Opinion ID: 2794578
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: Overman's conviction for possession of red phosphorous and iodine with intent to manufacture a controlled substance was governed by K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-7006(a), which provided: (a) It shall be unlawful for any person to possess ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, red phosphorous, lithium metal, sodium metal, iodine, anhydrous ammonia, pressurized ammonia or phenylpropanolamine, or their salts, isomers or salts of isomers with intent to use the product to manufacture a controlled substance. (Emphasis added.) Possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture is proscribed in a different statute, K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4152(a)(3), which reads in relevant part: (a) No person shall use or possess with intent to use: . . . (3) any drug paraphernalia to . . . manufacture . . . a controlled substance in violation of the uniform controlled substances act. In turn, drug paraphernalia is defined as all equipment and materials of any kind which are used . . . in . . . manufacturing . . . a controlled substance and in violation of the uniform controlled substances act. K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4150(c). Schoonover is our recent seminal case on double jeopardy/multiplicity claims. After a comprehensive review of federal and Kansas analyses, Schoonover announced the following analytical framework: In considering a double jeopardy issue, the overarching inquiry is whether the convictions are for the same offense. There are two components to this inquiry, both of which must be met for there to be a double jeopardy violation: (1) Do the convictions arise from the same conduct? and (2) By statutory definition are there two offenses or only one? 281 Kan. at 496. 13 Here, in applying the first component of the inquiry, the Court of Appeals opined that [i]t is undisputed that Overman was convicted based on one methamphetamine manufacturing event. Overman, 2012 WL 6634362, at . Accordingly, the panel turned to the second inquiry, under which the test to be applied depends on whether the convictions arose from one or two statutes. If the double jeopardy issue arises from convictions for multiple violations of a single statute, the unit of prosecution test is applied. If the double jeopardy issue arises from multiple convictions of different statutes, in other words if it is a multiple-description issue, the strict-elements test is applied. State v. Appleby, 289 Kan. 1017, 1027, 221 P.3d 525 (2009) (citing Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 497). Overman's petition for review concedes that Schoonover's same elements test (sometimes referred to as the strict-elements test) applies in his case because the two convictions he claims are multiplicitous arose from alleged violations of two different statutes: K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-7006 and K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4152(a). Moreover, he cites to Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 467, as support for his statement that [t]he same elements test asks whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other. If not, then they are the same offense, and double jeopardy bars multiple punishment. But then, inexplicably, he declares that we must reach a result directly opposite of the result we reached in Schoonover, based solely upon an argument that Schoonover specifically rejected, i.e., the K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-7006 product(s) possessed by the defendant also fit the definition of drug paraphernalia under K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4152(a)(3). Schoonover involved an elements comparison of the same statutes as this case, K.S.A. 65-7006(a) and K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(3). The only difference in the two cases is the particular products that the respective defendant was alleged to have possessed; Schoonover was charged with possessing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, whereas 14 Overman was charged with possessing red phosphorous and iodine. All of those products are part of the proscribed list in K.S.A. 65-7006(a), and the factual distinction of a different listed product has no bearing on our legal analysis of the statutes' comparative elements. The Schoonover defendant argued that possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine under K.S.A. 65-7006 and possession of drug paraphernalia under K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(3) were multiplicitous because, by statutory definition, the single act of possessing ephedrine/pseudoephedrine constituted both crimes, i.e., he was being punished twice for the single offense of possessing ephedrine/pseudoephedrine. Overman makes the same argument with respect to his possession of red phosphorous and iodine, i.e., the statutory definition of drug paraphernalia results in his being punished twice for the single offense of possessing red phosphorous and iodine. Indeed, as the Court of Appeals observed, the instructions given to Overman's jury could have resulted in his being convicted of two different offenses . . . based on his possession of red phosphorous and iodine. Overman, 2012 WL 6634362, at . But Schoonover rejected that argument, characterized the relationship between K.S.A. 65-7006 and K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(3) as 'overlapping rather than identical,' and opined that simply because the statutes overlap, there is not necessarily a double jeopardy violation. 281 Kan. at 503-04. The Schoonover court relied upon the rationale that K.S.A. 65-7006 requires proof of possession of ephedrine/pseudoephedrine whereas K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(3) does not, but rather K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(3) . . . applies to possession of other paraphernalia as well. 281 Kan. at 503 (discussing and quoting from State v. Cherry, 279 Kan. 535, 541, 112 P.3d 224 [2005]). In short, Schoonover established the point of law that the elements of K.S.A. 65-7006 and K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(3) are not identical. 15 Although Overman does not explicitly ask us to overrule the ultimate holding in Schoonover, that is what we would have to do to accept his argument on this issue. See Crist v. Hunan Palace, Inc., 277 Kan. 706, 715, 89 P.3d 573 (2004) (quoting Samsel v. Wheeler Transport Services, Inc., 246 Kan. 336, 356, 789 P.2d 541 [1990], overruled on other grounds Bair v. Peck, 248 Kan. 824, 844, 811 P.2d 1176 [1991]) (doctrine of stare decisis provides that 'once a point of law has been established by a court, that point of law will generally be followed by the same court and all courts of lower rank in subsequent cases where the same legal issue is raised'). Granted, subsequently, in State v. Thompson, 287 Kan. 238, 259, 200 P.3d 22 (2009), we clarified that when overlapping statutory provisions have identical elements, the rule of lenity will usually mean the legislature intended only one punishment. Nevertheless, when there is a clear expression of legislative intent to provide multiple punishments for the same conduct, double jeopardy is not violated even if overlapping provisions have identical elements. 287 Kan. at 259 (discussing Schoonover). Schoonover found such a clear expression of legislative intent in the context of K.S.A. 65-7006(a) and K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(3), the statutes at issue in Overman's challenge. 281 Kan. at 501-04. Consequently, we affirm the Court of Appeals' holding that Overman's convictions for both possession of red phosphorous and iodine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine were not multiplicitous as a violation of double jeopardy, based upon this court's precedent in Schoonover. APPRENDI CHALLENGE TO SENTENCE Finally, Overman argues that his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated because the State did not include his prior convictions in the charging document nor did it prove those convictions to the jury beyond a reasonable 16 doubt. Overman contends that such a process is required by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). But he acknowledges that this court has specifically rejected his argument, holding in State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 41 P.3d 781 (2002), that Apprendi does not require the jury to find the fact of a prior conviction. Moreover, we have repeatedly confirmed Ivory's holding. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 294 Kan. 171, 185, 273 P.3d 718 (2012). The imposition of the enhanced sentence was not unconstitutional. Affirmed.