Opinion ID: 1430387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: propriety of entering final judgment

Text: Adkins first contends that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to grant final judgment to Nabors rather than waiting for the entire matter to be consolidated in a single appeal. Civil Rule 54(b) [6] gives discretion to a trial judge to grant final judgment to one party or claim so that an immediate appeal may be taken. The rule seeks to accommodate the competing interests of not forcing a party to wait until a court reaches a final judgment as to all claims or parties with the equally desirable policy of avoiding duplicitous and piecemeal appeals. Panichella v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 252 F.2d 452, 454 (3d Cir.1958). In Johnson v. State, 577 P.2d 706 (Alaska 1978), this court considered some of the factors that might be relevant in determining whether final judgment would be appropriate under Rule 54(b). We noted that findings similar to those governing interlocutory appeals under Appellate Rules 23 and 24 should be made. Id. at 710. Specifically, we considered that later proceedings might make a present appeal moot. We noted there might be a close relationship between several claims or parties so that a more complete factual record would be developed to aid in deciding an appeal later. Additionally, we considered whether a present appeal would simplify or shorten later proceedings. Id. at 711. [7] Adkins seems to suggest that the present appeal against Nabors may be mooted because he might be able to collect his entire judgment from the original defendant, Standard Oil. However, the mootness issue presented here is considerably different from the issue presented in Johnson. Unlike Johnson, there is no relationship here between Adkins' present claim, that the statute of limitations was tolled in his action against Nabors, and his claim against Standard. Nothing that happens at trial will moot this issue. At the close of trial, Adkins may still wish to appeal his claim against Nabors. Adkins also argues that more evidence will be developed in his case against Standard that will permit the court to determine the statutory standard of mental illness in the light of a complete record. Although Johnson involved a question of statutory interpretation, it was clear there that the statute would remain an issue in the case among the other parties after the appeal. Here, the proper interpretation of the tolling statute has nothing to do with Adkins' case against Standard. Thus, any factual record developed would be outside the scope of the statute and would not aid in its interpretation. Nabors argues that resolution of the issue now would simplify and shorten later proceedings. It points out that if the present action goes forward against Standard alone, it may at some point be necessary to conduct a second trial solely for the benefit of Nabors. It urges that the issue be resolved now to save the expense of multiple trials and appeals. Despite the somewhat restrictive test for determining when final judgment should be issued, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by granting a final judgment in this case.