Opinion ID: 2520215
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Proper Forum for an Appeal from the Decision of a Municipal Clerk

Text: ¶ 5 This proceeding may be divided into two parts for the purpose of analysis. The first is whether this proceeding should be in this Court. The second is the substantive issue of whether the proposed law is legislative or administrative in character. I first address the procedural problem. ¶ 6 This matter was filed as an appeal in this Court and converted to a request for extraordinary relief. Our previous order herein did not explain why this was done. We should now clarify for all municipalities across the State that protests of this nature are filed in the District Courts and not this Court. ¶ 7 In 1931 this Court reviewed an initiative petition to amend the charter of the City of Oklahoma City. Ruth v. Peshek, 1931 OK 674, 5 P.2d 108. Therein we followed an earlier opinion by this Court that also reviewed an initiative petition from the City of Oklahoma City. Id., 5 P.2d at 110, citing, Ruth v. Merrill, 1914 OK 564, 144 P. 371. Both of these opinions explain that State procedural law and not a municipal charter provision is the proper authority for initiative petition protests. In short, a municipality lacks the authority to select whether the Supreme Court or a District Court will have jurisdiction over initiative petition appeals from the clerk of that municipality. In Ruth v. Peshek, supra , we said that: The city charter of Oklahoma City does not provide a method of appeal in such cases as the case at bar, and, even if it did, the state law providing procedure in such cases and fixing the jurisdiction thereof on appeal would be controlling. This court in the case of Ruth et al. v. Merrill, 43 Okl. 764, at page 765 and 766, 144 P. 371 of the Oklahoma Report (43 Okla. 764, 144 P. 371), said: But let that be as it may, the district court was without jurisdiction to pass on the sufficiency of the petition, and for that reason did not err in dismissing the appeal. In support of the contention that the court was vested with jurisdiction to entertain said appeal, petitioner says that, although the act of March 17, 1910 (Laws 1910, c. 66), in effect repealed that part of section 6 of the act approved April 16, 1908 (Laws 1907-08, c. 44, art. 1), which vested the district court with jurisdiction to entertain appeals from the action of the city clerk in all cases where the initiative or referendum is invoked upon matters of purely municipal concern, yet he says that, as said section was incorporated in the city charter, adopted March 8, 1911, the effect of the adoption was to vest the district court with jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. There is no merit in this contention, for the reason that the jurisdiction of the courts of this state is fixed by the lawmaking power of the state and not by the lawmaking power of any municipality therein. It goes without saying that when the Legislature authorized the people of this municipality to adopt a charter and legislate therein upon matters of purely local and municipal concern, it did not intend to, and could not, vest the municipality with power to legislate with respect to state government. Ruth v. Peshek, 5 P.2d at 110, quoting, Ruth v. Merrill, at 371-372. (emphasis added). The former statutes allowed for an appeal to the Supreme Court, but they were repealed and replaced with statutes providing for an appeal to a District Court. See Fite v. Lacey, 1984 OK 83, 691 P.2d 901, 903-904, and the discussion of both the repealed statutes and 11 O.S.1981 § 15-104 providing for an appeal to District Court. ¶ 8 In Fite we said that: Title 34, would therefore, determine the procedure for municipal initiative and referendum petitions unless the city charter contained a controlling provision, or if not, unless 11 O.S. §§ 15-101 through 15-110 contained a specific provision. The Muskogee city charter contains a single section which provides only that the procedure shall be in conformance with the Constitution and state laws. A specific procedure for filing a protest to the petition or the count of signatures is found in 11 O.S. § 15-104B, quoted above. Fite, 691 P.2d at 904, (emphasis added). We did say that a city charter provision would control over Title 34, but such was not the case in Fite, and we did not explain our previous cases such as Ruth v. Peshek, supra , and Ruth v. Merrill, supra, that clearly hold otherwise. A conflict exists between a state enactment and a municipal charter or ordinance when both contain either express or implied provisions that are inconsistent or irreconcilable with one another. Simpson v. Dixon, 1993 OK 71, 853 P.2d 176, 182. Oklahoma's City's charter provision allowing for an appeal directly to the Supreme Court conflicts with the language in § 15-104 stating that a protest is filed in, and heard by, a District Court. 11 O.S.2001 § 15-104. [1] In this case the statute trumps the charter. ¶ 9 In Ryan v. Roach Drug Co., 1925 OK 611, 239 P. 912, 915, we said that: We therefore conclude that the subjects of taxation, the jurisdiction of the courts, and the regulation of the practice and procedure of the courts of this state are matters of general public concern in which the sovereign, the state, has an interest, and that these subjects are subject to control and regulation by the state by general laws. Ryan v. Roach Drug Co., 239 P. at 915, quoting, City of Sapulpa v. Land, 1924 OK 92, 223 P. 640, (emphasis added). In City of Sapulpa we said: The judicial power here conferred by the Constitution is the power to hear and determine those matters which affect the life, liberty, or property of the citizens of the state as distinguished from ministerial power or authority, and the judicial power vested in the courts to determine such controversy must find the source of its authority in the supreme sovereign, which is the state. The Constitution of this state confides the judicial power to no court except those organized under the sanction and regulation of state law. This power cannot be delegated to cities, and such municipalities cannot confer any jurisdiction upon such courts in any class of cases. City of Sapulpa v. Land, 223 P. at 644-645, emphasis added. To put it simply, a municipality has no power to vest power in state courts to hear certain controversies. This conclusion is consistent with our recent opinion explaining that 11 O.S. § 15-104 is the exclusive procedure for testing the sufficiency of a recall petition. Clapsaddle v. Blevins, 1998 OK 5, ¶ 14, 66 P.3d 352, 357. Further, we have said that a city charter must give way to a matter of statewide interest. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 165 v. City of Choctaw, 1996 OK 78, 933 P.2d 261, 266. See Matter of Referendum Petition Filed with City Clerk of Norman on January 31, 1980, 1980 OK 61, 610 P.2d 243, 245, citing, Merrill, Constitutional Home Rule for Cities Oklahoma Version, 5 Okla.L.Rev. 139, 169 (1952), (annexation is a wider public interest so as to require provisions of the charter of a Home Rule city to yield to state law). The power to vest jurisdiction in state courts is a state interest. Ryan v. Roach Drug Co., supra , City of Sapulpa v. Land, supra . The District Court is the proper forum to hear an appeal from the decision of a municipal clerk, 11 O.S.2001 § 15-104, unless a petitioner can show that this Court should exercise a concurrent original jurisdiction.