Opinion ID: 204775
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Adequacy of the SEA

Text: In addition to seeking a closed hearing, SLOMFP challenges the SEA's adequacy under NEPA. The essence of its argument is that the NRC should have considered a group of credible attacks which could result in severe impacts and in fact required preparation of an EIS, and that the Commission failed to do so by improperly selecting terrorist attack scenarios and refusing to consider a scenario presented by SLOMFP. These arguments derive from Contentions 2, 3, and 6 from the proceedings below, and we will organize our discussion accordingly. We review the NRC's decision to reject a contention for abuse of discretion, see Limerick Ecology, 869 F.2d at 749-50, and its decision not to prepare an EIS can be set aside only upon a showing that it was `arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.' Dep't of Transp'n v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 763, 124 S.Ct. 2204, 159 L.Ed.2d 60 (2004) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). We examine the EA with two purposes in mind: to determine whether it has adequately considered and elaborated the possible consequences of the proposed agency action when concluding that it will have no significant impact on the environment, and whether its determination that no EIS is required is a reasonable conclusion. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1215 (9th Cir.2008).
As part of Contention 2, SLOMFP alleges that the NRC screened out attacks that would not cause early fatalities, thereby excluding scenarios that would cause land degradation or non-fatal illness. [6] In the proceedings, the Commission rejected Contention 2's screening argument and admitted petitioner's concerns about land degradation and non-fatal illness. See CLI-08-1 at 17-18. [7] SLOMFP's early fatalities screening argument is not persuasive. That the SEA only provided one indicator of adverse outcomes does not establish, as SLOMFP posits, that the Staff screened out attacks that would not cause immediate fatalities. As the NRC explained, the SEA mentions early fatalities only in the context of the consideration of the need for additional security measures and . . . goes on to provide dose estimates and other findings in support of its determination. CLI-08-1 at 18. [8] Indeed, the SEA expressly states that the NRC screened plausible threat scenarios on the basis of information from law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Staff confirmed this at oral argument, assuring the Commission that credibility of attacks, not early fatalities, was the screening criterion. The Commission did not abuse its discretion when it rejected petitioner's argument that the EA improperly screened its analysis using an early fatalities criterion.
In challenging NRC's refusal to admit Contention 3, SLOMFP makes two unsuccessful argumentsthat the NRC (1) made an unlawful threshold determination that any attack on the Diablo Canyon ISFSI is remote and speculative, and (2) improperly failed to address Contention 3 evidence about the possibility of a catastrophic zirconium fire. SLOMFP's claim that the NRC made an unlawful threshold determination misstates the record. Petitioner urges us to read the Commission's initial order as announcing that any attacks on Diablo Canyon are remote and speculative. But in the language SLOMFP quotes, the Commission merely reiterated its position outside of this proceeding (i.e. in other circuits) that NEPA does not require analysis of terrorist threats. See, e.g., CLI-07-11 at 149 n. 5; see, e.g., N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132 (3d Cir.2009). As for the NRC's statements about the impracticab[ility] of adjudicating alternate terrorist scenarios, they indeed resemble the Commission's arguments in Mothers for Peace. This time, though, the NRC performed an analysis in which it made factual determinations as to plausible attack scenarios and their consequences. We also disagree with SLOMFP's suggestion that the NRC had no reasoned basis for rejecting petitioner's attack scenario and otherwise failed to address it in the proceedings. In petitioner's scenario, an attacker ignites a fire in a spent fuel canister, causing the fuel and its cladding to burn as well as the release of radioactive material, resulting in widespread environmental contamination. SLOMFP inferred that the NRC failed to consider this credible scenario because the SEA's dose estimates were so small. The Commission rejected Contention 3 because it was impracticable to adjudicate the range of alternate scenarios and because hearings would require substantial disclosure of classified and safeguards information. CLI-08-1 at 20. While we question the NRC's impracticability argument, given its procedures for winnowing admitted contentions, its decision not to litigate Contention 3 on Weinberger grounds was reasonable. That decision did not absolve the Commission of its duty to consider SLOMFP's evidence, as we have emphasized, but the record shows that the agency did so. Despite its conclusion that the scenarios could not be discussed in a public hearing, the NRC Staff was familiar with the zirconium fire scenarios and assured the Commission that they did not alter the FONSI finding. Accordingly, the Commission did not abuse its discretion in resolving Contention 3.
Similar to its early fatalities argument in Contention 2, SLOMFP's petition for review maintains that the NRC screened out credible attacks by relying on the Ease indicator as a proxy for the probability of a threat scenario. SLOMFP raised this point in late-filed Contention 6, which the NRC rejected because SLOMFP failed to show good cause and otherwise failed a weighing of the remaining factors under the Commission's late-filed criteria. See CLI-08-8 at 200-202. Because SLOMFP fails to challenge that finding, we conclude that the NRC acted within its discretion in declining to admit late-filed Contention 6.