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Because it was just ...

Text: Defense counsel objected and, after the jury was removed, moved for a mistrial on the basis that the prosecutor's question infringed upon defendant's constitutional right to refrain from incriminating himself. In response, the prosecutor argued that the defendant took the stand, testified, gave numerous voluntary statements to the police officers concerning the fire and its possible origin, and, thus, that the state had the right to inquire why defendant never told police about the conversation with the waitress. The trial judge recessed until the following morning and instructed the attorneys to research the law and that he would make a ruling at that time. The following day the court determined that on the basis of the fact that defendant talked freely to the police there was no issue of silence in the case and denied defense counsel's motion for mistrial. [17] The prosecutor was permitted to resume questioning: Q. Mr. Cetlinski, during the course of the investigation of this fire at your bar, you talked to the police officers a number of times; isn't that correct? A. Yes. Q. Different officers at different times? A. Yes. Q. During any of the course [sic] of those conversations with those officers, did you ever mention to them this conversation you had with [the waitress]? A. No. Q. You didn't tell them about that at all? A. No. Q. Why didn't you tell them about that at all? A. I didn't  I forgot about it. The prosecutor never again raised the issue with the defendant or any other witness, or made reference during closing argument to defendant's failure to tell police of the conversation with his employee. [18] Defense counsel argued during closing argument that the prosecutor's question regarding the defendant's failure to tell police about the conversation was unfair because there was no claim that defendant failed to answer all of the questions during the investigation or that he ever lied to anyone. Further, defense counsel noted that even if the waitress' version of the conversation was correct she had all kind [sic] of motivation [to lie] including her fight with [the defendant's girl friend's] son.... At the conclusion of the four-day trial, the defendant was convicted by a jury of burning insured property, MCL 750.75; MSA 28.270. On March 7, 1985, the defendant was sentenced to five years probation, with the first year to be served in the Lenawee County Jail. On initial appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the cross-examination by the prosecutor regarding the defendant's pre-arrest failure to tell the investigating officer, at the scene immediately after he and [his companion] were awakened, about his prior conversation violated defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination under the rule of Bobo. [19] Although noting  Bobo had been appropriately limited and defined in recent decisions of this court ... in the light of subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the panel concluded nonetheless that Bobo required reversal. [20] After this Court held in Collier that impeachment with prearrest silence was not constitutionally precluded, Cetlinski was remanded to the Court of Appeals. On remand, the Court of Appeals again reversed on the basis of Bobo. It distinguished Collier on the ground that Collier was cross-examined regarding his failure to report to the police, prior to any contact with the police, a crime of which he had allegedly been the victim. The panel interpreted Collier only as limiting the Bobo holding to those situations where the state seeks to impeach a defendant with his silence maintained during contact with police officers. Here, the prosecutor impeached defendant regarding his failure to report a robbery to the police. There was no questioning or mention of defendant's silence at or after his contact with the police.  [Citing Collier, supra, p 31. Emphasis added.] Therefore, because defendant [Cetlinski] was in contact with the police, and the police were questioning him during their investigation, the panel concluded Collier did not require a different result in this case. Thus, the Court of Appeals, post- Collier, erroneously held that Bobo prevents impeachment of a testifying defendant with a prior inconsistent statement made voluntarily to the police prior to arrest and during general investigatory questioning.